Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Police Intelligence Operations
Transcription
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Police Intelligence Operations
ǤǤ Mission ǤǤ ǡǡ ǡ Ǣ ǡ ǡ Ǣ ǡǡ ǡǡ ǡǡ ǡ ǡǤ ProjectLeader ȋ ǤȌ ʹͻͲͲ ǡͺͲͲ ǡʹʹʹͲ Ͳ͵ǦͶͳ Ǧ͵ʹ Ǥ ̷Ǥ FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ConceptofOperations(CONOPS) for PoliceIntelligenceOperations(PIO) 4March2009 i FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ii FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Acknowledgements ǤȋǤ Ȍ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ ȋȌ ȋȌǤ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ USAMPSProjectLeader ȋȌ WorkingGroupFacilitators x Ǥ ȋȌ x ǦȋȌ x ȋȌ x ͶȋȌ TigerTeamMembers x ǤȋȌ x ǤȋȌ x ȋȌ x ǤȋȌ x ͵ȋȌ x ȋ Ȍ x ǤȋȌ x ȋ Ȍ x ǤȋȌ x Ǥ ȋ Ȍ x ȋ Ȍ x Ǥ ȋ Ȍ x ǤȋȌ x ȋ Ȍ x Ǥȋ Ȍ x Ǥ ȋǦ Ȍ x ǤȋȌ x Ǥȋ Ȍ x ȋͻʹȌ x ȋͻʹȌ x ͳȋͻʹȌ x ȋȌ x ȋȌ x ȋȌ iii FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x ȋ Ȍ x ǤȋȌ x ȋͳȌ x ȋ͵ͺͷȌ x ǤȋȌ x ǤȋȌ x ȋȌ x ȋ Ȍ x ȋͳȋȌȌ x ǤȋȌ x Ǥ ȋȌ x ͶȋȌ x ͵ȋȌ x ͵ȋȌ ANSERCONOPSWritingTeam x Ǥ ȋ ǡ ǤȌ x Ǥ ȋ ǡ ǡ ǤȌ x Ǥȋ ǡ ǤȌ x Ǥȋ ǡȌ iv FOROFFICIALUSEONLY TableofContents ExecutiveSummary.......................................................................................................................................1 1.Introduction..............................................................................................................................................2 1.1Purpose...............................................................................................................................................2 1.2Scope...................................................................................................................................................2 2.Background...............................................................................................................................................3 3.JointOperatingConcepts..........................................................................................................................4 3.1IrregularWarfare(IW)JOC..................................................................................................................4 3.2MajorCombatOperations(MCO)JOC................................................................................................4 3.3SecurityandStabilityTransitionandReconstructionOperations(SSTRO)JOC.................................4 3.4DeterrenceOperationsJOC................................................................................................................5 3.5HomelandDefense(HD)JOC..............................................................................................................5 4.MilitaryProblem.......................................................................................................................................6 5.Vision.........................................................................................................................................................8 6.PoliceIntelligenceOperations..................................................................................................................9 6.1PrinciplesofPoliceIntelligenceOperations........................................................................................9 6.2PIOIntegrationintotheOperationsProcess......................................................................................9 6.3PIOCapabilitiesinanExpeditionaryEnvironment...........................................................................15 6.4IntegratingPIOPrinciplesfortheGarrisonEnvironment.................................................................22 6.5LinkingPolice,ForensicandBiometricInformation.........................................................................29 7.RisksandMitigation................................................................................................................................31 7.1Regulatory.........................................................................................................................................31 7.2OperationalConditions.....................................................................................................................33 7.3InformationManagement.................................................................................................................34 7.4ForceManagement...........................................................................................................................35 8.DOTMLPFImplications............................................................................................................................36 8.1Doctrine.............................................................................................................................................36 8.2Organization......................................................................................................................................36 8.3Training.............................................................................................................................................37 8.4Materiel.............................................................................................................................................37 8.5LeaderDevelopment.........................................................................................................................38 8.6Personnel..........................................................................................................................................38 v FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 8.7Facilities.............................................................................................................................................39 8.8PolicyImplications............................................................................................................................39 