The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience

Transcription

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE
DISSERTATION
submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in Political Science
by
Nathan Patrick Jones
Dissertation Committee:
Professor Caesar D. Sereseres, Co-Chair
Professor Etel Solingen, Co-Chair
Professor Louis Desipio
Professor Kamal Sadiq
2011
UMI Number: 3490128
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI 3490128
Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 - 1346
Copyright 2011 Nathan Patrick Jones
DEDICATION
To
My Mother and Father
Without your support this would not have been possible.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Figures
Page
v
List of Tables
vi
Acknowledgements
vii
Curriculum Vitae
ix
Abstract of Dissertation
xxvi
Chapter 1: Introduction
1
Chapter 2: Literature Review:
Three Levels of Illicit Network Analysis:
Internal, Domestic and Global
31
Chapter 3: Illicit Network Resilience: A Theory
73
Chapter 4: Methodology
99
Chapter 5: The Resilience of the Arellano-Félix Organization
117
Chapter 6: The US-Mexico Reaction to the Arellano Felix Organization
151
Chapter 7: Conclusion: A General Argument of Illicit Network Resilience
176
Bibliography
191
Appendix A: Organization Chart - Mexican Drug Trafficking 1980‟s (Cooperative and
Centralized Under El Padrino)
234
Appendix B: AFO Structure Post 1991(Simplified)
235
Appendix C: Organizational Chart AFO 1991-1995
236
Appendix D: Organizational Chart AFO 1995-1997
237
Appendix E: Organizational Chart AFO 1997-2002
238
Appendix F
239
Organizational Chart AFO 2002-2006
iii
Appendix G: Organization Chart AFO 2006-2008
240
Appendix H: Organization Chart Teo Faction 2008-January 2010
241
Appendix I: Fernando Sanchez Arellano Organization (FSO) April 2008-January 2010
242
Appendix J: AFO Reward Poster
243
Appendix K: AFO Reward Poster 2000‟s
244
Appendix L: Study Information Sheet
245
Appendix M: Interview Questionnaire
249
Appendix N: Interview Subject Chart
254
Appendix O: List of Acronyms and Glossary of Important Terms
247
Appendix P: Timeline of Major events in AFO History
257
Appendix Q: Large Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization by Business Model and
Author‟s Present Perceived Strength Based on Media and Expert Accounts 2011
265
Appendix R: Cartel Arrest Data adapted from NPR examination of arrests
265
Appendix S: Cartel Bribe Data adapted from NPR analysis
267
Appendix T: The Extended State Reaction Model of
Profit-Seeking Illicit Network Resilience
268
iv
List of Figures
Page
Figure 1. Types of Illicit Networks
11
Figure 2. The State Reaction and Illicit Network Resilience
28
Figure 3. Chain, Wheel and All-Channel Networks
42
Figure 4. UNODC Pilot Study 2002 - Organizational Structure Models
45
Figure 5. Capillary and Double-Funnel Trafficking Models
65
Figure 6. Combining the Double-Funnel Model and the Wheel Network
67
Figure 7. Combining the Double-Funnel Model and the Chain Network
69
Figure 1. Types of Illicit Networks
77
Figure 8. The Relationship between Hierarchy and Business Model in Illicit Networks
81
Figure 9. Resilience Typology
86
Figure 2. The State Reaction and Illicit Network Resilience
90
Figure 10. Organization Chart - Mexican Drug Trafficking 1980‟s
123
Figure 11. AFO Structure Post-1991 (Simplified
130
Figure 12. Kidnappings in Tijuana 2006-September 2011
144
Figure 13. Kidnappings, Homicides and Extortions in Tijuana 2006-September 2011
168
Figure 14. Tijuana Homicides 2006-September 2011
169
v
List of Tables
Table 1. Territorial Versus Transactional: Business Strategy in 26 Areas
83
Table 2. Timeline of Major events in AFO History
118
vi
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my advisors Caesar D. Sereseres and Etel Solingen for feedback,
advice, and counseling through the long process of finishing a dissertation. The advice of
advisors, both academic and personal, has proven critical to its completion. I cannot thank you
both enough. I would like to thank my dissertation committee member Professor Louis Desipio
for providing excellent feedback and being willing to jump on the committee to help us all in
times of need. I would like to thank dissertation committee member Professor Kamal Sadiq for
his enthusiasm, sage advice, and spearheading of all that is “Illicit Flows.”
I am forever indebted to the men and women of law enforcement who dedicated their
lives to the pursuit of justice and willingly made time for a young academic without reputation.
Thank you for your time, advice, thoughts, expertise and giving me my start. I would like to
reserve special thanks to my good friend Steve Duncan whose willingness to meet and discuss
the dissertation was invaluable.
I would like to thank the following people and institutions for their intellectual, financial
and personal support:
To my wife Sofia for her love, support and tolerating my long work hours and late nights.
The Department of Political Science at UC Irvine for providing me time, funding and a
well rounded intellectual foundation. Teaching my way through graduate school was one of the
most intellectually rewarding experiences of my life.
The Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) for providing me the
fellowship that made fieldwork in Tijuana and Mexico City possible.
vii
The Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) at UC Irvine for providing
me a forum to receive feedback on my work and funding preliminary interview trips to Mexico
and Washington, D.C.
Colonel Cope of the National Defense University for allowing me to intern and soak up
his wisdom both personally and substantively.
David Shirk and Viridiana Rios of the Transborder Institute for their advice feedback and
encouragement.
The InsightCrime.org team for helping me to write better and publish regularly on crime
and security in Mexico.
Colegio De La Frontera Norte, Tijuana (COLEF) for providing me an intellectually
vibrant place to base my fieldwork and write.
Special thanks to Professor Rosio Barrajas for that most amazing of all gifts; my own
office.
I would like to thank Professor Jose Maria Ramos (my COLEF advisor) for taking me
under his wing and letting me bounce ideas off of him for hours on end.
Any errors are my own.
viii
Curriculum Vitae
Nathan P. Jones
[email protected]
Education:
UC Irvine 2004-2011

PhD in the Political Science focusing on international relations and security issues related
to Latin America.

Dissertation Title: The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience.
A historical case study of the illicit network structure and resiliency of the drug
trafficking organization commonly referred to as the Tijuana cartel.

PhD to be awarded Fall 2011.

Masters Political Science Fall 2008

Cumulative GPA: 3.908
Colegio de La Frontera Norte, Tijuana (COLEF) 2011

Attended COLEF while doing fieldwork in Tijuana. January -June 2011.
UC Berkeley 1999-2003

Cumulative GPA: 3.47

Major GPA: 3.85

Bachelors Political Science (High Honors)

Honors Thesis on Regime Stability in Syria
ix
Publications:

“Applying Lessons From Colombia to Mexico” Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars:
Mexico Institute. Al Dia. December 2, 2010.

http://mexicoinstitute.wordpress.com/2010/12/03/applying-lessons-from-colombia-tomexico/

“Goat-Horns, Blackbirds and Copkillers: The Flow of Guns from the United States into
Mexico.” November 22, 2010. Appendix of the Center For Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) policy proposal report on US-Mexico Counternarcotics Efforts organized
by Sidney Weintraub and Duncan Wood.
http://csis.org/files/publication/101108_Weintraub_MexicanUSAntinarc_web.pdf

“InSight: Report Tracks How Intra-Cartel Wars Exploded in Mexico.” Wednesday,
February 09, 2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/548-insight-reporttracks-how-intra-cartel-wars-exploded-in-mexico

“Kidnapping in Tijuana: The New Normal.” Insightcrime.org. May 31, 2011.
http://insightcrime.org/investigations/insight-exclusives/item/1002-kidnapping-in-tijuanathe-new-normal

Arrest of Tijuana Ex-Mayor: Putting Crime in the 'Freezer'? June 5, 2011.
http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1033-arrest-of-tijuana-ex-mayorputting-crime-in-the-freezer

Key Lieutenant's Testimony Could Bring Tijuana Drug Lord to Justice Monday, July 11,
2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1213-key-lieutenants-testimonycould-bring-tijuana-drug-lord-to-justice
x

Cartel Lieutenant‟s Capture Could Bring Tijuana a Step Closer to War. Monday, 18 July
2011. http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1248-cartellieutenant%E2%80%99s-capture-could-bring-tijuana-a-step-closer-to-war

Measuring Reforms to Mexico's Broken Justice System. June 28, 2011.
http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1148-measuring-reforms-to-mexicosbroken-justice-system

Why Extraditing Mexico Traffickers Could Strengthen US Gangs. August 18, 2011.
http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1431-why-extraditing-mexico-drugtraffickers-could-strengthen-us-gangs

Why the US Doesn‟t Have Mexico-Style Drug Cartels… Yet. August 16, 2011.
http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1414-why-the-us-doesnt-havemexico-style-drug-cartels-yet

Review of Sylvia Longmire‟s Cartel: The Coming Invasion of Mexico‟s Drug Wars.
September 30, 2011. InsightCrime.org. http://www.insightcrime.org/insight-latestnews/item/1647-cartel-the-coming-invasion-of-mexico%E2%80%99s-drug-wars
xi
Upcoming Publications

Defense Intelligence Agency (National Defense Intelligence College) project on bilateral
security issues in Mexico.
The Four Phases of the Arellano-Félix Organization.
Presented in Guadalajara Mexico at Universidad de Guadalajara February 18-21, 2010.

"Ejércitos de usuarios y el uso del secuestro por los carteles de las drogas:
Consecuencias no intencionales de las estrategias de los barones de las drogas." (An
Army of Users and the Use of Kidnapping by Drug Cartels:
The Unintended
Consequences of King-pin Strategies.) Nathan Jones. Colegio de la Frontera Norte de
Tijuana. June 29, 2011.

Book Chapter edited by Katherine Tate UC Irvine, “„California Dreaming‟: Explaining
Mexico‟s Quixotic Foreign Policy on California‟s Proposition 19.”
xii
Media Appearances:

Interviewed KPBS Radio Frontera Desk on the Impact of the Arrest of “Hank” Rhon
former Mayor of Tijuana on Firearms Charges.
http://www.kpbs.org/news/2011/jun/07/former-tijuana-mayor-suspected-illegal-firearmspo/

Interviewed on the impact of the arrest of “El Ruedas,” KPBS Evening Edition,
November 9, 2011.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PL2BEE055A0FBFA666&feature=player_embedde
d&v=5uLIds1_MXs
xiii
Graduate Course Work:

US-Latin-American Security Relations
Professor Sereseres
Fall 2004

Foundations of Modern Political Theory
Professor Easton
Fall 2004

International Relations Theory
Professor Morgan
Winter 2005

Micro-Politics
Professor Rosenberg
Winter 2005

Macro-Politics
Professor Solingen
Spring 2005

International Relations Theory of East Asia Professor Uriu
Spring 2005

Approaches to International Relations
Professor Uriu
Fall 2005

Religion in International Politics
Professor Lynch
Fall 2005

History of Political Thought
Professor Olson
Winter 2006

Regime Change East Asia
Professor Solinger
Spring 2006

Game Theory of International Relations
Professor McGann
Fall 2006

International Security
Professor Sereseres
Fall 2006

Rethinking Otherness
Professor Brunstetter
Winter 2007

Counterinsurgency
Professor Sereseres
Spring 2007

Qualitative Interpretive Methods
Professor Lynch
Spring 2007

Illicit Flows
Professor Sadiq
Winter 2008

Homeland Security
Professor Sereseres
Fall 2008

ICPSR Graduate Statistics program University of Michigan Summer 2005

Regression 1 and Game Theory taught by Dean Lacy of Ohio State University.

Audited the Graduate Seminar the Just War with Professor Daniel Brunstetter.
xiv
Study Abroad/Language Skills

Lived in Cuernavaca Mexico for approximately 3 months in the summer of 2007 and
took six weeks of intensive immersion language courses at Universidad Internacional
(UNINTER) (3 years of study equivalent). Proficient in written and spoken Spanish.

Attended Colegio de La Frontera Norte in Tijuana a graduate University Specializing in
the Northern border of Mexico 2010-2011 academic year. Fieldwork conducted in
Spanish.
Intern Experience

Research Intern (Fall 2007)

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)

National Defense University (NDU) Fort McNair

Duties included translations from Spanish to English of government documents and other
materials. Kept abreast of world and Latin American news relevant to American security
policy. Assisted in the organization of a conference on the security of the United States
Southern approach, including Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America. Provided
succinct summaries and analyses of conferences, seminars and workshops.
xv
Relevant TA Experience:

Teaching Assistant US Civil Liberties 171A Professor Buzan Fall 2004
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.54 out of 7

Teaching Assistant US Supreme Court 174CW Professor Petracca Winter 2005
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.0 out of 7

Teaching Assistant Anthropology 2D Linguistics and Culture Professor Boellstorf Spring
2005 General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 5.8 of 7

Teaching Assistant Intro to Law 71A Professor Buzan Fall 2005
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.13 of 7

Teaching Assistant US Coercive Diplomacy 142G Professor Sereseres Winter 2006

Teaching Assistant Latin American Revolutions Professor Duncan Spring 2006

Teaching Assistant US Intervention in Latin America Professor Duncan Winter 2007.

Teaching Assistant Latin American Revolutions Professor Duncan Spring 2007
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: NA

Teaching Assistant Race in Latin America Professor Duncan Spring 2007
General Teaching Effectiveness Score: NA
xvi

UCDC Grad Fellow in Washington, D.C., TAing courses in Monuments and Memorials
and a Washington DC Seminar for UCDC students doing internships.


Teaching Assistant Political Theory Professor Kevin Olson Spring 2008 General
Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.11 of 7

Legal Implications of the Drug Trade Federal Judge David Carter Fall 2008


Legal Implications of the Drug Trade: Federal Judge Carter Spring 2009 General
Teaching Effectiveness Score: 6.01 of 7

General Teaching Effectiveness Score: Not yet available

Teaching Assistant Multicultural Education 124 Lecturer Laurie Hansen Spring 2010
xvii
Lecturing Experience

Lecturer for International Studies 12/Political Science 44A Global Issues and Institutions
Summer Session II at UC Irvine. Lectured a lower division survey course on topics such
as intergovernmental organizations like the UN, NGO‟s, insurgency, counterinsurgency,
terrorism, failed states, migration, transnational criminal organizations, politicaleconomy, and the history of the international state-system.

Lecturer Introduction to International Relations Theory at UCI Summer session II 2010.

Guest Lecture on Mexican and Colombian Drug Trafficking for Federal Judge David
Carter‟s Legal Implications of the Drug Trade UC Irvine Fall 2009 and 2010

Guest Lecture on Preemptive vs. Preventive War for Professor Daniel Brunstetter‟s Just
War Revisited Course 2008.

Introduction to International Relations Theory. University of San Diego Fall 2011.
xviii
Awards:

Letter of congratulations from the Dean of Social Sciences on Top 10 ranking for all
social science TAs (March, 2005).

Excellence in Teaching Award from the Department of Political Science for Winter 2006
US Coercive Diplomacy.

Global Connect Award 2008 for Graduate Student Presentation on What Is Terrorism?

Global Connect Award 2009 for Graduate student Presentation on Counterinsurgency and
Failed States.

Dissertation Fellow Department of Political Science UC Irvine Fall 2009

Excellence in Teaching Award from the Department of Political Science for Winter 2010
US Coercive Diplomacy.

Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) Award 2010

Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) Fellow 2010-11 – Provided one
year of funding for field work and dissertation completion to be carried out in Mexico.
Currently in Mexico City researching for dissertation.

Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies (CGPACS) Research Award Recipient and
Affiliate 2010.

James Danziger Award for Teaching Excellence 2011 UC Irvine Political Science.
xix
Conference Presentations:

International Studies Association March 2006 Just War, Pacifism and the Holy See a
panel presentation.

International Studies Association February/March 2007 The Decision to Invade and the
Iraqi Insurgency as a Market Entry/Exit Game

ISA West San Francisco 2008-- Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the
Westphalian State Against Criminal Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico

ISA National New York 2009 -- Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the
Westphalian State Against Criminal Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico

The Four Phases of the Arellano-Felix Organization. Presented in Guadalajara Mexico
at Universidad de Guadalajara February 18-21, 2010. National Defense Intelligence
College (Defense Intelligence Agency).

The Four Phases of the Arellano-Felix Organization. Presented in Washington, DC.
May 25, 2010. National Defense Intelligence College (Defense Intelligence Agency).
xx

Territorial Cartels and the Reaction of the State: The Arellano Felix Organization in
Mexico.
Panel Discussant The War on Terror and Counterinsurgency Issues.
International Studies Association-West -- Los Angeles. September 25-26, 2010.

Panel Chair ISA West 2010 – Los Angeles. Panel on Counterinsurgency.

The State and Illicit Network Structures. Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation
Southern California Symposium. UC Irvine campus. January 14, 2011.

Illicit Network Business Models. Kidnapping and the Tijuana Cartel. Center for Global
Peace and Conflict Studies. UC Irvine Campus. April 2011.

“La reacción del Estado mexicano frente al crimen organizado: una teoría de la
elasticidad” Colegio de la Frontera Norte de Tijuana. June 16, 2011. Presentation in
Spanish.

The Unintended
Consequences of King-pin Strategies.) Nathan Jones. Colegio de la frontera Norte de
Tijuana. June 29, 2011.
xxi

Consequences of King-pin Strategies.) Nathan Jones.
The Unintended
Universidad Autónoma Baja
California, Mexicali. October 27-28, 2011 en la Segundo Foro Binacional: El Impacto
Social de la Inseguridad Publica en la Frontera México-Estados Unidos.

Armies of Users and the Unintended Consequences of King-Pin Strategies in the Fight
against Drug Trafficking Organizations.
Pacific Coast Latin American Studies
Association Conference. October 29, 2011.

Three Levels of Illicit Network Analysis: A Literature Review. International Studies
Association West 2011, Pasadena 2011.
xxii
Upcoming Conference Presentations

Tijuana’s Counterinsurgency Strategy and Organized Crime. (2008-2010).
Latin
American Studies Association 2012.

Fearing the State: Why Illicit Networks Flatten and Reduce Violence

International Studies Association 2012 San Diego.
Discussant:

Spring 2009 -- UC Irvine Research in International Global Studies (RIGS) Discussant for
Presentation of Book Chapter “Leveraging Host Governments in War: Lessons from
Vietnam and Iraq” by James H. Lebovic
Conference Attendance

Attended two conferences at Colegio De La Frontera Norte in Tijuana (COLEF) with
Associate Dean Caesar Sereseres. Both conferences were on Mexican Border Security
Issues and the Merida Initiative 2008-2009.

Attended Global Public Policy Forum on War On Drugs at University of Texas El Paso
(UTEP) and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico September 21-22, 2009.

Attended CASEDE Conference in Mexico City on Organized Crime October 2010.

Attended Stanford-ITAM Conference on Governance in Mexico November 2010.
xxiii
Course Papers and Qualifying Papers:

An Elitist Critique of Laski‟s Pluralism

What Oil and the Military Mean for Democracy in Chavez‟s Venezuela

Just War, Pacifism and the Holy See (Qualifier)

The Role of Alliance in the Democratization of East Asia

Assessing the Permeation of American Political Ideology on the American Catholic
Church‟s Foreign Policy

Augustine or Kant? Assessing the US and German Responses to Terrorism

The Catholic Church 411-1648 and the International Relations Paradigms

Assessing the Process of “Othering” in Augustinian Just War Tradition

The Origins of Civil War in Iraq

Religious Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons in International Relations Theory (Qualifier)

Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the Westphalian State Against Criminal
Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico (Qualifier)
xxiv
Academic Service:

Headed the International Relations Group 2006-2007. The IR group is comprised of
graduate students with an IR focus. This group helps to build graduate studentfaculty relations and allows IR grad students to network and practice conference
presentations. We also put on our own conference annually.

Assisted the undergraduate UC Irvine Model United Nations team put on their annual
high school conference. (2005-6)

Global Connect 2008-9 Graduate Student Presenter – What is Terrorism? ; What is
Counterinsurgency? And Failed States. Global Connect is a high school outreach
program run by UCI undergraduates, which develops curriculums to improve upon
local schools‟ ability to educate global citizens. Graduate students provide
specialized presentations.

Interim-Administrator Global Connect Winter 2010 – Duties include: Addressing
personnel issues, making presentations, running weekly meetings, interfacing with
local high school teachers and administrators on Global connect curriculum, etc.
xxv
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
By
Nathan Patrick Jones
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Irvine, 2011
Professor Caesar D. Sereseres, Co-Chair
Professor Etel Solingen, Co-Chair
This dissertation elucidates the relationship between a profit-seeking illicit network‟s
(PSIN‟s) business strategy and resilience. The dissertation finds that territorial PSIN business
strategies challenge “the territorially sovereign state” through activities like kidnapping and
extortion. The intensity of the state reaction to the illicit network was the single most important
factor in its ability to survive disruptive events. The state, in this case Mexico, reacted more
intensely to territorial PSIN‟s in collaboration with civil society, other states and rival
“transactional” PSIN‟s. In this case the state (Mexico) dissolved a territorial PSIN, suggesting
that the state is capable of effectively confronting this illicit network type. On the other hand,
the case finds that the state was corrupted by transactional PSINs whose business strategies made
them resilient. This finding suggests that through corruption, transactional PSINs will pose a
long-term threat to democratic institutionalization in Mexico and internationally anywhere that
states must address these illicit networks.
xxvi
The dissertation is an in-depth historical case study of the Tijuana Cartel, also known as
the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO). Through archival research and interviews with experts
on the illicit network a case study was constructed. Experts interviewed for the dissertation
during nine months of fieldwork in Mexico City and Tijuana, included:
journalists, law
enforcement, scholars, extortion victims and businessmen. Given the similar structures of illicit
networks, the findings of this dissertation have important implications for understanding other
drug trafficking organizations, prison gangs, terrorists, insurgencies, arms traffickers, among a
host of other potential “dark network” actors.
xxvii
Chapter 1
Introduction
States and territorial profit-seeking illicit networks (PSINs) are enemies, because they are
so much alike. They are both: territorial, hierarchical, resilient, prone to violence and funded by
taxation.1 Territorial PSINs threaten the state’s underlying raison d’être, the ability to govern
through the taxation of territory.2 The “predatory” “alternative governance structure” these
territorial profit-seeking illicit networks establish through extortion and kidnap activities, directly
challenge states by illicitly taxing the local population and exercising violence within state
territory.3
Territorial profit-seeking illicit networks thus become the primary targets for
“territorially sovereign states.”4
1
The conception of the state is heavily influenced by the work of Charles Tilly which views the state as a form of
organized crime providing security in exchange for taxation; albeit in a more professionalized fashion than
organized crime. Tilly 1990; Tilly 1985; Tilly 1986; Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993; Skaperdas
1992.
2
The term profit-seeking illicit network (PSIN) is utilized here because this work situates itself within the literature
on illicit networks and illicit flows. To the best of my knowledge this is the first formal use of the term, though
“profit-seeking” and “illicit network” have clearly been used by other authors like Michael Kenney and formal
government reports on organized crime. The qualitative sociological network literature provides useful concepts
that can explain the capability of these criminal actors to create “networks of complicity” within the state apparatus
(Sadiq 2009). The term “ illicit network” also connotes the transnational character of the project because the term is
not constrained by the “state-centric discourse, e.g. “non-state actors.” The term “illicit network” is superior to
“drug cartel” because these networks have not proven capable of controlling the supply and price of a given
commodity.
For excellent discussions of the misuse of the term “cartel”
See: Lacey 2009; Cook 2007; Sadiq 2009; Schendel and Abraham 2005.
More in-depth discussions of the terms transactional versus territorial PSINs will be provided in chapter three on my
state reaction argument.
3
Other terms often used to describe profit-seeking illicit networks include: terrorist organizations and transnational
criminal organizations (TCO’s), clandestine transnational actors (CTA’s), drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s),
illicit networks, “dark networks,” and organized criminal groups (OCG’s). The term is superior to drug trafficking
organization because these networks are not limited to trafficking illicit narcotics, nor is this always their primary
source of profit in some cases.
Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, chap. Introduction; Andreas 2001; Andreas 2003; Olson and Salazar 2011; Williams
1995; Sullivan 2008; Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005; 2010l; Milward 2003.
4
Spruyt 1994.
1
“Transactional” profit-seeking illicit networks, which focus their illicit activities on the
trafficking of narcotics, money laundering, front businesses, or other non-extortionist activities,
become secondary targets for states and are more capable of forming alliances with states
through corruptive collusion. Due to the violent reaction of states (prompted by civil society)
against territorial PSINs, they tend to be less resilient than their “transactional” counterparts.5
The surviving transactional PSINs form state alliances against their rivals through corruption,
thus institutionalizing state-PSIN cooperation that hinders long term democratic consolidation.
The threat they pose to states is more subtle and insidious than that posed by territorial or
insurgent illicit networks that seek to supplant the state, or weaken it in crucial territories through
brute force. Transactional PSINs constrain and pervert democratic consolidation, economic
development and the rule of law.
The distinction between “transactional” and “territorial” was initially published in an
Economist article quoting an unknown Mexican government official. My contribution has been
to develop this brief characterization into a typology, and relate it to the dependent variable of
resilience.6
While the answer (summarized above) was complex, it began with a simple question.
What makes illicit networks resilient? As the research continued, the answer to that question
was found largely in the answer to another. Why do states attack some illicit networks more
aggressively than others?
5
For the first mention of the distinction between territorial and transactional see the Economist’s “Outsmarted by
Sinaloa.” Chapter three provides a typology of insurgent, transactional and territorial illicit networks the latter two
of which are primarily profit-seeking. Explaining why states attack insurgent networks is obvious. They are
political entities seeking to overthrow the state and supplant it. Explaining why states attack some profit-seeking
illicit networks and not others is thus far more interesting and important.
2010j.
6
Ibid.
2
These questions have important implications for international relations and globalization
debates on the future of the sovereign state system under conditions of globalization. Many have
argued that the state is “withering” or “losing control” in the face of globalization and expanded
markets.7 Part of this debate is the affect of what Peter Andreas calls “illicit globalization.”8
Scholars like Phil Williams, Arquilla and Ronfeldt and Moíses Naím have warned of the coming
threat of illicit “netwar” or illicit networked actors that “nimbly” “outmaneuver” the state.9
Andreas has countered that the threat illicit networks pose has been “overblown” and that states
strengthen themselves through the very fight with illicit networks.10 This dissertation contributes
to this debate by elucidating which profit-seeking illicit networks trigger a violent state reaction,
which illicit networks are likely to survive and how the symbiotic relationships that allow them to
survive are likely to affect the character of states under conditions of globalization.
Illicit Economies
The exponential expansion of licit markets in the 20th century has been well documented,
but lesser studied are the important illicit economies that thrive in their shadow.
Illicit
economies exist in “ungoverned spaces” but also exist in what we would consider well-governed
“spaces,” e.g. narcotics sales in cities with low crime in Western Europe and copyright-piracy
resulting in billions of dollars of losses in the United States.11 Vanda Felbab-Brown utilizes the
term “illicit economy” in lieu of “black markets” because the term better encapsulates the nature
of the “scope and extent of many illicit economies.”12 It is in illicit economies that illicit
7
Strange 1997; Strange 2000; Strange 1996, 49:; Strange 1999; Kenney 2007b; Arquilla et al. 1997, chap. see
chapter by Phil Williams; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, chap. Especially Phil Williams; Andreas 2011, 2.
8
Andreas 2011.
9
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Garzón 2008; Kenney 2007b; Naím 2005; Schendel and Abraham 2005; Chestnut
2007.
10
Andreas 2001.
11
Siwek 2007; 2011b.
12
Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, 176.
3
networks emerge or adapt to exploit, profit and further political aims. The illicit drug market is
one of the major sources of profits for PSINs. Moíses Naím uses the term “arbitrage,” to explain
how illicit networks exploit price differentials created by state regulations within states and
across international borders on licit goods like cigarettes. The very fact that the state makes a
commodity illegal reduces supply and ceteris paribus increases the price and incentive to traffic,
produce and distribute the commodity. For example, through state copyright legislation, the state
creates incentives for an illicit market which takes advantage of the “brand” name of a
commodity by “pirating” or reproducing without permission.
Conversely the state retains
significant power and legitimacy via the ability to delegitimize commodities and trades; a source
of power that should not be underestimated, as Andreas argues.13
Profit-seeking illicit networks can also provide services where the state fails. In Japan
organized crime fills the void left by a dearth of lawyers and expensive court fees. Thus,
Japanese organized crime is comprised of a varied and diverse set of groups (not a single
monopolizing group) coexisting in equilibrium based on social norms. It provides a “privateordering” where state “regulatory design” is insufficient or more costly than the “private”
alternatives.14 In this fashion organized crime in Japan fills needed social roles and is widely
accepted. This is very different from the Mexican context where organized crime dominates
drug trafficking and important transit areas are monopolized and controlled by individual illicit
networks.
There is some anecdotal and interview based evidence of diversification into
“contract” enforcement in Mexico where legitimate businesses are “assisted” in very real ways in
exchange for payment of “piso,” similar to organized crime behavior in the Japanese case.15
13
Ibid., Chapter by Vanda Felbab–Brown; Andreas 2011.
Milhaupt and West 2000.
15
2011a.
14
4
To give an idea of the relative size of illicit economies in this case, the profits of drugs
transported to the United States by Mexican trafficking organizations is estimated by US
government reports as ranging between 18 and 39 billion dollars in profits annually. It is
estimated that 90% of US cocaine enters through Mexico. Further it is estimated that 100% of
methamphetamine imported into the United States is manufactured in Mexico.16 Mexico is also a
major source of US black-tar heroin.
It cannot be forgotten that the US provides the
consumption market and demand for drugs trafficked from and through Mexico.17 The United
States is also the source of 90% of the guns recovered in crimes in Mexico.18 Narcotics are the
most profitable of illicit-seeking commodities to traffic and thus the study of profit-seeking illicit
networks which specialize in trafficking provides a strong case for understanding the potential
power of illicit networks.19
Potential State Responses to Illicit Economies
There are three choices broad choices facing democratic states addressing profit-seeking
illicit networks.
States can legalize, medicalize or decriminalize illicit commodities that
empower profit-seeking illicit networks. These “legalizations” must be complete and include the
production of the commodity to be effective in eliminating the trade as a profit-source for illicit
networks. The state and society must also be willing to bear the burden of social costs associated
with ending “prohibition” regimes, including increased addiction and health costs.20
The second choice for states is to engage in “drug wars” or prohibitionist policies, which
“reify” the notion of the state by strengthening borders, increasing spending on state security
16
Whitworth 2008.
Ramos 2011.
18
Jones 2010b.
19
Schendel and Abraham 2005, chap. Gootenberg.
20
Medicalization refers to treating drug violations as a public health problem requiring medical treatment rather than
a criminal problem.
Gray 2001.
17
5
forces and socially constructing foreigners as “aliens” or “others.” Success in prohibitionist
policies can only be achieved at great expense through the increased funding of interdiction
efforts led by military and law enforcement institutions.21 This has been the response of most
states including the United States Mexico under the Calderon Administration.
Finally, some states choose to “collude” with PSINs.22 Collusion between state actors
and traffickers does not generally represent unified state policy. The state cannot be viewed
“monolithically” especially with regard to relations with profit-seeking illicit networks.23 As
Chapter three discusses, transactional PSINs are capable of corrupting at higher levels of
government, e.g. state and federal agencies and politicians, while territorial PSINs tend to
develop stronger relationships with local authorities with whom they have more contact.
The Threat of Illicit Networks to States
The threat illicit networks pose to states in an “era of globalization” has become a
dominant narrative among academics and policy-makers addressing illicit networks. Kahler and
Walter define globalization in terms of “increased economic interdependence” between states.
Illicit networks have increased in relative power vis-à-vis states in the “era of globalization” by
taking advantage of privately available technologies and blurring the lines between traditional
insurgency and criminality.24
“Illicit flows” hitch-hike on the increased licit trade between
states and as licit trade expands, so do the profits illicit of networks. While organized crime is as
old as humanity, the rapid improvements in communications technologies, increases in
international trade, spread of democracy and availability of cheap technologies, have allowed
21
Andreas 2001.
Sabet.
23
Solingen 2007; Solingen 1998.
24
Arquilla et al. 1997, chap. Phil Williams; Kaldor 1999.
22
6
profit-seeking illicit networks to increase profits and power vis-à-vis states in the international
system.25
Many like Kaldor have pointed to the post Cold War era as a starting point for the current
“era of globalization” while others like Keohane and Nye point to the post WWII economic
order. Williams provides an excellent discussion of the increased levels of trade in the 20th
century.26 Andreas goes back further still to the mercantilist period where states attempted to
assert economic controls and created the “illicit.”27 There is a “prevailing pessimism” in the
international relations and globalization studies debates about the ability of internally
hierarchical states to address these “flatly” organized “hydra-headed” illicit networks.28
Michael Kenney has pointed to the variables of “flatness” and learning in illicit networks’
“competitive adaptations” with states. Flatness he defines in terms of layers of management
within the network. Kenney paints a picture of “nimble” “adaptive networks” competing with
bulky “hierarchical” law enforcement institutions constrained by the very legal system they seek
to protect. Phil Williams paints a similar picture describing how the “hydra-headed” character of
these networks makes them resilient to state attack. Susan Strange’s work on globalization and
the “retreat of the state” argues in a similar intellectual vein, stating that “transnational criminal
organizations may be the preeminent threat to security.29
Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that network forms of organization and the fluid structures of
these “dark networks” make them more resilient and privilege them in their struggles with
25
Kahler and Walter 2006; Kahler 2009.
Kaldor 1999.
27
Andreas 2011; Keohane and Nye 2001, 3:; Friedman 2007, 1:.
28
Jones 2008a.
29
Strange 1996, 49:; Kenney 2007b; Kenney 2007a; Arquilla et al. 1997; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, chap. Phil
Williams.
26
7
hierarchical and bureaucratically-laden states.30 They point to resilient characteristics like the
compartmentation of illicit networks, decentralization, “hydra-headed” structures that allow
illicit networks to survive attacks from states, among other resilient characteristics.31
Following Eilstrup-Sangiovani and Jones, I posit that the antagonistic and all-powerful
characterization of profit-seeking illicit networks versus unwieldy-bureaucratically-laden states
is an over-simplification of the challenge illicit networks pose.
First, profit-seeking illicit
networks are not always resilient, criminal and insurgent networks are eliminated regularly by
states in an evolutionary fashion. Second, illicit networks can reify the state. They provide an
excuse for states to increase financing of law enforcement and security institutions that defend
the state32. They pose challenges that states find useful points of cooperation amongst each
other, allowing the diffusion of technology and capacity from strong to weak states.
For
example, the United States through the Merida Initiative is providing technology and weaponry
to Mexico for its fight against organized crime. This improves state capacity to fight illicit
networks in weak states. Some illicit networks form alliances with states against their rivals and
even form long-term functioning relationships which assist the state in governance through
financial and political support.33
But, which profit-seeking illicit networks ally with the state? Which choose to confront
the state and how?
These are important unanswered questions in the illicit network and
international relations literatures.
30
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001.
Arquilla et al. 1997; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b.
32
Andreas 2011.
33
Arias 2006b.
31
8
Adding to the fears of profit-seeking illicit networks, government reports have
increasingly referred to the potential nexus between international terrorism and highly profitable
criminal activities like drug trafficking.
The advances of globalization also make us vulnerable in new ways, and they
have given rise to other, destructive networks that undermine security and
development. Taking advantage of innovations in technology, communication
and transportation, loose networks of criminals or insurgents can easily link with
each other, and also with organized criminal groups that operate internationally.
They smuggle illicit drugs, weapons, natural resources, counterfeit goods and
human beings across borders and between continents for the enrichment of
criminals, insurgents and crooked officials. In some cases, they generate
34
economic profits that support terrorist groups as well.
Important examples of insurgent or terrorist networks using illicitly derived profits have
included: opium profits funding the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah illegally
smuggling cigarettes to fund its operations, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia
(FARC) providing “protection” to coca growers in Colombia, splinter Irish Republican Army
(IRA) factions trafficking drugs and arms, among many other combinations of insurgent
networks and criminal activities.35 A 2006 Congressional Research Services report stated,
Terrorist networks are believed to be increasingly supporting themselves
through traditional crime, and have been linked to criminal organizations.
Alliances between the two groups could amplify threats to American security.
Transnational criminals engage in a spectrum of illicit activities, including
narcotics and arms smuggling, trafficking in persons, counterfeiting, and money
36
laundering and other financial crimes.
Terror and criminal groups learn from each other through mass media communication,
purchase training from each other and form alliances to facilitate their operations. In some cases
criminal groups appear to have genuine political motivations while in other cases classical
insurgencies have appeared more criminal in character. The “interplay” between terror and
crime is so pervasive that Tamara Makarenko has argued for a crime-terror continuum to better
34
UNODC 2010.
Curtis and Karacan 2002; Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005; Sullivan 2008; 2010i.
36
Wagley 2006.
35
9
conceptualize it.37
I concur with this assessment, and provide a typology that distinguishes
between two broad types of transnational organized crime groups. I refer to them as profitseeking illicit networks. These types include insurgent networks, “territorial” profit-seeking
illicit networks which focus on extortion-based activities within their territory and
“transactional” profit-seeking illicit networks, which focus on trafficking high-profit
commodities, while minimizing violence. The focus here is on the latter two categories which
are profit-seeking illicit networks.38
37
Makarenko 2004.
Why states attack insurgencies is less interesting question than understanding why and when they attack
predominately profit-seeking illicit networks versus when they feign wrath but allow them to function unhindered.
A more in-depth description of insurgent illicit networks is included in the typology in chapter three.
38
10
Figure 1.
Types of Illicit Networks
Insurgent
Transactional
Territorial
The implications of illicit networks in the globalized international system are of growing
importance to policy-makers and scholars alike. It is estimated that 40% of the Russian economy
is controlled by organized crime.39 Violence in Colombia and Mexico can challenge society’s
perception of the legitimacy of the state and its monopoly on the control of force.40 Corruption
perpetrated by illicit networks also entails high costs to states.41
The affect of illicit networks on the future of the state as the dominant governing unit of
the international system is an important and largely ignored portion of a larger debate on how
globalization is changing the sovereign state system. Saskia Sassen’s work has engaged this
debate by providing us with a new vocabulary. In this sense, those like Sassen address “future of
the state” debates in the context of the debates in international political economy on states versus
markets. Sassen uses the privatization of executive power and the expansion in the number, size
39
Milhaupt and West 2000, 2.
Tilly 1985.
41
The World Bank estimates that the global cost of corruption is 5% of the global economy with over a trillion
dollars in bribes paid each year. Studies have suggested that some countries lose upwards of 20% of their internal
revenues to corruption.
UNODC 2010, 36.
40
11
and power of actors like hedge and sovereign-wealth funds, to illustrate constrained state
sovereignty.42 These actors are by and large licit in their activities. But Sassen’s recent work has
failed to address the role illicit networks provide in weakening and simultaneously “reifying” the
state as those like Sadiq have by highlighting how political factions take advantage of
undocumented immigrant flows and the falsification of identity documents.43
This project
pushes “the states versus market-based illicit network” debates further by typologizing which
profit-seeking illicit networks challenge the state most violently and are least resilient.
At first look, PSINs appear to weaken the state as market-based non-state actors that
avoid taxation and flout legal norms, but in some ways they support the state.44 In fact, as the
case study demonstrates, the more market-based PSINs are, the more they graft themselves to the
state, thus strengthening the state in its conflicts with other PSINs. However, the corruptive
influence of such PSINs constrains and slows democratic consolidation in developing states.
Conversely, territorial PSINs, which are less market-oriented and more violent, reify the state
because the state’s reaction involves the strengthening of the security apparatus. These security
institutions give states the ability to defeat future threats from “alternative governance structures”
and through the fortification of borders and strengthening of anti-illicit network legislation, allow
the state to exert economic and social controls it never hitherto possessed.45
PSINs generally
don’t have the ability to overthrow the state but illicit networks like Los Zetas which are
territorial, may eventually supplant the Mexican state if the state fails to make sufficient
investments in social programs and the judicial system to eliminate its recruiting-base and
42
Sassen 2006; Sadiq 2009; Friman and Andreas 1999; Andreas 2001; Andreas 2003; Bailey and Chabat 2002.
It should be noted that Sassen has done work on human trafficking though does not broach the subject in her more
recent and seminal work on “territory, authority and rights.” Sassen 2006; Sadiq 2009.
44
Andreas 2001; Andreas 2003.
45
Andreas 2011.
43
12
impunity. This is an unlikely scenario, but is worthy of note particularly when considering the
power of some territorial PSINs in relation to small states in Central America.46
Words of Caution
Eilstrup-Sangiovani and Jones and Peter Andreas, argue that the threat of illicit networks
like Al Qaeda may be exaggerated by recent research. Illicit networks suffer from significant
organizational limitations in their competition with hierarchical states. If the advantages of
networks were greater why do we not observe a greater diffusion of the organizational design?47
For Andreas who takes a longue dureé historical view of smuggling, illicit networks are not a
new phenomenon but an old one. He also points out that the study of illicit networks is
inherently difficult, due to their clandestine nature. As a result he argues, the data we rely on
comes primarily from government publications, the very institutions we seek to evaluate.48
These governmental reports come from agencies with their own biases and interests, namely
perpetuating the authoring bureaucracies, and utilize dubious and secretive methodologies that
are often best guesses.49
How States Use Illicit Networks
States have also directed their own profit-seeking illicit networks with varying degrees of
control. Cash-strapped North Korea has engaged in activities related to counterfeiting, drug
cultivation and potentially nuclear weapons proliferation.50 In the early phases these activities
were state-directed, but later were contracted to criminal networks. Pakistan derived its own
nuclear weapons capability through the AQ Khan network which later engaged in the
46
2011d; Richter and Ken 2010; 2010f; Clare Ribando Seelke 2009; Booth and Miroff 2010b.
Friman and Andreas 1999; Andreas 2003; Andreas 2001; Andreas 2011.
48
Sadiq 2009.
49
Andreas 2011; Jones 2008a.
50
Chestnut 2007; Chestnut 2005.
47
13
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology for profit.51 Even illicit immigration and phony
citizenship documents can play important roles for state actors. As Sadiq has demonstrated
political actors encourage “illegal” immigration and legitimize it through “networks of
complicity,” often times for political purposes.52 In Mexico, profit-seeking illicit networks are
said to fund democratic election campaigns of chosen candidates in states like Sinaloa and the
populace widely believes that each president is allied to and funded by one of the various
“cartels.” Some have argued that the profits they launder into the licit financial system play an
important role not just in Mexico but in the United States as well, most notably lubricating the
financial system with hard currency during the 2008 financial crisis.53 As case study illustrates,
the Mexican government accepted intelligence from one faction of the “Tijuana Cartel” to
eliminate another faction that engaged in kidnapping and extortion.54
The international relations and globalization debates on states versus illicit networks have
thus far lacked the specificity of how illicit network actors challenge the state and in what ways
they may reify the state. Some, like Andreas and Friman, have pointed out that illicit networks
can serve as an important excuse for states to “reify” their territorial boundaries and the security
institutions that maintain them. 55 Others like Desmond Arias have pointed to the close symbiotic
relationship between organized crime and politicians in the favelas of Brazil, e.g. organized
crime is allowed to function as long as votes are provided.56 However, lacking in the discussion
is, what characteristics, behaviors and organizational structures of illicit networks trigger strong
state reactions and which are likely to garner cooperation?
51
Corera 2006.
Sadiq 2009.
53
Smith 2010.
54
2011b.
55
Andreas 2001; Andreas 2003; Friman and Andreas 1999.
56
Arias 2006a.
52
14
The empirical reality of the relationship between illicit networks and states is not
uniformly antagonistic. Some illicit networks support the state in some sectors while weakening
it in others. Thus, those like Andreas that caution against exaggerating the threat of illicit
networks are correct in pointing to the complexity of the relationship between states and illicit
networks.57
In the Mexican context, the reaction of the state was a key factor in understanding the
lack of resilience of profit-seeking illicit networks. When profit-seeking illicit networks ran
afoul of their host-states, their demise was often inevitable (only once the state had marshaled
sufficient resources to counter PSINs). However, some profit-seeking illicit networks proved
adept at co-opting the state instead of confronting it. In some ways they counter-intuitively
assisted the state. Whether or not a state chooses to attack an illicit network and the intensity of
that attack, is a critical factor in the network’s survival and thus significantly affects its
resilience. This was not unique to the Mexican case, indeed a similar pattern emerged when
assessing other cases of major profit-seeking illicit networks in states like Colombia,
Afghanistan and Northern Ireland.58
The “dominant narrative,” that illicit networks are “nimbly” defeating states, gave way to
a much more complex picture in which states maintain the advantage and PSINs that allied with
states were more resilient in their conflicts with PSINs that challenged states through violence
and territoriality. This should not surprise us. The “territorially sovereign state” maintains
powerful advantages over illicit networks in the international system, including economic size,
ability to marshal powerful resources through hierarchically organized bureaucracies, the support
57
58
Andreas 2001; Andreas 2003; Friman and Andreas 1999.
Bowden 2001; Felbab-Brown 2009a; Felbab-Brown 2010; Felbab-Brown.
15
of neighboring states against illicit networks, and most importantly, legitimacy.59 But states
suffer from unwieldy bureaucracies that are slow-moving in their “competitive adaptations”
against flatly organized illicit networks.60 There is a vast world illicit economy that is beyond the
watchful eye of state regulation and in this realm nefarious actors both serve the state and
undermine its authority and ability to maintain domestic control over its population. This makes
understanding actors in illicit economies critical to the study of international relations and
globalization.
Illicit Networks and International Relations Theory
The study of illicit networks has come to be considered, “acceptable” and crucial to “the
study of international relations.”61 Illicit networks can range from nuclear weapons smugglers,
drug traffickers, sex traffickers drug cultivators, terrorists, copyright pirates, money launderers,
etc. The list of possible illicit network activities is unending. The key distinction for illicit
networks is that they engage in activities which are considered illegal by states and unacceptable
by societies.62
Much of international relations theory is viewed as arcane and out of step with changing
“governance structures” in an “era of globalization” as scholars like Susan Strange argue. At the
crux of this criticism, is the realist and neoliberal-institutionalist, assumption of the state as a
unitary and primary actor in international relations in an epoch where multinational corporations,
59
Spruyt 1994.
Kenney 2007b.
61
Jones 2008a.
62
Licit means generally accepted by society. Illicit refers to an activity or commodity that is generally rejected by
society. This is to be distinguished from illegal which refers to that which the state has legislated against or legal
which refers to what is considered within the bounds of the law of the state.
Schendel and Abraham 2005.
60
16
sovereign wealth funds, social activist networks, terrorist, insurgent and illicit criminal networks
increasingly challenge and constrain the sovereignty of states.63
Structural realism and neo-liberal-institutionalism are the dominant international relations
paradigms and take states as their fundamental assumptions. They thus possess scant ability to
understand and explain illicit networks that are at their core non-state actors. To be fair to the
classical realism of Morgenthau, he might credibly argue that realism does take into account the
weakening effect of these illicit networks on the national culture.64 To defend structural realism,
Waltz might argue that illicit networks weaken the state’s “power” by sapping state economic
and military resources, but this story is more complex than a uniform weakening of the state.65
Much of the practical work of approaches to the study of international politics like
“constructivism” focus on socially constructed norms and institutions related to the state, e.g.
changing norms and conceptions of “territory, authority, rights.”66 However, these responses
answer few questions about which illicit networks will form pacts with states, thus “reifying”
their authority versus those which will attempt to subvert states through violent confrontation.
None of these paradigms explain the growing importance of illicit networks in international
relations.67 Political survival models are willing to open “the black box” of the state, look inside
and see the nitty-gritty difficulties and politics of illicit networks and state relations that are at
once domestic and transnational. Thus any argument must look inside the state at the interplay
between various illicit networks and states.68
63
Strange 1996, 49:.
Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 6:.
65
Waltz 1979; Waltz 2001; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 6:.
66
Klotz and Lynch 2007; Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003, 1:; Klotz 1995; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006; Wendt
1992; Sassen 1996; Sassen 2006; Sassen 2000.
67
Keohane 2005, 1:; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 6:; Waltz 1979; Waltz 1959; Strange 1996, 49:.
68
Solingen 1994a; Solingen 2007.
64
17
Those studying the impact of globalization have turned toward qualitative sociological
network theories to explain illicit flows across state borders and the licit and illicit actors that
orchestrate them. Those who have turned to this literature have found it “thin,” with a few
scholars making important contributions and a vast amount of work to be done. Sociological
network theory is useful because it focuses on the relationships between actors or nodes in a
network.
Unfortunately applying network theory to the relations between states and illicit
networks has been limited in political science and its subfields of international relations and
comparative politics. In this discipline, the application of network theories and concepts has
been particularly limited in the study of internal criminal network structures that challenge states;
though it has a longer and broader pedigree in criminology.69 Some exceptions to the rule of the
dearth of illicit network literature in political science include Sadiq, Bailey and Godson,
Andreas, Kahler and Elstrup-Sangiovani and Jones. None of these authors have pushed into the
internal structures of illicit networks and provided a typology of networks and characteristics that
help us to understand and predict their relations with states. This project’s contribution is its
assessment of internal profit-seeking illicit network structures and an explanation of how those
structures impact the relationship with the state, which in turn impacts illicit network resilience.70
Illicit Networks Increasing Inter-State Cooperation
One of the surprising effects of illicit networks on the international system is the fact that
in some ways they strengthen states by increasing the incentives for states to cooperate with each
other in scenarios in which structural realism might not otherwise expect them to do so. Robert
Keohane in After Hegemony postulated that there is a larger realm of interstate cooperation than
69
COLES 2001; Chambliss 1989; Arias 2006b; Scott 2000, 2:; Kenney 2007b; Bailey and Chabat 2002; Klerks
2003; Morselli 2009; Sparrow 1991; Arias 2006c; Jones 2008b.
70
Sadiq 2009; Andreas 2003; Kahler 2009; Jones 2008a.
18
realists like Waltz and Morgenthau predict.71 Indeed the battle of states against PSINs has
created another issue-area for interstate cooperation. As the case study demonstrates, states view
PSINs, especially territorial PSINs, as common enemies and assist each other in defeating them.
Simultaneously, they use harsh rhetoric against each other for creating the supply and demand
forces that empower PSINs.
Nonetheless, cooperation becomes institutionalized at the
bureaucratic level, as militaries and law enforcement agencies cooperate against common
enemies over long periods of time.72 Further, states utilize intergovernmental organizations
(IGO’s) like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to build coalitions and
codify norms that assist states in their battle with illicit networks. The common threat of illicit
networks is so great that it motivates states to forego sovereignty in some areas in an effort to
protect it in the battle against illicit networks.73 In this sense neo-liberal insitutionalism does
provide some important insights once illicit networks are viewed as sufficient threats to state
security and the assumption of states as fundamental actors is not taken to the point of ignoring
increasingly important illicit networks as threats.74
States and Supply-Side Strategies
States have had impressive successes against illicit networks.
Al Qaeda has been
decentralized such that its capability to launch 911 scale attacks has been severely limited. It
must now rely on the support of local affiliates and insurgencies with limited technical
sophistication and even less central direction.75 Against drug trafficking networks the United
71
Keohane 2005, 1:.
Ibid.; Keohane and Nye 2001, 3:; Allison 1971.
73
The cooperation of Latin American governments in the drug war is an important example. These governments
have feared the hegemonic power of the United States in the twentieth century and yet as with Mexico have
increasingly allowed the presence of American intelligence and law enforcement agents in their territory in the 21st
century. Downie 1998; 2010l.
74
Keohane and Nye Jr 1998; Keohane 2005, 1:; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001, 5:.
75
Kahler 2009.
72
19
States and Colombia are examples of states that working in conjunction with each other have
successfully dismantled profit-seeking illicit networks like the Medellín and Cali “cartels,”
resulting in a decentralized and less violent illicit network system.76 Interestingly this may have
actually increased the flow of coca from Colombia.77
How success is defined in prohibitionist “wars on drugs” is critical. In terms of the flow
of drugs into consumer markets, supply-side strategies have failed. The demand has always been
met with prices largely remaining stable.78 But the interdiction of drugs and the arrest and
killings of PSIN leadership figures have been successful in decapitating illicit networks that can
challenge state authority. In this sense supply-side strategies serve a useful function, to prevent
political-power concentration in illicit hands that might one day supplant or “capture” the state
with an “alternative governance structure.”79
States attack illicit networks through “decapitation” strategies or the removal of the heads
of illicit networks. This has the effect of fragmenting illicit networks along their lines of
functional specialization.80
Occasionally states choose to couple security spending with
matching social programs; though this is rarely the case. “Transactional” or trafficking-oriented
PSINs split from territorial PSINs under sufficient decapitation strike pressure from states.81
Transactional PSINs focus their efforts on money laundering, trafficking and front-businesses,
while territorial PSINs emphasize taxing territory through extortion of licit and illicit businesses,
kidnapping, theft and robbery.
76
Garzón 2008.
Ford 2008.
78
UNODC 2010; Ford 2008; Ford 2007.
79
Bowden 2001; Forero 2010; Ellingwood 2010.
80
Chapter six describes the implementation of US and Mexican strategies against the AFO.
81
Slaughter 1997.
77
20
The state is not challenged by profit-seeking illicit networks in the same way as
insurgencies. The threat from PSINs to states is far more fundamental though subtle, than that
posed by insurgent networks.82 Insurgent networks, of which terrorist networks like Al Qaeda
are a subset, challenge the state for power directly by seeking to replace the state or change its
policies. They reinforce the institution of “the state” and state sovereignty by aspiring to it.
PSINs challenge how states conceptualize themselves by weakening them in certain economic
and territorial sectors. They seek control of illicit markets and transit zones. They provide “an
alternative governance” structure based upon a criminal or “feudal” ethic.83
Transactional PSINs create a system of “plural authority” in which they control the illicit
world and leave licit markets to state regulation in which they invest their ill-gotten profits.
These illicit networks seek a modus vivendi or cooperative coexistence with states. Territorial
profit-seeking illicit networks seek to achieve “trafficker controlled territory” by extorting illicit
and licit businesses within their territories. These territorial profit-seeking illicit networks hope
to influence and in some cases control the state through violence. They rarely achieve this goal,
but often succeed in denying the state large swaths of territory in rural areas and entire sectors of
urban cities.84 Public perception of state sovereignty only comes into question when states are
challenged by profit-seeking illicit networks through violence; the higher the degree of hierarchy
and territoriality of the illicit network, the more likely violence becomes, because hierarchy is
associated with a larger number of “enforcers” who must be managed through multiple layers of
82
The nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking is well-documented in government and policy reports and
briefly discussed in the conclusion (Shadow cases).
Steinitz 2002.
83
Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas 1992; Perez 2005; 2010j; Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005; Manwaring
2007; Manwaring 2005.
84
For discussions of the “predatory state” and markets for security see Skaperdas, Tilly and the literature review of
the dissertation.
Krauze 1997; Spruyt 1994; Sassen 2006; Boniface VIII 2007; Tilly 1990; Tilly 1985; Skaperdas 1992; Skaperdas
and Syropoulos 1993; Skaperdas 2001.
21
management.85 The theoretical chapter will discuss in-depth the relationship between hierarchy
and the business strategies of profit-seeking illicit networks.
Profit-Seeking Illicit Networks in Mexico
Mexico has become an example of state which has been challenged by violent profitseeking illicit networks. Mexico is geographically positioned between the only source of coca
(Andean Region) and the largest consumer market in the world (the United States), making the
emergence of PSINs there inevitable following the destruction of large Colombian “cartels” in
the 1990’s. More than 45,000 people have been killed in drug-related homicides since President
Felipe Calderon began his militarized assault on “cartels” in Mexico in 2006, demonstrating the
PSINs threaten not just national security, but human security. In the process, Calderon sent more
than 5,000 federal police and 60,000 soldiers to more than 18 states.86
He has promoted
legislation that would subsume municipal police forces under state governments and legalized
small quantities of drugs, like marijuana, ostensibly to free law enforcement to fight larger
criminal organizations, yet his administration opposed the legalization of marijuana in California
under Proposition 19.87
Some in Mexico, including famed poet Javier Sicilia, have called upon the government to
negotiate with profit-seeking illicit networks, blaming the violence on the Calderon
Administration and his aggressive strategy. Calderon Administration supporters counter that
increased violence is a sign of success against cartels that are now in disarray and consumed by
internecine conflict. The violence is limited to criminals and the average citizen need not fear
85
Kenney 2007b.
2010s.
87
Wilkinson 2010a; Ellingwood 2009a; Marosi 2010a; Roosevelt and Hoeffel 2010; 2010e; Ellingwood 2009b;
Wilkinson 2008; Stevenson; Tracy Wilkinson 2010.
86
22
increased homicide rates. It is a media generated fear induced by the daily images of carnage,
beheadings, mutilations, hung bodies, narcofosas and disappearances.88
The Calderon administration advertizes its success against Mexican PSINs by listing
capos arrested or killed on radio and television. Critics argue these successes are against lower
level cartel lieutenants and the enemies of the Sinaloa “Cartel” led by Chapo Guzman, who is
said to have corrupted the federal government at the highest levels. Mexicans are universally
skeptical of the success of democratic governance in the country and assume corruption is
rampant. Indeed data from a study by National Public Radio indicated that the Sinaloa cartel
was subject to a disproportionately low level of arrests compared to other profit-seeking illicit
networks like Los Zetas (See Appendices R and S).89
I argue that the Sinaloa cartel’s transactional nature has made it less violent in
confrontations with the government and more able to corrupt than its territorial PSIN rivals like
Los Zetas that violently confront Mexican government forces and engage in extortion and
kidnapping of the local population. This has important implications for the future of democracy
in Mexico.
On the one hand Mexico is assisted in its struggle with territorial PSINs by
transactional PSINs. On the other hand it is weakened through corruption and the purchasing of
elections by transactional networks, creating a long term threat to democratic consolidation.90
As Mexico has decapitated trafficking networks through “king-pin strategies” it has
splintered Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks. Examples of the splintering of illicit networks
in Mexico include: the Sinaloa cartel and the Beltran-Leyva Organization (BLO), the Gulf
Cartel and Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacána and Los Cabelleros Templarios, the Arellano
88
Wilkinson 2010a; de Mauleon 2009; Marosi; Johnson 2010.
Burnett, Penalosa, and Bennincasa 2010; Burnett and Penalosa.
90
2010j.
89
23
Felix Organization and the splinter Teo Faction. Since the BLO split with the Sinaloa cartel
another faction the Cartel of the South Pacific has emerged. Independent cartels have emerged
in Acapulco and the Millenio cartel is reported to have reemerged. The resultant intra and intercartel conflicts have increased drug related homicide rates.91 Conflicts include the fight for
Ciudad Juarez which now has a homicide rate comparable to Iraq or Afghanistan (231 per
100,000), conflict throughout the country between illicit networks allied to the Sinaloa cartel
with Los Zetas and conflict between the Sinaloa cartel and its former partners the BLO.92 The
Tijuana Cartel or Arellano Felix Organization splintered into internecine conflict in 2008 over
the issue of kidnapping and two years later the Teo pro-kidnapping faction was dissolved. Many
of these newly fragmented networks have splintered or been dissolved by state action of both the
United States and Mexico, e.g. La Familia Michoacána appears to have been dissolved though
further evidence is needed.93
Why have some groups been destroyed, while others have proven resilient? Why have
states like Mexico chosen to target some profit-seeking illicit networks and not others?
This
dissertation
finds
profit-seeking
illicit
networks
that
moved
toward
territorial/extortion based-business strategies tended to be more hierarchical in organizational
structure and drew state responses because they were more visible to the state and civil society
due to their use of violence and extortion. In essence, they began to steal the “territorial
sovereign state’s” function, protecting and taxing the population. As Charles Tilly has argued
the state can be viewed as a professionalized “protection racket.”94 When a profit-seeking illicit
91
Johnson 2010; Walser; Guerrero Gutierrez 2011; Escalante Gonzalbo 2011.
2011e.
93
It appears that one portion of the La Familia network split off under the leadership of “La Tuta” 2009a; 2010g;
Ordaz 2010.
94
Tilly 1990; Tilly 1985; Tilly 1986.
92
24
network delves deeply into these activities, it becomes a competitor and potential “alternative
governance structure.”95 The state cannot tolerate this alerted to the threat to its legitimacy and
monopolies on taxation and the use of force by civil society that is the victim of the extortion.96
The conflict between territorial profit-seeking illicit networks is thus structurally rooted in the
character of the state as a territorial taxing and war-fighting governing unit.97 By no means is the
provision of security the sole function of the modern state, but it is the most fundamental.
Indeed, failure to provide the social services that have come to be expected of modern states in
the 20th and 21st centuries can inadvertently feed criminal networks by providing them a
dissatisfied population from which to recruit new members.
Understanding how and why these illicit networks are targeted and the impact of that
targeting tells us which illicit networks are likely to survive. Further understanding the structure
of surviving and failed profit-seeking illicit networks and their respective strategies, allows us to
understand the role illicit networks are likely to play in the development of state structures and
behaviors in an era of rapid globalization.
The survival of transactional PSINs promotes
corruption and thereby stunts democratic institutionalization and economic development by
weakening the rule of law. All of these effects threaten the legitimacy of democratic institutions
in developing states. How states address these foundational challenges of profit-seeking illicit
networks will determine whether the state will maintain itself as the dominant governance
structure in the international system, be supplanted by territorial PSINs or be corrupted,
constrained and weakened by transactional PSINs over the long term.
95
Clunan and Trinkunas 2010.
Weber 1958.
97
Tilly et al. 1985; Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994; Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993.
96
25
Dissertation Outline
Chapter two reviews the literature on illicit networks. It proposes a novel view of the
relevant literatures--which span numerous academic disciplines--by sorting the works according
to their level of analysis. I argue that there are three levels of analysis in the illicit networks
literature, those that assess: (1) the internal network structure, (2) the domestic structure and (3)
the global illicit networks structures.
The internal illicit network structure literature contains those works which assess the
illicit networks, including terrorist organizations, internally for their organizational architecture.
These important works include the business literature on resilience, and “sense-making
organizations,” organizational learning, network flatness, network procedures, and centralization
or decentralization in social networks.98
The domestic structure works focus on the relationship of the illicit network to its hoststate.
Is the relationship characterized by “collusion, tolerance, confrontation?”
Can we
conceptualize ways in which illicit networks attempt to “capture the state,” or “parasitically”
attach themselves to it, among other metaphors.99
The third and final level of analysis present in the literature assesses illicit networks in
terms of changing social, political, technological and economic structures of globalization. This
level of analysis includes a growing body of literature on “illicit flows” and includes works on
the nature of borders and border regions. My theoretical model locates itself within the first and
second levels of analysis of internal network structure and the domestic relationship with the
state.
98
99
Weick 1976; Weick 2001; Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, 1:; Weick 1995.
Sabet 2011; Bailey and Godson 2000.
26
Chapter three presents the theoretical argument for why some illicit networks engender
stronger state reactions. This theoretical argument posits that the relationship of the illicit
network to the state is the most important factor in its ability to survive disruptive events
(resilience). More hierarchical illicit networks will tend toward territorial business strategies
which necessarily involve “the diversification of criminal activities.” This diversification into
extortion activities and kidnappings of legitimate businessmen creates a societal backlash forcing
the state security apparatus to attack the territorial PSIN. Because states continue to have “a
preponderance of power” in the international system, they have a strong advantage against illicit
networks when they properly marshal their resources.100
100
Waltz 1979.
27
Figure 2.
The State Reaction and Illicit Network Resilience
Type of ProfitSeeking Illicit
Network
State
Reaction
Transactional
Weak
Level of
Resilience
Survive Intact
Reorganize
Territorial
Strong
Fragment
Dissolution
The fourth chapter describes the dissertation’s methodology which is primarily archival,
but has utilized interviews and in-country fieldwork.
Utilizing historical institutionalism’s
concepts of “path dependence” and “critical junctures,” I have created a narrative and presented
a case study of the Arellano Felix Organization and its relationship with the US and Mexican
governments from its inception in the 1980’s, to its present restructuring.101
In addition to archival research, in-depth interviews of AFO experts over the course of
one year of in-country fieldwork, were utilized to construct the narrative case study. These
experts included law enforcement, academics, Tijuana citizens, business leaders and reporters
who cover the Tijuana region in both the United States and Mexico.102 All interviews were
101
102
Thelen 1999.
Chabot 2008; George and Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997.
28
anonymous due to sensitivity and confidentiality issues, as per the UCI Institutional Review
Board requirements for the dissertation (See Appendices L-N).
The fifth chapter provides a historical institutional case study of the Arellano Felix
Organization. It describes its structure as an illicit network, how it evolved, some of its “tactics,
techniques and procedures” and its resilience. Through painstaking research, I constructed
organization charts at crucial points in the illicit network’s history to illustrate its changing
structure. I based these charts on interviews and archival research. They are available in
appendices A-J. They demonstrate the layers of management and complexity of the network at
various points in the AFO’s history. For the purposes of the empirical chapters, simplified
diagrams were created that captured the essence of the complex networks by using functional
roles in lieu of names, e.g. “enforcer” was used instead of listing the name of every enforcer
mentioned in court documents. While they can in no way be considered a complete picture of
these difficult to study “opaque networks,” they provide a sense of structure and complexity that,
in conjunction with the historical case study, help us to better understand the inner-workings of
this profit-seeking illicit network.103
Chapter six assesses “the state reaction” to the profit-seeking illicit network the Arellano
Felix organization. It describes the historical relationship of the United States and Mexico in
combating this PSIN and the resources and strategies the Mexican state has utilized to combat it.
With a discussion of the US-Mexico relations, it describes how these states have found points of
cooperation in combating profit-seeking illicit networks. It also briefly elucidates the nature of
103
Friman and Andreas 1999.
29
pacts between state authorities at various levels and transactional illicit networks designed to
eliminate territorial illicit networks.104
The conclusion summarizes the important findings of the dissertation and identifies
important consequences to current US-Mexican government strategies. In the short term, the
decapitation of cartels will result in younger management figures that are more violent and
territorial.105 It addresses the implications of transactional versus territorial PSIN resilience and
the resulting impact upon the future of globalization and sovereign states.106
Further it provides theoretical and policy implications of the argument that includes the
prediction that as transactional PSINs are more resilient, corruption and stunted democratic
institutionalization will be the long-term problems in states strong enough to defeat territorial
PSINs. It will illustrate how the cheap availability of technology wrought by globalization has
narrowed the advantages of the state vis-à-vis illicit networks and how states cooperate to
mitigate this new reality. The challenge of transactional PSINs can only be met through deep
institutional reforms to the appropriate military, social and judicial institutions, which will
necessarily require economic structural changes in developing states to marshal the resources for
the battle with PSINs.
104
Jones 2010c; Felbab-Brown; Felbab-Brown 2009c.
