Hurricane Preparedness in Bermuda: Impacts to Critical

Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences
Hurricane Preparedness in Bermuda: Impacts
to Critical Infrastructure and Primary Industries
from Hurricane Joaquin
Hurricane Joaquin west of Bermuda on 5 October 2015 (Image credit:
NOAA/NASA GOES Project).
Dr. John Wardman and Dr. Mark Guishard
November 2015
The Risk Prediction Initiative (RPI), part of the Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences, promotes productive dialogue
between scientists and (re)insurers involved in catastrophe risk by refocusing scientific research towards answering
the industry’s questions. The BermudaRisk project of RPI investigates risks from catastrophes to Bermuda's society.
The Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences is an independent U.S. not-for-profit marine research and educational
organization with501(c)(3) status and a Bermuda Registered Charity (#116).
Executive Summary
The aim of this study is to provide an holistic view of hurricane preparedness in
Bermuda, and to identify lessons learned from Hurricane Joaquin, as well as insights
from Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo in 2014.
Hurricane Joaquin passed 55 nautical miles west of Bermuda at approximately 22:00
local time on 4 October 2015, as a Category 2 hurricane, after passing over its own cold
water ‘wake’ generated earlier in its lifecycle. This likely contributed to the storm’s
weakening prior to the closest point of approach (CPA) to Bermuda. As Joaquin passed
west of Bermuda, its wind field expanded, prolonging the tropical storm force winds for
more time after its CPA than before.
This report focusses on infrastructure impacts and summarises the findings from
interviews with personnel from Bermudian infrastructure and primary production sectors
affected by Hurricane Joaquin. The aim of these interviews, carried out in October and
November 2015 by a team from the Risk Prediction Initiative (at the Bermuda Institute of
Ocean Sciences), was to investigate both direct and indirect effects of the storm on
critical infrastructure and primary production, and the emergency management of
tropical cyclone events. In particular, attention was paid to less-studied areas of interest
including electricity supply, the healthcare system and the National Museum of
Bermuda. All infrastructure reports explored aspects of resilience and adaptation, in the
context of increased hurricane activity over the 2014-2015 period. Research methods
were largely qualitative and included structured interviews, observations and informal
conversations with locals.
Overall, infrastructure appeared to function well during Hurricane Joaquin, with only
minor problems reported. However, the intensity of the storm weakened significantly
before passing Bermuda at its closest point. Over the past 150 years of recorded
hurricane activity in Bermuda, other events have caused more serious impacts, most
recently hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo, which occurred on 7 and 12 October 2014,
respectively.
Approximately 43% of Bermuda Electric Light Company’s (BELCO’s) customer base
was without electricity following the passing of Joaquin. Outages were primarily caused
by vegetation falling onto conductors and causing either line breakage or line faults
(abnormal transfer of electric current). Latent effects of tropical cyclones on BELCO’s
system include pole fires in the days to week following a storm, possibly due to residual
pollution (salt) inducing leakage current, tracking and/or flashover (disruptive electrical
discharge) across insulators. Telecommunications infrastructure generally remained
intact during and after the storm, with only minor damages and disruptions incurred to
the networks.
Healthcare centres are well prepared for hurricanes and have a robust preparedness
plan which includes forming pre-positioned brigades for rapid response in affected
areas. Minor issues with fluctuations in main electricity supply led officials to switch to
1
emergency generator supply so as to protect sensitive apparatus from power and/or
switching surges.
The Bermuda Maritime Operations Centre (BMOC) plays a crucial role in disseminating
tropical cyclone-related information to the ocean-going public and has robust
preparedness procedures in place. Shipping and cargo services in Bermuda are
similarly well prepared for hurricanes. Both the BMOC and shipping industry
experienced little impacts from Joaquin.
Several buildings at the National Museum of Bermuda experienced roof damage from
Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo in 2014. Although the Museum follows a detailed, fivephase tropical cyclone preparedness plan and exhibited a high degree of readiness for
Hurricane Joaquin, roof damage caused by high winds during Hurricane Joaquin led to
water ingress on the second floor foyer and exacerbated existing interior damage to the
dry walls and electrics of the grand staircase, the south corridor and foyer on the
second floor.
In the transport sector, the passing of Hurricane Joaquin resulted in the closure of L.F.
Wade International Airport at 13:00 on Sunday 4 October 2015 for 23 hours. Roads
suffered no structural damage and were cleared of debris by the early hours of the
morning on 5 October. A one-way traffic system was implemented on the Causeway on
5 October 2015 while inspections took place following the passage of the storm.
The focus on adaptations and responses to long-term hurricane activity in Bermuda has
provided insights into the long-term effects of hurricanes and helped identify possible
mitigation and prevention measures. It is found that in general, increased maintenance
of infrastructure now occurs widely across sectors, and general awareness of hurricane
risk has increased since Fay and Gonzalo. The EMO’s response to hurricane impacts is
well coordinated with the Royal Bermuda Regiment, and Police and Fire Services and
responding Government Departments. Increased capacity, personnel and resources
available to the EMO will improve the ability for all involved to develop proactive
measures.
Whilst emergency management in Bermuda appears organised, more could be done to
improve post and pre-tropical cyclone communication between and within infrastructure
sectors and emphasise the importance of emergency drills and updating and revising
contingency plans following hurricanes. Overall, we found clear evidence for increased
organisation and improved management procedures for tropical cyclones since
Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo, the impacts and lessons from which have strengthened
societal resilience.
An assessment of the frequency of Bermuda hurricanes is necessary, in the context of
trends and variability of the climate, and changes in societal vulnerability. Further
studies on impacts to Bermuda’s critical infrastructure from hurricanes would be of
specific benefit, to provide decision-makers with strategic understanding of hurricane
hazard consequences.
2
Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 1
1.0
Introduction............................................................................................................ 5
1.1
Personnel ........................................................................................................... 5
1.2
Research Methods ............................................................................................. 5
1.3
Aims of the Study ............................................................................................... 6
2.0
Meteorological and Oceanographic Characteristics of Hurricane Joaquin ............ 7
2.1
Timings of Potentially Damaging Conditions ...................................................... 7
2.2
Conditions in Bermuda During Hurricane Joaquin ........................................... 10
2.3
Ocean Observations ........................................................................................ 10
3.0
Tropical Cyclone Preparedness and Emergency Management in Bermuda ....... 13
3.1
Advisories Issued by the Bermuda Weather Service ....................................... 13
3.1.1
3.2
Preparedness Measures Taken by the BWS and Impacts from Joaquin ... 14
Emergency Measures Organisation ................................................................. 15
3.2.1 Embodying the Royal Bermuda Regiment and Emergency Services .......... 15
3.2.2 Emergency Broadcast Facility ..................................................................... 16
3.3
4.0
EMO Actions Before, During and After Hurricane Joaquin............................... 16
Infrastructure and Industry Preparedness and Recorded Impacts from Hurricane
Joaquin ................................................................................................................ 17
4.1
Electricity Supply .............................................................................................. 17
4.1.1
BELCO Preparedness ............................................................................... 17
4.1.2
Impacts to BELCO’s Network from Joaquin............................................... 18
4.2
Bermuda Hospitals Board ................................................................................ 19
4.2.1
Hospital Preparedness .............................................................................. 19
3
4.2.2
4.3
Hospital Impacts and Admittances ............................................................ 20
Transportation .................................................................................................. 21
4.3.1
L.F. Wade International Airport .................................................................. 21
4.3.1.1
4.3.2
4.4
Roads ........................................................................................................ 22
Maritime Operations ......................................................................................... 23
4.4.1
Bermuda Maritime Operations Centre ....................................................... 23
4.4.1.1
4.4.2
BMOC Preparedness and Impacts from Joaquin ................................ 23
Shipping and Cargo Services .................................................................... 24
4.4.2.1
4.5
Aviation Operations: Preparedness and Impacts from Joaquin .......... 21
Shipping Industry Preparedness and Impacts from Joaquin ............... 24
National Museum of Bermuda .......................................................................... 25
4.5.1
Museum Preparedness.............................................................................. 26
4.5.2
Museum Impacts ....................................................................................... 27
5.0
Lessons Learned ................................................................................................. 28
6.0
Conclusions and Future Work ............................................................................. 29
6.1
Future Work ..................................................................................................... 30
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 32
References .................................................................................................................... 32
4
1.0
Introduction
Bermuda is at risk of physical and socio-economic impacts from tropical cyclone (tropical
depression, tropical storm or hurricane) hazards. The major hazards associated with tropical
cyclones are storm surge and storm tide, heavy rainfall and inland flooding, high winds, rip
currents and tornadoes. The mitigation of tropical cyclone induced impacts requires good
knowledge of the intensity of events that can occur, the range of hazards that can be generated
and the potential impacts that these may cause. Furthering our knowledge of tropical cyclones
making landfall or coming close to Bermuda, impacts, monitoring, mitigation and adaptation will
help Bermuda better prepare for and respond to future natural disasters.
