the future of amazon.com - UConn School of Law
Transcription
the future of amazon.com - UConn School of Law
SPECIAL REPORT SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM REPORT HIGHLIGHTS > > > AMZN Is Our Top Pick Among Internet Stocks Market share projections (p. 7). Key metrics estimates (p. 10). Potential sales & margin impact of emerging efforts (p. 11). > Price comparisons: vs. competition (pp. 15-18), 1P vs. 3P (pp. 33-34) vs. Quidsi (pp. 55-56) vs. Zappos (pp. 57-58), AmazonFresh vs. Safeway (p. 42), and vs. Whole Foods (p. 42). > Case for/against collecting sales taxes For this report, we talked to more than 50 industry sources, encompassing public and private companies, industry experts, and government-related entities. Conducting the research for this report has increased our conviction on the name for the following reasons: > We have a greater understanding of Amazon.com’s strategy regarding sales tax and greater appreciation of its efforts that could more than offset any pressure on big-ticket sales, including adding fulfillment centers for expedited delivery, lockers, AmazonFresh, and (perhaps) pickup points. In addition, several third-party sellers will still be able to offer merchandise on Amazon.com’s platform without having to collect sales tax, which should allow Amazon.com to retain these sales and should be accretive to margins. > We have a greater appreciation for the levers the company could pull to increase its long-term consolidated segment operating income (CSOI) margin, including increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales, converting Amazon Prime into more of a membership model (similar to the warehouse clubs), intensifying its advertising efforts, offering more private-label merchandise, and leveraging its expanded fulfillment center footprint. > A number of our industry sources suggest that Amazon cannot be disrupted because it has been executing its strategy so effectively and has positioned itself so well from a competitive standpoint. affecting Amazon.com’s revenues and potential impact (p. 24). > > Amazon.com vs. Walmart, by-state sales taxes (p. 28). Who offered the most choices Super Bowl Sunday (p. 37). > > Online grocery services comparison (p. 41). AmazonFresh SKU’s by category, Seattle vs. L.A. (p. 45). > > > > > > > > AmazonFresh buying experience (pp. 44-45). Kindle Fire estimates (p. 47). Kindle smartphone estimates (p. 48). Amazon Local cities (p. 51). Spectrum of shipping options (p. 62). Fulfillment centers forecast vs. Wal-Mart (p. 63). Emerging megaregions and FC footprint (p. 65). Lockers locations (p. 67), retailers (p. 68), and competition (p. 70). > > > > Pickup points analysis (pp. 71-72). Stores analysis (pp. 72-79). Same-day shipping analysis (pp. 80-86). eBay Now has Amazon.com in its crosshairs (pp. 8586). > > > > > > We are increasing our 12-month price target to $400 from $370. Our new price target is based on our free cash flow yield analysis, which compares our long-term forecast for Amazon.com, including a 7.0% CSOI margin, against current valuations of more mature retailers – Costco, Target, and Wal-Mart. Amazon Instant Video content deals (p. 89). Streaming video devices distribution (p. 90). Amazon Studios pilots (p. 92). Amazon Web Services analysis (pp. 94-102). Margin Potential and Long-Term Outlook (pp. 103-107). Who could Amazon.com disrupt and vice versa (pp. 108-116). > > > How to compete against Amazon.com (p. 117). Stock anchor points (pp. 118-121). Long-Term Outlook and Valuation (p. 122). Tom Forte, CFA 212.584.4636 / [email protected] James Cakmak, CFA 212.600.2803 / [email protected] Please read the important disclosure and analyst certification information in the Addendum section of this report SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CONTENTS REPORT HIGHLIGHTS................................................................................................................................................................1 AMAZON.COM IS LEADING A RETAIL MOVEMENT ...............................................................................................................7 LONG-TERM MARGIN ................................................................................................................................................................8 DISRUPTION ................................................................................................................................................................................8 EMERGING EFFORTS ..............................................................................................................................................................10 SALES TAXES AND INCREASING ITS PHYSICAL PRESENCE ...........................................................................................11 INVESTMENT CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................................................11 AMAZON.COM – OUR TOP PICK AMONG INTERNET STOCKS .........................................................................................................11 INCREASING OUR 12-MONTH PRICE TARGET TO $400 FROM $370 ..............................................................................................12 OUR INVESTMENT THESIS ..........................................................................................................................................................12 PRICING PHILOSOPHY ............................................................................................................................................................14 SALES TAX: ONE OF THE MOST COMPLEX ISSUES FOR AMZN.......................................................................................19 INDEPENDENT OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, AMAZON.COM IS COLLECTING SALES TAX IN MORE STATES..........................................21 FEDERAL LEGISLATION STILL HAS TO GET THROUGH THE HOUSE ...............................................................................................22 What Our Industry Sources Are Saying ..............................................................................................................................22 IMPLICATIONS: WE ESTIMATE THAT 21% OF AMAZON.COM’S US RETAIL SALES AND 10% OF ITS TOTAL REVENUES ARE AT RISK ..25 TABLES TURNED – COMPETITION WITH SALES TAX ADVANTAGE OVER AMZN .............................................................................27 AMAZON.COM RAMPING EFFORTS TO OFFSET POTENTIAL REVENUE DRAG ..................................................................................27 THIRD-PARTY SALES VIA AMAZON.COM DRIVE LOW PRICING .......................................................................................29 THIRD-PARTY SALES THROUGH AMAZON.COM DRIVE SELECTION ...............................................................................36 CATEGORY AND COUNTRY EXPANSION .............................................................................................................................38 AMAZONFRESH (GROCERY).......................................................................................................................................................40 Two Markets – Two Different Loyalty Programs: Big Radish and Amazon Prime for Prime Fresh ..................................43 Big Radish...........................................................................................................................................................................43 Prime Fresh ........................................................................................................................................................................43 AMAZONSUPPLY (B2B) .............................................................................................................................................................46 HARDWARE: E-READERS, TABLETS, AND SMARTPHONES .............................................................................................47 SET-TOP BOXES AND THE BATTLE FOR THE LIVING ROOM ...........................................................................................................47 SMARTPHONES – THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP FOR HARDWARE.......................................................................................................48 MYHABIT (APPAREL) .................................................................................................................................................................49 AMAZON LOCAL .......................................................................................................................................................................50 AMAZON GAME STUDIOS (SOCIAL GAMING) ................................................................................................................................52 ADVERTISING ............................................................................................................................................................................52 AMAZON PUBLISHING .............................................................................................................................................................53 SELLING MERCHANDISE OUTSIDE OF AMAZON.COM: QUIDSI AND ZAPPOS ..............................................................54 QUIDSI – AFTERSCHOOL.COM, BEAUTYBAR.COM, BOOKWORM.COM, CASA.COM, DIAPERS.COM, LOOK.COM, SOAP.COM, VINE.COM, WAG.COM, YOYO.COM .............................................................................................................................................54 ZAPPOS ....................................................................................................................................................................................56 OTHER CATEGORIES .................................................................................................................................................................58 th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT FULFILLMENT – GETTING CLOSER TO THE CUSTOMER ...................................................................................................63 KIVA SYSTEMS AND FASTER PICKING .................................................................................................................................66 USING PHYSICAL LOCATIONS TO GET PRODUCTS TO THE CONSUMER FASTER .......................................................66 LOCKERS ..................................................................................................................................................................................66 Why Consumers Appreciate Lockers. ................................................................................................................................68 DHL and Lockers ................................................................................................................................................................68 Google Positions Itself for Lockers with Buffer Box Acquisition .........................................................................................68 Staples: If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em ...........................................................................................................................69 Walmart’s Efforts.................................................................................................................................................................69 USPS’s gopost Effort ..........................................................................................................................................................70 Why Lockers May Enable Amazon.com to Avoid Opening Its Own Stores .......................................................................70 PICKUP POINTS .........................................................................................................................................................................71 STORES ....................................................................................................................................................................................72 Best-Case Scenario: Apple.................................................................................................................................................74 Microsoft – Not Apple, but Not Bad ....................................................................................................................................75 Worst-Case Scenario, Practically Everyone Else ...............................................................................................................76 Store Within a Store – Best Buy .........................................................................................................................................77 Kiosks/Pop-Up Stores .........................................................................................................................................................78 Outlet Stores .......................................................................................................................................................................79 TWO-DAY SHIPPING ................................................................................................................................................................79 NEXT-DAY SHIPPING ...............................................................................................................................................................80 SAME-DAY SHIPPING ..............................................................................................................................................................80 CONSUMER DEMAND FOR SAME-DAY SHIPPING IS UNCLEAR .......................................................................................................80 EXPEDITORS STILL DEVELOPING BUSINESS MODELS FOR SAME-DAY SHIPPING ...........................................................................81 LOGISTICAL CHALLENGES FOR SAME-DAY SHIPPING ARE SIGNIFICANT ........................................................................................81 AMAZON.COM’S SAME-DAY SHIPPING EFFORTS..........................................................................................................................82 THE COST OF OFFERING SAME-DAY SHIPPING ...........................................................................................................................82 AMAZON’S SAME-DAY EFFORTS VS. EBAY’S AND GOOGLE’S .......................................................................................................83 Google Shopping Express ..................................................................................................................................................86 AMAZON PRIME .........................................................................................................................................................................87 AMAZON INSTANT VIDEO ...........................................................................................................................................................87 LOVEFILM ..................................................................................................................................................................................91 THE EMERGENCE OF ANYTIME AND ANYWHERE VIDEO CONTENT CONSUMPTION .........................................................................91 MONTHLY AMAZON INSTANT VIDEO OFFERING............................................................................................................................91 FUTURE COMPETITION AS MORE SERVICES BECOME UNTETHERED .............................................................................................91 PIRACY .....................................................................................................................................................................................91 AMAZON STUDIOS .....................................................................................................................................................................92 AMAZONFRESH – ANOTHER MECHANISM FOR SPEEDY DELIVERY ................................................................................................93 JUST-IN-TIME INVENTORY AND 3D PRINTING ..............................................................................................................................93 KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM 2013 AWS SUMMIT SERIES ...................................................................................................................99 AWS AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES ............................................................................................................................................99 INCREASING INNOVATION SHOULD DRIVE SALES .........................................................................................................................99 LOW PRICES ARE ALSO PART OF AWS’S VIRTUOUS CYCLE ......................................................................................................101 AWS AIDING INTERNET STARTUPS AND LARGE, ESTABLISHED FIRMS, ALIKE. ............................................................................101 CULTURE .................................................................................................................................................................................104 INCREASING PROPORTION OF THIRD-PARTY UNIT SALES ..........................................................................................................104 th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 3 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT WAREHOUSE CLUB MEMBERSHIP ............................................................................................................................................105 ADVERTISING .........................................................................................................................................................................106 SHIPPING .................................................................................................................................................................................107 PRIVATE LABEL .....................................................................................................................................................................107 WHO COULD BE DEVOURED BY AMAZON?.......................................................................................................................108 BANK OF AMERICA ..................................................................................................................................................................110 DISNEY ...................................................................................................................................................................................111 FACEBOOK..............................................................................................................................................................................111 FEDEX AND UPS ....................................................................................................................................................................112 WHO COULD DISRUPT AMAZON? .......................................................................................................................................113 GOOGLE .................................................................................................................................................................................114 WAL-MART .............................................................................................................................................................................114 EBAY ......................................................................................................................................................................................115 UBER......................................................................................................................................................................................115 NO ONE..................................................................................................................................................................................116 SALES GROWTH: PRIMARY ANCHOR POINT ..............................................................................................................................118 UNIT GROWTH ........................................................................................................................................................................119 GROSS PROFIT GROWTH.........................................................................................................................................................119 AWS’S SALES GROWTH ..........................................................................................................................................................120 MARKET SHARE ......................................................................................................................................................................121 OUR METHOD FOR ESTIMATING AMAZON.COM’S GMV, THIRD-PARTY SALES, AND THIRD-PARTY CSOI ............123 AMAZON’S AVERAGE SELLING PRICE .......................................................................................................................................124 AMAZON.COM’S TAKE RATE .....................................................................................................................................................126 AMAZON.COM’S GMV ..............................................................................................................................................................128 GROSS MARGIN ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................................129 OPERATING EXPENSES ESTIMATES ..........................................................................................................................................130 HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE VS. GUIDANCE AND OUR ESTIMATES ............................................................................130 SHOPRUNNER ........................................................................................................................................................................131 TRACKING AMAZON.COM SHIPMENTS ..............................................................................................................................131 A DASHBOARD ON AMAZON’S OPERATING RESULTS. ...................................................................................................133 th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 4 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT HOW WE ANALYZED AMAZON.COM To maximize our understanding of this complex subject, we spoke with representatives of public companies, privately held firms, trade organizations, industry experts, and governmentrelated entities, including the following: Public Companies: Ahold, Amazon.com, Angie’s List, AOL, Apple, Barnes & Noble, Carrefour, comScore, DHL, eBay, Facebook, FedEx, Google, Groupon, HSNi, Liberty Interactive Corp., LinkedIn, Loblaw, McDonald’s, Metro AG, Millennial Media, Netflix, OpenTable, Overstock, Pandora, Rakuten, Sport Chalet, UPS, Woolworths, XO Group, Yelp, Zillow, and Zynga. Privately Held Companies: Box, LaserShip, LJM Consultants, Mogreet, MomentFeed, Mouth, OnTrac, PushPoint, Relay, Tesco, Trunk Club, and Village Ventures. Trade Organizations: Direct Marketing Association, Performance Marketing Association, and the Retail Industries Leaders Association. Industry Experts: Wharton Professor David Bell, Forrester Research, University of Connecticut Professor Richard Pomp, and University of Arizona Professor John Swain. Government-Related Entities: New York Office of Tax Policy SOURCES FOR THIS REPORT – PUBLIC COMPANIES Source: Company websites and TAG research. SOURCES – PRIVATE COMPANIES Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 5 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT SOURCES – TRADE ORGANIZATIONS Source: Company websites and TAG research. SOURCES – INDUSTRY EXPERTS AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 6 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Amazon.com Is Leading a Retail Movement In the history of the retail sector, combinations of innovative business models and mavericks have created retail movements that had an enormous impact on consumers, businesses, and the economy. At the top of the list are Wal-Mart and Sam Walton. Among retailers, Wal-Mart is in a class by itself with more than $1B per day in sales. Other innovators/mavericks include McDonald’s and Ray Kroc, Starbucks and Howard Schultz, and Costco and Jim Sinegal. The force of the Amazon.com movement, led by Jeff Bezos (founder, president, CEO, and chairman), is massive, and although the company may not reach the $1B in retail sales per day level until 2023 (based on gross merchandise volume – GMV – generated on its platform, which assumes a 16.0% CAGR after 2012), its impact on consumers, businesses, and the economy is tremendous. For this report, we have analyzed the future of Amazon.com, which, in some (but not all) instances represents the future of e-commerce and retail. One way to measure Amazon.com’s disruption is to look at its market share. (We also believe market share is the best determinant of its long-term share price.) We project that Amazon.com’s US e-commerce market share (based on our estimates of its GMV) will increase to 24.0% in 2015 from 18.5% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2009 and that its share of total US retail sales will reach 1.7% from 1.0% and 0.4% over the same timeframes. We project that Amazon.com’s international e-commerce market share will be 4.0% in 2015 vs. 4.3% in 2012 and 3.9% in 2009 and that its share of total international retail sales will reach 0.6% from 0.5% and 0.3% over the same periods. We estimate that Amazon.com’s global e-commerce market share will grow to 7.7% in 2015 from 7.3% in 2012 and 5.7% in 2009 and that its share of total global retail sales will reach 1.0% from 0.7% and 0.3% over the same timeframes. (In the appendix, we illustrate our method for estimating GMV.) AMAZON.COM INCREASING MARKET SHARE, 2009–2015E CAGR 2009-2012 CAGR 2012-2015E 77,768 323,554 4,712,807 24.0% 1.7% 38.4% 15.8% 6.3% 23.2% 12.8% 2.7% 56,398 1,417,246 8,688,149 4.0% 0.6% 31.6% 27.5% 4.3% 14.6% 18.0% 6.4% 32,136 79,061 134,166 561,440 1,088,800 1,740,800 10,000,000 11,576,250 13,400,956 5.7% 7.3% 7.7% 0.3% 0.7% 1.0% 35.0% 24.7% 5.0% 19.3% 16.9% 5.0% ($MM) US Amazon US GMV Total US Online Sales Total US Retail Sales Amazon (% of Total US Online Sales) Amazon (% of Total US Retail Sales) 2009 2012 2015E 15,714 145,260 3,627,628 10.8% 0.4% 41,627 225,609 4,354,610 18.5% 1.0% International Amazon International GMV Total International Online Sales Total International Retail Sales Amazon (% of Total International Online Sales) Amazon (% of Total International Retail Sales) 16,422 416,180 6,372,372 3.9% 0.3% 37,434 863,191 7,221,640 4.3% 0.5% Global Amazon Global GMV Total Global Online Sales Total Global Retail Sales Amazon (% of Total Global Online Sales) Amazon (% of Total Global Retail Sales) Source: Company reports, US Census Bureau, eMarketer, and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 7 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT In this report, we look at the drivers behind Amazon.com’s retail strategy (low prices, large selection, and fast delivery). We answer the two questions we receive most from investors: (1) What is the company’s long-term margin? and (2) Which companies are most at risk to be devoured by Amazon.com? We also turn the second question around and discuss which companies we believe could disrupt Amazon.com. We examine the sales and margin potential for a number of the company’s emerging efforts, such as AmazonFresh in the grocery category. We analyze the potential impact on its retail sales from collecting sales tax in more US states, including the potential for its growing physical presence to offset the pressure on big-ticket items. Furthermore, we analyze anchor points for the stock – single data points that are likely to have the greatest influence on the performance of its stock. Long-Term Margin Should Amazon.com choose to do so, we believe the company could increase its CSOI margin to 7.0% over the long term – vs. our estimate of 3.9% in 2015, 2.7% in 2012, 6.4% in 2009, and its high-water mark of 7.1% in 2004 – through a combination of increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales, converting Amazon Prime into more of a membership model (similar to the warehouse clubs), intensifying its advertising efforts, offering more private-label merchandise, and leveraging its expanded fulfillment center footprint. Disruption Based on a straw poll of industry experts, we believe that Best Buy, Barnes & Noble, and Walmart are the retailers most at risk of being devoured by Amazon.com and that Google, Wal-Mart, and e-Bay have the best chance of disrupting Amazon.com. In addition, beyond the consensus selections for which companies could be devoured by Amazon.com, in this report, we discuss a few more provocative picks: Bank of America, Disney, Facebook, FedEx, and UPS. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 8 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM 2009/AMAZON.COM 2012/AMAZON.COM 2015 IN PICTURES 2009 2012 2015E Emerging Efforts Physical Presence Hardware Acquisitions Source: Company websites, The Dallas Morning News, The Digital Reader, GeekWire, and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 9 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM KEY METRICS: 2009, 2012, AND 2015E Gross Merchandise Volume (GMV) 2009 32,136 2012 79,061 2015E 134,166 CAGR 3-Years Ending 2009 31.7% CAGR 3-Years Ending 2012 35.0% CAGR 3-Years Ending 2015E 19.3% Sales First-Party Retail Third-Party Retail Other North America Other International Total Sales 22,831 1,024 550 104 24,508 56,039 2,532 2,350 172 61,093 95,144 4,292 7,299 270 107,005 31.7% 31.7% 27.7% 73.2% 31.8% 34.9% 35.3% 62.3% 18.3% 35.6% 19.3% 19.2% 45.9% 16.2% 20.5% Mix (% of Sales) First-Party Retail Third-Party Retail Other North America Other International 93.2% 4.2% 2.2% 0.4% 91.7% 4.1% 3.8% 0.3% 88.9% 4.0% 6.8% 0.3% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA By Geography North America Sales International Sales 12,828 11,680 34,812 26,281 67,970 39,035 29.8% 34.1% 39.5% 31.0% 25.0% 14.1% Mix (% of Sales) North America Sales International Sales 52.3% 47.7% 57.0% 43.0% 63.5% 36.5% NA NA NA NA NA NA Margin North America International Total CSOI Margin 5.5% 7.4% 6.4% 4.6% 0.3% 2.7% 5.4% 1.3% 3.9% NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Other Customers (MM) Fulfillment Centers Third-Party Units (% of Total) 105 39 29.8% 200 89 39.7% 285 110 41.0% 18.6% 8.0% NA 24.0% 31.7% NA 12.5% 7.3% NA Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Emerging Efforts Amazon.com has a number of initiatives under way that could meaningfully affect its longterm sales growth and CSOI margin. We outline a number of them in this report and in the following table, including the percentage likelihood of the company generating incremental sales in 2015 akin to 1% market share for its various efforts. When considering Amazon.com’s long-term margin opportunity from its emerging efforts, it is important to consider the company’s ability to leverage its platform to offer consumers merchandise from third-party sellers, which carry higher margins than first-party sales. Based on this analysis, we conclude that the company’s efforts in grocery (AmazonFresh), B2B (AmazonSupply), hardware, and apparel (such as MyHabit) could have the greatest impact on its sales growth in 2015. Of the emerging efforts, we believe Amazon.com has the greatest chance of generating an incremental 1% market share of revenue in 2015 from publishing (Amazon Publishing), advertising, and apparel. And in our view, the greatest potential for a lift in its CSOI margin from an incremental $1B in revenue lies in advertising, adding a smartphone to th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 10 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT its hardware lineup (though the company is highly unlikely to do so at a margin profile comparable to Apple’s), and its Amazon Studios efforts. AMAZON.COM’S EMERGING EFFORTS AmazonFresh (Grocery) AmazonSupply (B2B) Amazon Smartphone MyHabit (Apparel) Amazon Local Amazon Game Studios (Social Gaming) Advertising Amazon Studios Amazon Publishing 2015 Total Addressable Market ($B) 648.9 592.3 442.1 364.7 340.3 222.8 146.2 54.0 17.4 2015 Sales Lift from 1% Market Share (Basis Pts) 708 647 483 398 372 243 160 59 19 Odds of Achieving 1% Market Share in 2015 10% <5% 10% 33% <5% <5% 33% <5% 75% Market Leader Kroger Home Depot Apple Macy's Groupon Zynga Google Disney Bertelsmann 2015 Operating Margin 2.8% 12.8% 27.5% 10.4% 10.0% 5.7% 39.0% 25.3% 11.5% Potential for ThirdParty Sales High High Low High High Low High Low Low 2015 Margin Lift/(Drag) from $1B Sales (Basis Pts) (1) 8 22 6 6 2 33 20 7 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Sales Taxes and Increasing Its Physical Presence We believe collecting sales taxes could have a negative impact on as much as 21% of its US retail sales (or 10% of total revenues), based on our analysis of Amazon.com’s proportion of big-ticket sales. However, a number of the company’s efforts that are at least somewhat dependent on it increasing its physical presence and collecting sales tax could offset much of that pressure, including adding fulfillment centers for expedited delivery, lockers, AmazonFresh, and (potentially) pickup points. Last, several third-party sellers will still be able to offer merchandise on Amazon.com’s platform without having to collect sales taxes, which should enable Amazon.com to retain these sales and – considering the much more favorable margin dynamics for third-party sales over first party – could benefit the company’s CSOI margin. Investment Conclusions Amazon.com – Our Top Pick Among Internet Stocks Results of the research we conducted for this report increase our conviction in the name for several reasons: th We have a greater understanding of the company’s strategy regarding sales taxes and a greater appreciation of its efforts that could more than offset any pressure on big-ticket sales, including adding fulfillment centers for expedited delivery, lockers, AmazonFresh, and (potentially) pickup points. Also, several third-party sellers will still be able to offer merchandise on Amazon.com’s platform without having to collect sales taxes, which should enable Amazon.com to retain these sales and should be accretive to margins. We have a greater appreciation for the levers the company could pull to increase its longterm CSOI margin, including increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales, converting Amazon Prime into more of a membership model (similar to the warehouse clubs), intensifying its advertising efforts, offering more private-label merchandise, and leveraging its expanded fulfillment center footprint. A number of our industry sources suggest that Amazon would not be disrupted because it has been executing its strategy so effectively and has positioned itself so well from a competitive standpoint. > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 11 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Increasing Our 12-Month Price Target to $400 from $370 Our new price target is based on our free cash flow yield analysis, which compares our longterm forecast for Amazon.com, including a 7.0% CSOI margin, against current valuations of more mature retailers – Costco, Target, and Wal-Mart. Our Investment Thesis Thanks to its basic strategy of investing to offer consumers a large selection with low prices and fast delivery times, we believe Amazon.com will increase its market share in global ecommerce to 7.7% in 2015 from 7.3% in 2012 and 5.7% in 2009, and we project that its penetration of total global retail sales will rise to 1.0% in 2015 from 0.7% in 2012 and 0.3% in 2009. Several of Amazon.com’s emerging efforts could meaningfully increase its sales growth, including advertising, apparel (such as MyHabit), and grocery (AmazonFresh). The company could pull multiple levers to increase its CSOI margin, including increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales, converting Amazon Prime into more of a membership model (similar to the warehouse clubs), intensifying its advertising efforts, offering more private-label merchandise, and leveraging its expanded fulfillment center footprint. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 12 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S STRATEGY – IN BRIEF Mr. Bezos’ comments at an Amazon Web Services (AWS) conference in Las Vegas in November 2012 explained the company’s strategy as well as – if not better than – anything we have seen or heard before or since. He noted that he is frequently asked, What is going to change in the future? A better question, according to Mr. Bezos, would be: What is not going to change in the future? It is a better question because you can build a business with a greater chance of succeeding around the answer to the second question than the first. What is not going to change in the future? In all likelihood, customers will still want low prices, a large selection, and fast delivery. Amazon.com invests a lot of resources in those three items, which drive its flywheel, including its performance today and in the future. Its efforts on those fronts will ensure that the company remains the market leader in e-commerce in the future and that it continues to take share of the overall retail market, too. THE STRATEGY THAT DRIVES AMAZON.COM’S FLYWHEEL Source: Company reports and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 13 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT LOW PRICES SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS In this section we discuss the company’s efforts to offer consumers low prices, including its pricing strategy, use of thirdparty sales on the Amazon.com platform, and online sales taxes strategy. Sales Implications: Its reputation for low prices is one reason many customers turn to Amazon.com and is therefore a significant driver of its past, present, and future long-term sales growth. We project that sales will expand at a 20.5% CAGR during 2012-2015 vs. 35.6% in 2009-2012 and 31.8% in 2006-2009. Margin Implications: Amazon.com’s strategy of offering consumers low prices means it will have to rely on scale or mix – instead of pricing – to drive margin. For that reason, we consider Amazon.com similar to Wal-Mart, the current market leader in retail sales (at more than $1B per day) but a low-margin business, with operating margins of 5.9% in 2012 vs. 5.9% in 2009 and TAG’s forecast for 6.2% in 2015. We project Amazon.com’s CSOI margin at 3.9% in 2015 vs. 2.7% in 2012 and 6.4% in 2009. Pricing Philosophy Amazon.com’s philosophy is to sell products to consumers at low prices every day (similar to Walmart’s everyday low pricing strategy), rather than have frequent sales (such as department stores) or sell some products at a loss with others at a healthier profit (akin to the high-low grocery store model). Its desire to offer consumers low prices extends to shipping, including its Amazon Prime membership offering. The company strives to operate its business more efficiently so it can offer even lower prices to consumers. It does not explicitly factor taxes into its pricing equation: Product prices are the same in New York, where it collects sales tax of 8.0%, as they are in Nevada, where it collects no tax. One way the company implements its pricing strategy is by using an algorithm that enables it to match competitors’ prices (including those of third-party sales on its platform). As a result, prices on Amazon.com can move. For example, we purchased an LED lantern from Amazon.com on October 28, 2012 (following Hurricane Sandy), for $21.39. On December 5, 2012 (about a month later), the product was offered by Amazon.com at $29.19; as of January 17, 2013, the price was $29.59; and as of August 20, 2013, the price was $27.67 (shown in the following pictures). This example suggests that the company matched a competitor’s pricing around Hurricane Sandy. The point here is that its prices are fluid, and through use of its pricing algorithm, Amazon.com tries to maintain prices that are competitive with those of other retailers, including those offering merchandise on its platform. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 14 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM – MOVING PRICES EXAMPLE – LED LANTERN, JANUARY 2013 Source: Company website and TAG estimates. SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM – MOVING PRICES EXAMPLE – LED LANTERN, AUGUST 2013 Source: Company website and TAG estimates. CASE STUDY 1: PRICE COMPARISON – AMAZON.COM VS. THE COMPETITION, AUGUST 2013 In our price comparison, eBay offered consumers the lowest prices, not only on merchandise but also when shipping and sales taxes are factored in. We compared the price of identical merchandise on an à la carte basis at Amazon.com (both first party and third party) against Apple, Costco, eBay, HSN, QVC (part of Liberty Interactive Corp.), Target, and Walmart. We discovered that eBay offered the lowest prices on the merchandise, with Amazon.com’s prices 1.9% higher. Including shipping costs, eBay’s prices remained the lowest, with Amazon.com’s 1.8% greater. To illustrate the benefits to Amazon.com of not collecting sales taxes in all 50 states, we compared prices for a consumer in New York (where Amazon.com collects sales tax) with those for a consumer in Connecticut (where it will begin collecting sales taxes in November 2013). On that basis, the total cost of merchandise (product plus shipping and taxes) was lowest at eBay for both our New York consumer, with Amazon.com 7.1% higher, and our Connecticut consumer, with Amazon.com 1.3% higher. We considered this a great illustration of why Amazon.com wants the minimum sales threshold to be as low as possible for a company to be required to collect sales taxes (under legislation that passed the Senate in May and is now in the House) to protect itself against small-scale sellers on eBay, which will have a sales tax advantage over Amazon.com. When comparing prices at Amazon.com with those at Walmart.com, we note the following: The merchandise was 6.3% lower at Amazon.com. Including shipping, it was 6.8% less at Amazon.com. Factoring in sales taxes, our Connecticut consumer would pay 11.6% less on Amazon.com while our New York purchaser would spend 7.7% less. Stated differently, not collecting sales taxes on firstparty items sold in Connecticut gave Amazon.com a 480-basis-point advantage over Walmart. In New York, where Amazon.com collects sales taxes on first-party items and collection on third-party items depends on whether the seller has a physical presence in the state (among other things), the advantage was only 90 basis points. Analyzing the results on a by-item basis, of the 56 like-for-like items, Amazon.com’s merchandise prices were cheaper for 19 (34%) than were those of eBay, identical for 2 (4%), and pricier for 35 (63%). Including shipping, it was 16 (29%) cheaper, 1 (2%) identical, and 39 (70%) pricier. Including shipping and sales taxes, it was 17 (30%) cheaper, 1 (2%) identical, and 38 (68%) pricier for our Connecticut consumer and 14 cheaper (25%), 1 (2%) identical, and 41 (73%) pricier for our New York consumer. Therefore, eBay’s sales tax advantage over Amazon.com in New York enabled it to offer consumers 2 more items (4% more) at a lower total cost. Compared with Walmart for the 35 identical products, Amazon.com’s prices were cheaper for 14 (40%), identical for 12 (34%), and pricier for 9 (26%) Including shipping, it was 15 (43%) cheaper, 5 (14%) identical, and 15 (43%) pricier. Including shipping and sales taxes, it was 25 (71%) cheaper, 1 (3%) identical, and 9 (26%) pricier for our Connecticut consumer and 17 cheaper (49%), 5 (14%) identical, and 13 (37%) pricier for our New York consumer. Amazon.com’s sales tax advantage over Walmart in Connecticut enabled it to offer consumers 10 more items (29% more) at a lower total cost. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 15 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT INTERNET PRICE COMPARISON, AUGUST 2013 vs. AAPL Shipping P+S C I (72.5%) (3.4%) 7 2 (72.5%) (3.4%) 7 2 Items Product C CT 11 (3.3%) 7 NY 11 (3.3%) 7 I 2 2 P 2 2 Items Product C CT 56 1.9% 19 NY 56 1.9% 19 I 2 2 P Shipping 35 (1.5%) 35 (1.5%) Items Product C CT 11 (21.5%) 10 NY 11 (21.5%) 10 I 0 0 P 1 1 vs. HSNI Shipping P+S C I (67.3%) (24.1%) 10 0 (67.3%) (24.1%) 10 0 P Tax Total C I 1 (100.0%) (28.6%) 10 0 1 (26.3%) (24.3%) 10 0 P 1 1 Items Product C CT 14 (14.3%) 11 NY 14 (14.3%) 11 I 0 0 P 3 3 vs. QVC (LINTA) Shipping P+S C I (77.0%) (18.1%) 11 0 (77.0%) (18.1%) 11 0 P Tax Total C I 3 (100.0%) (23.0%) 12 0 3 (58.7%) (21.4%) 13 0 P 2 1 Items Product C CT 10 (0.7%) 6 NY 10 (0.7%) 6 I 0 0 P 4 4 vs. COST Shipping P+S C I (46.7%) (2.0%) 6 0 (46.7%) (2.0%) 6 0 P Tax Total 4 (100.0%) (7.7%) 4 (58.5%) (6.0%) C I 6 0 6 0 P 4 4 Items Product C CT 29 (6.8%) 24 NY 29 (6.8%) 24 I 4 4 P 1 1 vs. TGT Shipping P+S C I (69.4%) (8.3%) 27 0 (69.4%) (8.3%) 27 0 P Tax Total C I 2 (100.0%) (13.8%) 29 0 2 (37.9%) (10.7%) 28 0 P 0 1 P 9 9 vs. WMT Shipping P+S C I P Tax Total C I P (27.2%) (6.8%) 15 5 15 (100.0%) (11.6%) 25 1 9 (27.2%) (6.8%) 15 5 15 (20.7%) (7.7%) 17 5 13 CT NY Items Product C I 35 (6.3%) 14 12 35 (6.3%) 14 12 P Tax Total C I 2 (100.0%) (9.0%) 11 0 2 (31.4%) (5.6%) 9 2 vs. EBAY P+S C I P Tax 1.8% 16 1 39 (100.0%) 1.8% 16 1 39 1817.5% Total 1.3% 7.1% P 0 0 C I P 17 1 38 14 1 41 Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 16 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMZN V. EBAY – PRODUCT PRICE ONLY SPECIAL REPORT AMZN V. EBAY W/ SHIPPING COSTS 70% 80% 63% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 34% 40% 30% 30% 20% 29% 20% 10% 10% 4% 2% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Cheaper Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Identical Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. AMZN V. EBAY – IN CT (NO TAX) AMZN V. EBAY – IN NY (W/ TAX) 80% 80% 68% 70% 73% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 30% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 25% 10% 2% 2% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com Pricier 17 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMZN V. WMT – PRODUCT PRICE ONLY SPECIAL REPORT AMZN V. WMT W/ SHIPPING COSTS 45% 45% 43% 43% 40% 40% 40% 34% 35% 35% 30% 30% 26% 25% 25% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10% 5% 5% 0% 14% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. AMZN V. WMT – IN CT (NO TAX) AMZN V. WMT – IN NY (W/ TAX) 60% 80% 71% 70% 50% 49% 60% 37% 40% 50% 40% 30% 30% 26% 20% 14% 20% 10% 10% 3% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Cheaper Identical Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com Pricier 18 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Sales Tax: One of the Most Complex Issues for AMZN SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: We believe collecting sales taxes could have a negative impact on as much as 21% of its US retail sales (or 10% of total revenues), based on our analysis of Amazon.com’s proportion of big-ticket sales. However, a number of the company’s efforts that are at least somewhat dependent on it increasing its physical presence and collecting sales tax could offset much of that pressure, including adding fulfillment centers for expedited delivery, lockers, AmazonFresh, and (potentially) pickup points. Last, several third-party sellers will still be able to offer merchandise on Amazon.com’s platform without having to collect sales taxes, which should enable Amazon.com to retain these sales. Margin Implications: With Amazon.com’s margin reliant on scale, a decline in revenues owing to the collection of sales taxes could result in significant deleveraging. However, considering that we believe most of the sales pressure would come on big-ticket items, such as TVs and computers, which have lower margins than other categories, such as apparel, the improvement in mix could offset some of the deleverage. In addition, if Amazon’s collection of sales taxes on first-party sales increases the proportion of third-party sales from merchants that will still not collect sales taxes (such as those with less than $1MM in annual sales), it could benefit margins since margins on its third-party sales are much more favorable than those on first-party transactions. In our view, Amazon will continue to collect sales taxes in an increasing number of states in the US either because it forges more by-state deals or Congress passes legislation. We believe collecting sales taxes could negatively affect as much as 21% of its US retail sales (or 10% of total revenues). Depending on passage of federal legislation and how it is written, Amazon could face more intense competition from certain e-retailers that now have a sales tax advantage over Amazon, such as small-scale sellers on eBay. However; we believe Amazon could use multiple strategies to offset that impact, including offering sales tax collection as a service to merchants selling on its platform and, more importantly, advancing its physical efforts (those that give it a physical presence in a state, whereby the company would collect sales taxes per current law) – adding fulfillment centers for expedited delivery, lockers, AmazonFresh, and (potentially) pickup points. Last, several third-party sellers will still be able to offer merchandise on Amazon.com’s platform without having to collect sales taxes, which should enable Amazon.com to retain these sales and – considering the much more favorable margin dynamics for third-party sales than for first-party – could benefit the company’s CSOI margin. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 19 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM EXPANDING ITS PHYSICAL PRESENCE, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: The Dallas Morning News, The Digital Reader, GeekWire, and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 20 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON’S PHYSICAL LOCATIONS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Independent of Federal Legislation, Amazon.com Is Collecting Sales Tax in More States When applying by-state US retail sales as a proxy, we estimate that Amazon.com will collect sales taxes on 54.1% of its US retail sales in 2015 vs. 34.6% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2009. When applying by-state US retail sales as a proxy, we estimate that Amazon.com will collect sales taxes on 54.1% of its US retail sales in 2015 vs. 34.6% in 2012 and only 10.8% in 2009. The following figure illustrates the percentage of US retail sales (based on 2009 data from the US Census) for which Amazon.com collects sales taxes. For example, it has been collecting taxes in its home state of Washington since its 1994 launch. Washington’s 2009 retail sales of $88.4B accounted for 2.3% of the US total. The percentage of its US sales for which Amazon collected taxes increased to 3.6% in 1999 with the addition of Kentucky, then moved to 3.8% when North Dakota was added in 2001, and ticked up to 4.7% with the addition of Kansas in 2004. When New York came on board in 2008, it moved the needle up to 10.8%. After three years with no new states added, 2012 represented a significant change, as the additions of some of the largest US states for retail sales, including California (ranked first), Texas (second), and Pennsylvania (sixth) pushed the figure materially higher to 34.6%. This year includes the largest addition of states in a calendar year (six) with Arizona (added in February), New Jersey (July), Georgia (September), Virginia (September) and Connecticut (November), and Massachusetts (November) coming on board later this year. As a result of th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 21 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT this activity, we estimate that Amazon.com is currently collecting taxes for 45.6% of its US retail sales, which will increase to 49.0% at year-end. As of this writing, Indiana (January 2014), Nevada (January 2014), and Tennessee (January 2014) are coming on board next year, which would drive the total to 54.1%. South Carolina starts in January 2016, which would bring the total to 55.5%. In addition, according to published reports, the company has made a proposal for Florida (6.5% of US retail sales). (Note: Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do not have state sales tax; Alaska has city sales tax; and these five states account for only 2.9% of US retail sales.) AMAZON.COM SALES TAX COLLECTION AND BY-STATE US RETAIL SALES, 1994-2016E 60% 40% 20% 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 0% Source: Company reports, US Census Bureau, and TAG estimates. Federal Legislation Still Has to Get Through the House In May, the Senate voted 69-27 in favor of online sales tax legislation. We remain skeptical that the bill will have as easy a time in the House of Representatives for the following reasons: Unlike the Senate, which is controlled by Democrats (53 Democrats, 45 Republicans, and 2 Independents), Republicans control the House (232 Republicans, 201 Democrats, and 2 vacancies). Although proponents of the legislation have done a good job of changing the narrative to a way of helping businesses (small, medium, and large) combat showrooming and away from a new tax, many still consider it anti-small-business and a new tax. Unlike senators, who have the luxury of six-year terms, representatives serve only for two-year periods, and Republicans still face the risk of angry constituents (spurred by Grover Norquist’s lobbying) who oppose raising taxes. Overall, Congress, in our view, has not been effective in passing major legislation since Republicans took control of the House in January 2011. What Our Industry Sources Are Saying As part of our effort to closely monitor the legislative process, we reached out to a number of industry sources for updates on their opinions and here is what we found: Professor Richard Pomp, a tax expert and law professor at the University of Connecticut, noted that although the legislation passed the Senate, it will be more difficult to get it through the House. A well organized pushback is already underway. But in support of the legislation, he pointed out that small businesses are telling their congressmen that their stores have become Internet showrooms, where consumers visit, pick their salespersons’ brains, track bar codes, and ultimately purchase on the Internet. He also noted that the Tea Party seems emasculated and that Grover Norquist's power has waned. Professor Pomp believes the change in Amazon’s position – to actually supporting the legislation instead of merely paying lip service to it – was a catalyst for the change in political th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 22 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT views. He believes eBay may be resigned to it passing in the House and, therefore, has changed its tactics to damage control from blocking the legislation. If it passes, he thinks eBay could make money by starting to collect sales taxes on behalf of any of its sellers that will be forced to collect sales taxes by the legislation. Professor John Swain, a tax expert and law professor at the University of Arizona (and panel participant at our 5th Annual Spring Consumer Conference in April), is more confident that the legislation will pass than in prior years, but he still does not see the likelihood as even 50/50. He believes eBay will exploit any weakness in the vote count, which could make it more difficult for the bill’s sponsors to get it passed without a material increase in the nexus threshold, which might cause it to move up from $1MM. The Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA) noted that the bill passed in the Senate. It expects the House debate to start in the Judiciary Committee, which could result in the bill being altered. However, RILA likes the potential for passage in the House because it is starting with the support of 24 Republican cosponsors. The Performance Marketing Association (PMA) believed there was a high likelihood that the bill would pass the Senate, noting that the vote to invoke “cloture” and bypass the committee was 76-24 in favor. The PMA believes the legislation will receive much more scrutiny in the House than in the Senate because of the Republican control. It noted that last year there was a lot of support for the legislation, including from more than a dozen Republican governors, and confidence that the bill would pass if it made it to the floor. The PMA mentioned eBay’s opposition and the company’s efforts to build grassroots support against the bill. It also pointed out that eBay agreed to a $1MM sales threshold for California and speculated that more than 95% of its sellers were below that threshold. The PMA believes bricks and mortar retailers would balk at a higher threshold than $1MM because they do not get such a benefit themselves and, at the minimum, there will be much more debate on the threshold. In the view of the PMA, the biggest risk to passage is partisan politics creating distractions, akin to the fiscal cliff of 2012. Industry Source No. 1 noted that there are many more skeptical politicians in the House than in the Senate, which should result in a lot more scrutiny of the legislation; even so, according to this source, the bill will not be dead on arrival. At a minimum, the bill will receive much more consideration in the House than it did in the Senate. This consideration could include a closer look at the $1MM threshold than was given in the Senate. Industry Source No. 2 said that some in Washington think the exemption threshold could start above $1MM but then phase down to lower levels in a few years. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 23 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 2: THE CASES FOR/AGAINST SALES TAX COLLECTION HURTING AMAZON’S SALES The Case for Sales Tax Collection Hurting Amazon’s Sales According to an industry source, consumers shop at remote sellers (e-commerce companies and catalog retailers) for a number of reasons, including selection and convenience and sometimes price. Avoiding sales taxes is low on that list. However, according to the source’s studies, consumers care about sales taxes on big-ticket items, such as computers and televisions. We estimate that 21% of Amazon.com’s US retail sales come from big-ticket items. This notion was supported by Amazon.com’s comments that its 4Q12 sales were soft in products with high average selling prices, such as televisions. The company noted that the softness in TV sales was across the US and not limited to California, Pennsylvania, and Texas – three states where it had recently begun collecting sales taxes. Best Buy indicated that its online sales in California, Pennsylvania, and Texas improved 400-600 basis points after Amazon.com began collecting sales taxes in those states. The Case Against Sales Tax Collection Hurting Amazon’s Sales Our analysis of data from the New York suggests that Amazon.com’s collection of sales taxes in that state did not result in New York’s ecommerce sales growing more slowly than those for the entire US. We compared data from the State of New York Office of Tax Policy Analysis against US Census Bureau e-commerce data and found that e-commerce sales in NY grew faster than those in all of the US in comparable time periods (see the following figure). E-COMMERCE SALES GROWTH NY VS. US, 2008-2012 ($MM) Start Date 3/1/08 3/1/09 3/1/10 3/1/11 - End Date 2/28/09 2/28/10 2/28/11 2/29/12 NY Tax Revenue 57 82 100 120 NY E-Commerce Sales 671 965 1,176 1,412 Annual Growth NA NA 22.0% 20.0% US E-Commerce Sales 105,590 150,014 175,387 201,409 Annual Growth NA NA 16.9% 14.8% Source: State of New York Office of Tax Policy Analysis, US Census Bureau, and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 24 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Implications: We Estimate That 21% of Amazon.com’s US Retail Sales and 10% of Its Total Revenues Are at Risk Regarding demand elasticity and online sales tax, we assume that if the sales tax disparity were resolved, only sales of big-ticket items (products that sell for more than $300) would be materially affected and that Amazon could lose sales to consumers who opt for the instant gratification of purchasing an item at a brick-and-mortar retailer. We performed two types of analysis to estimate the portion of sales Amazon.com derives from big-ticket items. First, we examined the categories it sells in the US and looked at other retailers that offer that type of merchandise, and we estimated the percentage of sales they derive from big-ticket items. That analysis suggests that Amazon.com derives 21% of its US retail sales from big-ticket items. On a company-wide basis that would suggest that 10% of its revenues come from big-ticket items (considering that it derives significant revenue outside the US and from its other efforts, including Amazon Web Services). AMAZON.COM—CATEGORIES AND BIG-TICKET SALES MIX, 2012 Comparison Company Category Physical Media Electronics Toys Baby Tools & Hardware Home & Garden Apparel Sports & Outdoors Jewelry & Watches Health & Personal Care Beauty Shoes & Accessories Dry Foods Auto Parts & Accessories Kindle Device & Store Office Supplies Year Company 1995 Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1999 Best Buy Co. Inc. 1999 Toys 'R Us 1999 Toys 'R Us 1999 The Home Depot, Inc. 2000 Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. 2002 Gap Inc. 2003 Dick's Sporting Goods Inc. 2003 Tiffany & Co. 2003 Walgreen Co. 2004 Estee Lauder Companies, Inc. 2005 Nike Inc. 2006 The Kroger Co. 2006 AutoZone Inc. 2007 Apple 2008 Staples, Inc. Average Ticker 2012 Sales ($MM) BKS 7,129 BBY 50,705 NA 13,543 NA 13,543 HD 74,754 BBBY 10,915 GPS 15,651 DKS 5,836 TIF 3,794 WAG 71,633 EL 9,714 NKE 24,128 KR 96,751 AZO 8,604 AAPL 156,508 SPLS 24,381 36,724 Big Ticket Sales Mix 0% 70% 10% 10% 10% 10% 0% 10% 70% 0% 5% 0% 0% 25% 90% 25% 21% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. For our second analysis, we examined the company’s best-selling items on a by-category basis, which suggested that the impact from collecting sales taxes may be even greater (more or less), depending on how you interpret the data. We considered six of the 105 top-selling products to be big-ticket items (those with price tags greater than or equal to $300). On an equal-weighted basis only 6% of the items are big ticket. However, when we considered product prices and held the number of units constant, then 40% of sales are from big-ticket items. On a company-wide basis that would suggest that 3%-20% of Amazon.com’s revenues come from big-ticket items. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 25 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT TOP ITEM SALES AT AMAZON AND AVERAGE SELLING PRICES, JUNE 2013 Category Appliances Appstore for Android (Paid only) Arts, Crafts & Sewing Automotive Baby Beauty Books Camera & Photo Cell Phones & Accessories Clothing Computers & Accessories Electronics Gift Cards Store Grocery & Gourmet Food Health & Personal Care Home & Kitchen Home Improvement Industrial & Scientific Jewelry Kindle Store #1 Item GE MWF Refrigerator Water Filter, 1-Pack Dentist Office Kids 15pcs Nail Art Painting Pen Brush Viking 912600 8-Way Heavy Duty Spray… Vulli Sophie the Giraffe Teether Dotting 5 X 2 Way Marbleizing Dotting… Inferno, by Dan Brown GoPro HERO3: Black Edition iPhone 4 / 4S Anti-Glare, Anti-Scratc… Ray-Ban RB2132 New Wayfarer Sunglasses Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 (7Inch, Wi-Fi) Kindle Fire HD 7", Dolby Audio, Dual-… Amazon Gift Card - E-mail Donut Shop K-Cup packs for Keurig Bre… Playtex Diaper Genie Refill (810 coun… Cuisinart CGS-5014 14Piece Deluxe St… GE MWF Refrigerator Water Filter, 1-Pack Emergency Mylar Thermal Blankets (Pac… Vintage, Retro Colorful Crystal Owl P… Price 33.99 0.99 2.43 5.64 19.99 1.76 16.19 399.99 0.85 127.68 169.00 199.00 50.00 29.99 16.99 37.49 33.99 6.60 0.97 26.49 MP3 Downloads (Paid only) Up the Down Staircase Paderno World Cuisine A4982799 Tri-Bl… 101 - The Essential Blues Album, Various Magazines National Geographic 15.99 Movies & TV Favors 13 [Deluxe Edition], by Black Sabbath 1.99 Kitchen & Dining Music Musical Instruments Office Products Patio, Lawn & Garden Pet Supplies Shoes Software Sports & Outdoors Toys & Games Video Games Watches 8.08 2.99 14.99 Snark SN-1 Tuner 8.34 GP Spectrum Multi-Use Paper, 8.5 x 11… 13.99 Cuisinart CGS-5014 14Piece Deluxe St… 37.49 Merial Frontline Plus Flea and Tick C… 57.15 Reef Men's Fanning Sandal 59.25 Norton 360 2013 - 1 User / 3 PC [Down… 22.99 Insanity 60 Day 13 Dvd Workout 144.80 Cards Against Humanity PlayStation 4 Standard Edition Geneva Rose Gold Plated Classic Round… Average Median 25.00 399.96 7.50 57.16 19.99 #2 Item Little Giant Classic 10103LGW 300-Pou... 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As was borne out in our conversations with multiple industry sources, one advantage of working more closely with members of Congress is the ability to influence how legislation is written. For example, one sticking point is the revenue threshold for online sales tax collection. This year’s legislation includes a $1MM threshold – that is, companies with more than $1MM in online sales will be required to collect sales tax. Last year the House version had a $1MM provision while the Senate version’s was $0.5MM. Amazon.com wants this figure to be as low as possible so that it will not be at a disadvantage to small-scale sellers on eBay. According to our conversations with industry sources, the legislation may be passed, but the threshold may be $5MM or higher. The Performance Marketing Association suggested that 95% of eBay’s sellers had less than $1MM in online revenues, which could result in significant competition even if the threshold were not increased. This was supported by the results of our pricing survey. The sales tax bill from purchasing the 56 products from Amazon.com was $484.95 vs. only $25.29 on eBay, 1,817.5% higher. Amazon.com collected sales taxes on 32 items, but eBay collected sales taxes on only 2. This enabled eBay to improve its total purchase price against Amazon.com by 530 basis points, converting a 1.8% price advantage (when factoring in the price of the merchandise and shipping) to a 7.1% lead. Amazon.com Ramping Efforts to Offset Potential Revenue Drag Amazon appears to have multiple strategies to offset the impact of collecting sales taxes, including offering sales tax collection as a service to merchants selling on its platform and, more importantly, advancing its physical efforts (those that give it a physical presence in a state, whereby the company would collect sales taxes, per current laws) – adding fulfillment centers for expedited delivery, lockers, AmazonFresh, and (potentially) pickup points. We discuss these efforts throughout the report and believe they could enable the company, over time, to more than offset the sales drag from collecting sales taxes. Given the importance to both Amazon.com and all of retail, we will continue to closely monitor sales-tax-related issues. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 27 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 3: AMAZON.COM VS. WALMART, BY-STATE SALES TAXES COLLECTION COMPARISON, SEPTEMBER 2013 In the following table, we compare sales tax rates in capital cities across the US. As of September 2013, Amazon collects sales taxes in 12 states, five states do not have sales taxes, and Amazon does not collect in the remaining 33 states. Walmart collects sales taxes in 46 states. The average sales tax rate is 7.0% in the 34 states in which Amazon.com does not collect, but Walmart does. Independent of federal legislation, Amazon.com will begin collecting sales taxes in Connecticut (November 2013), Massachusetts (November 2013), Indiana (January 2014), Nevada (January 2014), Tennessee (January 2014), and South Carolina (January 2016). After South Carolina, there would be 28 states where Amazon.com does not collect sales tax but Walmart does; the average tax rate for those states is 6.9%. CURRENT SALES TAX RATES, BY STATE, SEPTEMBER 2013 City County State Alabama Montgomery Montgomery Alaska Juneau Juneau Phoenix Maricopa Arizona Arkansas Little Rock Pulaski Sacramento Sacramento California Denver Denver Colorado Hartford Hartford Connecticut Dover Kent Delaware Tallahassee Leon Florida Atlanta Fulton Georgia Honolulu Honolulu Hawaii Boise Ada Idaho Springfield Sangamon Illinois Indianapolis Marion Indiana Des Moines Polk Iowa Topeka Shawnee Kansas Frankfort Franklin Kentucky Baton Rouge East Baton Rouge Louisiana Augusta Kennebec Maine Annapolis Anne Arundel Maryland Boston Suffolk Massachusetts Lansing Ingham Michigan St. Paul Ramsey Minnesota Jackson Hinds Mississippi Jefferson City Cole Missouri Helena Lewis and Clark Montana Lincoln Lancaster Nebraska Carson City Nevada Carson City Concord Merrimack New Hampshire Trenton Mercer New Jersey Santa Fe Santa Fe New Mexico Albany New York Albany Raleigh Wake North Carolina Bismarck Burleigh North Dakota Columbus Franklin Ohio Oklahoma City Oklahoma Oklahoma Salem Marion Oregon Harrisburg Dauphin Pennsylvania Providence Providence Rhode Island Columbia Richland South Carolina Pierre Hughes South Dakota Nashville Davidson Tennessee Austin Travis Texas Salt Lake Utah Salt Lake City Vermont Montpellier Washington Virginia Richmond Richmond City Olympia Thurston Washington Charleston Kanawha West Virginia Madison Dane Wisconsin Cheyenne Laramie Wyoming Tax 10.0000% 5.0000% 8.3000% 8.5000% 8.5000% 7.6200% 6.3500% 0.0000% 7.5000% 8.0000% 4.7120% 6.0000% 8.0000% 7.0000% 6.0000% 8.9500% 6.0000% 9.0000% 5.0000% 6.0000% 6.2500% 6.0000% 7.6250% 7.0000% 7.7250% 0.0000% 7.0000% 7.4750% 0.0000% 7.0000% 8.1875% 8.0000% 6.7500% 6.0000% 6.7500% 8.3750% 0.0000% 6.0000% 7.0000% 8.0000% 6.0000% 9.2500% 8.2500% 6.8500% 6.0000% 5.0000% 8.8000% 6.0000% 5.5000% 6.0000% Amazon.com 0.0000% 0.0000% 8.3000% 0.0000% 8.5000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 8.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 8.9500% 6.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 7.0000% 0.0000% 8.0000% 0.0000% 6.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 6.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 8.2500% 0.0000% 0.0000% 5.0000% 8.8000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000% 34 States Where Walmart.com Collects Sales Tax and Amazon.com Does Not: Average Tax Rate Median Tax Rate Walmart.com 10.0000% 5.0000% 8.3000% 8.5000% 8.5000% 7.6200% 6.3500% 0.0000% 7.5000% 8.0000% 4.7120% 6.0000% 8.0000% 7.0000% 6.0000% 8.9500% 6.0000% 9.0000% 5.0000% 6.0000% 6.2500% 6.0000% 7.6250% 7.0000% 7.7250% 0.0000% 7.0000% 7.4750% 0.0000% 7.0000% 8.1875% 8.0000% 6.7500% 6.0000% 6.7500% 8.3750% 0.0000% 6.0000% 7.0000% 8.0000% 6.0000% 9.2500% 8.2500% 6.8500% 6.0000% 5.0000% 8.8000% 6.0000% 5.5000% 6.0000% 6.9535% 6.9250% Note: Bolding represents states where Amazon.com does not collects sales tax and states bolded in green text do not collect sales tax: DE, MT, NH, and OR. Alaska does not have a state sales tax, but does have a city sales tax. Source: Source: Zip2tax.com and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 28 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Third-Party Sales via Amazon.com Drive Low Pricing SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: Because offering merchandise from third-party sellers on its platform both increases its selection and enables it to be more price competitive, we believe thirdparty sales are accretive to Amazon.com’s revenues and are one of the cornerstones of the company’s strategy. We estimate that third-party sales will account for 4.0% of total revenues in 2015 vs. 4.1% in 2012 and 4.2% in 2009. Margin Implications: We estimate that the incremental gross margin from a third-party sale vs. a first-party one approximates 7,000 basis points. Therefore, every incremental $1B of revenue from third-party sales on Amazon.com would add 65 basis points to our base CSOI margin forecast for 2015. We estimate that the percentage of paid units sold by third parties through Amazon will reach 41.0% in 2015, compared with 39.7% in 2012 and 29.8% in 2009. As a result, we project that Amazon.com’s commissions from these third-party sales would represent 4.3% of its retail sales in 2015 vs. 4.3% in 2012 and 4.3% in 2009. On a total revenue basis this would account for 4.0% of its total revenues in 2015 compared with 4.1% in 2012 and 4.2% in 2009. This suggests that its third party efforts would account for 12.9% of its gross profit dollars in 2015 compared with 15.1% in 2012 and 16.7% in 2009 and 67.5% of its CSOI in 2015 compared with 103.1% in 2012 and 48.0% in 2009. We note the 2012 and 2015 figures are particularly high because of our estimates that first-party sales generated or will generate a negative CSOI in 2012 and 2015. (In the Appendix, we illustrate our method for estimating revenues and CSOI from third-party sales.) THIRD-PARTY UNITS MIX, 2011-2015E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. THIRD-PARTY SALES, 2011-2015E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 29 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM’S REVENUE MIX, 2009 4.2% SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S REVENUE MIX, 2012 2.2% 0.4% 4.1% 3.8% 0.3% 91.7% 93.2% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l 1P Retail Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AMAZON.COM’S REVENUE MIX, 2015E 6.8% 0.3% 4.0% 88.9% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 30 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM’S GROSS PROFIT MIX, 2009 SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S GROSS PROFIT MIX, 2012 1.9% 1.1% 9.9% 15.5% 16.7% 15.1% 68.3% 71.5% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l 1P Retail Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AMAZON.COM’S GROSS PROFIT MIX, 2015E 0.9% 24.3% 62.0% 12.9% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 31 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM’S CSOI MIX, 2009 SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S CSOI MIX, 2012 60.0% 150.0% 103.1% 48.0% 50.0% 100.0% 40.0% 50.0% 20.0% 8.0% 29.3% 30.0% 0.0% 17.2% -50.0% 10.0% -100.0% 5.5% 0.0% 1P Retail -150.0% 3P Retail 109.7% Other - NA Other - Int'l (120.80%) 1P Retail Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AMAZON.COM’S CSOI MIX, 2015E 150.0% 132.3% 100.0% 67.5% 50.0% 4.9% 0.0% -50.0% -100.0% (104.7%) -150.0% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 32 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 4: PRICE COMPARISON – AMAZON.COM FIRST PARTY VS. THIRD PARTY, AUGUST 2013 Amazon.com offered consumers the lowest prices for its first-party merchandise, but third-party sellers provided merchandise at a lower total cost including shipping and sales taxes in states where they had a tax advantage over Amazon.com’s first-party efforts. In the second pricing survey we conducted, we compared the prices of identical merchandise sold by Amazon.com with those on merchandise sold by thirdparty sellers on its platform. Amazon.com’s price on first-party merchandise was 3.2% below that of third-party sellers. Including shipping costs, Amazon.com’s first-party prices remained the lowest, by 3.3%. Connecticut consumers able to circumvent sales taxes on first-party and almost all third-party merchandise (sales taxes were collected on only 1 of the 32 items) saved 4.9% buying first-party merchandise. However, the story changed for our New York consumer, because many third-party sellers were not required to collect sales taxes while Amazon.com was, and first-party merchandise from Amazon.com was now 2.4% more expensive. Stated differently, not collecting sales taxes on first-party items sold in Connecticut vs. one third-party seller that collected sales taxes gave Amazon.com’s first-party sales a 160-basis-point advantage over third-party sellers. In New York, where Amazon.com collects sales taxes on first-party items and collection on third-party items depends on whether the seller has a physical presence in the state, among other things, third-party sellers held a 570-basis-point advantage over Amazon.com’s first-party efforts. Therefore, Amazon.com’s efforts to offer merchandise from third-party sellers on its platform could enable it to retain revenues even when it must collect sales taxes on first-party merchandise. In addition, this increasing proportion of third-party unit sales could also provide a margin lift to the company. Analyzing results on a by-item basis, of the 32 like-for-like items, Amazon.com’s first-party merchandise prices were cheaper for 12 (38%) than those of third-party sellers, identical for 1 (3%), and pricier for 19 (59%). Including shipping, it was 8 (25%) cheaper, 2 (6%) identical, and 22 (69%) pricier. Including shipping and sales taxes, it was 8 (25%) cheaper, 2 (6%) identical, and 22 (69%) pricier for our Connecticut consumer and 7 cheaper (22%), 0 (0%) identical, and 25 (78%) for our New York consumer. Therefore Amazon.com’s thirdparty sales tax edge over its first-party sellers in New York enabled it to offer consumers 1 more item (3% more) at a lower total cost. INTERNET PRICE COMPARISON FIRST PARTY VS. THIRD PARTY, AUGUST 2013 Items Product C I CT 32 (3.2%) 12 1 NY 32 (3.2%) 12 1 P 19 19 vs. Amazon.com Third Party Shipping P+S C I P (5.3%) (3.3%) 8 2 22 (5.3%) (3.3%) 8 2 22 Tax Total C I P (100.0%) (4.9%) 8 2 22 263.3% 2.4% 7 0 25 Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 33 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM 1P VS. 3P – PRODUCT PRICES SPECIAL REPORT 1P VS. 3P PRODUCT & SHIPPING 80% 90% 69% 70% 78% 80% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 25% 30% 20% 22% 20% 6% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Cheaper 1P VS. 3P TOTAL COST – NY 70% 70% 59% 60% 50% 59% 60% 50% 38% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 38% 10% 10% 3% 3% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. 