The Decline of Irish Industry in the Nineteenth Century

The Economic and Social Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, October, 1981, pp. 21-42
The Decline of Irish Industry
in the Nineteenth Century
EOIN O'MALLEY*
The University of Sussex.
Precis: This article first outlines a number of the explanations which have been suggested for the longterm decline of most of Irish industry in the nineteenth century. By contrasting the nature of in­
dustrial decline in most of the island with the specific pattern of successful industrialisation in the
north-east, it is argued that the main causes of decline lay in the strong tendencies to industrial cen­
tralisation in Britain and Ireland. It is concluded that this experience shows that market forces cannot
be relied on to generate industrialisation in a relatively late-developing economy competing with more
advanced industrial countries.
I INTRODUCTION
U
n t i l the early nineteenth century Ireland had a fairly substantial indust­
rial sector b y the standards o f most countries at that time, w i t h the
major exception o f Great Britain, the pioneer o f the Industrial Revolution.
Cullen (1972, p . 120) points out, for example, that i n the 1841 census
one-fifth o f the w o r k i n g p o p u l a t i o n was reported t o be occupied i n textile
manufacturing alone. A n d according t o the 1821 census, one-third o f the
1
'1
Probably many of these people, being domestic spinners, would in reality have had little work by
1841 due to the mechanisation of spinning. But the fact that they reported their principal occupations
as they did at least indicates considerable textile activity at some earlier stage.
* The author is grateful to Manfred Bienefeld, Raymond Crotty and Reginald Green of the Institute of
Development Studies at the University of Sussex, to Gerry Hughes of The Economic and Social Research
Institute, and to an anonymous referee for valuable comments on earner drafts of this article. None of
them, of course, bears any responsibility for the views expressed here.
Irish counties, including 6 o f the 23 outside Ulster, had a greater number o f
people engaged i n manufacture, trade or handicraft than i n agriculture.
I n the course o f the nineteenth century, however, industrial activity
decreased i n most o f Ireland. As industry declined, offering diminishing
prospects o f e m p l o y m e n t to the masses being squeezed o u t o f agriculture,
emigration rose to proportions unparalleled i n any other c o u n t r y . The
labour force o f the 26 counties o f the present Republic o f Ireland dropped
f r o m 3 m i l l i o n i n 1841 to just 1.3 m i l l i o n i n the new Irish Free State i n the
1920s; b y then l i t t l e more than 100,000 workers were employed i n i n d u s t r y .
B u t one i m p o r t a n t exception to the general experience o f industrial decline
was the region around Belfast where g r o w t h c o n t i n u e d i n a manner similar
to that o f large industrial centres i n B r i t a i n . A f t e r the middle o f the nine­
teenth century, Belfast became the largest centre o f linen manufacture
i n the w o r l d and by the 1900s her shipyards were building up t o about
a quarter o f the t o t a l U n i t e d K i n g d o m tonnage.
A l t h o u g h the s t u d y o f Irish industrial history is probably still less well
developed than that o f other aspects o f the country's economic history,
the literature dealing w i t h the subject, w h i c h is referred to below, neverthe­
less contains many differing views on the causes o f the nineteenth century
decline. Some o f these views w o u l d seem familiar, at least i n their general
f o r m , t o anyone familiar w i t h the literature on present day industrial back­
wardness i n less developed countries, or on regional imbalance w i t h i n ad­
vanced industrial countries. For example, Lee (1968 and 1973) stresses the
importance o f the lack o f a strong entrepreneurial spirit, as do "modernisa­
t i o n " theorists w r i t i n g on present day less developed countries. Others
mentioned below stress the importance o f centralising tendencies f o l l o w i n g
the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n and the consequent effects on the peripheral
areas and nations, such as most o f Ireland. Again such views f i n d parallels
i n the literature on m o d e r n less developed countries and regions; the argu­
ments o f M y r d a l , Perroux or many modern Marxists, for instance, are well
k n o w n ( H o l l a n d , 1976, Ch. 2 usefully summarises such arguments).
This article first outlines the main explanations o f Ireland's industrial
decline contained i n a selection o f the literature dealing w i t h the subject.
A n d , secondly, i t attempts t o support the argument that the main causes
of decline lay i n the strong tendencies t o industrial centralisation, or agglo­
m e r a t i o n , w i t h i n the U n i t e d K i n g d o m o f Great B r i t a i n and Ireland as a
whole, w h i c h resulted f r o m the increasing mechanisation o f manufacturing.
By l o o k i n g at the early structure o f Irish i n d u s t r y , and its decline i n most
of the island contrasted w i t h the specific pattern o f development i n the
north-east, we can show h o w this tendency w o r k e d against most o f Irish
industry and generally i n favour o f industries i n B r i t a i n .
I I SOME I N T E R P R E T A T I O N S O F T H E E X P E R I E N C E O F I R I S H
INDUSTRY
II.1. The Traditional Nationalist View
The development o f the traditional nationalist interpretation o f Irish
economic history is o u t l i n e d i n Cullen (1968b) and is perhaps best exem­
plified b y the works o f George O'Brien (1918 and 1921). This interpretation
is characterised by an emphasis on Britain's role i n impeding the Irish
economy. I n the seventeenth and most o f the eighteenth centuries, industry
is said to have been m i n i m a l as a result o f English legislation. For example,
a law of 1699 forbade the export o f woollens overseas while prohibitive
duties prevented their entry to B r i t a i n . I t is argued that English tariffs o n
manufactured goods were often p r o h i b i t i v e , while Irish tariffs were lower
and often allowed a preferential rate for English products. The Navigation
Acts after 1663 are also said to have favoured British producers and traders,
causing great difficulties for the Irish economy.
However, the degree of autonomy achieved b y "Grattan's Parliament"
i n 1782-1800 is said t o have greatly reduced the harmful British influence,
particularly through using more protective tariffs, and to have been the
main cause o f an unprecedented economic expansion at that time. Then the
i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the A c t o f U n i o n w h i c h came i n t o effect i n 1801 was held
responsible for the nineteenth century industrial decline. Some writers, such
as O'Brien (1918, Ch. 3 4 ) , l i n k e d this argument particularly w i t h the effects
of free trade w i t h Britain's larger more advanced and specialised industries;
based on this view, politicians like A r t h u r G r i f f i t h therefore advocated
a programme o f p r o t e c t i o n for Irish industry. Chart (1920, C h . V I ) , w h o
differs f r o m the traditional nationalist view i n d o u b t i n g the wisdom o f
protectionism, also n o t e d that small, less advanced producers i n many sectors
i n Ireland, as well as i n B r i t a i n , were eliminated b y "great specialised factories
centralized i n one d i s t r i c t " , generally i n B r i t a i n .
The traditional nationalist view treats the north-east as a rather insigni­
ficant exception t o the general picture. O'Brien (1918, C h . 19) very briefly
explains the development o f its largest industry, l i n e n , mainly b y the arrival
there o f skilled Huguenot immigrants after the Edict o f Nantes i n 1685. He
also mentions that the Ulster Custom — w h i c h was n o t actually a legal right,
b u t an understanding w h i c h gave tenants security o f tenure, a reasonable
rent and the right to sell the goodwill o f their h o l d i n g — enabled Protestant
tenant farmers i n Ulster t o accumulate capital w i t h o u t fear o f rack-renting
and, therefore, encouraged them to be more enterprising.
