2007-2011 Four Year Report - Food Protection and Defense Institute

Transcription

2007-2011 Four Year Report - Food Protection and Defense Institute
1 National Center for Food Protection and Defense Final Report: 2007-­‐2011 DHS Award #2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003 National Center for Food Protection and Defense Final Report 2007-­‐2011 Table of Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 5 Highlights and Accomplishments ............................................................................................ 6 FASCAT (Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool) .................................................................. 6 FoodSHIELD ................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Food Defense Research Database ....................................................................................................................................... 7 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) and Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) .................... 7 Center of Excellence (COE) Projects .................................................................................................................................. 7 Center Organization ................................................................................................................ 8 Managerial Staff .......................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Industry Work Group ............................................................................................................................................................... 9 External Board of Advisors .................................................................................................................................................... 9 Research ............................................................................................................................... 10 Themes and Theme Leaders .............................................................................................................................................. 10 Investigator-­‐Driven Projects .............................................................................................................................................. 11 RFP Process ............................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Research Evaluation and Assessment Panel (REAP) ............................................................................................... 13 Management of Subaward Projects ................................................................................................................................. 13 Sponsor-­‐Driven Projects ...................................................................................................................................................... 14 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment ............................................................................................................................................ 14 Dept. of Homeland Security University Programs (HSUP) .................................................................................... 15 Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) ................................................................ 15 Food and Agriculture Sector Transportation Modeling (FASTRANS) .............................................................. 16 Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor (FBADS) ..................................................................................................... 16 Food Defense Research Database ..................................................................................................................................... 17 FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls .................................................................................................................................................... 17 FoodSHIELD: OHA ................................................................................................................................................................... 18 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-­‐9) ........................................................................................... 19 Import Vulnerability ............................................................................................................................................................... 19 Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) ........................................................................................ 19 Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) ............................................................................................................... 20 National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) .............................................................................................. 20 Proficiency Testing (PT) Results ....................................................................................................................................... 21 Education ............................................................................................................................. 22 Minority-­‐Serving Institutions ................................................................................................ 25 Summer Research Teams .................................................................................................................................................... 25 MSI-­‐Led Projects ...................................................................................................................................................................... 25 Collaboration and Integration ............................................................................................... 27 Industry Work Group and Private Sector ..................................................................................................................... 27 2 Federal Agencies ...................................................................................................................................................................... 27 International Relationships, NGO’s and IGO’s ............................................................................................................ 28 Center of Excellence Collaboration ................................................................................................................................. 28 CoreSHIELD / HSIN Integration ....................................................................................................................................... 29 Outreach Events ................................................................................................................... 30 NCFPD-­‐Sponsored Research Meetings .......................................................................................................................... 30 Research in Food Defense Webinar Series ................................................................................................................... 31 Presentations at Meetings and Conferences ............................................................................................................... 31 International Outreach ......................................................................................................................................................... 31 Communications ................................................................................................................... 33 Newsletter and Website ....................................................................................................................................................... 33 Social Media and Media Relations ................................................................................................................................... 33 Journals, Books and Magazine Articles .......................................................................................................................... 33 Appendices ........................................................................................................................... 34 Appendix A: Project Outputs .............................................................................................................................................. 34 Publications ................................................................................................................................................................................ 34 Staff-­‐Written Publications ........................................................................................................................................................... 34 Peer-­‐Reviewed Publications ....................................................................................................................................................... 35 Other Publications ........................................................................................................................................................................... 41 Dissertations & Theses ........................................................................................................................................................... 44 Presentations ............................................................................................................................................................................. 47 Staff Presentations .......................................................................................................................................................................... 47 Agent Behavior ................................................................................................................................................................................. 61 Event Modeling ................................................................................................................................................................................. 69 Risk & Crisis Communication ..................................................................................................................................................... 69 Systems Strategies ........................................................................................................................................................................... 73 Education & Outreach Programs .............................................................................................................................................. 74 Patents .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 78 Appendix B: Center of Excellence (COE) Project Summaries .............................................................................. 80 Agent Behavior ......................................................................................................................................................................... 80 Event Modeling ...................................................................................................................................................................... 107 Risk and Crisis Communication ...................................................................................................................................... 114 Systems Strategies ................................................................................................................................................................ 125 Education ................................................................................................................................................................................. 135 Appendix C: Sponsor-­‐Driven Project Summaries .................................................................................................. 142 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment ......................................................................................................................................... 142 Dept. of Homeland Security University Programs (HSUP) ................................................................................. 147 Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) ............................................................. 153 Food and Agriculture Sector Transportation Modeling (FASTRANS) ........................................................... 161 Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor (FBADS) .................................................................................................. 168 Food Defense Research Database .................................................................................................................................. 171 FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls ................................................................................................................................................. 178 FoodSHIELD: OHA ................................................................................................................................................................ 181 Import Vulnerability ............................................................................................................................................................ 183 Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) ..................................................................................... 185 Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) ............................................................................................................ 189 National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) ........................................................................................... 190 Proficiency Testing (PT) Results .................................................................................................................................... 193 Appendix D: Agendas from NCFPD Meetings ........................................................................................................... 196 3 2007 Biennial Meeting ........................................................................................................................................................ 196 2008 Annual Meeting .......................................................................................................................................................... 200 2009 Risk Communication Team Meeting ................................................................................................................. 205 2009 Event Modeling & System Strategies Theme Meeting ............................................................................... 208 2009 Agent Behavior Theme Meeting ......................................................................................................................... 212 2010 Biennial Meeting ........................................................................................................................................................ 215 Appendix E: Research in Food Defense Webinar Listing .................................................................................... 219 Appendix F: Personnel ....................................................................................................................................................... 222 Project Investigators ........................................................................................................................................................... 222 Students ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 226 Industry Work Group (IWG) ............................................................................................................................................. 230 External Board of Advisors (EBA) ................................................................................................................................. 232 Research Evaluation and Advisory Panel (REAP) .................................................................................................. 233 4 Introduction NCFPD was fully established with the Center’s launch on June 1, 2004, and in the years 2007-­‐2011 we continued to refine the strategic and tactical plans that drive our actions through ongoing engagement of investigators, stakeholders, customers, partners, and peers. We built on a strong research portfolio that supports education, training, and outreach programs. DHS, its partner agencies and other stakeholders have very diverse needs in food defense, and NCFPD has an established track record of delivering stakeholder-­‐
relevant, science-­‐based solutions to meet those needs and to anticipate needs as they evolve. Our researchers conduct innovative, fundamental and translational research across a wide range of disciplines, and we bring real-­‐time translational and applied research tools to bear during emerging crises, such as the melamine contamination of wheat gluten in 2007, the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak in 2008, and the Japanese disaster in 2011. NCFPD’s investigators also develop entirely new interdisciplinary education and training programs, as well as invigorate existing curricula by integrating investigators’ research into already rigorous coursework. NCFPD’s core vision has been “Defending the Safety of the Food System through Research and Education” since the initial Center of Excellence (COE) grant by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology (S&T), University Programs (UP) to the University of Minnesota (UMN) and its consortium. Since inception, NCFPD has engaged over 100 investigators and 200 students from 50 institutions. NCFPD’s research, from discovery science through translational to applied research, provides new tools, techniques, and strategies to strengthen the food system in the face of potentially catastrophic events. We also seek to maximize the value of the strategies and tools that our researchers develop. We provide benefits beyond interventions for food defense—improving the efficiency and reliability of the supply chain and increasing food safety. Perhaps most importantly, NCFPD educates and trains the next generation of food system professionals and scientists, because human capital is the key bulwark against future threats to our ever-­‐globalizing food system, and therefore the public. 5 Highlights and Accomplishments NCFPD had many significant accomplishments in the years 2007-­‐2011, in both projects awarded under our rigorous peer review process as well as those that were funded to meet a specific DHS or other sponsor agency mission gaps. FASCAT (Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool) An important example of the latter is FASCAT, the Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool. FASCAT is a capability developed for providing a means of determining what is critical in the food and agriculture sector that has now been deployed as a web-­‐based assessment tool. Developed by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) in collaboration with FAZD (the National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense) and CREATE (the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events), FASCAT is the first tool that enables comparative, quantitative assessments within this systems-­‐based sector. FASCAT provides a system-­‐
based approach to identifying which systems, sub-­‐systems or assets within the food and agriculture sector are most critical and therefore in need of further assessment or protection. Because the food system is privately held, the tool helps state officials to partner with the private sector and determine what are the most critical elements, nodes, and subsystems, through an analysis process that includes direct and indirect consequences of failure/attack and the scale of the impacted systems within the food and agriculture infrastructure. This process helps states and DHS prioritize the most important elements in order to maximize the effectiveness of the available resources for protecting the infrastructure. This process helps states and DHS prioritize the most important elements in order to maximize the effectiveness of the available resources for protecting the infrastructure. FASCAT is the tool for states to use in support of the annual DHS data call since 2010. To date, over 700 sub-­‐systems have been mapped in 39 states, with food and agriculture now accounting for 10% of all designated critical infrastructure (the number was 0% before FASCAT). The tool is available on both the NCFPD and FoodSHIELD websites. (http://www.ncfpd.umn.edu and http://www.foodshield.org) FoodSHIELD FoodSHIELD (http://www.FoodSHIELD.org), another NCFPD-­‐developed tool set, was designated by the Food and Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating Council as the communication portal for the sector. FoodSHIELD is a national, web-­‐based system for communication, coordination, education and training for the local, state and federal communities that protect and defend the food and agriculture system and the public’s health. It allows diverse groups of state, federal, and local regulatory officials, laboratorians, researchers, and stakeholders responsible for protecting the nation’s food supply to interact and function as one unified network. FoodSHIELD’s backbone, CoreSHIELD, also hosts national networks such as FERN, NAHLN, and ICLN. FoodSHIELD currently has 3500 users with representation from all 50 states, federal organizations, and international partners. Currently FoodSHIELD has 900 work groups 6 established to support the critical work of the food and agriculture sector at all levels. On average there are approximately 157,000 hits to the FoodSHIELD portal per week. Food Defense Research Database A recently deployed tool, developed based on public and private sector needs is the Food Defense Research Database. This database is an easily searchable repository of food defense information that is uniformly catalogued and stored. The database houses publications, projects, presentations, and reports produced by government agencies (U.S. and foreign), academia, and the private sector, identifying research about intentional or catastrophic events in the food and agriculture sector. Through advanced search capabilities users can find information on specific topics or interest items without having to know exact titles, names, or funding agencies. Users also have the opportunity to suggest updates or additions to the database with new work or work not previously included through an easy upload feature. The database was populated by searching government, organization, academic, and public domain websites, databases and publication reserves using keyword search strings to find food defense works. As of May 2011, this effort has scanned over 2.6 million records with over 15,000 abstracts reviewed to initially populate the database with nearly 1,000 relevant records. Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) and Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) DHS is tasked to provide a Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) and a Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA) every two years. NCFPD enhanced the utility of the food system portions of the assessments by developing a methodology for selecting food supply chains and consumer patterns that represent the range of risk for the food system. After identifying representative foods, NCFPD gathered extensive industry and consumer data to develop models for the ten selected exemplar food supply chains that are now the basis for the 2012 CTRA and will be used for the next BTRA update. Center of Excellence (COE) Projects In addition to this subset of stakeholder-­‐driven projects, NCFPD has also conducted a wide range of basic through applied research through its competitively awarded projects. While many of them are early stage discovery research, such as novel sensors for toxins or new approaches to supply chain modeling, others are closer to implementation and have helped stakeholders improve their practices. As just one of many examples of the latter, the NCFPD risk communication group was asked by the Centers for Disease Control to apply their analysis of best practices in risk communication to CDC’s messaging during the H1N1 flu pandemic. In total, NCFPD investigators have completed 50 research projects during this award period. These projects have resulted in over 115 articles, 15 patent applications, and 171 scientific presentations. They span from the very basic understanding of agent behavior to applied projects on inactivation of threat agents, to social science understanding of how underserved populations receive and process risk information – and a wide range of things in between. Further details are provided in Appendix B. 7 Center Organization Managerial Staff In the years 2007-­‐2011, the Center moved to new space twice to accommodate a growing roster of staff, students and projects. The core managerial staff currently consists of: • Director: Shaun Kennedy serves as the Center’s Director and one of the Principal Investigators on stakeholder-­‐driven research projects. His primary focus is internal and external partner relations and research programs that help ensure that NCFPD is best meeting its stakeholders’ and funding entities’ needs. He also supervises all operational management staff as well as Center Advisors, and is leading the efforts on creating the Institute for future Center growth. • Associate Director: Amy Kircher, DrPH, is the Associate Director for NCFPD, and serves as PI on a number of stakeholder-­‐driven projects. She provides Center leadership for all programmatic management staff and project-­‐related staff, to include Research Fellows, student employees, and the IT stakeholder liaison who navigates between stakeholders and NCFPD IT providers in addition to managing research projects, subcontracts and other contractual obligations of the Center. Amy also collaborates on external and internal relationships for the Center, and does much of the proposal writing to procure new funding. • Director Emeritus/Sr. Science Advisor: Frank Busta, PhD, is the Senior Science Advisor as well as the Director Emeritus for the Center. In this role, Frank is the lead of the Research Evaluation and Advisory Panel (REAP), advises on all scientific matters for the Center and is a representative of NCFPD to external partners. In addition, Frank maintains project leadership for, and participation in, various stakeholder driven projects, and mentors many students associated with NCFPD projects. • Administration Manager: Jenni Sullivan serves as the Administration Manager for the Center. She also serves as the primary liaison between the Academic Health Center (the unit within the University that houses NCFPD) human resources, and is the Center’s HR lead. She manages all administrative staff, including the Administrative Specialist and the Project Support Assistant and students, and participates in all hiring and interviews. Jenni handles all policy and procedure as well as all meeting planning, coordination and execution. She also maintains all facilities management coordination for the Center to include space needs and day-­‐
to-­‐day operations. • Finance Manager: Ann Cary is the Finance Manager for NCFPD with leadership responsibility for all fiscal-­‐ and finance-­‐related functions for the Center. This includes all financial reporting and forecasting as required for NCFPD, its sponsors and the University. Ann is the primary liaison with the University’s Sponsored Projects Administration group as well as the main contact for the grants and contracts for all of the Center’s funding entities. Ann also manages the finance support staff, currently comprised of a Senior Accountant. • Communications Manager: Elizabeth Cunningham is the Communications Manager for NCFPD. In this role, she serves as the primary contact for all marketing 8 •
and Center public relations. She is the primary content liaison with the programming support (currently Datastream Connexions and University of Minnesota Academic Health Center Information Systems), the University of Minnesota communications offices, and the communications managers from the other Centers of Excellence. Elizabeth also manages media relations, supports general communications needs for the Center including preparing and enhancing presentations, written communications and other materials as required. She is also the primary content manager of the NCFPD website. Sr. Project Manager: Lisa Brienzo’s primary area of focus is the competitively awarded projects. She is responsible for managing the Request for Proposals (RFP) process for the competitively awarded projects, including the preparation of materials, REAP participation, coordination with the Theme Leaders on theme activities and project reporting, as well as the coordination of funder requested compliance and submission documentation. Lisa also ensures that NCFPD and all projects meet sponsor compliance and reporting requirements, and is the Student Engagement Coordinator for all incoming student experiences. Industry Work Group The Industry Work Group serves multiple roles in ensuring NCFPD’s success, beginning with providing private sector perspective on the merit of the NCFPD research and education projects. The Industry Work Group provides information and data for select NCFPD projects, pilots new tools developed for the private sector, and provides valuable experiential opportunities for NCFPD students. The group includes Rich Ryan, Assistant Deputy Director/Corporate Security of Archer Daniels Midland, who is also the chair of the Food and Agriculture Sector/Government Coordinating Councils’ Joint Committee on Research, and Bill Ramsey, Director of Security, McCormick & Company, who is also the Chair of the Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) Food Defense committee, as well as 35 additional industry experts from leading international food companies (membership in Appendix F). The members of the Industry Work Group meet with NCFPD leadership semi-­‐
annually (generally once during NCFPD’s annual meeting and once with the Director and Senior Science Advisor), participate in regular conference calls, and meet individually as appropriate with individual theme leaders and investigators. External Board of Advisors The External Board of Advisors serves as NCFPD’s board of directors. The External Board of Advisors meets semi-­‐annually, usually once in connection with NCFPD’s annual meeting and once with the Director and Senior Science Advisor. The Board provides the senior strategic and management guidance and review to ensure that NCFPD is maximizing the return on DHS’s investment in food system defense. One of the most valuable aspects of this is providing executive insight into how the private and public sectors will evaluate whether or not to utilize NCFPD’s research and education products. This awareness is how NCFPD ensures that it is doing outstanding science and developing curriculum that will be used outside of the laboratory. The EBA is comprised of executives from FDA, USDA and five multinational food companies. 9 Research Themes and Theme Leaders NCFPD’s research is organized into five research themes and programmatic areas to promote collaboration, peer support and professional development among theme members. Each area is led by a Theme Leader, an internationally recognized, senior researcher or faculty member, who provides content expertise at the project level and serves as a senior level advisor to NCFPD leadership by identifying research trends and developments of particular significance to food protection and defense; assisting in identifying current gaps in the NCFPD research portfolio and provides recommendations for potential additional investigators; partner institutions and resources to address these gaps. Systems Strategies encompasses the study of food systems and those systems that support it, depend on it, and respond to issues in the system. The primary focus of this work is system interdependencies as they relate to both intentional contamination and catastrophic natural events. Theme Leader: Chip White, H. Milton & Carolyn J. Stewart School Chair, Schneider National Chair of Transportation and Logistics, H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology Event Modeling develops realistic models of food system events and their cascading impacts for understanding consequences, conducting vulnerability and risk assessments, and analyzing potential preparedness/response/recovery strategies including their potential for real time decision support. Theme Leader: Donald W. Schaffner, Extension Specialist in Food Science, and Director, Center for Advanced Food Technology, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey Biological Agent Behavior studies the behavior of biological agents in food matrices to enable detection, inactivation, decontamination and disposal strategies for biological agents in food systems. Theme Leader: Eric Johnson, Professor, Department of Bacteriology Botulinum Toxins Laboratory, Food Research Institute, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Chemical Agent Behavior studies the properties of chemical agents in food matrices to enable detection, inactivation, decontamination and disposal strategies for chemical agents in food systems. Theme Leader: Peter Varelis, Senior Research Scientist, Food Assurance, Fonterra Risk Communication and Crisis Communication studies communications strategies at both the systems and message-­‐levels before, during, and after an event to reduce the potential consequences of the event and ensure a rapid return to the “new normal.” 10 Theme Leader: Tim Sellnow, Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate Programs, College of Communications and Information Studies, University of Kentucky
Education and Outreach programs provide food defense education and training for the next generation of homeland security science, technology, engineering, and math (HS-­‐
STEM) professionals—including students, governmental and private sector audiences. Theme Leader: Curtis Kastner, Director, Food Science Institute, Kansas State University Theme Leaders convene conference calls and webinars with their investigators and students 6-­‐10 times per year. The theme webinars were conceived in 2009 by theme leaders as a vehicle to better track project progress and to foster collegial discourse among investigators and students. In addition, Theme Leaders participate in monthly conference calls with the NCFPD Director, Associate Director, Senior Science Advisor and Senior Project Manager. These monthly calls alternate between individual theme-­‐specific calls and all-­‐theme discussions. Agenda items include: review of project progress reports, promoting DHS University Program and other Food and Agriculture Sector opportunities, reports of individual theme activities and accomplishments, emerging events related to food protection, funding opportunities, etc. In addition, Theme leaders were instrumental in the development of Center-­‐wide Research in Food Protection monthly webinars series. They participate in identifying projects from their theme to showcase to a national/international audience and serve as both webinar presenters and facilitators. The May 2011 webinar was titled “NCFPD Student Research Showcase” and included presentations by outstanding student researchers selected by the Theme Leaders. Investigator-­‐Driven Projects During the 2007-­‐11 funding cycle, NCFPD has funded 50 projects from 24 institutions nationally and internationally. Multi-­‐discipline, Multi-­‐Institution In the course of this award period, projects involved significant multi-­‐disciplinary work across disciplines and institutions. For example, Dr. Srivand Sreevatsan developed aptemers in his laboratory at that University of Minnesota which were utilized by Dr. Keith Warriner in his project Extraction and Concentration of Chemical (TETS) and biological (ricin) toxins using Molecular Imprinted Electrospun Fibers Coupled at the University of Guelph and also by Dr. Ted Labuza, in his project Application of Surface Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy for Detection of Chemical and Biological Terror Agents in Food Matrices at the University of Minnesota. Dr. Suresh Pillai, Texas A&M, utilized the engineering expertise of Dr. Ali Beskok, Old Dominion University, in developing a prototype continuous flow device for the project Integrating Microbial Target Capture with Flow Field Fractionation for Lab on a Chip Device for Food Matrices. The Systems Strategies project Continuous Tracking and Analyzing Consumer Confidence in the U.S. Food Supply Chain involved a collaboration with the Applied Economics team at the University of Minnesota, led by PI Jean Kinsey and Co-­‐PI 11 Dennis Degeneffe, responsible for consumer survey development, Wes Harrison, Louisiana State University AgCenter who provided agricultural economics and marketing expertise to maintain a media count database, and the University of Kentucky’s Digital Content Analysis Lab used for tracking television coverage. These are just a few examples of such collaborations. Technology Transfer Between 2007-­‐11 NCFPD investigators reported 15 patents accepted or in submission for work funded in part by this award. Examples of successful transfer include: •
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The Centers for Disease Control consulted with NCFPD Risk Communication investigator’s during the H1N1 outbreak in 2009 for critique of CDC messages based on NCFPD risk communication best practices research. NCFPD’s new models for food systems for the BTRA/CTRA have transformed how DHS and its sister agencies approach the food and agriculture sector. As noted earlier, FASCAT went from concept to deployed, required assessment tool for the national data call and has dramatically changed food and agriculture status in CIKR. On a different type of technology transfer, (human capital or NCFPD students moving on in their careers), NCFPD graduate students have moved on to significant, homeland security career positions during this period, including the CDC, USDA, Los Alamos, state agencies and food protection positions in industry. Academic Leadership Through publications, professional presentations and organization leadership, NCFPD has continued to attract academic leaders as exemplified in the prolific publications, professional presentations at national and international meetings and organization leadership. For example, PI Evangelyn Alocilja, Michigan State University, was the invited keynote speaker at the 11th World Congress on Biosensors, Glasgow, May 2010 based on her NCFPD research A multiplex nanoparticle-­‐based bio-­‐barcoded DNA sensor for the rapid detection of Bacillus anthracis and Salmonella Enteritidis. This conference is the premier meeting for scientists all over the world who are working on biosensors. Leadership positions in the International Association for Food Protection (IAFP) have recently included two NCFPD researchers: Agent Behavior PI LeeAnn Jaykus, North Carolina State University (IAFP President, 2011) and Event Modeling Theme Leader and PI: Don Schaffner, Rutgers University (IAFP Secretary, 2011). In 2010/11, Systems Strategies Theme Leader and Co-­‐PI Chip White, Georgia Tech, assisted in the creation of the Industrial Engineering Department & Logistics Institute at Khalifa University which involved a yearlong residency in Abu Dhabi, U.A.E. Education Program PI Justin Kastner, Kansas State University, edited the book Food and Agriculture Security: An Historical, Multidisciplinary Approach published in 2010 which discusses the role of multiple academic disciplines in the comprehensive understanding of food and agriculture security. 12 RFP Process The first of two open Requests for Proposals (RFP) under this award (a standard NCFPD practice) was issued in May 2007, resulting in 43 proposals received from 19 institutions with 31 awarded projects for the performance period September 1, 2007 – May 31, 2009. In June, 2009, a second RFP was issued with 47 proposals received resulting in 27 projects awarded for the original performance period of October 1, 2009 – September 30, 2010. In addition, NCFPD solicited proposals in the interim which resulted in 4 additional projects selected. In identifying research aims for the RFPs, NCFPD consulted with Theme Leaders, Industry Work Group and Food and Agriculture agency partners. RFPs were distributed to the NCFPD academic network and potentially interested departments at Minority Serving Institutions (Departments of Chemistry, Biosciences, Agricultural Engineering and Research Directors). Research Evaluation and Assessment Panel (REAP) The NCFPD Research Evaluation and Assessment Panel (REAP) provides a peer review of all proposals received. The REAP is composed of Theme Leaders, scientific leaders from academia, industry and regulatory food agencies. A listing of REAP members from the 2007-­‐09 and the 2009-­‐11 cycles are located in Appendix F (Personnel). The REAP review process entailed: 1) Minimum of 3 REAP members assigned to review each proposal 2) A score sheet was provided by which reviewers ssigned numeric scores in 3 areas: a. Relevance and significance of proposed effort b. Scientific merit c. Qualifications of personnel and adequacy of facilities In addition viewers provide comments on: opportunities for collaboration with other COEs, industry or food regulatory agencies; appropriate level of budget requested, and the likelihood of success within timeframe Scores were tallied, normalized (to allow for differences & variations) and ranked. 3) On August 23-­‐24, 2007 a REAP meeting was convened at the University of Minnesota. On August 26 and 31, 2009 a virtual REAP meeting was conducted via teleconferences to reduce costs and maximize participation of REAP members. Note: Based on the efficiency and success of the NCFPD virtual review process in 2009, the FAZD Center adapted NCFPD’s REAP procedures for their 2010/11 proposal selection in May 2010. While final funding decisions are the responsibility of the Director in consultation with the S&T Program staff, projects must be deemed of strong scientific merit by the REAP to be considered for funding. Management of Subaward Projects Beginning in 2010, NCFPD instituted a customized Project Portal reporting system utilizing the Homeland Security University Programs (HSUP) platform (developed and managed by 13 NCFPD). The system allows NCFPD administration and Theme Leaders to view all project related documents (proposal, progress report, final report), percentage of completed milestones and deliverables and a repository of related outputs developed in the course of the project activities (slides, survey instruments, papers, posters, etc.). Selected information entered to the NCFPD Project Portal is transferred the HSUP site thus eliminating reporting redundancy. Reporting Expectations: PIs were required to provide a minimum of three progress reports per year via the NCFPD Project Portal. In 2010, Theme Leaders recommended that NCFPD require more rigorous and detailed interim reporting in keeping with the reporting expectations of other funding agencies such as NIH. All progress reports are reviewed by Theme Leaders, NCFPD Director, Associate Director, Senior Science Advisor and Senior Project Manager. Utilizing content expertise, Theme Leaders provide recommendations to NCFPD concerning continuation funding, modifications in scope of work, and end-­‐user application. Theme Leaders are asked to assess: •
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Did PI provide adequate data to assess progress? Was sound methodology used to meet project objectives? Was adequate progress made and is there likelihood of successful completion by the project end date? Recommendations for continuation funding (multi-­‐year projects), modifications in scope of work, end-­‐user usefulness and application. Individual project summaries of work completed from 2007-­‐11 may be found in Appendix B. Sponsor-­‐Driven Projects Leveraging the DHS investment, NCFPD has been able to conduct significant sponsor-­‐
driven research in the 2007-­‐2011 funding cycle. These requests and subsequent effort have been driven by needs in the federal government and inter-­‐governmental/non-­‐
governmental organizations to improve the protection and defense of food systems. Highlights of the projects have been included in the narrative below, with more detailed reporting in the appendices. Bioterrorism Risk Assessment The global food system that nourishes the United States is likely the most complicated system of supply chains known. This system, from primary production through final consumption, has been optimized to deliver a dizzying array of foods from around the world at the lowest possible cost year round. It was not designed for, and has not been optimized to, protect it from intentional disruption or contamination. The systems that are in place do not even make such optimization readily feasible. Its complexity and rapidly evolving nature, moreover, makes development of a detailed model of the entire food system an unattainable goal. Based on registrants in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Bio-­‐terrorism Registration Database, there are over 130,000 domestic food processing firms and over 150,000 foreign food processing firms that are registered to 14 produce food for sale in the U.S. This wide range of processors eventually end up supplying the over 55,000 individual types of food (stock keeping units or sku’s) that are available in an average retail grocery store. The challenges that this complexity and variability present in food contamination scenarios has been highlighted in recent foodborne illness outbreaks, where identifying the food vehicle has presented a significant challenge for both government agencies and industry. Through subject matter expertise (SME) input, review, and collaboration, NCFPD developed “framework foods.” The fundamental hypothesis is that there are supply chain, processing, consumption and specific food attributes that contribute to an individual food’s overall vulnerability, and the relative utility of mitigation strategies, that will allow a food to be grouped together with similar foods. The processing characteristics covered the range of processes in food systems, including those that may represent existing mitigation steps, such as thermal treatments. Supply chain characteristics include length, complexity and transportation parameters, among others, that may introduce points of vulnerability. Product characteristics include both food composition and final preparation characteristics that could also represent existing mitigation strategies. In selecting the characteristics for consideration, existing risk, consequence and vulnerability assessments were utilized. This included each of the assessments conducted through the Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) conducted by the FDA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Dept. of Homeland Security University Programs (HSUP) This multi-­‐year project leverages the collaboration portal tools and online information sharing system initially developed by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense for its own use by expanding the availability of these tools to other Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence to facilitate targeted information sharing and collaboration within and among the Centers of Excellence community. NCFPD was tasked with researching how to enhance its existing portal collaboration capabilities to enable and encourage usage by the other Centers. The resultant Homeland Security Office of University Programs (HSUP/OUP) web site provides a secure environment for university researchers working in government-­‐funded programs to share information, publish reports, and collaborate on projects. The site also provides a point of communication to allow HSUP staff to disseminate important information to research partners at regional Centers of Excellence and universities. The HSUP website includes a project system application for use by all Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) The Food and Agriculture infrastructure is a unique, complex, globally distributed and highly integrated system of systems. Due to the unique nature of the agriculture system, identifying the critical components of this system has remained a challenge. In order to 15 develop a unified method for identifying and reporting critical food and agriculture infrastructure, DHS funded the creation of the Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool, or FASCAT, through NCFPD. The first version of the FASCAT tool became available for use in 2009, with 23 states utilizing the tool to report critical agriculture infrastructures. The 2009 assessments included a total of 35 commodities and 178 sub-­‐systems within various states. In 2010, use of the tool was expanded to additional partners as it was designated as the assessment tool for the sector, including the Multi-­‐state Partnership for Security in Agriculture, and the Southern Agriculture and Animal Disaster Response Alliance, with 33 states submitting and 121 systems accepted by DHS as Level 2 critical. In 2011, 39 states submitted with determinations due this fall. The use of the FASCAT tool supports the idea that food and agriculture infrastructure needs to be assessed as systems rather than as individual facilities and provides a unified means to that end with over 200 systems now assessed. Food and Agriculture Sector Transportation Modeling (FASTRANS) The Food and Agriculture Sector Transportation Modeling effort (FASTRANS) was undertaken to address the inability to include product and animal movement in event and risk models in any meaningful way. The initial effort or first phase of the project was limited in scope by the need to focus on DHS’s immediate Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) modeling requirements for cattle and swine. The project team developed methodologies to integrate business rules, routing and livestock transportation information with these models. Without this data, current FMD disease spread models simulate random livestock transportation movements that do not reflect the actual national livestock transportation system. As a result, such models, where used to develop control and eradication plans or in an actual event, could inappropriately influence the plans to apply critical resources and high impact control measures in locations or region where positive effect would be minimal. Research focused on five key areas: 1) developing representative business rules for livestock movements, 2) development of a stakeholder accessible FASTRANS database, 3) development of a commodity routing model to output GIS based sector representative commodity movement information 4) collection of data on location, transaction modalities and quantities of livestock passing through salesyards and data on representative characteristics of livestock way points, such as truck stops where in-­‐transit livestock commingle, and 5) early pilot studies to look at the value in accurate disease modeling of more realistic salesyard representation and way stops in the spread of exotic animal disease viruses such as FMD. Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor (FBADS) Botulinum neurotoxin is the most toxic substance known. The lethal dose for mice is 0.3 ng/kg, and for humans is thought to be 0.2-­‐2.0 μg/kg. Botulinum neurotoxin poses a major bio-­‐weapon threat because of its extreme potency and lethality; its ease of production, 16 transport, and the need for prolonged intensive care among affected persons. Botulinum toxin is listed among the leading foodborne biological terror agents. The current accepted gold standard diagnostic method for detection of botulinum toxin in foods is the mouse bioassay. Although sensitive, it can take days for positive sample detection, and the number of samples that can be tested at one time is greatly restricted by on-­‐demand mouse test capactity. This study evaluated the performance of the MesoScale Diagnostics (MSD) System (Gaithersburg, Maryland) that employs the principle of electro-­‐chemiluminescence detection of botulinum toxin type A under the Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor (FBADS) Program of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The MSD model PR2 1900 utilizes a kit for detection of botulinum A and is standardized for toxin detection in raw milk to up to 40pg/ml. The first phase of the study was to field test the MSD systems in a commercial dairy for six months to evaluate reliability and false positive rates. The second phase of the study was lab based and evaluated the performance of this system in terms of detection limits and analytical sensitivity when applied to a wider variety of food matrices. A series of fruits, vegetables and juices were tested before and after toxin enrichment protocols. Food Defense Research Database The Joint Council for Research (JCR) of the Food and Agriculture Sector/Government Coordinating Councils identified an overall gap in accessing research completed or underway in food and agriculture as well as the lack of a functional database of identified research and related information that can be used to help public and private sector leaders in identifying research gaps, detecting needs, and prioritizing research. The Research Database project was initiated to address the gap in identifying research completed or underway pertinent to intentional or catastrophic events in the food and agriculture sector. Multiple agencies in the US Government funded NCFPD to work on the first two aims of the effort. The NCFPD team reviewed over 2.6 million hits to keyword strings to identify records related to the intentional contamination of food or water. Today 907 records are complete in the database, with new records added regularly. FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls The FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls system is a tool created to coordinate food inspections and track recalls for the FDA. This tool allows state coordinators to assign recalls to state inspectors who in turn submit their findings for approval or denial by an FDA district official. The user has the ability to upload distribution lists, tracking tainted product shipments, and also access forms for inspectors to complete and email into the system. Once the forms are entered, they are available for use in reporting, so that state administrators are able to view state specific reports, and FDA officials, who can see all data nationwide, can also view both completed and incomplete inspections. 17 The recall enhancements provided during this contract period gave the end-­‐user better overall system functionality and provided a more efficient way of tracking products, uploading findings, and accessing reports. The new user interface was improved to enable users to navigate and perform functions required for their jobs during a recall without special tool training. The initial state-­‐based changes implemented during this reporting period position the states to be able to use this recall portal as their default tracking mechanism for audit checks for state based activities as needed, before a national FDA-­‐
guided effort is implemented. As the states’ familiarity with the portal systems increases the state recall results will improve. The core member portal saw significant growth in the number of FDA-­‐based workgroups coordinating activities through the system. These groups have additionally supported improvements to the system through concise and frequent feature and improvement requests. This has created a uniquely positioned system to help users achieve their objectives. FoodSHIELD: OHA The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is charged with implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-­‐9), which specifies protection of the food and agriculture infrastructure. This effort built upon NCFPD’s existing expertise with HSPD-­‐9 and the information technology capabilities housed within NCFPD’s existing FoodSHIELD research project. The OHA FAVD asked to support NCFPD in advancing FoodSHIELD research by providing the resources necessary to build additional information technology capabilities that will be accessible to the OHA FAVD, Federal, State, and local partners. In this effort, additional tool capabilities were developed within FoodSHIELD to support workgroups and general information sharing in a secure environment. Several modules to support information sharing within the portal were built, including: •
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News feed sharing Video sharing Event management Scheduling management for webinars Enhancements to document sharing New forums/discussion tool Agenda management for meetings These new features enhance collaboration and communication among users in the Food and Agriculture sector to improve and support preparedness and response to incidents. The new functionality also helps increase strategic coordination and information sharing among stakeholders on a daily basis. 18 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-­‐9) HSPD-­‐9 was a project to assist the Office of Health Affairs with its responsibilities under HSPD-­‐9 and the Presidential import order. Following several high profile imported product issues, ranging from lead in paint on toys to melamine in wheat gluten that was used for pet food, the White House directed agencies to find out how the U.S. could improve the safety and reliability of imported products. For this effort NCFPD conducted analysis of the country of origin of food products to help focus on a more limited subset of products. In addition, NCFPD conducted research on policy options to identify what realistically could and could not be done. The final effort was to facilitate a series of meetings between DHS component agencies and the private sector so that the private sector could provide input on the potential policy options as well as explain what industry could do on their own to improve import reliability and safety. As a result of these efforts, the actions taken by DHS to improve the safety and reliability of imports did not result in unanticipated, and unintended, secondary impacts on industry. Import Vulnerability The Import Vulnerability project was designed to combine the real-­‐time need for analytical support that the Office of Health Affairs, FDA and USDA-­‐FSIS have requested with the strategic need to understand the potential vulnerabilities in the global food system through imported products and trans-­‐shipped products. Initial characterization of imported ingredients, components and finished foods sourced from China was completed through a thorough review and analysis of the data available from FATUS (Foreign Agricultural Trade of the U.S., U.N. COMTRADE (International Merchant Trading), FAOSTAT (FAO’s food and agriculture statistics) and other sources. A melamine case study included a combination of private sector interviews and data mining for relevant information in both English and Chinese. For initial characterization of globally sourced imported ingredients, a synthesis of the information from the earlier efforts was utilized with additional insight gained, as possible, by regulatory system characterization. Preliminary vulnerability assessments on imported ingredients, components and finished foods sourced from China were partially satisfied through the use of domestic risk assessments and applying that prioritization for China-­‐sourced foods. The rapid assessment of imports from China and wheat gluten sources, along with the costs of radical interventions or substitutions, was used by various agencies in their response to the melamine incident. Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) The Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) site provides a secure environment for laboratory networks to share data and collaborate on reports. This site includes the incident management system that gives the user the ability to share data and manage an incident requiring laboratory capabilities. During the contract period, our support efforts included providing dedicated programming/staff, help desk, quality assurance, failover testing and network support for web servers; an analytics package was developed to support website traffic and usage 19 monitoring, providing the project sponsor with an overview of how the system is being used and by whom, including system metrics and web usage stats. The ICLN Incident Manager was completed and successfully utilized in test scenarios; functionality was added to display “all files” and “list most recently updated” in the incident manager workgroup files; portal upgrades were completed, including a preview email function and an upgrade to Standard Office Procedure (SOP) workflow; Information Technology Communications and Coordination (ITCC) Subgroup data enhancements continued, and Situation Report (SITREP) and Preparedness Alert Template (PAT) web forms and PDF-­‐produced forms were developed: removing and adding fields, removing and adding questions, and changing labels. These forms give each network the capability to fill out a situation report online and submit it directly to the system electronically; primary and secondary contact selection and results were added to both forms; data management of PAT and SITREP records has been created; a contact look up and selection process was added; additionally, documenting, securing, and incorporating SITREP files into the ICLN application were completed. Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) The National Agricultural Biosecurity Center (NABC) at Kansas State University (KSU), through this DHS project, developed Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)/Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense (FAVD) products for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Health Affairs (OHA). This project served to enhance the development and functionality of the FAVD page on the LLIS website through the review and analysis of the After Action Reports/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) from emergency operations and training exercises and posting those lessons learned on the FAVD page. The review and analysis of training exercises are an integral part of preparation for an actual event. Lessons learned serve no purpose if their value is left buried within the text of an exercise report. The extraction of lessons learned from the AAR/IP’s and their inclusion in an easily accessible and understandable format greatly increases their value to agricultural emergency management personnel. The FAVD page has the potential to become a very important “go-­‐to” source for emergency management personnel within the food and agriculture community. Emergency management personnel could review the abstracts explaining the lessons learned from tabletop and field exercises and then decide if it might be something that would work for their situation. The needs of the food and agricultural community in response to an emergency situation often mirrors the urban response but there are also many needs and solutions that are more unique to an agricultural setting. What seems unimportant and trivial to an urban analyst could make or break a successful response within an agricultural community. National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) This effort provided support of NBIS, through the offering of scientific reach back capabilities, event investigation and assessment, and scientific consultation. The NCFPD assistance accelerated the growth of the technical capabilities for national biosurveillance to support early and ongoing biological event cueing, information sharing and situational awareness capabilities for federal, state and local public health officials and academic 20 researchers from a range of disciplines. Through this project NCFPD specifically provided the NBIC team with access to industry and academic Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), facilitated collaboration with state public health, food regulatory and industry information sources and users, offered technology support for the Biosurveillance Common Operating Picture (BCOP) development and its transition to full operational capability and research and analytics-­‐based event characterization capabilities for a wide range of emerging issues. Proficiency Testing (PT) Results This project continued the expansion and data population of the FERN-­‐originated Proficiency Testing Results Capture systems. To facilitate wider adoption and clarity in purpose, this PT Results addition was built on the FoodSHIELD infrastructure. The FERN-­‐
based PT Results system requires participants to be FERN members, which is only a portion of the typical PT constituents. New functionality resulting from this project included capturing results from Food & Ag laboratories, providing data export, and a developing a smart login system to push results gathering to the correct site. The FoodSHIELD PT Results Capture System established a central housing for PT results data to create a data aggregation point for reporting. This central baseline result set could then be used to build a re-­‐usable data repository for many PT results events. The storage capability created was intended to be flexible and potentially adaptable to specific requirements of PT events outside of standard managed proficiency tests. 21 Education NCFPD’s education efforts involve students engaged in Center research; students supported by NCFPD-­‐received fellowships; incorporating food defense concepts into existing curricula; and the development of new curricula in food defense. Since inception, NCFPD has engaged over 200 undergraduate, graduate and professional students in its research projects, representing the single largest federal investment in the next generation of food defense scientists in the academic community. In addition to these students, there have been 17 students funded by a Department of Homeland Security HS-­‐STEM Career Development Grant (CDG). All undergraduate students complete internships, and all students are tracked into Homeland Security-­‐related employment. These students have accomplished much in their time with the Center. In the years 2007-­‐
2011, NCFPD-­‐engaged students have produced 28 dissertations and theses, and 89 students have presented at NCFPD’s biennial research meetings. In 2010, NCFPD established the Frank Busta Poster Award, which was given to Yu Zhang, who went on to be recognized for his research at the 2011 DHS University Programs Summit. In addition, the following students have been selected to present research at the Summit: •
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2007: Aylin Sayir, Jun Zhuang, Scott Walper, Kim Cowden, Megan Frisk, and M. Douglas Voss 2008: Seungkyung Park, Megan Frisk (awarded third place for outstanding poster), Kim Cowden, Azadeh Namvar and Stella Opendi. 2009: Azadeh Namvar and Morgan Hennessey (who was extended a special invite to present on the G8 exercise). 2010: Edikan Archibong (a former MSI Summer Research Team student), Ryan Newkirk (who was awarded third place for outstanding poster), Kathryn Krusemark (a FIX/CDG student who was later hired at Los Alamos National Laboratory) and Azadeh Namvar. 2011: Elizabeth Petrun, Deepti Joshi and Yu Zhang (who received an award recognizing the excellence of his white paper). The Frontier Interdisciplinary eXperiences (or FIX) program currently involves over two dozen students—including the CDG students. All FIX students are affiliated with NCFPD and, through the inter-­‐institutional Frontier program (co-­‐directed by Drs. Justin Kastner of Kansas State and Jason Ackleson of New Mexico State), enjoy collaboration with the BORDERS Center of Excellence. FIX students pursue interdisciplinary studies on such issues as border security, food protection, food defense, food security, cross-­‐border cooperation, and international trade. Significantly, the CDG students are intentionally mentored to develop specific skillsets—most notably, critical thinking skills, writing skills, and an appreciation for the complexity of Homeland Security issues. The impact of the FIX program extends well beyond the 17 CDG students to several other non-­‐NCFPD funded students in the Frontier program (for a full listing, see http://frontier.k-­‐state.edu and click on “people”). Diversity is valued in the Frontier program, and the involvement of NMSU’s campus (which has been designated by the U.S. Department of Education as a Hispanic-­‐
Serving Institution) has ensured that the FIX program consistently includes Hispanic students and minorities. 22 The FIX program’s management of CDG funds on behalf of NCFPD has involved the following education and mentoring activities: •
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Through an application and award process, recruit students from strong HS-­‐STEM educational platforms and curricula at multiple universities; Connect students to career development activities—including unique Frontier Field Trips and Frontier student-­‐centered retreats—that develop critical thinking skills, multidisciplinary breadth, and an appreciation for the complexity of homeland security; Help connect students to internships and employment; and Routinely evaluate students through the Frontier program’s Student Learning Outcomes (SLO) tracking document (submitted each semester to Stephanie Willett in DHS); Many new courses and coursework in food defense have been developed in the past several years. A recent survey found 30 university courses or workshops currently using NCFPD research in the course content. Examples of some of these courses include: • Food Defense: Protecting the Food Supply from Intentional Harm (University of Missouri) • Globalization, Cooperation, and the Food Trade (Kansas State University) • Protecting the Food Supply from Terrorists: What the Food Industry Needs to Know (Rutgers University) • Food Safety Risk Communication (University of Maryland) • Molecular Methods of Microbial Detection and Characterization (Texas A&M University) • Food Protection and Defense—Essential Concepts (Kansas State University) In 2010, the Master of Science in Security Technologies (MSST) program was launched at the University of Minnesota. The program educates analytical and risk management policymakers and innovators through a multi-­‐disciplinary graduate program developed in response to growing demand in industry and government. During the fourteen-­‐month program and through a multi-­‐disciplinary, systems approach, the program synthesizes core learning in four areas: • Security Methods and Foundations • Application Expertise (including cyber, bio, food, infrastructure, global supply chains) • Systems Science (interdependency among critical networks, components, human capital, organizational dimensions) • Social and Policy Dimensions Through elective courses, students also choose one of two learning tracks, and can further specialize through a range of elective courses: • Security Systems Technologies 23 •
