A Critical Analysis of Adam Doboszyński`s March on Myślenice in 1936

Agnieszka Cahn
Clare Hall
A Critical Analysis of Adam Doboszyński’s March on Myślenice in 1936
2011
The dissertation does not exceed the word limit for the respective Degree Committee.
The dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing, which is the
outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text.
Agnieszka Cahn
20 June 2011
2
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank CJCR for the financial support I have received throughout
the course of my studies.
I am particularly grateful to Dr. Lars Fischer for teaching me how to make
sense of history and how to see the untold even behind the supposedly clear
evidence of documents and archival materials.
I would also wish to express my thanks to my supervisor Dr. Francois Guesnet
for extremely useful initial discussions which guided me in the right direction as well
as for meticulously detailed comments on my thesis.
Last, but not least, I thank my husband Martin for all his moral support and my
children for their patience.
3
I. Introduction
1.1 Myślenice: from 2005 to 1936
II. Historical Background
2.1 Sources and Methodology
2.2 The Polish Political Scene between the Wars
2.3 Catholic – Jewish Relations and the Question of Victimhood
III. 24 June 1936
3.1 Protection Squadrons
3.2 The Putsch
3.3 A Failed Revolution
IV. “Act of Higher Necessity”, Pogrom, March or Anti-Government Rebellion?
4.1 Doboszyński – A Revolutionary Firebrand (Sanacja’s Media Event)
4.2 Doboszyński – A Leader of Great Poland (Nationalist Power Demonstration)
4.3 Doboszyński – An Antisemite (Jewish Furore)
4.4 Doboszyński – A Messiah for Poland (Adam’s Performance)
V. Conclusions
Annex
4
Abstract
This study investigates Doboszynski’s March on Myślenice on 23rd June
1936. Adam Doboszynski, a local leader of the right wing Stronnictwo Narodowe,
created a small private army and attacked local Jewish shops, their owners’ families
and representatives of the state. This event gave rise to a series of high profile court
cases used by Doboszynski and his political associates to launch one of the biggest
anti-Jewish campaigns in interwar Poland. The impact on the local Jewish residents
was largely ignored in the court cases.
Doboszynski returned to Poland after the War and was arrested and executed
by the communist authorities, thus achieving martyr status in post-communist Poland.
The study uses archival records of the original court cases, contemporary
newspaper reports and interviews with surviving witnesses to reappraise the event
and in particular the way it has been viewed by the interested parties.
The event is analysed from the point of view of four different interests: the
Sanacja Government, Stronnictwo Narodowe, Adam Doboszynski himself and the
Jewish community. At the time it was to the advantage of all four interests to
emphasise the event’s importance, but it was the conflict between Sanacja and
Stronnictwo Narodowe which dominated and which Adam Doboszynski used as a
tool for promoting his own antisemitic political views. In post-communist Poland
analysis of the March has almost exclusively been carried out by nationalist
historians who tend to uncritically accept the views of Doboszynski himself and
minimise the impact on the Jewish residents. Examination of the original records
highlights the significance of that impact and emphasizes how the voices of the
original Jewish victims have not been heard.
Historians wanting a fuller understanding of the event must leave behind the
official story which can only so easily find confirmation in documents and start
searching for the untold.
5
I. Introduction
1.1 Myślenice: from 2005 to 1936
At the beginning of June 2005 the local authorities of Myślenice, a small Polish
town located thirty kilometres south of Kraków, received an official letter from a
regional wing of Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR), a neo-fascist youth organization.
The letter had been signed by the head of the group, Tomasz Piasecki.1 As an
organizer of a public event Piasecki asked the permission of the Mayor of Myślenice
to demonstrate on the town’s Market Square “in honour of Adam Doboszyński”.2
Sixty nine years earlier, on 23 June 1936, Doboszyński (1904-1949), a young
activist from the opposition to the Sanacja3 government and land owner of a small
estate situated near Myślenice, organised a paramilitary attack on the town’s Jewish
community. Wielka Encyklopedia PWN mentions that an armed gang of Stronnictwo
Narodowe (SN) led by Adam Doboszyński attacked Myślenice on the night of 22/23
June 1936 shouting antisemitic slogans. “The attackers wrecked the local station of
State Police, the Starosta’s (head of the District) flat, and a couple of Jewish shops,
having done which, they withdrew into the forest, where after a few days they were
ambushed by the police”.4
The relatively quick reaction of the police forces which led to the arrest of
Doboszyński was followed by the highest profile series of political trials5 in the history
of Interwar Poland accompanied by a phenomenon which can only be described as a
“media war”. The event has taken on historical significance as a symbol of Polish
antisemitism of the 1930’s, even though many Polish historians referred to it as
1
Pseudonym commemorating Bolesław Piasecki (1915-1979), leader of ONR-
Falanga.
2
3
Olszewski 2005a.
Political movement in power in Poland from Piłsudski’s coup d’état in May 1926 until
September 1939.
4
5
Wojnowski 2003, p252.
June 1937 – Kraków, February 1938 - Lwów, June-November 1938 - High Court
Appeals.
6
“economic” antisemitism.6 Perhaps therefore - the young radicals coming to
Myślenice half a century later felt justified in commemorating and praising it.
Every summer since the early 1980s ONR had gathered in Myślenice at the
Zarabie leisure area beyond the River Raba to participate in special training
workshops and “to restore their pride in Polish history”. For years they had not
attracted much public attention. In 2003, however, journalists of a popular Polish
weekly Wprost, not only counted Myślenice among the favourite meeting points of
Polish White Power7, but also gave a quite terrifying account of those meetings, e.g.
reporting that the shooting targets used during military training were silhouettes of
Orthodox Jews, both adults and children. The article caused discussions among the
town’s citizens. Some claimed that Doboszyński was a fascist and his attack on
Myślenice Jews revealed it clearly, others argued that such actions were necessary
for the economic survival of Catholic Poles and that ONR should not be considered
fascist, neither before the war, nor in 2003.8
Two years later the Mayor received Piasecki’s letter and gave ONR
permission to demonstrate. Within a week, for the second time in its history,
Myślenice became a centre of attention for the Polish media. Gazeta Wyborcza, the
most influential Polish daily, called the town a place of particular national dishonour
for Poles9 and ran a series of articles focusing on the Interwar “brown” movements,
such as ONR. Gazeta Wyborcza triggered a more general fascism-related
discussion. Journalists interviewed historians and asked for their comments. Many,
like Jacek Majchrowski, pointed out that Polish prewar nationalism, unlike German or
Italian, was free from a racial background.10 This argument has been commonly used
by all historians who reject any affiliation between Polish nationalism and fascism.
They explain that German or Italian Nazis placed the “nation” at the top of their neopagan value ladder, while the Catholic Poles reserved the highest point of their
6
7
Wapiński 1980, Majchrowski 1986.
“A “national radical picnic” is organised there every June on the anniversary of the
1936 Myślenice pogrom, when Adam Doboszyński’s paramilitary group attacked
Jewish shops and public buildings” (Pawelczyk, Kudzia 2003).
8
Interview 3.
9
Olszewski, Grzebałkowska 2005.
10
Olszewski 2005b.
7
system for a metaphysical absolute - God.11 What would be the practical results of
this difference and, more particularly, what would be the difference in their attitude
towards Jews, has rarely been the subject of analysis.
I remember the moment when I became interested in the Doboszyński case
and in the way it has been presented by modern historians. It happened in the middle
of the 2005 media campaign. I read extensively on the 1936 events in Myślenice and
the court trials that followed and I was surprised by the one-sidedness of most of the
interpretations. The Jewish side of the story had either been misunderstood and
simplified or was entirely missing. Searching for it made me realise that there were
other pieces also missing from the puzzle and that a better understanding of what
happened in Myślenice in 1936 could be crucial to a better understanding of the
history of Poland between the wars. There was much more to Doboszyński’s action
than an anti-Sanacja demonstration or a simple anti-Jewish raid. The event was
multifaceted and should not be explained in a simplified manner.
In my dissertation I try to answer the following questions: why the events
remembered in Polish history as a local, brief action by an individual of limited
importance12 in which “nobody was killed”13 were at the time they happened
internationally famous; why the court trial of the main defendant attracted the daily
attention of all Polish and a significant number of international media14; why, although
he accepted responsibility for an obviously criminal action, it proved almost
impossible to sentence him15 and required major changes in the state legal system
11
Meller, Tomaszewski 2011, p31, cf Grott 2005, p357.
12
In June 1936 Doboszyński was just a minor author discussed in nationalist circles,
on leave from his position as head of an SN branch near Kraków.
13
Historians underlined that Doboszyński’s action posed no physical threat to
Myślenice citizens (e.g. Baliszewski 2009). Its life endangering aspect was not raised
as an issue in any of his trials.
14
Among 40 journalists accredited as trial observers there were Czech reporters
from Národní výzva, as well as Palestine Jews from Davar and Haaretz.
15
Both in Kraków and Lwów the jurors wanted to free him but the judges prevented
this. However, it is known that some jurors and judges in Lwów received anonymous
threats. Following a complicated appeal process, he was sentenced by Tribunal to
8
and why the town he attacked became a symbol of Polish nationalism for many years
to come. I will also briefly comment on how Polish communist historiography
influenced the way Adam Doboszyński’s action in Myślenice has been viewed.
I hope that my analysis of this particular event can add to existing knowledge
of the nature of Polish right wing politics between the wars and of the changes
happening at that time within different political groups of the Right. It may also help to
better explain Jewish-Christian relations in the interwar period.
3.5 years after jury trials were abolished by a parliamentary decision sometimes
referred to as Lex Doboszyński (Nitschke 1993, p105, Żaryn 1993, p111).
9
II. Historical background
2.1 Sources and methodology
The core of primary literature used in my dissertation consists of the legal
documents from the court trials of Adam Doboszyński and the 47 members of his
squad who were also tried. While studying these archival documents I paid special
attention to the statements given by Jewish witnesses because they were almost
totally neglected by my predecessors. The Jewish side of the conflict had not been
taken into account by the researchers. A monograph by Kaczmarski and Tomasik
published in 2010 during my research included two short fragments of statements by
Jewish victims of the attack.16 Although not followed by any comment, these,
together with two articles by Jewish journalists published at the time of the attack,
comprise the first voices of Jews noted by historians. This previous neglect was
facilitated by discussing the Myślenice events as part of prewar Polish-Jewish
conflict, a dichotomy which in itself incorporates certain political and sociological
preconceptions. I specifically chose to rather talk about Catholic-Jewish relations, as
all the Jews involved in the case were, and considered themselves, Polish citizens.
