Black Sunday in Sadr City

Black Sunday in Sadr City
"Black Sunday" in Sadr City, April 4, 2004
Go!
April 4, 2004 was a bloody day for American forces in Sadr City,
Iraq. Some of the troops call it "Black Sunday," sad, because it was
Palm Sunday. What began as a routine patrol escorting sewage
trucks, known as the "honey wagons," ended up in surprise
ambushes that left eight US Army soldiers killed in action that day.
We think about 50 were wounded, many of whom had to be taken
back to the US. "Black Sunday" seems to have occurred at the
confluence of various events. The city was and remains shamefully
poor, but had been peaceful. Some political events were already in
train that caused tensions between the city's independent-minded
residents and American forces who were trying to improve the city's
condition but were nonetheless increasingly seen as occupiers. Then
some new political events emerged that made confrontation
inevitable, all at a time when the US was finishing up a major troop
rotation. At the end of the day, a routine patrol and patrols that
would try to rescue it took the brunt of these and other converging
events. As you will see, little in life is simple, little can be taken for
granted, and one is always best advised to keep his or her guard up.
Furthermore, every one of these kinds of fights has consequences, in
Iraq, here, and around the world.
By Ed Marek, editor
October 19, 2004, revised November 8, 2004 based on new
information received from an Army spokesman; revised again
for the same reason on November 12, 2007. Updated on
February 26, 2012 to highlight the important role played by the
1-12 Cav medics.
(Note bene: Most photos of "battle scenes" that follow are not from
the April 4 fight. They are provided for descriptive purposes only, to
help readers envision the fight)
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Opening photo credit: U.S.
Army soldiers from the 2nd
Battalion 5th Cavalry
Regiment drive through the
Sadr City neighborhood of
Baghdad, Oct. 11, 2004.
Militia members began
turning in weapons and
ammunition as part of a deal
with the Iraqi government to
end the violence between
insurgents and U.S. forces in
Sadr City. John Moore, AP
Black Sunday in Sadr City
April 4, 2004 was a bloody day for American forces in Sadr City,
Iraq, a suburb of Baghdad. Eight US Army soldiers were killed in
action that day. We do not know the count of wounded. We are
aware that one company alone suffered 14 wounded, all of whom
were serious enough to be medevac'd back to the US, and we have
seen a media report that said 50 were wounded total.
Major General Martin Dempsey, Commander, First Armored
Division, called the fight of April 4 in Sadr City “the biggest
gunfight since the fall of Baghdad a year ago.” The battle was one
of the worst single losses for US soldiers since the fall of Baghdad a
year before.
We are distant from the battlefield with no direct access to those
who fought the Sadr City battle of April 4 so valiantly. This editor is
in awe of the soldiers who braved that city on that day, and we
remain in awe of all our fighting forces deployed to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
The fog of war is always very hard to explore, by anyone.
Nonetheless, we have had sufficient access to a sufficient amount of
information to draw some conclusions and express some concerns.
Three background points to understand
Before trying to ascertain what happened on that April 4, Palm
Sunday for Christians, three major points need to be made.
First, Sadr City is one of the poorest districts in all Baghdad,
and one of the most densely populated. There is an estimated 2.0
million people living in an 8-sq-mile district, about the population
of Houston. About half of Baghdad's population lives here.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
The first Landsat photo shows you a glimpse of Sadr City in
relationship to the rest of Baghdad. It is in the northeastern sector.
The second Landsat photo zooms in on Sadr City. It is 19-sq-miles
in area, and, as you can see, is mostly homes and businesses. Some
call it a “concrete jungle." Saddam Hussein had it built. It is said he
visited once, and never came back. Camp War Eagle just outside the
city proper, to the east. The troops living and working there suffered
continuous mortar attacks.
The "gunfight" in Sadr City we mentioned at the opening that
occurred on April 4, 2004 involved an ambush of the 2-5 Cav. The
2-5 Cav was a newly arriving unit, having come to Camp War Eagle
just weeks before the ambush, in March 2004. The 2-5 Cav was
replacing the 1st Sq 2nd Cav to take responsibility for Sadr City. As
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
it turned out, the 2nd Cav was extended.