Security and Risk Management This program bridges disciplines to address local, regional, national and global areas of need, seeding innovative capabilities while enabling interdisciplinary connections through direct links to industry, business and government partners. The students in the MSST program have been disproportionately interested in food defense. After Shaun Kennedy’s core course, “Dynamic Systems Modeling & Simulation Tools,” a large number of students have gone on to take “Food Defense: Vulnerabilities in Food System & How to Close Them” a course also taught by Kennedy and offered through the University of Minnesota’s Summer Public Health Institute, and a core course for the food protection track in the MPH program. 24 Minority-­‐Serving Institutions Summer Research Teams For several years, NCFPD has hosted faculty and students for the DHS Summer Research Team Program for Minority Serving Institutions. These programs often involve significant outreach to the groups both to raise their interest and awareness in food defense and to assist in capacity building at the host institution to ensure their success. From 2007-­‐2010, our research teams included: • 2007: Salam Ibrahim (North Carolina A&T State University) hosted by Francisco Diez-­‐Gonzalez (University of Minnesota). • 2008: Patricia Hatch (Hampton University) and students Jeanine Carney and Shawnta Lloyd, hosted by Charles Young (Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory). She received $40,000 in follow-­‐on funding. Jeanine Carney was hired the following year as a paid summer intern at Johns Hopkins. • 2009: Nelly Mateeva (Florida A&M University) and students Edikan Archibong and Alexander Foster, hosted by Keith Warriner (University of Guelph) and Stacey Davis (Johnson C. Smith University) hosted by Lee-­‐Ann Jaykus (North Carolina A&T State University). Each received $40,000 in follow-­‐on funding. • 2010: Sylvia Vetrone (Whittier College) and Jessica Ochoa, an undergraduate student, hosted by Vangie Alocilja (Michigan State University). Dr. Vetrone received $49,910 in follow-­‐on funding. In addition to the SRTs, in 2010, four undergraduate students from the University of Puerto Rico-­‐Ponce completed summer research experiences through the DHS Scientific Leadership Award for Minority Serving Institutions program; three of these students spent the summer working on projects in Keith Warriner's laboratory at the University of Guelph, and one spent the summer working at Texas A&M University with Suresh Pillai. These activities have given these minority researchers and students the opportunity to work with top-­‐notch research mentors widely considered to be among the best in their fields. MSI-­‐Led Projects Much of the interest at MSI’s is in the Agent Behavior area, but in many cases the investigators need support in order to be successful in both proposal development and research execution due to the nature of the research. To that end, Dr. Frank Busta, NCFPD Senior Science Advisor, has conducted several site visits to MSI’s conducting Agent Behavior research and Director Shaun Kennedy has met with the investigators at membership meetings to provide support and consultation in experimental design and evaluation of results. The administrations of the MSI's involved have appreciated the direct involvement of personal visits to the institutions and direct research mentoring of the faculty involved with NCFPD. Visits by Dr. Busta to Tuskegee University and N.C.A. & T. University and Director Kennedy to Florida A&M have been recognized as productive and beneficial to the institutions as well as to the investigators and NCFPD. These visits have included presentations; research discussions; laboratory activities; sessions with staff, 25 students, & post-­‐docs as well as faculty; and writing sessions. There is no question that these relationships have been broadly beneficial. MSI-­‐Led Project Highlights Teshome Yehualaeshet, Tuskegee University School of Veterinary Medicine, Identification and characterization of temperature-­‐dependent virulent genes in Y. pestis, Y pseudotuberculosis and Y. enterocolitica • Dr. Yehualaeshet received an additional award from NCFPD for his 2010/11 project Modification of sample preparation to differentiate live, injured and dead bacteria in Polymerase Chain Reaction assay. • Dr. Yehualaeshet’s personal development in his position at Tuskegee was recognized by his promotion to Associate Professor with tenure in 2010. Salam Ibrahim, North Carolina A&T State University, Impact of select rodenticides on the coagulation properties of milk proteins • In 2010, Dr. Ibrahim also successfully secured a USDA “1890 Institution Teaching, Research and Extension Capacity Building Grant (CBG) for his project “Development of Integrated Food Defense Education and Extension Program for Professionals and Students in 1890 Universities” based on his involvement with NCFPD. • In addition, Salam Ibrahim was selected to host a 2010 DHS Summer Scholar, Nathan Georgette, a degree candidate in Molecular and Cellular Biology at Harvard University. • Dr. Ibrahim and his research associate, Dr. Mehrdad Tajkarimi, have parlayed the NCFPD supported efforts into additional grants from USDA., • Dr. Ibrahim received tenure in 2010. Nelly Mateeva, Florida A&M, Extraction of ricin and PCB's using functionalized electrospun fibers (Co-­‐PI with Keith Warriner, University of Guelph) • Edikan Archibong, Florida A&M graduate student, was selected to present a poster a the 2010 DHS University Summit. • Dr. Mateeva received tenure in 2010. Woubit Abdela, Tuskegee University School of Veterinary Medicine, Simultaneous detection of multiple food safety threat agents using multiplex PCR and PCR-­‐based microarray approaches. • Dr. Abdela upon demonstrating strong progress and extraordinary research and communication skills, progressed from a post-­‐doctorate position to a permanent Assistant Professor position in the Department of Veterinary Pathobiology. • To facilitate the special requirements of Dr. Abdela's unique research on select agent detection by PCR, an isolation clean-­‐lab controlled temperature room was established in which she could place the instruments used for her research. This was encouraged by NCFPD and reinforced on Dr. Busta's visits. 26 Collaboration and Integration A critical strength for NCFPD is our broad network of collaborations and partnerships that we are able to leverage to maximize our success. NCFPD has aggressively pursued collaborative opportunities; with the full belief that only through partnerships and collaboration can we maximize our opportunity to defend the safety of the food system. The results to date are impressive, illustrating NCFPD’s ability to form successful partnerships, including ones where the partners are willing to invest their own resources in the effort. Industry Work Group and Private Sector NCFPD’s Industry Work Group and External Board of Advisors include members from over 35 leading national and multi-­‐national food firms that provide guidance, provide access to information on supply chain and product systems, and participate in NCFPD research projects. We have engaged them to obtain feedback from end users on research outcomes and to expose the private sector partners to future technology and resource options. Many of the industry partners attend the Center’s regular research and biennial meetings, at their own expense, and give freely of their time to ensure the success of the Center. In some cases that has directly led to new funding and projects for NCFPD, such as the Food Defense Research Database. In others it has led to obtaining supply chain data that has been critical for the BTRA and other projects so that realistic supply chain and consumer behavior is represented. Without our industry partners, much of the detailed data necessary would simply not have been available. Federal Agencies Federal agencies are also important partners for NCFPD. The Center has received active engagement with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) – Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA); U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS); DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA), Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP); the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) – Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate; and the State Department. In addition to our direct collaborations with these agencies and our private sector partners, NCFPD also often serves the role of trusted neutral party between companies, between companies and the Federal agencies and between the Federal Agencies. NCFPD has worked very hard to maintain these relationships because they are so critical to protecting the food system from attack. An example of our credibility in that role is perhaps best exemplified by the informational webinar in January 2011 to examine the food defense implications of the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) where participants included representatives from FDA, USDA, DHS and the private sector. In the case of FDA, it included many of those who are responsible for the rule-­‐making related to food defense. The unique aspect of the webinar was that we were able to go through potential implications in a way that was not encumbered by restrictions placed on federal agencies during the rule-­‐making process. 27 International Relationships, NGO’s and IGO’s In addition to U.S. agencies, NCFPD has worked closely with comparable agencies in leading countries on food defense as well as Non-­‐Governmental and Intergovernmental Organizations (NGO’s/IGO’s). This includes Australia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. One project that helped forge some of these relationships was the development and facilitation of a food defense exercise for the Group of Eight Nations (G8) which brought together in Minnesota the agriculture, public health, law enforcement and foreign affairs representatives from the G8 countries for the first multi-­‐national food defense exercise ever conducted. As two examples of the depth of these foreign relationships: in Canada NCFPD has had ongoing research collaborations with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and Health Canada and in China we will soon sign an agreement on future collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Inspection and Quarantine. There are three primary IGO’s associated with the food system; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Animal Health Organization (OIE); with each of whom NCFPD has long-­‐standing partnerships. Examples include NCFPD and its partner center on campus, the Center for Animal Health and Food Safety, being named as OIE collaborating centers (the only ones in the U.S.) and NCFPD receiving a grant from FAO to develop the consultative plan for FAO’s emergency preparedness and response organization for food safety – EMPRES-­‐Food Safety. Consumer groups also play an important role in food defense, as the consumer ultimately pays for any costs associated with food defense mitigation efforts and also pays the ultimate price for any food defense failures. To that end, NCFPD has been working for over five years with the leading food safety NGO, the Center for Science in the Public Interest and also their global collaborative effort Safe Food International. Center of Excellence Collaboration In order to maximize the return on its investments in the Centers of Excellence, the Office of University Programs has emphasized inter-­‐COE collaboration. NCFPD has moved strongly ahead in this area with both funded projects that include other COE’s as well as outreach and resource sharing. Funded projects that have benefited from partnerships with other DHS Centers of Excellence include: • Systems Based Risk/Vulnerability Methodology project, in which NCFPD brings detailed knowledge of specific food systems together with the expertise of CREATE on risk analysis, FAZD on animal production systems, NISAC/Sandia/LANL on infrastructure interdependencies, and FDA-­‐CFSAN/USDA-­‐FSIS on regulatory frameworks. • FASCAT (Food and Agriculture Criticality Assessment Tool) developed, in collaboration with FAZD and CREATE, as a novel approach to identify critical food and agriculture sector assets and provide reporting mechanisms to DHS. 28 FASTRANS (Food and Agriculture Transportation Study) develops databases and models for interstate food and agriculture transportation systems with an initial focus on animal movement with swine and cattle to improve the utility of current foreign animal disease models. A collaboration with FAZD and CREATE, FAS-­‐TRANS will later expand to other food and agriculture systems. • Instructional Strategies for Tailoring Risk Communication Messaging. Tim Sellnow, Risk Communication Theme Leader, is working on a CREATE project to develop instructional approaches for risk assessment and communication across homeland security domains. Because homeland security is a relatively new field, learning from each other is important to each COE’s success. Examples of this with FAZD include: the jointly led 2008 consequence-­‐modeling workshop; active participation of each centers’ director in the other centers’ regular all investigator meeting; NCFPD providing templates and IT support it developed for its competitive grants program, among others. START has presented at one of the regular monthly NCFPD webinars and some of their investigators in risk communication have joined NCFPD’s regular theme meetings. CREATE, CAMRA and PACER were also part of the consequence-­‐modeling workshop, and all of the COE directors work together on educational opportunities for Congressional staff. In addition, all of the COE communications representatives regularly meet to help each other with communication plans and share resources. •
CoreSHIELD / HSIN Integration CoreSHIELD is the communication and collaboration platform developed by NCFPD to improve the ability for critical infrastructure professionals to prepare and rapidly respond to catastrophic events. Over the past year, the CoreSHIELD and HSIN technical teams met several times, both in-­‐person in the Washington D.C. area and via conference call to collaborate on how best to achieve integration between these two systems. The strategic planning activities resulted in a decision to primarily use web services to enable the desired integration, which will include: • Single Sign On capability between the two platforms • Calendar sharing • Ability for HSIN users to query CoreSHIELD database to obtain Subject Matter Expert contact information • Document sharing capability from CoreSHIELD to HSIN enabling documents initially stored in CoreSHIELD to transition into “For Official Use Only” and/or “Law Enforcement Sensitive” document categorization within HSIN. HSIN and CoreSHIELD technologists also worked together in an effort to transform the HSIN user interface into a more CoreSHIELD-­‐like interface. This work is still ongoing, pending changes to the existing HSIN platform. 29 Outreach Events Outreach events at NCFPD have included our research meetings, our monthly “Research in Food Defense Webinar Series,” presentations at meetings and conferences, and our extensive international outreach. NCFPD-­‐Sponsored Research Meetings In the years 2007-­‐2011, NCFPD held three major research meetings, in 2007, 2008 and 2010. All were held at the Oak Ridge Conference Center in Chaska, Minnesota. The remote location was purposely chosen to focus the meeting more specifically on the meeting purpose and avoid the distractions inherent in choosing a major city. This was a “lesson learned” and applied from the 2005 meeting, which was held in Atlanta, GA. This allows us to maximize the valuable time of our investigators and industry representatives. The first meeting was June 28-­‐29, 2007. There were 116 attendees and 27 student poster presentations. Presenters included Desiree Linson, Dept. of Homeland Security, Science & Technology (S&T) Division, University Programs; Segaran Pillai, Dept. of Homeland Security, Chemical/Biological (Chem/Bio) Division; Tom McGinn, Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs; Bob Brackett, FDA-­‐Center for Food Safety and Nutrition (CFSAN) and Perfecto Santiago, USDA-­‐Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). The keynote was delivered by Marc Ostfield, Senior Advisor on Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security, Office of International Health Affairs, U.S. Department of State. The second meeting was September 29 – October 1, 2008, with an objective to, “develop the five and ten year strategic research and education plan for NCFPD, including inter-­‐ and intra-­‐ theme coordination and partner/stakeholder collaboration.” There were 140 attendees and 28 student posters. Some notable speakers included Liz Filauri, Dept. of Homeland Security, Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate, University Programs; Sara Klucking, Dept. of Homeland Security, Science & Technology (S&T) Directorate, Chemical/Biological (Chem/Bio) Division; Tom McGinn, Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs; Donald Zink, FDA-­‐Center for Food Safety and Nutrition (CFSAN) and Carol Maczka, USDA-­‐Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). The keynote speech was delivered by Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director of the Food Safety Program, Center for Science in the Public Interest. The third meeting was September 27 – 29, 2010. There were 34 student posters and 160 attendees. The keynote speaker was Deborah Westphal, Managing Partner, Toffler Associates. Other speakers included Matthew Clark, Director, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security; Doug Meckes, Branch Chief, Food Agriculture and Veterinary Branch, Office of Health Affairs, Department of Homeland Security; LeeAnne Jackson, FDA Co-­‐Chair of the Food and Agriculture Sector, Health Science Policy Advisor, Food and Drug Administration and Don Kautter, Sr. Food Defense Analyst, Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA. Agendas from these three research meetings are available in Appendix D. 30 In addition, NCFPD sponsored individual Theme meetings from April through October, 2009 in lieu of a center-­‐wide meeting in that year. Each meeting was chaired by Theme Leaders and focused on project research presentations and opportunities for collaboration among projects. Each meeting also included a presentation by a food defense stakeholder, e.g. Institute of Food Technologists, and International Food Information Council (Risk Communication Theme); CH Robinson Worldwide Inc. (Event Modeling/System Strategies Themes); and FBI (Agent Behavior Theme). Agendas for the 2009 Theme Meetings are found in Appendix D. Research in Food Defense Webinar Series Launched in December, 2009 the NCFPD Research in Food Defense Webinar Series showcases NCFPD-­‐conducted research and to promote research and resources developed by other Food and Agriculture Sector partners. Programs are generally scheduled for the first Friday of each month at 11:00 ET. Primary promotion is through the NCFPD newsletter distribution list. The intended audience was originally NCFPD investigators and other members of the Center’s network, however, the presentations have had a far wider appeal. Participation for the first sixteen webinars has totaled 1,223 through May, 2011. Distribution by sector is: faculty/students (32%), federal government (22%), state and local government (21%), and private sector (24%). Presentations at Meetings and Conferences NCFPD researchers and staff have presented at a variety of conferences and other venues in an effort to educate others about food defense issues, and to engage potential collaborators. In the award period, over 200 presentations were made by NCFPD researchers on food defense topics. Some of the meetings presented at include the National Communicators Association Annual Meeting, the Food Safety Research Council, the World Congress of Food Science & Technology, and many more. A listing of presentations conducted by NCFPD investigators and students may be found in Appendix A – Project Outputs. International Outreach Just as the U.S. food supply is really a global food system, NCFPD’s outreach has also been global in nature. NCFPD leadership has conducted outreach efforts in Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Vietnam, in addition to the significant outreach performed by NCFPD’s investigators. One of the hallmark efforts of the Center is the Collaborative Exchange program jointly supported by FDA-­‐CFSAN (Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition) and USDA-­‐
Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS). In this program, NCFPD investigators travel with CFSAN and FAS food defense leads to a country where the NCFPD investigator conducts food defense vulnerability assessment training for academia, government and industry representatives. Following the training, a subset of those trained are selected to come to the University of Minnesota, where they participate in a one week Public Health Institute course on vulnerability assessment taught by the director and then stay for a second week where they share food defense practices in their country and then receive additional 31 opportunities to develop their food defense expertise through visits to a wide range of food firms. Two other programs in which NCFPD plays an integral part are the Global Initiative for Food System Leadership (GIFSL) and the Institute for Science in Global Policy (ISGP). GIFSL is an industry-­‐supported effort to provide leadership training for food system leaders in the developing world that is led by the original leader of NCFPD’s Risk Communication Theme (Will Hueston) and includes food defense in its scope. ISGP is led by George Atkinson at the University of Arizona and is a unique forum for connecting world-­‐leading scientists with policy makers from multiple countries to explore policy issues. While its initial focus has been on emerging infectious disease, food sustainability has been added as its second thrust area with NCFPD as the lead for this area. In ISGP’s parlance, food sustainability is inclusive of food safety, food defense and food security. At the next forum in Scotland in October, NCFPD’s director will be providing one of the three food sustainability policy papers. 32 Communications Newsletter and Website In the past four years, a large portion of NCFPD’s communications program has centered around the newsletter and website. Launched in 2009 with 272 subscribers (mostly our investigators, students and members of our Industry Work Group), the newsletter list has grown to 1,350 subscribers from over 30 countries, largely through promotion on our website and at meetings. The email marketing software we use has grown increasingly sophisticated, allowing us to track opens by location, domain name and to track link clicks in order to better target the information we provide. Every month, the newsletter “spotlights” a member of our food defense community, giving our community an opportunity to know each other better. A central column in the newsletter and on our website is the monthly “Message from the Director,” in which Shaun Kennedy pens insights on current events related to food defense. This column was launched to strategically position Shaun as the premier thought leader on food defense and to spark interest in the intersection of the Center’s mission and its relationship to the larger culture. A redesign of the website in 2008 brought the Center more in line with its brand design, and a redesign to be launched in 2011 will refocus the home page to be more news-­‐centric and content-­‐driven, now that the Center is generating more content and traffic. So far in 2011, the website has had about 240,000 page views. In 2010, the Center contracted with WebsEdge to produce a video overview of the Center for the ASIS (American Society for Industrial Security) Meeting in October 2010. The resulting video can be viewed on our website. Social Media and Media Relations The Center has dipped its toe in social media, with a Twitter account and a LinkedIn group. The Twitter account has so far been used to promote our webinar and newsletter, but has been successful in that respect. The LinkedIn group currently has over 40 members. The Center has been very receptive to media requests, both for leadership and to direct media to appropriate subject matter experts within our organization. Some recent media requests that we have responded to have been from the Associated Press, Science magazine, the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, the Globe and Mail (Canada), Food Quality Magazine, the Kansas City Star, and Nature. Journals, Books and Magazine Articles In addition to our project-­‐generated publications, Center staff have also been active in publishing to industry journals, books and magazines. Some notable examples include a chapter in Hygienic Design of Food Factories (forthcoming from Woodhead Publishing), a chapter in Advances in Food Protection (2011, Springer) and articles in FDQ (Food & Drink Quarterly), the Journal of Food Protection, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Report, the Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism and Science Magazine. A complete listing of staff publications is available in Appendix A. 33 Appendices Appendix A: Project Outputs Publications Staff-­‐Written Publications Kennedy, S. 2011. Food Safety. Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense. 1–3. Morgan Hennessey, Elizabeth Cunningham and Shaun Kennedy. (November 2010) "The National Center for Food Protection and Defense's Development of Food Risk Models for the BTRA (Bio-­‐terrorism Risk Assessment" George Mason University: The CIP (Center for Infrastructure Protection) Report 9(5): 6-­‐7, 11. Shaun Kennedy and Elizabeth Cunningham. (Fall 2010) "Food Contamination: An Economic and Health Threat." FDQ: Food & Drink Quarterly 6(3): 22-­‐25. Morgan Hennessey, Shaun Kennedy and Frank Busta. Demeter's Resilience: An International Food Defense Exercise. Journal of Food Protection 73(7): 1353-­‐1356, July 2010. Shaun Kennedy, "Why Can't We Test Our Way to Absolute Food Safety?" Science Magazine, 12 December 2008. Kennedy, S. P., “Food Defense: Post-­‐Harvest Preparedness,” Federal Efforts to Mitigate Vulnerabilities in the Food Supply Chain., Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, 2007. Hoffman, J. and S. P. Kennedy, “International Cooperation to Defend the Food Supply Chain: Nations Are Talking; Next Step—Action ,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 40: 1169-­‐1178, 2007. Kennedy, S. P. and F. Busta; “Biosecurity: Food Protection and Defense” Chapter 5 in Food Microbiology: Fundamentals and Frontiers, 3rd Edition, (M. Doyle and L. Beuchatt editors), 2007. Kennedy, S. P. and J. Hoffman, “Systems Based Vulnerability and Risk Assessment”, Department of Homeland Security, Science & Technology Summit, Washington, D.C., 2007 (Abstract) Francis Busta, Shaun Kennedy, Julie Ostrowsky. Priorities for Research in Food Defense, Institute of Medicine Center Staff in "Addressing Foodborne Threats to Health" 247-­‐254, 2006. Julie Ostrowsky. Colloquy: Toward progress in food protection and defense, MN J of Law, Science and Technology Center Staff 8(1):175-­‐185, 2006. 34 Peer-­‐Reviewed Publications Agent Behavior Ágoston, R., K.A. Soni, K. McElhany, M.L. Cepeda, U. Zuckerman, S. Tzipori, C.M. Farkas, and S.D. Pillai (2009) Rapid Concentration of Bacillus and Clostridium Spores from Large Volumes of Milk using Continuous Flow Centrifugation. Journal of Food Protection 72: 666-­‐
669 Anderson, J. M., Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., Castro, A. B., and Alocilja, C. E., 2010. One step alkaline synthesis of biocompatible gold nanoparticles using dextrin as capping agent. Journal of Nanoparticle Research, published online on Dec. 31, 2010 at DOI 10.1007/s11051-­‐010-­‐
0172-­‐3. Anderson, M.J., Zhang, D., and Alocilja, E.C., 2011. Spectral and electrical nanoparticle-­‐based molecular detection of Bacillus anthracis using copolymer mass amplification. IEEE Transaction on Nanotechnology, 10(1), p. 44-­‐49 (January 2011). Archibong, E., Lita, A., Warriner, K., Mateeva, N, Polymerization of Aniline in Presence of Dioxin Selective Pentapeptides, European Polymer Journal, manuscript in preparation. Archibong, E., Lita, A., Warriner, K., Mateeva, N., Binding of Dioxin Selective Pentapeptides to a Polyaniline Matrix, Synthetic Metals, manuscript in preparation. Bullerman, L.B., Bianchini, A., Jackson, L.S., Jablonski, J.J., Hanna, M.A. and D. Ryu. 2008. Reduction of fumonisin B1 in corn grits by single-­‐screw extrusion. J. Agric. Food Chem. 56(7): 2400-­‐2405. Dong, L. and H. Jiang. (2008) “Selective Formation and removal of liquid microlenses at predetermined locations within microfluidics through pneumatic control.” J. Microelectromechanical Systems 17(2):281-­‐392. Frisk, M., Erwin Berthier, William H. Tepp, Eric A Johnson and David J. Beebe. (2008) Bead-­‐based microfluidic toxin sensor integrating evaporative signal amplification. Lab on a Chip. 8:11, 1793-­‐1800. Frisk, M., William H. Tepp, Guangyun Lin, Eric A Johnson and David J. Beebe. (2007) Substrate-­‐Modified Hydrogels for Autonomous Sensing of Botulinum Neurotoxin Type A. Chem. Mater. 19, 5842-­‐5844. Frisk, M.L., Berthier, E., Tepp, W.H., Johnson, E.A., and Beebe, D.J. (2008). "Bead-­‐based toxin sensor integrating evaporative signal amplification," Lab on a Chip, 8:1793-­‐1800. Frisk, M.L., Guangyun Lin, Eric A Johnson and David J. Beebe. (2010) Synaptotagmin II Peptide-­‐Bead Conjugated for Botulinum Toxin Enrichment and Detection in Microchannels. Biosensors & Bioelectronics (under review) Frisk, M.L., Tepp, W.H., Johnson, E.A., and Beebe, D.J. (2009) "Self-­‐assembld peptide monolayers as a toxin-­‐sensing mechanism within arrayed microchannels," Analytical Chemistry. (article pending) 35 Frisk, M.L., Tepp, W.H., Lin, G., Johnson, E.A., and Beebe, D.J. (2007) Substrate-­‐modified hydrogels for autonomous sensing of botulinum neurotoxin", Chemistry of Materials, 19:5842-­‐5844 Frisk, Megan L., Tepp, William H., Johnson, Eric A. and Beebe, David J. (2009) Self-­‐
Assembled Peptide Monolayers as a Toxin Sensing Mechanism within Arrayed Microchannels. ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY 81:7, 2760-­‐2767. Harris Leishman, O. N., T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2009. Development of a surrogate positive control for PCR detection of Bacillus anthracis plasmid pXO2. J. Microbiol. Hathurusinghe, M. H., AbuGhazaleh, A. A., Reddy, M.R., Ibrahim, S. A., Tajkarimi, M., and Song, D. Development an on-­‐farm technique using lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect of toxins in milk. Journal of Dairy Science 93:1. 2010. Hathurusinghe, M., Alazzeh, A., Shahbazi, A., Ibrahim, S. A., and AbuGhazaleh, A. A. A simple on-­‐farm technique for early detection of foreign substances in milk. Journal of Dairy Science 92:1. 2009. He, L.; Haynes, C. L.; Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F.; Labuza, T.P*. 2010. Rapid detection of a foreign protein in milk using IMS-­‐SERS. J.Raman Spectrosc. In press. DOI: 10.1002/jrs.2880 He, L.; Rodda T.; Haynes, C.L.; Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F.; Labuza, T.P*. 2011. Rapid detection of a foreign protein in milk using surface-­‐enhanced Raman spectroscopy coupled with antibody-­‐modified silver dendrites. Anal. Chem. 83 (5), 1510–1513. Islam G, Meleeva, N and Warriner K. Extraction of concanvalin A using chitosan modified electrospun fibers. Sensors. In Preparation Jablonski, J.J. and Jackson, L.S. 2008. Stability of picrotoxin during yogurt manufacture and storage. J. Food Sci. 73(8):T121-­‐T128. Jackson, L. S., Z. Zhang and W. H. Tolleson (2010). "Thermal Stability of Ricin in Orange and Apple Juices." Journal of Food Science 75(4): T65-­‐T71. Kamikawa, T., Mikolajczyk, M.G., Kennedy, M., Zhong, L., Zhang, P., Scott, D.E. and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Pandemic influenza detection by electrically active magnetic nanoparticles and surface Plasmon resonance. IEEE Transaction of Nanotechnology (in review). Kamikawa, T.L., Mikolajczyk, M.G., Kennedy, M., Zhang, P., Wang, W., Scott, D.E., and Alocilja, E.C., 2010. Nanoparticle-­‐based biosensor for the detection of emerging pandemic influenza strains. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 26(4), 1346-­‐1352 Koklu, M., Park, S., Pillai, S.D., Beskok, A., “Negative Dielectrophoretic Capture of Bacterial Spores in Food Matrices,” Biomicrofluidics, 4, 034107, 2010. (Also featured in the September 1, 2010 issue of Virtual Journal of Biological Physics Research). 36 Koklu, M., Sabuncu, A.C., Beskok, A., “Acoustophoresis in Shallow Microchannels,” Journal of Colloid and Interface Science, doi:10.1016/j.jcis.2010.08.029, 2010. Leishman, O., M. Johnson, T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2010. Survival of Bacillus anthracis spores in fruit juices and wine. J. Food Prot. (in press). Leishman, O., T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2010. Hydrophobic properties and extraction of Bacillus anthracis spores from liquid foods. Food Microbiol. 27: 661-­‐666. Lumor, S. E., Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F. and Labuza, T. P. 2011. Detection of warfare agents in liquid foods using the brine shrimp lethality assay. Journal of Food Science, 76:C112-­‐C116 DOI 10.1111/j1750-­‐3841.2010.01966.x. Lumor, S. E., Hutt, A., Ronningen, I., Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F. and Labuza, T. P. 2011. Validation of immunodetection (ELISA) of ricin using a biological activity assay. Journal of Food Science, J Food Science 76:T16-­‐T19 DOI 10.1111/j.1750-­‐3841.2010.01943.x. Pal, S. and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Electrically-­‐Active Polyaniline Coated Magnetic (EAPM) Nanoparticle as Novel Transducer in Biosensor for Detection of Bacillus anthracis Spores in Food Samples. Biosensors and Bioelectronics Journal 24(5): 1437-­‐1444 (available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bios.2008.08.020) Pal, S. and Alocilja, E.C., 2010. Electrically–active magnetic nanoparticles as novel concentrator and electrochemical redox transducer in Bacillus anthracis DNA detection. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 26(4), 1624-­‐1630 Pal, S., Setterington, E., and Alocilja, E.C. 2008. Electrically-­‐Active Magnetic Nanoparticles for Concentrating and Detecting Bacillus anthracis Spores in a Direct-­‐Charge Transfer Biosensor. IEEE Sensors Journal 8(6): 647-­‐654. Park, S; Beskok, A, “Alternating current electrokinetic motion of colloidal particles on interdigitated microelectrodes,” Anal. Chem., 80(8) pp 2832-­‐2841, 2008 Park, S; Koklu, M., Beskok, A, “Particle Trapping in High-­‐Conductivity Media with Electrothermally Enhanced Negative Dielectrophoresis,” Anal. Chem., 81(6), pp 2303–2310, 2009. Setterington, E. and Alocilja, E.C. 2010. Magnetic/polyaniline core/shell nanoparticles for target extraction and electrochemical detection of threat agents. IEEE Transaction of Nanotechnology (in review). Setterington, E.B., Cloutier, B.C., Ochoa, J.M., Cloutier, A.K., Jain, P., Alocilja, E.C. Rapid, sensitive, and specific immunomagnetic separation of foodborne pathogens. International Journal of Food Safety, Nutrition and Public Health. (in review) Setterington, E.H. and Alocilja, E.C., 2011. Rapid electrochemical detection of polyaniline-­‐
labeled Escherichia coli O157:H7. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 26(5), 2208-­‐2212 37 Stephan A. Cameron, Kathrarina Durchschein, Jack Richman, Michael Sadowsky, and Lawrence P. Wackett . 2011. A new family of biuret hydrolases functioning in s-­‐triazine ring metabolism. ACS Catalysis (to be submitted) Torres-­‐Chavolla, E. and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Aptasensors for detection of microbial and viral pathogens. Biosensors and Bioelectronics Journal 24: 3175-­‐3182 (available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bios.2008.11.010) Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., and Alocilja, E.C. 2011. Nanoparticle based DNA biosensor for tuberculosis detection using thermophilic helicase-­‐dependent isothermal amplification. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 26(11): 4614– 4618 (July 2011). Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., Ranasinghe, R.J., and Alocilja, E.C., 2010. Characterization and functionalization of biogenic gold nanoparticles for biosensing enhancement. IEEE Transaction on Nanotechnology, 9(5), 533-­‐538. Xu, S., T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2008. Inactivation kinetics of avirulent Bacillus anthracis spores in milk with a combination of heat and hydrogen peroxide. J. Food Prot. 51: 333-­‐338. Xu, S., T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2008. Inactivation of Bacillus anthracis spores in milk by a combination of biocides and heating at high-­‐temperature short-­‐time (HTST) pasteurization temperatures. Appl. Environ. Microbiol. 74: 3336-­‐3341 Yehualaeshet T., Montgomery M., Grahams M., Habtemariam T., Samuel T., and W. Abdela. Effects of temperature on survival and growth of Yersinia and associated genome profile (Pending, Manuscript submitted to Journal of Food Science). Yi, C, Shara, T, Islam G and Warriner K. Fabrication of polyaniline nanowiires based on modified electrospun nylon fibers. Analyst. In Preparation. Zeng, X. and H. Jiang, “Polydimethylsiloxane microlens arrays fabricated through liquid phase photopolymerization and molding,” IEEE/ASME Journal of Microelectromechanical Systems, 17 (5), pp. 1210-­‐1217, 2008. Zhang, D., Carr, D.J., and Alocilja, E.C., 2009. Fluorescent bio-­‐barcode DNA assay for the detection of Salmonella enterica serovar Enteritidis. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 24(5), 1377-­‐1381. Zhang, D., Huarng, M.C., and Alocilja, E.C., 2010. A Multiplex Nanoparticle-­‐based Bio-­‐
barcoded DNA Sensor for the Simultaneous Detection of Multiple Pathogens. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 26(4), 1736-­‐1742. Event Modeling 38 Bravo, J., Nganje, W., Kagan, A., Acharya, R., and Edwards, M. “Food Safety and Defense Risks in U.S. Mexico Produce Trade: Aizen’s Theory of Planned Behavior, Second Review, Business Hispanic Journal, Feb. 2010. Li J, Maclehose R, Smith K, Kaehler D, Hedberg C. Development of a Salmonella screening tool for consumer complaint-­‐based foodborne illness surveillance systems. J Food Prot. 2011 Jan;74(1):106-­‐10. Li, J.; Shah, G.H.; Hedberg, C. Complaint-­‐Based Surveillance for Foodborne Illness in the United States: A Survey of Local Health Departments, Journal of Food Protection®, Volume 74, Number 3, March 2011 , pp. 432-­‐437(6), International Association for Food Protection Li, J.; Smith, K.; Kaehler, D.; Everstine, K.; Rounds, J.; Hedberg, C. Evaluation of a Statewide Foodborne Illness Complaint Surveillance System in Minnesota, 2000 through 2006 Journal of Food Protection®, Volume 73, Number 11, November 2010 , pp. 2059-­‐2064(6) International Association for Food Protection Mejia, C., McEntire, J., Keener, K., Nganje, W., Stinson, T., Muth, M.K., and Jensen, H. “Traceability (Product Tracing) in Food Systems: An IFT Report Submitted to FDA, Volume 2: Cost Considerations and Implications,” Comprehensive Reviews in Food Science and Food Safety, Vol. 9:159-­‐175 2010. Nganje, W., Richards, T., Bravo, J., Hu, N., Kagan, A., Acharya, R., and Edwards, M. “Food Safety and Defense Risks in U.S. Mexico Produce Trade, Choices, 2nd Quarter 2009, 24(2):1-­‐
8. Novak, J. M., & Sellnow, T. L. (2009). Reducing organizational risk through participatory communication. Journal of Applied Communication Research. Richards, T., Nganje, W., and Ram, A. “Hysteresis and Investment in Food Safety.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 34(3):464-­‐482, 2009. Risk Communication Prebles, E.A.; Sayir, A.D.; Brandenburg, D.C.; and Mather, E.C. (2008). "Longitudinal Evaluation of Food Safety Discussion-­‐Based Exercises: Tool Development and Initial Validation," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 5: Issue 1, Article 37. It can be downloaded from: http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol5/iss1/37 Reierson, J. L., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (in press). Complexities of crisis renewal over time: Learning from the case of tainted Odwalla apple juice. Communication Studies. Sellnow, T. L., Littlefield, R. S., Vidoloff, K. G., & Webb, E. M. (2009). The interacting arguments of risk communication in response to terrorist hoaxes. Argumentation and Advocacy. 39 Spink, J, and Moyer, D. (2011) Defining the Public Health Threat of Food Fraud, Journal of Food Science (In Review 2/2011) Veil, S., Buehner, T., & Palenchar, M. J. (2011). A work-­‐in-­‐process literature review: Incorporating social media in risk and crisis communication. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 19(2). DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-­‐5973.2011.00639. Vidoloff, K.G. & Petrun, E.L. (in press). Communication successes and constraints: Analysis of the 2008 Salmonella saintpaul foodborne illness outbreak. Journal of the Northwest Communication Association. Systems Strategies Kinsey, J., Harrison, R.W., Degeneffe, D., Ferreira, G., and Shiratori, S. 2009. “Index of Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the Food System.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 91(5):1470-­‐1476. Education Ackleson, J. and Kastner, J. “Borders and Governance: An Analysis of Health Regulation and the Agri-­‐food Trade,” Geopolitics 27, no. 1 (2011). Gopalakrishnan, S.; Cochran, C.; and Kastner, J. “The Multiplicity of Actors Involved in Securing America’s Food Imports,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (submitted December 2010; in review). Linton, R., A. Nutsch, D. McSwane, J. Kastner, T. Bhatt, S. Hodge, K. Getty, C. Racz, C. Kastner, D. Maier, W. Field, A. Chaturvedi, and C. Woodley. “Use of a Stakeholder-­‐Driven DACUM Process to Define Knowledge Areas for Food Protection and Defense,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (accepted and in press for special issue in 2011). Nutsch, A. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management in June 2010, "Use of a Stakeholder-­‐Driven DACUM Process to Define Knowledge Areas for Food Protection and Defense" Nyambok, E. and Kastner, J. “United States Import Safety and the Chinese Aquaculture Industry,” Journal of Environmental Health (accepted and in press for April 2011). Schenck-­‐Hamlin, D. Journal of Issues in Science and Technology Librarianship Taylor E., Kastner, J., and Renter, D. “Challenges involved in the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak and lessons learned,” Journal of Public Health Management and Practice 16(3):221-­‐231 (2010). 40 Other Publications Agent Behavior Alocilja, E.C. and Pal, S. 2010. Microbiological biosensors for food defense and safety. In Voeller, G. (ed.). Wiley Handbook of Science & Technology for Homeland Security. Wiley & Sons, Inc. (in press; expected to be out in March 2010). Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Market Opportunities for Biosensor Technologies in the Food Industry. Featured article of the March 2009 edition of the Resource Magazine, a publication of the American Society of Biological and Agricultural Engineers. Alocilja, E.C. 2008. Biosensors for detecting pathogenic bacteria in the meat industry, In: F. Toldrá. (ed.), Meat Biotechnology, Springer, New York. ISBN 978-­‐0-­‐387-­‐79381-­‐8. Alocilja, E.C. and Muhammad-­‐Tahir, Z. 2008. Label-­‐free microbial biosensors using molecular nanowire transducers. In: M. Zuorob, S. Elwary, and A. Turner (ed). Principles of bacterial detection: biosensors, recognition receptors, and microsystems, Springer, New York. ISBN 978-­‐0-­‐387-­‐75112-­‐2. Ágoston, R., K.A. Soni, K. McElhany, M.L. Cepeda, U. Zuckerman, S. Tzipori, C.M. Farkas, and S.D. Pillai (2009) Rapid Concentration of Bacillus and Clostridium Spores from Large Volumes of Milk using Continuous Flow Centrifugation. Journal of Food Protection72: 666-­‐
669 Jackson, L.S. and F. Al-­‐Taher. 2008. Factors affection mycotoxin production in fruits. In Mycotoxins in Fruits and Vegetables, R. Barkai-­‐Golan and N. Paster (eds.), Elsevier, pp. 75-­‐
104. Jackson, L.S. and F. Al-­‐Taher. 2008. Factors affection mycotoxin production in fruits. In Mycotoxins in Fruits and Vegetables, R. Barkai-­‐Golan and N. Paster (eds.), Elsevier, pp. 75-­‐
104. Event Modeling Nganje, William (2009) Traceability in Food Systems: An Economic Analysis of LGMA and the 2006 Spinach Outbreak. Case Study Report Prepared for FDA/IFT Traceability Initiative. Nganje, William, Na Hu, and Timothy Richards. “Improving the Safety of Imported Foods with Intelligent Systems: The Case of U.S.-­‐Mexico Fresh Produce Supply Chain,” Book Chapter, Forthcoming 2010 Wiley & Blackwell. Risk Communication 41 Brandenburg, D. How Lessons Learned Are Translated into Improved Supply Chain Responsiveness (Phase I: Preliminary Investigation -­‐Interviews with Selected Stakeholders). November, 2007. Cowden, K. J., Littlefield, R. S., & Long Feather, C. (Submitted July 2008). Empowering tribal college students: Experiential learning and action research about risk and crisis communication. (This research highlights best practices, and lettuce and spinach contamination). Remains under review. Submitted to the Journal of Intercultural Communication Research. Harvey, D. Evaluation of Risk Communication Practices with Minnesota Immigrant Communities (Preliminary Report). November, 2007. Littlefield, R. S. (2008). Moving to culture-­‐centered risk communication: A rationale for rethinking the single-­‐spokesperson model. A white paper submitted by the Risk Communication Group to the National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Minneapolis, MN. Littlefield, R. S., Cowden, K. J., McDonald, L. (Submitted February 2009). Risk message perceptions: Challenges for food contamination alerts directed toward American Indian populations. Submitted to the Journal of International and Intercultural Communication Research. Littlefield, R. S., Cowden, K. J., Novak, J. M., Ulmer, R. R., & Curry, N. J. (Submitted March 2009). Spokesperson credibility: Ethos and identification of food related crisis and emergency risk messages by culturally diverse groups. Submitted to Communication Studies. Littlefield, R. S., Cowden, K., Farah, F. M., & Hueston, W. D. (2008). Crisis communication with diverse publics: Message testing best practices across cultures. Submitted to Communication Studies. Under review. Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations (Three Affiliated Tribes) Tribal Report. Our research documents summarize tribal findings in aggregate form, per tribal agreements. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) prohibits the release of specific information. Individual tribal reports remain the property of each tribe. McDonald, L. Summary of Emergency and Community Health Outreach (ECHO) Notification Test Metrics. November, 2007. Palenchar, M. J., Freberg, K. (in press). Emergency management planning: Risk, crisis, issues and social media. In B. Olaniran, D. Williams, & T. Coombs (Eds.), Pre Crisis Management: Preparing for the inevitable. Peter Lang Publishing Group. Report of findings. Dairy Response Update (newsletter) / Industry Update, June 2009, p 1-­‐2. Published by Dairy Management Inc., Rosemont, IL. 42 Sellnow, T. L., & Vidoloff, K. G. (2009, September). Getting Crisis Communication Right: Eleven best practices for effective risk communication can help an organization navigate the slippery path through a crisis situation. Food Technology Magazine. Sellnow, T. L., Littlefield, R. S., Vidoloff, K. G., & Webb, E. (2009). Public communication in response to terrorist hoaxes: Risk communication as interacting arguments. (Includes food-­‐
related research). Argumentation & Advocacy,(in press). Sellnow, T. L., Ulmer, R. R., Seeger, M. W., & Littlefield, R. S. (in press) Effective risk communication: A message-­‐centered approach. New York: NY: Springer. Spink, J, and Moyer D (2011) Backgrounder: Defining the Public Health Threat of Food Fraud, National Center for Food Protection and Defense, a Backgrounder (Report for web publication) Spirit Lake Nation Tribal Report. Our research documents summarize tribal findings in aggregate form, per tribal agreements. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) prohibits the release of specific information. Individual tribal reports remain the property of each tribe. Standing Rock Sioux Nation Tribal Report. Our research documents summarize tribal findings in aggregate form, per tribal agreements. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) prohibits the release of specific information. Individual tribal reports remain the property of each tribe. Turtle Mountain Band of Chipewea Tribal Report. Our research documents summarize tribal findings in aggregate form, per tribal agreements. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) prohibits the release of specific information. Individual tribal reports remain the property of each tribe. Western, K. & Littlefield, R. S. (Submitted March 2009). When pets die: Analyzing the media’s influence on public perception in Menu Foods’ crisis. Submitted to Communication Quarterly. Systems Strategies Garcia-­‐Fuentes, P. G. Ferreira. R.W. Harrison, J. Kinsey, D. Degeneffe. 2010. “Consumer Confidence in the Food System, Media Coverage and Stock Prices of Food Companies” Working Paper, Dept. of Ag. Econ and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University AgCenter, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Bharad A.B., R.W. Harrison, J. Kinsey, D. Degeneffe, G.Ferreira. 2010. “Analysis of Media Agenda-­‐Setting Effects on Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the U.S. Food System” Working Paper, Dept. of Ag. Econ and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University AgCenter, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 43 Education Crnic, T. and Kastner, J. “Veterinary Capacity Analysis: Taiwan.” Report prepared for Dr. Barry Erlick for U.S. Department of Defense and National Agricultural Biosecurity Center project, “Development of Veterinary Response Capacity Templates for Intelligence Analysts” (30 September 2009). Gopalakrishnan, S., Jensby, J., and Kastner, J. “Food Defense and Governance: Safeguarding the nation’s food imports through public-­‐private partnerships.” Poster and abstract prepared for the National Center for Food Protection and Defense biennial meeting, September 2010. Kastner, J. and Block, C. “The Global Food Supply Chain.” In Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security, edited by John Voeller. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (2009) Kastner, J. Food and Agriculture Security: An Historical, Multidisciplinary Approach (Justin Kastner, Ed). Publisher: ABC-­‐CLIO (2010). [Edited by Frontier co-­‐director Dr. Kastner, with contributions from a number of Frontier faculty and FIX students.] Kastner, J., Ackleson, J., Nutsch, A., Elgina, V., Toburen, S., Dominguez, C., Thompson, T., Bursum, M., and Tenhouse, B. Frontier Field Guide, 3rd edition, August 2010. Kastner, J., Nutsch, A., and Kastner, C. “The Role of Food Safety in Food Security/Defense.” In Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security, edited by John Voeller. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (2009) Nutsch, A. and Kastner, J. “Carcass Disposal Options.” In Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security, edited by John Voeller. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (2009). Warkentien, M. and Kastner, J. “Cross-­‐border Cooperation of Brazil and the United States in the Beef Trade: Use of Regionalization to Address Foot and Mouth Disease.” Poster prepared for Cattlemen’s Day, Manhattan, Kansas, March 2011. Dissertations & Theses Archibong, Edikan. Determination of PCBs and Dioxins Using Selective Pentapeptides on Polyaniline Matrix. Florida A&M, Masters thesis, 12/2010. Bharad, A.B. Analysis of Media Agenda-­‐Setting Effects on Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the U.S. Food System Across Consumer Segments. Louisiana State University, Master's thesis, 2010. Bor, Tarik. Using lactic acid as biomarker to detect toxin in dairy product. North Carolina A&T, MS research project, 2009. Cooper, Kerri. The Effectiveness of Ozone Gas on Various Food Contact Surfaces Containing Sucrose Embedded with Bacillus Spores. Illinois Institute of Technology, National Center for Food Safety and Technology, MS thesis, 12/2009. 44 Cowden, Kimberly. Communication Needs of American Indians During Events of Intentional Catastrophic Food Contamination, North Dakota State University, Doctoral dissertation, 2009. Crnic, Tarrie. Transboundary Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Efforts: Disconnects Between Federal and State Levels of Government. Kansas State University, MPH thesis, 12/2010. Freberg, Karen. Intention to Comply with Food Safety Messages in a Crisis as a Function of Message Source and Message Reliability. School of Advertising and Public Relations, University of Tennessee. PhD dissertation, 3/2011. Gopalakrishnan, Shweta. Mapping the Elements of Governance in International Health Security. Kansas State University, MPH thesis, 5/2011. Hathurusinghe, M. Coagulation Properties of Milk in the Presence of Toxins. North Carolina A&T, PhD. dissertation, 2011. Islam, G. Extraction of Biohazards Using Modified Electrospun Fibers. MSc thesis, 8/2011. Krusemark, Kathryn. Decision-­‐making Applications in Food Safety and Food Defense. Kansas State University, MS thesis, 12/2009. Leishman, O. Concentration and Extraction of Bacillus anthracis Spores and Ricin Toxin from Liquid Foods. University of Minnesota, PhD dissertation, 2009 Li, John. Foodborne Disease Surveillance: Evaluation of Consumer Driven Complaint Systems and Development of Methods for Screening of Pathogens and Cluster Detection. University of Minnesota, PhD thesis, 9/2010. Montgomery, Marica. The influence of temperature in Yersinia: viability, growth and gene expression. Tuskegee University. (5/2011 -­‐ in development) Na Hu, Regina. Intelligent Sampling Method for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables Imported from Mexico. Arizona State University, 8/2008. Oh, Soo Yeon. Effects of Sanitizers and Sterilants on Bacillus Spores in Simulated Food Matrices on Food Contact Surfaces. Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT), National Center for Food Safety and Technology (NCFST), MS thesis, 8/2007. Pal, Sudeshna. Electrically-­‐Active Polyaniline Coated Magnetic Nanoparticles: A Novel Magnetic Concentrator and Nanostructured Transducer in Biosensor Devices. Michigan State University, PhD thesis, 2009. Park, Seungkyung. Electrokinetic and Acoustic Manipulations of Colloidal and Biological Particles. Texas A&M University, Mechanical Engineering Department, PhD thesis, 12/2008. Petrun, E. L. China’s Response to the Melamine Crisis: A Case Study in Actional Legitimacy. University of Kentucky, Master’s thesis, 2010. 45 Ping Xie, Ping. The Effectiveness of Cleaning Procedures to Remove Food Matrices Containing Bacillus Spores on Food Contact Surfaces before Sanitizer Application. Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT), National Center for Food Safety and Technology (NCFST), MS thesis, 12/2007. Reierson, J. Critical and Cultural Implications of Risk and Crisis Communication: Lessons for Crisis Renewal from Three Diverse Cases. North Dakota State University, Dissertation. 8/2009. van Rijn, Saskia. Food System Vulnerability and Defense: Modeling the Public Health System to Recognize and Respond to Intentional Food Contamination. New Mexico State University. MPH report, 5/2011. Vasquez, Rose Ann. Examining the U.S. Department of Homeland Security‘s National Strategy of Resilience: Food Security & Safety in the Southwestern Region of the U.S.-­‐
Mexico Border. Kansas State University, Masters paper, 5/2011. Vidoloff, K. G. Where There Is Smoke, Is There Fire? Learning about Hoax Terrorist Threats from New Zealand’s Operation Waiheke. North Dakota State University, Master’s thesis, 2007. Wang, Lei (Lisa). Comparing the effectiveness of Vortexx and hydrogen peroxide to inactivate Bacillus species spores embedded in food matrices. Illinois Institute of Technology, National Center for Food Safety and Technology, MS thesis, 12/2009. Wang, Na. Thermal and Chemical Inactivation of Ricin and Shiga Toxin in Orange Juice. University of Minnesota, Masters thesis, 1/2010. Wolf, K. E. Risk and Crisis Communication Message Testing: The Creation and Validation of an Instrument. Dissertation Prospectus. North Dakota State University, 3/2009. Zeng, Xuefeng. Microlenses and their applications in endoscopes. University of Wisconsin, Madison, PhD dissertation, 8/2009. Zhang, Deng. Development of a Nanoparticle-­‐based Electrochemical Bio-­‐barcode DNA sensor for Multiplex Pathogen Detection on Screen-­‐printed Carbon Electrodes. Michigan State University, Ph.D. thesis, 2011. 46 Presentations Staff Presentations Shaun Kennedy’s Presentations “Japan Crisis and Impacts on the Global Food System”, Aon Presentation, April 2010. “Food Defense Implications of the Food Safety Modernization Act”, International Symposium on Agro-­‐Terrorism, Kansas City, MO, April 2010. “Economically Motivated Adulteration”, International Symposium on Agro-­‐Terrorism, Kansas City, MO, April 2010. “Emerging Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, FBI Minneapolis District Office, Minneapolis, MN, February 2010. “Economically Motivated Adulteration Update”, SBIR, April 2011. “Preparedness for Food System Attacks and Failures -­‐ New Tools and Approaches”, Public Health Preparedness Summit, February 2011. “Food Defense: Emerging Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences” Land-­‐o-­‐
Lakes”, February 2010. “New Technologies and Old Statutes: Challenges for 21st Century Food and Medical Product Regulation”, Commentary at Coffman Memorial Union, Minneapolis, MN, February 2011. “Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, Briefing for National Security Staff, December 2010. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense”, DHS Centers of Excellence Directors Meetings, October 2010. “New Food Models for the BTRA”, FIMRT, October 2010. “Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) Indicators and Early Warning Model”, GMA, October 2010. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense”, Global Food Collaboration Forum, September 2010. “Agent Behavior in Dairy Systems and Criticality Assessments of Diary at a State Level”, International Dairy Show, Dallas, TX, September 2010. “From Regulation to Retail: Chemical Management in a Chemophobic Society”, GMA Executive Conference, Colorado Springs, CO, August 2010. “Emerging Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, FDA-­‐CFSAN/USDA-­‐FAS Sponsored Food Defense Workshop, August 2010. 47 “New Food Defense Tools Under Development”, SCCGCC, July 2010. “Food Defense Research Database”, Briefing for GCC, July 2010. “Food Safety and Food Defense: Vulnerabilities in the Supply Chain”, Institute of Food Technologists, July 2010. “Food Safety and Food Defense Measures to be Considered in Global Harmonization”, Institute of Food Technologists, July 2010. “Emerging Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, Food Emergency Response Network National Training Conference, June 2010. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense”, CEEZAD Kickoff Meeting, June 2010. “Emerging Food & Agriculture System Needs”, AUTM 2011 Central Region Meeting, July 2010. “Vulnerability Assessment for Food Systems”, FERA/JIFSAN, York, U.K., June 2010. “Food System Threats and the Research to Mitigate Them”, Food Research Institute 2010 Spring Meeting, Madison, WI, May 2010. “Emerging Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, Briefing for National Security Staff, April 2010. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Briefing for the Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee”, National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), Frederick, MD, April 2010. “Emerging Threats in the Global Food System”, ADT Food Defense Summit, April 2010. “Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, National Security Staff, March 2010. “What Makes and Infrastructure Resilient -­‐ The Food System”, Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Summit, March 2010. “Current and Emerging Threat Agents in the Food System”, Food Safety and Security -­‐ UK-­‐
USA Workshop, March 2010. “Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, Focused HITRAC Threat Brief, Chicago, IL, January 2010. “Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, Briefing for National Security Staff, Washington DC, January 2010. “Food Defense Implications of the Food Safety Modernization Act”, Minnesota Food Safety & Defense Task Force, St. Paul, MN, January 2010. 48 “Food Safety -­‐ A Full Spectrum Approach: Emerging Food System Risks”, LifeScience Alley Annual Eighth Annual Conference & Expo, Minneapolis, MN, December 2009. “Food Sustainability”, Institute on Science for Global Policy -­‐ Global Perspectives Conference, AZ, December 2009. “Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) Indicators and Early Warning Model”, Intential Adulterants Advisory Panel Meeting, November 2009. “Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) Indicators and Early Warning Model”, GMA SEF Meeting, November 2009. “Food Contamination Threats: Natural Outbreaks, Intentional Threat Scenarios and Emerging Risks”, Fort Sam Houston, November 2009. “FAS-­‐CAT Update”, Food & Agriculture Sector Joint Quarterly Meeting, Washington DC, October 2009. “NCFPD Overview and Food Defense Planning”, EDEN Regional Food Protection Conference, October 2009. “Global Food System Complexity and Resulting Food Defense Risks”, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Food Defense Webinar, November 2009. “Food Safety Bio-­‐Security: Vulnerability and Interventions”, Kansas State Research and Extension Annual Conference, Manhattan, KS, October, 2009. “Food System Threats and the Potential Consequences”, National Security Staff -­‐ BNA Briefing, December 2009. “University Research in Food Safety and Food Defense”, Government-­‐University-­‐Industry Research Roundtable Food Safety Working Group The National Academy of Sciences, Washington DC, September 2009. “The Evolving Challenges of Defending a Global Food System”, Purdue Defense Presentation, IN, September 2009. “Defending the Safety of the Global Food System from Intentional Contamination”, USP Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM), Toronto, Canada, September 2009. “FoodSHIELD Briefing for APHIS”, USDA South Building, Washington DC, September 2009. “Global Food Safety -­‐ Trends and Challenges”, Food Industry Risk Management Workshop Product Safety -­‐ Global Issues, Global Solutions, September 2009. “Import Threats and Vulnerability Assessment Studies”, DHS S&T, Washington DC, July 2009. “Supply Chain Informed Food System Contamination Scenarios” Homeland Security Council, July 2009. 49 “Food Defense Mitigation Strategies”, International Association for Food Protection, TX, July 2009. “NCFPD Overview”, Annual Meeting, College Station, TX, June 2009. “NCFPD Overview and Food Defense Planning”, Regional Food Protection Conference, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, June 2009. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Update and FAS-­‐CAT Implementation”, Minnesota Food Protection Task Force, June 2009. “Global Food System Comlexity and Resulting Food Defense Risks”, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Food Defense Workshop, Ottawa, Ontario, June 2009. “Global Food Transportation Vulnerability – A ‘Moving’ Target”, Association of Food and Drug Officials Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, June 2009. “Supply Chain Informed Food System Contamination Scenarios”, Homeland Security Council, Washington DC, June 2009. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense”, Review for FRI, May 2009. “Emerging Global Food System Risks and Potential Systems”, Food Import Safety: Systems and Infrastructure, Madison, WI, May 2009. “Food Defense Implications of Salmonella Saintpaul”, American Society of Micorbiology, Philadelphia, PA, May 2009. “Why Do You Need Traceability Systems?”, Joint Institute for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition/Central Science Laboratory Symposium on Food Safety and Nutrition, Greenbelt, MD, May 2009. “Food Safety and Defense -­‐ Technology Gaps and Solutions”, LifeScience Alley Biotechnology SIG, New Brighton, MN, May 2009. “Import Data as an Early Indicator of Economically Motivated Adulteration”, FDA Public Meeting, College Park, Maryland, May 2009. “FAS-­‐CAT Food & Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool”, New Assessment Tools for Food & Agriculture, DHS Webinar, April 2009. “Threat Assessment of Food Contaminants in the Farm-­‐to-­‐the-­‐Fork Continuum and Potential Solutions”, FDA Chief Scientist’s Distinguished Lecture Series, Maryland, 2009. “Food Defense: Overview, Multi-­‐national Exercises & Ongoing Research”, Singapore Food Defense Workshop, Singapore, February 2009. "FAS-­‐CAT Criticality Tools for Food and Agriculture", Status & Next Steps Food & Agriculture Government/Sector Coordinating Councils, Washington DC, January 2009. 50 "Current and Future Trends in U.S. Food Defense Research", Examining the Risks-­‐
Intentional Contamination of the Food System: Integrating Federal Science Capabilities to Address Vulnerabilites, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, September 2008. "Food Defense: Threats, Risk and Countermeasures", 2008 ASIS International 54th Annual Seminar & Exhibits, Atlanta, GA, September 2008. "Salmonella Saintpaul Case Study", Animal & Plant Industries Committee – National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, September 2008. "Food System Contamination The Potential for Catastrophic Harm", BioNet Assessment Executive Panel, Washington DC, September 2008. "Food Defense: Threats, Risk and Countermeasures", Asia-­‐Pacific Homeland Security Summit, Honolulu HI, October 2008. "International Collaboration in Food Defense: Demeter's Resilience", Briefing for Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington DC, May 2008. "Imported Food: Food Safety and Defense Considerations ", Briefing for Congressman Grainger, Washington DC, March 2008. "Preparedness and Agriculture Chemical Security", Association of American Pesticide Control Officers Annual Conference, Washington DC, March 2008. "International Collaboration in Food Defense Exercises", Briefing for DHS Under Secretary of Science and Technology Cohen, Washington DC, March 2008. "International Collaboration in Food Defense Exercises", DHS Science & Technology Summit, Washington DC, March 2008. "Food Defense: New Technologies for Prevention, Response and Recovery", 235th American Chemical Society National Meeting, New Orleans, LA, March 2008. "Food Defense: Nature of the Threat and Current Efforts", Food Defense and Security Advisory Committee, Washington DC, June 2008. "The Need for Food Defense Education Curriculum", International Association for Food Protection Annual Conference, Columbus, OH, August 2008. "Consumer Expectations Of The Public and Private Sector In Food Protection and the Consequences of Failure", Ag FIRST!, Raleigh, NC, August 2008. "Food Terrorism in a Climate of Unrest and Global Change: Are you Alert and Taking Action Now?", Food Safety 2008 New Horizons -­‐ Novel Approaches, Chicago, IL, April 2008. "Risk & Vulnerability Assessment for Food and Agriculture", Go Global: Emerging Threats in the Food and Feed Chain, Delhi, India, 2008. 51 "Identifying Potential Risks and Preventing Intentional Contamination: The Basics", Food Defense-­‐Preparing for the Coming Storm 2007 Meat Industry Research Conference, Chicago, IL, October 2007. "Imports from China: Food Safety and Defense Considerations”, Briefing for Congressman Forbes, Washington DC, November 2007. "Imported Foods Vulnerability Considerations", BIOTRACER General Meeting, Athens, Greece, November 2007. "Systems Based Vulnerability & Risk Assessment", DHS University Network Summit on Research and Education, Washington DC, March 2007. "FoodSHIELD, HSIN, InfraGard, et. Al. Information Systems & Food Defense", Association of Food and Drug Officials Annual Conference, San Antonio, TX, June 2007. "Food Defense: Post-­‐Harvest Preparedness", Testimony before Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science & Technology, July 2007. "New Solutions for Food Defense", International Association for Food Protection Annual Conference, Orlando, FL, July 2007. "Imported Food Vulnerability Considerations", Briefing for DHS Under Secretary of Science and Technology Jay Cohen, Washington DC, July 2007. "New Technology Strategies for Food Protection and Defense", Force Health Protection Conference, Louisville KY, August 2007. "NCFPD Recent Developments", Institute of Food Technologists Global Food Safety & Quality Conference, Chicago, IL August 2007. “Food Defense: Status and Future Needs”, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, 2007. “Protecting and Defending the Food and Agriculture Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Needs, Partnerships and Solutions”, Marshfield Clinic, Marshfield, WI, 2006. “New Technology Strategies for Food Protection and Defense”, International Symposium on Agroterrorism, Kansas City, MO, 2006. "Interventions and Countermeasures" InfraGard 2006 National Conference, Washington DC, 2006 "New Technology Strategies for Food Protection and Defense" Force Health Protection Conference, Albuquerque, NM, 2006 "Protecting and Defending the Food and Agriculture Critical Infrastructure" EPA PREP, Greenville, SC, 2006. 52 “Innovation & Commercialization strategies for Food Protection & Defense” Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer, Minneapolis, MN, 2006. “Food System Event Models – A Tool for Risk Communication in Context” at the National Association of State Department of Agriculture, Washington DC, 2006 “Avian Influenza: Current Situation and Implications to Minnesota”, Minnesota Veterinary Medical Association Annual Meeting, Duluth, MN, 2006. “The National Center for Food Protection & Defense – Vision”, Food Microbiology Research Conference. Northbrook, IL, 2006. “Food System Event Models – A Tool for Risk Communication in Context”, National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 2006 “Academic/Public/Private Partnerships: Exploring a Key DHS Science & Technology Strategy”, Minnesota High Tech Association, Eagan, MN, 2005 “Food Safety and Food Protection: Similarities, Challenges and Needs”, Minnesota Biotechnology Conference, St. Paul, MN, 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense – Progress and Future Plans”, House Agriculture and Education Subcommittee Staff, Washington, DC, 2005 “Homeland Security Efforts in Biodefense”, Minnesota House Subcommittee on Homeland Security, St. Paul, MN, 2005 “National Center for Food Protection and Defense – Program Overview”, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Program Review, St. Paul, MN, 2005. “Food for Thought, The Current State of Food Safety and Security”, Minnesota Hi-­‐Tech Society Annual Conference, Minneapolis, MN, 2005 “Collaboration on Food Protection and Defense”, USDA-­‐FSIS, USDA-­‐CSREES and FDA-­‐
CFSAN Panel Review, Washington, DC, 2005 “Approaches to Food Safety and the Consumer’s Interest: Report from a WHO Forum”, SSAFE (Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere) Conference, Minneapolis, MN, 2005. “Food Monitoring: Lab Requirements and System Implications”, Safe Foods International, a World Health Organization and Food & Agriculture Organization Summit, Geneva, Switzerland, 2005. “Demystifying Food Defense”, 109th Association of Food & Drug Officials Annual Conference, Kansas City, MO, 2005 “Food Protection and Defense Research and Needs”, National Institute for Animal Agriculture Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, 2005 53 “Food Safety & Security”, Minnesota Senate Higher Education Committee, St. Paul, MN, 2005. “National Organic Program”, University of Minnesota Dairy Health Conference, St. Paul, MN, 2005. “Food Protection and Defense – Status and Future Needs”, Governor’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management Annual Conference, St. Paul, MN, 2005 “Food Safety, Protection and Defense: Who Decides on the Public Good and Who Pays”, School of Public Health Roundtable Series, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, 2005. “Food Protection and Defense – Technology Challenges and Opportunities”, Minnesota Hi-­‐
