Homo Academicus

For a Socio-Analysis of Intellectuals: On "Homo Academicus"
Author(s): Loïc J.D. Wacquant
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol. 34, Symposium on the Foundations of Radical
Social Science (1989), pp. 1-29
Published by: Regents of the University of California
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An InterviewWithPierreBourdieu
For a Socio-Analysis
of Intellectuals:
On Homo Academicus*
Introductionby Loïc J.D. Wacquant
An exceptionallyproductiveand inventivethinker,Frenchsociologist
Pierre Bourdieu has, over the past three decades, produced one of the
mostambitiousand fertilebodies of sociologicalworkof the post-classical
era. After a protractedhistoryof partial and often distortedreadings
among Anglo-Americanscholars,1his writings,which range widelyfrom
the anthropologyof Algeria,the sociologyof language,culture,class and
politics,to the philosophyand epistemologyof the social sciences, have
become one of the major sources of the currenttheoretical renewal.
Beyond its apparentdispersion,one major thrustof Bourdieu's work has
been to explore the manifoldformsof symbolicpower and to unmaskits
contributionto the constitutionand reproduction of domination in
modern society. This problematicof a political economy of symbolic
violence has led him,time and again, to aim his sociological weapons at
the preeminentcontendersin the symbolicclass struggle:intellectuals.In
Homo Academicus,a dense volume which packs more than twentyyears
of intenseresearchand thinkingon the subject,Bourdieu (1988a) tackles
the issue of practiceand power among French universityprofessors.
The end-resultis a livelyand often surprisingjourney throughthe
intricate landscape of academia in France. Combining ethnographic
vignettes,statisticalprofiles,and prosopographicdetail, the book offers
a vividdepictionof the structuredconflictsand intereststhatdefine and
shape the French intellectualspace and link it to the larger arena of
politics,as well as a lucid illustrationof Bourdieu's highlydistinctive
theories,concepts, and methods.Homo Academicus, however,is much
more than an empiricalinvestigationof French academics and the May
'68 crisis.It is an attemptto providean experimentaldemonstrationfor
the necessityand potencyof a genuinelyreflexivesociology: Bourdieu's
aim is to show thatsociologistscan overcome the antinomyof objectivist
and account forthe veryworld
explanationand subjectivistunderstanding
withinwhich they live on condition of turningupon themselves the
♦This text is the transcriptionof an interviewconducted in Paris in April of 1989 by
Lore J.D. Wacquant, who is also responsible for the translationand notes. The interviewer
would like to thank Daniel Breslau for a careful re-reading of the translationand the
editorial collective of the BerkeleyJournal of Sociology for their suggestions,enthusiasm,
and patience on this project.
1. See Wacquant (1989) for a discussion of the reasons for this fragmentedand
incomplete reception of Bourdieu's work in America.
2
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
scientifictools for objectivationthat theyroutinelyemploy upon others
so as to neutralizethe biases inscribedboth in the contemplativerelation
between the social observerand her object and in the factof occupying
a particularlocation in the universeunder investigation.In this sense,
Homo Academicus also constitutesa politicalinterventionin the specific
politics of intellectuallife. Bourdieu's hope is that the socio-analytic
instruments
he sharpens in this book can be used in academic struggles
to help increase the autonomyof the scientificfield and therebythe
of its participantsby makingthem more aware of
politicalresponsibility
the hidden determinationsthatoperate withinand upon it.
Yet the greatest value of Homo Academicus lies perhaps in the
and
threatit poses to the present"workingconsensus"between "theorists"
"researchers"that allows each side to ignore the other while payinglip
service to the necessityof the integrationof conceptual and empirical
work. By consistentlyeffacingthis sacred divide, Bourdieu forces us
criticallyto re-examine not only the institutionalconditions of our
professionalconduct,but also the scientificunconsciouswhich regulates
our daily practicesas symbolicproducers.There should be no mistake
about the implicationsof his inquiry:while Bourdieu writesabout French
professors,the concepts, methodology,and theoretical model he puts
forthhave a greatdeal to reveal about academics and other intellectuals
on thisside of the Atlantic.Its ultimatemerit,then,maybe to challenge
us to a hunt for homo academicus americanas that is as fiercelessand
uncompromisingas the one the Professorof the Collège de France
launched on his own tribe.
Sociology As Socioanalysis
Loïc J.D. Wacquant: One might have thoughtthat Homo Academicus
would be an easy book for you to write since it deals with French
intellectuals,that is, witha world in whichyou have been an actor, and
a centralone, fornearlythreedecades. Now,on the contrary,of all your
works,Homo Academicus appears to be the one that has cost you most
in termsof time,of thinking,of writing,and in research effort-andalso
(I think this is revealing) in terms of anxiety: you mention in the
forewordyour apprehension about publishing such a book and you
devote the entire opening chapter to ward off,and to guard yourself
against, a wide varietyof possible misreadings.Whyso much difficulty?
Pierre Bourdieu: It is true thatHomo Academicus is a book that I kept
for a verylong time in myfilesbecause I feared that it would slip away
from me upon publication and that it would be read in a manner
opposite to its deep intent,namely,as a pamphletor as an instrument
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
3
It is a book whichis peculiarin thatthe ordinary
of self-flagellation.2
workrequiredby scientific
is accompaniedby a work-a
objectivation
labor in the psychoanalytic
sense-upon the subjectof objectivation.
on suchan object,one is reminded
at everymomentthatthe
Working
himself
is beingobjectivized:
theharshest
and
subjectof theobjectivation
most cruel analysesare writtenwith the knowledgeand an acute
of thefactthattheyapplyto he whois writing
awarenesss
them;and,at
thesame time,withtheawarenessthatthosewhobearsuchcruelty
will
notthinkforone momentthattheauthorof thisor thatsentenceGlied
withviolencebearsit alongwiththem.Consequently,
theywilldenounce
as gratuitous
what
is
in
anamnesis~a
fact
a
labor
cruelty
socioanalysis.
of
I have in mindhere in particularsome of the passages which
I havehad-I thinkthatthis
separatedme fromsomeof mybestfriends.
is not of merelyanecdotalsignificanceverydramaticclashes with
theviolenceoftheobjectivation
colleagueswhoperceived
veryaccurately
butwho saw a contradiction
in the factthatI couldobjectivizewithout
of myself,
whileof courseI was doingit all thewhile.[...]
thinking
This nativefamiliarity
withtheuniversethatyouanalyzewas thusan
asset but also, on anotherlevel,an obstaclethatyou had to overturn.
Is thiswhyyoubase yourworkon sucha largearrayofdata (themere
listingofall thesourcestakesup severalpagesand appendices)and yet
displayonlya smallportionofthem?One cannotbutbe struckbyhow
asceticthisbook is.
It is indeedan asceticbook in tworespects,
first
withregardto the
use of data,secondwithregardto writing.
Thereis firstof all an ascesis
in the rhetoricof data display.There are severalfactorsbehindthis,
a numberof thingsthatan analysis
of myintellectual
including
trajectory
(Bourdieu1987a;Honneth,KocybaandSchwibs1986)wouldaccountfor
thatI owe precisely
to having
verywell,suchas a formof aristocratism
followedone of thehighesttrajectories
in theFrencheducationalsytem,
to havingbeen initially
trainedas a philosopher,
etc. This explainsthat
and thata
my"invisible
college"is foundfora partamongphilosophers
certainformof positivistic
exhibitionism
is no doubt unconsciously
forbidden
to me as pedestrian.
[...] Havingsaid this,it is truethatI have
perhapsneverhandledmoredata thanforthisbook.This is something
2. Reflecting
on HomoAcademicusshortly
afteritspublication,
Bourdieu(1987a, p.
of
117) writeswithrare emotion:"Sociologycan be an extremely
powerfulinstrument
whichallowsone betterto understand
whathe or she is by givingone an
self-analysis
of one's ownconditions
of production
and of thepositionone occupiesin
understanding
thesocialworld.. . It followsthatthisbookdemandsa particular
mannerof reading.One
is not to construeit as a pamphletor to use it in a self-punitive
fashion.. . If mybook
were read as a pamphlet,I would soon come to hate it and I would ratherhave it
burned."
4
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
that is not always readilyrecognized in the United States, no doubt in
the name of a positivisticdefinitionof data and of their usage which
wronglyidentifiesscience with an exhibitionismof data and results--we
would be better advised to display the conditionsof constructionand
analysisof these data.
