the iran conflict

A z a d i (L i b e r t y) T o w e r , T e h r a n / I r a n
IRAN
IN THE
EYE
OF
STORM
WHY A
GLOBAL WAR
HAS BEGUN

We live, after all,
in a world where
illusions are sacred
and truth profane.
Tariq Ali
2005

ALI FATHOLLAH-NEJAD
RESEARCH PAPER | WORK IN PROGRESS
FULLY REVISED VERSION: APRIL 2007
INITIAL VERSION: AUTUMN 2005
ABSTRACTS [EN] [DE] [FR]
GENERAL REMARKS ▪ INITIAL WORDS
3
5
INTRODUCTION
6

GEOPOLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
7
1.
GEOECONOMIC CENTERS
1) The Middle East’s Centrality for the World
2) Iran’s Centrality in the Middle East
7
7
8
2.
GEOSTRATEGIC HOT SPOT
1) Oil and Democracy
2) Iran and Great Powers Rivalry
9
10
11



THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE MIDDLE EAST
13
1.
21ST CENTURY U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
2.
IRAN AND AMERICA’S WARS
23
1) Iranian Détente as Response to U.S. Containment and Peripheral Wars 23
2) Iran’s Security Dilemma: U.S. Militarization of the Middle East
25
3) Forced Modus Vivendi: ‘Axis of Evil’ as Reward for Cooperation
26
4) The Neocons in the Corridors of Power
27
13
1) On How to Designate American Supremacy
13
2) The ‘Cheney Report’ on Energy Policy (May 2001): On Securing Oil
15
3) The 2002 National Security Strategy: The ‘Preemptive’ Strike Doctrine 17
4) The ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’: America’s Restructuring Offensive 19
5) The 2006 National Security Strategy: Putting Iran in Crosshairs
20
6) A Highly Explosive Mixture
22
MANUFACTURING A GLOBAL CRISIS: THE IRAN CONFLICT
31
1.
ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM?
1) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Its Erosion
2) Historical Outline of Iran’s Nuclear Program
3) Dilemmas of Double-Standard and Dual-Use
31
31
33
34
2.
ON HOW DIPLOMACY CAN PAVE THE WAY FOR WAR
1) Negotiations over Iran’s Nuclear Program: Escalating Diplomacy
2) Why the Talks’ Failure was Foreseeable
3) Tackling the Real Issues: How Diplomacy Can Finally Succeed
38
38
57
61
AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE
64
1.
WHO IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY? ON GLOBAL FISSURES
1) The West’s Sole Agency Claim
2) Southern Objection
64
65
65
2.
THE GLOBAL HEGEMON’S DECISIVE BATTLE
1) Stranglehold on its Rivals: America’s ‘Oil Weapon’
2) Feeling the Hegemon’s Squeeze: Asian Great Powers and Iran
3) Consequences of an Iran War
4) Who Would Benefit from an Iran War and Who Not?
5) The War Bells Ring: America and the World at the Crossroads
67
67
69
71
74
75
CONCLUDING REMARKS
84
REFERENCE LIST ▪ ABOUT THE AUTHOR
88 ▪ 95
2
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
What Is At Stake?
And What To Do?
GEOPOLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE
MIDDLE EAST
MANUFACTURING A CRISIS:
THE IRAN CONFLICT
AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE
ABSTRACTS
English | The Iran crisis has become a synonym for escalation dangerously tending towards confrontation. Tehran therein is accused by the U.S.-led West of developing nuclear weapons. This in fact is an
alerting highlight in the tense history of U.S.-Iranian relations since World War Two, as we clearly hear
the war bells ring. What lies behind that present Irano-Western conflict has to be seen in a broader historical and political context: Beginning with the 1953 coup d’état against Iran’s democratically elected Mossadegh government till recent wars in the Iranian periphery, American interventionist foreign policy in
the world economy’s most crucial region, the Middle East, proves a great deal of bitter continuity in its
push for controlling this part of the world for the sake of global hegemony. The new U.S. preventive war
doctrine provides the political legitimacy for such an agenda. The major battlefield of this militaristic
agenda of America’s grand strategy seems to be focused on the ‘Greater Middle East.’ Besides having to
cope with a considerable security dilemma due to tremendous trembles in her environment, Iran now
sees herself targeted as an exclusive member of the ‘Axis of Evil.’ This paper will attempt to clarify the
interests at stake for the sole remaining superpower. It will thus argue that the only meaningful way to
perceive the present conflict is through considering its politico-strategic background and implications.
The Iran crisis is indeed a significant symptom of a unilateral world order on the verge of collapse. To
prevent a catastrophic conflagration, an unbiased engagement by the European Union is indispensable in
order to decrease the regional security dilemma by ultimately establishing a nuclear-free Near and Middle East zone. Europe should assume responsibility vis-à-vis her neighboring region, for surrendering to
New Order fantasies à l’Américaine will heavily harm her own interests.
Français | La crise iranienne est devenue un synonyme pour une escalade dangereusement menant à la
confrontation. Téhéran est accusé par l’Occident, mené par les Etats-Unis, de vouloir développer l’arme
nucléaire. Ceci est en fait une culmination alarmante des relations américano-iraniennes depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, comme nous entendons clairement les cloches de guerre sonner. Ce qui est derrière ce présent conflit irano-occidental doit être considéré en prenant en compte le contexte historique
et politique : Commençant par le coup d’état de 1953 contre le gouvernement iranien démocratiquement
3
élu de Mossadegh jusqu’aux guerres récentes dans la périphérie iranienne, la politique étrangère interventionniste des Américains dans la région la plus prépondérante pour l’économie mondiale, le MoyenOrient, atteste une continuité amère dans sa volonté de contrôler cette part du monde. Désormais, la
nouvelle doctrine de guerres préventives des Etats-Unis offre la légitimité politique pour un tel agenda
visé à sauvegarder son hégémonie mondiale. Le champ de bataille majeur de cet agenda militariste de la
politique mondiale des Etats-Unis semble se concentrer sur le « Grand Moyen-Orient ». Face à un considérable dilemme sécuritaire, l’Iran se voit dorénavant ciblé en tant que membre exclusif de l’« Axe du
Mal ». Cette étude veut clarifier les intérêts en jeu pour l’hyper-puissance. Elle veut ainsi argumenter que
la seule manière significative de percevoir le conflit présent se fait par la considération des éléments de
base au niveau politico-stratégique. Afin de réduire le dilemme sécuritaire régional, un engagement sérieux par l’Union européenne est indispensable qui devrait viser l’établissement d’une Conférence sur la
sécurité et la coopération dans un Proche- et Moyen-Orient complètement dépourvu d’armes nucléaires.
L’Europe devrait assumer ses responsabilités face à sa région voisine, car en cédant { des fantaisies d’un
« New Order » { l’Américaine ses propres intérêts seront terriblement nuis.
Deutsch | Die Iran-Krise ist zum Synonym einer gefahrenvollen Eskalation, die gen Konfrontation tendiert, geworden. Der von den Vereinigten Staaten geführte Westen wirft Teheran vor, die Atomwaffe
entwickeln zu wollen. Dies ist in der Tat ein alarmierender Höhepunkt in den iranisch-amerikanischen
Beziehungen seit Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs, zumal die Zeichen unverkennbar auf Krieg weisen. Um
die Hintergründe dieses Konfliktes zu verstehen, darf ein Blick auf den historischen sowie politischen
Kontext nicht außer Acht bleiben: Beginnend mit dem 1953 erfolgten Staatsstreich gegen Irans demokratisch gewählte Mossadegh-Regierung bis hin zu Kriegen neueren Datums in Irans Peripherie, zeugt
die interventionistische US-Außenpolitik in der für die Weltwirtschaft ausschlaggebendsten Region, dem
Mittleren Osten, von der bitteren Kontinuität diesen Teil der Welt beherrschen zu wollen. Die Präventivkriegs-Doktrin der USA stellt die politische Legitimation solch eines Unternehmens dar, dessen Anspruch
es ist ihre weltumspannende Hegemonie aufrechtzuerhalten. Der dafür identifizierte Hauptkampfschauplatz scheint unverkennbar der „Größere Mittlere Osten“ zu sein. Einem existentiellen Sicherheitsdilemma gegenüber ausgesetzt, sieht sich Iran nun als exklusives Mitglied der „Achse des Bösen“ im unmittelbaren Schussfeld. Diese vorliegende Studie beabsichtigt die auf dem Spiel stehenden Interessen der
einzig verbliebenen Supermacht zu verdeutlichen. So argumentiert sie, dass die einzig konstruktive Weise diesen Konflikt zu betrachten eine sein muss, die den politisch-strategischen Implikationen bezüglichen des internationalen Systems Rechnung trägt. Um das regionale Sicherheitsdilemma zu verringern,
ist ein ehrliches Engagement der Europäischen Union für eine nuklearfreie Zone unerlässlich. Europa
sollte sich gegenüber seiner immens bedeutsamen Nachbarregion seiner Verantwortung stellen. Sich
stattdessen amerikanischen Neuordnungsfantasien zu beugen, würde ihr immensen Schaden zufügen.
4
SOME REMARKS
GENERAL REMARKS
 The sheets included in this paper are part of a PowerPoint presentation of the topic.
 Underlined words are hyperlinked.
 For Persian/Farsi names, the English phonetic transcription is being used (except those authors cited as
well as citations). E.g. â stands for [a:]. For Afghan and other names, the prevalent English diction is
used.
ABBREVIATIONS
$ U.S. dollar
AEOI Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
BoG Board of Governors (of the IAEA)
EU European Union
EU-3 The European Three, composed of Great Britain, France, and Germany
G-8 Group of Eight comprising the Group of Seven (G-7) highly industrialized nations (Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Russia
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
MinAtom Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation
(N)ME (Near and) Middle East
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSS National Security Strategy of the United States
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
P5+1 The five U.N. Security Council veto powers plus Germany
R&D research and development
SCR Security Council Resolution
UK United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
U.S. United States
WTO World Trade Organization
Initial Words
The motivation for conducting such a study was the simplistic, all too often lopsided, media coverage of
the conflict erupting between the West, above all the United States, and Iran. Unfortunately that has not
much changed since. This is an attempt to present multi-layered façades of the conflict’s international
implications. Only through a complex account of what is actually at stake, peaceful means to settle the
conflict can be sought. Identifying the global political conflict lines is a prerequisite to find feasible and
acceptable ways to halt the dangerous escalation. An allegedly ‘military solution,’ causing a violent outbreak our world has hardly witnessed, would bring about terrible and unutterable consequences. Scholars dealing with matters of peace and conflict should acknowledge the immense significance to report in
due time all the complexities and, all too often, ulterior motives of powerful actors shaping our world
today. Bringing the results of such studies to public (and media) attention is not only desirable, but of
utmost importance. All this in the endeavor to avoid a looming catastrophe on the horizon.
A. F.-N., Gelsenkirchen (Germany), March 28, 2007
5
Introduction
WE ARE CONDUCTING MILITARY OPERATIONS INSIDE
IRAN RIGHT NOW. THE EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING.
(RET. U.S. AIR FORCE COL. SAM GARDINER
ON CNN [2006] IN SEPTEMBER 2006)
The world is at crossroads, and with it the unipolar world order deeply in crisis. Emerged as the
world’s sole superpower after the collapse of the bipolar confrontation, the United States has
become the hegemon in international relations. Preeminent militarily, this hyper-puissance has
established a quasi-Empire that is highly under challenge, not least due to the quagmire in the
aftermath of the neoconservative-orchestrated Iraq War. The bloody lessons from the hardnosed build-up to and hypocritical justifications of the occupation of Iraq compel us to take a
calm look at the heated waters around the crisis with Iran. This escalating crisis magnificently
affects the whole international system—with dividing lines running globally. Will Washington
loose its Empire for the sake of preserving it? Why Iran has been chosen as target? What roles do
Europe and other major powers play in this regard? If international peace and security is threatened, who are the driving forces behind that? And what effect would an Iran War have on the
whole international system? A careful mapping of the issues at stake is crucial to grip economic
and political factors of a geostrategic power game of high intensity and utmost emergency.
In an initial effort to highlight the tremendous significance of the crisis regarding Iran, we
will start examining in Chapter 1 the geoeconomic endowment of both the Middle East and Iran
for the world and Great Powers’ geostrategy vis-à-vis Iran. Then, in Chapter 2, the global hegemon’s attention to the Middle East region, and particularly Iran, will be explained. For doing so, a
discussion of the United States’ Grand Strategy and its implications for Iran—as well as the latter’s reactions to it—is necessary in order to understand the politico-strategic context in which
the Iran crisis has emerged. In Chapter 3, we will address the issue of the Iran conflict. After assessing the accuracy of the focus set on Iran’s nuclear program, we will then go great length in
evaluating the adequacy of European diplomacy towards Iran—in consideration of Washington’s
afore-discussed foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Tehran. After explaining the vicious cycle of misguided diplomacy paving the way for escalation, effective guidelines and frameworks for a
peaceful settlement will be indicated. In a final step, in Chapter 4, we will elevate our view to the
global perspective, raising the questions of the very constitution of the international system and
the fervent drive of the global hegemon for extending its unilateral preeminence—and its farreaching risks for all concerned.
At the end, on the basis of the insights gained from the previous discussions, necessary initiatives for a durable pacification of the Near and Middle East region will be addressed, highlighting the contributions Europe could make.


6

Middle Eastern countries have been taking center stage in international politics for so many
decades, and are still today. Why is this so? Iran also makes reappearance in the headlines today.
But why Iran once again? I will now show that both have a tremendous weight inside their respective geo-economic and geo-strategic realms, for that is indispensable if one intends to fully
understand the geographical special position the region at stake is holding.
1.1.1. The Middle East’s Centrality for the World
The world is dependent on the ME natural resources: In terms of oil, we can classify—pursuant
to MASSARRAT (2004)—, for 2005, different scales of
dependencies vis-à-vis this region: For the United
States, you have a 17.33% dependency (i.e. low
dependency), for Europe, 23.71% (i.e. relatively
large regional dependency), for China 40.19%, for
Japan 81.70%, and for other Asian Pacific nations a
79.66% dependency (i.e. complete dependency).1
The ME provides for the largest regional share in
worldwide crude oil production (IEA 2006: 10, see
Regional Shares of Crude Oil Production (IEA
2006: 10). Total production in 2005: 3,923 million
tons (Mt). [*Asia except China]
fig.).
As for gas, the ME ranks top with 40.1% of the world’s proved reserves in late 2005 (BP
2006: 22).
1.1.2. Iran’s Centrality in the Middle East—and Beyond
Various reasons ought to be mentioned in order to underscore the central position the country
of Iran holds in the Middle East region:
Iran’s geo-strategic position:
o
in the West: the Arab Near and Middle East [NME] as well as Israel (the region’s number
one military power);
o
in its North: the Caspian Sea, most probably the 21st century’s geo-strategic bone of contention (cf. AMINEH 2000);
o
on the Eastern flank: the non-Arab Middle East (Afghanistan and Pakistan), India (an
emerging heavyweight power), former Soviet republics (rich in natural resources and
bone of contention between grand powers) as well as China (the next superpower?);
1
Own calculations based on BP 2006: 20, Table ‘Oil: Inter-area movements 2005.’ It can be added that the
United States and Japan are Saudi Arabia and Iran’s largest oil customers, respectively (see United States Congress Joint Economic Committee (2006), “Iran’s Oil and Gas Wealth,” Research Report #109-31, March; obtained from www.house.gov/jec).
7
o
in the South: the Persian Gulf (world’s number one source for oil) as well as the Arab
Gulf states;
o
second in terms of surface (1,648,000 km², i.e. larger than Germany’s, France’s, and
Spain’s surfaces taken together) after Saudi-Arabia in the NME;
o
its capital Tehran is the largest city in the NME, with almost 13 million inhabitants.
The country’s demography: 72 million inhabitants, i.e. largest population in NME as well
as the world’s youngest population; and
natural resources:
o
for oil, second after Saudi-Arabia in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and fourth in worldwide production (in 2005) 2 as well as fifth as to oil exports (in 2004)3 (IEA 2006: 11);4
o
as to gas, Iran has the world’s greatest reserves after Russia, 5 but in 2005 was only the
seventh greatest exporter worldwide (IEA 2006: 13).
Iran is the only country which serves as a geostrategic linkage between the two main
fossil cores of our time.6 Furthermore, its size, population, and its own huge resources—
accompanied by a long-standing precious civilization are founding the bases for the country
to play an outstanding role in world politics.
2
The ranking is as follows (of total world crude oil production): Saudi Arabia 13.2%, Russia 12.0%, the U.S.
7.8%, and Iran 5.2%.
3
Here the ranking is as follows (in million tons [Mt]): Saudi Arabia 346, Russia 258, Norway 132, Nigeria 123,
and Iran 122. As far as exports of crude oil and petroleum products in 2004 are concerned, Iran ranks fourth
behind Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Norway (IEA 2006: 23).
4
Iran produces 3.7 million barrel oil per day, almost 300,000 barrels below the quota set by OPEC. Such a difference signifies, according to STERN, an annual loss of $5.5 billion (2007: 377-78). In 2004, the profits from the
oil business comprised 63 percent of the Iranian State’s revenue (p. 377).
5
At the end of 2005, Russia’s share of 26.6% of global proved reserves of natural gas ranks top, with Iran (with
14.9%) and Qatar (14.3%) following (BP 2006).
6
Iran is further in the best position to be the main transit country for fossil energies. But its pariah status has
avoided such an outcome.
8
GEOPOLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
2. GEOSTRATEGIC
HOT SPOT
Source: arte, “Le Dessous des Cartes.”
As we have seen, the Middle East—and therein Iran—in fact constitutes the world economy’s
most crucial region since the latter is still based on resources such as petroleum and gas. The
combination of these fossil energies in the region and the core position it holds in America’s foreign policy contributed to the region’s bloody reputation as a global hot spot—and even prior to
the end of the Cold War as main battlefield for rivalries between various Great Powers. The fall
of the Iron Curtain did not affect the tremendous strategic relevance of this region, but highlighted it as global oil demand from various actors in the globalization process is continuingly
on the rise. American foreign policy experts and advisors—from Brzezinski, Kissinger to neoconservatives—agree upon that the Near and Middle East region is also the most crucial one
when it comes to the sole remaining superpower’s ‘longstanding national interests,’ thus necessitating U.S. control over that region. As the proclaimed goal of the U.S. strategy in the Middle
East is to democratize the autocratic structures at place (outlined below in 2.1.4. on the Greater
Middle East Initiative)—, it will now be discussed in which political circumstances global oil
demand can be best satisfied. Then, we will briefly discuss the tense history of Great Powers
rivalry in and around Iran.
9
1.2.1. Oil and Democracy
IF THE CHIEF NATURAL RESOURCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST WERE BANANAS,
THE REGION WOULD NOT HAVE ATTRACTED THE ATTENTION OF
U.S. POLICYMAKERS AS IT HAS FOR DECADES.
(RICHMAN 1991)
THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE GOOD LORD DIDN’T SEE FIT
TO PUT OIL AND GAS RESERVES WHERE THERE ARE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS
(DICK CHENEY, THEN CEO OF HALLIBURTON,
AT A 1996 ENERGY CONFERRENCE IN NEW ORLEANS)
7
In contrast to the views of many consumers in the West that the oil price is at a high level, according to its real price oil is cheaper today than in the 1980s and scarcely more expensive than
in the early of the 1930s when the international oil market was set up. Despite the facts that
global oil demand tremendously rose by 2,000 percent and oil resources are becoming scarcer,
the oil price—in contradiction to any market logic—stayed at a low level. (MASSARRAT 2005a) In
order to set the market price for oil at a level that satisfies both producers and consumers, market participants’ sovereign action is indispensable. Thus for assuring this basic Neoclassical assumption in terms of market and equilibrium theory, democracy is inseparable to the sovereignty of market participants. The annuity rate of oil, representing a great share of revenues from the
oil market, is subject to struggles between the political élite of the producer countries and the
level of subsidies for the importing nations’ oil consumption (EHRKE 2003: 12-13). The higher
the oil price, the less profits for those two entities. But as we take a look at the democratic deficits of much of the Middle Eastern oil-rich countries, we might understand why the oil price
could not be evolving according to Neoclassical theory.
In the early 1970s the oil-owning countries of the South have transferred their market sovereignty to half a dozen multinational oil corporations, while being content with a share of 10 to
20 percent of total gains. An era of latent over-production followed as competition in this highly
profitable sector grew over the years. The results were prices between $1 and $2 per barrel. Not
only did oil-trading multinational corporations (MNCs) became the world’s strongest financial
players, but cheap oil soon marked the basis for Western mass consumption and prosperity—all
this to Middle Eastern nations’ detriment. (MASSARRAT 2005a) Those oppressive contracts between producers and consumers were signed by the region’s corrupt élites who herewith sought
to stabilize their rule in an openly colonial era of world history (AMIRPUR 2002).
In an act of self-determination and sovereignty upon own oil resources, in 1951, the first
democratically elected government in Iran—but also the first one of the region—declared the
nationalization of the country’s oil, then exploited by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), as its chief objective. Elected ‘Person of the Year’ in 1951 in the American news
magazine The Time, the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, soon became a symbol
7
Cited in PEMBERTON, Miriam, ed. (2004), Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) PetroPolitics Special Report, January,
53 pages, p. 31. URL
10
of Third World resistance against Western imperialism and exploitation. As his oil nationalization act harshly undermined American and British interests, in a joint Anglo-American effort
Mossadegh and his government were deposed in 1953 (cf. also KAZEMZADEH 2003). In a next
step, the then ousted Shah of Iran was reinstalled by the Americans. Thus the monarch’s dictatorship was put back in place; and the popular democratic movement with Mossadegh at its
head harshly exterminated (GAVIN 1999). The reason behind the coup d’état was the West’s
angst vis-à-vis the adaptation of the Mossadegh model. The international system at place was
endangered as the example of a Third World country pursuing independence and national empowerment risked being imitated.
Under increasing legitimacy pressure by the own population, in early 1970s even dictators
were pushed to nationalize the oil industry, thus gaining a little amount of their lost market sovereignty. What followed are the widely known—from the Western perspective—two oil crises:
in 1974, due to the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the price experienced a rise from $2 to $10
per barrel, and the 1979 revolution in Iran set the oil price at $40. But despite gaining formal
sovereignty over own oil sources, a real democratization did not take place. The ruling petrodollar monarchies continued to cooperate with the world’s greatest oil consumer, the United
States. The deal made between them can be summarized as follows: the securing of own rule and
military cooperation versus a moderate oil price policy (MASSARRAT 2005a).
This brief retrospect with the protruding Mossadegh coup boldly illustrates that if a country
rich in oil has a political system in which democratic control is exercised, then this will run counter to oil-consuming industrialized states’ interests. Given this reverse interaction between oil
price and democratic polity in oil-producing countries, a skeptical look at so-called democratization efforts put forward by hegemonic powers is certainly—as the historic record suggests—
more than appropriate.
1.2.2. Iran and Great Powers Rivalry
The world economy’s core region has ever since been the hot spot in international politics, with
Great Powers satisfying their vital interests located in the Middle East region, in particular Iran,
by considerably intervening into the region’s affairs.
a) Cold War and Shah Era
Iran’s relations with its neighbors prior to 1979 can be reflected in the Cold War context, wherein the capitalist and communist blocks were facing each other. Iran under the Shah was then the
closest U.S. partner in the Middle East, while Turkey and Israel completed the triad of Washington’s allies. These three countries—especially a strongly armed Iran—were meant to stand as a
wall against Soviet influence, so to prevent Moscow to connect to the Persian Gulf. Iran’s strateg-
11
ic alliance with Israel provoked Arab anger,8 particularly during numerous Israeli-Arab conflicts.
Thus Irano-Arab relations were marked by a high degree of tensions, which was especially due
to—at least forced by—Great Power rivalries and interests in the region (cf. IBRAHIM 2004).
b) Iranian Revolution as Shock for Western Interests
The Iranian Revolution—i.e. the downfall of the U.S.-backed Shah regime—was conceived as a
tremendous shock for Western, particularly U.S. interests. The speedy revolution suddenly established a vacuum for U.S. interests as Iran declared the dawn of an independent foreign policy,
especially regarding to its energy resources (cf. 1973/74 oil crisis). Moreover, Iran was feared as
an example for an independent, anti-imperialistic Third World country—as witnesses one of the
revolutionary slogans: ‘neither Western nor Eastern’ (cf. AFRASIABI 2002; SARRESCHTEHDARI
2001).
c) Post-Revolutionary Confrontation
Washington thus engaged in preventing the new strategic situation erupting from the Iranian
Revolution from undermining its interests in the region and encouraged Iraq under Saddam to
attack the neighboring country. An eight-year long war followed, being the most severe war in
history after World War Two with about one million victims. In politico-strategic terms, the IraqIran war was a war fought by Iran against both the West and the East, as Germany (delivering
tanks and biochemical warfare), France (providing mirages aircrafts), the United States—along
with Arab states—as well as the Soviet Union predominantly favored Baghdad, offering military
and intelligence support during the war period. As foreign policy advisor Henry Kissinger then
underscored, it was in America’s national interest to prolong this war as long as possible, noting
that it was “too bad they can’t both lose” (cf. TIMES 1987). At the end, Iran managed to defend
itself against the aggressor due to the country’s successful mass mobilization.
The American government reacted to the new geopolitical setting in the Middle East caused
by the Iranian Revolution by kicking off a policy of isolation and containment (cf. economic sanctions in April 1995 by the Clinton Administration as well as Iran’s classification as a ‘rogue
state’) accompanied by a demonization of post-revolutionary Iran.