Tech Association Winter Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, 2005 “Food Protection and Defense – Challenges and Opportunities”, Minnesota Institute of Food Technologists Winter Meeting, Minneapolis, MN, 2004 “Food Safety & Security: Research, Education and Outreach at the University of Minnesota”, Minnesota Congressional Delegation Review at the University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, 2004. “Foodborne Illness: Engineering Solutions to a Significant Public Health Concern”, Department of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering Systems, College of Food, Agriculture and Engineering Science Seminar Series, St. Paul, MN, 2003. “Center for Animal Health and Food Safety and the Food Safety Inspection Service: Partners for the Future”, United States Department of Agriculture, Food Safety Inspection Service, HACCP Roundtable, St. Paul, MN, 2003. “Collaboration for Survival and Success”, University of Minnesota Agriculture and Food Extension Services Annual Meeting, St. Paul, MN, 2003. Frank Busta’s Presentations “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Briefing” presented at Government Coordinating Council and Joint Council Meeting, Crystal City, VA, September 21, 2004. “DHS Centers of Excellence” presented at City of Los Angeles, Mayor James K Hahn Homeland Security Leadership Summit, Los Angeles, CA September 23, 2004. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Briefing” presented at Food Safety Advisory Task Force, St. Paul, MN October 6, 2004. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Briefing” presented at 10th Annual EDEN Meeting, State College, PA, October 14, 2004. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Briefing” presented at North Central AFDO Meeting, Bloomington, MN, October 19, 2004. 54 “Food Biosecurity Challenges for Defending the Safety of the Food Supply” presented at 24th University of Wisconsin, River Falls Food Microbiology Symposium, River Falls, WI, October 19, 2004. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense” presented at InfraGard Meeting, Bloomington, MN, November 9, 2004. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Opportunities for Michigan Collaboration” presented at Michigan Food & Agricultural Protection 2005 Summit, East Lansing, Michigan, January 19, 2005. “Defending and Protecting the Food System” presented at National Grocers Association 2005 Convention, Las Vegas, Nevada, February 8 & 9, 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense” presented at InfraGard Meeting, Dakota State University, Madison, SD, April 19, 2005. “Food Safety and Food Defense – Similarities and Differences” presented at Iowa State University, Ames, IA, April 20 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense” presented at Homeland Security Centers of Excellence Showcase, Boston, ...…MA, April 26, 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Overview” presented at FAO, Rome, Italy, May 17, 2005 “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Overview” presented at Homeland Security Workshop, Tuskegee University, Tuskegee, AL, May 24, 2005. “Demystifying Food Defense” presented at 109th Association of Food & Drug Officials Annual Conference, Kansas City, MO, June 6, 2005. “Panel Discussion: Using Examples if Identified Vulnerabilities, Consider Cooperative Strategies for Desired Prevention, Consequence and Response Senarios” presented at Department of Homeland Security, University Centers of Excellence Symposium on Science-­‐
Based Risk Analysis: Examining Threats, Vulnerabilities, Consequences and Responses:, Washington, DC, June 14, 2005 “Food Protection and Defense” presented at Market Opportunities in Food Security Conference-­‐Illinois Department of Commerce & Economic Opportunity, Marriott Chicago SW, Bull Ridge, IL, June 27, 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Overview” presented at Physical Science Laboratory, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM, July 7, 2005 “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Overview” presented at FERN Central Regional Meeting, Madison, WI, July 11, 2005 55 “Symposium Overview” in Food Defense and Protection: Detection of Poisonous Agents Symposium 26 presented at Institute of Food Technologists Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, July 18, 2005. “Networking and Data Integration” in Food Defense and Protection: Detection of Poisonous Agents Symposium 26 presented at Institute of Food Technologists Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA, July 18,2005. “IFT Food Summit Summary: Food Defense Pertaining to Potential Intentional Contamination” presented at International Food Safety and Quality Conference, IFT, New Orleans, LA, July 20, 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense” presented at University Programs Performance and Management Review, Washington, DC, September 21, 2005. “Differentiating Natural, Accidental, and Intentional Contamination of Food Supply Systems” presented at Sixth Annual Biomedical Research Symposium, Kellogg Conference Center, Tuskegee University, Tuskegee, AL, September 29, 2005. “Differentiating Natural, Accidental, and Intentional Contamination of Food Systems” presented at North Carolina A & T University, Greensboro, NC, October 6, 2005. “Defending the Safety of Our Food Supply from Intentional Contamination -­‐ Challenges and Progress” presented at 25th UW-­‐RF Food Microbiology Symposium & Rapid Methods Workshop, River Falls, WI, October 17, 2005. “U.S. Homeland Security’s Perspective on Prevention/Response to Deliberate Additions of Chemical and/or Biological Agents to the Food Supply” presented at Federal Food Safety & Nutrition Research Meeting, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, October 20, 2005. “Threat Reduction Research and Policy Opportunities” presented at Forum on Microbial Threats, Session VII, Foodborne Threats to Health: The Policies & Practice of Surveillance, Prevention, Outbreak Investigations, and International Coordination, National Academies, Washington, D.C., October 26, 2005. “Welcome to NCFPD Annual Meeting” presented at First Annual Meeting of the National Center for Food Protection & Defense, Atlanta, GA, November 1, 2005. “Vulnerabilities of the Food Supply” presented at Interstate Preparedness & Response Coordination for Food Defense, Naval Postgraduate School Workshop for Multistate Partnership for Agrosecurity, Northbrook, IL, November 15, 2005. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense – Overview” presented with Shaun P. Kennedy at Food Microbiology Research Conference II 2006, Northbrook, IL, March 27, 2006. “Food Safety and Food Defense – Similarities and Differences” presented at Chicago Section, Institute of Food Technologists Meeting, Rosemount, IL April 10 2006. 56 “Food Defense Awareness Training Courses” sponsored by NCFPD collaborators-­‐Institute of Food Technologists(IFT) & FDA: – Sacramento, CA. The audience represented most of the CA dairy industry. May 26, 2005 – Syracuse, NY. The audience represented most of the NY dairy industry. June 15, 2005 – Washington, DC. The American Baking Association was the audience. June 22, 2005 – Chicago, IL. The American Millers Association was the audience. Sept. 27, 2005 – Raleigh, NC. The audience consisted of NC Extension agents. Oct. 12, 2005 – Raleigh, NC. The audience consisted of food scientists in the Nutmeg Section of IFT. Oct. 13, 2005 – Pentagon City, VA. The audience consisted of the International Food Additives Council. Nov. 30, 2005 – Elkhart Lake, WI. The audience consisted of food scientists in the Wisconsin Section of IFT. March 9, 2006 – Pasadena, CA. The audience consisted of food scientists in the So. Cal Section of IFT. March 22, 2006 – Nogales, AZ. The audience consisted of members of the Fresh Fruits & Vegetables Assoc. April 4, 2006 – Seattle, WA. The audience -­‐ food scientists and public health laboratory staff sponsored by the Puget Sound Section of IFT. May 2, 2006 -­‐ Orlando, FL. Attendees of Bioterrorism/Food Defense Session on Awareness at IFT Annual Meeting. June 27, 2006 -­‐ Modesto,CA. The audience consisted of food scientists in the Northern Cal Section of IFT. Sept. 11, 2006 -­‐ Fresno, CA. The audience consisted of food scientists in the Northern Cal Section of IFT. Sept. 11, 2006 -­‐ Minneapolis, MN. The audience consisted of food scientists in the MN Section of IFT. Nov. 14, 2006 -­‐ Richland, WA. The audience consisted of food scientists, Lewis & Clark Section of IFT. Nov. 16, 2006 “Preparing for the New Reality” presented at Association of Food and Drug Officials Pre-­‐
Conference Food Defense Workshop, Albany, NY. June 17, 2006. 57 “National Center for Food Protection and Defense Project & Opportunity Review” presented to Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council – Government Coordinating Council Joint Meeting, Arlington, VA. July 25, 2006. “Defining the Food and Agriculture System” presented at InfraGard 2006 National Conference -­‐ Food and Agriculture Terrorism Track, Washington, D.C. August 22, 2006. “Vulnerabilities in the Food System” presented at InfraGard 2006 National Conference -­‐ Food and Agriculture Terrorism Track, Washington, D.C. August 22, 2006. “Defending the safety of the food system -­‐ Why? When? Where? Who? How?” presented to Roseville Rotary Club, Roseville, MN. September 20, 2006. “Food Quality, Food Safety, Food Defense –"Think Bacillacae"” presented to National Center for Food Safety and Technology/Illinois Institute of Technology, Summit, IL. October 13, 2006. “Food Defense and Security – The New Reality” presented at R&DA 2006 Fall Meeting, Salt Lake City, UT. October 18, 2006. “Welcome and Overview” presented at Terrorism, Pandemics, and Natural Disasters: Food Supply Chain Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Symposium, Minneapolis, MN. November 1, 2006. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense: Overview and Future Focus” presented to Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, Committee on Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. January 10, 2007. “Protection of the Global Food Supply is Key to a Sustainable Society” in AAAS Symposium:90-­‐79 Agricultural Biosecurity Toward a Secure Global Economy and Public, AAAS Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA.. February 19, 2007. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense: Overview” at DHS University Network Summit on Research and Education, Washington, D.C. March 15, 2007. “Terrorism and the Defense of the Food System” at Food Systems and the Environment-­‐
Spring 2007 Environmental Lecture Series, Amherst, MA. April 3, 2007. “Future Direction of University Programs” at Food Defense Education: Post 9/11, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI. April 17, 2007. “Food Defense and Emergent Response Systems for Foodborne Terrorism in USA” at Third International Forum on Food Safety, Shanghai, China. May 18, 2007. “Similarities and Differences among Food Security, Food Safety and Food Defense” at Third International Forum on Food Safety, Shanghai, China. May 18, 2007. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense: Overview” at DHS Science and Technology Stakeholders Conference, Washington, D.C. May 22, 2007. 58 “The Role of Bacterial Spores in Food Safety and Security – the Paul A. Hartman Memorial Lecture” at 27th International Symposium-­‐Rapid Methods & Automation in Microbiology, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS. June 15, 2007. “Recent Developments at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense” at Institute of Food Technologists Global Food Safety & Quality Conference, Chicago, IL. August 1, 2007. “Food Defense” at FBI Agroterrorism Workshop, Minneapolis, MN. August 9, 2007. “Counterterrorism: The New Food Safety Reality” at Symposium of Food Innovation & Development, INNOVA 2007, LATU, Montevideo, Uruguay, October 8, 2007. “Effective Product Tracing: Essential in Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks” at Symposium of Food Innovation & Development, INNOVA 2007, LATU, Montevideo, Uruguay, October 10, 2007. “Protection of the Global Food Supply from Intentional Contamination” at Food Science and Technology for the Benefit of Society: Bridging the Gap between Agriculture and Health -­‐ SLACA 2007, Unicamp, Campinas, Brazil, November 5, 2007. “Protection of the Global Food Supply from Intentional Contamination” and “Effective Product Tracing: Essential in Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks” at Faculdade de Ciencias Farmaceuticas, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil, November 8, 2007. “Terrorism and Defense of the Food System” at 3M, St. Paul, MN. February 15, 2008. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense: Overview” on Food and Water Safety Committee Conference Call. April 29, 2008. “Food Terrorism in a Climate of Unrest and Global Change” Seminar at Kansas State University, Manhattan KS. May 12, 2008. “Terrorism and Defense of the Food System” at Long Island Section, Institute of Food Technologists, Plainview, NY. June 2, 2008 “Summary – National Center for Food Protection & Defense 2008 Annual Meeting” at Food and Agriculture Sector Quarterly Joint Meeting, Arlington, VA October 7, 2008. “Defending the safety of the global food system from intentional contamination in a changing international market” at 14th World Congress of Food Science & Technology Shanghai, China, October 22, 2008. “Protection of the Global Food Supply” at Asia Pacific Clinical Nutrition Society Symposium on Nutritional Improvement in China, Xiamen, China, October 27, 2008. “Managing Food Safety Risks and Terrorism” to Food Safety Task Force of National Council of Chain Restaurants by distance to Dallas, TX, November 11, 2008. 59 “Detection and surveillance of Biothreats and Emerging Infectious Diseases” at Third Annual DHS University Network Summit, Washington, DC, March 18, 2009. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense – Overview” at Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Center Annual Meeting, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, July 1, 2009. “Predicting economic adulteration from commodity trades and other indicators” on GMA Economic Adulteration Workshop Webinar, August 26, 2009. “Defending the safety of the global food system from intentional contamination” at Quality of Food Ingredients, International Food Ingredient Safety Issues Workshop, USP Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM), Toronto, Canada, September 23, 2009. “Defending the safety of the global food system from intentional contamination in a changing international market” at Food Science in the Globalized World: New Challenges, New Perspectives, 8th Latin American Symposium on Food Science [SLACAS], Campinas, Brasil, November 10, 2009. "Risk factors: product and process specific criteria” at Assuring Safety of Import Foods – Food Safety Research Council, Washington, D.C., February 1, 2010. “Defending the safety of the global food system from intentional contamination in a changing international market” at Advances in Food Security and Safety against Terrorist Threats and Natural Disasters, NATO/SPS Advanced Research Workshop, Cairo, Egypt , April 14, 2010. Morgan Hennessey’s Presentations “Risk Evaluation Tools and Food Defense” North Central Cheese Industry Association Annual Conference, Brookings, SD: October 13, 2010 “Food and Agriculture Defense Research Database Update” National Center for Food Protection and Defense biennial meeting, Minneapolis, MN: September 28, 2010 “One Health Strategic Vision” Invited panel discussion member on the United States Department of Agriculture -­‐ Animal and health Plant inspection Service – Veterinary Services 2015 vision working group, Minneapolis, MN: April 14, 2010. “Challenges and New Approaches for Protecting Systems-­‐Based Infrastructures" Department of Homeland Security University Programs Summit, Washington, D.C. March 11, 2010 “Food and Agriculture Criticality Assessment Tool” California Agriculture Commissioners and Sealers Association winter conference, Sacramento, CA: December 7, 2009 “Food Defense Planning for facilities” Extension Disaster Education Network Regional Food Protection Conference, Lexington, KY: November 18, 2009 60 “Opportunities for funded research in risk and crisis communication” National Communicators Association annual meeting, Chicago, IL: November 11, 2009. “Update on the Food and Agriculture Criticality Assessment Tool” Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council, Food and Agriculture Sector Joint Quarterly meeting, Washington, D.C. November 5, 2009. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense update” Department of Homeland Security Internal Food and Agriculture Training Summit, Dallas, TX: October 21, 2009. “Predicting economic adulteration from commodity trades and other indicators” Grocery Manufacturers Association: Economic Adulteration Workshop Webinar, August 26, 2009 “Potential Disease Concerns for Trappers” Minnesota Trappers Association annual meeting, Hibbing, MN: August 2009. “National Center for Food Protection and Defense update” Minnesota Governors Food Safety and Defense Task Force, St. Paul, MN: June 2009 “Pro-­‐active Risk Assessments” National Institute for Animal Agriculture annual meeting, Louisville, KY: April 2009. “Descriptive Epidemiology of Turkey Cellulitis” North Central Avian Disease Conference, St. Paul, MN: March, 2009. “International Collaboration in Food Defense Exercises” National Center for Food Protection and Defense annual meeting, St. Paul, MN: October 2008. “Templates for Risk Assessment” United Egg producers seminar on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, Indianapolis, IN: September 2008. “Responsible Use of Antibiotics” presented at multiple Midwest Dairy Association meetings throughout Minnesota during 2007-­‐2009. Agent Behavior Agoston, R., K.Soni, K. Mcelhany, M.L. Cepeda, U. Zuckerman, S.Tzipori and S.D. Pillai. Continuous Flow Centrifugation (CFC) Technology for Pre-­‐Analytical Sample Processing to Separate and Concentrate Bio-­‐Threat Agents from Large Volumes of Milk. 2007. Texas branch meeting of the American Society for Microbiology. Hunstville. Alocilja, E.C. 2008. Nano-­‐Biosensors for Food Defense. Invited oral presentation at the “Symposium on Detection of Chemical and Biological Hazards in Food,” PITTCON 2008, New Orleans, LA, March 2-­‐7, 2008. Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Nano-­‐Biosensors for Biodefense. Invited presentation at the Michigan Homeland Security Market Leadership Conference, Session Four: “Biodefense and Michigan,” Dearborn, Michigan, November 4, 2009. 61 Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Nanoparticle-­‐based biosensors for biodefense and food safety. Invited oral presentation at the 237th National Meeting of the American Chemical Society, Session on “Food-­‐related Nanotechnology,” Salt Lake City, Utah, March 22-­‐26, 2009. Alocilja, E.C. and Wang, Y. 2009. NanoBio Sensors and Integrated Microsystems for Intelligent Food Packaging. Invited presentation at the 2009 Symposium on Nanomaterials for Flexible Packaging, Columbus, Ohio, April 28-­‐30, 2009. Alocilja, E.C., Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., and Cloutier, B. 2010. Field-­‐based integrated biosensor system to rapidly detect tuberculosis in the military. Oral presentation at the 2010 13th Annual Force Health Protection Conference, August 8-­‐13, 2010. Anderson, M. and Alocilja, E. 2010. Rapid fluorescent signal amplification of short DNA reporter molecures through mass amplification by co-­‐polymeriration hybrididzation for the rapid detection of Bacillus anthracis, poster presentation at the 2010 NCFPD biennial meeting, Chaska, Minnesota, September 27-­‐29, 2010. Anderson, M. and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Nano-­‐Biosensors for Biodefense. Invited presentation at the MichBio Expo, Session on “Hot Innovations,” Kalamazoo, Michigan, November 4, 2009. Archibong, Edikan, Mateeva, Nelly, Warriner, Keith, Determination of PCBs and dioxins using selective pentapeptides on polyaniline matrix, NCFPD 2010 Biennial Meeting, Oak Ridge Hotel and Conference Center, Chaska, Minnesota, September 27 – 29, 2010 Archibong, Edikan; Foster, Alexander; Mateeva, Nelly N.; Warriner, Keith; Sreevatsan, Srinand. Sensors for extraction and determination of PCBs and dioxins based on selective pentapeptides. Abstracts of Papers, 240th ACS National Meeting, Boston, MA, United States, August 22-­‐26, 2010. Castro, B., Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., and Alocilja, E. 2008. Aptamer selection for microorganism detection. Preliminary assays. Poster presentation. National Center of Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) 2008 Annual Meeting, Chaska, Minnesota. Sep 29–Oct 1, 2008. Cloutier, B. and Alocilja, E.C. 2010. Validation and optimization of biologically modified electrically active magnetic nano-­‐particles for direct capture and concentration of bioterrorism agents in various food matrices. Oral presentation at the 2010 13th Annual Force Health Protection Conference, August 8-­‐13, 2010. Cloutier, B., Setterington, E.B., Cloutier, A., Ochoa, J., and Alocilja, E.C. 2010. Validation and optimization of biologically modified electrically active magnetic nano-­‐particles for direct capture and concentration of bioterrorism agents in various food matrices, poster presentation at the 2010 NCFPD biennial meeting, Chaska, Minnesota, September 27-­‐29, 2010. 62 Dodge, Anthony. Student posters at the NCFPD Biennial Meeting, September, 2010 Foster, Alexander, Mateeva, Nelly, Warriner, Keith, Detection of PCBs and Dioxins Using Cysteine Modified Pentapeptides fixed on Gold Nanoparticles, NCFPD 2010 Biennial Meeting, Oak Ridge Hotel and Conference Center, Chaska, Minnesota, September 27 – 29, 2010. Frisk, M.L. (speaker), Tepp, W.H., Johnson, E.A., and Beebe, D.J. "Microfluidic sensors for botulinum neurotoxin", DHS Annual University Summit on Research and Education, March 18-­‐20, 2008, Washington, D.C. Frisk, M.L. (speaker), Tepp, W.H., Johnson, E.A., and Beebe, D.J., "A Microfluidic array integrating peptide SAMs for sensing botulinum neurotoxin," Biomedical Engineering Society (BMES) Meeting, October 2-­‐4, 2008, St. Louis, MO. Frisk, M.L., Tepp, W.H., Johnson, E.A., and Beebe, D.J. “A Microfluidic Biosensor Integrating Self-­‐Assembled Peptide Monolayers for the Detection of Botulinum Neurotoxin,” Micro Total Analytical Systems (µTAS) 2007, October 7-­‐11, 2007, Paris, France. Gu, S., Pal, S., McGraw, S., and Alocilja, E. 2007. The Capture Effect of Magnetic Polyaniline on E.coli O157:H7, High School Honors Science Program seminar, Michigan State University, August, 2007. H. Jiang, “Controlled microfluidic interfaces for microsensors,” invited, SPIE Photonics West, Symposium on Frontiers in Pathogen Detection: From Nanosensors to Systems, January 25, 2009, San Jose, CA. Hathurusinghe, M.H. , A. AbuGhazaleh, M.R. Reddy, S. A. Ibrahim, M. Tajkarimi, D. Song. Development an on-­‐farm technique using lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect of toxins in milk. 2010. ADSA Annual Meeting, 2010, Denver, CO, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H. and S. A. Ibrahim, Sensitivity of lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect rodenticides in milk. Annual meeting, International Association for Food Protection (IAFP), to be held on July 31-­‐ August 3, 2011, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim, M. Tajkarimi and T.Song. Development an on-­‐farm technique using lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect of toxins in milk." Ronald E. Mcnair Conference, January 28, 2010, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, Greensboro, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim, M. Tajkarimi, D. Song. Detection of sensitivity of lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker for detection of toxins in fresh milk Annual Conference, Institute of Food Technologists (IFT), 2010, Chicago, Illinois, USA. 63 Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim, R. Gyawali, and A. Elamin. Sensitivity of Lactic Acid Bacteria as a Biomarker to Detect Toxins in Milk. Ronald E. McNair national Research Symphosium, January 26-­‐28 2011, North Carolina, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim, R. Gyawali, and A. Elamin. Sensitivity of Lactic Acid Bacteria as a Biomarker to Detect Toxins in Milk. Student Research Day, April 11, 2011, North Carolina A & T State University, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim, R. Gyawali, and D. Song, Lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect rodenticides in milk. American Chemical Society (ACS) National Meeting and Exposition, March 27-­‐31, 2011, Anaheim, California, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim, R. Gyawali, M. Tajkarimi and D. Song.Lactic acid bacteria could be applied as a biomarker to detect rodenticides in milk. Association of Research Directors (ARD) Conference, April 9-­‐13, 2011, Atlanta, GA, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S. A. Ibrahim1, R. Gyawali and A. Elamin. Sensitivity of lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect toxins in milk.USDA Graduate Student Research Symphosium, February, 2011, Maryland, USA. Hathurusinghe, M.H., S.A. Ibrahim, A. AbuGhazaleh, M. Tajkarimi, and D. Song. Detection of sensitivity of lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker for detection of toxins in fresh milk.2010 NIFS Annual Conference, Wilmington, NC, USA June 26th -­‐ July 1, 2010 Hathurusinghe, M.H., V.L. Giddings and S. A. Ibrahim, Sensitivity of lactic acid bacteria as a biomarker to detect rodenticides in milk. Annual meeting, North Carolina Association of Family and Consumer Sciences (NCAFCS), March 6-­‐9, 2011, Sunset Beach, NC USA,. He, L. 2010. Rapid detection of Ricin in milk using IMS-­‐SERS. [Invited Talk]. Chemistry department seminar, Univ. of Minnesota. He, L. 2010. Rapid detection of Ricin in milk using SERS immunoassays. National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) webinar. He, L.; Haynes, C. L.; Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F.; Labuza, T.P. 2010. Rapid detection of a protein toxin surrogate in milk using IMS-­‐SERS. [Poster]. NCFPD Biennial Meeting. Chaska, MN, US. Huarng, M., Vetrone, S., and Alocilja, E., 2010. Rapid Detection of Salmonella enterica serovar Enteritidis Genomic DNA Using a Nanoparticle-­‐based DNA Sensor, poster presentation at the 2010 NCFPD biennial meeting, Chaska, Minnesota, September 27-­‐29, 2010. Huarng, M., Zhang, D., and Alocilja, E. 2009. Development and Efficacy of Anti-­‐Salmonella Magnetic Beads, poster presentation at the University Undergraduate Research and Arts Forum, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, April 16, 2009 64 Huarng, M., Zhang, D., and Alocilja, E., 2010. Rapid detection of pagA gene of Bacillus anthracis using a nanoparticle-­‐based bio-­‐barcode DNA sensor, poster presentation at the University Undergraduate Research and Arts Forum, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, April 16, 2010. Hummel, E., Pal, S., and Alocilja, E. 2007. A New Magnetic Polymer used in Electrochemical Biosensor for Bacillus Cereus, 2007 University Undergraduate Research and Arts Forum, Michigan State University, March 2007. Isalm, G., Namvar A., Cuiping Ye and Warriner K. Extraction of ricin and other lectins using chitosan modified electrospun fibers. CPHAZ Annual Symposium Guelph June 9th 2011 Jackson, L.S. and Tolleson, W.H. July 2008. Thermal stability of ricin in orange juice. Poster presentation at IFT Annual Meeting, New Orleans, LA Jackson, L.S. May 2008. Effects of consumer food preparation on acrylamide formation. Oral presentation at IAFP Latin American Symposium on Food Safety, Campinas, Brazil Jackson, L.S., Tolleson, Truong, P., and W.H. Tolleson. April 2008. Stability of ricin and abrin in yogurt. Oral presentation at ACS Meeting, New Orleans, LA Kamikawa, T., Mikolajczyk, M.G., Kennedy, M., Zhang, P., Wang, W. Scott, D.E., and Alocilja, E.C. 2010. Nanoparticle-­‐based biosensor for the detection of emerging pandemic influenza strains and SPR binding characterization. Poster presentation at the 2010 World Congress on Biosensors, Glasgow, UK, May 26-­‐28, 2010. Kamikawa, T., Mikolajczyk, M.G., Kennedy, M., Zhong, L., Zhang, P., Scott, D.E. and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Pandemic influenza detection by electrically active magnetic nanoparticles and surface Plasmon resonance. Oral presentation at the 2009 Nanoelectronic Devices for Defense and Security (NANO-­‐DDS), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, September 28-­‐October 2, 2009. Liu, Y. “Enhancing Lab-­‐on-­‐a-­‐Chip Performance via Tunable Parallel Liquid Mircolens Arrays”, SPIE Photonics West, Symposium on Frontiers in Pathogen Detection: From Nanosensors to Systems, January 25, 2009, San Jose, CA. Liu, Y. “Mircolenses for Enhancing Fluorescent Detection in Lab on Chips” (poster and oral), NCFPD Annual Meeting, September 30, 2008, Chaska, MN. Lumor, S. et al. Correlation between Immunodetection (ELISA) and biological activity of Shiga toxin 1. Poster presentation at the 2010 biennial meeting of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense in Chaska, MN (27th – 29th September, 2010). Lumor, S.E., A. Hutt, I. Ronningen, F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez & T.P. Labuza. Validation of Immunodetection (ELISA) of ricin using a biological activity assaypresentation at the 2010 65 annual meeting of the International Association for Food Protection in Anaheim, CA (1st – 4th August, 2010). Mateeva, Nelly N.; Archibong, Edikan; Foster, Alexander; Warriner, Keith; Sreevatsan, Srinand. Extraction, concentration and decontamination of PCB's and dioxins in food using small peptides on polyaniline matrix. Abstracts of Papers, 240th ACS National Meeting, Boston, MA, United States, August 22-­‐26, 2010. Moore S., Grahm M., Samuel T., Edmond E. Abdela W., and Yehualaeshet T. Antimicrobial Potential of Vegetable Homogenate to Inhibit the Growth of Yersinia Species. 45th Veterinary Medical Symposium, Tuskegee, AL. March 24-­‐28, 2010. Pal, S. and Alocilja, E.C. 2008. Polyaniline-­‐Coated Magnetic Nanoparticle as Novel Transducer in Biosensor for Detection of Bacillus anthracis Spores in Food Samples. Poster presentation at the Tenth World Congress on Biosensors, Shanghai, China, May 14-­‐16, 2008. Pal, S., Hummel, E. B., Alocilja, E. C, 2007. Electrically active nanomagnets for concentrating and detecting Bacillus anthracis spores in a direct-­‐charge transfer biosensor, poster presentation at the 2007 Nanoelectronic Devices for Defense and Security (Nano-­‐DDS) Conference, June 18-­‐21, 2007, Crystal City, Virginia. Pal, S., Hummel, E. B., Alocilja, E. C., 2007. A nano-­‐electromagnetic polymer based direct-­‐
charge transfer biosensor for detection of Bacillus anthracis endospores in food matrices, poster presentation at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) Biennial Meeting, June 27-­‐29, 2007, Chaska, Minnesota. Pal, S., Miller, H. and Alocilja, E. 2008. Electrically-­‐active polyaniline coated magnetic nanoparticles as novel concentration tool for separation of Bacillus cereus. Poster presentation. National Center of Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) 2008 Annual Meeting, Chaska, Minnesota. Sep 29–Oct 1, 2008. Pawloski, R., Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., and Alocilja E.C. 2010. Biosynthesis of gold glyconanoparticles using a green-­‐chemistry approach, poster presentation at the 2010 NCFPD biennial meeting, Chaska, Minnesota, September 27-­‐29, 2010. Raabe, O., T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2007. Extraction of Bacillus anthracis spores from milk. IAFP Annual Meeting, July 8-­‐12, Orlando, FL. Raabe, O., T. P. Labuza, and F. Diez-­‐Gonzalez. 2008. Development of a PCR positive control protocol for detecting the presence of Bacillus anthracis plasmid pXO2. ASM Annual Meeting, June 1-­‐6, Boston, MA. Ranasinghe, R., Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., and Alocilja, E. 2008. Biosynthesis of gold nanoparticles. National Center of Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) 2008 Annual Meeting, Chaska, Minnesota. Sep 29–Oct 1, 2008. 66 Ronningen, I. et al. Inactivation and detection of saxitoxin in skim milk. Poster presentation at the 2010 biennial meeting of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense in Chaska, MN (27th – 29th September, 2010). Setterington, E. and Alocilja, E.C. 2010. Multifunctional core/shell nanoparticles for immunomagnetic extraction and direct electrochemical detection of bacterial cells. Oral presentation at the 2010 World Congress on Biosensors, Glasgow, UK, May 26-­‐28, 2010. Setterington, E., and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Magnetic/polyaniline core/shell nanoparticles for target extraction and electrical detection of threat-­‐agents. Oral presentation at the 2009 Nanoelectronic Devices for Defense and Security (NANO-­‐DDS), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, September 28-­‐October 2, 2009. Tolleson, W. H., O. A. Triplett, K. T. Nguyen and L. S. Jackson (2010). Influence of pH on the kinetics of chemical inactivation for abrin and ricin. Annual Meeting of the Society of Toxicology, Salt Lake City, UT. Torres-­‐Chavolla, E. and Alocilja, E. 2008. Evaluation of the binding efficiency of aptamers specific to B. anthracis Sterne strain spores. Poster presentation. National Center of Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) 2008 Annual Meeting, Chaska, Minnesota. Sep 29–Oct 1, 2008. Torres-­‐Chavolla, E. And Alocilja, E., 2010. Development of rapid molecular diagnostics for tuberculosis detection, Michigan Alliance for Graduate Education and the Professoriate (AGEP) and King Chavez Parks (KCP) Future Faculty Fellows (FFF) Fall Conference, Kellogg Conference Center & Hotel, East Lansing, Michigan, October 28-­‐29, 2010 Torres-­‐Chavolla, E., Anderson, M., Ranasinghe, R. Castro, B., and Alocilja, E.C. 2009. Characterization and functionalization of biogenic gold nanoparticles for biosensing enhancement. Oral presentation at the 2009 Nanoelectronic Devices for Defense and Security (NANO-­‐DDS), Fort Lauderdale, Florida, September 28-­‐October 2, 2009. Wacett, L. “Enzyme-­‐based Detection Systems for Melamine and Other Food Adulterants.” National Center for Food Safety and Defense, International Webinar, May 11, 2010 Wacket, L. “Enzyme Chemistry for Degrading and Detecting s-­‐Triazines.” Seminar, Department of Chemistry, University of N. Iowa, October 29, 2009 Wackett, L. “Biocatalysis: Applictions for Microbial Enzymes.” 3M meeting, December 4, 2009 Wackett, L. “Enzyme Applications.” University of Minnesota, BTI Fermentation Workshop, January 12, 2010 Wackett, L. “Enzyme Chemistry for Degrading and Detecting s-­‐Triazines.” Seminar, Department of Chemistry, University of N. Iowa, October 29, 2009 67 Wackett, L. “Enzyme Engineering for Degrading and Detecting s-­‐Triazines.” Enzyme Engineering Foundation Meeting, Groningen, Netherlands, Sept 20-­‐24, 2009 Wackett, L. “Enzymes and Their Applications: Environmental Cleanup, Test Kits, and Health.” College of Wooster, Ohio, Department of Chemistry, March 7, 2011 Wackett, L. “Novel Biological Approaches for Fuels and Chemicals.” Industrial Partnership for Research in Interfacial and Materials Engineering Conference, June 3, 2010 Warriner, K. Extraction of biohazards using electrospun fibers. NOBCChE, 2010 Atlanta, GA. Warriner, Keith. Extraction and detection of biohazards using Molecular Imprinted Polymers, University of Toronto. Chemistry Symposium, March 2009. Wiederoder, M., Zhou, J., and Alocilja, E.C. 2007. Synthesis of magnetic polyaniline-­‐
tetracyanoquinodimethane as nanowires for Bacillus cereus biosensor development, poster presentation at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) Biennial Meeting, June 27-­‐29, 2007, Chaska, Minnesota; also presented at the 2007 University Undergraduate Research and Arts Forum, Michigan State University, March 2007. Yan, P., Pal, S., McGraw, S., and Alocilja, E. 2007. Comparison of the Influence of Different Magnetic PANI Cores on the Effectiveness of Biosensors Detecting Bacillus cereus, High School Honors Science Program seminar, August, 2007. Yehualaeshet, T. Molecular typing of Yersinia enterocolitica and Yersinia pseudotuberculosis after temperature and pH stresses. 2009 CSL/JIFSAN Joint Symposium. On Methods and Systems for Tracking, Tracing and Verifying Foods. May 13-­‐15, 2009, Greenbelt, Maryland. Yehualaeshet, T. Multi Locus Sequence alignment in the transcriptional analysis of potentially pathogenic genes of Yersinia species ensuing pH treatment Submitted to 10th Biomedical Research Symposium, September 17-­‐18, 2009 Tuskegee, Alabama. Young, C. An isotachophoretic approach to universal sample preparation. 3rd National Conference on Environmental Sampling and Detection of Bio-­‐Threat Agents, Las Vegas NV. Oral presentation and abstract Young, C. Detection of biological agents/pathogens in food. 2008. Society for Industrial Microbiology Annual Meeting, San Diego CA. Oral presentation and abstract Young, C. 2009. Rounding them all together: Phenotype/genotype independent target concentration. International Association of Food Protection. Grapevine TX. Oral presentation and abstract 68 Young, C. 2009. Taking biological detectors to the sample: A paradigm shift for sample preparation. Biodetection Technologies 2009. Baltimore MD. Oral presentation and abstract Young, C., A. Proescher, E. Seay, S. Grady. 2008. An isotachophoretic approach to the development of a modular, universal sample preparation device. 3rd National Conference on Environmental Sampling and Detection of Bio-­‐Threat Agents, Las Vegas NV. Poster abstract Event Modeling Nganje, W. Dealing with Globalizing Supply Chains and Managing Risks, U.S. Policies Affecting Food and Agricultural Marketing in a Global Economy. Administrator, Staff, and Researchers Workshop Organized by Farm Foundation, ERS, and FDA December 3-­‐4, 2009. Nganje, W. Food Safety and Defense Risks in US-­‐Mexico Produce Trade. Paper Presented at the AAEA Annual Meeting Milwaukee, WI July 28, 2009. Nganje, W. Public Good, Hysteresis, and Investment in Food Safety/Defense. Selected Poster to be presented at the American Agricultural Economic Association Annual Meeting, Orlando Florida, July 27-­‐29, 2008. Nganje, W. Risk Based Sampling and Imported Produce from Mexico, Selected Paper to be presented at the American Agricultural Economic Association Annual Meeting, Orlando Florida, July 27-­‐29, 2008. Risk & Crisis Communication Beauchamp, K. A. & Littlefield, R. S. (2009, November). Maple Leaf Foods: Timely responses during a food-­‐related crisis. A top paper presented at the National Communication Association Conference, Chicago, IL. Best practice risk communication. Jeannie Houchins. Sept 29, 2010. Indiana State Department of Public Health. Best practice risk communication. Jennifer McEntire. August 31, 2010. US FDA CFSAN. College Park, MD. Brandenburg, D. Improving Discussion-­‐Based Exercises. Presentation to Community Partners of Wayne State University "Engineering the Unexpected" project, July 23, 2009. Sponsor: Institute for Information Technology and Culture, Wayne State University. Coombs, W. T., Cameron, G. T., Pang, A., Jin, T., Falkheimer, J., Veil, S. R., Holloday, S., & Heide, M. (2010, June). Antecedents fo crisis communication: Developing a research agenda for furthering crisis communication. Panel to be presented at the International Communication Association Conference, Singapore. 69 Cowden, K. J. & Littlefield, R. S. (2008, November). Perceptions of risk and crisis among vulnerable populations. Top poster presentation at the November 2008 Pre-­‐conference Forum on Emergency Pre-­‐event Communication co-­‐sponsored by the National Communication Association and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, San Diego, CA. Curry, N. J. (2008, September). How do cultural groups identify with and respond to the credibility of different spokespeople presenting similar risk and crisis messages? Poster presentation by Kimberly Cowden at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense Annual Meeting, Chaska, MN. Freberg, K., Palenchar, M. J., & Veil, S. R. (2010). Social media bookmarking services: Managing and sharing information from a centralized source. Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the National Communication Association, San Francisco, CA. Top Paper, Applied Communications Division. Littlefield, R. S. (2008, November). Culture-­‐centered risk communication: An unconventional approach. Paper presented at the National Communication Association Conference, San Diego, CA. Littlefield, R. S. (2009, February). Culturally centered research: 10 suggestions for risk and crisis communication for Native and New Americans. (includes food related research.) Foodshield podcast http://www.foodshield.org/riskcomm.cfm Littlefield, R. S., Cowden, K. J., Novak, J. M., Ulmer, R. R., & Curry, N. J. (2009, November). Spokesperson credibility: Ethos and identification of food related crisis and emergency risk messages by culturally diverse groups. Paper presented at the November 2009 National Communication Association Conference, Chicago, IL. Littlefield, R. S., Roanhorse, M., Cowden, K., & Beauchamp, K. (2009). Clarifying terminology: Defining Vulnerability and Vulnerable Populations in Food Safety Research." Paper accepted for presentation at the Central States Communication Association convention in April 2010. Palenchar, M. J. (2010, July). Convincing customers when your product is safe. Speaker at the pre-­‐annual meeting short course entitle Managing Risks Associated with Food Ingredient Safety, annual conference of the Institute for Food Technologists, Chicago, IL. Palenchar, M. J. (2010, July). Convincing customers why your product is safe. Workshop to be presented as part of the pre-­‐annual meeting short course entitled Managing Risks Associated with Food Ingredient Safety at the Institute of Food Technologists Annual Meeting, Chicago. Palenchar, M. J. (2011, May). Crisis communication and unique stakeholders: Leveraging user-­‐generated content and other best practices. International Crisis & R 70 Palenchar, M. J., & Freberg, K. (2011, March). Social media and mobile technologies implemented in risk and crisis communication practices. Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the International Public Relations Research Conference, Miami, FL. Palenchar, M. J., & Freberg, K. (2011, May). Conceptualizing social media and mobile technologies in risk and crisis communication practices. Paper presented at the annuual meeting of the International Communication Association, preconference workshop entitled Seamlessly mobile?: Mobile communications @ a crossroads, Boston, MA. Palenchar, M. J., & Freberg, K. (2011, May). Opportunities and barriers implementing mobile technologies and social media in reputation management and crisis communication practices. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Conference on Corporate Reputation, Brand Identity and Competitiveness, New Orleans, LA. Palenchar, M. J., & Veil, S. R. (2009, November). How to overcome the constraints and take advantage of the opportunities of the power of social media in risk and crisis communication. Panel presented at the Social Media for Crisis Communications in Government Conference, Washington, DC. Sellnow, T. L., & Veil, S. R. (2010, September). Cannons of crisis communication. Presented at University of Kentucky College of Communications and Information Studies Research Seminar, Lexington, KY.? Sellnow, T. L., & Veil, S. R. (2010, September). Risk communication strategies for food defense. Presented at the International Dairy Show. Dallas, TX.?.? Sellnow, T. L., & Veil, S. R. (2010, September). The best practices in risk communication. Presented at the Department for Environmental Protection Research Translation Seminar Series. Frankfort, KY.? Sellnow, T. L., Flood, A., Littlefield, R. S., & Seeger, M. W. (2009, March). Risk communication as an intervention strategy. Preliminary findings presented at the Third Annual DHS University Summit, March 17–19, 2009. Sellnow, T. L., Littlefield, R. S., Vidoloff, K. G., & Webb, E. (2008, November). Public communication in response to terrorist hoaxes: Risk communication as interacting arguments. (Includes food-­‐related research). A top paper presented at the National Communication Association Conference, San Diego, CA. Sellnow, T., Sellnow, D., Lane, D., & Littlefield, R. S. (2010, June). The value of instructional communication in crisis situations: Restoring order to chaos. Paper accepted for presentation at the International Communication Association in Singapore. (Data drawn from project). 71 Session : Best practice risk communication: Challenges for food safety versus food defense events. Title: Variation in Risk Communication: IFT Study findings. Jeannie Houchins. July 20, 2010. Institute of Food Technologists, Chicago, IL Stover, C. Examining vulnerabilities in the food supply network: The peanut paste case. Presentation accepted at the meetings of the International Research Committee on Disasters and the Natural Hazards' Research Conference, July 14, 2010 in Broomfield, CO. Veil, S. R. (2009, December). Risk center updates: Social media and crisis. Presented at the University of Oklahoma Community Advisery Board meeting, Norman, OK. Veil, S. R. (2010, June). Risk communication and community-­‐based research. Presented at the Institute for the Integration of Research on Climate Change and Hazards in the Americans. National Science Foundation. Panama City, Panama. Veil, S. R., & Vinette, S. J. (2009, November). Risk communication training. Panel presente at the Extension Disaster Education Network Risk Communication Session, Lexington, KY. Veil, S. R., Buehner, T., & Palenchar, M. J. (2010). Increasing dialogue in disasters: Incorporating social media in risk and crisis communication. Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the National Communication Association, San Francisco, CA. Veil, S. R., Chen, C., Wang, Q., Petrun, E. L., & Roberts, H. A. (2011, May). Online vs. traditional media in publishing pranks: The case of the unicorn meat. Paper to be presented at the International Communication Association Conference, Boston, MA. Venette, S. J. & Littlefield, R. S., Cowden, K. J., Wolf, K. E. & Sellnow, T. L. (2008, November). Problem-­‐based learning as experiential education: Lessons learned. (Panel presentation at the National Communication Association Conference, San Diego, CA. Western, K. & Littlefield, R. S. (2009, November). When pets die: Analyzing the power of the media in Menu Foods’ crisis. Paper presented at the November 2009 National Communication Association Conference in Chicago, IL. Wolf, K. E.(2008, September). Risk and crisis communication messages testing instrument. Poster presentation by Kimberly Beauchamp at the National Center for Food Protection and Defense Annual Meeting, Chaska, MN. Yang, A., & Veil, S. R. (2010, June). Issues management and media transparency: Sanlu Group's media manipulation in China. Paper to be presented at the International Communication Association Conference, Singapore. 72 Systems Strategies Bharad A. B., R.W. Harrison, J. Kinsey, and D. Degeneffe"Analysis of Media Agenda-­‐Setting Effects on Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the U.S. Food System across Consumer Segments." Food Distribution Research Society Annual Meeting. Destin, Fl. October 2010. Bharad A. B., R.W. Harrison, J. Kinsey, D. Degeneffe, G.Ferreira. “Analysis of Media Agenda-­‐
Setting Effects on Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the U.S. Food System” Selected Paper presented at the Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Orlando, FL, February 6-­‐9, 2010. Degeneffe, D. Methodologies for Constructing Media Tracking Indexes for Food Safety and Defense Events. Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Meetings, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August, 2009 Degeneffe, D. National Grocers Association (NGA) National Convention, Las Vegas -­‐ Consumer Confidence in the Safety & Security of the Food Supply, February 4, 2009. Degeneffe, D. National Grocers Association (NGA) National Convention, Las Vegas -­‐ Reinforcing the Circle of Trust: The Impact of Food Safety Incidents on Consumer Confidence, February 7, 2008. Degeneffe, D. National Grocers Association (NGA) National Convention, Las Vegas -­‐ Understanding the Impact of Food Safety Incidents on Consumer Confidence, February 10, 2010. "Degeneffe, D. National Grocers Association Board of Directors – University Food Industry Coalition Project Update, February 5, 2008." Degeneffe, D. National Grocers Association Executive Leadership Conference, Irving TX -­‐ America's Challenge: Food Safety and Security, September 26, 2008. Degeneffe, D. National Grocers Association Executive Leadership Conference, Irving TX -­‐ CFST – Continuous Tracking of Consumer Confidence in Food Safety, September 25, 2009. Degeneffe. NCFPD Risk Communications Task Force Annual Meeting -­‐ Consumer Confidence in the Safety & Security of the Food Supply, April 22, 2009. Garcia-­‐Fuentes, P. G. Ferreira. R.W. Harrison, J. Kinsey, D. Degeneffe. “Consumer Confidence in the Food System, Media Coverage and Stock Prices of Food Companies” Accepted for presentation at the 2010 American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado. July 24-­‐27, 2010. Harrison, R. Wes,Dennis Degeneffe and Jean Kinsey. "Consumer Confidence in Food Safety: Evidence from the Gulf Oil Spill." Food Distribution Research Society Annual Meeting. Destin, Fl. October 2010. 73 Harrison, R.W, and D. Degeneffe. Louisiana Food Processors Association Conference, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA -­‐ Consumer Confidence in the Safety & Security of the Food Supply, March 19, 2009. Harrison, R.W., Ferreira, G., Kinsey, J. and Degeneffe, D. Index of Consumer Confidence in the Safety of the Food System", American Agricultural Economics Association, August 2009. (Invited Paper) Kinsey, J. and D. Degeneffe. Food Industry Center Spring Conference, Coffman Auditorium, Minneapolis -­‐ Consumer Confidence in the Safety & Security of the Food Supply, April 1, 2009. Education & Outreach Programs Ackleson J. and J.Kastner. “Frontier: an inter-­‐institutional, interdisciplinary model for homeland security education.” Abstract prepared for and delivered at the “DHS University Network Summit,” Washington, D.C., March 19, 2009. Ackleson, J. and J. Kastner. “Frontier: an inter-­‐institutional, interdisciplinary model for homeland security education.” Abstract prepared for and delivered at the “DHS University Network Summit,” Washington, D.C., March 19, 2009. Ackleson, J., J. Jensby, and J. Kastner “Factors that Influence Cross-­‐Border Cooperation: A Preliminary Inductive Analysis.” Paper for the 2009 International Studies Association Annual Convention (Panel: “The Future of North American Integration”), 15 January 2009 in New York City. Webposted at http://frontier.k-­‐state.edu. Block, C. “Chicken Wars and Other U.S.-­‐China Trade Concerns” Frontier podcast audio commentary, February, 2009. http://frontier.k-­‐state.edu): Block, C. “The Chinese Hokou System” Frontier podcast audio commentary, February, 2009. http://frontier.k-­‐state.edu): Cobus Block. “Chicken Wars and Other U.S.-­‐China Trade Concerns” Podcasted audio commentary, February, 2009. Cobus Block. “The Chinese Hokou System” Podcasted audio commentary, February, 2009. Gopalakrishnan, S., J. Jensby, and J. Kastner. “Food Defense and Governance: Safeguarding the nation’s food imports through public-­‐private partnerships.” Poster and abstract prepared for the National Center for Food Protection and Defense biennial meeting, September 2010. 74 Hedberg, C. "Food Defense Education: The University of Minnesota Public Health Institute Approach" in the Food Defense Education Symposium at International Association for Food Protection meeting, August 2008, Columbus, OH Jensby, J., K. Krusemark, T. Lapid, R.A. Vasquez, J. Ackleson, A. Nutsch, and J. Kastner. “Frontier Interdisciplinary eXperiences.” Poster prepared for the National Center for Food Protection and Defense Annual Meeting, Chaska, Minnesota, September 2008. Kastner, J, S.Gopalakrishnan, and C. Cochran, “Models of Cross-­‐Border Cooperation and the Role of Public-­‐Private Partnerships in Import Security,” invited presentation for the Achieving Safety in the Global Food Supply Chain Conference, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 28 April 2011 (invited). Kastner, J. “Internship and career development opportunities at NCFPD.” Presentation to students attending the Department of Homeland Security Career Pathways Conference, Washington, D.C., October 23, 2010 (invited). Kastner, J. “Policy and Risk Assessment,” 22 September 2009. Lecture for Food Protection and Defense Meeting and Shortcourse, Purdue University. Kastner, J. and J. Ackleson. “Frontier: A growing community of scholars.” Presentation to students attending the Frontier student retreat, in Chaska, Minnesota, 27 September 2010. Kastner, J. "Experiencing Scholarship." 22 January 2010. Lecture to Frontier Interdisciplinary eXperiences (FIX) Program Students, during January 2010 Frontier Student Retreat (K-­‐State Alumni Center). Kastner, J. “How to attend to detail.” Presentation for the Frontier student breakfast meeting, 1 December 2010, K-­‐State School of Leadership Studies Building, Manhattan, Kansas. Kastner, J. “How to document your thinking.” Presentation for the Frontier student breakfast meeting, 27 October 2010, K-­‐State School of Leadership Studies Building, Manhattan, Kansas. Kastner, J. “Interdisciplinary career-­‐development opportunities in homeland security,” invited presentation on homeland security related career opportunities, for the Empowering Young Men conference, involving gifted students at Salina South High School, Salina, Kansas, 1 December 2010 (invited). Kastner, J. “Policy and Risk Assessment,” 22 September 2009. Lecture for Food Protection and Defense Meeting and Shortcourse, Purdue University. Kastner, J. “The Frontier Program,” invited presentation delivered in conjunction with the Official Opening of the K-­‐State Olathe campus, Olathe, Kansas, 26 April 2011 (invited). 75 Kastner, J. and J. Ackleson. “Frontier: A growing community of scholars.” Presentation to students attending the Frontier student retreat, in Chaska, Minnesota, 27 September 2010. Kastner, J. and Nutsch, A. “How to critically think across disciplines.” Presentation for the Frontier student breakfast meeting, 6 October 2010, K-­‐State School of Leadership Studies Building, Manhattan, Kansas. Kastner, J. et. Al “The FIX Program: what will your experience look like?” Presentations to students attending the Frontier student retreat, in Chaska, Minnesota, 27 September 2010. Kastner, J. S. Gopalakrishnan, and C. Cochran, “Models of Cross-­‐Border Cooperation and the Role of Public-­‐Private Partnerships in Import Security,” invited presentation for the Achieving Safety in the Global Food Supply Chain Conference, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 28 April 2011 (invited). Kastner, J., S. Toburen, K. Krusemark, and S. Gopalakrishnan. “The FIX Program: what will your experience look like?” Presentations to students attending the Frontier student retreat, in Chaska, Minnesota, 27 September 2010. Krusemark, K., J. Kastner, and A. Nutsch. “Historical Perspectives in Food Defense.” Frontier podcasted audio commentary, September, 2009. http://frontier.k-­‐state.edu) Linton, R. and A. Nutsch. Using stakeholder input to develop multi-­‐institutional graduate education programs in food defense. Presented at DHS University Network Summit, Washington, DC., March 2009. Lozano, M. “The FIX-­‐Files – Episode 6 – Miguel shares his experiences with the Frontier Program” Frontier podcast video commentary, October, 2009. http://frontier.k-­‐state.edu). Nutsch, A. & C. Kastner. NCFPD Education, Training & Curriculum Development. Presented at DHS site visit to NCFPD, Minneapolis, MN, June 2009. Nutsch, A. Collaborative Food Defense Graduate Educational Initiatives: Examples and Challenges. Presented at International Association for Food Protection, Annual Meeting, August 2008. Nutsch, A. Using stakeholder input to define knowledge areas needed for a curriculum in food protection and defense. Presentation at IAFP 96th Annual Meeting, Grapevine, TX, July 2009. Nutsch, A., J. Kastner, and J. Ackleson. “Opportunities for NCFPD students.” Presentation to students attending the National Center for Food Protection and Defense Biennial Meeting, Chaska, Minnesota, 28 September 2010 (invited). 76 Warkentien, M. and Kastner, J. “Cross-­‐border Cooperation of Brazil and the United States in the Beef Trade: Use of Regionalization to Address Foot and Mouth Disease.” Poster prepared for Cattlemen’s Day, Manhattan, Kansas, March 2011. 77 Patents PI-­‐Last Invention Title Alocilja Electrically-­‐active ferromagnetic particle conductimetric biosensor test kit (Previous E.C. Alocilja, title: Development of a Conductometric S. Pal, Biosensor for Detecting Pathogenic E. B. Setterington. Microorganisms and Toxins Using Electroactive Nanomagnetic Polyaniline). Alocilja Biologically enhanced electrically-­‐active magnetic nanoparticles for concentration, separation, and detection applications. Johnson Compound Eye Inventors E. Alocilja S. Pal E. Setterington Patent Publication Number US 2008/0314766 A1 US 2009/0123939 A1 H. Jiang L. Dong US 7,672,058 Bioagent detection device H. Jiang D. J. Beebe US 7,722,809 Johnson Variable-­‐focus lens assembly H. Jiang A. K. Agarwal L. Dong D. Beebe US 7,554,743 Johnson Detection device and method H. Jiang S.S. Sridharamurthy US 7,722,816 Johnson Device and Methods for Liquid-­‐Crystal Based Bioagent Detection N.L. Abbott J.S. Park S. Teren D.J. Beebe E.A. Johnson. US 7910382 Wackett Methods, Compositions and Devices Utilizing Structurally Stable Cyanuric Acid Hydrolase M. Sadowsky J. Seffernick L. Wackett US 2011/0127208 A1 Young Purification and Concentration of Proteins and DNA from a Complex Sample Using Isotachophoresis and a Device to Perform the Purification C. C. Young US 2010/0261612 A1 Young Concentration, Purification and Separation of C. C. Young Nucleic Acids and proteins by Isotachophoresis US 2010/0323913 A1 Johnson 78 Pending Invention Disclosure Alocilja Electrochemical detection of Microbial Cells Using Biologically Modified Electrically Active Magnetic Nanoparticles. E.C. Alocilja E. Setterington. TEC2010-­‐0030 Patent Applications in review Alocilja Nanoparticle tracer-­‐based electrochemical bio-­‐
barcode DNA sensor for multiple detection of pathogens. Alocilja Directed DNA co-­‐polymer mass amplification for ssDNA detection. E.C. Alocilja D. Zhang TEC2009-­‐0053. E.C. Alocilja M. Anderson TEC2010-­‐0071. Alocilja Novel alkaline synthesis of biocompatible gold nanoparticles using dextrin as reducing and capping agent E.C. Alocilja TEC2011-­‐0030 “ Wackett An invention disclosure was filed with the University of Minnesota Office of Technology Commercialization, M. Sadowsky L. Wackett Disclosure filed 10/2010 79 Appendix B: Center of Excellence (COE) Project Summaries Agent Behavior Simultaneous Detection of Multiple Food Safety Threat Agents Using Multiplex PCR and PCR-­‐Macroarray PI: Woubit S Abdela, Tuskegee University October 1, 2009 -­‐ April 30, 2011 The bacterial genera Escherichia, Francisella, Salmonella, Shigella, Yersinia and Vibrio comprise important food safety and threat agents causing food-­‐related human illnesses worldwide. We aimed to develop rapid methods with the capability to simultaneously and differentially detect all the six pathogens in one run. Our initial experiments to use previously reported sets of primers revealed non-­‐specificity of some of the sequences when tested against a broader array of pathogens, or proved not optimal for simultaneous detection parameters. By extensive mining of the whole genome and protein databases of diverse closely and distantly related bacterial species and strains, we have identified unique genome regions, which we utilized to develop a detection platform. Twelve of the specific genomic targets we have identified to design the primers in F. tularensis, F. novicida, S. dysentriae, S. typhimurium, V. cholera, Y. pestis, and Y. pseudotuberculosis were either hypothetical or putative proteins the functions of which have not been clearly defined. Corresponding primer sets were designed from the target regions for use in real-­‐time PCR assays to detect specific food threat pathogens at species or strain levels. The primer sets were first tested by in-­‐silico PCR against whole genome sequences of different species, sub-­‐
species, or strains and then by in vitro PCR against genomic DNA preparations from 23 species representing six food threat agents (E.coli O157:H7 strain EDL 933, Shigella dysentriae, Salmonella typhi, Francisella tularensis subspecies tularensis, Vibrio cholera, and Yersinia pestis) and six foodborne pathogens (Salmonella typhimurium, Salmonella enterica serovar Saintpaul, Shigella sonnei, Francisella novicida, Vibrio parahemolytica and Yersinia pseudotuberculosis). Each pathogen was specifically identifiable at the genus and species levels. Sensitivity assays performed using purified DNA showed the lowest detection limit of 640 fg DNA/µl for F. tularensis. A preliminary test done to detect Shigella organisms in milk matrix also showed that 6-­‐60 colony forming units of the bacterium could be detected per milliliter of milk in about an hour. Therefore, we have developed a platform to simultaneously detect foodborne pathogen and threat agents specifically and in real-­‐time. Such a platform could enable rapid detection or confirmation of contamination by these agents. Customized PCR-­‐arrays of 96, 48 and 63-­‐wells were developed for the rapid identification of six select agents, Escherichia coli O157:H7, Francisella tularensis, Salmonella typhi, Shigella dysentriae, Yersinia pestis and Vibrio cholera and closely related six major food borne pathogens Salmonella typhimurium, Salmonella enterica serovar Saintpaul, Francisella novicida, Vibrio parahemolytica, Yersinia pseudotuberculosis. Current methods for pathogen detection have limitations in the effectiveness of identifying multiple foodborne pathogens. Customized PCR-­‐array plates specifically coated with individual primers for simultaneous identification of food safety treat agents and major food borne pathogens. A mixed aliquot of genomic DNA from 23 different species and strains were used for the specific validation of the three PCR-­‐array plates. Same PCR conditions were 80 used to run all the samples of the three different plates. A specific amplification was obtained from all the three custom plates, more over melting curve analysis of Real-­‐time PCR revealed a single dissociation curve from all the reaction wells. We have developed a rapid (< 1hr over all testing time), high-­‐throughput screening PCR-­‐macro-­‐array technique to simultaneously detect multiple food safety threat agents. The present multiplex-­‐detection method has an improved sensitivity and specificity for the detection of multiple high-­‐impact food-­‐borne pathogens simultaneously. Findings of this study will ensure emplacing an effective means of detection prior to any incident to identify and apply appropriate risk mitigation measures. Moreover, this tool will provide reliable detection techniques to identify high-­‐impact pathogenic agents in human food supply systems, before the agents reach the consumer. The future direction will involve utilization of these specific tools into mobile or hand held devices for the identification of these pathogens at point of concern level. Development of a Multiplex Bio-­‐barcode DNA Biosensor for Bacillus anthracis Detection Without PCR Amplification, Phase II PI: Dr. Evangelyn C. Alocilja, Department of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering, Michigan State University October, 2009 – May, 2011 The long-­‐term goal of this project is to develop a DNA-­‐based detection device for Bacillus anthracis that will not require PCR amplification and still retain PCR sensitivity. In Phase I, we achieved our proposed objectives and accomplished the following: (1) synthesized and characterized the DNA probe-­‐coated and bio-­‐barcoded gold nanoparticles and DNA probe-­‐ coated magnetic nanoparticles; (2) developed an assay for Bacillus anthracis DNA recognition and bio-­‐barcode release; and (3) fabricated the bio-­‐barcode DNA biosensor and evaluated its sensitivity performance. In Phase II (this project), we addressed sample preparation (DNA extraction) and DNA amplification of B. anthracis without the use of a themocycler. For sample preparation, we explored four lysis methods (heat, salt concentration, mechanical beads, and proteinase K digestion) and coupled them with two purification reagents (ethanol and phenol/chloroform). For DNA amplification, we proposed to develop a thermophilic helicase-­‐ dependent isothermal amplification (tHDA) method and an enzymatic fragmentation method specific to B. anthracis. Results from the studies show that heat, proteinase K, and ethanol purification extracted high yields of DNA. A tHDA method, a tHDA reagent, and a fragmentation method were developed and validated. The isothermal amplification was conducted at a single temperature (65°C) using a regular thermal block, thus reducing equipment needs. During the implementation of the project, an alkaline method to gold nanoparticle synthesis was discovered and developed. With these results, we have successfully developed methods for a PCR-­‐less thremocycler-­‐
free DNA based detection of B. anthracis using simple field-­‐friendly devices, such as a simple heating block. The biosensor was also successfully applied to areas in food safety and global health. The assay was used for the direct detection of Salmonella enteritidis in 81 food samples and Mycobacterium tuberculosis synthetic targets. These applications are in line with the nation’’s biodefense strategies (http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/biodefenserelated/biodefense/research/pages/cata.asp
x). These results lay the foundation for moving DNA based biosensors and other detection modalities closer to implementing in field conditions at potentially lower cost. This has tremendous impact in that the power of DNA-­‐based specificity can now be combined with field-­‐operability and user-­‐ simplicity for quickly monitoring biodefense and food safety issues. Proof-­‐of-­‐Concept Study for the Development of a Cell-­‐Free GPCR-­‐based Biosensor for Rapid Non-­‐Specific Detection of Chemical and Biological Toxic Agents PI: Dr. Evangelyn C. Alocilja, Professor, Department of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering, Michigan State University October, 2009 – May, 2011 The long-­‐term goal of this project is to develop a cell-­‐free detect-­‐to-­‐warn biosensor system for rapid non-­‐specific but highly sensitive detection of toxic substances of concern to national security, public safety, food defense, food safety, environmental quality, healthcare, and civilian and military medical diagnostics. For this specific project, the objectives were to: (1) Characterize the acetylcholine receptor (AChR) peptide; (2) Immobilize AChR on a screen-­‐ printed carbon electrode and evaluate its stability; and (3) Evaluate the AChR biosensor response to toxic agents. All the three objectives were achieved. We showed that AChRs were electrically active and followed Ohm’’s law at a concentration range of 5-­‐50 ug/mL. Immobilization of AChR on screen printed carbon electrode chips had challenges but immobilization of AChR on magnetic nanoparticles was successful. A Torca-­‐NAChR biosensor was developed. Sample preparation took 30 min (mostly for incubation) and detection time was 2 min. The biosensor was successfully tested in three classes of toxins: biological toxin (alpha-­‐bungarotoxin), chemical toxin (potassium cyanide), and neuromuscular blocking drugs (pancuronium bromide and tubocurarine chloride). The biosensor was tested in two food matrices: milk and orange juice. Alpha-­‐bungarotoxin (␣-­‐