Appendix1–References............................................................................................................................40 Appendix2–Glossary.................................................................................................................................42 Appendix3–Acronyms..............................................................................................................................47 ListofFigures Figure1–CivilAuthorityTriad......................................................................................................................8 Figure2–OperationsProcess....................................................................................................................10 Figure3–PIOIntegratedintoMDMP........................................................................................................11 Figure4–IntelligenceProcess....................................................................................................................13 Figure5–CriminalIntelligenceProcess.....................................................................................................14 Figure6–PoliceIntelligenceProducts.......................................................................................................19 Figure7–PoliceInformationFlowforaTheaterofOperation..................................................................20 Figure8–TheIntelligenceFusionProcess.................................................................................................26 vi FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ExecutiveSummary ȋȌ ȋȌ Ǥ ȋȌ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ƭ ǡ Ȁǡ ǡ ȌǤ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌǤ ǡ Ǥ ǣ x ǡ Ǥ x ȋȌ Ǥ x ǡ Ǥ x ǡǤ 1 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 1.Introduction 1.1Purpose ȋǡ ǡ ǡ ȌǤ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ 1.2Scope ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ ȋȌ ǡ ǤǤ ȋȌ ǡ ȋȌ Ǥ ǡ Dz dzȋȌ Ǥ 2 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 2.Background ǡ ǡ ̵ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ Vignette:DepartmentofDefense(DoD)CriminalInvestigationTaskForce(CITF)specialagents andanalystsworkingwithataskforcewerepreparingcriminalcasesagainstdetainees.Thecases supportedthetaskforce’sfocusonidentifyingthoseresponsiblefortheMosulDiningFacility bombingandeliminatingtheAlQaidainIraq(AQI)cellinMosul.Analystsbegantopreparelink analysisdiagramsofthecellanditsconnections.Meanwhile,CITFspecialagentsreceiveda requestfromanotherunittohelpthemprepareacriminalcaseagainstaforeignfighterdetained inFallujah.Whileinterviewingtheforeignfighter,CITFspecialagentsdeterminedhewasaMosul cellmember,whowassenttoFallujah.Theforeignfighterwaswoundedinthefightingand abandonedbyhiscompanions.Hewasangrywithhiscompanionsforleavinghimandagreedto provideinformationabouttheFallujahcell.Withtheforeignfighter’shelp,thetaskforcewas abletoidentifytheentirecellstructure,safehouses,cachelocations,andotherinformation abouttheMosulcell,toincludeitsEmirandthechiefbombmaker.Asaresult,thetaskforce begandetainingmembersofthecell.Theforeignfighterwaspresentedtoaninvestigativejudge fortheCentralCriminalCourtsofIraq,andheprovidedcompleteinformationonthecellandits activities.Usinglinkanalysisdiagrams,CITFspecialagentswereabletoobtainconfessionsfrom othercellmembers,whowerealsopresentedtotheinvestigativejudge.Asaresultofthe operation,theEmirofthecell,alongwithseveralothermembers,waskilledduringraids.The remainingmembers,includingthemasterbombmakerforAQI,weredetainedandpresentedto theinvestigativejudge.CITFagentswereabletoidentifyinsurgentvideosofbombingoperations thatweretiedtothebombmakerandthecell.Thisevidencewaspresentedtotheinvestigative judgewhochargedthemen,whowerelaterconvicted. Ǥ ʹͲͲͳ Ǥ Ǥ ͵ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ 3 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 3.JointOperatingConcepts ȋȌ Ǥ Ǥ ǡǣ 3.1IrregularWarfare(IW)JOC ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǡǡ ǡǤ ǡ Ǥ 3.2MajorCombatOperations(MCO)JOC Ǣ ǡ Ǧ Ǣ Ǣ Ǥ ȋ Ǧ Ȍǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧǡ Ǥ 3.3SecurityandStabilityTransitionandReconstructionOperations (SSTRO)JOC ȋȌǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌǤ Vignette:DuringtheearlytransitiontoCOINandStabilityOperationsduringOperationIraqi Freedom(OIF),siteexploitationreceivedpriorityinattemptingtocurtailinsurgentoperations. Duringtheexploitationofaweaponscache,IEDweaponsmaterialwasdiscoveredandseized. Theforensicprocessingofthematerialrevealedlatentfingerprintsonseveraldetonatorsthat boreidentificationnumbersoriginatingfromstockmaterialshippedfromaneighboringcountry. Becauseofbiometricinformationalreadyonfile,asuspectwasidentifiedasapossible conspiratorinanimprovisedexplosivedevice(IED)bombmakingcell.Thisconsolidated informationwasprovidedtomilitarycommanders,hostnationlawenforcement,military intelligence(MI),policeagencies,andprovostmarshals(PM).Asaresult,awarrantwasissued; thesuspectwasidentified,arrestedandinterviewedbyhostnationpolice.Thesuspectwaslater prosecutedwithinthehostnationjudicialsystembaseduponinformationderivedfromUS militarypoliceinformationandbiometricdata. 4 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 3.4DeterrenceOperationsJOC ǡ ǡ Ǧ ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ Ǧ Ǧ ǯǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ 3.5HomelandDefense(HD)JOC ǡǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌ ȋ Ȍ ǡȀ ǡ ǦǤ 5 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 4.MilitaryProblem ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌǤ ǯ ȋ Ȍ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡǦ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋȌǡ ȏ ȋȌ ȋȌȐ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǧ ȋȌ ȋȌ ȋȌ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ʹͲͲǡ ǦǦ ǡǡǡǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ʹͲͲǤ ʹͲͲͺǡ ǯ ȋȌ Ǥ Ǥ Vignette:Aseasonedlawenforcementprofessional’sdirectparticipationinsiteexploitation resultedintheseizureofweaponscachesandhomemadeexplosives(HME)sourcediscoveries. Onespecificcaseresultedinthesuccessfulidentificationandrecoveryofacacheof168 explosivelyformedpenetrators(EFP)fromamosqueinBaqubah. 