Bossaso Safety and Security Baseline

Transcription

Safety and security
District baseline report
Bossaso
Safety and Security District Baseline Report: Bossaso
Authors
•
Yann-Cédric Quero, Criminologist, Senior Analyst (Ph.D. Candidate, University of Montreal)
•
Mireille Widmer, Community Safety Specialist (UNDP Somalia)
•
Katrina Aitken, Researcher (Saferworld)
•
Lindsey Peterson, Analyst (UNDP Somalia and OCVP)
Copyright
Published and Copyright ©2011 by the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieved system without permission in writing.
First Edition (August 2011)
First Printing (February 2012)
ISBN: 987-9966-1614-4-4
Inquiries should be addressed to:
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)
Hargeisa, Somaliland
[email protected]
http://www.ocvp.org
2
Community Security Approach to Peace-building
Acknowledgements
The Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) wishes to thank the following organizations (in
alphabetical order):
Right from the beginning of this project, the Danish Demining Group participated in consultations on the development
of the survey tools, particularly the Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS). In addition, it provided logistical and
substantive support for the facilitation of several rounds of focus group discussions, including training of local nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners, facilitation and recording of the proceedings, and drafting the District
Safety Plans. It also helped gather additional data for the district mapping in Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo.
The NGOs Haqsoor (Burao), Hornpeace (Las Anod), SORSO (Bossaso) and KAALO (Galkayo) provided local
support for the facilitation of the district mapping and sampling, the CVS, and focus group discussions. SOYDEN
and the Centre for Peace and Democracy also provided mapping information from four Mogadishu districts and
supported the implementation of the CVS.
The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (Montreal, Canada) provided expert feedback on the
development of the CVS.
The Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention took a leading role in the development of the survey tools and methodological
guidance, primarily the CVS and the focus group questionnaires. It oversaw the sampling of districts prior to the CVS,
participated in the training of enumerators, set up the database, and oversaw data entry and cleaning.
The Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP) contributed to the collection of additional information
from Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo for the finalization of the Community Safety and Security Analysis.
SAACID contributed useful insights for the development of the CVS.
Saferworld was involved from the beginning in consultations on the development of the various survey tools,
particularly the CVS. It took a leading role in collecting and analysing information from the focus group discussions,
including additional desk-based reviews, for the production of the initial Community Safety and Security Analyses for
Burao, Las Anod, Bossaso and Galkayo. For Galkayo and Burao, Saferworld also performed a first statistical analysis
of the data from the CVS, including additional key informant interviews.
SOCDA took a leading role in the implementation of the CVS. From the beginning of the project, it participated in
the development of the CVS, recruited and oversaw the local teams of enumerators, participated in their training and
supervision, as well as contributed to data entry and cleaning.
SOYDEN took the initiative of conducting focus group discussions in four Mogadishu districts, providing precious
additional qualitative information on patterns of crime and violence in Mogadishu.
3
Table of Contents
4
1. Introduction
11
2. Methodology
12
2.1 District mapping
12
2.2. The Crime and Victimization Survey
12
2.3. Focus groups discussions
12
2.4. Validation
13
3. Mapping of Bossaso District
14
3.1. Historical notes
14
3.2. Geography and demographics 14
3.3. Resources and economy
16
3.4. Access to basic services
17
3.5. Governance
18
4. Perceptions of insecurity
19
5. Forms of insecurity and violence
21
5.1. Homicide 21
5.2. Assault or physical attack
22
5.2.1. Victims
22
5.2.2. Perpetrators 23
5.3. Piracy 23
5.4. Property crime
24
5.5. People smuggling
25
5.6. Abductions and human trafficking
26
5.7. Violence against children 26
5.8. Violence against women 27
5.9. Threat from violent Islamic groups
28
5.10. Conflict dynamics
28
6. Drivers and risk factors
30
6.1. Social factors
30
6.2. Political/governance-related factors
30
6.3. Economic factors
31
6.4. Firearms and security-related factors
32
7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors
35
7.1. Comparative perspectives 35
7.1.1. General perception
35
7.1.2. Assault 35
7.1.3. Sexual violence 36
7.1.4. Property crime
36
7.2. Police 36
7.2.1. Mapping information
36
7.2.2. General perception 36
7.2.3. Response
38
7.3. Statutory courts
38
38
7.3.2. General perception 38
7.4. Women 40
7.5. The elders and religious leaders
40
7.6. The business community
41
7.7. Other security providers
41
8. Recommendations
42
8.1. Strengthening the police
42
8.2 Improving the judicial system 43
8.3 Improving the prison system
43
8.4 Modifying the urban landscape to prevent crime
44
8.5 Supporting better communication on safety issues
45
8.6 Creating employment opportunities
46
About the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)
48
5
Figures
6
Figure 1: Subdivisions of Bossaso District (Freq.)
12
Figure 2: Clan of head of household (Weighted)
15
Figure 3: Residential status (Freq. %)
15
Figure 4: Occupation of the head of household (Freq. %)
16
Figure 5: Daily spending on food (US$) (Freq. %)
16
Figure 6: Level and type of education of heads of households (Freq. %)
17
Figure 7: Change in perceived safety over the last 12 months (Weighted %)
19
Figure 8: Level of perceived safety walking after dark (Weighted %)
19
Figure 9: Activities avoided due to insecurity (Freq. %)
19
Figure 10: Number of crimes witnessed (Freq.)
20
Figure 11: Number of assaults experienced (Freq.)
22
Figure 12: Location and time of day of attack/assault (Freq.)
22
Figure 13: Type of weapon used in assault (Freq. %)
22
Figure 14: Gender and age of assault victims (Freq.)
23
Figure 15: Victims of assault or physical attack, by clan (Weighted %)
23
Figure 16: Victims of assault or physical attack, by residential status (Weighted %)
23
Figure 17: Level of injury (Freq. %)
23
Figure 18: Profile of perpetrators of assault, by gender of victim (Weighted %)
23
Figure 19: Property crime witnessed, experienced, and resulting in injuries (Freq.)
24
Figure 21: Profile of perpetrators of property crime (Freq. %)
25
Figure 22: Month of property crime (Freq. %)
25
Figure 23: Child victims of assault (Freq.)
26
Figure 24: Female victims of assault (Freq.)
27
Figure 25: Sexual violence, by location and time of day (Freq.)
27
Figure 26: Profile of perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq.)
27
Figure 27: Frequency of clan disputes (Freq. %)
28
Figure 29: Clan disputes by month (Freq. %)
29
Figure 30: Availability of firearms over the last 12 months (Freq. %)
32
Figure 31: Availability of firearms, by clan (Weighted %)
33
Figure 32: Availability of firearms, by residential status (Weighted %)
33
Figure 33: Firearm possession, by clan (Weighted %)
33
Figure 34: Firearm possession, by residential status (Weighted %)
33
Figure 35: Types of firearms available (Freq. %)
33
Figure 36: Main reason reported for owning a firearm (Freq. %)
33
Figure 37: Perceptions of threat from remote-controlled or time bombs (Freq. %)
34
Figure 38: Perceived presence of mines and unexploded ordnances (Freq. %)
34
Figure 39: Level of trust in public authorities who serve as security providers (Weighted %)
35
Figure 40: Accessibility of security actors (Weighted %)
35
Figure 41: Speed of response of security actors (Weighted %)
35
Figure 42: Reporting rates, assault (Freq. %)
36
Figure 43: Public authority to whom assault was first reported (Freq. %)
36
Figure 44: Reporting rate, sexual violence (Freq. %)
36
Figure 45: Reporting rate, property crime (Freq. %)
36
Figure 46: Public authority to whom property crime was first reported (Freq. %)
36
Figure 48: Accessibility of the police in terms of physical distance and ease to locate (Freq. %)
37
Figure 49: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision (Freq. %)
37
Figure 50: Speed of police response (Freq. %)
37
Figure 51: Satisfaction with the police’s response, assault (Freq. %)
38
Figure 52: Satisfaction with the police’s response, property crime (Freq.)
38
Figure 53: Reason for dissatisfaction with the police’s response, property crime (Freq.)
38
Figure 54: Level of trust in the courts (Freq. %)
38
Figure 55: Accessibility of the courts in terms of physical distance and ease to locate (Freq. %)
39
Figure 56: Accessibility of the courts, by subdivision (Freq. %)
39
Figure 57: Speed of the court’s response (Freq. %)
39
Figure 58: Reasons for not turning to the criminal courts (Freq. %)
39
Figure 59: Victims’ satisfaction with the courts’ decision (Freq.)
40
Figure 60: Reasons for female non-participation in community or townhall meetings,
by gender of respondent (Weighted %)
40
Figure 61: Trust in the clan/community elders (Freq. %)
40
Figure 62: Trust in the religious leaders (Freq. %)
40
40
7
Executive summary
The coastal town of Bossaso has experienced a dramatic population increase in the past 20 years, since violence in the
south has triggered migratory flows and displaced many economic activities to its port. Despite having experienced
heavy fighting in the early 1990s, today, according to the Crime and Victimization Survey (CVS), most of its population
feels that the security situation had been notably improving over the 12 months preceding the survey.
Focus group discussions revealed that the single most important preoccupation of the inhabitants of Bossaso, particularly
in urban areas of the district, relates to what participants called “unknown killings”, i.e. assassinations apparently not
related to clan revenge or honour. These killings particularly instil fear and suspicion in the population and could
be partly related to the threat posed by radicalized groups. In rural areas, revenge killings were also perceived as a
problem. Overall, the CVS only captured one instance of homicide.
Piracy generally came second among focus group participants’ concerns. They specifically stressed its negative impact
on the economy, contrary to various reports of economies being boosted by pirate monies. Rising prices of household
goods were mentioned and specific linkages were drawn between piracy and the increased proliferation of weapons
and drug use.
According to the CVS, property crime is also of concern, mainly burglaries and theft (36% respectively of property
crime). Focus group participants agreed that home burglaries tended to target in particular poorly protected internally
displaced person (IDP) shelters, as well as other homes deserted during the hot summer months when residents move
to cooler areas. In addition, street theft, was perceived as opportunistic, not highly organized and often not associated
with the use of weapons. In 71 percent of cases, perpetrators were individual criminals, rather than organized armed
groups.
People smuggling is an important issue in Bossaso principally due to the port as the principal jump-off point for
aspiring emigrants. Focus group participants emphasized the link between this phenomenon and semi-organized crime
and physical violence; in the most extreme cases, it could also be linked to human trafficking. The CVS captured six
kidnapping cases, but no information that could link them to human trafficking. Focus group participants asserted
that child abductions and trafficking, including for organ harvesting, together with child labour particularly target IDP
populations.
Assault and physical attacks are the principal form of reported crimes. The CVS captured 40 such incidents, representing
5 percent of the sample. Assault generally occurs at night, both at home and in the street. Firearms feature in over 25
percent of cases, with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles alone used in 20 percent of assault. Victims are men and women
alike, although of slightly different age groups. IDPs are targeted more than permanent residents. Further, perpetrators
are overwhelmingly individual criminals (80% of cases); in 29 percent of cases, the perpetrator was thought to be under
the influence of qat.
Violence against women was mentioned as a concern principally by women and IDP focus groups. Forms of abuse
include assault, sexual violence, domestic abuse, and forced marriage. Indeed, the CVS captured five cases of sexual
violence. Prostitution was also mentioned briefly as a new concern.
Remarkably, clan conflicts were not mentioned as a concern by focus group participants: 61 percent of CVS respondents
indeed stated that such conflict never or almost never occurred in the district. On the other hand, 32 percent of
respondents indicated that community disputes or clan conflicts occur on a yearly basis. When they occur, they largely
concerned issues of land and water.
Focus group discussions delved further into the drivers and risk factors of various forms of insecurity and violence.
The foremost social factors mentioned were: the ideology of inter-clan rivalry, particularly the narratives transmitted
over time through songs and poems, which perpetuates conflicts, following by qat abuse and the strain on social control
mechanisms imposed by population movements, particularly in IDP camps.
Political and governance-related causes again refer to inter-clan competition, this time for positions at all levels of
government. A confusing legal framework – with three competing and interwoven legal systems – can also lead to
conflict, particularly over land tenure. Finally, religious divisions are registered – a relatively new phenomenon.
8
The economy plays a major role in the dynamics of insecurity. Obvious factors of insecurity include unemployment,
disputes over limited resources in rural areas, and pressure on resources in urban areas due to the combination of
migration of impoverished pastoralists and poor urban planning. It emerged from the discussions that overfishing in
Somali waters by foreign companies caused fishing communities to shift to more lucrative criminal activities such as
people smuggling and piracy. The payment of high ransoms was indicated as a factor perpetuating piracy. Finally, clanbased food distribution in IDP camps was cited as occasionally triggering disputes.
Finally, security-related factors include the militarized nature of society and the reported heavy-handedness of the state
security apparatus, but also the widespread availability of firearms. CVS respondents are ambivalent with respect to
recent trends in firearms possession. It emerged from the CVS that firearm possession was more widespread in urban
areas, where 6 percent of respondents declared possessing a firearm, compared to 1 percent in rural areas. It should be
noted that actual rates were thought to be much higher by focus group participants. In addition, 50 percent of the CVS
respondents who admitted owning a firearm possessed a Kalashnikov-type assault rifle, while 44 percent owned a
handgun. These firearms are said to be held mainly for protection purposes. In addition, remote-control or time bombs
were also of concern.
The CVS also provides data on the perceived performance of various justice and security providers. Highest levels of
trust are afforded to religious leaders, followed by the traditional elders, the police, and finally the courts, who receive
a negative rating. Women, however, have greater trust than men in the police and the courts. It emerged from the focus
group discussions that there was a worrying trend of “forum shopping”, where the strongest party to a dispute or crime
selects the institution that it hopes will provide the most favourable outcome.
Actual reporting rates depend on the type of crime. According to the CVS, 60 percent of sexual violence cases, 69
percent of property crime, and up to 80 percent of assaults were disclosed to the public; only a fraction of them were
reported to the police (20% of cases of sexual violence, 19% of property crime and a mere 10% of assault), or reached
a verdict in court (20% of sexual violence cases, 10% of assaults, 17% of property crimes).
A closer look at the performance of the police in the CVS confirms the rather ambivalent attitude to institutions
in general. However, police response to actual crimes was rated positively. In focus group discussions, one issue
concerning the police was its alleged clan bias.
The courts received a negative view, being considered inaccessible and slow. The single most important factor inhibiting
CVS respondents from going to court was that they considered its judgments not fair. Focus group participants also
mentioned that court judgments were influenced by the party able to pay the highest bribe.
As noted above, the elders and religious leaders are rated highly on their ability to contribute to peace and security.
Remarkably, however, focus group participants felt that they were ill-equipped to deal with new types of violence such
as assassinations, piracy and gang theft – the three top concerns of the community in Bossaso according to the same
focus groups.
Other actors of change mentioned in focus group discussions included women, the business community, private security
guards, neighbourhood watch schemes and IDP security guards. An important obstacle to women’s participation was
their discomfort with speaking up in townhall meetings.
9
1. Introduction
Evidence-based programming and policy development in
the fields of community security, armed violence reduction
and peace-building require a comprehensive and accurate
prior analysis of insecurity. Measuring the outcome and
impact of interventions to deal with insecurity is equally
important, both to advance collective understanding
of what works and what does not, and to hold all those
involved accountable. The Somali Community Safety
Framework (SCSF) is a loose consortium of organizations
and local and international, non-governmental and United
Nations agencies, which collectively aims at building
Somali capacity to mitigate violence and insecurity in
a sustainable manner.1 Committed to evidence-based
programming, participants in the SCSF identified the
collection and analysis of solid data on safety as a priority.
