Border Conflict, Border Fences, and the "Tortilla Curtain" Incident of
Transcription
Border Conflict, Border Fences, and the "Tortilla Curtain" Incident of
Journal of the Southwest Border Conflict, Border Fences, and the "Tortilla Curtain" Incident of 1978-1979 Author(s): Oscar J. Martinez Source: Journal of the Southwest, Vol. 50, No. 3, Fences (Autumn, 2008), pp. 263-278 Published by: Journal of the Southwest Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40170391 . Accessed: 23/12/2013 11:08 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Journal of the Southwest is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the Southwest. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BorderConflict,BorderFences,and the "TortillaCurtain"Incidentof 1978-1979 Oscar J. Martinez The currentdebate in the United States over proposalsto build an impenetrablebarrieralongthe U.S.-Mexicoborderforsecurityreasons and to stop undocumentedimmigrationis the latestchapterin a long historyof manyinitiativesto erectborderfences.Some of these initiatives actuallyled to the buildingof realfenceswhile othersnevergot off the drawingboard. This article focuses the notorious "TortillaCurtain"episode of 1978-1979 thatresultedin the erectionof new fencesin El Paso,Texas, andin SanYsidro,California, oppositeCiudadJuarez,Chihuahua, opposite Tijuana,BajaCalifornia.Heated controversybrokeout when the publiclearnedof the designof the fences,whichincludedbarbedwire with sharprazorsthatwould havethe potentialto maimclimbers.The disputeover the proposednew barriers,which lastedseveralmonths, assumedinternationalproportionswhen the Mexican government expressedoutrageat the physicalharmthat would befallimmigrants attemptingto enterthe United States. Part1 of thispaperprovidesa historicalsketchof boundarymaking and borderconflict.The descriptionand analysisprovidecontext for understandingthe tensionsgeneratedby the TortillaCurtain.Part2 chroniclesfence buildingon the borderbeforethe late 1970s to the extent that extantfragmentarydatahavepermitted.In part 3, 1 relate the storyof the TortillaCurtainfrommy own perspectiveasan observer of eventsas they unfoldedin El Pasoand as a professorandresearcher at the time at the Universityof Texasat El Paso. Legacy of Border Conflict Safeguardingthe border from unauthorizedhuman intrusion and smugglingof goods has been an ongoing concernfor both the United Oscar J. Martinez is Regents' Professor in the Department of History at the University of Arizona. Journal of the Southwest50, 3 (Autumn 2008) : 263-278 This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 264 * Journal of the Southwest States and Mexico since the early nineteenth century, when the formal relationship between the two countries began.1 When Mexico won its independence from Spain in 1821, Mexicans and European Americans had no choice but to contend with problems arising from a shared boundary line. From the early 1820s to the early 1850s, the biggest issue had to do with the actual location of the boundary. The United States wanted to acquireland that Mexico refused to sell. Determined to significantlyincrease its national domain, the U.S. government aggressively and successfullypursued an expansionist agenda against its weaker neighbor, eventually forcing the movement of the border south to the Rio Grande and west to the Pacific Ocean. As a result Mexico lost half of its national territory. The process of forced border change began in the 1820s with the legal and illegal entry of tens of thousands of European Americans into Texas, a Mexican frontier province whose boundary with Louisiana and its coastline along the Gulf of Mexico could not be adequately secured by the Mexican government for lack of resources, including insufficient militaryforces. Dissatisfactionwith Mexican rule and ethnic tensions drove the newly arrived European Americans to launch an insurgency that culminated in the creation in 1836 of the Republic of Texas. During the rebellion, volunteers and arms from the United States poured illegally into Texas, assuring the success of the movement. Mexico, however, refused to recognize Texas' independence. In 1845, the United States annexed Texas, an action that greatly alarmed the Mexican government. For Mexico, annexation constituted an act of war because Texas was still considered part of its national domain. Yet Mexico did not declare war on the United States over the Texas question. Mexico's refusalto accept the loss of Texas to the United Stateswould play a centralrole in the U.S. declarationof war against Mexico in 1846. The United States claimed the Nueces River-Rio Grande land strip as a part of Texas, and ordered troops to that location, precipitating the skirmishwith Mexican troops that started the war. President James Polk justified the declaration of war on the grounds that "American blood had been shed on American soil." In