To establish the arguments of all sides of the conflict I have used articles and
commentaries published by the media during the Kraków and Lwów trials. I looked
both at those papers very much involved on a particular side of the debate (Nowy
Dziennik, Naje Folkscajtung, Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy, Prosto z Mostu, Bunt
Młodych, Robotnik) and those trying, rather unsuccessfully, to report the case without
taking sides (Czas, Goniec Częstochowski, Gazeta Lwowska, Gazeta Polska,
Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny).
I studied the private letters of Doboszyński and his publications: his only novel,
his studies, essays, poems and prayers.
All the interviews I made were carried out as informal discussions. I contacted
Holocaust survivors from Myślenice, witnesses of the attack found from local
sources, family members of those who took part in the attack and Adam
Doboszyński’s nephew, himself a retired historian, who lives in Edinburgh.
16
Kaczmarski, Tomasik 2010, p105, 127.
10
I treated most of the materials from the years 1936-1939 including all the
memories concerning that time as primary sources although of course many of them,
those not based on direct knowledge of the events but interpreting and analysing
other sources, are of a secondary character. What was a secondary source in 1936
was a primary source for me as my interest lay not only in what happened, but also in
how it was interpreted. For practical reasons I divided all the primary sources I used
into four groups in relation to their origins, the interests they represented and the
position they took in the Doboszyński debate. I called these groups accordingly:
Sanacja, National Camp, Jews and Doboszyński.
Although there are numerous secondary sources available relating to the
general historical background: Poland between the wars, contemporary Polish
political parties, ideologies and movements, the secondary literature on the
Myślenice case has been extremely limited. Doboszyński’s trials in the 1930s
attracted unprecedented attention, hence his action found its way into historical
works dealing with interwar Poland. However, in the majority of cases, it has hardly
been more than mentioned. In 1947 Doboszyński smuggled himself from London to
Poland and was arrested, tried and executed as a German and American spy after a
Stalinist show trial. Therefore, his action in 1936 was not supposed to be discussed
beyond the only official interpretation it received.17 Even those historians who wrote
freely outside Poland did not dedicate more than a couple of sentences to
Doboszyński. They saw him as a politician of rather marginal importance and
categorised his action as yet another pogrom, a signum temporis of growing
antisemitism caused by economic crises and the influence of Nazi ideology. Adam
Pragier, a Polish economist and member of PPS (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna), who
published his memoirs in London in 1966, described him as a “hot head” who was
never taken seriously in politics.18
17
Which stated that “an imperialist agent and traitor of the Polish nation Doboszyński
organised the Myślenice putsch to spread fascist ideology”. The communists noted
the general antisemitic aspects of Myślenice but, like all the prewar trials, ignored the
particular voices of Jewish victims. It seemed that Doboszyński’s antisemitism was
much less important to this court than his anti-communism.
18
“Doboszyński was not a serious politician and as a private individual he was not
completely sane either” (Pragier 1966, p691).
11
Two documentary programmes about Doboszyński prepared by Polish
Television in 1993 and 2006 rather than properly analysing the importance of
Myślenice for interwar Poland, diminished it. “When truth is not accessible, it is often
replaced by legend”, said Dariusz Baliszewski19 at the beginning of the 2006 feature.
In the opinion of most historians interviewed by Baliszewski, Myślenice, which
“became a black legend in communist propaganda”, was in fact an event of little
significance in prewar politics. “The entire hustle took an hour, a couple of shop
windows got smashed, nothing much happened there” – argued in unison those who
condemned and those who defended Doboszyński.
At the same time there continued to be a group of historians whose interest in
Doboszyński, his life, ideas and performances, never ceased. These were people
linked with ONR and Polish extreme nationalism. They have kept writing about the
Raid on Myślenice, and explaining Doboszyński’s reasons behind it. In the words of
Mieczysław Harusewicz20, Myślenice should be understood as a “justifiable
punishment expedition” organised by a “fully responsible” individual. Doboszyński,
“an absolutely unusual phenomenon” in the history of Poland, had been “courageous
enough” to bring “freedom and justice” to Myślenice. Poland was so “disgustingly
corrupted” at all levels of state administration that invading towns and “spanking
Starostas” was SN’s only choice. If Myślenice happened only in Myślenice, it was
because “unfortunately there were no other Doboszyńskis”.21
With the final fall of communism in 1989, Adam Doboszyński’s conviction22
was quashed and his record could again be freely discussed. The interest in
Doboszyński grew significantly, especially among the young generation of historians.
The last five years have brought several scholarly articles and two more significant
books related to his life and political ideas. Still this is not enough, particularly in the
case of the Myślenice event which has been continuously presented in a simplified,
one-sided manner as a dramatic protest against unjust economic relations within
19
A historian, journalist and writer specializing in XX century.
20
Prewar member of Młodzież Wszechpolska and ONR, together with Doboszyński
active among Polish radical nationalists in London, opposed to Sikorski’s
government.
21
Harusewicz 1984, p1-3.
22
From 1949.
12
prewar Poland, a protest for which Doboszyński was punished both before and
after23 the war.
In the 1930s the debate on Doboszyński’s case had four “sides”, each
representing its own interest and using its own arguments. Only one of these four
“sides” has been preserved in Polish history.
2.2 The Polish Political Scene between the Wars
Studying the media debate surrounding the “Myślenice Trials” one can easily
notice that the traditional socialist and nationalist sides of the Polish political scene
had changed some of their distinctive features. Left-and-right wing journalists used
quite confusing vocabulary when the accusations of fascism, communism or lack of
patriotism could come from all sides alike. Without knowing the name of the paper
from which a particular cutting commenting on the case came, it would be difficult to
judge which political side the author supported.
Adam Doboszyński had been considered a politician of the Polish far right. If
communism was to represent the ultimate incarnation of an ideology of the left,
Doboszyński would certainly view himself as standing on the exactly opposite pole.
Yet, when one reads his ideological creed “National Economy”, first published in
1934, it is impossible not to note that he places himself in many ways on the side of
the traditional left in his criticism of the existing system. Seeing the situation in Poland
as a fight between “anonymous capital”, which he identified with the state (linked to it
by thousands of threads such as “powerful speculators” or “an army of state officials”)
and the “masses of proletariat”, which were “totally dependent on speculators” and
deprived of their future, he stood on the side of the weak and against the forces and
groups in power. Although he explained that his position and system were not rooted
in socialism but in the “eternal teaching of the Catholic Church”,24 replacing the
traditional opposition: communism versus capitalism with the new one: capitalism
(equals communism) versus nationalism could still lead to confusion. Traditionally the
political right grew out of conservatism rather than revolutionary ideas, even if of
23
24
See p28.
He also considered Hitler’s economic theory as rooted in Christian rather than
socialist origins.
13
religious provenance. Doboszyński, however, was not the only right wing ideologist
of that time calling for radical changes and promoting military forms of religiosity. With
all his specific features he was part of a wider trend of merging socialism and
nationalism which resulted in the appearance of movements such as Fascism in Italy
or National Socialism in Germany.25
The left wing roots of the modern right are being noted by an increasing
number of scholars.26 Brian Porter, a leading historian of the evolution of Polish
nationalism, showed through a very detailed analysis how the economic problems of
the fin de dix-neuvième siècle gave birth to the authoritarianism of Doboszyński’s
party, Endecja27 (later SN). A call to improve the economic situation of the Polish
people through certain organised actions had to be pronounced by any political
movement appearing at the end of 19th century. That was why the two main political
groupings formed in Poland at that time: “socialists”, concentrated around PPS, and
“nationalists”, brought together through organisational work among students (Zets)28
and peasants (Polak)29, started from almost the same position. During the last
decade of the old century Roman Dmowski (1864-1939), the spiritual father of all
Polish nationalists, still praised the socialist movement as an extremely important
expression of the aspirations of the working class, who “thanks to its numbers and
possibilities of development should be considered an excellent source of national
power”30. Only a couple of years later he backed away from these revolutionary
positions having decided that the obligation towards the nation overrides all social
needs and his group became the deadly enemy of PPS.
Before Adam Doboszyński entered the Polish political scene, Dmowski’s
nationalists had already been called “the old ones” as they returned to more
traditional conservative positions. After May 1926 and the success of Piłsudski’s coup
25
Sternhell, Sznajder, Asheri 1994, Hagen 1996, Besier, Stokłosa 2009.
26
e.g. Porter 2000, Krzywiec 2009, Meller, Tomaszewski 2011.
27
Porter 2000, p257.
28
Związek Młodzieży Polskiej, a secret association of Polish students which had
active branches at Universities and High Schools in all three parts of Poland.
29
A monthly magazine edited in Krakow from 1896 by J.L. Popławski with the aim of
strengthening national identity among Polish peasants on Russian territory.
30
Dmowski 1893.
14
d’état, they were criticised by the younger generations for the weakness of their
traditional political methods. With the economic crises of the 1930s deepening, right
wing youth radicalised further and again called for revolutionary deeds.
Polish socialists had to be “patriotic” even more than Polish nationalists
needed to be revolutionary. This was a special feature of the Polish political scene of
the time caused by historical circumstances and was similarly confusing as “right”
rooted in the “left”.
At the turn of the century when “modernity” started challenging the “old”
political order of XIX century Europe, Poland did not exist. For over a hundred years
it had been divided between three occupying powers with different political, social
and economic frameworks existing for Poles in each of them. Like every nation
deprived of its statehood, the Polish people had to preserve their national identity in
order to survive. Polishness thus became a real obsession of most Poles, an
obsession which found its extreme in a romantic messianic concept interpreting
Poland – in the sense and form of the Polish nation - as the tortured and executed
Christ who in due course will be resurrected and act as a saviour of all peoples.31
Different concepts of Polishness had been discussed by every generation since the
one which lost the state’s independence in 1795. Even those groups or generations
which gave up the idea of statehood, either by proposing economic and intellectual
improvements in the lands of the former Polish state instead of another national
uprising or by calling for a cross boundary international social revolution, could not
allow themselves, for many political reasons, to give up Polishness.32
What united those who were proposing the independence of Poland with those
who limited their plans to preserving Polish autonomy and Polish identity was that
both programmes meant staying more or less in opposition to the government of
each empire and both proposed keeping a high profile of national awareness.
Identifying with the state, opting for a citizen-type of patriotism, would automatically
31
“And on the third day, the soul shall return to its body; and the nation shall rise
from the dead; and shall free all the nations of Europe from slavery.” (Mickiewicz
1833, p21).
32
In 1938 Stalin accused the KPP (Komunistyczna Partia Polski) leadership of
nationalism and dismantled it, recalling its members to the Soviet Union to be killed
or arrested.