8

Although most of Arab regimes have been installed through Anglo-Saxon interference, they worried about
that the Tehran-Tel Aviv alliance would undermine their interests in the region.
12
THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE ME
1. 21st CENTURY U.S. GRAND STRATEGY
1.1. On How to Designate
American Supremacy
1.2. The ‘Cheney Report’ on
Energy Policy, May 2001
1.3. The National Security
Strategy (NSS), 2002
2.1.1. On How to Designate American Supremacy
Hegemony represents a useful concept for grasping dominance phenomena in international relations. The notion implies the coercion or acknowledged leadership of a specific actor in pursuit
of own interests, utilizing different layers of power which it has at its disposal. A hegemonic
power is “a state ... able to impose its set of rules on the interstate system, and thereby create temporarily a new political order.” (WALLERSTEIN 2002: 357) Hegemony does also imply the global
outreach of powerful political actors, mostly countries, to fields being defined as essential to
their rule. Despite the centrality of power relations in the fields of politics, economy, technology,
and military, the ideological dimension of hegemony as the exercise of consensual domination is
indispensable (GRAMSCI 1971).
In the effort to promote peaceful alternatives, it is indispensable to analyze the dominant hegemonic discourse and to expose material interests hiding behind it. This is even more crucial in
times where the practice of noble virtues—such as human rights and democracy—heralding
military action is almost taken for granted. Only by dismantling such rhetoric through uncovering agendas and mechanisms of hegemonic rule, paths to establishing peace can be paved. Moreover, the hegemonic orientation of U.S. foreign policy has bluntly entered the inner-American
debate about Washington’s role in the world. Herein the term hegemony comprises the goal that
the U.S. should be immune against any challenge which could possibly occur. The term is frequently used in all discussions about American global dominance, American Empire (cf. RILLING
2004), or pax americana, both by supporters and critics of the United States’ global policy. While
there is still debate about which term to use—in general, between ‘hegemony’ and ‘empire’—
when it comes to adequately grasp the current world order, for the purpose of this paper I
would prefer the notion ‘hegemony.’ I will do so because it is intended to discuss Washington’s
13
global policy objectives more than broaching the issue of transnational ruling structures, devoid
of any territorial binding, as the term ‘empire’ would rather comprise. As will be seen, this is
even more useful as the United States’ policies seem to intend to knock down America’s global
rivals—their alleged ‘allies.’9 But considering the huge number of 737 U.S. military bases in more
than 130 countries—with “over half a million U.S. troops, spies, contractors, dependents, and others,” except those in Iraq and Afghanistan (JOHNSON 2007)—, this strong case for global powerprojection can, if it must, be justifiably designated as an ‘American Empire.’
Already under the Clinton Administration the direction of American foreign and security policy was set towards safeguarding U.S. global predominance (RUDOLF 2001) and maintaining it at
all conceivable levels—a so-called ‘full-spectrum dominance,’ as prescribed in the Joint Vision
2010 (published on May 30, 2000, cf. SCHÖFBÄNKER 2000). First outlined in the policy paper Rebuilding America’s Defenses10 (DONNELLY ET AL. 2000), a unipolar world order deriving from
American supremacy should be enduringly established (DONNELLY 2003). It was the belief that
any reduction of American power would inevitably cause more conflict or even favor newly
emerging blocks that justifies that aspiration for permanent predominance. Therefore a unipolar
world with the U.S. at its head would be the most stable of all systems. (WOHLFORTH 1999) Long
before 9/11 this pax americana was proclaimed by American neoconservatives as a strategic
goal to be warranted through new, and costly, military capabilities (DONNELLY ET AL. 2000: 14).
With George W. Bush jr. stepping into office, the gap between pretension and reality sensitively
shortened.
In order to better comprehend the background of today’s escalating conflict with Iran, it is
useful to look at the effectual global hegemon’s strategic orientation, drafting the sole remaining
global superpower’s grand strategy in general, and in particular towards the Middle Eastern
area and in regard to Iran.
9
In how far the aggressive U.S. policy respects a transnational global class’s interests is a highly interesting—
and certainly tremendously important—field to study.
10
Following individuals participated or contributed in this report of the Project for a New American Century
(PNAC): Roger Barnett (U.S. Naval War College), Alvin Bernstein, Stephen Cambone (both National Defense
University), Eliot Cohen (Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), Devon
Gaffney Cross (Donors’ Forum for International Affairs), Thomas Donnelly (PNAC), David Epstein (Office of Secretary of Defense, Net Assessment), David Fautua (Lt. Col., U.S. Army), Dan Goure (Center for Strategic and
International Studies), Donald Kagan (Yale University), Fred Kagan (U.S. Military Academy at West Point), Robert Kagan (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Robert Killebrew (Col., USA [Ret.]), William Kristol
(The Weekly Standard), Mark Lagon (Senate Foreign Relations Committee), James Lasswell (GAMA Corporation), I. Lewis Libby (Dechert Price & Rhoads), Robert Martinage (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment), Phil Meilinger (U.S. Naval War College), Mackubin Owens (U.S. Naval War College), Steve Rosen (Harvard University), Gary Schmitt (PNAC), Abram Shulsky (The RAND Corporation), Michael Vickers (Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessment), Barry Watts (Northrop Grumman Corporation), Paul Wolfowitz (Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), and Dov Zakheim (System Planning Corporation). All the protagonists’ posts indicated are taken from the report itself (DONNELLY ET AL. 2000: 90) and thus
reflect the positions held at that time.
14
2.1.2. The ‘Cheney Report’ on Energy Policy (May 2001): On Securing Oil
THE INTERNATIONAL OIL MARKET IS NOT A FREE,
BUT A POLITICALLY CONTROLLED MARKET,
11
THE ECONOMY OF OIL IS A POLITICAL ECONOMY.
(EHRKE 2003: 12)
At the outset of George W. Bush’s administration, the President directed Vice-President Dick
Cheney to develop guidelines for U.S. energy policy. The task of the report by the NATIONAL ENERGY
POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP12 (NEPD 2001) was to set America’s energy perspectives for the
next two decades. It projects that by 2020 two-thirds of U.S. oil demand ought to be imported,
signifying the doubling of the level at the dawn of the 21st century, thus stating: “A fundamental
imbalance between supply and demand defines our nation’s energy crisis.” (IBID.: viii) Therefore
the report recommends the extension of the fossil energy sector and calls upon the President
that “[e]nergy security must be priority of U.S. trade and foreign policy.” (IBID.: xv) As will be briefly indicated now, the so-called Cheney Report not only provoked the U.S. to move out from the
Kyoto Protocol, but implies geopolitical dimensions of much more gravity.
It is only in the eighth and last chapter, entitled Strengthening Global Alliances, that the reports basic purpose becomes clear, beginning with “U.S. national energy security depends on sufficient energy supplies to support U.S. and global economic growth.” (8—1) While emphasizing the
need for diversification of U.S. energy supply, the report contrastingly does not challenge American reliance on imported oil, but “[t]he basic goal of the Cheney plan is to find additional external
sources of oil for the United States.” (KLARE 2004: 4). Therefore alliances with “high –priority
countries” (NEPD 2001: 8—7), such as former Soviet Caspian Sea countries and Russia, have to
be enforced (IBID.: 8—12; 8—13-8—14). Further, the report observes that “Asia holds less than 5
percent of world proven oil reserves, but accounts for more than 10 percent of oil production and
about 30 percent of world oil consumption” and underlines that both Asian developing countries,
especially India and China—the latter being “a critical player in global energy security issues”—
heavily depend upon ME imports. It is stressed that the ME “remain[s] vital to U.S. interests” as by
2020 Persian Gulf oil producers were projected to supply two-thirds of the world’s oil (all IBID.:
8—14). Consequently, this area will play a tremendous role and “be a primary focus of U.S.international energy policy, but our engagement will be global, spotlighting existing and emerging
11
Own translation. The original reads: “Der internationale Erdölmarkt ist kein freier, sondern ein politisch kontrollierter Markt, die Ökonomie des Öls ist eine politische Ökonomie.”
12
Members of the NEPD Group are Dick Cheney (Vice President), Colin L. Powell (Secretary of State), Paul
O’Neill (Secretary of the Treasury), Gale Norton (Secretary of the Interior), Ann M. Veneman (Secretary of Agriculture), Donald L. Evans (Secretary of Commerce), Norman Y. Mineta (Secretary of Transportation), Spencer
Abraham (Secretary of Energy), Joe M. Allbaugh (Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency),
Christine Todd Whitman (Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency), Joshua B. Bolton (Assistant to
the President and Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy), Mitchell E. Daniels (Director of the Office of Management
and Budget), Lawrence B. Lindsey (Assistant to the President for Economic Policy), Ruben Barrales (Deputy
Assistant to the President and Director of Intergovernmental Affairs), and Andrew D. Lundquist as the Group’s
Executive Director (NEPD 2001: vi).
15
regions that will have a major impact on the global energy balance.” (8—5) Accordingly, the report strongly recommends U.S. engagement to open up the energy sectors of Persian Gulf Arab
countries (both IBID.: 8—5).
However, the before mentioned U.S. ‘energy crisis’ is relativized affirming that “[t]he rate of
growth in U.S. oil demand has slowed significantly since the first oil shocks of the 1970s” (8—1). In
this light, the importance of the geopolitical dimension of the report’s recommendations comes
to the fore. Accordingly, the document connects global oil supply with Washington’s geoeconomic policy goals:
We should not, however, look at energy security in isolation from the rest of the world. In a
global energy marketplace, U.S. energy and economic security are directly linked not only
to our domestic and international energy supplies, but to those of our trading partners as
well. A significant disruption in world oil supplies could adversely affect our economy and
our ability to promote key foreign and economic policy objectives, regardless of the level of
U.S. dependence on oil imports. (8—3)
This can be understood in terms of focusing the attention of U.S. global policies on the role global
energy supplies play to advance overall American objectives, also undeniably towards its current and emergent rivals as they all heavily depend on the import of petroleum. Thus concentration on the strategic significance of the global energy system is indispensable. What is more, “the
architects of the Bush-Cheney policy know that ensuring access to some oil sources may prove impossible without the use of military force.” (KLARE 2004: 10) And the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea
areas’ blatant militarization serves as an obvious proof of the United States’ ‘vital interest’ to
secure his, but above all its rivals’ energy supply. In this light, the NEPD’s message encouraged
the occupation of Iraq which has the world’s second largest proven oil reserves (EHRKE 2003).
Due to the U.S. embargo, Baghdad’s oil has been exploited by non-American companies, and this
situation had to be reversed in order to meet the report’s recommendations.
It is commonly known that leading U.S. energy companies were strongly involved in drafting
the ‘Cheney report’:
The decades-long supply of Western national economies with cheap oil generated the establishment of a de facto subsidized ‘petro-industrial complex’ (from the oil till the automobile
industry) which relies on the continuous inflow of cheap oil—and is politically strong
enough to affect government policies of Western democracies.13 (EHRKE 2003: 13)
The ‘Cheney Report’ thus serves as a blunt example of the complicity between the so-called “petro-industrial complex” (IBID.: 13) and the military-industrial one (MIC) as it requires tight cooperation of both sectors to satisfy the aims of U.S. grand strategy.
13
Own translation. The original reads: “Die über viele Jahrzehnte hinweg garantierte Versorgung der westlichen
Volkswirtschaften mit billigem Öl ließ einen de facto subventionierten »petro-industriellen Komplex« (von der
Erdöl- bis zur Automobilindustrie) entstehen, der auf einen kontinuierlichen Zustrom billigen Öls angewiesen –
und politisch stark genug ist, die Regierungspolitik der westlichen Demokratien zu beeinflussen.”
16
2.1.3. The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy: The ‘Preemptive’ Strike Doctrine
WE WILL ACTIVELY WORK TO BRING THE HOPE OF DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT,
FREE MARKETS , AND FREE TRADE TO EVERY CORNER OF THE GLOBE.
(NSS, SEPTEMBER 2002)
The National Security Strategies have no legal force of their own but serve as a guidepost for
agencies and officials drawing up policies in a range of military, diplomatic and other arenas
(BAKER 2006). The 2002 published The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(NSS) forms—predominantly in the form of a political manifesto—the basis of U.S. post-Cold
War global strategy at the beginning of the 21st century. Herein aspects of the two dominant U.S.
schools of thoughts in international relations (IR) are included: On the one hand, pursuit of classical Machtpolitik along with politics of national interest according to the realist canon and on
the other, liberal internationalists’ claim for offensively extending democracy and marketeconomy are being considered. Simultaneously, in the effort to push for a consequent hegemonic
outline, some core elements of these both IR schools were put aside: realism’s—more precisely
defensive realism’s—assertion not to overstretch the use of force as well as internationalism’s
claim for multilateral cooperation (WAGNER 2003: 7). The NSS explicitly draws the outlines for
the United States’ global outreach by offering “a single sustainable model for national success:
freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” (NSS 2002: iv) which America should bring to “every
corner of the world” (IBID.: v). The NSS thus clarifies the major objectives the U.S. should follow in
its foreign policy centered on a new kind of “internationalism” (IBID.: 1). By this term the neoconservative authors allude to the global stage upon which their policy guidelines should be
exercised. They stress the following pillars: Acknowledging the new post-Cold War realities
while fighting terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (either in regard to
States or groups); promoting democracy and human rights globally; developing market economies and free trade on a global scale along neoliberal economic patterns; and adapting the existing system of international cooperation to new settings and requirements.
All this should imply the use of military force and also cooperation with allies whenever this
suits American interests. This ‘globalization of the Monroe Doctrine’ (DE WILDE 2003) is endorsed with a decisive element: What makes the NSS so revolutionary is the institutionalization
of the preventive strikes which counters existing prescriptions of international law. It hast to be
underlined that the term ‘preemption’ is being misleadingly used as ‘preemption’ is covered by
international law signifying a military reaction toward a provable and imminent attack (cf. Article 51, U.N. Charta). In reality ‘prevention’ is meant, as it comprises military reaction against a
possibly, by no means certainly occurring threat. This however is a clear breach of international
law and moreover the factual suspension of State sovereignty and the obligation of nonaggression (WAGNER 2003; MÄRKER 2004: 3-4).
17
The so-called Bush, or Wolfowitz Doctrine, which was first announced three months earlier
by President Bush in his speech at West Point’s military academy, provides the political legitimacy for any action pursued by America in its ‘global war on terror’:
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. (NSS 2002: 15)
Put in other words, the newly established preemptive war doctrine points to the “the use of military force to eliminate an invented or imagined threat” (CHOMSKY 2003; cf. also MEGGLE 2006) and
sets the ground for a confrontational course with the rest of the world (WAGNER 2003).
Based on the assumption that today there is a huge gap in terms of power, especially military, between the United States and the rest of the world—as implied in the concept of an ‘American Empire’—the NSS suggests to establish a global and enduring pax americana and therefore
calls for an activist policy based upon military superiority beyond challenge, war against terror,
and prevention (RILLING 2004): “The unparalleled strength of the United States armed forces, and
their forward presence, have maintained the peace in some of the world’s most strategically vital
regions.” (NSS 2002: 29) American ‘forward presence’ in such regions is most keenly felt in the
Caspian and Persian Gulf regions where “radical extension of stationing U.S. troops” [own translation] (WAGNER 2003: 3) takes place. This new “imperial grand strategy,” the prominent IR theorist and Princeton scholar John IKENBERRY underlines, proclaims the United States as “a revisionist
state seeking to parlay its momentary advantages into a world order in which it runs the show,”
since “no state or coalition could ever challenge it as global leader, protector, and enforcer.” Nevertheless he recognizes the NSS’s potential to endanger the dominant role the U.S. is holding
(2002).
THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE ME
1.4.
Greater
Middle
East
Initiative
(GMEI), 2004
1.5.
NSS, 2006
• How broad is your vision of the Greater Middle East?
• As great as the word “HEGEMONY.“ (Y.Abedlaki, AlKhaleej, 6/9/04)
18
2.1.4. The Greater Middle East Initiative (2004): America’s Restructuring Offensive
In the aftermath of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the United States announced its vision of
a democratized broader Middle East region. This project officially embodies three main cornerstones: promotion of democracy and good governance; establishment of a knowledge society; as
well as extension of economic potentials through liberalization ( AL-HAYAT 2004). According to its
initiators, the Greater Middle East Initiative takes as its starting point the huge deficits of Arab
countries put forward by the 2002 and 2003 U.N. Arab Human Development Program (UNAHDP). After having identified the interventionist nature of America’s vision for the Middle East,
a large debate broke out about the geographical limitations of the plan: While some consider
nearly the whole Muslim world (from Marrakesh to Bangladesh), others limit its scope till Pakistan. However it is clear that all the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, i.e. also Iran, are involved
herein. The GMEI, which intends to limit any threat posed to all G-8 members’ national interests,
such as “extremism, terrorism, international crime, and illegal migration,” (IBID.) was first presented as a draft proposal to America’s G-8 counterparts in early 2004. The London-based Arabic daily al-Hayat obtained and published a copy of this. Due to some reservations by European
countries because of the plan’s too offensive tone, a revised version of the proposal was later
issued at the June 2004 Sea Island Summit of the G-8, but also at other U.S.-EU and NATO summits. This more ‘diplomatic’ version was then titled by the G-8 Summit’s participants Partnership
for Progress and a Common Future with Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa. The
GMEI can be seen as the culmination of many foreign policy proposals made by neo-conservative
policy advisers in recent years and even before 9/11. The identification of the key figures responsible for the U.S. Broader Middle East initiative as key protagonists of the much controversial shape of U.S. foreign policy on the Middle East gained much criticism. The more visible of
these are Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under-Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith,
Richard Perle (Defense Policy Board), David Wurmser (Vice-President Dick Cheney's adviser),
and Danielle Pletka (a vice-president of the neoconservative think tank, the American Enterprise
Institute [AEI]) (ALJAZEERA 2004).
Therefore it is important to note that the U.S. government, besides this ‘democratization offensive,’ pursues another Greater Middle East project, this time in undisguised hegemonic terms:
first of all, the removal of allegedly aggressive and war-prone ‘rogue states’—although this assumption is being empirically refuted (cf. CAPRIOLI & TRUMBORE 2005)14—as already realized in
the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, and since a while harshly voiced against the Iranian regime,
while putting in place American-oriented leading élites and also organizing elections; secondly,
under the label of Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiated bilateral agreements focused on establish-
14
In the very first empirical testing of that common notion of U.S. foreign policy, American political scientists
CAPRIOLI and TRUMBORE find that so-called ‘rogue States’ are no more likely to use force than others (2005).
19
ing military bases across the Middle East region, such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and the Persian Gulf Arab sheikhdoms; and thirdly, cooperation with
friendly States through money and arms (MASSARRAT 2005b). Therefore the GMEI has to be primarily considered as a hegemonic project rather than a policy plan with a real democratization
intention (SCHMID 2006).
2.1.5. The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy: Putting Iran in Crosshairs
In March 2006 the White House published a new National Security Strategy.15 The U.S. President’s foreword – in his letter to his “fellow Americans” – starts with an apocalyptic tone: “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the great challenge we face –
the rise of terrorism […]” (NSS 2006: I). Focusing expansively on America’s war on terror, beyond
the post-invasion-orders in Afghanistan and Iraq, the new NSS aims at “[e]nding tyranny” also in
countries such as North-Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe (p. 3). Every
nation should strive for “effective democracy” defined along neoliberal patterns (4). The United
States defines its goal in turning tyrannies into democracies. The alternatives for the achievement of such a goal are outlined here: “In some cases, we will take vocal and visible steps on behalf
of immediate change. In other cases, we will lend more quiet support to lay the foundation for future reforms.” (6) As to the Middle East region, the U.S. should engage in “[s]trengthening and
building new initiatives such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’s Foundation
for the Future” (6). Iran, along with Syria, is considered to “[…] harbor terrorists at home and
sponsor terrorist activity abroad.” (9) In order to resolve such problems, the U.S. will pursue a
fight which “involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation; prevent them from gaining
access to WMD; […]” (9) By “using all elements of national power” (18), Washington considers
“[s]afe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces [to] continue to play a critical role.“ (22). As did the
2002 NSS, the new version underlines the centrality of the preventive strike doctrine: “[W]e do
not rule out the use of force before attacks occur” “[s]ince this is the principle and logic of preemption” (23).
As to Iran, the 2006 NSS tightens the tone when saying “[a]ny government that chooses to be
an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace.
The world must hold those regimes to account.“ (p. 12) Moreover the NSS clearly indicates that
“[t]he proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our [that of the United
States—the author] national security.“ (19) Among the “serious challenges” in Washington’s ‘War
on Terror’ which remain is foremost Tehran that “has violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty safe15
Although a 1986 U.S. law requires that the National Security Strategy be revised annually, this was the first
new version since 2002.
20
guards obligations and refuses to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is solely
for peaceful purposes.” (both 19). On the resolution offered to this, the NSS is highly clear:
We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20
years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons.
The Iranian regime’s true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by
providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to “be wiped off the face of the earth.”
The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its
international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only
for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided.
As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has broader concerns regarding
Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East
peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The
nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime
makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will
continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security
against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. The problems lie with the illicit behavior
and dangerous ambition of the Iranian regime, not the legitimate aspirations and interests
of the Iranian people. Our strategy is to block the threats posed by the regime while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing. (IBID.: 20-21)
Signaling sympathy with the Iranian people, the report stresses: “Tyrannical regimes such as Iran
and Syria that oppress at home and sponsor terrorism abroad know that we will continue to stand
with their people against their misrule.“ (38)