The point we wish to make is that a troop changeover was occurring
at this time at War Eagle. We will talk later about the troop
changeover that was occurring in the spring 2004, will return to
Camp War Eagle later, and will also mentioned the 1st Sq 2nd Cav
later when we talk a bit more about the battle.
We want to show you one more Landsat photo of the city.
This zoom view gives you a sense for the density, and, if you are in
the military and responsible for patrolling these streets, you can see
how easy it might be to get yourself in a jam.
Experts who have studied this country say that the people of Sadr
City not only are part of the Shi'ite majority while Saddam Hussein
was part of the Sunni minority, but the people of the city held
Hussein responsible for their misery. Therefore, many, perhaps most
of them were happy to see American forces liberate them from
Hussein. However, they had for some time been pressing their
government for increased autonomy. Hussein refused that.
Once the Americans liberated them
from Hussein, the people of the city
continued to press for the autonomy
they had wanted for so long. As a
general rule, the Americans were
reluctant to grant that because the
area was so badly in need of the
bare necessities of life,
reconstruction and it was a highly
volatile area politically, prone to
instability and insecurity. Therefore,
from the time the Americans arrived
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
in June 2003, there was a tension
between the residents and the occupiers, a tension evident on the
face of this young girl peering from her home in Sadr City (Photo
credit: Jewel Samad, AFP).
It's worthwhile getting a sense for the poverty, through these few
photos that follow, all credited to Andrea Brice Woodall, The
Washington Post.
Sewage flows in the streets of Sadr City, Baghdad's large Shiite slum, where cleric
Moqtada Sadr has wide support.
A woman empties her garbage near the street in the sprawling Shiite area of
Baghdad known as Sadr City. Garbage collection and disposal are rare in this
poverty-stricken side of the city.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
Goats graze in the garbage left in the roadside as sheep and goat herders tend their
flock in the poverty stricken side of Baghdad known as Sadr City.
For much of the time, however, the tension was held in check. There
were multiple reasons. One reason is that the Army, private
businesses and non-government organizations had poured several
million dollars into the city to get it up on its feet with the minimum
essential things like water, electricity and sewage systems. Indeed
there was progress made, as everyone clearly understood the need to
improve conditions in the city as quickly as possible. People used
the municipal center as a place to voice their opinions and meet, a
real embryo for democracy.
In this photo, for example, you see American forces handing out aid
to local residents in Sadr City. You cannot see the length of the
truck's flatbed, but it is long and has a lot of aid on it.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
In this photo, which we believe was taken outside Camp Eagle,
which we think is in the background, US troops are putting a group
of Iraqi lads through warm ups prior to a soccer match. We have
seen many photos like this and the one above to indicate there was
real solid progress to bring peace to Sadr City.
The second point has to do with the posture of our military
forces in Iraq, and specifically Baghdad, at the time of the April 4,
2004 Battle of Sadr City. Said briefly, they were in the final throes
of the most massive troop rotation in the history of the US military.
It was known as Operation Iraqi Freedom 2, or OIF2 for short. This
was the first major force rotation of the war and was the largest,
fastest combat cargo movement since WWII. The rough numbers
were 130,000 US troops going out, and 110,000 US troops coming
in, plus everyone's equipment and weapons systems traveling in
each direction.
The turnover in Baghdad can get a little
confusing, because the major units have
similar names" 1st Armored Division
replaced by the 1st Armored Cavalry
Division.
The 1st Armored Division, "Old
Ironsides," home-based in Germany, had
been in Iraq since the war began. It was
responsible for Baghdad. A unit not
normally part of the 1st Armored was responsible for Sadr City.
On April 15, 2004, a quiet turnover of
official responsibility for Baghdad
occurred. The 1st Armored Cavalry
Division, known as the "Ironhorse
Division," also known as "The First Team,"
America's largest Army division, took
responsibility for Baghdad, replacing the
1st Armored Division.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
Even though Old Ironsides had been relieved of responsibility for
Baghdad, its tour of duty was extended for three months due to
increased enemy operations in the south. It redeployed units out of
Baghdad to the southern cities of Najaf, Diwaniya, Kut and Karbala.