This study summarises the findings from an investigation into the impacts to essential
infrastructure and primary production from Hurricane Joaquin, which passed within 55 nm of the
islands of Bermuda on 4 October 2015. This presented our research group with a good
opportunity to examine the effects of a Category 2 storm as it came within proximity of
Bermuda.
1.1
Personnel
The study was carried out by Dr. John Wardman and Dr. Mark Guishard of the Risk Prediction
Initiative (RPI), at the Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences (BIOS). The wider team that
supports this work also includes Charles King.
1.2
Research Methods
Analysis of meteorological and oceanographic data collected before, during and after the
passage of Hurricane Joaquin provided background context of the storm’s intensity, relative to
previous impacts, and some useful insights into hurricane behaviour in Bermuda’s region.
Research methods used to investigate infrastructure preparedness and impacts during this
study included field observations, meetings and semi-structured interviews.
Meetings and interviews were conducted at infrastructure offices and facilities, and interviewees
were comprised mainly of facility managers, directors and operating professionals for each
infrastructure system. The sectors that were investigated during fieldwork were: power,
healthcare, maritime operations, airport and emergency management at the national level.
Interviews were semi-structured in nature to allow for freer exploration and discussion around
the various topics that were touched upon in conversation. The interviews utilized prompt
questions which were used to steer the conversation, and touched upon the main topics of
interest for research including: the general impacts of Joaquin on the sector; actions taken in
response to hurricanes; post-event clean up and any associated problems; emergency
management plans and interrelated power, water and access impacts on the sectors.
In general, the interviewee was asked to speak freely following a prompt question. This allowed
the researcher to have some level of continued exploration of some of the aspects mentioned in
dialogue by the participant. But detailed explanations at the time were not deemed appropriate
in the interview, in order to maintain the interest of the interviewee and to reduce the interview
time.
Interviews were recorded and consent forms signed by the interviewee(s) at the time of
interview. A total of eight recorded interviews were conducted during this study, which varied in
length from 30 to 75 minutes.
5
1.3
Aims of the Study
The following were the specific areas of interest for our study:





Impacts on essential infrastructure (electrical supply networks, maritime operations,
transportation and communication networks);
Impacts on healthcare facilities and healthcare service provision;
Impacts on Bermuda’s cultural and heritage treasures at the National Museum of
Bermuda in Dockyard;
Assessment of emergency planning carried out by the Emergency Measures
Organisation (EMO) and the Bermuda Weather Service (BWS) during a hurricane crisis;
Social and physical adaptations made to living with hurricane hazards.
Due to limited field time and our research interests, it was not possible to cover all of these
areas in equal depth. The topics covered in greatest detail were: electricity generation and
supply, healthcare facilities, maritime operations, and emergency management. Inquiry into
Hurricane Joaquin, together with a comparison of impacts from previous storms, allowed a
greater longitudinal insight into the adaptations to, and the resilience of such infrastructure.
6
2.0 Meteorological and Oceanographic Characteristics of Hurricane
Joaquin
2.1
Timings of Potentially Damaging Conditions
The CPA of Hurricane Joaquin’s centre was approximately 22:00 on the evening of Sunday 4
October 2015, while it was a Category 2 storm with estimated maximum winds of 85 kn, based
on National Hurricane Center (NHC) real-time forecast advisories (Figure 1). At that time, the
eye was located at approximately 32.8°N, 65.7°W, about 55 nm/101 km/63 miles west
northwest of Bermuda.
a)
b)
Figure 1: a) Estimated positions of Hurricane Joaquin’s centre, as it passed Bermuda on the evening
of October 4, 2015, based on NHC advisories. Range rings are in nautical miles, and times are
Atlantic Daylight Time (local to Bermuda), b) Category 2 Hurricane Joaquin, with the eye approaching
its nearest passage to Bermuda. Time is 22:43 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), which is 19:43
ADT (Source: BWS).
7
The first observation of sustained tropical storm force winds (10-minute average of ≥34 kn) at
the LF Wade International Airport was 35 kn at 12:35 Atlantic Daylight Time, (ADT, i.e. local
time), with the wind speed dropping back below that threshold thereafter. Regular tropical storm
force winds were recorded at the airport for 17 hours, most of that time being after the CPA,
frequent gusts of 50 kn or more were experienced for 12 hours, again mostly following the
closest point of the storm’s approach. A timeline of significant meteorological observations at
the airport (refer to Table 1 and Figure 2 for further information on recorded wind data during
Hurricane Joaquin):





19:55 ADT 4 October 2015 - Onset of tropical storm force winds and ≥50 kn gusts;
21:55 ADT 4 October 2015 - CPA, lowest pressure recorded of 990.7 hPa (indicated by
vertical line in Figure 2);
22:05 ADT 4 October 2015 - Strongest wind speed and gust recorded: 49 gust to 63 kn;
07:55 ADT 5 October 2015 - Cessation of ≥50 kn gusts;
12:55 ADT 5 October 2015 - Cessation of sustained tropical storm force winds.
Figure 2: Dates and times (ADT) of transmitted observations at LF Wade International Airport of sea level
pressure (green line, in hPa – left axis), 10-minute averaged sustained winds (black solid circles, in kn –
right axis) and 3-second gusts (black open circles, in kn - right axis). Additionally plotted are wind speed
thresholds for tropical storm force winds (≥34 kn, blue dashed line) and 50 kn winds (orange dashed line),
and the estimated time of CPA at 21:55 ADT 4 October 2015 is indicated with the solid vertical line.
Measurements of minimum sea level pressure and maximum winds & gusts are all highlighted and
labelled in red. All data courtesy of the BWS.
8
This prolonged period of the strongest winds after the CPA is counter-intuitive to most, and
often serves to catch people unprepared. Bermuda has experienced this phenomenon before
with recent hurricanes (e.g. Florence in 2006, Igor in 2010 and Gonzalo in 2014)(Guishard,
2007; 2011; Curry and Guishard, 2015). The reason for this effect may be that as hurricanes
move as far north as Bermuda, where they begin to interact with mid-latitude weather systems
such as cold fronts, they tend to undergo a structural change known as extratropical transition.
The result of this is typically that the storm:



Weakens in maximum intensity initially;
Broadens the footprint of its tropical storm force winds;
Becomes less symmetric in the shield of rainfall and cloud cover.
The schematics in Figure 3 illustrate the different characteristics between an intense, symmetric
hurricane in the tropics (Figure 3a) compared with those commonly seen in a storm undergoing
extratropical transition (Figure 3b).
a)
b)
Figure 3: Schematics of a) a typical hurricane in the tropics with symmetric spiral rain bands
(Source: NOAA), b) a typical storm undergoing extratropical transition, with strongest winds (yellow)
in the rear right quadrant, south of asymmetric heavy rain bands (blue) - note the characteristic
band of rain to the north of the centre of circulation (from Fogarty, 2002).
The characteristic rain bands to the north can be seen in Joaquin’s radar signature (Figure 1b),
whilst the longest duration of tropical storm force winds was on the ‘back side’ of the storm
(Figure 2). This doesn’t necessarily mean it will happen for all hurricanes which pass near
Bermuda, but it is more likely to occur at our latitude than farther south. One notable symptom
of extratropical transition is that the shape of the wind field can change to reveal potentially
stronger winds in the southeast quadrant of the storm (Figure 3b).
9
2.2
Conditions in Bermuda During Hurricane Joaquin
A summary of the BWS wind data recorded during Hurricane Joaquin’s passing is outlined in
the table below:
Table 1: Summary of wind speed data* collected at different times during Hurricane Joaquin’s passing.
Elevations listed as Above Mean sea Level (AMSL)(all data provided by the BWS).
Maximum sustained winds at the
Airport (10 min average)
Airport (10 min average)
Maximum sustained winds
estimated at the Bermuda Radio
(1 min average)
Bermuda Radio (1 min average)
Bermuda Radio (1 min average)
Crescent (1 min average)
49 Gust 63 kn 40 ft AMSL
Verified 22:05 ADT 4 Oct.
42 Gust 56 kn 40 ft AMSL
Verified 00:55 ADT 5 Oct.
80 Gust 100 kn 290 ft AMSL
Estimated 21:57 ADT 4 Oct.
Gust 89 kn
69 kn (sustained)
51 Gust 64 kn 20 ft AMSL
Verified 21:58 ADT 4 Oct.
Verified 22:13 ADT 4 Oct.
Verified 22:27 ADT 4 Oct.
