China`s Gathering Amphibious and Airborne Expeditionary

China’s Gathering Amphibious and
Airborne Expeditionary Capabilities
Richard D. Fisher Jr., Senior Fellow
International Assessment and Strategy Center
www.strategycenter.net
For IDGA’s Amphibious Operations Summit
May 21, 2012
Credit for LHD photo here and slide 16 : DTM
Summary
China’s Communist Party leadership views the acquisition of greater global power as necessary to sustain its political dictatorship.
As China deploys increasingly modern and long-range naval and air assets, there will be an increase in China-US military posturing
combined with both coercive and cooperative diplomacy.
China is using its considerable and growing “soft power” to leverage strategic influence.
China’s record of participation in Peace Mission exercises is one of increasing sophistication.
By the 2020s ,China could have a force of 4 to 5 aircraft carriers and up to 12 large amphibious assault ships.
PLA development of modern carrier fighters and possible STOVL fighters will put it on a near par with the U.S. Navy and Marine
air forces.
Both PLA Marine, and much larger PLA Army Amphibious, forces have stressed increasing mechanization and firepower.
Current limited formal PLA airlift assets could be expanded considerably with civilian “militia” cargo lift.
Expected development of the “Y-20” could give the PLA an airlifter similar in capability to the C-17.
Formal PLA Airborne forces have been mechanized over the last decade, and new medium-weight armor and the Y-20 will give the
PLA a formidable future air expeditionary capability.
China’s space program is a PLA-Space program to the Moon and beyond, and the PLA will derive “dual use” benefits all along the
way toward controlling the “Earth-Moon System.”
Bottom Line: By the 2020s , US Marines will not be alone in the Expeditionary business, and may have a tough competitor.
Indications of China’s Expeditionary Power Projection Ambitions
“we will not seek hegemony…” -- Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guangli, June 5,
2011 Singapore
This common phrase used by Chinese officials for decades belies China’s requirement to exercise greater world
leadership in order for China’s Communist Party to sustain its continued dictatorship. The last decade has
provided significant indicators that China will seek military power commensurate with its economic power.
1. Increasing dependence on overseas resources and markets creates strong interest in a globally-capable navy
to secure maritime access—don’t want to depend on Washington.
2. December 2004, new “Historic Missions” for the PLA announced by the Communist Party Leadership, to
include increasingly defending the Party’s interests abroad.
3. For the first time, the 2011 Defense White Paper highlights “Maintaining World Peace and Stability” as a
major mission for China’s military.
4. From 2007 onward, Chinese academics and officials debate whether China should seek overseas military
bases, while investing in the “String of Pearls” -- building new civil port facilities that could in the future lead to
naval access. In November 2011, China “invited” to base anti-piracy forces in the Seychelles.
5. The need to secure the South China Sea and East China Sea for military and resource goals necessitates new
military forces able to operate 1000+km from China’s shores.
6. “Land-locked” Shanghai Cooperation Organization trends toward being far more “maritime” with potential
addition of Pakistan, India and Iran as formal members.
7. Preparing to control the Earth-Moon System and reach the “ultimate high ground,” the Moon — strategic
position and Helium-3.
Early 2011: China-US-Neighbors Military Interaction
March 4: The Philippines files a protest with China over an incident near the Reed Bank in which Manila said two
Chinese patrol boats threatened to ram a survey ship.
March 28: The Philippines says it has increased air and naval patrols and plans to upgrade an airstrip on an island
it occupies in the South China Sea to strengthen its claim on the disputed area.
April 13: The Philippines protests to the United Nations over China's claim's to disputed areas in the South China
Sea, saying Beijing's stance has no basis under international law.
May 18: PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli visits Singapore.
May 20-21: Chinese survey ships spotted off of Palawan; PLA fighters intercept Philippine OV-10s on patrol.
May 27: Vietnam says three Chinese patrol boats challenged a Vietnamese ship exploring for oil in the South
China Sea, damaging equipment and warning the ship that it was violating Chinese territory.
May 28: China criticizes Vietnam for its offshore exploration of oil and gas in the South China Sea.
June 1: Manila says Chinese navy boats erected pillars, set a buoy and unloaded materials near Amy Douglas Bank,
inside the Philippines exclusive economic zone, and says any construction would violate a the code of conduct.
June 1st week: 11 PLAN ship formation spotted by Japanese aircraft near Ryukus.
