Regional Development and the Baltic Sea Region

Transcription

Regional Development
and the Baltic Sea Region
–––––––––––––––––
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Regional Development
and the Baltic Sea Region
Editors:
Tomasz Branka
Arnold Bernaciak
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Editors:Tomasz Branka and Arnold Bernaciak
Reviewer: Prof. Joost Platje
© The Baltic University Programme, Uppsala University, 2014
Layout: Magnus Lehman
Cover Photo: Krzysztof Ciesielski
Print: Poznan University of Economics
ISBN 978-91-86189-16-7
Contents
Preface7
PAULA LINDROOS
Introduction8
TOMASZ BRANKA
ARNOLD BERNACIAK
Part A The Cultural Landscape
Regional Pedagogies: A Local Approach versus Generalisation in Education
OLEG YAROVIKOV
History of the Belarusian Language
ELENA KORSHUK AND NlKOLAY R. PRYGODICH
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Part B The Political Landscape
Trajectories of State-Building and Democratisation in the Former Soviet Region:
The Second Decade of Independence
LI BENNICH-BJÖRKMAN
Ukraine’s Foreign Policy in the Face of the Challenges of European Integration
MARKIYAN MALSKY
Conditions and Prospects for Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation
MARIANNA GLADYSH
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Part C The Social & Natural Landscape
Ecosystem Services in the Development of Regions
ARNOLD BERNACIAK
The Concept and Typology of Regions
ANNA BERNACIAK
Supporters and Opponents of Autonomous Solutions
TOMASZ BRANKA
The Process of Building Civil Society against the Shortcomings of
Polish Planning Legislation
TOMASZ ROZWADOWSKI
Rule of Law and Political Development in the Baltic Sea Region
LARS RYDÉN
Problems of Democracy Development in the Post-Soviet Space: Cases of Belarus,
Ukraine and Russia
VICTOR SHADURSKI
Sweden and Poland: Nordicization Versus Europeanization Processes
AGNIESZKA WÓJCICKA
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85
95
106
117
132
143
Preface
The Baltic University Programme is a network for universities, researchers,
teachers and students. Starting in 1991, the activities span over education, research and applied projects, with focus on different aspects of sustainable development in the Baltic Sea region.
The definition of the region which is used by the Baltic University Programme
is not the conventional political definition of the Baltic Sea Region. Instead, for
Baltic University Programme the region for cooperation is defined as the drainage
area, which is the area within which water is drained to the Baltic Sea as. With this
definition we include – in addition to the countries along the coastline of the Baltic
Sea – also Ukraine, Belarus, Slovak Republic and Czech Republic, countries which
partly belong to the drainage area but which do not border to the Baltic Sea itself.
This publication from the Baltic University Programme gives a momentary
glimpse of the region. In September 2011, the authors gathered to a meeting in
Gniezno, Poland, and the articles should be seen as a reflection of that time. The
eleven articles span over three different landscapes in the Baltic Sea region; the
educational, the political and the social and natural landscapes. They cover aspects from the local level to the international level. The publication was edited by
a team from University of Economics in Poznan and Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland, and from the BUP secretariat at Uppsala University, Sweden.
The authors are responsible for their contributions.
Paula Lindroos
Director of the Baltic University Programme
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Introduction
The spatial dimension in current economic research is becoming more and more
popular. European researchers revolve especially around regions as a subject of
investigation. There are two main causes of this phenomenon. On the one side – the
policy of the European Union is focused on the regional level. Regional and cohesion policies were major instruments for increasing economic and social cohesion
in the European Union until 2013. The new financial perspectives have redefined
the main tasks of cohesion policy, but still it seems that regional level will be crucial. That is why many studies and papers touching on current European issues
relate to regions and the regional dimension out of necessity. On the other hand, regions are a very interesting subject of research. It is possible to describe them from
many viewpoints including their geographical, social, economic and environmental
characteristics. In this publication we have tried to present different topics connected with the Baltic Sea Region and its main development and future challenges.
The theoretical introduction to the problem is provided by the paper by Anna
Bernaciak from the Poznań University of Economics. It presents concepts of the
region and provides different typologies of regions. Starting from an assumption
that region is understood in two ways: as a natural entity and as a socio-economic
subject, the author shows various definitions of this term. The included typologies show the different approaches used in regional studies.
The group of papers referring to current socio-political problems and challenges consists of works by Li Bennich-Björkman from Uppsala University,
Victor Shadurski from the Belarusian State University, Oleg Yarovikov from
Novgorod State University, Lars Rydén from Uppsala University, Tomasz Rozwadowski from Gdańsk University of Technology and Markijan Malsky – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of Ukraine to Poland.
Li Bennich-Björkman, in her paper, takes up the subject of state-building and
democratisation in the former Soviet Region, and general trends of transforma-
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tion. She makes a short overview of formal institutions and its diversity. Presenting
the main trajectories of particular countries’ development, she tries to explain why
they are so different and what the future prospects for the countries analysed are.
A similar issue is the subject of the paper by Victor Shadursky. He focuses
his considerations on the cases of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, and problems of
the development of democracy in these countries. He describes the problems of
the transformation of the political regime in Russia in a context of the concepts of
the “liberal democracy” of Yeltsin’s presidency and the “sovereign democracy”
of Vladimir Putin. Referring to Ukraine he presents the “two Ukraines” project as
a factor of the democratic development of the Country. Finally, Shadursky shows
the case of Belarus in the context of the social and economic contract between the
authorities and population in this country.
Lars Rydén gives an overview of the concept of the rule of law. Starting from
a short background about the development of the Baltic Sea region since the end
of the Cold War, he presents the idea of the rule of law and The World Justice Project. He shows the main methods of measurements of the rule of law and gives the
results of his investigation into this area in the countries of the Baltic Sea Region.
Different approaches are presented by Tomasz Rozwadowski and Oleg Yarovikov. The first one concentrates on the problem of the shortcomings of Polish
planning law and the difficulties faced by the public participation process in terms
of building civil society. Against the background of this problem, the author presents the main assumptions of the project of Coastal Strip development in Gdańsk.
Oleg Yarovikov brings up the issue of Regional Pedagogics – a brand new
elective course designed at Novgorod State University. It contrasts a local approach with generalisation in the education process. Several interdependent elements of the course and methods used are presented there. As the author says,
the principal idea of the course was to prevent students from over-generalising
educational problems that are concrete enough to be analysed as cultural and
socio-economic situations. It seems to be a sign of a new approach in the educational process in the context of the regional level.
An original approach is contained in the paper by Markijan Malsky. Using
his academic and political experiences, the author presents his opinion in a discussion about Ukraine’s foreign policy in the face of the challenges of European
integration. He hopes to bring about a deeper understanding of the actual state of
affairs in Ukraine – its international relations, perspectives and needs.
Tomasz Brańka, from Adam Mickiewicz University in Poland, in his paper
takes up the dispute between supporters and opponents of autonomous solutions.
The states continue to be disinclined to adopt autonomous solutions, perceiving
their implementation as the establishment of a centre of a competitor for power.
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An interesting interregional perspective is presented in the paper prepared by
Marianna Gladysh from Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. Describing the
conditions and prospects of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation, she presents the genesis
of the phenomenon of interregional cooperation. Then she describes the main areas of regional cooperation and its institutional infrastructure. At the end, she tries
to point out the most likely ways of development and prospects of this project.
The environmental dimension is shown in the paper by Arnold Bernaciak
from the Poznań School of Banking. The author uses a concept of ecosystem
services and points out the shortcomings in most popular concepts of regional development. He draws attention to the fact that there is no environmental perspective in those concepts, which makes them incomplete. He proposes considering
ecosystem services as a factor in regional development.
The article by Agnieszka Wojcicka, from Adam Mickiewicz University in
Poznan, is focused on the Nordicization versus Europeanization processes. The
aim of the text is to depict their evolution and mutual influence, through a comparison be¬tween the paths of Sweden and Poland towards the accession to the
European Union. The thesis is that the concepts of Europe and Norden complement and influence each other to such an extent that the Europeanization of Norden triggers the Nordicization of Europe.
The history of Belarusian language is analyzed by Elena Korshuk, Nikolay
R. Prygodich (both from Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus) and Sven
Gustavsson (from Uppsala University). The authors describe the roots of the language and its changes since the 14th century. The emphasis is put on the post-war
developments in Belarus and both the influence and reasons of strong Russification. In conclusion the authors stress that in today’s Belarus the national language
is becoming increasingly elitist.
The variety of papers presented is a manifestation of a multidisciplinary approach. The invited authors present contemporary issues from their main fields
and this has influenced the final shape of this publication. We hope it will be
valuable additional material for students and teachers interested in the issues of
the Baltic Sea Region.
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Poznań, from February 2013 to July 2014
Arnold Bernaciak, Poznań School of Banking, Poland
Tomasz Brańka, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
Part A
The Cultural Landscape
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12
Regional Pedagogies: A Local Approach versus
Generalisation in Education
OLEG YAROVIKOV
Novgorod State University, Russia
Russia can be viewed as a country of vast territories, a unique and enigmatic state
of mind, of diverse traditions and culture. It is the usual way to study a foreign
setting looking at it as a whole. The general perception of the country’s image,
inspired by the biggest Russian cities – Moscow and St. Petersburg – is a trivial
and unreliable source of knowledge for investigation. This perspective may be
misleading in many ways, because these sprawling cities can hardly express the
idea of a typical Russian life today. We live in a time of far-reaching goals and
great perspectives, but the gap between the centre and periphery leads to unequal
access to the benefits of modernisation. That is why the problems of regional
development in Russia are really urgent now and should become the subject of
serious discussion.
The crucial point here is that the regions make larger contributions to the Russian economy than those two federal cities. Different kinds of industries, natural
and human resources are concentrated basically in regional centres or small cities,
providing the “capitals” with all types of production. Unfortunately, the service
and housing delivery in periphery areas is rather poor, labour is underpaid. As a
result, there is huge migration of young people from rural districts to towns. Obviously, it is the government’s duty to provide a constituent regional policy, but a lot
of work should be done by the community and local education system. Besides,
the regions in Russia are too diverse to be examined as an abstract entity. In the
long run, these scattered localities form the texture of Russian culture.
This paper focuses on Regional Pedagogics – a brand new elective course
designed at Novgorod State University (NovSU). It studies regional systems of
education in Russia. Such systems include several interdependent elements: ed-
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Regional Pedagogies
ucational institutions, managing structures, various relations between them, and
specific (regional) potential for development. These should be made familiar to
the course’s students for their actual pedagogical practice.
As for the content of the course, one may notice that it encompasses several
important topics divided into theoretical and practical classes (see Table 1.).
The first chapter presents some introductory material concerning the subject
of the course. According to the existing standards, Regional Pedagogics covers a
number of subject-specific competences in education acknowledged at the Faculty of Psychology and Pedagogics (NovSU):
1.Understanding of the structures and purposes of educational systems;
2. Ability to identify potential connections between aspects of educational theory
and educational policies and contexts;
3.Awareness of the different contexts in which learning can take place.
Further, the list is specified with several objectives, clarifying the learning outcomes. They are the following:
1.Identifying the peculiarities of education system in a region, its historical and
current state of development;
2.Studying the conditions of administrative, pedagogical and social integration
within the regional system of education;
3.Developing skills of analysis and design of educational projects at a regional
level.
Regional Pedagogics explores many important concepts related to a certain locality, but the key notion here is, obviously, the “region.” There is a significant
divergence in treating this concept from Russian and foreign perspectives. The
Anglo-American and European tradition expands the meaning of “region” to
countries or even unions of different states. According to the AER (The Assembly
of European Regions) the term “region” refers to a territorial authority existing at
the level immediately below that of the central government, with its own political
representation in the form of an elected regional assembly.1 Due to globalisation,
regions acquired as much autonomy as dependency on international trade and
mobility. The Baltic University Programme, promoting the idea of sustainable
development in Baltic Sea region, is a good example here. On the one hand,
1 Declaration on regionalism in Europe Assembly of European Regions. p. 4,
http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PressComm/Publications/DeclarationRegionalism/DR_GB.pdf,
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Regional Pedagogies
Table 1. The Syllabus for Regional Education
Theory (12 hours)
Practice (24 hours)
1 Introduction to Regional Pedagogics.
Goals of the course.
Complementary or related courses.
The key notions.
Local environment (micro level) and socialisation.
The concept of socialisation.
The structure of a local environment.
Veliky Novgorod and Novgorod region as local
environments.
2 Educational Regionalisation.
The concept of educational regionalisation
and its forms.
The main aspects of educational
regionalisation.
Educational regionalisation principles..
The historical background for the development of
education in Novgorod region.
The stages of educational regionalisation in
Novgorod region.
3 The regional system of education.
Key notions, peculiarities.
Educational policy in a region. Different
approaches to the management of regional
education. Target-Program management.
Managing the regional system of education in
Novgorod region.
Committees on education in Veliky Novgorod and
Novgorod region.
The levels of professional education and types of
educational institutions in Veliky Novgorod and
Novgorod region.
The problem of rural schools in Novgorod region.
The state and prospects for University education
in Novgorod region (the analysis of a multilevel
educational system).
Basic trends of educational policy in Novgorod
region.
The necessity and results of Education
Development Programs (1993-1996, 1996-2000,
2000-2006, 2006-2011).
The analysis of the current EDP.
4 Educational standards in a region. Types
and structure of educational standards in
Russia.
National and regional component of
educational standards in Russia.
The analysis of the regional component realised in
Veliky Novgorod and Novgorod region.
5 Organising the study of local lore at school Local lore study at school (the Case of Veliky
Novgorod).
(local history, geography and culture).
Students projects on local lore study at school.
Local culture as the source of personal
development.
The system and methods of local lore study
at school.
6 Community links in education. The
concept and types of social partnership.
Studying employers’ demands
(TUNING RUSSIA Programme)
Identifying stakeholders.
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Regional Pedagogies
the word “region” contradicts the AER’s definition mentioned above. More than
that, judging from the membership list, the criterion for being “Baltic” is not
clear enough. But on the other hand, “Baltic region” captures a winning idea of
large-scale integration for multicultural cooperation. Finally, it does not evoke
any misunderstandings or conflicts because we are dealing with a comprehensive
(i.e. European) meaning of the term “region.”
In our case, a typical Russian approach to the vocabulary is preferred. For
the Russian Federation, a region (or federal subject) is a territory outlined administratively, with a federally appointed governor and locally elected legislature,
commonly named after their administrative centres. For example, there are 83
federal subjects in Russia: 21 republics, 46 regions (oblasts), 2 federal cities and
so on. Although regional governments in Russia are subordinate to state policy,
making them share the same rights and responsibilities, each separate region possesses its own cultural identity and resources.
The course introduction is followed by some explanations concerning the core
arguments or motives for studying it. Regional Pedagogics has the right to exist for
several reasons. The idea of making such a course appeared as an alternative to the
high extent of generalisation in pedagogical science and teacher training, resulting
in an acute scarcity of skills for solving many urgent problems in contemporary educational situations. As a rule, young specialists, with all their university knowledge
gathered and a minimum of practice, waste too much time adapting to their professional environments before they start working efficiently. The situation is very
typical among novice teachers in Russia. First of all, this is a problem of motivation,
self-esteem, adaptability and so on. But region-specific knowledge is likely to equip
students with knowledge of different social contexts, problem-solving and project
methods. We expect that the stress factors and mistakes will be eliminated, if students
acquire a vivid idea of how education works without superfluous generalisations.
In most cases the regions tend to manifest their local traditions to emphasise their historical mission, improve their image and finally attract more tourists
(Kaliningrad region, Pskov region, Irkutsk region and others). The goals can be
quite different, but students should consider the peculiarities of the educational
environment objectively. Social and demographic situation, policy, culture and
economy – these are the basic factors determining the trends of education in a
territory. These features may supplement, exclude or overlap each other. In order
to analyse the educational system as a whole, additional variables should be taken
into account. There are several elements constituting the environment in which
schools find themselves. Draft (1988) offers a set of elements with demonstrable
relevance to schools:
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Regional Pedagogies
1. The pool of human resources which employees are drawn from (such as the extent to which talented college graduates choose to enter or not to enter teaching);
2.The market for services provided by the organisation;
3.The availability of financing for the organisation’s initiatives (erosion of support for school funding by increased public demand for health care and other
social services);
4. New technologies in the environment that may threaten the need for the services provided by the organisation (the extent to which computer-based technologies provide access to educational services and information outside the bounds
of formal educational institutions);
5.Economic conditions that influence the volume of business (the impact on support for school bounds issues of recessionary business cycles);
6.Governments and the nature of their policies and regulations (the extent to
which governments are embarked on major educational initiatives);
7. Sociocultural conditions, such as social value systems and demographics (generational shifts in the size of the school age population and the effects this has
on support for the education of youth).2
Encompassing all of these features, the regional systems of education in Russia
are too diverse and identical at the same time. Of course, it is useless to compare
all regions, but in our classes we tend to concentrate mainly on the Novgorod
region. There is certainly much to discuss. For example, in the United States
the Regional Educational Laboratory Program (REL) was launched to study and
make recommendations for the improvement of educational policy in various
parts of the country. This is an approach, focusing on the principles of intensive
regional development, implying a higher level of decentralisation.
In comparison with the USA, Russia has a centralised system of education,
that is why the regions implement their policy using directives from above. As a
result, there have always been really tough relations between the centre and periphery. Very often some over-generalised reforms initiated by state government
do not take into account the peculiarities of local communities. This is especially
typical for the process of closing village schools. But new opportunities appear,
e.g., the autonomisation of schools when the state widens the rights and responsibility of regional education. Government can subsidise schools, not only to implement new technologies in education, but to answer community needs and deliver a
2 K. Leithwood, Daniel L. Duke, A Century’s Quest to Understand School Leadership, [in:] Handbook of
Educational Leadership and Management. B. Davies, J. West-Burnham (eds.), Pearson Education Limited
2003, p. 66
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Regional Pedagogies
wider range of educational services. In this respect, school managers are forced to
use market research of the target-audience before practicing. Finally, the level of
responsibility and professionalism should be gradually increased. These measures
can be the first step towards the rise and development of regional education.
The last argument is based on the open character of regional education. This
system is open in many ways: to the society, business, international cooperation
and so on. A specialist in social education should be aware of the different challenges of the community, think in a creative manner and be able to offer a qualified decision improving the surrounding situation. There are still groups of people
that cannot afford higher or supplementary education. It becomes essential to
learn more about the inner opportunities of the educational system to satisfy these
needs.
Nowadays, businessmen are becoming the target audience and consumers of
educational services. A business sector with interests attached to specific territories and different resources can apply to educational institutions to win higher
competitive positions.