It finally returned home to Germany in July 2004.
Formal changeover of responsibility for Baghdad and Sadr City
occurred on April 15, 2004. For the April 4 battle, most soldiers had
been there for only a week or two, and most of the officers had been
there only a month. The commander responsible for the main thrust
into Sadr City officially took command about 15 minutes after the
battle got nasty. He fought valiantly, as did his soldiers, but one
cannot ignore this timing when analyzing the April 4 battle.
The third and final background point relates back to earlier
comments about continuous tensions between Sadr City
residents and American forces. As we have already indicated,
poverty was not the only hot-button issue in Sadr City. Initially seen
as liberators, American forces by April 2004 were seen as
occupation forces, unwanted by many; not so much because the
residents hated Americans, because there is plenty of testimony that
they did not hate them, but more because they had always wanted
autonomy for themselves and they feared the Americans would
overstay their welcome.
A rather obscure and unpopular
“religious cleric,” named Muqtada
al 'Sadr, took advantage of this
tension, and the city's poverty and
the people's lack of education, to
light a fire under an already hot
kettle.
This man surprised the Americans,
and has been a thorn in the side of
the American-led Coalition and the interim Iraqi government since
Saddam Hussein was taken down. His father, Grand Ayatollah
Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, was the most powerful Shiite cleric in
Iraq in the late 1990s. His uncle, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir
al-Sadr, was a leading Shiite activist. Saddam Hussein's forces
murdered both, the uncle in 1980, the father, along with two
brothers, in 1999.
Muqtada al-Sadr is described as "fiercely anti-American." We're not
sure why, but suspect it has something to do with his ties to Iran.
Religiously, he commands very little respect among other clerics,
and has been trying to lay his claim to fame on the basis if his
lineage to his father and uncle.
While a young man in his thirties,
he has been cleverly able to blend
his anti-Americanism, his
understanding of the politics in
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
Sadr City, and the fact that there
are so many impoverished and
uneducated Shiites in Sadr City to
gather quite a following. He has
built a militia, known as the Imam
Mahdi Army, he has attracted people sharing his sentiments from
other countries to come and fight, he has actively promoted and
rewarded violence against Americans, and for reasons that escape
this editor, he has managed to stay alive after seriously disrupting
Iraq for about a year. He has been wanted by Iraq authorities on a
charge of murder.
Major General Dempsey, the 1st
Armored Division commander,
seems to agree that we should have
taken down al-Sadr a long time
ago. He said in a press conference
on May 11, 2004 in Baghdad that
the US was reluctant to take him,
because of family name, various
religious issues, etc. This sounds to
this editor very much like "State
Department speak." General
Dempsey has pointed out that the
net effect of leaving al-Sadr alone
was that he had six months to train
troops, acquire resources, gather a following, incite people, and
stockpile ammunition. In retrospect, the general said:
" I think we missed the opportunity -- it wasn't a missed
opportunity as much as it was a rational decision which
perhaps we would do differently now.
Someone some day needs to explore that "rational decision," who
made it, and why. That al-Sadr was left to do his thing has caused
the deaths and wounding of many, many American soldiers, and this
American does not like the so-called "rational decision" one bit.
But, that's water over the dam. It is worth noting that prior to April
2004 the tensions that existed did not turn into major armed
confrontations. We fear someone in charge on the US side was
lulled to sleep.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
On March 28, 2004, the Coalition shut down al-Howza (some spell
it Hawza), a newspaper published by Sadr's organization, for 60
days on charges of “inciting violence.” One result of this action is
that Sadr supporters went into the streets to protest. For the most
part, however, the protests were peaceful.
We are not certain precisely who in
the Coalition gave that order. We
have seen one press report that said
Paul Bremer ordered the closure as
an attempt to provoke al-Sadr into
a fight. We do know that as early
as January 2004, Lt. General
Sanchez, the on-scene Coalition
commander, had said that al-Howza was at risk of being shut down
if it were operating outside the laws of Iraq. He said Iraqi security
forces would take the action, if required, and Coalition forces would
support them if needed. So it is clear that there were strong tensions
between the Coalition and the newspaper.
