Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab

International
StudiesQuarterly
(1993) 37, 271-296
Institutions,
Roles, and Disorder:
The Case of theArabStatesSystem
MICHAELBARNETT
University
ofWisconsin-Madison
roles,and role
This articleexploresthe relationshipbetweeninstitutions,
conflict,and examinesthe destabilizingeffectsof the coexistenceof overin the contextof theArab Middle East.
lappinginternationalinstitutions
I am concernedwithtwofeaturesof the relationshipbetweeninstituin manydefinitions
tionsand roles. First,while roles figureprominently
of institutions,
theyare given scant theoreticalor empiricalattentionin
the institutionsliterature.The second concern is what transpireswhen
the stateis embedded in more than one institutionand each institution
demands a differentrole and set of behavioralactions. Therefore,the
state's actions that are consistentwith the role requirementsof one
institutionmight be inconsistentwith the role demands of another
institution.
Statesfrequently
experiencerole conflictas a consequence of
their presence in two or more institutions,and such coexisting
farfromproducingthe stabilizingqualitiesobservedbymany
institutions,
theorists,can generatefalseexpectationsand conflict.We need a better
of overlappinginstitutions
on statebehavior.
understandingof the effects
The Arab statessystemis used as an illustrative
case studyto demonstratehow role conflictcomplicatedthe searchforregionalstability.
Arab
of sovereignty
and
stateshad twodistinctroles because of the institutions
pan-Arabism:theywere at one and the same time to recognize each
other's authorityand to followpan-Arabismto its logical conclusion of
and potentially
politicalunification.These institutions
provideddifferent
contradictoryroles for Arab states,which complicated the search for
regionalorder.
Scholars of international relations have gravitated toward the concept of international institutions over the past few years. The reasons behind this move are
understandable. Not only does an institutional approach offer a potentially superior explanation of historical processes and change, its emphasis on and positive
evaluation of the prospects of interstate cooperation-and particularly so in the
context of rapid political change-makes it an attractivetheoretical alternative to
the pessimism associated with realism and its modern variants (Kupchan and
Studies
Author's
note:I would like to thankJaniceThomson, the editors,threeanonymousrefereesof International
Quarterly,
and especiallyEmanuel Adlerand AlexanderWendt,forsupportiveand criticalcommentson earlierdrafts.
(? 1993 InternationalStudiesAssociation.
PublishedbyBlackwellPublishers,238 Main Street,Cambridge,MA 02142, USA, and 108 CowleyRoad, OxfordOX4
1JF,UK.
272
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
Kupchan, 1991:118).1 By clarifying
norms,rules, and principlesthat guide state
behavior,by defininga range of acceptable behavior,and by altering(or creating
greatercertainty
in) a state'sexpectationsof anotherstate'sbehavior,institutions
create mutual expectationsand stable and predictable outcomes and thereby
encourage actorsto have greatertrustin each other and in the future.In other
words, institutionslengthen the,shadow of the futureand escape the classic
competitivetrapfosteredbythe Prisoner'sDilemma.
Because internationalinstitutions
offerthe promiseof order and cooperation
among self-interested
states,theoristsand policymakersalike have venturedfrom
simplydiscoveringthe existenceof such institutions
to proposingtheirwholescale
constructionand application to confronta series of internationalproblems.To
solve current and future environmentalproblems, states must build on and
strengthensuch internationalinstitutionsas the United Nations Environmental
Program and the Montreal Protocols (Young, 1989; Haas, 1990); to steer the
internationaltradingcommunityawayfromthe beggar-thy-neighbor
policieswhich
about futurecooperation,statesmustmaintain
accompanyincreasinguncertainty
and strengthen
freetradeinstitutions
such as theGeneralAgreementon Tariffsand
Trade (Ruggie, 1991); to head offchaos and disorderin Europe, a myriadof
security
institutions,
manythathad emergedduringtheCold War to confronta very
differentstrategicenvironment,must be modified,developed, and coordinated
(Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991; Adler, 1992). In short,moves in any substantive
directionreveala positiveevaluationof how internationalinstitutions
can mitigate
the anxietyand insecurity-producing
effectsof anarchy,and, therefore,promote
and increaseinterstate
stability
cooperation.
Roles figureprominentlyin the explanationof the workings-indeed the very
definition-of institutions.Robert Keohane (1989:3) defines an institutionas a
"persistent
and connectedset of rules (formaland informal)thatprescribebehavioral roles,constrainactivity,
and shape expectations";and Oran Young (1989:5)
viewsinstitutions
as "identifiablepracticesconsistingof recognizedroles linkedby
clustersof rules or conventionsgoverningrelationsamong the occupantsof these
roles." Such definitionalinclusion is theoreticallyjustified because it is the
routinizedbehaviorassociatedwithinstitutionally
generatedroles thatis centralto
producing the cooperativeand orderlyqualities associated with institutions.In
general, institutionsdistributeroles that mutuallyconstrain actions and that
increase the probabilityof a strongcorrespondencebetween expectationsand
outcomes;thatis, once stateactorsadopt a particularrole theyusuallylimittheir
behaviorin a continuousand predictablemannerwhich,accordingly,harmonizes
mutualexpectationsand increasessystemstability.
I am concernedwithtwofeaturesof the relationshipbetweenroles and institutions.First,whereasroles figureprominentlyin manydefinitionsof institutions,
literature.
theyare givenscanttheoreticalor empiricalattentionin the institutions
Keohane and Young are representative
of thisgap betweenthe definitionalinclusion of roles and the theoreticalattentiontheygenerate.2Because roles represent
an importantlink between agent and structure,the failure to examine the
relationshipbetween roles and institutionshas significantimplicationsfor our
fosterthe orderand stability
so widelyobserved.3
understandingof how institutions
ISee Keohane (1984, 1989), Young (1989), and Strang (1991) forvariousappraisalsof the greaterexplanatory
and analyticalpowerof institutional
analyses.
2Whereasinternationalrelationstheoi-yhas been relativelynegligentof roles, the foreignpolicy (Walker,1987,
1992), Americanpolitics (Wahlke,Eulau, and Buchanan, 1962; Searing, 1991), and comparativepolitics (Hopkins,
1971; Price,1975; and Magid, 1980) literatureshave been more attentiveto theirresearchvalue.
3Searing (1991) suggeststhat roles provide a bridge between economic and sociological man-that is, roles
incorporatehow behavioris both purposefLil
and shaped by the institutionalcontext.Hollis and Smith (1990:167)
argue thatroles are a "two-way
processbetweenstructureand actor."
MICHAELBARNETT
273
The studyof roles, then, highlights"a chief problem confrontingall social and
between expectationsfor the
political systems:that of maximizingconformity
of a systemis in parta
behaviorof members,and theiractualbehavior.The stability
betweenthe two"(Magid, 1980:328).
functionof thedegree of conformity
Mysecond concernis whattranspireswhen the stateis embedded in more than
one institution
and each institution
demands a different
role and set of behavioral
actions.That is,it is possiblethatthe state'sactionsthatare consistentwiththerole
requirementsof one institutionmightbe inconsistentwiththe role demands of
anotherinstitution;
therefore,the state'sactionsthatare consistentand stabilizing
in one institutionalsettingmightbreed conflictin another.This is a potentially
importantarea of concern,but one thatboth rationalistand reflectivist
approaches
to institutionshave failed to examine. For instance, whereas Keohane
(1989:163-164) argues that "institutions
differentiate
among actors according to
the rolestheyare expected to perform,and institutions
can be identifiedbyasking
whetherpatternsof behaviorare indeed differentiated
by role," to myknowledge
has explicitlyaddressedeitherthe question
no rationalistapproach to institutions
of whetheror not state roles are incompatibleor the implicationsthis incompatibility
mayhave forinstitutional
stability.
Reflectiveapproaches to internationalinstitutions
also overlook the effectsof
on statebehavior.In contrastto rationalistapproachesto instimultipleinstitutions
tutionsthat examine how actorswithalreadywell defined identitiesand preferdo
ences establishinstitutions,
sociologicalapproaches investigatehow institutions
not simplyconstrainstateactionbut are also an importantsourceof staterolesand
interests.That is, actors develop a particularidentityas a consequence of their
Most likelybecause of the reflectiveprogram'spreoccupresencein institutions.4
pation withunderstandingthe originof and changes in the state'sinterestsand
preferences,thisliteraturehas implicitly
assumed thatthereis one determinative
socializing agent.5 There is everyreason to suspect, however,that states are
embedded in multipleinternationaland domesticinstitutions,
whichimpliesthat
states may have multiple roles, identities,and interests.Although this line of
argumentrepresentsan importantthemein the sociologicalliteraturethatinspires
much of the reflectiveprogram,6curiouslythus far the reflectiveliteraturehas
overlookedthisdimension.By recognizingthatstateactorsmaybe influencedby
thatthe same statewilllearn
more thanone institution,
we allowforthe possibility
and adopt differentroles because of the presence of different(socializing)
institutional
influences.In sum,we need a betterunderstandingof the effectsof
on statebehavior;thisis particularly
so because internaoverlappinginstitutions
tional relations theoristsrecognize that states are embedded in a myriadof
institutions
and indeed encouragemovementin thisverydirection.
This articleexplores the relationshipbetweeninstitutions,
roles, and role conflict,and examines the destabilizingeffectsof the coexistence of overlapping
in the contextof the Arab Middle East. In the following
internationalinstitutions
sectionI discussthe relationshipbetweeninternationalinstitutions,
roles,and role
conflict.In thesectionentitled"Role Conflictand theArab StatesSystem"I use the
illustrative
case of the pre-1967Arab statessystemto showcase how overlapping
institutionsproduce contradictory
demands on Arab states' foreignpolicy and
as a relatively
stableset of identities,roles,and interests.See, forinstance,
4Wendt(1922a:399) definesinstitutions
Berger (1966), Young (1976:43), Thomas, Meyer,Ramirez, and Boli (1987), Krasner (1988:74), and Duvall and
Wendt (1989). Note Wendt's (1992a:392) description of "soft"liberals that straddles the distinctionbetween
analyses.
institutional
and reflective
Organization
(Haas, 1992) dedicated to epistemiccommunitiesfor
5See the recent special issue of International
some good examplesof thisapproach.
6Here I have in mind theworkof Mead (1934), Blumer (1969), Turner (1978), and Stryker(1980).
274
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
contributeto regional instability.Specifically,the Arab states systemhas been
characterizedby high levelsof regionalinstability,
largelya productof the contradictorystateroles associatedwiththe overlappinginstitutions
of pan-Arabismand
I conclude by discussingthe relationshipamong international
state sovereignty.
institutions,
roles,and stability.
