A conversation with Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder
Transcription
A conversation with Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder
The giant of developmental psychology and his collaborator talk about children — how they learn, when they learn, what they learn. Jean Piaget: I must warn you that I cannot understand English when it is pronounced properly. If you will say zis and zat and zhose, I will be able to follow you. Elizabeth Hall: And if you promise to speak French wretchedly, I might understand you. But luckily we have Guy Cellerier here to solve our lan guage problems. You and Sigmund Freud are re garded as the two giants of 20th-Cen tury philosophy. If Freud has changed our thinking about personality, you have certainly changed our thinking about intelligence, yet a great deal of confusion surrounds your work. Whenever someone tries to explain your theories to the rest of us, he succeeds only in obscuring them. Piaget: Yes, I’ve seen that done. Per haps we will do better today. Hall: It is interesting that both Fred Skinner and D. O. Hebb intended to become novelists. Piaget: Is that so? Hall: I was surprised myself when I first heard it. They regard intelligence empirically, while you began as a natural scientist and look at intelli gence philosophically. Piaget: First we must agree on what you mean by philosophical. All the problems I have attacked are epistemological. All the methods I have used are either experimental or for malizations that Americans would also regard as empirical. Hall: Psychology was originally a part of philosophy; William James was a philosopher. You have raided the field of philosophy again and cap tured the area of epistemology. Piaget: It is true that I have taken epistemology away from philosophy, but I have not taken it only for psy chology. It belongs in all the sci ences; they are all concerned with the nature and origin of knowledge. Hall: What caused you to turn from biology and the study of mollusks to epistemology? Piaget: I began to study mollusks when I was 10. The director of the Museum of Natural History in Neuchâtel, who was a mollusk specialist, invited me to assist him twice a week. I helped him stick labels on his shell collection and he taught me mala cology. I began publishing articles about shells when I was 15. Hall: That’s quite young to be pub lishing scientific papers. Piaget: Specialists in malacology are rare. Because I was so young, I had to decline invitations from foreign specialists who wanted to meet me. My first paper—a one-page report of a part-albino sparrow I had seen— was published when I was only 10. It was about the time that I began to publish articles on shells that I found a book on philosophy in my father’s library. My new passion for philoso phy was encouraged when my god father introduced me to Henri Berg son’s creative evolution. Suddenly the problem of knowledge appeared to me in a new light. I became con vinced very quickly that most of the problems in philosophy were prob lems of knowledge, and that most problems of knowledge were prob lems of biology. You see, the prob lem of knowledge is the problem of the relation between the subject and the object—how the subject knows the object. If you translate this into biological terms, it is a problem of the organism’s adapting to its envi ronment. I decided to consecrate my 25 In somnolent Switzerland lives a gracious giant who has upset the world of developmental psychology. Jean Piaget, born in Neuchatel on August 9, 1896, has done more to shake psychologists’ faith in the stimulus-response approach to child psychology than all the humanistic psychologists of the Third Force put together. Sigmund Freud discovered the unconscious, it is said, and Piaget discovered the conscious. Piaget believes that reflexes and other automatic patterns of behavior have a minor role in the development of human intelligence. It is only in the first few days of the infant’s life that his behavior depends on automatic behavioral reaction. When Piaget first put forth this view of infancy it was radically opposed to accepted theory. Both Freudian psychology and traditional behaviorist theory emphasized that man seeks to escape from stimulation and excitation, while Piaget maintained that the infant often actively seeks stimulation. Some writers claim that the conflict between Piaget’s view of intellectual development and modern behavioral theory is more apparent than real and they point to a compatibility between Piaget’s system and D. O. Hebb’s neurological theory. In Piaget’s view of intellectual development the child passes through four major periods: sensori-motor (birth to two years); pre-operational (two to seven years); concrete operational (seven to 11 years); and formal operational 26 (above 11 years). It is not until the growing child reaches the two operational stages that he begins to acquire the various concepts of conservation. When Piaget speaks of conservation, he refers to the idea that the mass of an object remains constant no matter how much the form changes. For example, if you give a five-year-old two tumblers, each half-full of orangeade, he will agree that there is the same amount of orangeade in each. But if, before his eyes, you pour the orangeade from one glass into a tall, narrow container, he will say that there is more orangeade in the new glass than in the old one. The five-year-old has no concept of the conservation of substance. A child who does not understand the conservation of length will maintain that a necklace laid out in a