BGT) and potassium cyanide (KCN) artificially spiked in milk and orange juice were detected by the biosensor. For the range of concentration tested in this study, the detection limit for ␣-­‐BGT was 50 μg/mL. At this level, a one cup of contaminated milk (240 mL) would contain 12,000 μg of ␣-­‐BGT. The LD50 of ␣-­‐BGT is 150 μg/Kg in mice (or equivalent to 11,250 μg for an average person weighing 75 Kg). Thus, the preliminary detection limit is within the range of the LD50. To eliminate the effect of ions, the biosensor was tested in potassium chloride. Results showed that the biosensor responded to potassium cyanide and not to potassium chloride. In summary, this proof-­‐of-­‐concept study successfully demonstrates the great potential of the NAChR biosensor as a detect-­‐to-­‐warn detection device. The biosensor can be used to quickly screen (32 min total) for unknown toxic substances in food products and thus 82 minimize public exposure to these potentially fatal events. Determining the specific sources of toxins or contaminants in food can take time, but at least there is now a quick way of alerting the public of the eminent danger. The novelty of this biosensor design is that it is label-­‐free hence, the detection is a one-­‐step process that is simple and potentially low cost. Furthermore, it is cell-­‐free so there is no requirement to maintain the viability of reporter cells. Thus, the biosensor is field operable and practical for use in rugged conditions. Given these features, the AChR biosensor is truly a promising novel technology that can satisfy the need for non-­‐specific rapid field-­‐based diagnosis of bioterrorism events that is critically missing in existing detection methods. Development of biologically modified electrically-­‐active magnetic nanoparticles (nano-­‐BEAMs) for direct capture and concentration of Bacillus anthracis spores and cells in various food matrices PI: Evangelyn Alocilja, Department of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering, Michigan State University September, 2007 -­‐ December, 2009 Objective 1: Synthesize and characterize the electrically-­‐active magnetic nanoparticles. Electrically active magnetic (EAM) nanoparticles, which contained Fe2O3 as core and polyaniline as shell, were successfully synthesized and characterized. The saturation magnetization MS of EAMs was 44.1 emu/g compared to 64.4 emu/g for the Fe2O3 core. The remanent magnetization Mr of EAMs and Fe2O3 were 10.4 and 14.2, respectively. The coercive force Hc for both nanoparticles was 200 Oe. The low values of Mr and Hc suggest that the nanoparticles are still in the ferromagnetic phase but approaching superparamagnetic behavior. ZFC-­‐FC (zero-­‐field-­‐cooled/field-­‐cooled) magnetism measurements were performed for the EAM nanoparticles from 5 K to 300 K at 100 Oe applied field. At 100 Oe, the nanoparticles were close to blocking at 300K. High blocking temperatures confirm that the nanoparticles are still in the ferromagnetic phase at room temperature. The electrical conductivity of both the synthesized EAM and unmodified Fe2O3 nanoparticles was done by compressing these materials into pellets of 2000-­‐micrometer thickness at room temperature. The Fe2O3 nanoparticles had an electrical conductivity of 3.4 × 10-­‐5 S/cm whereas the conductivity of the EAM nanoparticles was five orders of magnitude higher at 3.3 S/cm. This increase in electrical conductivity is expected and confirms the presence of electrically active polyaniline on the nanoparticles. A transmission electron microscope (TEM) was used to image the unmodified Fe2O3 nanoparticles and the EAM nanoparticles. The iron oxide nanoparticles had an average diameter of 20 nm, consistent with the manufacturer’s specifications. The EAM nanoparticles had a diameter ranging from 50 to 100 nm. 83 Objective 2: Biologically modify these nanoparticles (nano-­‐BEAMs) with antibodies and aptamers specific to the target Bacillus anthracis and optimize the binding parameters. The EAMs were biologically modified (referred to as nano-­‐BEAMs) with antibodies and aptamers for Bacillus anthracis and Bacillus cereus 9as surrogate of B. anthracis). The immunomagnetic concentration procedure using the nano-­‐BEAMs was optimized based on three parameters: immunoreaction time, antibody concentration, and nanoparticle concentration. Based on our experimental results, an immunoreaction time of 30 min was found to be adequate for the maximum capture. The nano-­‐BEAMs showed a maximum capture efficiency when the nanoparticle concentration was fixed at 10 mg/ml. The optimum antibody concentration for the nano-­‐BEAM capture was found to be 0.5 mg/ml. Modification of the EAM nanoparticles with various aptamers to Bacillus anthracis was not successful hence this part of the experiment was abandoned. However, we were able to put together knowledge learned from this study into a review paper by Torres-­‐Chavolla and Alocilja (2009) (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bios.2008.11.010) Objective 3: Evaluate the effectiveness of nano-­‐BEAMs to separate and concentrate B. anthracis from artificially contaminated food samples. The capture efficiency of the nano-­‐BEAMs for B. cereus was in the range of 6% and 86%. The lowest limit of capture of the nano-­‐BEAMs for B. cereus was 102 CFU/ml. The capture efficiency of the nano-­‐BEAMs for B. anthracis spores was in the range of 45% and 100%. The lowest limit of capture of the nano-­‐BEAMs for B. anthracis was 101 spores/ml. The higher capture efficiencies of the nano-­‐BEAMs for B. anthracis could be attributed to the monoclonal antibodies used in the nanoparticle bio-­‐modification process. Capture efficiency of nano-­‐BEAMs in food matrices The nano-­‐BEAM capture efficiency in lettuce samples varied between 9% and 59% for B. cereus for the range of cell concentrations tested (101-­‐106 cfu/ml). Similar to the data in pure cultures, the nano-­‐BEAM capture efficiency for B. anthracis was higher than B. cereus in lettuce samples and varied between 11% and 98%. The nano-­‐BEAM capture efficiency for B. cereus in 2-­‐percent milk varied between 12% and 75%. Specificity study of the nano-­‐BEAMs The specificity of the nano-­‐BEAMs was tested in pure cultures of B. cereus by running a control test where the nano-­‐BEAMs were not modified with antibodies specific to the antigen. A small amount of nonspecific adherence of the bacteria to the nano-­‐BEAM particles were observed at high cell concentrations i.e. 105 CFU/ml. However, at lower cell concentrations, no non-­‐specific interactions were noted. Evaluation of binding efficiency between aptamer sequences and B. anthracis spores Aptamer sequences published by Kiel et al. (2004) and Zhen et al. (2002) were used in these experiments. Modifying the nano-­‐BEAMs with the aptamer sequence by Kiel et al. 84 (2004) was abandoned due to poor results. Using two aptamer sequences (F77 and B180) by Zhen et al. (2002) resulted in the following: •
The capture efficiency from 104 to 108 viable B. anthracis spores/ml was below 15% for both aptamers. · There was minimal difference between B. anthracis spores captured by the magnetic beads with and without aptamers, potentially due to streptavidin-­‐spore cell protein interactions. •
The fluorescence readings obtained from the negative control (FAM-­‐aptamer without spores) were higher than all the different spore concentrations. •
The evaluated aptamers (F77 and B180) showed low capture efficiency for B. anthracis Sterne strain, under the tested binding conditions for both fluorescence and microbiological assays. Validation and Optimization of Biologically Modified Electrically-­‐Active Magnetic Nanoparticles (nano-­‐BEAMs) for Direct Capture and Concentration of Bioterrorism Agents in Various Food Matrices for Rapid Non-­‐Specific Detection of Chemical and Biological Toxic Agents PI: Evangelyn C. Alocilja, Department of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering, Michigan State University February, 2010 -­‐ May, 2011 Using Escherichia coli O157:H7 as a target, a novel EAMNP-­‐DSPCE biosensor was developed and validated in broth matrix and preliminarily tested in whole fluid milk. This biosensor is a field ready, shelf stable screening test for bioterrorism microbial targets in food and can be modified for clinical specimen. It utilizes EAMNPs for IMS and subsequent D + mannose modified screen printed carbon electrode capture and evaluation on a hand held potentiostat with cyclic voltammetry. Its inclusivity and exclusivity, in broth, are 94% and 64%, respectively when challenged against 74 closely related organisms. The limits of detection in broth are 1-­‐2 CFU/ml and 109 CFU/ml with an LOD50 of 6-­‐9 CFU/ml. Statistically significant differentiation between concentrations was achieved down to 10 CFU/ml (p=0.035, n=28) with concentrations between 1 and 10 CFU/ml approaching significance (p=0.094, n=20). Capture efficiency was 90% or better in the range between 10 CFU/ml and 109 CFU/ml. In milk trials, this biosensor out-­‐performed culture method. From a bulk spiked sample of 8.6L, this biosensor correctly identified 20 of the 20 portions at 1.47 MPN/ml, where culture could only identify 2 of those portions. The biosensor results were verified, by portion, in the JBAIDS PCR for 14 of 20, all without pre-­‐enrichment. Parallel portions of the same bulk tank concurrently verified the results in the FDA BAM gold standard method for 20 of 20, using pre-­‐enrichment. Many microorganisms use D+ mannose as an attachment site in vivo, and data shows excellent capture of a very diverse set of 29 organisms, showing promise for later multiplexing on the universal DSPCE. This 85 methodology takes 1 hour and costs less than $2 per test. In summary, the EAMNP-­‐DSPCE biosensor presented here is sensitive, specific, rapid, and inexpensive. It shows potential for extraction and concentration of microbial pathogens from food matrices, eliminating overnight enrichment steps, and could be paired with nearly any rapid detection method for practical applications in food defense, food and water safety, and clinical diagnostics. This biosensor out performs the FDA BAM method in speed, field portability and cost and matches it in sensitivity and specificity. Opportunities for future development and validation are unlimited. For simplicity, we shall refer to this device hereafter as M3 (magnetic, mannose-­‐modified) biosensor. Chemical Inactivation of Protein Toxins on Food-­‐contact Surfaces PI: Jack Cappozzo, National Center for Food Safety and Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology; Co-­‐PI: Lauren S. Jackson, FDA March, 2008 – December, 2010 The main goal of this project is to identify cleaning/sanitizing treatments that result in inactivation of protein toxins (e.g. ricin or abrin) on food-­‐contact surfaces in the absence and presence of different classes of food matrices (i.e., high fat, high protein, high starch). Other goals were to 1) compare enzyme-­‐linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) detection to cytotoxicity assay for measuring loss of ricin or abrin activity in the presence of cleaning/sanitizing solution, and 2) identify surrogate(s) that can be used to study chemical inactivation of ricin. Effect of the active ingredients in chemical santizers (sodium hypochlorite and peroxyacetic acid) on the stability of ricin in the absence of food matrices. ELISA detection was used to measure apparent loss of ricin activity (detection) after exposure to chemical sanitizers (chlorinated alkaline detergent; peroxyacetic acid-­‐based sanitizer; quaternary ammonium compound-­‐based santizer). In the absence of a food matrix, loss of ricin detection in the presence of sodium hypochlorite or peroxyacetic acid appeared to follow first order kinetics. As expected, the rate of inactivation increased with the concentration of both sanitizers. Minor differences were found for the inactivation rates for ricin in solution compared to those for the toxin on the surface of the coupons. Overall, the results indicate that in the absence of food matrices, sanitizers that contain ~200 ppm active chlorine would be very effective at inactivating ricin on food-­‐contact surfaces, as measured by the loss in ELISA detectability. In contrast to results obtained using ELISA, identical samples analyzed using cytotoxicity assays revealed very rapid and complete inactivation of ricin biological activity following treatment with sodium hypochlorite. Results obtained using ELISA, which were most consistent with first order kinetics, contrasted with results reported by other groups and with results obtained in this study using fluorescence quenching. We feel that this interesting difference may be related to the differences in detection strategy. 86 Effects of sodium hypochlorite and peroxyacetic acid on the stability of ricin in the presence of food matrices: infant formula, peanut butter and pancake mix. The effects of sodium hypochlorite and peroxyacetic acid on ricin inactivation in the presence of an infant formula matrix increased with the concentrations of both sanitizers, and minor differences in inactivation rate were seen for ricin in infant formula solution compared to the dried residue on the surface of stainless steel coupons. As expected, higher concentrations of both sanitizers were needed to inactivate ricin in the presence of infant formula. Studies have been completed on the effects of a sodium hypochlorite and peroxyacetic acid on ricin in the presence of peanut butter and pancake mix. Similar to those results presented for infant formula, the rate of loss of ricin increased with the concentration of sodium hypochlorite or peroxyacetic acid. Overall, the half-­‐lives for ricin in the presence of peanut butter were the longest for all of the food matrices studied. This observation may have been due to a protective/stabilizing effect of the lipids from peanut butter on ricin. Consistent with results obtained in the absence of food residues, cytotoxicity assays revealed rapid and complete inactivation of ricin treated with sodium hypochlorite or peroxyacetic acid in the presence of food residues in suspension or dried onto stainless steel coupons. As described earlier, we attribute the differences in results obtained using ELISA and cytotoxicity assays to a two-­‐step model by with the chemical agent reacts rapidly with the toxin to produce oxidative damage, presumably to highly labile sulfur containing amino acid residues, followed by slower refolding of the damaged protein that destroys the structural epitope recognized by the mononclonal antibody used in our ELISA technique. Effects of commercially available cleaning solutions (detergents and sanitizers) on ricin stability in the absence and presence of food matrices. Studies have been completed on the effects of commercially available cleaning solutions/santizers on ricin stability in the absence of food. Of the cleaning solutions evaluated, the phosphoric acid-­‐based detergent (Bruspray Acid) was the least effective on inactivating ricin. This finding is not surprising since the ricin is known to be fairly stable at the low pH values encountered with this acid detergent (pH < 2.5). Of the solutions evaluated here, chlorinated alkaline detergent was the most effective at inactivating ricin. These results are likely due to the presence of sodium hypochlorite, a compound previously shown to effectively inactivate ricin, in the detergent. The high pH of the detergent (pH >10) also likely contributed to the loss in ricin detection. Studies have been completed on the effects of some of the cleaning solutions described above (chlorinated alkaline detergent; peroxyacetic acid-­‐based sanitizer; quaternary ammonium compound-­‐based santizer) on ricin in the presence of food matrices. Similar to results presented earlier, the presence of peanut butter greatly reduced the effectiveness of the cleaning solutions from inactivating ricin. 87 Thermal and Chemical Inactivation of Select Agents Toxins in Liquid Foods PI: Francisco Diez-­‐Gonzalez, University of Minnesota Co-­‐PI: Theodore P. Labuza, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – April, 2011 Research Objectives: The objectives of this investigation were to (1) characterize the stabilities of ricin, Shiga toxin, T-­‐2 toxin, and saxitoxin to thermal and chemical treatments, (2) validate immunodetection of ricin and Shiga toxin by using a biological activity assay, and (3) develop rapid assays for the detection and/or inactivation of saxitoxin, T-­‐2 toxin, trimethylsilyl cyanide, and commercially available pesticides in liquid foods. Methods: Milk and juice samples containing different concentrations of toxins were prepared. To determine thermal stability, the toxins, in capillary tubes, were subjected to different temperature-­‐time treatments, and residual toxin concentrations were determined, followed by calculations of half-­‐lives and other kinetic parameters. The toxins were also treated with different levels of sodium hypochlorite and sodium hydroxide – separately or combined – and residual toxin concentrations were determined, and kinetic parameters calculated as well. To validate immunodetection of ricin and Shiga toxin, the toxins were thermally treated for different time periods, and residual toxin concentrations were determined by the enzyme-­‐linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and a biological activity assay (BAA), which determined the amount of adenine released by the toxins upon incubation with a DNA substrate. We also examined the ability of milk lactose to inhibit the activity of ricin by determining the levels of protein synthesis in HeLa cells when incubated with different levels of ricin pretreated with milk. Finally, the suitability of a chemical assay for detecting saxitoxin in skim milk, and the use of the brine shrimp lethality assay for non-­‐
specific detection of toxicants in milk and orange juice were investigated. Results: The findings of this study indicated that standard milk pasteurization conditions might not be adequate for complete inactivation of ricin and Shiga toxin. Higher temperatures, combined with long processing time with or without sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite would suffice. This study also showed that ELISA determinations of residual concentrations of ricin and Shiga toxin were highly correlated to the biological activities of the toxins, even though the rates of inactivation of the active sites of the toxins were significantly higher than those of their respective epitopes that are recognized by ELISA. Our results also indicate that even though milk lactose was able to inhibit the activity of ricin at lower concentrations, but was unable inhibit ricin at the least concentration that could cause harm to humans. Our work with saxitoxin showed that the toxin in skim milk could indeed be inactivated and subsequently detected, in less than 5 min, at concentrations significantly below that which would cause harm to humans. Finally, the brine shrimp lethality proved to be useful for detecting most toxicants in milk below their respective lethal doses. 88 Significance to Food Defense: The outcomes of this investigation would prove critical to food defense. We have demonstrated that a combination of high temperature and biocides can be used for inactivation ricin and Shiga toxin in milk and orange juice. ELISA can be used for routine determination of residual concentrations of ricin and Shiga toxin since it was found to be a conservative estimator of the biological activities of the two toxins. Survival and Pre-­‐analytical concentration, Extraction, and Detection of Bacillus anthracis in Fruit Juice PI: Francisco Diez-­‐Gonzalez, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – December, 2009 The goal of this project was to design and test pre-­‐analytical extraction techniques for two potential bioterrorism agents, B. anthracis and ricin toxin, from liquid foods. The result of this project was the development of a rapid concentration and extraction protocol for milk and fruit juice potentially contaminated with B. anthracis spores. The resulting sample was compatible with detection via real-­‐time PCR for both milk and fruit juice samples and juice samples were compatible with detection via lateral flow assay. Use of this concentration and extraction procedure lowered the limit of detection by 2 log units, such that real-­‐time PCR can consistently detect B. anthracis at a level of 10 spores/mL in the initial sample. This project also examined the application of immunomagnetic separation for extraction of ricin toxin from liquids. Results from this portion of the project demonstrated that immunomagnetic beads can specifically bind ricin in traditional immunomagnetic separation. However, recirculating immunomagnetic separation using the Pathatrix ® system was not demonstrated to specifically bind ricin. Immunomagnetic separation and concentration of ricin from a simple buffer system was complicated by a number of factors. ELISA is not an ideal measurement tool for quantifying ricin from samples due to the variability incurred between assay plates and even on the same plate, the multiple incubation/washing steps, and the small range of linear response of OD vs. concentration. Despite the narrow range of linear response and variability between plates, the assay can be used to quantify ricin, with or without prior dilution, so long as internal standards are included. Ideally, the sample obtained from immunomagnetic extraction would be compatible with the detection procedure without further processing. However, this project demonstrated that the immunomagnetic beads themselves had a highly variable affect in the ELISA assay. This is most likely due to the variability in how and when the beads are washed from the plate, as well as the competition between the assay antibody and the beads for ricin binding. In addition, separation of beads and supernatant after ricin incubation yielded less ricin detectable on the beads than expected based on the results from the whole sample prior to magnetic extraction of the beads or the ricin remaining in the bead-­‐
free supernatant. This result confirms that the presence of beads interferes with detection using the ELISA assay. The variability and apparent decreased level of detection prevented accurate, direct quantification of the ricin bound to the beads. Evidence from this study 89 also demonstrated the time dependence of bead-­‐ricin binding, with increased binding of ricin after 60 minutes as compared to after 30 minutes as measured by the amount of ricin remaining in the supernatant. This result correlates to the 60 minute binding time used for initial ricin binding in the ELISA assay. Bead beating was used to elute ricin from the beads, but was unsuccessful. Other possible elution techniques, such as papain digestion of the bead bound antibody, were considered but not used due to evidence of ricin digestion with the same enzyme treatment. This forced the use of indirect measurement of ricin binding through the supernatant (standard IMS) and effluent (Pathatrix recirculating IMS), which avoids the variable effect of the beads, but does not give direct evidence of concentration in the bead fraction. Other methods that could be considered for future work to release the ricin from the bead bound antibody, may include heat or pH denaturation of the antibody. However, no standard procedure exists for separating ricin from antibody using these methods. Additionally, the application of either of these methods would need to be verified to not alter the ricin molecule so as to preserve the antigenic site for future immune-­‐based detection assays. Another possibility may be to use the antibody-­‐ricin beads themselves as the primary phase for the ELISA using a 96 well magnet, although this method would not permit the use of an automated plate washer. Anti-­‐ricin antibody conjugated to the Pathatrix magnetic beads decreased the ricin concentration remaining in the supernatant at a wide range of concentrations when used in standard IMS. Standard IMS demonstrated that the anti-­‐ricin beads specifically bound ricin in the system. The anti-­‐ricin beads also demonstrated a binding capacity close to 20 μg. However, when applied to the Pathatrix system, the specific effect of the beads was no longer apparent. Non-­‐specific binding of ricin in the system alone decreased the concentration in the effluent, although the remaining ricin in the effluent was significantly less when anti-­‐ricin beads were added. Standard IMS demonstrated that although anti-­‐
ricin beads decreased the ricin remaining in the supernatant significantly more than the unconjugated beads, some ricin is likely non-­‐specifically bound to system components surfaces, e. g. the glass wall itself. The combined effect of non-­‐specific binding in the Pathatrix system and to the unconjugated beads may have overwhelmed the specific anti-­‐
ricin bead effects. Although the current results seem discouraging for the future use of recirculating IMS for pre-­‐analytical separation of protein toxins such as ricin, there are a number of factors not taken in to account in this system based on ricin detection in the effluent. However, any future work using IMS must first establish a methodology for rapidly and completely eluting ricin from the beads without altering the antigenic site, or alternative test method. This will allow for direct quantification of the ricin bound to the beads, which is key to proof of concept for use of IMS as a method to extract ricin from liquid systems. As the present study was only able to quantify the ricin remaining in the effluent, a wash step in the Pathatrix system was not utilized due to the need for an undiluted effluent for quantify ricin remaining in the effluent. Addition of this wash step to this type of indirect measurement would have diluted the effluent to a variable degree. However, if ricin bound to the beads could be measured directly, it is likely that the system wash step would 90 decrease non-­‐specific binding in the system. Additionally, after the system wash and bead collection from Pathatrix, the beads can be washed and extracted a second time. This secondary wash would also help to reduce non-­‐specific binding to give a better idea of the extraction efficacy of the antibody coated beads. The findings of this project indicate that IMS may be suitable for extraction of protein toxins from simple liquid systems. However, prior to further examination, an alternative system of toxin elution from the magnetic beads is required to demonstrate active concentration in the extracted fraction. Impact of Rodenticides on the Coagulation Properties of Milk Proteins PI: Salam A. Ibrahim, North Carolina Agriculture & Technical State University March, 2008 – April, 2011 The current level of bio-­‐security on dairy farms in the United States is unacceptable. This vulnerability could lead to the intentional contamination of milk with harmful chemicals. Undetected contamination of milk from just a single farm could lead to potential health hazards in human consumers. Furthermore, contaminated milk would cause problems in the milk processing industry which could lead to severe economic losses for affected companies and individual farmers. The early detection of chemical contaminants in milk at the farm level is therefore essential to prevent such contaminants from entering into the food chain. Most of the existing methods to detect toxins are expensive and time consuming. Therefore, it is critical that we have a better understanding of the interaction between chemically adulterated agents and milk proteins in order to help identify intentional contamination of milk. This will lead to better isolation of the chemical contaminant. Therefore, a simple and robust on-­‐farm bioassay technique can be developed for the early detection of harmful chemicals in milk. In turn, this new technique will reduce the cost and time to process an unusable food product as well as reduce unnecessary destruction of usable dairy products. This bioassay technique will ensure the consumer safety by avoiding final retail distribution and consumer consumption of intentionally contaminated milk. The fundamental objective of this project was to determine the effect of selected toxins on the coagulation of milk. In our study, we used two different milk coagulation models: acidic coagulation and enzymatic coagulation. Acidic coagulation is generally attributable to lactic acid starter culture activity. Enzymatic coagulation is due to a common enzyme used in cheese making, rennin. The more specific objectives of this study were: 1.To determine the effect of selected toxins on the growth and activity of lactic acid bacteria in MRS broth, 2. To determine the effect of selected toxins on the growth and activity of lactic acid bacteria in milk and 3. To determine the effect of toxins on the enzymatic coagulation properties of milk. In our project, yogurt starter culture was used for acidic coagulation, ands rennin was used for enzymatic coagulation. The acidic coagulation properties of milk were monitored by measuring the starter culture activity and acid development. Enzymatic coagulation was determined by measuring the rheological properties and gel strength of milk samples. Our results showed that the presence of 91 strychnine, bromadiolone, or brodifacoum, caused a significant delay in the enzymatic coagulation time (4-­‐5 minutes). In the control samples, the coagulation time was approximately 30.5 minutes after rennet addition, while all of the contaminated samples had a coagulation time of at least 34.5 minutes. The presence of these toxins could reduce the gel strength of milk; therefore, coagulation time could be used as a indicator for the presence of a foreign substance in milk. The presence of these toxins also caused a significant delay in the growth and acid production of yogurt cultures. Our results showed that yogurt culture could be used as a biomarker for the early detection of rodenticides in milk. With some adjustments, this process could be utilized as a fast and accurate test for the presence of pesticides in dairy food products. The findings also demonstrated that the presence of these toxins could delay the coagulation time in milk and weaken the milk gel strength; therefore, the detection process could serve as an indicator for the presence of foreign substances in milk. In addition, this procedure could be modified to produce a fast, highly sensitive, environmentally safe and accurate test kit which could be used for early detection of terrorist attacks on the nation’s food supplies Detection and Removal of Select Agents from Complex Sample Matrices: Phase II PI: Lee-­‐Ann Jaykus, North Carolina State University September, 2007 – May, 2010 The purpose of this project was to use specific DNA aptamer and peptide ligands for the development of small, robust and inexpensive technologies for separating B. anthracis spores, ricin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (capture) from the background components (colloidal substances, non-­‐harmful proteins, solids) of complex liquid food matrices, followed by their detection. The specific objectives were: i) preparation of ligand-­‐bound chromatographic and nonwoven membrane solid supports capable of capturing B. anthracis spores, ricin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) from complex liquid food matrices, 2) physiochemical characterization of ligand-­‐agent binding occurring on the surface of solid supports to which the affinity ligands have been tethered, 3) characterization and optimization of select-­‐agent capture using the ligand-­‐bound solid supports as applied to liquid food materials (water, milk, and juice), 4) investigation of the surface Plasmon resonance (SPR), quartz crystal microbalance (QCM) and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) technologies for the detection of low concentrations of the select agents previously captured using the pre-­‐analytical sample processing technologies described in objective (3). Result Summary A new method was presented to modify silica surfaces with PEG chains terminated with amine groups. This kind of construct can be used to immobilize biomolecules, allowing for its use in fundamental studies of surface interactions between immobilized biomolecules and their targets with low nonspecific binding background. 92 A Quartz crystal microbalance (QCM) sensor with native silica surface was modified by the same method mentioned above and then hexamer peptide ligand HWRGWV was immobilized on it. The success of immobilization was proven by ToF-­‐SIMS spectra. The immobilization conditions were optimized. The gold surfaces of both QCM and surface plasmon resonance (SPR) sensors were modified with self-­‐assembled monlayers, (SAMs) of EG6NH2 and the peptide ligand HWRGWV was immobilized using the best conditions obtained with silica surface modification experiments. The success of the peptide immobilization step was evident from the ToF-­‐SIMS spectra of X-­‐ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS). Both SPR and QCM results showed that this hexamer peptide immobilized on gold surface has high affinity and specificity to hIgG adsorption even in complex media such as cMEM. Thermodynamic and kinetic parameters of this affinity interaction were obtained by the analysis of static and dynamic QCM and SPR data. (1). Finally, the feasibility of using the peptide functionalized SPR and QCM sensors to quickly determine IgG concentration from the initial slopes of the system response was proven. Capture and Detection of Botulinum Neurotoxin (BoNT) in Complex Food Matrices Using Novel Biosensor Platforms PI: Eric Johnson, University of Wisconsin, Madison September, 2007 – December, 2009 In an effort to improve early BoNT/A detection, we have developed four different sensors to capture and detect botulinum neurotoxin. 1. toxin-­‐responsive hydrogel sensors; 2. self-­‐
assembled monolayers (SAMs), SAMs consisting of an immobilized synthetic peptide that mimicked the toxin's in vivo SNAP-­‐25 protein substrate were formed on Au and interfaced with arrayed microfluidic channels; 3. We also have devised a microfluidic platform that incorporates substrate-­‐laden silica beads for sensing the proteolytic activity of botulinum neurotoxin type A (BoNT/A). 4. We developed an enrichment platform for botulinum neurotoxin type B (BoNT/B) that has been realized through the fusion of bioconjugation chemistry and microfluidics. Micrometer-­‐sized magnetic beads were conjugated to a 22 mer peptide derived from the neuronal synaptotagmin II protein that is specific for BoNT/B heavy chain binding. To further improve performances of microfluidics and lab on chips in sensing of biological/chemical to electrical/optical signal transduction, we successfully developed polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) microlens arrays fabricated through liquid-­‐phase photopolymerization and molding. The gist of this fabrication process is to form liquid menisci of variable radii of curvature at an array of apertures through pneumatic control, followed by photopolymerization under ultraviolet radiance. 93 1. Microfluidic sensing of botulinum toxin 1. 1: Substrate-­‐Modified Hydrogels for Autonomous Sensing of Botulinum Neurotoxin Type A. In an effort to improve early BoNT/A detection, we have developed toxin-­‐
responsive hydrogel sensors. The responsiveness of the hydrogels relies on toxin enzymatic activity and is therefore specific, as BoNT/A has a substrate cleavage site unique to its type. The autonomous BoNT/A sensor was generated by housing toxin-­‐sensitive hydrogels within microfluidic channels, requiring less than 20 µl of contaminated fluid for visual output indicating the presence of BoNT/A. We reported peptide-­‐modified hydrogels for sensing enzymatic activity of BoNT/A which has been published as “Substrate-­‐Modified Hydrogels for Autonomous Sensing of Botulinum Neurotoxin Type A. Megan L. Frisk, William H. Tepp, Guangyun Lin, Eric A Johnson and David J. Beebe. 2007. Chem. Mater. 19, 5842-­‐5844.” 1. 2: Self-­‐Assembled Peptide Monolayers as a Toxin Sensing Mechanism within Arrayed Microchannels. A sensor for the lethal bacterial enzyme, botulinum neurotoxin type A (BoNT/A), was developed using self-­‐assembled monolayers (SAMs). SAMs consisting of an immobilized synthetic peptide that mimicked the toxin's in vivo SNAP-­‐25 protein substrate were formed on Au and interfaced with arrayed microfluidic channels. Efforts to optimize SAM composition and assay conditions for greatest reaction efficiency and sensitivity are described in detail in the published paper. Channel design provided facile fluid manipulation, sample incubation, analyze concentration, and fluorescence detection all within a single microfluidic channel, thus avoiding sample transfer and loss. Peptide SAMs were exposed to varying concentrations of BoNT/A or its catalytic light chain (ALC), resulting in enzymatic cleavage of the peptide substrate from the surface. Fluorescence detection was achieved down to 20 pg/mL ALC and 3 pg/mL BoNT/A in 3 h. Toxin sensing was also accomplished in vegetable soup, demonstrating practicality of the method. The modular design of this microfluidic SAM platform allows for extension to sensing other toxins that operate via enzymatic cleavage, such as the remaining BoNT serotypes B-­‐G, anthrax, and tetanus toxin. 1. 3: Bead-­‐based microfluidic toxin sensor integrating evaporative signal amplification We have devised a microfluidic platform that incorporates substrate-­‐laden silica beads for sensing the proteolytic activity of botulinum neurotoxin type A (BoNT/A)-­‐
one of the most poisonous substances known and a significant biological threat. The sensor relies on toxin-­‐mediated cleavage of a fluorophore-­‐tagged peptide substrate specific for only BoNT/A. Peptide immobilized on beads is recognized and cleaved by the toxin, releasing fluorescent fragments into solution that can be concentrated at an isolated port via evaporation and detected using microscopy. Evaporative concentration in combination with a specific channel geometry provides up to a 3-­‐fold signal amplification in 35 min, allowing for detection of low levels of fluorophore-­‐labeled peptide-­‐a task not easily accomplished using traditional channel designs. Our bead-­‐based microfluidic platform can sense BoNT/A down to 10 pg of toxin per mL buffer solution in 3.5 h and can be adapted to sensing other toxins that operate via enzymatic cleavage of a known substrate. 94 1. 4: Synaptotagmin II Peptide-­‐Bead Conjugated for Botulinum Toxin Enrichment and Detection in Microchannels. We report an enrichment platform for botulinum neurotoxin type B (BoNT/B) that has been realized through the fusion of bioconjugation chemistry and microfluidics. Micrometer-­‐sized magnetic beads were conjugated to a 22 mer peptide derived from the neuronal synaptotagmin II protein that is specific for BoNT/B heavy chain binding. Bead-­‐peptide conjugates were integrated into arrayed, polymeric microfluidic channels. Exposure to picogram quantities of the type B toxin produced visible signals using near-­‐infrared immunoflurescence. Our sensitive microscale approach require only 5 µl of adulterated sample without any preprocessing (dilution, centrifugation, filtering etc.) with a “hands-­‐on” time of only 1 hour. All assay steps-­‐from capture to detection-­‐ were performed directly I microchannels using passive pumping for fluid manipulation, thereby increasing through relative to existing detection methodologies and simplifying assay utility. 2.Design and optimization of tunable microlens and microlens arrays 2.1 To further improve performances of microfluidics and lab on chips in sensing of biological/chemical to electrical/optical signal transducing, we successfully developed polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) microlens arrays fabricated through liquid-­‐phase photopolymerization and molding. The gist of this fabrication process is to form liquid menisci of variable radii of curvature at an array of apertures through pneumatic control, followed by photopolymerization under ultraviolet radiance. 2.2 To provide a better sensing of biological/chemical to electrical/optical signal transducing in the horizontal direction, we extended our previous research of parallel liquid microlenses within microfluidics. In additional to the single tunable liquid microlens, we successfully demonstrated the formation and tuning of a microlens array in a single microchannel device. Development of Nontoxigenic Clostridium botulinum Toxins and Strains for Food Defense Studies PI: Eric A. Johnson, University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison October, 2009 – April, 2011 Clostridium botulinum produces the most poisonous toxin known and is a potential major biodefense threat in various food systems. To ensure defense measures against intentional foodborne and inhalational botulism, it is valuable to have non-­‐toxic surrogates of botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs) and strains of C. botulinum. The research objectives of this proposal was to generate such nontoxigenic botulinum neurotoxins and nontoxigenic C. botulinum strains as surrogates to replace their toxigenic counterparts for food defense studies and development of inactivation methods and countermeasures for the food industry and governmental agencies. We have constructed several isogenic C. botulinum strains that differ from the wild type strains in the single gene encoding BoNT. The physiological characteristics including growth and sporulation properties between the 95 nontoxigenic mutant strains and the wild type strains were compared and shown to be indistinguishable. The major target organism was C. botulinum strain 62A, a primary strain used in the standard food challenge cocktail and two high BoNT producer strains Hall A-­‐hyper and KyotoF. These latter two strains were used for expression and purification of type A1 and A2 botulinum neurotoxins in our laboratory. The modification of the strains was achieved using a recently developed gene inactivation system that permits inactivation of individual genes by insertion of the group II intron into the target genes. The atoxic mutant strain Hall A-­‐hyper/tox-­‐ was instrumental in the development of efficient expression system for purification of recombinant nontoxigenic BoNTs. The improved clostridial expression system provides the entire translational and post-­‐translational processing machinery and cellular environment required for fidelity of the expression, post-­‐translational modification and stability of the rBoNTs, and enables production of the rBoNTs in high quantity and quality. The construction of the nontoxigenic recombinant BoNT genes is based on available information on the BoNT crystal structure in order to generate holoproteins that structurally resemble their toxigenic counterparts except for the toxicity. The well-­‐
established purification protocols routinely performed in our laboratory were used for production and purification of these surrogate BoNTs. Our improved clostridial expression system can also be used for production and purification of rBoNTs for countermeasure development as well as modified rBoNTs can be produced for detailed structure-­‐function studies leading to development of novel pharmaceuticals. The availability of such nontoxigenic botulinum toxins and bacterial strains for food defense and food-­‐ processing studies will be beneficial with regard to cost and safety. This novel assay platform will significantly reduce the cost and labor involved in the food sample testing by eliminating the need for special facilities, personnel, and the use of mice. Usage of surrogate botulinum toxins and clostridial strains will greatly improve the environment and biosafety of the workers and facilitate analysis of large number of food samples and food processing conditions which will result in increased food safety and enhanced food defense. The strategy of molecular techniques applied for deletion of virulence gene sequences from the genome of this pathogen will have utility for manipulation of genomes of other pathogenic or solvent-­‐producing clostridia to generate strains with desired phenotypes. The NCFPD has been and will continue to be the ideal venue for development and assessment of these surrogate botulinum neurotoxins and nontoxigenic C. botulinum strains for enhancement of food biosecurity. These surrogates will be made available for study by industry, government and academic laboratories associated with NCFPD upon approval by the appropriate regulatory agencies. Stability of Botulinum Neurotoxin (BoNT) in Food Matrices PI: Eric Johnson, University of Wisconsin, Madison September, 2007 – May, 2010 96 Objectives. The primary goal of this project was to determine the stability of the Clostridium botulinum neurotoxin (BoNT) in various foods and when subjected to intrinsic and extrinsic environmental conditions. To accomplish this task, representative food items (raw and pasteurized milk, apple juice, lettuce and turkey) were exposed to various preparations of BoNT/A, including crude acid precipitate (acid mud), BoNT complex, and purified BoNT (150 kDa neurotoxin). Crude preparations of BoNT/B were also tested in certain experiments. Crude acid mud (prepared by precipitation of cultures at pH 3.4 by addition of sulfuric acid) was used predominantly as it is the most likely vehicle for terrorist action against the food supply due to its high stability compared to purified forms of BoNT. After inoculation with BoNT preparations, the foods were tested in different storage conditions to mimic potential handling of the food items by manufacturers and consumers. Additionally, purified BoNT/A toxin was tested using different buffer solutions and environmental conditions to determine the stability of acid mud and purified neurotoxin. Study One: Stability in Pasteurized Whole Milk. Analysis of the stability of crude BoNT Type A (BoNT/A) and Type B (BoNT/B) involved inoculating whole milk samples with the toxin and then comparing the stability to inoculated phosphate buffer solution (PBS) samples at 25 degrees and 4 degrees. These temperatures were selected as they represented ambient and refrigerated conditions. Outcomes: Crude BoNT/A was relatively stable at 25oC in whole milk compared to PBS at pH 5 and slightly more stable in whole milk than PBS at pH 7. At 4oC, there was no difference in stability between whole milk and PBS. In addition, crude BoNT/B followed a trend similar to crude BoNT/A. Study Two: To further determine the stability of crude toxin BoNT/A in foods, the crude extract was applied to apple juice, ground turkey and lettuce samples and the stability determined at three temperatures and various incubation times. Individual incubation conditions for each food type were selected to best represent potential storage conditions at the marketplace or by consumers, and room temperature treatments were chosen to represent mishandled food. Turkey samples tested after two days of incubation showed an appreciable loss of toxicity compared to the control in room temperature samples, and room temperature samples had one-­‐third of the toxicity of control samples. Lettuce samples inoculated with BoNT/A mud and incubated for two days demonstrated no appreciable loss of toxicity as room temperature compared to the control samples, 368,000 and 369,000 LD50s respectively. In pasteurized apple juice treated with BoNT/A crude mud, there was no loss of toxicity after two days of incubation. However, after incubation for one month, the samples incubated at room temperature lost close to 90% of their toxicity compared to the control, 4oC, and -­‐20oC. The results of this study show that the degree of purity of BoNT/A has a significant impact on the stability of BoNT/A and /B in foods and in buffers. The crude mud extract prepared by precipitation of BoNT by addition of mineral acid to pH 3.4 has remarkable stability in foods and buffers. In comparison, the BoNT/A complex and purified neurotoxin has considerably less stability. The high stability of the mud form, coupled with the simplicity 97 of the steps needed to produce acid mud support the view that it could be used as potential bioterrorism threat. Application of Surface Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy for Detection of Chemical and Biological Terror Agents in Food Matrices (Part 1) PI: Ted Labuza, University of Minnesota October, 2009 – April, 2011 Research objectives Develop Surface Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy (SERS) based immunoassays for detection of ovalbumin, a protein toxin surrogate, in milk within 20 min. Methods utilized SERS is a variant of Raman spectroscopy that exploits nanoscale optical phenomena. With some metallic nanostructures, the SERS signals can be enhanced more than millions of time. In this project, we used silver (Ag) dendrites as the nano-­‐enhancer. Two SERS based immunoassays were developed, 1) combined immunomagnetic separation (IMS) and SERS, 2) conjugated antibody onto the Ag dendrites for SERS measurement. Final results, end products and/or accomplishments Two methods, IMS-­‐SERS and Ag-­‐antibody SERS, were developed in the project. Compared with these two methods, both of them can be completed within 20 min if the antibody was conjugated onto the silver ahead of time. The limit of detection (LOD) of the IMS-­‐SERS method was 4 µg/mL. The LOD of the Ag-­‐antibody SERS method was 0.1 µg/mL in PBS and 5 µg/mL in the milk. There were some non-­‐specific binding when using the Ag-­‐antibody SERS method. In addition, the IMS-­‐SERS method was able to quantify the amount of antigen, while the Ag-­‐antibody SERS method can’t. For the cost, the IMS-­‐SERS method was more expensive because of the use of the commercial IMS kit. Two publications were produced from this project. He, L.; Haynes, C.L.; Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F.; Labuza, T.P*. 2011. Rapid detection of a foreign protein in milk using IMS-­‐SERS. J. Raman Spectrosc. In press. DOI: 10.1002/jrs.2880 He, L.; Rodda T.; Haynes, C.L.; Diez-­‐Gonzalez, F.; Labuza, T.P*. 2011. Detection of a foreign protein in milk using surface-­‐enhanced Raman spectroscopy coupled with antibody-­‐
modified silver dendrites. Anal. Chem. 83 (5), 1510–1513. We are also working with Thermo Fisher Scientific on the development of some application documents to show the advantage of Raman spectroscopy and SERS techniques. We have given two webinars for NCFPD and will have a poster presentation at the IFT meeting on June 13, 2011. 98 User needs and/or significance to food defense We have developed two rapid detection assays for protein toxins in milk within 20 min. While ovalbumin has no toxicity, its utilization as surrogate molecule provided the proof-­‐
of-­‐concept for using SERS in the detection of select agents such as ricin. We have also showed the possibility of using an advanced Raman instrument for automatic detection of multiple samples. Validation of Methods for Decontamination of Food Processing Equipment and Facilities PI: Alvin Lee, National Center for Food Safety and Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology September, 2007 – May, 2010 This investigation aims to provide a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of the effects of sterilants on Bacillus spores in simulated food processing environments. Both aqueous and gaseous systems will be investigated. Initially, spores from a number of Bacillus species, some genetically closely related to B. anthracis and others less-­‐closely related, will be exposed to various sterilizing regimens in order to identify suitable surrogate microorganisms for future scale-­‐up studies. Attenuated strains of B. anthracis (e.g., the Sterne strain) will be used once optimal conditions for inactivation have been identified. All techniques explored offer the promise of being relatively non-­‐invasive and hence may afford better protection to a sensitive food processing infrastructure (e.g., computer hardware and delicate processing equipment and facilities). This may present opportunities for use of moderate and less destructive options with respect to capital item salvage and remediation. Such technology may also have application outside of the food production environment, such as in isolation and treatment of other potential high impact areas such as office and postal equipment and facilities. This project was divided in to two parts, namely: (1) investigations into the formation of “biofilms” consisting of Bacillus spores (B. cereus ATCC 21281 (Bc), B. thuringiensis ATCC 33680 (Bt) and B. anthracis Sterne 34F2(Ba)) embedded in complex food matrices on different food contact surfaces and the ability of cleaning regimens to remove spores in food; and (2) investigations into the effects of liquid and gaseous/vaporized sanitizers (or sterilants) to inactivate spores on cleaned and non-­‐cleaned surfaces. All experiments were conducted with spores of B. cereus ATCC 21281, B. thuringiensis ATCC 33680 and B. anthracis Sterne 34F2. Two food matrices were examined – peanut butter and baked on sucrose Media: Nutrient Agar with 0.1% yeast extract and 5ppm manganese sulphate (NAYEMn) was used as sporulation medium. Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) was used for plate counts. Overnight cultures were grown in Tryptic Soy Broth (TSB). Serial dilutions were done in buffered peptone water (BPW). 99 Test Surfaces: Materials commonly used in the food industry were used as carrier were: Stainless steel coupon, Glazed Tile coupon, and Teflon. Results Food Matrix Effect: Food residues can inhibit sporicidal effects of chemical sanitizers on Bacillus spores. This was affirmed by the validation experiments conducted to determine the removal reduction of spores on coupons. Without a wash step, peanut butter would protect more spores from inactivation by hydrogen peroxide than sucrose. Only < 1 log reduction of Ba embedded in peanut butter was achieved using 15% H2O2 for 20 min. Whereas sucrose is more soluble and resulted in < 3 log reduction of Ba. Effectiveness of wash step and sanitizers: A 3-­‐4 log reduction of Ba spores was achieved during the detergent wash procedure. Less than 3 log spore reduction was achieved during the second steep COP exposure to sanitizers with the overall inactivation of each Ba spores between 5.2-­‐6.84 log cfu/ml for both peanut butter and sucrose. Calibration and validation of ozone delivery system A validation of the system was performed to calibrate the ozone concentrations, understand gas flow times, and the effect of ozone based upon the experimental design setup before the optimal conditions for ozone can be determined. The design of the ozone delivery system directly affects the overall inactivation of Bacillus spores when exposed to ozone. This is due to the amount of time required to reach the desired concentration and the nitrogen flush time of the system. The concentration in the anaerobic reaction tank can be calculated using the correlation equation of time (min) vs. concentration (%wt), and the amount of time to flush the system with nitrogen to remove ozone was standardized at 20min. These system requirements must be taken into account when performing experiments for determining ozone’s effect. For an 8%wt concentration, 45min for the ozone to flow through the system, 20min to flush the buffer tank with nitrogen and another 20min nitrogen flush of the system has established a 1.8 – 2.2 log reduction. Based upon the experimental design and setup of the system, the final optimal conditions and overall spore inactivation will be adjusted to include the log reduction that occurs from the required time and concentrations of the system. Integrating Microbial Target Capture with Flow Field Fractionation for Lab on a Chip Device for Food Matrices PI: Suresh D. Pillai, Texas A&M University Co-­‐PI: Ali Beskok, Old Dominion University September, 2007 – April, 2011 100 The possibility of deliberate contamination of vulnerable foods such as fruit juices and milk with infectious agents or their associated toxins is an unfortunate reality. For food defense purposes, there is a critical need to develop technologies that can rapidly and efficiently capture and concentrate bio-­‐threat agents (bacterial spores) from food matrices, thereby rendering them available for detection. As a part of this project we have designed a prototype continuous flow microfluidic system that separate the bacterial spores from milk and apple juice using flow field fractionation (FFF), and concentrate them at specific regions of the device using negative dielectrophoresis (DEP). We have successfully demonstrated that negative DEP could be exploited to concentrate bacterial spores in high conductivity liquids such as apple juice and milk. This is particularly significant because bacterial spores are often not as polarizable as the high conductivity media, thus, positive DEP becomes ineffective. We have developed and optimized a simple two-­‐dimensional micro electrode design that maximizes the negative DEP effects. We have also optimized antibody capture in well chambers that will enable the quantification of spore capture by negative dielectrophoresis. One key advantage of the technologies developed during this project is that they can be customized to any target pathogen(s) of interest. Also, these technologies can be used as stand-­‐alone or to improve concentration efficiency, in conjunction with other concentration technologies. Very importantly, these technologies can be integrated with current or future pathogen detection technologies such as biosensors and real-­‐time PCR assays. There is, however, a need for a commercial partner to develop a prototype based on the technologies developed in this project. The technologies that have been developed and tested during this project have the ability to enhance the capabilities of federal agencies and private entities to detect deliberate or accidental contamination in liquid food matrices. Protein Complementation Based Functional Detection Assay for Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B PI: Jody Proescher, The Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University October, 2009 – April, 2011 The aims of this project were to develop a functional detection assay for staphylococcal enterotoxin B using a protein complementation strategy, and to screen this assay for performance in the presence of food matrices. We were successful in setting up a luciferase assay using full-­‐length recombinant gaussia luciferase. We also worked on transecting the different constructs to proceed with testing complementation in the presence of SEB, but encountered problems with the stocks of 293 FT cells. We switched to the basic 293 cells (as they are easier to maintain), and transfection conditions were re-­‐optimized. Luciferase activity was observed from cells transfected with full-­‐length Gaussia luciferase (blue bars) upon addition of coelenterazine substrate, serving as a positive control for transfection and luminescence assay conditions. The individual split luciferase chimeric constructs when transfected alone (yellow and red bars), cotransfected (green bar), or 101 mixed after individual transfection (purple bars) showed no discernible luciferase activity over lysates from cells transfected without DNA independent of SEB concentration indicating the chimeric constructs are not complementing in the presence of SEB under these conditions. Due to the absence of complementation in this experiment we acquired new SEB stock and tested higher concentration SEB with original constructs. In order to test the new SEB stock and higher concentrations of SEB, transfections of the original constructs were performed in HEK 293 cells. Western blotting revealed poor expression of the TCRVB-­‐
hGluc construct both alone and when co-­‐transfected with the HLADRA-­‐hGluc construct. This was puzzling as previous transfections showed similar expression levels for the two constructs under the same conditions. A new clone of the TCRVB construct was amplified after transformation in DH10B cells but with no improvement in expression upon transfection in HEK293 cells. A fresh stock of HEK293 cells was brought up and transfected without improvement. HEK293FT cells had previously shown to give higher expression levels of both constructs so these cells were grown up again for transfection. Several attempts to transfect these cells were unsuccessful due to issues with adhesion during manipulation that could not be resolved by changes in experimental condition or advice from the source (Invitrogen). Due to time constraints no further optimization or alternate protocols could be evaluated. Thus the attempts to test the original constructs with higher levels of SEB and with new SEB stock were not successfully completed because adequate expression of both constructs could not be achieved. New constructs with longer (GGGGS)x3 linker were successfully cloned using a similar overlap extension protocol used to generate the initial constructs. The protocol included use of newly designed primers to insert the longer linkers. Unfortunately the new constructs could not be tested due to protein expression and cell line issues discussed above. Melamine-­‐Cyanuric Acid Detection System for Purposely Adulterated Foods PI: Lawrence Wackett, University of Minnesota Co-­‐PI: Michael Sadowsky, University of Minneosta October, 2009 -­‐ April 30, 2011 Research Aims The research proposed here is designed to develop new enzyme technology that can be used in a second generation test kit for detecting cyanuric acid, alone or in combination with melamine, in foods and food products. Melamine and cyanuric acid together are exquisitely nephrotoxic. This combination of chemicals will likely be an adulterant of choice to artificially increase apparent nitrogen content of foods, for future attacks on people, or for causing widespread and intentional economic disruption in the food 102 distribution system. The World Health Organization has called for a global effort to develop rapid testing methods for cyanuric acid. Methodology We have purified five different cyanuric acid hydrolases, three of them specifically for this project. Each enzyme was derived from a different bacterial strain, Pseudomonas, Acidovorax, Bradyrhizobium, Rhizobium, and Moorella. The genes encoding each of the enzymes has been cloned in E. coli and heterologously expressed with an N-­‐terminal polyhistidine tail. These enzymes have each been purified in a single step via Ni-­‐column chromatography. The purified proteins have been subjected to steady-­‐ state enzyme kinetic analysis and substrate specificity studies. Previously, no one had been successful in purifying a biuret hydrolase to homogeneity and obtaining an active enzyme. To this end, we took a bioinformatics approach. We then purified a biuret hydrolase. We conducted steady-­‐state kinetic experiments. We conducted 13C-­‐NMR experiments to show that we could measure cyanuric acid to allophanate and ammonia by the cobined action of cyanuric acid hydrolase and biuret hydrolase. Final Results, Accomplishments and Deliverables To determine which cyanuric acid hydrolases was best for our purposes, kinetic constants were determined for each. For comparative purposes, the AtzD from P. ADP and TrzD were also purified, and kinetic values determined. Stability studies with the P. ADP enzyme found that when the enzyme was frozen a substantial loss in activity was observed. Storage of the enzyme at 4°C resulted in stable activities for over a month. For this reason, all enzymes were stored at these new conditions and activity monitored throughout the study to ensure no loss of activity. The kcat from the P. ADP enzyme stored in this new fashion yielded a ten fold increase over previously published results (Fruchey, et al, 2002). The TrzD enzyme, on the other hand, had kcat values that were ten fold reduced from those previously published [Karns, 1999 ]. This could in part be due to differences in assay temperatures, though data from Li, et al. suggests that this may not be the sole reason [Li, 2009]. The kcat and Km values for the newly cloned cyanuric acid hydrolases are within an order of magnitude of each other. The kcat values ranged from 5-­‐73 s-­‐1 and the Km from 23-­‐130. Based on kinetic parameters and stability, the enzyme from Moorella was used for studies (Li, et al, 2009). We also filed a patent on this enzyme for use in potential test kit applications. Extraction and Concentration of Chemical (Tetramethylenedisulfotetramine) and Biological (Ricin) Toxins Using Molecular Imprinted Electrospun Fibers Coupled with Detection at Aptamer Modified Polymer Electrodes PI: Keith Warriner, University of Guelph September, 2007 – December, 2009 103 The main objective of the project was to fabricate imprinted electrospun fibers with affinity towards target toxins such as ricin. Electrospun fibers enable the fabrication of ultra-­‐thin membrane materials that possess a high surface area and mechanical strength. Because of the unique properties, electrspun fibers have found application in dressings, ultrathin fabrics and filtration matrices. In the research performed attempts were made to develop solid phase extraction matrices to enable concentration of target toxins from complex food matrices. Imprinting techniques were used to impart specificity to electrospun fibers against target toxins. Imprinting is a process whereby the polymer (or fiber in the present case) is impregnated with template molecules (target toxin or structural mimic) that is subsequently removed leaving voids with affinity towards the target. Baseline studies evaluated a range of polymer materials (polylactide, nylon-­‐6) to imprint proteins and amino acids (model templates). Through optimization of the electrospining process it was possible to introduce the template into the polymer melt and impregnate the templates into the formed fibers. Template release was achieved through submerging the fibers in alkali pH buffered solutions. When the binding of the target analyte to the imprinted fibers was assessed no significant differences were observed compared to non-­‐