June 5: U.S. Sec Def Robert Gates suggests U.S. may want to station two new Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore.
June 5: China's Defense Minister Liang Guangli in Singapore tells an Asian defense forum that his country's growing economic and military
power was not a threat, saying Beijing is not seeking hegemony and will not threaten any country.
June 5: PLA and Indonesian Special Forces in Indonesia for exercise “Sharp Knife 2011.”
June 8: China steps up criticism of the Philippines in a fresh exchange of invective over disputed waters, calling on Manila to stop infringing its
sovereignty with irresponsible claims over the South China Sea..
June 11: Vietnam announces live fire drill, and welcomes international support to maintain peace in the “Eastern Sea.”
June 12: 11 ship PLA Navy force exercises east of Taiwan.
June 12: Taiwan legislator calls for redeployment of Marines to Taiping Island, the major Taiwan island in the Spratly Group.
June 13: Vietnam holds live-fire exercise off of coast.
June 13: Reports that the U.S. will send to destroyers to exercise with Philippines Navy near Palawan.
June 13: Reports that China will move a new huge oil exploration rig into the South China Sea.
June 14: People’s Liberation Army Daily resolutely “opposes any country unrelated to the South China Sea issue meddling in disputes,
and it opposes the internationalisation of the South China Sea issue.”
June 14: Chinese Foreign Ministry says China will not use force or threat of force in South China Sea.
June 14: Two U.S. Senators co-sponsor resolution critical of China’s actions in South China Sea, call for U.S. leadership in mediation.
June 14: U.S. Ambassador in Manila states, “The Philippines and the US are strategic allies. We will continue to consult and work with each
other on all issues, including [the] South China Sea and Spratly Islands.”
June 16: Singapore Center for International Law conference on joint development of South China Sea.
June 17: China starts three days of military exercises in the South China Sea.
June 20: Chinese reports say maritime surveillance personnel will increase to 15,000 from 9,000.
June 28: U.S. Navy destroyers arriving in Palawan for Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises.
Early 2012: China-US-Neighbor Military Interaction—After the US “Pivot”
Oct-Nov 2011: Sec. State Clinton then President Obama make clear the U.S. “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia.
Early April, 2012: US Air Force “Operation Chimichanga” exercise reportedly prepares for long-range strikes against China.
April 8-10: Chinese trawlers intercepted in Scarborough Shoal by Philippine Navy; two Chinese Fisheries protection ships appear.
April 14: After week of intense standoff, apparent stand down reversed as China sends new ships to Shoal.
April 15: 28th Philippine-US Balikatan exercises begin; US and Philippine troops exercise on Palawan Island.
April 15: In North Korea’s military parade, a new North Korean ICBM is revealed to be carried by a Chinese-made TEL.
April 22-27: 18 PLA Navy ships and 7 Russian Pacific Fleet ships hold exercises.
April 24: Chinese Y-12 patrol aircraft buzzes Japanese destroyer in East China Sea.
May 8: Japan MSDF reports formation of five PLAN ships led by LPD 988 are 650km Southwest of Okinawa, amid continued
standoff at Scarborough Shoal. Preceded by weeks of intensifying Chinese government approved vitriol against Manila.
May 7: In a Pentagon press con, PLA Defense Minister Liang Guanglie implies his visit was a response to Washington’s 2011
decision not to sell new F-16s to Taiwan. Liang visits LCAC in San Diego, rides MV-22 and tours F-15E base.
May 11: Chinese government denies that its Guangzhou MR and South Sea Fleet have entered state of “combat readiness.”
May 11: Thailand sends 126 of its Marines to China to begin exercise “Blue Commando 2012.”
May 15: USS North Carolina, SSN 777, makes port call at Subic Bay.
“Soft” Military Power Projection
Ten PLA Navy squadrons sent to anti-piracy patrols off of Somalia since the end of 2008.
Increasing interaction and demonstrations for Foreign Military Attaches; increasing global naval interaction.
China now one of the largest contributors to UN sponsored peacekeeping operations; 2/11 PLA General Cmdr of Cyprus PKO
Participating in multinational naval exercises sponsored by Pakistan and Singapore.
PLA Air Force exercises Turkish Air Force, September 2010, with Pakistan AF in April 2011.