*As per aviation weather observing practice, the measurements taken by the BWS which meet specific threshold wind speeds are
transmitted to the aviation community and recorded as the official observation. In some cases, as with Hurricane Joaquin’s passage,
maxima can occur between official observations which do not meet the threshold criteria for issuing and new observation. These are
accounted for by recording a daily maximum wind in the day’s climatological summary. The observations indicating 42 gust 56 kn
were the highest recorded in aviation observations, whereas the maximum winds measured at the BWS (in the daily climatological
summary) were 49 gust 63 kn. Both sets of data are presented above.
Tropical storm force winds (34 kn or more, 10 min average) began at 11:29 ADT Sunday 4
October at the Airport, ceasing at 14:03 ADT Monday 5 October. The storm’s rainfall total
recorded at the airport by the BWS was 3.6 inches, over the period 3-5 October, inclusive. The
lowest recorded pressure was approximately 990 hPa / 29.24 Hg at all above locations.
There was some evidence of tornado activity on Doppler radar imagery, in rain bands to the
east/southeast of the Island. This was corroborated by the BWS 09:00 weather balloon launch
data for 4 October NOAA’s Storm Prediction Center provided the BWS advice on this data, and
a tornado statement was added to NHC advisory #28A at 15:00 ADT Sunday 4 October, as
follows: “Hazards Affecting Land: TORNADOES – Isolated tornadoes are possible on Bermuda
this afternoon and early evening.”
2.3
Ocean Observations
As hurricanes move over a warm ocean, they churn up (or ‘upwell’) colder deep water, through
a process known as Ekman pumping. Through this process, slow-moving storms develop what
is often referred to as a ‘cold wake’. This phenomenon was detected by autonomous
underwater glider observations following the passage of Hurricane Fay and on the approach of
Hurricane Gonzalo to Bermuda in 2014 (Curry and Guishard, 2015).
It is apparent that Hurricane Joaquin moved over its own previous path, when departing the
Bahamas as a Category 4 storm, as shown in Figure 4a. Thus, it moved directly over any cold
wake it had produced prior to approaching Bermuda. This reduction in near-surface
temperatures was also observed during glider operations in advance of Hurricane Joaquin
(Figure 4b), and is likely to be a factor that contributed to its weakening.
10
a)
b)
Figure 4: a) Track of Hurricane Joaquin from 28 September through 8 October 2015. Note that the storm
passed over its own track on its way from the Bahamas into the Atlantic during the 3-5 October (Source:
Unisys Weather). Inset – graph of Joaquin’s minimum central pressure (red) and maximum sustained
winds (blue). Note a weakening in the storm after 4 October through the CPA to Bermuda (green
line)(Source: NHC), b) Cross section of Sargasso Sea temperatures (°C) southeast of Bermuda before,
during and after the passage of Hurricane Joaquin, as measured by an autonomous underwater glider.
The CPA to Bermuda and the glider is indicted by the black arrow. Measurements indicate that nearsurface ocean temperatures (shown in white text) were cooled by the hurricane, compared to pre-storm
condition (Graphic courtesy of Ruth Curry, BIOS MAGIC Lab).
11
The tide in Bermuda is measured by NOAA at the Esso Pier tide gauge station (Figure 5). The
timing of Hurricane Joaquin’s passage past Bermuda was fortuitous, in that the worst storm
surge conditions came as the tide was falling (Figure 6), thereby sparing parts of Bermuda from
damage due to inundation, as we have seen during other hurricanes (notably Igor in 2010, and
Fabian in 2003)(Pasch et al., 2003; Williams and Guishard, 2004; Guishard, 2011).
Figure 5: Map of the East end of Bermuda, with the Oil Docks (‘Esso Pier’) circled in red. This is the
location of Bermuda’s only long-term tide gauge, operated by NOAA (Source: ESRI ArcGIS, 2015).
Height of water above datum (ft)
The water level predicted and measured at the tide gauge (Figure 6) indicates an anomalously
rising tide associated with the approach of Hurricane Joaquin, before measurements were
interrupted by a failure in equipment.
Figure 6: Measurements (red line), and predictions (blue line) of water levels, as departures from the
Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW) datum (left axis). The green line (right axis) represents differences
between the two, which is an indication of the order of magnitude of the storm surge (no wave action
recorded)(Source: NOAA).
12
3.0 Tropical Cyclone Preparedness and Emergency Management in
Bermuda
The following sections summarise the role of the BWS and the EMO in the readiness, response
and recovery phases of tropical cyclones, and outlines the chronology of events as carried out
by both entities for Hurricane Joaquin.
3.1
Advisories Issued by the Bermuda Weather Service
A local Tropical Update Bulletin (TUB) is issued by the BWS for each active tropical cyclone
designated by the NHC and reflects the latest NHC forecast for the system. BWS TUBs may be
found online here http://weather.bm/tropical.asp. The TUBs consist of a forecast track map of a
tropical cyclone, the ‘cone of uncertainty’ surrounding its predicted central position and wind
field, and further annotations for timing, and watch/warning conditions in Bermuda (Figure 7).
Figure 7: TUB associated with Advisory 29 for Hurricane
Joaquin, 4 October 2015 (Source: BWS).
Additional text is provided on the TUB document, which is updated at least every 6 hours. The
text updates the reader on the current position, speed, intensity, predicted CPA distance to
Bermuda (within 72 hours), and whether the system is a threat or potential threat (see
definitions below). If there is a watch or warning in effect for Bermuda, it will be featured in red
text on the map.
13
In conjunction with TUBs, there are specific criteria for the issuance by the BWS of a variety of
advisories, watches and warnings; all are contingent on the proximity or forecasted impacts of a
tropical cyclone on Bermuda, and are consistent with the NHC advisories. Simply put, NHC
forecasts the storm’s characteristics (position, intensity, and size), whereas the BWS uses that
information to develop a forecast of local conditions. These advisories, and their criteria for
issuance, are summarised as follows:






The threat parameter 'Potential Threat' is issued in TUBS when the centre of a Tropical
system is expected to pass within 400 nm of Bermuda within 72 hours;
The threat parameter 'Threat' is issued in TUBs when the centre of a Tropical system is
expected to pass within 100 nm of Bermuda within 72 hours (or otherwise when effects
from a tropical system are possible within 72 hours);
Hurricane Watch: 48 hours or less prior to possible onset of hurricane force (64 kn or
more) winds;
Hurricane Warning: Hurricane force winds within 36 hours;
(Sub)Tropical Storm Watch: 48 hours or less prior to possible onset of tropical (or
subtropical) storm force (34 kn or more) winds;
(Sub)Tropical Storm Warning: Tropical (or subtropical) storm force winds within 36
hours.
In addition to these advisories, designed for public consumption, the BWS advises the EMO, the
Department of Airport Operations and other stakeholders as appropriate on expected conditions
associated with an impending tropical cyclone, and their timing.
3.1.1 Preparedness Measures Taken by the BWS and Impacts from Joaquin
The operational observing and forecasting staff at the BWS are organized into 12-hour shifts to
maintain a 24/7/365 operation. These are doubled up in the event that a hurricane is forecast to
make an impact on the island, and the potential for disruption of transport to/from the BWS
office. Unlike most organisations in Bermuda, BWS operations are necessary to remain as
resilient and continuous as possible throughout tropical cyclone events. As such, the BWS is
located in a hardened infrastructure (reinforced concrete building), with a full kitchen, hurricanerated storm shutters, showering facilities and a backup generator, which also serves the Air
Traffic Control complex and Ground Electronics Services support (all three are currently
managed by BAS-Serco Ltd., contracted to provide air operations support services to the
Department of Airport Operations). Observations and forecasting operations carry on as normal
so long as it is safe to maintain them.
With this in mind, the ‘off-shift’ personnel have a place to sleep and relax, but can also augment
activities such as answering phone calls during very busy times during the onset of the worst
conditions. When necessary, dependents and even pets have been accommodated at the office
for people who would otherwise not be able to come to work, e.g. because of Causeway
closures or damage. Following a damaging storm passage, BWS staff are all contacted to
ensure their safety, security and ability to relieve the doubled-up shifts who worked during the
storm.
Communications are robust at the BWS, with multiple redundancies and methods for getting
information out, including hard-wired landline telephone, mobile phone, web-based
communications, VHF radio, satellite phone and telecommunications network.
During Hurricane Joaquin’s passing in October 2015, the BWS experienced no adverse
impacts.
14
3.2
Emergency Measures Organisation
The EMO consists of representatives from each of the Bermuda Government departments, and
is chaired by the Minister of National Security, with a view towards disseminating crucial
information to the public in the lead up to, during and after natural disasters. Despite its
important role in emergency management, the EMO is not a legislated body.
