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Assessment of public service
broadcasting in the Southern
Mediterranean Region
by dima dabbous
This report has been produced with the assistance of the European Union.
The content is the sole responsibility of the MedMedia project and can in no way
be taken to reflect the views of the European Union.
This project is
funded by the
European Union
Contents
The author
Dima Dabbous PhD is Visiting
Assistant Professor at the Centre on
Democracy, Development, and the
Rule of Law, Stanford University,
California, USA.
Report completed: September 2014
Photography: Sophia Baraket
Library pictures from iStockPhoto
The lessons learned in the recent
past should be used to develop a set
of principles which can help national
media to represent the interests and
concerns of their audiences in
a more effective way.
4
1. Preface
1.1. Encouraging pluralism
1.2. Redefining state media
1.3. Putting the audience first
1.4. Focusing on content
1.5. Shaping the public
service model
7
2. Algeria
2.1. Introduction: liberalising
the broadcasting sector
in Algeria
2.2. Management and structure
of l’Entreprise Nationale
de Télévision (ENTV) \
2.3. Programming and the
public service mission
2.4. Funding, audiences
and competition
2.5. Conclusion: Algeria’s
“mini-revolution”
11
3. Egypt
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Legislation and public
service programming
3.3. Management structures
3.4. Funding, competition
and audiences
3.5. Conclusion: the challenge
of legal reform in postrevolutionary Egypt
16
4. Israel
4.1. Overview
4.2. Public service
programming and mission
and competition
4.4. Conclusion
20
5. Jordan
5.1. Introduction
service programming
and audiences
5.5. Conclusion
23
6. Lebanon
6.1. Introduction
6.2. Programme content and
public service requirements
6.3. Funding and management
of TL
6.4. Conclusion
27
7. Libya
7.1. Introduction: public
broadcasting in postQaddafi Libya
7.2. Management, funding
and audiences
7.3. Public service broadcasting
ideals and Libyan society
7.4. Conclusion
32
8. Morocco
8.1. Introduction
8.2. Programming and public
service broadcasting ideals
8.4. Audiences
8.5. Funding, audiences and
commercial pressures
8.6. Conclusion
36
9. Palestine
9.1. Introduction
service programming
and audiences
9.5. Conclusion
39
10. Tunisia
10.1. Introduction
10.2. The structure and
management of Tunisian
public broadcasting
10.3. Public service mission and
editorial independence
10.4. Funding, audience
and competition
10.5. Conclusion
3
1.Preface
This report examines public broadcasting models in the MENA
region in the wake of the Arab Spring, and considers what kind
of content, structure, legislation and funding can best serve state
media in countries experiencing a period of transition.
By Aida Al-Kaisy,
Media Reform Special Advisor,
BBC Media Action
The Arab Spring uprisings were
instrumental in putting media reforms on
government agendas across the Southern
Mediterranean region. In response to
demands for freedom of speech and
the lifting of state control, steps have
been taken to enshrine these notions in
national constitutions; to encourage the
growth of private media; and to develop
public broadcasting models that respond
to perceived audience needs. With
some external support, policy-makers
have been working to develop new
laws and create regulatory frameworks
which could allow “democratised” media
environments to flourish. However,
despite significant improvements on
paper, there is little evidence of real
impact in practice.
Against a backdrop of security concerns
and continuing upheaval, governments
have been loath to relinquish control
over state broadcasters, while many
media outlets have strong political or
sectarian affiliations and journalists –
operating in an atmosphere of fear
and intimidation – often practise selfcensorship. It is clear that media reform
4
initiatives in the Arab world should be
tailored to reflect these constraints.
Rather than seeking to impose preconceived models, they should adopt an
approach which is realistic and pragmatic
at the present time. In particular, the
lessons learned in the recent past should
be used to develop a set of principles
which can help national media to
represent the interests and concerns of
their audiences in a more effective way.
1.1. Encouraging pluralism
Most of the legal reforms that have been
implemented in the partner countries
are textbook liberal attempts at media
democratisation, based on the premise
that the media can play a key role in
underpinning democratic principles and
values. However, with political pluralism in
its infancy, media landscapes have become
dominated by party politics and sectarian
divides. Countries such as Palestine,
Lebanon and Tunisia have seen significant
growth in the number of private channels
as a result of reforms. Yet, in Palestine,
broadcasters betray clear allegiances
to the West Bank or Gaza, while in
Tunisia audiences continue to consume
French, English and other Arabic regional
channels in order to compensate for a
perceived lack of trustworthy information
from local sources.
While there is widespread recognition
across the region of the need to establish
independent regulatory media bodies
to deal with issues such as licensing and
compliance, governments have been slow
to develop the necessary legal framework
to achieve this goal. In Algeria, for example,
a law passed early in 2014 to establish
a new regulatory authority, the Algerian
Audiovisual Regulation Authority (ARAV),
neglected to set a deadline or timetable
for this process. As a result, the Ministry
of Information remains the ultimate
authority within the broadcast sector.
Other countries have struggled to establish
regulatory bodies which have a truly
independent profile and a clearly defined
remit. In some cases, the appointment of
military officials and politicians to senior
posts has left doubts as to whether the
authorities’ declared commitment to media
freedoms is genuine.
mechanisms for measuring the extent of
political pluralism in media outputs and
ensuring fair election coverage.
of a public broadcaster and that of private
media, resulting in a paucity of content to
serve the nation as a whole.
Morocco’s achievements in this field
have been recognised in Tunisia, which
has modelled its own regulator, the
Haute autorité indépendante de la
communication audiovisuelle (HAICA), on
the Moroccan example. HAICA operates
independently of the government, with
a board nominated by the country’s
major professional unions. In both cases,
reformists have focused on tailoring the
regulatory mechanism to perceived needs
and priorities. However, it should be
noted that, despite the existence of a fully
functioning regulatory body in Morocco,
there are still no private domestic
channels in operation, demonstrating a
continuing struggle to achieve in practice
what has been developed on paper.
The focus has often been on creating
structures and governance mechanisms
which emulate those of western
broadcasters, but without a clear
understanding of how this might work in
practice. Where they do exist, core public
service principles such as national unity,
cultural identity and respect for religion
are often misrepresented and are used
as a tool for stifling opposition, political
thought and minority representation.
This is most evident in countries like
Jordan, where a lack of content-related
provisions means that the Jordan Radio
and Television Corporation (JRTV) is
viewed as a mouthpiece for both the
king and the government. In Algeria,
research conducted by the Committee
for the Protection of Journalists showed
that articles in the new Information Law
aimed at ensuring respect for the symbols
of the state and national history were in
fact being used to “stifle free expression”.
1.2. Redefining state media
Moves to transition existing state
broadcasters into public service
broadcasters have been noted in all
of the countries included in this study.
However, even in those cases where the
law makes provisions for a publicly funded
national broadcaster, there is a marked
lack of a clear public service remit
adapted to the needs of the country and
its citizens. In Algeria, for example, there is
no clear differentiation between the role
The economic environment of the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region
has also impacted on the independence
of broadcasters. Advertising markets
remain weak and unstable; they are often
subject to corruption and nepotism. Not
only does this mean that private media
outlets are forced to rely on private
donors and political parties for financial
support, it also puts public broadcasters
at the mercy of government funding.
In most of the partner countries, this
funding is derived from a combination
of sources – government grants,
advertising and taxes or licence fees.
However, all state broadcasters are hard
pushed to cover their costs, let alone
invest in technical upgrades, training or
programme development. Consequently,
they struggle to compete with private
operators and regional satellite channels.
The practice of allocating budgets
annually means that broadcasters do not
have the scope to develop long-term
strategies. In Egypt, the annual budget
of the Egyptian Radio and Television
Union (ERTU), which is defined by the
government and approved by presidential
decree, is largely consumed by the
colossal wage bill and operating expenses,
leaving little for the production of quality
programming. The situation is similar in
Jordan and Palestine. In all three countries,
a longer-term funding plan would offer
broadcasters the flexibility to implement
content strategies targeted at their
specific audiences.
Inevitably, the operating environment
impacts heavily on journalistic practice
across the region. In a media landscape
Morocco is one country which has seen
significant progress in this area. The Haute
autorité de la communication audiovisuelle
(HACA) has been successful in developing
public service principles and editorial
guidelines that allow for diverse media
content to be created. Key improvements
have included efforts to introduce
production quotas that reflect Morocco’s
ethnic and religious diversity, as well as
5
2.ALGERIA
where editorial policy is shaped by
political allegiances and appointments
are made on nepotistic rather than
meritocratic grounds, senior posts are
often filled by people with little relevant
experience. At non-executive level,
journalists work under the shadow of
government control and the fear of
physical violence. Consequently, selfcensorship is rife. This self-perpetuating
situation means that content is often
unrelated to the public service principles
of impartiality, transparency and
fairness, while non-professional editorial
standards proliferate. These problems are
compounded by low salary levels, a civil
service mentality and a widespread lack
of motivation. Meanwhile, opportunities
for professional development are few
and far between: Morocco’s public
broadcasters are perhaps the only
state media outlets in the region which
have allocated a specific budget for
staff training.
1.3. Putting the audience
first
The notion of “public” in public service
broadcasting has become something of
an anomaly in the MENA region, since
there is little understanding of what
audiences want from their national media.
What is clear is that audiences across the
region are turning to private and regional
broadcasters as their public broadcasters
fail to provide the content they are looking
for. Where qualitative audience research
has been carried out, it has highlighted
a growing awareness of political and
sectarian partisanship in the private sector.
The need for nationally representative
coverage that reflects local interests and
concerns has been widely voiced.
More accurate empirical research would
enable public service broadcasters to
make informed decisions about their
programming schedules. It could also
encourage programme-makers to move
away from poor imitations of western
or pan-Arab models and embrace ideas
which play to their strengths. This process
should be underpinned by better dialogue
with citizens and civil society in order to
generate credible feedback and ensure
that diverse views are heard.
6
1.4. Focusing on content
The question, then, remains: have
ongoing reforms prompted any real and
positive changes in media output, or has
the focus on creating new regulations
and structures failed to translate into
improved programming? This report
found little evidence that there has been
any growth in pluralistic, non-partisan
coverage of news and current affairs that
can be directly ascribed to the reform
processes. Public broadcasters continue
to toe the government line rather than
challenge the official version of events,
while private media remain reliant on
politically motivated financial backing.
In the Arab world, two forms of
content remain prevalent – the drama
or musalsal and the political/social chat
show. Currently, public broadcasters
in the Southern Mediterranean region
have little hope of delivering this content
successfully in the face of political,
economic and security pressures. Many
prefer to rely on imported shows and
reruns rather than produce relevant and
current programming. However, where
efforts have been made to develop public
service content – such as Shada Omar’s
new political talk show on TeleLiban –
there are clear indications of a positive
response from local audiences, as well
as measurable changes in public opinion
and attitudes.
One of the main ways in which public
service broadcasters can uphold and
underpin the principle of national unity
– a goal that most countries in the region
struggle to achieve – is through the
transmission of major sporting, cultural
and national events. Broadcasters in
Jordan and Lebanon have started to
respond to this need, despite fierce
competition from private (and pirate)
operators. The recent scandal around
TeleLiban’s broadcasting of the 2014
World Cup illustrates the challenges
faced by public media in a crowded and
sometimes corrupt market.
Local production quotas could help
to stimulate an increase in domestic
programming that responds to the needs
of national audiences. They could also
provide a vital shot in the arm to local
producers. In particular, such quotas
should reflect the ethnic and religious
diversity of the country in question,
as well as the interests of women
and young people in both rural and
urban environments.
1.5. Shaping the public
service model
MedMedia has a unique opportunity
to facilitate and enrich the debate
on the role of public media in the
Arab world, particularly in the light of
ongoing discussions on the future of
public service broadcasting globally. As
state broadcasters attempt to reinvent
themselves in the wake of the Arab
Spring and deal with the dramatic
rise of social media as an information
source, there is an urgent requirement
to consider what kind of content and
structure can best serve those countries
which are experiencing a period
of transition.
The public service broadcasting model is
now being re-appraised and re-evaluated
around the world against the backdrop
of radical changes in the way content is
created and accessed. These challenges
are particularly acute in the Arab world,
where the digital revolution has coincided
with (and, some would argue, triggered)
a political revolution. This report on
public service media by Dima Dabbous
presents a stark and uncompromising
picture of these challenges, as well as
providing a unique insight into the efforts
being made to overcome them. In the
context of the MedMedia project, it
should serve to stimulate a constructive
debate on the raison d’être of public
service broadcasting across the Southern
Mediterranean region.
The so-called “mini-revolution” set to liberalise Algeria’s media
sector after a decade-long state monopoly may have averted
regime change, but its restrictions on content and private
channels have proved too prohibitive to be of benefit.
2.1. Introduction:
liberalising the
broadcasting sector
in Algeria
In 2011, pressured by the popular
uprisings in the region and in response
to a wave of internal popular protests,
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced
a series of economic and social reforms.
In particular, he promised to introduce
a new media bill to increase press
freedom and liberalise the broadcasting
sector. On February 3rd 2011 the state
of emergency was finally lifted, having
been in force for nearly three decades.
On April 15th Bouteflika announced a
series of revisions with respect to the
constitution and the liberalisation of
various institutions. Indeed, following a
nationwide consultation process, six new
laws were passed by Parliament and
promulgated in 2012. On January 12th
2012 Parliament passed Information
Law No. 12-05 of 2012, which was
supposed to replace the older restrictive
media law introduced in 1990.1 The
government considered this to be a
major step towards advancing freedom
of expression in the country. Many
journalists and civil society activists,
however, voiced their disappointment
with the new law, which failed to provide
them with the protection they needed
to work freely as journalists. Indeed, the
long list of content-related restrictions
in both Article 2 and Article 92 of Law
No. 12-05 of 2012 makes it practically
impossible to cover any social, economic
or political issue without risking retaliation
by the authorities, even though the
beginning of Article 2 states that the
gathering of information is an activity
“freely exercised”. The same article
requires that journalists and media
practitioners respect Islam and other
religions, the national identity, the cultural
values of society, national sovereignty
and unity, the requirements of security
and national defence, the requirements
to maintain public order, the economic
interests of the country and the mission
of public service. The law also requires
the provision of “complete and objective”
information to citizens and respect for
the plurality of different political currents
of thought in the country (Article 2).
Moreover, journalists should respect,
among other things, the attributes and
symbols of the state, and should refrain
from disrespecting national history,
justifying colonialism, and spreading or
publishing images or words that “shock
the sensibility of the citizen” (Article
92). Indeed, research conducted by
the Committee for the Protection of
Journalists (CPJ) shows that, among
the law’s 133 articles, “at least 32 can
be used to restrict coverage by stifling
free expression […]. Several of the
provisions are ambiguous and impose
undue restrictions on access to
information as well as heavy fines for
violations of the law.” 2
Two years later another law was
promulgated by Parliament in order
to complete the process started by
the Information Law of 2012, and to
put an end to nearly half a century of
state monopoly over the broadcasting
sector (since independence in 1962).
Broadcast Law No. 14-04 of February
24th 2014 was going to make it possible,
for the first time in the country, to
license private broadcasters.3 The law
was met with heavy criticism for failing,
like the 2012 Information Law, to meet
international standards of freedom of
expression.4 It contained several contentrelated restrictions expressed so vaguely
that “they hoist an intolerable sword
of Damocles over the freedom of the
press and expression”, as MP Ali Brahimi
explained.5 The major criticism of this
law, however, concerned the clause
relating to the licensing of private
operators. According to Article 17,
licences are granted exclusively to private
thematic channels which target specific
he French text of this law (Loi organique n° 12-05 du 18 Safar 1433 correspondant au 12 janvier 2012 relative à l’information) is part of the database of the programme
T
Euromed Audiovisuel III, available at: www.euromedaudiovisuel.net/l.aspx?t=legaltexts2&mid=79&l=fr.
2
“In Algeria, new media law stifles free expression”, by Fethi Belaid. Agence France Press. Posted on January 25th 2012 at: www.cpj.org/2012/01/in-algeria-new-media-lawstifles-free-expression.php.
3
The Arabic text of this law was published in issue no. 16 of the National Gazette on March 23rd 2014. Available at: www.joradp.dz/FTP/JO-ARABE/2014/A2014016.pdf.
4
“Algeria adopts controversial media law”. Posted on December 11th 2014 at: www.moroccoworldnews.com/2011/12/19113/algeria-adopts-controversial-media-law/.
5
ibid.
1
7
audiences. In other words, according
to Broadcast Law No. 14-04 of 2014,
private channels cannot obtain a licence
and be allowed to operate in Algeria if
they broadcast general entertainment
programmes and news, and seek to reach
a wide national audience.
2.2. Management and
structure of l’Entreprise
nationale de télévision
(ENTV)
The most important change with
respect to the public broadcasting sector
introduced by the Broadcast Law of
2014 is that it is now placed under the
control of Algeria’s new authority for
broadcast regulation (the adopted French
acronym of which is ARAV), as specified
in Article 55 of Law No. 14-04 of 2014.6
ARAV, which has not yet been formed,
is a body consisting of nine members, all
to be appointed by presidential decree
(Article 57). Five members, including the
chairperson, are chosen by the president,
while the other four are suggested by the
heads of the two parliamentary chambers
and approved by the president. Members
serve a (non-renewable) term of six
years, and cannot be removed from office
unless they infringe the terms stipulated
in the new law (Article 60). According to
Article 58, this body “performs its duties
with complete independence”. It should
be mentioned that Law No. 14-04 of
2014 does not impose a deadline for
the setting up of ARAV and states that,
until a regulatory authority is formed,
the Minister of Information is in charge
and assumes all of ARAV’s duties and
responsibilities vis-à-vis the broadcasting
sector (Article 112). To date no regulatory
authority has been formed, which makes
the current minister of information the
sole person responsible for heading the
public broadcasting sector in Algeria.
Télédiffusion d’Algerie (TDA) is the
public entity responsible for operating
both radio and television broadcasting in
Algeria).7 ENTV (also known as EPTV)
is Algeria’s sole public TV network. It
consists of five national TV channels. These
are: La Terrestre (the main Arabic channel,
In an attempt to restructure Algeria’s
public television, Executive Decree No.
91-100 of April 20th 1991 changed
ENTV into EPTV and made it a public
institution with a commercial character,
placed “under the tutelage of the
authority designated by the head of
state” (Article 2). The head of state
also chooses the director general of
the establishment, who is assisted by
an associate director and seven other
members. The make-up of the board of
directors of ENTV does not guarantee
its independence from government, since
six of its nine members are government
employees and representatives of
government media (Article 15, Executive
Decree No. 91-100 of April 20th 1991).
In February 2011, probably in response
to the wave of public protests and
calls for more democratisation which
swept the Arab world, the government
announced, as part of its reform agenda,
that a new organisational chart for public
broadcasters was being discussed at
the Council of Ministers (or Cabinet).
However, at the time of writing there
has been no progress concerning this
announcement, nor has any serious
follow-up been documented.
ENTV (or EPTV) runs 19 departments
(“directions” in French), of which four
are regional. These include: production
of programming and news; archiving;
advertising, research and equipment;
human resources, finance and security.
2.3. Programming and the
public service mission
In addition to the general content
requirements found in the applicable
media laws (as seen above), most of
which are negative (laying out what
not to do) or have little to do with the
mission of public service broadcasting,
ENTV’s 1991 book of specifications
(terms of reference or cahier des
charges)8 requires it to offer programming
that reflects “the pluralist expression
of different currents of thought and
opinion and the principle of equality of
treatment, honesty, independence, and
recommendations of the [now defunct]
CSI”. The provision on pluralism of
opinion is also required of any “wouldbe” private operators, as per the new
media law of 2014. In other words, there
is nothing to differentiate the content of
Algeria’s public broadcaster from that
of other private national broadcasters,
according to the law. Moreover, the
new duties and responsibilities of ENTV
as spelled out in the recent book of
specifications (May 2012) do not set out
the public service mission of ENTV or
explain how this public TV operator is
supposed to reflect this mission through
its programming. Unlike the Moroccan
case, for instance, where existing books
of specifications explain in great detail
how such a service is to be achieved
(through the imposition of detailed
quotas on programme genres and
concrete and detailed provisions and
percentages regarding the expression
of pluralist views), the 2014 book of
specifications for ENTV is more focused
on improving the technical quality of
its broadcasting and reception, and on
increasing networking and co-operation
between ENTV and other national
and international agencies. Some
general (and aggregate) percentages
are mentioned with respect to the
promotion of national production. This
is found in the Broadcast Law of 2014
itself (Article 48): a minimum of 60% of
all programming should be produced in
Algeria, of which at least 20% should be
dedicated to cinematographic works.
Imported programmes (dubbed into the
country’s two official languages) should
not exceed 20% of total programming.
Statistics related to programming on
ENTV in 2012 show that national
programmes constituted 67.42% of the
totality of programming for this year,
Arab programmes 26.82% and western
programmes 5.76%.9 With respect to
L’Autorité de Régulation de l’Audio-Visuel.