Inevitably, all the regions tend to cooperate with their closest partners. Realising the common state policy of the Russian Federation, the Kaliningrad region
receives a strong impetus from Europe that makes this territory unique in a cultural and economic way. Such contacts bring new traditions of regionalism to Russia
and evoke a feeling of solidarity at international level. Besides, studying them
can help to develop new levels and concepts of regionalisation.
The variety of subjects presented above needs a deliberate methodology. The
research scheme of the course is grounded on the basic principles taken from educational management and applied to the problems of regional development. Since
Regional Pedagogics has derived from a vast set of social and economic sciences
(regional economics, educational management, sociology, history of education
and others), there are no original methods. Most of them are descriptive, explanatory or generative: case-study, brain-storm, SWOT-analysis, SOFT, discussions
and so on. We can also use these techniques for prediction and modelling, but the
true prognostic method will be “the analysis of socio-cultural situations” aimed at
designing educational projects within a territory. It was introduced by the Russian
scholar A.M. Tsirulnikov.
For this type of research students will use standard formulae describing the
type of socio-cultural situation. It depends on two variables: local history and
tradition (LHT) and the level of socio-cultural background (SCB). Various combinations of these variables stipulate four perspectives on the development of
regional education:
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Regional Pedagogies
LHT (+), SCB (+) – local history and tradition are preserved and a high level of
socio-cultural background (the situation “school at a cultural centre”);
LHT (+), SCB (-) – local history and tradition are preserved while the level of
socio-cultural background is rather low (the situation “school at a former cultural centre”);
LHT (-), SCB (+) – no local history and tradition but a high level of socio-cultural
background (the situation “school at a potential cultural centre”);
LHT (-), SCB (-) – no local history and tradition and a very low level of socio-cultural background (the situation “school at a cultural desert”).3
Each situation requires its own strategy, balancing external (economic) and
internal (cultural) initiatives. Extremely negative variant (LHT (-), SCB (-)) is
typical for the majority of rural schools in Russia and without the government
support it will not be improved.
To define the proper formulae for Novgorod and the Novgorod region, students have to answer five questions:
1.What is the region’s profile (territory, immediate context, economy, demography, social infrastructure)?
2.What are the most common educational problems in the territory?
3.Are there any educational demands among the community? How can we classify them?
4.What resources does the regional system of education have to satisfy these
demands?
5.What is the main problem of education in the territory? Can it be solved with
the help of local history and tradition or with improvements in socio-cultural
background? 4
We should admit that, probably, our students taking their first steps towards professional attainments will not affect the socio-cultural situation greatly. At least we
may hope their involvement in field research and discussions will change the perception of current educational problems. Additionally, these issues will not provide any general examples any more, everything will be evident and up-to-date.
The second chapter draws our attention to the concept of regionalisation and
its forms. First of all, it is necessary to point out here that regionalisation can
manifest higher levels of internationalisation. For example, examining the case
3 A. Tsirulnikov, Socio-cultural basis of educational system. Socio-cultural situation method
“Voprosy Obrazovaniya”, no 2/2009. – p. 44.
4
Ibidem, pp. 50-51
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Regional Pedagogies
of European higher education, we cannot ignore the fact that in Western Europe,
regionalisation happens in large part as a consequence of governmental policies
(setting up universities in economically deprived areas, and also upgrading vocational/professional colleges to higher education status). In central and eastern
Europe, regionalisation took place chiefly through market mechanisms (the emergence of private institutions, as well as existing universities setting up branch
campuses). The same goes for internationalisation, where, for example, patterns
of mobility, with respect to the balance between incoming and outgoing students,
differ considerably between countries and regions (e.g., western versus Central
and Eastern Europe).5
Summing up the ideas of Russian scholars (Averkin, Novikov, et al.), regionalisation may stand both for principle and process, discovering the issues of
educational policy, marketing, social networks and so on. But we should bear in
mind that these issues must be studied only within the existing territory division.
Thereby the core features of regionalisation in Russia are:
▪ decentralisation in the educational sphere;
▪ transition from a unified content of education to a regional one;
▪ orientation of educational institutions towards the specific needs of the regional economy and regional industries;
▪ increase of cultural influence of educational institutions in a region.
These, and other traits of regionalisation, can be traced at different stages of Russian history. Some of them became apparent enough to be realised through certain
political decisions while others lag behind and play very little role. Considering
different scientific sources on history of education, we can mark four stages of
regionalisation in Russia.
The first period is associated with incipient decentralisation throughout the
Russian Empire. According to the Emperor’s Decree of 1803, several educational
districts were established around large universities. Initially there were six such
territories: Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, Derpt, Vilno, Kazan and Kiev. Later, in
1915, the number of districts rose to 15. During this period another significant
reform was initiated. In 1864 a special body of self-government in a territory
appeared. The so-called “Zemstwa” were authorised to implement local policies
in education, social work and healthcare.
5 A. Abazi, D. Farrington, J. Huisman, Globalisation, Internationalisation and Regionalisation [in:] Education Management and Development. Compendium for Managers. J. Huisman, A. Pausits (eds.) Waxmann
2010, p. 40.
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Regional Pedagogies
These steps suggested early attempts at power delegation, but eventually the
breakthrough touched only economic issues, since all the decisions on standards
of education were made centrally.
The second period began with the change of political course in the country
in 1917. The Soviet government and educators were seriously concerned about
the idea of centralised management in education. J.I. Zajda points out that in
1922, the newly created USSR, consisting of four republics inherited from the
Russian Empire, was very backward in education, with 78% of the population
being illiterate in 1897. The eradication of illiteracy became a major goal of government policy; and by the early 1940s the level of literacy in the 16 to 50 age
group had reached 90% (Zajda, 1992).6 The measures taken by the Soviet leaders
demonstrated impressive results in education, which could be attained only due
to the high concentration of resources and power. The new education reflected the
authoritarian approach typical of all spheres of social life. The Russian language
as a weapon of dissemination of literacy was taught at that time as the first and
only state language in the entire Soviet Union. Even the educational standards
for different regions (“oblasts”) were unified. At the same time, regionalisation
was perceived as the development of vocational education adapted to the needs
of Soviet republics.
Decentralisation became the major tendency during the third stage of regionalisation in Russia. Finally, it turned out that an inevitable cost of decentralisation
in Russia was a rise in inequality in the availability of resources among local
governments. But at the beginning of the transition period, in the late 1980s, few
reformers could have guessed that regional inequalities would threaten access to
education.
Much attention was paid to the outcomes of transition period in Russian education. After Russia became independent in 1992, it embarked on a somewhat
chaotic process of decentralisation, giving regions more control over their own
resources, a greatly widened set of expenditure responsibilities, and more autonomy regarding educational and other types of social expenditures. Russia’s
transition to a market economy has led to a greater divergence in incomes across
regions and, within each region, across households and individuals. A few of Russia’s regions have been able to capitalise on their resource endowments, location
or other factors to increase per capital income relative to the rest. Those regions
with high per capita incomes have been able to spend more on education and
other social areas.
6 Joseph I. Zajda, Schooling the New Russians: Transforming Soviet Workers into Capitalist Entrepreneurs.
James Nicholas Publishers, 2007, p. 17
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Regional Pedagogies
There have been several attempts since 1992 to create a workable fiscal
equalisation mechanism that would help to preserve the goal of a common educational space across the regions of Russia, as well as across lower-level units
(“rayons”) within regions, but these attempts have proven generally quite ineffective because of the many regions eligible to receive transfers and the relatively
small amount of money available for redistribution.
Not surprisingly, the two federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (as well
as the Moscow oblast) had by far the most highly educated populations in the
country in 1989. Many people from outside these two cities went there to study,
because of the good reputations of the educational institutions in these places, and
later found employment there and did not return home.7
The fourth period put forward the necessity of more deliberate and accurate
reforms in education. One of them was aimed at the revival of educational districts. According to the official documentation, the federal experiment on creating
educational districts was started in 2003 by the Government of Russia. The aim
of this project is the modernisation of regional systems of education management
on the basis of creating educational districts in subjects.
The primary tasks which are decided within this project are:
▪ increase of efficiency of management of education in regions and efficiency of
resource usage;
▪ orientation of the system of education toward local labour markets, including,
as a result, the strengthening of connections between general and professional
education;
▪ increasing quality and availability of education (especially in the country) by
optimisation of the educational network.
Since 2003 the experiment has been carried out on the territory of one region –
Samara. Looking at its positive results, in 2005 the Government of Russia made
the decision to prolong the experiments and expand the number of participants.
In 2006-2008, 6 regions took part in the experiment: the regions of Astrakhan,
Kirov, Samara, Sakhalin and Ulyanovsk, and Chukotka autonomous district.
The experimental experience of regions has made it possible to form three
models of educational districts.
7 M. Carry, Peter R. Moock, Timothy E. Heleniak, Reforming Education in the Regions of Russia. World
Bank Technical paper No. 457. The World Bank, 1999, pp. 20-21, 26.
22
Regional Pedagogies
1.The “strict state” model involves the transfer of most or key functions of municipalities in education management to the state body of educational management of the Russian Federation’s subject (this is the case in the Samara region;
it exceeds the bounds of functioning legislation);
2.The “soft state” model brings the state closer to the objects of management
(this is realised in the Kirov region);
3.The “inter-municipal contractual” model is based on increasing the role of
public-state management and involves unification of resources of several
municipalities with the participation of the state in solving separate tasks of
functioning and modernising education in these territories (this is the case in
the Astrakhan and Altai regions). Other regions, involved in the experiment
(Sakhalin and Ulyanovsk regions, and Chukotka autonomous district) at present are undergoing the stage of approving normative-legal acts.
In general, the introduction of educational districts is possible using different
models, and does not always demand considerable changes in the system of educational management. Educational management on the basis of educational districts simplifies the realisation of programs and projects for the development of
education, harmonises state and municipal management of territorial systems of
education, decreases administrative and transaction expenses, promoting modernisation of the system of Russian education.8
It should be mentioned that this experiment did not have such a significant effect as the creation of new universities in federal districts. The aim of the creation
of new universities is the development of system of higher professional education
on the basis of optimising regional educational structures and strengthening links
of educational institutions of higher education with economics and social sphere
of the federal districts. A federal university brings about this mission by organising and coordinating in the federal district works on the balanced provision of
large programs of social-economic development of territories and regions in its
structure with qualified personnel, and also with scientific, technical and technological solutions, including by bringing the results of intellectual activity into
practice.
New universities in Southern and Siberian federal districts were created as
part of the priority national project on the basis of functioning universities and
academic centres in Rostov-on-Don and Krasnoyarsk. The aim of creating new
universities is a development of the system of higher professional education on
the basis of optimisation of regional educational structures and strengthening
8
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, http://eng.mon.gov.ru/pro/okruga/
23
Regional Pedagogies
connections of educational institutions of higher education with economics and
the social sphere of federal districts.
The creation within the national project of new universities will make it possible to elaborate a model of perspective Russian university for distribution in
other regions. In these universities new systems of management will be introduced, and the universities themselves will become integrated complexes of education, science and business, which will be centres of innovative and technological development and training personnel of international level. It is assumed that
over 5-6 years the institutions of higher education based on this new model will
be among the 10 leading universities of Russia, and to 2020 – among the 100 best
universities in the world.9
This reform provoked acute debates among educators and, particularly regional communities. Some specialists warn that Federal Universities can draw
the best students from the periphery and leave the small universities without
enough candidates. Others deem that the situation in higher education will be improved: Russia will gain innovative academic centres and finally acquire a chance
to compete with the most famous universities at the international level.
It is not necessary to undertake a detailed survey of the whole syllabus in
this paper. But two more items should be described, as they will unfold further
perspectives on the implementation of Regional Pedagogics.
The course identifies not only the basic tendencies in regionalisation. It proposes deeper insights into educational methods and, especially, project work at
school. Organising local lore study (local history, geography and culture) 10 is
first being integrated to the university curriculum. Surprisingly, the study of local
lore as a part of teaching program at school has no academic provision in higher
education.
As a rule, the study of local lore is split into several directions: ecological,
social and economic, and historical. Since the questions of social life and history
occupy much of the school programs, great attention should be paid to the ecological aspects of local studies. Students should introduce and entrench the idea
of sustainable development while working with children, because this sphere has
been ignored, not only in Novgorod region. But the work should be done properly
– without trivial speculation. We will get positive changes if there is real experience and active participation.
9
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, http://eng.mon.gov.ru/pro/pnpo/fed/
10 In Russian – “kraevedenie”.
24
Regional Pedagogies
Table 2. The levels of functioning of local culture (A. Kloskowska, 1983) Source: A.W. Brzezińska,
Od obywatela regionu do obywatela świata – ruch regionalny, edukacja regionalna i animacja kultury jako
sposób poznania małej ojczyzny, [in:] Edukacja obywatelska w społeczeństwach wielokulturowych, A. Szerląg (ed.), Kraków 2007, p. 81.
Levels of culture
Ways of studying culture
Means promoting
the content of culture
Primary
regionalism
Establishing non-government
organisations, funds
Institutional
local lore studies
Teaching at schools, centres for
compulsory education, museums,
libraries etc.
Mass
(mediated communication)
stimulating social activity
Singular and regular events with
the local community engaged
(fairs, exhibitions, festivals, master-classes)
The theory from this chapter will be used by students during their work on
educational projects. The central approach here is proposed by A. Kloskowska.
She highlighted three basic levels for the functioning of local culture (see Table 2).
The projects can embrace all three levels, as long as students are free to include cooperation with public organisations and educational institutions, and engagement with community events into their programs of local lore study. Eventually, due to the experience of using project work, local culture will be popularised
among young people and other citizens. In addition, schools will get recommendations on how to set up common values for interaction between the community
and the system of education. This issue is examined in the last chapter of the
course “Community links in education.”
The development of social partnership is a very urgent problem for Russia,
because intense decentralisation requires more responsibility at a local level. Educational institutions are required to address external stakeholders for advice on
quality improvement, fiscal policy, and management. Studying the particular demands of clients and employers also became the key point of analysis in Regional
Education (especially now, when we are used to speaking about education as a
service).
In the last chapter students become acquainted with methods that help to
identify and tie bonds with potential stakeholders. Partnership rests on a reciprocal awareness of common interests and values.
According to Mitroff, Wieringen, and Ax, the groups concerned (“stakeholders,” support groups, and constituents) can be identified in various ways, including:
25
Regional Pedagogies
▪ The imperative method: the determination of the powers which the organisation must take into consideration. The sources of these of these powers are
viewed as potential stakeholders;
▪ The positional method (based on formal positions): tracing who has a formal
say in the determination of policy;
▪ The reputation method: asking key figures which stakeholders they consider
important;
▪ The social participation method (those deeply involved in activities): the identification of actors who participate in the process of policy-making. A weakness in this method is that potential stakeholders are overlooked;
▪ The opinion leadership method (those informing the opinions of other “stakeholders”);
▪ The demographic method (those who are important by virtue of age, ethnicity,
religion, gender, etc.). The disadvantage of this method is that it assumes group
homogeneity.11
The identification of stakeholders among current and potential employers is a
very challenging task. On the one hand, firm evidence can be extracted from the
situational analysis. There is a lot of hard data in documents regulating the economy of a region (“Strategy for Social and Economic Development in Novgorod
Region” (2009-2030)).
It is also necessary to include some independent variables into situational
analysis. Birth rates are really important for the forecast of educational situation
in a region. Carry, Moock and Heleniak (1999) argue that there have been demographic trends in Russia that have impacted dramatically upon the educational
system. The first has been the decline in the birth rate, starting in the late 1980s
and now beginning to be felt in schools. The second has been the two large migration streams, one from the peripheral regions to the central regions of Russia,
and the other from the non-Russian FSU states back into Russia.12
For example, if we look at the data collected by Novgorod State University, it
becomes clear that until 1987 there was a considerable growth in birth rate. That
is why we had enough university entrants during 2000-2003. But since 1988 the
situation has changed, and now we have big problems with the enrolment of new
students. We assume that this tendency will be stable until 2015-2016. The prac11 F. van. Wieringen, J. Ax, Quality of Educational Organizations and Vocational education and external
interests: a stakeholder approach, [in:] Research on Educational Management in Europe, R. Bolam, F. van.
Wieringen, J. Ax, (eds.), Waxmann 1999, p. 49, 77-78.
12 M. Carry, Peter R. Moock, Timothy E. Heleniak, Reforming Education in the Regions of Russia. World
Bank Technical paper No. 457. The World Bank, 1999, p. 21.
26
Regional Pedagogies
tice is entirely built on studying local needs, taken into account during students’
project work. Meeting these specific needs is crucial for administrative bodies
and the whole system education in a region.
Finally, we see international projects as a means of building social networks
for regional education. Identifying the demands of employers has become the
starting point for coordinated strategic planning since TUNING RUSSIA Programme was introduced at Novgorod State University in 2010. This project is
aimed at designing generic and specific competencies in higher education by the
study of employers’ preferences. Students have not taken part in the surveys for
this programme so far, however, an obvious benefit of TUNING for students is
that they can compare regional standards of education and demands on the local
market with those proclaimed in Europe.
In making my final remarks, I would like to note again that Regional Pedagogics is designed for students of higher educational institutions in Russia,
though it can be turned to the international level if we change the perspective
of regionalisation’s treatment. Even so, working on some topics, students get an
opportunity to reflect on foreign experiences.
As for adaptability, the theoretical basis presents a structured approach that
can be used regardless of regional specifics. The practical assignments must be
adapted to a certain local environment, its history, culture and economy.
The principal idea of the course was to prevent students from over-generalising educational problems that are concrete enough to be analysed as cultural and
socio-economic situations. “Start from meeting with your locality and learn to
manage it properly, then move further” – that is exactly what Regional Pedagogics says. We hope that this course will let students become discerning specialists,
competent enough to see the directions of further improvement and implement
different approaches to educational policy.
Literature:
Abazi A., Farrington D., Huisman J., Globalisation, Internationalisation and Regionalisation [in:] Education
Management and Development. Compendium for Managers, J. Huisman, A. Pausits (eds.) Waxmann 2010
Brzezińska A.W., Od obywatela regionu do obywatela świata – ruch regionalny, edukacja regionalna i animacja kultury jako sposób poznania małej ojczyzny, [in:] Edukacja obywatelska w społeczeństwach wielokulturowych, A. Szerląg (ed.), Kraków 2007
Carry M., Moock P.R., Heleniak T.E., Reforming Education in the Regions of Russia. World Bank Technical
paper No. 457. The World Bank, 1999
Declaration on regionalism in Europe Assembly of European Regions. p. 4, http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_
upload/PressComm/Publications/DeclarationRegionalism/DR_GB.pdf
27
Regional Pedagogies
Leithwood K., Duke D.L., A Century’s Quest to Understand School Leadership, [in:] Handbook of Educational
Leadership and Management, B. Davies, J. West-Burnham (eds.), Pearson Education Limited 2003
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, http://eng.mon.gov.ru/
Tsirulnikov A., Socio-cultural basis of educational system. Socio-cultural situation method, “Voprosy
Obrazovaniya”, no 2/2009. – pp. 44-62.
