Audit Committee Agenda - Feb. 24, 2016

Transcription

THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF NIAGARA
AUDIT COMMITTEE
FINAL AGENDA
AC 1-2016
Wednesday, February 24, 2016
2:00 p.m.
Council Chamber
Niagara Region Headquarters, Campbell West
1815 Sir Isaac Brock Way, Thorold, ON
Pages
1.
CALL TO ORDER
2.
DISCLOSURES OF PECUNIARY INTEREST
3.
PRESENTATIONS
4.
DELEGATIONS
5.
ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION
6.
CONSENT ITEMS FOR INFORMATION
6.1
AC-C 01-2016
3 - 62
Burgoyne Bridge Value for Money Audit Report
- A consultant presentation to precede the discussion of this report.
6.2
AC-C 02-2016
63 - 64
A memorandum from H. Schlange, CAO, dated February 24, 2016,
respecting the Preliminary Management Response - Burgoyne Bridge
Performance Assessment
7.
OTHER BUSINESS
8.
NEXT MEETING
The next meeting will be held on Monday, March 21, 2016 at 9:30 a.m. in
Council Chamber.
1
9.
ADJOURNMENT
If you require any accommodations for a disability in order to attend and participate in meetings or
events, please let us know in advance so that arrangements can be made in a timely matter. Please
contact the Accessibility Advisory Coordinator at 905-685-4225 ext. 3252 or
[email protected]
2
Burgoyne Bridge
Regional Municipality of Niagara
Presentation to Audit Committee
February 24, 2016
3
Background, scope and approach
Scope overview:
•
Deloitte LLP (Deloitte) was engaged by the Regional
Municipality of Niagara (Region) to conduct a performance
assessment of the replacement of the Burgoyne Bridge
(Project). The purpose of the engagement was to review
selected decisions, procurements and processes to determine
whether the Region received value for money in the delivery
of the Project.
•
The initial Request for Proposal (RFP) for this performance
assessment was limited to a review of the feasibility study and
class EA; however, based on subsequent discussions, the
scope of the review was extended to include the procurement
process for detailed design and construction, up to, but
excluding the tender opening for General Contracting.
Approach:
Overall assessment:
•
The lack of timely provision of documentation by the Region to support the performance assessment is an indication of poor
document management practices, and a lack of collaboration on this important performance improvement initiative.
•
The Region reacted in an appropriate and timely manner once structural issues were identified, however, the decision making
process was not sufficiently documented or communicated. In addition, the decision to replace the Bridge was made before the
Region was able to complete a detailed structural analysis, and adequately assess possible options and associated costs.
•
The procurement practices reviewed for the Project were largely compliant with the purchasing policy, although opportunities to
improve the transparency and competitiveness of the process exist.
•
Region has a defined engineering process, but lacks the documented processes, governance structure and project management
capabilities to effectively manage and control large capital projects.
4
3
Regional Municipality of Niagara – Burgoyne Bridge Performance Assessment
© Deloitte LLP and affiliated entities.
Key recommendations
1
The Region’s capital investment plan should include major capital assets that are expected to require replacement or
rehabilitation in the next 10 years to allow for effective decision making and a proactive approach to managing these
large projects.
2
The Region should develop a policy and define criteria for sole and single sourcing.
3
The Region should develop a structured estimating process to allow for accurate monitoring, control, forecasting and
reporting of project costs.
4
The Region should develop and implement a tiered approach to the management of capital projects that are included in
the investment plan.
5
The Region should develop a PM Manual which defines key processes, and the associated roles and responsibilities.
6
The Region should develop and implement a formal risk management process for large capital projects.
7
The Region should develop and implement standardized project reporting, which provides relevant, accurate and timely
information, and is scalable according to the project Tier.
8
The Region should develop and implement a formal document management process for all projects.
5
5
6
Key findings
•
The replacement or rehabilitation of the Bridge was not included in the Region’s capital investment plan at the point in time at
which the Bridge was identified as a BCF priority.
•
The decision to replace the Bridge was made prior to receiving the findings and recommendations from the detailed structural
analysis.
•
Utilizing a Request for Pre-qualification (RFPQ) process to engage competent consultants and contractors for the Project was
an appropriate approach; however, the evaluation of bidders was not a transparent and defendable process due to the lack of
a minimum score.
•
Procurement of contract administration and inspection services for the Project was not an open, transparent and competitive
process.
•
The delivery model selected by the Region for the Project appears to be reasonable give the size, scope and complexity of
the project.
•
The Region did not implement a standardized approach to estimate and report on project costs.
•
Project contingency was not appropriately or consistently estimated for the Project.
•
The Region does not have a record of how the cost estimate included in the Building Canada Fund (BCF) application was
developed.
•
The Region has experienced engineering staff who were engaged throughout the feasibility, design and procurement phases
of the Project, to resolve technical issues.
•
The Project Management (PM) Manual is not adequate to support the delivery of large capital projects such as the Bridge
replacement.
•
Project related roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities were not adequately defined for the Project.
•
The Region did not utilize a formal risk management process during the initial stages of the Project.
•
The PW Committee was not properly informed of the risks and assumptions associated with the funding application or the
delivery of the Project.
•
Reports prepared by PW staff for presentation to the PW Committee did not provide sufficient detail to facilitate effective
project accountability, oversight and governance.
•
Adequate documentation organization and management processes were not implemented for the Project, and in many
instances, key projects details and facts are not supported by documentation.
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4
AC-C-1-2016
February 24, 2016
Page 1
REPORT TO:
Audit Committee
MEETING DATE:
Wednesday, February 24, 2016
SUBJECT:
Value for Money Audit – Burgoyne Bridge
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That Report AC-C 01-2016, dated February 24, 2016, respecting the Burgoyne
Bridge Value for Money Audit Report BE RECEIVED, and
2. That this Report BE FORWARDED to the Burgoyne Bridge Replacement
Taskforce for information.
KEY FACTS





At the February 2015 Audit Committee, the Burgoyne Bridge Environmental
Assessment and Feasibility Study was selected for a value for money (VFM)
audit at a cost of $28,200.
Following initial consultation with Deloitte Consulting, the successful proponent, it
was recommended that the audit scope should be expanded to include all
activities up to the contractor selection tender closing.
Audit Committee approved the scope expansion at its September 8, 2015
meeting at a cost of $17,000 for a revised total price of $45,200.
Deloitte commenced their audit work in late September 2015 and the final report
was received on February 12, 2016.
This report accompanies the Deloitte final report and presentation on the
Burgoyne Bridge value for money audit.
CONSIDERATIONS
Financial
Due to the scope expansion and the volume of documents received the audit was
completed approximately 2 weeks later than originally planned but still within the
prescribed bid price.
Corporate
The Burgoyne Bridge audit is the second of three VFM audits to be completed and
presented to Audit Committee. In November 2015, Audit Committee received a report
on the NRH Capital Projects – Broadoak and Fitch Street Redevelopments. In March
2016 Audit Committee will receive a VFM report on Road Maintenance.
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AC-C-12016
February 24, 2016
Page 2
Governmental Partners
There is no anticipated impact on other governmental partners. This report will be
presented to Burgoyne Bridge Task Force and Public Works Committee to address
findings and recommendations to improve future management of capital projects.
Public and/or Service Users
This report includes several recommendations, once implemented will improve services
to the public and reduce operating and capital construction costs in the future.
ANALYSIS
The audit report is a chronological study of the various activities and studies leading up
to the tender opening of the eventual contractor. The report highlights potential
improvement areas for various aspects of the region’s project management practices.
