Resilience building and innovation

Transcription

Institute for Social Science Research
Review of UNDP/RBAS
Sub-Regional Response Facility - Syria crisis
Review of UNDP/RBAS
Sarah Dix and Jodie Curth-Bibb
Authors
Sarah Dix
Jodie Curth-Bibb
Acknowledgements
The authors highly appreciate the contributions of the interviewees, as
well as the participants of the ISSR research methods informal seminar
organized by Dr. Bernard Baffour.
Prepared for
UNDP/RBAS
Prepared by
The University of Queensland
Level 4, General Purpose North 3 (Building 39A)
St Lucia Queensland 4072
Australia
Phone +61 7 3346 7471
Email [email protected]
Date prepared
17 April 2015
ISSR Project number
ISSR021000
Review of UNDP/RBAS
CONTENTS
Executive Summary
1
1
Background
5
1.1 Purpose of the Review
5
1.2 Review Approach
5
1.3 Sub-Regional Context
6
Overview of the Facility
8
2.1 Impetus for the Facility
8
2.2 Purpose of the Facility
9
2
3
4
5
6
Achievements
11
3.1 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)
11
3.2 Thought leadership and advocacy for resilience
15
3.3 Knowledge management and innovation
19
3.4 Information Management and Analysis System
20
Challenges
25
4.1 Political
25
4.2 Accountability and 3RP impact measurement
26
4.3 Conceptual
28
29
4.5 Funding and other challenges
29
Lessons learned
30
5.1 Resilience is a best practice
30
5.2 Accountability and M&E framework is critical
32
5.3 Contextualizing the approach is essential
32
5.4 Ad-hoc response requires widely understood ToR
33
5.5 UNDG an effective operational mechanism for coordination
34
Review recommendations
35
ANNEX 1: List of documents reviewed
40
ANNEX 2: Communications, outreach and advocacy tools
43
ANNEX 3: UNHCR-UNDP Joint Secretariat Publications (2015)
46
ANNEX 4: List of interviewees
47
ANNEX 5: Review questions
50
ANNEX 6: Facility’s responsibilities as outlined in concept note
51
ANNEX 7: Facility’s responsibilities as outlined in Review ToR
52
ANNEX 8: Examples of an integrated response across sectors (3RP)
53
ANNEX 9: Top donors and pledges for resilience (3RP)
54
ANNEX 10: UNDP Syria-related funding, 2013, 2104 and 201
55
FOOTNOTES
56
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Five years into the Syria Crisis, it is frequently referred to as the worst humanitarian crisis since
World War II. The conflict is reversing Syria’s development progress as well as that of the neighboring
refugee-hosting countries. Government infrastructure and mechanisms in host countries are now
under threat, with public systems increasingly showing signs of significant stress. The protracted
nature of the situation, and its complexity, combining both humanitarian and development challenges,
called for new aid responses and coordination mechanisms.1
On this basis, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) established the Regional Bureau for
Arab States (RBAS) Sub-Regional Response Facility. The Facility prioritized a ‘resilience’ approach,
to improve sub-regional coordination, enhance cost-effectiveness, and position the organization at
the forefront of a multi-country response.2 The purpose of this Review was to reflect upon the first 18
months of operation of the Facility, to account for its place in responding to the Syria-related crisis,
and to inform the scope and nature of the Facility’s role as part of the UNDP’s subsequent response
efforts in the sub-region.
Key Findings
Achievements
The Facility is widely credited for being instrumental in bringing about the achievement of 3RP,
the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 – In Response to the Syria Crisis. 3RP
represents a major shift in the aid architecture for the Syria crisis in that it recognizes that it is not
just a humanitarian crisis but also a significant challenge to socioeconomic development, and thus
a development concern. At the Third International Humanitarian Pledging Conference in Kuwait in
March 2015, member states, the UN Secretary General and donors made significant references
to the importance of a resilience response, with $846m pledges received for 66% of the resilience
component, a strong result for 3RP/SRF.
Through the Facility, the UNDP has influenced a paradigm shift from what was once solely a
humanitarian approach to crisis, to a resilience-based one with a humanitarian and development
outlook. While resilience is by no means the sole purview of the Facility, interview respondents
acknowledged the significant role the Facility has played in realizing the prominence of resilience
thinking in the region and in working to consolidate this concept both in theory and practice. The
Facility has been instrumental in advocating for the resilience concept, developing policies and
planning frameworks/instruments for this approach, and bringing on board and working with critical
stakeholders, including donors and implementing partners.
Moreover, the Facility effectively advocated for the centrality of national plans, as evidenced by the
participation of national governments in 3RP. Further, interview respondents widely acknowledged
that the 3RP regional process, as well as the dialogue leading up to it, was highly inclusive. Many
stakeholders confirmed that they were regularly consulted and that often this approach was
collaborative and their views were clearly taken on board.
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The Facility has been active in producing evidence and knowledge products on resilience, effectively
using such products for influencing policy decisions and contributing to policy development. For
example its novel ‘Stress Index’ captures the extent to which existing systems and communities are
vulnerable. This and other knowledge products/publications can be traced to tangible developments
and changes in policy and practice.
One of the Facility’s most innovative and impressive achievements has been the development of
an integrated toolkit that offers users access to development as well as humanitarian information.
This Information Management and Analysis System (IMAS) responds to donor aid coordination
needs as well as government, UN and partner data needs, particularly for resilience and stabilization
programming. It is being developed in Lebanon and Jordan.
Challenges
A major challenge has been the gap between the enormity of the crisis and the needs of refugees,
host communities and governments, on the one hand, and the availability of donor and government
resources, on the other. Not coincidentally, interviewees with field experience and their local
informants report that tensions are high in countries with high concentration of refugees where the
competition for resources, jobs, housing, and water, is reaching a critical point.
Governments in the sub-region face competing national priorities. Governments are faced with
serious threats to social cohesion, security threats and political obstacles as well as competition
for increasingly scarce resources. Consequently national governments take differing positions on
servicing refugees and approaches to resilience. They are also differently inclined to work with
particular intervening organizations such as INGOs.
There is an obvious need to support the resilience of refugees, and the delivery of resilience support
to host governments and communities would invariably include the support of services which
refugees access and rely upon. However, there is a political problem here in that governments have
differing views and challenges in relation to accepting a long-term presence of refugees in host
communities.
Donors have their own political and policy logics for making decisions on who, what, and where to
commit funds to, and these logics may or may not neatly align with 3RP. Donor decisions are also
subject to change in response to competing demands including responding to crisis in other parts of
the world, or responding to changing domestic or member country political imperatives. They also
require evidence of the impact of their investments.
As put forward in the Berlin Communiqué, for the international community, the UNDG, UNDP and
the Facility in particular, resilience inside Syria constitutes the next step. The challenge of building
resilience in Syria raises many questions such as: resilience for what, for whom, and even with whom
– government, local authorities, rebel groups?
As a facilitator of processes and outcomes, rather than a direct implementer, the Facility is in a
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delicate position. It has to claim a significant contribution towards achieving outcomes to demonstrate
meeting its mandate. At the same time, the Facility must acknowledge the centrality of other actors
in these successes, and coordinate closely with them, both to reflect reality and to ensure ongoing
productive collaborative relationships.
Lessons Learned
A consensus has emerged through the 3RP process that early on in the response to a complex,
multidimensional crisis, there has to be a resilience approach. As a concept, resilience has been
highly successful in bringing together humanitarian and development actors. The timing was right,
in that the crisis was protracted, and donors were calling for solutions to ensure refugees would
not depend on aid indefinitely. Governments, too, required support for not only refugees but host
communities, and strengthening of government systems to cope with increasing pressures.
The Information Management Analysis System (IMAS) tools being rolled out in Lebanon, and
now being tailored to Jordan, have great potential in addressing the aid effectiveness agenda that
concerns most donors, and could become a best practice. There is a need for a hybrid (development/
humanitarian) accountability framework which is capable of robust M&E and impact measurement
in a crisis situation. To be suited to a crisis situation, it needs to be flexible, responsive, and provide
data and a platform for analysis in ‘real time.’ The IMAS tools would appear to be well placed to
respond to this demand.
The importance of accountability and M&E cannot be stressed enough. From the perspective of
donors, the single most important concern beyond political or strategic interests was getting value
for money, and evidence to assure them that their investments would make a visible impact in the
target countries. While the Facility has been on the front foot in moving forward on an integrated
3RP measurement framework (and all previous investments have had accountability mechanisms
in place), it is nonetheless a lesson for the future that such an integrated accountability and M&E
framework needs to be embedded from the start.
Recommendations
From the outset, the Facility needs to agree on its priorities for 2015 with RBAS and other
stakeholders, and resource them accordingly. More than ever the Facility needs secured financing,
at least for its key personnel. If for no other reason, its sub-regional coordination role demands this.
All reports indicate that refugees and IDPs will be an enduring presence in the sub-region for the
next ten years. Just when the other major partners are planning long term strategies, it is all the
more striking that UNDP has yet to commit significant financial resources to the Facility in the coming
year, commensurate with its mandate and stakeholder expectations. With this in mind, the review
recommends the following:
1. Syria is central to the crisis, so the Facility should put Syria at the center. The Facility is the
most well positioned UNDP mechanism in the sub-region to engage in a forward–looking strategic
planning process, paving the way for recovery with a view towards an eventual return. Acknowledge
Syria’s centrality and integrate it in the resilience discussion.
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2. Support generation and uptake of local, regional and global knowledge innovation on
resilience. The Facility should challenge UNDP and others to think about what the sub-region will be
going through in the next ten years. And what does a (partial) return look like?
3. Prioritize 3RP and SRP resource mobilization, in close coordination with RCs, COs and
RBAS. A top priority is for the Facility to mobilize resources internationally for 3RP to support the
whole resilience/development community, R-UNDG, the RC system, and COs
4. Invest in reaching IMAS potential through concerted stakeholder negotiation/political effort.
The Information Management and Information System (IMAS) should be a flagship initiative for
UNDP in the sub-region. The expansion of IMAS is a challenging but essential goal.
5. Develop an M&E / impact framework for 3RP that is a hybrid between humanitarian and
development approaches. As custodian of 3RP, UNDP along with UNHCR is obliged to account for
what is being funded, and provide evidence to for better targeting.
6. Respond to CO requests for guidance on how to operationalize resilience and bring it to
life. Through the provision of both sub-regional knowledge tools and country-specific support and
tailored advice, the Facility should support the operationalization of resilience.
7. Match human resources and capacity to meet identified knowledge management needs.
The Facility could do more to meet KM and Innovation needs, responding to needs on the ground,
informing implementation, and keeping the Facility on the map.
8. Translate the sub-regional resilience approach to other contexts. The sub-regional resilience
approach should be shared widely for adaptation and adoption in other contexts in the Arab States
/ Middle East / North Africa region and internationally. In the region, UNDP could look to apply the
resilience approach to Yemen and Libya.
9. Explicitly link the resilience agenda to security. There needs to be better engagement with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations (UNSG)’s Special Envoy, the UN Department of Political
Affairs (DPA) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to engage Syria on
different terms.
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1 BACKGROUND
1.1 Purpose of the Review
The purpose of the Review was to reflect upon the first year of operation of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) Sub-Regional Response
Facility, to account for its place in responding to the Syria crisis, and to inform the scope and nature
of the Facility’s role as part of the UNDP’s subsequent response efforts in the sub-region. The
Review focused on the modality of the Facility, the lessons learned and good practice. The findings
include observations which may be relevant for informing future similar endeavors. In accordance
with the ToR, the review:
•
Explored the drivers and enablers that led to the establishment of the Facility;
•
Took stock of the achievements of the Facility over the past 18 months in light of its mandate;
•
Analyzed the relevance and impact of these achievements within the overall international
response;
•
Explored the innovation and challenges associated with the operational set up;
•
Identified promising innovations brought about by the Facility;
•
Consolidated lessons learned and to be learned from the first year and a half of operation;
•
Identified good practices that could be further replicated in the UNDP’s response to similar
contexts – including for its global work on development solutions for displacement;
•
Developed action-oriented recommendations to help the Facility to achieve more effectively its
goals and/or reorient its mandate for better results.
1.2 Review Approach
In accordance with the Review›s ToR, the approach to the review included a desk review of
documents and products made by the Facility (see Annexes 1, 2 and 3), and semi-structured
interviews with UNDP personnel, partners and stakeholders in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt
and Turkey as well as New York and Geneva (see Annex 4). A field mission was conducted January
2015 to consult with the Facility, further develop the approach to the Review, and carry out interviews
in Jordan and Lebanon. Exploratory face-to-face interviews were carried out with key informants
from the Facility. Informed by these interviews, further face-to-face interviews in Jordan and Lebanon
as well as Skype interviews were conducted with a range of other review participants in January to
April 2015, using a semi-structured interview format. The interview questions were adjusted to reflect
the level of involvement with, and knowledge of, the Facility or UNDP and its work. Categories
of interviewees included Facility personnel, representatives of the six relevant UNDP Country
Offices, UNDP regional and headquarters personnel, other UN agency personnel, international
non-governmental organization (INGO) representatives, and development partners (bilateral and
multilaterals). In total, 56 people participated in this Review.
The Review team developed a list of questions (provided in Annex 5) to guide the semi-structured
interview process. Not all of these questions were asked to all participants. Rather, the approach was
to address as many of these questions as possible in a conversational format. The semi-structured
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approach to the interviews started with between three and six open-ended questions designed
to allow the interview participant to speak freely over the range of topics (outlined in the list of
questions) and to provide them with the opportunity to address these questions. In cases where the
full range of questions was not covered through the course of the interview, supplementary and more
direct questions were asked to ensure stakeholders were given the opportunity to comment on all
aspects relevant to them. Some interviews were shorter due to the time constraints of participants.
However, the duration of the majority of interviews was between 45 and 60 minutes. Interviewers
took extensive notes to record the responses of interview participants, and the responses were
coded against the Review questions. A pattern emerged through this analysis, which informed the
subsequent structure of the report.
The findings are therefore summarized under the following categories: Background; Overview of
the Facility; Achievements; Challenges; Lessons Learned; and Review Recommendations, as they
related to the overarching Review questions.
1.3 Sub-Regional Context
As the Syria crisis enters a fifth year, it is frequently referred to as the worst humanitarian crisis since
World War II. Continued fighting, shelling and aerial bombardment pose a grave protection risk to
Syrians, as well as destroying infrastructure and livelihoods. There are now 12.2 million in need of
humanitarian assistance in Syria, including more than 5.6 million children, and it is expected that
by mid-2015, virtually all Syrians remaining in the country will require assistance.3 More than 11.6
million people - over half the population - have been forced to leave their homes, often multiple
times, making Syria the largest displacement crisis in the world. In addition to 7.6 million internally
displaced people (IDPs) in Syria, almost 4 million have fled to neighboring countries of Turkey,
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt.4
Beyond its devastating humanitarian impact in Syria, the conflict is reversing Syria’s development
progress and impacting the neighboring refugee-hosting countries. With the exception of Iraq, which
is lower-middle income, these host countries are upper-middle income economies, with advanced
systems for the provision of social and public services and goods, a dynamic private sector, a vocal
civil society and functioning state apparatus, sustained by reasonable levels of national ownership.5
Importantly, in the early years of the crisis, these countries were not waiting for the international
community to respond to isolated refugee populations – but were already responding to the needs
of these populations, as they were dispersed throughout the communities. It is estimated that up to
85% of Syrian refugees live in host communities, and not in refugee camps.6 In Jordan refugees now
constitute 10% of the overall population, in Lebanon they make up more than 27%, and Turkey hosts
the greatest number of Syrian refugees, over 1.7 million.7
It is not surprising that government infrastructure and mechanisms are now under threat, with
public systems increasingly showing signs of significant stress. Resilience capacities in all countries
are being stretched in unsustainable ways, with severe consequences which are both immediate
and threatening to future generations. Vulnerable populations of host countries are, together with
refugees, the most at risk. The human development indices of all the affected countries are slipping,
with all being downgraded since the crisis began.