When a hurricane forms in the Atlantic, the EMO maintains contact with the BWS, which
monitors the forecasted trajectory of the storm. The EMO typically calls a meeting once the
BWS issues notice of a hurricane threatening the island. During the meeting, the EMO and its
attending agencies decide when to initiate a reduction of government services and activate
emergency preparedness procedures. It is important to note that each agency is responsible for
developing and activating its own emergency plans. Given the interdependence of each
department on others’ actions, public transportation and schools will often unofficially set the
timeline by determining the last safest time to operate. A series of cascading decisions results
from these timeframes. For example, the release of children from school requires parents to be
available, and both groups must be able to travel home on public transportation. Any
departments that need to reduce services must account for these factors before doing so, and
allow sufficient time for their employees to safely transit home, or to their duty stations. Actions
for recovery after the event are also discussed.
Bermuda has strict building codes and robust houses. Consequently, it is generally perceived by
Bermudians that effects will not be felt as strongly as in other jurisdictions that are also exposed
to hurricane risk, such as Florida. As a result, hurricane preparations are typically carried out
<24 hours before expected impact.
3.2.1 Embodying the Royal Bermuda Regiment and Emergency Services
A crucial role of the EMO is to arrange the positioning of resources throughout the island prior to
an impending hurricane, to address localised emergencies during and immediately after the
storm. The EMO will also advise His Excellency the Governor on the partial or full embodiment
of the Royal Bermuda Regiment. The EMO coordinates Government’s departmental resources
and emergency services with the Royal Bermuda Regiment to assist with readiness, response
and recovery activities. Since 2014, a decision has been taken to strategically pre-position
ambulances at Port Royal and Clearwater Fire Stations. In addition, one pre-storm emergency
shelter is designated at Cedarbridge Academy in Devonshire.
During the storm, all agencies involved with reporting and decision-making are positioned at the
Police Communications and Operations Command Post (ComOps). Police dispatching occurs in
its regular daily operations room, and another room is set up with communications for other
agencies to ensure that are all close together and coordinated. These include EMO’s
representatives from the Bermuda Fire and Rescue Services (BFRS), Public Works, Parks,
Bermuda Electric Light Company (BELCO), Department of Communication and Information,
Royal Bermuda Regiment and Bermuda Police Service, all of whom receive real-time
information on the status of their respective assets and systems. Once the information is
received, the combined agencies make decisions on where forces need to be deployed. This
information is relayed to the public continually via the emergency broadcast facility (Refer to
Section 3.2.2 for more information).
In the wake of a storm, the Royal Bermuda Regiment is dispatched to clear east and west
routes (roads) across the island. An ambulance is available to respond to each crew as needed,
and a BELCO crew is on hand to ensure that any downed power lines are de-energised and
safe to approach. Once the roads have been cleared of debris, critical government services
(e.g. public transportation, Works and Engineering, etc.) can dispatch representatives to assess
15
any damages to critical infrastructure. As services are restored, the EMO coordinates with the
Chamber of Commerce to inform the public about the status of the business sector, and
whether it is safe to return to work.
3.2.2 Emergency Broadcast Facility
Bermuda has an emergency broadcast facility which is located at Police ComOps in Prospect. A
chief responsibility of the EMO is to receive, interpret and translate reports from the BWS and
other hazard assessment resources before disseminating the information to the public via
broadcast radio at FM 100.1 MHz. Included in the broadcasts are warnings, advice, and
updates on the status of critical infrastructure before, during and after the storm. The station
begins broadcasting well in advance of the storm’s approach (i.e. 12 h before expected impact).
News and information is broadcast at the top and bottom of each hour. At the time of writing this
report, phone numbers for the station are +1 (441) 247-1646, 247-1647 and 247-1648.
3.3
EMO Actions Before, During and After Hurricane Joaquin
The uncertainty of Hurricane Joaquin’s forecast trajectory made it difficult for the EMO to know
when to initiate a meeting of its executives. Originally, the EMO planned to meet on Thursday 1
October 2015, but uncertainties surrounding the storm’s projected path, together with advice
from the BWS led to postponement of the meeting until Friday 2 October 2015. By this time, the
BWS was in better position to predict what track the hurricane might take.
Warnings and alerts were disseminated to the public by BWS in accordance with the standard
meteorological classifications and communications systems (as described in Section 3.1), and
redistributed by the EMO. The EMO informed the public when each infrastructure sector was
due to shut down, and Bermudians were urged to complete all hurricane preparations by the
evening of Saturday 3 October. A mass text was sent via Bermuda’s mobile phone service
providers on Saturday 3 October 2015 with the message: “Hurricane Watch: Complete all
preparations by Saturday night. EMO is monitoring the storm closely. Updates at 12:00 pm & 6
pm today. EMO update to follow 6 pm forecast.”
In advance of the Joaquin’s arrival, ambulances were placed at Clearwater Fire Station, and
Port Royal Fire Station. Additionally, five quick reaction teams from the Royal Bermuda
Regiment, each comprised of 24 personnel, were dispatched to different locations around the
island. One team was positioned on the eastern side of the Causeway, at Clearwater Fire
Station, and its primary responsibility was to clear the airport runway of debris and ensure
airport operations were resumed as quickly as possible. Another quick reaction team was
positioned at Warwick Camp and its primary objective was to establish one lane of traffic from
Dockyard to St Georges so as to facilitate emergency service response across the island. Road
clearing and other regimental duties started at 03:00 hrs.
Police ComOps lost power at Prospect around 00:00 hrs on 5 October 2015. As part of the
facilities’ contingency plan, an emergency generator was automatically activated. However, by
accident, the circuit designated for the Emergency Broadcast Facility was not closed (i.e. was
not transmitting a feed), and so the facility was without power for 3 hours while a technician was
called in to correct the issue. Three hours after power was restored to the broadcasting facility
(~03:00 hrs), the diesel generator ran out of fuel, so power was lost for a further 10-15 mins
while the generator was refuelled. As a result of the power loss, all computer servers in the
facility were inactive, and thereby inhibited access to email or other electrically dependent forms
of communication. The EMO was unable to send out updates during periods of power loss.
Aside from the short-duration power outages, there were no other impacts to the EMO/Police
ComOps facilities.
16
4.0 Infrastructure and Industry Preparedness and Recorded Impacts
from Hurricane Joaquin
The following sections outline the hurricane preparations for some of Bermuda’s essential
infrastructure and primary industry sectors in advance of a tropical system, and the recorded
impacts to each infrastructure system or industry from Hurricane Joaquin.
4.1
Electricity Supply
Originally called the Bermuda Electric Light, Power and Traction Company, BELCO has a
Bermuda Government legislated monopoly on the supply of electricity to Bermuda, and is a
local commercial joint stock company that is majority owned by Bermudian shareholders.
BELCO began operations in 1904, and started selling electricity in 1908.
There are two generating stations on 23 acres of BELCO’s Serpentine Road property in
Pembroke Parish. The ‘East’ and ‘West’ power stations contain a total of 12 diesel engines and
7 gas turbines capable of generating a peak load of 165 MW at a frequency of 60 Hz. Heavy
fuel, used by 82% of the entire system, powers the four newest diesel engines which generate
the basic load of power used by Bermudians. Generating voltage is 13.8 kV, and step-up
transformers increase the voltage to either 22 kV (sub-transmission) or 33 kV (transmission) to
transfer energy more efficiently over long distances. All of BELCOs sub-transmission and
transmission circuits are sub-surface, while its overhead assets (lines, poles, insulators, etc.)
constitute the distribution (i.e. low voltage) proportion of the network. BELCO operates its
distribution system at 4.16 kV before stepping down the voltage to 120/240 V by pole-mounted
and/or pad-mounted transformers for commercial and/or residential use.
BELCO’s grid power system follows N-1 protocol (e.g. Berrizzi et al., 2000), adheres to
international guides and standards (e.g. IEEE, IEC, and NESC) for safe and efficient power
delivery and maintains an inventory of critical spare components in the event of a disaster.
Bermuda’s electric power network is designed to be highly reliable, evidenced by BELCO’s
receipt of the 2013 CARILEC (Caribbean Electric Utility Services Corporation’s) “Best Utility
Award” for its superior performance over other Caribbean power utilities. Despite this, previous
tropical cyclones have caused significant disruption to the provision of electricity, such as in
2014 when Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo left 27,000+ and 31,000+ customers without power,
respectively.
4.1.1 BELCO Preparedness
In May (before the start of hurricane season) of each year, executives and operations staff meet
to discuss BELCO’s six-step hurricane preparedness plan. BELCO’s preparedness plan follows
an incident command system (ICS) structure, and is categorised into TS/Category 1 and
Category 2+ events. The preparedness plan is activated once an advisory is issued by the
BWS.