ENTV is one of the departments run by the public entity responsible for operating broadcasting in Algeria, Télédiffusion d’Algérie. See the official website at: www.okbob.
net/article-tda-le-site-officiel-de-la-telediffusion-algerienne-108348000.html.
8
Article 4, Executive Decree No. 91-100 of April 20th 1991.
9
“Rapport statistiques de diffusion – Année 2012”. Direction Programmation, Département reporting et mesured’audience, EPTV, Algeria.
6
with general interest programming);
Canal Algérie (French general interest
programming); Algérie 3 (A3) (Arabic
general interest programming); and, since
2009, Algérie 4 (Tamazight, satellite) and
Algérie 5 (thematic/Koran, satellite).
7
8
films, ENTV broadcast mostly French
films (71.32%), compared with 23.66%
that were national films.
Despite its mandate to represent
different opinions and the political
and cultural diversity of the country,
ENTV has largely failed to do so.
Its information and news are very
state-centric, and serve to praise the
authorities first and foremost. Most of
the information broadcast on ENTV
consists of government speeches and
international news. Moreover, Algerian
public broadcasting operators “provide
more information about the violence
in Palestine than the internal problems
in Algeria”.10
Indeed, a comparative analysis of news
content showed that ENTV dedicated
a significant amount of airtime on
the evening news to the president of
Algeria alone (16%), while the political
and social chat show format, which has
become the most popular information
genre on Arab television, was practically
non-existent:
The last two decades have been
marked by a complete boycott by
Algerian TV (ENTV) of issues of major
concern to Algerian society, in contrast
to a relatively free printed [sic] press
which has been more able to reflect
Algerian reality.11
With the exception of the Tamazight
channel, which caters to the interests
of the indigenous Amazigh people
and broadcasts programming in their
own language, public broadcasting in
Arabic does not cater for minorities in
the country.
During election times an ad hoc
committee is set up in order to allocate
time to the different candidates, but
political parties that are not engaged in
the electoral race or that boycott it are
excluded from political debates.12
and competition
Audience dissatisfaction with the
nature of the content on ENTV is
such that Algerians often refer to it
sarcastically as “the Orphan”, “the
Unique” or “the Mandatory”.13 The
exceptionally high number of satellite
dishes in the country is, according to
some commentators, the most glaring
evidence of audience dissatisfaction
with the programming offered on
national public television.14 The fact
that Algerian viewers are increasingly
turning towards European and Arab
channels (Tunisian, Moroccan, Lebanese,
Syrian, Saudi and even Iraqi ones)
is due to the inability of public TV
to offer, across genres – political,
entertainment, sport and culture15 – programming that is attractive to
national audiences. There are few, if any,
organisations in Algeria that conduct
audience research. It should also be
noted that Algeria is not included in
the annual reports of Eurodata TV
Worldwide.16 However, the high number
of private satellite channels (Algerian,
Arab and European) penetrating homes
and competing with public broadcasting
is encouraging some private firms
specialising in the study of audiences to
develop their work in Algeria.
African Media Barometer: Algerie 2009. Available at: www.fesmedia-africa.org/uploads/media/AMB_Algeria_2009_French_and_English_01.pdf.
“ Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig. In “Public Service Broadcasting in the MENA Region: Potential for
Reform”. Panos Paris Institute and Mediterranean Observatory of Communication. Report available at: http://iwsaw.lau.edu.lb/publications/documents/PSB-Book.pdf.
12
African Media Barometer: Algerie 2009, op. cit., page 50.
13
African Media Barometer: Algerie 2009, op. cit., page 48.
14
ibid.
15
“Loi sur l’audiovisuel: Un texte pour une avancée politique et technologique”, by Ali El Hadj Tahar. Posted on February 6th 2014 at: www.liberte-algerie.com/contributions/untexte-pour-une-avancee-politique-et-technologique-loi-sur-l-audiovisuel-215238.
16
“Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens: Algérie”. Euromed Audiovisuel. Available at: http://
euromedaudiovisuel.net/Files/2014/05/27/1401210761199.pdf.
10
11
9
3.Egypt
In 2006, an Algerian company specialising
in audience polls, AbassaCom, published
results that showed that 45% of Algerians
watched one of the public channels
(ENTV, Canal Algérie and Algérie 3) “once
a day”, while 20% watched pan-Arab
satellite channels. These were followed by
the French channels, which were watched
by 10 million viewers.17
Funding for ENTV comes from several
sources: direct subsidies (budget
allocation) by the government, the licence
fee, advertising and the sale of services and
programming. Details and a breakdown
of the total funding are not made public
but can be provided upon request.18 In
2012 funding for ENTV’s operational
costs reached a total of 115 million euros
(12,116,065,346 AD).19 The 2012 budget
for operational costs was distributed as
follows: 87,542,300 euros allocated by the
government in order for ENTV to fulfil a
public service mission and obtain retransmission rights by satellite; 9,176,310
euros generated through taxation (the
licence fee) and 18,075,900 euros earned
through sponsorship and the sale of
advertising time and programmes.
It should be noted that, to date, the
public broadcaster has a monopoly over
advertising through ANEP, 20 the state
agency for publishing and advertising.
This monopoly status, which poses a
serious threat to the development of both
private print and broadcast media, has
been seriously questioned by journalists
and members of civil society, especially in
light of the recent decision to liberalise
the broadcasting sector. The official
response so far has been ambiguous:
while reaffirming that “advertising is
not a constitutional right”, Minister of
Communication Hamid Grine also
promised that a draft law on advertising
was envisaged for September 2014.21
ENTV covers 85% of Algeria, with plans
to upgrade transmission and reach the
goal of 95% national coverage by 2015,
with the remaining 5% of coverage to be
ensured through satellite transmission.22
2.5. Conclusion: Algeria’s
“mini-revolution”
The Algerian president’s announcement
of a series of political and economic
reforms to democratise the country and
liberalise the broadcasting sector, after
nearly half a decade of state monopoly,
prompted some commentators
and researchers to speak of a “minirevolution” sweeping the media sector
in Algeria.23
The reason behind such reforms,
according to some, was a desire to
pre-empt internal dissent and avert
regime change (in contrast to what
happened in the neighbouring countries
Egypt and Tunisia). Indeed, with respect
to the media, several new laws and
decrees were introduced in the space
of two years in order to guarantee
a more liberalised environment that
was more conducive to freedom of
expression and pluralism of opinion
– something that was anathema in
official discourse and practice until then.
Moreover, in the year 2000 an ambitious
plan to modernise ENTV was set in
motion, which included the transition
to digital broadcasting and archiving,
and the acquisition of state-of-the-art
studios and equipment, as well as the
introduction of five television centres
in the far south. This ambitious plan has
already seen many of its components
achieved within five years of its launch,
After the 2011 revolution, the media landscape in Egypt saw
a period of relative freedom. However, there has since been
a considerable erosion of liberty with the reintroduction of
military rule of state television.
while others are still under way, such
as the introduction of digital terrestrial
(public) television.24
While achievements based on the
upgrading of the technical quality and
transmission capacity of ENTV – and on
the introduction of laws liberalising the
media sector – cannot be denied, a closer
examination of the quality and nature
of the changes introduced shows their
limitations. For example, Information Law
No. 12-05 of 2012 has so many contentrelated restrictions that it cannot serve
as a guarantee of pluralism and freedom
of expression in Algeria. As for Broadcast
Law No. 14-04 of 2014, not only does it
not allow the licensing of private channels
offering general interest programming
(including news bulletins), but it has
not yet led to the privatisation of any
television companies in the country.
On the contrary, on 12th March 2014
(shortly after the introduction of this law),
the Algerian authorities closed down
the offices of a private channel (al-Atlas
TV) ahead of the Algerian presidential
elections,25 and Algeria earned itself a
very low ranking (121st) with respect to
media freedoms according to Reporters
Without Borders, faring worse than the
United Arab Emirates, South Sudan
and Uganda.26
3.1. Introduction
Since the collapse of the Mubarak
government in early 2011, Egypt has been
witnessing a series of political upheavals
and a regime change that have hindered
legal reform in the area of broadcast
regulation. On January 18th 2014 Egypt
acquired a new constitution, which marks
a significant departure from the previous
ones in the way in which it guarantees
several civil liberties and freedom of
the media.27 The new constitution
devotes an entire chapter (Chapter 3)
to guaranteeing rights for its citizens,
including freedom of expression and of
the media, and the right to protection
from various types of discrimination
based on religion, sex/gender, ethnicity,
language, class, political or geographical
affiliation or any other factor (Article
53). According to the 2014 constitution,
“freedom of thought and opinion is
guaranteed” and “each individual has
the right to express his [sic] opinion”
orally, in writing or by “any other means
of expression or publication” (Article
65). Article 70 states that the freedom
of various forms of media (e.g. print,
broadcast and electronic) is guaranteed,
while Article 71 protects these media
from any form of censorship, except “in
Algeria’s numerous private satellite
channels, which continue to have the
status of “offshore” companies and
are mostly operating from outside the
country, are still waiting to reap the
benefits of Algeria’s “mini-revolution”.
“ Loi sur l’audiovisuel: Un texte pour une avancée politique et technologique”, by Ali El Hadj Tahar, op. cit.
Details of the 2012 budget for ENTV were provided by EPTV in November 2013 to one of the researchers involved in a Euromed Audiovisuel study on media in Algeria.
See details in “Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens: Algérie”, op. cit.
19
See “Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens”, op. cit. The currency conversion was carried
out using the rates on the Oanda website (www.oanda.com) for December 31st 2012.
20
ANEP is the acronym for the French name, Entreprise Nationale de Communication d’Edition et de Publicité.
21
“Suspension de journaux, publicité Anep, chaînes de télévision privées: les précisions de Hamid Grine”, by Hadjer Guenanfa. Posted on July 9th 2014 at: www.tsa-algerie.
com/2014/07/09/suspension-de-journaux-publicite-anep-chaines-de-televisions-privees-les-precisions-de-hamid-grine/.
22
Communiqué issued by the minister of communication, March 2014. Posted on the official website of the Ministry of Communication at: www.ministerecommunication.gov.
dz/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2282&Itemid=1.
23
See “Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens”, op. cit.
24
ibid.
25
“Al Atlas TV, première victime de la présidentielle algérienne”, by Marie-Hélène Soenen. Posted on March 17th 2014 at: http://television.telerama.fr/television/al-atlas-tvpremiere-victime-de-la-presidentielle-algerienne,109889.php.
26
“World Press Freedom Index 2014”. Reporters without Borders. Available at: http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php.
17
18
10
a limited manner, during times of war
or general mobilisation”. Another article
concerns “state-owned media” specifically,
and guarantees their independence
and their ability to express all opinions,
political leanings and social interests,
in addition to guaranteeing “equal
opportunities to address public opinion”
(Article 72).28
With the exception of the new
constitution of 2014 – which reflects
a serious effort, at least on paper, to
guarantee various civil and mediarelated liberties in an unprecedented
way – no media-related legal reforms of
the public or private sector have taken
place in the last three years.29 Instead,
the media landscape in the country
has been continuously deteriorating: it
was characterised at first by a period
of relative relaxation of the rules, an
increase in the number of private media
outlets, and greater pluralism in opinion
and freedom of expression (especially
immediately after the collapse of the
Mubarak government); but this was
followed by periods of crackdown and
greater restrictions on these outlets
and journalists, and increased control
by existing power structures over state
media. Indeed, the latest reports on
media freedoms in Egypt seem to signal a
setback in that respect, while the Freedom
House ranking of the country went from
“partly free” in 2012 to “not free” in 2013.
As the report explains, the justification for
this increasingly negative ranking is:
… the officially tolerated campaigns
to intimidate journalists, increased
efforts to prosecute reporters and
commentators for insulting the political
leadership or defaming religion, and
intensified polarisation of the proand anti-Muslim Brotherhood press,
which reduced the availability of
balanced coverage.30
The situation took a turn for the worse
with the recent wire-tapping scandal
involving the various security and military
intelligence agencies. As one activist
commented, muted domestic reactions
to the wire-tapping of politicians and
activists, and the unwillingness of the
Egyptian/military authorities to take any
steps to stem the leaks, despite provisions
in the new constitution to penalise
violations of privacy, “don’t bode well for
the future of citizens’ rights and the rule
of law” in the country.31
he new constitution was drafted by a small committee of judges and constitutional law professors, and was reviewed by a committee of 50 members representing various
T
sectors of Egyptian society. A national referendum was held on January 14th and 15th 2014, and 98.1% of voters approved the final version of the draft constitution. The
interim president promulgated the final version of the law on March 8th 2014.
28
Note the use of the qualifier “state-owned” when referring to “public media”. All translations from Arabic are by the author.
29
Egyptian constitution 2014. Available at: www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/download/Constitution_2014.pdf.
30
“Freedom of the Press 2013: Egypt”. Freedom House. Available at: www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/egypt#.U3-juvmSySo.
31
“Egypt’s Wiretapping Scandal”, by Mohammed Abdel Salam. Posted on March 31st 2014 at: http://goo.gl/NQkl41.
27
11
service programming
The Egyptian Radio and Television Union
(ERTU) is the sole public authority
responsible for radio and television
broadcasting in the country. It was
established in 1971, and operates under
Law No. 13 of 1979 (last amended by
Law No. 223 of 1989).32 Article 2 of the
ERTU charter (or Law No. 13 of 1979)
deals with broadcasting content. Its third
paragraph can be considered a blueprint
for a public service mission. It calls for the
creation and provision of programming
“oriented towards a wide range of
interests… for the benefit of a crosssection of the Egyptian society”, and is
dedicated to enabling the “development
of different population groups, including
children, adolescents, young men and
women, professionals, and farmers”.
What is notable about the contentrelated directive for this public
broadcasting entity is that its wording
is general, vague and does not
encompass the various functions found
in internationally accepted definitions of
public service broadcasting. For instance,
the concept of catering to “minority
interests” (the Egyptian Copts are a
numerically large religious group) is
absent. Also absent are ideas of balance,
fairness and impartiality in the news, and
references to election coverage.
few years, ERTU channels have failed
systematically to act in the interests
of the Egyptian public, have served as
mouthpieces of the government of
the day and, more recently, have been
broadcasting “blunt propaganda in praise
of the military in the post-Brotherhood”
period.34 Indeed, state media do not
currently allow either any criticism of
the army or any discussion of its budget
or security-related issues.35 The army is
once again the red line (as it was under
Mubarak). There are also directives by
management being sent out to journalists
on a daily basis, informing them what
they are not allowed to broadcast in
programmes and news.36
Moreover, there are no specific
mechanisms that help to translate the
general guidelines on content into actual
programming, as is the case in Morocco.
Indeed, existing studies of output on
ERTU’s major TV channel, Al-Masriyah,
have shown the extent to which ERTU
has failed to offer programming that
serves the interests of the Egyptian
population in all its diversity.33 Throughout
the successive regimes of the last
The ERTU code of ethics, which remains
unchanged, is a list of prohibitions about
what not to do, rather than a set of
guidelines for good or professional
journalistic practice. Each of its 33 articles
starts with the phrase, “It is prohibited
to broadcast…”.40 While some of the
articles seek to protect the well-being
of children and marginalised people (e.g.
people with disabilities) and to prevent
the broadcasting of discriminatory
32
33
Not only is the army currently the centre
of praise in both public and private media,
but opposition politicians and supporters
are vilified and the object of ongoing
smear campaigns; “counter-narratives”
are practically non-existent.37 There are
no programmes whatsoever that cater
to religious minorities or marginalised
social groups.38 Some programmes
are allowed occasionally to contain a
certain number of critical views due
to their low popularity and impact on
audiences. However, the general service
remains “propagandist for the regime, any
regime, as it had always been in the state
media”.39
Although ERTU is officially a public
body, both in practice and in structure
it is an “appendage of government”. It
is directly accountable to the minister
of information, who acts as chair of the
ERTU board of trustees and whose
control over ERTU was reinforced by
the 1989 amendment to the ERTU
charter of 1979.42 This arrangement,
whereby this public entity is entirely
controlled by government, remains
unchanged to date. Indeed, it “has been
in force for so long that the meaning
of ‘state’, ‘public’, and ‘government’ have
become fused in Egyptian everyday
discourse regarding rights and
responsibilities in media systems”.43
(e.g. the Supreme Council for Youth and
Sports and Al-Azhar) and other experts
appointed by the minister of information
(Article 28). This body approves the
annual reports, financial reports, draft
budgets and actual budgets, in addition to
a number of other financial documents
related to ERTU (Article 29).
Article 5, which deals with the formation
of the ERTU board of trustees, gives the
president of the Republic the power to
appoint the chairperson of the board
and to determine the duration of their
term, in addition to their salary and
compensation. According to Article 12
of the 1989 amendment, the managing
director of ERTU is appointed by
presidential decree. The ERTU board
is entrusted, among other things, with
developing the general policies of ERTU
(including its code of ethics), monitoring
and evaluating its functions, preparing
the annual budget, adopting bylaws
The ERTU governance structure consists
of a general assembly, a board of trustees
and a board of managing directors
(Article 4). The general assembly is
chaired by the minister of information
and includes the members of the board
of trustees, various other ministers,
representatives of several official bodies
he text of the law is available at: www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Law.ERTU_.No-13-of-1979.pdf. Law No. 223 of 1989 is available at:
T
www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Law-ERTU-Amend-223-of-1989.pdf.
“Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, op. cit.
34
“Egyptian Media Under Transition: In the Name of the Regime… In the Name of the People?”, by Fatima el Issawi. Polis, London School of Economics.
Available at: www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/Polis/documents/Polis%20papers/Egyptian-Media-Under-Transition.PDF.
35
Personal interview with Ibrahim Sayyed Mustafa, journalist with the newspaper al-Akhbar, July 28th 2014.
36
Personal interview with Somaia el-Shennawi, senior news correspondent, state TV, July 29th 2014.
37
“Egyptian Media Under Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
38
39
Issam Said, state TV talk show host, as quoted in “Egyptian Media Under Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
40
ERTU code of ethics. Available at: http://tbsjournal.arabmediasociety.com/Archives/Spring05/ERTU.html.
41
“Optical Illusions: Television and Censorship in the Arab World”, by Naomi Sakr. In Transnational Broadcasting Studies, No. 5, Autumn–Winter 2000. Available at: http://
tbsjournal.arabmediasociety.com/Archives/Fall00/sakr1.htm
42
Law No. 223 of 1989 is available at: www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Law-ERTU-Amend-223-of-1989.pdf.
43
“Egyptian TV in the Grip of Government”, by Naomi Sakr. In “Television and Public Policy: Change and Continuity in an Era of Global Liberalization”, edited by David Ward.
Taylor & Francis, New York.
12
Nile Culture and Nile Cinema) and
six entertainment channels through
its Nile Television Network. The Nile
Educational Channel consists of six
educational channels that cover all levels
of public education in Egypt. According
to a recent Euromed country profile,
Egypt has the highest number of stateowned satellite channels in the region
(35 channels).45 It should be noted that
no specific mandate is provided for the
different stations operating under the
ERTU umbrella.
content (based on ethnicity, class or
religion), the overwhelming majority of
the other articles contain prohibitions
that serve to protect the interests of
the power elites and to suppress any
critical views about them. Specifically,
the requirement that operators should
avoid broadcasting “any programme that
criticises other broadcast programmes”
reflects best the extent to which the
ERTU code of ethics is just another
instrument available to the authorities
for stifling criticism in all its aspects and
forms, including media self-criticism. The
document is so restrictive of what can
be expressed in the media that it makes
it “all but impossible to risk transmitting
television broadcasts live”.41
and internal statutes regarding human
resources and personnel, and approving
the general programming schedule
(Article 6). Article 3 requires this public
entity to provide its staff with training.
Through both terrestrial analogue and
satellite transmission, ERTU operates
two general interest national terrestrial
channels: Channel 1 (Al-Masriyah 1),
and Channel 2 (Al-Masriyah 2), which is
aimed at Egyptian and Arab communities
overseas. Both these channels have been
offering non-stop transmission since
2007. Another television network, alMahroussa, includes six regional channels
and covers 27 different governorates
in the country.44 The three satellite
channels operated by ERTU are the
Al-Masriyah satellite channel, Nile
News and Nile TV International. ERTU
also operates 12 specialised thematic
channels through its Nile Thematic
Network (e.g. Nile Sport, Nile News,
ERTU also runs production studios, and
its news production centre is highly
equipped and has one of the largest
digital studios in the region.46 Nothing
in the law relating to ERTU mentions
that this public operator should be
an independent entity. Moreover, the
“heavily top-down model which is said
to prevail within ERTU exacerbates its
lack of independence”, and ERTU is also
“characterized by a strong vertically
integrated economic structure, which
leads to the creation of bottlenecks and
control points”.47
The number of employees at ERTU
is estimated to be 43,000, only 8% of
whom are media professionals.48 As public
employees they have the advantage of
being secure in their jobs and benefiting
from health insurance cover and access
to some training, although this is seen as
insufficient and inadequate.49 Soon after
the revolution there were some attempts
at changing the structure of ERTU. A
general, Tarek El-Mahdi, was appointed
“supervisor” in February 2011 after
the arrest of Osama el Sheikh. A new
chairman was appointed in March: Dr
Samy Sherif, a former media professor.