reality,the armed encounter took place on Mexican soil, since the site in question was part of the state of Tamaulipas and not Texas. Subsequently, U.S. military forces invaded Mexico by land and sea and in 1848 imposed the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, by which Mexico reluctantly accepted the loss of Texas and This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict -0- 265 further agreed to cede New Mexico, Arizona, California,and other territories long desired by the United States. In 1853 the United States purchased from Mexico portions of northern Chihuahua and northern Sonora through the Gadsden Treaty. After these events, the boundary assumed relative permanence, although threats to border integrity originating in the United States continued for decades, causing recurringworry in Mexico that more of the northern frontier might be lost. But, except for minor adjustments arising from a constantly shifting Rio Grande, the new border would remain an unchanged line of demarcation. Unfortunately, disorder and bloodshed continued for decades after the signing of the Gadsden Treaty, shattering the hope of a peaceful border region. One of the greatest sources of strife arose from recurring trans-boundary Indian raids, while problems with slave hunters, smugglers, robbers, cattle thieves, and desperate charactersof all shades that congregated in the borderlandsincreased the friction between the two countries. Moreover, many European American adventurersdefied Mexico's statutes and territorialintegrity, engaging in repeated filibustering expeditions into various northern Mexican states. Tensions rose so high over the volatile border conditions that another war seemed a possibilityin the 1870s. With the arrivalof the railroadsin the 1880s and the influx and expansion of law-abiding citizenry, however, lawlessness declined. During the next three decades the borderlands experienced relative peace and order. The 1910 Mexican Revolution introduced a new era of hostilities when Mexican insurgents and bandits raisedhavoc in the Texas and New Mexico borderlands.Bullets often flew into U.S. territorywhen Mexican federal troops and revolutionaries engaged in battle in several Mexican border towns. For a time residents in the U.S. border states lived in fear that extremistsfrom Mexico and Chicanos north of the boundarywould attempt to retake lands lost by Mexico in the nineteenth century. The crisis spawned acts of brutality by rogue Texas Rangers against Mexican Americansin south Texas and also occasioned severalillegal crossings of U.S. troops into Mexican territory,including the unsuccessful chase in Chihuahua by General John J. Pershing of revolutionary leader Pancho Villa. War seemed likely again between the two countries in 1916, but the crisis abated as the violent phase of the Mexican Revolution waned and as the United States turned its attention to World War I. By 1920 This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 266 * Journal of the Southwest stabilityreturnedto the borderlands,andinternationalarmedconfrontationsceased.But borderissuescontinuedto troublethe relationship betweenthe two neighbors.New problemsspurredbygrowingeconomic interdependence,namelymigrationanddrugtrafficking,wouldtrigger recurringcrisesfor generationsto come. From1920 to 1933, U.S. Prohibitiondrovebooze-seekingtouriststo Mexicoandprecipitatedliquor smugglingfrom Mexicoto the United States.Tensionsensued,along with attendantviolence.Betweenthe 1930s and 1970s, undocumented heroin,and immigrationandsmugglingof narcotics,namelymarijuana, became intractable international tensions to high cocaine, issues,raising levelsperiodically. The U.S. governmentrespondedto the bordersituationby (1) pressuringmillionsof Mexicansto leavethe United Statesand "repatriate" themselvesto theirhomelandduringthe GreatDepression;(2) implementinga majorguestworkerprogrambetween1942 and 1964 to meet renewedU.S. labordemandsarisingfrommanpowershortagesduring and afterWorldWarII; (3) selectivelyallowingMexicansto crossthe borderwithoutdocumentsandturningoverimmigrantsheld at detention centersto U.S. employersduringperiodsof "laborshortages";(4) increasingthe enforcementcapacityof the ImmigrationandNaturalizationService(INS)andthe CustomsService;(5) constructingobservation towersandfencesin differentpartsof the border;and(6) incorporating temporaryvisaprogramsfor smallnumbersof guest workersas partof the permanentimmigrationlaw.2 Border Barriers Prior to the Tortilla Curtain Beforethe 1970s, fenceson U.S. soil could be foundalongstretchesof the borderin both ruralandurbanareas.Ranchers,for example,fenced their propertiesto stop human trespassingand to preventlivestock fromrunningloose. Beginningin the earlytwentiethcentury,the U.S. governmenton variousoccasionsfinancedthe constructionof fences in urbanareassuch as El Paso,Nogales, and SanYsidroto enforcethe