BELCO carries out regular maintenance and overhead line refurbishment to maintain a high
level of reliability (A BELCO Employee, 2015). In the event of a major natural disaster, BELCO
has the ability to monitor and control the power flow for areas east of the Causeway, and can
de-energise circuits to maintain frequency and voltage stability if necessary. Many local and
international contractors are available at short notice to help with emergency repair work, such
as in 2014 when CARILEC sent 19 linemen to Bermuda in the wake of Gonzalo to help with
restoration efforts.
17
4.1.2 Impacts to BELCO’s Network from Joaquin
Power outages were recorded throughout the passage of Joaquin (Figure 8). Reports of power
loss began around midday on 4 October 2015, and by 06:00 on 5 October 2015 there were
15,380 customers (approximately 43% of BELCO’s customer base) without power.
a)
c)
b)
Figure 8: a) Customer outages recorded during the passing of Hurricane Joaquin (data courtesy of
BELCO), b) and c) BELCO linemen work to restore power to residences following Joaquin’s passing
(Photo source: Bernews).
18
There were no reports of damage to underground assets (e.g. cabling, transformer vaults,
switching cabinets, etc.) or disruption of supply at the transmission and sub-transmission levels.
However, of the 86 distribution circuits, 48 (56%) were tripped during the storm. The primary
mechanism of failure was high winds causing vegetation to make contact with energised
conductors (lines), resulting in either line breakage, phase-to-ground faults (abnormal current
transfer to the ground or earth) or, in the case of a tree or branch bridging two conductors,
phase-to-phase faults (abnormal current transfer between two phases of a polyphase system).
Metal fatigue and subsequent line breakage from high winds is also a common cause of power
loss during high winds (experienced during Gonzalo in 2014); however, winds during Joaquin’s
passage were not strong enough to induce this type of damage (A BELCO Employee, 2015).
Despite the relatively low wind speeds, a total of 18 transformers, 14 utility poles and 3,719 ft of
wire were replaced following Joaquin. Given their high exposure to hurricane hazards, BELCO’s
bare conductor system is believed to be most vulnerable to hurricane-induced damages (A
BELCO Employee, 2015).
Rain is usually sufficient during hurricanes to effectively wash away any conductive salts from
insulator surfaces and thereby reduce the likelihood of leakage current, tracking and/or pollution
induced insulator flashover (the unintended electrical discharge around or over the surface of an
insulator). However, historically there have been increased reports of outages due to pole fires
in the days and sometimes week after a tropical cyclone. This latent effect, which occurred in
the week after Joaquin’s passing, most often occurs in the evening (i.e. when the air
temperature has reached its dew point), and may be due to tracking, partial discharge and or
flashover across polluted (salty) insulators. Though, more research is needed to support this
claim.
According to BELCO response teams, communications infrastructure generally remained intact
during and after the storm, with only minor damages and disruptions incurred to the networks.
This was partly due to good preparation before the event.
4.2
Bermuda Hospitals Board
The Bermuda Hospitals Board (BHB) comprises King Edward VII Memorial Hospital (KEMH),
Mid-Atlantic Wellness Institute (MWI) and the Lamb Foggo Urgent Care Centre. BHB offers
comprehensive diagnostic, treatment and rehabilitative services in response to Bermuda’s full
spectrum of medical and mental health needs. BHB is mandated through legislation to provide
quality mental health and acute medical care for the people of Bermuda.
4.2.1 Hospital Preparedness
The BHB has a disaster management and response committee (DMRC) whose remit includes
liaising with the EMO and activating BHB’s preparedness or response plans. A designated room
within the hospital with IT access and an uninterrupted power supply (UPS) is used for the
Hospital Incident Command Centre (HICC). The HICC is managed by a group of hospital
officials who are designated by BHB’s CEO and COO. The HICC acts as an information centre
for the rest of the hospital. Departments call the HICC for updates, notices, alerts and
instructions before and during a hurricane.
The BHB has a disaster response plan for the entire hospital (KEMH), as well as individual
plans for each department. The overarching plan is divided into phases that coincide with the
meteorological warnings and alerts issued by the BWS and other accessible hurricane watch
websites. How much of the response plan is activated depends on the HICC’s interpretation of
the storms track, intensity, etc. For example, a ‘Yellow Alert’ is typically activated when impact is
19
expected within 36-48 hours. The HICC makes an independent decision on when to start
hurricane preparation procedures and when to activate the emergency preparedness plan.
When a hurricane alert is issued, a notice is sent to all staff, across all locations and
departments, to update them on the situation. Updates are provided approximately every 12
hours, and then more frequently as the storm nears Bermuda. Each hospital department that
has to keep operational during the hurricane is assigned its own ‘hurricane box’ which contains
crucial emergency supplies (e.g. fully charged batteries, a portable radio, etc.). The hurricane
boxes are prepped and checked at the beginning of each hurricane season by a designated
individual from the DMRC. Each department has a specific job to do at the beginning of
hurricane season. For example, the facilities department is in charge of overseeing the five BHB
campuses by way of checking each campus’ generators and fuel supply, ensuring that
sandbags are available, etc.
Free in-house nursery care for children of employees, as well as support for persons on oxygen
concentrators is offered by the hospital [only] during the lockdown period of a tropical cyclone.
The BHB’s Emergency department remains open, so anyone can ‘walk in’ during the storm for
medical attention. In the event of a major storm (e.g. Gonzalo in 2014), the hospital has a
lockdown procedure, whereby the facility is closed off completely so that no one on duty is
permitted to leave. During a lockdown, all departments are required to report to the HICC with a
list of the in-house staff and to account for patients and their spouses/family who may be inhouse for the lockdown period. Departments contact HICC for advice/information throughout the
storm, and notices are circulated via hard copy and email for urgent occurrences, such as lift
closures or leaks. Staff are split up into two shifts: those designated to work during the storm,
while others act as the ‘relief’ crew and come in later/after the storm. Updates are shared via
email and phone messages on the BHB Storm Hotline, so that staff in the hospital and at home
are aware of the latest weather and hospital updates.
The hospital advises the public not to travel to the hospital if winds exceed 50 kn (A Hospital
Official, 2015). In the event of a pregnant woman going into labour or if any urgent medical
situations occur outside of the hospital during these unsafe wind speeds, hospital personnel will
talk the patient through the procedure or advise interventions as best they can via telephone.
During the height of a storm, ambulance and fire services are limited in their capabilities and
equipment to safely negotiate the roads to assist patients. As of last year (Gonzalo), the hospital
embeds an ambulance at the regiment (with staff) to follow the regiment road clearing team so
that the ambulance can be available to help injured parties as soon as access is restored.
4.2.2 Hospital Impacts and Admittances
No major impacts were recorded during Joaquin, though media reports suggested that there
were some ‘small leaks’ at both hospitals, which were swiftly tended to by maintenance staff.
Brown outs (temporary outages) in power supply to the acute care wing were reported and, as a
result, the HICC made the decision to switch to generator power during the advent of the storm
so as to avoid surges and potential damages to sensitive hospital equipment and computer
servers. The hospital generators have the capacity to provide power to the entire facility for up
to 14 days, and an additional 10 days worth of power can be supplied to critical circuits and
central equipment (e.g. servers, dialysis machines, and other vital equipment) via UPS (stored
battery supply).
There was no increase in admissions from injuries or otherwise during or after Joaquin.
Typically, the majority of injuries just before a storm are the result of reckless behaviour, such
as swimming in the strong surf, crossing unsafe areas, sticking heads out of windows (windows
slamming on fingers or head, etc.). As the storm approaches and with the associated falling of
20
barometric pressure, there is commonly an increased number in asthma attacks. After the
storm, the bulk of injuries are from clean-up activities such as accidental machete wounds,
stepping on glass or nails, falling off roofs, branches hitting cyclists as they ride past, etc. Major
events often cause an increase in hospital visits for puncture wounds, abrasions, eye injuries
and tetanus toxoid booster injections.
Given 1) the track of Joaquin was forecasted to be at least 50 nm away from the island, 2) that
hurricane-force winds only extended outward up to 40 nm from the centre of Joaquin, and 3) the
thinning of vegetation since last years’ storms, the decision was made to only partially execute
the emergency response plan and no formal lockdown was initiated. Upon assessing the
severity of Hurricane Joaquin, the HICC did not invite people seeking childcare or assistance
with oxygen concentrators (except for one individual who took it upon himself to seek
assistance). Additionally, an ambulance was not posted at Warwick Camp.
4.3
Transportation
4.3.1 L.F. Wade International Airport
The first facility on the site now occupied by L.F. Wade International Airport was built between
1941 and 1943 as a joint US Army Air Forces (USAAF)/Royal Air Force (RAF) base named
Kindley Field. At the end of World War II, the RAF left Bermuda. The field, by then hosting civil
as well as military aircraft, was operated by the United States Air Force as Kindley Air Force
Base until 1970, when it was transferred to the United States Navy. The Navy operated it as US
Naval Air Station, Bermuda until 1995, when it was transferred to the Bermuda Government’s
Ministry of Tourism and Transport.