Finally, the consultant provided several recommendations for future consideration.
ALTERNATIVES REVIEWED
Alternative delivery methods were not part of the scope of work for this review.
ORIGIN OF REPORT
As part of the Council Strategic Priorities, Regional Council directed that external value
for money audits be conducted by external consultants on specific program/services
and capital projects. For 2015, three value for money audits were approved, initiated
and completed.
OTHER PERTINENT REPORTS
AC-C-11-2015, September 8, 2015
SUBMITTED BY:
Chris McQueen, Director
Organizational Performance
APPROVED BY:
Harry Schlange
Chief Administrative Officer
This report was prepared by Frank Marcella, Business Consultant, Organizational
Performance.
APPENDICES
Appendix I
Burgoyne Bridge Performance Assessment (Deloitte Consulting)
9
Burgoyne Bridge
Regional Municipality of Niagara
February 16, 2016
10
Contents
Executive summary
2
Background
6
Scope, approach and limitations
8
Observations and findings
12
Decision making process
14
Procurement process
18
Project management processes
25
Key recommendations and implementation strategies
40
Appendices
Appendix A – Documents reviewed
45
Appendix B – Building Canada Fund correspondence
50
11
1
Executive summary
12
2
2
Background, scope and approach
Scope overview:
•
Deloitte LLP (Deloitte) was engaged by the Regional
Municipality of Niagara (Region) to conduct a performance
assessment of the replacement of the Burgoyne Bridge
(Project). The purpose of the engagement was to review
selected decisions, procurements and processes to determine
whether the Region received value for money in the delivery
of the Project.
•
The initial Request for Proposal (RFP) for this performance
assessment was limited to a review of the feasibility study and
class EA; however, based on subsequent discussions, the
scope of the review was extended to include the procurement
process for detailed design and construction, up to, but
excluding the tender opening for General Contracting.
Approach:
Overall assessment:
•
The lack of timely provision of documentation by the Region to support the performance assessment is an indication of poor
document management practices, and a lack of collaboration on this important performance improvement initiative.
•
The Region reacted in an appropriate and timely manner once structural issues were identified, however, the decision making
•
The procurement practices reviewed for the Project were largely compliant with the purchasing policy, although opportunities to
improve the transparency and competitiveness of the process exist.
•
Region has a defined engineering process, but lacks the documented processes, governance structure and project management
capabilities to effectively manage and control large capital projects.
13
3
Key findings
•
The replacement or rehabilitation of the Bridge was not included in the Region’s capital investment plan at the point in time at
•
The decision to replace the Bridge was made prior to receiving the findings and recommendations from the detailed structural
analysis.
•
Utilizing a Request for Pre-qualification (RFPQ) process to engage competent consultants and contractors for the Project was
an appropriate approach; however, the evaluation of bidders was not a transparent and defendable process due to the lack of
a minimum score.
•
Procurement of contract administration and inspection services for the Project was not an open, transparent and competitive
process.
•
The delivery model selected by the Region for the Project appears to be reasonable give the size, scope and complexity of
the project.
•
The Region did not implement a standardized approach to estimate and report on project costs.
•
•
The Region does not have a record of how the cost estimate included in the Building Canada Fund (BCF) application was
developed.
•
The Region has experienced engineering staff who were engaged throughout the feasibility, design and procurement phases
of the Project, to resolve technical issues.
•
The Project Management (PM) Manual is not adequate to support the delivery of large capital projects such as the Bridge
replacement.
•
•
The Region did not utilize a formal risk management process during the initial stages of the Project.
•
The PW Committee was not properly informed of the risks and assumptions associated with the funding application or the
•
Reports prepared by PW staff for presentation to the PW Committee did not provide sufficient detail to facilitate effective
project accountability, oversight and governance.
•
instances, key projects details and facts are not supported by documentation.
14
4
Key recommendations
1
rehabilitation in the next 10 years to allow for effective decision making and a proactive approach to managing these
large projects.
2
3
The Region should develop a structured estimating process to allow for accurate monitoring, control, forecasting and
reporting of project costs.
4
The Region should develop and implement a tiered approach to the management of capital projects that are included in
the investment plan.
5
The Region should develop a PM Manual which defines key processes, and the associated roles and responsibilities.
6
The Region should develop and implement a formal risk management process for large capital projects.
7
The Region should develop and implement standardized project reporting, which provides relevant, accurate and timely
8
The Region should develop and implement a formal document management process for all projects.
15
5
Background
16
6
6
Background
•
The Burgoyne Bridge (Bridge) is a two-lane bridge that carries Regional Road 81 (St. Paul Street West) over Twelve
Mile Creek and Highway 406, in the City of St. Catharines. The Bridge, which provides a critical link between
Downtown St. Catharines and West St. Catharines, spans 370 meters and is the largest structure maintained by the
Region.
•
The Regional Municipality of Niagara (Region) is currently undertaking a capital project to replace the Bridge
(Project). Construction is expected to be complete in the Spring of 2017 with total costs currently forecasted to
exceed $90 million.
•
Key contracts and assignments completed during the initial phases of the Project included:
• On June 23, 2009, Hatch Mott Macdonald (Hatch) was awarded a contract to conduct a detailed structural analysis
of the Bridge. This study included analysis on whether rehabilitation or replacement of the Bridge was
recommended. The final recommendation from Hatch was to replace the Bridge.
• On February 18, 2010, the Region completed an application for the Building Canada Fund (BCF) to request
support from the Province of Ontario and the Federal Government for the Project.
• In late 2010, Delcan Corporation (Delcan) was awarded a contract to complete a class environmental assessment
(EA) and preliminary design. The final report was completed and presented to Regional Council in January 2012.
• On April 24, 2012, Delcan was awarded the contract to complete the detailed design for the Bridge. On February
6, 2014, the detailed design contract was amended to include contract administration and inspection services for
construction.
• On December 20, 2012, a competitive process for General Contracting for the Project was initiated.
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7
Scope, approach and limitations
18
8
8
Scope
•
Deloitte LLP (Deloitte) was engaged by the Regional Municipality of Niagara (Region) to conduct a performance
assessment of the replacement of the Burgoyne Bridge (Project). The purpose of the engagement was to review
selected decisions, procurements and processes to determine whether the Region received value for money in the
•
The initial Request for Proposal (RFP) for this performance assessment was limited to a review of the feasibility study
and class EA; however, based on subsequent discussions, the scope of the review was extended to include the
procurement process for detailed design and construction, up to, but excluding the tender opening for General
Contracting.
•
The scope of work for the performance assessment included the following:
• Analyze various contracts and assignments leading up to the decision to replace the Bridge to determine if the
decision making process can be improved and/or expedited;
• Assess compliance to Regional processes for the procurement and management of the Project;
• Compare Regional practices to leading practices for similar projects;
• Identify related risks or economic consequences due to the lack of adherence to Regional policy or gaps between
leading practices and Regional policies and procedures;
• Identify areas for improvement including potential risks, benefits and ability to implement within the Regional
municipal context; and
• Identify and assess other relevant information during the course of the review and communicate to Council to
know, act upon in the future or investigate further.
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9
Approach
Deloitte utilized a proven methodology to conduct the performance assessment of the Project. The table below
summarizes the approach and key activities for the review which was conducted between August 2015 and
February 2016. A complete list of documents reviewed, as supplied by the Region, is included at Appendix A.