The traditional nationalist interpretation was w i d e l y accepted i n Ireland,
except i n the N o r t h , u n t i l the 1960s. B u t early critics o f this view included
Green (1949, p . 176) w h o described O'Brien's w o r k as "strongly protec-
tionist and southern i n t o n e " and highly unsatisfactory i n its neglect of
"the p r o b l e m o f reconciling this w i t h the industrial development i n the
n o r t h " . I n a similar vein, Adams ( 1 9 3 2 ) , i n his bibliographical notes, had
described O'Brien's w o r k as "a piece o f protectionist propaganda".
II.2. Recent Revisions of the Traditional Nationalist View
Since the 1960s the traditional nationalist view has been challenged b y a
number of interpretations w h i c h argue that the U n i o n was n o t the m a i n
cause o f nineteenth century decline. Those that deal w i t h the earlier period
also argue that the eighteenth century was a time o f general economic ex­
pansion and that "Grattan's Parliament" was n o t the main cause of i n ­
dustrial g r o w t h i n 1782-1800 (which was n o t i n sharp contrast to the alleged
prevalent depression before that time). B u t no consensus has emerged on
the real causes o f industrial decline.
Lee (1973, Ch. 1) says that the decline o f rural industries became inevit­
able when transport improvements exposed them t o c o m p e t i t i o n from largescale producers. So "the p r o b l e m was n o t w h y local firms collapsed b u t w h y
more o f them were n o t destroyed b y Irish instead o f English manufacturers".
He argues that Ireland's main problem was "the wasteful use o f capital by
savers, investors, businessmen, i n other words, that Ireland's human capital
failed t o make the best use of the country's resources" (Lee, 1968). This
argument, that competent entrepreneurs c o u l d have developed Irish industry
successfully, is backed up b y reference to the success of shipbuilding i n
Belfast due to brilliant entrepreneurship i n a situation w h i c h , he suggests,
was n o t particularly favourable. He also refers to the reluctance of Irish
capitalists t o invest i n banks and railways u n t i l the participation o f British
investors had been secured, to the tendency o f Irish businessmen to w i t h ­
draw f r o m successful businesses and to retire to a more sedate life, and t o
the tendency of the middle class, i n general, to choose a profession or
c o u n t r y life rather than industry. B u t he does concede that this sensivity
of the middle class to social considerations was n o t peculiar to Ireland.
"The real p r o b l e m was that a country relying heavily o n its human resources,
t o compensate for its lack o f natural resources, could n o t afford t o indulge
this tendency to the same extent as more generously endowed economies"
(Lee, 1973, Ch. 1). This concession suggests that he cannot reasonably
refer t o the unexceptional social preference o f the middle class as a major
cause o f the exceptional failure o f Irish industry, b u t his other points do
need to be considered.
Concerning the development o f the north-east, Lee argues that i t was
l i t t l e better endowed w i t h entrepreneurial talent than the rest of Ireland,
that there is consequently little t r u t h i n the Protestant ethic argument, and
that Belfast's progress was largely due to new immigrant businesspeople w h o
showed w h a t c o u l d be achieved i n the Irish economy.
The argument concerning p o o r entrepreneurship had appeared i n some
contemporary studies such as Kane ( 1 8 4 4 ) , and some recent writers have
also used i t as p a r t o f their explanation o f the decline, b u t w i t h o u t stressing
i t as heavily as Lee. Lyons ( 1 9 7 1 , p . 4 3 ) , for instance, mentions many con­
t r i b u t o r y factors such as the l a n d tenure system, p o l i t i c a l violence, scarcity
of natural resources, transport costs t o large markets and c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m
B r i t a i n , b u t concludes " i n the last resort i t was unwillingness t o take certain
m i n i m a l risks that lay at the heart o f the p r o b l e m " . A n d O T u a t h a i g h ( 1 9 7 2 ,
Ch. 4) first argues that Ireland's difficulties were one aspect o f a process i n
w h i c h i n d u s t r y became centralised near the m a i n sources o f coal and i r o n ,
none o f w h i c h existed i n Ireland. B u t he later adds that part o f the p r o b l e m
was that Irish investors were t o o averse t o risk, having more o f an eye for
security and status. He attributes this caution t o the political tensions o f
Irish society — a view w h i c h seems at odds w i t h the experience o f Belfast
where sectarian riots accounted for more deaths than all the nationalist risings
o f the nineteenth century.
Cullen ( 1 9 6 8 b ) , however, explains the decline m a i n l y i n terms o f the
importance o f increasingly large-scale p r o d u c t i o n and the fact that industrial
transformation occurred first i n B r i t a i n . Thus Ireland's " p r o x i m i t y t o the
leader o f the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n and the dramatic reductions i n transport
costs i n the nineteenth century i n conjunction left its small-scale and domestic
industries vulnerable i n a more fiercely competitive age". I n a later w o r k ,
Cullen ( 1 9 7 2 , Ch. 6) argues that business initiative was n o t i n fact critically
lacking, as shown b y the efficient reorganisation o f the wholesale and retail
trade. He also extends his earlier argument f r o m one concerning the advant­
ages enjoyed b y large firms t o include more specifically the benefits o f cen­
tralisation i n large manufacturing centres, m e n t i o n i n g m a i n l y the advantages
gained i n the organisation o f foreign trade w h i c h meant that Belfast, and
D u b l i n t o some extent, had exceptional facilities i n specialist services such as
financing and insuring the export consignments w h i c h were essential to
attain the scale o f operation required for survival. Cullen argues that the
decline c o u l d n o t be blamed o n the U n i o n since he considers that any
benefits o f tariff p r o t e c t i o n w o u l d n o t have been sufficient to counter
the effects o f the transformation set i n m o t i o n b y the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n
(Cullen, 1972, p . 107 and 1968b).
C r o t t y (1979) argues that "the most i m p o r t a n t single consequence for
Ireland o f the g r o w t h o f factory capitalism i n B r i t a i n has been its effect
o n Irish cattle prices". G r o w i n g incomes i n B r i t a i n changed the pattern
of demand and raised the price o f beef relative t o other agricultural pro­
ducts, m a k i n g l o w gross o u t p u t cattle p r o d u c t i o n increasingly profitable
compared w i t h other higher gross o u t p u t , more labour-intensive patterns
of agriculture. The result, says C r o t t y , was massive emigration among agri­
cultural workers and a net decline i n demand f r o m the agricultural sector,
leading t o increased u n i t costs for industry so that m u c h o f industry was
forced o u t o f business b y cheapening imports from B r i t a i n . W i t h a different
pattern o f agriculture, demand c o u l d have been greater, industrial u n i t costs
consequently lower, and industrial survival and g r o w t h rates more satisfac­
tory.
II.3. Marxist Views
A p a r t f r o m a section i n Marx's Capital, most o f Marx and Engels' con­
siderable volume o f w r i t i n g o n Ireland (collected i n Marx and Engels, 1971)
consists o f letters, journalistic articles and political speeches. Marx was,
o f course, well aware o f the tendency o f nineteenth century industry b o t h
t o t h r o w up increasingly large firms w h i c h progressively eliminated smaller
ones, and t o agglomerate specialised activities i n particular locations — n o t
p r i m a r i l y determined b y raw material deposits, b u t more b y the l o c a t i o n
of specialised skills and related industries. He also considered (in C h . X X V
o f Capital, V o l . 1) that Ireland must be viewed as a region o f the U K
economy, w h i c h w o u l d presumably be affected b y such tendencies i n the
U K as a whole: " I r e l a n d is at present (the 1860s) only an agricultural dis­
t r i c t o f England . . . t o w h i c h i t yields corn, w o o l , cattle, industrial and
m i l i t a r y recruits". His view of such general tendencies i n industry, and
presumably o f their effects on Ireland, w o u l d explain w h y he wrote t o
Engels i n a letter dated 1867, "What the Irish need is:
1) Self-government and independence f r o m England.