officialhourswhen portsof entryremainedclosedandto makeit more difficultfor undocumentedimmigrantsand drug smugglersto cross the border. In El Pasoby the 1970s, variousfenceswerein evidencein the vicinity of the border.But, apartfrom obvious,aging INS fencingdirectly This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict + 267 on the north bank of the Rio Grande, it was impossible to know which of the other barriershad been erected to deter illegal immigrants or smugglers, and which had been built to keep people out of irrigation canals and away from the railroadyards, and to prevent accidents along the new border highway. Federal agencies like the INS and the International Boundary and Water Commission, as well as the State of Texas, the City of El Paso, and private railroadcompanies had all participated in building fences. Unfortunately, lack of historical research regarding the actual construction of border fences makes it impossible to provide a comprehensive listing of all the extant fences in the 1970s and when they were erected. Pressreports, however, do provide useful information about the plans of U.S. authorities as they proposed building fences in different border locales to deter unwanted traffic.Typically,newspaperswould announce fence-building initiatives under consideration, but lamentably would not follow up with stories to inform readers whether such fences had actuallybeen built. The U.S. Congress sometimes delayed appropriating the funds for the construction of proposed fences and at other times did not appropriatethe funds at all. Nonetheless, newspaper stories such as the ones referredto below help us understand the historical context for the Tortilla Curtain incident of 1978-1979.3 1924 160-mile long, 8-foot-high fence proposed for the CaliforniaMexico boundary line. 1925 (January)Constructionof "hog tight, horse high, and boot-leggerproof barbed-wirefence, possibly electricallycharged, announced for El Paso area. 1925 (February)30-mile long, 18-foot-high barbed-wirefence proposed for El Paso area;official adds that existing barbed-wirefence in San Ysidro is "impenetrable." 1936 High-wire fence proposed for El Paso area. 1937 Funding for construction of eight observation towers in El Paso areaapprovedby U.S. Congress;one tower projected to be 175 feet high, another 125 feet high, and the rest each 75 feet high. 1948 Barbed-wire fence in El Paso reported in story, along with active observation towers. 1955 (May) 696-mile-long fence proposed in U.S. Congress between El Paso and the Pacific Ocean to keep out animals infected with hoof-and-mouth disease and to enforce plant quarantines. This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 268 * Journal of the Southwest 1955 (July) New 14-foot-high fence proposed to replace old fence in San Ysidro. It is difficult to know how effective the fences and observation towers were in stopping undesirable people, diseased animals, and smuggled merchandise from penetrating the border. These structures certainly slowed down the surreptitioustraffic,but in reality,the impact was minimal. The flow of undocumented migration continued at high levels in the 1940s and 1950s, and so did the smuggling of narcotics and many other products.4 Another important dimension of the story that has not received due attention from historians is the public reaction to the presence of human-made barriersin border communities. On the U.S. side, more than likely each border fence episode before the 1970s elicited a mixed response, just as occurred during the Tortilla Curtain incident and in the most recent debates about the latest border wall proposal. On the Mexican side, it is a good bet that there has always been overwhelming opposition to barriersand observation towers installed by the U.S. government. One indication of the level of opposition in Mexico to fences and watchtowers comes from the actions of former Ciudad Juarez Mayor Rene MascarenasMiranda, who revealed in a 1976 oral history interview his involvement in convincing U.S. authorities to remove the towers in El Paso in the late 1950s. During my term as mayor,my good friendAmbassadorRobert Hill [U.S. ambassadorto Mexico] paid us a visit. It must have been in the fall of 1958. At that time we were working to open the Cordova Bridge, and I took him to Cordova Island.5 We came directly to one of the observation towers. I had taken the road that led to that tower purposely so he could see it. He did and without my saying a word he asked, "Whatis that, a water tower?" "No sir," I replied, "It is an observation tower. Pretend we are in a concentration camp, and we are under observation. Surely they are looking at you with eyeglasses, and they must be asking themselves, 'What the devil is the U.S. ambassador doing on that dusty road with the mayor of Juarez?'"The ambassador said, "This is an insult to Mexico." I replied, "It is good