Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos, 1974

Transcription

HACIA
XX SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS
Executive Cabinet of
Omar Torrijos, 1974
Committee Bulletin
Andrew Kim, Chair
Benjamin Raderstorf, Director of English Committees
Cabinet 2014
Contents
1. Welcome Letters....................................................... 2
2. Introduction.............................................................. 4
3. The Situation in Context........................................ 6
4. Panama Under Omar Torrijos............................... 18
5. Key Players................................................................ 26
6. Position Papers and Further Research.................. 29
7. Endnotes................................................................... 33
8. Sources....................................................................... 35
For every ton of recycled paper, 17 trees are saved. Please
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1 | Cabinet 2014: Bulletin
XX
Welcome
to HACIA XX
Board of Directors
Most esteemed delegates,
Manuel Andrés Meléndez
President
María Camila Rincón
Business Director
Julián Atehortúa Muñoz
Recruiting Director
Benjamin S. Raderstorf
English Committees Director
Hilary Julissa Higgins
Spanish Committees Director
Martín Santiago Molina
Development Director
Raúl Prakash Quintana
Administrative Director
Board of Advisors
Jorge I. Domínguez, PhD
Vice Provost for International Affairs
Harvard University
Steven Levitsky, PhD
Professor of Government
Harvard University
As the Director of English Committees, it is my upmost pleasure to welcome
to the Harvard Association Cultivating Inter-American Democracy
2014—the XX Summit of the Americas! You are about to participate in one
of the most innovative, most dynamic, most realistic, and most prestigious
simulations of international relations anywhere in the world.
While every year at HACIA is new and different, this year represents one of
the most dramatic steps forward in the conference’s history. With three brand
new committees in English alone—the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States, the Union of South American Nations, and the UN Security Council—HACIA has begun to expand outward from the OAS towards
the reality of Latin American politics today. Moreover, with salient and often
controversial committee topics, from the U.S. embargo against Cuba to
mental health treatment in Latin America to the much-publicized case of ‘Beatriz’ in El Salvador, HACIA is going deeper into the substance of Latin
American politics and current events than ever before.
For each of you, this is not only a chance to engage, it is also a chance to
learn—from your co-chairs, from the topics, from the debate, and, most
importantly, from each other. The most amazing and special part of HACIA
is how it brings incredible people like yourselves from all corners of the
hemisphere together in one place for discussion and debate. Take advantage
of every moment.
This bulletin should be the starting point in your substantive preparation for
HACIA XX. In addition to your own research, I encourage you to study the
HACIA Democracy Rules of Parliamentary Procedure and the Position Paper Guide,
both of which are available on our website.
XX
Most sincerely,
Benjamin Shafer Raderstorf
Director of English Committees, HACIA Democracy 2014
[email protected]
XX
From your
English Committees
Lucas Swisher
Timothy Tsai
UN Security Council
Nina Chen
Joseph Wall
Union of South American Nations
Daniel Granoff
Sarah Fellay
Community of Latin American
and Carribean States
Ashley Bach
Melisa Noriega
Pan-American Health Organization
Harleen Gambhir
Michael George
OAS Special Mission to Mexico, 1994
Cayla Calderwood
Aaron Watanabe
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, 2019
Jan Böckstiegel
Dear Delegates,
Chair
It’s my pleasure to welcome you to Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos, 1974
at the Harvard Association Cultivating Inter-American Democracy. My name
is Andrew Kim and I will be the chair of the executive crisis cabinet. This will
be my first HACIA and I could not be more excited for this March.
The crisis cabinet will be one of the most engaging, fast-paced, and, in my
opinion, fun committees you can experience here at HACIA. Delegates in
this committee will be acting as members of the presidential cabinet of Omar
Torrijos, set in the year 1974. We will have the pleasure of simulating a presidential cabinet in the very city, Panama City, in which the original cabinet convened forty years ago. Panama was a wildly different place back in 1974, six
years after a military coup toppled the government and brought Omar Torrijos and the National Guard to power. In a time of economic recession, bubbling discontent, and tensions with the United States, the committee will rely
on fast-paced directives and quick thinking on the part of its delegates in
order to react to the ever-changing political and social landscape of Panama
in 1974. This committee will have the unique opportunity of getting to shape
the course of Panamanian history. I hope to see you come with ideas both
brilliant and bold.
Colombian Peace Negotiations, 2012
Andrew Kim
Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos,
1974
Eva Guidarini
Elaine Cheng
Inter-American Court of Human
Rights
I am currently a sophomore studying psychology at Harvard University. My
hometown is a small rural town called Dover, Massachusetts, just outside
Boston. Since getting started in middle school, I was an avid participant in
Model United Nations. Although it was exciting to travel with my Model UN
team to nearby cities, I never got to participate in a conference outside the
United States such as HACIA. I can only imagine what a new and formative
experience this conference will be for me and hopefully for all of you.
I look forward to meeting all of you! Feel free to contact me with questions
about HACIA, this committee, or anything that strikes you.
Sincerely,
Andrew Kim
Chair, Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos, 1974
[email protected]
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Introduction
On October 1, 1968, Arnulfo Arias was elected the 43rd President of
The Rise of
Omar Torrijos Panama on promises to mold a new Panama free from corruption. Ten days later,
the government fell in a coup d’état launched by the National Guard, Panama’s
security force. Leading the military and the coup effort were Major Boris
Martínez and Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos who rose to power on the claim
that only military intervention could end the cycle of dictatorship, corruption,
and incompetency that characterized 65 years of oligarchical domination. Out of
a brief power struggle and yet another coup attempt emerged Omar Torrijos as
Panama’s undisputed leader. Six years have passed since the coup, and since then,
Omar Torrijos has dominated Panamanian politics as de facto leader and “Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution.”
With Omar Torrijos’ rise to power, Panama emerged from a 65-year
period in which the country was essentially ruled by a traditional oligarchy known
as the rabiblancos, or “white tails,” that utilized Panamanian national sentiment
to maintain power over the political system. The rabiblancos were a light-skinned
social elite that ruled over a poor Panamanian majority that was Spanish-speaking
and generally of mixed heritage. Although Arnulfo Arias had been overthrown
twice before in 1941 and 1951, neither coup brought about the transformation of
the political scene that resulted from the 1968 coup and the rise of Torrijos.
Since 1968, Torrijos has weakened the dominance of the traditional oligarchy by excluding elites from political power. He banned all political parties and
dissolved the legislative for four years until the National Assembly of Municipal
Representatives was formed, made up of 505 government-selected representatives. While suppressing the influence of the oligarchy, Torrijos has worked to
win the support of the lower- and middle-class majority populations of Panama
through nationalist and populist policies. His social and economic reforms
focused on reducing poverty through land reform, an increased emphasis on education, and increased public-sector employment. However, while the period
between 1950 and 1970 was marked by rapid economic expansion and some of
the highest GDP growth rates in the world, Panama has not enjoyed the same
unequivocal success in the present decade. Decline in world trade has induced
economic difficulties, including a decline in the agricultural sector, inflation,
unemployment, and mounting foreign debts. The reversal of Panama’s formerly
impressive growth has recently been eroding the populist alliance that Torrijos
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worked so hard to create in the early 1970s. Furthermore, corruption in the government and in the National Guard has become salient problems on the national
and international stage.
Above all, Torrijos and his cabinet must confront the ever-present specter
of the Panama Canal and the United States’ presence in the Canal Zone. Ever
since the Hay-Bunau-Vanilla Treaty was signed in 1903, the territory surrounding
the Panama Canal has been under the sovereignty of the United States. 1964 saw
the breakdown of Panama-U.S. relations due to a deadly conflict between Canal
Zone police officers and Panamanian students over the students’ planting of a
Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. Diplomatic relations resumed that same year,
but the only treaty to come out of negotiations in 1967 failed to be ratified in
Panama. Now, Panama’s economic troubles have only increased the pressure for
Torrijos to negotiate a new agreement with the United States.
The Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos will have to decide how to
address these pressing issues facing Panama. The country stands at a pivotal
moment and how the cabinet decides to move forward will have consequences
that will reverberate in the political, economic, and social spheres for decades to
come.
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The Situation in
Context
The Founding of
Panama and the
Formation of the
Canal
After the wars of independence from Spain that were waged across Latin
America in the early 19th century, Panama was a department of Colombia for
eighty years. Despite multiple attempts at achieving its independence from
Colombia, Panama only became an independent republic in 1903 in a virtually
bloodless revolution, starting a 65-year period of democracy dominated by the
Panamanian oligarchy. One can only understand the Panama of the 1970s by
understanding the manner in which Panama achieved independence. The founding of the Republic of Panama was intimately intertwined with two central issues
that are still pressing in the 1970s—the Panama Canal and Panama-U.S. relations.
After the first major attempt to build a Panama Canal in the 1880s by
Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps failed miserably, it would take the involvement
of the United States and the rise to the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt to
complete the Panama Canal successfully. In Roosevelt’s First Annual Message to
the Senate and House of Representatives, he declared, “No single great material
work which remains to be undertaken on this continent is of such consequence
to the American people as the building of a canal across the Isthmus connecting
North and South America.”1 However, such a canal was not intended to be a
Panama Canal. Rather, the consensus in the United States was in favor of a Nicaragua Canal in light of geographical and financial considerations and especially
the recent French debacle over the Panama Canal. However, in opposition was a
small but loud “Panama Lobby,” led by attorney William Nelson Cromwell and
Frenchman Philippe Bunau-Varilla, both of whom had vested interests in a
Panama Canal. Bunau-Varilla was deeply involved with the original Panama Canal
Company that went bankrupt and it was deeply in his interest to have the United
States buy up the assets and rights of the company. Through the nonstop lobbying of businessmen, Congress, and the American people, the Panama Lobby successfully persuaded the United States government to continue where France had
failed and build the canal in Panama.2
At this point, the territory of ‘Panama’ was a department of Colombia,
rather than an independent country, and so negotiations over a proposed Panama
Canal began with the Colombian government. The negotiations were difficult
and frustrating for both sides. The emotional strain had forced the resignation of
two successive Colombian diplomats and it proved one of the most exasperating
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periods of John Hay’s career as Secretary of State under Roosevelt.3 Colombia
was primarily concerned with maintaining sovereignty over the proposed canal
zone. The Thousand Days’ War, a civil conflict fought between Colombian
factions on Panamanian soil, flared up at a crucial moment in negotiations
between the United States and Colombia. Roosevelt in an effort to secure the
Panama Railroad sent the United States Navy to Panama in order to ‘ensure
stability’ in the area, effectively prolonging the Panamanian conflict. For example,
an American admiral prevented any Colombian soldiers from using the Panama
Railroad as transportation at certain key moments in the conflict. The intervention severely hampered negotiations between the United States and the Colombian government. Colombia viewed the landing of the Navy without express permission as a violation of sovereignty and proof of the United States’ imperialistic
intentions. Dr. José Vicente Concha, the Colombian diplomat handling the negotiations at that time, refused to see John Hay out of anger.4 Dr. Concha quit the
position and was immediately replaced by Dr. Tomás Herrán. The prospects for
completing a canal treaty within a reasonable time seemed doubtful. The United
States, frustrated with stagnancy and anxious to begin construction, issued an
ultimatum whereby John Hay would began negotiating with Nicaragua for a new
canal if Colombia refused to assent to the treaty as it stood. The day after the ultimatum, on January 22, 1903, the Hay-Herrán Treaty was signed, granting the
United States control of the canal zone from Colon to Panama City for one hundred years with the ability to enforce its own regulations and intervene as needed
in the zone. In return, the United States government would pay $10,000,000 and
an annual rent of $250,000. The United States Senate ratified the treaty with near
unanimity. However, the Colombian Congress and the public were strongly
against its ratification, believing it to be too unbalanced in favor of the United
States’ interests.
This impasse with the Colombian government presented an opportunity
for Dr. Manuel Amador, a physician and leading figure in Panama City. Dr.
Amador had gained most of his influence from his work as chief physician of
the Panama Railroad. More importantly, on August 26, 1903, Amador sailed to
New York to start a Panamanian revolution. Along with Dr. Amador, Senator
José Agustín Arango and Constantino Arosemena formed the rest of the core of
the revolutionaries. Amador was sent to New York to attain arms and money as
well as to ascertain that if Panama were to revolt, the United States would be able
to offer military support. There, Amador met Philippe Bunau-Varilla, one of the
driving forces of the Panama Lobby. Through the work and connections of
Bunau-Varilla, eventually key members in the United States government, including John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt, were on board with the imminent revolution.5 On November 3, the revolutionaries arrested a Colombian battalion in the
Panamanian city of Colón with the subtle assistance of the United States Navy
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Commander John Hubbard and the USS Nashville, who prevented further
Colombian troops from disembarking in Colón. The Revolutionary Junta
declared the Republic of Panama officially independent from Colombia. The
appearance of more United States navy ships in support of the revolutionaries
prevented any retaliation and attempt at suppression by the Colombian government. With United States ships materializing on the coast of Panama and the
United States’ official recognition of the Republic of Panama on November 13,
Colombia had no choice in the matter. Dr. Manuel Amador, the physician who
guaranteed American support with his voyage to New York City a few months
prior, was elected the first constitutional president of the republic.
Image 1.1: Philippe Bunau-Varilla, one of the key players in the formation of the Panama
Canal.
With independence achieved, the United States could now focus on what
it wanted, a Panama Canal treaty. In return for the financial assistance he offered
Dr. Amador and the revolutionaries, Philippe Bunau-Varilla earned the status of
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diplomatic representative on behalf of Panama in the treaty negotiations despite
the fact that Bunau-Varilla was a Frenchman who had not set foot on Panamanian soil for seventeen years. Therefore, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, signed
between John Hay and Philippe Bunau-Varilla, bore no Panamanian signature. In
many ways, the new treaty struck between Hay and Bunau-Varilla was even more
advantageous toward the United States than the Hay-Herrán Treaty that was to
be signed with Colombia. Essentially, the treaty grants the United States “in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of a zone of land and land under water
for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of said
Canal.”6 The United States would have “all the rights, power, and authority within
the zone . . . which the United States would possess and exercise if it were sovereign of the territory . . . to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of
Panama of any such sovereign rights, power, or authority.”7 In return the United
States guaranteed the independence of Panama and would also compensate
Panama with $10,000,000 on exchange of ratifications and an annual $250,000
that would begin nine years later. While the treaty with Colombia was to last only
one hundred years with indefinite renewability, the zone in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty was to be held by the United States “in perpetuity.” When Bunau-Varilla
informed the Panamanians of the agreement he had struck with Hay, Federico
Boyd, an active member of the revolution and future President of Panama, is said
to have slapped Bunau-Varilla across the face.8 However, Bunau-Varilla sent a
370-word telegram to a Panamanian minister saying that if Panama refused to
ratify the treaty immediately, the United States of America would suspend its protection of Panama and begin negotiations with the Colombian government once
again. While this ultimatum came solely from Bunau-Varilla without any indication that this was even contemplated among the higher levels of the United States
government, the threat was enough to make the government of Panama ratify
the treaty and sign the Canal Zone away to the United States “in perpetuity.”9
The New
Republic and
the Changing
Role of the
United States
Like many Latin American constitutions, the 1904 constitution drafted for
the new Republic of Panama was modeled closely after the United States constitution. Panama’s municipalities were to elect their representative officials, but
provincial authorities were to be appointed by the central government.10 Panama
maintained the two-party system of Liberals and Conservatives that Colombia
possessed, but the parties largely lacked meaningful ideologies that were attached
to the brand names. Throughout the early 1900s, an oligarchy that consisted of
wealthy, white families dominated politics through the Conservative and Liberal
parties. The Union Club of Panama City was the rich gentleman’s club within
which the competition of Panamanian politics was contained. However, by the
1930s, Panama was suffering from the economic depression that hit the Western
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world. A movement known as Acción Comunal, led by brothers Harmodio and
Arnulfo Arias, incorporated middle-class nationalists who staked a position
against both the oligarchy and the United States. Powered by grievances and
growing discontent, armed members of Acción Comunal ended the complacent
dominance of the Liberal and Conservative parties in January 1931, when they
seized the presidential palace and deposed President Florencio Arosemena. Harmodio Arias won the subsequent presidential election in 1932. During his presidency, Arias strengthened the Panamanian armed forces that would eventually
frustrate his brother Arnulfo in his own attempts at the presidency. When
Arnulfo Arias was elected by an impressive majority to the presidency in 1940,
the National Police deposed him in 1941 in a coup supported of the United
States.