Initial Planning
Assessment of
Key Processes
and Controls
Gathering and
Analysis of Data
• Evaluate project
• Meet with the Region • Obtain key project
decision making,
to finalize objectives
documents;
processes and
and scope of work;
• Conduct initial review
procedures;
of available
• Obtain preliminary
• Compare
documents to
understanding of the
procurement and
understand project
Project through
project management
discussions with key
structure, decision
making process,
processes against
project personnel;
project timeline,
industry standard
• Provide initial
delivery model and
practices, and
document request list;
identified gaps; and
procurement
policies,
and
processes and
• Conduct follow-up
• Identify key project
procedures;
and
discussions with the
team members and
Region to review
• Conduct interviews to
stakeholders for
validate
observations and
interviews.
understanding of the
findings and identify
additional data
Project and related
sources.
processes.
Reporting of
Findings
• Develop initial report
of observations and
findings for review;
• Validate observations
and findings with the
Region; and
• Develop a report
documenting
observations, findings
and identified areas
for improvement.
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10
Limitations
•
This report outlines our observations, which are based on interviews, review of project documentation, our
experience performing reviews on similar projects, and comparison with industry leading practices for the delivery of
major capital projects.
•
This report is not intended for circulation or publication, nor is it to be reproduced for any other purpose than for the
use of Client, without our prior express written permission in each specific instance. We do not assume any
responsibility for losses suffered by any party as a result of circulation, publication, or reproduction of this report
contrary to the Provisions of this paragraph.
•
The services provided do not constitute an audit, compilation, review, or attestation as described in the
pronouncements on professional standards issued by the Chartered Professional Accountants Canada or other
regulatory bodies and, therefore, we do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance as a result of
performing the services described below. Our work cannot be relied upon to disclose certain errors, fraud or illegal
acts that may exist and which might have been detected had we performed an audit in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards.
•
We reserve the right, but will be under no obligation, to review this report, and if we consider it necessary, to revise
our report in light of any information, which becomes known to us after the date of this report, including information
provided by the Contractor and its Subcontractors.
21
11
22
12
12
As defined in the RFP, the review has been focused on developing observations and findings for the Project in the
following areas:
•
Decision making process;
•
Procurement process; and
•
Project management processes.
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13
Decision making
Observations
The timeline below summarizes key activities and assignments leading up to the decision to replace the Bridge:
• Bridge structures must be inspected at least once every second calendar year by a professional engineer in order to be compliant
with Ontario Regulation 104/97.
• In early 2008, Ellis Engineering (Ellis) was engaged by the Region to conduct condition inspections of the Bridge.
• The Ellis inspection identified that extensive rehabilitation of the bridge sidewalk, substructure, and superstructure was
required, and recommended a load capacity evaluation and fatigue analysis, bridge deck, superstructure and substructure
condition surveys, and a fatigue inspection.
• In July 2009, the Region engaged Hatch through a competitive process to carry out the detailed structural analysis of the Bridge
to determine whether rehabilitation or replacement was required.
• In August 2009, Ellis was re-engaged to inspect the sidewalks of the Bridge and recommend a repair strategy.
• On February 18, 2010 and February 24, 2010, BCF application letters were submitted to the Provincial and Federal Governments
respectively, indicating the Project as a key initiative for the Region.
• There were no staff from the Region available for interviews who were involved in the preparation of the BCF application.
• There was no documentation available, such as a breakdown of cost component and sources, for review that supported the
cost estimate included in the BCF application.
• To meet the timelines required to proceed with a BCF application, the Region made a preliminary decision to replace the
Bridge, prior to the completion of a feasibility study or options analysis
• Due to the lack of supporting information, such as a BCF application instruction or related directives, it cannot be determined
what deadlines or submission requirements were associated with the BCF program at the time of the Region’s application.
• The Region included two projects in the initial BCF application; the Niagara-on-the-Lake Wastewater Treatment Plant
Expansion and Relocation Project, and the Bridge replacement.
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14
Decision making
Observations
• Subsequent to the initial application, the Region decided to only pursue funding for the Bridge replacement.
• A list of key communications related to the Region’s BCF application is provided in Appendix B.
• On May 19, 2010, the Region submitted a letter to the Provincial and Federal Governments indicating the intention to proceed
with the Project and stating support for the Project from the Region’s 12 Mayors.
• On August 30, 2010, Hatch submitted a detailed structural analysis report to the Region.
• The report stated that “the preferred structural option is the replacement of the Bridge with a new structure adjacent to the
existing structure”.
• In January 2012, Delcan submitted the class EA and preliminary design report to the Region.
• As part of the report, Delcan contemplated and evaluated remediation options including, making no improvements to the
bridge, rehabilitating the Bridge on its existing structure, replacing the existing Bridge, or rehabilitating the Bridge on its
existing structure and building a new bridge adjacent the existing Bridge.
• The preferred solution, based on Delcan’s evaluation, was to replace the existing Bridge, which support Hatch’s
recommendation.
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15
Timeline of key decisions and activities
Timeline
4/25/2008
2/11/2008
Ellis report recommending Ellis report recommending
posting of load limits
rehabilitation work to bridge
8/31/2009
Ellis report recommending
repairs to sidewalk
11/26/2009
PW Committee
recommend
sidewalk repairs
6/25/2008
PW Committee recommends
posting load limits
2/3/2009 - 2/17/2009
RFPQ for Detailed
Structural Analysis
8/30/2010
Hatch report for
rehabilitation/replacement
6/23/2009
PW Committee recommends
award of Detailed
Structural Analysis to Hatch
2/18/2010
Region submits
BCF proposal
5/19/2010
BCF endorsement
letter from Region
9/30/2010 - 11/2/2010
RFP for Class EA and
Preliminary Design
7/6/2010 - 7/20/2010
3/23/2010
RFPQ for Class EA and
7/9/2009
Detailed Structural Preliminary Design
Detailed Structural Analysis contract phase 2
Analysis contract phase 1
4/22/2009 - 5/19/2009
RFP for Detailed
Structural Analysis
Note: items above the line represent reports issued to the Region and items below the line represent activities and decisions made by the Region.
Figure 1: Timeline of key decisions and activities
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16
Decision making
Findings
• The replacement or rehabilitation of the Bridge was not included in the Region’s capital investment plan at the point in time at
• The need to rehabilitate or replace the Bridge was known through the biannual inspection schedule as specified in Ontario
Regulation 104/97.
• Once the structural issues were identified, the Region engaged a consultant to conduct a detailed structural analysis of the
Bridge and provide recommendations on rehabilitation and replacement options.
• The decision to replace the Bridge was made on May 19, 2010, as documented in the letter to the Provincial and Federal
Governments stating the Region’s intent to proceed with the Project.
• The decision to replace the Bridge was made prior to receiving the findings and recommendations from the detailed structural
analysis.
• The Region reacted in an appropriate and timely manner once structural issues were identified, however, the decision making
27
17
Procurement process
Procurement
Observations
The findings included in this section of the report are based on a review of the following procurement processes:
• Detailed structural analysis;
• Class EA and preliminary design;
• Detailed design;
• Contract administration; and
• General Contracting (up to, but excluding tender opening).
• The following Regional policies apply to the timeframe considered for this review:
• By-Law #56-2009 and By-Law #61-2010 (amendment to the previous by-law) apply to procurements between June 18, 2009
to December 31, 2010; and
• By-Law #130-2010 applies to all procurements commenced after January 1, 2011.
• In February 2009, the Region commenced a competitive process to engage a consultant for the detailed structural analysis of the
Bridge.
• An RFPQ was issued on February 3, 2009.
• RFPQ responses were evaluated based on the quality of submission weighted at 15%, experience in related projects
weighted at 40% and relevant professional skills of team members weighted at 45%; overall scores ranged from 552 to 953.