imprinted controls. The lack of an imprinting effect was likely due to the flexibility of the polymers that is advantageous in forming nanofibers although a disadvantage for imprinting due to loss of affinity site integrity. An alternative approach was undertaken whereby imprinted beads were formed using methmethacrylate-­‐ a rigid polymer traditionally used for fabricating imprinted films. The formed imprinted beads were suspended in polymer melt and electrspun. Verification that the beads had been successfully imprinted was confirmed using FTIR. However, again the binding of the target was not significantly different compared to non-­‐imprinted controls. The lack of an imprinting effect was attributed to the beads retained in the electrospun fiber being inaccessible to the target. An alternative approach to imprinting was to immobilize affinity agents (aptamers) on the fiber surface. Here, thiol coupling was used to immobilize aptamers with affinity towards ricin B to nylon electrospun fibers. The resultant fibers were found to bind ricin to a significantly greater extent compared to non-­‐aptamer modified electrospun fibers although performance was inconsistent. Extraction of ricin and PCB's Using Functionalized Electrospun Fibers PI: Keith Warriner, University of Guelph Co-­‐PI: Nelly Mateeva, Florida A&M October, 2009 – April, 2011 Objectives The objective of the research was to develop technologies that could be applied in the field for extraction of lectins and PCB’s. In one approach, modified electrospun fibers were 104 fabricated with enhanced affinity for lectins (concanavalin A and ricin). The main benefits derived from electrospun fibers are the mechanical flexibility, high surface area and versatility compared to conventionally cast films. Simultaneous extraction and detection of PCB’s was achieved through binding to pentapeptides as artificial recognition elements. The binding event was reported by monitoring the change in fluorescence of conducting polymer films immobilized on the surface of paramagenetic beads to facilitate concentration of the target. Methods Lectin Binding Electrospun Fibers: Elecrospun fibers were prepared from Nylon 6 dissolved in formic acid and spun within a electrospining apperatus. A range of approaches were applied to enhance the affinity of the electropun fibres for lectins (concanavalin A and ricin). Specifically, fibers were impregnated with binding sugars or reactive groups formed by grafting chitosan polymer on the pre-­‐formed fibers. A further approach modified Nylon fibers with conducting polymers onto which antibodies were immobilized. Extraction of PCB’s with Pentapeptide Modified Beads: Pentapeptides with affinity towards PCB’s were covalently attached to polyanaline grafted onto paramagnetic nanobeads. The binding of PCB to the immobilized pentapeptides was monitored via fluorescence spectroscopy. Final Results and Accomplishments Lectin Binding Electrospun Fibers: Fibers impregnated with sugars (mannose and galactose) did not exhibit enhanced binding of lectins (Con A and ricin) compared to controls. However, chitosan modified fibers did support enhanced binding of the lectins although both specific and non-­‐specific interactions were noted. At pH <6 the lectin binding was non-­‐specific with ionic bonding being the main interaction. However, at pH>6 the lectin binding was specific and the bound target could be readily eluted with mannose solutions. Conducting polymer modified fibers were prepared and antibodies subsequently immobilized. However, there was strong non-­‐specific binding effects that were dominated by ionic interactions. Extraction of PCB’s with Pentapeptide Modified Beads: A selection of five pentapeptides were covalently immobilized onto polyaniline that was subsequently immobilized onto paramagnetic beads. Through using the optimized assay it was possible to simultaneously extract and detect a range of PCB’s using fluorescence as the transduction method. User Needs and significance to Food Defense Both ricin and PCB’s are of major concern in food defense due to the ease of acquisition and toxicity. The research performed has provided proof-­‐of-­‐principle of technologies that can be applied in the field to extract both targets from sample matrices thereby facilitating down-­‐stream detection. It can be anticipated that with further development the use of modified electrospun fibers and nanobeads will provide useful tools to the early detection of biohazards within the environment. 105 Identification and Characterization of Temperature and pH-­‐Dependent Virulent Genes in Y. pestis, Y. pseudotuberculosis and Y. enterocolitica PI: Teshome Yehualaeshet, Tuskegee University September, 2007 – December, 2010 Yersinia species are responsible for disease syndromes ranging from plague to gastroenteritis. Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of the plague and which evolved from Y. pseusotuberculosis, is of major concern as a potential bioweapon. Yersinia can be easily contaminated in overt or covert manner in the food chain. The objectives of the study were a) Optimize PCR compatible DNA extraction protocol from culture and inoculated food matrices. b) Identify and characterize temperature and pH-­‐dependent gene of Yersinia in milk and orange juice. c) Viability and growth of Yersinia at different temperature and pH settings. d) The role of milk background flora to modulate Yersinia growth. The methods used in the experiment were real time PCR, pulsed field gel electrophoresis and colony forming unit’s count. Fourteen virulence genes expression modulated by temperature and pH were examined by real-­‐time PCR assay. NotI, FseI and XbaI-­‐PFGE patterns were examined for all Yersinia strains. Adaptation of Yersinia to different temperature shifts and pH may be associated with significant phenotype variations such as changes in virulence, growth, nutrient requirements and enzyme activity. The gene expression and genomic profile results showed that the protocol can differentiate inter and intra Yersinia spp. Overall results revealed that Yersinia can survive and grow in commonly used standard food storage temperature and acidic environments. Finding from coculture of Yersinia and Lactobacillus casei indicated that inhibition of Yersinia growth in milk at 37 0C could be attributed to the background flora of the milk. Profound study of the interaction between the food matrix and the foodborne pathogen could give more knowledge on the growth and pathogenecity of Yersinia. In summary, the results retrieved could be translated to revise the existing practice in food processing, storage and handling, to address the possible risk spots and food matrices vulnerable to contamination, and to design specific detection package which can be adopted to food inspection directly from the food matrix. Because of similar evolutionary origin, the results extracted for Y. pseudotuberculosis will provide valuable information for Y. pestis. Based on the preliminary data and related experience, a total of eight new grant proposals were prepared, out of which three were funded and the rest are pending and non-­‐funded. As work-­‐study and summer student program about thirteen minority students were trained in the lab with related area of food safety. From the existing results, one publication is accepted, one is pending and one manuscript is in preparation. The College of Veterinary Medicine, Nursing and Allied Health incorporated food safety in the newly designed public health and PhD program (MPH/MPSC and One-­‐Medicine PhD). 106 Event Modeling Examining Food Risk in the Large Using a Complex, Networked System-­‐of-­‐Systems Approach PI: John Ambrosiano, Los Alamos National Laboratory October, 2009 – April, 2010 Characterizing the risks of intentional contamination in multi ingredient manufactured foods is challenging because those risks depend on two very different kinds of systems: (1) processing facilities, and (2) food distribution networks. Our principal aim is to integrate these within a system of systems (SoS) methodology, providing an alternative to traditional risk assessment and thereby allowing analysts to gauge the risk of food contamination in complex food networks using readily available, high level information. To orient our research to the real world, we adopted a model problem involving the manufacture of a snack cake product incorporating fluid milk, liquid eggs, and cocoa. We constructed simulation models for each of the food processing systems in the model problem based on systems dynamics. The main purpose of these simulations was to obtain contaminant distribution functions for products of two different unit sizes: one intended for immediate consumption, and another for use by other manufacturers. These simulation results provided two basic consequence “indicators”: the number of contaminated product units, and the average dose per unit, whose product is the total contaminant output. These correlate the output of facility contamination simulations with potential consequences. To represent distribution networks, we developed a high level aggregate distribution model resembling a Bayesian network, with conditional probabilities based on link probabilities in the distribution network. We developed this model as a two tier representation where the first is a high level aggregate network of actors standing for all manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers of a given commodity. The second tier provides the option to disaggregate each node into subcategories of nodes and links based on those having large versus small capacity. We applied these principles to characterize the distribution systems of the three commodities in the model problem. To incorporate vulnerability in the methodology, we developed a simplified model of facility vulnerability based on very general concepts related to food attack scenarios. We implemented this model as a Bayesian network and showed how it could be used to get simple vulnerability estimates for facility entry points by eliciting a few subjective probabilities. Finally we combined these elements in the context of the snack cake food system model. In the combined system of systems, the main indicator is obtained by multiplying numbers of contaminated units, average dose per unit, and distribution probability to yield the expected contamination. This measure, when applied to product contamination scenarios, can provide useful insights into the relative impact of different contaminated products. It also appears to be a useful indicator to propagate through the system, acting much like “dye placed in a stream..” Multiplying this indicator by vulnerability produces a “risk indicator” that can be used in much the same way. 107 As a result of this research, we have established a reasonable conceptual framework for characterizing aspects of risk, at a very general level, in large food production networks. We believe it would be possible to build computational tools based on this methodology for planners and educators to explore food production networks for areas of relatively greater risk. Conversion of the Academic CMS to a Web-­‐Enabled Version for Academic Use Sue Harlander, The Vista Institute (formerly BTSafety) September, 2007 – April, 2011 The objectives of the NCFPD-­‐funded project were to: 1) create illustrative intentional and unintentional food contamination scenarios based on actual proprietary data collected from farmers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, public health departments and local, state and federal agencies; 2) collect extensive information from the public domain on susceptible food products, agent and disease profiles, and public health implications, as well as proprietary data on food consumption patterns and demographics; and, 3) deliver the program utilizing the CitrixXenApp™, an on-­‐demand application delivery sys stem that enables any Windows application to be virtualized, managed, and instantly delivered to users anywhere on many different platforms including computer type, operating systems and handheld devices through FoodSHIELD, a familiar and readily accessible website that is capable of providing password protected, secure access to the site and tracking of users to facilitate obtaining feedback on Academic CMS performance and to resolve any technical issues. The Academic CMS was programmed in original programming code using Visual Basic 6 to operate on an IBM-­‐compatible PC running Microsoft Windows 2000 or later versions. To create illustrative scenarios of food contamination events, we collected actual sourcing, processing, and distribution data directly from food companies, distributors, retailers and foodservice outlets. All confidential data were anonymized and pooled to protect the identity of participating companies. Agent characteristics, disease onset and progression, public health system recognition and response, economic and public health impact and intervention impact data were obtained from extensive literature reviews, examination of prior foodborne illness outbreak investigations, and interviews with a variety of subject matter experts from academia, industry, and local, state and federal agencies including FDA, USDA, ERS and CDC. The Academic CMS database is populated with sourcing, processing, distribution and consumption data for the following foods: head lettuce, shredded lettuce, ready-­‐to-­‐eat meat (bologna), hamburger, fluid milk, imported frozen shrimp, infant formula, bottled water and chocolate bars. Over 25 major food manufacturers, distributors, retailers and foodservice outlets have contributed extensive data enabling the creation of 8 intentional and 3 unintentional food contamination events. Extensive literature reviews and subject matter expert interviews were conducted on 11 agents including pathogens unintentionally introduced into foods such as E. coli O157:H7 and Salmonella enteritidis, and bioterrorism agents intentionally introduced into foods such 108 as Clostridium botulinum toxin, arsenic trioxide, anthrax, potassium cyanide, fluoroacetic acid, Staphylococcus aureus enterotoxin B, and Yersinia pestis. Emergency room physicians and nurses, board certified toxicologists, clinicians, hospitalists, clinical laboratory personnel and public health officials were individually interviewed on their recognition and response to the variety of bioterrorism agents listed above to support the timing of public health responses to outbreaks. Thirteen public health departments were interviewed regarding their procedures for recognizing and managing foodborne illness outbreaks. The Academic CMS was released to the academic community following an NCFPD-­‐sponsored webinar on August 5, 2011. The “real world” food contamination events built into BTSafety’s Academic CMS software could be used by the academic community to train the future business leaders, food scientists, public health epidemiologists and medical practitioners who will be responsible for dealing with catastrophic food-­‐related events. Consumer Complaint Surveillance for Foodborne Illness Outbreak Detection in the United States PI: Craig Hedberg, University of Minnesota Octobers, 2009 – September, 2010 The goal of this study was to determine the use of consumer complaint surveillance for foodborne illnesses in the United States and examine ways to more effectively use incoming data. This was done through several objectives; 1) determine the percentage of local health departments in the U.S. have a complaint surveillance system, 2) describe the type of information gathered from complainants, 3) develop new methods that could prospectively analyze incoming surveillance data. Research Strategy The objectives for this study were carried out using two main strategies. The first was to conduct a survey of a representative sample of 500 local health departments in the U.S. An online survey was sent to sampled health departments to determine their use of a complaint based surveillance system and investigation practices for foodborne outbreaks. The second strategy was to develop methods for analyzing incoming surveillance data. Data from the Minnesota Department of Health’s (MDH) complaint surveillance system was used to create a cumulative sum algorithm to detect cluster of illness. This algorithm flagged weeks with unusually high amounts of complaint calls that could indicate potential outbreaks. Results Eighty-­‐one percent of local health departments in the U.S. use a complaint surveillance system. Complaint rates and outbreak rates were found to be associated with a pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.38 (p=0.0004). Agencies without an electronic database appeared to show a higher correlation between outbreak rates and complaint rates with a correlation coefficient of 0.411 (p=.005). For health department serving a population 109 greater than 250,000 the median outbreaks per 1,000 complaint was higher for those with an electronic database than those without, 39 versus 20 respectively, however this was only border line significant (p=0.10). Those that collected a food history also had a higher correlation, 0.564 (p<0.001). A cusum algorithm has the ability to detect flag potential outbreak weeks in incoming surveillance data. Sensitivity and specificity for the detection algorithm were 26% and 81% when looking at all outbreaks. When focusing only on norovirus outbreaks the sensitivity and specificity were 63% and 84%. Relevance Complaint based surveillance systems are widely used in the United States and can provide a rich source of data for outbreak detection. Data suggest that use of an electronic database could lead to increase detection of outbreaks. Better use of incoming data from complaint surveillance systems could lead to the detection of more outbreaks. The use of automatic algorithms with jurisdictions that already have an electronic database could also provide a method to more effectively use incoming data. Vulnerability Assessment and Reduction of Economic Impact for the Fruit and Vegetable Industry: A Food Defense Assessment for Border Communities in the Southwest United States PI: William Nganje, Arizona State University September, 2007 – May, 2010 The farm value of fresh fruits and vegetables is approaching $36 billion dollars in 2007 (NFAPP, 2007). This figure is expected to reach $40 billion by 2016. Fruit and vegetables comprise a large group of food products that are imported on a regular basis throughout the year. Twenty percent of all fruits and almost twenty-­‐five percent of all vegetables are imported annually. Most work on biological security to date has not considered the intricate supply-­‐chain structures of produce logistics associated with crossing the U.S. border. Although the United States has initiated several private and public efforts to mitigate the risk of an agro-­‐terrorism attack on the U.S. food supply, imported foods are increasingly becoming the weakest link. In recent years there have been several food recall incidences in the U.S. that originated from non-­‐domestic sources. The economies of several local communities along the U.S. border such as Nogales, Arizona, rely on trade and food imports. For example, the Port of Entry (POE) at Nogales, Arizona processes almost 50% of the United States fresh produce trade during the winter season (October-­‐May). Approximately 300,000 trucks pass through the Nogales POE from Mexico during the year. This is an average of over 1,400 trucks per day during the winter season, of which 900 contain produce. The value of the fruit and vegetable shipments through the Nogales, Arizona POE is estimated at over $2 billion annually, which accounts for over 4 billion pounds of fresh product. A terrorist attack on the fruit and vegetable industry in Arizona would create widespread losses to this community as well as the entire fruit and vegetable sector. 110 The primary goal of this project is to develop vulnerability assessment tools that may help in mitigating the economic impact of security threats on border communities and the US fruit and vegetable industry. This was accomplished by administering a vulnerability survey instrument to participants along the U.S. Mexico fresh produce supply chain in collaboration with Caades, a Mexican parent cooperative association with more than 1,500 growers. The survey enabled us to collect pertinent data related to cost, food safety/defense risk, and psychological information on intention to deliberately contaminate food. Threat point analysis, intelligent sampling methods and dynamic market equilibrium models, that account for short-­‐term and long term economic impacts, were used to identify food vulnerability gaps and evaluate existing and potential practices in order to identify how such gaps might be bridged. The project also enabled us to develop empirical methods and a framework to estimate cost and benefits of rapid response targeted traceability methods to contain and minimize economic impacts of food terrorist attacks on the fruit and vegetable industry. The analysis was extended to evaluate incentives of alternative food defense risk mitigation strategies, including the implementation of intelligent technologies and smart boxes. Some of the main findings include: •
American consumers continually demand more fresh produce throughout the year, in particular during non productive US seasons. Consumer demand escalates food imports and requires delivering more tonnage through the current US Ports of Entry (POE) particularly the Nogales, AZ. POE. Fresh produce is perishable which causes the food supply chain to move increased volumes of product with ever increasing velocity because consumers demand prime produce. Elevation of produce velocity magnifies the threat from intentional (agro-­‐terrorism or food defense) or unintentional food contamination (food safety). •
Overall threat/vulnerability survey results indicate that all survey participants along the U.S.-­‐Mexico supply chain implement some components of the custom, trade partnership against terrorism (C-­‐TPAT) and free and secure trade (FAST), programs required to improve food defense security measures. However, most participants are not fully C-­‐TPAT/FAST certified. One possible reason is that C-­‐
TPAT/FAST have unintended consequences to attract drug traffickers. •
Without complete security measures there is some likelihood for a food defense attack. Truckers constitute the greatest vulnerability to not implementing components of C-­‐TPAT/FAST with 50.6 percent variability within the system. This is followed by growers/packers with 29 percent variability, and distributors have the lowest vulnerability with 19 percent variability. •
As a way of understanding the potential antecedents of intentional acts of food contamination, a framework that employs tenets of Ajzen’s (1985) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) was utilized to assess employees’ attitudes about committing such acts. In a sample of 403 employees from various links along the fruit and vegetable industry supply chain between Mexico and the United States, we 111 found industry commitment and moral norm to be antecedents to attitudes toward intentional food contamination. We also found that both perceived behavioral controls (i.e., security measures) and attitude toward intentional food contamination to be positively related to intention to contaminate food. •
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses alternative forms of intelligent and risk based technologies to screen information on 100% of the cargo before it is loaded onto vessels bound for the U.S. At the Port-­‐of-­‐Entry (POE) CBP inspectors work with specialized x-­‐ray machines and gamma-­‐imaging systems to determine anomalies associated with the cargo listed on the manifest (Agriculture Protection Program, 2008). The inspection is intended to target not only the safety of the produce but to detect any activities related to narcotics, fire arms, and/or human trafficking. However, CBP officers inspect 100% of the high risk shipments with a sample size of 2% of the boxes of non-­‐NARP (high risk) commodities in the shipments (United States Department of Agriculture, 2009). The results show that in order to appropriately mitigate food safety and defense risks, approach rates (sample sizes) for may vary from approximately 24% for peppers, 44% for watermelons, and 44.27% for tomatoes. These are significantly higher compared to current rates currently inspected. Increasing the sample size to 44% ; as indicated in our Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence Prevention Models; for multiple risks (food safety/defense, drugs, firearms, human trafficking, etc.) may be unrealistic because of resource limitations. The sample amount (number of boxes sampled) may be increased for smaller shipments, for a shipper or commodity that has a limited background history, or for a first time shipper, and, likewise may be decreased for large shipments following the Hypergeometric risk based sampling procedures but this may not resolve a significant portion of the threats or vulnerabilities along an international food supply chain. •
Intelligent systems could alleviate some of these challenges and improve the safety of imported foods. Science-­‐based intelligent inspection systems have been used in a variety of fields in engineering and manufacturing. The general idea is to develop highly adaptive inspection methodologies, which over time can incorporate on-­‐line sensors (e.g., COOLTRAX; http://www.cooltrax.com). With COOLTRAX real time “journey based” data on temperature, vibration and geographical position are recorded every 15 minutes or less directly to an internet data base that can be accessed by multiple entities and agencies. •
Issues related to information sharing, incentives to overcome hysteresis and free rider problems should be addressed to facilitate private sector investments in food defense measures along the international supply chain. Optimized Detection of Intentional Contamination Using Simulation Modeling PI: Donald Schaffner, Rutgers University 112 Co-­‐PI: Craig Hedberg, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – May, 2010 The goal of this project was to develop a computer simulation model which allows the user to specify the container size, contamination prevalence, agent concentration and agent distribution. The propotype model can be used to address differing sampling requirements for agents able to cause illness at very low doses (e.g., E. coli O157:H7), as well as agents where higher doses are required (e.g. ., F. tularensis). The simulation has a user-­‐friendly interface so that it can by used by non-­‐experts to study the influence of different factors. The computer model still requires evaluation using a variety of scenarios with specific agents and matrices to determine which variables are more important in the design of tests for agents used in intentional contamination events. The project built on the existing collaboration between the PI, the co-­‐investigator and consultant developed during their NCFPD funded project on modeling the response of the public health system to deliberate contamination events. The project used the risk modeling software platform Analytica (Lumina Decision Systems, Los Gatos, CA) to develop the user-­‐friendly simulation model. Aspects relating to the modeling of the effectiveness of sampling plans have been work out, at least in part for the recent FAO-­‐WHO Enterobacter sakazakii report (FAO-­‐WHO 2006). Specific design elements included the cost per sample tested, and output of the total cost of a given sampling protocol. Some microbial testing procedures involve both “presumptive” and “confirmatory” tests, each with their own techniques, costs and sensitivities. While addressing such two stage microbial testing may introduce a level of complexity into the simulation that is prohibitive, the project has been designed in such a way that this complexity can be added at a later point. Other important aspects of the project included regular teleconferences for the project participants. Future iterations of the project will include travel to visit with academic researchers developing diagnostic tests, as well industry and government scientists using these tests. Future iterations of the prject will also include a prioritized list of food/agent combinations to be evaluated. Special consideration will be given to including food/agent pairs that are already part of the CMS software as well. A prototype model has been developed. A number of personal and professional conflicts have prevented additional progress, but these are now resolved and work is progressing. We anticipate that the final computer model will be widely disseminated and adopted in the food industry and by government regulators as an aid to risk management and decision-­‐making. We also anticipate that the final computer model will be disseminated amongst academic researchers and used to guide research on diagnostic tests with appropriate levels of sensitivity and specificity. 113 Risk and Crisis Communication Assessing Lessons Learned from Food Recall Case Studies PI: Dale C. Brandenburg, Wayne State University September, 2007 – April, 2011 The goal of this case study research was to understand the “lessons learned” process as it may be applied to the context of risk communication in food recalls. We postulated some assumptions and a formative portrayal of the major variables associated with that process. The effort was focused on the long term effects, called deployment of lessons learned, that are linked to a learning event or series of learning events. The process from the learning event to subsequent actions is termed the lessons learned process. We drill down our understanding of this process to apply the lessons learned process to food recalls and then to food safety and defense. Our Fundamental Research Question is: What factors most influence the successful implementation of risk communication lessons learned from a food recall? Our two cases were drawn from notable examples -­‐ cases where individuals would have ready knowledge because many public and private organizations had a role to play in their resolution. Specifically these were the tomato / green pepper recall of 2008 and the peanut paste case of 2009. We conducted 18 in-­‐depth interviews in order to develop a detailed understanding of how the lessons learned process is practiced with food recalls. In collating the findings across both case studies, we developed the following conclusions: •
Work experience made a difference in the success of subsequently applying lessons learned, especially in cases where recalls of major proportions were involved. However, this was limited in many organizations due to internal constraints. •
Size of organization matters -­‐ large organizations have the capabilities to better respond to food recalls than smaller organizations. Nearly all individuals interviewed in each case study cited large organizations as being the most effective in absorbing lessons learned from food crises. •
The lessons learned process evolving from the interviews tended to be based substantially on an informal process that had few rules and even fewer guidelines. Our model, on the other hand states that in order for learning to be successful, it needs to be formalized and supported by key individuals who fully participate in the process. •
A formal measurement process to understand the causes and prevention of further recalls appeared to be lacking in most organizations. •
Being involved in a recall appears to promote increased coordination across organizations. But we have no evidence to indicate whether or not this is short-­‐term or long-­‐term. 114 •
The concept of food defense is a relatively foreign notion to the participants interviewed for this study. From our limited sample we are concerned about the lack of food defense mechanisms across organizations in the US food supply chain. Guidelines need to be produced that are robust with regard to food defense at least to the level that they are currently with food safety. The Risk Communication Message: A Case Study Approach PI: Paul Devito, Saint Joseph’s University September, 2007 – May, 2008 We developed a robust, interactive web-­‐based asynchronous training module and training support materials that is capable of reaching a public audience. The module expands on our existing general awareness course on food defense risk communication that was recently completed for the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) in 2006-­‐07 The primary component of the project was to develop a web-­‐based module, which would be an expansion of our existing general awareness course on food defense risk communication that was developed for the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) in 2007. The overall objective of this new course is to provide the learner with competencies to develop an effective risk communication strategy related to a food incident and based on the Ten Best Practices of Effective Risk Communication developed by the NCFPD PI Tim Sellnow, University of Kentucky (formerly North Dakota State University). The course provides interactivity by incorporating the New Zealand Foot and Mouth Disease hoax that occurred in 2005. The case study was based on the research conducted by NCFPD graduate student Kathleen Vidoloff, North Dakota State University and investigator Steven Venette, University of Southern Mississippi. The online training module entitled “The Ten Best Practices of Risk Communication” is posted on the NCFPD Risk Communication page. This course is applicable to anyone involved in food industry or any agency (local, state, and federal level) that interfaces with the food industry. While the Early Responders Distance Learning Center (ERDLC ) focuses on food defense, the objectives and content could also be tailored to specific companies, organizations, or even other types of events (such as natural disasters). Risk Communication Team Leadership and Administration: Trainer Development, Emergency Response and Stakeholder Relations PI: Will Hueston, University of Minnesota Project Manager: Lisa Brienzo, University of Minnesota 115 September, 2007 – May, 2009 Team leadership During the project period, the Risk Communication Theme continued to function as an operational team with monthly theme conference calls and webinars to present project research and hold communication briefings addressing current large-­‐scale outbreaks and recalls. These briefings included presentations from Subject Matter Experts highlighting technical aspects of the current large-­‐scale outbreaks (public health surveillance, industry response, communication challenges). In addition, annual theme meetings were held in October 2007 and May 2008 to discuss project research and foster collaboration among investigators. These conference calls and on-­‐site meetings served as models for the other NCFPD research themes (Agent Behavior, Event Modeling, Systems Strategies). Risk Communication Trainer Development Risk Communicator training modules continued to be utilized by IFIC’s Food Safety Communicators Forum members and FDA’s Joint Institute for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (JIFSAN) as well as other IFIC website users. In 2008, the National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense adapted the NCFPD training materials for animal agriculture communicator training. Also in 2008, Steven Venette, University of Southern Mississippi and Monique Turner, University of Maryland updated the 2006 NCFPD Risk Communicator Training Modules by injecting additional and updated research references. A Trainers Training for Risk Communication Theme members was held in October 2008 at the IFIC office in Washington. The focus of the training was interactive exercises for risk communicator training. Resources from this training were used in regional Extension Disaster Education Network (EDEN) conferences in 2010 and the University of Minnesota’s Public Health Institute’s “Introduction to Risk Communication” graduate course. Emergency Response The NCFPD Center Emergency Response Plan (CERP) was completed in October, 2010. The CERP includes a significant crisis communication component utilizing NCFPD subject matter experts (investigators) and communication specialists for the development of Just in Time (JIT) webinar briefings which can be developed and presented within four hours of activation of the response plan. The JIT is a 20-­‐minute webinar presented in three parts: 1) technical summary of an event based in consultation with subject matter experts and key government and food system stakeholders (10 min), 2) review of risk communication best practices and key messages (5 min), and 3) summary of media pointers and anticipated interview questions (5 min). Stakeholder Relations Industry communicators and federal agency staff participated in the Risk Communication Theme meeting, October, 2007, Washington. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an opportunity for stakeholder input into preliminary research plans for the 2007-­‐2009 Risk 116 Communication projects. Upon request from the Cross Species Communicator Group, NCFPD co-­‐hosted a meeting to address Foot and Mouth Disease communication research in September, 2008. Representatives from National Pork Board, National Cattlemen’s Beef Association, Dairy Management, Inc., Fleishman-­‐Hillard, and Weber Shandwick attended the meeting. FAZD also participated via conference call. Assessing Message Effectiveness with Diverse Cultural Groups Based on Learning Styles PI: Robert Littlefield, North Dakota State University September, 2007 – December, 2009 The goal of our message testing/learning styles research project was to determine if there is a correlation between the learning styles of the receptivity of audience members to particular risk messages. Our findings suggest that learning styles influence and reflect how people respond to risk messages. For example, participants whose learning style indicated a preference for reflective observation were not persuaded by any of the communication strategies used in the prototype message developed for testing in 2008/09. However, all participants were affected by the strategies reflecting concrete experience. In other words, seeing someone actually experience the crisis was persuasive to all. Current sociological studies suggest similar findings; prompting that risk and crisis messages may be most compelling if they employ a communication strategy appealing to individuals of all learning styles. In our related project exploring the attribution of blame for intentional bioterrorism or contamination completed by Dr. Maureen Turner, University of Maryland, we found that Americans blame the company more when the attribution was personal. The Asians blamed the company more when the attribution was situational. Specific observations follow: Observation: Asians tend to blame the company for having to let go of an employee that caused this problem going (in their perception). Hence message to this audience must emphasize that company has done everything in its power to be fair to employee. Americans tend to blame company more when the attribution was personal. This may stem from holding the company responsible for letting an unfit employee work with critical items such as food. Message to this audience must emphasize that specific security measures will ensure this doesn’t happen again. Blaming the perpetrator: For Asian participants, the Caucasian perpetrator was more ‘deranged’ than the Asian perpetrator. The Americans also thought the Caucasian was only slightly more disturbed than the Asian. Observation: Asians tend to see ingroup-­‐outgroup distinctions more clearly and are more willing to excuse the crime when the perpetrator is one of their own. A message to them can benefit from highlighting any ‘Asian’ connection. 117 Trusting the company -­‐ Process and Product related trust: Asians didn’t show much difference between the attributions. However Americans trusted the product significantly more if the event was described as situational. In general, for process related trust, the Asians felt about the same level of trust no matter what the attribution. The Americans, however trusted the company more when the attribution was situational. Observation: A message to the Americans could focus on how a particular negative incident was ‘situational’ or caused by a host of factors that snowballed into larger incident. Negative Affect: For Americans, concern for self and family was high when Caucasian contaminated potpies. For Asians, this concern was highest when Asian contaminated potpies and lowest when Asian contaminated dumplings. Observation: Both groups seem to be anxious about one of their own contaminating a food source. The difference is that the Americans were more concerned for self and family when their own food was contaminated while the Asians were more anxious when potpies were contaminated. This could display a concern for saving ingroup face. Messages should therefore address this concern. The value of the research we produced will be measured by its useful to those responsible for developing and presenting risk messages in times of national emergency due to intentional contamination of the food supply. Providing quality findings to members of the translational research team to produce instructional materials remains as a priority goal for the future. Perceived Communication Needs of American Indians during Events of Catastrophic Intentional Food Contamination PI: Robert Littlefield, North Dakota State University Co-­‐PI: Kimberly J. Cowden, University of North Dakota October, 2009 – September, 2010 This study explored the perceptions of Northern Plains American Indian groups about the threat of a catastrophic intentional food contamination (Carfono, 2003). Previous studies have suggested that when such an event occurs, vulnerable populations, such as American Indian groups, are more likely to suffer consequences (Fullerton et al., 2003). In order to minimize such negative consequences, risk and crisis communication scholars have advocated the pre-­‐-­‐-­‐planning of communication processes (Coombs, 1999; Heath, 1998; Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 1998), and the adoption of a culturally-­‐-­‐-­‐centered manner (Sellnow et al., 2009). The findings of 16 talking circle focus groups were reported and analyzed. Ten questions were asked (appendix A) and topics were identified to make comparisons between elder and non-­‐-­‐-­‐elder groups. Due to the similarity of the topics introduced by the two groups, the data were combined in the discussion to answer the research questions. Following are a list of findings and recommendations that are discussed in more detail in the results section of this report. 118 1. The findings strongly affirm the fact that Northern Plains American Indians are concerned about food safety and defense. From the data, participants were able to identify current food contamination incidents such as the salmonella in peanut butter and the hamburger recall, and they raised concerns about terrorism and bioterrorism, specifically, racially motivated acts of terrorism. Additionally, participants noted a desire to know who did the act so that there could be retribution. 2. There is a need for a consistent and culturally competent definition of catastrophe. Current definitions and subsequent catastrophic models do not consider smaller communities with the quantitative definitions of mortality and economic loss. 3. During events of intentional catastrophic food contamination, Northern Plains Indian groups preferred learning about the event(s) locally and would then seek trusted information regionally and nationally. Participants noted a desire for communication between tribal councils and constituents on a continual basis, not just when crises occur. 4. Two communities specifically mentioned the at-­‐-­‐-­‐risk cultural food sources of bison and wild rice. Risk assessments for these food types could be warranted and preparedness plans developed for contamination events. 5. Participants noted a desire for their communities to pre-­‐-­‐-­‐plan for intentional catastrophic events. Because of storytelling tradition of Native peoples, culturally appropriate tabletop exercises, rather than trainings, are recommended for Native peoples. Food Industry Challenges to "Best Practices" Risk Communication PI: Jennifer McEntire, Institute of Food Technologists October, 2009 – September, 2010 Effective food safety and food defense risk communication helps to inform consumers without causing panic and alarm. The Risk Communication team of the National Center for Food Defense and Protection has a list of 11 best practices recommended for effective risk communication. These practices, designed for a food defense crisis, are currently applied to food safety issues. Food system stakeholders from the food industry and regulatory communities are at the forefront of communication during these events. IFT examined the utility of these best practices and the limitations on their use during food safety and food defense crises. It was hypothesized that legal and business considerations as well as the nature of the event, whether food defense or food safety, would determine the implementation of the best practices by stakeholders. 119 Through the use of focus group meetings, it was discovered that there was a low level of awareness of the best practices. However, stakeholders practiced some aspects of the recommended practices. Most participants felt that the best practices were general enough to apply to both food safety and food defense situations, but acknowledged that their own communications would likely differ, with the expectation that a food defense emergency would warrant more rapid communications. They also agreed that a food defense event will increase the urgency of the communication and include players not typically involved in food safety issues. The challenges reported by the stakeholders varied, but legal liability, as well as the impact their communications could have on an industry, were often cited. From the government perspective, their need to act within their authorities drove some of their actions with respect to communication. Independent scientists overwhelmingly were concerned about disseminating the “right” information. When contacted, academics felt an obligation to address the media and provide whatever information they could. They were very willing to say “I don’t know” or provide a referral to a more qualified expert. Understanding the participants desire to communicate more quickly, while recognizing the increased number of hurdles (or perhaps hurdles that are different than those encountered during communication of food safety issues) is an important area to develop recommendations around. Trade associations exist to serve their members. They must be careful to protect the industry they represent. The role of any government agency, state or local, during a crisis is dictated by the laws that give that agency authority. Not only must the government operate within the boundaries of its jurisdiction, it must remain sensitive to the damage that can be inflicted on industry while being protective of public health. The state government representative noted that there is sensitivity around damaging industries important to the economy of the state, similar to what some extension professors reported. Social Media Constraints and Opportunities Case Studies and Industry White Paper Project PI: Michael J. Palenchar, University of Tennessee Co-­‐PI: Shari Veil, University of Kentucky October, 2009 – April, 2011 The dawn of the 21st century has seen the emergence of several themes that require the immediate attention and critical analysis of risk and crisis communicators: (1) Increasingly complicated world; (2) Technological advances have transformed how risk bearers (and hopefully professional communicators and managers) view, interact with, create and disseminate information, and engage in dialogue within affected communities in a crisis situation; and (3) Push for transparency, government and major organization intervention, and citizen-­‐centric government. With that in mind, the overall objective of the various research projects within this grant is How can we make the most effective use of new 120 communication technologies in response to risk, crisis, issues, and incidents facing stakeholders during a food defense or safety event? The research design is hybrid of quantitative descriptive and statistical analysis with qualitative in-­‐depth interviews analyzed from a narrative and rhetorical orientation. This combination of research in applied situations offers a unique and rich numeric and textual analysis of case studies and for industry white papers. This combined approach allows us to meet the demands of the specified objectives both statistically, but also within applicable and useful context for key stakeholders. Additional research methodologies included several case studies, an exhaustive literature review of best practices related to social media and risk communication, as well as an experiment testing message affects via social media related to food safety. End results include an exhaustive literature review that demonstrates how social media can be incorporated into current NCFPD-­‐developed best risk communication practices, the importance of understanding how information is being shared as opposed to just how much, and the interaction of source credibility and reliability within persuasive food safety message construction. End products included numerous local, regional, national and international conference presentations and papers, a podcast and PowerPoint educational tool available on the NCFPD web site, a book chapter, one published peer-­‐
reviewed journal piece and another under consideration. The recommendations provided here incorporate social media tools in risk and crisis communication. As channels of communication are becoming more diffused, reaching the public through their preferred media is essential (Guth & Alloway, 2008). Therefore, crisis communicators must excel in engaging both traditional and social media (Rand & Rodriguez, 2007). This project demonstrated how crisis communication practitioners can embrace social media tools to better manage a risk or crisis. After all, as Johnson (2009) suggests, the philosophy that social media and crisis communications are two separate segments of a communication practitioner’s career simply ‘doesn’t work anymore’ (p. 23). At the end of the day it’s about balancing social media interaction and the organizations’ desire for information control in order to most effectively communicate with stakeholders and publics. Used thoughtfully, social media, can improve risk and crisis communication efforts. Modeling the Foodborne Event PI: Matt Seeger, Wayne State University Co-­‐PI: Julie Novak, Wayne State University September, 2007 – May, 2008 This project intended to construct a broader, integrated understanding of foodborne illness outbreak events. In this way, the dynamics of a food event and the food system may be more fully understood. The overall goals of this project, then, are to provide an overall taxonomy that would assist researchers and practitioners in more fully understanding the range of foodborne event types and their associated impacts. This taxonomy is constructed around a set of interrelated factors of variables that have been judged to be important to the development of a foodborne illness outbreak. 121 We approached the problems of developing a foodborne event typology from two perspectives. First, qualitative analysis of robust case studies of foodborne events served as the data base for comparing and contrasting foodborne outbreaks. The researchers identified emergent and salient features from these specifically foodborne events. Second, this initial list of factors was then tested with an expert panel. A panel of eight participants with experience in foodborne events rated the factors on a five point scale from “Very Important” to “Not at all important.” We also solicited open-­‐ended comments on the importance of the factors and asked the panel to identify places where these factors interacted. The qualitative review of foodborne episodes identified the following eight factors: •
Commodity group (e.g., dairy, poultry, produce, etc.) •
Regulatory/governmental agency •
Specific product •
Specific company •
Geographic distribution (contaminant/outbreak spread) •
Intentionality of contamination •
Mortality and morbidity •
Contaminant. Based on our field experience, we added state where the outbreak occurred and retail outlet as factors for review by the expert panel. The taxonomy allows a macro view of a foodborne illness outbreak. By approaching and conceptualizing an outbreak as a unique event comprised of known variables and interactions among these variables, we can frame and understand any particular crisis more quickly. In this way, the dynamics of a food event and the food system may be more fully understood. Knowledge about the variables and previous experience related to the variables provide an appreciation of vulnerabilities and opportunity for meaningful intervention. Therefore, this overall will assist researchers and practitioners in more fully understanding the range of foodborne event types and their associated impacts. Modeling the Recall and Warning Process in the Foodborne Event: The Recall as Risk/Crisis Communication PI: Matt Seeger, Wayne State University 122 September, 2007 – May, 2008 This project examined the risk communication processes associated with the food recall and modeled the overall recall process. The goal and objectives were to propose a visual model of the food recall event in order to illuminate the critical points at which governments and organizations could act to make risk assessment/management decisions and similarly act to communicate with any one of their publics during a foodborne crisis, including one of catastrophic proportions. In the case of catastrophic event, the warning and recall is essentially the only method to reduce the public’s exposure. If done effectively, early, and distributed appropriately, the official recall and warning have the potential to contain and limit a significant proportion of the threat to public health. This project drew on existing models of emergency warning and mass communication systems and data specific to foodborne outbreaks and crises from variety of sources, including FSIS, USDA, CDC and Center for Science and the Public Interest. This information contributed to 1) the development of a model of the food system recall and warning process; 2) a description of the elements that contribute to a more effective recall (reach, credibility, action); and 3) the identification of strategies for improving the warning process. The model along with the its description and suggestions for intervention during a food system crisis, including catastrophic food system crises, has already been shared by the researchers with the Centers for Disease Control in their current work of preparing response strategies for catastrophic events. The model and the suggested points of intervention will be helpful for risk/crisis communicators and issue managers in the food industry. Similarly, risk/crisis communication officials in governmental organizations such as the CDC and state and local public health agencies will find the model helpful when making risk assessment/management decisions and implementing response strategies for public health safety during an unfolding crisis, including catastrophic crises involving the food supply system. Advancing the Robust Case Study PI: Timothy Sellnow, University of Kentucky September, 2007 -­‐ April, 2011 Research objectives: The first objective was to enhance understanding of the media filtering process. The second objective was to provide a just in time service to afflicted agencies and organizations regarding media coverage of key messages. 123 Methods utilized: The University of Kentucky Digital Content Analysis Laboratory was used to constantly monitor the 26 most watched television stations in the United States. Once a H1N1 crisis began, all television coverage was captured for analysis. We engaged in an ongoing content analysis of this data based on the news releases provided by the CDC, National Pork Board and other agencies. Final results, end products and/or accomplishments Our results were shared with practitioners on numerous occasions. The formal presentations include: Vidoloff, K. G., & Sellnow, T. L. Collaboration and competence within Public Health: Preliminary findings from the 2009 H1N1 emergency risk communication response. Preconference on Communicating Science in Routine, Recreational, Controversial, and Crisis Contest: Theory, Research, Funding. National Communication Association, San Francisco, CA, November 14-­‐17, 2010. Sellnow, T. L., & Veil, S. R. Best practices in risk communication: Addressing Challenges for food safety and defense. International Dairy Show, Dallas, TX, September 15, 2010. Sellnow, T. L. & Vidoloff, K. G. The 11 best practices of risk communication. Institute of Food Technologists annual meeting and food expo, Chicago, IL, July 17-­‐20. Palenchar, M. & Sellnow, T. L. Managing risks associated with food ingredient safety. Institute of Food Technologists annual meeting and food expo, Chicago, IL, July 17-­‐20. Sellnow, T. L., Petrun, E. L., & Johnson, S. Media surveillance in public health crises: Lessons learned from the H1N1 Pandemic. Kentucky Conference on Health Communication, April 22, 2010. Sellnow, T. L. Messaging, risk communication and risk perception. Workshop on Public Response to Alerts and Warnings on Mobile Devices: Current Knowledge and Research Needs, National Academies, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2010. Sellnow, T. L., & Vidoloff, K. G. Distinct applications of dialogue and instructional messages for enhancing community resilience. The Fourth Annual DHS University Network Summit, Washington, D.C., March 10-­‐12, 2010. Sellnow, T. L., & Vidoloff, K. G. Complexity in prioritizing risk messages: Instructional 124 complexities in response to the H1N1 Pandemic. Risk Perception and Risk-­‐Related Behaviors: Anticipating and Responding to Crisis, conference sponsored by the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorist Events, Los Angeles, CA, March 6, 2010. In collaboration with the CDC, we also provided an NCFPD Webinar during the pandemic event. A journal article based on the analysis has been submitted to a refereed journal, Journal of Health Communication. We also offered just in time information about media coverage to the CDC throughout the event. We also provide just in time information to the National Pork Board on one occasion. User needs and/or significance to food defense The H1N1 project emphasized the considerable potential of the media tracking system developed through several iterations of the Robust Case Study series. The system could be called upon at any time to track, code, and generate risk and crisis communication recommendations should an intentional catastrophic event occur. Systems Strategies Continuous Tracking and Analyzing Consumer Confidence in the U.S. Food Supply Chain (CFST) PI: Dennis Degeneffe, University of Minnesota Co-­‐PI: Wes Harrison, Louisiana State University September, 2007 – November, 2010 Overview of Findings This research initiative was a multi-­‐institutional, multi-­‐regional project, conducted jointly by researchers at The Food Industry Center, University of Minnesota and the Louisiana State University Agricultural Center. It consisted of a continuous survey that was initiated the week of May 5th, 2008 and completed the week of November 8, 2010 (132 consecutive weeks), tracking consumer attitudes, beliefs, and usage of information related to food protection. The survey is linked to continuous tracking of media coverage of public health threats due to food terrorism, and food safety including economically motivated adulteration (EMA) incidents. Since its inception the Week of May 5th, 2008, a total of 24,869 interviews have been completed. 125 Based on the findings from the survey, two sets of indexes were developed, one to track consumer concern over the safety and defense of the U.S. food supply (CFSTc), and one to track consumer perception of preparedness of the industry to deal with food safety and defense incidents (CFSTp). Weekly results were trended over time to establish a baseline and confidence intervals for the identification of significant changes in the each of the sets of indexes. A media count index of food safety/defense events was also developed to measure the degree major news networks and newspapers focus on events related to food safety, bioterrorism, and food defense of the global supply chain. The index was constructed from keywords and phrase by searches articles of major newspapers throughout the United States (e.g., New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Miami Herald, etc…) and the daily transcripts from major news networks (e.g. CNN, MSNBC, NBC, CBS, ABC, and FOX). The data for the index was collected on a daily basis over the term of the study. Several studies have utilized the media data and CFST indexes. One study analyzed the relationship between media tracking and the CFSTc and CFSTp indexes. A vector autoregressive time series analysis showed that media coverage had a significant and negative effect on both indexes. We also found that both measures of consumer confidence recovered in 4 to 6 weeks following completion of a food safety event. Both magnitude and duration of the agenda-­‐setting effect were impacted by the nature of the event as well as the intensity of media coverage. In another study, we found that increases in media coverage have a negative impact on consumer confidence, and that decreases in the levels of consumer confidence regarding food safety have a negative impact on stock prices for the food industry, in particular for larger food companies. These findings suggest that the financial performance of food the industry in general is negatively affected by category-­‐
specific food safety events and media coverage associated with these events. We also examined how media use and consumer confidence varied across consumer segments. In this study we found that consumer use of media varied significantly across consumer segments, with some segments exhibiting little concern and minimal impact associated with media coverage, and other segment exhibiting high levels of concern and significant variability in confidence, depending on both the source and intensity of media coverage. Although no major Food Defense incidents occurred since the study was initiated, a series of major Food Safety events have been tracked including: •
Tomatoes/Jalapeno Peppers Recall – 2008 •
PCA Peanut Butter, and Related Products Recalls -­‐ 2008/09 •
Nestle Frozen Cookie Dough Recall – 2009 •
Various Ground Beef Recalls – 2008/10 •
Romaine Lettuce Recalls – 2010 •
Gulf Oil Spill – 2010 126 •
Egg Recall – 2010 Additionally consumer concerns, perceptions and precautions related to the H1N1 pandemic have been tracked since the initial outbreak in April 2009. Conclusions and Future Research A primary conclusion of the project is that consumer confidence in the safety of the food system is extremely dynamic, and varies significantly across consumer segments and according to the intensity of media coverage of a food safety event. However, the duration of downswings in consumer confidence appears to be temporary, rebounding in 4 to 6 weeks following the completion of the event. We also conclude that the magnitude of a decline in confidence is significantly affected by the intensity of media coverage and the nature of media messaging. This implies that communication strategies that convey information that reassures consumers that a food safety event is being properly managed may mitigate negative effects on consumer confidence. We were not able to acquire syndicated scanner data (e.g. A.C Nielsen) during the term of the project. This would have allowed us to analyze the affects of the CFST indexes on actual consumer behavior. The primary reason for this shortcoming is associated with the cost of acquiring concurrent Neilson scanner data. The PI’s do have access to home-­‐scan data on a two-­‐year delay, hence future research utilizing the data collected by this project may include analysis of how the CFST indexes explain changes in consumer purchases following food safety events. Future research may also include the use of content analysis to test the affects of media content of consumer confidence. Freight Transportation Risk and Resiliency in International Food Supply Chains PI: Alan Erera, The Supply Chain and Logistics Institute, School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Co-­‐PI: Chip White, Georgia Institute of Technology September, 2007 – May, 2010 This study is an application of a methodology developed to assess the vulnerability of a supply chain network to disruptions, where vulnerability is measured by the potential direct economic loss consequences of disruptions to various infrastructure components supporting the supply network. The methodology represents a systematic approach to identifying which infrastructure, if disrupted, would lead to the largest economic losses. Importantly, the methodology recognizes that supply networks are reconfigured (or re-­‐
optimized) in the period immediately following a disruption, and that the consequence impact of disruption to a specific infrastructure component depends significantly on the available alternatives (and their costs and capacities) to that component during the reconfiguration process. The vulnerability assessment method proposed in Erera and Zhang (2009) can analyze the impact of disruptions by testing the rerouting ability of the 127 network when each network component is disrupted, and provide information to help decision-­‐makers understand the relative vulnerability of the components to help prioritize additional risk analysis and protection investments. Grain exports are critical to the health of U.S. economy. Since export flows of grains rely on the transportation system to move through the mainland U.S. en route to an export port and the transportation system has a very tight capacity and often faces various kinds of disruptions, then the security of the transportation component in the grain export supply chain is very important to ensure the standing of U.S. in the international grain market. We have introduced the method of modeling the grain export supply chain as a network and proposed an algorithm for vulnerability assessment. To illustrate the method, we build a data set of U.S. corn export supply chain and perform both static and dynamic vulnerability assessment on selected targets. According to the results of vulnerability assessment, the vulnerability of a target is effected by three factors: redundancy, alternative routes, and time. For example, OHIO L52 and ILL L8 are the most vulnerable among the six targets studied, because of high utilization and lack of good alternative routes. The vulnerability of MISS L25 is close to the above two. MISS L27 is less vulnerable than MISS L25 because MISS L27 has more good alternative routes. MISS L15 is less vulnerable because its capacity is not fully utilized and the slack capacity can absorb small disruptions. ARK L1 has a limited impact if disrupted due to its small capacity and good alternative routes. In addition, the time when the disruption occurs is also an important factor for determining the vulnerability. If the disruption occurs near peak season when the transportation system is busy, the economic impact of the disruption is high. For the purpose of protection, the two most vulnerable dams{OHIO L52 and ILL L8 should be paid special attention, especially near the critical times during the year. Attention should also be paid to MISS L25 and MISS L27. MISS L15 and ARK L1 are not so vulnerable as the four mentioned above. Based on the three factors of vulnerability: redundancy, alternative and time, we give the following suggestions to reduce the vulnerability of the grain export supply chain: In the long run, decision-­‐makers should consider expanding the capacity of the critical infrastructures, such as OHIO L52 and ILL L8. In the short run, identifying and establishing good alternative (backup) routes for vulnerable arcs in the network and making emergency plans can improve the responsiveness of system and can reduce the economic loss when disruption occurs. Moreover, staggering transportation peaks and smoothing the grain flows by optimally organizing the transportation activity can mitigate the difficulties posed by critical times during the year, and reduce the seasonal vulnerability of the system. Finally, we would like to stress that the conclusions in this report are primarily for illustration only, due to the various assumptions and approximations made in configuring the models. The methodology, however, seems well suited for this type of analysis and could be easily deployed to perform a rigorous study using more accurate data inputs. Diagnostic Tools and Gap Analysis for Food Firms' Defense Practice 128 PI: Jean Kinsey, The Food Industry Center, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – August, 2008 The Diagnostic Tool is a 42-­‐question on-­‐line evaluation for use by food firms and their operating units to benchmark their use of business and communication practices that will increase the resistance to and recovery from intentional (terrorist) contamination of food products. The tool can be accessed at: http://webapps.cfans.umn.edu/TFIC/Main/index.html Project objectives: 1. To refine and test the Diagnostic Tool for Food Defense, a deliverable product from the Supply Chain Benchmarking Project. 2. To have several food companies using the Diagnostic Tool and participating in the practices that will make their companies and the food they handle safer and enable them to recover quicker in the event of a food defense incident. 3. To capture the data entered by new companies in an anonymous fashion and use it to periodically update the “industry leader” and “industry average” information relayed to firms as they use the Tool. 4. The Diagnostic Tool should be a) user friendly, b) useful for firms to make strategic food defense decisions, c) help firms set priorities about investments in food defense practices, and d) self perpetuating. 5. To understand and document how product specifications at various points in the supply chain change food defense practices. Objectives #1-­‐4 were completed successfully and #5 is available for study. Summary of Diagnostic Tool Participants from 2007-­‐To Date Sector Number of Participating Firms Manufacturing 64 Food Service Wholesale 07 Food Service Retail 20 Grocery Wholesale 33 Grocery Retail 19 Total Firms Participating 143 129 While the funding for this project ended in 2008, users continue to access the tool. A Probability and Cost Based Analysis of Food Threats PI: Hamid Mohtadi, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee September, 2007 – May, 2010 This project consisted of two distinct but interrelated segments. The primary and major segment of the research concerned estimating the probability of foodborne illnesses using a novel statistical approach (Extreme Value Theory) based on an extensive analysis of data from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). The second segment was an attempt to track foodborne illnesses to their underlying food source as well as to examine the behavior of the consumers after a food outbreak. For this part we relied on an extensive analysis of data by Nielsen that was made available to us through a contractual agreement between the University of Minnesota and the USDA. Understanding the probability of foodborne illnesses and tracing their impact is important not only for accidental food events but also for events that have the potential of being intentional, whether criminal or terroristic in nature. This is because regardless of the original cause (intentional or accidental) foodborne illnesses are likely to travel through the same channels. Thus, protecting society against accidental events also protects it against intentional events. Furthermore, as a study by Mohtadi and Murshid (2009) indicates, terrorists have moved away from hardened targets (such as airports with their increased security levels) to softer and more vulnerable targets. The Food supply chain, being a more vulnerable target, would therefore certainly constitute such a potential. Thus, understanding the vulnerabilities of the food system is key to our ability to better protect it. Our approach also provided an alternative to the well known but more complex and data intensive study by Mead et al (1999) which is now by now dated. Our simple model was based on a class of statistical analysis known as the Extreme Value Theory which provided estimates and predicted the severity of foodborne disease outbreaks using CDC’s OutbreakNet data. Based on this, we estimated a return of a yearly return of about 600 to 800 annual illnesses and a 10-­‐year return period of an exceptional year in which about 1000 to 1200 total illnesses are observed. For the indirect economic effect of a foodborne outbreak, we focused on the channel of consumer demand, subsequent to an outbreak. For example, Kinsey et al (2009) studied food safety media exposures, and examined consumer confidence following the news of an outbreak. Here we focused on actual consumer purchases. We found that, for outbreaks for which the food carriers are unknown, there was no consistent relation between the occurrence of outbreak and the pattern of consumption, while for outbreaks for which the food carriers were identified, the impact caused by a single outbreak elapsed after about 2 130 months. We also found that different demographics of households implied different patterns of response. Case Studies Food Recall Project PI: Jon Seltzer, The Food Industry Center, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – December, 2009 The recall case studies examined costs associated with food-­‐system failures and decision-­‐
making approaches by agency and industry leadership. These analyses were intended to motivate industry to better prepare for similar events and to be used as an educational tool to understand the impact of recalls. Equally important, these case studies were intended to “de-­‐mystify” the food industry. From these cases, the general public and policy makers will be able to better understand the different food system supply chains; what the strengths of these systems are and what the inherent system weaknesses are. From this better understanding, the general public, and people who speak to the general public about food defense and protection, will have a better platform to explain to the public the consumer role in food defense and protection. Policy makers will have an additional broadly understood and accepted platform on which to base their actions. Cases studies produced were: 1. Castleberry Case Study (July, 2007) -­‐ canned beans, Botulinum http://foodindustrycenter.umn.edu/vd/Publications/castleberrys.pdf 2. Natural Selection Foods LLC (September, 2006) -­‐ bagged spinach, contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7 http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/54784/2/Natural%20Selection.pdf 3. Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Company (February, 2008) -­‐ ground beef -­‐ animal welfare issues http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/58145/2/Westland%20Hallmarka.pdf Modeling Sampling Strategies for Detecting Intentional Contamination of Imported Food Systems PI: Randall Singer, University of Minnesota May, 2008 – April, 2011 131 This project initially focused on the importation of berries, salmon, and cranberry juice from Chile. The goals of this project were to model the supply chains of these items, to evaluate the vulnerability of these systems to intentional contamination, and to evaluate sampling strategies throughout the food systems for the rapid detection and removal of contaminated products from the food supply chain. We believe that these models in their generic form can have broad application to other imported food items, as the models will incorporate the mixing of lots from different dates of production and from different producers. During the project, the salmon industry was decimated by infectious salmon anemia virus and the cranberry collaborator switched production to a freeze-­‐dried product. Both of these circumstances required us to focus on the blueberry model. We developed the supply chain models using the software STELLA / iThink. The simulation model has a mixture of deterministic and stochastic parameters. The models also provide the flexibility to predict future fruit production based on climatic conditions rather than on past production quantities. In the blueberry production model, each farm is modeled separately as is each blueberry variety on each farm. The model has lag functions included that enable the product to experience delays at each stage of production and processing. We programmed the model so that the user can select the limiting factor of blueberry production on the farm. Choices include the number of people picking fruit, the amount of fruit that is ready to be picked on a given day, or the availability of trucks to drive the fruit to the processing plant. In general, we found that the amount of fruit ripening on any given day is the variable that typically limits production. For this reason, the inclusion of the equation for predicting fruit ripening was a key addition to the model. Through our surveys of various blueberry companies, we found that the fruit from a given company and from a given lot is rarely mixed with fruit from other lots. This project has resulted in the development of a different form of import supply chain model that can be expanded to other imported food products. The project made considerable strides in developing an infrastructure within Latin America for conducting assessment of food imports. Specifically for a fresh fruit model in which the fruit is consumed within months of collection, the overall impact of a food contamination event would be limited due to product lots remaining separate through processing and distribution. Many fresh fruit distributors are also expanding into frozen and freeze-­‐dried product, and this type of product would represent a greater risk due to its use as an ingredient in additional products and its increased difficult in tracking. Our models can be expanded to include these additional products. Food Fraud Public Health Threat Backgrounder PI: John Spink, Michigan State University, Anti-­‐Counterfeiting and Product Protection Program, School of Criminal Justice September, 2009 -­‐ April, 2011 132 This proposal was for the development of a 2,500 word peer-­‐reviewed backgrounder on economically motivated adulteration, which is also called food fraud. Examples of the public health threat of food fraud include melamine in pet food, melamine in infant formula, Sudan red colorant in sauces and agricultural products, banned antibiotics or pesticides in food, undeclared allergens in spices that have country-­‐of-­‐origin fraud, and many others. The deliverable will also include development of an agency-­‐ready web-­‐page content, creation of webinar content related of the Backgrounder, as well as an approved modification of development and dissemination of brochures to a complex, professionally produced video webinar (to be posted for public access on MSU.edu and YouTube.com). Without additional funding, the researchers also developed a 5,000+ word manuscript that was invited, and currently under review, by the respected scholarly Journal of Food Science. The grant also provided time and travel resources to broadly disseminate the concepts. Problem: The problem addressed was the lack of clear definition of Economically Motivated Adulteration which has also been called Food Fraud. Without a clear definition and statement by agencies, producers, manufactures, retailers, and consumers do not have a sense of the risk or countermeasures. Methods: The researchers analyzed literature and current trends in the definition, including the presentations and Federal Register comments from the May 2009 FDA Open Meeting on Economically Motivated Adulteration (which included a presentation by the PI titled “Defining Food Fraud & The Chemistry of the Crime”). The research and expert insight were supplemented with peer-­‐reviews by relevant industry, agency, and association partners. Final Result/ End Products/ Outcomes: With the publishing of the Backgrounder on Food Fraud, the concept itself, and the risks, was clearly communicated. This will be posted for public access on the NCFPD and MSU websites. When the concept and dangers are clearly defined, increased vigilance and diligence can reduce the risk (probability versus severity) or increase the detection and prevention actions. A second major deliverable was the development of on-­‐line training content in the form of a PowerPoint with text and a webinar. The third deliverable was the complex and professionally produced video webinar. Also, the grant included time, travel and conference fees for the PI and the Graduate Assistant to present at industry conferences which included IAFP, IFT, the Food Safety Summit, Society for Risk Analysis, as well as agency presentations such as at the FBI International Symposium on Agro-­‐terrorism, the DHS/FDA SCC/GCC, the NC-­‐FAR US Capital Hill seminar series on Food and Agriculture Research, among others. End Users: The Backgrounder was targeted at agencies, producers, manufactures, and retailers. By defining Food Fraud as an autonomous concept, the Backgrounder justifies further academic research of this risk. Finally, by publishing a peer-­‐reviewed Food Fraud definition and risk, the agencies and legislature will be educated on this topic. 133 Significance to Food Defense. The most significance to food defense is further defining food defense by defining how it is different from food fraud and economically motivated adulteration. Also, there was extensive focus on further definition of the overall concept of food protection. Cross Cultural Differences in Attitudes Toward Food Safety and Food Defense PI: Thomas Stinson, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – December, 2009 An increasing percentage of the food Americans consume is harvested and processed outside its borders. The impossibility of inspecting all food imports for all potential contaminants makes the imported food supply a soft and potentially attractive target for a terrorist attack. The economic losses due to the disruption in trade from even a small-­‐scale food terrorism event would create catastrophic economic losses since all global trade would be affected. It is unrealistic to expect firms or nations exporting food products to unilaterally institute the stricter controls needed to reduce the probability of deliberate contamination. Those controls would increase production costs and the benefits to the firm and to the exporting country would be unlikely to offset the additional expenses. The cost increases associated with improved food defense would be passed on to consumers and the higher prices associated with improved food defense, unless matched by exporters in other countries, would cause the firms and countries increasing their food defense capability to lose market share and profits. Increased multilateral cooperation offers a more promising approach to improving global food defense systems. Agreement by importing nations on more stringent food defense related standards for food imports will create a strong financial incentive for firms producing food for export to adjust production processes in ways that will reduce their vulnerability to food terrorists, since those whose processes fail to meet the agreed upon standards no longer will be able to sell in the most attractive international markets. Some groundwork for reaching agreement on the components of a global food defense program is already underway, but considerable further international negotiation will be necessary. An issue of particular concern is that collaborative efforts on food defense by importing nations could be seen as simply a device for erecting non-­‐tariff trade barriers to protect domestic producers and processors. Results from this cross-­‐cultural survey of attitudes toward food defense activities will be of use to negotiators in countering that claim by documenting the level of common concern that consumers in the U.S., Europe, and Japan have about food terrorism. Findings demonstrating the broad commonality of public support in developed countries for improved food defense practices should help ease the way for more comprehensive multi-­‐