Image 1.2: United States President Franklin Roosevelt with Brazilian President Getulio
Vargas, marking the U.S. shift to the Good Neighbor Policy.
The most controversial aspect of the 1904 constitution was the fact that it
granted the United States the unilateral right to intervene in the new republic
when and where it deemed it necessary to preserve order. While the embedding
in the constitution of the United States’ right to intervene was heavy-handed, the
new government of Panama lacked an official army for the first ten years after
independence and its security interests at the time were served by the United
States’ interventionist role.11 By 1920, the United States had intervened four
times in Panama, though these incidents involved fairly little military conflict.12
United States intervention most often stemmed from the request of a Panamanian faction that wanted the United States’ aid in securing its rights against some
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threat. The United States supervised elections, stationed forces in Chiriquí Province, and dispersed mobs during 1925 rent riots in Panama City at the request of
the Panamanian government. At the end of the 1920s, United States maintained
its interests in the progress of Panama, but its willingness to intervene directly
into Panamanian affairs markedly decreased. When the 1932 coup led by Acción
Comunal deposed Arosemena, the United States did not intervene, allowing the
first successful coup in the republic’s short history and marking a shift in United
States policy toward Panama. While the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 had declared that the United States could and should intervene with
military force to maintain order in the Western hemisphere, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s new Good Neighbor Policy marked a significant shift in United
States policy through the 1930s.13 In 1936, the United States accepted the principle of nonintervention without reservation.
The Economy of
Panama
Image 1.3: The Panama Canal, the main driving force of Panama’s economy.
Since the 16th century, Panama’s greatest asset has been its geography—namely, the fact that Panama provides the shortest distance between the
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Nearly four centuries before the construction of the
Panama Canal, the Spanish constructed a “Royal Road” through Panama on
which silver and gold from the western regions of South America could be transported and then shipped across the Atlantic to Spain.14 In 1847, New York bankers organized the construction of the Panama Railroad, which launched a period
of flourishing trade across the isthmus. Between 1855 and 1869, 600,000 travellers used the railroad and $750 million worth of gold was transported from Cali-
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fornia to the East Coast of the United States.15 Panama became dependent on
world trade for its own prosperity. Agriculture and industry received relatively
little emphasis and developed slowly because of the heavy flow of goods from
Europe and North America to Panama. As a result, the prosperity of Panama has
followed closely the twists and turns of international trade. While the completion
of the railroad in 1855 did boost trade across the isthmus, the increase was
short-lived. The first transcontinental railroad in the United States replaced much
of the traffic that once made Panama a bustling center for merchants transporting their goods. The completion of the Panama Canal in 1914 brought about a
similar rise in trade and prosperity across Panama. Canal traffic increased by an
average of 15 percent a year between 1915 and 1930. However, in the 1930s, the
advent of the Great Depression dampened international commerce. The decline
brought unemployment around the Canal Zone and many Panamanians were
required to return to subsistence farming in order to survive.16
After the postwar depression, Panama experienced rapid economic expansion between 1950 and 1970. GDP grew by an average of 6.4 percent per year,
making Panama one of the fastest-growing economies during that time period.
Agriculture, commerce, banking, and tourism all contributed to the growing
prosperity of Panama. The rise in world trade brought a significant stimulus to
the Panama Canal and the economy overall. Despite the rates of growth in industry, however, the manufacturing sector in Panama remained diminutive, limited
mostly to traditional and light industrial activities. Manufacturing accounted for
only six percent of merchandise exports.17 Ever since the founding of Panama up
until the military coup in 1968, the economic elite considered of merchant families whose influenced nudged Panama toward a mercantilist mentality.18 Thus, the
government, concerned with promoting mercantile interests, was less concerned
with creating a strong industrial sector. No coherent set of policies or development strategies promoted industrial growth in 20th century Panama.
One of the most important trends that ultimately led to the 1968 military
The Rise of
Military coup that put Omar Torrijos in power was the growing influence of the military
in Panamanian politics. During the 1930s, as Franklin D. Roosevelt was enacting
Influence his Good Neighbor Policy, President Harmodio Arias succeeded in eliminating
United States supervision of the National Police in 1932.19 Instead, a Panamanian, José Antonio Remón, was made commander of the National Police. Free
from North American influence, the military under Remón moved toward professionalization and consolidation. The military began to act in the political realm
in line with its own interests. For example, the National Police fought for presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias against the forces of another candidate, Juan
Demóstenes Arosemena in the open street in the 1930s. However, just a few
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years later, in 1941, the National Police supported the overthrow of Arnulfo
Arias after he was elected president in 1940. Military intervention, according to
the military itself, was justified because Arias had created a military force independent of the National Police called the National Secret Police (Policía National
Secreta), he had refused to accept U.S. requests to renew their ninety-nine year
leases on military bases, and he had “exiled” Remón to training in the United
States in 1940. The coup launched by the National Police partly discredited the
legitimacy of the civilian political establishment and threw Panamanian politics
into disarray for the remainder of the 1940s. Between 1941 and 1949 after the
deposing of Arnulfo Arias, six different presidents held the office, one for less
than a day. In 1948, the National Police closely monitored and influenced the
elections so as to prevent Arias from regaining the presidency on his nationalist
campaign against recent defense agreements with the United States. Instead, the
National Police helped boost Domingo Díaz Arosemena to the presidency. After
his unexpected death the next year, his vice president, Daniel Chanis assumed the
presidency and asked Remón to step down from the position of police commander. Remón refused and Chanis resigned instead in protest to the new status
of the military created and maintained by Remón. Arias once again attained the
presidency in 1949 in a vacuum devoid of available candidates, but was again
deposed by the National Police in 1951 after threatening to abolish the National
Assembly.20 The military was becoming increasingly powerful and confident of
its role in politics.
Image 1.4: José Antonio Remón, commander of the National Police and eventual President
of Panama.
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In 1952, Remón decided to stop influencing politics from
behind-the-scenes and he ran for the presidency himself as the representative of
a coalition of five different parties, called the Coalición Nacional Patriótica
(CPN). He won easily. With essentially no political competition, Remón had complete control over a one-party, military-led government. He used the National
Police for two main purposes—to amass wealth and to hold on to power using
repressive means. Despite the corruption of Remón’s government, the United
States approved of him because he was only marginally politically ambitious and
he was anti-communist, attributes that the United States looked for in Latin
American leaders during the Cold War.21 Instead of denouncing the regime, the
United States gave Remón enough money to expand the National Police and
agreed to train new recruits to the military in the Canal Zone as well as the United
States. The National Police was renamed the National Guard (Guardia Nacional),
and became a fully professionalized and militarized autonomous body with the
encouragement of both President Remón and the United States government.