Felbab-Brown 2009a.
106
Sassen 2006; Schendel and Abraham 2005; Friman and Andreas 1999.
105
30
Chapter 2
Literature Review:
Three Levels of Illicit Network Analysis: Internal, Domestic and Global
There is a rapidly growing literature on the illicit global economy, defined as “the system
of transnational economic activities that are criminalized by states in importing or exporting
countries.”107 Add to this the extensive literature on organized crime, literatures on conceptions
of the state, network theory as applied to states and criminal actors, and the small but significant
literature on resilience, and a literature review without carefully prescribed boundaries could
expand ad infinitum. The focus here is thus on the structure of drug trafficking organizations or
profit-seeking illicit networks. While much of the existing international relations literature on
networks focuses on the positive aspects of networks as social movements like advocacy
networks, the focus here is on the growing literature on “illicit” or “dark networks.”108 To quote a
recent article, “understanding international organized crime and terrorism in terms of networks
has become a widely accepted paradigm in the field of international relations.”109 Illicit network
structure triggers different reactions from states as will be argued in the theoretical chapter. An
assessment of what particular characteristics of illicit networks have been identified in the
literature on illicit networks is thus critical.
107
A distinction is drawn in the “illicit flows” literature between that which is illegal versus that which is illicit.
Legality refers to state laws on a given practice or commodity while “licitness” refers to the social acceptability
among populations however defined. On issues like child pornography they overlap to an overwhelming degree, but
on issues like the consumption of substances like marijuana this is not always the case. The support for a
legalization of Marijuana initiative, California Proposition 19, is an interesting case in point. It enjoyed 44% of the
public’s support in California opinion polls despite a concerted effort by the federal government officials to defeat
the initiative.
Roosevelt and Hoeffel 2010; Friman and Andreas 1999; Schendel and Abraham 2005.
108
Milward 2003.
109
Jones 2008a.
31
The existing international relations and globalization literature on illicit networks can
efficaciously be divided into three parts: (1) those that focus on the internal structure of illicit
networks, (2) those that focus on the domestic structure of the illicit network in relation to its
host state and (3) the global structure of illicit networks which assess the structure of illicit
networks based on the changing structure of the international state-system often referred to as
“globalization.”
These are often broader political economic arguments taking into account
markets, sovereignty and borders.
This tripartite division of the literatures is useful because it highlights the levels of
analysis problem in assessing illicit networks. By levels of analysis, I mean what is the unit of
analysis under study? Are we (1) assessing the smaller nodes involved in trafficking like
traffickers, producers, distributors and protection rackets? Are we (2) assessing the “collusion,”
“confrontation” or “tolerance” of the state as part of the network?, or finally, are we (3) assessing
the network structures under the conditions of globalization which have fueled the capabilities of
illicit networks, or their implications for international relations?
While some authors straddle these divisions, they each have a theoretical focus placing
them at one of these levels. This literature review will demonstrate some ways in which these
varying analyses can be synthesized to complement each other.
This review of the literature on the structures of illicit networks will begin by elucidating
the three main levels of analysis and their literatures: (1) internal structures, (2) domestic
structures which include the relationship with the state, and finally (3) the global-structures level,
which focuses on the unique aspects of border areas and broader arguments about the changing
nature of the international system due to globalization. Throughout, this literature review will
32
describe points of convergence and areas where concepts presented by these three levels of
analysis can be combined and understood as complementary, rather than mutually exclusive.
33
Part I. The Internal Structures of Trafficking Organizations
The internal structure of drug trafficking organizations has been conceptualized in a
myriad of ways by government reports and academics. While it has become popular to describe
organizations and networks as mutually exclusive categories, they are rather elastic concepts
each with important ideas for understanding the relationship between structure and resilience.110
This section describes the seminal works conceptualizing networks and organizations and the
points of convergence between them.
Definitions of Networks, Organizations and Organized Crime
Networks are conceptually defined as the space between markets and hierarchies,
according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt in their influential the Advent of Netwar.111 We can imagine
a continuum: at one pole is the ideal market with its perfect information, buyers and sellers
coming together through the price mechanism driven purely by the forces of supply and demand.
The image of the bazaar might come to mind to describe this pole. At the opposite pole we can
envision the perfect bureaucratic hierarchy, with many layers of management organizing vast
resources toward singular goals which are not always addressed by markets; such as national
defense. The image conjured might be of the Roman Legion or even the highly bureaucratized
and effective US military with its many ranks and thereby layers of management. In between
these poles of ideal types is reality; between these ideal types, are networks.112
Networks are relationships between “nodes” or “actors” which can reduce “transaction
costs” and resolve “collective action problems” “in the absence of central authority” in both licit
110
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, chap. Phil Williams.
Thompson 2003; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b; Arquilla et al. 1997.
112
Thompson 2003; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000, 2:.
111
34
and illicit business.113 Filial networks of trust can protect illicit networks from law enforcement
infiltration by the state and rivals.114 Some network theorists like Page and Podolny reject the
tripartite division of markets, networks and hierarchies, arguing instead that hierarchies are
simply highly centralized networks, while markets like perfect “spot markets” are network nodes
with no ties.115 According to Page and Podolny, networks are defined as:
Any collection of actors (N≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations
with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority
116
to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.
Networks survive in an evolutionary and marketized fashion. When a node is removed
from the network, another eventually takes its functional place or the network restructures
entirely to accommodate.
Nodes can be individual actors or organizations in networks.
Internally they can vary in their degree of hierarchy and be “tightly” or “loosely coupled”
amongst each other. But in their relationships with other nodes in illicit networks, they tend to
be “loosely coupled.”117 Nodes and entire networks that do not adapt to exogenous factors e.g.,
the challenge of states or other drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s), are removed from the
system to be replaced by more resilient networks in an evolutionary fashion.118
Granovetter argues that nodes or actors within networks who have weak ties to other
parts of a broader system can serve as important “bridges” to other parts of a network. This can
be critical in the illicit world in which criminal organizations may have opportunities for profit
based on contacts with other criminal networks, i.e. suppliers, traffickers, enforcers or
distributors, etc.
Thus, the actors in networks with “social capital” become important “non-
113
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Arrow 1974; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Podolny 1998.
115
Podolny 1998, 59.
116
Podolny 1998.
117
Weick 1976.
118
[CSL STYLE ERROR: reference with no printed form.]; Chabot 2008.
114
35
redundant nodes,” or as Burt calls them, “structural holes.”119 These will prove important for
explaining why key individuals and nodes became so important or lost status.
Krebs describes the difficulties in mapping covert networks in his analysis of the 19
September 11th hijackers. He concludes that there are 4 “networks to map” that should be used
to understand illicit networks: (1) trust, (2) task, (3) money and resources, and (4) strategy and
goals.120
Kahler uses existing data, including Krebs’ analysis, on Al Qaeda to engage in an internal
network analysis of the terror network which argues that it has shifted from a highly centralized
and tight-knit network prior to 911, to a loosely coupled/decentralized network which relies on
the vision it provided prior to 911 and local insurgencies/social movements to act independently
of any central command from Al Qaeda leadership.121
Defining the Organization
Like pornography, organized crime is easier to “know it when we see it,” than to define it
systematically. According to the Mexican government’s definition of organized crime:
When three or more people make an agreement to organize or form an
organization to engage, in an ongoing or reiterated fashion, in activities that by
themselves or together with other activities have as a goal or a result the
commission of any or several crimes… they will be legally classified and
122
penalized because of these actions as members of organized crime.
According to Karl Weick, organizations are collections of individuals trying to “make
sense” of the world around them. For Weick, they go through an iterative learning cycle. Their
ability to adapt is based upon their ability to learn and “make sense” of their environment.
Factors which can improve their ability to survive disruptive events can include the ability to
break through rigid hierarchical relationships, such as, rank to be more adaptable. He uses the
119
Granovetter 1983, 202-203; Burt 2001; Burt 1995.
Krebs 2002.
121
Kahler 2009.
122
Garzón 2008, 21.
120
36
Mann-Gulch disaster and the case of fire fighters trying to escape a massive fire to demonstrate
the characteristics and failures of a resilient organization.123 Weick’s work is foundational for the
High Reliability Organization (HRO) literature and is relevant to the study of illicit network
resilience.
Chabot adds to Weick’s complex circular model by adding two important
environmental variables which strengthen the Arellano Felix Organization’s resilience; “a vast
consumer-base” in the United States and “diminished societal rule of law” in Mexico.124
Though cognition and the ability to learn are important factors, organizational survival in
the face of disruptive events, or resilience, is more than just a cognitive exercise. The structure
or the architecture of the organization matters as well; particularly when that organization is
deeply embedded within a larger network of alliances for services and resources.125
One of the key arguments among network theoreticians is that flatness in networks
increases their resilience.126 Organizational management has its own literature on “the effects of
flat or tall organization,” going back to the 1960’s. Carzo and Yanouzas argued through an
experiment between different groups assigned a task with varying degrees of hierarchy, that there
was no statistically significant difference between the speeds of decisions in a flat or tall
organization. Rather their experiment found that there were advantages to taller organizational
structures. However, in his critique of Carzo and Yanouzas’ experiment and analysis, Norman P.
Hummon found their statistical analysis and experimental design severely flawed. Thus, flatness
may be an important variable in the success or failure of networks.127
123
Weick 1995; Weick.
Chabot 2008, 199.
125
Weick 2001.
126
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996a; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, chap. Phil Williams; Ibid., chap. Introduction by
Editors; Kenney 2007b.
127
Yanouzas 1969; Hummon 1970.
124
37
Organizations? Networks? or Both?
I view organizations as nodes within larger networks. For example, the Arellano-Félix
Organization is a transport and protection node of a larger drug production, trafficking and
distribution network of illicit narcotics from the Andes to the United States. It is in many ways
the “central” node of the network, not just geographically, but relationally; commanding a
dominant and central network position.128
False dichotomies are drawn in the policy world between networks and organizations.
According to a 2006 Congressional Research Services report:
Traditional vs. Modern Networks. Definitions of transnational organized crime often
differentiate between traditional crime organizations and more modern criminal
networks. Traditional groups have a hierarchical structure that operates continuously or
for an extended period. Newer networks, in contrast, are seen as having a more
129
decentralized, often cell-like structure.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations (MDTO’s) can be characterized simultaneously by these
descriptions of networks and organizations. First, while they exist for extended periods of time,
they form, break and reform relationships with other “cells,” “organizations,” or “nodes” to
traffic drugs and engage in other criminal activities.
Second, MDTO’s have changing
relationships with the Mexican state, (another network node) depending upon political party in
power, the degree of democratic consolidation and their ability to bribe officials.130 Third, they
organize themselves internally along network lines. While some Mexican PSINs like the AFO
have 5-6 layers of management, they are also decentralized in decision-making and
compartmentalized into cells. This bifurcation between networks and organizations makes little
sense for the AFO.131
128
Kenney 2007b; Kenney 2007a.
Wagley 2006.
130
Ravelo 2005.
131
Jones 2009.
129
38
A better understanding of MDTO’s can be developed by recognizing that organizations
represent nodes in networks. The illicit narcotics networks under study here span geographically
from the South American Andean coca-growing region, to consumers in the United States,
Europe, Russia, other world markets and increasingly Latin American domestic markets.
Functionally, they include: coca farmers, extortion rackets at all stages of production,
transportation and distribution cells, processing labs, various trafficking nodes, sea-submersible
crews, landing-strip managers in Mexico, communications managers, enforcers, traffickers who
specialize in trafficking at the US border, distributors and street-gangs within the United
States.132
Phil Williams argues, that the bifurcations drawn between hierarchies and networks are
problematic despite the practice’s dominance in law enforcement and academia. He defines
networks broadly to include organizations that may be hierarchical:
A network can be understood very simply as a series of nodes that are
connected. The nodes can be individuals, organizations, firms, or computers, so
133
long as they are connected in significant ways.
In contradistinction to his editors in Networks and Netwars, he argues that:
The traditional hierarchical model long associated with Mafia families in the
United States, for example, does not need to be jettisoned: After all, it is
possible to have networks of hierarchies, hybrid organizational forms with some
hierarchical components and a significant network dimension, and even a
134
network of networks.
For Williams, the explanatory power of social network analysis in the business and sociology
literatures is in their emphasis on the relations between nodes.135
One problem with network analysis is in determining the “boundary” of the network.136
Where does the network begin and end? Who do we consider a member of the network? Is a
132
Kenney 2007b.
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 66.
134
Ibid., 69.
135
136
Wasserman and Faust 1994.
133
39
carpenter who is coerced to assassinate on behalf of the illicit network by threats to the life of his
family a member of the network or simply a tool? Are we assessing individual nodes or the
networks themselves? Simply stating that networks survive or reform despite the actions of state
law enforcement is borderline tautological given the powerful supply and demand forces
involved in illicit narcotics trafficking.
Are individuals the nodes/actors?
Or are entire
organizations?
This project takes trafficking nodes and the organizations that control them as its level of
analysis. Nodes will be assessed internally for flatness or degree of hierarchy measured in terms
of layers of management. It is of course cognizant of trafficking nodes’ position in larger global
networks.137
Networks typically allow for flatter organizational structures by bringing organizations
together in “loose couplings” that are very flexible and adaptable.138 Each node in the network
has its degree of hierarchy based on its needs and the tasks it must engage in.139
For Arquilla and Ronfeldt, nodes within criminal networks are never hierarchically
organized. This analysis of internal structures of the nodes themselves found that there are
varying degrees of hierarchy. Arquilla and Ronfeldt are generally correct in suggesting that
network nodes are not hierarchical, but as the empirical chapter will show, this is not always the
case. There can be “networks of hierarchies,” as Williams argues, of which the core node in a
wheel model network can be a good example.140
137
Kenney 2007b.
Weick 1976; Weick 2001.
139
Corchado 2007.
140
138
40
41
Figure 3. Chain, Wheel and All-Channel Networks
Three Network Structure Basic Network
Types as Illustrated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt
Chain Network
Hub or Star
Network
All-Channel
Network
141
Arquilla and Ronfeldt have identified three ideal network “topologies” which they call, ‘chain,’
‘star or hub’ (wheel) network and the ‘all-channel’ network.142
These three network structures can challenge the state in different ways. The all-channel
network is not well suited to the illicit world because it lacks compartmentation. Remove one
node in the network and it becomes possible to discover the entire network. Thus, the all
channel network is more suited toward the licit action of civil society groups utilizing technology
to challenge democratic states in a legal fashion through control of message and public opinion,
rather than insurgencies or traffickers.143
On the other hand, chain networks are the most logical starting point for the development
and inception of illicit networks and are empirically where most begin.144 Over time, chain
networks are consolidated into wheel networks by core nodes that provide protection and
141
Figure 3 adapted from introduction. Ibid.
Ibid.
143
Ibid.
144
Ibid.; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b.
142
42
enforcement services. Wheel networks can be dismantled by the state and remaining nodes will
typically reform, at least initially into chain networks.145
Drug trafficking in Colombia provides the prototype model for this process.
The
Medellín and Cali cartels consolidated Colombian trafficking into two large wheel networks
during the 1980’s and 1990’s.146 The Colombian state in conjunction with the US military
dismantled the core nodes of these networks in 1993 and 1995 respectively.147 The resultant
Colombian trafficking model is made up of smaller specialized cartelitos more reminiscent of
chain networks.148
Michael Kenney demonstrates via interviews with jailed Colombian smugglers that the
Medellín and Cali Cartels, were wheel networks. Kenney assessed the smuggling aspects of the
drug trafficking business, which may explain his key finding that despite the description of these
“cartels” by law enforcement as hierarchical and menacing they were in reality very flat at 3-4
layers of management. This analysis differs from Kenney’s in that it assesses a broader swath of
these organizations, which includes enforcers that are layer of management intensive. Michael
Kenney’s earlier work also describes how wheel network core nodes can be easily targeted by
states like the US and Colombia for removal. Thus he argues that wheel networks, while
efficient and profitable, may be vulnerable to attack.149
United Nations Report Typologizing Criminal Organizations
There are further conceptualizations of networks, hierarchies and criminal organizations
provided by government reports.
In 2002 the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
145
Kenney 2007b.
Ibid.
147
Ibid.; Bailey and Chabat 2002; Bowden 2001; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001.
148
Garzón 2008.
149
Kenney 2007b; Kenney 2007a.
146
43
surveyed leading criminologists on the structures of 40 organized crime groups. The report
authors describe five types of criminal organization:
The five typologies identified and a short introductory explanation of each are as
follows: [1.] ‘Standard hierarchy’: Single hierarchical group with strong
internal systems of discipline. [2.] ‘Regional hierarchy’: Hierarchically
structured groups, with strong internal lines of control and discipline, but with
relative autonomy for regional components. [3.] ‘Clustered hierarchy’: A set of
criminal groups which have established a system of coordination/control,
ranging from weak to strong, over all their various activities. [4.] ‘Core group’:
A relatively tightly organized but unstructured group, surrounded in some cases
by a network of individuals engaged in criminal activities. [5.] ‘Criminal
network’: A loose and fluid network of individuals, often drawing on individuals
with particular skills, who constitute themselves around an ongoing series of
150
criminal projects.
150
2002a.
44
Figure 4.
151
The UNODC pilot study identifies the AFO as a “clustered hierarchy.” There is a core group of
leaders which are Arellano family members and close associates and there are other hierarchies
tied to the core group in clusters. This characterization is consistent with the findings of the
empirical chapters but does not explain the important role of business strategy in illicit network
resilience.
Providing some of the best empirical and historical descriptions of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations (MDTO’s), is George Grayson in his book Mexico: Narco-Violence and
a Failed State? In it he empirically describes the internal structures of the cartels and also argues
that they have significantly weakened the Mexican state.152
151
152
Figure 4 from UNODC Pilot Study. Ibid.
Grayson 2009a.
45
Why Flatness Leads to Resilience
Flatness can increase resilience or robustness of illicit networks in a number of ways,
including, reducing decision times, mitigating the need for doctrine, increasing learning,
adaptability and scalability through alliances.153
1. Fast Decisions. First, flatness reduces the time of decision-cycles.
Flat nodes or
networks can make decisions quickly because they have few layers of management from
top to bottom. Once decisions are made they can be implemented quickly throughout the
network.
In illicit networks they can also be implemented with a high degree of
efficiency because the penalties for failure or insubordination often involve death or the
death of family members. Hierarchies on the other hand, tend to have congestion in their
highly centralized and bureaucratic structures.154 Implementing new procedures can be
difficult for hierarchies. However, institutionalizing procedures can be more difficult for
flat networks or nodes because they have short memories and lack formal mechanisms
like publications.
2. Doctrine. Second, flat networks typically do not have to formalize their operations
through doctrinal handbooks and manuals.155
Some networks like Al Qaeda create
manuals which are distributed via the internet or via other means, but this is the
exception, not the rule.156
In contrast, the US military must go through an extensive
learning process to create new doctrine. This process often ends in failure because of
differences within the bureaucracy.
The many layers of management which must
153
Yanouzas 1969.
Kenney 2007b; Hummon 1970; Yanouzas 1969.
155
156
Kenney 2007b.
154
46
approve the changes in doctrine and the cognitive dissonance about the founding
principles of the institution are a source of stagnation.
157
3. Learning and Adaptability. Flatness in structure is often the result of the ability of
organizations to learn. Networks choose to be flat and compartmentalized as they learn
from the failure and capture of members or other criminal organizations. Flatness and
learning thus have a “mutually constitutive” element.158 Flatness can make learning and
adaptability more rapid because of the ability to make decisions quickly and respond to
changes in the external environment of the organization.
Learning organizations will
also flatten themselves through the practice of compartmentation.159
Flatter structures are often the result of historical lessons and learning. One of the
lessons learned in tandem with the importance of compartmentation is the value of a shift
to “the low-profile” strategy. Especially for profit-seeking drug trafficking organizations,
as distinct from similarly organized terror networks, this strategy is more likely.
Threatening the state is not a prerequisite for drug trafficking organizations as it is for
terror networks. Drawing attention to the network results in attacks from the state. The
strategy of maintaining a low profile is adopted to mitigate this threat as it detracts from
the ability to do business. Further, in diffuse flatter networks, enforcement can be
achieved through ostracism. Nodes or actors within the network which draw attention to
network operations are removed from the network by simply not being contacted again.160
157
Nagl 2002; Downie 1998.
Klotz and Lynch 2007.
159
Kenney 2007b.
160
Ibid.
158
47
Networks viewed as “loosely coupled” organizations also have the ability to
decentralize decision-making.161 This improves information gathering and accuracy of
understanding of decisions. Information does not have to be filtered upward toward a
central bureaucratic hierarchy with many layers, consuming time along the way. Rather,
individual nodes in the network with specific specializations can make in-the-field
decisions immediately and are expected to do so, as they are organized in a decentralized
fashion.
4. Alliances. Flatter networks are also capable of forming alliances and may indeed rely on
alliances to minimize degree of hierarchy by minimizing management needs.162 They do
this out of necessity because smuggling cells alone must be contracted to be part of larger
networks. Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks rely on “loosely coupled” street gangs
in the United States for many functions including a labor supply of individuals with “a
comparative advantage in violence,” executions and assassinations in the United States,
street level dealing and even retail distribution.163 On the production side, the AFO has
established alliances with “belligerents” like the FARC which provide security, regulate
prices for coca farmers in Colombia and ship cocaine to Mexican profit-seeking illicit
networks.164 According to US officials, Pakistani militants have “morphed” through their
use of alliances amongst each other into networks with no coherent leadership structure
161
“Weick (1976) defined “loose coupling” as a situation in which elements are responsive, but retain evidence of
separate identity. Later he wrote that loose coupling is evident when elements effect each other “suddenly” (rather
than continuously), occasionally (rather than constantly), negligibly (rather than significantly), indirectly (rather than
directly), and eventually (rather than immediately).”
Weick 1976.
162
Gulati 1998.
163
Weick 1976; Skaperdas 1992; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993; Skaperdas 2001.
164
Felbab-Brown 2009b; Felbab-Brown 2009c.
48
to attack.165 Smaller network nodes are more likely to engage in business dealings with
other network nodes based on high degrees of “trust” rather than “name brand
recognition” of hierarchies.166
How Flatness Can Reduce Resilience
Many nascent criminal networks fail. As Kahler describes, there is a tendency to assess
successful criminal or terrorist networks, but few study failed networks.167
This has led
researchers to overestimate the resilience of flat network structures.168 Or, as was pointed out
earlier, truly successful criminal networks remain so invisible that they are impossible to study.
When criminal networks survive it is in an evolutionary fashion. Those that are best suited for
the environment and capable of adaptation survive, while those that fail to adapt are removed
from the system. While on average flatness increases resilience, it can also have the opposite
effect, particularly for illicit criminal networks.
First, I argue that a small organization or network is easy to “wrap up” by arresting all
members in one fell swoop. Flatness and smallness often correlate with each other. A small
organization is more likely to be captured in its entirety by law enforcement or suffer total
destruction in conflict with rival criminal groups. Larger organizations become less susceptible
to having their entire network “rolled up” by law enforcement. Criminal networks that are
165
Gall and Tavernise.
The recent Goldman Sachs scandals are a good example. Investors sought out Goldman Sachs based on its
reputation and trusted its advice. That advice was later discovered to be in favor of bad investments that benefitted
Goldman-Sachs. Advice to the contrary was intentionally withheld. Whereas in the licit market this fraud is
accepted and is unlikely to be prosecuted despite a Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) indictment, in the
illicit market this fraud would be met with violence or would never occur because smaller network nodes would
form a business relationship based on a higher degree of personalized trust.
Crippen.
167
Kahler 2009.
168
Jones 2008a.
166
49
composed of “loosely coupled” and highly compartmentalized cells are most difficult to
dismantle and thus most resilient.169
Second, compartmentation can hinder resilience as much as help it. Compartmentation
can reduce information flows within the network. A lack of information-sharing, can a make a
criminal organization subject to numerous environmental hazards.
For example, a lack of
intelligence-sharing among cells about law enforcement operations could result in the arrest of
members and the seizures of important drug loads.170
A lack of coordination among
compartmentalized cells in an illicit network could result in the execution of perceived rivals
when in reality the victims were smuggling on behalf of another cell of the network.171
Third, “poor decision-making” and “excessive risk-taking” are common problems in dark
networks. Flat networks can be the result of the flattening of more hierarchical networks through
the removal of leadership figures. This can result in inexperienced and young leadership. These
young leaders will have a high propensity for violence because they lack experience in nonviolent dispute resolution mechanisms. Drug use among new, young illicit network leaders can
also lead to erratic, impulsive and violent decisions and the death of new illicit networks.172
Fourth, “scalability” is limited in illicit networks. The ability to add size, resources and
capabilities via lateral relationships may be overstated as a means by which networks are more
169
Weick 1976; Kenney 2007b.
Kenney 2007b.
171
For example, one “Juarez cartel” hit-man was a member of a cell that was so compartmentalized he never knew
who his employer was. He always assumed it was the Juarez cartel under Amado Carillo-Fuentes. In the 1990’s
that was a logical assumption. But when the Juarez cartel found itself in a war with the Sinaloa cartel under the
leadership of “Chapo” Guzman, that assumption was no longer viable and he was uncertain as to which cartel he
worked for on any given assassination. This is an example of how too much compartmentation can lead to an
organization which literally cannibalizes itself. It becomes susceptible to exploitation from outside organizations
and the state and can thus reduce the resilience of the organization leading to its replacement by a new network.
Jones 2009; Bowden 2009.
172
Felbab-Brown 2009a.
170
50
resilient; social trust and ethnic kinship ties are usually required. These groups typically splinter
if they try to expand themselves too far.173
Resilience in Hierarchies
There are many reasons why hierarchies have survived and become the dominant
governance structure in the international system. First, hierarchies are capable of organizing vast
resources. Militaries are the quintessential hierarchies. They have rigid structures embodied by
openly displayed ranks. Although they can be fraught with bureaucratic inefficiencies, militaries
can be some of the most remarkably efficient and resilient institutions. Hierarchy provides clear
command and control over the organization and clearly understood divisions of labor.174
Second, militaries like all hierarchies have the ability to network themselves.
A
lieutenant in Iraq does not need to ask superiors all the way up to the President to order an
artillery strike in the field. Rather he radios a target to a central communications hub and an
artillery unit or air-support is contacted to fire. “Hierarchies can network themselves” through
standard operating procedures (SOP’s), within generalized rules of engagement (ROE’s).175
Third, hierarchies are resilient because they have clear lines of succession. When a
leader is killed, a replacement is immediately known and the hierarchy is able to regenerate.
Only under sustained attack do hierarchies begin to break down. As Privette describes, the Cosa
Nostra was a resilient network because of its hierarchical structures. There were clear lines of
succession when leaders were killed and replacements were ready and able to take the mantle of
leadership. It was only when the “entire network” was “wrapped” up that the US government
173
2008d; Jones 2009; Astorga 2007.
Brennan 2008; 2010x; Sullivan 2008; Scott 2000, 2:; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Hammes 2004.
175
Brennan 2008.
174
51
could plausibly have claimed to have controlled the Cosa Nostra, despite the fact that it
continues to function in a much more limited fashion.176
Fourth, hierarchies have the ability through centralized command structures to overcome
collective action problems. Hierarchically organized states can tax and invest in infrastructure
which markets do not provide on their own. States in Europe were founded on their ability to
wage war and collect taxes as Charles Tilly argues.177 Even today with increased privatization of
security, most private military contractors compete for state contracts rather than self-funding
sources like controlling diamond mines.178
Reduced Resilience in Hierarchies
However, hierarchies can also lack adaptability. First, standard operating procedures or
SOP’s can be suboptimal in certain situations.179 What happens when the rules of engagement
restrain soldiers in the field to their detriment and the detriment of their mission? In cases such
as these, rules of engagement must be changed sometimes requiring the approval of the
commander in chief and necessitating a great deal of time for information to be processed
upward and command decisions and new strategies to percolate downward to soldiers in the
field.180
Second, hierarchies have deeply ingrained internal biases that stifle adaptation and
learning. Both Nagl and Downie describe the US Army’s conventional “big war” bias and
refusal to learn from its unconventional war experience in Vietnam.181
Part II. The Domestic Structure of Illicit Networks
176
Privette 2006.
Tilly 1990.
178
Rupert 1999.
179
Keohane 2005, 1:114.
180
Downie 1998.
181
Nagl 2002; Downie 1998.
177
52
The second level of analysis I identified in the literature on illicit networks were those
that assess the relationship between the state and illicit networks. Shirk and Astorga define the
types of relationships the traffickers can have with the state and make policy suggestions
accordingly. They identify “complicity,” “confrontation” and “tolerance.”182 Sabet reaches
similar conceptualizations by analyzing the municipal level of Tijuana police and organized
crime. He categorizes the relationship between organized crime and local law enforcement as
“collusion,” “confrontation” or “tolerance” in Tijuana.183
State-Criminal Symbiosis
Gootenberg sees a more complex picture of the relationship between the state and
DTO’s:
The relation looks more “symbiotic” than the zero-sum oficialista idea that
governments ban and fight bad drugs and that sinister narcotics dealers subvert
states and rules. Much is written on this theme since drug literatures are
characteristically “state-centric…” Local US police forces, with diminishing
federal aid, can live off proceeds of confiscated “dealers” property, with scant
concern for the constitutional due process for the policy’s victims… Anglo
184
banks in Miami or Houston are relatively immune from prosecution.
On the one hand states ban narcotics, legally and through discourse, while on the other hand
tolerating their existence and even benefitting from their trade.
Menno Vellinga also sees varying relationships between traffickers and the state which
include complex symbiotic relationships.
For Vellinga, cartel strategy is one of the most
important factors explaining the relationship of traffickers to the state. In a 2004 article, he
describes the Medellín cartel’s confrontational relationship which challenged Colombian
182
Ibid., 24.
Sabet 2011.
184
Schendel and Abraham 2005, 111.
183
53
political elites. The Cali cartel focused more on corrupting the state but could also react to the
state with violence.185
Once these large cartels were removed smaller, lower profile informal trafficking groups
with looser connections formed to traffic drugs from the Andes to Europe and North America.
They relied on “couriers” travelling on “regularly scheduled international flights;” in other
words, the “illicit” travelled along the “licit.” Vellinga could also be characterized as assessing
the internal structure for these organizations in terms of size and business practices. He notes
importantly that the large organizations continue to thrive in Mexico and they tend to respond to
the government with more violence than these smaller organizations and networks referred to by
Garzón as “cartelitos.”186
Chestnut assesses the symbiotic relationship of profit-seeking illicit networks and the
state by analyzing what motivated North Korea to engage in state sponsored illicit activities and
when the state began outsourcing to illicit networks like the Chinese Triads. She identified
moments of economic desperation and weakened domestic political control as key points in
which the North Korean regime moved toward the use of illicit activities. For Chestnut, North
Korean illicit economic activities including counterfeit dollars, counterfeit cigarettes, opium
cultivation and narcotics trafficking were key mechanisms of regime survival.187
Snyder and Duran Martinez assess the relationship between the state and drug trafficking
organizations using the cases of Mexico and Burma. Theirs is a political-economic argument
which suggests that Mexico’s increase in drug related violence is due to the decentralization of
the Mexican security apparatus in conjunction with the decentralization of Mexico’s drug
185
Vellinga 2004; Garzón 2008.
Vellinga 2004.
187
Chestnut 2007; Chestnut 2005.
186
54
trafficking organizations and Mexico’s democratization. Through this democratization and
decentralization the state can no longer negotiate with traffickers because it cannot make credible
long term promises.
188
State Capture Arguments
Buscaglia, Gonzalez-Ruiz and Ratliff, argue that five levels of organized crime
infiltration of the state have been identified by policy makers and academics. They can be
summarized as follows: (1) “sporadic acts of bribery or other abuse of public office in local
government agencies by organized crime,” (2) “frequent corruption in low-ranking state officials
on the organized crime payroll. This second kind of infiltration is commonly directed at
international border checkpoints to ease the traffic of illegal goods and human beings,” (3)
“organized crime infiltrates the mid-ranks of public sector agencies in an attempt to capture the
operational effectiveness of, for example, law enforcement and the judiciary, thus easing the
operations of criminal groups,” (4) “The fourth level of infiltration compromises the heads of
public agencies, like the former Mexican drug czar, responsible directly or indirectly for fighting
organized crime–related activities (Buscaglia and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2002) or occurs in agencies
providing potential long-term benefits to a criminal group, such as Paraguay’s custom office,”
and (5) “organized crime encompasses the capture of the state’s policies by criminal groups who
are then able to bias lawmaking, law enforcement, and judicial decisions themselves.”189
Bailey and Godson provide “six images” for conceptualizing organized crime in Mexico.
The first is “contained corruption.” Here the state is controlled at the state and local levels and
has effective control over organized crime which is “dispersed” and “fragmented.” The second
image is “centralized-systemic” governability in which the state exerts central control and
188
189
Duran-Martinez and Snyder 2009.
Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005.
55
subordinates “disciplined hierarchical” organized criminal groups.
The third is “centralized
systemic (formal and shadow)” which is similar to the second image except that it includes a
shadow government capable of controlling organized crime. The fourth image is “fragmentedcontested” governability in which the state and governability are directly challenged by
organized crime.
The fifth image is “marginal ad hoc corruption.”
The sixth image is
“decentralized, targeted corruption” which is the highest level of political-criminal nexus. They
conclude that the chapters in their edited volume generally point to “Image IV fragmentedcontested political-criminal linkages” to describe governability in Mexico, while “Image V
(Marginal ad hoc corruption)” they found most aptly described “US Borderlands.”190
190
Bailey and Godson 2000, 218.
56
Section III. Globalization and Illicit Networks
The third and final category of the literature review is work which focuses on the
dark/illicit network structures which benefit from the increasingly globalized international
system.
They question the fundamental building block of the international system, “the
territorially sovereign state,”191 its future, its dependence on borders and the very premise that it
has “a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”192 Schendel, for example, argues that “illicit
flows” and “borderlands” erode the reality and the concept of “the territorially sovereign
state.”193 Others like Andreas argue that the state’s reaction to illicit networks serves to reinforce
it in a never-ending cycle. Some like, Adler and Schendel provide models that conceptualize
state pressure on orders which can be combined with our understandings of the internal
organizational structures of these networks to provide us with a better understanding of the
structure and resilience of these networks at multiple levels of analysis.194
Fukumi, citing Lupsha, views “transnational organized crime [as] a feature of an
international capitalist market economy where the motive is to pursue maximum wealth with
minimum risk.”195
Globalization
The processes of “globalization” are complex but have key characteristics most social
scientists agree on: (1) the spread of markets, (2) privatization/deregulation, (3) the spread of
human rights, and (4) the diffusion of democratic values.196 First, most authors agree that the
contemporary epoch is not the first period of globalization. Without going back to the opening
191
Spruyt 1994.
Weber 1958.
193
Spruyt 1994; Schendel 2005; Schendel and Abraham 2005.
194
Schendel and Abraham 2005, chap. introduction citing Adler.
195
Fukumi 2008.
196
Chua 2004, 1:.
192
57
of the silk roads connecting east and western civilizations, the nineteenth century nation-states
through colonialism expanded markets and resource extraction world-wide.
Keohane and Nye described “complex interdependence” in Power and Interdependence
in the 1980’s and argued that the processes had begun following the Second World War.197 The
current period intensified following the fall of the Soviet Union, the opening of the east-bloc
states and economies, the “death” of communism as a viable alternative to capitalism,198 and the
improvement of communications technologies.199
While many have argued in favor of the positive aspects of globalization, others like
Naím have urged policy-makers to recall the “dark side of globalization” manifested by illicit
networks.200 Middle classes are squeezed out particularly in Latin America where they have
difficulty competing with cheap Chinese labor (due to currency manipulation).201
Grayson
described how globalization’s cheapening of communications technologies has exposed the
impoverished youth in developing states like Mexico to the extreme opulence globalization has
provided, which, without education, they can never legally attain.202 This raises their sense of
“relative deprivation” and increases their likelihood to join drug trafficking organizations in an
attempt to attain the wealth they have been exposed to.203 States are weakening vis-à-vis licit and
illicit non-state actors and networks. This has re-raised the perennial issue in international
relations of the future of the international state system. Scholars have responded to the question
in a myriad of ways.
197
Keohane and Nye 2001, 3:.
Fukuyama 1992.
199
Friedman 2007, 1:.
200
Naím 2005.
201
Garrett 2004; Geoffrey 2004.
202
Grayson 2009a.
203
Gurr and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies. 1971;
Gurr 1993.
198
58
Mary Kaldor’s New and Old Wars argues that the line between criminality and civil war
is blurring in “new wars.” She uses Bosnia in the 1990’s as an example of the phenomenon.204
Weak State Arguments
The state can be viewed as a protection racket according to Gambetta.205 So too, goes the
argument of Charles Tilly in his analysis of the rise of the modern state in Europe. “War made
the state and the state made war.”206 When states are weak or failing, “alternate governance
structures” e.g. organized crime, warlords, corporations, mercenaries, etc., can arise to fill the
gap or exploit the weaknesses of the state as Clunan and Trinkunas argue.207 The following
elucidates some of the key authors who have addressed the issue of weak states and the rise of
organized crime.
Skaperdas provides a political economic argument suggesting that organized crime arises
to provide “protection” where there is a vacuum of state authority. He has provided extensive
formal models on Warlordism which describe the conditions under which warlordism arises.
Mafias can also be viewed as “alternative governance structures” according to Skaperdas and are
typically organized along hierarchical lines according to his analysis of the American Cosa
Nostra and other organized criminal groups. These mafias arise or are strengthened where state
authority is weak though they provide protection at “much higher costs” than we “normally
associate with modern governance.”208 He demonstrates that through prohibitionist policies
states choose to remove some of their own power to regulate illicit commodity flows. This is a
key point which many other scholars agree on, including: Francisco Thoumi, Peter Andreas,
204
Kaldor 1999.
Garzón 2008.
206
Tilly 1985; Tilly 1990.
207
208
Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993; Skaperdas 1992.
205
59
David Shirk and Jorge Chabat. At the root of illicit drug trafficking is the “prohibition” regime
which is embodied by the 40 year “war on drugs” declared by President Nixon.209 For Chabat,
the problems of the drug war could be reduced to a much less costly level if legalization,
medicalization or decriminalization policies were established in drug consuming states allowing
the state to focus on drug consumption as a public health issue.210
Andreas similarly argues that states have engaged in a never-ending cycle of increased
enforcement of borders in “a spectacle” designed to appease domestic constituencies. Ironically,
the increased enforcement shifts the nature and location of the trafficking of labor and drugs and
creates more difficult work for the law enforcement agencies tasked with enforcing the borders.
For Andreas the root cause of trafficking is a global prohibition regime on drugs and the discord
between neoliberal economic policies and the prohibition of the free flow of labor and illicit
goods.211
In the same vein, Gootenberg argues that state discourse empowers states vis-à-vis illicit
networks. It serves to define some commodities as “illicit” as a mechanism for asserting control
over territory. He takes a “commodity” view of illicit narcotics and points out that these
commodities, which covered their cost of freight as easily as jewels, had state borders
superimposed upon them in the 20th century.212
Schendel takes a different intellectual path in his argument that states are weakening or
were never as strong as they have purported to be. He defines “borderlands” as a “zone, or
region, within which lies an international border, and a ‘borderland society’ is a social and
209
Chabat Interview responses (Video) 2009b; Andreas 2001.
2009g; Grayson 2008b.
211
Andreas 2001.
212
Schendel and Abraham 2005, 107.
210
60
cultural system straddling that border.”213 “Borderland practices” “partially unbundle” “the
inherited model” --“the link between territory and sovereignty,” which the nation-state is
dependent upon because-- “they are based on ways of imagining power and space that differ
from the ‘heartland’ practices that underlie much social science theorizing.”214
Schendel’s
argument moves beyond the state’s conception of territoriality and suggests that in some regions
border cultures are created which re-conceptualize territorial boundaries.
A World of City-States?
Related to Schendel’s “borderlands” concept, author Moises Naím provides an important
framework for understanding the geography of state strength and weakness and warns of new a
new fundamental unit of political authority entering the international system. Naím argues that
there are “bright spots” within states which are comprised of “metropolises” and “dark” masses
where state authority is weak. In this model, power emanates from metropolises, usually state
capitals, but weakens in border regions.215
Feudalism
Another theoretical paradigm which attempts to explain the role of illicit networks in the
international system are models which compare organized criminal groups who can subvert
governance in whole or in part to Medieval Feudalism. Flores-Peres refers to “the feudalization
of the [Mexican] state,” for example in his dissertation El Estado en Crisis.216 Feudal arguments
generally compare organized crime’s control over terror or aspects of illicit economic life and the
213
Schendel 2005, 8.
Ibid., 4-5.
215
Naím 2005.
216
Perez 2005.
214
61
monarch’s of Medieval Europe who pluralistically shared authority with religious authority and
owed their serfs protection in exchange for the fruits of their labor.217
Feudal pluralism is analogous to the competition between states and organized
crime/PSINs in a multitude of ways. The state maintains its sphere of the licit and legal markets
while organized crime attempts to control the illegal and illicit markets. In between they share
plural authority in many places e.g., where agents of the state collude and benefit from the illicit
market profits and where organized crime attempts to legitimate itself by investing in licit/legal
businesses, financing elections, or, as in the case of Pablo Escobar, running for political office.218
Professor Edgardo Buscaglia, advisor to the United Nations Office of Crime
Prevention, has called this regionalization and fragmentation the “feudalization
of organized crime.” He defines this as the ‘capture’ of regional governments by
crime groups, a result of the central government’s inability to implement
policies in different areas, where authorities have been captured and it is
impossible for the central government to implement its programs. He says,
“…crime groups establish an alternative state where they control all of the
219
services.”
With this discussion of feudalism there comes a temptation to compare organized crime to
insurgency, “a political-military attempt to overthrow an existing state.”220 While there are many
similarities between insurgencies and PSINs--including but not limited to, the use of violence,
terrorism, taxation, and extortion-- their end goals are different. Organized crime seeks to
weaken the state “parasitically,” while insurgencies seek to overthrow it all together, according
to Tom Shannon Under-Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric Affairs.221
There are
however examples of criminal organizations with political aspirations and insurgencies which
digress into criminality in whole or in part as discussed in the introduction.
217
Laski 2003.
Bowden 2001.
219
Garzón 2008, 104.
220
Beckett 2001; Brands 2009b; Jones 2008b.
221
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Merida Initiative.
Thomas Shannon 2007.
218
62
The state aggressively tries to reassert itself against the challenges posed by illicit
networks, as Peter Andreas argues in his book Border Games. The state spends ever more
money in a self-reinforcing cycle.222 Andreas makes a similar argument:
Borders are not eroding or remaining unchanged, but are being recrafted through
ambitious and innovative state efforts to territorially exclude CTAs [Clandestine
Transnational Actors] while assuring territorial access for “desirable” entries.223
But how can we conceptualize these state increases in border enforcement and their
impact upon the resilience of illicit networks? Adler, cited by Schendel, has provided two
models, “the capillary” and “the double-funnel,” to describe the global structure of trafficking
when states put increased pressure on borders. The capillary model is dominant when there is
limited state pressure on borders. In this scenario trafficking and smuggling operations tend to
be smaller in size but larger in number. They can be characterized as “mom and pop.” There are
a large number of them and as the term capillary suggests, they can smuggle illicit goods in very
small shipments. Once the state chooses to enforce its borders the capillary model is replaced by
the double funnel model.224
The double-funnel model is dominant when state pressure on borders is high (See Figure
5 below). In this scenario, the number of trafficking/smuggling organizations will decrease, but
their sophistication will increase. The increased sophistication required to smuggle goods across
borders that are enforced, (payments to corrupt border officials, high technology transportation
methods like tunneling, submersibles, low flying planes etc.) lends itself to a smaller number of
more sophisticated trafficking organizations to overcome high startup costs. This leads to a
funneling effect at borders, while production and distribution nodes remain large in number and
222
Andreas 2001, See Introduction.
Andreas 2003, 80.
224
Schendel and Abraham 2005.
223
63
diverse. Border trafficking models described by Adler give context to the environment in which
these illicit networks operate.225
Independently, Marcelo Bergman conceptualizes a similar double-funnel model. He uses
the model to explain why drug trafficking organizations choose to “funnel down” in transit to
avoid state interdiction strategies and subvert border enforcement. His finding is that in transit,
drugs and profits are concentrated in the smallest number of hands, those of traffickers and that
is the best way to avoid US interdiction efforts.226
225
226
Ibid.
Bergman 2010b; Bergman 2010a.
64
Figure 5.
Capillary and Double-Funnel Trafficking Models227
Capillary Model of Illicit Flows
Characterized by small diffuse
networks operating independently
(Schendel)
Porous State Border
Challenging the Double-Funnel
Trafficking Model
(Adler cited by Schendel)
Labor intensive at
point of distribution
Narrow and
Sophisticated
in transit
Enforced State
borders
Labor intensive at
point of production
227
Adler 1993; Schendel and Abraham 2005; Schendel 2005; Jones 2008b.
65
Combining the Double-Funnel Model and the Wheel Network
Figure 6 below, is an attempt to graphically demonstrate the compatibility between the
double-funnel model and the wheel network concept. It graphically demonstrates how Mexican
cartels provide the core trafficking nodes of networks. Figure 6 illustrates how a small number
of trafficking core nodes in transit countries can orchestrate a large number of distribution and
production nodes which are labor intensive. Wheel network nodes are positioned geographically
in distribution and production zones in “the funnel openings” of the diagram. The lack of wheel
“look” is simply a matter of diagramming. The current structure of PSINs in Mexico and that of
Colombia in the 1980’s and early 1990’s are best encapsulated by figure 6’s double funnel
model.
66
Figure 6. Combining the Double-Funnel Model and the Wheel Network
228
These cores are the most threatening to the state because they can accumulate and
concentrate resources. They are structural holes, meaning they occupy non-redundant positions
in the network. When core nodes are removed, wheel networks are disrupted. However, over
time these disrupted wheel networks reform into chain networks which are more efficient and
don’t threaten the state. This transition is depicted in Figure 7.
Figure 7 is an attempt to graphically demonstrate what many in Mexico, and likely the
Mexican government, hope is the structural end-state for trafficking in Mexico. The goal of the
current government strategy is to dismantle the large Mexican trafficking organizations through
228
Jones 2008b.
67
kingpin or decapitation strategies. This has resulted in increased levels of violence as the groups
engage in infighting resulting from leadership vacuums. The end-state desired has been achieved
in Colombia, where as Villenga has demonstrated, smaller organizations and networks which
have maintained “a low profile” that do not threaten the state or its political elites have become
the dominant business strategy.229
For Arquilla and Ronfeldt and also Michael Kenney this end-state is represented by the
concept of “chain networks.” For Adler these chain networks will still be limited in number but
not so limited as the current Mexican cartel system with seven large cartels and a number of
other smaller trafficking operations. Thus, for Adler it is still a double funnel model due to