Secondly, there is an ascesis at the level of writing.I wrote a
considerablenumberof pages which could have earned me a succès de
scandale forbeing slightlypolemic and caustic that I ended up throwing
out because, precisely,theywould have encouraged a regressionto the
ordinaryvisionof the field,whichis generallypolemic. I should also add
that the scientificrenderingof an in-depthsociological analysisof this
kind raises verythornyquestions of writing.One would need to invent
a whole new language for it (the journal thatwe edit at the Center for
European Sociology,Actes de la rechercheen sciencessociales, has been
a laboratory for experimentingsuch a new mode of sociological
expression).
In fact,one of the centralproblemsof a sociologyof the intellectual
milieu is that intellectuals are, as all social agents, "spontaneous
sociologists"who are particularlyskilled at objectivizingothers. Being
professionalsof discourse and explication,however,intellectualshave a
much greater than average capacity to transformtheir spontaneous
vision of the social world,into the
sociology,thatis, theirself-interested
much of sociologyis little
a
of
scientific
Besides,
appearance
sociology.
more than that...
This would be especially true of the sociologyof intellectuals?
Yes, for the sociology of intellectuals is very often the mere
conversionof an interestedand partialvision of the weaknesses of one's
intellectualopponents into a discourse that has all the trappingsof
science. This is most evident at the stage of constructionof the object,
one asks what
forinstancein the samplingproceduresadopted: typically,
is an intellectualand provides a definitionbased on biased, partisan
a centralpropertyof the intellectualfield,
criteria,furthermore
destroying
site
that
it
is
the
of
strugglesover who does and does not belong
namely,
to it.
At the riskof seemingto moralize,I would say that,on thismatter,
comes at the cost of a kind of a little courage of every
scientificity
moment,a vigilanceand commitmentto criticallyscrutinizeeach word,
each line, to track down polemical adjectives, slight connotations,
unconsciousinnuendos,and so on.
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
5
And Practice
Field,Interest,
it shouldbe emphasizedthatHomoAcadémicasis nota book
Precisely,
on intellectualsbut ratheron the intellectual
field.I thinkthat this
and in thetheoretical
a fundamental
difference
ofperspective
introduces
of theobject Whatis themeaningof this notionof field
construction
in
and howdid it helpyou,in the particularinstanceof intellectuals,
shapingyourproblematic?
much-a
BeforeI put fortha definition-Ido not like definitions
de sociologue
briefaside on theirusage.I couldreferhereto Le métier
(Bourdieuet al. 1973),whichis a didactic,almostscholasticbook,3but
which nevertheless
containsmanytheoreticaland methododological
thatwouldmakepeople understand
thatmanyof thegapsor
principles
and
forwhichI amreproached
are infactconsciousrefusals
shortcomings
deliberatechoices.For instance,the use of open conceptsis a wayof
thisis a ready-made
rejectingpositivism-but
phrase;it is, to be more
other
a
that
reminder
have no definition
permanent
concepts
precise,
thansystemic.
Such notionsas habitus,field,and capitalare definable,
butonlywithinthetheoretical
not in isolation.
systemtheyconstitute,
This applies also to a questionwhichis oftenput to me in the
UnitedStates:whydo I not proposeanylaws of the middlerange?I
thinkthat thiswould firstof all be a way of satisfying
a positivistic
of
the
kind
in
earlier
times
represented
expectation,
by a book by
Berelsonand Steiner(1964) whichwas a rote compilationof small,
partiallaws establishedby the social sciences.This kindof positivistic
is something
thatsciencemustdenyitself.
Thereare no such
gratification
laws"
in
the
of laws,as
social
there
are
world,
"middle-range
onlysystems
is the case in physics-Duhem
said it some thirty
yearsago, and more
Quine has developedit.4Andwhatis trueofconceptsis trueof
recently
whichacquiretheirmeaningonlywithina system
of relations.
relations,
3. This book (whosetranslation
reasons
was foryearsblockedforobscurecopyright
and has recentlybeen announcedby De Gruyter)is essentialto an understanding
of
Bourdieu's sociologicalepistemology.It consistsof a 100-page expositionof the
foundational
of "appliedrationalism"
in thesocialsciences,and of a selectionof
principles
texts(by historians
and philosophers
of science,Marx,Durkheim,Weber,and other
thatillustrate
Each comprisesthreepartswhichtheorizethe
keyarguments.
sociologists)
threestagesthatBourdieu,following
Frenchepistemologist
GastonBachelard,considers
centralto the productionof sociologicalknowledgeand that he encapsulatesin the
formula:
"factsare conquered[through
withcommonsense],constructed,
following
rupture
verified[les faitssont conquis,construits,
constatés]"(Bourdieu et al. 1973, p. 24). A
worthwhile
criticalintroduction
of Bachelard'sphilosophy
can be foundin Tiles (1984).
4. The now-famous
statesthatscienceis a complexnetwork
Duhem-Quinehypothesis
thatfaces the testof empiricalexperienceas a whole:evidenceimpingesnot on any
or conceptbuton theentirenet theyform.
particular
proposition
6
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
Now, in thisinstance,the notion of fieldhas proved criticalbecause
the intellectualworld is a terrainwhere we are particularlyexposed to
usingoperationaldefinitionsas an unconsciousmannerof satiatingsocial
pulsions of categorization,of labeling, and where the uncontrolled
constructionof the object allows us to exclude those who do not fitthe
image thatwe have, or would like to have, of ourselves.Indeed, one of
overtheir
the general propertiesof fieldsis thattheyencompassstruggles
veryboundaries.As soon as the researcheris alerted to this,he or she
is on guard against the temptationof stating7 shall call 'intellectual'"
such and such set of agents.
A second general propertyof fields is that they are systemsof
relationsthat are independentof the populations which these relations
define.When I talkof the "intellectualfield,"I knowverywell thatin this
fieldI will find"particles"(let me pretendfor a momentwe are dealing
witha physicalfield-we shall see that it is not the case) that are under
the swayof forcesof attraction,of repulsion,and so on, as in a magnetic
field.Having said this,as soon as I speak of a field,myattentionfastens
on the primacyof this systemof objective relationsover the particles
themselves. And we could say, following the formula of a famous
that the individual,like the electron,is ausgeburtdes Felds; he
physicist,
or she is in a sense an emanation of the field. This or that particular
intellectual,this or that artist,exists as such only because there is an
intellectualor an artisticfield. (This is veryimportantto help solve the
perennial question that historiansof art have raised time and again,
namely,at what point have we moved fromthe craftsmanto the artist.
This is a question which, posed in this fashion,is almost meaningless,
since this transitionis made progressively,
along withthe constitutionof
an artisticfieldwithinwhichsomethinglike an artistcan come to exist.)5
The notion of field is extremelyimportantbecause it remindsus
thatthe true object of social science is not individuals,even thoughone
cannot constructa fieldif not throughindividuals,since the information
necessaryforstatisticalanalysisare generallyattached to individuals(or
It is the Held whichis primaryand mustbe the focusof the
institutions).
research operations. This does not imply that individuals are mere
"illusions,"that they do not exist: they exist as agents~and not as
biological individuals,actors,or subjects-who are sociallyconstitutedas
active and actingin the field under considerationby the fact that they
5. Bourdieu'sanalysisof the historicalformationof the artisticfield in late
of the modernartistis the
"invention"
Franceand of the correlative
nineteenth-century
book on The Economicsof CulturalProduction.For
of a forthcoming
centerpiece
'
sketches,see Bourdieu (1971a, 1971c, 1983b, 1987b, 1988c). A concise
preliminary
and art is Bourdieu(1989b).
statement
of Bourdieu'ssociologyof aesthetics
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
7
to be effective,
to produceeffects,
in this
possessthenecessary
properties
field.6
Ateverymomentthereis something
likea "barrierto entry"
or a right
of entrythat the field imposes and which defineseligibilityfor
participation.