Obviously, according to the revised NSS, Iran presents the greatest challenge to U.S. interests
and security. Which means does the report bring forward to counter such a ‘challenge’ for the
U.S.? “Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability.” (16) ‘Conflict intervention’ has to be
seen in direct contact with the principle of preemptive strikes:
Taking action need not involve military force. Our strong preference and common practice
is to address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy, in concert with key
allies and regional partners. If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self
defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with
WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers
materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption. The place of preemption in our
national security strategy remains the same. (23)
Against the background of a “new strategic environment require[ing] new approaches to deterrence and defense,” “[s]afe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role.”
For the aim of deterrence, the United States should also use “offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities)”. The question of leadership is answered without
much further ado: “Meeting WMD proliferation challenges also requires effective international
action – and the international community is most engaged in such action when the United States
21
leads.“ (all 22) As Jorge HIRSCH16 indicates, the 2006 NSS predicts that the nuclear threshold may
soon be crossed in an armed confrontation with Iran (2006). This is the result of the changing
U.S. nuclear policy during the last five years, culminating in the 2005 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS where the use of nuclear weapons in a variety of situations against non-nuclear adversaries is being considered.
2.1.6. A Highly Explosive Mixture
While the 2002 NSS sets the framework of the United States’ new preemptive strike doctrine and
the revised 2006 version suggests the use of nuclear arms in confrontation with whoever endangers U.S. global dominance—with Iran classified as the greatest challenge, the May 2001 National Energy Policy report had already identified the place where this should be carried out: the
region with tremendous amounts of fossil energy—the Greater Middle East—is subjected to a
new order initiative { l’Américaine. All these policy papers combined offer a highly explosive
mixture, carefully preparing the ground for U.S. military interventions in the last couple of years.
Accordingly, in 2002, two of Clinton’s political advisors, Ronald ASMUS and Kenneth POLLACK,
pleaded for a “common transatlantic strategy,” which is “not going to happen without the leadership of the United States and the president personally.” The authors called upon the U.S. and Europe to “coalesce around a new strategic purpose and paradigm to guide future cooperation.” As
to Iraq, they call for “a full-scale invasion;” as to neighboring Iran they demand the Atlantic alliance “to help the process of regime change.” (2002)
As “[i]t is not enough for a hegemonic power to declare an official policy. It must establish it as
a new norm of international law by exemplary action.” (CHOMSKY 2003), the United States’ wars
on Afghanistan and Iraq—two countries immensely important from geoeconomic and geostrategic perspectives—have in fact turned into reality much of the policy guidelines mentioned. The
myth put forward by Washington and much of the West that these invasions were a direct response to the 9/11 attacks is now thoroughly refuted and the longstanding U.S. neoconservatism’s push for war—as outlined in The Project for the New American Century’s letter asking the
Clinton Administration for regime change in Iraq (PNAC 1998)17—well-documented (cf. ALI
2003b: 7-10; cf. SUSKIND 2004).18
16
Jorge E. Hirsch is professor at the Physics Department of the University of California in San Diego. He became
famous worldwide in 2005-2006 with his public warnings about the increasing risk of nuclear war due to what
he claims is an unnecessarily aggressive military nuclear policy of the United States (see URL). In fall 2005, he
initiated a letter that put together a petition signed by more than 1,800 physicists that repudiated new U.S.
nuclear weapons policies that include preemptive use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries. On
April 17, 2006 Hirsch along with eminent physicists—numerous Nobel laureates being among them—sent a
letter to President Bush, calling the use of nuclear weapons against Iran “gravely irresponsible.” For his articles
documenting the dangers associated with a potential U.S. nuclear strike on Iran, see URL.
17
The letter was signed by Elliott Abrams, Richard L. Armitage, William J. Bennett, Jeffrey Bergner, John Bolton,
Paula Dobriansky, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, William Kristol, Richard Perle, Peter W.
22
THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE ME
2. IRAN AND AMERICA’S WARS
2.1. Iranian Détente
as Response to
U.S. Containment and
Peripheral Wars
Now, what about Iran? Will it be the next target of the U.S. imperial grand strategy at the beginning of our bloody century as its placement at the forefront of Washington’s global focus, outlined in the 2006 NSS, is considering? And even suspecting such a scenario, how has Iranian foreign policy respond to Washington’s wars in its periphery?
2.2.1. Iranian Détente as Response to U.S. Containment and Peripheral Wars
With the end of the bloody war between Saddam’s Iraq and post-revolutionary Iran, Tehran
tried to balance the security dilemma it had experienced for such a long time—caused by direct
and indirect interference by non-regional powers—by adopting a détente policy now rendered
possible in the aftermath of hard-shaking troubles of Cold War Great Powers rivalries, internal
struggles, disruptions prior to and in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution as well as the tragedies and immense losses caused by a very severe and longstanding armed confrontation (198088). As will be argued, the politics of détente was the sole reasonable manner to react to the given circumstances—considering in particular Washington’s policy of containment vis-à-vis Tehran—, in an effort to pursue stabilizing national interest politics (cf. IBRAHIM 2004).
After the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Âyatollah Ruhollâh Khomeini died in June 1989,
the then President, Ali Khâmenei, was finally designated his successor. In July, the former Speaker of Parliament (Majles), Hâshemi Rafsanjâni, was elected President. In 1990, Iran condemned
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but also the mobilization of U.S. forces in Saudi-Arabia, while it
Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, William Schneider, Jr., Vin Weber, Paul Wolfowitz, R. James Woolsey, and Robert B.
Zoellick.
18
Cf. also the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which is a U.S. Congressional statement of policy calling for regime
change in Iraq.
23
maintained diplomatic relations with Baghdad which dropped any territorial claims vis-à-vis
Tehran. In the Second Gulf War (Aug. 1990 – March 1991), Iran officially declared neutrality.
Although backed by a parliamentary majority gained in the 1992 elections, Rafsanjâni did
not succeed in improving the country‘s economic situation, but instead favored the creation of a
class of “nouveaux riches” (DABASHI 2007). Carrying out a policy of economic liberalization, foreign debts and inflation experienced a crucial rise. Under the umbrella of so-called economic
liberalization, rendering foreign investment easier than in prior times, Rafsanjâni made efforts
to prevent a serious isolation of the country, especially after Iran was continuously condemned
internationally because of sponsoring terrorism. He nevertheless tackled to open up an era of
political détente and normalizing relations with neighboring countries.
The amelioration of relations with its neighbors, in particular Saudi-Arabia and the sheikhdoms of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), was also a result of improved relations with the
West, especially with Europe, due to the mentioned economic liberalization process permitting
European enterprises to enter the Iranian market. Nonetheless, numerous ‘battle fields’ remained as U.S.-backed Arab Gulf States continuously called for ‘territorial adjustments,’ e.g. the
Greater and Smaller Tomb situated in the Persian Gulf.
After two presidential terms, Rafsanjâni —a pragmatic power politician—could not present
himself once again. In 1997, the so-called reformist presidential candidate Mohammad Khâtami
surprisingly won with a huge majority out of young people and women. Continuing Iran‘s foreign policy directed towards de-escalation, the Khâtami government made remarkable steps in a
rapprochement process with Iran’s Arab neighbors.
As this short overview suggests, Iran’s national interest could be summarized as follows:
pursuing a policy of détente and rapprochement with all its regional neighbors; establishing ties
with non-regional actors, especially the EU, Russia, China, and India, even though these efforts
have been constantly undermined by the U.S.—for instance, the 1995 imposed trade embargo on
Iran and constant pressure on Pakistan and India to prevent them from cooperating with Iran;
and thus keeping the status quo, while emphasizing the key position the country holds in the
region.
24
THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE ME
2.2. Iran’s Security Dilemma:
U.S. Militarization of the Middle East
2.3. Forced Modus Vivendi: Admission to the
‘Axis of Evil’ as Reward for Iranian Cooperation
Source: http://www.writingshop.ws/assets/images/Iran-encircled.gif (March 17, 2007)
2.2.2. Iranian Security Dilemma: U.S. Militarization of the Middle East
We have seen that Iran managed to build up and improve relations with neighboring as well as
European and Asian countries. However, one obstacle remains: the ongoing confrontation with
Washington fueled by continued propaganda on both sides. So should the often used thesis of a
somehow intrinsic confrontation between Iran and the U.S. be adopted, commonly presented as
an emotional result of e.g. the post-revolutionary Iran hostage crisis? Putting aside such simplistic views, what makes the Irano-American relationship so enduringly shaped by an absence of
confidence and even hostility?
After the invasions of Afghanistan (2002) and Iraq (2003), Iran was founding itself surrounded—both at its Eastern and Western flanks—by U.S. troops and large-scale military bases.
To the east, Iran sees the United States firmly grounded in Afghanistan—with two permanent air
bases established at Bagram near the capital city of Kabul and at Qandahar, close to the AfghanPakistani border. What is more, a large military base is being put in place near the Western Afghan city of Herat, close to the Iranian border. And to the west of Iran, the United States has
around 150,000 troops in Iraq and is building permanent military bases there. Furthermore, in
sheikhdoms such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, the U.S. extensive deployments and its Fifth
Fleet control both the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, which “is overwhelmingly powerful in
contrast to the small Iranian Navy” (ROGERS 2006: 6). Besides that, America has built close military links and, in some cases, bases in a number of countries to the north and east of Iran, “especially those close to the Caspian Basin oil fields or pipelines that bring such oil through the Black
Sea or Mediterranean ports” (IBID.).
This American military presence on such a large scale even deteriorated Iranian security
problems as U.S. military bases prior to 9/11 were already existent in much of the Iranian back25
yard, such as in Pakistan and several Persian Gulf countries (PERKOVICH 2003). As also Israeli
aggressive rhetoric was enforced, Iran entered an era of an unprecedented security dilemma
(DJALILI 2003). It is worth knowing if Tehran remained true to its policy of avoiding confrontation and seeking détente, also as regards its harshest foreign policy challenge, i.e. the United
States.
2.2.3. Forced Modus Vivendi:
Admission to the ‘Axis of Evil’ as Reward for Iranian Cooperation
We can first recognize that Iran could respond to that situation neither through ‘hard power’—
as the military preponderance lies in the hands of some 200,000 American-allied troops stationed in the region as well as more than 200 Israeli nuclear warheads threatening the country—nor via ‘soft power’—due its status as a pariah state resulting from demonization, isolation,
and containment policy (FABRY, n.d.). Consequently the most adequate policy choice was to arrange itself with the new order of its direct neighborhood which was caused by its most outstanding political enemy, the United States. But due to Iran’s central role in the region, living
with the status quo soon turned into a modus vivendi with the occupational forces, despite continuing vivid discontent against American and British aggressions and the emphasis put on false
justifications used for invasion. As in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Washington was intent to
fight al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, “a period of extraordinary strategic cooperation between Iran and
the United States” commenced (PORTER 2006: 20). This modus vivendi included closed-door negotiations with the Americans aimed at balancing the destabilizing factors resulted out of the invasions as well as Iran’s crucial role both in stabilizing post-Taliban Afghanistan and in legitimizing
the new Afghan leadership, as can be witnessed in the major and much-applauded role it played
in the Petersburg Conference in Bonn (Germany) on Afghanistan’s future on December 2, 2002
(DJALILI 2003).
Against such a background, important circles in the U.S.—such as the Office for Policy Planning (with at its head, Middle East specialist Richard Haass), the CIA, above all the State Department led by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Undersecretary of State, Richard Armitage, and
even White House coordinator on counterterrorism, Wayne Downing—saw a real opportunity
to enter a comprehensive dialog with Iran: Issues ranging from the fight against al-Qaeda, Tehran’s nuclear program, its membership in the World Trade Organization, security guarantees
for Iran and even the prospect of take the country off the state-sponsors-of-terrorism list should
be dealt with. (PORTER 2006: 21) There was hard evidence that “[t]he post-9-11 period was the
most promising moment for a U.S. opening to Iran since the two countries cut their relations in
1979” (IBID.).
26
Indeed the stabilization efforts made by Tehran in order to balance the disorders caused by
U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were crucial, but were also part of the traditional national interest pursued by Iran in its regional environment, as has been previously indicated.
Iran has actively been pursuing such stabilization efforts, despite charges that it could cause
troubles in the ‘post-war rehabilitation period’ of the ‘liberated’ nations, painting the specter of a
Shi’a Crescent on the wall. However Iran’s influence—despite its encirclement—was hard to
deny as the potential of its regime as to the Lebanese Hezbollah for confronting Israel and the
Shi’a majority in neighboring Iraq when encouraging them to amplify their resistance to the
American and British military presence in their country. But Tehran apparently chose the way of
accommodation and cooperation.
THE HEGEMON’S HOLD ON THE ME
2.4.
The Neocons in the
Corridors of Power:
The Fervent Drive
for Regime Change
Spurns Iran’s Historic
Offer of Dialog
Source:
http://sf.indymedia.org/reagan/topth_
neocons_group_web.jpg
2.2.4. The Neocons in the Corridor’s of Power:
The Fervent Drive for Regime Change Spurns Iran’s Historic Offer of Dialog
Despite Tehran’s stabilization efforts especially in the aftermath of Washington’s invasion in
Afghanistan, Iran soon became member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ in President Bush’s State of the Union
address in January 2002 and was henceforward predestined as a target of American new order
policies in the region. Thus, the neoconservative camp around Bush—led by prominent figures
such as Vice-President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith19—struck back. Under the label ‘Had-
19
Feith, described by PORTER (2006: 22) as “abrasive and aggressively pro-Israel,” was mainly responsible, along
with his two staff members, Larry Franklin and Harold Rhode, for developing details of the ‘regime change’
policy towards Iran. It is further reported that in December 2001, Franklin and Rhode met with Manuchehr
27
ley Rules’ the policy toward members of the ‘Axis of Evil’ was framed in December 2001: “The
new rules put U.S. policy toward Iran in a straitjacket requiring that Iran could never be treated as
a sovereign equal on any issue.” (PORTER 2006: 22)
This indeed was a harsh blow into the faces of all those inside Washington’s political establishment, above all the State Department, who sought to improve relations with Tehran. But in
analogy to those circles, there were also many in Iran’s political élite who intended to seize this
unique opportunity as Washington was beginning its military occupation of Iraq in April 2003.
Conscious of its stabilizing capacity of a foreseeable quagmire in Iraq during the post-invasion
phase, Tehran worked an extraordinary effort to launch an overall normalization process with
Washington. In spring 2003, a two-pages proposal20 (ACA 2003) was sent to U.S. authorities,
outlining an extensive framework of negotiations “in mutual respect” covering areas of concerns
for both Washington and Tehran. As to the field of terrorism, the Iranians offered “decisive action” against al-Qaeda on their soil as well as “full cooperation and exchange of all relevant information.” Concerning Iraq, Iran vowed to engage in political stabilization activities as well as “the
establishment of democratic institutions and a non-religious government,” thus countering U.S.
concerns of a Shi’a leadership { l’Iranienne in Iraq. The offer also included Iran’s promise for
ending support to Hamas, Jihad, and Hezbollah, further “pressur[ing] these organizations to stop
violent actions against civilians within borders of 1967.” Finally, Tehran proposed to act upon
Hezbollah to turn it into a “mere political organization within Lebanon.” These concessions were
certainly made in the hope of being removed from the U.S. list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism.’
Not enough, Iran also showed that it would meet American concerns over its nuclear program.
Accordingly, it proposed “full transparency for security that there are no Iranian endeavors to
develop or possess WMD, full cooperation with IAEA based on Iranian adoption of all relevant instruments (93+2 and all further IAEA protocols).” (all p. 1) The latter referred to new IAEA protocols for unannounced snap inspections, which according to PORTER “would have made it significantly more difficult for Iran to carry on a secret nuclear program without the risk of being
caught.” (2003: 23) Moreover, Tehran declared its willingness to accept the Saudi-initiated Arab
League Beirut Declaration21 on a two-States approach for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Ghorbanifar, the Iranian arms dealer in the Iran-Contra affair, in Rome as well as Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK)
representatives (IBID.).
20
This document is believed to have been drafted by Iran’s then-ambassador to France, Sâdegh Kharrâzi (the
nephew of then-Foreign Minister Kamâl Kharrâzi). According to a cover letter, accompanying the document, by
then-Swiss ambassador to Iran, Tim Guldimann, who handed the offer over to American officials, the proposal
was approved by Iran’s highest authorities, such as Supreme Leader Khâmenei, the Supreme National Security
Council, and then-President Khâtami. But just a few days after receiving the Iranian offer, the U.S. dispatches a
message of displeasure to Guldimann (PORTER 2006: 24). The fact that the U.S. did not even respond to the
offer has, according to Middle Eastz expert Trita Parsi “strengthened the hands of those in Iran who believe the
only way to compel the United States to talk or deal with Iran is not by sending peace offers but by being a
nuisance” (KESSLER 2006).
21
The Declaration, also called the Arab Peace Initiative, signed in March 2002, had embraced the land-forpeace principle as well as a comprehensive peace with Israel in return to its withdrawal to 1967 lines.
28
This indeed signaled a “sweeping reorientation of Iranian policy toward Israel” (PORTER 2006:
23), as Iran for the first time since the revolution declared its willingness to accept the State of
Israel—thus far officially called ‘occupied Palestine’ or ‘the Zionist regime.’
In return, Iran envisaged to get the following concessions from the United States: stopping
U.S. interference in Iranian affairs as well as removing the country from the ‘Axis of Evil’ and
terrorism lists; abolishing all trade and financial sanctions in all areas; as to Iraq, the establishment of a “democratic and fully representative government”—signifying a de facto Shi’adominated regime—and “support of Iranian claims for Iraqi reparations” as regards Saddam’s
assault on Iran with a view to discussions on Iraq’s foreign debts; “full access to peaceful nuclear
technology, biotechnology and chemical technology”; “recognition of Iran’s legitimate security interests” while permitting Iran adequate defense capacities; and last but not least, the repatriation of MKO members based in Iraq as well as “decisive actions against anti-Iranian terrorists”
(all ACA 2003: 1). The document also laid out an agenda for negotiations, outlining a road map
for negotiations on disarmament, terrorism, and economic cooperation (ACA 2003: 2).
This package of proposals was on the one hand based upon the belief that Iran as a direct
neighbor of Iraq had legitimate interests there and that this should be formally acknowledged by
the United States. On the other side, Tehran showed great interest to go for a comprehensive
arrangement with Washington, negotiating on all disputed areas which have been accumulated
between the two countries in their crisis-ridden relationship from the 1979 revolution to the
present, with the clear intention of an overall settlement of all the conflicts in question. Flynt
Leverett, then a senior director on the National Security Council staff, described the Iranian offer
as “a serious effort, a respectable effort to lay out a comprehensive agenda for U.S.-Iranian rapprochement.” (cited in KESSLER 2006) But, as we will see now, influential neoconservative decision-makers convinced Bush not to seize such a unique historic opportunity for diplomacy.
Knowing that such on overture would not find support among neoconservatives advising the
U.S. President, the State Department—generally open-minded about the Iranian effort—
refrained from pushing for the acceptance of Tehran’s negotiation proposals (PORTER 2003: 2324). Within a few days, the preeminence of the aforementioned Hadley Rules for American policy behavior vis-à-vis Iran was underscored. As Lawrence Wilkerson, then one of Powell’s top
aides, stated in BBC’s Newsnight in Jan. 2007: “But as soon as it got to the White House, and as
soon as it got to the Vice-President's office, the old mantra of 'We don't talk to evil'... reasserted
itself.” (BBC NEWS 2007) Richard N. Haass, head of policy planning at the State Department at the
time, said in 2006 that the Bush Administration’s “bias was toward a policy of regime chang.” and
called the neoconservatives’ explanation of the Iranian offer that the regime—witnessing the
United States’ prompt invasion of neighboring Iran—were on the brink, misleading (KESSLER
2006). Even though, Iran’s concessions offer included pretty much the same as Washington is
demanding—even today—from Iran “in a masterstroke, Rumsfeld and Cheney had shut down the
29
only diplomatic avenue available for communicating with Iran and convinced Bush that Iran was
on the same side as al-Qaeda.” (PORTER 2003: 24)
With the neoconservatives now boldly dominating the orientation of U.S. foreign and security policy and directing firmly both the Pentagon and the White House, the ‘regime change’ rhetoric against Iran should now be covered at the United Nations level. By the second half of 2003,
Washington focused its Iran policy on the issue of Tehran’s allegedly nuclear weapons aspiration. John Bolton, the then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
already notorious for its harsh anti-UN stance—and on Aug. 1, 2005, nominated as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, replaced in February of 2007 by Zalmay Khalilzad 22, renowned as a fervent
supporter of Israel’s aggressive policies (cf. BARRY 2006), and one of the signatories of the Iraqi
regime change call on Clinton by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) in 1998, was
given the leading role for exercising the new U.S. policy approach towards Iran. Iran was henceforth continuously branded as the world’s greatest security challenge. Washington’s leitmotiv
was to coerce Iran to fully abandon its nuclear fuel cycle and getting the IAEA Board to bring the
Iranian dossier before the UNSC (PORTER 2003: 24). According to Condoleezza Rice, at the time
of the Iranian offer Bush’s National Security Advisor, elevating U.S. concerns towards Iran on an
international level—with Iran no more facing the United States, but the ‘international community—was a major strategic goal to follow (STATE 2006). 23 And thus Iran returned—as so many
times in recent history—to the main stage of international politics, this time for its nuclear program.
Even though the above analysis offers much evidence of the manufactured nature of the confrontation vis-à-vis Iran for the country’s nuclear program—an effort aggressively pursued by
American neoconservatives—, the case of the present conflict and questions raised in that context should be equally addressed in the following. That is intended to be done in the effort to find
out if the conclusions so far about the United States’ continuous hegemonic foreign policy orientation can be underlined or should be discarded. Thus, can any ‘moments’ of hegemonic aspiration, as outlined hitherto, be indentified in the present war-prone crisis? Or put differently, how
can the present conflict on Iran’s allegedly nuclear-weapons ambition be adequately evaluated?