border enforcement but the funnel is not as thin in the middle due to a larger number of
sophisticated networks.
Figure 7 is the structure of what that end-state might look like
combining the multiple models presented in the literatures on the structure trafficking in
Mexico.230
229
230
Vellinga 2004.
Kenney 2007b; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996a; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b; Adler 1993.
68
Figure 7. Combining the Double-Funnel Model and the Chain Network
231
Figure 7 illustrates that there is still a funneling in that a small number of sophisticated illicit
trafficking organizations in the overall system of increased border enforcement, but also shows
that trafficking nodes increase their specialization and become smaller to focus on specific
aspects of trafficking. This figure demonstrates the compatibility of the various models and
concepts within the various literatures. This model combines border enforcement literature with,
the internal structures of illicit trafficking organization literatures.
231
Jones 2008b.
69
When do the different figures apply? Figure 6’s double-funnel model applies when states
have begun enforcing borders pressuring criminal activity to move from small capillary mom
and pop organizations to centralized organized crime in the form of wheel networks. It is
centralized in that core nodes occupy controlling positions for production, distribution and
transportation nodes throughout the network.
Figure 7 demonstrates how, when state pressure
becomes sufficient, the hierarchical core wheel node networks are dismantled through
decapitation strikes and break into smaller more sophisticated chain network nodes that traffic
drugs efficiently but maintain a lower profile and do not threaten the state’s monopoly on
political power or force. Figure 7 encapsulates Colombia’s narco-trafficking structures after the
destruction of the Medellín and Cali Cartels.232
Summation
The categorization of scholarly works on illicit networks by (1) internal network
structure, (2) domestic network structure and (3) global network structures, are useful for
understanding the levels and units of analyses in illicit networks. This literature review has
demonstrated that the works relevant to illicit networks come from a myriad of disciplines
including: political science, criminology, sociology, economics, public policy, political
economy, business management, network theory and Latin American and other regional studies.
The three part levels of analyses division of the literature are ideal types with significant
overlap in practice. The “weak state,” “alternately governed spaces” and “feudalism” arguments
could be placed in both the domestic structure level and the global structural level depending on
what they emphasize or the breadth of their argumentation. They could be viewed as at the
domestic level because they describe the relationship of illicit networks with the state by carving
232
Bowden 2001; Ford 2007; Felbab-Brown 2009c.
70
out chunks of territory where state governance is weak. They can also be viewed as redefining
the international state system by introducing new units of analysis and challenging the centrality
of the territorially sovereign state in the international system.
Like so many of the works cited in this literature review this dissertation straddles the
conceptual divides of the divisions made in this literature review. It situates itself within the
internal
structure
literatures
due
its
independent
variable
of
(hierarchy/centralization) and the dependent variable of resilience.
internal
structure
However, because my
argument about the reaction of the state to PSINs emphasizes the domestic structural relationship
of the state to the illicit network, this is the critical level of analysis of the theory.
The
concluding chapter provides implications of the theory for long term globalization and the future
of the sovereign state system.
Figures 5, 6 and 7 demonstrated the compatibility of the first level of analysis of internal
structures and the second and third levels of analyses of domestic structure and state border
enforcement in a globalized political economic environment.
Figures 6 and 7 further
demonstrated how increased border enforcement and state confrontation can eventually
decapitate large cartels into smaller cartelitos that are more like chain networks than their
vertically integrated and hierarchical predecessors. These organizations will still be small in
number at border crossing points but will be increasingly specialized in smaller and more
specific aspects of trafficking. Adler’s model demonstrates how increased border enforcement
simply increases the power and strength of large criminal organizations forcing the migrants into
the hands of traffickers to whom they owe money in perpetuity. The hope is that Mexico will
follow the Colombian path. With sufficient and sustained pressure, the larger cartels will be
broken down into smaller, sophisticated and highly specialized cartelitos that the state can
71
manage.233 In the short term, the strikes against cartel heads have only appeared to make drug
trafficking in Mexico more violent.
By no means could this be considered an exhaustive illicit networks review of all
potentially relevant works, but rather this literature review provides a sampling of the most
relevant and respected works and authors on illicit network structures. The theoretical chapter
will provide important causal mechanisms and intervening variables to elucidate my argument
that the state reaction to PSIN business strategies is critical to understanding illicit network
resilience.
233
Garzón 2008.
72
Chapter 3:
Illicit Network Resilience: A Theory
“Dark” or “illicit” networks, also referred to as clandestine transnational actors (CTA’s)
include:
(1) terrorist networks like Al Qaeda, (2) Mexican drug trafficking organizations
(Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks) like the Arellano-Félix Organization (AFO), (3) prison
gangs like the Aryan Brotherhood and (4) street gangs like Mara Salvatruche (MS-13).234 These
“dark networks” threaten the security of states by directly challenging state governance and
flouting legal norms. Within the larger category of illicit networks are transnational criminal
organizations (TCO’s) or profit-seeking illicit networks (PSINs). These profit-seeking illicit
networks are particularly strengthened by the process of globalization which has added privately
available communications technology and increased economic interdependence to the
international sovereign state system.235 States have expended great resources attempting to
combat these networks to little avail.236 How do these networks structure themselves to be so
resilient? How can they be dismantled? Why do states attack some illicit networks and not
others?
There is an extensive literature which identifies “dark networks” and “netwar actors” as
threats to security.
In this literature, the network structure is identified as critical to
understanding why these networks survive. Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that flatter, headless, or
hydra-headed structures, will be more likely to survive because these structures are minimally
234
Chabot 2008; Andreas 2003; Milward 2003.
Naím 2005.
236
Manwaring 2007; Manwaring 2005; Manwaring 2009.
235
73
impacted as leadership is removed.237
Illicit networks face incredible threats to their survival.
They compete with the state, which has the ability to arrest or kill leadership figures as a regular
feature of business. They face violent threats from rival networks, which have the ability to
gather intelligence against them in the underworld.238
Utilizing the case of the Arellano–Félix Organization over its thirty year history, 239 this
dissertation inductively explains the relationship between profit-seeking illicit network structure,
defined in terms of degree of hierarchy or “flatness” (independent variable) and resilience
(dependent variable) in profit-seeking illicit networks.240 It began with two simple hypotheses:
1) flatter structures (independent variable) would increase resilience (dependent variable), and
the converse 2) more hierarchical structures (independent variable) would reduce resilience
(dependent variable).
In the course of research, both archival and interview-based, the business strategy of the
PSIN was identified as a critical explanatory variable and an argument of profit-seeking illicit
network resilience emerged based on how the host-state reacts to profit-seeking illicit networks.
The AFO illustrates that when illicit networks fragment, they do so along the lines of varying
business strategies.
When those business strategies are territorial or extortion-based, civil
society, the state and rival illicit networks ally against them to eliminate the threat they pose to
the business and security environment.
States maintain large potential economic advantages over PSINs, but can only marshal
them when political will of the state, society and civil society are galvanized against illicit
networks. For example, Mexico’s gross domestic product (GDP) is 1 trillion dollars, while total
237
Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b.
Kenney 2007b; Kenney 2007a; Bailey and Chabat 2002.
239
Blancornelas 2002, 1:.
240
Kenney 2007b.
238
74
Mexican drug trafficking profits are estimated at 18-39 billion dollars.241 Assuming properly
funded security institutions, the state should easily trounce profit-seeking illicit networks in
Mexico.242 Explaining why the Mexican state and states generally target some profit-seeking
illicit networks and not others is the focus here.243
Typologizing Illicit Networks
I posit that there are three ideal types of illicit networks; (1) insurgent and (2) transactional and
(3) territorial profit seekers. The following is a description of the characteristics of each.
1. The Insurgent Network
The first is characterized by insurgency defined as a political movement attempting to
overthrow a state through the unconventional use of force. Terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda that use terrorism as a “logic of action” are included in this type, but so are more
traditional insurgencies that use terrorism as “a method of action” while retaining their
“mass base of support.” The presence of political ideology is a critical characteristic in
defining insurgent illicit networks; though alone it is insufficient. This type includes
religious and ethno-nationalist networks.
The relative importance of the political ideology must be evaluated in relationship
to the illicit network’s profit-seeking activities. This can only be done qualitatively and
on a case-by-case basis; though quantitative metrics would also be useful for evaluation
of each illicit network.
The relative strength of various cells within the network,
assuming it can be defined as a single network with a coherent identity, is also important
to the evaluation of insurgent illicit networks.
241
2008a; 2008; 2010u.
Mexico generates less than 9% of GDP in taxation. That is the lowest rate in Latin America with the exception
of Haiti. 40% of government revenues are derived from the state oil monopoly PEMEX. 2010f.
243
2008f.
242
75
The focus of this project is not on insurgent illicit networks, but on profit-seeking
illicit networks, which comprise the base of the triangular continuum in the model below.
76
Figure 1.
A Three Part Illicit Network Typology
Insurgent
Transactional
(Profit-seeking)
Territorial
(Profit-seeking)
Explaining why the state reacts to insurgent networks is simple; the state is directly challenged
and threatened by insurgent violence. Insurgents seek to overthrow the state through violence,
which challenges the state’s “monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”244 Insurgent networks
attempt to delegitimize the state and limit the state’s “domestic control” calling into question its
sovereignty.245 Whether the state is democratic or authoritarian is irrelevant to a strong state
response to an insurgency. Rather the success of the insurgency will depend on its strength
versus the state. The state’s relationship with primarily profit-seeking illicit networks is far more
complex. Why does the state attack some profit-seeking illicit networks and not others?
Two Profit-Seeking Illicit Network Types246
The business strategy of profit-seeking illicit networks can be divided into two camps, the
transactional and the territorial. The “transactional” business strategy focuses on trafficking,
244
Weber 1958.
Krasner 1999.
246
The observation of the different business strategies is attributed to an unnamed Mexican government source in a
recent Economist article: 2010j.
245
77
utilizes sophisticated businessmen and college graduates, eschews violence where possible and
attempts to maintain a “low profile.” On the other hand, the territorial model focuses on taxing
the plaza or territory they control. They also traffic drugs but “diversify” into kidnapping,
human trafficking, firearms trafficking, extortion, taxing illicit activities, the domestic
distribution of drugs, etc. These models are ideal types and illicit networks can be viewed as
being on some point on the continuum between them according to the proportion of these various
activities in the network. No profit-seeking illicit network perfectly embodies all of the business
strategy characteristics, but some come very close and a list of which illicit networks generally
fall where in Mexico is provided in appendix Q.
1. The Transactional Type
The ideal type of the transactional illicit network focuses entirely on the business of
trafficking and laundering the proceeds.247 Transactional traffickers hide their wealth
behind front businesses. At its extreme a transactional PSIN is a single, flat trafficking or
money-laundering cell with one layer of management.
Transactional illicit networks are
the most difficult to identify and study because they can appear entirely licit.
Transactional PSINs tend to corrupt higher levels of government. In democratic
federal systems, they target federal officials. Transactional profit-seeking illicit networks
tend toward the use of violence only to fend off rival traffickers instead of using it against
the local population. Due to the need for specific trafficking routes, even transactional
247
Ideal types are a staple of political science. The most famous example in political science is Weber’s use of
typologies to describe where legitimacy is derived. He argued all authority was provided by some combination of
three types, “charismatic,” “legal” and “traditional.” No individual case would perfectly fit this model, as they were
“ideal types” like Plato’s “forms.” Ideal types are nonetheless useful for understanding sources of authority or in
this case, business strategies and their different implications for governance.
Weber 1958.
78
PSINs have some territorial elements, but they do not make money extorting the local
population; instead extorting illicit actors and trafficking drugs through the region.
Transactional PSINs focus on bribing higher levels of government like the
military and federal police, while state and local police tend to be bribed more by
territorial cartels which are more likely to be in contact with municipal police. If the
argument presented here holds true we would expect the arrest of illicit network members
to be higher among territorial PSINs that use teenagers as low level extortionists and are
unable to establish relationships with the state because of their violent territorial business
strategies. Also, transactional PSINs or transactional cells of PSINs should be arrested at
lower rates and should bribe higher level government officials if the model holds.
Transactional PSINs may dominate a territory, but do not make their money from
the predatory extraction of taxes from that territory. Rather they profit from trafficking
illicit narcotics through the territory. They may tax for this service but that taxation
typically does not extend into the licit world. On the other hand, territorial PSINs have a
comparative advantage in the provision of violence and extract taxes from their territory.
As a result, territorial PSINs tend to be more territorial and utilize territory in a more
predatory fashion.
Transactional PSINs in Mexico also assist local Mexican licit
businesses in exchange for piso. These are not extortion schemes, but actual business
services including the provision of government permits, protection from predatory police
officers, business connections, among many other potential forms of assistance.248 The
violent externalities produced by transactional traffickers are located primarily in
consumption states and among drug-abusers in the transit country (an increasing problem
248
2011b.
79
in Mexico).
These are not inherently violent externalities, but rather corrosions of
democratic institutionalization and the rule of law.
2. The Territorial Type
Territorial profit-seeking illicit networks focus on the control of territory that can
generate revenue through taxation; much like the state itself. These profit-seeking illicit
networks traffic drugs through their territory, but may also rely on taxing other traffickers
using their plaza, extortion, kidnapping, taxing legal and illegal street vendors among
other illicit activities. Territorial PSINs expand and diversify their activities. These
networks are more hierarchical because they must police their territories to prevent other
smugglers from trafficking without paying the cuota. Thus, they need more enforcers
and managers. Their primary commodity is the control of taxable territory.249
The
negative externalities of territorial PSINs are borne primarily domestically through
violence and extortion.
The territorial traffickers use violence to demonstrate that the state lacks control
over territory and is incapable of governing or they use it to send messages to rival
traffickers. They utilize symbolic violence and arranged bodies with narco-mensajes to
convey messages to the local population, state agencies and rival traffickers. They stage
acts of violence that are public and do not result in profits to demonstrate a lack of
government control.250
The profit-seeking illicit network’s business strategy is structurally determined by
its “comparative advantages in violence,” number of enforcers, degree of hierarchy, local
knowledge and connections, ability to negotiate, business connections among other
249
250
Tilly 1990.
Booth and Fainaru.
80
characteristics of the individuals comprising the illicit network. PSINs often cannot
consciously choose business strategy types, rather they have certain advantages and they
exploit them. As the case study will demonstrate, the Teo faction of the AFO tried to
become more transactional but with heavy overhead and limited connections needed to
continue kidnap activities despite the backlash.
The business strategy also has a
“feedback loop” relationship with degree of hierarchy in the networks because the high
number of enforcers to patrol territory requires more managers and therefore more
degrees of hierarchy.251 Territorial PSINs tend toward higher levels of organizational
hierarchy while transactional PSINs tend toward flatness as the figure below
demonstrates.
Figure 8. The Relationship between Hierarchy and Business Strategy in Illicit Networks
Low Degree
of Hierarchy
“Flat”
Transactional
Business
Strategy
High Degree
of Hierarchy
Territorial
Business
Strategy
252
The most manpower intensive need of territorial PSINs is the number of enforcers needed
to control a given territory.
Enforcers must be recruited and trained along disciplined,
hierarchical police and military lines. They mimic the organizations from which they buy
training through corrupted, military, police and state-trained mercenaries, as we will see with the
251
252
Easton 1965; Klotz and Lynch 2007.
Beith 2010.
81
AFO. Transactional illicit networks can actually increase their profits by limiting “overhead” by
employing a fewer individuals, but more highly trained and sophisticated agents and utilizing
corruption to buy hierarchy from the state apparatus.
Where labor is needed, it can be
subcontracted.
Most Mexican PSINs have a minimum of five layers of management and are central
nodes in wheel networks.253 Though illicit networks with the same level of hierarchy can be
found choosing both business strategies, transactional illicit networks with high levels of
hierarchy in terms of their layers of management tend to be much larger in size relative to
similarly hierarchical territorial illicit networks. For example, the Sinaloa cartel is primarily
transactional in character but uses many “go-betweens” to protect core members of the network.
It could be argued to have a higher level of hierarchy. This is due to its vast size in comparison
to other Mexican PSINs.254 Transactional illicit networks also tend to increase their degree of
hierarchy in response to challenges with territorial profit-seeking illicit networks, rather than
choosing to increase hierarchy in a vacuum.255
Most profit-seeking illicit networks are hybrids between the territorial and the
transactional types with varying proportions of each. The following list presents twenty-six key
business strategies of territorial versus transactional PSIN types.
253
Jones 2009.
Marosi 2011; Richard Marosi and Ellingwood 2010.
255
For example, the Sinaloa cartel recruited very heavily from local gangs and significantly increased its size to
battle the Juarez cartel and its armed wing La Linea for control of the Juarez plaza.
2009f; AP 2010.
254
82
Table 1. Territorial Versus Transactional: Business Strategy in 26 Areas
Business Strategy in 26
Areas
Territorial Traffickers
Transactional Traffickers
1. Treatment of Territory
Focus on control and taxation of
territory
More hierarchical due to need for
enforcers
Emphasis on trafficking over territorial
control
Flatter structures, but can be hierarchical.
A smaller number of highly sophisticated
individuals
Lifestyle low profile (No conspicuous
consumption). Or lifestyle is explained by
front-businesses
Extorts illicit businesses but profits mostly
from trafficking drugs. Establishes norms
of paying piso extortion tax regularly for
illicit businesses.
Kidnappings limited to enforcing drug
debts and those involved in crime.
Sometimes utilized when network is profit
starved always high profile targets.
More emphasis on corrupting police or
evading altogether. Pays off high level
commanders.
Focus on bribery of officials over
symbolic violence or threats but will use
symbolic violence in confrontations with
territorial traffickers.
Greater funding of political campaigns
especially the federal and state levels, but
also local.
Experienced managers. Typically have or
hire some business, law, accounting
degrees, etc.
Fewer enforcers more smugglers and
intelligence. Enforcers focus on
bodyguard and security operations.
Large organizations but higher profit
margins due to relative numbers involved
Less violence toward society, some
violence directed at rival traffickers, more
likely to use intelligence to tip state
security apparatus off to rivals.
2. Degree of Hierarchy
3. Profile
Flashy lifestyle (Gold Plated Guns)
4. Extortion as a source of
profit
Extortion of illegitimate and
legitimate businesses used en masse.
Extortion of petit bourgeoisie.
5. Kidnapping
Kidnappings of citizens uninvolved
in underworld. Lower intelligence
on targets. Targets held for short
periods of time.
Killing police officers in large
numbers
6. Violence against police
7. Use of symbolic
violence
8. Political campaigns
Symbolic violence use very heavy.
Cutting off heads. Youtube.com
postings, public hangings of bodies
from bridges.
Some funding of local political
campaigns
9. Management
Typically younger leadership often
more violent (Ephemeral)
10. Use of enforcers
More enforcers
11. Size
Larger organizations in terms of
numbers of individuals involved
More violence toward society and
rival traffickers. More likely to have
street gun battles and come into
conflict with police or local turf
battles.
Profits primarily from:
Kidnapping/extortion and taxing
small smugglers for use of territory
12. Violence toward
society
13. Where profit comes
from
14. Retail drug sales
15. Domestic use of street
gangs
More retail drug sales in their
territory
More use of local street gangs
domestically
83
Profits from trafficking drugs, money
laundering, financing drug production,
high profile kidnap victims, legitimate
businesses, front-businesses, government
contracts, etc.
Fewer retail drug sales in their home
territories
Lower use of local street gangs
domestically
16. Crime rates
17. Corruption/Bribes
18. Adaptability
19. Alliance Stability
Higher crime in areas controlled by
these groups
Tend to bribe lower levels of
government (Local Cops)
Less adaptable in smuggling
methods but able to diversify
activities to compensate.
Fewer alliances; less stable. More
likely to annex local street gangs and
change their identity.
Lower crime rates in areas controlled by
these groups
Tend to bribe higher levels of government
(Federal/State)
Highly adaptable in smuggling methods.
More alliances with other groups.
Alliances more stable and based on
business interests. More likely to create
"federations" with other transactional
cartels.
More sophisticated trafficking methods,
sea-submersibles, ventilated tunnels, air
transport, all of which may require large
initial investments, etc.
Greater capital reserves, less need to
diversify criminal activity.
20. Trafficking Method
Sophistication
Sophistication of trafficking
dependent upon smuggling group
being taxed
21. Capital Reserves
Less capital reserves resulting in a
diversification of criminal activity to
cover overhead of enforcers when
drug profits drop due to market
forces or border enforcement.
22. Violence toward state,
society and political elites
Highly violent threat to state, society
and political elites
Lower violent threat to state, society and
political elites. Dangerous corrupting
influence
23. Investment in local
population
Invest heavily in local population
Invest heavily in local population and
central government corruption
24. Use of Firepower
Heavy emphasis on firepower
Lower emphasis on fire power
25. Assassination
Strategies
Random assassination strategies
(Bounties for killing any police
officers, etc.)
Strategic assassinations targeting specific
high ranking individuals for specific
reasons
26. Terror Bombings
More likely to engage in terror
bombings
More likely to ally with state than use
terror
84
Resilience Definition
Resilience is defined as “the ability to survive a disruptive event.”256 For a PSIN like the
Arellano-Félix Organization, daily operations are fraught with the potential for disruptive events
including: the arrest of key leaders, lieutenants or even the killings of leadership figures.
Seizures of large shipments of drugs can also potentially bankrupt core nodes of the PSIN.
Recognizing that disruptive events are a regular feature of life in this type of PSIN is insufficient.
The variable must be defined and the circumstances under which a network can be shown to be
more or less resilient, even if only ex-post facto disruptive events, must be delineated.
A significant weakness in the existing literature on resilience is that it is treated as a
simple “either-or” variable; the organizations survived or it did not.257 Rather, it has a significant
degree of variance. We intuitively know that there are levels of survival. An individual can
survive a traumatic event but go into “shell-shock” or an individual can treat deep traumas as
empowering events like cancer survivors who complete long chemotherapy treatments with hope
and optimism despite enduring traumatic pain and illness.
Resilience applies not just to
individuals but to networks and hierarchies as well.258
The bifurcated treatment of resilience is an incorrect and problematic gap in the theory
and literature. The variable must be better elucidated to include variance and increase validity.
My contribution to the literature is to present a continuum based typology of “levels of
resilience.”259 The chart below demonstrates the basic types and a discussion of each is provided
below.
256
Chabot 2008.
Ibid.
258
Ibid.
259
Ibid.
257
85
Figure 9. Resilience Typology
Resilience Typology
Survive Intact
Restructure
Fragmentation
Dissolution
1. Survive Intact. After a disruptive event an organization can survive intact without requiring
major reorganization to survive.
This is the highest level of resilience.
It is best
characterized by contingency theory designs, which argue that organizations that maintain
highly adaptive structures as a matter of standard operating procedure will be most adaptable
and resilient. Any reorganization following a disruptive event is thus a matter of course and
does not constitute a major restructuring of the organization. Organizations with this type of
amorphous design are highly adaptive but may be weaker in responding to anticipating
predictable threats that a reified hierarchy could be incredibly efficient at combating.260
2. Restructuring. The second highest level of resilience is the survival of a disruptive event
resulting in the need to restructure. This could be the organization’s internal recognition that
to prevent similar events from occurring in the future or to better withstand them, major
organizational changes must be made. Or it could be the result of a major disruption within
the organization. In Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks, which are central nodes in
wheel networks, disruptive events can include the arrest or killings of key leadership figures.
260
Rothstein 2006.
86
These events can force the rapid restructuring of PSINs, or worse, violent fragmentation of
the PSIN.261
3. Fragmentation. Fragmentation is defined here as when a disruptive event leads to a splitting
of the illicit network into smaller parts.
This often occurs along lines of functional
specialization, e.g. smugglers and enforcers split from each other.262 These splits are usually
violent forms of internecine conflict with factions vying for control of the formerly unified
whole. Thus, it is a lower level of resilience than peaceful restructuring.
4. Dissolution. Finally, central/core nodes or entire PSINs can be dissolved. This can be the
result of state action in which the entire node is systematically dismantled beyond
recognition.
By “wrapping up” entire organizations through complex tedious and
sophisticated law enforcement operations this can be achieved. This has been carried out
effectively against organized crime networks in the United States.263
Resilience of Profit-Seeking Illicit Networks
Different profit-seeking illicit networks structures and business strategies trigger
different state responses.
More territorial PSINs with business strategies that focus on
kidnapping and extortion in addition to a lesser amount of drug trafficking will be targeted by
states and their allies and thus have lower resilience. Given that states continue to have “the
261
Splintering or fragmentation can lead to an increase in violence in multiple ways. New organizations cannot
operate based on the “reputation for violence” once maintained by the original organization. This requires the reestablishment of a “reputation for violence” which can increase violence. The original organization, e.g. Cosa
Nostra in the US, often times does not actually have to kill because the threat of violence is credible due to their
established reputation.
Further, violence may then occur and be advertized in more shocking and dramatic ways in an effort to
intimidate and establish that reputation for violence. Central nodes of trafficking wheel networks are often
characterized more as protection rackets than smugglers. Pablo Escobar was not a clever entrepreneur adapting new
trafficking and smuggling methods. Rather, he coerced other entrepreneurs into his organization as they discovered
new routes and methods. He can be credited with providing new resources to empower these smuggling cells by
offering access to his airstrips, etc. but he was not the originator of smuggling techniques.
Skaperdas 2001; Privette 2006; Sabet 2011; Bowden 2001.
263
Privette 2006.
262
87
preponderance of power in the international system” based on economic size, moral legitimacy
and the resources of state allies, and assuming that to be true for the foreseeable future, the most
critical factor for the survival of a profit-seeking illicit network is its relationship to its hoststate.264
Territorial PSINs tend to have more members to patrol territory and thus require more
managers or more “hierarchy.” In periods of profit deprivation they must pay their members and
thus must diversify their criminal activities. The criminal activities they choose rely on taxing
their territory through extortion and intelligence activities typically associated with mafias.265
Territorial PSINs challenge the logic of the “territorially sovereign state” and create a societal
backlash through extortion activities that prompts a strong state response. States tend to view
territorial PSINs as common threats, increasing the likelihood that states will cooperate with each
other and transactional PSINs against this challenge to the dominant unit of the international
system.266
No illicit network is perfectly resilient, but some are more resilient than others. Mexican
profit-seeking illicit networks are highly resilient. They survive under tremendous pressure, but
with sufficient state resources applied against them, they can crumble. The state rarely applies
the necessary resources against illicit networks and is vastly limited, in bringing resources to
bear efficiently against them. The Arellano-Félix Organization is an example of this lukewarm
reaction from the state. While the AFO has fragmented, its remnants may be more resilient than
264
Waltz 2001; Waltz 1979.
Resa Nestares 2003.
266
Spruyt 1994.
265
88
before due in part to their new business strategies which allow for a modus vivendi with the state
through corruption and higher profits.267
267
Jones 2009.
89
Figure 2.
The State Reaction and Profit-Seeking Illicit Network Resilience
Type of ProfitSeeking Illicit
Network
State
Reaction
Transactional
Weak
Level of
Resilience
Survive Intact
Reorganize
Territorial
Strong
Fragment
Dissolution
The Life Cycle of Profit-Seeking Illicit Networks (PSINs)
The figure above, describes the inputs of the business strategies, the state’s reaction to
them, and the output of the level of resilience. It graphically illustrates how the state reaction is
weak against transactional networks, which results in the survival or reorganization of the illicit
network. Whether the PSIN survives intact reorganizes, fragments or dissolves depends upon
the strength of state institutions and the reaction from the state it has triggered.
Often times, large PSINs will contain both territorial and transactional cells. When
attacked by the state or rivals through “decapitation strikes,” they fragment along transactional
and territorial lines and the process begins anew. The surviving networks will again trigger a
powerful or weak state reaction based up on their new business strategies and the process
continues in an evolutionary fashion.
90
Along the bottom half of the chart we can see the path of the territorial PSINs. A
stronger state reaction is induced by these PSINs reducing their resilience. Depending upon the
state’s security apparatus capability, that reaction will be sufficient to dissolve or fragment the
PSIN. The figure above also illustrates the iterative nature of the theory. The resilience of a
PSIN is constantly being tested in its competition or collusion with the state and other rival
networks.
The top half of the figure shows the path of transactional PSINs. Based on the state
reaction against them they will be forced to restructure or survive intact. Again, the strength of
the state reaction and the quality of the security and judicial institutions will determine whether
the PSIN must restructure or survive intact.
This theory focuses on the host state reaction to PSINs not the reaction of other affected
states like consuming nations where the negative externalities of drug consumption occur. These
states are also likely to react more aggressively toward territorial illicit networks depending upon
the how much territorial extortion characterizes the PSIN’s business strategy.
Democratic
consolidation reduces the state’s threshold for tolerance of even primarily transactional PSINs.
However, the absence of extortion and violence from transactional PSINs means that even
democratically consolidated states will react with priority to territorial PSINs that focus their
efforts upon the extraction of taxation over a given territory through extortion, kidnapping and
murder. These violent activities also engender greater media and civil society responses, further
galvanizing the states’ reaction against territorial PSINs.
91
How Civil Society Galvanizes the State Reaction
The typology provided, helps us to understand the analytics behind the differing state
reactions to profit-seeking illicit networks by understanding the networks and identify
intervening variables and causal mechanisms to build a theory. There are an infinite variety of
organized criminal networks with an infinite variety of potential business strategies and network
architectures. Some typologizing is necessary. This project began by assessing the PSIN’s
degree of hierarchy, but found that while hierarchy correlated in important ways with business
strategy, the business strategy of the PSIN was far more important as an explanatory variable.
The correlation with hierarchy was important, but because of the diversity of organized criminal
networks, it was more difficult to produce a generalizable argument on the basis of hierarchy. In
the course of investigation business strategy became the preferred variable.
Territorial PSIN violence is caused by multiple factors including young and
inexperienced leadership figures, a comparative advantage in violence, and limited drug
trafficking connections. They have a comparative advantage in violence because they take with
them low level enforcers in their splits with larger PSINs. Their labor force makes any decision
to become transactional structurally unattainable and thus they are structurally limited to the
extortionist business strategy until they can establish strong transactional trafficking and political
contacts.
The violence resulting from intra and inter-cartel conflict creates an intolerable situation
for society by increasing homicide, kidnap and general crime rates. Civil Society networks
pressure the state to react against territorial PSINs, which engage in extortionist and kidnapping
activities because they are the perpetrators of the violent “high impact crimes” civil society is
victim to. The violence is likely to be highly localized along trafficking corridors but aggregate
92
homicide rates and media attention will force national and local governments to react. When
extortion and kidnapping reach into the petit bourgeoisie, professional classes and political elites,
a critical mass of civil society is achieved; exerting strong pressure on the state and forcing it to
react. In some cases simply targeting political elites for kidnapping is sufficient to galvanize the
state apparatus against PSINs despite largely transaction compositions of those PSINs, e.g.
Colombia’s strong state reaction to the Medellín illicit network in the 1990’s.268
Many victims of kidnapping and extortion are state employees, officials and leadership
figures in addition to local businessmen. This increases the state’s propensity to respond to the
territorial PSINs. State and civil society are also supported by rival PSINs which are preyed
upon and in conflict with territorial PSINs. These are likely to be transactional PSINs, whose
members are likely to be closely socially tied to public officials and civil society in “networks of
complicity” and genuine social networks of “trust” and “kinship.”269
Lubricating this
relationship between the state and transactional illicit networks are the “high capital” reserves
and incredible profit to membership ratios these networks can achieve to corrupt public officials
and the state apparatus. These transactional PSINs are incentivized to provide intelligence to the
state coercive apparatus against their territorial PSIN rivals.270
As territorial PSINs become increasingly aware that the coercive apparatus has turned
against them, they are likely to become ever more desperate in their attempts to change the
relationship. With limited profits and capacity to corrupt, they often turn to terror bombings
against the police and members of the military. This further galvanizes the state, civil society
268
Pablo Escobar triggered a powerful reaction against his Medellín cartel from the US and Colombian governments
by targeting political elites and their children for death and kidnappings. His aim was political in nature however.
He wanted to change the Colombian constitution to outlaw extradition and offered to pay all Colombian social
programs with narcotics profits if Colombia would legalize cocaine. This would have made Colombia a pariah state
according to Charles Bowden. It should be noted that this is insurgent in orientation not territorial. Bowden 2001.
269
Scott 2000, vol. 2, chap. Introduction.
270
Sadiq 2009.
93
and coercive response against extortionist PSINs. Having only violence in their management
skill toolbox, territorial PSINs rely on terror-bombings, or the threat thereof, against the police
and symbolic violence against the population to cow both groups into submission. With the full
might of the coercive apparatus, the state, rival PSINs and even foreign governments against
them, territorial PSINs suffer from reduced resilience; resulting in fragmentation or dissolution.
The only situation in which territorial PSINs appear to be resilient is when the state is
sufficiently weak and they are sufficiently strong to supplant the state. This is rare but possible
failed states like Haiti and portions of Sudan and Somalia where, territorial PSINs and insurgent
PSINs take on governing characteristics and supplant the state.
The strength of state institutions and the level of democratic consolidation are critical.
Democratic consolidation has ameliorative affects on the state’s ability to control organized
crime. On the other hand if the state is so weak that it verges on failure or is failed, then the
extortionist PSIN might serve as a viable “alternative governance structure.”271 Cases of states
this weak are rare but possible. Consolidated democracies have less tolerance for illicit networks
of any kind and are more likely to reach across state borders to target their leadership. This is
politically feasible because the public in consolidated democracies supports strong anti-crime
efforts and is particularly willing to act aggressively and violate other state’s sovereignty when
their national security is threatened through acts like killing law enforcement.272
State
bureaucrats in all states are also more likely to increase and institutionalize cooperation with
271
One example of a PSIN killing a state law enforcement official is the 1985 killing of Enrique Camarena that
triggered a powerful US response. That US reaction resulted in the dismantlement of the Guadalajara Cartel or the
loose federation that had dominated Mexican trafficking. Shannon 1988.
272
94
foreign state counterparts when threatened by violent traffickers thus increasing the diffusion of
democratic values at the bureaucratic level.273
States maintain the preponderance of power in the international system. States like
Mexico have large GDPs and large potential tax bases to fund their own coercive apparatuses to
eliminate illicit networks.274 But the modern state has other social responsibilities like providing
for education, infrastructure and basic social services.275 This results in PSINs with greater
resources to divert toward intelligence and combating government efforts than the state
possesses.
Rival Illicit Networks as an Alternative Explanation
A counterargument to my state reaction argument of profit-seeking illicit network
resilience is that rival PSINs may be more relevant to destroying other PSINs than states. This is
certainly relevant to Mexico where levels of violence correlate strongly with inter-cartel warfare.
Profit-seeking illicit networks defeat their rivals by successfully allying themselves with the
state. This may explain why levels of violence in Mexico correlate with the presence of the
Mexican Army and inter-cartel conflicts.276 We may see transactional PSINs corrupting the state
and directing the state’s wrath toward territorial rivals.
Thus, my state reaction argument
addresses rival illicit networks’ effect on resilience through the inclusion of corruption as an
intervening variable possessed by transactional PSINs and their assistance to the state.277
273
Allison 1971.
Jones 2010c.
275
Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005.
276
Escalante Gonzalbo 2011.
277
Burnett and Penalosa; Burnett and Montagne; 2005.
274
95
Theoretical Implications of the State Reaction to Illicit Networks
If territorial illicit networks are less resilient because of the state’s reaction to them, then
surviving illicit networks will be largely, though not entirely, transactional and lacking in
political agenda, other than what is necessary to meet their business needs. The surviving low
profile transactional illicit networks will have grafted themselves into the state apparatus and
created areas of “plural authority” within the state largely in areas related to law enforcement and
trafficking routes.278 Where the size and strength of these networks is sufficient and the ability to
accumulate resources in core nodes of wheel networks is sufficient, then the illicit networks will
influence national as well as local politics. The ability to combat these illicit networks will have
less to do with military capability, than it will have to do with improved judicial institutions
prison system and other aspects of the legal system largely associated with consolidated
democracies. The profit concentrations of transactional illicit networks allow them to fund
political campaigns and insert themselves into the political system.279
As I began:
States and territorial profit-seeking illicit networks are enemies, because they are
so much alike. They are both: territorial, hierarchical, resilient, prone to
violence and funded by taxation. Thus, states will target territorial illicit
networks first reducing their resilience.
Territoriality leads to the
“diversification of criminal activities” like: extortion, kidnapping, oil theft,
retail drug sales all of which increase societal pressure on democratic states to
eliminate the threat.280 A societal backlash reduces territorial PSIN intelligence
278
Clunan and Trinkunas 2010, sec. Desmond Arias.
Interestingly corruption can actually provide a check against trafficker’s ability to buy elections. Government
contracts in developing countries are typically much larger than the actual cost of the contract. A portion of the
markup is then used to fund political campaigns in an effort to garner more contracts. In this fashion, it is
government money which funds elections and mitigates the effects of drug money on the political process by
decentralizing the sources of corruption. 2011b; Arias 2006b.
280
Kidnappings in Mexico have become so widespread as to include “virtual kidnappings” in which territorial
PSINs or independent kidnap cells/networks who have not kidnapped anyone call a victim and claim to be holding a
friend or family member. They attempt to extort a smaller ransom as rapidly as possible; sometimes in as little as 15
minutes. Kidnapping in Tijuana became so rampant that by 2008 doctors and engineers (middle-class professionals)
were targeted for kidnappings so heavily that the city’s doctors threatened a strike.
Lacey; Conery 2009.
279
96
gathering capabilities and weakens them vis-à-vis the state and other illicit
networks.281
Periods of fragmentation and confrontations with the state, speed up the process of
“natural selection” between transactional and territorial PSINs. When illicit networks fragment
along their lines of functional specialization, the result is warring territorial and transactional
factions. Young inexperienced leadership will often choose to meet violence with violence and
will face an ever-increasing threat from the state.282 If strong enough, territorial PSINs will be
able to withstand the onslaught of the state and, if the state is weak enough, provide a viable
“alternate governance structure.”283
Transactional PSINs will not emerge from these conflicts unscathed, but will have
increased cooperation with the state through corruption and new tactics focused on “laying
low.”284 The surviving transactional PSINs may even have increased profits as they have reduced
their enforcer squad ranks and renewed focus on trafficking of illicit commodities and moneylaundering. Transactional PSINs are more resilient than territorial PSINs when state institutions
are strong because they challenge the state less and are more capable of corrupting state
institutions and carving a modus vivendi.285 On the other hand, territorial PSINs are typically
larger, more hierarchical networks that are more capable of directly challenging the state’s
“monopoly on the legitimate use of force.”286 Territorial PSIN are the most threatening to the
state and thus are least resilient when state institutions are strong. However, state institutions are
often weak in developing states and during democratic transitions. These vulnerable states are
281
Introduction page 1.
Felbab-Brown 2009a.
283
284
Jones 2009.
285
Shirk and Astorga Forthcoming.
286
Weber 1958.
282
97
often assisted by neighboring states in their efforts to police borders and combat illicit non-state
actors.287
It must also be understood that the territorial and transactional strategies are ideal types
and most profit-seeking illicit networks contain varying elements of the two models. Thus,
understanding these illicit networks must be achieved by assessing the available data on their
behaviors, structures and assessing how strongly they correlate to these typological models. The
first empirical chapter assesses the Arellano Felix organization along the lines of the variables
described here to test my state reaction argument.
In Colombia and Mexico an expression has arisen to describe the corrupting strategies of
PSINs, “plata o plomo,” “the bullet or the bribe.” It refers to the inducing and deterrent
strategies utilized in the coercive repertoire of PSINs. The more a PSIN relies on extortion and
threats, the more it threatens the society, civil society and the state.288 That threat triggers a
strong response, which if the state apparatus is strong enough, will reduce the resilience of the
PSIN by forcing it to restructure or dissolving it entirely by arresting all of the network members
or killing them. Transactional PSINs which rely more heavily on plata are more resilient;
particularly in transit states like Mexico where the negative externalities of transactional PSINs
are borne primarily in other states and the state is highly corruptible.
287
288
2010d; Danelo; 2010f; Cook, Rush, and Seelke; Lacey 2010; Johnson 2008.
Bowden 2001.
98
Chapter 4
Methodology
The following chapters will provide a historical case study of the Arellano-Félix
Organization which seeks to explain the relationship between the illicit network’s business
strategy and resilience. My goal in this chapter is to describe the methodology used to develop
and refine existing network and organizational theory. My dissertation is a typological theory
project, which integrates historical institutionalism and process-tracing to develop and test the
proposed relationship between business strategy and resilience.289
I began by assessing the relationship between the degree of hierarchy and resilience. I
was forced to change the independent variable of the dissertation when, upon analysis of the case
study, I found that business strategy was far more important to resilience than hierarchy; though
as discussed in the previous chapter, high levels of hierarchy and territorial business strategies
are correlated with each other. In this chapter, I will first describe the case design, methods
utilized and the last half of the chapter will discuss how I collected and analyzed the interview
data while conducting fieldwork in Mexico over the course of nine months.
289
Ragin 2000; George and Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997.
99
Case Selection
The Arellano-Félix Organization was considered the most powerful drug “cartel” in
Mexico in the 1990’s.290 It controlled the lucrative Tijuana-San Diego trafficking corridor into
the United States. It employed paramilitaries and used mercenaries to train their sicarios or hitmen. But since the early 21st century, due to strong US and Mexican government pressure
through the arrest of leaders, it was claimed by US and Mexican law enforcement that the AFO
was “nearly” dismantled.
Despite severe disruption and the fragmentation into internecine
conflict, it continues to operate.291 It provided variation in the independent and dependent
variables that allowed for validity. The case also resulted in the dissolution of one splinter
network that allowed the case to be used as microcosm for a larger universe of cases particularly
useful for the understanding of other DTO’s in Mexico.
The level of analysis is the relationship between Arellano-Félix Organization (Tijuana
Cartel) and the US and Mexican nation-states. The AFO can be viewed as a node “embedded” in
a larger drug trafficking network and to the extent that it is vertically-integrated including
processing in the Andes and distribution in the US, a network unto itself.292 The independent
variable business strategy is described in chapter three and is correlated to “flatness.” Kenney
defines degree of hierarchy in terms of the number of layers of management the network
possesses, which is the metric utilized here.293
290
Grayson 2009a; Grayson 2009b.
292
Granovetter 1983; Klotz and Lynch 2007; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006.
293
Kenney 2007b.
291
100
The Use of Typological Theory
My dissertation is qualitative and positivist in orientation.294 It defines the dependent
variable of resilience by creating a typology with variance in the Weberian tradition. His
typology was comprised of ideal types and recognized that in reality, leaders, be they individuals
or regimes, would derive their authority from some mixture of at least two or more of these types
of authority.295
The typology developed in this project gives the variable resilience variance by creating a
typology that conceptualizes the possible range of resilience following potentially disruptive
events, e.g. the killings or arrest of leaders, the seizure of drug shipments, inter-cartel conflict,
the loss of business contacts in source countries. The typology created has four-parts. At one
pole is (1) the survival of the network intact, followed by (2) restructuring, further followed by
(3) fragmentation or “splintering,” and finally at the far pole (4) dissolution. This typology is
described in-depth in the theoretical chapter.296 Continuum-based typologies may also be useful
for the development of future quantitative data collection and analysis.297
The hypothesized relationship between variables was that as flatness increases, so does
resilience; though business strategy was identified as a critical intervening variable of such
importance that it replaced degree of hierarchy as the independent variable (they correlate as
described in chapter three).
As the PSIN functions with fewer layers of management, its
resilience will move along the typologized continuum toward greater resilience.
I was forced to change my argument numerous times in the face of evidence leading me
to the belief that inductive and deductive distinctions are false. My dissertation began by looking
294
Van Evera 1997.
Weber 1958.
296
See chapter three.
297
George and Bennett 2005.
295
101
at data and studying a Mexican DTO in terms of its hierarchy and resilience. I then tested
various hypotheses within the data I collected. Those hypotheses were often disproven, but were
replaced or tweaked; then they were tested. Only then was an argument about the business
strategy of an illicit network increasing or decreasing resilience developed. To say that one does
not theorize until one has gathered all data is to say that one has not thought about one’s data.
To say that one understood one’s theory from the beginning and simply gathered data to test and
confirm it; is to lie.
Historical Case Studies
Historical case studies are rich sources of data for theory development.
Criminal
networks are inherently difficult to study because of how they mask communications and
consciously avoid detection.298 The efforts of law enforcement to capture criminal networks
including primary data sources like interrogations, extradition packages, wiretap transcripts,
among other sources of evidence allow for the creation of rich case studies. These case studies
can be mined for hypotheses and theory development through process-tracing methods.299
Due to the clandestine nature of these groups it is preferable to open “the black-box” of
the criminal network by using historical case studies to understand how the organization is
structured.300
Process-tracing is an effective methodological tool for understanding causal
relationships and finding prime causes or variables. It is commonly described as “opening the
black-box” of historical cases, an homage to the ability of “black-box recorders” in crashed
planes to explain the cause of the crash and allow to prevent future catastrophes.301
298
Chabot 2008.
300
Chabot 2008.
301
Elman and Elman 2001.
299
102
Process-Tracing
The empirical chapters use process-tracing in conjunction with historical institutionalism
to establish causal relationships between business strategy and resilience.302 In process tracing,
“the investigator traces backward the causal process that produces the case outcome, at each
stage inferring from the context what caused each cause.
If this backward process-trace
succeeds, it leads the investigator back to a prime cause.”303
According to George and Bennet,
The researcher attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed
outcomes. In process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival
documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal
process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the
304
sequence and values of the intervening variables.”
Process-tracing is compatible with typological theory development.305
It helps to identify
potential alternate hypotheses and causal mechanisms that would not otherwise be identified.
Further, process-tracing in conjunction with typological theorizing can overcome problems of
equifinality, when different causes result in the same outcome.
This iterative process of
inductive typological theorizing and process-tracing helped to identify new hypotheses, causal
mechanisms and intervening variables about theorized relationship between business strategy
and resilience.306
Historical Institutionalism
This historical institutional analysis of the AFO utilizes the concept of path dependency
to explain organizational stability and identifies critical junctures in the organization’s history to
explain change.
Path dependency is a concept borrowed from economics literature which
302
Van Evera 1997.
304
305
Ibid.
306
Ibid.
303
103
describes the tendency of organizations or institutions to maintain their structure or “path,”