Among the new wave of young officers was a man by the name of Omar Torrijos
Herrera, a rising star who dealt primarily with social unrest and was beginning to
doubt the elites’ ability to deal appropriately with this unrest. In 1955, Remón was
murdered by machine gun at a horse race in the countryside.22 The death of
Remón left a power vacuum into which the old oligarchy returned and resumed
its familiar role as political leaders. However, the National Guard with its newfound power, autonomy, and ability to influence politics, would never return to
its former position as a tool of the government.
The Panama
Canal
From the beginning of the 20th century, the Panama Canal has been at the
core of not only Panama’s relationship with the United States but also the stability of Panama’s domestic situation. The Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, “The
Treaty that No Panamanian Signed,” left a bitter taste in the mouth of Panamanians. Throughout the next six decades, they struggled to restore some of the control over the Panama Canal that they felt was rather unfairly granted to the United
States under the circumstances. The terms of the treaty itself were at points
vague and open to interpretation. The United States government interpreted the
treaty to mean that it had complete sovereignty over the canal and all the occurrences in the Canal Zone, while Panama tended to interpret the treaty as pertaining predominantly to the construction, operation, and defense of the canal.
Later attempts to modify or clarify the terms of United States control over
the Canal Zone had mixed results. Clamors on both sides for a revision to the
treaty led to the Kellogg-Alfaro Treaty of 1925, in which the United States agreed
to restrictions on private commercial operations in the Canal Zone. In return,
Panama agreed to automatic participation in any war involving the United States
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and would allow the United States control over its own military operations in
such a case. The treaty encountered widespread opposition in Panama, and the
National Assembly refused to consider the draft treaty in 1927. A more successful attempt at revision came in 1936 in the form of the Hull-Alfaro Treaty. The
treaty included a number of agreements that renounced the United States’ rights
of intervention and an increase in the annuity paid to Panama, but most notable
was Roosevelt’s acceptance that the United States’ rights in the zone applied only
to the “maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection” of the canal.23 While
the United States’ superior position in the agreement was largely unchanged, the
treaty marked a change in how the relationship between the two countries could
begin to be interpreted.
However, as nationalist sentiments and general frustrations matured, Panamanians began to express their grievances over the Panama Canal with violence.
In 1958, after the Egyptian takeover of the Suez Canal, discontent over the
unequal relationship that characterized the Panama Canal agreement became
impossible to ignore. Aquilino Boyd, the foreign minister at the time, tried to
demand that all Panama Canal revenues be split 50-50 and that Panamanian and
American workers be paid equally. While the effort ultimately failed, it galvanized
the public in demanding a greater share of the Panama Canal.24 The next year,
students entered the Canal Zone to place Panamanian flags for Panama’s independence day. The combined force of the National Guard and the U.S. Army met
the students and the ensuing conflict left 120 students wounded. In the subsequent uproar, the United States opened up a program that would allow Panamanians to attain skilled jobs that were previously open only to workers from the
U.S. They also allowed the Panamanian flag within the Canal Zone, but the grace
of the concession was marred when President de la Guardia’s request to raise the
flag himself was rejected. However, on January 9, 1964, a similarly violent confrontation occurred. The Panamanian flag only flew at one location in the Canal
Zone, while the United States flag flew at multiple sites in the zone. While an official agreement allowed for multiple other Panamanian flags, the United States
citizens in the zone were reluctant to abide by this policy. As a result, over 200
Panamanian students from the National Institute went into the Canal Zone to fly
their flag next to that of the United States. A fight broke out between the Panamanian students and hostile Canal Zone students, forcing military officials to
intervene. At the end of the conflict, three U.S. servicemen and twenty-two Panamanians had died.25 President Roberto Chiari broke off diplomatic relations with
the United States. While relations were resumed by April 3, the pressure to reach
a new agreement over the Panama Canal was steadily mounting.
XX
The 1960s Crisis
of Hegemony
and the 1968
Coup
The 1960s saw the decline of oligarchical rule in Panama, culminating in
the 1968 military coup out of which emerged the National Guard and Lieutenant
Colonel Omar Torrijos. The dissatisfaction with the current regime stemmed
from the oligarchy’s inability to address the social issues of the time and also to
make considerable progress on the Panama Canal. On the surface, Panama’s
economy seemed to boom during the 1960s. The GNP doubled from 1960 to
1970, exports of goods and services tripled, and manufacturing was on the rise.
Panama sustained one of the highest growth rates in the world, largely due to the
increase in world trade and its effect on canal traffic. Panama was also implementing a policy of import substitution, in which state policies aimed to replace
foreign imports with domestic industrial production for the sake of self-sufficiency and economic growth. However, foreign debt skyrocketed as Panama had
for pay to import the machinery and equipment needed for import substitution
and industrialization. Furthermore, even as the country as a whole was rapidly
growing, the growth was not evenly spread. Significant social issues were still
largely unaddressed in Panama. An Alliance for Progress report in 1973 revealed
inequitable conditions in Panama that were not captured by the impressive
growth rates. While per capita income was $531, a third of total income nevertheless went to five percent of the population. Half of all Panamanian employees
were farmers, most of whom earned less than $100 a year. By 1966, unemployment reached 25%. The most disadvantaged were the rural poor and the urban
unemployed.26 The oligarchy, lured to complacency by the booming economic
growth throughout the 1960s, failed to implement the needed reforms to address
these social issues. Students, workers, and the unemployed launched demonstrations to protest hunger, poverty, high rents, and to achieve a minimum wage of
40 cents per hour. Urban transport workers, public school teachers, and banana
workers went on strike as well. The Panamanian government reacted with
small-scale reforms, but largely depended on repression to address such movements.27
The oligarchy also proved incapable of achieving substantial gains on the
issue of the Panama Canal. In June of 1967, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and
Marco Robles proposed an agreement whereby Panama would legitimize all U.S.
military bases in Panama and allow for the construction of a sea-level canal. In
return, the United States would recognize Panama’s right to exercise jurisdiction
over the existing Canal Zone and would grant Panama a larger annuity. However,
still bitter from the violent conflict of 1964, the Panamanian Students Federation
(FEP) refused to accept the small concessions offered by the United States and
put pressure on the National Assembly to reject the treaty proposal, which it
eventually did.
Amid doubts and frustrations with the oligarchy, the 1968 elections
brought Arnulfo Arias yet again to the presidency for the third time. Ten days
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Image 1.5: Arnulfo Arias was deposed by the Naitonal Guard on October 11, 1968.
later, on October 11, it was rumored that Arias was planning to reshuffle the hierarchy of the National Guard. The National Guard, in reaction to these rumors,
deposed Arias. While in past coups, the military would reliably return power to
the civilian politicians after deposing an undesirable president, this time, the
Guard declared that the civilian political establishment could no longer be trusted
to address the issues confronting Panama adequately. The National Guard had
taken power, and it was here to stay.
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Panama Under
Omar Torrijos
The military coup took place on October 11, 1968. At that time, Torrijos
The Coup and
Torrijos’ Rise to had been a relatively obscure, unmemorable member of the military. However, he
would soon rise to become undisputed leader of Panama and seize control of the
Power Panamanian revolución.
When Arnulfo Arias won the presidential election on October 1, 1968, the
National Guard had been content to let Arias remain in the presidency and to
allow democracy to proceed and unfold without heavy military intervention.