1P VS. 3P TOTAL PRICE – CT 40% Identical 34 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT LARGE SELECTION SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: Its large selection is one reason many customers shop at Amazon.com and is therefore a significant driver of its past, present, and future long-term sales growth. We project that sales will expand at a 20.5% CAGR in 2012-2015 vs. 35.6% in 2009-2012 and 31.8% in 2006-2009. Margin Implications: With a willingness to wait five to seven years to achieve a profit, most of Amazon.com’s expansion into new categories and countries dilutes its short-term CSOI margin. This is evident when comparing its North American and International CSOI margins, which we estimate at 5.4% and 1.3%, respectively, in 2015 vs. 4.6% and 0.3% in 2012 and 5.5% and 7.4% in 2009. An important offset is the prevalence of third-party unit sales on its platform, because their gross margins are higher than those on its other efforts. In this section, we discuss the company’s efforts to offer consumers a large selection of merchandise, including via third parties selling on its platform and by adding categories. According to an industry source, consumers shop from remote sellers (e-commerce companies and catalog retailers) for a number of reasons, including selection and convenience and sometimes price. Amazon.com is able to increase its wallet share by offering products across multiple categories, and consumers are more likely to start their shopping experience with Amazon.com because they know they are usually able to get most, if not all, of what they are looking for at one site vs. having to purchase products from multiple retailers. The company’s efforts to expand its selection are a big reason for our projection of 24.0% e-commerce market share in the US in 2015 vs. 18.5% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2009. Same for international, where we project that Amazon.com will achieve 4.0% e-commerce market share in 2015 vs. 4.3% in 2012 and 3.9% in 2009. In the following table, we show the categories of merchandise Amazon.com sells, as illustrated by a screen shot from its Amazon.com website from September 2013. As a general rule, the company targets a five- to seven-year time horizon to achieve profitability in a new category or country. Its willingness to invest for such a long time before earning a return gives Amazon.com a large competitive advantage over other businesses that manage their operations focused on much shorter time periods. Wharton Professor David Bell noted that an average of 8%-10% of all retail is e-commerce, but with a wide range of categories, from grocery at the low end and consumer electronics at 20%. He suggested that e-commerce penetration in certain categories could approach 50%60%, so there is a lot of runway for Amazon.com, in our view. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 35 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM SELECTION, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Third-Party Sales Through Amazon.com Drive Selection Offering merchandise from third-parties on its platform increases Amazon.com’s selection, which makes it easier for consumers to shop their entire baskets through the company. For example, for our next case study (detailed below), we compared the selection at Amazon.com with those at a number of other retailers when putting together a shopping list for Super Bowl XLVII. We started by looking for a Samsung OLED TV that was at least 40”. Using third-party sellers nearly doubled Amazon.com’s SKU count, increasing it to 71 from 38. Best Buy began allowing third-party sellers at BestBuy.com in September 2011, and this initiative increased its SKUs by 6 to 67. Anecdotally, Amazon.com’s use of third-party sellers enabled me to purchase the entire list of back-to-school merchandise required by my daughter’s school, whereas I was not able to get all of the items at Office Depot, Staples, Target, and Walmart th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 36 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 5: WHO OFFERED CONSUMERS THE MOST CHOICES ON SUPER BOWL SUNDAY? To illustrate Amazon.com’s large selection, we put together a shopping list for Super Bowl XLVII and compared the number of SKUs available at Amazon.com and at a handful of other retailers. The company came second only to eBay (whose Marketplaces leveraged inventory from 119.7MM active accounts as of June 2013) in offering consumers the most choices for the products on our shopping list. We started by looking for a Samsung OLED TV that was at least 40” because you need to have a big-screen TV to enjoy the Super Bowl. We focused our search on new products and in TVs, for example, we excluded refurbished ones (Amazon.com, Best Buy, and eBay sell refurbished TVs). The Marketplaces at eBay offered the greatest selection, at 641, with Amazon.com second, at 71, and Best Buy third, at 67. Best Buy and Walmart also offer merchandise from third-party sellers on their websites. Best Buy began this strategy in September 2011, and Walmart started in September 2009. Next we looked at HDMI cables, a necessity to exploit the HD capabilities of the Samsung OLED TV. This time, Amazon led the charge with a whopping 29,922 SKUs, ahead of even eBay at 12,809. Included in the list were 13 private-label AmazonBasics SKUs. Later in this report, we discuss the potential for the company to offer more private-label merchandise to drive its long-term margin. We also looked at the number of SKUs for PlayStation3 consoles and video games in case we wanted to play video games instead of watching the hours and hours of pre-game and post-game TV coverage. Because the PlayStation3 doubles as a Blu-Ray player, we also included the number of Blu-Ray titles offered by the retailers. We could have expanded our comparison even further by comparing the number of digital titles offered by the retailers. We included two grocery items – potato chips and beer – to illustrate a point that grocery remains an opportunity for Amazon.com. (We discuss its AmazonFresh effort.) For beer, there were several SKUs from third-party sellers on Amazon.com, but we were unable to purchase Bud Light or Heineken. In addition, we were able to determine which beers Target and Walmart offered in its stores, but we were unable to purchase beer through their websites. For potato chips, there were a lot SKUs, but many were for bulk purchases, such as a 24 pack of Popchips; we could not purchase a single large bag of Tostitos, akin to what you might pick up at a Costco, Target, or Walmart physical store. SUPER BOWL SHOPPING LIST, JANUARY 2013 Samsung TV TV - Samsung LED TV > 40" HDMI cables Wall Mounts Surge Protectors PS3 Console PS3 Video Games Blu-Rays NFL Jerseys Potato Chips Beer Amazon.com Company Third-Party Total Rank 62 357 419 2 38 33 71 2 1,330 28,592 29,922 1 862 28,514 29,376 2 218 1,555 1,773 3 4 40 44 2 467 2,449 2,916 2 NA NA 31,236 2 255 4,646 4,901 2 237 2,046 2,283 1 0 2,557 2,557 1 Average Samsung TV TV - Samsung LED TV > 40" HDMI cables Wall Mounts Surge Protectors PS3 Console PS3 Video Games Blu-Rays NFL Jerseys Potato Chips Beer Best Buy Company Third-Party Total Rank 103 10 113 3 61 6 67 3 98 764 862 3 63 3 66 4 65 9 74 4 6 0 6 6 404 0 404 5 NA NA 8,999 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 1.8 HSN Company Third-Party Total 27 0 27 10 0 10 7 0 7 12 0 12 6 0 6 2 0 2 278 0 278 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Average Rank 5 8 7 8 8 7 6 7 6 5 2 6.3 4.0 QVC Company Third-Party Total 58 0 58 32 0 32 23 0 23 61 0 61 12 0 12 23 0 23 118 0 118 5 0 5 439 0 439 10 0 10 0 0 0 Rank 4 4 5 5 7 3 7 6 3 4 2 4.5 Costco Company Third-Party Total Rank 17 0 17 8 17 0 17 5 4 0 4 8 16 0 16 7 14 0 14 6 1 0 1 8 10 0 10 8 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 6.5 Target Company Third-Party Total Rank 19 0 19 7 12 0 12 6 20 0 20 6 41 0 41 6 31 0 31 5 7 0 7 5 435 0 435 4 6,720 0 6,720 4 31 0 31 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 eBay Buy It Now Auction Only 1,095 34 624 17 12,137 672 30,110 361 8,978 143 464 71 24,441 1,829 104,037 4,476 30,773 1,743 612 5 0 0 Total Rank 1,129 1 641 1 12,809 2 30,471 1 9,121 1 535 1 26,270 1 108,513 1 32,516 1 617 2 0 2 1.3 Company 21 12 30 226 295 8 560 NA 10 136 0 Wal-Mart Third-Party 0 0 4 899 1,598 0 0 NA 341 1 0 5.0 Total 21 12 34 1,125 1,893 8 560 6,421 351 137 0 Rank 6 6 4 3 2 4 3 5 4 3 2 3.8 Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 37 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Category and Country Expansion We expect Amazon.com to keep adding new categories for its US and international websites to increase the large selection of merchandise it offers consumers and increase its wallet share. In the next three years, we believe the company will continue to fill in the grid in the following table and add grocery if its rollout succeeds (it launched its second market, Los Angeles, in June 2013). For example, so far during 2013, Amazon.com has added toys, health & personal care, and beauty in Canada; auto parts & accessories in France, Italy, and Spain; and physical media, Kindle devices, and the Kindle store in India (which also is a new country for the company). Given the small relative size of the company’s AmazonFresh grocery effort, it is not included in one of these categories. Should the company advance its efforts here, it could become a new category. AMAZON.COM’S CATEGORY ADDITIONS, 2Q13 Product Categories Physical Media Electronics Toys Baby Tools & Hardware Home & Garden Apparel Sports & Outdoors Jewelry & Watches Health & Personal Care Beauty Shoes & Accessories Dry Foods Auto Parts & Accessories Kindle Device & Store Office Supplies US 1995 1999 1999 1999 1999 2000 2002 2003 2003 2003 2004 2005 2006 2006 2007 2008 UK 1998 2001 2001 2007 2004 2004 2008 2007 2007 2008 2008 2007 2010 2009 2010 2009 Germany 1998 2001 2004 2007 2004 2004 2008 2006 2007 2007 2008 2007 2010 2008 2011 2009 France 2000 2005 2007 2007 2012 2007 2010 2010 2007 2009 2009 2009 NA 2013 2011 2009 Japan 2000 2003 2004 2007 2009 2003 2007 2005 2007 2006 2008 2007 2008 2009 2012 2009 China 2004 2004 2004 2006 2009 2006 2010 2006 2006 2006 2006 2009 2010 2009 2012 2010 Canada 2002 2008 2013 2012 2011 2009 NA 2010 2010 2013 2013 NA NA NA 2012 NA Italy 2010 2010 2011 2012 NA 2010 NA 2011 2010 NA NA 2011 NA 2013 2011 NA Spain 2011 2011 2011 2012 NA 2011 NA NA 2011 2011 NA 2012 NA 2013 2011 NA India 2013 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2013 NA Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. The timeline of Amazon.com’s international expansion illustrates that after being dormant from 2005 to 2009, the company is, once again, adding new countries at a measured pace. We view international expansion as one of the company’s current investment buckets (along with Amazon Web Services, content for Amazon Instant Video, fulfillment center expansion, and hardware). Future countries could include Brazil and Russia, when considering eBay’s expansion plans. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 38 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION: 1995-2015E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. As illustrated in the following table, Amazon.com has accelerated its rollout of new countries and categories since 2010 vs. 1995-1999 and 2000-2009. We believe the company is becoming more efficient at adding categories, which, coupled with its advanced digital efforts, has speeded the expansion. We expect the company to add eight categories per year through 2015, which would mimic the pace from 2012. For international expansion, we believe the company could mirror eBay’s efforts and enter Brazil and Russia before the end of 2015 though we have not included those countries in our sales and earnings estimates. AMAZON CATEGORY AND COUNTRY ADDITIONS, 1995-2015E Countries Categories 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 3 3 2 5 10 3 10 17 10 14 14 14 8 8 8 8 19952003 0.7 2.2 20042011 0.4 11.5 20122015E 0.3 8.0 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 39 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AmazonFresh (Grocery) SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon.com could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it would add $6.5B in revenue and 708 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: Grocery is among the lower-margin categories in the retail sector, and AmazonFresh’s lack of private-label merchandise suggests that this initiative will dampen company margins. We see two potential offsets: First, the vast majority of SKUs offered by AmazonFresh are not grocery products and, therefore, should have higher gross margins; second, the company could leverage its AmazonFresh infrastructure to sell thirdparty merchandise, as it does with its core retail website Amazon.com. If the company were able to add $1B of grocery revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Kroger (TAG’s 2015 forecast for Kroger is 2.8%), it would subtract 1 basis point from our CSOI margin projection for 2015. AmazonFresh is an important initiative for the company for several reasons: th Adding grocery could meaningfully expand Amazon.com’s total addressable market – with $602.6B in sales in the US in 2012, according to Progressive Grocer magazine. Put differently, it could enable Amazon.com to pick up incremental wallet share. The USDA estimated that 4.1% of disposable income was spent on food at home in 2011. Grocery items, such as milk, are purchased frequently, so offering these items to consumers could increase the frequency of other purchases at Amazon.com or could enable Amazon.com to capture sales it would not have captured without offering grocery. According to the Food Marketing Institute, on average, consumers visit supermarkets 2.2x per week. Consumer demand for online grocery is robust. According to The Hartman Group’s The Online Grocery Shopper 2013 report, 18% of US households went online to purchase food, beverages, or groceries over a three-month period, with 75% of those buying 5% or more of such products online and 20% buying at least 50%. To address this opportunity, Amazon is delivering products to consumers from its own trucks, which leverages its fulfillment center infrastructure and positions the company to compete against UPS and FedEx. Creating pickup points for consumers to get their groceries at locations outside of their homes and offices adds locations to which Amazon could deliver other products to consumers. AmazonFresh could represent the next major capital investment by the company, which could pressure near-term operating margins. According to an industry source, Amazon could expand into 50 markets at $20MM per, for a total investment of $1B. Forrester noted that those figures could be much higher, depending on the extent to which Amazon sells non-grocery items; for example, of the roughly 100K SKUs in Seattle, only about 11K are grocery. This compares with the Food Marketing Institute’s data point that the average supermarket offered 39K SKUs in 2010. In addition, LJM Consultants pointed out that Amazon’s grocery efforts could extend beyond AmazonFresh, as products could be ordered through Amazon and delivered by a local store, as in the 1-800-Flowers model. At present, our model includes Amazon’s efforts only in Seattle and Los Angeles. Should the company meaningfully expand AmazonFresh, there would be upside to our sales estimates and incremental CSOI margin pressure (1 basis point for every $1B of grocery sales). > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 40 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Amazon.com started testing grocery sales in major metropolitan Seattle in 2007. In June it expanded the service to the Los Angeles area. We compare AmazonFresh with a number of other online grocery companies in the following table. Most offer pickup points, and we believe Amazon.com will do so in the future. ONLINE GROCERY SERVICES COMPARISON, SEPTEMBER 2013 Delivery Launched Order Delivery Free Membership Minimum Charges Delivery Program Availability Pick-up Points Varies by location; free shipping on orders over $30 for Prime Fresh members Seattle: BigRaddish loyalty program offers free delivery on orders > $50; LA: Free delivery on orders > $30 for Prime Fresh Members (costs $299/yr after 90-day free trial) Seattle, WA; Los Angeles, CA No AmazonFresh 2007 None Seattle: $9.99 for orders > $50, $7.99 on orders costing $50-99.99. LA: Only available to Prime Fresh members Fresh Direct 2002 $30 Varies by location; $5.99+ No No New York and surrounding areas Yes Instacart Express membership costs $99/yr and provides free shipping for orders over $35 San Francisco, Palo Alto, Mountain View, Berkeley, & Oakland, CA No No Chicagoland, Milwaukee, S.E. Wisconsin, Indianapolis; CT, MS, RI, Southern NH; NY, NJ, MD, VA, Washington D.C.; Philadelphia, S.E. PA Yes Instacart 2012 None $3.99 for orders over $35 Free shipping on orders over $35 for Instacart Express members PeaPod 1989 $60 $6.95 No Relay 2009 None $9 No Safeway 2002 $49 $3.95 on purchases >$150; $6.95 on purchases <$150 No No Phoenix, Tucson, AZ; Greater Sacramento, San Francisco Bay Area, Fresno, Stockton, Bakersfield, Ventura County, San Fernando Valley, Greater San Diego, CA; Baltimore/Washington Metropolitan Area, MD, Las Vegas, NV; Portland, OR; Philadelphia, PA; Seattle, WA Yes, but at higher cost SPUD 2011 None Varies by zip code Varies by zip code; free delivery above threshold No; however, company offers SPUD Rewards Points US: Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles; Canada: Vancouver, Victoria, Calgary Yes Ocado 2002 £40 SmartPass membership program offers free delivery, among other benefits Growing parts of the UK No Tesco 2002 £40 Delivery Saver membership program offers free delivery from £10 a month on orders over £40 UK Yes Charges vary depending on Orders over £75 may delivery address, day and be offered free time of chosen slot and delivery at certain order value times Varies by product type; starting from £3 For books Relay Doorstep program offers Richmond, VA; Annapolis and Baltimore, MD; and all northern unlimited delivery for VA and Southern MD cities that are part of the DC metro area $30/month Yes Source: Company website, company reports, and TAG research. Relay noted that online grocery delivery is challenging, especially from an execution standpoint; it is one that is easy to get wrong and, for example, lose $10 on a variable basis for every $90 of sales, before taking into account fixed costs. Forrester discussed the opportunities and challenges for online grocery. The opportunities include offering premium merchandise and providing a unique delivery service. The target customer is a busy professional who resides in an urban area. Forrester expressed concerns about a company’s ability to address the US online grocery market at enough scale to be profitable. When comparing Relay’s approach with AmazonFresh, Forrester pointed out Relay’s advantages, including less focus on delivering merchandise the last mile to the consumer’s home, which can be expensive, and offering consumers the benefits of trip consolidation (picking up merchandise from Relay in a pre-determined time period, including products from grocery stores, direct from farms, and restaurants). Regarding the potential for Amazon.com to acquire a company in the online grocery category, Forrester pointed out that in the past, the company’s strategy has been to initially attempt to buy a market, but if that effort became too unprofitable, Amazon.com’s next step has been to make an acquisition, as it did with Quidsi (Diapers.com) and Zappos. The difference with grocery is that no company has cracked the code (as Quidsi did with diapers and Zappos did with shoes). Delivering dry goods is not the problem; it is perishable products that are the th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 41 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT most difficult, as they require a different logistical skill set and assets, including refrigerated trucks and fulfillment centers. CASE STUDY 6: PRICE COMPARISON – GROCERY – EDLP WITH CHEAPER DELIVERY, FEBRUARY 2013 We compared the price of online grocery delivery for AmazonFresh and Safeway in suburban Seattle and found that, in general, their prices were comparable; however, Safeway Club prices were lower than AmazonFresh’s, and delivery was cheaper at Amazon.com. Our Amazon grocery basket of 60 items was 0.1% more expensive than Safeway’s regular prices. Thirty-one items (52%) were cheaper at AmazonFresh, 8 (13%) were identically priced, and 21 (35%) were more expensive. Including delivery charges, our total cost was 1.2% cheaper. Our Amazon grocery basket was 7.5% more expensive than Safeway Club’s prices. Eighteen items (30%) were cheaper at AmazonFresh, 7 (12%) were identically priced, and 35 (58%) were more expensive. Including delivery charges, it was 6.0% more expensive. Of the 60 products, there were Safeway Club prices on 26. AMAZONFRESH PRICE COMPARISON, FEBRUARY 2013 Safeway - Safeway Club Prices Safeway - Regular Prices AMZN Competitor's AMZN Competitor's Premium/ AMZN Competitor's Premium/ Basket & Basket & Premium/ Basket (Discount) Shipping Shipping (Discount) Shipping Shipping (Discount) Cheaper Identical Pricier Total Basket 0.00 3.95 (100.0%) 303.19 286.08 6.0% 18 7 35 60 303.19 282.13 7.5% 0.00 3.95 (100.0%) 303.19 306.72 (1.2%) 31 8 21 60 303.19 302.77 0.1% Source: Company websites and TAG research. CASE STUDY 7: PRICE COMPARISON – GROCERY – SURPRISE! WHOLE FOODS WAS CHEAPER, FEBRUARY 2013 We wanted to see how AmazonFresh’s and Whole Foods’ prices compared so we looked at the prices of Amazon’s online grocery delivery in suburban Seattle and Whole Foods’ prices in Richmond, Virginia. Whole Foods is not offering online grocery delivery today, so we used prices from Relay’s offering. Relay is a Mid-Atlantic online natural and organic delivery company that delivers consumers food from local farms, artisans, and national brands. Our grocery basket of 60 items was 11.0% more expensive at Amazon. Fifteen items (25%) were cheaper at AmazonFresh, 2 (3%) were identically priced, and 43 (72%) were more expensive. Including delivery charges, our total cost was 6.0% more expensive. Since Relay allows consumers to pick up merchandise at pickup spots for free, AmazonFresh was, once again, 11.0% more expensive. We believe the higher prices at Amazon reflect its pricing algorithm, not including Whole Foods’ prices because Whole Foods does not deliver groceries. Should Whole Foods enter the market, we expect Amazon to be more price competitive. AMAZONFRESH PRICE COMPARISON, FEBRUARY 2013 Whole Foods - Relay Foods Home Delivery Whole Foods - Relay Foods Pickup Spot Delivery AMZN Competitor's AMZN Competitor's Premium/ AMZN Competitor's Premium/ Basket & Basket & Premium/ Basket (Discount) Shipping Shipping (Discount) Shipping Shipping (Discount) Cheaper Identical Pricier Total Basket 15 2 43 60 283.61 255.61 0.00 12.00 (100.0%) 283.61 267.61 6.0% 11.0% 0.00 0.00 0.0% 283.61 255.61 11.0% 15 2 43 60 283.61 255.61 11.0% Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 42 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Two Markets – Two Different Loyalty Programs: Big Radish and Amazon Prime for Prime Fresh When it comes to grocery, Amazon offers two different loyalty programs for the Seattle and Los Angeles markets, which provide insights on its different strategies for the two markets. Big Radish Big Radish is a free loyalty program for AmazonFresh customers. It rewards customers for purchasing more than $300 of products from AmazonFresh by providing them lower thresholds for free delivery for a 30- to 60-day period. As long as customers continue to meet that $300 threshold they qualify for the Big Radish program. Prime Fresh In our view, to combat higher transportation costs in the Los Angeles market – such as higher fuel expenses, more delivery miles owing to the spread out nature of the area, and longer travel times because of the traffic – Amazon requires a membership in Prime Fresh (at $299 per year) and requires a customer to purchase more than $35 of merchandise per delivery to qualify for its grocery delivery service in this market. We believe Prime Fresh is an example of the premium type of delivery service Amazon could roll out as it extends its Amazon Prime membership to higher price points for greater levels of service, such as next-day delivery instead of two-day. BIG RADISH VS. PRIME FRESH, SEPTEMBER 2013 Market Requirement for Service Eligibility Duration Membership Fee Benefits Big Radish Seattle No Based on purchase levels 30-60 days Free Delivery discounts (outlined in the following table) Prime Fresh Los Angeles Yes Annual membership fee 1 year $299 Amazon Prime benefits plus free delivery for purchases >$35 Source: Company websites and TAG research. AMAZONFRESH SEATTLE DELIVERY CHARGES, SEPTEMBER 2013 AMAZONFRESH LOS ANGELES DELIVERY CHARGES, SEPTEMBER 2013 Order Size Order Size Doorstep Delivery Big Radish Status Big Radish Not Big Radish <$49.99 $9.99 $9.99 $50.00-$99.99 Free $7.99 >$100 Free Free Attended Delivery Big Radish Status Big Radish Not Big Radish <$49.99 $9.99 $9.99 $50.00-$124.99 Free $7.99 >$125 Free Free Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. Doorstep Delivery Prime Fresh Attended Delivery Prime Fresh <$49.99 $9.99 $50.00-$99.99 $7.99 >$100 Free <$49.99 $9.99 $50.00-$124.99 $7.99 >$125 Free Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 43 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 8: OUR EXPERIENCE WITH AMAZONFRESH: IT IS AS MUCH ABOUT FAST AND CONVENIENT DELIVERY OF PRODUCTS FROM AMAZON AS IT IS ABOUT GROCERY On a business trip in June, we ordered from AmazonFresh and had our order delivered to our hotel in Seattle. Conclusions from Our Experience It was truly an eye-opening experience for us and gave us a lot of insight into what the offering could mean to Amazon.com. In short, AmazonFresh is about having products from Amazon delivered to you in an Amazon truck (often with an Amazon employee as the driver) to your doorstep in less than 24 hours. Nothing could be more convenient than having Amazon deliver merchandise (grocery and non-grocery) to your doorstep in a short time frame (with several options in less than 24 hours). Ordering on AmazonFresh was similar to ordering from Amazon.com – a great experience if you know what you are looking for, less so if you aren’t certain. The $9.99 delivery charge is a premium to same-day offerings from eBay (eBay Now at $5.00) and Google (currently offering it for free as part of its beta test) but comparable to those of other online grocery delivery services. As a consumer, we look forward to the service coming to the East Coast so we can use it again and again. The Ordering Process – Via App, Mobile Web, or Laptop Browser We started the ordering process on our cab ride from the airport to our hotel. We had already downloaded the app to our iPhone 5 to learn more about the offering. So we started the process from our app. > Step 1 – Adding an Eligible Address to Our Amazon.com Account To be eligible for the service, we needed a Seattle address, so we added our hotel as a new address to our Amazon account. This was fairly straightforward but had to be done via Amazon.com on the mobile web, as we were unable to determine how or if it could be done on our AmazonFresh or Amazon.com apps. We think Amazon will add that capability to its apps in the future. > Step 2 – Picking a Delivery Type and Time Next, we chose our delivery type and time. We could have it sent by “Attended Delivery” (where we would be present for the delivery) or “Doorstep Delivery” (where we did not have to be present). There were fewer options for “Attended Delivery,” and none were available during our window of opportunity, so we chose “Doorstep Delivery” for the following morning between 4AM and 6AM. (There were extra steps involved for us at this point because we were having it shipped to a hotel address, but we will ignore those because they are not applicable to the average consumer’s experience – except for one detail, which we found funny/interesting (explained below). In addition, during this part of the experience we contacted customer service to learn more about the offering.) > Step 3 – Ordering the Merchandise This was a real eye opener and is where we learned a lot about the potential for AmazonFresh. Of the roughly 100K SKUs offered in Seattle for AmazonFresh, only about 11K are grocery and the rest are general merchandise (led by about 45K books). th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 44 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 8: OUR EXPERIENCE WITH AMAZONFRESH: IT IS AS MUCH ABOUT FAST AND CONVENIENT DELIVERY OF PRODUCTS FROM AMAZON AS IT IS ABOUT GROCERY (CONTINUED). AMAZONFRESH SKUs BY CATEGORY, AUGUST 2013 Apparel & Accessories Appliances Arts, Crafts & Sewing Automotive Baby Beauty Books Electronics Grocery Health & Personal Care Home & Kitchen Industrial & Scientific Movies & TV Music Musical Instruments Office Products & Supplies Pet Products Software Sports & Outdoors Tools & Home Improvement Toys & Games Video Games Total Los Angeles 6,717 NA 18,860 6,991 11,185 17,322 144,232 17,740 28,637 28,647 63,508 10,013 16,625 22,742 4,194 12,897 17,152 NA 57,648 33,227 18,604 NA 536,941 % 1.3% NA 3.5% 1.3% 2.1% 3.2% 26.9% 3.3% 5.3% 5.3% 11.8% 1.9% 3.1% 4.2% 0.8% 2.4% 3.2% NA 10.7% 6.2% 3.5% NA Seattle 1,105 211 1,657 2,831 3,641 1,374 31,342 9,305 11,883 76 11,732 1,413 10,932 7,861 1,547 3,437 2,467 226 5,807 9,476 5,039 833 % 0.9% 0.2% 1.3% 2.3% 2.9% 1.1% 25.2% 7.5% 9.6% 0.1% 9.4% 1.1% 8.8% 6.3% 1.2% 2.8% 2.0% 0.2% 4.7% 7.6% 4.1% 0.7% 124,195 Source: Company websites and TAG research. The selection was broader than we expected, especially for something described as grocery delivery. There were multiple SKUs related to our interests, including Chicago Bears merchandise (though some of it was out of stock) and products tied to the New York Yankees. (Anecdotally, a Seattle resident suggested that the merchandise from out-of-town sports teams was available because the local teams were so bad.) With so many products to choose from, the AmazonFresh buying experience was much like the Amazon.com buying experience. It was good if you knew what you wanted: You could search by category or item description. It was not a curated type of experience where you rely on the merchant to pick the one or two best items in a category or even offer good, better, and best choices, and we did not notice any private-label merchandise. This was similar to our experience shopping Best Buy on the eBay Now app. So a lot could be done here, in our view, to make the experience easier for the consumer. So what did we buy? One grocery item – Tim’s Cascade Style Potato Chips Hawaiian Luau Barbeque, because we love barbeque potato chips and wanted to try a new brand. (They were good and had a surprising bite to them.) One gift for our kids (because you never want to come home empty handed from a business trip): We opted for a Melissa & Doug puzzle because we were unable to find a children’s Blu-ray that we did not already own, through no fault of AmazonFresh because it offered several titles. One book: We decided we had waited long enough for the sequel to Black Swan to come out in paperback (it hasn’t yet) so we decided it was time to start reading it in hardcover on the long flight back to the East Coast. Our total purchase price was $36.76; delivery cost $9.99 (we did not receive a discount for being an Amazon Prime member), and we opted not to tip the delivery person via the app (sorry). > Step 4 – Receiving the Merchandise As promised, AmazonFresh delivered the three items to our hotel between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. the next day. Here is the funny/interesting part we mentioned earlier. Our hotel, not knowing what we ordered, put the bags in the fridge. So when we came down to the lobby to pick them up, we had a cold bag of chips, book, and puzzle. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 45 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AmazonSupply (B2B) SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share in 2015, that would add $5.9B to revenues and 647 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: As a whole, we view selling B2B merchandise as an average margin opportunity. Though the company’s initial efforts are limited to first party, if it could leverage its platform to offer third-party merchandise as well, the long-term margin opportunity would be more favorable. If the company were able to add $1B of B2B revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Home Depot (TAG’s 2015 forecast is 12.8%), it would add 8 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. To better address the $550B B2B market (according to The Electrical Distributor magazine), the company launched AmazonSupply in April 2012, which is still in beta. It offers more than 600K SKUs in 14 categories and leverages the company’s 2005 acquisition of science labs equipment supplier Small Parts. As with other company initiatives, we see this as primarily a sales driver; on the CSOI front, it will depend on the extent to which the company opens its platform for third-party unit sales. Today, it is primarily a first-party effort. AMAZONSUPPLY, AUGUST 2013 Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 46 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Hardware: E-Readers, Tablets, and Smartphones In our view, the company’s efforts in hardware are part and parcel with its efforts to offer consumers a large selection of merchandise. We believe Amazon.com will add a smartphone to its growing list of branded hardware to extend this strategy in the future. In the following table, we illustrate our estimates for Kindle Fire unit sales and what the product means to Amazon.com’s sales and operating profit. The company noted when it announced its second generation of tablets in September 2012 that it commanded 22% of the US tablet market. Barnes & Noble has noted the benefits of selling e-readers along with digital content. It has found that once a consumer establishes a digital locker and builds a library, she is unlikely to abandon the library. Most of that company’s digital content sales have been to dedicated ereading devices, primarily its Nook hardware. Selling Nooks can also be accretive, as Barnes & Noble noted that its members increased their baskets by 25% following a Nook purchase. Wharton Professor David Bell discussed how mobile e-commerce is transformative, as consumers are now able to purchase merchandise in what had previously been down time, such as when on a commuter train. Selling smartphones could also make it easier for consumers to purchase products via showrooming, whereby a consumer can scan an item from an Amazon smartphone and purchase it with one push of a button, and Amazon would not have to worry about circumventing potential tolls to Apple, Google, or anyone else that may get in its way. KINDLE FIRE, 1Q13E-4Q15E Kindle Fire Units (MM) ASPs ($) 1Q13 1.8 232 2Q13 1.3 221 3Q13E 1.2 213 4Q13E 6.0 217 1Q14E 1.8 214 2Q14E 1.8 208 3Q14E 1.4 204 4Q14E 6.0 204 1Q15E 2.2 202 2Q15E 2.2 197 3Q15E 1.6 193 4Q15E 6.0 190 Kindle Fire Sales ($MM) Kindle Fire Sales (% of Total) 417.0 2.6% 287.3 1.8% 258.8 1.5% 1,302.0 4.9% 385.2 2.0% 374.4 2.0% 275.4 1.3% 1,224.0 3.7% 435.6 2.0% 425.5 1.9% 312.7 1.3% 1,140.6 3.0% Kindle Fire Gross Profit ($MM) Kindle Fire Gross Profit Margin 20.9 5.0% 14.4 5.0% 12.9 5.0% 65.1 5.0% 19.3 5.0% 18.7 5.0% 13.8 5.0% 61.2 5.0% 21.8 5.0% 21.3 5.0% 15.6 5.0% 57.0 5.0% Sales Growth Sales Growth (ex-Kindle Fire) Difference NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 23.8% 26.4% (2.6%) 18.4% 19.1% (0.7%) 20.6% 20.5% 0.2% 23.3% 23.6% (0.3%) 24.1% 25.6% (1.6%) 17.4% 17.5% (0.1%) 16.6% 16.7% (0.1%) 16.6% 16.6% (0.0%) 16.8% 17.7% (0.9%) Gross Margin Gross Margin (ex-Kindle Fire) Difference 26.6% 27.1% (0.6%) 28.6% 29.1% (0.4%) 27.3% 27.6% (0.3%) 26.3% 27.4% (1.1%) 27.5% 27.9% (0.5%) 29.4% 29.9% (0.5%) 27.8% 28.2% (0.3%) 26.8% 27.7% (0.9%) 27.8% 28.2% (0.5%) 29.8% 30.3% (0.5%) 28.2% 28.5% (0.3%) 27.2% 27.9% (0.7%) Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Set-Top Boxes and the Battle for the Living Room According to published reports, Amazon is working on a set-top box device. Assuming this is true, we believe this would be part of Amazon’s strategy to win the battle in the consumer’s living room. In other words, several companies are vying to own the first screen a consumer sees when he turns on his TV. They can influence the content he watches, such as by offering subscription streaming video services (like Amazon Instant Video, Hulu, and Netflix), sell TV shows and movies on an à la carte basis, provide consumers another access point to their digital media locker (not just TV shows and movies but also personal photos and videos), and offer additional services, such as a web browser and access to social networking (Facebook, Twitter, etc.). A set-top box, at a minimum, would serve as another distribution point for its streaming video subscription services – Amazon Instant Video and LOVEFiLM. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 47 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Smartphones – The Next Logical Step for Hardware SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it could add $4.4B in revenue and 483 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: The potential is there for the company to make money selling a smartphone, as evidenced by market-profitability leader, Apple. If the company were able to add $1B of hardware revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Apple (TAG’s FY15 forecast is 27.5%), it would add 22 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. However, if Amazon.com were to mirror its hardware strategy with tablets, it would probably be much less accretive to our base margin forecast. Now that the company is offering e-readers, a low-end and high-end tablet to compete against Apple and others in that hardware category, and may roll out a set-top box, we believe smartphones are the next logical device for Amazon.com. An Amazon smartphone could make it even easier for consumers to order merchandise from Amazon.com. Rather than having to download apps, consumers could use their device’s pre-programmed functionality to scan barcodes for products in competitors’ stores and purchase them on Amazon. Similar to buying items on other Amazon hardware, buying could be just one click away, reducing the friction when purchasing from Amazon on Apple devices. (For example, consumers are unable to purchase movies and TV shows on Apple’s Amazon Instant Video iPad app. Instead, they must buy them elsewhere and add them to their watch list to view them on the app.) In addition, having consumers own your device greatly increases the likelihood that they will purchase digital media from your store, which alone could make it worth Amazon’s time and investment to create its own smartphone. With low prices at its foundation, Amazon is a natural to offer a low-priced phone to penetrate emerging markets, whereas Apple has to walk a tightrope to protect its premium brand, as was evident by the “high” price of its low-end smartphone, the iPhone 5c at $549, without a subsidy from a wireless carrier vs. $649 for its high-end one, the iPhone 5s. Forrester suggested that offering its own smartphone would make sense for Amazon as it would be another way for Amazon.com to own its ecosystem. One challenge for Amazon and others is that participants in mobile are both partners and competitors. For example, if Amazon offered its own smartphone, it would compete with Apple in hardware but would be its partner on its iOS mobile operating system as a leading e-commerce app provider. KINDLE SMARTPHONE, 4Q13-4Q15E Kindle Smartphone Units (MM) ASPs ($) 4Q13E 1.2 299 1Q14E 1.3 299 2Q14E 1.1 299 3Q14E 1.1 299 4Q14E 1.6 289 1Q15E 1.7 289 2Q15E 1.4 289 3Q15E 1.4 289 4Q15E 2.1 287 Kindle Smartphone Sales ($MM) Kindle Smartphone Sales (% of Total) 346.8 1.3% 392.4 2.1% 321.4 1.7% 321.4 1.5% 461.0 1.4% 500.7 2.2% 410.1 1.9% 410.1 1.7% 589.5 1.5% Kindle Smartphone Gross Profit ($MM) Kindle Smartphone Gross Profit Margin 17.3 5.0% 19.6 5.0% 16.1 5.0% 16.1 5.0% 23.0 5.0% 25.0 5.0% 20.5 5.0% 20.5 5.0% 29.5 5.0% Sales Growth Sales Growth (ex-Kindle Smartphone) Difference NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 24.1% 23.9% 0.1% 17.4% 17.2% 0.2% 16.6% 16.4% 0.2% 16.6% 16.4% 0.2% 16.8% 16.6% 0.2% Gross Margin Gross Margin (ex-Kindle Smartphone) Difference 26.3% 26.5% (0.3%) 27.5% 27.9% (0.5%) 29.4% 29.9% (0.4%) 27.8% 28.2% (0.4%) 26.8% 27.1% (0.3%) 27.8% 28.3% (0.5%) 29.8% 30.3% (0.5%) 28.2% 28.6% (0.4%) 27.2% 27.5% (0.3%) Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 48 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT MyHabit (Apparel) SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it could add $3.6B in revenue and 398 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: Apparel is among the higher-margin categories in the retail sector. It is also a natural category for third-party sales, which should benefit margins. If the company were able to add $1B of apparel revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Gap (TAG’s 2015 forecast is 14.1%) it would add 10 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. We believe Amazon is making great strides in its efforts to sell apparel, which could have a favorable impact on its margin because of its potential for higher margins than other categories, especially consumer electronics. The company launched its flash sales website MyHabit in May 2011. On its 2Q13 earnings call, Amazon mentioned that apparel and consumables were two of its fastest-growing retail sales categories in North America. Overstock discussed its own strategy for apparel sales and how e-commerce companies, including Amazon, are doing a better job selling apparel. Overstock is moving its model toward carrying less of its own inventory and having more fulfillment performed by its suppliers, similar to what it has done in jewelry. The challenge for all e-commerce companies in selling apparel online is that consumers are unable to try on merchandise before purchasing it to feel the material and see if it fits properly. Overstock noted that e-commerce companies have added better pictures, such as Amazon.com’s use of what looks like live models displaying their products. Despite the improvements, Overstock said that return rates will always be high in apparel. We recognize this from our coverage of HSN and QVC (part of Liberty Interactive Corp.), which have blended return rates in the high teens, often approaching 20%. This reflects high return rates (perhaps 30% or more) for apparel offset by lower return rates for other categories, such as consumer electronics. We have also read that Zappos’ return rates for shoes were 30%. Overstock agreed with our assessment that virtual dressing rooms (such as Swivel by FaceCake) should be able to result in, at least, slightly lower return rates for apparel in the future. MYHABIT LIVE MODELS Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. FACECAKE SWIVEL Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 49 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Amazon Local SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015 that would represent $3.4B and add 372 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: As evidenced by our 2015 forecast for Groupon – 10.0% – we believe it is possible to generate a double-digit operating margin from daily deals. If the company were able to add $1B of local revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Groupon (the TAG forecast for 2015 is 10.0%) it would add 6 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Amazon offers consumers additional SKUs through its Amazon Local initiative and investment in LivingSocial. It also builds a connection between the company and local merchants, one that could build over time. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 50 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON LOCAL, SEPTEMBER 2013 City Birmingham State Alabama City St. Paul State Minnesota East Valley Phoenix Scottsdale Tucson West Valley Arizona Arizona Arizona Arizona Arizona Kansas City St. Louis Missouri Missouri Omaha Nebraska Las Vegas Nevada Inland Empire Long Beach Los Angeles Napa / Sonoma North Orange County Oakland / Easty Bay Roseville / Folsom Sacramento San Diego San Fernando Valley San Francisco San Gabriel Valley San Jose SF Peninsula South Orange Count Ventura County Walnut Creek Contra Costa West Side / South County California California California California California California California California California California California California California California California California California California California Bergen County Central Jersey Hoboken / Jersey City North Jersey South Jersey New Jersey New Jersey New Jersey New Jersey New Jersey Albequerque New Mexico Brooklyn Buffalo Nassau County NYC Rochester Staten Island Westchester County New York New York New York New York New York New York New York Charlotte Raleigh North Carolina North Carolina Boulder County Colorado Springs Denver Colorado Colorado Colorado Cincinatti Cleveland Columbus Ohio Ohio Ohio Washington District of Columbia Portland Oregon Philadelphia Pittsburgh Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Nashville Tennessee Coral Gables / South Miami Florida Fort Lauderdale Florida Jacksonville Beaches Florida Miami Florida North Miami Dade / South BrowFlorida Orlando Florida Palm Beaches Florida Tampa Florida Atlanta Georgia Boise Idaho Chicago Illinois Indianapolis Indiana Louisville Kentucky New Orleans Louisiana Montgomery County Maryland Boston Massachussetts Detroit Michigan Wayne County / Oakland CountMichigan Minneapolis Minnesota Austin Texas Dallas - Fort Worth Texas Houston Texas San Antonia Texas Sugar Land / South Houston Texas The Woodlands / North HoustonTexas Salt Lake City Utah County Utah Utah Arlington / Alexandria Northern Virginia Richmond Virginia Virginia Virginia Bellevue / East Side Olympia Seattle Snohomish County South King County Tacoma Washington Washington Washington Washington Washington Washington Milwaukee Wisconsin Source: Company website and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 51 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Amazon Game Studios (Social Gaming) SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it could add $2.2B in revenues and 243 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: The social gaming market should offer an attractive long-term margin opportunity if the company can moderate development expenses and open its platform to games from third-party developers, or if it could generate revenue from app sales, online ads, and in-app purchases of virtual goods. Zynga has struggled to exploit the opportunity, and we project its 2015 margin at 5.7%. If Amazon.com were able to add $1B of B2B revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to Zynga’s, it could add 2 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. To better address the social games market, Amazon.com launched Living Classics in August 2012 on Facebook and Air Patriots in November 2012 as mobile Android and iOS apps. We believe this initiative is comparable to its Amazon Studios effort and to Amazon Publishing as they all offer the company the potential to be more vertically integrated – offering hardware (Kindle Fire) and software (social game) or hardware (Kindle e-reader) and software (e-book published by Amazon.com). Of those three efforts, however, Amazon Game Studios seems to be the least advanced. LIVING CLASSICS, AUGUST 2012 Source: Company website and TAG research. AIR PATRIOTS, NOVEMBER 2012 Source: Company website and TAG research. Advertising SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it could add $1.5B in revenue and 160 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: Advertising is among the higher-margin categories in the Internet sector. If the company were able to add $1B of apparel revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Google (TAG’s 2015 forecast is 39.0%), it would add 33 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. Amazon.com has been generating revenue from online advertisements since at least 2005 (according to its 10K SEC filings). Its 2012 advertising revenue was estimated at $600MM by eMarketer, suggesting that it accounted for 23.8% of its other revenue (both North American and international). The company has been including ads on start-up screens for its e-readers and tablets as a way of offering consumers the devices at lower prices. For example, it offers the Kindle Fire HD tablet for $15 less to consumers willing to view the startup aps. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 52 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT When it comes to its advertising efforts, Forrester noted that Amazon.com has a lot of valuable information to leverage, including minutiae on purchased product and post-purchase details. The challenge for the company is that if it is successful, its advertisers’ efforts on Amazon.com could result in consumers leaving its website to make e-commerce purchases elsewhere. KINDLE FIRE HD WITH SPECIAL OFFERS Source: Company website and TAG research. ADVERTISING ON AMAZON.COM Source: Company website and TAG research. Amazon Publishing SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it could add $174MM in revenue and 19 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: Publishing can be a double-digit operating margin business. If the company were able to add $1B of apparel revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Bertelsmann (we estimate a 2015 margin of 11.5%), it would add 7 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. As part of its efforts to become more vertically integrated in books, Amazon launched Amazon Publishing in May 2009. Imprints include AmazonCrossing, AmazonEncore, 47 North, Montlake Romance, Powered by Amazon, and Thomas & Mercer. In June 2013, it achieved its first 1MM selling title, when Oliver Potzsch’s Hangman’s Daughter series (three titles – The Hangman’s Daughter, The Dark Monk: A Hangman’s Daughter Tale, and The Beggar King: A Hangman’s Daughter Tale) topped 1MM in combined print, e-book, and audio book sales. In July the fourth book of the series, The Poisoned Pilgrim: A Hangman’s Daughter Tale, was published. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 53 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT The company is also using Amazon Publishing to offer exclusive e-book titles. Barnes & Noble is not selling Amazon Publishing titles in its brick-and-mortar locations when it is unable to sell the e-book, as was the case with the cooking title Four Hour Chef by Timothy Ferriss. The company is not limiting that practice to Amazon Publishing but is applying it to any publisher that will not allow it to sell the physical and digital versions of the book, with another example being DC Comics. Selling Merchandise Outside of Amazon.com: Quidsi and Zappos SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: We consider Amazon.com’s retail efforts through its growing Quidsi family of branded websites and Zappos as a way for the company to penetrate categories more deeply, such as baby (via Diapers.com) and shoes (Zappos). These efforts are already baked into our numbers, but we estimate that sales for both the Quidsi family of brands and Zappos are accretive to Amazon.com’s first-party sales on its platforms because of expansion in nameplates for Quidsi and categories for Zappos. Margin Implications: Because Amazon.com primarily sells first-party merchandise through its Quidsi family of branded websites and Zappos and, in some cases, offers the same inventory it sells on Amazon.com, we consider these low-margin retail sales. The primary margin opportunity is to get the scale benefits from additional sales, leverage its infrastructure, and, in some instances, offer the same inventory through multiple websites to improve sales. When considering the shipping policies at Quidsi (free two-day delivery with a $35 hurdle rate) vs. Zappos (free shipping and free returns), we estimate that Quidsi has superior margins. When considering the types of products offered – primarily consumables at Quidsi and apparel at Zappos, we give the nod to Zappos. So, we would not be surprised if they both had similar low margins. In addition to offering more categories through Amazon.com, the company is adding categories through two of its most significant e-commerce acquisitions – Quidsi (in April 2011 for $500MM) and Zappos (in November 2009 for $1.1B). Quidsi – AfterSchool.com, BEAUTYBAR.com, Bookworm.com, CASA.com, Diapers.com, Look.com, SOAP.com, VINE.com, wag.com, yoyo.com If Amazon.com is the superstore, its Quidsi brands are its specialty retailers, offering the company another way of expanding its sales in specific categories and of leveraging its warehouse infrastructure. Amazon.com acquired Quidsi and the company is using the platform to run multiple category-specific websites – AfterSchool.com (activities), Bookworm.com (books), Diapers.com (baby), BEAUTYBAR.com (beauty), CASA.com (home goods), LOOK.com (clothing), SOAP.com (essentials), VINE.com (natural), wag.com (pets), and yoyo.com (toys). Anecdotally, as a parent, Diapers.com is an extraordinary e-commerce company, enabling you to order products on Sunday evening on the East Coast and receive them Monday, without charging for shipping, and shipping products to you on the West Coast in a similar manner, in case you did not pack enough diapers for a West Coast trip. As much as we wanted to try the Amazon Mom Amazon Prime service, it was difficult (nearly impossible) to want to change from Diapers.com. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 54 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT QUIDSI BRANDS, AUGUST 2013 Source: Company website and TAG research. CASE STUDY 9: PRICE COMPARISON – AMAZON VS. QUIDSI, SEPTEMBER 2013 We compared the prices of Amazon.com with those of Quidsi’s family of e-commerce websites and found Amazon.com’s to be cheaper, while Quidi’s e-commerce sites offered faster shipping to compete with Amazon.com (spend $35 or more on select merchandise for free two-day shipping) and in some instances offered free next-day shipping. By comparison, consumers had to purchase $25 or more of merchandise (for free shipping, but not guaranteed free two-day shipping) or sign up for Amazon Prime (and pay $79 per year) to get free delivery from Amazon.com, including two-day shipping. In addition, Quidsi’s websites capped shipping at $4.99 per vs. as much as $12.49 for a product from a third-party seller or $6.49 on those from Amazon.com. Amazon.com’s price on merchandise was 16.1% lower than those of Quidsi’s websites. Quidsi’s shipping policy enabled it to recapture 90 basis points of pricing, as Amazon.com’s price advantage declined to 15.2%. Quidsi collects sales taxes in the same states as Amazon, so any differences in collection were due to third-party sellers on Amazon.com. Connecticut consumers are able to circumvent sales taxes at both Amazon.com and Zappos. In New York, Amazon.com’s use of third-party sellers resulted in a 42.7% decline in sales tax. Analyzing the results on a by-item basis, of the 17 like-for-like items, Amazon.com’s merchandise prices were cheaper than Quidsi’s for 14 (82%), identical for 1 (6%), and pricier for 2 (12%). That prices were identical for only 1 product suggests to us that Amazon.com has room for improvement in leveraging the same inventory for Quidsi vs. Zappos, where 42% of the merchandise we selected had the same prices. Including shipping, it was 14 (82%) cheaper, 0 (0%) identical, and 3 (18%) pricier. Including shipping and sales taxes, it was 14 (82%) cheaper, 0 (0%) identical, and 3 (18%) pricier for both our Connecticut and New York consumers, an indication that we did not select items from Amazon.com’s third-party sellers, which usually do not collect sales taxes. AMAZON VS. QUIDSI PRICE COMPARISON, SEPTEMBER 2013 Items Product C I CT 17 (16.1%) 14 1 NY 17 (16.1%) 14 1 P 2 2 vs. Quidsi Shipping P+S C I 22.6% (15.2%) 14 0 22.6% (15.2%) 14 0 P 3 3 Tax NA (42.7%) Total C I (15.2%) 14 0 (17.4%) 14 0 P 3 3 Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 55 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON V. QUIDSI - PRODUCT 90% SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON V. QUIDSI – PRODUCT AND SHIPPING 90% 82% 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 30% 82% 40% 30% 20% 6% 10% 18% 20% 12% 10% 0% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Cheaper Source: Company websites and TAG research. Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG research. AMAZON V. QUIDSI – TOTAL COST CT 90% Identical AMAZON V. QUIDSI TOTAL COST NY 90% 82% 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 30% 82% 40% 30% 18% 20% 18% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG research. Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG research. Zappos Zappos is broadening its merchandise from shoes to apparel to home to beauty. We are familiar with Zappos, having toured its headquarters on multiple occasions and having read Tony Hsieh’s book, Delivering Happiness. It also includes the liquidation e-commerce website, 6pm.com. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 56 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT ZAPPOS CATEGORY EXPANSION, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company website and TAG research. CASE STUDY 10: PRICE COMPARISON – AMAZON VS. ZAPPOS, SEPTEMBER 2013 We compared the prices of Amazon.com with those of Zappos and found Amazon.com’s to be cheaper, while Zappos offered consumers the benefit of free shipping (and free returns) on all purchases, whereas consumers had to purchase at least $25 of merchandise or sign up for Amazon Prime to get free delivery from Amazon.com. Amazon.com’s price on merchandise was 6.9% lower than that of Zappos. Zappos’ free shipping policy enabled it to recapture 90 basis points of pricing, as Amazon.com’s price advantage declined to 6.0%. Zappos collects sales taxes in the same states as Amazon, so any differences in collection were due to third-party sellers on Amazon.com. Connecticut consumers able to circumvent sales taxes at both Amazon.com and Zappos. In New York, Amazon.com’s use of third-party sellers resulted in a 14.3% decline in sales tax. Analyzing the results on a by-item basis, of the 12 like-for-like items, Amazon.com’s merchandise prices were cheaper than Zappos’ for 6 (50%), identical for 5 (42%), and pricier for 1 (8%). That prices were identical for 5 products suggests to us that we picked items where Amazon.com is offering the same merchandise at the same prices on both platforms. Including shipping, it was 5 (42%) cheaper, 5 (42%) identical, and 2 (8%) pricier. Including shipping and sales taxes, it was 5 (42%) cheaper, 5 (42%) identical, and 2 (8%) pricier for our Connecticut consumer and 6 cheaper (50%), 4 (33%) identical, and 2 (17%) for our New York consumer. Therefore Amazon.com’s sales tax advantage over Zappos in New York from offering third-party merchandise enabled it to offer consumers 1 more item (8% more) at a lower total cost. AMAZON VS. ZAPPOS PRICE COMPARISON, SEPTEMBER 2013 Items Product C I CT 12 (6.9%) 6 5 NY 12 (6.9%) 6 5 P 1 1 vs. Zappos Shipping P+S C I NA (6.0%) 5 5 NA (6.0%) 5 5 P 2 2 Tax NA (14.3%) Total C I (6.0%) 5 5 (6.5%) 6 4 P 2 2 Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 57 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON V. ZAPPOS - PRODUCT SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON V. ZAPPOS – PRODUCT AND SHIPPING 60% 45% 50% 42% 42% 40% 50% 35% 42% 40% 30% 25% 30% 20% 20% 10% 8% 10% 5% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Cheaper Pricier Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG research. AMAZON V. ZAPPOS – TOTAL COST CT 42% Identical Source: Company websites and TAG research. 45% 17% 15% AMAZON V. ZAPPOS TOTAL COST NY 60% 42% 50% 40% 50% 35% 40% 30% 33% 25% 20% 17% 15% 30% 20% 17% 10% 10% 5% 0% 0% Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG research. Cheaper Identical Pricier Source: Company websites and TAG research. Other Categories We believe Amazon.com’s long-term strategy for category expansion will not be limited to the grid on page 38. It proved with Amazon Web Services that it can succeed outside of its core retail effort. Depending on the category and how Amazon elects to pursue it (for example, first party or third party, direct sales or commission revenue), the impact on its long-term sales growth and margins could be meaningful. Forrester suggested some long-term category opportunities for Amazon.com, including the automotive industry, banking, and travel. For example, it suggested that insurance could be a th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 58 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT very lucrative opportunity for Amazon.com to leverage its extensive database on its customers’ browsing and buying habits. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 59 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT FAST DELIVERY In this section, we discuss the company’s efforts to deliver merchandise to consumers quickly, including Amazon Prime (its free two-day shipping membership offering) and its budding same-day shipping efforts. We also discuss the company’s fulfillment center rollout. SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: Amazon’s ability to compete in a retail environment with a level playing field for sales tax collection will increasingly depend on its ability to get products to consumers quickly. We remain highly confident in this ability, and this effort is reflected in our current sales expectations. Margin Implications: The company is already losing money on its shipping efforts. The situation could worsen due to higher shipping expenses attributable to expedited delivery offerings, such as same-day shipping. That said, the company could pull several levers to offset that pressure, including adding fulfillment centers to shorten ship miles, offer consumers more shipping choices (including ones that are less detrimental to margins, such as a free MP3 for consumers who are willing to wait to get their products vs. same-day, next-day, or two-day shipping options), and converting Amazon Prime to more of a membership model (like warehouse clubs). Although we believe offering consumers faster delivery is core to Amazon.com’s basic strategy (low prices, large selection, and fast delivery), in our view, of equal importance is the company’s creation of a spectrum of delivery options for consumers, which provides it a much greater ability to manage margins from fast delivery (AmazonFresh’s Prime Fresh) to add-on sales (requiring consumers, including Amazon Prime members, to spend $25 to purchase items that may pressure margins to ship individually – such as a box of crayons) to slow delivery (free MP3s to consumers who are willing to wait longer to receive their merchandise) to a much broader set of membership options beyond Amazon Prime ($2.99 for curated kids’ content on Kindle Devices with an Amazon Prime membership, $4.99 without). Managing shipping costs will become only more important because of the convergence of two important trends in e-commerce: Shipping costs continue to increase and consumers want products delivered to them faster. LaserShip noted that its pricing on certain services, such as ground, was similar to last year’s rates for FedEx and UPS, which was another reason e-commerce companies such as Amazon.com use regional providers in addition to the national ones. Another reason is that LaserShip is more flexible on accessorial charges (such as shipping to a residential address instead of a commercial one). OnTrac pointed out that it offers next-day delivery at ground rates for much of the West Coast (it provides next day services from its Reno distribution center on the West Coast from the Mexican border to the Canadian border). FedEx does not offer a similar service, which enables OnTrac to secure important customers such as Newegg.com and drugstore.com. LJM Consultants outlined the ways that FedEx and UPS were raising prices by more than the 4.9% they noted. For example, the companies may refer to the 4.9% figure as the average price increase for deliveries from 1 lb. to zones 2 through 8; however, the actual increase on packages weighing 1-10 lbs. is closer to 7.5%, and those on packages 70-150 lbs. are less than 2.5%. Most e-commerce shippers are sending packages that weigh less than 20 lbs. Accessorial fees, such as an address correction (an increase to $12 from $11 in the charge for a wrong zip code) or shipping to a residential address instead of a commercial one, are th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 60 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT going up to $3.00 from $2.50. Including price hikes on lighter-weight packages and accessorial fees, the real price increase for an e-commerce company could reach 9%-10%. LJM Consultants pointed out that FedEx and UPS are highly unlikely to lower prices and offered the example of how both companies increased prices during the last recession. In the following table, we illustrate our estimates of Amazon.com’s shipping revenue as a percentage of sales and profitability. Based on our conversations with industry sources, we estimate that Amazon.com could save 200-300 basis points on its shipping expenses from its efforts to add fulfillment centers and shorten its ship miles. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 61 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S SPECTRUM OF SHIPPING OPTIONS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company reports and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 62 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SHIPPING AS A PERCENT OF REVENUE, 2011-2015E SPECIAL REPORT SHIPPING REVENUE, 2011-2015E 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 2015E 2014E 2013E 2012 2011 0.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Fulfillment – Getting Closer to the Customer SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: Adding fulfillment centers closer to the consumer improves the company’s ability to get merchandise to the consumer more quickly, as evidenced by Amazon.com’s 2Q13 earnings call comments that its consumable sales were growing quickly. Margin Implications: We estimate Amazon.com could add 200-300 basis points to its gross margin by reducing its ship miles from adding fulfillment centers to move closer to its customers. At the mid-point (250 basis points), an incremental $1B of revenues would add 2 basis points to our base CSOI margin forecast. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Amazon.com’s fulfillment center expansion is the cornerstone of its efforts to expedite delivery. We project that the company will expand its number of fulfillment centers by 21 to 110 in 2015 from 89 in 2012, compared with 50 added in the prior three-year period. LaserShip pointed out that Amazon.com is a leader in offering fast shipping at an economical price and the company could move further ahead of the competition by converting its Amazon Prime offer to next-day shipping from two-day, thanks, in part to its fulfillment expansion efforts. AMAZON.COM FULFILLMENT CENTERS, 2006-2015E Amazon.com Wal-Mart 2006 31 269 2009 39 278 2012 89 318 2015E 110 355 CAGR 20062009 8.0% 1.1% CAGR 20092012 31.7% 4.6% CAGR 20122015E 7.3% 3.7% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 63 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Wharton Professor David Bell noted that, in general, consumers respond to faster shipping times, with sales higher in locations that can receive merchandise in one day instead of two and two days instead of three. LJM Consultants indicated that shipping expense leverage could be significant from adding fulfillment centers. For example, if adding fulfillment centers enables an e-commerce company to change its shipping method to ground service instead of air from UPS or FedEx or allows it to use a regional carrier (such as LaserShip or OnTrac – which can offer next-day delivery from its Reno facility to the Canadian and Mexican borders at ground rates), instead of UPS or FedEx, it could result in significant cost savings. (OnTrac’s customers include Newegg.com, drugstore.com, and Urban Outfitters. Residential deliveries account for 49.5% of its business, with the majority of those from e-commerce companies.) LJM Consultants also pointed out that adding fulfillment centers helps Amazon.com get a leg up on its competition. For example, most retailers have only one or two fulfillment centers. So, for a company with only a fulfillment center on the West Coast it would be more expensive and more difficult to offer same-day shipping to the East Coast vs. Amazon, which could put a fulfillment center in Hartford, Connecticut, and offer consumers next-day or same-day shipping – a tremendous competitive advantage. Overstock discussed its strategy for adding fulfillment centers. The company noted the tradeoff between lower shipping costs from reducing freight miles and the expenses of running another facility. It is not always obvious that adding fulfillment centers will improve overall economics, and in some instances it is more expensive to operate two fulfillment centers instead of one. The incentive for an e-commerce company is to get product to the consumer faster and get returns from the consumer more quickly, which are both viewed favorably by the consumer. According to OnTrac, there are 11 megaregions (areas of concentrated population) in the US and that a company could provide next-day shipping to most of the US if it had fulfillment centers located in those megaregions. In the following figure, we illustrate the megaregions and locations of Amazon’s fulfillment centers. Based on this analysis, Amazon has eight megaregions well covered and is under-penetrated in the three megaregions. This will become increasingly important as companies, including Amazon.com, advance their efforts to ship merchandise to consumers more quickly. OnTrac noted that today two-thirds of the US population can be reached by two-day shipping from Kentucky and if an e-commerce company adds a second fulfillment center in Salt Lake City, Utah or Reno, Nevada it could add a large portion of the US for two-day shipping. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 64 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT THE EMERGING 11 MEGAREGIONS Source: OnTrac and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 65 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Kiva Systems and Faster Picking According to Rakuten, speedy picking of merchandise off the shelves of its fulfillment centers is vital for an e-commerce company to get merchandise to the consumer quickly. To that end, in May 2012, Amazon.com acquired Kiva Systems for $678MM. Relay noted the speed advantage of picking in a warehouse vs. at a retail store: It takes four times as long to pick items in a store as it does in a warehouse. E-commerce company Overstock discussed the importance of fast delivery based on its infrastructure. It is always working to improve the time it takes to get merchandise to the consumer. Overstock leverages its own warehouse for its core products and those of its 1,200-1,500 supplier partners that have their own warehouses across the US. When a consumer orders a product from Overstock it could be receiving it from across the country or practically next door. Overstock works hard at ensuring that it and its suppliers get orders out the door in less than 24 hours. It believes this effort benefits its sales. Using Physical Locations to Get Products to the Consumer Faster We believe that in the future, Amazon will use more physical locations to deliver merchandise to consumers more quickly, including its lockers initiative (currently active) and pickup points (something it has tested in the past and an initiative used by other retailers, especially in the grocery category). In addition, we think the company could open stores to showcase its expanded hardware lineup. The future of Amazon.com includes physical locations – at a minimum, places where consumers can pick up merchandise beyond their home and office; at the maximum, at Amazon.com’s own retail stores. Lockers According to LJM Consultants, FedEx and UPS essentially operate a duopoly in the US and consistently raise prices 4%-5% annually. However, the rate of annual increase is uneven – higher for deliveries to residential addresses and lower for those to commercial ones. Enter Amazon.com’s lockers initiative, which we expect to be a successful driver of e-commerce transactions and provide superior management of shipping expenses for multiple reasons, including the ability to convert multiple residential deliveries (one of the most expensive types of deliveries) to a single commercial delivery (one of the least expensive types). AMAZON.COM LOCKERS Source: GeekWire and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 66 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT For example, by converting a residential delivery to a commercial one, Amazon.com could save $3.00 per package, so if is able to consolidate three deliveries, it could save $9.00. Shipping to commercial addresses rather than residential offers multiple opportunities for cost savings, according to LJM Consultants. For example, Michael Kors could save $3.00 per item by having a product shipped to one of its stores rather than the customer’s house. Additional cost savings are possible by avoiding delivery area surcharges, off-the-beaten path charges, and extended delivery fees. Wharton Professor David Bell noted similar benefits to the lockers initiative – the ability to create customer density; for example, by sending eight things to one location instead of eight separate ones. He cited Relay’s ability to leverage this density by offering pickup points and how consumers prefer picking up products (at their convenience) instead of having them delivered to their homes. Sport Chalet pointed out that Amazon.com’s lockers initiative could also be effective at college campuses, office complexes, and retailers, where there was a natural complement in product offerings. Amazon launched Amazon Lockers in September 2011. In the following table, we estimate the number of Amazon lockers by state and in the UK. For the analysis, we used Google Maps and searched for “Amazon Locker” and “State” or “UK.” What we learned from the exercise is that the initiative is limited to a handful of states – California, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Virginia. We believe the company has not rolled it out to more states because it is concerned that adding lockers to states where it does not have a sales tax collections deal would force its hand and eliminate its ability to negotiate with those states. As the company forges more deals on a state-by-state basis, or in the event of federal legislation, this impediment will go away, and we expect Amazon will continue expanding this effort. The analysis also suggests that Amazon is further along in this initiative in the UK than in the US. AMAZON.COM LOCKERS LOCATIONS, AUGUST 2013 Locations % State California 315 34.3% New Jersey 6 0.7% New York 180 19.6% Oregon 66 7.2% Virginia 78 8.5% Total US 645 UK Total International 273 273 Total Global 918 29.7% Source: Google Maps and TAG estimates. In the following table, we list a number of retailers Amazon is working with for its lockers initiative. As part of our research, we noticed that there were several locations outside of traditional retailers, such as convenience stores, gas stations, and parking garages. Many of these nontraditional retailer locations had the added benefit of 24-hour accessibility, which suggested to us that the company is focusing on high-traffic spots. Amazon’s efforts have resulted in speculation that it would consider purchasing a retailer with a large base of small stores to advance its efforts, such as Radio Shack (which had 4,311 stores in the US and 273 in Mexico as of June). We believe such a deal makes sense based on our assessment of Amazon.com’s ability to leverage such retail real estate – as a showroom for its increasing hardware offerings and a pickup point for merchandise delivery; however, we do not foresee Amazon.com entering into any deal that would give it nexus in all 50 states until federal sales tax legislation has passed or the company has forged agreements with the 46 states that have sales taxes. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 67 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM LOCKERS RETAILERS, SEPTEMBER 2013 7-Eleven Ace Hardware Albertsons Box Brothers Broadway Market Central Parking D'Agostino Discount Builders Fillmore Center Fort Knox Storage Foto Video Green Citizen Gristedes Hammersmith Broadway Harbor Steps Tower New Street Square Nob Hill O2 Central Mall Pacific Place Park West Apts Philz Coffee Professor Copy 'n' Print Radio Shack Ranier Copy Red Apple Rite Aid Seattle Muni Tower Shepherd's Bush Library SoHo Food 'n' Wine SPAR Storage PRO Staples The Cooperative Unit 1 West 12 Shopping Center Youngstown Flats Source: Company websites and TAG research. Why Consumers Appreciate Lockers. Lockers offer consumers a third location to have merchandise shipped, beyond their home and office. This can be convenient for consumers ordering products online which they do not want shipped to their apartments because, for example, they do not have a doorman, as noted by LaserShip. Consumers can also shop at the location where they pick up merchandise (discussed below in the paragraph on Walmart). DHL and Lockers According to Deutsche Post DHL, its German Mail and Parcel business was one of the pioneers for lockers and it has approximately 2,500 of them in Germany. They are located at gas stations, work places, and supermarkets. Consumers appreciate the ability to pick up merchandise 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. We believe that e-commerce customers who use lockers, including those of Amazon.com, purchase more frequently. The companies appreciate the traffic the lockers drive to their establishments; for example, consumers who pick up merchandise at lockers at gas stations also buy gas; as a result DHL can often secure attractively low rent for its lockers. That Germany has a number of densely populated urban areas is a positive contributing factor to the performance of the company’s lockers, in our view. LaserShip mentioned the benefits of lockers to carriers, such as economies of scale from delivering 10 packages to one location instead of 10 different ones. Delivering to condominiums and apartment buildings with doormen also prevents situations where there are high attempt rates, which frustrate consumers and delivery companies, alike, and negatively impact its margins. One industry expert noted that e-commerce companies often prefer regional carriers to national ones because they have greater flexibility with accessorial charges, such as residential delivery surcharges. Having a greater upfront understanding of accessorial charges also makes it easier for e-commerce companies to understand their per-unit and customer acquisition costs, which is very valuable. Forrester noted that the reason lockers are so effective in Germany is because of its customer density. For example, it is smaller than California but has twice the population. The lockers are also effective because consumers are uncomfortable having merchandise left at their doorsteps, many of which do not have front porches. It noted that less than 20% of ecommerce packages were delivered in this manner in Germany and that penetration in the US may not get that high, though it could approach that figure in certain markets. Google Positions Itself for Lockers with Buffer Box Acquisition In December 2012, Google acquired Buffer Box, a Canadian start-up launched in June 2011, for a reported $17MM. Buffer Box offers consumers the ability to pick up e-commerce merchandise at lockers located primarily at transportation hubs, such as train stations. As of September, there were 25 locations in the Toronto area. We believe Google is expanding its th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 68 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT offering to compete more effectively against Amazon.com in this arena. We also view its acquisition as validation that more of e-commerce will be delivered via lockers in the future. BUFFERBOX LOCATIONS (GREATER TORONTO, ON AREA), SEPTEMBER 2013 City Waterloo Hamilton Burlington Oakville Mississauga Etobicoke Bramalea North York Toronto Total Locations 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 13 25 Source: Company website and TAG research. Staples: If You Can’t Beat ’Em, Join ’Em According to published reports, in November 2012, Amazon.com forged an agreement with Staples to include its stores in its lockers initiative. Among retailers offering Amazon.com’s lockers in its stores, we considered this to be one of the most interesting from a strategic standpoint for both parties. Based on our conversations with industry sources, Staples receives rent and a commission on merchandise picked up at its stores. The company entered into the agreement in hopes of generating incremental traffic, which it could leverage for its other services, such as printing. We will continue to monitor Amazon.com’s lockers efforts to see if more companies it competes with begin including its lockers in their retail stores. Note, recently there have been published reports suggesting both Staples and Radio Shack may be discontinuing their practice of housing Amazon.com’s lockers. If true, this would not negatively impact our favorable view of the initiative as there are still several high-traffic locations for Amazon.com to leverage. Walmart’s Efforts Walmart announced its plans to add lockers to its stores in March 2013. In December 2012, Wal-Mart indicated that consumers who shop online and pick up merchandise in its stores spend about $60 at their physical stores when they come to get their online order. Forrester commented that Walmart has an even bigger opportunity in this arena because of its efficiency and frequency of product deliveries and customer visits to its stores. Walmart’s stores could become pickup locations for merchandise from other retailers, with its sister company, Sam’s Club, at the minimum. Forrester pointed out that UK grocers are already doing this at their grocery stores. Both UK grocers and Walmart have the advantage of store density, with several locations throughout their countries. Forrester mentioned that Walmart is already working to make its real estate more productive by including everything from nail salons to opticians in its stores. This theme of making real estate more productive will make this model more efficient for rapid delivery of e-commerce purchases than those offered by Amazon.com, eBay, or Google. As an adjunct to this service, Wal-Mart could leverage its supply chain management expertise to other e-commerce companies. This could be another way to take advantage of the fact that delivery to commercial addresses is less expensive than residential ones. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 69 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Forrester suggested that although Amazon may have a first-mover advantage in lockers for the US, other retailers may be better positioned to leverage the opportunity, including CVS, Walgreens, and regional grocers. USPS’s gopost Effort As another indication of the emerging trends of lockers, the USPS launched its own service, dubbed gopost in January 2012. An interesting feature of the USPS’s efforts is the ability for consumers to ship from these lockers in addition to receiving packages at them. We illustrate the gopost locations in the following table. USPS GOPOST LOCATIONS, SEPTEMBER 2013 City College Park Rockville Brooklyn New York Alexandria Arlington Merrifield Springfield Total State Maryland Maryland New York New York Virginia Virginia Virginia Virginia Number 1 2 2 3 2 3 1 1 15 Source: Company website and TAG research. Why Lockers May Enable Amazon.com to Avoid Opening Its Own Stores LJM Consultants noted that Amazon.com’s ability to ship to another retailer’s location may preclude it from opening its own stores by eliminating much of the need to do so. LOCKERS COMPARISON, SEPTEMBER 2013 Number Market Location Types Pricing & Fees Accessibility Ship From Potential advantages Potential Disadvantages Max Days to Pick Up Amazon 918 CA, WA, DC, NY, UK Rite-Aids, Staples, Radio Shack, 7/11s No cost to consumer; Fee to retailer Subject to retailers' business hours No - only returns Higher number, closer together No way to browse or exchange 3 Wal-Mart 12 CA Only In-Store Only No cost to consumer 24/7 Availability No Wal-Mart leads in distribution Ability to browse and exchange 7 Google/BufferBox 25 Toronto, ON GO, 7/11s, Sobeys TBD Variable Fee Subject to retailers' business hours No Google Late-mover in USA 3 USPS gopost 15 Virginia Post Office, groceries,transportation hubs No additional cost 24/7 Availability Yes Greater historical user penetration Standard USPS reliability woes 15 Source: Company websites and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 70 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Pickup Points Following its Lockers effort, we believe Amazon.com’s next step toward using physical locations to get product to consumers faster is pickup points (pickup stations for physical merchandise). We believe this could be another catalyst for its sales as it provides yet another way for consumers to conveniently receive products from Amazon.com. PICKUP POINTS Source: GeekWire and TAG estimates. This is not a new concept for Amazon.com, as it tested pickup points in 2007 as part of its early efforts with Amazon Fresh (as depicted in the picture above). It discontinued the effort in 2008 as it focused on home delivery. Today, Amazon offers consumers pickup points in the UK, leveraging an effort by a third party. Based on our conversations with a number of global grocers, including Ahold, Carrefour, Loblaws, and Metro AG, we believe Amazon.com could restart this effort in the US, especially as it collects sales taxes in more states, with the addition of grocery as a catalyst to do so. Ahold’s online grocer, Peapod, is offering consumers pickup points as part of its Peapod Pickup initiative (see below). As of September 2013, there were 45 Peapod Pickup points in eight states. PEAPOD PICKUP POINTS Source: Ahold and TAG estimates. PEAPOD PICKUP POINTS Source: SupermarketNews.com and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 71 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT PEAPOD’S PICKUP POINTS, SEPTEMBER 2013 City Norwalk Stonington Wilton State Connecticut Connecticut Connecticut Deerfield Palatine Illinois Illinois Annapolis Chevy Chase Clarksville Columbia Gambrills Maryland Maryland Maryland Maryland Maryland Abington Braintree Chelmsford East Weymouth Hudson Milford North Andover North Attleboro North Dartmouth Norwood Pembroke Plymouth Quincy Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts City Sandwich Walpole Wareham Westborough State Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Massachussetts Franklin Lakes New Jersey Jackson Hartsdale Lake Ronkonkoma Medford North White Plains Port Chester Shirley Smithtown South Setauket Staten Island New Jersey New York New York New York New York New York New York New York New York New York Cranston Lincoln Pawtucket Providence Rhode Island Rhode Island Rhode Island Rhode Island Alexandria Centreville Herndon Virigina Virigina Virigina Source: Company website and TAG research. Relay, one company that has excelled in leveraging pickup points, was surprised to discover that consumers often preferred receiving merchandise in this manner over home delivery because they consider it more convenient. One reason is that the company offers consumers a four-hour window at the location so they do not have to rush home to avoid missing a delivery. Many consumers also prefer picking up merchandise over having someone knocking on their door. Consumers appreciate having control over pickup location, and Relay offers convenient ones, such as a Walgreens parking lot, where consumers would be driving anyway, and it sends them reminders so they do not forget to pick up their groceries. Stores In our view, the next logical step in Amazon.com’s strategy to expand its physical presence is opening stores. When considering the new emerging retail store formats, Amazon.com’s hardware expansion efforts, its foray into grocery, and its growing list of states with sales taxes, this may not be as radical a departure from the company’s original business model as investors would have thought even a few years ago. New ideas for unconventional store formats are emerging, so Amazon may not be limited to traditional stores, such as Apple. Wharton Professor David Bell mentioned a few examples of new store formats. Eyeglass merchant Warby Parker is adding locations in hotels (such as the Standard Hotel in Los Angeles in the picture below). This is on top of its efforts to open its own stores on a very limited basis, such as its two locations in New York City (SoHo and the Meat Packing District). (Anecdotally, we recently visited the Meat Packing District location and had a positive experience that included a less expensive eye exam – $85, including a $35 th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 72 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT charge to have our pupils dilated, not to mention the inexpensive, but still highly fashionable, designer glasses, at $95). Men’s fashion retailer Bonobos is opening “guide” shops, where men can be fitted and order products that are shipped to them at either 25th Street or Crosby Street in New York City (the picture below depicts its guide shop in Bethesda, Maryland). Dr. Nadia Shouraboura, the former head of Supply Chain and Fulfillment Technologies for Amazon.com, has come up with an innovative retail store format for Hointer, with the tag line where “retail meets technology.” Consumers tap the clothes they are interested in trying on with their smartphones, and the clothes are ready for them in a fitting room in less than 30 seconds, plus customers can self-checkout if they want to purchase the merchandise. The company’s goals are to provide consumers real-time inventory information, make in-store shopping as easy as online, and leverage big data to personalize the shopping experience. HOINTER, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company website and TAG research. Electric car company Tesla has an entirely new approach to showrooms, opening them in malls (such as the one pictured below at the Westchester Mall in White Plains, New York). Wharton’s Professor Bell said he could envision a future where Amazon opens stores based on the alternate prototypes others are creating. Retail store formats are changing, and we remain highly confident that Amazon.com could come up with its own store to increase its distribution and drive sales. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 73 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM WARBY PARKER, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Selectism and TAG research. SPECIAL REPORT BONOBOS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Refinery29.com and TAG research. HOINTER, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company website and TAG research. TESLA, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: CNN and TAG research. Best-Case Scenario: Apple Apple opened its first two retail stores on May 15, 2001, at the Glendale Galleria in Glendale, California, and Tysons Corner Center in McLean, Virginia. The combination of innovative store design, compelling products, and efficient customer service (the Genius Bar) has created a retail powerhouse. As of September 2013, there were 413 Apple stores, 253 in the US and 160 in 13 countries outside the US. In the June quarter, Apple’s retail sales totaled $4.1B (which equates to 25.9% of Amazon.com’s total revenues), its operating income amounted to $0.7B (176.9% that of Amazon.com’s total CSOI), and its average store generated $10.1MM in revenue. We believe Amazon.com could mirror Apple’s efforts – especially as it increases its hardware SKUs – and use retail stores to showcase its products. In addition, Amazon.com’s stores could offer consumers yet another pickup point for online orders, much like its lockers effort at 7-Eleven, Staples, and other retailers’ stores. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 74 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT APPLE STORE – 3RD ST. PROMENADE, SANTA MONICA, CA Source: Company website and TAG research. APPLE STORES, SEPTEMBER 2013 State Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina No. of Locations 2 1 6 1 52 6 5 3 16 5 3 1 9 2 1 1 2 2 1 5 10 5 5 1 3 1 4 2 12 1 17 5 State Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Texas Utah Virginia Washington Wisconsin Total US store count No. of Locations 6 2 3 9 1 2 4 18 2 7 6 3 253 Country United Kingdom Japan Canada Italy Austrailia China Switzerland Germany France Spain Hong Kong Amsterdam Sweden Total International No. of Locations 37 7 28 14 20 8 3 11 16 10 3 1 2 160 Total Store count 413 Source: Company website and TAG research. Microsoft – Not Apple, but Not Bad Microsoft has successfully created its own retail stores, leveraging many of Apple’s traits – including a clean and simple store layout design, offering a manageable number of SKUs, focusing on customer service, and concentrating on A and B mall real estate. According to one of our mall developer contacts, Microsoft’s retail efforts have been favorable because the th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 75 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT stores generate sales of $1,000 per square foot, and although that is a fraction of Apple’s $6,000, it is more than double the previous tenants’ average of $400. MICROSOFT STORE – DANBURY, CT Source: The Dancing Hotdogs and TAG estimates. MICROSOFT STORES,SEPTEMBER 2013 State Arizona California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Illinois Indiana Kansas Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Missouri Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey No. of Locations 1 10 2 2 1 8 2 1 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 State New York North Carolina Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island Texas Utah Virginia Washington Wisconsin PUERTO RICO Alberta British Columbia Ontario No. of Locations 6 1 2 2 2 1 1 7 2 2 3 1 1 1 3 2 Total store count 45 Source: Company website and TAG research. Worst-Case Scenario, Practically Everyone Else Although Apple has been extraordinarily successful and Microsoft is doing relatively well, there is a long list of technology companies that opened stores that are now closed. When was the last time you stepped into a Palm or a Gateway store? th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 76 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM GATEWAY SPECIAL REPORT PALM Source: aaplinvestors.net and TAG research. Source: palminfocenter.com and TAG research. Store Within a Store – Best Buy Amazon arguably already has a presence in stores, with portions of certain retailers’ locations showcasing and selling its Kindle and Kindle Fire e-readers and tablets and accessories (see the following table). The company could also follow Apple, Microsoft, and Samsung’s lead by opening stores within Best Buy locations. SAMSUNG STORE-WITHIN-A-STORE Source: idownloadblog.com and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 77 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT PHYSICAL STORES SELLING KINDLE DEVICES AND ACCESSORIES, SEPTEMBER 2013 US ABC Warehouse Alco Stores AT&T Bartell Drugs Best Buy Bi-Mart BJ's Wholesale Club Conn's Exchange Follett Stores Fred Meyer Fry's GameStop J&R Kmart La Curacao Navy Exchange Nebraska Furniture Mart Office Depot Office Max PC Mall Purchasing Power Radio Shack Sears Staples Toys 'R Us Australia/ New Zealand Big W Dick Smith Canada Canadian Tire London Drugs Memory Express NCIX The Source Shopper's Drug Mart Staples CA Visions South Africa Incredible Connection Source: Company website and TAG research. Kiosks/Pop-Up Stores In our research, we have found examples of Amazon kiosks selling its hardware. For example, in Brazil, retailer Superfone has opened Amazon kiosks in malls to sell its Kindle line. In addition, we believe Amazon could mirror Microsoft, Samsung, and others by opening pop-up stores in malls to sell its hardware. Forrester echoed our sentiment on this opportunity for Amazon.com’s retail stores, noting that the company almost needs to have stores, though not necessarily traditional ones, where it could demonstrate its hardware, such as an airport kiosk (which is one way Google has shown consumers the power of its Chromebooks). th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 78 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM KINDLE KIOSK, BRAZIL SPECIAL REPORT CHROMEBOOK AIRPORT KIOSK Source: The Digital Reader and TAG estimates. Source: The New York Times and TAG research. Outlet Stores Amazon.com could also open outlet stores to liquidate inventory. This strategy is employed by e-commerce company Overstock, which has an outlet store near Salt Lake City, where it mainly sells product returns it cannot offer via its website. OVERSTOCK.COM OUTLET STORE Source: KSL.com and TAG estimates. Two-Day Shipping This is the basic service offered by Amazon.com as part of its Amazon Prime membership program and duplicated by ShopRunner, another shipping membership program. We believe the company’s ability to get merchandise to consumers in two days gives it a significant competitive advantage, and Amazon.com has trained consumers to expect merchandise this quickly from others. Anecdotally, as Amazon Prime members, 31 of our 34 purchases on Amazon.com were delivered via two-day shipping. OnTrac discussed how fast shipping times enable e-commerce companies to compete more effectively against brick-and-mortar retailers. It can take a long time for a consumer to receive a product from an e-commerce company (as much as 7-10 business days) vs. picking up merchandise at a local store. The same could be said for returns. However, when a consumer th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 79 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT is now able to order a product on Monday and receive it on Tuesday or Wednesday that is a significant improvement and competitive enabler. Next-Day Shipping This is the next level of premium shipping for consumers interested in receiving packages faster but unwilling to pay a premium for same-day shipping. Amazon.com charges Amazon Prime members $3.99 to receive purchases on a next-day basis. LaserShip noted that one way Amazon.com could get further ahead of the competition would be to shift its two-day shipping to next-day for its Amazon Prime membership program. LaserShip’s comments suggested that although same-day delivery is getting all of the press these days, next-day shipping will be the sweet spot for Amazon.com and other e-commerce companies over the next three years. The company noted that it expected same-day delivery to continue growing, but the largest piece of the puzzle will be next-day delivery, as LaserShip, OnTrac, and regional carriers offer e-commerce companies the opportunity to get them the product late in the day, or early in the morning while still delivering to the consumer that day, as they offer much greater flexibility to companies like Amazon.com vs. the national players, FedEx and UPS. LaserShip discussed what we considered was the big opportunity for next-day shipping (and same-day shipping, too). Regional shipping companies fill a niche in the market place. They usually operate in major metropolitan areas and offer companies such as Amazon.com a lot of flexibility, including weekend delivery. They enable e-commerce companies to compete with traditional retailers for weekend sales thanks to next-day and same-day shipping options. For example, the consumer who otherwise would be going to a store on Saturday or Sunday to make a purchase, is now able to buy an item from home and receive it on Saturday or Sunday, which we believe is very powerful. Same-Day Shipping Same-day shipping is one of the emerging trends in e-commerce, but there is still a lot of uncertainty surrounding the initiative that needs to be addressed, including consumer demand, expeditors’ business models, and the pluses and minuses of different logistical methods to provide the service. Because same-day shipping is becoming more of a factor in e-commerce, we will continue to closely watch developments, including Amazon.com’s efforts to roll out same-day shipping to more locations across the US and the emergence of competition, such as eBay Now. We remain concerned that same-day shipping could put further pressure on margins for e-commerce companies, especially Amazon.com. Consumer Demand for Same-Day Shipping Is Unclear What is the consumer demand for same-day shipping? Wharton Professor David Bell and Forrester suggest that, in many instances, Amazon.com and others might have some consumer education to do when it comes to their same-day shipping efforts, i.e. that it is not yet clear there is not significant demand for the service. Professor Bell suggested that consumers who purchase online have set schedules for replenishment items, such as dog food or detergent and are unlikely to pay a premium to have them delivered same day; whereas, they may consider same-day shipping more seriously for items they perceive as must-haves, such as the latest iPhone or iPad. Of course, to the extent that Amazon can bundle items, perhaps through using the new AmazonFresh option as a "foot in the door" this could be very successful. Forrester pointed out that the service is expensive for both the e-commerce company to provide and the consumer to use. A typical Walmart in-store shopper is a mother who is shopping when she wants to and would rather pay a babysitter the $10 she would otherwise spend for same-day delivery and shop at the store herself. Forrester noted that one reason th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 80 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT shopping online and picking up in store is so successful is that consumers appreciate the opportunity to save the $5-$10 on shipping. Buying products for same-day shipping could make sense for the small portion of the total population that lives in a major metropolitan area, such as New York City, and is too busy to shop or works off-hour shifts and cannot make it to the stores when they are open. Most of the population already lives within two miles of a Walmart store, which would limit demand for the service in the first place and is why cash and carry remains the standard for retail. Forrester also pointed out that when consumers are required to pay for shipping, they always choose free delivery over fast. Expeditors Still Developing Business Models for Same-Day Shipping FedEx and UPS are still trying to determine how to make money on same-day shipping. Both have had same-day products for some time but for very different reasons. FedEx Critical is the same-day offering for healthcare, such as transporting a kidney for a transplant. As a result, its price points are much higher and margins much better. Walmart uses UPS for its same-day shipping initiative, which costs the consumer $10 per. UPS is still trying to determine whether there will be enough volume for it to profitably offer that service to Walmart and others. Professor Bell also pointed out that same-day shipping will be difficult in terms of cost and logistics and will largely depend on volume. He noted that FedEx and UPS may not have sufficient free capacity and that their logistics systems may get clogged in major metropolitan areas. In addition, bottlenecks can arise, such as consumers not being home at the time of delivery. Another industry contact suggested that Amazon.com’s efforts in same-day shipping could spur the initiative for the e-commerce sector by generating interest in several other companies to follow Amazon.com’s efforts, thereby increasing what had been a low-volume offering for the expeditors. LJM Consultants suggested that Amazon.com or others interested in offering same-day delivery to customers would have to employ several regional carriers because it would be difficult to offer that service leveraging FedEx, UPS, or the USPS. LJM Consultants also noted that for expeditors in general, there comes a point where they cannot profitably ship products for Amazon even if Amazon.com continues to increase its volumes. According to LaserShip the challenge for any company interested in offering same-day delivery is scale. If LaserShip is able to pick up 10 deliveries with one driver in New York City then it would result in one cost model. However, if LaserShip has to pick up 10 deliveries in 10 different locations with 10 separate drivers the cost model is entirely different. Economies of scale lower the cost to both the expeditor and the e-commerce company shipping the merchandise to the consumer. Deutsche Post DHL is aware of the demand and has launched same-day delivery services in selected city areas in Germany. These services target food and grocery distribution service that supermarkets can use to offer consumers same-day shipping. Logistical Challenges for Same-Day Shipping Are Significant LaserShip discussed the logistical challenges for offering same-day shipping. To provide same-day shipping at scale the e-commerce company needs to sell a product that can be turned around quickly – it has to be easy to sort so it can move through distribution center conveyors rapidly (therefore it will be difficult to offer same-day shipping on large items, at scale). The products need to those selling in large volumes, such as Kindles and iPads; products where e-commerce companies are able to compete with a computer going to a physical store to pick it up, such as cellphone chargers. Conversely, slower turning inventory th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 81 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT items, such as TVs, that require scheduling a delivery will likely be shipped in the same manner as today. Amazon.com’s Same-Day Shipping Efforts Today, Amazon offers same-day deliver services in 11 cities vs. 3 for eBay Now and 1 for Google. University of Connecticut Professor Richard Pomp suggested that Amazon.com’s business model has changed to offer same-day and next-day delivery, which will require adding fulfillment centers in key locations. This need to add fulfillment centers was a motivating factor for the company to forge by-state sales tax agreements, such as in California, because it needed fulfillment centers closer than those in Nevada to advance its new strategy. Wharton’s Professor Bell made similar remarks, noting that with Amazon.com’s pricing advantage being wiped out as it collects sales taxes in more states, the company is working on another strategy to remain relevant to the consumer – offering same-day delivery to be almost as convenient as shopping at a local store. He said the company’s success here will depend on consumers getting used to the new service. Regarding the potential rollout of same-day delivery, LaserShip suggested it would start in major metropolitan areas and the ability to offer the service to more rural locations will be dependent on population density and proximity to a fulfillment center (such as New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania to service New York), because of the necessary short turnaround times required to execute the service. Otherwise, it would be cost prohibitive to offer the service in rural areas. LaserShip also pointed out that same-day delivery will be the premier service for e-commerce companies in the next few years. LaserShip also pointed out that prior to Amazon.com’s and other e-commerce shippers interest in offering same-day shipping it had been a service in decline – as it was historically used for legal documents or by architectural companies. SAME-DAY SHIPPING COMPARISON, SEPTEMBER 2013 Price Service Eligibility Delivery Speed Cities Served Retailers / Sourcing Amazon $8.99 and up Amazon Prime Members Within the day Baltimore Boston Chicago Indianapolis Las Vegas New York City (and parts of New Jersey) Philadelphia Phoenix Seattle Washington, D.C. eBay Now $5 per store w/ $25 minimum order eBay account holders Within the hour San Francisco Bay Area San Jose New York City Wal Mart To Go Google Shopping Express $3-$10 for most orders, $45 min purchase Free 6 month membership + $4.99/trip None No requirements Within the day 3 - 4 Hours Washington D.C. San Francisco Bay Area Philadelphia Minneapolis San Jose San Francisco Routed Via Amazon Fulfillment Centers Best Buy, Toys R Us Macy's, Office Depot Target, Urban Outfitters, GNC AutoZone, Radio Shack, Home Depot Wal-Mart Stores and Distribution Centers Target, American Eagle Outfitters,, and Office Depot, Toys R Us, Toy World Staples, Walgreens, Nob Hill Foods Blue Bottle Coffee, Palo Alto Sport Shop Source: Company websites and TAG research. The Cost of Offering Same-Day Shipping LaserShip suggested the cost of same-day shipping to an e-commerce company was 3x-4x that of next day ground delivery. As an illustration, LaserShip suggested that the cost structure could be offering the consumer free shipping that will arrive in 7-10 days, paying th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 82 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT ground shipping that takes up to five days to deliver for $4, two-day shipping at $8, next day for $19 (for next-day air), and same-day in an hour for $35. OnTrac noted that when comparing the cost of same-day and next-day shipping offers it was important to consider where distribution centers are located. At the lower end, next-day shipping could cost $4 (on shipments less than one pound for a large e-commerce company), while same-day shipping in the Bay Area, Los Angeles Basin, or Seattle could cost $10-$20. Scale could reduce the cost to $10. For same-day to work from a logistical stand point there needs to be distribution centers in close proximity to the delivery area. For example, it would be difficult to offer same-day delivery out of Reno Nevada (an area where there is a lot of distribution) for San Francisco, which is four hours away, because a consumer would have to order the product by 8AM, which would dampen demand for the service. (In general, one advantage of using a regional carrier to a national one is the ability to get the package to the regional carrier later in the day for next-day shipping, such as at the end of the business day instead of 10:30AM.) Next-day shipping when using a regional company and ground transportation could be $4-$5 depending on the shipping volume of the e-commerce company and if there are accessorial charges, such as a surcharge for residential delivery. A similar service from FedEx or UPS could cost $6 for ground transportation, with opportunity for cost savings if they are able to use sure post (UPS) or smart post (FedEx), where the local post office delivers the product the last mile to the consumer. In that instance, FedEx and UPS are cannibalizing their own business, but willing to make that tradeoff because the final mile is the most expensive one. Next-day delivery from locations further from the consumer, such as Zone 4, would require express service, which is much more expensive. For example, a Zone 4 tariff for a one-pound package to arrive at the consumer the next afternoon would be $32 for FedEx or UPS. OnTrac pointed out the challenge for all e-commerce companies when it comes to shipping times and what they can or cannot charge for shipping: Generation Y (consumers under age 35) want their products yesterday and do not want to pay for shipping. Amazon’s Same-Day Efforts vs. eBay’s and Google’s Most of the industry experts we talked to favored Amazon.com’s same-day delivery model over those of eBay and Google. The basic notion is that Amazon.com has greater control of its efforts as it is leveraging its own fulfillment centers outside of major metropolitan areas, whereas eBay and Google are relying on local merchants’ inventory management systems, which can often be flawed. LaserShip outlined some of the benefits of Amazon.com’s approach and challenges for eBay, Google, smaller e-commerce companies, and multi-channel retailers leveraging their store bases. Amazon has the competitive advantage of being able to pick merchandise from oneto-three fulfillment centers in an area because the company has so many of them. This compares against a smaller-scale e-commerce company that only has one fulfillment center in that region. Walmart and other multi-channel retailers are upgrade their technologies to leverage their stores and fulfillment centers more effectively, including to change their configurations to offer same-day shipping. Unlike Amazon.com which is building its systems and infrastructure from scratch, Walmart and others have to reconfigure their efforts, because they stores, systems, and infrastructure were not designed for this purpose originally, which is very difficult. The company will need to have a centralized system for every Walmart doing same-day delivery in a certain area which will lead to more of a point-to-point delivery system than a true distribution model; for example, pick up the merchandise from Walmart and deliver to the consumer in an hour, which will be very expensive proposition for Walmart. Barnes & Noble has been offering same-day shipping in New York City for several years. It offers the service for free to its members or to consumers who purchase more than $25 worth of merchandise. The products come from its New Jersey distribution center instead of its retail th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 83 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT stores. The company has considered expanding the service into other markets but has not announced an expansion of the offering. Forrester discussed the challenge of eBay’s, Google’s, and couriers’ models for same-day delivery. Practically all companies do not like shipping to residential addresses because it is really expensive to deliver products the last mile to the consumer. Courier models are expensive and historically were used only when businesses, not consumers, were paying for them. As a result, using couriers makes sense for Staples with its business orders but not for eBay, Google, and others, where consumers are unwilling to pay for the service. Forrester provided additional details on the challenges of the courier delivery business model. It is much cheaper to leverage retail stores to get products to consumers because commercial real estate in the US is so inexpensive. For example, you cannot build a distribution center that is that much cheaper than retail stores in the US. It can work in Europe because real estate is much more expensive, and consumers pay a premium for groceries, such as at Tesco, which can ship products from its distribution centers. Fresh Direct could be successful in parts of the US where grocery is expensive; but in other parts of the country, it will be difficult because grocery products are so cheap. Even if you pay a courier above-minimum wages, such as $8 per hour, most businesses expect them to do more than just deliveries, such as stocking shelves or processing multiple transactions in an hour. As a result, too much scale economics are lost in the courier model. It can work for Domino’s because it is selling a high-margin product, pizza. The last thing chain retailers want is for the customer not to visit its stores, where impulse buying occurs. Costco, Sam’s Club, and Target need customers to visit their stores to get average transaction sizes of $70-$100. Relay compared the logistical challenges for eBay’s and Google’s models with that of Amazon.com. For example, it takes four times as long to pick items in stores as it does in a warehouse. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 84 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 11: EBAY NOW HAS AMAZON.COM IN ITS CROSSHAIRS One of the surprises with same-day shipping has been the emergence of eBay as a player. That said, we believe that eBay has what it takes to be a serious participant in this emerging service. Same-day shipping could be a tremendous opportunity for eBay for several reasons. The Marketplaces effort (52.6% of its 2012 revenues and 66.4% of segment operating profits) boasts some of the highest margins in e-commerce, enabling eBay to price the service aggressively – at $5 per order (plus, in some cases, an introductory promotion of free the first time). In addition, the strategy is 100% aligned with eBay’s intent to be the partner of choice for retailers (including multichannel ones). The company’s December 2010 acquisition of Milo for $75MM gave it the technology to collect local inventory data from retailers. While Amazon.com is adding fulfillment centers near major metropolitan areas, eBay Now leverages stores in major cities, including New York, San Francisco, and San Jose. This is important because it could allow eBay to get products to customers more quickly. Its service aims for one- to two-hour delivery times, but it often gets the product to the consumer in less than an hour. (In our Valentine’s Day test – detailed below – it was about 30 minutes.) The company is also in the very early stages of enabling consumers to have merchandise ordered online delivered the same day. > About eBay Now Same-Day Shipping Service The eBay Now mobile app enables consumers to browse local inventory from hundreds of retailers. Participants include Best Buy, Home Depot, Macy’s, Target, Toys ‘R’ Us, Urban Outfitters, and Walgreens. It currently costs $5 per order, but we would not be surprised if eBay were to increase the pricing later, depending on consumer demand. By comparison, Walmart charges $10 for same-day delivery (via UPS), as does Amazon. Delivery times are targeted at two to four hours, but eBay is currently surpassing that goal, at one to two hours. The company launched same-day delivery as a beta test in San Francisco in August 2012, with an official launch in October 2012. It started rolling out the service in New York City in November 2012. In March 2013 it added San Jose, and it has announced plans to expand to Chicago and Dallas in 2H13. Depending on the success of the offering, we believe eBay could roll it out to more cities over time. > eBay Now Delivers for Valentine’s Day We used eBay Now same-day delivery service on Valentine’s Day, and it was a very good experience from start to finish. After spending a little time using the service on our iPhone app, we found it easy enough to navigate to find the product we were looking for. The eBay courier could not have been nicer and walked us through the process once we placed the order. We look forward to purchasing through eBay Now again in the near future. eBay Now made it very easy for us to purchase a Blu-Ray DVD from Best Buy. Had we ordered it on Amazon.com, the earliest we could have received it would have been the next day. > Details from Our Experience with eBay Now When we launched the eBay Now app on our iPhone 5 at 8:58 a.m., we initially were surprised to see that the service was closed. A message on the screen indicated that we could browse merchandise and return between 9 a.m. and 9 p.m. to complete our transaction. Shortly after 9 a.m., we received an alert to a promotion on our phone, enabling us to get free shipping on our first eBay Now purchase. Our intent was to buy a children’s Blu-Ray disc from Best Buy for Valentine’s Day. After some tinkering, searching for products was reasonably intuitive, though we must admit to having visited BestBuy.com on our work computer to get more information about a product before returning to the service. We attribute this more to our initial unfamiliarity with the app, not to a shortcoming of the offering. We wanted to purchase the “Robots” Blu-Ray, but we were unable to find it through the app. We believe this was probably because the product was not in inventory at any nearby Best Buy locations. The film was from 2005 and is not among the more popular titles. After some browsing, we decided to purchase “A Bug’s Life.” We placed the order shortly after 9:30 a.m. and almost immediately were notified that an eBay courier was available to deliver the product to us. Within minutes, the courier called us on our iPhone 5 and let us know he would have the product for us within an hour and confirmed our address. The GPS on our iPhone was a little off and had indicated to him that we were at 545 Fifth Avenue, instead of 535 Fifth Avenue. We asked him questions about payment options, and he explained that we could use PayPal or a debit or credit card. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 85 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 11: EBAY NOW HAS AMAZON.COM IN ITS CROSSHAIRS (CONTINUED) As promised, the courier dropped off the Blu-Ray at our office a little after 10 a.m., well within an hour. The courier walked us through paying with PayPal Here, which was very easy through our PayPal iPhone app, and we received a red rose and eBay Now canvas bag along with our purchase. To be fair, the Best Buy location is across the street from our office, which probably accounted for the short delivery time. When we discussed the service being closed when we first used the eBay Now app, the courier explained the hours of operation (9 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday to Saturday and 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Sundays) and how it had been open longer during the holidays. As with any service business, the quality of the experience will depend greatly on the quality of the courier’s service; and in this instance, it was very good. > Others’ Experience with eBay Now Based on anecdotal evidence from our co-workers’ experiences with the service, three out of four times it was very favorable. On the plus side, it was very convenient and fast (less than 90 minutes each time from order to delivery, with constant updates on where in the process you stood), and the quality of the customer service and couriers exceeded expectations. For example, call center representatives and couriers were helpful in explaining the service, including timing and payment options, and in confirming the order. Similar to our experience on Valentine’s Day, when we received a free rose and canvas bag, the deliveries included free items that were timely, such as wrapping paper, a card, and a box during the holidays. The unfavorable experience was during the holiday shopping season and occurred late in the evening, during extended holiday hours. The courier failed to get to Macy’s in a timely manner and what should have been a delivery by midnight would have become a 1:30 a.m.2 a.m. delivery if it had not been cancelled. Google Shopping Express In March, Google announced it would be testing a local delivery service featuring same-day delivery. The initiative, dubbed Google Shopping Express, will be available in the San Francisco Bay Area. Initial six-month test memberships will be offered for free and will feature six national retailers, along with distinguished local businesses. The company has not disclosed membership pricing for after the testing period. We believe there could be a place at the table for Google, given its long list of assets and competitive strengths – such as local search (historically, 20% of search activity has been local oriented), inventory information showcased in Google Shopping, and Google Wallet. Same-day shipping remains in its early stages for Google, and we await announcement of further details and expansion plans. GOOGLE SHOPPING EXPRESS Source: Company website and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 86 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Amazon Prime Amazon Prime is the company’s flagship delivery membership program and could be one of the keys to improving its long-term CSOI margin. Launched in 2005 in the US, consumers are able to get “free” two-day shipping, and a whole lot more, from Amazon.com in exchange for an annual membership fee of $79. In the following table, we outline the company’s local Amazon Prime membership programs across the globe. AMAZON.COM’S SHIPPING PROGRAMS, 2Q13 Free Shipping (Purchase Requirement) (local currency) Membership Program Launched Annual Fee (local currency) Offer US UK Germany Japan France Italy Spain Canada China India $25 amazon.com prime 2005 $79 £10 amazon.co.uk prime 2007 £49 € 20 amazon.de prime 2007 € 29 ¥0 amazon.co.jp prime 2007 ¥3,900 € 15 amazon.fr premium 2008 € 49 € 19 amazon.it.prime 2010 € 10 € 19 amazon.es premium 2011 € 15 $25 amazon.com prime 2012 $79 ¥29 NA NA NA INR 499 NA NA NA Free Expedited (Same/Next Day & Scheduled) Shipping Free One-Day Shipping NA NA Free Two-Day Shipping Free One-Day Shipping Free One-Day Shipping Free Two-to-Three-Day Free Two-to-Three-Day Free Two-Day Shipping Shipping Shipping Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Notes: Free shipping for UK website includes 17 countries in Europe for orders greater than £25. Free shipping for German website includes Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. Free shipping for French website includes Belgium, Luxembourg (for some categories), and Switzerland. Free shipping for Italian website includes Switzerland. Free shipping for Spanish website is only for books. According to Wharton’s Professor Bell, lowering the threshold for consumers to qualify for free shipping opened the door to orders of any size, rather than those of $25 or more, igniting spontaneous orders, which resulted in a lot of incremental purchasing. Anecdotally, we can attest to Professor Bell’s observation as Amazon Prime members who purchase individual products from Amazon.com all the time with order sizes below $25. An industry source suggested Amazon.com could offer same-day shipping as a boutique service, as part of an effort to offer consumers multiple choices, akin to suggesting whatever you want, Amazon can do it. LaserShip discussed the power of Amazon.com’s free shipping offering within Amazon Prime. Products offered by third-parties on Amazon.com are often less expensive than those offered by Amazon.com; however, including shipping costs, Amazon.com is less expensive because others are unable to offer free shipping. It also pointed out that free shipping for e-commerce companies is akin to marketing spending since offering free shipping on an e-commerce website is similar to running an advertisement for an e-commerce company. Overstock’s shipping membership program, Club O, is loyalty based. Consumers pay a $20 annual fee and, in return, earn 5% rewards on purchases and receive free shipping. If the company were to upgrade the service to a next-day or same-day shipping model, it would have to change the annual fee to compensate. Offering next-day delivery on everything would be especially difficult for Overstock because it ships anything from DVDs to sectional couches. As a result, it would have to exclude certain products from that offering. Overstock indicated that its Club O members are very loyal, order much more than non-members, and are much more profitable than its average customer. Wharton’s Professor Bell believes Amazon.com has an opportunity to adjust its Amazon Prime offering over time from less of a one-size-fits-all solution to one that is more customized to the needs of varying groups of consumers, as the company collects more data on its usage. He suggested that this could benefit margins, and he cited the example of Netgrocer’s efforts to discourage consumers from placing large orders in areas that are hard to reach for delivery. Amazon Instant Video With the company selling more of its own branded hardware, its Amazon Instant Video effort will become more important in the future, in our view. The company launched the service as th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 87 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT part of its Amazon Prime shipping program in February 2011. Since then, it has steadily ramped up its investment in content for the service and in distribution for the service (outlined in the following tables). In the second table that follows, we compare distribution for a number of streaming video services. When it comes to the quality of the viewing experience, Netflix walked through the hierarchy: The first preference is to watch on a large screen in front of your couch at home; a distant second is on a tablet device, such as an iPad, because its screen is larger than that of a smartphone; and watching on a smartphone is a close third. The quality of the viewing experience is important because it is tied to consumer use. Netflix noted that when it comes to distribution for large-screen at-home viewing, game consoles are important because of their large installed bases. Smart TV adoption has been relatively slow versus other connected devices, such as smartphones and tablets. In some locations outside the US devices can be prohibitively expensive for consumers and many, instead, opt to connect their laptops to their TVs to access streaming video content. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 88 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON VIDEO CONTENT DEALS (AS OF AUGUST 2013) Distributor Sony Pictures Warner Bros. BBC PBS Magnolia Pictures IFC National Geographic Shout Factory Music Box Films Egami Media Reel Media Announced Rights in Type of Content 02/22/11 U.S. Movies 02/22/11 U.S. Movies 02/22/11 U.S. TV 02/22/11 U.S. TV 02/22/11 U.S. Movies 02/22/11 U.S. Movies 02/22/11 U.S. TV 02/22/11 U.S. Movies 02/22/11 U.S. Movies Movies, docs, 02/22/11 U.S. performance 02/22/11 U.S. Movies Exclusivity non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive non-exclusive Window library library library library library library library library premium, library Examples of Shows/Movies: non-exclusive library n/a n/a The Tudors, Numb3rs, Medium, the complete Star Trek franchise, Frasier Cheers. Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, Elizabeth, Babe, Flipper, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas. Speed, Mrs. Doubtfire, Doctor Dolittle, Last of the Mohicans, Office Space, 24, The X-Files, NYPD Blue, Arrested Development. NOVA, Masterpiece, Antiques Roadshow, The Civil War, The National Parks: America’s Best Idea, Baseball, Jazz ABC Family’s Greek and The Secret Life of the American Teenager, ABC Studios’ Lost, Grey’s Anatomy and Felicity, the Disney Channel’s Phineas & Ferb, and Marvel’s Spider Man, XMen Evolution. Stripes Syriana, March of the Penguins Doctor Who, The Office Arthur, Caillou, Super Why! and Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood Food Inc. n/a n/a n/a Girl with the Dragon Tattoo series non-exclusive library CBS 07/19/11 U.S. TV non-exclusive library NBCUniversal 07/28/11 U.S. Movies non-exclusive library Twentieth Century Fox 09/26/11 U.S. Movies, TV non-exclusive library PBS 10/19/11 U.S. TV non-exclusive current, library Disney - ABC 10/31/11 U.S. TV non-exclusive library Twentieth Century Fox 12/09/11 U.S. TV non-exclusive library Glee, Sons of Anarchy MTV shows including The Hills, Jersey Shore, The Hard Times of RJ Berger, several seasons of The Real World, and Comedy Central shows such as Chappelle’s Show and The Sarah Silverman Program. Nickelodeon episodes of iCarly, Dora the Explorer, SpongeBob SquarePants, Yo Gabba Gabba, along with TV Land favorite, Hot in Cleveland. Viacom 02/08/12 U.S. TV non-exclusive library Discovery 03/14/12 U.S. TV non-exclusive library Paramount 05/23/12 U.S. Movies non-exclusive library MGM 06/13/12 U.S. Movies, TV non-exclusive library Terminator, Rain Man, Silence of the Lambs, Dances with Wolves library Fringe, The West Wing Dirty Jobs, Whale Wars Star Trek, Breakfast at Tiffany’s, Top Gun, The Italian Job, The Truman Show Warner Bros. 07/20/12 U.S. TV Exclusive thru summer 2012 for Fringe and West Wing ESPN 08/21/12 U.S. Movies non-exclusive library NBCUniversal 08/24/12 U.S. TV non-exclusive library EPIX 09/04/12 U.S. movies, originals non-exclusive premium, library The Avengers, Iron Man 2, The Hunger Games, Transformers: Dark of the Moon, Thor, Rango Turner Broadcasting/Warner Bros. 12/17/12 U.S. TV exclusive current, library Falling Skies, The Closer, A&E Networks PBS 01/04/13 02/01/13 U.S. U.S. TV TV non-exclusive exclusive library current, library Pawn Stars, Storage Wars, Dance Moms The U, Pony Excess and Winning Time, Ice Cube’s Straight Outta L.A. Parks and Recreation, Parenthood, Friday Night Lights, Heroes, Battlestar Galactica Downtown Abby Under the Dome, America's Next Top Model, Everybody Loves Raymond, Undercover Boss, United States of Tara and more CBS 02/13/13 U.S. TV non-exclusive current, library Sony Pictures Television 02/26/13 U.S. TV exclusive library Justified, The Shield Scripps Networks Interactive 02/28/13 U.S. TV non-exclusive library Rachael Ray's Week in a Day, Anthony Bourdain: No Reservations; Cupcake Wars; Diners, Drive-Ins and Dives; House Hunters and House Hunters International, Iron Chef America, Man v. Food, Selling New York and Selling LA, Throwdown With Bobby Flay, Chopped, Ghost Advertures and Yard Crashers NBCUniversal & NewMedia Distribution 05/16/13 U.S. TV non-exclusive library Grimm, Suits, Hannibal, Defiance, Smash, Alphas, Eureka and Warehouse 13 Viacom 06/04/13 U.S. TV non-exclusive library CBS 06/28/13 U.S. TV n/a = not available. Note: not all content deals are listed above. non-exclusive current Dora the Explorer, Go, Diego, Go!, Blue's Clues and The Backyardigans Dome Source: SNLKagan and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 89 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF STREAMING VIDEO ON VARIOUS DEVICES, SEPTEMBER 2013 DEVICES Video Game Consoles Microsoft Xbox 360 Nintendo Wii Nintendo Wii U Sony PlayStation 3 Mobile Devices Apple iPad, iPhone, iPod Touch Google Android Microsoft Windows 7 Smartphone HDTV LG Mitsubishi Panasonic Philips Samsung Sanyo Sharp Sony Toshiba VIZIO Blu-Ray Players Insignia LG Magnavox Mitsubishi OPPO Digital Panasonic Philips Pioneer Samsung Sharp Sony Sylvania Toshiba VIZIO Yamaha DVRs TiVo Streaming Players Apple Logitech Roku Seagate Sony WD D-Link LG Note: Best Buy owns CinemaNow and Wal-Mart owns VUDU. Netflix is available on a few smartphones and tablets with the Google Android operating system. Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 90 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT LOVEFiLM The company’s LOVEFiLM unit will complement its Amazon Instant Video effort and serve as its primary vehicle for international expansion. In February 2008, Amazon.com became LOVEFiLM’s largest shareholder as part of a transaction in which Amazon.com sold the company its DVD rental business in Germany and the UK. In January 2011, Amazon.com acquired the company for €200MM. Netflix noted that it competed separately against LOVEFiLM in the UK, where both companies primarily acquire content on an exclusive basis. Regarding the potential for streaming video rights to be sold on a global basis, rather than by country/region, Netflix suggested that it would take someone with enough scale to make it happen for the content providers. The Emergence of Anytime and Anywhere Video Content Consumption We believe Amazon.com should be able to leverage the opportunity of video becoming more of an anytime and anywhere experience and appointment TV fades away. This should contribute to its long-term sales growth, and depending on the rate at which Amazon.com signs content, this could be accretive to its long-term margin. Although the timing of the move to true anytime, anywhere TV is unclear, we are convinced that we are heading in that direction. Netflix suggested that much will depend on what happens to advertising-supported TV in the next three years. Today content owners monetize their product via multiple avenues, including linear advertising-supported viewing, offering recent shows as part of a subscription with Hulu Plus, and licensing prior seasons for streaming and DVD viewing via Netflix and streaming with Amazon Instant Video, for example. Monthly Amazon Instant Video Offering Amazon tested charging a monthly fee for its Amazon Prime membership for a short period of time, ultimately discontinuing the practice. We believe it could restart this effort, especially as it bulks up its Amazon Instant Video offering with more exclusive content. Future Competition as More Services Become Untethered We believe more competition for streaming video services will come online as more traditional players, such as HBO, are untethered from subscription video services over time, such as cable and satellite TV. Netflix noted that there are many nuances that must be addressed when pursuing the direct-to-consumer business model, including payment mechanisms and marketing. The opportunity for Amazon, Netflix, and others is to provide a robust, differentiated service to motivate consumers to subscribe to multiple services, including those offered by Amazon, Hulu, Netflix and, down the line, HBO and Showtime. One way Amazon.com and Netflix are working toward that goal is by offering consumers exclusive content (see our comments on Amazon Studios). Piracy One challenge Amazon.com faces for Amazon Instant Video and LOVEFiLM is piracy (illegal free consumption of licensed content), with consumers opting to circumvent paid services to consume free digital content, as was the case for the music industry with the emergence of Napster. Netflix pointed out that video content providers, such as the movie industry, learned lessons from what happened with music and Napster. In addition, Netflix mentioned that video content appeals to a broader audience than the younger generation that was pirating music; it suggested that, for example, a “soccer mom” is less likely to visit a website that offers pirated th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 91 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT video content for free. We remain concerned about piracy, especially as Internet connection speeds increase over time and it becomes easier for a consumer to download longer-form media, such as movies. Amazon Studios SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: If Amazon could take an incremental 1.0% market share by 2015, it could add $540MM in revenue and 59 basis points to our sales growth projection for 2015. Margin Implications: Popular TV and movie content can still achieve a strong margin. If the company were able to add $1B of proprietary-content-related revenue in 2015 at a margin rate comparable to that of Disney (TAG’s 2015 forecast is 25.3%), it would add 20 basis points to our CSOI margin projection for 2015. Launched in November 2010, Amazon Studios has been the company’s channel for the growth of original feature films and TV series. Since its launch, more than 14,000 movie and 4,000 series pilot scripts have been submitted to the studio. The company now has 25 movies under development and 14 pilots that have been rolled out. Amazon Studios pilots are currently streamed for free and solicit immediate feedback from viewers. The pilots have featured such stars as John Goodman, Jeffrey Tambor, and Bebe Neuwirth and can be accessed on the Amazon Instant Video app across the company’s Kindle Fire lineup, as well as iPad, iPhone, iPod, Roku, Xbox, PlayStation 3, and Nintendo Wii. AMAZON STUDIOS PILOTS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Title Comedy Alpha House Betas Browsers Dark Minions Onion News Empire Supanatural Those Who Can’t Zombieland Reviews Picked Stars Number Up Creators Actors TAG Description Follows 4 Senators who live together in Washington DC A series on 4 friends cracking the code in Silicon Valley Follows 4 individuals in NYC as they start a news website Centers on 2 slackers who work on an intergalactic warship A news network spin-off from the popular satirical news outlet A series that follows 2 outspoken divas and their adventures A series based on juvenile misfit teachers and their students 4 survivors working together in a zombie apocalypse 4.1 4.3 3.0 3.7 4.3 4.2 4.4 3.7 3,117 1,859 926 971 2,099 817 1,725 6,055 yes yes no no no no no no Garry Trudeau Evan Endicott, Josh Stoddard David Javerbaum Kevin Sussman, John Ross Bowie Will Graham Lily Sparks Andrew Orvedahl Rhett Reese John Goodman Joe Dinicol Bebe Neuwirth John Ross Bowie Jeffrey Tambor Kristin Schaal Andrew Orvedahl Kirk Ward Kids Annebots Creative Galaxy Positively Ozitively Sara Solves It Teeny Tiny Dogs Tumbleaf 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.4 4.7 324 215 261 300 339 304 yes yes no no no yes JJ Johnson Angela Santomero Dara Monahan Carol Greenwald The Jim Henson Company Drew Hodges Katie Griffin Susan Roman Andy Yerkes Shannon Chan-Kent John Tartaglia Gary Littman Average 4.2 1,379 A series on a kid scientist, her best friend, and a robot A lovable little alien explores various faucets of art A carve-out of Frank Baum’s classic Wizard of Oz A mathematical mystery show for kids A children’s series that explores the world guided by dogs A small blue fox named Fig embarks on an adventure Source: Company website and TAG research. Given the exclusive nature of content from Amazon Studios, it could be more lucrative nonexclusive content to Amazon.com if it is successful, in our view. If any of these pilots become series, they would add to Amazon Instant Video’s short but growing list of exclusive content, which includes episodes of The Closer, Falling Skies, The West Wing, and Fringe. Most of Netflix’s content also is not exclusive, but its longer list of exclusive content includes its own content (Lilyhammer and House of Cards) and library content, such as Breaking Bad and Mad Men. We are encouraged by the announcements as Amazon continues to add content to Amazon Instant Video. Still, we are concerned that more agreements are exclusive, which suggests to th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 92 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT us that they are more expensive. Netflix has pointed out that exclusive content costs 1.3x-1.5x more to license than nonexclusive. Netflix also has been adding exclusive content, including deals with Disney (announced December 4, 2012), Queen Latifah’s Flavor Unit Entertainment (February 5), and DreamWorks Animation (February 12). When considering Amazon.com’s margins, which are already very narrow, we are closely monitoring the situation to see if it becomes an arms race, akin to satellite radio when Sirius and XM forged expensive exclusive deals for professional sports leagues, including MLB, NBA, and the NFL. AmazonFresh – Another Mechanism for Speedy Delivery As we indicated on page 44, we believe AmazonFresh is as much about fast delivery as it is about selling groceries. Based on our own experience, we were able to place an order in the evening and have it delivered between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. the following morning. Based on our own research of looking at open delivery times on its iPhone app, we were consistently able to arrange same-day shipping times for Attended Delivery (where the consumer is at the delivery location) and Doorstep Delivery (where the consumer does not have to be at the delivery location). In certain instances, we were able to line up Doorstep Delivery times within 12 hours of our orders. Just-in-Time Inventory and 3D Printing A potential game-changer sits on the horizon, though we do not think it will materially affect Amazon.com’s results by 2015. The basic concept is that Amazon will be able to leverage the combination of its broad fulfillment center distribution and emerging 3D printing technology to create a large number of SKUs in its fulfillment centers and ship to consumers in less than two days. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 93 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON WEB SERVICES (AWS) SALES/MARGIN IMPLICATIONS Sales Implications: Amazon.com includes the sales from AWS in its other line for its North American segment, which we estimate will represent 6.8% of its total revenue in 2015 vs. 3.8% in 2012 and 2.2% in 2009. This revenue line also includes sales from advertising and its co-branded credit card. Margin Implications: We estimate that its CSOI operating margin is in the low single digits, comparable to its consolidated CSOI margin of 2.7% in 2012. At its summit earlier this year, AWS indicated that it had cut pricing 31 times during its seven-year history, which supports our view that it prices its AWS effort aggressively, as it does its retail division, which results in low margins. At the summit, the company also indicated that it advised clients on how to save money using AWS, which resulted in $22MM in additional savings for its clients. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Amazon Web Services is the company’s cloud computing service, launched seven years ago, that it offers services to start-ups, small- and medium-sized businesses, and large companies across multiple industries and leverages Amazon.com’s technology infrastructure. AWS offers 33 major services and has hundreds of thousands of clients in more than 190 countries. Its marketplace (launched last year) spans more than 25 categories with 778 product listings, and it stores a massive number of objects (more than 2T vs. 905B in 1Q12). AWS CLIENTS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company website and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 94 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AWS CLIENTS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Source: Company website and TAG research. AWS also represents the company’s most significant business outside of its retail operations. It demonstrates that Amazon can apply many of the same principles from its retail efforts to non-retail opportunities. 8,000.0 80.0% 7,000.0 70.0% 6,000.0 60.0% 5,000.0 50.0% 4,000.0 40.0% 3,000.0 30.0% 2,000.0 20.0% 1,000.0 10.0% (Annual Growth) (NA Other Sales) AWS SALES, 2011-2015E 0.0% Annual NA Other Sales (Includes AWS) 2015E 2014E 2013E 2012 2011 0.0 YoY Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 95 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM’S REVENUE MIX, 2009 4.2% SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S REVENUE MIX, 2012 2.2% 0.4% 4.1% 3.8% 0.3% 91.7% 93.2% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l 1P Retail Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AMAZON.COM’S REVENUE MIX, 2015E 6.8% 0.3% 4.0% 88.9% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 96 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM’S GROSS PROFIT MIX, 2009 SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S GROSS PROFIT MIX, 2012 1.1% 1.9% 9.9% 15.5% 16.7% 15.1% 68.3% 71.5% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l 1P Retail Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AMAZON.COM’S GROSS PROFIT MIX, 2015E 0.9% 24.3% 62.0% 12.9% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 97 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM AMAZON.COM’S CSOI MIX, 2009 SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S CSOI MIX, 2012 60.0% 150.0% 103.1% 48.0% 50.0% 100.0% 40.0% 50.0% 20.0% 8.0% 29.3% 30.0% 0.0% 17.2% -50.0% 10.0% -100.0% 5.5% 0.0% 1P Retail -150.0% 3P Retail 109.7% Other - NA Other - Int'l (120.80%) 1P Retail Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AMAZON.COM’S CSOI MIX, 2015E 150.0% 132.3% 100.0% 67.5% 50.0% 4.9% 0.0% -50.0% -100.0% (104.7%) -150.0% 1P Retail 3P Retail Other - NA Other - Int'l Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 98 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Key Takeaways from 2013 AWS Summit Series We attended the AWS Summit series in New York City in both 2012 and 2013. For 2013, the summit series spanned 12 cities across the globe and was its largest yet, with more than 20K attendee registrations. The key takeaways from the 2013 AWS Summit series were as follows: We believe Amazon will continue to invest and expand AWS for years to come. The company’s comments that it has cut pricing 31 times since its first product launched on March 14, 2006, once again confirmed our view that it prices the service aggressively, and we estimate that it generates low-single-digit non-GAAP operating margins from this initiative. AWS is accelerating its pace of innovation, which should benefit its revenue growth, in our view. Although AWS accounts for less than 5.0% of its total revenue, we forecast that the effort will be accretive to the company’s total sales between 2012 and 2015. We believe the company’s service is benefiting Internet start-ups and large, established companies across multiple industries, as Amazon can leverage its tech infrastructure without having to invest in capital expenditures, and it can then scale up spending with demand. AWS and Capital Expenditures Investments in AWS contributed to the company’s increase in capital expenditures to $3.8B in 2012 (6.2% of revenues) from $1.8B in 2011 (3.8%) and $1.0B in 2010 (2.9%). We attribute the bulk of the increase to the company’s efforts to expand its fulfillment centers. We project 2013 capital expenditures at $4.3B (5.7% of sales), with AWS investing as one contributor. Among the current buckets Amazon is spending on during its current phase of hyperinvestment (AWS, hardware, fulfillment centers, and content for Amazon Instant Video), we expect that Amazon will continue to invest heavily in expanding AWS in five years, and we believe it is likely to scale back its spending on adding fulfillment centers, over that time frame. Increasing Innovation Should Drive Sales AWS is accelerating its pace of innovation, which should boost its revenue growth, in our view. It made 159 changes to its services in 2012 vs. 82 in 2011 and 61 in 2010, and the pace is accelerating in 2013, with 122 changes made in 1Q13 (suggesting a run rate of 244 for 2013). th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 99 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AWS NUMBER OF INNOVATIONS 600 100% 80% 70% 400 60% 300 50% 40% 200 30% (Annual Growth) (Number of Innovations) 90% 500 20% 100 10% 0 0% 2011 2012 2013E 2014E New Service Announcements & Updates 2015E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AWS INNOVATIONS 2011 2012 2013 YTD S3 Multi-Object Delete 6 new Direct Connect Sites Elastic Transcoder AWS Sao Paulo Region DynamoDB Amazon Redshift available to all customers AWS Oregon Region RDS in VPC AWS OpsWorks Elastic Beanstalk (Beta) AWS Trusted Advisor Amazon SES (Beta) CloudFormation in VPC AWS CloudFormation AWS Storage Gateway Amazon RDS for Oracle Amazon Glacier AWS Direct Connect CloudFront Live Streaming AWS GovCloud (US) Amazon CloudSearch Amazon ElastiCache AWS Marketplace VPC Virtual Networking Red Hat Reserved Instances VPC Dedicated Instances New EC2 Instance Types SMS Text Notification Mult-AZ Oracle RDS CloudFront Live RDS SQL Server Streaming EC2 RI Marketplace AWS Tokyo Region VM Export SAP RDS on EC2 Multiple Ips in VPC SAP BO on EC2 Provisioned IOPS Win Srv 2008 R2 on EC2 Oracle data Pump Win Srv 2003 VM Import New APAC Region - Sydney Amazon RDS now supports 3TB and 30,000 provisioned IOPS per database instance AWWS GovCloud (US) achieves FedRamp complaint agency ATO AWS Data Pipeline Source: Company website and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 100 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Low Prices Are Also Part of AWS’s Virtuous Cycle Similar to Amazon’s retail efforts which leverage a virtuous cycle based on low prices, large selection, and fast delivery, AWS has its own virtuous circle, which it described at its Amazon Web Services (AWS) conference in Las Vegas in November 2012. The more customers that use AWS more frequently, the more AWS is able to buy more infrastructure and take advantage of economies of scale and, therefore, lower prices which results in more customers using AWS more frequently, and so on. Amazon can also make the flywheel spin faster by adding new services and features, expanding internationally, and expanding the number of partners in its ecosystem enabling more companies to move to the cloud. AWS has cut its pricing more than 23 times (as of that time) without competitive pressure to do so, which is very powerful. For example, the company reduced pricing by at least 24% for its S3 service in December 2012 (illustrated below). AWS AMAZON S3 PRICE CUT (US – EAST STANDARD REGION), DECEMBER 2012 (?) Tier First 1 TB Next 49 TB Next 450 TB Next 500 TB Next 4,000 TB New Price $0.095 $0.080 $0.070 $0.065 $0.060 Old Price $0.125 $0.110 $0.095 $0.090 $0.080 Change (24.0%) (27.3%) (26.3%) (27.8%) (25.0%) Source: Company website and TAG research. AWS Aiding Internet Startups and Large, Established Firms, Alike. We believe the company’s service benefits firms of all sizes, including Internet start-ups and big firms, which are able to leverage Amazon’s tech infrastructure without having to invest in capital expenditures and then scale up spending with demand. For example, AWS has positively affected the growth of Internet start-ups including Datadog, Holler, and Mortar, and of big firms, such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, GE, and NASDAQ, which presented testimonials during the summit. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 101 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT WHO DOES AWS COMPETE WITH? Company Amazon.com Ticker Market Cap ($B) Founded Headquarters CEO Sales ($B) FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Adj. Operating Margin FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Capital Expenditures ($B) FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Balance Sheet (3/13) ($MM) Cash & Equivalents Debt Net Cash Debt/Total Capital Rackspace Microsoft IBM AMZN RAX MSFT IBM 138.1 5.6 264.9 203.0 1994 1998 1975 1911 Seattle, WA San Antonio, TX Redmond, WA Armonk, NY Jeff Bezos Lanham Napier Steve Ballmer Virginia Rometty 34.2 48.1 61.1 77.7 96.1 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 62.5 69.9 74.3 77.3 83.2 99.9 106.9 104.5 102.3 104.8 5.4% 3.0% 2.5% 2.9% 3.1% 10.2% 12.0% 11.3% 9.7% 10.6% 38.7% 38.9% 29.7% 28.3% 33.5% 19.7% 19.6% 21.0% 22.4% 23.8% 1.0 1.8 3.8 4.1 4.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 2.0 2.4 2.3 4.3 5.3 4.8 4.7 4.7 3.7 3.9 7,895 4,578 3,317 35.2% 279 106 173 10.7% 77 16 61 14.6% 10 34 (24) 65.8% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 102 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT MARGIN POTENTIAL AND LONG-TERM OUTLOOK Should Amazon.com choose to do so, we believe the company could increase its CSOI margin to 7.0% over the long term vs. our forecast for 3.9% in 2015, 2.7% in 2012, 6.4% in 2009 and its high-water mark of 7.1% in 2004, through a combination of increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales, converting Amazon Prime into more of a membership model (similar to the warehouse clubs), intensifying its advertising efforts, offering more private-label merchandise, and leveraging its expanded fulfillment center footprint. This scenario compares with Wal-Mart, another highly competitive retailer with a low-margin culture, which had an operating margin between 5.6% and 6.1% in 2002-2012 (its high-water mark during that period was 6.1% in 2010). Amazon.com’s CSOI margin does not include stock-based compensation and other operating expenses. If you include those items in WalMart’s operating margin for comparison’s sake, its average would be 130-230 basis points higher, or 6.9%-8.4% for 2002-2012. AMAZON.COM CSOI MARGIN, 2001-2015E 8.