Institutions,
Roles, and Role Conflict
Roles can be understoodas how the individual(or state) participatesin society
and comes to modifybehavioraccordingly(Berger
accordingto a particularidentity
and Luckmann,1967:72-74;also see Stryker,
1980:57). Rosenau (1990:212), one of
thefewcontemporary
international
relationstheoristsgivento thinkingabout roles,
definesthembytheir"attitudinal
and behavioralexpectationsthatthosewho relate
to itsoccupanthave of the occupantand the expectationsthatthe occupanthas of
himselfor herselfin the role." In short,an actorcomes to identify
witha particular
role and accordinglylimitsits behaviorin accordance withthe expectationsand
demandsthatrole generates.
Two immediate issues accompany any discussion of how roles shape state
behavior.The firstconcernswhetherstates-ratherthanthe leaderswho act in the
name of the state-occupy roles; that is, to whom do we attributethe actions
emittedin the name of the state?This is,of course,a perennialissueforstudentsof
internationalrelations:whereas internationalrelationstheory(and this is particularlytrueof the institutions
literature)routinelyspeaks the language of states-asactors, historicalnarrativesemploy the state-as-actor
as a shorthandfor state
officialsactingin the name of the state.To what extentare we justifiedin using
language generallyreservedfor the actions of individuals,and in appropriating
theoriesthatare builtat the individuallevel,to discussand considerthe actionsof
states?Below I briefly
threeapproachesthatsuggestthatenduringenvironidentify
mentalforcesthatproduce a constancyof stateactionjustifythe applicationof the
languageof action,roles,and intereststo states.7
The firstequates the statewithitstop officials.
Whereasthe stateis a shorthand
for the preferencesof leaders, the consistencyof actions across governmentsis
generallyexplained by systemic(Krasner,1978) or domestic (Holsti, 1970) constraints.8
While the firstapproach viewsroles as constraintson leaders,the second
suggeststhat leaders are socialized into, and internalize,these roles. Whethera
productof belief systems(Littleand Smith,1988) or ideology (Carlsneas,1987),
because the internationaland domesticenvironments
fromwhichleaders emerge
are relatively
stable,states'actionsare consistentfromone leader to the next. In
contrast to the second approach, which holds that individual thoughts and
stancecontendsthat
expressionshave a social origin,the third,more controversial,
it is plausibleto portraycorporateentitiesas havinga stableidentity(Douglas, 1986;
Kertzer,1988:17-19;Gilbert,1989:chap.5; Wendt,1992b).
their specificdifferences,these three approaches share the
Notwithstanding
are stabilizingbecause theyare not wholly
viewthat,first,
internationalinstitutions
dependent on the individualizedwhims and preferencesof state leaders, and,
second,we can reasonablypresentstatesas occupyingroles and as acting.As E. H.
Carr (1964:149) argues,we can justifiably
statesbecause such categorizapersonify
tion"expressesthe continuity
of institutions."
7See Wendt (1992b) foran extended treatmentof theseissues.
8The bureaucraticpoliticsliteratureis also relevanthere. See Hollis and Smith (1990:chap. 7) for an explicit
discussionof roles and bureaucratic-driven
stateaction.
MICHAELBARNETT
275
adopt a
Institutions
generatetheirstabilizingpropertiesonce actorsconsistently
particularrole conception and modifytheirbehavior according to each other's
roles,behaviors,and expectations.9The second issue,then,is the degree to which
roles shape behavior.10Althoughroles do not determinebehavior (even though
much of the writingin internationalrelationstheoryimplicitlyproceeds on the
assumptionthattheydo), ifthe concept is to retainimportanceit is because roles
are constraining.An importantdistinctionhere is between position roles and
and
preferenceroles; the formerare generallyassociatedwithformalinstitutions
have well-definedand detailed guides to action; the latterare more closelylinked
to informalinstitutionsand are less constrainingon behavior (Searing, 1991:
1249).11 Internationalrelationscontains both formaland informalinstitutions,
theireffectson internationalprocessesit is importantto
and when investigating
recognize thateach role typeplaces greateror lesserboundaries on stateaction.
Contrast,forinstance,the role of the U.S. in the United Nations' SecurityCouncil
withitsrole as a sovereignstatein internationalsociety.In the formerthereexists
well-definedguides and limits to its actions because of codified rules and
procedures; the latter,although still limitingstate behavior,allows for greater
discretionand behavioralleeway.
This suggeststhatwhen examininghow roles affectstatebehavior,and particularlyso for preferenceroles, the state's understandingof and the meaning it
attachesto its role mustbe incorporated.As Keohane (1989:6; emphasisadded)
thatleadersof states
acknowledges,"Institutions
mayalso affectthe understandings
shouldplayand theirassumptionsabout others'motivations
and
have of the rolesthey
K. J. Holsti (1970:245-246) arguesthatforeignpolicyelites
perceivedself-interest."
often express a "national role conception,"which signals the actions that are
appropriateto their state and the tasksit should performin the international
perspective
system.12
Therefore,it is importantto incorporatea more interpretive
(Kratochwiland Ruggie,1986:772-774;Adler and Haas, 1992:367).13For instance,
the failureof the U.S. to playthe role of the hegemon duringthe interwarperiod
of the role the U.S. should
was partiallydue to U.S. policymakers'interpretations
playin theinternational
system(Kindleberger,1971).
This raisesa relatedquestion,the originof roles. Social roles are nevercreated
in a vacuumbut are formedin relationto others;it is in the processof interacting
withinan institutional
contextthatthe actor comes to occupya
and participating
role. In short,roles are learned.14For instance,Americandecision makerswere
profoundlyaffectedby the U.S.'s failureto playa more activerole in the interwar
period and were determinedthatit occupythe role demanded of it byvirtueof its
theoryassumes thatstatesplay establishedroles (i.e.,
9For instance,Holsti (1970) argues thatbalance-of-power
In other
balancer) and thatfailureto performin the prescribedmannerincreasessystemimbalance and instability.
words,the institution
of balance of power (Bull, 1977; Holsti,1992) distributesroles to states,and the failureto act in
accordancewiththeseroles potentiallyincreasessysteminstability.
l?Giddens (1983:116-117) dismissesrole theoryfor its inherentstructuraldeterminismand assumption that
actors' behavior and understandings must adjust to societally distributedroles. In a later work (1984:84) he
substitutes
social "position"forsocial role. "Social position. . . can be regardedas a social identitythatcarrieswithita
certainrange (howeverdiffusely
specified)of prerogativesand obligationsthatan actorwho is accorded thatidentity
associated withthat
may activateor carryout: these prerogativesan-dobligationsconstitutethe role-prescriptions
position."
to whichtheyallow theiroccupantsdiscretion
llSimilarly,
Rosenau (1990:212) argues thatroles "varyin the exten-t
in interpreting
the expectationsand in resolvingthe conflictsthatstemfromthe occupancyof multipleroles."
12Alsosee Walker(1987).
13Hollisand Smith (1990:168) similarlyargue that "role involvesjudgement and skill,but at the same time it
involvesa notionof structurewithinwhichrolesoperate."
14The idea that roles and interests are learned within an institutional context is related to questions of
socialization.See Bergerand Luckmann (1967), Blumer (1969), Stryker(1980), and Wendt (1922a:399).
276
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
powerpositionfollowingWWII (Baker, 1991/92:11). Moreover,actorsdo not passivelyappropriateroles conferredupon themby othersbecause theyare actively
involvedin categorizingand classifying
themselves;thatis, theyoftenexplain their
behaviorwith referenceto particularroles. For instance,statesroutinelyjustify
theiractionsbecausetheyare statesand are thereforeentitledto act in certainways.
In sum, "The occupants of roles not only have an understandingof what is
expected of them,but theyalso carryaround a multitudeof premisesor assumptionsabout how othersin relevantsystems
willconductthemselvesin relationboth
to themand theproblemat hand" (Rosenau, 1990:216-217).
Presentlyinternationalrelationstheorysuggeststhatstateroles derivefromthe
internationalsystem(Keohane, 1989; Wendt,1992a). That is, it assumesthatstates
learn theirroles fromother statesand fromtheirpresence in an international
institution.
Yet domesticinstitutions
are also a source of stateroles. In fact,early
role theoryslightedsystemicin favorof domestic forces,in contrastto today's
structuralbent. Holsti (1970:243; emphasis in original) asserts,"The fact of
sovereignty
implies thatforeignpolicydecisions and actions . . . deriveprimarily
frompolicymakers'role conceptions,domesticneeds and demands,and critical
is viewed
eventsor trendsin the externalenvironment."
Said otherwise,sovereignty
as a preferencerole which providestremendousleewayfor state action, and so
analystsmustlook to domestic-generated
roles to guide thataction. If one takes
and
seriouslythatstatesare embedded in domesticand internationalinstitutions
thatroles do not determinebut shape behavior,then one needs to incorporate
more fullyhow actors' conceptionsof theirroles are produced and affectedby
both internationaland domesticinstitutions.15
RoleConflict
What happens when state actors are embedded in two differentinstitutionswhetherat the domestic and internationallevels or both at the international
level-that call fordifferent
roles and behaviors?Key here is the concept of role
which
conflict,
existswhentherearecontradictory
thatattachtosomepositionin a
expectations
socialrelationship.
Such expectations
performances;
maycall forincompatible
theymayrequirethatone hold twonormsor valueswhichlogicallycall for
opposingbehaviors;or theymay demand that one role necessitatesthe
to carry
suchthatitis difficult
or impossible
out
oftimeand energy
expenditure
ofanotherrole.(Stryker,
theobligations
1980:73)
institutions
Role conflictmaybe producedwhenevertheactorexistsin twodifferent
behavior.16Actorshave a
thatsimultaneously
demand thatit expresscontradictory
numberof social roles in the course of a day; as professoror mother,husband or
wife,owneror worker,and so on. Although"the role selected in responseto any
situationdepends upon the definitionand perceptionof particularevents"(Young,
to predict
1976:38), oftensituationsstructurally
overlap,and it becomes difficult
whichrolewillpredominate.
An importantconsiderationfor anticipatingthe possibilityof role conflictis
whetherstatesoccupypreferenceor positionroles. Each presentsadvantagesand
15Thiswas an importantcritiqueof the regimesliterature(Haggard and Simmons,1987:516) and has come to be
games"literature(Putnam,1988).
identifiedwiththe "two-level
16Turner(1978:1) describesa relatedphenomenonwhen "theattitudesand behaviorsdeveloped as an expression
of one role carryover into another."Such an occurrencerepresentsa mergerof the personwiththe role. Here the
individual determinants,rather than the situational characteristics,become a better guide to and predictorof
behavior.
