Issue 4

T h e R A F F l i g h t S af e t y M a g a z i n e
airCLUES
NovemBER 2010
issue 4
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contents
10
features
Foreword
4
Spry’s View 5
The Icing on the Wing
6
I learnt about the weather from that x 4 10
I learnt about arctic flying from that
14
Flight safety in the arctic circle
16
I learnt about pushing the limits
18
Children, elves and fairy tales
22
The views expressed within Air Clues are those of the authors concerned, and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Royal Air Force, or MoD. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form without prior permission in writing
from the editor. Unless by prior arrangement, articles and photographs will not normally be returned.
2
24
30
There’s no landings like snow landings
24
Winter Operations 26
Relections on a harsh winter
28
Dealing with the known unknown 30
Operating in Extreme Weather
34
Flight Safety Awards
40
FOD Matters
45
Chinese Lanterns
46
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I learnt about cockpit gradients from that 33
3
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foreword
by Air Chief Marshal Bryant CBE ADC MA BA CDir RAF, Commander in Chief, HQ Air Command
At the time of writing, we are about to enter a period of extreme turbulence
that will follow decisions made during the SDSR, which, added to the already
high tariff of support to current operations, can only increase the challenge
to operating safely. However, I am determined that, despite these potential
distractions, safety will remain at the heart of all that we do. During this period,
more than ever, we must continue to invest in our safety culture; this speaks
to both resources and, perhaps more importantly, through the unambiguous
support of all within the chain of command. Air Safety critically underpins
effective air power and you should be in no doubt that compromises in safety
will inevitably and very directly lead to both reduced operational capability and
unacceptable risk to our people.
However, I do not wish to dwell solely on the challenges ahead, I also wish
to highlight some of our recent achievements. Foremost amongst these is the
progress made in implementing the recommendations arising from the HaddonCave Report into the loss of Nimrod XV230. Following on from the formation and
expansion of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA), we now have a formalised
clear structure of aviation safety accountability. This is helping to ensure that
Duty Holders are provided with the requisite airworthiness and operational
advice needed to make informed decisions about the levels of risk to their
platforms and aircrew. Meanwhile, the Air Command Safety Management Plan
(ASMP), which provides the higher level governance processes for aviation
safety across the RAF, is being reviewed and rewritten to provide robust, clear
direction as to how we identify, manage and, where possible, control risk.
At the Command level, I have already noticed a better understanding of the
management of risk, however, for this to reap real dividends and to be valid
and authoritative it must also be supported by an effective system of error
reporting at all levels of the organisation. We are en-route to achieving this
with the roll out of the Error Management System (EMS), which is already
proving an invaluable tool for the reporting of error in the workplace and is
increasingly providing the data we need to identify developing error trends
and to understand the reasons that underline them. Ultimately, this will allow
us to predict and prevent reoccurrence of the errors which hitherto have led
to aviation accidents. With initial success within the A4 environment already
assured, EMS is now being trialled across all aviation-related areas as part of
the wider Aviation EMS project, which will include Air Traffic operations.
In sum, I believe that the RAF has made significant progress in achieving
a “just” culture in the Air Safety domain over the last year. However, there is
much more to be done. We are starting to inculcate a cultural shift but this will
require constant attention and appropriate resourcing to ensure this change
becomes embedded. I will be endeavouring to provide both and I ask that you
do the same.
4
Spry’s View
Mil:
95 221 6666
BT:
01494 496666
Email: [email protected]
Welcome to the fourth issue of Air Clues and a hearty greetings of the season to you all. As I write
my Foreword in the tail end of our rather dismal attempt at a Summer, I can’t help but feel a trifle
odd discussing the approaching bleak midwinter, but as we are oft reminded, “fail to plan; plan to
fail”. So as the frost makes its first appearances on the old E-Type, even Spry’s dusty old cranium
is reminded of the upstart of a winter season we had this year; which had the temerity to disrupt the smooth running of
the roads, runways and infrastructure of this fine country. With this memory foremost in my mind I have pulled together
a veritable cornucopia of winter articles in this issue that should give you a little seasonal hindsight to mull over during
the long winter evenings. Take this gift, read it, inwardly digest and make sure that you learn from the lessons of others
and are fully prepared for the meteorological machinations of the British winter to
come. As ever, I hope you have a first-rate Christmas and New Year and I will see
you all safely back in 2011.
Yours aye, Spry
Dear Wg Cdr Spry
After all these years I’ve finally dusted off the old quill pen, found myself a pot of
the old blue/black Quink and penned a missive in your direction (metaphorically)!
What, you might ask, can possibly have stirred these old bones into action? Well
in fact it was an article in the June 2010 issue of your splendid periodical. It
was entitled, if my memory serves me correctly, ‘I learned about TCAS from that ……’ and was
presumably penned by some young sprog from Cranwell. The gist of the article seemed to me to be that the
rest of the world was out of step with 45 Sqn’s TCAS SOPs and thus that a Captain in an E-3D (splendid old aircraft,
what…!!) found himself ‘generally not knowing what the *&^$ was going on (sic) !!!
I was most gratified to read on further and to find that 45 Sqn’s SOPs have now been changed to tie in with the way
the rest of us do things !
I’m sure that the aforementioned young sprog was attempting to be humorous when he wrote the article – and
assuming that this is the case, I’m not totally convinced that he should give up his day job. However, presuming that
he will continue with his day job, he might wish to note that following a Resolution Advisory should never result in the
overstress of an ac (clever little devil, this TCAS thingy !!), E-3Ds crews tend to prefer Horlicks to tea/coffee (that caffeine
stuff stops you having a nice snooze in the old cockpit) and surprisingly we do generally tend to have a very good idea
of what the *&^$ (sic) is going on. We have taken to heart lessons learnt from incidents such as the collision between
the Bashkirian TU-154M and the DHL 757 in July 2002 and, more specifically, the old military maxim that it’s the one you
don’t see that gets you ! We follow the guidance given by the TCAS system since we can’t guarantee that a Resolution
Advisory has come from ‘the aircraft that we’ve visually identified’ and since, assuming that the other aircraft also has
TCAS (or ACAS), his/her reaction will be based upon the ‘handshake’ between our respective TCAS systems.
Spry Says:
Thank you for your letter, but I feel that not unlike an inverted fast jet jockey, you may have got
the wrong end of the stick. The original article’s author clearly had a case of the ‘mea culpas’
and appeared more than happy to admit that the actions of the King Air may have appeared both
confusing and illogical to other parties and that assumption in these situations had the potential
to be maternal to all cock-ups. However, from a purely HF perspective, this does reiterate how
communications in whatever form are inevitably open to differing interpretations. As such, we
should strive to make our human interactions, be they handovers, briefings, as accurate and
unambiguous as possible, backed up by a thorough check of understanding.
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Sqn Ldr Gunning
8 Sqn QFI
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the
icing on the wing
It’s official; summer must be coming to an end because I have been asked
to write an article for Air Clues on ‘Winter Ops’ from a flying perspective. As
an inexperienced writer I began sketching out the myriad of issues relating to
aviating during the cold winter months. I could have covered Black Top states,
precipitation or how to operate out of those many countries infinitely adept at
dealing with severe winter weather, such as Norway and Canada. Instead I
decided to write about an area I have definitely experienced - aircraft icing
In basic terms, in-flight icing is the accretion of ice on the airframe during
contact with super-cooled liquid droplets. This can come in the form of cloud
droplets, snow, hail or freezing rain/drizzle. In rare cases it can also be formed
when a cold soaked aircraft enters a moist warm air mass. Icing really concerns
us because it can adversely affect the flight characteristics of an aircraft. It
can increase drag, decrease lift, and cause control problems. Added weight
from ice accretion can also be a factor in light aircraft. It is, however, widely
agreed that severity is dependent upon moisture content, temperature and,
most importantly, water droplet size.
Flt Lt Chrispin Chapple,
Captain, 32(TR)Sqn
explains the dangers
of ice in aviation;
Icing is currently classified into four severity categories:
• TRACE. Ice becomes perceptible. Rate of accumulation is slightly
greater than the rate of sublimation. It is not hazardous even though
de-icing/anti-icing equipment is not generally used, unless encountered
for an extended period of time.
• LIGHT. The rate of accumulation may create a problem if flight is
prolonged in this environment. Occasional use of de-icing/anti-icing
equipment removes accumulation.
• MODERATE. The rate of accumulation is such that even short encounters
become potentially hazardous and the use of de-icing/anti-icing
equipment or diversion/re-routing is necessary.
• SEVERE. The rate of accumulation is such that de-icing/anti-icing
equipment fails to reduce or control the hazard. Immediate diversion/
re-routing is necessary.
reminding us all that it
is only really safe for
ice and aircrew to
come together
in a Gin & Tonic.
Note that these definitions are based on the pilot’s perception of the aircraft’s
ability to deal with the ice accretion. They are not based on meteorology.
OUTSIDE AIR
O C to
-1OOC to
-15OC to
O
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TEMPERATURE RANGE
-1O C
-15OC
-2OOC
O
ICING TYPE
CLEAR
MIXED CLEAR AND RIME
RIME
Types of icing encountered that affect us are:
• RIME. Rough, milky, opaque ice formed by instantaneous freezing of
small super-cooled water droplets.
• Rime ice occurs when tiny, super-cooled liquid water droplets
freeze on contact with a surface whose temperature is below
freezing. Because the droplets are small, the amount of water
remaining after the initial freezing is insufficient to coalesce into
a continuous sheet before freezing. The result is a mixture of
tiny ice particles and trapped air, giving a rough, opaque,
crystalline deposit that is fairly brittle. Rime ice often forms on
leading edges and can affect the aerodynamic qualities of an
aerofoil or the airflow into the engine intake. Due to entrapped
air, and slow accumulation rate, Rime ice usually does not cause
a significant increase in weight.
• CLEAR. A glossy, clear or translucent ice formed by the relatively slow
freezing of large super-cooled water droplets.
• Clear ice is most likely to form in freezing rain, a phenomena
comprising raindrops that spread out and freeze on contact with
the cold airframe. This situation can occur below a warm front.
Super-cooled drops are unstable, and will freeze on contact with
a surface that is below zero degrees — the skin of an aircraft,
or the propeller blades, for example. Freezing of each drop will
be relatively gradual, due to the latent heat released in the
freezing process, allowing part of the water drop to flow rearwards
before it solidifies. The slower the freezing process, the greater
the flow-back of the water before it freezes. The flow-back is
greatest at temperatures around 0° C. The result is a sheet of
solid, clear, glazed ice with very little air enclosed, usually with
undulations and lumps. Clear ice can alter the aerodynamic shape
of the aerofoils quite dramatically and reduce or destroy their
effectiveness. It is tenacious and, if it does break off, large chunks
may damage the airframe. Freezing rain may exist at higher
altitudes in the presence of ice pellets, formed by rain falling from
warmer air and freezing during descent through colder air. The
presence of ice pellets therefore usually indicates cold air below
freezing with a layer of warmer air above.
• MIXED. A mixture of Rime and Clear ice.
ICE TYPES
CLEAR ICING
Note the freezing that occurs down-flow of the
point of initial airframe contact.
RIME ICING
Note the freezing that occurs down-flow of the
point of initial airframe contact.
MIXED ICING
Note the freezing that occurs down-flow of the
point of initial airframe contact.
In 1942, Jerome F. Lederer, the
founder of the New Zealand Flight
Safety Foundation (FSF), stated in a
lecture on aviation safety; “Strange
as it may seem, a very light coating
of snow or ice, light enough to be
hardly visible, will have a tremendous
effect on reducing the performance
of a modern aeroplane”. How true
these words still are today; and
despite new technology, training and
procedures developed since then
to address the problem, accidents
related to icing conditions continue
to occur.
How quickly a surface collects ice
depends in part on its shape. Thin,
modern wings will be more critical
with ice on them than thick, older
wing sections. The tail surfaces of
an aeroplane will normally ice up
much faster than the wing. If the
tail stalls due to ice and the airflow
disruption it causes, recovery is
unlikely at low altitudes. Tail stall
is less familiar to many pilots,
however, in aircraft with high tails,
Based on depiction found in Fig. 9-5 of Air Command Weather Manual
7
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such as the VC10 or smaller aircraft like the HS125, it
can be lethal. A wing stall is the much more common
threat, and it is very important to correctly distinguish
between the two, since the required actions are
roughly opposite.
WINGS
The wing will ordinarily stall at a lower angle of attack, and
thus a higher airspeed, when contaminated with ice. Even
small amounts of ice, especially if the ice is rough, can
have an appreciable affect. Thus an increase in approach
speed is advisable if ice remains on the wings. How much
of an increase depends on both the aircraft type and
amount of ice, and the Aircrew Manual particular to the
type must be the reference.
Normally, washout helps to ensure that a symmetric
stall starts inboard, and spreads progressively. However,
the stall characteristics of an aircraft with ice-contaminated
wings can be seriously degraded. The tips are usually
thinner than the rest of the wing, so they are the part of
the wing that most efficiently collects ice. This can lead to
a partial stall of the wing at the tip, which may lead to an
asymmetric stall between the two wings.
One of the hazards of this type of structural icing is the
possible uncommanded and uncontrolled roll phenomenon
referred to as roll upset. If ice accumulates in a ridge aft
of the de-ice boots but forward of the ailerons, this can
affect the airflow and interfere with the proper functioning
of the ailerons. This type of situation is often associated
with severe in-flight icing. Roll upset may be caused by
airflow separation inducing self-deflection of the ailerons
and loss of, or degraded, roll-handling characteristics. It
can occur without the usual symptoms of ice or perceived
aerodynamic stall. It is a little known and infrequently
occurring flight hazard that can affect aircraft of all sizes.
In 1994, an ATR 72 crashed in Roselawn, Indiana,
during a rapid descent after an uncommanded roll
excursion while on autopilot. The airplane was in a holding
pattern in freezing drizzle and was descending to a newly
assigned altitude. The NTSB determined that one of the
probable causes of this accident was “loss of control,
attributed to a sudden and unexpected aileron hinge
moment reversal that occurred after a ridge of ice accreted
beyond the de-ice boots... Had ice accumulated on the
wing leading edges so as to burden the ice protection
system, or if the crew had been able to observe the ridge
of ice building behind the de-ice boots... it is probable that
the crew would have exited the conditions.” A contributing
factor was the lack of information in the flight manual
about autopilot operation during such conditions.
8
TAIL
The horizontal stabilizer balances the tendency of the
nose to pitch down by generating downward lift on the tail
of the aircraft. When the tail stalls, this downward force
is lessened or removed, and the nose of the aeroplane
can severely pitch down. Perhaps the most important
characteristic of a tail-plane stall is the relatively high
airspeed at the onset and, if it occurs, the suddenness
and magnitude of this nose down pitch. Because the
tail has a smaller leading edge radius and chord length
than the wings, it can collect proportionately two to
three times more ice than the wings and, often, the pilot
cannot see the accumulation. This is particularly relevant
during the approach phase of flight. Application of flaps
can aggravate or initiate the stall, and the pilot must use
caution when applying flaps during an approach if there
is the possibility of icing on the tail-plane. A stall is much
more likely to occur when the flaps are approaching the
fully extended position. In this configuration, the wing
centre of lift moves aft, downwash is increased and the
horizontal tail, as a result, must provide greater downward
lift. In some aircraft, depending on the forward C of G,
the tail may be near its maximum lift coefficient and just a
small amount of contamination could cause it to stall.