However, he resigned three months later
and was replaced by his deputy, Tharwat
Mekki. Not only has there been a return
to the status quo ante, but more than a
dozen managers and senior personnel
with a military background (at the rank of
general) have been appointed since then.50
E uromed Country Profile: Egypt. Available at: http://euromedaudiovisuel.net/Files/2013/08/20/1377006300957.pdf.
ibid.
46
ibid.
47
“Assessment of Media Development in Egypt: Based on UNESCO’s Media Development Indicators”, by Toby Mendel. UNESCO. Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0022/002207/220742e.pdf.
48 ibid.
49 Personal interview with Ibrahim Sayyed Mustafa, journalist with the newspaper al-Akhbar, July 28th 2014.
50
Euromed Country Profile: Egypt, op. cit.
44
45
13
The fear is that creating [a national
broadcasting council] will serve merely
as ‘window-dressing’ – a convenient
‘surrogate’ or ‘substitute’ for the (recently)
re-abolished Ministry of Information, with
the purpose of suggesting that public
service broadcasting exists
in Egypt.
and audiences
The funding of ERTU is dealt with in
Articles 16 to 27 of Law No. 13 of
1979. While the independence of ERTU
is not mentioned anywhere in this law,
Article 18 does state that ERTU should
have an independent budget, decreed
by the president. Moreover, ERTU
may raise funding from statutory fees,
government budget allocations, subsidies,
grants, loans and revenue generated by
the companies it owns (Article 20). The
government is responsible, every year,
for deciding on the amount of money to
be allocated to ERTU, and deposits it in
ERTU’s account at the Central Bank of
Egypt (Article 24). Because no user fees
have been imposed in order to fund
ERTU, most of its budget comes from
the government.51 There are other sources
of revenue, such as advertising and the sale
of radio and television shows, but these
are not sufficient to make ERTU financially
independent of government. This financial
dependence has been a serious threat to
ERTU’s editorial and managerial autonomy.
Since the revolution, ERTU has been
experiencing serious financial difficulties,
in part due to growing competition
from the private satellite channels,
a dwindling audience share and the
paucity of advertisements on its
networks.52 Other reasons for the
ERTU deficit are ERTU’s “bloated
structure”, the unnecessarily high
number of employees, and heavy capital
investments coupled with losses (e.g.
Nilesat).53 Increasing the (low) salaries at
ERTU by 400% following the revolution
only exacerbated its financial difficulties.54
In 2011 ERTU received close to 1.6
billion Egyptian pounds (c. $263 million)
in direct government subsidies, yet its
overall debt reached 13.5 billion Egyptian
pounds (c. $2.2 billion).55 In 2012 its
budget showed a deficit of 19 billion
Egyptian pounds (c. $3.2 billion dollars),56
and by 2014 this had risen to 20 billion
Egyptian pounds.57
Despite the rich local and satellite
broadcasting landscape in Egypt, no
institution or media observatory is
able to provide statistics about the real
number of channels or their audience
share.58 The absence of a modern survey
system to assess the performance
of broadcast operators is, perhaps,
surprising given that the Egyptian
television is well developed and has
been through a period of significant
expansion. Only recently, a leading
international private polling company,
Ipsos, conducted an audience share
assessment for television (February
2012): its results showed a low level
of viewership for the public channels,
especially when compared with private
ones like Al-Hayat, Dream TV and
CBC.59
3.5. Conclusion: the
challenge of legal reform
in post-revolutionary Egypt
Immediately following the revolution,
the media landscape in Egypt, both
private and public, witnessed a period
of relaxation of the rules and relative
freedom, which culminated in the
abolition of the Ministry of Information in
“ Assessment of Media Development in Egypt”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit.
Personal interview with Ibrahim Sayyed Mustafa, journalist with the newspaper al-Akhbar, July 28th 2014.
53
“Assessment of Media Development in Egypt”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit.
54
“Egyptian Media under Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
55
ibid.
56
Egypt’s Media in the Midst of Revolution”, by Rasha Abdulla. Paper posted on July 16th 2014 at: http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/16/egypt-s-media-in-midst-ofrevolution/hg1v.
57
58
Euromed Country Profile: Egypt, op. cit.
59
“Assessment of Media Development in Egypt”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit.
the first cabinet reshuffle. This important
move was welcome because the ministry
was seen as an obstacle to media
independence in Egypt, especially with
respect to state media. The “Maspero
revolutionaries” (this is how ERTU
employees who called for drastic change
within ERTU were referred to) had a
number of other important demands,
since abolishing the ministry alone was
not going to be sufficient to change
the authoritarian and corrupt structure
of ERTU, an entity which could remain
impervious to change if other kinds of
internal restructuring did not take place.60
According to Mustafa Shuman,
public policy advisor with the Ministry
of Labour: 61
Demands for the abolishing of the
Ministry of Information are absurd
and won’t change the reality of
Maspero.62 Maspero is a huge entity.
Every new minister comes with their
own way to regulate its internal
operations and is then replaced by
another, without anything changing
much within the ERTU.
For many ERTU employees, “all these
changes at the top are irrelevant”.63
The internal management (senior and
lower level managers) had to be changed,
and a union for broadcast employees
formed, in order for ERTU to become
more independent of government.
What took place next, following
the demands of the “Maspero
revolutionaries” (who had their own
tent set up in Tahrir Square), started
a reversal process that is still to be
addressed if the media sector is to
be democratised: as noted above, in
February 2011, the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF) removed the
head of ERTU and replaced him with an
army general. The Ministry of Information
was also reinstated in a subsequent
cabinet reshuffle, under the justification
that in a transitional phase “certain
tasks” can best be performed by a
ministry.64 The inability to move forward
with respect to media law reform was
accompanied by a severe deterioration
in the freedom of the media (both
private and public), whose content was
increasingly characterised by extreme
polarisation of news and information
content, especially in the immensely
popular talk shows.
After his election to office, President
Sisi formed a Supreme Committee for
Legislative Reform, whose purpose is
to revise all existing laws and decrees
(including draft proposals) in order to
assess the extent to which they are
compatible with Egypt’s constitution
of 2014. At the top of the agenda
regarding the media sector is the law
for introducing a national broadcasting
council for regulating and guaranteeing
the independence of state-owned media,
as mentioned in the constitution (Article
213). Considering the significant setback
in media freedoms since the military
took over in 2013 (in what is referred to
as “the counter-revolution” by some) and
the fact that state TV is under the direct
control of SCAF, scepticism is quite high
among media practitioners. Some of
them already expect the worst.
Because there is currently no parliament
in Egypt, there is a fear that President Sisi
might exploit the legal vacuum in order
to pass laws without going through any
democratic or consultative process.65
Other analysts have severe doubts that
the introduction of a national council will
be able to guarantee the independence
of state media. Considering that the draft
law itself is shrouded in ambiguity, that
civil society (including media experts) has
not been involved in any consultations,
and that the people put forward to
serve on the council are pro-regime, the
fear is that creating such a council will
serve merely as “window-dressing” – a
convenient “surrogate” or “substitute’
for the (recently) re-abolished Ministry
of Information, with the purpose
of “suggesting that public service
broadcasting exists in Egypt”.66
In Egypt, the media revolution has yet
to happen.
51
52
14
“ Egypt’s state media: Obstacles on the road to freedom of speech”, by Nada Hussein Rashwan. Posted on August 4th 2011 at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/4/17790/Egypt/Media/Egypts-state-media-Obstacles-on-the-road-to-freedo.aspx.
61
Personal interview, July 25th 2014.
62
“Maspero” is the name of the building where ERTU’s headquarters are located, and is also used to refer to ERTU itself.
63
“Egyptian Media Under Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
64
“Egypt’s state media: Obstacles on the road to freedom of speech”, by Nada Hussein Rashwan, op. cit. It should be noted that the Ministry of Information was abolished
again following the formation of the latest Egyptian cabinet by President Sisi.
65
66
ibid.
60
15
4.Israel
Television has played a central role in the building of Jewish
identity in Israel, but public service broadcaster IBA’s failure to
provide programming for the entire population combined with
allegations of political and financial mismanagement have given
commercial television the upper hand.
By Aida Al-Kaisy
4.1. Overview
Television has played a fundamental
role in Israel’s social, cultural and
political development. From the outset,
media have been considered a means
of support for building a Jewish state
and a Jewish identity. On one hand,
broadcasting has been regarded by the
government as a way of maintaining
security from the ongoing “threat”
posed by Israel’s neighbours, and on the
other as a source of propaganda and
misrepresentation by its many ethnic and
religious communities.67 Long-standing
conflicts with Palestine, as well as fears
of attack by neighbouring states such
as Lebanon and Syria, have seen the
Israeli government try to impose military
censorship laws and gagging orders in the
name of national security.68 The case of
Haartz reporter Uri Blau, who specialised
in investigative reporting on military
affairs and corruption, is an extreme but
not uncommon example of the use of
libel laws to curb free speech.69 However,
the Israeli constitution does recognise
the fundamental right to freedom of
expression, despite some restrictions
around hate speech and support for
alleged terrorist organisations. Freedom
House ranks Israel as the only country
in the Middle East to have a “free” media
in 2014, and describes the Israeli media
environment as “lively and pluralistic”.70
The Broadcasting Authority Law (BAL) of
1965 established the Israel Broadcasting
Authority (IBA) as the national noncommercial television platform. It is
funded by a licence fee, with eight radio
platforms funded by advertising (with an
additional licence fee/tax for car radios).
As the sole broadcasting authority
in the country for 25 years, the IBA
was effectively government-controlled
and, as such, was often the subject of
political wrangling and criticism from
the opposition and the wider media
community. In response to internal
pressure in Israel to enhance the media
landscape and embrace pluralism, the
Knesset passed the Second Authority
for Radio and Television Law in 1990,
which established a regulatory body
to oversee the commercial television
landscape (this was in addition to the
establishment of the Cable Broadcasting
Council in 1986 to regulate cable and
satellite television). This law saw the
development of the current Israeli media
environment, which now comprises
Channel 1, Channel 33, the Israeli
Educational Channel and the Knesset
Channel (IBA), Channel 2, Channel 10,
i24news, Music 24 and Israel Plus (Second
Authority) as well as numerous cable and
satellite television channels.
68
16
Not only has the IBA’s television
viewership been rapidly declining
for some time, due to competition
from commercial channels, but the
channel has also been subject to many
accusations of political meddling in
programme content, as well as poor
financial management and corruption.75
Interestingly, however, its radio
listenership remains high, suggesting a
distinction in the minds of the public
between the roles of state-funded
radio and television.76 In 2013 a newly
appointed Minister of Communications,
Gilan Erdan, announced the
government’s plans to review the
role, funding and structure of the IBA.
Claims of mismanagement of funds and
non-financial viability saw a committee
appointed (the Landes Committee) that
eventually led to the decree that the
IBA should be closed down in March
2015 and replaced with a “slimmer
more efficient organization”,77 with all
of its assets sold off. Erdan stated that
the television licence fee would be
The advent of commercial television
brought with it a raft of issues that
continue to impact on Israel’s public
broadcasting scene. First, the question
of media ownership is key. Channel 2
and many of the cable companies that
were launched in Israel were owned by
the country’s two largest newspaper
chains, developing an environment with
a very concentrated ownership.71 Even
though the media ownership laws were
overhauled in 2001, the landscape is still
dominated by a few very powerful figures
who have other vested interests in both
the political and economic domains in
Israel, leaving a partisan media scene
that tends not to be as critical as it could
or should be in a democratic state.
“The Israeli media is voluntarily very
nationalistic – both sociologically and also
economically as they are connected very
closely to the networks in the country.”72
The Second Authority Law of 1990 also
saw the recognition of broadcasting as
a means of cultural development and
“ Muting Israeli Democracy: How Media and Cultural Policy Undermine Free Expression”, by Amit Schejter. University of Illinois Press, Illinois.
“Freedom of the Press 2014: Israel”. Freedom House. Available at: http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/israel#.VB_om3-9KK0.
69
ibid. Blau was convicted of obtaining allegedly classified documents for his report on the killings of two Islamic militants by the government (despite a Supreme Court ruling
that they should not be killed).
70 ibid.
71 “Muting Israeli Democracy”, by Amit Schejter, op. cit.
72 Interview with Dr Amal Jamal, September 18th 2014.
67
expression. Its wording allowed for the
different heritage and demographic
groups of Israel to be represented and
“expressed” in programming, rather
than “reflected” as was the wording in
the 1965 BAL. Commercial television
therefore began to take over from the
IBA as a means of representing the
nation of Israel, while the IBA continued
to act as a mouthpiece for government.
It limited its Arabic programming, for
example, to a few dubbed or subtitled
programmes on Channel 33, suggesting
that it was up to all members of the state
of Israel to speak Hebrew. Meanwhile,
both Channel 2 and Channel 10, with
newly introduced local production
and content quotas, catered more
prolifically.73 That said, production quotas
do not necessarily guarantee quality and,
consequently, more and more “minority”
groups have been turning to regional
stations such as Al Jazeera and other
cable and satellite channels.74
abandoned and the government would
look for alternative means of funding
its public service broadcaster, as well
as redefining and establishing its remit
for serving Israel. Initial talk has been of
streamlining the business so that news
teams operate cross platform in radio
and television but, as yet, no revised
media law or action plan for transition
has been discussed or agreed.
The media community in Israel seems
divided on whether or not this will
actually take place, with a general
feeling that it was more a ploy by the
current government to convince the
public that it was tackling the issues
with the IBA. It is likely that the interior
minister who recently resigned will be
replaced by Erdan, who is one of the key
propagators of the closure. It is possible
that his successor will not share Erdan’s
commitment to the reform initiative.78
4.2. Public service
programming and mission
The 1965 BAL revealed a Knessetidentified need for television in Israel
to play a more actively “Jewish” role.
The wording of the law, which does
attempt to embody many of the key
public service broadcasting international
standards (such as national unity and
representation), makes a clear distinction
between the role of a public broadcaster
for the Jewish population and that of
other cultures and religions.
For example, Article 3 of the law includes
a reference to “strengthening the bond
with Jewish Heritage and values and
enhancing the knowledge therefore”
and “promoting Hebrew and Israeli
creativity”. It then distinguishes the needs
of the Arab population by proposing
“maintaining broadcasts in the Arabic
language” rather than serving the entire
Israeli population equally and in an
“ethnically neutral” way.79 This clause also
references Arabic language programming
as a means of “promoting understanding
and peace with the neighbouring states”,
which in turn suggests a political message
in this type of programming.
So, while the law recognises the
importance of representing “the values
of Judaism” and “the life of the Jewish
people”, it neglects to mention the social
and cultural needs of other ethnic and
The landscape is still dominated by a
few very powerful figures who have
other vested interests in both the political
and economic domains in Israel, leaving
a partisan media scene that tends
not to be as critical as it
could or should be.
“ Muting Israeli Democracy”, by Amit Schejter, op. cit.
“Don’t give up on English-language broadcasting in Israel”, by Nachman Shai. Jerusalem Post. Posted on September 3rd 2014 at:
www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Dont-give-up-on-English-language-broadcasting-in-Israel-374355.
75
“Freedom of the Press 2014: Israel”, op. cit.
76
Interview with Lisa Goldman, September 17th 2014.
77
“EBU insists Israeli lawmakers protect public broadcasting as they dismantle IBA”. European Broadcasting Union. Posted on May 5th 2014 at:
www3.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/05/ebu-insists-israeli-lawmakers-pr.html.
78
Interview with Dr Amal Jamal, September 18th 2014.
79
“Israel: Public Service Broadcasting Law”. Article 19. Posted on February 16th 2007 at:
www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/564/en/israel:-public-service-broadcasting-law.
73
74
17
religious groups in Israel.80 This lack of
considered representation of the
entire population of Israel is reflected
in the make-up and structures of the
IBA, opening it up to accusations of
political interference and control by an
elite minority.81
Another area in Article 3 which has been
open to interpretation are the provisions
for the IBA’s role in highlighting “the
achievements of the state”, a clause which
suggests that the IBA should be portraying
the government and its functions in
a positive light. There is no reference
to independence; indeed, the word
“independent” does not appear once
in the law.82
The structure of the IBA, which was
originally designed to give it a high degree
of independence, has had rather the
opposite effect. A 31-member plenum
committee approves and oversees
the IBA’s budget and programming.83
All members of the plenum are
recommended by the government in
consultation with public bodies – rather
than civil society – and appointed by the
president. Members come from across
the academic, cultural and media spectra,
except for one who must be a member
of the Jewish Agency.84 The government
selects the chair and deputy chair of the
plenum, as per Article 7 of the BAL. From
within the plenum, seven members are
then chosen again by the government
as board directors who, among other
duties, are responsible for reporting to the
Knesset and ministers. Because the plenum
is tasked with content-related issues, this
appointment process allows government
control and interference in IBA outputs.
Although the plenum and board agree a
budget and licence fee, this is again ratified
by government, allowing further control
and interference.
Similarly, the director general is directly
appointed (and also dismissed) by
the government at its sole discretion,
with little involvement from either the
plenum or the board. As a result, this
post is highly politicised. The plenum
will make its recommendations, but the
government can choose to appoint at
its own discretion or at the discretion
of the minister in charge. As with the
plenum and executive board, there is no
transparency in the selection process,
leaving it subject to much criticism and
accusations of corruption.
Other aspects of the law, such as
the minister of defence having sole
control over military broadcasts, sees a
government with sweeping powers over
the content, financing and governance of
its country’s public service broadcaster.
The proposed changes to the governance
of the IBA, announced in September
2014, could see the IBA become
even more elitist and politicised. All
appointments will be made by a
three-person committee, headed by a
Supreme Court judge chosen by the
minister of communications. In an op-ed
in the Jerusalem Post, commentators
Yisrael Medad and Eli Pollak openly
state that “the broadcaster will be public
in a name only, while overtly political
in practice, its politics dominated by a
controlling minority”.85
and competition
The IBA is currently 85% funded by
a licence fee drawn from taxation on
radio and television sets. The price is
set by the executive board of the IBA
and authorised by the government.
Other revenue streams include radio
advertising and television sponsorship.
On one hand, this is a steady source
of income for the IBA and is less
subject to government interference
than an annual grant or advertising
revenue might be. It should allow the
IBA to make long-term programming
and strategic decisions. In reality, the
IBA has been subject to much financial
mismanagement, with staff complaining
of very low salaries and poorly funded
content, studios and equipment.86
A recent announcement by the
minister of communications regarding
the closure of the IBA stated: “We
want something better, cheaper and
divorced from political influence.”87
The minister called for funding of the
new entity to come from advertising
revenue, the sale of IBA assets and
the Ministry of Finance. Knesset
Finance Committee Chairman Nissan
Slomianski noted that the IBA was
“wasting millions of shekels in public
funds collected through licence fees”.88
Ironically, the costs of closing the IBA
and dismissing 1,700 employees with
severance packages and early retirement
are estimated at 1.7 billion shekels
($495 million).89
Furthermore, Channel 2 carries a range
of popular imported programming such
as The Voice, MasterChef Australia and Sex
and the City. Channel 10, the second most
popular channel, is more controversial in
its coverage of Israeli affairs and politics
and, as such, has had its licence revoked in
the past – allegedly for financial reasons.
It carries a lot more original and locally
produced drama and content than the
IBA (or even Channel 2).
Commercial television has posed fierce
competition to the IBA, spending money
on foreign imports, locally produced
reality television shows and talk
programmes which, in turn, have created
a risk-averse media environment.90
Content tends to be the same across
all the channels and, although the IBA
has tried to be different, it has lost both
viewers and credibility. Channel 2 is
now the most popular channel in Israel
and, in the main, its content consists of
reality television and game shows. Big
Brother is one of its most popular shows,
and a decision to take it off air for a
week during the recent conflict with
Gaza caused uproar.91 Its evening news
bulletin is also the most watched in Israel.
“ Muting Israeli Democracy”, by Amit Schejter, op. cit.
“The (Post Zionist) Public Broadcasting Corporation”, by Yisrael Medad and Eli Pollack. Jerusalem Post. Posted on July 2nd 2014 at:
www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Media-Comment-The-post-Zionist-Public-Broadcasting-Corporation-361304.
82
“Israel: Public Service Broadcasting Law”, op. cit.
83
“Muting Israeli Democracy”, by Amit Schejter, op. cit.
84
The Jewish Agency is a government-funded organisation that looks after the immigration and assimilation of Jews from the diaspora into Israel.
It is considered to be highly politicised.
85
“The (Post Zionist) Public Broadcasting Corporation”, by Yisrael Medad and Eli Pollack, op. cit.
86
Interview with Dr Amal Jamal, September 18th 2014.
87
“Erdan announces closure of Israel Broadcast Authority”, by Greer Fay Cashman. Jerusalem Post. Posted on March 6th 2014 at:
www.jpost.com/National-News/Erdan-announces-closure-of-Israel-Broadcast-Authority-344495.
88
ibid.
89
“Israel Broadcasting Authority to close in 2015”, by Zeev Klein. Israel Hayom. Posted on July 30th 2014 at: www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=19133.