especially if those tendencies were part of formative/nascent events. Critical junctures, defined
as major events, are capable of jarring the organization/institution loose from those paths.307
While this approach is conducive to rational-choice analysis, it is bounded by the concept
of “institutional isomorphism.”308 Rational choice theory argues that actors will make rational
decisions about the “expected utility” of choices. It conceptualizes a mathematical weighing of
the costs and benefits of different decisions and their respective payoffs.309 But rationality in
organizations can be bounded by:
limited information, transaction costs, and institutional
isomorphism (the tendency to conform to the existing institutional environment and mimic
surrounding organizations).310 Organizations have a tendency to adopt procedures and structures
from institutions with which they have contact and share information flows. In the case of the
AFO, we will see how the organization adopted territoriality and structures from state security
operations through the training it purchased from corrupted police, military and mercenaries.311
Data Collection
Data collection proceeded in two ways. First, archival research was gathered on the AFO
via primary sources. These sources included: newspapers/magazines in English and Spanish,
court documents including indictments and extradition packages prepared by the US government
for the Mexican government, television news coverage, analytical pieces from US and Mexican
scholars, and other internet sources.312 The Mexican weekly Tijuana magazine Zeta is well
307
Thelen 1999; Powell and DiMaggio 1991.
Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Peters 1999.
309
Schelling 1966.
310
Arrow 1974; Ibid.
311
Peters 1999; Tilly 1990.
312
Van Evera 1997.
308
104
known for its accuracy in reporting and its willingness to report on organized crime.313 Archival
research was limited to reputable news sources reporting on the AFO and court documents
directly related to the AFO and other related PSINs. No qualitative or quantitative analysis
software was used to analyze the data. Rather the data and historical narrative were created
through painstaking research and an actual reading of the research materials.
Second, interviews were conducted with law enforcement officials, reporters and
academics with experience studying the AFO. They were identified in the course of archival
research and snowball sampling methods in the initial phases. For a list of general titles of
interviews designed to protect their anonymity, see Appendix N.
Law enforcement interviews are particularly helpful because officers have direct contact
with traffickers and have built cases against the organization in question. Law enforcement
analysis of a drug-trafficking organization may in some ways be superior to trafficker interviews.
PSINs create extortion rackets, which control and tax smugglers throughout their territory. Thus,
smugglers are actually low-level functionaries, subject to coercion, with no knowledge or
understanding of the upper echelons of leadership.314 My empirical work encountered higher
levels of hierarchy within some nodes of the trafficking organization than other research which
looked exclusively at smuggler interviews.
This was because it included a broader law
enforcement view which included “enforcers” or cartel hit-men which are often larger in number
and require more training and organization. These organizations are also highly compartmented
throughout; another reason why low-level smugglers may not have the sense of the overall
313
Sabet 2011.
Caldwell 2007.
In one example, a successful marijuana smuggler was asked to smuggle cocaine for the AFO. He protested given
the increased danger and possibility of detection with cocaine. Members of the AFO took him to the desert and beat
two other smugglers in front of him as a warning. He immediately began smuggling cocaine for the organization.
314
105
structure of the organization that law enforcement has from analyzing the organization in
aggregate and interrogating key members of the AFO.
Interviews
The second aspect of research went beyond archival research to answer the inevitable
unanswered questions through interviews and field work in Tijuana, Ensenada, Mexico City,
Monterrey, Guadalajara, Washington, D.C. and the San Diego border area including: San Diego,
Chula Vista, San Ysidro and National City, California. Living in Tijuana, and Mexico City
provided me with important insights into the sociological impact of “the drug-war” violence, the
policies of the US and Mexican governments and the cartels themselves. In some cases where
data is lacking, public perception is just as important as numerical data.315
I chose law enforcement interview subjects based upon their expertise in prosecuting the
Arellano-Félix Organization and their willingness to be interviewed in accordance with
University Institutional Review Board procedures. I was careful to protect the identities of
interview subjects who did not have a public record of speaking on this issue and requested
anonymity. Snow-ball sampling methods helped to identify important new interview subjects.316
Interviewees forwarded the researcher’s contact information to potential interview subjects who
contacted the researcher. Law enforcement investigators literally “vouched” for me to other
investigators allowing me to expand my interview base.
I am forever indebted to my expert interview subjects, especially those in law
enforcement, who were willing to read my analysis to check it for accuracy and provide
suggestions. In this sense the project was iterative with follow-up interviews and reviews of the
315
Public perception in public opinion polls of violence reducing is very important especially when it for example
diverges from actual homicide statistics. Why did the perception change if the reality did not for example?
316
Van Evera 1997.
106
analysis. My affiliation with Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), allowed me to build
contacts among the researchers there, who in turn referred me to their contacts in the community.
This was an invaluable source of interview contacts and opened doors because they “vouched for
me” to the interview contacts. My experience at COLEF was one of the most rewarding
intellectual experiences of my life.
I also conducted interviews of Tijuana citizens. These included individuals who had paid
piso or cuota (extortion tax) on their legitimate businesses during the period understudy. This
allowed for the attainment of a sociological view of the impact of these illicit criminal networks.
It also allowed for the identification of cartel tactics which were relevant to the understanding of
structure of the network.
Trust was a key issue in conducting interviews on organized crime in an environment of
fear. I typically began interviews talking about myself, my credentials and who I knew in the
area that was a public figure the interview subject might know. My credentials as a COLEF
student and my business cards were helpful for entering buildings and legitimizing myself for
security guards at buildings. No interview subject asked for identification with the exception of
one Mexican government official.
Mexican culture relies heavily on trust through social
connections and being referred to interview-subjects by friends and family helped make
interviews possible. Many interviews were conducted in public places like local Starbucks cafes
or, if they were more comfortable, in their offices and even on occasion in their homes.
Another key factor that may have impacted levels of trust both adversely and positively is
my physical appearance. I am a white male of mixed European descent and I appear Irish at first
glance. I am an American who speaks Spanish with a slight accent but better than the average
gringo. I have blue-eyes and do not blend physically in Mexico despite its racial diversity.
107
Mexicans assume a guero with blue-eyes is foreign first and only allow the assumption to change
based on the quality of the individual’s Spanish. My Spanish is not good enough for that; though
no Mexican would ever tell me so. Indeed, Mexicans were more understanding of my imperfect
Spanish than many Americans would be of an accented English-speaker.
I am five foot ten
inches tall, making me of average height in the United States, but slightly tall in Mexico. I wear
my hair in a short-cropped almost military fade cut and keep my beard short and neatly trimmed.
I was regularly accused of being a CIA agent. In one interview it became a running joke
for the interviewees; who included: a former politician, a former government official and a
businessman/politico. They joked that on my way to the bathroom they would ask me to do a
flip to see if a recorder would fall out. My protestations that I was not a CIA agent only
emboldened their belief that I was indeed a spy. Finally, I told them that if I was a spy I would
have been able to pay them for the conversation, to which they laughed and one said “you don’t
have to pay us. We always talk about this!”
In another incident I went to Tijuana for a preliminary research visit to get “the lay of the
land” and establish research contacts. I was bitten by a dog. Later the owner told me that his
thought during the incident was “Oh no! [Dog’s Name] bit the FBI agent!” Fortunately, the dog
did not draw blood.
One morning at COLEF, I went into the office of a Mexican researcher and friend and
excitedly told her about an intellectual breakthrough in my dissertation. She got a sad look on
her face and said, “Nate this is so disappointing. All this time I thought you were a CIA agent.
But no CIA agent could fake being this excited about a dissertation.”
I got the sense that the unintended perception that I was CIA or a Federal Agent of the
United States did not hinder my interviews. At this time in Mexico, there was a real sense
108
among much of the population that the Mexican government was too corrupt or inept to gather
the kind of intelligence that was needed to fight Mexican drug cartels. The fact that the US
government was taking an interest in Mexico was viewed with ambivalence by the Mexican
population. On the one hand, the US government could effectively combat the narcos. On the
other hand, Mexicans feared the long term consequences for sovereignty.
I also anecdotally noticed a difference of opinion between Mexicans in the border regions
and Mexicans in Mexico City on sovereignty concerns. In Mexico City, US involvement was
viewed as a major affront to Mexican sovereignty. In border areas this was less the case. In
these regions where the citizenry had felt the pain of narco-violence, had a history of trade with
the United States and an established border culture, US involvement was viewed more benignly.
This was a purely anecdotal observation and of course I found those in both regions whose
opinions differed from the norm.
While in Tijuana, San Diego and Mexico City, I conducted in-depth interviews of AFO
specialists. These expert interviews included law enforcement that specialized in prosecuting
members of the AFO in both Mexico and the US, US and Mexican scholars who specialize in the
AFO, US and Mexican government officials who make American drug policy on Mexico. Indepth interviews allowed me to engage in back and forth with the subjects to clarify answers and
further develop data relevant to understanding the structure of the organization. I conducted
more than 32 in depth interviews of citizens and specialists focusing on the Tijuana cartel or
living in affected areas.317 More than 80 hours of in-depth interviews were conducted. Some of
the interviews included follow-up interviews over the course of six months in Tijuana from
January 2011-June 2011 and Mexico City from October 2010 to December 2010. A chart of
317
I am indebted to all interviewees but especially those in law enforcement who welcomed me into their
community and provided me with access to their important sometimes hermetically sealed world.
109
interviewee titles and a list of questions informing the dissertation can be found in Appendices
L-N.318
Some interviews were difficult if not impossible to attain, e.g. some law enforcement
agencies were more willing to grant interviews than others. These were largely high-level
institutional policies that prevented interviews. Public affairs officers appeared to be trained to
say “no” to students, while other agencies’ public affairs officers were forthcoming with
assistance. My philosophy in the research process was that when one door closed, I would
simply have to knock on another.
Informally, members of taskforces were able to arrange interviews with other members or
convey the opinions of co-workers whose agencies would not allow them to give interviews
because the results could become “discoverable” in future federal cases. I treated this kind of
indirect evidence as apocryphal unless it coincided with multiple confirmable sources.
US federal prosecutors were particularly sensitive to issues of discoverability.
Fortunately members of taskforces were willing to meet for anonymous interviews and were able
to inform the understanding of the hierarchy, business strategy and resilience of the AFO.
Law enforcement investigators were sensitive to people who were “not legitimate.”
Fortunately, early in the process I found an agent who was willing to informally discuss the
Tijuana cartel and was willing to “vouch” for me to other law enforcement agents. His trust
spread to other investigators. I was even invited to informal “success parties” celebrating the
arrest of key drug trafficking figures. Always aware of my lack of security clearance I would tell
318
I am indebted to the Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies and the department of Political Science at UC
Irvine for funding summer research in Tijuana and Washington D.C., the Institute for Global Conflict and
Cooperation for funding my nine months of fieldwork in Mexico and the Colegio de La Frontera Norte in Tijuana
for allowing me to affiliate with the University and utilize its resources without cost.
Caldwell 2007.
110
new interview subjects that I was not “cleared” and that I did not want sensitive information.
They appreciated my candor and self-censored what was not in the public record or classified.
Avoiding damaging cases against alleged criminals and protecting the identities of my
interviewees was ever-present in my mind. Eliminating names was not enough. I had to also
limit details so that they would not be identifiable. Some federal agencies had only a handful of
agents in a given region. That meant that citing certain statistics or facts could easily identify
them or narrow the scope of the source of information to 2-3 individuals. At that point not using
names is moot. I made clear to interview subjects that I would “run-by” what I would publish
with them. This made interview subjects more comfortable and had the added benefit of factchecking my work. Law enforcement never attempted to change my arguments, nor was I ever
pressured in any way to do so.
I ended my data collection when I realized I was getting very little new information from
interviewees. There was a point at which I had become an expert on the history of the AFO and
new interview subjects, though expert, were not adding to my data. When it became obvious I
was hearing the same story, from different viewpoints—though they all corroborated each other
in broad strokes-- I realized I had completed my data collection. I also had to resist the urge to
incorporate new events as I wrote. The AFO continues but I had to end the narrative in mid2010 lest I never sit down and write the dissertation.
111
Methodological Problems
Numerous methodological problems arise in this type of research utilizing typologies and
process-tracing methods. Measurement must be qualitatively assessed and thus some might
suggest it is less precise than if the project were quantitative.
unfortunately inappropriate in this case.
Quantitative research is
First, this is a theory developing and refining
dissertation. It also tests the hypotheses through comparisons between splinter groups that have
resulted from the fragmentation of the AFO. There is also a brief comparison of Mexico’s
current situation to Colombia and the general similarities between Colombia’s fight against
narco-traffickers in the conclusion.319
Second, interviews of law enforcement are problematic because I am studying a profitseeking illicit network by interviewing those charged with prosecuting it, rather than interviews
of members. As Kenney argues, this can lead to problems in terms of the portrayal of the
criminal network as more hierarchical and threatening than. Unfortunately, direct ethnographic
study or participant-observation/participation is impossible to carry out in a safe fashion given
the nature of the AFO.320 In addition, the state of California’s budget woes prevented my access
to prisoner interviews. As Kenney predicted, I found more layers of management through law
enforcement interviews, though this was not due to an exaggerated sense of threat from law
enforcement but because the AFO empirically had more levels of hierarchy than Colombian
smugglers. This was because they had to “enforce” their territory rather than focus exclusively
on smuggling.321
319
Van Evera 1997.
Chabot 2008.
321
Kenney 2007b.
320
112
While others have engaged in ethnographic work on drug smugglers and “upper-level
dealers” in the United States, those projects focused on distributors in the United States, not the
violent networks which control territorial plazas or areas of extortion of licit and illicit
economies in Mexico.322
Law enforcement has the ability to provide anecdotes described in interrogations or
anonymously discuss the structure and history of the illicit network. Other court documents like
indictments and extradition packages which describe in detail the government’s case against the
members of the organization were also available.
Former cartel members have become
surprisingly forthcoming with law enforcement and thus the drawbacks associated with this
methodological choice were diminished.323
In gathering data through qualitative interviews with citizens it was important to crosscheck data. If a particular Mexican PSIN tactic or structure was mentioned it was be crossverified with other sources, like government officials and other citizens who experienced the
tactic first-hand. Wherever possible I attempted to cross-check data to avoid what I refer to in
Mexico as “the Ricardo Ravelo effect.” Ricardo Ravelo is a famous reporter in Mexico who
writes on drug traffickers in Mexico. Many times interviewees told me about a cartel structure
or tactic that was practically plagiarized from a Ravelo article or book. It was invariably
attributed to a friend or firsthand source, but the source of the “rumor,” or in this case a
potentially verifiable news story is often the same. This has the effect of giving credence to the
322
323
Adler 1993.
Caldwell 2007.
113
data point that may be undeserved.324 Thus, in this dissertation, I have been careful to “beware
the Ricardo Ravelo Effect.”325
324
325
Ibid.
Ravelo 2006; Ravelo 2005.
114
Methodological Advantages
My dissertation differs from other projects which rely heavily on in-depth smuggler
interviews.326 These projects are advantageous in that they are a rich primary source of data.
They can be credited with going directly to the networks to gather empirical data. However,
there are methodological problems with this approach.
Smugglers themselves represent
middlemen in larger drug trafficking organization (DTO) operations. Often times, Mexican
DTO’s are more akin to protection or extortion rackets. They replace the state in the security
vacuum of the illicit market by charging plaza or a tax to traffic drugs across the border through
their territory. In this scheme of things, smuggler interviews take on a smaller relevance in
understanding the organizational structures of the upper-levels of the cartel. Methodologically,
reliance on interviews of middlemen, while illuminating in its own right, is problematic for any
attempt to understand sophisticated and diversified cartels.327
Law enforcement officials on the other hand, possess a “big-picture” understanding of the
organization in question, as do academics and reporters. Evidence gathered by law enforcement
must meet strict evidence requirements, as must reporters and academics who must confirm their
sources.328
Data Analysis
In chapters five, six and seven, I analyze the data collected by creating a historical
narrative of the AFO. The empirical chapters trace the relationship between business strategy
and resilience. Historical narrative is an effective means by which to present, in readable
326
Kenney 2007b.
Ibid.
328
Jones 2009; 2010m; 2011h; Kenney 2003; Kenney 2007a.
327
115
fashion, the analysis of the relationship between variables with empirical evidence.329 I also
utilized were concepts from sociological network theory like “loose coupling,” “the strength of
weak ties,” “structural holes,” “network centrality,” among other concepts related to network
alliances.330 The result is what I hope is an interesting, readable account of the AFO that shows
how business strategies triggered varying state reactions and thus reduced or increased the
resilience of the portions of the AFO.
329
330
Thelen 1999.
Kenney 2007a; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996b; Burt 2001; Granovetter 1983; Weick 1995; Weick 1976.
116
Chapter 5
The Resilience of Arellano-Félix Organization
The Arellano-Félix Organization (AFO) was once considered one of the most powerful
Mexican illicit networks.331 In the first decade of the 21st century it has lost all of its firstgeneration top-level leadership to arrests or death.
It fragmented into a short but bloody
internecine conflict which challenged the Mexican state at a time of high narco-violence.332 The
historical context of the AFO is critical to understanding its degree of hierarchy, business
strategies, resilience, and future in a conflictive period spawned by globalization for drug
traffickers, society and the Mexican state. The focus of this analysis will be on the business
strategies as identified in chapter three and their relationship with the AFO’s resilience.333 This
chapter will demonstrate how the AFO has changed its business strategy toward the transactional
PSIN type and how the territorial PSIN faction was dissolved by the reaction of the state.334 It
applies the theoretical model developed in chapter three to the case study of the Arellano Felix
Organization. I identified four distinct phases in the AFO’s history which will provide structure
for the case study.
331
Shirk 2010.
333
This discussion of flatness or “degree of hierarchy” uses Michael Kenney’s definition of the number of layers of
management within the organization.
334
Kenney 2007b.
332
117
Extended Version with
Table 2. Timeline of Major events in AFO History
citations Available in
Appendix P
Death of DEA Agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena
1985
Transfer of Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo to La Palma Maximum
1991
Security Prison
Division of Territories amongst major traffickers in Mexico
1991
Christine's Discoteque AFO battle with Chapo's assassins -- Barron
Nov-92
saves the Arellano's lives and earns their trust
Archbishop and Cardinal Posadas-Ocampo is assassinated by AFO in
1993
a case of mistaken identity
David Barron Corona is killed by friendly fire in an assassination
1997
attempt on Zeta Reporter Jesus Blancornelas
Arrest Of Jesus Chuy Labra Aviles
12-Mar-00
Arrest of Ismael Higuerra-Guererro "El Mayel"
4-May-00
Arrest of Benajamin Félix-Arellano in the state of Pueblo Mexico 2-Mar
Oldest brother and head of he organization
Death of Ramon Arellano-Felix - Chief enforcer of the organization.
With his death AFO members in custody like Kitty Páez become
2-Feb
willing to testify.
Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix takes control of the AFO
118
2002
Arrest of AFO assassin "EL Cris" (Brother of El Teo)
25-Jun-04
67 Specially trained Mexican federal agents arrest Jorge Aureliano7-Jun-04
Felix and Efrain Perez two major AFO Lieutenants
DEA/Coast Guard Operation Arrests Francisco Javier Arellano Felix
14-Aug-06
"El Tigrillo" off the Coast of Baja in international waters
Fernando Sanchez Arellano with the support of his uncle Eduardo
14-Aug-06
Arellano-Felix "El Doctor" takes control of the organization.
El Teo Splits with Fernando and fragments the Network into a
8-Apr
internecine conflict.
El Teo establishes a brief Alliance with Chapo Guzman/"Mayo"
2008
Zambada of the Sinaloa cartel
El Teo is arrested with a drug shipment in La Paz Baja California Sur
10-Jan
(Teo faction effectively dissolved)
119
I.
The First Phase: Pax Padrino
The Arellano-Félix Family sired seven sons and four daughters in the Mexican city of
Culiacan, Sinaloa; a state renowned for drug trafficking. According to George Grayson, “five of
the sons (Francisco Rafael, Carlos, Benjamin, Ramon Eduardo, and Francisco Javier) dedicated
themselves to smuggling clothing and electronics before entering the drug trade.”335
The
Arellano-Félix brothers are rumored to be the nephews of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo, the most
important Mexican trafficker of the 1980’s, though this is not the case according to interviews of
Gallardo himself and US law enforcement.336
Drug trafficking in Mexico in the 1980’s was a highly transactional “loosely coupled
federation,” led by Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo known as El Padrino (the Godfather) head of
the Guadalajara Cartel. Gallardo was adept at managing volatile personalities like those of Caro
Quintero who had developed a marijuana empire in Sinaloa and Sonora. With higher quality
sinsemilla marijuana Caro Quintero had created vast productive and profitable fields in the
deserts of Mexico.337
The relationship among Mexican traffickers was cooperative during the 1980’s and can
be described as a Pax Padrino or “Peace of the Godfather.”338 Three primary factors contributed
to this cooperative peaceful period among traffickers including: (1) a corrupt Dirección Federal
de Seguridad (DFS), (2) an authoritarian Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) party
capable of making credible long-term promises to traffickers and (3) the managerial capabilities
of Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo.339
335
Grayson 2009a.
Jones 2009.
337
Shannon 1988.
338
Jones 2009.
339
336
120
First, high level Mexican government officials were corrupted making the Mexican state
and security services highly complicit in the drug trafficking business. The DFS was notoriously
corrupt, but also provided a pacifying effect on Mexican cartels because it could mediate conflict
among traffickers. This high level state protection made the drug trade extremely lucrative and
for the most part peaceful. In reality it was the DFS that controlled traffickers. Trafficking in
Mexico was divided among territories because that was how the DFS divided it. The DFS
appointed the traffickers that would control the various regions.340
Second, the PRI and the DFS as an institution of the one-party state, could make credible
long term reciprocal promises to traffickers because they were not subject to losing power in
democratic elections. This period represented a “pax mafiosi” between the state and profitseeking illicit networks in Mexico. 341
During this period the Arellanos did not possess a monopoly on the Tijuana plaza, but
were considered major traffickers working with Jesus “Chuy” Labra Aviles who would become
their chief advisor.
The Arellanos arrived in the 1980’s in the Tijuana area and were
immediately accepted by Tijuana high society. They created a mystique around trafficking that
lured the children of Tijuana’s wealthy elite. They became known as “narco-juniors.” Young
people in the 1980’s in Tijuana remember seeing the Arellano brothers, Ramon and Benjamin in
the most upscale night clubs where they would buy young patrons drinks and recruit them into
trafficking and enforcing for the organization. Many joined not out of economic desperation, but
for the excitement and glamour of the criminal lifestyle.342
340
Ibid.
Ibid.
342
Bergman 2000a.
341
121
Mexican trafficking in this phase was small in terms of the number of individuals
involved and did not require heavy firepower or large “enforcement” apparatuses because it
could rely on the state for protection and mediation of inter-cartel disputes. Traffickers like
Gallardo of Guadalajara, Amado Carillo-Fuentes of Ciudad Juarez, Chapo Guzman of the
Sinaloa Cartel, the Arellano-Félix’s of Tijuana and Caro Quintero of Sonora, were so
cooperative in this period that they would pool money together to buy large loads of cocaine and
share in the profits.343 Figure 10 graphically demonstrates the structure of Mexican profitseeking illicit networks in this period.
343
Jones 2009.
122
Figure 10.
Organization Chart - Mexican
Drug Trafficking 1980’s
The Mexican State
Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo
“El Padrino”
Drug Traffickers
in Mexico
The ability of Gallardo to manage personalities and maintain a pax mafiosi meant that
while the Mexican trafficking superstructure aligned under him was hierarchical and centralized,
the individual organizations were internally flat.344 The business strategy in this period was
344
The Arellanos, being from Sinaloa, also enjoyed extensive social networks that spanned trafficking groups, which
though they would come into conflict, ultimately served to alleviate conflict and assist in the creation of alliances
and non aggression pacts with members of the Sinaloa cartel.
Ibid.
123
almost entirely “transactional,” given the cooperative nature of the business and the “collusion”
and controls of state authorities.345
The Death of Enrique Camarena
The brutal torture and killing of the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent Enrique
Camarena in 1985 put incredible pressure upon the Mexican government. The killing of a law
enforcement agent was an exception to Gallardo’s transactional business strategy, which tried to
minimize violence and attention from the state. The DEA pressured the US government to take a
hard-line position with the Mexican government on Camarena’s death. It also pressured the
Mexican government to actively and genuinely cooperate in the investigation. As it became
apparent that Camarena was unlikely to be found alive, pressure was applied to the Mexican
government to find his body.346
The US government began car by car searches along the US border from Mexico with the
stated desire of finding DEA agent Enrique Camarena. In reality, the intent was not to find
Camarena at the border, but to shut down the border by slowing traffic to a grinding halt. This
put incredible pressure on US and Mexican businesses along the border. There was no way this
policy could be maintained indefinitely on either side of the border, due to domestic political
demands in the United States and pressure from the Mexican Government which viewed this as
punitive. It did however send an important message to Mexican traffickers; targeting US law
enforcement operating inside Mexico would be met with a strong reprisal on multiple fronts.
The political and economic ramifications for traffickers and the Mexican government would be
too great and too disruptive.347
345
Sabet 2011.
Shannon 1988.
347
Ibid.
346
124
125
II.
The Second Phase: The Territorializing of the AFO
The territorializing phase of the AFO is marked by its independence from other Mexican
profit-seeking illicit networks, and increasing its number of “enforcers” to meet the challenges
posed by the state and other Mexican PSINs. It moved from a transactional and “loosely
coupled” coalition with other Mexican PSINs to an independent, violent, mixed transactionalterritorial and internally hierarchical model.348
It ended when US-Mexican joint law
enforcement efforts begin to effectively dismantle the top-level first generation of AFO
leadership in 2000.
The Fall of the Godfather (First Critical Juncture)
In 1989, Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo was arrested and placed in prison for his
complicity in DEA agent Enrique Camarena’s death. By 1991 he was moved to La Palma prison
and could no longer continue to run his operations via cellular phone from prison.349 This critical
juncture marks the end of the Pax Padrino period and the beginning of the “territorializing”
period for the AFO.
Varying accounts suggest that he divided the territories among his
lieutenants and told them not to fight amongst each other and continue cooperating; though
recent interviews with Gallardo from prison deny this claim. Others suggest the lieutenants
divided the territories into plazas themselves. The most likely explanation is that the DFS had
already divided the territories and that the AFO’s increased territoriality was a natural result of
the removal of Gallardo as leader and the dismantlement of the DFS following US demands.350
348
Weick 1976.
Shannon 1988.
350
2011a.
349
126
Under the new arrangement, traffickers would pay each other a “cuota” (a toll), to traffic
through each other’s plazas.351 This would serve as the beginning of the increase in hierarchy,
territoriality and violence amongst the Mexican drug cartels.352
The Tijuana territory was supposedly given to Jesus “Chuy” Labra-Aviles.353 In reality,
Benjamin Arellano-Félix was the strategic head of the organization with Jesus Labra-Aviles or
El Chuy as his chief adviser. Ramon Arellano-Félix was known as the enforcer of the family.354
Chapo Guzman received the nearby Mexicali trafficking corridor in addition to Sinaloa, his
traditional area of control.355 This would later become a source of tension between Guzman and
the Arellanos.356
Conflict with Joaquin Guzman Loera “El Chapo”
Almost immediately upon taking control of the territory there was conflict between the
Arellano’s and Joaquin Loera Guzman “El Chapo” who controlled the nearby Mexicali plaza.
There are varying accounts as to what precipitated the conflict. Regardless of the source of the
conflict by 1991 there were tit-for-tat killings between Chapo and the AFO.357
The Arellanos and Chapo attempted to reconcile their differences at a meeting in Puerto
Vallarta in November of 1992. Following the meeting, Ramon Arellano-Félix, Francisco-Javier
Arellano-Félix, David-Barron-Corona and Ismael Higuera-Guerrero, went to Christine’s Disco
where they came under attack from Chapo’s enforcers in the early morning hours. Benjamin
Arellano-Félix was not present because he was at a hotel with his wife and family. Fortunately,
for the AFO leadership present, they were in the bathroom when the attack began. Logan Street
351
Jones 2009.
353
354
Bergman 2000b.
355
356
Dillon 1997.
357
Interview US Law Enforcment.
352
127
Gang Member and AFO bodyguard, David Barron-Corona protected the brothers with
suppression fire while they escaped out an air-conditioning duct. Francisco Javier ArellanoFélix went one direction while Ramon, David Barron Corona and Ismael Higuera Guerrero “El
Mayel” went another. From the roof the three returned fire and jumped to the ground where they
encountered a rival assassin armed with an AK-47. Little did the three know that they had one
bullet left between them. David Barron-Corona killed the assassin with the remaining bullet and
the three escaped.358
The critical juncture of the imprisonment of Felix Gallardo was the “precondition” for a
new increasingly territorial AFO business strategy in the newly anarchic environment of
Mexican drug trafficking.
However Chapo’s attempted assassination of the Arellanos at
Christine’s Disco was the “precipitant” for change.359
Following this precipitating event,
Benjamin and Ramon decided to actively increase their enforcement squads realizing they would
have to prepare for war against all other profit-seeking illicit networks in Mexico. They were
now in conflict with the Sonora, Juarez and Sinaloa “cartels.” They needed more enforcement,
more bodyguards and the ability to defend their “turf” against encroachment.360
They also needed an extremely good intelligence system to be able to find clandestine
traffickers and force them to pay cuota. Failure to pay cuota or the tax for shipping illicit goods
across the border through their plaza (territory) would result in death and/or torture. The
Arellanos killed in ways designed to terrorize other organizations and signal a “reputation for
358
2008c; Dillon 1997; Jones 2009.
Harry Eckstein argued that “preconditions” are the underlying causes of war but often require a “precipitant” to
begin an internal war in his analysis of “The Etiology of Internal Wars.” In this case I have identified critical
junctures as laying the preconditions for change and also identified precipitating events like the attack at Christine’s
Disco.
Eckstein 1965.
360
Jones 2009.
359
128
violence.”361 By doing this in select and brutal ways, they forced traffickers moving through
their territory to pay them and increased profits. They continued to possess “transactional”
business strategy elements. They trafficked large amounts of cocaine and marijuana into the
United States and developed sophisticated money laundering fronts.
In this period both
transactional and territorial business strategies coexisted, with the transactional largely
controlling the territorial.
In David Barron-Corona aka “CH,” the Arellanos had an important link to two major US
criminal networks which served as important “enforcer” recruitment sources. Barron grew up in
the Logan Street Gang in San Diego and was also a member of the prison gang known as the
Mexican Mafia or La EME. Barron served a 3-year prison term in the California penitentiary
system following his 1987 arrest for burglary and possession of an M-16. He was also convicted
of drunk-driving in 1990. Barron’s tattoos provide concrete evidence of his affiliation with the
Mexican Mafia. He maintained positive relations with the prison gang by sending money-orders
to his fellow gang members and was also a highly prized member of La Eme because of his links
to the AFO which were viewed as a lucrative source of revenue for the prison gang.362
Once asked by Ramon and Benjamin Arellano-Félix to recruit, he recruited heavily from
his street and prison gang affiliations using his brother-in-law as an intermediary. David BarronCorona could no longer pass back and forth across the border because of US law enforcement
surveillance and his immigration status. He thus relied on filial connections to recruit for him by
proxy.363
361
Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993; Jones 2009; Chabot 2008.
Dillon 1997.
363
Ibid.; Jones 2009.
362
129
The men Barron recruited were trained as enforcers for the AFO by foreign mercenaries
including one from Iraq referred to as “El Iraqui” and corrupted members of the Mexican
military and police in mountainous training camps outside of Tijuana. The new AFO enforcers
were paid $500 a week and told to be ready to kill on a moment’s notice. They were paid
significantly more for successful missions.364 These enforcers became the territorial wing of the
AFO in Tijuana in the 1990’s.365
Many have attributed the arms-build-up in Mexican drug trafficking to the Gulf Cartel’s
recruitment of Los Zetas a former Special Forces military unit in the late 1990’s. In reality this
was a trend which occurred in every major Mexican PSIN by the mid-90’s due to the conflicts
amongst the cartels and their competition for lucrative trafficking corridors known as plazas.
The trend was especially pronounced within the Arellano-Félix Organization because of their
extensive conflict with El Chapo of the Sinaloa cartel and other PSINs.
Also, the PAN
opposition party won Baja California and municipal elections much earlier than in other Mexican
regions. This meant that the PRI’s grip on power and therefore ability to control organized crime
was weaker in Tijuana than in other regions.366
The increase in enforcer squads by the AFO required the training of these enforcers by
corrupted military, police and foreign mercenaries.
The Arellano-Félix Organization is a
powerful case of “institutional isomorphism.” Mexican PSINs learned their territoriality from
the state. The DFS organized them along territorial lines in the 1980’s and when it could no
longer mediate them they purchased their training in how to patrol territory from corrupted state
364
Jones 2009.
The term “enforcer” refers to members of a DTO who specialize in providing violence on behalf of the
organization. A common term for enforcer in Latin America is Sicario (hit-man).
Marks 2008; United States. Dept. of the Army and United States. Marine Corps 2007, University of Chicago Press:;
Felbab-Brown 2009b; Downie 1998.
366
Grayson; Brands 2009a; Wilkinson 2010b.
365
130
military and law enforcement officers.367 In this fashion the AFO adopted policies, standard
operating procedures (SOP’s) and tactics from the Mexican state, and even other states, through
its use of foreign mercenaries. Nowhere is this more powerfully demonstrated than in the use of
police codes over their radio communication frequencies. They used standard police radio codes
for their communications including orders to kill.368 For diagrams depicting in detail the network
connections and structures of the AFO in this period see appendices B-I.
Figure 11.
AFO Structure Post 1991
(Simplified)
Political
Connections
Strategic Head
Chief Enforcer
Regional
Operational
Commander
Dispatcher
Lieutenants
Money Launder Cells
Front Businesses
Enforcer Squads
368
Arellanos
Financial
Advisors/Investors
Sergeants
367
Colombian
Cocaine
Suppliers
Retail Drug Sales in TJ
Peters 1999.
Jones 2009; Peters 1999.
131
All of their communications were coded, in that all persons and locations had nicknames
or cartel codes. These codes were not particularly sophisticated in that they did not necessarily
rotate frequently and were understood over time by law enforcement. However, the limited
coding of proper-nouns would at least slow and confuse Mexican and American law enforcement
surveillance over the short term, without making communication amongst network members so
cumbersome that business could not be done.369
The mimicry of police structures by the AFO is logical given the peculiar nature of drug
trafficking in Mexico and in particular the northern border states of Mexico.
Mexico’s
comparative advantage in drug trafficking is intrinsically linked to the control of territory or
plazas. The AFO controls the most lucrative plaza on the Southern US border, the San Ysidro
crossing into San Diego.370
Mexican cartels are thus intrinsically tied to territory in a way that Colombian cartels and
Mexican cartels in Sinaloa and central Mexico are not.371 For the AFO, following the Pax
Padrino phase, the most important functions of the cartel became the ability to defend and police
their lucrative plazas.
The plazas had to be defended from the external threats of rival
traffickers; especially Chapo Guzman.
They also had to be policed to control low-level
smugglers who might traffic on behalf of other MDTO’s, or free-lance independently. The
inability to prevent small smugglers from operating without paying a tax to the AFO would
encourage others to do the same and erode the profits and legitimacy of the AFO’s control over
the illicit market in this territory.372
369
Jones 2009.
Ibid.
371
Colombian trafficking groups’ desire to control territory, stems from involvement in cultivation and the ability to
provide protection to cocaleros in exchange for extortion payments. Thus, the territoriality of Mexican and
Colombian cartels serves different purposes.
372
Jones 2009; Skaperdas 1992; Skaperdas 2001; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993.
370
132
To prevent free-lance smuggling, the AFO needed enforcer squads with access to rapid
communications and exceptional intelligence. A reputation for violence and brutality would
bring a certain number of smugglers to the organization willing to pay taxes without effort.
Thus, brutal, violent symbolic killings are a highly effective and rational short term strategy to
cow the population and low-level smugglers into cooperation. A reputation for violence is
irrelevant if the cartel cannot also establish a reputation for being able to find free-lance
smugglers and make rapid decisions on how they should be treated.373 Appendices A, B and C
demonstrate the AFO’s increase in hierarchy to five to six layers of management with the
addition of the territorial business practice of patrolling “territory.” It also illustrates the central
role enforcer squads and “the dispatcher” played in the PSIN.
The level of compartmentation found in terror networks like Al Qaeda would be
problematic in a drug trafficking organization like the AFO that must patrol a plaza with
independent enforcer squad cells.374 If a smuggler is captured free-lancing, he might truthfully
claim that he is trafficking on behalf of another cell of the AFO. The AFO enforcer squad which
has “discovered him” has no way of knowing whether or not the other enforcer squad actually
exists, unless they happen to know the squad sergeant personally. They further don’t know if an
373
Skaperdas 1992; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1993; Skaperdas 2001.
In a compartmented organization, in which not every node in the organization is aware of each other’s operations,
there must be some centralization of information. Drug trafficking is distinct from terrorism in that terrorist
networks like Al Qaeda do not need to coordinate their operations to the same degree. After 9/11, most experts
agree that Al Qaeda flattened its organizational structure and relied on local social movements and insurgent groups
to launch their own small attacks against the United States and western allies. This is evidenced by the amateurish
attempted attacks of the “shoe” and “underwear” bombers, and even successful train attacks in Spain. These attacks
are launched by cells with plausibly no connection or communication with central Al Qaeda leadership. Rather, Al
Qaeda has provided the strategic vision and inspiration for these attacks and encouraged these groups to act
independently. In the “underwear bomber” attempted attack, Bin Laden has claimed credit ex post facto, but is
unlikely to have had advanced knowledge of the attack. This reduces the likelihood of being discovered and having
the attack thwarted by law enforcement or US intelligence.
Kenney 2007b; Keane.
374
133
agreement has been made between the smuggler and the enforcer cell, or if the smuggler is lying
to them.375
Thus, they used radio communications on rotating frequencies, to a central dispatcher
who could call to the rest of the organization. If the smuggler was “vouched for” by someone in
the organization, and they were determined to already be paying taxes to the organization, it
would have been a bad business decision to execute them. If they are not claimed, a decision
must be made; whether to execute them for trafficking through AFO territory and dissolve them
in acid, or to annex them into a taxable smuggling cell of the organization. These decisions can
be made in 20 minutes or less. In this fashion the AFO has blended compartmentation with
centralized command and control through advanced technology. This structure remained stable
in the 2000’s when, US Law enforcement through Operation United Eagles radio surveillance
(2004-August 14, 2006), counted 1500 names called over AFO frequencies, most of whom
disappeared.376
The success of this strategy is incumbent upon the centralization of radio dispatch nodes
which are “structural holes.” They are structural holes in the network because they are “nonredundant” and their removal would cause the severe disruption of the network.377
The above description of the AFO was based largely on US law enforcement that
specialized in prosecuting the AFO.
Anonymous interviews of Mexican law enforcement
officials provided very different results. They described a “flat” AFO with only three layers of
management, which was based on the “capitalismo” of “transactional” trafficking.
When
showed the figures in the appendices B-I, they were only aware of the top level traffickers. My
375
Jones 2009; Kenney 2007b.
2008c.
377
Gordon Walker 1997; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000, 2:.
376
134
interpretation of the varying results is that both United States and Mexican law enforcement are
correct in their assessments of the AFO in this period. They were simply focused on different
portions of the same profit-seeking illicit network. The Mexican prosecutors were targeting high
level Mexican traffickers; the Arellano Family and close associates.
US law enforcement,
having more contact with US street gangs with AFO connections, built many of their cases
against the territorial cells of the AFO. Because transactional cells dominated the territorial cells
of the AFO in this period, violence was minimized and the Mexican state was not threatened by
the AFO with one notable exception.
The Assassination of Archbishop Posadas
The most significant event in the history of the AFO occurred on May 24, 1993 when
AFO hit-men allegedly assassinated Archbishop Posadas at the Guadalajara Airport.
AFO
assassination squads constantly hunted for Chapo Guzman in the 1990’s. They received word
that he would be in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Logan-Heights enforcer squads were sent to meet Los
Mochis (an enforcement squad from Los Mochis Sinaloa) and kill Chapo Guzman. When
Guzman did not arrive at the airport, the Logan Heights enforcers left for their flight. At this
point a white Grand Marquis arrived, presumably with Chapo Guzman inside. The Los Mochis
gunmen and what was left of the Logan Heights AFO enforcers joined in the gunfight riddling
the car with bullets.378 The assassins left believing they had killed Guzman. Only later would
they learn from news reports that Guzman had not been the victim, but rather Archbishop Jesus
Posadas Ocampo. The killing of a Cardinal and Archbishop of the Catholic Church, the most
respected institution in Mexico, forced the government to crack down on the AFO. The AFO
378
According to a Mexican Military recording of its interview with Hodoyan a former AFO member, the Logan
Heights assassins were incompetent and possibly high when this occurred. Bergman 2000b.
135
leadership immediately understood the significance of the error and knew it could destroy the
AFO if not handled properly.379
The AFO Response
The AFO response to the crisis was largely “transactional” focusing on bribes and
avoiding state attention. According to Everardo Arturo “Kitty” Páez-Martinez, a high-ranking
AFO lieutenant, the AFO leadership immediately began bribing high-level Mexican government
officials to minimize the government response including a 10 million dollar bribe to the head of
the Federal Judicial Police, Rodolfo Leon Aragón. Benjamin Arellano-Félix arranged for AFO
safe houses to be sacrificed, once incriminating documents were removed. He also arranged for
AFO enforcers involved in the killing of the Cardinal to be arrested. All of this was designed to
provide a public appearance of a strong crackdown on the AFO for the Mexican government.380
The AFO leadership went into hiding following the assassination. Ramon travelled
throughout Mexico hunting “El Chapo,” “El Mayo” and enforcing for the AFO. Benjamin the
strategic head of the organization went into hiding in the United States.381
The AFO was profit-starved in the immediate aftermath of the killing of Cardinal ArchBishop Posadas Ocampo in 1993 and could not pay its enforcers. The PSIN made calculated
top-down decisions (or core to periphery) to engage in kidnapping, typically “on an as needed
basis” and for high-profile targets.382 Kidnapping is generally associated with territorial PSINs.
This is an example of how the territorial PSIN cells of largely transactional PSINs may engage in
kidnapping when profit-starved, with the consent or tolerance of the transactional leadership.
379
Jones 2009; Caldwell 2007.
Caldwell 2007.
381
Jones 2009.
382
Ibid.
380
136
Prior to 1993 the AFO rarely engaged in kidnapping deriving nearly all of its profits from drug
trafficking and smuggling activities.383
These high-profile kidnappings required intelligence on the target’s habits, surveillance
of the target, safe-houses and the capability to hold the victim for long periods of time.
Typically the AFO had “inside-information” about the target and a corrupted official within the
Mexican anti-kidnap unit.
Usually, someone on the target’s security detail would make a
commission from the ransom for providing information. Thus, the intelligence often came to the
AFO based upon their “reputation for violence” and their reputation for paying commissions to
those who provided intelligence.384
The AFO had “offices” where enforcers were expected to be ready to work each
morning. No advance warning would be given to those participating in a kidnapping. A
lieutenant of the PSIN would arrive at the “office” on the morning of a kidnap operation and give
minimal instructions to enforcers participating in the kidnapping.
Typically these were
instructions on what to wear, what arms to carry and what type of vehicle to drive. This is an
example of information compartmentation through procedures within the PSIN. It is also an
example of “the need for security” coming into conflict with “the need for information” flows
within an illicit network. The AFO failed in some of their attempts to kidnap high profile targets
during this period, likely due to the compartmentation of information. It also likely survived this
period intact without large numbers of major arrests because of its compartmentation of
information.385
383
Ibid.
Ibid.
385
Ibid.; Kenney 2003; Kenney 2007a.
384
137
Rule By Proxy: Ismael Higuera-Guerrero “El Mayel” (1993-1995)
The period from 1993 to roughly 1995, when Benjamin and Ramon were outside of
Tijuana “laying-low,” can structurally be characterized as “rule by proxy” for the Arellano-Félix
brothers. The operation of the organization was left to Ismael Higuera-Guerrero “El Mayel” a
top-level lieutenant personally responsible for brutal tortures and killings on behalf of the AFO.
Higuera-Guerrero became the node through which all information from the top-level leadership
passed.386
In social network analysis terms he was “a structural hole;” a non-redundant node, the
removal of which would cause significant damage to the PSIN’s functioning, and in 2000 did.
Benjamin Arellano-Félix was still the symbolic and strategic head of the organization, but
operations were controlled by Higuera-Guerrero who had significant independent decisionmaking capabilities in this period.387 His brother Gilberto also controlled Mexicali on behalf of
the PSIN, increasing both their relative importance to the AFO.388
The role of Higuera-Guerrero during this period demonstrates the limits of the AFO’s
emphasis on co-sanguinity. Being a member of the Arellano Family is extremely important
symbolically to head the organization, but is not a prerequisite for holding an important
operational position. Trust through social network ties is not simply attained through bloodrelations, but can be earned over an extended period of time through personal loyalty and
performance within the AFO.389
386
Jones 2009.
Burt 2001; Burt 1995.
388
2006a; Caldwell 2007; Caldwell 2004; 2004; 2010r.
389
The role of blood relations will be discussed later in greater detail in the discussion of the ascendance of
Fernando Sanchez-Arellano to leadership within the organization.
387
138
The Arrest of “Kitty” Páez (1997)
The first major arrest of an AFO lieutenant occurred in 1997. The arrest of EverardoArturo “Kitty” Páez-Martinez, at his favorite Tijuana Japanese restaurant, was not in and of itself
significant, but in 2001 he became the first major “cartel” figure in Mexico to be extradited to the
United States. Exactly one year later, he would become “a wealth of information” for US law
enforcement on the internal structures of the organization. “Kitty” was arrested three weeks
prior to the death of Barron-Corona and played a key role in the events leading up to his death.390
The Death of David Barron-Corona
In 1997 David Barron-Corona was killed in his attempt to kill famous Zeta editor Jesus
Blancornelas. The attempt was in response to stories Blancornelas had written about Barron in
Zeta magazine.391 In his ambush assassination attempt on the reporter, Barron was killed by
friendly-fire. A ricochet AK-47 round struck him in the eye and resulted in the iconic photo of
Barron slumped over dead propped on the shotgun he used in the attack.
Miraculously,
Blancornelas survived the attack, but his bodyguard was killed defending him as he took bullets
with his body to defend his principle.392 For the AFO, the death of Barron represented the loss of
an important, skilled and well-connected enforcer. He was so important that the AFO enforcer
who accidentally killed him was executed. By this point, however the AFO ties to La Eme and
street gangs in San Diego were well established and his death did not, in and of itself, represent a
loss of connections to these recruitment sources.393
390
Caldwell 2007.
Dillon 1997.
392
Jones 2009.
393
Ibid.; 2010b.
391
139
III.
The Third Phase: The AFO Dismantlement Phase (2000-2008)
The year 2000 represented the beginning of the success of US-Mexican law enforcement
“kingpin” or “decapitation” strategies and the beginning of a severe weakening of the strength of
the AFO.394 Operation United Eagles represented unprecedented cooperation between US and
Mexican law enforcement and included the electronic surveillance of the AFO and the training of
elite Mexican police forces.395
AFO leadership figures were “decapitated” through cooperation between US and
Mexican law enforcement. This period began in earnest with the arrest of Jesus “Chuy” LabraAviles and Ismael Higuera-Guerrero “Mayel,” two of the cartel’s most important leadership
figures in 2000. These events are the critical juncture marking the end of the territorialization
phase and the beginning of the dismantlement phase of the AFO. The two lieutenants were
important to the functioning of the “transactional” side of the business as first-generation
leadership figures. Unlike previous extradition subjects, they were full Mexican nationals that
would eventually be extradited to US prisons. US prisons effectively eliminated their ability to
run their operations from behind bars.396
The arrest of both of these major advisors and
operational commanders represented a significant weakening of the AFO. However, 2002 would
prove a far worse year for the AFO.
In 2001 Mexico’s Supreme Court made an important decision which allowed for the
extradition of solely Mexican citizens to the United States. Shortly thereafter “Kitty” Páez was
extradited to the US. With the death of Ramon and the arrest of Benjamin (2002), he began to
394
The embodiment of “Kingpin” or “Decapitation” strategies is the designation of “Consolidated Priority
Organization Targets” (CPOTs) by the DEA.
395
Operation United Eagles will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 2004; 2010r; Bergman
2000b.
396
2009d; Caldwell 2007; 2010c; 2002b; 2010r; 2004.
140
cooperate with authorities, as his fear of retribution from the AFO leadership dissipated. Two
weeks after this Supreme Court decision, Chapo Guzman escaped from La Puente maximum
security prison and remains the most wanted man in Mexico.397
Ramon Arellano-Félix was killed in a shoot out with a police officer in Mazatlan Sinaloa
February 11, 2002, presumably while hunting for Mayo Zambada. Ramon’s remains were