Thisis indeedthedefinition
I usedto construct
mysampleof agents
activein the humanities
and social sciencesdepartments
'facultédes
whenI studythetotality
of thefaculties
or disciplines,
lettres]:
mysample
is a representative
randomsample;fortheanalysis
of thecollegeof arts,
I retainedtheset of agentswho had titlesof access,who had
however,
one or severalof the properties
thatone musthavein orderto existas
such in thisuniverse.I foundout thatone can exist in the French
fieldbecause one detainsacademicpower,definedas the
university
of the institution
powerto controlthe reproduction
(thatis, controlof
and
of
the
of
and other
allocation
financial
positions,appointments,
resources).In France,thismeansbeinga memberof the University
which nominatesuniversity
AdvisoryCommittee[comitéconsultatif]
In theUnitedStates,I couldnotsayforsurewhatwouldbe
professors.
the equivalentbodybut I believethereare analogousmechanisms
at
workthatare controlled
in
the
definite
by people occupying
positions
field.
to enterthe fieldby
People are at once foundedand legitimized
theirpossessing
a definite
One of the goals
of
configuration properties.
of researchis to identifythese active properties,these efficient
thatis,theseforms
ofspecific
characteristics,
capital.Thereis thusa sort
of hermeneutic
circle:in orderto construct
the field,one mustidentify
theformsof specificcapitalthatoperatewithinit,and to construct
the
formsof specificcapitalone mustknowthe field.There is an endless
movement
to and fro,in theresearchprocess,whichis quitelengthy
and
arduous.
To say thatthe structure
of the field-notethatI am progressively
definition
of theconcept-isdefinedbythestructure
buildinga working
of the distribution
of the specificformsof capitalthatare activein it
means thatwhen myknowledgeof formsof capital is sound,I can
differentiate
thatthereis to differentiate.
For example,and
everything
thisis one of theprinciples
thatguidedmywork,one cannotbe satisfied
6. For further
see Bourdieu(1971b, 1987e)and Bourdieuand de Saint
elaborations,
Martin(1982) on thereligious
field;Bourdieu(1981c,1989e,1989f)on thescientific
field;
Bourdieu(1981a) on the fieldof representative
politics;Bourdieu(1983b, 1988c)on the
artisticfield;Bourdieu(1987d) on the juridicalfield;Bourdieu(1983a) on the fieldof
and Bourdieuand de SaintMartin(1978) and Bourdieu(1989a) on the"field
philosophy,
of power."
8
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
with an explanatorymodel incapable of differentiating
people whom
ordinaryintuitionin the specific universe tells us are quite different.
(Parenthesis: ordinary intuition and mundane knowledge are quite
respectable;only,one mustbe sure to introducethemin the analysisin
a conscious and reasoned manner,whereas manysociologistsuse them
unconsciously,7as when they build the kind of silly typologiesthat I
criticizeat the beginningof Homo Academicus-^et sociologist"givingway
to "universal"
vs. "parochial,"etc.)8 Here intuitionraisesquestions:"Where
does the differencecomes from?"And if I have built a model that does
not differentiate
these people, then it means that somewhere I forgot
the
academic universe,a rigorous and fullyexplanatory
In
something.
account
not onlyforobjectivedifferencesbetween positions
must
system
and institutions,
but also forthe individualand collectivedistinctionsthat
agents spontaneouslyestablish, for these are part and parcel of the
objectivetruthof thisuniverse.This kindof work is verytime-consuming,
because one must acquire both a thorough knowledge of objective
propertiesof the field and sufficientcommand of the native "practical
sense," which is always suspect and touchy to use since it is through
native intuitionthat "spontaneous sociology"and value-judgementscan
re-enterthe picture.
One last and criticalpoint on this:social agents are not "particles"
that are mechanicallypushed about by externalforces.They are, rather,
bearersof capitalsand, dependingon the positionthattheyoccupyin the
fieldbyvirtueof theirendowment(volume and structure)in capital,they
tend to act either toward the preservationof the distributionof capital
or towardthe subversionof thisdistribution(thingsare of course much
more complicatedthan that). I thinkthat this is a simplifiedbut general
propositionthat applies to social space as a whole, althoughit does not
implythatall smallcapital holdersare necessarilyrevolutionariesand all
big capital holdersare automaticallyconservatives.
The field is thus not only of field of forces,a space of objective force
lines, but also a battlefield,a structuredarena within which agents,
because theycarrydifferentpotentials and have differentpositions and
proclivities,struggleto (re)define the verystructureand boundaries of
the field.
7. H. Stuart Hughes' SophisticatedRebels (1988) would be a good instance of this
uncontrolledbricolage of scientificand commonscnsical types and propositions.
8. "Far frombeing,as certain 'initiatory'representativesof the 'epistemologicalbreak'
would have us believe,a sort of simultaneouslyinauguraland terminalact, the renunciation
of first-handintuitionis the end product of a long dialectical process in which intuition,
formulatedin an empirical operation, analyses and verifiesor falsifiesitself,engendering
new hypotheses,gradually more firmlybased, which will be transcended in their turn,
thanks to the problems, failures and expectations which they bring to light"(Bourdieu
1988a, p. 7).
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
9
in a manner
Correct,buttheydo notstruggle
freely:
theystruggle
consistentwith the positionthey occupy in the field. They are
on thebasisof theperception
thattheyhaveof thefield,
differentiated
of thepointof viewtheytakeon thefieldas a viewtakenfroma point
in thefield.
Ifone definesthefieldbya specificformofcapitaland,conversely,
the
of
the
that
in
fact
it
is
in
a
field,
then,
type capitalby
currency given
this is not tautological:thereis a dialecticalmovementof mutual
whichone termhelpsprogressively
to definethe
specification
through
other.It seemsto me,however,
thatthereis a thirdterm,lackingso far
in the discussion,whichconstitutesthe conceptualbridgebetween
capital and fieldby providingthe mechanismthat "propels"definite
agents,who bear certainvalencesof capital,to take up this or that
subversionor conservation.
This tertiwn
strategy,
quid is the concept
of habitus.It playsa pivotalrole in allowingyou to breakout of the
structuralist
visionwhichreducesthesocial agentto the merebearer,
in thesenseof Träger,
ofa capital(or ofa positionin a network
in the
case of "Americanstructuralism1*)
that mechanically
determinesthe
strategyhe or she will follow,and thuseliminatesactionfromsocial
analysis.
One would need to specifythe meaning of the adjective
"structuralist.11
Marxist
forinstance,
does noteven havethe
structuralism,
of
the
notion
that
there
can be, withinsocial
concept specificcapital,
whichenjoya degreeof autonomyand
space, sub-spacesof struggles
followspecificlogicsthatare irreducible
to economiclogiceven though
In short,theyignorea wholerangeofphenomena
theyhavean economy.
thatare critical,
even fromwithintheirownapproach.
The notionof habitusis important
in thatit allowsus to escape
structural
mechanism
without
intotheintentionalist
behaviorism
relapsing
whichis butitstransfigured
Thisperspective
expression.9
positsthatthere
are externalstimuli
associatedwitha positionand thatresponsesto them
can be somewhatdeducedfroma description
of the position,following
a logicwhichcan be eithermechanistic
and deterministic
or teleological
and voluntaristic.
On theone handit is proposedthatagentsact under
theconstraint
in the situationand we have
of causes thatare inscribed
the mechanistic
on the otherit is arguedthatagentsacts
perspective;
9. The concept of habitus,as the "principleof regulated improvisation,"is the means
whereby Bourdieu re-introduces a strategic dimension into his structural framework
and individualrationality.See Bourdieu (1980a,
while-paradoxically-eschewingintentionality
chapter 3; 1977, 1985a, 1986a, 1986b, 1988d).
10
BERKELEY
JOURNAL
OF SOCIOLOGY
withfull knowledgeof thefacts,10that theyhave a complete, totalizing,
and fully-informed
vision of the situationand thus produce the response
best adjusted to it, and we have the finalist perspective. Thus,
paradoxically(but thisis somethingthatphilosophicalreflectionsince the
Cartesianshas demonstratedrepeatedly),thereis ultimatelyno difference
between a fullymechanisticand a fullyfinalistphilosophyof social
conduct
The notion of habitus accounts for what is the truthof human
action,namely,the factthatsocial agents are neitherparticlesof matter
that are determinedby externalcauses, nor littlemonads guided solely
by internal reasons, executing a sort of perfectlyrational internal
programmeof action. Social agents are the product of history,of the
historyof the whole social fieldand of the accumulatedexperienceof a
path withinthe specificsub-field.11Thus, in order to understandwhat
such and such a professorwill do in a givenconjuncture,we mustknow
what position he occupies in academic space but also how he got there
and fromwhat originalpoint in social space. The way one accedes to a
positionis inscribedin habitus as a systemof durable and transposable
dispositionsto perceive,evaluate, and respond to social reality.To put
it differently,
social agents will activelydetermine,on the basis of these
socially and historicallyconstituted categories of perception and
appreciation,the situationwhichdeterminesthem.One can even say that
social agents are determinedonly to the extent that they determine
themselves.