90
“American Dreams, Hebrew Subtitles”, by Tamar Liebes. Hampton Press, New York.
91
Interview with Lisa Goldman, September 17th 2014.
The government has announced that
the IBA will be pared down to three
television channels: one in Hebrew, one
in Arabic and one children’s channel.
Its eight radio stations will remain in
place (radio is still extremely popular
in Israel, especially the IBA’s public
radio stations). The radio and television
news departments, however, will be
amalgamated into one. There are
concerns among the media community in
Israel that the Arabic channel will be far
inferior to the Hebrew one, and that a
lack of English-language programming will
distance its neighbours even further. The
proposed new law has omitted the “nice
neighbour clause” that appeared in the
80
81
18
92
93
1965 BAL, which seems to suggest that
“Israel is giving up on having a dialogue
with its neighbours”.92
Audience research is produced by a
number of local agencies and tends to
be commissioned by the commercial
and cable stations, which publish figures
on a regular basis. The Israeli Democracy
Institute commissions research that
measures public trust in the media.
According to its findings, trust has
dropped every year bar one since 2006,
despite a growing increase in trust in
other public institutions. The IBA does
not produce any of its own audience
research, nor does it interact with its
audiences in the way a public service
broadcasting organisation should, either
through a complaints system, audience
councils or even by publishing annual
reports.93 Its accountability to the public
is questionable.
4.4. Conclusion
The IBA’s failure to provide adequate
relevant television programming
for the entire Israeli population has
given commercial television the upper
hand. The organisation has been further
damaged by accusations of ongoing
political and financial mismanagement.
At its core lies an issue with
representation that has further tarnished
its reputation with the Israeli public.
The Landes Committee inquiry into
the IBA’s function as a public service
broadcaster has been lauded by the
wider media and political community
as triggering a much-needed debate
about the role of the IBA and the
media industry as a whole. However,
the decision by the government to close
the IBA based on the findings of the
committee has been widely criticised,
and its practicality remains in doubt.
Suggested changes to the IBA’s structures
and funding seem to imply further
government interference in the IBA’s
affairs and the emergence of an even
more politicised structure, which is more
likely to serve the government’s agenda
than the interests of the general public.
“ Don’t give up on English-language broadcasting in Israel”, by Nachman Shai, op. cit.
More detail on the 2012 survey is available at: http://blog.camera.org/archives/2012/09/survey_public_trust_in_israeli.html.
19
5.Jordan
Vaguely worded broadcast laws, state-biased programming and
competition from a growing number of satellite channels point
to a need for Jordan’s public television network, JRTV, to improve
its performance.
5.1. Introduction
The Jordanian broadcasting landscape
is characterised by a proliferation of
private radio and satellite channels (38
satellite channels as of March 2013).
With the exception of Jordan’s public
television network, Jordanian TV (JRTV),
there are still no terrestrial television
channels in operation. This is despite
the existence of Law No. 71 of 2002,
which sought to liberalise the sector and
allowed the licensing and operation of
private broadcasters. The only terrestrial
television channel licensed in 2010,
ATV, was marred in controversy and
was eventually shut down before it had
started to broadcast.94
The Jordanian Institution for Radio and
Television (JRTV, or Mu’assassat al-iza’a
wal television al-urdunyya in Arabic) was
set up in 1985. It manages the operation
of four radio stations and three television
channels. The main radio channel,
Jordanian Radio, is available on both AM
and FM, while the other three, Radio
Amman FM, Radio of the Holy Koran
and the English-speaking Radio Jordan,
are available only on FM. There are two
public television channels with general
programming and another specialising in
sport, which more recently also started
to broadcast parliamentary sessions.
Both the terrestrial and the satellite TV
channels have the same name (JRTV)
and broadcast the same programme
schedule. The operation of Jordan’s public
broadcasting channels is regulated by Law
No. 35 of 2000, and they are licensed as
per Broadcast Law No. 71 of 2002.
management of JRTV. A lack of
openness and transparency seems to
characterise decision-making within
its administration, although, in theory,
the broadcaster is accountable to the
Jordanian people through the Council of
Ministers and Parliament.
According to Article 3 of Law No. 35
of 2000, JRTV is a public entity with
independent status, both administratively
and financially. However, subsequent
articles in the same law give complete
oversight of this public entity to the
Council of Ministers, entrusting it with
issuing all the internal bylaws pertaining
to JRTV’s finances and administration
(Article 14). The Council of Ministers is
also responsible for appointing all nine
members of the board of directors,
based on the recommendation of the
prime minister (Article 6). The chair of
the board is not elected by directors but
is appointed by the Council of Ministers
and can be one of the serving ministers
in the government. The chair can also be
fired at will by the Council of Ministers.
All appointments have to be approved
by the king.
There are currently 1,800 state
employees at JRTV. There are no open
and transparent criteria used in the
hiring of personnel. Their status and
ranking are detailed in Law No. 35 of
2000, in which they are considered to be
public employees. Because of this status
there is no incentive to perform well,
as they cannot be sacked. In a research
study in which staff were interviewed
anonymously, it was confirmed that some
might go to work once or twice a week,
while others said that they did not go
to work at all and only attended at the
end of the month to collect their pay
cheque.95 According to a recent comment
by JRTV’s General Director Ramadan
Rawashdeh, “the institution is suffering
from decay… and is lacking in technical
expertise in many areas”.96
There is no publicly available information
regarding the internal operation and
service programming
JRTV’s editorial policy is dependent, by
law, on government policy. According
F or details of the corruption charges levelled against ATV, see “Al-urdun yatarakkab al-kashf aan ikhtiliasat” (“Jordan awaits to uncover the embezzlement of millions of
dollars at ATV”). Arabian Business. Posted on December 4th 2012 at: http://arabic.arabianbusiness.com/business/media-marketing/2012/dec/4/309980“Don’t give up on
English-language broadcasting in Israel”, by Nachman Shai. /#.U16r7j-Xikw.
95 “Thultha al-urdunyyin yu mawwilun television la yu shahidunahu” (“One-third of Jordanians subsidise a television channel they do not watch”), by Sawsan Zaideh. Published in
Arabic on April 17th 2014 at: http://7iber.net/2014/04/jtv/.
96 ibid.
94
20
to Article 5 of Law No. 35 of 2000,
this public institution has to operate
according to “the media policy and
national media plans of the state”. These
plans and policies are usually spelled
out by the prime minister upon his/her
appointment and have to be approved by
the king. They are supposed to reflect a
number of values derived from royal and
legal precepts such as the constitution.
For instance, the “royal vision” of
2003 emphasised the importance of
guaranteeing freedom of expression and
promoting diversity of opinion.
the channel JRTV continues to function
mostly as a mouthpiece of government
and the king, in particular across its news
and public affairs shows. Content analyses
carried out on these information-based
programmes in 2010 and more recently
in 2014 have confirmed a continuing
trend at JRTV to favour coverage of royal
figures and government officials and to
give high priority to lengthy news items
related to their achievements and official
visits, irrespective of the importance
of the news event itself and without
including any diversity of opinion.100
However, the existing laws that apply
to the media – such as Law No. 35 of
2000, which set up JRTV, and Broadcast
Law No. 71 of 2002 – contain a number
of restrictive articles and negative
requirements that can easily lead to
the muzzling of freedom of speech.
For instance, according to Article 20,
licensed operators should commit “not
to broadcast” anything that might “hurt
the relationship of the kingdom with
other states” or “any topic or economic
commentary that might affect the
stability of the economy or the national
currency”.97 Some of the restrictions on
content are in line with international
standards for public service broadcasting
and are meant to preserve human dignity
and pluralism of opinion while outlawing
speech that discriminates on the basis of
ethnicity or religion. However, most of the
content-related provisions in the 2002
law are vaguely worded, reflect too many
“red lines” and can therefore be used by
the authorities to restrict opinions critical
of their own performance.98 Indeed, the
rating of Jordan’s media freedom has
been quite poor, showing a trend towards
greater restrictions on the national media,
as well as on websites.99 JRTV is operating
without a code of ethics.
and audiences
The funding of Jordan’s public
broadcasting entity is based mostly on
government allocations approved by
the Council of Ministers (Law No. 35 of
2000), which determines the amount
of taxes to be levied, drawing down
revenues from Jordanian electricity bills
(approximately one euro is allocated to
JRTV from each bill). Money collected
through licence fees is not sufficient to
cover the operating and capital expenses
of JRTV: considering that its annual
budget has been an average of 19–20
In the absence of any clear public service
guidelines for programming and contentrelated provisions that serve to guarantee
diversity and pluralism in its output,
million euros per year in the last five
years, and that there are only 1.1 million
households in Jordan, it is clear that most
of its funding is actually coming from
the government (through annual budget
allocations) and that Jordan’s public radio
and television is heavily dependent on
government funding.101 Government
funding currently constitutes 80% of the
total annual funding of JRTV.
The remaining 20% of the annual
budget is covered by revenues
generated internally (e.g. through
advertising, sponsorship and the sale
of various programmes). Because of a
government decision to increase support
to the public channels, in 2014 public
funding reached its highest point of the
previous five years, amounting to 26
million Jordanian dinars. Interestingly, such
an increase was not accompanied by any
change in the strategic planning of JRTV,
whose objectives have been the same
since 2008.102
According to former Minister of State
for Media and Communication Nabil AlShareef, JRTV spends most of its budget
on salaries and operating expenses,
In the absence of any clear public service
guidelines for programming and contentrelated provisions that serve to guarantee
diversity and pluralism in its output, the
channel JRTV continues to function
mostly as a mouthpiece of government
and the king.
ranslation from Arabic by the author.
T
“The Jordanian media have traditionally been under tight state control”. BBC News. Posted on June 4th 2013 at: www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14636310.
99
See “Jordan Blocks over 200 News Websites, Limits Freedom of Information and Expression”. Posted on June 3rd 2014 at: www.freedomhouse.org/article/jordan-blocksover-200-news-websites-limits-freedom-information-and-expression#.U3-0L_mSySo. See also “Amendments to Law in Jordan Restrict Press, Internet Freedom”. Posted on
August 27th 2012 at: www.freedomhouse.org/article/amendments-law-jordan-restrict-press-internet-freedom#.U87hmvldVqU.
100 “Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, op. cit. See also “Thultha al-urdunyyin yu mawwilun television la yu
shahidunahu”, by Sawsan Zaideh, op. cit.
101 This information is derived from statements by the former CEO of JRTV, Jareer Maraka (see http://almadenahnews.com/newss/news.php?c=117&id=26611). Maraka was
removed from office and replaced by former Information Minister Saleh al-Kallab, who was named interim CEO and chairman of the board in May 2010.
102 See “Thultha al-urdunyyin yu mawwilun television la yu shahidunahu”, by Sawsan Zaideh, op. cit.
97
98
21
6.Lebanon
which leaves it with very little to spend on
upgrading equipment, producing quality
programming and training personnel.103
Data about the audience share of Jordan’s
television channels is collected by Ipsos
Stat Jordan, which publishes the results
on the internet.104 It should be noted that
the audience study carried out by Ipsos
for 2012 and 2013 was commissioned by
JRTV. According to Ipsos, slightly more than
one-third of the population watches JRTV
(37% in 2012 and 36% in 2013). Based on
these results, it can be said that roughly
two-thirds of the population is paying
for a public channel that they are not
even watching.105
Up until quite recently, the viewing figures
for JRTV were relatively high and stable,
mostly because it had a monopoly and
was the only source of national news
for the Jordanian population. Increasingly,
however, JRTV is facing all-year-round
competition from local satellite stations106
such as Al Haqeeqah Al Dawliyah, while
during Ramadan it has to compete with
Roya TV, which is able to attract viewers
and advertisers despite a yearly budget
that barely reaches 1/30th of JRTV’s.107
Up until quite recently, the viewing
figures for JRTV were relatively high
and stable, mostly because it had a
monopoly and was the only source
of national news.
Lebanon was the first Arab country with a private television
channel, TL, but this has failed to fulfil its original remit, and a
combination of neglect and lack of a legal framework has led
its audience to switch to private stations. Recent reforms may
revive the broadcaster, but it could be too little too late.
5.5. Conclusion
A total of 38 satellite channels had been
licensed by the Jordanian Audiovisual
Media Commission by March 2013.
The high number of licences issued
might suggest a strong liberalisation of
the sector, but this seemingly positive
development is tempered by the fact
that no private terrestrial television
channel has yet been allowed to operate
in Jordan (the public station JRTV is the
only terrestrial television channel in the
country). Moreover, recent trends in media
legislation, such as the amendment to
the Press and Publications Law passed in
September 2012 (which requires local
news websites to obtain a licence from the
Press and Publication Department or risk
being blocked by the Telecommunication
Regulatory Commission) are a step in the
wrong direction. JRTV, which is operating
without a clear public service mandate,
continues to attract a relatively solid and
stable proportion of the national audience,
who are thirsty for coverage of local
news and national issues. With increasing
competition from other national satellite
channels threatening to erode its audience
share, it should benefit from the strong
financial support of the government to
improve its performance and cater better
to the public interest.
“ Laysa difa’an aan al-television” (“Not in defence of television”), by Nabil Al-Sharif. Posted on May 21st 2011 at: www.eyeonmediajo.net/?p=3892.
Personal interview with Sawsan Zaideh, Jordanian media expert, April 2nd 2014.
105
See “Thultha al-urdunyyin yu mawwilun television la yu shahidunahu”, by Sawsan Zaideh, op. cit.
106
“Statistical data collection project on the film and audiovisual markets in nine Mediterranean countries: Jordan”. Euromed Audiovisuel. Available at: http://
euromedaudiovisuel.net/Files/2014/03/20/1395303583983.pdf.
107
Interview with Sawsan Zaideh, media expert, April 2nd 2014.
6.1. Introduction
Lebanon was the first country among its
Arab counterparts to introduce, as early
as 1959, a private television channel –
which became by law a publicly owned
entity, Télé Liban (TL), in 1995 – and
later, in 1994, the first Arab country to
liberalise and regulate the broadcasting
sector (Law No. 382 of 1994). However,
to date no legal reforms have been
introduced to deal with the various gaps
that have been identified with respect to
media laws and regulation in the country.
Similarly, no specific laws pertaining to the
mission, objectives and content-related
aims of TL exist, two decades after the
introduction of the 1994 Broadcasting
Law. This law reflects this neglect in its
Chapter 9 (Article 41), which is dedicated
to reorganising TL. While abolishing
state control/monopoly of the airwaves
in order to make room for private
television stations, the Broadcasting Law
simply defers the reorganisation of TL to
a later date, through specialised decrees
to be developed and signed later by the
Council of Ministers:
Contrary to all other texts of law,
the government has the right to
reorganise TL1 according to decrees
adopted by the Council of Ministers
upon the proposal of the Ministers of
Information and Finance.
While continuing to operate in a legal
vacuum with respect to its mission as
a public broadcaster, TL has increasingly
been facing financial hardships and is
haemorrhaging its audience share in the
face of fierce competition from Lebanon’s
much more successful and affluent
private television stations.
The latest draft proposal to reorganise
the media in Lebanon, which was
submitted to Parliament in 2010
by MP Ghassan Mukhaiber and
the media NGO Maharat, did not
contain any provisions related to
public television. However, more
recently Maharat tried to rectify
this absence by adding a chapter to
the proposal during the discussions
held by the relevant parliamentary
sub-committee: this chapter recognises
the dire need to reorganise TL, to
increase its overall funding, to improve
the mechanisms regulating it, and
to allocate an annual budget for the
production of national dramas. Even
this addition was considered by
Maharat to be insufficient to turn
TL into a state-funded broadcaster
with a public service remit, as “a
separate law proposal, and not a
decree signed by the Council of
Ministers, is what is needed in order
to achieve this purpose”.108
6.2. Programme content and
public service requirements
Like any other print or broadcast
medium operating in Lebanon, TL has to
abide by the content-related restrictions
set out in the Press Code of 1962 (as
amended by Decree No. 104 of 1977
and Decree No. 330 of 1994), the 1994
Broadcasting Law and the Penal Code.
These content-related restrictions,
which are very loosely worded, cover
a wide spectrum of protections for
the government and state institutions,
including the head of state, the military
and judicial corps, the Lebanese flag
and the national currency. Indeed, libel
laws, which are the most frequently
invoked laws in lawsuits launched against
the media and free speech in Lebanon,
are the greatest threat to freedom of
expression in the country, “the mother of
all threats” and the sword of Damocles
continually overhanging media practices
and operations in the country.109
Interestingly, the 1994 Broadcasting Law
had more content-related requirements
for private TV channels than for TL. While
all licensed private stations (in addition
to TL) had to refrain from broadcasting
sensitive material such as programmes
that incite confessional strife and
encourage “relations with the Zionist
enemy” (Article 7), positive requirements
103
104
22
108
109
Interview with Tony Mikhael, lawyer at Maharat, June 24th 2014.
“ Publication Court: Political Criticism is not allowed”. Maharat News. Posted on June 3rd 2014 at: http://goo.gl/BJQmVR.
23
meant to ensure that programming
promoted national culture and heritage
(film, theatre, etc) and catered to children,
young people and rural communities
applied only to the private channels,
through books of specifications that were
part of their licensing agreement. In other
words, Lebanon’s public broadcaster has
been, and still is, under no legal obligation
to produce programming that fulfils any
public service remit, whereas private
television channels are.110
The 1994 Broadcasting Law also created
a regulatory authority, the National
Audiovisual Council (NAVC).111 The
first of its kind in the Arab world, this
council is a purely consultative body
with no executive powers when it
comes to licensing or sanctioning the
broadcast media. The power to license
and withdraw licences (as well as to
punish licensees for infringements of
the law) was bestowed on the Council
of Ministers, a decision which was
vehemently opposed, but in vain, by
several MPs during the parliamentary
debates about the draft law in 1994.
Although the ten members of the council
were, by law, to be appointed in equal
numbers by the Cabinet (or Council of
Ministers) and Parliament (five members
to be elected by each body) – with the
aim of guaranteeing it at least some
independence from the executive
branch – this measure was insufficient to
protect the NAVC from the influence of
political elites. The NAVC remains almost
entirely at the behest of the government
of the day, as has been noted in several
research studies.112 Equally concerning
is that the NAVC, which is operating
out of the Ministry of Information with
a negligible budget, has to date been
unable to monitor the broadcast media
properly. This task is still carried out by
the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon,
without any legal or constitutional
framework to regulate the media and
internet “monitoring” activities of this
state security body, which also continues
to exercise prior censorship over film
and theatre in Lebanon.113
6.3. Funding and
management of TL
On March 8th 2002, in compliance with
Article 41 of Law No. 383 of 1994 (and
following the recommendations of the
minister of information and the minister
of finance), the Lebanese Council of
Ministers issued Decree No. 7576 with
the aim of restructuring TL. While, prior
to this decree, there were six members
of the TL board of directors, the decree
stipulated decreasing this number to
three: two members and a president,
who also serves as director general of
TL. Decree No. 7576 also turned TL into
a government-led institution: it made
the Council of Ministers responsible for
appointing the members, as well as for
removing them from office whenever it
wanted to, without having to offer any
justification for its decisions. In other
words, although TL, as a legal entity
governed by Article 157 of the Lebanese
Trade Law, is a legally independent
company with an independent board that
can theoretically make its own decisions
without having to answer directly to the
minister of information, control of this
publicly funded body ultimately rests
with the executive branch through the
appointment of “loyal members”.114 As
Jad Melki emphasised, “as long as the
director of TL and the director of news
are afraid of losing their jobs, there is no
such thing as TL being an independent
public broadcaster”.115
Interestingly, more than a decade after
the introduction of Decree No. 7576, the
members of the TL board of directors
are still in office, although their term
expired in 2001. Successive governments
have justified their inability to implement
this decree by citing the need to maintain
religious balance and the representation
of all the major religions on the board:
three Christian members (Maronite,
Catholic and Greek Orthodox) and
three Muslim members (Sunni, Shi’ite
and Druze).116 The appointment of staff
members to positions in TL has followed
a similar pattern over the years, leading
to a situation whereby most staff are kept
and promoted based on their political
affiliation and religious identity rather than
on their ability or qualifications. These
political and religious appointments,
coupled with a general lack of interest
by the state in reorganising and properly
funding TL, have led to a general mood of
malaise among even the most motivated
of TL employees. Indeed, some TL
employees, as “state employees”, do not
even report for work, while continuing to
receive their salary.
Last year this situation seemed to
improve slightly with the appointment
of a new chairman of the board to
replace former chairman Ibrahim Khoury,
who succumbed to illness in July 2013.
The legal process which led to the
appointment of advertising and media
executive Talal Makdisi was controversial,
as it was the result of a court ruling by
the “judge of urgent matters” rather than
a decision by the Council of Ministers, as
stipulated by law. As mentioned earlier,
successive governments were reluctant
to change the status quo and elect new
members of the board because of the
need to maintain sectarian balance when
agreeing on new candidates – something
that ministers have not been able to
do since 2001. Last year the caretaker
Minister of Information Walid Daouk
tried to break the status quo and filed a
case with the Court of Urgent Matters in
order to find a solution to the impasse.