2) A n agrarian r e v o l u t i o n . . .
3) Protective tariffs against England." (his emphasis).
The same letter explains further "between 1783 and 1801 every branch
of Irish industry flourished. The U n i o n w h i c h overthrew the protective
tariffs established b y the Irish Parliament, destroyed all industrial life i n
Ireland . . . Once the Irish are independent, necessity w i l l t u r n them i n t o
protectionists, as i t d i d Canada, Australia, etc."
Marx largely ignored the distinctive development i n Ulster w h i c h was
already well advanced b y the 1860s. Consequently, because he saw no
economic basis for the division between Ulster Protestants and the rest o f
Ireland, he regarded that issue as superficial and destined to fade away.
James Connolly's view o f the Ulster p r o b l e m was similar, as was Lenin's
(1974), and the combined influence of these p a r t l y explains the nationa­
list p o s i t i o n adopted by the mainstream o f Irish Marxists — at least u n t i l
the b r e a k d o w n since the late 1960s o f the virtual u n a n i m i t y i n this regard.
Connolly (1973) argued that "Grattan's Parliament" d i d n o t cause the
industrial g r o w t h o f the late eighteenth century, w h i c h was due to the
a d o p t i o n o f mechanical power as a result o f the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n .
The subsequent decline o f industry was n o t due to the U n i o n , he says,
b u t rather t o the disadvantage faced b y Ireland as a result o f the absence o f
cheap native coal. The weakening o f Irish capitalism for this reason, follow­
ed b y the refusal o f the weak capitalist class to risk j o i n i n g w i t h the people
to establish an independent democratic state, made inevitable the imposi­
t i o n o f the U n i o n and free trade. B u t he does say that "an Ireland con­
trolled b y popular suffrage w o u l d u n d o u b t e d l y have sought to save Irish
industry while i t was y e t time b y a a stringent system o f p r o t e c t i o n , w h i c h
w o u l d have imposed u p o n i m p o r t e d goods a tax heavy enough t o neutralise
the advantages accruing t o the foreigner f r o m his coal supply, and such a
system m i g h t have averted that decline w h i c h , as we have already stated,
was otherwise inevitable". Thus, i n stating that industrial decline was n o t
caused b y the U n i o n , he d i d n o t mean that the i m p o s i t i o n o f free trade
w i t h B r i t a i n was u n i m p o r t a n t . What he meant was that the mere a b o l i t i o n
of a b o d y o f upper class Parliamentarians, w h o had never been o f m u c h
benefit t o the people or t o i n d u s t r y , was o f l i t t l e significance compared w i t h
the basic cause o f industrial decline, w h i c h was the absence o f coal and the
refusal o f Irish capitalists to j o i n the people's independence struggle t o
secure the power t o p r o t e c t the economy against this natural disadvantage.
Sinn Fein the Workers' Party ( 1 9 7 7 ) , however, argues that Irish and
British industry competed on equal terms under the U n i o n . A l t h o u g h
they use different terminology t o Lee's, their argument is essentially the
same as his (which was referred to above), stressing the effects o f bad entrepreneurship i n Ireland, and i n fact m a k i n g frequent reference to Lee's
w o r k . The British and Irish Communist Organisation (1972) also focus
particularly o n the deficiencies o f the capitalist class i n Gaelic Catholic
Ireland, i n contrast to the strength o f that w h i c h they argue emerged among
Ulster Protestants. B u t they a t t e m p t a deeper explanation o f this difference,
tracing i t back t o the origins o f Ulster Protestants i n early capitalist B r i t a i n ,
a more advanced society than the pre-capitalist Gaelic Catholic clans o f Ire­
land at the time o f the Plantations. The B & I C O goes o n to argue that the
successful development o f advanced capitalist industry i n Protestant Ulster,
w h i c h was hatched o u t o f local society b u t b o u n d up w i t h British markets,
gave the n o r t h e r n Protestants a strong interest i n the U n i o n w i t h B r i t a i n .
Thus i t ensured that they never merged w i t h the Catholic Irish n a t i o n w h i c h
sought t o leave the U n i o n w i t h plans for economic segregation from B r i t a i n
in the f o r m o f wide-ranging tariff barriers.
Some o f the interpretations referred to above, such as those o f Lee or
the B & I C O , concentrate — i n different ways — o n the importance o f certain
internal factors i n a society as the main requirements for capitalist indus­
trialisation and tend, therefore, to attribute the failure o f industrialisation
mainly t o internal inadequacies. I n contrast, the rest o f this article (like
some o f the other interpretations referred to) stresses the importance o f
the constraints imposed b y the existence o f strong competitors elsewhere,
w h i c h mean that one cannot assume that the attainment o f certain necessary
local economic and social conditions is sufficient for broadly based industria­
lisation. I n most o f the major nineteenth century industries, survival and
successful development i n a competitive environment required that relati­
vely large-scale, specialised and centralised p r o d u c t i o n should be achieved
i n the quite early stages o f mechanisation, and i n some cases p r o x i m i t y
to major markets was also i m p o r t a n t . I n general, unprotected industries
c o u l d n o t and d i d n o t develop smoothly f r o m relatively small beginnings
after the start o f mechanisation elsewhere i n t o successful large-scale pro­
ducers. Rather, o n l y the few most favoured centres o f an industry, w h i c h
made the earliest start i n mechanisation o n the largest scale, c o u l d develop
successfully, disposing o f lesser competitors as they d i d so. This process
generally favoured British industries over Irish ones, w i t h w h o m they were
i n c o m p e t i t i o n i n the market o f one single state.
I t should be said, t o o , that the process o f development o f many i m ­
p o r t a n t sectors i n any one t o w n or area was apparently quite specifically
l i n k e d t o , and depended heavily on the success o f its leading sectors —
or its earliest major mechanised industries. I n Ireland, the various textile
industries had the best potential for acting as leading sectors i n this way
(they were also very i m p o r t a n t i n Great B r i t a i n ) . I t is therefore i m p o r t a n t
to outline the manner o f their ultimate failure i n most o f Ireland, and the
success o f linen i n the north-east. A n outline o f the subsequent development
of a wider range o f industries i n the Belfast area, w h i c h can be traced back
to the success o f l i n e n , w i l l then serve to illustrate b o t h the process w h i c h
caused industrialisation t o be so centralised and the long-term consequences
of the failure o f textiles elsewhere i n Ireland.
I l l IRISH INDUSTRY BEFORE THE UNION
When the A c t o f U n i o n was passed i n 1800 most o f Irish industry d i d n o t
seem particularly unhealthy. L i n e n was the most i m p o r t a n t industry w i t h
large exports going mainly to B r i t a i n , and the c o t t o n and woollen industries
were b o t h still i n a strong position i n the home market. While these textile
industries were the most i m p o r t a n t , there were also other industries such as
grain-milling, brewing, distilling, sugar-refining and the manufacture o f
l u x u r y consumer items.