This is an actual photo of one of the cars that was attacked in Falluja on March 31,
2004. It is provided courtesy of EastWestSoutNorth Global Culture and Politics. If
you click on that link, you will see terribly gruesome photos of the mutilation of
four American civilian contract workers. These photos are very graphic, but
should be viewed to better understand the nature of the enemy we face in Iraq and
the character of these Iraqi people. We are told by American authorities that many
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
Iraqis have voiced their outrage and shame.
On March 31, an Iraqi mob killed and mutilated four American
civilian contract workers and dragged them through the streets of
Falluja. One corpse was carted through town as people slashed it
with knives, beat it with sticks and jabbed it with poles. A burning
body was doused with gasoline to raise the flames. Two charred
bodies were hanged from a bridge over the Euphrates River. Body
parts were hung from wires. US commanders vowed a massive
response. We are unsure if such a "massive response" has ever
occurred. Perhaps the answer lies in how one defines "massive."
Then, on April 3, Coalition forces
surrounded al-Sadr's house in Najaf
and arrested Mustafa al-Yaqubi, a
senior aide to al-Sadr. This photo,
from CNN, is said to be an actual
video cut of the raid.
We have seen one press report that
said Bremer also ordered this action. Oddly, Iraq's Minister of
Communications was flabbergasted to learn of the arrest, and said
no one had alerted him to it prior to execution.
On April 3, enemy militia took control of some five police stations
and the municipal building, which heretofore had been a location of
city pride and a place where democracy was starting to take root.
Violence also broke out in Najaf, Nasiriyah, and Amarah, all led by
Shi'as, not Sunnis, and it now appeared that the Coalition had at
least a two front military problem on its hands, majority Shi'a and
minority Sunni.
The Battle for Sadr City, April 4, 2004
So, here we are. It is now April 4, 2004. The stage is set for some
kind of violent confrontation. And that's exactly what happened on
this day. It's worth repeating that it is extraordinarily hard to
reconstruct what happened in a battle, no matter who you are, or
where you are. The fog of war is always thick. We are at the
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
disadvantage of not having been there, and having to rely on media
and personal accounts, though following publication of the story, we
were contacted by a representative of the 1st Cavalry Division who
helped clarify a few outstanding questions we had.
All that said, what we know for sure, however, is that eight
American soldiers died that day in the fight. One commander said,
"Uncommon valor was common that day." It is with these eight that
we want to start:
This is the memorial service held for seven of the eight who fell, conducted by the
2-5 Cav. Sgt. Mitchell's ceremony was conducted by his unit earlier. Photo credit:
Michael Abrams, Stars and Stripes
Tracie Arsiaga and Robert
were married five months
when he left for Iraq. Tracie
said, "I'm not angry. I'm just
hurt. I believe I should have
had more time with him. He
was taken too soon. He's our
hero and we love him very,
very much." Angel Munoz,
Arsiaga's older sister who has
served in the Army, said
Arsiaga was passionate about
helping the Iraqi people. "The
soldier in me says, 'That was
his job,'" Munoz said. "And he
did his job well. The sister in
me is angry at losing him. I
don't understand why he had to
die."
Spc. Robert R. Arsiaga, 25, San Antonio, Texas, 2nd Battalion, 5th
Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Cavalry Division, hereinafter
referred to as the 2-5 Cav.
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He was known as Mel. Wanted to be
military, like both parents. Family
members said his loyalty to country
came naturally, he didn't always agree,
but always accepted the challenge and
responsibility of what he had to do. He
is a hero to everybody.
Spc. Ahmed Cason, 24, McCalla, Alabama, 2-5 Cav
Eddie was the oldest of those killed
this day. His unit thought it was
rotating out, but his platoon was called
on to go in and help. Sgt. Chen was an
infantryman with the 2-5 Cav, 1st
Cavalry Division, working from a
Humvee fighting vehicle when killed.