MICHAEL BARNETT
277
disadvantagesfromthe standpointof reconcilingrole conflict.When statesoccupy
preferenceroles,leaders have greateropportunity
and determinationover how to
adjust to potentiallyinconsistentrole expectations. This is because behavior
shaped bypreferenceroles is a productof the leader's interpretations
of thatrole
and the meanings the leader associates with it. Yet because governmentsare
allowedgreaterleewayin determiningwhatbehavioris and is not consistentwitha
and failedexpectaparticularrole, thereis greaterpotentialformisunderstanding
tions between states is greater because of the differentmeanings and understandingstheyattachto thatrole.17
Positionroleshold the oppositeadvantagesand disadvantages.On the one hand,
because positionrolesbetterdefineand limitstatebehaviortheyare betterable to
On the
standardizeexpectations,avoid misunderstandings,
and increase stability.
otherhand, theymaybe less resilientto role conflictbecause theyallow decision
makerslittleinterpretive
leewayto reconcilethe competingrole expectationsthey
occasionallyproduce. In sum,it is importantto recognizethatinstitutions
contain
different
typesofroles,and thattheseprovideimportantinsightsintothelikelihood
of role conflict,how easilyrole conflictis reconciled,and the prospectsforstability
and cooperation.
The idea thatroles are both appropriatedbystatesand conferredupon themby
otherstates,thatstatesmayoccupymultipleroles,and thatsuch role conflictcan
lead to miscalculationand interstate
conflictis illustrated
bythe GulfWar and Saudi
Arabia's decision to allow U.S. troopson its soil in response to Iraq's invasionof
Kuwait.A role of sovereignstate may have quicklyled to the conclusion that
Westerntroop presence was required; the role of representative
of the Arab or
Islamicnation,however,indicatedthatsuch presence would be anathema.Social
roles are not onlyself-professed,
theyare also conferredupon by other actors.In
fact,Iraq mayhave based itsdecision to swallowKuwaitwhole-rather than simply
taketheRumailaoil fields-on a beliefthatSaudi Arabiawould respondin the role
of the representative
of the Arab nationand not one of sovereignstate.According
to the Iraqi foreignminister,Tariq Aziz,Hussein assumed thatSaudi Arabiawould
neverallowU.S. troopson itssoil,and so byincorporating
all of Kuwait,Iraq would
denythe U.S. the logisticalbase it would need to reversethe Iraqi invasion(Viorst,
1991:67). The implicationis thatifIraq had identifiedSaudi Arabia as a sovereign
state,and not simplyas an Arabstate,thenit mighthave been morerestrainedin its
actions towardKuwait.In this way,the presence of both pan-Arabismand state
confersseparateroles,preferences,
and expectedbehaviorsfortheArab
sovereignty
linkedto regionalinstability.
states,and is directly
How do governments
resolverole conflict?There is littleempiricalor theoretical
researchto providestrongguides.18Blackman(1970:318) suggeststhatrole conflict
is resolvedbased on the "perceivedlegitimacyof the expectations,the perceived
17Considerthe changingrole of the statein the internationalpoliticaleconomyduringthe interwarperiod. Prior
of the
to WorldWar I there reigned a laissez-fairedomesticand internationalcontext,symbolizedby the centrality
gold standardformanagingthe internationaleconomy.Because the role of the statewas to promoteand guaranteea
liberaldomesticand internationaleconomic order,the state'srole was consistentin both domains. FollowingWorld
War I, however,domesticsocial forcesbegan to championa new role and social purpose forthe state,one thatwas to
protectand promote national welfare.That is, this newlydefined,domesticallygenerated role conflictedwiththe
context. This role conflictcontributedto the economic
state's traditionalrole in the internationalinstitution-al
instabilityof the period (Polanyi, 1957). "Embedded liberalism" can be interpretedas the state's attempt to
amelioratetheseroles (Ruggie,1991).
18"Identity
salience" refersto the situationin which differentidentitiesmay be conjured up, and attemptsto
1980:61).
whichidentity
identify
willdominatedepending on theirrelativelocation in the identityhierarchy(Stryker,
Although this sounds helpful, there is frequentlylittle reasonable guide to behavior based on such broad
generalizations.
278
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
strengthof the sanctionsimposed fornonconformity
to each of the expectations,
and the actor'sorientationrelativeto legitimacy
and sanction."Rosenau (1990:213)
arguesthatsuch conflictis largelyreconciledby powerpoliticsconsiderations;and
the example of Saudi Arabia supportshis realpolitikargument.Rosenau implicitly
assumes that state roles are generated largelyby the internationalsystem;yet
because domesticinstitutions
are also an importantsourceof roleswe need a better
understandingof whetherrolesgeneratedbydomesticor internationalinstitutions
providegreatersalience,are more restrictive
and demanding,and are more consistentwithits power interests.The state'ssurvivalis rarelyat stakebut the government's domesticstandingfrequentlyis, so it is possible that domestic-generated
roles will have greaterforce than roles dictatedby power considerations.At this
to suggesthowstatesresolvesuch conflict.
earlystageitis difficult
In sum,a keyissue forthe studyof internationalinstitutions,
and particularly
so
withregardto theirhypothesizedstabilizingproperties,is thatof role conflict.The
presenttendencyin international
relationstheoryis to focuson one institution
and
thenexamine how the state'sroles and itsrelatedactionsare or are not consistent
withthe functionalrequirementsof stability
and cooperation.To do so, however,
failsto recognize how those state roles and theiraccompanyingactions that are
consistentwith the requirementsof one institutionmay be inconsistentand
destabilizingforanother.The next sectionexplores these veryissues in the Arab
Middle East.
Role Conflictand theArab StatesSystem
One wayto conceptualizetheArab statessystemand the correspondingstateroles
is to ask,whatis the relationship
associatedwithpan-Arabism
and statesovereignty
betweenthe part (state) and the whole (the Arab World)? Specifically,
therehave
been twobasic visionsof how the Arab statessystemshould be orderedwhichare
reflectedby the institutions
of pan-Arabismand statesovereignty.
The firstis the
idea of the unityof the Arab World,and the focusis on the securityand powerof
the Arab World and not the securityand power of any individualArab state.The
second is the beliefthatthe Arab statessystemshould be organizednot to project
theArabWorld'spowerbut to protecttheArab states'securityand alloweach state
In short,each institution
containsan understandto pursue itsown raison d'Wtat.19
ing ofwhatit means to be-what the role is of-an Arab state.20
fromthe dominantrealistand neorealist
This approach deviatessignificantly
withinthe
explanationsof the dynamicsof inter-Arab
politicsand the instability
Arab states system(Evron and Bar-Siman-Tov,1975; Taylor, 1982; Walt, 1987;
Telhami, 1990).21 This literatureargues that despite the nominal presence and
19Thisis analogous to F. H. Hinsley's (1963:chap. 8) provocativereading of the evolutionof the European state
system.
20Zartmanand Kluge (1984:176) argue that"the conceptionof foreignpolicyas the 'role' of a nationhas a deep
groundingin Arab politicaltradition."Indeed, Nasserhimselfused the language of role: "Forsome reason itseems to
me thatwithintheArab circlethereis a role,wanderingaimlesslyin searchof a hero. And I do not knowwhyit seems
to me thatthisrole, exhausted by itswanderings,has at last settleddown, tiredand weary,near the bordersof our
countryand is beckoningus to move,to take up itslines,to put on itscostume,since no one else is qualifiedto play
it" (cited fromZartmanand Kluge, 1984:176). See Korany(1991) foran explicituse of roles in discussingEgyptian
foreignpolicy.
2IFor exploratorypurposes I limitmydiscussionto the FertileCrescentcountries;thisis largelyconsistentwith
the aforementioned realist literatures.I bracket the role of Islam because (1) Islamic movementswere not a
map; (2) Islamicreformsrevolvedprincipallyaround
prominentforcebehind the attemptedreformof the territorial
changing state-societyrelationsand not inter-staterelations;and (3) there is a body of Islamic scholarshipthat
are not incompatible(Piscatori,1986).
suggeststhatIslam and sovereignty
MICHAEL BARNETT
279
beliefthatthe Arab statesreprerhetoricof pan-Arabismand the self-proclaimed
Arab statesdemonstratedthe same interactive
senta singlefamilyand community,
patternsas did statesin otherregionsand historicalperiods,and remainedfearful
of each other'smotivations
and actions.Such fearsgenerateda similarand familiar
patternof threatening
behavior,balancing,and coalitionformation.
Although realist-driven
explanations have their obvious parsimoniousattracin twoprincipalwayswhen attemptingto understand
tions,theyare unsatisfactory
the dynamicsof the Arab statessystem.First,whereasArab stateshave evidenced
clear balancingformulations,
such balances are not drivenby a preponderanceof
are equallyunhelpful
considerationsalone. Balance-of-threat
formulations
military
(Walt, 1987), because frequentlythese threatsare not a product of imminent
militaryinvasion,or even of fear of loss of external autonomy (indeed, panArabismsuggeststhatArab statesmovepreciselyin thatdirection).Simplystated,a
neorealistapproach "does not predictwhethertwostateswillbe friendsor foes,will
be revisionistor statusquo powers,and so on" (Wendt,1922a:398). In short,we
require an approach that signals why certain states are viewed as threatseven
menace; otherwiseit is hardlyintelligiblewhy,
thoughtheyrepresentlittlemilitary
for instance,in the 1940s, a militarily
powerfulEgyptshould fear a substantially
weaker Iraq that was a thousand miles from its borders,offeredlittlemilitary
challenge,and, in fact,offereditselfup forpoliticalunification.
Frequentlythe threatposed by Arab states was not militarybut rather the
of a rivalrole fortheArabstatethatpotentially
underminedthe
successfulportrayal
state'sinternaland externalbasisof existence.Bysuggestingthatthepurposeof the
Arab statewas to worktowardpoliticalunificationand to safeguardthe common
pan-Arabismunderminedthe
interestsof Arab statesregardlessof theircitizenry,
state'sexternaland internalsovereignty.
Accordingly,
an Arabstatethatsuccessfully
wielded the pan-Arabcard threatenedto subvertthe state'sinternaland external
dynamicsmust
security.A richerand more complex understandingof inter-Arab
and abilityto
incorporatehow the threatposed byArableaderswas theirwillingness
of theArabstate'srole and relationshipto other
forward
a particularunderstanding
Arab state6.Powertranslatesinto threatonlywithina certainset of understandings
weak statesrepresenteda
and presentations;the implicationis thateven relatively
potentialthreatto strongerstates.Such a perspectivebegins to suggestwhy,for
instance,a potential Syrian-Iraqifederationin the late 1940s and the realized
unificationin 1958 provedso threatening
to theentireregion.
Syrian-Egyptian
approach presumes that these statesaccept each
Second, a balance-of-power
and legitimacy.