22

Khalilzad, like John Bolton a signatory of the PNAC’s ‘regime change’ call, was beforehand the U.S. Ambassador to the occupied Iraq (2005-2007) and Afghanistan (2003-2005).
23
Excerpt from the interview with Rice: QUESTION: “Some officials who work with you at the White House and
at the State Department said that the U.S. missed an opportunity in 2003, that Iran came to the U.S., wanted to
talk, and the U.S. rejected that. And that was a period when the U.S. was stronger. It appears that the U.S. is
coming to this in a much weaker position. Aren't you?” SECRETARY RICE: “Oh, I think coming to the table with
the entire international community united around a particular course is a pretty strong position to be in. What
people wanted, what the Iranians wanted earlier, was to be one-on-one with the United States so that this
could be about the United States and Iran. Now it is Iran the international community, and Iran has to answer
to the international community. I think that's the strongest possible position to be in.” (STATE 2006)
30
 MANUFACTURING A
GLOBAL CRISIS: THE IRAN CONFLICT
1. ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM?
1.1.
The NPT
and
Its Erosion
Source: http://www.uruknet.web.at.it/pic.php?f=nukes.gif
As the root of the present conflict is often stated as being Iranian non-compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is useful to begin with NPT‘s present état d’âme.
3.1.1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Its Erosion
In 1970 the NPT came into existence through an exchange deal, even then highly controversial
(ZUMACH 2005): The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—i.e. the United States,
the Soviet Union, China, France, and Great Britain—were officially recognized as the only legitimate nuclear powers and further agreed to disarm their arsenals (NPT, Art. VI); as a countermove the ‘rest of the world’ renounced to get access to nuclear weapons of mass destruction, but
received the unlimited right to use all available technologies for gaining nuclear energy in sites
controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, this political exchange
deal of 1970 is now based on a rather volatile ground (ZUMACH 2005). Five reasons can be enumerated for this:
1. Lacking fulfillment of the treaty or even open violations against it by some of the by now
188 NPT undersigning nations: Instead of fulfilling their disarmament duties, the five nuclear
powers go on developing military strategies around WMD. The United States is further more
developing new nuclear weapons, such as so-called ‘mini nukes,’ (DPA 2005; BLAIR 2003) and is
openly menacing other states with ‘preventive’ action (cf. NSS). Moreover Iran and other states
have been temporarily running nuclear sites without reporting it to the IAEO. In one case Iran
has been highly enriching some grams uranium till a military nuclear dimension.24 What is more,
the ‘nuclear share’ of Germany and other NATO members in the American nuclear arsenal violates the NPT (BRZOSKA & NEUNECK 2006: 15).
24
This will be discussed later.
31
2. Developments in some non-NPT countries: Israel, Pakistan, and India are admittedly
nuclear powers. Besides that, North-Korea resigned from the NPT and further declared in spring
2005 that it has nuclear warheads at its disposal.
3. Wars and the threat of wars by the U.S. against countries of the South since the end of the
East-West conflict: In particular the Iraq War starting in spring 2003 as well as unveiled war
threats against so-called ‘rogue States’ included both in the U.S. national military strategy (NSS)
of September 2002 and in other government documents of the Bush II Administration have
strengthened the judgment in countries of the South that having nuclear weapons is the only
remedy against a U.S. attack.
4. The U.S. and EU claims vis-à-vis Iran in the current conflict, which go against the NPT:
The United States and the European Union are demanding Iran to a lasting renunciation of uranium conversion and enrichment, despite the fact that both procedures intended for purposes of
gaining energy are explicitly allowed by the NPT. The Americans—and in the meantime also the
Europeans—pretend that with the instruments offered by the NPT the Iranian nuclear program
can not be reliably controlled. That’s why an abuse of the uranium enrichment process for developing nuclear weapons can not be prevented. This claim put forward by Washington and
Brussels fully jeopardizes the NPT as a whole. Due to these reasons, one could argue that from
the beginning the Western claim is doomed to fail (ZUMACH 2005).
5. The rapprochement between the United States and India, especially the extensive nuclear cooperation with the latter, being not member of the NPT. Promising to deliver aid in the
nuclear field, Washington thus breaches provisions of the NPT by simultaneously putting New
Delhi’s atomic weapons program on legitimate grounds.
 MANUFACTURING A
GLOBAL CRISIS: THE IRAN CONFLICT
1.2. Historical Outline of Iran‘s
NuclearProgram
1.3. Dilemmas of Double-Standard
and Dual-Use
32
3.1.2. Historical Outline of Iran’s Nuclear Program
1957
Aug. 9,
1963
1967
July 1968
1970
1970s
1973
1975
1979
1983
1987/88
1990
1995
1992
Jan.1995
1996
Jan. 29,
2002
The U.S. and Iran sign an agreement on civil nuclear cooperation as part of the U.S. Atoms
for Peace program.
Iran signs the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), ratifying it on Dec. 23.
The Tehran Nuclear Research Center is built.
The U.S. supplies a five-megawatt research reactor and nuclear fuel rod to Iran.
Iran signs as one of the first non-nuclear-weapon states the NPT.
Iran ratifies the NPT, which goes into effect on March 5.
Under the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, plans are made to construct up to twenty
nuclear power stations with a total scale of 23 gigawatt across the country with U.S. support
and backing. Numerous contracts are signed with various Western firms, and the German
firm Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens AG) begins construction on the Bushehr power
plant in 1974.
The civil Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was created to supervise those power
stations.
German engineers start with the construction of the Bushehr power plant.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology signs a contract with the AEOI to provide training for
Iranian nuclear engineers.
The Iranian Revolution puts a freeze on the existing nuclear program and the Bushehr contract with Siemens AG is terminated as the German firm leaves.
IAEA inspectors inspect Iranian nuclear facilities, and report on proposed cooperation
agreement to help Iran manufacture enriched uranium fuel as part of Iran’s ‘ambitious programme in the field of nuclear power reactor technology and fuel cycle technology.’ The
assistance program is later terminated under U.S. pressure.
Iran’s reactors are heavily damaged by Iraqi air strikes.
Iran begins negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the re-construction of the Bushehr
power plant.
Iran and Russia conclude a contract on that issue.
Iran signs an agreement with China for the building of two 950-watt reactors in Darkhovin
(Western Iran). To date, construction has not yet begun.
Iran signs an $800 million contract with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom) to
complete (probably in late 2007) reactors at Bushehr under IAEA safeguards.25
China and Iran inform the IAEA of plans to construct a nuclear enrichment facility in Iran, but
China withdraws from the contract under U.S. pressure. Iran advises the IAEA that it plans to
pursue the construction anyway.
U.S. President George W. Bush speaks of an “axis of evil” gathering Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea during his State of the Union Address.
BRZOSKA & NEUNECK & MEIER 2006: 2, Table ‘Chronologie der Krise um das iranische Atomprogramm’;
and “Nuclear program of Iran,” Wikipedia, accessed on March 3, 2007, URL.
25
Cf. GEDYE, Robin (2004), “Iran’s nuclear history,” The Telegraph, Nov. 27. URL
33
3.1.3. Dilemmas of Double-Standard and Dual-Use
A widely circulating assumption is that such a country as Iran with lots of oil and gas reserves do
not need nuclear energy, so its nuclear program should be for non-peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the issue is more complex than that.
a) (Why) Does Iran Need Nuclear Energy?
Although Iran is rich of fossil energies, these resources will be exploited within the next few decades. Moreover, Iran’s old infrastructure of refineries requires heavy investment. As Johns
Hopkins University economic geographer, Roger Stern, asserts, Iran is suffering a staggering
decline in revenue from its oil exports, and if the trend continues income could be halved in less
than five years and virtually disappear by 2015. Thus Tehran’s assertion that it needs nuclear
energy for civilian purposes could be believed in. He emphasizes that the country’s oil production is declining and both gas and oil are being sold domestically at highly subsidized rates. At
the same time, Iran is neglecting to reinvest in its oil production. The Iranian petroleum crisis
would immensely degrade the country’s overall performance thus making U.S. military action
superfluous. (STERN 2007) Moreover, considering Iran’s rising energy demands due to considerable industrialization and demography, other energy sources will be necessary. By 2025, the
population is expected to reach the mark of 90 million (SB 2004: 201). At the same time, it is
true that the country has a great deal of potential for alternative energies, such as wind and solar. However extensive investment into establishing such infrastructure is needed.
b) Politico-Strategic Considerations
Iran is in fact surrounded by five nuclear powers: Israel, the U.S., Russia, Pakistan, and India.
According to Realist IR belief, such a tremendous security dilemma would inherently push Iran
to acquire nuclear weapons as well. In this sense, ElBaradei indicates,
all this talk about the use of force, it’s not only counter productive but in fact does not in
any way help resolve the issue. Imagine what a regime would feel if they hear that force will
be used against them, in additional to being called names, in addition to talk about regime
change in the past. Even if they were not going to develop a nuclear weapon today, this
would be a sure recipe for them to go down that route. (FT 2007)
Out of pure security considerations and even in terms of the very existence of the country, it
might be comprehensible that Iran will be constrained to acquire such capabilities in a dangerous and partly overtly hostile environment. Nevertheless, the Iranians have always denied such
an option, arguing that it will not contribute to increase their own and regional stability and security.
34
SUMMARY OF THE NPT ARTICLES REFERRED TO
Article II
No non-nuclear weapon state that is party to the treaty is allowed to produce or otherwise
acquire a nuclear warhead.
Article III
(1) and (2): Non-nuclear weapon states must accept full-scope safeguards for all of their
source or special fissionable material.
Article IV
Civilian nuclear technology is an inalienable right for every party to the treaty and there exists an obligation to make it available.26
KALINOWSKI 2006: 25.
c) Does Iran Follow a Weaponization Program?
Especially among Americans and Israelis the question if Iran is pursuing a nuclear-weapons program is often clearly approved. Likewise the Director of the U.S. National Intelligence states in
his testimony on threats against Washington: “We assess that Tehran is determined to develop
nuclear weapons […].” (DNI 2007a: 6) But in scientific circles, the answer to this question is given
differently. The most extensive study on Iran’s nuclear capabilities by now is being conducted by
KALINOWSKI27, an internationally renowned expert on nuclear issues. Under the title Iran’s Nuclear Programme – Civilian or military? (2006), he concludes that there is no evidence for the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. While noting Iran’s violations against Art. III of
the NPT and IAEA Safeguards, he places the problem into a larger international context: “Similar
breaches and failures of numerous other countries have also been known without it having lead to
a noteworthy international reaction, with the exception of Iraq and North Korea.” The author nevertheless points to the problem of dual-use, making it hard to clearly identify weaponization
purposes. He therefore suggests a serious of steps to be taken in order to tackle the problem. He
calls for strict adherence to all Safeguards obligations, the improvement of nuclear Safeguards,
and clear signs of a nuclear weapon program should be seen as a breach of the NPT.
26
Full text of Article IV of the NPT:
“(1) Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to
develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
(2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with
other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
27
On March 1, 2006, Dr. Martin Kalinowski was named the first Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Professor for
Science and Peace Research at the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Center for Science and Peace Research (ZNF),
University of Hamburg, Germany.
35
TWO IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS AND FOUR POSSIBLE STANDPOINTS
Iran’s nuclear program is
regarded as purely civilian
in nature, until the
opposite is proven.
Iran is suspected of
having a nuclear weapon
program until all traces in
regard to this have been
removed.
NPT, no discrimination
Victim: Iran sees itself as a victim of a
breach of Art. IV of the NPT. Cooperation and transparency where necessary. No renunciation, at the most
suspension.
The principle of equality: Breach of Art.
II and III of the NPT. Exhaustive inspections according to the treaty. Voluntary renunciation negotiated in return for
compensation.
NPT, suspects get stricter controls
Innocent until proven guilty: Breach
of Art. III of the NPT. Stricter inspections than demanded by the
treaty or additional agreements.
Perpetrator: Breach of Art. II and III
of the NPT. Stricter inspections
than demanded by the treaty or
additional agreements. No full
right to Art. IV of the NPT.
KALINOWSKI 2006: 29, Table 1.
Kalinowski further expresses the wish that Iran voluntarily renounces from critical activities
in terms of uranium enrichment and reprocessing, at the same time noting: “A ban on certain
civilian nuclear activities would, however, contradict Article IV of the NPT, according to which Iran
has an inalienable right to the procurement and use of civilian nuclear technology.” Kalinowski
further proposes the establishment of an international norm of renunciation as outlined in the
Comprehensive Cutoff Convention28 and in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention29, at the
same time underscoring: “The aspect of non-discrimination by the NPT could be better implemented if the nuclear weapons states were to fulfil their obligation under Article VI and disarm.”
(p. 31) While stating that an internationalization of crucial installations may help, he notes Iran’s
possible denial vis-à-vis such measures due to its bad historical experiences (IBID.). The lack of
complete insurability by the IAEA as regards the nature of the Iranian program as well as Tehran’s inalienable right under Art. IV of the NPT, creates irreconcilable positions as to the problem’s resolution (see table below), which “could lead to an escalation that threatens peace.“ He
concludes his analysis by emphasizing the only possible step to do: “The only solution that goes
further than the current damage limitation attempts is to create a global norm of non-availability
of nuclear weapon grade material and to fully implement the norm of a nuclear weapon free
world.” (both p. 32)
Meanwhile BAGHERZADEH30 (2006) argues that there is a huge gap between the myths and the
facts about the Iranian nuclear program. As does Kalinowski, he also underlines that “Iran did
fail to report acquisition/development of minute amount of enriched material, but so did South
Korea and a few other nations.” BAGHERZADEH goes on reminding that “[e]xperts agree that this is
28
See KALINOWSKI, Martin B. (2006), “Outline of a Comprehensive Cut-Off Convention,” in: KALINOWSKI, Martin B., ed., Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Baden-Baden (Germany): Nomos.
29
See DATAN, Merav, WARE, Alyn, KALINOWSKI, Martin B., SCHEFFRAN, Jürgen, SEIDEL, Victor & BURROUGHS,
John (1999), Security and Survival. The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, published by IPPNW/IALANA/
INESAP, Cambridge (Massachusetts).
30
Dr. Nader Bagherzadeh is Professor at the Henry Samueli School of Engineering at the University of California, Irvine.
36
not enough for referral to SC while IAEA is still evaluating P2 (a more advanced centrifuge) and
Lavisan related concerns.” He further notices that “[u]nder pressure from US, Chinese had to pull
out of the Isfahan project (UCF), contrary to Article 4 of NPT.” Bagherzadeh also makes clear that
the “Natanz facility is under strict supervision of IAEA and it will be very unlikely to cross the 4%
enrichment line under the watchful eyes of IAEA, but the technology of enrichment will be mastered.” Therefore KALINOWSKI offers a number of remedies for countering international concerns,
such as strictly keeping all safeguards obligations and improving nuclear safeguards, while stating the necessity of internationalizing all nuclear facilities worldwide in which uranium is being
enriched.
We can witness that Iran is not the only case in the framework of the international proliferation (control) regime that poses a problem. Indeed, other countries, such as Brazil, are carrying
out the same civil—and dual-use—nuclear activities as Tehran does, which is simply ignored.
And others, like South-Korea, have broken the same NPT requirements as Iran did, but without
any further consideration. Despite concerns over Iran ‘going for the bomb,’ it can be ascertained
that there is no indication so far that the country has already produced or even is producing
weapon-grade material (BRZOSKA & NEUNECK 2006: 14).
d) The Current State of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran has already achieved to enrich uranium, a process covered by the NPT. However, this is not
at an industrial level needed to develop a bomb. Iran disposes of research and development
(R&D) projects at a knowledge level. It is expected that Iran has at most two functioning 164
centrifuge cascades above ground in the R&D facility at Natanz. But in the absence of the NPT
Addition Protocol, inspectors are not allowed to check equipment manufacturing in order to
gain more insight on the program’s nature. (FT 2007) It can be reminded that industrial scale
enrichment with almost 3,000 centrifuges at a high degree of about 90 percent would render
bomb making possible. It is consensus that Iran is still far away from such a capacity. The country could get there by 2008. (IBID.)
e) When Could Iran Get the Bomb?
Although some concerns over the Iranian nuclear program still persist, most experts agree that
it does not pose any threat so far. As ElBaradei states in February 2007, there is a “difference
between acquiring knowledge [for enrichment] and having a bomb is at least five to ten years
away.” (FT 2007) The CIA expects the same time period in which Tehran might be able to develop nuclear bombs. The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) accordingly expects Iran to
be able to build a single nuclear bomb by the earliest possible date of 2015 (FTD 2006). Likewise
the Director of U.S. National Intelligence (DNI) expects a nuclear-armed Iran by 2015 (DNI
2007b: 6, 24, 50, 51, 55).
37
According to all intelligence estimates, Iran is 5 to 10 years away from acquiring a nuclear
bomb, i.e. from the production of significant masses of weapon-grade material. In her Washington Post article, LINZER notes:
A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate
of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the analysis.
The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials
have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a
nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its
nuclear ambitions. President Bush has said that he wants the crisis resolved diplomatically
but that “all options are on the table.” (2005)
 MANUFACTURING A
GLOBAL CRISIS: THE IRAN CONFLICT
3.2.
On How Diplomacy
Can Pave the Way
for War
3.2.1. Negotiations over
Iran’s Nuclear Program:
Escalating Diplomacy
3.2.1. The Negotiations over Iran’s Nuclear Program: Escalating Diplomacy
The conversion of raw uranium into uranium gas is a preliminary stage for uranium enrichment.
According to its official declarations, Iran is doing this procedure only for the peaceful purpose
of gaining nuclear energy. Further Iran declared in April 2006 that it has achieved to complete
the nuclear cycle, which was later confirmed by an IAEA report. Indeed, all this is allowed without any limitation by the 1970-signed Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) to which Tehran adhered as a founding member. Western countries are suspicious of Iran
enriching high-grade uranium gas necessary for the development of atomic bombs.
In the light of rising pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv to confront Iran because of its
alleged nuclear program’s military nature, Tehran was forced into negotiations over its nuclear
program. As the U.S.—the initial denouncer—renounced any direct talks with Iran, the so-called
EU-3—composed of France, Great Britain, and Germany—was commissioned to hold talks with
the Iranians. As we will now see, due to fundamental negotiating errors, progress was not being
38
made during the talks. The question which now arises is whether Iran’s hardliners are playing a
power game with this hot issue or are there reliable and rational reasons for Tehran’s repeated
rejection, which have been, and still are, ignored in the Western discourse on this matter?
a) Tehran Agreement (October 2003) and Ongoing “Demagogy”
In the first agreement signed between Iran and the EU-3, Tehran agreed to sign and implement
the Additional Protocol to the NPT—which it did on Dec. 18, 2003—that permits snap inspections of its nuclear sites. Besides that, Iran, as a confidence-building measure, “has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.“ (IMFA
2003) In return, the Europeans—represented by then-Foreign Ministers Dominique de Villepin,
Jack Straw, and Joschka Fischer—assured to prevent Washington from handing the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UNSC. Previously, the IAEA had found weapons-grade-enriched uranium at
two sites in Iran. The country blamed the findings on contamination from parts it bought abroad
on the black market, as a result of the U.S.-imposed embargo on the country (KOCH 2004).31 This
was also later confirmed by the IAEA ( VON RANDOW 2004). Moreover, the EU-3 promised to support Iran in the peaceful use of nuclear energy (anyway required by the NPT) and further vowed
broad economic relations with Tehran.
The Agreement was considered a positive step (HAFEZI & EVANS 2003) and French Foreign
Minister de Villepin even expected the final resolution of latent problems (NIRUMAND 2006: 26).
Until mid-November 2004, the IAEA found no evidence that Iran had followed any prohibited
activities and acknowledged full cooperation by Iran (GOV/2003/75; GOV/2004/83). Already in
February 2004, the suspension in relation to all kinds of enrichment and enrichment-related
activities was prolonged by Tehran.
Washington’s hard stance vis-à-vis Iran provoked harsh criticism by leading U.S. figures in
non-neoconservative camps. For instance, in mid-November 2004, Zbigniew Brzezinski called
the American view that fundamentalist mullahs in Iran would threaten global security as “irrational and paranoid slogans.” This would “ominously” remind of the “demagogy” legitimizing the
use of force against Iraq.32 He further noted that Iran is not a notoriously aggressive country and
that the U.S. should be appreciative of any Iranian nuclear ambition as a tool of deterrence. 33
31
Cf. also Javad Zarif’s, Iran’s Ambassador to the U.N., remarks in an interview on Dec. 7, 2004, with BBC
HARDTalk’s Tim Sebastian: “Iran has been deprived of the means to acquire technology for the past over two
decades. At the same time Iranian people are very proud and we have the necessary scientific infrastructure.
We've had to go through the black market because the open market was close to us in order to acquire technology.” Video’s URL.
32
The original reads: “Das sind doch irrationale und paranoide Slogans. Diese Argumentation erinnert verdächtig an die Demagogie, die vor dem Irak-Krieg verbreitet wurde und mit der dann die Gewalt gerechtfertigt wurde.”
33
The original reads: “Man kann verstehen, dass die Iraner überzeugt sind, genau diese Waffen [Atombomben—A. F.-N.] haben zu müssen. Teherans nukleare Ambitionen sind unter anderem darauf zurückzuführen,
dass man dort über ein Mittel der Abschreckung verfügen will. Der Iran selbst ist ja kein notorisch aggressives
39
“Selective engagement” by Washington—i.e. talks over Iran’s security concerns as well as Iraq,
Afghanistan, and maybe even a nuclear-weapon-free region while keeping all options on the
table—is strongly needed in order to settle the conflict, Brzezinski claimed. (STERN.DE 2004)
b) Paris Agreement (November 2004)
Building upon the road map set in the avowals of Tehran, in the ‘Paris Agreement’ of November
15, 2004, Iran once again declared its willingness to temporarily suspend activities in the field of
uranium conversion as well as enrichment. All this was conducted as a “voluntary confidence
building measure” (INFCIRC/637 2004: 3) and it was emphasized that “[t]he suspension will be
sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements” (IBID.: 3) Tehran agreed to concede on the matter of uranium activities as long as the
“long-term agreement,” being the subject of further negotiations, would “provide […] firm commitments on security issues.” In return, the EU-3 ascertained: “Once suspension has been verified,
the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume. The E3/EU will
actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations at the WTO.” Further it was intended that a steering committee would “set up working groups on political and security issues,
technology and cooperation, and nuclear issues.” The committee would then obtain reports from
the working groups in order “to move ahead with projects and/or measures that can be implemented in advance of an overall agreement.“ (all IBID.: 4) in forthcoming months.
In such a critical situation, a call by former Western Foreign Ministers34, in an article published in the Washington Post on Dec. 13, 2004, submitted proposals aiming at hindering Iran to
acquire nuclear weapons. They further called for a common Western approach with the U.S.
supporting European diplomacy and not tending to a failure of the negotiation process. The nuclear powers U.S., Russia, and Europe should provide Iran with fuel rods for its nuclear reactors,
so that in return they could push the country to permanently renounce from uranium enrichment and related activities. While accepting the agreement between the EU-3 and Iran, the Bush
Administration should announce the start of economic and diplomatic relations with Tehran,
emphasizing Iran’s remarkable cultural and political developments in the last two decades. (NIRUMAND 2006: 43-44)
c) EU-3’s Package of Proposals (August 2005) with Bitter American Note
A LOT OF GIFT WRAPPING AROUND A PRETTY EMPTY BOX
(UNDISCLOSED EU DIPLOMAT, QUOTED IN REUTERS, JULY 27, 2005)
In the summer of 2005, Iran declared that if the EU-3 will not present new and more extensive
offers until August 1, the country would take up its nuclear activities. As the proposals by the
Land. Wenn wir wirklich wollen, dass die iranische Führung unsere Besorgnis ernst nimmt, müssen wir auch
Verständnis aufbringen.”
34
The eight former representatives were from the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, Denmark,
Spain, and the Netherlands.
40
Europeans at first did not come in, Tehran promptly ended its “voluntary” suspension35 and dutifully informed the IAEA so to render any supervision possible (ZUMACH 2005). On August 7, the
EU-3 presented its proposals pursuant to the Paris Agreement. Besides the already known request on Iran to enduringly renounce from all activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, the
country should further bind itself under international law to renounce from leaving the NPT at
any time and to agree that all of its nuclear plants should, under all circumstances, be controlled
by the IAEA. Under such premises, the EU would guarantee to provide Iran the access to the
global market for nuclear fuel rods and in cases of shortage to satisfy Tehran’s need from European reserves. Brussels would further finalize negotiations over economic and trade agreements
as well as technologically support the construction of planned nuclear plants in Iran. The country’s concerns should also be met. The proposal thus included a security guarantee by the nuclear powers Paris and London as well as the announced support for the resolution of regional
security problems and for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Near and Middle East (cf.
NIRUMAND 2006: 53).
Iranian representatives reacted with great dissatisfaction to the package offered and fully rejected it. As the EU-3 now demanded Iran to fully renounce from its enrichment activities, the
proposal was considered as a violation of the Paris Agreement which guaranteed Iran’s rights
under the NPT. The head of the AEOI, Gholâm-Rezâ Âghâzâdeh, even called the proposals “a humiliation of the Iranian people,” as they were “cheap and quibbling.” He emphasized that after one
and a half year of negotiations, the Europeans should have known that Iran aims at mastering
the whole fuel cycle. But why did Iran’s diplomacy so harshly reject the offer? It was indeed foreseeable that Iran would not agree, as requested, to fully renounce from its vested rights under
the NPT. Further, the latter covered that no nuclear power had the right to use atomic bombs
against any other member state. So France’s and Great Britain’s security guarantee was indeed
farcical. Besides, the sale of nuclear fuel rod was an offer primarily benefitting the European
atomic industry. Moreover, those extensive agreements in the field of economy and trade were
in planning before even the conflict erupted. Against such a background, the conclusion that
“[t]he offer was a provocation” (NIRUMAND 2006: 54) can well be retraced.
After Tehran’s rejection, the EU-3 canceled the continuation of negotiations. The French Foreign Ministry on Aug. 23, 2005, explained that by assuming that Iran had breached the Paris
Agreement by resuming its program in Isfahân. The EU thus followed Washington’s desired path
by submitting a resolution draft at the upcoming IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting in September 2005 which intended the case’s referral to the UNSC. The IAEA’s General Director was first
expected to present a new report (GOV/2005/87). On that basis, the 35 board members should
35
In fact, Iran announced to resume its halted activities at the Isfahân plant. It thus removed the IAEA seals
there. From November 2005 on, Tehran also resumes its conversion activities. All this provoked harsh protests
from the European Union.
41
decide upon referring Iran’s dossier to the Security Council. Rather unusually, only 22 of the
member states voted for the referral, twelve—Russia and China among them—abstained, and
only Venezuela voted against. Tehran expressed outrage as the voted resolution had no legal
basis. The only reason for the attacks on Iran was the intention to deprive states with no nuclear
technology to produce themselves rod for the nuclear cycle. Accordingly, on Sep. 28, the Iranian
Parliament (Majles) voted in favor of resuming the Additional Protocol and stopping any further
inspections of the plants.
At a United Nations high-level summit on Sept. 15, 2005, the newly elected 36 Iranian President—inaugurated on Aug. 1, 2005—offered a respectable compromise solution to the nuclear
dispute. Ahmadinejâd invited foreign companies and States to invest and participate in Iran’s
nuclear program, which would ensure that it cannot be secretly diverted to make nuclear weapons. While the U.S. mission to the UN walked out during his speech, his offer was widely dismissed in the West. Almost reaching its aim, Washington now tried to strengthen Brussels’ new
position as well as rally Moscow and Beijing behind it. The U.S. effort to demonize Iran and the
never-ending allegation the country would pursue a nuclear weapons program was further nourished by Iranian President Ahmadinejâd’s statements on Israel. However, Iran made further
surprising concessions: In early November, the country opened up the doors of its military facility in Pârchin—until then a restricted area—for IAEA inspectors. Those were even allowed to
interview Iranian nuclear experts. What is more, three days before the IAEA’s BoG meeting in
November 2005, Tehran complied by halting its disputed Isfahân nuclear plant.
During those months, talk about a military confrontation emanating from Washington
and/or Tel Aviv against Iran became more frequent and war plans entered the public arena
(FALLOWS 2004; HERSH 2005). While the European counterparts, now following Washington’s
hard line, regularly reproached Iran to ‘violate’ agreements agreed upon, it is important to underline that the Paris Agreement was voluntary and valid as long as progress was being made in
negotiations (INFCIRC/637 2004: 3, 4), which is widely neglected both in political and public
debates.
d) Critical Stalemate: The Route Toward Escalation
Iran’s basic position was not to surrender to pressures calling for an ultimate stop of all enrichment activities, i.e. its nuclear program. The speaker of Iran’s National Security Council, Hossein
Entezâmi, declared in an interview with the Iranian reformist daily Sharq in December 2005:
“We however will not accept any proposal refusing Iran the vested right to produce fuel in the own
country for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” (IRAN-REPORT 01/2006: 13) Iran’s Foreign Minis36
In mid-August 2005, Ahmadinejâd installed his new government. Ali Lârijâni replaced Hassan Rohâni as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the country’s top policy-making body, with nuclear policy in