straight line is longer than an identical necklace that lies in a circle. The average child acquires both these concepts by the time he is eight. Other important conservations that the child must learn are the conservation of number, of area, of weight and of volume. Piaget tested many of his ideas on his own three children, watching hour after patient hour as. Lucienne, Laurent and Jacqueline developed through infancy and childhood. Although his theories have received increasingly wide attention, Piaget remains a modest man. He rarely grants interviews and for 10 years he has, with some effort, avoided Swiss television cameras. He feels that time spent talking with reporters is time stolen from his work. It is said that he speaks no English, and it was with some trepidation that we scheduled a bilingual interview. But there was no need for concern. Piaget perhaps does not speak English, but he understands it. Frequently he answered questions before the translator could say a word. On one occasion he interrupted the translation to say that his reply had been expanded but that he agreed with the addition. At 73, Piaget follows a full schedule. He teaches four hours a week, supervises doctoral candidates, directs both the Institute for Psychol ogy and the International Center of Genetic Epistemology, and edits the Archives de Psychologie. And he writes. Each morning he produces his daily quota of manuscript before most people are awake. In the summer he retreats to the Swiss Alps where he writes in an abandoned farmhouse. During the year he writes in the airports of the world. Always at least two hours early for his plane—and sometimes as much as five—he settles down to work, meerschaum clenched in his teeth, unaware of the bustle about him. Thirty books and more than a hundred articles now bear his name. But he is being surpassed by his admirers-at the current rate of publication there soon will be many more volumes about Jean Piaget than by Jean Piaget. —Elizabeth Hall life to this biological explanation of knowledge. Hall: With your interest in the rela tion between the subject and the ob ject, i am surprised that you did not become a Gestalt psychologist. Piaget: If I had come across the writ ings of Max Wertheimer and of Wolf gang Kohler when I was 18, I would have. But I was reading psychology only in French, so I was unacquainted with their work. Hall: In your autobiography, you said that your natural-history background provided protection against the demon of philosophy. Piaget: The demon of philosophy is taking the easy way out. You believe that you can solve problems by sit ting in your office and reasoning them out. Because I was a biologist, I knew that deductions must be made from facts. Hall: But after you establish the facts, then you go back to your office and work out the problem. Piaget: Yes. Now, if you don’t have a philosophical outlook, you probably won’t be a good scientist. Abstract reflection is fundamental to seeing problems clearly. But the error of philosophy—its demon—is to believe that you can go ahead and solve the problem you formulated in the office without going into the field and es tablishing the facts. Hall: You once wrote that you de tested any departure from reality. Piaget: That was because of my mother’s poor mental health. At the beginning of my studies in psychol ogy, I was interested in psychoanal ysis and pathological psychology because of her. But I always pre ferred the workings of the intellect to the tricks of the unconscious. Hall: Does your dislike of unreality extend to literature? Piaget: Oh, no. I read many novels— and I even wrote a philosophical novel many years ago. Novels are not pathological. Hall: I understand that your study of intelligence came about when you tried to standardize reasoning tests at Alfred Binet’s laboratory school in Paris. Piaget: It was Binet’s school, but I was not working on Binet’s test. My task was to standardize Cyril Burt’s tests on the children of Paris. I never actually did it. Standardization was not at all interesting; I preferred to study the errors on the test. I became interested in the reasoning process behind the children’s wrong answers. Hall: Has anyone tried to develop an intelligence test based on your research? Piaget: That kind of research is going on in two places right now. Here at the University of Geneva,Vinh Bang— a Vietnamese psychologist—is work ing on a test. And Monique Lauren deau and Adrien Pinard, two psychol ogists at the University of Montreal, have been using my experimental methods and giving all the various tests to a single child. Just now they are back-checking to see if their ex periments and mine produce similar results, and they are publishing vol umes on different aspects of the experiments. Hall: Would such a test have to be an individual test, or could it be given to a group of children at one time? Piaget: The hope is that we will have a battery of tests that can be given to a group of children together. The risk is that we will get deformed answers. Hail: Isn’t a group test more likely to run aground on the same shoals that wreck the standard tests—a reliance on the answer instead of the method of reasoning? Piaget: The difference will be that the clinical method will already have been used in studying the reasoning of children at each stage of develop ment. We will have a background to help interpret the answers. It will have advantages that the I. Q. test lacks because the method of reason ing is unknown. Hall: Your research — especially in conservation—revealed that children did