Sgt. Yihjyh L. "Eddie" Chen, 31, Saipan, Mariana Protectorate,
2-5 Cav
Good friends with Robert Arsiaga,
who also died this day. Survived
by his wife, Guadalupe Silva, two
sons, Israel Jr., 2, and Michael, 4
months (at the time). Garza also
had a daughter Brianna, 9 and a
son, Stephen, 8. Israel's mom,
Dinah Rodriguez, tried to dissuade
him from joining the Army. A
week before he went to Iraq, she
told him she finally accepted his
position, and told him how proud
she was of him. This is not a good
photo of him, but is the only one
we could find.
Spc. Israel Garza, 25, Lubbock, Texas, 2-5 Cav
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
Nicknamed "Dusty." Volunteered to go to Mexico in
the summer to build homes for the poor. His mom
says, "He was a true soldier. He volunteered for the
mission he was on. If I had to choose a way for him
to go, this would have been it. He was a military
career man and I am very proud of him."
Spc Stephen D. Hiller, 25, Opelika, Alabama, 2-5 Cav
Wanted to be in the military
since grade school. Two
months after 911, he joined the
regular Army. His mom and
dad said, "He believed in what
he was doing. He went in
proud and brave to serve his
country and fight terrorism,
and we want him to be
honored. We expressed all of
our love to him. Although we
mourn his loss, we are in good
spirits."
Cpl. Forest J. Jostes, 22, Albion, Illinois, 1st Battalion, 82nd Field
Artillery Regiment, hereinafter referred to as the 1-82 FA, assigned
to the 1st Armored Cavalry Division, supporting the 2-5 Cav.
An Eagle Scout, devout Catholic
committed to his parish, saw the Army
as another way of serving. His mom
says, "My son was brave; he didn't
want to go to war. But he joined the
Army and he volunteered to go on the
mission that killed him because his
buddies needed to be rescued. "
Spc. Casey Sheehan, 24, Vacaville, California, 1-82 FA, assigned
to the 1st Armored Cavalry Division, supporting the 2-5 Cav.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
His coach remembers him as "a scrappy,
tenacious competitor." His dad is a Vietnam
vet. His older sister, Christine Jaroe,
remembers him as "my little playmate. I used
to drag him and play in the dirt."
Sgt. Michael W. Mitchell, 25, Porterville, California, 2nd
Battalion, 37th Armor, 1st Armored Division
We are only going to deal with what happened on April 4, 2004, in
Sadr City. We have tried to understand which outfits were in this
fight. This is what we have reconstructed:
The 2-5 Cav was there. It
was commanded by Lt. Col.
Gary Volesky. Alpha, Bravo
and Charlie Company were
all in the fight. Bravo Co.
"Banshees" were out with
their Bradleys taking care of
business with the militias,
and did plenty of fighting
this day. Charlie Co.
"Comanches" were on patrol
and got ambushed. Alpha
Co. was standing ready as a
Quick Reaction Force (QRF)
in case anyone got into
trouble. The 2-5 Cav had just rotated in. Most soldiers had
been there only two weeks, its officers for a month or so, most
of whom were just finishing their orientations. Lt. Col.
Volesky took command of the 2-5 on this day. He was in the
fight, reported at one time trying to talk to HQ by radio while
at the same time gunning down enemy. For purposes of this
report, our focus will be on the Charlie Co. "Comanches."
Bravo Co., 2nd Battalion 37th Armor Regiment (B/2-37), an
element of the 1st Armored Division, was in the fight for sure
as well, attached to the 2nd Armored Cav Regiment (ACR) as
a tank component. It is our understanding that the 2 ACR did
not have any armor, but was organized as a Light Cavalry
regiment. The 2-37 was in the process of rotating out of Iraq,
but did send in Bravo Co. to help.
We fought with this story for two weeks, unable to resolve one
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
issue. Based on an Army press release about two Silver Stars
awarded for valor during the April 4 fight, we concluded that the
Army had launched an operation nicknamed "Operation
Lancer Fury" in Sadr City on April 4 and terminated on April
9. We concluded that the eight soldiers killed on April 4 were
part of this operation and we could not understand how they
could be surprised, ambushed and trapped. We concluded it was
not a well planned operation.