that you consider it an insult, because I do too. Why don't you bring up the matter with your State Department so those towers will disappear?"Three months later there were no more towers.6 This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict -fr 269 With some obvious satisfaction,MascarenasMirandaalso related that the following year he, along with the governor of Chihuahua and the county judge of El Paso County, personally cut the barbed-wire fence that surrounded Cordova Island when the announcement was made that a proposed new international bridge at that spot would become a reality. MascarenasMiranda expounded further on his feelings toward border fences. I don't like the idea offences. We don't live between East and West Germany.The communist wall that is there is a slap in the face to any nation that boasts of being democratic. We want greater fluidity and communication between us. We don't want barriers;we don't want barbedwire fences. We brag that we are two neighborly countries, two friendly nations, and that this is the longest border in the world where one does not see a single soldier, a single rifle, a single bayonet, or a single affronting or discriminatorysign.7 The Tortilla Curtain Episode The rising controversy over illegal immigration during the post-World WarII yearsprecipitatedstronger border-enforcementactions on the part of the INS. Between 1950 and 1955 the U.S. government successfully pressured millions of Mexicans to leave the United States "voluntarily" as part of an aggressive, quasi-military campaign known as "Operation Wetback."8 Those detained immigrants who rejected the option to depart on their own suffered deportation. At the conclusion of the campaign, U.S. officials asserted that the "wetback problem" had been solved once and for all. Contraryto that claim, however, undocumented immigrationactually swelled during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Officials calculated that at least three million unauthorized immigrants lived in the United States in 1978, and that the number could be as high as five million.9 The perception that a foreign "invasion"was underway led to an increasingly acrimonious national debate in which Mexican immigrants became the main targets. Thus the eruption of the Tortilla Curtainincident in 1978-1979 followed yearsof frustrationin the United States over the persistence of the border problem. What made it worse was that in Washington, DC, attempts to find a comprehensive solution to immigration issues failed repeatedly. This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 270 * Journal of the Southwest In the absence of a legislative response to border concerns, the INS sought support in the U.S. Congress for stopgap measures. That body approvedfunding in 1977 and 1978 for the building offences in El Paso, Texas;San Ysidro, California(on the boundary line south of San Diego); and San Luis, Arizona (on the line south of Yuma). The new structures in El Paso and San Ysidro had two purposes: (1) to replace dilapidated fences that were full of holes, some big enough to allow cars through, and (2) to force undocumented immigrants away from the urban areas and into the open desert where they could be caught more easily.Thus in late October 1978, the INS made a routine announcement that new, twelve-foot-highfences topped with barbedwire would be built in El Paso and San Ysidro. Fencing with barbed wire was not new on the border, but what attracted attention was a remarkby the boastful contractor in Houston that the new fences would "sever the toes of anyone trying to scale [them]." The U.S. press quickly sensationalized the story by referringto the fences as the "TortillaCurtain" and by highlighting the featurein the builder'sdesign that called for the inclusion of sharprazors and wires capable of cutting off fingers and toes of climbers.10 In Mexico, government officials and other leaders assailed the INS, charging that the fences were a slap in the face to Mexico and that border crossers would face added dangers. Loud protests quickly erupted among Mexican American organizations in the United States. Many leaders denounced the INS for its inhumane approach to dealing with undocumented immigrantsand for not consulting with the border community in advance. In El Paso, the Coalition Against the Fence held a demonstration in December 1978, protesting the fence and the possible stationing of troops along the border as well. In March 1979, an incident involving a group of angry Mexican women whose crossing cards had been taken by U.S. Immigrationinspectors turned into a near riot at one of the international bridges when militant protestors arrivedto support the women, blocking trafficand tearing down a U.S. flag and throwing it into the Rio Grande.11 The objections raised in both countries by critics of the stepped-up border-enforcement efforts had their desired