Wieringen F. van., Ax J., Quality of Educational Organizations and Vocational education and external interests: a stakeholder approach, [in:] Research on Educational Management in Europe, R. Bolam, F. van.
Wieringen, J. Ax, (eds.), Waxmann 1999.
Zajda J.I., Schooling the New Russians: Transforming Soviet Workers into Capitalist Entrepreneurs. James
Nicholas Publishers, 2007.
28
ELENA KORSHUK
NlKOLAY R. PRYGODICH
Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus
In memoriam of SVEN GUSTAVSSON Prof., Uppsala University
Belarusian – Early Development
Modern Belarusian literary language is essentially a product of the 20th century,
and it is a fact that standard Belarusian is much nearer to the popular language,
and that it has far fewer Church-Slavonicisms.
The formation of Belarusian literary language is attributed to the 14th-16th
centuries, when written language on Belarusian territory absorbed specific local phonetic, lexical, semantic, and grammatical features. The written Belarusian
language of ancient times was formed on the basis of the written heritage of
the Eastern-Slavic language and the living dialects of the former Drygavichy,
Kryvichy, and Radzimichy tribes. The old Belarusian literary language reached
its highest level of development in the 14th-16th centuries, when it became the
official language of the Great Principality of Lithuania and was used in the most
important spheres of social life. Chronicles, diplomatic correspondence, magisterial works, legal provisions and state documents were officially registered as well
as belles-lettres, scientific and religious literature was written in the language.
A Note from the Authors.
The present text is an update of parts 6-7 of Chapter 17 of the 2003 edition of “The Baltic Sea Region.
Cultures, Politics, Societies” written by Professor Sven Gustavsson. It was meant to develop his ideas and
provide some additional information of the latest changes in the Belarusian language. Professor Gustavsson
was to be one of the authors. Due to his illness, the other authors took the responsibility of producing the
whole text. The new article was sent to Prof.Gustavsson. As a result a scientific discussion started, which,
most unfortunately, had no opportunity to bring the parties to a consensus, as the outstanding linguist and a
true friend of the Slavic world Sven Gustavsson left us on February 15, 2013.
We invite the reader to study both articles on the development of the Belarusian language and single out the
aspects differently viewed by the Belarusian linguists and by the Swedish one.
29
However, by the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, the scope of the use of the old Belarusian literary language had gradually
diminished. Since then the written tradition has been interrupted. Under the new
political and socio-economic conditions of the Lublin Union (1569) use of the
Belarusian language was considerably restrained, and Warsaw Confederation of
1696 substituted Polish for it. The Belarusian language remained in use only in
Uniate Basilican schools and local dialects.
The appearance of the new Belarusian written language and the formation of
the new Belarusian literary language is connected with the revival of the Belarusian nation and the liberation movement in the Russian Empire of the 19th and
early 20th centuries.
The towns in the area were inhabited mostly by non-Belarusians, while the
countryside contained the overwhelming majority of the Belarusian population,
which was poor, mostly illiterate, and usually had local identities. The fact that
more than five million people in the area in the 1897 census claimed Belarusian
as their language should probably not be seen as a sign of a clear national consciousness. It is worth mentioning that the revival of the national movement was
started by young intellectuals studying in St. Petersburg, in Russia, rather than
by the population living in Belarus as such. In their attempts to build the national
spirit they published a newspaper titled Nasha Niva in Belarusian. It was the
teachers who would go to the rural areas to read the paper for the peasantry.
The spoken variant became the paramount source for the making of the new
(modern) literary language as the language of fiction.
In the early 20th century Belarusian printing used two graphic systems:
Roman (in its Polish and then also Czech variants) and Cyrillic (the so-called
‘grazhdanka’ or ‘Russian’) alphabets. Initially, some editions were issued in both
Roman and Cyrillic alphabets (Nasha Niva started to use one alphabet – ‘grazhdanka’ – only after 1912). With time, the Cyrillic alphabet started to prevail and
became the main Belarusian graphic.
At that time the distinguishing features of the Belarusian alphabet were established (the letter ‘і’ replaced ‘и’, the letters ‘шч’, replaced ‘щ’, the letter ‘ў’ appeared, etc.), and orthography was unified. The phonological principle for vowels
and morphological principle for consonants were gradually introduced and put into
practice in Belarusian book printing. Lexicography and phraseology grew considerably, words and phrases from classic languages and literatures were adopted,
and the process of producing social, political, scientific, technical, and agricultural
terminology began. The generally practiced speech characteristics were revealed
and established in the works of writers who represented different dialects. The
grammatical means of the language were gradually enriched and developed. The
30
word-building capacity of the Belarusian literary language was enlarged, some
grammatical categories acquired new forms (non-declensional nouns, non-transitive adverbial participle), structural types of the Simple Sentence and Compound
Sentences became more varied, grammatical connections in word-combinations
and complex syntactical constructions became more complicated.
Despite the restricted conditions for its functioning and the absence of commonly established orthography, graphics, and grammatical norms, by 1917 the
Belarusian literary language already possessed the necessary level of development to present the ideas of people in many spheres of their lives.
The young Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic actively participated in the
process of cultural construction, in spite of the difficult economic conditions and
the lack of national intellectuals in the post-revolutionary period. The Second Session of the CEC BSSR (15th July, 1924) passed a Resolution on Legislative Enactment in the Realisation of National Policy, which instigated the process of planned
Belarusianisation. The programme included the organisation of educational establishments using the native language of instruction, the development of national literature, the publication of Belarusian books, comprehensive academic research, the
introduction of the national language in the state, party, trade unions, cooperatives,
and military structures. In accordance with the Constitution of the BSSR (1927),
the Belarusian language was declared to be “the prevailing language of communication in state, professional, and public establishments and organisations.”
The wide range of social functions of Belarusian literary language called for
the immediate elimination of discordances in pronunciation and the establishment
of a common orthography. To set the grammatical-orthographic norms it was necessary to establish a standard grammar of the Belarusian language. As is generally
known, the attempts made before the 1917 Socialist Revolution proved fruitless.
The dialects of central Belarus (mostly the central districts of the Minsk region and to some extent those of the Eastern districts of Grodno region) which
embodied most vividly the specific features of the Belarusian language made the
basis for the working out of literary norms. The important fact that the outstanding Belarusian writers of late 19th and early 20th centuries (Kupala, Kolas, Biadulja, Tseotka, Gartny and Dunin-Martsinkevich) originated from central Belarus
may have been decisive.
In the pre-revolution period, the Belarusian literary language, under the
influence of central-Belarusian dialects, acquired such specific features as
non-dissimilative akanje (exaggerated pronunciation of [a]), hardened [r], fricative [r], etc.). In the process of developing literary norms in the post-revolutionary period, the adoption of most typical features from other dialects took
place, for example, in the initial stages of the formation of the national liter-
31
ary language south-western dialects played an important role, by introducing
some verb forms and some nominal forms to the literary standard. Later on,
north-eastern dialects, having much in common with the Russian language and
its dialects, gained importance.
Work on developing and establishing standard rules in grammar and spelling
was started; five grammar books were issued in 1918, with Tarashkevich’s Belarusian grammar book for schools the most authoritative among them. Based on
the material of living folk speech, pre-revolutionary publications and academic
research in the field, the grammar book by Tarashkevich was quite consistent in
defining the grammatical features of the Belarusian language and formulating its
spelling norms. It became the teaching aid to refer to by the following textbooks
and research in the Belarusian language.
However, the grammar book, as well as the textbooks based on it, failed to
precisely define all the characteristic features of the Belarusian language and to
finally set the standards in grammar and orthography. There was an active discussion on the standardisation of Belarusian literary language in 1920. The Proposition for Simplification of Belarusian Orthography was issued in the 1930s, and
on the basis of that Proposition, the Council of People’s Commissars of the BSSR
passed the Resolution on Changes and Simplifications of Belarusian Orthography, which for the first time in the history of the Belarusian language legally
stated the definite standards of Belarusian orthography and grammar.
The new historical reality substantially influenced the vocabulary and phraseology of the Belarusian literary language. The vocabulary was enriched by the
building of new words and word combinations on the basis of its own vocabulary,
borrowings from other languages, and by assimilating the experience and wealth of
the speech of the people. In that period the working out of national terminology was
started – 24 publications on Belarusian scientific terminology were issued between
1922 and 1930, providing a solid basis for creating new textbooks and manuals in
different areas of knowledge, as well as promoting further activity in lexicography.
After the October Revolution the system of styles of the literary language
changed substantially. While before 1917 the Belarusian language fulfilled a
limited range of social and cultural functions, now there appeared an exigency
of embracing all the spheres of state and administrative office work, education,
science, culture, etc. The scientific, business, functional, and other styles of Belarusian literary language, as well as journalese started to develop.
The efforts of the best representatives of Belarusian literature, science and
culture brought the literary language of the late 20s and early 30s to a high level.
The success could have been even greater, but for the political oppression that
strangled the process of Belarusianisation. By the end of the 1930s instruction
32
in many Belarusian schools was conducted in the Russian language, the native
tongue was gradually ousted from the majority of the spheres of social and cultural life of the country. Enforced bilingualism made Russian the only ‘official’
language in Belarus.
Post-World War II Developments
The social and political life of the second half of the 20th century in Belarus, just
like in other parts of the former USSR, conformed to the notions ‘soviet epoch’
and ‘post-soviet’ (the epoch of the national-state independence). According to
the changes that mark the speech practice of the Belarusian people, the post-war
history of the Belarusian literary language in the following periods can be defined
as: 1945, early 50s, late 50s, early 80s, late 80s and 90s. Each of the periods had
a dominant feature that, to a certain degree, marked the specifics of the socio-cultural and speech orientation of the society and the character of the active processes in different spheres of speech activity.
Post-War Developments in Belarus
The Belarusians suffered great losses in World War II following the pre-war purges. In most of the industrial areas, in towns and cities as well as villages, about
30% of the population perished. The Belarusian population, which before the war
was mostly rural (before the war the towns and cities were still to a great extent
non-Belarusian), became urban very rapidly.
The post-war period also brought a strong Russification of the republic, perhaps the most far-reaching in any Soviet republic. The reasons for this are many:
(1) there was not a fully developed national consciousness. The results of the
short period of Belarusification in the 1920s were countermanded by the purges
in the 1930s and the war, during which most of the newly-born Belarusian intelligentsia perished; (2) before World War II, Belarus was still mostly a rural society,
whereas the towns were inhabited by a majority of non-Belarusians. The towns
and their culture were thus by tradition non-Belarusian. After the war, considerable numbers of non-Belarusians came to the country to rebuild the towns razed
to the ground. The common language, thus, could only be Russian. The post-war
urbanisation of the Belarusians took place in a period when Russification was
intensive. The towns, thus, became Russian-speaking; (3) some kind of feeling
of kinship between Belarusians and Russians, and the close relationship between
the two languages paved the way for Russification; (4) it is probable that the Belarusians, when moving into the towns, viewed the relation between their spoken
language and the Russian language as a relation between dialects, and a high
knowledge of Russian gave prestige and became a means for social advancement.
33
In the 1980s the results of Russification were highly visible. The administration, politics, party, and higher education were almost totally Russian. In lower
education, almost all schools in towns and cities were Russian; the mass-media
were to a great extent Russian; in 1984, around 95% of all works of literature
printed were in Russian; only 3 out 15 theatres used Belarusian, and so on. The
stronghold of Belarusian education was the rural schools, but even there Belarusian was often exchanged for Russian as the language of administration, medical
service, and so on. The spoken Belarusian language in the countryside was usually the local dialect, not a spoken variant of Standard Belarusian. In many places,
the spoken language was a mixed Belarusian-Russian, the so-called Trasjanka, a
term literally meaning “mixed cattle-food.”
The Belarusian language was thus in a clear minority position, even though
Belarusians constituted the majority population in the republic, and Russian the
dominant language, so dominant that many feared the extinction of Belarusian as
a literary language. Russian was also dominant among the minorities who had no
minority rights at all in the post-war period. Outside the home, only Polish had
a position as the language of service in the very circumscribed Catholic Church.
As a matter of fact, up to the 1980s a policy (sometimes implicit) of ousting the
Belarusian language from different spheres of social life was employed.
At that time certain measures were taken by the authorities to standardise and
unify language norms at the lexical, grammatical and other levels (the Resolution
of 1957). The standardising activity was mostly characteristic of the Yakub Kolas
and Yanka Kupala Institute of Linguistic Science of the Academy of Sciences,
and the linguistic chairs/departments of the leading establishments of higher education in Belarus. Their efforts resulted in the creation of Belarusian academic
grammar books and the publication of trend-setting (explanatory, spelling, etymological, etc.) dictionaries.
Disharmony in the functioning of the Belarusian language became particularly strong by the 1970-80s, when spoken Belarusian was increasingly losing its
previously won positions. There was a situation that could have led to a complete
loss of the national language. However, the democratisation of the country, the
formation of a sovereign Belarus helped to awaken people’s interest in history, culture and language. A national “Mother tongue” program was developed,
and the Society of the Belarusian language and other socio-cultural organisations
were formed. On 26th January, 1990 the 14th session of the Supreme Soviet of
the Belarusian SSR adopted the Law “On Languages in the Belarusian SSR” and
clarified the positions of the Belarusian, Russian and other languages in the country. Under this law, the Belarusian language became the only official language
in Belarus. In September 1990, on the basis of legislation the “State Program
34
on development of the Belarusian language and other national languages in the
Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic” was adopted.
However, the situation changed in Belarus after the referendum in 1995, according to which the status of a state language was given to two languages – to
Belarusian and to Russian. This inevitably led to a reduction of the role of the Belarusian language, sharply narrowing the area of its use. The Act of the Republic
of Belarus of 23rd July 2008 on “Rules of Belarusian spelling and punctuation,”
enforced on 1st September, 2010 received a mixed reception from academics.
On the one hand, it was high time to make many changes to the spelling rules of
1957, and, on the other hand, the new version of the rules created some confusion
in the use of many of the practices in school, in dictionaries, and so on. The new
Act could not yet definitively resolve all the disputed issues in the writing of certain words. And so today the efforts of the linguistic community seek to create a
special Council of Ministers commission to clarify spelling, to make adjustments
for Belarusian language teaching in schools, the use of it in the media, and so on.
In today’s Belarus the national language is increasingly becoming elitist,
used by language and literature specialists, some opposition politicians or the
young, who either are truly interested in the revival of national culture, or take
it as a form of a sub-culture, distinguishing them from the world of the adults.
However, whatever the reasons of choosing Belarusian for daily use, it may be a
sign of the revival of the language and Belarusian culture as such.
Literature:
Шакун, Л. М. Мастацкае маўленне ў гісторыі беларускай літаратурнай мовы, Мінск, 1996, p. 147.
Жураўскі А. І., Прыгодзіч, М. Р. Гісторыя беларускай літаратурнай мовы, Мінск, 1994, pp. 151-152.
35
36
Part B
The Political Landscape
37
38
Trajectories of State-Building and
Democratisation in the Former Soviet Region:
The Second Decade of Independence
LI BENNICH-BJÖRKMAN
Uppsala University, Sweden
Introduction
When the Soviet experiment ended in 1991, fifteen successor states rose out of the
former empire. How has the unprecedented experience of modern dictatorship of
Soviet totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism affected political developments in
these states, and why has the modern state, combining democratic rule with state
capacity, been so hard to achieve in this part of the world? Following the collapse
of the Soviet order in the eastern part of Europe, the political and security architecture of the continent has since been subjected to a drastic reconfiguration. Early hopes for a rapid transition of the former socialist countries to a Western-style
system of democracy, market economy, and the rule of law were articulated in
academia and elsewhere, initially comparing the post-communist transitions to
those in Latin America and Southern Europe.1 The transition paradigm, however, proved to be inadequate as a new reality emerged that is instead marked by
striking regime divergence.2 There was definitely a transition from authoritarian
1 T. Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, “Journal of Democracy”, Vol. 13, No. 1: 2002, 5–21,
H. Hale, Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia in “World Politics”
58(1): 2005, pp. 133-165.
2 A. Grzymala-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist
Democracies, New York: Cambridge University Press 2007, K. Darden & A. Grzymala-Busse, The Great
Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse in “World Politics” vol. 59, No.1 : 2006, pp. 83115, G. Ekiert & S. Hanson (eds.), Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the
Legacy of Communist Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, M. McFaul & K. Stoner-Weiss,
(eds.), After the Collapse of Communism. Comparative Lessons of Transition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004, B. Milanovic, K. Hoff & S. Horowitz, Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in
Influence. Evidence from the Post-Communist Transition, The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper
4747 2008, H. Kitschelt, Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good a Cause?
in Ekiert and Hanson, 2003.
39
Trajectories of State-Building and Democratisation ...
government, but the mistake, as argued by Carothers, was in believing that the
transition was being made to something absolute, even final. Few of the major
transformations have been as linear and straightforward as was first believed by
economists and institutionalists in many of the leading academic disciplines.
In this chapter, the central focus is on political developments in the second
decade as independent states, and the ambition is to provide an overview of the
trajectories unfolding within this region, also hinting at explanations to why there
is such diversity between first and foremost the Baltic States and the others. What
I would like to point to initially is that what we are usually talking about when
reflecting upon political developments are in reality two separate things. Democratisation is one, understood as the increasing influence of the voice of the people
through free and fair elections (that is elections that benefit from a low level of
manipulation), and an increasingly vital and influential civil society. The other is
state-building, understood as the reform capability of the state, and the rise of efficient and fairly non-corrupt institutions that are working under the laws. Sometimes, but far from always, democratisation and state-building move positively
together. In large parts of the former Soviet Union, however, these two stand in a
trade-off position vis-à-vis each other. When the level of democracy is rising, either intentionally or as a by-product of other processes (“pluralism by default”),3
state capacity decreases, and vice versa. When more “interests” are formally and
informally allowed into decision-making structures, as is the case in democracies, the state often runs the risk of becoming corrupt, captured or developing
into a party state. However, when interests are not allowed to organise themselves
and citizens are deprived of their right to participate, institutions run the risk of
becoming illegitimate and isolated. A major conclusion here is, thus, that the real
political challenge facing many of the new states in this region (and Russia) is the
creation of sustainable and reform capable states that are also democratic.