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% 1.0% 0.0% (1.0%) 2015E 2014E 2013E 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 (2.0%) Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. In the following table, we outline our long-term CSOI model for Amazon including its gross margin and operating expenses from its high-water-mark year in 2004 in addition to the timeframes included in this report: 2009, 2012, and 2015. LONG-TERM CSOI MODEL Gross Margin Long 2004 2009 2012E 2015E Term 23.1% 22.6% 24.8% 28.1% 29.0% Fulfillment Marketing Technology and Content G&A 8.5% 2.3% 3.6% 1.6% 8.0% 10.2% 10.9% 2.7% 3.8% 4.1% 4.3% 6.8% 7.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.3% 8.5% 4.1% 8.0% 1.3% CSOI Margin 7.1% 6.4% 7.0% 2.7% 3.8% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 103 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT MARGIN OPPORTUNITIES 2015 Margin Lift from $1B Sales (Basis Pts) Third-Party Sales 65 Membership 46 Advertising 33 Shipping 15 Private Label 7 2015 Margin Lift from 1% of Sales Mix (Basis Pts) 70 50 35 16 7 Odds of Achieving Margin Lift from 1% of Sales Mix in 2015 10% 10% 33% 100% 10% 2015 Margin Lift from 5% of Sales Mix (Basis Pts) 350 250 177 83 38 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Culture As with Costco, we believe Amazon.com’s culture will dictate its long-term margin as much as anything. Since the beginning, Amazon has focused on building its business and capturing market share at the expense of profitability, initially, and higher margins, more recently. Because of Amazon.com’s culture – for example, CFO Tom Szkutak ended his prepared remarks on the company’s last 20 quarterly earnings calls with, “We remain heads-down focused on driving a better customer experience through price, selection and convenience. We believe putting customers first is the only reliable way to create lasting value for shareholders – and competition, we believe it will always operate its business to generate low margins. As we have said before, if you give Amazon.com an incremental $0.10 of gross profit, it will invest $0.11 to grow its business. This is especially evident today as the company is in a hyper investment stage. These investments include adding fulfillment centers, increasing SKUs in company-branded hardware, building AWS, international expansion, and securing content for Amazon Instant Video. We believe that five years from now, Amazon.com will continue to invest, but at a slower pace, with a slowdown in the number of fulfillment centers added per year as the most obvious opportunity for a pullback; the company added 20 in 2012 and as of 2Q13, it indicated plans to add only five in the US and fewer than five outside the US in 2013. For that reason, we foresee a margin rebound as a binary event. If you give Amazon.com an incremental $0.10 of gross profit, it will invest $0.11 to grow its business. That said, we believe the company could pull a number of levers to increase its long-term CSOI margin, including leveraging its expanded fulfillment center footprint, increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales, advertising, private-label, and expanding Amazon Prime to more of a membership service (akin to the warehouse club model operated by Costco). Increasing Proportion of Third-Party Unit Sales MARGIN OPPORTUNITY We estimate that the incremental gross margin from a third-party sale vs. a first-party one is approximately 7,000 basis points. Therefore, every incremental $1B of revenue from thirdparty sales on Amazon.com would add 65 basis points to our base CSOI margin forecast for 2015. Our base forecast is for third-party units to increase to 41.0% of total in 2015 vs. 39.7% in 2012 and 29.8% in 2009. The company could raise its CSOI margin by increasing its proportion of third-party unit sales. A growing proportion of third-party unit sales is the key contributing factor to the company being able to improve its long-term gross margin. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 104 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Warehouse Club Membership MARGIN OPPORTUNITY Membership revenue represents the bulk of operating profits for warehouse club companies – BJ’s, Costco, and Sam’s Club. If Amazon.com were able to emulate their membership model more closely, so that the gross margin from Amazon Prime were 50.0% (half of that of the warehouse clubs, (representing incremental margin of at least 50.0% vs. today’s negative gross margin) every incremental $1B in revenue would add 46 basis points to our base CSOI forecast. We believe Amazon could improve its CSOI margin over the long term if it adopts the membership model employed by warehouse club operators, such as BJ’s, Costco, and WalMart’s Sam’s Club. Adoption of the membership model would require the company to enhance its Amazon Prime program by adding promotions and services similar to those offered by BJ’s, Costco, and Sam’s Club, such as car buying, insurance, and travel. The company took a small step in this direction with the February 2011 addition of Amazon Instant Video to Amazon Prime. Since then it has taken several additional steps, such as its free Kindle lending library. In the following table, we compare the terms and privileges of Amazon Prime with those of warehouse club memberships. Warehouse clubs derive a large portion of their profits from membership fees, and we believe such fees could benefit Amazon.com’s operating profit as well. In addition, attracting consumers to Amazon.com by offering services that are less costly to provide than free shipping could expand the company’s operating margin. For example, warehouse-club-type services could present an opportunity for Amazon to earn higher-margin commissions like those recorded by Costco and BJ’s on car buying, insurance, and travel. We estimate that these companies’ operating margins on membership fee revenue exceed 90%. The annual revenue figure we present in the table for Amazon Prime includes shipping revenue outside of Amazon Prime and Fulfillment by Amazon because the company does not break out Amazon Prime-only numbers. Amazon.com will indicate only that it has millions of members. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 105 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON PRIME VS. WAREHOUSE CLUB MEMBERSHIPS Year ending Total Members (MM) Costco 2-Sep-12 69.9 BJ's N/A Sam's Club 31-Jan-13 Amazon Prime 31-Dec-12 N/A 55 55 110 N/A 50 50 100 45 45 100 79 N/A N/A N/A Annual Fees Amazon Prime Business Members Individual Members Rewards Members Annual Fees/Revenues TTM Fees/Revenues ($MM) % of Total Revenue TTM Operating Income ($MM) % of Operating Income % of Net Income 2,264 2.2% 3,048 74.3% 111.5% 3,060 5.4% 1,998 153.2% Priveleges/Services Included Warehouse shopping privileges Costco Auto Program Auto & Home Insurance (Ameriprise) Mortgage & Refinancing (First Choice Bank) Boat & RV Loans and Refinancing Vehicle Repair Protection Domains, Websites and Online Solutions Water Delivery (DS Waters) Identity Protection (Identity Guard) Mexico Travel Auto Insurance (BWMIS) Online Investing (ShareBuilder) Personal Checks Warehouse shopping privileges Warehouse shopping benefits Free two-day shipping Health & Wellness services (Hearing Center / Health Travel: Car rentals, cruises, hotels screenings) and vacation packages Services: Auto Buying; BJ's Gold Exchange; BJ's Optical; BJ's Visa Card; Credit Card Acceptance; Custom-built sheds; Deli & Bakery Party Plannig; Discover Savings Products; Dish; Extended Warranties; Global Sales; Health Insurance; Home & Auto Insurance; Home Improvement; Tire Center; Verizon Wireless Free release-date delivery on Financial Services (Sam's Club video games, DVDs, books and Credit, Sam's Club Discover, Merchant Credit Card Processing, more SBA Small Business Loans) Amazon Instant Video Satisfaction & Freshness Guarantees Borrow books for free up to once a month Tire and Battery Center Electronic Services & Technical Assistance Source: Company websites and TAG research. Advertising MARGIN OPPORTUNITY When using Google, the market leader for online advertising as a guidepost for potential operating margins on advertising revenue, we estimate that for every incremental $1B of advertising revenue Amazon.com could generate in 2015 it would add 33 basis points to our CSOI margin forecast. Therefore, if Amazon.com were able to derive 5% of its 2015 sales from advertising, it could add 177 basis points to our base-level forecast. Amazon.com could improve its long-term CSOI margin by placing greater emphasis on advertising. We estimate that it could add 33 basis points to our annual CSOI margin forecast for every incremental $1B in ad revenue. Today, advertising revenue is the second-largest component of its North American Other sales component but a distant second to AWS. The company eMarketer estimates that Amazon.com generated $600MM of advertising revenue in 2012, or 25.5% of its North American Other revenue for that period. When it comes to its advertising efforts, Forrester noted that Amazon.com could leverage a lot of valuable information, including purchased-product and post-purchase details. The challenge for the company is that if it is successful, its advertisers’ efforts on Amazon.com could result in consumers leaving its website to make e-commerce purchases elsewhere. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 106 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT An increasing proportion of advertising sales could be a significant contributor to our longterm gross margin forecast. Shipping MARGIN OPPORTUNITY We estimate Amazon.com could add 1,300-2,000 basis points to its gross margin if it reduces its ship miles by adding fulfillment centers closer to its customers. At the midpoint (1,650 basis points) an incremental $1B of revenues would add 15 basis points to our base CSOI margin forecast. Amazon could improve its operating margin by leveraging its larger fulfillment center footprint. The company added 20 fulfillment centers in 2012, which brought the total to 89. Having fulfillment centers closer to consumers not only enables Amazon.com to offer faster shipping times but also allows it to reduce transit miles for products. For example, the company is adding a fulfillment center in New Jersey, following its sales tax agreement with that state; the center is located about 40 miles from Philadelphia and 60 miles from New York City. We believe the expanded footprint was one reason the company has recently had leverage on its shipping costs. Anecdotally, we purchased a lot of products from Amazon.com during the holidays in 2012, and many were shipped from its Arizona and Kentucky fulfillment centers to Connecticut.. Were the company able to ship that merchandise from New Jersey that could result in 13%20% savings on UPS’ ground rates as we move from zone 7 in Arizona and zone 4 in Kentucky to zone 2 in New Jersey. Leverage on shipping expenses from its increased fulfillment center footprint will be crucial for the company to reduce its fulfillment expenses from currently elevated levels. Private Label MARGIN OPPORTUNITY In retail, gross margins on private-label merchandise can be 500-1,000 basis points better than those on branded merchandise. At the midpoint (750 basis points), every incremental $1B of revenue derived from private-label merchandise would add 7 basis points to our 2015 CSOI margin estimate. In other words, for every 100 basis points of revenue Amazon.com can derive from private-label merchandise, it could increase its CSOI margin by 7 basis points. So if Amazon.com were able to match Whole Foods’ proportion of privatelabel merchandise, that could add 83 basis points to our margin forecast; and if it were able to duplicate Kroger’s proportion of private-label merchandise, it could add 221 basis points Private label represents a low-hanging-fruit-type opportunity for Amazon to improve its operating margin, in our view. The company could mirror the efforts of other low-margin operators, such as Costco and grocery stores, to improve its gross margin. Costco offers consumers the opportunity to save even more money with private-label merchandise under its Kirkland brand. Among grocers, Kroger’s supermarkets offer 11K private-label SKUs, which accounted for 27% of its revenues and 35% of units sold. Whole Foods has approximately 2,600 SKUs for its 365 Everyday Value private-label brand, and 11% of its grocery sales came from private labels. Today Amazon.com offers private-label merchandise on only a small number of items, such as the HDMI cords from our Super Bowl case study. An increasing proportion of private-label sales could be a significant contributor to our longterm gross margin forecast. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 107 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT COMPETITION: WHO COULD BE DEVOURED BY AND WHO COULD DISRUPT AMAZON.COM? LJM Consultants best described the competitive power of Amazon.com, in our view, when it stated that Amazon.com could do whatever it wanted to because it has the money, technology, and best shipping rates in the world thanks to its volumes. We asked our industry experts to name the companies they felt were most vulnerable to being disrupted by Amazon.com and the companies that could most likely disrupt Amazon.com. The results are outlined in the following figures, with Best Buy, Barnes & Noble, and Walmart receiving the most votes for the former and Google, Wal-Mart, and eBay for the latter. Who Could Be Devoured by Amazon? WHO COULD BE DEVOURED BY AMAZON? Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 108 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT WHO COULD BE DEVOURED BY AMAZON? BBY WMT BKS NFLX TGT EBAY UPS SHLD M FB AAPL Mr. Price Truworth's Edgar's JCP OMX ODP WAG FDX Fresh Direct LGF GOOG Toys "R" Us (pvt) SPLS DIS MSFT Bass Pro (pvt) REI (pvt) CHTR CVC CAB Brighthouse BAC 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% Source: TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 109 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT STRAW POLL RESULTS: COMPANIES AT RISK OF BEING DEVOURED BY AMAZON Source: Company websites and TAG research. Regarding those vulnerable to Amazon, rather than focus on the consensus selections, we comment on some of the more surprising selections – Bank of America, Disney, Facebook, FedEx, and UPS. Bank of America The notion is that Amazon could mirror the efforts of Walmart or PayPal in making bankingrelated services and payments less expensive and more convenient for the consumer. For example, in October 2012, Walmart and American Express launched Bluebird to provide consumers with a cheaper alternative to checking and debit accounts. PayPal is a conduit for consumers to make purchases both online and offline and extends consumers credit through its Bill Me Later division. As of today, Amazon.com does not allow consumers to pay with PayPal, but Zappos and the Quidsi family of websites do. Amazon.com has offered an Amazon.com rewards Visa card and an Amazon.com store card for some time. In May it launched Amazon Coins virtual currency, which we consider a potential catalyst for purchases on its Kindle Fire tablets, such as apps. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 110 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Disney Amazon Studios, the company’s crowd sourced efforts to create proprietary TV and movie content, was one reason Disney was named. In theory, Amazon’s crowd sourcing efforts to generate original content should help it avoid major box office bombs, such as John Carter, Mars Needs Moms, and, more recently, The Lone Ranger. It remains to be seen if Amazon.com’s crowd-sourcing model for TV shows and movies will be more effective than Disney’s process, but if it is we could see how the company could pressure Disney and other TV and movie studios. If its 14 TV pilots are a guide to the company’s ability to create popular content, its Amazon Studios pilots averaged 4.2 star ratings (out of five stars). Counterpoints: Our Entertainment and Communications analyst, Jaison Blair, offered the following counterpoints on why Amazon.com may not be able to disrupt Disney. Digital competitors can reduce some of the frictional costs of TV and film. However, it they are going to disrupt TV and film, it is not going to be an overnight bonanza, but rather a long hard-fought slog. Ongoing development costs are what Warren Buffet would refer to as the competitive moat of the TV business. There is no digital shortcut around the hard math of the network and studio business – TV and film require immense and ongoing costs associated with processing pitches, developing scripts, paying for pilots, signing up talent, getting shows on the air, promoting series, and distributing content globally. Even under the best case scenario, these costs (and the endless dead-ends of a creative business) produce only an occasional hit show which produces the vast majority of profits. The back of the envelope math is as follows: the average network processes many hundreds of pitches per year which requires time and attention of programming executives. He estimates that only about one in twenty script development deals (which can cost $10K to $500K per script) gets picked up as a pilot. The average cost of a pilot is $3MM-$4MM (e.g. the Mad Men pilot required three months of filming during a Sopranos production team break.) He estimates that only one in ten pilots gets picked up as a series. New series (~10 episodes for an original order) can cost $30MM-$40MM to produce based on talent, and $10MM-$50MM to promote. Only one in three series makes it past season one. In general, series cancelled within the first season run at a deficit for the network and studio. Only about 7% of all new series make it past five seasons (>100 episodes) which is generally when they provide high-margin revenues. Incumbents’ advantages include network effects and scale. Leading networks and studios are by definition more efficient because they can spread development costs over larger average audiences and global distribution platforms. Thus, a leader in a chosen genre becomes the buyer of choice (e.g. CBS in procedural dramas or ESPN in sports.) Further, companies like Disney can promote IP across every aspect of their business (e.g., parks, ABC, film, DisneyChannel). Incumbents also benefit from customer captivity. TV viewing is a behavior rather than a discrete purchase. As a result, audiences form viewing habits and market share changes slowly. Facebook Amazon’s advertising efforts were behind this choice, as we do not believe Amazon.com is going to build or buy a social network to directly compete against Facebook. We expect that with an estimated $600MM in advertising revenue in 2012 vs. $4.3B for Facebook, Amazon.com will continue to build upon its efforts in advertising. At a minimum, we believe it will continue to offer consumers lower-priced hardware in exchange for their willingness to view advertisements and promotions when they turn on their devices. We also believe the company will continue to show ads on its shopping websites, primarily Amazon.com. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 111 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT FedEx and UPS With AmazonFresh, the company is delivering products to consumers’ doorsteps. In Seattle, it is using Amazon trucks and Amazon drivers. In Los Angeles, it is using Amazon trucks and third-party drivers. Should the company continue to expand AmazonFresh or leverage its expanded fulfillment center network, it is easy to imagine Amazon disrupting the business of other expeditors, such as FedEx and UPS. DHL’s comments suggested to us that one motivation behind Amazon.com disrupting FedEx and UPS is to break up the duopoly the two companies have in the US market. Deutsche Post DHL noted that price increases in the German Parcel market, a much more competitive market than the US, have been much lower than those of FedEx and UPS in the US in the recent years. Forrester pointed out the pros and cons of Amazon.com attempting to disrupt FedEx and UPS. Forrester thinks Amazon.com believes it could ship merchandise for less money than FedEx and UPS charge; however, it would require investing billions of dollars to do so. The company is doing just that by adding fulfillment centers and via its Fulfillment by Amazon.com effort, and it is investing in trucking infrastructure in certain markets. For Amazon.com it would try to improve its shipping expenses, as Forrester estimates that Amazon.com accounts for as much as 20% of UPS’s global package volume, but the range in pricing for Amazon.com and UPS’s other clients is only 30%. Another industry source suggested that discounts were determined by the skill level of the negotiator and are not merely dependent on the volume of merchandise shipped, pointing out times when there were big differences in discounts despite comparable volumes. Counterpoints: TAG’s freight and logistics analyst, Josh Herrity, offered the following counterpoints regarding why Amazon.com may not be able to disrupt FedEx and UPS: th FedEx and UPS are among Amazon.com’s most important partners and it would be difficult for Amazon.com to run its business as effectively without being able to use the services of either one. He believes Amazon.com accounts for less of UPS’s volume than Forrester suggested. At a minimum, he pointed out that the company’s top 20 customers accounted for less than 10% of its global revenues. Although building fulfillment centers would be a step in the right direction toward competing against FedEx and UPS, it is only one component of several necessary to compete in delivery. For example, FedEx and UPS have spent decades building sophisticated networks. They operate two of the globe’s largest airlines, and UPS alone has $18B in property, plant, and equipment on its balance sheet, reflecting an expansive air and ground fleet along with state-of-the-art distribution facilities. The success of FedEx and UPS has made it very difficult for a third participant to enter the market at scale. Mr. Herrity noted the difficulties DHL (the leading logistics operator outside the Americas) had when it tried to penetrate the US market, which resulted in billions of dollars of losses. > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 112 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM VS. BANK OF AMERICA, FACEBOOK, FEDEX, UPS, SEPTEMBER 2013 Company Ticker Market Cap ($B) Founded Headquarters CEO Sales ($B) FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Adj. Operating Margin FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Capital Expenditures ($B) FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Balance Sheet (6/13) ($MM) Cash & Equivalents Debt Net Cash Debt/Total Capital Amazon.com AMZN 138.1 1994 Seattle, WA Jeff Bezos Bank of America BAC 147.2 1784 Charlotte, NC Brian Moynihan Disney DIS 119.7 1923 Burbank, CA Bob Iger Facebook FB 62.1 2004 Menlo Park, CA Mark Zuckerberg FedEx FDX 32.6 1971 Memphis, TN Fred Smith UPS UPS 81.6 1907 Atlanta, GA Scott Davis 34.2 48.1 61.1 77.7 96.1 111.4 94.4 84.2 91.4 92.4 38.1 40.9 42.3 45.2 48.0 2.0 3.7 5.1 6.7 7.3 34.7 39.3 42.7 46.0 48.7 49.5 53.1 54.1 56.5 60.0 5.4% 3.0% 2.5% 2.9% 3.1% 12.4% 4.1% 3.7% 27.4% 32.9% 17.4% 19.7% 21.9% 23.2% 24.4% 53.3% 53.2% 43.8% 37.9% 39.5% 5.8% 6.3% 7.8% 7.0% 9.3% 11.4% 11.4% 2.5% 13.3% 13.8% 1.0 1.8 3.8 4.1 4.3 987.0 1,307.0 0.0 N/A N/A 2.1 3.6 3.8 2.9 2.9 0.3 0.6 1.2 1.8 1.8 2.8 3.4 4.0 3.9 3.9 1.4 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 7,463 3,733 3,730 27.4% 98,800 541,559 (442,759) 71.3% 3,932 15,003 (11,071) 27.7% 10,252 1,500 8,752 11.7% 5,096 2,990 2,106 13.5% 6,192 11,923 (5,731) 71.1% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Who Could Disrupt Amazon? WHO COULD DISRUPT AMAZON.COM Source: Company websites and TAG research. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 113 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT STRAW POLL RESULTS: COMPANIES WHICH CAN DISRUPT AMAZON.COM WMT GOOG EBAY FB AAPL Uber TGT NFLX GRPN Fab COST Alibaba 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Source: TAG research. Google Google is to search what Amazon.com is to e-commerce, only it garners even greater market share in its category. Just as Amazon.com is expanding its tentacles into advertising, Google is doing the same for e-commerce, with an increasing number of services to compete against Amazon.com. Forrester noted one competitive advantage Google had over Amazon – when it comes to data on future purchase intent, Google is the leader. Similar to eBay, Google is coming after Amazon with its own same-day shipping service, Google Shopping Express, where it too is leveraging inventory at stores in major metropolitan areas vs. Amazon.com’s reliance on its fulfillment centers located close to major metropolitan areas. We discuss Google Shopping Express further on page 86. The company’s shopping site boasts information on more than 1B products, and many consumers start their shopping search at Google instead of Amazon.com. A recent initiative by the company is to prominently offer product listing ads (PLAs) on its website, which makes it even easier for merchants to showcase their products on Google and for consumers to find what they are looking for. Channel Advisor noted the influence of Google’s efforts on ecommerce in its August same-store sales report, pointing out the 7.7% comp from Google’s PLAs vs. only a 0.2% comp for traditional search. Wal-Mart With more than $1B per day in sales, Wal-Mart still has a scale advantage over Amazon.com, which, among other things, enables it to compete against Amazon.com on price. At year-end 2012 the company had many more fulfillment centers than Amazon, at 318 vs. 89. Like Amazon, Wal-Mart excels at logistics and does a great job of getting products to its stores, especially in advance of hurricanes. Including its 8,500 stores, Wal-Mart has a lot of points of distribution at which it sells products to consumers. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 114 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Based on our conversations with industry sources, Wal-Mart could leverage its infrastructure to transport e-commerce products from other merchants to its stores. For example, a consumer could purchase items from Walmart.com and L.L. Bean and pick them up at the local Walmart store. In its supply chain business DHL also runs warehouses and distribution centers, such as the Northeast distribution for Toys ‘R’ Us.com. One of the core offerings of DHL Supply Chain is the operation of distribution centers and warehouses as well as related transportation management. These services also cover e-fulfillment for B2C markets. Among Wal-Mart’s e-commerce efforts, one of our favorites as a differentiator from Amazon.com is allowing consumers to buy online and pick up in store and pay cash. The company also is testing a same-day shipping initiative with UPS, where it charges consumers $10 for the service. It owns video-streaming company Vudu, which competes against Amazon.com for à la carte movie offerings and could offer a streaming subscription service in the future to compete against Amazon Instant Video. An industry source suggested Walmart was big enough to be able to compete with Amazon.com for same-day delivery, including leveraging its store base in selective areas, such as San Jose. eBay eBay has positioned itself as the anti-Amazon – a partner of traditional and multichannel retailers, rather than a competitor. The company has successfully turned around its Marketplaces business, which is now, once again, a formidable competitor, having grown its number of active users at an accelerated rate for the past 15 quarters. Depending on how the federal legislation shakes out, small-scale sellers on eBay could have a sales tax advantage over Amazon.com. According to the Performance Market Association, 95% of eBay’s sellers have less than $1MM in revenue and would therefore be exempt from collecting sales taxes under the legislation that passed in the Senate. eBay is increasingly working with traditional and multichannel retailers to drive sales both on and off the Internet. For example, it is turning showrooming into a sales opportunity via technology. A customer will be able to visit Toys ‘R’ Us (an eBay Enterprise client) and scan the price of a toy with a PayPal app. eBay’s Where geolocater technology will recognize that the customer is at a Toys ‘R’ Us and will offer her an instant coupon to bring the price closer to parity with merchandise sold on Amazon and eBay. And PayPal wallet will enable her to pay for the merchandise from her smartphone, automatically earnings her Toys ‘R’ Us rewards and allowing her to skip the checkout counter on her way out of the store. We believe this very compelling suite of services will provide brick-and-mortar retailers an opportunity to convert showrooming to an in-store purchase. The company is also coming after Amazon.com with its own same-day shipping service, eBay Now, where it is leveraging inventory at stores in major metropolitan areas vs. Amazon.com’s reliance on its fulfillment centers located close to major metropolitan areas. We discuss eBay Now further on pages 85-86. Uber On the surface, Uber provides consumers a great way to get a black car to drive them around town. Below the surface lies what could become a tremendous logistics company, including an infrastructure to deliver consumers merchandise in a short period of time in major metropolitan areas. For example, the company delivered roses to consumers on Valentine’s Day in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New York City, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Washington D.C. and Toronto. . For that reason, we consider Uber a potential acquisition target for Amazon.com in the future. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 115 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT No One A number of our industry sources suggested that Amazon could not be disrupted because it was executing its strategy so effectively and had positioned itself so well from a competitive standpoint. AMAZON.COM VS. EBAY, GOOGLE, AND WAL-MART, JULY 2013 Company Ticker Market Cap ($B) Founded Headquarters CEO Sales ($B) FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Adj. Operating Margin FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Capital Expenditures ($B) FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E Balance Sheet (6/13) ($MM) Cash & Equivalents Debt Net Cash Debt/Total Capital Amazon.com AMZN 133.1 1994 Seattle, WA Jeff Bezos eBay EBAY 71.2 1995 San Jose, CA John Donahoe Google GOOG 300.6 1998 Mountain View, CA Larry Page Wal-Mart WMT 251.6 1969 Bentonville, AR Mike Duke 34.2 48.1 61.1 77.7 96.1 9.2 11.7 14.1 16.5 19.3 29.3 37.9 51.4 60.7 72.2 421.8 447.0 469.2 487.4 509.6 5.4% 3.0% 2.5% 2.9% 3.1% 29.5% 27.7% 27.3% 28.1% 29.0% 53.4% 48.9% 39.4% 39.3% 39.6% 6.1% 5.9% 5.9% 6.0% 6.0% 1.0 1.8 3.8 4.1 4.3 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.0 4.0 3.4 3.3 4.0 4.2 12.7 13.5 12.9 12.7 12.9 7,463 3,733 3,730 27.4% 10,436 4,533 5,903 16.2% 54,430 4,989 49,441 7.3% 9,020 54,009 (44,989) 43.6% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 116 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT CASE STUDY 12: HOW TO COMPETE AGAINST AMAZON.COM QVC, part of Liberty Interactive Corp., has described how it effectively competes against Amazon.com at its analyst meeting in November 2011. It sells differentiated product, competes effectively on price, and offers an engaging shopping experience. Differentiated Product About 70% of the merchandise offered by QVC cannot be found elsewhere. This gives consumers a reason to shop at QVC instead of Amazon.com. It also insulates QVC from price competition on its merchandise because consumers are unable to compare products against those of Amazon.com and therefore protects the products from being treated like commodities by consumers. We believe this opportunity will remain as many premium brands do not want their merchandise sold on Amazon.com, just as they would not want to offer their merchandise in Walmart or Home Depot stores. Examples include Louis Vuitton handbags or Stihl power tools. One easy way for companies to succeed in this area is through private-label merchandise. This has two benefits: First, consumers cannot find this merchandise at Amazon.com; second, prices on private-label merchandise should be lower than those on comparable branded products at Amazon.com. Competitive Pricing At the November 2011 Liberty analyst meeting, QVC indicated that it is able to compete against Amazon.com through its Today’s Special Value offering – where it features one item daily at a compelling price (lower than Amazon’s, even including shipping, handling, and sales tax). Today’s Special Value accounts for 25% of its sales. There is another nuance to QVC’s Today’s Special Value promotion that we believe is worth mentioning. Brands are willing to sell their products on QVC at low prices because of QVC’s video formatting, which acts as free TV advertising. The brands know that when they sell on QVC they also sell more merchandise at Bed, Bath & Beyond, Macy’s, and even Amazon.com.com because of this free advertising. QVC creates demand for products, especially with its use of video, which is a key differentiator of the shopping experience on QVC vs. Amazon.com. Best Buy, Target, and others have offered programs where they match Amazon.com’s prices, but they can be misleading and cumbersome to the consumer to use. Engaging Shopping Experience QVC also competes against Amazon.com by offering a more engaging and fun shopping experience. For example, the company has compared shopping for a particular shoe at Amazon.com with QVC. The Amazon shopping experience is very efficient, as you are able to locate and purchase the shoes in a short period of time. The experience at QVC is very engaging. The company’s programming often features a product’s designer, who tells customers about the inspiration behind the design. A very personable hostess, with whom the customers have built strong bonds, including through social networking (such as Facebook or Twitter) and one whom the customers trust, tells the shopper about the product’s wonderful attributes. Like its core customer, the hostess loves shopping. And if the consumer is merely looking for a quick way to purchase an item, QVC offers that functionality on its mobile app. Forrester compared the shopping experience on Amazon.com to spear fishing: You see what you want (the fish) and you buy it (stab it with a spear), and two days later the product is at your door. In that regard, Amazon.com is a fulfillment engine, an excellent tool for consumers to purchase merchandise when they know what they want. Other prime examples from retailers are Barnes & Noble’s author events (anecdotally, we saw consumers line up for several blocks in Manhattan for a book signing by former Met Mike Piazza). Lululemon has turned shopping for yoga pants into an experience, including offering yoga classes at malls. Apple’s customer service, such as its Genius Bar, and efforts to train consumers on how to use its products before and after purchase differentiate its stores and are a big reason behind its efforts to expand its stores’ square footage. Other Factors to Consider There are other important factors to consider when evaluating a retailer’s ability to compete against Amazon.com. For example, a loyalty program can entice a consumer to shop at a retailer even if it does not score well on the three criteria above. Credit is another example. Both HSN and QVC offer their customers certain items on a flex pay basis, allowing them to pay for products over time without interest. Some companies, such as Home Depot, Macy’s, and Williams Sonoma’s Pottery Barn, offer branded credit cards that have both loyalty and credit elements. For example, Pottery Barn may offer 12 months same as cash (i.e. no interest charges) when a consumer uses her Pottery Barn credit card to entice her to purchase a big-ticket item, such as a couch. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 117 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT ANCHOR POINTS Because of its high valuation, by any traditional metric (forward P/E or EV/EBITDA), it is very important to understand investor sentiment on AMZN. The combination of projecting Amazon.com’s operating performance (sales and earnings) with limited information from the company (such as the number of Amazon Prime members and percentage of sales and CSOI from AWS, to name a few items on a very long list) and trying to determine how investors will respond to the company’s earnings announcements makes for one extremely challenging stock to analyze. For example, more and more investors we talk to on the name admit that even if we were able to read the company’s earnings press release before the company officially announced its results, it would be very difficult to determine if the stock was going to go higher or lower afterward. As we see it, four anchor points are important to track to forecast AMZN’s likely short-term stock performance: sales growth, unit growth, gross profit growth, and AWS’s sales growth (the newest one). Over the long term, we believe the stock trades on the company’s ability to grow market share in US and non-US e-commerce, US retail sales, international retail sales, and any other markets Amazon can penetrate (as evidenced to date by AWS). In our efforts to better forecast Amazon.com’s stock performance, we will continue to closely monitor these data points and investors’ reaction to their gyrations and will look for other data points that may become anchors for Amazon.com’s short-term share price in the future. Sales Growth: Primary Anchor Point In our view, sales growth remains the primary anchor in determining Amazon.com’s shortterm stock price moves. If sales growth meets expectations, the stock should continue to trade higher even if CSOI is low or even negative. The challenge for the company and investors is to determine how much sales growth is enough, especially as Amazon gets bigger and bigger and it is more difficult for it to maintain FX-adjusted top-line growth of 30% or even 25% or 20%. We forecast a sales CAGR of 20.5% for 2012-2015, which compares against the 35.6% achieved for the three-years ending 2012 and 31.8% for the prior three-year period. We believe that is strong enough growth for the stock to continue to increase in value over that timeframe. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 118 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT SHARE PRICE VS. SALES GROWTH. 3Q04-4Q15E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Unit Growth After sales growth, based on our conversations with investors, unit growth is the next anchor, the most important among the secondary anchors (unit growth, gross profit growth, and AWS’s sales growth). With more units coming from third-party sellers, which, for accounting reasons have less of an impact on revenue growth, we believe unit growth may be less important an anchor in the future. SHARE PRICE VS. UNIT GROWTH. 3Q04-4Q15E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Gross Profit Growth Amazon.com is currently in a period of hyper investment. The company is investing in building AWS, adding fulfillment centers, expanding its hardware, and adding content for Amazon Instant Video. As a result of all of these investments, its CSOI is depressed. Many investors th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 119 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT are focusing on the company’s gross profit growth under the assumption that investments will slow at some point and that Amazon.com’s CSOI will rebound. The problem with focusing on gross profit growth is that there has been a fundamental change in the pricing for e-books following agreements between the US Department of Justice and publishers, which is distorting gross profit growth numbers. SHARE PRICE VS. GROSS PROFIT GROWTH. 3Q04-4Q15E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. AWS’s Sales Growth The newest anchor is AWS’s sales growth as large-cap tech investors look at Amazon.com as a mechanism to invest in the emerging cloud computing market. The surprise here is that AWS is still a small portion of the company’s total revenue (its North American other segment, which includes AWS, represented 3.8% of 2012 sales). The company’s willingness to disrupt its peers with aggressive pricing, however, has investors opting for Amazon.com’s shares over those of Rackspace and others, in our view. AMAZON.COM’S SHARE PRICE VS. NA OTHER SALES GROWTH, 1Q06-4Q15E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 120 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Market Share Long-term, we believe Amazon.com’s market share (initially for e-commerce, but ultimately for total commerce just as initially it will be for the US market and eventually for the global one) will be the most important determinant of its share price. E-Commerce Market Share 4Q15E 1Q15E 2Q14E 0 3Q13E 0.0% 4Q12 50 1Q12 5.0% 2Q11 100 3Q10 10.0% 4Q09 150 1Q09 15.0% 2Q08 200 3Q07 20.0% 4Q06 250 1Q06 25.0% 2Q05 300 3Q04 30.0% (Stock Price) (Market Share) SHARE PRICE VS. US E-COMMERCE MARKET SHARE, 3Q04-4Q15E Stock Price Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 121 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT LONG-TERM OUTLOOK AND VALUATION For valuation, we came up with annual estimates for the next 10-year period, including sales, free cash flow, and share count. We used our long-term CSOI margin forecast of 7.0% as one of the cornerstones of our analysis. We projected that the company could achieve a 16.0% sales CAGR for 2012-2022, compared with 31.6% achieved in the prior 10-year period. (That would represent a premium to the rate achieved by our comparison group of mature retailers from the last 10-year period – 2002-2012 – Costco 9.8%, Target 7.0%, and Wal-Mart 8.8%.) Next, we examined the current free cash flow yields for stocks of more mature retailers – Costco, Target, and Wal-Mart. When considering the similar cultures – highly competitive, comfortable operating low-margin businesses – and our view that Amazon.com will have a more global footprint over the long term, more similar to that of Wal-Mart and less similar to those of Costco and Target, we used Wal-Mart as the comp for our long-term valuation analysis of Amazon.com’s shares. We discounted the long-term figure back at 10.0% per year to arrive at our new 12-month price target for the shares of Amazon.com of $400. FREE CASH FLOW YIELD AND LONG-TERM VALUATION Costco Target Wal-Mart Current Share Price Target NA NA NA Current Share Price 117.94 64.55 75.83 12-Month Share Price Target NA NA NA Long-Term Share Price Target NA NA NA Amazon.com's valuation based on the free-cash flow yields for: Costco NA 666 732 1,427 Target NA 241 266 518 Wal-Mart NA 369 400 790 Free Cash Flow Yield 2013 2014 2015 2020 2021 2022 1.8% 2.3% 3.0% 7.8% 4.8% 8.2% 5.8% 4.7% 5.4% NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.0% 8.2% 5.4% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 122 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT APPENDIX Our Method for Estimating Amazon.com’s GMV, Third-Party Sales, and Third-Party CSOI Amazon.com provides quarterly data on revenues, unit sales growth, and percent of paid units that come from third-party. To estimate its gross merchandise volume (GMV) we needed to come up with our own estimates for average selling prices and take rate (the amount of money Amazon.com receives in commissions for sales by third parties on its website). Based on our GMV and take rates estimates we derived a projection for its revenues from third-party sales. To project its consolidated segment operating income on a by-segment basis (first party, third party, and AWS we needed to estimate its gross margins by segment and allocate its operating expenses. AMAZON.COM REVENUE BREAKDOWN Line North America Media Electronics and Other General Merchandise Other Total North America Includes AWS, Advertising, Co-Branded Credit Card International Media Electronics and Other General Merchandise Other Total International Advertising, Co-Branded Credit Card Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. ANNUAL REVENUES, 2011-2015E 35.00% 60,000.0 30.00% 50,000.0 25.00% 40,000.0 20.00% 30,000.0 15.00% 20,000.0 10.00% 10,000.0 5.00% 0.0 0.00% Annual Revenue Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2015E 70,000.0 2014E 40.00% 2013E 80,000.0 2012 45.00% 2011 90,000.0 YoY Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com YoY Growth Annual Revenues QUARTERLY REVENUES, 2011-2015E 123 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT QUARTERLY UNIT SALES GROWTH, 2011-2015E 50.0% 60.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 40.0% 10.0% 0.0% 30.0% (10.0.%) 20.0% YoY Change Unit Grow th 50.0% (20.0.%) (30.0.%) 10.0% (40.0.%) (50.0.%) Unit Growth 3Q15E 1Q15E 3Q14E 1Q14E 1Q13 3Q13E 3Q12 1Q12 3Q11 1Q11 0.0% YoY Change Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. QUARTERLY THIRD-PARTY UNITS MIX, 2011-2015E ANNUAL THIRD-PARTY UNITS MIX, 2011-2015E 43.0% 42.0% 41.0% 40.0% 39.0% 38.0% 37.0% 36.0% 35.0% 34.0% 33.0% 32.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Amazon’s Average Selling Price One way to ballpark Amazon.com’s average selling prices (ASPs) is to look at the average and median selling prices of its top-selling units on a by-category basis. This analysis suggests an ASP of $40-$62, based on the average, and $16-$20, when using the median. We chose to go with the median at $20 because we believe it more accurately reflects the large number of lower-ticker items the company sells, such as e-books. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 124 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT TOP ITEM SALES AT AMAZON AND AVERAGE SELLING PRICES, JUNE 2013 Category Appliances Appstore for Android (Paid only) Arts, Crafts & Sewing Automotive Baby Beauty Books Camera & Photo Cell Phones & Accessories Clothing Computers & Accessories Electronics Gift Cards Store Grocery & Gourmet Food Health & Personal Care Home & Kitchen Home Improvement Industrial & Scientific Jewelry Kindle Store #1 Item GE MWF Refrigerator Water Filter, 1-Pack Dentist Office Kids 15pcs Nail Art Painting Pen Brush Viking 912600 8-Way Heavy Duty Spray… Vulli Sophie the Giraffe Teether Dotting 5 X 2 Way Marbleizing Dotting… Inferno, by Dan Brown GoPro HERO3: Black Edition iPhone 4 / 4S Anti-Glare, Anti-Scratc… Ray-Ban RB2132 New Wayfarer Sunglasses Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 (7Inch, Wi-Fi) Kindle Fire HD 7", Dolby Audio, Dual-… Amazon Gift Card - E-mail Donut Shop K-Cup packs for Keurig Bre… Playtex Diaper Genie Refill (810 coun… Cuisinart CGS-5014 14Piece Deluxe St… GE MWF Refrigerator Water Filter, 1-Pack Emergency Mylar Thermal Blankets (Pac… Vintage, Retro Colorful Crystal Owl P… Price 33.99 0.99 2.43 5.64 19.99 1.76 16.19 399.99 0.85 127.68 169.00 199.00 50.00 29.99 16.99 37.49 33.99 6.60 0.97 26.49 MP3 Downloads (Paid only) Up the Down Staircase Paderno World Cuisine A4982799 Tri-Bl… 101 - The Essential Blues Album, Various Magazines National Geographic 15.99 Movies & TV Favors 13 [Deluxe Edition], by Black Sabbath 1.99 Kitchen & Dining Music Musical Instruments Office Products Patio, Lawn & Garden Pet Supplies Shoes Software Sports & Outdoors Toys & Games Video Games Watches 8.08 2.99 14.99 Snark SN-1 Tuner 8.34 GP Spectrum Multi-Use Paper, 8.5 x 11… 13.99 Cuisinart CGS-5014 14Piece Deluxe St… 37.49 Merial Frontline Plus Flea and Tick C… 57.15 Reef Men's Fanning Sandal 59.25 Norton 360 2013 - 1 User / 3 PC [Down… 22.99 Insanity 60 Day 13 Dvd Workout 144.80 Cards Against Humanity PlayStation 4 Standard Edition Geneva Rose Gold Plated Classic Round… Average Median 25.00 399.96 7.50 57.16 19.99 #2 Item Little Giant Classic 10103LGW 300-Pou... Minecraft - Pocket Edition Brother CS6000i FeatureRich Sewing M… BAFX Products (TM) PIC18F2480 Bluet… Nosefrida The Snotsucker Nasal Aspirator Extra Strength Hair Nutrient Tablets,… A Song of Ice and Fire, Books 1-4, by G. Martin Canon PowerShot A2300 16.0 MP Digital… Apple Lightning to USB Cable Carhartt Men's Workwear Pocket T-Shir… Tech Armor Apple iPad Mini Premium HD… Kindle Paperwhite, 6" High Resolution… Amazon Gift Card - E-mail #1 Dad Nature's Way Organic Extra Virgin Coc… Pampers Sensitive Wipes 12x Box with… Paderno World Cuisine A4982799 Tri-Bl… Little Giant Classic 10103LGW 300-Pou… Commercial Chalkboard Contact Paper,… 316L Surgical Steel 14 Guage Leaf Dan… Price 349.99 6.99 154.99 23.99 12.29 29.05 19.79 79.00 16.99 22.95 7.95 119.00 50.00 8.89 22.89 26.49 349.99 8.02 1.59 Forever Too Far 3.99 BlenderBottle® Classic 28ounce Black 6.53 Tomorrow's Harvest, by Boards of Canada 6.99 Popular Science (1-year auto-renewal) 7.00 Star Trek: The Complete Original Seri… 106.41 Random Access Memories, by Daft Punk 11.88 Planet Waves Assorted Pearl Celluloid… 3.68 Velcro Reusable SelfGripping Cable T… 7.10 Weber 7416 Rapidfire Chimney Starter 14.99 Precious Cat Ultra Premium Clumping C… 22.56 Crocs Unisex Classic Clog Premium SP1 64bit (OEM… 32.23 Camelbak Eddy Bottle Cards Against Humanity: First Expansion Xbox One Console - Day One Edition U.S. Polo Assn. Sport Men's US9061 Bl… 16.99 90.91 #3 Item Price Maytag UKF8001 Pur Refrigerator Cyst... 29.50 Plants vs. Zombies (Kindle Tablet Edi… 0.99 Art Advantage Oil and Acrylic Brush S… 14.98 Autel MaxiScan MS300 CAN Diagnostic S… 16.99 Baby Einstein Take Along Tunes 8.99 Lovely Vintage Jewelry Crystal Peacoc… 0.95 Joyland (Hard Case Crime) 6.79 Dropcam HD Wi-Fi Wireless Video Monit… 147.99 iPhone 5 USB Cable, Car Charger 5V 1A… 3.32 Levi's Men's 501 Jean Samsung Chromebook (Wi-Fi, 11.6-Inch) Kindle, 6" E Ink Display, WiFi - Inc… Amazon Gift Card Upload Your Photo -… Brooklyn Beans Variety Pack Coffee K-… Fitbit One Wireless Activity Plus Sle… SODIAL- Mickey Mouse Face Shape Cooki… Maytag UKF8001 Pur Refrigerator Cyst… Kapro 990V-41-48 Zeus Vision Box Leve… 2.00 Carat Cubic Zirconia Earrings. S… Inferno: A Novel (Robert Langdon) SODIAL- Mickey Mouse Face Shape Cooki… 13, by Black Sabbath Cosmopolitan (1-year autorenewal) Skyfall (Blu-ray/ DVD + Digital Copy) Wrote a Song For Everyone, by J. Fogerty On Stage XCG4 Tubular Guitar Stand wi… Brother Laminated Black On White Tape… Weber 6424 21-Inch TBrush Bayer Advantage II Purple 6-Month Fle… KEEN Newport H2 Sandal (Toddler/Littl… Office Mac Home and Student 2011 - 1P… 55.50 249.00 69.00 50.00 22.00 89.00 0.64 29.50 79.00 0.01 12.99 0.64 7.99 15.00 12.00 11.88 9.95 19.26 12.33 50.84 127.49 119.99 21.99 Hip Hop Abs DVD Workout 27.94 Cards Against Humanity: Second Expansion 10.00 PlayStation 4 Launch Day Edition N/A Casio Men's DW9052-1V G-Shock Classic… 39.42 62.12 19.79 39.76 16.00 10.00 499.96 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 125 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM QUARTERLY AMAZON.COM ASPs, 2011-2015E SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM ANNUAL ASPs, 2011-2015E $25.00 $25.00 $20.00 $20.00 $15.00 $15.00 $10.00 $10.00 $5.00 $5.00 $- Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2015E 2014E 2013E 2012 2011 3Q15E 1Q15E 3Q14E 1Q14E 3Q13E 1Q13 3Q12 1Q12 3Q11 1Q11 $- Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Amazon.com’s Take Rate To calculate Amazon’s revenue from third-party unit sales we had to estimate the company’s commission rate, or take rate – the amount of money it receives for sales of third-party merchandise on its platform. In the following table we illustrate the company’s commission rates for third-party sales in different categories. We conservatively chose a take rate of 11%, which is lower than the average rate, because we would rather under-state and overstate its third-party sales. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 126 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON COMMISION RATES BY CATEGORY, JULY 2013 Category Automotive Parts & Accessories Baby Products Beauty Camera & Photo Clothing, Accessories & Luggage Consumer Electronics Electronic Accessories Gift Cards Grocery & Gourmet Food Health & Personal Care Home & Gardening Industrial & Scientific Jewelry Kindle Accessories Kitchen Media (ex-Video Game Consoles) Media (Video Game Consoles) Motorcyles, ATV & Protective Gear Musical Instruments Office Products Personal Computer Shoes Sports & Outdoors Sports and Entertainment Collectibles Tools & Home Improvement Toys & Games Unlocked Cell Phone Watches Everything Else Commission Rate 12% 15% 15% 8% 15% 8% 8%, 15% 20% 15% 15% 15% 12% 20% 25% 15% 15% 8% 12% 15% 15% 6% 15% 15% 6%-20% 12% 15% 8% 15% 15% Range Median Average 6%-25% 15% 14% Notes: Home & Gardening includes pet supplies. Media products also include a variable closing fee of $1.35 per. Commission rates are staggered for Sports and Entertainment Collectibles and Electronic Accessories and decrease as the price of the merchandise increases. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 78.0% 77.0% 76.0% 75.0% 74.0% 73.0% 72.0% 71.0% 70.0% 69.0% 68.0% AMAZON.COM ANNUAL TAKE RATE 2011-2015E 74.1% 74.1% Take Rate 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% 74.1% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2015E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E 2013E 2012 2011 3Q15E 1Q15E 3Q14E 1Q14E 3Q13E 1Q13 3Q12 1Q12 3Q11 74.1% 1Q11 Take Rate AMAZON.COM QUARTERLY TAKE RATE, 2011-2015E 127 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Amazon.com’s GMV In the following table we illustrate Amazon.com’s GMV, based on the assumptions we outlined above for ASPs and Take Rate and the company’s data on unit growth and proportion of third-party units. AMAZON.COM QUARTERLY GMV, 2011-2015E AMAZON.COM ANNUAL GMV, 2011-2015E 50,000.0 45,000.0 40,000.0 35,000.0 30,000.0 25,000.0 20,000.0 15,000.0 10,000.0 5,000.0 0.0 160,000.0 140,000.0 120,000.0 100,000.0 80,000.0 60,000.0 40,000.0 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2015E 2014E 2013E 2012 0.0 2011 3Q15E 1Q15E 3Q14E 1Q14E 3Q13E 1Q13 3Q12 1Q12 3Q11 1Q11 20,000.0 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. In the following table, we illustrate how our numbers fare against those of Channel Advisor for 2012. Many of the differences stem from our lower ASP assumption on both first-party and third-party unit sales. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 128 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT AMAZON.COM’S GMV: OUR ESTIMATE VS. CHANNEL ADVISOR’S, 2012E First-Party Average Selling Price First-Party Units (MM) First-Party Units (Mix) First-Party GMV (MM) First-Party GMV (Mix) First-Party Revenue ($MM) First-Party Revenue (Mix) TAG 20 2,825 71% 56,039 71% 56,039 96% Channel Advisor 30 1,500 60% 45,000 47% 45,000 90% Third-Party Average Selling Price Third-Party Units (MM) Third-Party Units (Mix) Third-Party GMV (MM) Third-Party GMV (Mix) Take Rate Third-Party Revenue ($MM) Third-Party Revenue (Mix) 20 1,157 29% 23,022 29% 11% 2,532 4% 50 1,000 40% 50,000 53% 10% 5,000 10% Total Units (MM) Total GMV Total Revenue ($MM) 3,981 79,061 58,571 2,500 95,000 50,000 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Gross Margin Assumptions To project by-segment gross profits, we made the following assumptions: the gross margin on third-party sales is 90.0%, North American Other revenue is 100.0% and International Other revenue is 100.0%. We also assumed that Amazon.com’s first-party sales of physical merchandise are profitable on both a gross margin and by-segment CSOI bases. AMAZON.COM QUARTERLY GROSS MARGIN, 2011-2015E 35.0% 60.0% 30.0% 50.0% Annual Gross Margin 20.0% 10.0% 35.0% 20.0% 30.0% 25.0% 15.0% 20.0% 15.0% 10.0% 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0% Quarterly Gross Margin YoY Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Annual Gross Margin 2015E 2014E 2013E 0.0% 2012 3Q15E 1Q15E 3Q14E 1Q14E 3Q13E 1Q13 3Q12 1Q12 3Q11 1Q11 0.0% 2011 0.0% YoY Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com YoY Change 15.0% YoY Change 30.0% 40.0% 25.0% 40.0% 20.0% 45.0% 30.0% 25.0% Gross Margin AMAZON.COM ANNUAL GROSS MARGIN, 2011-2015E 129 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT Operating Expenses Estimates To project by-segment CSOI, we allocated operating expenses on a percentage of sales basis. AMAZON.COM QUARTERLY CSOI, 2011-2015E AMAZON.COM ANNUAL CSOI, 2011-2015E 2.5% 2.5% 2.0% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 3Q15E 1Q15E 3Q14E 1Q14E 3Q13E 1Q13 3Q12 1Q12 3Q11 1Q11 0.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2015E 3.0% 3.0% 2014E 3.5% 3.5% 2012 4.0% 4.0% 2011 4.5% 2013E 5.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Historical Performance Vs. Guidance and Our Estimates In the following table we compare Amazon.com’s historical operating results against its guidance and our projections. Typically, the company provides quarterly guidance on revenue, the impact on currency exchange rates on sales growth, and GAAP operating income. PERFORMANCE VS. GUIDANCE AND TAG ESTIMATES, 1Q08–3Q13E Date Provided 1Q10 1/28/10 2Q10 4/22/10 3Q10 7/22/10 4Q10 10/21/10 1Q11 1/27/11 2Q11 4/26/11 3Q11 7/26/11 4Q11 10/25/11 1Q12 1/31/12 2Q12 4/26/12 3Q12 7/26/12 4Q12 10/25/12 1Q13 1/29/13 2Q13E 4/25/13 3Q13 7/25/13 Q1 Net Sales ($MM) Low High TAG Estimate Actual 6,450 7,000 NA 7,131 6,100 6,700 NA 6,566 6,900 7,625 NA 7,560 12,000 13,300 NA 12,948 9,100 9,900 NA 9,857 8,850 9,650 9,757 9,913 10,300 11,100 11,000 10,876 16,450 18,650 18,597 17,431 12,000 13,400 12,828 13,185 11,900 13,300 12,700 13,185 12,900 14,300 13,655 13,806 20,250 22,750 22,523 21,268 15,000 16,600 16,678 16,070 14,500 16,200 16,332 15,704 15,450 17,150 17,000 NA Net Sales Growth Low High TAG Estimate Actual 32% 43% NA 46% 31% 44% NA 41% 27% 40% NA 39% 26% 40% NA 36% 28% 39% NA 38% 35% 47% 49% 51% 36% 47% 46% 44% 27% 44% 44% 35% 22% 36% 30% 34% 20% 34% 28% 34% 19% 31% 26% 27% 20% 34% 29% 22% 14% 26% 26% 22% 13% 26% 27% 22% 12% 24% 23% NA FX Impact on Growth Rate (Basis Points) 500 100 (300) (70) 140 640 490 130 (50) (280) (400) (280) (414) (275) (300) GAAP Operating Income ($MM) Low High TAG Estimate Actual 275 365 NA 394 220 320 NA 270 210 310 NA 268 360 560 NA 474 260 285 NA 322 95 245 222 201 20 170 158 79 (200) 250 25 260 (200) 100 62 192 (260) 40 39 107 (350) (50) (65) (28) (490) 310 164 405 (285) 65 61 181 (340) 10 254 79 (440) (65) 32 NA GAAP Operating Income Growth Low High TAG Estimate Actual 13% 50% NA 61% 39% 102% NA 70% (16%) 24% NA 7% (24%) 18% NA (0%) (34%) (2%) NA (18%) (65%) 9% (18%) (26%) (93%) (37%) (41%) (71%) (47%) 142% (95%) (3%) (162%) 69% (81%) (40%) (162%) 69% (80%) (40%) NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF (66%) (68%) (5.7%) NMF (91%) (26%) NMF NMF NMF (216%) NA Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 130 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT ShopRunner In the following table, we show the participating merchants in ShopRunner, a competing shipping membership program that was initially started by GSI Commerce, which is now part of eBay. SHOPRUNNER—PARTICIPATING RETAILERS, JULY 2013 aerie Chefs Haggar PetSmart AEO Factory Store Claire's Helly Hansen RadioShack American Eagle Outfitters Costume Express Icing Readingglasses.com Anne Klein David's Cookies igourmet.com Reeds Jewelers Auto Zone Destination Kona kimi's korner Shoes.com Babies R Us Domino's Pizza Landing Zone Shop PBS bare necessities Drugstore.com Lord & Taylor SleepyHeads.com Beauty.com Eastern Mountain Sports Luxury Lane Speedo Beauty.com eBags MacMall Sports Authority Birthday Express ESPN Shop MLB.com Shop The Organized Parent Blue Nile eToys.com Nascar.com Superstore The Perfume Spot Blue Sky Co. FAO Schwarz NBA Store Tiny Nirvana Brooks Brothers Fathead Newegg.com Timberland Buycostumes.com Fogdog Sports NFLshop.com Tommy Hilfiger Calvin Klein FranklinPlanner Shop.NHL.com Toys R US Candy.com FTD Nine West WatchWear.com Case HQ Geekorize Olly Wilsons Leather Celebrate Express GNC OnlineShoes Wireless Emporium Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Tracking Amazon.com Shipments Using our own experience as an example, we are noticing more packages originating on the East Coast, which suggests Amazon is leveraging its expanded network of fulfillment centers to cut miles shipped, which should enable it to save significant dollars on shipping. For 31 of our 34 orders (91.2%) we were able to take advantage of our Amazon Prime membership for two-day delivery. Twenty five (73.5%) were delivered by UPS, 7 (20.6%) came via FedEx, and 1 (2.9%) was DHL and 1 (2.9%) was USPS. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 131 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT TRACKING OUR AMAZON.COM ORDERS, 2013 Ordered Sun Sat Thu Sun Mon Thu Tue Tue Sat Thu Thu Thu Mon Mon Tue Sat Sat Fri Mon Wed Sun Wed Sun Wed Tue Mon Mon Mon Mon Sun Sun Mon Sat Fri Date 9/15/13 9/7/13 9/5/13 8/4/13 7/29/13 7/18/13 7/9/13 7/9/13 6/29/13 6/13/13 6/13/13 6/13/13 6/10/13 6/10/13 6/11/13 6/8/13 6/8/13 6/7/13 5/20/13 5/15/13 5/5/13 4/24/13 4/21/13 4/3/13 3/26/13 3/25/13 3/25/13 3/25/13 3/25/13 3/24/13 3/24/13 3/11/13 1/19/13 1/18/13 Seller Drill Spot Zulera Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Heart Rate Monitors USA Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Health and Beauty and More for Less Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Shevos World of Products E Shop Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com ClosedoutBats Amazon.com Amazon.com Amazon.com Average Two-Day Shipping Delivery Type Carrier Days Two-Day Shipping UPS 4 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 5 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 4 Two-Day Shipping UPS 2 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 4 Two-Day Shipping UPS 2 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 2 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Standard DHL 5 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 2 Two-Day Shipping UPS 5 Two-Day Shipping UPS 4 Two-Day Shipping UPS 5 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Standard UPS 5 Standard USPS 6 Two-Day Shipping UPS 4 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 3 Two-Day Shipping FedEx 3 Two-Day Shipping UPS 4 Two-Day Shipping UPS 6 Business Days 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 5 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 5 5 4 3 2 2 3 3 4 3.5 3.4 2.9 2.7 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 132 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT A Dashboard on Amazon’s Operating Results. We have included several graphs on the following pages to provide investors a dashboard to evaluate Amazon’s results and our projections for 2013 and 2014. ACTIVE CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS, 1Q11 – 4Q13 30.0% 25.0% 250 25.0% 200 20.0% 150 15.0% 100 10.0% 50 5.0% 20.0% 150 15.0% 100 10.0% 50 5.0% 0 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% Active Customer Accounts 2010 2011 2012 Active Customer Accounts Annual Growth 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. ACTIVE SELLER ACCOUNTS, 1Q11 – 4Q13 2.1 ACTIVE SELLER ACCOUNTS, 2010-2014 6.0% 2.3 5.0% 2.2 2.1 6.0% 5.0% 2.1 4.0% 3.0% 2.0 2.0 2.0% 2.0 1.0% 2.2 4.0% 2.1 2.1 3.0% 2.0 2.0% 2.0 2.0 1.9 Active Seller Accounts Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% (Annual Growth) 2.0 (Acitve Sellers - MM) 2.1 (Annual Growth) (Active Seller Accounts - MM) 0.0% 0 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 1.0% 1.9 1.9 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 Active Seller Accounts 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com (Annual Growth) 300 (Acitve Customers - MM) 200 30.0% (Annual Growth) (Active Customer Accounts - MM) 250 ACTIVE CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS, 2010-2014 133 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM NORTH AMERICA MEDIA REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11-4Q13 NORTH AMERICA MEDIA REVENUE ($MM), 2010 - 2014 25.0% 15.0% 2,000 10.0% 1,500 1,000 5.0% 500 0 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% 12,000 70.0% 60.0% 10,000 6,000 30.0% 4,000 20.0% 2,000 10.0% 0 North America - EGM Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 0.0% 2Q12 8.0% 6.0% 4,000 4.0% 2,000 2.0% 0 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 2013E Annual Growth 45,000 80.0% 40,000 70.0% 35,000 60.0% 30,000 50.0% 25,000 40.0% 20,000 30.0% 15,000 20.0% 10,000 10.0% 5,000 0.0% 0 2010 2011 2012 North America - EGM 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E 134 (Annual Growth) 40.0% (Annual Growth) 50.0% 8,000 1Q12 6,000 NORTH AMERICA EGM REVENUE ($MM), 2010-2014 (North American Media Sales - $MM) 80.0% 4Q11 10.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 14,000 3Q11 12.0% 8,000 North America - Media NORTH AMERICA EGM REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 – 4Q13 2Q11 14.0% 10,000 Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 1Q11 16.0% 12,000 (Annual Growth) 2,500 (North American Media Sales - $MM) 20.0% 3,000 North America - Media (North American EGM Sales - $MM) 18.0% 14,000 3,500 (Annual Growth) (North American Media Sales - $MM) 4,000 SPECIAL REPORT SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM NORTH AMERICA OTHER REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 - 4Q13 6,000 80.0% 1,200 60.0% 50.0% 600 40.0% 30.0% 400 20.0% 200 10.0% 0.0% North America - Other 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0 80.0% 70.0% 5,000 60.0% 4,000 50.0% 3,000 40.0% 30.0% 2,000 20.0% 1,000 10.0% 0 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 2013E North America - Other Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. NORTH AMERICA TOTAL REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 – 4Q13 NORTH AMERICA TOTAL REVENUE ($MM), 2010 - 2014 60.0% 18,000 70,000 50.0% 16,000 50.0% 20.0% 6,000 4,000 10.0% 2,000 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 0.0% 1Q11 0 (North America Total Sales - $MM) 30.0% 8,000 40.0% 50,000 35.0% 30.0% 40,000 25.0% 30,000 20.0% 15.0% 20,000 (Annual Growth) 10,000 (Annual Growth) 40.0% 12,000 45.0% 60,000 14,000 10.0% 10,000 5.0% 0.0% 0 2010 2011 2012 North America - Total 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. North America - Total (Annual Growth) 800 (North American Other Sales - $MM) 70.0% 1,000 (Annual Growth) (North American Other Sales - $MM) NORTH AMERICA OTHER REVENUE ($MM), 2010 - 2014 90.0% 1,400 (North America Total Sales - $MM) SPECIAL REPORT 135 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM INTERNATIONAL MEDIA REVENUE ($MM), 2009 - 2014 40.0% 3,500 35.0% 12,000 3,000 30.0% 10,000 25.0% 2,500 15.0% 1,500 10.0% 1,000 5.0% 500 0.0% 0 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 (5.0%) 25.0% 20.0% 8,000 15.0% 6,000 10.0% 4,000 5.0% 2,000 0.0% 0 2010 2011 2012 International - Media International - Media 70.0% 6,000 60.0% 5,000 50.0% 4,000 40.0% 3,000 30.0% 2,000 20.0% 1,000 10.0% 0 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 0.0% 25,000 (International EGM Sales - $MM) 7,000 60.0% 50.0% 20,000 40.0% 15,000 30.0% 10,000 20.0% 5,000 (Annual Growth) 80.0% (Annual Growth) 8,000 1Q11 Annual Growth INTERNATIONAL EGM REVENUE ($MM), 2009 – 2014E 10.0% 0.0% 0 2010 2011 2012 International - EGM 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. INTERNATIONAL EGM REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 -4Q13E (International EGM Sales - $MM) 2013E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. International - EGM (Annual Growth) 20.0% 2,000 (International Media Sales - $MM) 4,000 (Annual Growth) (International Media Sales - $MM) INTERNATIONAL MEDIA REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 – 4Q13 SPECIAL REPORT 136 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM 10 5.0% 0 0.0% International - Other 3Q13E 4Q13E 10.0% 2Q13 20 1Q13 15.0% 4Q12 30 3Q12 20.0% 2Q12 40 1Q12 25.0% 4Q11 50 3Q11 30.0% 2Q11 60 1Q11 35.0% INTERNATIONAL OTHER REVENUE ($MM), 2010 – 2014E 300 30.0% 250 25.0% 200 20.0% 150 15.0% 100 10.0% 50 5.0% 0 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 International - Other Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. INTERNATIONAL TOTAL REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 – 4Q13E INTERNATIONAL TOTAL REVENUE ($MM), 2010 – 2014E 40,000 40.0% 12,000 30.0% 35,000 35.0% 10,000 25.0% 30,000 30.0% 8,000 20.0% 25,000 25.0% 6,000 15.0% 20,000 20.0% 4,000 10.0% 15,000 15.0% 10,000 10.0% 5,000 5.0% International - Total Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 4Q14E 3Q14E 2Q14E 1Q14E 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 0.0% 3Q12 0 2Q12 5.0% 1Q12 2,000 (International Total Sales - $MM) 35.0% 0.0% 0 2010 2011 2012 International - Total 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com (Annual Growth) 14,000 (Annual Growth) (International Total Sales - $MM) SPECIAL REPORT (Annual Growth) 70 (Annual Growth) (International Other Sales - $MM) INTERNATIONAL OTHER REVENUE ($MM), 1Q11 – 4Q13E (International Other Sales - $MM) SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 137 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM TOTAL REVENUES ($MM), 1Q11-4Q13E TOTAL REVENUES, 2010 – 2014E 60.0% 50.0% 20,000 40.0% 30.0% 10,000 20.0% 5,000 10.0% 0 Total Revenues 50.0% 90,000 45.0% 80,000 40.0% 70,000 35.0% 60,000 30.0% 50,000 25.0% 40,000 20.0% 30,000 15.0% 20,000 10.0% 10,000 5.0% 4Q13E 2Q13 3Q13E 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% 100,000 0.0% 0 2010 Annual Growth 2011 2012 Total Revenues NET SHIPPING COSTS (% OF SALES), 1Q11 – 4Q13E 10.0% (Annual Growth) 15,000 (Total Revenues - $MM) 25,000 (Annual Growth) (Total Revenues - $MM) 30,000 SPECIAL REPORT 2013E 2014E Annual Growth NET SHIPPING COSTS (% OF SALES), 2010 – 2014E 8.0% 9.0% 7.0% 8.0% 6.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 5.0% 4.0% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0% Shipping Revenue (% of Sales) Shipping Costs (% of Sales) 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 Shipping Revenue (% of Sales) 2013E Shipping Costs (% of Sales) Net Shipping Costs (% of Sales) Net Shipping Costs (% of Sales) Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E 138 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT GROSS MARGIN, 1Q11 – 4Q13E GROSS MARGIN, 2010 – 2014E 35.0% 30.0% 30.0% 25.0% 25.0% 20.0% 20.0% 15.0% 15.0% 10.0% 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% 0.0% 2010 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2011 2012 2013E 2014E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. OPERATING MARGIN, 1Q11 – 4Q13E OPERATING MARGIN, 2010 – 2014E 3.5% 4.5% 3.0% 4.0% 2.5% 3.5% 2.0% 3.0% 1.5% 2.5% 1.0% 2.0% 1.5% 0.5% 1.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 -0.5% 1Q11 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 2010 2011 2012 2013E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E 139 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT EBITDA MARGIN, 1Q11 – 4Q13E EBITDA MARGIN, 2010 – 2014E 6.0% 7.0% 5.0% 6.0% 4.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 3.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.0% 1.0% Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 0.0% 0.0% 2010 90.0% 50.0% 80.0% 4Q13E 2Q13 3Q13E -100.0% 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 0.0% 2Q11 2013E 2014E EFFECTIVE TAX RATE, 2010 – 2014E 100.0% 1Q11 2012 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. EFFECTIVE TAX RATE, 1Q11 – 4Q13E -50.0% 2011 70.0% 60.0% -150.0% 50.0% -200.0% 40.0% -250.0% 30.0% -300.0% 20.0% -350.0% 10.0% -400.0% 0.0% 2010 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 2011 2012 2013E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E 140 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SHARES OUTSTANDING, 1Q11 – 4Q14E SHARES OUTSTANDING, 2010 – 2014E 1.2% 464 1.0% 0.6% 0.4% 458 0.2% 0.0% 456 (0.2%) 454 (0.4%) (0.6%) 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 1Q11 452 468 3.5% 466 3.0% 464 2.5% 462 2.0% 460 1.5% 458 1.0% 456 0.5% 454 0.0% 452 (0.5%) 450 (1.0%) 2010 2011 2012 Shares Outstanding Shares Outstanding 400.0% $0.80 300.0% $0.60 200.0% 100.0% (100.0%) 4Q13E 2Q13 ($0.40) 3Q13E 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 $0.00 (200.0%) (300.0%) (400.0%) ($0.60) (500.0%) ($0.80) (600.0%) 200% $2.50 0% (200%) $2.00 (400%) (EPS) $0.20 $3.00 $1.50 (600%) $1.00 (800%) $0.50 (1000%) $0.00 2010 2011 2012 2013E 2014E ($0.50) EPS Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com (1200%) (1400%) EPS Annual Growth (Annual Growth) 0.0% (Annual Growth) $0.40 2Q11 Annual Growth EPS, 2010 – 2014E $1.00 1Q11 2014E Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. EPS, 1Q11 – 4Q13E (EPS) 2013E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. ($0.20) (Annual Growth) (Shares Outstanding - MM) 0.8% (Annual Growth) (Shares Outstanding - MM) 462 460 SPECIAL REPORT 141 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, 1Q11 – 4Q13E CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, 2010 – 2014 300.0% 2,500 2,000 200.0% 0.0% 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 2Q11 (500) (1,000) 1Q11 0 (100.0%) (200.0%) (1,500) (300.0%) (2,000) (2,500) (400.0%) 5,000 180.0% 4,500 160.0% 4,000 140.0% 3,500 120.0% 3,000 100.0% 2,500 80.0% 2,000 60.0% 1,500 1,000 40.0% 500 20.0% 0.0% 0 2010 Capital Expenditures Annual Growth 4,000 300.0% 3,500 0.0% 500 (100.0%) 0 Annual Growth 4Q13E 3Q13E 2Q13 1Q13 4Q12 3Q12 2Q12 1Q12 4Q11 3Q11 (200.0%) (LTM Free Cash Flow - $MM) 1,000 100.0% 2Q11 Annual Growth 500.0% 400.0% 300.0% 3,000 2,500 200.0% 2,000 100.0% 1,500 0.0% (Annual Growth) 200.0% (Annual Growth) 1,500 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. 1,000 (100.0%) 500 0 (200.0%) 2010 2011 2012 LTM Free Cash Flow 2013E 2014E Annual Growth Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. th > Telsey Advisory Group 535 Fifth Avenue, 12 Floor, New York, NY 10017 p 212 973 9700 f 212 973 9711 www.telseygroup.com 2014E 4,500 400.0% 2,000 1Q11 2013E LTM FREE CASH FLOW, 2010 - 2014 500.0% 2,500 (LTM Free Cash Flow - $MM) 2012 Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. LTM FREE CASH FLOW, 1Q11 – 4Q13E LTM Free Cash Flow 2011 Capital Expenditures Source: Company reports and TAG estimates. (Annual Growth) 500 (Capital Expenditures - $MM) 100.0% (Annual Growth) (Capital Expenditures - $MM) 1,500 1,000 SPECIAL REPORT 142 SEPTEMBER 23, 2013 THE FUTURE OF AMAZON.COM SPECIAL REPORT ADDENDUM Important Disclosures: Valuation Method for Target Price: Price-to-Earnings, price-to-EBITDA, P/E to growth, price to free cash flow, and discounted cash flow analysis. Investment Risks: Telsey Advisory Group’s (TAG’s) equity research department covers consumer-focused sectors including apparel, footwear and sporting goods, casinos, consumer finance and payments, cosmetics, cruise lines, department stores, discounters, entertainment and communications, gaming, hardlines, internet, lodging, luxury, restaurants, and specialty apparel. Risks across or specific to one or more of these sectors include volatility of commodity costs, consumer spending, currency, rising interest rates, weaker consumer confidence and unemployment rates. In addition, access to capital, supply chain disruptions, commodity costs, private-label distribution, currency, geopolitical uncertainly, unfavorable government regulations, lack of appropriate real estate sites, and the use of the World Wide Web to sell merchandise represent unique industry risks. Analyst Certification The Research Analyst(s) who prepared the research report hereby certify that the views expressed in this report accurately reflect the Analyst(s) personal views about the subject companies and their securities. The Research Analyst(s) also certify that the Analyst(s) have not been, are not, and will not be receiving direct or indirect compensation for expressing the specific recommendation(s) or view(s) in this report. Tom Forte, CFA, James Cakmak, CFA Historical Price Targets To see price charts and TAG’s historical price targets please click the following link: http://www.telseygroup.com/files/historicalprices.pdf Company-Specific Disclosures None Disclosures required by United States laws and regulations See company-specific regulatory disclosures above for any of the following disclosures required as to companies referred to in this report: manager or co-manager in a pending transaction; 1% or other ownership; compensation for certain services; types of client relationships; managed/co-managed public offerings in prior periods; directorships; market making and/or specialist role. The following are additional required disclosures: Ownership and material conflicts of interest: TAG prohibits its analysts, professionals reporting to analysts and members of their households from owning securities of any company in the analyst's area of coverage. Analyst compensation: Neither TAG nor its employees/analysts receives any compensation from subject companies for inclusion in our research. Analysts are paid in part based on the overall profitability of TAG which may include investment banking revenues. Analyst as officer or director: TAG analysts, persons reporting to analysts or members of their households do not serve as officers, directors, advisory board members or employees of any of our subject companies in the analyst's area of coverage. Investment banking activities: TAG provides investment banking, other non-investment banking securities related services, and non-securities services and may seek such relationships from subject companies. Distribution of ratings: TAG analysts do not assign ratings to covered companies. 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