Increasing military interaction in Southeast Asia: PLA Marines to Thailand October 2010 ; PLA Spec Ops to Indonesia in June
2011; host Thai Marines in May 2012; muted interest in joint ASEAN military exercises in 2008
Willingness to consider joint operations: Indonesia-PLA joint maritime patrols in 2010
Greater promotion of military arms sales, CETC at FIDAE, Chile, March 2012.
Hospital ship cruise to Cuba and Caribbean in late 2011-2012.
Seychelles: First Overseas PLA “Base” ?
December 2, 2011 “invitation” by Seychelles President James Michel to visiting Defense Minister Liang
Guanglie preceded by “offer” to host a Chinese military presence as early as a year before.
Offer also preceded by significant diplomacy: economic aid for Seychelles; Peace Ark hospital ship visit
in October 2010; two PLA Navy frigates visit in April 2011; gifting of two Y-12 aircraft in June 2011.
Seychelles has publicly mentioned it has discussed stationing of Chinese Y-12s for anti-piracy patrols,
though ship logistic support is likely under consideration.
The Seychelles has hosted U.S. drones since 2009, which have been used for anti-terror and anti-piracy
missions.
PEACE MISSION 2005—In China—PLA Army+PLA Navy+ PLAAF
August 2005, Shandong Peninsula—moved from Fujian Province
First time PRC invites a foreign military for exercises on its territory; 20,000 total troops
Tri-service exercises; Russia sends Backfire bombers, Su-27, ABN, Naval Infantry
Naval exercises near Vladivostok; air exercises; joint amphib landing
Peace Mission 2007—To Russia—PLA Army + PLAAF
August 9-17, 2007;
1st foreign deployment of PLA units—to Russia
PLAAF joint force Cmdr; Hu Jintao attends
New “projection” strategies formulated
1,600-1,700 troops from Nanjing and Beijing MRs
ABN, JH-7A fighter bombers, Z-9G attack helos by air;
WZ551 IFVs and PTL02 anti-tank by rail
Peace Mission 2009—In China—PLA Army + PLAAF
July 22-26, 2009
Taonan Combined Tactical Training Base, Shenyang MR
About 3,000 total troops
Followed high profile Xinjiang riots
Peace Mission 2010—In Almaty, Kazakhstan—PLA Army + PLAAF
September 9-26, 2010
Represents “exercises becoming institutionalized and standardized…strategic projection gradually increased,
and gradually resolve our lack of training in foreign countries.”
1,000 PLA troops sent; T-99 tank, PTL02 anti-tank, WZ551; Type 95 AAA, PCL03 122mm sp arty, “Humvee”
First foreign use of complex PLAAF force of H-6 bombers, J-10 fighters, H-6 tankers and KJ-2000 AWACS
First joint “projection” across the Chinese border that involved “airpower” supporting ground forces, albeit in
a staged exercise
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Aircraft Carriers
First STOBAR carrier transferred from Ukraine in 2002; rebuilt; 7x trials by May 2012; first jet aircraft tests expected in 2012;
may start training/exercises/demonstrations by 2015.
Electronics and systems development/training carrier being completed in Wuhan.
February 2009: Asahi Shimbun reports from Chinese sources that two nuclear powered carriers will be built in the 2020s,
following the construction of two non-nuclear powered carriers.
May 2012: Taiwan’s National Security Bureau director states China will build two carriers starting in 2013 and 2015, with
delivery expected by 2020 and 2022.
Carrier training in North Sea Fleet, first major carrier base in Sanya on Hainan Island.
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Gathering Carrier Air Wing
Speculation: Shenyang J-15 and Boeing F/A-18E/F
China’s Potential Carrier Fighters Vs Boeing F/A-18E/F
Boeing F/A-18E/F
Block 2
Shenyang J-11B+/J-15
(data estimated)
Multi Role: Anti-Air and
Ground/Naval Attack Capable
Yes
Yes
G Limit
Wing Area
Max wing loading (less is
better)
Engine
+7.6
500 sqft
132 lbs/sqft
8+
666sqft
@100lbs/sqft
2x GE-414-400
(2x 22,000 lbs thrust)
2x WS-10A
(2x 29,106lbs)
Aerial Refueling
Yes
Yes
Supercruise potential
None
None
Thrust vectoring
Helmet Display
No
Joint Helmet Mounted
Cuing System
Available option
Yes
AESA Radar
AN/APG-79
Range: 150+km ?(air
target)
Tracking ?; Targeting: ?