When they are thus embodied, differencesof social trajectoryare
such thateventsand situationsthatare perceivedby some as unbearable
or revoltingwill seem acceptable, natural or even desirable to others
(Bourdieu 1980c). For instance,when thereis a general shiftto the right
in the politicalfield,the factthatsome people remainsteadyon the left
will be viewed as rigidity,
stubborness,fromthe standpointof dominant
this will be a mark of rigor.Differencesin
whereas
for
others
values,
differencesin stances or position-takings
that
account
for
disposition
[prisesde position] are linked, throughsocial trajectory,to the values
associated with the group of origin-for instance,values of dignity,of
constancy,constantiasibi, that are at the foundationof values of honor
(a man of honor is one who does not change at everyturnof the wind).
of theFrenchexpressions
10. Translator's
note:hereBourdieuplayson thesimilarity
"undertheconstraint
of causes")and en connaissance
de causes(literally
sous la contrainte
of finalistand
de cause ("withknowledgeof causes") to bringhome the similarity
mechanistic
formsof socialanalysis.
11. On practiceas the productof the "meetingof two formsof history,"
history
in fields,see Bourdieu(1980a, pp. 95-101;
embodiedin habitusand history
objectified
1980c,1981b,1984,1986b).
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
11
Such and such political or social event that divides intellectualscannot
be describedas a stimuluswhichautomatically
determinestheirreactions.
These reactions are socially generated on the basis of situational
properties,not as these propertiesare in fact given, but as they are
perceivedthroughthe dispositionsassociated witha definitepositionand
trajectoryin the academic and social spaces. This explainsthatacademics
who occupy similarpositionssynchronically
may take up quite different
lines of politicalconduct.
You thus reject the kind of deterministicscheme that is sometimes
attributedto you withthe formula"structuredeterminespracticewhich
reproduces structure"(e.g., Gorder 1980; Jenkins1982, G iroux 1982, p.
7), that is, with the idea that position in the structure directly
determinessocial strategy,inasmuch as the determinismsapplying to
a given position never operate but through the complex filter of
dispositions acquired and articulated over the whole social and
biographical trajectoryof the agent,and of the structuralhistoryof this
position in social space.
Circularand mechanicalmodels of this kind are preciselywhat the
notion of habitus is designed to help us get away from(see Bourdieu
1980a, 1988b). On the otherhand, I can understandsuch interpretations:
insofaras dispositionsthemselvesare sociallydetermined,thenone could
It is true that analysesthat
say that I am in a sense an ultra-determinist.
take into account both effectsof positionand effectsof dispositioncan
be perceived as formidably
deterministic.
This being said, one can utilize
such analyses preciselyto step back and gain distance fromdispositions.
(This is the old Spinozistdefinitionof freedom;there are of course many
other formsof freedom,but it is one that social analysiscan provide).
The Stoicians used to say thatwhat depends upon us is not the first
movementbut only the second one. It is difficultto control the first
movements of habitus but reflexiveanalysis allows us to alter our
perceptionof the situationand therebyour reactionto the situation,thus
to control,up to a certainpoint,some of the determinismsthatoperate
through the relation of immediate complicitybetween position and
dispositions.
To come to the substantive argumentof Homo Académicas, what are,
in the French universityworld as you analyzed it, the main forms of
power, the principal species of capital that are effective?Is the
underlyingstructureof this universeas you describe it found in other
academic fields,and especially in the Americanacademic field,or is it
a unique case?
One can and must read Homo Academicus as a programmeof
research on any academic field. In fact, by means of a mere mental
12
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
the American reader can do the work of transposition
expérimentation,
and discover,throughhomological reasoning,a good numberof things
about his or her own professional universe. Of course, this is no
substitutefora thoroughscientificstudyof the Americanscientificfield.
I toyedwiththe idea of doing such a studya fewyears back; I had even
begun gatheringdata and documents duringa previous sojourn in the
United States. At the time I even thoughtof puttingtogethera team
withsome Americancolleagues to tryto cumulate all advantages,those
of the theoreticalmasteryof a comparative model and the primary
with the universe to be analyzed. I believe that, in the
familiarity
Americancase, such a project would be in some ways easier, owing to
the fact that there exist series of yearlystatisticsthat are much more
elaborate and readily available, on professors,on the various student
hierarchiesand rankings
bodies,and on universities,
university
particularly
of departments.(In the French case, I had to construct,often from
scratch,a whole batteryof indicatorswhich did not exist). I even think
that a very worthwhilefirstpass could be done on the basis of a
secondaryanalysisof data that are alreadycollected.
My hypothesis here would be that we would find the main
oppositions,such as that between academic capital linked to power over
the instruments
of reproductionand intellectualcapital linkedto scientific
renown, but that it would be expressed in different,perhaps more
forms.Would the oppositionbe more or less pronounced?
differentiated,
Is the capacityof an academic power devoid of scientificgroundingto
perpetuateitselfgreaterin France or in the United States? Only a full
survey could tell us the answer. Such research could also give an
empiricalanswer to the question that is raised periodically,both by the
Americansociologyof the French universitysystemand by the French
uses of the American model as a instrumentof critique of the French
system,namely,whetherthisAmericansystemthatpresentsitselfas more
is more favorableto scientificautonomy
competitiveand "meritocratic11
from social forces than the French system, in which sociopolitical
pressuresseem to exert themselvesin more visible fashion.This is an
and politically.
issue of the greatestimportance,both scientifically
This raises also the problem of the relation of academics to the
powers that be. Here, too, we would need to have very precise
measurementsof the relation of American scholars to the various
institutions
that are part of what I call the field of power.12In France,
seeksto getaway
12. On thenotionof fieldofpower,bywhichtheFrenchsociologist
castof theconceptof"ruling
fromthesusbstantialist
class,"see Bourdieu(1989a,especially
definition
is the following:
The fieldof poweris a fieldof
pp. 373-427).A preliminary
of theexisting
balanceof forcesbetweenformsof power,
forcesdefinedbythestructure
or betweendifferent
speciesofcapital.It is also simultaneously
forpower
afieldofstruggles
in
formsofpower.It is a space of playand competition
amongtheholdersof different
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
13
in officialadministrative
you have indicatorssuch as membership
boards,unions,etc. In
committees,
commissions,
advisory
governmental
the UnitedStates,I thinkthatone wouldneed to turnone's attention
Offices of the Dean, scientific
to the control of departments,
andespecially
thelargeresearchand
"blue-ribbon"
panels,expertreports,
and
institutes
of
research
whichseemto
foundations
policy
philanthropic
a
in
the
broader
directions
albeit
role
hidden,
crucial,
defining
play
largely
wouldbe thatthe structural
of research.On thiscount,myhypothesis
in
fieldand thefieldof powerare stronger
linksbetweentheuniversity
theUnitedStates.Of course,one wouldneed to takeintoconsideration
thespecificity
of theverystructure
of theAmerican
anotherdifference:
political field, characterized,very cursorily,by federalism,the
and conflicts
betweendifferent
levelsof decision-making,
multiplication
of oppositional
the absenceof leftistpartiesand of a strongtradition
theweakroleof "publicintellectuals,"
and so on.
trade-unionism,
In yourperspective,
on theFrench
youhavenotproduceda monograph
but studieda set of verygeneralmechanismsthatbear on
university
intellectuals
throughone of its specifichistoricalrealizations.
I followhere the Bachelardian
idea of the "particular
case of the
possible."One of the virtuesof the notionof fieldis preciselythatit
allowsone to ask verygeneralquestionsabout objects thatare very
in time and space. It generatesbroad
specificand well-demarcated
or problems-take
forinstance
thenotionthatthefieldis the
propositions
site of strugglesaround specificstakes-whichimmediately
specify
themselves
as theyare appliedto a concretehistorical
case, and which
call forcomparisons,
and so on. In
suggestnew issuesthatimmediately
use the knowledge
myown work,I constantly
acquiredof one fieldto
throwlighton anotherand to ask questionsof boththateach couldnot
possibly
generateon itsown.Thusin mylatestbook,The StateNobility
ofelite
ofconsecration
[Bourdieu1989a],inwhichI analyzethefunction
whichthe social agentsand institutions
whichall possess the determinate
quantityof
sufficient
to occupythe
specificcapital(and economicand culturalcapitalin particular)
dominant
within
theirrespective
fields[theeconomicfield,thefieldof highercivil
positions
serviceor thestate,theuniversity
one anotherin
field,and theintellectual
field]confront
aimedat preserving
or transforming
thisbalanceof forces.(...) Thisstruggle
for
strategies
the imposition
of the dominantprincipleof dominationleads, at everymoment,to a
balancein thesharing
of power,thatis,to whatI calla divisionin theworkofdomination.