not understand things that adults assumed they knew. Piaget: It’s just that no adult ever had the idea of asking children about con servation. It was so obvious that if you change the shape of an object, the quantity will be conserved. Why ask a child? The novelty lay in ask ing the question. I first discovered the problem of conservation when I worked with young epileptics from 10 to 15. I wanted to find some empirical way of distinguishing them from normal chil dren. I went around with four coins and four beads, and I would put the coins and beads in one-to-one cor respondence and then hide one of the coins. If the three remaining coins were then stretched out into a longer line, the epileptic children said they had more coins than beads. No con “I always preferred the workings of the intellect to the tricks of the unconscious.” servation at all. I thought I had dis covered a method to distinguish nor mal from abnormal children. Then I went on to work with normal children and discovered that all children lack conservation. Hall: Isn’t it fortunate that you checked? Piaget: A biologist would have to ver ify; a philosopher would not have checked. Hall: When you say that the young child is egocentric, just what do you mean? Piaget: That term has had the worst interpretations of any word I have used. Hall: That’s why I asked the question. Piaget: When I refer to the child, I use the term egocentric in an epis temological sense, not in an affective or a moral one. This is why it has been misinterpreted. The egocentric child—and all children are egocen tric—considers his own point of view as the only possible one. He is inca pable of putting himself in someone else’s place, because he is unaware that the other person has a point of view. Hall: Would this be analogous to man’s original belief that the universe revolved around the earth? Piaget: That is precisely the example I was going to give. It is a natural tendency of the intelligence and it becomes corrected very slowly as the child matures. Many children, you know, believe that the sun and the moon follow them as they walk. A 28 more prosaic example is the way a young child makes up a new word and assumes that everyone knows ex actly what he means by it. Hall: Then morality doesn’t enter the picture until the child is aware of other viewpoints and disregards them. At one time you did extensive work on the way children develop a sense of right and wrong. Piaget: That was 40 years ago and I haven’t gone back to it. But we can talk about it if you like. Hall: I believe you said that the child’s sense of moral judgment is largely independent of adult influence. Piaget: You must distinguish between two periods in the development of moral judgment. In the first period, a child accepts his rules from author ity and the ideas of adults are impor tant to him. In the second period, he is independent of adults. Solidarity grows between children and a moral ity develops, based on cooperation. Hall: As more mothers work, children are placed in nursery schools at ear lier ages, and communal methods of life, like those in the kibbutz, are be coming more common. Suppose adults did not impose standards of right and wrong upon children who were reared in a kibbutz. Would the children develop this sense of moral justice and cooperation anyway? Piaget: It would happen even earlier. And if the adults are ready to discuss matters seriously with the children they will form a system of coopera tion with the adults. Hall: Would the morality that devel oped under this cooperative system be likely to lessen the conflict be tween the generations? Piaget: I would think so. Children often must discover the idea of jus tice at the expense of their parents. From about the age of seven or eight, justice prevails over obedi ence. But this theory should be studied experimentally. Hall: You would have to go out into the field and test it. Piaget: I have other pies in the oven. Hall: I’m interested in the implica tions for education of the pies you’ve already baked. In the United States we have a concept called reading readiness. Some educators say that a child cannot learn to read until he has reached a mental age of six years and six months. Piaget: The idea of reading readiness corresponds to the idea of compe tence in embryology. If a specific chemical inductor hits the develop ing embryo, it will produce an effect if the competence is there, and if it is not, the effect will not occur. So the concept of readiness is not bad but I am not sure that it can be applied to reading. Reading aptitude may not be related to mental age. There could easily be a difference of aptitude be tween children independent of men “John Dewey was a great man.” tal age. But I cannot state that as a fact because I have not studied it closely. Hall: in recent years the new mathe matics has come into American schools. Along with a new vocabu lary we introduced new concepts like set theory. Piaget: Seven years would be per fectly all right for most operations of set theory because children have their own spontaneous operations that are very akin to those concepts. But when you teach set theory you should use the child’s actual vocabu lary along with activity — make the child do natural things. The impor tant thing is not to teach modern mathematics with ancient methods. As for teaching children concepts that they have not attained in their spontaneous development, it is com pletely useless. A British mathemati cian attempted to teach his five-yearold daughter the rudiments of set theory and conservation. He did