The value added of these data would be greatly increased
if they contributed to the adoption of common indicators
and methodologies feeding into a common information
pool. A broad consultation process was therefore
undertaken in 2009–2010 under the umbrella of the SCSF
to develop a CVS that would be recognized by SCSF
participants.
Somali ownership of the data and survey methodologies
must be ensured. Until recently, the little data and
knowledge available on causes and manifestations
of insecurity – whether related to crime or conflict –
generally remained within the organization that collected
it, and were often lost when projects ended or key staff
moved on. To contribute to local ownership, the Somali
is undertaking this task on behalf of participants in the
SCSF in order to ensure that a non-partisan academic
institution will be the custodian of data and information
on crime and conflict in the Somali regions. By
collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired,
the OCVP can help ensure that interventions are guided
by reliable evidence and that their impact is measured and
evaluated. It will also centralize data collection tools and
methodologies, and encourage their widespread use to
improve the comparability of the data collected.
UNDP Somalia is a founding member of the Somali
OCVP. Through its Rule of Law and Security Programme,
it supported the development and implementation of the
CVS in selected Somali districts between 2009 and 2010.
Specifically, this household survey was rolled out in the
districts of Burao, Bossaso, Galkayo and Las Anod,
as well as six Mogadishu districts (Waberi, Shangani,
Hamar Weyne, Hamar Jabjab, Dharkenley and Wadajir).
Locations were selected in order to cover some of the
major population centres so that more people might benefit
from the lessons drawn from the survey while at the
same time illustrating a variety of security challenges. In
particular, the locations surveyed vary between conflict,
post-conflict or crime-related. The entire raw data, as well
as the data collection tools and methodologies, form the
initial endowment of the OCVP and are publicly available
for further research.
Based on these data, UNDP Somalia then supported the
drafting, on behalf of the OCVP, of five Safety and Security
District Baseline Reports, which will also be translated
into Somali. These analytical reports are compiled using
a selection of data from the CVS, focus group results,
mapping information, key informant interviews and a
number of secondary sources. Results are validated by
the community and authorities prior to publication. The
reports will be supplemented every year by brief updates
of trends based on focus group discussions and possibly
new qualitative and quantitative data.
The picture of safety and security that emerges from
these baseline reports then guided the elaboration of
appropriate responses by communities, local and state
governments. These recommendations were elaborated
by the District Safety Committees (DSCs), which were
established under the authority of the District Council
in each location, composed of representatives of youth,
women, the elders and religious leaders, local government
and police/justice officials. The suggested interventions
are described in District Safety Plans, which will be
integrated into the District Development Framework and
as part of annual planning and budgeting cycles. Local
and international agencies will be able to benefit from
these tools to select, design and measure the impact of
ensuing interventions on the basis of this combination of
data and needs assessment.
This District Baseline Report is divided into eight
sections. Following this introduction, the research
methodology is described in Section 2. Section 3 provides
a general profile (mapping) of Bossaso District, including
important historical background notes. Section 4 looks at
perceptions of insecurity, and Section 5 presents the main
security concerns noted in Bossaso. The drivers and risk
factors underlying these problems are then explored in
Section 6. Section 7 examines the perceived performance
of justice and security actors, including the police, the
courts, women, the elders and religious leaders. Finally,
Section 8 provides some recommendations in response to
the analysis.
1
See www.somalipeacebuilding.org for more information.
11
2. Methodology
This Safety and Security District Baseline Report for
Bossaso was prepared through compilation of data and
information gathered through three research tools and
methodologies: a district mapping, the CVS and focus
group discussions. It was complemented by further desk
reviews. More information on the development, content
and use of the various tools is available in the Monitoring
and Assessment Toolkit. 2
2.1.
District mapping
The first tool used to produce this District Baseline
Report is a mapping of existing formal and informal
resources in the community to cope with insecurity. The
mapping template3 seeks to capture initial indications
on the composition of the target community, its
demographic profile and degree of social cohesion (e.g.
proportion of IDPs, clan profile). Historical background
information is included to reveal traumatic events that
may underpin the vulnerability of the community, and
past peace initiatives, which may provide important
lessons learned and influence perceptions regarding any
new peace initiatives. Existing institutions of justice,
security and healthcare have been surveyed to map out
the state’s capacity to enforce peace, justice and security,
and provide assistance to victims of violence. Finally,
capacity for peace such as civil society organizations,
initiatives or mechanisms – e.g. conflict management
mechanisms or neighbourhood watch schemes – have
been mapped out because, under certain conditions, they
could be incorporated into programmes. Knowing how
information is accessed/circulated in the community can
also be useful for future awareness-raising activities.
In Bossaso, a first mapping was carried out in December
2009 by SORSO. It was revised in April 2011 by the
Danish Demining Group, which also collected GPS
coordinates of various institutions.
2.2.The Crime and Victimization Survey
The second tool used was the CVS questionnaire, which
was developed during 2009.4 The CVS aims at providing
the necessary quantitative information for outlining an
accurate picture of crime and victimization in target
districts, and hence measuring the impact of interventions.
Enumerators in Bossaso were hired by NGO partner
SOCDA and trained in Bossaso with the support of the
Japan Centre for Conflict Prevention (JCCP).
The information gathered during the mapping exercise
12
was used to determine possible subdivisions in which
the CVS could be conducted. Subdivisions were chosen
after meeting with the local administration, partner
NGOs or the community elders to obtain a profile for
drawing maps, creating borders and estimating the
number of households. These were then used to create the
subdivisions of the districts. The researchers were then
able to identify starting points, followed by randomized
sampling of 20 households from each localized area. The
CVS was administered to 780 households, approximately
5,850 people. The average number of individuals per
household was around 7.5 (3.9 male and 3.6 female) and
the average of youth (under 15) per household, around 3.3
(1.8 male and 1.6 female).
The survey was conducted across 16 of the Bossaso
District subdivisions. Figure 1 presents the number of
surveys collected in each subdivision – Gerible Ubah,
Wadajir, Dayaha, Girible B, 26-June and Suweto, which
correspond to segments of Bossaso town.
Figure 1: Subdivisions of Bossaso District (Freq.)
Ref. R3_R (n= 736)
2.3. Focus groups discussions
The third tool is focus groups aimed to capture perceptions
about the nature of insecurity in the districts, its causes
and risk factors, victims and perpetrators, and capacities
for peace.5 SORSO convened the focus groups from 3 to
9 June 2010, bringing together women, youth, internally
displaced persons (IDPs), elders, religious leaders,
local authorities and residents from rural areas in seven
separate discussions. The focus groups began with asking
participants to define safety, security and violence, and
then to speak about the levels and changes in security
over the preceding 12 months. Participants were asked
to compile a thorough list of all major types of violence
experienced within Bossaso. They were then led through
a process of describing the causes, locations, times or
seasons, victims, perpetrators, means or weapons, and
levels of organization for each priority type of violence.
Finally, they were asked to identify the individuals
or institutions whom they trusted to either prevent or
respond to violence.
Each focus group was attended by between 15 and
20 participants, and efforts were made to ensure that
different genders, age groups and residents from different
areas were adequately represented; for the most part, this
was achieved. In the case of the focus group consisting
of rural residents, however, due to the last minute setup of the group, it consisted of only one woman and one
individual under the age of 30, and some questions were
ignored.
2.4. Validation
Results from the focus group discussions were
compiled and presented first to the community in a
four-day workshop held by SORSO in June 2010 with
representatives of the elders, religious groups, business
groups, the District Council, the judiciary, the police,
women’s and youth groups, professional associations,
secondary school students (youth) and the media. After
further desk-based reviews, a draft Community Safety
and Security Analysis was written up by Saferworld in
September 2010 based on this information. After further
editing, this was presented to the Bossaso District
Safety Committee by UNDP in November 2010, during
which time some additional qualitative information was
received.
2
The Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit is available at http://www.
somalipeacebuilding.org/pb-resources/maa.html
3
See Annex A of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
4
See Annex B of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
5
See Annex C of the Monitoring and Assessment Toolkit.
13
3. Mapping of Bossaso District
3.1. Historical notes
The city of Bossaso was first established in 1745 by
nomadic Somalis and an Arab fisherman named Qasim,
after whom it gained its original name of Bender Qasim.
Bossaso has undergone a rapid increase in its urban
population, following Somalia’s 1991 civil war. Until the
early 1990s, it was a tiny port town with an estimated
population of between 10,000–20,000 inhabitants.
Under the rule of Siad Barre, exports were indeed routed
through the country’s major all-weather ports in the south
rather than in Bossaso, which can only be used for part
of the year.6 The year 1991, however, saw the collapse of
the central state and the flight by members of the Harti
sub-clan group to the northeast from the south, and from
parts of present-day Somaliland. Following the 1991
civil war, the population of Bossaso quickly doubled.
But this growth was organic. Without input from local
government, building was unplanned and development,
uneven. The legacy is one of make-shift infrastructure
and overcrowding.
The area was fortunate in some respects. Although
Bossaso received huge numbers of IDPs, some incomers
were successful businesspeople or skilled government
technocrats who brought skills and economic drive that
enabled its subsequent growth. In addition, much of the
northeast’s infrastructure and public buildings were also
preserved in 1991 because the region did not succumb to
the same intensity of violence and destruction as the rest
of Somalia.
Following the fall of the dictatorial regime of Siad Barre
in 1991, Puntland came under the control of the Somali
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), whose administrative
seat lay in Bossaso. With their tacit approval, the Al-Ittihad
Al-Islami (AIAI) established strategic posts throughout
the northeast of the country, taking control of Bossaso’s
port and hospital, and establishing a large military base
in Qaw, 20 kilometres from Bossaso. In 1992, following
his release from five years’ imprisonment, Abdullahi
Yusuf, the founder of the SSDF, launched a campaign
of resistance against AIAI – indeed, the latter’s growing
military capacity in their Garowe and Bossaso bases was
increasingly perceived as a threat. On the morning of
19 June 1992, AIAI forces sealed off the city of Garowe
and launched simultaneous attacks on locations in the
country’s northeast, including Bossaso. SSDF forces,
bolstered by quickly formed clan militias in the region,
responded quickly and regained control of the northeast,
killing 600 AIAI fighters in the process.7
14
The Bari Regional Administration was formed around
Bossaso between 1993 and 1996 through inter-clan
negotiations held in order to smooth over divisions within
the SSDF militia force and among leaders of the Bari
region’s dominant clan, the Osman Mohamoud. Since
Bossaso port was the main source of public revenue for
the entire Northeast at that time, there was a good deal
at stake in these negotiations. Initial talks produced a
proposal for a local administration that was considered by
all clans and sub-clans in Bari and subsequently to a sixmonth All Bari Communities Conference in 1995. In early
1996, this conference concluded with an agreement to
form a regional council, which would define a subsequent
regional administration. Over time, nine district councils
were formed; proving viable in most cases, they vindicated
the idea of decentralized governance for the whole region.
In time, the newly established regional administration
reached an agreement on sharing revenue from the port
with other regions, and funding common security forces
and social services.8 In parallel, the 1998 formation of the Puntland
administration flowed from a power-sharing arrangement
between the northeast’s main clans. The state’s 1998
interim charter reflected this arrangement, carefully
balancing representation within the government and with
control of the economy between dominant sub-clans,
particularly the Omar Mohamoud, Issa Mohamoud,
Osman Mohamoud, Dhulbahante and Warsangeli. But
while the dominant Darod groups assented, minorities felt
increasingly excluded. The Yusuf government did make
progress with institution-building and rehabilitation,
but in 2001, Yusuf ultimately refused to step down in
favour of a rival, Jama Ali Jama who had been selected as
leader by the traditional elders (Isimada). This triggered
two years of warfare – also affecting Bossaso – until
Yusuf emerged victorious with Ethiopian support. Jama
eventually left the country, and in 2003 Yusuf was reappointed president.
3.2. Geography and demographics
Bossaso District is located to the north of Puntland State
of Somalia. It lies within the administrative region of
Bari.9 Puntland is mostly composed of semi-arid land
supporting nomadic pastoralists who raise goats, camels
and sheep. Except for a small number of urban centres
including Galkayo, the administrative capital Garowe
and the port town of Bossaso, most other settlements are
small villages, including a significant number of coastal
settlements dependent on fishing.
Bossaso District is dominated by the port town of
Bossaso. Located on the Gulf of Aden, Bossaso is
Somalia’s commercial centre and one of Somalia’s most
important ports. The district spans approximately 36
square kilometres comprised of the town itself and some
50 small outlying villages. The city of Bossaso has 16
administrative subdivisions10 and many small outlying
hamlets such as Laag, which lies to the south. To its east
lies the Baalade Valley and to the west, the Biyokulul area.
The city is divided in two by the main tarmac road, which
runs from the port south to Galkayo in central Somalia.
It is also connected to the Gulf States and neighbouring
countries by a small international airport.
Map 1: Somalia
24.3 percent rural or sedentary. Population figures and
growth rate are debated.14 As will be further explained
below, the area has not only been the site of huge inward
migration, but also acts as a jump-off point for illegal
migration to neighbouring countries and across the Gulf
of Aden.
Puntland is the historic home of the Darod superclan and
the Harti clan group in particular.15 Partly for this reason,
Puntland is relatively homogenous at the level of clan in
comparison to the other regions of Somalia. In Bossaso
District, most survey respondents identified themselves
as members of the Darod clan (72.5%), followed by the
Bantu clan (7.4%); other clans (4.1% or less) include, inter
alia, the Hawiye, Dir, Arab, Madiban, Digil-Mirifle and
Isaq (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Clan of head of household (Weighted)
Source: United Nations Administrative Map, 2011
It only rains in Bossaso every three to four years on
average, which regularly leads to flooding. The hagaa
season, lasting roughly from April to September, is
characterized by high temperatures and strong winds.
From mid-April to the end of August, few vessels travel
in and out of Bossaso port, and many residents leave town
for cooler areas.
Bossaso depends for its security and stability on Puntland
and the wider region. Disputes in neighbouring areas
have the potential to destabilize the district as do major
political changes at the state level. In Bossaso District, the
small farming village of Galgala, some 45 km southwest
of Bossaso town in the Golis mountains, has also had a
destabilizing influence. Galgala was the base of a small
militia fighting under the leadership of Atom.11 Although
they mainly operated in Galgala and the nearby villages
of Laag, Yalho and Karin, government officials were also
targeted elsewhere, including through assassinations
carried out in Bossaso town. A series of military
offensives in 2010 and 2011 reduced this threat.12
Precise population figures for Bossaso are difficult to
arrive at since estimates vary considerably, but a working
figure of 200,000 is often used.13 According to the CVS,
Bossaso District is classified as 75.7 percent urban and
Ref. RP9 (n=739)
The majority of Bossaso District are permanent residents
(71.9%), followed by IDPs (21.0%) and refugees (7.2%).