It is also a struggleover the legitimate
and forthe legitimate
of legitimation
principle
mode of reproduction
of the foundations
of domination.
This can take the formof real,
or warsof religion
forinstance)or ofsymbolic
physical
struggles,
(as in"palacerevolutions"
confrontations
(as in the discussionsover the relativerankingof oratores,priests,and
in Medieval Europe). [...] The fieldof power is organizedas a
bellatorts,knights,
charismatic
structure:
thedistribution
tothedominant
ofhierarchization
according
principle
to thedistribution
(economiccapital)is inversely
symmetrical
accordingto thedominated
ofhierarchization
lectureon "TheFieldof Power,"
principle
(cultural
capital)"(unpublished
of Wisconsin-Madison,
University
April1989).
14
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
schoolsin theirrelationto the fieldof powerand in the reproduction
call the "rulingclass,"I referboth to
of whatwe commonsensically
in advancedcountries,
especiallyin Englandand
equivalentinstitutions
the United States,and to comparablemechanisms
presentin more
traditional
societiessuch as the Maori of New Zealand, or to the
in medievalsocietyas describedby
of thedubbingof knights
ceremony
MarcBloch...
Let us returnto the problemof the logicof action.Even thoughyou
evensometimespreferences
of interest,
utilizethevocabulary
strategy,
as in The StateNobility
(Bourdieu1989a,pp. 225-228),the theoryof
practicethat you put forth,as a historicallyconstituteddialectic
between
thesocialembodiedin theformofhabitusand thesocialmade
institution
in theformoffields,presentsitself,notas a theory
germane
and
alternative
to rationalchoicetheory,
but reallyas a fundamental
challengeto it
It is, I believe,the true paradigmwhichaccountsboth for the
immanentlogic of action and for what appearanceof validitythe
of
of RationalActionTheory(RAT) mayhave.The paradigm
paradigm
untenable~wehave knownthisforquite some time
RAT is obviously
that have been
now and I shall not rehearsehere all the criticisms
on
to
Durkheim
Pascal
from
levelledat itsanthropological
foundations,
after
his
downto Wittgenstein.
But,justas Ptolemy
system
perpetuated
on
in it moreand morecorrections,
likewise,
byintroducing
Copernicus
theside of theRAT, someauthorssuchas JonElster'(whoreadswhat
I write and more readilyemphasizesdivergencesthan he admits
to preservetheirparadigm
makeeveryeffort
bycontinually
borrowings),
takenfromtherivalparadigm
corrections
and
more
in
it
more
inserting
-thustheschemeof "sourgrapes,"forinstance(Elster1984).
The adequateanalysisof social actionthatis madepossiblebythe
socialagentsare
of habitusexplainsthat,withoutbeingrational,
theory
thisis whatmakessociology
reasonable-and
possiblein theend.Without
or
actingwithfullknowledgeof the facts,and withoutmechanically
of
had
act
as
if
social
causes,
knowledge
they
agents
obeying
passively
thosecauses. People are not fools;theyact, moreoftenthannot,in
accordancewiththeirobjectivechancesbecause theyhave internalized
in the form
a longand complexprocessof conditioning,
them,through
Hume writesin the Treatiseon
of mentalschemes,of expectations.
of
Human Naturethat "no sooner do we knowof the impossibility
Thisongoingdialectic
a desirethanthisdesireitselfvanishes."
satisfying
of
of subjectivehopesand objectivechances,whichcan yielda variety
mutualfit(whenpeoplecometo desirethat
forperfect
outcomesranging
to whichtheyare objectively
(as withthe
doomed)to radicaldisjunction
or the Don Quixoteeffect
forinstance,
of subproletarians
Millenarism
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
15
dear to Marx), is at work throughoutthe social world (Bourdieu 1974,
1979, 1977).
At bottom,determinismsoperate to their full only by the help of
unconsciousness, with the complicity of the unconscious.13 For
determinismto exert itselfunchecked,dispositionsmustbe abandonned
to theirfreeplay.This means thatagentsbecome somethinglike subjects
onlyto the extentthattheyconsciouslymasterthe relationtheyentertain
withtheirdispositions:theycan consciouslylet them"act"or theycan on
the contrary inhibit them through the virtue of consciousness. Or,
followinga strategythat seventeenth-century
philosophersadvised, they
can pit one dispositionagainst another. (Leibniz said that one can not
fightpassion with reason, as Descartes claimed, but with "slantedwills"
[volontésobliques], i.e., withthe help of other passions).14
But thisworkof managementof one's dispositions,of habitusas the
unchosen principle of all "choices," is possible only with the help of
explicitclarification.Failingan analysisof such subtle determinationsthat
work themselvesout throughdispositions,one becomes accessoryto the
unconsciousness of the action of dispositions, which is itself the
accomplice of determinism.
Science, Conscience, And Politics
Could one say that your method of analysis and the sociology you
practice comprise both a theoryof the social world and an ethic?
This is a verydifficultquestion and I would be tempted to answer
both yes and no. I would say no if one abides by the old antinomy
between the positiveand the normative.I would say yes if we agree to
thinkbeyond thisopposition. In point of fact,it is an ethic because it is
a science. If what I say is correct,ifit is truethatit is throughknowledge
of determinationsthat only science can know that a formof freedom
which is the conditionof an ethic is possible, then it is also true that
science is an ethic-which does not implythat it is a scientisticethic.
Morality is, in this instance, made possible by an awakening of
consciousness[prisede conscience]thatscience can triggerunderdefinite
13. The 'unconscious' is indeed never but the forgettingof historythat historyitself
produces by turningthe objective structuresit itselfengenders into those quasi-natures that
habituses are" (Bourdieu 1980a:94).
14. Albert Hirschman's (1977) The Passions and the Interestsrecounts part of that
storyand argues persuasivelyfor its role in the cultural legitimationof early capitalism.
16
BERKELEY
JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
circumstances.
(It goes withoutsayingthatthisis not the onlywayto
an
ground ethic.)[...]
Wheredoes this significance
you attributeto the autonomyof the
scientific
fieldlie preciselyand howdoes it relateto youranalysisof
thesocial world?
Therewouldbe too muchto say on this.I willsimplystate,in a
rathercoarse and hastymanner,that autonomyis the conditionof
thatone does notfindfreedom
alone.
butmoreimportantly
scientificity,
Justas one is notan artistalone,butbyparticipating
in theartistic
field,
fieldwhichmakesscientific
likewisewe can say thatit is the scientific
itsveryfunctioning.15
freedom
possiblethrough
of the intellectual,
it is not the
In otherwords,if thereis a freedom
individualfreedomof a Cartesian cogitobut a freedomachieved
datedand situatedconstruction
of
collectively
throughthe historically
a space of regulateddiscussionand critique.
who are
This is something
thatintellectuals
veryseldomrecognize,
inclinedto thinkin singularfashionand who expectsalvation
typically
fromindividual
in thelogicofwisdomand initiatory
liberation,
conquest.
toooftenforget
thatthereis a politicsofintellectual
Intellectuals
freedom.
On the basis of everything
I have said, one can clearlysee thatan
scienceis possibleonlyifthesocialand politicalconditions
emancipatory
to putan
thatmakeit possibleare gathered:thisrequires,forinstance,
end to theeffects
of domination
whichdistortscientific
by
competition
preventing
peoplewhowantto enterintothegameto do so-byturning
or bycutting
offresearch
downmeritorious
forfellowships
applications
butwe mustnotforget
funds(thisis themorebrutalformof censorship
suchas
thatit is exercisedon a dailybasis).Thereare softerformulas,
academic
somebody
byobliging
censorship
through
propriety
[bienséance]:
to expenda considerable
who has a lot to contribute
portionof his or
canonsof
to thepositivistic
hertimeto providethefullproof,according
her
one can prevent
thetime,ofeach andeveryone of herpropositions,
she
whosefullvalidation
a greatmanynewpropositions
fromproducing
could leave to others.As I showedin Homo Academicus,it is mainly
thecontrolof timethatacademicpoweris exercised(Bourdieu,
through
1988a,pp. 90-105).
acute mannerin the case of
This problemarisesin a particularly
sociologybecausesociologyis a fieldwherepoliticalforcescan exert
15. For Bourdieu, the scientificfieldis both a field like all others and a unique space
of strugglesin that it is capable of yieldingproducts (true knowledge) that transcendtheir
historicalconditions of production. This "peculiarityof the historyof scientificreason" is
discussed in Bourdieu (1981c, 1989e, 1989f).