• The four highest out of nine consultants were selected to proceed to the RFP stage of the process, however the minimum
score for selection was not indicated in the documents provided for review.
• An RFP was subsequently issued to the selected consultants on April 22, 2009.
• RFP responses were evaluated based on a technical evaluation weighted at 85% and commercial evaluation weighted at
15%; the overall evaluation scores ranged from 744 to 908.
• The contract was awarded to Hatch for $337,649.75 based on receiving the highest overall evaluation score of 908.
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18
Procurement process
Procurement
Observations
• The work was contracted to Hatch in two phases: the first phase, awarded on June 23, 2009, was for fatigue inspection and
non-destructive testing, and fatigue analysis and evaluation; the second phase, awarded on March 23, 2010, was for a deck
condition survey and rehabilitation/replacement analysis feasibility report.
• Both phases of the contract were executed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and this is compliant with the limits of
authority in the purchasing policy, which requires the CAO to execute a RFP contract valued between $250,000 and
$1,000,000
• A final report was submitted in August 30, 2010 following the completion of the second phase of the work.
• An amendment to the contract was issued on February 18, 2011 to include contract administration and inspection for the
sidewalk repairs at a value of $63,000.
• The amendment was approved by the CAO and this is compliant with the limits of authority in the purchasing policy.
• This amendment was not contemplated in the original scope of work for detailed structural analysis.
• In July 2010, the Region commenced a competitive process for procurement of a class EA and preliminary design.
• An RFPQ was issued on July 6, 2010.
• RFPQ responses were evaluated based on the quality of submission weighted at 15%, experience in related projects
weighted at 40% and relevant professional skills of team members weighted at 45%; overall scores ranged from 580 to 980.
• The three highest out of 11 consultants to proceed to the RFP stage of the process, however the minimum score for selection
was not indicated in the documents provided for review.
• The RFPQ was followed by an RFP, which was issued to the three selected consultants on September 30, 2010.
• There was one addenda issued on October 21, 2010 to extend the closing date for the RFP to November 2, 2010.
• Completed score sheets for the RFP evaluations were not available for review.
29
19
Procurement process
Procurement
Observations
• The contract award document was not available for review to assess compliance with the purchasing policy; however, it is
understood that Delcan was awarded the contract at some time between November 2010 and January 2011.
• The contract for the class EA and preliminary design was awarded to Delcan in two stages:
• The first stage was for phase one and phase two of the class EA, which was included in the contract dated January 7,
2011 at a value of $138,251.67 plus disbursements. The contract for this stage was awarded by the Commissioner of
PW who was the Document Execution Authority for RFPs up to $250,000 as per the Region’s purchasing policy.
• The second stage was for phase three and phase four of the class EA, preliminary design, and public information
centre meetings which was included in the May 18, 2011 amendment to the contact at a value of $373,219.85 plus
disbursements. The contract for this stage was awarded by the CAO, who was the Document Execution Authority for
RFPs up to $5,000,000 as per the Region’s purchasing policy.
• In February 2012, the Region commenced a procurement process for detailed design services.
• The three consultants selected as part of the class EA and preliminary design RFPQ process were invited to participate in the
detailed design RFP process.
• The original RFPQ for the class EA and preliminary design did not indicate that it could also apply to the RFP for detailed
design services.
• A limited tendering approach was approved by the PW Committee in PWA 7-2012 on January 10, 2012.
• The RFP for detailed design was issued to the three consultants on February 2, 2012.
30
20
Procurement process
Procurement
Observations
• There were four addenda issued between February 10, 2012 and February 27, 2012 including the provision of an additional
appendix containing the class EA and preliminary design report, deletion of the consultant submission section, and responses
to bidder questions.
• RFP responses were evaluated based on a weighted score allocated as follows: technical proposal, 75%, presentation, 15%,
and commercial proposal, 10%; the overall evaluation scores ranged from 807 to 892.
• The contract was awarded on April 24, 2012 to Delcan at a value of $1,266,595.00 based on receiving the highest overall
evaluation of 892.
• The contract was executed by the CAO who was the Document Execution Authority for RFPs up to $5,000,000 as per the
Region’s purchasing policy.
• The value of the contract was subsequently increased by $728,598.17 resulting from the inclusion of wind engineering
analysis, utility test holes, geotechnical and slope stability issues, street design, utility redesign, traffic management and
attendance at additional meetings.
• In December 2012, the Region commenced a competitive process to select a General Contractor.
• An RFPQ was issued on December 20, 2012, resulting in the selection of nine out of 11 contractors to proceed with the
Request for Tender (RFT) process.
• Completed RFPQ evaluations were not available for review.
• There were five addenda issued for the RFPQ between January 9, 2013 and February 11, 2013, including the removal of a
page limitation requirement, providing standards for welders and requirements for engineers and specialists, addressing
various bidder questions, identifying additional stakeholders, and clarifying the requirement to have a single price contractor.
31
21
Procurement process
Procurement
Observations
• A report to the PW Committee (PW 69-2013), dated July 23, 2013, indicated that the design was 95% complete.
• An RFT was issued to the nine selected contractors in September 2013.
• There were 11 addenda issued between September 18, 2013 and November 21, 2013, including the extension of the closing
date for the RFT (twice), responses to bidder questions, revisions to required quantities and item descriptions, revisions to
sections, and providing rules for submittal of form of tender.
• The addenda issued on October 17, 2013 extended the closing date for the RFT to November 26, 2013.
• In February 2014, the Region engaged Delcan to provide contract administration and inspection services as an amendment to
the detailed design contract.
• A proposal to procure contract administration and inspection services from Delcan on a single source basis at an estimated
cost of $3,000,000 was reported to the PW Committee on February 19, 2013 (PW 16-2013).
• Contract administration and inspection services were not contemplated in the original scope of work for the detailed design.
• On July 24, 2013, Delcan submitted a proposal to provide contract administration and inspection services for the Project.
• PW staff interviewed indicated that the Region conducted negotiations with Delcan prior to the submission of the
proposal
• PW staff interviewed indicated that the decision to retain Delcan to provide contract administration and inspection services
was based on Delcan’s prior performance, and knowledge of the Project scope and requirements.
• A amendment was agreed to and executed on February 6, 2014 to increase Delcan’s detailed design contract value by
$4,069,532.40, which was almost four times the original contract award value.
• The contract was executed by the Regional Chair and Regional Clerk and this is compliant with the limits of authority in the
purchasing policy, which requires the Regional Chair and Regional Clerk to execute a single source contract valued greater
than $1,000,000.
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22
Procurement process
Procurement
Observations
Procurements
Key activity
Detailed structural
Class EA and
Detailed design and
analysis
preliminary design
CA and inspections
RFPQ issued
February 3, 2009
July 6, 2010
N/A
December 20, 2012
RFPQ closed
February 17, 2009
July 20, 2010
N/A
January 31, 2013
RFP/T issued
April 22, 2009
September 30, 2010
Feb. 2, 2012
September 2013
RFP/T closed
May 19, 2009
November 2, 2010
March 1, 2012
November 26, 2013
Not available for review
April 24, 2012
Not in scope
July 9, 2009
January 7, 2011
May 17, 2012
Not in scope
February 18, 2011
May 18, 2011
February 6, 2014
N/A
August 30, 2010
January 2012
N/A
N/A
Award
Contract
Amendment
Report
June 23, 2009
March 23, 2010
General Contracting
Table 1: Key dates for procurement of services
33
23
Procurement process
Procurement
Findings
• The Region has a documented and comprehensive purchasing policy.
• Utilizing an RFPQ process to engage competent consultants and contractors for the Project was an appropriate approach;
however, the evaluation of bidders was not a transparent and defendable process due to the lack of a minimum score.
• The following specific instances of non-compliance were noted:
• The first stage of the class EA and preliminary design contract was executed by the Commissioner of PW, which is not in
compliance with the limits of authority in the purchasing policy given that the total contract value exceeded $250,000.
• The RFP for the detailed design was only sent to consultants that had been selected through the RFPQ process for the class
EA and preliminary design services, and not advertised in accordance with the requirements of the Region’s purchasing
policy. Based on PWA 07-2012, dated January 10, 2012, this approach was approved by the PW Committee.
• Procurement of contract administration and inspection services for the Project was not an open, transparent and competitive
process.
• Existing contract was expanded without full consideration of other bidders.
• Contract administration and inspection services were not identified as an optional scope of work during the procurement of
detailed design.
• PW staff interviewed indicated that it is a standard practice to award contract administration and inspection services to the
detailed design consultant.
• PW Committee approval was obtained to amend the detailed design contract; however, it is not clear whether there is no
documentation indicating that other options were investigated or presented to the committee for decision.
• There is no documentation indicating that PW Committee was advised that the value of the amendment to procure contract
administration and inspection services had increased from $3,000,000 to over $4,000,000.
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24
The review of project management processes included the following key areas:
•
Delivery model;
•
Cost estimate;
•
Organization, roles and responsibilities;
•
Risk management;
•
Scope management;
•
Communication; and
•
Document management.
35
25
Delivery model
Observations
• Hatch’s detailed structural analysis report, dated August 30, 2010, included an analysis of various project delivery methods.
• On January 10, 2012 a report to the PW Committee was issued with the recommendation that the Committee approve the
implementation of a design-bid-build strategy.
• The recommendation is supported by the analysis of other project delivery methods completed by Hatch.
Findings
• The delivery model selected by the Region for the Project appears to be reasonable give the size, scope and complexity of the
project.
36
26
Cost estimating
Observations
• The estimated cost to replace the Bridge has increased since the preparation of the BCF application. Most significantly,
construction costs increased from $44,500,000 in the BCF application in February 2010 to $70,409,980 as reported to the PW
Committee in January 2014. A summary of the project cost estimates, is provided in Table 2.
• In February 2010, a total project cost of $59,000,000 was documented in the BCF application.
• The project estimate included costs associated with the EA, studies and approvals, engineering, construction, property
acquisition and contingency.
• A basis of estimate to support the BCF application was not available for review.
• It is understood that that there are currently no personnel employed by the Region who were involved with, or had specific
knowledge of, the preparation of the BCF cost estimate.
• The cost estimate submitted with the BCF application was communicated to the PW Committee on October 16, 2012, which
was 18 months after it was submitted.
• In August 2010, Hatch’s detailed structural analysis report submitted to the Region included project costs totaling $56,530,600.
• The estimate did not include costs associated with the EA, studies and approvals, however it did include an inflation
adjustment.
• The estimate was based on the construction of a new structure adjacent to the existing Bridge.
• In January 2012, Delcan’s class EA and preliminary design report submitted to the Region included project costs estimated at
$49,215,800.
• The estimate provided in the report only included costs associated with construction and contingency.
• Delcan identified and evaluated design alternatives for Bridge replacement, which took into consideration the Bridge corridor,
alignment, profile, cross section and type.
37
27
Cost estimating
Observations
• Three corridor options were identified, including far west (connecting St. Paul Street to Ridley Road), central (vicinity
of the existing Bridge), and far east (connecting St. Paul Street to southeast of the valley); the central (existing)
corridor was determined to be the preferred option.
• Three alignment options were identified, including west, existing central, and east; the preferred alignment was
determined to be a ‘hybrid’ central alignment consisting of the existing central and east alignments in order to minimize
property acquisition and maintain both pedestrian and vehicular traffic throughout construction.
• The estimate included for the class EA and preliminary design was based on a central corridor, hybrid alignment design.
• On October 16, 2012, a project cost update of $67,850,000 was presented to the PW Committee in PW 99-2012, but the report
did not include a breakdown of the increased cost or risk analysis.
• A report to the PW Committee (PW 69-2013), dated July 23, 2013, indicated that the design was 95% complete.
• The report did not provide an update on the certainty of estimated costs based on the design completion status.
• In January 2014, a report to the PW Committee (PW 8-2014) included project costs estimated to be $91,350,000.
• Although January 2014 is beyond the scope of this review, PW 8-2014 has been referenced as it was the first detailed cost
update provided to PW Committee following the class EA and preliminary design report.
• The PW 8-2014 included construction costs that were approximately $25,000,000 more than what was estimated in the BCF
application.
• Contingency was included in the various cost estimates; however contingency amount was not supported by risk analysis:
• The BCF included a contingency of 10%.
• Hatch’s detailed structural analysis report included a contingency of 12%.
• Delcan’s class EA and preliminary design report included a contingency of 6%.
• The Region’s report to the PW Committee included a contingency of 11%.
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28
Cost estimating
Comparison of cost estimates
Cost component
Building Canada
Fund
(February 2010)
EA, studies, and
approvals
$ 1,500,000
Engineering
$ 3,500,000
Detailed structural
analysis
(August 2010)
Class EA and
preliminary design
(December 2011)
Report to PW
Committee, PW 8-2014
(January 2014)
$ 1,710,000
$ 5,367,000
$ 2,688,000
Contract Admin
$ 4,069,532
Construction
$ 44,500,000
$ 35,780,000
Property acquisition
$ 5,000,000
$ 7,000,000
Contingency
$ 4,500,000
$ 4,293,600
Inflation
$ 46,430,000
$ 70,409,980
$ 2,300,000
$ 2,785,800
$ 8,000,000
$ 4,090,000
Tax
$ 1,357,488
Other
$ 815,000
Table 2: Comparison of cost estimates
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29
Cost estimating
Findings
• The Region did not implement a standardized approach to estimate project costs.
• Cost estimates were not supported by the identification and analysis of project risks.
• The Region does not have a record of how the estimate included in the BCF application was developed.
• The estimate appears to have been prepared without consultation with key stakeholders within the Region, and the
individuals directly involved in the BCF application are not longer employed by the Region.
• There is a lack of documentation available, including a cost breakdown with supporting sources, to substantiate the estimate
that was included in the BCF.
•
• Development of project contingency did not follow industry practices for large capital projects.
• Contingency does was not based on the identification and analysis of project risks.
• Given the lack of a design or basis of estimate available at the time of the BCF application, a much greater contingency would
have been expected than was included in the proposal.
– The Region did not utilize relevant industry standards to determine the appropriate level of contingency.
• The Region did not report on changes to the project cost estimate, assumptions and risks in a consistent or timely basis to the
PW Committee.
40
30
Organization, roles and responsibilities
Observations
•
This Bridge replacement is one of the most significant projects in terms of size, scope and complexity that the Region has
undertaken.
•
The Region did not assign a dedicated Project Manager assigned with ultimate responsibility for all aspects of Project delivery.
•
After several meetings with project personnel, a copy of the Project Manager’s Manual (PM Manual) for review. The PM Manual
is not developed in consideration of the additional risk profiles on large capital projects, providing some engineering process, but
limited application to project management.
• The PM Manual does not adequately define the organization, roles and responsibilities for large capital projects.
• The PM Manual is to be used as a guideline for all projects, but typically applies to smaller projects and is not regularly used
to deliver projects similar to the Project.
• Several documents within the PM Manual are dated prior to 2004, and it does not appear that the PM Manual has been
updated on a regular basis.
Findings
•
The Region has experienced engineering staff who were engaged throughout the feasibility, design and procurement phases of
the Project, to assist with the resolution technical issues.
•
The PM Manual is not adequate to support the delivery of large capital projects such as the Bridge replacement.
•
•
Critical project management processes and controls are not documented in the PM Manual.
•
Project management was based on individual knowledge, experience, and undocumented practices, rather than measurable
accountability.
41
31
Risk management
Observations
•
The Region’s PM Manual does not include a defined process for risk management.
•
The BCF application indicated that the project team would conduct a risk workshop to identify and manage risks throughout the
Project. The submission also indicated that cost increases, project delays, risk of scope changes, and service interruptions
would be addressed in a Risk Assessment & Management Plan.
• There is no documentation, such as workshop minutes or a record of identified risks, that would indicate that the risk
workshop was conducted.
• There is no documentation, such as a project risk register, indicating how risks were monitored and updated, or whether risk
owners were assigned to identified risks.
• A Risk Assessment & Management Plan, as described in the BCF application, was not available for review.
•
The BCF application included the following risks:
• Health and safety in event of catastrophic failure; and
• Environmental impacts.
•
Hatch’s detailed structural analysis report included the following risks:
• Property acquisition;
• Conflicts with adjacent Regional facility;
• Location of footings restricting type of bridge structure;
• Delays due to EA;
• Utility conflicts;
• EA issues;
• Temporary road closures;
42
32
Risk management
Observations
• Demolition/disposal of existing structure;
• Effects to local business; and
• Slope stability issues.
• Delcan’s preliminary design report included the following risks:
• Environmental;
• Socio-economic; and
• Traffic disruption.
• Industry standard practice is to implement a formal risk management process when delivering projects of the size, scope and
complexity of the Project.
• Industry standard practice is to develop project contingency based, in part, on identified risks.
43
33
Risk management
Findings
• The Region did not utilize a formal risk management process during the initial stages of the Project.
• Risks were not adequately identified and documented.
• Risk Owners were not assigned with accountability for monitoring and updating identified risks.
• There were no documented risk management plans to address risks in the event of occurrence.
• The PW Committee was not properly informed of the risks and assumptions associated with the funding application or the
• Risks were not regularly or adequately presented to the PW Committee during the delivery of the Project.
• Risks were not adequately considered when developing the project contingency.
44
34
Scope management
Observations
• The detailed design scope of work was initially awarded to Delcan for the amount of $1,266,595 on April 24, 2012, which later
increased to $2,105,261.17.
• Delcan submitted an initial request for additional payment for detailed design work on November 8, 2013. A revised request
was submitted on February 19, 2014 and approved by the Region on February 24, 2014.
• The increase in contract value was requested due to additional scope of work, including wind engineering analysis, utility test
holes, geotechnical and slope stability issues, street design, utility redesign, traffic management and attendance at additional
meetings, for a total additional cost of $728,598.17.
• The Region communicated the potential increase in scope for detailed design to the PW Committee in the PW 8-2014 report
on January 7, 2014; estimated costs reported were $740,410.
• The scope of work included in the detailed structural analysis and detailed design contracts were substantially increased
following award.
• Hatch’s contract was amended on February 18, 2011 to include contract administration and inspection services for
emergency sidewalk repairs to the Bridge, including attendance at design meetings with contractors, reviewing of EFCO
designs, attending weekly site meetings and inspections, addressing site issues and re-engineering issues, and issuing asbuilt drawings.
• Delcan’s detailed design contract was amended on February 6, 2014 to include contract administration and inspection
services during construction of the Bridge, including providing project management and coordination, and engineering
services during construction.
• A preliminary schedule of key activities was proposed in Hatch’s detailed structural analysis report, dated August 10, 2010.
• The Region provided schedules for the class EA and preliminary design procurement process and the detailed design
procurement process.
• The PW Committee was provided updates on the detailed design at 50% completion on October 16, 2012, 80% completion on
February 19, 2013 and 95% completion on June 23, 2013.
45
35
Scope management
Findings
• Schedules were used by PW staff to monitor design progress and other key milestones.
• Scope and schedule updates were not effectively documented and communicated in reports to PW Committee.
46
36
Communication
Observations
• A total of 16 reports related to the Project were presented to the PW Committee between November 2009 and January 2014.
• Reports provided for review did not include sufficient or consistent schedule updates, schedule forecasting, or financial
reporting.
• Contingency was not discussed in any reports to the PW Committee.
• Risks were not communicated in reports to the PW Committee.
• The estimated cost of $59,000,000 was not communicated in any of the reports to PW Committee prior to the submission of the
BCF application in February 2010.
• On April 24, 2012, the PW Committee was made aware of the project approval, however financials were not reported.
• On October 16, 2012, the amount of funding associated with the Project was communicated to the PW Committee.
• Recommendations to award contracts were presented in reports to the PW Committee for all procurements except for the
procurement of class EA and preliminary design services.
• A total of four confidential reports related to property acquisition for the Project were submitted to the PW Committee during the
period of the review.
47
37
Communication
Findings
• Reports prepared by PW staff for presentation to the PW Committee did not provide sufficient detail to facilitate effective project
accountability, oversight and governance.
• The submission of the BCF application and associated project estimate were not communicated to PW Committee in a timely
manner.
• Project updates were not presented to the PW Committee with appropriate content, in a proper format or in a timely manner to
support appropriate oversight and decision making.
• Key Project updates and details were not communicated to the PW Committee during the initial stages of the Project.
48
38
Document management
Observations
• Project documents were not readily available for Deloitte to conduct the review, and a significant amount of effort was required by
the Region to identify and collect required documentation.
• Important project documents, including support for the BCF application, cannot be located.
• Project documents were not organized or tracked using a file management system.
• The Region’s PM Manual does not include a defined process for document management.
• The following key documentation was not available for review:
• The award of the class EA and preliminary design work to Delcan; and
• Basis of estimate for costs included in the BCF application.
Findings
•
instances, key projects details and facts are not supported by documented proof.
• A significant amount of effort would be required to gather documents to conduct a complete assessment of the Project.
• The lack of a disciplined approach to document management has eroded accountability and compromised the audit trail.
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39
Key recommendations and
implementation strategies
50
40
40
Decision making
•
rehabilitation in the next 10 years to allow for effective decision making and a proactive approach to managing these large
capital projects.
Procurement
•
• The policy should differentiate between sole source purchases and single source purchases, document criteria around
justification and negotiation of pricing, and include authorization limits.
• Contract administration and inspections services should either be procured using a competitive process or included as part of
the initial detailed design scope of work.
• The Region should include a minimum evaluation score when utilizing a RFPQ process.
Cost estimating
• The Region should develop a structured estimating process to allow for accurate forecasting and reporting of project costs.
• The estimating process should include guidelines for evaluating and assigning contingencies for large capital projects based
on the project risk profile, assumptions, complexity and maturity.
• The assignment of contingency should be aligned with relevant industry standards, such as Association for the Advancement
of Cost Engineering (AACE).
51
41
Organization, roles and responsibilities
•
The Region should develop and implement a tiered approach to the management of capital projects that are included in the
investment plan.
• Projects should be categorized by scope, scale, complexity and risk to determine the appropriate level of management,
governance and oversight.
• A dedicated project manager should be assigned to large capital projects that are included in the investment plan.
• The Region should develop a PM Manual which specifies standards, guidelines and principles for the delivery and management
of capital projects, including:
• Health and Safety;
• Communications and Reporting;
• Risk Management;
• Cost Management;
• Schedule Management;
• Scope and Change Management;
• Procurement Management;
• Contractor and Consultant Management; and
• Document Management.
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42
Risk management
• The Region should develop and implement a formal risk management process for large capital projects.
• Training should be provided for all personnel who are involved in the delivery of capital projects to build a greater
understanding of project risk management.
• The project team should proactively identify and report all key assumptions and risks when presenting estimates and status
reports to Council.
• The project team should develop and regularly update a project risk register for all major capital projects that specifies the
probability, cost and schedule impacts, management plan, and owner for each identified risk.
Communication
• The Region should develop and implement standardized project reporting, which provides relevant, accurate and timely
• Templates and timelines for project reporting should be established for use on all capital projects.
• Reports should be consistent, accurate and regular, and as a minimum, should include sections on the following:
• Safety;
• Cost;
• Schedule;
• Change;
• Risk; and
• Quality.
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43
Document management
• The Region should develop and implement a formal document management process for all projects.
• The document management process should identify a central repository for all project documents, file numbering system, list
of key documents required for all projects, and protocols for updating and archiving documents to ensure version control and
traceability.
• The document management process should be development to capture lessons learned through the delivery of capital
projects.
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44
Appendix A – Documents reviewed
55
45
45
Documents reviewed
Documents listed in chronological order where dates could be identified:
• 2007 Municipal Bridge Appraisal - Rehabilitation/Replacement (1 of 2)
• 2007 Municipal Bridge Appraisal - Rehabilitation/Replacement (2 of 2)
• Bridge Load Capacity Evaluation Report for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220)
• PWA 66-2008: Load Capacity Evaluation for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) Which Carries Regional Road 81 (St. Paul Street) Over
Twelve Mile Creek and Highway 406 in the City of St. Catharines
• Request for Pre-qualification (RFPQ) of Professional Engineering Consultants for Structural Analysis of Burgoyne Bridge
• Structural Analysis RFPQ
• Request for Pre-qualification (RFPQ) of Professional Engineering Consultants for Structural Analysis of Burgoyne Bridge with Evaluations
• Request for Proposal (RFP) for Detailed Structural Analysis/Evaluation of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) - Proposal No. 2009-RFP-19
• By-Law No. 56-2009 - Being a By-Law to Define the Purchasing Policies and Procedures for the Regional Municipality of Niagara, and to Repeal
By-Laws 78-2006 and 30-2007
• Engineering Agreement with Hatch Mott McDonald for Detailed Structural Analysis/Evaluation of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220)
• Rehabilitation/Replacement Analysis Report for the Burgoyne Bridge Sidewalks (Structure No. 081220)
• PWA 114-2009: Initiation of Project ZGG0901 - Emergency Capital Levy Programs - Emergency Sidewalk Repairs on Burgoyne Bridge
• Niagara Region Building Canada Fund (MIC) Submission - Burgoyne Bridge Rehabilitation/Replacement Project (Regional Road 81-City of
St. Catharines)
• Letter: Submission by the Niagara Region for the Burgoyne Bridge Rehabilitation/Replacement Project and the Niagara-On-The-Lake Wastewater
Treatment Plant Expansion and Relocation Project under the Building Canada Fund (MIC)
• File No: F.08 2009-RFP-19
• Detailed Structural Analysis / Evaluation of Burgoyne Bridge - Award 2
• By-Law No. 61-2010 - A By-Law to Define the Purchasing Policies and Procedures for the Regional Municipality of Niagara
• Request for Pre-qualification (RFPQ) to Complete a Class Environmental Assessment Study and Preliminary Design for Burgoyne Bridge
(Structure No. 081220) - Document No. 2010-RFPQ-12
• Burgoyne Bridge Evaluation, Inspection and Rehabilitation/Replacement Analysis
• PWA 89-2010: Evaluation, Inspection, and Rehabilitation/Replacement Analysis for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No 081220) on Regional Road 81
(St. Paul Street West), in the City of St. Catharines
• PWP 10-2011: Status Update No. 1 on the Class Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Study for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No.
0811220), In the City of St. Catharines
• Request for Proposal (RFP) - Class Environmental Assessment Study and Preliminary Design for the Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220)
• Which Carries Regional Road 81 (St. Paul Street West) Over 12 Mile Creek and Highway 406 in the City of St. Catharines - Proposal No.
2010-RFP-52
• Request for Proposal - Class Environmental Assessment Study and Preliminary Design for the Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) –
Addendum #1
• Letter: Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities for Priority for Funding
• Engineering Agreement with Delcan Corporation for Class Environmental Assessment Study and Preliminary Design for the Burgoyne Bridge
(Structure No. 081220)
56
46
Documents reviewed
• CSD 16-2011: Proposed Acquisition of Land by the Municipality, Burgoyne Bridge Rehabilitation, Regional Road 81 (St. Paul Street West), City of
St. Catharines
• Burgoyne Bridge Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Stakeholder Group Meeting 1
• Burgoyne Bridge Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Technical Agency Committee Meeting 1
• Amending Agreement to the Engineering Agreement with Hatch Mott MacDonald for the Addition of Contract Administration and Inspections to the
Detailed Structural Analysis/Evaluation of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220)
• PWP 18-2011: Status Update No. 2 on the Class Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Study for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No.
081220), In the City of St. Catherine's
• Request for Proposal (RFP) for Geotechnical Investigation (EA Stage) for the Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) - Proposal
No. 2011-RFP-30
• Memorandum: Stakeholder Meeting and Comments
• Memorandum: Technical Agency Committee Meeting and Comments
• Engineering Agreement with Thurber Engineering Ltd. For Geotechnical Investigation (EA Stage) for the Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge
• FW: Burgoyne Bridge Approval in Principle Update
• Burgoyne Bridge Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Stakeholder Group Meeting 3+B35
• Burgoyne Bridge Environmental Assessment and Preliminary Design Technical Agency Committee Meeting 3
• PWA 07-2012: Completion of Class Environmental Assessment (EA) Study for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220), In the City of St. Catharines
• The Regional Municipality of Niagara Culture Committee Report 7-2011 Meeting Minutes
• Table 2: Cost and Cash Flow by Fiscal Year
• Foundation Investigation and Design Report Burgoyne Bridge Replacement E.A. Stage Regional Road 81 Over 12 Mile Creek and Highway 406
City of St. Catharines, Ontario
• PW 48-2012: Award of the Detailed Design Assignment For the Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220), In the City of St. Catharines
• FW: Burgoyne Bridge BCF Funding Update
• Request for Proposal (RFP) - Detailed Design and Preparation of Contract Drawings and Specifications for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No.