General Tendencies in the Region
Many of the Soviet republics had been part of tsarist Russia for extensive periods,
had no statehood experiences behind them, and were affected by traditions of
orthodoxy, elite-orientation, and non-pluralism. The layers of tsarist and Soviet
legacies seem to have generated great difficulties. The result so far is a majority
of what have been described as weak states (nine), a few authoritarian but strong
states (three), and a few states that both possess state capacity and are democratic
3
40
L. Way, Pluralism by default in Moldova, “Journal of Democracy” Vol. 13, No 4:2002.
(three). It is clear that what Finer called the paradigmatic Western state model
came to a halt in the post-Soviet region.4
The World Bank Governance Indicators offer a time series for 1996-2007, divided into six dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability (violence),
government effectiveness (deliverance of public services, resisting pressures
from outside), regulatory quality (enforcement and implementation), rule of law,
and control of corruption.5 Analysing the data for these fifteen countries over the
time period shows some quite intriguing patterns. On a general level, most transformation seems to be occurring in the areas of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality (the latter two are more rarely put
forward in analyses of state strength but are very crucial). For the rule of law and
control of corruption the states show a common pattern of poor or even somewhat
worse behaviour over time (with the exception of the Baltic States).
There are two competing trends of transformation when it comes to voice
and accountability (openness and pluralism). The predominant one is the move
towards less pluralism over time, where Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan cluster together. The experiment with greater voice
and pluralism after 1991 has been distinctly reversed over the period covered here.
This is the clearest tendency in the region. The other, much weaker but growing,
trend is represented by Georgia and Ukraine, which over these ten years have broken with the above pattern and moved towards increasing openness. The breaking
points are the coloured revolutions, which seem to have had a stronger influence
in Ukraine than in Georgia when it comes to pluralism (but which is reversed after 2010). Moldova is less pluralistic than Ukraine and Georgia, but still deviates
completely from the authoritarian trend of the first six countries. Kyrgyzstan is a
deviant and interesting case, particularly when viewed from a regional perspective. It is the only country in Central Asia that has not moved towards growing
authoritarianism. Kyrgyzstan is therefore clustered more with Armenia than with
its geographical neighbours. The Baltic States are not transforming very much in
terms of openness; they represented a stable and successful group already in 1996.
For government effectiveness and regulatory quality, there are clear tendencies of change in the region. All the “re-authoritarian” states, that is states that
have returned to authoritarianism after gaining independence (Russia, Belarus,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan), have improved on the first
4 S.E. Finer, The History of Government III. Empires, Monarchies and the Modern State, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997/1999.
5 D. Kaufmann, Daniel, A.Kraay, & M. Mastruzzi, Massimo, Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007, Policy Research Working Paper 4654, The World Bank 2008 (web.
worldbank.org).
41
dimension, and some have also improved on the second one. The three Baltic
States (which have been affected during this period by their EU accession processes) have also improved substantially in both respects, showing a pattern
where participation comes first, and then institutionalisation (contrary to Huntington’s conclusions) does. Armenia and Azerbaijan are also improving.
Within the region, it is then, broadly speaking, possible to identify three
categories of states: firstly the comparatively successful ones, when it comes to
democratisation and state-building, secondly the ones that after a short, more democratic opening in the ‘90s, have developed in a stable authoritarian direction once
again, and thirdly the hybrid or transitional ones. In the first category we find only,
but not surprisingly given their historic experiences, the three Baltic States, who
because of this position often are left out of analyses of the post-Soviet region, but
nevertheless – because of their 1944 incorporation into the Union – belong to it,
in the second falls nine states (including Russia), and in the hybrid/transitional/
oscillating category many analysts place Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.
Formal Institutions: an Overview
The Baltic States are parliamentary republics, even though Lithuania has a presidency equipped with more power resources than the other two. Among the nine
states that have developed authoritarian tendencies over the last decade – Russia,
Belarus, the five Central Asian States, Armenia and Azerbaijan, all are presidential systems (I include here Kyrgyzstan, which, however, is hard to categorise).
In many of these, the incumbent presidents have, moreover, ruled since the ‘90s,
through, among other things, manipulation of the constitutions so as to be able to
be re-elected for more than the usual two terms of office. Thus, the personalistic
rule is firmly anchored and the systems are only vulnerable when the president
either falls ill or has to resign (in particular if there is no clear successor). Among
the “hybrids,” Ukraine, in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in late 2004,
established a more dual system, where strong presidential powers were balanced
by a more powerful parliament. After the victory of the former loser from 2004,
Victor Janukovych, in 2010’s presidential elections, there have been steps taken
to return once more to stronger presidentialism. Georgia has kept its presidential
system, also after the “Rose” revolution in 2003, while Moldova, which in the
‘90s had a dualistic system resembling the Ukrainian one between 2005-2010,
has, after the “twitter” revolution following the parliamentary elections in 2009,
changed the constitution and is now a parliamentary democracy.6
6 A. Johansson, Dissenting Democrats. Nation and Democracy in the Republic of Moldova, Stockholm
Studies in Politics 142, 2011.
42
Baltic Exceptionalism
The three Baltic States are the only real examples of successful democratisation in
the region, which also tells us something of their deviance in relation to the others.
Among the three, Estonia stands out, and has done so since independence, in the
purposeful and consensually-based transformation of the economy and the state.7
At the other end of the scale there is Latvia, while Lithuania should be placed
somewhere in between the two, but ultimately siding more with Estonia than Latvia.8 Overall, their political developments over the last decade have included both
EU and NATO membership in 2004, for Estonia’s part, additionally entering the
euro-zone in 2011. Elections here have been considered free and fair, with subsequent peaceful power shifts and the formation of reformable coalitions.9 Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania have often been accused of having fragmented, unstable and
immature party systems, since not least in Latvia and Lithuania new parties have
tended to form before each election, and coalition formation may include surprising partners ideology-wise. However, the instability is a truth with modification.
Estonia’s last parliamentary elections (in March 2011) resulted in a four-party
parliament, and a renewed confidence of the incumbent government (dominated
by the Reform party); a situation which had not occurred before. In Lithuania, the
last decade certainly witnessed a growing fragmentation of the previous two-party system, and new parties seem to keep forming before elections. However, the
situation during the ‘90s was considered by many as very polarised and locked-in
around a cultural cleavage of communism/anti-communism which now has been
neutralised. Parties in Latvia are still very much connected to private sponsors as
a consequence of Latvia being the only EU member without publicly supported
parties. The dire situation (called “oligarchic”) led to by-elections in September
2011, as a result of a referendum in July that dissolved the newly (October 2010)
elected parliament. Estonia and Latvia have large Russian-speaking populations
(around 30 percent or more), many of whom arrived after the Second World War,
and thus not automatically enfranchised as a result of the citizenship legislation
adopted in both countries in 1991-1994. There is no room to go into more detailed
background here to the sensitive and highly questioned citizenship issue, which
7 L. Bennich-Björkman & B. Likic-Brboric, Successful but Different. Deliberate Identity and the Consensus-driven Transition to Capitalism in Estonia and Slovenia, “Journal of Baltic Studies”, Vol. 43, No 1 2012.
8 L. Bennich-Björkman, The Communist Past. Party Formation and Elites in the Baltic States, Baltic
Worlds 4: 2009 (online February 2010).
9 For analyses over time see the Nations in Transit (www.freedomhouse.org) which covers the political
developments of all post-communist countries on a yearly basis.
43
has historical as well as strategical explanations.10 Whereas many in the Russian-speaking population have acquired citizenship as a result of learning the official, native, languages, many are still non-citizens without the right to vote. That
is particularly true of Latvia, where few have acquired Russian citizenship (as
opposed to Estonia), and where the legislation is stricter, in that non-citizens cannot vote in local elections (in Estonia non-citizens have local voting rights). This
situation is not in itself un-democratic, but continues to constitute a problem from
a democratic point of view, since the Russian-speakers are permanent residents
without the possibility of affecting political decisions that concern them. Hence,
even if all three of the Baltic States, in relation to the other mostly newly created
states in the region, have managed well in the second decade, there are shortcomings to be identified. Latvia suffers much greater problems than, in particular,
Estonia, and demonstrates tendencies that resemble more the other “post-Soviet”
states; high levels of political corruption, destructively close ties between politics
and business, and at least up until 2009, problems with reform-capacity.
The Major Trajectory: Growing Non-pluralism
The nine authoritarian states, Russia, Belarus, the five Central Asian Republics,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, have more or less followed similar trajectories during
the last decade – and Russia is here an influential role model. In these states, the
concentration of power is strong and has been growing, often in the hands of a
power party closely linked to the president, that through both legal and more
illicit methods has gained ground. Elections are manipulated by the incumbents
to an extent that by international observers do not render them the epithet free
and fair,11 using so-called “administrative resources” (state resources) to secure
the defeat of oppositional forces. Attempts at controlling independent media and
the press occur frequently, and the preconditions for civil society organisations
10 There is extensive literature on citizenship and language policies in Estonia and Latvia which have
attracted great international interest. See, for example, R. Misiunas & R. Taagepera, The Baltic States.
Years of Dependence 1940-1990, London: Hurst and Company 1993; V. Pettai & K. Hallik, Understanding
processes of ethnic control: segmentation, dependency and co-optation in post-communist Europe, “Nations
and Nationalism”, 8, No 4: 2002, 505-529; J. Reinikainen, Right Against Right. Membership and Justice in
Post-Soviet Estonia, University of Stockholm, Department of Political Science (dissertation) 1999; A. Lieven,
The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993, J. Linz & A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996;
L.K Metcalf, Outbidding to radical nationalists: minority policy in Estonia, 1988-1993, “Nations and Nationalism”, 2, 2 1996, 213-234; P. Kolstoe, Conclusions, Pål Kolstoe, (ed.), National Integration and Violent
Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies. The Cases of Estonia and Moldova, New York: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers 2002, P.Kolstoe, Nasjonsbygging. Russland og de nye statene i öst, Oslo: Universitetsförlaget 1999,
P. Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London: Hurst and Company 1995.
11 See Nations in Transit www.freedomhouse.org.
44
to work – not least those sponsored from external sources, foundations or individuals – have become more difficult. The presidential elections in Belarus in
December 2010, followed by a surprisingly strong repressive response by the
state towards opposition and demonstrators, shows that an authoritarian regime
under these conditions needs to demonstrate its control very heavily. There is
basically no development towards increasing democracy in these states, and the
presidential constitutions further contribute to reduce pluralist tendencies in that
they reinforce a monolithic informal power structure, “a power vertical.”12 These
nine are authoritarian states today, moving away from the tendencies towards
openness during the ‘90s which were prevalent, not least in Russia.
During the 1990s, when the central state was weakened, it is true that Russia
experienced some often chaotic years of genuine competition. However, during
the 2000s, Russia from a democratic perspective has been moving in a more
negative direction. Elections have been rigged and there is a classic power party,
United Russia, dominating the Duma. The political opposition is harassed and the
media are controlled and manipulated by the authorities. Civil society continues
to be active, as do the media, but the risks and dangers are considerable. Russia’s
parliamentary elections in December of 2011 generated popular protests all over
the country in reaction to alleged fraud. These protests indicate that there is a
social contract between the institutions and the citizens that – as was the case in
Ukraine in 2004 – must be respected.
Still Transforming? Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
The “hybrids” – Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – attract a lot of interest and
have at times inspired hopes of genuine democratisation. What can appear as
democratisation is, however, not a genuine move based on values and democratic
behaviour, but rather a specific form of elite power struggle, which has opened
up with constitutions that allow for more duality than a presidential system. Interestingly, these states experienced a kind of liberalisation first, after the institutional transition at the beginning of the ‘90s (whereas, according to theory, such
liberalisation precedes institutional transition). Political parties began to form, a
more active civil society and independent press slowly emerged. In that sense,
the institutional changes which occurred as a result of initiatives of the elites,
and not out of grass-root mobilisation, generated the preconditions for a new, and
more society-based transitional phase – witnessed during the colour revolutions
in 2003, 2004 and, in Moldova, actually first in 2009. Among those three, it may
be Moldova and Georgia which today are on the most sustainable reform trajecto12 H. Hale, Formal Institutions in Informal Politics, “World Politics,” 63: 4 2011,
45
ry; Georgia with respect to state-building and Moldova with respect to democratisation. Ukraine in 2010 and 2011 has deteriorating democratic indicators, media
freedom appears to be decreasing, there is growing repression towards political
rivals to the incumbent president (Yulia Tymoshenko has been imprisoned) and
tendencies of weakening the possibilities for civil society.13
A Market Imperialist State?
Describing the developments, I want to tentatively suggest that we are seeing
signs of a new “type” of post-Soviet state that has developed as a result of an
incongruence between formally democratic institutions and strong market actors:
what could be called a “market imperialist” state. This type of distortion differs
from political corruption, capture, or exploitation in that political and economic
elites integrate as in Soviet times, not only by personal overlaps, but most importantly by combining the resources of money and contacts. The boundaries
between states and markets have become blurred, similar to how the boundaries
between private (civil society) and public (state) are blurred in some developing
states in Africa and Asia. This state of affairs is qualitatively different from, and
even more dangerous and destructive than, state institutions or officials being
corrupted, captured, or exploited. Corruption, capture, and exploitation presuppose the existence of imagined boundaries between politics and money, or state
and business (even though they are constantly crossed). Market imperialist states
do not presuppose this. Basically, the practices by which markets function, following the “logic of the market,” become the practices (and norms) by which
political institutions (parliaments, parties) are run as well. We can mention some
examples. Today, parliamentary seats are for sale in Ukraine for huge sums of
money; businessmen with connections in the financial sector dominate the legislative assemblies; and parties buy parliamentarians from other parties in the
sessions, in the Verkhovna Rada. Parties are often described as representing different business clans or networks rather than functioning in an ideological or
even clientelistic manner. Similar features seem to exist in Kyrgyzstan.14 Even in
comparatively well-functioning Latvia, a tremendous and hard-to-solve problem
is that market actors “buy” political parties, control individual parliamentarians,
and use their contacts to further particular self-interests.
13 For analyses of the 2010 presidential election and its consequences see the special issue of East European
Politics and Societies, February 2011, featuring articles by among others Colton, d’Anieri, Herron and Kuzio.
14 J. Engvall, The State as Investment Market. An Analytical Framework for Interpreting Politics and
Bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis 2011 (diss.)
46
Poland
Let me also mention Poland and the political developments there; Poland being the major country in the Baltic Sea Region in terms of size and importance.
The plane crash in 2010 did not cause severe disruptions and shows that crisis
management at the elite level is well developed in Poland today. Even though
large parts of the political and military elite were killed, the state continued to
function in a stable and safe way. That is not to say that the previous decade has
been only rosy. Worries were articulated after EU accession in 2004, when the
Kaczynski brothers (Jaroslaw and Lech, the latter killed in the 2010 crash) gained
power, and a number of the parties dominating the political scene embraced intolerant standpoints and so-called traditional family values to a degree that created
strong internal polarisation and international complaints. The years 2005-2007
saw a radicalisation of Polish politics which could have proved disastrous if it
had continued. However, more liberal tendencies have prevailed after the snap
elections in 2007, and what seems to be a slow decrease in intolerance towards
homosexuals (Poland is a very homogenous country ethnically so such prejudices
do not surface much), also demonstrates the importance of the subtle forces of
Europeanisation. State-building has been solid in Poland. Today, it is Hungary
among the new EU member states that gives cause for concern, with its highly
intolerant Jobbik party entering parliament in 2010 and the right-wing, with the
leading Fidesz party controlling two-thirds of parliament attempting constitutional changes that have been accused of being undemocratic.
Why Such Different Developments?
What separates the much more democratically successful Baltic States and Poland, who have been able to build a functioning state with reform capability, from
the former Soviet Union at large? It is obvious that two major things differ the
former from the latter; firstly historical and cultural legacies, and secondly the active influence of attempts to meet the conditions imposed for EU membership and
later membership. A third difference is the greater political and social consensus
in the former, regarding where the new democracies were heading and of national
identity. The territories today constituting Estonia and Latvia were for centuries
ruled by the Baltic Germans, later the Swedes, before becoming self-governing
provinces in the Russian empire in 1709. These lands were mostly protestant (Lutheran), and were furthermore heavily influenced by the nationalist awakening in
the late 19th century. Lithuania was an independent state during medieval times,
came into union with Poland, where she became more and more overtaken by
Polish language and elites. The Catholic faith dominated in Lithuania, as in Poland, but like Estonia and Latvia, a national identity was vigorously sought in the
47
later decades of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th. In contrast to
a country such as Ukraine, the three Baltic States (and Poland) experienced independent and partly democratic statehood in the interwar years, 1918-1940. Most
of the former Soviet Union have experienced being provinces within the Russian
empire, or under Ottoman rule, Orthodoxy and Islam have been the major religious influences, and few had experience of independent statehood before 1991.
For the Baltic States, with an initially strong political will to join western
institutions, the EU’s active presence may not have been decisive in changing behaviour or attitudes, but instead rather reinforced already existing ones. For other
countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, now Serbia (and Croatia), that were not
endowed with the same political will and carried with them other, less fortunate,
historical legacies, the EU’s presence appears to have been able to positively
affect democratisation at the very least. These latter countries bear a stronger
resemblance to some of the states in former Soviet Union, which could indicate
that their legacies may be overtaken by the logic of EU accession, providing
membership as a highly desired “carrot” is offered.
What about the Future?
How will things develop in this region in the future? What can be seen is that the
divide between EU member states and the former Soviet Union will widen even
further, despite the efforts made by the EU in its Neighbourhood Policy and the
Eastern Partnership. The concrete presence of the EU in the form of conditions
imposed on membership prospects has worked surprisingly well in all regions
where it has been used; including now in the Balkans. But that demands that potential membership is a credible reward for the difficult to implement reforms and
the efforts at attacking monolithic power structures and clientelism. For Ukraine,
Georgia and Moldova this is just not the case. The costs on behalf of the EU
member states of incorporating these are too high, and the potential gains too low
for the EU – and the “moral” overtones of making up for Yalta and the agreements made to divide Europe that were there in the ‘90s are not valid anymore.
The EU has been able to overcome, at least to a certain extent, historical cultural
legacies of a more ‘problematic’ nature than the ones shared by Central Europe
and the Baltic states. The lack of previous democratic experience, civil traditions
and pluralist societies in Bulgaria, Romania and also Serbia, still could not prevent Europeanisation from taking root, in the sense of the values and practices of
politics and minority rights that are more and more in line with European traditions – or those which are considered European traditions. But since the EU only
offers second choice alternatives to, for example, Ukraine, the elites cannot join
together around EU accession as a common project. We can thus conclude that
48
the more internally reform-oriented and progressive forces in the hybrid states
are not likely to receive the international push and pressure that the EU can offer. Whether domestic actors can become strong enough to initiate more genuine democratisation and state-building on their own remains to be seen. It is an
intricate combination of more internally democratic party structures, more civil
initiatives, and an electorate that punishes un-democratic behaviour.