effect. Shortly after the initial announcement of the "TortillaCurtain," U.S. officialsdenied the allegation that armed troops would be sent to patrol the border. They also began to alter the design of the fence, removing the objectionable razors that might cause physical harm to immigrants.12Meetings were held with leaders of Mexican American organizations to explain the This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict 4" 271 changes. Meanwhile U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo discussed the fence controversy as part of a broader bilateralagenda in a meeting in Mexico in February 1979. The final outcome of the debate, demonstrations, and official meetings was the scaling back of the original menacing design of the Tortilla Curtain. By the time construction began in the summer of 1979, the infamous barbed-wire and razors feature had disappeared,and the lengths of the fences had been reduced in both El Paso and San Ysidro.13 As borderlandersgrew accustomed to the new barriers,the INS in subsequent years added more fencing in those two communities and in other parts of the border as well. But the post- 1979 construction structures lacked the dangerous designs that had brought notoriety to the Tortilla Curtain, and the work proceeded with little controversy on either side of the border. At the beginning of the twenty-firstcentury,however, in the aftermath of the terroristattacksof September 11, 2001, the issue of border fencing resurfaced with greater force than ever before because of the new concern that anti-American Islamic jihadists might enter Mexico and then sneak into the United States via stretches of the border that lacked barriers.Thus, alarm over national security has been added to the two traditional border concerns, undocumented migration and drug smuggling, and the pressure has never been greater on the U.S. government to seal the border completely. But let us return to the Tortilla Curtain incident, as the current proposed border fencing is addressed elsewhere in this volume. The controversy in 1978-1979 elicited interesting responses from U.S. officials.At the time, relationswith Mexico were somewhat strained because of disagreements between the two countries over the price of Mexican oil and naturalgas exports. The specter of dangerous fences on the border fueled tensions and made trade negotiations more difficult.In an effort to lessen the friction, PresidentJimmy Carter,Attorney General Griffen Bell, and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico PatrickJ. Lucey publicly opposed the design of the fences, expressing surprisethat barrierswith features that might injure immigrants were even under consideration. Luceycharacterizedthe builder'scomments referringto the "toe-cutting" capabilityof the fences as "outrageous."14In Texas, Governor William Clemens spoke strongly against the Tortilla Curtain, saying, "I don't believe that we and Mexico should have any sort of Berlin Wall on our borders."15 This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 272 * Journal of the Southwest In the midst of the controversy, border scholars conducted several opinion surveys in El Paso-Ciudad Juarez and San Diego. One survey undertaken by Professor Ellwyn R. Stoddard that focused on leaders revealed that 70 percent of influential El Pasoans opposed the construction of the fence, and an even higher 86 percent of important people in Ciudad Juarez objected to the project. UE1Pasoans who opposed the fence gave reasons for their attitudes quite similarto those expressed by Ciudad Juarez leaders who also opposed it," wrote Stoddard. "Most of them saw the barrieras unnecessary, ineffective and of short duration for the expense involved. Many were disturbed by its design . . . , but mostly critical of the insensitivity of federal officials in commencing such a project unilaterally without some input from Mexican officials."16 I decided to conduct my own surveys after reading in the El Paso press and hearing from U.S. immigration officials and others claims that most El Pasoans, and particularly Mexican Americans, strongly supported the building of the Tortilla Curtain. Such support allegedly stemmed from firm opposition to undocumented immigration and from the desire to keep out Mexicans from Ciudad Juarez, especially juveniles, who were said to be committing many crimes in El Paso. I found it disturbing that the El Paso Herald Post had concluded that overwhelming backing for the INS proposal existed in the city based on a few interviews with residents in a predominantly middle-class neighborhood called Sunset Heights (near the border) and especially from responses in returned questionnaires published in the Herald Post that had solicited reader opinions about the fence. Of the 807 persons who returned questionnaires, 86 percent supported the fence and only 7 percent opposed it. Some supporters