Today, L.F. Wade International Airport offers service to fourteen destinations in Europe, Canada
and the U.S., including travel hubs such as London, New York, Miami and Toronto. The airport
can support aircraft of all sizes up to and including the Airbus 380 (though current ground
handling equipment is not suitable to board and deplane passengers). Facilities include both a
passenger and a cargo terminal as well as an airport hangar constructed in 1995.
4.3.1.1 Aviation Operations: Preparedness and Impacts from Joaquin
The continuity of operations at LF Wade International Airport can be challenging during
hurricane onsets, due to the variety of factors at play, some of them unrelated to aviation itself.
For example, wind speeds of significant strength may not hamper the ability of aircraft to take off
and land if the wind direction is not across the runway (crosswinds). However, winds which blow
straight along the runway are often coincident with winds across the Causeway, which in an
impending hurricane situation may prompt an EMO decision to close that roadway. Such a
decision has an impact on aviation, in that emergency services may not be able to access the
airport. Thus, decisions based on external (non-aviation) factors may be taken to close the
terminal or entire airfield. In other scenarios, the airport itself may remain open and fully
functioning, but decisions could be taken by the airline operators to cancel their flights into and
out of Bermuda, based on their aircraft criteria and threshold operating parameters.
In the instance of Hurricane Joaquin’s approach, the Department of Airport Operations was
briefed and undertook decisions in conjunction with the EMO to close the airport at 13:00 on
Sunday 4 October 2015 (Royal Gazette, 2015). It was reopened by 12:00 on Monday 5 October
2015. All airlines cancelled their scheduled flights for Sunday 4 October 2015; subsequent
impacts to the tourism industry were not available at the time of writing this report. Minor
infrastructure damage was reported, including a section of perimeter fence falling down (Figure
9).
21
Figure 9: A section of the airport’s perimeter fence blown down by high winds during Hurricane Joaquin
(Photo source: Bernews).
4.3.2 Roads
Bermuda has approximately 447 km of paved private (222 km/138 mi) and public
225 km/140 mi) roads (CIA Factbook, 2013). Among a number of small bridges that connect
some islands, a Causeway (Figure 10a) links Hamilton Parish to St. George's and the airport.
a)
b)
c)
d)
Figure 10: a) Traffic travelling across the Causeway at approximately midday on 4 October 2015, b)
section of concrete panel along the Causeway that was reported to have been damaged from Hurricane
Joaquin’s passage, c) downed vegetation on Bermuda’s roads on the morning of 5 October 2015, d) one
way traffic along the causeway on 5 October 2015 (Photo source: Bernews).
An early media report of damage to the Causeway was published around 12:00 hrs on 4
October 2015 (approximately 9-10 hours before the storm’s CPA). A closer inspection of the
22
purportedly damaged section showed one of the concrete panels leaning over (Figure 10b). The
initial report suggested that this was hurricane-induced damage but, after further investigation,
was found to be damage caused from an accident that happened roughly 1.5 months prior to
the storm (An EMO Executive, 2015).
Compared with Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo, minimal impacts and downed trees (e.g. Figure
10c) made for swift clearing of Bermuda roads following Joaquin. By 09:00 hrs, the Royal
Bermuda Regiment had completely cleared two lanes from east to west. This year there were
minimal road closures, and roads were fully operational by midday on 5 October 2015 (the day
after the storm’s passing).
A post-storm damage assessment reported possible undermining of the Causeway. Thus, a
one-way traffic system was maintained for the first day (5 October 2015) while inspections took
place (Figure 10d).
4.4
Maritime Operations
4.4.1 Bermuda Maritime Operations Centre
The BMOC is responsible for monitoring and controlling the shipping traffic in and out of
Bermuda’s maritime space. The BMOC has three primary responsibilities:



Coast Radio Station: broadcasting Maritime Safety Information to mariners every four
hours using voice or NAVTEX systems; including filing ‘float plans’ for mariners venturing
out on the water;
Vessel Traffic Monitoring: monitoring any vessel movements in and out of Bermuda’s
ports. In 2014 there were approximately 900 ship movements (ships arriving or departing
Bermuda ports), 350 ships which passed within 30 nm of Bermuda waters (i.e. not
coming to port), and 1,000 foreign yacht visits to Bermuda. In addition to the foreign
traffic, there are some 8,000 registered local vessels which the BMOC monitor with a
view towards protection of the environment and risk assessment;
Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) Bermuda: anything related to search and rescue
activities in Bermuda’s waters and further afield. For example, the BMOC responds to
calls ranging from local harbour incidents (e.g. vessels running out of fuel) to distress
calls made hundreds to thousands of miles away. The BMOC works closely with their
Coast Guard colleagues in Norfolk Virginia, who have more search and rescue
resources available to them (e.g. aircraft).
If any Bermuda registered ship activates its emergency beacon (regardless of its location), the
vessel’s distress signal is transmitted directly to the BMOC. The BMOC is therefore the first
point of emergency contact for any locally registered vessel, and must follow up to ensure that
the appropriate authorities assist a ship in distress. The BMOC is also the first point of contact
for any aircraft emergencies between the hours of 23:00 – 07:00. Once it has been established
that an aircraft emergency landing is imminent then the BMOC will page the BFRS which will
prepare for aircraft arrival.
4.4.1.1 BMOC Preparedness and Impacts from Joaquin
The BMOC constantly seeks expert advice (e.g. from the BWS and the NHC) to help them
monitor a storm, and will monitor a tropical disturbance well in advance of its arrival. Once the
storm appears within 1,000 nm of Bermuda, the BMOC starts broadcasting storm-related
information to mariners. Typically, the BMOC broadcasts weather info 24 hours a day, with local
weather updates at 05:30, 11:30, 16:30 and 23:30 hrs. The BMOC has direct involvement and
23
collaboration with other government agencies such as the Bermuda Police Service, BFRS,
Parks, Conservation Services, Immigration, Customs, and local lifeguards. Thus, the BMOC is a
vital lifeline and means of public communication if no other modes are available.
The close working relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard’s Atlantic Area Command centre in
Norfolk, VA specific to search and rescue efforts in this area of the Atlantic has resulted in the
periodic use of long range C-130 aircraft to warn mariners by VHF radio call-outs about the
forecast track and intensity of severe tropical systems. The use of a C-130
reconnaissance/over-flight of the Bermuda Islands and surrounding marine area post storm is
normally also pre-planned between RCC Norfolk and RCC Bermuda when a direct impact on
the island appears imminent. Such assistance was not required for Joaquin, but previous
operational examples included Hurricanes Gonzalo (2014) and Fabian (2003).
Depending on the intensity of the hurricane, and given past experience, the BMOC will consider
taking down non-essential equipment such as radars and other communication systems that
would likely be damaged in a Category 3+ hurricane. A faulty generator during last year’s
hurricanes (Fay and Gonzalo) influenced the BMOC to be well prepared for Joaquin by stocking
up on spare parts and fuel.
The Department of Marine and Ports Services has hurricane moorings that are used to
safeguard government vessels during large storms, and contingency plans are in place should
there be a loss of service. For example, in the event of shutting down the Causeway for posthurricane damage assessments or repair, a boat or boats will be assigned to ferry people
across the harbour. After a storm, Marine and Ports personnel inspect ferry terminals and
shipping channels before relaying the information to the BMOC for dissemination to the general
public.
Aside from some very minor damage to the doors of a generator room housing for Bermuda
Radio’s NAVTEX transmitter and the BWS (BAS-Serco) Doppler radar emergency power supply
at Cooper’s Island, there were no distress calls, and no other impacts to BMOC during or after
Joaquin. All control equipment and monitoring instruments remained intact.
4.4.2 Shipping and Cargo Services
Polaris Holding Company Limited is the parent company of Stevedoring Services Limited, which
provides the labour and equipment for the offloading and export of cargo into or out of Bermuda
(e.g. container, break bulk, vehicles, animals, etc.). Stevedoring Services operates the container
docks and are also responsible for providing line handling for ships that come into the Hamilton
port.
Roughly 98% of all cargo into the island arrives by ship, the majority of which is offloaded in the
Hamilton port. On average, 35,000 TEUs (Twenty foot Equivalent Units) of cargo are moved
through Bermuda’s ports each year. Three cargo ships make weekly stops into the island,
totalling 12 visits per month. In addition, one car ship delivers vehicles to Bermuda every month,
and several cruise lines operate seasonal visits, with the season typically lasting from April
through October.