lateral agreements on food defense. In general findings from the U.S. portion of this study provides further confirmation of the validity of earlier surveys of U.S. consumers attitudes toward terrorism and the value they ascribe to anti-­‐terrorism programs. In the October 2008 survey U.S. respondents would devote an even greater proportion of their anti-­‐terrorism budget to protecting the food 134 supply chain, more than 21 percent. The 21.3 percent U.S. respondents chose to allocate to food defense in this survey was more than 2 percentage points more than respondents to the first survey conducted in 2005 indicated they would devote to defending the food supply. As before, that percentage remained greater than U.S. residents would allocate to any other anti-­‐terrorism activity, even though respondents indicated that they believed attacks on the subway or passenger rail systems, or the release of a toxic compound in a crowded public area more likely to occur during the next 10 years. Japanese respondents allocated the largest percentage of their prospective anti-­‐terrorism budget to protecting the food supply, 26 percent, and Britain the lowest, 15.6 percent. Germany, Spain, and Italy all clustered around 19 percent of their anti-­‐terrorism budget devoted to food defense. The anti-­‐terrorism activity allocated the largest share of the anti-­‐terrorist budget in the four European countries was subway and rail transportation. Food received the second largest allocation in Italy and Germany. In Spain protecting air transportation was second. In Britain food defense fell to fifth place with respondents desired budget allocations for protecting subway and rail, air transport, protection against release of a chemical or biological agent in a public place, and protecting the power grid from attack all given larger shares of the anti-­‐terrorism budget. Education Frontier Interdisciplinary Experiences (FIX) Program Coordination PI: Jason Ackleson, New Mexico State University July, 2008 – April, 2011 Drs. Justin Kastner and Jason Ackleson co-­‐direct the Frontier Interdisciplinary eXperiences (FIX) program, working closely with a number of Kansas State University (e.g., Dr. Abbey Nutsch and Steve Toburen) and New Mexico State University (e.g., Michael Bursum) faculty and staff. The FIX program seeks to prepare a diverse group of Homeland Security professionals through curricular and experiential training that develops critical thinking across disciplines and research areas related to Food Defense and Border Security, Food Safety and Security, and International Trade. The program harnesses the student-­‐
mentoring and student-­‐coordinating efforts of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense’s (NCFPD’s) ongoing DHS career-­‐development grants (CDG) program, directed by Kansas State University (KSU) and the inter-­‐institutional Frontier program. The Frontier program involves KSU and New Mexico State University (NMSU) faculty, student-­‐program coordinators, and students from KSU, NMSU, and other DHS COE-­‐affiliated universities who pursue interdisciplinary scholarship in Border Security, Food and Agriculture Security, Food Safety and Security, International Relations, and related HS-­‐STEM research areas and disciplines. True to the name “Frontier,” CDG-­‐funded (as well as non-­‐CDG funded) students in the FIX program develop valuable, career-­‐relevant skills while crossing the frontiers of academic disciplines. Through the administration of two DHS CDG awards, the Frontier program has helped superintend the curricular and experiential learning of 17 CDG students at multiple NCFPD-­‐affiliated universities: 135 CDG students (past and present) in the Frontier program. Student University Academic level Lapid, Talia NMSU Undergraduate Jensby, Julianne KSU Undergraduate Vasquez, Rose Ann NMSU Graduate Krusemark, Kathryn KSU Graduate Everstine, Karen Univ. of Graduate Minnesota Crnic, Tarrie KSU Graduate O'Neill, Casey NMSU Undergraduate Dorr, Nicole KSU Undergraduate Marceau, Haley KSU Undergraduate Tapia, Alexandria NMSU Undergraduate Taylor, Jeffrey (Randy) NMSU Undergraduate Deen, Bronwyn Univ. of Undergraduate Minnesota Fredrickson, Neal Univ. of Undergraduate Minnesota Hystead, Ellen Univ. of Graduate Minnesota Huarng, Michael Michigan State Undergraduate Un. van Rijn, Saskia Univ. of Arizona Graduate Pogreba-­‐Brown, Kristen Univ. of Arizona Graduate The FIX program has served and continues to serve these students through the following objectives: • Through an application and award process, recruit students from strong HS-­‐
STEM educational platforms and curricula at multiple universities; • Connect students to career development activities (most notably, Frontier field trips, retreats, and workshops, summarized in Project Narrative) that develop critical thinking skills, multidisciplinary breadth, and an appreciation for the complexity of homeland security; • Help connect students to internships and employment; and • Routinely evaluate students through the Frontier program’s Student Learning Outcomes (SLO) tracking document (on a biannual basis), and documentation and “student-­‐tracking” efforts related to internship and employment requirements. The FIX program not only serves students in its CDG program, but also helps mentor a wider community of scholars. Since June 2008, the Frontier program has “touched” over 136 200 students through experiential learning during Frontier student field trips, retreats, and workshops. Conversion of Curriculum for Food Safety and Food Defense Certificate from In-­‐Class Delivery to Distance Learning Format PI: Craig Hedberg, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota September, 2007 – May, 2010 The goal of this project was to make educational programs for Food Defense more widely available to health professionals, food regulatory officials and food defense specialists in industry. The objective was to convert the food defense courses currently offered through the University of Minnesota’s Public Health Institute into a distance learning format. 1. Introduction to Business Continuity Planning for Disasters and Emergencies Provides learners with an overview of the basics of business continuity planning, including a review of key terms and concepts. CEU credit is available for this module through the University of Minnesota School of Public Health Centers for Public Health Outreach & Education. 2. Risk Communication Center The Risk Communication Center (RCC) is a collaborative project between the National Center for Food Protection and Defense Risk Communication Team, the Education Team and FoodSHIELD. The goal of the RCC is to provide educational material to FoodSHIELD and public users on what risk communication is, how risk communication practices are used, current risk communication research, and timely food related risk communication topics. You will be able to listen to the podcasts and access articles, documents, PowerPoints, videos and other educational materials (as available) from FoodSHIELD directly. http://www.foodshield.org/education/riskcomm.cfm 3. Food System Defense: Vulnerabilities in the Food System The course takes a holistic view of the food system from agricultural inputs through to final consumption to enable both critical analyses of current food system vulnerabilities and examination of available and needed interventions and counter measures. Building from a basic understanding of the history of intentional contamination of the food system and current intelligence, tools currently in use to assess the vulnerability of specific food systems and facilities will be explored. The course will then move from vulnerabilities to the legal, regulatory, supply chain, public health system and technology strategies currently available to reduce the potential of intentional food contamination events. This includes conducting food facility vulnerability assessments as part of developing a draft food defense plan for one of the facilities. The non-­‐workshop and vulnerability assessment portions of the class are now available in an on-­‐line module. Link to course syllabus: http://www.sph.umn.edu/ce/institute/docs/syllabi/2010/7233-­‐
101Kennedy.pdf NCFPD Center of Excellence Food Protection Education Portal-­‐ Phase 1 PI: Craig Hedberg, University of Minnesota-­‐ School of Public Health 137 October, 2009 – April, 2011 In the wake of the September 2001 attacks, the U.S. government founded the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with responsibility to develop a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) for securing critical infrastructures and key resources (CI/KR). DSH established interdisciplinary networks of academic expertise administered through Centers of Excellence across the country, each addressing a different aspect of homeland defense. The National Consortium for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), created in 2004, organized over 150 experts around 5 theme groups: Agent Behavior; Event Modeling, Systems Strategies, Risk Communication, and Educational Programs. The fifth theme group, Educational Programs, was the focus of a special library project to assist experts in their delivery of “high quality education and training programs to develop a cadre of professionals equipped to deal with future threats to the food system.” An initial database provided NCFPD experts with a listing of educational resources and their URLs. A review of those resources with a focus on metadata for each record was held in 2007, and in 2009 NCFPD formed a team to finalize the framework for a working collection of food protection educational resources. The framework consisted of 1) a scope of work for the database, 2) descriptive metadata elements and classification decisions, and 3) a vetting instrument to maintain the utility and currency of selected information. Using a measurement known as Expert Panel Validity, developed by C. H. Lawshe, a Content Validity Ratio (CVR) from -­‐1 to +1 was calculated for each examined resource, reflecting experts’ agreement on how essential it is by the above criteria. Since the CVR value is dependent on the number of expert raters, a minimally statistically significant CVR value is highly dependent on the number of experts providing ratings. Lawshe offered a table of minimum CVR values based on a one-­‐tailed significance test with p =.05 demonstrating that for 40 experts, only a CVR value of .29 or greater is statistically significant. Despite the large proportion of experts answering the survey (54 out of 153 sent responded), no positive CVR value for “essential” was achieved for the six sample resources. However, examining the survey for agreement on “peripheral” resources resulted in two statistically significant positive values. Since vetting is a process of exclusion as well as inclusion, these positive values can be employed by the education portal team as a de-­‐selection benchmark in future training of non-­‐expert library student interns. The significant finding from the research conducted on this project is food protection educational resources are being collected from a variety of organizations, disciplines, and viewpoints. As demonstrated by the Content Validity Ratio (CVR) test NCFPD researchers could not agree on what was an essential resource. Food protection is still a relatively new profession thus agreement on essential educational resources is still under contention. As the profession evolves, a more defined set of educational resources will become apparent as a must know for employees in the field. The resources collected by this project illustrate the wide breadth of knowledge that is food protection. Frontier Interdisciplinary eXperiences (FIX) Coordinators for NCFPD Career Development Program (KSU) 138 PI: Justin Kastner, Kansas State University June, 2008 – April, 2011 Drs. Justin Kastner and Jason Ackleson co-­‐direct the Frontier Interdisciplinary eXperiences (FIX) program, working closely with a number of Kansas State University (e.g., Dr. Abbey Nutsch and Steve Toburen) and New Mexico State University (e.g., Michael Bursum) faculty and staff. The FIX program seeks to prepare a diverse group of Homeland Security professionals through curricular and experiential training that develops critical thinking across disciplines and research areas related to Food Defense and Border Security, Food Safety and Security, and International Trade. The program harnesses the student-­‐
mentoring and student-­‐coordinating efforts of the National Center for Food Protection and Defense’s (NCFPD’s) ongoing DHS career-­‐development grants (CDG) program, directed by Kansas State University (KSU) and the inter-­‐institutional Frontier program. The Frontier program involves KSU and New Mexico State University (NMSU) faculty, student-­‐program coordinators, and students from KSU, NMSU, and other DHS COE-­‐affiliated universities who pursue interdisciplinary scholarship in Border Security, Food and Agriculture Security, Food Safety and Security, International Relations, and related HS-­‐STEM research areas and disciplines. True to the name “Frontier,” CDG-­‐funded (as well as non-­‐CDG funded) students in the FIX program develop valuable, career-­‐relevant skills while crossing the frontiers of academic disciplines. Through the administration of two DHS CDG awards, the Frontier program has helped superintend the curricular and experiential learning of 17 CDG students at multiple NCFPD-­‐affiliated universities: CDG students (past and present) in the Frontier program. Student University Academic level Relevant DHS CDG funding opportunity no. Lapid, Talia NMSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Jensby, Julianne KSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Vasquez, Rose Ann NMSU Graduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Krusemark, Kathryn KSU Graduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Everstine, Karen Univ. of Graduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Minnesota Crnic, Tarrie KSU Graduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 O'Neill, Casey NMSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Dorr, Nicole KSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Marceau, Haley KSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Tapia, Alexandria NMSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Taylor, Jeffrey (Randy) NMSU Undergraduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Deen, Bronwyn Univ. of Undergraduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Minnesota Fredrickson, Neal Univ. of Undergraduate DHS-­‐07-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Minnesota 139 Hystead, Ellen Univ. of Minnesota Michigan State Un. Univ. of Arizona Univ. of Arizona Graduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Huarng, Michael Undergraduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 van Rijn, Saskia Graduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Pogreba-­‐Brown, Graduate DHS-­‐09-­‐ST-­‐104-­‐001 Kristen The FIX program has served and continues to serve these students through the following objectives: • Through an application and award process, recruit students from strong HS-­‐
STEM educational platforms and curricula at multiple universities; • Connect students to career development activities (most notably, Frontier field trips, retreats, and workshops, summarized in Project Narrative) that develop critical thinking skills, multidisciplinary breadth, and an appreciation for the complexity of homeland security; • Help connect students to internships and employment; and • Routinely evaluate students through the Frontier program’s Student Learning Outcomes (SLO) tracking document (on a biannual basis), and documentation and “student-­‐tracking” efforts related to internship and employment requirements. The FIX program not only serves students in its CDG program, but also helps mentor a wider community of scholars. Since June 2008, the Frontier program has “touched” over 200 students through experiential learning during Frontier student field trips, retreats, and workshops. Development and Implementation of a Graduate Certification of Completion Program in Food Protection and Defense PI: Abbey Nutsch, Kansas State University March, 2008 – July, 2010 Graduate Education Program As originally envisioned, the NCFPD Graduate Education Program in Food Protection and Defense would leverage graduate-­‐level courses already available from various institutions nationwide and would be accessible across academic institutions and degree programs (to maximize both the ease of access for students and the human capital developed). In addition, the program would provide a framework to 1) leverage course offerings from a large number of institutions, 2) accommodate a variety of course formats, including traditional classroom courses, online/distance education courses, short courses, onsite summer institute courses, and workshops, 3) make coursework accessible to students anywhere, 4) flexibly meet the needs of individual students, and 5) plan for and embrace change as the needs of food defense professionals evolve. The program would complement a broad range of degree programs across partner institutions and would be inherently 140 interdisciplinary, spanning food safety, food science, public health, food and agriculture systems, emergency management, animal health, communications, engineering, epidemiology, and many others. In May 2010 a specific framework and implementation schedule for the Graduate Education Program was proposed and provided to NCFPD leadership for review, comment, and approval. The proposed framework was submitted in conjunction with the 2010-­‐2016 proposal, “Interdisciplinary Multi-­‐Institutional Education Programs for NCFPD,” which reflected the combined initiatives of the Graduate Education Program and the FIX Program. Student-­‐centered Activities Other Education Theme activities that have directly impacted students include encouraging student participation in the DHS University Network Summit as well as facilitating placements of students and faculty with NCFPD-­‐affiliated investigators for summer 2010 experiences. Graduates directly or indirectly “touched” by the Center will serve as a valuable resource to support the activities of DHS and other federal agencies such as USDA and FDA, state and local partners (food, agriculture, public health and other agencies), industry, and international stakeholders. Historically (since the original founding of NCFPD), NCFPD-­‐affiliated students have received advanced training through their research, engaged in NCFPD course work, and presented their work at NCFPD’s research meetings through highly successful poster sessions. These activities continue, but are now augmented by other student-­‐centered activities (e.g., through the CDG and FIX programs). On behalf of NCFPD, we have sought to facilitate the application, selection, and host-­‐placement processes for students and faculty interested in DHS-­‐funded educational programs (i.e., DHS Scholars and Fellows Program, DHS Internship Program, DHS Summer Research Team Program, as well as summer internship programs funded by specific DHS Scientific Leadership Awards Grants). In addition, we have sought to encourage NCFPD-­‐funded and -­‐affiliated students to participate in DHS-­‐sponsored conferences and meeting opportunities such as the DHS University Network Summit. Going forward, an ever-­‐increasing number of students are anticipated to be involved in and impacted by such NCPFD Education Theme activities. 141 Appendix C: Sponsor-­‐Driven Project Summaries Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Contract Title and number: Bioterrorism Risk Assessment on DHS Award 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐
000003 Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 9/8/09-­‐12/31/10 1. Project Summary The global food system that nourishes the United States is likely the most complicated system of supply chains known. This system, from primary production through final consumption, has been optimized to deliver a dizzying array of foods from around the world at the lowest possible cost year round. It was not designed for, and has not been optimized to, protect it from intentional disruption or contamination. The systems that are in place do not even make such optimization readily feasible. Its complexity and rapidly evolving nature moreover makes development of a detailed model of the entire food system an unattainable goal. Based on registrants in the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) Bio-­‐terrorism Registration Database, there are over 130,000 domestic food processing firms and over 150,000 foreign food processing firms that are registered to produce food for sale in the U.S. This wide range of processors eventually end up supplying the over 55,000 individual types of food (stock keeping units or sku’s) that are available in an average retail grocery store. The complexity and variability present in food contamination scenarios are challenges that has been highlighted in recent foodborne illness outbreaks where identifying the food vehicle has presented a significant challenge for both government agencies and industry. Through the course of its investigation of the Salmonella Saintpaul outbreak associated with produce in 2008, the Food and Drug Administration and state and local agencies sorted through a pepper supply system that included more than 500 producers in Mexico, 300 importers, and 25,000 shipments of peppers from March through June of 2008. The Peanut Corporation of America product contamination in 2010 led to nearly 4,000 individual recalls impacting over 200 food companies with dramatically different potential vulnerabilities relative to intentional contamination. While these recalls illustrate the complexity of the food system, a methodology to sufficiently generalize food systems for risk assessment and mitigation strategy evaluation is still needed and is the focus of NCFPD’s efforts on this project. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCFPD team members: Saif Benjaafar, Frank Busta, Koel Ghosh, Morgan Hennessey, Gale Prince, John Hoffman, Rui Chen, and Fan Jia. 142 External Consultants: Approximately fifty subject matter experts were engaged for methodology discussions on this project. 3. Deliverable Effort Task 1: Define data collection requirements for the six S&T risk assessment foods and two additional foods And Task 2: Perform data collection to address requirements identified in task 1. Through subject matter expertise (SME) input, review, and collaboration NCFPD went through a process to develop “framework foods.” The fundamental hypothesis is that there are supply chain, processing, consumption and specific food attributes that contribute to an individual food’s overall vulnerability, and the relative utility of mitigation strategies, that will allow a food to be grouped together with similar foods. The processing characteristics covered the range of processes in food systems, including those that may represent existing mitigation steps such as thermal treatments. Supply chain characteristics include length, complexity and transportation parameters, among others, that may introduce points of vulnerability. Product characteristics include both food composition and final preparation characteristics that could also represent existing mitigation strategies. In selecting the characteristics for consideration, existing risk, consequence and vulnerability assessments were utilized. This included each of the assessments conducted through the Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) conducted by the FDA, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), those assessments included: SPPA Assessments Utilized Cattle stockyard/sale barn Beef cattle feedlot Corn farm Dairy farm Soybean farm Poultry farm Deli meat processing Grain elevator/Export Ground beef processing Hot dog processing Import facilities Processed poultry Liquid eggs processing School kitchens Swine production Retailers – processing meat Animal foods/feeds Baby food Deli salads Flour Frozen entrees Fruit juice High fructose corn syrup Infant formula Milk Produce Transportation Bottled water Yogurt Stadium Food Service 143 Breakfast cereals Warehouses/Distribution Center In addition to other assessments made available by FDA, USDA and private sector partners, an important source of input has been the Food and Agriculture Criticality Assessment Tool (FAS-­‐CAT) assessments of food and agriculture systems at the state level. At the time of this effort, over 500 FAS-­‐CAT assessments had been conducted by the states and represent a significant source of supply chain characteristics, system documentation and potential importance criticality/vulnerability of the assessed systems. Once the groups or clusters of similar foods were developed, exemplar foods were selected within each cluster that provides the opportunity to evaluate a range of potential mitigation strategies. This summary documents the efforts for developing the clusters, scoring metrics and final food selection. Documentation of the exemplar foods’ supply chain characteristics have been developed as is required to develop risk models. Completed and initiated architectures include fluid milk, bagged salad, ground beef patties, liquid eggs and baked goods.. Please note that this summary includes elements that will be separately submitted for publication in peer-­‐reviewed journals so it is not for public release. Food Architecture/Cluster Development NCFPD worked with its network of researchers from industry, academia, and government to assemble a core group of individuals to drive our efforts surrounding the food protection architecture analysis. Dedicated academic members of the assessment team include investigators from Georgia Tech University, Arizona State University, Rutgers University, the University of Minnesota, and New Mexico State University. Our industry partners for this effort include subject matter experts (SME’s) from Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland Company, Burger King Corporation, BT Safety, General Mills, and Medallion Laboratories. Additional government, industry and academic partners have participated as part of the assessment team for specific foods or assessment phases. The basic process for the project was to follow each phase of NCFPD investigator efforts with an SME workshop to both critique/revise the work to that point and strategize the next phase of the project. To that end, three subject matter expert workshops were held at the University of Minnesota. The first workshop was held on January 26, 2010, a second workshop was held on April 20, 2010, and the last on-­‐site workshop with the team was held on May 27, 2010. During the first workshop, the assessment team built from the NCFPD developed draft list of characteristics of foods to develop a broad list of potential attributes for food frameworks. The characteristics developed were intended to be general, such that over-­‐arching frameworks of foods could be generated from them. The selection of the proposed, optimal characteristics for use in defining the architecture and thus clustering the foods was an iterative process as individual attributes were refined or removed to limit the architecture definition to those characteristics that most effectively enabled clustering of the foods. The beta clustering characteristics that were developed from the first several rounds of optimization to eliminate obvious duplication are: 144 Beta Clustering Characteristics Bulk/open transport Processed in large lot/batch Multiple/primary component Cold supply chain Complex supply chain Import content Thoroughly mixed during processing Dominant ingredient Thermally processed in manufacturing Consumed immediately Consume purchased portion all at once Thermally processed in home/restaurant Consumed with other products Peeled or washed prior to consumption National or international distribution footprint Highly perishable These characteristics were further refined once they were applied to the initial food list to limit the impact of co-­‐variance and data availability limitations such that three characteristics were removed (large lot/batch, import content and consumed with other products). The refined list of characteristics was then applied to the food list described in the next section. The basic clustering approach assesses the degree of similarity and dissimilarity of the binary responses to the clustering characteristics. This was initially conducted as a simultaneous solution to all characteristics. This, however, resulted in non-­‐
obvious clustering of foods into the same cluster. The non-­‐obvious clustering resulted from foods that had the same overall degree of similarity and dissimilarity, but the specific characteristics of dissimilarity were in different types of characteristics so that their overall architecture wasn’t as similar as the clustering suggested. To resolve this, the characteristics were classified as either primarily vulnerability or primarily consequence related and then re-­‐clustered sequentially by those two groupings. This yielded an optimum solution of ten clusters (below), and their resulting architectures, that were reviewed during the April 20, 2010 food defense assessment team workshop. Optimum Cluster Solution Set Multi-­‐component assembled foods, thermally processed in the home Multi-­‐component assembled foods, not thermally processed in the home Packaged, processed, cold chain RTE Ready to eat, primary component foods Assembled companion dishes Beverages Main dishes, single component foods Industrial ingredients Produce Home Ingredients 145 During the April 20 workshop, potential scoring metrics were developed which were then analyzed and refined for review at the May 27, 2010 workshop. These scoring metrics were utilized to down-­‐select to lead foods from each cluster to use as exemplars to build more detailed architectures. In this workshop the food clusters, initial food architectures and consumption indicators were finalized. Selection of Foods As noted above, with over 55,000 foods available in a retail grocery store and tens of thousands of both home and industrial food ingredients, assessing all foods even for the initial clustering and architecture design was neither feasible nor likely useful. NCFPD partnered with the NPD group (http://www.npd.com) to address this challenge. NPD is a consumer research organization that, among other industries, serves the food and beverage industry to help them understand consumer habits, preferences and consumption patterns. After thirty years of ongoing research, NPD has built both a comprehensive “menu” of consumption items and indicators of their consumption patterns. From the 55,000 sku’s that could enter into the consumer home, NPD and NCFPD developed a master list of 250 “base dishes” that capture the full range of consumption item with no obvious duplication. To this list of base dishes, over 80 of the more concerning and important industrial and home ingredients were added for the initial food list. Through a series of repeated revisions through private sector SME input and re-­‐clustering, this list was reduced to 138 foods and ingredients that represent the full span of the food system with limited overlap or covariance. Task 3: Develop recommendations for a “perfect” model. In order to select foods from each cluster that represent an optimum combination of consequence, vulnerability and consumption intensity profile, additional scoring metrics were required beyond those utilized to define the clusters. This included the development of a scoring rubric for each characteristic and a relative weighting. The SPPA and FASCAT assessments referenced earlier were the starting point for identification of attributes of food systems that most often contributed to an asset being scored highest via CARVER-­‐
Shock or sub-­‐system being scored most critical via FASCAT. A set of potential criterion were developed based on this and then expanded through SME elicitation. The criterions are grouped by those that primarily contribute to consequence and those that primarily contribute to vulnerability. Since each characteristic has some impact on both, this is a subjective separation that was arrived at via subject matter elicitation. An analysis of the full list of criterion enabled NCFPD to reduce them to the minimum number of criterion that represent the majority of the characteristics identified as uniquely driving an asset or system being evaluated as vulnerable or critical in prior assessments. The scoring rubric includes relative weights for each criterion within consequence and vulnerability groups. The weightings within either consequence or vulnerability groupings was derived through the use of the SMARTER multi-­‐attribute utility approach for SME assessments. This included a validation step by the SME panel that did revise some of the weightings. Each of the 138 food systems in the clusters was then scored on each criterion and plotted as a function of consequence and vulnerability. Potential exemplar foods were 146 then identified as those that could well represent the cluster based on the overall consequence and vulnerability mapping. Frozen pizza, macaroni and cheese and baked beans would appear to best represent the cluster. Phase II Optional Task 4: Based on feedback provided at the end of task 3, perform additional data collection efforts. Additional data collection was conducted so that the Chemical Threat Risk Assessment, the twin of the BTRA, could utilize the foods selected. However it was running new models so the data has not been used to date. 4. Obstacles One primary obstacle was simply dealing with a rage of stakeholders who all had important needs and inputs, but they did not necessarily all align. This was primarily dealt with by making sure that they were informed and involved throughout the process. While the original plan had been to collect data on the prior six BTRA foods, there was general agreement that those foods represented some internal duplication and an insufficient representation of the food risk space. As a result, Task 3 was pushed up and partially completed before starting the in depth data collection. 5. Outcomes There are no broadly accepted existing examples of how to select or model a small subset of food systems for use in evaluating mitigation strategies across the entire food system. NCFPD’s efforts have developed a minimal/optimal solution of ten food clusters that can represent the full food system space. These clusters represent a broad range of potential consequence; vulnerability and that are useful in assessing the utility of potential mitigation strategies. The ten foods selected, and the data gathered on them, are now being used to drive the 2012 BTRA. 6. Future Effort While this represents a significant improvement in both food selection and data collection on the foods, both could be improved. For the food clustering, relationships between the clustering characteristics and a more sophisticated scoring system could further refine the cluster definitions. As for data collection, with more lead time it would be possible to do more intensive data collection as there is still significant variability even within the ten foods chosen. Dept. of Homeland Security University Programs (HSUP) Contract Title and number: OUP Office of University Programs Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 7/1/07 -­‐ 5/31/11 1. Project Summary 147 The purpose of this multi-­‐year project was to leverage the collaboration portal tools and online information sharing system initially developed by the National Center for Food Protection and Defense for its own use by expanding the availability of these tools to other Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence to facilitate targeted information sharing and collaboration within and among the Centers of Excellence community. NCFPD was tasked with researching how to enhance its existing portal collaboration capabilities to enable and encourage usage by the other Centers. The resultant Homeland Security Office of University Programs (HSUP/OUP) web site provides a secure environment for university researchers working in government-­‐funded programs to share information, publish reports, and collaborate on projects. The site also provides a point of communication to allow HSUP staff to disseminate important information to research partners at regional Centers of Excellence and universities. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy External Consultants: Datastream Connexion, Eric Hoffman and Grandville Ricks 3. Deliverable Effort During this contract period, an initial HSUP website was created along with a project system application to be used by all Homeland Security Centers of Excellence. A search/query function was provided and many subsequent enhancements and improvements were implemented throughout. Initial deliverable effort entailed many portal improvements, system design, and a primary website completion. The HSUP website, completed in year one of the contract, provided the end user with content management tools for the site. Survey tools were added, giving user the ability to create a survey inside of a work group. Users were provided the capability of creating their own meetings, searching for contacts, and utilizing voice-­‐over IP (VOIP). Development work also consisted of system upgrades; upgrades to the website/workzone, bug fixes, and basic reporting. During this contract-­‐reporting period, work continued on tasks and issues related to the Subject Matter Expert Database, HSUP Search Re-­‐design, and ongoing Site Maintenance and support. Creation of the project search/query reporting capability, and the following HSUP project search enhancements were completed: •
Legacy data was removed from the search results (fields that are currently unused) •
Co-­‐Principal investigators were verified and updated for all projects •
Filters for Principal investigator and co-­‐principal investigator were combined to find users listed as either PI or CPI’s •
A “select all” feature was created for adding search results to the PDF report 148 •
The results layout was updated to a table layout •
A tag cloud of aggregated project data returned by the search engine was created; this will display words and terms related to the original search string tag clouds •
A ‘contact us’ form, and a quick finder, were completed •
The FoodSHIELD discussion functionality was added to the site. Discussion functionality allows users to have secure, online discussions with a designated workgroup Internal process enhancements beneficial to the end user were also introduced with use of Protoshare, a collaborative web based prototyping tool. This wire frame tool allows users to envision what a site may look like, providing the user the opportunity for extensive input on page layout, workflow, and functionality of the site before programming / logic work begins, thus saving time and effort while giving the end-­‐user a superior result, agreed upon by all parties involved. A state filter was added which enables the search results to be filtered to show only certain states in the results. Newsletters, events, and reports for The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) were posted to the HSUP site. A Center of Excellence (COE) specific page was created for START. Assistance was offered to HSUP to help create unique pages for each COE. One-­‐on-­‐one training for HSUP staff was provided, including training on use of the technical consultant’s project system, SAVVY content manager, Secure Send, and Mura Content Management. Spring Graph data relationship analyzer was created and extensive collaborative effort occurred with the Office of University Programs to produce desired reports. Data relating to projects and Co-­‐
Principal investigators was cleaned up and enhancements to manage email Distribution lists were made. Throughout the course of the contract period, the client was provided with a dedicated programmer, project management and staff; this included a programmer dedicated specifically to development, client outreach and feedback meetings, collaboration portal customizations, RPDB & PPDB System expansion and System Documentation. Dedicated staff also included an HSUP help desk, live chat, and email support; network support, support for web servers, database and email. Redundancy/failover testing, quality assurance and testing were also provided. Additional support included development of an analytics package to track system metrics and website usage, giving the client a better understanding of system use. During year 1 of the contract, the initial version for the Research Project Database (RPDB) was created. The RPDB was implemented based on initial rough draft guidelines presented at the project inception. This first release required essential architecture and infrastructure planning and implementation in a compressed timeframe to meet the needs of OUP to bring the RPDB online. The RPDB Database Search and Report Function, upgrades, and data entry interface enhancements were subsequently completed. Some of the data interface 149 upgrades include adding a link to the main HSUP landing page to the carry-­‐over procedures; creating data-­‐dump XML files for the Purdue University spring graph; adding “Co-­‐PI” field in the second database, where co-­‐principal investigators can be listed; ensuring that the project “detail” pages in the secured database link to all annual reports; and adding “state” as a research database search field. The RPDB Reporting Upgrade allows users to select projects and export the selected items into a word document. This function is extremely helpful in automatically creating a number of reports that University Programs manually generated throughout the year. Workzone creation was implemented in year 1 of the project as part of the system upgrades, programming included creating a basic shell for the workzone, which is required to handle security and user access. Year 1, quarter 4 brought to completion the first year of development. This included the completion of a functional Collaboration Portal integrated with the Research Project Database, the Query Center and a preliminary Student & Alumni Center Framework. The Project Proposal Database (PPDB) was added during the first year of the project. PPDB came fully online for new COE’s to submit their proposals during this timeframe. This process included additional usability feedback to ensure accurate and successful data entry. The RPDP project system differs from the Project Proposal Database, as the PPDB was created specifically for proposals that have not yet been approved, while the RPDP system was created for current or past projects. Once proposals become approved projects, they are transferred from the PPDB to the RPDP project system. The project system application allows each of the Homeland Securities Centers of Excellence to enter each project into a database, which gathers all the pertinent information for each project for reporting and tracking purposes for OUP. A new website content management system was implemented, with a migration to MURA as content manager. This system enables DHS to make website content and layout changes with greater ease and to include news feed, blogs, calendars, etc. on their pages in a standardized customizable format. For refinement of the site, new logos, and an updated website design were created. Year 2 of the contract brought about many significant updates and additions. After client use of the system, valuable feedback was provided, and enhancements based on this feedback were completed during year 2 of the project. RPDB and PPDB upgrades were completed. The Search & Query/Report was created to implement reports and queries as requested. An initial wire-­‐frame for the congressional portal was produced as well as a dedicated querying portal with executive level reporting customized for congress with specialized security structure for users. An auditing framework was created to address any data compliance issues. A Subject Matter Expert Database was designed, built and improved upon, providing users with ready access to contact information for specialists in areas of particular interest. Collaboration portal upgrades were made to add surveys and upgrade forums/message boards. Assistance and training was provided in website content creation and maintenance. During year 3, updates and enhancements continued. Community tools/portal upgrades for document management, working groups, forum message boards and surveys were implemented. For additional efficiency, a migration to Cold Fusion 9 was completed. 150 Website functionality upgrades and a full website redesign were also completed during this contract year. During year 4 of the contract, interface upgrades to RPDB were done, and a Risk Analysis Workgroup (RAW) was implemented. This effort was a result of an interest by University Programs for a collaborative effort to combine the RAW and the UP databases. RAW is a modeling database simulating different scenarios based on the information that is entered, consisting of two user interfaces: a web browser and standalone client. In addition to gaining access to documentation, users can also download the stand-­‐alone version of RAW enabling the ability to operate RAW while disconnected from the Internet. Throughout the entire contract time frame, security audits were conducted, whereby the project underwent a third-­‐party security audit twice yearly to certify the application is free of security defects. Documentation on the database, application and security/network were updated on a semi-­‐annual basis. 4. Obstacles Technical obstacles: University Summit Streaming was intended to be a small pilot event streaming the Summit in 2010 within the confines of the existing system. After 6 weeks of preparation for this scenario, requirements changed 11 days before the event to include new streaming requirements: concurrent streams now needed to support more than 1,000 users, these new users would not follow the current event registration process in place to gain access, closed captioning would be needed, recordings of the full event required, and other requests that demanded a complete retool of the event. Issues with the hotel equipment arose with internet and audio equipment problems. Resolution: The NCFPD technical contractor contacted Adobe and Connect Solutions to assist with the new requirements. Adobe and Connect solutions were able to provide staffing and real time data center support from Connect Solutions from meet the of needs of the event. Hardware to support the new requirements of concurrent streams was sent overnight and staff was trained in its usage. The technical contractor was able to obtain the services of a closed captioning provider and get it integrated into the live streams for the main events. Help Desk support for University Programs was augmented to respond to the influx of questions from new attendees. For future events it was determined that the technical staff may need to bring along a complete set of redundant cords and equipment in case of similar hotel equipment failures. Non-­‐technical obstacles: Frequent turnover of technical liaison at the HSUP department headquartered in Washington DC made project-­‐related communication and decisions difficult. Resolution: Initiated weekly status calls with current HSUP personnel for project communication and feedback. Worked with new liaisons as they became available to conduct knowledge transfers and support Q & A. 151 5. Outcomes A website for HSUP that Homeland Security can use for project management and reporting was created; a project system application was also added to the HSUP site to be utilized by all Homeland Security Centers of Excellence, giving Center users the ability to enter their projects along with all data associated with each project for reporting purposes. The site also features a project search/query functionality, which is optimized to enable the user to quickly find data and research projects conducted by COE’s. A ‘select all’ feature was also created for adding search results to PDF reports. An initial public HSUP site design was piloted, and then after user testing and feedback, the HSUP public site was transformed through an extensive full site re-­‐design, giving HSUP users the ability to control content changes with use of open-­‐source content management software (MURA), allowing OUP staff to more easily update and create content. Technical staff began the initial portal creation for each Center of Excellence (COE), enabling centers to create/edit their own content, add newsfeeds, and post images and documents for public use. Feedback capability, enabling users to submit questions and comments to OUP HSUP members via the portal was also added. The re-­‐design additionally features a dynamic content function related to project information for each COE. This information is listed in a side bar and pulls content for each site automatically, by selected terms for that COE. During this contract period, HSUP also benefitted from general internal system improvements, providing the end user with more reliability, better back up and more efficiency. System and process upgrades have transformed the QA testing process, making it smoother and more efficient. Quality Assurance testing is now done in two different “pre-­‐production” environments, BETA and PILOT, enabling both staff and end-­‐users to conduct testing before new features/enhancements are moved to production servers. Additionally, the database was upgraded from MySQL to Microsoft SQL server. This upgrade provides greater reliability, as well as better back-­‐up and fail-­‐over capabilities for the entire site. Several steps were taken to ensure security. Production servers were moved to dedicated rack-­‐space in a secure facility; server software patches were added; incremental upgrades were implemented to protect against viruses and denial of service attacks; and firewall and Virtual Private Network (VPN) upgrades were also performed. To further ensure security, all development and production systems are now only accessible through VPN. Finally, HSUP users were provided with the ability to share large files via File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Purdue University is already using this capability. HSUP members also benefit from CoreSHIELD functionality; offering an online secure platform by which users can share documents, create online webinars, look up contact information, create distribution lists, and add workgroups, etc. During this reporting period, significant support was provided for the DHS University Summit event. Online broadcasting of the Summit event was provided and members of the technical staff were in attendance to record and trouble shoot. In preparation for the event, a recommendation document was developed, which covered technical, event regulation procedures, archiving and polling. 152 6. Recommendations for Future Effort Single Sign on: Allow portal members to have access (when proper authorization has been granted) to other sites (where they currently have access granted) without the need to login again to the other site. Enhanced reporting capability: Automate report dissemination to frequent requestors. This would decrease the amount of internal resources spent aggregating and searching for this date. Congressional Portal: Allow access to Congressional members and staffers to quickly see how/where OUP research dollars are being utilized in their state/district. Create canned, prescribed reports for reuse, and allow for general raw data search as needed. The Student and Alumni portal: This effort was initiated but tabled during the project period. NCFPD believes there is strong benefit to continuing to support students and alumni to these programs. By leveraging the existing portal a new secure area for the student and alumni can be created. Social Media Engagement: Encourage greater user participation and involvement through social media such as instant messaging. Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FASCAT) Contract Title and number: FASCAT attached to DHS Grant 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003 Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 6/18/09-­‐2/28/11 1. Project Summary The Food and Agriculture infrastructure is a unique, complex, globally distributed and highly integrated system of systems. Due to the unique nature of the agriculture system, identifying the critical components of this system has remained a challenge. In order to develop a unified method for identifying and reporting critical agriculture infrastructure, DHS funded the creation of the Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool or FASCAT by The National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD). The first version of the FASCAT tool was an Excel based spreadsheet and became available as version 1.0 for use in 2009. Twenty-­‐three states utilized the tool to report critical food and agriculture infrastructures. The 2009 assessments included a total of 35 commodities and 178 sub-­‐systems within various states. In 2010, the tool was updated to a web based platform, FASCAT 2.0, and expanded to additional partners including the Multi-­‐state Partnership for Security in Agriculture, and the Southern Agriculture and Animal Disaster Response Alliance. In late 2010 through February 2011, initial development of FASCAT 3.0 was accomplished. This included the integration of the new DHS Taxonomy 4.0. 153 The use of the FASCAT tool supports the idea that food and agriculture infrastructure needs to be assessed as a system rather than as individual facilities and provides a unified means to that end. The tool is accessible at both the FoodSHIELD, and the NCFPD websites: •
http://www.FoodSHIELD.org •
http://www.ncfpd.umn.edu 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCFPD team members: Morgan Hennessey, Jennifer Koeman, Shelley Mehlenbacher Yu Wang, John Hoffman, Bill Krueger and Jennifer Pierquet. External Consultants: Datastream Connexion, Eric Hoffman and Grandville Ricks 4. Deliverable Effort Task 1. Facilitate FASCAT use by the states and additional interested parties. 1.1. Contact States and engage them in participating in the FASCAT workshops. In 2009, NCFPD worked with states that assisted in the FASCAT development to host workshops with state officials and industry to further the use and understanding of the tool. California was the first state to initiate host a workshop for performing assessments that could be submitted as part of the NCIPP data call process. Minnesota and New York also held on-­‐site workshops. Many of the Southern Agriculture and Animal Disaster Response Alliance (SAADRA) states attended a train the trainer workshop that engaged Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and Louisiana. Additionally in February and March of 2009, NCFPD held on-­‐line webinars with each of these states to continue the process of FASCAT assessments and the organization of state FASCAT data into a format acceptable for submission to DHS. During 2010, NCFPD supported onsite workshops in Alaska, California, Colorado, and New Mexico. States in the Midwest worked through a grant established by the Multi-­‐State Partnership with James Lee Witt and Associates to facilitate FASCAT workshops with the partnership states. NCFPD attended each of these workshops to support the states in training and to develop a consistent training with James Lee Witt that could be extended by contract to other states and organizations. States involved in these workshops included Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, , Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. 154 NCFPD also provided a second train the trainer workshop in Georgia for the SADDRA states, which included, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and Louisiana. While most of the on-­‐site workshops were one day, states like New York and California actually had multiple day workshops engaging different stakeholders for multiple commodity chains. Follow-­‐up webinar training was provided again in 2010 to states that responded to the data call including Michigan, Arizona and New Mexico. 1.2. Respond to questions from the states. NCFPD provided an ongoing support network for the states that included, training on and transition between FASCAT versions 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0. This support also assisted states in use of the FoodSHIELD web site which hosted the FASCAT tool. Training and support included accessing the tool, user guides, uploading materials and document management, use of webinar resources built into FoodSHIELD, adding new members to each state’s unique and secure portal within FoodSHIELD and administration of security for each state’s access. Throughout the development and deployment of FASCAT 2.0, a team of NCFPD staff and contract technical support provided ready both user support and maintenance/ bug fixes for the FASCAT tool. An online helpdesk and phone support were provided to support users for extended business hours during the week. Beyond this, 24 hour messaging was available online to ensure capture and resolution of all user concerns. 1.3. Develop list of State points of contact to plan the workshops. A spreadsheet of all state points of contact was established to track participation and to facilitate communication on upgrades and training opportunities. Additionally, all State primary administrators for FASCAT were added to the FoodSHIELD contact Directory and can be accessed or queried for other communication and reporting associated with ongoing use for the FASCAT tool. 1.4 Conduct a series of webinars to provide training on FASCAT. In each year of the 2009, 2010 and 2011datacalls, NCFPD worked with DHS-­‐HITRAC to provide several nation-­‐wide overviews on FASCAT and use of the tool. Many states then received individual webinars to enhance their understanding of the tool and to support them in getting FASCAT data formatted to for entry into DHS data systems. All 30 states participating in the Data Call received multiple webinars to support their FASCAT training and IDCA submissions. Over 30 webinars were conducted each year by NCFPD in 2009 through 2011to support all phases of FASCAT implementation and use by states. 1.5 Provide on-­‐site workshops to train state and regional FASCAT users. In 2009, four workshops were conducted on use of the FASCAT tool. Three states held workshops focused on the commodity supply chains represented their respective states. This included California with five workshops and New York and Minnesota with one each. 155 These state-­‐based workshops followed different approaches. California emphasized industry participation by having workshops in locations throughout the state where the industry stakeholders could best participate. For example, the assessment on the cattle industry was hosted on a large ranch. Minnesota and New York each hosted their workshops at their Departments of Agriculture. Participants include regulatory officials with primary responsibility for each assessed industry and representative industry. Government stakeholders participated by webinar for each assessment. SAADRA held a regional workshop with a train the trainer approach. They did not have industry participation in the workshop but did individually follow up with industry stakeholders for review of the data from each assessment. In 2010 a total of 17 FASCAT workshops were conducted around the country. Alaska, Colorado, Florida and New Mexico each hosted one-­‐day workshops at their primary food regulatory agency. Interestingly, their diversity included all three agencies of Agriculture, Environmental Protection and Public Health. Each of them included industry participation on site in the assessments. California and New York each hosted 2 one-­‐day industry focused workshops. California again held their workshops in geographic proximity to the represented industry. New York held their workshops on site at the Department of Agriculture with representative industry stakeholders participating by webinar over two concurrent days. The Southern Agriculture & Animal Disaster Response Alliance (SAADRA) held a second regional workshop with the same train the trainer approach as they employed for 2009. As noted above, NCFPD worked with James Lee Witt on a contract with the Midwest Multistate Partnership states to provide FASCAT training on site with appropriate government and industry officials represented. Ten states engaged in these workshops to include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. 1.6 Compile data from 2009 – 2010 workshops and assessments; summarize data collected, and lessons learned. Using de-­‐identified data, NCFPD accomplished basic analysis to determine the amount and types of commodities that had been assessed. Quantitative and qualitative assessment was conducted to assess patterns in response. This analysis assisted in understanding if the responses answered the intended question. This work highlighted the need for review of the comment fields where significant data had been entered however was difficult to efficiently analyze. NCFPD gathered input on: proposed adjustments to the threat and consequence lists, suggested changes to the characteristics list, and complied data for the “other Attributes” list that was then incorporated into FASCAT 2.0 and 3.0. Additionally the Center took input on changes needed for the guidance document that were incorporated into the new FASCAT 2.0 and 3.0 Guidance Documents. 156 Through the on-­‐site and webinar interactions with states, NCFPD collected information on user interface improvements needed, such as page layout, input page access and collection of participant information. Data for improvements to the commodity flow charts was also collected via both the comments sections and from meeting discussions with users. Many of the page layout and user interface changes were built into the new FASCAT 3.0 design but some of the recommended improvements, (especially enhancements to the commodity flow charts) were not incorporated into FASCAT 3.0 due to limited budget and time available before the next DHS Data Call in 2011. 1.7 Write guidance document for state FASCAT use to include terminology definitions. Work with states to engage Private Sector in use of FASCAT. Starting in 2008 with the first deployment of FASCAT, a guidance document was developed which has been updated for new FASCAT versions to facilitate use of the tool and to ensure a uniform understanding of terminology employed by FASCAT. During 2010, a significant rewrite was necessary to capture the changes presented by migration from a spreadsheet application to a web-­‐based version of the tool. In each release of the FASCAT guidance, a significant portion was dedicated to definitions of the terminology used in the tool. This was important since each selection made within FASCAT affects the score generated by the tool. The scores are what states use to prioritize the importance of each critical infrastructure assessed. Selecting a particular threat, consequence impact or characteristic within the tool requires a common understanding by stakeholders performing the assessment of how each selection is defined. Developing clear, concise definitions for the terminology used to describe each selection was critical to ensuring uniform application of FASCAT by all state and industry participants. Access to the guidance documentation was important for ensuring that state and industry officials had a good understanding of the tool before trying to perform an actual assessment. The guidance documentation was made available on the public access side of the FoodSHIELD and NCFPD’s web sites. Links to these locations for FASCAT guidance documentation was provided to industry and state officials through mailings from FDA, USDA and DHS. The Food and Agriculture Sector Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and the Industry Sector Coordination Council (SCC) also ensured that links were provided to associations and organizations serving Food and Agriculture for distribution to respective membership. Task 2. Assist states in determining their nomination of Food and Agriculture submissions for the DHS data calls occurring in 2009 and 2010. Enable state access to prior FASCAT assessment data for preliminary user inter-­‐face and analysis. To use FASCAT data for the DHS Annual Data Call, it was critical to get FASCAT information into the established DHS system for capturing Data Call information. This system, the Infrastructure Data Collection Application (IDCA), is required for all Level 1 and Level 2 nominations that are a pre-­‐requisite of receiving DHS funding for Critical Infrastructure. Since no software interface existed between FASCAT and IDCA, it was necessary to create and deploy a defined process for translating and entering FASCAT data into this DHS 157 application. With significant state support, a guidance presentation and document was developed to assist states in translating FASCAT data into IDCA. Many of the states also submitted their FASCAT spreadsheets that were performed in Excel versions of FASCAT as attachments in IDCA to support the submissions. NCFPD provided significant support to states in performing the tasks outlined in the Guidance. Several national webinars were conducted to train states and answer questions on this process. Additionally, NCFPD followed up by phone with all states using FASCAT to ensure their understanding of these critical steps. Ten states required follow-­‐up webinars with NCFPD during the last week of the Data Call to support their submission efforts. Since 2010 was the transition from the spreadsheet to the web-­‐based version of the tool, NCFPD ensured that all of the data from the spreadsheet versions were uploaded into the FASCAT 2.0 web based version. This enabled for query of the data archive of all FASCAT submissions from 2008 through 2010. This interface was developed within the FASCAT web based portal for states to look up and analyze specific assessments. The capability was structured such that each result field could be queried as a single field or as a more complex multiple field lookup. Based on state feedback, further refinement of this tool and access to template or routine look-­‐ups is planned for future FASCAT 3.0 development. Task 3. Develop FASCAT 2.0 as a web-­‐based scalable application. 3.1 Create secure user access for FASCAT through FoodSHIELD FASCAT 2.0 was deployed in its web-­‐based version on the FoodSHIELD platform. Within FoodSHIELD, a customized workgroup was created for each state that allowed states to control access and security read/write privileges for their designated state and industry participants. Each state FASCAT workgroup/state portal had tools beyond just accessing the FASCAT tool and assessments for their state. The portal allowed them to share secure documents and to host webinar conferences and training exclusive to their states participants. The goal was for each state to create community and communication, education and training around their FASCAT assessments that could lead to improved risk mitigation. 3.2.