The g r o w t h o f linen exports, w h i c h first became significant i n the 1680s,
had been spectacular during the eighteenth century, f r o m 520,000 yards i n
1705 t o over 40 m i l l i o n yards i n the 1790s (see G i l l , 1964). L i n e n manu-
facture was an ancient craft i n Ireland as evidenced b y records o f yarn ex­
ports as early as 1542 ( G i l l , 1964, C h . 2 ) . B u t the type o f finished c l o t h
made then, i n various locations, was n o t i n demand outside the c o u n t r y
and when significant c l o t h exports began, the weaving and finishing o f
c l o t h for e x p o r t was m a i n l y concentrated i n the north-east. Since the manu­
facture o f linen was relatively labour-intensive, while wages i n England were
higher than i n Scotland and Ireland, and since England's mercantilist policies
discouraged continental European competitors i n the growing English
market while English textile manufacturers concentrated mainly on woollens
and later c o t t o n , there was clearly an excellent o p p o r t u n i t y for linen manu­
facture i n Scotland and Ireland. B u t w i t h i n Ireland, one may ask, w h y d i d
the north-east become the main l o c a t i o n o f weaving and finishing, particularly
for the rapidly expanding export trade? Most writers on the subject agree
that the seventeenth century i m m i g r a t i o n o f Huguenots and British settlers
to the north-east had m u c h to do w i t h i t . For many o f t h e m had the parti­
cular skills required for the manufacture o f broadcloths and finer linens for
English and continental markets. W i t h a supply o f Irish yarn they were well
placed to produce such cloth to supplement the incomes from their small
farms.
However, some w o u l d argue that this is n o t a sufficient explanation;
" i f there had been no stronger' cause at w o r k " , says G i l l (1964, p . 22),
". . .the industry w o u l d almost certainly have spread i n course o f time
beyond Ulster". G i l l explains the concentration i n the north-east b y the
Ulster Custom w h i c h gave tenant farmers security from rack-renting, whereas
elsewhere tenants had l i t t l e incentive to better themselves. G i l l , and the
B & I C O ( 1 9 7 2 ) , argue that, because o f the land system, the linen industry
outside Ulster — such as i t was — had to be unsoundly based i n " a r t i f i c i a l "
large inefficient enterprises and consequently i t never really prospered and
was m o s t l y ruined i n the slump o f the 1770s.
2
Cullen (1972, C h . 3) disputes this, saying that the land system i n m u c h o f
the south d i d n o t create such extreme insecurity. He agrees that the de­
pression o f the 1770s ruined many o f the large southern enterprises, b u t
says that the industry there nevertheless survived and expanded as a rural
domestic i n d u s t r y , as i n Ulster. I n fact Crawford (1968) mentions that the
Linen Board had begun to encourage the more viable decentralised f o r m o f
p r o d u c t i o n i n the south by subsidising public markets i n the 1760s. Cullen's
argument is supported by Gill's o w n statistics which do n o t tally w i t h his
statements on the collapse o f the southern i n d u s t r y . Thus Gill's figures
2
The argument is that before the advent of mechanised production after the late eighteenth century,
the technology in use gave little advantage to large enterprises over dispersed cottage industries (in
textiles, at least, which is the main sector concerned), whereas large enterprises had problems of
control over wage labourers who could combine together for better wages and conditions.
(pp. 161 and 271) p u t sales o f c l o t h outside Ulster at 8 m i l l i o n yards i n
1770, 9 m i l l i o n i n 1784 and 14.3 m i l l i o n per year i n 1816-21; this repre­
sents a fairly consistent p r o p o r t i o n o f t o t a l Irish sales, being 19 per cent i n
1770 and 1784 and 16 per cent i n 1816-21. Thus, while further research
may be necessary here, the available evidence suggests that linen weaving,
w h i c h was already i m p o r t a n t i n m u c h o f the n o r t h e r n half o f the c o u n t r y b y
1770, appears to have g r o w n outside Ulster at m u c h the same rate as i n
Ulster itself after that date; spinning certainly spread even more rapidly
outside Ulster, especially i n Connaught. B o t h developments suggest that the
class f o r m a t i o n and l a n d tenure system outside Ulster d i d n o t necessarily
preclude the development o f a large rural textile i n d u s t r y . Nevertheless, due
t o its original strength i n the north-east, the weaving and finishing o f linen
remained relatively concentrated there.
A l t h o u g h linen was the major eighteenth century i n d u s t r y , the mechanis­
ed technology o f the Industrial R e v o l u t i o n first appeared i n Ireland on a
wide scale towards the end o f the 1770s i n the c o t t o n industry, which also
led the way i n Great B r i t a i n . As Cullen and Smout (1977) show, the Irish
c o t t o n industry was probably larger and at least comparable i n size i n 1 7 8 1 86 t o that o f Scotland, which was to develop i n the Glasgow area a c o t t o n
industry second only to that o f Lancashire. D i c k s o n (1977) provides a con­
siderable volume o f evidence t o show that the industry was n o t predomin­
antly an Ulster phenomenon, b u t that i t was quite widely dispersed w i t h
D u b l i n being a larger regional centre than Belfast or C o r k . I n the 1780s and
1790s, however, the Irish industry grew m u c h more slowly than that o f
Scotland and was probably only about one-quarter o f the size o f the Scottish
industry at the t u r n o f the century. I t appears that the Irish showed a stronger
tendency to keep t o the still less mechanised linen industry, especially
fine linen, i n w h i c h they had a strong established competitive p o s i t i o n .
Also the m a i n l y coarser cottons produced i n Ireland were n o t so readily
sold b e y o n d the home market, which had the added benefit o f protective
tariffs i n the 1790s. '
B y the 1790s, according to D i c k s o n , Belfast was becoming the main
location o f c o t t o n spinning (the most highly mechanised stage o f its pro­
duction) w i t h 54.5 per cent o f Irish capacity i n 1800. The reason for this,
he argues, was the presence i n the adjacent Lagan valley o f a large workforce
of skilled weavers o f finer linens w h o could w o r k w i t h c o t t o n yarn produced
b y spinning mills. The fact that c o t t o n weaving c o u l d displace linen t o the
extent that linen weaving almost completely disappeared i n the Belfast area
i n the 1800s (Monaghan, 1942 and Green, 1949, p . 9 9 ) , w i t h o u t reducing
Irish linen o u t p u t , is a further indication that linen weaving could spread
effectively i n t o o u t l y i n g districts o f Ulster and b e y o n d . This tendency o f
the spinning mills to concentrate i n the Belfast area shows, t o o , that even
at this early stage there were signs o f a centralising tendency, i n a l o c a t i o n
w h i c h c o u l d be heavily influenced b y the existing l o c a t i o n o f related skilled
labour.
A l t h o u g h the woollen industry had been excluded f r o m e x p o r t markets
b y the A c t o f 1699 (which is i n itself an i n d i c a t i o n o f the contemporary
British industry's evaluation o f its p o t e n t i a l ) , i t had continued t o grow during
m u c h o f the eighteenth century due t o its dominance o f the home market.
B u t the situation began t o change w i t h the transformation o f the British
industry. I m p o r t s o f some cloths rose d u r i n g the 1780s, while the relatively
small exports o f worsted, made possible after the repeal o f the 1699 A c t i n
1779, declined q u i c k l y after 1785. However, the emergence o f some factory
type firms i n Ireland eventually halted the decline for a t i m e ; imports levelled
off between 1799 and 1825 despite rising demand (Cullen, 1972, p . 105).
I n some o f the non-textile industries such as brewing, glass, grain-milling
and sugar, many Irish firms, especially those i n the ports, m e t increasingly
stiff c o m p e t i t i o n from larger English firms around the 1770s. B u t the Irish
firms had mostly been successful i n reorganising on a larger scale similar t o
the English p a t t e r n during the 1770s and 1780s and thus maintained their
position (Cullen, 1972, Ch. 4 ) .