added comments, including the following: "Build it 2,000 miles long." "But we'd prefer a cheaper way, a minefield." "Also, electrify the fence with 2,000 volts of electricity." And from opponents: "The fence will be full of holes, just wait and see ... waste of taxpayer monies. ..." "Travel 1,000 miles and be stopped by a six-mile fence? Nuts!" "Use the money to develop jobs in Mexico."17 In the unpublished reports that summarizedthe results of my surveys, I pointed out that the newspaper had failed to indicate that its interviews and "polls" were not scientific, and therefore the results should be considered at most suggestive, and certainly not conclusive. I also wrote that persons who responded to such requests from the media This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict > 273 tendedto be seniorcitizens,conservative,affluent,and predominantly I addedthat it was a safebet that manywere retirees Anglo-American. who habituallypassedawaytheirfreetimewritingletters"to the editor" in sundryopinionpolls.Further,fewfromthe workingor participating classsector of the MexicanAmericancommunityin El Paso read the HeraldPost,let alone engagedin fillingout and mailingin newspaper questionnaires. Assistedby MarioGaldos,then a graduatestudentat the University of Texasat El Paso,we set out in February1979 to determinethe viewpointsof fiftyrandomlyselectedMexicanAmericanresidentsof SouthEl Paso,a poorneighborhoodadjacentto the border,andof fiftyrandomly of variousethnicitieswho servedthat partof selectedbusinesspersons the city.At the time (and now) South El Paso servedas a prominent who andimmediatepathwayforhundredsof undocumentedimmigrants crossedthe internationalboundaryon a dailybasis. The resultsof our door-to-doorsurveysshowed that the assumed "strong support" for the Tortilla Curtain among South El Paso's Mexican Americansand businesspeoplewas in fact not there (see table).18Among the communityresidents,34 percent opposed the fence, 34 percentsupportedit, and 32 percentwere neutral.Eighty percentfelt the fencewould not stop people fromcrossingthe border, 12 percent said it would, and 8 percentwere not sure. When asked if they had experiencedproblemswith undocumentedpersons, 70 percent answeredno, 26 percent said yes, and 4 percent were not sure. Those who reportedproblemsmentioned break-ins,attempted break-ins,and theft as theirmaingrievances.Whenaskedif they knew for surethat the intruderswereundocumentedpeople, they expressed uncertainty,revealingawarenessthat many incidents of petty crime invariablyinvolvedindividualsindigenous to the community.At the time (and now) South El Paso had serioussocialproblemsstemming from poverty and widespreadunemployment,especiallyamong the youth. The merchantswere even less enthusiasticabout the INS fence. Sixty-twopercentopposedit, 28 percentfavoredit, and 10 percentwere neutral.Eightypercentbelievedthat the fence would not stop people fromcrossingthe border,while 16 percentfelt it would, and4 percent werenot sure.Despitethe storiesthathadappearedin the mediaregarding widespreadtheft and vandalismin the Southsidestores allegedly causedby undocumentedjuveniles,only 26 percentof the merchants This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 274 * Journal of the Southwest had experiencedsuch problems,and the nationalidentityof the perpetratorswas unclear.Seventypercenthad not encounteredproblems andthe remainderwasuncertain.The most commoncomplaintamong thosewho reportedproblemswastheft. Coincidentally, the percentage of merchantsreportingproblemswas the sameas that of the residents. Results of "Tortilla Curtain" Survey Conductedin February1979 with fiftyresidentsof South El Pasoand fiftymerchantswith businessesin South El Paso Are you in agreement that thefence should be built? Yes No Residents Merchants 17 (34%) 14 (28%) 17 (34%) 31 (62%) Neutral 16 (32%) 5 (10%) If built, do you think thefence will stop undocumentedpersonsfrom crossing the river? Yes No Not Sure Residents Merchants 6(12%) 8(16%) Problemswith undocumentedpersons: Yes Residents Merchants 13(26%) 13 (26%) 40(80%) 40(80%) 4(8%) 2(4%) No Not Sure 35(70%) 35 (70%) 2(4%) 2 (4%) Problemsexperiencedby thosewhoansweredpreviousquestion affirmatively (number of times): Residents Theft Theft andvandalism Vandalism Break-in/enteredhome Nuisance Merchants 7 4 2 10 1 1 1 Source: Unpublisheddata in the author'sfiles. Surveysconducted by author and Mario Galdos. the viewpointsconcerningthe TortillaCurtainin El Paso Interestingly, differedsignificantlyfrom those in San Diego. In that Californiacity, two surveyssuggestedvery strongsupportfor the fence. One mailing This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict > 275 froma congressmanfoundthat64 percentof his constituentsendorsed it, while only 29 percentdissented.A more formalsurveyof opinion throughoutthe city yielded similarresults:68 percentsupportedthe fence,26 