This type of issue was thrust into the spotlight in the
early 1990s after a number of accidents involving US
regional air carrier turboprop aircraft. These aircraft all
shared the following characteristics:
• Non-powered flying control surfaces, relying on
aerodynamic balance to keep stick forces low.
• High efficiency flaps producing relatively high
downwash, which results in high angle of attack on
the tail-plane.
• Non-trimmable stabilisers.
• Efficient stabilisers with short chord length and
small leading edge radii.
• Inflatable boots for ice protection.
This immediately led to a joint NASA/FAA International
Tail-plane Icing Workshop to address the problem, and
one of the findings was the recognition of the need for
more education and training for pilots. It suggested that
some of the training at the time, specifically to increase
airspeed, might have actually exacerbated the already
adverse situation at the horizontal tail-plane. In this case
as power is added to compensate for the additional drag
and the nose is lifted to maintain altitude, the angle of
attack increases, allowing the underside of the tail to
accumulate additional ice.
• Elevator control pulsing, oscillation or vibrations.
• Abnormal nose-down trim change.
• Reduction or loss of elevator effectiveness
• Sudden change in elevator force.
• Sudden uncommanded nose down pitch.
This does refer to aircraft with tail-plane pitch control
only. As a pilot if you encounter bad weather during
the approach phase and final flap is taken, would you
immediately notice any of the above symptoms given the
prevailing conditions and react appropriately? It is vital
to understand the dynamics of your aircraft for exactly
this reason.
Of course, with all forms of airframe icing it does
not always have to happen in the cruise or approach; if
conditions are poor enough, or correct procedures are not
carried out on the ground, these symptoms may appear
as early as initial climb.
North American and North European countries are
continuing to invest in research to increase the safety
of aircraft with respect to icing, with the shared common
purpose of improving air transportation safety. In the United
States and in Canada a number of Federal agencies as
well as universities have active programs in icing research.
The Aircraft Icing Research Alliance (AIRA), created by
Canadian and US partners, has a mission to “coordinate
among parties, the conduct of collaborative aircraft icing
research activities that improve the safety of aircraft
operations in icing conditions”. You only need to look at
the statistics to see how much of an effect icing has on
aircraft accidents; more than 1 in 10 over the period 19902000 were directly attributable to icing.
In conclusion, as pilots we are required to know and
recognise times and areas where the aircraft is in danger
of experiencing icing conditions, and knowing how to deal
with them. Being familiar with the aircraft’s performance
and flight characteristics will also help in recognising the
possibility of ice. Ice build-up will require more power to
maintain safe cruise airspeed. Ice on the tail-plane can
cause diminished nose up pitch control and heavy
elevator forces, and the aircraft may buffet if
flaps are extended. Ice on the rudder or
ailerons can cause control oscillations or
vibrations. Ice on the leading edges can
lead to wing stall and undemanded roll.
Make sure that your met briefing is
as up-to-date as it can be if you think
that icing may be an issue on your flight.
Know the characteristics that are unique to your aircraft,
and how best to manoeuver should symptoms become
apparent. If you find yourself inadvertently in icing
conditions, quickly consider how best to get out of them.
Don’t become a statistic, and be aware of aircraft icing.
Spry Says:
“I’ve never seen icing conditions. I’ve never deiced.
I’ve never seen any—I’ve never experienced any of that.
I don’t want to have to experience that and make those
kinds of calls. You know I’d’ve freaked out. I’d’ve have
like seen this much ice and thought oh my gosh we were
going to crash.”
First Officer Rebecca Shaw, less than five minutes before
forty-nine people in the aircraft and one person on the ground
died. Colgan Air, Flight 3407 Buffalo, NY.
One of the key factors which links the accidents to
Colgan Air Flight 3407 and the infamous Air Florida Flight
90, which crashed into the Potomac Bridge in Washington
seconds after take off, is that the flight deck crews of
both aircraft underestimated the effects of ice accretion
at critical junctures in flight and failed to take the right
corrective action to remedy the situation. Icing in aviation
is one of the most dangerous and insidious of killers,
mainly because of the initial difficulties in recognising that
it is affecting aircraft performance and, more importantly,
because of the instantaneous and significant effect it has
on handling. With our focus on hot and dry operations,
our corporate experience of icing is diminishing and so
the need to train and inform our people in dealing with
the exigencies of cold weather operations becomes ever
more important. The demands on maintaining currency
and competency across the broad gamut of operations
and operating environments remains difficult, however,
it is vital that we never take our eye of the ball when it
comes to developing core airmanship skills, of which the
ability to recognise and deal effectively with icing must
surely be fundamental.
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Tail-plane stall symptoms include:
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I learnt about the weather
from that x4!
I have enjoyed a long and safe career in the RAF with no
ejections, the same number of take-offs and landings, and
I have only ever had to shut down an engine in anger once
(I now fly multi-engine aircraft!). All the other incidents that
have occurred have, in my opinion, all been relatively
minor in nature, including a few aborted take-offs and the
occasional precautionary engine shut down. However,
during my flying time I have slowly learnt to treat the
weather gods with more and more respect and to become
more of a weather pessimist at least as far as flying is
concerned. I can highlight 4 separate incidents where I
have learnt from the weather.
Incident 1. As a young co-pilot on a delta wing bomber,
I was probably more thumb in bum, mind in neutral at
both most aspects of aviation apart from the pure flying
and the planning and preparation required to do so. One
beautiful winter’s day following overnight light snow, there
was a forecast of isolated snow showers accompanied
by increased wind strengths and a weather symbol in
the TAF titled BLSN about which I was blissfully ignorant.
We duly launched and flew a successful low level sortie
before returning to base. It was my turn to fly a few circuits
at the end of the sortie and I was looking forward to a bit of
‘hands on pole time’. Closer to base, we were warned of
a snow shower in the vicinity of the airfield and my older,
wiser captain elected to make a single approach to land
and to bin the circuits, much to my evident disgust. I flew
the practice instrument approach to my freshly minted
green rating, looked up at DH and prepared to land. At
this point, the beautiful winter’s day suddenly changed
and it started to snow. Again, much to my chagrin, my
captain elected to land the aircraft himself and, following
10
a successful touchdown, we suddenly lost sight of the
runway as the wind picked up and snow started blowing
across the airfield. In utter silence my captain brought the
aircraft successfully to a halt. There we were in our little
cockpit bubble some 15 ft above the ground, clearly able to
see the ATC Control Tower but nothing else on the ground
at all. We remained in this ethereal atmosphere for some
10 minutes waiting for the snow shower to pass while the
crew reminded (taught!) me that BLSN stood for blowing
snow. Eventually the snow stopped and it transpired that
we had nearly stopped on the RW Centreline and a much
chastened co-pilot requested that we be allowed to taxi to
our dispersal.
Incident 2. A few years later and I was now a fully fledged
bomber captain passing on all my knowledge to my own
co-pilot. On this occasion, we had briefed for a low level
sortie which involved flying the old ‘Stornoway Link Route’
with a simulated bomb run on Stornoway airfield itself.
The weather on this summer’s day was as near perfect
as possible with excellent visibility, some fluffy Cu and a
little bit of low level turbulence. The sortie proceeded in
a completely normal fashion until shortly before the start
of the ‘bomb run’ when there a noise that I can only say
sounded like an explosion, followed by some strange
electrical indications and unintelligible but loud mutterings
(expletives) from the AEO. I immediately commenced
a low level abort, but with the throttles untouched and
started looking about for engine problems. My co-pilot
looked at me for words of comfort and explanation; he
was out of luck as I had no idea what had happened and
my scrambled brain was fully employed flying the aircraft.
I did manage to order a ‘Pan’ call and turned the aircraft
Incident 3. Yet a few more years later, I was now an A2
QFI and Flt Cdr at BFTS. It was the night flying phase of
the course and it was a beautiful night so I attended Met
brief in body if not in mind while considering a few issues
with the flying programme etc (distractions?!), and missed
the bit about the possibility of low lying fog patches later
in the night. I took my student off for his night navex and
relaxed while he went about his task. Somewhere to the
South of York, with visibility only limited by the curvature of
the earth, the DI ordered a recall because of the possibility
of fog!!. In true QFI fashion (especially as an A2!) I regaled
my student about the stupidity of this decision (blah, blah,
blah) all the way back to base. True enough, the weather
at base appeared to be magnificent and as the last aircraft
to return we did a visual join and the subsequent circuit
proceeded uneventfully, until just as the student prepared
to flare, and without warning, the ground disappeared in
shallow fog. I took control and did nothing as the aircraft
settled heavier than usual onto the ground. In total silence
(again) we travelled down the runway until, a few seconds
later, we came out of the fog remarkably somewhere near
the centerline and taxied back to dispersal. It was only
later when I re-checked the forecast that I remembered
all those Met gems about high pressure in late Autumn,
cooling below Dew Point temperatures, the possibility of
thick shallow fog forming when there was little or no wind,
especially in low lying ground near a source of water; RW
22 at Linton-on-Ouse ticked all those boxes on that night.
Incident 4. Still more years later, and I was
now a C130 Flt Cdr and Training Captain but
on this occasion I was let loose in the USA as
part of a 5 man crew on a Routine Logistics
Flight ( I’d love to tell you more but I would
have to shoot you afterwards!). We were
planned for an overnight flight from our USAF
base with a dawn landing back at base and,
according to the weather forecast there was
absolutely nothing to worry about. This was
quite important because we had a Weapons
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towards Prestwick. There followed an agonising wait of
only a few seconds during which my life seemed to flash
in front of me, before the AEO stated, in a remarkably calm
and reassuring voice, ‘OK we’ve had a Lightning Strike’
followed by a statement about loss of electrical bits and
pieces which had no effect on me whatsoever since I could
now tell that all the engines were still operating normally
and that we were going to survive this little escapade
more or less unscathed. The co-pilot pointed out that there
were a number of ’interesting’ little holes and marks on the
refueling probe as we proceeded with a plethora of FRC
actions to cover the electrical problems that we had. On
the advice of the AEO and despite being well over normal
maximum landing weight, I elected not to burn off fuel and
not to stream the tail chute on landing in case it brought
on additional electrical problems. Following a textbook
approach and landing (well, modesty has never been
a strong suit), we climbed out of the aircraft to discover
approximately 20 individual lightning strikes all entering in
the vicinity of the probe and all with bigger exit ‘wounds’
along the trailing edges of the wings. Oh and when I
returned eventually to base feeling like a bit of a hero, I
had an interview with a Flt Cdr to explain my departures
from the SOP in not burning off fuel and not streaming
the chute.
11
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Safety Officer (WSO) on board who
had spent the previous few days
stressing the importance of avoiding
weather, especially lightning strikes
because of the possible effect on our
highly sensitive load. Shortly after
take off we were passed on to New
York Centre and cleared to climb to
our cruising altitude of FL220. Halfway
up the climb it became apparent that
all was not well with the weather as
all the civil traffic were requesting
deviations from track because of a
line of completely unforecast thunder
storms stretching about 400 nm North
and South of our intended track and
from approx FL160 – FL250. With an
IFR flight plan we were required to
climb above FL180 and with the help
of my highly experienced Navigator
we were cleared deviation from track
as required to avoid weather and
then to proceed direct to our Oceanic
Entry Point. Following a stressful
meander through cloud following the
CCWR and with frequent operation
of the aircraft de-icing and constant
12
operation of anti-icing, we eventually
re-discovered the stars above and the
lights of the Atlantic seaboard below.
I heaved a big sigh of relief until
the Nav then informed me that we
would reach our Oceanic Entry Point
approximately 2000lbs (those were
the days before metric weights) below
Red Fuel (the absolute minimum) to
cross the pond. Unfortunately, due
to the nature of the load, the only
diversion airfield was our USAF
base of departure so we reversed
track to return there. Meanwhile
we were informed by ATC that the
thunderstorms tops had climbed
to FL280. After some thought we
elected to dump fuel and requested
the ‘wrong’ altitude of FL280 since we
were unable to climb to FL290 and
retain sufficient fuel plus reserves.
Another extremely tense period
followed as we tip toed through the
clouds until, yet again, the stars came
back into view. Unfortunately, at this
point, there was a noise like a gun
going off as the pilot’s windscreen
effectively delaminated. The WSO
had an unfortunate accident since he
was convinced that we had now been
struck by lightning and we were all
about to die. I was able to reassure
the crew and we descended carrying
out FRC drills as we did before a
relatively uneventful landing. I can
say that this was one of the most
stressful flights I have ever been on;
3hrs 30 mins in the logbook and not a
single cup of coffee. I can also testify
to the absolute brilliance on US ATC
when there is weather about and I
walked off the aircraft with a beer in
one hand and a cigarette in the other
despite having given up smoking
some years before. I remember
little about the rest of the night since
the WSO insisted on plying us with
copious amounts of beer for ‘saving his life’ and I didn’t
have the heart to tell him that it was down to a lot of luck
as well as good crew co-operation.
As a result of the above incidents and a lot of other
experiences along the way, I have learnt to give the
weather total respect and I am much more careful now
than I was in my younger years. Which brings me to those
well worn Flight Safety idioms which hold as true today as
they always have and they are Never Assume, Check and
Always expect the Unexpected.
airCLUES
Spry Says:
I too am of the old and bold school of aviators, but this
has largely been down to having Lady Luck on my side
for the large part of my frivolous youth. You see, it is
only the gift of hindsight and the increased awareness of
risk that comes with advancing toward my dotage, that
has highlighted how much of my early aviation career I
‘winged’. One of the things I oft paid lip service to were
those clever johnnies in the Met Office. Cu this; Cb
that; advection fog, katabatic drainage; it was all a bit to
technical and irrelevant to the young Spry. However, as
this article rightly highlights it is not until the proverbial hits
the fan, that you realise the full potential of the weather
to ruin your day. It would be trite of me to say, “pay
attention to the met brief”, or, “make sure you understand
the effects of extreme weather” for we are all professional
aviators and this is our bread and butter. What I would
say is never, like myself of old, let Lady Luck be your
mistress and where possible plan for the unexpected;
as the one predictable thing about the weather is
its unpredictability.
13
airCLUES
I learnt about arctic flying
from that…
‘It’ll be fine… that’s how we always did it years ago…’
February 2010… It’s the Puma Force’s first deployment to Norway for winter
training in 3 years. During the European transit en-route to Bardufoss, Norway,
for Exercise CLOCKWORK 10, our 3-ship Puma helicopter formation had
planned a 3-day route stopping in Aalborg, Denmark and Trondheim, Norway
before reaching our destination on the third day. However, in true Support
Helicopter fashion, we were constantly hampered by bad weather… pretty
much the norm for Europe in February!