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Economic growth in neighboring countries is stalling. Lebanon, for example, has fallen from a growth
rate of 10% in 2009 to 1 % in 2014.8 Trade routes through Syria have closed with hundreds of
businesses collapsing as a result. Tourism, which had previously provided a significant source of
income, has been critically affected. The resultant strain on the public purse is undermining fiscal
stability in the region.9 In Lebanon for example, the loss in GDP on account of the crisis between
2012 and 2014 is estimated at over 3 percent and the negative impact on the government’s budget
is estimated at USD 2.6 billion.10 Likewise, in Jordan, the fiscal impact of the crisis on the education,
health, electricity and water sectors exceeded USD 850 million in just two years (2012-2013).11
Adding to this bleak and complex picture are the poor global economic conditions generally, making
it difficult for donors respond to the Syria crisis with sufficient funding or commitment. Given that
there is no political solution forthcoming, ad hoc and temporary arrangements for dealing with this
crisis have become increasingly untenable. The protracted nature of the situation, and its complexity,
combining both humanitarian and development challenges, not only defies conventional conflict
resolution approaches, but calls for new aid responses and coordination mechanisms.
It is also important to note that the crisis is having a significant impact on (in)security in the region
and a comprehensive approach to responding to the humanitarian and development crisis includes
an understanding of how interventions in this regard might attempt to contribute to peace, protection
and stability. The risk of instability in the sub-region is amplified as Syrian refugees continue to
flee to neighboring countries, as militant groups seize territory. Unsurprisingly, xenophobia and
discrimination toward Syrian refugees is increasing with host communities viewing refugees as
posing multiple threats including competition for limited resources as well as a potential security
threat. The combination of the continued Syrian crisis and the growth of sectarianism could ignite
larger regional hostilities - which could further radicalize youth and further destabilize the region.
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2 OVERVIEW OF THE FACILITY
2.1 Impetus for the Facility
In light of the context described above, the international community acknowledged that there was an
overwhelming need to take a vastly different approach to addressing the Syria-related crisis. By the
end of 2013, there was a general recognition that the crisis could not be addressed by humanitarian
means alone.12 The protracted and seemingly intractable nature of the crisis as well as the eruption of
“non-humanitarian issues” led the UNDG to call for a robust development response and investment
to complement ongoing humanitarian and refugee efforts in the region. Donors supported this,
particularly in the interests of cost-effectiveness and producing more sustainable solutions over the
medium and longer term.
With a growing sense that humanitarian and development integration was necessary, our interviews
show that further impetus for taking such an approach was generated by the unique nature of
the host countries. Host countries, in many cases, had the infrastructure in place for the delivery
of services – what was required was an international response which worked to strengthen this
infrastructure and these mechanisms to help them to sustain the population influx. Host governments
also understandably placed significant emphasis on protecting and supporting their own populations.
Therefore, the international community needed to respond with an approach that would enhance the
resilience of host countries processes, institutions and response capacities.
As several interviewees pointed out, there was already an emerging discourse within the international
community about the need for an integrated humanitarian/development response to complex
emergencies like the Sahel and Horn of Africa.13 There appeared to be a clear fit between such
conceptual thinking and the unique circumstances of the Syria crisis. As it became clear that
the international community was unable to find a political solution to this ‘wicked problem,’14 the
protracted nature of the Syria crisis was accepted, and a number of donors started looking towards
development investment – and associated ‘pots’ of funds.
In addition, the fact the refugees were outside of camps in this instance made a range of actors more
conducive, to and accepting of, a development approach to the Syria crisis. Traditional humanitarian
organizations and organizations whose core work is in responding to refugees were not used to
responding to crises outside of camp contexts, and therefore in this instance they were more inclined
to welcome a humanitarian/development integrated approach. Moreover, the particularities shared
by the host countries – existing national capacities, strong private sector, robust banking systems,
strong sense of ownership – also facilitated a narrative that proposed a better use of local systems
and national capacities.
It is in this context that the Sub-Regional Facility came into being. While there were, and are, a
myriad of stakeholders and expectations driving the Facility’s work, it is fair to say that its role and
focus on a regional approach to resilience was in response to the clearly articulated expectations
of highly influential donors, and the priorities and needs of host governments. At the same time,
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this increasing emphasis on resilience heightened the importance of taking a development
approach to responding to the crisis. With this understanding, UNDP was in a position to take an
active coordinating role, to attempt to enhance the overall cohesion and effectiveness of the UN’s
development efforts in the sub-region.
On this basis, a sub-regional structure was developed. The Facility (as it came to be known15) was
strategically located in Amman, Jordan in the interests of being in close proximity to countries and
UNDP Country Offices (COs) impacted by the Syria crisis, to provide ‘simultaneous, timely, strategic,
programmatic and organizational support’ to six countries. The Facility was to contribute to ‘improving
sub-regional coordination with a variety of partners and enhancing cost-effectiveness’ as well as
‘positioning the organization at the forefront of a regional response.’16
Based on the formative documentation and interview responses, it is clear that the Facility’s
prioritization of a ‘resilience’ approach, together with a strategic regional coordination focus, has
been very much driven by the expectation of donor agencies, UN agencies and UNDP priorities and
the expressed focus and needs of national governments. Nonetheless, as the following analysis
discusses, these interests are not always aligned, and the Facility has had to juggle the often
contradictory, inconsistent and changing demands of these stakeholders.
2.2 Purpose of the Facility
The purpose of the Facility was initially outlined in the original concept note entitled ‘Establishment
of a Subregional Multidisciplinary Task Force to better address development challenges of the
Syrian-related crisis’ in September 2013 (see Annex 6).17 The proposed role of the Facility included:
supporting COs in the sub-region in planning, programming, resource optimization and in the creation
of partnerships (including with donors, UN organizations, regional organizations, civil society and
the private sector); to participate in the design and roll-out of regional coordination mechanisms
(humanitarian/development); work with research centers academia and think-tanks to conduct
relevant studies (including impact, sectorial, stakeholder, and risk analysis); to establish a knowledge
management capacity in the sub-region; and to support the development of a coherent message
through communication tools for sister agencies, donors and other humanitarian and development
actors on the regional impact/response of the UNDP.
The Facility’s role was revised following discussions at regional and Headquarters levels, and over
the course of the first year of operation, to focus on three areas: (1) the conceptual development
and promotion of the ‘resilience’ concept and its operationalization; (2) the creation of knowledge
products and communication materials; and (3) resource mobilization for resilience (see Annex 7).
In carrying out this role, the Facility has been responsible for driving policy discussions with political,
humanitarian and development partners at the sub-regional and international levels, towards an
integrated approach to humanitarian and development assistance, and for facilitating coordination
with the United Nations Development Group (UNDG),18 Bretton Woods institutions and the
humanitarian community through various planning frameworks.19
It is important to highlight here that the Facility had no precedent in UNDP. As illustrated in Table 1
below, the sub-regional Facility differed from a typical UNDP Regional Center.
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Table 1: Regional Center vs. Sub-Regional Facility
Regional Center
Sub-Regional Facility
Scope
Wide range of interventions
Crisis oriented interventions
Structure
Permanent structure
Benchmark oriented team
Services
Standard technical support
services
Strategic advice, sub-regional advocacy,
outreach and resource mobilization
support
Specialized technical support on resilience
Clients
Support to UNDP COs
Support to RC/HC, UNCT, UNDG and
COs
Staffing
Permanent / semi-permanent staff
Outsourced / ad hoc staff
Reporting
Standard reporting lines to
Regional Bureau Deputy Director
Ad hoc dual reporting line to Regional
Bureau Director and Deputy Director
Location
Regional center / HQ
Sub-regional center
Coverage
Regional
Sub-region targets countries irrespective
of region and can cross regions
The Facility is ‘hosted’ by the Regional Bureau for Arab States, but with core functions belonging to
the former Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. The resulting hybrid setup at a sub-regional
level to enhance a crisis response was a UNDP first. For that reason, our interviews within UNDP
showed there were differing views and perceptions about its nature and mission. The hybridity
complicated the Facility’s initial work, particularly in its positioning vis-à-vis the country offices and
the standard and well-accepted business models, based on principles of national implementation.
Support to the Facility in terms of staff and financial resources was also affected by the UNDP’s
structural review carried out in 2014. This process implied, among other changes, the transitioning of
the Cairo Regional Centre to Amman, the conversion of BCPR into a Unit (CRU) and the transition
of the Bureau for Development Policy to a Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, as well as
a reinvigoration of the Bureau for External Relations and Advocacy. These huge organizational
arrangements affected the timely deployment of staff to the Facility as well as negotiations about its
budget.
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3 ACHIEVEMENTS
This section highlights what was achieved by the Facility, in partnership with other parts of UNDP and
the wider UN system.
3.1 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 in Response to the
Syria Crisis (3RP)
The Facility is widely credited for being instrumental in bringing about the achievement of 3RP,
the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan 2015-2016 – In Response to the Syria Crisis. The 3RP
represents a major shift in the aid architecture for the Syria crisis in that it recognizes that it is not
just a humanitarian crisis but also a significant development challenge. UNDP co-chaired the 3RP
process, together with the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
With the Facility’s leadership, the development aspects of the crisis became more visible, and a
consensus among 3RP participants emerged around the cross-cutting concept of resilience.20 On
18 December 2014 in Berlin, the 3RP was launched alongside The Syrian Arab Republic Strategic
Response Plan 2015 (SRP), coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Although there were other milestones and achievements along the
way, the Facility’s first phase of work culminated in the Berlin launch and the Third International
Humanitarian Pledging Conference in Kuwait 3 in March 2015.
Table 2: 3RP Milestones
Timeframe
Milestone
Throughout the year
leading up to the 3RP launch
Coordination and consensus achieved through UNDP-UNHCR jointly chaired quarterly
Regional Technical Committee meetings and multiple Facility activities. Key event
brought together global thinkers on resilience (OECD, ODI).
1 September 2014
3RP Roadmap, the guiding document for the development of the Plan, agreed on and
disseminated by Regional Directors
3-4 September 2014
Regional 3RP Workshop launched the process and provided participants from 5
countries and 40 sectors with guidance and templates to be tailored for the development
of 3RP country chapters
Early September 2014
Country-level planning processes initiated with governments and partners
20 September 2014
First draft of country abstracts submitted for analysis and review at the regional level
13 October 2014
Regional Workshop on Information Management, Monitoring and Evaluation held to
promote best practice and regional coherence in 3RP reporting
Oct-Nov 2014
Development of full country plans in each sector and country, with the development of
national resilience and stabilization plans
Nov-Dec 2014
Country chapters and regional overviews finalized
Nov-Dec 2014
3RP communications plan implemented to update stakeholders at the global, regional
and national levels on 3RP developments, milestones and activities
18 December 2014
3RP and SRP launched globally in Berlin
31 March 2015
3RP and SRP appeal at Kuwait 3
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3RP is essentially a country-driven regional planning and coordination mechanism with the
overarching goals of ‘ensuring protection and humanitarian assistance for refugees fleeing the
conflict in Syria and other vulnerable communities, while building the resilience of individuals,
families, communities and institutions in the most impacted countries.’21 The Regional Refugee and
Resilience Plan brings together country plans, developed by the national authorities in the respective
crisis affected countries, into one comprehensive regional framework (see Box 2 below).
Box 2: 3RP Strategic Objectives
The 3RP Refugee protection and humanitarian component addresses the protection and
assistance needs of refugees living in camps, in settlements and in local communities in all
sectors, as well as the most vulnerable members of impacted communities. It strengthens
community-based protection through identifying and responding with quick-impact support for
communal services in affected communities.
The 3RP Resilience/Stabilization-based development component addresses the resilience
and stabilization needs of impacted and vulnerable communities in all sectors; to build the
capacities of national and sub-national service delivery systems; strengthen the ability of
governments to lead the crisis response; and provide the strategic, technical and policy support
to advance national responses
It is acknowledged through this framework that national ownership and perspectives are fundamental
in ensuring a contextually appropriate and sustainable response to the crisis. On this basis, the
3RP attempts to provide a regional lens based on country driven plans and strategies.22 Critically,
the approach aims to ensure support for government priorities and, where appropriate, to channel
its efforts through country infrastructure and mechanisms in order to contribute to the resilience of
respective country contexts. Indeed, as compared to the previous RRP6, interviewees involved in
the 3RP process widely acknowledged that not only did national governments and country level
representatives participate more in 3RP, the end result was far more country driven. Box 1 below
gives examples of how UN agencies are taking a resilience approach in 3RP and SRP (see also
Annex 8).
Box 2: 3RP Strategic Objectives
•
In Syria, the UNICEF No Lost Generation (NLG) Initiative offers a comprehensive and holistic
approach to addressing the education and protection needs of millions of children through
immediate emergency support and resilience-based interventions.
• In Egypt, ILO, UNDP, UNHCR, and UNIDO will provide technical and financial support
to existing livelihoods service provision systems to target refugees and poor members of
impacted communities through intensive works programs.
• In Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon, the World Food Program (WFP), and UNHCR and
UNICEF will together explore methods and mechanisms for ensuring complementary targeting
of cash and food assistance.
The overall 3RP framework includes almost 200 humanitarian and development partners in an
integrated humanitarian/development response, embedding resilience into the framework. The
partners include governments, UN agencies and INGOs. This framework attempts to break down
funding and program silos by providing in the one planning document a coherent and comprehensive
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account of the needs, targets, objectives, implementation partners and funding requirements across
the region. The two-year plan includes a detailed budget requirement for 2015, with an indicative
budget for 2016. The budget is broken down by country, purpose and implementing agency/
organization – making it clear where the money is needed and the responsible organization for
delivery.
The total funding requirements laid out for the implementation of 3RP in 2015 amounts to in excess
of $5.5 billion. Illustrative of the fundamental shift in the response to the sub-region, on average one
third of 3RP is comprised of investments in resilience and stabilization programs. This represents a
300% increase in comparison to the previous year’s appeal (the 6th Syria Regional Response Plan,
RRP6, which was led by UNHCR).23 This increase is shown in Graph 1, below.
Table 2: 3RP Milestones
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
RRP6
3RP
Statements by member states in Kuwait made significant references to the importance of a resilience
response, as did the statements by the UN Secretary General, UNDP, UNHCR and OCHA.24
Although the event was branded as a ‘humanitarian pledging event,’ donor statements reflected the
composition of the 3RP and SRP, with development actors pledging towards resilience activities in
the respective plans. A USD $3.6 billion pledge can be considered a positive result for the 3RP and
SRP. While this only amounts to 42% of the $8.4 billion required, it is a significant increase on the
USD 2.4 billion pledged at Kuwait 2. Furthermore, of the $3.6 billion, $843m was pledged for 66% of
the resilience component, a strong result (see Annexes 9 and 10).
The 3RP process and outcomes were highly reliant on the enormous work and input of a huge range
of partners and stakeholders – but the consensus was that without the Facility, the achievement of
3RP would not have been possible. In fact, several respondents were deliberately emphatic about
this point, in reference to both the level of coordination, and the 3RP result itself. The Facility was
instrumental in advocating for the resilience concept, developing policies and planning frameworks/
instruments for this approach, and bringing on board and working with critical stakeholders, including
donors and implementing partners. Direct support was provided to select UNDP Country Offices and
UNCTs to support the roll-out and development of the 3RP country chapters, including dedicated
capacity provided to Governments and Resident Coordinators.
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Through the Facility, the UNDP has influenced a paradigm shift from what was once solely a
humanitarian approach to crisis, to a resilience-based one with a humanitarian and development
outlook. In doing so, the Facility has also conveyed and demonstrated to donors what the UNDP is
doing and how, in terms of its resilience agenda in the development arena. In fact, the Facility was
regularly credited by interview participants for being a visible demonstration of UNDP’s commitment
to resilience, and has provided the resources and capabilities to explain to partners and work with
them on developing the resilience approach.
When considering the record of the Facility, it is worth noting how much criticism the UNDP would
have faced without an RBAS Sub-Regional Facility in Amman. Although a counter-factual is difficult
to establish, a year-by-year comparison between the 3RP and the RRP6 provides evidence of a
shift to a resilience response. A 7th cycle of a humanitarian response would undoubtedly have
resulted in continued development loss, because of limited support to national response capacities.