081220) - Proposal No. 2012-RFP-04
• Request for Proposal - Detailed Design of Burgoyne Bridge - Addendum #1
• CSD 40-2012: Proposed Acquisition of Land, Proposed Acquisition Strategy, Burgoyne Bridge Replacement, City of St. Catharines
• Request for Proposal - Detailed Design of Burgoyne Bridge - Addendum #4A
• Letter: Infrastructure Canada Approval-In-Principal
• Consultant Proposal Evaluation - Burgoyne Bridge Detailed Design (2012-RFP-04)
• CSD 54-2012: Proposed Acquisition of Land, Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge, City of St. Catharines
• PW 99-2012: Status Update on the Burgoyne Bridge Project in the City of St. Catharines
• Engineering Agreement with Delcan Corporation for Detailed Design and Preparation of Contact Drawings and Specifications for Burgoyne Bridge
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47
Documents reviewed
• Request for Proposal - Geotechnical Investigation and Pavement Design for the Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) –
Proposal No. 2012-RFP-31
• Request for Proposal - Geotechnical Investigation and Pavement Design for the Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure no.081220) –
Addendum #1
• Burgoyne Bridget Detailed Design Minutes of Meeting 14
• Burgoyne Bridget Detailed Design Minutes of Meeting 13
• Burgoyne Bridge Geotechnical Investigation - Detailed Design
• Burgoyne Bridge Detailed Design Minutes of Meeting 17
• Engineering Agreement with Golder Associated Ltd. For Geotechnical Investigation and Pavement Design for the Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge
• PW 114-2012: Contractor Pre-Qualification for the Burgoyne Bridge Replacement Project
• PW 118-2012: Provincial & Federal Funding Agreements, Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge in the City of St. Catharines
• PW 16-2013: Status Update on the Burgoyne Bridge Project in the City of St. Catharines
• Burgoyne Bridge Detailed Design Minutes of Meeting for Heritage Committee Meeting
• Request for Pre-Qualification (RFPQ) for General Contracting Services for the Replacement of Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) –
Document No. 2012-RFPQ-10
• Request for Prequalification - General Contracting Services - Addendum #1
• Memorandum: April 25, 2013 - Status of Burgoyne Bridge Detailed Design Assignment
• Burgoyne Bridge Transfer Payment Agreement FINAL Mar 4 2013
• Utility Company Burgoyne Bridge Replacement Meeting Minutes
• Canada - Niagara Region Building Canada Fund Agreement for the Burgoyne Bridge Replacement Project 2012-2013/2016-2017
• Regional Municipality of Niagara Building Canada Fund Agreement for Burgoyne Bridge Replacement Project
• Status of Burgoyne Bridge Detailed Design Assignment
• PW 69-2013: Status on the Replacement of the Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220) That Carries Regional Road 81 (St. Paul Street West)
Over the 12 Mile Creek in the City of St. Catharines
• PWC 44-2013: Scoring and Evaluation for 2012-RFPQ-10 Burgoyne Bridge General Contractors Submission - Our File: O.01.08 77 08 1202
• Burgoyne Bridge Detail Design PWC Meeting
• Burgoyne Bridge Detailed Design Minutes of Conference Call with MTO
• PW 96-2013: Approval of the Burgoyne Bridge Audited Schedule of Eligible Expenditures for the period ending March 31, 2013
• Email: Re: Burgoyne Bridge Tender Process
• Email: Re: Burgoyne
• Email: FW: Media Report - Standard Interview
• Email: FW: Heads Up on Something for Tonight
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48
Documents reviewed
• PW 8-2014: Award of Contract No. 2013-T-104 (RN 13-04) Burgoyne Bridge Replacement (Structure No. 081220) Which carries Regional Road 81
(St. Paul Street West) over 12 Mile Creek and Highway 406 In the City of St. Catharines
• Amending Agreement to the Engineering Agreement with Parsons Inc. for Detailed Design and Preparation of Contact Drawings and Specifications
for Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220)
• The Regional Municipality of Niagara - Contract No.: 2013-T-104 (RN 13-04) - Burgoyne Bridge Replacement (Structure No. 081220)
• Detailed Structural Analysis/Evaluation of Burgoyne Bridge (081220)
• Consultant Proposal Evaluation
• Environmental Study Report - Burgoyne Bridge Class Environmental Assessment & Preliminary Design Study
• Class EA and Preliminary Design Consultant RFPQ Evaluation Forms
• Class EA and Preliminary Design Consultant RFP Evaluation Forms
• Class EA and Preliminary Design Consultant Evaluation Form
• Niagara Region Roadway Design Standards
• PW 8-2014: Award of Contact No. 2013-T-104 (RN 13-04) Burgoyne Bridge Replacement (Structure No. 081220) Which carries Region Road 81
(St. Paul Street West) over 12 Mile Creek and Highway 406 In the City of St. Catharines
• PWA 114-2009: Initiation of Project ZGG0901 - Emergency Capital Levy Programs - Emergency Sidewalk Repairs on Burgoyne Bridge
• Amending Agreement to the Engineering Agreement with Delcan Corporation for Class Environmental Assessment Study and Preliminary Design
for the Burgoyne Bridge (Structure No. 081220)
• Hard Copy Memo BBRPT-C 7-2015 - Burgoyne Bridge Replacement - Correspondence Records Search
• Hard Copy Memo Documents - BBRPT-C 5-2015 Reference Materials
• Expenditure Authorization $1,000,000 to $1,000,000 Public Works Department
• File No: F.08 2009-RFP-19
• Detailed Structural Analysis / Evaluation of Burgoyne Bridge - Award 1
• Project Manager's Manual
• By-Law No. 30-2007 - A By-Law to Define the Purchasing Policies and Procedures for the Regional Municipality of Niagara
• By-Law No. 96-2008 - A By-Law to Govern the Execution of Documents and to Delegate Certain Administrative Powers and Duties to Staff
• By-Law No. 130-2010 - Being a By-Law to Define the Purchasing Policies and Procedures for the Regional Municipality of Niagara and to Repeal
By-Law 56-2009
• Burgoyne Bridge - Development and Servicing Folder No. 2
• Burgoyne Bridge - BCF Agreement - Development and Servicing Folder No. 3
• Burgoyne Bridge RFP Consultant Interview - Development and Servicing Folder
• Burgoyne Bridge Cost Estimates - Development and Serving Folder
• LCS 2-2014: A Matter Respecting the Tender Award for Burgoyne Bridge Replacement - Advice that is Subject to Solicitor and Client Privilege
• LCS 3-2014: A Matter Respecting Advice that is Subject to Solicitor-Client Privilege - Burgoyne Bridge Legal Procurement Issues
• Request for Extra DD Fees #1
• Request for Extra DD Fees #2
• Request for Extra DD Fees # 3
• Request for Extra CA Fees
• Various Project Schedules
59
49
Appendix B – Building Canada
Fund correspondence
60
50
50
Building Canada Fund correspondence
Date
Document
Description
February 18, 2010
Letter from Peter Partington, Niagara
Regional Chair, to Minister Brad
Duguid (Provincial government).
Letter identifying the Project as one of the key initiatives for the
Region, at an estimated project cost of $59,000,000.
February 24, 2010
Regional Chair, to Minister Jim
Bradley (Federal government).
Letter identifying the Project as one of the key initiatives for the
Region, at an estimated project cost of $59,000,000.
May 19, 2010
Regional Chair, to Ministers John
Baird and Brad Duguid (Federal and
Provincial governments).
Letter stating that the Niagara Regional Council endorses the
Project as the primary infrastructure project for the region, and has
support for the 12 regional Mayors. Cost for the Project is
estimated at $59,000,000.
December 13, 2010
Letter from Chuck Strahl, Minister of
Transport, Infrastructure and
Communities, to Gary Burroughs,
Niagara Regional Chair.
Letter stating that the Project has been identified as a priority for
funding consideration under the BCF, but does not signify funding
approval. States that the maximum federal contribution would be
$18,000,000, which is conditional upon completion of federal review
and fulfillment of Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.
Indicates that costs incurred before approval-in-principle are not
eligible for federal reimbursement.
March 16, 2012
Letter from Denis Lebel, Minister of
Transport, Infrastructure, and
Communities, to Gary Burroughs,
Niagara Regional Chair.
Letter indicating approval-in-principle for funding of the Project.
61
51
62
63
64

Audit Committee Agenda - Feb. 24, 2016

Transcription

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