cremated and released to a family member before law enforcement could access them, which
gave rise to potential conspiracy theories about the veracity of his death.398 The death of Ramon
and the arrest of Benjamin represented a nadir for the most important and experienced firstgeneration of AFO leadership.399 Appendices G and I, graphically illustrate the structure of the
AFO in the dismantlement phase.
Ramon Arellano’s death represented a weakening of
operational control over enforcers within the PSIN. The arrest of Benjamin the strategic head
was a blow to the upper echelons of the PSIN which allowed the territorial and transactional
business strategies to be centrally controlled within the same PSIN.
397
Caldwell 2007; Walser; Grayson 2008b.
Kraul 2004; 2006b; 2005.
399
Sullivan 2004; Kraul 2004; 2002b; 2010o.
398
141
The AFO Under “El Tigrillo” (2002-2006)
Following the arrest of Benjamin March 2002, and the death of Ramon earlier in
February, the natural successor to head the AFO was Francisco Javier Arellano-Félix “El
Tigrillo” their youngest brother. He had been in charge of daily AFO operations since the 2000
presumably following the arrest of “El Mayel.”400
During this period of decapitation and loss of key leadership figures, AFO organizational
structure did not change despite the loss of major Colombian cocaine connections which
dramatically reduced profits.401 The AFO continued to employ large enforcer squads which
entailed large overhead costs for the organization. To compensate for this loss of cocaine profits,
the organization was forced to diversify its criminal activities. This included the expansion of
marijuana cultivation and trafficking. Kidnapping also became a major source of revenue for the
AFO and the cells associated with Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental leader of the “El Teo”
faction that splintered from the AFO in April of 2008.402 Enforcer squads of the AFO have long
been effective kidnappers. Kidnapping is a classic tool of PSINs to enforce the payment of debts
by rival traffickers and buyers.
They thus had a comparative advantage in this criminal
activity.403
Francisco Javier Arellano-Félix was arrested as part of a joint DEA/Coast Guard
Operation Shadow Game, aboard his fishing boat the Dock Holiday in a joint US Coast
Guard/DEA on August 14, 2006 when his boat ventured into international waters.
400
He was
Jones 2009; Moore 2009; 2006a.
Jones 2009.
402
Kidnapping has long been a problem of in Latin America. However, the victims of kidnappings were typically
wealthy and returned. As MDTO’s like El Teo’s faction of the AFO began targeting middle class professionals like
doctors, and engineers, the practice began to terrorize the mass population and impact every facet of Mexican life.
Tijuana professionals began living on the US side of the border and minimizing their time in Mexico. A backlash
against the DTO’s was triggered from society at large. This may have led to the split between El Ingeniero and El
Teo. El Ingeniero viewed the kidnappings as bad for business while Teo wanted to continue.
403
Kraul 2004; Moore 2009; Dibble; Marosi 2009; O’Connor.
401
142
immediately arrested and brought to the United States where he was charged, with drug
trafficking and racketeering. Eduardo Arellano-Félix took control of the AFO following the
arrest of Francisco Javier Arellano-Félix in 2006. He was known as a recluse. Somewhere
between August 2006 and his arrest October 27, 2008, El Doctor became a symbolic figure and
mentor to Fernando Sanchez-Arellano who took operational control.404 Appendices F and G
graphically demonstrates the network structure of “the AFO in Decline.”
404
Marosi 2008b.
143
IV.
The Fourth Phase: The Restructuring of the AFO
The death or arrests of key AFO leadership throughout the first decade of the 21st century
forced “a fragmentation” of the PSIN; reducing its resilience according to the resilience typology
established in the theoretical section. The primary structural change came in the form of a
internecine conflict and the dividing of the plaza which once included Tijuana, Tecate and
Mexicali into smaller plazas or “turf” areas.405
The rise of “El Ingeniero” Fernando Sánchez-Arellano between 2006 and 2008, the son
of Alicia Arellano represents a new generation of leadership for the AFO and a fundamental
restructuring of the PSIN. There has been confusion about his nickname. He has been referred
to as El Ingeniero (the Engineer), El Alineador (Aligner), and Fernandito (little Fernando). He
also reportedly has a cousin named Zamora who is also referred to as El Ingeniero.406
El Ingeniero’s rise demonstrates that top-level leadership would remain in the Arellano
family and is based on co-sanguinity. It would have been impossible for a non-Arellano to
become the symbolic head of the AFO. This may have been equally as important to nonArellanos in the AFO as it was to Arellano family members. Keeping leadership within the
family may provide a sense of stability and identity to the PSIN because it prevents the
usurpation of power by hungry and aggressive younger lieutenants. It did not however prevent
the split with “El Teo,” which fragmented the PSIN into internecine conflict.407 Appendices H
and I graphically demonstrate the AFO structure during “the rise of El Ingeniero.”
405
Conflicting media reports have led to serious debate among academics that specialize in Mexican drug trafficking
organizations on the accuracy of nicknames for narco-bosses. Some have even suggested that the confusion may be
an intended consequence and part of an AFO strategy.
Grayson 2009a.
407
Dibble.
406
144
Internecine Conflict 2008-January 2010
The onset of an internecine conflict between El Teo and El Ingeniero within the AFO
represents another critical juncture, which fragmented the PSIN. The PSIN structural changes
are graphically demonstrated in appendices H-J.
In the early 2000’s the AFO suffered major arrests and the attacks of September 11th
resulted in increased US border enforcement. This made drugs more difficult to traffic across the
border and forced some elements of the PSIN to diversify their activities into retail drug sales
and kidnappings. In the early to mid 2000’s an AFO lieutenant “El Cris” began kidnapping more
individuals for smaller and smaller ransoms. In 2004 he was arrested but his brother “El Teo”
continued the practice with his enforcer cells. This would lead to one of the most important
splits within the AFO. 408
Eduardo Teodoro Garcia Simental, “El Teo” relied heavily on kidnapping as a revenue
source, a fact that is universally recognized based on interviews of Tijuana citizens,
businessmen, civic leaders, and law enforcement.409 As it was implemented in Tijuana by 2007,
kidnapping was a highly territorial activity and was the means of enforcing extortion payments
for the El Teo PSIN.
The kidnapping operations were not sophisticated, though they did include a large
number of people, cell phones and safe-houses. Most of the people operating these kidnap cells
were mugrosos young teenagers doing “the dirty work” of the “El Teo” PSIN. There was very
little previously collected intelligence on the people being kidnapped and they were typically not
held for very long periods; usually 4-5 days. The victims were often killed. The advantage to the
strategy of using mugrosos is that an illicit network relying on them is highly resilient because
408
409
2011e; 2010j; Ojeda; Reza Gonzalez 2011.
2011a; 2009b; 2011b; 2011c; 2010m; 2011g; Ramos 2011; Jones 2011c; 2010n.
145
they can be constantly recruited and replaced, due to a large number of highly impoverished
young people in Mexico.410
Holding the victims for short periods allowed an increase in the number of kidnappings
that could be undertaken. Once the Teo faction began kidnapping petit bourgeoisie, e.g. taco
stand owners, they were kidnapping for much smaller amounts, usually $5-10,000 US dollars.
This dramatically increased the number of people who could be kidnapped and the number of
people in Tijuana who had been touched by the phenomena. The psychological impact upon the
victims was devastating. Female victims were raped repeatedly and “would never be the same.”
The sense of security of all of the victims, and their family and friends, was shattered.411
According to multiple Tijuana citizens and confirmed by anonymous government
officials, kidnap victims, usually business-owners, would be abducted and held for ransom.
They often negotiated their own ransom and were asked for exorbitant amounts. The victim
would offer a lower amount which they could produce. The kidnapping cell would accept the
lower amount but on the provision that the victim provide ten names of people who could pay
the same amount. In this fashion the kidnappings occurred along the lines of social networks,
e.g. an auto-mechanic knows other auto-mechanics and those of similar socio-economic status.
Eventually, kidnappings got to the professionally educated like doctors, engineers and lawyers
and triggered a societal backlash.412
To avoid being kidnapped, an illicit or licit business owner was usually given an
opportunity to pay “cuota” (tax) regularly (the tax is also sometimes referred to as piso or plaza).
Again, anecdotally, the pattern appeared to be that the business-owner had a “protector” to whom
410
Jones 2011c.
Jones 2009; Ramos 2011; Contact 2009.
412
Jones 2011c; 2010n.
411
146
he could contact to arrange payments. Sometimes payments would become dramatically larger
when for example “the boss has a birthday coming.”413 If a business-owner wanted to shut down
his business, he had to arrange a final payment; usually larger than his regular payments. This
was not uncommon in the period in which the Sanchez Arellano Faction and the Teo PSIN of the
AFO were at war from 2008-2010. One business owner lamented being told by police that it was
“not a good time to be in business,” fatalistically acknowledging that they could not keep the
business safe.”414 Business people paying piso, or extortion tax, were also given an opportunity
to provide 10 names of people that would not be kidnapped based on this arrangement. This
usually included immediate family and employees.415
After the experience of narco-juniors in the 1990’s Tijuana society wanted a separation
between “polite society” and the criminal under-world; although there were those who may have
blurred the line. The Rhon family and other Tijuana elites are reported to have functioned as the
money-laundering side of the illicit criminal world in Tijuana, though he has never been
convicted.416 The criminal world was allowed to function and largely ignored provided that
“polite society,” the elites of the licit world, went unmolested.417
Kidnappings of those who were uninvolved in illicit businesses were shocking to Tijuana
society. Doctors installed panic-rooms in their offices and even threatened to go on strike,
threatening to refuse to treat police officers and the public, until the kidnappings of doctors
ended.418 The abduction of Dr. Guzman “the general surgeon of a leading Tijuana hospital,” was
a turning point.
413
2011b.
Ibid.
415
Ibid.
416
Bergman 2000c; Jones 2011a; Cearley.
417
2011b; 2010n.
418
2009b; Marosi 2008a.
414
147
Guzman's abduction came amid a plague of crime targeting the city's medical
community. About 20 doctors have been kidnapped and dozens have received
calls demanding as much as $50,000, according to the city's medical
419
associations.
In response to the kidnappings, civil society groups representing doctors mobilized and
threatened a strike. Shortly, thereafter Dr. Guzman was released.420
Kidnapping was at the center of the split between the El Teo and the Fernando Sanchez
Arellano “El Ingeniero” faction in April of 2008. The El Ingeniero faction believed the Teo
cells were “calentando la plaza” heating up the turf with too many kidnappings and drawing
negative attention which could hurt the trafficking business. El Teo believed El Ingeniero was a
weak leader, a spoiled child not from the Tijuana streets and unworthy of leadership in the
organization. He also needed the profits kidnapping brought his faction, while El Ingeniero
needed a calm plaza to traffic drugs and operated money laundering front-businesses. Neither El
Teo nor El Ingeniero was present for the violent April 2008 gun-battle on the streets of Tijuana
that marked their split.421
Most Tijuana citizens attributed these kidnappings to the El Teo faction of the Arellano
Felix Organization. This is consistent with media reports which suggested that El Teo had a
network of kidnapping houses and kidnap cells throughout Tijuana.422 He also had a higher
propensity for violence and the symbolic use of violence. He employed “El Pozolero” who used
acid to dissolve the bodies of cartel victims. El Teo is rumored to have had a drug-use problem;
cristal (methamphetamine). This could have contributed to higher levels of violence in addition
to his youthful and inexperienced leadership.423
419
Marosi 2008a.
Ibid.
421
Marosi; 2009e.
422
This was also verified by law enforcement interviews in the US and Mexico and interviews with Tijuana business
leaders.
423
Marosi 2008b.
420
148
El Teo had many advantages in the internecine conflict with El Ingeniero. First, he and
his brothers were Tijuana natives. They had grown up within the city and had operated as
enforcers there for most of their lives. It is reported that El Teo and his brother began in the
criminal world as teenagers taking undocumented aliens across the border on foot. Second, El
Teo was able to establish a short-lived six-month alliance with the Sinaloa cartel led by “Chapo”
Guzman and Mayo Zambada. Widely considered the most powerful cartel in, this alliance
provided Teo with the drug connections he lacked. The Sinaloa cartel had already taken control
of Mexicali which since 2004 facilitating this alliance. Third, El Teo had extensive contacts
within the local police force.424
Fourth, as a territorial PSIN, El Teo’s use of symbolic violence was high; a key
prediction of my state reaction argument.425 He was known for leaving the decapitated heads of
victims on top of vats of acid where their bodies were dissolved. This in effect, defeated the
purpose of having a Pozolero to hide the carnage, but had a strong psychological impact upon
rival cartels and the local population.426 He was known for having many local police on his
payroll but also for killing police that did not cooperate with him.427 This violence was a
“double-edged sword” for this faction. It terrorized, and cowed the population into submission,
but also led to a societal backlash.428
Officials say the differences were long-simmering, though the final split took
place with a confrontation April 26 in eastern Tijuana that left at least 14 dead.
Law enforcement officials say that Sánchez had called a meeting to rein in
424
Anonymous interviews in Mexico.
Ellingwood 2009a; Marosi; Jones 2011b; Carroll 2010.
426
de Mauleon 2009; Dudley 2010; Marosi 2008b.
427
Before El Teo’s arrest in January 2010, I visited Tijuana in 2009 and noticed that municipal police travelled in
groups of two trucks, with at least two men each sitting in the truck bed with automatic weapons. Motorcycle
police, that typically enforce traffic violations individually, rode in groups of three. Seven months after Teo’s
January 2010 arrest, Police appeared to be calmer and rode in their trucks with one partner in the cab with them and
no one in the truck bed. This is an example of the impact that Teo’s arrest had on the Tijuana psyche. It has calmed
municipal police by reducing the daily threat of police assassination.
428
For a description of the state’s response to the Teo faction in Tijuana see chapter six.
425
149
García and his crew members, who were conducting abductions outside their
429
designated zone. But the meeting disintegrated into a gunbattle.
El Teo, who controlled a network of safe houses where kidnap victims were held, did not agree
with the move and broke with the AFO in a violent gun battle on the streets of Tijuana which left
fourteen dead. El Teo retreated to Sinaloa only to return in September 2008 to restart his conflict
with El Ingeniero.430
El Teo’s arrest on January 12, 2010 in La Paz Baja California Sur, while loading drugs
for shipment to the United States marked a major public relations victory for the Calderon
Administration.431 One of Teo’s top lieutenants Lopez-Uriarte also known as El Muletas and
Teo’s younger brother Manuel Garcia-Simental were arrested in February of 2010 dealing
another blow to this territorial PSIN.432 Many have speculated that the information that led to
Teo’s arrest was provided by elements of the Sinaloa cartel which had switched to an alliance
with the El Ingeniero transactional PSIN. This is a plausible if unconfirmed scenario that would
suggest that transactional PSINs prefer alliances with each other because they both employ “low
profile” business strategies that do not trigger harsh state responses.
Through a powerful state and rival PSIN reaction, the territorial PSIN led by El Teo was
dissolved and subsequent iterations of the AFO have utilized “low-profile” strategies that
minimize violence. This case study elucidated the evolutionary process that eliminated one
PSIN for its emphasis on territorial extortion and the resilience stemming from its transactional
character and its ability to form alliances with the state and other powerful transactional PSINs.
This chapter described this process at the internal level of analysis by looking inside the
illicit network. The next chapter will elucidate my state reaction argument for understanding
429
Dibble 2009.
2008e; Marosi 2009; Dibble; Spagat 2010.
431
Spagat 2010.
432
Marosi 2010b.
430
150
PSIN resilience from the perspective of the state and the policies the Mexican and US
governments used to fight these PSINs.
151
Chapter 6
The US-Mexico Reaction to the Arellano Felix Organization
The territorial business strategy of the (AFO) splinter cells led by El Teo triggered a
strong societal backlash that pressured the Mexican state at all levels to react strongly against it.
The widespread use of kidnapping, extortion of the local population and the killing of Tijuana
police officers galvanized the civil society and state reaction. The El Ingeniero transactional
PSIN supported the state response through the provision of intelligence on the Teo PSIN to the
state.433
The AFO was forced into internecine conflict by continual US decapitation strikes that
led to a fragmentation of the PSIN. Why was the US response to the AFO stronger, earlier? I
believe the answer lies in stronger democratic institutions and the rule of law. The killing of
DEA agent Enrique Camarena in Mexico triggered a stronger response than the killing of a US
agent in the United States might have because it involved elements of foreign policy nationalist
concerns about the safety of US agents abroad. Further the event occurred in the midst of an
already declared war on drugs in the United States that stretched back to the Nixon
Administration.434 US democratic institutions are well established. Democratic institutions
lower the tolerance of states to territorial and transactional PSINs; though territorial PSINs are
always higher priority targets for states due to territorial PSIN violence.
To understand the Mexican state reaction to the Arellano Felix Organization and its
success we must also understand Mexico’s democratization and US-Mexico relations. US law
433
434
2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2010m.
Shannon 1988.
152
enforcement played a major role in assisting the Mexican state against this profit-seeking illicit
network. State “successes,” in the form of arrests of AFO leadership figures, occurred when US
law enforcement found Mexican counterparts they felt they could trust and when Tijuana civil
society forced the Mexican to state to react to territorial profit-seeking illicit networks.435
US policy has been largely confrontational with traffickers in the 20th century while
Mexico has undergone a policy shift toward narcotics trafficking. Official Mexican state policy
had long been confrontational with traffickers, but a deeply corrupted internal security service
(DFS) colluded with traffickers through much of the 1980’s. The democratic consolidation
process explains much of Mexico’s change in policy to complete “confrontation” with profitseeking illicit networks.436
By 2006 the Calderon administration sent more than 60,000 federal soldiers and more
than 5,000 federal police to cartel hotspots throughout the country.437
It also negotiated
unprecedented levels of cooperation between the US and Mexico in the fight against Mexican
PSINs.438
435
2004; 2010d; Jones 2011b; 2011h; Jones 2011d; Cook, Rush, and Seelke; Neher 2009; 2009a; Booth and
Miroff 2010a.
436
437
Wilkinson 2009; 2010s.
438
2010d; Jones 2011a; Danelo.
153
US-Mexico Historical Relations
The US-Mexico relationship on drug trafficking can be characterized as cooperative
tempered by Mexican sovereignty concerns. For Mexican elites, the fear of US invasion is real
and stems from the loss of territory in the Mexican-American War resulting in the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the punitive raid of General Pershing against the forces of
Pancho Villa during the Revolution. The power differential between the United States and
Mexico is tremendous.
A small but illustrative example is the size of the two countries’
economies as measured by GDP, the US at 14 and Mexico at 1 trillion dollars shows the clear
differential. Despite the differences in economic size and development, the two countries are
natural trading partners and have codified the relationship with the 1994 North American Free
Trade Agreement; a key example of state led increased economic interdependence and
globalization.439 NAFTA itself increased the free flow of goods between the US and Mexico
which PSINs have taken advantage of. As Mexico’s struggle with organized crime has become
more violent, US assistance in the form of equipment, training, and now even embedding US
agents in Mexico has been offered and quietly accepted by the Mexican government. “Drug
wars” have thus become a source of mutual interest cooperation between the states and the
pattern is noticeable internationally. 440
Democratization in Mexico
Higher levels of democratic consolidation lower the state’s tolerance for organized crime,
particularly if that crime results in violence. Democratic transition, defined as the movement
from authoritarian to liberal democratic rule, results in a short term weakening of institutions
which can hinder the state’s response to organized crime. Over the long run however, the state is
439
440
2008a; Diaz 2009; Camp 2005a; Diez and Nicholls 2006.
Thompson 2011b; Thompson and Mazetti 2011.
154
better served against organized crime under democracy.441 Democracy is not a panacea for
organized crime, but its characteristics including: rule of law, transparency and accountability,
are the most effective means by which to combat organized crime. Democratic consolidation
must be careful to include legal reforms to prevent the funding of political campaigns by
organized crime, as has been the case in Mexico.442
Criminal activity threatens the foundations of liberal democracies and engenders
resentment from the population coupled with political demands to reduce crime and violence.
Populations in democracies are rarely willing to allow the state to engage in “dirty deals” with
organized crime in exchange for peace. “Political survival” explains democratic consolidation’s
movement toward “confrontational” relationships with traffickers.443 Political elites become
subject to electoral losses as the public makes demands to root out corruption. Traffickers
threaten the state by threatening the position of traditional political elites; thus political survival
models encapsulate the ways in which democratization moves states toward confrontational
relationships with traffickers. Traffickers also threaten “rule of law” norms and institutions
through their “impunity;” further triggering a societal backlash.444
Democratic consolidation can be a long and winding road. Democracy may include
demands for peace and accommodation with illicit networks in the short term.
445
Nowhere is
this clearer than in Mexico. Under the 70 years of one-party PRI rule, Mexico developed an ever441
Zakaria 2007.
Buscaglia and Van Dijk 2003; Buscaglia 2001.
443
Solingen 1998; Solingen 1994a; Solingen 1994b.
444
2010d; Jones 2010c; Marosi; Edmonds-Poli and Shirk 2009; Solingen 2007; Solingen 1998; Solingen 1994a;
Sabet 2011.
445
This occurred under the Colombian Pastrana administration in the late 1990’s. The Colombian government
provided a demilitarized zone to the FARC to facilitate negotiations. The demilitarized zone resulted in a de facto
state for the FARC which engaged in extensive drug trafficking and criminal activities like car theft in the region
which they dubbed “FARC-landia.” The FARC used the demilitarized zone to rearm and prepare for a continued
struggle against the Colombian state. Negotiation was widely considered a failure.
Pardo 2000.
442
155
increasing drug trafficking problem. However, under the PRI this trafficking was tolerated and
even encouraged so long as it occurred non-violently and significant payments to corrupt state
officials in the DFS were made. It was only in situations where the interests of the United States
were harmed that the Mexican government arrested major cartel figures.446
When American DEA agent Enrique Camarena was killed by the Guadalajara Cartel,
severe pressure was brought to bear on the Mexican government. Thus, democracy did force a
change in Mexico’s drug policy, it was however a foreign democracy.447
Democratization has weakened Mexico’s ability to negotiate with drug traffickers.448 The
movement away from the single party Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) rule and the
Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS) security agency has made long term credible promises to
traffickers on behalf of the Mexican government to traffickers impossible. Baja California was
the first state to break the PRI’s unified grip on power in Mexico and thus it was the first place
where the local trafficking network, the Arellano Felix Organization militarized because it could
no longer purchase the security services of the state.449
The more progressively democratic Mexico has become the stronger the state response
has been to drug cartels. Carlos Salinas de Gortari, president from 1988-1994, was considered
corrupt and in collusion with the Gulf Cartel.450 In 1989 the Partido Acion Nacional (PAN) also
won Baja California elections for governor and Mayor of Tijuana. For the first time in Mexican
446
Shannon 1988.
Ibid.
448
449
This was not the sole factor at play. With the removal of the DFS other cartels were threatening to infringe upon
the lucrative territory, further forcing the AFO to purchase weaponry and increase their enforcer squads recruited
from San Diego gangs. See chapter five.
450
Arteaga 2006.
447
156
politics the PRI’s unified grip on Mexico weakened. This also meant that the political class was
less able to control the AFO because it was less unified than under the PRI.451
President Ernesto Zedillo 1994-2000 (PRI) began a slow fight against the drug cartels
which resulted in the arrest of numerous major traffickers including Juan Abrego head of the
Gulf Cartel. His Drug Czar General Rebollo was discovered to be in collusion with the Juarez
Cartel. By the time Vicente Fox was elected in 2000, he had begun the process of utilizing the
military against the cartels; though at a much lower level than current President Calderon. Some
of the most important arrests of cartel leaders occurred in this period under the Fox
Administration including the arrest of Benjamin Arellano-Félix head of the AFO, Osiel Cardenas
Guillen head of the Gulf Cartel and El Tigrillo successor to Benjamin Arellano Felix. The Fox
administration was the first non-PRI election victory in more than 70 years and was considered a
major step toward democratization in Mexico.452
US-Mexico Counternarcotics Strategies
The Mexican and US government strategy to fight the AFO has focused on
“decapitation” strikes, or the targeting of AFO leadership figures for arrest. This strategy is
embodied by DEA’s Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) lists which focus on
prominent DTO’s and their leadership figures. The goal of these strikes is the dismantlement of
the organization resulting “flatter” organizations which do not threaten the state. This is the
dominant narrative of what occurred in Colombia following the dismantlement of the Medellín
and Cali Cartels.453
451
2010g.
Shirk and Latin American Studies Association. International Congress 1998; Velasco 2005; Shirk 2005; Bailey
and Godson 2000.
453
Garzón 2008; 2008b.
452
157
The US-Mexico Cross-Border taskforce is an example of an interagency US law
enforcement program that increased cooperation amongst US agencies responsible for
prosecuting the AFO. These agencies included the California Department of Justice, the FBI, the
DEA, the US Attorney’s office among other agencies. At various times they have had the
cooperation of the US Coast Guard. The United States largest hindrance in the interdiction
strategies of the 1990’s was the perceived corruption of Mexican officials. This perception
prevented the sharing of accurate intelligence.454
Operation United Eagles represented a model for the successful cooperation between US
and Mexican law enforcement and military agencies. Under Operation United Eagles US law
enforcement brought 65 vetted Mexican law enforcement agents into the United States for
counternarcotics training. They were then returned to Mexico and given intelligence from US
wiretaps on the whereabouts of AFO leaders. The Operation led to the arrest of major AFO
leaders including “El Tigrillo” in 2006.455
The US government response to drug cartels in Mexico has been much more aggressive
much earlier than in Mexico.
Indeed this aggressive approach stems from stronger law
enforcement institutions that wanted to punish the heirs of the Guadalajara cartel for the death of
Enrique Camarena and the support of a democratic populace with a low tolerance for drug
related violence and ironically a high consumption rate. This aggressive response was felt in the
late 90’s and early 2000’s in the Tijuana cartel which was decapitated to such a degree that the
split along transactional versus territorial lines occurred. The Mexican government was later
coming to the fight against organized crime and democratization appears to have been the key
factor increasing the response against organized crime. In Tijuana the coordinated federal and
454
455
2010l; 2008b.
2008b.
158
local state responses were triggered only when the territorial Teo faction fragmented from the
rest of the AFO and triggered a civil society response.456
The Merida Initiative
Upon taking office the Calderon Administration realized it would need to fight organized
crime and would need the support of the United States. The Merida Initiative began with the
Bush Administration and the subject was broached in 2007 in Merida Mexico by President
Calderon. The ongoing Initiative is a US-Mexico “partnership” in which Mexico receives 1.4
billion dollars in US military equipment over three years for its fight against profit-seeking illicit
networks. The program was very carefully crafted to alleviate Mexican sovereignty concerns.
The equipment has been slow to arrive in the time since the agreement was reached and Mexican
officials have told American diplomats that the Merida Initiative should have included more
training and personnel capacity-building.
Capacity-building and training in the Merida Initiative were minimized and subcontracted
to private security firms due to Mexican sovereignty sensitivities.457 According to leaked state
department cables available from Wikileaks, Mexican Calderon Administration officials have
acknowledged that the lack of emphasis on capacity building was problematic for the success of
the Merida Initiative. The equipment provided will be useful, but training and capacity-building
would have been more useful and will be emphasized in future iterations provided the next
Administration does not make radical changes in anti-organized crime policy.458
456
Ibid.; Shannon 1988; Grayson 2008b; Bjerke 2010.
2010d; Cook, Rush, and Seelke; Neher 2009; Lacey 2010; Johnson 2008.
458
Booth and Miroff 2010a; Carroll 2010; Danelo.
457
159
ATF Project Gunrunner
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations have acknowledged the US responsibility to
stop the flow of guns into Mexico from the United States. 90% of guns in Mexico recovered in
crimes that are traced are traced back to the United States. Guns are purchased through strawbuyers and modified by illegal gunsmiths in the US or Mexico before or after being trafficked
into Mexico.
The US response has been to send more Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) agents to border areas where guns are most likely to be trafficked to Mexico or
the US.459 The ATF has recently received criticism for Operation Fast and Furious. This
operation allowed guns to “walk” into Mexico, in an attempt to track the weapons to high
ranking cartel figures. The guns were lost and one may be linked to the death of an American
ICE Agent Jaime Zapata killed by Los Zetas gunmen in Mexico.460
The Tijuana Federal and Local Response
While Mexico’s current national counternarcotics strategy has overemphasized
equipment in its battles with drug traffickers, it has its own “successful” model Tijuana.461
Tijuana has not made public the details of Operativo Tijuana, but it has created a model for
success, which through interviews, media reporting, official statements, and statistics can be
understood and applied to other regions.462
459
Jones 2010a.
Serrano 2011; Thompson 2011a.
461
2010t.
462
Public statements on the plan were limited and came primarily at the federal level from the military in January
2007. Details on the actual strategy were limited and the public address announcing it primarily provided the
numbers on forces and equipment to be sent to Baja California. It should be noted that Municipal police chief
Leyzaola took office in September of 2008 and could not have been present for a planning session in or before
January 2007. The plan underwent a major revision in December 2007 when Leyzaola arrived. There is no clear
strategic statement of the operation or publicly available statistics from the government assessing it. This
demonstrates a lack of communication with society and Operativo Tijuana may have succeeded despite this lack of
communication, not because of it.
Merlos and De La Luz Gonzalez 2007; Ortiz Aguilera.
460
160
The ongoing Tijuana strategy includes both social and security programs with an
emphasis on the security. The social prong of the strategy included Educacion para Rechaz Uso
y Abuso de Drogas a program designed to educate young people to reject drug use. Operativo
Tijuana, or Operacion Tijuana, was announced in January of 2007 by the federal government,
but was completely revised with local and state participation in September of 2007 following the
kidnapping of the President of the Confederation of Employers of Tijuana (COPARMEX) on
September 2, 2007.463 The strategy was completed in December 2007 following a series of
meetings between the military, federal government, state and local authorities, US law
enforcement and civil society groups. Leaders of business associations representing businesses
and professionals were especially important according to interviews conducted for this project.464
The strategy was premised on Los Angeles counter-gang strategies of the 1990’s
according to anonymous interviews of those present. The army also worked extensively with
local human rights groups, business leaders and citizen civil society groups in the planning and
implementation of the strategy. This increased “local buy-in” and “intelligence.”465 Overall it
was characterized by “a single charismatic leader” in military commander General Alfonso
Duarte Mujica, who worked closely with his municipal police counterpart Julian Leyzaola.466
The Tijuana Alliance
Civil society groups had created the demand necessitating the strong state reaction. As
the victims of kidnappings and extortion, businessmen became ready allies in the fight against
territorial PSINs in Tijuana. Human rights groups also participated, but continued to accuse the
military and police of human rights violations. The governor of Baja California Osuna (PAN)
463
2010h.
Alvarado 2010.
465
2011b; 2011c; Contact 2009.
466
Marosi 2009; Marosi.
464
161
and President Calderon (PAN) were committed to improving security and provided many of the
resources necessary, including the best trained and most competent components of the Mexican
military. 467
There was one final ally of note.468 The “El Ingeniero” or Fernando Sanchez Arellano
faction of the AFO provided the police and military with valuable intelligence about the Teo
faction and its key leaders after their split in 2008. We can surmise that this information may
have been taken unwittingly by the state through a hotline the military had established to garner
intelligence and tips on narco traffickers operating in the area. The FSO is a transactional cartel
with extensive money laundering and trafficking operations that did not want to “heat up the
plaza.” El Ingeniero was at war with the Teo territorial PSIN from April 2008 to early 2010.469
When the Teo territorial PSIN broke from the AFO it increased kidnappings, homicides in the
city and issued cuotas on the number of police its sicarios had to kill for refusing to cooperate.
Also, it threatened the police chief Leyzaola with bombings of police buildings. The Teo faction
had many corrupted police but could not corrupt all and thus the AFO internecine conflict had a
mirror within the municipal police. The Teo faction was territorial, hierarchical and unable to
establish a Pax Mafiosi with the police and military that US officials suspect the Fernando
Sanchez organization was able to establish.470
Police Reform
Through the creation of a stronger, vetted, better equipped police force and military
coordination, Tijuana scored impressive successes against organized crime in the city. The
467
James Ackerman President of the Tijuana Employers Confederation (COPARMEX) was kidnapped on
September 2, 2007 and released shortly thereafter. Ackerman’s kidnapping by the Teo faction added to a strong
societal backlash against the Teo faction within the AFO at this time.
2010a.
468
Ramos 2011.
469
Marosi 2008a; Marosi; Marosi 2008b; Marosi; Marosi.
470
Betanzos 2011.
162
municipal police force has improved and is in the midst of an ongoing reformation process. The
emphasis on municipal police assisted the gathering of intelligence which, when given to the
military on incidents related to federal crimes, was effectively acted upon. For example, cases
involving assault weapons and large quantities of drugs, which were not under municipal
jurisdiction were referred to the army (SEDENA). Interviews within Tijuana indicated a high
level of distrust of Federal Police due to potential corruption. Thus, while the military was less
embedded in the society and had less law enforcement experience but it was more trusted then
the federal police. One interviewee stated, “Mejor un novato que un corrompido.” Or better a
Rookie than a dirty cop.471
Chemotherapy for the Municipal Police
The focus of the Tijuana strategy was on the municipal police and capacity-building in
the agency. A major element of the strategy was the elimination of corrupt police elements,
which like chemotherapy would be a long, painful but necessary process. These corrupt officers
provided much of the logistical support for illicit criminal networks throughout the city, but
especially for the Teo Faction. The police were deeply corrupted by the AFO over the previous
thirty years, from which the Teo faction split in 2008. These deeply embedded officers had to be
removed to successfully combat organized crime.472
The tactics for eliminating internal police corruption were regular polygraphs,
background checks, drug tests, training sessions, target practice, etc.
Police pay had been
increased under the former Mayor Jorge Hank Rhon (PRI) to the highest levels in Mexico; a
necessary precondition for the success of the program. Despite the increases, the average police
officer makes about $1100 US dollars a month Tijuana, which is still a small sum for one of the
471
472
Author’s translation. Multiple interviews of anonymous scholars, law enforcement and reporters in Mexico.
2011c.
163
most expensive cities to live in Mexico. Those pay increases were accompanied by other
infrastructural improvements like new police office buildings and cameras to prevent crime
throughout the city. 473
Torture appears to have been used to gain intelligence and remove corrupt officers.
When officers proved to be corrupted, torture in the form of beatings and electrocutions were
used to garner intelligence on officers suspected of corruption. Former Police Commander
Leyzaola denies these charges but there are media reports and witnesses to support the
accusation that torture was used particularly on suspected police officers.474 Without judging
torture’s moral implications, it appears to have been effective to the extent that there is more
public confidence in the municipal police and many corrupt officers were arrested in this period,
though many innocent police officers were no doubt implicated as well.475
Incompetent Enemies
The success of the government effort can in part be attributed to the incompetence of the
enemy. The Teo faction was not particularly sophisticated in its methods of kidnapping or
intelligence.
The victims of kidnapping moved in this period from high level wealthy
individuals in Tijuana society to small business owners, owners of taco stands, restaurants,
mechanics, etc. This created a strong societal backlash which put tremendous pressure on the
state apparatus and made Teo’s soldiers visible to the local population.476 Intelligence fed to the
government by the FSO no doubt also played a role.477 The FSO’s ability to create an alliance
with local authorities and the Sinaloa cartel through its Sinaloa and business connections made it
473
Shirk; Shirk.
2010b; Walker 2010; Finnegan 2010.
475
2005.
476
2011b; 2011a; 2010n.
477
2011c.
474
164
more able to survive the onslaught and redirect the state’s energies toward the Teo faction
culminating in his arrest and the arrest of all of his top lieutenants in early 2010.478
The Mexican government response had many advantages. US law enforcement had
specialized taskforces eavesdropping on cartel radios and telephone systems. They may have fed
the Mexican state intelligence on the Teo faction, as the Wikilieaks cables demonstrate the DEA
had done in the case of the Mexican Marine’s capture of Arturo Beltran-Leyva in Cuernavaca,
Mexico.
Mexican law enforcement have also benefitted from the training of US law
enforcement.479
“Oil-Spots”
Operativo Tijuana focused resources on small-targeted regions to clear those areas of
members of organized crime.480 It focused police capacity-building in geographic sectors. This
is much like an “oil spot” or “ink-stain” counterinsurgency strategy as articulated by Sir Robert
Thompson.481
The Tijuana plan had a key difference from the typical “ink spot” strategy in that it did
not begin in the center of the City, but rather in its farthest western region a Delegacion known
as Las Playas de Tijuana. Playas de Tijuana is a logical starting point for the strategy; it is
abutted by the ocean which means that infiltration from the West is unlikely. It is fairly
geographically isolated with one main road connecting it to Central Tijuana. There are other
roads which travel to Rosarito and Ensenada, but there is only one main road to the center of the
city due to hills. It is also known as an affluent region where American ex-patriots reside
because of the lower cost of living. The goal of the strategy was to recover Tijuana delegacion
478
Spagat 2010.
2009a; Booth and Miroff 2010a.
480
Felbab-Brown 2009c.
481
Thompson 1966.
479
165
by delegacion starting west to east. The process is ongoing with east Tijuana delegaciones still
not fully recovered.482
One notable example of the geographic character of the recovery was the recent military
decommissioning of 134 tons of Sinaloa Cartel marijuana. Following the decommissioning
police and military were threatened via police radio frequencies with 134 murders in the city in
response.
How was this possible if police radio frequencies were now encrypted?
The
encryption system was effective in Playas and Centro delegaciones, but not in the east where the
resources have not yet been applied. It is projected by the strategy proposal that the large more
rural east Tijuana delegaciones are projected to be “recovered” in 2011.483
The “Successful” Reaction of the State to a Territorial Illicit Network
The reaction of the state can be characterized as successful in the Tijuana case because
the citizens of Tijuana feel more secure, kidnappings and extortion of legitimate businesses are
down, and one cartel faction was dissolved and another is reorganizing. Figure 14 below
demonstrate in both annual and monthly data the reduction of kidnappings in Tijuana following
the highs of 2008.
482
483
2011a; 2011c.
2011e; Ibarra Gonzalez 2010.
166
Figure 12. Kidnappings in Tijuana 2006-September 2011
Average Monthly
Kidnappings in Tijuana
9
8
7.67 7.92
7
6
5.67
5
4.33
4
3
2
1
2.50
Average
Monthly
Kidnappings
in Tijuana
* 2011 based on
data through
September
1.17
0
200620072008200920102011
484
Figure 14 shows a reduction in violence from the highs of the cartel internecine conflict
of 2008 but the new “lows” are higher than years prior to Calderon’s drug war. There are
multiple explanations for what could cause this new level of violence. Some Mexican scholars
argue that this has more to do with how the numbers are compiled. Now that local governments
get federal government attention and money based on violence, they are more likely to count
homicides and kidnappings. Another possible explanation is that the new levels of violence
represent a decentralization of violence and the rise of retail drug use and sales in Mexico.485
484
485
These figures are monthly and annual raw numbers (not rates).
Jones 2011d.
167
The Resilience of the Transactional PSIN
The AFO has proven resilient, though US prosecutors call it by a new name, the
Fernando Sanchez Organization (FSO), after having forced its reorganization. It is severely
weakened and is being supplanted by the Sinaloa cartel, which continues to pay the FSO cuota in
an agreement the nature of which no one outside the illicit networks clearly understands. Tijuana
was considered such a success that President Felipe Calderon took Baja California leader Blake
Mora has his new Government Secretary a position equivalent in importance to the US VicePresidency.486
Tijuana has not eliminated organized crime in the city, but the municipal police have
strengthened themselves sufficiently that illicit networks have taken a “lower profile.”
Organized crime, at least the Teo Faction, could not rely on corrupted police officers to provide
logistical support and was quickly dissolved by early 2010. Tijuana itself has become too secure
for most high level traffickers to reside in. Most have moved to Baja California Sur; e.g. the
arrest of El Teo was in La Paz. Murders and the “settling of scores” between criminal groups,
narcomenudistas and buyers, continue to occur, but not in broad day light. Extortions and
kidnappings, referred to as “high impact” crimes are also down in the city as the figure below
demonstrates.487
486
In December 2007 there were 6,076 delitos or crimes and in December 2010 there were 4,304 representing a 33%
decline in general crime during the implementation of Tijuana’s COIN strategy.
2011a.
487
Ibid.
168
Figure 13. Kidnappings, Homicides and Extortions in Tijuana 2006-September 2011
Source: Secretary of Security Baja California
Homicides
140
Arrest
of El
Tigrill
o
120
Kidnappings
Interneci
ne war
between
El
Ingeniero
and El
Ceasefire
between
Teo and El
Arrest
of El
Doctor
Arrest
of El
Teo
Extortion
Cases
100
80
60
40
20
2011-7-July
2011-4-April
2011-1-January
2010-10-october
2010-7-july
2010-4-april
2010-1-January
2009-7-july
2009-10-october
2009-4-april
2009-1-January
2008-7-july
2008-10-october
2008-4-april
2008-1-January
2007-10-october
2007-7-july
2007-4-april
2007-1-January
2006-10-october
2006-7-july
2006-4-april
2006-1-January
0
Source:
Baja
California
State
Police
What is interesting about this chart is not that it demonstrates that spikes in violence are directly
related to conflict within the AFO but the new “normal” levels of violence after the spikes.488
Annual homicides in 2010 are higher than in 2008, as the figure below demonstrates. Mexican
488
Jones 2011d.
169
scholars like Dra. Virginia Ilescas argue this is the result of improved data collection following
periods of intense violence.489
Figure 15. Tijuana Homicides 2006-2011 Data From Secretaria de Seguridad Publica Baja
California
Average annual Tijuana Homicides
70
60
57.33
50
48.08
46.33
40
30
37.78
26.17
Average annual
Tijuana Homicides
25.83
20
2011 Data
through
September
10
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
The trend in Mexico and as evidenced here in Tijuana has been that the new “lows” in
violence are higher than in previous years though lower than the spikes due to internecine PSIN
conflict. This suggests that the new norm will be worse than the old and is no longer in the
control the AFO or other large PSINs. We can logically hypothesize that the new violence may
be due to increased retail drug traffickers “settling scores.”
The new violence is now
decentralized and uncontrolled. The “success” has been in controlling the spikes in violence due
to internecine conflict within and between “cartels.”490
Tijuana has not improved in all security metrics, but the sense of cartel “impunity” has
been eliminated and the police have largely been purged of corrupted officers that provided the
489
490
Public presentation on violence in Mexico at COLEF University in Tijuana.
Jones 2011d.
170
logistical support to territorial PSINs like the Teo faction. The Teo faction had many police
contacts which it attempted to leverage in a territorial fashion. This directly challenged state
authority. They engaged in broad daylight shootings threatened to bomb municipal police
stations and taxed their territory through extortion and kidnappings.491
Fearing a Return
There is a fear of a return of violence in Tijuana. It centers on the scenario that as the
remnants of the AFO led by “El Ingeniero” are displaced by the Sinaloa cartel, there will be a
final territorial struggle between them. Municipal police appear confident in their ability to
address that scenario today because the police forces have been largely purged of corrupt officers
which could prevent their ability to address security threats. Further, they appear emboldened by
the presence and the cooperation of the military which has taken the mantle of leadership in the
area.492
More and more reports arise suggesting that the success in Tijuana was due to the
alliance between the local police and the AFO against the Teo faction. Once the Teo faction has
been eliminated the new equilibrium appears to be to allow the AFO to function. Also the
Sinaloa cartel has made inroads into Tijuana and appears to have “purchased” the territory for
the long term, suggesting the presence of the cartel will be permanent. The Sinaloa Cartel is
largely transactional much like the Cartel Arellano Felix. This suggests that the transactional
PSINS are better at corrupting the government and creating alliances with each other, which are
both capabilities, suggesting transactional PSINs are more resilient than their territorial
counterparts.493
491
Marosi 2009.
2011a; 2011b; 2011c.
493
2010v.
492
171
The Role of Technology in US-Mexico Battle against Organized Crime
The role of technology can both benefit and hinder flat illicit networks in their
competition with hierarchical states. Expert opinion has generally argued that technology would
weaken the state vis-à-vis illicit networks.
Generally, globalization has diminished the
technological advantage the state has enjoyed over profit-seeking illicit networks, though a
narrow gap advantaging states remains. The causal mechanism for this trend has been the
widespread availability of technology in the private sector. 494
Technology can strengthen the grip of the state over its citizenry. It was once argued that
the Internet and the free flow of information would dismantle autocratic regimes. This has not
been the case as the state has found impressive mechanisms for controlling the flows of
information and suppressing dissent with technology.495
One implication of globalization is that technology is privately available to individuals
and illicit networks. Global Position Systems (GPS) can be bought and used to track drug loads,
“pay as you go,” “clone” cellular and satellite phones can be used to coordinate drug deals or
terror attacks, sea-submersibles can be constructed using materials and components available on
the open market, email accounts can be used to engage in untraceable communications, and free
encryption systems can be used to prevent or stifle state surveillance, e.g. blackberry encryption
(Research in Motion Canada-based) can prevent government surveillance.496
494
Naím 2005; Friedman 2007, 1:; Friedman 2010.
Certainly the Communist leadership in China and its recent cyber attacks on dissidents using Google is a case in
point. China has opened economically but not politically, despite rapid technological development in the private
and public sectors. Iran’s ability to suppress the Facebook utilizing Green Movement and North Korea’s ability to
control everything its population has access to, are also illustrative of how technology can be used to maintain the
dominance of the state over non-state actors and social movements.
Cole 2010.
496
The Mexican government’s recent attempts to identify cell phone users by forcing them to “text” their identities
was derisively received by the Mexican public, with Telefonica refusing to cut users off and Proceso Magazine
issuing cartoons poking fun at how many Mexicans claimed to be the president of Mexico. All of this was an
495
172
Technology has traditionally been an advantage for the state in its struggles with nonstate actors like insurgencies and organized crime. This has been due to the state’s development
and control of these technologies; especially in the realm of surveillance. During the Cold War,
the US government developed extensive surveillance technology. The sophisticated surveillance
equipment which took so much money to develop in the Cold War is now passé by the standards
of what is available at a Radio-Shack or an Internet “spy” website.497
In an increasingly globalized world, where much of the technology is developed by
private companies for the open market, the technological advantage of states over organized
criminal groups has narrowed. Governments aren’t the only ones who can wiretap phones.
Illicit networks like the Gulf Cartel are notorious for tapping phone lines and killing the citizenry
who provide tips to the government about the cartel operations.498
Advanced drone technology is an example of an area where states, in particular the
United States, maintain an advantage. Surveillance drones require billions of dollars of research
and development. While PSINs have the ability to accumulate capital, that level of capital
accumulation and investment, is typically beyond their reach. Advanced drones have played an
important role in US support for Mexico in the fight against organized crime. Sophisticated
surveillance drones flying at over 60,000 feet now provide Mexican security forces with
attempt by the Mexican state to prevent drug traffickers from using “pay as you go” cell phones to engage in
criminal activities.
Naím 2005.
497
Marshall.
498
States still wield power over private companies with encryption technologies that states cannot break. The US
government for example can and does offer private entities lucrative government and law enforcement contracts on
the use of the technology, on the condition that it not be sold on the open market. Private entities comply for profit
and possibly fearing state retribution in other sectors like the regulation of airwaves and the ability of regulatory
agencies like the FCC to punish.
Grayson.
173
intelligence on PSINs.499 Data-mining is also an area where states maintain a surveillance
technology advantage over illicit networks.
The capability to develop the algorithms and
maintain this surveillance requires large scale investments in supercomputers, qualified and
vetted personnel, and even the cooperation of private telecommunications actors.500
States maintain a narrow technological advantage over PSINs, but democratic ones are
limited in how they use it.
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) likely engages in
sophisticated social network analysis of insurgencies and criminal groups in foreign countries.
The National Security Administration (NSA) engages in the “warrantless-wiretapping” of
American citizens’ communications with suspected terrorists, raising constitutional issues.
Democracies prefer to avoid spying on their own citizens, which limits how they can take
advantage of their narrowing technological advantage.501
For better or worse, democracies have been able to overcome the privacy issues of
surveillance technology through their cooperation with each other. The US-Mexico relationship
is an example. Mexico cannot spy on its own citizens, but has had no qualms accepting
intelligence from US intelligence agencies about internal corruption and illicit PSINs. This has
led to major prosecutions in Mexico. Vice-versa Mexican espionage could also engage in some
of the same activities and pass information on to US law enforcement. These arrangements
likely occur and are not publicized.502 Further, today states must compete for talent, which it
pays to educate, with its own private sector. The state advantage comes in the size and quality of
499
Thompson and Mazetti 2011.
Smith 2007; Thompson and Mazetti 2011; Thompson 2011b.
501
Smith 2007.
502
Ravelo 2005.
500
174
the bureaucracies they can create for the sophisticated analysis, surveillance software, and
equipment capable of giving them an advantage over technologically sophisticated networks.503
This technological advantage exists only for the wealthiest states willing to invest large
sums in defense and intelligence gathering. It requires hierarchies to collect and analyze the data
in addition to laws to control the spread of software like encryption programs government
agencies cannot decrypt. Developing economies do not possess this advantage, unless they
operate in conjunction with developed states and take advantage of their economies of scale.504
Mexico and the United States represent an example where the battle against illicit networks has
provided a point of cooperation on the issue of the diffusion of surveillance technology from
strong to weak states. The importance of that diffusion has been highlighted by leaked state
department cables released by Wikileaks, which describe the desire of Mexican government
officials to develop an indigenous surveillance capability.505
503
Friedman 2007, 1:.
Colombia in the 1990’s and present-day Mexico are excellent examples of developed states taking advantage of