Because balance-of-power
other'ssovereignty
are comprised
systems
of sovereignstates,a systemis more than the abilityof the actionsby one partyto
over time (Bull, 1977:2); just as criticalis
affectthe actionsof anotherconsistently
each party'swillingnessto recognizethe othermembersas legitimatepartsof the
in the
system.Consequently,statesshould recognizethattheyhave "commoninterests
elementarygoals of social life" (Bull, 1977:53, emphasis in original),which is a
mutual stake in the others' survivaland sovereignty.Such an acceptance and
recognitionrestrictsthe level of violence present in the community.An even
thatstateshave routinely
cursoryreadingof theMiddle East,however,demonstrates
was an incompleteconquestin the
Sovereignty
questionedeach other'ssovereignty.
a
Middle East, not solelybecause of the troubledsearch forempiricalsovereignty,
mostThirdWorldstates,but because of the difficult
taskthatfrustrated
processof
establishing
juridicalsovereignty.
A briefcomparisonof the Africanand Middle Easternstatesystemshighlights
this point. By recognizingeach other's sovereignty,
Africanleaders adopted an
and limitedstate actions; African
institutionalarmor that imposed self-restraint
statesfaced both externaland internalsecuritythreats,and by acceptingjuridical
280
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
sovereigntytheycould limitexternalviolence and concentrateon internalthreats
and the task of state-building(Jacksonand Rosberg, 1982). In contrastto the
Africancase, Arab leaders, who also ruled statesthatwere arbitrarily
created by
Great Powers,held a decidedlymore ambivalentrelationshipto both sovereignty
and theirinheritedborders.Far fromuniformly
embracingeach other'sjuridical
at varioustimesArab leaders strovenot only to modifytheirborders
sovereignty,
but to erase themaltogether.
Byreconceptualizing
theArabstatessystemas comprisedof theoverlappinginstitutionsof sovereignty
and pan-Arabismthatdistributedtwodifferent
roles to Arab
states,we are in a positionto address:whichArab stateswere consideredthreats;
the principleof sovereignty;
whythe Arab statesfailed to embrace uniformly
and
whythe searchforregionalorder has been so torturedand painful.22As Ben-Dor
(1983:146) argues,"The transitory
situationbetweenthesetwopoles [realpolitik
and
pan-Arabism]debilitatedand denormalizedArabpoliticsforovera generation,and
so theunstablenatureof theArabpoliticalsystemdestabilizedtheentireregion."23
The discussionis organizedas follows.To begin,I briefly
discussthe evolutionof
pan-Arabism,suggestwhyit can be properlyconceptualizedas an international
and outlinehow the preferenceroles associatedwiththe institutions
institution,
of
and pan-Arabismproduced contradictory
sovereignty
role expectationsand guides
to action forArab states.SubsequentlyI examine three principalwaysin which
these contradictory
roles affectedthe foreignpolicies of Arab statesand complicated the search for regional order. Specifically,I focus on how pan-Arabism
complicatedthe search forregionalorder by (1) frequently
providingArab states
withan incentiveand set of expectationsto conformto the normsof pan-Arabism
and statesovereignty;
(2) encouraginga clash betweenthosewho wantedto maintainthe territorial
and thosewho advocatedreform;and (3)
systemand sovereignty
different
offering
meaningsassociatedwithbeing an Arab state,and how such rival
led to failedexpectations,misunderstandings,
interpretations
and conflict.
Pan-Arabism
Born in the literaryclubs of Damascus in the late 1800s, pan-Arabmovements
began to flourishin the decades precedingWorld War I, demanding an "Arab
awakening,"a resurgenceof an Arab identity.24
During thisinitialphase therewas
22I have bracketedhow the superpowersmighthave produced or affectedthese roles forthe followingreasons.
Although the superpowers have left their mark on the region, and the Middle East can be understood as a
"subordinatesystem"-itis penetratedand affectedby Great Power rivalries-much historicalscholarshipportrays
the superpowersas accommodatingthemselvesto, accentuating,or mitigatingalreadypresentinter-Arab
dynamics.
See Ajami (1981), Ben-Dor (1983), Brown(1984), Koranyand Dessouki (1984), Noble (1984), and Ismael (1986) for
implicitand explicitendorsementsof thisposition.Indeed, a recent,edited,volume thatuses the conceptsof roles
to examine how superpowerrelationsaffectedMiddle Easternpoliticsconcludes thatMiddle Eastern "clients"had
tremendous autonomy and frequentlycontrolled their patrons (Efrat and Bercovitch, 1991); therefore,roles
associatedwithinter-Arab,
ratherthansuperpower,politicscan be givengreaterweight.
23Hudson (1977:54), Noble (1984:48-50), and Ayoob (1992:48-50) also argue thatpan-Arabismdestabilizedthe
region.
24Integralto the emergence of Arab nationalismwas the introductionof the firstArabic printingpresses in
Istanbul (1812) and Cairo (1882), and the resurgence of Arabic as a language of instructionin primaryand
secondaryschools. These developmentspaved the wayfor new vehiclesof thoughtand culturalsystems(Antonius,
1965:38-40). A major impetus occurred with the Young Turk movementof 1908 and its desire to introduce a
Turkificationprogramin the FertileCrescent.In response,Arab nationalistscalled forfullinstructionin the Arabic
language,greaterlocal autonomyand the protectionof Arab rightswithinthe OttomanEmpire,and the promotion
of Arab unityand withit a sense of itshistoricpast and a restorationof itsglory.Notable at thistime,however,was
the absence of a demand forArab sovereignty;
most were contentwithremainingwithinthe Ottoman Empire so
long as theirothergoals ofArab autonomyand the revocationofTurkification
weremet (Duri, 1987:232).
MICHAEL BARNETT
281
a conscious attemptto promoteand define the Arab nation,to create a political
vocabularyof Arab nationalism,and to identifythe "'we' and 'they'in the geographyof identity"(Young,1976:382).
Arab nationalismincreasedin strengthbetweenthe worldwarsas the resultof
the
legitimatedand strengthened
fourfactors.First,the normof self-determination
desire byArab nationalsforindependence. Second, duringthe war the Ottoman
Empireand theAlliedforcesalikebelievedthattheArabpopulationsrepresenteda
lethal militaryweapon; therefore,both sides attemptedto win over the Arab
leadershipwithvariouspromisesand guaranteesof autonomyto be deliveredafter
These promiseswhettedthe appetiteof the local populationsforpolitical
victory.
independence.
The thirdfactorwas the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the
impacton howArabsunderstood
mandatesystem.These changeshad a significant
themselvesand theirdesired politicalarrangements(Hourani, 1991:316). Briefly,
the Britishwon both the sympathiesof the Arab cause and the war,but failed to
followthroughon the bulk of itspromisesconcerningArab independence.25The
of the OttomanEmpireprovidedthe Britishand the Frenchwithan
disintegration
to reconstructthe Middle East-and theywastedlittletime in doing
opportunity
just that.In addition to theirestablishedpresence in NorthAfrica,the European
statesobtainedcontrolof the FertileCrescentthroughthe mandatesystem;France
now oversawLebanon and Syria,and Britainruled Jordan,Palestine,and Iraq.
Consequently,thisperiod introducedtwo externalelementswhich increased the
sense ofArab nationalism:a duplicitousWesterndiplomacythatbetrayedthe cause
ofArab independenceand the recognitionof the ZionistmovementwithBritainas
its overseer.The divisionof these territoriesinto mandates under Britishand
Frenchcontrolratherthanintounitsin the possessionof the local rulersdid much
to developArabnationalism.
The fourthfactorleading to the growthin Arab nationalismwas the increasein
extensiveand intensivecontactsamong previouslydetached Arab communities.
Whereasonce mostcontactbetweenArabsoccurredduringthe pilgrimage(which
consequentlygave identitya religiousflavor),now newspapersmultiplied,Arabs
began to travelmore frequentlyand to be educated in each other's schools,and
even Egyptianfilmswere being shown throughoutthe entireArab World,all of
which"helped to createa sharedworldof tasteand ideas" (Hourani, 1991:339;also
see Porath, 1986:chap. 3). World War II furtheredthe cause of Arab unityby
increasinga sense ofArab identityand a demand forautonomyand independence
from foreign forces (Hourani, 1991:356). In general, whereas once Arab
nationalismhad limitedsuccessbecause of the continuedsalience of religion,the
local politicalstructures,
and the lack of coordinationbetweenArabsin disparate
locales (Antonius,1965), afterWorldWar I it rose to challengereligiousand local
identities(Owen, 1992:82-86).
Withindependence,the Arab statesoccupied twodistinctroles associatedwith
the institutions
of pan-Arabismand sovereignty.
By aligningthemselveswith,and
appropriatingthe language of, pan-Arabism,Arab leaders were suggestingthat
Arabstatesare "one nationhavingcommoninterestsand security
prioritiesdistinct
fromthose of the West. . . . The countriesof the area, which enjoyed unityof
language, religion,historyand cultureshould-indeed could-create theirown
systemto counteranythreatfromwhateversource" (Heikal, 1978:719).
25Thereis obviouslyconsiderabledebate concerningthe nature of Britishpromises,particularly
withregard to
the dispensation of Palestine. See Fromkin (1989) for a good discussion of Great Power intriguesand broken
promisesto theArab populations.
282
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
Pan-Arabism'sbroad claim thatthe Arab statederivesits moral authorityfrom
an Arab nation that was artificially
segmentedby the West produced a set of
demands on and expectationsof Arab leaders. Their role was now to protect
Arabs-and representtheir interests-regardlessof their citizenry,and to work
towardpolitical unificationand thereforebring into correspondencethe Arab
nation and politicalauthority.Therefore,duringthisperiod pan-Arabismcan be
understood as the belief that (1) "there is or can be created an Arab nation,
formedof all who share theArabiclanguage and culturalheritage";(2) "thisArab
nationoughtto forma singleindependentpoliticalunity";and (3) "thecreationof
such a unit presupposesthe developmentamong the membersof the consciousness ... [and] thattheirbeing membersis thefactorwhichshould determinetheir
politicaldecisionsand loyalties"(Hourani, 1946:101).
Can pan-Arabism
be regardedas an institution?