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
17
themselvesmore strongly:by some of its properties,the sociological field
followsthe logic of the scientificfield,but by others it followsthe logic
of the political field (Bourdieu 1980b, 1989d). It followsthat the claim
for autonomyand the conquest of the politicalconditions that make it
possible are absolute prerequisitesforindividualautonomizationand even
for the appropriationof instruments
of individualautonomization.
To put it differently,
one does not win one's scientificsalvation or
one's ethical salvation alone. This is a point that separates me from
Habermas, beyond many convergences. (Very quickly, at the risk of
soundingquite simplistic,I would say that we must not forgetthat the
universal subject is a historical achievement and that it is through
historicalstrugglesin historicalspaces of forcesthatwe progresstoward
a littlemore universality
[Bourdieu and Schwibs1985].) It is on condition
that we engage in the strugglefor reason and that we engage it in
history-thatwe practicewhat I called a Realpolitikof reason (Bourdieu
to reformthe university
1987c)~for instancethroughinterventions
system
or through actions aimed at defending the possibilityof publishing
avant-gardebooks, by means of a demonstrationagainst the exclusion
of assistant professorson political grounds or by fightingthe use of
pseudo-scientificargumentsin issues of racism,etc., that we can push
reason forward.16
Let us pursue this issue of the relationsbetweenscientificsociologyand
political progress.Some criticswill object that this reflexivereturn,this
reflectionon the intellectualworld and on the possibilities it offersfor
more universality,runs the risk of becoming an end in itself. Is the
analysis of Homo Académicas, then,a self-containedproject or is it, as
you just suggested,the means of a more rigorous science of the social
capable of producing stronger political effects because it is more
rigorous?
Such an analysishas two kindsof effects,the one scientificand the
other political,scientificeffectsin turngeneratingpolitical effects.Just
16. AmongBourdieu
's recentpoliticalinterventions,
the following
bear mentioning.
Afterdrafting
the "Reportof the Collègede Franceon the Futureof Education"that
informedMitterrand's
1988 presidential
on education,Bourdieuis currently
platform
-Committee
on theReformof theContentsof Education"
headinga cabinet-level
advisory
thelong-term
schoolreform
thatis thepet projectof Rocard's
chargedwithspearheading
socialistgovernment.
He is also on theboardof Channel7, a publicly-owned,
European,
culturaltelevisionchannelin the making;he will be the editor-in-chief
of Liber, an
international
intellectual
to majornewspapers
journalscheduledto appearas a supplement
in France,Italy,GreatBritain,
and^Germany
laterthisyearand designedto facilitate
the
formation
of a European "collective
intellectual"
capable of actingas a countervailing
withthesocialist-led
power.Overtheyears,Bourdieuhas also beeninvolved
CjFDT union
and activein anti-racism
withthe groupSOS-Racisme.For a sample of his
struggles
stancesand thinking
on the roleof sociologyin politicsand currentissues,see Bourdieu
(1985b, 1986c,1987e,1988f)and Bourdieu,Casanovaand Simon(1975).
18
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
as I said earlierregardingindividualagentsthat unconsciousness
is
withdeterminism,
likewiseI would argue thatthe collective
complicit
unconsciousness
is thespecific
of intellectuals
formthatthecomplicity
of
intellectuals
withthedominant
sociopolitical
forcestakes.I believethat
the blindnessof intellectualsto the social forceswhich rule the
intellectual
theirpractices,is whatexplainsthat,
field,and therefore
oftenunderveryradicalairs,theintelligentsia
almostalways
collectively,
contribute
to theperpetuation
of dominant
forces.I am awarethatsuch
a bluntstatement
is veryshockingbecauseit goes againsttheimageof
themselvesthat intellectualshave fabricated:they like to thinkof
themselvesas liberators,as progressive(or at worst as neutral,
in theUnitedStates).Andit is truethattheyhave
disengaged,
especially
oftentakensideswiththedominated-for
structural
reasons,byvirtueof
theirpositionas dominated
But theyhavebeen so
amongthedominant.
muchlessoftenthantheycouldhavebeen andespecially
muchless than
believe.
they
Is this the reason whyyou reject the label of "critical sociology"?You
have always kept aloof from everythingthat marches under the
self-proclaimedbanner of "radical" sociologyor "critical"theory?
reflexes
You are absolutely
right(I can evensaythatone of myfirst
as a youngsociologist
was to constitute
myself
againsta certainimageof
to use
the Frankfurt
School as a sortof "spiritualist
pointd'honneur,"
Marx's expression,that some bourgeoisintellectualslike to avail
themselvesof). I thinkthat it is the ignoranceof the collective
mechanisms
andtheoverestimation
ofpoliticalandethicalsubordination,
of the freedom
of intellectuals,
thathas too oftenled the mostsincere
intellectuals
suchas Sartre-whodoes not at all belongin thiscategory
in myestimation-to
remaincomplicit
withthe forcestheythought
they
to escape
werefighting,
and thisin spiteof theefforts
investedin trying
theshacklesof intellectual
determinism.
Because theyengagein forms
of struggle
thatare unrealistic,
naive,"adolescent."
Partof the difficulty
here is that,amongthe risksthatone must
take to defendpositionslike mine,there is that of disappointing
senseof theterm,that
notthebiological,
adolescents
(in thesociological,
All intellectuals
scholarsand graduatestudents).
is,in particular
younger
of theword.
of youth,"
dreamof beingthe "corrupters
in all meanings
subversive
their
that
to
tell
adolescents
it
is
Granted,
disappointing
unrealistic.
intentions
thatis,oneiric,Utopian,
are adolescent,
immature,
thatare in effect
Thereis a wholerangeof suchstrategies
of subversion
this
of intellectualsof displacement.
(The specificPharisaism
strategies
to
us
enables
book
was remarked
but
I
think
that
graspits
my
longago,
the
more
of
the
more
distant,
revolutionary,
being
principle-consists
the issuesat stake.)One of thegoalsof
and historically,
geographically
of all this
of all thesemalpractices,
myworkis to showthattheprinciple
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
19
double talkand doublesjeux, residesin bad faithin one's relationto
in the intellectual
field.
one's insertion
It followsfromthis thatthereflexive
sociologyyou practiceaims,not
at effecting
a narcissisticreturnupon the individualperson of the
but at uncovering
whathervisionof theobjectowesto what
scientist,
is a specificinterestof theintellectual.
their
Intellectuals
are particularly
inventive
whenitcomesto masking
interests.
For instance,
after'68, therewas a kindof toposin theFrench
intellectual
milieuwhichconsistedin asking:"Butfromwhereare you
speaking?From what place am I speaking?"This false, narcissistic
servedas a screen,in the
confession,
bypsychoanalysis,
vaguelyinspired
thatis,
Freudiansense of theword,and blockeda genuineelucidation,
the discoveryof the social locationof the locutor:in this case, the
positionin theuniversity
hierarchy.
I firstelaboratedthe notionof fieldin the case of the intellectual
and artistic
worldand thisis no happenstance
(Bourdieu,1971a,1971b,
and a
1971c).(In thisregard,HomoAcademicusis botha culmination
returnto the point of departure.)This notion was deliberately
vicious
constructed
to destroy
narcissism
and thisparticularly
intellectual
which consistsof making
legerdemain[escamotage]of objectivation
or
eithersingular,
andherepsychoanalysis
comesin handy,
objectivations
so broadthatthe individual
underconsideration
becomesthe tokenof
To
a categoryso largethathis or her responsibility
vanishesentirely.
"I ama bourgeoisintellectual,
is devoidof any
I ama slimyrat!1*
proclaim
at Grenobleand I am
meaning.But to say "I am an assistant-professor
is to forceoneselfto ask whetherit is
speakingto a Parisianprofessor"
nottherelationbetweenthesetwopositions
thatis speakingthrough
my
mouth.Now, thisis muchmorepainfulbecause it touchesupon vital
useful:
and thisis wherethenotionof interest
becomesextremely
things,
it servesto showthatthereare specificprofits
in beingan intellectual.