Arias’ popularity among the lower class appealed to many members of the Guard
initially, for many of them had roots in these lower classes. However, Arias would
immediately turn against the National Guard. Wary of the history of military
power and the past interventions of the National Guard, Arias planned to scatter
some of the top Guard officers to distant parts of Panama or other countries
altogether, including Omar Torrijos, who was to be sent to El Salvador. Arias
planned to install his own men in control of the National Guard to solidify his
rule and ensure loyalty within the military. Not only that, Arias also planned to
create his own personal presidential guard. Under such pressures, the National
Guard that had originally intended to let Arias run his own democratic government was forced to act in order to preserve its own interests. A coup attempt
seemed inevitable.28
The first major player in the military coup was Major Boris Martínez.
Martínez never intended to join the military. As a student in 1952, he intended to
pursue the career of physician, and his good grades were supposed to earn him a
medical scholarship in Mexico. However, friends of then-president Remón
grabbed the scholarship through their connections alone and instead of medicine, Martínez found himself traveling to Mexico for military studies. He
returned to Panama as a graduate and, without other options, joined the Panamanian National Guard. He quickly established himself as a man deserving of
respect with his serious, scrupulous, idealistic nature. He refused to take part in
the rampant bribery and corruption prevalent in the National Guard. Although
he was only a major in 1968, he led and commanded loyalties like a general. Arias
planned to transfer Martínez to Herrera, a less important province than
Martínez’s original posting at Chiriquí Province. Not particularly affronted by the
transfer, Martínez himself was ready to accept the posting until general outrage
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within the National Guard brought officers’ pleas to “do something” raining
down on Martínez.29
Image 1.6: Major Boris Martínez.
His closest friend in the Guard was a man named Lieutenant Colonel
Omar Torrijos. The two, while markedly different in disposition, were true comrades. In contrast to the serious, industrious manner of Martínez, Torrijos was
likable and easygoing, less devoutly principled than his disciplined friend and
more suited to the atmosphere of the Panamanian army. Martínez often had to
bail Torrijos out of tough situations that Torrijos had gotten himself into. When
Martínez and Torrijos led a company to quash a Castro-inspired group of armed
university students in Veraguas Province, Torrijos fled at the first sign of action
and got shot in the buttocks. Martínez managed the situation and forced a surrender by the students, and afterwards, he kept his mouth shut about Torrijos’
actions on the battlefield. By the year of the coup, Torrijos had been accused of
election fraud, and so was essentially banished all the way to El Salvador. Yet he
pleaded with Martínez to find some way to have the transfer rescinded. As
Martínez received more and more pressure to lead a coup d’état, he decided that
he had to act. Interestingly, the United States of America had already essentially
given the Panamanian military a detailed plan for a coup. Under the code name
of “Plan A,” the US Army had delivered multiple Latin American armed forces
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specific plans of action in the case of a communist seizure of power. While these
circumstances were not the ones that the United States envisioned when drafting
up Plan A, the plan was under the control of the National Guard and relatively
easy to carry out. Martínez secured the cooperation of his own officers, including
Lieutenant Manuel Noriega, an intelligence officer. With widespread support in
the military, Martínez effected a relatively painless and bloodless coup. He
declared the military takeover over radio while President Arias was at the theater
with his wife. By the time he heard the news and rushed back to the capitol building, the National Guard controlled Panama in its entirety.30
The coup was not received well among the majority of Panamanian
citizens. Student demonstrations and riots broke out in the slums of Panama City.
The National Guard had to quash peasant uprisings in Chiriquí province for several months. The new government took drastic measures to maintain control of
Panama. Hundreds of political leaders were arrested and jailed on charges of corruption or subversion, while other politicians went into exile, both imposed and
self-imposed. The National Guard disbanded the National Assembly and political parties altogether. The new government purged the faculty and student body
of the University of Panama, and controlled and censored the media to prevent
subversive discourse. At this point, Martínez and Torrijos were chief of staff and
commander, respectively, of the National Guard. Martínez valued Torrijos’ political skills and connection to the Guard officers, and had made him his partner in
power. However, frustration with Martínez as a visible leader grew. Uprisings and
riots continued to plague the National Guard and only provoked greater repression. The United States wanted Martínez out of power. He had proved to be
more independent than Washington liked in its Latin American allies, even after
he had seized power using weapons bought by American aid. The National
Guard needed American support in general so that they could finally reach a suitable canal treaty and so that the United States would aid the National Guard
against guerrillas and the various enemies that the Guard had made after its
seizure of power. Members of the Guard turned to Torrijos.
The highest priority, above reform or revolution, was simply the preservation of the Guard’s power. The National Guard had jailed, exiled, and tortured
too many Panamanians for their safety and freedom to be ensured if the Guard
ever lost power. In Match of 1969, Martínez sealed his fate in a speech over the
radio that promised land reform in a radical shift of policy that galvanized landowners and entrepreneurs. Colonel Boris Martínez arrived at his office a few days
later and sat down for his breakfast like any other day. He was summoned to the
office of Omar Torrijos, who needed to speak with him urgently. Waiting for him
were Omar Torrijos and two lieutenant colonels, who surprised Martínez, beat
him to the ground, and cuffed his hands. He and three of his supporters were put
on a plane to Miami, leaving Omar Torrijos as the sole man in power. “He was
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my friend,” Martínez said later of Torrijos. “I helped him, I put him where he
was. I never suspected him.”31
The main threat to Torrijos’ power from within the National Guard came
nine months after his own betrayal of Boris Martínez. While Torrijos was attending a horse race in Mexico City with Demetrio Basilio Lakas and Rubén Paredes,
he received a phone call from Colonels Urrutia and Pinilla, who said, “We have
decided that you should not come back home again.”32 They offered to pay Torrijos from the national social security account if he stayed away from Panama. Torrijos refused, covertly landing in Panama on a nighttime plane. When he came
back to headquarters, he founded that the conspirators had been arrested by
Lieutenant Manuel Noriega, his intelligence officer, and his other loyal officers.
While the punishment for such attempts at subversion was death, Torrijos
graciously interceded on behalf of the traitors and saved them from certain
death. He took the successful quashing of the countercoup attempt as proof of
the loyalty and solid power base that he had in the National Guard. Thus, Omar
Torrijos entered 1970 as the undisputed leader of Panama. He appointed Demetrio Lakas as the new president of Panama, but Lakas was merely a figurehead.
The primary functions of the government, from foreign policy to budget, were
undoubtedly in Torrijos’ hands.
Torrijos’
Domestic
Reforms
By the time that Omar Torrijos emerged as the Commander in Chief of
the Panamanian National Guard and Maximum Leader of the Revolution,
Panama needed change. The students, the lower classes, and the oligarchy had all
proven to be important political players since the 1968 coup. The National Guard
learned the lesson that to rule authoritatively without winning over these groups
was to ensure its own demise. The riots and uprisings that characterized the
period under Boris Martínez were subdued for the moment. But the regime was
still under heavy criticism for not holding elections and returning power to a civilian government as it had previously promised. Instead, Torrijos wished to institute a “democracy without elections,” in which the electoral process lay in the
hands of the National Guard. Furthermore, the regime faced criticism for its
deplorable human rights record. The Panamanian intelligence agency, G-2,
headed by Manuel Noriega since 1971, has been ruthless. One infamous example
of repression was the disappearance of Father Héctor Gallegos, a Catholic priest
from Veraguas Province. Gallegos had organized agricultural cooperatives and
was trying to raise political consciousness until the G-2 arrested him and he was
never seen again. The official explanation was that his social justice work undermined Torrijos’ constituency building.