Althoughmanywillconcede that
it imposed constraintsand expectationson Arab states,three objectionscan be
is simplyan ideologyexploitedforpoweranticipated.The firstis thatpan-Arabism
is to take seriously
seekingpurposesbyArab leaders; to take seriouslypan-Arabism
their rhetoric.I find this charge difficultto sustain for a number of reasons.
has frequently
Althoughadmittedly
pan-Arabism
been used byArableadersto serve
theirparticularistic
interests,we still need to account for whyit could be used
successfully
by them.Part of the reason mustresidewiththe simplefactthatpanArabismhad meaningforArab populations;therefore,
was more than
pan-Arabism
an Arab leader's versionof alchemy.Second, in theirlanguage and actionsArab
leaders frequently
exhibiteda strongsense of the roles theywere supposed to play
and attemptedto portraytheirpolicies and actions as consistentwithArabism's
demands.Indeed, Arab leaders maybe capturedby theirown rhetoric.This is one
of whyNasseragreed to the formationof the UnitedArab Republic
interpretation
withSyriain 1958; farfromenthusiasticabout politicalintegration,Nasser could
hardlyrejectthe proposed mergerforfearof being exposed by his own rhetoric
(Dann, 1989:78). Therefore,therolesassociatedwithpan-Arabism
placed limitsand
expectationson the actions of Arab leaders. Finally,to argue that pan-Arabism
cannot be consideredan institution
because it is associatedwiththe self-interested
aspirationsof Arab leaders ignores a fundamentalfeature of the rationalist
behavior.
approachto institutions:
theyare theproductof self-interested
The second objection derivesfrom the observationthat since its birth panArabismhas evidenced historicaland regionalconceptualelasticity.
Notwithstanding pan-Arabism's
variations,historicalevidencesuggeststhatthe masseswere genand susceptible,to a pan-Arabismthatunderminedsovereignty
erallysympathetic,
and advocated immediate political unification(Owen 1992:87-88).26 Indeed,
reformsthatmightstrip
whereasmostArab leaders were suspiciousof territorial
vocalized a pan-Arabism
them of theirnewlywon independence,theyfrequently
but also politicalintegration.
Their responsewas
thatmeantnot onlyArabsolidarity
due not only to power-seekingbehaviorbut also to domesticand transnational
normsthatdemanded legitimationalong these lines. Therefore,whetherbecause
Arab leadersfeltconstrainedbydomesticpressuresand regionalnormsor because
they had internalizedArab identitiesthat necessitatedcertain objectives,they
regularlyvocalized support for, and occasionally adopted, policies that were
consistent
withpan-Arabism's
demand ofpoliticalintegration.
A third objection to viewingpan-Arabismas an institutionis because panArabism's promise of political integrationwas never fulfilled.As PatrickSeale
26SeeTibi (1981), Duri (1987), Dawn (1991), Khalidi (1991), and Khalidi et al. (1991) forgood overviewsof the
debate concerningwho is partof theArab nationand whatconstitutespan-Arabism.
MICHAELBARNETT
283
(1986:4) argues,"Arabunityis stilla matterof sentimentratherthana well-defined
and
politicalnotion."True enough. Yet thereare formaland informalinstitutions,
the latter frequentlyplace strong expectations and constraintson actors. As
Keohane (1989:4-5) argues, institutionalization
incorporatesthree dimensions:
commonality,"the degree to which expectationsabout appropriatebehaviorand
understandingsand how to interpretaction are shared by the participantsin the
can alteritsown rules";and
system";
autonomy,"theextentto whichthe institution
"thedegree to whichtheseexpectationsare clearlyspecifiedin the form
specificity,
of rules."Althoughpan-Arabism
was weaklyinstitutionalized
accordingto the latter
twoprinciples,it subjectedArab leaders to normsthatnot onlyconstrainedtheir
actionsbut also compelledthemto be perceivedas workingtowardArabunityifnot
politicalunification.
whichholds that"the stateis subjectto no otherstateand has full
Sovereignty,
and exclusivepowerswithinitsjurisdictionwithoutprejudice to the limitsset by
applicable laws,"27is widelyregardedas an institution(Bull, 1977; Krasner,1988;
Keohane, 1989; Wendt,1992a). Being recognizedas sovereignamountsto a social
"permission"grantedby the communityof statesto act withcertainpowersand
impliesa certainmeasure of self-restraint
by othermembersof thiscommunity,
a
"live-and-let-live"
attitude,as itwere.This "anarchicalsociety"(Bull, 1977) does not
mean that statesnever have conflicts-quite clearlytheydo-but limitationsto
these conflictsare structuredby the collectiveacceptance of the principle of
sovereignty.28
If the institution
of sovereignty
instructedthe newlyindependentArab statesto
overitspopulation,the institution
of
recognizeeach other'sbordersand authority
pan-Arabismsanctionedjust the opposite. By occupyingthe role of representative
of the Arab nation, Arab stateswere expected to protectthe Arab nation that
enveloped its borders, and to work toward political unification.Therefore,if
sovereignty
prohibitedinterferencein each other's domesticaffairs,pan-Arabism
not only sanctioned it but also denied the verydistinctionbetween the international and the domestic.29Arab leaders were expected to conformto regional
standards of legitimacywhich undermined a strictrealpolitik
reading of their
interests(Khalidi,1978:696); indeed, pan-Arabism
provideddomesticand regional
sanctionsfor those who violated its norms. Therefore,Arab leaders frequently
foundthemselvesattemptingto accommodateand amelioratecontradictory
roles;
such role conflictcomplicatedthe searchforregionalorder.
seriesA, no. 1, 1923. Cited in Keohane, 1988:385.
27Wimbledoncase, PermanentCourtof InternationalJustice,
28Sovereignty
has an internaldimension as well. The internaldimension of sovereigntyassertsthat the state
authority,not that it is
representslegitimatedomestic authority.It amounts to a claim that the state is the highest
alwaysable to ensure compliance withits laws. Externalsovereigntyconformsto whatJackson (1990) refersto as
I use these concepts
internalsovereignty
conformsto whathe refersto as empiricalsovereignty.
juridical sovereign-ty;
interchangeably.
29See Owen (1983:20) and Salame (1988:345-346) for how pan-Arabismled to state policies thatviolated the
principle of noninterference.The contradictionbetween sovereigntyand nation existed elsewhere in the Third
World, and this was particularly so as sovereigntycontradicted the principle of "self" determination. This
contradictionwas accuratelyreflectedin the 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Grantingof Independen-ceto Colonial
byvirtueof thatrightthey
Countriesand Peoples. Article2 states:"Allpeoples have the rightto self-determin-ation;
freelydeterminetheirpoliticalstatusand freelypursue theireconomic,social, an-dculturaldevelopment."YetArticle
of a
in-tegrity
6 reads: "Anyattemptaimed at the partialor whole disruptionof the national unityand the territorial
of the Charterof the United Nations."The self,farfrom
countryis in-compatible
withthe purposes and prin-ciples
carved up by the West.Yet it was also recognizedthat
bein-ga nation,however,was essentiallythe colonial territory
because of how the
farfrombeing fullydeveloped "selves,"containedmultipleperson-alities
thesecolonial territories,
colonial powers carved up the territory.In short, the inormsof self-determiniationan-dsovereigntywere in
contradiction(Youing,1991:324-325).
284
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
RoleConflict
and RegionalInstability
At independence most Arab states were expected to adhere to the norms of
sovereignty,
to honor the principle of noninterference,
and to recognize each
other's authoritywhile also respectingthe norms associated withArabism.Arab
leaders experiencedstrongdomesticand transnationalpressuresto adhere to an
Arabismthatsuggestedat the least thatwhatmatteredwas not the state'sinterests
but the Arab national interest,and at the most that there should be immediate
politicaland territorial
integration.Therefore,because Arab stateswereembedded
in the twininstitutions
of pan-Arabismand statesovereignty,
Arab leaders had to
consider,articulate,and adopt foreignpolicies that reflectedboth sets of roles.
Below I considerthreewaysin whichrole conflictaffectedthe foreignpolicies of
Arabstatesand thesearchforregionalorder.
Role conflictcontributedto regionalinstability
by encouragingArab leaders to
and state
adopt foreignpoliciesthatwereconsistentwiththe normsof pan-Arabism
sovereignty;
by emittingpolicies and language thatpaid tributeto and were conit made mutual expectations
sistentwithboth pan-Arabismand state sovereignty
and predictability
difficult
to achieve.There were twoprimaryreasonsforthisdual
stance.A primary,
reason forpan-Arabism's
is the state'slack of
oft-cited,
durability
legitimacy(Hudson, 1977). Arab nationalismsimultaneouslycomplicated and
assistedthe Arab state's search for legitimacy.As long as citizensin Arab states
withthe goals of the state,Arab
adhered to an Arab identityand did not identify
leaderswereunable to use state-centric
principlestojustifytheiractions;therefore,
these same leaders were likelyto turnto an Arab politicalidentitythatwas most
salientto itspopulationand to justifytheirpoliciesas being in the interestsof the
Arab nation.30For instance,in theirfightfor independence,Syrianleaders were
more likelyto vocalizeArab ratherthan Syriannationalismor speak in favorof a
GreaterSyriabecause "there[was] no sense of Syrianunity,or even the existenceof
geographicalSyriaas a separatecountry"(Hourani, 1946:117). Withthe exception
thiswas truethroughouttheFertileCrescent.
of theLebanese Maronitecommunity,
'There was no historical,cultural,religious,or linguistic
justification"forlimiting
was availablebecause
the territorial
goals (Brown,1984:150-151). Such a strategy
the masses did question the appropriatenessof the currentbordersand because
theyweremorelikelyto see themselvesas Arabs,not,forinstance,as Syrians.
Afterindependence nearlyall Arab leaders continuedto presenttheirforeign
policyin pan-Arabterms.In other words,whereasArab leaders mightrecognize
thatsovereignty
theyalso created
provideda basis forregimeand regionalstability,
obstaclesto itspath bythe continualuse of pan-Arabslogansfordomesticpolitical
purposes; this only reinforcedArab, as opposed to state,identities.Accordingly,
Arab statesvacillatedbetweena policythatcorrespondedto pan-Arabismand state
As Lisa Anderson(1991:72) states:
sovereignty.
The individual states of the Arab World are not congruentwith,and cannot
whollyappropriate,the powerfulnationalismofArab identity,
yettheyare equally
unable to fullytranscendor replace it by cultivatingpurelylocal loyalties.Thus
the elitesin the region have vacillatedbetweenattemptsto portraythemselvesas
the vanguard of Arab unityand to relyon provincialidentitiesand loyaltiesto
engenderpoliticalsupport.
30Theproblemshere can be highlightedwiththe concept of the nationalinterest.The generalassumptionis that
the state,whose missionis to promote the securityof the nation,and the n-ationare circumscribedspatiallyby the
An Arab leader who evokes the "national interest,"however,is poten-tially
same territory.
referringto his own
population an-dthose livin-gin other Arab states. Consequently,even the mere use of the term nationalinterest
poten-tiallyviolates the principle of n-oninterference.This is akin to the "nation-al identitydynamic," the
sociopsychologicaldyn-amicby which a "mass national public may be mobilized in relation-to its in-tern-ational
environ-ment"
(Bloom, 1990:79).