Due to the bad weather, the formation never actually stayed or refuelled
anywhere that was originally planned, instead over-nighting at Groningen,
Holland… Odense, Denmark and then Molde, Norway. Having lost a day-anda-half in Denmark, there was also the perception within the crews that we had
to try our utmost to get to Norway in order to commence training, as the Puma
Force had very limited time to get many of its personnel qualified in arctic
techniques, and a limited number of days on the Exercise. This was pretty
much a self-induced pressure as the detachment commander and the training
officer were both part of the transit party.
In hindsight, a call to the Duty Flight Commander (DFC) at Benson or indeed
the Squadron Boss would have been the better option as they would definitely
have given us advice and reassured us that these ‘pressures’ were not there!
Having previously refuelled with F34 fuel (with icing inhibitor) and F35 fuel
(without icing inhibitor) through the low-countries we had yet to experience
sub-zero temperatures on our transit. However on a clear-weather day in
Norway, the decision was made for a straight-line transit between Kristiansund
and Floro rather than a lower-level coastal route, as it saved approx 2-3 hrs
and another refuel stop.
This route would have kept us within the Outside Air Temperature (OAT)
limits laid down in the Puma Release to Service which states that flight without
icing inhibitor in the fuel is not permitted below 0°C. We refuelled the aircraft
with F35 (this was our first mistake) and planned our sortie. Terrain meant
that a high-level (above Flight Level 70, OAT -15 deg C) transit was needed
and all 3 crews (consisting of 2 pilot instructors, 3 training captains, one pilot
standards officer (STANO), one crewman instructor, one crewman trainer and
one crewman STANO) agreed it as the best course of action.
This was our second and potentially most critical mistake. By choosing this
course we were disregarding the Release-to-Service (RTS) limits with respect
to the use of F35 (ie fuel without icing inhibitor (FSII)), which is not to be used
below 0˚C OAT). Everyone was working on the ‘old wives tail’ that as long as
there was some FSII in the tanks from the previous fill, then everything would
be fine. We further compounded our earlier errors when we were ordered,
14
under Radar Control, by ATC to climb further still into
even colder air at FL100 which we complied with, without
question, and continued to fly there for 15 minutes with an
OAT of approx -21˚ C.
The formation then began a descent for the approach to
Floro and during this descent the lead aircraft experienced
a momentary drop of engine performance (Ng) on the
No 1 engine. The drop lasted less than one second and
fortunately for us, recovered to normal readings with no
further fluctuations. All the aircraft then landed at Floro
approx 20 mins later without further incident, where the
crew concerned heaved a sigh of relief and then refuelled
with standard F34 fuel with FSII. Although there is no way
of knowing what actually happened to the engine that day,
we came to the conclusion that the event may have been
caused by the early signs of fuel icing. The possibility is
that the lack of FSII in the tanks caused residual water
within the fuel to freeze and under the pressure change
in the descent the ice formed was dislodged, travelled
through the system and thus caused the engine speed
to drop. The Release to Service limits are based on the
temperature exposure the fuel has prior to entering the
engine and in a Puma the fuel pipe routing unintentionally
ensures that the fuel is cooled to the ambient OAT, in
this case well below the 0 ˚C specified. We disregarded
clearly specified limits in our haste to arrive in good time
and in so doing we could have seriously damaged our
chances of arriving at all.
OC CLOCKWORK’s Comments
The crews involved in this non-incident were all well
practiced, current and qualified, had flown for several
hours and indeed days prior to what at first sight
seems a very minor event; a momentary drop in engine
performance. Where the crews have been entirely proactive, is in their recognition of the potential seriousness
of their lapse of judgement taking unprotected fuel and
their post-flight analysis of the events. It is seemingly
minor events that can trigger a sequence which can lead
to a serious incident. In this case the minor event has
lead to a learning exercise for current arctic operators and
a dispelling of certain ‘myths and legends’ about the way
we used to do business.
A DFSOR was raised to ensure that the lessons that
this deploying crew learned will not be lost and I’m really
pleased that Air Clues is back to ensure that there is a
vehicle to pass this information on to a wider audience.
A double engine flame-out over mountains, in the winter,
in Norway, at -15 deg C, is not the place to remember
the reason for using fuel with FSII; these crews were
probably lucky (although we will never really know), but
most importantly are to be commended for their honesty.
Spry Says:
I fully concur with OC CLOCKWORK’s comments,
the crew of this aircraft are to be fully commended for
their professional and honest analysis and subsequent
reporting of what appears to be a ‘non-event’. The
inculcation of a questioning culture, where we review our
actions and errors is fundamental to ensuring that we
not only report errors in the first place, but also that we
are able to learn valuable lessons about preventing their
reoccurrence as well.
The key to understanding error is not to glibly construct
an obvious error chain, that is forged in the fires of
hindsight, rather we need to put ourselves in the position
of this crew as they made each decision and think, “why
did they take this particular course of action?” As an
example, when the crews decided to make a high level
transit without FSII in the tanks, we can all look back
and say that was a risky decision, but why did they take
it? The fact that so many were involved in the decision
making process and approved the final decision, points
toward a high degree of ‘risky shift’; where the degree
of risk that the group is willing to take is significantly
higher than individual members would take on their own.
So what? What factors actually convinced that group
that this was a good call, despite their years of aviation
experience? Pressure, over-confidence, unrealistic risk
reduction? Ultimately, I leave the analysis to you, for it
is fundamental that you question the decisions and glean
the ‘whys and wherefores’ of error. From there you can
consider how often you have been in a similar situation
and how you would deal with it in the future without
inducing unnecessary risk.
15
airCLUES
engineering flight safety
in the arctic circle
by Flt Lt Dave Mirfin, JEngO 28 Sqn B Flt
The Me Fce detachment to Ex CLOCKWORK was
conducted at RNoAF Bardufoss over a 5 week period
in Feb/Mar 10. I was fortunate to be the EngO for the
Me detachment and my team of engineers remained for
the whole period in support of 2 Mk 3A ac and an initial
deployment of 28 Sqn aircrew, followed by 78 Sqn aircrew
roulement at the mid point of the detachment. The
engineers worked a two-shift system to provide a 24/7
commitment to operating the 2 ac.
The principles of engineering and Flight Safety apply
irrespective of the environment, but the challenges
presented by operating inside the Arctic Circle, where -25
deg C temperatures and high winds were routine, dictates
more stringent attention to personal preparation and
maintenance procedures. Even though all the engineers
had completed a Cold Weather Survival Course to
prepare for the conditions, which primarily concentrates
on operating in the field, it was imperative that the affects
of the cold and the necessity to wear protective equipment
when maintaining ac were fully understood by everyone.
In particular, simple measures such as monitoring the
time exposed to the elements and wearing gloves proved
to be essential because two of the major risks were that
personnel would stay outside too long to get the job done
and freezing metallic surfaces are a serious hazard to
unprotected skin.
16
Consequently, additional time had to be factored
in to the maintenance estimates to the aircrew in order
to allow for the impacts of shorter working periods and
more cumbersome PPE, irrespective of conducting
rectification maintenance or routine tasks such as Flight
Servicing. Similarly, whilst it was a personal responsibility
to monitor your own reaction to the cold, these testing
conditions naturally placed heightened responsibility on
the command chain to assure the safety and welfare of
everyone.
Alongside personal preparation, there is also an
additional commitment to prepare the ac for operating
in such an environment. The Extreme Cold Weather
Environment Procedures are laid down in the Technical
Publications and detail additional maintenance to be
carried out on the ac. Before the ac can commence
flying, it is imperative that these extra procedures are fully
captured in the Aircraft Document Set and understood
by all personnel so that the ac are maintained correctly
for the operating conditions. Not only does this confirm
that the ac is serviceable for the demands of Arctic flying,
this preparation is undoubtedly a major contributor to
flight safety.
Whilst it is normal practice to protect the ac overnight
using the blanks and designated covers for the nose,
windscreen, main rotor blades and tail rotor blades,
preparation, understanding the environment and adhering
to procedures materialised in response to an incident
experienced with one of the ac. On returning from a
sortie, a whining noise was heard on the ac and reported
by one of the engineers stood close by. The aircrew were
unable to hear the noise, so the alertness of the engineer
was the starting point in the successful recovery of this ac.
Following investigation, it was established that ‘Engine 2’
was the source of the noise and the resulting course of
action was to change the engine. With limited options for
towing the ac inside a hangar, the engineers erected a
temporary shelter over the ac and commenced the engine
change outside. Employing a vehicle-mounted crane to
remove the old engine and install the new one, the engine
change was completed in a matter of hours in conditions
that worsened as the day progressed. Notably, following
a successful air test the following morning, the ac was
quickly returned to the flying programme. This ac recovery
was impressive to witness and the whole chain of events
is testimony to the vigilance, initiative, determination
and ‘can-do safely’ attitude of those involved in their
contribution to Flight Safety.
Overall, Ex CLOCKWORK was a success for the
Me Fce and it can be considered a true reflection of the
engineers’ professionalism and total regard for Flight
Safety that contributed to this success.
airCLUES
additional operating procedures were instigated to ensure
that the blanks and covers would be fitted during any
extended periods of non-flying throughout the day. By
protecting the ac this way, especially during periods of
heavy snow, we were not only reducing the risk of snow
and ice build up, but were enabling the ac to be made
flight ready in a relatively short time when required. It
is worth commenting at this point that proactive aircrew
assistance in this labour intensive task certainly resulted
in the process becoming very slick.
On occasions, the colder overnight temperatures
had frozen certain actuator-driven components on the
engines. The recovery procedure in this instance was to
apply warm air through the engine intake using a dieselpowered GSE heater and hoses to eventually thaw the
frozen component. Another locally instigated procedure
for preparing the ac first thing in the morning was to affix
a series of the heater hoses in to the engine intakes and
in to the cabin area. Besides removing any ice build-up
in the engine compartments, this procedure also slightly
warmed inside the ac without incurring any problems with
condensation. These preventative measures not only
reduced the chance of experiencing a fault on start and
delaying the sortie, but further minimised the risk to Flight
Safety from environmental factors.
The culmination of all the aforementioned personal
17
airCLUES
I learnt about pushing the limits
...from that
“Go down, slow down, turn round, land on” is the standard
Support Helicopter (SH) poor weather brief. In terms of
the Puma, this comes partly from reluctance, in the winter
months, to carry out a low level abort into cloud due to a lack
of icing clearance, and not normally having sufficient fuel
for an instrument recovery. The SH force has a reputation
for a ‘can-do’ spirit and, given the flexibility of helicopter
operations, we very often find ourselves grovelling around
at low level in poor weather in order to reach troops (that
sadly do not operate exclusively at airfields). The result of
this is that we can become desensitised to how bad the
picture outside the cockpit actually is; thinking, “I’ve seen
this before, it’ll be fine once we get round the next corner”.
I recently discovered what happens after you go down,
slow down, loose the turn round option and become forced
to land on in a remote location without communications
with home base.
I was part of a small detachment of Puma aircrew
taking part in an exercise involving both fixed wing and
rotary aircraft and troops. We had spent a few days at
a Main Operating Base (MOB) in Yorkshire not greatly
involved in the Exercise tasking, instead trying to achieve
our own training. We then deployed with 2 Pumas to
set up a Forward Operating Base (FOB) at RAF Kinloss
with enough troops to form a reaction force and wait for
18
further tasking. No tasking came and we were unable to
carry out any of our own training for the first few days due
to poor weather. To add to this 2 pilots and the Mobile
Meteorological Unit (MMU) Officer were struck down by
diarrhoea and vomiting. On 25 March 2010 the weather
was below night flying limits and the exercise scenario
called for 2 pilots to be put ‘on the run’ with some of
the troops to simulate a downed aircraft, enabling the
Exercise Headquarters to practise a personnel recovery
situation. Just prior to this the Squadron Survive, Evade,
Resist, Extract Instructor had given a brief that covered
the aspects of survival in the Scottish Highlands, using
“Protection, Location, Water, Food” as a framework. After
helping the chosen pilots gather their kit and having a
bit of a laugh at their faces as the minibus door closed
and the rain started to be blown sideways, we watched
a film and then returned to the accommodation. We went
to bed just after midnight to maintain the expected night
tasking routine.
I travelled into the FOB shortly after lunch and it was
decided that we would carry out our own training that
afternoon and fly a low-level tactical formation sortie. We
received a weather brief via telephone from the Kinloss
Met Office as the MMU Officer was sick in quarters. The
forecast indicated potentially poor weather conditions
in the area of operation with cloudbases as low as
700’-800’ in parts with showers reducing visibility. The
sortie was therefore planned utilising the low valleys to
Autlbea Helicopter Landing Site (HLS) on the west coast
of Scotland where we had forward deployed a Tactical
Supply Wing (TSW) team to set up a Forward Arming
and Refuelling Point (FARP). The planned route would
take us from Kinloss to 2 HLSs in Inverness, southwest
through the Great Glen before heading west towards the
coast northeast of Skye to Applecross HLS and then on to
Aultbea HLS for a refuel. We would then return to Kinloss
by either reversing the route or, if weather permitted,
following an easterly route via Cromarty. The sortie was
briefed and we walked for the aircraft slightly later than
the original plan, but not rushed as the sortie was not
time critical. We decided to take the reaction force troops
as passengers so that if exercise tasking emerged they
would be with us and the helicopter experience would
benefit them and provide us with practise of flying
a heavier aircraft.
THE SORTIE
along the valley in an attempt to reach a point where the
bowser could drive to us however the visibility reduced to
100m and we were forced to land with approx 60kg of fuel
per group - still above min landing allowance. The aircraft
was shut down, rotors were socked and locked and the
aircraft was picketed to the ground to prevent damage
from strong and increasing wind.
POST LANDING
We then found ourselves in a survival situation and as a
crew used the Protection, Location, Water, Food survival
principles. All crew and pax remained inside the aircraft
for shelter from the heavy drizzle and rain and winds in
excess of 25kts that peaked at approx 35-40kts. One
SARBE was activated from a crew LCJ and
the aircraft radio used to transmit on 243.0 and
121.5 and various airways frequencies in the
area overhead with no response. In addition,
an extra radio, fitted only for the exercise, was
used to try transmitting on 406Mhz, again with
no response. The passengers sent messages
on their survival radios again with no response.
One of these radios was set to 121.5 to allow for
a listening watch without using aircraft battery
power. There was no mobile phone coverage.
Approximately 45 minutes before darkness
airCLUES
I was the handling pilot and captain of the Lead
aircraft. The aircraft suffered 2 failed engine start
attempts due to low battery voltage but successfully
started after a helistart kit was connected. Shortly
after we started, the No2 aircraft shutdown and
informed us they had a failed alternator; we
therefore continued as a singleton as per the loser
plan.