his purview. It can be added that according to Iranian Constitution, the President does not have exclusive control over Iran's nuclear program, which falls mainly under the purview of its Supreme Leader.
42
ter Mottaki on his short visit to Kabul on Dec. 26, 2005, said that his country does not need to
obtain permission to use nuclear technology. Further did he emphasize: “We neither accept global nuclear apartheid nor economic apartheid.” Iran’s right for the peaceful use of nuclear energy
would find support among many countries, he was quoted as saying, and added that Iran’s plans
are transparent (IBID.: 12).
Meanwhile it was reported that the Bush Administration tapped phone calls by ElBaradei
with Iranian diplomats in an effort to oust him. The IAEA General Director’s allegedly cautious
approach on Iran was a thorn in the American neoconservatives’ flash (LINZER 2004). In January
2005, the then British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, produced a 200-pages dossier, entitled
Iran’s Nuclear Program, which was quietly issued in the House of Commons on the eve of Bush’s
inauguration the week before for fear of provoking a public rift with Washington. Therein, as the
Sunday Times reported, military action is ruled out and the case is made for a “negotiated solution” to thwart Iran's suspected ambition to produce nuclear weapons. The document further
said a peaceful solution led by Britain, France, and Germany was “in the best interests of Iran and
the international community,” while referring to “safeguarding Iran's right to the peaceful use of
nuclear technology.” (DAILY TELEGRAPH 2005) Against such a background of rising tensions and
reports about U.S. spying on potential targets inside Iran, NIRUMAND summarizes:
The situation got bogged down, and the U.S. government’s hard line was primarily responsible for it. From the beginning, its goal was to commit the EU to its position. For a success
by the EU, on the one hand, would have considerably strengthened the EU states’ political
and, most notably, economic influence in the Near and Middle East and, on the other hand,
would have provided the evidence that conflicts could be better resolved diplomatically
than militarily.37 (2006: 49)
e) Russian Remedy Under American Attack (late 2005 – early 2006)
Most observers agreed that in late 2005 the dialog between the West and Iran reached an impasse (BRZOSKA & NEUNECK 2006: 15). In Iran the question of uranium enrichment—indeed guaranteed by international law—turned into one of national prestige, so that it was unthinkable for
Iranian politicians to renounce from that right. On the other hand, the EU-3, adopting American
and Israeli calls to fully stop any enrichment activity in Iran, maneuvered itself into a stalemate.
That is why on different occasions talks between the two sides did not succeed and were predominantly shaped by helplessness ( IRAN-REPORT 02/2006). The United States simultaneously
underlined that there is a military option in the case diplomacy should not succeed—a logic
harshly underpinned in neoconservative publications (cf. KRISTOL 2006a). On Jan. 22, 2006,
Israel’s Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, threatened Iran with a military strike. Even French President Jacques Chirac indirectly considered the use of nuclear weapons against ‘terrorist states’
37
The original reads: “Die Situation war festgefahren, und dafür war in erster Linie der harte Kurs der USRegierung verantwortlich. Ihr Ziel war von Anbeginn, die EU auf ihre Position einzuschwören. Denn ein Erfolg
der EU hätte zum einen den politischen und vor allem wirtschaftlichen Einfluss der EU-Staaten im Nahen und
Mittleren Osten erheblich verstärkt und zum anderen den Nachweis erbracht, dass sich Konflikte diplomatisch
besser lösen lassen als militärisch.“
43
such as Iran (NIRUMAND 2006: 61). In late February, the IAEA doubts whether elements of the
Iranian nuclear program are for military purposes (GOV/2006/15: 11).
In November 2005, Russia submitted a mediation offer. According to it, Iran could continue
to convert uranium into gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6) on its soil. It would then transport
this gas to Russia, where it would be enriched and processed into fuel. Tehran would also get a
share of the profit from the sales of fuel rods. This Russo-Iranian joint project was now under
spotlight, however lots of details remained to be clarified. Although Iran would thus be allowed
to have access to reserves of weapon-grade uranium (UF6)—a lasting concern for especially the
U.S.38, Tehran thus reduced its original claim of mastering the whole fuel cycle on its territory.
Nevertheless, Iran emphasized its intention to enrich uranium on its own soil (KATZ 2006). On
the other hand, Washington’s strong objections, accompanied by the talk of war, complicated
Iranian and Russian efforts to make a respected agreement.
The first round of talks between Tehran and Moscow on the latter’s proposal did not make
the case for a positive outcome. On Feb. 26, 2006, Gholâm-Rezâ Âghâzâdeh, head of the AEOI,
along with its Russian counterpart, Sergey Kiriyenko, announced in Bushehr that they had ‘basically’ agreed upon establishing a joint corporation for conducting uranium enrichment in Russia.
It seemed that “Iran backed down before reaching the brink of a crisis.” (KATZ 2006) But Russia
had also conceded by allowing Iran to enrich uranium for R&D purposes on its own territory at a
low level, to be fixed by the IAEA in order to reduce the potential for a weaponization program.
In return, Tehran had agreed to suspend its nuclear program for a limited period of time. (NIRUMAND 2006: 65) Thus Iran seemed to have
averted the danger of its dossier being referred to the
UNSC. But Washington promptly signaled its opposition to the deal made, emphasizing that this
would not prevent from referring the case to the UNSC. After a meeting between Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov and his American counterpart Condoleezza Rice in Washington, Moscow’s representative surprisingly said that there was no compromise with Tehran on the horizon, while Rice underlined that her country would not accept any uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. (NIRUMAND 2006: 65) Thus the U.S. bluntly avoided this promising diplomatic initiative
(MASSARRAT 2006c: 544-545).
f) Tiding the Iranian Dossier Over to the UNSC (early 2006)
In January 2006, Iran made a six-point proposal to the Europeans—a step not reported in the
Western press. Therein Tehran pledged to again suspend uranium enrichment for at least a period of two years during which negotiations should be pursued, to seek Majles ratification of the
NPT Additional Protocol, to further allow IAEA inspections and monitoring of its activities, and
to stay within the NPT (AFRASIABI 2006). This offer was again disregarded by both Brussels and
Washington.
38
U.S. Secretary of State, Rice, was quoted as being highly worried about Russia’s proposal.
44
The transatlantic camp insisted upon handing the Iran issue over to the UNSC. On Jan. 31,
2006, a declaration released by the Foreign Ministers of the EU-3, Russia, China, the U.S., and the
E.U.’s High Representative requested an “extensive period of confidence-building” by Tehran and
“called on Iran to restore in full the suspension of enrichment-related activity, including R&D.”
They finally “confirmed their resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iran problem.“ (GFO 2006) On the same day, the IAEA’s Deputy Director General for Safeguards briefs that
“Iran has continued to facilitate access under its Safeguards Agreement as requested by the Agency,
and to act as if the Additional Protocol is in force, including by providing in a timely manner the
requisite declarations and access to locations” (IAEA 2006a: 1).
Nevertheless, on Feb. 4, the IAEA’s BoG in a 27-3 vote with five abstentions39 requested from
its General Director to officially inform the UNSC about the conflict with Iran (GOV/2006/14). At
an extraordinary IAEA BoG meeting, scheduled on March 7, the referral to the UNSC should be
finally decided upon, thus granting a very limited time for any possible solution of the conflict.
But the matter should not yet be actively considered by the UNSC before ElBaradei’s report due
on March 6. In anticipation of the report, the Iranian delegate in a note verbale declared that
“[t]he mere fact that some members of the Board – who have no privilege over the others – preimpose certain decisions on the Board, goes against the legal stance and authority of the Board,”
finding that “[t]he Board decision to report the issue to the Security Council has no legal and technical basis.” The document further speaks of “political pressures over the Board” (all INFCIRC/666: 4) in its Feb. 4 decision—an allegation also made by many commentators, such as
The Hindu’s Deputy Editor Siddharth VARADARAJAN citing Stephen J. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and International Security at the U.S. State Department until December
2006. The latter said that the U.S. coerced India in two crucial decisions by the IAEA’s BoG, in
2005 and 2006, to vote against Iran: the first time to condemn Iran for not meeting its obligations under NPT and the second time to report Iran’s file to the UNSC (2007).40
Finally on March 6, ElBaradei in a press conference declared: “I do not expect the Board to
adopt a resolution on the Iranian issue unless there is a breakthrough and unless there is a positive
agreement.” (DGPS 2006) Nonetheless, on the next day, the BoG remained true to its prior notice
and voted for the referral of the Iran nuclear dossier to the UNSC (IAEA 2006b). Against such a
background the 2006 referral had no legal basis as it preempted the final report of the IAEA investigation due on March 6 and thus tried to influence and shape the final decision illegally
(PRATHER 2006). Bound by a Majles legislation in case of the Iranian nuclear case being handed
39
Board members supporting it were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Ecuador,
Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation,
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen. Those
against: Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela. Abstentions: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, and South Africa. This voting behavior is however unusual since for more than a decade decisions adopted by the BoG were made unanimously.
40
Those anti-Iran votes indeed provoked harsh political arguments inside India.
45
over to the UNSC, Tehran announced its intention to end its voluntary cooperation with the IAEA
beyond basic NPT requirements and to resume the enrichment of uranium. It was also in these
days that the newly edited NSS with its focus on Iran was released, unilaterally stating “Iran has
violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations and refuses to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.” (2006: 19, Section 5)
g) Washington’s Arrogant Escalation Plan Works Out (Spring 2006)
On his trip to New Delhi U.S. President Bush finalized the bilateral agreement on nuclear issues
and others41. India—a non-NPT nuclear power—on its part agreed to allow IAEA supervision in
some of its nuclear plants, while those plants which were for weaponization purposes should be
further kept secret. In return, the U.S. would provide nuclear fuel rods as well as transfer technology. New Delhi, on its part, conceded to U.S. pressures by putting the gas pipeline deal with
Tehran on hold (VARADARAJAN 2005). That deal was indeed a horrible proof of breaching international law—in this case, the NPT—and in relation to the Iran conflict, an arrogant exercise of
double-standard. NIRUMAND comments:
The arrogance of power could not be overbid. While the U.S. wanted, menacing to wage a
war, to coerce Iran to completely and durably give up its nuclear program, and even did not
want to allow the country to enrich uranium for research purposes, now they granted India
with all nuclear liberties. … Strategic and economic interests of the U.S. were pivotal.
(2006: 66)
On March 10, 2006, George W. Bush made an essential prerequisite step to militarily tackle
the Iran problem by declaring a newspaper group: “You begin to see an issue of grave national
security concern.” (BOHAN 2006) In mid-March, the White House releases a revised version of the
U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). While Iran is viewed as the country’s greatest security challenge (along with North Korea)—echoing a statement made by Secretary of State Rice the week
before—42, the 2002 preemptive war doctrine is reaffirmed. According to it, terrorists and hostile states should be fought with the help of chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry. The NSS
recommits to efforts with European allies to pressure Tehran to give up any aspirations of nuclear weapons, then adds ominously: “This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be
avoided.” (p. 20) While stressing “transformational diplomacy” (pp. 33 and 44) together with
allies to achieve change, at the same time it asserts that formal structures such as the UN or
NATO may at times be less effective than “coalitions of the willing” (p. 48)—a strategy advocated
at several times in the conflict with Iran. BAKER observes:
41
Both countries envisaged to double their trade volume until 2009, with further cooperation in the fields of
agriculture, science, and environmental technology. Besides, Washington announced to deliver F-16 and F-18
warplanes. What is more, the Swedish daily Dagens Nyheter reported on April 7, 2006, that the largest U.S.
military modernization program since the end of the Cold War was under way. Washington would plan to produce on an annual basis some new 125 nuclear warheads in the next 15 years.
42
In the second week of March 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a testimony before the Senate: “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.”
46
Such language could be seen as provocative at a time when the United States and its European allies have brought Iran before the U.N. Security Council to answer allegations that it
is secretly developing nuclear weapons. At a news conference in January, Bush described an
Iran with nuclear arms as a “grave threat to the security of the world.” (2006)
On March 29, after difficult deliberations among its five permanent members—as Moscow
and Beijing still refused to put strong pressure on Tehran—the UNSC requested “in 30 days a
report from the Director General of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps
required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council
for its consideration.” (SC8679), thus setting a 30-days deadline for Tehran to halt its uraniumenrichment activities, i.e. its nuclear program. This UNSC Presidential Statement, however, was
not binding under international law. Further it did not include the threat of sanctions. With Iran
vaulting to the front of the U.S. national security agenda (cf. NSS 2006), the Washington Post reported about rising activities by Washington in an effort to bring about ‘regime change’ in Iran.
Bush had been advised by 30 to 40 Iran specialists in recent months. The State Department
created an own Iran desk and quintupled the number of people working on the country onto ten.
It would also add staff in Dubai as well as at other American embassies in the region, all assigned
to watch Tehran. The U.S. government also launched a $75 million program to ‘advance democracy’ in Iran by funding oppositional groups, both political and cultural. 43 (BAKER & KESSLER
2006)
During the time limit set for Iran, there was tremendous talk about eventual sanctions vis-àvis Tehran if Iran did not comply.44 Amidst such strained atmosphere, President Ahmadinejâd
declared in Mashhad on April 11 that Iran has become part of the exclusive club of the world’s
nuclear powers. Two days earlier, the country’s scientists had achieved to enrich uranium to a
degree needed for mastering the nuclear cycle. 45 A week later, the P5+1 met in Moscow for talks
about the way to proceed with Iran. An agreement was out of sight since Russia and China resisted demands to vote for sanctions. Consequently, U.S. Secretary of State, Rice, said that if the
UNSC was unable to arrive at an agreement, Washington would build a ‘coalition of the willing’
43
There are several reports confirming Washington’s efforts to destabilize the Iranian regime by providing
support for riots among ethnic minorities inside Iran. On Jan. 24, 2006, in Southern Iranian city of Ahvâz, two
bombs detonated and destructed a bank building as well as the main office for mineral resources killing eight
and injuring 46 people. There were also two previous bombings in that city, killing seven in June and four in
October 2005. Moreover, in an attack by Afghan rebels on a convoy between the Eastern Iranian cities of Sâbol
and Zâhedân near the border to Afghanistan and Pakistan, 23 people were killed, among them the Governor of
Zâhedân Province. For all these incidents, Iran held Americans and British responsible.
44
Beside military action, propositions for sanctioning Iran included extensive economic sanctions, an oil embargo, the blocking of Iranian foreign bank accounts, denying entry for Iranian politicians and scientists as well
as expelling the Iranian national soccer team from the 2006 World Cup in Germany. As a reaction to a possible
blocking of Iranian bank accounts in Western countries, in mid-January Tehran—according to unconfirmed
reports—had transferred €8 billion of its assets from Europe to East Asia (NIRUMAND 2006: 71).
45
Some hours prior to the President’s ceremonial announcement on this issue, his predecessor, Hâshemi Rafsanjâni, in an interview with the Kuwaiti news agency KUNA said Iran has made use of 164 centrifuges and has
reached to close the nuclear cycle by feeding uranium hexafluoride, further reaching the level of industrial
production.
47
in its effort to exercise the right for self-defense, thus rendering a SCR redundant. As expected,
Iran finally did not give in and the P5+1 ultimatum expired.
In late March, non-proliferation expert Joseph CIRINCIONE claimed that “some senior officials
have already made up their minds: They want to hit Iran,” speaking about a “co-ordinated campaign to prepare for a military strike on Iran.” He also warned
that a military strike would be disastrous for the United States. It would rally the Iranian
public around an otherwise unpopular regime, inflame anti-American anger around the
Muslim world, and jeopardise the already fragile U.S. position in Iraq. And it would accelerate, not delay, the Iranian nuclear program. Hard-liners in Tehran would be proven right
in their claim that the only thing that can deter the United States is a nuclear bomb. Iranian
leaders could respond with a crash nuclear program that could produce a bomb in a few
years.
and concluded: “We cannot let the political or ideological agenda of a small group determine a
national security decision that could create havoc in a critical area of the globe. Not again.” (2006)
In mid-April, the American investigative journalist Seymour HERSH revealed that a military attack on Iran is highly possible (2006a). A probable Israeli and/or U.S. military strike was now
openly debated (MERTINS 2006; ZUNES 2006) and security policy expert BRZEZINSKI entered the
floor by strongly warning against using military force in the nuclear dispute with Iran (2006). In
late April, six former Foreign Ministers from Western countries 46 called upon President Bush to
hold direct talks with Tehran in order to settle the conflict peacefully (IHT 2006). In its report on
April 28, 2006, which was prepared at the request of the UNSC (cf. SC8679), the IAEA’s Director
General finds that “the Agency cannot make a judgment about, or reach a conclusion on, future
compliance or intentions.” (GOV/2006/27: 8, para. 36) thus leaving much room for speculation
and for Washington’s ongoing escalation efforts in the attempt to fabricate a SCR supported by
all permanent members.
h) P5+1 Proposal Accompanied by Resolution 1696 (Spring – Fall 2006)
In spring 2006 the nuclear crisis turned into a decisive stage ( IRAN-REPORT 06/2006: 14-15). On
May 18, a European draft proposal for Iran was handed over to the United States. Long awaited,
the U.S. then decided to enter the negotiation process as no diplomatic solution was conceivable
without Washington’s direct input (PERTHES 2005). Indeed this alienated lots of hardliners both
among the U.S. neoconservative camp as well as in Israel, but at the end the overture was accepted as an effective means to rally international support for harsh sanctions on Tehran (NIR
2006). After tough discussions on the proposal among all Security Council veto powers plus
Germany (P5+1), it was finally presented to Iran on June 4.47 Ahmadinejâd considered the pro46
The statement is signed by Madeleine Albright of the United States, Joschka Fischer of Germany, Jozias van
Aartsen of the Netherlands, Bronislaw Geremek of Poland, Hubert Védrine of France, and Lydia Polfer of Luxembourg.
47
Some days earlier, on May 31, elements of a so-called ‘Final (Revised) Proposal’ were published online by the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One day later ABC News made public a very similar version of the offer,
which is widely referred to as the said proposal.
48
posal as a step forward, while Bush announced that the sanctions envisaged against Iran should
be sharpened (IRAN-REPORT 07/2006: 10-12). Tehran emphasized that it would open talks on its
nuclear program, but does not accept any preconditions, i.e. stopping its enrichment activities—
a vested right under the NPT (SMYTH & DOMBEY 2006; DAILY STAR 2006). On July 31, the pressure
on Tehran arrives at a peak: Acting under Art. 40 of Chapter VII UN Charta and pending the IAEA
Board of Governors’ GOV/2006/14 resolution of Feb. 4, the UNSC adopts with only Qatar opposing, Resolution 1696. The SCR demands the suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment within a
month. If it failed to do so, it would “adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter
VII”—thus making the case for a military strike—, while underlining “that further decisions will
be required should such additional measures be necessary.” But once more, with reference to its
inalienable right under the NPT, Tehran did not comply. The same day, Iran’s UN Ambassador
Javâd Zarif qualified the resolution as arbitrary and illegal because the NTP explicitly guaranteed
under international law his country’s right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
CHAPTER VII
Article 40
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND
ACTS OF AGGRESSION
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article
39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice
to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall
duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members
of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would
be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations
by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
On September 18, French President Chirac surprisingly announced support for Iran’s stance
and calls for negotiations with Tehran, without any preconditions or Security Council involvement. On Oct. 3, the AEOI’s Mohammad Saidi proposes that Paris could form a consortium out of
Eurodif and Areva48 to carry out uranium enrichment inside Iran. An effort qualified as interesting by Javier Solana. (ZERROUKY 2006) However, after several meetings between the latter and
Iran’s chief negotiator Ali Lârijâni ended with no serious results, as Iran would not give up its
48
AREVA is a France-based multinational industrial conglomerate being the world market leader in nuclear
technology. In 2001, the company was founded as the result of the merger of CEA-Industrie, COGEMA, Framatome ANP, and FCI.
49
enrichment program. Thus the EU’s foreign ministers declared in mid-October the temporary
failure of the negotiations with Iran and stressed that deliberations at Security Council level
about Chapter VII, UN Charter, sanctions on Tehran cannot be avoided any more. At the same
time, they “noted that the door to negotiations nevertheless remained open.” (cf. CEU 2006: 24).
The Europeans’ draft SCR called upon all States to stop supplying material or technology that
could contribute to any nuclear and missile programs. It would also ban and asset freeze on organizations, individuals, and companies involved in those projects. While Moscow and Beijing
called for a settlement of the conflict via dialog and Washington “has said the European draft is
too lenient”, Tehran said it is open to talks with the U.S. on regional issues (AP 2006). Thus a new
phase in the nuclear conflict was being kicked off.
i) Sanctions and Sabre-Rattling (late 2006 – early 2007): The ‘New Iraq Strategy’
The way for sanctions being paved, on Dec. 23, 2006, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution
1737 imposing sanctions on Iran. It calls Tehran to halt activities whatsoever in relation to its
nuclear program. Further, trade, travelling, and financial sanctions for those persons or institutions related to the Iranian nuclear program are being put into place. Moreover Within sixty
days, the IAEA should report if Iran has complied with that. Additionally, the SCR prevents Iranians from studying and teaching in those “disciplines which would contribute to Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems related to
atomic or missile issues” (SCR1737, para. 17). The sanctions would be lifted, if Iran halted its
enrichment program. Meanwhile, Germany’s foreign minister, Steinmeier, affirms that P5+1 June
proposals were still on the table. Iran’s foreign minister at the same time calls the adopted SCR
not lawful as it went beyond UNSC authority (IRAN-REPORT 01/2007: 12).49
On Dec. 20, 2006 British Prime Minister Blair, at a speech before the business community in
the United Arab Emirates, call had called upon the region’s moderates to actively support the
“monumental struggle” between democracy and extremism in the effort to counter Iran.50 While
claiming that “[w]e must recognize the strategic threat the government of Iran poses,” Blair holds
Iran responsible for negatively interfering in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq (BBC NEWS 2007). On
Jan. 17, seven Arab states and the U.S. made a common declaration calling on Iran to mend its
interference in Iran.
On Jan. 29, the IAEA’s Director General, ElBaradei, during the 2007 Annual Meeting of the
World Economic Forum held in Davos (Switzerland), called for a “timeout regarding the Iranian
nuclear issue” (CNN 2007). The same day Bush said: “If Iran escalates its military action in Iraq to
the detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi people, we will respond firmly.” (NPR 2007)
49
For Iran’s statement before the UNSC on the day of the Resolution’s passage, see URL.
Cf. also BLAIR, Tony (2007), “A Battle for Global Values,” Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2007, Vol. 86, No. 1. Therein he expects Washington to lead in a global war on terrorism simultaneously being a battle for tolerance and
liberty.
50
50
Thus, a new confrontational attitude to any Iranian activities in the Iranian-Iraqi border region
is proclaimed by U.S. representatives. In fact, Washington has evidently started its war activities
with increasing military operations in the Iraq-Iran border region, even crossing the frontier and
financing insurgent groups there. In this light, the U.S. has kidnapped several Iranian diplomats
inside Iraq—a harsh breach of international law, which only Russia condemned. 51 Part of Bush’s
‘new Iraq strategy’ is to ‘capture or kill’ Iranians ‘interfering’ in Iraqi affairs. As his National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley said, the crossing of the border may be necessary to perform the
task (SENGUPTA 2007). It seems that since the second half of 2006, the United States carried out
provocative acts in order to implicate Iran in an escalation leading to war. Meanwhile preparations for a war against Tehran seem to reach the final level. Israel has asked the U.S. for an air
corridor over Iraq for strikes against Iran (COUGHLIN 2007) and staged the largest civil defense
exercise in its history on March 20/21 (COPANS 2007).
For the very first time, Iran’s chief negotiator at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy (Feb. 9 till 11, 2007) declared that Iran in an effort to cooperate with the UNSC would agree
to limit its enrichment of uranium at four percent—a level sufficient to produce the fuel rod for
its reactors, but far from being used for weaponization purposes (LARIJANI 2007). The next day,
the EU’s Foreign Ministers decided to strictly implement the sanctions of SCR1737 52, while proclaiming their support for a diplomatic solution through negotiations ( IRAN-REPORT 03/2007: 11).
On Feb. 19, 2007, ElBaradei casted doubts both about calls for more sanctions and the international community’s emphasis on suspending enrichment. He said that it is far more important
to dissuade Iran from pursuing enrichment on an industrial scale—a development that could be
a mere six months away—since Tehran has already acquired considerable technical knowledge
from enriching uranium in a R&D facility. The IAEA’s Director General also pointed out: “The US
could be very helpful in providing the security assurances that obviously lie at the heart of some of
the Iranian activities.” (FT 2007) The day after, Ahmadinejâd, in a speech in the Iranian city of
Rasht, called the West to simultaneously suspend its uranium enrichment as a prerequisite for
serious and confidence-building negotiations, a proposition originally made by ElBaradei in his
call for a ‘time-out.’ However, the Iranian President’s offer was harshly refused by Washington.
Iran, once more, allowed the sixty-day UNSC ultimatum to expire on Feb. 21, 2007. As expected,
the IAEA has subsequently reported to the UNSC that Iran has ignored the latter’s demands, so
that the way for further sanctions is being opened.
51
On Jan. 11, 2007, five Iranians—believed to be Revolutionary Guardians—were arrested by U.S. troops in the
Northern Iraqi city of Arbil and are still under American custody. Moreover, on Feb. 4, Iraqi special forces presumably under U.S. command captured the deputy secretary of the Iranian Embassy, Jalal Sharafis, in Baghdad.
(IRAN-REPORT 03/2007: 13-14)
52
On Feb. 22, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed a decree according to which his country sanctions Iran pendant to SCR1737 demands.
51
For the very first time since the 2002 Afghanistan Conference Iranian and American representatives participated at a summit. In order to improve the situation of the country, the Iraqi
government initiated a two-round conference. The first, held on March 10, assembled senior
officials from all neighboring countries, Egypt, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC), and the P5. The surprising U.S. acceptance to take part in a conference
along with Iranian representatives can certainly be explained by growing pressure inside the
United States, but does not make a case for a reorientation of American policy vis-à-vis Iran as
ongoing hostile moves indicate. The second meeting is scheduled for the first half of April on the
level of ministers from all nations participating in the first round of talks plus those of the G-8.
Following a one-day consultative meeting, the Foreign Ministers from seven important Muslim
countries—Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi-Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia—plus the
OIC’s Secretary General called, in a Press Statement on Feb. 25, 2007 in Islamabad:
The Ministers viewed with deep concern the dangerous escalation of tension especially over
the Iranian nuclear issue. It is vital that all issues must be resolved through diplomacy and
there must be no resort to use of force. There is need for de-escalation instead of aggravation and confrontation in the Gulf region. All countries must work towards that objective.
(MOFA 2007)
j) Exposing the World at Odds: Resolution 1747 and ‘Unanimous’ Disaccord
On March 24, the P5+1—after extraordinarily difficult deliberations—pushed a second unanimous SCR imposing sanctions on Iran. Also for the second time, Iran is urged to resume its nuclear
program within 60 days. SCR1747 includes the extension of sanctions upon those affiliated to
the country’s nuclear program, the freeze of Iranian assets, a ban on arms exports to and from
Iran, and a ban on Iranians’ choice of study abroad. Annex II comprises the P5+1 proposals on
Iran, dated June 2006. The SCR foresees the removal of sanctions if Iran will comply with its demands. As the statements by the UNSC members made prior to the vote indicated, the unanimity
of the vote was accompanied by a tremendous gap of assessment vis-à-vis the issue at hand.
While all UNSC members underlined that talks should bring about a peaceful settlement of the
conflict, however, significant differences showed up between the fifteen countries involved in
the drafting process. In order to adequately grasp the whole political dimension of that UNSC
decision, I will give an overview of what happened at this UNSC meeting, presided by the South
African representative.53
The Qatari representative—the only Arab and Persian Gulf country on the Council, and
above all assuming the G-77 chairmanship—expressed “sadness” about the adopted SCR and said
his country were sure Iran would pursue a peaceful program. The Congolese delegation condemned any threat of using force. Indonesia stressed that its proposal of a nuclear-free zone was
amended to the SCR. It further emphasized, as Congo did before, that all three pillars of the
NPT—the right for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the duty for disarmament, the interdiction
53
The following report is based on the webcast of the UNSC meeting on March 24, 2007.
52
of pursuing a weaponization program—should be respected in a non-discriminatory manner,
while underscoring Iran’s rights under this Treaty should be respected. In its statement, South
Africa urged that deescalation in a heightened situation of escalation is needed and rejected the
idea that WMDs “are safe in some hands and not in others.” All these countries urged the unavoidability of dialog and negotiations on the basis of mutual respect.
Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the UK’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN, read a
declaration made by the P5+1, expressing the latter’s “profound” concerns—a view not reaffirmed by the majority of the UNSC. The declaration indicated further that the June 2006 P5+1