The international community including donors had identified that Syria was a multi-country crisis
with a common driver, and the UN System set up a regional response. Other UN agencies like
UNHCR, INGOs and donors already had regional hubs in Amman, and some like OCHA, UNICEF
and UNFPA set up new sub-regional teams in Amman in response to the Syria crisis. Most recently,
FAO strengthened regional capacity in Amman. However, UNDP’s Regional Bureau of Arab States is
based in New York, with a hub that was until recently based in Cairo.25
From this perspective, interviews suggest that the UNDP ‘had to have the Sub-regional Facility’
in Amman. It was also noted that the very existence of the Facility among a sea of predominantly
humanitarian actors was an achievement in itself, given the complex political environment, both
internal and external. The actual process of working with such diverse stakeholders to bring together
a regional framework which is based on national plans and (to varying degrees) owned by respective
host governments was overwhelmingly acknowledged as a significant achievement, given the
practical and political enormity of the task.
Both the regional framework and the commitment to resilience have been central tenets of the
Facility’s work. Stakeholders noted that this has been critical in responding to the demands of donors
and host governments alike. Both UNDP personnel working with donors and funding agencies and
the donors themselves all confirmed the critical importance of a regional approach and an emphasis
on resilience. Donors noted that the regional approach was important to ensure coordination and
to provide a ‘consistency check’ across countries as well as being critical for planning and ensuring
there is a full picture of both the needs and the response. At the same time, donors confirmed that
the manner in which the regional lens is based on an integration of country plans is also crucially
important – emphasizing the complexity and contextual differences of the countries effected. One
respondent from a donor agency made the point that 3RP for the first time put together country
responses into a regional framework with a resilience focus, and that this is ‘going in the right
direction.’
Interview respondents widely acknowledged that the 3RP regional process, as well as the dialogue
leading up to it, has been highly inclusive. Many stakeholders confirmed that they were regularly
consulted and that often this approach was collaborative and their views were clearly taken on
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board. Most stakeholders generally made mention of the Facility and its staff directly in this process
of engagement. INGOs were particularly happy with the level of inclusion at the 3RP regional level.
Some INGOs noted that their inclusion in the regional planning documents increased their legitimacy
and confirmed their place as part of an integrated solution – potentially improving the likelihood for
funding.
On the other hand, INGOs noted a tendency for the country planning process to be less inclusive of
non-state actors. This was partially attributed to a less inclusive process and partly to do with political
problems – particularly in terms of how host governments perceive INGOs and their work.26 While the
emphasis on national plans in the 3RP approach was appreciated and acknowledged, occasionally
respondents denied the value of a regional lens at all. In particular, it was felt by some that country
contexts were too different and one respondent noted that some of the host countries would be better
off on their own – making separate appeals for funding and support. A small number of respondents
across the spectrum of stakeholders disagreed with the separation of refugees and resilience in
the strategic outcomes. One respondent noted that the separation of resilience and refugees was
artificial, suggesting that the resilience of refugees and host communities cannot in practice be
divided and in actual fact they will not be divided. Some of the Lebanon based respondents noted
that the Lebanon approach was far more integrated and that this was considered a good thing.
The 3RP process and planning documents were generally applauded for being both a significant
achievement and for heading in the right direction. Nonetheless, there were some criticisms. For
example, one donor agency representative suggested that 3RP did not reflect the inevitability
of funding shortages, in that it did not clearly articulate and justify priorities. Further, there was a
concern about value for money, given a perception of inadequate accounting for funding allocations
under the previous framework (see problems and challenges for more detail). Others reserved their
judgment on 3RP pending the outcome of funding appeals, noting that this would be the real test of
the effectiveness of the approach.
While resilience is by no means the sole purview of the Facility, interview respondents acknowledged
the significant role the Facility has played in realizing the prominence of resilience thinking in the
region and in working to consolidate this concept both in theory and practice – this was certainly
the case among UN agencies. More broadly, while other UN agencies and INGOs were already
working and thinking in terms of resilience, it was nonetheless noted on several occasions that there
had been a recent noticeable shift in discourse in the sub-region, and this was largely attributed to
the advocacy and policy work of the Facility. Donor organization representatives interviewed also
acknowledged that there had been a recent shift in discourse and that the Facility played a significant
role in this, at least at the sub-regional level.
3.2 Thought leadership and advocacy for the resilience approach
The Facility has played a critical role in thought leadership and policy advocacy around the resilience
approach, and the centrality of national governments. Through the resilience lens, development
is now understood as part and parcel of a humanitarian-development response to a refugee
and IDP crisis. The Facility has generated evidence of vulnerability for government, donor and
UN decisionmakers to better target interventions, and has contributed tremendously by getting
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diverse stakeholders to adopt a common resilience agenda at the international level. Critically, the
Facility shaped and influenced regional discourse, shifting the agenda from a ‘regional response’
to a ‘nationally driven process with regional coherence’ when it tabled its discussion paper on the
centrality of national plans at the EU in Brussels in March 2014.27 The result was evident from our
interviews, where a number of participants in the 3RP process recognized the Facility as setting the
agenda on resilience, and moreover, as championing the building of national plans. As a result of the
Facility’s advocacy, governments participated in directly shaping the 3RP.
Shaping international discourse
Through its involvement in key international and regional forums, the Facility has played a key role in
shaping discourse on the sub-region, and framing these events. For example, the 28 October 2014
Berlin Conference on refugees and host countries was a major political achievement. The Federal
Republic of Germany hosted this international conference to explore innovative ways of addressing
international burden sharing. The Facility played a highly influential role in expanding the scope of
the conference beyond refugees, and in guiding the debate towards the adoption of a declaration
by neighboring countries and donors. The Facility actively contributed to drafting the conference
communiqué, and preparing donors and neighboring countries to endorse it. Although the debate was
difficult and politically sensitive, the Berlin’s Communiqué on Solidarity with Refugees and their Hosts
constitutes today the first ‘political’ piece calling for more resilience investment outside and within
Syria. It effectively paved the road for a more comprehensive approach to the Syria crisis.
Interviews with donors as well as review of documents indicate the degree that the resilience agenda
influenced an EU based group of ‘Core Donors’ as well as the ‘Top Donors to the Syrian Crisis’, as
well. For example UNDP used the Core Donors forum convened by the EU in April 2014 to reinforce
the importance of the centrality of national plans. While traditionally, humanitarian coordination is
done by OCHA - or UNHCR in this case - and development coordination by the governments, in the
Syria crisis response UNDP advocated bringing these closer together under national leadership.
As UNDP has argued, governments must drive national planning processes. To this end, UNDP
has effectively broadened the scope of conversations with donors to identify ways to operationalize
resilience-based development,28 discuss policy options on issues such as the inclusion of refugee
populations in the host country labor market, and establish a donor network on private sector
engagement in Amman.
UNDP with the Facility’s input also contributed to shaping the agenda of the Syria Top Donors Group
(TDG) meeting on 28 January 2015. This forum was held for partners to review the response to the
Syrian Crisis, assess progress in meeting pledges and to receive first-hand information from the
UN leadership.29 The UNDP Sub-Regional Development Coordinator briefed this group on 3RP and
spoke to donors’ funding strategies and the outlook for 2015. The meeting agreed that Kuwait 3
should capture the new paradigm shift in the response by actively mobilizing the humanitarian and
development communities at Ministerial level. Delegations recognized the unprecedented integrated
nature of 3RP, with Germany in particular signaling their willingness to address both development
and humanitarian issues. The UK called for countries to do more to mobilize traditional and nontraditional funds and to prioritize resources in the most effective way, building the resilience of the
region and addressing development needs. Furthermore, the Chair’s summary ‘adopts the Berlin
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Declaration as a reference framework to support the implementation of the ‘whole of Syria approach’
in order to identify the immediate needs and target the most vulnerable people affected by the
humanitarian situation in Syria.’
Other examples of events the Facility shaped include the launch of the Regional Refugee and
Resilience Plan (3RP) 2015-2016, hosted by the United Nations and Germany in Berlin on 15
December 2014.30 And the Facility played a pivotal strategic advisory role in the recent lead up
to the UN’s largest ever appeal, Kuwait 3, which took place on 31 March 2015. With the Facility’s
support, and with the participation of the RBAS Director and UN Resident Coordinators/Humanitarian
Coordinators (RC/HCs) in the subregion, the UNDP Administrator inaugurated a ‘Friends of
Resilience’ meeting during Kuwait 3.31
Friends of Resilience is a platform and network to think and plan a more sustainable response to
the Syria-related crisis, integrating efforts from the humanitarian and development communities.
Participants agreed that the resilience agenda implies expanding the partnership platforms by
bringing private sector to generate jobs and expand service delivery; increasing civil society
organizations (CSOs) participation to fill critical gaps as a result of the demographic shock; and
engaging development banks for more sustainable investments in neighboring countries. It was also
acknowledged that the resilience agenda requires adapting aid architecture in fragile and vulnerable
middle income countries, by widening development funding instruments such as extra-concessional
funding, multi-partner trust funds, and budget support. To progress the agenda, the Facility will be
taking the lead in following up with forming a FoR technical committee.
Country-level policy and strategy advice on resilience
Remarkably, UNDP is now co-leading, with UNCHR, the UN sub-regional response to a refugee
crisis, which is a first for the agency.32 The Facility’s initiatives in this arena have effectively opened
up policy space for UNDP Country Office programming to build on.
For example, the Facility provided UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) and Governments with policy
and strategic advice on national planning processes regarding resilience. It also contributed in the
setting up of the Needs Assessment Team in Egypt, as well as two similar exercises in Jordan and
Lebanon.33 In Iraq, with the Facility’s support, UNDP is co-chairing the response to the Syrian refugee
crisis. Although OCHA sees the crisis as humanitarian, UNDP Iraq insists on a livelihoods approach
in the recovery and sustainability cluster, and has found humanitarian-development bridging tools
provided by the Facility to be useful in this regard. In addition to creating tools, the Facility has also
borrowed best practices from Country Offices, such as UNDP Lebanon’s work with municipalities,
and shared them sub-regionally.
As 3RP co-chair, the Facility succeeded in bringing INGOs to the table - despite government
preferences to the contrary - thus recognizing the value of INGO knowledge and perspectives. This
at least initially created a tension between the aims of the Facility and those of the Country Offices,
which generally work with host governments, within their policy frameworks. At the end of the day,
however, it can be said that including INGOs in 3RP processes gave voice to the crisis affected
communities the international community seeks to protect and serve. And in turn, the advocacy role
played by INGOs on the 3RP steering and technical committees opened the door ever so slightly for
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governments to hear (if not be more responsive to) the needs of not only their own citizens, but those
of Syrians.
Evidence for policy advocacy
To provide an evidence base for its policy advocacy work, the Facility has been involved in critical
innovation products, also discussed in the next section below. For example its novel Stress Index
captures the extent to which existing systems and communities are vulnerable. The Stress Index
was central to UNDG Position Paper – A Resilience-based Development Response to the Syrian
Crisis (December 2013). Other examples include the UNDG endorsed Policy Note, Resilience-based
development response to the Syrian Crisis (December 2013), and the ‘Resilience and capacity
development’ chapter in the RRP6. The Facility also supported a Vulnerability Analysis by the
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and an analysis of ‘Private sector engagement in resiliencebased development by the Istanbul International Center for Private Sector in Development (IICPSD),
which contributed to constructive debate among donors.
Part of the Facility’s thought leadership role has been to identify and support important regional
thinking and knowledge production as it relates to a resilience-based response to the crisis. To this
end the Facility has been working with think tanks and research centers in the region to support
and contribute to the development of innovative approaches to responding to the crisis. One
such relationship has been in support of the Istanbul International Centre for Private Sector in
Development. The Centre had been working on private sector involvement in the response to the
crisis – developing and replicating innovative approaches to private sector inclusion beyond the
standard corporate responsibility approaches. The Facility supported the Centre’s work through
disseminating significant research publications on the subject of the private sector in development as
well as coordinating ‘fact finding missions’ in the region and facilitating workshops and other modes
of knowledge dissemination.
The ‘fact finding missions’ conducted by the Centre and accompanied by colleagues from the
Facility, were conducted in each of the affected countries to assess private sector opportunities
and involvement in the resilience/recovery effort. This included collaboration with OCHA to identify
opportunities for the local private sector to be involved as humanitarian suppliers. Subsequently, the
Centre was involved in providing advice in the development of country plans – particularly focusing
on recommendations that could lead to greater private sector involvement in resilience and recovery.
Supported by the Facility, the Centre also developed quite specific policy proposals including: labor
schemes for refugees34; approaches to inclusive procurement;35 geothermal energy-based food
drying;36 and the creation of ‘value chains’ in waste management – to name a few. The Centre
developed several of these proposals to the level of detail required for implementation and these
were included in national resilience plans. The work of the Centre on private sector inclusion in
resilience-based responses to the crisis was supported by the Facility through a range of forums
including workshops with UNDG to discuss and disseminate this thinking on private sector
involvement. Based on a review of the knowledge products and interviews with key informants, it
would appear that this collaboration is a successful example of knowledge brokering.
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UNDP’s work in this area was informed by a vulnerability impact assessment conducted in
partnership with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), as well as resilience system analysis
conducted in partnership with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).37 With support from UNDP, the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office, the UK Department for
International Development (DfID) and Mercy Corps, OECD also carried out a workshop on the key
risks to stability in Lebanon in September 2014.38 This fed into the development of the Lebanon Crisis
Response Plan (LCRP) as well as UNDP’s analysis and decision-making on programming priorities
for 2015-2016. This exercise concluded that the risk landscape in Lebanon is likely to deteriorate
over the next two years, with greater impact on all areas of wellbeing, albeit in different ways for
differing population groups.39
In summary, UNDP has contributed to thought leadership and advocacy on resilience by (a)
developing the conceptual framework and partnership platform of the resilience-based development
approach within the context of the Regional UN Development Group; (b) supporting neighboring
countries (national counterparts, UNCTs, RC/HC and UNDP COs) in developing resilience-based
country plans; and (c) developing a new generation of tools and frameworks to support organizations
and partners in measuring, mapping and rolling out resilience-related issues.
Given the mandate of the Facility and the emphasis placed on knowledge generation and
dissemination, it was clear that the Facility needed to focus on its knowledge management (KM) role.
To this end the Facility brought in a KM specialist adviser in the early phases of its existence. The
KM approach came to include a combination of high level research, community of practice approach
and elements of social media. Central was the need to create a high level of visibility for the work of
the Facility and to involve stakeholders in both the conceptual and practical aspects of integrating
humanitarian and development responses through the resilience agenda.
In the early stages of the Facility, considerable planning and highly effective KM activities took place
in this space. Of note, an online community was established in November 2013, the Syria Crisis:
A Resilience-Based Development Response. The online community was designed to coordinate
the work of the regional UNDG and contribute to a shift in the discourse in support of a resilience
approach. This forum generated a great deal of interest with over 300 active members. Through this
platform the Facility engaged UN stakeholders in the resilience conversation and this was reportedly
very effective in generating interest – contributing to early shifts in the discourse towards a resilience
agenda.
Another effective online activity pursued through the KM approach included the online community
on ‘Assessing vulnerability to crisis in support of a resilience-based approach’. This discussion was
reportedly very effective in generating interest as well as significant input on thinking in this space.
Importantly, this forum connected the Facility with a range of stakeholders including stakeholders
that they would not normally have had such close contact with. It helped identify those in this space
that were thinking in similar terms and this broadened the scope for collaboration. A ‘consolidated
summary’ of this e-discussion was then generated as a final report and made available online. This
approach also contributed in generating a broader sense of ownership amongst stakeholders which
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is critical for improving the likelihood of implementation of these ideas.
Early KM tools and approaches developed also included the use of ‘After Action Reviews’ and ‘Peer
Assist’. The KM adviser developed an approach to ‘After Action Reviews’ for the Facility and used
this approach to produce a report for the Facility as an example for future approaches to reviewing
interventions, workshops, and other forums as a learning and knowledge sharing tool. Another
innovative tool utilized was the ‘Peer Assist’ approach. The KM adviser facilitated discussion entitled
Innovation for UNDP’s Sub-Regional Response Facility for Syria – A Peer Assist Conversation with
Arndt Husar and George Hodge. The KM adviser posted this insightful conversation on ‘Teamworks’
to share the knowledge of these experienced practitioners in the field of innovation. The KM
adviser usefully explained this approach in this posting as: Peer Assist - ‘a knowledge management
methodology that brings together a group of peers to elicit feedback on a problem, project or activity
and draws insights from the participants’ knowledge and experience’.40
This Peer Assist conversation was useful in several ways. First, the participants provided insights
into how to approach innovation in a manner that shared experience and knowledge with the broader
audience of this post – which in itself was a valuable knowledge product that the Facility produced.