the typical experiments of conservation with numbers. Then he gave the child two collections and the five-year-old immediately said those are two sets. But she couldn’t count and she had no idea of conservation. Hall: But she had the vocabulary. Piaget: That’s the point. You cannot teach concepts verbally; you must use a method founded on activity. Hall: If you had the power in your hands, would you make any changes in the school curriculum? Piaget: We spend so much time teaching things that don’t have to be taught. Spelling is a good example. One learns to spell much better just by reading; teaching spelling is a waste of time. And history. We should reduce the amount of time we spend making people disgusted with his tory. We should concentrate on giv ing them a taste for reading history— which is not the same thing at all. There is one addition I would like to make to the curriculum. So far as I know the experimental method is not taught in any school and it is a way of checking your hypotheses. If we can teach this method to children they will learn that it is possible to check their thoughts. Hall: How would you go about teach ing this? Piaget: In the experimental method you have the problem of what causes a given effect. A certain number of factors intervene and—in order to dis cover the cause—you must keep all factors constant except one. Hall: As when you gave the children five flasks of colorless liquid and asked them to produce yellow. Piaget: That’s right. One of the flasks contained only water, another flask contained bleach, and the other three liquids that when mixed together turned yellow. We showed the child the color but not how to make it. The child also had to determine just what sort of liquid was in the flasks that held bleach and water. Not until a child reaches the age of 12 does he test all possible combinations of fluids and solve the problem. Hall: What if the teacher were to dem onstrate this experiment to the class? Piaget: It would be completely use less. The child must discover the method for himself through his own activity. Hall: That sounds very much like John Dewey’s concept of learning by doing. Piaget: Indeed it does; John Dewey was a great man. Hall: Now that we’ve mentioned an American educator, may I ask what you have called “the American ques tion”? Is it possible to speed up the learning of conservation concepts? Piaget: In turn may I ask the counter question? Is it a good thing to accel erate the learning of these concepts? Acceleration is certainly possible but first we must find out whether it is desirable or harmful. Take the con cept of object permanency—the reali zation that a ball, a rattle or a person continues to exist when it no longer can be seen. A kitten develops this concept at four months, a human baby at nine months; but the kitten stops right there while the baby goes on to learn more advanced concepts. Perhaps a certain slowness is useful in developing the capacity to assimi late new concepts. We also know that the ease of learning varies with the develop mental level of the child. In the same number of learning sessions children who have reached an advanced stage make marked progress over younger children. It appears that there is an optimum speed of development. If you write a book too slowly it won’t be a good book; if you write it too fast it won’t be a good book either. No one has made studies to deter mine the optimum speed. Hall: But wouldn’t the optimum speed vary with the person? Some people naturally write faster than others— and write just as well. Piaget: That’s highly possible. We know the average speed of the chil dren we have studied in our Swiss culture but there is nothing that says that the average speed is the opti mum. But blindly to accelerate the learning of conservation concepts could be even worse than doing nothing. Hall: I think we ask the American question because the ever-increasing length of education troubles us. Many of us would like to find some way to shorten those years that go into pro fessional preparation. Piaget: It is difficult to decide just how to shorten studies. If you spend one year studying something verbally that requires two years of active study, then you have actually lost a year. If we were willing to lose a bit more time and let the children be ac tive, let them use trial and error on dif ferent things, then the time we seem to have lost we may have actually gained. Children may develop a gen era! method that they can use on other subjects. Hall: And we come back to learning by doing. Some of your experiments “Blindly to accelerate the learning of conservation concepts could be even worse than doing nothing.” with the child’s concept of space in dicate that children come to a Euclid ean world view very slowly. Does this same conception of space evolve in all peoples, or is it a feature of West ern culture? Piaget: I wouldn’t say that Euclidean geometry is cultural. You know, his torically scientific geometry began with Euclidean metric geometry. Pro jective geometry followed and only later did we develop topology. But so far as theory goes, both projective and metric geometry can be derived from topology. Now if you examine the way a child develops his idea of space, you will see that he first de velops topological intuitions, so that the child’s ideas are closer to mathe matical theory than to history. To get back to your question, any group—if they develop that far—would certainly acquire a Euclidean geometry, be cause once you have the topological intuitions and actual measurement, it is the simplest