Literature:
Bennich-Björkman L. & Likic-Brboric B.,Successful but Different. Deliberate Identity and the Consensusdriven Transition to Capitalism in Estonia and Slovenia, “Journal of Baltic Studies”, Vol 43, No 1 2012.
Bennich-Björkman L., The Communist Past. Party Formation and Elites in the Baltic States, ”Baltic Worlds”
4: 2009 (online Feb. 2010)
Carothers T.,The End of the Transition Paradigm, “Journal of Democracy”, Vol. 13, No. 1: 2002, 5–21
Darden K.& Grzymala-Busse A.,The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse in
“World Politics” vol. 59, No.1: 2006, pp. 83-115
Ekiert G. & Hanson S. (eds.), Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Assessing the Legacy
of Communist Rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003
“East European Politics and Societies”, February 2011 (special issue).
Engvall J., The State as Investment Market, An Analytical Framework for Interpreting Politics and. Bureaucracy
in Kyrgyzstan, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis 2011 (diss.)
Finer S.E., The History of Government III. Empires, Monarchies and the Modern State, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997/1999
Grzymala-Busse A., Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist
Democracies, New York: Cambridge University Press 2007
Hale H., Formal Institutions in Informal Politics, “World Politics”, 63: 4 2011
Hale H., Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia “World Politics” 58(1):
2005, 133-165
Johansson A., Dissenting Democrats. Nation and Democracy in the Republic of Moldova, Stockholm Studies
in Politics 142 2011
Kaufmann D., Daniel, A.Kraay, & Mastruzzi M., Massimo, Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual
Governance Indicators 1996-2007, “Policy Research Working Paper” 4654, The World Bank 2008 (web.
worldbank.org)
Kitschelt H., Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good a Cause? in Ekiert and
Hanson, 2003
Kolstoe P., Conclusions, Kolstoe P., (ed.), National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies.
The Cases of Estonia and Moldova, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2002
Kolstoe P., Nasjonsbygging. Russland og de nye statene i öst, Oslo: Universitetsförlaget 1999
Polstoe P., Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London: Hurst and Company 1995
Lieven A., The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Indepedence, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993
Linz J. & Stepan A., Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America,
and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996
Metcalf L.K., Outbidding to radical nationalists: minority policy in Estonia, 1988-1993, ”Nations and
Nationalism”, 2, 2 1996 213-234
49
Milanovic B., Hoff K. & Horowitz S., Political Alternation as a Restraint on Investing in Influence. Evidence
from the Post-Communist Transition, The World Bank: Policy Research Working Paper 4747 2008
Misiunas R.& Taagepera R., The Baltic States. Years of Dependence 1940-1990, London: Hurst and Company
1993
McFaul M. & Stoner-Weiss K., (eds.), After the Collapse of Communism. Comparative Lessons of Transition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004
Nations in Transit (www.freedomhouse.org).
Pettai V. & Hallik K., Understanding processes of ethnic control: segmentation, dependency and co-optation in
post-communist Europe, ”Nations and Nationalism”, 8, No 4: 2002, 505-529
Reinikainen J., Right Against Right. Membership and Justice in Post-Soviet Estonia, University of Stockholm,
Department of Political Science (dissertation) 1999
Way L., Pluralism by default in Moldova, ”Journal of Democracy” Vol. 13, No 4:2002.
50
Ukraine’s Foreign Policy in the Face of the
Challenges of European Integration
MARKIYAN MALSKY
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ambassador of Ukraine to Poland
For all the twenty years of the existence of the Baltic University Programme and
the program of Lviv Ivan Franko National University, where I headed the Faculty of International Relations, I had the honour to cooperate with the regional
network of the Baltic universities. Due to this, we gathered new experiences and
greatly expanded opportunities for our students to acquire up-to-date knowledge.
Today, being the Ambassador of Ukraine to Poland, I am pleased to recall the
times of our academic cooperation and make every effort to give further support
to the Baltic University Programme.
I hope that the topics set out in this short article will help readers to acquire
a deeper understanding of the actual state of affairs in my state. First of all, I
want to emphasise that, despite the severe impact of the global economic crisis,
Ukraine’s economy has returned to a path of sustainable economic growth, on
which, according to preliminary estimates, GDP growth for our country in 2011
will exceed 4.5%. However, without immediately solving the systemic problems
of development, which have accumulated over decades, Ukraine will be doomed
to lag behind and suffer a prolonged crisis. With awareness of this danger, and
bearing all the responsibility for the fate of future generations of Ukrainians, my
country has entered a period of radical social and economic transformation. The
purpose of the Ukrainian government is to implement social welfare system reforms in the country through the creation of a new economic model.
Our task is to build a democratic political system model based on the rule
of law, an advanced legal culture, a balanced representative democracy, strong
government and effective public management. Only the effective delivery of reforms in Ukraine can make possible the prospect of sustainable development
and strengthen the country’s substantive position in the international arena. After
51
Ukraine’s Foreign Policy ....
all, the geographical, economic, transit position and human potential of Ukraine
should allow it to join the group of leading European countries.
Thus, in his speech on 3rd June of this year, before the audience of the Odessa
Law Academy the Ukrainian minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Konstantin
Gryshchenko, noted that Ukraine’s chances to take its rightful place in Europe
and the world have quite practical grounds, as “in the background of another
round of the struggle for energy resources, Ukraine has the largest gas pipeline
network in Europe and rich offshore deposits of shelf and shale gas. Amid the
growing shortage of natural resources – it is in the top five countries in the world
that have rich deposits of ore minerals which have already been explored. Amid
the ongoing information revolution – it is among the world leaders in the number
of computer programmers with higher education.
Finally, in the context of the coming world food crisis, its lands – the most
fertile lands in the world, rich in water resources and enjoying a mild climate –
are becoming more and more important.”
Thus, to realise the potential of these opportunities is a strategic task of
Ukrainian foreign policy. I therefore consider it appropriate to briefly give some
information about Ukraine’s key foreign policy priorities.
At the same time I want to emphasise that the subject of Polish-Ukrainian
cooperation directly concerns almost every one of them. Our strategic partnership
with Poland is one of the most effective mechanisms for the implementation of
Ukraine’s foreign policy. This mechanism is beneficial for both countries, and its
perspectives are far from being exhausted.
Today, Ukraine’s foreign policy is based on pragmatism and sound economics. It aims to achieve results that will actually improve the lives of the Ukrainian
people, strengthen the economy and open new markets for Ukrainian producers.
European integration is crucial to Ukraine’s foreign policy. We consider Ukraine’s
European integration primarily as a guideline for the system of internal reforms and
achieving European standards in all key areas. For Ukrainian society, our country’s
European perspective is very important. It will provide clear guidelines for Ukraine
on the implementation of complex socio-economic and democratic reforms.
For more than seven years our beneficial cooperation with Poland has become synonymous for us with cooperation with the European Union. After its EU
accession, Poland has become for Ukraine, without exaggeration, a key partner in
European integration. The high level of Ukrainian-Polish understanding ensures
that the voice of Ukraine is always heard in the European Union. It means that we
are engaged in a meaningful and intense dialogue.
The last year has shown the effectiveness of the common efforts of Kiev and
Warsaw in the consistent and sustained implementation of the European aspira-
52
tions of our country. We finalised negotiations with the EU on the Association
Treaty. It will be a unique base document, which will bring Ukraine’s relations
with the EU to a qualitatively new level of “political association and economic
integration.” Ukraine considers the Treaty as an important step towards its membership of the EU. Finally, an important part of the Treaty will be a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement aimed at the most profound economic integration.
From the Free Trade Area, we expect to provide Ukrainian producers with
real access to EU markets and spread to Ukraine four freedoms – free movement
of goods, services, capital and labour.
One should also mention our joint initiative with our Polish and Swedish
friends – the “Eastern Partnership.” I am sure that you are well aware of the
Ukrainian position regarding the place of Eastern Partnership Initiative in the system of our priorities. We have always been constructive, but considered it as an
additional tool in our bilateral relations with the European Union. One could hardly deny that Ukraine has been a door-opener for other partners before and after the
Eastern Partnership’s launching. The initiative brought undoubted benefits, in the
context of European integration, to the other partners, but added value for Ukraine,
both from the political and practical points of view, has remained rather limited.
We are approaching the second anniversary of the Eastern Partnership. These
two years were not static for all of us. The EU succeeded in launching the Lisbon Treaty. Ukraine has finally restored internal political stability and economic
growth. The European integration of Moldova has been unfolding with encouraging speed, and a new dimension appeared in the EU’s relations with the Caucasian states, after launching negotiations on Association Agreements last year. The
dynamic development of the region justifies the need of the gradual evolution of
the Eastern Partnership itself.
I think you will all agree that if one talks about the efficiency of a certain
policy – substance is what really matters. The goals envisaged within this policy
should be properly supported by relevant mechanisms and resources. We have
been talking a lot about the intensity of high-level contacts, or the level of joint
structures. We talk about the quantity of sessions or platforms we have. But really all these leave us at the starting, preparatory stage of the process of practical
approximation. What really matters is our joint approach towards comprehensive
integration between the EU and the Eastern Partners.
Eastern Partnership goals, with enlargement mechanisms – that is the way
forward if we are really thinking about taking matters to their conclusion. They
should, in particular, include the comprehensive review of national legislations
by EU experts (so-called screening), drafting step-by-step approximation programs and increasing financial, expert and technical assistance. This, in turn, will
53
encourage EU business, investments and technologies to come to the Partner
States and lay foundations for the prosperity of the region.
This approach is rather ambitious. At the same time, it is the only option to
make the Eastern Partnership a real success. The Ukrainian example is probably
the best one in demonstrating the limited abilities of the Eastern Partnership in its
current shape. From the very beginning, our country has been an acknowledged
frontrunner in the process. Today, after several turbulent years, Ukraine is back
on track with dedicated efforts regarding its European integration. The legislative
and executive branches of power are consistently elaborating and implementing
reforms. We have turned to a phase where European integration is a core principle
of state development, rather than a comfortable declarative platform to improve
the image of politicians in power.
The year of 2010 became a turning point in Ukraine-EU relations. The new
quality of our internal efforts allowed us to solve many domestic issues which
had remained on the agenda for years. I would like to stress that this happened
not because of, but despite the Eastern Partnership, as well as the ENP as a whole.
And now we find ourselves in a situation where these two levels of the EU’s umbrella approach to its relations with the neighbouring states continue to be unable
to provide the political signals necessary to boost further efforts. As a restrictive
factor for Ukraine-EU relations in political terms, the ENP framework, including
the Eastern Partnership, is close to losing its practical efficiency.
The tasks placed in front of Ukraine are quite clear, as we are going to launch
large scale integration with the EU through implementation of the Association
Agreement. Our common goal is to finalise negotiations this year, during the Polish Presidency of the EU. At the same time, we can already predict the immediate
consequences the new Agreement will bring to Ukraine. Above all, it will mean
that approximation of a huge dossier of EU legislation will become a legally
binding commitment of Ukraine.
This dossier could be easily compared with the process candidate countries
go through. At the same time, for political reasons, which prevent the EU from
granting a European perspective to Ukraine, we will not be entitled to take advantage of the support instruments established for potential candidates. Of course, it
was our sovereign choice in favour of this complicated path.
At the same time, it is our strong belief that the EU should treat Ukraine
accordingly, in order to meet our political and practical needs in the context of
comprehensive approximation to the European Union. The resources currently
allocated by the EU for the needs of the Eastern Partnership neither correlate
with the goals the Union wants to achieve by means of this Initiative, nor with
Ukrainian aspirations. For instance, the EU-Ukraine National Indicative Program
54
2011-2013 envisages 470 million euro of financial support. At a first glance, this
is quite an encouraging sum of money. At the same time, the losses of Ukrainian
State Budget in the same timeframe due to launching Ukraine-EU DC FTA will
constitute around a billion euro. I do not mention here the border, infrastructure
projects, implementation of the Action Plan on visa liberalisation (which also
costs more than 40 million euro) and so on.
We believe that the European Union should be able to reward the dedication
of partner states. One of the crucial steps in this regard would be to increase significantly the volume of allocations which could be channelled to support their
transition in the next EU financial framework (2014-2020). This reward, however, should not be limited to additional resources and mechanisms alone. The
whole process should be based on mutual respect in implementation of bilateral
commitments. Experience of Ukraine-EU relations has shown that this has not
always been the case.
Visa liberalisation is the brightest example from our perspective. It has been
three years since Ukraine and the EU started implementing a Visa Facilitation
Agreement. As for every partner country, further visa liberalisation is among our
key priorities. At the same time, our respective efforts are constantly being accompanied by systemic violations of the Agreement by a number of EU member
states, in particular in terms of delays and groundless refusals while processing
visa applications. We remain constructive on a political level, but such cases undermine the EU’s credibility on the level of ordinary citizens.
In closing, I would like to suggest a couple of other ideas which may also
contribute to a practical output of the Eastern Partnership:
1. The Initiative should be based on a project-oriented approach. I am not talking
about major infrastructural projects, but about a focused list of small to medium multilateral project initiatives;
2. Establishing an executive body could help to streamline the implementation of
multilateral projects;
3. Extending cross border cooperation (CBC) programs between the partner states
would be another promising idea. It will match the interests of all the partner
states, as well as contribute to more intensive cooperation between them;
4.The regional component of the Eastern Partnership should gain a practical dimension. Crimea could serve as a possible region for first pilot projects within
the regional component of the Eastern Partnership;
5.Let us also think about launching a special facility to support legislative approximation in those partner states which are ready to do so.
55
On several occasions, the well-known Commissioner Stefan Fule asked the rhetorical question of whether there was an “end-game” in the European Neighbourhood Policy. I believe that this question, first of all, matters in the case of
the Eastern Partnership. Our reply would be – the European perspective, enlargement-like instruments of support and possibility of upgrading to enlargement policy as a reward for the winners of this game. To this end the Eastern Partnership
should be reinforced and become more flexible and responsive. The European
Union should clearly differentiate between partner states on the basis of their
merits. In such a way advanced partners, with the most ambitious goals and undertaken reforms, will not become victims of a common denominator approach.
We firmly believe that the success of Ukraine’s European integration depends on
the mutual desire of the parties to build relationships based on trust and pragmatic
cooperation.
Ukraine’s future is in our own hands. On our own, we will create an updated
state corresponding to European standards. And then, I am sure, the European
perspective will become a reality to my country.
56
Conditions and Prospects
for Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation
MARIANNA GLADYSH
Ivan Franko National University, Lviv, Ukraine
Interregional cooperation is one of the essential elements in the development of
the modern world. The practice of interregional cooperation provides an opportunity for the effective use of new possibilities of political cooperation, economic
and cultural interaction, and ensuring stability and sustainable development while
taking into account the new challenges and threats that appear in the world.
Baltic-Black Sea interregional cooperation forms a good basis for the further
creation of a single region which would ensure the interests of all member-states.
Baltic-Black Sea cooperation is an important factor in uniting the peoples of
these two basins for collective action in different spheres. Over the centuries it
has experienced varying dynamics. Nowadays, we may state that it is of vital importance for every country that belongs to this area. For a complete understanding
of the dynamics and prospects for cooperation between the Baltic and Black Sea
regions, it is important to consider the historical conditions of its formation.
Contacts between the peoples of the Black and Baltic Sea regions have a long
history. Even during Varangian times, in the 9th-12th centuries, the Kyiv Rus’
carried out trade with Northern Europe and the Byzantine Empire through the
ancient trade route called “from the Varangians to the Greeks” between the Baltic
and Black Seas. This trade route was not only a transport connection between the
Baltic and Black Sea lands but also an important factor in contacts and the unity
of the peoples of these lands for common action.1
The process of collaboration between these regions was rather long and
sometimes very complicated. In spite of their rich history, the Baltic and Black
1 О.Зарубінський, В.Чорний Перспективи Балто-Чорноморського співробітництва // Дзеркало
тижня. – 2005. – № 8 (536). – 5-11 березня, // http://www.dt.ua/2000/2675/49403/.
57
Sea cooperation passed through many obstacles (I and II World Wars, the Cold
War, problems concerning different understandings of the future of this collaboration, etc.)
The 20th century was, perhaps, the most difficult period in terms of the political, economic and military situation for Europe, and many events considerably
influenced the development of the Baltic-Black Sea cooperation.
The idea of creating a Baltic-Black Sea region was reflected in many academic works by European and Ukrainian researchers, and in the declarations of
famous politicians.
At the beginning of the twentieth century one of the most famous Ukrainian
political and public figures, Professor Stepan Rudnitsky, made the first attempts
to develop the Baltic-Black Sea geopolitical concept. In his book, A Brief Geography of Ukraine, published in Lviv in 1914, Rudnitsky proposed linking the
Black and Baltic Seas by a canal along the Dnipro.2
The next stage of the development of the concept of interregional cooperation
was the presenting of the idea of a Baltic-Black Sea Union, or a Confederation
of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, formulated by the President of the Ukrainian
People’s Republic, Mykhailo Hrushevsky in 1918.3
The end of the First World War brought many changes. For the small Baltic
States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which proclaimed their independence in
1918, the issue of survival under pressure from Bolshevik Russia and Germany was of vital importance. In such conditions the idea of the so-called Baltic
League (Baltic Union) appeared.4 The first calls for integration of the Baltic Sea
were probably advanced by the Estonian writer G. Suits.5 In 1917 he proposed
creating a Finnish-Estonian union to counter Germany. Germany itself wanted to
integrate Estonian and Latvian territories into the “Baltic Duchy” and to rule it.
6
Unfortunately, this and many other attempts to create a powerful regional union
were not successful, due to different factors. The Baltic states, Ukraine and Bela2 Ю. Кочубей Мужність думки. Геополітичні візії Юрія Липи в контексті сучасності, http:// www.
day.kiev.ua/125691.
3 Рассоха Л. Активізація ролі України у розвитку Спільноти Демократичного Вибору: історикополітичний аспект, Стратегічні пріоритети, №1(6), 2008 р., P.169.
4 Надтока О. О. Балто-Чорноморський Союз: історична ретроспектива і політична перспектива,
Наукові записки. Том 22, ч. 1, Гуманітарні науки / Національний університет ”Києво-Могилянська
академія”, 2003, С.149.
5 Арумяэ X. За кулисами «Балтийского союза» (из истории внешней политики буржуазной Эстонии
1920-1925 гг.), Таллинн: Изд-во ЭэстиРААМАТ, 1966.-С. 21.
академія”, 2003, С.149.
58
rus became a part of the USSR, Poland was a satellite for many years, and the iron
curtain which divided Europe for many decades was one of the main obstacles for
fruitful cooperation.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the restoration of independence by Eastern
and Central European states, followed by their involvement in European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes, provided unique possibilities for sub-regional
cooperation in these regions.7
For the first time after the disintegration of the USSR, the activation of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation at state level was initiated by the President of Lithuania, A. Brazauskas at the Summit in Vilnius in 1997.8 The idea was supported
and even practically developed on the initiative of the President of Ukraine,
Leonid Kuchma to hold a meeting of all interested states in the Crimea in Yalta,
in September 1999.9 In 1999, at the conference in Klaipeda, the Presidents of
Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland discussed joint projects to create optimal transit
routes which have important geo-economic significance in relations between the
Baltic and Black Seas.10 Ukraine was particularly interested in accelerating this
process – in 1993 the Ukrainian Institute of Society Transformation began to
study potential features and advantages of a Baltic-Black Sea partnership. During the second half of the ‘90s the Institute developed a model of functioning of
the partnership in the economic sphere. “A strong transit and transport system
that connects the Baltic and Black Sea” was offered as the basis of economic
partnership. In fact, it was a kind of restoration of the trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks.”11
It should be noted that since the project of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation has
been actively discussed at the highest level, representatives of NGOs, political
parties and business structures and even individuals have engaged in testing this
idea. The need for active cooperation to meet common interests in these circles
was apparently felt more deeply. On the 9th-11th of May, 1997, at the Congress
of the Baltic-Black Sea states held in Kiev, a draft Charter of the Baltic-Black
Sea Assembly was approved. The aim was to create a public organisation with
7 Evaldas Ignatavièius Yalta Conference: Partnership Along The Baltic - Black Sea Axis, http://www.lfpr.lt/
uploads/File/1999-4/Yalta.pdf.
8 О.Зарубінський, В.Чорний Перспективи Балто-Чорноморського співробітництва // Дзеркало
тижня. – 2005. – № 8 (536). – 5-11 березня, // http://www.dt.ua/2000/2675/49403/.
9Ibidem.
10 Рассоха Л. Активізація ролі України у розвитку Спільноти Демократичного Вибору: історикополітичний аспект, Стратегічні пріоритети, №1(6), 2008 р. 169.
11Ibidem.
59
international status, which is intended to promote a zone of stability, security and
multilateral cooperation.12
On 10th-11th September 1999, in Yalta a summit was held under the title
“Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation: Towards Integrated Europe of the 21st Century
without Division Lines.”13 The representatives of 22 countries of the world in
a joint statement stated their desire to make joint efforts to resolve and prevent
conflicts, and maintain security and stability, economic cooperation in the Baltic-Black Sea area through participation in joint projects in spheres of energy,
transport, communications and ecology.
In the opening remarks of the conference, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma spoke about the need to “wipe out the dividing lines that almost for half a
century kept our countries outside the natural context of the evolution of European civilisation.” He mentioned harmonising the activities of regional and sub-regional structures, consolidating the efforts of the Baltic and Black Sea countries
to create a future security system in Europe, and facilitating the establishment of
mutually beneficial economic and humanitarian cooperation among the region’s
states as the primary tasks for the region’s countries.14 Then the leaders of the
states of the Baltic and Black Sea regions expressed their intention to play an
important role in the twenty-first century in the development and consolidation of
democracy, economic prosperity and stability in a Europe without dividing lines.
It was agreed to exchange information between the two regional organisations –
the Baltic Sea States Council and the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic
Cooperation. This should lead to the identification of priority cooperation areas.
Some of them can be defined:
•
•
•
•
political dialogue on security, regional and European integration issues;
sub-regional economic cooperation;
the development of transport and energy infrastructure;
third pillar issues – combating organised crime, illegal migration, drug-trafficking, increasing the efficiency of border controls.15
академія”, 2003, С.155.
13 Evaldas Ignatavièius Yalta Conference: Partnership Along The Baltic-Black Sea Axis, http://www.lfpr.lt/
14 Evaldas Ignatavièius Yalta Conference: Partnership Along The Baltic-Black Sea Axis, http://www.lfpr.lt/
15Ibidem.
60
One of the most important results of the Yalta Conference was the common understanding that the Baltic-Black Sea sub-region must become an area of stable
political and economic development with a network of regional cooperative activities and joint infrastructural projects.16
Nevertheless, the formalisation and institutionalisation of Baltic-Black Sea
cooperation during the summit in Yalta did not take place. The Yalta summit confirmed the special role of the Baltic-Black Sea region to ensure democratic stability, prosperity and security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area in the 21st century.
It promoted awareness of the importance of the joint efforts of the Baltic-Black
Sea space as an integral part of the European process within extant regional and
subregional organisations and forums.
It was natural to expect attempts to expand the geographical status of the
region from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Caspian.
Ukraine’s President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikhail
Saakashvili, at a joint Press Conference on 12th August, 2005 in Borjomi, initiated the organisation in Ukraine of a summit with the leaders of the Baltic-Black
Sea-Caspian region, Russia and the United States. Later, this initiative was supported by Latvia and Romania. On 2nd December, 2005 a constituent meeting of
the Community of Democratic Choice was conducted. The meeting was attended by the presidents of Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Romania,
Slovenia, Moldova and the Republic of Macedonia, as well as by representatives
of Poland, Bulgaria and Azerbaijan. That same day, they adopted a Declaration
of the CDC, signed by nine states, including 3 Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia,
Latvia), 4 states from the Black Sea region (Ukraine, Georgia, Romania and
Moldova), as well as two Balkan ones (Slovenia and Macedonia). Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, United States, European Union and
the OSCE have observer status at the CDC.17
As stated in the Declaration of the Community of Democratic Choice, the
CDC is a “governmental forum for cooperation and dialogue.” Under the provisions of the Declaration, the aims and objectives of the Community of Democratic
Choice are as follows: “As members of the Community of Democracies sharing
the universal goals of the global forum that unites democracies worldwide, we
adhere to the principles of this Community and in line with the implementation
of the Seoul Plan of Action, that envisages regional cooperation for the promotion
and protection of democracy. In this regard, we are considering the creation of a
community of democracies in our part of Europe: the Community for Democratic
16Ibidem.
17 Community of Democratic Choice - http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Community_ of_ Democratic_Choice.
61
Choice. Our objective is to make this new community a strong tool to free our
region from all remaining dividing lines, from violations of human rights, from
any spirit of confrontation, from frozen conflicts and thus to open a new era of
democracy, security, stability and lasting peace for the whole of Europe, from the
Atlantic to the Caspian Sea.”18
The next step in promoting further cooperation was the international conference “Common vision of common neighbourhood,” held in Vilnius on 2nd5th May 2006, dedicated to the problems of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation. During the summit, organised by the presidents of Lithuania and Poland, Valdas
Adamkus and Lech Kaczyński, the heads of States and Governments of the new
EU members and NATO (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania), and the heads of the states from so-called “new democracies” (Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldova) in the presence of the NATO Deputy Secretary General,
the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana,
discussed the prospects and methods of deepening interregional cooperation
and exchange of experience in the sphere of democracy and Euro-Atlantic integration.19
At the summit, the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko appealed to the
leaders of the states of the Baltic, Black Sea and Caspian regions. He stressed that
“recent changes in Ukraine and other former Soviet states have provided a new
impulse to the process of democracy on the continent.”20
On 31st October, 2008 in Riga, as a reaction to the Georgia-Russia war, the
Baltic to Black Sea Alliance was founded. The BBSA is an International NGO Alliance for Regional Security and Democracy. The initiative group for forming the
Alliance included Ms. Elina Lange (Latvia), Mr. Martins Murnieks (Latvia), Mr.
Koki Ionatamishvili (Georgia) and Mr. Oleksandr Omelchuk (Ukraine). There
are over 40 founding members, representing all three aforementioned countries.
The BBSA is open to accept new members (organisations and individuals) into
the Alliance.21
The main areas of regional cooperation in the Baltic-Black Sea Alliance are
as follows:
18 Borjomi Declaration, http://eu.prostir.ua/data?t=1&q=1775.
19 Рассоха Л. Активізація ролі України у розвитку Спільноти Демократичного Вибору: історикополітичний аспект, Стратегічні пріоритети, №1(6), 2008 р. 169.
20Ibidem.
21 BalticBlackSeaInitiative, http://www.usbaltic.org/pdfs/BalticBlackSeaInitiative.pdf
62
▪ Democratic Leadership Development – to bring together leadership groups in
business, government, and non-governmental organisations with a special emphasis on youth, to promote the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and
enhance the role of civil society;
▪ Economic and Trade Development – to identify and promote competitive opportunities in areas such as regional branding, tourism, wine exports and lowering cross-border trade barriers;
▪ Crisis Management – to promote effective regional responses to crises such as
natural disasters or cyber wars;
▪ Conflict Prevention and Resolution – to promote civil society dialogue and
open media discourse to identify confidence-building measures in resolving
conflicts;
▪ Energy Security – to identify and promote reliable, efficient, and affordable energy strategies based on a diversification of supply sources and transportation.22
The Baltic-Black Sea region is a very important element in the European infrastructure, not only in terms of economics but also in terms of European security.
It is obvious that the EU is heavily involved and interested in promoting Baltic-Black Sea cooperation.
The EU, certainly, has its own vision of the future of the Baltic-Black Sea region manifested through a variety of region-building initiatives, with the European Neighbourhood Policy at their core. Presumably, this vision is based upon the
EU’s policy of creating a friendly area of proximity, consisting of geographically
adjacent countries that are supposed to share basic European values.23
The EU pursues its policies mostly through “soft security” mechanisms, like
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Black Sea Synergy (with the leading
role of Bulgaria and Romania), the Northern Dimension and “Eastern Partnership” proposed by Poland and Sweden. EU policy is for enhancing already existing cooperation formats without establishing new ones, based on the principle of
differentiation of partners according to their success in the implementation of bilateral cooperation/partnership agreements. The Polish-Swedish initiative of the
“Eastern Partnership” presented in May and approved by the European Council
22Ibidem.
23 Andrey S.Makarychev The Baltic-Black Sea Connection. A Region in the Making or a Political Project?,
PONARS Policy Memo No. 390, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, December 2005, p. 150.
63
in June 2008 additionally articulates the need to strengthen both bilateral contacts
between the countries of the BBSR and the EU, and intraregional integration.24
Prof. Z. Marshania from Odessa National University states that there is a
direct link between the regional policy of the European Union towards the Baltic
and Black Sea areas and the success of regional initiatives there. In the Baltic Sea
region, because of the active regional policy of the European Union, all the Baltic
regional organisations are successful, while obedience to European Union policy
engenders the ineffectiveness of Black Sea regional initiatives. If the European
Union implements a more active regional policy and contributes to creation of
new frameworks of regional cooperation, it will “open new windows” with a
wider perspective and effective regional cooperation in the wider Baltic-Black
Sea area.25
An effective institutional infrastructure is one of the most important factors in
developing fruitful Baltic-Black Sea cooperation. It is important to mention the role
of the Baltic Sea States Council (CBSS), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
and GUAM Organization of Democracy and Economic Development in it.
The CBSS, established in 1992, was intended to deepen dialogue and cooperation in almost all spheres of regional cooperation (economics, social development, environment, nuclear security). Some experts evaluate it as non-transparent
organisation with unclear activities, which is currently seeking a clear agenda and
optimal structure, concentrating on the issues of common interest (economic cooperation, environment, energy, education) and avoiding conflict issues (human
rights).26
The priority goals of the BSEC include implementation of concrete infrastructural projects – road and electric grids around the Black Sea. The effectiveness of the BSEC is limited by a shortage of resources and the varying priorities
of the member countries, which incorporates countries lying far beyond the Black
Sea area.27
GUAM, which got the additional title of the Organization for Democracy and
Economic Development, is the oldest alternative integrationist grouping in the
post-Soviet space. On account of the limited political and economic resources of
24 L. Karabeshkin Baltic-Black Sea Region-building and Russia’s Interests, http://www.harvard-bssp.org/
static/files/358/black_sea_2007.pdf, p. 2.
25 Z. S. Marshania Baltic-Black Sea Area In The New Regional Policy Of European Union, http://dspace.
onu.edu.ua:8080/bitstream/123456789/1612/1/Вестник%20ОНУ%20Соц%20т%2013%20вып%203.225240.pdf.
static/files/358/black_sea_2007.pdf, p. 2.
static/files/358/black_sea_2007.pdf.
64
GUAM, conditioning its low readiness to participate in large-scale geopolitical
projects, it was natural to expect attempts to expand the geographical status of the
region from the Baltic-Black Sea to the Caspian. On the initiative of Georgia and
Ukraine, with the support of the USA, a new organisation was established – the
“Community of Democratic Choice,” this included both some countries of the
CIS and of “New Europe.”28
To my mind, all the above-mentioned organisations are more or less active in
the defined region (either Baltic or Black Sea regions), but in order to facilitate
more active interregional cooperation, new structures should be established, or
maybe the functions of the existing ones must be expanded.
Ukraine’s role in Baltic-Black Sea cooperation is very important. Ukraine
plays an important role in the transfer of traded goods from East to West, from
North to South and vice-versa. Much depends on the ability of Ukraine to adapt
to the new realities within the Baltic-Black Sea Region. Currently, Ukraine is
proclaiming its European choice and vector of development.29
In the monograph Modern Ukrainian geopolitics the Ukrainian researchers
V. Madysson and V. Shah claim that “active cooperation and leadership in the
Baltic and Black interregional cooperation (partnership)” is extremely important
for Ukraine. “In terms of its geo-strategic location, Ukraine is a ‘natural mediator’ between the Baltic and Black Seas. The expansion of relations between
South and North Europe today meets the needs and requirements of the time, and
if Ukraine is a passive actor then another state may take an intermediary role.
Cooperation along the ‘South-North’ axis will strengthen the security of Europe
between the Baltic and Black Sea.”30
According to Ukrainian geopolitical researchers, during the last decade there
have been real preconditions for the development of regional cooperation along
the “Black-Baltic Sea axis” and Ukraine should initiate more active cooperation
between the countries of the two seas, given the dynamics for mutually beneficial
cooperation, and harmonise the existing sub-regional organisations and forums in
this area in the direction of European structures.31
Economic ties with the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea Region are the priority for Ukraine. Among the ten major trade partners of Ukraine, seven belong
28Ibidem.
29 T. Danko, Perspectives of Economic Cooperation of Ukraine with the States of the Baltic-Black Sea
Region, http://users.kpi.kharkov.ua/liber/pecusb.htm.
30 Мадіссон В., Шахов В. Сучасна українська геополітика. – К., 2003. – c. 104.
31 Мадіссон В., Шахов В. Сучасна українська геополітика. – К., 2003. – c. 125.
65
to the Baltic-Black Sea Region. These are Russia, Germany, Poland, Belarus,
Turkey, Hungary and Slovakia.
Ukraine is positioning itself in the Baltic-Black Sea-Caspian area, which is
composed of the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Poland and Romania are closely related to this
geopolitical region. The development of the Ukrainian economy largely depends
on successful relations with the Baltic-Black Sea states, as well as on the overall
economic performance of the region.32
Ukrainian foreign policy in the Baltic-Black Sea Region should concentrate
on the transformation of the conflicts of interests in the region into the co-operative
efforts of interested parties. Such a policy would allow Ukraine and its neighbours
to enjoy long lasting peace, prosperity and sustainable growth within the region.
Ukraine should focus on further efforts aimed at promoting productive economic co-operation within the Baltic-Black Sea region.33
The transformation policy of Ukraine has started to show some hopeful results. The study of the political and economic relations of Ukraine with the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region generally gives positive conclusions regarding their current level and potential. If both of those trends prevail in the future,
Ukraine will demonstrate higher input in the prosperity, stability and sustainable
growth of the Baltic-Black Sea region.
The steps that the Ukrainian side should take in further market and economic
reforms, as well as for the forging of its relations with its neighbours, are generally
understood and agreed both at the levels of Ukrainian society and among politicians.
At the same time, a lack of information about developments, existing opportunities and achievements in the Baltic-Black Sea region can undermine the chances
of the successful transformation of the region into a zone of stability and security.
This makes it all the more important in this phase to inform the public more
comprehensively, both in Ukraine and neighbouring states, about the new political architecture and developments in the Baltic-Black Sea Region. We can
suggest that more emphasis should be made, both in Ukraine and internationally,
on the establishment of think tanks, providing research, analysis and discussion,
as well as disseminating information covering economic, political, legal and socio-cultural issues within the Baltic-Black Sea region.34
32 T. Danko Perspectives of Economic Cooperation of Ukraine with the States of the Baltic-Black Sea Region http://users.kpi.kharkov.ua/liber/pecusb.htm.
33Ibidem.
34 T. Danko Perspectives of Economic Cooperation of Ukraine with the States of the Baltic-Black Sea Region http://users.kpi.kharkov.ua/liber/pecusb.htm.
66
Prospects for Baltic-Black Sea Cooperation
For further fruitful cooperation between the Baltic and Black Sea regions, it is
necessary to develop an economic, humanitarian and even an ideological identity.
A political identity finds expression in the formation of numerous institutional
structures, including in the security sphere. Ideological identity is an important
phenomenon, based on perception of belonging to a region on behalf of a population, as well as the mutual predictability and trust of regional political elites.
Currently this element of regional identity is under construction, which is strongly affected by the process of national identity-building in the countries of the
Baltic-Black Sea Region.35
An economic identity may emerge as a result of the implementation of numerous common projects in transport, energy transit, trade and investment. It is
necessary to create an alternative economic vector of economic relationship –
North-South, which should complement (or counterweight) the historically dominating East-West vector. Development of an economic identity is an essential
prerequisite for the sustainability of a region-building project.
To create a Baltic-Black Sea Economic Alliance (BCHEA), extensive coordination mechanisms of the national markets of the states of this region are
required. They should operate in the following directions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
eliminating restrictions on trade in goods and services;
elimination of obstacles to free movement of people;
formation of a common market of capital, its free import and export;
joint ventures;
formation of a common labour market;
formation of joint commercial and investment banks, insurance companies and
pension funds;
formation of free trade zones;
adherence to common migration policy;
development of joint production infrastructure (roads, communications, telecommunications);
cooperation in tourism;
convergence of national civil codes;
organisation of visa-free travel, etc.36
static/files/358/black_sea_2007.pdf.
36 Стратегічні аспекти економічного співробітництва країн Балто-Чорноморського регіону
(Матеріали круглого столу, проведеного Інститутом трансформації суспільства та Польським
Інститутом у Києві 1 грудня 2000 року)/Економічний часопис, 2001, № 2, стор. 3-18.
67
Today, the formation of the Baltic-Black Sea Economic Alliance is not just an
initiative that is at the level of theoretical development but is an actual process.
The concept of the Baltic-Black Sea Alliance is recognised in economic circles
and is regarded as the second division of the European Union.37 Countries placed
on the axis of the Baltic and Black Seas have to realise their potential not only
within the European Union, but in other ways as well. One of them is the way out
to North Africa, through Turkey, and to Asia, through Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The sphere of Baltic-Black Sea cooperation has several modules.
The first module is transport. This applies to land transport and related infrastructure. This is primarily for debugging unimpeded freight and passenger transport and the formation of a common rail system – with the Nordic and Baltic
zones, along the axis of Belarus-Poland-Ukraine, via the Black Sea with access to
Central Asia. The building of the Pan-European transport corridors and road infrastructure that will connect the region from south to north plays a very important
role in this. Creating an integrated transport system along the Baltic-Black Sea
axis is an essential foundation for an economically strong regional community.
The second module is an expansion of the international pipeline. This problem should be seen primarily in the context of the forming of an international oil
consortium that would transform the Black Sea in the global oil market, where
Caspian oil and then oil from Iraq through Turkey would come through. However, this scheme will only work if the Turkish oil Ceyhan-Samsun pipeline is built.
The construction of the “Southern” oil terminal and the Odessa-Brody pipeline is
very important for the future of Ukraine as well, as it will provide an alternative
oil supply system for our country.
The third module is the formation of gas traffic in the Baltic-Black Sea region.
The fourth module is the transformation of the Black Sea to the complex
system of ferry traffic. In fact, it will connect all Europe – from South to North.
The fifth module is the formation mechanisms of the coordinated functioning
of financial systems, joint banking centres in the Baltic and Black Sea.38
The formation of partnerships between the Baltic and Black Sea areas and
Scandinavia, through the flowering of the above-mentioned modules, forms the
geo-economic and geopolitical outlooks of Ukraine.
The humanitarian identity of the region-building project includes the importance of increasing the density of trans-border contacts and the development of
new platforms of cultural links.
37 Соскін О. Україна на шляху реформ: досвід і перспективи/ Економічний часопис, 2000, № 6, стор.
31-41.
38 Васильченко О. А. Форми взаємодії України з країнами Балто-Чорноморського регіону, http://masters.donntu.edu.ua/2002/fem/vasylchenko/diss/diss6.htm#1.
68
Literature:
BalticBlackSeaInitiative, http://www.usbaltic.org/pdfs/BalticBlackSeaInitiative.pdf
Borjomi Declaration, http://eu.prostir.ua/data?t=1&q=1775
Community of Democratic Choice - http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Community_ of_ Democratic_Choice
Danko T., Perspectives of Economic Cooperation of Ukraine with the States of the Baltic-Black Sea Region,
http://users.kpi.kharkov.ua/liber/pecusb.htm
Ignatavièius E., Yalta Conference: Partnership Along The Baltic - Black Sea Axis, http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/
File/1999-4/Yalta.pdf
Karabeshkin L., Baltic-Black Sea Region-building and Russia’s Interests, http://www.harvard-bssp.org/static/
files/358/black_sea_2007.pdf p. 2
Makarychev A.S., The Baltic-Black Sea Connection A Region in the Making or a Political Project?, PONARS
Policy Memo No. 390, Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University, December 2005
Marshania Z.S., Baltic-Black Sea Area In The New Regional Policy Of European Union, http://dspace.onu.edu.
ua:8080/bitstream/123456789/1612/1/Вестник%20ОНУ%20Соц%20т%2013%20вып%203.225-240.pdf
Арумяэ X. За кулисами «Балтийского союза» (из истории внешней политики буржуазной Эстонии 19201925 гг.), Таллинн: Изд-во ЭэстиРААМАТ, 1966.-С. 21.
Васильченко О. А. Форми взаємодії України з країнами Балто-Чорноморського регіону, http://masters.
donntu.edu.ua/2002/fem/vasylchenko/diss/diss6.htm#1
Мадіссон В., Шахов В. Сучасна українська геополітика. – К., 2003. – c. 104
Надтока О. О. Балто-Чорноморський Союз: історична ретроспектива і політична перспектива,
Наукові записки. Том 22, ч. 1, Гуманітарні науки / Національний університет “Києво-Могилянська
академія”, 2003, С.149
Зарубінський O., Чорний В., Перспективи Балто-Чорноморського співробітництва // Дзеркало тижня.
– 2005. – № 8 (536). – 5-11 березня, // http://www.dt.ua/2000/2675/49403/.
Рассоха Л. Активізація ролі України у розвитку Спільноти Демократичного Вибору: історикополітичний аспект, Стратегічні пріоритети, №1(6), 2008 р. 169
Соскін О. Україна на шляху реформ: досвід і перспективи/ Економічний часопис, 2000, № 6, стор. 31-41.
Стратегічні аспекти економічного співробітництва країн Балто-Чорноморського регіону (Матеріали
круглого столу, проведеного Інститутом трансформації суспільства та Польським Інститутом у Києві
1 грудня 2000 року)/Економічний часопис, 2001, № 2, стор. 3-18.
Кочубей Ю., Мужність думки. Геополітичні візії Юрія Липи в контексті сучасності, http:// www.day.
kiev.ua/125691.
69
70
Part C
The Social & Natural Landscape
71
72
Ecosystem Services in
the Development of Regions
ARNOLD BERNACIAK
Poznań School of Banking, Poland
Introduction
There are many theories, concepts and typologies of regional development factors. They take into account a range of economic, political, legal and social elements that impact on the socio-economic development of regions, but they frequently neglect the actual role of the natural environment in the socio-economic
development of regions. The goods and services provided by ecosystems play a
highly important, albeit often overlooked, role. However, numerous surveys into
ecosystem services point to the environment as a development factor of equal,
and frequently even greater, significance than the economy. Including ecosystems
in the theories and concepts of regional development seems to better facilitate
understanding of the mechanisms that actually govern it.
Modern Theories and Concepts of Regional Development
The foundation, and starting point, of the considerations on diversified development on the regional level is provided by determining the groups of development
factors, followed by indicating which of them contribute to the emergence of
development differences and how. The concepts of development that have been
coined as the science on regions has progressed have focused on different phenomena and factors considered decisive for changes in the condition and structure of a region. Currently, two research approaches dominate: (1) the concentration on a given development concept and the analysis of development within the
framework of theoretical and practical assumptions, and (2) the identification of
development phenomena in the regions on the basis of a universal set of regional
development factors derived from various trends.
73
As concerns the first approach, certain fluctuations of the dominating concepts over time can be noted. As socio-economic processes taking place in space
are recognized in more and more detail, the description of regional reality is becoming increasingly accurate. Hence the popularity of relatively new concepts,
such as the concept of endogenous growth (development), ecological-economic
models, the concept of development based on social capital or that of the learning
region. Each of them is founded on a slightly different perception of the socio-economic phenomena taking place within a region and identification of their reasons.
Theoretical concepts explain development mechanisms and indicate their stimuli.
It is significant to note that in the context of the changing levels of well-being in
regions the notion of ‘growth’ tends to be used rather than ‘development’. In his
explanation of the difference between these two notions, Woźniak observes that
economic growth is a measure of short-term quantitative changes in the economy, whereas economic development encompasses quantitative changes alongside
qualitative changes in the socio-economic structure. These include the changes
in the quality of goods and services produced, changes in the product mix as well
as improved techniques of work and management, and other factors of economic
growth and well-being. This concerns both the changes in the real economy and
that of institutional regulations.1 When Chojnicki and Czyż refer these notions to
the region as a system category, they add that qualitative changes take the region
along a phase process from a lower level of development to a higher one. This is,
therefore, an example of the evolution of a system, where the starting point is represented by a certain point in the phase space, which seeks a new organizational
level, or a new structure, as a consequence of internal transformation.2
The concepts and theories that aim to explain and describe the mechanisms
and course of development processes on a regional level on the one hand include
the spatial dimension in model economic theories, on the other hand they try to
adapt models of economic growth (which by definition refer to national economies) to the regional level. Richardson, among other authors, criticizes the latter
approach. He points to the fundamental differences between national and regional economies that make the simple adaptation of national models to the regional
scale unjustified. He indicates the following differences:
1 M.G. Woźniak, Wzrost gospodarczy. Podstawy teoretyczne, wyd. II poprawione i uzupełnione, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, Kraków 2008, pp. 20-21.
2 Z. Chojnicki, T. Czyż, Główne aspekty regionalnego rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego, in: Parysek, J.J.
(ed.), Rozwój regionalny i lokalny w Polsce w latach 1989-2002, Instytut Geografii Społeczno-Ekonomicznej
i Gospodarki Przestrzennej, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznań
2004, pp. 13-24.
74
• regions’ larger openness to the flow of goods, and the factors shaping them;
• different instruments of economic policy applied by states and regions, in particular the inability of regional authorities to influence trade, monetary, taxation or competition policy. 3
The differences identified by Richardson can be complemented with the following:
• less diversity (cultural, linguistic, frequently also economic) of individual regions than states;
• smaller barriers between regions than between states, both in terms of the flow
of goods as well as labor factors, capital, population, knowledge and innovation.
The majority of current concepts, however, make accurate spatial references, taking into account the specific nature of the relations indicated by Richardson. For
example, the theory of endogenous growth, also named a new theory of growth, is
universally applied to describe economic phenomena both at national and regional levels. Its main assumption is that of endogenizing (internalizing) the mechanisms of growth and development. By this token, the theory opposes neoclassical models of growth, which condition economic growth on external changes in
technology. In the endogenous model, the mechanism of technological change is
included in the internal growth mechanism. In this way, the economy of a region
becomes an internally coherent set of links and dependencies that occur in the
process of economic transformation. This model also assigns greater importance
to social capital and knowledge capital as significant determinants of changes
in the pace of development. Expanded in this way, internal space increases its
cohesion, becoming a territory where regional authorities can more efficiently
implement their desired development policy. It needs to be noted, though, that
this model does not take into account any environmental elements whatsoever, or
economic factors related to their evaluation.4
This gap is attempted to be filled by ecological-economic models emerging
from the fields of both ecology and the economic sciences, in particular economics theory. Their main goal is to identify complex dependencies between economic systems and the natural environment. They try to recognize the optimum
relations between these elements, model the scenarios of potential consequences
3
H.W. Richardson, Regional growth theory, Macmillan, London 1973.
4 R. Domański, Gospodarka przestrzenna. Podstawy teoretyczne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2006, pp. 189-190. Cf.: R.E. Lucas, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary
Economics, July, 1988; D. Romer, Advanced Macroeconomics, 4-th edition, McGraw-Hill Series Economics,
2011; K. Shell, “Towards a Theory of Inventive Activity and Capital Accumulation”, American Economic
Review, May 1966.
75
of mutual dependencies, and provide alternative assessments of the solutions to
problems emerging at their point of contact.5 The construction of such models is
directly related to the idea of sustainable development. The results of this type of
research are provided by Brock and Taylor’s studies, among others.6 These two
authors apply a range of models designed at the junction of economics and ecology. Most of them relate economic growth to the quality of the environment and
the quantity of emissions – from the studies combining growth with pollution by
Forster, Solow, Stiglitz and Brock, to more recent works on Kuznets environmental curve, to the findings of Stokey, Aghion and Howitt as well as those of Jones
and Manuelli.7
The researchers who concentrate on development factors as the main field
of analysis propose a completely different approach. Rejecting the use of models, they found their considerations on factors whose roots can be traced back to
various theoretical concepts. Grosse presents one possible typology of regional
development factors, pointing to the following:
• business entities (concentrated spaces, domestically and internationally competitive manufacturing industries and services),
• legal regulations (legal system) and guarantees of economic freedoms,
• political stabilization (both domestic and international),
• organizational conditionings of business (the network of cooperating economic and social institutions – financial, academic, research, service and advisory
entities),
• social life standards that value competition while encouraging cooperation;
• political maturity and the quality of public authorities at all levels,
• social capital.8
5 R. Domański, Gospodarka przestrzenna. Podstawy teoretyczne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2006, pp. 190-191.
6 .A. Brock, M.S. Taylor, Economic Growth and the Environment. A Review of Theory and Empirics, in:
Aghion, P., Durlauf, S.N. (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1B, Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam 2005.
7 Cf. W.A. Brock, A Polluted Golden Age, in: V.L. Smith (ed.), Economics of Natural and Environmental
Resources, New York: Gordon & Breach 1977; B.A. Forster, Optimal Consumption Planning in a Polluted
Environment, in: Economic Record, vol. 49, 1973, pp. 534-545; J. Stiglitz, “Growth with Exhaustible Natural
Resources: Efficient and Optimal Growth,” Review of Economic Studies, vol. 41, 1974, pp. 123-137; N. Stokey, “Are there Limits of Growth”, International Economic Review, vol. 39, no 1, pp. 1-31. Aghion, P., Howitt,
P., 1998, Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge 1998; L.E. Jones, R.E. Manuelli, “Endogenous
Policy Choice: The Case of Pollution and Growth”, Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 4, 2001, pp. 369-405.
8 T.G. Grosse, “Przegląd koncepcji teoretycznych rozwoju regionalnego”, Studia Regionalne i Lokalne, no
1 (8), 2002, pp. 44-46.
76
Churski enumerates the following basic regional development factors: human,
physical and financial capital, social capital, technological and organizational innovation, economies of scale, the benefits of agglomeration, external flows of
people, capital and goods, and territorial marketing. Taking into account the differences between the established and developed market economies and the economies of Central and Eastern Europe he modifies the typology presented, additionally indicating the processes of system transformation and European integration to be relevant, specific development factors in the transforming territories. 9
Both typologies encompass a set of factors originating in various concepts
and theoretical trends of regional development. In general, they can be grouped
into a set of factors conducive to development (e.g. legal regulations, economic
and political stabilization, organizational conditions and economies of scale) and
a set of elements that create a certain paradigm and level of development (e.g.
various types of capital, the flow of production factors, innovations). It should
be emphasized that these typologies completely ignore the natural environment.
Ecosystems and the services they provide are not perceived as a factor in regional development by any typology. Meanwhile, in the light of the findings of
many studies conducted on the basis of environmental economics and ecological
economics, the services provided by ecosystems play a significant role in socio-economic development. For some regions they can even play a key role in
development, as exemplified by regions of special significance for tourism and
agriculture, where a substantial part of the economy is based on the services of
ecosystems. Consequently, socio-economic development and the quality of life
of the inhabitants of these regions largely depend on the natural environment.
The Concept of Ecosystem Services and Their Significance for Quality of
Life
The concept of ecosystem services expresses the anthropocentric approach to the
functions of ecosystems. Services are defined as the portion of functions that are
used by humans directly or indirectly, in economic processes and other areas of
social activity. There occurs a relation describable in terms of economics: ecosystems provide goods and services, thus becoming the supply party of the market relation, whereas humans, with their needs, use these products and services,
constituting the demand party. This relation is characterized by two properties
that are of utmost importance in the context of using services in economic pro9 P. Churski, Czynniki rozwoju regionalnego i polityka regionalna w Polsce w okresie integracji z Unią
Europejską, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Seria Geografia no 79, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM,
Poznań 2008, pp. 60-64.
77
78
Regulation of hydrological cycle
Coastal and river channel stability
Moderation of weather extremes
Partial stabilization of climate
Control of pest species
Compensation of one species for another under varying conditions
Cultural
services
Regulating
services
Provisioning
services
Category
•Crops
•Fiber
• Genetic resources
• Biochemicals, natural medicines and pharmaceuticals
• Ornamental resources
• Fresh water
• Air quality regulation
• Climate regulation
• Water regulation
• Erosion regulation
• Water purification and waste treatment
• Disease regulation
• Pest regulation
•Pollination
• Natural hazard regulation
• Cultural diversity
• Spiritual and religious values
• Knowledge systems
• Educational values
•Inspiration
• Aesthetic values
• Social relations
• Sense of place
• Cultural heritage values
• Recreation and ecotourism
• Soil formation
•Photosynthesis
• Primary production
• Nutrient cycling
• Water cycling
Subcategory
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005
Life -fulfilling • Aesthetic beauty
Supporting
functions
• Cultural, intellectual and spiritual services
inspiration
• Scientific discovery
•Serenity
• Existence value
Preservation • Maintenance of the ecological com
of options
ponents and system needed for future supply
•
•
•
•
•
•
Production of •Food
goods
•Pharmaceuticals
• Durable materials (natural fiber, timber)
• Energy (biomass fuels)
• Industrial products
Regeneration • Cycling and filtration processes
processes
• Translocation processes (dispersal of seeds, pollination)
• Gas regulation
• Climate regulation
• Disturbance regulation
• Water regulation
• Water supply
• Erosion control and sediment retention
• Soil formation
• Nutrient cycling
• Waste treatment
•Pollination
• Biological control
•Refugia
• Food production
• Raw materials
•Recreation
•Cultural
Stabilizing
processes
Category
Ecosystem service
Subcategory
Daily, 1999
Costanza, 1997
Table 1. Selected typologies of ecosystem services. Source: Author’s concept on the basis of: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, op. cit., R. Costanza et al., “The value…,” op. cit., G.C. Daily, Developing…, op. cit.
cesses. Firstly, the services can be supplied free of charge. Secondly, the amount
of services provided is limited. The extent to which the services can be supplied
is expressed by the so-called ecosystem capacity. When the capacity is exceeded,
that is when a larger amount of a given service is used, the system is degraded,
consequently limiting the potential for future supply of services.
LIFE ON EARTH - BIODIVERSITY
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
PROVISIONING
• Food
• Fresh water
• Wood and fiber
• Fuel • … SUPPORTING
• Nutrient
cycling
• Soil formation
• Primary
production
•…
REGULATING
• Climate
regulation
• Flood regulation
• Disease
regulation
• Water
purification
• …
CULTURAL
• Aesthetic
• Spiritual
• Educational
• Recreational
•…
ARROWS WIDTH
Intensity of linkages between ecosystem
services and human well-being
Weak
Medium
Strong
CONSTITUENTS OF WELL-BEING
SECURITY
• Personal safety
• Secure resource access
• Security from
disasters
BASIC MATERIAL FOR GOOD LIFE • Adequate livelihoods
FREEDOM
• Sufficient nutritious OF CHOICE
food
AND
• Shelter
ACTION
• Access to goods
Opportunity
to be able to
achieve
what
HEALTH
an individual
• Strength
values doing
• Feeling well
and being
• Access to clean air and
water
ŻYCIE NA ZIEMI -‐ BIORÓŻNORODNOŚĆ GOOD SOCIAL
REALTIONS
• Social cohesion
• Mutual respect
• Ability to help others
ARROWS COLOR
Potential for mediation by socioeconomic
factors:
Low
Medium
High
Fig.1.1.Linkages
Figure
Linkages between
between ecosystem
ecosystemservices
servicesand
andhuman
humanwell-being
well-being. Source: Millenium Ecosystem
Assessment,
op.cit, p.10.