Up until the point we lifted from Applecross
HLS, the sortie had run as planned with better than
expected weather, in fact the poor weather that
had been forecast was not observed. We had an
extra 20 mins of fuel over and above the minimum
required to complete the planned route to the FARP
at Aultbea (a rare occurrence in the Puma). The
weather being 10K+ visibility, 2000’+ cloudbase, the
Non-Handling Pilot (NHP) suggested we deviate
from our planned track to identify a WWII crash
site, near Torridon, that had been discussed in
previous planning back at Kinloss. This would add
approx 10nm requiring 5 mins extra fuel – in reality
it would have required approx 9 mins extra fuel but
still within the extra fuel we had. I initially thought
perhaps we should continue with the plan but taking into
consideration the extra fuel and the weather, which was
suitable, I changed my mind and agreed to the diversion
as it would be both good training value and interesting
to see.
The transit was uneventful until we reached the area
of interest and found the peak to be in cloud. We did not
attempt to ID the site and continued to regain track at the
refuel site at Aultbea HLS. Due to an avoid around Eilean
Subhainn we routed around another, northwesterly, valley
that would steer us direct toward Aultbea. We have since
identified a lower ground route around the avoid however,
without site of the map and given the high level of service
throughout the sortie, I accepted the route given by the
NHP. At this point the weather was 5K+ visibility, 2000’
cloudbase. However, very soon after we entered the valley
the weather deteriorated very quickly. Within a couple of
minutes the weather had closed in both front and back
and we were reduced to a hover taxy. During the weather
deterioration we reached a point where, due to increased
fuel burn caused by reduced speed, the fuel required to
retrace our steps out of the valley was not sufficient to
reach Aultbea and we were committed to the chosen route.
Given the very low speed and high fuel burn, we were
soon unable to reach Aultbea. We elected to continue
19
airCLUES
2 of the passengers took a mobile phone and a survival
radio as far up the hillside as could be seen through the
weather but were unable to establish communication with
any agency.
With light fading we elected to stay with the aircraft for
the night and cosider a move towards the nearest habitation
at first light. Between the crew and passengers we had
survival equipment including cold weather gear, sleeping
bags, rations and water for 24 hours. Shortly before
darkness we heard a Coastguard helicopter transmitting
on 121.5 and established weak communication. They
were unable to get to our location due to the weather,
however established that we were safe and had sufficient
equipment and rations for the night and informed us that
they would try again in the morning.
Relieved that we had been located, the crew and pax
ate some rations and bedded down inside the aircraft
cabin for the night. At approx 0230 I was awake checking
for signs of frost or ice outside to gauge the outside
air temperature, when I saw some searchlights and a
paralume in the valley. I woke everyone up and took the
day/night flare and miniflares that had been prepared
outside to use as signals if required. My head torch was
enough for the 3 members of the RAF Leuchars MRT
to find our location. They gave us more rations, blizzard
tubes and set up camp next to the aircraft. In addition,
they used a satellite phone to inform the Aeronautical
Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) that we were safe
and well and updated the Detachment Commander on
the condition of the aircraft with respect to socks/locks,
picketing, fuel state and whether the engines had flamed
out or not. We were told that a Chinook was tasked to
bring a replacement crew and fuel the following day so
returned to the aircraft to sleep.
RECOVERY
In the morning we woke up, packed up all kit, replaced the
seats in the aircraft cabin, ate some breakfast rations and
serviced the aircraft in preparation for the recovery crew.
We all walked with the MRT 200m to where the terrain
descended rapidly towards the coast and the FARP at
Aultbea HLS – the area we had been unable to see the
previous day. Around lunchtime a Chinook arrived with
replacement crew and engineers to refuel and recover the
aircraft. We helped the crew to set up the refuel equipment
and the aircraft was refuelled from the Chinook. My crew,
plus the pax, were recovered to Kinloss by Chinook and
the aircraft followed shortly after.
HINDSIGHT
With hindsight the decision to deviate from track was illconceived. Although the weather and fuel allowed this
20
detour, the lack of flight following and SAR cover as
detailed below makes subsequent searches difficult. At the
point where we found the area of interest to be in cloud we
should have retraced our steps back to the coastal route.
The route chosen on the 1:250,000 scale map did not fully
represent the terrain we were attempting to route through
and the river valley that appeared to plateau before
rapidly descending toward the coast did in fact continue to
increase in altitude before the descent we were eventually
unable to reach. All of this, our lack of experience in this
location and a rapid reduction in the weather conditions
caught us out, resulting in an unplanned landing in a
mountainous environment off planned track.
HOW WILL THEY FIND ME?
SARSAT no longer monitors the SARBE transmissions
and 406Mhz capable replacements are still long overdue,
in addition the recent removal of fixed wing SAR aircraft
on standby capable of searching at height made locating
our off-track position difficult. If you have no radio
contact with an ATC agency before you are forced to
land and no mobile phone coverage after you land then
locating your position will rely heavily on a search of your
planned route. Clearly, if you were not on the planned
route, either by choice or forced by weather, the search
will be more difficult. If operating within a formation you
have a greater freedom of routing as flight following is
provided by the other aircraft. ‘Spot-nav’ is a recognised
method of training but hindsight has reminded me
that deviating from planned track as a singleton in a
mountainous environment without the location aids
discussed above should be carefully considered, if not
avoided all together. If you wish to test the ‘spot-nav’ of
a crew member then simply leave your intentions on a
separate map with the authoriser.
SURVIVAL KIT
The crew had survival go-bags with warm kit for a night
but with experience of the blizzard tubes provided by
the MRT and how little space they require for storage, I
now carry one in my ‘go-bag’. I have also suggested that
consideration should be given to the Puma Fce adding
these to the role fit of the aircraft. In addition, 24 hour
ration packs and cyalumes could be carried in a ‘go-bag’
and/or stored in the aircraft with little weight and space
penalty and neither expire in short timescales. We were
confident that we could walk to habitation in daylight and
therefore were confident we would be located within 24
hours. I know from experience of survival exercises that
we can generally survive 24 hours without food fairly easily
but the rations, especially hot drinks, kept our spirits up.
The picketing kit is not always carried in the aircraft
but was invaluable in preventing damage to the aircraft.
The Puma has a high centre of gravity and a narrow
undercarriage meaning that high winds present a risk of
the aircraft being blown over. This risk is increased at low
fuel states. I will certainly consider taking a picketing kit on
tasks into more remote areas in the future.
embarrassing, account of their incident. So the crew (and
I) stand to be judged and acknowledge that things would
certainly be different next time – our embarrassment is
worth it if you are reading this article and thinking how you
would not make the same mistake. In this case, the crew
sought to make things more demanding for their training
benefit, but without thinking through the consequences all
the way to the finish. With no IFR options, the withdrawal of
Nimrod SAR cover, the lack of 406 beacons and operating
in an unfamiliar area with changeable weather, this was
an unnecessary increase in risk. However, mistakes and
set-backs will always occur in some form – the challenge
for supervisors is how we react to them. Here, from the
point of landing the actions of the crew were excellent and
probably saved a notoriously ‘top heavy’ Puma from being
blown over that night; nothing was hurt beyond personal
pride. I commend the captain for his approach to the
aftermath of this incident, including the time taken to write
this article; it is more valuable to my flight safety effort that
any stand-up interview, or written warning could ever be.
Hindsight is a wonderful thing. Unfortunately, as the word
suggests, lessons identified tend to come after the event
and are very often glaringly obvious. This incident has
highlighted mistakes and consequences that were not
fully considered before actions were carried out. Had we
asked the “What if?” question with respect to the points
raised above we would probably have made different
choices. When I say ‘we’, ultimately I mean ‘I’, as the
captain. My decision not only lead to a full scale search
and rescue operation, but caused great distress to my
colleagues and chain of command who spent 2 long hours
believing the search was for wreckage. My only saving
grace is that after finding myself in that final scenario I
stuck to the last part of the “Go down, slow down, turn
round, land on” motto. It would have been very easy to
press on in desperation below fuel minima, causing the
engines to flame-out, potentially crashing and killing 8
people. Luckily I can finish with the following: Did anyone
get hurt? No. Was the aircraft damaged? No. Did we
“learn about flying from that”? Yes.
SQUADRON COMMANDER’S COMMENTS
In Edition 1 of the re-launched Airclues, a Puma pilot
described the ‘Airclues Test’ – the concept that you may be
asked to write to Airclues describing your actions one day
and, if this would be an embarrassment, then it is probably
not worth doing. I applied the Airclues Test to this particular
crew and the result is an open and honest, if slightly
airCLUES
ASK THE “WHAT IF?”
21
airCLUES
children, elves
and fairy tales
Flt Lt Jon Dunn, SFSO, RAF Linton-on-Ouse takes a alternative look at
risk assessment in military aviation.
Mentioning risk assessment in the title would lose me 90%
of the potential readership so bear with me; this story has
drama and excitement and might save somebody’s life
and prevent you going to jail. The problem with mentioning
risk assessment is that it conjures up sentiments like,
“this is ‘elf and safety gone mad” and the gem, “we’ve
been doin’ it like this for years without any accidents”.
More importantly the fact is that you’ve been doing risk
assessments for years and you don’t even notice that
you are doing them. Every time you cross the road you
are, without thinking, carrying out a risk assessment. How
busy is the road? Do I really need to cross the road? Is
there a pedestrian crossing/traffic lights/footbridge? Can
I remember the Green Cross Code etc? The fact that in
most cases the risk associated with crossing the road can
be effectively mitigated by these sorts of defences doesn’t
make crossing the road an inherently safe activity - just
ask the 3000, or so people who get run over every year!
Neither does it make it a sensible option to extrapolate
our assessment of risk to playing volleyball in the middle
of the M25 at rush hour; although given the average traffic
speed on the M25 it probably wouldn’t be a high risk
venture.
By the jolly clever process of “natural selection” the
gene pool is relatively free from individuals who are
incapable of making appropriate risk assessments. Sadly
in aviation terms we have not evolved a robust method
of assessing aviation risks. Birds, on the other hand,
probably have and yet you still see them making errors
and having accidents when confronted by something
relatively new like windows, power lines and aircraft. Bear
in mind that a bird strike for us is usually a relatively minor
incident. From the bird’s perspective it’s a fairly major
accident! Birds have also failed to organize themselves
into Air Forces and convene Coroner’s Courts - but more
on those later.
Children play. Fact. Children sometimes get injured
playing. Fact. Children very occasionally die playing.
Sadly, this is also a fact. Do we stop children from playing?
22
No, of course we don’t. To do so would be absurd, or
in RAF speak, “risk averse”. Do we attempt to mitigate
the risks? Yes. We supervise them. We set limits and
boundaries. We ensure that their activities are appropriate
for their level of development. We teach them to make
appropriate choices and decisions for themselves. So
when last weekend my three children were playing in the
park within 20 meters of my wife and I, things were going
well. When my eldest son, Freddie, 7, offered to give my
daughter, Olympia, 2, a piggy back I was unconcerned
as he had done it before. I had explained the dangers
of dropping her and he was a strong and sensible boy. I
therefore assessed the residual risk to be minimal. Sadly
for the Dunn family Freddie had not been taught about or
thought through the potential pitfalls of his sister sliding
down his back and more importantly the risk associated
with his recovery action. So when she did slide down he
bent forward and lifted her up his back. The result was
that she flew over his head and landed forehead first on
the grass flipping over and flexing her neck backwards
to a frankly alarming degree. Screaming would have
been preferable to what actually happened. My wife and
I were quickly confronted with an unconscious two year
old who was now suffering a seizure. Needless to say an
ambulance was called and shortly thereafter our nice day
out terminated in A&E.
So was our risk assessment appropriate? With 20:20
hindsight, probably not! This is the point! Your activity will
be assessed with the benefit of hindsight. The Coroner will
have the benefit of looking back on the planning for your
flying activity knowing that it ends in a fatal accident. If
you approach your risk assessment from the point of view
that your proposed activity is inherently safe then you will
inevitably reach the conclusion that the risk assessment
process is pointless, a waste of time and only likely to be
filed in the bin anyway. In most cases I’m glad to say you’ll
be right, but at least you have gone to the effort of thinking
through what the potential risks are. Here lies another
little pitfall. By the nature of the people who are attracted
services industry and the result was the Recession.
I’m not saying that I am in no way affected by all of
the preconceptions that I have discussed thus far. I vividly
remember climbing up the ladder to my Tornado F3 in a
HAS at RAF Leeming and being roundly chastised by WO
Eng on XI(F) Sqn for not wearing my flying helmet whilst
doing so. “’elf and safety gone mad” surely? “I’m about to
strap myself heroically to a piece of exploding furniture
and swoop majestically down valleys at 600 mph; don’t
bother me with your petty, earth bound inconveniences, I
am a military aviator and above all of this” I thought. What I
had failed to realise was that the two are entirely separate
activities only linked in my mind by the fact that it was me
carrying them out. To put it another way; the fact that the
activity you are about to carry out might carry an incredibly
high risk, which might be outside your control, should not
prevent you from attempting to mitigate those risks which
are within your control. Or more simply your task of flying
£50,000,000 worth of state of the art military hard wear
will not protect you from being hit by the fuel tanker during
your short walk to crew in to it. On an organisational level
the fact that we are at war in Afghanistan should not make
us think that it’s OK to risk lives in the UK.
I hope this article has put risk assessment into some
sort of context for you. If you are tasked with carrying out
a risk assessment then how to go about it is all there for
you in JSP 551 Vol 3; another worthy candidate for the
Man Booker Prize.
Oh, my daughter, Olympia….. she’s fine. Her neck
wasn’t broken. She hadn’t fractured her skull. She didn’t
have a brain haemorrhage and no lasting damage thank
goodness. Freddie has learnt about piggy backs (which
are now prohibited in the Dunn household). I’ve learnt
about risk assessment and the Child Protection authorities
haven’t come round to discuss our risk mitigation
measures. The elf? Never seen ‘im.
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to military aviation we are more often than not life’s risk
takers. People don’t sign up to potentially going to war
in a fast jet thinking that they aren’t going to survive. We
enhance this by training them to believe that they are the
best trained, best equipped and pound for pound, person
for person the most capable Air Force in the world. I
would not wish to undermine all this great esprit de corps
building stuff, but it doesn’t set us up well for realistically
assessing the risk inherent in our activities. The average
mid twenties military pilot firmly believes that he/she is
immortal; they won’t admit it, mostly because they are
intelligent enough to objectively analyse when asked
but the majority of them are firmly in denial. The motor
insurance industry knows how skewed the perception of
risk held by a mid twenties male is and sets premiums
appropriately. Fortunately the vast majority of these young
aviators don’t die due to their skewed perception of risk.
More disappointingly, this lack of threat in their experience
often leaves them with the enhanced perception that it will
always happen to the “other guy”. Cue the banter of, “elf
and safety gone mad!” and “We’ve done it like this for
years and never had an accident”. I have to fight the urge
to add “Yet” for them.