6 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Ǧ Ǥǡ Ǧ ȋǦȌ Dz dz Ǥ Ǥ Vignette:Duringstabilityoperations,informationobtainedduringanarrestinterviewand previousinformationcollectedduringcombatoperationsyieldedananalyticalproductthat producedcredibleinformationimplicatinganewsuspect’sinvolvementinanIEDcell.Asaresult ofthisinformation,anarrestwarrantwasobtainedandthesuspectwaslaterdetainedata bordercrossingoftheadjacentcountry.Subsequentbiometricandpolicedatabaseinformation confirmedthesuspect’sidentity,andanarrestwarrantwasissued.Thesuspectwasdetainedby USmilitaryforcesandjointlyinterviewedbyHNandUSlawenforcement.Headmittedtobeing theEmirofthisIEDcellandstatedhepurchaseddetonatorsfrommilitarysourceswithin neighboringcountries,aswellasreceivedfinancialsupportfromlocalsinthosecountries.This informationwasprovidedtoUSandmultiͲnationalforceintelligenceagenciesandhostnation prosecutors.Asaresult,thesuspectwasprosecutedandimprisoned.Intelligenceagencies utilizedthisinformationasmeanstotargetstatesupportedterroristcellsthatoperatedoutside theboundariesofthehostnation. ǡ Ǥǡ Ǥ 7 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 5.Vision Dzdz ǡ ǡ ȋȌ Ǥ ȋ Ȍǯǡ ȋȌ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡǦ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋǡǡ ǡ ǡ ǤȌǡ Ǥ ȋ Ƭ ǡ Ȁǡ Ƭ ǡ ȌǤ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ ǡ Ǥ ǤǤ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ Figure1–CivilAuthorityTriad 8 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 6.PoliceIntelligenceOperations ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌǤ Ǧ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ 6.1PrinciplesofPoliceIntelligenceOperations 6.2PIOIntegrationintotheOperationsProcess ȋʹȌ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ 9 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Figure2–OperationsProcess ȋȌ Ǥ ȋ͵ǦͳͻǤͷͲȌ Dzdz Ǥ x P ǣ ȋǡǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ȍǫ x Oǣ ǡ ǫ x Lǣ ǫ ȋ ǡ ǡ ǡȌ ǫ x Iǣ ǫ x C ǣ ǫ x E ǣ ǡǡȋȌ ǫ 10 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Figure3–PIOIntegratedintoMDMP Vignette:MultiͲnationalforceexperienceinIraqandAfghanistanhasshownthatifany componentofthelegalsystem(police,prosecution,judiciaryorpenal)ceasestofunction,the entiresystembreaksdown.Example:asoflate2008,Afghanistanhadarobustcorruption investigationsunitwithover300activecriminalcases,yetthesystemasawholefailedto processcasesthroughjudicialreviewduetoalackofprosecutorialfollowͲthroughand appropriatecourtwithvenue. Vignette:In2007inFallujah,localjudgesfailedtoreportforworkandperformtheirdutiesdue toalQaidaintimidation.Asaresult,detentionfacilitiesremainedintolerablyovercrowded,and thepolicebecamefrustratedandsawnopointinmakingadditionalarrestsorconducting thoroughinvestigations.Absentdueprocess,manyinnocentdetaineeslanguishedinsubͲ standardprisonfacilitiesandbecameprimerecruitmentcandidatesforalQaida.Furthermore, duetoovercrowdedconditions,somedetaineeswerereleased. Ǥ ǡ ǯ 11 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ȋȌ ǡ ȋȌ Ǥ Ǥ ȋǤǤǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ȍ Ǥ Ǥ ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ǡ Ǧ ǡ Ȁ ǡ ǡǡ ȀȀ Ȁ Ǥ ȋȌ ǡ Ȁ ǯ ǤDzdz ͵ǦͳͻǤͷͲǤ ǡȀ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ Ȁ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ ʹʹȌȋǤǤ ǡǡȌ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȀǦ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ ǣ x x x x x Ȁ x ȋǤǤǡ Ȍ 12 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x ȋǤǤǡ ǡǦǡ Ȍ x ȋǤǤǡǡȌ x ǡ ǡ ȋȌ ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ȋͶȌǡ ǣ ǡ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Figure4–IntelligenceProcess Ǥ Ǧȋ ǦȌ Ǥ ǡ ʹȀ ʹ Ǥ ǡ Ǧ ǡ ǤǤ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ȋȌǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌǤ ǡ ǯ ȋȌǤ Ǥ Ȁ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ 13 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǤǦ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Figure5–CriminalIntelligenceProcess ǡ ǤǡȀ Ȁ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǯǤ ǣ x x ȋȌ x ȋǡǡǡǡȌ x ȋǡǡ ǡ ǡ Ȍ x Ȁ Ȁ ǯǤȀ 14 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ȁ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǣ x ǣ Ǣ Ǣ x ǣǡǡǡ ǡ ǡ x ǣ ǡǡǡǡǡ x ǣǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ x ǣ ǡ ǡ Ȁǡ x ǣ ǡ 6.3PIOCapabilitiesinanExpeditionaryEnvironment Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Collection ǡ ȋ ǡ Ƭ ǡ Ȁǡ Ƭ ǡ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǣ 15 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x ȋƬǡ Ȍ x x x x x x x ȋ Ȍ x Ǧ ȋ Ȍ x ǡ x x Ǧ x ActiveCollection ǡ ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ ȋȌǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ȋǤǤ ǡ ǡ Ȍǡ Ǥ PassiveCollection Ǧ Ǥ DzdzǦǦ Ǥ Ȁǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Dzǡdz ǣǡǡǤ ǡ Dzdz Ǥ 16 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY PoliceInformationSources Ǥ ǣ x Ȁ x ȋǤǤ Ȍ x x Ǧ x Dzdz x x x x ȋȌ ȋȌ x x x x x ȋ Ȍ x Ǧ ȋ Ȍ x ǡ KeyThemesinMPCollectionofInformation ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥǡ 17 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Ǥ Ǥ Analysis Ǥ ǡ ȋȌ Ǥ ǡ ȋȌ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǣ x x x ȋǤǤǡ ǡǡǡ ǡ ǡǡ ǡǡ ǡ ǤȌ x x x Dzdz x x ȋȌ x x x Ǥ ǣ x ǣ Ǧ x ǣ ǡ 18 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x ǣ x ǣ ȋ ǡȀ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ȍ x ǣ ǯǡ Ǧ Ȁ ǡ ǡǤ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Figure6–PoliceIntelligenceProducts Ǥ ȋȌ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ ȋȌ Ǧ Ǥ 19 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Vignette:DuringclearingoperationsinZandubahr,elementsof2Ͳ3Infantrylocatedacache whichincludedasuicidevest,plasticexplosives,weapons,ammunition,GoogleEarthmaps,and morethan150piecesofphotoidentification.Thecachewasprocessedforevidentiarypurposes andlaterthesuicidevest,mapsandpiecesofidentificationweresubmittedtoCEXCforforensic examination.Theresultsoftheexamrevealedmultiplesetsofidentifiablelatentfingerprints. Threelatentfingerprintswereidentifiedasbelongingtopersonsprocessedthroughahostnation detentionfacility,withoneofthesubjectsstilldetained.Furtherexploitationofthecache indicatedthat,inadditiontobeingasuicidebombcell,itsmembersplannedandexecuted kidnappings. ǡ Ǥ ǯ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ ǯ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Figure7–PoliceInformationFlowforaTheaterofOperation 20 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Dzǡ dz ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ǥǡ ȋ ǡ ǡ ǡȌǡ Ǥ Vignette:Thevastmajorityoftheinformationanddatacollectionisperformedatthesmallunit levelwhereunitshavedirectinteractionwiththecommunityandhostnation/indigenous securityforces.InformationgatheredisreviewedandreceivesinitialanalysisatboththeMPand maneuvercompanylevel,whereadditional,focusedcollectioneffortscanbedirected. Informationfromthelowestlevelisenteredintoauniversal,networkeddatabasefollowinga standardizeddataentryprotocoltoenablerapiddataanalysisandexploitation.Battalionand higherlevelheadquartersaccesstheinformationviatheuniversaldatabase.Eachunitleveltakes appropriateactionwithintheirAObasedondevelopmentofintelligence,and,inturn,adds additionaldataandanalyticalproductstotheuniversaldatabase.Theresultisawidearea networkcriminalintelligencepicturetosupportMP/CID,BCTanddivisionoperationsand continuousanalyticalprocesses.DatafromthelowestlevelsisaccessiblebytheJEFFlabsfor synchronizationandexploitation.Byusingauniversal,networkeddatabase,unitsatthetactical levelcanactoncriminalactivitieswithintheirAO,whileoperationalandstrategiclevelsidentify organizedcriminalelementsthatcrossgeographicalandnationalboundaries.Theendresult facilitatestheeffectivetargetingoftheentirenetwork(fromtacticaltostrategiclevels) consistingofplanners,financiers,supporters,trainers,andfacilitators. Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ȋǤǤǡ ȌǤ ǡ ȋǤǤ Ȍ ȋȌ Ǥ ǡȀ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ 21 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ǡȋ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ȋȌǤ ȋȌ ȋǤǤǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǤȌ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ Vignette:TheDoD’sCriminalInvestigationTaskForce(CITF)hasauniquemissionofcombining intelligencewithlawenforcementinformationinordertodevelopprosecutablecasesagainst terroristsandwarcriminalsinvenuesthatrangefrommilitarycommissiontothecentralcriminal courtofIraqandtheAfghanistannationalsecuritycourt.Overthealmostsevenyearsofits existencetheCITF’sinvestigativemodelhasevolved,andtheynowusethe“agent,analystand attorney”(A3)model.Earlyinitsevolution,CITFlearnedthatspecialagentsandanalystsprocess informationdifferently,andtheyachievethemostefficientinvestigationbyhavingspecial agentsandanalystsworkinpeerteamswherebothreviewthesameinformationandcollaborate onwhatitmeansandhowbesttodevelopinvestigativeleads.Byaddinganattorneytothe model,CITFlearnedthatthiskeptinvestigationsfocusedandbroughtanotheruniqueskillsetto bearoncasedevelopment.Ascurrentlystaffed,CITFisorganizedwithoneanalystforeverytwo specialagentsandoneattorneytoeveryinvestigativeunit.WhethertoinstitutionalizetheA3 modelasanenduringArmycapabilitywarrantsfurtherreview. ǡ Ǥ ȋ ǡ Ȍ Ǥ Vignette:Aseasonedlawenforcementprofessionalcoachedandmentoredtheimplementation ofacommunityͲbasedpolicingprogramwiththeeldersinMetrLam,Afghanistan,whichfocused onthesecurityofbridgesandculvertsandthepreventionofimprovisedexplosivesdevice(IED) attacks.Thesecurityprogram,ledbyAfghancitizens,includedthedailyinspectionofover600 bridgesandculverts.TheprogramreducedtheoccurrenceofIEDsfromthreeperweektozero. 6.4IntegratingPIOPrinciplesfortheGarrisonEnvironment ȋ Ǥ͵ Ȍ ȋ ȌǤ Ǥ ǤͳǤ 22 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ȋ ǡȌ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ Vignette:AVCSAreportconcerningsexualassaultsandreviewsoftheMilitaryPoliceDaily BlotterandJournalpromptedaSeniorCommanderandGarrisonCommandertocreateaSexual AssaultTaskForce(SATF)toexaminesexcrimesimpactingthelife,health,andsafetyofthe installationcommunity.TheInstallationCommandingGeneraltaskedtheGarrisonCommander toprovidesexualassaultinformationinanIPBformat.Thefusioncellwastaskedastheleadfor theSATFIPBeffort.Thiswaspossiblebecausethefusioncellincludedpersonnelfromthe intelligenceandpolicedisciplinesandwasabletonotonlyfuseinformationintointelligence,but tofusetypesofinformationanalysis(actionableͲpreventiveandprosecutorial).Thefusioncell usedvariousdatabasestoconductdataminingtoidentifysexualcrimes,personcrimes,and propertycrimes.Productsincludeddevelopinggraphicproducts(maps)thatpinpointedcrime locationsandidentificationofthetopcrimeareasontheinstallation,withassociatedsecurity lightingdata.Thisprovidedtargetareasforlightingefforts,installationofCCTV,andadjustments tolawenforcementpatroldistributionplans.Throughanalysis,thefusioncellwasabletodefine thecrimeenvironment,acriminalandvictimprofile,aswellassocialͲbehavioralfactors. Solutionsaddressedandrefinedinitialattemptstosolvetheissuewithoutanalysis.Analysis providedtheabilitytopinpointspecificproblemlocationsandspecificsocialissues,whichinturn allowedthefocusoflimitedfunding.Thesolutionswentbeyondtraditionalpoliceandincluded recommendedenvironmentalandsocialchanges.Informationcollectedincludedpolice informationaswellasnonͲpoliceinformation.Analysisincludesthecomparisonandcorrelation ofbothunrestrictedandrestricteddata.Theprocessfusedintelligencetoolsandmethods throughapolicelens. ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Vignette:At0345hours,6March2008,abombwasdetonatedattheTimesSquare(NewYork City)RecruitingStationcausingdamagetothefrontofthefacility.Atthetimeofthebombing, lawenforcementagencieswereconductinganactiveinvestigationofthreeallegedanarchists withtiestoFranceandCanada.Weekspriortothebombing,aNewYorkCityPoliceDetective informedamemberoftherecruitingstationofapossiblethreat.AccordingtotheDetective, duringavehiclesearchattheCanadianborder,lawenforcementofficialsdiscoveredanarchist pamphletsalongwithphotographsofTimesSquare,includingseveralphotographsappearingto showtheTimesSquareRecruitingStation.NoimminentthreattotheRecruitingStationwasever identified.Moreover,theDetectiveinformedtherecruitertherewasnodirectthreattothe RecruitingStation,butNYPDwasincreasinglawenforcementpresenceintheareaandwould continuetomonitorthesituation.HealsoindicatedtheFBIandNYCJTTFwereinvestigatingthe case.On27February2008,theTimesSquareRecruitingStationCommandersubmittedan 23 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY officialincidentreporttotheUnitedStatesArmyRecruitingCommandforsituationalawareness andimplementedinternalsecurityandawarenessmeasures.Thereportwasforwardedasa SuspiciousActivityReport(SAR)throughAT/FPstaffchannelstofourArmyCommandsandthe Servicesforsituationalawareness(SA).Therewerenospecificidentifiedthreatstowardsany particularlocationwithintheTimesSquareareaofNewYorkCity.On3March2008, USARNORTHreceivedadditionaldetailedLawEnforcementSensitiveinformationconcerningthe ongoinginvestigationfromJTTFchannelsbutheldreleaseoftheinformationawaitingFBI approvalforaredactedreleaseoftheinformation.Ofconcernwasthefactthatthereport revealedthethreeindividualswereactuallystoppedbyCanadianlawenforcementofficialsat theUSͲCanadianborderon31January2008,fourweekspriortotheTimesSquareRecruiting Stationbeinginformedofthesituation.Althoughthereisnopositivelinkbetweentheinitial suspiciousactivityreportandthebombinginvestigation,andnoknownassociationbetweenthe vehiclestoppedandsearchedattheCanadianborder,theincidentshowsexcellentcooperation andpoliceintelligencesharingatthelowestlevels. Ȁ Ǥ ǡ ǤǦ Ǥ OrganizingforIntelligenceFusionwithintheGarrison Ǥ ǡ ǯ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ Ǧ ȋȌͻͲʹ Ǥ Ǥ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ȋǦȌ Ǧ ǡ ǡ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǡǦ ǡ Ǥ Vignette:AStrykerBrigadeCombatTeam(SBCT)waspreparingtomoveequipmenttoaportof embarkation(POE)fordeployment.Theshipmentrequiredthemovementof300vehiclesacross eightlawenforcementjurisdictions.Basedonpreviousthreatfusionexpertise,thegarrison’s forceprotection(FP)fusioncellwasuniquelyqualifiedtobetheleadintelligenceproducerto supportthemovement.Thefusioncellcoordinatedpoliceinformation,intelligenceandcivilian securitywithover22local,federal,andDoDagencies.ThefusioncellproducedinͲdepthanalysis ofthethreattotheSBCTequipmentandadvisedtheSBCTandgarrisoncommanderson protection.Thecoordinatedeffortgavelawenforcementagenciestheknowledgetoidentifyand 24 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY preventdisruptiveactionsbyviolentprotesters.TheoperationwasconsideredbyCorps leadershiptobeawatershedeventforinͲdepthinvolvementofagarrisonͲbasedFPfusioncellin supportofunitdeployments.Moreover,theCorpsheadquartersintegratedthefusioncellinto otheroperationswheretheG2isconstrainedbyintelligenceoversightrules,orthereisaneed forpoliceinformation/intelligenceassessmentsandanalysis. ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡǡȀ Ǥ ͻȀͳͳǡ ǡ ǡǡǡ Ǥ NationalCriminalIntelligenceSharingPlan(Ȁ Fusion Center Guidelines ǡ ʹͲͲͷ)Ǥ Ǥ ȋǤǤǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȌǤ ǡ Ǧ Ǧ Ǥǡ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ InformationFlowandIntelligenceFusion Ǥ Dzǡ dz ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ 25 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Ǧ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǯ ȋȌ ȋȌǤ ǡ ǡ ǯ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǯ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ͺ ǡ Ǥ Ǣ ǡ Ǥ Figure8–TheIntelligenceFusionProcess 26 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǣ ǡ ǡ Ǣ Ǥ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǡǡǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǣ x x x x x x Vignette:Armycriminalinvestigationsspecialagents receiveinformationfromasourcethatan unknownsubjectistraffickinginlargequantitiesofillegaldrugsandsellingthemtoaviolent criminalorganizationoperatingincloseproximitytoanArmyinstallation.Thesourcerevealsthe methodoftransport,transferlocations,storageanddistributionmethodsoftheillegalnarcotics. Coordinationwithlocal,stateand federallawenforcementagencies revealsapriorcriminal recordandmultiplepoliceengagementswiththesubjectandidentifiesthestructureand individualswithintheviolentcriminalorganization.Analysisandfusionofnewlydeveloped policeinformation,inconjunctionwithpreviouslycaptureddatabyother civilianlaw enforcement agencies,linksthesubjectwithpossibleassociatesandthecriminalnetwork.The analysisidentifiesspecificinformationgapswhich,ifanswered,couldassociatekeyfigures.The analysisleadstoatargetedpoliceinformationcollectionplandesignedtogatheradditional informationanddocumentevidencetocorroboratecriminalactivityandlinkspecificcrimestoa widergroup,aswellasimplicatekeyleadershipfigureswithinthecriminalorganization.Army investigators,withtheassistanceandsupportofa violentcrimetaskforce,continueto investigateand collecttheadditionalinformationneeded.Afterthenewinformationisentered intothe crimedatabase,furtheranalysisrevealsapatternthatallowsanalystsandinvestigators tolinkaforeignsourcetothedrugs,tiesillegalweaponssmugglingtothecriminalorganization, andimplicatesthreeknowncriminalsinmultiplehomicides.Theresultoftheinteragency investigationisthedismantlingofaviolentcriminalorganizationandthearrest,prosecutionand