Soon will feature a
Chinese developed AESA
radar
High Off-Boresight Air to Air
Missile
Self-Guided BVR AAM
AIM-9X 10-20km range
PL-10, 10-20km range
AIM-120D, @100km
range
PL-12 70-100km range
Very Long Range BVR Missile
Development of ramjet
powered AAM
cancelled in 2011.
Ramjet powered AAM in
development; estimate
100-200km range
Anti-Ship Missile
AGM-84H SLAM-ER,
270km range
“YJ-62” 500+ km range;
C-803K , 200+km; YJ-91,
110km range
Source: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft; Jane’s Air Launched Weapons; Yefim Gordon and Peter
Davidson; press reports; interview data; and author estimates
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD)
3x Type 071 LPD launched; two in the South Sea Fleet, up to 6 expected.
14-20,000tons displacement; 800-1,000 troop capacity; 2-3 Z-8 size helicopters; 3-4 LCAC hovercraft in well deck.
Well deck can also accommodate 30+ ZBD-05 size armored fighting vehicles; additional space for heavy tanks.
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Type 081 ?
Existence of LHD program to compliment LPD program first reported in 2006, confirmed in May 2007 at
IMDEX show in Singapore. Reports indicate the PLA Navy may acquire up to six LHDs.
While the subject of considerable speculation, in April 2012 at a Bangkok arms show the China Shipbuilding
Co. reveals a new model of a LHD that shows considerable influence from the French Mistral design.
Specs: 20,000 tons; 180 meters; capacity for 1,000 troops; 2x Type 730 CIWS; 4x 25mm guns.
Well deck not shown on model, but assumed to be there. No. of aircraft and vehicle capacity unknown.
Army Expeditionary Asset: Amphibious Army
Modernization and expansion of Army amphibious capabilities has been a
key focus for PLA Army modernization.
In the last decade an estimated 25 infantry and armored divisions and brigades
have conducted some kind of amphibious training, or about a quarter of the
total force.
Leading amphibious would be followed by more numerous regular units.
While the main focus in against Taiwan, there is ample capability to support
Korean, South China Sea and Vietnam scenarios.
Mechanization has seen two generations of new amphibious vehicles enter
leading amphibious units in the last decade.
Armored units include the new 3rd gen ZBD05 tank/IFV family and increasingly, the
T-96 medium tank. 2nd gen T-63C amphib tank only now with 31st Group Army.
There has also been a clear emphasis on gathering the requisite specialized
engineering and beach breaching systems to support amphib ops.
There is a distinct lack of formal amphibious lift that would have to be
supplemented by ships taken up from trade (STUFT).
Estimated PLA Army Leading And Follow-on Amphibious Capable Units
Nanjing MR
1st Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV
1st Group Army
10th Armored DIV
9th Artillery DIV
3rd Motorized BDE
5th Army Aviation RGT
st
86th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV
31 Group Army
Armored BDE
10th Army Aviation RGT
th
179th Special Landing BDE
12 Group Army
Guangzhou MR
124th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV
42st Group Army
9th Armored BDE
163rd Motorized Infantry DIV
1st Artillery DIV
6th Army Aviation RGT
41st Group Army
Jinan MR
54th Group Army
123rd Amphibious Mechanized Infantry DIV
Armored BDE
132nd BDE (Hainan Island)
121 Motorized Infantry DIV
11th Armored DIV (?)
1st Army Aviation RGT
Naval Expeditionary Asset: PLA Marines
Subordinate to the PLA Navy
Two Brigades based near South Sea Fleet HQ of Zhanjiang
Taiwan and South China Sea focus
Marines contributed to PeaceMission 2005 and to Gulf of
Aden missions; small garrisons for Paracel/Spratly islands
No organic aviation assets, relies on PLA Naval Aviation
Joint exercises with Army Amphib units
Will likely have access to more helicopters, perhaps future
VSTOL fighters, following entry of Type 081 LHD
PLA Marines
Unit
HQ
Year Founded
Zhanjiang, South Sea Fleet
1980
1st Brigade
1997
164th Brigade Zhanjiang, South Sea Fleet
Total Troops: 12,000
Brigade Structure:
1-2 BTN Amphib Armored, each w/ 30-40 ZBD-05, T-63A tanks
4-5 BTN Amphib Infantry, each w/ 30-40 ZBD-05 IFV, T-63C APC
1 BTN Arty w/ Type 89 or PLZ 07B 122mm SP arty
1 Amphib Recon Unit
1 BTN Missile w/ ATGW and shoulder launched SAMs
1 BTN Engineer and Chemical Defense
1 BTN Communication and Guards
I BTN Maintence
Investing in Specialized Amphibious Assault Systems
“Informatization” enables increasing “jointness” with other services.