MICHAEL BARNETT
285
That these stateswere expressingrole conflictis also reflectedby the following
statementby Mohammed Heikal, a confidantof Nasser and editor of the semiofficialEgyptiandailyAl-Ahram:
As a state, Egypt deals with all Arab governments,whatevertheir reformsor
systems.She takesher place beside themin the Arab League and at the UN and
concludes defence,trade,and other pacts withthem.... As a revolution,Egypt
should deal withthe people.31
He continued,referringto Egypt,"[We have] no rightto separateourselvesfrom
the struggleof other citizensof our nation."Egyptcan be understoodas having
undergonea nearlycentury-long
debate concerningwhetheror not it is a member
of the Arab World,and whatthatmembershipentails(Ajami,1981; Lopez, 1990);
In Searchof
itis probablyconsequentialthatAnwarSadat entitledhis autobiography
Identity.
In general, there are two,conflicting,dynamicsat work:Arab leaders have a
vestedinterestin seeing the principleof sovereignty
honored because it represents
an importantbasis forstatesurvival;at the same timeArabismservesan important
functionfor most Arab leaders because it providesa normativebasis for their
actions.In short,by suggestingthattheirbasis of legitimacywas an artificeand a
giftof the West,Arab leaders were paradoxicallypromotingtheirown domestic
power and at the same time opening the door to interferencein theirdomestic
affairsby otherstates.Althoughsuch a scenarioinevitably
complicatedtheirquest
forregionaland domesticorder,32in the absence of statelegitimacyArab leaders
turnedto the language of pan-Arabism
to bolstertheirdomesticfortunes.33
Pan-Arabismcertainlycaused Arab leaders to either change theirpolicies or
legitimatethem in the language of Arabism,but it is also importantto recognize
thatpan-Arabismand realpolitik
were not necessarilyoppositionalcategories.That
is, Arabismfrequentlyhelped to define the state'sgoals and its definitionof the
national interest.The case of Egyptis instructivehere: not only were Egyptian
leaders forced to remain attentiveto the masses' pan-Arabaspirations,but soon
these aspirationsdid more than constrainEgyptianstate interests-theydefined
them. Until the 1930s Egyptianleaders and intellectualsshowed littleinterestin
Arab affairs,that is, events in the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent.
Egyptianscharacterizedthe Arabs as backward and inferior,and as a nation
distinctfromthe Egyptiannation.AlthoughEgyptiansmightsharewithArabs the
Arabic language, theyshared littleelse (and Egyptianintellectualsoftenstressed
that the dialects were quite different)(Gershoni and Jankowski,1987:chap. 5;
Porath,1986:149-151). This attitudetowardtheArabsmeantthat"Arab'unity'was
discussedin Egyptianpoliticalcirclesin the 1920s,and whatopinion
infrequently
was voiced on the subject tended both to exclude Egypt from the terms of
discussion and to be pessimisticconcerning the possibilityof Arab unity"
(Gershoniand Jankowski,1987:234). It is significantthat the Britishand French
presencein the Levantand the SyrianRevoltof the 1920s-a definingmomentin
modernArab historyand pan-Arabism-rousedlittleinterestin Egyptas an Arab
eventper se, but more as a possible signal of Westernintentionsin the region
(GershoniandJankowski,
1987:235,245-247).
31AI-Ahram,
December 29, 1962; citedfromSharma (1990:95).
32Theuse of pan-Arabismby manyArab leaders mightappear irrationalbecause supposedlytheir"true"interest
lies in maintainingthe authorityof their state,somethingclearlyundermined by calls for pan-Arabism.Tsebelis
(1990) argues that the observerfocusingonly on the need for state sovereigntymightportraythis behavior as
suboptimal,but fromthe standpointof the stateactorwho is interestedin both sovereignty
and domesticlegitimacy
it is rational.In Tsebelis's terminology,
the stateactoris embedded in a seriesof "nestedgames."
33Ayoob(1992:48) similarlyobservesthat"thesedaysthe narrowerthe base of a regimethe greateris itsneed to
paylip serviceto the concept of theArab nation in an attemptto augmentitslegitimacy."
286
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
By the mid-1930s,however,the growthof an Arab identityand associationwith
Arab causes withinthe increasingly
politicizedEgyptianpopulationtranslatedinto
societalpressureon the Palace to takea greaterinterestin Palestineand elsewhere
in the Fertile Crescent (Seale, 1986:20; Porath, 1986:chap. 3). For example,
Egyptianleaderswould have preferredto have ignoredthe 1936 Palestineriots.At
thistimeEgyptwas attemptingto convincethe Britishto withdrawfromEgyptian
soil as soon as possible.AlthoughEgyptianleaderscalculatedthatstrongsupportof
PalestinianArabswould potentiallyanger Britain,who oversawthe Palestinemanbecause of
date, the Egyptiansneverthelessfeltcompelled to responddramatically
how pan-Arabismhad percolated through Egyptian society to produce new
standardsof domesticlegitimacy(Porath,1986:162-163). As Seale (1986:19) concludes, "Politicalleaders were not the real initiatorsof Egypt'sArab policy:they
responded to pressureswhichhad become too powerfulto ignore."34The importance of this change cannot be overestimated;because of the growthof panArabisma newsetof staterolesand interests
had emerged.
It is now thatEgyptianofficialsbegan to considerEgyptpartof the Mashreq (the
East). In fact,because Egyptianleaders were being forcedfrombelow to take a
greaterinterestin Arab affairstheybecame more interestedin makingsure that
theycontrolledthoseeventsand werenot controlledbythem."Indeed,once Egypt
opted formembershipof theArab familyshe quicklysaw thather nationalinterest
layin containingthe Hashemites,in preventingthe emergencein the EasternArab
World of a powerstrongenough to challenge her, in preservingthe statusquo of
smallsovereignnation-states
subordinateto herself"(Seale, 1986:23). Egypt'sArab
policyand increased interestin eventsto the East cannot be separatedfromthe
growthof pan-Arabismand the associateddemands it placed on Egyptianleaders.
Egypt'sdefinitionof the nationalinterestwas directlyshaped bythe growthof panArabism.The implicationis thatEgyptianleaders would both use the language of
and pursuea policythatwas more in keepingwithrealpolitik.
pan-Arabism
The Arab statessystemwas also underminedby the clash between those who
wantedto maintainthe territorial
and thosewho advocated
systemand sovereignty
change. The regionwas filledwithnumerousmovementsto change its territorial
shape; in accordance, differentexpectationsof the Arab state were presented.
Consequently,state leaders frequentlydefined the threat as those state and
nonstateactorswho championed a rivalpurpose and role forthe Arab state.Arab
leaderswere quite awarethatpan-Arabismand statesovereignty
were a deadlymix
and would probablydestabilizethe region.They were,however,of distinctminds
concerninghow thisproblem should be resolved.In 1943 Iraq's Nuri al-Said,in
response to the urgingsof Britain'sPrime MinisterAnthonyEden, convened a
summitof Arab leaders to considerpoliticaland territorial
reforms.35
Nuri al-Said
proposed an immediatefederationbetweenJordan,Syria,Lebanon, and Palestine,
who would then forma new Arab League with Iraq. Althoughthe convention
adjourned withoutsubstantiveagreement,it was a significantmomentnevertheless. Arab leaders had elevated pan-Arabismfromthe streetsto the diplomatic
table.Pan-Arabism
appeared to be gatheringmomentum.
34Alsosee Porath (1986:157-158).
351tis significant,
then,thatBritishpolicyaccuratelyreflectedthese twoforcesin the Middle East. As a mandatory
power Britainwas responsiblefor "rearing"these countriesinto statehoodand sovereignty,
yetit also attemptedto
hitch its fortunesto a pan-Arabismthatwanted to rewritethe region's territorialconfiguration.Britainmay have
believed that by manipulatingpan-Arabismtheycould furthertheir own strategicinterestsand limit that of the
Frenchand the Germans (Khadduri,1946:10). What is significant
is thatBritainwas interestedin attachingitselfto a
movementitconsideredunstoppable (Gomaa, 1977:chap.4).
MICHAEL BARNETT
287
Indeed, it was the fearof pan-Arabismand itsincreasingpopularitythatcaused
Egyptianleaders to take a leading role in craftingthe Alexandria Protocol of
October 1944 and in establishingthe League of Arab Statesin March 1945. It was
hoped thatboth actionswould end any question of redrawingthe Middle East's
to become the cornerstoneof intermap and cause the principleof sovereignty
Arab politics(Porath, 1986).36Althoughthe conferenceconsidereda numberof
pan-Arabdesigns-including a unitarystate with centralizedpolitical authority,
and a federatedstatewitha centralparliamentand executivecommittee-in the
end, membersagreed on a loose confederationfocusedon issuesof coordination
and cooperation,whichessentiallyamounted to an embracingof sovereignty
and
independence (MacDonald, 1965:33-38). It appeared that the League of Arab
States would resemble other regional organizations that similarlyadopted
as a cornerstoneof regionalorder.
sovereignty
could be containedthroughthe
Notwithstanding
Egypt'shope thatpan-Arabism
League of Arab States,the League failedto answerthe basic questionsconcerning
the purpose and role of theArab state.One reason whythe League ofArab States
failed to contain pan-Arabismis thatwhereasmanyArab leaders demonstrateda
territoriallines,
general willingnessto order their relationsalong state-centric,
transnationaland domesticforcescontinuedto demand and expect anotherrole
fortheArab state.These subnationalforces,consequently,argued thatthe rulesof
inter-Arab
interactionwere farfromsettled(Seale, 1986; Maddy-Weitzman,
1993).
Noteworthyis the change that occurred in Syriandomesticpoliticsand foreign
policyin the fewshortyearsfollowingthe establishmentof the League of Arab
States. Those Syrianleaders who were signatoriesto the League in 1945 were
reformsadvocatedby Iraq's Nuri alsuspiciousof pan-Arabismand the territorial
Said. The overthrowof Syria'sPresidentShukrial-Quwwatliby General Zaim in
1949,however,opened a new chapterin Syrianpoliticsand "thestruggleforSyria"
(Seale, 1986). A numberof Syriangroups now came to the fore,manyof whom,
like the National partyand the People's party,made a definingfeatureof their
politicalprograma more positiveevaluationof pan-Arabism.
Syria's domestic weakness and internal strugglesover the future of Syria
encouragedotherArab statesto involvethemselvesin Syrianpolitics,some attempting to encourage the developmentof pan-Arabexpressions,othersattemptingto
discourage them. In other words,because of the state's lack of legitimacyand
transnationalforceswhichdemanded a different
role for the Arab state,Arabism
frequentlyprovided opportunitiesfor Arab leaders to interferein the domestic
affairsof othersas long as these intrusionswere viewedas servingpan-Arabism's
goals.For instance,KingAbdullahofJordanattemptedto inserthimselfintoSyrian
and his family'shistoricalties
politicsbydrawingfromthe reservoirof pan-Arabism
to thismovement(Wilson,1988). Abdullah wasjoined by a host of Arab leaders
who,in the name of pan-Arabism,
attemptedto controlSyria'spoliciesand military.