We have since learned that Operation Lancer Fury did start on
April 4, but it was a response to the ambushes and attacks that
killed the eight and wounded so many others. It was a counterattack. The facts seem to be that the patrols sustaining the most
serious attacks on April 4 included a routine patrol and rescue
patrols that attempted to help that routine patrol once it came under
a surprise attack. Operation Lancer Fury was then an organized
counterattack that lasted until April 9 and took back a group of
targets enemy forces were holding. We will return to it later.
We'll first try to describe what we think happened on April 4.
Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jerry Swope, a platoon sergeant with
Company C, 2-5 Cavalry, said the following about April 4:
“The day turned ugly real quick. We just tried to stay alive
and get out of there ... We were so glad when those vehicles (a
group of armored vehicles) came to help us and get us out of
there. I just took all my guys and got out of there as quickly as
we could.”
Melinda Liu, a well known and well respected reporter for
Newsweek magazine, a woman who was there during the initial
invasion and came back a year later, in March 2004, and was still
there in April, reported on this fight in Sadr City on April 4. She
said this:
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
“April 4 began as a routine day in the slum. A 19-man patrol
in four Humvees was escorting three Iraqi 'honey wagons' on
their rounds collecting sewage.”
Company C, 2-5 Cav's First
Sergeant Casey Carson has
described events of April 4 in Sadr
City this way:
“Operating out of Forward
Operating Base 'War Eagle,'
twenty two members of the
2-5 Cav were on patrol to
protect Shia Muslim
worshipers during the holy
period of Arbayeen. The
troopers were in heavily
armored Humvees in the
Sadr City slums of Baghdad
when they were ambushed.”
Set aside the discrepancy on the
purpose of the patrol, whether to accompany sewage workers or
protect worshippers, and the numbers of soldiers involved.
Liu reported that 1st Lt Shane
Aguero was the platoon leader for
the sewage escort. This is photo of
him taken in Iraq sometime later.
SFC Swope was in Lt. Aguero's
platoon, riding the last Humvee.
So, for Comanche Co., 2-5 Cav,
Aguero is at the lead and Swope is
in the rear of a four Humvee
patrol. Liu quotes Aguero saying
he knew something was not right:
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
“People were throwing more
rocks than usual at the
(sewage) trucks and at our gunners. Our (sewage) work crews
were threatened at each stop. At the last place about 400
people said [to the work crews] 'if you come back we'll kill
you.'”
Liu then commented that all three drivers hauled their cargo to the
disposal site, dumped it and quit on the spot.
Aguero's patrol continued on. According to Liu's account:
“The patrol encountered a number of armed men in a mosque
and told them the weapons would have to be confiscated. The
militants refused, and the Humvees moved on after some
muddled negotiations about how the weapons would be
turned in at a future date. Around 5:40 p.m., the patrol rolled
past the Sadr Bureau, headquarters for the political wing of
his (al-Sadr's) organization. Aguero noticed at least 200 men
out front who 'quickly ran away when we arrived. Another 15
or 20 people outside were waving their hands at us-but to say
stay away? Or to say hello? We couldn't tell.' A block later,
the soldiers heard a few rounds of small arms fire. 'We
couldn't tell where it came from, it was just three to five
rounds,' says Sgt. Jerry Swope of Austin, Texas, who was in
the last vehicle, 'we figured it was a lone gunman.'
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
“Aguero decided to try to detain the shooter. But as they tried
to determine the source of the gunfire, suddenly more gunmen
joined in from street-level and from second-story balconies.
'We began to engage the enemy, then got back in our vehicles
and headed north,' he says.
"Suddenly, Aguero found his
unit heading into a Mad Max
gauntlet of burning tires and
road obstacles of every
imaginable description:
concrete blocks, metal
market stalls, air
conditioners, scrap metal,
truck axles, even
refrigerators. The burning
debris put out so much
choking black smoke that
visibility was down to 300
meters. The street had
become 'a 300-meter-long kill zone,' recalls Aguero. The
vehicles swerved and ran onto sidewalks, rolling on the rims
of flat tires, as gunmen kept up the barrage of bullets.”
So what we have here is a routine patrol ambushed by surprise and
suddenly trapped. On the surface, it appears enemy forces
anticipated American patrols coming through this area and had a
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plan to attack them. Given that there had not been serious
confrontations for so many months before, indeed given that the city
had been relatively peaceful for many months, our soldiers were
surprised.