Over the past four years, Torrijos has worked to solidify his power base in
both the political and social sphere. First, Torrijos enlarged the National Guard
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and granted it new powers in the new government. In 1969, Torrijos added an air
force and marine corps to the military and increased military spending. The
National Guard has become intimately involved in politics, as Torrijos divided
Panama into ten military zones and assigned a Guard commander to each zone
as a de facto provincial governor. Torrijos’ reforms made political and military
power essentially inseparable. Furthermore, within the Guard, Torrijos replaced
many of the white officers with black or middle-class mestizo officers who
shared his own background. He created Panama’s first military academy, the
Instituto Militar Tomás Herrera in order to rid the National Guard of its dependence on the United States for training. The training focused on theories of economic development and national independence from the United States as well as
the usual military training.33
But to legitimize the regime, Torrijos has turned to the political sphere.
The previous oligarchical political system was nominally democratic and representative, but most of the power lay in the hands of the mercantile economic
elite. Torrijos wanted a different political system to serve his own interests. In
March 1972, he created the Constitutional Reform Commission whose task was
to reform the 1946 constitution. First, the constitution officially abolished direct
elections and, while vesting nominal powers in the president, for the most part
granted Torrijos six years of dictatorial power. Second, the constitution emphasized that Torrijos’ Panama lay on socialist and populist foundations. Despite
having betrayed Martínez partly on the basis on his radical socialist leanings, Torrijos himself has become increasingly sympathetic with the cause of socialism.
He admires the socialist military governments in Peru and Bolivia and has
become friends with Fidel Castro. However, he has explicitly distanced himself
from the Panamanian Marxists, instead identifying himself as a populist.34 Populism has been Torrijos’ primary way of securing power by building a loyal constituency among the people. The social situation in Panama requires vast improvement. Among Panama’s 1.5 million citizens in 1968, 200,000 were illiterate,
100,000 malnourished, and 50,000 were subsistence farmers earned less than
$100 a year.35 Over the past few years, Torrijos has built a populist alliance that
encompasses the National Guard, students, the People’s Party, and the working
class. The government promised major agrarian reform and land distribution to
the peasants, although the actual implementation has been slow or stagnant in
practice. Torrijos has also pushed for education reforms in favor of vocational
and agricultural training. In health care, he established a system whereby medical
care became available for family members and relatives of anyone who has
worked long enough to qualify for social security benefits. Torrijos has also built
more hospitals in provincial cities, as most hospitals previously had been concentrated solely in Panama City.
However, as of last year, 1973, economic problems have slowed the afore-
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mentioned reforms to a standstill. For several years after the military coup in
1968, Panama was able to maintain impressive growth rates from the 1960s. In
the past few years, however, world inflation and increasing domestic pressures
have eroded Panama’s economic performance. Panama’s open economy has
always relied on international trade. As a result, Panama is significantly affected
by changes in the global economy such as foreign inflation. By 1972, consumer
prices were rising by 6.7 percent.36 The trend has only continued since then,
plunging Panama into a deep recession. Furthermore, adverse weather conditions
have reduced the export of bananas, Panama’s main crop. The price of oil and
other imports has increased, a trend largely beyond the control of the Panamanian government. As a result, rising commodity prices have put many Panamanians
in more desperate straits. The value earned from economic activity in the Canal
Zone has been steadily dropping as well. No new workers from Panama are being
hired in the Zone, and the number of United States residents and their purchases
of Panamanian goods have also remained stagnant.37 As discontent rises and
reforms have come to a standstill, the cabinet will have to decide how to move
forward with consolidating the support of the people while getting Panama back
on the track of growth and development. Otherwise, the government may risk a
flaring up of the discontent that led to uprisings, student demonstrations, and
peasant rebellions in the history of the regime.
The Canal Zone
After the 1964 student riots that temporarily ended diplomatic relations
and the United between Panama and the United States, most attempts at renegotiating “the
States treaty that no Panamanian ever signed” have not produced results. At the April
1967 Punta del Este conference, United States President Lyndon Johnson and
Panamanian President Marco Robles agreed to work toward a treaty as soon as
possible. However, student protests against the drafts of the new treaty and the
eventual 1968 coup put negotiations permanently on hiatus.
Torrijos has since then sought to renew the negotiations on behalf of
Panama. As the economy has slowed in the current recession, the citizens of
Panama have reinvigorated passion regarding the Panama Canal and negotiations
with the United States. Because of the government’s new focus on development,
the Torrijos feels that the canal cannot play a major beneficial economic role
unless the treaty with the United States is renegotiated. Furthermore, Panamanian citizens, frustrated by the country’s economy, resent their country’s dependence on the United States. They feel that the future of Panama depends too
heavily on policies from Washington and on the global market over which
Panama has no control. Torrijos has used the Canal issue as nationalistic support
for his own regime. Amid negotiations, Torrijos refused a proposal from the
United States that would give up the Canal over the course of a schedule that
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lasted past 2003. An editorial in the New York Times soon after expressed the
opinion that the United States should give up negotiations with Panama because
of its leaders “lame explanations” for rejecting the earlier drafts.38 Torrijos used
this editorial as nationalistic rhetoric against the United States. He demanded that
the 1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty be completely abrogated and that the United
States return complete control of the Canal Zone to Panama.
Image 1.7: United States forces defending the Canal Zone, 1964.
Since then, the issue has been heated on both sides. In January 1972, the
United Nations Security Council met for the first time outside New York in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Panama’s ambassador to the United Nations, Aquilino
Boyd, took advantage of the fact that they were no longer on U.S. soil, and
accused the United States of attempting to colonize Panama in the way that
Western powers long colonized Africa. The United States ambassador, George
H.W. Bush, refuted the claims, but no resolution or agreement has made.39 The
next year, in March, 1973, Panama arranged for the Security Council to meet in
Panama itself. When the United States tried to resist this decision, citing the
expenses, Boyd asked the United States why, after spending $137 billion on the
Vietnam War, they could not spare $100,000 in order “to avert possible conflict
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of unforeseeable consequences.”40 After fiery accusations and speeches by both
Boyd and Torrijos himself at the Council meetings, all the other Latina American
states encouraged treaty negotiations and condemned the United States.
Image 1.8: The United States is a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council.
When a resolution in favor of Panama was voted on, 13 countries voted for, one
abstained (Britain), and one voted against (the United States). Because the United
States is a permanent member of the Security Council and has veto power, their
vote automatically killed the resolution despite the majority. The future the Canal
Zone remains the issue most prominent in the hearts of Panamanians today. The
Executive Cabinet will undoubtedly have to decide how to proceed with negotiations in light of shifts in the perspective of the global community and continuing
resistance on the part of the United States.
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Key Players
The National Guard essentially serves as the ruling body of Panama. Led
The National
Guard by Omar Torrijos, the Commander in Chief, the Guard has become increasingly
politicized beyond its original role as Panama’s armed forces. The National
Guard for the decade before the 1968 coup arguably fell under the category of a
“praetorian” military—a military that exercises independent political power by
use of force.41 The military in the eyes of the public has been a source of civil
support and a mechanism for political participation. The military officers in the
Guard are regarded with respect as high-ranking members of society. The interests of the military are no longer restricted to national security. The National
Guard, like many militaries across Latin America, has shifted toward a more
developmentally focused body that engages with social issues as much as with
security. Such engagement with the social sphere of Panama has been a way of
holding onto power by earning working-class and middle-class support. The
National Guard also uses covert repression in order to maintain order, especially
through the G-2, Panama’s ruthless intelligence agency currently headed by General Manuel Noriega.
The Oligarchy
For most Panama’s history until the rise of Torrijos, the oligarchy was
firmly in control of the state. The oligarchy consists mostly of wealthy families
of Spanish descent with deep roots in the upper class. Their wealth is tightly connected with commerce and Panama’s role as a transit zone. Panamanian presidents, cabinet members, and politicians throughout oligarchical rule came from
the same familiar families with names such as Arias, Arosemena, Alemán, Chiari,
and de la Guardia. Education has always been the mark of the elite. Nearly all
males in the oligarchy possess a university education and enter fields such as medicine or law. Since the 1960s and the fall of the civilian government, the oligarchy’s power has been greatly reduced. However, the economy is still very much in
the hands of the elites, the Torrijos has been careful about keeping the upper
classes pleased while pushing for his populist reforms.