Figure 3: Residential status (Freq. %)
Ref. RP10 (n=739)
According to recent estimates, there are between
28,00016 and 50,000 IDPs in and around the outskirts
of Bossaso town, spread over 24 camps of varying
size. Most focus groups rated IDPs as among the most
vulnerable groups of victims in Bossaso due to their low
economic standing and poor access to security services
and infrastructure. Nevertheless, relations between IDP
and host communities seem remarkably good. There are
probably a number of reasons for this: since IDPs largely
originate from the south-central region of Somalia, they
share many of the same cultural and religious practices as
their host community counterparts; within Bossaso, both
communities share social services such as healthcare;
IDP children whose parents can afford education attend
15
the same schools as host community children; and there
is intermarriage between the communities. In addition,
many IDPs also work within the host community: men
are largely employed in construction, while women work
in domestic service for host families. Moreover, focus
group discussions mentioned that the elders from both
host and IDP communities cooperated with one another
fairly regularly. For example, in 2009, the elders from the
host community successfully advocated on behalf of IDP
communities for a lowering of a government-instituted
tax on temporary shelters.17 Further, when fires broke out
in one of the camps, host community elders supported a
response, raising money and collecting goods to support
them.
unevenly, however, with high rates of poverty and
inequality afflicting most of the population. According
to the sociological profile of CVS respondents from
Bossaso District, 21.0 percent of survey respondents
are unemployed. Out of those who are employed, 38.0
percent are manual labourers, 16.0 percent are traders or
entrepreneurs, 9.3 percent are farmers, and 5.1 percent
fishermen. Less significant occupations consist of
government positions (3.8%), work in NGOs and United
Nations agencies (1.9%), private security (1.5%) and other
vocations (1.8%) (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Occupation of the head of household (Freq. %)
3.3. Resources and economy
The private sector is the primary source of economic
activity in Puntland and Bossaso. The range of sectors
is limited, however, and there is overdependence on
livestock and its export, and on diaspora remittances
and investment. Today, Bossaso is Somalia’s main port
for imports and exports servicing most of the needs of
Sanaag and Sool and much of central Somalia, with 95
percent of products being traded with the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). In addition to meat, Bossaso, like the
rest of Puntland, imports all its basic goods and food
stuffs, including rice, pasta, cooking oil and tomato
paste. Much of the trade comes from Dubai. The import
market, however, remains poorly co-ordinated with
few businessmen working together to buy in bulk and
all importing very similar goods, creating a highly
competitive but limited market.18 It should be noted
that Bossaso port is the main source of public revenue
for the entire northeast, making it a location of strategic
importance.
Exports include livestock and livestock products, fish
and seafood, and frankincense, myrrh and other aromatic
gums. Somalia’s livestock market suffered considerably
following bans instituted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
in 1998 and 2000 to curb the spread of the Rift Valley
fever. The market has recovered to some extent since the
lifting of those bans in November 2009, but was hit by
droughts and the impact of piracy on exports in 2009.
Difficulty with the livestock market has encouraged some
development of the fishing industry, but this has remained
relatively small in scale and has been severely damaged
by illegal fishing of Somali waters and subsequent
increases in levels of piracy. Other than the import-export
business, Bossaso has seen substantial investment in real
estate during this period from Diaspora sources, which
has transformed the city landscape.
16
The benefits of this growth are distributed very
Ref. RP11 (n=732)
Salaries and income earned are largely unavailable; hence,
the CVS deduces household wealth through consumption
spending. Nearly half of Bossaso households spend US$
9.00 or less per day on food; 27.3 percent spend US$ 0.00–
4.00, and 21.6 percent spend US$ 4.00– 9.00. However,
there are significant pockets of outliers within the district
who spend much more: 13.0 percent of respondents
indicated a daily budget of US$ 60.00–64.00; 4.6 percent,
US$ 95.00–99.00 (4.6%), and 6.2 percent, over US$ 99.00
(6.2%) (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Daily spending on food (US$) (Freq. %)
Ref. RP13_R (n=615)
Disparities also affect the urban landscape in Bossaso.
Together with impressive construction of hotels, small
businesses and residential units, unplanned urban slums
have emerged. Poverty rates are expectedly high across
Somalia, with aggregated statistics suggesting that around
43 percent of the population lives on less than US$ 1 per
day.19 There are known disparities between Puntland’s
regions and within Bossaso, however. For example,
according to one measurement, the per capita income
per year in the Bari Region within which lies Bossaso
District, is US$ 250–300 per year (the same as in Sool
and Sanaag), while it is only US$ 150–200 in the more
southerly Mudug and Nugaal regions.20 Bossaso city’s
poorest communities are Hormud, Horseed, Wadajir, X.
Carab, Suweto and Sanfaro.21 Unemployment and idleness are rife across Puntland
and also in Bossaso. Rural and urban areas are affected
alike, for although employment opportunities are at least
conceivably available in the towns, most vacancies require
technical skills that are generally lacking. Given the high
unemployment rates, it is common to see young men
sitting idly around in towns, but women are particularly
disadvantaged in the job market given their history of
exclusion from the schooling system and cultural pressure
to remain in the home. This is all the more striking given
that, according to a 2005 study, approximately 70 percent
of Bossaso households, including IDP households, are
headed by or dependent on a woman.22 This indicates that
across Bossaso, women are the primary breadwinners for
many households in which men are either absent, unable
or unwilling to find work.23 These women are largely
self-employed and involved in petty trading of small
goods, although a significant number, particularly those
belonging to IDP communities, also take up daily casual
labour or domestic service. Socio-economic problems
are particularly pressing among Bossaso’s significant
population of IDPs. The household income of the most
well-off IDPs is roughly equivalent to the top of range of
poor host community households.24 3.4. Access to basic services
Social services have not kept pace with Bossaso’s rapid
population increase. As a UN-Habitat report points out,
“urban services, education, and health care are in a
deplorable state, since Bossaso developed very fast during
the civil war in an administrative and political vacuum”.25 For example, four out of 16 sub-sections of Bossaso’s
town do not have a primary school and, for those that
do, education still remains well beyond the economic
reach of many households. Educational opportunities are
particularly limited for girls, who are frequently regarded
as less worthwhile investments since they likely marry
and leave the home at around their 15th birthday.
According to the CVS, over 60 percent of Bossaso District
heads of households have acquired some form of education
(Figure 6); 44.6 percent of respondents indicated that the
head of household was formally educated and an additional
16.2 percent received a form of informal education, thus
leaving 39.2 percent of heads of households without any
education. Out of those informally educated, over half
(58.4%) have received some form of life-skills or literacy
training, and the remaining 41.6 percent had attended a
religious school. Of those formally educated, 17.6 percent
have completed an advanced degree up to university or
college. Roughly half (46.6%) completed either secondary
or high school; an additional 30.0 percent completed an
intermediate level education, and 5.8 percent had only
attended primary school.
Figure 6: Level and type of education of heads of
households (Freq. %)
Ref. RP14 (n=722), RP15 (n=113) RP16 (n=313)
Similarly, there is a significant need for improved
healthcare, especially due to major issues in basic hygiene
and sanitation. According to the World Bank, infant
mortality rates in Puntland are among the worst in the
world; three-quarters of the population lack access to
safe drinking water; and 19 hospitals serve a population
of approximately 1.1 m people.26 Yet, the Puntland
government’s budget is limited (estimated as US$ 18.8
m in 2005)27 and only 11 percent is allocated to either
development or service delivery. Consequently, like
elsewhere in Somalia, it is non-state actors, international
NGOs and United Nations agencies that provide most
services.
Nevertheless, urban areas like Bossaso are better off than
rural areas in terms of state service provision. Bossaso
has two hospitals, Bossaso General Hospital, with 130
beds, and Puntland General Hospital, with 30 beds. In
addition, the district has five mother and child health
clinics.28 According to one source, nearly half of all
Puntland health personnel work in Bossaso town, while
Eastern Sanaag region has only one doctor.29
In relative terms, Bossaso town and municipality fare
better according to most socio-economic indicators, from
literacy levels to income. However, while the district’s
population has exploded over the last two decades,
social services have failed to keep pace with the rapid
change. At present levels, social safety nets and economic
opportunities are too few to counterbalance continued
population growth and attendant pressures. The Ministry
of Interior is currently working together with a number of
international agencies under the UN Joint Programme on
17
Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
(JPLG) on a district development framework. The
district administration and district councils are involved
in designing an overall plan for service delivery that
incorporates the priorities of communities from across
Bossaso District. 3.5. Governance
Bossaso town is the capital of the Bari region, one of
Puntland’s seven administrative regions. Bossaso’s
security is overseen by the Bari Regional Governor, who
chairs regional security meetings, as well as the Bari
Regional Division, which is responsible for co-ordinating
and supervising police posts. Furthermore, the town has
a number of national representatives from, inter alia, the
Ministries of Interior, Security, Women’s Development
and Family Affairs, Livestock and Environment, and
Agriculture, as well as co-ordinators for health, education,
planning and international cooperation and agriculture
within the region.
The district has a District Council chaired by a mayor.
At the sub-district level, governance takes the form
of 16 village committees, as well as a number of IDP
committees.30
UNDP, ILO & PI (July 2005) Territorial Diagnosis & Institutional
Mapping: Bossaso-Galkayo Corridor. p.35.
6
See for example, ‘The Birth and Rise of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the
Somali Inhabited Regions in the Horn of Africa’, A. Duale Sii'arag,
November 13, 2005. http://wardheernews.com/articles/November/13__
Alittihad_Sii'arag.html
7
8
The Search for Peace, The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up
Approach to Peace and State Building, Interpeace and PDRC, 2007,
p. 22.
9
Bari has ten administrative sub-divisions of which Bossaso is one.
10
These are: Wadajir, Hawl wadaag, Hurmuud, Kulmiye, Horseed,
October, Girible Ubax, Gibible A, Girible B, Sanfarow, Dayaxa,
Gusoore, 26 June, Suweyto, 1st Luulyo, and Xaafatul Carab.
the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, FEWS NET/USAID,
Somalia, October 2009, p. 11. Another study conducted by Progressive
Interventions for the UNDP and ILO in the same year estimated the
population at 200,000. Territorial Diagnosis and Institutional Mapping,
Bossaso-Galkayo Corridor, UNDP, ILO & PI, July 2005, p. 73.
14
A UN-HABITAT report published in February 2009 estimates a total
town population of 250,000. Bossaso: First Steps Toward Strategic
Urban Planning, UN-Habitat, February 2009, p. 18. A USAID report
published in October 2009 estimates a total urban population of
approximately 480,000. USAID, op. cit., October 2009, p.11, whereas
the municipality estimates a total population of between 700,000 to 1
million inhabitants living in the district. Bossaso Community Mapping
provided by SORSO.
15
The Harti clan group is composed of the Majeerteen (found mainly
in Bari, Nugaal and North Mudug Regions of Puntland as well as in
Zone 5 of Ethiopia), the Dhulbahante (in Sool and Sanaag regions),
the Warsangeli (in Sanaag and Bari) and the Deshiishe clans (again in
Bari region). Three other clans of the Harti clan group, the Geesaguule,
Kaskiqabe and Liibaangashe, are found in all of these regions, as well
as a number of other Darod clans, including the Marehan, Leylkase
and Awrtable and minority groups, such as the Arab Mohamud
Saalah, Madhibaan, Tumaal, and Bantu. Minorities in the area include
Meheri Arabs and Ethiopians, many of who are transitory migrants.
See Interpeace and PDRC (2007) The Search for Peace, The Puntland
Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building. p. 8
“Puntland helps IDPs integrate, learn skills”, IRIN, 27 May 2010,
http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx? ReportId=89271.
16
17
The elders’ focus group.
18
UNDP, ILO & PI, op. cit., p. 65.
19
Somalia Socio-Economic Survey, UNDP/WB, 2002.
20
UN/World Bank, op. cit., p. 6.
21
USAID, op. cit., p. 7.
22
UNDP, ILO & PI, op. cit., p. 73.
According to one estimate, the percentage of female-headed or
female-dependent households in Bossaso is 70 percent, including IDP
households. UNDP/ILO, op. cit., p. 73.
23
24
On many issues, however, it is not possible to obtain disaggregated
data on women and IDPs; aggregate statistics conceal a good degree of
inequality and disadvantage. UNDP/ILO, op. cit., p. 74.
25
UN-Habitat, op. cit., p. 18.
26
27
Ibid., p. 16.
28
District mapping by the Danish Demining Group, April 2011.
United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), 10 March 2010, p. 45.
Somali Reconstruction and Development Programme: Deepening
Peace and Reducing Poverty, Vol. 3, Puntland, UN/World Bank, 2007,
p. 5.
United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010), 18 July
2011, p. 14.
Interview with the District Safety Committee as part of the District
mapping by the Danish Demining Group, April 2011.
29
11
12
UNDP uses a working figure of 120,000, which dates back to 2005.
Bossaso Urban Household Economic Study: A special report by
13
18
30
4. Perceptions of insecurity
Feelings or perceptions of insecurity are important to
measure because people regulate their behaviour on the
basis of these abstract emotions. Bossaso focus group
participants described violence as the violation of one’s
body, dignity or property. Safety and security were
described as the protection from largely external threats.
These threats could be physical (beatings, murder,
etc.), environmental (floods, heat, etc.), socio-economic
(possibility of earning a living or travelling to/from the
market) or religious (freedom of religious belief and
expression) in nature. Almost all groups described the need
to preserve and protect individuals’ and communities’
sense of dignity as central to real safety and security, and
all groups described safety as a situation where day and
night are a time of peacefulness, and people can sleep and
wake without fear.
Three quarters of CVS respondents consider that Bossaso
District has become safer than during the 12 months
preceding the survey; however, there is still a significant
number who feel that their communities have become less
safe. This phenomenon deserves further investigation into
which specific communities are feeling more vulnerable
and why. While both men and women tend to perceive a
general increase in safety, women tend to be slightly more
cautious than men (Figure 7).
Figure 8: Level of perceived safety walking after dark
(Weighted %)
Ref. PV2xRP1 (n=740)
Very few activities are avoided due to the insecurity, with
the exception of keeping property or livestock outdoors
(62.3%) (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Activities avoided due to insecurity (Freq. %)
70.0
62.3
60.0
53.9
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2.3 2.3
3.1 2.5
10.1
3.0
4.0
Figure 7: Change in perceived safety over the last 12
months (Weighted %)
Ref. PV3 (n=481), PV4 (n=480), PV5 (n=466), and PV6 (n=478)
At least five out of seven focus groups concluded that they
felt more secure over the previous 12 months than ever
before.31 Some participants, however, felt they could “no
longer trust their own brother” for fear that he might be
involved in assassinations, which was indicated as a new
trend.
Ref. PV1 (n=735)
In agreement with the change in community safety,
perceived safety related to walking at night is nearly
unanimous, with an average of 97.8 percent of total
respondents stating that it was rather safe to very safe,
including 97.3 percent of female respondents (Figure 8).
Based on focus group discussions it seems that perceptions
of security in Bossaso are very much linked to key
historical events and wider trends: memories of fierce
fighting in the district during the early 1990s; more recent
stories of violent conflict in the south-central region of
Somalia; and the rise of political or criminal killings in
the Bossaso area from 2006 to date.
Memories of violent clashes between competing SSDF
and AIAI groups in 1992 were vivid among many
focus group participants. This is striking since many
of Bossaso’s current residents were new immigrants
19
to the area and therefore would not have experienced
the violence firsthand. It is possible that this historical
narrative is bolstered by more recent fighting in Bossaso
in 2001, or currently, in the country’s south-central
region. Indeed, large numbers of IDPs transiting through
or settling in Bossaso bring with them stories of violent
conflict in the south.
Witnessing violence is also a key contributor to feelings
of insecurity. According to the CVS, 66 respondent
households (8.5% of the sample) had witnessed a property
crime. The majority witnessed between one and three
property crimes. In addition, 68 respondent households
were witness to an assault, 56 percent of whom witnessed
one incident, and 30.9 percent witnessed two incidents
(Figure 10).
20
Figure 10: Number of crimes witnessed (Freq.)
Ref. WV2 (n=66), WV3 (n=68)
31
These were focus groups of women, elders, religious leaders, local
authorities and residents from rural areas. The question was not posed
to the IDP group, and the youth group responded that the situation had
worsened.
5. Forms of insecurity and violence
A criminological typology of violence includes standard crimes such as homicide, assault, sexual violence, or property
crime. In the Somali context, some individual crimes are often viewed as components of broader conflict dynamics and
inter-group violence. Remarkably, however, in Bossaso, conflicts did not arise as an issue in focus group discussions.
They will nevertheless be discussed in this section. As Table 1 illustrates, the overriding concern for most focus groups
was a spate of assassinations that focus group respondents referred to as ‘unknown killings’, followed by piracy, theft,
violence related to migration, child trafficking, domestic violence and rape/sexual violence.