geometry. Hall: Then you do not believe that our language determines the way we see the world? Piaget: There is a very close relation ship between language and thought, but language does not govern thoughts or form operations. It is lan guage that is influenced by opera tions and not our operations that are influenced by language. Dr. H. Sinclair has made some interesting experiments along this line. She had two groups of children; one group had conservation, the other group did not. She took the group of children that did not under stand conservation and taught them the language used by the children who understood the concept. They learned to use “long” and “short” and “wide” and “narrow” in a con sistent way. She wanted to see if the concepts would come once the lan guage was learned. They did not. If a ball of clay was pulled into a sau sage, the children could describe it as “long” and “thin.” But they did not understand that the clay was longer but thinner than the ball and therefore the same quantity. Hall: What if the language does not express a concept? Piaget: The thing that changes with different languages is the way we par tition reality—the way we break the world into composing parts. But this translation of concepts into their parts is not essential to thought. Hall: Jerome Bruner has studied child development extensively and he is 31 one of your respectful critics. Could you explain to me the difference be tween your theoretical approach and that of Bruner’s? Piaget: It is very difficult to explain the difference between Bruner and me. Bruner is a mobile and active man and has held a sequence of dif ferent points of view. Essentially Bru ner does not believe in mental operations while I do. Bruner re places operations with factors that have varied through his different stages—Bruner’s stages, not the child’s. Bruner uses things like lan guage, like image. When Bruner was at the stage of strategies he used to say that his strategies were more or less Piaget’s operations. At that time our theories were closest. Since then he has changed his point of view. Hall: Might we say that one day Bru ner may reach the operational stage? Piaget: The answer to your question is that Bruner is an unpredictable man—this is what makes his charm. Hall: Can we learn about man only by studying man? Or can we go into the laboratory and study rats and primates? Piaget: Comparative studies are nec essary but one must not make the mistake of believing that a rat is “Many theories of some schools that I will not name are based on the rat. It is not enough for me.” sufficient. Many theories of some schools that I will not name are based on the rat. It is not enough for me. Hall: But I can mention a school of psychology. Could you describe your differences with behaviorism? Piaget: That’s too broad a term. Let’s talk instead about behaviorist empiri cism; I think that’s what you’re really asking about. Empiricism implies that reality can be reduced to observable features and that knowledge must limit itself to those features. Biolo gists have shown that the organism constantly interacts with its environ ment; the view that it submits pas sively to the environment has become untenable. How then can man be simply a recorder of outside events? When he transforms his environment by acting upon it he gains a deeper knowledge of the world than any copy of reality ever could provide. What is more empiricism cannot explain the existence of mathematics which deals with unobservable features and with cognitive constructions. In biology the exact counterpart of behaviorist empiricism is the La marckian theory of variation and evo lution—a long-abandoned doctrine. When we look at the famous stimulus- response schema we find that be haviorist psychologists have retained a strictly Lamarckian outlook. The contemporary biological revolution has passed them by. If we are to get a tenable stimulus-response theory we must completely modify its clas sical meaning. Before a stimulus can set off a response the organism must be capable of providing it. We talked earlier about the idea of competence in embryology. If this concept applies in learning —and my research indi cates that it does—then learning will be different at different develop mental levels. It would depend upon the evolution of competences. The classical concept of learning sud denly becomes inadequate. Hall: Does this mean that individual development is all innate? Piaget: Not at all. Each man is the product of interaction between he redity and environment. It is virtually impossible to draw a clear line be tween innate and acquired behavior patterns. Hall: Are there any pitfalls to trap the unwary psychologist? Piaget: The danger to psychologists lies in practical applications. Too often psychologists make practical applications before they know what they are applying. We must always keep a place for fundamental re search and beware of practical ap plications when we do not know the foundation of our theories. Hall: How do you see the future of psychology? Piaget: With optimism. We see new problems every day. Across the Rhone River from the University of Geneva, on the other side of the lake, the Palais Wilson stands in a wide lawn. Pansies bloom along the tree-lined quay and down the street Charles II, Duke of Bismarck, rests in his elaborate sepulcher, guarded by his equestrian statue and a flock of pigeons. On the wall that surrounds the palace, a plaque honors the memory of Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States and founder of the League of