15
mean to become German or Russian33. Thus, to stay Polish one had to be a rebel
fighting for the national rights of one’s “oppressed minority”.
2.3 Catholic – Jewish Relations and the Question of Victimhood
When studying Catholic-Jewish relations in the inter war period as reported by
Catholic and Jewish media of that time, and particularly the debate related to the
Doboszyński case, one can observe that both groups competed in seeing
themselves as their respective victims. The vocabulary of “persecution” and “abuse”
which had to be answered by “more effective protection” and “self-defence” can be
seen in comparable quantity in both the Jewish and Catholic press.34
By the time Poland regained its independence at the end of WWI the “golden
times” of Jewish life in Poland were long gone. The new, post war concept of Europe
consisting of national states designed to separate different ethnic groups worsened
the position of Jews relative to Catholic Poles. Before, both used to be co-victims of
the bigger powers, experiencing a more or less similar fate within the Russian or
Austrian Empire. Now Jews were expected to stay in their lower position while nonJewish Poles were moving up, becoming the majority, possibly replacing their former
persecutors.35
The difficulty of Poles accepting the fact that after a century of suffering
oppression from the hands of the three occupying powers they can themselves
become oppressors of their minorities was visible already during the Versailles
conference. The Polish delegation led by Roman Dmowski and Ignacy Paderewski
(1860-1941) fought unsuccessfully against the Minorities Treaty that Poland was
forced to sign. The Treaty gave members of the League of the Nations rights to
defend minority groups in Poland in their potential conflicts with the Polish state. In
the opinion of the Polish government this could involve foreign influence on internal
33
The situation was a bit different in Galicia, where Polish national autonomy was
respected and where, with time, many Poles grew loyal to the Austrian Empire.
34
In my work I refer to all non-Jewish Polish media (except the socialist Robotnik) as
Catholic.
35
Kapiszewski 2004, p259.
16
Polish affairs but also meant – and this was much worse – that Poland had lost its
position of victim of the imperial powers and had started to be treated as an
oppressor itself. “The accusation of imperialism”, said Paderewski in the newly
established Polish parliament in May 1919, “came exactly from those three
imperialisms that put us down, looted us and dismembered us”.36 Dmowski,
furthermore, saw the hands of Jews behind the Treaty and behind sentiments
expressed during the peace conference that he thought anti-Polish. According to him,
it was international Jewry which plotted the destruction of Poland, which set Lloyd
George against her and which in exchange for many high positions promised to them
in German politics, committed itself to acting as allies of Germany.37 This accusation
was later used repeatedly in the attempt to picture Poles as victims of Jewish
viciousness. The Catholic media went on calling Jews “the fourth partition of
Poland”38 and identifying them with all evil.39
Among few western thinkers likely to share views on Poland’s victimhood was
G.K. Chesterton (1874-1936).40 He personally knew Dmowski and was involved in
the discussions surrounding the Peace Conference. In 1933 Chesterton became the
philosophical mentor of Doboszyński.
One of the explanations of Doboszyński’s attack on Myślenice employed by
his defenders was that he acted in a state of “higher necessity” supporting Catholic
Poles in their struggle against Jews who “ran rampant in Poland”41. The role of
Doboszyński as a protector of local SN members from a powerful Jew-loving
government and saviour of the Catholic faith from Jew-based communism was
highlighted in the media debate by Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy and other right
wing papers. Naje Folkscajtung and Nowy Dziennik counterbalanced this picture
portraying him as a persecutor of the Jewish people and a petty antisemite.
36
Pobóg-Malinowski 1961, p157.
37
Dmowski 1925, pp105-16.
38
Modras 1996, p178.
39
Researched by Modras 1994, 1996, Landau-Czajka 1994, 1997 and more recently
Libionka 2002 and Pałka 2006.
40
Chesterton 1922.
41
Words used in Doboszyński’s Prayer to Holy Mary in August 1935.
17
If the jurors who pronounced Doboszyński “not guilty” felt comfortable that
justice had been done, it was mainly thanks to his advocates who presented him as a
victim. The Catholic-Jewish competition in victimhood allowed for the defence to be
turned into an accusation.
18
III. 23 June 193642
3.1 Protection Squadrons
On the 6th June 1936 Doboszyński returned to Kraków after six weeks of
military training. He came back frustrated and dissatisfied. The army, which he had
known since 1920 when as a 16 year old he volunteered to fight the Soviets,43 was
now in a pitiful state. He observed a lack of organisation, discipline, provisions, and
above all a lack of awareness that, if the army was to provide any security for the
nation, something must be done and as soon as possible. Next day he called a
meeting of all local offices of SN in Kraków District and ordered them to create
paramilitary units, one in each of the groups44. He wanted strong, young people who
had had prior army experience and would be able to obey orders, deal with weapons
and, if necessary, fight. Candidates had to pass “moral selection” confirming their
ideological “soundness”. During the Kraków trial he explained that the main reason
for creating the units was to provide safety for party meetings.45 Doboszyński
believed the authorities used all means available to either block or break up any
opposition gatherings and if they did eventually take place, there was always the risk
42
The description of the events is based on court statements (Doboszyński 1936b,
Małecki 1936) and interviews (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12).
43
He never managed to reach the front in 1920. He had only finished preliminary
training when the peace treaty was signed.
44
Thanks to Doboszyński’s organisational activity the number of the SN cells within
the Kraków District grew from a couple in 1934, when he started his work, to over
seventy in June 1936.
45
Doboszyński 1936b.
19
of being attacked by the communists.46 Interviewed after the war, he admitted,
however, that he did consider using the units in other additional ways.47
On 14th June G.K. Chesterton died from heart failure at his home, Top
Meadow, in Beaconsfield. Doboszyński was probably devastated by his death. There
was never a thinker, philosopher, or writer who would inspire him more than the
author of Orthodoxy. All the main concepts of his economic and social theories had
been rooted in Chesterton’s thought. They shared Catholicism, a fundamental phobia
of Germany and a conviction that Freemasons and Jews conspire against the
Christian world. Adam got to know Chesterton in early 193348 when he spent over
three months in Beaconsfield living in the local Catholic Parish hosted by Monsignor
Smith and studying Chesterton extensively. It has never been recorded how close
was their relationship49 or what topics they discussed but Doboszyński’s National
Economy, published shortly after his return from Britain, owes a great deal to
Chesterton’s distributism. Doboszyński himself admitted that all he ever wrote in
economic matters came either from Chesterton or from the fundamental Catholicism
of
46
Thomas
Aquinas
(1224-74)
from
whom
Chesterton
drew
inspiration.
Ibid., Książka i Wiedza, 1949. He obsessively recalled a meeting at Jagiellońska
Street in Kraków during which the nationalists were attacked by an aggressive mob,
allegedly of Jewish communists.
47
He admitted thinking of an action which would demonstrate the weakness of the
State Police. (Kaczmarski, Tomasik 2010 p.113-114). The parallel of the origins of his
“private army” with the origins of Hitler’s SA is striking.
48
His friends and family recalled that he came back from Britain a significantly
changed man: his religiosity deepened and more conservative, his political views
radicalised. (Interview 12). Upon return from Beaconsfield, he joined Akcja Katolicka
(AK) an association whose aim according to Francesco Marmaggi, Pius XI’s nuncio
in Poland, was “to construct a protective wall against Bolshevism and Freemasonry”.
It was in cooperation with AK that he organized a nationally publicised pilgrimage of
youth to Kalwaria Zebrzydowska in August 1935.
49
Zbigniew Stypułkowski (1904-1979), one of Doboszyński’s defenders in the
Myślenice trials, claimed that this relationship was quite intense and that
notwithstanding the age difference, Chesterton and Doboszyński could be called
friends (Stypułkowski, 1949).
20
Doboszyński’s eulogy describing Chesterton as a human being “on the verge of
sainthood”,50 which appeared in Bunt Młodych on 25th June, must have been written
during one of those days between setting up the military brigades and using them in
action. Perhaps he sketched the main points of the article while cycling back to
Chorowice from Nowy Targ on the 15th June. This preparatory escapade took four
days. He went through towns and villages of the region planning the technical details
of his action, looking for the best hiding places and possible directions into which the
rebellion might spread. He stopped in several places, talking to his national
“comrades” and collecting “news”. In the eyes of the nationalists, the situation was
bad everywhere as far as spreading their ideology was concerned: in Nowy Targ the
manager of “Sokół”51 refused to let a room for SN’s meeting demonstrating, in
Doboszynski’s opinion, total lack of respect for the national idea, in Myślenice “the
trade continued being controlled by Jews, who were supported by the district
authority (Starostwo) headquarters, while persecuted and jail-threatened nationalists
had no means to spread their wings”.52 He believed that the International
Government of World Jewry had moved from Vienna to Kraków.53 For most of his
adult life Doboszyński believed in a Jewish plot to rule the world, achieving which,
required destruction of the Catholic faith by Freemasons and other Jewish secret
enterprises.54 Some have interpreted this obsession as a rebellion against his father,
a liberal, conservative politician, who represented Kraków democrats in the Austrian
Parliament and may have been a member of a Lodge.55 “I could not recognise
Kraków”, said Doboszyński during his first trial, “The city was like Barcelona a month
before the revolution. In Barcelona they burnt churches, here such actions were
50
“If I was God “, wrote Doboszyński, “I would place him in the top row of my choir”
(Doboszyński 1936a).
51
A patriotic, anti-Jewish sports society, in 1926 joined Dmowski’s OWP (Obóz
Wielkiej Polski).
52
Doboszynski, 1936b.
53
Ibid..
54
Doboszyński 1947b.
55
Nitschke 1993, Interview 8.
21
already discussed.56 That Jew Drobner57, who positioned himself on top of the Leftist
front, was capable of anything at all”58.
To make sure his newly formed military units could be relied upon he
organised two trial runs: on the nights of 18/19 and 19/20 June. The call on 22nd was
the third in a row. About a hundred comrades59 from the villages of the district
answered the call. Among them were his most faithful believers and captive subjects,
peasants from his own estate - Chorowice. By 10 p.m. they had all gathered in the
forest, not far from his house. Some were on horses or bicycles but the majority
came on foot. Some had pistols, axes or field tools, others only pieces of wood.60 The
clearing, known by the locals as “Little Hell” looked completely packed. “We are
charging at Myślenice tonight”, said Doboszyński, “it has begun.” Then he formed
people into marching order, into rows of four with cyclists in front and at the back and
led them across the fields in the direction of Głogoczów. To make sure nobody
slipped away he appointed a reargard. During the trial most of them claimed to have
no idea about what exactly was going to happen in Myślenice. It is possible that the
attack on the police and Starosta came as a bit of a surprise but they would have
certainly realised who was their main target. Doboszyński had been disseminating his
“programme” among his party colleagues and neighbouring peasants for some time;
even persuading a few to take part in his previous actions. Since they had heard him
praying to St. Mary to save the country from Jews at the shrine in Kalwaria, it would
be really difficult not to guess against whom they were being led, at night, in military
56
In April 1935, during a meeting of Kraków City Council, Bolesław Drobner, who
disapproved of spending public money on financing Talmud Torah schools, was
witnessed saying: “I would gladly burn all those Jewish and Catholic sheds!” This
single statement grew into widespread gossip of “Jews planning to burn Churches
and kill priests” during the Myślenice trials.