Table 1: Prioritization of different types of violence by focus groups
1
2
3
4
Women
Youth
Elders
Religious groups
Internally
displaced
persons (IDPs)
Villagers/ rural
areas
Local
authorities
‘Unknown
killing’
Explosions
(i.e. related to
‘unknown killing’)
‘Unknown
killing’
‘Unknown killing’
Violence
against women
‘Unknown
killing’
‘Illegal killing’
(i.e. not
revenge killing)
Theft
‘Unknown killing’
Piracy
Theft (of houses and
mobiles phones)
‘Unknown
killing’
Piracy
Piracy
Rape
Emigration
Emigration
Piracy
Rape
Theft (w/o
weapons)
Emigration
Domestic
violence
Pirates
Emigration
Theft
Child trafficking
Child trafficking
The following section will present the quantitative data
collected on individual crimes, replacing it in the context
of the dominant forms of violence identified in focus
group discussions, and presenting it as far as possible in
order of importance for the community.
5.1. Homicide
Homicide was investigated as a component of assault
among CVS respondents. Only one account was declared
through the CVS. This type of crime, however, appeared
to be the biggest priority among focus group participants.
It was stated that assassinations were usually carried out
using pistols and AK-47s.
According to focus group participants, ‘unknown
killings' refer to a type of homicide not motivated by
traditional revenge or honour issues. The perpetrators and
motives behind these killings were not known or at least
not declared by focus group participants who were even
fearful of discussing the topic at points. The profile of
most victims suggests that there is a political dimension
to this, linked either to the growth of militant political
Islamic groups or to more routine inter-party (and interclan) rivalries.32 Importantly, victims have included
women as well as men; at least two women were killed in
2010. This marks a significant shift away from traditional
norms surrounding birima gaydo, or the protection from
violence of groups within society such as women and
children. According to members of the local authority
focus group, the assassins are directed by phone and are
generally young men with no previous relationship to the
victims who are hired by outsiders. Another suggestion,
made publicly at government security meetings, is that
the killers originate from the south-central region of
the country and hide themselves in the IDP camps.
However, when pressed further as to how these murders
are organized, focus group participants tended to become
uncomfortable with the line of enquiry.
In addition to concerns over immediate security, these
killings also threaten the social fabric of Bossaso society.
The lack of clear information on the motives, perpetrators
and levels of organization of these assassinations, as
well the broadening of the potential victims to include
previously protected segments of society, contribute to
a sense that anyone can be a victim and indeed anyone
can be a perpetrator. Focus group participants repeatedly
spoke of increased levels of suspicion and fear, even
within their own families. Several participants stated that
one could not speak freely about particular incidents even
with one’s own brother for fear that he might be involved,
while other participants became visibly more guarded
and uncomfortable in their responses when pressed for
details. They were also doubtful about the ability of their
traditional leaders, who have managed other kinds of
killing, to prevent or respond to this new phenomenon.
21
The better understood inter-clan revenge killings were
of greatest concern to residents from rural areas in focus
groups, for whom problems of deforestation, water use
and land demarcation are pressing. Other focus group
participants were less concerned with these killings than
with ‘unknown killings’, perhaps because they witness
them less but understand them more easily. Just as occurs
elsewhere in Somalia, clan groups compete for access to
scarce resources such as water, land and pasture in rural
areas with xeer law providing a framework to manage
conflicts. This type of violence has a strong seasonal
dimension: both rain and drought may trigger violence
since they shift grazing patterns and the movement
of people and animals. One example is the increase of
revenge killings in rural areas when rains begin and
communities move to fresh pasture. The problem is also
related to identity, memory and cultures in songs and
poems, however, as each clan group maintains a narrative
of the rights and wrongs done to them, which can play
into cycles of vengeance against perceived transgressors.
5.2. Assault or physical attack
Thirty-nine respondents (5.4% of the sample) indicated
that at least one member of their household was victim to
an assault or physical attack over the 12 months prior to
the survey. In 32 households (82.1%), only one incident
occurred; however, six households (15.4%) recorded two
incidents of assault or physical attack in the period, and
one household (2.6%) experienced assault or physical
attack four times (Figure 11).
Figure 12: Location and time of day of attack/assault (Freq.)
Ref. AA4 (n=40)
Only 12.5 percent of victims reported that no weapons
were used. Of those who experienced an armed attack, the
most common weapons used by perpetrators were more
primitive ones such as stones, bottles, glass, ropes, sticks
and fire (32.5%). The second most common weapons used
were knives, swords, pangas, axes and clubs (25.0%). The
third most common were Kalashnikov-type assault rifles
(20.0%). Less common weapons used were pistols and
revolvers (5.0%); hunting rifles or shotguns (2.5%); and
bombs, hand grenades or other explosives (2.5%) (Figure
13).
Figure 13: Type of weapon used in assault (Freq. %)
Figure 11: Number of assaults experienced (Freq.)
Ref. AA6 (n= 40)
Ref. AA2 (n=39)
Furthermore, out of the 39 respondent households who
were victim to assault, eight stated that there were two or
more victims at the time of the crime.
Assaults are most likely to occur at night in the home
(35.0%) and at night in the street (30.0%). Overall, 20
percent of assaults occurred in the morning and 12.5
percent in the afternoon (Figure 12).
22
5.2.1. Victims
The pattern of assault or physical attack disaggregated by
gender and age illustrates that more males than females are
likely to be victims of assault at a younger age; however,
females remain vulnerable for a longer period. Attacks
on young men between the ages of 15 and 29 remain the
most critical (28.3% of total assaults). Similarly, females
are more likely to encounter assault from ages 25 to 29,
yet remain at a relatively high risk from the ages 15 to 44
(Figure 14).
Figure 14: Gender and age of assault victims (Freq.)
Figure 17: Level of injury (Freq. %)
Ref. AA13_R (n=53)
Ref. AA12_R1 by AA11_R: male (n=26) and female (n=27)
In addition, 14.5 percent of the Bantu population had
been victimized in the 12 months preceding the survey,
against 10.0 percent of the Hawiye and 8.0 percent of the
Dir (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Victims of assault or physical attack, by clan
(Weighted %)
5.2.2. Perpetrators
The majority of victims identified the perpetrators
as individual criminals (80.0%), followed by family
or relatives (7.5%), friends or neighbours (5.0%),
government forces such as the army or police (5.0%), and
finally, member(s) of an organized armed group (2.5%).
Differences are not significant between genders, although
women were at a marginally higher risk from individual
criminals and family/relatives, while only men are
targeted by organized armed groups (Figure 18).
Figure 18: Profile of perpetrators of assault, by gender of
victim (Weighted %)
Ref. AA1xRP9 (n=40)
By residential status, 11.6 percent of the IDP households
had been victimized, a similar percentage to that of
refugees, at 11.3 percent; 3.0 percent of permanent
residents were victimized (Figure 16).
Figure 16: Victims of assault or physical attack, by
Ref. AA7xAA11_R (n=40)
residential status (Weighted %)
Only individual criminals, organized armed groups and
government forces used firearms. In addition, within
the CVS, there were ten incidents (29.4% of assaults) in
which victims indicated that the perpetrator was under
the influence of drugs, alcohol or qat. 34
5.3. Piracy
Ref. AA1xRP10 (n=40)
The majority of victims of assault or physical attack
required, at the minimum, minor medical attention, with
only 13.2 percent indicating no injury at all. Roughly half
of the victims (50.9%) indicated that they suffered slight
injuries; an additional 22.6 percent had suffered medium
injuries that required medical assistance, and 11.3 percent
of victims were more seriously injured and required
hospitalization (Figure 17). The remaining case resulted
in the victim’s death.33
Another major security issue that focus group participants
dwelt on was piracy, although the CVS does not provide
specific data to illustrate this phenomenon. Bossaso’s long
stretch of coastline and booming port make the district
one of Puntland’s centres for piracy activity, both off its
shores and within its city limits. Focus group participants
explained that the problem started as fishermen sought
to protect Somali waters from large illegal fishing boats
whose size and advanced technology allowed them to catch
large quantities of fish while severely damaging much
smaller Somali boats and nets. Following the collapse of
the Somali Government and the state’s inability to patrol
23
and protect its waters, young fishermen took on this role
but soon began demanding payments for their services.
Today, this relatively small protection racket has been
transformed into a multi-million dollar criminal enterprise
with established salary levels and defined career tracks.
In their earliest years, piracy networks were formed primarily
according to village and clan affiliations, with leaders
recruiting members they knew personally. As a result, some
clans began to dominate the piracy industry. Piracy today,
however, functions much more like a recruiting agency that
crosses ethnic and clan lines to target a particular set of
skills. Thus, former soldiers are recruited to handle weapons
and security, former fishermen to drive boats, and those
with language skills are recruited as translators.
Pirates operate primarily from September to May
following the haaga season in which the Gulf of Aden
experiences high winds and the waters are often too rough
to safely travel. Although much of the business of piracy
occurs at sea, the impact of piracy on Bossaso District
is profound. Since 2007, increasing risk of piracy has
triggered a steep rise in the price of basic goods imported
from abroad. Shipping companies are required to pay
higher insurance premiums to offset the risk of sailing
in the Somali seas.35 The result has been a reduction in
Bossaso’s independent business sector, much of which
can no longer afford to import goods. Piracy has also
increased the level of economic stress on already very
poor households, who now struggle even more to meet
the rising prices of basic goods. Many of these households
have suffered the effects of piracy doubly since insecure
access to the port has hampered the delivery of food aid.
Focus group participants also explained that beyond
piracy’s direct impact on Bossaso’s economy, the presence
of pirates on land significantly contributes to increased
risks of violence, both through the proliferation of weapons
and the spread of drug use. Weapons commonly used
by pirates include AK-47s, Bardolol and PKM machine
guns, rocket-propelled grenades and pistols. While these
weapons are primarily used at sea, the demand for them
by individuals associated with piracy contributes to their
increased availability within Bossaso itself. Similarly,
there is some evidence to suggest that the presence of
pirates in the region contributes to increased drug use,
particularly among young men. While on land, pirates
frequently spend their money on qat or other substances
such as sniffing glue or alcohol. They allegedly also
occasionally offer free samples to other youth.
Although it was not discussed in the focus groups, the
United Nations Monitoring Group asserts that “in northeastern Somalia, pirate leaders have compromised state
institutions at both the local and central levels by coopting and corrupting government officials.”36 However,
24
since late April 2009, state security forces have been
conducting an anti-piracy campaign with some effect,
raiding a number of hideouts and ultimately imposing
lengthy jail sentences. In addition, an awareness-raising
campaign (wa’yigelin) may have had some preventive
effect.37 The Government also illustrates its commitment
to fighting piracy by pointing out that it jailed nearly 300
convicted or suspected pirates in the last few years.38
5.4. Property crime
There were 65 cases of property crimes witnessed by
CVS respondents over the 12 months prior to the survey;
36 respondent households (4.6% of the sample, or 4.9% of
the respondents) were victim of a type of property crime,
nine of which resulted in injuries and required medical
attention (Figure 19).
Figure 19: Property crime witnessed, experienced, and
resulting in injuries (Freq.)
Ref. WV2 (n=66), PC1 (n=36/741), and PC7 (n=36)
Out of those 36 households who were victim to property
crimes, nine experienced crimes twice and one was
victimized three times. No respondent households were
victim more than three times.
The great majority of property crimes were either home
burglaries (36.1%) or theft of personal property while on
the streets (36.1%). Other violations to property included
theft of crops or livestock (16.7%), theft of land or illicit
use of a water point (8.3%), and other crimes not specified
in the questionnaire (2.8%) (Figure 20).
Figure 20: Type of property violated (Freq. %)
Ref. PC3 (n=36)
According to the CVS, crimes against property are
mainly perpetrated by individual criminals (71.4%). To
a much lesser degree, perpetrators were also identified as
members of organized armed groups (14.3%), family or
relatives (5.7%), friends or neighbours (5.7%), or members
of the government police or military (2.9%) (Figure 21).
Figure 21: Profile of perpetrators of property crime (Freq.
%)
Ref. PC6 (n=35)
Property crimes were more frequent at the beginning
of the year, with nine crimes – over one-quarter of total
property crimes (26.5%) committed in January alone,
following by February, with six declared crimes (17.6%).
Thereafter, there was a steep drop in March claiming
only one crime (2.9%). No property crimes were reported
in April and November; the rest of the months varied
between one and three crimes per month (Figure 22).
Figure 22: Month of property crime (Freq. %)
Ref. PC4 (n=34)
Theft is an increasingly serious threat to the daily
lives of Bossaso’s citizens, according to focus group
participants. Participants distinguished between broadly
two categories of theft: unarmed and opportunistic versus
armed and semi-organized.
According to focus group discussions, the most common
type of theft in Bossaso is largely opportunistic in nature
and rarely involves the use of weapons. Many of these
thefts occur in the evening hours while people are busy
bargaining or returning from the mosque in the town’s
poorly lit or congested central marketplaces. Burglaries
are also very common, affecting both wealthy families
who travel to cooler regions for the hot hagaa summer
months leaving their city homes unoccupied, and IDPs,39
whose homes are not secured.
IDPs and women are said by focus group participants
to be among the biggest victims of theft in Bossaso and
are often the first targets of opportunistic theft. IDPs’
homes, which are constructed out of cardboard and
other disposable goods, leave their occupants largely
unprotected. Houses are often packed tightly together,
lacking proper doors and windows, and surrounded by
low fences over which perpetrators can quickly jump.
Thieves are thus able to move between one house and
another, often robbing several in succession. Femaleheaded households are increasingly at risk because they
are seen as posing an even smaller threat to potential
thieves. For a similar reason, women are often targeted by
thieves who operate in the streets during evening market
hours.
A second, less common but emerging type of theft in
Bossaso is armed theft, which appears to be perpetrated by
small and loosely organized criminal gangs of youth from
both IDP and host communities. The tooray or traditional
double-edged Somali knife remains the most commonly
used weapon, but focus group participants suggested
that pistols were becoming an increasingly popular and
available alternative that may be lent in exchange for
payments of qat or a cut of the value of the stolen goods.
In the focus group discussion among local government
officials, the view was that while perpetrators were often
from IDP communities, the firearms used generally
belonged to members of the host community. These thefts
most commonly involve stealing items such as mobile
phones or small amounts of cash. Some criminal gangs
have begun to carry out more ambitious thefts, however,
by setting up illegal checkpoints along the roads leading
out of the city and between different villages, armed with
more serious weapons such as Kalashnikov-type assault
rifles.
5.5. People smuggling
Although it is not illustrated by the CVS, people
smuggling is a third important security threat to Bossaso
residents according to focus group discussions. It affects
the community both directly through its association with
semi-organized crime and explicit forms of physical
violence, and indirectly through its negative impact on
communities’ ability to resist and respond cooperatively
to violence.
Illegal emigration from Bossaso to neighbouring
countries follows two main routes, one on overcrowded
fishing boats across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, and
the other overland through Ethiopia and Sudan and into
Libya, where emigrants take a short boat trip across
the Mediterranean to arrive in Italy. Both routes are
associated with high levels of mortality.
25
Travelling by boat to Yemen, most emigration occurs
between October and April, avoiding the hagaa period.
Would-be migrants, most of whom are from Somalia
or Ethiopia, gather in one of Bossaso’s smaller ports.
The precise port of departure shifts regularly to avoid
detection, but has included locations such as Qow, Ceelayo,
Shinbiro, Cadcado, Magero and Wasah. Migrants crowd
onto poorly maintained fishing vessels, which often break
down, leaving passengers and operators to float for days
without food or water. Some have even been thrown
overboard when food shortages or the Yemeni coastguard
threatens the crews manning the boats; the survivors of
such events suffer from residual trauma and guilt.40 Migrants taking the second route overland from Somalia
to Libya and onto Italy tend to travel during the summer
months from May to September, often leaving when
schools are out of session and the Mediterranean Sea is
relatively calm. The trip lasts approximately 45 days and
winds its way through the Sudanese and Libyan deserts.