percentdid not, and 6 percentgaveno opinion.19 Two majorfactorsneedto be consideredin attemptingto understand the contrastin the opinionsin El Pasoversusthosein SanDiego. First,El Pasois directlyadjacentto the borderandits economywas(andremains) highlyintegratedwith Mexico's,whileSanDiego is abouttwentymiles from the borderand its economy was only minimallydependenton Mexicoat the timeof the TortillaCurtainincident.Sincethe late 1970s, the degree of cross-borderintegrationbetween San Diego and Baja The realbordercommunityin the Californiahasincreasedsignificantly. SanDiego areawas(andis) SanYsidro,but the opinionsof its residents werenot soughtout becauseits smallsizemadeit ratherinconsequential in internationalaffairs.Second,at the time of the controversy,Mexican Americanscomprisedabout 63 of El Paso's populationbut only 15 percentof SanDiego's population.ThusEl Pasoansweremoredirectly linkedwith Mexico and tended to be more sensitiveto the negative impactthat a dangerousfencecould haveon cross-borderrelations.By contrast,mostSanDiegoansdid not feelstronglinksto Mexicoandsaw undocumentedimmigrantslargelyas a menaceto the United States. Conclusion The TortillaCurtainincidentof 1978-1979 put the nationalspotlight in the United Statesonce againon undocumentedimmigration,triggeringan emotionaldebatefamiliarto historians.Similarcontroversies had brokenout duringthe 1920s overimmigrationquotas,duringthe depressionof the 1930s over economicand socialconcerns,and during the 1950s over cold war-triggeredanxietyrelatedto unauthorized foreignersliving in the United States. Greaterborder controls and and deportationsof Mexicanimmigrantsresulted massiverepatriations from these previousepisodes.But none of the responsesby the U.S. governmenteffectivelycurtailedundocumentedimmigrationor reduced drug smuggling.Thatpatternof failurecontinuedinto the late 1970s: afterthe TortillaCurtainbarrierswent up in El Paso and San Diego, didnot decline;instead undocumentedimmigrationanddrugtrafficking they increasedto unprecedentedlevels. This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 276 ^ Journal of the Southwest At the time both the United States and Mexico understood abundantly well that economic need prompted Mexicans to cross the border en masse, and that the U.S. economy needed and benefited from their labor. In terms of real solutions, it was clear in the 1970s, as it is now, that only a binational, comprehensive approachwould have any chance of effectively managing the migration flow. But the political climate in the United States did not allow for devising and implementing such a holistic framework,or for havingMexicangovernment officialsparticipate in negotiations that would lead to effective legislation. The immigration issue was simply too "hot" in the U.S. political system, and it remainsso today. So the focus in the U.S. Congress remained on border enforcement rather than on finding lasting solutions to the problem. Interestingly,the TortillaCurtainepisode moved the INS along a new path regardingbordercontrol; that is, towardfullerimplementationof the idea of diverting undesirabletrafficawayfrom popular crossing points in border urban areasto uninhabited ruralterrain.That strategywould be carriedout in 1993 when the Border Patrol successfullylaunched Operation Blockade (renamed Operation Hold the Line) in El Paso, which became the model for subsequent operations in other border locations. The Border Patrol positioned agents on the border in close proximity to each other around the clock, making it next to impossible for crossers to break through the extant fences and the new human blockade. But would-be immigrants did not give up. They went instead to unguarded areas such as the Sonora-Arizona desert, where they could cross the border more easily. That change in the pattern of crossing the border has had tragic consequences for the immigrants. Since 1993 thousands of people have died from exposure in the Arizona desert and in other unforgiving, remote areas of the borderlands. The uproar over the Tortilla Curtain was predictable once the media publicized the builder'sabysmalcomment about barbedwire and razors, and the INS had to backdown. Interestingly,opposition in both countries to the dangerousdesign revealeda significantamount of humanitarianism and sympathy for immigrants. By contrast, in the twenty-first century, it appears that those compassionate feelings have eroded substantially, as the hostility toward undocumented immigration in the United States has hardened and become vitriolic, and many would even say hateful. Legions of right-wing radio and television commentators, who were rare in the 1970s, today engage in constant fearmongering, whipping up public opinion against undocumented immigrants. The pundits, along This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Border Conflict -fr 277 with right-wing politicians, exaggerate numbers, distort the impact of immigrants on U.S. society, and issue incessant hysterical warnings about alleged terroristthreats on the border. Compared to the poisoned political climate in which immigration and border fences are discussed publicly today, and the harshness of the language used by some politicians as they debate legislative proposals, the environment that existed during the Tortilla Curtainincident in the late 1970s seems quite sedate, even nostalgic. * Notes 1 . This brief overview of border history is based on my book, Troublesome Border(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988; rev. ed., 2006). 