I agree that if you start from the mind set of “our activity
is inherently safe” then risk assessments are garbage and
a waste of time. However, if you have gone through the
motions of a risk assessment and completed it from this
point of view then remember that the Coroner will assess
you from the view point of knowing the outcome. He or she
is unlikely to be swayed by your argument that “it was very
unlikely that one of our aircraft would crash and kill the two
crew and three civilians” if that is what actually happened.
If you have carried out a risk assessment and filed it and
that assessment was reasonably thorough and if a similarly
experienced and competent person would come to similar
conclusions based on the evidence that was available to
you at the time then the coroner is very likely to agree
with you and you will be part of a learning process. If that
is not the case then you may quickly find yourself on the
wrong end of a gross negligence or manslaughter charge.
So yes, to a certain extent a risk assessment is a rearcovering exercise. This flawed methodology was brought
to light by Charles Haddon-Cave QC in “The Nimrod
Review”, but at 500+ pages I suspect that the majority of
the potential readership was whittled down to all but the
most determined, or the insomniacs. Suggesting that we
aren’t very good at assessing risk would mark you out as
somebody who was “risk averse”, a cardinal sin. However,
by being “risk aware” from the viewpoint that our business
is inherently safe; is not risk management, it’s gambling.
The last group of “professional” risk managers who went
about their activity in this manner worked in the financial
23
airCLUES
There’s no Landings like
Snow Landings…
Lessons learned
from the
Merlin Force’s
recent experience
of landing in arctic
conditions in the
midst of an
Oxfordshire winter.
Landing a helicopter is like parking
your car. The more practice you get
the better you are at it. Ultimately
though, when you have found a
space, in order to know what steering,
brake and accelerator inputs to
make, you need to reference your
car’s position to the open space or
the cars between which you intend
to park. References are also the
secret to hovering and landing a
helicopter. In normal UK conditions
this is relatively easy, but when these
references become obscured by the
environment, landing without specific
training becomes a serious flight
safety concern.
The weather last winter was
changeable, giving sudden, often
heavy snow showers. With it came
poor visibility due to low cloud bases
caused by the cooler snowy surfaces,
similar conditions to those found in
the Arctic. Being able to delineate
between white cloud and snowcovered surfaces becomes more
difficult, especially as the visibility
deteriorates.
The
disorientation
caused
by
this
phenomenon
24
manifested itself as a serious flight safety concern at RAF Benson. For several
years, the Puma, Merlin, Chinook and Commando Helicopter Forces have
sent detachments to RNAF Bardufoss, Norway inside the Arctic circle to train
in just these conditions, and just as well; landing an aircraft in snow is one of
the most testing techniques which Support Helicopter (SH) aircrew are taught,
and here’s why.
As the helicopter gets near the ground and slows, its downwash (a 70kt
wind, keeping the aircraft airborne) hits the surface, and creates an enormous
blowing cloud of snow. “White-out” ensues, creating a very disorientating
experience and without reference to anything on the ground, landing is
extremely hazardous. A similar situation results when operating in the desert,
and it’s often referred to as a limited visibility landing. So the art is to win
the battle, helicopter vs. snow. By picking a marker on the ground (something
sticking out of the snow), the aircraft is manoeuvred from transit to the ground
reducing speed and height to zero, at the same time, before the snow cloud
has an opportunity to obscure the reference. Easy, provided that you bear a
few things in mind.
Firstly, size loses its context in the snow. Picking a marker in snow
conditions is a challenge itself. It needs to be something chunky enough to
stand out but small enough to get under the rotor disc, bearing in mind, the
blade tips are spinning at nearly 400mph! The other major considerations
are the thickness of the snow and what is under it. Often in deep snow the
aircraft wheels will never actually reach the ground and it will sit on the snow
after landing on its belly. But you just don’t know. In the battle, helicopter vs.
snow, the speed and height must be zero at touchdown, or a sub-snow level
boulder that you had not seen might damage the aircraft undercarriage or
belly skin. There are many different considerations that go into perfecting this
technique and with practice it becomes an essential skill for SH squadrons
to maintain.
This decision wasn’t taken lightly but was one that would
be repeated on flight safety grounds if, and when, these
conditions return again this year.
Spry Says:
Whilst on the subject of low visibility landings I thought it
may be of interest to provide you all with an update on
the latest technological solutions to the problem. As such
I have consulted the boffins at Dstl to see what they are
working on; so here comes the science bit …..
“Accidents due to brown/white-out can be broadly divided
in to two causal areas; loss of situational awareness and
unseen landing site (LS) obstacles. With dust-penetrating
sensors, which can identify LS hazards, still some way
off, Dstl have been working on the situational awareness
problem. Dstl scientists and engineers initially carried
out a rapid technology assessment of several proposed
solutions, which resulted in a Ferranti Technologies
Limited conformal symbology solution being taken forward
to simulator and flying trials. The system utilises an
Advanced Signal Display Computer, with feeds from a high
grade EGI, millimetric wave RADALT and aircraft RADALT
to generate symbology. The symbology is presented on
a helmet mounted display, and provides the crew with a
virtual 3D representation of the LS that stays fixed to the
earth as the pilot flies his approach. The LS symbology
provides the pilot with enough cues to fly visually, even
when the outside world is completely obscured by dust
or snow. The system can be used with helmet mounted
day HUD for daytime operation, with the symbology fed
through current night vision goggles to provide a night time
capability. Currently LVL is undergoing de-risking activities
prior to hopefully achieving UOR status in early ’11.”
airCLUES
Some may argue that this type of approach in these
times of desert warfare is the mainstay of helicopter
aircrew skill sets, with limited visibility landings being
flown daily in Afghanistan, and other environmental
training deployments. The techniques are similar, but not
the same. The smooth monochromatic nature of snow
cannot be understated, and consequently the importance
of a predetermined, crew-agreed marker is paramount
before the start of an approach. With dust, however, the
undulations and texture of the ground allow the crew to
modify their marker late in the manoeuvre, making it a
more flexible approach profile, even when in the heaviest
“brown-out” conditions. So landing a helicopter in Arctic
conditions is much more involved than a normal hover
landing, which is practiced and taught daily, and subtly
different to landing in the dust. To be competent to deal
with Arctic conditions and safely land a helicopter in the
snow, involves a specific qualification and training of its
own as a result.
The decision was made at RAF Benson, during
the heavy snow conditions earlier this year, that only
Arctic qualified aircrew would cascade training to those
without snow experience rather than falling back on the
fleets’ unquestionably vast “limited visibility” operational
experience. The Merlin Force had suffered a period of
serviceability issues around this time with many crews
were on the edge of currency. There was therefore a
risk balance to be contested, between the continuation
of routine currency training and the difficult decision to
qualify crews in the difficult conditions. With the exception
of operations and their kinetic threat, approaches into
limited visibility landings, especially snow are dangerous,
especially without training and practice. Advantage was
taken to train more crews and share this Arctic experience,
although it was a hindrance to normal training and tasking.
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airCLUES
WINTEROPERATIONS
By Flight Sergeant Paul Buttolph,
ATC, RAF Benson
- an ATC perspective
Well, the summer is drawing to a close and it’s time to
think about Op Blacktop again. As a rotary unit we don’t
need to clear the runway which is a bit of a bonus as we
come under the classification of a “Training Unit” and,
therefore, don’t have the budget, or equipment for runway
clearance. Our Blacktop ops therefore revolve around the
dispersal and hangars. We have a 3 Priority system:
Priority 1 clears the areas required for the Thames
Valley Air Ambulance, the Chiltern Air Support
Unit (Thames Valley Police helicopter) and an
emergency response route for the Fire Section to
reach the technical and domestic sites. These are
areas that must be kept clear at all times to ensure
emergency services can respond.
Priority 2 clears a limited numbers of spots for
both the Puma and Merlin Forces and a route
from the hangar to the spot. The Duty Controller
liaises with Sqns to plan which end of each hangar
is to be cleared. This allows for very limited flying
capability, ensuring that high priority sorties can
take place.
Priority 3 covers the rest of the dispersal, taxiways
and engineering areas.
When the snow hit us last year we were already
well into the Blacktop season and were coping well with
keeping Priority 1 and 2 clear of frost and ice. Our only
concerns at the time were that Clearway isn’t a great deicer and only works effectively for a short period; and we
had a limited supply of it. This meant that when a severe
frost was forecast the MT Blacktop team would have to
monitor the surfaces throughout the night and judge the
right moment to begin laying.
Unfortunately you can’t stop snow falling in the same
way that you can prevent ice forming, you have to wait for
it to become deep enough to plough and hope that it stops
snowing long enough to clear. This was the major problem
when the snow did come; it didn’t stop. We didn’t have the
manpower, equipment, or budget to clear snow over the
26
area required on a continuous basis. Despite their best
efforts MT were hard pressed to keep Priority 1 clear.
By the time the snow stopped and the skies cleared
we were running short of Clearway and other units were
“borrowing” from us. MT did a sterling job on the dispersal,
keeping Priority 1 and 2 clear. The sqns were obviously
itching to fly and there seemed to be a continuous stream
of requests for snowploughs to clear various parts of the
dispersal and hangar ends, most of which were politely
refused and the callers referred to the Blacktop Op Order.
As soon as possible more of the dispersal was cleared,
enabling flying to increase. Some of the brave aircrew
used the opportunity to practice their snow landings,
which led to its own problems – what do you use as a
landing reference when the whole area is covered in
snow? How about the PAPIs? Just remember that if your
downwash causes them to become mis-aligned, they
won’t be available when you need them to check your
approach to the runway. It also led to some amusement
when 2 aircraft recovered to the airfield and had to hold
for 10 minutes over the grass while the engineers towed
aircraft back into the hangar, because they had filled all of
the available spots.
So, what did we learn from last year?
We have a Priority system which aims to keep the most
important areas clear. We have very limited resources
for snow clearing. This means that our ability to maintain
clear dispersals and launch aircraft is limited. If you feel
that your needs are not met by this system, you need to
highlight this at the end of season wash-up.
Clearway works well in preventing ice from forming for
short periods, but it must be laid at just the right time – too
early and it dissipates before the frost, too late and the
ice has already formed. It must also be re-laid at regular
intervals to continue to be effective.
To close I leave you with this thought: One of the most
pleasing sights of the snow season last year was 3 days
into the snowfall when a group of personnel trooped out of
a hangar armed with shovels and brooms and proceeded
to clear parking spots for their aircraft. This contrasted
with the scene at the other end of the dispersal where
airCLUES
an aircrew vs engineer snowball
fight had just finished. So, if you’ve
got people sitting in the crew room
moaning about a lack of flying, they
might be better employed with a
shovel or broom.
27
airCLUES
reflections on a Harsh Winter
RAF Lyneham describes how learning lessons, teamwork and forward
planning enabled them to cope with the last Wiltshire winter.
In January and February of 2010 the heavy onslaught
of snow and subsequent icing across southern England
affected most of the RAF airfields and major civilian
airports in southern UK, often rendering them unable to
accept, or release, traffic. At RAF Lyneham in Wiltshire,
we happened to have experienced similar issues the
previous year, which were still fresh enough in the memory
of some, to ensure that some of those lessons were
lessons learned, not just lessons identified. Therefore,
this reflection visits our key experiences and lessons in
brief as everyone enters ‘short finals’ for the next winter
blues.
As airports and units closed under the winter onslaught
the concern for Lyneham was our remit as the UK
Military Emergency Diversion Airfield (MEDA), the need
to continue supporting Ops and those now too frequent
repatriation ceremonies of our fallen, which alas would not
decrease any more than the blizzards. The snow fell as
quickly as it was being cleared, and that which was left,
28
froze with an impenetrable grip under clear nights. In sum,
our limited resources meant that the airfield simply could
not be cleared as a whole.
Every person and section on Stn was affected and
the MT and Logistics Sqns were inundated with Stnwide requests for snow clearance, or gritting. Stepping
back further and further to maintain priority and then just
catering for those most critical areas became the new
modus operandi; this became somewhat taxing as those
priorities regularly changed and the subsequent actions
were sometimes unpopular. Operation BLACKTOP is
our process of using key personnel, mainly Ops, ATC,
Movements and Airfield MT to maintain a clear runway.
These adverse conditions and the fear of closure left us
temporarily widening the array of Subject Matter Experts
(SMEs) to include the Met Office, Logistics, MT, flying
sqns, BSW, and various others, to form thrice daily
BLACKTOP Action Group meetings.
For efficiency and effectiveness, Stn Ops provided
a new single point of contact for all, or any, Stn snow
& ice clearance decisions and so the wider Action Gp
membership SMEs became crucial. We needed to know
the consequences of all sections and sqns in order
to maintain the aim. Despite the huge input which
regularly tested patience, this literally allowed us
to effectively leave large areas of the Stn alone
and saved massive waste by further pooling
limited resources.
Experience taught us Clearway anti-icing is nowhere
near as good as a de-icing agent, so keeping the runways
open relied upon prevention rather than cure. That bold
ethos was averaging 9000ltrs a day on a 5-day 40000ltr
stock! This critical, tactical point led to early strategic
communication through HQ 2 Group and Air Command
to rethink the unsustainable usage. The follow on process
encouragingly realised a particularly strong team ethos
across the rest of the RAF too: Waddington, Cranwell,
Leeming, Marham and Brize Norton all provided extra
chemical agent to assist in keeping Lyneham open for
ops, an excellent result given that the supply routes were
also suffering from that same snow and ice!
The combination of our recent experience and
increased communications was the key in Lyneham
staying open whilst other airfields were closing. If it’s
winter, then it’s too late to start thinking of BLACKTOP
Ops. Irrespective of available stocks, Lyneham will
definitely return to a wider BLACKTOP pool of advice
and an ultra-centralisation of control and assets for more
effective and efficient results this winter. We believe that
whilst none of this is new, some of the most obvious
lessons can easily be forgotten until it’s too late. The trite
mantra of ‘team effort’ is all well and good, but the art
of convincing someone to close their section, give their
assets to someone else for the bigger picture lies in the
cross pollination of knowledge rather than reliance on the
Stn command chain. As always, the devil is in the detail.
airCLUES
The immediate forecast and priorities were identified
in the morning Action Gp meetings with the workload
coordinated and a daily stock-check of CLEARWAY antiicing chemical and other key assets. The wider Action Gp
could then inform the remainder of the Stn on why things
were being done or left alone, accordingly. The midday
and evening meetings revisited priorities, provided Sitreps,
cross pollination of advice, checked contingency plans
and organised preparation for the following day; pooling
the aircraft and equipment required for the following days
work into one single area eased the morning burden.
However, the process had to be 24/7 and those wider
elements not usually so involved with BLACKTOP proved
invaluable; simple examples of extra personnel relieving
critical engineers and snowplough drivers from other
commitments like Stn guard duty, all helped.
The dangerous ice on the dispersals left several looking
skyward at short notice and manoeuvring C130s across
ice was not a widely practised skill. Encouragingly, such
risk in prepositioning aircraft was also reduced by utilising
aircrew that had the right snow and ice experience; this
was no time for vanity, or pride. Additionally, the cross
pollination of advice found that some engineers were
unfamiliar with the aircrew orders and aircraft manual as
much as some aircrew were unfamiliar with engineering
orders. The technical advice for snow and ice measures
seemed slightly scattered which became an issued
addressed by Ops Sqn’s Flight Safety office.