their alliances with the United States and its economy of scale in defense spending.
Bowden 2001.
505
2009a; 2010f; Booth and Miroff 2010a; 2010y.
504
175
Deepening Ties and Capacity-Building
The United States and Mexico appear to be deepening ties with each other in the battle
against organized crime. Mexican sovereignty concerns have slowly given way to an acceptance
of US assistance and US intelligence. These have included the presence of US intelligence
officials in Mexico, US drone flights and US telecommunication intelligence.506 Some have
criticized the over reliance on US intelligence and questioned its validity in Mexico, yet the trend
appears to be deepening.507
This seems to confirm the neo-liberal-institutionalist notion that states will find areas of
common ground in which to cooperate. Ultimately however domestic political concerns have
driven the policies of both states and thus political survival models best encapsulate the
continued cooperation between these states in this issue area. Key to my state reaction argument
for illicit network resilience is the notion that territorial PSINs trigger strong reactions from civil
society which demands that the state react rapidly. Government officials and politicians hoping
to survive politically must act or be removed. Going forward, it appears that more US agents
will be placed in Mexico and capacity-building between US and Mexican agencies will be
emphasized over equipment.508
506
Cave 2011; Martinez-Amador 2011; Mendoza and Castillo 2011; Thompson 2011b.
Martinez-Amador 2011.
508
Barclay 2009; Booth and Miroff 2010a; Danelo; Malkin 2010.
507
176
Chapter 7:
Conclusion:
A Generalizable Argument on Illicit Network Resilience
Over the course of the preceding five chapters, my state reaction argument has been
developed and tested. It has shown through the examination of the historical case study of the
Arellano Felix Organization, popularly known as the Tijuana Cartel, that the business strategy of
the profit-seeking illicit network triggers state reactions of varying intensity, which depending
upon the strength of those state reactions affect the resilience of the illicit network. Profitseeking illicit networks with the most territorial and extortion-oriented business strategies,
trigger the strongest state reaction and is thus least resilient. Typically, these territorial PSINs
are more hierarchical due to the large numbers of enforcers required to “tax” the local
population. This analysis thus concludes that, given the preponderance of state power vis-à-vis
profit-seeking illicit networks, hierarchical territorial illicit networks are less resilient than flatter
transactional illicit networks because of the state reaction they trigger.509
introduction:
States and territorial profit-seeking illicit networks (PSINs) are enemies, because
they are so much alike. They are both: territorial, hierarchical, resilient, prone to
violence and funded by taxation. Territorial PSINs threaten the state’s
underlying raison d’être, the ability to govern through the taxation of territory.
The “predatory” “alternative governance structure” these territorial profitseeking illicit networks establish through extortion and kidnap activities, directly
challenge states by illicitly taxing the local population and exercising violence
within state territory. Territorial profit-seeking illicit networks thus become the
primary targets for “territorially sovereign states.”510
509
510
2010u.
Introduction to dissertation. Ibid.; Povoledo 2006.
177
To quote the
The Case Study: The AFO
The Tijuana cartel’s recent internecine conflict and dissolution through state arrest of the
territorial faction’s leadership and enforcers, illustrates the model’s predictions. The kidnap and
extortion wave of the independent El Teo faction in the 2008-2010 epoch, demonstrates a strong
state and societal backlash that converged to dissolve the Teo faction.511
The surviving El Ingeniero faction is now a much smaller transactional PSIN. It focuses
now on money laundering, drug trafficking and charging cuota to other large illicit networks like
the Sinaloa Cartel, which have begun to supplant the AFO in Baja California.512 My state
reaction argument demonstrates which business strategies will cause states to attack profitseeking illicit networks and in what priority. This answers important questions about Mexico’s
practical behavior in targeting some cartels ahead of others.
This has both practical and
theoretical implications.
Theoretically it suggests that states will react quickly to maintain themselves as the
dominant unit of the international system when challenged by “alternative governance
structures;” implying that states have long term staying power despite reduced technological
advantages resulting from increased globalization.
Weak state areas and the resulting
conceptualizations cannot be geographically predicted other than in the probabilistic context of
looking toward important trafficking corridors. Practically, this dissertation has described some
of the unintended consequences of “decapitation strikes” by the state against illicit networks, like
increased kidnapping, homicides and “cartel” internecine war. It has also most importantly
511
Marosi 2008b.
It is impossible to confirm the exact illicit arrangements between the AFO and the Sinaloa Cartel, but it does
appear that the Sinaloa cartel is deferring to the AFO as its power increases in Tijuana. The Sinaloa Cartel may be
avoiding conflict in Tijuana due to the ongoing conflict in Ciudad Juaraez with the Carillo-Fuentes Organization.
2011a; 2009b; 2011b; 2011c.
512
178
illustrated why transactional traffickers tend to be more resilient vis-à-vis the state than territorial
traffickers.513
Mexican PSINs were split along these lines of transactional and territorial due to the
arrest of top-level leadership by state. The AFO was heavily targeted by US law enforcement in
the early 1990’s, though the Mexican state response was not triggered until the widespread
kidnappings in Tijuana in the mid to late 2000’s. After suffering the arrest or killings of its first
generation of leadership it split along territorial and transactional lines in 2008. The state and
society reacted viscerally and immediately against the territorial Teo faction in collusion with the
transactional El Ingeniero faction. The Teo faction has since dissolved while the El Ingeniero
faction has reorganized and formed alliances with the Sinaloa cartel. Prior to US-Mexico
decapitations of the PSIN both business strategies coexisted within the same PSIN.
The
transactional portions of the PSIN controlled the territorial portions in a clear hierarchy. Wealth
was redistributed within the network by the transactional and strategic leadership.514
A precondition for the “success” in Tijuana was the willingness to spend more on
capacity-building in the police forces. The application of counterinsurgency strategies like “oilspot” strategies, a focus on intelligence, the removal of corrupt police officers, and cooperation
from local civil society groups, businessmen, rival (PSIN’s) and the population at large, were all
critical elements in reducing violence in Tijuana from their highs in 2008. The state response
was galvanized by the response to widespread kidnappings and extortion of the El Teo territorial
PSIN.515
513
2010u.
Benitez 2009.
515
Thompson 1966.
514
179
Broader Applicability of the Argument in Mexico
The pattern of the state inadvertently splintering these PSINs along business strategy
lines is apparent throughout Mexico and beyond. After the arrest of Osiel Cardenas Guillen,
head of the Gulf Cartel, the cartel splintered between its traffickers and its former armed wing
Los Zetas.
The Gulf Cartel continued its transactional business strategy with the violent
exceptions of its conflicts with the Zetas which took on territorial character.516 The Zetas, with
fewer drug trafficking contacts, focused on extortion of legitimate businesses and kidnappings.
They attempted to gain drug trafficking contacts through alliances with Mara Salvatruche and
appear to have made inroads into Central America. However, Los Zetas continue their largely
territorial strategy.
Recent reports indicate that immigrants deported to Mexico from the US are requesting
deportation to states that are not controlled by the Zetas to avoid being kidnapped for ransom.
The Zetas brought with them sophisticated tactics, techniques and procedures from the Mexican
Special Forces (GAFES) when they defected. This may make them more resilient in their fight
with Mexican authorities than the Teo faction of the AFO and allow them to supplant the state as
an “alternative governance structure;” though this is highly improbable. The Mexican
government has targeted the Zetas in much the same way it did the Teo faction because of the
civil society backlash to the high-levels of violence in areas it controls.517
The Sinaloa cartel’s split with its former enforcers the Beltran-Leyva Organization
followed a similar pattern to the AFO split. The exception to the Sinaloa-BLO split is that the
Sinaloa Cartel put the Beltran-Leyva brothers in charge of corrupting the government as well as
enforcer operations. Despite that largely transactional activity the BLO continued to have a
516
517
Brands 2009a; Grayson 2008a; Rodriguez; SGF 2010; Logan and Sullivan 2010.
Burnett and Montagne; Burnett and Penalosa; Burnett, Penalosa, and Bennincasa 2010; 2010v.
180
territorial focus and engage in violent conflict throughout Mexico including Cuernavaca less than
one hour’s drive from Mexico City. In all of these cases, arrest and corruption data strongly
suggest that the state is targeting territorial PSINs first and being corrupted by transactional
PSINs at higher levels of government.518
International Applicability of the Argument
The argument that business model triggers a strong state reaction and thereby reduces the
resilience of an illicit network can be applied far beyond Mexico. Nor can it be argued that the
this phenomena is unique to the North American cocaine market because we see illicit networks
in other regions, trafficking different commodities survive or dissolve in similar patterns.
The Irish Republican Army’s splinter factions, which did not accept the Good Friday
Accords, like the Continuing Irish Republican Army, are examples of insurgent illicit networks
that have taken on an increasingly transactional character. They focus their efforts on the
profitability of arms and drug trafficking and instrumentally use political violence as a façade for
criminality. In the preceding chapters I have explained why these illicit networks have survived;
they are less visible to the state and do not trigger a strong reaction through insurgent or
extortionist activities.519
Examples of illicit networks, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, which trigger a strong state
reaction due to their insurgent character and desire to overthrow the existing state, abound. Their
resilience comes in the relative strength of their institutions versus those of the US and Afghan
governments; the latter of which is particularly corrupt. “Defeating” the Taliban which aspires
518
Burnett, Penalosa, and Bennincasa 2010; Burnett and Penalosa; Burnett 2009; Burnett and Montagne; Burnett
2010; 2010v.
519
Curtis and Karacan 2002; Sullivan 2008; 2010x.
181
to political power thus has more to do with eliminating the corruption within the Karzai
government, providing stability and basic social services to the population.520
Al Qaeda can and must be described as distinct from the Taliban in Afghanistan though
they share extensive social connections given their shared history fighting the Soviet Union in
the 1980’s. The Al Qaeda that launched the 911 attacks was much more tightly connected and
centralized/hierarchical than the Al Qaeda that has functioned since.521 Experts like Thomas
Hammes have described Al Qaeda’s new strategy as decentralized and entrepreneurial. It is one
in which Al Qaeda leadership relies on autonomous insurgencies functioning with little central
direction save the vision established by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.522
Al Qaeda as a politically motivated insurgent illicit network will always trigger strong
state reactions, greater even than territorial and transactional PSINs. Indeed, in Iraq where Al
Qaeda in Iraq’s “morality” conflicted with smuggling operations and brothels in Al Anbar
province it contributed to the Sunni Awakening where Sunni paramilitaries contributed by tribal
leaders were trained by US Marines to fight Al Qaeda in Iraq. This is an example of how the
political insurgent motivations of AQI reduced its resilience by putting it in conflict with
transactionally-oriented illicit networks that were deeply embedded among local elites. Also, Al
Qaeda has extensive fundraising and we would not be surprised to observe some of those
transactional cells utilizing insurgent bonds and trust instrumentally for profit. Indeed, as Al
Qaeda engenders greater reactions from states due to its terror activities, we can expect these
cells to survive through state collaboration and the betrayal of their more politically/religiously
motivated co-conspirators.
520
Felbab-Brown 2009b; Felbab-Brown 2009a; Felbab-Brown 2009c; Felbab-Brown 2010.
Kahler 2009.
522
Hammes 2004.
521
182
It is possible for insurgent illicit networks to survive and thrive because of their political
motivations, though this is often the exception rather than the rule. One example is the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and the illicit heroin and arms trafficking networks that funded it. The
success of these hybridized transactional-insurgent illicit networks is due largely to the military
intervention of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, which prevented Serb forces from decimating
the KLA and eventually resulted in the fall of Milosevic.
Colombian cartels like the Medellín and Cali “cartels” of the 1980’s and 1990’s are
interesting tests of my state reaction argument. The Medellín cartel led by Pablo Escobar was
largely transactional in its business strategy and tolerated by the Colombian government
throughout the 1990’s. That changed when Pablo Escobar moved the Medellín cartel toward
“insurgency” on the illicit network typology established in chapter three, by engaging in the
kidnappings of politicians and the random assassination of police officers in an effort to change
government policy on extradition. After Escobar’s death in 1993 the Cali Cartel was also
dismantled; despite the Colombian state’s reticence because it had not directly threatened the
state through political violence.
This was prompted by the United States, which as a
consolidated democracy with a prohibitionist drug regime, has a low tolerance for even
transactional PSINs. As Kenney has also argued the “wheel network” models these PSINs
utilized made their core nodes particularly choice targets for the states battling them.523
The decentralized cartelito trafficking model described by Garzón in Colombia and
improved security conditions following Uribe’s administration could be fairly described as more
transactional and more focused specific aspects of drug trafficking. Indeed territorial PSIN
activities like kidnapping and extortion are all down in Colombia suggesting that in the face of a
523
Kenney 2007b.
183
strong reaction from the state and strengthened state institutions in social and security terms, has
destroyed or weakened territorial PSINs leaving low profile transactional PSINs in their place.
Political Economic Structures
The tax base of the licit markets of states provides the ability to marshal incredible
resources. Some states like Mexico have chosen to be rentier-states; forever dependent upon oil
resources and the state oil company PEMEX for 40% of government resources. This has
allowed a concentrated upper-class to avoid paying taxes. Mexico raises less than 9% of GDP in
taxes. That is the lowest rate in Latin America behind only Haiti.524 Mexico must improve its
ability to fund the judicial system to end impunity, the military which suffers from funding less
than .5% of GDP and reform and professionalize the thousands of independent police agencies
throughout the country.525
Free market norms like privatization, low taxation and “smaller government” are not
always consistent with the goals of states. The ability to tax is the lifeblood of the state and
provides the resources to hold profit-seeking illicit networks at tolerable levels.526 The goals of
states are not to eliminate illicit flows but to reify themselves and state capacity by eliminating
“alternate governance structures” as potential threats.527 Security is the goal, not the elimination
of the illicit flow. The Colombia case of the last decade best embodies the security priority in
the face of illicit networks. Mexico appears to be following the same path; emphasizing security
over the elimination of illicit narcotics flows.528
524
Jones 2010c.
Camp 2005b.
526
Tolerable levels include reductions in violence and the elimination of territorial PSINS which threaten the state.
527
Andreas 2001.
528
Ford 2008.
525
184
The success of transactional PSINs results in the establishment of a plural-authority
between transactional PSINs and the various levels of the state. Through the consolidation of
democracy-including reforms like government funding of political campaigns-this relationship
can be broken. Also imperative, is an improved judicial system that can solve more than 1.5% of
crimes and increase the Mexican public’s willingness to report crime to authorities. Large
transactional PSINs can then be dismantled and PSINs will assume decentralized network forms.
This decentralization of PSINs was achieved in Colombia when state security institutions were
improved over the last decade.529
The battle against territorial PSINs can in many ways reify the state and state borders
because it can serve to justify the increased emphasis on law enforcement and “the hardening of
borders.” But transactional PSINs pose a long term threat through increased resilience and their
ability to corrupt and deflect the reaction of the state. They can even, in democratic states, make
the state dependent and beholden to them through the funding of elections and the ability to
embed themselves within the society in a parasitic and symbiotic fashion; e.g. Russian organized
crime’s role in reinforcing the state.
Weaknesses of the Argument
As with any typological theory, real world cases do not always perfectly fit the ideal type
descriptions. Transactional PSINs like the El Ingeniero faction did engage in some extortion and
kidnap activities as evidenced by court documents. Overall however these extortion activities
were much more limited and kidnappings tended to target wealthy individuals as opposed to a
large number of middle class and small business owners. Also, some transactional PSINs can
529
Bowden 2001; 2010w; 2011i; Oppenheimer; Guerrero Gutierrez 2010; Garzón 2008.
185
engage in highly territorial behaviors as in the case of the Sinaloa Cartel’s behavior in its battle
for Ciudad Juarez against the Carillo Fuentes Organization (Juarez Cartel).
The Sinaloa cartel is largely a transactional PSIN but in its battle for the strategically
important trafficking border city of Juarez it has subcontracted many of its operations to highly
territorial street gangs in an attempt to maintain control. How do we categorize a largely
transactional PSIN that annexes highly territorial street gangs in key strategic areas? This model
has settled for making overall judgments about where larger PSINs lie on the territorial versus
transactional portion of the continuum, but the effects of the war in Juarez between territorial
street gangs controlled by larger transactional PSINs cannot be ignored.
Most critically, the unique nature of the border between Mexico and the United States
threatens the generalizabilty of any argument based on Mexican case studies. The criticism is
mitigated however because other cases like those in Colombia and Ireland demonstrate that these
patterns exist in other illicit networks.
186
The Future of States and Illicit Networks
The question of the future of the territorial sovereign state in the international system
hangs heavy in the political science discipline and debates on states versus markets and states
versus illicit networks. The analysis of the AFO suggests that the challenge PSINs pose to the
state is not in their direct violent confrontation with the state--a short term problem--but in the
long term capability of transactional PSINs to establish “plural authority” with the state; to graft
themselves to the state, eroding democracy and the rule of law and stunting and perverting
economic development. Wherever the state can utilize market solutions effectively to address the
powerful supply and demand forces that fuel PSINs, they can strengthen themselves by reducing
the cost of combating illicit networks. In so far as the state is unwilling to lift prohibition
regimes or is unable due to negative externalities, the state will continue to face both territorial
and transactional PSINs.
The technological advantage states hold over illicit networks has narrowed in the “era of
globalization,” but states have proven adept at leveraging their advantages to stay ahead of
profit-seeking illicit networks.
States dangle lucrative government contracts in front of
purveyors of encryption technology to prevent their use on the open market, and may also
threaten the wrath of regulatory agencies behind closed doors.530
The future of the state as the dominant unit of the international system is bright if it
prudently applies the resources it at its disposal. A list of reforms that strengthen states vis-à-vis
PSINs is less important than the ability of the state to fund “capacity-building” through taxation.
Without resources, no reforms or increases in state capacity are possible. In so far as norms of
“privatization,” “smaller government” and low taxation prevail, the state is weakened in its
530
Friedman 2007, 1:.
187
capacity to marshal these resources. These norms, when taken to extremes, are incompatible
with the concept of the state itself.531
Democratic consolidation and its concomitant features including transparency, rule of
law and effective judicial institutions, appear to reduce corruption. Thus we can surmise that the
elimination of corruption through democratic consolidation is a likely mechanism that many
developing states will utilize in their struggles with transactional PSINs following the defeat of
territorial PSINs which may resemble armed struggles with insurgencies.532
The victory of states over territorial PSINs is not inevitable. If state institutions are weak,
corrupted and suffer from a lack of legitimacy and territorial PSINs are strong, well organized,
violent and profitable, they can potentially supplant the state. Most developing states are not in
this position. Strong states will be able to manage both these PSIN business strategies through
decapitation strategies.
Weak states can piggy-back on the “economies of scale” and
technological advantages of strong states to combat PSINs. The motivation of states to engage in
these battles is the reification of the concept of the state itself and the achievement of security
from political threat not the elimination of “illicit flows.” 533 Territorial PSIN’ will be targeted
first by “territorially sovereign states” because they most resemble the state and trigger a visceral
societal backlash necessitating even stronger responses from democratic states. “States and
profit-seeking illicit networks are enemies because they are so much alike.”534
The state is the dominant unit of the international system and appears poised to remain
that way. This analysis of PSIN capabilities painted a very different the threat PSINs pose to
states. They at once strengthen states and weaken them. In direct confrontation with the state
531
Rawls 1999; Polanyi 2001, 2:.
Arias 2006a; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005.
533
Andreas 2001.
534
Quote from introduction.
532
188
they appear to strengthen states as states gather the resources and galvanize public support to
defeat them and in so doing strengthen their institutions. The hierarchies of states provide
important advantages in terms of marshalling resources and properly applying those resources
against illicit networks. “Territorially sovereign states” like Mexico and the United States have
been shown to cooperate to prevent challenging alternate governance structures from entering the
system.535
Rethinking Illicit Markets
At the heart of the resilience of transactional PSINs are the profits stemming from the
consumption of drugs in the developed and increasingly the developing world. Developing
states like Mexico are also becoming consumer nations. Because major policy shifts toward
legalization, medicalization or decriminalization appear politically unfeasible, states must
understand the character of profit-seeking illicit networks to better understand their supply-side
counternarcotics strategies against them.536
I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters that there are different illicit network types
and states react to them with varying levels of intensity. Territorial PSINs are intolerable to
states because they are so much like states and engage in forms of taxation and violence over
territory the state is supposed to monopolize. Territorial PSINs will be eliminated first and are
thus less resilient than their transactional counterparts. However, transactional illicit networks
are the long-term threat. They are able to weaken state responses to them through corruption and
in democratic societies the funding of elections leaving the state beholden to them. Stronger
electoral regulation institutions, professionalized bureaucracies and market regulators could
manage and mitigate the power of these illicit networks, but that will require significant political
535
536
Spruyt 1994.
Gray 2001; 2010s.
189
will and state expenditure.537 The willingness to pay higher taxes to fund stronger more effective
state institutions will prove critical to Mexico’s success as a transitioning democracy combating
illicit networks.
537
Buscaglia and Ratliff 2001; Buscaglia, Ratliff, and Gonzalez-Ruiz 2005; Buscaglia 2001.
190
191
Bibliography
2009a. 09MEXICO3573, MEXICAN NAVY OPERATION NETS DRUG KINGPIN ARTURO.
Wikileaks. Available from
<http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09MEXICO3573.html>. . Accessed3 December
2010.
2010a. 2010/09/13 Reconocen al general Alfonso Duarte Mújica -El Mexicano. Available from
<http://www.elmexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/3/estatal/2010/09/13/425134/reconocen-algeneral-alfonso-duarte-mujica.aspx>. . Accessed16 March 2011.
2010b. 2010/11/28 ¡Porqué se fue Leyzaola!: EU -El Mexicano. Available from <http://www.elmexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/3/estatal/2010/11/28/440646/porque-se-fueleyzaola-eu.aspx>. . Accessed29 November 2010.
2010c. 40 Años de Cárcel a Chuy Labra. www.SignOnSanDiego.com. Available from
<http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/apr/05/40-anos-de-carcel-chuy-labra/>. .
Accessed12 May 2010.
Adler, Patricia. 1993. Wheeling and Dealing : An Ethnography of an Upper-level Drug Dealing
and Smuggling Community. New York: Columbia University Press.
2010d. AL DÍA: Merida Initiative & Pillar IV – Addressing the Causes of Mexican Criminal
Violence: What Role for the USAID? « Mexico Institute. Available from
<http://mexicoinstitute.wordpress.com/2010/12/15/al-dia-merida-initiative-pillar-iv%e2%80%93-addressing-the-causes-of-mexican-criminal-violence-what-role-for-theusaid/>. . Accessed19 December 2010.
192
Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston:
Little Brown.
Alvarado, Ignacio. 2010. Leyzaola: Héroe, villano ¿o ambos? - El Universal - Sociedad.
Available from <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/721865.html>. . Accessed9
March 2011.
Andrea. 2010e. FBI Informant Details Mexican Mafia’s Control Over Prisons - San Diego News
Story - KGTV San Diego. Available from
<http://www.10news.com/news/22516591/detail.html>. . Accessed9 May 2010.
Andreas, Peter. 2001. Border Games: Policing the US-Mexico Divide. Cornell Univ Pr.
Andreas, Peter. 2011. Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons.
Political Science Quarterly.
Andreas, Peter. 2003. Redrawing the Line. International Security 28 (2): 93.
2011a. Anonymous Interview Mexican Official. Interview by Nathan Jones.
2009b. Anonymous Interview of Family member of Tijuana Doctor. Interview by Nathan Jones.
2011b. Anonymous interview with Tijuana Businessman. Interview by Nathan Jones.
2011c. Anonymous Interview with Tijuana Municipal Police Officer. Interview by Nathan Jones.
AP. 2010. Mexico Says Cartels Turning Attacks on Authorities - NYTimes.com. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/04/25/world/AP-LT-Drug-WarMexico.html?ref=americas>. . Accessed26 April 2010.
n.d. April 30.
Arias, E.D. 2006a. Drugs & Democracy in Rio de Janeiro. Trafficking. Social Networks, &
Public Security. Chaped Hill: The University of North Caroline Press 279.
193
Arias, E.D. 2006b. Drugs & democracy in Rio de Janeiro: trafficking, social networks, & public
security. The University of North Carolina Press.
Arias, E.D. 2006c. The dynamics of criminal governance: Networks and social order in Rio de
Janeiro. Journal of Latin American Studies 38 (02): 293-325.
Arquilla, J., and D. Ronfeldt. 1996a. The Advent of Netwar. Foreign Affairs 77 (6): 80–94.
Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt. 2001. Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror,
Crime, and Militancy. Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute (RAND),
United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Available from
<http://ed.informata.com/liburl.asp?productid=0833032356&customerid=002217
http://www.rand.org/PUBS/index.html>.
Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt. 1996b. The Advent of Netwar. Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
National Defense Research Institute. United States Department of Defense.
Arquilla, John, David F. Ronfeldt, United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary of
Defense., and National Defense Research Institute (U.S.). 1997. In Athena’s Camp:
Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand. Available
from <http://www.rand.org/pubs/index.html>.
Arrow, KJ. 1974. The Limits of Organization. WW Norton & Company.
Arteaga, Jose Manuel. 2006. Ingresos petroleros, el mejor aliado de Fox - El Universal Finanzas. Available from
<http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=53687&tabla=finan
zas>. . Accessed21 November 2010.
Astorga, L. 2007. Seguridad, traficantes y militares. El poder y la sombra. México DF: Tusquets.
194
Bailey, John J., and Roy Godson. 2000. Organized crime & democratic governability : Mexico
and the U.S.-Mexican borderlands. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Bailey, John, and Jorge Chabat. 2002. Transnational crime and public security : challenges to
Mexico and the United States. U.S.-Mexico contemporary perspectives series. La Jolla,
CA: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies/University of California, San Diego. Available
from <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy022/2001059874.html>.
Barclay, Charles V. 2009. Wikileaks -- Cable Viewer -- Viewing cable 09MEXICO193, THE
BATTLE JOINED: NARCO VIOLENCE TRENDS IN 2008. Available from
<http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/01/09MEXICO193.html>. . Accessed13 December
2010.
Beckett, I. F. W. 2001. Modern insurgencies and counter-insurgencies guerrillas and their
opponents since 1750. Warfare and history. London ; New York: Routledge. Available
from <http://uclibs.org/PID/112308 http://uclibs.org/PID/112308
http://uclibs.org/PID/112308 http://uclibs.org/PID/112308 http://uclibs.org/PID/112308
http://uclibs.org/PID/112308 http://uclibs.org/PID/112308 http://uclibs.org/PID/112308
http://uclibs.org/PID/112308>.
Beith, Malcom. 2010. The Last Narco: Inside the Hunt for El Chapo the World’s Most Wanted
Drug Lord. 1st ed. Grove Press.
Benitez, Raul. 2009. Professor Raul Benitez. Edited by Nathan Jones.
Bergman, Lowell. 2000a. Frontline: Drug Wars: Interviews: “Steve” | PBS. Documentary.
PBS. Available from
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/interviews/steve.html>. .
195
Bergman, Lowell. 2000b. Frontline: Drug Wars. Documentary. PBS. Available from
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/afo/narcojunior.html>.
Bergman, Lowell. 2000c. Frontline: Murder Money & Mexico: Family Tree: The Hanks.
Documentary. Available from
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/family/bergman.html>. .
Accessed21 February 2011.
Bergman, Marcelo. 2010a. Mesa 7 Desarrollo de la delincuencia organizada en México. Panel
Presentation presented at the Seminario Internacional México: Seguridad nacional,
relaciones cívico militares, democracia y combate a la delincuencia organizada., Mexico
City.
Bergman, Marcelo. 2010b. Narcopolitique et narco-economie en Amerique Latine. Problemes
D’Amerique Latine 76: 25-42.
Betanzos, Said. 2011. 2011/03/17 Leyzaola “pactó” con los Arellano -El Mexicano. Available
from <http://www.elmexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/3/estatal/2011/03/17/461166/leyzaola-pactocon-los-arellano.aspx>. . Accessed17 March 2011.
Bjerke, Maxwell E. 2010. Explaining Variation in the Apprehension of Mexican Drug
Trafficking Cartel Leaders. Masters thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Post Graduate
School. Available from
<http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2010/Jun/10Jun_Bjerke.pdf>. . Accessed2
February 2011.
Blancornelas, Jesús. 2002. El Cártel : Los Arellano Félix, La Mafia Más Poderosa En La
Historia de América Latina. Vol. 1. México, D.F.: Plaza y Janés.
196
Boniface VIII, Pope. 2007. Unam Sanctum (Bull). Available from
<http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Bon08/B8unam.htm>.
Booth, William, and Steve Fainaru. n.d. Widespread Oil Theft by Drug Traffickers Deals Major
Blow to Mexico’s Government. Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/12/AR2009121202888_pf.html>. . Accessed2 May 2010.
Booth, William, and Nick Miroff. 2010a. DEA intelligence aids Mexican marines in drug war.
Washington Post. Washington D.C. Available from
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120306820.html?hpid=topnewswashingtonpost.c
om>. . Accessed5 December 2010.
Booth, William, and Nick Miroff. 2010b. Mexican drug cartels bring violence with them in move
to Central America. Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/26/AR2010072605661.html?sid=ST2010072106244>. .
Accessed31 July 2010.
Bowden, Charles. 2009. The Sicario: A Juárez Hit Man Speaks. Harper’s.
Bowden, Mark. 2001. Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw. New York:
Penguin Books.
Brands, Hal. 2009a. Los Zetas: Inside Mexico’s Most Dangerous Drug Gang. Available from
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2009/3tri09/brandseng.htm>.
Brands, Hal. 2009b. MEXICO’S NARCO-INSURGENCY AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG
POLICY. Strategic Studies Institute. Available from
<www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub918.pdf>.
197
Brennan, Rick. 2008. Interview with RAND scholar Rick Brennan School of Social Sciences UC
Irvine. Interview by Nathan Jones.
Burnett, John. 2010. Drug Lord’s Death Brings Hope, Fear To Mexican City : NPR. Available
from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=131146378>. . Accessed9
November 2010.
Burnett, John. 2009. Nuevo Laredo Returns To Normal As Violence Slows. Available from
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99742620>.
Burnett, John, and Renee Montagne. n.d. On The Trail Of Mexico’s Vicious Sinaloa Cartel :
NPR. Available from
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126894829>. . Accessed19 May
2010.
Burnett, John, and Marisa Penalosa. n.d. Mexico’s Drug War: A Rigged Fight? : NPR.
Available from <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126890838>. .
Burnett, John, Marisa Penalosa, and Robert Bennincasa. 2010. Mexico Seems To Favor Sinaloa
Cartel In Drug War : NPR. Available from
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126906809&ps=rs>. .
Accessed26 October 2010.
Burt, Ronald S. 2001. Structural Holes Versus Network Closure as Social Capital. Social capital:
Theory and research: 31-56.
Burt, RS. 1995. Structural holes: The social structure of competition. Harvard Univ Pr.
Buscaglia, E, and J Van Dijk. 2003. Controlling organized crime and corruption in the public
sector. 3:2. Vol. 3.
198
Buscaglia, E, and WE Ratliff. 2001. War and lack of governance in Colombia: narcos,
guerrillas, and US policy. Hoover Inst Pr.
Buscaglia, Edgardo. 2001. Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and
Economic Consequences. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office of Drug Control and
Crime Prevention (UNODCCP).
Buscaglia, Edgardo, William Ratliff, and Samuel Gonzalez-Ruiz. 2005. Undermining the
Foundations of Organized Crime and Public Sector Corruption: An Essay on Best
International Practices | Hoover Institution. Available from
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27199>. . Accessed25 October 2010.
2008a. C.I.A World Factbook: Mexico. Washington D.C.: CIA. Available from
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html#Military>.
2010f. Cable Viewer. Wikileaks. Available from
<http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2010/01/10MEXICO83.html>. . Accessed7 December 2010.
2006a. Cae “El Tigrillo” Arellano Félix. AP. Washington D.C. Available from
<http://www.tabascohoy.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=114426>. . Accessed9 May 2010.
Caldwell, Robert. 2004. Captured | The San Diego Union-Tribune.
Caldwell, Robert. 2007. Cartel Secrets. San Diego Union Tribune. San Diego. Available from
<http://ww.uniontrib.com/uniontrib/20070701/news_lz1e1cartel.html>.
Camp, RA. 2005a. Mexico’s military on the democratic stage. Praeger Security Intl.
Camp, Roderic Ai. 2005b. Mexico’s military on the democratic stage. Westport, Conn.
Washington, D.C.: Praeger Security International ; Published in cooperation with the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0514/2005016705.html>.
199
Carroll, Rory. 2010. US has lost faith in Mexico’s ability to win drugs war, WikiLeaks cables
show | World news | The Guardian. Available from
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/02/us-mexico-drugs-war-wikileaks>. .
Accessed3 December 2010.
Cave, Damien. 2011. For Mexicans Looking North, a New Calculus Favors Home - Interactive
Feature - NYTimes.com. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/06/world/americas/immigration.html?ref=
americas>. . Accessed4 November 2011.
Cearley, Anna. n.d. Many ignore official’s alleged link to Arellanos | The San Diego UnionTribune. Available from
<http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20051031/news_1m31carrillo.html>. .
2011d. Central America’s Security Predicament. Journal. Inter-American Dialogue. Available
from <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2558&s=>. .
Accessed28 January 2011.
Chabot, Paul. 2008. An Historical Case Study of Organizational Resiliency within the ArellanoFelix Drug Trafficking Organization.
Chambliss, WJ. 1989. State-organized crime. Criminology 27: 183.
Chestnut, S. 2007. Illicit activity and proliferation: North Korean smuggling networks.
International Security 32 (1): 80-111.
Chestnut, S. 2005. The “Sopranos State”? North Korean Involvement in Criminal Activity and
Implications for International Security. Center for International Security and
Cooperation Honors Thesis, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
200
Chua, Amy. 2004. World on fire how exporting free market democracy breeds ethnic hatred and
global instability. Vol. 1. New York: Anchor Books. Available from
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/ucsc/Doc?id=10048881>.
Clare Ribando Seelke, June S. Beittel. 2009. Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America:
Funding and Policy Issues. Services, Congressional Research. Available from
<www.crs.gov>.
Clunan, AL, and HA Trinkunas. 2010. Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an
Era of Softened Sovereignty. Stanford Security Studies.
Cole, Juan. 2010. Iran’s Green Movement: One Year Later - CBS News. Available from
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/10/opinion/main6568553.shtml>. .
COLES, N. 2001. It’s Not What You Know-It’s Who You Know that Counts. Analysing Serious
Crime Groups as Social Networks. British Journal of Criminology 41 (4): 580-594.
Conery, Ben. 2009. Washington Times - Mexican drug cartels “hide in plain sight” in U.S.
Available from <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/07/mexican-drugcartels-hide-in-plain-sight-in-us/print/>. . Accessed6 May 2010.
Contact, Anonymous interview. 2009. Interview in Tijuana Mexico. Edited by Nathan Jones.
Cook, Colleen W. 2007. C.R.S Report For Congress: Mexico’s Drug Cartels. Congress:
Congressional Research Services. Available from
<www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf>.
Cook, Colleen, Rebecca G. Rush, and Clare Ribando Seelke. n.d. Merida Initiative: Proposed
U.S. Anticrime andCounterdrug Assistance for Mexico andCentral America
CRS Report.pdf (application/pdf Object). Available from
201
06.03.08
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/06.03.08%20CRS%20Report.pdf>. .
Accessed29 November 2008.
Corchado, Alfredo. 2007. Mexican Drug Cartels Gaining Strength in Peru: Worry Spreads as
Their Presence Increases Coca Production, Violence. Dallas Morning News. Washington,
DC. Available from <WWW.DALLASNEWS.COM>.
Corera, Gordon. 2006. Shopping for bombs : nuclear proliferation, global insecurity, and the
rise and fall of the A.Q. Khan network. Oxford ; New York, N.Y.: Oxford University
Press. Available from <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0612/2006012510.html>.
Crippen, Alex. n.d. CNBC TRANSCRIPT & VIDEO: Warren Buffett on Goldman Sachs and
U.S. Economic Rebound - CNBC. Available from <http://www.cnbc.com/id/36915020>.
. Accessed7 May 2010.
2010g. Cuernavaca New Front in Mexico Drug War. Los Angeles Times. Available from
<http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/22/opinion/la-ed-cuernavaca-20100422>. .
Accessed6 June 2010.
Curtis, Glenn E., and Tara Karacan. 2002. THE NEXUS AMONG TERRORISTS, NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKERS, WEAPONS PROLIFERATORS, AND ORGANIZED CRIME
NETWORKS IN WESTERN EUROPE. Study Commissioned by Congress. Washington,
D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/>. . Accessed9 March 2011.
Danelo, David. n.d. A New Approach is needed in Anti-crime Fight in Mexico. Available from
<http://www.mexidata.info/id2896.html>. . Accessed21 December 2010.
2008b. DEA History 2003-2008. Justice, Department of: DEA. Available from
<http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/history/2003-2008.pdf>.
202
Diaz, Tom. 2009. Before the Subcommittee on National Security & Foreign Affairs Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform U.S. House of Representatives Hearing on
“Money, Guns, and Drugs: Are U.S. Inputs Fueling Violence on the U.S./Mexico
Border?” March 12, 2009. Representatives, House of: Violence Policy Center. Available
from
<http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=4429:subcommittee-holds-hearing-on-money-guns-and-drugs-are-us-inputs-fuelingviolence-on-the-us-mexico-border&catid=140:hearings-nshdfo>.
Dibble, Sandra. n.d. Split Within Arellano Félix Cartel Leads to More Violence. Available from
<http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/jan/04/n52766113653-arellano-f233lixdrug-cartel-split-sm/>. . Accessed7 September 2009a.
Dibble, Sandra. n.d. Tijuana Violence Slows, Drops From Spotlight. SignOnSanDiego.com.
Available from <http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/apr/26/tijuana-violenceslows-drops-out-of-spotlight/>. . Accessed12 May 2010b.
Dibble, Sandra. 2009. Tijuana’s Bloodiest Year. San Diego Union Tribune
(SignOnSanDiego.com). San Diego, California. Available from
<http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/jan/04/lz1n4tijuana23134-tijuanasbloodiest-year/?zIndex=31756>. . Accessed11 July 2010.
Diez, J., and I. Nicholls. 2006. The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition.
Dillon, Sam. 1997. Mexican Traffickers Recruiting Killers in the U.S. New York Times. Tijuana.
Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/04/world/mexican-traffickersrecruiting-killers-in-the-us.html?pagewanted=2&pagewanted=print>.
203
Dougherty, James E., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. 2001. Contending theories of international
relations : a comprehensive survey. Vol. 5. New York: Longman.
Downie, Richard Duncan. 1998. Learning From Conflict : the U.S. Military in Vietnam, El
Salvador, and the Drug War. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
2008c. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION LECTURE SERIES: HARROD, SCHARF
AND ZIEGLAR. Justice, Department of: DEA. Available from
<http://www.deamuseum.org/transcripts/Harrod_Scharf.pdf>.
2010h. Drug gang “threatens Guatemala war” - Americas - Al Jazeera English. Al Jazeera.
Available from
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2010/12/2010122941020654735.html>. .
Accessed29 December 2010.
Dudley, Steven. 2010. Tijuana Cartel. Insightcrime.org. Available from
<http://www.insightcrime.org/criminal-groups/mexico/tijuana-cartel/item/193-tijuanacartel-profile?tmpl=component&type=raw>. . Accessed27 January 2011.
Duran-Martinez, Angelica, and Richard Snyder. 2009. Does Illegality Breed Violence? Drug
Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets. Crime, Law and Social Change:
253-273.
Easton, David. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Eckstein, H. 1965. On the Etiology of Internal Wars. History and Theory 4 (2): 133-163.
Edmonds-Poli, Emily, and David A. Shirk. 2009. Contemporary Mexican politics. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Available from
204
2011e. Ejército y PEP Capturan a Célula en Mexicali: Ahora Van por Células de “El Chapo.”
ZETA. Tijuana, Mexico. Available from
<http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/EdicionActual/Principal.html>. . Accessed1 May
2010.
2011f. “El Chapo” y “El Mayo” reclutan jefes de célula para traficar droga en Tijuana. Delata
estructurade Sinaloa: Por lo menos diez delincuentes. ZETA > Reportajez. Zeta.
Available from <http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/Edicion1919/Principal.html>. .
Ellingwood, Ken. 2009a. Actually Violence is Down-- So Say the Numbers. Los Angeles Times.
Mexico City. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgmexico-murder22-2009aug22,0,3018278.story>.
Ellingwood, Ken. 2009b. Grim Glossary of the Narco-World: Average Words Aren’t Sufficient
for the Over-the-Top Violence of Mexico’s Drug War, So New Ones Have Been
Invented. Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles. Available from
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-narco-glossary282009oct28,0,1009690.story>.
Ellingwood, Ken. 2010. Why Mexico is not the new Colombia when it comes to drug cartels latimes.com. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgmexico-colombia-20100926,0,852091,print.story>. . Accessed7 October 2010.
Elman, Colin, and Miriam Fendius Elman. 2001. Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political
Scientists, and the Study of International Relations. BCSIA studies in international
security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
205
Escalante Gonzalbo, Fernando. 2011. Nexos - Homicidios 2008-2009 La muerte tiene permiso.
Nexos. Available from <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=1943189>. .
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2009a. Interview on Mexican Drug Cartels. Interview by Nathan Jones.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2010. Mexican Drug War - Brookings Institution. Available from
<http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2010/0408_mexico_narcotics_felbabbrown.aspx?
rssid=felbabbrownv&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed
:+BrookingsRSS/experts/felbabbrownv+(Brookings:+Experts+-+Vanda+FelbabBrown)>. . Accessed1 May 2010.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. n.d. Shooting up : counterinsurgency and the war on drugs.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2009b. Shooting Up : Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
Felbab-Brown, Vanda. 2009c. The Violent Drug Market in Mexico and Lessons from Colombia.
Foreign Policy at Brookings: Policy Paper. Available from
<www.brookings.edu/.../papers/2009/.../03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf>.
Finnegan, William. 2010. In the Name of the Law: A Colonel Cracks Down on Corruption. The
New Yorker. Available from
<http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/18/101018fa_fact_finnegan#ixzz12ONN
9dAn>. . Accessed15 October 2010.
206
Ford, Jess. 2008. PLAN COLOMBIA: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security
Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance.
Office, Government Accountability: GAO. Available from
<http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71>.
Ford, Jess T. 2007. U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but the Flow
of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains High. GAO: Government Accountability
Office. Available from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08215t.pdf>.
Forero, Juan. 2010. Mexico Seeks Lessons From Colombia’s War On FARC : NPR. Available
from <http://www.npr.org/2011/01/02/132492582/mexico-seeks-lessons-fromcolombias-war-on-farc>. . Accessed2 January 2011.
Friedman, Thomas L. 2010. Narcos, No’s and Nafta. The New York Times, sec. Opinion.
Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/opinion/02friedman.html>. .
Accessed3 May 2010.
Friedman, Thomas L. 2007. The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century.
Vol. 1. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. Available from
Friman, HR, and Peter Andreas. 1999. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Rowman &
Littlefield.
Fukumi, S. 2008. Cocaine trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy responses. Ashgate
Pub Co.
Fukuyama, F. 1992. The end of history. New York.
Gall, Carlotta, and Sabrina Tavernise. n.d. Pakistani Taliban Are Said to Expand Alliances NYTimes.com. Available from
207
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/asia/07pstan.html?th=&emc=th&pagewante
d=print>. . Accessed7 May 2010.
Garrett, G. 2004. Globalization’s missing middle. Foreign Affairs 83 (6): 84-96.
Garzón, Juan Carlos. 2008. Mafia & Co. Bogotá, D.C.: Editorial Planeta Colombiana.
Geoffrey, G. 2004. Globalization’s Missing Middle. Foreign Affairs 83 (6).
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences. BCSIA studies in international security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
2010i. Gobernadores. Subsecretaría de Innovación y Modernización de la SPFArchivo Histórico
de Baja California. . Available from
<http://www.bajacalifornia.gob.mx/portal/nuestro_estado/historia/gobernadores.jsp>. .
Accessed9 March 2011.
Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut. 1997. Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an
Industry Network. Organization Science 8 (2): 109-125.
Granovetter. 1983. The Strength of Weak Ties Network Theory Revisited. Sociological Theory
1. Available from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2776392.pdf?acceptTC=true>.
Gray, JP. 2001. Why our drug laws have failed and what we can do about it: A judicial
indictment of the war on drugs. Temple Univ Pr.
Grayson, George. 2009a. Mexico: Narco-Violence and a Failed State? Transaction Publishers.
Grayson, George W. n.d. E-Notes: Los Zetas: the Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug
Cartel - FPRI. Available from
<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200805.grayson.loszetas.html>. . Accessed15 December
2008.
208
Grayson, George W. 2008a. Los Zetas: the Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel.
E-Notes. Available from <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200805.grayson.loszetas.html>.
Grayson, George W. 2008b. Mexico and the Drug Cartels. Available from
<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200708.grayson.mexicodrugcartels.html>.
Grayson, George W. 2009b. Mexico’s struggle with “drugs and thugs”. New York, NY: Foreign
Policy Association.
Guerrero Gutierrez, Eduardo. 2010. Nexos - Cómo reducir la violencia en México. Available
from <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=1197808>. . Accessed11
December 2010.
Guerrero Gutierrez, Eduardo. 2011. Nexos - Cómo reducir la violencia en México. Available
from <http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=1197808>. . Accessed20
January 2011.
Gulati, Ranjay. 1998. Alliances and Networks. Strategic Management Journal 19 (4): 293-317.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. Minorities at risk : a global view of ethnopolitical conflicts.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1971. Why men rebel. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Hammes, Thomas X. 2004. The sling and the stone : on war in the 21st century. St. Paul, MN:
Zenith Press. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0704/2004559123-b.html>.
2008d. Heredero de los Arellano - El Universal - México. El Universal. Available from
<http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/162697.html>. . Accessed13 November 2010.
Hummon, Norman P. 1970. Criticism of “Effects of Flat and Tall Organization Structure.”
Administrative Sciences Quarterly 15 (2): 230-234.
209
Ibarra Gonzalez, Jose Israel. 2010. El Ejército quema 134 toneladas de marihuana decomisadas
en Tijuana - CNNMéxico.com. CNN: Mexico. Available from
<http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2010/10/20/el-ejercito-quema-134-toneladas-demarihuana-decomisadas-en-tijuana>. . Accessed21 February 2011.
2010j. Imparables Comandos de “El Teo.” ZETA. Available from
<http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/EdcionesAnteriores/Edicion1748/Principal.html>. .
Accessed16 March 2011.
2010k. Index of Economic Freedom: Link Between Economic Opportunity and Prosperity | The
Heritage Foundation. Heritage Institute and Wall Street Journal. Available from
<http://www.heritage.org/index/>. . Accessed21 November 2010.
2010l. Indictment: United States vs. Armando Villareal Heredia et al. United States District
Court Southern District of California.
2010m. Interview Former High-Ranking Mexican Law Enforcement Official. Interview by
Nathan Jones.
2011g. Interview with Anonymous Tijuana Journalist. Interview by Nathan Jones.
2010n. Interview with Tijuana Resident July, 2010. Interview by Nathan Jones.
Johnson, David T. 2008. The Merida Initiative: Examining U.S. Efforts to Combat Transnational
Criminal Organizations. Available from <http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/105695.htm>.
. Accessed30 November 2008.
Johnson, Tim. 2010. Mexico finds killing drug kingpins can add to mayhem - World AP MiamiHerald.com. Available from
<http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/11/11/1920346/mexico-finds-killing-drugkingpins.html>. . Accessed13 November 2010.
210
Jones, Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert. 2008a. Assessing the Dangers of Illicit
Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think. International
Security 33 (2): 7-44.
Jones, Nathan. 2010a. Appendix A: Goat Horns, Blackbirds and Cop Killers: U.S. Guns in
Mexico’s Drug Violence. Cooperative Mexican-U.S. Antinarcotics Efforts Center for
Strategic and International Studies: 52-73.
Jones, Nathan. 2010b. Appendix A: Goat Horns, Blackbirds, and Cop Killers: U.S. Guns in
Mexico’s Drug Violence in Cooperative Mexican-U.S. Antinarcotics Efforts edited by
Duncan Wood and Sydney Weintraub. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and
International Studies. Available from
<http://csis.org/files/publication/101108_Weintraub_MexicanUSAntinarc_web.pdf>. .
Jones, Nathan. 2010c. Applying Lessons from Colombia to Mexico « Mexico Institute.
Woodrow Wilson Institute. Al Dia. Available from
<http://mexicoinstitute.wordpress.com/2010/12/03/applying-lessons-from-colombia-tomexico/>. . Accessed13 January 2011.
Jones, Nathan. 2011a. Arrest of Tijuana Ex-Mayor: Putting Crime in the “Freezer”?
Insightcrime.org. Available from <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1033arrest-of-tijuana-ex-mayor-putting-crime-in-the-freezer>. . Accessed7 August 2011.
Jones, Nathan. 2011b. InSight: Report Tracks How Intra-Cartel Wars Exploded in Mexico.
Insightcrime.org. Available from <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/548insight-report-tracks-how-intra-cartel-wars-exploded-in-mexico>. . Accessed11 February
2011.
211
Jones, Nathan. 2011c. Interview with Tijuana Business Leader.
Jones, Nathan. 2011d. Kidnapping in Tijuana: The New Normal. Insightcrime.org. Available
from <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1002-kidnapping-in-tijuana-thenew-normal>. . Accessed7 August 2011.
Jones, Nathan. 2008b. Using Counterinsurgency Strategy to Reassert the Westphalian State
Against Criminal Networks: The Case of the Gulf Cartel in Mexico. International Studies
Association - West.
Jones, Nathan, ed. 2009. Interview with US Law Enforcement Officer Focused on Arellano Felix
Organization.
2010o. Juez falla a favor de extradición de Benjamín Arellano Félix a EU | Milenio.com.
Available from <http://www.milenio.com/node/429295>. . Accessed3 May 2010.
Kahler, Miles. 2009. Networked Politics: Agency, Power and Governance. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press.
Kahler, Miles, and Barbara Walter, eds. 2006. Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of
Globalization. Cambridge University Press.
Kaldor, Mary. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford
California: Stanford University Press.
Keane, Thomas H. n.d. 9/11 Commission Report. Available from <http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>.
Kenney, M. 2003. From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs.
Survival 45 (3): 187-206.
Kenney, M. 2007a. The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation in the
Colombian Cocaine Trade. Global Crime 8 (3): 233-259.
212
Kenney, Michael. 2007b. From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks,
Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation. University Park, Pa.:
Pennsylvania State University Press. Available from
Keohane, RO, and JS Nye Jr. 1998. Power and interdependence in the information age. Foreign
Affairs: 81-94.
Keohane, Robert O. 2005. After hegemony : cooperation and discord in the world political
economy. Vol. 1. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 2001. Power and Interdependence. Vol. 3. New York ;
London: Longman.
2011h. Key Lieutenant’s Testimony Could Bring Tijuana Drug Lord to Justice. Insightcrime.org.
Available from <http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/1213-key-lieutenantstestimony-could-bring-tijuana-drug-lord-to-justice>. . Accessed7 August 2011.
Klerks, P. 2003. 6 The network paradigm applied to criminal organisations. Transnational
organised crime: perspectives on global security: 97.
Klotz, Audie Jeanne. 1995. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Klotz, Audie, and Cecelia Lynch. 2007. Strategies for Research in Constructivist International
Relations. International relations in a constructed world. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Available from <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip072/2006032192.html>.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/prin032/99012204.html>.
213
Kraul, Chris. 2004. Weakened Tijuana Drug Cartel Still Deadly. Los Angeles Times. Available
from <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jul/17/world/fg-tijuana17>. . Accessed2 May
2010.
Krauze, E. 1997. Mexico: Biography of power. New York: HarperCollins 307: 11-14.
Krebs, V. E. 2002. Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells. Connections 24 (3): 43-52.
2009c. La Familia Michoacana Factsheet. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency:
DEA. Available from <http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr102209a1.pdf>.
2010p. La Familia, “cada vez más debilitada”, asegura el gobierno federal | Milenio.com.
Available from <http://www.milenio.com/node/602566>. . Accessed17 December 2010.
Lacey, Marc. n.d. At Least 6 People Abducted in Mexican Hotel Raids - NYTimes.com.
Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/world/americas/22mexico.html?hp>. . Accessed23
April 2010.
Lacey, Marc. 2009. Drug Wars: When a “Cartel” Really Isn’t. Economix. Available from
<http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/drug-wars-when-a-cartel-reallyisnt/?scp=1&sq=merida%20initiative&st=cseID - 526>.
Lacey, Marc. 2010. Report Says U.S. Fails to Assess Drug Aid to Mexico - NYTimes.com.
Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/americas/21mexico.html?_r=1&hp>. .
Laski, H. J. 2003. Authority in the Modern State. Lawbook Exchange.
2011i. Latin America Most Dangerous Region for Journalists in 2010. Latin American Herald
Tribune. Geneva, Switzerland. Available from
214
<http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=382446&CategoryId=12394>. . Accessed31
December 2010.
2009d. Leaders of Arellano-Felix Criminal Organization Plead Guilty. San Diego Union
Tribune. Available from <http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/sd102109a.htm>.
Logan, Samuel, and J. P. Sullivan. 2010. The Gulf-Zeta Split and the Praetorian Revolt / ISN.
Available from <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/SecurityWatch/Detail/?lng=en&id=114551>. . Accessed10 October 2010.
2010q. “Los Teos” rentan sicarios -- ZETA > Reportajez. Available from
<http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/Edicion1904/Reportajez_Los_Teos_rentan_sicarios.ht
ml>. . Accessed16 October 2010.
2004. Major Cartel Lieutenants Arrested in Mexico. Administration, Department of Justice:
Drug Enforcement: DEA Press Release. Available from
<http://www.justice.gov/dea/major/united_eagles/index.html>.
Makarenko, T. 2004. The crime-terror continuum: tracing the interplay between transnational
organised crime and terrorism. Global Crime 6 (1): 129-145.
Malkin, Elizabeth. 2010. WikiLeaks Archive - Cooperation and Frustration With Mexico NYTimes.com. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/04/world/americas/04wikileaksmexico.html?ref=americas>. . Accessed17 December 2010.
Manwaring, M. G. 2005. Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency.
Manwaring, Max. 2009. A “NEW” DYNAMIC IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE MEXICAN ZETAS AND OTHER PRIVATE
215
ARMIES. Strategic Studies Institute. Available from
<http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/>.
Manwaring, Max G. 2007. A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other
Illicit Trafficking Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica and
Brazil. Strategic Studies Institute December 2007: 59.
Marks, T. A. 2008. Counterinsurgency in the Age of Globalism. Journal of Conflict Studies 27
(1).
Marosi, Richard. n.d. A Tijuana blood bath - Los Angeles Times. Available from
<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/06/world/fg-arellano6>. . Accessed2 May 2010a.
Marosi, Richard. 2010a. Another marijuana tunnel and two more warehouses found latimes.com. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-tunnel20101127,0,416000.story>. . Accessed27 November 2010.
Marosi, Richard. 2008a. Diagnosis: irony - Los Angeles Times. Available from
<http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/03/local/me-tijuana3>. . Accessed4 February 2011.
Marosi, Richard. 2011. Flying high for the Sinaloa drug cartel - latimes.com. Los Angeles Times.
Los Angeles. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/cartel/la-me-cartel20110727,0,4934932,print.story>. . Accessed29 July 2011.
Marosi, Richard. 2008b. Mystery Man Blamed for Gruesome Tijuana Deaths. LA Times.
Available from <http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-tijuanadruglord182008dec18,0,5864824.story>.
Marosi, Richard. 2010b. Reputed drug cartel leader “Muletas” and another suspected gangster
are arrested in Baja California. Available from
216
<http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2010/02/mexico-cartel-leaders-arrested-bajacalifornia-la-paz-muletas-raydel-lopez-uriarte-manuel-simentel.html>.
Marosi, Richard. n.d. Tijuana Drug Cartels Feel Crackdown. La Plaza. Available from
<http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2008/02/tijuana-cartels.htmlID - 514>.
Marosi, Richard. n.d. Tijuana reels amid a surge of violence - Los Angeles Times. Available
from <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/11/world/la-fg-tijuana-violence112010jan11>. . Accessed2 May 2010c.
Marosi, Richard. 2009. Tijuana’s Security Chief Needs All of it He Can Get: Julian Leyzaola
Lives With Threats and Worse, Plus the Accusations. LA Times. Los Angeles. Available
from <http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-tijuana-police202009dec20,0,1484440.story>.
Marshall, Tom. n.d. Cell phone registration turns into legal farce | Guadalajara Reporter.
Available from <http://www.guadalajarareporter.com/news-mainmenu-82/nationalmainmenu-86/26688-cell-phone-registration-turns-into-legal-farce.html>. . Accessed7
May 2010.
Martinez-Amador, David C. 2011. A War of Information: US Intervention in Mexico’s Drug
War. Insightcrime.org. Washington, DC. Available from <http://insightcrime.org/insightlatest-news/item/1437-a-war-of-information-us-intervention-in-mexicos-drug-war>. .
Accessed21 August 2011.
Massa, P, and P Avesani. 2007. Trust metrics on controversial users: balancing between tyranny
of the majority and echo chambers. International Journal on Semantic Web and
Information Systems 3 (1): 39-64.
217
2009e. Massive Gunbattles Break Out in Tijuana; 13 Dead, 9 Wounded. Available from
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,352739,00.html>.
de Mauleon, Hector. 2009. Tijuana. En la colina de El Pozolero. Nexos. Available from
<http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulov2print&Article=729>. . Accessed21 October
2010.
2011j. Media Piracy in Emerging Economies. United States of America: Social Science
Research Council.
2010r. Members of Arellano-Felix Organization. Frontline, Drug Wars. Available from
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/afo/afomembers.html>.
Mendoza, Martha, and Eduardo Castillo. 2011. US law enforcement role in Mexico drug war
surges - chicagotribune.com. Available from
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-ap-lt-fea-drugwaruscop,0,5391743,print.story>. . Accessed20 March 2011.
Merlos, Andrea, and Maria De La Luz Gonzalez. 2007. Pone Gobierno federal en marcha
Operativo Tijuana - El Universal - México. Available from
<http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/397765.html>. . Accessed16 March 2011.
2008e. Mexican Drug Cartels: Government Progress and Increasing Violence. STRATFOR.
Available from <www.Stratfor.com>.
2009f. Mexico Security Memo November 10, 2008. Available from
<http://www.stratfor.com/node/126816/analysis/20081110_mexico_security_memo_nov
_10_2008>.
2009g. Mexico Under Siege: The Drug War at Our Doorstep. Mexico Under Siege. Available
from <http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war>.
218
2011k. Mexico: Worse Than Wartime Baghdad. Strategy Page. Available from
<http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/mexico/articles/20110728.aspx>. . Accessed3 August
2011.
2010s. Mexico’s Drug War - Stories, Photos, Videos - Mexico Under Siege - World News - Los
Angeles Times - It’s A War. Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles, sec. Mexico Under Seige.
Available from <http://projects.latimes.com/mexico-drug-war/#/its-a-war>. . Accessed2
June 2010.
Milhaupt, Curtis, and Mark West. 2000. The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and
Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime. The University of Chicago Law Review 67 (1):
41-98.
Milward, Jorg Raab and H. Brinton. 2003. Dark Networks as Problems. Journal Of Public
Administration and Research Theory 13 (4): 413-439.
Moore, Solomon. 2009. War Without Borders: How U.S. Became Stage for Mexican Drug Feud.
NY Times. New York. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/us/09border.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print>.
Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, and Kenneth W. Thompson. 1985. Politics Among Nations : the
Struggle for Power and Peace. Vol. 6. New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random
House.
Morselli, Carlo. 2009. Inside Criminal Networks. Edited by Frabk Bovenkerk. Studies of
Organized Crime. New York: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009.
Nagl, John A. 2002. Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam : Learning to Eat
Soup with a Knife. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.
219
Naím, Moisés. 2005. Illicit : How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the
Global Economy. Washington, D.C.: Centro Cultural del BID.
2008f. National Drug Threat Assessment 2008. Justice, United States Department of: National
Drug Intelligence Center. Available from
<http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/25921p.pdf>.
2010t. National Drug Threat Assessment 2010. Washington D.C.: Department of Justice.
Available from <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/index.htm>. . Accessed22
October 2010.
2010u. National Drug Threat Assessment 2010. Washington D.C.: Department of Justice.
Available from <http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/index.htm>. . Accessed10
July 2010.
Neher, Julian. 2009. Mexico Cleared for U.S. Anti-Drug Aid as Army Accused of Crimes Bloomberg.com. Available from
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=ag0Y1liddYzg>. .
2006b. News from DEA, News Releases, 08/16/06. DEA. Available from
<http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr081606.html>. . Accessed25 August 2009.
O’Connor, Anna-Marie. n.d. Tijuana Gunman May Have Mexican Mafia Tie. Los Angeles
Times. Available from <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/29/news/mn-58795/2>. .
Accessed9 May 2010.
Ojeda, Nestor. n.d. 2002/07/08 Ruffo y Franco Ríos protegían a los Arellano Félix: “El Chapo” El Mexicano. Available from <http://www.el-
220
mexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/1/internacional/2002/07/08/1878/ruffo-yfranco-rios-protegian-a-los-arellano-felix-el-chapo.aspx>. . Accessed18 August 2010.
Olson, Eric, and Miguel Salazar. 2011. A Profile of Mexico’s Major Organized Crime Groups.
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Institute. Available from
<http://wilsoncenter.org/news/docs/A%20Profile%20of%20Mexicos%20Organized%20
Crime.pdf>. . Accessed20 February 2011.
Oppenheimer, Andres. n.d. Mexico’s big hope: get 5 million U.S. retirees - Andres Oppenheimer
- MiamiHerald.com. Available from
<http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/04/17/1584887/mexicos-big-hope-get-5million.html>. . Accessed3 May 2010.
Ordaz, Pablo. 2010. La guerra al “narco” causa 22.700 muertos en México · ELPAÍS.com.
Available from
<http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/guerra/narco/causa/22700/muertos/Mexico
/elpepuint/20100414elpepuint_16/Tes>. . Accessed4 December 2010.
Ortiz Aguilera, Lauro. n.d. ZETA > Reportajez > Operativo Tijuana. Available from
<http://www.zetatijuana.com/html/EdcionesAnteriores/Edicion1714/Reportajez_Operativ
oTijuana.html>. . Accessed16 March 2011.
2010v. Outsmarted By Sinaloa: Why the Biggest Drug Gang Has Been Least Hit. The
Economist.
Pardo, R. 2000. Colombia’s Two-Front War. Foreign Affairs 79 (4): 64-73.
Perez, Carlos Antonio Flores. 2005. EL ESTADO EN CRISIS: CRIMEN ORGANIZADO Y
POLITICA DESAFIOS PARA LA CONSOLIDACION DEMOCRATICA.
221
Peters, B. Guy. 1999. Institutional Theory in Political Science : The New Institutionalism.
London ; New York: Pinter.
Petito, Fabio, and Pavlos Hatzopoulos. 2003. Religion in international relations : the return
from exile. Vol. 1. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/hol031/2002192552.html>.
Podolny, J. M. Page. 1998. NETWORK FORMS OF ORGANIZATION. Annual Reviews in
Sociology 24 (1): 57-76.
Polanyi, Karl. 2001. The Great Transformation the Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.
Vol. 2. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Available from
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/ucmerced/Doc?id=10014733>.
Povoledo, Elisabetha. 2006. In Sicily, an Arrest Could End “Pax Mafiosa” - New York Times.
Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/12/world/europe/12cndmafia.html?ex=1302494400&en=a468ce6046014cda&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rs
s>. . Accessed9 March 2011.
Powell, Walter W., and Paul DiMaggio. 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organizational
Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/uchi052/91009999.html>.
Privette, W. H. 2006. Organized Crime in the United States: Organizational Analogies for
Counterinsurgency Strategy. Available from
<http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2006/Dec/06Dec_Privette.pdf>.
Ragin, CC. 2000. Fuzzy-Set Social Science. University of Chicago Press.
Ramos, Jose Maria. 2011. Interview with Professor Jose Maria Ramos of Colegio de La Frontera
Norte. Interview by Nathan Jones.
222
Ravelo, R. 2006. Los Narcoabogados. Grijalbo Mondadori.
Ravelo, Ricardo. 2005. Los Capos: Las Narco-Rutas De México. Plaza Y Janes Mexico.
Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press.
Resa Nestares, Carlos. 2003. Los Zetas: de narcos a mafiosos. EL COMERCIO DE DROGAS
ILEGALES EN MÉXICO: 9.
2002a. Results of a Pilot Survey of Forty Selected Organized Criminal Groups in Sixteen
Countries. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. United Nations. Available from
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf>. . Accessed8 August
2010.
Reza Gonzalez, Yamile. 2011. 2011/02/07 “Cae” narco miembros del CAF -El Mexicano.
Available from <http://www.elmexicano.com.mx/informacion/noticias/1/22/policiaca/2011/02/07/453559/cae-narcomiembros-del-caf.aspx>. . Accessed8 February 2011.
Richard Marosi, and Ken Ellingwood. 2010. Mexico drug war: Troops kill top Sinaloa cartel
figure - latimes.com. Available from
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-cops20100730,0,5278620.story>. . Accessed30 July 2010.
Richter, Paul, and Dilanian Ken. 2010. Clinton says Mexico drug wars starting to look like
insurgency - latimes.com. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-fgmexico-insurgency-20100909,0,224449,print.story>. . Accessed22 September 2010.
223
Rodriguez, Olga. n.d. Mexican Drug Cartels Join Forces To Destroy Rival Gang. Available from
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/13/mexican-drug-cartelsjoin_n_535406.html>. . Accessed9 October 2010.
Roosevelt, Margot, and John Hoeffel. 2010. California voters turning against Prop. 19 and Prop.
23, poll shows - Los Angeles Times. Available from
<http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/21/local/la-me-1021-prop-poll-20101021>. .
Rothstein, Hy S. 2006. Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. Available from
Rupert, James. 1999. Washingtonpost.com: Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa’s Brutal Wars.
Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/oct99/sierra16.htm>.
. Accessed11 March 2011.
Russian Organized Crime Scholar. 2011. Interviews with Russian Organized Crime Scholar.
Interview by Nathan Jones.
Sabet, D. 2011. Confrontation, Collusion and Tolerance: The Relationship Between Law
Enforcement and Organized Crime in Tijuana. Mexican Law Review 2 (2).
Sadiq, Kamal. 2009. Paper Citizens : How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship In
Developing Countries. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Sandholtz, W., and W. Koetzle. 2000. Accounting for corruption: economic structure,
democracy, and trade. International Studies Quarterly 44 (1): 31-50.
Sassen, S. 1996. Losing control?: Sovereignty in an age of globalization. Columbia Univ Pr.
224
Sassen, S. 2000. Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization.
Public Culture 12 (1): 215.
Sassen, Saskia. 2006. Territory, authority, rights : from medieval to global assemblages.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0654/2005048867-t.html>.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press.
Schendel, Willem van. 2005. The Bengal borderland : beyond state and nation in South Asia.
Anthem South Asian studies. London: Anthem.
Schendel, Willem van, and Abraham. 2005. Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders,
and the Other Side of Globalization. Tracking globalization. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press. Available from
Scott, John. 2000. Social Network Analysis : a Handbook. Vol. 2. London ; Thousands Oaks,
Calif.: SAGE Publications. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0657/00267957-d.html
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0657/00267957-t.html>.
Serrano, Richard. 2011. Fast And Furious | Gun trafficking: Family of U.S. agent slain in Mexico
demands to know source of guns. LA Times. Washington, DC. Available from
<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/nation/la-na-guns-cartel-20110718>. .
SGF. 2010. “Zetas” usan a pandillas para extender su control - El Universal - México. Available
from <http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/678889.html>. . Accessed10 May 2010.
225
Shannon, Elaine. 1988. Desperados : Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America
Can’t Win. New York: Viking.
Shirk, David A. n.d. Law enforcement challenges and “smart borders.”
Shirk, David A. 2005. Mexico’s new politics : the PAN and democratic change. Boulder, Colo.:
L. Rienner. Available from <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0419/2004014910.html>.
Shirk, David A., and Latin American Studies Association. International Congress. 1998.
Democratization and party organization : the growing PAiNs of Mexico’s Partido
Acción Nacional. [Pittsburgh, Pa.?: Latin American Studies Association.
Shirk, David. 2010. Drug Violence in Mexico: Data and Analysis from 2001-2009. Available
from <http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/drug_violence.pdf>.
Shirk, David. n.d. Judicial Reform in Mexico: Change & Challenges in the Justice Sector.
Shirk, David, and Luis Astorga. Forthcoming. Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-Drug
Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context.
2005. Sinaloa Drug Cartel Said to Infiltrate Executive Branch. SourceMex Economic News &
Analysis on Mexico. Available from <http://www.allbusiness.com/northamerica/mexico/341120-1.html>. . Accessed6 January 2010.
Siwek, Stephen E. 2007. THE TRUE COST OF COPYRIGHT PIRACY TO THE U.S.
ECONOMY. 1660 S. Stemmons Freeway, Suite 475 Lewisville, TX 75067: Institute for
Policy Innovation: Reducing Government Consumption, Increasing Personal Wealth:
Limiting Federal Spending Growth Through Large Personal Retirement Accounts By Dr.
Lawrence A. Hunter POLICY REPORT 183 JULY 2004 IPI CENTER FOR
TECHNOLOGY FREEDOM. Available from
226
<http://www.copyrightalliance.org/files/siwekcopyrightpiracy_studypdf.pdf>. .
Skaperdas, S. 1992. Cooperation, Conflict, and Power in the Absence of Property Rights. The
American Economic Review 82 (4): 720-739.
Skaperdas, S. 2001. The Political Economy of Organized Crime: Providing Protection When the
State Does Not. Economics of Governance 2 (3): 173-202.
Skaperdas, S, and C Syropoulos. 1993. Gangs as Primitive States. Papers.
Slaughter, A.M. 1997. The real new world order. Foreign Affairs 76 (5): 183-197.
Smith, Hedrick. 2007. FRONTLINE: Spying On The Home Front. Available from
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/homefront/view/>. . Accessed7 May 2010.
Smith, Michael. 2010. Banks Financing Mexico Gangs Admitted in Wells Fargo Deal Bloomberg. Available from <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-29/banksfinancing-mexico-s-drug-cartels-admitted-in-wells-fargo-s-u-s-deal.html>. . Accessed8
December 2010.
Solingen, E. 1994a. The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear
Ambiguity in the Middle East. International Studies Quarterly 38 (2): 305-337.
Solingen, E. 1994b. The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint. International Security 19 (2):
126-169.
Solingen, Etel. 2007. Nuclear Logics : Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East.
Princeton: Princeton University Press. Available from
227
Solingen, Etel. 1998. Regional orders at century’s dawn : global and domestic influences on
grand strategy. Princeton studies in international history and politics. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Spagat, Eliot. 2010. Reputed Mexican drug lord Teodoro Garcia Simental is captured.
Washington Post. Tijuana, Mexico.
Sparrow, MK. 1991. The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An assessment
of the prospects. Social networks 13 (3): 251-274.
Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
Steinitz, MS. 2002. The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America’s Andean Region.
Policy Papers on the Americas 13.
Stevenson, Mark. n.d. Mexico cartels go from drugs to full-scale mafias - El Paso Times.
Available from <http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci_13142923>. . Accessed7 September
2009.
Strange, S. 2000. States and Markets: An International Political Economy.
Strange, S. 1997. The erosion of the state. Current History (613): 365-369.
Strange, S. 1996. The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy. Vol. 49.
Cambridge Univ Pr.
Strange, S. 1999. The westfailure system. Review of International Studies 25 (3): 345-354.
2010w. Study: 98.5% of Crimes Go Unpunished in Mexico. Latin American Herald Tribune.
Mexico City. Available from
<http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=376423&CategoryId=14091>. . Accessed12
February 2011.
228
Sullivan, J. P. 2008. Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs in Central
America. Air & Space Power Journal - Español Segundo Trimestre 2008. Available
from <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apjs/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm>. . Accessed11 December 2010.
Sullivan, Kevin. 2004. Tijuana Gang Figure Held After Slaying of Journalist. Washington Post.
Washington D.C. Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A69892004Jun25?language=printer>.
2002b. Suspected Tijuana Drug Kingpin Arraigned - San Diego News Story - KGTV San Diego.
Available from <http://www.10news.com/news/757024/detail.html>. . Accessed10 May
2010.
Thelen, Helen. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review of
Political Science 2: 369-404.
Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs. 2007. The
Mexico/Central America Security Cooperation Package: On-The-Record Briefing Via
Conference Call.
Thompson, Ginger. 2011a. Justice Department Accused of “Reckless Technique” NYTimes.com. New York Times. New York. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/us/politics/15guns.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print>
. . Accessed21 August 2011.
Thompson, Ginger. 2011b. U.S. Widens Its Role in Battle Against Mexico’s Drug Cartels NYTimes.com. New York Times. New York, Sunday edition. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/world/07drugs.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&e
mc=tha22>. . Accessed7 August 2011.
229
Thompson, Ginger, and Mark Mazetti. 2011. U.S. Sends Drones to Fight Mexican Drug Trade NYTimes.com. Available from
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/16/world/americas/16drug.html?_r=1&partner=rss&e
mc=rss&pagewanted=print>. . Accessed16 March 2011.
Thompson, Grahame. 2003. Between Hierarchies and Markets : the Logic and Limits of
Network Forms of Organization. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Thompson, Robert Grainger Ker. 1966. Defeating Communist Insurgency; the Lessons of
Malaya and Vietnam. Studies in international security, 10. New York,: F. A. Praeger.
Tilly, C., P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol. 1985. War making and state making as
organized crime. Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990. Cambridge, Mass.:
B. Blackwell.
Tilly, Charles. 1986. Space for Capital, Space for States. Theory an Society 15 (No. 1/2 Special
DOuble issue: Structures of Capital): 301-309.
Tilly, Charles. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Bringing the State
Back In, edited by Theda Skocpol, Peter Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer.
Tracy Wilkinson. 2010. Mexico Under Siege, drug war: Mexico grave yields 51 bodies latimes.com. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgmexico-bodies-20100725,0,2032876.story>. . Accessed30 July 2010.
United States. Dept. of the Army, and United States. Marine Corps. 2007. The U.S. Army/Marine
Corps counterinsurgency field manual : U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24 : Marine
Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5. Vol. University of Chicago Press. Chicago:
230
University of Chicago Press. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0708/2007006105-t.html>.
2010x. UNODC -- Organized Crime. United Nations. Available from
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/index.html?ref=menuside>. .
UNODC. 2010. UNODC Annual Report 2010. United Nations Office of drugs and Crime
(UNODC). Available from <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/annualreport.html>. . Accessed30 July 2011.
2010y. US embassy cables: Mexico is losing drug war, says US. The Guardian. London.
Available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/246329>. . Accessed3 December 2010.
Velasco, JL. 2005. Insurgency, authoritarianism, and drug trafficking in Mexico’s“
democratization”. Routledge.
Vellinga, M. 2004. Some Observations on Changing Business Practices in Drug Trafficking: The
Andean Experience. Global Crime 6 (3): 374-386.
Wagley, John R. 2006. Transnational Organized Crime: Principal Threats and U.S. Responses.
Services, Congressional Research. Available from
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33335.pdf>.
Walker, Rob. 2010. BBC News - Tijuana police chief Leyzaola: Torturer or saviour? BBC News.
Available from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12070346>. .
231
Walser, Ray. n.d. U.S. Strategy Against Mexican Drug Cartels: Flawed And Uncertain | Eurasia
Review. Available from <http://www.eurasiareview.com/2010/04/us-strategy-againstmexican-drug.html>. . Accessed3 May 2010.
Waltz, K. N. 2001. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co.
Waltz, KN. 1959. Man, the state and war. Columbia Univ. Press.
Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis : Methods and
Applications. Structural analysis in the social sciences. Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press. Available from
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam026/94020602.html>.
Weber, Max. 1958. From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology. Edited by Hans Heinrich Gerth
and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weick, Karl E. 1976. Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems. Administrative
Sciences Quarterly 21 (1): 1-19.
Weick, Karl E. 2001. Making Sense of the Organization. Oxford, U.K. ; Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell Business.
Weick, Karl E. n.d. Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability.
Weick, Karl E. 1995. Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Weick, Karl E., and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe. 2001. Managing the unexpected : assuring high
performance in an age of complexity. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Wendt, A. 1992. Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.
International Organization 46 (2): 391-425.
232
Whitworth, Steven Scott. 2008. THE UNTOLD STORY OF MEXICO’S RISE AND
EVENTUAL MONOPOLY OF THE METHAMPHETAMINE TRADE. Monterey,
California: Naval Post Graduate School, Department of National Security Affairs.
Wilkinson, Ken Ellingwood and Tracy. 2009. Drug Cartels’ New Weaponry Means War:
Narcotics Traffickers Are Acquiring Firepower More Appropriate to an Army -Including Grenade Launchers and Antitank Rockets -- and the Police Are Feeling
Outgunned. Available from <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgmexico-arms-race15-2009mar15,0,7843719,print.story>.
Wilkinson, Tracy. 2010a. A top Salvadoran ex-guerrilla commander advises Mexico’s
conservative president - Los Angeles Times. Available from
<http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/22/world/la-fg-mexico-guru-20101023>. .
Accessed3 November 2010.
Wilkinson, Tracy. 2008. In Sinaloa, the drug trade has infiltrated “every corner of life.” Los
Angeles Times. Culiacan.
Wilkinson, Tracy. 2010b. Mexico drug gangs turn weapons on army - latimes.com. Mexico
Under Siege. Available from
<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/latinamerica/la-fg-mexicogunbattles2-2010apr02,0,5886596.story>. . Accessed27 April 2010.
Williams, P. 1995. Transnational criminal organizations: Strategic alliances. The Washington
Quarterly 18 (1): 57-72.
2010z. World Drug Report 2010: drug use is shifting towards new drugs and new markets.
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Available from
233
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2010/June/drug-use-is-shifting-towards-newdrugs-and-new-markets.html>. . Accessed21 November 2010.
Yanouzas, Rocco Carzo and John N. 1969. Effects of Flat and Tall Organization Structure.
Administrative Sciences Quarterly 14 (2): 178-191.
Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea. 2006. Interpretation and Method : Empirical
Research Methods and The Interpretive Turn. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Zakaria, F. 2007. The future of freedom: Illiberal democracy at home and abroad. WW Norton
& Co Inc.
234
Appendix A
Organization Chart - Mexican Drug
Trafficking 1980’s (Cooperative and
Centralized Under El Padrino)
Direccion Federal de
Seguridad (DFS)
Mexican Law
Enforcement
Mexican Political Elites
Mexican Military
Miguel Angel Felix
Gallardo “El Padrino”
Jesus Labra Aviles
“El Chuy”
Caro Quintero
Amado Carillo
Fuentes
Arellanos
Chapo Guzman
Mayo Zambada
NarcoJuniors
NarcoJuniors
El Azul
“Guero” Palma Salazar
Data From: San Diego Union Tribune reports, Insightcrime.org, Zeta
Magazine, DEA Wanted Poster of AFO, Press releases PGJ, Interviews
with US and Mexican Law Enforcement, Elaine Shannon’s Desperado’s.
Key Arrows indicate a power relationship over the recipient of arrow
Plain lines represent some contact of neutral power relationship
Broken arrows indicate someone who attempted to kill recipient
235
Appendix B
AFO Structure Post 1991
(Simplified)
Political
Connections
Colombian
Cocaine
Suppliers
Strategic Head
Chief Enforcer
Arellanos
Regional
Operational
Commander
Dispatcher
Financial
Advisors/Investors
Money Launder Cells
Lieutenants
Sergeants
Front Businesses
Enforcer Squads
Retail Drug Sales in TJ
236
Appendix C
Rodolfo Leon
Aragon (PGR)
Benjamin Arellano Felix
Francisco Arellano
Felix (Arrested 1993)
El Tigrillo
1
Ramon Arellano Felix
(Chief Enforcer)
La Eme
El Doctor
Jesus Chuy Labra Aviles
Financial Head
2
“El Tarzan”
Manuel Herrera
Barraza Trafficker
Logan Street
Gang
“El Caballo”
Aguirre (money
laundering
El Mayel
Kitty Paez
US Distribution
Network
David Barron Corona “CH”
Los Mochis
3
Lieutenants
4
Sergeants
5
Enforcer
Squads
4
Two Middle
Eastern
Enforcer
Trainers
Narco-Junior Cells
Alfredo Hodoyan
Dispatcher
5
Gustavo Miranda
Santacruz “El Tortas”
Sergeants
Leon Brothers
Enforcer
Squads
Enforcer
Squads
Data From: US Luz Verde Indictment, wanted posters, San Diego Union Tribune reports,
Insightcrime.org, Zeta Magazine, DEA Wanted Poster of AFO, Press releases PGJ,
Interviews with US and Mexican Law Enforcement.
237
Alex Hodoyan
El Tiburon (Enforcer)
Narco-Junior Fabian
Gonzalez Martinez
Appendix D
Benjamin Arellano-Felix
Enedina
Jesus Chuy Labra Aviles
El Tigrillo
Ismael Higuerra Guerrero
(El Mayel) (Tijuana)
Alicia
Colombian Cocaine
Connections/FARC
El Doctor
El Caballo (Manuel Aguirre
Galindo Money laundering
Gilberto Higuera Guerrero
(Mexicali)
Lieutenants
David Barron Corona
“CH” Killed 1997
Oscar Gomez Angarita
Kitty Paez
(Arrested
1997)
Sergeants
Enforcers
Lieutenants
Dispatcher
Sergeants
Lieutenants
Narco
Juniors/Enforcers
Sergeants
US Distribution
Network
Enforcers
Enforcers
El Eme
Maritime Shipments
from Colombia
Interviews with US and Mexican Law Enforcement.
238
Appendix E
FARC (19992000) Cocaine
(Killed 2002)
Benjamin Arellano Felix
(Arrested 2002)
El Doctor
Enedina Arellano Felix
Money Laundering
Edgardo Leyva Escandalon
Jesus Chuy Labra
Aviles
Arrested 2000
Gilberto Higuera Guererro
Security trafficking
Mexicali Arrested 2004
Efrain Perez Pasuengo
Counter-intelligence
Arrested 2004
Ismael Higuerra Guererro
(El Mayel ) Arrested 2000
Oscar Gomez Angarita
Fernando Sanchez Arellano
(Dispatcher)
Jorge “El Cholo”
Enforcers
Counter-intelligence Cells
Rigoberto Yanez Guerrero
(Arrested 2002)
Trafficking cells
El Teo
El Pozolero
Body Disposal
Jorge Aureliano Felix
Security Operations
“Acquired weapons and
armored cars”
Gustavo Rivera Martinez
Armando Duarte
Martinez (Trafficker)
Arrested 2002
El Cris
El Caballo Manuel Aguirre Galindo
El Tigrillo
(Daily
Operationsal
Control 2000
Security Cells
Enforcers
Enforcer Cells
Kidnap cells
Interviews with Law Enforcement in the US and Mexico.
239
Enforcer cells
Appendix F
Enedina
El Tigrillo
Arrested 2006
Norma Ruth BAF’s
Wife
Gilberto Higuera
Guerrero Allies
Sinaloa (2004)
Arrested 2004
Alicia
El Caballo
Manuel Arturo
Villarreal-Heredia
Arrested 2006
Fernando Sanchez
Arellano (Dispatcher)
El Cris
Arrested
(2004)
Jorge Aureliano Felix
Arrested 2004
“El Pozolero” Santiago
Meza López Body Disposal
Sergeant
Enforcer Cells
Sergeant
Counter-intelligence Cells
El 24 Escandon Security
Specialist
El Teo
Efrain Perez Pasuengo
Counter-intelligence
Arrested 2004
Sergeants
Sergeants
Couriers
Kidnap Cells
Enforcer cells
Trafficking cells
Mayo
Zambada/Chapo
Guzman (Sinaloa)
Enforcer cells
Trafficking cells
Enforcer Cells
Enforcers and
traffickers in
Mexicali
Ismael Higuera
Guererro
Almoyoya
/Altiplano
Benjamin
Arellano Felix
Almoyoya
/Altiplano
240
Enforcer Cells
Appendix G
Organization Chart AFO 2006-2008
Alicia
(money
Enedina
(money
El Gus – Chief of Money Laundering
(Finances) (Arrested)
El Jimmy
El Doctor
Fernando Sanchez Arellano
Aguirre Galindo El Caballo
Armando Villareal-Heredia (El
Gordo)
Juan
Francisco
Sillas Rocha
“El Rueda
El Guero
El 24 Escandon
El Teo
El Cholo- Jorge
Briseno
El Efra --Efrain Perez
Pasuenga
El Muletas
El Pollo Ricardo
Estrada Perez
El Cabezon
El Chiricua
El Mickey
Juan
Querendon
Paúl Rodríguez
Palacio “El
Mateo”
José Rafael Méndez
Gutiérrez “El Güero
Jícama”
Fernando Avila
Valenzuela
El Piwi
El Apache
Kidnap cell
Kidnap cell
El Licenciado
Kidnap
Cell
Corrupt TJ
Police
Trafficking
Cells
Kidnap
Cell
Data From: US Luz Verde Indictment, wanted posters, San Diego
Union Tribune reports, Insightcrime.org, Zeta Magazine, DEA
Wanted Poster of AFO, Press releases PGJ,
241
Appendix H
Organization Chart Teo Faction
2008-January 2010
El Ingeniero - Fernando Sanchez
Arellano
Internecine
conflict
Mayo Zambada (Sinaloa Cartel)
El Teo Teodoro Garcia Simental
(arrested Jan 2010)
“El Perra”Jose Filiberto Parra
Ramos (arrested 2009)
Extortion Cell
“El Chiquilin”
Jose Manuel
Garcia
La Familia Michoacana
“Las Muletas”
Reydel Lopez
Uriarte
Trafficking Cell
Paúl Salomón
Sauceda “El
Paúl”
Enforcer Cells
Diego Raymundo
Guerrero Gómez
Arested with
Teo’s brother
El Guicho Héctor
Eduardo
Guajardo
José Antonio
Rangel Casas
Arested with
Teo 2010
Jesús Israel de la
Cruz López “El
Tomate”
Arrested 2011
Trafficking Cell
El Kaibil Jacome Gamboa
Arrested 2009
Kidnap Cell
Enforcer Cells
Kidnap Cell
Enforcer Cells
Kidnap Cell
“El Bebé”,
“El Max”, “El
Pepo”, “El
Cochi”, “El
Charly”, “El
Chaparrito”,
“El Bombón”
y “El Sairus”
Narco Menudeo Cells
4,000 Estimated Tijuana Narcotienditas
Data From: US Luz Verde Indictment, wanted posters, San Diego Union
Tribune reports, Insightcrime.org, Zeta Magazine, DEA Wanted Poster of
AFO, Press releases PGJ,
242
Appendix I
243
Appendix J
538
538
(2003). "REWARDS OFFERED FOR MEMBERS OF ARELLANO-FELIX ORGANIZATION: Information
sought on dangerous Mexican trafficking ring." Retrieved January 31, 2010, from
http://www.justice.gov/dea/fugitives/sandiego/arellano-felix_hotline.htm.
244
Appendix K
245
Appendix L
University of California, Irvine
Study Information Sheet
Splintering and Survival: The Arellano-Felix Organization
Lead Researcher
Nathan Jones
Department: Political Science
Telephone number and e-mail address: [email protected]
(949) 378-4667
Faculty Sponsor,
Associate Dean Caesar Sereseres
Department: Political Science
Telephone number and e-mail address: [email protected]
(949) 824-6334, 1426
246
•
You are being asked to participate in a research study about what makes Mexican drug trafficking
organizations resilient. The project specifically looks at the organizational structures of the ArellanoFelix Organization and other cartels to determine what makes them able to survive the current US and
Mexican government pressures. This project may help to develop strategies and policy
recommendations to help the government of Mexico combat drug trafficking organizations.
•
You are eligible to participate in this study if you are over the age of 18 and are a Mexican or US
citizen or business owner living in an area impacted by the Mexican drug trafficking organizations
under study or you are an expert academic, journalist or government official in the US or Mexico
specializing in .
•
The research procedures involve one in-depth audio-taped interview lasting approximately one hour
at a location convenient for you. If you choose not to be audio recorded you will not be.
•
Possible discomfort(s) associated with the study are: invasion of privacy and or psychological
distress.
•
There are no direct benefits from participation in the study. However, this study may explain the
resilience of Mexican drug trafficking organizations and offer insights into how they might be better
dismantled.
•
Participation in this study is voluntary. There is no cost to you for participating. You may refuse to
participate or discontinue your involvement at any time without penalty. You may choose to skip a
question or a study procedure.
247
You will not be paid for your participation in this research.
•
All research data collected will be stored securely and confidentially. Audio recordings will be
transcribed and deleted within 2 weeks of interviews. Your name will not be kept with any transcripts,
only a title like “journalist” or “academic” or “law enforcement official” would be kept with transcripts
with your permission. Transcripts will be destroyed upon the completion of the project.
•
The research team, authorized UCI personnel, may have access to your study records to protect your
safety and welfare. Any information derived from this research project that personally identifies you
will not be voluntarily released or disclosed by these entities without your separate consent, except as
specifically required by law.
•
If you have any comments, concerns, or questions regarding the conduct of this research please
contact the researchers listed at the top of this form.
•
If you are unable to reach the researchers listed at the top of the form and have general questions, or
you have concerns or complaints about the research, or questions about your rights as a research
subject, please contact UCI’s Office of Research Administration by phone, (949) 824-6662, by e-mail
at [email protected] or at University Tower - 4199 Campus Drive, Suite 300, Irvine, CA 92697-7600.
248
249
Appendix M
University of California, Irvine
Interview Questionnaire
Structure and Resilience in Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations:
The Case of the Arellano-Felix Organization
Lead Researcher
Nathan Jones
PhD Candidate
Department of Political Science
Phone: (949) 378-4667
[email protected]
Faculty Sponsor
Caesar Sereseres, PhD
Associate Dean of the Social Sciences/Professor
Department of Political Science
Phone: (949) 824-1426
[email protected]
250
Questionnaire:
Questions for Experts including:
journalists, scholars, government officials and law
enforcement in the US and Mexico.
1)
Identify critical events in the history of the Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO) like
inception, arrests or killings of leadership, internal conflict, etc.
2) How did the AFO structure change after each of these events? Did the AFO become
more flat, hierarchical or stay the same?
3) How many layers of management did the AFO have before and after each event?
4) After disruptive events, did the AFO maintain the same level of strength, did it
fragment, was it forced to restructure or did it dissolve?
5) What procedures changed for the AFO after the arrest or killings of key leaders? Did
members change the way they contacted each other? What technologies did they use
and how has that changed over time?
6) What has been the impact of alliances of factions of the AFO with other drug
trafficking organizations?
7) What major conflicts has the AFO had with other drug trafficking organizations?
8) What is the relationship of the Arellano-Felix Organization with street gangs and
prison gangs in the United States and abroad?
9) What is the relationship of the Arellano-Felix Organization with the production of
illicit narcotics especially cocaine in Colombia?
10) How is the AFO similar or different from other DTO’s in Mexico?
11) What has been the AFO’s relationship with the Mexican government at the local, state
and federal levels?
251
12) How does the AFO compartmentalize operations? Are there lieutenants who serve as
protective nodes for the organization’s leadership?
13) What AFO actions triggered aggressive government responses from Mexico and the
United States? When did the AFO avoid government detection or strong government
responses?
14) How has the AFO threatened or weakened the Mexican state?
15) What is the business strategy of the AFO?
16) How would you characterize the Mexican government’s strategy to combat the cartels?
17) How would you improve that strategy?
252
Questions For Mexican Citizens – To be encountered via research contacts like professors in
Mexico and journalists. Interviews could be conducted in public places like cafes or in
people’s homes.
1) Have you ever paid “piso” or tax/extortion payments to a drug cartel operating in this
territory?
2) Did you know to which cartel you were paying?
3) Without names, did you have a handler who received or demanded payments for the
organization?
4) How did payment work? How often? How much? If you closed your business what
was the cost of final payment?
5) Do you know anyone who has been kidnapped by the cartels? What were the cartel’s
demands? How much was demanded? Did they know the victims approximate networth? Does the victim know how or why they were targeted?
6) What is your opinion of the Gulf Cartel vs Los Zetas?
7) What is your opinion of Sanchez Arellano faction of the AFO vs. the El Teo Faction?
8) How has life changed in this city since President Calderon began his war on drugs
using the military in 2006? Has life gotten better or worse in terms of job and income?
What is your opinion of President Calderon?
9) What is your opinion of the various cartels?
10) Which cartel or cartels hold sway in this city? Specifically which neighborhoods are
controlled by each?
253
11) Has your business had any interactions with Mexican drug trafficking organizations?
What was the nature of this contact?
254
Appendix N
Interview Subject Chart
Interview Length
Interview Subjects
Number of Interviews
(hours)
Official
1
1
High Ranking US Official
1
2
Mid Level US Government Official
1
2
Tijuana Business Leader
1
2
US reporter covering Tijuana –
2
4
1
2
High ranking Tijuana law enforcement
US Reporter Covering Mexico in the
US
Multiple Interviews over
Tijuana Businessman –
9 months
7
1
2
Multiple interviews
6
1
1
arranged by US law Enforcement
1
1.5
Conference Attendance in Mexico City
1
6
1
2
Multiple interviews (3
6
US Law Enforcement in Tijuana
US Law Enforcement Specializing in
AFO in US –
Tijuana Human Rights Leader –
Confidential Informant interview
Mexican Scholar specializing in
Mexican Trafficking groups–
Mexican Scholar Specializing in
255
Security Issues –
months )
Mexican Scholar Specializing in Public
policy –
1
3
extortion payments –
1
2
Former Mexican Prosecutor—
2
3
Current Mexican Prosecutor –
1
1
1
8
1
2
Multiple
0.5
Mexico
1
2
Former Mexican Law Enforcement
1
1
Interview Mexican Police Officer
1
0.5
Interview Mexican Businessman
1
2
Interview Former Mexican Politician
1
2
1
1
1
1
Mexican Citizen and victim of required
US Law Enforcement Conference
Attendance
Interview Washington DC focused on
US policy toward Mexico –
Multiple Interviews with Mexican
Citizens on their experiences related to
Narco-violence.
American Scholar Specializing in
Interview Current Mexican
Government Official 3
Interview Former Mexican
Government official 1
256
Interview Former Mexican government
official 2
1
1
covering Organized Crime
1
2
Interview Current Mexican Reporter.
1
1
1
3
32 or More
80.5
Interview current Mexican Reporter
US Officials in Washington DC sit
down interview with 3 officials –
Totals
257
Appendix O
List of Acronyms and Glossary of Important Terms
COLEF – Colegio De La Frontera Norte. A prestigious Mexican Federal Government Research
University System.
POE -- point of entry
New Federation -- An alliance of Mexican cartels comprised of the Sinaloa Cartel and Gulf
Cartel unified in their fight against Los Zetas.
Los Zetas – Former armed wing of the Gulf Cartel now functioning as its own DTO.
MDTO—Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization
DTO—Drug Trafficking Organization
UNDP—United Nations Development Program
ONDCP—Office of National Drug Control Policy
CPOT- Consolidated Priority Organization Target
DEA – Drug Enforcement Agency
FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation
Decapitation strikes – Intentionally targeting the heads or upper echelons of drug trafficking
organizations or profit-seeking illicit networks in an attempt to disrupt them. Sometimes referred
to as “kingpin” strategies.
Piso – Literally means floor. In Mexico refers to price paid to operate a licit or illicit business in
cartel controlled territory. Also called cuota.
Cuota—See piso.
Plaza – Territory controlled by drug traffickers.
NDIC -- National Drug Intelligence Center or National Defense Intelligence College.
258
AFO – Arellano-Felix Organization
CAF – Cartel Arellano Felix (Spanish)
FSO – Fernando Sanchez Organization. See AFO.
Tijuana Cartel – See AFO
La Eme – Also known as Mexican Mafia. A prison gang that is predominant in southern
California with links to Mexican DTO’s.
Mexican Mafia -- See La Eme
Nuestra Familia—Prison Gang originally comprised of Hispanics from northern California who
wanted to protect themselves from La Eme.
Logan Street – Street Gang in San Diego which the AFO recruited from heavily in the 1990’s.
259
Appendix P
Timeline of Major events in AFO History
AFO Event Timeline
Date
Source
Death of DEA Agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena
1985
Shannon, E. (1988). Desperados :
Latin drug lords, U.S. lawmen, and the
war America can't win. New York,
Viking.
Arrest of Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo
1989
Viking.
Transfer of Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo to La Palma
1991
Maximum Security Prison
Viking.
Division of Territories amongst major traffickers in
1991
Mexico
Blancornelas, J. (2002). El cártel : los
Arellano Félix, la mafia más poderosa
en la historia de América Latina.
México, D.F., Plaza y Janés.
Christine's Discoteque AFO battle with Chapo's
Nov-92
Dillon, S. (1997). Mexican Traffickers
assassins -- Barron saves the Arellano's lives and
Recruiting Killers in the U.S. New
earns their trust
York Times. Tijuana.
David Barron Corona recruits La Eme and his Logan
1992-1997
street Gang Members
Dillon, S. (1997). Mexican Traffickers
Recruiting Killers in the U.S. New
York Times. Tijuana.
260
Archbishop and Cardinal Posadas-Ocampo is
1993
assassinated by AFO in a case of mistaken identity
Caldwell, R. (2007). Cartel Secrets.
San Diego Union Tribune. San Diego.
http://ww.uniontrib.com/uniontrib/200
70701/news_lz1e1cartel.html
Rule by Proxy -- Ismael Higuerra Guerrero -- Ramon
1993-1995
Steven Duncan, November 11 2009.
1997
Sam Dillon, "Mexican Traffickers
and Benjamin leave Mexico to lay low in the United
States
David Barron Corona is killed by friendly fire in an
assassination attempt on Zeta Reporter Jesus
Recruiting Killers in the U.S.," New
Blancornelas
York Times, December 2 1997.
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/04/
world/mexican-traffickers-recruitingkillers-in-theus.html?pagewanted=2&pagewanted=
print
Mexican Supreme Court Rules in favor of allowing
2001
solely Mexican citizens to be extradited to the US
(2008). DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION LECTURE
SERIES: HARROD, SCHARF AND
ZIEGLAR. D. o. Justice. Washington,
D.C., DEA.
http://www.deamuseum.org/transcripts
/Harrod_Scharf.pdf
Extradition of Kitty Paez to the United States
2001
261
Arrest Of Jesus Chuy Labra Aviles
12-Mar-00
(2000). "Members of Arellano-Felix
Organization." Drug Wars Retrieved
January 30, 2010, from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontli
ne/shows/drugs/business/afo/afomemb
ers.html.
Arrest of Ismael Higuerra-Guererro "El Mayel"
4-May-00
(2000). "Members of Arellano-Felix
Organization." Drug Wars Retrieved
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontli
ne/shows/drugs/business/afo/afomemb
ers.html.
Arrest of Benajamin Félix-Arellano in the state of
Mar-02
(2002). "DEA CONFIRMS
Pueblo Mexico - Oldest brother and head of he
CAPTURE OF BENJAMIN
organization
ARELLANO-FELIX." Retrieved
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/press
rel/pr030902.html.
Death of Ramon Arellano-Felix - Chief enforcer of
Feb-02
(2002). "DEA CONFIRMS
the organization. With his death AFO members in
CAPTURE OF BENJAMIN
custody like Kitty Páez become willing to testify.
ARELLANO-FELIX." Retrieved
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/press
rel/pr030902.html.
Kitty Paez starts cooperating with US law
2002
enforcement in the case against top AFO leadership
262
Francisco Javier Arellano-Felix takes control of the
2002
world/mexican-traffickers-recruiting-
AFO
killers-in-theus.html?pagewanted=2&pagewanted=
print
Arrest of AFO assassin "EL Cris" (Brother of El Teo)
25-Jun-04
Sullivan, K. (2004). Tijuana Gang
Figure Held After Slaying of
Journalist Washington Post.
Washington D.C.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
wp-dyn/A69892004Jun25?language=printer
67 Specially trained Mexican federal agents arrest
7-Jun-04
(2004). Major Cartel Lieutenants
Jorge Aureliano-Felix and Efrain Perez two major
Arrested in Mexico. D. o. J. D. E.
AFO Lieutenants
Administration. Washington, D.C.,
DEA Press Release.
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/histor
y/2003-2008.pdf
http://www.justice.gov/dea/major/unit
ed_eagles/index.html
DEA/Coast Guard Operation Arrests Francisco Javier
14-Aug-06
(2008). DEA History 2003-2008. D. o.
Arellano Felix "El Tigrillo" off the Coast of Baja in
Justice. Washington, D.C. , DEA: 44.
international waters
y/2003-2008.pdf
263
Fernando Sanchez Arellano with the support of his
14-Aug-06
(2008). DEA History 2003-2008. D. o.
uncle Eduardo Arellano-Felix "El Doctor" takes
Justice. Washington, D.C. , DEA: 44.
control of the organization.
y/2003-2008.pdf
Fernando Sanchez Arellano takes maintains control of
2008
the network after El Doctor’s arrest.
El Teo Splits with Fernando and fragments the
Apr-08
Organization into internecine conflict.
Richard Marosi, "Mystery Man
Blamed for Gruesome Tijuana
Deaths," La Times, December 18,
2008 2008.
http://www.latimes.com/la-fgtijuanadruglord182008dec18,0,5864824.story
El Teo establishes a brief Alliance with Chapo
2008
Guzman/"Mayo" Zambada of the Sinaloa cartel
Mexican Drug Cartels: Government
Progress and Increasing Violence,
STRATFOR2008).
http://web.stratfor.com/images/MEXI
CAN%20Cartels%202008.pdf
"Jesus “Chuy” Labra-Aviles, Efrain Perez, Jorge
Oct-09
(2009). "Leaders of Arellano-Felix
Aureliano Felix, and Armando Martinez-Duarte pled
Criminal Organization Plead Guilty."
guilty in United States District Court to charges
Retrieved November 30, 2009, 2009,
arising from their leadership of the Arellano-Felix
from
drug trafficking organization (AFO)"
http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pre
ssrel09/sd102109a.htm.
264
El Teo is arrested with a drug shipment in La Paz Baja
Jan-10
California Sur
Lacey, M. (2010). Mexico Holds Drug
Suspect Accused of Grisly Tactics.
New York Times. New York, New
York Times.
world/americas/13mexico.html?scp=1
&sq=el%20teo&st=cse
Raydal Rosario Lopez-Uriarte - El Muletas of the El
Feb-10
Teo faction is arrested
Marosi, R. (2010). "Reputed drug
cartel leader "Muletas" and another
suspected gangster are arrested in Baja
California." Retrieved April 14,
2010, from
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaz
a/2010/02/mexico-cartel-leadersarrested-baja-california-la-pazmuletas-raydel-lopez-uriarte-manuelsimentel.html.
Operation Luz Verde Indicts 43 FSO Members
July 2010
Luz Verde Indictment
US. V. Armando Villareal Heredia et
including a government liaison officer
al. 2010
265
Appendix Q
Large MDTO’s by Business strategy And Author’s Present Perceived Strength
Based on Media and Expert Accounts February 2011
Transactional
Territorial
Sinaloa Cartel (Strong)
Los Zetas (Inception as independent 2008)
Strong
Gulf Cartel (post 2008) Medium Strength
La Familia Michoacana (Present weak)
Sanchez-Arellano Faction AFO (post 2008)
Juarez Cartel (present weak)
Weakened but resilient treaty with Sinaloa
Beltran-Leyva Organization (2008-Present)
El Teo Faction AFO 2008-2010 (Dissolved)
Weakened
Guadalajara Cartel (1980’s) Fragmented into
La Barbie faction (BLO) Dissolved.
contemporary Mexican Cartels
266
Appendix R
Cartel Arrest Data From
December 2006-May
2010 -- Analysis by NPR - Robert Benincasa and
Stephanie d'Otreppe
Juarez Cartel, 5%
Beltran-Leyva,
13%
Gulf-Zeta, 44%
Sinaloa Cartel, 12%
Tijuana Cartel,
12%
La Familia, 15%
267
Appendix S
Reported Cartel Bribes of Mexican Officials
Data From NPR analysis of 400 corruption reports
250
200
Municipal
150
State
Federal
Military
100
50
0
268
Appendix T
The Extended State Reaction Model of Profit-Seeking Illicit Network Resilience
539
539
All aspects of this model will be explained in detail. Box A refers to how many layers of management within the
node or organization. Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks typically have 5 layers of management or more and
are typically more hierarchical than their Colombian counterparts due to their need to police plazas (territory).
269
These layers of management estimates were gleaned from interviews with Mexican profit-seeking illicit networks
experts, law enforcement, scholars and government officials.
Box B refers to small trafficking nodes typical in nascent trafficking areas with minimal border
enforcement. They are small and flat at 1-2 layers of management. Typically they specialize in some aspect of
trafficking, protection, processing, extortion, money laundering, and front-businesses. 3-4 layers of management
can be core nodes in trafficking networks like the Medellín and Cali Cartels of Colombia.
Box C refers to the two ideal types of trafficking nodes/organizations that typically exist within profitseeking illicit networks of five or more layers of management. The first is a “transactional” or trafficking oriented
model that focuses the organization on the trafficking of drugs instead of the very wide diversification of criminal
activities (BOX E) like kidnapping and extortion which draws negative state attention and demands from society
especially democratic ones, to attack cartels. Territorial traffickers will focus exclusively on taxing the territory.
This will include not just taxing drug smugglers moving through the territory but also moving into criminal activities
like extortion and kidnapping. These territorial traffickers have a high visibility (BOX E) to the state because they
increase the societal backlash by kidnapping professionals and the petit bourgeoisie.
Box F represents factors which contribute to or detract from the strength of the state reaction. States
typically have varying degrees of responses to profit-seeking illicit networks. Factors in box G are noted with a “+”
if the factor contributes to a strong state reaction against the illicit network, a “-“ if it contributes to a weak reaction
and a “+/-“ if it can contribute to both a strong or weak reaction. As the level of democratic consolidation increases
in the host-state the reaction to the illicit network will be more aggressive, because consolidated democracies have
well-developed legal and security institutions, and leaders will not be able to survive politically if they negotiate
with traffickers.
Also important to strength of the state response to territorial illicit networks is the support of neighboring
states, the societal response to the illicit network which is more negative for territorial illicit networks, the character
of the international system (free market or statist oriented) and the demand and profitability for the commodity or
commodities trafficked. Free market systems tend to benefit the profits and ability to corrupt of illicit networks
thus tending to weaken the state response to them.
The strength of the state reaction will over time determine the level of resilience for the network in an
iterative fashion. By iterative, I mean that when an illicit network survives, restructures or fragments, the process
begins anew. The resultant factions face the state again testing their new structures against the state and its coercive
apparatus.
Organized crime may be impossible to completely eliminate anytime there are prohibitions on commodities
with high demands. Organized crime may be a condition that is managed not cured.539 However, with stronger state
reactions and democratic consolidation, it can be held to lower levels. A thorough description of the levels of
resilience depicted in BOX G is described in detail in chapter three under “the resilience typology.” To summarize,
hierarchy leads to territorial business strategies which leads to a stronger state reaction to the illicit network, which
reduces resilience.
270

The State Reaction: A Theory of Illicit Network Resilience

Transcription

Similar documents

Josefina Vázquez Mota, President of Juntos Podemos

Mexico Gold 50 Pesos AGW 1.2057 (Random Year)

Mexican Independence Day Colouring Page

Richard Montijo, SWCA Environmental Consultants

New tendencies in Mexican Cinematography

Welcome to Mexico

weekly - Notimex

1998 The Puebla Folkloric Festival

Mexico is an independent country now, but it wasn`t always. For 300

Southern Expansion