A soldier with the B Co. Banshees has told us that once the ambush
got underway, C Co. called for help and Alpha Co., the QRF force,
responded but was brought under attack on its way to C Co.'s
position. As a result, the Banshees were told to break off and get
over to help C. Co. The Banshees, however, had to wait for a
medevac to arrive before getting over there, and had to pick up the
vehicles they had left in their area.
First Sgt. Carson seems to ditto that. He said:
“The fact that a roadblock was set up, and that the original
ambush used RPGs (rocket propelled grenades) and small
arms from roof-tops and buildings indicate it was a planned
attack, and not a spontaneous event.”
It is at this point, and we are close to 6 pm by this time, that Sgt.
Chen was hit and killed on the spot. Another soldier was wounded.
Then, according to Liu's account,
two of the four Humvees were
disabled. Aguero directed his
people to dismount and get to
protective cover, which they did.
Aguero went with them and led his
soldiers into a building where they
could set up machine-gun positions
on the roof.
SFC Swope was in this fight as well. He stayed in his Humvee,
despite heavy fire, in order to keep his radio open to battalion and
arrange for help.
Swope later received the Silver Star for his
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
bravery and the coordinating actions he took
to get help. The photo to the right is of
Swope on September 30, 2004, after
receiving his award from Lt. General
Thomas Metz, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
Commanding General (Photo credit: Spc
Erik LeDrew, US Army photo)
First Sgt. Carson reported that “word got
around (at Camp War Eagle) fast that the
patrol was in trouble.” He said that their
public affairs officer, Captain O'Malley, said
this:
"They had guys who normally don't fight who volunteered to
help their buddies. There were guys fighting to get on that
convoy."
This is substantiated by the mother of Spc. Casey Sheehan. She has
said that:
“And the sergeant said, 'Sheehan, you don't have to go,'
because my son was a mechanic.' And Casey said, 'Where my
chief goes, I go.' "
It is right about here that nailing down who did what to whom gets a
little cloudy writing from here. We have received some critiques
from men who fought there and will try our best to integrate what
they have said with what we have read.
We have said that both A/2-5 Cav and B/2-5 Cav mounted QRFs,
ran into trouble, and were delayed. Lt. Colonel Mark Calvert in
command of 1-2 ACR, selected two platoons from C Troop, 1-2
ACR and they headed out from Camp War Eagle as a QRF. Calvert
took these two platoons out for a reconnaissance assessment. Tanks
from B/2-37 attached to the 1-2 ACR were then ordered to get ready
for combat along with four Light Scout Platoons and a mortar
infantry platoon from C Troop 1-2 ACR. At 2000 hours (8 PM),
they all rolled out and conducted a direct assault into Sadr City.
They reached their initial objective and eliminated enemy forces
holding that objective. The C/1-2 ACR troops and B/2-37 tanks
continued to attack through Sadr City engaging enemy forces until
they were ordered to return to Camp War Eagle.
It should be said here that the 1-82 FA, to which Sheehan and Jostes
(both participated in a QRF this day) were assigned, is field artillery,
normally employing guns as shown here:
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
These are powerful guns with very long range. Please recall that at
least part of the 1-82 FA was at Camp Eagle, on the edge of Sadr
City. So certainly such guns would be of little value at such close
range. We have seen personal accounts that say that the 1-82 FA
soldiers at Camp Eagle were not there to operate these weapons, but
rather were there to supplement infantry. While that will strike most
of us as yet another indicator that something was wrong, we would
comment that our experience in Vietnam was that you use what you
have, to do what you have to do, and sometimes one runs short of
exactly the right resources. This is common in battle. But if this
personal account is true, then it does seem to be an example of the
criticism that we did not have sufficient forces there to do the job.
According to Liu's account, Swope heard on the radio that the first
QRF was ambushed two streets away. This seems to underscore that
these QRFs entered the fray without a pre-determined plan and
perhaps even with little support, like air or armor.
Swope saw that his patrol was stuck and would have to remain put
and fight to survive. You will recall his saying:
“The day turned ugly real quick. We just tried to stay alive
and get out of there.”