The available evidence undermines the t r a d i t i o n a l nationalist view that
British legislation prevented industrial g r o w t h i n Ireland i n the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Britain's mercantilist regulations actually bene­
fited Irish linen w h i c h became an i m p o r t a n t industry t h r o u g h o u t about half
the island. A n d although these regulations l i m i t e d the woollen industry
largely t o Irish markets, this d i d n o t prevent its expansion. I t seems, t o o ,
that the t r a d i t i o n a l nationalist view overestimated the importance o f
"Grattan's Parliament" as a cause o f industrial g r o w t h at the end o f the
eighteenth century. The g r o w t h o f that p e r i o d was n o t , i n fact, a remarkable
break w i t h past experience, nor was i t m a i n l y due to the Parliament. The
tariff p r o t e c t i o n and other encouragements given to the c o t t o n industry
were n o d o u b t o f some assistance, b u t i n view o f that industry's survival
u n t i l the c o n t r a c t i o n w h i c h began i n the 1820s, w i t h only a 10 per cent
tariff after 1816, the p r o t e c t i o n afforded to i t by the Irish Parliament
may n o t have been essential at that t i m e .
IV NINETEENTH CENTURY DECLINE
The A c t o f U n i o n removed some trade barriers between Great Britain
and Ireland immediately, b u t some tariffs such as those on woollen and
c o t t o n goods were reduced gradually and removed finally i n the early
1820s. For 25 years after the U n i o n there was l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n o f the scale
of the decline to come, b u t i n the depression of 1825-26 industry ex­
perienced major difficulties which had lasting effects i n the c o t t o n and
w o o l l e n sectors, as c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m the larger more advanced British
industries urgently seeking new markets quickened considerably and prices
fell. Many Irish w o o l l e n manufacturers • closed d o w n permanently, and
imports more than doubled between 1825 and 1835. B y 1838, the Irish
woollen industry supplied o n l y about 14 per cent o f its home market
(Cullen, 1972, Ch. 5). This decline o f the Irish industry, as Cullen points
out, was comparable to the decline of smaller British centres such as
N o r w i c h and the south-west, i n the face o f the growing dominance o f Y o r k ­
shire.
The 1820s were also traumatic for the c o t t o n industry i n Leinster and
Munster, although one particularly large vertically-integrated f i r m at Portlaw
continued to expand u n t i l the 1860s before finally collapsing i n 1874
(Dickson, 1977). I n Ulster increasing specialisation i n the weaving and em­
broidery of muslin (by hand) continued t o provide m u c h e m p l o y m e n t , b u t
a growing p r o p o r t i o n o f the yarn was i m p o r t e d from the m u c h larger
Glasgow industry and the number o f c o t t o n spinning mills i n the Belfast
area declined f r o m 22 i n 1824 t o 10 i n 1840. The contraction and decline
of c o t t o n i n Ireland, Dickson concludes, may be regarded as " o n l y one
aspect o f the general concentration of the industry on Lancashire and
Glasgow, i n the second generation of industrialisation". The absence of
coal i n Ireland and the greater external economies enjoyed at an earlier
stage by these larger British centres o f the industry, he suggests, w o u l d
explain much of their increasing competitive advantages over the Irish
industry. The importance o f coal may be doubted, as we w i l l suggest later,
b u t the train of events i n Ireland and Britain i n the textile industries was
certainly consistent w i t h the idea that increasing advantages accrued from
external economies i n ever larger centres o f the industry, which progressi­
vely eliminated smaller competitors.
I n the mid-1820s a successful process for powered spinning o f fine linen
yarn was developed for the first time and many o f the Belfast c o t t o n mills,
under severe competitive pressure, changed over t o linen (Coe, 1969, Ch. 5).
Because the linen industry had large established markets, a large p o p u l a t i o n
of skilled weavers i n the area, and existing mills and factory hands avail­
able at the time when the new technology was first developed, Belfast
was i n an excellent position to become one of the early major centres
of mechanised fine linen spinning. A c t u a l l y , machinery was developed by
1790 for spinning coarse yarn f r o m flax, b u t this had been little used i n
Ireland, probably due mainly t o lower wages than i n B r i t a i n ; a few British
centres had, therefore, captured the coarse linen trade but Irish fine linen
was unaffected.
The decline o f the w o o l l e n industry and the centralisation o f linen spinn­
ing i n Belfast had severe consequences for the rural p o o r — the landless
labourers, the cottiers and the smaller tenant farmers, for spinning had pro­
vided an i m p o r t a n t supplement t o their household incomes, especially those
i n Ulster and Connaught. I n the n o r t h and west o f Ireland, as i n other
areas o f Europe w i t h a widespread domestic textile industry before the
Industrial R e v o l u t i o n , the incidence o f this w o r k was associated w i t h a high
p o p u l a t i o n density and a relatively landless peasantry, so that i t had become
an i m p o r t a n t c o n d i t i o n for the survival o f these societies. I n Ireland, since
the decline o f domestic spinning coincided w i t h the early stages o f a longterm rise i n the price o f beef relative t o more labour-intensive agricultural
products, w h i c h began t o l i m i t the demand for labour i n agriculture, i t be­
came increasingly difficult for the still growing numbers i n the poorer
classes t o earn a living (see C r o t t y , 1966, m o d i f i e d b y Lee, 1969). Conse­
quently emigration was already growing i n the 1820s and 1830s, although
i t was o n l y during and after the Great Famine o f 1845-48 that emigration
actually led to p o p u l a t i o n decline. The severity o f the famine was due less
t o an absolute shortage o f f o o d than t o u n e m p l o y m e n t and lack o f access t o
sufficient land among the labourers, cottiers and smaller tenant farmers,
many o f w h o m came t o have l i t t l e income and t o depend heavily on smallscale c u l t i v a t i o n o f the unreliable p o t a t o crop for subsistence.
The industrial crisis i n the first half o f the century was confined to tex­
tiles. Cullen (1972, p p . 123-125) shows that other industries such as m i l l i n g ,
brewing, iron-founding, shipbuilding, rope-making, paper and glass-making
expanded at this t i m e . The growing importance o f large-scale p r o d u c t i o n
and centralisation was also evident i n these sectors since the number o f
firms declined as the larger producers, generally situated i n or near the towns,
gained larger markets w i t h the help o f improvement i n road and canal trans­
p o r t . B u t outside textiles this process had n o t yet developed t o the p o i n t
where an Irish regional market was inadequate for competitive p r o d u c t i o n .
A new industrial crisis emerged i n the 1870s, the immediate cause o f
w h i c h was the onset o f the "Great Depression" i n Britain i n 1874 leading
t o tougher c o m p e t i t i o n for markets, as well as the decline o f agricultural
demand due t o bad harvests and falling grain prices caused b y cheap N o r t h
American grain (Cullen, 1972, C h . 6 ) . B u t the crisis had deeper roots, since
in m a n y industries considerable progress had been made i n methods o f largescale p r o d u c t i o n i n Britain and elsewhere, while transport costs to Irish
markets had been reduced. A l t h o u g h Irish firms also had the benefit o f this
cheap transport, of course, i t w o u l d be reasonable to suggest that the re­
latively small, declining and dispersed nature o f local markets (as a result
of a declining agricultural p o p u l a t i o n after the 1840s and the earlier failure
of textile-based industrialisation) gave them l i t t l e incentive to introduce
new methods o f large-scale p r o d u c t i o n . B u t British or European firms, w i t h
larger, growing markets close b y , had that incentive and c o u l d then go
o n t o capture e x p o r t markets such as Ireland's. Irish industries w h i c h de­
clined f r o m (or j u s t before) this time included iron-founding, paper, bootm a k i n g , rope-making, tanning, m i l l i n g and chandling (Cullen, 1972, Ch. 6 ) .