24
4.4.2.1 Shipping Industry Preparedness and Impacts from Joaquin
The general timeline for Stevedoring’s hurricane preparations is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Hurricane preparation timeline for Stevedoring Services Ltd.
Time Before
Expected Impact
Action
72 Hours
48 Hours
24 Hours
12 Hours
Potential threat: advanced preparations begin
Impact expected: hurricane plans are accelerated
Impact imminent: port reconfiguration begins
Final preparations and port closure
There are approximately 300-400 containers on the Hamilton dock at any given time (A
Stevedoring Employee, 2015). Thus, one of the primary hurricane preparation tasks is to
consolidate and configure the stack of containers to a low enough height to counter wind
impact. Any heavy machinery and equipment that can be stored is placed in the Queen’s
Warehouse, and all other machinery is moved away from the waterside. All crane booms are
lowered to mitigate wind hazards, and temporary offices (trailers) are strapped down and
surrounded with containers to create a windbreak.
Previous storms have caused cruise ships to pull away from the dock in both Dockyard and St
George’s (A Stevedoring Employee, 2015). Fortunately, no ships were berthed when Joaquin
passed the island, so there was no responsibility or concern for their safeguarding.
Stevedoring staff members are released to go home once hurricane preparations are complete.
A skeleton crew is designated as first responders in the aftermath of a storm and the rest of the
staff are called in once a damage assessment has been carried out. No members of staff are on
site during the event.
No impacts from Joaquin to shipping services were recorded. No latent effects were observed,
in part due to regular maintenance on equipment and assets. Stevedoring’s hurricane
preparedness plan is updated on a yearly basis, and efforts are being made to improve pre- and
post-event communication with staff to ensure the proper safety information is relayed in a
timely fashion.
4.5
National Museum of Bermuda
The National Museum of Bermuda is a non-government, not-for-profit Bermuda Registered
Charity (No. 136), created by the Bermuda National Trust in 1974 as the Bermuda Maritime
Museum. In 1978, an Act of Parliament formally established the Museum to promote, collect,
preserve, research and exhibit Bermuda’s maritime history and restore the buildings of the Keep
Fort. Over the years, the Museum’s scope has expanded to include more than maritime history.
Thus, in 2009, the Government of Bermuda recognised the Museum’s national role with a
change of name, formalised in December 2013 with the passage of the Museum Amendment
Act, which officially created the National Museum of Bermuda. The Museum is presently
recognised as the leading preserver of Bermuda’s underwater and land-based cultural heritage
through collecting, exhibitions, restoration, conservation, research, publication, education, public
outreach and archaeology.
The Museum is housed in Bermuda’s largest fort, the Keep, at the Royal Navy Dockyard. The
Keep’s ramparts and bastions enclose eight Grade I listed buildings, including the hilltop Commissioner’s House. The 16-acre Museum property also extends to the fortifications
adjoining the Keep and includes Casemates Barracks.
25
In 2014, Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo caused significant damage to many structures at the
Museum (Figure 11). These impacts have informed the Museum’s current hurricane
preparedness plan.
Figure 11: Impacts to buildings at the National Museum in Dockyard from Hurricanes Fay
and Gonzalo (image from Maritimes, 2014). Damage to the following structures were
recorded: 1) Commissioner’s House roof, north slope, 2) Commissioner’s House roof, inner
slopes, 3) Commissioner’s House roof, western slope, 4) Curatorial Department roof, 5)
Museum academic housing roofs, 6) hostel bathroom roof, 7) hostel roof, including the
veranda, 8) workshop.
4.5.1 Museum Preparedness
The National Museum has a five-phase hurricane preparedness plan, summarised in Table 3.
Table 3: Hurricane preparation timeline for the National Museum of Bermuda.
Phase
Time Before
Expected Impact
1
>5 days
2
5 days
3
96 to 72 hours
4
<72 hours
5
<24 hours
Action
Tropical storm and hurricane watch; all staff to monitor relevant storm
watch websites.
Staff meeting to be held to discuss plan of action as directed by the
Executive Director or Deputy Director.
All staff to report to Deputy Director to carry out hurricane preparation
tasks/checklist.
All staff required to attend Tropical Storm/Hurricane meeting. Staff to
be divided into teams to carry out final storm preparations. Depending
on speed and severity of the approaching storm, phases 3 and 4 may
be combined.
Museum closed to the public and staff urged to keep safe. Hostel and
apartments on upper grounds evacuated.
26
A detailed hurricane preparation tasks list to be carried out during phases 3 and 4 of the
preparedness plan has been devised for the different Museum departments in the lead up to an
approaching storm. These tasks include (but are not limited to):







Preparing and distributing hurricane supply boxes containing zip ties, flashlights, utility
knives, scissors, permanent pens, heavy duty clips, trash bags, duct tape, etc.;
Boarding up windows and doors of the Commissioner’s House before winds reach 15
mph (task becomes too difficult once winds exceed this threshold);
Storing fuel for the Museum’s truck and emergency generator (used to power on-site
refrigerators and water pumps in the event of power loss);
Covering books, file cabinets, and storage shelves in tarpaulins;
Placing computers in garbage bags and seal with zip ties;
Backing up computer network server and move to a secure space;
Clearing loose debris from the entire property.
In the case of a hurricane causing structural, exterior and/or interior damage, and despite
preventative measures carried out before the storm, the Museum has a detailed disaster
management plan to deal with a range of disasters. For example, the plan outlines actions on
how to safely assess the damage; how to deal with flooding and fire; how to salvage waterlogged or fire damaged documents, books and objects; how to prevent a mould bloom; and
contains a list of vendors and volunteers to contact for help with recovery actions, depending on
the severity of the disaster.
4.5.2 Museum Impacts
Hurricane Joaquin damaged the inner roof slopes of Commissioner’s House (Figures 12a and
b) and toppled a historic chimney (Figure 12c). This roof damage led to water ingress on the
second floor foyer and exacerbated existing interior damage to the dry walls and electrics of the
grand staircase, the south corridor and foyer on the second floor. The extent of the interior
damage was still being assessed at the time of writing this report.
The Museum did not lose power during or after Joaquin’s passing. However, the biggest
disruption to Museum operations was the loss of their wireless Internet transmitter, which was
fixed to the roof. Consequently, the Museum was without Internet for two weeks (A Museum
Member of Staff, 2015). Additionally, the supporting structure for a cell phone relay antenna on
one of the (undamaged) chimneys was bent to 90 degrees (Figure 12d).
27
a)
b)
c)
d)
Figure 12: Hurricane Joaquin-induced damages to a) and b) the inner slopes of the Commissioner’s
House, c) a historic chimney, d) telecommunications equipment (bent by high winds). Photos courtesy of
the National Museum of Bermuda.
5.0
Lessons Learned
The suddenness with which Hurricane Fay impacted Bermuda in 2014 and the subsequent
direct hit of Hurricane Gonzalo one week later caused significant disruption to Bermuda’s
essential infrastructure and primary industry. All infrastructure/industry personnel interviewed for
this study readily agreed that the lessons from Fay and Gonzalo helped inform and harden their
preparedness plans for Joaquin.
In an increasingly connected and technologically-savvy jurisdiction where mobile phone
ownership is becoming ubiquitous, there has recently been a push to utilise social networks and
other communication platforms to help raise awareness and keep people informed well in
advance of an impending disaster. The mass SMS text message sent out to Bermudian mobile
devices before the arrival of Joaquin demonstrated a proactive and effective means of disaster
readiness that should be extended to the response and recovery phases of an event.
Hurricane Awareness week, which usually occurs in the week before hurricane season begins,
is an annual event that provides an opportunity to educate the public on hurricane hazards and
give updates on the most up-to-date EMO procedures. However, there is a need to train local
disaster managers, agencies and stakeholders on how to disseminate information in a
conventional and understandable way such that the EMO meets the public’s expectations.
28
There are many potential disasters which Bermuda emergency management leaders have not
considered or planned for. For example, no contingency plans are in place to accommodate
potentially thousands of passengers and staff that may get stranded on a cruise ship that runs
aground in Bermuda’s waters (as happened with the Norwegian Breakaway in May 2015).
Despite efforts to educate the public on tsunami hazards and their likelihood, Bermuda has no
national tsunami plan, and the exercises are generally not taken seriously (A Police Official,
2015). Care should be taken to ensure that the Bermudian public does not become complacent
about their risk, or the risk to visitors, based on past experience of limited physical impacts from
a tsunami or other natural hazard.