Swope, manning the radios, also came to realize that similar fighting
was underway all over Sadr City, with other patrols ambushed,
trapped and in a fight for their lives.
In the mean time, our analysis of the various accounts we have is
that the first QRF was in trouble, and this second makeshift QRF
also got into trouble. Our information is that it was composed of
more Humvees and LMTVs, with no armor. The QRF headed down
a street, turned a corner, the street was blocked, people started
throwing obstacles behind them, including burning tires, and the
QRF began taking fire from rooftops and windows. Before it was
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
over, two soldiers were down. Spc. Casey Sheehan was dead. Cpl.
Foster Jostes was badly wounded and was dead by the time he
returned to Camp Eagle. We have a report that Sheehan was riding
in an LMTV with no protection, while Jostes was in a Humvee.
Apparently a third QRF was called out of Camp Eagle at 10 pm.
Liu said this QRF was composed of Humvees, Bradley Fighting
Vehicles, and two LMTVs. First Sergeant Carson, and we think
he was referring to this QRF, said it was composed of “two
columns of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M-1 Abrams tanks."
The force in the main was drawn from the 1st Squadron, 2nd
Cavalry Regiment, mainly the squadron's Comanche Troop (C
Troop). Carson said it took three hours for this fairly powerful
force to get to the patrol. Such a delay is hard to understand.
Spc. Ahmed Cason, we believe, was in the second QRF. He was a
Humvee gunner, and was hit. He dropped down, then got up and
started shooting more. He then ran out of blood and passed out. A
medic tended to him and urged that they get Cason out right away.
But the team was not able to move, caught in a stinging ambush.
Cason bled to death.
Not widely acknowledged is the role played by the 1-12 Cav
medics. They treated most of the casualties, and some of theirs even
went out into the fight to assist the wounded. One of them has told
us, "Soldiers were piling up in the back of the LMTVs and coming
back seriously wounded. In fact, 35-40 minutes into the battle all
wheeled vehicles were stopped from leaving the FOB because it
was too dangerous."
Aguero and his men remained on
the rooftop, and successfully
fought off attacks.
A Kiowa helicopter came over, the
smoke and darkness were too
much to distinguish between friend
and foe, Aguero's men set up
emergency panels designed to be
seen at night, they set disabled
Humvees on fire, and detonated
smoke grenades. Some soldiers even ripped off segments of their
uniforms and set them on fire to help the helicopter spot them.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
At long last, the heavy stuff arrived, tanks and Bradley fighting
vehicles. The area began to quiet and the troops, assembling with
the cover of the tanks, began to feel more secure.
While our focus has been on April 4, we do have a few photos from
April 5, the very next day.
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
Once the rescue forces got everyone out of their predicaments,
including killed and wounded, Operation Lancer Fury was
organized and set into motion as a counterattack. The mission was
to seize and defend all municipal buildings, including police
stations, in order to deny al-Sadr's militia from controlling any key
infrastructure in the city. Lancer Fury kicked off late in the night on
April 4. The report we have is that it took about an hour to gain
control of all the police stations and the municipal building. The
American force then defended all these until April 9, when the
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Black Sunday in Sadr City
attacks had subsided and Iraqi Police were able to take over on their
own. US tanks stood in front of the municipal building for several
days as a show that American forces prevailed.
Combat operations of all sorts continued in and around the city until
June, and started again on August 5, continuing to mid-October.
We had originally reported that a major effort ensued to buy arms
from city residents as one means to pacify the area. Our information
was that as of October 19, 2004, the US military had paid out about
$1.2 million for weapons, which were being handed in at the central
stadium. Our latest information is that the Army had paid for
weapons in May 2004, but did not do so after that. Such weapons
buys were instead made by the Iraqi government with US people
working as advisors.
Iraq's interim prime minister, Iyad Allawi, showed courage to visit
the city on October 18.
We're not sure how to close, so we'll close with this photo we found
which has a little "prayer" inscribed on the wall, a prayer that has
been around soldiers for a long time:
And when he gets to Heaven,
To Saint Peter he will tell,
"Just another soldier reporting Sir.
I have spent my time in hell."
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