29
airCLUES
dealing with the Known Unknown
– maintaining operations in snowy Scotland
Flt Lt Dave King, Pilot, 201 Sqn, RAF Kinloss writes about the specific
difficulties of managing operational commitments when the ‘unthinkable’
happens and the weather turns bad in Scotland.
With the winter of 2009/10 being particularly harsh
throughout the UK, RAF Kinloss received more than its fair
share of bad weather. Snow and ice persisted throughout
the North of Scotland for nearly 3 months; it was the
best Scottish skiing conditions on record with skiing on
Cairngorm still possible on Midsummer Day.
As the Nimrod Duty Pilot (NDP) over the Christmas
period I found myself thrown in at the deep end. Part of
my remit was to provide aircrew specific advice to ATC
and Operations staff. With the inclement weather, a
variety of issues presented themselves most noticeably
with the snow and ice. At Kinloss, virtually permanent MT
snow clearing activity on the runway was required to keep
the airfield open to maintain the Nimrod MR2’s SAR and
30
operational commitments. Numerous runway inspections
were carried out throughout the day by the ATC supervisor
and myself with the runway being maintained clear for the
most part. However, Kinloss is presented with a few unique
issues by virtue of its locality. Being situated right next to
Findhorn Bay (a local nature reserve), strict procedures
are in place to ensure minimal environmental impact from
operations at Kinloss. As a result, the strength and type
of Clearway used at Kinloss is significantly weaker than
other local airfields such as Prestwick.
The use of Clearway generally kept the runway clear
of significant deposits of snow and ice; however, the
greatest problem was with slush deposits and some
local ice patches. This was further compounded by two
airCLUES
different types of black top on the
runway (1500ft of one end of the
runway had been resurfaced the
preceding year and this patch took
significantly longer to clear than
the rest of the blacktop). Because
of this only 6000ft of runway was
available, and at reduced widths, as
the significant snow fall experienced
had lead to snow banks along the
sides of the runway; Kinloss issued
SNOWTAMS for the first time in
years. This resulted in the MR2 being
prepared with a reduced fuel load,
impacting on range and endurance,
to be able to operate safely from the
shortened runway requiring the 2nd
aircraft to be held at reduced notice.
Clearing the taxiways and aircraft
manoeuvring areas was no less
challenging a problem, especially
when it took all our snow clearing
capability to maintain even the
reduced runway strip.
Other issues included the
selection of the Station Diversion.
With marginal conditions at base,
the choice of a ‘solid’ diversion
was imperative. With snow, ice
and fog widespread throughout the
UK and Northern Europe, airfields
meeting our requirements were few
and far between. This was further
exacerbated on Christmas Day
with airfields closing for the holiday.
This resulted in the NDP having to
negotiate with the Airport Manager
at London Gatwick for permission
to use their airfield, in particular
an exemption for noise limits; the
Nimrod MR2 certainly isn’t quiet! With
the constantly changing weather it
was routine to have 3, or sometimes
more, diversion changes throughout
the day. On one occasion Lyon in
France was booked as it was the
nearest airfield that met the diversion
requirements, over 2hrs flying time
from Kinloss. This constant juggling
act and the tenacity of the Duty Ops
Staff ensured there was always a
diversion available.
31
airCLUES
As 24/7 snow and ice clearing operations were
underway, the stock of Clearway was rapidly depleting.
All efforts were made to replenish the supplies, but as the
only 2 major roads to the Morayshire coast were closed
by snowfalls for significant periods, replenishment was
difficult. No break was expected with the poor weather in
the Kinloss area and the decision was made to try and
deploy one ac and ground crew away from Kinloss to cover
SAR/Ops on 27 Dec 09. The search for a suitable airfield
was complicated due to other RAF airfields also being
either shut, or severely affected by weather. Although
affected by snow, Prestwick airport managed to maintain
its operational capability and was also deemed a good
choice to allow crews to rotate after a bus journey from
Kinloss. Departing from Kinloss became a race against
time as the last application of Clearway for the runway
and taxiway had been used with no more available for at
least 24hrs.
On request from the captain of the departing aircraft,
the NDP assisted with the planning and preparation for
operating in less than ideal conditions at Kinloss. After
an excellent team effort from MT, Nimrod Line Sqn, ATC
and Ops, the airfield was cleared to sufficient standard to
allow for the safe departure. Whilst the NDP’s principal
focus was directed at the safe aircraft operation other
issues presented themselves, in particular around the
aircraft. Such simple things as loading the aircraft became
treacherous, with untreated areas having approximately
an inch of solid sheet ice (very akin to the local ice rink).
Great care was required to ensure no injuries to personnel
or damage to vehicles or aircraft occurred.
Now at Prestwick, on the 28 Dec 09, the Nimrod MR2
was scrambled for a SAR tasking involving a 406 MHz
locator beacon 200nm west of Ireland. As the aircraft had
been parked at the civilian terminal the only way to the
aircraft was via standard airport departures and security.
The crew were impressed by the security staff who cleared
the busy security area of holiday makers and allowed
the crew a quick transition through the scanners to the
wonder of the many onlookers. Take off was achieved
only 90 minutes after receiving the initial call. This was no
32
mean feat with the crew accommodated 20 minutes from
the airport, having to go through security and de-ice the
aircraft prior to departure. Once on task, communications
were established with the vessel and it was discovered
that the beacon had been accidentally activated. However,
the weather was very bad and the yacht’s crew were
concerned about the weather conditions ahead. Weather
information was past and photo runs were conducted prior
to returning to Prestwick where the aircraft remained for
over a week on standby.
With all the efforts over the period, culminating in
this SAR tasking (on this occasion a false alarm but the
outcome of which could have been significantly different)
proved that all the hard work from the Duty Staff at Kinloss
was completely justified. This was a busy final Christmas
and New Year for the RAF’s long-serving MR2 in some
of its most trying (and unusual) conditions; many lessons
were learned throughout the period and much experience
was gained.
Further Comment by OC Ops Wg
One of the more challenging aspects of last year’s winter
was our crews’ ability and experience of operating on
snow and ice. In the preceding years there had been a
significant outflow of experienced pilots from the Nimrod
Force and following many years of desert operations, and
a reduction in the number of traditional maritime operating
bases, the newer generation of Nimrod pilots had rarely
experienced taxiing on snow and ice. In the 1970s and
1980s this used to be relatively common, with winter
operations from Icelandic and Norwegian airfields being
a regular occurrence.
Unfortunately, despite the weather presenting an
unusual and perfect opportunity to practice this skill at
Kinloss, Nimrod MR2 aircraft availability over this period
was poor and we were not afforded the spare aircraft to
allow crews to taxi aircraft in these conditions. Despite
our ground crew working desperately hard to keep the
SAR Ops aircraft available for the standby commitment,
it proved impossible to generate additional aircraft to take
advantage of practising on these extreme conditions.
I learnt about
cockpit gradients
...from that
As the junior crew member on a multi engine type a
number of years ago I was on the way back from a 5 day
trip around America. This had been my first States trip
and was very enjoyable, very enjoyable that is apart from
the crew dynamic which had built throughout the trip. My
Captain for the trip was a very senior Captain who was
also an OCU instructor, and knew his way around America
and American ATC with his eyes shut, he was also of the
opinion that the only point of view worth airing was his,
and if he wanted someone else’s then he would ask for
it – which he didn’t!
So, there we were winding our way back up the coast
about an hours flying offshore from the Eastern Seaboard,
heading for a flag stop before going oceanic, when I heard
a SAR homer breaking through faintly. Now the aircraft
type I was on was fairly well equipped for homing to a
beacon and after a few minutes of looking at the kit it was
quite clear that we had tracked towards this beacon, then
passed it, probably on our starboard side, and were then
tracking away from it.
During this time I had announced to the crew that I was
picking up a beacon, this had been greeted with silence.
Throughout the route it had become clear that the best
way to avoid the Captain’s scorn was to say as little as
was necessary and not voice an opinion on anything that
was not directly in your job spec!
I commented again on the beacon, this time giving my
thoughts as to its relative position, and suggested that at
the least we ought to mention it to ATC who could then
choose whether to take further action. I was then informed
that when I had, ‘got some time in’ I would know that this
area was fairly prone to beacons going off and that it would
be down in one of the many marinas along this stretch of
coast. Having been told in no uncertain terms that if and
when my opinion was required it would be asked for, we
continued on our way. I quickly forgot the issue with the
beacon and by the time we had flag stopped and headed
across the pond it was well and truly in the past. The
remainder of the trip was uneventful and I eventually got
into bed some 16 hours after crewing in that morning.
It was only on turning on the television the following
morning that I was very quickly taken back to the previous
day as I was faced with footage of the US coastguard
winching over 30 people off a burning ship near the US
coast. Further digging showed that the ship was in pretty
much the same location as we had heard the beacon,
and that the alarm had been raised when an aircraft had
radioed in about the beacon. It later transpired that the
aircraft was further company traffic from one of our other
squadrons tracking up the coast about 30 mins after we
had done so. Thankfully they had raised the alarm, where
we hadn’t.
I am sure that many people will remember crew
dynamics such as this and think that they don’t exist
anymore, well maybe they don’t in such blatant form,
mainly through the effective application of CRM training.
However, what does still exist is the situation where the
inexperienced crew member feels reluctant to speak up
or, having voiced their opinion once, reluctant to press it
home because the other crew member, or members, all
have so much more experience they couldn’t possibly be
wrong – could they?
Spry Says:
The history of aviation is replete with examples of the fatal
consequences of steep cockpit gradients, most notably
the Tenerife Air disaster in 1977 which cost the lives of
583 people. In my experience the RAF has made very
significant progress, as identified by the author of this
tale, in changing the ethos and culture of multi-aircrew
aircraft such that the attitudes and behaviours described
above are very much in the minority. Of course, I stand
ready to be corrected! However, I think the real key point
that this article brings out is the importance of the art of
assertiveness. Assertiveness is a fundamental part of
the followership role and fostering it in a team should
be a major part of how we lead. As such, assertiveness
is inextricably linked to the mission outcome and the
leader’s ultimate success, or otherwise. Thankfully, I see
much evidence of such healthy team dynamics across
the RAF, however, there is always room for improvement
and I would ask that in whatever environment you work,
that you take a fresh look at how you lead and follow.
Breaking the accident chain relies on all personnel in
the RAF contributing assertively to flight safety through
the proactive identification of risk. However, achieving
this safety culture also requires the support of leaders at
all levels to ensure that contributions are respected and
received without fear of undue castigation.
airCLUES
Operating in Extreme Weather
- Advice from those in the know!
Wg Cdr Sophy Gardner,
OC Ops Wg and
contributors from across
RAF Valley describe
some of the engineering,
infrastructure and
operating difficulties of
maintaining aviation
output in the
‘4-seasons-in-a-day’
environment of
RAF Valley.
34
Ask those who know Valley from a brief spell of training here, or who have
only heard anecdotes from mates, and you’ll probably immediately associate
our location with ‘weather’ – of all descriptions. High winds, hail, gales, heavy
rain, bright sunshine; we can have all of these in the space of a day, and
sometimes twenty minutes. Less well known, and a well kept secret in many
ways, that becomes apparent to those of us who are based here for a couple
of years, is that the overall weather factor here is extremely good and very
much bound up with the reason why the base was established here in the first
instance. For 80% of the time, we have a WHT/BLU colour state, which makes
us an attractive diversion and indicates the relatively high levels of sunshine
we enjoy, throughout the year. Our Station motto is: ‘In Adversis Perfugium’
translates as ‘Refuge in Adversity’ and originates from the years of the Second
World War when the Station was obvious location to develop as a Second
World War diversion airfield for aircraft transiting the Atlantic since we would
generally be available if the rest of the country wasn’t. And our coastal location
on the Irish Sea protects us from the worst of snow and ice on the base, albeit
we can normally see it from our airfield on the top of Snowdon for around half
the year. But there can be no denying that when we have ‘weather’ it is more
likely than in most UK cases to be extreme, and for that reason, our operators
and engineers have rifled through their experiences to provide some advice
gleaned from plenty of lessons learned over the years.
As for the weather, some statistics first on wind, which, of course, our
cheerful WHT/BLU statistics don’t fully expose (with thanks to our Senior Met
Officer, Graeme Jackson):
The windiest month at Valley was February 2002
when we recorded an average wind speed over
the entire month of 19.9 kts (the 10-year average
for February is currently 13.3 kts). This included 9
separate “days with gales” within the month when
we averaged a mean speed of at least 34 kts during
one routine hourly observation. The maximum
individual gust within the month was 61 kts. The
period between November 2006 and January
2007 gave rise to the windiest three-monthly
period in Valley’s recent history, with mean wind
speeds for November, December and January of
17.1 kts, 17.4 kts and 19.4 kts respectively. During
this period, we saw 28 “days with gales” in this
92 day block (12 days in December alone). The
highest gusts we’ve had over the last decade
also occurred within this period. 67 kts were
recorded on both 3rd December 2006 and 18th
January 2007. The highest mean maximum gust
(each day’s maximum gust summed and divided
by the number of days within the month) for any
individual month in the last decade occurred just
last year in November 2009. This averaged to 40.3
kts. 9 “days with gales” occurred and a maximum
gust of 58 kts was recorded. With a mean wind
speed of 19.0 kts, it was also the 4th windiest
November since records began (in 1941). The
windiest day ever recorded at Valley occurred on
the 19th November 2009. On that day, the mean
wind speed was 37.1 kts, with a maximum gust
of 56 kts.
set in a harsh marine environment’. This neatly captures
the challenges offered by the local conditions, in that
winds frequently reach gale force, the salt and sand
content of the air is high, and thus corrosive to materials,
and the likelihood of rain delays is significant. The
following is a sample of some of the challenges that are
faced through the build phase and beyond through the
life of our infrastructure:
So most of us currently stationed at Valley have very
recent experience of some pretty extreme (for the UK)
sustained high wind conditions.
Competition for operating surfaces, airspace, circuit
access, instrument patterns, local operating areas and
even parking and hangarage is now at a premium; any
loss of flying due to bad weather just compounds the
pressures; the more we can do to mitigate against this
happening has got to be good news. Thus challenging
weather just adds to the fun for engineers, aircrew and
operations staff and so we offer some thoughts from our
various bazaars.
- Permanent Fencing. Equally, permanent
fencing must be able to withstand strong winds
over a sustained period. Unsurprisingly, RAF
Valley is used to test specialised fencing for the
whole of the MOD!
A View from Support Wing: Construction
and Maintenance
Sqn Ldr Steve Fulcher, SETL, shares his experiences
of how extreme weather impacts on Infrastructure.