As a consequence of theseprocessesthe Syrianleadershipand itsopponentsbegan
to make overturesto Iraq and to explore the prospectof unificationbetweenthe
two countries (Seale, 1986; Maddy-Weitzman,
1993). This possibilitygalvanized
Egyptianand Saudi officialsto tryand counteractand underminethisoption; for
collectivesecurity
instance,Egyptproposed a (state-centric)
pact in lieu of an IraqiSyrianfederation.
Althoughthe resultof thisperiod of challengesand counterchallengesto the
Arab states systemwas to check Iraqi and Syrianrevisionistaspirations,there
36Thisis akin-to Holsti's (1992) readinigof the Concert of Europe as an attemptby Europe's Great Powers to
ensure that therewould not emerge Napoleonlic-likerevolutionary
forcesthatwould challenge the statusquo and
increasethe prospectsof GreatPowerwar.
288
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
remaineda numberof substateactorsthroughouttheArabWorldwho werenot as
committedto a regional order based on the principle of sovereigntyand who
In
demanded thattheArab statego beyondthe limitationsimposedbysovereignty.
of the Arab statessystembyproviding
general,pan-Arabismencouraged instability
Arab leaders witha camouflagefor theirinterventions
in each other's domestic
but
withthe normof sovereignty
affairs.Such intrusionswerenot onlyinconsistent
clearlycomplicatedtheregion'ssearchforrulesof stability.
Ironically,it was the veryEgyptthat had hoped to make the League of Arab
Statesa constrainton Arab nationalismthatwould soon lead pan-Arabisminto its
mostvisible,confrontational,
and destabilizingphase. What Malcolm Kerr (1970)
called the "Arab Cold War," from 1957 to 1970, can be reconceptualizedas a
productof a clash betweenthe roles thatArab statesshould playand how regional
life should be governed.The tensionbetweenpan-Arabismand statesovereignty
increased during this period, for three reasons. First, Israel's presence and
supposed affrontand challenge it representedto the Arab World was portentous
became the showcase cause of
for maintainingArab nationalism."Anti-Zionism
thevehicleforleaders to showtheirpan-Arabist
credentials,or a way
pan-Arabism,
to protectthemselvesfromthose possessingthem" (Pipes, 1983:155). Second, the
U.S. was makinginroadswiththe conservative
regimesof the ArabWorld;thisnot
only increased the perceived alien and artificialnature of these statesby their
societiesbut also strengthenedthe sense of nationalidentitythroughmuch of the
ArabWorld (Owen, 1992:87-88).
pan-Arabism,was the
Third, and perhaps most importantfor strengthening
ascendance of a new generation of Arab leaders, including Nasser of Egypt,
Quassim of Iraq, and Michel Aflaq,the fatherof the Baath partyof Syria.These
leaders came of age in the 1930s, when state-centricnationalists,who were
were
associatedwitha particularconstellationof politicaland economic interests,
leading theircountriesto independence.Beginningwiththe Suez War,these new
Arableadersrejuvenatedpan-Arabism
and lentitgreatercredibility
and practicality,
emphasized the Arab peoples' common roots and dangers,and challenged the
identity,purpose, and authorityof the Arab state. And, as evident from the
widespreadappeal and tremendousexcitementthese leaders' messagesgenerated
withthe Arab masses,theywere activatinga barelysubmergedforce and talking
directlyto the citizensof other Arab states (Koranyand Dessouki, 1984:29). In
basis of the Middle
general,Arab leaders were openly challengingthe territorial
East as theyarticulateda beliefthat"thenewlyindependentArabstateshad enough
in common,in shared cultureand historicalexperienceas well as sharedinterests,
to make it possibleforthemto come into close union witheach other,and such a
union wouldnot onlygivethemgreatercollectivepowerbutwouldbringabout that
moral unitybetween people and governmentwhich would make government
legitimateand stable"(Hourani, 1991:401). VariousArab leaderswerearguingthat
the Arab people confronteda uniformset of challengesthat called for common
responses,and, ideally,politicalunification.
Consequently,the tension between sovereigntyand pan-Arabismled to both
domesticupheavals and inter-Arabconflictbetween those who supportedNasser
(and pan-Arabism)and those who did not. The zenith of pan-Arabism,the
formationof the United Arab Republic between Syriaand Egyptin 1958, only
furtherdestabilizedthe region:
The proclamation
of theunion [betweenSyriaand Egypt]had an electrifying
effect
on all Arabpeoples,whosawin it thebeginning
of therealization
ofthe
Arabnationalist
dreamand lookedto otherArabstatesto respondto thecall to
theirownfederalunion,the
enlargeit.Iraq andJordanrespondedbyforming
UnitedArabKingdom,on February
14, 1958.Yemenjoined the UnitedArab
MICHAEL BARNETT
289
Republic in a federativearrangementcalled the United Arab States. Lebanon
began to slide toward civil war....
In Saudi Arabia ...
nationalist sentiments
swelled.(Safran,1988:85)
Nasser'spromotionof a "unityof ranks,"his sloganforstressingthatthe divisionof
the Arab nation into severalstateswas an artificialcreationof the West,and his
establishmentof the United Arab Republic destabilizedthe entire Middle East.
Nasser's challenge led to the formationof the Arab Federation (ittihad)between
of the UnitedArabRepublic
Jordanand Iraq twoweeksfollowingtheestablishment
(Dann, 1989:chap. 6). What is importantis that the externalenvironmentwas
not simplybecause of the fear thatthe UAR would pose a
viewedas threatening,
militarythreat to the Arab World,37but rather because its successful,rival,
interpretation
of the role of the Arab state provided a challenge to both the
of many
statesystemand thedomesticlegitimacy
governingnormsof the inter-Arab
Arab states.In short,the institutionof pan-Arabismcontinuedto influenceboth
Arab massesand leaders alike,who, in turn,challengedthe earlierconceptionof
state sovereigntyas the cornerstonefor regional life. Such conflictingrole
complicatedthesearchforregionalstability.
expectationssignificantly
The thirdwaythatpan-Arabismaccentuatedregionalconflictwas by producing
differentmeanings and understandingsconcerningwhat being an Arab state
demanded. As I argued earlier,although Arab leaders supported pan-Arabism,
mindsconcerningwhatthatentailedor meant.Such conflict
theywereof different
of meaningwas highlylikelygiven thatpan-Arabismallocated a preferencerole,
and meaningsof the actors that
one thatwas dependent on the interpretations
could be expected to produce false
occupied thatrole. Differentinterpretations
expectationsand conflict.Order would be possible only aftercollectivemeaning
was established(Adlerand Haas, 1992:368).
That pan-Arabismwas subjectto variousinterpretations
was trueboth spatially
and temporally.For instance,fromthe mid-1940sthroughthe mid-1950sthere
were significant
differencesbetweenthe Arab statesconcerningwhat it meant to
fulfillpan-Arabism'snorms. Saudi Arabia was suspicious of a pan-Arabismthat
potentiallyimplied unification,and acquiesced to participatingin variousArab
summitmeetingsand deliberationsonlyafterit was guaranteedthatEgyptshared
withit an antipathyto unificationschemes.The same Arab statealso showed an
abilityto "learn" or adopt a new meaning and interpretationof pan-Arabism.
Perhapsthe mostvisibleexample is Egypt,whichfluctuatedamong a pan-Arabism
that meant inter-state
cooperation (Faisal), one that meant political unification
(Nasser), and one thatmeant raisond'etat(Sadat). It is important,however,not to
thereis every
assumethatsuch changesrepresentedsimplychangesin personality;
reason to believe that these leaders were themselvesrepresentingsocial forces,
relations,and the expectationsand demands thatsocietal
changesin state-society
forceshad of the state'sforeignpolicy.
In sum, the twininstitutions
and pan-Arabismsignificantly
of statesovereignty
affectedthe foreignpoliciesof Arab statesand complicatedthe region'ssearchfor
I have identifiedthreereasonsforthisdynamic.First,because of
orderand stability.
pan-ArabismArab stateswere on a constantsearch for legitimacy:theirforeign
policies often articulated,and at the least were couched in, Arabism'sdesigns,
whichonlyhinderedthe goal of institutionalizing
sovereignty.
Second, therewere
on the agenda
both stateand nonstateforcesthatcontinuedto place pan-Arabism
and to argue thatthe role of the Arab stateand the design of the regionalsystem
37Theobviousexceptionhere is theYemenWar between1962 and 1967.
290
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
was stillfar fromsettled.Consequently,there was a directrelationshipbetween
those actorswho were viewedas a threatand theirpresentationof a role for the
Arab state thatwas consistentwithpan-Arabism.Third,Arab stateshad different
understandingsof what pan-Arabismmeant and what was expected of the Arab
state. Such differentinterpretations
produced false expectationsand bred interstateconflict.In general,such conflicting
behavioralpropensitiesmeantthatit was
difficult
to establisha stableset of expectationsand a commonset of meaningsand
understandingsin inter-Arabrelations; this clash of roles and understandings
concerningwhatwas expected of the Arab statecomplicatedthe search for predictableand stableexpectationsupon whichanyregionalorderwouldbe based.
Conclusion
The concept of internationalinstitutions
has sweptinternationalrelationstheory,
but unfortunately
thissweep has not included a detailed and carefulstudyof the
is
concept of roles. The neglectof the relationshipbetweenroles and institutions
forroles,byvirtueof theirabilityto constrainstateactivity
and harunfortunate,
monize expectations,are inextricably
linked to questionsof internationalcooperIn otherwords,the conceptof rolesis centralforappreciating
ation and stability.38
I
produce stability.
fullyhow,and underwhatconditions,internationalinstitutions
want to conclude by considering,first,the relationshipbetweenrole conflictand
not onlyby
institutional
instability
and, second, how institutions
promotestability
encouraginga stableset of expectationsbut also byhelpingto shape stateinterests.