57
Bolesław Drobner (1883-1962).
58
In all legal statements (1936, 1937, 1947) while describing the situation in Kraków
at the time of the Myślenice escapade, Doboszyński focused on the activities of
Drobner.
59
The numbers differed depending on the source from 50 to 150 participants.
Doboszyński talked about 70 people (Doboszyński 1936b).
60
Altogether the group was armed with 4 pistols and c200 bullets.
22
formation, with wooden sticks and guns in hand. Once on the main road they began
to hum and sing religious hymns to pretend it was a peaceful pilgrimage. Before
entering Myślenice, Doboszyński ordered three teams of cyclists to cut the telephone
lines so disabling the town’s connection with the outside world.
Myślenice had not been chosen by pure chance. Doboszyński used to come
there often enough, invited by local nationalists, to speak against “Jews and the Jewsupporting government”.61 The meetings took place in the open, on the fields beyond
the River Raba. SN members complained that they could not count on any job in
Myślenice. The head of the district was quite clear that he would “have no opposition
here”.62 Still, they believed being union members helped and would gladly join
Doboszyński’s building workers’ branch of the SN union, Praca Polska, but he
continued to have trouble with its official registration. During the trial he will state:
“The situation of nationalists in Myślenice seemed to be abysmal: one could not
possess a single copy of Orędownik63 before being fined or arrested (…) which was
symbolic of the overall situation in Poland”.64
3.2 The Putsch
The attack started at 3.30. The squad, divided into two main groups each
appointed to specific tasks, dispersed throughout the town centre. Doboszyński as
head of his section fooled the policeman on duty that there was a burglary he was
going to report and broke into the commissariat. The policeman after being wounded
on the head could not utter a single word of protest while the entire place was being
smashed up. The attackers took away all the rifles and bullets that they found and
61
Stoszek 2009.
62
Dulski 1936.
63
An anti-socialist, right-wing daily published in Poznań, representing the interests of
the petite bourgeoisie.
64
Doboszyński 1936b.
23
tried them out firing several times inside and outside the building.65 At the point of
leaving, they again hit the victim’s face with a rubber truncheon. 66
A separate section of only three people, equipped by Doboszynski with a
bottle of paraffin, broke into the Synagogue building to set it on fire.67 As revealed in
the court proceedings later on, Doboszyński wanted to burn down the Synagogue to
“pay back” the Jews for promoting communism in Poland and for inciting the
destruction of Catholic Churches.68
The most demanding task in Doboszyński’s plan, assigned therefore to the
largest number of his people, was to ransack the Jewish shops on the Market
Square. “Jewish” being the only precondition, the order did not specify which kind of
shops should be targeted leaving this decision to the whim of the attackers. Ozjasz
Blumenstock’s Szatnia, the most elegant fashion shop in Myślenice, was their first
choice. The huge glass window was broken and fur coats, jackets and dresses
started disappearing at great speed. A similar fate awaited the premises of Olga
Weinman, Rozalia Goldstein and Berisch Becker.69 Within minutes the burglars were
inside those shops emptying them of any valuables.
At that point the town had already been woken up. People who lived close to
the police station started looking out of their houses to check what was happening.
65
The court proceedings mention 14 rifles, 10 bayonets, 5 pistols, 10 grenades and
458 bullets. During the trial Doboszyński ridiculed the police saying that their arms
were in a scandalous state.
66
Some witnesses later reported that Doboszyński was upset about his people’s
physical attack on an innocent man “doing his duty” and promised to give him job
after SN takes power.
67
Their attempts turned out to be futile. The fire destroyed the entrance room and
stopped, most probably on its own.
68
As the trials showed, those “incitements” were: the Drobner incident in 1935 and
unspecified gossip from Skotniki about “a group” of “some” Hasids plotting to kill a
priest and burn a church there.
69
It is difficult to establish how many shops were attacked altogether. The first press
reports talked about two shops, the official accusation mentioned eight properties
affected (Weinman, Becker, Goldstein, Westreich, Zanker, Blumenstock, Karger,
Emmer), Jewish sources listed over ten of them.
24
The most courageous and curious ones went out in the direction of the centre from
where the loudest noises were coming. Others opened their windows and shouted
questions into the twilight. Józef Chęciński still remembered his family talking to
Doboszyński’s people seventy years earlier. His father asked one of the attackers
whether war had started, since “they all looked like soldiers and were armed”70 but
became reassured by the answer that the matter concerned Jews not Catholics and
went back to sleep.
Doboszyński arrived at the Market Square when the stealing had reached a
climax. He was apparently disgusted71 with what he saw and ordered all stolen goods
to be piled up in front of the shops and burnt. The situation became difficult to control
as in the meantime his people were joined by some local looters who would not listen
to anyone’s orders. Witnesses interviewed in 2009 remembered that a couple of
Catholics, owners of the adjoining shops, followed the burglars trying to smear their
garments with dry paint so that they could be recognised in the full light of day.72
With piles of goods burning in the middle of the square, and all the victims
screaming with fear and running around in an attempt to hide themselves and their
children, the devastation entered yet another stage.73 Axes were used to destroy
doors, windows and furniture, containers and boxes of food were cut into pieces,
bags lifted and grains mixed together. White clouds of fresh flour rising in the
darkness of the night was a picture remembered by most of the witnesses I
interviewed. Anything of value was destined for total destruction. Chaja Becker
70
71
Interview 2.
Several defence witnesses reported Doboszyński being upset by too much
violence and saying to his people “Do not turn a political demonstration into an
ordinary crime.” This version was also confirmed by members of his family. However,
there were other statements, including Doboszyński’s own, suggesting that his
dissatisfaction was caused by the fact that not enough shops were attacked and not
enough damage inflicted.
72
Stoszek, 2009.
73
The description of this stage of the attack varies a lot depending on the sources.
Considered least important during the trial, it received almost no attention. The total
value of all damage inflicted on the Jewish shops was calculated at 10000 zlotys. My
description has been based on the interviews with Myślenice citizens.
25
reported being woken up by an intensive knocking on the shop doors and sending
her twenty year old son to check what was happening. He saw the burglars breaking
in and tried to wake up his sister, who slept in the kitchen:
“At this moment one of the men aimed at me with his rifle. I jumped towards
the wall as he fired in my direction. He missed me but the bullet only just missed my
sister Chana”. 74
They all ran away screaming, Chaja carrying the youngest baby, while the
attackers kept firing at their backs.75
Ozjasz Blumenstock, who unlike the Beckers, lived at a distance from his
shop, did not run away from, but towards, the attackers. When he arrived at the
Square he saw clouds of smoke coming out of his shop and a pile of clothes burning
in front of it. He tried to stop the fire with the help of others because the fire brigade,
although notified, did not arrive.76
At the same time Josef Emmer, loading a wagon in front of his house by
Stradomska Street, was taken by surprise. Attacked with wooden planks and axes,
he dropped everything and ran into his children’s room fearing for their life. Outside,
the wagon was turned upside down and set on fire by Doboszynski’s people.77
Emmer was on his way to the morning market and the wagon loaded with goods to
sell was almost everything that he possessed. The harm inflicted by the attackers
was extremely hard on his modest business.78
Hirsch Westreich avoided physical harm but his shop and his wagon were
totally damaged.79 Josef Hopfenberg, while trying to defend his shop, heard the
words “Here is one, kill him, kill the Jew” shouted at him and saw an axe flying in his
direction. He escaped but the premises were ransacked and his wife was hit with a
74
Becker 1936.
75
Ibid..
76
Blumenstock 1936.
77
Emmer 1936.
78
Interview 7.
79
Westreich 1936.
26
heavy clock.80 A 58 year old baker, Lejb Wachsberg was also unlucky. Caught on the
street and beaten up by a group of aggressors, he was left unconscious.81 Earlier on,
a similar group stopped the wagon of Majer Berkowicz who was driving to Siepraw
with a Catholic horseman Filip Kulas. The attackers shouted:
“Stop or I will shoot! Jew or Catholic?”
Berkowicz answered he was Catholic but they did not seem to believe him.
“Three or four of them approached the wagon and one hit me close to the eye
with the butt of his rifle. At the same time he turned to his colleague asking: ‘What do
we do with him Mr Engineer?’82 At that point I jumped off and ran. Three or four guns
fired in my direction”.83
Berkowicz must have been lucky because Władysław Święch, a municipal guard later
disarmed and kidnapped by Doboszyński’s people, witnessed84 the entire situation
and was persuaded they did not miss.
A couple of other Jews had been threatened and all were scared before
Doboszyński decided that they had had enough. He blew his whistle three times
which meant that the action on the shops came to an end. The looting on the Square
did not stop after Doboszyński withdrew his squad, at least not immediately. With the
police disarmed and the means of communication disabled, it was not easy to reestablish security. The Krakow police was only notified when a messenger was sent
next morning by car from the nearby estate of the town’s mayor.85
Doboszyński withdrew slowly from the centre of town along Reja Street. It was
there, as he found out from local informers, that the Starosta, the next target of his
80
Hopfenberg 1936.
81
Wachsberg 1936.
82
Doboszyński was often addressed by his professional title.
83
Berkowicz 1936.
84
Święch 1936.
85
Interview 12.
27
action, lived.86 The Starosta was a government-appointed head of the district. In
1936 the position in Myślenice was occupied by Antoni Bassara, who was, according
to Doboszyński, a corrupted “quarter of an intelligent” who hated nationalist ideology
and persecuted its followers.87 For that he was now to be punished and his flat and
its contents ransacked. Woken up by screams, curses and noises of axes breaking
through doors, the Starosta jumped out of bed and followed his panic stricken
housekeeper into the larder. Soon, however, the larder door was also broken down
by axes and Doboszyński stuck a pistol into his mouth.
“The other one pointed a gun at my head” recollected the housekeeper,
Kunegunda Turek in the Court in Kraków, “Doboszyński asked who it was and I
answered it was a guest of Mr Starosta. (…) When leaving, Doboszyński said to me:
“Madam, please tell Mr Starosta that we were here to thank him for persecuting
national ideology””.88
Before giving the order to leave, Doboszyński made sure that the entire flat
had been totally ransacked.89 Then he formed his squad in rows of four and marched
them out of town. It was 4.30 a.m.