imprisonmentoffivehighrankingmembersoftheorganizedcrimegroup.Further,overtwo 27 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY dozenothercriminalassociateswereidentified,leadingtotheinitiationofseveraladditional criminalinvestigations. Ǥǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǯ Ǥ AdditionalVignettes: Vignette:ThePuertoRicoBranchOffice[3dMPGroup(CID)],hasgeographicresponsibilityfor theCaribbean.Thisisalargeanddiversearea,coveredbyonlyafewagents.Assuch,agentsrely heavilyuponarobustcriminalintelligencenetworktopolicetheareaeffectively.Oneofthe agentsdevelopedasourceworkingattheFortBuchanancommissary.Thecommissaryalsohasa largewarehouseoperationthathasbeenplaguedbyfailedeffortstoautomatetheinventory. Initialanalysisassumedwarehouseworkerswereintentionallymovingpropertypalletsaround afterinventories,makingitimpossibletocompleteaccuratedailycountsofcurrentstock.The sourcewastargetedtocollectinformationregardingwarehouseoperations.Thesourcereported thatawarehouseemployeewhohadpreviouslybeenonthedayshiftwasmovedtoanother shiftfollowingargumentswiththesupervisor.Theemployeetoldthesourcethattheentireshift wasinvolvedinlargescaletheftfromthewarehouse.Driversdeliveringitemspaidtheshift supervisorincash,andheinturnhademployeesloaditemsthedriverwantedontotheirtruck. Thedriversthensoldtheitemtolocalmerchantsforareducedprice.Thesupervisorsplitthe illegalprofitswiththeemployeesattheendofeachday.AftercoordinationwiththeFBIandthe USattorney’soffice,thesourceagreedtoweararecordingdevicetocaptureanother conversationwiththeemployee.Thesourcelaterarrangedameetingbetweentheemployee andCIDagentswheretheemployeewasconfrontedwiththeevidenceagainsthimandagreedto assistwiththeinvestigationaftertheAssistantUSAttorneyagreedtogivehimimmunityfrom prosecutioncontingentonhiscooperation.TheemployeewasthenpresentedtotheGrandJury wherehedetailedthemagnitudeofthetheftscheme,whichwasoperatingundetectedinthe warehousefor10years.Thegrandjuryhandeddownfiveindictments,andtheassetforfeiture branchoftheUSattorney’sofficeseizedfourhouseswhichwerepurchasedwiththeillegal proceeds. Vignette:AspecialagentattheAberdeenProvingGroundResidentAgencyreceivedarequest forassistancefromanagentinKorea.TheagentinKoreareportedageneralofficer’sidentity wasstolenthroughtheofficer’sbankinginformation.Theagentsetupameetingwithasecurity specialistfromthebank.Duringtheconversationthesecurityspecialiststatedthathehad workedonseveralcasesinvolvingseniormilitarymembersdatingbacksixmonths,andthebank corporatestaffwastryingtocoveruptheproblem.Heagreedtoworkasasourcefortheagent andprovidedaninitiallistof127seniorrankingDoDofficialswhowerevictimsofidentitytheft andprovidedtheaddresswherethecardsweresent.TheagentnextcoordinatedwiththeUS PostalInspectionService(USPIS)whointerviewedthelocalcarrieranddeterminedthathe deliveredhundredsofcardstoaspecificresidence.Theresidencewascurrentlyabandoned,but USPISprovidedidentityinformationoftheoccupant.Sincethevictimsspannedallbranchesof themilitary,coordinationwasconductedwithAirForceOfficeofSpecialInvestigations(AFOSI) andtheNavalCriminalInvestigativeService(NCIS).TheAFOSIreportedtheydiscoveredawebͲ 28 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY sitewherethenamesandsocialsecuritynumbersof4,700DoDofficialswerelisted.Becausethe investigationwasexpanding,aJointInvestigativeTaskForcewasformedwithCIDasleadagency. CIDagentscontactedtheUSAttorney’soffice,whowishedtoinvestigateandprosecutethecase. TheUSAttorney’sOfficeassistedintheformationofataskforcewhichincludedallthemilitary criminalinvestigativeorganizations,SocialSecurityAdministration,USPostalInspectionService, theInternalRevenueService,andtheUSSecretService.Alistofthecompromisedsocialsecurity numberswasgiventothebank,whichproducedalistof11,000potentiallyfraudulentaccounts. CIDagentsthencontactedtheRegionalIntelligenceSystemService(RISS)andprovidedthedata fromthebank.ThroughlinkanalysisRISSwasabletoidentify32identitytheftringsoperatingin 26states.Thesubsequentinvestigationresultedinnumerousprosecutionsandconvictions. 6.5LinkingPolice,ForensicandBiometricInformation Ǥ ǡ ȋǡ Ȍ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡǡ ǣ ǣ x ǡ ǡ x x ȋ ǡ ǡǡ ǡ ǤȌ x Ǧ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ ǡǣ 29 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Dzdz Ǥ ǡǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋǤǤǡ ǡǡǡ ǤȌǤ Vignette:AnArmymaneuverunitoperatinginIraqdevelopedaverygoodrapportwithalocal villagerwhotheyencounteredregularlyduringpatrols.Whileononeoftheirroutinepatrols,the villagerapproachedtheunitandprovidedinformationregardingthelocationofapossible enemyweaponscache.Thepatrolproceededtothedescribedlocationanddiscoveredaburied cachecontainingweapons,currencyanddocuments.Theunit,previouslytrainedonsite exploitation(SE)andbattlefieldforensics,collectedandprocessedtheevidenceastheywere trainedtodo.Muchoftheevidence,toincludethedocuments,wasdeliveredtoforensicsunits foranalysisandexploitation.Asinglelatentfingerprintliftedfromoneoftheseizeddocuments wassenttoastatesideforensicslaboratorywherethefingerprintwasrunthroughadatabasefor comparisonandresultedinamatch.Thispieceofevidenceledtotheidentification,subsequent arrestandprosecutionoftheindividual.Noteworthyisthefactthattheoriginalfingerprinton fileatthestatesidefacility,andusedforcomparison,wassubmittedseveralyearspriortothe cachefindbyanothermaneuverunitastheresultofaBiometricsAutomatedToolset(BAT) record.Duringtheinterveningyears,theindividualbecameahighvaluetargetandwasplaced onseveralwantedlists. 