Soon afterwards, Judge Jad Maalouf
ruled that Makdisi was the best available
candidate to take over as “temporary
general director of TL”. This decision
spurred a negative reaction from other
board members, who contested the
ruling on the grounds that the case fell
“ From defending ‘Cultural Exception’ to promoting ‘Cultural Diversity’: European cultural policy and the Arab world”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensening. In Quaderns del CAC,
No. 14, September–December 2002. Available at: http://europa.sim.ucm.es/compludoc/AA?a=Dabbous-Sensening%2c+Dima&donde=otras&zfr=0.
111
Article 16 of Law No. 382 of 1994. According to official English translations of the law and English articles by the National News Agency, the Al majles al watani lil ilam al
mar’I wal masmou is commonly translated as “National Audiovisual Council”.
112
For details, see “Regulating Lebanese Broadcasting: A Policy Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous. Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, Germany. See also “Defining the
Nation? Lebanese TV Stations: The Political Elite’s Dominance over the Visual Space”, by K. Notzold. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Germany.
113
“Re-evaluating Lebanon’s Media Laws”. Available at: www.balamand.edu.lb/News/Pages/MediaLaws.aspx.
114
“Public Broadcast Assessment”. Maharat Foundation. Available at: www.maharatfoundation.info/publications/public-broadcast-assessment/.
115
Interview with Jad Melki, Assistant Professor of Media, AUB, June 23rd 2014.
116
“Former head of TéléLiban board of directors dies”. The Daily Star. Posted on July 29th 2013 at: www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2013/Jul-29/225410-formerhead-of-tele-liban-board-of-directors-dies.ashx#axzz35EP8asSX.
under the jurisdiction of the Trade Court
and not the Court of Urgent Matters.117
Since Talal Makdisi took over the
chairmanship of TL, several positive
changes have been introduced in order
to revamp the station, make it live up
to a few public service ideals and act
as the country’s (sole) unifying voice in
the midst of a destabilising cacophony
created by multiple private media outlets
with antagonistic political and religious
allegiances.118 These changes were
achieved within the existing minimal
budget, with TL being one of the most
underfunded, commercially unprofitable
TV outlets in the country. TL has been
operating at a deficit since the early
1990s – a deficit so severe that it has
often failed to cover even the most basic
of its operating costs, such as employees’
monthly salaries.119 Indeed, the politicians
who own the country’s major private
media and who are able, through the
Council of Ministers, to control the fate
of TL, have no qualms about letting TL
“sink”, because it is in their own interests
to eliminate it as a competitor to their
own channels.120
The election of Makdisi as president of
COPEAM, the permanent network of
Mediterranean broadcasters, at its 21st
annual conference in May 2014 marks
the end of an era in which TL was totally
absent from such a network, and the
beginning of a number of serious (yet
so far insufficient) attempts to revamp
Lebanon’s ailing public broadcaster. As
Makdisi stated on his appointment: “Télé
Liban is today saved. The station, which
was exploited by politicians, was in a
pitiful state, left without plans to develop
it or equip it since 2001.”121 Within a
few months of his appointment, Makdisi
had negotiated with the Lebanese
government for the payment of TL’s
debt, renovated its studios (with no
additional funding) and updated its
programming grid (which had relied up
until then mostly on very old reruns
and infomercials) to include educational
game shows and a high-calibre political
talk show presented by newly recruited
Lebanese star journalist Shada Omar. As
he put it, TL must be “a television channel
for all Lebanese”.122 Moreover, TL finally
switched to digital broadcasting in 2014
(which made it the last public broadcaster
in the world to make the switch), and is
now the first Lebanese station to benefit
from the fibre-optic technology provided
by state-run telecommunications
company Ogero – a switch which is
meant to greatly enhance picture quality
for viewers.123
Finally, in an effort to boost morale
and to reward productivity among
TL’s employees, Makdisi recently spoke
publicly about having rewarded a
hard-working TL employee who helped
110
24
“Judge appoints Talal Makdessi as new head of TéléLiban”, by Hasan Lakkis and Meris Lutz. The Daily Star. Posted on July 9th 2013 at:
www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Jul-09/223018-judge-appoints-talal-makdessi-as-new-head-of-tele-liban.ashx#axzz35EP8asSX.
118
See “Channels of Resistance in Lebanon: Liberation Propaganda, Hezbollah and the Media”, by Zahera Harb. I. B. Tauris, London; “Arab Television Industries”, by Joe Khalil
and Marwan M. Kraidy. Palgrave Macmillan, London; and “Image Politics in the Middle East: the Role of the Visual in Political Struggle”, by Lina Khatib. I. B. Tauris, London.
119
For details, see “Public Broadcast Assessment”, op. cit.
120
Interview with Jad Melki, June 23rd 2014.
121
“Talal Makdessi, président de la Copeam, à la rescousse de Télé Liban”, by Béchara Maroun. L’Orient le Jour. Posted on April 19th 2014 at: www.lorientlejour.com/
article/863948/talal-makdessi-president-de-la-copeam-a-la-rescousse-de-tele-liban.html.
122
ibid.
123
“Tele-Liban gets glossy hi-tech overhaul”, by Samya Kullb. The Daily Star. January 31st 2014.
117
25
7.Libya
The chaotic and partisan media landscape in post-revolution
Libya has led to a yearning for an unbiased publicly funded
broadcaster to help the democratic cause. This, however, seems
unlikely to happen in the current climate of conflict.
renovate the studios in record time by
promoting him and offering him a 15%
salary increase. In Makdisi’s words: “Télé
Liban honours and supports whoever
gives and punishes those who do not.”124
The most recent attempt by some
government officials to make TL live up
to a public service ideal – to broadcast
the World Cup terrestrially to Lebanese
viewers – ended up, ironically, with a deal
being struck with a cable provider, which
sidelined TL and allowed the hundreds
of thousands of viewers who subscribe
illegally to cable to watch the tournament
for free. What should have allowed TL
to act as a unifying national broadcaster,
capable of offering a major source of
entertainment to millions of Lebanese
for free, ended up as a business deal with
cable operators. This “deal”, branded
“corrupt” by many analysts, led Makdisi to
defy the agreement – which removed TL’s
right to broadcast the World Cup – and
to start broadcasting matches a couple of
days after the opening of the tournament.
Makdisi did this in the full knowledge that
it could cost him his position.125
6.4. Conclusion
Generally, TL has been unable to live
up to its role as a public broadcaster
capable of catering to the interests of all
Lebanese, due to its neglect by successive
governments since the end of the civil
war, and the quasi-legal vacuum within
which it has been operating since 1994
(when a law for liberalising and regulating
broadcasting was introduced in the
country). Since the appointment of the
new TL chairman in July 2013, this public
broadcaster has started to undergo
a number of positive changes, whose
purpose is to strengthen the role of TL as
a television channel serving the interests
of all Lebanese, and to distinguish it from
local private channels, which strongly
reflect partisan political interests.
Unfortunately, these positive changes may
be “too little, too late”. TL has long since
lost its viewers to the better funded,
more attractive private stations, and
there seems to be no political will on the
horizon to properly fund and equip the
channel to compete with these stations.
The changes introduced so far by Makdisi
reflect the will of a single committed
individual at the top, while frameworks
for regulatory and financial reforms of TL
remain absent. Meanwhile TL is a public
broadcaster for the Lebanese that the
Lebanese do not really care to watch.
As a journalism professor said: “It is not
appealing, even for me as someone who
teaches the media!”126
While it might take a while before we
can assess the success (with audiences)
of the most recent and modest reforms
undertaken within TL, efforts to revive
or resuscitate it are still perceived by
scholars and activists to be vital for
the country:
With the right management
and mechanisms to separate TL
from politics in order to have an
independent board that does not
answer to the Minister of Information
or government, it is worth investing
in TL as a public service broadcaster.
This is especially important because it
has a huge national archive that needs
to be saved.127 ibid.
“ Free football for all as Telecoms Ministry cuts $3M deal”, by Justin Salhani. The Daily Star. Posted on June 17th 2014 at: www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/
Jun-17/260378-free-football-for-all-as-telecoms-ministry-cuts-3m-deal.ashx#axzz34mZkOJsa.
126 Interview with Yasmine Dabbous, Assistant Professor of Communication, Lebanese American University, June 22nd 2014.
127 Interview with Jad Melki, June 23rd 2014.
124
125
26
7.1. Introduction:
public broadcasting
in post-Qaddafi Libya
The state of broadcasting in Libya
presents unique challenges compared
with other Arab countries in the region.
The media (print and broadcasting) are
still operating in a complete legal vacuum
three years after the revolution that
overthrew the Qaddafi regime. Journalists,
reporters and media practitioners are
not only faced with continuous threats
to their lives in a country where conflict
between the different armed factions is
still raging, but are not allowed by the
armed militias to freely cover events
related to their activities or the activities
of their leadership.128
For nearly three decades, public television
was very tightly controlled by Muammar
Qaddafi. After the collapse of the Qaddafi
regime, freedom of expression and
freedom of the press were guaranteed in
Article 14 of the Interim Constitutional
Declaration (also known as the Draft
Constitutional Charter for the Transitional
Stage of 2011), which repealed all laws
that restricted freedom of expression
until new laws were introduced by the
government.129 This has not yet happened,
as the transitional authorities have not
been able to agree on the official body
or entity that will be responsible for
reorganising the media landscape and
introducing new media laws.
The repeated, unsuccessful, attempts by
the National Transitional Council (NTC)
to introduce a public body to regulate
the media in Libya do not bode well for
Libya’s citizens and for the flourishing of
public service broadcasting ideals. After
initially handing control of the media to
the Ministry of Culture and Civil Society,
the NTC was forced to backtrack
following demonstrations by journalists
who were opposed to this decision. The
authorities then issued Decree No. 44 of
May 19th 2012. This decree established
the Higher Media Council, which would
be responsible for overseeing the media
sector and would report to the NTC.
Some of the major tasks of this newly
established council included formulating
new laws and regulations, issuing a code
of ethics and allocating licences.130 The
new council, which was also responsible
for the administrative and financial
operation of public radio and television
(Article 3), was immediately met with
heavy criticism, not least because all of
its 16 members had been appointed
by the NTC without any nomination
and election processes that might have
guaranteed its independence.131
Eventually, less than a month after the
creation of the Higher Media Council,
the NTC suspended it.132 Around the
time that it was being disbanded, a major
association of journalists elected a second
Higher Media Council at their conference
– consisting of 21 members – which met
for the first time on June 25th 2012.133
This newer council, which was approved
by the NTC in Decree No. 22 of 2012,
was to be in charge until the election
of the General National Congress.134
However, this council also met with
criticism, because it was elected by
“citizen” journalists and technicians with
no professional journalistic credentials.135
Finally, in November 2012 the majority
of the members of the General National
Congress voted in favour of creating a
“ Town vs. town and faction vs. faction: new realities in Libya”. The Daily Star. Posted on August 1st 2014 at: www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Aug-01/265685town-vs-town-and-faction-vs-faction-new-realities-in-libya.ashx#axzz398KGQoyx.
129
“Libya: Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage of 2011”. Available at: www.refworld.org/docid/4e80475b2.html.
130
“National Transitional Council Decree No. 44 / 2012 on the Creation of the Higher Media Council”. Available at: http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Decree_
number_44.
131
“Transitional Libyan Media. Free at last?”, by Fatima el Issawi. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/transitional_libyan_media.pdf.
132
See the official letter from Mustafa Mohamed Al-Mani, Secretary of the National Transitional Council. Available at: http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Letter_
Ref:_497/2012.
133
See “Libya Media Wiki”. Available at: http://en.libyamediawiki.com/index.php?title=Media_Policy#Minister_of_Media.
134
“NTC Decree No. 62 / 2012 on the amendment of a TNC decision number 58 / 2012 regarding the Higher Media Council”. Available at: http://en.libyamediawiki.com/
index.php?title=Decree_Number_62.
135
“Transitional Libyan Media. Free at last?”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
128
27
Throughout the revolution, and after the collapse of the Qaddafi
government, the proliferating private media (television, radio and
print media), in addition to social media, played an important role
in conveying news of the revolt to both national and international
audiences, while the public channels, underfunded and badly
equipped, lagged behind. In the absence of adequate legislation to
regulate the burgeoning media environment, these newly found
media freedoms came at a heavy price: a chaotic, ‘out of control’
media scene where public broadcasters are incapable
of providing fair and impartial content.
ministry of information to replace the
Higher Media Council, and on December
30th 2013 Yousef Mohammad Sherif was
nominated as Minister of Information.136
7.2. Management, funding
and audiences
Currently there are two television
channels funded by the state: Al-Wataniya
and Al-Rasmiyah. Their operators, which
also run radio channels, are based in
Tripoli due to the ongoing conflict and do
not cover the entire country. For instance,
the channels do not cover Misrata, and
they barely cover major cities outside
Tripoli such as Benghazi and Sabha. Their
correspondents are mostly based in
Tripoli and, for reasons related to lack
of funding and lack of access due to the
security situation, are effectively absent
from other areas of the country.
In addition to struggling with the
development of an official institution or
body to effectively oversee the general
media landscape, the transitional councils
in Libya have had to deal (unsuccessfully)
with several issues related to the nature
and objectives of public television in the
country. The reality on the ground is
that broadcasters are facing some very
real challenges: overstaffing; lack of
equipment and qualified personnel; lack
of leadership and professionalism; lack of
editorial guidelines; weak management
structures; and funding problems
exacerbated by competition from the
more professional private television
channels that have started broadcasting
since the collapse of the Qaddafi regime.
But the most immediate and pressing
concern continues to be the lack of safety
for media personnel.
Public broadcasters are faring very poorly
compared with their more successful
private counterparts, for a variety of
reasons. The state is unable to meet the
financial needs of the two public channels,
which are increasingly competing with
private channels with newer equipment
and better production values. The
Qatari-funded private television channel
Al-Nabaa (the news), for instance, has
the financial and professional means
to produce quality programming that
is attracting viewers away from Libyan
public stations.137
“ Libya Media Wiki”, op. cit.
137
Personal interview with Ashour Shamis, media consultant, August 7th 2014.
138
ibid.
139
As quoted in “Transitional Libyan Media. Free at last?”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
136
28
There are currently estimated to be over
6,000 public broadcasting employees,
with some estimates putting the figure
as high as 9,000. These employees,
whether technicians or journalists,
are all considered to be “government
employees”, with all the privileges and
limits on their work that this status
entails. Indeed, media practitioners in
mid- to senior-level managerial posts
have denounced the prevalent attitude
among most employees in public media,
including journalists, who continue to
act like “state employees”: they are still
on the government payroll and receive
government benefits, even though many
of them are either not reporting to work
or sitting around the office with nothing
to do.138 As Mahmoud el Misrati, owner
and editor-in-chief of the newspaper
Libya al-Jadida, put it:
Moreover, public broadcasters have
not been able to update and repair
equipment for a long period of time,
due to the US government embargo
of 1991. Long-term underfunding
has also meant that they have not
been able to modernise and update
their facilities. As a result, they have
lost the competition with the private
television channels, because audiences
consider them to be “old-style” and
prefer to watch the private channels
with their higher production values
and more controversial and politicised
programming. Although there are no
figures related to the TV audience
share, several analysts consider that
the private Libya Al-Ahrar channel,
which broadcasts from Doha in Qatar,
is the most viewed TV station in
Libya, in addition to being the most
professional, especially with respect
to news.140 It should be noted that
this professionalism and these quality
production values are, according to
some critics, problematic, because they
mask content that is essentially partisan
and politicised.141
We tried to engage journalists from
the former media. They could not work
at our rhythm; they are still working
under the mentality of the state media
where they consider themselves to be
employees. I told them they have to
work or they will be fired.139
According to one of the very few recent
studies of TV audiences in Libya, AlWataniya, the larger of the two public
broadcasters, has a measly audience
share of 7%.142
Public television is also plagued with
very poor management, with people in
decision-making positions often unable
or unwilling to assume their role: having
been trained for decades to blindly follow
orders from a centralised leadership (in
order to avoid Qaddafi’s personal wrath),
they seem to be unable to make decisions
or take responsibility for even the smallest
of tasks.143 Moreover, the sudden collapse
of the old leadership, coupled with a
lack of any clear internal structure and
hierarchy, has sometimes led former junior
to mid-level staff members to assume
leadership positions, much to the dismay
of some “older”, more experienced
employees. Not only that, but in postrevolutionary Libya the main criterion for
nominating the new leadership among
media practitioners is their independence
from the former regime, not their
professional experience.144
With the myriad problems listed above
hindering the proper operation of
publicly funded media, social media has
emerged as another major source of
competition for information and news.
This need to rely on social media, mostly
Facebook, for updates “from the field”
is exacerbated by the fact that field
reporting remains a very dangerous
endeavour in post-Qaddafi Libya.
In such a context, Facebook has
become not just a site for social
interaction but a major source of
news for both private and public media
in Libya. Indeed, private media have
been specifically criticised for relying
on Facebook as a key news source.
Many former journalists who stopped
working for state media and are reluctant
to work for their private counterparts
have found in Facebook an important
“publishing” outlet for their own views
and reports. A major problem, of
course, is that such vast amounts of
user-generated material have not been
verified and are often rife with baseless
and libellous allegations.
“ Transitional Libyan Media. Free at last?”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
Personal interview with Ashour Shamis, August 7th 2014.
“A Rapid Assessment of the Media Landscape and Media Consumption Patterns in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, Gharyan and Sabha”. USAID.
143
“Public Service Broadcasting Reform – Libya”, by Elizabeth Smith. BBC Media Action.
144
140
141
142
29
7.3. Public service
broadcasting ideals and
Libyan society
Since the collapse of the Qaddafi
government, the two Libyan public
channels have been operating without any
public service remit or editorial guidelines.
The situation has been exacerbated
by the failure to introduce laws and
regulatory mechanisms to turn statecontrolled entities into operators with a
public service remit. Moreover, their news
content continues to be directly affected
by the ongoing conflict. For instance, due
to the physical presence of armed militia
on its premises, Al-Watanyya, which has a
strong anti-government bias, is not able to
report critically on the armed group these
men belong to.145
The scepticism with which many Libyans
judge the actual performance of their
public media is also the result of four
decades of a very centralised and
hegemonic public media, whose main
coverage revolved, at worst, around
the person of Qaddafi himself and, at
best, around issues exclusively related
to praising the Libyan government and
its work and achievements in major
cities in the country. This also meant
that coverage of remote areas or cities
other than the three major ones was
practically non-existent. Coverage of
religious and linguistic or ethnic minorities
was taboo, and was therefore avoided
through the prevalent practice of selfcensorship. In one recounted instance
Qaddafi personally interfered to punish a
journalist who wrote about the Amazigh
people in Libya, and in another a statefunded newspaper was forced to publish
a report saying that Libyans are “antiChristian” following an earlier article it
had published about Christmas.146
There is no indication, at the time of
writing, that this exclusionist attitude
towards coverage has changed much
with respect to Libya’s public channels.
There is, however, some anecdotal
evidence suggesting that editors are
now more open to the idea of covering
minority issues in the country. Indeed,
it is becoming more common for
media managers to train their staff and
journalists to incorporate the voices of
minority and non-Arab groups in Libya
(e.g. the Tebu and Amazigh people).
However, this is done in a rather
superficial manner, and often does not
mean more than translating some stories
into the Amazigh language. In rarer cases
managers admitted to employing “at least
one Amazigh staff member in order to
make sure their voices are heard”.147 In
other instances, managers had no qualms
in admitting that there was no need
for such “inclusion” since there are no
minorities in the cities they cover.
In summary, existing research and
documented interviews with Libyan
experts and journalists point to a mere
shift in culture rather than an eradication
of the red lines governing media content
in Libya (both private and public). For
instance, since the revolution it has been
taboo (and dangerous) to cover news
relating to Jews in Libya, Mufti Sadeq
al Gharyani, religious extremist militias
(e.g. Ansar al-Sharia), the government
(General National Congress, or GNC),
tribal conflict, prison torture, rape and
homosexuality. Doing so has often led
to anonymous death threats against the
media and practitioners behind such
news, and has resulted in very severe
forms of self-censorship.148
Equally worrying is that, according
to various sources, while the old red
lines were quite clear and known to
all – for example, no negative coverage
of Qaddafi or his government, no
questioning of Libya’s sovereignty, no
coverage of Christians – the new red
lines are more ambiguous, unpredictable
and ever-expanding, since most armed
factions with conflicting political
allegiances are still roaming freely and
threatening to kill journalists without the
Ministry of Information being able to do
anything about it:149
Before, we used to have only one red
line: Qaddafi and his family. After
the liberation, we have hundreds of
red lines. If I criticized a political
party, I would receive an angry phone
call. If I criticize a minister for their [sic]
performance or decisions, I – or even
the media institution where I work –
become labeled as troublemakers
and the ministry could refuse to deal
with us anymore. I might also risk
losing my job.150
are simply not present. Equally, technical,
professional, managerial and financial
problems result in bland news, which
lacks the dynamism found in the private
sector. Additionally, the public sector is
so squeezed to provide content that
it still relies on archive and imported
shows. The channels are also suffering
from a lack of serious planning and
scheduling, and few programmes dare to
tackle the real issues being faced by the
population, such as the spread of arms,
the influence of militias, the weak role of
state institutions (e.g. the national army
and government), the increasing pressure
and intimidation exercised by extremist
groups and militias, and the growing role
of religious institutions represented by
the Mufti.152
Indeed, from a legal standpoint, journalists
and other media professionals currently
have no formal protection against threats
or attacks. Very recently the GNC
legislated against journalists’ rights and
freedoms by amending the already highly
controversial Article 195 of the Penal
Code. According to the amended version
of this article, Amendment (5) 2014,
approved on February 5th 2014:
Whether public or private, one thing is
clear: rather than reflect the interests of
the Libyan public, Libya’s television channels
are instead reflecting the narrow interests
of their owners/funders or the militias
that control them. Meanwhile, and in the
absence of audience research, “the Libyan
public opinion remains unknown”.153
… any person stating something that
is detrimental to the 17 February
Revolution is liable to be punished with
imprisonment […]. The same penalty
will be applied to any person who
publicly insults the legislative, executive
or judicial authorities or any of their
members during or in connection with
the execution of their duties, or who
insults the emblem of the state or
its flag.