Thereis a libidoacadémicawhichis thistypeof veryspecificdesire
or impulsewhicharisesout of the relationbetweena certainhabitus,
forinstance,
knowthatthechildren
of professors,
sociallyconstituted-we
a
to
libido
académica
else
held
have,everything
equal, greaterpropensity
than the childrenof businessmen
who, often,will findsuch stakes
a fieldwhichoffers
The relationbetween
grotesque-and
specificprofits.
a specifichabitusand a specificfieldproducesa specificlibido,a libido
sublimateitselfintoa
académica,whichcan, undercertainconditions,
libidoscientifica
in
addition
of
science.
capable
(It is clearthat
producing
thenotionof interest
is herea meansofcontestthatallowsone to effect
20
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
a breakwiththeprofessional
as "unattached
and
ideologyof intellectuals
and social.)17
disinterested"
whichis inseparably
epistemological
In theend,althoughyouuse thesameexpression,
reflexive
as
sociology
from
youconceiveit (e.g.,Bourdieu1982and 1987a),is quitedifferent
the kind of reflexivity
advocated by Gouldner or claimed by
ethnomethodologists.
as it is, firstof
I believethatit is somewhattheoppositeinasmuch
because fundamentally
anti-narcissistic.
all, a paradoxicalreflexivity
is bettertoleratedand receivedbecause,ifthe
reflexivity
Psychoanalytic
mechanisms
it makesus discoverare universal,
theyare also tied to a
therelationto thefatheris alwaysa relationto a singular
uniquehistory:
Whatmakesforthe absenceof charm,the
fatherin a singularhistory.
is thatit makesus discover
even,of sociologicalreflexivity
painfulness
that
that
are
are
Now,
shared,banal,commonplace.
generic,
things
things
in the table of intellectual
values, thereis nothingworse than the
commonand the average.This explainsmuchof the resistancethat
reflexivesociology,
sociology,and in particulara non-narcissistic
encounters
amongintellectuals.
thefactthat
Underthisangle,mycontribution
residesin uncovering
intellectual
are related,not to the social positionof the
productions
producerdefinedin the broadestterms,but to the locationhe or she
of the intellectualuniverse.The
occupiesin the objectivestructure
and forces
externalfactors
intellectual
fieldprovidesa crucialmediation:
structure.
Thisis already
itsspecific
actuponitsparticipants
onlythrough
a considerableadvanceand we could stop here. There is, however,
thatI discovered
in myanthropological
evenmoreimportant
something
thatare associated
the factthattherearefallacies,blunders,
fieldwork:
thatgo withthe postureof the "thinking
withthe positionof thinker,
depensée]whoretiresfromactionin orderto thinkit (see
man"[homme
Bourdieu1977,1986a,and 1980a,Book I).
bias that inheresin the scientificproject,
A sort of intellectualist
cannot
inscribedwithinthe "scientific
eye"itself,and whichtherefore
see itself?
in the positionof
bias inherent
Exactly.Thereis an intellectualist
whoobservesfromtheoutsidea universeinwhichhe
thesocialscientist
relationto
involved.It is thisintellectualiste
or she is not immediately
theworld,whichreplacesthe practicalrelationto practicethatagents
social
fromutilitarian
and itsdifference
17. Bourdieu'susageof thenotionof interest
of theSociologist"
is discussedin Bourdieu(1988b) and in The Interest
(Bourdieu
theory
1987a:124-131).
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
21
have with that between the observer and his object, that must be
objectivized.This is one of the thingsthat separate me fromGarfinkel
and ethnomethodology.
I grantthatthere is a primaryexperience of the
social which, as Husserl and Schutz showed, rests on a relation of
of the world that makes one take it for
immediatebelief in the facticity
granted,and so on. This analysis is excellent as far as descriptionis
concerned,but we mustgo beyondit and raise the issue of the conditions
of possibilityof this doxic experience. We must recognize that the
coincidence between objectivestructuresand embodied structureswhich
creates the illusionof immediateunderstanding
is a particularcase of the
relation to the world, namely the native relation. The great virtue of
ethnologicalexperienceis thatit makes one immediatelyaware thatsuch
conditionsare not universallyfulfilled,
as phenomenologywould have us
believe by universalizingreflectionbased on the particularcase of the
indigenousrelationto one's own society.
But thisis not all: ethnomethodology
is a depoliticized
formof analysis
We need thoroughly
to sociologize the phenomenological
of conformismo
analysisof doxa as the uncontestedacceptance of the daily lifeworld,not
simplyto establish that it is not universallyvalid for all perceivingand
actingsubjects,but also to discoverthat,when it realizes itselfin certain
social positions,among the dominatedforinstance,it representsthe most
radical formof acceptance of the world,of conservatism.This relationof
pre-reflexiveacceptance of the world groundedin a fundamentalbelief
in the immediacyof the structuresof the Lebenswelt represents the
absolute, ultimate form of conservative conformism(it lies below
orthodoxy,that is, the "rightbelief," which presupposes at least an
awareness of a "wrongbelief,"a croyancegauche). There is no way of
adheringto the establishedorder that is more undivided,more complete
than this infra-political
relationof doxic evidence; there is no fullerway
of findingnatural conditions of existence that would be revoltingfor
somebodysocialized underotherconditionsand who does not grasp them
throughcategories of perceptionissued out of this world.18This alone
between intellectualsand
explains a good numberof misunderstandings
workers,where proletarianswill take for granted and find acceptable,
even "natural," conditions of oppression and exploitation that are
sickening to those "on the outside"--whichdoes not exclude practical
formsof resistanceand the possibility
of a revoltagainstthem (Bourdieu
1980c).
18. The two-way
relation(of conditioning
on the one hand,of structuring
on the
thatcomewith
of perception
other)betweena positionin a socialspaceand thecategories
is capturedby Bourdieuwiththe conceptof
it,and whichtendto mirrorits structure,
"pointof viewas a viewtakenfroma point"(see Bourdieu1988d,1989cand 1988c,on
"Flaubert'sPointof View").
22
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
Whatseparatesyoufromethnomethodology
on thiscountis thatwhere
of
a
of
talk
they
genericexperience doxa,youarguethatthereare daxak
thereis nota singledoxabutvariousformsofdoxicexperience,
specific
to different
fieldsand regionsof social space, each of whichwithits
and efficacy.
definite
historicalconditionsof possibility
Yes and, moregenerally,
I arguethatdoxa is political.The doxic
relationto theworld.As soon
relationto theworldis notan individual
we remindourselvesthat,
as we recallitssocialconditions
of possibility,
of beingand livingin thisrelation,
first
thereare different
manners
and,
thatwhatcomeswitha narrowly
analysisis
secondly,
phenomenological
of thisrelationand of its
the neglectof the historical
underpinnings
thatis,depoliticization.
politicalimport,
For a SociologicalUtopianism
If I understand
then,scienceis stillthebesttoolforthe
youcorrectly,
critiqueof domination.You are verymuchin line withthe modern
when you presentsociology,when it is
projectof the Aufklärung
force.But isn'tthere
as an inherently
scientific,
politically
progressive
a paradoxhere in the factthat,on the one hand,you increasethe
possibilityof a space of freedom,of a liberatingawakeningof
consciousness
whichbringswithinrationalreachhistoricalpossibilities
hithertoexcludedby symbolicdominationand by the misrecognition
of the social world,while,on the
impliedin the doxicunderstanding
that
effecta radical disenchanting
otherhand, you simultaneously
makesthissocial worldin whichwe mustcontinueto strugglealmost
between
unlivable?Thereis a strongtension,perhaps,a contradiction,
for increasingconsciousnessand
this will to provideinstruments
thatan overlyacute consciousnessof
freedom
and thedemobilization
threatensto produce.
thepervasiveness
of social determinisms
Reflexive
purposes.
analysisas I conceiveof itservestwoimportant
is notan end in itselfand,on
is a scientific
function:
The first
reflexivity
thiscount,I mustdisassociatemyselfcompletelyfromthe formsof
thathave recentlybecome popularin the UnitedStates,
"reflexivity"
(viz. the booksbyMarcusand Fisher[1986]
especiallyin anthropology
or by Rosaldo [1989]) and in the sociologyof science (Latour and
Woolgar1983,Latour1988),and thatculminatein a sortof relativist
nihilism.In Homo Academicus,I use the instruments
providedby
and to make
to controlthebiasesintroduced
byun-reflexivity
reflexivity
thatcan altermyreflection.