In this case, the emigrants are exposed to risks including
a lack of food and water, harsh climactic conditions and
even detention and torture upon arrival by state security
forces.
It appears that people smuggling across the Gulf of
Aden or through the deserts of Ethiopia and Sudan is an
increasingly lucrative and well-organized enterprise led
largely by boat owners and fishermen, whose traditional
way of life has been undermined by both illegal fishing
and piracy. Some efforts have been made by the Puntland
government to tackle this trade. In April 2009, the
government formed a new Migration Response Centre
(MRC), which, in partnership with the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and the local NGO
Red Sea Fishing Organization, launched a pilot project
to provide skills training and employment opportunities
among migrants and locals. The emphasis of this training
centres on the fishing industry. Given the insecurity of
Somali seas, the absence of necessary processing plants
within Bossaso and the subsequent weak market for
Somali-caught fish, all of which have increased incentives
for fishermen to involve themselves in criminal activities,
other income-generating avenues are worth exploring.41
Focus groups mentioned the increasing number of young
men leaving Bossaso contributed to social unrest and
a slow unravelling of the fabric that ties families and
communities together. Stories of a better life overseas
are shared widely, and many dissatisfied and unemployed
youth are choosing to try and emigrate. For Bossaso as a
whole, this disinvestment in the local economy saps the
district’s human capital as well exacerbating dependency
on remittances from those that succeed in establishing
26
themselves overseas. At the community and family level,
the desire and attempts of so many youth to emigrate
overseas is a significant source of social and, potentially,
economic strain. For families left behind, the event of
losing a family member is a significant and distressing
one, particularly as many travel in secret.
5.6. Abductions and human trafficking
The CVS captured six instances of kidnappings
throughout the 12 months prior to the survey. However,
the data give no indication as to the age and gender of
victims.
According to focus group discussions, child abduction
and trafficking have become more prevalent in Bossaso
during the 12 months preceding the survey. Little appears
to be known about the final destination of these children
or the real purpose of their abduction, except that several
focus groups suggested that they were trafficked to other
neighbouring African nations for their organs, specifically
their liver and kidneys. It was suggested that they might
be trafficked for adoption by individuals abroad who
could not conceive their own children. This seems to be a
highly organized enterprise with actors, male and female,
who are both familiar with locations in Bossaso where
children are less protected and who are well connected
to markets abroad. Abductors lure children with toys and
promises, and then drug them. They have apparently been
taken while en route to or in their schools, at home and at
marketplaces. IDP children appear to be at particular risk
because their homes provide little security and they are
often left without their parents for extended periods. In
fact, IDP focus group participants listed child trafficking
as the number one priority area of insecurity suffered by
their communities, together with violence against women
but before murder and rape.
5.7. Violence against children
The CVS captured 11 cases of assault or physical attack
against children ages 0 to 17 (Figure 23).
Figure 23: Child victims of assault (Freq.)
Ref. AA12_R (n= 11)
In addition to child abductions mentioned above (section
5.6), forms of violence against children cited in focus
groups included abusive corporal punishment in school,
child labour and financial exploitation of children. The
latter is seen as a big problem in Bossaso, exacerbated
by the significant numbers of children that live on the
streets. According to the Governor of Bari region,
between 4,500 and 5,500 children spend their days on
the streets of Bossaso, although the numbers may well
be higher. Most are IDP children, some of whom return
to their families at night and some of whom have lost or
become separated from their families while fleeing the
fighting in the south of the country. Others are qat, glue
or alcohol users that remain on the streets throughout
the night and become both victims and perpetrators of
various forms of violence.42 Young boys take up jobs
shining shoes, cleaning cars or collecting sacks, fuel
and firewood in the marketplaces. Young girls typically
take low-paid domestic work. When very young, these
children may be brought along by their mothers or lent to
other childless women as aids for begging. Children are
often not compensated for their labour or are forced to
relinquish their earnings to their parents or minders.
5.8. Violence against women
Violence against women was captured in the CVS first
through cases of assault or physical attack. There were 27
(against 26 for men) cases of assault against women and
girls ranging from the ages of 5 to 64 years. The frequency
of assault tends to remain relatively stable from the age of
15 up until the age of 44, with a slight peak between the
ages of 20 and 29. There were additional attacks against
an eight-year-old girl, and three attacks against women of
45–64 years of age (Figure 24).
Figure 24: Female victims of assault (Freq.)
Ref. AA12_R1 (n= 27)
In addition to assault, women are also subject to sexual
violence. The CVS survey revealed five cases of sexual
violence from different respondent households. In the
three cases where gender was declared, the victim was
female. Three of the cases occurred in more isolated
environments such as a field, bush or forest, two of which
at night and one in the morning. One case occurred in the
morning while at home, and one in the afternoon while on
a public street (Figure 25).
Figure 25: Sexual violence, by location and time of day
(Freq.)
Ref. SV7 by SV6 (n=5)
Only three of these victims’ households shared
information on their ages at the time of the crime, during
the survey: one was between 5 and 9 years of age, one
between 10 and 14, and one between 25 and 29.
Of the four cases of sexual violence for which a perpetrator
was identified, two of the perpetrators were identified
as individual criminals. One perpetrator was a family
member or relative, and one was identified as a member
of an organized armed group (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Profile of perpetrators of sexual violence (Freq.)
Ref. SV10 (n=4)
According to focus group discussions, violence against
women, including rape, forced marriage and domestic
abuse, is a significant issue for Bossaso, although
not prioritized by all groups. Only women and IDPs
identified some form of violence against women as one
of the top priority areas of threat against themselves
and their communities in focus groups. The elders, by
contrast, began by insisting that there was no violence
against women within their communities, although when
pressed, they admitted that there was rape within IDP
communities.
Rape is among the greatest threats facing women in
Bossaso. The true incidence of rape cannot be determined
from focus groups and is unlikely to be reflected
accurately in statistics as many women refuse to report
attacks for fear that they will be socially marginalized
or forced to marry the rapists. Focus group discussions
indicated that most rape occurred outside the family and
was fairly opportunistic; a few focus group participants
also mentioned incidents of gang rape.43 Women living
in Bossaso’s IDP settlements appear to be at a high risk
of rape. Their homes provide little protection and they
are often forced to walk a significant distance alone
27
in order to collect firewood or to visit toilet facilities.
During the summer, the heat forces many to sleep outside
their homes where the risk of rape is greater. The civil
society group We Are Women Activists (WAWA) has
encouraged women in IDP settlements to “break the
silence” and report incidents of rape. In October 2009,
they recorded 30 incidents of rape, followed by an
additional 45 in November 2009.44 It was unclear from
the focus group discussions whether the perpetrators of
these rapes originated mostly from within or outside the
IDP communities, though IDPs themselves suggested
that incidents of gang rape involved mostly members of
host communities, who had access to pistols and AK-47s. Domestic violence (referred to locally as ‘wife beating’) is
another significant problem for women living in Bossaso.
Again, the problem was said to be greatest within IDP
communities, likely due to the link between domestic
violence and economic stress and trauma suffered by excombatants.45 Across Bossaso, women are the primary
breadwinners for many households in which men are
either unable or unwilling to find work.46 These women
are largely self-employed and involved in small-scale
trade, although a significant number, particularly those
belonging to IDP communities, also take up daily casual
labour or domestic service. Somali tradition dictates that
it is a man’s obligation to provide for his family, even when
married to a wife who may be wealthier than himself. Yet,
men in Bossaso find it more difficult to find work. The
problem appears to be most severe for ex-combatants,
many of whom returned to find their wives working
and soon fell into a pattern of substance abuse and
unemployment. These men frequently arrive home late
at night under the influence of qat, which they purchase
using money confiscated from their wives’ labour.
Domestic violence against the woman is apparently the
most common outcome, often triggered by arguments
over the man’s contributions to the household or the
husband’s attempts to take all or some of the woman’s
daily earnings.47 In addition to acts of rape and domestic violence, women
in Bossaso are also frequently victims of neglect and
abuse related to the marriage contract. Female genital
mutilation (FGM) continues to be widely practised,
despite campaigns discouraging the practice. Young
girls are forced into marriage, often to much older men,
and have few rights to divorce. Giving a girl in marriage
continues to be a central component in paying blood
compensations and an accepted way of linking previously
feuding families or clans. While this may succeed in
winning a kind of peace between communities, it can,
undoubtedly, bring enormous distress to the girl involved.
Finally, in focus group discussions, prostitution was
mentioned as a growing problem in Bossaso, particularly
28
related to piracy. No detailed information was provided
on the extent of the phenomenon.
5.9. Threat from violent Islamic groups
Successive governments have been under pressure from
violent Islamic groups, some of whom explicitly threaten
violence to achieve their ends. In 2010, there has been
a string of attacks by such groups. For example, in July
2010, a government security operation at an army post
on the south-western outskirts of Bossaso was reported
as leading to th e death of 13 such militants.48 But it
is not only government officials and the political class
that have been targeted in this way: in 2008, there were
also attacks against Ethiopian migrants in Bossaso
and a bomb targeting Puntland Intelligence Services
buildings timed to coincide with a similar attack in
Hargeisa.49 This wave of violence has encouraged the
government to bring in a new counter-terrorism law
introducing special fast-track courts for suspects.50
According to focus group discussions, a subset of these
radicalized Islamic groups now threatens or carries out
violent acts in the name of Islam. The existence of such
groups needs to be factored into any analysis because
they collectively point to the emergence of a new social
movement. A related threat is the actions of Islamic
militant groups (likely linked to political assassinations)
and the government’s military-political response.
Militant actions are a prima facie threat to peace that need
little comment. It remains to be seen whether the state’s
response will stem or foment further violence.
5.10. Conflict dynamics
Inter-group conflict is also an issue in Bossaso District.
Although 60.9 percent of survey respondents declared that
clan disputes occur very rarely if not, never, a significant
31.5 percent of respondents declared that disputes do
occur on a yearly basis (Figure 27).
Figure 27: Frequency of clan disputes (Freq. %)
Ref. CD1 (n=708)
Respondents mentioned the most common cause of disputes
in Bossaso as conflict over land and water resources
(46.7%); followed by revenge (19.5%), family disputes
(14.7%) and power or cultural struggle (7.0%) (Figure 28).
Figure 28: Most common reasons for clan disputes (Freq. %)
37
Ibid., p. 12.
38
Allafrica.com, op. cit.
39
It is noteworthy that IDPs did not prioritize theft as one of the four
major forms of violence from which they suffered. Instead, they
prioritized violence against women, child trafficking, murder and rape.
Other focus groups, however, consistently identified IDPs as one of
the most vulnerable groups of victims. The reasons for this are likely
complex and deserve further exploration.
Several focus group participants recounted stories of fishermen who
had seen bodies floating in the ocean. These stories are confirmed by
media reports, which talk of bodies washing up on the Yemeni coast.
In 2007, the BBC reported 30 bodies washed up on beaches of Yemen
one weekend. ‘French newsman seized in Somalia’, BBC News, 16
December 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/africa/7147068.stm.
A more recent report quotes an Aden-based UNHCR spokesperson,
who reported over 300 bodies washed up on Yemen’s coasts in 2009.
‘Global Post: Desperate refugees cross the Gulf of Aden to Yemen’,
H. S. Edwards, 31 December 2009, http://sanaabureau.worldpress.
com/2009/12/31/globalpost-desperate-refugees-cross-the-fulf-ofaden-to-yemen/.
40
Ref. CD3 (n=272)
Conflict triggers listed in focus group discussions
included crimes such as domestic violence against
women, rape and even neighbourhood fights between
women and young people. It would seem that many forms
of crime and violence can quickly draw in clans if there is
a plausible inter-group dimension.
Furthermore, CVS respondent households stated that
there were more disputes during the first six months of
the year than during the last six months (Figure 29).
Figure 29: Clan disputes by month (Freq. %)
‘Offering migrants an alternative to death by water’, IRIN, 12 March
2010, http://www.bulshoweyn.com/ news.php?readmore=3560.
41
‘Poverty pushes Bossaso children on to streets’, Reuters AlertNet, 8
March 2010, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/5b01
e090ae47e22113252a688344ef8e.htm>.
42
Focus group participants variously attributed rape to a lack of
religious teaching or to uncontrolled sexual desire, with some
suggesting also that a woman’s inappropriate dress (i.e. not keeping her
hijab tied tightly around her face and covering her body fully) could
contribute to the problem. The inability of some young men to pay the
necessary bride price or their rejection by young women were also said
to be drivers of rape because a young man may reason that Somali
custom would require a young woman to marry him after he has raped
her in order to save her dignity within society.
43
44
‘Rape a major problem for Bossaso IDPs’, IRIN, 16 December 2009,
<http://www.irinnews.org/ PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=87453>.
Ex-combatants refers to former militia and gang members who were
not formally registered under the armed forces and did not receive any
demobilization assistance.
45
According to one estimate, the percentage of female-headed or
female-dependent households in Bossaso is 70 percent, including IDP
households. UNDP/ILO, op. cit., p. 73.
46
Ref. CD4_R (n=51)
32
Victims have included court officials, politicians and parliamentarians,
elders, religious leaders and civil society organizers, among others.
33
See Section 5.1, Homicide.
Qat is a central part of many Somalis’ lives and is readily seen
on almost every street corner in Bossaso, despite its reputation for
inducing criminal and violent behaviour. Shipments of miraa, one
of two varieties of the drug consumed in Puntland, are flown into
Bossaso daily from western Ethiopia. From there, they are transported
throughout the Bari and Sanaag Regions, where the district supplies
most of the drug that is consumed. In 2005, it was estimated that
imports of qat likely exceeded 3,000 tonnes, at an annual retail value
of US$15 million in Bossaso, although profits are concentrated in the
hands of a few major importers and distributors, and most local traders
see very little economic gain. UNDP, ILO & PI, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
34
Rafi Chaudhury, “The New Face of Maritime Piracy in Somalia”,
International Affairs Journal, December 2008.
35
ICG, op. cit., p. 11.; United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group
on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), 10
March 2010, p. 39.
36
47
There also appear to have been a number of incidents of wives acting
out violently in frustration against their husbands. At least two focus
groups told stories of women pouring boiling water over their husbands
while they were sleeping, including one story about a woman who
sewed her husband into his bed so he could not escape when he refused
to wake up in the mornings to help with work.
The men in question were said to be members of a group led by
Mohamed Said Atom, who is mounting a violent campaign to pressure
the government to introduce a strict version of shari’a law. Atom’s
force was said to be hiding in the Galgala hills southwest of Bossaso
(Allafrica, op. cit).
48
49
On 5 February 2008, the Al Shabaab militant group claimed
responsibility for a grenade attack on Bossaso that left 25 civilians
dead and 90 wounded in a residential area heavily populated by
Ethiopian migrants. (‘February 2008 Bossaso Bombings’, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_2008_Bosaso_bombings). Two more
Ethiopians died in a similar attack in December 2009: (‘Explosion
Kills Two, Wounds More than 20 Others in Bosaso Town’, http://
allafrica.com/stories/200912020449.html). On 29 October 2008, the
town was the subject of a twin bomb attack that also targeted Hargeisa.
(‘Somalia Historical Chronology’, UN Security Council, http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2876199/).
50
Similar measures are mooted for those accused of piracy and human
trafficking (‘Puntland Cabinet Approves Counterterrorism Law’,
GaroweOnline, 17 July 2010).
29
6. Drivers and risk factors
In most cases, the underlying drivers and risk factors of
insecurity are social and economic, although political
and security-related causes can also be identified. In
many cases, the drivers will be multiple and connected,
and may operate at different levels. Here, a distinction is
made between underlying structural causes, exacerbating
factors (proximate causes) and events that may spark
violence (triggers).
6.1. Social factors
Clan identities or more specifically, the dominant
narratives of inter-clan rivalry, can be cited as a structural
cause of insecurity. As the traditional basis of Somali
society and as a complex social phenomenon, clan
structures and identities warrant more than simplistic
criticism. Inter-clan rivalry can be compounded with
other problems such as resource shortages to spark
conflict, but the clan system can positively contribute
towards society’s capacities for peace. In focus groups
discussions, religious leaders noted the role that oral
narrative plays in maintaining clan competition over
time, a structural cause of conflict. They also noted that
poems and songs can incite violence on certain occasions.
The abuse of qat is an important proximate cause of
insecurity and a risk factor for criminal and violent
behaviour. As noted above, in 29.4 percent of the cases
of assault captured in the CVS, the victims suspected that
the perpetrator was under the influence of drugs, alcohol
or qat. As a stimulant, qat induces a mild euphoria and
inhibition; over time, it can result in emotional instability
and manic and irrational behaviour. Its addictive qualities
often lead habitual users towards crime as a means of
payment. For example, qat use is closely associated with
incidents of attempted rape. The drug increases men’s
sexual appetite while reducing inhibitions (yet it also
curbs a man’s ability to complete the sexual act). Qat
markets and chewing areas are usually staffed by women
who are at particularly high risk of being attacked. Addicts
often turn to opportunistic theft in order to pay for the qat
that they buy on credit. Qat markets and chewing areas
such as those in front of the Bossaso Public Hospital are
thus hotspots for violent activity such as theft, rape and
murder.
The large presence of IDPs has
a structural cause of insecurity.
rise in ‘unknown killings’ has
among the host community
30
also been mentioned as
For example, the recent
raised some suspicions
and authorities that
perpetrators originate from south-central Somalia and
are being protected or are hiding themselves within IDP
settlements. According to focus group participants, these
suspicions are fuelled by government authorities who have
made accusations at security meetings. One focus group
mentioned that in the first six months of 2010, at least one
bomb was planted by someone originating in the southcentral region of the country and that suspicion had fallen
on IDPs as harbouring the perpetrators. Finally, some
focus group participants suggested that the problem of
theft began within the IDP communities, but no evidence
was offered to support this claim. As a result of tensions
between IDPs and the Bossaso host community, IDPs at
times feel discriminated against, although they generally
feel they have access to the same basic services as others.
6.2. Political/governance-related factors
As previously noted, Puntland’s apparent clan
homogeneity conceals fierce competition between suband sub-sub clans. This manifests itself in the political
and economic spheres as inter-clan competition for
positions of authority in the administration or as contests
to control resources.51 Politically, it is the regional
Puntland administration that has been the site of the
most contestation, leading to open warfare on more than
one occasion. But jockeying for position within state
institutions is apparently a feature at all levels and sectors
– in fact, rural focus group respondents mentioned that
competition for political office is a driver of inter-clan
conflict from the lowest level of the village up to that
of the district administration. This has led to a further
weakening of many state institutions that already struggle
with corruption and skill deficiencies.
Since Puntland has historically been a place of religious
homogeneity: regardless of the other cleavages in society,
a set of common cultural values acted as a unifying
force. The emergence of new religious movements in
recent years has begun to change this. Although most
new movements have small followings, some are at odds
with the mainstream interpretation of Islam in the area,
and many of them are becoming politically engaged.
Political Islam is serving as a binding force for political
opposition to the current government. According to
focus group participants, currently, there are definitely
tensions and occasional violence in Bossaso between
individuals of mainstream religious persuasion and more
radical thinkers (some but not all espousing violence). As
illustrated above, the very existence of such movements
is a concern to the Puntland government and its security
forces, particularly the Puntland Intelligence Services,
which try to monitor these groups closely.
The lack of legal instruments and institutions for
protection of vulnerable people (e.g. women, children
and the disabled) is an important missed opportunity
for restraining violence.52 For example, Puntland has no
juvenile justice law or dedicated institutions to support
child protection within the justice system or even
rehabilitate young offenders. Young convicts, some
of whom may only be guilty of anti-social behaviour,
are placed in prisons with more serious criminals
including pirates. As a result, they often emerge more
firmly embedded in criminal networks than when they
went in. The absence of alternative facilities focused
on rehabilitating and reintegrating young people into
productive life is of concern given youth’s vulnerability
to involvement in criminal activities.
As elsewhere, Bossaso is also saddled with an outmoded
and incoherent legal system and a judiciary with low
capacity. The land laws are a good example of this since
the majority of cases currently passing through the state
courts are land-related.53 The problem is that while land
is managed by local governments, there is no consistent
and comprehensive legal framework for land or property
management because Puntland’s three legal systems each
contain different provisions in this area.54 Xeer is geared
to regulating common property such as pasture, grazing
land and water, and contains only simple provisions. State
law, in contrast, considers all land to be governmentowned, although it can be leased by individuals for
specific uses over a defined period of time. Meanwhile,
shari’a law prohibits commercial transactions over
land (although not investments made on it). Each legal
framework has positive attributes, but collectively they
are at odds with the realities of Bossaso’s growing land
market. Substantial legal revisions are needed so that
land titles can be accurately assigned and disputes dealt
with. New land and planning laws that would deal with
these issues were apparently submitted to Parliament in
February 2006, but this does not appear to have changed
the reality on the ground as yet. In addition, the best laws
also require effective courts and public administration
for enforcement. Institutions do not currently have the
required capacity: the courts have inadequate manpower,
and infrastructure is poor. They also cannot depend on the
public administration to assist in land disputes because
cadastral records do not exist.55 6.3. Economic factors
Economic stress appears to be the leading contributor to
insecurity in urban Bossaso, placing young men and IDPs
at particular risk of becoming both the perpetrators and
the victims of crime. Most notably, for young men living
in these communities, education provides no guarantee
of job opportunities and unemployment is extraordinarily
high. Due to Bossaso’s position as a major port town and
trading route, these young men are almost constantly
exposed to stories of better opportunities abroad. The
rise of piracy and its associated promise of ‘getting rich
quick’ have further heightened the level of dissatisfaction
among youth. But this is a vicious circle as focus group
respondents cited high unemployment as the principal
cause of piracy. Today’s pirates range from about 15 to 30
years of age and are almost entirely male. Most of them
are uneducated and unskilled, and many come from rural
communities where they find it increasingly difficult to
make a living from tending livestock. For these groups
of young men, piracy offers the promise of getting rich
quick and of enjoying its associated benefits of comfort,
marriage and drug use.
Another underlying cause, overfishing in Somalia’s now
unregulated seas, should not be forgotten: some villagers
complain that they have lost almost all their youth
to piracy and almost all their fish to illegal fishing.56 Meanwhile, due to poor processing and freezing facilities
on land, the market for Somali-caught fish is insufficient
to justify these risks. Many fishermen are thus seeking
to use their skills for more profitable and often criminal
ends. Finally, it also seems that the payment of highfigure ransoms by international shipping companies has
exacerbated the problem, aiding the recruitment of young
men by piracy gangs and attracting further investment
into the business from overseas. Focus group participants
expressed resentment that so much money was paid in
ransom to pirates by foreign parties, particularly since
they did not see this money invested in building the
capacity of Somalia’s coastguard to effectively patrol and
protect the Somali seas.
Disputes over resources such as water points and
pastureland were cited in focus groups as leading causes
of both inter- and intra-clan conflict in rural areas. Within
rural and remote areas of Bossaso, these disputes often
intensify following the rains because clans will return to
the land that they previously occupied but had abandoned
when it had become less productive; often, they find others
have settled there. Any clashes that follow are managed
by the elders according to xeer, but in times of low rainfall
or in cases where customary law is blatantly violated,
this task is more difficult. Since the 1990s, there has
been a tendency in Puntland’s pastoralist areas towards
illegal enclosing high-value land and water points for
private use.57 This is in stark contradiction to traditional
31
arrangements between clans in which these areas were
set aside for use in dry seasons. Blocking access to these
refuge areas disrupts traditional movement patterns
for herdsmen and results in more intensive use of the
remaining areas. By extension, it also raises the overall
stakes for the inter-clan management of pasturelands.
According to focus group participants, illegal enclosure,
together with periodic drought, have driven the migration
of impoverished pastoralists within Puntland to coastal
villages and urban areas like Bossaso on a large scale.
This has contributed to demographic pressure and led to
conflict between incoming migrants and townspeople.58 However, migration into Bossaso has not to date been
planned or managed due to inadequate urban planning
and land tenure systems (see above).
Environmental degradation of forested areas created by
charcoal producers was also cited as a cause of conflict by
rural focus group members, although this point was not
followed up in discussions.
IDPs cited competition over land and natural resources as
a conflict driver. The root of their problem may be the fact
that all land in Bossaso is privately owned so the IDPs and
the aid agencies that support them are held captive to the
will of landowners. IDPs are forced to seek approval for
any construction, even the most basic sanitary facilities.
For example, in the two days preceding the focus group
discussions in June 2010, one IDP community had
apparently been forced to return tents that they had
used for community meetings to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees because the landlord
decided that he did not want them on that land. One IDP
focus group respondent summed up the desperation they
face even in the case of petty land disputes by saying,
“Unless there is a death, we cannot solve anything about
land disputes. It is better that people see that a dispute is
leading to death. If I go and simply say, ‘Please stop this!’,
they will do nothing.”
Landowners will occasionally insist that IDPs hand over
food aid as payment in kind for the use of their land.
This plays into a secondary problem caused by clanbased food aid distribution, which IDPs mentioned as
problematic in focus groups. This system, which evolved
over many years and is used by many organizations, has
its advantages, including ensuring that smaller clans are
provided for, and helping to prevent members of the host
community from registering themselves as IDPs in order
to receive assistance that they would not otherwise be
eligible for. Nevertheless, allocation along clan lines also
encourages competition between and within clans that
can turn violent as ‘gatekeepers’ within each clan group
inevitably wield the power to decide who gets what. 59
32
6.4. Firearms and security-related factors
The weakness of the justice and security sector is a missed
opportunity for restraining violence and insecurity (see
section 7).
By most measures, Puntland is a militarized society, a
condition that goes beyond traditional arms possession
and gun culture associated with pastoralism. The state
maintains a proportionally large security force and
expenditure. But the state’s dealings with its citizenry, even
in the course of disarmament campaigns, can be marked
by the use of force. Focus group respondents tended not
only to rate the state security system ineffective, but at
times repressive. Certainly, the Puntland Intelligence
Service has a record of arrests and renditions of real and
perceived enemies of the state, mainly those suspected
of links to violent Islamic groups. Its operations could
come at the expense of the police and even the military,
who at times have gone unpaid for months.60 According
to a World Bank report, “The administration’s reliance
on violence has made citizens feel that demilitarization is
one-sided, with the regional administration only paying
lip service to a weapons-free society while imposing
severe restrictions on civil and political rights.” 61
Easy access to firearms and other weapons within society
considerably raises the risk of conflict turning violent and
deadly. Following the collapse of the Somali Government
two decades ago, availability and demand for weapons
rose significantly as citizens increasingly felt under
threat and unprotected by the state’s security forces.
Today, access to firearms is regarded as an important
source of security. One participant of the youth focus
group discussion stated, “The man who does not have a
weapon is not a human!” while another IDP focus group
participant lamented his inability to afford a firearm,
saying that it would significantly increase his and his
community’s level of security.
The CVS respondents’ views on the availability of arms
show a wide range of opinions: 38.4 percent of respondents
indicated that firearms were more available, 31.4%, that
they were less available, and 30.3 percent that availability
stayed the same (Figure 30).
Figure 30: Availability of firearms over the last 12 months
(Freq. %)
Ref. WE1 (n= 578)
This ambivalence may be better understood by further
analysing these perceptions with respect to with
respondents’ clan affiliation, residential status and place
of residence. Proportionally to the relative importance of
each clan in the survey sample, availability is perceived to
increase most among the Madiban, Digil-Mirifle and Dir,
whereas the dominant Darod have a more measured view
of trends in firearms availability (Figure 31).
With respect to residential status, 5.5 percent of the
permanent resident respondents owned at least one
firearm at home, compared to 3.9 percent of IDPs and 3.8
percent of the refugees (Figure 34).
Figure 34: Firearm possession, by residential status
(Weighted %)
Figure 31: Availability of firearms, by clan (Weighted %)
Ref. WE2_RxRP10 (n=731)
Similarly, availability is perceived to increase to the
greatest extent among refugees, followed by IDPs;
permanent residents have a more measured view of trends
(Figure 32).
Survey respondents indicated that Kalashnikov-type
assault or automatic rifles accounted for half of the
available firearms (50.0%). The second most common
firearm, pistols and revolvers, accounted for 44.4 percent
of available arms, and hunting rifles or shotguns, merely
5.6 percent (Figure 35).
Figure 35: Types of firearms available (Freq. %)
Figure 32: Availability of firearms, by residential status
(Weighted %)
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
46.2
39.6
37.5
The CVS also explored actual possession of firearms.
Overall, only 37 respondent households (5.1%) admitted
to possessing a firearm. Although possibly biased by
under-reporting, the possession of firearms seems to be
more an urban phenomenon than a rural one: 6.3 percent
of the households investigated by the CVS had at least one
firearm at home in the urban districts, against 1.1 percent
in the rural areas.
Patterns of ownership also vary depending on residential
status and clan: 12.0 percent of the Dir respondents owned
at least one firearm at home, compared to 6.7 percent for
the Hawiye, 6.3 percent for the Isaq, 5.7 percent for the
Darod, 4.2 percent for the Arab and 0.0 percent for the
Digil-Mirifle (81.3% of which are IDPs), Bantu (96.4% of
which are IDPs) and Madiban (Figure 33).
Ref. WE3_R (n=36)
Out of the 33 respondents who provided reasons for
possessing a firearm in Bossaso, over half (51.5%) mentioned
protection from clans and gangs, etc. as the main one,
followed by work as a police officer, guard or watchman
(21.2%)
and for traditional purposes (21.2%) (Figure 36)
.
Figure 36: Main reason reported for owning a firearm (Freq. %)
Figure 33: Firearm possession, by clan (Weighted %)
Ref. WE4 (n=33)
33
Historically, Bossaso is a common entry point for arms
deliveries arriving from Yemen by sea. According to
a UN Monitoring Group, up to 80 percent are then
trafficked onwards by road to Mogadishu and SouthCentral Somalia, while the remainder go to pirate groups
or are used in other armed conflicts or intercommunal
violence.62
According to focus group discussions, firearms are
available for purchase in the Bossaso markets, particularly
those near the foreign exchange market in the Cirtoogte
neighbourhood. While it is evidently not difficult to
access firearms, one focus group participant suggested
that the trade has recently become more organized and
clandestine and that today it is accessed through brokers.
Others stated that the availability of Kalashnikovtype assault rifles, pistols and even hand grenades had
increased recently and that, as a result, it was possible
to rent weapons even with payment in kind such as qat.
Similarly, focus group participants from Bossaso’s rural
communities and outlying villages insisted that they
could access firearms when they were under threat.63 But
while the availability of firearms has increased the rate
at which these weapons are used in revenge killings, it
is worth recalling that killings over resources or familial
disputes tend to be carried out with traditional weapons
such as sticks and the tooray, or traditional two-edged
Somali knife.
In addition to firearms, there have been some incidents
in which assassinations have been carried out using
explosives. Although the intended target is often known,
these explosives have frequently left far larger numbers
of victims behind than the prominent personality for
whom they were intended. Indeed, 43.9 percent of
CVS respondents indicated that there was an apparent
threat, either low (20.9%) or high (23.0%), from remotecontrolled or time bombs (Figure 37).
Figure 37: Perceptions of threat from remote-controlled or
time bombs (Freq. %)
Ref. WE7 (n= 732)
34
Similarly, 41.9 percent mentioned a degree of risk from
landmines and unexploded ordnances (UXOs), ranging
from some (39.0%) to a lot (2.9%) (Figure 38).
Figure 38: Perceived presence of mines and unexploded
ordnances (Freq. %)
Ref. WE8 (n= 692)
Clan groups have, of course, vied for control of Bossaso port as the
primary source of income for the state. Conflict in Somalia: Drivers
and Dynamics, World Bank, January 2005, p. 16. Uneven distribution
of resources across Puntland also plays into clan faultlines, however.
This is probably a natural consequence of overdependence on the
livestock industry and its export to and from Bossaso port; however,
Puntland’s internal regional and district sub-divisions often correspond
with sub-clan groupings and those in outlying areas away from the
main north-south commercial corridor between Bossaso and Galkayo,
or away from main roads are economically disadvantaged. Ongoing
intervention by the elders is apparently required to quell such feelings.
51
52
53
54
Ibid., p. 13.
The court system has been rehabilitated and undergone a number of
reforms, but still only covers around 25 percent of Puntland. Bossaso
District itself has a primary and an appeals court, and six judges in
total. Ibid., pp. 13–14.
55
56
Elders’ focus group.
57
UNDP/ILO, op. cit., p. 38.
58
59
IDP focus group.
60
ICG, op. cit., p. 14.
61
World Bank, op. cit., p. 33.
United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010), 18 July
2011, p. 35.
62
63
The actual level of ownership of firearms in Bossaso is obviously
very difficult to ascertain. When focus group participants were asked
how many households out of every ten owned firearms, rates ranged
from one out of ten, to ten out of ten. They estimated that in urban
areas, ownership was concentrated among businessmen, while in rural
areas, those tending livestock were the most likely weapon-holders.
Rates of ownership were rated lowest among IDP communities, for
whom ownership is affordable.
7. Perceived performance of justice and security actors
Both the CVS and focus group discussions inquired
about the performance of the various public authorities
or civil society actors able to respond to insecurity,
namely the police, the courts, religious leaders, the
clan or community elders, and women. The following
sections will first present a comparative perspective
of the perceived performance of these different actors,
including by type of crime. Each actor is then considered
separately in further detail.
7.1.
Figure 40: Accessibility of security actors (Weighted %)
Comparative perspectives
The CVS examined the level of general trust afforded
to clan/community elders, religious leaders, the police
and the courts by asking respondents to state for each
whether their trust was very high, fairly high, fairly
low or very low. Religious leaders were ranked the most
trusted, with 40.6 percent of CVS respondents. The clan
and community elders ranked second, with an average
of 34.6 percent. Both the police and the courts show
significantly lower levels of trust from the respondents,
with an average of 1.6 percent trusting the police and an
average of 3.7 percent mistrusting the courts. It should
be noted, however, that perceptions of men and women
differ significantly, with women affording much higher
levels of trust to police and courts than male respondents
(Figure 39).64
Figure 39: Level of trust in public authorities who serve as
security providers (Weighted %)
Ref. AR2_RxRP1 (n=737), AR5_RxRP1 (n=735), AR8_RxRP1
(n=736), AR11_RxRP1 (n=732)
Figure 41: Speed of response of security actors (Weighted %)
Ref. AR3_3xRP1 (n=727), AR6_RxRP1 (n=728), AR9_RxRP1
(n=703), AR12_RxRP1 (n=705)
Focus group discussions revealed the practice of ‘forum
shopping’: institutions are sought out for different reasons
by different social groups. For example, the women’s
group said that they would turn to religious leaders or
women’s associations in the case of a killing, the police
in the case of a theft, and religious leaders in the case
of a rape. Young people explained that a killing would
only be taken to the state system if it had no obvious clan
dimension. IDPs seemed more likely to take cases of
domestic violence to the police but would also use family
and clan contacts.
7.1.2. Assault
Ref. AR1_R (n=733), AR4_R (n=735), AR7_R (n=710), and AR10_R
(n=709)
The difference between male and female respondents also
emerges when asked about accessibility of and speed of
response by security actors (Figure 40 and Figure 41).
Of the 40 incidents of assault or physical attack recorded
by the CVS, 80 percent were disclosed to the public, but
only 10 percent were formally reported to the police, and
another 10 percent ended in a decision by a criminal court
(Figure 42).
35
Figure 42: Reporting rates, assault (Freq. %)
disclosed to the public, seven were reported to the police
(19.4%) and six ended in a criminal court decision (16.7%)
(Figure 45).
Figure 45: Reporting rate, property crime (Freq. %)
Ref. AA1 (n=40), AA34 (n=32), AA39 (n=4), AA42 (n=4)
These victims were most likely to report first to the
community elders (46.9%) followed by all other public
authority figures such as the government police (34.4%),
religious leaders (12.5%) and non-state or communitybased policing groups (3.1%) (Figure 43). Note that
women tend to report marginally more often to the police
and religious leaders.
Figure 43: Public authority to whom assault was first
reported (Freq. %)
Ref. PC1 (n=36), PC8 n(=25), PC13 (n=7), PC16 (n=6)
Of the 25 cases disclosed to the public, 14 were first
reported to the community elders (56.0%), ten to the
government police (40.0%), and one to a religious leader
(4.0%) (Figure 46).
Figure 46: Public authority to whom property crime was
first reported (Freq. %)
Ref. PC10 (n=25)
Ref. AA36 (n=32)
Of the eight victim households who did not disclose the
incident, five cited other means to resolve the issue, and
three mentioned that there were no authorities available to
turn to. 7.1.3. Sexual violence
Out of three cases of sexual violence disclosed to the
public, one victim reported to the community elders, and
two, to the government police. In addition, three cases
reached a verdict by a criminal court.
Figure 44: Reporting rate, sexual violence (Freq. %)
Ref. SV1 (n=5), SV11 (n=3), SV16 (n=1), SV19 (n=1)
No information is available as to the reason for not
reporting sexual violence.
7.1.4. Property crime
Out of 36 property crimes mentioned in the CVS
questionnaire, 25 (69.4% of total property crimes) were
36
7.2. Police
Bossaso District has six police stations, the largest two
of which are located in the airport and the port. The
remaining four stations are all located inside or close to
Bossaso town, and with a total staff of 127 male and 21
female police officers, of whom 48 officers are illiterate.
Patrols are conducted in three shifts, and accompanied by
members of community-based policing units.65
As noted above, respondents ranked the police the third
most trusted entity after the clan and community elders,
religious leaders, and the courts (Figure 39). However,
there is a general overall ambivalence towards trusting the
police within Bossaso District (51.5% of CVS respondents
indicated relatively to very high trust in the police, and
48.5%, relatively to very low trust in the police as authority
figures). The perceptions of female respondents were
markedly more positive than male respondents (Figure 47).
Figure 47: Level of trust in the police (Freq. %)
the police within Bossaso District responded relatively or
very slowly (Figure 50).
Figure 50: Speed of police response (Freq. %)
Ref. AR7 (n=710)
Over half of the respondents (54.8%) rated the police as
relatively accessible in terms of physical distance and
ease to locate – again female respondents provided a more
positive rating than did male respondents (Figure 48).
Ref. AR9 (n=704)
Figure 48: Accessibility of the police in terms of physical
Focus group participants regretted that due to Bossaso’s
security and justice system being understaffed,
undertrained and poorly equipped, crime could not be
deterred through sufficient arrests and prosecutions.
Their absence and ineffectiveness fails to improve
security in the district. The local authorities themselves
admitted in focus groups that public trust is low and that
communities are often reluctant to report crimes for fear
that they will become the first suspects. This same fear
was confirmed in several other focus groups, where it was
said that when the police arrive, they are usually heavyhanded, making arbitrary arrests, demanding bribes and
ignoring perpetrators.
distance and ease to locate (Freq. %)
Ref. AR8 (n=737)
It should be noted, however, that accessibility is assessed
significantly differently between wards (Figure 49), while
no significant differences are recorded between urban and
rural areas.
Figure 49: Accessibility of the police, by subdivision (Freq. %)
Ref. AR8_Rx3_R (n=733)
Just over half of CVS respondents (51.7%) indicated that
Like other parts of the state security system, it was stated
in focus group discussions that the police service showed
clan bias within its ranks. Initially formed from ex-SSDF
members,66 it has been predominantly composed of the
Majerteen clan and especially the Mohamoud Saleban
sub-clan since the time of the Yusuf presidency. This
imbalance seems to have intensified competition and
a perception of clan bias between the state’s different
security agencies just when organized crime was gaining
ground in Puntland. Competition between different
factions is one explanation offered by respondents for
‘unknown killings’.
Nevertheless, focus group participants were of the view
that the government had made additional efforts to ensure
that police salaries were paid, and respondents reported
that the police seemed to be more vigilant after dark than
before. Additionally, negotiations and discussions among
the police, the elders and the religious leaders over the
past 12 months have contributed to a marked improvement
in cooperation with the communities they serve. When
asked how security had changed in the last 12 months,
many focus groups referred to meetings between the
community elders and the police. For example, IDPs
37
established a committee to work more consistently with
the police and were allocated special phone numbers to
call in case of an emergency or security threat.
Figure 53: Reason for dissatisfaction with the police’s
response, property crime (Freq.)
7.2.3. Response
In addition to the general perception of the police, the
CVS also inquired into satisfaction with police response
to actual crimes. Out of the 14 cases of assault reported
to the police, eight victims were very satisfied with police
response, whereas three were rather unsatisfied and three
were very unsatisfied (Figure 51).
Figure 51: Satisfaction with the police’s response, assault
(Freq. %)
Ref. PC15 (n=6)
As noted above, of five cases of sexual violence revealed
in the CVS, two were reported to the police. In one of
the two cases, the victim was rather satisfied, while in
the other, the victim was very satisfied by the police
response. There is no information on grievances towards
the police’s response to sexual violence.
7.3.
Statutory courts
Ref. AA40
Of those who reported instances of property crime to the
government police, over half reported a positive degree
of satisfaction (35.3% were very satisfied and 23.5% were
rather satisfied). However, this still leaves a significant
percentage who declared a degree of discontent with
police response (11.8% were rather unsatisfied and 29.4%
were very unsatisfied) (Figure 52).
Figure 52: Satisfaction with the police’s response, property
crime (Freq.)
Ref. PC14 (n=17)
Six of the victims who were unsatisfied with the police
response had specific grievances with the government
police: two victims complained that it took too long to
respond to the reported crime; one that it took too long
for the initial contact; one that it did not take action at all;
one that he/she was not treated fairly; and one victim was
harassed or intimidated (Figure 53).
38
Bossaso District has one Criminal Court, whose presiding
judge also acts as the Attorney General. It also has one
District Court, one Regional Court and one Court of
Appeal. The courts administer both statutory and shari’ah
law. All three judges have received formal legal training.67 7.3.2. General perception
The courts were the least trusted of all public authority
institutions (Figure 39). Overall, there was a tendency
towards distrust. However, as with the police, women
tend to view the courts more favourably than men (Figure
54).
Figure 54: Level of trust in the courts (Freq. %)
Ref. AR10 (n=709)
In terms of physical distance and ease to locate, respondent
households were somewhat ambivalent towards the
accessibility to the courts, with nearly half of household
respondents (49.7%) attributing relative to high levels of
accessibility to the courts and 50.3 percent considering
them relatively to very inaccessible. Notably, there were
more respondents (38.2%) who considered the courts very
inaccessible (Figure 55).
Figure 55: Accessibility of the courts in terms of physical
distance and ease to locate (Freq. %)
Nevertheless, out of the 737 answers, 554 respondents
(75.2%) stated that they would go to a criminal court
should they be victim of a crime.
The reasons given by the CVS respondents for not bringing
a criminal case to the courts were: unfair judgments
(average of 40.6%); court corruption or bribery (22.3%);
expensive court fees (16.0%); cases take too long (10.9%);
the courts do not take action (6.3%); and the courts’
inaccessibility (4.0%). The differences between male and
female respondents are not significant (Figure 58).
Figure 58: Reasons for not turning to the criminal courts
Ref. AR11 (n=733)
(Freq. %)
Predictably, perception of accessibility varies per location
within the district (Figure 56).
Figure 56: Accessibility of the courts, by subdivision (Freq. %)
Ref. AR15 (n=175)
Ref. AR11_RxB3_R (n=729)
With respect to how quickly the courts respond, more
respondents indicated that the courts were relatively
(15.4%) to very slow (41.2%) (Figure 57).
Figure 57: Speed of the court’s response (Freq. %)
According to focus group participants, corruption is
a problem in the courts, and access to justice varies
considerably depending on plaintiffs’ ability to pay
bribes. By way of explanation, one IDP quoted the
familiar Somali proverb: “As long as the fingers are
well greased, they can massage the body”, i.e. for
those who have money, Bossaso’s judicial system can
work remarkably smoothly. For the many who do not,
however, the system remains slow and cumbersome,
and is often a source of further abuse and injustice. All
focus groups placed much greater trust and showed
greater appreciation for the elders and religious leaders.
Nevertheless, as with the security services, focus group
participants recognize that trust and confidence in Bossaso’s
judicial system have improved to some extent over the
last year, although they remain very low. The reason for
this may be that the government had responded to claims
of corruption by launching an investigation into judges’
behaviour and establishing an investigative committee,
which has removed several judges from their posts.68
7.3.3. Response
Ref. AR12 (n=706)
Out of the 32 cases of assault or physical attack, four
reached a decision through the criminal courts. In two
of these cases, the victims were very satisfied with the
court decision, one victim, rather satisfied, and one
victim, rather unsatisfied (Figure 59). The reasons for
dissatisfaction were not stated.
39
Figure 59: Victims’ satisfaction with the courts’ decision
(Freq.)
Ref. AA43 (n=4)
There were a total of six decisions made through a
criminal court for crimes against property (25.0% of
recorded property crimes).
Furthermore, there was one decision by a criminal court
regarding a case of sexual violence; however, no data
were available on the level of the victim’s satisfaction
with the ruling.
7.4.
Women
Women have an important role to play in safety and
security, and indeed women’s groups were mentioned
in the focus group discussions as a group that would
likely contribute to peace-building. In the CVS, only 16.1
percent of respondent households stated that women are
not allowed to participate in town meetings. The most
common reasons given for this were: the family’s belief
that the woman should focus on family issues (35.0%)
the feeling of discomfort of female household members
with participating (30.0%), the male household members’
dislike of female visibility in decision-making (23.0%);
and the husband’s jealousy or lack of trust in his wife’s
loyalty (12.0%). However, some interesting differences
do appear based on the gender of the respondent: for
example, more women than men think women may
abstain from participation due to feeling uncomfortable
with participation (Figure 60).
Figure 60: Reasons for female non-participation
7.5.
The elders and religious leaders
According to focus group responses and CVS data,
Bossaso’s elders and religious leaders dispense a far
more trusted and reliable form of justice than do official
state institutions. This is obviously related to varying
perceptions and justice practices. Somalia as a whole
functions under a complex system of legal plurality that,
in addition to the country’s formal criminal law, includes
both Islamic shari’a law and a number of traditional clanbased laws called xeer. Community members turn to the
arbiters of these laws far more often than to the formal
court systems. As one focus group member said, “People
have confidence in the elders. ‘There is nowhere higher
than the head on a person to touch.’ The elders do not take
bribes and they have the authority to decide who is right
and who is wrong.” Another said, “Elders and religious
leaders can solve all sorts of violence. There is nothing
that they cannot solve.” Indeed, even the government
occasionally refers cases to the elders, who act as a kind of
bridge between them and the communities. This general
trust is confirmed by the CVS (Figure 61 andFigure
62). Much of the trust, however, is linked to perceived
needs for stability and violence prevention, rather than
considerations of individual human rights.
Figure 61: Trust in the clan/community elders (Freq. %)
Ref. AR1xRP1 (n=732)
Figure 62: Trust in the religious leaders (Freq. %)
in community or townhall meetings, by gender of
respondent (Weighted %)
Ref. AR4xRP1 (n=734)
Ref. RP19 (n= 117)
40
As the analysis is broken down, however, it is becoming
clear that traditional mechanisms are incapable of
addressing new and more complex forms of organized
crime. Focus group participants admitted that these
traditional mechanisms are proving ill-equipped to
address emerging forms of violence such as assassinations,
piracy and gang theft. While xeer and shari’a law are well-
developed for traditional forms of murder and crimes
such as revenge killings and theft, they do not address
more organized forms of violence and crime. Xeer in
particular also relies on the compliance of clans and their
mutual recognition of the law. In cases of organized crime
linked to state corruption and nepotistic practices, this is
less likely to be forthcoming.
Some of the issues and capacities of the traditional elders
and religious leaders in relation to dispensation of justice
have been detailed above. It is worth emphasizing that the
key institution for conflict resolution (and dispensation
of justice) in Puntland and Bossaso is still xeer. The
question, however, is whether the traditional systems can
cope with modern problems and individual conceptions
of human rights. Many believe that justice as a whole may
be strengthened through new forms of linkages between
formal and informal systems. The state court system
is clearly still under-resourced and weak in coverage,
mostly limited to urban areas and undermined by the
low but growing number of legal professionals. While
some religious leaders have taken to studying formal
law, others claimed in focus group discussions that they
were better placed than the courts to deal with complex
business disputes.
7.6.
The business community
According to focus group participants, Bossaso’s private
sector also has huge capacities for peace, provided that
its dynamism can be harnessed for cross-clan business
activity and that the subsequent distribution of economic
opportunities and wealth it creates is not perceived as
being divisive. Economic growth and employment should
reduce the economic stresses on problem groups, but
these changes in turn could create further incentives
for cooperation across social divides if regulated and
consciously directed towards peace-building. The
business administration was cited in some focus group
discussions as providing a neutral means to resolve
business and land disputes in the town. These are both
sources of conflict between clans as well as an impediment
to legitimate business activity.
7.7.
Other security providers
A limited number of businesses hire their own private
security guards, who should be registered at the Ministry
of Security. In order to do so, a registration form needs
to be filled, including the following: the name of the
company, the name of the security guard(s), serial number
of the guard’s firearm(s). Following the submission of
the registration form with an ID photo of the security
guard(s), the Ministry of Security will issues an identity
card for the guard(s).69 Enforcement is weak, however,
and stories of private military security companies that
protect oil companies or fight pirates are commonplace.
In addition, Bossaso’s 16 villages each have a
neighbourhood watch of ten guards, who are said to
answer to the District Commissioner. Similarly, IDP
settlements have some ten guards.70
64
See subsections 7.2.2 and 7.3.1 for a detailed perception of the police
and statutory courts.
65
These units are the Central Police Station, Biyo Kulule Police Station,
Mijir Police Station and Balade Police Station. District mapping,
Danish Demining Group, April 2011.
With the state’s formation in 1998, around 15,000 former militiamen
came under government auspices. According to figures from 2005,
6,500 have since joined the security forces or civil service, 3,000
voluntarily demobilized and joined civilian life, while at least 6,000
remained unemployed. UN/World Bank, op. cit., p. 12.
66
67
Interview with the Attorney General for the District Mapping,
Danish Demining Group, April 2011.
See, for example, ‘Puntland President Makes Minor Cabinet,
Judicial Reshuffle’, Garowe Online, 17 May 2010, http://allafrica.com/
stories/201005170789.html.
68
69
Interview with the Deputy Ministry of Security by the Danish
Demining Group, April 2011.
70
Interview with the Deputy Mayor by the Danish Demining Group,
April 2011.
41
8. Recommendations
The following recommendations are extracted from the Bossaso District Safety Plan. A workshop was held at the
end of June 2010 with individuals who had participated in the focus group discussions in Bossaso. The workshop was
facilitated by SORSO, the Danish Demining Group, UNDP and Saferworld. Participants validated the draft community
safety diagnosis, prioritized security concerns, and brainstormed solutions to the issues identified. It should be noted
that quantitative data from the CVS were not yet available at the time. The District Safety Committee then adopted the
resulting District Safety Plan. This plan will be revised on an annual basis as part of the District Council’s annual work
plan. External and governmental support is required for its full implementation.
8.1. Strengthening the police
Vision
Intervention and activities for implementing the intervention
Local contribution
The police in
Bossaso are
well trained and
equipped, and
able to ensure a
safe community
with a reduced
level of thefts
and killings.
1) Intervention for building the capacity of the police. Activities:
a. Identify XX police officers for training as crime investigators.
Mobilization of the
police
External support
needed
b.Identify XX police officers for training in traffic management.
c. Arrange training courses with the Carmo Police Academy.
d.Deploy police and traffic police to: XX.
2) Intervention for improving the equipment and infrastructure of the
police: Activities:
a)Have Puntland State Ministry of Security assign distinct
uniforms.
Transportation and
nightly subsistence
Unskilled labour
b)Build police stations in Suweto (IDP camp) and Ridwan (close to
the seaside).
c)Deploy 40 police to Suweyto.
The police and
the community
of Bossaso
work closely
together in law
enforcement and
crime prevention
3) Intervention for improving cooperation between police and
community. Activities:
a)Establish a Community-Based Policing Committee (CBP).
Mobilization of
community
Representation of
the police
Establish-ment of
CBP
Training of CBP
Committee
members
4) Intervention to improve security in various hotspots. Activities
a) Conduct day and evening (6–9 pm) police patrols in the town
centre, market, busy streets (e.g. Raffiyo Raho) and mosques.
b) Deploy plain-clothed police officers in hotspots including tea
bars, qat-chewing areas, and busy streets (during the day).
Police deployment
Community
cooperation
Financial (fuelling
transport vehicles)
5) Explore public private partnerships for security. Activities:
a. Build consensus among business owners on the need for
regulation and coordination of private guards/militias.
b. Develop standards and regulations on private security provision
(a guiding framework of principles).
c. Establish government-based (police) and community-based
(traditional and religious leaders) oversight of private security.
d. Train private security guards on crime prevention and legitimate
security provision.
e. Establish liaisons among District Safety Committee (DSC), the
police and traditional and religious leaders for safety in business
areas (related to crime incident reporting and trend analysis).
Advocacy/
mobilization
Expertise on
legitimate private
security provision
and management
Government
b)Provide training to members of the CBP Committee.
c)Hold regular meetings for discussions on cooperation,
have police report back, and have the community provide
suggestions.
d)Establish sub-committees for different residential areas, IDP
camps and rural villages.
The private
security
arrangements
are regulated
and reformed
to complement
police efforts.
42
8.2 Improving the judicial system
Vision
The local community has access
to a free, independent and fair
judiciary system.
1) Ongoing training for the judiciary
a)Build capacities of current judges to respond to
complaints.
Local
contribution
External support
needed
Financial
b)Train 9 additional judges.
c)Train the current prosecutor.
d)Train XX additional prosecutors.
2) Ensuring the security of judiciary personnel. Activities:
a)Recruit and train 15 guards for the security of the
judges and prosecutors.
b)Provide vehicles and equipment for the guards.
3) Provision of office equipment for the judiciary. Activities.
a)Procure 15 computers, 5 printers and 2 photocopy
machines for the judiciary staff.
b)Procure 3 vehicles for the judges and staff.
8.3 Improving the prison system
Vision
The prison system fulfils the needs
of the region, houses inmates
of different genders and age
groups, and provides an effective
rehabilitation programme.
1) Rehabilitation of existing facilities. Activities:
a)Expand the prison to separately house women and
juveniles.
b)Expand the prison to house all inmates under humane
conditions.
Local
contribution
Hygiene and
sanitation
improvement
Council/local
government
community
External
support
needed
Financial
support
c)Establish a health post in the prison.
d)Provide drinking water.
e)Improve hygiene and sanitation.
f) Provide eating utensils and mattresses for prisoners.
2) Intervention for provision of vocational training to the
prisoners. Activities:
a)Rehabilitate current tools and machinery.
b)Teach the prisoners carpentry and electricity skills.
3) Intervention for rehabilitation and education for
prisoners
c)Provide Quranic and Islamic teaching.
d)Provide academic (school) education to the prisoners.
4) Training prison personnel. Activities:
e)Train prison staff in human rights and other
international conventions related to prisoners’ rights.
43
8.4 Modifying the urban landscape to prevent crime
External
support
needed
There is a wellplanned and crimefree city
1) Safer Streets
a. Mobilize the business community to install security lights around their
businesses (especially along Ariga).
b. Advocate for integration of requirements for installation of security
lighting.
c. Install street lights along Ariga.
Mobilization
Business
community
goodwill
Expertise
Local
Government
Financial
resources
2) Urban Planning
a. Advocate for better city planning with wider streets and designated
space for building roads.
b. Create secure qat markets that are away from the town centre.
Mobilization
Business
community
goodwill
Expertise
Local
Government
Financial
resources
3) Better Housing in IDP Camps
a. Mobilize community members (and IDPs) to buy-in to the need for
better planned residences.
b. Develop property courts (i.e. fencing groups of houses into common
enclosures with single entry points).
c. Upgrade housing in low-income communities and IDP camps in
Suweyto, Raffiyo Raho and Ridwan).
d. Install security lighting on houses.
Mobilization
Community
goodwill
Neighbourhood watch
initiative
(through
CBP)
Financial
resources
Expertise
Government
To have well-lit and
safe residential
areas and IDP
camps
44
Local
contribution
Vision
8.5 Supporting better communication on safety issues
External
support
needed
Vision
Local contribution
The community of Bossaso
is safety- conscious, and
takes part in reducing
piracy and improving
the situation of potential
emigrants.
1) Intervention to raise awareness on the effect of piracy on the
a)Develop and distribute Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials (posters, t-shirts and
poems) on business ethics and the consumer’s role in
dissociating from piracy-tainted money and investments,
e.g. the Halal and Haram Campaign reinforcing Muslim
values on handling money and products and/or other
honest and legitimate practices.
Mobilization
Development/
enrichment
of awareness
campaign messages
Financial
resources
DSC coordination of
dialogue forums
Mobilization
of community
members
Record of
proceedings
Government
Follow-up
Mobilization
Development/
enrichment
of awareness
campaign messages
Financial
resources
Guest speakers
Story-telling
Monitoring
Guest speakers
(women, youth,
elders, sheikhs,
intellectuals)
Mobilization
Accessible venue
Monitoring
and followup
b)Publish IEC materials (billboards and posters) warning
about violent hotspots (e.g. busy streets, town centres, IDP
camps, coastal villages).
Messages
Incident monitoring
Financial
resources
c)Implement school, mosque, and college education
programmes on public safety consciousness (e.g. walking
in groups to mosques to reduce the likelihood of being
killed) .
Guest speakers
(women, youth,
the elders, sheikhs,
intellectuals)
Monitoring
and followup
d)Use local media to educate public on health dangers of qat
use.
Guest speakers
Monitoring
and followup
Mobilization
Police
Local
government
b)Hold monthly public debate/dialogue forums involving
traditional and religious leaders and the public in qat
chewing areas in discussions on community and religious
values, discouraging the culture of piracy, and also
discussing the challenges around emigrants.
2) Intervention to raise awareness on the plight of immigrants.
Activities:
a)Develop and distribute IEC materials on facts and myths of
immigration, e.g. the truth about life in Yemen.
b)Raise awareness through local media (poems, radio
programs, and local newspapers) on the plight of
immigrants (real life stories).
3) Intervention for raising awareness about general safety in the
a)Convene quarterly public education forums on violence
trends and precautionary measures (conducted by
traditional and religious leaders and DSC).
All community safety
stakeholders have a strong
and efficient broad-based
partnership
1) Information-sharing
a.Develop partnership between the private sector,71 DSC,
IDP committees and the police for information-sharing
and coordination of safety initiatives in the town centre.
b.Establish and use information-sharing mechanisms (for
established partnership) with respect to:
i. new investors, monitoring reports on money flows72 and
the nature of new investments;
ii.security concerns over areas around mosques and on busy
streets.
c. Conduct quarterly confidence and trust-building forums
involving the police and the community (including all
stakeholders) to enhance the public’s willingness to
divulge information on assassinations.73
d.Appoint a Police Community Liaison Officer.
e.Audit the local government registry of businesses
operating the city, and clamp down on unregistered
business entities.
45
8.6 Creating employment opportunities
Vision
Local contribution
External support
needed
There are employment
and livelihood
opportunities for
youth, especially
from the IDP and
rural communities, to
prevent them from
becoming involved in
piracy, or needing to
emigrate.
1) Expanding existing skills training programmes. Activities:
a)Expand skills-training programmes to train more youth
from the IDP and rural communities to become tailors,
electricians and carpenters.
Mobilization
Financial resources
Mobilization
Financial resources
b)Engage current vocational training institutes to
provide the training.
c)Train XX male youth and XX female youth.
d)Procure tools and training materials.
e)Create linkages between training institution and
employment opportunities (business people).
There is a
vibrant economy
characterized by
legitimate and ethical
business
Technical support
f) Strengthen water management committees through
training on dispute resolution, conflict early warning
and early response and negotiation skills.
g)Enhance partnerships between water management
committees and traditional and religious leaders
in mediating conflicts on water points (through
cooptation of these leaders in water committee
meetings).
Creation of linkages
between water
management
committees and
traditional and
religious leaders
2) Promoting Business Development
a. Establish a small- to medium-sized enterprises
development programme addressing:
• loan facilities for small- and medium-scale business
investors.
• import support initiatives (tariff reduction, securing
trade routes, info on diverse sources for procurement of
goods for import, etc.).
b. Consensually develop and facilitate (creation of) a
framework guiding labour rights that also addresses
rights to wages for all (including immigrant workers).
Consensus on need
for business ethics
Technical advice
Monitoring
Government
Financial resources
Government
INGOs
The private sector includes the Chamber of Commerce and the business community – including qat sellers and owners of qat-chewing areas,
where suspected pirates and lords of illegal immigration frequent – all of whom are critical actors in combating theft, piracy and migration-related
violence.
71
It has been observed that the Bossaso community can recognize suspicious money (i.e. pirates’ money) on the basis of the denominations of the
dollars used for purchases, especially for bulk payments.
72
The main cause of police failure to arrest suspected perpetrators of ‘unknown killings’ is that witnesses choose not to divulge information for
fear of their identity being revealed to the perpetrator. In the latest
73
46
47
About the Somali Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP)
The Somali OCVP – referred to as Homboro in Somali – gathers data and information on patterns of criminal social
and political violence in the region, supporting analysis that can be useful to all Somalis. Homboro is the Somali name
for the bottlenose dolphin, an animal celebrated in traditional songs for its intervention in protecting and rescuing
human beings. The OCVP pursues a similar human security objective.
The OCVP is currently accumulating quantitative and qualitative data on insecurity and violence in the Somali
regions, which are available for further use. The OCVP data and analytical reports can help practitioners ensure that
interventions are guided by up-to-date information and evidence. The OCVP is also setting up a safety and security
monitoring system to form the cornerstone of a Somali Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN). Beyond data
collection and analysis, the OCVP will draw on the fields of conflict management — traditional and contemporary
— to support practitioners and policy makers with guidance notes, an interactive discussion forum and training. By
collecting, storing and sharing the knowledge acquired in the field of crime and violence reduction, it aims at becoming
a centre of excellence for conflict and violence prevention.
For further information:
The Director
Hargeisa, Somaliland
[email protected]
http://www.ocvp.org
48

Bossaso Safety and Security Baseline

Transcription

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