7.4. Conclusion
Public broadcasting in Libya throughout
the last four decades earned itself the
reputation of being a loyal mouthpiece
of the government and of Qaddafi
himself, and was a very weak source
of information for Libyan citizens, who
preferred instead to tune into the
Gulf-based, uncensored satellite news
channels such as Al Jazeera and Al
Arabiya.154 Throughout the revolution,
and after the collapse of the Qaddafi
government, the proliferating private
media (television, radio and print media),
in addition to social media, played an
important role in conveying news of the
revolt to both national and international
audiences, while the public channels,
underfunded and badly equipped, lagged
behind. In the absence of adequate
legislation to regulate the burgeoning
media environment, these newly found
media freedoms came at a heavy price:
a chaotic, “out of control” media scene
To many observers this amendment
“simply adapts the existing repressive law
to the new political context”.151 It follows
Decree 5 of 2014, adopted on January
22nd 2014 by the GNC, which calls for
“taking necessary measures” and “stopping
and banning the broadcasting of certain
satellite TV stations” if they criticise the
February 17th revolution, promote conflict
or destabilise the country.
In an environment still marred by
instability and insecurity due to a lack
of rule of law and no strong central
government, the conditions for
broadcasting credible and impartial news
147
“Public Service Broadcasting Reform – Libya”, by Elizabeth Smith, op. cit.
148
Details of self-censorship and recent cases of harassment and even physical threats against journalists who dare to cover “taboo” issues in post-Gaddafi Libya are very well
documented in the forthcoming UNESCO report on the impact of the Media Development Indicators (MDIs) in the country.
149
UNESCO MDI report on Libya (forthcoming), op. cit.
150 Mohamed Saghir, freelance journalist and former reporter for the government-controlled Libiyya TV channel, as quoted in “Transitional Libyan Media. Free at last?”, by
Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
151 UNESCO MDI report on Libya (forthcoming), op. cit.
145
where public broadcasters are incapable
of providing fair and impartial content
that caters to the interests of various
groups in society, and where private
broadcast stations continue to operate
without licences and are politically
aligned, serving the interests of their
funders or owners. News content is
often rife with libellous claims and verbal
attacks against political opponents,
with operating channels able to “say
whatever they please politically, and
ridicule everything and everyone without
fear of sanctions. They are platforms for
owners and journalists to attack other
media, regardless of what the public
wants.”155 Individuals who find themselves
at the receiving end of libellous claims,
verbal attacks or ridicule on broadcast
channels have no available means of legal
redress, such as the right of reply. The
only recourse available to them is the
outdated legal provision related to libel,
but even this is not being implemented
due to a weak and politicised judiciary.156
Considering the failure of the postQaddafi national government to
introduce legal reform, and the return
of the Ministry of Information after
repeated attempts to abolish it, feelings
among journalists and civil society groups
are mixed regarding the return of a
system which seems like a throwback
to the Qaddafi era. Nevertheless,
discussions continue regarding how
best to reorganise the media sector
in a way that would guarantee media
independence and freedom. Those who
still support a higher media council
with executive powers – instead of
a ministry – do so because of their
conviction that putting a government
ministry in charge of the media sector
would “undoubtedly [lead] to the return
of a hegemonic government with deep
implications for independent media”.157
Recent studies and anecdotal evidence
also suggest strong public support among
both average citizens and experts for
the idea of public service broadcasting
in Libya. Many Libyans seemingly yearn
for national, publicly funded television
channels that can provide them with
quality, reliable programming about their
own country and their own national
issues and events. The belief is that there
is a strong need for programming that
would contribute significantly to national
reconciliation and the democratic
process – a “hunger” eloquently and
succinctly expressed as wanting “our own
BBC”.158 This enthusiasm for setting up a
public service broadcaster is matched by
an equally strong scepticism caused by
the ongoing military conflict, the lack of
any perceptible change in state-funded
media since the collapse of the Qaddafi
government, and the rising and fierce
competition from the more attractive
content of the (very politically motivated)
private media in Libya.
POSTSCRIPT
In July 2014, a coalition of militias
known as Libya Dawn seized the
international airport in Tripoli and
subsequent fighting forced the
House of Representatives to flee to
Tobruk. The previous parliament
then reconvened in Tripoli and
chose Omar al-Hasi as its leader
and prime-minister. At the time of
writing, Libya is divided between
two competing governments, each
claiming legitimacy and each backed
by armed groups.
The state broadcaster, Al-Wataniya,
was overrun by a militia controlled
by Abdelraouf Kara, an Islamist ally
of the Misrata brigades. Since August,
the TV station has served as the
mouthpiece of Kara and his militias.
Although its signal on the Egyptian
satellite company, Nilesat, has been
suspended at the request of the
Tobruk government, Al-Wataniya
now broadcasts through the satellite
frequencies of the children’s TV
station, Libya Al-Atfal.
Attempts by the House of
Representatives to establish a new
incarnation of Al-Wataniya outside
Libya have yet to come to fruition.
146
30
ibid.
“Al wake al i’lami” (“The media reality”). Available at: www.menassat.com/?q=ar/media-landscape/ar-lybia-press-fact.
155
156
“Al rouya al iilamyyah li Libya” (“The state of Libyan media”). Available at: http://mediavisionlibya.northwestern.edu/the-state-of-libyan-media/.
157
158
“Public Service Broadcasting Reform – Libya”, by Elizabeth Smith, op. cit.
152
153
154
31
8.Morocco
In theory, Morocco’s public broadcasting model seems to offer
an example of best practice to other Arab countries undergoing
democratic and constitutional reform. However, the theory still
remains to be delivered in practice.
8.1. Introduction
As is the case in most Arab countries,
the Moroccan state has dominated the
broadcasting sector since its inception.
In 1999 the country embarked on a
media reform process that culminated
in the introduction of a series of laws in
the early 2000s. With the exception of
Lebanon, Morocco was the first Arab
country (along with Jordan) to introduce
laws to liberalise the broadcasting
sector and create a commission for its
regulation, the Haute Autorité de la
Communication Audiovisuelle (HACA).
These laws were Dahir No. 1-02212 of August 31st 2002 on creating
HACA, and Decree No. 2-02-663 of
September 10th 2002 on ending state
monopoly in television broadcasting.
Broadcast Law No. 77-03 of 2005 was
an extension of the two 2002 laws: its
purpose was to establish a pluralist media
environment and to offer opportunities
to private operators by “attracting them
to operate audiovisual communication
networks in an organised and transparent
framework”.159 These and other reforms
were part of the state’s commitment to
promoting the values of democracy and
pluralism in the country.
This commitment was more recently
reiterated in the new constitution of
June 2011, which reasserted Morocco’s
adherence to the universal principles
of human rights and the promotion of
freedom of expression (Article 25). More
importantly, in a unique move in the Arab
context, Article 165 of the constitution
formalised the role of HACA as the most
important regulatory body responsible
for representing the diversity of opinion
in the kingdom’s media landscape.160
Whereas other Arab countries have
publicly owned broadcasting channels
without any clear or detailed public
service obligations, Morocco is,
comparatively, quite advanced and
comprehensive with respect to the
promotion of the values of public service
broadcasting and the introduction
of institutional and legal frameworks
to guarantee them. The focus in this
section, therefore, will be on the content
and management of Morocco’s public
broadcasting institutions – La Société
Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de
Télévision (SNRT) and La Société
d’Études et de Réalisations Audiovisuelles
(SOREAD) – and the law that regulates
their operation, namely Broadcast Law
No. 77-03 of 2005.
8.2. Programming and public
service broadcasting ideals
There are currently several public TV
channels in Morocco (ten television
channels and 15 radio channels).
Two public institutions control the
protect children from harmful content,
and the consumer in general from false
allegations and deceptive programming.
It also bans any incitement to hatred.
However, the same article contains
vaguely phrased content restrictions that
can easily be used by the authorities in
order to curb “unwanted” speech and
restrict diversity of opinion. These are
the content restrictions related to the
ideological principles of the Moroccan
kingdom as defined by the constitution
(i.e. Islam, the territorial integrity of the
kingdom and the monarchy).
It should be noted that, unlike in most
other Arab countries, the regulation of the
broadcasting sector in Morocco is not only
dependent on the Broadcast Law of 2005,
but also on the accompanying terms of
reference for licensed operators (or books
of specifications), which are the legal
operating conditions developed by HACA
and approved by ministerial decree.
These books of specifications set out
requirements for each licensed operator
to meet, such as quota targets for the
production of content and the types of
programme to produce in order to fulfil
the public service remit. For instance, the
book of specifications for the channel 2M
(Decree No. 2-12-597 of October 12th
2012) requires this public operator to
respect the national unity of the Moroccan
population, which comprises people of
different origins (Arab/Muslim, Amazigh
and Sahraoui, including communities
of African, Andalusian and Hebrew
descent).162 It also calls for protection and
reinforcement of the formally recognised
languages in Morocco, as well as other
cultural and linguistic expressions in the
country (Articles 2 and 9). In a move that
attempts to make up for the discrimination
that the Amazigh people have suffered,
2M’s book of specifications specifically
requires the “active consolidation of the
Amazigh language into the broadcasting
sector”,163 the adoption of a specific
Amazigh alphabet, and co-ordination with
the Royal Academy for the Promotion
of Amazigh Culture in order to ensure
the best (or most correct) usage of the
Amazigh language (Article 3).
broadcasting sector: SNRT and SOREAD.
Of the existing public TV channels,
only two are terrestrial, ensuring
national coverage and offering general
programming: Al-Aoula (operated
by SNRT) and 2M (operated by
SOREAD).161 These two channels are
regulated by Broadcast Law No. 77-03
of 2005, which also applies to private
broadcasting (both radio and television)
in the country.
According to its preamble, the Broadcast
Law of 2005 seeks to balance the values
of Islam and constitutional monarchy,
while recognising the importance of
national unity and the universal principles
relating to human rights. In addition, the
law contains specific content-related
provisions: the guarantee of freedom
of expression and pluralism; respect for
human rights, human dignity and privacy;
the protection of cultural heritage; and
the promotion of local programming.
Whereas Article 8 of the Broadcast
Law of 2005 contains several positive
requirements that largely define the role
and mission of a licensed broadcaster
(i.e. “what to do” in order to fulfil the
requirements of the law), Article 9
contains several negative requirements
(i.e. “what not to do”) in order to protect
viewers from harmful and discriminatory
content. For instance, Article 9 seeks to
“ Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens: Maroc”. Euromed Audiovisuel. Available at:
http://euromedaudiovisuel.net/Files/2013/08/20/1377006300959.pdf.
The example of Morocco was followed more recently in Tunisia, where the role of the newly introduced media regulatory body, HAICA, was enshrined in the new Tunisian
constitution of January 2014.
161 For more on the peculiar status of a third TV channel operating in Morocco, Medi 1 TV, which has oscillated between being public and private since it was launched, see
“Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens: Maroc”. op. cit.
In order to ensure that 2M contributes
to the promotion of national culture
(broadcasting and cinema), its book
of specifications lays out annual quotas,
some of them as high as 60%, regarding
in-house productions (Article 11).
The book of specifications also details
the number of hours per year that
2M has to dedicate to thematic
programming – including politics, sport
and programming for children and young
people – while also ensuring plurality of
opinion and representing the diversity
of the population (Articles 22 to 34).
Guidelines to be published on the
HACA website, for both broadcasters
and parents, reinforce the public service
mission of Morocco’s broadcasters, and
introduce a range of protection for young
viewers (e.g. visual on-screen labels, press
releases and sound alerts before the start
of programmes).
Other strengths of the book of
specifications for 2M relate to a detailed
code of ethics (Chapter 4) that protects
the interests of children and those of
viewers in general (e.g. respect for
privacy and human dignity), and the
requirement to conduct regular audience
surveys in order to gauge satisfaction
with 2M’s performance and its ability to
meet the expectations of the various
national groups to which it is supposed
to reach out (Article 14).
Whereas SOREAD only operates two
public channels (2M and Radio 2M),
SNRT, the oldest of Morocco’s public
channels, operates eight television
channels and five radio channels. In
addition to the main (generalist) Al
Aoula TV channel, there is the generalist
Tamazight channel, which broadcasts
exclusively in the Amazigh language.
There are also a number of thematic
public channels covering sports, culture,
religion and cinema. A number of public
radio channels are required to cover
the major conglomerates and regions
of the country. Thus, not only is cultural
and linguistic diversity guaranteed by
having general programming in both
languages on public radio and television,
but a number of television and radio
channels operated by SNRT are required,
by law, to pay attention to the Amazigh
culture and language.
What distinguishes the content of
2M and Al Aoula is that their books
of specifications also require them to
ensure political pluralism by covering
parliamentary activities, including those
of the opposition (Article 10). Despite
the various constitutional and other legal
provisions aimed at safeguarding freedom
of expression, pluralism and the rule of law,
a number of structural, cultural, political and
financial limitations continue to affect the
realisation of these public service ideals.
For example, the public operators were
failing to give equal broadcasting time to
members of parliament and opposition
representatives. In response to complaints
lodged by several national parties in
this regard, HACA introduced new rules
in order to guarantee pluralism outside
election periods (CSCA Decision
No. 46-06).164 This new decision not
only ensures that airtime is given to MPs
and political parties, but also extends
the guarantee to other national players
(e.g. trade unions, professional and
economic associations, etc). The access
and airtime given to various organisations
is based on their importance and level of
representation at a national level.
In order to guarantee political pluralism
and equal access for the various political
parties, HACA requests the application
of the “rule of third” (“la règle des trois
tiers”). According to this rule (Articles 6
and 7 of CSCA Decision No. 46-06), onethird of speaking time is to be allocated
to government, one-third to the majority
parliamentary party and one-third to the
parliamentary opposition. Political parties
that are too small to be represented in
Parliament are entitled to 10% of the total
time given to the other three groups. HACA
has also developed sophisticated indicators
that allow it to measure quantitatively the
extent of political pluralism in news reports
and general programming, and which
were eventually adopted by several other
African and Arab countries.165 Consequently,
159
160
32
S NRT’s cahier des charges is available at: www.mincom.gov.ma/fr/textes-juridiques/documentation/item/download/278_b9a256514333700ec0d2dfdf1e3b8f91.html.
SOREAD’s cahier des charges is available at: www.mincom.gov.ma/fr/textes-juridiques/documentation/item/download/276_092512a4cf4106ee6679b2d93d1b64a4.html.
Author’s translation.
164
See details at: http://haca.ma/pdf/Note_de_syntheseVF.pdf.
165 Personal interview with Bouchra Bourara, Associate Director, Research and Development, HACA, July 4th 2014.
162
163
33
HACA has been preparing and publishing
quarterly reports on news programmes
and bi-annual reports on talk shows
(Article 9 of HACA Decision No. 46-06)
and sending them out to relevant societal
and institutional actors as stipulated by
Law No. 1-02-212 of August 31st 2002.166
Another decision by the CSCA,
Decision No. 14-07, enforces respect
for political pluralism in the audiovisual
media (both private and public) during
election periods.167
Despite the various rules and
mechanisms developed by HACA to
ensure political pluralism in the broadcast
media, the major challenge so far has
been enforcing them, especially with
respect to “la règle des trois tiers” and
diversity in news and public affairs
programming.168 Another challenge still
faced by management is ensuring the
fair and positive portrayal of women
across programming.169
Recent developments, however, have
demonstrated a renewed effort on
behalf of the minister of communication,
concerned authorities (especially
HACA) and the public broadcasters
themselves to reform the sector in
order to consolidate the public service
remit of the broadcasting channels
operating in Morocco. Recently 2M
published its own charter for enhancing
the image of women, and hopes to
achieve this goal by identifying and
combating negative stereotypes,
promoting a proactive editorial approach,
diversifying its programming and, most
important of all, carrying out regular
monitoring activities.170
In 2006, HACA recommended the
restructuring of the (then) separate
companies SOREAD and SNRT in
order to create a holding company
responsible for public broadcasting.
The king appointed a single director
general for both companies. This
restructuring, whose purpose was
to increase the competitiveness and
editorial independence of 2M (owned
by SOREAD) and Al Aoula (owned by
SNRT), has been criticised as insufficient
by analysts and members of civil society.
Indeed, the boards of both SNRT and
SOREAD are heavily dominated by
representatives of different ministries
and other public bodies, mostly the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of
Communication. For instance, in 2012
the board of directors of 2M had only
one non-government member, who only
had non-voting powers (observer status).
As some analysts have observed, the
predominance of public officials on both
boards is problematic, and can negatively
affect the independence of these public
operators, making them more likely to
cater to the interests of government than
to those of the public.
As part of the effort to make both
public broadcasters act in a transparent
and accountable manner, their amended
books of specifications (Article 65 for
SOREAD and Article 196 for SNRT)
require them to prepare and publish
annual reports that document their
production, programming and financial
activities. These reports are also to be
posted on the operators’ websites in
order to make them available to all.
Because of the lack of a coherent set
of rules related to personnel and the
management of staff, conflict situations
have often arisen, mostly between
management and employees. With respect
to the training of personnel in these public
institutions, there are clear discrepancies
in terms of budgeting and opportunities.
SNRT, for instance, has a specialist
personnel policy and reserves a budget
specifically for professional development,
based on the realisation that work in the
broadcasting sector requires a particular
set of skills that needs to be honed and
developed on a regular basis.
SOREAD, by contrast, does not have a
specific law regulating the employment
167
34
8.5. Funding, audiences and
commercial pressures
Both Al Aoula and 2M have been
criticised by audiences for scheduling
too many dubbed dramas and
telenovelas from Mexico, Turkey and
Korea.174 Other criticisms relate to the
dearth of political programmes, debate
shows, documentaries and investigative
reporting, and the predominance of
imported cartoon shows for children.175
The two operators justify this “poorness”
of content by blaming it on a lack of
financial resources and the need to
attract advertisers, who are more
interested in the number of viewers than
in quality programming.176
8.4. Audiences
There are two interesting legal provisions
to ensure that Morocco’s public
broadcasters are accountable to the
public. The first requires the creation
of the role of “mediator” to encourage
feedback and audience participation.
The mediator must deal with viewers’
complaints and respond to them in a
show (emission de mediation or mediation
programme) which is to be aired for at
least 52 minutes every two weeks.171 The
mediator for each public operator must
also prepare an annual report detailing
their remarks and recommendations
regarding viewers’ complaints, and must
post this report on the company’s website.
For instance, according to a 2009 report
the mediator received 1,755 messages,
of which 564 were about Al Aoula.
Audience criticism revolved mainly around
dissatisfaction with political debates and
some cultural and artistic programmes.
The funding of Morocco’s public
operators is based on a hybrid system,
with multiple sources of income. First,
there is a monthly licence fee included
in the electricity bill for each household.
60% of this licence fee is allocated to
SNRT, while 40% goes to the other
operators: SOREAD and Le Centre
Cinématographique Marocain (CCM).177
Other sources of income include
revenues from advertising and the sale
of programmes, and additional
government funding. These multiple
funding sources have, however, proven
insufficient to keep the operators afloat,
and the state has intervened to rescue
them on more than one occasion. More
recently, to quell rumours about a lack
of government commitment to SNRT
(the operator of Morocco’s most
watched public channel, Al Aoula), a
communiqué published on May 20th
2013 by the Ministry of Communication
announced a 50% increase in SNRT’s
Second, regular audience surveys are
required to gauge audience satisfaction
and the ability of the operators to cater
effectively to the public interest (see,
for example, Article 13 of the book of
specifications for SNRT).
Enshrining in law the need to engage
in audience research on a regular basis
helps licensed operators find out the
extent to which they are meeting the
expectations of their audience and
fulfilling their public service remit. It can
also provide a stimulus for competition
among the various broadcasters, and
for developing programming that can
help them maximise their advertising
revenues. While the results of some of
the audience research undertaken in
the past have shown the popularity of
S ee, for instance, the HACA report for the fourth quarter of 2013 on access to news. Available at: www.haca.ma/pdf/RP_4emeTrimestre_2013_VA.pdf.