Enable the states to securely access their own data on the web based version. Each state was provided their own secure portal into FASCAT that only permitted access to that individual states FASCAT assessments. Each state helped identify a primary point person (State Administrator) for their portal who was then given rights to add or delete additional state and industry participants. Webinars and training was provided to the state designated portal Administrators on maintaining user rights and security for their respective state portals and FASCAT assessments. 3.3.
Build capability into the tool to access IMPLAN state agricultural economic data. The IMPLAN is a software and aggregation of economic data for all sectors that enables economic modeling to be performed based on NAICS Codes. Since DHS Taxonomy is rooted in NAICS codes, it was logical that FASCAT could eventually link what is critical through 158 assessments of critical infrastructure to what the economic risk might be for any given critical infrastructure. IMPLAN data user rites were purchased by NCFPD for piloting the concept of data alignment with FASCAT assessments. The FASCAT query tool was customized to integrate IMPLAN economic data into the values retrieved for a given query set. By example, one could query the number of sub-­‐systems impacted by a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) event which is one of the threats identified in FASCAT. The retrieved sub-­‐systems impacted could then weigh the economic impact of these systems by retrieving the associated IMPLAN data. This feature was tested and showed promise for potential economic modeling within the FASCAT tool based on threats and consequences. While aligning IMPLAN data to queries based on FASCAT assessments demonstrated this capability it highlighted the need for more refinement and granularity than IMPLAN data is currently capable of providing. Meetings with USDA Agriculture Statistics management have shown that additional data elements that can compliment IMPLAN data are available but would require significant FASCAT enhancement to rapidly acquire and merge these relevant but highly disparate data streams. 4. Obstacles 1. Funding Inconsistencies. Throughout the piloting, development and deployment of FASCAT, funding from DHS to NCFPD has lagged far behind the expectations for deliverables. During 2009, DHS -­‐ IICD funding to support the Data Call occurring from February 2009 to April 2009 were allocated in November of 2008 but actually received by NCFPD in June of 2009. Many of the funded tasks in support of the Data Call were no longer achievable at this point. FASCAT deliverables for the funding had to be redesigned to new expectations. For example, funding for states to host workshops for the Data Call did not occur for lack of timely funding. This six month delay was repeated again in 2010 and in 2011. The delays compromised the support for states during the Data Calls and severely limited software development. FASCAT version releases were often delayed to occur during or after the Data Call process precluding any pre-­‐Data Call training on the tool for states. 2. Automated integration of FASCAT into IDCA. The delay in funding for FASCAT also impacted the resources that could be applied to designing and integrating FASCAT with other DHS Data Call software. This forced the states to have significant additional steps in getting FASCAT data into appropriate DHS data systems such as the Infrastructure Data Collection Application (IDCA) required for successful Data Call participation. 3. Funding to states to support FASCAT efforts. While states saw the value of identifying critical infrastructure and mitigating risk to Food and Agriculture critical systems, they primarily saw value in using FASCAT as an opportunity to generate more federal funding to the state. Currently states are struggling with budgets and resources as a whole. In this resource constrained environment they are focused on things they must do by law or regulation. Most states saw FASCAT as a voluntary exercise that did not make their “must do’’ list. Without funding, states struggled to support the FASCAT effort. Many of the 159 Midwest states only participated because they had a $250,000 federal grant to assist them in holding FASCAT workshops. 4. Conflicting messaging from DHS regarding use of FASCAT. DHS employs many people to work with states to the national Data Call such as staff from HITRAC, Protective Security Advisors PSA’s and support from the Infrastructure Information Collection Division (IICD) that helped with use of the DHS IDCA and ACAMS software used for all sectors in the Data Call process. Many of these people had inadequate or misinformation on FASCAT that created confusion for the states. Some states thought FASCAT was required while others felt it was totally unnecessary and an added workload with no benefit. While NCFPD worked with DHS HITRAC, IICD and POD to improve the education of the states and federal partners, it was impossible to reach all key stakeholders given the funding and time constraints. 5. Outcomes From January through the end of the 2011 DHS NCIPP Data Call on April 9th 2010, outreach efforts included more than 30 webinars and 17 on-­‐site state workshops. Additionally, the Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) for the Food and Agriculture Sector formed a steering group to help guide this process. With this strong push, the following results were realized during 2010: •
FASCAT Web version 2.0 was released on FoodSHIELD for the data call. All prior spreadsheet assessments from 2008 and 2009 were migrated to this new platform. With this prior data and 148 new sub-­‐systems assessments performed during 2010, a total of 499 sub-­‐systems were now captured online. •
30 States were successful at getting 121 Sub-­‐Systems representing over 1300 nodes from food and agriculture Sub-­‐Systems recognized as National Critical Infrastructure. This represents approximately 10% of the total number Critical Infrastructures designated as Level 2 for all 18 sectors. This was the first time food and agriculture had been represented on the Critical Infrastructure list. The framework for integration of FASCAT with other DHS systems and Taxonomy had been established to guide future development of the FASCAT tool and state participation with the process. For FASCAT data to be used in the NCIPP data call process, it was imperative to convert FASCAT terminology into DHS Taxonomy for describing Critical Infrastructure and Assets in all 18 sectors. While DHS Taxonomy was built on an international standard North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), the use of terms for food and agriculture were incomplete and needed more specificity to fully capture what was being assessed. FASCAT terminology was reconciled with DHS Taxonomy for submission during the NCIPP Data Call into other DHS systems. An extensive 1300 record cross-­‐reference was developed to crosswalk all data submitted in 2009 FASCAT submissions. In 2010, this crosswalk was built into a tool for conversion of all FASCAT spreadsheets into a format that included DHS Taxonomy descriptors. Improving the DHS Taxonomy language for Food and Agriculture was a major initiative of the FASCAT team in 2010. This effort was able to leverage the 2010 DHS taxonomy upgrades for all sectors from Taxonomy version 3.0 to a new 4.0 160 version. Developing a more comprehensive taxonomy for the food and agriculture sector also enabled the migration of the FASCAT development towards adopting DHS Taxonomy 4.0 as the sole means of defining Critical Infrastructure systems and assets. 6. Future Effort Based on the results of the FASCAT usage in 2010 and the lessons learned, a project for future development of the FASCAT tool and engagement of stakeholders in the process was developed by NCFPD and DHS/IP/POD for work in 2011 and beyond. A statement of work has been delivered to NCFPD to continue FASCAT efforts for 2011. Food and Agriculture Sector Transportation Modeling (FASTRANS) Contract Title and number: FASTRANS on DHS Award 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003 Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 9/28/07-­‐12/31/08 1. Project Summary The Food and Agriculture Sector Transportation Modeling effort (FASTRANS) was undertaken to address this capability gap. The initial effort or first phase of the project was limited in scope by the need to focus on the immediate FMD modeling requirements for cattle and swine. The project team developed methodologies to integrate business rules, routing and livestock transportation information with these models. Without this data, current FMD disease spread models simulate random livestock transportation movements that do not reflect the actual national livestock transportation system. As a result, such models, where used to develop control and eradication plans or in an actual event, could inappropriately influence the plans to apply critical resources and high impact control measures in locations or region where positive effect would be minimal. Research focused on five key areas: 1) developing representative business rules for livestock movements, 2) development of a stakeholder accessible FASTRANS database, 3) development of a commodity routing model to output GIS based sector representative commodity movement information 4) collection of data on location, transaction modalities and quantities of livestock passing through salesyards and data on representative characteristics of livestock way points, such as truck stops where in-­‐transit livestock commingle, and 5) early pilot studies to look at the value in accurate disease modeling of more realistic salesyard representation and way stops in the spread of exotic animal disease viruses such as FMD. It must be understood that the U.S. livestock industry is not motivated to share significant quantities of information on their business activities for a variety of proprietary reasons. This is evident, for example, in the reluctance of the industry to embrace national animal identification efforts. The research effort for business rules and characteristics of interstate movements was hindered by this industry posture, but a number of relationships were established over the course of the project and sufficient representative data was made available to inform this project and demonstrate the value of such information. 161 Phase 1 of the project provided a prototype model of the interstate transportation within the beef, dairy, and swine sectors that can be used by decision-­‐makers in assessing livestock movements and serve as one example input to epidemic models. This first effort was intended to evaluate the relative importance of including the long distance high fidelity movement information for animals in the national livestock marketing system in models used to evaluate the potential spread of FMD. Further, the project was designed to develop requirements for GIS interfaces, databases and management systems to better inform these FMD and other epidemic models. The intent has been to fill this recognized gap in capacity needed to model the dispersion of this disease over long distances with multiple origins and destinations as it might actually occur in the U.S. The Phase 1 outcomes from this project clearly demonstrate the value of such commodity movement information and the need to define a systematic approach to collecting this information on a continuing basis to maintain currency of the FASTRANS databases. These outcomes include the successful development and deployment of the FASTRANS database populated with a small, but representative subset of beef, dairy, and swine movement and premises data, a clear demonstration of the impact of both salesyards and transportation way points and the development of a livestock routing model based upon collected commodity business rules that can provide realistic transportation data input to current epidemic modeling effort. Finally, this first phase of the FASTRANS effort demonstrates the need to continue to understand and define in usable formats the business rules and practices of the U.S. livestock industry and of the need for improved commodity tracking information. It is also clear that the lack of a national animal ID program and the reluctance of the livestock industry to broadly share transportation and movement data impedes our ability to plan for and respond to a large scale infectious disease outbreak in these populations. This project serves as a stimulus to aggressively seek an accommodation with the private sector stakeholders, to continue to search out non-­‐traditional sources of information and to escalate the use of advanced technologies in state animal movement monitoring programs, such as health certifications and permits. Finally, as noted above, this project has shown a need for collecting and processing commodity movement and marketing data on a continuing basis. As more information is collected and processed, the value of this information will increase. To support this capability, the FASTRANS servers and databases will require a long term system operation and maintenance environment. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCFPD team members: Morgan Hennessey, John Hoffman External Consultants: Chelsea White, Georgia Institute of Technology, Michael Orosz, FAZD/USC ISI, Doug Tolleson, FAZD, David Wray 3. Deliverable Effort 162 The FASTRANS database and modeling system provides (via a graphical user interface) the following capabilities: •
•
Data management: •
Livestock movement records can be entered manually or via file importation. •
Collected livestock movement records can be viewed via a table or graphically on a map •
Collected livestock movement records can be exported for use by other applications Analytical Tools: •
Routing and way point analytical tools: •
Generate most likely transportation routes between premises •
Generate list of most likely way points between premises • Way points include: truck stops, weigh stations, rest stops, and other locations where livestock may congregate for any period of time thus creating a “temporary premises” for potential cross infection The FASTRANS database is currently populated with the following commodity movement data: •
Cattle movement data for CA and TX •
Swine movement data for IA, MN, and NC •
Premises information for the CONUS (from NASS (2002) and Dunn & Bradstreet) •
Transportation grid (from DOT and NISAC) – including way point data In addition to collected cattle and swine movement data, movement data for other livestock types (goats, sheep, etc.) were also collected when available. This information is sparse. Pilot Studies Two pilot studies were undertaken to explore the impact of livestock salesyard (in terms of multiple changes in ownership and comingling of animals with distribution from the salesyard to multiple premises) and waypoints (truck stops) on the spread of FMDV. Salesyards were examined because, in many cases, animal disease spread models either have insufficient salesyard information and assume a single “one size fits all” (i.e., in terms of sales volume) model of a salesyard (although the LLNL MESA model doesn’t make this assumption) or rely on dated salesyard movement/transaction information. Truck stops were examined because such waypoints are a major component of the interstate transportation system where livestock carrying trucks and tractor trailers stop for 163 extended lengths of time (> 8 hours). These stops are rarely accounted for when assessing the impact of interstate (and international border) livestock movements on the spread of exotic animal diseases. For example, there exists very little information on the potential spread of disease due to the close proximity of livestock trucks parked at these stops. Extended stay at truck stops by livestock trucks was assumed to be representative of the many other way points where potential load cross exposures occur every day. For example, there are truck weigh stations where trucks congregate for short and medium term exposures, there are agriculture weigh stations, there are rest stops for driver change, restroom use, water, etc., and there are many, many others….all of which create potential cross infection, disease spread risks. Davis Animal Disease Simulation (DADS) Model For the pilot studies, the DADS model was used to evaluate the significance of interstate transportation and marketing on outcomes of various scenarios involving single or multiple outbreaks of FMDV as a model disease. The DADS model was chosen because many of the issues that FASTRANS is designed to address in DADS are similar to those found with other exotic animal disease spread models (i.e., LLNL/MESA, USDA/NAADSM). The assumption was that the results produced using DADS would be applicable to the other disease spread models. Ongoing communication with LLNL and CEAH was maintained throughout the pilot study to apprise them of progress and to solicit their information needs. A strategic meeting with LLNL and USDA/CEAH is planned for early 2009 to further discuss the pilot study results and develop a Phase II experimental design to expand on the earlier results and further explore the utility of FASTRANS in extending/informing epidemic models. The initial plan for evaluating the role of interstate transportation and marketing had to be modified as the DADS model does not deal with multiple exchanges of ownership en-­‐route to final destination, it does not provide for the utilization of specific origin and destination movement information (as opposed to statistical-­‐distribution generated movements), nor does it permit modeling possible cross infection related to exposures at truck stops en-­‐
route from origin to destination. This is a capacity that can be incorporated into the models but requires significant development. The results of these pilot studies demonstrate the relative importance of these elements in the total interstate movement of animals and helps to justify the cost in terms of time and money to expand model capacity. Salesyards Pilot Study Effort This pilot study looked at how FASTRANS informs the modeling of an animal disease outbreak via both direct and indirect contacts. Specifically, does better informed (via FASTRANS data) salesyards information improve animal disease spread modeling? First, several scenarios were run in the DADS model where infection originates in large beef2 and dairy herds in Texas and California, and progresses through either small or large cattle auctions (as measured by sales volume) with further distribution past the market to multiple statistically defined destinations3. This was done for both interstate and intrastate movement of animals to estimate the influence of this kind of co-­‐mingling and multiple 164 ownership of animals. Results confirmed that in scenarios with large auction operations, larger numbers of infected herds and animals will result from the interstate movement. Specifically, we examined the importance of correctly classifying (using FASTRANS movement information) salesyards according to volume of animal sales. We examined two size classifications, large and small (LLNL MESA also considers large and small salesyards). First, we considered the number of shipments into and out of “one size fits all” salesyards where the shipment volumes are a weighted average (AVG) of the two salesyard sizes. Second, we assumed that shipments into and out of salesyards were larger (in terms of sales volume) for the large salesyards and smaller (again, in terms of sales volume) for the small salesyards, more accurately reflecting reality (REAL). The results of the pilot study suggest that in general, epidemic models underestimate – and in some cases greatly underestimate -­‐ the number of infected herds and animals that result from an FMDV outbreak when a single “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all” salesyard model is used. Specifically, by employing a two size (large and small) salesyard model based on accurate salesyard transaction information, epidemic model output is greatly impacted (i.e., the resulting spread predictions greatly differ from the predictions produced when using a single “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all” salesyard model). This suggests that further study is required (including the collection of additional information on salesyard operations across CONUS) to determine if more specificity in salesyard representation is required to more accurately predict the impact of disease spread resulting from interstate movements of livestock. Large California Beef Operations (Salesyards) In summary, 183 epidemics were successfully simulated. Of those 183, 98 included shipments with at least one infectious animal, and thereby were capable of leading to interstate disease transmission. The index herd was a large (>250) beef herd in CA. 4. Obstacles Although the movement and marketing data collected from state governments and the private sector represents only a small fraction of all available information, the sample was sufficiently deep and broad (covering beef, diary, swine, and several other livestock types from several different sources) to help with the design and development of the FASTRANS model, routing module, and database. On the other hand, while the movement and marketing data was sufficient for the design and development of the FASTRANS infrastructure, gaps still remained in the data that prevented the system from being used in the proof-­‐of-­‐concept pilot studies without further development. Several steps were taken to address the gap issues with cattle movement data and transportation system related business rules. First, detailed NASS data on interstate movements from the period 2004-­‐
2006 were reviewed for the specific states (i.e., TX, CA, MN, NC, and IA). Then commercial industry economic sales and transaction data were acquired via cooperating partners at the National Infrastructure Simulation Center (NISAC) at Sandia National Laboratory. This provided gross annual, and in some cases monthly, and with seasonal variations, interstate movement numbers that demonstrated the scale of these movements and allowed interstate movements to be simulated using the FASTRANS routing model, employing basic movement business rules and historical movement profiles. Using the cattle salesyard 165 transaction data, it was also possible to input data directly into the DADS model (see Pilot Study below) to demonstrate the impact these unique premises have on infection spread when their transactions are considered in the disease spread model. From this initial work it also became clear that long distance, interstate movements of cattle and swine are common and they provide numerous opportunities1 for indirect infection at truck stops and similar waypoints along the movement routes. 5. Outcomes Based on the results from the pilot studies and on the commodity movement and marketing data collected, this project has clearly demonstrated the value to DHS and the states of an effective livestock movement tracking and tracing capability. Such a system -­‐ the national Animal ID program -­‐ has been proposed, however, its implementation and rollout have been long delayed due to resistance from the private sector. Further, based on recent E.coli and salmonella foodborne outbreaks and the effort undertaken to trace the sources and distribution of the pathogens, the importance of being able to identify, track and trace all food and agriculture commodities (not just livestock) has been demonstrated. A key component of the next phase of this project must be to continue to work with industry to capture commodity movement business rules and to further illustrate the value of such national ID programs. A GIS-­‐based structure was developed and serves as the core for the FASTRANS database that provides for the capture and access of an array of transportation, population and infrastructure information. The core database has been populated with a small, but representative set of beef, dairy, and swine movement, marketing, and infrastructure data for the states of CA, TX, MN, NC, and IA. Included in the FASTRANS system is a commodity routing module (employing county level origin/destination pairs) which is based upon developed business rules and provides movement routing, stops and timing information, in a GIS format that can be provided to the FMDV disease model teams and other stakeholders. In addition, a graphical user interface (GUI) was developed to provide stakeholders access to the collected movement and marketing information. This GUI can also be used to add new movement and marking information. Two pilot studies were undertaken to explore the impact of livestock salesyard (in terms of cattle movements) and waypoints (truck stops) on the spread of FMDV. Salesyards were examined because, in many cases, animal disease spread models either assume a single “one size fits all” model of a salesyard or rely on dated salesyard movement/transaction information. Truck stops were examined because such waypoints are a major component of the interstate transportation system where livestock carrying trucks and traitor trailers stop for extended lengths of time. These stops are rarely accounted for when accessing the impact of interstate (and international border) livestock movements on the spread of exotic animal diseases. For example, there exists very little information on the potential spread of disease due to the close proximity of livestock trucks parked at these stops. Results from the salesyard pilot study showed that when it is assumed that all salesyards are the same size and complexity an existing epidemic model (DADS) underestimates the number of infected herds and cattle resulting from an FMDV outbreak when compared to 166 running DADS using the large and small salesyard representation. These results suggest that a more accurate salesyard representation (i.e., more salesyard specificity) may need to be incorporated into existing exotic animal disease spread epidemic models. It is clear that additional study is required to development a much greater understanding of the national livestock salesyard and auction systems and how they are changing as the result of new communications technologies (such as the INTERNET) and due to domestic consolidation and globalization of the sector. Results from the waypoint pilot study showed that for trucks with single drivers that have one or more extended-­‐stay stops (8 hours or more), the probability of FMDV transmission at a truck stop is sensitive to the number of long-­‐term trucks stopping in a day at the same truck stop and on the route of FMDV transmission. These initial results suggest that waypoints (at least truck stops) do in fact impact the spread of exotic animal diseases and suggests that further study may be warranted. It must be noted that many truck stock operators were very reluctant to share information on the conduct of movement operations by livestock firms through their facilities. Only limited studies on truck stops were done Phase 1. There are numerous other way points that may influence disease spread during movements, such as state operated weighing stations, agriculture inspections stations, rest stops, etc. Furthermore, because most livestock operators were reluctant to share business rules for transportation operations there is a need for a stronger partnership to facilitate greater acquisition of needed way point information so that in transit infectious disease exposure can accurately quantified for a given movement route profile. As Phase 1 was limited to cattle, dairy and swine livestock movement investigations, the movements of other sector commodities were not investigated. Yet, as recent events have shown, there is a critical need to also investigate the business rules and movement profiles of commodities such as fresh produce and those products with recent problematic histories, such as peanut butter. There is also an important information gap on importation of many products from our trading partners, such as Mexico and China. 6. Future Effort Policy Recommendations As is often the case during research of this nature, numerous system deficiencies are encountered that hinder data collection and full appreciation of the significance of key events, trends and practices. As this project progressed, the lack of available data on industry transportation practices and documentation of movements illustrated these deficiencies. The problems stem from a reluctance of the private sector to share information for both proprietary business reasons as well as a historical mistrust of government. These conditions must be overcome through a partnership between all of the stakeholders. Easily said, of course, but problematic to realize. That said, there are some significant policy issues that arise from an endeavor such as this. Policy Recommendations: 167 1. The Trucking industry component of the nation’s livestock system must be stimulated to improve movement record information sharing with key state and federal agencies. This may also necessitate new standards for record systems and uses of technology systems to facilitate information access when needed. 2. State level health certificate programs for interstate livestock movements must be improved and standards for information recording, transmission and storage must be modernized and implemented nationally. 3. A national animal identification program is essential. Such a program will not only facilitate more accurate and appropriate system and disease modeling, it will facilitate a more effective and cost efficient response to any outbreak of infectious disease within our nation’s livestock industry. It will improve the utility and accuracy of national and state level health certificate programs and it add significantly to our ability to safeguard our national food supply chain. Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor (FBADS) Contract Title and number: Detection of botulinum toxin subtypes in food matrices. IBC approval # 0902H58903 Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 05-­‐18-­‐2009 to 05-­‐18-­‐2011 1. Project Summary Botulinum, a potent neurotoxin is one the most toxic substances known. The lethal dose for mice is 0.3 ng/kg and for humans is thought to be 0.2-­‐2.0 μg/kg. Botulinum neurotoxin poses a major bio-­‐weapon threat because of its extreme potency and lethality; its ease of production, transport, and the need for prolonged intensive care among affected persons. Botulinum toxin is listed among the leading food borne biological terror agents. The current accepted diagnostic method for detection of botulinum toxin in foods is the mouse bioassay. Although sensitive, it can take up to two days for positive sample detection and number of samples that can be tested at one time is greatly restricted. Further testing is required to characterize the type of the toxin. Serotype specific in vitro detection systems are desperately needed to provide improved alternatives to animal testing and faster implementation of mitigation strategies during outbreaks. In this study we evaluated the performance of the MesoScale Diagnostics (MSD) System (Gaithersburg, Maryland) that employs the principle of electro-­‐chemiluminescence detection of botulinum toxin type A under the Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor (FBADS) Program of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The MSD model PR2 1900 utilizes a kit for detection of botulinum A and is standardized for toxin detection in raw milk to up to 40pg/ml. We evaluated the performance of this system in terms of detection limits and analytical sensitivity when applied to a wider variety of food matrices. A series of fruits, vegetables and juices were tested before and after toxin enrichment protocols. 168 The project employed the FBADS to test sample sets containing antigens at various concentrations across a variety of food matrices. The goal of this research project was to use the Food Biological Agent Detection Sensor Program (FBADS) system to test sample sets containing antigens at different concentrations across various food matrices, to include solids and liquids to verify the laboratory demonstration of Limits of Detection (LOD) for successful detection and identification of the targeted antigens under realistic conditions. The scope of work also extended to evaluate the performance ability of the FBADS system for antigen detection using spike and recovery experiments. The detection and identification of the targeted antigens under realistic conditions in this assay was compared to the diagnostic ability of a standard lab-­‐developed colorimetric ELISA. 2. Team Members PI: Dr. Srinand Sreevatsan NCFPD team members: Deepti Joshi (Research Assistant) External Consultants: MesoScale Diagnostics (Gaithersburg, Maryland) 3. Deliverable Effort The extension of food matrices to test using the FBADS instrument included liquids like water, chocolate milk, orange juice and tomato juice along with milk. Solid foods used in the study included spinach, lettuce, tomatoes (commonly consumed raw) and others like broccoli, meat, beans and carrots. We developed a laboratory-­‐based colorimetric sandwich ELISA using botulinum neurotoxin type A (source-­‐Metobiologics Inc.), purified rabbit polyclonal IgG specific to type A botulinum toxin as detection antibodies and mouse monoclonal antibodies as capture antibodies to the heavy chain of type A botulinum toxin. Goat anti-­‐rabbit IgG horse-­‐
radish peroxidase (HRP) conjugated affinity purified polyclonal antibodies were used as tertiary antibodies. TMB was used as the HRP substrate and 0.1N HCl was the stopping solution. The OD was measured at 450 nm using Spectramax M2, Molecular Devices (Sunnyvale, CA). The lab-­‐developed ELISA was able to detect up to 5ng/ml toxin in liquid food matrices like milk, chocolate milk and tomato juice and up to 2ng/ml in orange juice samples tested and for the solids tested the detection was up to 0.5ng/gm in spinach, 1ng/gm in tomato and 2ng/gm in lettuce samples. The same food matrices and a few others were tested using the FBADS instrument, MSD model PR2 1900. Since the instrument is not designed to handle food matrices other than milk, preanalytical sample processing was carried out prior to spiking with toxins like filtering of juices and blending and filtering of solid matrices or taking washings of spiked food samples prior to applying them on the system. The system is otherwise fully automated and runs the detection assay based on principle of electrochemiluminescence. The FBADS system failed to detect toxin in orange and tomato juice samples, as there was high background noise. In milk samples the detection limit was up to 20 pg/ml and for 169 chocolate milk it was 50 pg/ml. The LOD for solids varied depending on food matrix tested and sample preparation technique, ranging from up to 100 pg /gm in bean and beef samples to 100 ng/gm for carrots and broccoli when washings of these spiked matrices were taken. Sample processing techniques including blending and filtering of samples like spinach, lettuce and tomato did not improve sensitivity of the system to detect botulinum A in these matrices. 4. Obstacles The main obstacle or drawback of this project was the testing of solid food matrices using the FBADS platform. The instrument is designed to test only milk samples and even colored and slightly coarser liquid matrices like orange or tomato juice seemed to interfere with the assay. Where as, solids cannot be tested using this platform unless they undergo extensive sample preparation like blending and filtering. We tried testing solids after spiking by taking washings alone; however there was a difference in detection ability depending on matrix tested. Blending and filtering solids too didn’t seem to improve the detection ability. This greatly limits the field application of this platform in its current design. The current platform was standardized to detect BoNT in raw milk samples and is not physically equipped to deal with solid matrices, which need to undergo various preanalytical manipulations prior to application. 5. Outcomes In vitro assays are the need of the day to avoid for animal testing and rapid screening. Immunoassays with low-­‐end detection have been described in plenty for BoNT, however none of them so far have been able to replace the gold standard i.e. the mouse bioassay mainly because of lack of validation through screening for large number of samples. Our testing of the MesoScale Diagnostics platform, Model PR1900 for its limit of detection and sensitivity suffers a similar drawback. Our laboratory-­‐developed colorimetric sandwich ELISA was able to detect between up to 2 ng/ml toxin in the liquid food matrices tested and up to 0.5 ng/gm in the solid samples, varying with the food samples tested. However, in comparison to the limit of detection of ELISA the FBADS platform performed better with detection of 20 pg/ml of toxin in the milk sample and 50 pg/ml in chocolate milk sample. The major drawback being its performance varied greatly across the variety of matrices tested including inability to detect in orange juice, potatoes and at times in lettuce and spinach. The other limitation is reproducibility of data. Milk samples of same brand, with similar toxin concentrations tested on two different occasions, with each sample tested in triplicates resulted in absolute failure of one assay to detect any toxin. This could be due to expiration of reagents in that particular plate used for testing, however the instrument failed to identify this problem. The scientific support team of MSD shared with us the results of the assay they ran on few of the liquid matrices that demonstrated their LOD of 40 pg/ml across all tested matrices. When the same matrices were tested in our lab, using a similar sample dilution range showed that the results were not reproducible. The results were consistent only for milk and chocolate milk with an LOD at 40pg/ml and 50pg/ml respectively. 170 Some of the preliminary results were presented via poster presentation at the 5th DHS Annual University Network Summit, held at Washington DC, March 30-­‐April 1 2011. 6. Future Effort The variability across different food matrices and lack of assay reproducibility makes this platform unsuitable for testing solid foods and/or pigmented juices in its present form. Further refinement of the detection system to accommodate automation of preanalytical processing of complex food matrices is recommended. The future directions would include increasing the sample size and testing for multiple food matrices and changing the pre-­‐
existing sampler set-­‐up programmed for milk samples to accommodate testing for a variety of food samples. Food Defense Research Database Contract Title and number: FSIS-­‐IA-­‐09-­‐057A Food Defense Research Database Sponsor: Multiple Agencies (DHS, FDA, USDA) Timeframe: 9/8/09-­‐5/31/11 1. Project Summary The Joint Council for Research (JCR) of the Food and Agriculture Sector/Government Coordinating Councils identified an overall gap in identifying research completed or underway in food and agriculture as well as the lack of a functional database of identified research that can be used to help public and private sector leaders in addressing research gaps, detecting needs, and prioritizing research. The JCR solicited and obtained an enormous amount data from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) listing all known government-­‐funded research with potential application for security/defense programs. The FDA and USDA initially screened the data for relevant projects funded through their organizations. Through the initial screening process (which The National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD) facilitated), the JCR discovered that the data provided by OSTP covers a patchwork of federally funded research projects, including many which are not relevant to security/defense in the Sector. Additionally, the JCR found that the data exists in a variety of formats with significant variations in both the accuracy and focus of specific research project data. Finally, the JCR determined that by only focusing on government funded research initiatives, the collected data from OSTP also misses relevant international and private research that may otherwise be available for consideration. The Research Database project was initiated to address the gap in identifying research completed or underway pertinent to intentional or catastrophic events in the food and agriculture sector. Multiple agencies in the US Government funded the NCFPD to work on the first two aims of the effort. 2. Team Members 171 PI: Shaun Kennedy, NCFPD NCFPD Staff: Dr. Amy Kircher, Patty Hunter, Scott Asbach, Chad Burgess, Susan Gale, Sara Sheppard 3. Deliverable Effort Aim 1: Identify and assess existing, on-­‐going research throughout the Sector. NCFPD has identified and assessed existing research from numerous U.S. and international databases. Those projects that worked on the intentional contamination of food and water were added to the database as the initial content. After the initial entry of content from federal partners, NCFPD developed a literature review methodology to ensure quality and consistency of searching. The objective of the literature review was to identify publications, reports, projects, or presentations on the intentional contamination of the food and water supply. Inclusion criteria: all dates, English language, and available electronically. Four searches for scholarly or authoritative information as it relates to the topic were conducted: 1) Data submitted by project sponsors 2) Database searches 3) Internet search engine review for relevant records not found in a database 4) Reference reviews of literature included into the database. Databases and websites searched include: AgEcon Agricola Agricola Agriculture and Agri-­‐food Canada ANSES Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry Canadian Food Inspection Agency CDC CDC/NIOSH Codex Alimentarius (WHO and FAO food standards) 172 CORDIS EFSA EPA/National Homeland Security Research Center FAO FDA Google Google (Limited to .gov) Google Scholar Institute of Food Technologies International Association for Food Protection (Journal of Food Protection) IUFOST Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry National Agricultural Library New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Publications (Relevant Articles sent by Franks contact at ARS) Publications (Side list generated from other searches) PubMed Totals: UK Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA) USDA Food Safety Research Projects Database USDA/Agriculture Research Center USDA/Current Research Information System USDA/Food Safety and Inspection Services WHO An initial exploration of key word strings was conducted to find the most efficient search strings to capture publications, reports, presentations, or projects related to the intentional 173 contamination of food or water. All databases were searched for the first 15 key word search strings. Databases with the most information relevant to the objective were searched for all 44 key word search strings. The list of key word strings is below. 1 Food AND Defense AND National 2 Food AND Defense AND International 3 Food AND Defense AND Homeland 4 Food AND Emergency AND Plan 5 Food AND Emergency AND Response 6 Food AND Counterfeit 7 Food AND Biosecurity 8 Food AND Bioterrorism 9 Food AND Intentional AND Contamination 10 Food AND Intentional AND Decontamination 11 Food AND Intentional AND Strategies 12 Food AND Intentional AND Detection 13 Food AND Intentional AND Assessment 14 Food AND Adulteration 15 Economic AND Adulteration 16 Food OR Ingestion AND Bacillus anthracis Food OR Ingestion AND Clostridium botulinum 18 Food OR Ingestion AND Yersinia pestis 19 Food OR Ingestion AND Variola mayor Food OR Ingestion AND Francisella tularensis 21 Food OR Ingestion AND Brucella sp 22 Food OR Ingestion AND Clostridium 17 20 174 perfringens 23 Food OR Ingestion AND Salmonella sp Food OR Ingestion AND Escherichia coli O157:H7 25 Food OR Ingestion AND Shigella 26 Food OR Ingestion AND Vibrio cholera Food OR Ingestion AND Cryptosporidium parvum Food OR Ingestion AND Burkholderia mallei Food OR Ingestion AND Burkholderia pseudomallei Food OR Ingestion AND Chlamydia psittaci 31 Food OR Ingestion AND Coxiella burnetii 32 Food OR Ingestion AND Ricinus communis Food OR Ingestion AND Staphylococcus aureus Food OR Ingestion AND Rickettsia prowazekii 35 Food OR Ingestion AND Pesticide 36 Food OR Ingestion AND Herbicide 37 Food OR Ingestion AND Ricin 38 Food OR Ingestion AND Abrin 39 Food OR Ingestion AND Amantin 40 Food OR Ingestion AND Flouoroacetate 41 Food OR Ingestion AND Cyanide 42 Food OR Ingestion AND Nicotine 43 Food OR Ingestion AND Nitrite 24 27 28 29 30 33 34 175 44 Food OR Ingestion AND Colchisine Aim 2: Screen identified research for relevance and categorize into a useable database The literature search and review of 38 databases and 44 keyword search strings produced 2,606,495 hits. All titles were reviewed for relevancy to the objective of finding publications, reports, presentations, and projects related to the intentional contamination of food or water. Of the titles reviewed, 15,011 abstracts were reviewed for relevancy. A total of 907 records were added to the database. A web-­‐based database was constructed to house the food and agriculture research obtained from Aim 1 of this project. An entry search function allows user to query the database for relevant research on the topic of inquiry. Capabilities created in the platform: 1. Basic Search: Key words entered in a search field to rapidly find records related to the key words submitted. 2. Advanced Search: Specific data is entered to find exact records or group of records. Users can search by date, title, author, funding organization, or researching organization. 3. Links: Electronic links are available for records where available to assist in finding full publication, report, presentation, or project. 4. Search Tips: Pop-­‐up menu with search tips for users. 5. Background: Information on the project provided to users in Question and Answer format. 6. Suggest Project: Users are able to enter a publication, report, presentation, or project for consideration. All suggestions will be reviewed by NCFPD prior to posting. 7. Feedback: Pop-­‐up window to allow users to provide feedback to NCFPD. 8. Mobile Platform: A mobile version of the Database has been created for use on mobile-­‐based technology. 9. Broken Link Reporting: Broken links may be reported at time of identification if a link exists in the record. 10. Exporting: All records returned on any search may be exported to Excel. Troubleshooting: NCFPD and Stakeholders generated the following changes to the platform to enhance capability. a. Removal of funky characters from data transfer. 176 b. Correction of year display if no month and day present in record. c. Matrix of synonyms added to ease searching with acronyms. d. Made available the full list of records. e. Added ability to search for specific type of record f. Added pagination to top of search results. g. Used FA FCC/GCC approved logo. Stakeholder Engagement Throughout various stages of the project stakeholders were engaged to provide feedback on both the content and IT platform. •
Web-­‐based survey. In the fall of 2010 the database was beta tested with users from a variety of organizations to include sponsors, academic institutions, and government officials. A survey tool was used to capture the changes in the database to ensure that users concerns were being met. There were 20 responses to the survey. •
Agency specific review. Agency identified points of contact were engaged to assess the content and IT platform. All recommendations were included in the development of the project •
Webinar presentation. 30-­‐60 days prior to project completion webinars were conducted with sponsors and stakeholders to review the project to date. All feedback and recommendations were captured and, when appropriate, included into the development of the project. Items that required the decision of the sponsoring agencies were provided to them for final decision (e.g. logo, password protection). •
Private sector demonstration. Subject matter experts from the private sector were provided a demonstration of the project in the last 30 days of the project. All feedback and recommendations were included in the development of the project. 4. Obstacles The JCR did not meet until the last 45 days of the effort. This limited the amount of feedback NCFPD received on the effort. NCFPD proposed accomplishing aims 3 and 4 of the scope of work to complete the entire effort however was told not to complete the final two tasks by JCR. There has been no final decision on the password protection of the site. NCFPD is waiting on a final decision from the FA FCC/GCC. 5. Outcomes 177 The database is currently available at: https://rds.ahc.umn.edu/test/research_database/public/index.cfm/search. This website will be updated once a final decision on the password protection of the database is determined. Project Presentations. 1. Sponsor presentation. The Database was presented at the 2011 2nd Quarter FA FCC/GCC meeting. The presentation included a discussion of effort, demonstrated the Database, and provided final decisions to the group. Decisions made during the meeting were incorporated into the Database. 2. Launch demonstration. NCFPD provided a demonstration of the Database during its monthly webinar on July 8, 2011. Over 80 attendees from the public, private, and academic agencies participated in the webinar. 6. Future Effort NCFPD recommends the Food Defense Research Database be maintained and updated. Maintenance and funding of staff member to update content will require minimal funding. FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls Contract Title and number: FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls, 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003. Sponsor: FDA Timeframe: 9/8/09 -­‐ 9/30/10 1. Project Summary The FoodSHIELD: FDA Recalls system is a tool created to coordinate food inspections and track recalls for the FDA. This tool allows state coordinators to assign recalls to state inspectors who in turn submit their findings for approval or denial by an FDA district official. The user has the ability to upload distribution lists, tracking tainted product shipments, and also access forms for inspectors to complete and email into the system. Once the forms are in the system and databased, they are then available for use in reporting, so that state administrators are able to view state specific reports, and FDA officials, who can see all data nationwide, can also view both completed and incomplete inspections. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCFPD team members: Jenny Pierquet, Lisa Brower External Consultants: Datastream Connexion, Eric Hoffman 3. Deliverable Effort 178 Deliverable 1. The Recall system gives the end-­‐user a way to assign recalls to state inspectors and to submit/upload their findings. Distribution lists are available for states to track where products have been shipped. Some obstacles have presented themselves in data types originating from the varied formats potentially submitted by industry participants, which required resolution for proper system utilization. Role-­‐based security was completed to give the user access to information specific to their role, and only what has been assigned by the system. States were provided tools to customize to capture custom processes or data points. These, custom workflows are supported within the security framework. This improves adoption by states and allows the system to support their data requirements while maintaining the ability to transform data reporting to FDA standards transparently to state users. Workflow processes including Audit Check and Effectiveness Measurement have now been documented for future release 1.0. The distribution list management process has been upgraded to simplify upload/download and list usage management. In addition, the online audit check submission was upgraded to a fully functional format with a new electronic version of the revised FDA Audit Form 3177 and a corresponding web-­‐based form. Deliverables 2 and 5. FDA staff was welcomed to the FoodSHIELD steering committee, and were provided ongoing support through the CoreSHIELD helpdesk teams throughout the contract period. Deliverables 3, 4, 7.Significant core portal upgrades were completed to provide a foundation for improvements to the core over the next several years. More flexibility and user-­‐based options to support their work requirements were built into the system. Frequent communication with state and FDA based users helped guide improvements to many aspects of the system, including workgroups and communications functionality. Additional capacity was secured through this effort to support more concurrent users and increase the availability of meeting participant space in the Adobe Connect webinar system. Deliverable 6. Training programs were implemented to support ongoing and on-­‐demand training by the FoodSHIELD training coordinator for all end users of the system. Deliverable 8. Initial effort was conducted to begin the Certification & Accreditation process to support a security audit by the FDA. The framework for the new system security plan was implemented, but final deliverable was not achieved due to changes to the infrastructure and system management underway to support this year’s activities. These changes directly impacted our security posture, requiring significant changes to the System Security documentation. Final submission of the System Security Plan will occur after the close of the contract period. 4. Obstacles Significant obstacles were found during data management for the distribution lists and audit check assignments. These were overcome by creating a more robust data-­‐checking 179 mechanism during distribution uploads. More effort will be needed in this area to accommodate the many potential data input sources. State feedback has created a new level of customization to the system. While completing the original requirements and becoming functional, we identified the additional requests from state partners to enhance their usage. The requests included custom workflows and data points what would fully allow them to adopt the system and maintain enough data points to satisfy their specific state requirements. These requests are high value and critical to adoption, and were only identified through the research and surveying of state participants. We believe the system should adapt to these requests, however they were not a part of the original scope. This obstacle is not fully overcome as additional resources are needed to complete the state-­‐based customization. The System Security Plan effort has been complicated by unclear objectives for creating an accreditation boundary. Given the nature of the many portals and applications in the infrastructure, more research was needed to determine the proper way to document the system for FDA purposes, while excluding applications not utilized by FDA. Additional research is being conducted to determine if a National Institute of Standards and Technology based cloud model exists for C & A. A draft System Security Plan was submitted to FDA during this reporting period, but changes to that document are underway based on advice from an external security consultant and ongoing security documentation research. 5. Outcomes The recall enhancements provided during this contract period gave the end-­‐user better overall system functionality and provided a more efficient way of tracking products, uploading findings, and accessing reports. The new user interface was improved to enable users to navigate and perform functions required for their jobs during a recall without special tool training. The initial state-­‐based changes implemented during this reporting period position the states to be able to use this recall portal as their default tracking mechanism for audit checks for state based activities as needed, before a national FDA-­‐
guided effort is implemented. As the states’ familiarity with the portal systems increases the state recall results will improve. The core member portal saw significant growth in the number of FDA-­‐based workgroups coordinating activities through the system. These groups have additionally supported improvements to the system through concise and frequent feature and fix requests. This has created a uniquely positioned system to help users achieve their objectives. 6. Future Effort Next steps will include additional documentation support and accreditation boundary research for the System Security Plan. We anticipate presenting the additional documentation in first quarter of FY 12. This will be at the conclusion of additional hardware being introduced to the infrastructure and would require additional System Security Plan updates. 180 Pending receipt of additional funding, additional work is needed to fully accommodate the state based needs in the recalls system. Inclusion of Global Information System (GIS) data would further enhance reporting capabilities and data mining of the audit check efforts in a recall. Delivery and rollout of a state-­‐friendly Recall System, Version 1.0 could then be provided. FoodSHIELD: OHA Contract Title and number: FoodSHIELD OHA, 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003. Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 9/8/09 -­‐ 5/31/10 1. Project Summary The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is charged with implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-­‐9) that specifies protection of the food and agriculture infrastructure. The Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Defense (FAVD) division of OHA has been designated as the Departmental Lead to ensure the coordination and establishment of capabilities to respond to a catastrophic food event. To ensure success in this endeavor, FAVD is developing a strategic plan and utilizing information technology to collaborate and coordinate preparedness of Federal partners and State and local government agencies. NCFPD was asked to further support the Nation’s effort in rapidly identifying, containing, responding, and recovering from intentional contamination, both real and threatened. This research effort built upon NCFPD’s existing expertise with HSPD -­‐9 and the information technology capabilities housed within NCFPD’s existing FoodSHIELD research project. Through the DHS Science & Technology (S&T), Office of Research and Development, University Programs, the OHA FAVD supported NCFPD in advancing FoodSHIELD research by providing the resources necessary to build additional information technology capabilities that will be accessible to the OHA FAVD, Federal, State, and local partners. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy External Consultants: Datastream Connexion, Eric Hoffman 3. Deliverable Effort This effort enhanced information technology communications capabilities and creation of additional web-­‐based information sharing collaborative tools within FoodSHIELD to improve the Nation’s ability to communicate, collaborate, and perform outreach with Federal partners, state and local governments, and the private sector. Specific deliverables identified for this project included conducting research on existing preparedness tools for state and local government; facilitating response during a food 181 incident; and enhancing communication. Effort in each of the stated deliverable areas was specifically directed towards research and further development of tools for FoodSHIELD. 4. Obstacles None. 5. Outcomes Additional tool capabilities were developed within FoodSHIELD to support workgroups and general information sharing in a secure environment. The tools were developed in such a manner to allow them to standalone as portal-­‐wide applications, and also be plugged into specific workgroups and enabled by workgroup administrators on a workgroup-­‐by-­‐workgroup basis. Several modules to support information sharing within the portal were built, including: •
News feed sharing •
Video sharing •
Event management •
Scheduling management for webinars •
Enhancements to document sharing •
New forums/discussion tool •
Agenda management for meetings In addition, general system maintenance activities occurred throughout the contract period. The core platform features listed above will be integrated fully into workgroups as resources allow. These new features enhance collaboration and communication among users in the Food and Agriculture sector to enhance and support preparedness and response to incidents. The new functionality also helps increase strategic coordination and information sharing among stakeholders on a daily basis. 6. Future Effort If funding provided, the following technical efforts are recommended: 3) Integrate new core features listed above into workgroups 4) Create additional management capabilities of these features for workgroup members based on their security role. 182 5) Implement an enhanced an archive routine to better handle closing of workgroups by administrators. The current data backup feature only handles documents backups, but should be expanded to handle these additional modules. Import Vulnerability Contract Title and number: Import Vulnerability Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 9/28/07-­‐12/31/10 1. Project Summary This project was designed to combine the real-­‐time need for analytical support that the Office of Health Affairs, FDA and USDA-­‐FSIS have requested with the strategic need to understand the potential vulnerabilities in the global food system through imported products and trans-­‐shipped products. This included an understanding of the economic implications of restricting trade to contain events and the potential cost of substitute sources. The project includes a rapid assessment of the degree to which available data sources could adequately characterize ingredients, components and finished foods imported from China. The project also included a pilot assessment of the degree to which imported ingredients and finished foods can be characterized with an emphasis on countries for which we have less confidence in the positive control of the food safety/food defense requirements. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCPFD Staff: Dan Sumner, Morgan Hennessey, Dr. Craig Hedberg, Dr. Don Schaffner, Brendan Lee, Dr. Koel Gosh 3. Deliverable Effort Deliverable 1. This deliverable was completed through a thorough review and analysis of the data available from FATUS (Foreign Agricultural Trade of the U.S., www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FATUS/), U.N. COMTRADE (International Merchant Trading, http://comtrade.un.org/), FAOSTAT (FAO’s food and agriculture statistics, http://faostat.fao.org/) and other less comprehensive sources. Deliverable 2. This deliverable included a combination of a subset of (1), private sector interviews and data mining for relevant information in both English and Chinese. Deliverable 3. The first part was a synthesis of the information from deliverables 1 and 2 with additional insight gained, as possible, by regulatory system characterization. Deliverable 4. This deliverable was partially satisfied through the use of domestic risk assessments and applying that prioritization for China sourced foods. Limitations in both 183 the publically available import data (product specificity) and available information on quality assurance methods where a challenge. 4. Obstacles In addition to that noted above, the biggest challenge to the project was the availability of comparable data in a usable format. Data collected from different sources (such as FDA, FAS, FAO and USITC) often differed in content and formatting making collation of data a challenge. Access to market data on wheat gluten and more particularly melamine was not readily available. Also the timeliness of information proved to be a challenge with some agencies producing monthly public reports on import data, but on three-­‐month lag. To more effectively utilize such data it must be made available closer to real-­‐time. Also the data on some agency websites span a limited time frame making it difficult to do historical analysis of data. It proved to be a challenge to identify food safety regulations from the “at risk” countries identified for this study. These challenges included lack of online access to the regulatory authorities of these countries, language barriers (some regulatory websites were not available in English) and the difficulty to identify which regulations were applicable to food safety regulation. One web site, the International Portal on Food Safety, Animal and Plant Health, a website operated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) provided numerous references to regulations and regulatory matters but the format the information is presented in is not easily filterable. 5. Outcomes 1. The rapid assessment of what we import from China and where we get wheat gluten, both directly and indirectly, along with the costs of radical interventions or substitutions was used by various agencies in their response to the melamine incident. 2. There were several factors that may have impacted the “wheat gluten” event of 2007, including 1) the increased demand for wheat gluten, 2) decreased quality of wheat flour in the U.S and other countries, 3) increased market price of wheat gluten, 4) increased cost of production of wheat gluten and 5) decreased cost of melamine. Any of these factors may have been responsible for the economically motivated adulteration of the “wheat gluten” that was imported into the United States. Most of the data that would provide indications of this is publicly available and timely analysis could have focused surveillance on this product emanating from China thus preventing illnesses or more quickly identifying the adulterated product. Not all of the data, though available, was not readily accessible in a format that would have been useful to authorities. 3. It was determined that publicly accessible data sets are available that can be used to characterize food safety regulatory systems however these data sets are not always easily analyzed. Characterization of food safety regulatory systems from exporting countries may help inspection agencies better target their limited resources. The information available on imported products is mainly through US regulatory agencies, with some limited info available from international agencies such as FAO. It is difficult to be able to produce little 184 more than limited characterization of imported food products with the information available. 6. Future Effort The results from this project were presented at the FDA’s Public Meeting on EMA, to leadership in DHS, FDA and USDA. The primary next step has been underway for nine months, a two year project sponsored by DHS-­‐OHA, FDA-­‐CFSAN and USDA-­‐FSIS to develop indicators and warnings that could help agencies and the private sector target resources on identifying potential EMA weaknesses and threats. Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) Contract Title and number: ICLN, 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003. Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 4/1/10 -­‐ 9/30/10 1. Project Summary The Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN)site provides a secure environment for laboratory networks to share data and collaborate on reports. This site includes the incident management system that allows a user the ability to share data and manage an incident requiring laboratory capabilities. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCFPD Staff: Morgan Hennessey External Consultants: Datastream Connexion, Eric Hoffman 3. Deliverable Effort During this contract period, our support efforts included providing dedicated programming/staff, help desk, quality assurance, failover testing and network support for web servers; an analytics package was developed to support website traffic and usage monitoring, providing the project sponsor with an overview of how the system is being used and by whom, including system metrics and web usage stats. The ICLN Incident Manager was completed and successfully utilized in test scenarios; functionality was added to display “all files” and “list most recently updated” in the incident manager workgroup files; portal upgrades were completed; including a preview email function and an upgrade to Standard Office Procedure (SOP) workflow; Information Technology Communications and Coordination (ITCC) Subgroup data enhancements continued, and Situation Report (SITREP) and Preparedness Alert Template (PAT) web forms and PDF-­‐produced forms were developed: removing and adding fields, removing and adding questions, and changing labels. These forms give each network the capability to fill out a situation report online and submit it directly to the system electronically; primary and secondary contact selection and 185 results were added to both forms; data management of PAT and SITREP records has been created; a contact look up and selection process was added; additionally, documenting, securing, and incorporating SITREP files into the ICLN application were completed. Work was done on the ICLN Portal Incident Home Page wire-­‐frame. Preliminary pages of the wire-­‐frame were created for reviewers’ comments/discussion. Efforts in preliminary discussions included: design and development, getting the wireframe environment ready for layout, and a subsequent submittal of project plans. The wire-­‐framing functionality is utilized preceding full development in order to present a visual image of what the site would look like, and create discussion before any actual programming takes place. Deliverable 1: Dedicated Programming/Staff. The following were dedicated or implemented to ensure dedicate programming and staff was available to the project. •
Dedicated Programmer •
Project assistance under direction of lead programmer •
ICLN Help Desk •
Officially Supported Live Chat, Email, Live Phone Support •
Project Management •
Network Support for web servers, database, email •
Redundancy/Failover Testing •
Quality Assurance •
Testing of systems Deliverable 2: Analytics Package Completed. To understand how the portal is being used the following efforts were completed. •
•
•
•
Support website traffic and usage monitoring by implementing an analytics package to help understand who is using the website and how Go live to populate analytics table System Metrics Website Usage Deliverable 3: ICLN Incident Manager Completed. Functionality to display all files and listings most recently updated added to the incident manager workgroup files Deliverable 4: Portal Upgrades Completed. Preview email functionality and upgrades to SOP workflow were accomplished Deliverable 5: ITCC Data Exchange Enhancements. All ITCC Data exchange enhancements were completed as required. 186 Deliverable 6: SITREP and PAT Form Development. The following activities were completed to support SITREP and PAT FORM Developments. •
Info adding primary and secondary contact selection and results to both forms •
Creating data management of PAT and SITREP records •
SITREP form and contact selection •
Create a data manager for form records •
Create contact look up and selection process •
Documenting, securing and incorporating SITREP files into ICLN application Deliverable 7: Portal Instructional Handouts Completed. ICLN incident handouts as well as job aid additions were accomplished in support of the portal instructional handouts. Deliverable 8: Enhanced Data Security. Enhanced data security was completed during the period of performance. Deliverable 9: Agenda, Scheduler, Meeting Enhancements. Enhancements to ICLN included: •
New meeting feature incorporations •
Improved flow of the scheduler/meeting/agenda •
Added ability to create an agenda without creating an online meeting Deliverable 10. Lessons Learned Enhancements. All lesson learned enhancements were completed. Deliverable 11. Document updates. Document updates were completed. Deliverable 12. Portal layout changes. Changes to the portal layout was completed. 4. Obstacles Technical obstacles: A major portal infrastructure upgrade was underway during Winter 2011, which created a delay to data exchange/incident manager upgrades during that timeframe. Resolution: The portal upgrade was completed with implementation direction from ICLN, and although late, was completed late but before the March exercise. This new version specifically included upgrades to address upcoming requirements from ICLN for the ITCC Subgroup. Non-­‐technical obstacles: Quick turnaround time between exercises at the beginning of this project, coupled with requirements updates during that time required significant upfront effort. 187 Resolution: We utilized an agile approach to rapidly deploy new features while burning down more hours than anticipated during this time. As a result, some non-­‐critical features were still open once funding expired. Technical team continued to work on open issues as time permitted, without payment. NCFPD anticipates that a new contract will be formulated and additional work will continue to complete open items. 5. Outcomes The incident manager has been utilized several times in testing scenarios; and has been used in coordination with other networks such as the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), the Center for Disease Control (CDC), and the Department of Homeland Security for testing scenarios. With completion of the SITREP and PAT forms, users now have the ability to complete forms online and submit electronically. ICLN members also benefit from CoreSHIELD functionality, offering an online secure portal where members can share documents, create online webinars, look up contact information, create distribution lists, add workgroups and teams, all within a new user interface. 6. Future Effort Next steps: Work needs to continue on the tweaking the Incident Manager components, including the new SITREP Preparedness form. We may propose and review utilizing new CoreSHIELD form management technology to enable programming-­‐less updates for ICLN in the future. With additional funding, resources will work on open issues, new requests, and completing any wire-­‐frame additions. Work would also continue on completing lessons learned issues reported, including: Allowing the ability to add participants and change details related to an incident; updating default names that are included in an incident using attached updated emergency call roster; eliminating full meeting descriptions to save space by adding in a recent document area on the incident home page; adding a method to allow user to “view and edit” a preparedness alert or SITREP before saving it in the PDF format; providing agency information along with names added to the incident; giving the ability to have SITREP automatically send out once created and finalized; creating the ability to delete documents; have conference calls invite display meeting times in EST, CST and Mountain. Once issues and requests are completed, we will also be releasing a version of the system for client testing, followed by a subsequent live release. Additional future efforts will depend on funding provided, and may include the following items which have been identified as desirable by the ICLN Program Office: •
Incident Task Manager updates •
Data Exchange Prototyping •
Continued support for ICLN response exercises •
Admin and User Training 188 Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) Title of Project: Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Contract Number: P910602537 Sponsor: United States Department of Homeland Security Timeframe: July 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011 1. Project Summary The National Agricultural Biosecurity Center (NABC) at Kansas State University (KSU), through this DHS project, has developed Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)/Food, Agriculture and Veterinary Defense (FAVD) products for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Health Affairs (OHA). This project serves to enhance the development and functionality of the FAVD page on the LLIS website through the review and analysis of the After Action Reports/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) from emergency operations and training exercises and posting those lessons learned on the FAVD page. The review and analysis of training exercises are an integral part of preparation for an actual event. Lessons learned serve no purpose if their value is left buried within the text of an exercise report. The extraction of lessons learned from the AAR/IP’s and their inclusion in an easily accessible and understandable format greatly increases their value to agricultural emergency management personnel. The FAVD page has the potential to become a very important “go to” source for emergency management personnel within the agriculture community. Emergency management personnel could review the abstracts explaining the lessons learned from tabletop and field exercises and then decide if it might be something that would work for their situation. The needs of the agricultural community in response to an emergency situation often mirrors the urban response but there are also many needs and solutions that are more unique to an agricultural setting. What seems unimportant and trivial to an urban analyst could make or break a successful response within an agricultural community. This project was funded through the DHS Center of Excellence, The National Center for Food Production and Defense at the University of Minnesota. 2. Team Members PI: Marty Vanier, D.V.M. NABC Analyst: Kenneth R. Burton, D.V.M. 4. Deliverable Effort KSU, through discussions with DHS/OHA POC’s Dr. Doug Meckes and Dr. Marvin Meinders, researched and suggested a format for presentation of information on the LLIS/FAVD page. AAR/IP documents were be presented to KSU by DHS/OHA for review. Following review of the documents by KSU, those that are deemed appropriate for inclusion on the LLIS/FAVD page were analyzed for lessons learned through the exercise or actual event. The lessons identified through KSU analysis were placed in a format compatible with LLIS and returned to the DHS/OHA for inclusion in the LLIS/FAVD page. Document analysis was done using the DHS HSEEP template. 189 From the documents presented from DHS/OHA, KSU recommended inclusion of and analyzed a total of 10 AAR/IP’s. From the 10 AAR/IP’s, KSU extracted 17 total lessons learned and produced a document representing each lesson learned for inclusion on the LLIS/FAVD page. All 17 documents were presented to OHA for delivery to LLIS and publication on the FAVD page. 4. Obstacles The major obstacle presented with this project has been getting the lessons learned documents included on the FAVD page by LLIS. The documents have been in possession of LLIS for a significant period of time and have not yet been published on the FAVD page. 5. Outcomes The purpose of the Lessons Learned/Food, Animal, and Veterinary Defense (LLIS/FAVD) page is to provide a single point where information that is important to the food and agriculture community can be readily shared for the improvement of programs. First responders must be adequately trained for agricultural events. This includes understanding the unique nature of these events and being able to discern the resources and capabilities that jurisdictions need to provide an adequate response. The review and analysis of training exercises are an integral part of preparation for an actual event. Lessons learned serve no purpose if their value is left buried within the text of an exercise report. Agricultural emergency managers can look at the abstracts developed through KSU analysis which explain lessons learned from tabletop and field exercises and then decide if it might be something that would work for their situation. The needs of the agricultural community in response to an emergency situation often mirrors the urban response but there are also many needs and solutions that are more unique to an agricultural setting. What seems unimportant and trivial to an urban analyst could make or break a successful response within an agricultural community. Accurate information posted to the FAVD page in a timely manner seems to be an important issue right now. 6. Future Effort Ongoing discussions with Dr. Doug Meckes and Dr. Marvin Meinders, both from DHS/OHA, have developed three-­‐fold plans for the future: 1. Continued evaluation of agriculture-­‐
based AAR/IP’s focusing on lessons learned information and document preparation, 2. Publication of lessons learned documentation on the FAVD llis.gov web page, and 3. Analysis of lessons learned documents identifying recurrent themes of needs and matching them with existing training opportunities within the educational programs of the DHS. National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) Contract Title and number: NBIS Sponsor: DHS Timeframe: 8/8/08-­‐5/31/10 1. Project Summary 190 The objective of this effort was to, through the range of scientific reach back capabilities, emergent biological event investigation and assessment and supporting research efforts outlined, provide options for enhancing NBIC event investigation and analysis and accelerating the growth of the capabilities of the National Bio-­‐Surveillance Integration System to support early and ongoing biological event cueing, information sharing and situational awareness capabilities for federal, state and local public health officials and academic researchers from a range of disciplines. This project provided the NBIC team with access to industry and academic Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), facilitate collaboration with state public health, food regulatory and industry information sources and users, technology support, Biosurveillance Common Operating Picture (BCOP) development and transition to full operational capability, research and analytics-­‐based event characterization capabilities for a wide range of biological issues. 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy NCPFD Staff: John T. Hoffman, Gale Prince, Dr. Frank Busta 3. Deliverable Effort Deliverable 1: SME support. The NCFPD team provide scientific reach back support to OHA and the NBIC team, as well as support to the agency members of the NBIS Interagency Working Group (NWIG). Additionally, industry experts and industry assessment input was provided though the NCFPD Industry Working Group for specific event assessment. SME and technical support has also been provided, and continues, to the DHS/OHA North Carolina B-­‐Prepared bio-­‐surveillance project that supports NBIS development and state level bio-­‐surveillance capability development/enhancement. Finally, an external advisory group of industry, academic and state agency SMEs was established by and is now led by the NCFPD team to advise both OHA and the NC B-­‐Prepared project on the development and implementation strategy for state level support and bio-­‐surveillance information exchange to NBIS. Deliverable 2: Technology support and Development. With development of the second generation BCOP prototype, inter-­‐agency support for testing and application was coordinated and initiated. This led to the broader use of the system, however, access to the NBIC generated BCOP has, so far, been restricted to a very limited user group within DHS and select inter-­‐agency representatives. So far not state or industry collaborators have been granted access. This severely restricts the usefulness of the national level BCOP and may prevent effective information sharing in the event of an actual high consequence national biological event. Analysis/Assssment Tools. NCFPD has provided access to a variety of data sources and tools, from FASCAT tools, generalized food supply chain data from the FASCAT database contents, horizon scanning reporting on emergent events (global and domestic), assessments of the impact of such events, assistance in forecasting event developing and consequences, and, finally, assistance in SME assessments from the food and agriculture industry and the financial community. 191 NCFPD support has also been provided to the OHA funded NBIS support project operated by North Carolina under the NC Be-­‐Prepared project. This includes technical input, access to SMEs and assistance with planning and project execution. Deliverable 3: Collaborator Support. NCFPD has assisted NBIS will facilitating access to a wide variety of SMEs and institutions, public and private, as collaborators in support of NBIS goals and objectives. These include but are not limited to Sandia National Laboratory, SAS Institute, AON, and the NCFPD Industry Collaborators. Additionally, NCFPD has facilitated access and collaboration on specific events from international organizations such as FAO and OIE. Deliverable 4: Data Support. NCFPD, in collaboration with FAZD, has provided data processing support and database content for a number of events and for overall capability development. This includes access to national food system supply chain data, sector transportation information, financial support systems information, product distribution information and state level public health system infrastructure information. Additionally, NCFPD has made available food agent mix information, pathogen characteristics, Economically Motivated Adulteration (EMA) information, import characteristics and historical food event data. Deliverable 5: Exercise Support. While NCFPD has provide exercise support to a number of inter-­‐agency events, beyond the 2009 NBIS inter-­‐agency exercise, there has been no request for exercise from NBIS itself or OHA. Deliverable 6: Industry Collaboration Support. NCFPD has provided NBIS with collaborations from a number of industry groups and firms, from the dairy industry to liquid egg, produce and poultry processing firms. This has been in support of specific event response activities to horizon scanning stimulated planning and coordination, such as with the recent disaster in Japan. 4. Obstacles The lack of open information sharing with the states and industry has significantly hampered both the growth and maturity of the NBIS effort as well as the open and institutionalized information sharing on the part of the private sector in support of day-­‐to-­‐
day NBIS functions. Further the lack of priority on NBIS by DHS leadership, by the agency partners and the resultant lack of appropriate resourcing has limited the effectiveness of the support available to NBIS by NCFPD and the overall contribution that NBIS might otherwise make to the nation’s biological event preparedness. Limitations on direct communications between NBIS analysts, on open information sharing and on access to the BCOP all present obstacles to the growth and value of NBIS as well as NCFPD ability to assist NBIS. 5. Outcomes Despite the obstacles noted above, NCFPD has made substantial contributions to both the NBIS mission and to our ability to detect and respond to emergent biological events. 192 NCFPD has made a substantial contribution to the overall collaborator and SME partnerships across the food and agriculture sector, public and private, the financial sector and the human health insurance industry for NBIS. The BCOP development has been a valuable addition to the NBIS information sharing environment development, even if access is very limited due to current policy limitations. Access as the result of NCFPD tool deployments, such as FASCAT, have expanded access by NBIS analysts to specifics about the nation’s food and agriculture infrastructure. Lastly, on call SME, analytic and event impact assessment support by NCFPD to NBIS has been substantial and effective. It provides a force multiplication capability to the NBIS team and expands its reach and productivity. 6. Future Effort NBIS requires additional funding and strong DHS and interagency leadership support and guidance to mature into the national capability envisioned in both the law and the draft NBIS strategic Plan. With such support lacking, there is little prospect of NBIS maturing into such a capability or of NBIS being posture to provide the cueing and early warning to the nation’s public health sector of emergent or developing biological threats to our multi-­‐
faceted biological domains, from human health to the food supply systems. Given limited operating environment of NBIS, NCFPD support going forward may well be constrained. However NCFPD remains committed to provide SME, technical and horizon scanning support to the NBIS team as may be requested going forward, subject to available resources. Proficiency Testing (PT) Results Contract Title and number: FoodSHIELD PT Results System, 2007-­‐ST-­‐061-­‐000003. Sponsor: FDA Timeframe: 7/1/10 -­‐ 10/31/10 1. Project Summary This project continued the expansion and data population of the FERN-­‐originated Proficiency Testing Results Capture systems. To facilitate wider adoption and clarity in purpose, this PT Results addition was built on the FoodSHIELD infrastructure. The FERN-­‐
based PT Results system requires participants to be FERN members, which is only a portion of the typical PT constituents. New functionality resulting from this project was expected to include capturing results from Food & Ag laboratories, providing data export, and a developing a smart login system to push results gathering to the correct site. The FoodSHIELD PT Results Capture System intended to establish, a central housing for PT results data to create a data aggregation point for reporting. This central baseline result set could then be used to build a re-­‐usable data repository for many PT results events. The storage capability created was intended to be flexible and potentially adaptable to specific requirements of PT events outside of standard managed proficiency tests. 193 2. Team Members PI: Shaun Kennedy External Consultants: Datastream Connexion, Eric Hoffman 3. Deliverable Effort Deliverable efforts for PT Results included: project coding, building database tables to store data, client review meetings with the project sponsor, Ravinder Reddy, to determine requirements, issues, and follow up items. Additionally, the following deliverables were completed: Proficiency testing results capture; Update FoodSHIELD LabDIR; build PT Results capture forms for PT: Vitamins; and PT results entry. Aditional Deliverables: •
Created reusable, scalable, templated results gathering functions o Created lab-­‐facing data entry of results o Admin interface for creating results interface with two defaults o Built export capability to Excel and PDF o Provided functions to customize template per PT for differing questions o Created login functionality to direct labs to correct entry spot based upon membership o Allowed for historical review of lab’s PT results from viewable by only that lab. o Developed CFSAN-­‐defined reports for data views: dashboard overview of the results captured with critical-­‐need metrics highlighted. •
Update FoodSHIELD LabDIR o Migrate core PT/LabDIR Code to FoodSHIELD •
§
Update PT creation process based on FoodSHIELD lab data. §
Update PT registration process for FoodSHIELD members Built PT Results Capture Forms for PT: Vitamins o Customized admin. o Built data collection form for analysts/uses. o Built custom reporting for PT administrators. o Built database tables •
PT Results Entry o Templated data entry processes o Enhanced security/login processes 194 o Built central storage mechanism for results 4. Obstacles Obstacles included: Project timeline extended due to limited availability of stakeholder/ project sponsor, Ravinder Reddy. The time frames for site testing and sponsor feedback were also extended due to limited project sponsor availability. The sponsor project has expressed has expressed satisfaction with the progress of the PT Results project, but realizes we needed additional resources and time to complete his long term vision and is currently finishing approvals for that additional work. 5. Outcomes The Vitamins PT portion of the PT Results was completed to the satisfaction of the Project Sponsor. Currently the Project Sponsor is actively using the Proficiency testing system and reporting sections in FoodSHIELD for some Proficiency Tests, which was the core deliverable. The Vitamins PT is now created and successfully in use, and since its launch, the Vitamins PT has been used in two trial runs with live laboratories. Completion and use of the proficiency testing system for vitamins has given users the availability to have Vitamins PT data aggregated online, and automatically populated into one report, enabling more efficient information gathering and report generation. The new PT Results capability also provides the ability to store data electronically, rather than manually, for end-­‐user ease and efficiency. 6. Future Effort Future efforts will include development of additional Proficiency Tracking capabilities including: •
Shellfish •
Milk •
Food •
Concentrates The development process for these new modules will include analysis of lessons learned from the creation of the Vitamins PT development and applying those lessons in developing the new Proficiency Tracking modules. 195 Appendix D: Agendas from NCFPD Meetings 2007 Biennial Meeting NCFPD 2007 Biennial Meeting
Chaska, Minnesota: Oak Ridge Hotel and Conference Center http://oakridge.dolce.com/
June 28-29, 2007
FINAL AGENDA
Day 0 - Wednesday June 27 (3 pm check-in time)
6:00 pm
Dinner at Oak Ridge (optional)
7-9 pm
Research team meetings (recommended)
Day 1 - Thursday June 28
8:00 am
Welcome and introduction
8:15
Keynote Address: Marc Ostfield, Senior Advisor on Bioterrorism, Biodefense,
and Health Security, Office of International Health Affairs, U.S. Department of
State
9:00
Federal agency perspectives on food defense research
§
§
§
§
§
10:15
10:45
Desiree Linson, Dept. of Homeland Security, Science & Technology
(S&T) Division, University Programs
Segaran Pillai, Dept. of Homeland Security, Chemical/Biological
(Chem/Bio) Division
Tom McGinn, Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs
Bob Brackett, FDA-Center for Food Safety and Nutrition (CFSAN)
Perfecto Santiago, USDA-Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
Break
NCFPD’s FY08/09 work plan and new initiatives
196 §
§
11:30
Introduction to research posters
§
12:00 pm
Frank Busta, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Shaun Kennedy, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Student introductions
Lunch [Oak Ridge dining rooms]
External Board of Advisors breakout session (Private Dining Room)
1:00
CONCURRENT BREAKOUT SESSIONS
Industry Workgroup, Research and Education discussions: brief research
project summaries; gaps and challenges
--Industry workgroup (Room 319)
--Supply Chain Resiliency (McKnight Ballroom)
--Economic Analysis (McKnight Ballroom)
--Risk Communication (Horizon Room)
--Detection/inactivation of agents – biological (Room 307)
--Detection/inactivation of agents – chemical/toxin (Room 317)
--Decontamination and disposal (Room 321)
--Public Health Response and Epidemiology (McKnight Ballroom)
--Education/Programs of Study (McKnight Ballroom)
2:30
Poster Session (students present at posters)
3:00
Break
3:15
Breakout session summary reports: research and education needs and
gaps (facilitated by Team Leaders)
4:00
Food contamination event modeling: Schaffner/Hedberg model
Consequence Management System
§
and
Don Schaffner, Rutgers University
197 §
§
4:30
Emma Harnett, Rutgers University
Andy Jaine, BT Safety
Risk Communication I: Demonstration of research results
§
§
Will Hueston, University of Minnesota
Tim Sellnow, North Dakota State University
5:00
Drinks (cash bar) and hors d'oeuvres [piano bar]
6:00
Dinner [Oak Ridge dining room]
7:30-8:30
CARVER+Shock vulnerability/risk assessment exercise
§
§
Shaun Kennedy, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Frank Busta, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Day 2 - Friday June 29
8:00 am
Melamine case study: Ingredient contamination and the challenges of
defending the global food supply - highlighting public and private sector
issues for supply chain security, public health surveillance and reporting,
rapid detection, economic impact, food processing, risk communication, and
education.