Students
University students in Panama have always played an important role in
Panamanian politics. Oftentimes, students represent the push for progressive
reform on behalf of the lower and middle classes against the oligarchy and military. Most notably, students have been the galvanizing force in pressuring the
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United States to make concessions on the Canal issue. In 1964, the conflict that
erupted when Panamanian students tried to plant their flag next to the United
States flag in the Canal Zone sparked a movement in Panama that pressed for a
renegotiation of the treaty. The Federation of Panamanian Students (FEP) has
successfully influenced public opinion and treaty negotiations as the representatives of the young middle class. Torrijos so far has successfully co-opted the
student organization with his social programs. However, university students in
Panama have rarely stayed quietly complacent for long, and the economic recession combined with stagnancy on the Canal issue could create discontent.
Image 1.9: Political rally with poster of Omar Torrijos.
Peasants and
A stark distinction exists between urban and rural society in Panama. Rural
Rural Society society predominantly consists of small-scale farmers and cattle ranchers. The
land is mostly owned by wealthy landowners or urban elites, who rent out the
land to mestizo farmers. Agricultural production mostly goes toward individual
household consumption. Panama also has a core of rural educated middle class
citizens, who, while more educated than the average farmer, had little influence in
the country’s politics. Torrijos’ government was essentially the first to rely on
rural society for support. He not only tried to address rural needs through social
programs and land reform, but he tried to include them in political life in a very
limited way. Recently, the government has tried to model its land reform on a
collective framing system from Chile. The cooperatives have had mixed success,
with the greatest successes coming in regions like Veraguas Province.
The Lower Class
The lower class constitutes the majority of the country’s urban population.
The demographic is a diverse group that consists of unskilled or semiskilled
workers who either earn wages or who are informally self-employed. Social mo-
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bility has been on the rise throughout the 60s as education has become more
available, but due to the current recession, unemployment is on the rise more
recently in poorer neighborhoods. Women outnumber men in many of the metropolitan areas, because a majority of the rural-urban immigrants are young,
single mothers.42 The lower class is divided into three main ethnic groups, mestizo migrants from the countryside, descendants of Antillean blacks, and Hispanicized blacks—descendants of former slaves. The divide between the Antillean
blacks and the rest of the lower class is most stark, as any social or racial mixing
largely excludes this group.
The United
States
Without a doubt, the United States has been the biggest international
force in Panamanian politics. Ever since the United States helped Panama separate from Colombia in 1903 and gained control of the Panama Canal in return
through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, the fate of Panama has been
closely aligned with United States interests. The degree of intervention has fluctuated from direct military force to more hands-off diplomacy since Panama’s
founding. The administration of Richard Nixon, the current United States president, has established a heavy-handed approach to Latin America. Most notable
was last year’s military coup d’état in Chile that deposed President Salvador Allende and had direct support from Nixon’s government. The most pressing issue in
Panama-U.S. relations is by far the Panama Canal. While international pressure
has been mounting, the United States, as shown by their veto of the most recent
Security Council resolution for Canal Zone independence, has remained obstinate.
Other Latin
American
Countries
Over the course of the past decade, Latin America has experienced a wave
of military coups. Along with Panama, democratic regimes fell in Brazil (1964),
Argentina (1966), Peru (1968), Chile (1973), and Uruguay (1973). The decade has
also seen the rise of militant Marxism throughout the region, starting with the
Cuban Revolution in 1959. Torrijos, while explicitly denying that he wants
Panama to be a Marxist state, sympathizes with other left-wing regimes in Peru
and Bolivia, which have influenced his own shift to the left since coming to
power. Panama’s Latin America neighbors have also provided nominal support in
Panama’s attempt to extract the Canal Zone from the grasp of the United States.
In 1973, Peru announced its support of the Panamanian cause, having undergone its own left-wing coup. As the cabinet navigates the domestic issues that
confront Panama today, the government must also keep in mind the ever-changing climate of the region.
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Position Papers and
Further Research
Each delegate in the Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos will have to
Framing
Position Papers write a position paper before the conference. The hope is that by the end of the
position paper process, you will come to HACIA 2014 equipped with all the
research, knowledge, and analytical skills to dive right into this exciting period of
Panamanian history. The position paper is especially important in crafting the
perspective of a Panamanian cabinet member in 1974 that you will be donning
yourself when you step foot in committee. The position paper should not only
help you inform yourself on the relevant politics, history, and economics, but it
should also allow you to write from a viewpoint beyond your own biases and
beliefs, a process that, in my opinion, is one of the most important parts of participating in something like HACIA.
Here is the general structure of the position paper and some questions
that you will most likely want to answer in the course of your paper:
1. Introduction and Personal Background: You should provide a brief overview
of the cabinet member that you are representing in committee. Provide
a personal and professional history. Be sure to emphasize the interests
that you have or that you represent, as well as the groups or individuals
with whom you are generally aligned. Make it clear who you are and why
you are in the cabinet.
2. The Issues in Context: Provide a very brief overview of the issues in
context. This is not the most essential part of the position paper,
because the issues have mostly been explained in the bulletin. While you
can certainly use information from the bulletin, you should also include
information that comes from your own independent research. Perhaps
you can find potential issues or problems that were not covered in
bulletin, or perhaps your research looks at the problems in a new light.
Either way, this section should simply ground your position paper in the
issues at hand without spending excessive time rehashing what was
already in the bulletin.
3. Your Position: This is the most important part of your bulletin. While the
first section of the position paper was about your background and
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general alignments, this section is about the specific proposals you have
coming into committee. Based on your interests and agenda, what do
you think the Panamanian cabinet should do? What issues do you care
about the most? What potential outcomes are you most worried about?
Specific questions that you will want to answer include:
a. What should be done about the Canal Zone and the United States?
Should we continue with diplomatic negotiations or try something else?
How much of a priority should reclaiming the Panama Canal be? Are
there allies that we can recruit to gain leverage in these negotiations?
b. How should Panama address the current recession? With the recession
showing no signs of slowing, what can the government do either to
alleviate the recession itself or at the very least mitigate the effects of the
recession on the Panamanian people?
c. How can we maintain the support of the Panamanian people? In light
of the recession, how much should we spend on social programs? How
can we balance the oligarchical interests with the interests of the
students and the masses? What can we do to prevent more uprisings
and riots? Which groups are most important to appeal to?
d. What should be the future of Panama under an authoritarian military
government? Is the current system of governance ideal? What larger
visions or goals do you have for the country as a whole?
Of course, not every position paper will address every single question
that I have raised here. But these should be the types of questions that
you are thinking about as you craft your position. Remember, aim for
realism. As soon as you step into the committee, you will be a
Panamanian cabinet member in 1974. Write your position papers as if
you already are one.
Because I unfortunately cannot speak more than a few words of Spanish,
Recommendations for Further my own research was restricted to English websites and publications. Those of
Research you who can speak and read Spanish will undoubtedly find resources beyond my
own limited research, and I am excited to see what I have missed. For now, I can
make a few recommendations about resources in English that I think are helpful
in your preparation or just plain fascinating reads:
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The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870-1914 by
David McCullough: Wonderfully written book about the original
formation of the Panama Canal, starting with the failed French attempt
and then weaving through the intrigue that led to the United States’
construction and possession of the Canal. McCullough makes history
fascinating to read, and this is one of his best.
Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics by Robert C. Harding: This
book reads primarily like a political science book. It is a bit technical if
you have not had exposure to ideas in political science, but otherwise, it
provides a great overview of the development of the Panamanian
military and the general history leading up 1974.
In the Time of the Tyrants by R.M. Koster and Guillermo Sánchez: This
book provides a comprehensive history from the rise of Omar Torrijos
until the rule of Manuel Noriega. The book is written more like a novel
than anything, with personal anecdotes about all the big figures in
Panamanian politics, which makes it delightfully readable and
entertaining, though it may not be the most objective historical tone.
The Economic Development of Panama by Robert Looney: A pretty
comprehensive survey of Panama’s economy in 1974. Don’t read it cover
to cover. It is not that readable. But if you ever needed an overview of
the economy or a specific economic figure or fact from the time period,
it is a good resource to have.
Getting to Know the General by Graham Greene: Ever since Graham
Greene was invited to visit Panama by Omar Torrijos, they were close
friends. This is perhaps one of the most personal accounts of Torrijos
life and rule.
Closing
Remarks
A historical simulation like this cabinet is a unique opportunity. It is unique
because you will be engaging with history in a constructive way. We will literally
be making our own history of Panama over the course of three days at HACIA
2014. In essentially no other context of historical studies will you have the opportunity to see how a couple key decisions may have changed the course of Panamanian history completely. Not only will you see it, you will live it. That is why
coming to HACIA will be different from any classroom experience where you
learn about international affairs, politics, or history. We will ask you to use your
minds creatively. You will have to be another person for three days. You will no
longer be a high school student from Chile, Panama, or the United States. You
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will be a member of the Panamanian cabinet and the more you adopt that character as your own, the more successful this committee will be. Not only will you
have to think creatively across people, you will have to think creatively across
time. What was it like to live in 1974, back before the collapse of the Soviet
Union, before the internet, and only five years after a man walked on the moon
for the first time? Of course, from your own personal knowledge and from your
research, you will know what happens to Panama after 1974. You will know how
Panama ended up 30 years later in 2014. It will be tempting to use that knowledge
to guide your thinking, to mistake what happened for what was inevitable. But at
HACIA, your actions will determine the course of history more than history
itself will. You will make your own choices based on your interests, beliefs, and
biases, and while a perfect simulation of 1974 Panama might be impressive, a perfect simulation of history is not possible, nor is it necessarily desirable. I encourage you to think flexibly. Divorce yourself from the feeling of inevitability that
colors our absorption of history and start asking yourself, “What if ?” From the
moment you finish this bulletin until the moment I adjourn committee on the last
day of HACIA, we are making history. Best of luck, and see you in Panama!
XX
Endnotes
Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and
John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542.
2
McCullough, David G. The Path between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal,
1870-1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. Print.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty), U.S.-Panama.,
November 18, 1903.
7
Ibid.
8
McCullough, The Path between the Seas
9
Ibid.
10
Black, Jan Knippers and Flores, Edmundo. "A Country Study: Panama." Country Studies.
Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 6 Aug 2013. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/patoc.html
11
Zimbalist, Andrew S., and John Weeks. Panama at the Crossroads: Economic Development
and Political Change in the Twentieth Century. Berkeley: University of California, 1991. Print.
12
Black, Jan Knippers and Flores, Edmundo. "A Country Study: Panama." Country Studies.
Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 6 Aug 2013. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/patoc.html
13
Ibid.
14
Zimbalist and Weeks, 21.
15
Ibid, p. 22.
16
Tollefson, Scott. "A Country Study: Panama." Country Studies. Library of Congress, n.d. Web.
6 Aug 2013. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/patoc.html
17
Zimbalist and Weeks, 25.
18
Looney, Robert. The Economic Development of Panama. New York: Praeger, 1976.
19
Harding, Robert C. Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics. New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A.:
Transaction, 2001. Print.
20
Ibid, p. 36
21
Ibid, p. 40.
22
Ibid, p. 42.
23
Black and Flores
24
Harding, p. 44.
25
Priestley, George. Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama. Boulder, Colora1
XX
do: Westview, 1986, p. 24
26
LaFeber, Walter. The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective. New York: Oxford
UP, 1978, p. 150-1.
27
Priestley, p. 23-4.
28
Harding, p. 75.
29
Koster, R. M., and Guillermo Sánchez. In the Time of the Tyrants: Panama, 1968-1990. New
York: W.W. Norton, 1990, p. 70.
30
Ibid, p. 68-79.
31
Ibid, p. 116
32
Harding, p. 87
33
Ibid, p. 92
34
Country Studies
35
Ibid, p. 88
36
Looney, Robert E. The Economic Development of Panama: The Impact of World Inflation
on an Open Economy. New York: Praeger, 1976, p. 27.
37
Ibid, p. 28
38
Harding, p. 109.
39
Ibid, p. 110.
40
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, January 31,
1973, p. M1.
41
Harding, p. 56.
42
Country Studies
XX
Sources
References Black, Jan Knippers and Flores, Edmundo. "A Country Study: Panama." Country
Studies. Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 6 Aug 2013. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/patoc.html
Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty),
U.S.-Panama., November 18, 1903.
Greene, Graham. Getting to Know the General: The Story of an Involvement. New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984. Print.
Harding, Robert C. Military Foundations of Panamanian Politics. New Brunswick,
N.J., U.S.A.: Transaction, 2001. Print.
Koster, R. M., and Guillermo Sánchez. In the Time of the Tyrants: Panama,
1968-1990. New York: W.W. Norton, 1990, p. 70.
LaFeber, Walter. The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective. New York:
Oxford UP, 1978, p. 150-1.
Looney, Robert. The Economic Development of Panama. New York: Praeger, 1976.
McCullough, David G. The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal,
1870-1914. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977. Print.
Priestley, George. Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview, 1986, p. 24
Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
Tollefson, Scott. "A Country Study: Panama." Country Studies. Library of
Congress, n.d. Web. 6 Aug 2013. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/patoc.html
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-
XX
vice, January 31, 1973, p. M1.
Zimbalist, Andrew S., and John Weeks. Panama at the Crossroads: Economic Development and Political Change in the Twentieth Century. Berkeley: University of California,
1991. Print.
Image Page 4: http://www.capital.com.pa/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/casco2.jpg
Sources
Page 6: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b0/Satellite_image_of_Panama_in_March_2003.jpg
Page 8: http://yotomepanama.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/images/Phillipe_Bunau-Varilla.344124200_std.jpg
Page 10: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Vargas_e_Roosevelt.jpg
Page 11: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1e/Kroonland_in_Panama_Canal,_1915.jpg
Page 13: http://www.corbisimages.com/images/Corbis-U921900ACME.jpg?size=67&uid=e73c455d-8c86-43f5-b073-e5049033bcdd
Page 17: http://www.dealante.com/upload/nodos/2012/1/6/doc-271222.jpg
Page 18: http://voces.org.sv/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/General-Omar-Torrijos-Panam%C3%A1.jpg
Page 19: http://www.biography.com/imported/images/Biography/Images/Profiles/T/Omar-Torrijos-39262-1-402.jpg
Page 24: http://www.milsurps.com/images/imported/2010/03/0cab0918ee32326e_large-1.jpg
Page 25: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/82/Barack_Obama_chairs_a_United_Nations_Security_Council_meet
ing.jpg
Page 26: http://digitalvaults.org/images/assets/000/009/944/9944_dt_de-
XX
tail.jpg
Page 27: http://www.photius.com/images/pa04_03a.jpg
Other The HACIA Democracy Rules of Parliamentary Procedure and the Position Paper Guide
Documents can be found at www.hacia-democracy.org.
Half the world's forests have already been cleared or
burned. Please consider the environment before printing
copies of this document.
XX

Executive Cabinet of Omar Torrijos, 1974

Transcription

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