6.0
Conclusions and Future Work
The CPA of Hurricane Joaquin’s centre to Bermuda was between 21:00 and 22:00 on the
evening of Sunday 4 October 2015, while it was a Category 2 storm with estimated maximum
winds of 85 kn. At that time, the eye was located at approximately 32.8°N, 65.7°W, or
approximately 55 nm/101 km/63 miles west northwest of Bermuda. The prolonged period of the
strongest winds after the CPA is counter-intuitive to most, and is thus often unexpected, despite
perhaps being well-documented in Bermuda. The weakening of Hurricane Joaquin as it
approached was likely due to interactions with its own ‘wake’ of cooler upper ocean
temperatures.
Of the infrastructure and commercial entities studied here, Joaquin’s forecasted trajectory led to
the execution of hurricane preparedness plans across all sectors. This study examined the
hurricane preparedness of BELCO, the BHB, maritime operations entities, the transportation
sector and the National Museum of Bermuda. Impacts of Joaquin on these sectors are
described under the following headings:
Electricity Supply & Telecommunications Networks
 Approximately 43% of BELCO’s customer base was without power following the
passage of Joaquin.
 Outages were primarily caused by vegetation falling onto conductors and causing either
line breakage, phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase faults.
 Latent effects of tropical cyclones on BELCO’s system include pole fires in the days to
week following a storm, and may be due to residual pollution (salt) inducing leakage
current, tracking and/or flashover across insulators.
 Communications infrastructure generally remained intact during and after the storm, with
only minor damages and disruptions incurred to the networks.
Hospital and Medical Services
 Healthcare centres are well prepared for hurricanes and have a robust preparedness
plan which includes forming pre-positioned brigades for rapid response in affected
areas.
 Minor issues with fluctuations in main electricity supply led officials to switch to
emergency generator supply so as to protect sensitive apparatus from power and/or
switching surges.
Transportation
 In the transport sector, the passing of Hurricane Joaquin resulted in the closure of L.F.
Wade International Airport at 13:00 on Sunday 4 October 2015. The airport was
reopened by 12:00 on Monday 5 October 2015.
 Roads suffered no structural damage and were cleared of debris by the early hours of
the morning on 4 October.
29
Maritime Operations
 The BMOC plays a crucial role in disseminating tropical cyclone-related information to
the public and has robust preparedness procedures in place. Shipping and cargo
services in Bermuda are similarly well prepared for hurricanes.
 Both the BMOC and shipping industry experienced little impacts from Joaquin.
National Museum of Bermuda
 Several buildings at the National Museum experienced roof damage from Hurricanes
Fay and Gonzalo in 2014.
 Hurricane Joaquin caused further impacts to the roof of the Commissioner’s House,
causing water ingress into parts of the building, thereby exacerbating interior damages.
 The biggest disruption to Museum operations was the loss of their wireless Internet
transmitter, which resulted in the loss of Internet capabilities for two weeks.
The focus on adaptations and responses to long-term hurricane activity in Bermuda has
provided insights into the long-term effects of hurricanes and helped identify possible mitigation
and prevention measures. We found that, in general, increased maintenance of infrastructure
now occurs widely across sectors, and general awareness of hurricane risk has increased since
Fay and Gonzalo in 2014.
Bermuda’s emergency management system is improving with time and experience, although
information flow between key infrastructure groups and the EMO is not yet fluid and
responsibilities at each level require further definition. More could be done to improve risk
communication between and within agencies and emphasise the importance of emergency drills
and updating and revising contingency plans following hurricanes.
Overall, the Bermudian population is well adapted to the risks posed by a tropical cyclone, and
we found clear evidence for increased organisation and improved management procedures for
tropical cyclones since Hurricanes Fay and Gonzalo, the impacts and lessons from which have
strengthened societal resilience.
6.1
Future Work
During the writing of this report, Tropical Storm Kate threatened to come within proximity of the
island, but failed to make an impact, with the radius of sustained tropical storm force winds well
beyond Bermuda. Nonetheless, with multiple tropical cyclones impacting Bermuda within the
last few years, the question naturally arises: “Are we in a new phase of hurricane risk?” Looking
at counts of major hurricanes which have meet the threat criteria for Bermuda’s marine area (25
nm from the coast), it can be seen that we have re-entered an active phase of hurricane activity
near Bermuda since the turn of the century (Figure 13).
Figure 13: Black bars indicate singular instances of major (Category 3+) hurricanes passing within 100
nm of Bermuda’s Marine Area between 1870-2014 (Source: NOAA).
30
Research indicates that a previous inactive period of Atlantic hurricane activity was coincident
with an anomalously high abundance of sulphate aerosols (pollution) over the Atlantic (e.g.
Emanuel, 2015; Dunstone et al., 2013), which may have helped to suppress near-surface ocean
temperatures from the 1960s through the 1990s. Hence, Bermuda had not experienced a major
(Category 3+) storm in several decades prior to Hurricane Fabian in 2003. This lack of
experience may have enhanced our vulnerability to such an extreme event.
As understanding the interplay between hurricane activity and climate variability are crucial to
understanding our risk going forward, BermudaRisk will endeavour to produce research which
informs stakeholders of any changes in the frequency of major hurricanes. Future studies on
impacts to Bermuda’s critical infrastructure from hurricanes would be beneficial, to gain longterm understanding of hurricane hazard consequences on a variety of sectors, including those
explored in less depth in this study. Further to understanding the changes in hazard intensity
and the growth of exposure and vulnerability in Bermuda, one goal of BermudaRisk will be to
assess the cost of preparedness versus inaction (i.e. ‘doing nothing’) in the lead up to major
events.
31
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the cooperation and assistance provided to us during our interviews,
from staff of the following agencies: BELCO, Polaris/Stevedoring Services Ltd., the Emergency
Measures Organisation, the Bermuda Hospitals Board, the Bermuda Maritime Operations
Centre, the Bermuda Weather Service, the National Museum of Bermuda, and BAS-Serco Ltd.
Without the help of these participants, this report would not have been made possible.
The authors would like to thank The Bank of N. T. Butterfield & Son Ltd., Polaris Holding
Company Ltd., LRC Ltd., and RPI Member companies for funding support.
References
Berizzi A, Merlo M, Zeng Y, Marannino P, Scarpellini P (2000) Determination of the N-1 security
maximum transfer capability through power corridors. Proceedings of the Power Engineering
Society Winter Meeting, 23–27 Jan. IEEE 3:1739–1744
Bernews (2015) Photos: Hurricane Joaquin Passes By Bermuda Accessed 24 October 2015
Curry R and Guishard M (2015) Upper Ocean Observations During Hurricane Gonzalo: Cold Wake
th
Interactions and Inertial Currents, Proceedings of the 5 International Summit on Hurricanes and
Climate Change, Crete, Greece, June 2015
Department of Health, Ministry of Health (2012) Emergency Plan for the General Public, Internal Report
by the Government of Bermuda, 32 p
Dunstone NJ, Smith DM, Booth BBB, Hermanson L, Eade R (2013) Anthropogenic aerosol forcing of
Atlantic tropical storms. Nature Geosciences, 6:534–539. doi: 10.1038/ngeo1854
Emanuel K (2015) Presentation at RPI2.0 Workshop on Atlantic Hurricane Volatility. London, June 2015
ESRI ArcGIS Online (2015) Map of Bermuda, http://www.arcgis.com, accessed November 20, 2015
Fogarty C (2002) Operational Forecasting of Extratropical Transition, Proceedings of the American
Meteorological Society 25th Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical Meteorology, San Diego, CA,
May 2002, https://ams.confex.com/ams/25HURR/webprogram/Paper33172.html
Guishard MP (2007) Report on Hurricane Florence, Bermuda Weather Service, BAS-Serco Ltd. Internal
Report, Available online at http://weather.bm/tropicalArchiveDocuments.asp, November 20 2015
Guishard MP (2011) Review of the Past hurricane Season: Reports of Hurricanes, Tropical Storms,
Tropical Disturbances and Related Flooding During 2010 - The 2010 Hurricane Season in
Bermuda - RA IV/HC-XXXIII/Doc. 4.2(3), Proceedings of the World Meteorological Organization RA
IV Hurricane Committee, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, 2011
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)(2015) Atlantic hurricane database (HURDAT2)
1851-2014, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/#hurdat
Pasch R, Blake E, Brown D (2003) Hurricane Fabian Tropical Cyclone Report. National Hurricane Center
Technical Report
Royal Gazette (2015) EMO update for Hurricane Joaquin Accessed 24 October 2015
Strong E (2014) We Will Rebuild, Maritimes, 27:2, 11-15
US Central Intelligence Agency (2010) The World Factbook on Bermuda Accessed 24 October 2015
Williams R and Guishard M (2004) Reports of Hurricanes, Tropical Storms, Tropical Disturbances and
Related Flooding During 2010 - The 2003 Hurricane Season in Bermuda, Appendix IV of the Final
th
Report of the 26 Session of the World Meteorological Organization RA IV Hurricane Committee,
Miami Beach, Florida, USA, 2004
32