The example o f one major success i n southern Irish industry — Guinness's
brewery — underlines the argument above. I t was n o t very surprising that a
single Irish brewery was able t o gain such a large share o f first the D u b l i n
and then the Irish market as Guinness d i d , for brewing was an industry
i n w h i c h the benefits o f large-scale p r o d u c t i o n became i m p o r t a n t quite
early. Guinness's dominance o f the Irish market combined w i t h limits on
the g r o w t h o f individual British breweries — caused by their practice o f
b u y i n g up public houses and thus cornering l i m i t e d markets — made
Guinness a p r o d u c t w h i c h could remain competitive and develop large
e x p o r t sales.
3
By the time of independence there had been no significant industrial
recovery although some light industrial products such as tobacco and boots
were being produced i n large factory-type firms for the first t i m e . However,
the insignificance o f industry i n the new Irish Free State is summed up b y the
figure mentioned earlier o f an industrial labour force o f just over 100,000.
I n B r i t a i n the major industrial areas t h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth century
were the original large textile centres such as Manchester and Glasgow;
apart f r o m Belfast there was no such centre i n Ireland for reasons already
mentioned. There were also some i m p o r t a n t industrial centres b u i l t i n areas
of rich natural resources and again none o f these developed i n Ireland for
obvious reasons. (The textile and m i n i n g centres i n Britain often v i r t u a l l y
coincided.) A n o t h e r possible leading sector w h i c h might have stimulated
some further industrialisation i n Ireland was agricultural machinery (as i n
D e n m a r k ) , b u t this possibility, t o o , was closed o f f b y the pattern o f agri­
culture, w h i c h was relatively small i n scale and increasingly dominated b y
grazing.
Towards the end o f the nineteenth century and later, a new type o f
industrial area arose i n Britain w i t h the mechanisation o f consumer metal
goods p r o d u c t i o n and the development o f new consumer durable products
such as sewing machines, bicycles, m o t o r cars and later electrical goods.
The l o c a t i o n o f these industries was determined i n part b y a t r a d i t i o n
of metal goods manufacture before mechanisation, b u t an increasingly
i m p o r t a n t factor was p r o x i m i t y to the major market i n the southern part o f
England. I n these industries, economies o f scale and specialisation became
increasingly i m p o r t a n t as technology developed, so that firms w i t h favoured
3
I am grateful to Raymond Crotty for showing me some of his unpublished work on this matter.
locations i n the south eventually w i p e d o u t the early small-scale industries
operating elsewhere. I n Belfast, for instance, bicycle and m o t o r car pro­
d u c t i o n died o u t i n the 1920s (Coe, 1969, Ch. 7). As Hobsbawm ( 1 9 7 6 ,
p.219) puts i t , " i n a broad belt stretching between the B i r m i n g h a m and
L o n d o n regions, industry grew: the new m o t o r manufacture was v i r t u a l l y
confined t o this zone. The new consumer goods factories m u l t i p l i e d along
the Great West Road o u t o f L o n d o n , while emigrants f r o m Wales and the
n o r t h moved to Coventry and Slough. Industrially, B r i t a i n was t u r n i n g
i n t o t w o nations". The decline i n the dynamism o f industry w h i c h became
evident i n Belfast soon after the First W o r l d War~was thus part o f a general
t r e n d t h r o u g h o u t the older industrial areas o f the U K . I n the rest o f Ireland,
the p o t e n t i a l for the development o f these new industries was even less
than i n the o l d industrial areas, due to the small local market and the p o o r
development o f engineering skills i n the absence o f earlier industrialisation.
T o sustain the argument that industrial decline i n most o f Ireland was
mainly connected w i t h the advantages o f relatively early development o f
large-scale and centralised p r o d u c t i o n and p r o x i m i t y to major markets, we
must refer t o some other conceivable causes o f industrial failure w h i c h may
be dismissed. As Lee (1968) shows, capital shortage was n o t a p r o b l e m
since i t was available i n sums quite adequate for i n d u s t r y . Also, the argu­
ment that the price o f coal i n Ireland was an i m p o r t a n t disadvantage was
challenged b y Kane i n 1844 and has been effectively refuted b y M o k y r
(1980). B o t h acknowledge that coal prices were several times higher i n Ire­
land than i n the m i n i n g areas o f B r i t a i n , b u t they then show that coal was
such a m i n o r part o f t o t a l p r o d u c t i o n costs that the price difference was
u n i m p o r t a n t and easily offset by cheaper labour. Figures quoted b y M o k y r
(1980) suggest that expenditure o n coal i n Irish manufacturing firms rarely
exceeded 3 or 4 per cent o f p r o d u c t i o n costs. Cheap labour, t o o , was
clearly available i n abundance, while p o o r basic education could n o t have
been a p r o b l e m since Ireland was a relatively literate society b y 1 8 4 1 . The
possibility that a lack o f competent entrepreneurship may have been a
major cause o f industrial underdevelopment can be more conveniently
considered later after examining the industrialisation o f the north-east.
4
T o what extent was the U n i o n responsible for industrial decline, as the
traditional nationalist interpretation argues? While the o l d Irish Parliament
may n o t have made an essential c o n t r i b u t i o n to the welfare o f i n d u s t r y ,
and although the U n i o n involved no legal disadvantages for Irish i n d u s t r y ,
4
The frequent location of British industrial centres at the mining areas was probably due more to
the early development there of engineering skills in the production of mining machinery, including
steam engines, than to the advantages of proximity to coal and iron sources; such an explanation is
suggested by the rather similar pattern of engineering development which arose in Belfast, starting
with textile machinery and steam engines, in the absence of local coal and iron.
the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f free trade w i t h Britain and the i n a b i l i t y o f Ireland t o
impose new tariffs as the need gradually grew greater i n the nineteenth
century was significant. I n fact, all the other countries w h i c h industrialised
successfully, after B r i t a i n , i n the nineteenth century used some degree o f
p r o t e c t i o n for a time against their more advanced competitors, especially
against B r i t a i n itself. Some writers have argued that p r o t e c t i o n w o u l d pro­
bably have done no good i n the l o n g r u n , suggesting that i t w o u l d even
have caused greater inefficiencies. B u t i t does seem clear that, given effec­
tive p r o t e c t i o n , the w o o l l e n and c o t t o n industries i n particular c o u l d have
grown and carried o n m u c h longer. I n an age o f simple and n e w l y develop­
ing technology i n w h i c h engineering industries arose to meet local needs
(unlike i n the t w e n t i e t h century, as w i t h Ireland's post-1930s protectionist
phase), the dynamic benefits for machinery and related industries could
have been o f considerable value for several generations at least, even i f
the textile industries eventually proved inefficient. The argument that
p r o t e c t i o n could have done l i t t l e good seems to give l i t t l e consideration
to the nature o f the early pattern o f development from textiles (or other
leading sectors) to a wider range o f related industries. Recognition o f this
pattern is i m p o r t a n t for an understanding o f the highly centralised nature
o f industrialisation and the consequent difficulties for industrial develop­
ment i n most o f Ireland. We n o w consider an example o f this pattern o f
development i n the Belfast area.