86
Some Jewish shops were still robbed on the way to the Starosta’s flat and
afterwards. There exist reports of Jews terrified by these attacks and the gunfire.
Many kept running between the houses of different family members in order to
protect their parents, children or cousins (Karger 1936, Aftergut 1936, Rand 1936).
87
Interview 8.
88
Turek 1936.
89
Even a painting of the holy Madonna, which used to hang over the Starosta’s bed,
did not survive. The story of Starosta Bassara’s chamber pot being exposed and
carried around the Market Square survived among Myślenice’s inhabitants, although
none of my interviewees was an eye witness to it nor was able to remember who the
witnesses were.
28
3.3 A Failed Revolution
The road they took leaving town in the direction of Dobczyce, King Casimir the
Great Street, will change its name and, for a short while during WWII, become
Engineer Doboszyński Street.90 This fact will be used by the communist regime as
additional evidence of Doboszyński’s cooperation with German Intelligence. On 29
August 1949, after a show trial, Doboszyński will be executed in Mokotów Prison in
Warsaw as a German and American “inspirational” spy. The Final Act of Accusation
prepared by the Military Court of Warsaw District will list the Myślenice events among
the activities organised by Doboszyński “on the demand” of the Germans.
“Fulfilling the function of an inspirational agent of Hitler’s Germany, (…)
indoctrinating the Polish nation with fascist political doctrines and philo-germanic
ideology (…) Adam Doboszyński organised a pogrom of Jews in Myślenice in
1936.”91
This erroneous interpretation will lead, as a side effect, to grave historical
consequences. While claiming that the attack on Myślenice had been ordered by
German fascists, the communists will at the same time reject the possibility that the
ultra-nationalism and fascism of the attackers might have originated from a native,
internal Polish source. This will additionally contribute to the progressive distortion of
Polish interwar history. Cleared of the communists’ accusations in 1989, the “martyr”
Doboszyński will be above all criticism. The inhabitants of his home village,
Chorowice, grandchildren of those who attacked Myślenice, will be able to tell me
that his death had nothing to do with the post war politics, it was just Jews murdering
him as revenge for their destroyed wagons.92 The persecution of Polish nationalists
by the communists will turn many nationalists, as well as pre-war nationalism itself,
into innocent victims and clear them of the accusation of fascism.
A wagon loaded with 140kg of bread, 70kg of sausages and 140 packets of
pipe tobacco awaited Doboszyński’s people by the bridge on the road to Droginia.
90
The idea of a local councillor, approved by the Germans.
91
Książka i Wiedza 1949, pp 567, 573.
92
Interview 10.
29
The provisions were partly bought in Jewish shops,93 but none of their consumers
had any doubt that the aim of the Myślenice escapade was anti-Jewish. They had
listened to their leader over previous years and knew whom he considered the main
enemy of the Nation. The literate ones read and disseminated “Orędownik”, recently
with additional motivation, because it was in this paper that Doboszyński described
the anti-national behaviour of the authorities in Myślenice district.94 Many, like
Płonka95 or Jan Kwinta, followed Doboszyński to Skawina only half a year
beforehand, where they bullied Catholic customers of the Christmas market to refrain
from entering Jewish shops or buying Jewish products.96 All took part in a national
pilgrimage to Holy Mary in Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, where Doboszyński asked God,
in front of a hundred thousand believers to spare the country from Jews, those
“enemies of our Holy Faith and Church” who “go rampant” in the poverty stricken
fatherland.97
Like a majority of Catholics in interwar Poland, Doboszyński had personal
friends who were Jewish. All those friendships, however, came to a sharp end in
1934, just before he became an official member of the National Party. Andrzej
Malkiewicz remembers one of those occasions when his uncle said his final good bye
to a particularly close friend, Bela “Czajka” Gelbardowa (1893-1968), an assimilated
Jewish novelist. “He felt he could not fight the Jews and continue staying in a close
relationship with one of them”.98 Although in June 1936 his main fight was against the
State Police, in which there probably were no Jews, he felt that this fight was to
achieve a political system guaranteeing the total removal of Jews from Poland.99
93
The Catholic ones could not provide a sufficient amount (Doboszyński 1936b).
94
Orędownik 274 1936.
95
Płonka was a former soldier of General Haller’s Legion, known for being the most
antisemitic part of the interwar Polish Army.
96
The “Stick with your own kind” boycott campaign received huge support from both
the government and the Catholic Church (Modras 1996, p179).
97
Doboszyński himself brought 4000 nationalist pilgrims.
98
Interview 8.
99
Idée fixe which Doboszyński never gave up. Still in 1941 he suggested in an open
letter to Antoni Słonimski published by ‘Jestem Polakiem’ that a forced removal of all
30
Anti-Jewish prejudices and personal dislike for Jews can be seen in the
statements of most of Doboszyński’s defence witnesses. Individual Jews are named
there as responsible for the misfortunes of particular witnesses. They own more
successful businesses, win competitions for jobs, lead trade unions, corrupt the
authorities and legal system or run away from illegal communist meetings leaving
Catholics to pay fines or get arrested.100 Twenty of them may ride in one carriage
without being told off while ten Catholics would immediately be fined.101 In Gorlice
Jews who illegally trade on Sunday pay ten times less than Catholics.102 In
Myślenice, where local furriers happen to be nationalists, there is no chance for them
to get any profitable contract since Jews work as intermediaries and control the
prices.103
The key witnesses on whose statements Doboszyński’s lawyers based their
defence had no relationship to Myślenice nor to the June 1936 events in Myślenice.
They were lawyers, doctors, teachers or journalists from large towns and cities in the
Galicia region, educated and outspoken, experienced in carrying out public
discussions on “Jewish matters”. Their role was to be witnesses of the “overall
situation in Poland”, where Jewish persecution of Catholics rose to the level of posing
an existential danger to the latter.
Doboszyński’s squad was dispersed immediately after the first battle with the
police near Poręba. Many of his people had already been arrested, others tried to
hide or returned home. Only the nine most faithful ones and himself continued
marching towards the mountains and on 24th June took part in a second battle
against the border guards in Zubrzyca. Just before this final battle Doboszyński
signed the guest book in a mountain refuge identifying himself and his group as
“fighters for Great Poland”. The same book was also signed by border guards “in
Jews will have to be organised in Poland as soon as the war ends. As a result of this
letter the paper was closed down by the British authorities.
100
e.g. Mech 1937, Brożek 1937.
101
Knotek 1936.
102
Otęski 1936.
103
A particular contract with the Railway Company is referred to by many witnesses
and Doboszyński himself.
31
pursuit of anarchists who try to destroy the State”.104 Doboszyński was arrested on
30 June 1936 near Zawoja, after several days spent on his own hiding in forests by
the Czechoslovakian border.
Preparations for the court trial took almost a year and from the very beginning
received an exceptionally large media attention. Their interest had been so great that
the number of journalists permitted to attend the hearings had to be limited.
Nevertheless for over two years almost forty reporters from Poland and abroad
debated the Myślenice events turning Doboszyński into the most controversial Polish
politician of prewar times. A “dangerous firebrand” inciting civil war in the eyes of
Sanacja, by some referred to as “little Mussolini” and considered fascist, for others a
symbol of Catholic antisemitism of the 1930s, yet another group crowned him as a
Messiah, the one who sacrificed himself for his people. His action, officially treated as
a “rebellion” or a “lawless excess”, was equally easily becoming a “march”, “a
putsch”, an “invasion”, a “failed pogrom” or – as expressed by Doboszyński and his
legal defenders: an “act of justice”. There were elements in the Myślenice events
which provided a basis for each of these descriptions as well as there being
exaggeration present in the views of each side.
The Myślenice debate revealed the “core” of political conflict in Poland,
splitting the arguing parties into four camps, whose different political reasons fuelled
different interpretations. It happened that exaggerating the importance of
Doboszyński’s action lay in the best interests of them all.
104
Doboszynski, 1936b.
32
IV. “Act of Higher Necessity”, Pogrom, March or Anti-Government Rebellion?
4.1 Doboszyński – A Revolutionary Firebrand (Sanacja’s Media Event)
The attack on Myślenice happened at a time of extreme social and political
unrest in Poland. Only one year earlier, in an atmosphere of growing popularity of
strong political leaders in Europe, Poland lost Piłsudski. Unstable and weakened by
internal conflicts, the “post-Piłsudski” camp showed little success in fighting economic
crises and keeping positive public esteem, a situation made more difficult by the
external influence of the social revolutions in Nazi Germany and Communist Russia
as well as strong internal opposition from the left and right of the political scene.
Continuing parliamentary battles, negative media campaigns, street protests and
strikes caused increasing lack of security among both citizens and government itself
which created an atmosphere of tension and suspicion.
In this situation Doboszyński’s action in Myślenice posed great potential
trouble105 for the government. The newly established106 cabinet of Felicjan SławojSkładkowski (1882-1962) was a result of a compromise between two groups of
Piłsudski’s heirs: one led by President Mościcki,107 the other by the army chief,
General Rydz-Śmigły (1886-1941). Constructed in haste, the cabinet worked as a
temporary solution, whose main purpose was to cover the internal weakness of the
105
The adjective “trouble maker” stayed with Doboszynski for the rest of his life and
influenced the attitude of the Polish government in exile to him. They interned him
twice during the war: first in 1941 for his antisemitic article in “I am a Pole” in which
he suggested the expulsion of all Jews from Poland after the war “using the newest
technologies” and the second time in 1943 for plotting against Sikorski at a time
when a difficult agreement with Ivan Majski (1884-1975) and the Soviet Union was
being negotiated (Doboszyński tried to force President Raczkiewicz (1885-1947) to
dismiss General Sikorski from his position as PM). At that time, General Sikorski was
heard asking Doboszyński during an officers’ picnic: “Are you preparing another
Myślenice for me, Lieutenant?” (Harusewicz, 1984, p9).
106
15 May 1936.
107
Ignacy Mościcki (1867-1946), President of Poland (1926-1939).
33
Sanacja camp, which, if exposed, could be used by the opposition. The last thing
Składkowski wanted to see in June 1936 was a political demonstration of power.