Nations. The Palais Wilson houses the Jean Jacques Rousseau Institute, a part of the University devoted to psychology and education. Just next to the Institute, beside the ultra-modern, tourist-filled Hotel President, is a (Continued on page 54.) A Conversation (Continued from page 32.) kindergarten where students from all over the world study the unfolding of the child mind. Bärbel Inhelder works in a narrow, book-lined office in the Palais Wilson. She is a professor of developmental psychology, and she began her collaboration with Piaget while she was an undergraduate. Together they have written more than nine books, and she is the author of more than 50 articles. She is President of the Association de Psychologie Scientifique de Langue Française and a past president of the Swiss Psychological Society. In 1968, with Piaget, she received the Award of the American Educational Research Association. She has been a Harvard research fellow and a Rockefeller fellow and has lectured at M.I.T., Princeton, Berkeley, Stanford, Temple and Penn State. (Her English, which has a slight German accent, is fluent.) The primitive life holds great attraction for Inhelder. She spends her summers in a remote cabin in the Alps “far away from everything.” There she depends on candlelight and draws her own water, and there— like Piaget—she writes. 54 Hall: Did you always plan to become a psychologist? Bärbel Inhelder: It is mostly a matter of chance. I was born in Saint Gall, in the German part of Switzerland. Orig inally I came to Geneva for a summer course at the University. I wanted to learn some French. I had some back ground in biology and in education, and then I discovered psychology and Edouard Claparède and Piaget here at the University. Originally I thought I would study psychology for a few years. Then I liked it so much that I stayed on to take my doctorate. After I had been at the University for a few weeks, first Claparède and then Piaget asked me to do some research. Hall: In the United States it is highly unusual for a first-year student to be asked to do research. Inhelder: It is not so very unusual here. During my first year of training, Piaget asked me to put some sugar in water and study children’s reac tions to what they saw. This led to our work on conservation concepts. My first publication was on conserva ation. I still remember the day when Piaget said: “Now look. I have some ideas on this. Let’s write a book to gether.” So I wrote my first book with Piaget before I delivered my thesis. Hall: That’s exciting. Inhelder: I was just lucky. Hall: That was more than chance. What happened after you finished your doctoral? Inhelder: I went back to Saint Gall, where the cantonal authorities asked me to create a school psychology service. There I began to study the reasoning processes of mentally re tarded children and in 1943 I deliv ered my thesis based on this work. It was not published in English until many years later. (The Diagnosis of Reasoning in the Mentally Retarded, John Day, 1968.) Hall: Did you do any research into the causes of retardation? Inhelder: I was more concerned with diagnosing the retardation than de termining its cause. To start with, my job was to go from one village to the next and examine the children and find out the best way of diagnosing retardation. Hall: Did you find that mentally re tarded children develop conserva tion theories? Inhelder: They develop them much later but they go through exactly the same steps normal children do. Using this developmental approach, it was relatively easy to distinguish between pseudodefective children and the truly retarded. Hall: What caused the pseudodefec tive children to be labeled as feeble minded? Inhelder: Often the children were so cially deprived. Sometimes they would have specific defects like dys lexia or aphasia. Under the global approach, they had all been consid ered retarded. We found that such defects would respond to a specific kind of help. Hall: Have you reached any conclu sions as to the causes of mental retardation? Inhelder: No, I have not. I am a psy chologist. We would need a whole team of psychologists, biochemists, geneticists and sociologists to even try to determine some of the causes of mental retardation. Hall: Do you think we will ever be able to determine what is environ mental and what is hereditary? Inhelder: I’m not sure if that is the right way to ask the question. I know the whole problem of heredity and environment has been given renewed attention. In fact, it’s experimentally impossible to separate the two fac tors in human beings. Hall: There seems to be no way to construct a study that would elimi nate environmental influences. Inhelder: No way at all. If one suc ceeds in training our young patients to overcome their specific difficulty then it is likely that their potential was more or less normal. From the psychological point of view that’s about the only thing we can do. In fact we did all kinds of training stud ies with a group of children with dif ferent difficulties who weren’t able to go through normal school training. As a result of our training method— which is an application of our funda mental studies in growth and devel opment—they were able to gain a lot. But one or two of them did not gain at all, so it is highly probable that their potential was not high enough. You have to take each case individ ually and devote a lot of time to it. Hall: So there is no easy way out. I was greatly interested in the paper you gave me yesterday. The results you got on the memory studies were remarkable. Inhelder: The results were in accord with our theories on the development of thought. We showed the children 10 sticks that varied in length and then asked them to draw the sticks from memory. The children under four drew a line of roughly equal sticks; those under five drew groups of paired, unequal sticks. At about five they often drew three groups of sticks—small, medium size and large ones. A month or two later they began to draw a series in ascending length but it was not complete. It’s only at about six that the children’s drawing became correct evocations of what they had seen. Hall: It was their recall after six months that was so interesting. Inhelder: Yes. We asked the same children to reproduce the line of sticks again. But we did not show them sticks. After six to eight months a majority of the children remem bered the arrangement better than they had just after they had seen the sticks; that is to say their recall was one “stage” better. Hall: Just how does this support your theories? Inhelder: Classical associationist empiricism considers the image to be the residual product of percep tion—and a fundamental element of thought. We, however, believe that children progressively structure re ality by means of operations which gradually increase in complexity. Ac cording to this theory, the memory code itself depends on the subject’s 55 operations and the code will be mod ified during development. Hall: That means that the memory of things for which children are devel oping concepts will improve as their concepts improve. Inhelder: You might put it that way. It indicates that memory images do not stem from perception; they are linked to operational schemes. These schemes control the images and are dominant over the model that has been seen. Hall: That is impressive. You have been studying children with Profes sor P i a g e t f o r 3 3 y e a r s . W h a t changes would you make in the school curriculum? Inhelder: There is quite a lot to do in this field. We must first determine more of the developmental laws; we must find out how the child is able to a s s i m i l a t e t h r o u g h h i s o w n schemes the knowledge we try to pass on to him. I think it is also very important to know the most funda mental structures of the sciences, grammar and mathematics we want to teach. For this we need the help of good mathematicians, good physi cists and good linguists. “George Miller once called himself a subjective behaviorist. If we must be labeled, you could say the same thing about us.” Hall: You’re not talking about the elementary teachers, but about the teachers of teachers? Inhelder: I’m really talking about the people who can best help in this research. Here in our center of epis temology we bring together the sci entists in the different disciplines — linguistics, logic, mathematics, physics and developmental psychol ogy. The scientists give us a heuris tic for our research and we can pass on what we learn about develop mental laws to the teachers. Hall: So your changes would be more in the education of teachers than in the curriculum? Inhelder: We can train the teachers to make curriculum studies and we can give them advice based on our studies, but I think that the educa tors themselves must work out their own curriculum. Hall: What kind of advice might you give them? Inhelder: The order of the introduc tion of the fundamental mathematical concepts might be changed to con form to the developmental laws of the child. We could give training in topology very early because it is based on much more elementary structures than is Euclidean geome try. But even Euclidean geometry should not be delayed until the child reaches secondary school. Basic concepts in mathematics and in sci ence can be introduced to children from seven to 10, if these are di vorced from their traditional mathe matical context. Hall: Would you have the children do more things themselves instead of just sitting and reading and being lectured to? Inhelder: Oh, sure. The other essen tial for introducing basic scientific ideas early is that they be studied through materials that the child can handle himself. Through games for example we can teach probabilistic reasoning long before the child can learn the techniques of the calculus of probabilities or the formal expres sions of probability theory. In a sci ence-and-mathematics pre-curricu lum, we can establish an intuitive and inductive understanding that will give the child a much firmer foundation on which to build his later formal studies. Hall: You sound optimistic; how do you feel about the future of psychology? Inhelder: Quite hopeful. Hall: So is Professor Piaget. Inhelder: He likes the profession, as I do. Hall: There are so many schools of psychology today—analytic and hu manist and behaviorist and pseudobehaviorist and neobehaviorist... Inhelder: And even neo-neo-neo behaviorist. Hall: You use empirical methods in your work, but your theoretical ap proach is not that of the behaviorist. Inhelder: George Miller once called himself a subjective behaviorist. If we must be labeled, you could say the same thing about us. We have a much more relativistic approach in regard to what is innate and what is acquired than do the behaviorists, and we hold a constructivist position on development and on the construc tions that are going on inside the black box. Hall: Will we ever get inside the black box? Inhelder: We can study the input to the box and see how the output changes with age. We can infer some rules, then do more experiments and make new inferences. These are the only things we can do.