For any new project at Valley, the first line of the
requirement document should read that ‘RAF Valley is
- Temporary Fencing. Fencing must be robust
and tied or weighted down; contractors have
returned to their site next morning to find poorly
erected fencing elsewhere on the base; most
recently in 208 Sqn’s car park following a windy
night in 2009. New standards of FOD fencing
have been developed which are able to sustain
the punishment even last November’s winds
meted out.
- Materials. Weather-resistant and high quality
materials are essential in order to preserve their
life. Powder coated paints, commonly used
elsewhere, quickly fail and flake; galvanised steel
and GRP extend the use of assets.
- Project Timescales. Tight timescales are rarely
met as most projects are affected by high winds
(roofing) or rain (exposed interiors). Planners will
try to build some flex into programmes but at a
cost to the project. Managing the expectations
of the operators and engineers, desperate for
restoration of their facilities, be it ASPs or hangars,
can be challenging…
35
airCLUES
- FOD. Contractors must be thoroughly briefed
on FOD and must adopt systems to secure
all materials, even within their compound. A
contractor will frequently consider the site to be his
own but he must be made aware of the impact of
material blowing across the airfield. Piles of loose
material, including light material in skips, cannot
be left exposed as a change in wind direction can
quickly fill hangars – and aircraft – with debris.
- Maintenance at Height. The wind can have a
significant effect on tall structures e.g. lighting
stanchions. Such assets must be regularly
inspected to minimise the risk of falling debris,
which threatens both personnel and our
valuable aircraft.
Engineering Operations - Strong Winds
and Horizontal Rain
By David Broatch, Babcock
As has already been mentioned, RAF Valley is located in
an exposed position on the Irish Sea coast of Anglesey
and is susceptible to strong winds and constantly
changing weather. Winters tend to be wet and windy and
summers can be hot with variable wind conditions. RAF
Valley operates line-ops for Hawk TMk1 and Hawk TMk2,
requiring engineering tasks and ac servicing to be carried
out in adverse weather conditions. Hawk aircraft also
need to be carefully parked to ensure the wind does not
blow directly down the jet pipe and the canopy damage is
not sustained.
Typically, the side opening Hawk canopy requires
two ground crew to open/close the canopy in medium to
strong winds to prevent canopy damage and to ensure the
H&S of the ground crew.
36
Hawk ac are always hangored overnight to minimise
exposure to the elements. RAF Valley has four Hawk
hangars, 3 traditional Bellman type hangars and a Rubb
hangar.All hangar doors have differing operating parameters
relating to the maximum permissible wind speed limits for
doors operation.
If a strong winds increase to a gale, all Hawk aircraft
remaining outside are required to be secured with piquets.
Unfortunately, RAF Valley is not provisioned with piquet
points, which means that the local weather condition and
wind speed have to be carefully monitored and continually
anticipated to ensure all ac are housed in the safety of the
hangars before the wind reaches critical speeds.
The close proximity of RAF Valley to the Irish Sea can
mean that the air can become laden with salt and fine sand.
This type of atmosphere can exacerbate corrosion and
sand induced erosion of the paint and other systems. The
local atmosphere regularly leads to additional cleaning of
windscreens, canopies and washing of the whole ac to
ensure flight safety is not compromised.
Extremes of weather can also adversely affect
Human Factors, specifically, the general welfare of
engineers working the ac lines. Strong winds, combined
with ‘horizontal rail’, hot and cold weather, all have to
be anticipated and appropriate control measures and
monitoring need to be in place to avoid hypothermia in
the winter and heat stroke and sand inhalation in the
summer months.
As a result of strong winds at Valley during the last
12 month period incidents have occurred, including an
engine intake blank being blow from the ground stowage
container. Storm damage to buildings is common and
roof tiles have been blown from buildings causing minor
damage to an MT vehicle. During a particularly strong
gust a ‘near miss’ occurred when a very heavy fabricated
steel hangar door was partially blown closed during an ac
towing operation.
37
airCLUES
airCLUES
A View from C Flt, 22 Sqn:
Well, I Didn’t See That Coming!
By Flt Lt Iain Smith
One cold and snowy winter afternoon, Rescue 122 was
called into action to evacuate a housebound casualty in
Shropshire to the local hospital; his predicament had been
caused by several inches of fresh snow blocking access
for an NHS ambulance. Our problems started with 10
miles to go when all 3 of our Attitude Indicators (AI) began
to indicate slightly differing information; notwithstanding
this, we managed to complete the rescue and recovered
the casualty to Shrewsbury Hospital. It was now dark
and following a crew discussion on how to get home if
the AI were still malfunctioning, we realised that we
38
couldn’t due to worsening weather over Wales and the
lack of reliable attitude instrumentation. We decided to get
ourselves to RAF Shawbury - a mere 5 minutes away - but
as we transited fuel began to leak into the aircraft cabin.
Fortunately, we were able to land safely at Shawbury
and shutdown without further incident. Overnight, the
temperature was forecast to reach minus 15 degrees, but
the aircraft would have to spend the night outside.
The next morning our engineers arrived and carried
out rectification on the ‘snags’ - the main rotor head and
tail rotors were re-greased as the cold soaking had frozen
it off, but other than that the aircraft was serviceable. We
said our goodbyes to Shawbury and started the journey
home. A phrase you will sometimes hear in a Sea King
is: “This cab feels a bit rough”, an inherent characteristic
of flying an aircraft in which all the moving parts are
headed in different directions. Not overly alarmed we
continued for home. The vibration very quickly became
uncharacteristically severe just as I began to feel a rattling
through the yaw pedals. A ‘PAN’ was transmitted and we
landed in a field 1½ mile from the North Wales Police
HLS. On the ground, still with rotors running, everything
seemed normal but any application of power produced
marked vibrations so for the second time we shut down
somewhere unexpected.
On a beautiful crisp winter’s day in a field in Conwy
you wouldn’t expect to be faced by a survival situation, but
that is what it quickly turned into. The aircraft temperature
gauge read minus 6. Stood in flying suits and thermals that
you had been sweating in 5 minutes before, we quickly
become chilled. Fortunately we all had hats, gloves and
extra layers to put on, but even this wasn’t enough and the
cold quickly penetrated the soles of our flying boots. My
co-pilot (ex-SERE School instructor) became concerned
about frost-nip on exposed extremities and so we were
soon wrapping ourselves up with anything we could find.
Not long after, we were sat on our ‘go-bags’ having a good
old sing-song in the emergency survival shelter. One foray
into the aircraft to get a Mars bar revealed that the drugs
had frozen in the first response bag! Worse still, so had
the Mars bar.
It is not often that a set of circumstances will conspire
so effectively against you to culminate in the strangest of
survival situations, but in a field in Conwy that is exactly
what happened to us. The phrase “dress to survive” is
glibly overlooked by some in our world – and probably in
yours. It certainly had been by me, but when packing for
winter think about what you’d do and how well protected
you are outside of your aircraft; if you’re cold and shivering
walking across dispersal I’d suggest it’s not a good start!
Spry Says:
When we consider the risks to aviation that extremes
of weather bring we often focus on the more obvious
conditions like driving snow or thick ice. However, what
these articles have so ably demonstrated is that ‘simple’
high winds, cold or heavy rain can all have second order
effects on flight safety. In the examples above, cold
and rain can drive personnel deep into the Error Zone,
increasing fatigue, reducing physical and mental abilities
and ultimately, affecting their judgment and decision
making skills. For flying and engineering, there is little
margin for this type of error to creep in and it is worth all of
us being aware of the effects even more benign conditions
can cause during prolonged exposure.
In addition, it is very easy for personnel not directly
working on the airfield to forget how easily loose items,
temporary structures and rubbish around station can
rapidly become a significant hazard when the wind picks
up. Objects like these have the tenacity of a pit bull when it
comes to finding innovative ways to end up on the airfield
on a windy day. So as the nights draw in please remember
that even autumn and spring weather bring with them
their own particular flight safety hazards; and it takes all
personnel on station to make sure they don’t contribute to
the next accident.
39
airCLUES
Flight Sa f e t y Aw a rd s
Cpl McGUIRE, Manchester
On the 28 Apr 09 Monarch Airlines Aircraft G-MAJS arrived from Manchester at
08:41L as part of the on-going De-compression flights. Upon arrival the aircraft
was diagnosed with an engine fault which required rectification by a civilian
engineer, due to the work carried out the aircraft required a subsequent flight
test. At 22:00L Cpl McGuire was in attendance at the above aircraft as NCO
i/c the start team for the see-off for the required flight test, as part of his duties
he and his team carried out a pre-start FOD check of the surrounding area in
preparation for the imminent engine start. At approximately 22:10L the aircraft
captain was given clearance form the VAHS ground-crew to start engine No.
2. During the engine start cycle Cpl McGuire witnessed a foreign article exit
the exhaust of the No. 2 engine, he immediately signalled via the safety man for the captain to shut down the No. 2
engine. With the engine safely shut down Cpl McGuire carried out a sweep of the area behind the No. 2 engine to find a
16oz hammer approximately 20 feet behind the exhaust. After a thorough check of the area he informed the crew of his
findings and raised his concerns over other possible articles or additional damage caused by the hammer on its egress,
the engineer refused to carry out a further check and the captain decided to proceed against Cpl McGuire’s advice. The
aircraft was then started and carried out the flight test without further incident.
Cpl Miller, RAF Akrotiri
On the 31Oct 09 a Globespan B767 Flt No. GSM7419/20 arrived at 0630L from
Minhad as part of the on-going Decompression flights through RAF Akrotiri. The
aircraft was scheduled for a 0800L departure that day to return Decompressed
troops to RAF Brize Norton. Upon arrival the aircraft was diagnosed with
an instrument problem, which caused a slight delay to the aircrafts allotted
departure time. At 0810L on the 31 Oct 09 Cpl Miller and his see-off team
proceeded to the aircraft upon notification that the passengers were boarding.
On arrival at the aircraft Cpl Miller proceeded to carry out a final FOD check
around the vicinity of the aircraft. In carrying out his FOD sweep Cpl Miller
observed what appeared to be evidence of a potential birdstrike on the No.1
engine and upon further investigation, evidence of blood and feathers could be seen on the 1st stage compressor rotor
blades. Cpl Miller immediately found the aircraft captain and made him aware of his findings. The captain did not appear
to be overly concerned with the situation so Cpl Miller located the aircraft ground engineer to further convey the gravity
of his findings. Cpl Miller’s well founded concerns were mirrored by the ground engineer who immediately declared the
aircraft unserviceable. Subsequently a specialist team was flown out from the UK to carry out further investigation into
the extent of any damage caused by the birdstrike. After extensive checks the aircraft was deemed serviceable by the
specialist team and departed at 0210L on 01 Nov 09 with no further complications.
40
SAC Morris, Kandahar
On 16 Sep 09, SAC Morris was conducting a ‘Man B’ After-Flight Servicing on
a Chinook helicopter at Kandahar Airfield. During his inspection of the airframe,
he noticed a crack in a section of critical load bearing frame. Subsequent
investigation and NDT analysis of the crack identified it to be 30mm in length,
running between two Hi-Lock Fasteners. This observation was due to Morris
being particularly diligent in his duties, as the area is not easy to inspect and
in excess of the requirements of the servicing. At the time Morris was in the
eleventh hour of a twelve hour shift, working in low-light levels, with the aircraft
having landed at 0510L.
SAC DINNING, 216 Sqn AAR Det
SAC Dinning was part of an aircraft servicing team working as part of the
216 Sqn AAR Det operating with 902 EAW in Seeb, Oman. During an After
Flight servicing, Dinning noticed that the Number 2 engine fuel feed pipe, in
the Hydraulic Servicing Centre, was chafing on adjacent hydraulic and fuel
vent pipes; the damage was not immediately obvious as the damage was
hidden by the two other pipes. Once Dinning realised what he had seen, he
immediately identified the possible risks and highlighted the damage and
possible consequences to his detachment engineering management. During
further more in-depth inspection, it was found that the chafing fuel pipe had
been incorrectly routed between a hydraulic pipe and a fuel vent pipe, rather
than underneath the vent pipe as per the design authority drawings. During his inspection Dinning recalls thinking that
‘something just didn’t look right’, driving him to carry out a further, deeper inspection. During his inspection, not only was
the area dark and the error difficult to see, but Dinning was not mandated to check these pipes during the flight servicing;
identifying an installation error such as this highlights Dinning’s diligence and professionalism. Luckily, on this occasion,
the fault was identified before it became a problem and the pipe was correctly routed before any further damage was
caused. The Number 2 Engine fuel feed pipe is the main fuel feed for the engine, and the consequences of failure are
very severe: the engine would have been starved of fuel, more than likely causing it to be shut down, and a very serious
potential fire risk in the belly of the aircraft would have been created. As a result of Dinning’s professionalism, it was
deemed necessary to check the rest of the RAF Tristar fleet, which fortunately were all found to have the engine fuel feed
pipes correctly routed.
MR WATSON, RAF Northolt
On the afternoon of Friday 2nd September 2009, Mr Watson, an Aircraft Handler
employed by Serco Defence, Science and Technology in the Visiting Aircraft
Support Section at RAF Northolt, was detailed to “see in” a visiting civilian
Gulfstream 550 twin engined aircraft ( reg no CS-DKF, call sign NJE-393D).
As the aircraft came to a stop, Mr Watson noticed what he thought was a fine
mist around the starboard mainwheel assembly. After placing the chocks on
the nosewheel he investigated the area and found a large pool of hydraulic fluid
around the brake assembly. Mr Watson contacted the pilot who, on inspecting
the leak, found that the parking brake pressure had dissapated: the pilot then
placed the aircraft unservicable. The fault was later confirmned by a company
aircraft technician as a ruptured brake seal. The fact that Mr Watson does not possess an aviation background prior to
working on VASS makes the discovery, and his response after noticing the ‘fine mist’, all the more commendable. The
mist was very easy to miss in the windy and dull weather conditions prevaling at the time. Vigilance and intelligent
application of his training prevented a serious flight safety problem to the aircraft.
41
airCLUES
Green Endorsements
& Flight Safety Awards
On the afternoon of Fri 16 Oct 09, RESCUE 128, a RAF Sea King from Leconfield, was scrambled to 2 people
stuck at the base of a high cliff, cut off by the tide, near Whitby. As had been briefed at the start of this crew’s
shift, the operational aircraft captain, Flt Lt Cunliffe, was in the left hand seat fulfilling the co-pilot duties whilst Lt
Bullock RN flew as ‘acting captain’ and handling pilot in the right hand seat to gain the maximum training benefit
from the sortie with a view to his forthcoming operational captaincy check. The geography and wind conditions at
the scene meant that Flt Lt Cunliffe had the best visual references and thus ended up actually flying the aircraft for
the rescue. The radar/winch operator, MALM Bragg and the winchman, FS Brompton were fulfilling their standard
primary duties.
After arriving at the scene and assessing the situation, the crew put their plan into action. The winchman,
FS Brompton, was lowered to a safe height of 10’ with the aircraft at 50’ over the sea and the aircraft was then
manoeuvred towards the cliff whilst climbing to 200’ to place the aircraft over the cliff with the winchman next to
the casualties. The winchman assessed the casualties, placed the person considered to be in the worst condition
into a rescue strop and secured himself and the casualty back to the winch hook ready for recovery. The aircraft
then flew back out to sea at a fast walking pace descending progressively to 50’ where winchman and casualty
could be safely winched up to the aircraft.
Having manoeuvred the winchman into position for a second time and secured the second casualty, the aircraft
started to move away from the cliff and down over the water to the safe height of 50ft to recover the winchman
and casualty to the aircraft. As the aircraft descended through approximately 175’ one phase of the aircraft AC
essential busbar failed, causing loss of all AC essential equipment. All the attitude indicators (AI) failed, including
the standby AI, so the pilot had no internal attitude references. In addition, the automatic flying control system
(AFCS) that normally helps keep the aircraft stable in flight and smooths out flying inputs now made random
changes in pitch, roll and yaw. This was felt through the airframe as serious vibration and gave the handling
pilot significant difficulties keeping the aircraft in a stable attitude. Moreover, the aircraft radar started to thrash
around making sounds remarkably similar to the Sea King simulator’s audio warning of a tail rotor drive shaft
failing – every helicopter’s operator’s worst nightmare. Various lights and captions flashed on and off as systems
intermittently lost all, or part of their power supply further adding to the melee of sensory inputs and general
confusion about what exactly was happening.
As handling pilot, Flt Lt Cunliffe, was presented with a vast array of symptoms including the possibility of an
imminent tail rotor failure and was coping with multiple undemanded control movements in all aircraft axes. He
accelerated forward, increasing the airflow over the airframe to help stabilise the aircraft. Lt Bullock immediately
started to record the indications and offered to make a mayday call. MALM Bragg started to winch-in rather
than cutting the winch cable and FS Brompton (who could hear by his remote radio what was going on) and the
casualty started to climb rapidly towards a bouncing aircraft at some 175ft. FS Brompton was now also consoling
a screaming male casualty at the same time as getting into position to manoeuvre them both into an aircraft
against the force of a significantly higher airflow (40-50 kts) than normal (5-10kts).
With no worsening of symptoms and assessing the aircraft to be ‘manageable’, Flt Lt Cunliffe elected to land
on the clifftop. As he flew towards the chosen landing area, Lt Bullock continued to calmly fault diagnose and the
crew worked together to ensure that the winchman and casualty were brought safely on board at the same time
as expediting getting on the ground.
Complete failure of the AC essential busbar in this manner is so unusual that it has no associated FRC drill,
although the crew were the first to determine with hindsight that some other drills might have been appropriate
to use, the indications seen and symptoms felt did not clearly lead to any particular drills. The information
42
gathered by Lt Bullock greatly aided the subsequent diagnosis / rectification work, however, this still took 2 days
of engineers’ head-scratching to locate the cause of the problem. Flt Lt Cunliffe, as handling pilot and aircraft
captain, kept a cool head and maintained a safe flight configuration whilst keeping the crew working together
to recover both aircraft and all occupants to a safe location. MALM Bragg made an excellent snap cut/don’t cut
decision on behalf of his winchman and casualty and also worked well with the captain to ensure their safety
on their subsequent roller coaster entry into the aircraft. Despite the traumatic ride, FS Brompton showed great
calmness and professionalism to ensure that his casualty was secure as the aircraft landed.
Flt Lt Stuart Cunliffe is awarded a green endorsement in recognition of his exceptionally cool and calm
handling of aircraft and crew in the face of extremely difficult circumstances.
In addition, MALM Richard Bragg is awarded a green endorsement for exceptional judgement in the face of
extremely testing conditions.
Lt James Bullock and FS Russell Brompton are both awarded flight safety awards in recognition of their
outstanding judgment and the excellent support they provided during a complicated aircraft emergency.
Lt James Bullock
Flt Lt Stuart Cunliffe, MALM Richard Bragg &
FS Russell Brompton
SAC WILSON, RAF Marham
SAC Wilson is an Aircraft Maintenance Mechanic employed on IX(B) Sqn at
RAF Marham. The following took place at Kandahar Airfield whilst the Sqn was
deployed in support of OP HERRICK.
On 1 April 2010, SAC Wilson was part of a see-off team for a Tornado GR4
which had been tasked with a Close Air Support mission. On marshalling the
aircraft out of its shelter SAC Wilson alerted the trade ‘hit team’ to the fact that
she had seen an unsecured panel on the spine of the aircraft. The ‘hit team’
brought the aircraft to a halt before it had left the dispersal and a technician
climbed onto the aircraft where he found that a quick release catch was indeed
unsecured. The technician secured the catch and the aircraft then continued
without further incident.
SAC Wilson was carrying out a task she had done many times before and the Sqn was close to the end of its
deployment. Due to the routine nature of the task it would have been very easy at that point to let complacency creep in.
However, not only was the unsecured catch in an extremely difficult place to see from SAC Wilson’s position but due to
the aircraft’s taxi pattern she was the last person who could possibly have spotted it before the aircraft left the dispersal.
SAC Wilson’s diligence and attention to detail, however, ensured that not only was a potentially serious flight safety
incident avoided but that the aircraft was able to carry out an important operational mission.
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airCLUES
MASTER AIRCREW CRIPPS
Master Aircrew Cripps was a Qualified Rearcrew Instructor on board a
54(R) Sqn Sentinel OCU training sortie. During the taxi, whilst the Flight Deck
were busy completing Taxi Checks, Master Aircrew Cripps was manning the
beam window as lookout and noticed that the arrestor cables were in the ‘up’
position. He immediately notified the flight deck as this cable position would not
have been discernable to the flight deck once the aircraft had lined up on the
runway. The standard configuration for a Sentinel departure is for the cables to
be de-rigged as the platform is not authorized to trample cables at greater than
20 knots. The Flight Deck queried ATC who then de-rigged the cable. Had the
take-off role commenced without de-rigging, considerable damage could have
been done to both the aerials under the Dual Mode Radar (DMR) Fairing and to the DMR fairing itself. Master Aircrew
Cripps’ diligence and quick thinking prevented what could have been a damaging, dangerous and expensive incident.
bomadier penney, 16 air Assault Brigade
On 20 Feb 2010 personnel from14 Sqn and associates from 16 Air Assault Brigade
(AAB) were airborne in VC10 XV104 of 101 Sqn, en-route to Davis Montham AFB,
via a refuelling stop at Ottawa, to run Exercise Torpedo Focus. Whilst over the North
Atlantic and some 2 hours from Ottawa, Bombardier Penney of 16 AAB observed a
‘blister’ lifting from the upper surface of one of the flaps on the left hand wing. Penney
alerted a 14 Sqn member who sought the views of a Sqn airframe trade SNCO. Sgt
Scott the VC10 Ground Engineer, was also alerted to the condition of the flap, the
gradual deterioration of which, was monitored until the safe landing at Ottawa. On
the ground the LH No4 flap was inspected and declared unserviceable with surface
de-lamination measuring approximately 4’ x 2’ and the aircraft was grounded. A repair
team was requested from RAF Brize Norton.
If XV104 had departed Ottawa for DMAFB without the fault being discovered the
result might have been a structural failure of the flap in flight, the ingestion of debris into engines 1 and 2, and consequently
an aircraft emergency.
Bombadier Penney is not an aircraft engineer but his alertness and moral courage in reporting his observation lead to
the early detection of a serious defect which may have endangered the aircraft. Penney is to be highly commended for
his Flight Safety awareness and his acceptance of responsibility.
44
FOD MATTERS
ONE OF THE BIGGEST SOURCES
OF FOD ON RAF STATIONS ARE SKIPS
AND WHEELIE BINS LEFT OPEN. JUST
BECAUSE THE SKIP IS BEHIND SHQ, THE
MESS, OR A BARRACK BLOCK
DOES NOT MEAN IT DOESN’T
COUNT – IT IS STILL ON AN
ACTIVE AIRFIELD
Close the lid!
A very recent
picture from a
Stn FODPO
NEWS
It was reported that a member of the public, local to
an RAF flying station, having become disgruntled with
aircraft noise, threatened to release 120 Chinese lanterns
near to the approach path. The member of the public was
visited by the local civilian police and the threat was never
carried out. However, threatening such an action could be
classed as intent to endanger the safety of an aircraft and
as such is an offence under the Civil Aviation Act 1982.
The GR4 community – IPT, 1Gp and Stns - is launching
a new FOD initiative this autumn, with full financial
support from Rolls-Royce, entitled Project FACT – FOD
Awareness Campaign Tornado. More information on this
in the next edition of Air Clues.
At a flying station in the south of England recently, the
Bird Control Unit, while on a routine FOD inspection of
the runway found a screwdriver. The screwdriver bore no
markings, making tracing the owner difficult.
The station in question is currently undergoing
an extensive programme of works, so one
possible source of the rogue screwdriver could
have been from a civilian contractor.
airCLUES
FOD damage can result in anything from minor repairs to
catastrophic events (think Concorde accident). Experts
estimate that the cost of FOD to the global aerospace
industry runs at around $4 billion annually.
Individual engine costs for the RAF are equally eyewatering; a Tornado engine rejection based on FOD
damage is currently running at around £300k per engine.
This is money from Defence which could be better spent
elsewhere.
FOD prevention in the RAF forms part of an MOD-wide
FOD prevention strategy. The newly-formed MAA has
overall responsibility for pan-Defence policy and ensuring
that the individual air arms comply with this policy.
Responsible for the RAF single service policy is the
Inspector of RAF Flight Safety; which then flows down
through the Groups and onto the FOD Prevention Officers
at stations.
FODPOs are either full or part-time, and are answerable
to the Stn Cdr through the Stn Flt Safety Officer, for FOD
prevention at their Unit.
FODPOs have a wide range of methods at their
disposal to assist them with FOD prevention such as:
publicity and awareness briefings, sweeping of operating
surfaces, analysis of found FOD (including trending of
areas of FOD ‘finds’), and investigations.
We are currently in the middle of an upgrade
programme for runway sweepers; whereby the old (and
now frequently unreliable) Johnson sweepers are being
replaced by the latest state-of-the-art Schmidt AS990s.
Priority for roll-out is for Stns holding QRA, but eventually
all units will receive the new sweepers.
However, the station also plays host to a
large number of visiting civilian aircraft and it
is just possible that the screwdriver fell from
one of those. As a result, a long list of actions
was implemented in an attempt to prevent
a recurrence.
45
airCLUES
chinese lantern
coming to a
airfield near you
Very pretty – but don’t mix with aeroplanes! See
accompanying Chinese Lantern Article
Other units should note the requirement for fully briefing
contractors on the importance of tool control and prevention
of loose articles and should consider formalising these
requirements in Station Standing Orders. Additionally, if
civilian aircraft are operating from our airfields, you are
entitled to challenge them over the fidelity of their tool
control – they may work to CAA rules, but they are on
MOD property.
The RAF will also be launching a fresh new FOD
awareness campaign this autumn, and is looking for
examples of best practice from across units.
FOD occurrences are still all too common. It is everyone’s
responsibility to play a role in FOD Prevention.
The Air Command FOD Prevention Officer is Flt Lt Rick
Lipscomb, who can be contacted at RAF Flt Safety, Air
Command, RAF High Wycombe ext 6666.
The author is grateful to any agencies who feel they
have something to contribute on FOD issues and would
wish to share with a wider audience in future editions of
Air Clues.
46
The releasing of Chinese Lanterns (sometimes known as
Sky Lanterns) is becoming evermore popular on occasions
such as fetes, weddings, parties and outdoor events.
These lanterns make for very attractive displays, and are
readily available from dealers on the Internet.
They do, however, pose a Flight Safety hazard –
something which has been recognised by the CAA and
prompted them into commissioning a safety assessment.
The hazard is twofold: firstly the remnants of lanterns
littering airfields and posing an engine ingestion problem;
and secondly the less likely, but potentially more serious
distraction (and potential subsequent evasive action)
issue. Anecdotally, pilots have reported that in poor
light conditions lanterns can be mistaken for conflicting
air traffic.
Several RAF airfields have reported picking up old
lanterns scattered across their ‘live’ areas. Those units
close to population centres seem to suffer the most, with
Northolt having a particular problem.
Lanterns are constructed of rice paper, with a
combustible fuel cell and then usually some rigid material
to keep the shape – often in the form of a metal framework.
They ‘fly’ for anything from 5 to 20 minutes and can reach
heights of 1500 ft. While no hard evidence exists as yet with
regard to the effect on a jet engine of ingesting a lantern,
clearly it is a situation which should be best avoided.
The metal frame would certainly cause damage in
some way, although the severity is as yet unquantified.
The consequences of a multiple strike could be much
more serious – similar to a flock of birds, as opposed to a
single specimen.
The CAA has no specific policy regarding lanterns
as yet – but they have become sufficiently concerned to
commission their own safety assessment. The closest
thing to a ‘policy’ for now is CAP 736 (available on the CAA
website – www.caa.co.uk ), which mandates regulation for
helium-filled balloons, lasers, searchlights and fireworks.
In 2009 the CAA considered almost 90 requests
for lantern releases – approving 76, but rejecting the
remainder on the basis of the proximity of the launch site
to an airfield. In addition, they issued 43 NOTAMs as a
result of the approvals.
ns
an
u?
There is however no legislation that requires people to
inform the CAA. New policy and guidance is being planned
for the next reissue of CAP 736 in early 2011. This will include
a piece on Sky lanterns specifically, and should cover some
of the following recommendations:
• Local ATC should be contacted if people intend to
release lanterns within 8 miles of that airfield.
• If the release site is outside of 8 miles, then depending
on numbers, the CAA is to be contacted. Ten lanterns
or fewer is being suggested as the threshold level.
All this is well and good as far as ‘officially’ organised events
are concerned; what will be much harder to regulate are
releases by private individuals. In the meantime, all operators
of RAF airfields should remain particularly vigilant to the
possibility of ‘spent’ lanterns being encountered anywhere on
manoeuvring areas.
FODPOs are encouraged to run awareness campaigns
at their Units, and in particular to ensure that occurrences
are notified using the DFSOR template on ASIMS. Early
approaches to government regarding banning of the sale of
lanterns have failed due to lack of recordable evidence, so it
is imperative that the RAF informs the discussion by recording
our occurrences.
A total ban is perhaps unlikely anyway; the farming
community have lobbied hard for such a ban – lanterns
have caused deaths in cattle from eating the metal parts
and also started crop fires – but as yet this lobbying has met
with no success. However, restrictions in manufacturing
materials and greater awareness of the dangers to aviation
being made at point-of-sale areas where regulations could
be tightened.
IF YOU EXPERIENCE CHINESE
LANTERNS AT YOUR UNIT, THEN
RAF FLIGHT SAFETY WOULD LIKE
TO KNOW ABOUT IT.
airCLUES
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Produced by Air Media Centre, HQ Air Command 0248_10CW © Crown/MOD 2009