As long as feasible the authorities kept calling it a “robbery”. Ilustrowany Kurier
Codzienny, Gazeta Polska and other mainstream newspapers reported that a “gang
of ruffians” led by “a certain Doboszyński” broke into the private flat of the Starosta
and a couple of posh shops in the town centre stealing valuables, clothes and
money. When it turned out that all the “thieves” were carrying their SN IDs and that
their leader was the head of the regional branch of the party, the “theft” interpretation
started sounding unjustifiable. Although the Jewish press regarded Myślenice as
clear evidence of the “pogrom inciting policy of the SN” and the left wing papers
called Doboszyński both “Führer” and “Duce”, the government tried to avoid “political”
explanations of the events. The prime minister Składkowski, in an aggressive answer
to an MP’s interpellation in Parliament on 28th June, repeated with all certainty that
“the town had been attacked by bandits”. By that time the gossip had been confirmed
and Składkowski knew that the “ringleader” was an opposition politician and quite a
conservative one at that. He knew that the “criminal” happened to be a well educated
intellectual from an aristocratic background who had only recently published a
popular work on economic matters.
The initial public condemnation of his act had already started waning and the
danger of him becoming “political competition” for the “helpless government” rose by
the hour. At this point the right wing media styled him a victim of the global chaos
overwhelming the entire country. “Poland is ill” announced Warszawski Dziennik
Narodowy, “no wonder that an emotional individual loses his senses”.108 Pronouncing
Doboszyński mad was an idea that the prosecution played with for a short while109
but in the end Sanacja preferred to see him sane. Only sane could he be vicious
enough to deliberately plan the destruction of whatever was left of state security in
the face of the external and internal enemies plotting against Poland. The trial had
been constructed as a media event during which the rebellious, anti-government
aspects of Doboszyński’s action were highlighted at the expense of his anti-Jewish
“demonstration”. By the second half of the decade antisemitism in Poland was seen
108
109
Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy, 27.06.36
The initial proposals for medical examinations of Doboszyński were quickly
abandoned.
34
as a sign of patriotism so Doboszyński as an enemy of Jews could easily become
potential competition for the government. Therefore the main impetus of the
prosecution had to go towards destroying Doboszyński’s possible role as a patriotic
leader. His action was therefore presented as the antithesis of patriotism. It
“weakened the state” and became “grist to the red mill”.110 He was described as a
soldier who used his military knowledge against his own country, a commander, who
abandoned his squad on the battlefield. To rid his action of any positive claims, a
specific vocabulary was used. An initial rough gangster of a modern type very soon
became an old fashioned, highly destructive firebrand, an eternal “noble robewearing demon rampaging anew on Polish highways”.111
A noble firebrand – “warchoł” – was a suitable, ready to use symbol of a well
established negative association in
Polish
history
and
provided
an
effective
counterbalance to a growing symbol of the self-sacrificing, God anointed “saviour”
which was being constructed by ONR, SN and Doboszyński himself. “SN does not
have a monopoly of patriotism, we have more constructive proposals for this country”
– cried the prosecutor at the end of his dramatic speech in Kraków’s courthouse. The
failure of the jurors to pronounce Doboszyński “guilty” became a serious threat to the
Sanacja’s State and could easily turn into the final straw which could break its back.
At the time that Doboszyński’s first trial was coming to an end, Cardinal
Sapieha, moved Piłsudski’s coffin into a new crypt at Wawel Castle ignoring
Government objections.112 Piłsudski’s legend was the main source of Sanacja’s
legitimacy, his grave was hallowed ground, so the Government could not accept it.
The fact that the Church went ahead regardless shows that power had started
slipping out of the Government’s hands.
110
Prosecutor Szypuła’s speech, reported in Głos Narodu 26.06.37.
111
Gazeta Polska 26.06.1936.
112
Składkowski resigned over the issue but was reinstated by Mościcki.
35
4.2 Doboszyński – A Leader of Great Poland (Nationalist Demonstration of Power)
On the same day that all the Polish media reported the attack on Myślenice,
condemning its organiser, Bunt Młodych published Doboszyński’s debut on their
columns: an eulogy to G.K. Chesterton.113 At this time Myślenice was still being still
interpreted as an “attack by gangsters”, so one of the following issues contained an
apologetic note from the chief editor in which the publication of Doboszyński’s text
was explained.
He seemed to be a perfectly respectable fellow, went the
explanation, a good Catholic who drew from Chesterton’s “sunny religiosity”, but here
we are, as Chesterton once said, “apathy can be worse than death”, the madness of
the Polish situation has reached the point of breaking down the best of us. 114
The initial uncertainty of SN and ONR whether to claim or reject links to
Doboszyński resulted from the political gridlock in which they found themselves. On
one hand some circles in the young nationalists were having “an affair” with
Sanacja115 at that time, on the other, Doboszyński’s action, if it received public
condemnation, could have put a stain on SN’s moral standing as an opposition to the
government. The hesitation, however, did not take long. After the initial statement of
the Kraków SN headquarters that they had absolutely nothing to do with Myślenice
as Doboszyński “acted on his own account being on official leave from his
organisational duties”,116 they quickly changed their decision and gave him the
party’s and the national camp’s full support. After having boycotted the parliamentary
election in July 1935, the right wing opposition had no comparable opportunity to
have its voice heard.
As early as three days after Myślenice, expressing his concerns about the
situation of Polish Jews squeezed between the antisemitism of Sanacja and the
antisemitism of Endecja, Henryk Hescheles predicted that Doboszyński’s trials were
113
Doboszyński, 1936a.
114
Bunt Młodych, 15.07.36.
115
Which resulted in their joining Związek Młodej Polski, a young and military
oriented wing of OZON (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego).
116
Goniec Częstochowski, 27.06.36.
36
going to become: “the nationalists’ tribunes for indoctrination”.117 In his opinion
Myślenice was yet another step towards the illegal takeover of the state’s control,
meticulously planned and performed by SN. SN, for its part, felt however that the
switch of power between the government and themselves (at least that part of it
represented by moral leadership) had already taken place. Somewhere between
Spring 1936 and 1937, when the trial of Doboszyński’s accomplices started,118 the
radical nationalists in Poland stopped considering themselves as suppressed and
controlled by the government minority. That was why the lawyers of the forty seven
accused decided that there was no need to defend them. Instead, they launched an
aggressive campaign of accusation.
By that time antisemitism was not anymore considered contrary to
Catholicism.119 Thus open hatred towards Jews and any party supposedly on the
Jewish side started being expressed freely from the very beginning of the trial. The
thirteen defenders of Doboszyński’s squad “heiled” their clients and vice versa in
front of the Tribunal, paying absolutely no attention to the fact that a significant group
of international journalists interpreted their gesture as open praise of Hitler. They
spoke from the position of moral power, throwing wild accusations at all and sundry
and ignored any attempts of the leading judge to subdue them.
In the opinion of SN lawyers their clients, men who robbed, stole, set fire,
threatened, hit and attempted to kill Jews in Myślenice, were not guilty of any criminal
offence. They had no other choice but to follow Doboszyński and act this way as they
all acted in self-defence. Jews not only plotted to economically destroy Catholics,
they also became a physical threat to them. “Jews dare to shoot Poles by the walls of
Częstochowa”, cried Orędownik in March 1937, with other national papers following.
Any crime committed by an individual Jew against an individual Catholic rose in scale
to a Jewish war against Catholic Poles.
The reports from the Myślenice trials were extensive, almost obsessively
detailed. Many issues of Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy and other right wing titles
had to be censored in order to ban their anti-government impact. Anti-Jewish
117
Chwila, 27.06.36.
118
Their trial finished on 5 June 1937 with 36 sentences between 10-20 months and
11 acquittals.
119
e.g. Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy 14.03.36.
37
comments, on the other hand, were never discouraged or prevented by censorship.
The questions of the defence were almost exclusively of an anti-Jewish character
and very rarely had anything to do with the attack on Myślenice. “Is it true that Jews
started the Russian revolution and spread communism in Poland?”, “Do you know
that in Soviet Russia Churches were burnt but Synagogues survived?” or “Did you
have many unfair Jewish competitors?” – were the favourite questions of the defence
lawyers. The role of witnesses was simply to confirm what the questions suggested:
“England owes the collapse of its Empire to the Jew Disraeli and Spaniards are being
murdered by Jewish Marranos”.120 The SN interpretation of Myślenice presented the
jurors with an artificial alternative that their verdict was a choice between the
Bolshevik star and the Catholic cross, between Judeopolonia and a national state.
This alternative will be revived by many historians after the fall of communism.121
On 5th November 1936, more than half a year before Doboszyński’s first trial,
the Minister of Justice122 spoke to the lawyers about the future directions of the Polish
legal system, which should abandon “beautiful but naïve democracy” and help
establishing the “total state”.123 A court in a total state that he imagined would have
no problem locking up its political enemies in jail. As it was, the jurors proclaimed
Doboszyński innocent.
4.3 Doboszyński – An Antisemite (Jewish Furore)
From the very beginning Myślenice received a highly symbolic place in the
Jewish interpretation. Three days after Doboszyński’s invasion a journalist of Nasz
Przegląd drew comparison between the “March on Myślenice” and other fascist
“marches” in Europe. “In the history of Fascism there is the March on Rome. In the
history of Nazism there is the March on Berlin. In the history of Polish antisemitism
there will always remain the March on Myślenice”.124 Notwithstanding the difference
in scale, there were aspects of the event that, in his opinion, justified this comparison.
120
Nowy Dziennik, 26.06.37.
121
Michlic 2007.
122
Witold Grabowski (1898-1966).
123
Robotnik, 12.11.36.
124
Nasz Przegląd, 26.06.36.
38
A young, openly antisemitic leader of a nationalist party gathered a group of his
followers, formed them into an armed unit and victoriously entered a nearby town. All
to demonstrate the party’s power and spread its ideology. The article was quite
sarcastic, it showed the danger of nationalist propaganda, pointing to its panEuropean context but still pretended to mock it at the same time. “The aim of this
entire political movement”, it said, “is to conquer a poor Jewish stall with celluloid
combs or cotton long johns”. In the middle of 1936 Nasz Przegląd and the majority of
Polish Jews continued to put faith in the value of their Polish citizenship. Myślenice
Jews attacked by Doboszyński at first hoped to get help in their home town and later
expected justice from their fatherland. By the time the Myślenice trials were finished
both expectations and the hopes of Polish Jews had become significantly reduced.
The first rumours from Myślenice reached Kraków early the next morning and
mentioned hundreds of injured and killed.125 The story went that the local Catholics
“jumped on their Jews, burning and killing”. As unbelievable as it sounded, since
Myślenice was a resort whose income depended on Jewish holiday tourism, the
surprised editors of Nasz Dziennik decided to send down four reporters to investigate
the situation. Although they quickly found out that the rumours were exaggerated
because there were no casualties, they did not return relieved. Things looked bad in
any case. Myślenice turned out to be something more than yet another uncontrolled
excess of an angry mob. It was a pogrom led by an SN leader, a well organized party
job. Myślenice meant that the Polish fascists had attempted to move Poland yet
another step closer to “Hitlerland”.126
In the opinion of Polish Jews there was little difference between Mussolini’s
Brown Shirts and Endecja’s Young Academics, between the speeches of Hitler, the
speeches of Doboszyński or the writings of Dmowski, They were not persuaded by
the argument, undeniable in the opinion of Prosto z Mostu or Orędownik, that Polish
nationalism cannot be bad since it is based on the good Catholic religion. Also the
other argument – used by the National Camp from the 1930s till today – that Polish
nationalism had nothing to do with fascism because it was anti German – sounded
even weaker in Jewish ears. For Józef Zanker, a young Jagiellonian University
educated Jewish lawyer, whose family had been living in Myślenice for five
125
Nowy Dziennik, 24.06.36.
126
Term used by interwar leftists (e.g. Robotnik, 12.11.1936).
39
generations, it made no difference if he was denied the right to live in Poland
because of his race, because of his religion or because of his “inner-strangeness” to
“real” Polishness. He also had difficulty understanding the concept of economic
antisemitism, especially on the local, Myślenice territory. Why the competing bakeries
of Pitala and Górnik did not “steal each other’s living space” but the bread and rolls of
Heutlinger, who was born on the same street and educated in the same school,
started posing an “economic threat to the Polish nation”.127
Observing the changes in Catholic public opinion (from initial condemnation to
final enthusiastic praise), the reaction of the government (in court and outside) to the
behavior of SN (Doboszyński, his squad and their legal defenders), the Jewish
interpreters of Myślenice rose in uproar. They had finally realised that the nationalists
will not cure themselves from their madness, neither will they be cured by the state. It
was therefore high time Jewish complaints were heard in the world. The Jewish press
competed in outrage. “Scandal”, “Shame”, “Pogrom”, “Political Banditism”, “Hitlerism”,
“Hooliganism”, “Nationalist attempt to introduce terror”, shouted Nasz Przegląd, Nowy
Dziennik and Naje Folkscajtung. Jewish MPs in the Polish parliament used a similar
vocabulary. During the 1937 trials Nowy Dziennik tried to describe the phenomenon
of Doboszyński and his miraculous transformation from a “slightly disobedient boy” to
a “martyr of the national idea”,128 and to give it possibly the widest context in order to
explain the miracle. The situation was becoming hopeless when, next to the reports
from Doboszyński’s trials there were notices of the so-called “Aryan paragraph” being
introduced by yet another union of professionals129 and information about ongoing
discussions concerning the best methods of expulsion of Jews from Europe or the
obituaries of Jews killed in antisemitic attacks.130
In June 1937, after a meeting of the Town Council in Kraków City Hall, an SN
councillor Dr. Kuśnierz verbally abused and physically attacked another councillor Mr
Szyf. Mr Szyf was of Jewish origin, Dr. Kuśnierz was a lawyer, one of the defence
127
Interview 7.
128
Nowy Dziennik, 29.05.37.
129
One of the main supporters of the Aryan paragraph among members of the
Kraków Chamber of Doctors was Doboszyński’s brother-in-law, Dr. Malkiewicz.
130
During the years 1936-7 about 100 deaths of Polish Jews killed by anti-Semites
were reported in media (cf Bauer 1974, reports 118-350 deaths, Cała 2009, only 30).
40
team in the Myślenice process going on at that time. If not for the Jewish press, the
incident would have passed unnoticed.
Almost immediately after his arrest in 1947 the communists started a
campaign presenting Doboszyński as a close friend of Hitler.131 They did it to support
the idea of him being an “imperialistic spy”. In 1949 the grimaced faces of the two
holding hands were published in Nr 26 of Trybuna Wolności and a poem about their
planning the attack on Myślenice Jews appeared in Nr 27 of Szpilki. It would be
difficult to say if any of the people who sentenced Doboszyński to death truly
believed in his sin, which was so evidently untrue. Certainly, according to their vision
of the world, Poles could never be fascist on their own account and if they were, they
were traitors, germanophiles or spies. According to some interpreters of history132 ,
those responsible for his “legalized murder” were Jews and the 1949 show trial was
nothing else but Jewish revenge for Myślenice. This is strongly believed in Chorowice
today. I was told that the village suffered 50 years of negligence from the communist
authorities as retribution for taking part in the antisemitic attack and that a “certain
Jewish doctor” who worked in Myślenice hospital in the 1970s murdered any patient
from “Doboszyński’s village”, no matter what illness the poor victim went to hospital
with.133
In fact the secret behind communist hatred for Doboszyński can be quite
easily deciphered. In spring 1943 Doboszyński launched an aggressive campaign in
London against Władysław Sikorski (1881-1943) and the Sikorski-Majski agreement,
revealing at the same time his deep animosity and total distrust for Soviet Russia.
This and the additional fact of representing the pre-war national camp was more than
enough to make him an enemy of the new Polish State. To receive the death penalty
there was no need for him to also be an ex-enemy of Myślenice’s Jews. The fact that
some of his prosecutors happened to be of Jewish origin means that people of
Jewish origin happened among the employees of the UB (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa),
but does not necessarily mean that they felt much solidarity with Jewish shop131
Kaczmarski, Tomasik 2010, pp 212-3.
132
This is generally believed by Doboszyński’s family and friends, most nationalist
and right wing groups in Poland and some professional historians, although few
would openly admit it in writing.
133
Interview 11.
41
keepers from Myślenice. Doboszyński was condemned by the communists as a
symbol of a nationalistic, “bankrupted” ideology, not as an individual who once upon
a time attacked the Comrade Judges’ fellow Jews.
With the tragedy of the Holocaust, Doboszyński’s action of 1936 receded from
individual Jewish memory. In the light of what happened to the Myślenice community
in August 1942, it seemed ridiculous to remember Doboszyński.134 On the other
hand, the anti-Jewish media war carried out by nationalists during the Myślenice trials
had been preserved in Jewish collective memory as one of the best examples of the
“language of hate”, of words paving the road to Auschwitz.
4.4 Doboszyński – A Messiah for Poland (Adam’s performance)
Doboszyński’s family remembered the day in their flat on St. Anne’s Street in
Kraków when Adam “decided to make his case heard.”135 He sat in the armchair with
a newspaper on his lap, reading a report from the court trials related to the “March”
events.136 “This is what one has to do”, he said, upset that a large part of the article
had been dedicated to presenting the political views of the accused, “the Court Hall is
nowadays the only tribune left for us” – saying “us”, he meant the right wing
opposition. The main reason for organising the Myślenice events was Doboszyński’s
desire to get arrested and put on trial. He needed the process as a theatre stage
from which his “improvement” programme for Poland could be announced. The
interest that Myślenice cases sparked, and the media attention they received, could
not please him more.
Doboszyński’s family considered him a genius from his very early years. The
best in everything he touched: all his school certificates had distinctions, he was
brilliant in sport, skilled in languages and never had any problems finding friends.137
At seventeen he became a student of two different departments: law in Warsaw and
engineering in Gdańsk. After a short hesitation he chose Gdańsk, where Polish
134
Interview 9.
135
He admitted it to his family, Interview 8.
136
The aggressively suppressed 17-21 March strike in the Semperit factory turned
into violent street demonstrations organised jointly by PPS and KPP.
137
Interview 8.
42
students were particularly needed to fight against Germans and Germanisation. From
the very beginning he became famous as an extremely active leader of all Polish
student organisations. He, himself, particularly remembered a society called “Wisła”.
All these national support groups, or as their members called them “self-defence”
groups, were highly antagonistic and fuelled with negative prejudice against the
“others”. It was in Gdańsk that Doboszyński became influenced by people and
ideologies of the far right. It was also there where his outstanding talent as a public
speaker was first recognized and praised. The ability to move the masses and make
them listen to his words boosted his ego to the point of conceit.
After the war Doboszyński explained to his communist prosecutors that his
choosing of political side was purely circumstantial and caused by the academic
environment which, at that time in Poland, was for most part revolutionary and
nationalistic. There were however elements of his general attitude to life, such as his
Catholic belief, admiration for military order or anti-Semitism that predestined him to
join rather extreme right wing groups. In 1931 he published a short novel called “The
Pregnant Word”. Its main character, Witek, is a young man of outstanding talents as
an orator, able to hypnotise the masses with his enchanting voice and indoctrinate
them with ideologies of his choice. Feared by representatives of traditional social and
political powers: journalists, politicians and Freemasons, he indulges in a short love
affair with an intelligent and rich Jewess, Ala, only to realise that the possibility of
producing half-Jewish children is such a repulsive idea, he has to reject it on moral,
religious, cultural and racial grounds. Although unspecified, the environment in which
Witek and Ala live is quite easily recognisable as Poland in the early 1930s. It is a
country of corruption and political chaos, endangered by the communist movement
and infiltrated in every possible way by greedy and powerful Jews. Only an all
encompassing fight against them designed and carried out by an intelligent leader
stands a chance of diverting fate and saving the state from collapsing . Most
predictably, it is Witek helped by a daughter of a legendary, Piłsudski-styled freedom
fighter who becomes recognised as the desired leader in the novel’s finale.
From the early 1930s Doboszyński believed that he was able to work out the
answers to what he understood was the main problem in Poland: economic crisis.
Together with other young nationalists he strongly opposed liberal democracy and all
its later consequences (including the free market) which in their opinion derived from
the ideological credo of the French Revolution. These were the views that in his
43
teenage years led him to heated discussions with his father138 and to his enthusiastic
interest in Italian Fascism. There were elements in the theory of Mussolini’s state,
such as centralisation of power, a one party political system and national control of
key industries that he regarded highly, although the entire system lacked stability and
a strong ideological base, both of which Doboszyński was soon to find elsewhere. In
March 1933 he left politically unstable Europe to stay for three months in the quiet
and more reliable environment of old, conservative England. It was in the Catholic
parish of Beaconsfield, and in the writings of G.K. Chesterton, that he found the
missing foundations for the political and economic system he was constructing: the
Catholic Church (as the foundation supporting a state) and Catholic religion (as a
core of national identity).
Soon after the British escapade he published “The National Economy”, his lifework and certainly the most serious economic dissertation proposed by Sanacja’s
opposition before WWII. In its introduction he defended Hitlerism as a system based
on the Christian values but lacking full practical realisation.139 This statement
probably cost him his life after the war. Upon the publication of the National
Economy, Doboszyński met Dmowski and as a result of this meeting joined the SN
branch in Kraków. He was given “Witek’s” position of propaganda officer and
immediately moved into action. He travelled around Poland140 disseminating his
“repair programme” among SN members, students, groups of professionals, farmers
and all others willing to listen. The main element of his teaching, as remembered by
witnesses,141 was drawing people’s attention to the Jewish and Masonic danger and
persuading them to actively oppose the “fourth, Jewish partition of Poland”.142 It is
difficult to say how big was his influence on people at that time.143 Unlike Dmowski,
138
Interview 8.