proposal remained on the table. In its statement, the United Kingdom suggested that further
sanctions are expected if Iran does not comply with demands included in the adopted SCR and
finishing with the ominous announcement: “Iran must make its choice.” Also the French representative, UN Ambassador de la Sablière, warned Iran that the UNSC may adopt further measures, thus the choice for Iran would be either to comply or to suffer heightened isolation. Paris
simultaneously offered nuclear cooperation with Iran.
In his statement, Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, Acting U.S. Permanent Representative to the
UN, considered the issue at hand as “clearly a grave threat to international peace and security,”
resuming:
The Iranian leadership’s continued defiance of this Council in failing to comply with Security Council Resolutions 1696 and 1737 requires that we uphold our responsibilities defined
in the Charter of this esteemed body and take necessary action. And while we hope Iran responds to this resolution by complying with its international legal obligations, the United
States is fully prepared to support additional measures in 60 days should Iran choose
another course.
He further spoke of “more than 20 years of deception of the IAEA” by Iran, violating the NPT.
Iran’s “continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability”—this indeed, a unilateral move of classifying the nature of the Iranian nuclear program—would “only further isolate Iran and make it
less, not more secure.” These “adopted stronger measures” would “persuade the regime to make its
country more secure by abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons,” Wolff said. He warned that
[s]hould Iran choose a different path, this resolution makes clear that we are prepared and
willing to adopt additional measures. Indeed, in the face of Iran’s continued defiance, the
United States expects that the Council will continue to incrementally increase pressure on
the Iranian regime.
He was further intent on making a difference between Iran’s regime and its people, underlining
the immense contributions people of Iranian descent did for his country and underlining that
sanctions would exclusively hit the regime. Reminiscing of the United States’ ‘regime change’
rhetoric, he said that “[w]e hope for another dynamic.” He considered it the Council’s “solemn
responsibility to take measures which will not only halt the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons
programs, but to encourage the leadership of Iran to choose a different path.” Qualifying Iran’s
rejection to the P5+1 Proposals as “a deeply troubling signal to the entire international communi-
53
ty,” his government would associate itself to this offer and to the “willingness to resolve this issue
through negotiations.”
However, the U.S. called the path pursued by Iran as a “direct challenge to the very principles
on which the United Nations was founded.” being a leading state sponsor of terrorism. Repeating
the accusation on Iran that it was willing to “wipe” Israel—a UN member state—“off the map,” he
considered that to break the provisions of Article 2, UN Charta, which states “that all Members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state.” This would even be amplified “by Iran’s continued well-known role as one of the world’s leading state-sponsors of terrorism.” In this light, he audaciously warned against another Holocaust: “To forget the past, or even worse, attempt to rewrite it is to invite it to be repeated. We cannot allow that to happen.” Classifying Iran as a “grave
threat to international peace and security,” he nevertheless expressed Washington’s ‘firm commitment’ for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Wolff at the end warned that “our vote here
today shows that the Council can and will act accordingly when countries violate their international obligations.”
Russia on its part emphasized the fact that there existed different views by UNSC members
on the Iranian case. Vitali Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the
UN, believed that the SCR was not aimed to punish Iran, but required Tehran to fully cooperate
with the IAEA. Therefore, he hoped for normalization as to Iran’s nuclear program. In his statement, the Chinese representative first outlined that his country does “not wish to see new turbulences in the Middle East.” He considered the development of Iran’s program “worrisome,” but the
SCR was not to punish Tehran, but to reactivate negotiation measures. Beijing’s UN Ambassador,
Wang Guangya, further justified his country’s approval of the SCR as follows:
China believes that any measure taken should aim at safeguarding the international nonproliferation mechanism and maintaining international and regional peace and stability.
Actions taken by the Security Council should be appropriate, incremental and proportionate. They should help enhance diplomatic efforts rather than aggravating conflicts and
leading to confrontation.
Diplomacy remained the best solution, since “[i]t is impossible to resolve the issue fundamentally
by imposing sanctions and pressure only.” China would “call upon all the parties concerned to
adopt a highly responsible and constructive attitude, keep calm, practice restraint, and refrain
from any actions that may lead to deterioration or escalation of the tension.” He further urged to
prevent the escalation of the crisis “maintaining international and regional peace and stability
remain the premise and ultimate objective” and underlined that the IAEA remained the “main
framework” to settle Iran’s issue, and “its authority and role should therefore be safeguarded and
strengthened.” In conclusion, he pointed that “[t]he ‘time out’ proposal by IAEA's Director-General
Baradei and the establishment of mechanism of talks that includes Iran also deserve our considera-
54
tios” as well as underscored China’s commitment to continue its “due role for a comprehensive
and peaceful solution.”
While Panama stated that the political process had failed, the statements of Slovakia, and
Belgium to emphasize the need to respect the NPT. Ghana, being the last to speak before the
vote, alluded to the “issue of selectivity” when it comes to deal with non-proliferation matters—
the subject on which the UNSC was convened with the Iranian case.
After the announced approval of the draft resolution on Iran by all 15 UNSC members, the
floor was given to Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manuchehr Mottaki. In his extensive and comprehensive statement, he said that the UNSC was pressured to adopt “illegal” and “unnecessary” measures by a minority of its members. As his country’s peaceful nuclear program would not pose a
threat to international peace and security, it could not be subjected to UNSC deliberations. Tehran would keep on resolving outstanding issues. He said that the IAEA’s BoG was being misused and its members coerced to vote against Iran. In this light, the case for a misuse of UNSC
would be accordingly set. Referring to the NAM and OIC declarations, he pointed out that twothird of UN member-states have expressed support for his country’s position. Mottaki spoke of a
long tradition of the UNSC denying rights toward Tehran. Reminding the silence of the UNSC
during the first seven days of Saddam’s assault on Iran, he criticized the body’s failure to call
upon Iraq to withdraw its troops from 30,000 km² occupied with that week. He alluded to the
fact that UNSC members supplied chemical and other weapons to Saddam to use them against
Iranian civilians. As SCR479 (dated Sept. 28, 1980) would expose, those acts remained unpunished. Moreover, the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry was condemned by the UNSC as a
‘threat of international peace and security.’ As to the 2006 Israeli attack on Lebanon, he harshly
condemned the UNSC’s silence with two of its members openly supporting the aggressor.
In this light, the Foreign Minister emphasized that law must be respected in all matters and
situations and that the UNSC must not deny the legitimacy of the majority of the international
community. There was no single threat of international peace and security originating from Iran,
but the preeminence of political interests by some UNSC members would pose problem. The
UNSC were not in the position to cope with the Iranian case as that remained to be done under
the authority of the IAEA. But the seizure of the UNSC would uncover the illegal and political
goals of that body. For instance, he referred to a recent U.S. report that American information as
to Iran’s nuclear program put before the IAEA BoG was incorrect. He furthermore questioned
the UNSC members’ readiness to expose their nuclear programs in the way his country did and
indicated that the P5 were even denying to expose the number of their centrifuges. Conferring to
a 2003 IAEA report, he underlined that no military diversion could be found, with this observation not being refuted up to date. As to the Agency’s February report, Mottaki emphasized the
document’s affirmation that Iran had fully cooperated.
55
Moreover, he expressed sadness over the fact that the UNSC was being subjected to pressures from some of its members in an effort to deprive a nation’s right. Indeed, the adopted
SCR—particularly contrasting what the U.S. representative had said before—would violate the
fundamental right of research and scientific principles, as prescribed in the UN Charta. He
pointed out that the financial sanctions put against Iran’s Sepah Bank would affect normal
people. Taking into account that there was no indication made by the IAEA as to the military
purpose of Iran’s nuclear program, he asked if this UNSC measure was not an action threatening
international peace and security. At the end of his statement, Mottaki asked the UNSC’s President to consider if the SCR adopted would not further the threat of international peace and security and if it would not send a signal to peoples worldwide that their vested rights would not be
guaranteed by international organizations. Strongly condemning Western support for Saddam’s
eight-year long war against his country, he urged to realize the reality and choose the right path,
not failing to mention that history would show that Iran were a peaceful nation and has been the
victim of terrorism, in part supported by the West.
At the UNSC stakeout, the U.S. representative called the Iranian Foreign Minister’s statement
a “revisionist speech” that missed the point, an act of “distraction.” He further alleged that the
unanimous passage of the SCR witnessed a “unity of assessment” among the UNSC members.54
The EU-3 representatives on their part underscored their claim that Iran would have to choose
between compliance and isolation. The UK’s delegate said that “we incrementally increased the
pressure on Iran,” while his French colleague stressed “[w]e hope Iran will make the right choice.”
Responding to a question affirming that this resolution could be used by the U.S. to launch a war
on Iran, he said: “Both resolution 1737 and this resolution are very clear. There are resolutions
based on article 41 of the charter, which is article which deals with economic sanctions only.” Russia clearly, on the other hand, surprisingly held that “unfortunately there is this list of sanctions”
and expressed hope that “political confrontation” will not be heightened. It underlined that further measures would be considered, but on the grounds of Art. 41 UN Charter, i.e. not providing
the legal foundation for the use of force. The Council’s President and South Africa’s representative said that his country would have wished that Iran’s Sepah Bank was not sanctioned. He further exposed that the SCR sponsors—the P5+1—tried to isolate other UNSC members at an early
stage of the debates on the draft, but finally those were successful to make some changes, e.g. by
incorporating the guarantee of NPT rights and disarmament duties. The SCR was now better, but
not perfect. However, he insisted that “this escalation […] is very worrisome.”
Thus, South Africa, Indonesia, and Qatar had achieved that the P5 include vaguely the notion
of a nuclear-free ME into the SCR text, but not as a UNSC affirmation:
Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that
a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts
54
This, however, is not mentioned in the official U.S. press release of the stakeout.
56
and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery (SCR1747: 1)
Moreover, both Russia and China succeeded to safeguard their economic interests in the country
sanctioned. The new Resolution did not introduce any change to the exemption provisions in
§15 of SCR1737, whereby all economic deals made with Iran prior to the SCR can be pursued.
Moreover, the fact that the proposal, once rejected by Iran due to its numerous shortcomings, is repeatedly offered to Iran—this time as part of the SCR—puts Tehran in the uncomfortable position to have to accept the package proposed. For Iran, the arms embargo may highly increase its vulnerability in case of a U.S. attack. The so-called P5+1’s proposal of ‘suspension for
suspension’ can be interpreted as a clear sign of coercion as it demands Iran to renounce from
its NPT rights. The repeated U.S. claims that Iran would be a “grave threat to international peace
and security,” legitimates Art. 42 UN Charta, including the use of force, to enter into force.
In the run-up to this UNSC meeting on sanctioning Iran, the latter’s President had announced
speaking before the Council’s vote—a right that is reserved to a State’s highest authority. But the
U.S. did not visa the President’s crew members so that he was kept from travelling to New York
cf. OLSON 2007). As a result, Iran’s statement could only be considered after the vote as it was
presented by its Foreign Minister only.
 MANUFACTURING A
GLOBAL CRISIS: THE IRAN CONFLICT
3.2.2. Why the Talks’ Failure was Foreseeable
3.2.3. Tackling the Real Issues:
How Diplomacy Can Finally Succeed
http://www.prisonplanet.com/Pictures/Jun06/050606sk6206.jpg
3.2.2. Why the Talks’ Failure was Foreseeable
The fundamental criteria for assessing whether the proposals made by the West—by the socalled EU-3 as well as in a later stage the P5+1—were and are reasonable or not are whether
they offer benefits to Iran that are both sufficiently specific and certain to be taken seriously and
whether those benefits are commensurate with the concessions being demanded from Iran. If
57
the proposals fulfill both conditions, they can be considered reasonable and powerful as to their
meaningfulness and feasibility. If the proposals offer benefits that are either too insubstantial to
bear the capacity of being weighed sincerely against the cost(s) Iran is demanded to concede, or
are tuned on other factors beyond that concession, it ought to be judged insufficient. If it further
fails on both matters, it is even more clearly to be deemed as an inadequate response to the solution of the nuclear dispute, as an issue of high gravity.
As the negotiation process overwhelmingly took place between Great Britain, France, and Germany, i.e. the EU-3, and Iran, it should now be dealt with the European ‘offer packages,’ primarily
made in the Paris Agreement.
a) The Absurdity of the EU-3 Offers
In negotiating partners’ allegedly extensive economic incentives it is dealt with e.g. technological
cooperation in the fields of oil and gas, agriculture and water supply. But these are no new incentives, as they deal with numerous projects already agreed upon or even started with. Anyways, those cooperation offers cannot be qualified as ‘incentives’ in real terms as economic and
other cooperation is primarily in the interests of the offerors. Furthermore, other proposals put
forward cannot be considered as binding since their realization lies in the hands of the United
States. In issues displeasing Washington, but benefiting Tehran—such as the suspension of trade
discriminations, the admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the supply of spare
parts for the Iranian civil aviation—the EU-3’s avowals to support Iran cannot be described as
serious or at least weightily. As the Iranian crucial pipeline project from the Caspian Sea to the
Persian Gulf is concerned, in the Paris Agreement the Europeans just signaled their ‘willingness’
to start ‘discussions’—hardly a trustworthy declaration of engagement. More generous and
binding are the EU-3 offers when it comes to the promise of providing fuel rods for Iran’s nuclear energy sector, taking back nuclear waste, and delivering light-water reactors. In that respect, it must be added that Iran would expose itself into a situation of dependence vis-à-vis foreign countries’ promises to provide for its nuclear energy supply.
b) Iran’s Historical Skepticism about Energy Cooperation with Foreign Powers
Whereas the failure of the Russian mediation effort was broadly viewed by most of the West as
exposing Iran’s secret desire for acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran’s underlying concerns were
not covered. Indeed, during the whole negotiation process with Russia, the Iranians were afflicted by serious worries to depend from a foreign country for the import of the nuclear fuel
rod. Placing itself in such dependence bore a great deal of risk as the country’s energy security
would be placed at the mercy of foreign powers’ political opportunism. Political and economic
independence—a leitmotiv of post-revolutionary Iran—would thus be trampled under foot.
Moreover, history proved no good experiences.
58
With France, for instance, Iran entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement and bought into the European uranium enrichment consortium Eurodif55 as a partner. The French government
subsidiary company Cogéma and the Iranian Government created the Sofidif enterprise (Société
franco–iranienne pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium par diffusion gazeuse) with a 60 to 40 percent share. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25 percent share in Eurodif, which gave Iran a 10 percent
share of Eurodif.56 Tehran thus purchased the right to 250-300 tons of 3% enriched uranium.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the government proved no interest and did not keep with its
payment obligations under the Eurodif agreement. As in 1991 it wanted to receive uranium, a
legal dispute followed since Paris no longer felt bound by the contract. But in the same year,
France had to refund Iran’s financial Eurodif share—more than $1.6 billion. But Paris affirmed
towards Washington that it will not release the enriched uranium that Iran has a claim to. However Iran remains a shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif, a Franco-Iranian consortium shareholder
which owns 25 percent of Eurodif. KALINOWSKI thus remarks: “When France, together with other
countries, now demands from Iran that it should not enrich uranium itself, one can guess how this
is received in Iran.” (2006)
As regards Moscow, its past policies were more characterized by aggressiveness than by cooperation. Prior to World War Two, Russia, which also sought access to the Persian Gulf, had
together with Britain divided Iran into spheres of influence and during that War its troops had
occupied the Iran’s Northern part. (NIRUMAND 2006: 62-63) In recent times, Moscow again and
again postponed the completion of the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, with all
kinds of pretenses. Against the severity of such a record, Iran’s denial of the Russian offer was
quite comprehensible.
c) Falling into America’s Trap: Why European Diplomacy Failed
It remains incomprehensible why Europe finally deviated from its original path to pursue a
peaceful resolution of the conflict and adopted Washington’s slogan that all options were on the
table. Any evidence that Iran is pursuing a weaponization program is still lacking. European
countries have—in the shadow of the U.S. Iran embargo—established not only solid and highly
beneficial economic ties57 with the country, but have also maintained mutually fertile cultural
relations. Europe should have had a fundamental interest to achieve a peaceful resolution with
the most important country in its neighboring region—both from economic and geostrategic
perspectives. The long looked for European dream to follow an independent foreign and security
55
The abbreviation stands for European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium, which is a subsidiary company of French company Cogéma. The joint stock company Eurodif was formed in 1973 by France,
Belgium, Spain, and Sweden. As the latter withdrew from the project in 1974, Iran took over its 10 percent
share in Eurodif—resulting from an arrangement between Paris and Tehran.
56
In 1974, the Shah lent 1 billion dollars—and another 180 million dollars in 1977—for the construction of the
factory, thus acquiring the right to buy 10 percent of the production.
57
German exports alone to Iran amount to a total of over €4 billion.
59
policy presenting a responsible and successful peaceful alternative to warmongering attitudes
had notable chance to prove its viability, particularly in contrast to Washington’s militaryabiding approach. “Why have the EU states jeopardized all this?” (NIRUMAND 2006: 49) is certainly
a legitimate question to raise, as the myth that diplomacy can best succeed if it is accompanied
by the threat of using force is hardly promising.
At the beginning of the negotiation process, the EU-3 aimed a compromise aiming at preventing Iran to acquire nuclear bombs by preserving Tehran’s vest right for a peaceful nuclear
program. The Europeans thus pursued the reasonable way of harsher controls by the IAEA. As a
confidence-building measure, Iran was requested to fully resume its uranium enrichment activities for the duration of the talks and was additionally asked to sign the Additional Protocol to the
NPT allowing unannounced inspections. After tough talks, Tehran finally agreed to do so.
The U-turn of the European stance came in the summer of 2005. This was certainly due to
the astonishment about Iran’s denial of incentives offered so far. Despite numerous voices inside
the European negotiation camp calling for more lucrative offers for Tehran in order for it to concede on a vested right, the EU-3 increasingly turned to the American creed that talks with the
mullahs threatening global security would not be fruitful. Suddenly, the EU-3 called upon Iran to
fully and even permanently to renounce from all its nuclear activities, thus denying Iran’s vested
right to have a nuclear program for energy purposes and additionally breaching the promise
made in the Paris Agreement to support Iran’s rights under the NPT. This ‘maximum demand’—
not covered by provisions of international law and egregiously making the case for a doublestandard policy—was, as could be expected, harshly criticized and rejected by Tehran. It moreover impeded the success of further negotiations as it created an intolerable gap between the two
parties’ position thus considerably reducing the chance of a negotiated settlement. This indeed
was a slap in the face of all those in Iran who had agreed to negotiate about the country’s vested
right in a non self-evident effort to meet European and other concerns. Europe, indeed, should
have known this. What is more, it should have known that such a demand would automatically
increase the probability of the conflict’s dangerous escalation. This shift of strategy had clearly
strengthened the radical faction inside Iran who now claimed that the reformist camp was misguided in pursuing a compromise with the West. The internationally vested right to follow a
nuclear energy program was now elevated into a question of national prestige. And those benefitting from the expected failure of the negotiations between the EU-3 and Iran were the U.S.
neoconservatives, with “… [t]he EU henceforth becoming the prisoner of the U.S.” (NIRUMAND
2006: 50) As diplomacy suffered a crash and was consequently propagated as inadequate to deal
with Iran, Washington—along with Tel Aviv58—increasingly insisted upon a widely dismissed
‘military option.’ Those repeated echoes of the intention to wage a war against Iran undermined
58
In an interview with the daily Maariv on April 21, 2005, Israel’s then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared
that the international community should aim at bringing about regime change in Iran.
60
further diplomatic efforts between Brussels and Tehran. However, it remains to be clarified why
Europe naively agreed to negotiate with Iran in lieu of the United States without realizing that it
was not in the position to offer remarkable incentives to Iran and why it failed at an early stage
to forcefully demand its American ally to engage constructively. Far from that, Europe embraced
the U.S. neoconservatives’ logic on the necessity of a threat scenario.
d) Playing the Neoconservative Game: Spurning Iran’s Security Dilemma
Iran’s fear of being threatened is certainly justified. Not only is it encircled by some quarter million U.S. and allied troops in its immediate neighborhood, Tehran also sees itself in the eye of
storm, at the latest since U.S. President Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address has put the
country on the ‘Axis of Evil,’ thus reserving the right to proceed militarily against it. It becomes
clear that the United States is the only country that is capable of reacting to Iran’s existential
security problems and offering remedies for it. But Washington constantly ignored and even
renounced signs from Tehran willing to start talks on strategic issues afflicting both, even
though Iran signaled its willingness to engage fully in a rapprochement process with the U.S. and
to meet all the latter’s outstanding concerns and interests (cf. PORTER 2006).
We have seen above that the EU-3 alone does not possess adequate and binding instruments,
particularly in the realm of security policy, which could be stressed in the negotiations with Tehran making the talks succeed. The Europeans’ frustrations about the diplomatic stagnation with
Tehran stems from their apparent lack of power due to Washington’s refusal to enter the diplomatic stage. As former U.S. National Security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski uncovered: “We simply
refuse to be part of the solution” [own translation] (BESTE & MASCOLO 2006). Instead, the U.S. constantly has augmented its pressure vis-à-vis Iran, accompanied by a harshening rhetoric against
its regime. In the meantime it has tried to rally a broad range of countries for an anti-Iran coalition. While lacking a reasonable support for rendering a diplomatic breakthrough possible,
Washington unmistakably strived for a military confrontation. And the U.S. neoconservatives
could have imagined no better outcome in the Iran issue.
3.2.3. Tackling the Real Issues: How Diplomacy Can Finally Succeed
In contrast of the much-cited determinism as to the insolubility of the so-called Iran crisis, there
are however ways to a diplomatic solution—indeed necessitating a sound farewell of the modus
operandi used so far.
a) Preconditions
Any adequate solution must meet both sides’ concerns. For Iran, this incorporates reliable civil
nuclear energy, guarantee of its NPT rights, rendering its technological development possible,
and foremost security assurances against any attack on the country. For the U.S. and Europe the
61
bottom line remains that Iran will not develop nuclear-weapons capability, i.e. a solid gap between civil and military nuclear activities best assured through extensive Iranian cooperation
with the IAEA. All other issues at stake for both sides are unlikely to be solved in an initial deal in
the ‘nuclear crisis.’ If a peaceful solution should be envisioned, the following aspects ought not to
be disregarded in any proposal made by the West:
Iran’s vested right under the NPT to complete the fuel cycle has become a question of national prestige, unimaginable to be neglected by the country’s political authorities (cf. LADURNER
& VON RANDOW 2004). The feeling of being discriminated against in the nuclear question is widely sensed in Iran accompanied by the widespread opinion that the West will deprive Iranians the
right for technological advancement. Here the case of double-standards exercised in matters of
international relations cannot be underestimated.
Iran’s rights under NPT—as emphasized in the Agreements made—should not be infringed in a discriminatory manner (VON RANDOW 2004).
The overemphasized, partly demagogic politization of the nuclear issue should be defused and counteracted by political actors involved in the negotiating process for it makes any
arrangement even harder to achieve.
The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, the Vienna-based IAEA, should be the sole authority to deal with the Iranian nuclear dossier (cf. PRATHER 2006). Any referral to the UNSC only
augments unnecessary pressure and further underscores Iran’s belief that the referral of its nuclear dossier was preceded by acts of political pressuring thus casting the legitimacy of Council
decisions into doubt. SCRs and sanctions moreover pave the way for the escalation of the
process, besides playing into the hands of those in Washington paradoxically traditionally opposed to any UN authority.
It should be seriously acknowledged that any UNSC sanctions—as experts widely note—
cannot be considered as an adequate instrument to cope with the problem at hand (cf. BLIX
2006; ELBARADEI 2006).
A sound contradiction in the Western demand vis-à-vis Iran to fully halt the latter’s nuclear program is that “France and Great Britain themselves dispose atomic weapons and that Germany is standing under the atomic umbrella of the U.S. A stronger commitment to disarmament—a
possible heavily symbolic compensation field for voluntary Iranian self-restriction—is thus not
credibly to hold.” (BRZOSKA & NEUNECK 2006: 15) Likewise “U.S. efforts to limit nuclear proliferation appear equally hypocritical giving its willingness to accept Israel’s nuclear arsenal, which encourages Iran and others to seek similar capabilities.” (MEARSHEIMER & WALT 2003: 40) What is
more, it would be Europe’s task to condemn a posteriori the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal as an egregious act of double-standard. Those kinds of confessions are essential to pour oil on troubled
waters.
62
What is bearing tremendous weight on the disharmony characterizing the whole issue
are the military threats by the United States and Israel with regard to Iran. Any aggressive regime change rhetoric only strengthens the hardliners in Iran and thus fosters the blockade (NIRUMAND 2006).
The threat of military use or even sanctions would be tremendously counterpro-
ductive in the way that Iran would increasingly consider to acquire the nuclear bomb as an effective means of deterrence (BRZOSKA & NEUNECK 2006: 23; PERTHES & WEGNER 2006). It has been
proved that nuclear weapons proliferation seems to be interconnected with the level of economic development, the external threat environment, lack of great-power security guarantees, and a
low level of integration into the world economy (SINGH & WAY 2004). It is startling how all these
factors are applicable to Iran at its present stage.
b) Concrete Measures: Extending the Framework of Negotiations
How to Resolve the Dual-Use Problem? The participation of other countries in the enrichment activities in Iran could ensure international confidence. 59 It seems that in the P5+1 Proposal Moscow’s offer to enrich uranium on Russian own soil—in a joint venture—for Iranian
power plants has been integrated (BRZOSKA & NEUNECK 2006: 16). This forms also a central element of proposals made by Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
scholars thus showing a way out of the nuclear dead-end (MALEKI & BUNN 2006; THOMSON & FORDEN 2006).
For this proposal of multilateralization of Iran’s uranium enrichment to succeed, it is
crucial that, on the one hand, Iran’s reservations as to a possible dependence toward foreign
powers regarding the delivery of raw uranium are effectively settled and, on the other, the United States finally agrees to that.
Offering Serious Incentives. In order to resolve the diplomatic impasse, significant additional incentives—both economically and politically—have to be offered to Tehran (POLENZ
2004; PERTHES 2006). In the field of economy, offers should not be only limited to the area of
trade in nuclear energy, but should also encompass cooperation in issues of regenerative energy.
As the Volker PERTHES from Germany’s most important think tank, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), incessantly argues, Germany being Europe’s most important country should be highly interested to develop long-term cooperation in the field energy
policy with Iran (2004a; 2004b: 90). In order to achieve such a goal crucial for Germany’s national interests, Berlin should—despite Chancellor Merkel’s surprisingly clear pro-American
stance—however abjure from any ‘military solution.’
59
This was first proposed by Iranian negotiators in the first half of 2004 and offered officially by Ahmadinejad
to the international community in his address to the UN General Assembly Summit in the latter half of 2005. In
August 2005, South African President Thabo Mbeki and Hassan Rohani, Iran’s chief negotiator at that time, had
agreed that Iran would export its uranium conversion facility (UCF) product to and import yellow cake from
South Africa. (MOUSAVIAN 2006: 3) This proposal, though ignored at that time, now entered various scientific
proposal sheets to end the nuclear conflict.
63
Launching a CSCNME Now. A key prerequisite for success however is the consideration of
Iran’s security dilemma. Security guarantees should be presented to Iran in the form classical
non-aggression acts. Here it is important to note that it is the United States government that can
and should do this. Accordingly Iran would have no excuse for not fully cooperating with the
West as picture of an aggressive Great Satan would break down.
Iran is, after all, due to its “unique geographic location […] a natural regional power,” which
wishes that its status as “regional hegemon” is acknowledged and respected by others. In order
to engage the country constructively it is time for a policy of détente. (TAKEYH 2007) That is why
Tehran’s abandonment of its contractual rights should be accompanied by the initiation of a
OSCE-modeled conference on security and cooperation for the Near and Middle East region. The
EU would be the credible actor to announce its active support for such a project with the aim of a
nuclear-free zone in the Near and Middle East (MASSARRAT 2007a).



 AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE
1. WHO IS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?
ON GLOBAL FISSURES
1.1. The West‘s Sole
Agency Claim
1.2. Southern
Objection
Source: Getty Images
Throughout the debate on Iran’s nuclear program, the picture of Iran versus the international
community is being painted. While Western countries incessantly and almost inherently claim to
represent the so-called international community, numerous international organizations comprising a high number of member states have repeatedly supported the Iranians’ position. In a
world order which is dominated by highly industrialized Western nations, the Iran conflict laid
open fundamental fissures in the international system’s global structure.
64
4.1.1. The West’s Sole Agency Claim
Indeed hundreds of years of Western powers’ global domination through eras of colonialism and
imperialism—not to speak of today’s renaissance of neocolonial wars—have left their mark in
the global distribution of power. We can witness outrageous and blatant gaps in terms of socioeconomic fabric between societies of the Northern and Southern hemisphere. While the North is
economically led by a triad comprising the United States, the European Union, and Japan, also
other powers matter in some respect. Due to its geostrategic asset deriving from its huge territory ranging from Eurasia to the North Pacific and its huge energy resources, the former superpower Russia has despite its economic shortcomings still an essential say in world politics. Some
even believe that Moscow has the potential to reemerge as a global superpower (cf. TODD 2002).
However, the strongest political body in today’s international relations is the UNSC. Its five
permanent members, each holding a veto power, can decide upon putting sanctions on one of
the 192 UN member countries or even legitimizing the use of force against it. And this without
any legitimacy vis-à-vis the ‘Parliament of Nations,’ i.e. the UN General Assembly (PAECH & STUBY
2001: 564f.) But the P5 reflect the global distribution of power after World War Two that is
hardly representative for the world as it is shaped after half a century. Moreover Western powers form the majority of the body. Against such a background the overwhelming majority of the
UN members does not feel adequately represented by the P5. As history has proven, the latter
are not acting on behalf of the whole international community’s interests—as prescribed by the
UN Charter, but solely on the bases of their own strategic interests and political motives (see
also RUF 2005). In this sense “[s]ince 1982, the US has vetoed 32 Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, more than the total number of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.”
(MEARSHEIMER & WALT 2006: 2) In terms of power relations, it is important to add that the P5
exclusively are nuclear powers which are anyway positioned in an extraordinary status in international relations. Nevertheless, it is characteristic for Western dominance in the global distribution of power that both non-Western UNSC veto powers are hard to convince to participate in
Western-orchestrated endeavors, as could be witnessed in the context of the Iraq War and can
be observed in the difficult talks about sanctions against Iran.
4.1.2. Southern Objection
The Iran crisis tells us also a lot about the current constitution of the international system. With
the polarization between Iran and the West reaching a peak, Tehran is however supported by a
great number of States from the South. That does not necessarily sign a sympathy towards Iran,
but should be understood as middle-powers’—such as Brazil, Argentina, and others—fear to
likewise become a target of hostile U.S. policies whatsoever. New intercontinental alliances,
65
above all between Iran and Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, emerged, stuck together in the common
desire to oppose American imperialism worldwide (cf. HUGHES 2006).
While the West is claiming sole agency in matters of international relations, in recent years a
considerable group of countries organized themselves in an evident effort to create counterpoles to a Western, especially U.S.-dominated world order. Among the most important international organizations that raise their voice in world affairs are the following:
1. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with 118 members from the so-called developing world,
thus representing nearly two-thirds of UN members and comprising more than half of the
world population. It includes among others India, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, South Africa, Iran, and Malaysia, while China and Brazil have only an observer status. The NAM has developed into an organization highly critical of U.S. imperialism.
2. The Group of 77 (G-77) is a loose coalition of developing countries at the UN. The organization has meanwhile increased its membership up to 134 covering nearly all nations of the
South, including the Southern American and African continents as well as Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The G-77 is considered a strong voice for an increased
third-world presence on the UNSC.
3. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an inter-governmental organization with
a Permanent Delegation to the UN. It groups 57 mostly Islamic nations with e.g. Russia occupying observer status.
4. The League of Arab States (also called Arab League) consists of 22 States, all being also OIC
members.
5. The Developing Eight (D-8) are a group of developing countries that have formed an economic development alliance. It consists of highly populated Muslim countries, in particular
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey.
6. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an intergovernmental organization with
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as members, thus covering
a quarter of the global population as well as three-fifth the territory of Eurasia. India, Iran,
Pakistan, and Mongolia have observer status while the latter three have already applied for
full membership.
Pursuant to the UN Charta, all these organizations have condemned the threat or use of force
in the conflict about Iran’s nuclear program. They have also repeatedly stressed that Tehran’s
vested rights under the NPT should be kept untouched. Calling upon the parties to engage in a
diplomatic resolution of the crisis, they strengthened Iran’s position that talks should be held
without preconditions and on equal footing.
At the 14th Summit of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM) held from September
11-16, 2006, in the Cuban capital of Havana, the final document, adopted by all 118 members,
66
states the NAM’s support for a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East while calling upon Israel to promptly join the NPT (NAM 2006/Doc.1/Rev.3: Chapter 1, J., Disarmament
and International Security, para. 89). Furthermore the document harshly criticizes U.S. foreign
policy:
They [the Non-Aligned Countries—A. F.-N.] further totally reject the use of the
term “axis of evil” by a certain State to target other States under the pretext of
combating terrorism, as well as the unilateral preparation of lists accusing States of
allegedly supporting terrorism, which are inconsistent with international law and
constitute on their part a form of psychological and political terrorism and in this
context, underscoring the need to exercise solidarity with the Non-Aligned Countries that are affected by such actions and measures. (IBID.: Chapter 1, J., Terrorism,
para. 119.14)
An additional statement by 56 member-states on Iran’s nuclear issue declares support for Tehran’s position for developing nuclear energy and affirms the IAEA’s central role for resolving
the issue in a peaceful manner (NAM 2006/Doc.12/Rev.1).
In March 2007 that both the NAM and the G-77 have prepared separate statements calling
for Tehran’s nuclear dossier to be removed from the agenda of the UNSC (MNA 2007) after their
representatives had visited the uranium conversion facility (UCF) at Isfahan (IRAN DAILY 2007).
 AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE
2. THE GLOBAL HEGEMON’S DECISIVE BATTLE
2.1. America’s ‘Oil Weapon’
2.2. Great Powers Interests and an Iran War
4.2.1. Stranglehold on its Rivals: America’s ‘Oil Weapon’
The disastrous negotiation tactic by the EU-3, demanding Iran to fully renounce to any nuclear
technology activity guaranteed by the NPT and moreover to ignore its serious security concerns
by lacking to offer adequate remedies for it, provides much evidence that Europe fell into the
American trap (MASSARRAT 2006b: 1; NIRUMAND 2006). The Persian Gulf region has an enormous
significance for the United States, both in terms of oil price formation and geostrategy (MASSAR-
67
RAT
2003: 36). The monopolistic direct control over the world’s most important oil sources
would give Washington a strikingly effective hegemonic tool that would ascertain America’s first
say on all global matters, since all its rivals—not only China, Russia, and India, but its own allies,
i.e. the EU and Japan, too—are heavily dependent on oil. This dependence makes them prone to
blackmail as the U.S. with its direct huge military presence, will have the ‘oil weapon’ at its exclusive disposal.60 Massarrat asserts that all these goals in terms of oil and hegemonic policy can
best be assured “the more oil States in the Greater Middle East the U.S. will directly, preferably
also militarily, control.” (IBID.: 46) That is why Iraq—possessing the world’s greatest oil resources other than Saudi-Arabia—and the Afghanistan pipeline project are taking a core position; the former for controlling the oil resources of the Persian Gulf region, the latter as to the
Caspian Sea region’s oil and gas reserves. It is no need to remind that just these two countries
are occupied by the U.S. Asserting prior to the Iraq invasion, Massarrat stressed that “military
occupation is the most important strategic goal of the U.S. Iraq policy.” (IBID.: 47) Therefore he
warned Europe that there is serious risk to be at the mercy of American absolute world domination for a long time to come (IBID.: 48-49). Indeed, such a geostrategic calculus does perfectly fit
to the Iranian case.
Against such a background, it becomes clear that a war on Iran would have damaging consequences for the Old Continent’s economic situation as an oil price rise till a level of at least €100
per barrel61 can be expected. Europe’s vital interest to have a considerable say in her neighboring region would be further undermined by U.S. military interventionism and securing of oil and
gas resources. This realistic scenario, sorely catching our eyes in what is happing in Iraq today,
should prevent Europe to support the neoconservative war agenda. Instead it should follow a
political path aimed at deescalation and resolution of the core conflicts in the region. Stabilization in the NME will tremendously profit Europe as immense economic opportunities lie in the
region. Thus the question of the benefactors of high oil prices being a consequence of political
instability in the ME region is not difficult to answer. While the U.S. due to its low oil dependency
vis-à-vis the ME would not be affected by high oil prices, Europe, India, and China would tremendously suffer from such a scenario. In contrast, Russia, as a high-cost oil producer, would
benefit from Middle Eastern instability that keeps oil prices high (COHEN 2006). In any case, the
United States, by militarily controlling the ME and its energy supply routes, possesses a highly
effective leverage vis-à-vis large oil consumer nations.
60
Such a scenario would, MASSARRAT (2003) reminds us, fully satisfy Brzezinski’s idea of geopolitics on the Eurasian chessboard.
61
In comparison, oil prices have risen from about $27 a barrel at the start of the Iraq War to a high of $78 during the war in Lebanon (WEISMAN, Steven R. *2006+, “As the Price of Oil Soars, So Does Its Power to Shape
Politics From Washington to Beijing,” The New York Times, July 25, cited in DOUGLAS et al. 2006: 14)
68
4.2.2. Feeling the Hegemon’s Squeeze: Asian Great Powers and Iran
In 2005, Iran, Russia, India, and China have signed energy deals with each other worth more
than $500 billion. As Robert Karniol, Asia-Pacific editor for Jane’s Defense Weekly, argues “China
and India, the world's fastest-growing energy consumers, want to divert Central Asia's energy resources toward their own economies, and Iran and Russia, the region’s largest energy suppliers, are
keen to reduce their dependence on sales to the West.” (cited in POCHA 2006), we have a strong
case of interdependence. Seen in this light, for the two emerging superpowers New Delhi and
Beijing, the crisis on Iran is of paramount importance as both depend on Iranian fossil energy.
For Beijing, economic relations with Tehran are of tremendous weight:
Iran is China’s third largest oil supplier according to Chinese figures.
Iranian and Saudi exports together now represent almost two-thirds of China’s Middle East
oil imports, meaning that relations with these two countries are of crucial importance. […]
Whereas in 1994, Iran accounted for just one percent of China's total imports, a decade later, Beijing purchased 13 percent of its oil from Tehran. (DOUGLAS et al. 2006: 5)
It is believed that for 2005 Sino-Iranian trade totaled $29 billion, mostly due to growing Chinese
demand for Iranian oil. Despite a great number of common economic and political goals with
Iran—e.g. the establishment of a multipolar world—, China is not expected to jeopardize SinoAmerican relations in the dispute about Iran’s nuclear program. While incessantly insisting on
the necessity of a peaceful settlement of the crisis, Beijing has however sidelined with other
UNSC members with regard to Iran. Due to its strong integration into the global market, it is not
conceivable for Beijing to risk deteriorating relations toward Washington. It can be assessed that
[f]or China, partnership with Iran is only one part of its energy diversification strategy. Chinese goodwill is by no means guaranteed, but very much desired. Under such an arrangement, Iran is best seen as only one strand among the complex web of energy relationships
China is currently pursuing. (IBID.: 10)
That is why the realization of the gigantic $100 billion-worth project on LNG (liquefied natural
gas) exports throughout a quarter century, agreed upon in a 2004 Sino-Iranian Memorandum of
Understanding, has again recently been postponed by Beijing. Moreover, China has instructed
Sinopec—also known as the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation—to hold off implementation of the agreement signed to develop Iran’s Yâdâvarân oil field due to fears that Iran may be
subject to a military strike (LANDWEHR 2006). But nevertheless an Irano-Chinese gas contract
worth $29 billion has been signed for exploitation, production, and refinery of Iran’s Pârs gas
field. The project should start by 2011 and last for 25 years. ( IRAN-REPORT 01/2007: 8)
Also Indo-Iranian relations have thus far suffered from the ongoing conflict. Two votes by
India at the IAEA against Iran supporting the latter’s dossier to be handed over to the UNSC
stand at the core of Tehran’s political infringement. The support for this fervent goal pursued by
the U.S. is widely interpreted as one condition of the U.S.-India nuclear deal to be signed (KOSHY
2005) As with Beijing, in this case, too, New Delhi seemed intent to avoid derogating relations
with Washington. Besides having a special close cultural tie, the trade volume between Iran and
69
India has reached about $6 billion by 2006. A planned huge oil pipeline deal between the two
countries is expected to double their trade volume. Despite outside political interference by the
United States, the project is in its final stage and can be finalized as soon as a pricing formula has
been worked out by both.
Furthermore, Japan, the world’s second largest oil importer and in 2005 importing 13.7 percent of its oil from Iran, has blocked loans worth of $10 billion, destined to nine oil projects in
Iran (IRAN-REPORT 12/2006: 9). Russia, rich in fossil energy itself, is mainly active in arms and
nuclear trade with Iran, which had to be very carefully pursued because of increasing pressure
from Washington. In various cases of contractual supplies, Moscow was forced to postpone the
projects. What is most stunning is that it has not yet completed the Bushehr reactor.
Counter to their inherent national interests, New Delhi, Beijing, Tokyo, and—to some extent—Moscow have conceded to U.S. pressure demanding the halt of economic exchange with
Tehran. Accordingly huge projects, dear to both Iran and its Asian partners, have been iced or
even abandoned.
70
 AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE
2.3.
Consequences of an Iran War
2.4.
America and the World
at the Crossroads
Sources: North Am. & Europe ed., Feb. 10, ‘07 | Poster distributed by U.S. Neocons after Afghanistan War
4.2.3. Consequences of an Iran War
US ACTION WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY GUARANTEE AN OVERTLY
NUCLEAR-ARMED IRAN FOR DECADES TO COME.
(ROGERS 2006: 10)
In 2002 Paul ROGERS62 from the Oxford Research Group had foreseen the devastating consequences of an eventual Iraq War. Four years later, Rogers examines in his briefing paper the
possible outcomes of U.S. and Israeli military attacks on Iranian facilities and scenarios of Iranian reactions. The author justifies the significant purpose of his study by pointing to the high
probability of military strikes against Iran: “A diplomatic solution to the profound differences between Washing-ton and Tehran is still possible, but is becoming progressively less likely. As major
difficulties persist and possibly intensify, the possibility of military action by the United States and
Israel increases.” (2006: 3) Besides the immense asymmetries between the two sides involved in
terms of military capabilities, Rogers nevertheless expects an armed conflict to escalate and endure indefinitely, and further to embrace many regional actors. He expects a surprise action with
over four to five days of “intense military activity” (p. 8). Based on “considerable information“ (p.
8) gained by previous U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance activities, the priority targets will be
research, development, and production facilities for Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile program. Rogers not only identifies Iranian nuclear and scientific infrastructure as targets of any
U.S. military action, but also the destruction of university laboratories and technology centers
along with their personnel would be aimed (pp. 7, 8). The killing of as many of the technically
competent staff—also foreign nationals—as possible will be central for U.S. strikes so to do the
62
Paul Rogers is Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University and is openDemocracy’s International Security Editor.
71
greatest damage to longterm rehabilitation.63 U.S.
military action would definitely target Iran’s major
nuclear
facilities,
above
them many in urban areas,
leading to “serious problems of radioactive dispersal affecting not just the
Iranian Gulf coast” (p. 7),
but also West Gulf seaboards.
Rogers
takes
li military action into sincere consideration, which
will be “far more substantial than the Israeli attack
on the Iraqi Osiraq nuclear
reactor in 1981” (p. 11),
prompting
Iranian
re-
sponse as Tel Aviv is
Washington’s closest ally
in the region. When it
comes to the nature of Iranian responses to Ameri-
© Eric Waddell, Global Research 2003
can or Israeli military ac-
tions, the author first makes the following remark: “Given the small size and largely obsolete nature of the Iranian Air Force and air defence systems, Iran would be able to offer little direct opposition to the kind of US attack outline above. Moreover, US action would have been designed to destroy what limited capabilities might be available.” (p. 9).
Other than Tehran’s very limited options of immediate effect, Rogers enumerates following
fields of Iranian responses: redeveloping of the nuclear program as rapid as possible “in a more
survivable manner” while withdrawing from the NPT, thus “undermining global non-proliferation
efforts” as “any hope of negotiating away Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme in the
63
On Jan. 15, 2007, a prize-winning Iranian nuclear scientist, Ardeshir Hassanpour, 44, has been murdered by
the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad, according to Stratfor, a website featuring intelligence and security analysis by former U.S. intelligence agents. Several other scientists may also have been assassinated or injured.
(MELMAN, Yossi (2007), “U.S. website: Mossad killed Iranian nuclear physicist,” Haaretz, Feb. 4, URL; and BAXTOR, Sarah (2007), “Iranian nuclear scientist ‘assassinated by Mossad’,” The Sunday Times, Feb. 4, URL.
72
years after a US attack would vanish”; mobilizing Hezbollah to attack cities in Northern Israel,
which would result in “substantial Israeli military responses“ given their outstanding military supremacy in the region; disturbing the passage of oil-exporting tankers in the Straits of Hormuz
(even though Rogers classifies this as quite problematic due the superiority of the U.S. military in
the waters); sabotaging oil export facilities in Western Gulf states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates, by paramilitary units; deploying the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards (IRG), as “a strong if largely free-standing component of the Iranian defence system,” for
linking with Shi’a militias in strengthening the Iraqi insurgency, resulting in an “escalating US
military response involving cross-border attacks on Iranian logistics […] increas[ing] Iranian civilian casualties, caus[ing] economic disruption and also further increas[ing] internal Iranian support for the current regime” (all p. 10); and international support, mainly from two of the five
permanent members of the UNSC—China and Russia—due to economic interests as well as
strong considerations as to prevent any protracted conflict.
It is important to note that the consequences of military action against Iran will bring about
two outcomes undermining previously formulated goals by the West: First of all, instead of delegitimizing the current Iranian regime, any bombardment would have a “very powerful unifying
effect within Iran” (p. 7), thus undermining ongoing democratization efforts from within.64 Secondly, the aim of preventing Iran to become a nuclear power would be countered, as in the aftermath of an attack Iran would withdraw from the NPT and concentrate on developing nuclear
weapons the soonest possible: “US action would almost certainly guarantee an overtly nucleararmed Iran for decades to come.” (p. 10) Thus, the case for a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ would be
made (SEELA & BOEKE 2005).
While the asymmetries of military power of the United States (and Israel) on the one side
and on the other Iran erupt to the surface causing a serious damage of the latter’s nuclear and
especially technological development potential, “a protracted and highly unstable conflict [would]
virtually [be] certain” (ROGERS 2005: 12), probably involving a great number of regional actors.
As to the future of Iranian-U.S. relations, this will be “one based on violence” (p. 7), rendering any
pacification efforts in the region more than obsolete. Meanwhile it is clear that military action in
scope and extent as outlined earlier will bring about a considerable number of Iranian civilian
casualties, not to speak of long-term disasters followed by nuclear warheads going to be used by
U.S. forces: “There will be no opportunity for people to move away from likely target areas as was
possible in the days and weeks leading up to the invasion of Iraq.” (p. 9) In the final part of his conclusion, Rogers writes:
The termination of the Saddam Hussein regime was expected to bring about a free-market
client state in Iraq. Instead it has produced a deeply unstable and costly conflict with no end
in sight. That may not prevent a US or an Israeli attack on Iran even though it should be ex64
The Iranian human rights activist and 2003 Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi emphasizes the destructive force of any military strike against Iran for any inner democratization process underway.
73
pected that the consequences would be substantially greater. What this analysis does conclude is that a military response to the current crisis in relations with Iran is a particularly
dangerous option and should not be considered further – alternative approaches must be
sought, however difficult these may be. (p. 12)
4.2.4. Who Would Benefit from an Iran War and Who Not? A Strategic Calculation
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING AN IRAN WAR
Standing vis-àStanding vis-àvis Iran
vis U.S.
OF POTENTIAL WAR PROMOTERS
ISRAELI Greatest obstacle Dependent on
HARD-LINERS to regional domi- strategic and
nation.
military support.
Vigilance
Dependent on
ISRAELI
political support
MODERATES
U.S. Main threat to
NEO- U.S. and Israeli
CONSER- hegemony
VATIVES*
U.S.
REALISTS
Re-emergent
regional great
power to consider
in strategic calculus
Inherent Strategic Interests
on the Global Chessboard
Avoiding an Iran as regional great
power rival =
Keeping regional military supremacy
Not further damaging Israel’s position
 Controlling Iran as indispensable
piece of the ‘Greater ME’
 Energy leverage toward rivals
 Distracting attention from Iraq
quagmire
 Keeping Israeli regional domination
‘Not another Iraq’: an attack would
undermine U.S. long-term hegemony = manageable challenge even w/t
nuclear-armed Iran
Iran
War?