V THE NORTH-EAST
Industrialisation continued i n the north-east w i t h linen replacing c o t t o n
as the main mechanised industry after the 1820s. Belfast's p o p u l a t i o n
rose f r o m under 20,000 i n 1791 to 75,000 i n 1841 and close to 400,000
by the 1900s. Industrialisation also affected some smaller towns w i t h i n
about 30 miles o f Belfast.
The p r o d u c t i o n o f fine linen from flax, i n all its stages, was relatively
labour-intensive and this helped the northern Irish industry, which could
pay lower wages than the British industry (apart from wages o f skilled
men), to gain markets rapidly f r o m the British linen industry, w h i c h was
i n any case relatively small compared w i t h other textiles. As the Irish i n ­
dustry grew, linen spinning began to decline before 1860 i n England and
by 1890 i t had almost ceased there and was no longer a major industry
in Scodand. B u t although Belfast linen prospered by capturing markets
from others, the long-term prospects were n o t good. World demand for
linen began to decline before the end o f the century, although Irish out­
p u t c o n t i n u e d to grow for several decades more.
Belfast's textile industries gave rise to many i m p o r t a n t branches of
engineering, i n c l u d i n g steam engine construction. U n t i l the late nineteenth
century, the weight o f this machinery combined w i t h p o o r transport con­
ditions encouraged its p r o d u c t i o n near t o where i t w o u l d be used. A n o t h e r
advantage o f such a l o c a t i o n was the fact that for m a x i m u m efficiency steam
engines had to be designed for the particular circumstances i n w h i c h they
w o u l d w o r k . I n the first half o f the nineteenth century "any large engineering
f i r m w o u l d have been prepared to undertake the construction o f all types o f
machinery, including steam engines, i f they c o u l d secure designs or machinery
to c o p y , for specialisation d i d n o t become general u n t i l the second half o f
the nineteenth c e n t u r y " (Coe, 1969, p . 39). Thus i t was possible for nonspecialised firms i n quite a number of places in Ireland to produce them
when the demand arose locally. Consequently, as late as 1838 two-thirds
of the steam engines used i n Irish industry were made and located outside
Belfast. B u t because the number o f new installations had been increasing
fastest i n Belfast since the early 1830s as the linen industry grew and became
mechanised, Belfast overtook. D u b l i n as the main producer o f engines i n that
decade. Belfast's dominance-was already well established when specialisation
became i m p o r t a n t later. (See Coe, 1969, C h . 4 concerning this discuss­
i o n o f steam engines.)
Steam engine manufacture involved the constuction of high pressure
boilers w h i c h were different to those used at atmospheric pressure i n such
processes as distilling (Coe, 1969, Ch. 6 ) . They were replaced more
frequendy than engines and had other uses t o o , so boilermaking became a
big industry requiring many skilled men.
The g r o w t h o f boilermaking i n Belfast was crucial for the development o f
shipbuilding. For, as Coe (1969, Ch. 6) points out, Belfast was at no disad­
vantage t o places such as Cork through having lagged behind i n wooden ship­
b u i l d i n g since "the building of i r o n ships was n o t a further extension o f
wooden shipbuilding, b u t a different craft, a development o f boilermaking.
Thus the first i r o n vessel launched i n Belfast was constructed, n o t i n one o f
the existing shipbuilding yards, b u t i n the engineering and boilermaking f i r m
of V i c t o r Coates & C o . " That was i n 1838 when Belfast had just become the
main producer o f steam engines and boilers i n Ireland. B u t i r o n shipbuilding
remained a relatively small industry t h r o u g h o u t the U K for some t i m e , and
when i t began to expand decisively Belfast was the one place i n Ireland
that offered the necessary conditions — i.e., skills and related engineering
industries as well as a favourable physical setting — for a major i r o n ship­
building i n d u s t r y .
The origins o f the f i r m o f Harland & W o l f f support the view that Belfast
was particularly suited for this industry because o f the fact that local de­
m a n d had already led to the p r o d u c t i o n o f boilers f r o m heavy i r o n plates.
I n 1 8 5 1 , the Belfast i r o n w o r k s was opened, pledged to make i r o n plates
for local industries f r o m the meagre Irish supplies o f coal and ore. I t was
soon forced o u t o f business b y competing imports and the owner William
Hickson h i t o n the idea o f t u r n i n g his surplus stocks i n t o i r o n ships
(Goldstrom, 1968). Hickson had the right idea b u t he knew l i t t l e about
shipbuilding and the venture was saved only b y the manager he recruited
f r o m England, Edward Harland. Harland soon bought o u t the f i r m , t o o k
W o l f f as a partner, and they b u i l t up the company that became the second
largest shipbuilder i n the U K b y the 1900s.
A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t industry i n the north-east was the p r o d u c t i o n o f
machinery for preparing and spinning flax, and later for other similar hard
fibres such as hemp, j u t e and sisal. Again there are good reasons w h y this
industry developed there since a close association between machine makers
and users benefited b o t h parties. Coe ( 1 9 6 9 , C h . 5) quotes a commentator
i n 1874 w h o said the Belfast machine-making establishments were "surround­
ed b y spinning mills and were visited almost daily b y the spinners, w h o thus
were able t o see the progress being made i n the execution o f their orders,
and t o p o i n t o u t their exact requirements and the defects o f previous
machines". Machinery for preparing and spinning flax was also produced i n
British linen centres, b u t as they became eclipsed b y the Belfast linen industry,
the Belfast machine-makers grew more competitive and captured export
markets f r o m them.-sCoe also points o u t that because c o t t o n machinery d i d
n o t l e n d itself to preparing and spinning hard fibres such as flax, Belfast
machine-makers were n o t i n c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the larger more advanced
industry p r o d u c i n g such machinery for c o t t o n . Thus the Belfast industry
could become the largest and most advanced i n the w o r l d i n its o w n field.
Other industries arose later i n the north-east, n o t in response to local
demand, b u t rather due to the availability o f skills, marketing organisation
and other advantages o f a large manufacturing centre w h i c h developed earlier
due to local demand, b u t could be t u r n e d to specialised manufacture o f new
products for other markets. One outstanding example o f this was Davidson
& Co., the first producer o f tea-drying equipment i n the 1880s and supplier
of 70 per cent o f the w o r l d market for i t i n the 1930s (Coe, 1969, Ch. 8 ) .
T h r o u g h their pioneering development o f fans for this equipment, Davidson's
came t o be major producers o f ventilating and heating equipment for ships,
factories, mines etc.; they even supplied most o f the ventilating fans for the
ships w h i c h made up the German First W o r l d War battle fleet. Probably
similar factors — the existence o f supporting engineering industries, skilled
labour and (as Cullen, 1972, p . 161 suggests) advantages i n the organisation
of e x p o r t trade — made Belfast a large centre o f p r o d u c t i o n and export
of f o o d , d r i n k and tobacco.
T o support the argument
that significant industrial development was
generally only possible, i n a competitive environment, where particular
industries were established relatively early and o n a relatively large scale,
i t is useful t o consider briefly some sectors w h i c h d i d not develop or succeed
for l o n g , even i n Belfast. Thus, despite the existence o f a c o t t o n industry
u n t i l the 1820s and later, the manufacture o f c o t t o n spinning machinery
never became i m p o r t a n t due to c o m p e t i t i o n from larger more advanced
specialists i n B r i t a i n . Furthermore, because the power looms w h i c h were
eventually developed for weaving linen were somewhat m o d i f i e d versions o f
those used for c o t t o n , Belfast machine-makers were never major suppliers
o f power looms t o the linen industry — again, (as Coe 1969, p . 69) argues,
due to c o m p e t i t i o n f r o m British specialists i n c o t t o n looms.