139
Doboszyński 1934, pVI.
140
Kraków region: November 1934 – February 1935,
Elsewhere in Poland: February 1935 – June 1936 & February – August 39.
141
“Fighting Jews” is considered Doboszyński’s inheritance by the inhabitants of
Chorowice (Ślęzak 2000).
142
A metaphor incessantly used by Doboszyński.
143
In the majority of cases the number of participants is unknown. Just one meeting
with the Association of Technicians in Warsaw (24.06.39) gathered over one
44
who trusted in traditional ways of disseminating ideas and so left many writings,
Doboszyński wanted to be a man of more active means of communication: a lesson,
a lecture, a discussion, a pilgrimage, a performance.
In a private letter sent to his mother in January 1937 from St Michael’s prison
in Kraków, Doboszyński reported having analysed the origins of his ideas and
arriving at the conclusion that they were not a result of his theory, but rather his deep
instincts. He studied the work of Pareto at that time and agreed with him that
societies similarly to individuals first follow their emotions to explain them ex post by
logical theories. “I caught myself red handed” , he admitted, “I claimed I acted pushed
by sophisticated reasons while in fact I was fuelled by subconscious instincts.”144
Being a thinker, authorship of the “National Economy” made Doboszyński an
heir of Dmowski, while driven by emotions, moulded as a “man of action”, he
positioned himself closer to Piłsudski. To become an ideal Polish leader and another
legendary saviour of the country he had to connect the two. Polish “Messiahs”
traditionally possessed both, intellectual and physical power, like the romantic “Great
Spirits” who led the nation on the barricades.
“When I stood alone in front of God and the people, I felt responsible to act, it
was my duty to intervene”.145 From the point of view of Doboszyński’s defenders the
similarity to Piłsudski had also been too great to ignore. A romantic individualist of a
sharp brain and biting tongue, madly in love with his fatherland, militarily oriented,
working alone against all the odds for his own vision of Poland, at one point noticing
that the situation around him leads to chaos hence taking the difficult decision to act
by force and in consequence leading a political demonstration, a “march”. Such was
Piłsudski of 1926146 and Doboszyński a decade later. This line of defence had been
carefully constructed of course. Piłsudski being the spiritual father of Sanacja and still
considered by many its symbol, there would be no direct comparison made between
thousand participants, by that time though Doboszyński’s fame had grown as a result
of the trials.
144
Kaczmarski, Tomasik 2010, p131.
145
Doboszyński 1936b.
146
According to Doboszyński, Piłsudski’s originally great idea lacked efficient
continuation. “In 1926 I was full of hope…” he sighed with regret in one of his 1937
court testimonies.
45
him and Doboszyński. On the other hand, the fact that the “Warsaw March” could
constitute a context for the “Myślenice March” had been used in the trials with
extreme efficiency.
Doboszyński was not given a chance to realise his dream. He spent the years
that could have been crucial to him becoming a true national leader in Sanacja’s
prison. Many of his supporters counted this fact among the greatest losses of
interwar Poland. “You are not answering the questions asked by the Court but by the
entire nation”, one of Doboszyński’s defenders pressured the jurors in his final
speech “You will answer ‘not guilty’ and then we will all go to Kalwaria, kneel down
and pray”. 147
While in prison, awaiting the result of the second process, Doboszyński
received a poem which praised and glorified his Myślenice performance, naming him
“Prophet”, “Moses” and “Christ”. The author,148 obviously trying to appeal to the
religious conscience of the judges, finished the last verse with a dramatic call to God:
Oh, Eternal God of all conquistadors
Make sure that when we run, we do not damage flowers
Such fragile violets that grow by darkest woods
Look at your humble servants and save Doboszyński, the best!149
147
Stypułkowski’s speech reported by Orędownik 28.06.37
148
Konstanty Dobrzyński.
149
Kaczmarski, Tomasik 2010, p143.
46
V. Conclusions
The Sanacja government struggling with economic crisis and the final collapse
of the old PPS legend after the death of Piłsudski, needed Doboszyński to be an
outlaw, a symbol of a destructive and chaos-producing opposition. In Sanacja
language he became an “anarchist”, a “revolutionary bully”, not much different in his
“lunatic brawling” from the communists and similarly dangerous to the stability of the
state. Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny and Gazeta Polska compared the invasion of
Myślenice to the worst activities of XVII and XVIII century Polish nobles, traditionally
blamed for the loss of independence. The criticism, however, had to be made
carefully, since the government claimed the inheritance of Piłsudski, himself author of
a coup d’état in 1926 and an authoritarian, military-oriented leader. Condemning
Doboszyński’s “act of higher necessity” while legitimising Piłsudski’s, as tricky as it
was, seemed vital to Sanacja’s political survival. Curing the state which had already
been cured before150 could not be allowed.
In the overall opinion of the right-wing opposition “Sanacja” had not been
working. The country badly needed another treatment. Thus Myślenice started being
used as a symbolic “final warning”. Warszawski Dziennik Narodowy, Trybuna
Narodowa and Głos Narodu kept describing Doboszyński’s case in a highly
emotional way using the vocabulary of a victim: “an act of self-defence”, “an idea
conceived in utter desperation”, “a cry issued from the edge of a void at the moment
of falling down”. The void into which Poland was falling had been caused by Jews,
the incarnation of the destructive power from which the nation needed to be
defended. Jews were seen by nationalists both as a leading force behind
communism and among the biggest, corruption causing industrialists which had to be
identified, accused and punished. Enlarging the importance of Doboszyński’s action
became a good strategy to achieve it. Sanacja also used antisemitism as a political
strategy, therefore Myślenice proved to be a very powerful weapon to its more
nationalistic opposition, because it formed a symbol of increasing Jewish persecution
of Catholics aided by corrupted state officials.
Adam Doboszyński did not march on Myślenice to fulfil nationalist youth’s
dream of radical action. Whatever the Sanacja press opinion of him, anarchic
150
Sanacja owed its name to the latin verb “sano, sanare” – to cure.
47
brawling was not where he belonged. He was not yet another hot headed right wing
revolutionary who believed that the destruction of one small Hasidic community, no
matter how successful economically, would change the overall situation in the
country. For all his support of many elements of the ONR programme, on June 22
1936 he had his own agenda. Myślenice was to become a means to introduce,
promote and disseminate a specific, carefully designed political solution: Adam
Doboszyński’s Programme for Poland, the only one that could save the collapsing
fatherland. The Myślenice action had to be serious enough to require a court trial but
not too “criminal” to be condemned by the general public. From his early teenage
years Doboszyński felt he was predestined to play the role of leader. In the 1920s he
led Polish students fighting against the Germans in Gdańsk; now it was time to lead
all Catholic Poles against Jews and the Jewish economy symbolised by a small
Galician town 30 km South of Kraków.
To the end of his life Doboszyński never regretted “Myślenice”.151 No wonder.
The trials worked better than he expected and brought him fame he could only dream
of before.
The Jewish interpretation of the Myślenice action was probably the simplest
one. Jews did not distinguish between Sanacja’s, SN’s, ONR’s and Doboszyński’s
own versions of anti-Semitism. In the opinion of the Jewish media, Myślenice was yet
another violent attack of a Catholic mob on a vulnerable and already impoverished
Jewish community. The lack of fatalities in Myślenice was accidental. In the opinion
of the journalists of Nasz Przegląd, Nowy Dziennik or Chwila the Myślenice pogrom
performed by one of the SN leaders became clear evidence of this party’s attitude
towards Jews as well as Sanacja’s lack of will and powerlessness in counteracting it.
Polish and international Jewish media competed in magnifying the significance of
Myślenice. What happened in the town and what was happening in the courts during
Doboszyński’s trials, grew into a symbol of the situation of Jews in 1930s Europe.
The review of the recent historical writings on Adam Doboszyński and his
action in Myślenice reveals that only one interpretation out of many original
interpretations has survived until today.152 The Myślenice event had been recorded
151
Interview 8.
152
Most post communist scholars studying Doboszyński e.g. Nitschke 1993, Łętocha
2008, Kaczmarski, Tomasik 2010, represent a view which had directly evolved from
48
by all four sides of the conflict: Jews, whose rights had been violated, Sanacja,
whose authority had been offended, the opposition who got blamed for the offence
and Doboszyński, who planned and performed it. Three of these sides, covering the
Polish, Catholic perspective are quite easy to reconstruct, just by a careful look at the
pre-war media debate or comparative searches in the archives. The Jewish
perspective, however, is much more difficult to access. Jews, who were the main
reason Doboszyński’s action ever happened, its main target and the main subject of
public debate surrounding the trials, in the end mattered very little. Their story had
never become part of mainstream Polish history, had never been listened to or taken
into account in historical analysis. By the time Doboszyński marched on Myślenice,
Jews had already lost most of their legal rights in Poland and what was left only
mattered in theory.153 In the media reports Myślenice Jews had often been referred to
as a faceless group, their surnames misspelled, their statements totally confused and
mingled together. In court they were also ignored and underrepresented, diminished
by Doboszyński’s defenders who hardly ever asked them questions or cared about
what they had to say. Therefore, historians who do not want to limit themselves to the
Catholic version of this important part of Polish history face a difficult job. Entering
the Archives and libraries they have to leave behind the official, well preserved story
which can only so easily find confirmation in documents and start searching for the
untold. Without those missing puzzles the picture will never be complete.
the original SN interpretation without even trying to present other potential readings
and dismiss inconvenient evidence where testimonies conflict.
153
Tomaszewski 1995.
49
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Annex
Akta Sędziego Śledczego rej. III w Krakowie. Sygn. III S 24/36, XV Kraków: State Archives.
1) Starosta Bassara’s flat. 2) Bullet hole – Police station. 3) Józef Hopfenberg’s sitting room.
62
List of Translations:
Biblioteka Jagiellońska (Jagiellonian Library)
Komunistyczna Partia Polski (Polish Communist Party)
Młodzież Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth)
Obóz Wielkiej Polski (Camp of Great Poland)
Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (Camp of National Unity)
Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)
PWN (Polish Scientific Publisher)
Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party)
Uniwersytet Jagielloński (Jagiellonian University)
Związek Młodej Polski (Union of Young Poland)
Związek Młodzieży Polskiej (Union of Polish Youth)
63