Purchasing/producing up to 4-6 Ukrainian Zubr large hovercraft; 3x MBT or 10 APC + 140 troops or 500 troops
Specialized beach obstacle breaching rockets launched from LCUs
Specialized beach breaching surfacing for vehicles
Experimentation with artillery on civilian ships; MLRS put on older ships
3rd Gen ZBD05 Amphib Family vs U.S. Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)
Weight
Water Speed
Versions
Armament: Gun
ZBD05 vs EFV
20+ tons
@12-15kts
IFV, Tank, Command, ARG
IFV: 30mm cannon
Tank: 105mm gun w/
Armament:
Missile
Laser-guided gun launched
missile for tank; HJ-3 for IFV
None
Crew/Troops
Status
3/9
In service in PLA Army and
Marine units since 20062007; about 500+ in service
3/17
Cancelled
38tons
25kts
IFV/Command
30mm cannon
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Type 07B/ PLZ07B 122mm gun armed amphibious howitzer
First seen in November 2009; by mid-2012 about 130 are deployed in PLA Army amphibious and PLA Marine
artillery units. Weight: close to 20 metric tons. Uses wave plane derived from that on ZBD-05.
Derived from the Norinco PLZ-07A, which is non amphibious, of which about 260 have been built since 2008.
This variant has also been seen participating in amphibious exercises; requires transport to beach by LST or LCU.
Such an amphibious howitzer is unique to the PLA and provides heavy fire support for opposed landings, perhaps
to compensate for the PLA’s lack of sufficient air support for amphibious assaults during the current period.
Type 726 vs U.S. Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Type 726 Hovercraft
Model revealed in 2005; prototype emerges in 2007.
First distant deployment in 2010.
One built; engines for two more built in 2011.
Type 726 (1)
LCAC
Deployed
2009-2010
1982
Length
33m
26.4m
Width
16.8m
14.3m
Deck Length
28.8
20.4mm
Engines
2x QC-70 turbofan,
7,000kw each
4x TF-40/ ETF-40B
turbofan, 3,400kw each
Weight
170 tons
165 tons
Payload
60 tons
60-75 tons
Speed
50 kts ?
40-70 kts
Range
200 nm
200nm
1.
Estimates, though from a Chinese source.
Naval Expeditionary Asset: Possible Program for STOVL Fighter
In early 2005 this analyst was told of the Chengdu Aircraft Co.’s interest in a “F-35 like program” by a Chinese
source, which might have meant that a possible program decision was meant for the next, 2006, Five Year Plan.
Numerous Russian and Chinese sources have noted the PLA’s high interest in the Russian Yak-131 STOVL
fighter. Though it yielded troubled prototypes, Yakovlev reportedly proposed better version of the Yak-131.
On or about April 18, 2012, the Asahi Shimbun reported that a “J-18” V/STOL fighter had been tested.
Air Expeditionary Asset: Current Lift
@ 20 Ilyushin Il-76MD transports, 40-50 tons cargo capacity. Lingering chance of buying 30-40 more.
@ 20-30 Xian Y-8 medium transports, 18-20 tons cargo capacity.
Xian Y-9, modern medium transport with a 20 ton capacity, sees first prototype in 2011.
Huge potential for cargo lift in civil airlines integrated into “militia” support: Up to 80+ Boeing 747F, 777F, 757F; and 737
Combi + @ 10 DC-10F cargolifters. This total would include Hong Kong airlines. This asset is increasingly exploited for
PLA trans-regional mobility exercises, and could be used for follow-on force inputs after airports are captured by formal
PLA Airborne or Special Forces units. April 2012: First exposure of China Southern B747F carrying ZBD-03 ABN IFV.
1,000+ civil Boeing and Airbus airliners also available for “militia” support operations.
@20 H-6 refuels in PLAAF and PLANAF, PLAAF exercises with Russian Il-76MD refuelers.