intheknowledge
ofthemechanisms
headway
more
not
less.
is
a
tool
to
science,
Reflexivity
produce
of
of scienceand thusthegrowth
Secondly,
byhelpingtheprogress
makespossiblea more
knowledgeabout the social world,reflexivity
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
23
responsiblepolitics,both insideand outside of academia. Bachelard wrote
that "there is no science but of that which is hidden." This effectof
unveilingcarriesan unintendedcritiquethatwill be all the strongerthe
more powerful science is and the more thoroughlymechanisms of
occultationand misrecognition
are neutralized.19
is not at all a form of "art for art's sake." Its
Thus reflexivity
is
not
to
contemplatemyprivatebackyard;it is to findout what
end-goal
is in mybackyardin order to look at what lies behind its fence. But as
long as I do not know what goes on in my backyard,I cannot see
anything;I do nothingbut projectmyblindness.A rigoroussociologycan
help freeintellectualsfromtheirillusions-andfirstof all fromthe illusion
that theydo not have any,especiallyabout themselves-andcan have at
least the negativevirtueof makingit more difficultfor them to bringa
passive and unconsciouscontributionto symbolicdomination.(The rather
naive idea which some American radicals have objected to me, which
consists in invoking"true political struggles,"is here an alibi in the
etymologicalsense of the term: I displace my gaze elsewhere~alibi~in
order not to have to look in mybackyard.)
You remindme hereof Durkheim'saphorism (1921:267) whichsays that
sociology "increases the range of our action by the mere fact that it
increases the range of our science." But I must come back to my
question: doesn't the disillusionmentreflexivity
produces also carrythe
risk of condemning us to this "passively conservativeattitude1*
from
which the founder of the Année sociologique was already defending
himself?20
There is a first level of answer to this question which is the
following:if the risk is only to disenchantand undermine adolescent
rebellion,whichoftentimesdoes not last beyondintellectualadolescence,
then it is not that great of a loss.
This is your anti-propheticside,21and perhaps one of the things that
distinguishesyour work fromthat of Foucault
19. "If'thereis no sciencebutof thatwhichis hidden',"
writeBourdieuand Passeron
thatsociology
is on theside of historical
forceswhich,
(1977,Foreword),"oneunderstands
at everyepoch,compelthe truthof relationsof powerto unveilthemselves,
if onlyby
themto veil themselves
evermore."
forcing
20. The Durkheim
in no wayimposes
quotation(1921,p. 267) beginsthus:"Sociology
conservative
attitude.On thecontrary.11
upon man a passively
21. "If, as Bachelardsays,'everychemistmust fightthe alchemistwithin',every
sociologistmustfightthe social prophetwithinthathis publicasks him to incarnate"
(Bourdieuet al. 1973,p. 42).
24
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
There is, it is true, a side of Foucault's work which theorizes the
revolt of the adolescent in trouble with his family and with the
institutionsthat relay familypedagogy and impose "disciplines"and
regulations(that is, the school, the clinic,the asylum,the hospital,and
so on). The notion of disciplineas used by Foucault is a rathercoarse
one: it refersto formsof social constraintthat are very external and
adolescent revoltsrepresentsymbolicdénégations,Utopianresponses to
general social constraintsthat allow one to avoid carryingout a full
analysisof the specifichistoricalforms,and especiallyof the differential
forms,assumed by the constraintsthat bear on adolescents of different
milieux,and also of formsof social constraintmore subtle than those that
operate throughthe drilling[dressage]of the bodies.22
Naturally,it is not pleasurable to disenchantadolescents,especially
since there are quite sincere and profoundthingsin adolescent revolts:
an inclinationto go against the establishedorder, against the hypocrisy
of submissiveadults,againstthe academic doxa whichmakes forthe fact
thatthereare people who can say veryrevolutionary
thingswiththeirlips
while theireyes say veryconservativethings.There is a whole range of
thingsthatadolescentsgraspverywell because theyhave not yet lost all
theirillusions;theyare not disenchanted,cynical,theyhave not done the
kindof about-facethat mostof the people of mygeneration,at least in
France, have made. Adolescents can feel such thingsand theyshow no
indulgenceforthem.
I believe that sociology does exert a disenchantingeffectbut this,
in myview, marksa progresstowardsof formof scientificand political
realismthatis the absolute antithesisof naive utopianism.While it is true
that a certain kind of sociology, and perhaps particularlythe one I
practice,can encourage sociologismas submissionto the inexorablelaws
of society(and thiseven thoughits intentionis exactlythe opposite), I
think that Marx's alternativebetween utopianism and sociologism is
somewhat misleading here: there is room, between sociologists
resignationand Utopianvoluntarism,forwhat I would call a sociological
utopianism,that is, a rationaland politicallyconscious use of the limits
of freedomaffordedby a true knowledgeof social laws and especiallyof
The politicaltask of social science
theirhistoricalconditionsof validity.23
ofthebodyin
22. Bourdieurefershereto Foucault's(1977) analysisof the-training"
Disciplineand Punish.
itselfonlyas longas we let it
law thatperpetuates
23. "A social law is a historical
to them)are in
operate,thatis,as longas thosewhomitserves(sometimesunbeknownst
. . One can claimto positeternal
of itsefficacy.
theconditions
a positionto perpetuate
of powerto concentrate
do abouttheso-calledtendency
laws,as conservative
sociologists
morethanrecord,in theformof
sciencemustknowthatit does nothing
itself.In reality,
in time,
a certaingame,at a certainmoment
tendential
laws,thelogicwhichcharacterizes
in favorof thosewhodominatethegameand have themeansto set
and whichfunctions
INTERVIEW WITH BOURDIEU
25
is to stand up both against irresponsiblevoluntarismand fatalistic
scientism,to contributeto defininga rational utopianismby using the
knowledge of the probable to make the possible come true. Such a
sociological,i.e., realistic,utopianismis veryunlikelyamong intellectuals.
Firstbecause it looks pettybourgeois,it does not look radical enough.
Extremesare always more chic and the aestheticdimensionof political
conduct mattersa lot to intellectuals.
This argumentis also a way of disavowingan image of politics that is
verydear to intellectuals,that is, the idea of a rational zoon politicón
who constitutes him- or herselfthroughthe exercise of free will and
throughpolitical self-proclamation.
I would not quite put it thatway. Rather, I argue that this project
itselfis an historicalproject. Those who take up this position should
know that theyare the historicalheirsof a long line of men and women
who have been placed in historicalconditionssuch that they had an
opportunityto help freedomadvance a little.They must firstcome to
gripswiththe factthat,to carrythisprojectforward,theremustbe chairs
of philosophyor departmentsof sociology(which impliesspecificforms
of alienation), that philosophyor social science as officialdisciplines,
sanctioned by the state, ought to have been invented.In order for the
intellectualas an efficaciousmythto exist,who feels compelled to speak
up on apartheid in South Africa,repressionin Chile and Romania or
gender inequality at home, it took the Paris Commune, it took the
Dreyfustrial,it took Zola and manyothers(see Pinto, 1984). Institutions
of freedom,such as social security,are social conquests (Bourdieu and
Schwibs,1985).
To conclude, isn't Homo Académicas a manner of sociological
biography?You writein the prefaceto the English translationthat the
book "comprisesa considerable proportionof self-analysisby proxy"?
I would rather say that it is an anti-biography,insofar as an
autobiographyis oftentimesa mannerof erectingoneself a mausoleum
whichis also a cenotaph. This book is both an attemptto test the outer
boundaries of reflexivityin social science and an enterprise in
self-knowledge.I could sum thisup by sayingsomethingquite banal but
little remarked: the most intimate truth of what we are, the most
unthinkableunthought[impensé],is inscribedin the objectivity,
and in the
the rulesof the game in factand in law. As soon as a law is stated,it can becomethe
stakeof struggles...The
of tendential
lawsis thecondition
of successof actions
uncovering
aimedat proving
thesocial
themwrong...
Justas it'denaturalizes'
'de-fatalizes'
it,sociology
world...True politicalactionconsistsof usingtheknowledge
of the probableto increase
the likelihood
of the possible"(Bourdieu1980b:46).
26
BERKELEY JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY
of the social positionsthatwe have held in the past and thatwe
history,
presentlyoccupy.24
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