OF OTHER GLOBAL PLAYERS: OPPOSING OR TOLERATING?
 Avoiding total U.S. control over ME
EU High trade poten-  Close strategic
tial
RUSSIA
CHINA
JAPAN
INDIA
 High trade potential
 Strategic partner vs. U.S. domination
Dependent on
Iran and ME oil
ally
 Strong economic intersection
Passive rival
Passive rival
= avoiding any
immediate
confrontation
Dependent on
Iran and ME oil
Close ally
Dependent on
Iranian energy
Ally
 Avoiding widening of ME quagmire
 energy insecurity / high oil price
 Avoiding total U.S. control over ME
 U.S. anchored at its Eastern and
Southern flank!
 But: Benefactor of high oil prices
 Avoiding total U.S. control over ME
 Avoiding widening of ME quagmire
 energy insecurity / high oil price
 U.S. anchored at its Western
flank!
 Avoiding total U.S. control over ME
 Avoiding widening of ME quagmire
 energy insecurity / high oil price
Avoiding widening of ME quagmire =
stable ME crucial for Indian supremacy in South Asia



?

*The larger circle of the ‘neocons’ includes key figures in the current Bush Administration (above all Cheney
and former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld), chief ideologues, prominent publications (The Weekly Standard,
Commentary, The National Interest, The National Review), leading think-tanks and their experts (American
Enterprise Institute [AEI], Project for the New American Century [PNAC]), pro-Israel lobbies (American Israel
Public Affairs Committee [AIPAC] and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs [JINSA]), the religious farright (Evangelicals and Christian Zionists), and a large web of affiliated TV (Fox News) and radio stations.
74
4.2.5. The War Bells Ring: America and the World at the Crossroads
A SHOCKING CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE
UNSCRUPULOUS INITIATIVE OF FEW INDIVIDUALS,
WITH THE BLESSING OF MORE,
AND AMID THE PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE OF ALL.
(TACITUS, C. 56 – C. 117, ROMAN HISTORIAN)
a) Atmospheric Preparations
As the United States diplomacy is expressly keeping the military option on the table, public
Western opinion has already been prepared for a military strike against Iran. Far-fetched comparisons between Iran’s arch-conservative President Mahmud Ahmadinejâd and Hitlerism by
leading U.S. neo-conservatives, but also by German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the 2006 Munich Security Conference, have painted the phantom of a world threatened in its very existence
by nuclear bombs in the merciless hands of Islamic Fascism { l’Iranienne. The imminent threat
by a nuclear-armed Iran—although this, as we have seen, is far from taking shape—ought to be
preempted by war. Indeed, given Israeli nuclear weapon capabilities and its ongoing aggressive
rhetoric vis-à-vis Iran as well as massive U.S. military presence in Iran’s neighborhood, bitingly
the above painted threat scenario can only reproduce reality when fully reversed.
Apparently in contrast to the Iraq War, this time the United States tries to rally all its European partners round its objective to target Iran. Accordingly, we can witness harsh rhetoric
throughout Western media coverage about the Iran crisis, ranging from the above-mentioned
Hitler comparison via the threat of an Islamo-fascist and anti-Semite Iran for Israel till the conscious misinterpretations and political instrumentalization of statements made by the Iranian
President as to the Judeocide’s scale.65
b) A New U.S. Strategy in Middle East? Pullback or Assault? (winter 2006 – early 2007)
As the controversy of the Administration’s Iraq policy and its stance vis-à-vis Iran reached a
peak, the so-called ‘Iraq Study Group’ (ISG), also known as the Baker-Hamilton Commission,
should show the way out of the Iraqi quagmire. Its report (BAKER & HAMILTON 2006), released on
Dec. 6, 2006, made a great number of recommendations believed to reorient Bush’s Middle East
policy. As to Iraq, the report advises not to withdraw because of the country’s importance, but
also states the inadequacy of sending more troops into the country (p. 30). The document also
calls upon Washington to hold direct talks with Syria and Iran. It further focuses on the Iraqi oil
65
For details, see GRUPPE ARBEITERFOTOGRAFIE (2006), “Äußerungen von Ahmadinedschad zum Holocaust
verfälscht: Wie Medien den Iran-Krieg vorbereiten,” NRhZ-Online (Neue Rheinische Zeitung), April 12, URL;
STEELE, Jonathan (2006), “If Iran is ready to talk, the US must do so unconditionally,” The Guardian, June 2,
URL; BRONNER, Ethan (2006), “Just How Far Did They Go These Words Against Israel?”, The New York Times,
June 11. It is important to note that during more than a quarter century since the establishment of the Islamic
Republic in Iran, those statements were constantly made by senior officials—especially in its early years. Only
this time, there is strong international reaction coupled with extensive political exploitation.
75
industry (Title II. B. 5: “The Oil Sector,” pp. 56-57), above others proposing in the long run its
privatization and opening-up for major U.S. petroleum multinationals:
The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s oil sector by the international
community and by international energy companies.” and “[t]he United States should assist
Iraqi leaders to reorganize the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to
enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.” (Recommendation 63, p. 57).
Reactions to the ISG report varied drastically. It is alleged that the group 66 represents the interests of the U.S. oil industry, noting that James A. Baker, III's law firm has interests in debt repayment to Kuwait and other Gulf States, Lawrence S. Eagleburger has ties to Halliburton and
Phillips Petroleum, and is a former head of Kissinger Associates, a corporate consulting firm67,
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. is a lawyer at Akin Gump who is closely associated with the Bilderberg
Group68. The expert working groups for the ISG include leaders of Bechtel, two representatives of
Citigroup, and PFC Energy69 (HAYDEN 2006). The report was on the other hand heavily attacked
by conservative and neoconservative media (cf. ZAKARIA 2006), interpreting the recommendations as leading towards surrender.70
A rival ‘hawkish’ report was published in its final version on Jan. 11, 2007, entitled Choosing
Victory, (KAGAN 2007) by the highly influential neoconservative U.S. think-tank the American
Enterprise Institute (AEI), pleading for ways to make America’s policy goals in Iraq succeed,
which have to be implemented in a short run. It recommends that more combat forces should be
sent into Iraq (p. 1)—for at least another 18 months—, that the “[t]he president must request a
dramatic increase in reconstruction aid for Iraq” and further calls for a large mobilization campaign:
The president must request a substantial increase in ground forces end-strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the
66
The ISG was a ten-person bipartisan panel appointed on March 15, 2006, by the United States Congress,
charged with assessing the situation in Iraq and the US-led Iraq War and making policy recommendations. It
was led by co-chairs James Baker, III, a former Secretary of State (Republican), and Lee Hamilton, a former U.S.
Representative (Democrat). In addition to Baker, the panel’s Republican members were Sandra Day O'Connor
(former Supreme Court Justice), Lawrence Eagleburger (Baker’s successor as Secretary of State under Bush sr.),
Edwin Meese III (former U.S. Attorney General), and Alan K. Simpson (former U.S. Senator from Wyoming). In
addition to Hamilton, the panel’s Democratic members were: Vernon Jordan, Jr. (business executive), Leon E.
Panetta (former White House Chief of Staff, from 1994-97, under Clinton), William J. Perry (former U.S. Secretary of Defense, from 1994-97, under Clinton), and Charles S. Robb (former Governor and U.S. Senator from
Virginia). In order to collect opinions, numerous ISG meetings were held with Iraqi officials, current U.S. Administration officials, members of Congress, foreign officials, as well as foreign experts. Among the latter group are
opinion leaders, such as Thomas Friedman (New York Times), Frederick Kagan (The American Enterprise Institute) and William Kristol (The Weekly Standard).
67
Paul Bremer was managing partner of Kissinger Associates.
68
For reports on the so-called Bilderberg Group, see FOSAR, Grazyna & BLUDORF, Franz (n.d.), “Die Bilderberge. Hinter den Kulissen der Macht,” http://www.fosar-bludorf.com/bilderberger/, MEDOSCH, Armin (2000),
„Keine Angst vor den globalen Eliten. Die Bilderberg-Konferenzen: Geheime Weltregierung oder seniler Debattierklub?, Telepolis, Nov. 14 [URL], as well as http://www.bilderberg.org.
69
PFC Energy is an energy consulting firm.
70
The cover of the Dec. 7, 2006, Rupert Murdoch-owned New York Post depicts the heads of James Baker and
Lee Hamilton superimposed onto the bodies of monkeys, with the headline “Surrender Monkeys: Iraq panel
urges U.S. to give up.”
76
way. The president must issue a personal call for young Americans to volunteer to fight in
the decisive conflict of this generation.” (p. 2)
As to Iran, the report contradicts the ISG’s recommendations to engage Iraq’s neighbors noting that these “are encouraging the violence, but they cannot stop it.” (p. 2) It further states that
“direct support through Iranian advisors” for different U.S. ‘enemy’ groups is likely to dramatically increase when those groups will be attacked by U.S. and allied forces (p. 29). Further Tehran
is accused of providing “Shiite groups of all varieties with weapons, expertise, advice, and money,”
but at the same time the authors admit: “It will always be difficult for Iraqi Shiites to obey explicit
instructions from Iranians for cultural reasons. But, above all, the escalating violence in Iraq results
less from Iranian encouragement than from the internal dynamics of Iraq itself.“ (all p. 41) The
report concludes by emphasizing:
[…] failure is neither inevitable nor tolerable, and so the United States must redouble its efforts to succeed. America must adopt a new strategy based more firmly on successful counterinsurgency practices, and the nation must provide its commanders with the troops they
need to execute that strategy in the face of a thinking enemy. The enemy has been at war
with us for nearly four years. The United States has emphasized restraint and caution. It is
time for America to go to war and win. And America can.” (p. 45)
It seems that U.S. President Bush has finally been ignored the policy recommendations put
forward by the Baker-Hamilton Commission and has instead adopted those AEI policies offered
by people close to his administration calling for more troops in Iraq. His ‘new Iraq strategy’ announced in his 2007 State of the Union address seems clearly to prove this by announcing some
21,50071 additional troops for a house-by-house ‘cleaning operation’ in Baghdadi suburbs. It is
plausible to suggest that Shi’a groups inside those areas in Iraq, which might be affiliated to Iran,
should be contained. All this seems to escalate the war in place, as the AEI report reckons even
with an increase of victims for the near future. 72 The emphasis of a political solution going along
with a training program for Iraqi security forces as proposed by the ISG has thus surrendered to
the combating-focused orientation of the AEI recommendations. It seems that the American military-industrial complex (MIC) in the short run and large U.S. oil companies in the long run are
the great profiteers of this allegedly ‘new strategy.’ This seems to strictly follow the so-called
Powell Doctrine73 which envisions the necessity of an overwhelming force to ensure a decisive
military victory. In this case classical counterinsurgency tactics are intended to be employed
(BENJAMIN 2006).
For the fiscal year 2008, Bush asked Congress to approve an additional amount of $141.7 billion for America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Meanwhile protest is being felt throughout the
71
Some experts even assume some 50,000 more troops to be sent to Iraq.
Both Senators John McCain (R-Arizona) and Joe Lieberman (D-Connecticut) attended the report’s presentation at the AEI headquarters in Washington, D.C., in support of the plan. McCain warned the crowd to expect
more casualties, saying that things in Iraq “will get worse before they get better” (BENJAMIN, 2006).
73
Also known as ‘Powell Doctrine of Overwhelming Force,’ outlined in his time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in POWELL, Colin L. (1992), “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, Vol. 71,
No. 5.
72
77
American political spectrum for Bush’s narrow-minded and dangerous Iraq policy (cf. also AFP
2007), warning against a possible widening of the war into Iran. All these efforts of acceleration
can be understood as intended to slow down Washington’s gradual decline since the 1970s (DE
WILDE 2002).
c) Apostles and Alliances of War: The War Lobby and its Power Structures
Against the background of what we have been already saying, several reasons why Washington
is interested in an attack on Iran can be enumerated: From a geostrategic point of view—i.e.
according to U.S. vital interests in the 21st century as outlined in both NSS documents and the
Cheney Report—it is indispensable to have direct control over Iran’s large gas and oil reserves.
This in fact did also apply to the case of Iraq. Due to its outstanding position between the Caspian Sea (the world’s number one source of gas) and the Persian Gulf (the global center for oil),
Iran is the main piece of the ‘Greater Middle East.’ An Iran ‘out of control’ would jeopardize the
viability of the ‘Free World.’ It seems that the United States’ conquest for the Middle East, with
Iran being at its very core, is the sole remaining superpower’s drive to ensure its preponderant
position in the international system as the region increasingly is put under U.S. military custody.
Therefore great power rivals, such as Russia and China, keep a sensitive eye on the United
States’ approach vis-à-vis the Iran crisis as they undoubtedly recognize the pivotal geopolitical
as well as geoeconomic dimensions at hand. In addition, as war can be regarded as a means to
increase one’s power or at least to preserve it, influential groups are playing a tremendous role
in this respect. But who are those and how can we identify them?
Power Structure Research (PSR)74 offers a very useful approach to identify those individuals,
groups, States, or other networks, which are decisive for considering the international use of
force. Through the tools of network-analyses, insider interviews, research of archives and other
documents, as well as case studies of political decision processes (cf. KRYSMANSKI 2006: 42-43), a
comprehensive picture of powerful networks can be put together. Thus the question of actors is
contextualized into a broader realm of transnational power structures. KRYSMANSKI considers
PSR as the best means to describe today’s ruling classes, or power élites (2004). All this enables
us, briefly put, to identify those who do not want to be identified, at least not in a larger context
of power networks affiliated to them. For this ‘power mapping’ could finally lead to the dismantling of those networks in the sense of their transparency and democratization. DOMHOFF proposes four networks of power to be explored: ideological, economic, military, and political as
74
Main representatives of PSR are G. William Domhoff (Research Professor in psychology and sociology at the
University of California, Santa Cruz) and Val Burris (Professor at the University of Oregon’s Department of Sociology). The Power Elite (1956, New York: Oxford University Press) by the American sociologist C. Wright Mills is
widely seen as PSR’s foundational work. The website TheyRule offers the opportunity to create graphical linkages between board members of major U.S. corporations—so-called interlocking directories—for 2004. The
Université de Tangente is another project dedicated to the exploration of power structures, publishing comprehensive network tableaus, or cartographies, of the interconnections of powerful bodies at both national and
international levels; see its carte du governement mondial for 2004 (submitted in Feb. 2005).
78
this ‘IEMP model’—as he calls it—would be “the most useful organizational bases for generating
power.” (2004b) He moreover classifies “five substantive areas” of interest being (1) the social
upper class, (2) corporations, (3) non-profit organizations such as foundations, think tanks, and
policy-discussion groups, (4) political parties and elections, and (5) the ‘state’ or government
(2004a). As to the post-9/11 wars, it can be ascertained that all those areas are very important.
However, I will limit my brief discussion to the last three ones.
The apostles of the afore-mentioned ‘forward strategy’ to shape the U.S. government’s foreign policy and military decision are political lobbies closely associated with the military’s industrial establishments. The U.S. media landscape is furthermore dominated by neoconservative
think-tanks, not seldom advocating a military response to global crises. Thus, the case for war is
offered a vast platform to take hold of public opinion. Regarding Iran, neoconservative élites in
the U.S. are ever since strong advocates for a confrontational course. Foremost the very influential U.S. think tank The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) considered the first step in America’s
‘long war against radical Islamists led by President Bush’ (KRISTOL 2006b)—i.e. the invasion of
Saddam’s Iraq—as a failure. They argued that Iran is the country which is the most essential to
American interests and ever since form a collecting basin for all kinds of anti-Iran groups. Besides ominous organizations such as the MEK as well as Iranian monarchs guised in democratic
robe, there are lobbies supporting Israel’s aggressive policies in the ME, which altogether form
the war-front against Iran. At the latter core of the pro-Israel lobby is the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC)75—known as the United States’ most effective political and fundraising lobby group, which ever since forcefully propagates a military assault on Iran.
As Iran’s immediate rival, there is much at stake for the region’s most powerful state, Israel.
From an Israeli perspective any reduction of its military supremacy in the region is unacceptable
and even seen—mostly by hardliners—as a threat to its very existence. Powerful pro-Israeli
lobby groups inside the U.S., allied with neoconservatives and the fundamentalist religious right
(e.g. Christian Zionists) have made tremendous efforts to put Iran at the forefront of Washington’s foreign policy agenda. Those engagements have indeed yielded fruit, as the Realist analysis
of MEARSHEIMER and WALT indicates:
One might argue that Israel and the [Israel—A. F.-N.] Lobby have not had much influence
on U.S. policy toward Iran, because the United States has its own reasons to keep Iran from
going nuclear. This is partly true, but Iran’s nuclear ambitions do not pose an existential
threat to the United States. If Washington could live with a nuclear Soviet Union, a nuclear
China, or even a nuclear North Korea, then it can live with a nuclear Iran. And that is why
they must keep constant pressure on U.S. politicians to confront Tehran.” (2003: 38)
75
AIPAC has attracted many political leaders to address their annual conferences. Among them are George W.
Bush (current U.S. President), Bill Clinton (former President), Dick Cheney (Vice President), John McCain, Evan
Bayh, Susan Collins, Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton (all Senators), John Edwards (former Senator), Nancy Pelosi
(Speaker of the House), Steny Hoyer (House Majority Leader), John Boehner (House Minority Leader), Harry
Reid (Senate Majority Leader), Roy Blunt (House Republican Whip), Dennis Hastert, Newt Gingrich (both former
Speakers of the House), Condoleezza Rice (U.S. Secretary of State), as well as all Israeli Prime Ministers.
79
Those groups’ state of mind could indeed well develop under an American administration
staffed with many sympathizers and blunt supporters. However, the merits for U.S. foreign policy, if following them, are hard to conceive:
The Lobby’s campaign for regime change in Iran and Syria could lead the United States to
attack those countries, with potentially disastrous effects. We do not need another Iraq. At
a minimum, the Lobby’s hostility towards these countries makes it especially difficult for
Washington to enlist them against al Qaeda and the Iraqi insurgency, where their help is
badly needed. (IBID.: 40)
Washington’s ignorance towards Iran’s 2003 extensive offer of dialog is to a highly significant
extent due to pro-Israel groups harshly rejecting a possible road for rapprochement. While a
strong Iran—even with nuclear capacity—would nullify Tel Aviv’s status as sole regional hegemon, it is conceivable for Washington to live with such a situation.
But there are also other powerful groups in the U.S. that support and actively advocate the
belligerent path of major think-tanks and political lobbies. The military-industrial complex
(MIC), which is a huge player in the country’s foreign policy establishment, can be clearly situated in preference of an armed confrontation. The MIC indeed comprises a gigantic network
serving the large Pentagon body.76 Think-tanks, such as the Rand Corporation and Hoover Institution are closely intertwined with the MIC, but also 350 universities are providing Pentagonsponsored research for military equipment (MASSARRAT 2007b)77. Moreover, the MIC unifies
ideological and plutocratic power élites in their push for war (cf. KRYSMANSKI 2004: 135-148). It
is such an alliance that conceives war—and the related rise of military budgets—as the most
lucrative business. According to Chalmers Johnson78, you can reckon with 25% profit rates in the
$750 billion defense budget of the U.S., so that waging more wars is a highly profitable business
(Why We Fight 2005) 79.
Major financial global players from the U.S. can also be grouped into such an alliance. For the
United States is interested in not farther endangering the supremacy of the U.S. dollar, as Iran
said to open up a stock market for oil which will be based upon Euro (RUPP 2006; EHLERS 2006).
76
The five largest arms companies are Boeing, Lockhead Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, and General
Dynamics. In addition to their 85,000 private sub-companies, almost three million people are working in the
American arms industry.
77
For a superb interdisciplinary investigation on historical, economic, and political dimensions, see HOSSEINZADEH, Ismael (2006), The Political Economy of U.S. Militarism, Basingstoke. See also LIEVEN, Anatol (2002),
“The Push for War,” London Review of Books, Vol. 24, No. 19.
78
Johnson is an author and professor emeritus of the University of California, San Diego. He believes the enforcement of American hegemony over the world constitutes a new form of global empire. Whereas traditional
empires maintained control over subject peoples via colonies, since World War Two the U.S. has developed a
vast system of hundreds of military bases around the world where it has strategic interests. The result of this
militarism is more terrorism against the US and its allies, the loss of core democratic values at home, and an
eventual disaster for the American economy. Cf. his Blowback trilogy Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of
American Empire (2000, rev. 2004), The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic
(2004) and Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (2007) as well as The American Empire Project.
79
This Eugene Jarecki-directed documentary film, starring Joseph Cirincione, Richard Perle, Chalmers Johnson,
and John McCain, won the 2005 Grand Jury Prize at the Sundance Film Festival.
80
While some identify an Iranian stock market for oil dealing with Euros as overthrowing the preponderance of the U.S. dollar, it is more likely that this would primarily lead to a diversification
of national money reserves, as Behrooz ABDOLVAND suggests (2006). He further indicates:
[i]n the medium and long term the immense American trade deficit, budget deficit, as well
as annual accrued interests for debts lead to the devaluation of the dollar. A reform of the
dollar-based world economic system, away from the dollar’s monopoly to a world currency
basket consisting of different currencies, thereby becomes overdue. Thus politically, the
world will ultimately develop from a unipolar world order into a multipolar system.80 (IBID.)
In short, should one follow the recommendations made by leading neoconservative thinktanks, media, experts, and other institutions during the past decades for U.S. policy in regard to
the Middle East, the region would see itself in a quagmire of chaos. Indeed and unfortunately this
is nowadays the case. Is the existence of such a chaotic and war-like situation in that region of
the world simple coincidence or aimed strategy? For such an immense military power such as
the U.S. it is simple exercise to engage in war. A look back into the modern history of the Near
and Middle East, roughed up by colonial and now imperial powers, proves that chaos and neverending crises were certainly an adequate means to reach the goals of these non-regional powers,
such as unnoticed economic exploitation—due to the lack of democratic control—and the justification of continued military presence, only to name a few (EL ALAOUI 2007; MASSARRAT 2007b).
Thus, particularly from an American perspective, all these are very good reasons for going to
war and are highly interconnected in their logic: the War on Terror, securing world peace, safeguarding Israel’s position as the region’s number one military power, and geostrategic leverage
vis-à-vis emergent and existing rivals.
d) War on the Horizon
Despite remaining reservations against a strike on Iran (MURPHY 2007), with its dossier handed
over to the UNSC, a SCR embodying measures according to Chapter VII allowing for the use of
military force enters the sphere of high probability (cf. MASSARRAT 2006a). Striking plans are on
the table since quite long time now (cf. AMWG 2004) and calls for regime change are constantly
put forward by U.S. neoconservatives and affiliated powerful groups close to the President (e.g.
LEDEEN 2004 & 2006 and KRISTOL 2006a/b). Not enough, Iran is blamed for the United States’
occupational quagmire in Iraq.
As the escalation already well put in train can be expected to keep rising with Iran being subject to UNSC demands and sanctions whatsoever as well as Washington’s warning to act unilaterally with a renaissance of a ‘coalition of the willing,’ there is not much ray of hope for avoiding
war. It can be sincerely reckoned with that the warmongers sitting in Washington and elsewhere
80
In the German original, it reads: „Mittel- bis langfristig führen das immense amerikanische Handelsdefizit, das
Etatdefizit und die jährlich anfallenden Zinsen der Schulden zur Abwertung des Dollars. Eine Reform des dollarbasierten Weltwirtschaftssystems, weg von der Monopolstellung des Dollars hin zu einem Weltwährungskorb
bestehend aus verschiedenen Währungen, wird dadurch fällig. Politisch wird sich die Welt damit endgültig von
einer unipolaren Weltordnung zu einem multipolaren System entwickeln.“
81
are not going to override the zenith of escalation. The preparations of war have already reached
the final stage. In his much acclaimed article in The New Yorker, the investigative journalist Seymour HERSH reveals plans by the U.S. government to use tactical nuclear weapons in a confrontation with Iran (2006a), being in line with its new nuclear weapons policy of the last years. In
May 2004 Bush issued an alarmingly National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) No. 35, authorizes nuclear weapons deployment for using them in regions characterized by tensions, such
as the Persian Gulf area. Thus, the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons, in form of B61-11
bombs, in the Persian Gulf region becomes ever more conceivable (LINDORFF 2006). From early
October 2006 until late February 2007, three U.S. naval strike groups—the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, the USS Iwo Jima Expeditionary Strike Group, and the USS John C. Stennis—were deployed to the Persian Gulf region,81 which even adds to the immense troop concentration already
in place: more than 200,000 U.S. troops82 are surrounding Iranian territory (DER SPIEGEL 2006).
This marks the first time since 2003 that there have been two aircraft carrier battle groups in
the region; at that time for the assault on Iraq. Moreover extra Patriot missiles have been sent
into Southern Iraq as well as more minesweepers.
On Sep. 18, 2006, former U.S. air force Colonel Sam Gardiner who has carried out war games
with Iran as target (cf. AMWG 2004) announces on CNN that the U.S. has been conducting military operations within Iran for at least 18 months. The strike plans have already been passed
over to the White House, where the political leadership is prone to implement them. (CNN 2006)
HERSH’s report documents that despite internal opponents a U.S. attack on Iran is likely as the
preparations for war have already been completed (2006b). Nearly half a year later, Gardiner
expresses certainty over Iran suffering an ‘air operation.’ (MACASKILL 2007) With U.S. troops
ordered to escalate war on the Western border of Iran and massive troop build-up, war can
break out within a matter of hours (ZUMACH 2007). Such an operation runs under the label Iran
Theater Near Term (TIRANNT) among military planners, preparing for a “’Shock and Awe’
Blitzkrieg” against Iran (CHOSSUDOVSKY 2007).
In early March 2007, U.S. House leader Nancy Pelosi opposed a $100 billion spending bill
that would have required Bush to seek Congressional approval for waging a war on Iran. AIPAC
is believed to have conducted very efficient lobbying for pushing the Democrats to back Bush’s
hard stance on Iran (MURPHY 2007). At its largest annual Policy Conference ever (March 11-13,
2007) with over 5,000 participants, the powerful political lobby expressed approval for the mili81
Both the USS Stennis and USS Eisenhower are Nimitz-class nuclear-powered Navy supercarriers. The first
leads a strike group consisting of nine warships, six destroyers, and two nuclear submarines. The latter comprises eight warships, three destroyers, and one nuclear submarine.
82
The United States has deployed troops in the following Near and Middle East countries: Turkey (1,700), Iraq
(150,000), Kuwait (25,000), Bahrain (3,000), Qatar (6,500), United Arab Emirates (1,300), Oman (300), Saudi
Arabia (300), Afghanistan (19,000), and Pakistan (400). Moreover, in many Central Asian countries, there are
also a significant number of American troops on the ground.
82
tary option to be employed against Iran (LEVEY 2007). Tensions are increasingly on the rise. On
March 23, Iran seized British soldiers on its territory on the bordering river to Iraq. In the wake
of the UNSC route vis-à-vis Tehran clearly failed, this incident indeed seems to be a carefully
planned British provocation act (LOYOLA 2007). As Iran denies the British nationals’ release—
possibly holding them as pledge regarding its captured citizens weeks ago by U.S. troops in Iraqi
Kurdistan—, Blair ominously announces a “different phase.” (USA TODAY 2007) Meanwhile London freezes bilateral relations with Tehran until their soldiers’ release. As a result of worries
about a possible outbreak of war, the oil price rises to about $65 per barrel. On March 29, the
UNSC presents a Press Statement—besides Resolutions and Presidential Statements one of its
tools to express itself—after more than four and a half hours of very controversial debates
among its members. The whole two-sentence statement reads:
Members of the Security Council expressed grave concern at the capture by the Revolutionary Guard, and the continuing detention by the Government of Iran, of 15 United Kingdom
naval personnel, and appealed to the Government of Iran to allow consular access, in terms
of the relevant international laws.
Members of the Security Council support calls, including by the Secretary-General in his 29
March meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister, for an early resolution of this problem,
including the release of the 15 United Kingdom personnel. (SC/8989)
The latter call for release is however quite surprising as the legal framework of Iran’s act is far
from being legally undisputed (cf. SILVERMAN 2007). From April on, London will replace Cape
Town as rotating UNSC president. The same day the League of Arab States held a summit in
Riyadh. Libya’s President Mu’ammar Qaddhafi did not attend explain that he would not support
a meeting paving the way for war on a specific country—an allusion to Iran. In a Declaration at a
meeting in Bremen (Germany) on March 30, the EU Foreign Ministers they unilaterally claim a
legal interpretation of the case, saying:
All evidence clearly indicates that at the time of the seizure, the British Naval personnel
were on a routine patrolling mission in Iraqi waters in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723. The seizure by Iranian Forces therefore constitutes a clear
breach of international law.
The document further expresses the warning that “[s]hould the UK citizens not be released in the
near future, the EU will decide on appropriate measures.” (both EU 2007) However the actual
legal setting two aspects seems to be clear: The dense militarization of the Persian Gulf by U.S.
and UK troops is highly provocative for Iran. On the other hand, by capturing the soldiers, Tehran demonstrates its multi-layered ability to response in the case of being attacked (cf. also
BITTNER 2007).
While Iranians celebrate their new year (Norooz) and the EU its 50th anniversary, the world
is at crossroads. At the same time, Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI, presenting his new book Second Chance
– Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower in which he designates Bush’s presi-
83
dency as having “strong gut instincts but no knowledge of global complexities and a temperament
prone to dogmatic formulations,” bluntly expressed of what is at stake for the American Empire:
We are facing a very serious crisis regarding the future. Our next twenty months are going
to be absolutely decisive. If we surmount the next twenty months without the war in Iraq
getting worse and expanding to a war with Iran, I think there is a good chance we’ll recoup.
[…] But if we do get into that larger conflict, then I’m afraid the era of American global
preeminence will prove to be historically very, very short. (2007)



CONCLUSIONS
1. Breaking the Discourse Domination
of Both Sides’
Hawkish Elites
2. EU to engage
firmly in nuclearfree ME
3. Regional StructureBuilding—instead
of New Order
Fantasies
Before making some remarks we will retain the results of the issues raised in the previous chapters. Initially, in Chapter 1, we have asserted the geoeconomic centrality of both Iran and the
Middle East in their respective larger geostrategic contexts, which catapulted Iran in the midst of
Great Power geopolitics with destructive outcomes in terms of national and political selfdetermination. In Chapter 2, we have seen that the focus on the Middle East region is deeply
rooted in the most relevant U.S. strategic policy directives and that putting Iran in crosshairs is a
consistent culmination of Washington’s hegemonic orientation. The latter put into action with
the hegemon holding on the Middle East and surrounding Iran, we have seen Tehran entering
the ‘Axis of Evil’ and the preeminence of the neocons’ fervent drive for regime change despite
Iran’s détente-oriented behavior and a remarkable effort to achieve a grand bargain with the
United States. In Chapter 3, we have seen that Iran’s nuclear program was illegitimately elevated
to a matter of concern for international peace and security with Europe’s diplomacy falling into
this Washington-orchestrated trap with inadequate means to settle this dispute through mutual84
ly benefiting deals. What followed is a foreseeable failure of the negotiation process and unprecedented spiral of escalation with Iran’s dossier now at the UNSC, where Washington is continuing to push its members to adopt its harsh stance vis-à-vis Iran. However, by tackling the real
politico-strategic issues at stake, diplomacy can finally succeed. As has been indicated in Chapter
4, the Iran crisis is a synonym for global fissures shaking the international system as a whole.
Although the West can still preserve its sole agency claim in matters affecting the international
community due to its power preponderance, objections by the rest of the world—indeed by a
clear majority of it—are incessantly on the rise. After all, the crisis erupts in a time where the
American Empire is at the edge of losing its global primacy. By exerting control over the world’s
centers for fossil energies, the United States will preserve its worldwide hegemony. But as a look
at the consequences of an Iran War indicates, the world is at crossroads with the outcome of the
inner-American struggle between Neoconservatives and Realists being decisive.
In addition to those conclusions, some general observations resulting from them have to be
stressed, which can lead to a gain of insight as to the present and the future of the world’s constitution. Against the background of deep-rooted, ‘vital’ interests of the United States in the Near
and Middle East, the sole remaining superpower’s democratization initiative for that crucial region bears no great deal of credibility. America’s global policy since the turn of the century is
essentially shaped by neoconservative plans fervently advocating the violent export of what they
proclaim as democracy to a region whose autocratic character is marked by the handwriting of
the colonial and imperial past and present. The hawkish élites in Washington proclaimed their
endless war on terror at radicals of Islamist couleur, making the case for a global clash of fundamentalisms (ALI 2003a). Also in the looming Iran catastrophe—most probably resulting in a
disastrous protracted war—the country’s new president is lifted to such a degree although similar harsh rhetoric has been ignored in favor of profits for such a long time now. Although it remains true that in the case of the ‘global war on terrorism,’ radical élites from every side dominate the escalating discourse, we have to acknowledge of what it means that still among these
two adversaries power is dispersed in a strongly uneven manner. But the powerful lacks much
of reliable morality in its fight for the Good—as America’s 14,000 prisoners in Abu Ghrayb and
Guantánamo as well as about 655,000 dead in Iraq since the country’s occupation (ROBERTS ET
AL.
2006) along with hundreds of daily casualties brutally remind us. That is why most of the
Near and Middle Eastern peoples cannot be fooled in believing the florid rhetoric of their new
rulers—from Bush and Blair to Karzai and Khalilzad—claiming to be democrats, but no more
than colonial clowns. Nor do people in Latin America, where strong opposition towards U.S. imperialism has forcefully erupted. Also the majority of European populations identified the warmongering hawkish rhetorical façades built up to wage a war in Iraq four years ago, while the
American people have slowly but surely realized the outrageous hypocrisy of their administration.
85
However the tale of Iran’s imminent nuclear threat—though refuted without exception
among Western intelligence services—has become conventional Western wisdom. The interests
at stake can hide behind the monumental image of ‘Islamo-fascist’ mullahs striving for a global
theocracy. As was the case in previous wars in Kosovo and Iraq, Hitler makes a sad reappearance. In Europe, non-alarmist and pragmatic steps as to Iran are quite non-existent. The political
class is washing its hands in the enemy’s dirty outbursts. And the embedded media of the Free
World reproduces what it has produced. Muted among the bombs’ droppings, those concerned
fall in-between. The ‘enemy’ is already stigmatized as a notorious liar before even checking the
facts. Thus, “[t]he credibility of Europe is being tested” (MASSARRAT 2005b: 37).
The peoples of the Middle East are practiced in unveiling the actual intentions at stake, so
are more and more people worldwide. Therefore Europe should be aware of long-term damages
caused by double-standards it has exercised with others for so many decades now. Indeed much
depends on Europe’s behavior in the current crisis with Iran. Will it keep binding itself in the
neocons’ Iran strategy, as it already did in a great part of the ‘talks’ leading to its foreseeable
impasse? Or, has the ‘no’ for the Iraq War to be taken as a mandate for distancing itself vis-à-vis
an American Middle East policy which terrifying daily outcries bury the West’s noble virtues?
The Europeans must resign from decades-old U.S. policy prescriptions for their crucial neighboring region. The credibility of an independent Near and Middle East course depends on a clear
separation to American endeavors, since any complicity jeopardizes the own credibility. Europe’s emancipation from this devil path is the only perceivable manner out of the dead-end.
Devoid of any hypocrisy, it should engage in giving support to democratic aspirations of the
particular civil societies in the region. Thus, an overall perspective for the whole region is crucial. But not in the way Washington’s Greater Middle East project heads to. The existential and
preliminary need for this highly important region of the world is security accompanied by equal
treatment of the States involved. A nuclear-free Near and Middle East region should be the primordial focus of such an agenda. That should foremost imply Israel and Iran as well as should be
extended to the two nuclear powers confronting each other in the Kashmir region. A nuclear
arms race could thus be prevented. In adapting a process resembling the European example, a
Conference on Near and Middle Eastern Security and Cooperation should be put in place with
Europe’s serious commitment (cf. PERTHES 2004a; MASSARRAT 2007a). Only in such an institutional framework the ethnic and cultural-religious misunderstandings as well as conflicts centered on border issues, water and oil sources can be placed on politico-legal bases. For this will
create best circumstances for democracy to flourish.
But in this moment, we are at a very critical stage. For Iran, the calm eye of storm is incrementally narrowing, with worrisome American thunders darkening the horizon. A lot points to
the fact that Europe did already fail in the current crisis as it actively provoked a military ‘resolution’ of the conflict with Iran. A clear negation of the ‘military option’ vis-à-vis Iran is of utmost
86
importance if a war with catastrophic outcomes should be avoided. The question whether Europe—remembering its own fate—will be able to prevent any U.S. military strike yet remains to
be answered as the countdown for outbreak has started.
The very constitution of global political system is under challenge—and with multilateralism
(cf. NEWMAN ET AL. 2006). The world at large is witnessing how the unipolar system risks stumbling. By targeting the world’s fossil cores, the American Empire gives up the principle of divide
et empera for the benefit of sink or swim. The world’s giants are dwarfing as aswoon observers
of the eagle’s hazardous flight. Or are they, with pleasure, observing the Empire’s ultimate
breakdown for the sake of their own reemergence? It is tragic irony that Iran, a proud bridge
over precious waters, bearing a high potential to nurse a world-system heavily shaken, is the evil
Empire’s last castle to capture. But will the colossus duly realize that it has as much to gain as to
loose? The rest, however, should content itself with the latter.
Half a year after the start of the Iraq War, the eminent Kofi ANNAN said:
You meet at a moment of great consequence for the international community. The events
of the past year have shaken the foundations of collective security, and undermined confidence in the possibility of collective responses to our common problems and challenges.
Deep divergences of opinion have come to the fore on the range and nature of the challenges we face, and are likely to face in the future. (2003)
Over three years later, he’d be glad to repeat this.



BUT HOPE FOR PEACE STILL REMAINS AS…
A cartoon published in the run-up for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
87
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▪▪▪
 OFFICAL DOCUMENTS
AL-HAYAT (2004), “G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper,” Feb. 13.
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION [ACA] (2003), Iran Proposal, Spring 2003. URL
The COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION [CEU] (2006), Council Conclusions on Iran, 2756th External Relations
Council meeting, Luxembourg (Oct. 16 – 17), Press Release, Oct. 18, 1 page. URL
DIRECTOR OF U.S. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE [DNI] (2007a), Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National
Intelligence for the Senate Armed Services Committee, by the Director of National Intelligence Michael J.
McConnell, Feb. 27, 23 pages. URL
______________________________________ (2007b), Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Annual
Threat Assessment, chaired by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), Feb. 27, 63 pages. URL
DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (2005), Joint Publication 3-12, Final Coordination (2), March 15.
EUROPEAN UNION [EU] (2007), “Declaration of the EU Foreign Ministers at the meeting in Bremen on 30th
March,” March 30. URL
GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE [GFO] (2006), Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the E3/EU, China, Russia and the
USA on Iran, London, 30.01.2006, Press Release, Jan. 31, 1 page. URL
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY [IEA] (2006), Key World Energy Statistics 2006, Paris, 82 pages. URL
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF PAKISTAN [MOFA] (2007), Press Statement Made by the Foreign Minister, on
behalf of the 7-Foreign Ministers of Muslim countries and Secretary General, OIC after their meeting in Islamabad on 25 February, 2007, PR. No.65/2007, Feb. 25. URL
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT [NAM 2006/Doc.1/Rev.3] (2006), Final Document, 14th Summit Conference of Heads
of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba, Sept. 16. URL
NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT [NAM 2006/Doc.12/Rev.1] (2006), Statement on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear
Issue, 14th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana,
Cuba, Sept. 16. URL
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NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP [NEPD] (2001), Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound
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UN SECRETARY-GENERAL [SG/SM/9052] (2003), “Secretary-General stresses importance of stocktaking in message to non-governmental organizations meeting in Geneva,” SG/SM/9052, NGO/522, New York: UN
Headquarters, Dec. 5. URL
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Steps Required by IAEA Board of Governors; Requests Report from IAEA Director General in 30 Days, March
29. URL
_____________________________ [SCR1696] (2006), Resolution 1696, adopted by the Security Council at its
5500th meeting on 31 July 2006, 3 pages. URL
_____________________________ [SCR1696] (2006), Resolution 1737, adopted by the Security Council at its
5612th meeting, on 23 December 2006, S/Res/1737/2006, 9 pages. URL
_____________________________ [SCR1747] (2007), Resolution 1747, adopted by the Security Council at its
5647th meeting on 24 March 2007, S/Res/1747 (2007), 9 pages. URL
_____________________________ [SC8989] (2007), Security Council Press Statement on Iran, SC/8989, March
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UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT [STATE] (2006), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice interviewed by Michele
Keleman of National Public Radio, Vienna (Austria), June 2. URL
The WHITE HOUSE [NSS] (2002), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington,
September, 35 pages. URL
______________________ (2006), The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington,
49 pages. URL
▪▪▪
 IAEA AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
DIRECTOR GENERAL’S PRESS STATEMENT [DGPS] (2006), On Iran, IAEA Headquarters Vienna, March 6. URL
IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS [GOV/2003/75] (2003), Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
ALI FATHOLLAH-NEJAD (B.A., B.Sc.), b. 1981, studies of Political Science, Sociology, Economics,
and Law at the University of Münster (Germany), Institut d’Études Politiques (Sciences Po) Lille
(France), and the University of Twente (the Netherlands). His main research fields cover international relations (theory), Iran and the Middle East, contemporary France and Germany, as well as political and cultural issues of migration and integration. He recently published the article Offensive
Realism, Concepts of Power, and China – Is There A New “Biggest and Baddest Dude on the Block”?
in: 360°, Vol. 1, No. 01/2006, pp. 38–48. He can be contacted at [email protected].
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