Air Expeditionary Asset: Xian “Y-20” Strategic Transport, Appearance Imminent
Program likely dates to 2001 Five Year Plan, prototype could emerge in 2012 or 2013.
Four turbofan transport; 50 to 60 ton cargo capacity.
Benefitting from Ukrainian (Antonov) and Russian technology inputs.
Two-to-three indigenous Chinese 30,000 lbs thrust high bypass turbofan programs may support Y-20.
Or it could initially use Russian turbofan engines.
Air Expeditionary Asset: Potential Refueler, Xian 4-Turbofan Passenger Transport
Images emerge in 2005 time frame, indicating it may be a program dating to 2001 Five Year Plan.
Despite repeated inquiries, Chinese officials from AVIC and Xian will not explain this program.
In December 2006, Premier Wen Jiabao was famously photographed by a model of this airliner concept.
It appears to be a wide-body aircraft similar in size to the Boeing 767, which would require about 4x of the
30,000 lbs thrust turbofans being developed by China.
In late May 2012, China’s COMAC and Russia’s Ilyushin sign pact to co-develop a widebody airliner based
on Il-96. Production may take place in China, meaning that China could produced its own version with
Russian technology, repeating the history of Sukhoi Su-27 “co-production” in China.
This aircraft will likely be used for multiple military missions by China, such as a refueling platform to enable
global reach for a future “Y-20” heavylift transport.
Air Expeditionary Asset: 15th Airborne Corp
15th Airborne Army (HQ: Xiaogan, Hubei, Guangzhou MR)
Division
43rd ABN Div
Special Operations Unit 43rd Div
44th ABN Div
45th ABN Div
Headquarters
Kaifeng, Henan Province
High priority for modernization in last decade.
1 ABN Corps; 3 ABN Divisions, @35,000 troops
Guangshui, Hubei Province
Under Direct Command of CMC as Rapid Reaction Unit.
Wuhan, Hubei Province
Strategy/Doctrine indicators toward “independent”
and “decisive” operations; significant influence from Russian VDV.
Taiwan priority, but also exercises in Tibet, Chengdu quake.
Increasing mechanization: ZBD-03 IFV, also basis for new tracked carrier; light trucks, SUVs, and jeeps.
Artillery: towed 122mm; 107mm MLR; 25mm AAA; MANPADS; 60mm mortar; ATGM; PF98 rockets.
Use of Russian “Shelf” ram-air cushion landing system.
Air Projection: PLA 15th Airborne Corp Airfield Attack Exercise, 2011
New Addition: Organic Helicopter Units for the 15th ABN
2x Regiments of 18x Z-9W Attack Helicopters, likely starting after 2005
No indication they are “air droppable” but likely can be moved to support internal or regional scenarios.
In May 2012, a Chinese report notes that the Jingdazhen helicopter combine is in the process of expanding its
production facilities to support production of nearly 300 helicopters a year by 2017 time frame.
Air Expeditionary Asset: Future Medium Weight Armor
Advent of the “Y-20” will allow airborne projection of new medium weight armor mechanized units now
being built for the PLA Army.
The Norinco ZBD-09 18-25+ ton 8x8 APC family includes: IFV; 105mm tank gun armed; 122mm
howitzer armed; command; recovery/repair; and ambulance.
The Poly Type 07P 8x8 APC family is less developed, but includes: IFV, 120mm mortar and 105mm gun
armed versions.
There is also the “Yitian,” a SAM/MG armed 6x6 air defense APC.
So far the PLA Army has not yet developed mechanized armor/infantry units based fully on wheeled
medium-weight armored combat and support vehicles, but existing divisions and brigades are gaining
increasing numbers of new subordinate units based on these new medium weight vehicles.
Space Projection: PLA Moon Base by 2049 ?
Informal Chinese sources suggest Moon landing by 2024, Moon Base by 2049.
PLA controls China’s manned and unmanned space program; both designed to benefit the PLA.
All Shenzhou capsule and the first Tiangong pre-space station all performed military missions.
The Shenzhou-7 mission could be viewed as combat interception exercise against the International Space
Station.
Change-3 soft Moon lander scheduled for 2013 may have “scientific” payload of a radar and laser rangefinder.
Chinese space officials often justify their Moon program to ensure China gets its share of Helium-3, which it
may use for its expected fusion energy program.
It is very likely that when the PLA goes to the Moon it will do so to gain military advantage.
Thankfully, Marines are not strangers to this theater of operations.