2. On the evolution of U.S. immigration policy and its impact on Mexican immigrants, see the following works: Francisco E. Balderramaand Raymond Rodriguez, Decade of Betrayal:MexicanRepatriation in the 1930s (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995); Arthur F. Corwin, ed., Immigrants and Immigrants: Perspectiveson Mexican Labor Migration to the United States (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978); Ernesto Galarza,Merchantsof Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story (San Jose, CA: Rosicrucian Press, 1964); Juan R. Garcia, Operation Wetback:The Mass Deportation of Mexican Undocumented Workersin 1954 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Michael C. LeMay, From Open Door to Dutch Door: An Analysis of U.S. Immigration Policy since 1820 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987); Mae M. Ngai, ImpossibleSubjects:Illegal Aliens and theMaking of ModernAmerica (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 2004); Joseph Nevins, OperationGatekeeper:TheRise of the "IllegalAlien" and the Making of the US -Mexico Boundary (New York: Routledge, 2002); and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,TemporaryWorkerPrograms: Backgroundand Issues,96th Congress, 2nd Session (February 1980). 3. From New TorkTimes,April 3, 1924, p. 34; LosAngeles Times,January26, 1925, p. 1; WashingtonPost,February24, 1925, p. 1; El PasoHerald Port,January 2, 1936; El Paso Times,April 15, 1937; ChicagoDaily Tribune,March 15, 1948, p. 1, and May 27, 1955, p. 1; LosAngeles Times,July 13, 1955, p. 27. 4. As a teenagerliving in CiudadJuarezin the late 1950s I crossedinto El Paso illegally many times, successfully hiding from the observers in the watchtowers and eluding the roving Border Patrol agents. On a couple of occasions, however, my brother and I were caught and sent back to Ciudad Juarez. 5. Patch of land belonging to Mexico left isolated by the shifting Rio Grande and consequently widely used by border crossers and smugglers. 6. Oscar J. Martinez, "La fronteravista por Rene MascarefiasMiranda:Entrevistade historia oral", [1976], unpublished manuscripton file at the Institute of Oral History at the University of Texas at El Paso, pp. 287-88. 7. Ibid. pp. 287, 289. This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 278 ^ Journal of the Southwest 8. See Garcia, Operation Wetback. 9. WashingtonPost. December 24, 1978, p. A3. 10. See, for example, WashingtonPost, October 24, 1978, p. A6; El Paso Herald Post, October 25, 1978, p. Al; New YorkTimes,November 7, 1978, p. 22.; WashingtonPost, December 24, 1978, p. A3. 11. Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Oscar J. Martinez, and Miguel Angel Martinez Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations and the ccTortillaCurtain": A Study of LocalAdaptation to FederalBorderPolicies(El Paso: El Paso Council on the Arts & Humanities, 1979), pp. 20-21. This sixty-seven-page report (in typescript) unfortunately received limited distribution beyond El Paso. 12. El Paso Herald Post, October 25, 1978, p. Al; Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp. 20-22. 13. Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp. 20-22. 14. WashingtonPost, December 24, 1978, p. A3. 15. New YorkTimes,November 7, 1978, p. 22. Interestingly,the Washington Post began another story on the controversy with a reference to famous border barriersin world history that had been judged failures:"History has given us a Great Wall of China, a Maginot Line in France, a McNamara Line in Vietnam and a lesson about man-made barriers:Most of them don't work, as long as there are human beings intent on going from one side to the other." WashingtonPost, December 24, 1978, p. A3 16. Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp. 27-28. 17. El Paso Herald Post, December 6, 1978, pp. A1-A2. 18. Complete results of the surveys are in the author's files. A brief summary drawn directly from my original report and similarto what I have included here appears in Stoddard, Martinez, and Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations, pp. 28-29. 19. Ibid., 30, 67. This content downloaded from 129.108.9.184 on Mon, 23 Dec 2013 11:08:27 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions