a parceria áfrica-europa em construção: que futuro?

Transcription

Proceedings 1/2013
A PARCERIA EUROPA-ÁFRICA EM CONSTRUÇÃO
A PARCERIA ÁFRICA-EUROPA
EM CONSTRUÇÃO:
QUE FUTURO?
Conferência realizada na Fundação Calouste
Gulbenkian em 13 e 14 de Dezembro de 2012
1 IMVF PROCEEDINGS 1/2013
Abstract
This publication summarises some of the presentations and discussions at the international
conference Building the Africa-Europe partnership: what next?, held in Lisbon on December
2012. Bearing in mind the 2014 EU-Africa Summit, the conference aimed at debating some of
the major themes that will continue to impact on the building of the Africa-Europe partnership
and on international development cooperation in forthcoming years. The definition of a post2015 global development agenda, which necessarily links complex issues such as security,
environment, governance and growth, underpinned the discussions on the sessions.
Esta publicação resume algumas das apresentações e debates da conferência internacional A
Parceria África-Europa em construção: que futuro?, realizada em Lisboa em Dezembro de 2012.
Tendo em conta a próxima Cimeira África-UE em 2014, a conferência teve por objetivo debater
alguns dos principais temas que continuarão a ter impacto na construção da parceria euroafricana e na cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos próximos anos. A definição de uma
agenda global para o desenvolvimento pós-2015, que necessariamente liga questões complexas
como a segurança, o ambiente, a governação e o crescimento, marcou transversalmente os
debates.
Keywords: Europe, Africa, Global Development, Development Financing, Security, Demography
Palavras-Chave: Europa, África, Desenvolvimento global, Financiamento do desenvolvimento, Segurança, Demografia
SOBRE A PUBLICAÇÃO
Esta publicação deve ser citada como: IMVF (2013); A Parceria Europa-África em Construção: Que
Futuro? Relatório da Conferência realizada na Fundação Gulbenkian em 13-14 Dezembro 2012,
IMVF Proceedings 1/2013, Lisboa.
Pode copiar, fazer download ou imprimir o conteúdo desta publicação [recomendamos a
utilização de papel reciclado ou certificado] . Pode incluir trechos desta publicação nos seus
documentos, apresentações, blogs e websites desde que a fonte seja mencionada.
As intervenções são apresentadas no idioma em que foram feitas. A edição dos conteúdos foi feita
por Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira. O conteúdo desta publicação é da exclusiva responsabilidade do
editor.
Esta publicação é resultado de uma colaboração entre o Instituto Marquês de Valle Flor, o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e
Internacionais, o European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) e o Centro de Estudos Africanos do ISCTE-IUL,
com a participação da Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN).
A Conferência foi financiada pelo Camões-Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua, contando igualmente com o apoio da Fundação
Portugal-África e da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.
Saiba mais sobre o IMVF em www.imvf.org
ÍNDICE
1. ENQUADRAMENTO
4
2. RESUMO DOS PAINÉIS
5
3. INTERVENÇÕES DOS ORADORES
8
3.1. ABERTURA DA CONFERÊNCIA
8
3.2. A CRISE
13
3.3. OS DESAFIOS DEMOGRÁFICOS
26
3.4. SEGURANÇA
49
3.5. FLUXOS E ACTORES DO DESENVOLVIMENTO
62
3.6. O FUTURO
79
3.7. ENCERRAMENTO DA CONFERÊNCIA
93
4. ANEXOS
100
4.1. PROGRAMA
101
4.2. BIOGRAFIAS DOS ORADORES | ABOUT THE SPEAKERS
103
4.3. LISTA DE PARTICIPANTES
109
PARA SABER MAIS… || FURTHER READING
113
1. ENQUADRAMENTO
A conferência internacional A Parceria África-Europa em construção: que futuro? foi organizada pelo
Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF), o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais (IEEI) e o
Centro de Estudos Africanos do ISCTE-IUL, em parceria com o European Centre for Development Policy
Management (ECDPM), e decorreu nos dias 13 e 14 de Dezembro na Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. Os
organizadores fazem parte da rede Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), que agrupa 25
membros, entre think tanks, instituições académicas e da sociedade civil africana e europeia, e que
produz contributos e análises independentes na promoção do diálogo político entre os dois continentes.
Os próximos anos assistirão a decisões fundamentais sobre as prioridades e objetivos do
Desenvolvimento, bem como sobre o quadro das relações entre a União Europeia e África, para as quais é
importante o contributo da investigação prática e de debates multidisciplinares que reflitam a
complexidade crescente das novas dinâmicas globais. Na verdade, embora os desafios da segurança e do
desenvolvimento tenham implicações profundas para os países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento,
para a sociedade civil e para os decisores políticos, na Europa e na África, não têm ainda sido
suficientemente analisados em termos dos impactos sobre os dois continentes e sobre o seu
relacionamento.
Tendo em conta a Cimeira África-UE em 2014, a conferência teve por objetivo debater alguns dos
principais temas que continuarão a ter impacto na construção da parceria euro-africana e na
cooperação para o desenvolvimento nos próximos anos. A definição de uma agenda global para o
desenvolvimento pós-2015, que necessariamente ligará questões complexas como a segurança, o
ambiente, a governação e o crescimento, marcou transversalmente os debates.
Os temas abordados por mais de 20 oradores europeus e africanos e cerca de 100 participantes focaram
o impacto na parceria da crise internacional, das tendências demográficas, dos problemas de segurança
no norte de África e no Sahel, do surgimento de novos parceiros e do financiamento do desenvolvimento.
Este relatório pretende resumir algumas das questões debatidas, das apresentações feitas pelos oradores
e dos aspectos mais salientados nos diversos painéis.
2. RESUMO DOS PAINÉIS
Os debates foram organizados em 4 sessões e 1 painel:
Sessão 1
Sessão 2
Crise Internacional
Desafios demográficos
Impacto na Europa, na África e nas suas
relações
Na sustentabilidade dos modelos de
crescimento e na ajuda ao
desenvolvimento
Sessão 3
Sessão 4
Ameaças de Segurança
Fluxos e Atores do Desenvolvimento:
Novos doadores e investidores
e ajuda versus negócios
O Norte de África, o Sahel e os países
vizinhos
Painel
A Cimeira UE-África de 2014 &
A Agenda Global de Desenvolvimento pós-2015
Os aspetos mais salientados e discutidos nos diversos painéis foram os seguintes:
Crise || África e Europa vivem momentos diversos, com a primeira a experimentar fortes taxas de
crescimento nos últimos dez anos e a segunda mergulhada numa dinâmica de estagnação e crise política
e institucional do modelo de integração. Estas realidades contrárias têm vindo a colocar em causa os
paradigmas de ajuda, com condicionalidades políticas a serem secundarizadas em favor de interesses
económicos mútuos. A entrada de novos parceiros emergentes, designadamente da China acelerou estas
dinâmicas, cujos efeitos deverão produzir uma alteração progressiva nas agendas fazendo deslocar o eixo
da parceria das questões da ajuda para as do negócios e desenvolvimento.
Demografia || Os desafios demográficos dos parceiros apresentam prioridades diferenciadas. No caso
europeu, a realidade é de envelhecimento da população, com uma crise de sustentabilidade dos modelos
de segurança social, agravada pelas políticas anti-imigração vigentes. Confrontados com os problemas
políticos e económicos do curto prazo, com taxas de crescimento decrescentes e o aumento do
desemprego, os países europeus têm evitado enfrentar as políticas necessárias, de natalidade e de
migração, para contrapor o impacto do envelhecimento populacional. No caso africano, as taxas de
crescimento demográfico têm-se mantido acima do limite de renovação geracional (2,1% ao ano),
originando problemas nos ritmos de urbanização e superiores aos da oferta de emprego, principalmente
aos jovens, levando à multiplicação de fenómenos sociais de marginalização e pressão social, sendo, por
isso, contrariamente ao caso europeu, prioritário o controle e planificação do crescimento populacional.
Neste contexto, o investimento nos sistemas de saúde e o empoderamento das mulheres assumem um
papel fundamental, querem termos de políticas de planeamento familiar quer na saúde sexual e
reprodutiva em geral, que se reflecte também em indicadores como a mortalidade materna e infantil. Foi
ainda salientada a falta de relevância das questões demográficas nas políticas governamentais, apesar da
sua relevância no médio e longo-prazo, bem como a falta de conhecimentos para implementar programas
abrangentes e inovadores, nomeadamente no campo da juventude e emprego.
Segurança || As questões de segurança em vastas regiões do Sahel e limítrofes foram priorizadas nas
discussões do painel, tendo sido salientada a necessidade de investir mais no conhecimento dos
fenómenos em curso evitando os sound-bites dos órgãos de informação e das forças políticas interessadas
em fazer vingar a sua versão da realidade. Neste contexto foi salientada a necessidade de centrar as
eventuais decisões de intervenção militar nos organismos regionais africanos, evitando a intervenção
unilateral de forças internacionais e europeias. O caso Líbio foi lembrado, designadamente para salientar
a oposição da União Africana à intervenção da NATO naquele país que foi desconsiderada; foi igualmente
lembrada a fragilidade demonstrada pelo regime maliano, em oposição ao nigerino, para lidar com as
consequências do desaparecimento do regime líbio, apesar do Mali ser até recentemente apontado como
exemplo de estabilidade e democracia em África. Foi ainda referida a existência de “double standards” na
actuação da União Europeia face a estes países, o que prejudica a assunção deste bloco como actor
político efectivo no plano global.
Financiamento || O impacto em África do crescimento da procura internacional de matérias-primas
desde o início da década anterior, o aparecimento de “novos” parceiros, particularmente da China (mas
não só) e o regresso do investimento privado foram salientados no painel. O crescimento nas ofertas de
financiamento sem condicionalidades políticas para obras de infraestrutura abriu uma janela de
oportunidade à generalidade dos países africanos e melhorou o ambiente de negócio atraindo novamente
o investimento privado internacional e nacional. Reflectiu-se, assim, numa maior capacidade negocial
destes países, que agora têm um espaço de manobra mais alargado para implementação das suas
próprias estratégias de desenvolvimento. Foi também referido que, contrariamente ao caso europeu,
onde uma significativa parte dos países membros da UE apresentam dificuldades nos respetivos
indicadores macroeconómicos, particularmente no peso da dívida e dos défices orçamentais nos PIB, a
generalidade dos países africanos, fruto do ajustamento estrutural e dos perdões de dívida anteriormente
realizados, apresentam melhores indicadores. No entanto, sabemos hoje que não havendo redução da
pobreza sem crescimento económico, pode existir grande crescimento económico sem redução da
pobreza e até com acentuação das desigualdades internas, pelo que o desafio está exactamente em
construir um crescimento inclusivo e sustentável. Paralelamente a estas considerações, foram abordadas
as principais questões relativas à reavaliação dos critérios do que efectivamente constitui Ajuda Pública
ao Desenvolvimento, como esta se interliga com outros fluxos externos e com outras políticas (numa
lógica de coerência), levantando-se a questão geral de como avaliar o esforço global de cada país para o
desenvolvimento.
Futuro da parceria || Foi transversal aos debates a ideia de que as relações ainda são marcadas por um
pendor assistencialista e por pré-conceitos históricos que afectam a confiança mútua entre as partes,
para além faltar à parceria “tracção política”, ou seja, de ainda ser necessário percorrer um longo
caminho para que exista uma verdadeira parceria política ao nível continental entre as duas partes. Foi
salientada a necessidade de relançar a parceria em novos moldes, passando progressivamente o discurso
e a prática do domínio quase exclusivo da ajuda para o domínio do diálogo político efectivo e da criação
de ambientes que favoreçam o investimento e as relações comerciais, com responsabilização de ambas as
partes. É, portanto, altura para os dois continentes repensarem os seus interesses no quadro deste
relacionamento, as suas mais-valias como parceiros e as imagens/percepções mútuas que ainda marcam
essas relações, investindo num diálogo mais franco e aberto sobre os seus interesses reais.
“ There is a need for a political and mental
shift in the way we perceive this
partnership relation.”
3. INTERVENÇÕES DOS ORADORES
3.1. Abertura da Conferência
Paulo Telles de Freitas
Presidente do Conselho de Administração, Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr
Esta conferência vem numa altura crítica para o futuro da Europa e, digamos, de toda a organização e
relacionamento entre os diferentes continentes. Esta conferência é organizada pelo Instituto Marquês de
Valle Flor em parceria com o Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais, o Centro de Estudos
Africanos do ISCTE e também com o European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECPDM);
todas estas organizações são membros da rede Europe-Africa Policy Research Network (EARN), que
agrupa membros da sociedade civil instituições académicas, produzindo análises independentes na
promoção do diálogo politico entre os dois continentes, Europa e África. Cabe agradecer pelo patrocínio
desta conferência ao Camões - Instituto da Cooperação da Língua, principal financiador, e à Fundação
Portugal África e a Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, fundação companheira de muitos projectos do Instituo
Marquês de Valle Flor e que nos acolhe aqui nesta casa com história.
Esta conferência vai focar vários temas de interesse, nomeadamente o impacto da crise económica
internacional no relacionamento entre os dois continentes. A Europa passa, como sabem, por um
momento de crise, que não é só económica mas também uma crise de projecto. Todo o modelo de
integração europeia está em crise, está outra vez em refundação, e o impacto que esta crise europeia vai
ter no relacionamento com o continente africano é um dos temas do primeiro painel.
O II painel vai focar a segurança internacional e o impacto que a evolução recentemente verificada,
nomeadamente nos países no Norte de África, com a mudança de regimes e a instabilidade gerada, vai ter
impacto não só nos países vizinhos mas também na União Europeia. Em termos demográficos, o III painel
vai centrar-se-á na geografia mundial da pobreza, os novos conceitos de pobreza, a degradação
económica dos países não só da Europa mas de alguns países de África, contrastando com outros países
de África que registam um aumento significativo dos seus rendimentos. Todo o panorama económico
mudou nos últimos cinco anos e isto tem certamente impactos que importa analisar, já que a
deterioração económica verifica-se na Europa, em contraste com alguns países de África que estão em
grande aceleração da economia. Finalmente, a recente diversificação dos parceiros externos de África
com as novas economias emergentes e o papel destes como novos doadores no continente africano,
obrigam-nos a reflectir sobre quais são os objectivos dessas novas parcerias, nomeadamente a
importância desta diversificação de fluxos financeiros para o desenvolvimento de África.
Nuno Guimarães
Pró-Reitor para a Internacionalização, ISCTE-IUL
O que eu gostava de trazer aqui era a perspectiva do ISCTE-IUL sobre as parcerias África-Europa, no
âmbito do espaço da internacionalização que temos vindo a desenvolver e que vamos desenvolver no
futuro. Qual é a nossa teoria, que é a teoria obviamente própria do ISCTE na área do conhecimento, da
formação avançada e da internacionalização? Como é que essa teoria é construída? O ISCTE possui, desde
há décadas, várias actividades relacionadas com os temas aqui abordados. Por um lado, os estudos sobre
temas africanos, ou seja, o Centro de Estudos Africanos, apesar de ter sido criado institucionalmente nos
anos noventa, tem raízes já na década de 1980, sendo uma estrutura que corporiza um património
científico maduro. Do ponto de vista da formação, há cerca de 15 a 20 anos o ISCTE começou a
desenvolver actividades fora de Portugal. Temos cerca de dois mil e duzentos diplomados pelo mundo
fora, sendo que a maioria é em África e depois uma segunda parte entre o Brasil e o Oriente,
nomeadamente Macau e China.
Tentando colocar o pensamento antes da
acção, esta experiência e este grupo de
pessoas faz-nos construir uma teoria com
dois princípios fundamentais. Em primeiro
lugar, estes quadros de referência na
parceria com África são crescentemente
distribuídos e multipolares, ou seja, já não
faz muito sentido estabelecer uma
parceria que seja entre Lisboa e a capital
de outro país.
Podemos referenciar, a este propósito, o facto de existir actualmente uma preocupação e discussão sobre
a pertinência de integrar os Estudos Africanos com outro tipo de Estudos, Estudos Asiáticos, com Estudos
de dimensão de outras geografias, porque o próprio estudo de natureza científica destes temas deve ser
mais multipolar e mais alargado a outras geografias. Não é possível também, no campo da formação (e
particularmente na formação avançada, de mestrado e doutoramento) pensar em programas para
leccionar em Luanda, Maputo ou Cabo Verde, sem ter em conta a cooperação que temos com instituições
académicas brasileiras, ou mesmo instituições académicas chinesas. Existe, portanto, uma certa
multipolaridade que emerge. Um terceiro exemplo que reforça esta ideia é que, quando patrocinamos o
encontro de estudantes de Angola, Moçambique, Cabo Verde, China, Brasil ou outros países,
estabelecem-se ligações entre alguns desses parceiros que não incluem necessariamente Portugal. Assim,
nesta rede (que até é uma rede pessoal mas também é uma rede de colaborações académicas, cientificas,
empresariais), o ISCTE não se pode pôr no papel de “nó principal” ou exclusivo, por onde tudo tem de
passar. Somos um nó razoavelmente relevante, na medida em que somos motivadores e promotores, e
esperamos ser um nó que contribui para a sustentação da rede, mas muitas das cooperações vão ocorrer
entre parceiros que participam na mesma rede, em que nós não somos exclusivos ou determinantes
dessa rede. Assim, na nossa perspectiva, o olhar para a Cooperação com África deve ser feito
crescentemente, no campo do ensino e da formação, numa perspectiva multipolar.
Há ainda um outro aspecto que tem vindo a evoluir no caso do ISCTE. Até agora, a tradição da
colaboração com África tem sido feita numa perspectiva não apenas marcadamente bilateral, mas
também muito baseada na unidade - seja o projecto, o curso, a acção de formação -, que é muito
segmentada no tempo. Há um curso, nós participamos no curso, podemos leccionar mais ou menos
disciplinas, os professores vão, alguns alunos até vêm defender os seus trabalhos, mas há um fim da
acção e as dinâmicas terminam (ou são retomadas noutra edição dessa mesma acção). Por outras
palavras, não há uma criação de uma estrutura institucional, pelo que pensamos que o próximo salto tem
que ser no sentido da criação de instituições ou de estruturas para-institucionais com esses países, como
Moçambique, Angola, ou Cabo Verde.
Há várias tendências que justificam isto. Por um lado, as necessidades nestas economias crescem de
forma tão rápida que não é possível manter o sistema granular da Cooperação pontual e, portanto, até
para ir de encontro às necessidades é necessário criar instituições. Por outro lado, relativamente aos
nossos parceiros, trata-se da criação de capital local, de capital intelectual e capital científico próprio, pelo
que, cada vez mais (e independentemente do modelo anterior continuar a funcionar) as novidades vão
necessariamente acontecer na criação de instituições multinacionais e transnacionais. Não sabemos bem
como é que estas se organizarão, ou como é que as pessoas vão navegar nesse espaço, mas neste âmbito
da formação avançada de base científica e académica, o ISCTE antecipa que iremos progressivamente
criar instituições com parcerias de capital, com investimento directo estrangeiro de instituições
académicas portuguesas nesses países, e de investimento directo estrangeiro de instituições desses
países em Portugal. Esta é a nossa perspectiva, ou seja, estamos a pensar de uma maneira muito
balanceada e não no modelo bilateral, desequilibrado, em que há um pólo que orienta a parceria e um
pólo que é receptor dessa parceira.
Sintetizando, as duas ideias ou tendências que gostaria de salientar no campo do conhecimento são, por
um lado, a multipolaridade e, por outro lado, uma transformação das formas de parceria em formas
institucionais mais sustentadas.
Francisco Almeida Leite
Vogal do Conselho Diretivo, Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua
É com imensa satisfação que a Cooperação Portuguesa se associa a esta iniciativa, agora através do novo
Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua, que é não só o organismo coordenador da Cooperação
Portuguesa, mas que também passou a ser responsável pelas funções das duas instituições que no
passado recente eram responsáveis, quer pela Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento, quer pela divulgação
da Língua e da Cultura Portuguesa no estrangeiro. Trata-se de um novo organismo, mas que retoma na
íntegra todas as funções e o empenho então a cargo do ex-IPAD, Instituto Português de Apoio ao
Desenvolvimento, relativamente à Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento, incluindo no que diz respeito ao
fortalecimento das relações entre a União Europeia e África. Há já alguns anos que o então IPAD, agora
Camões, tem vindo a colaborar com as entidades envolvidas na organização desta conferência, com
particular atenção para as relações UE-África, às quais Portugal atribui a maior importância. A realização
desta conferência é aliás uma prova inegável da importância desta colaboração.
O tema escolhido pelos organizadores desta Conferência Internacional não podia ser mais oportuno, pois
o futuro das relações entre a Europa e a África é um desafio incontornável, que tem a maior actualidade
no relacionamento entre os dois continentes, encontrando-se numa fase crucial. Portugal, até pela sua
ligação secular e histórica ao continente africano, tem procurado desempenhar um papel activo no
estabelecimento do diálogo, com vista ao reforço de um relacionamento mais estreito entre União
Europeia e África. Recordo que foi durante a presidência portuguesa da União Europeia, no ano 2000, e
após ultrapassadas muitas vicissitudes, que se conseguiram reunir as condições para que a primeira
Cimeira Europa-África, que reuniu os Chefes de Estado dos dois continentes, se realizasse no Cairo.
Portugal voltou a ter um papel determinante para que a segunda Cimeira, a chamada Cimeira de Lisboa,
fosse por nós organizada durante a Presidência Portuguesa de 2007. Como é sabido, foi nessa Cimeira de
Lisboa que se lançou a Estratégia Conjunta África-UE, em cuja negociação Portugal se orgulha de ter
participado na qualidade de Presidência da União. Esta estratégia veio efectivamente elevar a relação
África-União Europeia a um novo patamar estratégico, com uma parceira politica reforçada e uma
cooperação mais intensa a vários níveis. A Estratégia é baseada num consenso Euro-Africano assente em
valores e interesses comuns e procura reforçar quer a cooperação económica, cada vez mais importante
nos dias que correm, quer o desenvolvimento sustentável em ambos os continentes, para que possam
viver lado a lado e em paz, segurança, prosperidade, solidariedade e sobretudo dignidade humana.
Contudo, a concretização destes ambiciosos objectivos não é fácil tendo nomeadamente em conta os
diversos acontecimentos e os desafios que a conjuntura internacional coloca actualmente. O ultrapassar
destes obstáculos, no sentido da construção de uma parceria com futuro, pode beneficiar das respostas
às questões que os organizadores desta conferência levantam, e de entre os quais eu destaco, desde logo,
o impacto da crise financeira internacional nos dois continentes. Primeiro desafio: Como é que a Europa
vai lidar com os constrangimentos financeiros que ameaçam o novo quadro financeiro plurianual 20142020, que poderão pôr em causa o tradicional papel de primeiro doador global e o cumprimento de
compromissos assumidos internacionalmente em termos de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento? Segundo
desafio: Que mecanismos alternativos se podem accionar para manter esse papel? Terceiro desafio:
Como se vai posicionar face à crescente intervenção e relevância dos países emergentes? Quarto desafio:
Como dinamizar e fortalecer mecanismos complementares de ajuda e financiamento, através do reforço
necessário do papel de outros atores como as Organizações da Sociedade Civil e do Sector Privado, sem
se pôr em causa o principal objectivo que rege a Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento, que é a luta contra a
pobreza?
Em África, nos últimos dez ou quinze anos, pelo menos ao nível económico, tem-se verificado um
crescimento assinalável e continuado. Como vai África reagir à estagnação que tem atravessado a
economia europeia? Por último, como é que os países africanos concretizam a sua integração regional?
Como ultrapassam situações cada vez mais complexas, de diálogo entre as diversas organizações
económicas regionais? Por aquilo que expus aqui, os desafios são muitos e não deveram ser
negligenciados.
Porém, esta parceria encerra um potencial enorme, incluindo ao nível da execução de assuntos de
interesse comum, que deverá ser devidamente aproveitado. Entre estes assuntos conta-se, por exemplo,
o processo de definição do quadro para o Desenvolvimento pós-2015, data limite para a concretização
dos actuais Objectivos do Milénio, onde uma concertação estratégica entre a União Europeia e a África se
assume de cada vez maior importância. Enquanto principal doador internacional e importante actor
político e global, a União Europeia poderá, e deverá, ser capaz de assumir uma posição activa e
concertada neste processo, estando prevista para breve a apresentação de uma comunicação da
Comissão Europeia sobre o quadro pós-2015. Esta comunicação servirá de base à definição da posição
europeia para a discussão que terá lugar no quadro das Nações Unidas. Cabe-lhe também uma
responsabilidade importante ao nível da promoção de consensos e de envolvimento dos seus parceiros
estratégicos neste processo, assegurando que as suas preocupações e necessidades ficam reflectidas na
futura agenda global do Desenvolvimento, que se pretende que seja tão inclusiva como consensual. O
diálogo União Europeia-África reveste-se, assim, de uma importância óbvia neste quadro, devendo este
ser um tema central neste relacionamento ao longo dos próximos anos.
Esta será uma das questões relativamente à qual a parceria estratégica estabelecida entre os dois
continentes poderá ter um papel crucial. Aguardamos com expectativa os resultados da discussão sobre
esta e outras questões, que
serão certamente um contributo
importante para a reflexão em
torno do futuro das relações
União Europeia-África na
próxima Cimeira, prevista para
2014.
3.2. A Crise
O impacto da crise internacional na parceria Europa-África
Os efeitos combinados da crise financeira internacional e da crise do Euro, bem como o debate sobre
modelos de austeridade versus modelos de crescimento, continuarão seguramente a influenciar a
parceria e as perspetivas de cooperação UE-África. A Europa permanece indecisa sobre o seu futuro e
papel como ator global, vivendo hoje uma fase aguda de crise do modelo de integração, o que exerce
pressão sobre políticas e fundos destinados ao desenvolvimento internacional. Por seu lado, não
obstante o seu crescimento continuado, as economias africanas não deixam de ser igualmente
afetadas pela crise internacional e pelos efeitos da crise económica e política europeia.
Principais questões debatidas:
Quais são os principais impactos da crise em ambos os continentes?
De que forma se refletem nas relações UE-África?
Hélder Oliveira
Fundação Portugal-África
Moderador
Pensamos muito mais na Europa do que na relação que a Europa pode ter com outras áreas que puderam
e podem, em determinadas circunstâncias, contribuir significativamente para a solução da crise que
estamos a enfrentar na Europa. A crise que vivemos é económica, mas é também uma crise de valores e
uma crise de confiança. A relação com outros países, com outras áreas do mundo, designadamente com
África, pode contribuir para que possamos ultrapassar esta crise. A transição de um pensamento um
pouco eurocêntrico para uma perspectiva mais universal pode ser uma mais-valia para o desenvolvimento
dos debates desta conferência.
Adebayo Olukoshi
Director of UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP ) and Executive Director,
Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dakar
When I read the outline on the subject of this panel, I was tempted to ask: Crisis? What crisis? In a certain
sense there’s a very eurocentric reading of the crisis: an European crisis is not necessarily an African crisis,
and Africa is actually in a moment in which the narrative of growth is actually the dominant narrative
today. So, coming from Africa, you tell me about crisis and the impact on Africa, but what crisis are you
talking about at the end of the day?
I want to first of all situate the current crisis which began in 2007/8 in the broader flow of crisis which
have characterised the contemporary experience of globalisation, which itself has been underpinned by
the unidirectional strategy of liberalisation across the world (of trade liberalisation, of financial
liberalisation, of capital accounts’ liberalisation, broadly speaking of market reforms). You can call it
Washington consensus, you can call it new liberalism but that has been the dominant theme
underpinning the current face of globalisation. And from that point of view, the disconnections and the
disfunctionalities that have been associated with the process of unidirectional and rapid accelerated
liberalisation across the world has, in fact, played out over the last 20 to 25 years in repeated episodes of
crisis. So, the latest financial and economic crisis is, in fact, only one in a series.
We can go back to Mexico in 1982, when the Government of Mexico declared its inability to continue to
pay its debts and the impact that had on the global economy, especially in the American banking system,
which was heavily exposed in terms of loans to the Mexican economy.
Moving on to Brazil, and the repeated currency crisis which Brazil experienced and the various plans
which were put in place to try to save the Real, the Cruzeiro and the rest until the arrival of the Cardoso in
power, and his success in stabilising the economy and restoring the Brazilian currency.
Move on to Argentina, where there was a boom, which was presided over by Carlos Menem and soon
after it become a meltdown in which effectively the value of the money was completely wiped out and
the establishment of the currency board, which was basically an instrument that imposed a very tight
fiscal regime and foreign exchange money system on the economy of Mexico.
We can move on to Asia, in the 1997/8 crisis, which in a more dramatic expression resulted in the
overthrow of the Suharto regime but also affected Korea, Malaysia and the rest.
All of these episodes of crisis have pointed to a major disconnect in the international economic system, in
a context of massive accelerated liberalisation and in the disconnection between finance and production.
When it finally hit home in the USA, with the subprime crisis in 2007 and 2008, what for me was
significant about it, is that it marked the first time in the current phase of globalisation in which the crisis
(that is inbuilt into the system of liberalisation) hit the very centre of international capitalism and it
changed the narrative of crisis management completely. Going back again to the crisis of Mexico, and to
what Africa itself experienced on the 1980´s (when Mexico went into crisis, many African countries were
put in this situation of debt unsustainability and balance of payments’ problems), as well as when it
happened in Asia, the main narrative was essentially that many of those countries were suffering crisis of
crony capitalism. They were put on regimes of corruption and neo-patrimonialism, which came to boost
and translate it into crisis.
When it hit home in the Unites States, the narrative was not the same. And the actions which were taken
to try to manage the crisis run in direct contradiction to the precise actions which were prescribed for
Latin America, Africa and Asia facing with similar crisis of accumulation. In the context of Africa, Asia and
Latin America, the dominant crisis management approach was one of deflation. Economies were in crisis,
essentially Washington Consensus said: squeeze them all, in order to put them back into ship. Structural
adjustments were essentially about deflation. When the crisis hit in the United Sates and spread rapidly to
Europe, the basic theme was one of reflation, how to reflate economies. Notions like quantitative easing
invented by the Bank of England, basically meant pumping money into the economy. Keynesianism, which
was thought to be dead, suddenly came back to become the key instrument, for the management of crisis
and the message was how to avoid the economic crisis from becoming a depression. American
nationalising? Britain nationalising? Not just pumping money into the economy but nationalising private
institutions “too big to fail”? Notions that kind resonated heavily in the African world and the African
context, and it would be very interesting to compare the similarities and differences in experience of
Africa and Europe with adjustment. Perhaps with the partial exception of Greece, which probably has
undergone serial structural adjustments in African style, the rest of Europe has somehow manage to push
a narrative in which the message has been that we need to reflate, we need to prevent depression, we
cannot squeeze an economy that is already in crisis. These are the same arguments which Africans
scholars and policy officials made against structural adjustment, that were dismissed as simply pledging
special interests and not wanting to take painful decisions.
This current crisis, therefore, came in the context in which, after twenty five years of economic stagnation
and decline, Africa began to growth more than before. In the period before, growth rounded three to four
per cent, equated with the rate of population growth, which did not reflected in economic
transformation, as would have been desired. In the worst cases economies actually suffered a regression
and negative growth rates were experienced in several African countries. With the dawn of the new
millennium, with the rise of China, with the growing appetite of India and other new players and a
commodity boom that began to be experienced, African countries returned to the path of growth, to the
point that today six of the ten fastest growth economies in the world are in Africa.
That sifted the narrative about the continent from an Afro-pessimism that dominated the 80’s and 90’s,
into what I call an Afro-enthusiasm, which could itself be as irresponsible as yesterdays’ Afro-pessimism,
because the over enthusiasm about Africa’s growth prospects also masks several important challenges
which the continent that need to address. It also produces one-sided narrative of progress and happiness,
which actually does not exist on the ground as exemplified by the events which took place in Tunisia and
other northern African countries; I n general, and in different parts of the continent, people are not
feeling the impact of growth in their pockets.
African countries entered into a period of growth at the same time as the current international financial
and economic crisis broke out, and immediately raised concerns in the continent as to whether Africa
would not be penalised for a crisis for which it did not have any responsibility. Having passed twenty five
years of structural adjustment and finally beginning to resume growth, the biggest concern of officials was
how Africa would sustain growth in the face of the crisis; from the African Development Bank to the
African Union and to the Economic Commission for Africa, calls were made to Africa’s development
partners to be prepared to set aside resources, to compensate Africa for losses it might suffer as a result
of the crisis which was not originated on the African continent.
It is true that the initial crisis of 2007/2008 did impact on several African countries, particularly those with
the most intricate connections to the international economic system. The fastest impact of the crisis was
in stock markets almost all across the world, from Lagos to Nairobi or to Johannesburg. As capital was
withdrawn (remember that capital accounts had been liberalised across the world, and so portfolio
investors from Europe and America in the face of the financial crisis were rapidly recalling their moneys
and domestic investments, particularly the banks that were making a fortune from trading stocks
themselves also began to withdraw rapidly from the stocks in which they have invested), we saw a
massive collapse of stock markets across the continent between 2008 and 2010. Collapse of stock markets
carried consequences in terms of the ruination of many middle class investors, as well as small investor,
because in some countries and banks loans were given to people to buy stocks (e.g.Nigeria). People went
to the banks and took loans in order to buy stocks, then perhaps in some weeks you could double the
value of your stocks, pay back your loan, take more loans, and a cycle was produced in which people
actually began to depend on stock markets’ speculation for making a living, more than actually investing
in the real sectors of the economy.
Again this was a manifestation of the “financialisation” which we have experienced across the world in
the international system. We also saw the devaluation of currencies - there was a run on the South
African Rand, for example. Currencies across the world, for example Nigeria, depleted his external
reserves from sixty billion; put over twenty billion to try to defend the value of the Naira in the context of
the pressures of devaluation in the wake of the crisis.
However, these problems were relatively short-lived. Africa was able to recover from the initial shocks of
the crisis, thanks in part to the continuing robustness of demand from Asia, for its primary commodities
and the historically high commodity prices, plus the advantages which many of the oil rich countries like
Angola and Nigeria continued to enjoy. This meant that, on aggregate, Africa maintained growth rates and
recovered very quickly from the initial shocks of the crisis.
So, Africa did not experience the kind of contagion which Europe has experienced, and the narrative of
growth and transformation quickly returned to become the key issue in the discussion of economic
prospects of the continent. This is underpinned by several other factors, such as demographics: Africa’s
populations is going to hit the billion and it has a significant middle class, even if we are in a moment in
which inequality has never been greater in history. The top three most unequal countries in the world
today are in Africa, on the basis of the Gini coefficient, but still there is a big middle class with a great
purchasing power, and from an investor point of view, demographics does matter. It is also a youthful
population, and this, plus all the dividends associated with it, will be a reality over the next thirty to fifty
years before it will pick and begin to reverse itself.
It is also a continent that is undergoing massive urbanisation; in another twenty years or so Africa will be
an urban continent. Many countries have already more urban than rural population today, with
implications for the agrarian question, amongst others. In terms of natural resources, I think we listen
every day that something has been discovered somewhere in Africa, you just loose count of it. You think
you knew where all the uranium or platinum or palladium were located we wake up to find out that It’s
also available somewhere else. For instance, we didn’t know that Mozambique was a diamond producing
country until the massive discoveries that were made also in that country. The natural resources and this
wealth constitute also an important driver of the change Africa is undergoing.
Geostrategically, the shift is towards the East, and Africa’s trade relations with the Asian countries - not
just China and India, but also Korea, and Turkey, and Malaysia - are growing massively, to a point where
over the medium term will likely overtake the economic relationships with Europe. All of this suggests
that Africa has become something of a “bride”, as everybody wants to have relationships with Africa:
Europe-Africa, Japan-Africa, India-Africa, China-Africa, etc. There is a new scramble for the continent and
it is in this context that we need to rethink Europe-Africa relations very seriously.
It is clear that, in terms of the management of the European crisis and the approach which has been
taken, the attitude Europe previously had in terms of dictating lessons to Africa in how to manage
economies, can no longer stand. Africa will be justified to say to Europe “physician, heal thyself”. All of the
measures taken by Europe to manage its own crisis run almost contrarily to the recommendations and
prescriptions which Europe backed in the management of African crisis. And so it is not surprising to hear
at ADB, for example, “well Europe, you need to get your macroeconomic fundamentals right because we,
in Africa, we have our macroeconomic fundamentals right, after twenty five years of painful adjustment.
You need to get it right, you cannot live on debt, and you cannot borrow money perpetually and hope
that other people will pay your bills, directly or indirectly”. I think that the tune of the dialog is changing;
we are going to be confronted with a continent that is far more confident in itself. Africa today holds
about half billion dollars in aggregate reserves of all African countries, and these are the third most
important reserves held by any region of the world, after China and India.
I think that the discourse about Aid has also to change, because the all idea that the relationship with
Africa can only be conditioned and based on aid is one which I feel, even in Africa, is becoming past. In
discussions and meetings where Africa ministers participate, there are concrete examples of this: for
example, partners are now asked about their exit strategy, which was not a discussion ten years ago. In
other cases, international partners are asked to put the contribution in the table and not to make
promises, because several promises in the past were not delivered.
A country like Kenya generates ninety five percent of its revenue internally (long before the discovery of
oil) and finances its projects and economy on the basis of these internally generated revenues, so an aid
discourse is not feasible anymore. Like Kenya, countries like Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Namibia, or
Botswana, have the option to say “we will choose what we think is in our interests, not what you think
that is in our interests”. Therefore, the discourse around development assistance, which has been the
pillar on which relationships have been constructed over the years, will have to change radically.
The death of the aid ideology may be accompanied by the recomposition of the development cooperation
framework altogether. Here again, it is worth keeping in mind the discourse around China, which may not
feature officially and in formal engagements, but in fact is an underlying aspect of overall relationship
between Europe and Africa. For better or for worst, China, India, Brazil and others have become big
players on the African continent, in the same way as Europe, historically, was a big player on the
continent. It is of no use telling Africa “be careful of China”, because as the Minister of the Planning of
Kenya said in a meeting in Addis Ababa, the Europeans can also be found in Beijing – so what are you
looking for in Beijing if it is such a dangerous place to be? The equation is changing, and if Europe wants
to be relevant to the transformation which is taking place in Africa, it will also have to change the tone
and the tune of its own relationship. It is important to move into concrete areas of trade and investment
that can feed into the programme of transformation that is taking place in Africa.
There are a lot of areas where investments can be made: there is a huge infrastructure deficit on the
continent (which is why I talk about the need to temper our current afro-enthusiasm expressed in many
circles in the West); there is a need to invest in social policy (poverty is still a big issue in the African
continent and social policy will be an important area for governments to pay attention, if growth is to be
inclusive and sustainable); there are investments to be made in industry. Against the prediction of the
World Bank that industrial development in Africa will not happen for the foreseeable because of cheap
labour in China, the expectation is in fact that, over the next decade, China will lose over 10 million
industrial jobs for which countries like Ethiopia are positioned themselves strategically. Ethiopia is one of
the fastest growing economies in the world today, which is not based on commodity exports or in any
commodity boom. The growth of Ethiopia is due to a strategic refocusing of the economy, in order to
attract investments into the real sectors, and I think this is where I see the possibility of changes occurring
in Africa-Europe relations.
Finally, the tendency to try to gain advantage in a changing strategic environment through the use of
pressure is also one which needs to be rethought, in a very serious way. Too much pressure was put by
Europe and by the European Commission on Africa, around the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs),
to a point where many actually began to ask if there was more to the EPAs than just an economic
partnership. It almost became a conditionality, for African countries should sign an interim or a full EPA
before any other discussion could take place with Europe. I think the room for manoeuvre around those
kind of issues is also narrowing very tightly, to the extent to which Africa countries do not feel
themselves, either individually or collectively, ready to go alone with the EPAs as proposed by the
European Commission; and so the use of pressure might not be as useful as it used to be. Fortunately,
Europe has been very preoccupied with its own crisis over the last few years, and forgot about the EPAs a
bit. I fear that when things begins to stabilize, the EPA agenda might be revived, and the same old
approach - of divide and rule, fragment, blackmail, intimidation - might yet come back again.
There’s also the concern that, in the bid to manage the
influence of China in the continent, the temptation to resort
to unilateral military interventions on the part of Europe
might become an issue. Certainly there is concern in the
African continent in some quarters, and not just in the African
Union Commission, that some of the actions taken around
Libya, Cote D’Ivoire or other countries may presage a new
approach to manage the relations with Africa that includes
the use the use of military force.
Whatever the case, I think that the age of Europe-Africa
relationship that is premised one-sidedly on an aid narrative,
is gradually coming to the end, and maybe it is about time
that it ends.
Damien Helly
Visiting professor, College of Europe, Bruges
Gulbenkian is one of my favourite museums in Europe; it is a fantastic place to discuss international
politics, economics, but also in the background culture and architecture. I mentioned in culture because I
think, as Europeans, we need to get back to our own cultural communalities, and when the UK is about to
have a referendum about leaving the EU in 2015, we need to look back at our common capacity to
imagine the world, to rethink it together and, to quote a French curator: “if you don’t like the current
world just invent a new one”, and I think that this is a perfect place to try to do it together with our
African colleagues.
There are two topics in this pane – the crises and the EU-Africa partnership - and we are asked to reflect
on the interactions between the two, which is a very challenging task. I think the wording of the first
Lisbon declaration in 2007 is still valid: it’s about a more equal relationship, trying to move away from our
donor-recipient relationship. The rhetoric is really good and the strategic vision on paper is still relevant,
and I think we should not throw this baby with the bath water. But there’s also a need to reach the gap
between the discourse and the practise and actually this partnership was a very good compromise
between EU member states on one hand, the European Commission on the other, and African partners.
Everyone found some interest: the African were looking for some funding because it was still a mindset of
aid donorship, the European Commission wanted to be independent enough to disburse its money and
the members states wanted to have an impression of being in control of the whole process. The
compromise was there, but the question is ‘is this compromise still holding today when renegotiating the
partnership in two years’ time?’.
It was also a very Euro-African vision which is very common in some European states, that is, the idea of a
common space, and I think this vision is now outdated. The shift to the East was already mentioned, and
perhaps we need to be a little bit self-critical about this Euro-African narrative.
The relationship is still very marked by nation-states policies and we see that in the impact of the crisis;
those countries in Europe which have been most seriously hit by the crisis, have seen a strong damage in
their bilateral relations with their former colonies (look at Portugal and Mozambique for instance). We
need to be aware that our national foreign policies are still very much at the core of the way our national
capitals and foreign ministers look at our relationship with Africa. At the same time, you have countries
realising that they are not influential enough anymore to go on dealing with Africa, so they are using the
European framework to multiply their influence. This is also a very strong trend in Europe from all the
countries; Portugal is a very good example, but you have France, and even the UK is been doing it. I
wouldn’t say there is reciprocity, because African states do not do that with the African Union and,
therefore, there is a misbalance there that we need to think of.
I think one of the main challenges of the partnership is being far too bureaucratic, managed by the two
Commissions, and the eight partnerships have not worked well. Some people say that the Security
Partnership has been the one working best, but if you really look at the deliverables and the difference
made by the very framework of the partnership, it is really not convincing. It should probably have been
more focused on results but it was such a patchwork of existing components, programs and cooperation
relationship, that I think it didn’t really take off the ground. There are some exceptions, of course, and
that is why one of the big messages in my presentation is “let us be careful with the overall encompassing
analytical framework of Europe Africa relations”. It is misleading, because we need to look at the details,
very technical aspects, sectorial policies to be pursued, etc., and I think we need to be much more precise
in the way we look at facts, figures and trends,. This probably has been one of the shortcomings of the
partnership.
Looking at people, instead of just
institutions, is absolutely crucial and if the
institutions fail in moving the partnership
forward, I have no doubt that societies will
do it; there are already doing it: very
hands-on, very concrete day to day
corporation, substate levels, civil societies,
diasporas, you name it.
Regarding the crisis, I will just like to
repeat and complement something on
what Adebayo Olukoshi said about the
return of the Keynesian school. Early 2009,
many economists said: there is African
resilience because Africa is disconnected
from the world economy. They were
mainly economists working in economic
finance that said the African finance is not
that globalised, so Africa will be fine.
Others were looking at commodities prices and food crisis, saying that it’s all part of the same crisis.
Jeffrey Sachs stated that the challenge is global sustainability and we need to look at global solutions. One
of the solutions we were talking about, as earlier as 2009, was to really boost investment in all kinds of
infrastructure in developing countries, to boost growth there, but also to boost growth in developed
countries. A second message I take from that is that it’s a global crisis, which calls for global solutions.
Perhaps Europeans and Africans, if they want to do something together, should think (and it is also a part
of the rational partnership of 2007) to give a global dimension to the partnership by looking for joint
approaches to global solutions. How to work more together within multilateral institutions, global fora,
climate change, global financial architecture, etc., is certainly one avenue for the future of the partnership
and usually it is a little bit underlooked but some work have been done in these fora between the two
sides.
Literature also looked at the various channels of impact of the crisis on Africa. There are very good reports
on that, so let me perhaps mention some of them. We need to acknowledge the degree of
interdependence between our economies. Simulation models from the World Bank quoted by economists
in Africa really show that a decrease in our growth rate in Europe will have some impacts in growth rates
in Africa. This has actually has taken place, so we need to be aware of that, and we need to look at what
to do. If look for instance at the CFA franc zone, there is a clear linkage and parity with the Euro. So the
interdependency is there; it’s true that there is a power shift to the East but still we cannot forget that we
are very much interdependent.
One of the channels of the impact is aid. I agree we need to shift from the aid discourse, but at the same
time we also need to recognise that, some countries and some governments in Africa are still very much
aid dependent, even through budgets support (look at Mozambique, where the percentage of state
budget which is coming from aid is still very significant). So, aid still matters; the question is that there is
less aid because of the crisis. Trends from OECD show that there is a decrease globally from OECD donors,
and despite the fact that overall assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa in the last few years is still growing a
little bit (if you take the EU as a whole), the question is that some states have cut their budget
dramatically: Portugal, Greece, Spain, France, even Denmark or Austria. The targets of the MDGs in 2015
to have 0,7 of our budget to aid is appearing further away, meaning that we’re less good at reaching the
targets that we had promise to reach initially.
I think the question now has to be on what impact of the crisis country by country. Aggregates are fine,
but they are misleading perceptions; we speak about optimism or pessimism, but actually the reality it’s
much more complex if we look at the details.
Some authors have compared the crisis with a tidal and strong viral wave, on which surfers would
continue to surf, and the best and most talented surfers would surf at a faster speed, while those who are
not skilled enough or weakest would just fall down and sink. This is what has been happening from some
countries in Africa. If you take data from the OneCampaign, they have clearly shown that there are
several groups of countries in Africa suffering or being hit by the crisis in very different ways, so we need
to look at that in particular.
There other channels of impact which are not related to aid and I think they are growing in importance.
First of all, direct investment: although data shows that there is a decrease in flows from Europe, there
are still large amounts of FDI from Europe towards Africa and still we have ten countries in Europe
representing around 35% of global FDI flows towards Africa. Despite the impact of the crisis, there are still
private sector and public enterprises seeking FDI towards Africa. Policies have change as well in the EU,
with the blending models, trying to mix investment, loans and grants; so the aid business models in
Europe is being rethought. There is a debate about this and I think we need to look at how this will evolve
in the next few years and how it is going to be reflected in the new partnership. Remittances are much
higher than ODA itself, and although it decreases because of the crisis, it’s still there and it’s also a factor
of resilience. Besides that, there is indigenous growth in Africa and an emerging Africa narrative. I think
we need to insist on this, because this creates still huge opportunities for both African societies and
Europe.
Regarding long term trends and changes in the relation, parts of the optimistic narratives are related to
progress in health sector (e.g. fight against malaria), new models for development and development aid,
all the work done on innovative financing for development (this is new and includes air tax, financial
transaction tax online, etc), the huge work being done on transparency in extractive industry, amongst
others. All these trends are bypassing the old way of doing, of the relationship between the two
continents and I think this also has too inspire the new partnership.
But, because there is a but, there are huge areas of enduring fragility in Africa and I think one long term
challenge is how to find virtuous interactions between African growing areas and African fragile
territories. The challenge is about dealing with inequalities in long term within countries, within societies,
but also within regions and even within cities, and we are facing exactly the same challenge in Europe
with the current crisis. How to manage future growing inequality?
Amongst the remaining challenges for the partnership, beyond the crisis, is the quality of the political
dialogue. I think one change in Europe, even during the crisis, is the creation of a European External
Action Service and a stronger strategic approach to political issues. It is time for Europeans to go to
African partners not only talking about aid and donor-recipient relationship but also talking about
interests, about what do Europeans want out of Africa and what Africans want out of Europe. Let’s talk
about interests and be a little bit more business-like, rather than emotional about our historical ties and
so on.
Trade negotiations have been very seriously irritant and I fully agree with Adebayo’s assessment about
the EU use of arrogant and bullish behaviour during some negotiations. I think this was true for around
2007, when Peter Mandelson was Commissioner for Trade, but I think it’s not always case still
everywhere. You need also to look to the other side of the coin, which is African leadership really
bargaining development aid in compensation for liberalisation. You also need to look at the African
internal challenge which is about regional integration, and the EPAs have forced African countries to think
about the real terms of their regional integration. I don’t think that it is fair, but I’m just saying that all this
confusion of regional organisations is a challenge that goes beyond the behaviour of the EU, which I agree
has been unacceptable too many times. We’ve not mentioned migration policies yet; there are also
strong biased perceptions in Europe about migration from Africa and think the debate needs to be
reopened on that.
About the predicament of treating Africa as one, we also need to go beyond the intercontinental scheme
and think more precisely about what subsidiarity means in Africa between the states, the sub-states,
regional economic communities and the African Union. African partners are not clear enough about who
should be responsible for what, at what level, in our cooperation.
Fundamentally, it is all about sound political leadership and human capital. We need to work more
together on these two things, because, no matter the emerging narratives and African optimism, Africa
will need human capital to be sustainable in its growth. I suspect that those who know Europe and know
the experiences of European cooperation, recognise there is a value in keeping some relations with the
Europeans about human capital and capacity building.
In sum, I think the question is for Europeans not to miss the train of African growth and opportunities; for
African governments not to miss their own economic opportunities for their own societies; for private
sectors to work with the right partners and in the right legal environment; and for both continents to
rethink their mutual interests and their own image. Ultimately, this is the question of what models each
continent wants to give to the world and to its own citizens. Quoting Alyson Bailes in 2009, “the crisis is a
reminder that Europe global credibility depends precisely on how well it handles its internal social and
economic affairs”.
Fernando Jorge Cardoso
IMVF, Lisboa
A crise internacional de que falamos não é meramente uma crise financeira ou só uma crise económica,
mas sim uma crise sistémica e estrutural. Esta crise acelera e demonstra também, (é uma consequência e
uma causa) um movimento que se foi gizando desde a segunda metade dos anos 90 e acelerou a partir do
início da década passada, particularmente após a entrada da China para a Organização Mundial do
Comércio em 2001. É uma crise em que as chamadas economias capitalistas desenvolvidas - Estados
Unidos da América, Canadá, parte dos países da Europa Ocidental - sofreram um processo de
desindustrialização e de terciarização das suas actividades e, em simultâneo, alguns países emergentes (a
China em primeiro lugar, mais do que todos os outros juntos) se foram progressivamente transformando
em abastecedores do mercado mundial de um conjunto cada vez maior de produtos de natureza
industrial.
Isto significou uma modificação progressiva, e cada vez maior, dos investimentos directos internacionais
para a Ásia e particularmente para a China, para além de ter significado também a entrada, em termos da
economia internacional, de algumas economias emergentes que tinham uma base industrial muito forte,
que vinha de políticas de substituição de importação dos anos 50, 60 e 70, com população muito ampla,
ou seja, com mercados internos muito fortes como o Brasil e agora o México também. Assim, estamos
num processo de aceleração de mudança das relações de força e de poder, de natureza económica,
politica, e até de segurança. Portanto, esta crise não é meramente uma crise financeira.
Em segundo lugar, a crise do Euro não é meramente uma crise orçamental. É, sem dúvida, uma crise
económica e monetária, que tem muito a ver com a forma como a moeda única foi criada, pelos seus
condicionantes. Tem a ver com o facto de a União Económica Monetária na Europa não ter todos os seus
pilares construídos e em funcionamento. No entanto, o que se começou a verificar na Europa a partir do
fim da Guerra Fria é que, na Alemanha, o capital privado alemão e o Estado alemão investiram
fortemente na reunificação alemã, e ao fazê-lo, a própria Alemanha se atrasou do ponto de vista da
modernização tecnológica de um conjunto de áreas importantes, a começar pela energia e pelas redes de
transporte, que é uma das grandes preocupações de natureza estratégica que os Alemães têm
actualmente. Enquanto nos anos 90 vivemos esse grande processo, da reunificação da Alemanha e de um
euro-optimismo pronunciado, também as decisões sobre a construção europeia a partir da década
seguinte foram tomadas nos anos 90, como a decisão da criação do Euro e do avanço para formas mais
aprofundadas de integração. Mas ao passar-se isto, a Europa avança para um mundo que ele próprio está
em profunda mudança, e ao chegarmos ao início desta década a capacidade de competitividade industrial
europeia estava a diminuir consideravelmente em termos internacionais.
Enquanto os bancos europeus e os investidores europeus, que na primeira metade da década passada
(particularmente através de bancos alemães mas não só) investiram grandemente nos países do Sul da
Europa, avançavam também para a Ásia e em particular para a China, acontecia à população europeia
algo que não está a acontecer à população africana nem na América Latina e em partes da Ásia também
não. Ou seja, passava por um processo de envelhecimento da população e de diminuição do crescimento
demográfico, de tal maneira, que hoje só há um país da União Europeia em que as taxas de crescimento
demográfico se aproximam dos 2,1% sem as atingir, que é a França. E muito devido a politicas de
emigração antigas, que já não são mais as mesmas. Por outras palavras, isto significa custos muito
acrescidos do ponto de vista do chamado Estado Social Europeu como nós aqui o chamamos, bem como
uma incapacidade de o Estado funcionar como anteriormente, um pouco também como motor de
financiamento e como motor de desenvolvimento.
Assim, esta crise do Euro é também uma crise politica. Vivemos, na Europa, um processo de
europessimismo, em que há alguma descrença na construção europeia e um retorno à predominância de
políticas nacionalistas ao nível europeu, que são absolutamente evidentes nas discussões e nos debates
que estão em curso, a propósito dos países altamente endividados na Europa e a propósito daquilo que é
necessário fazer para ultrapassar a crise.
E toda esta crise sistémica dos países mais desenvolvidos do capitalismo das últimas décadas do último
século acontece num cenário em que a economia mundial está a crescer, apesar da Europa e apesar dos
Estados Unidos da América. A economia mundial está a crescer mais fortemente no lado dos países
emergentes e, interessantemente, dos países menos desenvolvidos, em que África não é caso único.
Vemos países saídos da antiga União Soviética e alguns países asiáticos que também experimentam,
desde há dois ou três anos, taxas de crescimento acima dos 10% ou muito perto disso. Estamos num
cenário em que o mundo cresce, mas a Europa e os Estados Unidos não, bem como o Japão, que continua
a sofrer a deflação dos anos 90. No caso africano, a partir particularmente de 2002, vemos
sistematicamente taxas de crescimento positivas, com pequenos recuos em 2009 e 2010 devido à crise
financeira internacional, recuos esses que não serviram para que as taxas médias de crescimento
baixassem para além das taxas médias de crescimento demográfico, ou seja, África cresceu em termos
relativos e em termos absolutos. O que é interessante também neste crescimento é que os estudos
demonstram que cresceram não só os países exportadores de petróleo, mas também os países
importadores de petróleo em África. O crescimento de alguns países não exportadores de petróleo
ultrapassou o crescimento dos países tradicionalmente exportadores de petróleo no continente.
Isto significa que algo de novo está a acontecer no mundo e em África do ponto de vista sistemático. Nos
anos após a descolonização em África, nós vivemos quatro décadas de saída e de não entrada do
investimento directo estrangeiro privado em África (1960-1990). As políticas nacionalistas do pósindependência levaram à saída de investimento directo privado em África, levaram a uma situação em
que o financiamento para o desenvolvimento no caso africano veio principalmente da ajuda ao
desenvolvimento (através de financiamentos protagonizados pelo Banco Mundial, pelo Banco Africano de
Desenvolvimento e pelos chamados países membros do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento). Também
por causa das relações históricas entre África e Europa, o relacionamento entre estes dois continentes
após as independências foi um relacionamento muito centrado na formatação da ajuda ao
desenvolvimento, através das convenções de Yaoundé, depois mais tarde da convenção de Lomé e dos
acordos de Cotonou. O diálogo institucional e político entre Europa, União Europeia, países europeus e
África, países africanos, Organização de Unidade Africana e depois, mais tarde, União Africana, foi um
debate muito à volta da ajuda ao desenvolvimento e do financiamento para o desenvolvimento.
Esta realidade está em profunda mudança neste momento, tal como referido anteriormente. Do ponto de
vista estatístico, se olharmos para o financiamento dos Orçamentos de Estado dos 54 países africanos em
2010, e apesar das mudanças que se estão a operar em África, metade ou mais dos Orçamentos de
Estado destes países ainda eram financiados pela ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Isto apesar de, de um ponto
de vista geral, a tendência e um dos principais desafios que os países africanos têm pela frente em termos
de modernidade e de governação dos respectivos Estados, seja suportarem os respectivos orçamentos,
particularmente os Orçamentos que nós chamamos correntes através do sistema fiscal. Países como
Angola ou Moçambique praticamente não têm receitas orçamentais provenientes dos impostos dos seus
cidadãos, e isto é uma das fraquezas da democracia em África, porque a partir do momento em que
houver uma lógica clara por parte da população e dos votantes de que as receitas do Estado provêm do
seu próprio trabalho e dos seus próprios impostos, então a pressão sobre os seus respectivos dirigentes e
governantes vai ser muito maior do que aquela que existe agora. Isso é bom do ponto de vista de
consolidação dos Estados de Direito e dos Estados Democráticos. Esta questão da reforma fiscal talvez
seja um dos principais desafios governativos que os africanos têm.
Voltando à questão das relações Europa-África, o que nós verificamos neste momento é que,
particularmente a partir de 2002 em diante, o financiamento para o desenvolvimento começa a vir de
outras origens que não só as origens tradicionais dos países do Comité de Desenvolvimento e das
instituições multilaterais, predominantemente da China.
Neste momento, a China é claramente a principal fonte de financiamento do desenvolvimento em África,
ultrapassando todos os outros. E a China, como todos nós sabemos também, não o faz meramente por
princípios caritativos, mas fá-lo por interesse próprio. Fá-lo porque está num processo de crescimento
acelerado, que já vem de há 30 anos, em que necessita de escoar as enormes reservas monetárias que
tem em seu próprio beneficio, o que significa modernizando as infra-estruturas, aeroportos, portos, redes
de comunicação, transportes e etc., de todos aqueles países que detêm matérias-primas, não só em
termos minerais e em termos energéticos, mas também matérias-primas agrícolas (alimentos). O
pensamento estratégico da China (também verificado noutros países como alguns países árabes), incide
no investimento directo, ou seja, de compra não só de minas mas também de terrenos agrícolas e de
terrenos de produção alimentar em vastas partes, neste não só de África mas também na Ásia e na
América Latina.
Estamos num mundo diferente, em que estas diferenças foram muito aceleradas nestes últimos tempos,
e chegamos também do ponto de vista da parceria Europa-África em que há que mudar completamente
de sintonia o tipo de diálogo político que existe até agora entre os dois continentes. Este diálogo já não
pode ser mais assente na cooperação para o desenvolvimento, mas a cooperação para o desenvolvimento
tem de passar a ser parte do diálogo (deixando de ser aquilo em que o diálogo assenta).
Após quatro décadas de não entrada de investimento directo estrangeiro em África, nós temos dez anos
do regresso deste investimento directo privado estrangeiro no continente, e mais, com o crescimento das
classes médias em África temos também investimento privado africano a investir no continente. Deixemme pegar em Portugal para ilustrar um pouco com aquilo que está a acontecer. Em Portugal, desde há
quatro anos, a principal entrada de investimento e de financiamento privado em Portugal não vem dos
seus parceiros e, como sabem, Portugal está num programa de ajustamento estrutural. Em África, os
programas de ajustamento estrutural sempre tiveram duas pernas: de um lado os programas de deflação
e de austeridade, suportados pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional e, do outro lado, houve os programas
de crescimento suportados pelo Banco Mundial, o que significa que houve financiamento para o
crescimento em simultâneo com medidas de reformas estruturais e de diminuição dos défices
orçamentais e das dívidas. Para além disso, em terceiro lugar, houve o perdão da dívida externa em
muitos países além dos reescalonamentos. Portugal não é África por uma razão muito simples: é muito
pior que os programas de ajustamento estrutural em África. Nós só temos uma das três dimensões que os
países africanos tiveram e essa dimensão é a seguinte: os portugueses que paguem o dinheiro que
Portugal deve à Banca Internacional. Este dinheiro que está a entrar não é dinheiro para investimento
nem para financiamento, mas sim dinheiro para pagar a dívida privada das famílias, que depois se
transforma em dívida dos bancos e que depois se transforma em dívida externa (para além da dívida do
Estado propriamente dita, que vem dos permanentes e constantes défices orçamentais dos últimos
tempos). Quem é que está a meter dinheiro para financiamento do desenvolvimento em Portugal? São os
chineses, através da compra, por exemplo, da EDP e da REN; são os angolanos do sistema bancário e não
só; são agora os brasileiros através de um investidor que vai comprar a TAP. E aqui nós vemos também
aquilo que está a acontecer de um ponto de vista internacional.
Neste quadro, a parceria Europa-África tem de passar a ser uma parceria de natureza politica, económica,
de segurança, em que a cooperação poderá ter um papel muito importante mas que aparece em quarto
lugar. No fundo foi tudo isto que nos levou a constituir a rede Europe-Africa Policy Research Network, ou
seja, pensar de que maneira é que a parceira Europa-África deve evoluir num ponto de vista estratégico e
político. É preciso salientar que 1% da população portuguesa, 100 mil pessoas pelo menos, emigraram nos
últimos dois anos para Angola e Moçambique, mas foi população qualificada. São movimentos
completamente contrários àqueles que existiram até há pouco tempo e, num ponto de vista de pontes
para o futuro, quero crer que pode haver aqui um aspecto positivo, tal como existe um aspecto positivo
da entrada de capitais angolanos (e eu espero que futuramente de capitais moçambicanos) em Portugal.
3.3. Os Desafios Demográficos
Os efeitos das tendências demográficas nas perspetivas de desenvolvimento e cooperação
As tendências demográficas encerram um conjunto de questões complexas e diversificadas, tais como
a sustentabilidade dos modelos de crescimento e de segurança social em sociedades envelhecidas, a
coesão social ou o impacto da crescente urbanização e desemprego, particularmente nas camadas
jovens. A geografia internacional da pobreza está em rápida mutação, com a maior parte da população
pobre concentrada em países de rendimento médio e com o crescimento da desigualdade, incluindo
nos países mais desenvolvidos. Estas questões não têm sido suficientemente abordadas no debate
sobre a cooperação para o desenvolvimento, apesar dos seus impactos nas relações UE-África,
incluindo em temas sensíveis como as migrações e o emprego.
Como é que os desafios demográficos se refletem nas perspetivas de desenvolvimento nos
dois continentes e na respectiva parceria?
De que formas podem a Europa e a África responder melhor aos riscos subjacentes ao
desemprego jovem, às migrações e a outras questões demográficas que desafiam a coesão
social e a sustentabilidade económica?
Alcinda Honwana
Visiting Professor at the Open University, UK, and Columbia University, NY
Abstract
My presentation examines the lives of young people struggling with unemployment and sustainable
livelihoods in the context of widespread social and economic crisis. Failed neo-liberal economic policies,
bad governance and political instability have caused stable jobs to disappear - without jobs young people
cannot support themselves and their families.
Most young Africans are living in “waithood”; a period of suspension between childhood and adulthood.
This state of limbo is becoming pervasive and is gradually replacing conventional adulthood. While
focusing on African case studies, the paper argues that youth in Europe, North America and other parts of
the world face the same crisis of joblessness and restricted futures. Thus, this youth crisis is global.
The “waithood generation” possesses a tremendous transformative potential, as young people
understand that the struggle to attain socio-economic freedoms requires radical political change. From
riots and protests in the streets of Maputo, Dakar, Madrid, Lisbon, London, New York and Santiago, to
revolutions that overthrow dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the “waithood generation” is
claiming a space for themselves and remaking the world.
Presentation
My presentation will focus on the issue of youth
unemployment and the difficulties faced by young
people to establish the transition to adulthood in Africa
and beyond. Let me start with a few stories.
Three Stories
Maputo, September 2010. I was there when thousands
of young Mozambicans staged riots against the
government to protest the rise in prices of bread, water
and fuel. They blocked the streets, burned tires, and
confronted the police. The escalation of the protests
forced the Mozambican government to concede and
reverse the price hikes.
Sidi Bouzid, in December 2010. A massive youth uprising was triggered by the death of Mohamed
Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old unemployed street vendor who killed himself in protest to his condition.
Bouazizi’s self-immolation and subsequent death created enormous outrage, and thousands of young
men and women came out to the streets to protest against unemployment and lack of opportunities.
Under the slogan “Ben Ali Dégage!” (Ben Ali Go!), the youth led demonstrations drove Ben Ali out of
power, opening a new chapter in Tunisian and world history. The Arab spring was born!
Dakar, June 2011. Rallying alongside the movement Y’en a Marre! (Enough is enough!), Senegalese youth
came out to the streets and managed to stop the approval of the constitutional amendments to favour
the sitting president. Galvanized by this victory the Y’en a Marre youth movement launched a national
campaign to encourage young people to vote freely. Under the slogan “Ma Carte d’Electeur, Mon Arme”
(my voting card, my weapon), in February 2012 they voted Abdoulaye Wade out of office.
Change also took place in Egypt and Libya in 2011 and youth protests have been happening in many
African and Middle Eastern countries. But this is not just an African story: In Europe, youth
demonstrations denouncing unemployment economic inequalities took place in Greece and here in
Portugal in March 2011. Since May 2011 the indignados movement in Spain has been protesting the lack
of prospects for the youth. Youth riots in London highlighted disconnections within British society and lack
of prospects for underprivileged youth. In South America, Chilean youth took to the streets of Santiago to
demand better quality public education; and in the United States, the Occupy Wall Street Movement
rallied many young Americans to protest against corporate greed and corporations’ undue influence over
government.
Despite their diverse situations, young people, in rich and poor countries alike, are affected by the same
problems of unemployment and restricted futures. And they are beginning to assert their rights as
citizens, and claiming a space for themselves in the world.
Waithood
But what is the situation of young men and women living in Africa today? We all know that young people
constitute the vast majority of the African population with more than 50 percent under the age of twenty-
five. But most young Africans feel marginalized from major socio-economic and political processes. They
lack stable jobs to become independent and fully partake in the responsibilities of adulthood.
I use the term waithood (Singerman 2007; Navtej and Yousef 2009), a portmanteau of “wait” and “hood”, meaning ‘waiting for adulthood. “Waithood” refers to this period of suspension that delays young
people’s access to social adulthood. While chronological age defines them as adults, they have not been
able to attain the social markers of adulthood, which are: earning a living, being independent, establishing
families, providing for their offspring and other relatives, and becoming taxpayers.
Liggey, which means work in Wolof, the national language of Senegal, is celebrated as an important
marker of adulthood. The ability to work and provide, defines a person’s self-worth and position in the
family and community. Yet, the majority of young people in Africa are unable to attain the sense of dignity
embedded in the notion of liggey.
Joel, a 28-year-old Mozambican man, explained that: “At the age of eighteen our fathers would go to
South Africa as labour migrants to work in the mines . . . [and] come home with enough money to pay
lobolo (bridewealth) for a girl, to build a house and start a family...” Indeed, becoming a labour migrant
was a rite of passage into adulthood, as work in the South African mines enabled young Mozambicans to
become workers, husbands, fathers and providers. And it allowed young women to become wives,
mothers, and homemakers.
Today, however, African societies do not offer robust pathways into adulthood - both traditional or new
ones. Although more young women are being educated, they are unable to enter the labour market.
Young people, both rural and urban, are increasingly forced to survive in an oversaturated informal
economy.
Coping with Waithood
Coping with waithood is a major challenge for many young people.Young Mozambicans used the
Portuguese term desenrascar a vida (eke out a living); young Senegalese and Tunisians employed the
French term débrouillage (making do); and young South Africans spoke about “just getting by”. All these
expressions vividly convey the extemporaneous and precarious nature of their lives.
These are the experiences of young men and women who resort to street vending, petty trading,
smuggling, illegal migration or to temporary odd jobs. Or those who get involved in relationships with
sugar daddies and sugar mamas to make ends meet or access fashionable goods in exchange for sexual
favours. And these types of relationships are redefining existing notions and patterns of intimate
relationships and generating new understandings of masculinity and femininity. But these are also the
experiences of young people become involved in fraudulent and criminal endeavours, as swindlers,
traffickers and gangsters.
Indeed, waithood constitutes this twilight zone, or interstitial space, where the boundaries between
legal/illegal; proper/improper; right/wrong and often very blurred. And it is precisely at this juncture that
young people are forced to make choices. The choices they make often define their relationships towards
work, family, intimacy, and the type of citizens they will become.
Regrettably, rather than being a short interruption in their transition to adulthood, waithood is pervasive
and prolonged, and is gradually replacing conventional understandings of adulthood. For many, being
young in Africa today becomes synonymous with living in waithood.
Waithood and Social Change
Waithood stems from national and global policies that failed to reduce poverty, and to promote growth
with equity. There is a failure of the social contract between the state and its citizenry. Corruption,
incompetence, absence of fundamental freedoms further compounds the problem.
Despite the challenges outlined above, it’s not all doom and gloom. Today young Africans are better
educated than their parents. They are also better connected with the rest of the world through new
technologies of information and communication. Young people are fully aware of the broader structural
conditions that create their inescapable socio-economic vulnerability.
There are stories to be told about young people’s engagement in youth associations in civil society, in
popular culture, in debates through cyber social networks, and in open political demonstrations. If we
listen carefully to the lyrics in their songs, the verses in their poems, the scripts of their plays and the
discourses in their cyber debates we will find a strong social critique of the status quo. As discussed in the
opening stories, young people are expressing their anger and are loudly questioning their waithood
status.
This waithood generation is global. And in this case, both European and African countries need to find
ways to effectively address unemployment and create better opportunities for the youth. However,
young people are not just waiting for governments to act. They are taking upon themselves to try and
remake the world they live in. These current youth social movements are still unfolding and it is anyone’s
guess where they might lead. But as Franz Fanon once said, “each generation must, out of relative
obscurity, discover its own mission (and either) fulfill it, or betray it”.
Gregory de Paepe
Policy Analyst, Development Centre, OECD, Paris
Promoting Youth Employment
Structure
1. Africa’s recent economic performance and outlook, focussing on why the recent high growth hasn’t
been conducive to job creation.
2. What is the situation of young people in African labour markets? (Some stylized facts)
3. What are the implications and risks of this situation and what can be done to promote youth
employment?
Abstract
Africa’s youth population is growing rapidly and getting better educated. This is a huge chance but also a
potential threat. With almost 200 million people aged between 15 and 24, Africa has the youngest
population in the world. By 2045 Africa’s youth population will double to 400 million. This means that
every year 10-12 million young people are joining Africa’s labour market, in need of a job. Based on
current trends, 59% of 20-24 year olds will have had secondary education in 2030, compared to 42%
today. Although significant quality gaps remain, these trends offer an unrivalled opportunity for economic
and social development. The Arab Spring has shown that unemployment and a lack of opportunity
among young people contain the potential for upheaval.
Surprisingly, Africa’s poorest countries have less unemployed youth than the better-off countries. As
countries grow richer and incomes rise, consumers start flocking to known brands, away from the simple
local products that used to provide livelihoods for many locals. Many African youth are poor despite
being employed. They deserve as much attention and support as youth that are not working. The global
economic crisis had a strong negative impact on the employment profile of African youth. Between 2008
and 2010 good jobs declined, while jobs in family agriculture and informal activities, picked up.
Youth expectations meet a difficult employment outlook. A global survey conducted by Gallup showed
that, young North Africans would rather have a government job than one in the private sector. But the
public sector cannot grow as fast as the population and is a much less important employer among youth
than adults.
The large majority of our country experts as well as young people themselves see the lack of demand for
labour as the main barrier to young people in African labour markets. The next bottlenecks are skills
mismatches and poor education.
Thus any youth employment policy must place job creation at its centre. First, there is the attitude of
governments towards small business. Second, governments can support social insurance adapted to the
needs of small businesses. Third, many small entrepreneurs in Africa do not have access to the loans that
could allow them to grow their business. Fourth, better services could do a great deal. For instance, a
stable electricity supply would allow many, especially in rural areas, to start small-scale production outfits.
Governments can also strive to make the education young people receive more relevant to what they
need to know in the world of work. Many young people in Africa suffer from skills mismatches.
Vocational and technical training systems are an important tool especially when done in cooperation with
firms, but play a minimal role for the time being. Education in technical fields is expensive and requires
scarce expertise.
Presentation
II. The employment
situation of young
Africans
III. What can be done to
promote youth
employment?
Ana Pires de Carvalho
Investigadora, Centro de Analise de Politicas, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo
Resumo
De que maneira as dinâmicas demográficas afectam as prioridades de desenvolvimento e ajuda no
futuro?
As dinâmicas de população constituem um instrumento crucial para a definição de estratégias do
desenvolvimento das sociedades, seja a curto, médio ou longo prazo, e a sua não inclusão conduz
necessariamente a quebras no desenvolvimento harmonioso das mesmas. As interligações entre
população e desenvolvimento são diversas, numerosas e frequentemente complexas. Esta apresentação
faz a abordagem dos efeitos de elevadas taxas de crescimento populacional no desenvolvimento em
Africa, com particular atenção à urbanização excessiva e à juventude. Para além de uma rápida incursão
na história do desenvolvimento da população humana, serão apresentados três temas, designadamente,
crescimento populacional e seus efeitos no desenvolvimento e pobreza, urbanização e juventude. A
apresentação terminará com algumas ideias para a contribuição de uma relação Europa-Africa.
Durante mais de um milhão de anos existiu um balanço relativamente estável entre nascimentos e
mortes, com um ligeiro aumento médio de nascimentos em relação aos falecimentos. A população
humana atingiu os primeiros mil milhões de pessoas nos fins do século XVIII – princípios do século XIX.
Neste momento a população humana ultrapassa os 7 mil milhões de pessoas, tendo a passagem de 6 para
7 mil milhões de pessoas ocorrido em menos de 10 anos. Em África ainda há uma taxa de crescimento
natural muito elevada, na verdade, dos 10 países do mundo com taxas de fecundidade mais elevadas, 8
são de África. A taxa geral de fecundidade destes países situa-se entre 7,8 e 6,7 filhos por mulher. Apesar
da epidemia de HIV-SIDA, estima-se que a África Subsaariana acrescentará mil milhões à população
mundial em 2050.
Se, por um lado, mais pessoas pode significar mais produção e mais riqueza, um crescimento populacional
muito rápido não ajuda ao desenvolvimento dos países. A questão de fundo é a proporção entre as
pessoas que não trabalham em relação às que trabalham, pois quanto maior for esta proporção, mais
fraco será o desempenho económico do país. Na verdade, o crescimento acelerado da população conduz
ao desemprego, crescimento desmesurado e muito rápido das cidades, pressão na oferta de alimentos,
degradação do meio ambiente, aumento da dimensão da pobreza absoluta e estimula governos
autoritários. De particular importância dos efeitos do rápido crescimento populacional são a educação e
saúde. Na verdade, por exemplo, elevadas taxas de fecundidade contribuem para o aumento da
malnutrição e mortalidade infantil, assim como para a mortalidade materna.
As cidades criam riqueza e podem contribuir significativamente para a diminuição da pobreza de um país
e as zonas rurais têm constituído o epicentro da pobreza e sofrimento humano. Contudo, esta situação
está a modificar-se. Na verdade, embora a proporção da população urbana vivendo nos ‘slums’ na Africa
Subsaariana tenha diminuído de 70% para 62% nos últimos vinte anos, o número total de pessoas vivendo
nessas condições duplicou em igual período, passando de 102 milhões para 213 milhões. Em igual período
de tempo, a população urbana passou de 146 milhões para 346 milhões. Note-se que o crescimento
urbano na Africa subsaariana é maioritariamente motivado pelo crescimento natural, isto é, nascimentos
superiores a mortes.
Os jovens urbanos merecem uma atenção especial. São uma grande parte do futuro dos países e portanto
deveriam ser educados, deviam ter acesso a serviços de saúde reprodutiva e saúde em geral, e deveriam
ter o direito ao emprego. Como mencionado atrás, o acesso à educação e saúde é fortemente restringido
pelo rápido crescimento. Por exemplo, em Moçambique, a população de 5 a 14 anos de idade crescerá de
6.3 milhões em 2010 para 9.6 milhões em 2030. Isto representa um crescimento de 50%, que se reflectirá
num crescimento igual de escolas, professores, carteiras, livros, etc., só para manter a actual taxa de
escolaridade e a actual qualidade de ensino. Além disso, o número de jovens urbanos de 15 a 24 anos
duplicará em igual período, passando de 1,5 milhões para 3,0 milhões. Como pano de fundo, a população
urbana em idade de trabalhar terá um acréscimo de quase 5 milhões de pessoas entre 2010 e 2030.
Geopoliticamente, Africa é de grande importância para a Europa e vice-versa. É indispensável a
estabilidade e o desenvolvimento dos países africanos, para que haja frutuosas relações. As questões
demográficas apresentadas apontam para um conjunto de acções específicas, a serem debatidas
profundamente.
Apresentação1
1
Os dados incluidos nesta apresentação foram retirados de documentos oficiais do FNUAP, UNICEF, UNDESA,
É interessante notar que:
• Nos anos 60 e nos anos 70 a taxa de crescimento anual da população no Ruanda era cerca de 4%,
ou seja uma geração antes do genocídio;
• No Níger, país sujeito a fomes com frequência, a taxa de crescimento populacional anual ronda os
3.5 nas ultimas décadas;
• No Mali, a taxa de crescimento populacional natural nos últimos anos é quase 3% ao ano.
Alguns comentários:
 A questão de fundo em relação aos elevados níveis de fecundidade é a proporção entre as
pessoas que não trabalham em relação às que trabalham, pois quanto maior for esta proporção,
mais fraco será o desempenho económico do País. Tipicamente, 50% da população na maior
parte dos países da Africa Subsaariana tem menos de 15-20 anos de idade, devido aos altos níveis
de fecundidade e mortalidade.
 Nos ultimos 50 anos a vasta maioria do crescimento da população a nivel mundial realizou-se nos
países menos desenvolvidos.
O crescimento da população em África nas últimas décadas é o mais elevado que há conhecimento na
história da humanidade. As Nações Unidas estimam que, apesar da pandemia do HIV/AIDS, Africa
provavelmente acrescentará mil milhões de pessoas à população mundial em 2050. Assim, prevê-se que a
população em Africa atingirá aproximadamente 1,8 mil milhões em 2050.
1.
Emprego
O efeito dos elevados níveis de crescimento populacional na oferta de emprego é um dos efeitos mais
negativos desse crescimento. Por exemplo, se um país tem 20 milhões de habitantes em 2000, alta
fecundidade (TGF=5) e crescimento populacional de 2% ao ano, em 15 anos a população potencialmente
activa terá crescido em cerca de 3 milhões. Para manter as taxas de emprego de 2000, sera necessário
criar 3 milhões de novos postos de trabalho em 15 anos, ou seja, 200.000 por ano.
2.
Crescimento urbano acelerado e massivo (mais à frente)
3.
Aumento da pobreza e do número de extremamente pobres
Uma consequência óbvia do crescimento populacional é a diminuição dos serviços de educação e saúde,
para o mesmo valor orçamental.
Para se garantir, por exemplo, que o mesmo número de crianças vá para a escola, todos os anos o
orçamento da educação tem de ser aumentado, caso contrário é diminuída a sua qualidade e a sua
cobertura.
Vejamos alguns indicadores de saúde e educação nos países de elevadas taxas de crescimento atrás
mencionadas (UNFPA, 2012).
Os elevados níveis de fecundidade associados ao rápido crescimento populacional , tem um conjunto de
efeitos na area da saúde e bem-estar:
• Aumenta a mortalidade infantil (nascimentos de mulheres mais novas, mulheres mais velhas e
pouco espaçados aumentam a probabilidade de morte das crianças)
• Aumenta a mortalidade materna, porque têm mais filhos e ficam mais expostas a mortalidade e
também é mais provavel a mortalidade materna em nascimentos de mulheres mais novas,
mulheres mais velhas e pouco espaçados
• Aumento de abortos clandestinos e consequentes riscos associados
Além disso, crescimento populacional acelerado reproduz a pobreza. Um modelo muito simplificado:
Imaginemos:
• 20 casais, dos quais 10 são pobres (50%) e 10 são ricos (50%), ou seja 20 pessoas pobres e 20
pessoas ricas
• Os casais pobres têm 6 filhos cada, totalizando 60
• Os casais ricos têm 2 filhos cada, totalizando 20
• A probabilidade de passar de pobre a rico numa geração é de 20 %
• A probabilidade de passar de rico a pobre é zero
Resultado: Na geração seguinte, haverá 48 pessoas pobres (60%) e 32 pessoas ricas (40%). O número total
de pessoas aumentou, o número total de pobres aumentou e a percentagem de pobres também
aumentou, apesar de 20% dos pobres passarem a ser ricos…
Este modelo é muito simplificado. Na verdade, numa economia agrária de subsistência e sem limites de
acesso à terra, altos níveis de fecundidade são economicamente atraentes. Na prática, neste caso a
família funciona como uma pequena empresa com economias de escala. Além disso, quanto mais filhos os
pais tiverem, mais apoio na velhice terão. À medida que a economia se moderniza e aparece um valor
associado aos filhos (custos de educação, saúde e outros) a estratégia de ter muitos filhos deixa de ser
eficiente. Note-se que esta modernização da economia vem acompanhada de uma diminuiçao das taxas
de mortalidade, particularmente a mortalidade infantil, mas de que os pais não se dão conta
imediatamente e continuam a pensar que precisam de ter muitos filhos. E, é claro, a premissa de haver
terra sem limites já não existe.
4. Pressão na procura de alimentos e degradação do meio ambiente
Se neste momento já há falta de alimentos em muitas regiões de África, a situação tende a exacerbar-se
com o crescimento populacional. Na verdade é extremamente difícil num curto espaço de tempo garantir
a oferta para uma procura crescente.
Além disso, o aumento da produção agrícola provavelmente vai impor stress insustentável no solo e
estará limitada em muitas regiões pela falta de acesso a água.
5. Estímulo para exacerbação da desigualdade de rendimentos e fortalecimento de governos
autoritários
O crescimento rápido aumenta em grande escala a oferta de mão-de-obra, provocando uma redução de
salários reais. Isto provocará um piorar da desigualdade de riqueza. Este aumento da desigualdade fará
com que as políticas de crescimento económico não tenham o efeito no crescimento da economia que se
previa. Na verdade, uma sociedade em que a maioria seja pobre e pouco educada dificilmente criará
riqueza.
A criação de uma pequena elite em contradição com uma maioria muito pobre, tão pobre que a sua
subsistência está em causa, leva os governos a tomar medidas de força e restringir as liberdades e direitos
básicos para conter a revolta dessa maioria. Os distúrbios que nos últimos anos têm tido lugar em várias
cidades africanas são um exemplo.
A população urbana no Séc. XX cresceu de 220 milhões para 2.8 milhões, mas nas próximas décadas a
escala de crescimento urbano será sem precedentes, em 2030 a população urbana na África e na Ásia
será o dobro que era em 2000.
É particularmente preocupante o crescimento urbano nos países mais pobres. Prevê-se que a maior parte
deste crescimento terá lugar nas cidades mais pequenas e secundárias, onde as taxas de pobreza são mais
altas e a cobertura sanitária e educacional é mais fraca, assim como outros serviços públicos (água,
saneamento, infra-estruturas, etc.).
•
•
Embora o acréscimo populacional na Ásia e Pacífico nas próximas décadas seja superior ao
acréscimo populacional em África, o ritmo do crescimento em África é muito superior.
O crescimento populacional moderado pode conduzir a um aumento de riqueza, embora haja um
limite para esse crescimento. No entanto é muito difícil gerir um crescimento acelerado.
IV – JUVENTUDE
A pirâmide etária característica de países com elevados níveis de fecundidade e mortalidade tem a forma
semelhante a um triângulo de base grande. A população é jovem e tipicamente metade da população tem
menos de 15-18 anos.
Alguns indicadores de Educação:
• Muitos jovens não terminam o ensino primário (p.ex., mais de metade dos jovens 15-19 anos no
Níger, Burkina e Mali)
• Entre os jovens de 20-24 anos, uma grande parte não tem nenhuma educação (mais de 50% em
Burkina Faso e Mali, mais de 30% no Chade e Etiópia)
• Em geral, a taxa de escolaridade das raparigas é mais baixa que dos rapazes, particularmente nas
zonas rurais (p.ex , em Moçambique, em 2003, a percentagem de rapazes de 16-20 anos que iam
a escola nas zonas rurais era de 43.5%, enquanto das raparigas era de 16%)
Alguns indicadores relativos a actividade laboral dos jovens em África :
• Taxa de desemprego de jovens é de 19.5% (Esta taxa não é relativa apenas ao mercado de
trabalho formal; neste caso a taxa seria muito mais elevada)
• Entre 1995 e 2005 a taxa de desemprego cresceu 34%
• Os jovens têm três vezes mais probabilidade de serem desempregados do que os adultos a partir
dos 25 anos de idade
• Cerca de 27% dos jovens não trabalha nem vai a escola
• O desemprego é muito maior nas zonas urbanas do que nas zonas rurais
• Existem diferenciais significativos por género: as raparigas têm maior taxa de desemprego que os
rapazes
Alguns indicadores de Saúde:
• No período 1988-1999, entre 30% a 40% das crianças na Africa Subsaariana eram malnutridas,
consequentemente os jovens de hoje terão problemas de rendimento escolar, sistemas
imunológicos reduzidos e susceptíveis a uma longevidade reduzida
• As estatísticas de prevalência do HIV-AIDS nos jovens são limitadas, mas alguns inquéritos
apontam para uma prevalência nas jovens raparigas com sendo pelo menos o dobro da
prevalência nos rapazes. Por exemplo, na Swazilândia, a prevalência de HIV-AIDS é de 27.2% para
jovens raparigas de 15-24 anos e 9.3% para rapazes do mesmo grupo etário.
• A severidade da pandemia HIV-AIDS verifica-se pelo enorme actual número de órfãos: no Quénia,
Malawi, Namíbia, Uganda e Zâmbia, cerca de 10% das crianças menores de 15 anos são órfãs. no
Ruanda , 26.5% das crianças menores de 15 anos são órfãs . Este valor reflecte a gravidade da
doença e do genocídio.
• Nos países mais desenvolvidos, Norte de Africa e maior parte da Asia, só 1% ou menos dos jovens
que atingem os 15 anos não atingem os 25 anos. A probabilidade de morte neste grupo etário na
Africa Subsaariana é quatro vezes maior
Jovens e instabilidade política:
• Conflitos armados
• Revoluções
• Manifestações
COMO LIDAR COM OS PROBLEMAS POPULACIONAIS NO MUNDO?
‘Se a população mundial tivesse a produtividade dos Suíços, os hábitos de consumo dos Chineses, os
instintos igualitários dos Suecos, e a disciplina social dos Japoneses, então o planeta poderia
suportar muitas vezes a actual população sem deprivar ninguém. Por outro lado, se a população
mundial tivesse a produtividade do Chade, os hábitos de consumo dos Americanos, os instintos
igualitários da Índia e a disciplina social da Argentina, então o planeta não poderia suportar de
maneira alguma os seus numeros correntes’ in Thurow, 1986, p.22.
(note-se que esta citação foi escrita há mais de 25 anos)
“Bigger pie,
fewer forks,
better manners”
(Joel Cohen, 1995)
Victor Ângelo
Member of the Board, PeaceNexus Foundation, Switzerland
and former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations
Europe-Africa: From Indifference to Interdependence
Introduction
Examining the future of the relations between Europe (EU) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), I can foresee a
clear trend of mutual growing indifference, as if both regions were moving apart and becoming less
interested in building a privileged partnership.
The current generation of European leaders is no longer emotionally connected with Africa. It is a depart
from the attitudes of past generations, who had kept a close interest in Africa, through colonial ties and
related business interests. The historical links appear now lost in the vague memories of the past. Today,
the empirical observation leads to the conclusion that there is lack of understanding on the importance of
co-operating with SSA. This is especially evident at present with the leaders ‘attention focused on the EU’s
internal crisis, including its own new poor, the developments in the immediate neighbourhood of North
Africa and Middle East and the economic and political threats China’s expansion poses.
In the current context of the international relations, Africa is perceived by many European opinion-makers
at best as a distant and modest player, with little relevance to the future of Europe. For others, the
stereotype is clear: Africa spells poverty, uncertainty and conflict, and undemocratic regimes. These views
are not new, of course. What is new is the leverage they seem to have gained on decision making.
If one observes the relationship from an African perspective, one notices that recent studies and well
publicised schools of thought question the way the EU provides development assistance, as being donor
driven, arrogant and too conditional. Besides, some African political and academic personalities have
extensively criticised the role of aid, as creating dependency, being ineffective and favouring the elites in
the recipient countries. In addition, several political leaders throughout the Continent have decided to
look towards China, India and other non-traditional partners of Africa, such as Qatar and other Gulf
States, and entice new economic investments and different forms of development aid from those
countries.
As a result, the following questions could be raised, from the European perspective:
 Is it in the strategic interest of Europe to ignore the formidable challenges – high impact
population dynamics, human insecurity and poor governance – that Africa will face in next
decades? And, looking at the other side of the question, is it good strategy to disregard the huge
potential Africa possesses?
 What should be the priorities for a renewed partnership between Europe and Africa? More
specifically, how relevant are the SSA’s demographic challenges in the shaping of a new
development co-operation agenda? The subsidiary question would be: What efforts must be
made to regain the political initiative in the EU in order to bring Africa back to the top of the
development agenda?
 Who sets the agenda? Who speaks on behalf of the African populations?
Key future African challenges
Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is growing very fast. From less than a billion today, SSA will be home to
close to 2 billion people by 2050. This rate of population growth is a major challenge with a tremendous,
multidimensional impact in the Continent and globally. By mid-century, there will be in average two
Africans out of nine human beings and almost three times more Africans than Europeans.
The most immediate demographic challenge, that needs to be addressed today, is how to help Africa to
stabilise its overall population at the level of two billion. If we do not act now, the population in SSA will
continue to grow beyond 2050, well above the level that could be considered as sustainable. For that, the
demographic transition, as technically defined by the demographers, needs to be accelerated through
expanded free access to contraception and related health services, girls’ education and women’s political
empowerment. Currently less than 20% of African women use modern contraceptive methods, whilst in
Latin America and Asia the prevalence rate is well over 60% in average. But evidence as shown that access
to family planning services and proactive population policies are incomplete and lack effectiveness if they
are not accompanied by widespread campaigns to get girls to schools. Furthermore, for both issues –
contraceptive access and girl’s education - to get high on the national priorities, more women need to
occupy positions of political authority, as this type of development agenda is only genuinely implemented
if driven by women leaders. I would hasten to add here that men’s adherence is critical for the
demographic transition and the adoption of modern family life, but the change only takes place if women
are truly empowered and in a position to fight for their rights.
The rapid population growth outpaces Africa’s capacity to produce its own food. Food insecurity is
widespread. SSA is the region of the world with the highest rate of undernourishment: it is estimated that
at least 30% of Africa’s population suffers from chronic hunger and malnutrition. As we look into the
coming decades, we can forecast more widespread food insecurity that could be further aggravated by
Africa’s lack of financial resources to pay for imported food combined with greater scarcity of the
international supply of grains, as the consumption of cereals augments in other parts of the world,
including in China, India and the Arab world. The investment in agriculture – including some kind of green
revolution adapted to the region’s conditions and consumption habits – is a priority. It has however to
take into account that there is water insecurity in some parts of the Continent, as there is also an
expansion of the arid lands and desertification. The agricultural revolution will have to take all these
factors into account and be based on seeds and technologies that will have little water demands, short
production cycles and be pest resistant.
There will be in addition very serious competition for vital natural resources, such as land, rangeland,
water, firewood and other forest related supplies, as well as minerals. In some cases, this competition will
take violent forms, including disputes between countries, in-country armed rebellions, civil conflicts, and
ethnic strife. In other cases, it will open the door for undemocratic, corrupt governments, which will try
to remain in power by force and through favouring their ethnic base’s access to scarce resources against
the interests of the rest of the population.
Urbanization is the other side of the population growth coin. SSA’s cities will expand fast and chaotically.
In the next decades many more urban centres like today’s Lagos and Kinshasa will spread all over Africa.
These will be unmanageable, sprawling conurbations, with few job opportunities, short on social
infrastructure and blind on humanity. Urban violence could easily become a trademark of the new
megalopolis. Furthermore, for many young people, especially for the young men, the big city will be a
temporary stop before joining the emigration flow, as they will be looking for opportunities to settle and
find a better life outside the Continent. Indeed, one can foresee that the current youth unemployment
rates – which can be estimated at 40% and in some cases can be as high as 2/3 of the total population
under the age of 35 years (the UNDP estimate of 28% is too conservative and is more inspired by a
politically correct approach than by data) – will continue to prevail in the future.
The above described conundrums are not inspired by either a pessimistic or a fatalist view of the future.
They represent key issues, based on real facts. They come out of any serious projection of the present
trends into the foreseeable future. For Europe, they represent two major challenges. One is related to our
system of ethics: how can we contribute to mitigate and respond to the critical harsh demands that many
in SSA will be facing? As fellow human beings and as a Continent that has benefitted for very long from
African resources and an unequal relationship, we cannot ignore the plight of those living next door and
to whom we have been linked by history. The second challenge is related to our own stability and
security. It will be a serious mistake full of dramatic consequences to believe that Europe can raise
enough barriers and frontiers that would isolate it from the problems experienced by people in
desperation and who would look at our region as a possible destination for their exodus.
There is however an optimistic side to the future of SSA. The region offers vast investment opportunities,
in terms of resources, and labour, with high rates of return. It is also a growing market for many goods
and services. Private sector expansion is an indispensable avenue to a better future. Public development
assistance policies have to create space and conditions for the entrepreneurs. Private sector co-operation
is a must. Investors should be guided by European institutions, as well as by their bilateral co-operation
agencies, and encouraged to look south, and partner with potential counterparts in SSA.
The priorities of a renewed
development co-operation agenda
Seen from the European side of the
equation, the first priority should
focus on changing the mind-set of
the EU leaders. They have to look at
Africa as a moral engagement and
also as a Continent with huge risks
and opportunities. The decisive
objective is to bring Africa back to
Europe’s priority list of external
partners. The concept of
neighbourhood has to include Africa,
because of vicinity and impact, as
well as our historical ties with that
Continent.
Firstly, it is a question of moral values. International relations and aid assistance have to be based in ethic
principles, such as solidarity, promotion of people’s dignity and human rights, as well as protecting lives.
Better off Europe has the duty to assist Africa’s disenfranchised populations. Secondly, it is a matter of
Europe’s interest. Our security is linked to human security in SSA. Additionally, Africa’s development and
democratic stability could make the region a major economic partner of ours. The challenge is to
cooperate with Africa to turn this potential into reality.
For the EU leaders to change their approach it is necessary to mobilise the public opinion. Members of
national parliaments, as well as MEPs sitting in Brussels, are called to play a critical role in terms of
changing the perceptions and the substance of the debate. Thereafter, the new policies would follow. The
European Parliamentary Forum on Population and Development is a major step in the right direction. It
needs, however, to have a comprehensive view of the issues, linked to strategic goals and human security
concerns. It also requires well-defined priorities and a close link with academic and media circles as well
as with key NGOs.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) remain the indispensable frame of reference for
development co-operation. The key challenges identified in the previous section of this paper are very
much in line with the Goals. They should constitute the starting points when it comes to defining the aid
agenda. In view of the specific context of SSA, particular attention needs to be given to maternal health,
gender equality, and hunger. HIV is also a major issue: annually, over 70% of HIV-related deaths occur in
SSA. Furthermore, the plight of urban youth deserves exceptional attention and resources. Recent
experience has shown that youth employment programmes lack substance, appropriate expertise and
measurable results. They are also very much oblivious of the political dimensions: lack of democratic
access to power by young people in societies where the young are the majority but the political control is
kept by older politicians. Empirical evidence has shown that these old men are by and large disconnected
from the aspirations of the younger generations.
International migrations are not the solution to the employment issue. It is true that we live in a more
globalised world and that many will move to foreign lands in search of job opportunities. But there are
limitations to these movements. Many of those who have migrated from Africa to Europe are the best
educated. Africa’s future needs their talent, skills and know-how. It cannot continue to lose valuable
human resources. Also, there is a limit to the number of foreign persons Europe can absorb without
compromising its own social stability. This is a very sensitive issue but it cannot be minimized: it requires
more research about impact and absorptive capacities of European societies and a better understanding
of its long term consequences. In the meantime, aid programmes should aim at creating the conditions
for young people to be able to settle in their own countries and lead meaningful lives where their roots
belong.
In addition to official aid programmes and strategic issues related to peace and security, the renewed
partnership between Europe and SSA has to be built on shared economic interests. The facilitation of
private sector investments should be encouraged, to expand mutual beneficial ventures, long term
commercial and productive projects, and ensure capital protection, corporate social responsibility and
resource sustainability.
Who sets the agenda?
The partnership between Europe and SSA has to result from a balanced dialogue between the two sides.
Money cannot dictate the priorities. Europe should not set the agenda. The donor-recipient relationship
should be something of the past. Only a balanced approach is acceptable in today’s circumstances.
There is a tendency within the EU to think that a number of African political leaders do not represent the
interests and aspirations of their own populations. This view is very much related to considering Africa as
a land of poor governance and unrepresentative politicians. The same people also see many of the African
intellectuals as distant from the masses, disconnected from their roots, and unable or unwilling to
influence the political elites. They therefore conclude that the agenda should be decided in Brussels and
other European capitals. They also tend to blindly consider the NGO community has more genuine
interlocutors. The proliferation of NGOs is, in many ways, an unintended consequence of this approach.
Whilst recognising the importance of voluntary and community based worked, one should also consider
that many African NGOs have little or no impact on people’s lives and a number of them are simply as
unconnected as many other players.
Europe has to engage the existing leaders and maintain with them a credible, robust and frank dialogue.
This is the only way we can build an effective partnership and, if necessary, contribute to the
democratization of political life in Africa and a new type of relationship. At the same time, Europe should
avoid show off meetings, formal gatherings void of substantive exchanges, as it is often the case between
the two Commissions: the European and the African. And, above all, Europe should abstain from double
standard approaches towards African leaders and their governance systems. Values and principles are the
same, for friends and foes alike.
3.4. Segurança
Radicalismo armado na África do Norte, no Sahel e nos países vizinhos: implicações para a
segurança internacional e para as relações Europa-África
A segurança e a paz são condições necessárias ao desenvolvimento na Europa e na África, como se
confirma pela história recente em ambos os continentes. A proliferação de armas resultante do fim do
regime de Khadafy tem alimentado grupos rebeldes e jihadistas numa vasta zona do Norte, do Sahel e
da África subsaariana limítrofe, como o caso do Mali bem ilustra. O agravamento da situação de
segurança e das suas implicações na segurança internacional contribuiu para (re)colocar África no
mapa estratégico internacional e é igualmente um desafio para a política externa da União Europeia e
para as prioridades africanas de segurança.
De que forma é que as alterações políticas no Norte de África (especialmente na Líbia), afetam
os países da África Subsaariana?
Quais os impactos da insegurança no Sahel e nas regiões limítrofes sobre as prioridades
internacionais e a parceria UE-África?
Alexandra Magnólia Dias
Investigadora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL, Lisboa
Apresentação sobre Radicalismo Armado no Corno de África: que implicações para a segurança
internacional e as relações Europa-África?
UE/Corno de África
 Desde 2006 Comunicação da Comissão ao Conselho e ao Parlamento de uma Estratégia para
África: A Parceria regional da UE para paz, segurança e Desenvolvimento do Corno de África.
 Desde Dezembro de 2009 Política da UE para o Corno de África- uma estratégia compreensiva
(integrada) Estratégia com maior enfoque na segurança.
 Desde Novembro de 2011 a UE adoptou o Enquadramento Estratégico para o Corno de África.
(Stategic Framework for the HOA)
 Objectivo e mudança significativa de abordagem: Coordenar acção dos Estados Membros e ter
uma Voz mais coerente na região.
 Representante Especial da UE para Corno de África (Jan. 2012): Alex Rondos
No quadro do Enquadramento Estratégico de Nov. De 2011 (Strategic Framework influência do
Documento para Sahel de Março de 2011)
 EEAS-África: Nick Wescott
 Representante Especial da UE para Corno de África (Jan. 2012): Alex Rondos
 Representante Especial da UE para o Sudão e Sul do Sudão: Rosalind Marsden
 Representante Especial da UE para UA: Gary Quince
 Representante Especial da UE para os Direitos Humanos: Stavros Lambrinidis
 Representante da UE para a Somália ( base em Nairobi-Quénia): George-Marc André
Duplicação de papéis ou complementaridade?
Quais os Estados membros com mais envolvimento bilateral na região: Itália, França, Reino Unido.
Fonte: Williams, 2011
Padrões de Conflitualidade e Tendências:
1) Frequência relativa de guerras inter-estatais em África muito baixa. Apenas duas se enquadram
inteiramente neste tipo.
Duas Guerras inter-estatais ocorreram no Corno de África envolvendo a Etiópia:
 1979 Tanzânia vs Uganda ( no entanto classifica-se enquanto intervenção humanitária)
 1977-78 Etiópia vs Somália (45.000 fatalidades)
 1998-2000 Eritreia vs Etiópia (80.000-100.000)
Corno de África e os principais desafios às Fronteiras herdadas do colonialismo: dois novos Estados no
pós-Guerra Fria (Eritreia e Sul do Sudão)
Princípio do uti possidetis (respeito pelas fronteiras herdadas do colonialismo) na carta fundadora da
Organização da Unidade Africana como forma de prevenir abertura da Caixa de Pandora e prevenir
conflitos
Corno de África no pós-11 de Setembro de 2001 e o debate em torno da ameaça dos Estados falhados
(Somália)
A) Proponentes da tese dos Estados Falhados enquanto ameaça à paz e segurança e enquanto bastiões
(safe-havens) para terroristas, Teóricos: Robert Rotberg
 EUA Estratégia de Segurança Nacional 2006
 Administração Bush
 Reino Unido Primeiro Ministro criou Unidade de Estratégia «Investir na Prevenção» 2005
 Maioria dos Estados Falhados em África (22 entre 40 de acordo com Index Estados Falhados)
B) Críticos
K. Menkhaus : Estados Fracos maior ameaça do que Estados falhados.
Crítica a esta tese por parte da literatura pós-colonial na medida em que se parte de assumpções etnocêntricas que caracterizam os Estados africanos enquanto cópias imperfeitas dos Estados ocidentais
Corno de África, a recurrência de conflitos e o processo de formação do Estado:
Resultados:
1) A guerra Consolida o Estado ou conduz ao seu enfraquecimento e desintegração?
2) Guerra pode conduzir ao redesenhar do mapa africano?
3) Criação de Novos Estados?
Tese: Guerra e a Lei do Retorno Limitado ie A guerra pode contribuir para a formação e/ou consolidação
do Estado (Eritreia e a insurreição contra o regime do Derg até à auto-determinação) no entanto o
recurso ou o regresso à força armada compromete e pode conduzir à desintegração do Estado (Sudão vs
Sul do Sudão).
RESPOSTA INTERNACIONAL
 Desde não interferência até às intervenções internacionais
 Peacebuilding ou construção da Paz pós-bélica como construção do Estado
 Peacebuilding como statebuilding. Grau de interferência externa ou processo externo de
reconstrução de Estados liderado pelos Estados ocidentais através das OIs e sistema da ONU.
A questão do Sudão / Sul do Sudão:
Arena Política Regional:
O Sul do Sudão: novo Estado sem acesso directo ao mar ( Landlocked) Dependência do Norte e
oportunidades para os Estados vizinhos
Reconfiguração do Corno de África e da África Oriental: Projectos de Expansão de Infra-Estruturas
Arena Política Interna: as políticas em torno da fronteira entre o Norte e o Sul
1) A Fronteira Propriamente Dita: O Enquadramento Institucional para o Acordo da linha fronteiriça
entre o Norte e o Sul (Quadro do Acordo de Paz Global de 2005: Comité Técnico Fronteiriço e os
pontos de disputa; Extra-APG: Abyei); Flashpoints & outras fontes de disputa relacionadas com a
delimitação e demarcação da Fronteira
2) A Questão Monetária
3) Definição e direitos de Cidadania
Como intervem a UE ao nível da RSS na Somália
- Apoio às Instituições de Transição e Pós-Transição, AMISOM, ECHO
- PCSD:
• EU-NAVFOR ATALANTA (Contra-pirataria): desde 2008, mandato até Dezembro de 2014.
Orçamento para 2012: 8.6 milhões EUR (estimativas de custos anuais combinados para EM 1.5
biliões).
• EUTM Missão de Treino para a Somália, Uganda, Campo de Bihanga: desde 2010, mandato expira
Dez. 2012. Mandato será renovado. Orçamento : 4.8 milhões EUR (Agosto 2011-Out. 2012).
Providenciou formação e treino a 3000 recrutas da Força Somali de Segurança Nacional.
• EUCAP NESTOR: Desde Julho de 2012. Orçamento inicial: 22 millhões EUR. Reforçar as capacidades
marítimas inicialmente de 5 Estados da Região: Djibouti, Quénia, Seicheles , Somália e futuramente
Tanzânia. (Inicialmente desenvolvimento de Força Policial Costeira nas regiões da Somália de
Puntlandia, Galmudug, e Somalilândia). Formação terá lugar nos Estados referidos e no Treino de
Formação Regional de Djibouti.
Ligações com MARSIC (Programa de Rotas Marítimas Críticas). Estratégia de saída para EUNAVFOR
ATALANTA? Objectivo: apoiar os Estados regionais a assumirem dimensão marítima da segurança
regional.
O APOIO DA UE À FORMAÇÃO DE INSTITUIÇÕES DE SEGURANÇA
A Missão de Treino da União Europeia (EUTM)
 A Formação de recrutas no campo de treino de Bihanga no Uganda foi precedida por uma
iniciativa bilateral francesa de formação de recrutas do GFT Somali em Djibouti (contingente:
500).
 Única missão de formação militar da UE em território africano.
 Actualmente 13 Estados membros contribuem para a EUTM, entre os quais Portugal.
 1 Contigente regressou a Mogadiscio em Fevereiro de 2011 (907).
 Total de recrutas treinados até ao presente: 3000


Constrangimentos: por um lado dificuldades de recrutamento e dada a trajectória da Somália e
permanente mudança de lados como evitar potencial de ‘’deserção’’ para facções opostas ao
Governo por partes dos recrutas formados?
Grande desafio: constituição de uma Força Nacional.
Empenhamento internacional na Somália
 Dificuldades em apreender o padrão volátil de formação de alianças na Somália.
 Tensão chave em modelos políticos anteriores: Presidente, Presid. Do Parlamento e Primeiro
Ministro.
 Tensão entre representates e círculos internos.
 Dificuldades na Extensão de controlo e presença por parte do Governo Federal e mobilização de
apoio para além da capital e nas áreas recentemente controladas no Sul e Centro da Somália pela
AMISOM.
 Empenhamento internacional na Somália ‘’A conta gotas’’. Intervenções Temporárias-limitadas e
não coordenadas.
 O Enquadramento Estratégio para o Corno de África de Novembro de 2011 visa contrariar esta
tendência e conduzir a um empenhamento a médio-longo prazo
Morten Boas
Head of Research, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo
Abstract
This presentation draws on my chapter ‘Castles in the sand: informal networks and power brokers in the
Northern Mali periphery’, published in Mats Utas (ed.) African Conflicts and Informal Power, Zed Books,
2012, but it also move beyond this chapter seeking to locate Northern Mali in a changing regional context.
This context is affected by post-Gaddafi repercussions, but also informal and illicit forces of globalisation.
The area north of the river Niger in Mali is an area of remoteness and isolation, but also of increased
geopolitical significance due to the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘unintended’ consequences of the Libyan
revolution. It is a site of informalisation, but also increased criminalisation: illicit transportation of
cigarettes, drugs, arms and people. There is also Global Jihad in the form of AQIM, MOJWA and Ansar udDine, more secular Tuareg rebels (MNLA) and ordinary bandits.
This is an area that formally belongs to a state, but that for most practical purposes exists somewhere inbetween and betwixt the Malian state and several neighbouring states. The region and town of Kidal
illustrates this point. Kidal is formally a part of Mali, but in reality it is something else as the state of Mali
stops where the road ends outside of Gao. The 350 kilometre track through the sand from Gao therefore
cuts across a borderless limbo between the Algerian and the Malian state. To some extent a place lost in
time and space. It is marginal, but also of primary importance. Kidal has been at the forefront of all Tuareg
rebellions, and it is increasingly a centre for trade and transportation (legal and illicit).
Taking this context as its point of departure, the presentation goes on to discuss the current situation in
Northern Mali and critically reviews:
1) the claim for Azawad: it is real as an image and a dream, but as a state in the making it is no more
a state that the large wadi, the dry desert riverbed north of Timbuktu where the name originates
from,
2) the claim that AQIM, MOJWA, Ansar ud-Dine, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab are uniting under the
al-Qaeda banner: another axis (triangle) of evil in the making – this view is caused by the failure to
understand the difference between ‘branding’ and ‘branching’, and
3) the planned Nigerian-led ECOWAS intervention force: it may managed to take Gao and Timbuktu,
but without successful negotiations with the Malian group Ansar ud-Dine and a clear exit strategy,
it will become yet another ‘castles of sand’ in the Northern Mali periphery.
Presentation on “The Crisis in Northern Mali: in-between resistance, criminality and Global Jihad?”
Locating Northern Mali?
•
Basically it’s the area north of the River Niger, but what does this actually tells us about its
regional neighbourhood?
 It is an area that formally belongs to a state, but that for most practical purposes it is
somewhere in-between and betwixt the Malian state and several neighbouring states
 That is Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Niger
 Each of them with their own sort of trouble and each of them hosting Tuareg minority
groups
 And the long lasting competition for hegemony in this part of the Sahel is also in flux
partly due to repercussions from the Libyan revolution
•
It sent people (Tuaregs, but not exclusively) back to their homes of origin with arms and
ammunition, but little else, and the very same repercussions are also altering for good and for
bad the quest for hegemony between Algeria, Morocco and Libya
The region and town of Kidal illustrates this point
Kidal – formally a part of Mali, but in reality something else
o The state of Mali stops where the road ends in Gao
o The 350 kilometre track through the sand from Gao cuts across a borderless limbo between the
Algerian and the Malian state
o A place lost in time and space
Kidal is marginal, but also a place of prime importance, at the forefront of all Tuareg rebellions, and
increasingly a centre for trade and transportation (legal and illicit)
Do the people of Northern Mali support an independent Azawad?
•
•
•
To a certain extent the history of rebellion here is “separatism as an allias”, and we should
acknowledge that
 The politics of the state as a “city game” – one of the few things that the North and the
South has in common
 In the South probably fair to say that to the extent that the rural population care about
the state it is as hoping that a government could improve their economic situation or at
the least not worsen it
In the North – in may be that for the majority of the Tuareg pastoralists – an independent Azawad
simply means no more state interference in their lives.
Azawad is real as an image and a dream, but as a state in the making no more a state than the
large wadi, the dry desert riverbed north of Timbuktu where the name originates from.
Global Jihad in Africa: another axis of evil?
•
•
•
The great conspiracy: AQIM, MOJWA, Ansar ud-Dine, Boko Haram, al-Shabbab – all as one united
under the al-Qaeda banner – this is the failure to understand the difference between “branding”
and “branching”;
Hausa being spoken in Gao is certainly not solid evidence, and neither is the fact that fighters are
shouting as this has been the main battle cry in the Muslim world the past 1432 years;
Rather we need to understand the chaos that MNLA created when the Malian army ran away and
how Iyad Ag Ghali and Ansar ud-Dine with the support of AQIM and MOJWA stepped in to the
security vacuum that this created.
The 2012 rebellion – purification, or what actually happend?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Tuareg warriors and military leaders returned from Libya well-armed
Started MNLA and the Malian army just fragmented and ran away
MNLA plunder, looting and sexual violence inflicted on the Tuareg population
It is into this chaos that Iyad Ag Ghali and Ansar ud-Dine steps with the support of AQIM and
MOJWA, re-establishes some sort of order
The old Turaeg warrior turned Jihadist or just a pragmatic re-orientation to a changing context?
Impossible to say at this point, but most likely a little of both
MNLA destroyed the old song of Azawad and a new tune, a reinterpretation of the Azawad
texture was necessary and a stricter version of Islam was one possibility and not that many others
really existed
Thus, the imaginary had to be re-imagined, but as ECOWAS both negotiate and plan for a military
intervention and the Tuaregs has probably lost once more.
The planned ECOWAS intervention
•
•
Need a credible partner in Bamako to have any chance of success – that is not the case now;
Even with such a partner it will be difficult:
 Can recapture Gao and Timbuktu, but much more difficult to fight an insurgency with
local support
 Need to find a negotiated settlement with Ansar ud-Dine – maybe then possible to deal
militarily with AQIM and MOJWA (weaken them and force them far into the desert)
 Need a military and a political plan, and a clear and credible exit strategy
To conclude with a plea for caution
•
•
•
We should be very careful to jump to conclusions
Simply too much that we do not know
Some pieces of information is given way too much credibility – particularly the case of that which
supports a ”war on terror”/criminalisation approach and thinking, whereas information that
would lead to the questioning of this paradigm is if not ignored at least not investigated much
further so far
3.5. Fluxos e Actores do Desenvolvimento
Investimento Direto Estrangeiro, ajuda externa e novos parceiros: Impactos nas estratégias africanas
de desenvolvimento
Os fluxos externos de financiamento do desenvolvimento provenientes da cooperação internacional
têm estado pressionados pelas crises orçamentais dos principais doadores “tradicionais”. O surgimento
de novos financiadores e investidores em África, com critérios próprios de ajuda ao desenvolvimento,
abrem novas oportunidades e têm estado a alimentar os debates sobre as prioridades de afetação de
fundos ou sobre a (in)coerência das políticas para o desenvolvimento. Para além do impacto das
economias emergentes em África, é igualmente relevante analisar em que medida os negócios estão a
substituir a ajuda como principal motor de crescimento e como isso se reflete nos programas de
redução da pobreza.
Quais as implicações políticas do aumento da importância de novos doadores na arquitetura
internacional da ajuda ao desenvolvimento?
Como podem os países africanos aproveitar da melhor maneira a crescente complexidade e
diversificação de parceiros para o seu desenvolvimento?
Any Freitas
Gestora de Programas, Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia (EU-ISS), Paris
O nosso painel abordará questões centrais do relacionamento entre a África e a União Europeia: as
políticas, instrumentos e principalmente os actores para o desenvolvimento.
Gostaria de fazer algumas reflexões para lançar o debate: por exemplo, de que tipo de desenvolvimento
estamos a falar hoje; o desenvolvimento humano, o well-being, ou outros conceitos que estão hoje
ligados ao desenvolvimento? Outra reflexão tem a ver com a forma como nos são apresentados estes
“novos” doadores, frequentemente em oposição aos “tradicionais”, como se houvesse uma dicotomia.
Esta separação ou dicotomia na verdade é falsa; é criada por uma espécie de justaposição um pouco
rígida em que parece que os países africanos estão perante uma escolha exclusiva dos seus parceiros,
como se fosse “ou um, ou outro” quando a realidade é mais complexa.
No painel sobre a crise internacional, vimos que é importante não subestimar o papel dos doadores
tradicionais, particularmente da UE, quando se fala em questões do desenvolvimento e da ajuda ao
desenvolvimento. Muitos especialistas indicam que a contribuição e papel da UE como actor de
desenvolvimento, em particular na África, continua a ser bastante forte. Dito isto, a posição de separar
entre novos e tradicionais não deixa perceber que há uma complementaridade entre diferentes actores e
mecanismos. Talvez fosse nesta ideia de complementaridade que a UE se deveria posicionar nos próximos
anos, incluindo através de mecanismos de cooperação trilateral e com maior engajamento do sector
privado.
Erik Lundsgaarde
Senior Researcher, German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn
Development Flows and Actors
One starting point for the presentation is that the Joint Africa-EU Strategy from 2007 was formed with the
recognition that the geopolitical importance of the African continent was increasing already then. One
reflection of the continent’s growing global geopolitical importance has been the increasing engagement
of a variety of external players in African countries.
In this presentation on new development aid providers in Africa, I will focus my remarks on three broad
areas: 1) I will provide some descriptive information on key new actors; 2) I will briefly discuss how their
engagement with the continent is perceived to differ from Europe’s; 3) I will discuss some challenges that
their engagement presents for European development cooperation and African development strategies.
1.Who are the ‘new’ development aid providers in Africa?
First, they are the so-called emerging economies, particularly China, India and Brazil. These countries can
all be considered mid-sized donors in comparison with OECD-DAC aid providers; narrow estimates of their
aid-like contributions fall in the range of $500 million to $1.5 billion per year. In terms of the scale of
giving, China leads the way, with cautious estimates of global giving falling in the range of $1 to $3 billion
annually, and India may provide as much as $1 billion in development aid annually. If these estimates are
small and potentially controversial, there is widespread agreement that aid figures comparable to official
development assistance provided by traditional donors are growing at a quick pace. In 2011, the Chinese
government announced that China had provided some $38 billion in aid to Africa from the 1950s through
2009 (according to American scholar Deborah Brautigam); as a point of comparison, all donors that report
to the DAC disbursed some $50 billion to Africa in 2009 alone. Brazil and South Africa are also increasing
their presence in the region and estimated to provide under $500 million annually as donors. For Brazil,
about half of its development assistance goes to Africa (comparable to the size of Portuguese aid to SubSaharan Africa). South Africa’s aid is essentially limited to the African continent.
Turkey is another regional power considered in this category, and seems to be growing dramatically. The
most recent figures from the DAC suggest that Turkey provided only around $38 million in aid to Africa in
2010, but $270 million dollars in 2011.
Often forgotten as official providers of development assistance are the donors in Central and Eastern
Europe. Africa is not really a strong focus of their aid programmes, and together only about $20 million in
development assistance to Africa from CEEC donors was reported to the DAC in 2011. Though these
states are small, they may nevertheless have an important impact on the future development financing
landscape in Africa if their political influence interests within the EU lead to a reassessment of the priority
given to the continent in development cooperation.
Apart from state donors, we should look at private aid providers. In some sense a traditional provider of
development assistance, considering large Western NGOs these are sometimes embedded in existing
OECD donor structures; in the last decade there has also been a growth in aid from private aid providers,
though the scale of this growth is difficult to quatify. One example of growth in private assistance is
engagement from private foundations, led by rising investments from the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, which distributes about $3 billion in global development and global health funding annually
on a global basis. This accounts for a large share of foundation funding on its own, as general estimates of
the scale of private foundation giving worldwide lie in the range of $7.5 to $9 billion, with Africa
representing one of the more important destinations for this aid globally. Foundations are associated with
innovation, but in many cases operate in traditional sectors of development cooperation: health,
education, and agriculture, for example. While they are also associated with applying business-oriented
approaches, often their manner of engagement also often takes a conventional form, giving grants to
other actors to implement programs.
Alongside with emerging donors and private aid providers, we can also point out the outgrowth of
program proliferation in multilateral development cooperation and traditional aid programs. Perhaps
discussed less in the context of ‘new’ aid providers, but it is also important to acknowledge the expansion
of channels for disbursing and administering aid within existing bilateral and multilateral aid systems. This
includes the growth in specialized agencies within the UN system and in bilateral programs (MCC) as well
as the rise of global vertical programs such as the Global Fund to Combat AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
or the GAVI Alliance. These new channels may be considered a remedy for the failings of more traditional
development cooperation approaches, but they are generally an addition to, rather than a replacement
for, existing channels. This heightens potential for greater transaction costs in aid management.
In this context, it is also important to note that major DAC donors like the United States, Japan, Canada,
and Norway which are outside of the EU continue to play an important role in the African development
financing landscape as well. European aid to Africa itself is still significant though-accounted for 56% of
DAC aid to Africa in 2010, or $16.5 billion. But then, the question is: what is Europe? Here, too, we are
talking about very different donors’ systems and a diverse set of actors that do not always pursue the
same interests.
2. What do we know about the character of the work of new actors and development aid providers?
There are perceived differences between “new” aid providers and European/OECD donors in terms of
priorities and manner of operation, but the former are also a very diverse group. The nature of assistance
can include large-scale loans for major infrastructure projects, debt relief, technical assistance, or support
for small-scale projects in traditional sectors of development cooperation such as education or health, or
agriculture.
In terms of the thematic focus, Brazil emphasises agriculture and food security, and prefers technical
cooperation programmes (capacity building), provision of expertise in particular areas rather than
distributing financial assistance. Indian development cooperation includes both financial assistance in the
form of loans made on concessional terms, and technical assistance (focusing on training programmes).
In Indian development cooperation there is often a perception of clear linkages between aid and private
investment, which is clear in programmes such as the so-called TEAM-9 credit facility for 8 African
countries ($500 million), the aim of which was to promote socio-economic development via increasing
access to Indian technology in poor countries.
It remains difficult to know exactly what China is providing as
development assistance, due to lack of transparency in
reporting, differing definitions of development aid, and the
blending of public and private investment, which happens
through support for foreign operations of state-owned
enterprises. China has especially been associated with the
provision of loans for large-scale infrastructure projects, but
the priorities addressed and the form that aid assumes has in
reality been more diverse than this. Assistance also falls
outside of the area of economic cooperation; China has
recently announced its intention to increase its support for the
African peace and security architecture, for example.
In general, new donors are characterised by their preference
for bilateral engagement, even if they prefer coordinated
multilateral engagement in their own development
cooperation with OECD countries. This preference for bilateral
cooperation is not that different from many European donors,
though, and within the DAC bilateral aid has represented
around 70% of aid flows in recent years.
The “new” donors also perceived to be generally characterised by the transparent linkage of development
funding to foreign policy objectives, such as the maintenance of energy security, or the promotion of
trade and investment. Development cooperation programmes and systems generally remain under the
umbrella of foreign affairs ministries in these countries. Especially in the ‘developing countries’ which
promote development under the label of South-South cooperation, the principles of non-interference in
internal affairs, equality of partnerships, and the mutuality of benefit are a key part of their selfperception as development actors. At the level of principles, one can question whether these notions are
really different from those guiding European cooperation with Africa, and also ask to what extend there is
a gap between the rhetoric and the reality on the ground.
3.Implications for (European) aid architecture and African development strategies?
One interesting aspect of studying the impact of emerging economies on the broader development policy
landscape is that their growing presence by itself acts as a stimulus for deepened self-reflection on the
performance of OECD donors as development assistance providers, and for the EU in particular.
If EU donors are concerned that the arrival of new donors undermines efforts to improve aid and
development effectiveness by increasing transaction costs for partner countries, they need to reflect on
the factors that are limited EU donors from coordinating their aid to a greater degree. This includes
barriers to achieving a more effective division of labor in development cooperation at the country level,
which still appears to be driven largely by what European donors want rather than as a result of
assessments of value-added from the side of partner governments.
If EU donors are concerned that the arrival of new donors undermines key policy goals such as the
promotion of good governance or democratisation, they similarly need to consider whether their own
instruments for democracy promotion are effective in achieving these goals and whether these
instruments are applied in a consistent manner.
If EU donors are concerned that China or other new players are becoming more important or attractive
interlocutors and partners for African governments, EU member states can consider whether it makes
sense to maintain a strongly bilateral orientation in development cooperation themselves, or whether this
it is now time to strengthen the development mandate of EU institutions to gain greater leverage.
Moreover, the rise of new actors is a stimulus for Europe to consider its attractiveness as a development
partner. Is its aid predictable, productive, and effective?
Finally, if the close linkages between aid, trade, and investment that are features of aid from new donors
are unsettling, the EU should consider whether it is fully transparent about the goals that it pursues in
external policy toward Africa and assess how its current institutional framework enables the EU to pursue
a coherent foreign policy agenda that better links these different dimensions of economic relations,
especially trade and development.
In general, new aid providers can have a positive role to play in African development as a source of
additional financing and alternative ideas on how to promote effective development cooperation. The
Busan Partnership has acknowledged the value of diversity of approaches and suggests that in the future
development cooperation is about managing a diversity of actors. Two key things are needed in order to
make the management of these actors easier at the country level. One is transparency: if it is not clear
what different donors (old and new) are doing within a country, it is probably difficult to determine how
to use their financing in a complementary way. A second factor is related to this: to ensure that new
financing can lead to development results it is necessary for partner governments to be in a position to
adequately steer the development process. This will require investments in capacity development, one
example being in the area of financial management of external flows and internal statistical capacities.
Ana Paula Fernandes
Conselheira de Portugal junto da OCDE
Vice-Presidente do Comité de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD), Paris
What are the political implications of the rising of new providers of development cooperation in the
traditional aid architecture?
Abstract
The Monterrey Consensus of 2002 established the primacy of domestic resources and the enabling
environment in fostering growth and development, while emphasising the role of ODA as a complement
and catalytic for other sources of financing for development.
Significant changes in the financing landscape have already taken place and it is clear that addressing the
challenges of the post-2015 development agenda requires a comprehensive approach to development: the
role of the private sector; market- based financial instruments; the need to engage with non-DAC donors
(Arab donors, south-south cooperation providers).
Still ODA will continue to be relevant for fragile and least developed countries, but we need to modernize
the system for measuring and reporting development finance. Many developing countries insist that
financing for global objectives, as climate change, should be additional to aid. In this sense, the ODA
concept may be re-examined.
I will focus on the current debate on development finance in the DAC and what are the challenges for the
current and post-MDG framework.
Apresentação
Há dois aspectos transversais à minha intervenção, que eu gostaria de destacar. Um é a desadequação da
classificação de “tradicional”. Quando nos tentam classificar como doadores tradicionais, face àquilo que
é a nova terminologia aceite em Busan relativa aos “novos parceiros da cooperação” que não se querem
classificar a si próprios como doadores mas como fornecedores de cooperação e de desenvolvimento,
vemos que os doadores denomidos de “tradicionais” de facto não têm sido tradicionais nas suas
abordagens. Isto porque têm assumido as suas responsabilidades, reformulado as abordagens e
reconhecido os erros do passado, tentando ao mesmo tempo inovar, e parte dessa inovação reside no
acordado em Busan sobre os novos princípios de uma parceria global para o desenvolvimento. Para além
disso, as economias emergentes também não gostam de ser apelidadas de “novos” doadores, já que a
China por exemplo afirma fazer cooperação há muitos mais anos que os doadores do CAD.
O segundo ponto tem a ver com a discussão se centrar muito numa perspectiva de competição. Parece
que estamos todos a competir entre nós, a avaliar qual o melhor e qual o parceiro mais vantajoso. Essa
não deve ser a ideia central da discussão, sobretudo se estamos a pensar num cenário pós-2015, mas sim
a ideia da complementaridade e de quais as mais-valias de cada um, sempre na perspectiva de que cabe
ao país parceiro tomar as suas decisões e optar pelas parcerias que considera serem mais vantajosas. É
nessa perspectiva que devemos pensar o futuro do financiamento do desenvolvimento, que se interliga
necessariamente com o debate sobre a revisão dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento do Milénio e o quadro
global após 2015.
A minha intervenção centra-se no que têm sido os debates no âmbito do CAD relativamente aos que se
perspectiva sobre a revisão do próprio conceito de Ajuda Pública ao Desenvolvimento (APD), os novos
fluxos e a relação com os novos actores da cooperação para o desenvolvimento. Nos últimos anos, e
apesar da crise financeira, os doadores do CAD têm conseguido manter o seu nível de compromissos em
matéria de APD e até aumentar o volume dessa ajuda. O CAD perspectiva, contudo, que não existirá um
aumento substancial até 2015 e que os compromissos assumidos quer em relação ao continente africano
quer em relação aos ODM em matéria de APD não serão cumpridos por uma série de circunstâncias,
incluindo a crise.
Face a este cenário, é preciso não esquecer que os doadores não contribuem só com a APD para o
desenvolvimento dos seus países parceiros, ou seja, a sua lógica de cooperação nunca foi assente
exclusivamente na ajuda ao desenvolvimento. Verifica-se uma tendência para ver a relação com os países
parceiros sempre na óptica da APD, mas sempre existiram empréstimos, concessionais e não
concessionais, embora essa vertente de cooperação não fosse no passado a mais privilegiada pelos
doadores tradicionais. Esse dado também está a mudar, por duas ordens de razão. Por um lado, cada vez
mais há um reconhecimento por parte dos doadores de que a ajuda por si só não é suficiente. Por outro
lado, há também um reconhecimento dos ministros das finanças dos países doadores de que há
mudanças nas realidades dos países em desenvolvimento que são importantes para as suas próprias
economias e que há outros países emergentes no terreno a estabelecer diferentes tipos de relação com
esses países (nomeadamente através de empréstimos). Nessa óptica, existe uma relação de concorrência
evidente nos fluxos que não são ajuda ao desenvolvimento, em termos de quem está a conseguir maiores
parcerias na área das infraestruturas para o desenvolvimento, do desenvolvimento financeiro desses
países, do investimento directo estrangeiro, entre outros.
Busan reflecte a ideia, presente nos debates do CAD há bastantes anos, de que temos de reconhecer
finalmente que a APD não é suficiente e que existem outros fluxos tão ou mais importantes – fluxos
oficiais que não são considerados APD e fluxos privados, reflectindo a importância das fundações e outros
actores que são reconhecidos como parceiros na Declaração de Busan. O que tem de discutir agora é qual
a divisão de trabalho entre entres fluxos, instrumentos e actores.
O diálogo com vários parceiros e actores tem sido levado a cabo pelo CAD conjuntamente com outros
comités da OCDE, nomeadamente na área do investimento e com o sector privado. Este diálogo começou
não há muito tempo mas está a ser estruturado também em função do que foi criado com Busan, através
do Building Block for Private Sector, em que várias companhias multinacionais e associações empresariais
reúnem com os doadores, ditos tradicionais mas que estão a desenvolver parcerias e a discutir o
desenvolvimento com o sector privado.
O CAD tem também procurado desenvolver um diálogo com os chamados “novos” fornecedores de ajuda,
nomeadamente com a China, mas também com doadores árabes. Estes últimos tendem a ser esquecidos
neste debate, mas têm desempenhado um papel importante em alguns países em desenvolvimento,
tendo uma preocupação em matéria de governação e direitos humanos (desenvolvendo um diálogo
interessante com o CAD sobretudo nesta áreas). A Turquia é observadora do CAD e está no pipeline para
aderir ao Comité, tendo justamente desenhado um quadro de contribuição para a APD já de cerca mil
milhões de dólares (naturalmente concentrada nos parceiros da região).
Um outro aspecto importante que tende a ser esquecido é todo o investimento que tem sido feito, não só
pela EU mas também pelos países doadores do CAD em matéria de Ajuda ao Comércio (Aid for Trade).
Esta agenda está a ser revista e as negociações de Doha têm sido muito complicadas, mas entra na
negociação que os doadores também fazem em termos de coerência com as regras internacionais de
comércio e a capacitação dos países em desenvolvimento para terem estruturas capazes de aproveitar o
comércio internacional.
Quais as grandes discussões do CAD sobre a APD e os cenários pós-2015? Claramente parece, pelos dados
que temos, que a APD a partir de 2015, terá um papel complementar e deverá estar centrada nos países
com maior dificuldade de financiamento externo ao seu desenvolvimento, nomeadamente os países em
situação de fragilidade (que têm mais dificuldades em captar IDE). Relativamente ao papel da APD, realçase o seu papel na área da Coerência das Políticas para o desenvolvimento (CPD): por um lado, como é que
a ajuda pode contribuir para aumentar a capacitação dos países em desenvolvimento para serem
parceiros no comércio e no investimento e terem capacidade para assumirem cada vez mais o seu
desenvolvimento, e por outro lado, o papel de potenciar discussões globais ao nível de fóruns como o G20, da Parceria Global para o Desenvolvimento ou no contexto das Nações Unidas, sobre problemas
globais que afectam estes países. Existe portanto uma agenda que se interligada com a da coerência das
políticas, e que nos é sistematicamente colocada pelos PED, relacionada com a contabilização da ligação
entre ajuda ao desenvolvimento como a conhecemos hoje e outros bens públicos globais (como p.ex. o
ambiente). OU seja, o que é que vamos considerar que é APD e aquilo que é adicional à APD; como é que
vamos medir o esforço financeiro dos novos ODM, quando dizemos que esses objectivos até podem ter
várias camadas – nacional, regional e global -; como é que definimos targets financeiros? Ainda não é
muito claro, para já, o que iremos definir como objectivos. Os ODM tiveram a grande mais-valia de definir
objectivos globais ligados a targets financeiros e a indicadores, mas este debate está ainda a ser definido
para 2015.
Na questão da definição da APD, há também um debate de definição do que é concessional e nãoconcessional, do que é empréstimo e do que constitui APD. Há quem diga que faria sentido retomar o que
foi discutido em Monterrey, de ter um objectivo de 1% do RNB afectado ao esforço de cada país para o
desenvolvimento global. Pensando nesse valor, poderíamos medir o global do esforço, passando da
eficácia da ajuda para a eficácia do desenvolvimento, mas por outro lado isto poderia ser penalizador para
os compromissos de APD na medida em que pode reduzir o esforço só com ajuda ao desenvolvimento,
favorecendo logicas mais comerciais e de empréstimos. Há um equilíbrio a definir entre aquilo que o
mundo precisa em termos de APD (nomeadamente os países em situação de fragilidade) e aquilo que são
os fluxos privados de relacionamento entre países que potenciam também o crescimento económico.
Nesta equação entra ainda a questão climática, uma vez que se discute também para o pós-2015 a ligação
entre APD e o debate realizado no Rio+20. Uma das mensagens da reunião de alto nível do CAD realizada
no início de Dezembro foi a necessidade de ligar os Objectivos do desenvolvimento aos objectivos da
sustentabilidade para ter uma única agenda global. Aqui coloca-se mais uma vez a questão de serem
fluxos adicionais ou não, e o que significa isto em termos financeiros.
O CAD tem no seu mandato o objectivo explícito de acabar consigo próprio. O esforço dos países que
estão sentados á mesa do CAD é entendido como um esforço para terminar com a necessidade de ajuda.
Toda a discussão política e esforço financeiro devem ser feitos no sentido de criar sustentabilidade nos
países parceiros e de a APD não ser necessária no futuro. Esta também explícito no novo mandato que
temos de entender o mundo como completamente diferente daquele que existia nos anos 70, quando foi
elaborada a definição de APD. Há novos parceiros e novos doadores, pelo que o diálogo não pode ser
exclusivamente bilateral, nem exclusivamente multilateral no sentido tradicional do termo, mas muito
mais inclusivo sobre estas dimensões. A nova parceria global para o desenvolvimento que surgiu em
Busan também passa esta mensagem, em que o CAD está presente mas assume que, ao contrário do que
fez na primeira discussão sobre a agenda dos ODM, não pode ser o único contribuinte para essa
discussão, sendo antes uma das partes desse diálogo.
É também interessantes não esquecer que a coerência das políticas é uma parte fundamental. A agenda
da fiscalidade e do desenvolvimento, da luta contra os fluxos ilícitos e a corrupção, p.ex., mostra-nos que
por cada dólar investido no combate à corrupção, resultam 20 dólares de cativação de rendimento. Será
tão importante no futuro contribuir para que os Estados em desenvolvimento tenham capacidade para
aumentarem os seus recursos internos, como será importante que os Estados doadores invistam muito
mais no combate a fluxos ilícitos e à corrupção, bem como em questões globais e políticas sectoriais que
sejam muito mais potenciadoras do desenvolvimento global, já que o desenvolvimento dos países
parceiros é também o nosso desenvolvimento.
Diogo Gomes de Araújo
Presidente Executivo, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento (SOFID), Lisboa
Abstract
There are enormous challenges in increasing inclusive growth, reducing poverty, and improving people’s
lives in developing countries. The private sector has a key role to play in addressing these challenges by
supporting inclusive growth, poverty reduction, job creation, and access to critical goods and basic
services and by providing tax revenues. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) support the private sector
gaps in finance, knowledge, and standards and endeavor to create high-impact, sustainable development
projects and programs.
The private sector in developing countries faces many constraints in such areas as finance, infrastructure,
employee skills, and the investment climate. IFIs focusing on private sector development can help address
these constraints. Over the past decade, IFIs have achieved substantial growth in private sector
operations. IFI projects have had significant impacts on job creation, connecting people via infrastructure
and communications, reaching small and medium enterprises (SMEs), generating government revenues,
providing health care and education, and assisting farmers.
Great change is occurring both in developing countries and in the approaches and institutions that
promote development. Recent trends indicate a growing emphasis on private sector to improve lives and
living conditions in developing countries. IFIs are attractive options for public expenditure, as they
leverage the limited funds entrusted to them by catalyzing the resources and talent of private actors. IFIs
will need to partner with each other and with other key stakeholders to enhance impact and to adapt. To
maximize development impact, public and private sector policies in each country need to be coherent and
complementary. There needs to be a virtuous circle between public and private undertakings to maximize
development impact and IFIs play an increasingly more important role on it.
Apresentação
É um prazer estar aqui e falar-vos sobre um tema que nem sempre é abordado neste tipo de conferências
mas que curiosamente já foi referido pelos membros do painel, que é o sector privado e o
desenvolvimento. Há neste âmbito um conjunto de instituições financeiras que não são tão novas quanto
isso, já que a nossa congénere alemã celebra já 50 anos de actividade. Vou falar sobre o impacto do
sector privado em diferentes aspectos do desenvolvimento, sobre qual o papel que a instituições
financeiras vocacionadas para o desenvolvimento – como bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento que
apenas financiam o sector privado, ou braços privados de bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento – têm
no desenvolvimento dos países em desenvolvimento, e ainda sobre o gaps que existem no apoio ao
sector privado e no papel deste tipo de instituições financeiras em suprir estas falhas de mercado.
1. Impacto do sector privado no desenvolvimento
Relativamente ao impacto do sector privado no crescimento, é preciso referir que este que é fundamental
para reduzir a pobreza e ajuda a criar riqueza para os mais pobres se for feito de forma inclusiva. Temos
dados que mostram que um PIB per capita maior está ligado a uma maior redução da pobreza (gráfico 1).
Quanto mais houver investimento privado, maior o crescimento, uma vez que as economias com maior
peso deste investimento na sua economia, relativamente ao investimento público, crescem também mais
depressa (gráfico 2). Ao nível da criação de emprego, temos o exemplo do México, onde o rácio de postos
de trabalho criados pelo sector privado, relativamente ao sector público, é de 87%, por comparação ao
Gabão, onde esse rácio é quatro vezes menor, sendo a diferença de crescimento entre os dois países
também notória (gráfico 3).
O sector privado tem também impactos ao nível da inclusão. Os estudos indicam que as desigualdades no
rendimento e nas oportunidades de acesso a vários serviços têm limitado a capacidade das pessoas
beneficiarem do crescimento económico Nesse sentido, temos de ter em atenção onde as pessoas vivem
e trabalham, em que sectores trabalham, para avaliar se há um impacto positivo nos mais pobres quando
falamos de investimento. O investimento privado pode ter um papel absolutamente fundamental ao criar
oportunidades, criando emprego, serviços, concorrência, que leve a que populações possam ter acesso a
vários serviços que não tinham anteriormente. Quanto menos avançado é um país, menor acesso existe
aos serviços financeiros – as pessoas não têm contas bancárias, não têm acesso a soluções financeiras – e
a serviços de comunicações, energias e outras infraestruturas, sectores estes onde a actuação do sector
privado é importante.
2. Papel das IFI no desenvolvimento do setor privado
Gostava de chamar a atenção para um inquérito quer foi feito pelo Banco mundial, onde se detecta que,
de todos os factores que limitam a actividade das empresas em países em desenvolvimento e
emergentes, a electricidade é indicada como a maior limitação pela maioria das empresas, mas o acesso
ao financiamento é aquele que mais consistentemente é referido em todas as regiões do mundo.
Relativamente às falhas de mercado para o apoio ao sector privado, gostaria de destacar que são as
pequenas empresas em países de baixo rendimento que mais identificam a falta de acesso ao
financiamento como o seu maior obstáculo para terem sucesso.
Se analisarmos os três pilares do desenvolvimento, verificamos que a ajuda pública ao desenvolvimento
representa mais de 100 biliões de dólares (doações, assistência humanitária e outras intervenções de
ajuda); o segundo pilar são os bancos de desenvolvimento do ponto de vista público (financiamentos
públicos de Estados, a empresas públicas, etc, com instrumentos que vão desde as doações, aos
empréstimos e garantias) representando entre 50 e 100 biliões de dólares; e o terceiro pilar que são as
instituições financeiras de desenvolvimento e que providenciam soluções de financiamento para o sector
privado, sendo já assinalável: cerca de 42 biliões de dólares, de financiamentos, investimentos, garantias
e todo o tipo de apoios que funcionam como catalisadores nos países onde actuamos. De destacar que
estas estratégias têm de ser coerentes e complementares, tem de ser desenvolvido um trabalho conjunto
(p.ex. é assinalável o trabalho que o CAD-OCDE tem feito de aproximação às EDFI – European
Development Finance Institutions, das quais a SOFID é membro).
Quanto ao papel destas instituições financeiras de apoio ao sector privado ao nível do preenchimento de
lacunas que possam existir no financiamento de empresas nestes países, gostaria de explicar a relevância
da nossa actuação. Existe muita dificuldade no acesso a financiamento, particularmente a pequenas e
médias empresas, existe igualmente um grande risco do sector privado investir em determinados países,
e ainda uma grande necessidade de aconselhamento. Já tivemos reuniões com cerca de mil empresas e
algo muito apreciado é o aconselhamento e a experiência que lhes podemos transmitir.
A nossa actuação contribui para melhorar o ambiente de negócios e de investimento; aconselhamos o
sector privado a ter preocupações de sustentabilidade nos seus projectos e de impacto no
desenvolvimento (algo que os empresários ainda não têm muito em consideração), introduzindo esses
conceitos nos projectos que nos são apresentados; promovemos a responsabilização por aspectos
ambientais, sociais e de boa governação nos projectos onde participamos. Para além disso, como somos
detidos maioritariamente pelos Estados, damos também algum conforto político que é apreciado pelos
clientes, muitas vezes em ambientes difíceis. Temos ainda um efeito demonstrativo, uma vez que quando
os bancos comerciais não acreditam num projecto, podemos apoiar esse projecto e demonstrar que se
forem apoiadas essas ideias, poderão ter sucesso.
É interessante ver em quanto se transforma cada euro investido por uma instituição como a SOFID.
Normalmente os nossos accionistas investem um terço do empréstimo e nós mobilizamos dois terços
através dos mercados internacionais, o que permite através do nosso financiamento alavancar esse valor
em três vezes (mobilizados através e bancos comerciais ou de capitais próprios dos promotores dos
projectos). Isto obviamente vai gerar receitas que depois continuarão a alimentar a nossa estrutura. Isto
faz com que 1 euro investido numa IFI pode gerar 12 euros de um investimento, sendo que também
contribui com 1 a 3 euros para impostos colectados pelos países onde esse investimento é feito. Portanto,
um investimento numa instituição como esta pode alavancar em 12 vezes esse valor (A SOFID ainda só
tem 5 anos de existência e esse valor é neste caso de 1 para 4). Isto gera receitas para os accionistas e
para a própria instituição, existindo um cash-flow que alimenta a nossa actividade ao nível de receitas e
que contribui para as receitas fiscais dos países onde actuamos.
Há também uma importância no contraciclo, ou seja, quando a crise se revela é exactamente quando
instituições como esta são chamadas a actuar. Quando os movimentos de investimento ou de capital
começaram a reduzir em virtude das crises sucessivas que se foram sentindo nesta última década, foi
quando a actividade das IFI aumentou. Este factor pode, por isso, ser determinante para apoiar e manter
um certo dinamismo económico nos países que mais precisam desse capital.
Foi feito um estudo sobre quais as vantagens e desvantagens de envolver a banca comercial com um
banco de desenvolvimento orientado para o sector privado. Só fomos classificados mais negativamente
em dois aspectos: a velocidade de processamento e na falta de presença local, mas em todos os outros
factores a nossa performance face aos bancos comerciais é muito satisfatória. Alguns exemplos de como
actuamos de forma diferenciada e em prol dos mais pobres são fornecidos na apresentação.
Ao nível dos resultados, gostaria de destacar a grande diferença nos volumes financeiros para o sector
privado. A partir do seculo XXI parece haver um reconhecimento crescente por parte dos nossos
accionistas (Estado) de instituições como a SOFID na eficácia de chegar aos mais pobres. Conseguimos,
além disso, mobilizar recursos adicionais através da alavancagem já referida.
Em conclusão, acredito que a redução da pobreza necessita de um envolvimento muito forte do sector
privado, que o sector privado beneficia se envolver um banco de desenvolvimento especializado (porque
contribui para maior eficácia no desenvolvimento), e que este tipo de instituições tem competências
específicas importantes preenchendo gaps nos financiamentos e aconselhamento. Por outro lado, temos
de continuar a melhorar e a estreitar relações tanto com fornecedores de ajuda pública ao
desenvolvimento como como com instituições multilaterais de desenvolvimento (public to public), sendo
que os esforços de blending (conjugação e fundos públicos e privados) devem ser trabalhados. Nenhum
de nós individualmente é mas esperto do que todos nós juntos.
3.6. O Futuro
Perspetivas para a Cimeira África-UE de 2014 e a Agenda de Desenvolvimento pós-2015
O debate em curso sobre a agenda de desenvolvimento global pós-2015, que substituirá os Objetivos
de Desenvolvimento do Milénio definidos em 2000, inclui um conjunto de questões desde a eficácia do
desenvolvimento, a coerência das políticas, o financiamento, as desigualdades e exclusão social (para
além da pobreza), a inclusão de bens públicos globais, ou as ligações segurança-desenvolvimentoambiente. Esta sessão procurará debater a relevância destes assuntos e a sua interligação com as
prioridades para a cooperação África-UE, tendo em conta a Cimeira de 2014.
Quais são (ou devem ser) as principais questões debatidas na definição de uma agenda de
desenvolvimento pós-2015?
Quais os desafios e oportunidades desta nova agenda para a parceria Europa-África?
Que contribuições podem os dois continentes dar a estes debates globais?
Geert Laporte
Deputy Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Maastricht
There have been quite a few meetings and brainstorms in the past years on Europe-Africa relations and I
hope this session will also contribute in helping to set the agenda of a next milestone in the Europe-Africa
partnership, the Summit that is foreseen in 2014.
When we were here some five years ago for the II EU-Africa Summit preparatory work, I would say that
there were a lot of positive feelings in most of the sessions we had at that time. In the past five years the
world has changed a lot, Europe has changed a lot, Africa has changed a lot. If I carefully listened to all the
various sessions, there are some changes for the better, but maybe also several changes for the worst.
What are the positive elements that we could retain from the discussions that we had so far? Definitively
the very important growth of Africa, although this growth is also creating a kind of paradox, because
growth is not always equally distributed as it was mentioned. We have seen the emerging of new players,
a lot of interest in Africa beyond the traditional Europe-Africa relationship; also a kind of shift that is
gradually taking place in the mindset of the different actors about the role of aid and the traditional
donor-recipient relations. I think everyone agrees that we should move beyond that approach and look on
other ways to answer to the huge challenges for development and the huge challenges posed by some of
the important global issues such as climate change. The whole discussion about finding enough resources
to financing development beyond – and maybe also with – traditional aid, is a big issue.
We’ve seen also a number of negative elements: in some of the sessions there was a lot of debate on the
problems of inequality, of unemployment particularly amongst the younger generations, and the security
problems were tackled. We also discussed the issue that some of the African institutions are quite
ambitious but still very much dependent on donor funding – there are not enough resources mobilized
within the African countries and continent to sustain the various institutions.
On the European side there was also a lot of criticism leveled on what is happening in the continent – in
spite of the fantastic Nobel prize for the EU that was delivered this week, Europe is confronted with a
major credibility crisis. Credibility crisis in Africa, where we see for example that the whole EPAs
negotiation as done a lot of harm in the mindset of many African leaders, but also in the populations,
where Europe is not always seen as a coherent actor or a very reliable actor, with double standards in the
application of some conditionalities that accompany European aid. Europe is in crisis and this will lead to a
very different way of looking at development relations and international relations in general. We had a
summit in 2010, in Tripoli and we probably deleted that summit out of our collective memory (and if you
google EU-Africa Summit, the 2007 meeting is very mentioned but not the 2010), since it was not a very
important event in terms of extending the dynamics that definitely existed 3 years before. Now we have
to look forward and to how this joint Africa-Europe strategy is operating – regarding this matter there is a
lot of criticism, because it is said that the JAES has not enough political traction, it has not the means to
back up the huge ambitions, it is having also problems with the heavy structures to manage all the
framework, and more importantly, in spite of that strategy, there is a kind of feeling that Europe and
Africa over the past years are mutually ignoring each other. I’m maybe exaggerating a little bit, but there
is certainly not the same type of dynamism that we witnessed in 2007.
I’m coming now to a few questions that we put in this session. First basic questions: is there hope for a
renewal and revitalized type of partnership between Europe and Africa towards 2014? What importance
would the new leadership in the African Union attach to Europe-Africa relations? With major changes in
Europe, such as the European External Action Service, what role does Lady Ashton want to play in the
relation to Africa? To what extend if the EEAS really able to put a more coherent foreign policy framework
in place, beyond the role that so far has
been played by the Commission and the
EC Development Directorate General
that did not have that overall foreign
policy ambition?
How can the Summit in 2014 be a
success and integrate many elements
that we are currently discussing also
for the post-2015 framework?
These are some of the questions: I
will also ask our speakers to highlight
some of the issues that should be in
the agenda.
Alex Vines
Research Director & Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House (RIIA), London
I’m going to reflect on how the continent has changed since we had the Lisbon Treaty and the 2007 JAES
and come up with some ideas on how we should move forward. What surprises have we already
witnessed this year: I’m an analyst of Sub-Saharan politics and I wouldn’t necessarily expect those events.
One big surprise is the impact of technology, for example shale gas technology and how it is transforming
energy markets quite quickly. Exports of oil from Nigeria to the US are in decline and that trajectory will
continue; Angola is producing gas that is not going to the US and from Tanzania to Mozambique they
don’t what the future price of gas will be. Technology can be transformative quickly and the point is that
we need to constantly review and test our assumptions. Another surprise is the security situation in Mali,
since very few people would predict that so soon to an election Mali would crumble in the way it did. We
were all anxious about Niger’s impact of Libia situation, but Mali less so. Again that is a big surprise that
will predominate in Europa and Africa thinking in 2013. Discussions and events around Mali will certainly
feed in the 2014 Summit.
Another surprise was in Malawi, where the situation changed with the death of president Mutharika. We
shouldn’t discount the role of individuals in all of this, because individuals play a key role. My last surprise
is about the African Union, where I didn’t expect Ms. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, from one of big 5
countries in Africa, to become the chair of the Africa Union Commission. That, in itself, raises an issue
when we are looking towards 2015: the mood inside the union amongst its members is mixed about Ms.
Zuma and it was quite a surprise. She has a great track record and let’s see how she can progress. There’s
no doubt that the African Union, as much as the EU, needs reform and rationalization. Looking back over
10 years of the AU, I reflected on how exciting many people where in the beginning and the vision that
the first chair and commissioners had at that time. Then thinks began to lose steam and many of the
problems were already defined and understood (see for instance the 2007 audit document): it’s about the
enacting the politics, leadership, and the political will by the members themselves. I wonder if some parts
of the AU architecture are premature, for instance I’m not sure about the pan-African parliament and
whether it can be afforded, it is not democratically elected and it’s expensive. Maybe in this atmosphere
of austerity, there needs to be some prioritization and strong political will about those priorities. I’m not
sure that Ms. Zuma will be able to achieve this, but I’m hopeful that she has the technocratic skills and if
she proves that she doesn’t pursues a national agenda, it could be quite an exciting time.
There are other things that we can predict that will happen in the continent next year. Guinea-Bissau, the
troubles with the collapse of the government in São Tomé & Principe, the situation in eastern Congo, the
results of the Angolan elections, are all no surprises. Therefore there are some constants, but there are
also things that we are not prepared for and we need to test our assumptions. The European crisis in not
going to go away and that is also a key issue building towards the Summit in 2014 that we’ll need to be
fully cognoscent on. This means that the big themes like the discussions on values versus interests are
going to be very apparent – trying to get a coherent strategy when there are diverse economic interests
and prosperity agendas… There are 120 thousand Portuguese in Angola at the moment and Angola is the
largest export market for Portuguese wine, besides all the other things we hear about Isabel dos Santos
and various investments that take place in Portugal. How are you going to get a coherent strategy when
you have that? The same with France, with the UK and with other countries that need to export more and
more efficiently to get out of the fiscal crisis they are in.
That is not to say that the Europe-Africa relationship isn’t important, we have seen the figures: 1 billion
euros spent by the EU between 2008 and 2013, 16.5 billion aid to Africa in 2011, a hundred million euros
for the Africa Peace Facility since 2004 – this is not insignificant money and a significant part of that goes
to the Africa Union project. Europe isn’t insignificant and it won’t be insignificant, but in an atmosphere of
continued austerity priorities and rationalization need to be made. There is a swing in the way of focusing
in the continent architecture that has the flavor of the recent years; this is something officials in the
African Union Commission are very vigilant about, but talking in the European capitals there in increasing
interest in putting more resources, more thinking and more time into the Regional Economic
Communities (REC) or regional mechanisms. The issue on how the RECs, the regional mechanisms and the
Africa Union fit together and interrelate with Europe is critically important. The situation in Mali shows
how all of these play a role – we need the AU level, the RECs level, the international level, and there is a
great complexity where no one should be exclusive of the other. There are very positive moments where
Europe has played a role. The process of encouraging coordination between the RECs and the AU,
including funding the liaison offices in Addis is a good thing; the Zanzibar meeting as part of that process,
held in November 2011, was positive and there are signs that some of this is improving. General Obasanjo
integrated a joint AU-ECOWAS election monitoring team in Ghana elections and that has to be a good
thing. There are examples of progress, and there are examples of incoherence.
The Joint-Africa-EU Strategy has been significantly underperforming. It is meant to be the long term
framework for the EU-Africa relations, with two actions plans (2008-2010 and 2011-2013). These action
plans needs to be rationalized: they are overambitious, fluffy and underperforming. There is also meant
to be provision for a civil society discourse, which is pretty silent and invisible. The question is how can
the JAES be rationalized and made more practical and how can other voices, including by civil society
actors, become involved? Part of the idea of EARN was a network to follow the JAES, but is also
underperforming. These are the sort of questions we need to consider, because there needs to be better
mechanisms to hold these processes to account.
The EU has had some progress in terms of cohesion, in its responses. A very good example of whether
there has been progress is the strategic framework on the Horn of Africa: there is better coherence in
terms of the overarching themes and approaches than there was before that framework existed. That
framework draws from the lessons and mistakes from the predecessor framework on the Sahel, which
basically didn’t anticipate the subsequent events and is not well equipped to deal with these crises. With
the input of the European External Action Service (EEAS), that didn’t existed in 2007, this is one area
where there has been some progress and Europe itself is responding to some of these challenges. But to
draw these strategic regional framework documents, the AU is not consulted, the AU ambassador in
Brussels isn’t brought in for a discussion, and these are bilateral discussions between an African region
and the EEAS and other parts of Brussels. Then again, how can you have an African strategy (“Africa
should be treated as one”) when you have all these other efforts and initiatives? It is also striking that the
EU can walk to AU Commission corridors very easily and have passes, when it is not the same for the AU
mission in Brussels; it happens in Addis but it does not happen in Brussels. So how do you have common
values and common trust when you have that sort of incoherence?
Finally, the EEAS is going through thieving problems and it is still a project in development, but we can, as
we’ve seen in the Horn of Africa strategic framework, see where there have been successes. I’m not sure
how much Baroness Ashton worries about Africa (she certainly worries about pirates), but one of the
things I would like to see in the run-up to the IV EU-Africa Summit is that she is more seized with the
challenges of the continent and does not only have an off-shore view of the continent.
I’ve talked about the regional frameworks, but we should also take into account the bilateral ones and
how they interrelate with the “treating Africa as one” strategy. For example, there is a strategic
partnership with South Africa and there was an attempt to have one with Angola, but the President dos
Santos is not interested and has made clear who the Angolan strategic partners are: China, US, Portugal
and Brazil, not the EU. So these are some of the issues we need to grapple with. The mechanisms are
there, there needs to be a rationalization and there needs to be a deepened seriousness on the
commissions about how this process is managed.
John K. Shinkaiye
Ambassador, former Chief of Staff of the President of the African Union Commission, Abuja
INTRODUCTION
I will like to begin my intervention by expressing my sincere thanks to the three Portuguese Institutions IEEI, IMVF and ISCTE-IUL, as well as ECDPM, firstly for organising this conference, which I consider timely,
and secondly for inviting me to participate in it. Having just left the African Union Commission at the end
of October, this is one of my first post retirement engagements. The engagement of the four institutions I
have just referred to, in the Africa-Europe partnership is well known and a demonstration of one of the
major planks of the partnership – “ensuring a better participation of African and European citizens, as
part of an overall strengthening of civil society in the two continents”. (1) It is therefore most
appropriate that these institutions have jointly organised this conference to look at the next stages in this
important partnership taking into account the critical decisions that will be taken outside the two
continents regarding the post-2015 global development agenda.
DISCLAIMER
Before going any further, let me state quite clearly that I was invited here in my individual capacity as I no
longer work in the African Union Commission. What I say therefore, is entirely my private and individual
opinion and does not represent what the A U Commission thinks. I should, nevertheless say that it was
because of the privileged positions I have occupied between 2000 and 2003 and 2006 and 2012 as
Nigeria’s Ambassador to Ethiopia and the OAU/AU and the Chief of Staff of the Chairperson of the African
Union Commission, respectively, that I could be invited to such a conference as this and to make some
contributions.
LOOKING AT THE FUTURE
Our session is to look at the future after the illuminating sessions preceding ours. Specifically, we were
required to focus on the 2014 EU-Africa Summit and the post-2015 Development Agenda: What Next.
The questions to address have also been identified and which are very helpful. I will try to address these
questions, but not always directly. I will also like to make some general points about the partnership, how
far it has gone since the first summit in 2000; issues of implementation of agreed instruments including
the Africa-EU Joint Strategy and the envisaged 2014 Summit.
With respect to the definition of a post-2015 agenda, my focus will be on how Africa sees it based on
emerging consensus from the continent after a series of consultations that have taken place and are
continuing. My hope would be to relate this to the contributions that the partnership between Africa and
the EU could make, not just to the definition of the agenda, but also its implementation.
FROM THE 1st Summit to the 4TH SUMMIT:
BRIEF COMMENTS
Africa’s relationship with Europe is deeply rooted in
history and has gradually evolved into a partnership
institutionalised through the Africa-EU Joint Strategy
(JAES). The JAES has become the overarching political
framework since it was adopted at the Lisbon Summit
in 2007, and guided the relations between the two
continents, together with the Cairo, Lisbon and Tripoli
Declarations and Plans of Action.
Since the establishment of the Africa-Europe partnership, considerable changes have taken place on both
continents. Democratisation and reform processes have been launched and deepened in Africa and
efforts have been successfully made to address many conflict and crisis situations in the continent. The
integration process has continued and the transformation of the OAU to the African Union has brought
about such an important change on the continent, unimaginable in the last decade before that
transformation.
On the other hand, the EU has more or less doubled in size and far reaching reforms have been put in
place, including the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the coming into force of
the Lisbon Treaty.
Overall, new international and global challenges have also emerged and, with accelerated globalisation,
the world has become increasingly interdependent. The importance of this last point is emphasized by
the first theme relating to the impact of the international crisis on the Africa-EU relationship. As the
concept note clearly and, in my view, correctly, indicated, the “combined effects of the global financial
and the Euro crisis, as well as the debate over austerity versus growth policies will surely continue to
frame the relationship”. (2) This point is extremely important because the EU collectively and with
several of its individual members, constitute the largest provider of overseas development assistance to
Africa, while the EU, as an Institution, is the largest provider of aid to the AU. It is therefore inevitable
that the current crisis will affect the agenda of the 4th Africa-EU Summit as it will affect how the EU could
respond to the developmental needs of Africa.
My conclusion on this section is that although the Africa-EU partnership has developed beyond the initial
thoughts of some, who saw the Cairo Summit as a one-off process and photo opportunity session of
African and EU leaders, and has recorded considerable achievements, the current crisis, particularly the
Euro crisis, will definitely, regrettably, adversely affect the future relationships between Africa and the EU
in terms of the implementation of the JAES and other agreed instruments. I should emphasize that, in my
view, some of the processes are irreversible because, I could not, for example, envisage a situation where
the EU will not be able to meaningfully engage with Africa in dealing with its peace agenda, governance
issues, migration and the environment, all of which have direct impact on the EU – should they go wrong!
THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: EMMERGING CONSENSUS FROM AFRICA.
As the concept note indicates, the “on-going debate over the 2015 agenda will substitute the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) defined in 2000” and includes a “ range of discussions on development
effectiveness, policy coherence, financing, the relevance of addressing exclusion and inequalities (more
than poverty), the inclusion of global public goods or the security-development-links.” All of these are
extremely important and relevant to Africa.
However, as I indicated earlier on in the paper, I will focus on the consensus that is emerging in Africa on
what should be the post-2015 development agenda. As would be seen, I think what is contained in the
concept note is not incomparable with what Africa is thinking.
Before proceeding further, let me just emphasize that Africa, led by its three continental institutions,
namely, the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has been doing a lot of reflections on the post-2015
development agenda. A summary of the activities is contained in a paper titled the “Road Map for Post2015 Development Agenda.” (3) The paper shows that the process undertaken by the three institutions
have been at the levels of the country, the region and the continent. It has also involved the NEPAD
Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) which functions as a technical arm of the AUC. They have also
been working with the Africa Bureau of the United Nations Development Programme. The last (19 th)
ordinary summit of the African Heads of State and Government adopted the joint MDG report for 2012 in
July 2012.
The consultations are still on-going, but the outcome document of the process so far, is quite clear. It
states that “Noting the relatively slow progress made by the African countries towards the MDGs and
recognising the capacity deficits and disabling initial conditions prevailing in a number of countries,
participants unanimously agreed that the post-2015 development agenda should:
1)
Emphasize inclusive economic growth and structural transformation.
2)
Re-orient the development paradigm away from externally-driven initiatives towards
domestically-inspired and funded initiatives that are grounded in national ownerships.
3)
Prioritize equity and social inclusion and measure progress in terms of both the availability and
quality of services delivery.
4)
Take into account initial conditions of nation states and recognise the effort countries have made
towards achieving the goals as opposed to exclusively measuring how far they fall short of global
targets.
5)
Be convergent with the Rio + 20 outcomes and related UN products such as ICPD + 20.
6)
Focus on development enablers as well as development outcomes.” (4)
Three broad development outcomes have been identified as priorities for the post-2015 development
agenda, namely: Structural economic transformation and inclusive growth; Innovation and technology
transfer; Human development. (5)
The consultations have also identified what they call “development enablers, which they emphasize, will
provide the “enabling environment at the national, regional and global levels” and which are prerequisites
for Africa’s post-2015 development agenda. These are:
i)
Peace and Security;
ii)
Good Governance, transparency and fighting corruption;
iii)
Strengthened institutional capacity;
iv)
Promoting equality and access to justice, and information;
v)
Human rights for all;
vi)
Domestic resource mobilisation;
vii) A credible participatory process with cultural sensitivity;
viii) Enhanced statistical capacity to measure progress and ensure accountability;
ix)
Growth oriented macro-economic policy;
x)
Developmental state. (This refers to a developmental framework that is informed by market
principles but guided by the state); and
xi)
An enabling global governance architecture. (6)
I had earlier indicated, and I wish to reiterate here, that Africa’s emerging consensus is not incompatible
with what is coming from outside the continent. I would however stress the imperative of listening very
closely to what Africa is saying. Yes, the current Declaration was signed by over 180 countries. However,
everyone knows that the Declaration has more relevance to Africa and it is that continent that has
struggled the most with achieving the goals. It is a very good thing that Africa and its institutions are
working with the UN and the EU to reflect on what happens post 2015.
THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE NEW AGENDA FOR THE AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP AND
AFRICA’S AND EU’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEBATE.
If a comparison were to be made between the emerging African consensus on the post-2015
development agenda as briefly outlined above and the content of the JAES Action Plan 2011 – 2013, and
other related Africa-EU programmes, a lot of similarities, would be found. When the details of the eight
partnerships are broken down, there is a lot of communality between what Africa has identified as
“development enablers” and what Africa and the EU are doing in their partnership.
At the risk of being simplistic, I would say that the post-2015 development agenda constitutes
opportunities for furthering the partnership between Africa and the EU. The challenges are of a general
nature and will emerge with the evolution of how the 4th Africa-EU summit will be affected by the current
world and EU crises. In one sentence, were the EU to be so incapacitated by the Euro crisis that it cannot
maintain the level of its assistance to and collaboration with Africa, let alone increase it, then Africa’s
capacity to meet its post-2015 development agenda can only be correspondingly weakened.
For me, and I admit that I do not know how the debate on the post-2015 development agenda is going in
Europe, the dialogue between Africa and EU could only but enhance early global consensus because what
Africa is saying is very much in tune with what it is actually doing with the EU. The main challenge will be
how the current crisis limits EU’s and Europe’s ability to make the contributions expected of them for the
new agenda.
THE 4th AFRICA-EU SUMMIT: RELEVANCE OF POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND LINKS WITH THE
PRIORITIES OF AFRICA-EU COOPERATION:
From the information already circulating, it is as if a decision has been taken that the 4th Summit will be
held in 2014. Let me just remind us that, were we to follow the Tripoli decision, in conformity with earlier
decisions, the 4th Africa-EU Summit should be taking place in 2013. I am aware that some discussion has
taken place between the two Commissions – AUC and EC – but I am not sure if both sides have already
agreed that the summit should be delayed till 2014 rather than being held in 2013 as originally envisaged.
I am sure the discussions will go on between the two Commissions. This was to have been part of the
agenda of the AUC-EC Joint Task Force (JTF) meeting which should have taken place in November this year
and which, I understand, may now hold in February 2013.
From my personal point of view, with this development, it will probably be better if the 4th summit takes
place in 2014. This has a number of advantages. It will allow the new AU Commission settle down
properly; allow for a proper preparation for the summit including a review of the implementation of the
JAES; offer the possibility of a clearer view of how far the current crisis will restrict EU’s intervention in
Africa and provide a more realistic outcome of the 4th Summit. These issues will need to be the main
focus of the next meetings of the JTF and the two Colleges in 2013. The fact though, is that neither Africa
nor the EU seems to be focusing adequate attention on their next summit. There is need for both sides to
change this, so as to ensure that the summit succeeds.
Again, at the risk of being simplistic, I would say that the relevance of the post-2015 development agenda
and its discussion, as well as links with the priorities of the Africa-EU cooperation or partnership, are quite
obvious. The discussion between Africa and the EU, as pointed out above, are more or less on the same
issues and the African identified priorities for the post-2015 development agenda are already priorities in
the Africa- EU dialogue.
What I would suggest here is that there is need to see how to deal with the impediments to the
implementation of the JAES, as not doing so will just ensue that the dialogue does not lead to concrete
implementation, which in turn, will adversely affect Africa’s ability to implement the new development
agenda.
One major area that I think both Africa and the EU agree on, is the need to have an instrument for the
implementation of the JAES. In this respect, the African side had been happy with the news that the EU
was thinking of establishing a “Pan-African Financing Instrument (7) which should have been contained in
the Commission’s EU budget post-2013. The size of such an envelope, and even the possibility of getting
it approved by all relevant EU institutions at a time of such financial turbulence, would always be a
challenge.
I have not seen much progress, since the JTF discussed this in April this year in Brussels, but I will be glad if
I am wrong. If the African proposal for an “African Integration Facility” was also to make progress, then
the financing issue would have been dealt with. Let me emphasize that the African side recognises that
both Africa and the EU have responsibility to provide funding and efforts must be made to increase
African participation in this.
There might also be need to look at the institutional architecture for the Joint Strategy including the
partnerships. I have heard hints of a reduction of the number of partnerships from the current eight to,
by some accounts, as few as four. I am not myself certain what good this will do because it is hard to
think of what should or could be left out. When you see the list of the “development enablers” identified
by Africa as essential for successful implementation, it will be tough to decide what should be dropped.
Some trimming will be required as would be some tightening of some loose ends.
There is also need to be faithful to the principles both sides have agreed to in Lisbon. One important one I
will mention is the principle of treating Africa as one. This is something the EU agreed to but has found
very difficult to implement. This has led to some complications in our relations, for example on how both
sides reacted to and proposed solutions for the Libyan crisis. While the EU saw Libya through the eyes of
its Southern Neighbourhood policies and did not want to deal with Africa, as in the other conflicts in
Africa, Guinea, for example, Africa insisted that Libya is an entirely in Africa and constitutes the northern
border with Europe! The repercussions of such divergences could be very serious for the relations
between the two partners and needs to be taken care of in the next summit.
CONCLUSION
My conclusion is that there is an intricate link between the issues that will come before the forthcoming
Africa-EU summit and Africa’s views and consensus on the post-2015 development agenda. The process
through the Dialogue between Africa and the EU can only but reinforce the larger and wider discussion on
the next global development agenda. The lessons learnt from this Conference will most certainly help the
process for the discussions on the post-2015 development agenda. So also will the process in the latter
help focus the right attention on the right issues as Africa and the EU prepare for their 4th Summit.
In this respect, I want to close by reiterating my appreciation to the organisers of this Conference and all
those who have supported it and participated in it. I have no doubt that the outcome of the Conference
will be useful to the African continent, the EU and the UN as well.
REFERENCES:
1) The Joint Strategy
2) Concept Note: BUILDING THE AFRICA-EUROPE PARTNERSHIP: WHAT NEXT.
3) Road Map for Post-2015 Development Agenda.
4) Post-2015 Development Agenda: Emerging Consensus from Africa
5) Ibid.
6) Ibid.
7) AFRICA-EU JOINT TASSK FORCE MEETING, 4 – 5 APRIL 2012: JOINT STATEMENT.
Pinkie Mekgwe
Executive Director for Internationalisation, University of Johannesburg
For me, the question about where the future lies, is with the future itself, and the future is with youth
and their preparedness. I would like to see us focusing much more on Education, which is crucial for the
preparedness of youth and allow us to deal with some of the exigencies of the XXI century – some of
which have been occasioned by shifts in the landscape and that we might not have at the time we started
our own construction of the EU-Africa partnership. A focus on Education is critical, that goes beyond
Science and Technology, beyond simply primary education, and while these are certainly important there
is also a need to look in a holistic manner to this subject. I would like to focus on higher education and
internationalisation, which is linked to partnership and therefore to areas we can discuss on EU-Africa
relations. I’d like to suggest that in the past few years, higher education has seen significant landscape
shifts, with a challenging nature, but also accompanied by opportunities that led to the opening up of
avenues for renewal. Some of the challenges that we see with respect to Africa are issues of low
participation rates, issues of access, issues of quality, etc. There have been ways in which
internationalization has been adopted in the South, in African countries, as a manner of addressing some
of these exigencies and this has been possible because internationalization has come into vogue as a sight
to renewal and creativity. In most developed areas of the world, including in Asia, institutions and
countries have taken this to position themselves much more competitively, taking education as a
development enabler and as a factor of openness.
The focus is on producing graduates for the global markets, a recognition of universities as important
global mobilizers for transformation, and also the importance of global themes of research and the
increasing mobility of students (including within Africa, from the north to the south for instance).
Why is internationalization a critical area of higher education and how does this strengthen the EuropeAfrica partnership? A successfully internationalized institution would be research intensive,
internationally mobile (with students going abroad and having international experiences), would have top
faculty and diverse, would have multinational collaborations, and well managed. These are elements that
provide us with and enhanced quality of education and with much more inclusiveness in terms of the
work we do. There has been research and studies that conclude that students who have an international
experience have attributes of adaptability, of creativity, of cross-cultural fluency and tolerance, in
addition to the academic aspects. These additional skills are key for employability, which has become a
real burden particularly for youth, with a big percentage of youth unemployment. This is something we
have to take forward, if we want a kind of transformation in the employability and preparedness of youth
as leaders. Industrial experience as well allows for entrepreneurial experiences for the students and
prepares them to create jobs for themselves and for others. In short, these young leaders and imbued
with global competencies and connectedness, which are key to leading and managing and shared and
increasingly connected globe.
The history of partnership in Education between Europe and Africa has been a long one, from the
establishment of Universities in African to the support for African students coming to European countries, to
continued partnerships between several instances in a loose level. The partnerships have been to a large
extend very unequal and perhaps it is necessary, as African countries begin to formulate their own
internationalisation policies, to pay much more attention on how do they work in consonance with those of
Europe, so that this becomes an enabling partnership going both ways. We have had projects that have started
as a way of Europeanising as Erasmus, that are going to other parts of the world (Erasmus mundus), but is still
a very uneven partnership in this matter. There is therefore a need for reconfiguration of this partnership,
where there should be much more reciprocity and joint research, where we co-creatively respond to global
challenges and where there is a recognition that learning should happen in both directions (e.g. as African
students learn languages of Europe, European students also learn languages of Africa). Youth is changing and is
significantly different from the past; we have a significant group that is said to be “the third culture youth” that
belong neither here nor anywhere else but belong everywhere else!
Also important is the recognition that the
question as not been so much what is undertaken
in the Europe-Africa partnership, but rather the
nature of the partnership that needs to be
transformed, and prepare leaders of tomorrow to
be in a position to steer differently.
Thomas Lawo
Executive Director, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), Bonn
BEYOND THE MDGS – THE POST 2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA:
A Review of the debate and potential elements of a joint EU strategy
Studies conducted have revealed that the global distribution of poverty has shifted from low income to
middle income countries. This ‘new bottom billion’ identified by Sumner (2012) is not the same as the
‘bottom billion’ earlier explained by Collier (2007) and is composed of five large MICs namely Pakistan,
India, Nigeria, China and Indonesia. In these countries as well as the MICs with high poverty incidence, the
average income increased whereas the absolute number of poor people fell negligibly. The majority of the
world’s poor by income and multi-dimensional poverty measures live in countries categorized by the
World Bank as middle-income countries. However it is important that the discussion of poverty in MICs
does not distract the reality that LICs typically have higher rates of poverty incidence. A closer analysis
indicates a ‘double bottom billion’ of poor people in MICs which implies a ‘bottom billion’ living on under
$1.25 per day and a further billion poor people living on between $1.25 and $2 per day per capita. This
compares with about 300 million living on under $1.25 and a further 200 million living on between $1.25
and $2 per day in LICs. Given that some present day LICs will move into the MICs bracket by 2020 or 2030,
this suggests that the structure of world poverty will remain split between LICs and MICs for the years to
come.
Another established trend closely related to the poor in LICs is that 18.4 percent of the world’s poor live in
‘fragile states’ in comparison to 60.4 percent in MICs while only 7 percent of world poverty remains
concentrated in ‘traditional’ developing countries such as Tanzania. Fundamentally, the new geography of
poverty amid high levels of average per capita income raises questions about the types of economic
growth that leads some countries to reduce the number of people in extreme poverty and other countries
not to. The good news in general is that as countries get richer, the cost of poverty as a proportion of GDP
should fall particularly for MICs.
For countries which are currently LMICs, the average cost of ending $1.25 poverty is estimated to be in
range of 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP in 2020 and at a similar level to end $2 poverty by 2030. However, the
approximated cost of ending $1.25 poverty in the present day LICs may remain high even in 2020 and
2030 which implies that for about 20 countries on the moderate growth, external support for poverty
reduction will remain absolutely essential. When data for the 20 countries with 90 percent world poverty
is considered, LICs such as Bangladesh, the DRC, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique and Malawi have
the particularly high costs of ending $1.25 and $2 poverty. MICs like Nigeria, Angola and Nepal also have
high costs of ending poverty.
The discussion on the Post-2015 development agenda in the context of a new development paradigm, has
also engaged various stakeholders such as governments, international institutions and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) to provide views on this topic. The United Nations (UN) under the stewardship of
the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has set up a UN System Task Team which is supported by the Highlevel Panel appointed by Ban Ki-Moon himself. The proposals from a recent UN publication ‘Realizing the
Future We Want for All’, inform the position of the UN that the future MDG framework should rest on
human rights, equality and sustainability i.e. a holistic approach which also draws lessons from Rio+20.
African priorities on post-2015 following the MDG Report 2012, indicate that the equity narrative or
MDG-plus is the preferred option. The opinions of the G20 on development advocate for Strong,
Sustainable and Balanced Growth as articulated in the six principles in the Seoul Development Consensus
for Shared Growth. Where governmental perspectives are concerned, Japan proposes a set of new goals
for new challenges guided by the principle of ‘Achieving well-being for all’. Whereas the Dutch
government insists on measuring progress every five to ten years instead of setting new targets and also
limiting the current eight goals to a maximum of four or five clusters and under each goal lay out the roles
and responsibilities of the various actors. The Dutch government therefore is more inclined to the zero
narrative. The 2013 European Report on Development to be released in 2013, will provide comprehensive
proposals from the European Union. However the proposals thus far are for inclusive and sustainable
development. Proposals from the Civil Society vary in content but most stress the need for an expansion
of the goals i.e. a human-rights base to development, crisis management and political rights and most
importantly, want an inclusive, participatory partnership process between the North and South in framing
post-2015.
A review of academic views on the post-2015 agenda reveals that three key positions have emerged from
the ongoing debate; zero narrative, equity narrative and the sustainability narrative. These perspectives
take into account the dynamics of international politics as well as the new geography of poverty and
ongoing research on the effect of MDGs.
The zero narrative proposes an elongation of the MDG deadline to 2030 in order to ‘finish the job’ but
with minor adjustments to the indicators measuring the goals and targets. Under this approach, there
would be no new structures or institutional arrangements but the aspiration to end extreme poverty
would remain even if the agreement lacks ‘teeth’.
The equity narrative or MDG-plus on the other hand, advocates for the revitalization of MDGs in order to
address emerging issues from the previous set of objectives such as inequality or the quality of outcomes.
This view emphasizes incorporating new goals such as human rights or rooting development onto a
human security approach and exploring the possibility of MDGs relaying a policy to achieving these goals
as well. This implies greater interventionist policies and thus far greater levels of national ownership in
any structures or institutional arrangements.
The sustainability position looks at the relationship between man and the environment and accentuates
the notion of holistic development in which goals (social, economic and environmental) address poverty
without contributing to further environmental degradation. This outlook would be bolder and more
ambitious and involve the creation of new structures which stress global public goods and can build on
MDG 8 on global partnerships to drive a new multilateralism to address global development and ignore
the North-South dichotomy.
Against the backdrop of the changing context in which post-2015 framework is being deliberated, the
strengths and limitations of the narratives also vary. In terms of addressing the deficiencies of the MDGs
and changing context of poverty ‘problem’, the ‘zero’ narrative may argue that the deficiencies of the
MDGs are not so bad given the political trade-offs of agreeing a new framework. The ‘equity’ narrative on
the contrary, is likely to address the weaknesses because it re-examines the indicators, adds local
ownership which might better address the missing poor or poorest. The sustainability goes beyond and
looks at global mechanism in order to mobilise resources and policy. Where addressing the changing
context and pattern of global poverty is concerned, the ‘zero’ approach is unlikely to attend to the
emerging challenges. The ‘equity’ approach would expand ownership and accountability to the national
level and thus make ending world poverty more of a shared effort between donors and governments of
MICs. The sustainability tackles the changing context. With the shifting global politics and emerging
powers and donors, some say the ‘zero’ approach is possibly the easiest way to political consensus and it
also pressures rich countries to honour commitments and stand by their pledges. However, it also misses
the opportunity to improve targets and indicators. The ‘equity’ narrative in contrast, complicates the
simplicity of MDGs due to the introduction of new targets especially if they are not in tune politically at
the national level. They risk being labelled again as donor led and reductionist. Through the ‘sustainability’
approach, a political agreement would be harder to reach despite the strength of being futuristic in
outlook, addressing wider and intergenerational causes of poverty and vulnerability and incentivising
behaviour change through mutual self-interest and solidarity.
The shifting global poverty from the poorest countries to MICs portends that new approaches are needed
in tackling extreme poverty. MICs for example will need and want “traditional aid” less and less as
domestic resources expand. However concessional loans will still be useful even if grants are less
appropriate given that resources are growing.
In view of these dynamics, aligning a joint EU strategy with the changing distribution of global poverty a
post-2015 agreement is necessary and could include the following components:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
Developing a new focus on the chronic, long-term poor, wherever they live and a new priority of
ensuring the benefits of growth and public spending are equitably distributed;
Focusing new resources to support the building of domestic taxation systems and the regulation
of tax havens and untaxed capital flight from MICs;
Supporting and expanding inclusive policy processes with the poor by donor-government joint
working with civil society;
Co-financing global public goods including knowledge sharing on public policy between MICs and
LICs; and
Ensuring coherence across donors’ development policies such as trade and migration.
3.7. Encerramento da Conferência
Cheikh Tidiane Niang
Representative of the Permanent Mission of the African Union in Brussels
The European Union remains a key partner for Africa. Our two continents share a common destiny. As
previously emphasized, the relations between Africa and Europe have crossed many centuries. They were
woven and fashioned by history and geography and have led to various forms of cooperation in the
political, economic, military, social, cultural and linguistic realms.
A political will has emerged from the Cairo Summit in April 2000, to merge all these forms of cooperation
into a comprehensive strategic framework based on a mutually beneficial continent to continent dialogue,
which is a notable progress. The adoption of the Joint Strategy in December 2007 in Lisbon marked the
beginning of a new era in the relationship between the two continents.
You would agree with me that this new cooperation framework opens many windows of opportunities
while raising many challenges in the same vein.
The opportunities
Globalization has made the world more and more interdependent as demonstrated by the current
economic and financial crisis. The partnership between Europe and Africa is a real opportunity for our two
continents. The EU – Africa block represents 81 countries which is an important element in global
geopolitics, international institutions and multilateral negotiations.
Since the emergence of the AU in 2000, with its Pan African instruments such as NEPAD, the Peace and
Security Council, the African Peer Review Mechanism, the Pan African Parliament, the African Charter on
Democracy, Elections and Governance, to mention but a few, Africa has been positioning itself more and
more as a credible actor on the international scene. At the end of the day, Africa’s main objective is to
seize this opportunity to engage in a sustainable development process which will usher its integration into
the world economy.
Africa is the continent of the future because of the following:
- Its increasing economic growth, its new strategic framework for economic diversification and job
creation;
- the huge potential market that its population represents, the implementation of the Programme for
Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) in order to address infrastructure bottlenecks, the
Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA), the Accelerated Agri-business and AgroIndustries Development (ADI), and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
(CAADP)
- Its huge raw materials’ reserve and energy potential etc.
The challenges
The challenges we face are commensurate with the hopes associated with the Joint Strategy. The strong
common vision of the Joint Strategy is to be translated into concrete actions to improve the impact and
visibility of the Africa-EU Partnership.
Many difficulties are faced in the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy because, particularly, of
the inadequate institutional architecture; lack of balance between the political and development
dimensions of the partnership; the co-existence of the Joint Strategy with other cooperation instruments
with the EU, the weak involvement of the various actors in the Joint Strategy implementation process,
lack of financial resources dedicated to Plans of Action of the Joint Strategy.
The Joint Strategy was the only partnership of the EU which is not provided with any specific financial
instrument. The proposed establishment of the Pan African Programme was provided for to remedy this
situation. The establishment of an adequately funded Pan African financial instrument constituted added
value to the Africa-EU Partnership and is an essential element to enhance its visibility. The Peace and
Security Facility was an example of added value to the Africa-EU Partnership. The Pan African Programme
would be a catalyst for cooperation between the two Continents.
There is a need to translate into concrete action the expectations raised by the adoption of the Joint
Africa-EU Strategy in 2007 and the need to find the right balance between political and development
dimensions within the framework of the joint partnership with particular emphasis on the capacity
building, skilling and mainstreaming of the youth and women to harness Africa’s full potential.
EPAs issues
I seized this opportunity to express the concerns of African countries and regions on the current status of
the Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations, and on the European Commission proposal that
amendment of EC Regulation 1528/2007 on access to European market be effective as from 1 January
2014. There is a need for initiation of a high-level political dialogue between the concerned parties in
order to advance the negotiations and reach mutually beneficial agreements, likely to achieve
development and accelerate the continental ongoing integration process in Africa towards achieving the
Continental Free Trade Area.
We want to appeal to our EU partner to:
- support Africa in these efforts towards its true integration into the world economy;
- continue to honor its commitments towards Africa despite the difficult as experienced by the
European Union due to the economic and financial crisis.
The Partnership should deliver some concretes activities before the 4th Africa-EU Summit. This Summit
would be fundamental as it would identify the existence or not of the necessary political will.
“Building the Africa-Europe Partnership: What next”? The success of the Strategy is the common
responsibility of the EU and Africa. We need to safeguard the gains of the Joint Strategy and the principles
on which it is based. A lot has been achieved but a lot still remains to be done. We should pull together
our efforts to meet all these challenges. I am sure that with an enhanced political will to promote
cooperation in the spirit of a win-win partnership, the future of Africa-EU relations will be better than it is
currently.
Françoise Moreau
Head of Pan-African Unit DEVCO, European Commission
I would like to congratulate the organizers and congratulate them for the quality of this conference and
the usefulness of this research-policy dialogue. We definitely need much more of this, in order to improve
policy making processes in the EU and elsewhere and more evidence-based policy making. I’m new in the
EU-Africa Partnership “business” but I’m not new in development since I was heading the Policy and
Coherence Unit in Europeaid previously, having dealt with a number of issues I think are very relevant and
the discussions in this events have confirmed me that importance: issues of the post-2015 framework and
the post-MDGs, issues of Policy Coherence for Development – a big and challenging agenda -, amongst
others. I’m also dealing with the European Report on Development, where there is also the attempt to
better link science/ research and policy. All these issues have, in a way or another, some relevance in
what I’m learning in regard to the Africa-EU Partnership. The discussions here have confirmed my strong
feeling that there is, at least, a kind of informal consensus on the need to revitalize this partnership and
review the policy priorities and modalities of our cooperation. By modalities I mean not only how do we
approach financing issues (the discussions this morning very cleared pointed to the need to have more
comprehensive approach to international cooperation financing, in line with what we have discussed in
Busan, about private flows and about the “newcomers” in international cooperation), but also from the
institutional working arrangements perspective. More broadly speaking there is also this kind of feeling
that we need to change the mind-set with regard to Africa-EU relations – although that will, of course,
take and will need some time.
On the policy priorities, I very much think that this is not only true for EU and Africa; those of you that
follow the discussions on EU development cooperation policy priorities know that we have adapted
earlier in 2012 the Agenda For Change which puts the emphasis exactly on some of the issues identified in
this conference’s discussions as being key for development today and in the future. Just to mention a few,
the increased focus on what we call the “drivers” for inclusive and sustainable growth, meaning in
particular an increased focus on certain sectors as agriculture and energy, and also focus on the
inclusiveness of growth, including the strengthening or setting up of social protection systems and all the
issues related to employability and job creation. There are also growing discussions on the involvement of
the private sector and how to review our policies and modalities for public-private partnerships, namely
the search for having a leveraging impact of development assistance by using it in blending operations or
for attracting private investors. These are definitely part of our new development policy agenda, towards
Africa but also elsewhere in general.
The same type of approach is also guiding us in our current preliminary reflexion on the post-2015
agenda. I appreciated the presentation this morning on the potential and emerging consensus in Africa in
a number of very important topics in this matter. In Europe we are maybe less advanced than Africa on
this, which can be seen perhaps as a good thing since we absolutely believe the post-2015 should not be
ODA based or donor-driven (in order to not reproduce all the weaknesses of the past MDG framework).
We tentatively have identified some key pillars for the post-2015 agenda such as, first of all, keeping the
focus on poverty eradication. All the analytical materials show that this is definitively unfinished business
and it is important to keep the focus on providing minimum standards of living for everyone in terms of
income poverty but also in terms of access to health, education and social services, while at the same
time addressing the weaknesses of the current MDGs. This includes the (maybe too exclusive) focus on
quantitative indicators; let’s use qualitative data as well and the discussion this morning on Education was
very important on that regard. Let’s address the issue of how to articulate targets and goals which are set
at the global level and what happens at the implementation level (at the national and local levels) taking
into account initial conditions and the national context, and also addressing the issue of accountability,
e.g. how to improve the governance accountability vis a vis their citizens with regard to progress or lack of
progress to whatever goals can be agreed.
Beyond this kind of minimum standards’ pillar, we definitely think that more attention will have to be paid
to the drivers for inclusive and sustainable growth, to the issues of productive capacities and structural
transformations, as it was mentioned in this conference and are important for Africa as well. The issue of
sustainability needs to be addressed much more strongly, including the sustainable or good stewardship
of natural resources at country and global level; as well as the issues access to justice and equity, with the
link to governance human rights and democracy; and last but not least, all the issues in relation with
peace and security. My unit being also in charge of the Africa Peace Facility, I’d pay particular attention on
these issues, that have to remain very high on the agenda, and the discussions in this conference were
very interesting in this regard.
I see a lot of communalities between those concerns and what we should address in the Africa-EU
partnership. It is important not to reinvent the wheel, as previously mentioned: the two successive action
plans and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in Lisbon are certainly all still relevant, contain many
important issues and identify lots of actions. Off course there is also an informal consensus that progress
has been made in certain areas – we have pages of examples of concrete things that have happened and
where progress has been made – but in general we all agree the partnership in underperforming, at least
with regard to the initial expectations and ambitions in 2007 in Lisbon.
In principle, we’ll have the Comission-to-Commision meeting in April 2013 and the EU-Africa Summit in
2014, and these are two important occasions to building this new impetus, which in my view depend on
some important interlinked points.
First, the political will is key - this morning it was mentioned the need for political traction in this
partnership –in the EU and AU institutions but also regarding member states on both sides getting more
actively involved and investing more politically in this partnership.
Secondly, I have personally the feeling that we definitively need more in-depths, namely political
economy type of analysis on African and EU interests in this partnership. The fact that this partnership
very explicitly was about development but also beyond development, about cooperation but also about
political dialogue and economic mutual interests, is really an opportunity not only to be more transparent
, but more aware and knowledgeable about what are really the European interests vis a vis Africa, what
are really Africa interests vis a vis Europe. For that we need more analytical material and forward looking
analysis, and this is an area where this network of research institutes (EARN) could be very helpful.
Thirdly, we need to frame this partnership in the global context. I think, on a personal basis, that today
multilateral is not in a very good health – we know about the Doha development agenda, RIO+20 brought
some positive outcomes but was well below expectations – and there is a big question mark on what are
the chances of getting an ambitious consensus on the post-2015 development agenda, since there is no
evidence that this negotiation process will be easy. This has to be taken into account in our partnership,
because Africa and the EU could be very important allies and actors to build something meaningful and
leading to concrete progress with regard to the post-2015 discussions and global governance issues.
Fourthly, we need very concrete cooperation tools and mechanisms, and this means not only regarding
the working arrangements (how the joint task forces are working, how the joint experts groups are
working, etc.). On the financial side, it was mentioned this morning the Commission proposal to create a
new programme that would be operational from 2014 in the new EU budget, the Pan-African programme,
that would not be a miraculous solution (the proposal is for a 1 billion programme for a 7 year period) but
nevertheless could be an important leverage and tool to facilitate the delivering of concrete outcomes
and results from this partnership.
To summarise, the ambitious of 2007 and 2010, in Lisbon and Tripoli, are still fully relevant and the
political and policy dialogue has to be as broad as possible between Africa and Europe. With regard to
concrete actions that we need to identify, I think we need to prioritise and rationalise, taking account of
the capacities on both sides. I very much believe the principle of subsidiarity is an important one, which as
you know is part of the European Union Treaty, and I definitely think it is something we need to apply in
the definition of the concrete goals and targets we set ourselves in the framework of the partnership for
the coming years. The principle of complementary is also important, because what we do at continent-tocontinent levels in a way complements what is on-going at national and regional levels. If we are a little
bit clearer about what we can do and what we cannot do in this partnership, we will increase our chances
of meeting our goals and targets.
Luís Brites Pereira
Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação
Queria começar por congratular a organização deste evento, que com muito mérito escolheu debater
alguns dos principais temas que continuarão a ter impacto na construção da parceria euro-africana nos
próximos anos. É justo dar também aqui o meu reconhecimento, ao trabalho que as entidades
promotoras têm desenvolvido não só na excelente organização deste evento, mas também na reflexão,
uma vez que o trabalho de produção e divulgação do conhecimento é muitas vezes invisível, mas tem
uma enorme relevância no policy-making.
É reconhecido que Portugal tem uma relação muito especial com o continente africano, muito
especialmente com os cinco países de língua oficial portuguesa, com os quais possui uma comunhão
linguística e identificação cultural. No seio da União Europeia, o nosso país tem sempre defendido uma
relação mais forte e robusta com África, tentando traduzir para a política europeia esta nossa prioridade
nacional. Diria mesmo que temos sido um dos actores principais na construção de pontes entre a Europa
e África. Vemos África como um verdadeiro parceiro estratégico para a Europa. Na verdade, o diálogo
com África foi uma das prioridades de Portugal no decorrer das suas presidências da UE. Na Cimeira
África-UE de 2007, lançámos a Estratégia Conjunta, que representa o compromisso de dois continentes
em trabalhar numa nova parceria estratégica, elevando a tradicional relação doador-receptor para um
novo patamar de relacionamento através do aprofundamento do diálogo político e da cooperação em
áreas de interesse comum assentando sobre valores e objectivos comuns, na construção da estabilidade,
democracia e Estado de Direito, do progresso e do desenvolvimento. À medida que nos aproximamos da
próxima Cimeira em 2014, teremos de reflectir sobre uma visão comum para o que queremos desta
relação entre os dois continentes.
I strongly believe this common vision entails a shared and mutual beneficial commitment to grow and
develop together. This vision implies strategic partnerships and a long-term perspective of our
relationship; a vision that goes beyond that of development cooperation. I also believe that Portugal can
build more and better bridges between Europe and Africa. Indeed, I often get to hear that Portugal is the
most African-friendly European country when I travel in Africa. As you know, Portugal and other euro-zone
countries have been in the international spotlight recently, due to the financial crisis. Portugal sees this
crisis, however, as an opportunity to turn our economic prospects around and to reengage with the world,
including Africa. Portugal is reducing its public deficit and debt levels, bolstering its banking sector and
harmonising its economic governance with European partners, to ensure better growth prospects.
Undoubtedly, this adjustment process will be slow and painful, but it is unavoidable, and as saying goes
“no pain, no gain”. At the same time, the crisis has driven us to make our economy more competitive and
open it up even more to the world, especially to those regions and countries beyond Europe’s borders. In
2010, the 27 EU countries accounted for almost 75% of Portuguese exports and around 85% of incoming
foreign direct investment. We must clearly diversify our trade and investment to include non-European
partners. And we are doing so: Angola is our 4th largest export market (has recently replaced the UK) and
is our top non-European market.
Although very important, economics and business are not the only reason why Portugal should diversify
and strengthen its international relations. We feel obligated to contribute towards development of our
Lusophone partner countries, especially in Africa. Today, Portugal is proud to have honest, balanced and
fruitful relations with Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé & Principe. The
bond we have with these five African countries goes beyond business; it implies a deeper engagement and
understanding, which is built upon a shared language and common heritage. It is called “lusofonia”,
reflected in the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and its 250 million citizens. This
community also comprises the diaspora of member countries, their companies spread out across the
globe, but also neighbouring countries and regions; for example, Namibia recently announced its intention
to apply for CPLP observer status. It also introduced the Portuguese language in the secondary school
system, and this is because it sees these actions as being critical for its political and economic influence in
the SADC region, which includes two Portuguese-speaking countries.
Portugal’s engagement with these African partners is thus being developed, slowly but surely. We believe
the potential of the Africa-European relationship can and must be further developed; and this must be
done to the good of all, both Portuguese and non-Portuguese speaking countries. We firmly believe that
this can only be achieved if we work together: our governments, our businesses, our civil societies.
De resto, e num contexto de crise europeia, mas também de emergência política, económica e cultural de
África, as nossas empresas, investidores, universidades e centros de investigação e organizações da
sociedade civil têm tanto a receber e a aprender como o inverso. Tais dinâmicas devem ser potenciadas
numa lógica de criação de riqueza e de desenvolvimento sustentável; com efeito, estes dois objectivos
são o futuro da relação Europa-África, não só no plano bilateral mas também na parceria estratégica
entre os dois continentes. Julgo, no entanto, que todos concordamos que a parceria Europa-África só faz
sentido se esta for efectivada ao nível dos seus cidadãos – todos nós -, proporcionando um impacto
positivo no dia-a-dia dos cidadãos. Só assim esta parceria será autêntica, respeitadora, e “future-proof”, a
bem de todos, africanos e europeus.
4. ANEXOS
4.1. Programa
Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa
13-14 dezembro 2012
Quinta-feira, 13 dezembro
09h30 – 10h30 Abertura
Paulo Telles de Freitas, Presidente do Conselho de Administração, Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr
Nuno Guimarães, Pró-Reitor para a Internacionalização, ISCTE-IUL
Francisco Almeida Leite, Vogal do Conselho Diretivo do Camões - Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua
11h00 – 13h00 Sessão 1: A CRISE
O impacto da crise internacional na Europa e na África: quais os desafios para a parceria?
Moderador: Hélder Oliveira, Fundação Portugal-África, Porto
Adebayo Olukoshi, Diretor do UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) e
Diretor Executivo, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar
Damien Helly, Professor Visitante, Colégio da Europa, Bruges
Fernando Jorge Cardoso, Coordenador de Investigação, IEEI & IMVF, Lisboa
14h30 – 16h00 Sessão 2 : DESAFIOS DEMOGRÁFICOS
Que efeitos das tendências demográficas nas perspetivas de desenvolvimento e cooperação?
Moderadora: Mónica Ferro, Grupo Parlamentar Português sobre População e Desenvolvimento,
Deputada à Assembleia da República
Alcinda Honwana, Professora visitante na Open University, Reino Unido, e na Columbia University, Nova
Iorque
Ana Pires de Carvalho, Investigadora, Centro de Analise de Politicas, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane,
Maputo
Gregory de Paepe, Analista de Políticas, Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE, Paris
Victor Ângelo, Vogal do Conselho de Administração da Fundação PeaceNexus, Suíça, e Antigo SecretárioGeral Adjunto e Representante Especial das NU
16h30 – 18h00 Sessão 3: A SEGURANÇA
Radicalismo armado no Norte de África, no Sahel e nos países vizinhos: que implicações para a
segurança internacional e as relações Europa-África?
Moderador: Santiago Martinez-Caro, Diretor, Casa África, Las Palmas
Alexandra Magnólia Dias, Investigadora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL, Lisboa
João Bernardo Honwana, Diretor da Divisão África II, Nações Unidas, Nova Iorque
Maurice Engueleguele, Coordenador, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar
Morten Boas, Diretor de Estudos, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo
Sexta-feira, 14 dezembro
09h00 – 10h30 Sessão 4: FLUXOS E ATORES DO DESENVOLVIMENTO
O regresso do IDE e novos parceiros da ajuda em África: Qual o impacto nas estratégias africanas de
desenvolvimento?
Moderador: Any Freitas, Gestora de Programas, Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União Europeia
(EU-ISS), Paris
Ana Paula Fernandes, Conselheira de Portugal junto da OCDE e Vice-Presidente do Comité de Ajuda ao
Desenvolvimento (CAD), Paris
Diogo Gomes de Araújo, Presidente Executivo, Sociedade para o Financiamento do Desenvolvimento
(SOFID), Lisboa
Erik Lundsgaarde, Investigador, German Development Institute (DIE), Bona
Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei, Coordenador de Políticas & Programas, TWN Africa, Acra
11h00 – 13h00 Painel: O FUTURO
A Cimeira África-UE de 2014 e a Agenda de Desenvolvimento pós-2015: que perspetivas?
Moderador: Geert Laporte, Vice-Diretor, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM),
Maastricht
Alex Vines, Diretor de Estudos e do Programa África, Chatham House (RIIA), Londres
J. K. Shinkaiye, Embaixador, antigo chefe de Gabinete do Presidente da Comissão da União Africana,
Abuja
Pinkie Mekgwe, Diretora Executiva para a Internacionalização, Universidade de Joanesburgo
Thomas Lawo, Diretor Executivo, European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes
(EADI), Bona
13h00 Encerramento
Francoise Moreau, Diretora da Unidade Pan-Africana DEVCO, Comissão Europeia
Cheikh Niang, Missão Permanente da União Africana junto da União Europeia
Luís Brites Pereira, Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação
4.2. Biografias dos Oradores | About the Speakers
Painel 1
THE CRISIS :: A CRISE
Hélder Oliveira é Presidente do CA da SPE-Sociedade Portuguesa de Empreendimentos, Administrador
Executivo da Fundação Portugal-África e não executivo da AMSCO – African Management Services
(Amsterdão) e membro da Mesa da AG da Ordem dos Economistas depois de ter sido membro da
Direcção da mesma Ordem. Tem participado regularmente em diversos grupos de trabalho e feito
intervenções públicas sobre políticas de internacionalização das empresas portuguesas. Exerceu vários
cargos no sector financeiro: Presidente da Comissão Executiva da SOFID Sociedade para o Financiamento
do Desenvolvimento – IFC, SA (EDFI -European Development Finance Institution); Director Central do
Banco BPI (Gabinete para Angola); Director Coordenador do Banco de Fomento e Exterior – (Área
Internacional) e Administrador da EURO-FINANCEIRA – Sociedade de Investimentos, SA. Foi ainda
Presidente do Conselho de Administração da Companhia Carris de Ferro de Lisboa e administrador de
várias empresas, designadamente, nos sectores do comércio externo e da comunicação social. Hélder
Oliveira é Licenciado em Economia pelo Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Financeiras da
Universidade Técnica de Lisboa.
Adebayo Olukoshi, from Nigeria, is the Director of the UN African Institute for Economic Development
and Planning (IDEP)and Executive Director of the Africa Governance Institute (AGI),in Dakar. Before, he
was the Executive Secretary of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
(CODESRIA), Director of research at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and Senior Research
Fellow at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. He served for one year as Professional Staff
responsible for the development of the Africa programme at The South Centre, in Geneva, Switzerland,
and holds a PhD on Politics from the University of Leeds.
Damien Helly has joined the College of Europe to teach Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as a
visiting professor in Bruges. Between 2008 and 2012, he was senior research fellow at the EU Institute for
Security Studies (EUISS), an EU intergovernmental agency acting in the framework of the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP), where he dealt with Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe-Africa relations, and CSDP. In
2013-2014, he will also be an independent expert of a consortium led by the Goethe Institute to research
on the external dimensions of EU’s cultural policies. Damien was senior analyst and head of the
International Crisis Group office in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (2006-2007). He also opened and managed Crisis
Group’s first regional South Caucasus office in 2003-2004 as project director before working as a
consultant on Moldova/Transdniestria for the same organisation. In 2005-2006, Damien opened and ran
Saferworld’s EU and advocacy office in Brussels. He holds a PhD in political science from Sciences po,
Paris. He is currently writing a book entitled Why Africa matters and how Europeans should act
strategically.
Fernando Jorge Cardoso is the research coordinator of the Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr Think Tank,
IMVF, in Lisbon. He is also member of the Institute for International and Strategic Studies, IEEI, and a
senior researcher at the Centre of African Studies at the Lisbon University Institute, ISCTE. Currently, on
behalf of IEEI, he chairs the Steering Committee of the Europe-Africa Policy Research Network, EARN. His
main fields of interest are development, regional integration and international relations with a major
focus in Sub-Saharan Africa. He holds a PhD in Economics by the Technical University of Lisbon.
Painel 2
DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES :: DESAFIOS DEMOGRÁFICOS
Mónica Ferro é Deputada à Assembleia da República e Membro efetivo da Comissão de Negócios
Estrangeiros (coordenadora do Grupo Parlamentar do PSD) e Comissão de Defesa Nacional. É Membro
suplente da Comissão de Assuntos Constitucionais, Direitos, Liberdades e Garantias, Membro da
Subcomissão da Igualdade, e Coordenadora do Grupo Parlamentar Português sobre População e
Desenvolvimento. É Membro do Comité Executivo do Fórum Europeu de Parlamentares para a População
e Desenvolvimento. É também Docente do Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, Universidade
Técnica de Lisboa e Docente Convidada do Instituto da Defesa Nacional, da Academia da Força Aérea, da
Academia Militar. É Licenciada e Mestre em Relações Internacionais, pelo ISCSP, e Doutoranda em
Relações Internacionais pelo ISCSP.
Alcinda Honwana is a visiting professor at the Open University (OU) in the UK and at Columbia University
in New York. She has been chair and director of the International Development Centre (IDC) at the OU;
director of programs at the Social Science Research Council in New York; and research coordinator in the
United Nations Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. She lectured
Anthropology at the Universities Eduardo Mondlane, University of Cape Town and the New School
University in New York. Honwana has written extensively on the links between political conflict and
culture, the impact of conflict on young people, and the role of young people and social change in Africa.
Her publications include: Youth and Revolution in Tunisia (forthcoming July 2013) Zed Books, London; The
Time of Youth: Work, Social Change and Politics in Africa, (2012) Kumarian Press USA, Child Soldiers in
Africa, (2006), University of Pennsylvania Press, USA; Makers & Breakers: Children and Youth in
Postcolonial Africa, (2005, co-edited), James Currey Publishers, UK; and Living Spirits, Modern Traditions:
Spirit Possession and Post-War Healing in Southern Mozambique, (2003) Ela Por Ela, Lisbon; and (2002)
Promedia, Maputo.
Ana Pires de Carvalho é Demógrafa e tem trabalhado como consultora em Moçambique, Angola e Sudão,
para a UNFPA, UNOCHA, UNICEF e Banco Mundial. Previamente leccionou e dirigiu Faculdades na
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM), Moçambique. Licenciou-se em Matemática Aplicada e
Informática pela UEM e concluiu o Mestrado de Investigação Operacional em Southampton, UK.
Posteriormente especializou-se em demografia, tendo feito uma pós-graduação de um ano em Princeton,
USA, e o doutoramento em Southampton, UK. Actualmente é investigadora sénior do Centro de Analise
de Politicas (CAP) da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, em Maputo.
Gregory De Paepe, a Belgian national, joined the Development Centre of OECD, in Paris, as a policy
analyst in the Europe, Middle East and Africa desk in November 2008. He has contributed to the several
thematic chapters of the Development Centre’s annual flagship publication, the African Economic Outlook
(AEO) and has been the AEO project coordinator since 2010. His main areas of work are development
economics, macro-economics and public finances, with a regional specialisation on Africa. Prior to joining
the Development Centre he has been working at the Spanish Delegation to the WTO and UNCTAD in
Geneva, where he covered the DOHA round negotiations and the preparatory committee for UNCTAD’s
XII Ministerial Conference. Gregory holds a Master degree in International Trade at the Centro de Estudios
Comerciales y Economicos in Madrid and a Master degree in Business Economics with a major in Finance
at the University of Ghent, Belgium.
Victor Ângelo, a Portuguese national, is a Former Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General
(Peacekeeping Operations, 2004-10), at the level of Under Secretary-General. He retired from the UN in
April 2010, as SRSG for MINURCAT (CAR and Chad), after 32 years of work with different departments of
the organization. As part of his career, he represented the UN in many countries, as resident coordinator
for development, as well as humanitarian coordinator and envoy for post-conflict situations. Prior to his
UN work, he was a senior civil servant in the Portuguese government and a commissioner of National
Electoral Commission which organised the Constitutional elections of 1975. He is currently a senior
international advisor on governance, crisis management and security. He is also a recognised columnist on
world affairs of Visão, the largest Portuguese weekly magazine, a board member of the PeaceNexus
Foundation (Switzerland) as well as a member of the North-South Centre’s Think Tank in the Council of
Europe and other research centres. He has written several academic papers and many weekly opinion
columns.
Painel 3
SECURITY :: SEGURANÇA
Santiago Martínez-Caro de la Concha-Castañeda. Nació el 28 de enero de 1957 en Nueva York. Segunda
Jefatura en la Embajada en Yaundé desde 18 de abril de 1984 y Cónsul de España en Lima desde 4 de julio
de 1986. Secretario en la Representación Permanente de España en el Consejo de Europa, Estrasburgo,
desde 9 de mayo de 1989. Consejero de Embajada en comisión el 8 de abril de 1992. Consejero Técnico
Relaciones Exteriores Países no Preferentes desde 1 de agosto de 1992. Vocal Asesor de la Subdirección
General de Coordinación Comunitaria para Asuntos Jurídicos desde 2 de agosto de 1993.-Subdirector
General Adjunto de Coordinación Comunitaria para Asuntos Técnicos desde 1 de enero de 1994.
Consejero Económico y Comercial, Jefe de la Oficina Comercial de la Embajada de España en Rabat, desde
1 de septiembre de 1994. Cónsul General de España en Caracas desde 14 de abril de 1998. Vocal Asesor
en la Dirección General de Política Exterior para el Mediterráneo desde 31 de julio de 2001. Subdirector
General de África Subsahariana desde 10 de enero de 2003. Embajador de España en la República de
Zimbabwe desde 1 de octubre de 2004. Embajador de España en la República de Malawi, con residencia
en Harare desde 26 de septiembre de 2005. Embajador de España en la República de Zambia, con
residencia en Harare, desde 26 de septiembre de 2005. Segunda Jefatura en la Representación
Permanente de España ante la ONU, Viena, desde 20 de abril de 2009.
Alexandra Magnólia Dias é licenciada em Relações Internacionais-Ramo Culturais e Políticas pela
Universidade do Minho. É mestre em Desenvolvimento Económico e Social em África : Análise e Gestão
pelo Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa- ISCTE com uma tese intitulada «Ensaio
sobre os Alinhamentos Partidários no Botswana». É Doutorada em Relações Internacionais pela London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) com uma tese intitulada "Uma Guerra Inter-Estatal no PósGuerra Fria: Eritreia-Etiópia 1998-2000", a qual recebeu menção honrosa do júri da 2.ª edição do Prémio
da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política (APCP). É actualmente Investigadora auxiliar do Instituto
Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL) no Centro de Estudos Africanos onde coordena o projecto
«Monitorização de Conflitos no Corno de África». É Professora Auxiliar Convidada no Departamento de
História na mesma instituição.
João Bernardo Honwana (colonel, retired, Mozambique) is the director of the Africa II Division in the UN
Department of Political Affairs since May 2012. He has served the UN as director of the Africa I Division,
chief of staff of the UN Mission in Sudan, representative of the secretary-general and head of the UN
Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNGBIS), and chief of the Conventional Arms Branch in
the Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). Prior to joining the UN, Honwana was a senior
researcher and project coordinator at the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South
Africa, from June 1993 to January 2000. He participated in Mozambique’s national liberation struggle and,
after independence, served in various capacities in the armed forces, including as commander of the
Mozambican Air Force and Air Defence from 1986 to 1993. Honwana trained as a fighter pilot and military
aviation tactical commander in the former Soviet Union (1977–80, 1982–83), graduated from the UK
Royal College of Defence Studies (1990), and holds an MA in war studies (1992) from Kings College
London.
Maurice Engueleguele is Professor of Political Science (PhD) and has taught for twenty years in French
universities (Amiens, Bordeaux) and Cameroon (International Relations Institute). He also served as Head
of Project in Governance Mission of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Maurice Engueleguele is the
Programme Coordinator of the Africa Governance Institute, in Dakar, since May 2008. He has published
several works on political behavior, political development and political participation issues.
Morten Bøås, PhD is a senior researcher at Fafo’s Institute for Applied International Studies. He has
written extensively on African politics and development. His work has appeared in a number of leading
international journals, including among others Journal of Modern African Studies, Politique Africaine, Third
World Quarterly, Global Governance, European Journal of Development Research, Globalizations and
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding. He has also published a number of books, including the muchcited African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine (Lynne Rienner, 2007), co-edited with Kevin Dunn,
International Development Vol. I.IV (Sage, 2010), co-edited with Benedicte Bull and The Politics of Origin
in Africa (Zed Books, forthcoming 2013), co-authored with Kevin Dunn.
Painel 4
DEVELOPMENT FLOWS AND ACTORS :: FLUXOS E ATORES DO DESENVOLVIMENTO
Any Freitas holds a M.A. in International Relations (PUC -Rio de Janeiro Catholic University) and a PhD in
Social and Political Sciences (European University Institute, Florence). She was visiting researcher at
Instituto Juan March (2006), and the Centre March Bloch (2007), and worked in different organizations
such as UNESCO (2008-2009), the Council of the European Union (2009), the Free University of Brussels
(2009-2010). Since 2011, Any works at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS), in Paris,
currently as Senior Programme Manager of the “Observatoire de l’Afrique”.
Ana Paula Fernandes é Licenciada em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade do Minho, Mestre em
Cooperação Internacional pelo ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, e Doutoranda em Assuntos
Africanos no mesmo Instituto. Foi voluntária dos Leigos para o Desenvolvimento em Moçambique (19941995) ; Assessora do Conselho Administração QBO Trading (1996-1997); Investigadora do Instituto de
Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais (1997-1999); Responsável de Projectos de Cooperação para o
Desenvolvimento no Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (1999-2005); Professora Universitária convidada (até
2009); e Assessora do Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação (2005-2009).
Atualmente é Conselheira Técnica na Delegação Permanente de Portugal junto da Organização de
Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico, desde 2009, tendo assumido a vice-presidência do Comité de
Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD) desde Janeiro de 2010. É também co-presidente do Grupo de Trabalho
sobre Investimento e Desenvolvimento da OCDE – AGID, desde 2012.
Diogo Gomes de Araújo is the CEO of SOFID, the Portuguese Development Financial Institution since May
2010. Before that, Diogo was an Adviser to the Supervisory Board of EDP, the Portuguese electricity
utility, Head of the Portuguese Business Development Agency responsible for promoting investment and
trade in Tunisia and Libya, Portuguese Representative at the African Development Bank and Adviser to
the Board of Directors the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Diogo has degrees in
Economics and International Affairs by the University of Minho, Portugal, a Master in International
Banking and Finance by the London Metropolitan University and has also studied International Trade in
Vigo, Spain.
Erik Lundsgaarde is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn, where his
work focuses on the diversification of the actor landscape in development cooperation. He is the editor of
the book Africa toward 2030: Challenges for Development Policy (Palgrave Macmillan) and the author of
The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid (Routledge). He received M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science
from the University of Washington, USA.
Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei is Head of Programmes at Third World Network-Africa based in Ghana.Tetteh has a
Master of Laws degree in International Economic Law and for two decades has been involved in research
and advocacy on key policy issues relating to international trade, finance, investment and the challenges
facing African economies.
Painel 5
THE FUTURE :: O FUTURO
Geert Laporte, a Belgian national, is Deputy Director at The European Centre for Development Policy
Management (ECDPM), in Maastricht/Brussels. He has worked for ECDPM since 1990 in different roles
and functions. Currently he is responsible for ECDPM’s relations with the EU institutions, EU Presidencies,
EU member states, and with the African Union, the ACP institutions and with a large network of partners
of the Centre in different parts of the world. His thematic areas of specialisation include: EU external
action and development policy, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy with
a particular focus on governance, political cooperation and regional integration.
Alex Vines is the Research Director at Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London)
since September 2008 and has run its Africa programme since 2002. He was Chair of the UN Group of
Experts on Côte d’Ivoire from 2005 to 2007 and was a member of the UN Group of Experts on Liberia
from 2001 to 2003. For nine years he was a senior researcher at the Arms and Africa Divisions of Human
Rights Watch working on Angola until 2002. He sits on several academic editorial boards including the
South Africa Journal of International Affairs and was awarded an OBE in the 2008 Queens Birthday
Honours for his work on Africa.
John Kayode Shinkaiye, a retired Nigerian career diplomat, who served his country for more than 35
years, has just left the service of the Commission of the African Union, where he was, for six years and
nine months (February 2006 to October 2012), the Chief of Staff of the AU Commission Chairperson.
Throughout that period he was the AUC Co-Chair of the AUC-EC Joint Task Force and played a key role in
developing the partnership between Africa and the EU. Married to Mrs. Agnes Shinkaiye, and father of
five children and two grandsons, Amb. Shinkaiye served his country in many capacities. He served in the
Nigerian Missions in Lome, Togo, London (twice), Dakar, Senegal and was Nigerian Ambassador to
Equitorial Guinea (1989 to 1993), Ethiopia and Djibouti and was the Nigerian Permanent Representative
to the OAU/AU and UNECA (2000 to 2003). Amb. Shinkaiye has authored several articles and was
honoured by Britain (LVO) in 1989; Equatorial Guinea (GCOI) in 1993 and his country (OFR) in 2001. He is a
Member of the Nigerian National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies for which he was awarded the
certificate, mni, in 1994. He is in the process of setting up a consulting firm to be based in Abuja, Nigeria.
Thomas Lawo is the Executive Secretary of EADI (European Association of Development Research and
Training Institutes) and Director of the international secretariat in Bonn/ Germany, since January 2000.
From 1986 until November 1990 he was resident representative of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation in
Malaysia and Visiting Research Fellow at the Asian and Pacific Development Centre (APDC) in Kuala
Lumpur and Associate Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies, (IDS) Sabah in Kota Kinabalu/
Malaysia. He has worked in development co-operation since 1978 as Project Officer for South Asia (197886), Head of Asia Department (1990-94) and Managing Director of MISEREOR, Central Agency for
Development Assistance, Aachen/Germany (1995-99). He has concluded Studies of Law at Bochum
University (1972-74), Agriculture and Nutrition Sciences at Bonn University 1974-78; additional studies of
Philosophy and Education Sciences (1976-78); and post-graduate studies in Agricultural Sociology and
Nutrition Sciences and doctoral Dissertation (PhD) in 1983 on Agriculture and Food Policy Issues in
Banglad0.esh. He has participated in various publications on nutrition and food policy issues, poverty
alleviation programmes, work of NGOs and Civil Society organizations, especially on participatory
approaches and management issues in development cooperation programmes and planning; policies of
European Development Co-operation.
4.3. Lista de Participantes
Adebayo Olukoshi
Diretor do UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning
(IDEP) e Diretor Executivo, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar
Adolfo Rututo
Estudante
Adriano Rafael Moreira
Deputado à Assembleia da República, Presidente da Delegação Permanente
da AR à Assembleia Parlamentar da CPLP
Ahmed Zaki
Director de Projetos, IMVF
Aida Pegado
Doutoranda em Estudos Africanos, ISCTE
Alcinda Honwana
Professora visitante na Open University, Reino Unido, e na Columbia
University, Nova Iorque
Alex Vines
Diretor de Estudos e do Programa África, Chatham House (RIIA), Londres
Alexandra Magnólia Dias
Investigadora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL
Alina Santos
APDES
Ana Mafalda Dourado Santos
GPPQ/Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia
Ana Margarida Portugal Melo
Diretora de Serviços de Cooperação, Instituto de Investigação Científica
Tropical
Ana Oliveira
Mestranda, Estudos Africanos, e Freelancer, Estudos de Mercado
Ana Oliveira
Jornalista, Sapo Internacional
Ana Paula Fernandes
Conselheira de Portugal junto da OCDE e Vice-Presidente do Comité de
Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento (CAD), Paris
Ana Pires de Carvalho
Investigadora, Centro de Analise de Politicas, Universidade Eduardo
Mondlane, Maputo
Ana Roque
Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical
Ana Sofia Afonso Cortes
Camões – Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua
Anabela Carvalho
Assessora de Imprensa, União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa
(UCCLA)
André Magrinho
Associação Industrial Portuguesa
Antonieta Rosa Gomes
Doutoranda, ISCTE-IUL
Any Freitas
Gestora de Programas, Instituto de Estudos de Segurança da União
Europeia (EU-ISS), Paris
Augusto Trindade
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros
Bheki Dube
Embaixada da África do Sul
Carlos Reino Antunes
Diplomata
Carlos Sangreman
Professor, Universidade de Aveiro
Cármen Maciel
Directora de Projetos Nacionais, ADRA Portugal
Carmo Fernandes
Leigos para o Desenvolvimento
Catarina Tavares
Secretária Internacional, UGT
Cheikh Niang
Missão permanente da União Africana junto da União Europeia, Bruxelas
Clara Carvalho
Diretora, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL
Clara Justino
Secretariado Executivo da CPLP
Cláudia Ramos
DGPJ, Ministério da Justiça
Cristina da Cruz Vaz Tomé
Vice-Presidente, Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical
Damien Helly
Professor Visitante, Colégio da Europa, Bruges
Diana Jarro Campos Sameiro
Estudante ISEG
Didier Gonzalez
Embaixada da França em Lisboa
Diogo Gomes de Araújo
Presidente Executivo, Sociedade para o Financiamento do
Desenvolvimento (SOFID), Lisboa
Dynka Amorim
Bué Fixe – Associação de Jovens
Erik Lundsgaarde
Investigador, German Development Institute (DIE), Bona
Eugénio Costa Almeida
Investigador, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL
Fernando Jorge Cardoso
Coordenador de Investigação, IEEI & IMVF
Fernando Medeiros
Direção-Geral da Qualificação dos Trab. em Funções Públicas (INA)
Fernando Sousa Júnior
Ministério do Trabalho e da Solidariedade Social
Filipa Barreira
Agência LUSA
Filomena André
Francisco Almeida Leite
Vogal do Conselho Diretivo, Camões: Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua
Francisco Rego
Françoise Moreau
Diretora da Unidade Pan-Africana DEVCO, Comissão Europeia
Gabriel Baguet Junior
RDP África
Geert Laporte
Vice-Diretor, European Centre for Development Policy Management
(ECDPM), Maastricht
Gerhard Seibert
Pesquisador, Centro de Estudos Africanos, ISCTE-IUL
Gonçalo Marques
Assessor, Gabinete do Secretário dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da
Cooperação
Gregory de Paepe
Analista de Políticas, Centro de Desenvolvimento da OCDE, Paris
Guilherme Collares Pereira
Fundação EDP – Inovação Social
Hélder Oliveira
Fundação Portugal-África
Helena Amaral
Laboratório Nacional de Energia e Geologia (LNEG)
Hugo Tavares Augusto
Project Development and Liaison Officer, OIM - Organização Internacional
para as Migrações
Inês Ferro Ribeiro
Officer-in-charge, UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
(UNICRI)
Inês Rosa
DG Assuntos Europeus, MNE
Isabel Amado
IICT-AHU
Isidora Frasquilho
J. K. Shinkaiye
Embaixador, antigo chefe de Gabinete do Presidente da Comissão da União
Africana, Abuja
Jessica Santos
Gestão de Projetos, CEsA - ISEG
Joana Gonçalves Sá
Investigadora, Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência
Joana Pedro
Aurecon
João Bernardo Honwana
Diretor da Divisão África II, Nações Unidas, Nova Iorque
João Carvalho
João Martins
Diretor Executivo, ADRA Portugal
João Nunes da Silva
Gabinete de Planeamento e Políticas
Joaquim Fonseca
Jornalista
Joaquim Gonçalves
Joaquim Neves
José Alberto Mafo
Estudante, ISEG
José Almeida Bastos
União das Cidades Capitais de Língua Portuguesa (UCCLA)
José Augusto Duarte
Diretor do Departamento Geral da Administração, MNE
José Correia
José Gonçalves de Melo
José Manuel Rolo
Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa
Keitumetse Matthews
Embaixadora, Embaixada da África do Sul em Lisboa
Liliana Azevedo
ACEP – Associação para a Cooperação entre os Povos
Luís Brites Pereira
Secretário de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Cooperação
Luís Castelo Branco
Luís Mah
CEsA-ISEG
Luís Manuel Brás Bernardino
Militar
Malan Gomes
Manuel Dutra
Manuela Afonso
Margarida Cruz
Acreditar
Maria Arnaldo Copeto
Estudante, ISCSP
Maria da Conceição Peleteiro
Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária, Univ. Técnica de Lisboa
Maria da Conceição Veiga
Chefe do Serviço de Relações Externa e Cooperação, Instituto Nacional de
Estatística
Maria da Costa Ferreira
Doutoranda, ISCTE-IUL
Maria Hermínia Cabral
Programa Gulbenkian de Ajuda ao Desenvolvimento, Fundação Gulbenkian
Maria Inês Silva
Maria Leonor Moreira Sales
Fundação Gonçalo da Silveira
Maria Madalena Teixeira Franco
Direção de Serviços Justiça e Assuntos Internos, DGAE - MNE
Maria Soto Barros
Maria Sousa Galito
Aluna Curso Defesa Nacional, IDN
Mário Ribeiro
Marta Bronzin
Chefe de Missão, Organização Internacional para as Migrações (OIM)
Maurice Engueleguele
Coordenador, Africa Governance Institute (AGI), Dacar
Maymouna Diop Sy
Embaixadora, Embaixada do Senegal em Lisboa
Mirieme Ferreira
Diretora de Departamento, Câmara Municipal do Seixal
Mónica Ferro
Grupo Parlamentar Português sobre População e Desenvolvimento,
Deputada à Assembleia da República
Morten Boas
Diretor de Estudos, Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo
Nazim Ahmad
Comendador, Representante da Rede Aga Khan para o Desenvolvimento
em Portugal
Nélia Ribeiro
Plataforma Portuguesa das ONGD
Noémia da Conceição Certo Simões
Engenho e Obra e ISEL
Nuno Degroote
Nuno Guimarães
Pró-Reitor para a Internacionalização, ISCTE-IUL
Nuno Rodrigues Carvalho
Estudante, ICTE
Oleksandr Nykonenko
Embaixador, Embaixada da Ucrânia em Lisboa
Otília Leitão
Jornalista, A Semana, Cabo Verde
Paolo Casilli
Project Specialist, UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
(UNICRI)
Papa Magueye Diop
Primeiro Conselheiro, Embaixada do Senegal em Lisboa
Patrícia Magalhães Ferreira
Consultora e Investigadora, IMVF
Patrícia Oliveira de Almeida e Silva
Paula Borges
RDP África
Paulo H. Alves
Laboratório Nacional de Energia e Geologia (LNEG)
Paulo Telles de Freitas
Presidente do Conselho de Administração, IMVF
Pedro Ferreira
Commercial Specialist, US Embassy in Lisbon
Pedro José Mazissa Gomes
Docente, Universidade Agostinho Neto, Luanda
Pedro Pereira Leite
CES, Universidade de Coimbra
Pinkie Mekgwe
Diretora Executiva para a Internacionalização, Universidade de Joanesburgo
Rafael Calandou
Consultor
Raquel Freitas
CIES, ISCTE-IUL
Regina Maria Quelhas Lima
Diretora de Serviços Justiça e Assuntos Internos, DGAE - MNE
Ricardo Jorge Goulão Santos
Doutorando, IDS, Universidade de Sussex
Rita Nascimento
Rodrigo Ferreira Brum
Administrador, INCM
Rui Paulo Almas
ISLA Campus de Lisboa
Sandra Fernandes
Fundação Gonçalo da Silveira
Santiago Martínez-Caro
Diretor, Casa África, Las Palmas
Sean Olmstead
Political and Economic Officer, , US Embassy in Lisbon
Sílvia Lopes Pereira
Câmara Municipal do Seixal
Simone Arzeni
Consultor Independente
Sofia Amaral de Oliveira
Organização Internacional do Trabalho
Sofia da Graça Cordeiro Fernandes
Investigadora, ISCTE-IUL
Souhir Mbarek China
Conselheira, Embaixada da Tunísia
Susana Maria Mântua
Assessora, Vice-Reitora para a Cooperação, Universidade Aberta
Tânia Couto
Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei
Coordenador de Políticas & Programas, TWN Africa, Acra
Victor Ângelo
Vogal do Conselho de Administração da Fundação PeaceNexus, Suíça, e
Antigo Secretário-Geral Adjunto e Representante Especial das NU
Wanda Guimarães
União Geral de Trabalhadores (UGT)
Para Saber mais… || Further Reading
Africa and Europe in Partnership
http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/
THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, 2007
http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/eas2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf
Joint Africa-EU Strategy: Action Plan 2011-2013
http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/doc_jaes_action_plan_2011_13_en.pdf
High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda
http://www.post2015hlp.org/
Blogue do Secretário-Geral da UNECA sobre África
http://www.uneca.org/es-blog
European Report on Development
http://www.erd-report.eu/erd/index.html
The road to the 2014 Summit: Challenges for Africa-EU relations in 2013
ECDPM, Janeiro de 2013
http://www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/969F02B0260E072BC1257B0C0055
790C/$FILE/challenges_2013_ENG.pdf
African Security in 2013: a year of disequilibrium?
NOREF, Abril de 2012
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/dfd3e89925de94c748e775fe6
a806cc7.pdf
A Estratégia Conjunta África-UE: Análise e Desafios da implementação após a Cimeira UE-África
Plataforma Portuguesa das ONGD, 2010
http://backoffice.plataformaongd.pt/documentacao/site/Repositorio/Documentos/Publica%C3%A7%C3%
B5es/Estudo%20UEAfrica%20-%202010.pdf
SOBRE O IMVF
O Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) é uma fundação de direito privado e uma Organização
Não Governamental para o Desenvolvimento (ONGD) que realiza ações de ajuda humanitária, de
cooperação e educação para o desenvolvimento económico, cultural e social, realiza estudos e
trabalhos científicos nos vários domínios do conhecimento, bem como fomenta e divulga a
cultura dos países de expressão oficial portuguesa.
ABOUT IMVF
Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr (IMVF) is a private foundation and a Non-Governmental
Development Organization (NGDO) that carries out humanitarian aid and economic, cultural and
social development cooperation and education. It also conducts studies and produces scientific
papers on several fields of knowledge, and promotes and disseminates the culture of countries
whose official language is Portuguese.
Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr
Rua de São Nicolau, 105
1100-548 Lisboa
Portugal
Tel.: + 351 213 256 300
Fax: + 351 213 471 904
E-mail: [email protected]
www.imvf.org

a parceria áfrica-europa em construção: que futuro?

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