See details at: www.haca.ma/pdf/note¬_presentation_decision_VF.pdf.
168
A conference organised by the Réseau Francophone des Régulateurs des Médias with the title “Management of pluralism in the audiovisual media in normal times and
during elections” took place in Fez on November 29th and 30th 2010.
169 See “Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, op. cit.
170 See “2M dévoile sa charte pour la valorisation de la femme”. Available at: www.2m.ma/Programmes/Magazines/Feminin/node_46532/2M-devoile-sa-charte-pour-lavalorisation-de-la-femme.
171 For details, see Article 195 of the SNRT book of specifications.
166
2M and Al Aoula during prime time,172
critics of Morocco’s public operators have
complained that audience share has had
little impact on their programming grid,
which is full of imported programmes
and low-quality national productions.173
of its staff, although its board of
directors gave a recommendation
to this effect in February 2006. As a
result, its employees are subject to the
national labour law, which does not
acknowledge the specificity of work in
the broadcasting sector.
budget. The purpose of this was to help
it cover the salaries of employees and to
uphold its commitments with regard to
producing programmes.178
8.6. Conclusion
A review of the regulatory landscape
within which Morocco’s two major
public TV channels operate shows
the extent to which, despite a number
of shortcomings in its implementation,
the ideal of public service broadcasting
is taken seriously by Morocco’s
legislators and political elite. Not only
is Morocco the first Arab country to
enshrine, both in its constitution and
in various national laws, the duty of the
highest regulatory authority (HACA)
to guarantee and protect pluralism in
the media, but various decrees and
related decisions have been promulgated
in the last decade or so in order to
detail and enhance the public service
mission of the licensed public operators.
Morocco’s case is also unique in the
Arab context with respect to
accommodating and responding to
criticism and complaints by political
parties and members of civil society.
Indeed, such complaints have led
the regulatory authorities and public
operators on several occasions to
introduce measures to increase access
and guarantee pluralism in the media.
As such, the Moroccan case seems
to offer a positive example of ”good
practice” for other Arab countries
undergoing regime change and
democratic and constitutional reform,
as well as for countries who need to
amend their existing media laws and
reform their public broadcasting sector
in order to align it with international
standards. Indeed, the recently introduced
Tunisian regulatory authority for
broadcasting (both public and private),
HAICA,179 was modelled in many
respects on its Moroccan counterpart,
HACA, and is currently co-operating with
it in order to learn from the latter’s greater
experience in the field.180
Interestingly, this advanced legal framework
has not led, to date, to the liberalisation
of the broadcasting sector or to increased
pluralism and access to broadcasting for
Morocco’s various political and societal
entities. Although laws to liberalise the
sector were introduced more than a
decade ago, there is still not a single private
television channel licensed to operate
in Morocco, and state monopoly is still
exercised over the terrestrial television
sector. Morocco’s ranking in terms of
freedom of expression has not improved
in recent years, and equal access for
various political actors has not yet been
achieved, despite the existence of legal
and institutional mechanisms to achieve
this. Lebanon’s public broadcaster, Télé
Liban, which is operating in a quasi-legal
vacuum and is controlled by the Ministry
of Information, gives far greater and more
equal access to its country’s major political
players (members of government, majority
party MPs and opposition MPs).181
With some already referring to Morocco’s
liberalisation and reform efforts as being
“theoretical”, the challenge ahead for
Morocco is the extent to which ideals can
be turned into reality with respect to the
broadcasting sector.
“ Mesures d’audience: les télés étrangères en force, les nationales resistant”, by Faical Faqihi. The Economist, No. 3309, June 30th 2010.
See “Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, op. cit.
174
See “Rapport Annuel Du Médiateur 2010”. Société Nationale de Radiodiffusion et de Télévision. Available at: www.snrt.ma/documents/Le%20Rapport%20du%20
M%C3%A9diateur%202010.pdf.
175 See: www.leconomiste-magazine.com/.../91.../734-chaines-nationales.ht.
177 Personal interview with Bouchra Bourara, Associate Director, Research and Development, HACA, July 4th 2014.
178
Ministry of Communication press release 20/05/13
179 Haute Autorité de la Communication Audiovisuelle.
180
“Ra’is al-hay’a al ulya al mustakilla” (“The president of the higher independent broadcasting authority in Tunisia visits the [Moroccan] higher authority”). HACA website.
Available at: www.haca.ma/indexAr.jsp.
172
173
35
9.Palestine
The media environment in Palestine faces a number of difficulties
that pose a challenge to the development of a national
broadcaster. But despite the unstable situation, there are ongoing
efforts to work towards international standards of media practice.
9.1. Introduction
Palestinian public broadcasting is the
youngest in the Arab world, being barely
two decades old. Prior to 1994, Palestinian
people living in the Occupied Territories
could only access Arabic-language news
on Israeli television, which used this
exclusive status in order to shape the
opinion of a “captive Palestinian audience”.
In the absence of national television
channels, Palestinians could also access
Arabic-language programming from both
Egyptian and Jordanian publicly owned
terrestrial channels, primarily to view
drama series. With respect to news
bulletins, Palestinians tended to tune
into the Israeli Arabic-language channels,
despite their suspicions that such targeted
programming was controlled by the Israeli
secret services.182
Decree No. 4566 of July 6th 1993, which
was signed by President Arafat, introduced
a public entity, the Palestinian Broadcasting
Corporation (PBC). This was responsible
for running both public television and
public radio, managing Palestine TV (PTV)
and Radio Voice of Palestine. However,
PTV did not start terrestrial broadcasts
until 1994, while its satellite service was
not up and running until April 1999.
Shortly afterwards, PTV was instrumental
in documenting abuses by the Israelis
against the Palestinian population.
Consequently, on November 20th 2000
Israeli planes bombed PTV’s premises and
entirely destroyed its facilities. Although
services then came to a complete
halt, they resumed shortly afterwards
following the merger of the terrestrial
and satellite services, also under the
name PTV.183
The Palestinian Parliament has not
convened since 2007. Palestine has been
divided politically and geographically, with
the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) retaining control of the West
Bank and the Hamas government
controlling the Gaza Strip. Not only
has this situation hindered efforts to
introduce a law for the licensing and
regulation of broadcasting, but the public
media landscape itself has been divided:
the PBC is still largely under the control
of the Palestinian National Authority,
while the Hamas government has been
running its own public TV station, the
Al Aqsa satellite network, since January
2006. Coverage of abuses and human
rights violations on both sides has been
curbed by the respective authorities in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.184
The current television landscape is also
characterised by the proliferation of
private terrestrial and satellite stations,
many of them operating in the West Bank
and Gaza. Their licences are obtained
from the Ministry of Information, due to
the absence of a broadcasting law.
183
36
Presidential Decree No. 2 of 2010 does
not adequately address the mission,
objectives and nature of the content to
be made available by Palestine’s public
broadcasters. Articles 3 and 4 have very
general requirements with respect to the
nature and role of public broadcasting,
such as strengthening national unity,
spreading national culture and awareness
of the history of the Palestinians and
Arabs, and strengthening the right
of citizens to freedom of expression.
The content-related provisions of the
decree are limited in scope and do not
cover the spectrum of internationally
recognised public service broadcasting
ideals. For instance, there is no mention
of the importance of guaranteeing
plurality of opinion or of diversity in
any of its forms (principally religious
and political). Moreover, the decree
does not detail anywhere the means to
achieve the objectives enumerated in
Articles 3 and 4.
service programming
Up until 2010, there were no specific
laws regulating public broadcasting in
Palestine. Instead, general provisions
in the Penal Code, the Press and
Publications Law of 1995 and the
Palestinian constitution (the Basic Law
of 2002) were applied to broadcasting.
Moreover, decisions relating to the dayto-day operations of public broadcasters
were made at the discretion of specific
administrators/directors who, in the
absence of guidelines and bylaws, could
not be held accountable for these
operations. Consequently, various internal
power struggles ensued, and accusations
of corruption within PTV became
rampant, mostly due to the fact that
“this institution was not regulated by any
financial or administrative system”.185 To
further complicate matters, following the
elections of 2006 which brought Hamas
to power, Palestine became politically
and geographically divided (into the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip). In the absence
of any clear mandate or regulatory
framework for its operations, PTV fell
prey to this political division, and this has
been reflected clearly in its programming,
especially its news broadcasts.186
S ee “Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, op. cit.
PTV was targeted on more than one occasion by the Israeli army. Another major attack on the main Ramallah headquarters occurred on January 19th 2002.
184
“Assessment of Media Development in Palestine: Based on UNESCO’s Media Development Indicators”. UNESCO.
185
A related article in Arabic is available at: www.aman-palestine.org/arabic/Activities/Aman/2010/15042010.htm.
186
See “Hamas and Fatah in their media rivalry”, by Jean-François Legrain. Mediterranean Confluences No. 69, 2009/2. Available at: www.cairn.info/revue-confluencesmediterranee-2009-2-page-75.htm.
182
The situation improved slightly with the
introduction of Presidential Decree No.
2 of March 9th 2010, which created
a public entity, the PBC, in order to
organise the administration of Palestine’s
public television and radio channels.
The decree also specified some of the
duties and responsibilities of employees
and managers. For instance, it called for
the creation of a general committee
responsible for the management of
national television and radio (Al-hay’a alamma lil-iza’a wal television al-falestiniyya).
Although the same decree states that
this committee enjoys “an independent
administrative and financial status”, this
independence is compromised by the
fact that it is, by law, an administrative
body dependent on and answerable to
the president of the Palestinian National
Authority (Article 2).187
With the exception of Decree No. 2 of
2010, there has been to date no law for
the regulation of broadcasting in Palestine,
nor any law for the introduction of a
higher regulatory authority. Existing draft
laws for the regulation of broadcasting, the
creation of a higher broadcasting authority
and the guarantee of access to information
have already been heavily criticised for
failing to meet international standards,
mostly because they keep control over
broadcasting within government.188
Indeed, the programming of PTV fails
to reflect a commitment to public
service ideals, especially with regard
to plurality of opinion and diversity
within Palestine. Moreover, it shuns
issues of relevance to the Palestinian
public, such as political debates involving
speakers with different viewpoints and
programming that targets women, young
people and religious minorities.189
For a considerable period of time, due
to the tight control exercised over it by
the PLO, PTV acquired a reputation for
being partisan and a PLO mouthpiece.
The situation improved slightly following
the reconciliation deal between Fatah
and Hamas, when PTV started to reflect
more of the Hamas viewpoint. What
also contributed to the more balanced
coverage of news by PTV was “the
awareness that its professional reputation
was at stake. It is now trying to be less
biased and to please a larger number of
its national audience.”190
Although it started operating in 2004,
PTV did not have a board of directors
until six years later, when Presidential
Decree No. 2 of March 9th 2010
called for the creation of the public
body named Al-hay’a al-amma lil-iza’a
wal television al-falestiniyya (see 9.2
above). The newly introduced board of
directors was responsible for managing
PTV’s financial and administrative affairs,
in addition to deciding on its general
policies and internal bylaws. The same
decree also introduced a board of
trustees (with no executive powers).
In contrast to the strictly advisory role
of the board of trustees, the board of
directors was responsible for deciding on
and implementing PTV’s policies. Critics
were quick to point to the problematic
nature of this set-up, which gave the
directors excessive powers.191 Another
problematic aspect of the decree was
that it failed to specify the number of
board members, and instead set a range
from nine to 13. Members serving on
the board of directors are not required
to have any expertise in the field of
media and merely need to fulfil the same
criteria as any other public servant (i.e.
never having been convicted of a crime
and holding Palestinian nationality). They
are nominated by the chairperson of the
board of the hay’a, who is appointed by
the president of the Palestinian National
Authority (instead of being elected by
members of the board).
During the implementation process
that saw the creation of the first
board of directors for the PBC, two
additional members were nominated
above and beyond the maximum legal
limit set by Decree No. 2 of 2010 (i.e.
13). This brought the final number to 15.
Their term was also significantly shorter
than the legal four-year term set by
the decree. The decree also allows the
president of the Palestinian National
Authority to remove members from
office at any time, without having to offer
any justification for his decision. This and
other provisions render the board of
directors subservient to the president,
susceptible to political interference and
unable to operate independently from
government and in the interests of the
Palestinian public.
Finally, considering that Decree No. 2
of 2010 specifies that the board
of directors is dependent on the
president of the executive committee
of the PLO (and not just the president
of the Palestinian National Authority),
the integrity and independence of the
PBC is compromised in a fundamental
way because it is structurally conceived
as being dependent on a single party
(the PLO). Therefore the president
of the Palestinian National Authority
(when he is also president of the
PLO) is the sole and ultimate authority
responsible for public broadcasting in
the country. While Decree No. 2 of
2010 was meant to fill a legal void
he Arabic version of Presidential Decree No. 2 of March 9th 2010 is available at: http://muqtafi.birzeit.edu/pg/getleg.asp?id=16093.
T
See the article “Masharee qawaneen el I’lam”, by Hanane Abou Nada. Posted on March 9th 2014 at: www.amad.ps/ar/?Action=Details&ID=17572.
189
190
Personal interview with Walid Batrawi, Director of Projects, Palestinian Territories, BBC Media Action, July 4th 2014.
191
187
188
37
10.Tunisia
caused by the absence of a national
parliament, to date no other laws or
regulations have been introduced
to manage either public or private
broadcasting in Palestine.
A major challenge facing employees
of the PBC stems from the fact that
their employment status is regulated by
the law covering all public employees/civil
servants. This does not make adequate
provision for the particular nature of
work in the broadcast sector. For instance,
according to the existing categories
and system of classification of this law,
a news editor can overrule the decisions
of a producer based simply on seniority.
Moreover, the law fixes the number
of working hours at eight, which have
to be carried out during normal office
hours. There is also a serious problem
with the current wages of employees
in the public broadcasting sector, who
are paid very meagre salaries (the
minimum wage) compared with what
they could earn in the private sector or
with international agencies operating
in Palestine. This has led to a lack of
commitment among employees at PTV,
who often prefer to work for other
employers at the same time in order
to make ends meet.192
and audiences
The PBC’s major source of funding
further consolidates its dependent status
vis-a-vis the government. According to
Decree No. 2 of 2010, its yearly budget
is part of the general state budget, and
was approximately $4.7 million in 2012.193
This covers operational and production
activities but not the salaries of the
PBC’s 1,000 employees. Other sources
of funding are commercial advertising,
the sponsorship of programmes and
donations. The annual budget allocation
for PTV does not cover its costs, especially
the development and production of
programming. Almost two-thirds of PTV’s
budget goes to cover the salaries of its
550 employees, while the remaining third
is allocated to operating expenses. Often
this annual budget is delivered piecemeal
by the Ministry of Finance, due to the
unavailability of funding.194 The financial
situation of PTV is complicated by the
proliferation of private broadcasting
channels, which often offer superior
and more attractive content to viewers
in the country.
There is no existing data concerning the
size of the advertising market and the
audience share of the nearly 30 national
television channels operating in Palestine.
Analysts agree, however, that the
advertising market is small, “partly due to
the weakness of the Palestinian economy
in general, but also because there is a lack
of experience with advertising”.195
Despite the proliferation of media
in Palestine, no reliable or systematic
audience research is being carried out.
Existing data are at best anecdotal and
incomplete, and are often unreliable.196
Audience research is sometimes
commissioned by external agencies
such as the BBC, but rarely for purposes
related to gauging the attractiveness
of overall public broadcasting
in Palestine.197
PTV has shown an interest in studying
audiences more recently, but it still
lacks the funding and expertise to
allow it to do so. Despite the absence
of audience research, there is a growing
awareness among the management
at PTV that the professional reputation
of this public operator is at stake,
and that it has to reach out to wider
segments of the population if it wants
to live up to its reputation as a national
public broadcaster.198
Draft laws relating to the regulation of
the broadcasting sector in general (as
well as to creating a higher council for
overseeing the process) have already
been heavily criticised by civil society
organisations, journalists and the
international community.200 Moreover,
the severe political divisions in the
country have not only had geographical
consequences but have also affected
the fundamental nature of public
broadcasting and any possibilities of
reforming the sector. In the absence
of a national parliament, it is hard to
expect that any of the existing draft laws
will be promulgated. Meanwhile Fatah
continues to control the West Bank
and the PTV in Ramallah, while Hamas
controls the Gaza Strip and its Al Aqsa
media network.
Despite the unstable political situation
and the multiple security threats that
face media practitioners and hinder
the development of a viable media
environment, there are ongoing efforts
by members of civil society and some
public servants to monitor abuses,
speak truth to power and work towards
the development of national laws
that meet international standards of
media practice.
ersonal interview with Imad al-Asfar, Programming Director at PTV, February 11th 2011.
P
“Projet de collecte de données statistiques sur les marchés cinématographiques et audio-visuels dans 9 pays méditerranéens: Palestine”. Euromed Audiovisuel.
Available at: http://euromedaudiovisuel.net/Files/2014/03/05/1394050594477.pdf.
194
ibid.
195
“Assessment of Media Development in Palestine”, op. cit.
196
See “Hamas versus Fatah: media war”, by Jean-Francois Legrain. Available at: http://iremam.cnrs.fr/legrain/fath_versus_hamas.htm.
197
Personal interview with Walid Batrawi, Director of Projects, Palestinian Territories, BBC Media Action, July 4th 2014. For example, the BBC carried out a study on audiences
for a joint programme it produced with PTV, Aswat men falasteen (“Voices from Palestine”).
198
Personal interview with Walid Batrawi, July 4th 2014.
199
“The legal framework for media in Palestine and under international law”, by Toby Mendel and Ali Khashan. Available at: www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/palestinemedia-framework.pdf.
200
“Hamas issues a draft media law which angers journalists in Gaza”. Article posted on March 27th 2013 at: www.sanadnet.net/topic.php?newsid=2238.
192
193
38
On paper, the myriad legal reforms since January 2014 make
Tunisian media the freest in the Arabic world. However, the
ultimate test is yet to come, with the implementation of these
new laws.
9.5. Conclusion
The current media landscape in Palestine
is marred by a number of difficulties,
which pose a serious challenge to the
proper development of a national
broadcaster capable of acting in the
public interest. To start with, the only
pieces of legislation that exist for
regulating the operation and output of
PTV (Decree No. 2 of 2010 and the
Press and Publications Law of 1995)
contradict both the Basic Law of 2002
and international standards, and “hinder
the development of the media in
Palestine”.199
10.1. Introduction
The Tunisian revolution, which led to the
collapse of the Ben Ali regime on January
11th 2011, culminated in the adoption
of a new constitution on January 26th
2014. This enshrined equality for men and
women and conveyed the fundamental
attributes of a modern democracy,
including freedom of expression and of
the media.201 Tunisia’s state of emergency,
which was ordered by President Ben Ali
just hours before he fled the country on
January 14th 2011, was finally lifted in
May 2014 by President Marzouki.202
However, the transformation of the
media started to occur in the immediate
aftermath of Ben Ali’s fall from power.
Within days, the Ministry of Information
was abolished and a few months later
new media laws were introduced by
a non-parliamentary interim body
entrusted with legislative reform – the
National Authority for Information and
Communication Reform (INRIC) – and
approved by the interim government.203
So, it should be noted, Decree Nos.
201
202
2011-115 and 2011-116 were introduced
before the new constitution was even
adopted:204 they were developed by
INRIC and approved by an interim
government whose legitimacy was
contested.205 Tensions between INRIC
and the Tunisian government, which was
refusing to implement the decrees, led
INRIC to express its refusal “to continue
to serve as a fig leaf while the situation of
the sector is in regression”.206
Despite the existence of some
weaknesses in the new media laws, their
introduction marked a clear departure
from the laws that were in force up
until then, and which were used by the
Ben Ali government to tightly control
the media in the country. The belated
introduction of the Haute Autorité
Indépendante de la Communication
Audiovisuelle (HAICA), almost two
years after Decree No. 2011-116
called for its creation, makes Tunisia
one of a handful of Arab countries that
are entrusting the regulation of the
broadcasting sector to a body that is
separate and quite independent from
the government or any of its ministries.
10.2. The structure and
management of Tunisian
public broadcasting
Tunisia’s public broadcasting network
consists of two terrestrial television
channels – Wataniya 1 and Wataniya
2 – and nine radio stations. These
terrestrial TV stations are almost
identical in their programming and are
practically competing with one another.
The authorities are currently considering
turning Wataniya 2 into a specialised
channel.207 Four of the radio stations are
national (Radio Tunis in Arabic, Radio
Tunis International, Culture Radio and
Youth Radio) and the other five are
regional (Sfax, Monastir, Gafsa, le Kef and
Tataouine). To these were added, after
January 14th 2011, Radio Shems FM
(which was the property of Cyrine Ben
Ali, daughter of the ousted president)
and Radio Zeitouna for the Holy Koran,
whose owner was Sakher El Matri, Ben
Ali’s son-in-law.208
F or details, see “Beyond Tunisia’s Constitution: The devil in the details”, by Maha Yahya. Carnegie Middle East Center. Available at: www.carnegie-mec.org/2014/04/28/
beyond-tunisia-s-constitution-devil-in-details/h9da.
“Tunisia Lifts 3-Year State of Emergency”, by Carlotta Gall. The New York Times. Posted on March 6th 2014 at: www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/world/africa/tunisia-endsemergency-rule.html?_r=0.
203
These are: Decree Law No. 2011-41 of May 26th 2011 (as amended by Decree No. 2011-54 of June 11th 2011), which guarantees the right of access to public
documents; Decree No. 2011-115 of November 2nd 2011 on freedom of the press and publication; and Decree No. 2011-116 of November 2nd 2011 on freedom of
broadcasting, which also called for the creation of a higher authority for broadcast regulation (referred to in Tunisia as HAICA).
204
For a thorough analysis of Decree No. 115 and Decree No. 116, see “The New Tunisian Legislative Framework”, by Joan Barata Mir. Internews. Available at: https://
internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/Internews_TunisiaMediaLaw_2012-02.pdf.
205
See “The New Tunisian Legislative Framework”, by Joan Barata Mir, op. cit.
206
“Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia: Based on the UNESCO Media Development Indicators”, by Toby Mendel. UNESCO. Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0022/002227/222701e.pdf.
207
Personal interview with Bachir Ouarda, Co-ordinator of the Civic Coalition for the Protection of Freedom of Expression, July 12th 2014. See also: www.article19.org/
resources.php/resource/37327/en/tunisia:-civil-society-representatives-call-for-the-revision-of-articles-concerning-freedom-of-expression-in-the-new-constitution#sthash.
lMmpVTNL.dpuf.
208
Report by INRIC. Available at: www.inric.tn/fr/INRIC-Report-Eng-final.pdf.
39
The number of employees in Tunisian
public TV is estimated to be close to
1,500. As public servants, their salaries
are very low but they have the privileges
that come with being employees in
the public sector (job security, health
insurance and retirement funds). After
the revolution, public disenchantment
with the worsening economic conditions
and the visible deterioration of services
in the public sector in general forced
the authorities to respond by adjusting
public sector salaries.209 Another problem
that legal and administrative reform
needs to address concerns the criteria
for employment in Tunisia’s public
broadcasting institutions. Authorities still
have to deal with the legacy of the past,
where recruitment was not conducted
on merit but on connections with “the
powers that be”. According to some
workers’ unions, close to a quarter of all
personnel are not qualified to work in
the broadcasting sector, while a number
of employees are still suspected of
remaining loyal to the ‘Ben Ali clan” and
are not reporting to work, despite still
being on the payroll.210
Prior to the revolution, public
broadcasting was placed directly
under the tutelage of the Ministry of
Communication. Decree No. 2007-1865
of July 23rd 2007 created two public
broadcasting bodies, Tunisian Television
and Tunisian Radio. Two related decrees
made these bodies directly answerable to
the minister of communication (Article
1) and fixed their administrative and
financial organisation and operational
procedures.211 Each of the organisations
was to be run by a board of directors,
whose chairperson was appointed by
decree. For instance, Decree No. 20071868 of July 23rd 2007 stipulated that
the board of Tunisian TV should consist
of ten members, to be selected from
the public sector and various ministries,
including the Prime Ministry (Article 5).
The chairman of the board, rather than
being elected by his peers, is appointed
by a decree issued by the Ministry
of Communication (Article 4). Most
importantly, the board of directors “shall
delegate the necessary prerogatives to
the managing director to manage Tunisian
Television” (Article 4). Moreover, the
minister of communication controls the
finances of Tunisia’s public broadcasting
institutions and follows their day-to-day
operations and activities, including the
approval of programming, access to
deliberations by the board, recruitment
and promotions (Article 16). In summary,
Given the lack of a proper regulatory
framework for public broadcasting, and
with controversial and political (upper
level) appointments still being carried out,
the editorial policy for public broadcasting
has become increasingly unclear.
every structural and managerial provision
is geared towards making public radio and
television an appendage of the Ministry
of Communication and the government.
Although the Tunisian revolution resulted
in the abolition of the Ministry of
Information very early on (on January
17th 2014), things have remained the
same with regard to the administration
of public TV and radio in Tunisia.212 The
internal structure and legal status of
the public broadcasters have not really
changed since 2011, although they are
currently being revised.213
HAICA is responsible for promoting all
types of broadcasting – public, private
and community-related (Article 15) –
and for ensuring that all broadcast
content is pluralistic (Article 16).220
Although the decree establishing
HAICA does not include specific
provisions regarding its role and
supervisory powers vis-à-vis public
broadcasting, one article in particular,
Article 19, requires HAICA to approve
the appointment of the chair of the
board (or the president/director general)
of all public broadcasting institutions.
Decree No. 2011-116 of November 2nd
2011 sought to free the Tunisian media
from the tight grip of government, first
by guaranteeing the freedom of the
broadcast media (both public and private)
and, second, by regulating their operations
through an “independent committee”
(HAICA) (Article 1). The independence
of HAICA is guaranteed in Article 6
by endowing it with an independent
budget and location, and stressing that
it should “exercise its role with total
independence and without interference
from anyone [or any party] that can
affect its membership and activities”
(Article 6).214 The membership of HAICA,
outlined in Article 7, further consolidates
this independence. Its nine members are
appointed for a non-renewable six-year
term and cannot be removed from office
except by a decision of the HAICA board
(under very limited circumstances). The
majority of the members (six out of nine)
are nominated by the major professional
unions in the country. Two are nominated
by the speaker of parliament, while the
chair of the board is nominated by the
president “after consulting with members
of the committee [i.e. HAICA]” (Article 7).
Overall, these provisions relating to
the independence of HAICA “are
consistent with international law and
best practices”.215
The most recent chair (and director
general) of Tunisian Television, Mustapha
Ben Latif, was appointed in early June
2014.221 In the continuing absence of
new laws and bylaws to reform Tunisia’s
public broadcasting institutions, he is
heading a board of directors whose
members still represent the various
ministries and who are appointed by
public authorities without any clear or
transparent process relating to their
appointment or their qualifications and
suitability for their roles.222
It took nearly 18 months from the
promulgation of Decree No. 2011- 116
“ Beyond Tunisia’s Constitution: The devil in the details”, by Maha Yahya, op. cit.
See “Un état des lieux de la télévision publique Tunisienne”, by Benoit Moulin and Auberi Edler. Le Bureau de projet de l’UNESCO à Tunis.
211
These are: Decree No. 2007-1867 of July 23rd 2007, relating to the establishment, administrative and financial organisation and operating procedures of “the Tunisian
Radio”; and Decree No. 2007-1868 of July 23rd 2007, relating to the establishment, administrative and financial organisation and operating procedures of “the Tunisian
Television”. The decrees are available in English at: www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2007/2007G/Jg0602007.pdf.
212
“Tarkeebat majales idarat al-mu’assassat al-samyya wal basaryya” (“The make-up of the board of directors of public broadcasting institutions in democratic countries”.
Report on a workshop held by the Coalition Civile pour la Défense de la Liberté d’Expression on March 6th 2014.
213
Personal interview with Bachir Ouarda, July 12th 2014.
214
Translation from the Arabic text of the law by the author.
215
“Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit.
209
210
40
for the presidency to announce the
membership of HAICA. Tensions
between INRIC – which pushed strongly
for an independent regulatory authority
to exercise oversight of the media –
and the office of the presidency had
caused the delay, with the president
being accused of “prevarication and
delaying tactics” by INRIC.216 On May
3rd 2013 the names of the appointed
members were finally announced.217
The appointment of HAICA’s president,
Nouri Lajmi, was considered to be
political and was criticised by members of
civil society. According to some, it came
as a result of pressure from the Ennahda
party and at the expense of many
other qualified candidates. The current
difficulties encountered by HAICA, which
mainly relate to questions about its
legitimacy from various concerned actors
in the private media sector, have recently
led a member to resign.218 According
to Reporters without Borders:
… perpetuating deposed President
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s methods,
the Ennahda-led government has
been making and breaking careers
at the head of the state radio and
TV stations. The hopes of media
freedom defenders were raised when
the appointment of members of
the Independent High Authority for
Broadcasting Communication (HAICA)
was announced on 3 May 2013
but then were again dashed when
another wave of senior appointments
in the state broadcast media were
quickly unveiled in August. Three years
after Ben Ali’s removal, authoritarian
methods continue to short-circuit
reform attempts and block state media
independence.219
Since its formation, HAICA has been faced
with many challenges. It has had to deal
with and/or legalise the dozen new radio
and TV stations that sprang up following
the collapse of the Ben Ali government,
many of which were broadcasting illegally.
It has established terms of reference (i.e.
books of specifications)223 for commercial
and community radio and TV stations
so that their licences could be properly
issued. It has also appointed the people in
charge of running Tunisia’s public media,
and has revised the appointments made
by the coalition government since January
2012. Most importantly, it has been
responsible for developing rules relating
to media coverage of the upcoming
elections, ensuring that “the public receives
freely-reported, transparent, diverse
and independent coverage”.224 Indeed,
on March 5th 2014 HAICA introduced
“ Tunisia to form new media regulatory body after months of delay”. Posted on May 4th 2013 at: www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=58526.
“Government finally appoints independent broadcasting authority”. Posted on May 7th 2013 at: http://en.rsf.org/tunisia-government-finally-appoints-07-05-2013,44580.
html?dolist=ok/tunisia-government-finally-appoints-07-05-2013,44580.html.
218
219
“World Press Freedom Index 2014”, op. cit.
220
For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of HAICA in relation to Decree No. 116 of November 2011, see “Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia”, by Toby
Mendel, op. cit.
221
See details at: www.africanmanager.com/167666.html.
222
223
These are the operating conditions for licensed broadcasters, usually issued as decrees.
224
For a detailed analysis of HAICA-related laws and articles, see “Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit.
216
217
41
four different books of specifications
relating to the licensing and operation
of both public and community radio and
television broadcasting.225
10.3. Public service mission
and editorial independence
According to Law No. 2007-33, Tunisian
public broadcasters have the following
responsibilities: to ensure a public service;
to promote the state’s culture and politics
while respecting national identity; to
develop the audiovisual sector; to provide
national and regional information; and to
facilitate access to information. They are
also responsible for promoting national
creativity; the production of short and
feature-length films and drama series; and
the promotion of co-productions and
international co-operation and exchange.
These responsibilities, which to date have
not been revised or expanded in order
to include important aspects of a public
service mission such as the promotion of
cultural diversity and political pluralism,
remain ineffective and very general. The
newly formed HAICA, responsible for
promoting pluralism in broadcasting, has
not yet developed books of specifications
for public broadcasters that could help
turn these general, vaguely worded ideals
into concrete measures (e.g. quotas for
specific programme types or audiences).
During the Ben Ali era, all media were
kept under strict government control,
being considered as an instrument of
propaganda for the regime: “hagiographic
coverage of the president was a daily
requirement”.226 This situation changed
dramatically after January 14th 2014.
The central system of censorship
disappeared and public media ceased to
give preferential treatment to government
officials and the presidency. Moreover,
Tunisia’s journalists themselves tried to
develop a public service model by forming
“editorial committees to defend the
independence of news and information
which they have since sought to transform
into permanent structures”.227
However, given the lack of a proper
regulatory framework for public
broadcasting, and with controversial and
political (upper level) appointments still
being carried out, the editorial policy
for public broadcasting has become
increasingly unclear. Within months
of the revolution, several reports
underscored the post-revolutionary
public broadcasters’ lack of editorial
guidelines and lack of independence from
the political authorities. Decision-making
continues to be excessively centralised,
and management is still in the “hands of
the Chief Executive Officers… who are
appointed directly by the executive arm
of Government”.228
While the phase immediately following
the revolution was characterised by
a newly found freedom to express a
diversity of opinions on air, the situation
was also described as one of “editorial
limbo”, where staff members were
“reluctant to make any decision that
could provoke unpredictable reactions
on the street”.229 This editorial limbo did
not last long. Many journalists began to
“do what they know best – flattering
political power”.230 Before the revolution,
“power” meant the Ben Ali regime.
Afterwards, “power” meant the army,
the people and the resistance.231 As one
state TV journalist put it: “We used to be
the trumpet of the regime. We did not
have the choice and now [that] we find
ourselves the trumpet of the people, we
also don’t have the choice.”232
No scientific data about the national
audience share of public television
stations exist to date. It is believed that
the post-revolutionary, pluralist content
on Wataniya 1 accounts for the relatively
high audience share of its prime time
news programme at 8:00 p.m.240 In a
2013 market survey on Tunisians’ main
sources of information, 52% of the
population selected Facebook as their
preferred source of news.241
Whereas public broadcasting is theoretically
still under the control of the government,
in practice the dominant editorial line of
its current affairs and news coverage has
reflected bias in favour of the opposition,
according to critics and the ruling Ennahda
party. State-run TV channels are even
accused by pro-Ennahda supporters of
being controlled by “hidden lobbies” and
of being the “new mouthpiece of the
secular opposition”. 233 The rift resulting
from the lack of clear editorial guidelines
on the content of public television
programmes has led to public demands
by Ennahda supporters (during sit-ins near
state television headquarters) to “purify”
public television of “agents” of the former
regime and foreign colonial interference.
The disenchantment of the Ennahda-led
government with the editorial line of public
TV reached a new low when “the battle
over the control of state television… shifted
from the streets to the courts” and the
government, feeling unable to control the
output of state TV, resorted to the judiciary
and filed lawsuits in order to increase
pressure and influence its output.234
10.4. Funding, audience
and competition
Immediately after the revolution, the
country witnessed a boom in the media
sector and the mushrooming of new
private media outlets, some of which are
still waiting to be licensed as per the books
of specifications introduced by the newly
formed HAICA.236 Not only is public
television now facing fierce competition
from the diverse private national
channels, but it also has to compete with
French and pan-Arab satellite channels,
which continue to have a large following
in Tunisia and are eroding the already
limited share of the advertising pie.237
In the face of this national, regional and
international competition, Tunisian public
TV seems to offer very little to national
audiences. To start with, it has meagre
financial means (it often has to seek loans),
its equipment is obsolete and its journalists
In summary, as some commentators have
noted, the post-revolutionary “newfound freedom was taken too far”, with
people defamed and attacked in live
television debates without being given
the right of reply. The lack of regulation
and guidelines – or what some describe
as “media laxity” – that continues to
characterise Tunisia’s public media reached
dramatic proportions when a young man
called for the execution of the then prime
minister Mohammed Ghannouchi on live
public television.235
These are: Decision No. 1-2014 of March 5th 2014 for private radio; Decision No. 2-2014 of March 5th 2014 for private television; Decision No. 3-2014 of March
5th 2014 for community radio; and Decision No. 4-2014 of March 5th 2014 for community television. The Arabic text of these decisions was published in issue no. 28
of the National Gazette on April 8th 2014. These decisions are also available on the HAICA website. See, for instance, its decision (in Arabic) on licensing and operating a
private television station at: http://haica.tn/media/cahier-des-charges-tv-privee.pdf.
226
“Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit. For a detailed analysis of public television during the period preceding the fall of the Ben Ali regime,
see “Arab Public Broadcasting: Regional Synthesis and Comparative Analysis”, by Dima Dabbous-Sensenig, op. cit.
227
“Assessment of Media Development in Tunisia”, by Toby Mendel, op. cit.
228
229
“Tunisian Media in Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi. The Carnegie Papers. Available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/tunisian_media.pdf.
230
ibid.
231
ibid.
232
Amira Arfaoui, as cited in “Tunisian Media in Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
233
See the interview with Adel Thabt, Editor-in-Chief of the magazine Al-Mouatinoun (published by the Ettakatol party, part of the ruling coalition), in “Tunisian Media in
Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit.
234
For details about lawsuits brought by the Ennahda government against state TV, see “Tunisian Media in Transition”, by Fatima el Issawi, op. cit. See also “Pouvoir, presse et
société: Tensions sur fond de censure”. Chopitos. Posted on March 6th 2012 at: http://chopitos.blogspot.com/2012/03/pouvoir-presse-et-societe-tensions-sur.html.
235
“Tunisian Media Since 2011: A Work in Progress”, by Mounira Chaieb. Posted on April 22nd 2013 at:
www.tunisia-live.net/2013/04/22/tunisian-media-since-2011-a-work-in-progress/.
225
42
are operating without editorial guidelines,
in addition to lacking commitment to
professionalism. A recent report by INRIC
also noted a “growing number of cases of
corruption and embezzlement over the
last two decades”.238
10.5. Conclusion
The myriad of legal reforms introduced
since the collapse of the Ben Ali regime
in January 2014 reflect the degree to
which the revolution has been successful
in reshaping the legal framework of a
democracy in transition. Not only is
Tunisia’s 2014 constitution the youngest
constitution in the Arab world, but it has
many provisions guaranteeing human
rights and women’s rights that are not
found in any of the constitutions of
other Arab countries, and especially not
in those that have experienced regime
change. The seriousness of the reforms
in the media sector was initially reflected
in the constitutional articles related to
freedom of expression and of the media,
and in the creation of a higher regulatory
authority to guarantee pluralism in
the country.
The sources of funding for public
broadcasters are multiple. Law No. 79-66
of December 31st 1979 introduced the
licence fee in order to provide funding
for public radio and television: citizens
have charges added to their gas and
electricity bills (the amount is calculated
according to their consumption of
electricity). Article 5 of Law No. 2007-33
enumerates the various other sources
of revenue for the public audiovisual
sector, ie government budget allocations,
advertising, loans, donations and subsidies.
It is estimated that the budget for 2014
exceeded 53 million Tunisian dinars.239
Equally important was the introduction
of the three new media-related decrees
that, despite a number of shortcomings,
consecrate freedom of access to
information, freedom of expression
in the print media, and the roles and
responsibilities of HAICA as the highest
independent public body responsible for
regulating the broadcasting sector and
guaranteeing pluralism. HAICA, whose
delayed formation is a testament to the
difficulty of reaching a national consensus
around its new role and responsibilities
in a country still sharply divided between
secularists and Islamists, soon developed
he interim government had already licensed 12 private radio stations and five private TV channels. There are an estimated 20 private radio and TV channels currently
T
operating without a licence. See “Harb ashad al mu’assassat…” (“The war by media owners on the higher regulatory authority for broadcasting reveals… electoral
intentions”), by Nadia Haddaoui. Posted on April 4th 2014 at: http://goo.gl/xLrLWW
237
238
239
Approximately $31 million.
240
See “Un état des lieux de la télévision publique Tunisienne”, by Benoit Moulin and Auberi Edler, op. cit.
241
Tunisia profile. BBC News. Posted on July 10th 2013 at: www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14107557. The survey was conducted by Northwestern University in Qatar
and Harris Interactive, a globally oriented research firm. For more details, see: www.tunisia-live.net/2013/06/20/tunisians-find-facebook-number-one-source-of-news-saysnew-stud/.
236
43
books of specifications for the licensing
and operation of private and community
broadcasters, in fulfilment of its mandate
as per Decree No. 2011-116 of
November 2nd 2011.
All these legal developments seem
to indicate that the Tunisian media
revolution is at full throttle, especially
with respect to media freedom
and regulation. However, recent
developments regarding the
implementation of media-related decrees
(especially Decree No. 2011-116) have
shown that the reform process may still
have to undergo its ultimate test: that
of implementing the newly introduced
laws. HAICA is currently facing a crisis
of legitimacy. On one hand, private TV
outlets are being very vocal in their
rejection of HAICA’s rules regarding the
licensing of private operators, and they
seem to be supported by journalists
and editors, who do not want to have
their newly found freedom of expression
(and ability to express their political bias)
constricted in any way.242 On the other
hand, the Ennahda-led government firmly
ignored the role of HAICA with respect
to nominations for top positions in the
public broadcasting sector, forcing HAICA
to sue the government in the courts.243
The legacy of the past seems to weigh
heavily on a young body tasked with a
formidable challenge: that of regulating for
and ensuring fair coverage and pluralism
in national elections, which will determine
the future of the country and the extent
of its democratic transition.
POSTSCRIPT
In the October 2014 parliamentary
elections, Nidaa Tounes, an alliance of
secularists, leftists, liberals and officials
from the Ben Ali era running on an
explicitly anti-Islamist platform, won
a majority of the vote and 86 seats.
Ennahda came second with 69 seats,
20 less than in 2011.
Nidaa Tounes is led by Beji Caid
Essebsi, an 87-year-old veteran
politician who previously served
as foreign minister under Habib
Bourguiba and parliamentary speaker
under Ben Ali.
Caid Essebsi won December’s
presidential elections in a second
round with 55 percent of the vote.
As some commentators have noted,
the post-revolutionary ‘new-found
freedom was taken too far’, with
people defamed and attacked in live
television debates without being
given the right of reply.
See “Harb ashad al mu’assassat…”, by Nadia Haddaoui, op. cit., for details of the campaign led by private broadcaster Nassma TV to discredit the newly introduced books
of specifications for private channels.
243 “Tunisia Media Chief Promotes Transparency”, by Yasm Najjar. Posted on February 7th 2014 at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201402101454.html?viewall=1.
242
44
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