Second, the conversation highlighted several important points that the Facility itself learned from – it
also recommended approaches to innovation that the Facility adopted. Third, this knowledge product
was a good example of what was possible in this KM/innovation space and provided the Facility with
a template for facilitating further Peer Assist conversations for the future.
The Facility also supported innovation workshops in the region to introduce, discuss, develop and
share ideas and knowledge around concepts and innovations around building resilience. One
‘innovation jam’ for example focused on how to increase access to livelihoods and income generating
opportunities in the sub-region, as a way to maintain social cohesion and build resilience. New ideas
developed by UNDP Country Office participants included a Minutes for Work initiative to rethink
currency to create a mobile minutes bank in Syria; Crowdsourcing for Rapid Labor Employment in
Lebanon; One Stop Shop for Jobs, a community-based online platform for employment in Egypt;
Women’s Enterprise for Social Economic Empowerment to foster income generating opportunities
for women in Iraq; Don’t Waste Your Waste to solid waste management into a profitable venture in
camps and host communities in Jordan and Turkey. While the Facility’s role is not program design
and implementation, it has served in the past year as a catalyst of innovation.
In addition, the Facility has created KM products with UNHCR. The Joint Secretariat has
commissioned studies and tools to fill critical knowledge gaps in the sub-region. For example,
Resilient Municipalities: A Resource for Countries affected by the Syria Crisis provides tools to
support municipalities, field tested with 36 mayors in Jordan. There is also A Compendium of Good
and Innovative practices in the regional response to the Syria Crisis for practitioners, and a Syria
Crisis Discussion Paper Series aimed at informing policy debate (see Annex 3).
3.4 Information Management and Analysis System (IMAS) for aid
coordination and effectiveness
One of the Facility’s most innovative and impressive achievements has been the development of
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an integrated toolkit that offers users access to development as well as humanitarian information.
This Information Management and Analysis System (IMAS) responds to donor aid coordination
needs as well as government, UN and partner data needs, particularly for resilience and stabilization
programming. It is being developed and piloted in Lebanon, with replication begun recently in Jordan.
The development of the IMAS toolkit specifically addresses a systemic gap in the UN crisis response
when this response needs to go beyond the humanitarian intervention. When engaging in longerterm, resilience and stabilization-focused analysis, planning and M&E there is a gap in availability of
appropriate tools for development actors to effectively engage with the key government counterparts
in sustainable interventions that are integrated with national development plans.41
Box 2: IMAS - The Complement to Humanitarian IM tools
IMAS extends the main humanitarian IM tools to the non-humanitarian sphere through: (1)
a Country Digital Atlas, as an extension of the basic country maps and CODs; (2) a nonhumanitarian RCO (or national) FTS to complement the OCHA humanitarian tracking; (3) a
GIS-enabled 4Ws that can be sustainably maintained by the government as a national aid
projects/activity tracking and coordination system, and (4) a Risk and Problem Mapping tool
to complement national planning systems and provide a relatively rapid assessment of key
problems and needs from a resilience/stabilization/development perspective.
The IMAS Lebanon initiative aims to enhance the capacity of key Government actors, led by the
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to produce ‘context-specific, situationally-aware,
cross-sectoral, multi-actor, stabilization and resilience (S&R), strategic analysis and prioritization,
programming support and effective coordination for the Government, UN agencies, (I)NGOs and
donors in Lebanon, through the provision of information management and analysis support tools and
the set-up of a national IMAS team.’ A comprehensive overview of projects and activities, actors and
expenditures, aid flow and funding mechanisms is critical in this context, due to the extraordinary
complexity of both the crisis and the response, as evidenced by the sheer scope of the humanitarian
and development interventions and the multitude of donors and implementing partners.
As of March 2015, the IMAS Lebanon team has rolled out the online 4Ws tool (who/what/where/
when) and populated it with UNDP Lebanon data. This tool provides an online platform for reporting
and displaying who (donors/implementing partners) is doing what (projects and related activities),
where (location in Lebanon), and when (project/activities implementation timeline and status). The
4Ws tool allows for multiple variations in terms of aggregation of data and display. For example,
dashboards provide a breakdown of funding by donor, funding by sector, and projects by sector
(see Figure 1 below). Alternatively, a data base of projects can be pulled up to display what projects
are happening where – who is implementing them, who is funding them, and what the status of the
project and of each individual activity is. This tool also links this information to multi-layered maps to
visually display the physical location of these commitments/activities, and contextualize them.
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Box 2: IMAS - The Complement to Humanitarian IM tools
Contribution by Sector
The platform is then linked to other sources of data which identify problems and risks, providing
additional layers of critical information for analysis. The Municipal Risk and Resource mapping is
based on data generated through the risk mapping methodology being implemented by the Ministry
of Social Affairs with the technical support of UNDP hosted communities programmer and the
Facility’s advisory services. Workshops are facilitated by the Ministry in each of the 250 highest
priority municipalities (based on a Population Stress Map also developed by the IMAS team), bringing
together a range of representative stakeholders (based on an appropriate sampling methodology
to include religious, women, youth, commercial, economic representatives) in each municipality to
identify key risks, associated problems and locally recommended solutions.
For example, an identified problem may be overcrowding in schools. The stakeholders then identify
potential solutions and resources and with the UNDP develop action plans. All of this data is then
uploaded into the MRR tool as part of the ‘Risk and Resources Mapping” tool. This data can then be
fully integrated with the 4Ws project/activity data by dynamically filtering and selecting Risk/Problems
and Projects/Activities in the MRR and 4Ws tools respectively and overlaying them on the common
map. The IMAS is in the process of incorporating additional sources of tension/conflict monitoring
data including incident tracking carried out by Lebanon Support’, based on media tracking, police and
security reports (publicly available), which will be integrated into the Lebanon Digital Atlas, currently
being expanded with the lead planning agency of Lebanon, CDR. This Digital Atlas will then serve as
the common background mapping tool for the 4Ws and MRR toolkit.
The IMAS Lebanon team has now also completed the roll-out of the RCO Non-humanitarian
Financial Tracking System. This is an on-line donor aid self-reporting system that complements
OCHA’s FTS tracking of humanitarian appeals funding. It has a dynamically updated Dashboard and
provides the options for a range of dashboards and search reports to be generated and downloaded.
The system allows users to search by sector, donor, recipient or implementing partner and details the
type of project, the funds pledged, and the funds contributed. This system is again compatible with
the 4Ws tools and therefore the data can be integrated through the display on the common mapping
component... The tracking system is aligned with the LCRP tracking done by OCHA and UNHCR,
with financial contributions related to the LCRP tracked through a direct link to the OCHA FTS, and
the non-LCRP aid displayed in compatible Dashboards formats for easy aggregation, and analysis or
reporting.
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The Lebanon Digital Atlas is also now fully operational, with over 150 layers of data collected
and being uploaded by CDR as a GoL national information tool. The Atlas provides an interactive
mapping platform to the whole 4Ws/MRR/FTS toolkit. With a range of base map options (topographic,
streets, photo imagery), data is layered over the map to identify the boundaries of municipalities,
location of settlements, and a range of services such as schools, hospitals, waste collection – for
example. With all the tools described being compatible, ultimately the Atlas will integrate the 4Ws, the
MRR and financial tracking data. When selecting a ‘layer’ the map displays the location point of all of
the selected items (e.g. hospitals). The user can then select any of the markers for relevant data to
appear which corresponds with the location marker (e.g. number of hospital beds).
CDR, under MoSA coordination, has also started working with the IMAS team’s support to develop
Sector Analysis plans that integrate all available information about Government projects, on-going
and planned, which is then overlaid with the UNDP 4Ws activities for each sector as well, as the
relevant ActivityInfo data for all partners.42 Taken together with the other layers of data and the
population stress map (including vulnerability analysis where relevant), this provides the platform for
joint analysis, including the identification of key gaps and priorities, allowing for joint planning and
coordination. To illustrate what this looks like, Figure 2 below gives a screen shot of the Digital Atlas
display of water points in Lebanon.
Figure 2: Digital Atlas display of water points
There is the potential for donors and governments to incorporate the 4Ws/MRR tools, the financial
tracking system, and the provision of geographically disaggregated data into their own reporting
requirements. This would mean that all implementing partners, including (I)NGOs, as well as
funders, would be required to provide the necessary data, as part of their accountability and
reporting measures. This would generate a complete picture in terms of crisis response programs
and activities. This would then provide the basis for monitoring and accountability at the individual
project level but at the same time enable partners and funders to track the whole picture over time
– providing invaluable data for holistic needs analysis, gaps analysis, risk analysis, activity tracing,
implementation monitoring and ultimately the measurement of impact and effectiveness. There
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is also potential for predictive capabilities. For example, with the provision of data there would be
the capacity to trace the correlation between needs, activities and risk perception (and/or conflict)
allowing for some prediction regarding critical tipping points in terms of stress on systems and
support for such.
Such an integrated information and data management system has the potential to significantly
improve cost effectiveness as well as provide a robust platform for the allocation of resources based
on an objective assessment of need. This system can also inform prioritization as well as decisions
regarding the sequence of rolling out responses and programs based on a holistic analysis of
respective contexts/locations at the micro level – informed by what is happening on the ground in real
time. With the necessary data and the full integration of these tools, there is the potential to address
and meet the incredibly complex, varied and sophisticated data needs of donors and to provide a
basis for detailed accountability to both funders and the Lebanon government with unprecedented
levels of coordination and transparency.
The tools are in place and significant inroads have been made in achieving data sharing agreements
with key actors. However, the next phase will require a commitment from a range of stakeholders to
share data and draw on the tools to inform their own work. This requires commitments from donors
and their implementing partners to provide program and detailed activity data and financial tracking
data. Importantly, it also requires this data to be properly geo-referenced, so as to usefully map this
information to the ground level – and aggregate it to useful levels of analysis. Ideally this would lead
to a Digital Atlas that embodied complete sectorial sets of data which could be overlaid (including
for example, location of refugees, needs identification, financial commitments, resources, program
and activity data, municipal service delivery, government capacity, social cohesion data, incidents
of conflict, and risk analysis) - providing the basis for a dynamically updated, real-time, fully detailed
picture of the 3RP response at any given time.
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4 CHALLENGES
4.1 Political challenges
A major challenge has been the gap between the enormity of the crisis and the needs of refugees,
host communities and governments, on the one hand, and the availability of donor and government
resources, on the other. Governments of Jordan, Lebanon and even now Turkey, reportedly have
indicated to the UN and donors that their capacity to respond has reached – or is reaching – a
breaking point where external assistance is not only welcome but required. Not coincidentally,
interviewees with field experience and their local informants report that tensions are high in countries
with high concentration of refugees where the competition for resources, jobs, housing, and water, is
reaching a critical point.
Governments in the sub-region face competing national priorities, and in Lebanon for example, there
has been understandable political resistance to servicing refugees. The UNDP Lebanon Country
Office in particular, has effectively advocated for a focus on host communities in municipalities, which
allows support to not only refugees but also affected nationals. For political reasons, Turkey and
Syria have shown some reluctance to allow INGOs to operate freely, and this is also a limitation, as
INGOs are a common vehicle to channel aid, and also these organizations and their local staff are
able to deliver services in areas that others cannot operate, in Syria for example.
With regard to donors, it is clear they have their own political and policy logics for making decisions
on who, what, and where to commit funds, and these logics may or may not neatly align with 3RP.
Donor decisions can also be subject to change in response to competing demands brought by an
emerging crisis, conflict or disaster in other countries, or in response to competing demands brought
by the political concerns of donor countries and bodies. If donors are willing, however, it would be
possible for them to make their decisions based on their own governance mechanisms and political
imperatives, and yet nonetheless provide the funding through the 3RP framework. There is some
concern that after having pushed for the 3RP approach in 2013 and 2014, donors might be looking
to take a more direct path in 2015, bypassing 3RP in the interests of ‘flying their own flags.’ In this
regard, it may be important that 3RP provide a way for donors to be able to take credit and be
recognized for their commitments, while channeling support through 3RP.
It is clear that 3RP has reached important levels of integration of humanitarian and development
planning. National plans are expected to deepen this integration in 2015 for better alignment with
long-term priorities. This “integration”, however, will not succeed if donors do not follow the same
shift. The 3RP aims to overcome the humanitarian and development divide. The resilience-building
policy should facilitate the combined use of humanitarian and development resources. There is some
encouraging evidence of this shift:
DfID (Lebanon) and Canada (Jordan) invest in municipalities to allow them better address the
demographic shock, and the United States Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (US-PRM)
is as an exception using humanitarian resources for resilience building in Turkey and Lebanon, with
dual purposes: refugees and host communities. Another example is the recently established EU
Regional Trust Fund, using development resources for 3RP resilience-building interventions.
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Some partners have gone further and initiated policy dialogue to continue shifting the balance
towards more development investment, hybrid financing and multi-year approaches. Going forward,
a commitment to widen this partnership is important, linking the private sector, investment funds and
regional development banks, and fully adapting standard development cooperation mechanisms to
fragile contexts.43 The World Bank is even considering a conditional aid model, in which countries that
include refugees in the labor market are entitled to extra-concessional loans. From this perspective,
refugees are potentially seen as assets instead of liabilities. While the World Bank welcomes UN
Multi-Partner Trust Funds (MPTFs) in the region, it also suggests combining International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans with grants and finding new financing mechanisms
through IBRD platforms.
The participation of refugees in the economy is in fact one of the most challenging political (and
development) issues for the sub-region and the work of the Facility. The UNHCR-UNDP Joint
Secretariat has already started this very sensitive political discussion under the umbrella of
inclusiveness and social cohesion.44 The next generation response should include this type of
rationale.
4.2 Accountability and 3RP impact measurement challenges
Donor representatives who were interviewed – as well as UNDP personnel involved in managing
donor relationships – reported that the work of the Facility was on track and moving towards an
alignment with donor expectations, particularly the 3RP process and documentation. There were
nonetheless some concerns about the 3RP appeal. For example, as both donors and UNDP
acknowledged, appeals are never fully funded. Given this reality, several donors expressed that they
would have liked 3RP to have offered an analysis of priorities both in terms of need and in terms of
sequence – what is most urgent, what will be done first, and why.
Several interview respondents made the point that it was difficult for donors to commit resources to
this next appeal when there has not been adequate reporting on the effectiveness of the appeal and
funding committed in the previous year, through the Regional Response Plan (RRP6). It was argued
that donors need to know what happened with the funding committed through the last appeal: Where
was it spent? Was it effective? By what measure? What was the impact? How does the assessment
of the last round of funding inform decisions about the allocation, prioritization and accountability
expectations of the next round?
Donors require significantly different information to justify and measure the effectiveness of their
spend to their governments and constituents. And 3RP presents significant and extraordinary
challenges in terms of demonstrating impact and meeting competing data requirements. In terms of
accountability, interview participants described the vastly different expectations of donors regarding
their data and information requirements which emanated from their differing notions of accountability,
measures of effectiveness and their competing logics in the justification of funding allocations. In
short, donors have their own accountability and transparency measures that they need to satisfy
in order to commit ongoing funding and demonstrate to their stakeholders that money has been
effectively spent according to their own objectives and accountability and effectiveness (or value for
money) criteria.
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The task of coordinating planning, needs assessments, and funding allocations across the region
through the 3RP has been enormous. The task of accounting for this spending and activity will
arguably be greater still. As outlined above, the accountability and measurement expectations
of donors are varied, and so too are the range of expectations emanating from other critical
stakeholders such as national governments – right down to the community level in affected host
countries. Added to this complexity is a conceptual gap. There are problems with establishing
appropriate M&E frameworks, accountability mechanisms and impact assessments in such an
operating environment in any case – but there are particular conceptual shortfalls in this space due to
the emphasis on resilience.
There exists a wide gap between humanitarian approaches to M&E, accountability and impact
assessment and development approaches. While humanitarian approaches tend to focus on the
immediate outputs and short-term outcomes, development approaches on the other hand have (for
good reason) morphed into often highly complex, data and resource intensive endeavors which
focus more on sustainability and longer term value for money assessments. While development
accountability frameworks are often sophisticated and highly rigorous, they can also be prescriptive
and rigid and often incapable of responding and adjusting to highly fluid environments – such as the
work of crisis response. They are also expensive and time consuming and may not be capable of
capturing progress in a constantly shifting environment. If the Facility is to address this accountability
problem and demonstrate 3RP’s effectiveness – as well as identify problems in real time for
adaptation – it will need to collaborate with stakeholders to develop a kind of hybrid approach to M&E
and impact assessment. Such an accountability framework would need to span the 3RP framework
and map onto the regional response – this will be a monumental task. Nonetheless, it brings into
sharp focus the possible value of using IMAS to its full potential, and integrating it fully with the 3RP
framework.
In highlighting this critical accountability challenge, it is important that these accountability problems
are kept in context. Needless to say, all investments/financial commitments and consequent
interventions, programs and projects are all accounted for in one way or another – that is that each
investment has its own corresponding reporting and accountability framework wrapped around it.
Consequently, a multiplicity of data collection and M&E systems are in place across the region – but
these systems are significantly different – varying across countries, agencies, organizations and
programs. So rather than an overall accountability deficit as such, there is a pressing need to pull
together an accountability framework that takes a regional lens and maps directly onto 3RP.
To this end the Facility has been making a concerted effort to achieve an integrated approach to IM,
M&E and FT across 3RP. Already significant work has been undertaken to attempt to produce a 3RP
framework for M&E which systematically draws from these different sources of data and reporting
frameworks to provide a coherent regional picture and to track resilience activities and outcomes The
most recent 3RP M&E and Information Management Workshop (18-19 February 2015) addressed:
1) the establishment of minimum standards for regional reporting on the output level; 2) ideas and
actions for more in-depth quarterly dashboard reporting at the outcome level; 3) the current state of
assessment, prioritization and targeting – and proposed actions; 4) map existing capacities and gaps.
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4.3 Conceptual challenges
Another problem that the Facility and 3RP face is that not all key stakeholders see the value of a
sub-regional resilience lens. As foregrounded in other sections, host countries have their own unique
contexts and priorities to deal with, and it has been argued by a few interview respondents that there
is little benefit for some of the individual countries involved to adopt a regional lens. One respondent
suggested that Lebanon, for example, would be better off going it alone – presumably in terms of
its individual political capacity to raise funds from the international community and in terms of being
fully in control of its own agenda – particularly given its extraordinary history of resilience and political
capacity. Lebanon was also often cited as a complex example given its historical experience with
refugees. These objections notwithstanding, most interview respondents acknowledged that the
approach to 3RP – based on national plans as the starting point – was an important factor in at least
partially addressing this concern.
Also touched on above, is the persistent questioning of a small number of interview respondents
(over the range of stakeholder types interviewed) regarding the conceptualization of the resilience
agenda as being separate from refugees. The 3RP objectives frame the ‘Resilience/Stabilizationbased development component’ as addressing the resilience and stabilization needs of impacted and
vulnerable communities and to build the capacity of delivery systems – strengthening governments
to lead the crisis response. However, a small number of interview respondents made a case for
including refugees in the conceptualization of resilience. First, this was argued by one respondent
to make sense given the obvious need to support the resilience of refugees and to provide the
necessary support to assist with such resilience. Second, there was a strong argument made that
the delivery of resilience support to host governments and communities would invariably include the
support of services which refugees access and rely upon and there was in this sense no separation
in reality.
On the other hand, there is an obvious political problem here in that governments have differing views
and challenges in relation to the acceptance, or assumption, of a long-term presence of refugees
in host communities and taking a resilience approach in this respect runs directly into such political
sensitivities. These problems are no doubt well understood by both the Facility and the UNDP. And
as the Facility itself has argued, national plans remain the most suitable forum to address some of
the most sensitive issues, such as refugee inclusion.45 As such, national plans are not only essential
for programmer coherence and national ownership, but for obvious political reasons.
As put forward in the Berlin Communique, for the international community, the UNDG, UNDP and
the Facility in particular, resilience inside Syria constitutes the next step. The challenge of building
resilience in Syria raises many questions such as: resilience for what, for whom, and even with
whom – government, local authorities, rebel groups? For UNDP, the response must first and foremost
be centered inside Syria to address humanitarian needs and to stabilize lives, livelihoods, and the
resilience of communities. Through the SRP in 2015, UNDP plans to support 2.3 million Syrians
through our recovery projects in Syria, while also creating 100,000 emergency jobs. This approach is
necessary in view of the massive needs, and also because every investment in stabilizing livelihoods
in Syria can also help stem part of the flow of refugees out of the country.
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4.4 Knowledge management and innovation challenges
While critical aspects of the Facility’s KM and innovation work clearly continues – in many cases
reaching critical momentum – the collection of KM and innovation products and tools most readily
identifiable as part of the KM strategy developed by the KM adviser have more recently stalled. The
Facility-moderated Teamworks Blog on resilience initially commanded a great deal of attention, but
has been inactive in the last part of 2014 and early 2015.46 Many of the products and tools identified
in the KM planning stages have not been systematically implemented, and online community of
practice approaches appear to have lost momentum.
This loss of momentum can be largely attributed to a broader problem with human resources.
While the KM adviser put in place the systems, products, templates and mechanisms to build a
comprehensive KM/Innovation framework, the Facility did not have a dedicated KM team member
in place, after the HQ Bureau in charge of providing KM expertise (BPPS) discontinued this kind of
assistance to the Facility. While the Facility continues with innovation workshops, sharing knowledge
and hosting conversations through social media forums, and contributing to resilience discourse
through stakeholder forums, the community of practice side of KM has not been sustained with the
intensity required to keep stakeholders engaged in meaningful ways.
4.5 Funding and other challenges
As a facilitator of processes and outcomes, rather than a direct implementer, the Facility is in a
delicate position. It has to claim a significant contribution towards achieving tangible (plans, products,
funds) and less-than-tangible outcomes (for example the paradigm shift) to demonstrate meeting its
mandate. Resource mobilization is an example. The Facility was widely acknowledged by external
stakeholders interviewed as having created a facilitating environment for resource mobilization for
the resilience community as a whole. In particular, it has substantially contributed to the creation of
a resilience funding niche in SRP and the 3RP, opening it to a wide range of partners such as UN
agencies, NGOs and governments in the region.
The Facility has also contributed with others to a significant increase in UNDP’s 2014 financial
resources in response to the Syria, in relation to previous years. Country Offices particularly
welcomed the Facility’s support in building relationships with non-traditional donors, and those not
present in-country. At the same time, the Facility had to acknowledge the centrality of other actors
in these successes, and coordinate closely with them, both to reflect reality and to ensure ongoing
productive collaborative relationships. This was not only the case in regard to Country Offices but
also RBAS. An example is the recent $10m commitment from the US government, which both the
Facility and RBAS facilitated. Other examples include Germany’s support for resilience in Lebanon
and Syria, and Canadian support to municipalities in Lebanon.
In its startup year, the Facility had inadequate financial and human resources to match the
expectations of UNDP and stakeholders. It was striking that in the course of this study, different
external interviewees suggested that the Facility prioritize and attend to relationships at all levels,
from the UNDG and the EU to the local religious NGO servicing a few hundred people on the ground,
in six countries. To this end, the Facility made good use of SURGE capacity,47 but with such a
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transient workforce, it was often commented that only constant was the director himself. With regard
to finances, the Facility was initially supported by ‘emergency’ funds, taking up a large part of the
RBAS budget. There was an unrealistic expectation from HQ that the Facility would become selfsustaining within six months of operations, which was an impossible task for an unknown structure
belonging to an agency considered a newcomer on the Syria crisis. As interviews with donors also
showed, while there is some scope to fund regional projects, funding tends to be country based.
Without a clear financial horizon and with ad hoc support, it was a challenge for the Facility to remain
focused, bold and consistent in its mission. Several interviews suggested that the Facility spread itself
too thin, and in the future, its work could be more streamlined and focused around core functions.
In other words, the expectations should have been scaled down according to the resources. Some
felt knowledge management activities not-in-demand should be cut. At the same time, others at the
field level stressed the Facility’s obligation to deliver on 3RP, and asked for more KM products and
research across the region, which would require greater resources. On balance, significant areas of
the Facility’s inter-agency coordination, knowledge innovation, and resource mobilization mandate
were under-resourced in the period under review, but it accomplished a lot with what it had.
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5 LESSONS LEARNED
5.1 Resilience is a best practice and any future response should have
resilience from the beginning
The lesson from the Syria response is that humanitarian and development responses to a complex,
multidimensional crisis should be seen as a contiguum, with both aspects included from the start.
Indeed, resilience is better understood as a new modus operandi than as a pillar or a component.
The resilience approach goes beyond the old idea of a linear continuum between humanitarian and
development. Coping and recovery are now widely understood as being very close.
As a concept, resilience has been highly successful in bringing together the humanitarian and
development actors on the Syria crisis. The timing was right, in that the crisis was protracted,
and donors were calling for solutions to ensure refugees would not depend on aid indefinitely.
Governments, too, required support for not only refugees but host communities, and strengthening of
government systems to cope with increasing pressures. In this context, the Facility was responding to
an existing demand, and formalizing and providing a framework to meet an understood need.
As many interviewees pointed out, technically speaking, resilience-building is not the exclusive
domain of development. Some humanitarian interventions can be implemented under a resilience
approach, with a view to longer term impact. This is perhaps why it appealed to and resonated with
both humanitarian and development actors. Resilience is commonly integrated in work with refugees
from the outset, and as such, could be understood as a cross-cutting theme. Therefore, categorizing
a resilience component as distinct from a refugee component should be discussed further as the
resilience concept is deepened in the coming year. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
as well as the International Labor Organization (ILO) take a resilience approach with refugees, for
example. Again, technically speaking, the distinction between the refugee and resilience components
in 3RP is more one between humanitarian and development approaches. Resilience itself, as it is
understood more broadly outside 3RP, in fact spans across the components. This is also the case
within Syria, where resilience can be built along with the provision of basic services.
Several interviewees with a more traditional humanitarian background – including donors and
implementers – admitted they have a hard time relating to development practitioners, who ‘speak
a different language.’ Further, some of the humanitarian actors interviewed seemed protective of
their (humanitarian) mandates – in other words, turf and funds. At the same time, however, it was
reported that many INGOs working in this space cover both realms, whether in integrated or side-byside projects. It is telling that interviewees reflected that INGO project designs in the sub-region are
funded as emergency work, yet bring in development approaches, in practice. The sentiment among
them was that the humanitarian response is easier to “sell” to the public, but in practice, relief work is
an excellent entry point for building resilience.
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5.2 A regional resilience accountability and M&E framework is critical to
effectively account for investments
The toolkit including the interactive dashboard being developed in the IMAS pilot in Lebanon has
great potential in addressing the aid effectiveness agenda that concerns most donors, and could
become a best practice. There is a need for a hybrid (development/humanitarian) accountability
framework which is capable of robust M&E and impact measurement in a crisis situation. To be suited
to a crisis situation, it needs to be flexible, responsive, and not time or resource intensive. To be
clear, we are not referring to a results framework for Facility itself, which is fairly straightforward to
develop, and does exist. We are referring to an accountability and M&E framework for Resilience –
in this case, the resilience component of 3RP.
The importance of accountability and M&E cannot be stressed enough. It was widely commented
in the interviews with UN agencies and INGOs that previous appeals had not been fully funded,
and that it should be a priority for the Facility to ‘troubleshoot’ and facilitate donor commitments to
3RP. From the perspective of donors, the single most important concern beyond political or strategic
interests, was getting value for money, and evidence to assure them that their investments would
make a visible impact in the target countries. Such evidence is needed both to satisfy their own
governments, and also the taxpayers to whom they are accountable. Donors as a whole are risk
adverse, and seek partners with a solid track record, and initiatives that will make a measurable
difference.
Related to this, donors would like appeals to give priorities and supporting data, so they may
strategically fund parts. Furthermore, it was commented by one donor that in the absence of priorities
and supporting data in 3RP, many donors are guided by their own priorities. This, in turn, results in
multiple like-minded donors supporting similar interventions – and other important areas perhaps
remaining uncovered, because the case for them is not evident. As a way to address this, IMAS
could be used to support prioritization strategies – both in terms of importance and in terms of
sequencing – and to provide a transparent methodology to inform and map donor contributions.
5.3 Contextualizing the approach to each country context in the sub region
is essential
Across the interviews with UN agencies and INGOs, a theme emerged that it is essential to
contextualize 3RP and its operationalization, as well as advocacy and KM materials. This should
be done while at the same time benefiting from looking at regional coherence, regional advocacy,
regional appeals and regional reporting indicators. The interviewees in this study’s emphasis on
contextualization is not unique to this sub-region, or to this crisis; it is common in any humanitarian or
development activity that the approach must be contextualized. However, the 3RP experience shows
that a sub-regional refugee and IDP crisis is inherently political – arguably more so than natural
disaster or drought – , there are heightened government and inter-governmental sensitivities related
to security, state sovereignty, nationality, citizenship, human rights, and social cohesion, among
others.
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Despite the urgency to act immediately, meaningful consultation with in-country stakeholders and
partners is necessary, as it allows for the necessary adaptation to take place. Governments in
particular perceived the regional emphasis of the earlier RRPs as a form of conditionality, as they
began working on their national plans. However, in the 3RP process in 2014, participants we
interviewed noted that the Facility advocated for the centrality of national plans, and encouraged
these to be debated and endorsed. It is important for these processes to be staged so as to feed into
the overall sub-regional strategy, rather than parallel efforts.
In Lebanon, for example, the UN and the Government of Lebanon jointly developed the Lebanon
Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), which is based on a full integration of the Resilience/Stabilization and
humanitarian/refugee dimensions, unlike the 3RP which contains distinct pillars. Despite efforts from
the Facility to convince the UN team in Lebanon to apply the pillar approach, the RC/HC maintained
the position to develop an integrated plan. This divergence in approach was not fully embraced by
the Facility during the development of the 3RP, and as a consequence, the alignment of the LCRP
with the 3RP was labor intensive, although successfully achieved. In 2015 this has changed, as the
Facility supports LCRP.
5.4 Ad-hoc response requires a flexible but widely understood ToR to
facilitate stakeholder support
By virtue of its innovative character, interviewees across the board expressed great interest in
knowing more specifically what the Facility does. It was almost universally suggested that the Facility
could define itself more clearly vis-à-vis UNDP Headquarters, COs, and the Regional Center (which
is moving from Cairo to Amman in 2015). To satisfy this demand requires updating and sharing
widely its TOR. While it was acknowledged in the interviews that most agencies or offices do not
share their TORs, it was pointed out that there is not much need, because they are widely known
and understood. The Facility, on the other hand, is a pioneer, and its purpose would be served by
disseminating information about its role and functions. At the same time, the TOR requires some
built-in flexibility, allowing the Facility to evolve in response to the emerging and far-from-predictable
situation in the sub-region.
Related to this, the experience of the Facility shows the need for a clear strategy for meeting its
mandate through an integrated human resources element, to avoid the lost momentum and changing
direction that results from high staff turnover with changing focuses. More broadly, there needs to a
be realistic assessment of the resources required to meet the mandate, with funding committed for
2-3 years in addition to Surge capacity. Or as an alternative, lower expectations, and send only 2-3
people on special mission for a year, and secure self-funding before developing a structure. The
difficulty in the latter option is that it would be difficult for a development agency to be a credible or
viable actor in a multidimensional crisis space, with only a handful of staff on the ground. As it was,
the Facility was dwarfed by the budgets and staff of UNHCR, OCHA and others who immediately set
up sub-regional hubs in Jordan at the start of the crisis. UNICEF, for example, is like UNDP in that it
does not usually operate sub-regionally, however in this case, it did establish a sub-regional presence
in Jordan, early on.
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5.5 The United Nations Development Group is an effective operational
mechanism for coordination
The UNDG, and the Regional UNDG for Arab States, Middle East and North Africa, offer a
convenient operational mechanism for coordinating a multi-agency response to a complex crisis. The
Facility’s strategy to work through R-UNDG gave the Resilience agenda a platform for advocacy and
a natural ‘home’ with other like-minded development actors. This gave it more strength when entering
a field dominated by humanitarians, mainly UNHCR. It also was useful at the highest level of UNDG,
to engage through a global network to include Turkey as well as Arab States/MENA. While the Syria
crisis is often thought of as an Arab States/MENA issue, close to half the Syrian refugees are in fact
hosted by Turkey, which is outside the region and also outside the purview of R-UNDG (see Figure
3 below).48 This is not always understood, because Turkey has done such a good job in addressing
refugee’s needs, mainly outside of camps. By operating though UNDG as well as R-UNDG, the
Facility has facilitated communications links across regional lines, with Turkey participating on an
equal basis.
Figure 3: Map of countries covered by UNDP’s
Sub-Regional Response Facility
Turkey
Syria
Lebanon
Iraq
Jordan
Egypt
Key: Light shading indicates RBAS/R-UNDG coverage
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6 REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS
From the outset, the Facility needs to agree on its priorities for 2015 with RBAS and other
stakeholders, and resource them accordingly. More than ever the Facility needs secured financing,
at least for its key personnel. If for no other reason, its sub-regional coordination role demands this.
All reports indicate that refugees and IDPs will be an enduring presence in the sub-region for the
next ten years. Just when the other major partners are planning long term strategies, it is all the
more striking that UNDP has yet to commit significant financial resources to the Facility in the coming
year, commensurate with its mandate and stakeholder expectations. With this in mind, the review
recommends the following:
6.1 Syria is central to the crisis, so the Facility should put Syria at the
center
The Facility is the most well positioned UNDP mechanism in the sub-region to engage in a forward–
looking strategic planning process, paving the way for recovery with a view towards an eventual
return. Within Syria, UNDP’s work is now preparing Syria for that return. While the UNDP country
office is building access and trust between government partners and the NGO network that operates
on the ground, the Facility must be equipped to act across the sub-region to ensure an integrated
and coordinated response. To this end, the Facility should contribute its technical expertise on
resilience in complex crisis situations, and strengthen and mobilize its network of resilience experts
and consultants.
With regard to advocacy, our recommendation is that UNDP and more specifically, the Facility, seek
to find acceptable ways to acknowledge Syria’s centrality and integrate it in the broader discussion
on building resilience. The conditions Syrians find themselves in as IDPs and refugees, are inherently
connected to what is happening in Syria today. It is widely acknowledged that there are common
drivers to the crisis that affect Syria as well as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Iraq. Furthermore,
the Berlin Communiqué asks for development resources to go into Syria. And the UNDG advocates
for a ‘continued focus within Syria itself on addressing humanitarian needs, working to support
livelihoods, and building the resilience of communities.’49
To respond to the crisis in a sustainable and cost-effective manner requires considering resilience
in the Whole of Syria.50 The Syria CO has already initiated work in this direction; Facility could
reinforce the resilience message there, and provide more support as country needs are identified.
The Syria CO has already mobilized $50m for the development of early recovery support for Syria,
inside Syria, and this should be expanded. While humanitarian actors address WASH, protection,
health and access to food, UNDP in Syria is working with building the capacity of GoS on ‘systems of
recovery’, and is also experimenting with mechanisms for rubble recycling and removal, for example,
using eight small crushers at the border. The fact that UNDP does this in Syria, and is in fairly good
standing, means that it will be well (and uniquely) positioned to do early recovery and livelihoods
programming, when refugees eventually return.
Because the resilience approach goes beyond provision of basic services, it has also the advantage
of bringing other ‘soft’ interventions into the picture, such as local governance and community
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dialogue. These could enhance the scope of intervention in Syria, especially since the UN is now
engaging in the “freeze zones” approach to stabilize livelihoods in Syria, and also help stem part
of the flow of refugees out of the country. This requires building on existing initiative and scaling up
in so-called pockets of peace. A resilience approach is all the more necessary because as several
politically well informed interviewees observed, the landscape in Syria has changed since two years
ago, when there was talk of regime change. Now, there are reportedly prospects for the regime and
moderate opposition to agree to fight the militant group. This would open up the potential for at least
a partial return.
6.2 Support generation and uptake of local, regional and global knowledge
innovation on resilience
As a thought leader, the Facility should continue to stimulate new knowledge on resilience. Many
people interviewed are looking to UNDP for this, and the Facility with its combined crisis and
development outlook is well suited to respond. First and foremost, it would be valuable for the Facility
to challenge UNDP and others to think about what the sub-region will be going through in the next ten
years. If and when there is a (partial) return on the horizon, what does this look like? How can UNDP
and others position themselves to respond? As co-chair of the Joint Secretariat, it could convene
eminent global thinkers on this, and make a contribution to significant knowledge gap.51 Furthermore,
the upcoming Resilience Development Forum52 could be activated virtually through the existing
Teamworks Blog or a series of Ted-X talks, before the face-to-face event, and followed by a Human
Development Report type report, if funds allow.
Regardless of the specific initiatives, it is recommended that knowledge innovation respond to
expressed needs, and involve local and regional researchers and think tanks to the extent possible,
including those in Syria itself, and ESCWAS. In this regard, several interviewees expressed that the
premise of the Facility has always been and should in the coming year be to analyze resilience and
the crisis response across the six countries and two regions. At the same time, it was suggested that
as a thought leader, the Facility should be challenging itself in the future to ask what likely to happen
in Syria and across the sub-region, when refugees return to Syria, as the international community will
be looking to UNDP on that. If and when there is a partial return on the horizon, what does this look
like and how to respond, from a resilience perspective?
6.3 Prioritize 3RP and SRP resource mobilization, in close coordination with
RCs, COs and RBAS
A top priority is for the Facility to mobilize resources internationally for 3RP. In the first quarter of
2015, the Facility has supported the lead-up to Kuwait 3 which took place on 31 March 2015, as well
as strengthening dialogue with donors who have expressed interest in 3RP since it was launched
in Berlin in December 2014. Resource mobilization this year will support the whole resilience/
development community, the R-UNDG, the Resident Coordinator (RC) system, and COs. This will
require close coordination with COs, especially when meeting with traditional donors in-county,
as well as RBAS, which also has strong relationships with key donors. It will also demand further
exploration of private sector partnerships in the region. All of this will in turn rely on dedicated
capacities to strategically advise donors and governments on how to prioritize and optimize resilience
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resources. An unprecedented investment in resilience, as called for in Kuwait 3, will certainly require
an unprecedented level of accountability and transparency. As discussed below, the realization of
IMAS will be critical to enabling this.
Development partners are beginning to re-align their capacities and resources with the new
challenging political, humanitarian, development and security needs facing the region. As agreed in
the 3RP, a Resilience Development Forum (RDF) will be convened in 2015 to provide analysis and
discussion needed for this re-alignment. The forum’s main goal is to bring together leaders from
government, the international community, civil society, think tanks and the private sector to work
around a common vision, brainstorm on the best ways to overcome the most pressing development
challenges posited by the Syria-related crisis and mobilize technology, knowledge and financial
resources to better address the Syria crisis in the region. This will require not only RBAS and the
Facility’s support but also that of Resident Coordinators in all affected countries, to follow-up with
government representatives and development stakeholders at national levels.
6.4 Invest in reaching IMAS potential through concerted stakeholder
negotiation/political effort
The Information Management and Information System (IMAS) should be a flagship initiative for
UNDP in the sub-region. The expansion of the successful IMAS Lebanon pilot across the sub-region
is a challenging but essential goal. It goes hand in hand with resource mobilization, because the
IMAS agenda is essentially about aid effectiveness in crisis contexts. It provides an interactive
mechanism for determining needs and monitoring results on the ground, across the sub-region. It
offers donors and governments alike a way to access evidence to determine funding priorities,
avoid duplication, get value for money, and account for how it has been spent. Success in this
regard will depend on the Facility’s advocacy – as co-chair of the Joint Secretariat – for data sharing
agreements, and working with donors and governments to require implementing partners and
service providers to provide data to feed the system. In particular, it is necessary to articulate clear
incentives for OCHA and other humanitarian actors to participate in the system, demonstrating what
they will gain from it.
If IMAS tools are rolled out across the sub-region – on a country-by-country basis and then integrated
into a regional framework – the system can provide the basis for the complete suite of data needs
required to support and monitor the implementation and effectiveness of 3RP. It would allow for
the aggregation of data to report against indicators which would provide a basis for tracking 3RP
and monitoring the commitment to, and impact of, the resilience approach to the crisis. With a
standardized set of indicators, all the actors would be reporting contributions against these indicators
providing a regional picture of commitments and outcomes within an overarching coordinated
framework. There is already considerable movement towards achieving sub-regional use of these
tools, in Jordan, for example.
6.5 Develop an M&E / impact framework for 3RP that is a hybrid between
humanitarian and development approaches
A humanitarian/development M&E/impact framework should be designed with the Facility’s support,
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to meet the development community’s expectations regarding measurement, sustainability of
interventions, and rigor. As custodian of 3RP, UNDP along with UNHCR is obliged to account for
what is being funded, and provide evidence to allow for better targeting. This is all the more essential
for UNDP to take up, in light of the fact that several donors interviewed have not received what they
consider to be adequate evidence of the impact of their contributions to the previous appeal, the
UNHCR-led 6th Regional Response Plan (RRP6). The data needs for addressing this shortfall could
be realized through a regional roll out of the IMAS suite of tools and integrated platforms for analysis.
6.6 Respond to CO requests for guidance on how to operationalize
resilience and bring it to life
Through the provision of both sub-regional knowledge tools and country-specific support and tailored
advice (for example, regarding the private sector), the Facility should respond to CO requests for
guidance on operationalizing resilience. What factors enable resilience in this context? What are the
obstacles to resilience and can anything be done about them? What does a resilient host community
look like? How to integrate a resilience approach and indicators in existing programming? As most
COs as well as the Regional hub lack expertise in this area, guidance from the Facility would add
value. Some of the COs would also appreciate guidance from the Facility on their new role as
country co-leaders of resilience.
6.7 Match human resources and capacity to meet identified knowledge
management needs
UNDP generally has a strong community of practice approach. UNDP staff rank KM networks
as one of the most important tools at their disposal. With this in mind, the Facility could do more
to understand the KM and Innovation needs of the COs and other stakeholders, to ensure that
they are responding to needs on the ground, and to better integrate the work of the Facility with
implementation. This would improve engagement and uptake. It is difficult to say with any certainty
how pivotal such KM tools and products were in gaining broader stakeholder support and in
contributing to the shift in discourse toward resilience in 2014. However, it is fair to say that KM is
central to moving forward if the Facility focuses on supporting the implementation of the resilience
agenda. It could also be critical for creating momentum on the ground, to ensure the kind of broader
ownership and inclusion that could stimulate the necessary coordination, cooperation and data
sharing necessary for the success of the 3RP agenda. The KM approach which is now in motion
has potential for greater impact if prioritized. It could link up and align with broader corporate KM
structures in the UN system. This is important for keeping the work of the Facility ‘on the map’.
6.8 Translate the sub-regional resilience approach to other contexts
The sub-regional resilience approach should be shared widely for adaptation and adoption in other
contexts in the Arab States / Middle East / North Africa region and internationally. In the region,
UNDP could look to apply the resilience approach to Yemen and Libya. In Yemen for example,
fighting is fragmenting the country and could spread if parties do not immediately de-escalate. It is
far more cost effective to intervene now, rather than later, and UNDP should not be wasting any more
time. As UNDP has learned from its experience in Syria, it should be forecasting scenarios, and quick
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to use its existing networks on the ground as a platform to scale up an aid response if the situation
escalates. At the same time, applying a resilience approach, UNDP would be well advised to focus on
opportunities with local actors to strengthen livelihoods and coping mechanisms.
More generally, the Teamworks Blog provides a convenient forum for cross-regional dissemination.
To kick start discussion, it could be useful to convene representatives from national governments,
UN agencies, NGOs, regional organizations and researchers to exchange on practices and lessons
learnt on resilience building in conflict-related crisis situations.53 The Facility could also explore
opportunities to disseminate the results of such an event, and the research it supports, through
international networks like the Crisis Resilience Alliance (CRA) in Canada. Among other aims, the
CRA is concerned with how to improve crisis management and develop resilient organizations and
communities around the world. This is but a few examples of a number of opportunities to share
UNDP’s experiences with resilience in the Syria-related crisis.
6.9 Explicitly link the resilience agenda to security
There needs to be better engagement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UNSG)’s
Special Envoy, the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) to engage Syria on different terms. On 19th January 2015 the UN Security
Council urged a common United Nations approach to inclusive development as a key for preventing
conflict and enabling sustainable peace. Ban Ki Moon called for the UN to break out of its silos and
work together on all three pillars of the UN, namely Peace and Security, Development and Human
Rights. The 3RP process has demonstrated the importance of working as one, not only integrating
resilience and refugee but harmonizing operational modalities, joint planning, monitoring and
reporting across countries.
The shortfall of the 3RP process remains the integration of the security dimension and closer
partnership with DPA, DPKO and the wider UN system. As social cohesion deteriorates, as
youth radicalization increases, as stability in the region is threatened because of the reversal of
development and the fragility of certain institutions, and as fighting in Syria and Iraq has become
a coping mechanism to access livelihoods, UNDP is well positioned to respond the UN Secretary
General and UNSC demands for a more integrated approach. Further, given the Facility’s experience
in working on an integrated and multi-country response to the Syria crisis, it is well placed to further a
conceptual and practical integration of resilience and security agendas.
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
UN Documents:
ODI / UNDP. Towards a resilience-based response to the Syrian refugee crisis: A critical review of
vulnerability criteria and frameworks. May 2014.
UNDG Arab States, Middle East, North Africa. Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria
Crisis – Position Paper. DRAFT October 2013. This Position Paper is based on a draft Discussion
Paper that was prepared as a background document in advance of the regional United Nations
Development Group meeting in Amman on November 4, 2013.
UNDG Arab States, Middle East, North Africa. Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria
Crisis – Position Paper 2014.
UNDP. Comprehensive Regional Strategy. DRAFT 29 November 2013.
UNDP. Responding to the Syria Crisis: Strengthening Resilience. 2014.
UNDP. A resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis. 2014.
UNDP. Barriers and Opportunities at the Base of the Pyramid: The Role of the Private Sector in
Inclusive Development. 2014.
UNDP. Building resilience – UNDP in the sub region 2015.
UNDP. Subregional Innovation Jam in Response to the Syria crisis, 26 October 2014. Concept note
for a regional event bringing together UNDP Country Offices from Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq,
Egypt and Turkey to learn how to create new pathways in response to the Syria Crisis.
UNDP Lebanon. Lebanon Crisis Response: Support to Host Communities. 2014.
UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States Sub Regional Response Facility. After One Cycle: Next
Generation Development Response. Draft 3 February 2015.
UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States Sub Regional Response Facility. The Centrality of National
Plans and Capacities in Responding to the Syrian Crisis. Discussion Paper, 25 March 2014.
UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States Sub Regional Response Facility. A Crowd-Funding Platform
for Syria Response. 2014.
UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States Sub Regional Response Facility. Taking Stock: 100 Days of
the Sub-Regional Response Facility: Responding to the Syrian Crisis. 2014.
UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States. Establishment of a Subregional Multidisciplinary Task Force
(SMTF) to better address development challenges of the Syrian-related crisis. Concept Note – First
Draft. 2013.
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UNDP / UNHCR. Memorandum of Understanding between UNDP and UNHCR – regional
cooperation on the Syria and Iraq situations. 17 September 2014.
UNHCR-UNDP Joint Secretariat. Compendium of Good and Innovative practices in the regional
response to the Syria Crisis, Volume 1. 2015.
UNHCR-UNDP Joint Secretariat. Resilient Municipalities: A Resource for Countries affected by the
Syria Crisis. 2015.