Institutionsfacilitatesocial order once actors play set roles, which leads to
certain institutionalizedpatterns of interactionthat provide some degree of
predictability
and certaintyin dailylife.Statesfrequentlyexperiencerole conflict
because of theirsimultaneouspresence in institutions
thatdemand contradictory
role expectationsand performances:actingin a mannerthatis consistentwithone
role mightunderminethe stability
of anotherinstitution.
failedto produce the same stabilizingoutcomesin the Middle East
Sovereignty
as in Africabecause pan-Arabismassigned to the Arab statea contradictory
role
and associatedbehavioralexpectations.Because of the coexistenceof pan-Arabism
and statesovereignty
Arab stateswere expected at one and the same timeto act in
a manner that was consistentwith sovereigntyand to recognize their own
and transitorynature. State sovereigntyofferedsome assurance of
artificiality
survival,giving Arab leaders a strong political interestin maintainingthese
Yet
borders,limitingregionalviolence,and recognizingeach other's sovereignty.
the idea thattheseweresupposed to
the beliefthattheyshareda commonidentity,
createdthe
be nationalstates,and the understandingthatthe Westhad arbitrarily
Arab statesand hence constructeda strongobstacle to Arab unity,combined to
createstrongdomesticpressuresfor,and to produce a generationof Arab leaders
thatexpressed,pan-Arabaspirations.Role conflictin the Middle East complicated
the searchforregionalorder.In general,frequently
statesare expected to perform
any numberof roles thatmayconflictwithone another;thismaybe particularly
true in an era of increasing interdependence that embeds state actors in a
of institutions
multiplicity
(Rosenau, 1990:213).
The concept of role conflictofferspotentiallyimportantcautionarynotes for
both neoliberalinstitutionalism
and neorealism.Neoliberalinstitutionalism
is most
relevantwhere there are both mutual interestsamong statesand institutionsto
38SeeRosenau (1990:215-216) foradditionalinsightsto be gained froman examinationof roles.
MICHAEL BARNETT
291
facilitate cooperation (Keohane, 1989:2-3); these conditions are likely to
encourage statesto evaluateoutcomesaccordingto absolute,ratherthan relative,
gains.This study,however,suggestsan importantaddendum: the presence of two
or more roles,even where mutual interestsattendin both, mightboth preclude
required to encourage cooperation and increase the
the institutionalization
because
prospectof conflictand, withit,the salience of relativegains. Specifically,
sugpan-Arabismholds thatArab stateshave common interests,and sovereignty
Arab
geststhatstateshave,at a minimum,a sharedinterestin each other'ssurvival,
stateswere seeminglypositioned to favorabsolute over relativegains. Inter-Arab
cooperation and absolute gains were undermined,however,by role conflictand
the regional suspicionsthat it bred. In short,whereas the presence of common
settingmightincreasestateinterestin absolute gains
interestsand an institutional
and cooperation, the presence of role conflict,even where shared interestsfor
both rolesattend,mightreintroducethe importanceof relativegains.
in
goal of predictability
Role conflictunderminesneorealism'sself-proclaimed
twoways.First,it challengesthe general neorealistclaim thatinternationalinstituso forthose thatare weaklyorganized,are ephemeral,and
tions,and particularly
thatpowerfulactorscan overruntheirdictateswhen theyview theirdemands as
ignored pancounter to the state's interests.Whereas Arab leaders successfully
Arabism'sdemand of politicalunification,theywere less successfulat resistingits
is
of an institution
other charges.As Young (1992:161) argues,the "effectiveness"
than
determinedby"theextentthatitsoperationimpelsactorsto behavedifferently
arrangement
did not existor ifsome otherinstitutional
theywould ifthe institution
were put in its place." In these termsthere is littlequestion of pan-Arabism's
role, and preferences
effectiveness.
Second, role conflictsuggeststhatthe identity,
of sovereignty
Althoughthe institution
of stateactorscannot be assumed a priorai.
mayhave long-runsocializingtendenciessuch thatit promotes"sameness"among
stateactors(Waltz,1979:128-129),stateactorsoftenexhibitvariousrolesas a result
Therefore,to attemptto
internationalinstitutions.
of theirpresence in different
deduce state interestsfromthe internationaldistributionof power is potentially
misleading.Because "neo-realistshave disregardedsome of the most important
sourcesof expectationslyingat the individual(subjective)and institutional(intersubjective)levels" (Adler and Haas, 1992:369), theyhave ignored an important
conflict.
sourceofinterstate
then we
stability,
If roles are an importantvariablein explaininginstitutional
in
requirea greaterunderstandingof the sourceof roles.The presentstructuralism
internationalrelations theorysuggeststhat systemicforces representthe most
how domesticand regional
however,highlights
potentoriginof roles;pan-Arabism,
forces must also be counted as additional sources. Moreover,we need greater
frequently
systems;
attentionto the relationshipbetweenregionaland international
internationalrelationstheoryignoresthat statesare expected to adhere to both
internationaland regional roles. Indeed, the necessity of examining the
relationshipbetweenregional and internationalsystemsis probablymore salient
todaybecause of the end of the Cold Warand the increasingautonomyaccorded to
manyregions as a consequence of theirdecliningimportanceto the West. The
decline of the Cold War has precipitateda reconsiderationof nationalityand
territorial
questions,which has prodded a complex search for identityfor many
states.For instance,a currentdebate in Turkeyrevolvesaround whetherTurkeyis
part of the Islamic, pan-Turkic,or European community;the answer to such
questionswillhave importantforeignpolicyimplications.
If statesfrequently
experiencerole conflict,and interdependenceincreasesthat
frequency,then we need greater attentionto both how states reconcile such
conflictand how such role conflictmightact as an importantsource of instability.
292
Institutions,
Roles,and Disorder
An importantconsiderationin attemptingto understandhow statesreconcilerole
conflictis whether states occupy preferenceroles or position roles. Earlier I
to reconsuggestedthat(1) whilepreferenceroles grantstatesgreateropportunity
cile potentiallyinconsistentrole expectations,this behavioral leeway is also
associatedwitha greaterlikelihoodforinter-actor
misunderstanding
and, hence,
instability;
and (2) whilepositionroles betterdefineand limitstatebehaviorthey
may be less resilientto role conflictbecause theyallow decision makers little
interpretive
leewayto reconcilethe competingrole expectationstheyoccasionally
produce.
and statesovereignty
The relationshipbetweenpan-Arabism
illustrates
how preference roles offerthese advantagesand disadvantages.Pan-Arabism'sfailurewas
partiallydue to the differentunderstandingsheld by Arab leaders of what it
demanded; during the early postwarperiod Arab leaders were not necessarily
but theydid presentverydifferent
ofwhat
opposed to pan-Arabism,
interpretations
being an Arab stateentailed. Indeed, a dominantexplanationfor the decline of
pan-Arabismwas that it generated false expectationsand hopes (Ajami, 1981),
whichcan be partiallyattributedto conflicting
interpretations
concerningwhatwas
and pan-Arabism
are informal
expectedof theArabstate.Because statesovereignty
institutionsthat distributepreferenceroles for Arab states,both allowed for a
of behaviors depending on domestic and internationalstructures,
multiplicity
states'interactivelearningprocess,and theirown interpretation
of the meaning
and expectationsassociatedwithpan-Arabism.
In sum, it is importantto recognize thatinstitutions
contain different
typesof
roles,and thatthishas importantimplicationsfor the likelihoodof role conflict,
how easilyrole conflictis reconciled,and the prospectsfor stabilityand cooperation. Regional stability
in the Middle East would onlyincreaseas the Arab states
began to share "specificgoals and interlockingphases of performance"(Berger
and Luckmann, 1967:72) and come to have mutual expectationsand shared
understandings.39
This discussion of pan-Arabismhighlightsthe limitsof anarchy-centric
and
microeconomicapproaches to the studyof internationalpoliticsand institutions.
Said otherwise,it identifiesthe benefitsto be gained byadoptinga more sociological approach. Specifically,
an exclusivefocuson anarchymisseshow pan-Arabism
helped to define the definitionof the national interest,the content of state
interests,and whysome stateswere considereda threat.For instance,in Egyptas
the definitionof the national interestexpanded from the Egyptiannation to
include the Arab nation-an expansion thatwas a productof transnationalforces
and linkagesnot necessarilyencouragedbyEgyptianleaders-there was an accompanyingshiftin the definitionof the Egyptianstateinterests:a foreignpolicythat
once evidenced relativelylittleattentionto events in the Fertile Crescent now
found thateventstherewere of concern. Indeed, Egyptianleaders believed that
whereas pan-Arabismmighthinder the state's interests-forit was nurturinga
d6tentewithBritainthat it hoped would increase its autonomy-theyfound the
39Thisdiscussionhelps to account forpan-Arabism'sMarkTwain-likeexistenceand the constantwritingof panArabism'sobituary(Ajami, 1978/79, 1981). Because pan-Arabismand statesovereignty
are preferenceroles theyare
capable of embodyinga different
meaningand interpretation
over timewithoutone institution
displacingthe other.
Specifically, pan-Arabism's meaning has changed from political integration to inter-Arabconsultation and
cooperation (Oweni,1992:90). Therefore,in contrastto the earlypost WorldWar II era, presentlypan-Arabismand
statesovereignty
are not incompatible.Althoughthispaper did not address the so-calleddecline of pan-Arabism,
in
another paper I argue that inter-Arabinteractionsand state formationprocesses have promoted a state-national
identitythatis betterable to compete withan Arab national identity(Barnett,1993). Therefore,I attemptto trace
how one institutioni
"wonout" overanlother.
MICHAEL BARNETT
293
demands of pan-Arabismtoo strongto ignore.It is impossibleto understandthis
change in Egyptianforeignpolicy by searchingfor externalsecuritythreats;it
becomes comprehensibleonlybyexaminingthe change in the idea of the nation
of pan-Arabismnot only
among the Egyptianpopulation.In short,the institution
providedan importantsource of expectationsof statebehavior,it also helped to
define the contentof state interests.Finally,as pre-NasserEgyptianleaders now
consideredEgyptas partof the Arab World,theycame to defineas a threatthose
statesthatattemptedto challenge the norm of sovereignty
and presenta role for
theArabstatethatwas consistentwiththe dictatesof pan-Arabism.
Therefore,thisdiscussionis consistentwiththose theoristswho desire to move
beyond rationalistapproaches to internationalinstitutionsand to champion a
reflectiveresearch program that reversesthe traditionalrelationshipbetween
institutionsand interests.Specifically,this discussion reinforcesthe need to
examine not only how pre-givenstate interestsshape institutionsbut also how
institutions
shape stateinterests.There is an expandingliteraturethatis interested
in overcomingneorealism'sadherence to exogenouslydeterminedand theoreticallygivenstatepreferences,and itsfailureto recognizethatinteractivelearning,
transnational
institutions,
and domesticforcescan be an importantsource of state
interests(Ikenberryand Kupchan, 1990; Adler and Haas, 1992; Wendt,1992a).40
Nevertheless,this discussionsuggeststhat reflectiveresearch should pay greater
and to how states
attentionboth to the multiplesourcesof staterolesand interests,
mayexpressand embodya numberof roles at any one time.Too frequentlythis
literatureconcentrateson one external source of state interestsand fails to
recognize that there are multiple sources of state interests.In general, this
discussion reinforcesthe need for a better understandingof the relationship
betweenstatepreferencesand institutional
structures;such a relationshippotentiallyyieldsimportantinsightsinto the natureof stabilityand conflictin internationalinstitutions.
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