30 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 7.RisksandMitigation ǡ ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ 7.1Regulatory ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ LegalConsiderations ǡ ǡ ǯ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ͳʹ͵͵͵ǡ ȋȌ ͷʹͲͲǤʹǡ ͷʹͶͲǤͳǡ ͷʹͶͲǤͳǦǡ ͵ͺͳǦͳͲǡ Ǥ x ȋȌͳʹ͵͵͵ȋ Ȍ ǯ Ǥͳʹ͵͵͵ Ǥ x ͷʹͲͲǤʹȋ Ȍ ǡǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ x ͷʹͶͲǤͳȋ Ȍ Ǥ x ͷʹͶͲǤͳǦȋ Ȍ Ǥ ǯ Ǥ 31 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ͵ͺͳǦͳͲ ȋ Ȍ Ǥǡ Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ͷʹͶͲǤͳǦǤ Due to AR 381Ǧ10 restrictions on U.S. person information, consolidated (MI and criminal intelligence data) threat statements cannot be filed,storedormaintainedasanintelligenceproduct.Thesestatementsmustbefiled,stored and maintained within law enforcement or operations channels (i.e., Provost Marshal (PM), DirectorofEmergencyServices(DES),USACIDC,DCSOPS/GǦ3/DPTMS). x ȋʹͶʹͲͲͷȌ Ǥ ǡǡ ǡ Ǥǯ ǡ Ǥ ͵ͺͳǦͳͲǡ ǣ x ǡ Ǥ x ǡǡǡ ǡǤ x ǡ Ǥ Commanders’AuthorizationandJurisdiction ͳͲǡ ͷʹͳͲǤͷǤ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡǡ Ǥ JurisdictionofPersonnel x Ǥ x ͳͻͲ Ǥ 32 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY IntelligenceOversight Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ x ͳʹ͵͵͵ǡ ǡ Ǥ x ͵ͺͳǦͳͲǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ͵ͺͳǦ ͳͲ ͳʹ͵͵͵ǡ ǡ ͷʹͶͲǤͳǡͷʹͶͲǤͳǦǡ ͷʹͶͲǤͶǤ ǡ ȋ Ȍǡ ȋȌǤ CivilLiberties Ǥ Ǥ x ͳʹ͵͵͵ǡ ǡȏ ͳ͵ʹͺͶȋʹͲͲ͵Ȍǡͳ͵͵ͷͷȋʹͲͲͶȌͳ͵ͶͲȋʹͲͲͺȌȐ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ x ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ͷʹͶͲǤͳǦ͵ͺͳǦͳͲǤ 7.2OperationalConditions Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ 33 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ȋȌ ǣ x ǡ ǡ x x x ȋȌ x ǡ ȋƬȌ x ȋǡǡȌ ȋ ǡ Ȍ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥǡ Ǥ 7.3InformationManagement ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ Ȁ ȋȌ Ǥ ǡ ǡǤ ǡ ǡǤ Ǥ ǡ ͷʹͶͲǤͳǦǡ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ 34 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ 7.4ForceManagement Ǥ ǡ Ȁ ǡ ǦǡǦǤ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ 35 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY 8.DOTMLPFImplications Ǥ ǡǤ 8.1Doctrine x Ǥ x ȋȌ͵ǦͳͻǤͷͲǡDz dzȋʹͲͲȌ ǡ ǡ ͵ǦͳͻǤͳ͵ȋ Ȍ͵ǦͳͻǤͳͲȋ ȌǤ x Ǥ x ǡ ǡ ͵ǦͲ ȋȌǡʹǦͲȋ Ȍǡ ͵Ǧͳͻȋ Ȍǡ͵ǦͳͻǤͳͲȋ Ȍǡ ͵ǦͳͻǤͶͲȋȀȌǤ x ǦͳͷǡȋȌͳǦͲʹǡ Ǥ x ȋȌDzdz ȋǡǡ ǡȌʹǦͲǤ x ǯǦ͵Ǥ x ȋ Ȍ ǡ ǡ Ǥ x ȋ Ƭ ȌǤ 8.2Organization x ȋȌ ǡ Ǥ ȋǤǤǡȌ Ȁ ǡ ȋȌǡ Ǥ 36 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x ȋǤǤȌ ȋǤǤǡ ǡǡ ǤȌǤ x Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ x Ȁ ȋȌ ȋȌ Ǥ 8.3Training x ǡ ǡ ǡ ȏ Ȃ ȐǤ x ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥȏ Ȃ ȐǤ x ȋ Ȁǡǡǡ Ȍ ǡǡ Ǥȏ Ȃ ȐǤ x ȋȌ ȋȌ Ǥ x Ǥ x ǡǤ x ȋ Ƭ Ȍ Ǥ x Ǧǡ ȋȌǦǤ 8.4Materiel x ǡǡȋ ǦȌ ǡ ǡǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ 37 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Ǥ x ǡ Ǥ x Ȁ Ǥ x ȋȌ Ȃȋ ǦȌǤ ȋȌǤ x ȋȌ ƬȋʹȌ ȋȌǤ x Ǥ x ȋȌ ȋȌǤ 8.5LeaderDevelopment x ȏ Ȃ ȐǤ x Ǧ ȋǡȌǡǦȋǡȌǡ Ǧ ǦȋǡȌǤ x ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ 8.6Personnel x Ǥ Ȁ ǡ ȋȌǡ Ǥ x ȋȀ ǡǡȀǡȀ Ȍ Ǥ x ȋȀ ǡǡȀȀ Ȍ Ǥ x Ȁ Ǥ 38 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x Ǥ x ǡ ǡȀ Ǥ 8.7Facilities x ȋȌ Ǥ x Ǥ 8.8PolicyImplications ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ǡǡ Ǥǡǡ ǡ Ȁ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ ǡ Ǥ 39 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Appendix1–References ǡ ȋȌǤ x ͳǡTheArmyǡͳͶʹͲͲͷǤ x ͳǦͲʹǡOperationalTermsandGraphicsǡʹͲͲͶǤ x ʹǦͻͳǤͶǡIntelligenceSupporttoUrbanOperations,ʹͲ ʹͲͲͺǤ x ͵ǦͲǡOperationsǡʹͲͲͺǤ x ͵ǦʹͶǡCounterinsurgencyǡ ʹͲͲǤ x ͵ǦͳͻǤͳǡMilitaryPoliceOperationsǡʹʹ ʹͲͲͳǤ x ͵ǦͳͻǤͳ͵ǡLawEnforcementInvestigationsǡͳ ʹͲͲͷǤ x ͵ǦͳͻǤͷͲǡPoliceIntelligenceOperationsǡʹͳʹͲͲǤ x ͷǦͲǡArmyPlanningandOrdersProductionǡʹͲͲͷǤ x ͷǦͲǤͳǡTheOperationsProcessǡʹͳ ʹͲͲǤ x ǦͳͷǡTheArmyUniversalTaskListǡʹͲͲ͵Ǥ x ͵ͶǦͳ͵ͲǡIntelligencePreparationoftheBattlefieldǡͺͳͻͻͶǤ x ͳʹ͵͵͵ǡ ǡͶ ͳͻͺͳǤ x ͷʹͲͲǤʹǡAcquisitionofInformationConcerningPersonsandOrganizationsnotAffiliated withtheDepartmentofDefenseǡͳͻͺͲǤ x ͷʹͶͲǤͳǡDoDIntelligenceActivitiesǡʹͷͳͻͺͺǤ x ͷʹͶͲǤͳǦǡProceduresGoverningtheActivitiesofDoDIntelligenceComponentsthatAffect UnitedStatesPersonsǡ ͳͻͺʹǤ x ͵ͺͳǦͳͲǡUSArmyintelligenceActivitiesǡͳͳͻͺͶǤ x ͳͻͲǦͳͶǡCarryingofFirearmsandUseofForceforLawEnforcementandSecurityDutiesǡͳʹ ͳͻͻ͵Ǥ x ͳͻͷǦʹǡCriminalInvestigationActivitiesǡ͵Ͳ ͳͻͺͷǤ x ͳͻͷǦ͵ǡAcceptance,Accreditation,andReleaseofUSArmyCriminalInvestigationCommand PersonnelǡʹʹͳͻͺǤ x ͷʹͲͲǤͳǦǡInformationSecurityProgramǡͳͶͳͻͻǤ x ͷʹ͵ͲǤͳͳǡDisclosureofClassifiedMilitaryInformationtoForeignGovernments andInternationalOrganizationsǡͳͳͻͻʹ 40 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY x ͵ͳͳͷǤͲͻǡDoDIntelligenceInterrogations,DetaineeDebriefings,andTactical Questioningǡ͵ʹͲͲͷǤ x ͵ͷͲͲǤͶǡUniversalJointTaskListǡͳʹͲͲͷǤ x DepartmentofDefenseProtectionJointFunctionalConceptǡʹͲͲͶǤ x CapstoneConceptforJointOperations,ʹǤͲǡʹͲͲͷǤ x ͵ͲͳͲǤͲʹǡJointOperationsConcepts(JOpsC)DevelopmentProcessǡ27,2005. x ͵ͲͲͲǤͲͷǡMilitarySupportforStability,Security,Transition,andReconstruction (SSTR)Operations,ʹͺǡʹͲͲͷǤ x DepartmentofDefenseMajorCombatOperationsJointOperatingConceptǡͳǡ ʹͲͲͶǤ x ǡJointFunctionalConceptforBattlespaceAwarenessǡ͵ͳ ʹͲͲ͵Ǥ x ͳǦͲʹǡDictionaryofMilitaryandAssociatedTermsǡ͵ͳʹͲͲͷǤ x ǡǡʹͲͲͶǤ x ͷʹͷǦǡForceOperatingCapabilitiesǡͳʹͲͲͷǤ x ǡCapstoneConceptofOperationsforDoDForensicsǡͺʹͲͲͺǤ 41 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Appendix2–Glossary ȋȌǤ Adversary. Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȀ͵ǦͲȌ Analysis (Intelligence). ǡ ǡ ȀǤȋ͵ͶǦ͵Ȍ Coalition. Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȀͷǦ ͲȌ Biometric. ǤȋǦͲʹȌ Biometrics. ǡ ǡ ǤȋǦͲʹȌ Collecting. ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǤȋͳǦͲʹȌ Collection Plan. ǤȋͳǦͲʹȌ Combatant Command (COCOM). ͳͲ ȋDz dzȌǡ ǡ ͳͶǡ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ ǡǡ ǡ ǡǡ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ Ȁ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ Ǥ ȋ ȌǤ ȋ͵ǦͲȀͳȌ Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). Ǥ Ǥȋ ͵ǦͲȀ͵ǦͲȌ 42 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY ConceptofOperations. Ǥ ǡǡǤȋ͵ǦͲȌ CriminalAnalysis. Ǥ ȋ ǡǤǤ ǡͲͶȌ Criminal Intelligence (CRIMINT). ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǤȋͷʹͷǦͳ͵Ȍ CrimeǦPattern Analysis. Ǥ ȋ ǡ ǤǤ ǡ ǡͲͶȌ Data. ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ȋͳǦͲʹȌ Database. Ǥ ȋ Ȍ Detainee. Ǥȋ͵ͶǦͷʹȌ Detention Operations. ǡ ǡ ǡ ǤǤ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋ ȌǤǤ Ǥȋ Ȍ ExploitationǤ ǡ ǤȋͳǦͲʹȌ Forensics. Ǧ Ǥ ȋ Ȍ HomelandDefense. ǡǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋ͵ǦʹȌ Homeland Security. ǡ ǯ ǡ Ǥȋ͵ǦʹȌ 43 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Host Nation (HN). Ȁ ǡ ǡ Ȁ ǡ ǡ Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȌ Informant(Source)ǤͳǤǡǡǡ ǡ ǤʹǤǡ ǤȋͳǦͲʹȀǦͲȌ Information Requirement. ǡǡ ǦǤ ȋͳǦͲʹȀǦͲȌ Intelligence. ͳǤ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ʹǤ ǡ ǡ ǡǤȋʹǦͻͳǤͶȀʹǦͲȌ Intelligence Cycle. ǤȋͳǦͲʹȌ IntelligenceǦled Policing. ǡ Ǥ ȋ ǡ ǤǤ ǡ ͲͶȌ Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). ǡ Ǥ Ǧ Ǥ ǤȋʹǦͻͳǤͶȀ͵ͶǦͳ͵ͲȌ Intelligence Process. Ǥ ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǤȋʹǦͲͳȌ Interagency Coordination. ǡ ǤǤ Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȀ͵ǦͲȌ Joint Force. ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ ȋ͵ǦͲȌ LawEnforcement(Police)Intelligence. ȋ ǡ ǡ Ȍ 44 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY OperationalEnvironment(OE). ǡ ǡ Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȀ͵ǦͲȌ Operations Process. ǣ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȌ PoliceInformation. ǡǡ Ǥ ǡ ǡ ǤȋͳǦͲʹȌ PoliceIntelligenceOperations(PIO). ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ȋȌǤ Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). ǡ Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȀʹǦͲȌ Processing (Intelligence). ǤȋͳǦͲʹȌ Production (Intelligence). ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǧ ǤȋʹǦͲȌ Raw Data. Ǥ ȋ ǡ ǤǤ ǡ ǡͲͶȌ Rule of Law (RoL). ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥȋ͵ǦͲȌ SpecificInformationRequirement(SIR). ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Specific Orders or Requests (SOR). ǡ Ǥ Stability Operations. ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡ ǡǤȋ͵ǦͲȌ 45 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY VignetteǤ Ǥȋ Ȍ 46 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY Appendix3–Acronyms A3 Agent, Analyst and Attorney (CITF investigative model) ACIC Army Counterintelligence Center AFOSI Air Force Office of Special Investigations AO Area of Operations AQI Al Qaida in Iraq ASI Additional Skill Identifier AUTL Army Universal Task List BAT Biometrics Automated Toolset BCT Brigade Combat Team BFT Blue Force Tracker CA Civil Affairs CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High-yield Explosives CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements CEXC Combined Explosives Exploitation Cell CID Criminal Investigation Command COA Course of Action CONOPS Concept of Operations CONUS Continental United States COP Common Operational Picture CRIMINT Criminal Intelligence CTC Combat Training Center DA Department of the Army DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System-Army DES Director of Emergency Services 47 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY DHA Detainee Holding Area DMS Detainee Management System DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid DO Detention Operations DOCEX Document Exploitation DoD Department of Defense DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development, Personnel and Facilities DPTMS Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security DSCA Defense Support to Civil Authorities EFP Explosively Formed Penetrator FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade & Below FP Force Protection FSO Full Spectrum Operations HD Homeland Defense HIIDE Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment HME Homemade Explosive HN Host Nation HTT Human Terrain Team HUMINT Human Intelligence IA Information Assurance IALEIA International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts IED Improvised Explosive Device IMINT Imagery Intelligence IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield IR Information Requirement 48 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY IRE Intelligence Running Estimate ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance IW Irregular Warfare JEFF Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat Organization JIM Joint, Interagency, and Multinational JOC Joint Operating Concept LE Law Enforcement LEP Law Enforcement Professional LEPP Law Enforcement Professional Program MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence MCO Major Combat Operations MI Military Intelligence MP Military Police NCIS Naval Criminal Investigative Service NGO Non-Governmental Organization OCONUS Outside Continental United States OE Operational Environment OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OGA Other Government Agencies OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom OPLAN Operation Plan OPORD Operation Order PIO Police Intelligence Operations PIR Priority Intelligence Requirements PMT Police Mentorship Team 49 FOROFFICIALUSEONLY PMO Provost Marshal Office POD Port of Debarkation POI Program of Instruction POLICE Police/prison, Organized crime, Legal systems, Investigations, Crime conducive conditions, Enforcement mechanisms and gaps PSYOP Psychological Operations PTT Police Transition Team RISS Regional Intelligence System Service RoL Rule of Law SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIR Specific Information Requirements SJA Staff Judge Advocate SOR Specific Orders and Requests SSTRO Security and Stability Transition and Reconstruction Operations TDA Table of Distribution and Allowances THT Tactical HUMINT Team TIF Theater Internment Facility TOE Table of Organization and Equipment TSP Training Support Package TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures USACIDC United States Army Criminal Investigation Command USCENTCOM United States Central Command USPIS United States Postal Inspection Service WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 50