UNHCR-UNDP Joint Secretariat. Regional Trends in the Impact of the Syria Crisis on Livelihoods and
Opportunities: A Socioeconomic Study of Impacts and Opportunities. Syria Crisis Discussion Paper
Series. 2015.
UNHCR-UNDP Joint Secretariat. Regional Trends and patterns in Social Cohesion: The Impact of
the Syria Crisis on the Social Structures of Countries Affected. Syria Crisis Discussion Paper Series.
2015.
Regional and Country Plans:
3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – In Response to the Syria Crisis. Regional
Strategic Overview. Available at: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/
3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – Egypt. Available at http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/
the-3rp/egypt/
3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – Iraq. Available at: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/
the-3rp/iraq/
3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – Lebanon. The Lebanon chapter of the 3RP is
based on the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan with the complete document available at: http://bit.ly/
LCRP_Full_EN
3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – Jordan. The Jordan chapter of the 3RP
consists of the Jordan Response Plan, with the complete document available at: http://jrpsc.org/
jrp-publications/
3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – Turkey. Available at: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.
org/the-3rp/turkey/
3RP Key Reference Documents & Updates. Key background documents, newsletters and updates on
the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). 20 Nov 2014.
3RP Information Management, Monitoring & Evaluation, and Reporting Workshop, 13 October 2014.
Agenda, presentations and other information on the Regional 3RP IM, M&E and Reporting Workshop
held in Amman, Jordan, on 13 October 2014.
3RP Regional Technical Workshop Report, 3-4 September 2014.
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3RP Regional Guidance & Methodology. Collection of regional guidance notes and templates for the
development of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). 02 Sep 2014.
UNCHR. Syria Regional Response Plan 2014: Strategic Overview (RRP6). Available at: http://www.
unhcr.org/52b170e49.html.
OCHA. Syrian Arab Republic, Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2015.
OCHA. Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan 2014 (SHARP). Available at: https://docs.
unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2014_Syria_SHARP.pdf
The upcoming Financing for Development Conference provides an opportunity to better engage
multilateral banks in mobilizing additional resources, including in middle income countries.
UNHCR-UNDP, Regional Trends and patterns in Social Cohesion. Syria Crisis Discussion Paper,
2015.
UNDP. The Centrality of National Plans and Capacities in Responding to the Syrian Crisis. RBAS
SRF Draft Discussion Paper, 17 April 2014.
Teamworks Resilience Working Group is accessible to registered development practitioners at
https://www.unteamworks.org/resilienceWG
SURGE is a mechanism that allows UNDP to deploy staff rapidly within days of a crisis. In addition
to the immediate response team, additional advisors can be sent for three month periods. See https://
intranet.undp.org/unit/bcpr/rrsg/SitePages/surge.aspx
With nearly 4 million Sryian refugees registered as of March 26, 2015, 1.7 million are in Turkey, close
to 1.2 million in Lebanon, 627,295 in Jordan, 246,836 in Iraq, and 133,619 in Egypt.
UNDG Chair Helen Clark’s speech available at: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/
presscenter/speeches/2015/03/31/helen-clark-statement-at-the-third-international-humanitarianpledging-conference-for-syria.html
The ‘Whole of Syria’ approach refers to the effort of humanitarian actors operating inside Syria from
Damascus or across the Turkish and Jordanian borders to improve the effectiveness and operational
reach of their collective responses. It was agreed in Beirut on 3 September 2014, following the
adoption of resolutions 2139 and 2165 by the United Nations Security Council.
Transition scenarios, including full regime collapse, partial regime collapse, or a negotiated transfer
of power.
As agreed in the 3RP, a Resilience Development Forum will be convened in 2015 to provide
analysis and discussion needed to re-align capacity and resources to meet new needs in the region.
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ANNEX 2: COMMUNICATIONS, OUTREACH AND
ADVOCACY TOOLS
PUBLICATIONS
Responding to the Syria Crisis: Strengthening Resilience
This report covers the quick-impact development interventions that UNDP
designed to respond to the crisis, trigger early recovery, support inclusive
economic growth and build resilience.
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/CPR/
Responding_Syria_Crisis_Strengthening_Resilience/
Resilience –based Development Response to the Syria crisis. This
brochure provides an overview of how UNDP works within the Resiliencebased development framework to respond to the needs at the country level
that allows clear accountability for results and converges on supporting
affected communities and societies.
A resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis
This document outlines the core principles of the Resilience base
development response to the Syria crisis. The overall goal is to frame a
resilience based development approach for Syria and neighboring countries.
The approach is to ensure that basic resources, infrastructures, especially
the housing sector and services, can cope with the pressure from increased
demand; that households are supported to recover and protected against
becoming further impoverished.
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/CPR/aresilience-based-development-response-to-the-syria-crisis/
Towards a resilience-based response to the Syrian refugee crisis
The paper is the work of ODI, the paper supports the operationalization of a
resilience-based development approach to dealing with the Syrian refugee
crisis by exploring how stakeholders understand the current challenges
and approach vulnerability and criteria that could inform the targeting and
prioritization of resilience-based development efforts.
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/CPR/
Towards_resilience_based_response_Syrian_refugee_crisis/
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UNDP Response to the Syria Crisis; Facts and Figures Brochure
This brochure summarizes the most relevant data on the Syria Crisis and its
impact on the sub-region. It presents UNDP’s resilience-based development
approach and shows the links between the refugee crisis and its economic,
demographic consequences on host countries and impacted communities.
http://arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/CPR/responseto-the-syria-crisis--facts-and-figures/
Building resilience – UNDP in the sub region 2015
This publication makes the case for a robust investment in the resilience
of people, communities and institutional systems affected by the crisis.
It also gives an overview of UNDP’s proposed interventions and funding
requirements in each of the six countries in the sub-region.
3RP leaflet
This foldable document presents the 3RP strategic shift from a humanitarian
to a resilience-based development response to the Syria crisis, highlighting
how the innovative planning process at country and regional level is
expected to enhance response effectiveness, and increase cost-efficiency of
interventions.
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/
SyriaResponse/3RP%20leaflet-FINAL-lowres.pdf
3RP preview brochure
This brochure presents a comprehensive summary of the context that led to
the elaboration of the 3RP, its innovative approach and expected benefits, as
well as regional and country specific chapters.
http://www.arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/library/CPR/3-rpregional-refugee--resilience-plan-2015--2016-/
VIDEOS/PHOTO
Video introducing the resilience concept
This video explores the main pillars of the UNDP resilience-based
development approach. It features statistics related to the crisis in Syria and
how it has affected the host countries, and explains how building resilience is
the best response in a region that is exposed to a wide range of shocks.
English: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hFjZ1Nr9EXE
Arabic: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lh9wmWjgpTQ
Two 360° photo reportages
showcase current projects in Lebanon and Jordan, focusing on resilience.
This new style of interactive photography offers visitors the opportunity to
explore the story ‘as if they were there’ by immersing themselves in the
moving images and audio.
http://360jordan.undp.org/ and http://360lebanon.undp.org/
Photo Competition
In 2014, the Facility launched a Facebook-based photo contest “Faces of
Resilience” that aimed at collecting photos that tell the story of resilience in
communities impacted by the Syria crisis in the sub-region. There were more
than 90 submissions received. The contest reached over 300,000 viewers
and the submissions came from all target countries. An exhibition is being
organized.
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Faces of Resilience: Testimonial videos (Jordan/Lebanon)
The four videos tell the stories of resilience in an innovative approach,
communicated through individuals and local government officials as they
explain the challenges faced in their host countries and the text screens
demonstrate how UNDP is helping them recover from the pressure of the
crisis. Each video is 1.3 minutes long and focuses on building self-reliance.
3RP video
Showcased in Berlin on 18 December 2014, the video introduces the 3RP
and SRP as a new approach to respond to the crisis inside and outside
Syria. It explains how both plans integrate in a region-wide approach to
provide life-saving protection and assistance, strengthen essential services,
and empower communities and host governments towards greater selfreliance. The video is being translated into Arabic. http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=gmvTHkNwwLY
WEBSITES
Consolidated UNDP web presence
The UNDP’s vision for a resilience-based response is communicated through
the UNDP Regional Bureau of Arab States website, which features all relevant
documents and materials.
http://arabstates.undp.org/content/rbas/en/home/ourwork/SyriaCrisis/
Overview.html
3RP Syria crisis homepage
A one stop shop for displaying all the material related to the 3RP. The Facility
designed the structure of this site and provided content.
http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org
Sources: RBAS webpage and UNDP Teamworks
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ANNEX 3: UNHCR-UNDP JOINT SECRETARIAT
PUBLICATIONS (2015)
Resilient Municipalities: A Resource for Countries affected by the
Syria Crisis
Based on the positive experiences from country offices and other
actors in the field, this resource provides some basic tools to support
municipalities to maximize their available resources, better plan, assess,
and manage the response to the crisis, while mainstreaming a conflict
sensitive approach. Prepared by Ellen Lust et al.
A Compendium of Good and Innovative practices in the regional
response to the Syria Crisis (Volume 1)
The compendium documents good practices and innovation in the
region. It gives a snapshot of initiatives being undertaken by international
organizations in refugee-hosting countries. It is arranged by sectors
of intervention (social cohesion, livelihoods, sustainable habitat,
sustainable services) and on key programming modalities (support
to local government, cash-based programming, and information
technology).
Syria Crisis Discussion Paper Series Prepared by Roger Zetter et al.
Regional Trends in the Impact of the Syria Crisis on Livelihoods and
Opportunities: A Socioeconomic Study of Impacts and Opportunities
Regional Trends and patterns in Social Cohesion: The Impact of the
Syria Crisis on the Social Structures of Countries Affected
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ANNEX 4: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
NAME
POSITION/AGENCY
SRF
Mr. Gustavo Gonzalez
Sub Regional Development Coordinator
Mr. Jason Pronyk
Development Coordinator
Mr. Jonathan Zigrand
Policy & Coordination Specialist
Ms. Karin Friedrich
Special Assistant
Ms. Yasmine Sherif
Resource Mobilization Advisor (former)
Mr. Maximo Halty
IM Advisor
REGIONAL
Ms. Anita Nirody
UN Resident Coordinator Egypt
Mr. Ignacio Artaza Zuriarrain
UNDP Country Director Egypt
Mr. Janthomas Hiemstra
UNDP Country Director Syria
Mr. Adam Abdelmoula
UNDP Country Director Iraq
Mr. Kamal Malhotra
UN Resident Coordinator Turkey
Ms . Matilda Dimovska
UNDP Deputy Resident Representative Turkey
Mr. Edward Kallon
UN Resident Coordinator Jordan
Mr. Michael Schaadt
UN RC Strategic Planning Specialist
Ms. Zena Ali-Ahmad
UNDP Country Director Jordan
Ms. Majida Al Assaf
UNDP Program Manager Jordan
Mr. Ross Mountain
UN Resident Coordinator Lebanon
Mr. Luca Renda
UNDP Country Director Lebanon
Ms. Afke Bootsman
UNDP Programme and Coordination Specialist Lebanon
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Mr. Jos de La Haye
Team Leader Governance and Peace Building Hub for the Regional Arab States
Mr. Francois Reybert- Degat
UNHCR Deputy Director, Deputy Regional Refugee Coordinator, Regional Bureau
Ms. Mirna Yacoub
UNICEF Regional
Mr. Geoff Wiffin
UNICEF Regional
Mr. Farid Belhaj
World Bank Lebanon
Mr. Frank Hegemann
ILO Lebanon
Mr. Abdallah AlDardari
ESCWA Deputy Executive Secretary
Ms. Maria Salem
ESCWA Team Leader Reconciliation & Social Cohesion Pillar, National Agenda for the
Future of Syria
Mr. Rasmus Egendahl
WFP Regional Office
Ms. Sanjana Quazi
OCHA Regional Office
Mr. Raul Rosende
OCHA Syria
Mr. Andrea Berloffa
FAO Emergency Coordinator
UNDP HQ/ REPRESENTATION OFFICES
Mr. Mourad Wahba
Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Regional Director, Bureau for Arab States
Mr. Bruno Lemarquis
Deputy Crisis Response Unit, HQ
Mr. Owen Schumba
Team Leader, Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group, Bureau for Policy and
Programme Support (BPPS)
Dr. Samuel Doe
Policy Advisor for Crisis, Fragility and Resilience (BPPS)
Mr. Benjamin Kumpf
Knowledge Management Specialist (BPPS)
Mr. Johannes Schunter
Policy Specialist, Knowledge Services, HQ
Dr. Simona Marinescu
Chief Development Impact, HQ
Dr. Samuel Rizk
Programme Advisor, Regional Bureau for Arab States, HQ
Ms. Mireia Villar-Forner
UNDP Brussels
Ms. Glaucia Boyer
UNDP Geneva
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DONORS/PARTNERS
Dr. Eduardo Fernandez-Zinke
ECHO Team Leader Syria Crisis
Mr. David Verboom
ECHO Head of Regional Support Office
Mr. Michael Callan
Canadian Embassy - Jordan
Mr. Philippe Royan
DfID Regional Humanitarian Adviser
Ms. Amanda McLoughlin
DfID Development Representative Lebanon
Ms. Rachel Scott
OECD Resilience Advisor
Ms. Kelly Clements
US-PRM Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. Clemens Hach
MOFA Germany - Dep. HOD Lebanon / Syria
Mr. Björn Schranz
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Mr. Sergio Garcia
Danida Lebanon
INGOs
Mr. Rob Drouen
SIRF Syria INGO Regional Forum
Mr. Matthieu Rouquette
SIRF Syria INGO Regional Forum
Mr. Jack Byrne
IRC Jordan Country Director
Ms. Amy Keith
LHIF Lebanon INGO Forum
Ms. Anne-Laure Duval
World Vision Jordan
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ANNEX 5: REVIEW QUESTIONS
Overall questions:
•
What has the Facility done in the past year?
•
What should it be doing this year?
•
What are the lessons learned?
Specific questions:
•
What does the Facility do?
•
How does the work of the Facility relate to your work? How have you been involved with
the Facility?
•
In what way is the operational modality of the Facility novel? What is it about the way the
facility is set-up/operates that is different and important?
•
To what extent is the Sub-regional Response Facility necessary or not? Why?
•
Is the regional approach important? How does the Facility work with the broader regional
context?
•
What innovations have been coming out of the Facility? What is new?
•
What have been the most important conceptual changes the Facility has been involved in?
Is the resilience agenda important? Why?
•
In what ways (if at all) has the Facility driven policy discussions and changes regarding the
integration of humanitarian and development assistance? What has been the result?
•
What has been the most important or novel innovation coming out of the Facility?
•
What do you think are the most important lessons learned or that should be learned?
•
Do you think this type of Facility should be set up in response to future crises (or other
existing ones)? If so, why? How would it translate?
•
Do you have practical suggestions for improving the Facility’s work? What else could it do?
•
Are there any particular problems, issues or needs you think the Facility could respond to
in the immediate future?
•
In what ways has the Facility facilitated improved coordination between partners? Was the
3RP process inclusive?
•
What knowledge products has the Facility successfully produced or promoted/facilitated?
•
What are the major obstacles the Facility and related work has faced?
•
What could the Facility be doing better?
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
ANNEX 6: FACILITY’S RESPONSIBILITIES AS
OUTLINED IN CONCEPT NOTE
As outlined in the original concept note by the UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States (2013),
‘Establishment of a Subregional Multidisciplinary Task Force (SMTF) to better address the
development challenges of the Syria-related crisis.’
The Subregional Multidisciplinary Task Force (SMTF) will have the following responsibilities:
a. Support UNDP COs in the sub-region in the planning, programming, resource optimization, and
creation of partnerships for an effective response to the crisis. Additionally, to contribute to a better
use of the organization’s comparative advantages for improved coordination and complementarity
with other agencies of the United Nations system.
b. Develop strategic and innovative partnerships at a regional level with UN organizations, donors,
regional organizations, civil society, and the private sector, with the objective of maximizing technical
and financial resources available to best respond to the challenges of the crisis.
c. Participate in the design, roll-out of regional coordination mechanisms (humanitarian/development)
in support of the crisis. Contribute to and update situation analyses for the purpose of continuously
developing strategic and programmatic recommendations for improved coordination and coherence
of the UN’s regional work.
d. In close collaboration with regional research centers, academia and think-tanks, conduct impact
assessments, sectorial studies, stakeholders mapping and any other research to enhance the
understanding of trends, patterns, risks, and typology of the crisis in order to improve programmer
development and implementation.
e. Establish a solid knowledge management capacity in the sub-region to systematize lessons
learned and best practices in areas of technical assistance to the COs, with the objective of
improving their performance and contributing to a learning environment in a crisis context.
f. Support the development of a coherent message and supportive communication and programmatic
tools vis-à-vis governments, sister agencies, donors and other humanitarian and development actors
on the regional impact/response of UNDP.
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
ANNEX 7: FACILITY’S RESPONSIBILITIES AS
OUTLINED IN REVIEW TOR
The overall objective of the Facility is to enhance overall UNDP’s response in the sub-region and
country levels - Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt - by rallying the capacities and
resources of development partners in the sub-region and generating catalytic knowledge for a most
cost-effective resilience-based development response to the crisis. To this end, the Facility is tasked
to:
•
Act as a think-tank and as a hub to test and scale innovative development support to the
RC/HC, UN Country Teams and UNDP Country Offices, including advocacy, outreach and
resource mobilization;
•
Drive policy discussions with political, humanitarian and development partners at the subregional, regional and international level towards an integrated approach of humanitarian
and development assistance;
•
Facilitate coordination with the UN Development Group, the Bretton Woods institutions
and the humanitarian community, notably OCHA and UNHCR, through the Comprehensive
Regional Strategic Framework, the Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP), the Syrian
Humanitarian Response Plan (SHARP) and national development plans, notably in Jordan,
Lebanon and Egypt;
•
Generate evidence-based knowledge through specialized studies and research about
the impact of the crisis as well as on cost-effective interventions, with strong focus on
innovation and knowledge management;
•
Contribute to the expansion of strategic partnerships with regional development partners
and think tanks to better support the United Nation Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian
Coordinator, the United Nations Country Team and UNDP country offices in addressing the
impact of the crisis;
•
Optimize a critical mass of in-house knowledge and experience through strengthened
cross-bureau cooperation; and
•
Provide a cost-effective response through the provision of policy and programmatic
services to the UNDP Country Offices in the sub-region from a multi-disciplinary team,
opposed to placing respective staff capacities in different Country Offices.
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
ANNEX 8: EXAMPLES OF AN INTEGRATED
RESPONSE ACROSS SECTORS (3RP)
SECTOR
INTEGRATED RESPONSE
Food Security
To promote social cohesion and parity, provide assistance to vulnerable members of host communities
and food insecure refugees. For refugees outside of camps, further targeting is foreseen. Complete
the transition from in-kind food and paper voucher to e-voucher, and expand the One-Card modality.
Support small-scale family agriculture production to improve food security and income generation from
sale of agriculture products.
Protection
To protect refugees, strengthen government protection mechanisms, emphasizing protection
mainstreaming and reduction of negative coping mechanisms. Ensure non-discriminatory access,
community participation and emphasis on “do no harm” throughout the multi-sector response.
WASH
To make water, sanitation and health (WASH) services more efficient, sustainable and economical
in camps, transition from temporary solutions such as water tanking and communal latrines to piped
networks, proper drainage systems and household level latrines linked to municipal systems. Outside
camps, work with host communities and governments to improve existing services, to cope with the
increased number of beneficiaries, leaving behind improved infrastructure, services and policies, such
as water scarcity adaptation, that will remain beyond the crisis.
Education
To ensure non-discriminatory access for refugee children to participate in national formal schooling
programs in region, maintain and expand as necessary second shifts to reach as many students as
possible. Cost-effectiveness when investing in education is a valued approach throughout the region.
Basic Needs
To reach those most in need, without compounding vulnerabilities, continue to shift from in-kind
assistance to unconditional monetized assistance, prioritizing improved targeting in lieu of in-kind
assistance. Scale up cash-based responses with focus on maximizing synergies with national systems,
especially in transferring knowledge and capacity. This allows refugees more dignity and choice, as well
as injecting cash and thus supporting jobs and livelihoods in local host communities.
Shelter
To offer an alternative to camps and promote self-sustainability, support people living in camps and
settlements to participate in the local community. Also strive to upgrade properties belonging to host
families, thus enabling them to benefit from structural improvements in the long-term.
Health
To ensure access to effective national systems for refugees, support the resilience of those systems to
cope with increased demand. The development of parallel mechanisms is discouraged. Immunization,
including polio, as well as strengthening health systems’ capacity to address communicable diseases in
the region are important health priorities.
Livelihoods
To stabilize refugee families, communities and host governments as well as generate employment
and prepare for a more sustainable future, promote investments in public infrastructure in local host
communities, helping to ease the strain placed on this infrastructure by the presence of large numbers
of refugees.
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
ANNEX 9: TOP DONORS AND PLEDGES FOR
RESILIENCE (3RP)
COUNTRY
RESILIENCE PLEDGES IN USD
*EU
636,267,232
Germany
164,369,035
Norway
18,560,000
Denmark
7,106,310
Italy
8,483,563
Finland
5,302,227
Luxembourg
3,181,336
Switzerland
TBA strong supporter of resilience
Canada
TBA development funding
Czech Republic
TBA development funding
Total resilience pledges 843,269,703
Total agency requirements 1,283,807,263
Total % of agency requirements
Pledged 66%
Source: UNDP preliminary figures as of 17 April 2015.
*Estimated EU 40-60 split between humanitarian and resilience funding;
see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-3883_en.htm
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
ANNEX 8: EXAMPLES OF AN INTEGRATED
RESPONSE ACROSS SECTORS (3RP)
ORIGINAL
REVISED
REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT
(USD)
(USD)
CARRY
OVER
(USD)
FUNDING
(USD)
TOTAL
AVAILABLE
RESOURCES
(USD)
UNMET
REQUIREMENTS
(USD)
%
COVERED
3RP
2015
418,764,278*
418,700,278
0
52,208,780**
52,208,780
366,491,498
16%***
SRP
2015
71,834,598*
71,834,598
0
25,100,000**
25,100,000
68,259,798
35%***
RRP6
2014
77,925,410
80,770,574
0
11,682,659
11,682,659
69,087,915
14.5%
SHARP
2014
52,737,550
52,737,550
0
9,692,050
9,692,050
43,045,500
18.4%
RRP5
2013
975,000
16,395,000
0
8,979,513
8,979,513
7,415,487
54.8%
SHARP
2013
45,101,953
41,182,091
0
5,759,321
5,759,321
35,422,770
14.0%
Sources: UNDP 17 April 2015; OCHA http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.
aspx?page=special-syriancrisis
*Note discrepancy between UNDP data and OCHA data on the UNDP funding requirement:
UNDP’s data is higher lower by 64,000 USD for the 3RP, and higher by 3,574,800 USD for the
SRP. Above table lists UNDP’s numbers for 3RP and SRP.
**Preliminary data, UNDP CO confirmation on selected contributions pending.
*** As of 17 April 2015
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
FOOTNOTES
1. UNDP/ODI, Towards a Resilience-based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. 18 Jun 2014, http://reliefweb.
int/report/lebanon/towards-resilience-based-response-syrian-refugee-crisis-critical-review-vulnerability
2. UNDP RBAS Concept Note. 2013.
3. OCHA Situation Report 6 April 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/
syrian-arab-republic-idleb-situation-report-no-1-2-6-april-2015
4. UNHCR 26 March 2015 data available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php and ECHO Fact
Sheet available at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/syria_en.pdf
5. According to the UNDP 2014 Human Development Report, Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing
Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience’, between 2008 and 2013 Turkey rose 16 places in the Human
Development Index, to 69th out of 187 countries; Lebanon rose from 63rd to 65th; and Jordan fell from 69th to
77th.
6. 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2015-16 – In Response to the Syria Crisis. Regional Strategic
Overview, p. 19. Available at: http://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/
7. See 3RP, p. 13 and UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php
8. GDP Annual Growth Rate in Lebanon is reported by the Banque du Liban (www.bdl.gov.lb).
9. IMF, World Economic Outlook. April 2014, p. 67.
10. UNDP/ODI, Towards a Resilience-based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis, 18 Jun 2014, http://reliefweb.
int/report/lebanon/towards-resilience-based-response-syrian-refugee-crisis-critical-review-vulnerability
11.Ibid
12. See UNDP Administrator Helen Clark and UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres’ speeches
at the Ministerial Conference on International Burden Sharing on Syria in Geneva, 30 September 2013. This
conference was a turning point towards more development engagement and was also where UNDP began to
take more vocal role in the Syria crisis. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/52493c516.html and http://www.
undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/speeches/2013/09/30/helen-clark-speech-at-unhcr-executivecommittee-high-level-segment-on-solidarity-with-syrian-refugees-and-host-countries-.html
13. EU Factsheet 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience_africa_en.pdf
14. See Brian Price’s (2013) article ‘Syria: A Wicked Problem for All,’ https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/
syria-a-wicked-problem-for-all
15. The Facility was initially conceived of as a ‘Subregional Multi-disciplinary Task Force.’
16. UNDP RBAS Concept Note. 2013.
17. In mid-2013, UNDP Yemen Senior Country Director Gustavo Gonzalez was tasked by the UNDP Regional
Bureau for Arab States in New York to put together a proposal for what became the Sub-Regional Response
Facility he now leads. The development of the Facility was closely coordinated with the UNDP Bureau of
Arab States, the then-Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (now part of the new Bureau for Policy and
Program Support).
18. UNDG is chaired by UNDP Administrator Helen Clark and is comprised of the two regional commissions
ESCWA and ECA and the following UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes: FAO, ILO, OCHA, ODC, OHCHR,
UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNISDIR, UNOPS, UNV,
UN Women, WFP, and WHO.
19. Including the Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework, the Syria Regional Refugee Response Plan
(RRP), the Syrian Humanitarian Response Plan (SHARP) and national development plans – notably Jordan
and Lebanon.
20. The previous Syria response plans also contain elements of the resilience concept; donors, UNDP, other UN
agencies and INGOs were all utilizing the concept – in different forms – before 2014 but interviewees widely
acknowledged it was UNDP and specifically the Facility that leveraged resilience in the 3RP process, to
highlight development aspects of the crisis.
21. 3RP Regional Strategic Overview, p. 7.
22. These national plans (existing and emerging) include the Jordan Response Plan 2015 to the Syria Crisis, the
Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, the Iraq Strategic Response Plan and country responses in Turkey and Egypt.
Syria’s country plan is separate - the Syrian Arab Republic, Strategic Response Plan.
23. UNCHR 2014 Regional Response Plan. See http://www.unhcr.org/52b170e49.html.
24. Statements by the UN Secretary General, UNHCR’s António Guterres, OCHA’s Valerie Amos and UNDP’s
Helen Clark at: http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8505), http://www.unhcr.org/551a59e06.html,
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/31%20March%2015%20USG%20Kuwait.pdf, http://www.undp.
org/content/undp/en/home/operations/leadership/administrator/speeches-and-statements-undp-administrator.
html
25. A recent restructure shifted a number of HQ personnel to the field, and migrated the hub to Amman over the
Page 56
Review of UNDP/RBAS
first quarter of 2015.
26. For example, a perceived INGO emphasis on refugees; see section on challenges below, for more detail.
27. UNDP RBAS Sub-Regional Facility, The Centrality of National Plans and Capacities in Responding to the
Syrian Crisis. RBAS SRF Discussion Paper, 25 March 2014.
28. See UNDP-UNHCR MOU 17 September 2014.
29. This forum allows donors contributing over 50m to share information, and for selected UN representatives to
contribute to review themes such as advocacy and outreach.
30. In Berlin, the UN also launched the Syria Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2015, which also incorporated
resilience-development aspects, facilitated by UNDP Syria leadership.
31. Participants included representatives from Canada, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, World Bank, and UNDP.
32. MOU signed by Administrator Helen Clark (UNDP) and Commissioner Antonio Guterres (UNHCR) in Lebanon,
and a joint operational framework adopted in Lebanon in Iraq.
33. Government of Jordan/United Nations Needs Assessment Review of the Impact of the Syrian Crisis, November
2013; ‘The Syrian Crisis: Tracking and Tackling impacts addressing challenges to sustainable development in
neighboring countries - insights from Lebanon and Jordan.’
34. This included various innovations in payment arrangements – including part payment in cash and part held
over in a savings account for resettlement - with refugees receiving the savings upon return.
35. Including approach to support businesses to work together in collaborative schemes so as to be competitive
in supplying large corporation – known as ‘building markets from below’. Inclusive procurement policies
also included educating small businesses on how they can be competitive in public procurement processes.
Building on other examples from Mexico, Brazil and Liberia the Centre developed locally relevant knowledge/
approaches for ‘procurement leveraging through business linkages platforms to boost local and global sourcing
and content building.’
36. Together with the University of Michigan, the Centre conducted a viability study regarding the geo-thermal
potential in relation to drying food in Jordan – both for export and local food security – this was also linked to
improving nutrition of school age children through using geo-thermal energy-based food into feeding programs.
37. OECD. Risk and Resilience: From Good Idea to Good Practice. December 2013.
38. OECD. Stabilisation Systems Analysis: Results and Roadmap. Report on Workshop held in Beirut, 25-26
September 2014.
39. See OECD Guidance for Resilience Systems Analysis 2014 and Lebanon’s Country Resilience Roadmap 2014
at http://www.oecd.org/dac/risk-resilience.htm
40. See discussion here: https://www.unteamworks.org/fr/node/430008.
41. For humanitarian contexts, OCHA and the main humanitarian agencies have developed a comprehensive set
of IM tools: the OCHA Common Operational Datasets, the 3Ws, the Appeal tracking through the FTS, and
an array of M&E and reporting tools, which in the case of the Syrian operation have been enhanced through
the adoption of the ActivityInfo as the common reporting tool and output aggregator, as well as through the
UNHCR Information Portal.
42. ActivityInfo is a search and mapping tool built into the Digital Atlas platform.
43. The upcoming Financing for Development Conference provides an opportunity to better engage multilateral
banks in mobilizing additional resources, including in middle income countries.
44. UNHCR-UNDP, Regional Trends and patterns in Social Cohesion. Syria Crisis Discussion Paper, 2015.
45. UNDP. The Centrality of National Plans and Capacities in Responding to the Syrian Crisis. RBAS SRF Draft
Discussion Paper, 17 April 2014.
46. Teamworks Resilience Working Group is accessible to registered development practitioners at https://www.
unteamworks.org/resilienceWG
47. SURGE is a mechanism that allows UNDP to deploy staff rapidly within days of a crisis. In addition to the
immediate response team, additional advisors can be sent for three month periods. See https://intranet.undp.
org/unit/bcpr/rrsg/SitePages/surge.aspx
48. With nearly 4 million Sryian refugees registered as of March 26, 2015, 1.7 million are in Turkey, close to 1.2
million in Lebanon, 627,295 in Jordan, 246,836 in Iraq, and 133,619 in Egypt.
49. UNDG Chair Helen Clark’s speech available at: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/
speeches/2015/03/31/helen-clark-statement-at-the-third-international-humanitarian-pledging-conference-forsyria.html
50. The ‘Whole of Syria’ approach refers to the effort of humanitarian actors operating inside Syria from Damascus
or across the Turkish and Jordanian borders to improve the effectiveness and operational reach of their
collective responses. It was agreed in Beirut on 3 September 2014, following the adoption of resolutions 2139
and 2165 by the United Nations Security Council.
51. Transition scenarios, including full regime collapse, partial regime collapse, or a negotiated transfer of power.
52. As agreed in the 3RP, a Resilience Development Forum will be convened in 2015 to provide analysis and
discussion needed to re-align capacity and resources to meet new needs in the region.
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Review of UNDP/RBAS
53. In July 2013 in Senegal, UNDP participated with OCHA in a similar event on building resilience in the Horn of
Africa and Sahel regions.
54. Also see Annexes 2 and 3 for materials reviewed.
Page 58

Resilience building and innovation

Transcription

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