The experience o f Irish iron-founding is significant t o o . When general
iron-founding, w h i c h was widespread t h r o u g h o u t the island, suffered f r o m
increasingly British c o m p e t i t i o n i n the later part o f the nineteenth century,
the industry i n the north-east declined i n m u c h the same way, w i t h the
significant exception o f firms specialising i n parts for machinery being made
locally (Coe, 1969, Ch. 3 ) . Part o f this general decline was the drop i n pro­
d u c t i o n o f agricultural implements and machinery w h i c h was hastened b y
the relatively small size o f Irish farms and the decrease i n tillage. Again,
firms i n this industry i n the north-east fared no better, and i n some cases
worse, than those i n the south. Similar remarks about the failure o f parti­
cular engineering industries i n the north-east, due to the absence o f a suffi­
ciently large local market and the existence o f specialised producers else­
where, apply to locomotives and most machine tools, as well as the new
generation o f consumer durables (Coe, 1969, Chs. 7-9).
T o conclude these remarks on the north-east, i t may be said that, whatever
the shortcomings o f the B&ICO's explanation, one c o u l d accept their
p o i n t that the north-east became a closely integrated and developed part o f
the U K industrial economy, depending heavily on trade w i t h Britain and the
empire. I n contrast, i t emerged that the competitive advantage o f the rest o f
Ireland — faced, under free trade, w i t h the dominance o f the large, earlier
established industrial centres o f Britain — lay m a i n l y i n agriculture, and i n ­
deed a type o f agriculture w h i c h required diminishing inputs o f labour.
Whatever one's views about the merits o f free trade i n terms o f purely
economic efficiency, and despite the benefits o f free trade for certain
classes, i t was scarcely surpising that m u c h o f the southern national inde­
pendence movement regarded the resulting heavy emigration, p o p u l a t i o n
decline and social disruption as politically unacceptable. M a n y i n this move­
m e n t thus became c o m m i t t e d to economic, as well as p o l i t i c a l separation
from the U K , i n the f o r m o f the establishment o f protective trade barriers
and the encouragement o f tillage. (This policy was n o t , i n fact, fully i m ­
plemented u n t i l the 1930s, 10 years after the establishment o f the Free
\
State.) This s i t u a t i o n , and the fact that the southern national independence movement defined Irish i d e n t i t y i n a way that i n effect excluded
the non-Catholic and non-Gaelic c o m m u n i t y o f the north-east, is a more
appropriate starting p o i n t for an understanding o f P a r t i t i o n than a conception
of all Ireland as naturally one economy and society which came to be
artificially divided.
We can n o w r e t u r n to consider the argument that poor entrepreneurship
was the main cause o f industrial underdevelopment i n most of Ireland.
Lee ( 1 9 7 3 , p . 15) instanced the story, referred to above, o f Hickson and
Harland at the t i m e o f the f o u n d a t i o n o f Harland & W o l f f as an example
i n support o f this view, arguing that where Hickson failed the i m m i g r a n t
entrepreneur, Harland, showed what could be achieved. B u t this overlooks
the p o i n t that, although Harland was the more talented o f the t w o , b o t h
he and H i c k s o n evidentiy agreed that the situation offered an excellent
o p p o r t u n i t y to b u i l d i r o n ships; and, as was argued above, conditions i n
Belfast were indeed exceptionally good for such a venture. Lee also points
o u t that many other industries were developed i n Belfast b y entrepreneurs
w h o included many new British immigrants, w i t h local businessmen be­
coming more p r o m i n e n t only later. B u t these examples, like the case o f
Harland, do n o t prove the p o i n t that competent Irish businessmen c o u l d
have fostered more widespread industrialisation. Rather they show that
exceptional opportunities for profitable industrial development existed
i n the north-east t o attract such people w h o might reasonably have been
expected t o p e r f o r m a similar f u n c t i o n , i f possible, i n the south. The reason
w h y many early industrial entrepreneurs i n Belfast were immigrants was
probably because they had greater engineering experience at an earlier date
due to the earlier and more extensive development o f such industries i n
Britain arising f r o m the earlier mechanisation o f c o t t o n (and perhaps m i n i n g ) .
Lee (1968) also suggested that Irish capitalists showed examples o f p o o r
enterprise i n n o t investing i n railways or banks u n t i l after British capital
bore the i n i t i a l risks. B u t concerning railways, i t must be recognised that
the p e r i o d referred to was notable for the "railway m a n i a " rampant among
British capitalists. Hobsbawm (1976) says that a great deal o f British capital
"was sunk i n t o railways, and m u c h o f i t was sunk w i t h o u t trace, because
by the 1830s there were vast accumulations o f capital b u r n i n g holes i n their
owner's pockets. . . " I n these circumstances, the relative slowness o f Irish
investment i n railways does n o t necessarily indicate excessive caution.
Furthermore, Hobsbawm c o u l d say o f Europe as a whole "inevitably we f i n d
the first railways — and bften the b u l k o f railways — b u i l t b y British contrac­
tors, w i t h British locomotives, rails, technical staff and capital". Ireland
simply f i t t e d i n t o the general p a t t e r n . As regards the banks, i t seems l i k e l y
that the reluctance o f Irish investors to take advantage immediately o f the
\
a b o l i t i o n o f the Bank o f Ireland's m o n o p o l y o f j o i n t - s t o c k banking i n 1821
was related t o the discouraging events o f the Irish b a n k i n g crisis o f the pre­
vious year, i n w h i c h a number o f private banks failed.
T h a t business enterprise was n o t generally absent when opportunities
existed was suggested b y the efficient reorganisation and g r o w t h o f most
non-textile industries, along lines similar t o Britain's after the 1770s and i n
the first half o f the nineteenth century, as well as b y the satisfactory develop­
m e n t o f d i s t r i b u t i o n and transport. B u t whatever the q u a l i t y o f local business
enterprise, the fact that British capital and entrepreneurs d i d get involved
i n the Irish economy i n some sectors, such as railways and banks, and i n the
north-east i n particular — b u t n o t on a more general scale — suggests that
untapped profitable opportunities for wider industrialisation were n o t
particularly evident t o t h e m either.
V I CONCLUSION
I n nineteenth century Ireland many o f the local conditions often regard­
ed as major requirements for industrialisation — such as supplies o f capital,
cheap labour, a basic education system and competent entrepreneurs —
were n o t particularly unfavourable. Rather the industrial decline was m a i n l y
connected w i t h the advantages o f large-scale and centralised p r o d u c t i o n
f r o m the early stages o f mechanisation, as well as p r o x i m i t y t o large markets.
These factors generally w o r k e d against Irish i n d u s t r y , except i n the n o r t h ­
east, and i n favour o f competitors elsewhere. The experience o f Irish i n ­
dustry under the U n i o n may be regarded as an example o f the fact that,
even given quite favourable local conditions, free market forces can b y no
means be relied on t o generate industrial development, or even t o sustain
existing e m p l o y m e n t , i n a relatively late-developing economy i n close
c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h more advanced industrial countries. M u c h o f the literature
o n issues o f industrialisation i n late-developing countries ( w h i c h w o u l d
include Ireland) i n modern times w o u l d argue that a similar conclusion
still applies.
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