§
10:15
John Hoffman, National Center for Food Protection and Defense
FoodSHIELD (http://www.foodshield.org/)
§
Carrie Rigdon, FoodSHIELD, Minnesota Department of Agriculture
10:45
Break
11:00
CONCURRENT SESSIONS FOR NCFPD THEME GROUPS: Synthesis of
results and input for research and education agenda (facilitated by Theme
Leaders)
§
§
§
§
Systems Strategies: supply chain resiliency; economic analysis; risk
communication (McKnight Ballroom)
Agents: detection; inactivation; disposal/decontamination (McKnight
Ballroom)
Event Modeling: public health response and epidemiology (Room 319)
Education/Programs of Study: (Room 321)
198 12:30 pm
Lunch [Oak Ridge dining rooms]
1:30
Continue CONCURRENT RESEARCH/EDUCATION GROUP SESSIONS
2:45
Summary and next steps
§
§
Shaun Kennedy, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Frank Busta, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
3:00
Adjourn large group
3:30
Post-conference leadership team debriefing
§
§
§
5:00 pm
Shaun Kennedy, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Frank Busta, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Theme Leaders
Adjourn leadership group 199 2008 Annual Meeting NCFPD 2008 Annual Meeting
www.ncfpd.umn.edu
Oak Ridge Hotel and Conference Center http://oakridge.dolce.com/
September 29 – October 1, 2008
FINAL AGENDA
Meeting Objective – Develop the five and ten year strategic research and education plan for NCFPD, including interand intra- theme coordination and partner/stakeholder collaboration
Day 1 – Monday, September 29
1:30 pm
Registration begins, 3:00 hotel check-in
2:00 pm
Theme Leader Planning Session (5:30 adjourn) [Room 307]
6:00 pm
Dinner [Oak Ridge Dining Room]
7-9 pm
Research Theme Meetings
§
§
§
§
§
Agents (Peter Varelis, University of Ballarat, Australia):
Detection;
inactivation; disposal/decontamination (Biological vs. Chemical/Toxins)
[Room 300]
Education/Programs of Study (Curt Kastner, Kansas State University): Formal
academic programs, professional training and development and fellowship
programs [Room 319]
Event Modeling (Don Schaffner, Rutgers University): Public health response and
epidemiology [Room 321]
Risk Communication (Tim Sellnow, University of Kentucky): Research, training,
emergency response and stakeholder relations [Room 307]
Systems Strategies (Chip White, Georgia Institute of Technology): Supply
chain resiliency; economic analysis [Room 306]
Day 2 – Tuesday, September 30
8:00 am
Welcome and Introduction [McKnight Ballroom]
8:15
NCFPD’s Reflections and the Future
200 §
§
9:00
Partner Perspectives on Food Defense Research
§
§
§
§
§
§
10:15
10:45
Liz Filauri, Dept. of Homeland Security, Science & Technology (S&T)
Directorate, University Programs
Sara Klucking, Dept. of Homeland Security, Science & Technology (S&T)
Directorate, Chemical/Biological (Chem/Bio) Division
Tom McGinn, Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs
Donald Zink, FDA-Center for Food Safety and Nutrition (CFSAN)
Carol Maczka, USDA-Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
Dave Wankowski, NCFPD Industry Work Group (Kraft)
Break
Keynote Address: Food Defense from the Consumer Perspective –
§
11:30
Shaun Kennedy, Director, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Frank Busta, Sr. Science Advisor, National Center for Food Protection and
Defense, University of Minnesota
Caroline Smith DeWaal, Director of the Food Safety Program, Center for
Science in the Public Interest
Introduction to Research Posters
Student Introductions
12:00 pm
Lunch [Oak Ridge Dining Room]
Student breakout lunch [served in McKnight Ballroom]
External Board of Advisors breakout session [Private Dining Room]
1:00
Concurrent Breakout Sessions
NCFPD’s Industry Work Group: Review current projects and identify current and
future gaps and needs [Room 208]
Theme Groups: Review of current projects; identify current and future gaps, needs,
and challenges in research and education (Theme Leaders facilitate discussion and
summarize at 3:30 session)
201 §
§
§
§
§
Agents (Peter Varelis): Detection; inactivation; disposal/decontamination
(Biological vs. Chemical/Toxins) [Room 300]
Education/Programs of Study (Curt Kastner): Formal academic programs,
professional training and development and fellowship programs [Room 319]
Event Modeling (Don Schaffner): Public health response and epidemiology
[Room 321]
Risk Communication (Tim Sellnow): Research, training, emergency response and
stakeholder relations [Room 307]
Systems Strategies (Chip White): Supply chain resiliency; economic analysis
[Room 306]
2:30
Poster Session (students present at posters) [McKnight Ballroom]
3:30
Breakout Session Summary Reports: Theme Leaders summarize current and
future needs, gaps and challenges in research and education. Response panel
provides feedback. (10 minute summary, 10 minute response)
FDA – Donald Zink, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
USDA – Lynda Kelley, Office of Food Defense and Emergency
Response
ACADEMIC COMMUNITY – Mark Becker, University of S. Carolina
INDUSTRY WORK GROUP – Gale Prince, SAGE Food Safety
Consultants, LLC
EXTERNAL BOARD OF ADVISORS – Bob Brackett, Grocery
Manufacturers Association
5:30
Poster Session (students present at posters)
6:00
Dinner [Oak Ridge Dining Room]
7:30
Food and Agriculture Sector Criticality Assessment Tool (FAS-CAT)
[McKnight Ballroom] Conduct an infrastructure assessment at each table
202 §
Shaun Kennedy, Director, National Center for Food Protection and
Defense, University of Minnesota
National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) [McKnight Ballroom]
BCOP (Biosurveillance Common Operating Picture) Demonstration
§
8:30
John Hoffman, Sr. Research Fellow, National Center for Food
Protection and Defense, University of Minnesota
Bonfire with s’mores, hot cocoa and hot cider
Day 3 – Wednesday, October 1
8:00 am
G8 Exercise [McKnight Ballroom]
§
§
§
10:15
Morgan Hennessey, Veterinary Public Health Resident, National Center for
Food Protection and Defense, and the Center for Animal Health and Food
Safety, University of Minnesota
Shaun Kennedy, Director, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Frank Busta, Sr. Science Advisor, National Center for Food Protection and
Defense, University of Minnesota
Homeland Security University Programs Web Portal (HSUP) and NCFPD
Web Portal
§
§
Eric Hoffman, Managing Partner, EJH and Associates
Elizabeth Cunningham, Content Manager, National Center for Food
Protection and Defense, University of Minnesota
10:45
Break
11:00
Concurrent Sessions for NCFPD Theme Groups: Based on response panel
feedback on Day 1, identify specific needed research areas and needed resources;
priority rank projects. (Facilitated by Theme Leaders)
§
§
Agents (Peter Varelis): Detection; inactivation; disposal/decontamination
(Biological vs. Chemical/Toxins) [Room 300]
Education/Programs of Study (Curt Kastner): Formal academic programs,
professional training and development and fellowship programs [Room 319]
203 Presentation (11:00 – 11:15: ‘Food Defense and the National School Lunch
Program’ (all are welcome to attend)
§
§
§
12:30 pm
Event Modeling (Don Schaffner): Public health response and epidemiology
[Room 321]
Risk Communication (Tim Sellnow): Research, training, emergency response and
stakeholder relations [Room 307]
Systems Strategies (Chip White): Supply chain resiliency; economic analysis
[Room 306]
Lunch [Oak Ridge Dining Rooms]
Industry Workgroup breakout session [Private Dining Room]
1:30
Continue Concurrent Sessions for Theme Groups
2:45
Summary and Next Steps
§
§
3:00
Shaun Kennedy, Director, National Center for Food Protection and Defense,
University of Minnesota
Frank Busta, Sr. Science Advisor, National Center for Food Protection and
Defense, University of Minnesota
Adjourn
204 2009 Risk Communication Team Meeting NCFPD Risk Communication Team Meeting
April 22- April 24, 2009
Crowne Plaza, The Campbell House
Lexington, KY
FINAL AGENDA
Meeting Purpose
•
•
Facilitate peer review of completed projects with an emphasis on their usefulness for enhancing the food defense
capabilities for food system stakeholders: government, industry, education, subject matter experts
Identify gaps in Risk Communication research, training and rapid response capacity to inform future project
directions.
Presentation Framework Please address the following in your individual project presentations:
•
•
•
What “new knowledge” has emerged as the result of your project?
How do your findings inform the food system’s risk communication preparedness, response and recovery
capabilities in the context of a large-scale food-related event?
How is the food system better prepared to respond to an intentional attack on the nation’s food system as the
result of your project?
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Crowne Plaza, Campbell House, Lexington, KY
6:00
Meet in Lobby of Crowne Plaza
Go to working BBQ at 237 Bittersweet Way
7:00 - 7:30
Team Welcome & Introductions - Tim Sellnow
• Introductions
• Meeting goals
7:30 – 8:30
Food Confidence Index: Lessons Learned
Dennis Degeneffe, Research Fellow, The Food Industry Center
Systems Strategies, National Center for Food Protection and Defense
8:30 – 9:00
Closing comments
1
205 Thursday, April 23, 2009
Mason Headley Room, Crowne Plaza, Campbell House, Lexington, KY
8:00-8:30
Breakfast and Welcome -Tim Sellnow
8:30-9:30
PART I: STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS
Risk Communication and Food Shield (25 min)
Jenny Pierquet, Food Shield
• Opportunities for additional research
• Response Panel: (30 min)
! Contributions to academic literature
! Immediate application for stakeholders
! How food system expert can help advance future research
! Training take-aways
! Future research directions, data/information needed
9:30-10:30
Risk Communication Curriculum Development, Rapid Response and
Stakeholder Relations (25 min)
Lisa Brienzo (PI), Katherine Waters & Tony Flood
• Research highlights & deliverables
• Opportunities for additional research
• Response Panel: (30 min)
! Contributions to academic literature
! Immediate application for stakeholders
! How food system expert can help advance future research
! Training take-aways
! Future research directions, data/information needed
10:30-10:45
Break
10:45-11:45
Who should we talk to, outside of ourselves (25 min)
Tony Flood, IFIC & Jennifer McEntire, IFT
• Opportunities for additional research
• Response Panel: (30 min)
! Contributions to academic literature
! Immediate application for stakeholders
! How food system expert can help advance future research
! Training take-aways
! Future research directions, data/information needed
11:45-1:00
Lunch
1:00-2:00
PART II: RESEARCH ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Food Defense Training and Exercise Evaluation: How Lessons Learned are
Translated into Improved Supply Chain Responsiveness (25 min)
Team: Dale Brandenburg (PI)
• Research highlights & deliverables
• Opportunities for additional research
• Response Panel: (30 min)
! Contributions to academic literature
! Immediate application for stakeholders
! How food system expert can help advance future research
! Training take-aways
! Future research directions, data/information needed
2
206 2:00-3:00
Assessing Message Effectiveness with Diverse Cultural Groups
Based on Learning Styles (25 min)
Team: Robert Littlefield (PI), Kim Cowden & Kim Beauchamp
• Research highlights & deliverables
• Opportunities for additional research
• Response Panel:
! Contributions to academic literature
! Immediate application for stakeholders
! How food system expert can help advance future research
! Training take-aways
! Future research directions, data/information needed
3:00-4:00
Robust Case Study Analysis of Media (25 min)
Team: Tim Sellnow (PI), Rob Ulmer & Liz Petrun
• Research highlights & deliverables
• Opportunities for additional research
• Response Panel: (30 min)
! Contributions to academic literature
! Immediate application for stakeholders
! How food system expert can help advance future research
! Training take-aways
! Future research directions, data/information needed
4:00-5:00
Closing Comments
5:00-7:00
Examining the intersection of crisis communication with new and social
media
Dr. Deborah Chung, University of Kentucky
Dr. Mina Tsay, University of Kentucky
Friday, April 24, 2009
Mason Headley Room, Crowne Plaza, Campbell House, Lexington, KY
8:00-8:30
Breakfast and Preview
8:30-9:30
Data collection in China during Melamine outbreak: Preliminary results
Min Liu & Julie Novak
9:30-10:00
Work Group Breakouts: Research & Curriculum Development
• Research Team -– Tim Sellnow
• Training Team – Lisa Brienzo
10:00-10:30
Working Group Reports – Tim Sellnow
• Reports from work groups
• Just-in-time capacity-building
10:30-11:30
PART IV: FUTURE PRIORITIES & PLANNING – Tim Sellnow
• Identifying gaps: membership, research, training, emergency response,
stakeholder relations
• How to better connect with food system experts
• Team conference calls and meeting in Year 6
11:30-12:00
Closing Comments
3
207 2009 Event Modeling & System Strategies Theme Meeting !
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2++*06/&$.-*0<0=.6*)Name Email address Title & Affiliation NCFPD Role
Name
Email Address
Title
Affiliation
John
Ambrosiano
[email protected]
PI
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Jeff Bender
[email protected]
Co-PI
University of Minnesota
S
Lisa Brienzo
[email protected]
Project
Manager
NCFPD
NA
Greg Burnham
[email protected]
Guest
U.S. Army
E
Frank Busta
[email protected]
Sr. Science
Advisor
NCFPD
NA
n/a
Student
Georgia Institute of Technology
[email protected]
CoInvestigator
University of Minnesota
S
[email protected]
PI
Georgia Institute of Technology
S
Koel Ghosh
[email protected]
CoInvestigator
University of Minnesota
S
Craig Hedberg
Tae Su
Cheong
Dennis
Degeneffe
Alan Erera
Theme
[email protected]
Co-PI
University of Minnesota
M
Morgan
Hennessey
[email protected]
Project
Manager
NCFPD
NA
Philip Huntley
[email protected]
University of Minnesota
Import
Vulnerability
Al Kagan
[email protected]
Co-PI
Arizona State University
M
Shaun
Kennedy
[email protected]
Director
NCFPD
NA
Jean Kinsey
[email protected]
Co-PI
University of Minnesota
S
John Li
[email protected]
Student
University of Minnesota
210 1
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&
&
&
&
&
2++*06/&$.-*0<0=.6*)Name
Name
Dennis
Lonergan
J. David
Luedeke
Hamid
Mohtadi
Richard
Mosley
Email Address
Title
Affiliation
Theme
[email protected]
Sr. Project
Manager
BTSafety LLC
M
[email protected]
Guest
Battelle Memorial Institute
NA
[email protected]
PI
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
S
[email protected]
Guest
CH Robinson
NA
University of Minnesota
Systems
Vulnerability
Ryan Newkirk
[email protected]
William
Nganje
[email protected]
PI
Arizona State University
M
Abbey Nutsch
[email protected]
PI
Kansas State University
E
Greg Paoli
[email protected]
Consultant
Risk Sciences International, Inc
M
Mark Petersen
[email protected]
Guest
CH Robinson
Don Schaffner
[email protected]
PI
Rutgers University
M
Jon Seltzer
[email protected]
PI
University of Minnesota
S
Randy Singer
[email protected]
PI
University of Minnesota
S
Thomas
Stinson
[email protected]
Co-PI
University of Minnesota
S
Chip White
[email protected]
PI
Georgia Institute of Technology
S
2
211 2009 Agent Behavior Theme Meeting NCFPD Agent Behavior Theme Meeting
October 14-15, 2009
Continuing Education Center
University of Minnesota, Saint Paul campus
FINAL AGENDA
Project Presentations: Please allow 3-5 minutes for questions and discussion within your allotted time as
noted below:
• Year 5 Projects to be completed 12/31/2009: 15 minutes
• 2009/10 Supplemental Funding projects to be completed 9/30/2010
o Year 5 continuation projects: 20 minutes
o New projects: 10 minutes
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
11:45 & 12:30
Radisson Roseville Hotel shuttle departs for campus (meet in hotel lobby)
Lunch will be served at Continuing Education Center from 12 -1:00 p.m.
1:00pm
Welcome & Introductions
Agent Behavior Theme Co-leaders: Eric Johnson, University of Wisconsin and Peter
Varelis, University of Ballarat
• Introductions
• Meeting goals
• PIs’ meeting expectations
1:30
The Evolution of the Center Years 1-6
Frank Busta, NCFPD Senior Science Advisor
Current Projects Receiving 2009/10 Supplemental Funding:
1:45
Development of a Multiplex Bio-barcode DNA Biosensor for Bacillus anthracis
Detection Without PCR Amplification, Phase II
PI: Evangelyn Alocilja, Michigan State University
2:05
Extraction and Concentration of Chemical (Tetramethylenedisulfo-tetramine)
and Biological (Ricin) Toxins Using Molecular Imprinted Electrospun Fibers
Coupled with Detection at Aptamer Modified Polymer Electrodes
PI: Keith Warriner, University of Guelph
2.25
A Microfluidic Approach for Separation and Concentration of Bacterial Spores
from Milk and Juices
PI: Suresh Pillai, Texas A & M
2:45
Break
212 Years 4-5 Projects (2007-2009)
3:00
Extraction of Bacillus anthracis Spores and Ricin from Liquid Foods
PI: Francisco Diez-Gonzalez, University of Minnesota
3:15
Impact of Select Agents on the Coagulation Properties of Milk Proteins
PI: Salam Ibrahim, North Caroline A & T State University
3:30
Validation of Methods for Decontamination of Food Processing Equipment and
Facilities Deliberately Contaminated with Bacillus Spores
PI: Alvin Lee, Illinois Institute of Technology
3:45
Special Topic: Key Activities in the Education Theme and Opportunities for
Inter-Theme Collaborations
Abbey Nutsch, Kansas State University
Agent Behavior – Education Liaison: Evangelyn Alocilja, Michigan State University
4:15
Detection and Removal of Select Agents from Complex Food Matrices: Phase II
Co-PI, Ruben Carbonell, University of North Carolina (via conference call)
4:30
Identification and Characterization of Temperature-dependent Virulent Genes in
Y. pestis, Y. pseudotuberculosis, and Y. enterocolitica.
PI: Teshome Yehualaeshet, Tuskegee University
4:45
Special Topic: Army food Safety and Defense Initiatives
Dr. Andy Senecal, U.S. Army
NEW 2009/10 Supplemental Funding Projects
Please present using 3 slides: project title, objectives, agent(s)/food matrix
5:00
Simultaneous Detection of Multiple Food Safety Threat Agents Using Multiplex
PCR and PCR-based Microarray Approaches
PI: Woubit Salah Abdela, Tuskegee University
5:10
Proof-of-concept Study for the Development of a Cell-free GPCR-based
Biosensor for Rapid Non-specific Detection of Chemical and Biological Toxic
Agents
PI: Evangelyn Alocilja, Michigan State University
5:20
Development of Nontoxigenic Clostridium botulinum Toxins and Strains for
Food Defense Studies
PI: Eric Johnson, University of Wisconsin, Madison
5:30
Protein Complementation Based Functional Detection Assay for Staphylococcal
Enterotoxin B
PI: Jody Proescher, Johns Hopkins University
5:40
Day 1 Research Wrap-up
Theme Co-leaders: Peter Varelis and Eric Johnson
6.00
Dinner and Director’s Comments
Shaun Kennedy, NCFPD Director
7:00
Food Defense from a Law Enforcement Perspective
Special Agent Fred Stephens, FBI, Minnesota Office
7:45pm
Shuttle returns to Radisson Roseville Hotel
213 Thursday, October 15, 2009
8:10am
Radisson Roseville Hotel shuttle departs for campus (meet in hotel lobby)
8:30
Continental Breakfast – Continuing Education Center
9:00
Chemical Inactivation of Protein Toxins on Food-Contact Surfaces
PI: Jack Cappozzo, Illinois Institute of Technology
9:15
A Simple and Rapid Method for the Simultaneous Purification and
Concentration of Nucleic Acids and Proteins from Food Matrices.
PI: Charles Young, Johns Hopkins University
9:30
Development of Biologically Modified Electrically-active Magnetic
Nanoparticles (nano-BEAMs) for Direct Capture and Concentration of
Bacillus anthracis Spores and Cells in Various Food Matrices
PI: Evangelyn Alocilja, Michigan State University
9:45
Thermal and Chemical Inactivation of Select Agent Toxins in Liquid Foods
(including 09/10 continuation)
PI: Theodore P. Labuza, University of Minnesota
9/10 PI: Francisco Diez-Gonzalez
Students: Stephan Lumor, Lili He, Na Wang
10:05
Stability of Botulinum Neurotoxin (BoNT) in Food Matrices
PI: Eric Johnson, University of Wisconsin, Madison
10:20
Break
10: 35
2009/10 Supplemental Funding Project: Application of Surface Enhanced
Raman Spectroscopy for Detection of Chemical and Biological Terror
Agents in Food Matrices
PI: Ted Labuza, University of Minnesota
Students: Stephan Lumor, Lili He, Na Wang
10:45
Capture and Detection of Botulinum Neurotoxin (BoNT) in Complex Food
Matrices using Novel Biosensor Platforms
PI: Eric Johnson, University of Wisconsin, Madison
11:00
Discussion Session - Preliminary Topics:
• Safety and compliance issues
• Fostering collaborations
• Procedures for modifying projects and protocols
• Identifying new opportunities (Research directions & new PIs), e.g. small
molecule research
• How to increase participation in teleconferences
• NCFPD research webinar series
12:30P
Working Lunch: Experiences from Agent Behavior Participants in DHS
Summer Research Team Program for Minority Serving Institutions (MSI)
Discussion Facilitator: Frank Busta
Past and Current MSI Summer Participants: Francisco Diez-Gonzalez, Charles
Young, Salam Ibrahim, Keith Warriner, Nelly Mateeva, Abbey Nutsch
1:15
Discussion Session - continued
1:45
Wrap Up & Actions
2:00pm
Adjourn – Taxi pick-up to airport
214 2010 Biennial Meeting !
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218 Appendix E: Research in Food Defense Webinar Listing National Center for Food Protection and Defense Research in Food Protection Webinar Series December, 2009 – May, 2011 Date Presentation Title 12/4/2009 Terrorism Risk Assessment from Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate Sara Klucking, Threat Characterization Program Manager, Chemical and Biological Division, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security Modeling the Public Health System Response to Deliberate Contamination of the Food Supply Don Schaffner, Extension Specialist in Food Science, and Director, Center for Advanced Food Technology, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey and Greg Paoli, Risk Sciences International Consumer Fraud: Deterrence and Detection of Economically Motivated Adulteration of Food Products Craig Henry, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Scientific and Regulatory Affairs, Grocery Manufacturers Association Lessons Learned from H1N1 Pandemic: Strategies for Preparation and Risk Communication Timothy Sellnow and Kathleen Vidoloff, University of Kentucky; Matthew Seeger, Wayne State University; Keri Lubell and Katherine Becker, CDC Office of Communication and Community Mitigation Force Tools and Resources from the FDA Food Defense Oversight Team Jason Bashura, General Health Scientist , Food Defense Oversight Team, FDA / CFSAN / OFDCER 1/8/2010 2/5/2010 3/5/2010 4/9/2010 5/7/2010 8/6/2010 Total Attendees 78 75 50 53 75 Virtual Tour of Kansas State University's State-­‐of-­‐the-­‐Art Biosecurity 59 Research & Training Capabilities Beth Montelone, Associate Dean, College of Arts & Sciences, Interim Director, Biosecurity Research Institute, Kansas State University Assessing Economic Consequences of Disruptions to Export Grain 41 Supply Chains Alan Erera, Associate Professor and Co-­‐Director, Supply Chain and Logistics Institute’s Center, for Global Transportation, Georgia Institute of Technology 219 9/10/2010 10/8/2010 11/5/2010 12/3/2010 1/7/2011 2/4/2011 3/4/2011 4/8/2011 5/6/2011 A Introducing START's Global Terrorism Database Erin Miller, Global Terrorism Database (GTD) Project Manager, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Highlights from the National Center for Food Safety and Technology (NCFST) Food Defense Research Activities Robert Brackett, Vice President and Director, National Center for Food Safety and Technology, Illinois Institute of Technology; Alvin Lee, Director of Microbiology, NCFST, IIT; Lauren Jackson, Research Food Technologist, FDA, Division of Food Processing Science and Technology; Jack Cappozzo, Director of Chemistry, NCFST, IIT Results of USDA FSIS Vulnerability Assessments on International and Domestic Transportation of Food Kim Green, Director, Food Defense Assessment Staff, Office of Data Integration and Food Protection, USDA-­‐Food Safety and Inspection Service Tampering and Food Defense: The Canadian Perspective Harry Gardiner, Counter Terrorism and Emergency Mitigation, Office of Emergency Management, Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) and Darren Slevin, Bioterrorism Officer, Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) FDA Study on Consumers’ Beliefs and Perceptions About Food Terrorism Sara Eggers, Research Director, Decision Partners and Linda Verrill, Consumer Science Specialist, FDA Characterizing the Potential Use of Consumer Complaints Surveillance for the Early Detection of Foodborne Illness Events Craig W. Hedberg, Division of Environmental Health Sciences, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota Food Consequence Modeling for the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Rowan Wang, NCFPD Research Fellow, Industrial and Systems Engineering, University of Minnesota and Shaun Kennedy Director, National Center for Food Protection and Defense Social Media Constraints & Opportunities Research Project Michael Palenchar, School of Advertising and Public Relations, College of Communication and Information, University of Tennessee and Shari Veil, College of Communications and Information Studies University of Kentucky NCFPD Student Research Showcase 2011 Peanut Corporation of America Robust Case Study: Proxy Communication in 70 55 74 102 119 131 99 66 76 220 Organizational Crises (Risk Communication Theme) Alyssa Grace Millner, Doctoral Student, Department of Communication, University of Kentucky Rapid Detection Ricin in Liquid Foods Using Surface-­‐Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy (Agent Behavior Theme) Lili He, Post Doctorate, Food Science and Nutrition, University of Minnesota Examining Food Risk in the Large Using a Complex, Networked System-­‐
of-­‐Systems Approach (Event Modeling Theme) Ryan Newkirk, Doctoral Student, Department of Epidemiology and Community Health, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota TOTAL PARTICIPANTS: December, 2010 – May, 2011 1,223 221 Appendix F: Personnel Project Investigators June, 2007 – May, 2011 Name Affiliation Theme Project Role Woubit Abdela Tuskegee University Agent Behavior PI Ram Acharya New Mexico State University Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Jason Ackleson New Mexico State University Education PI Evangelyn C. Alocilja Michigan State University Agent Behavior PI John Ambrosiano Los Alamos National Laboratory Systems Strategies PI Kimberly Beauchamp North Dakota State University Risk Comm Co-­‐PI David Beebe University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Jeff Bender University of Minnesota Education Investigator Ali Beskok Old Dominion University Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Dale Brandenburg Wayne State University Risk Comm PI Jesus Bravo Arizona State University Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Lisa Brienzo University of Minnesota Risk Comm Jack Cappozzo National Center for Food Safety & Agent Behavior Technology, IIT PI Ruben Carbonell North Carolina State University Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Kristin Colony BTSafety LLC Event Modeling Investigator Kimberly Cowden University of North Dakota Risk Comm Co-­‐PI Dennis Degeneffe University of Minnesota Systems Strategies Co-­‐PI Paul DeVito Saint Joseph's University Risk Comm PI Francisco Diez-­‐
Gonzalez University of Minnesota Agent Behavior PI Project Manager 222 Mark Edwards Arizona State University Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Alan Erera Georgia Institute of Technology Systems Strategies PI Santiago Ernst Universidad Austral de Chile Systems Strategies Investigator Kelly Getty Kansas State University Education Investigator Koel Ghosh University of Minnesota Systems Strategies Co-­‐
Investigator Paul Goodwin University of Guelph Agent Behavior Investigator Tsegaye Habtemariam Tuskegee University Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Susan Harlander BTSafety LLC Event Modeling PI R. Wes Harrison Louisinna State University Systems Strategies Co-­‐PI Emma Hartnett Risk Sciences International Education PI Craig Hedberg University of Minnesota Education PI David Hird University of California-­‐Davis Systems Strategies Investigator Will Hueston University of Minnesota Risk Comm PI Salam Ibrahim North Carolina A&T Agent Behavior PI Lauren Jackson FDA Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Lee-­‐Ann Jaykus North Carolina State University Agent Behavior PI Eric Johnson University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Theme Leader Scott Johnson University of Kentucky Risk Comm Investigator Albert Kagan Arizona State University Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Curt Kastner Kansas State University Education Investigator Justin Kastner Kansas State University Education Co-­‐PI Jean Kinsey University of Minnesota Systems Strategies Co-­‐PI 223 Ulrich Krull University of Toronto Agent Behavior Investigator Ted Labuza University of Minnesota Agent Behavior PI Alvin Lee National Center for Food Safety and Technology, IIT Agent Behavior PI Loong Tak Lim University of Guelph Agent Behavior Investigator Robert Littlefield North Dakota State University Risk Comm PI Nelly Mateeva Florida A & M University Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Brian McCauley Saint Joseph's University Risk Comm Investigator Mark McDonald Vanderbilt University Event Modeling Investigator Jennifer McEntire Institute of Food Technologists Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Hamid Mohtadi University of Wisconsin-­‐
Milwaukee Systems Strategies PI Claudia Munoz-­‐
Zanzi University of Minnesota Systems Strategies Co-­‐PI Ryan Newkirk University of Minnesota Event Modeling Co-­‐PI William Nganje Arizona State University Event Modeling PI Julie Novak Wayne State University Education Investigator Abbey Nutsch Kansas State University Education PI Michael Palenchar University of Tennessee Risk Comm PI Greg Paoli Risk Sciences International Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Christina Pier Univeristy of WI-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Investigator Suresh Pillai Texas A & M University Agent Behavior PI Alex Proescher Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Agent Behavior Investigator Jody Proescher Johns Hopkins University Agent Behavior PI Subrayal Reddy University of Surrey Agent Behavior Investigator Deanna Retzlaff Kansas State University Education Investigator Orlando Rojas NC State University Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI 224 Michael Sadowsky Biotechnology Institute Agent Behavior Co-­‐PI Peter Sandman Consultant Risk Comm Investigator Don Schaffner Rutgers University Event Modeling PI Matthew Seeger Wayne State University Risk Comm PI Deanna Sellnow University of Kentucky Risk Comm Specialist Tim Sellnow University of Kentucky Risk Comm PI Jon Seltzer University of Minnesota Systems Strategies PI Donna Shenck-­‐
Hamlin Kansas State University Education Investigator Jeff Sholl BTSafety LLC Event Modeling Co-­‐PI Randall Singer University of Minnesota Systems Strategies PI John Spink Michigan State University Risk Comm PI Srinand Sreevatsan University of Minnesota Agent Behavior PI Tom Stinson University of Minnesota Systems Strategies Co-­‐PI Samuel Temesgen Tuskegee University Agent Behavior Investigator Robert Ulmer University of Arkansas Education Investigator Shari Veil University of Oklahoma Risk Comm Co-­‐PI Steve Venette University of Southern Mississippi Risk Comm Investigator Lawrence Wackett University of Minnesota Agent Behavior PI Keith Warriner University of Guelph Agent Behavior PI Katherine Waters University of Minnesota Risk Comm Investigator Chelsea C. White, III Georgia Institute of Technology Systems Strategies PI Teshome Yehualaeshet Agent Behavior PI Tuskegee University 225 Charles Young Johns Hopkins University Applied Agent Behavior Physics Laboratory PI Students June, 2007 – May, 2011 Name Affiliation Theme Awfa Alazzeh North Carolina A & T Agent Behavior Michael Anderson Michigan State University Agent Behavior Kathryn Anthony University of Kentucky Risk Communication Edikan Archibong Florida A&M Agent Behavior Kimberly Beauchamp North Dakota State University Risk Communication Sheena Bhalla Massachusetts Institute of Technology Risk Communication Akua Odi Boateng Howard University Risk Communication David Carr Michigan State University Agent Behavior Brian Castro Michigan State University Agent Behavior Yanling Chang Georgia Institute of Technology System Strategies Chen Chen University of Kentucky Risk Communication Tae Su Cheong Georgia Institute of Technology System Strategies Kerri Cooper National Center for Food Safety and Technology, IIT Agent Behavior Tarrie Crnic Kansas State University Education Whitnee Dash Tuskegee University Agent Behavior Atilio de Frias National Center for Food Safety and Technology, IIT Agent Behavior Bronwyn Deen University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Anthony Dodge Biotechnology Institute Agent Behavior Matt Dodor University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Mark Edwards Arizona State University Event Modeling 226 Karen Everstine University of Minnesota System Strategies Mac Farnam University of Minnesota Risk Communication Karen Freberg University of Tennessee Risk Communication Neal Fredrickson University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Megan Frisk University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Nathan Georgette Harvard College Agent Behavior Christopher Giese Arizona State University Event Modeling Tim Goldsmith University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Lili He University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Regina Hu Arizona State University Event Modeling Michael Huarng Michigan State University Agent Behavior Aaron Hutt University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Parul Jain Michigan State University Agent Behavior Julianne Jensby Kansas State University Education Jackie Koch University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Mehti Koklu Old Dominion University Agent Behavior Kathryn Krusemark Kansas State University Education Elise Lamont University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Talia Lapid New Mexico State University Education Chensha Li University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Wenchao Li Rutgers University Event Modeling John Li University of Minnesota Event Modeling Li Chenhui University of Wisconsin Agent Behavior Ye Liu University of Wisconsin Agent Behavior Lo Chi-­‐Wei University of Wisconsin Agent Behavior Stephen Lumor University of Minnesota Agent Behavior 227 Xudong Ma University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Hanna Miller Michigan State University Agent Behavior Alyssa Millner University of Kentucky Risk Communication Marica Montgomery Tuskegee University Agent Behavior Azadeh Namvar University of Guelph Agent Behavior Casey O'Neill New Mexico State University Education Ryan Palowski Michigan State University Agent Behavior Shantala Pamarthi National Center for Food Safety and Technology, IIT Agent Behavior Seungkyung Park Old Dominion University Agent Behavior Elizabeth Petrun University of Kentucky Risk Communication Lonnie Phetsomphou North Carolina A&T Agent Behavior Elizabeth Prebles Wayne State University Risk Communication Oriana Raabe University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Romali Ranasinghe Michigan State University Agent Behavior Ryan Palowski Michigan State University Agent Behavior Emma Setterington Michigan State University Agent Behavior Golam Shaharior Islam University of Guelph Agent Behavior Connie Shi Okemos High School (Okemos, MI) Agent Behavior Sakiko Shiratori University of Minnesota System Strategies Ellen Siebers University of Wisconsin Agent Behavior R. Derike Smiley North Carolina State University Agent Behavior Sudheer Sridharamurthy University of Wisconsin, Madison Agent Behavior Christine Stover Wayne State University Risk Communication Shelly Stowman North Dakota State University Risk Communication 228 Lindsay Strotman University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Edith Torres-­‐
Chavolla Michigan State University Agent Behavior Rose Ann Vasquez New Mexico State University Education Kathleen Vidoloff University of Kentucky Risk Comm Na Wang University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Lei Wang National Center for Food Safety and Technology, IIT Agent Behavior Quishi Wang University of Kentucky Risk Communication Minh Wednt University of Minnesota System Strategies Anna Wiley University of Minnesota Agent Behavior Ping Xie, MS National Center for Food Safety and Technology, IIT Agent Behavior Zhiyuan Xu University of Minnesota System Strategies Aimei Yang University of Oklahoma Risk Communication Xuefeng Zeng University of Wisconsin-­‐Madison Agent Behavior Deng Zhang Michigan State University Agent Behavior Yu Zhang Georgia Institute of Technology System Strategies 229 Industry Work Group (IWG) June, 2007 – May, 2011 Name Affiliation Title Location Thomas Bell P&G R&D Project Mgr, Product Safety & Regulatory Affairs Cincinnati, OH David Binder Nestle Dir, Risk Management Greenwich, CT Darren Blass Jack in the Box Dir, Quality Assurance San Diego, CA Ann Boeckman Kraft Foods, Inc. Senior Counsel, Food Law Chicago, IL Ken Conover Coca-­‐Cola, North America Dir, Incident Management Atlanta, GA Mike Craig Wal-­‐Mart, Inc. Dir, Food Safety & Security Bentonville, AR Ted Cronk Target Corporation Dir, Food Safety & Quality Assurance Minneapolis, MN Jackie Dillon Kraft Foods, Inc. Sr. Scientist Glenview, IL Mike Dunn Sodexo Dir, Product Quality Assurance Gaithersburg, MD Sarah Geisert General Mills, Inc. Sr Dir, Product Safety & Regulatory Affairs Minneapolis, MN Tim Haley Bush Brothers & Company Dir, Research and Regulatory Compliance Knoxville, TN Craig Henry Deloitte & Touche LLP ERS Director Baltimore, MD Richard Jacobs Richard Jacobs Kraft Foods Glenview, IL Charles Jamison Nat'l Corn Growers Assn Director Chesterfield, MO Cindy Jiang McDonald's Corporation Dir, Food Safety Oak Brook, IL Robert Johnston Malt-­‐O-­‐Meal Company Dir, Health Safety, Environment & Security Northfield, MN Robert Koeritzer 3M Health Care Business St. Paul, MN Sr. Technical Mgr 230 John Kolenski The Krogo Co. Dir, Food Safety & Regulatory Compliance Cincinnati, OH Michael Liewen Yum! Brands, Inc. VP, Quality Assurance Louisville, KY Ann Marie McNamara Jack in the Box VP, Food Safety San Diego, CA Jonathan Merkle Michael's Foods, Inc VP, Research and Devlpmt Gaylord, MN Kirsten Meskill Kraft Foods, Inc. Sr Security Mgr Glenview, IL Debbie Miller Restaurant Services, Inc. Sr Dir, Business Analysis & Promotions Planning Coral Gables, FL Phil Minerich Hormel VP, Research & Development Austin, MN Ned Mitenius Periscope Consulting Senior Consultant Grapevine, TX Sara Mortimore Land O'Lakes Inc VP, QA & Regulatory Affairs St. Paul, MN Richard Mosley C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. Produce Systems Design & Dvlpt Mgr Eden Prairie, MN Bill Ramsey McCormick & Company Dir, Corporate Security Sparks, MD Richard Ryan Archer, Daniels Midland Company Asst. Deputy Dir, Corp Security Decatur, IL Joseph Scimeca Cargill, Inc. Dir, Global Regulator Affairs Wayzata, MN Tony Smith Nash Finch Company Corporate Loss Prevention Mgr Minneapolis, MN Larry Steenson Danisco USA, Inc. Principal Scientist New Century, KS Jeff Varcoe Schwan Food Company VP, Food Safety & Quality Marshall, MN Dave Wankowski Kraft Foods Global Global Quality Audit Director Glenview, IL Dave Wiemer SUPERVALU INC. Corporate Dir, QA Chanhassen, MN Frank Yiannas Wal-­‐Mart, Inc. VP, Food Safety Bentonville, AR Gerald Zeidler Burger King Corporation Manager Miami, FL 231 External Board of Advisors (EBA) June, 2007 – May, 2011 Name Title Affiliation City Rhona Applebaum Chief Regulatory Officer Coca Cola Company Atlanta, GA Mark Becker President Georgia State University Atlanta, GA Bob Brackett IIT Vice President and Director of Institute of Food Safety and Health (IFSH) Illinois Institute of Technology Summit-­‐Argo, IL Frank Busta Director Emeritus, Senior Science Advisor NCFPD St. Paul, MN Ted Cronk Director of Food Safety and Quality Assurance Target Corporation Minneapolis, MN Tom Handley President Ecolab St. Paul, MN Shaun Kennedy Director NCFPD St. Paul, MN Segaran Pillai Chief Medical and Science Advisor DHS S&T Washington, DC Mike Robach Vice President, Corporate Food Safety Regulatory Cargill, Inc. Wayzata, MN 232 Research Evaluation and Advisory Panel (REAP) June, 2007 – May, 2011
Name Affiliation Evangelyn Alocilja Michigan State University John Ambrosiano Las Alamos National Laboratory Vicki Bier Michigan State University Robert Gravani Cornell University Craig Hedberg University of Minnesota Will Hueston University of Minnesota Eric Johnson University of Wisconsin, Madison Al Kagan Arizona State University Curtis Kastner Kansas State University Jean Kinsey University of Minnesota Ted Labuza University of Minnesota William Ngange Arizona State University Don Schaffner Rutgers University Tim Sellnow University of Kentucky Cindy Stewart Silliker US Peter Varelis NCFST, IIT Chip White Georgia Institute of Technology Teshome Yehualaeshet Tuskegee University External Reviewers Name Affiliation Bob Buchanan FDA/CFSAN 233 David Beebe University of Wisconsin, Madison Steve Bennett DHS S&T Larry Beuchat University of Georgia Michelle Catlin FSIS USDA Francisco Diez-­‐
Gonzalez University of Minnesota Tony Flood International Food Information Council Paul Hall Matrix MicroScience Inc. Andy Jaine Formerly BTSafety Heidi Kassenborg Minnesota Department of Agriculture Lynda Kelley FSIS, OFDER Don Klingborg University of California, Davis James Lightbourne NSF Mike Orosz USC, CREATE Robert Phillips FSIS USDA Suresh Pillai Texas A&M Greg Pompelli ERS USDA Edward Rhyne DHS S&T Matt Seeger Wayne State University Deanna Sellnow University of Kentucky John Shutske University of Wisconsin (formerly University of Minnesota) Dan Sumner University of California, Davis 234 Paul Takhistov Rutgers University Don Zink FDA Bob Ehart NASDA J.S. Smith Kansas State University Jason Wan NCFST, IIT 235