Source: Millenium…
op.cit, p.10.
79
The definition of ecosystem services is presented in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment document, as all the benefits obtained by humans from ecosystems.10 E.O. Wilson’s definition is somewhat broader. He perceives ecosystem
services as the biosphere’s supply of matter, energy and information, required by
humans to live.11
The long years of studies into the nature and significance of ecosystem services
have resulted in their multiple typologies. The best known ones have been presented by R. Costanza, G.C. Daily and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Table
1). Costanza distinguishes seventeen kinds of services, including those crucial for
the quality of life; for example climate regulation, prevention and protection against
natural disasters, water supplies, waste absorption, pollination, or the production of
food or resources for industry.12 Daily groups all the services into four basic categories: production of goods, regeneration, stabilization and the quality of life. He
additionally mentions the category of the preservation of options, which constitutes
the possibility of preserving ecosystems and their services for future use.13 The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report describes global environmental changes and their impact on the well-being and quality of life of societies, referring in its
analysis to the division of services into thirty seven kinds, grouped into four categories: provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting services.14
The number and diversity of services supplied by ecosystems confirms their
importance for socio-economic development and their enormous impact on the
quality of human life. The authors of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report present a diagram illustrating the direction and magnitude of the influence of
individual services on factors impacting the quality of life (Figure 1).
Provision of services has a strong influence on the sense of security, both in
individual and social terms. Access to food resources, water and fuels is among
the foundations of existence and development of socio-economic systems. Such
services provide the physical basis for all activity, providing food, securing residential requirements, and facilitating manufacturing activity. This category of
services also significantly impacts on the physical and mental health of citizens.
10 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis, Island Press, Washington, DC. 2005, p. 39.
11 E.O. Willson, The Future of Life, Deckle Edge, 2002.
12 R. Costanza et al., “The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital”, Nature 1997, vol.
387, p. 254.
13 G.C. Daily, “Developing a scientific basis for managing Earth’s life support systems,” Conservation Ecology 1999, vol. 3 (2), quotation after: Wyzwania zrównoważonego rozwoju w Polsce, J. Kronenberg, T. Bergier
(eds.), Fundacja Sendzimira, Kraków 2010, p. 13.
14 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, op. cit., pp. 41-45.
80
Access to food and water in sufficient quantities is an important element influencing their shape and well-being.
Regulating services exert a similar influence on the quality of life. Well-functioning, undisturbed processes of climate regulation, water flow and purification,
or plant pollination, ensure ecological security to societies. Disruption of these
processes may contribute to serious imbalances in the economy-environment
relation. Similar to provisioning services, regulatory services also influence the
essentials of human existence and the health of residents, and to a smaller degree
help shape social relations.
Cultural services: esthetic, spiritual, educational and recreational services
have a relatively weaker impact on the quality of life. Utilization of these services in the processes of socio-economic development occurs particularly under
the circumstances of appropriate functioning and utilization of provisioning and
regulating services. The proper utilization of resources that is optimal both from
the point of view of economy and the environment, accompanied by properly
functioning regulating processes, allow the social system to use cultural services.
These services can be described by economics as goods of a higher order. The
demand for such goods emerges when the demand for basic goods, in this case
provisioning and regulating services, has been met.
The role of supporting services is also significant. While the results of their
functioning are not directly revealed, they provide the foundations of all the remaining services. Their proper functioning facilitates the supply of provisioning,
regulating and cultural services to the socio-economic system. Properly-running
photosynthesis leads the balance of gases in the air to be maintained. Primary
production enables the socio-economic system to access food and durable materials. An undisturbed hydrological cycle ensures adequate water levels, protecting
societies from natural disasters.
The Evaluation of Services - a Condition for Inclusion in Economic Calculations
As early as 1997, Costanza conducted empirical research on a global scale corroborating the immense significance of ecosystem services for the processes of
economic growth and socio-economic development. In his analyses, Costanza
indicated that the annual value of services provided by ecosystems exceeded the
amount of global GDP. His research estimated the value of services provided to
the amount of USD 33 bn annually, while global GDP in 1996 amounted to a little
over USD 30 bn.15
15http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/year/1996/
81
He was able to conduct the above research by applying the appropriate methods of services valuation. A proper valuation methodology is particularly required
with respect to services that escape direct market valuation. Faber et al. present
six basic valuation methods, including the following techniques: 16 avoided cost
(AC), replacement cost (RC), factor income (FI), travel cost (TC), hedonic pricing (HP) and contingent valuation (CV).
The avoided cost technique represents the value of services by means of the
cost that would have to be borne had the services not been supplied by ecosystems. The function of greenery used for the purpose of providing a natural
protective barrier against noise, instead of acoustic screens, is an example here.
Replacement cost is a technique allowing for the valuation of the cost of replacement of ecosystem services by solutions designed by man, as exemplified by the
construction cost of a sewage treatment plant and sewage system to replace natural processes of water purification. Another technique, factor income, determines
the level of increased income following from the improved condition of the environment. Improved water conditions can lead to increased fishery levels, consequently generating higher incomes of related companies. The travel cost method
aims to determine the cost borne in order to reach the destinations of particular
natural properties that offer certain services. The hedonic pricing technique is
based on the identification of differences in prices of similar goods which differ
with respect to the ecosystem services related to them, as exemplified by differences in the prices of real estate which is identical in terms of architecture and
construction, but located in different environments. The last method, contingent
valuation, aims to determine the hypothetical scenarios of alternative utilization
of ecosystems and assess the propensity to pay for them.
On the basis of the above methods, the services supplied by numerous ecosystems, local, regional and global (e.g. Engle 2011, Jenkins et al. 2011, Guo et
al. 2001) have been evaluated. A number of other methods have been designed
by authors to evaluate the services supplied by individual elements of the environment as well as by ecosystems as a whole (e.g. Barbier 2007, Hein et al. 2006,
Staub et al. 2011). All these surveys and analyses demonstrate the considerable
value of the services provided by ecosystems. Their results provide justification
for the claim that ecosystem services be included in local, regional and global
economic calculations.
16 S.C. Faber, R. Costanza, M.A. Wilson, “Accounting for the value of ecosystem services”, Ecological
Economics 2002, vol.41, pp. 388-389.
82
Ecosystem Services as a Factor in Regional Development
Ignoring the natural environment, and in particular ignoring ecosystem services,
in the concepts and typologies of regional development seems to constitute a
significant shortage of modern theories. The concept of endogenous development
entirely ignores matters of the natural environment. Economic-ecological models
take the natural environment into account focusing on its quality and pollution,
while ignoring the products and services supplied by ecosystems. The same applies to typologies of the factors of regional development that encompass a range
of significant political, legal and economic elements, leaving out the environment
and the goods it supplies.
The significant role of goods and services provided by ecosystems to socio-economic systems has been corroborated in numerous surveys, and its significance as a factor in development is comparable to that of industry and social capital. What is more, it is virtually impossible for a society and economy to function
without support from ecosystems. Services provided by ecosystems have a direct
bearing on economic growth and socio-economic development. Calculations of
the value of ecosystem services conducted for the purpose of many surveys indicate their relatively high financial worth. Globally, their worth exceeds that of all
goods manufactured by man over a comparable period.
On the basis of the above observations it seems justifiable to include ecosystem services in considerations on the mechanisms and factors of regional development. Supplementing endogenous or economic-ecological concepts with the
issue of ecosystem services would allow a more comprehensive explanation of
the laws of regional development to be presented. This seems particularly significant with respect to endogenous concepts which completely ignore the natural environment. Given the current level of knowledge on the relations between
economy and the environment it also seems justified to try and include ecosystem
services in the economic-ecological models of regional development. Looking at
the environment from the perspective of the goods and services it supplies could
provide a fuller explanation of these relations than that provided by an analysis of
environmental quality and emissions. Including ecosystems and their services in
regional development models would also contribute to paying more attention to
the role of the natural environment as a factor in regional development.
83
Literature:
Aghion, P., Howitt, P., 1998, Endogenous Growth Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Barbier, E.B., 2007. Valuing ecosystem services as productive inputs. Economic Policy, 177–229 January.
Brock, W.A., Taylor, M.S., 2005, Economic Growth and the Environment. A Review of Theory and Empirics,
in: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S.N. (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1B, Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam.
Brock, W.A., 1977, A Polluted Golden Age, in: V.L. Smith (ed.), Economics of Natural and Environmental
Resources, New York: Gordon & Breach.
Churski, P., 2008, Czynniki rozwoju regionalnego i polityka regionalna w Polsce w okresie integracji z Unią
Europejską, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza, Seria geografia nr 79, Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM,
Poznań.
Costanza R. et al., 1997, “The value of the world’s ecosystem services and natural capital,” Nature, vol. 387.
G.C. Daily, 1999, “Developing a scientific basis for managing Earth’s life support systems,” Conservation
Ecology, vol. 3 (2).
Domański, R., 2006, Gospodarka przestrzenna. Podstawy teoretyczne, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN,
Warszawa.
Engle, V.D., 2011. “Estimating the provision of ecosystem services by Gulf of Mexico coastal wetlands.”
Wetlands 31, 179–193.
Faber, S.C., Costanza, R., Wilson, M., 2002, “Accounting for the value of ecosystem services,” Ecological
Economics, vol. 41, pp. 388-389.
Forster B. A., 1973, Optimal Consumption Planning in a Polluted Environment, in: Economic Record, vol. 49,
pp. 534-545.
Grosse, T.G., 2002, “Przegląd koncepcji teoretycznych rozwoju regionalnego,” Studia Regionalne i Lokalne,
nr 1 (8), pp. 25-48.
Guo, Z.W., Xiao, X.M., Gan, Y.L., Zheng, Y.J., 2001. “Ecosystem functions, services and their values — a case
study in Xingshan County of China”. Ecological Economics 38, 141–154.
Hein, L., van Koppen, K., de Groot, R.S., van Ierland, E.C., 2006, “Spatial scales, stakeholders and the valuation of ecosystem services.” Ecological Economics 57, 209–228.
Jenkins, W.A., Murray, B.C., Kramer, R.A., Faulkner, S.P., 2010, “Valuing ecosystem services from wetlands
restoration in the Mississippi Alluvial Valley.” Ecological Economics 69, 1051–1061.
Jones, L. E., Manuelli, R. E., 2001, “Endogenous Policy Choice: The Case of Pollution and Growth,” Review
of Economic Dynamics, vol. 4, pp. 369-405.
Lucas, R.E., 1988, “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,” Journal of Monetary Economics, July.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis, 2005, Island Press,
Washington, DC.
Richardson, H.W., 1973, Regional growth theory, Macmillan, London.
Romer, D., 2011, Advanced Macroeconomics, 4-th edition, McGraw-Hill Series Economics.
Shell, K, 1966, “Towards a Theory of Inventive Activity and Capital Accumulation,” American Economic
Review, May.
Staub, C., Ott, W., Heusi, F., Klingler, G., Jenny, A., Hacki, M., Hauser, A., 2011. Indicators for Ecosystem
Goods and Services: Framework, Methodology and Recommendations for a Welfare-related Environmental
Reporting. Federal Office for the Environment, Bern, Switzerland, p. 17.
Stiglitz, J. 1974, “Growth with Exhaustible Natural Resources: Efficient and Optimal Growth,” Review of
Economic Studies, vol. 41, pp. 123-137.
Stokey, N., 1998, “Are there Limits of Growth,” International Economic Review, vol. 39, no 1, pp. 1-31.
Willson, E.O., 2002, The Future of Life, Deckle Edge.
Woźniak, M.G., 2008, Wzrost gospodarczy. Podstawy teoretyczne, wyd. II poprawione i uzupełnione,
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie, Kraków.
Wyzwania zrównoważonego rozwoju w Polsce, 2010, J. Kronenberg, T. Bergier (eds.), Fundacja Sendzimira,
Kraków.
84
The Concept and Typology
of Regions
ANNA BERNACIAK
Poznan University of Economics, Poland
Processes of economic development (growth) always occur in a precisely defined
space. A. Lösch [1961, p. 380] claims that space is an indispensable condition for
separateness to exist and develop over time. The important thing in this approach
is both the spatial factor, understood in geographical terms, since changes occur
in different locations, and the factor of time, as changes occur temporally. The
space where the process of development (change) occurs can be delimited in
various ways and with different criteria. The region is the fundamental element in
this, and forms the object of further consideration here.
At the beginning, it should be specified that, in line with the logical division,
the region is understood in two ways: as a natural (physical and geographical)
entity, and as an economic region (or socio-economic one, as is currently more
common). K. Dziewoński [1967, pp. 35-50] presents the three main concepts
of the economic (socio-economic) region corresponding to the three different
notions of the part of a territory: the region as a tool for analysis (research), the
region as a tool for activity and the region as an object of study. Yet Z. Chojnicki
[1996, p. 8] proposed that Dziewoński’s tripartite division be limited to two ways
of conceptualizing: analytical and objective. In each case, there are interdependencies between these notions. For example, regions understood as an object of
research (statistical regions) are also applied in order to identify socio-economic
assets, spatially divided into regions and understood as the object of study [Domański 2000, p. 60].
As research into regions has developed and become more popular, various
modes of conceptual interpretation have been applied to coin a range of definitions of the region. The concept has been most frequently described and defined
in geography (physical and geographical region) and economic geography (socio-economic region)(Table 1).
85
Table 1. Selected definitions of the region in economic geography. Source: Minshull (2009, p. 18).
Author
T. J. Woofer
Definition
An area within which the combination of environmental and demographic factors have created a homogeneity of economic and social structure.
R. S. Platt
An area delineated on the basis of the general homogeneity of land character and occupancy.
American Society of Planning Officials
An area wherein there has grown one characteristic
human pattern of adjustment to the environment.
P. Vidal de la Blache
A domain where many dissimilar beings, artificially
brought together, have subsequently adapted themselves to a common existence.
An area throughout which a particular set of physical
conditions will lead to a particular type of economic
life.
An area whose physical conditions are homogenous
R. E. Dickinson
W. L. G. Joerg
N. M. Fenneman
A. J. Herbertson
K. Young
An area characterized throughout by similar surface
features and which is contrasted with neighboring
areas.
A complex of land, water, air, plant, animal and man
regarded in their special relationships, as together
constituting a definite, characteristic portion of the
earth’s surface.
A geographic area unified culturally, unified at first
economically and later by consensus of thought, education, recreation, etc. which distinguishes it from
other areas.
Generally, all the definitions coined on this basis boil down to two fundamental ways of describing the region as (1) an objective spatial-economic category
and (2) an intellectual concept. The former conceptual framework encompasses
such designates as territory, specific internal construction (concentration around
a core with central/dominating functions, occurrence of relations and interdependencies reflected in the flows within a region, etc.), potential, specialization, a
certain ‘autonomy’ and individual character. This approach fully conforms to the
historical process of the development of regions located in a defined geographical space and functioning in certain economic, social, and cultural conditions
characterized by dynamic changes and diversity [Zioło 1996, p. 77]. It is difficult
to develop a similar set of designates for the second approach, as the region is
always understood as a subjective analytical construction aimed at organizing
phenomena that occur on the earth’s surface. Their perception is subjective, as
their selection depends on the researcher’s knowledge and the objectives of the
analysis he has identified [Szymla 2000, p. 10]. On account of the relatively large
86
freedom in describing and presenting reality, the second approach tends to be less
popular among scholars and is the source of many controversies.
Sticking to the concept of the region as an objective spatial-economic category, one can distinguish regions in three ways: according to a single criterion
(e.g. on the basis of any statistical feature that describes a selected component
of the region), according to numerous criteria (on the basis of several statistical
features that describe a selected component or components of the region), and
according to the structure determined by interdependent fields of human activity
in the territory in question. Delimitation criteria applied in practice are neither
unequivocal nor universal. Hence the multiplicity of definitions of region and
their varied scope. The most universal definition of the region seems to be the one
coined by Chojnicki [1996, p. 8], where the region is a territorial social system
that is complex, dynamic, evolving, capable of self-organization, and that can be
understood as an element of the territorial division of a state.
When the region is approached as a system, in line with Chojnicki’s definition, its characteristic elements emerge, including components of the region, the
relations between these components, and the relations between the components
of the region and their surroundings. Referring them to the social system functioning in a given space results in defining the region as a territorial social system
(Table 2). The social and material layers operate in a twofold environment: an internal environment, contained within the region’s boundaries, where the relations
function in the internal system, and an external environment, comprised of other
systems and their combinations. The relations occurring inside the system as well
as between the system (or region) and its environment can differ. Depending on
the division criteria applied, these relations include, for example, functional relations, which themselves contain system-making elements, the relations related to
the system’s functioning, its structure, as well as formal relations which result in
the emergence of certain forms of the system.
In the literature on the subject, in particular in regional studies and economic
geography, numerous typologies of regions emerge. Their form depends on how
the concept is understood and on the classification criteria applied. Regardless
Table 2. Region as a territorial social system. Source: Parysek (2009), adapted.
Composition
1.Social layer
2.Material layer
Environment
1.External (other external systems of
various hierarchical levels)
2.Internal (territorially distinguished
layer of tangible foundation – both
natural and artificial)
Structure (relations)
1.Morphogenetic
2.System-making (functional)
3.Activities
4.Complexities
5.Primordial/secondary relations
87
of the criteria used to distinguish regions, they can be included in two groups:
homogenous regions and nodal regions. A homogeneous region defines a territory
whose parts have a property or properties that distinguish the region from a larger
territory. The values of these properties do not have to be the same in every part of
the region. They can differ inside the region, but only to the extent defined in the
delimitation procedure. A nodal region encompasses one, or more, hubs where
its organization is concentrated. Parysek [2009, p. 102] defines them as hubs or
regional centers, while the remaining elements of the nodal region are termed an
area under the influence exerted by the hub (residuum). 1 He emphasizes, however, that the residuum can also be highly varied. There can be ‘islands’ of intensive
use (in spatial terms, smaller urban centers form such islands) in the region. The
character of a homogenous region is additionally determined by its structure, that
is by the distribution and type of its components. Hence its alternative name – a
region of distributions. In nodal regions functionality constitutes the determinant of classification, related to the functions its elements play and the relations
between them. Therefore they are also named regions of links. The two types of
regions differ in terms of the shape and character of their borders. A homogeneous region has clearly defined, sharp borders. Nodal regions are characterized
by blurred, imprecise borders with transition zones between the region and its
environment, or other nodal regions.
Keating and Loughlin [2004, pp. 1-8] distinguish four types of regions: economic, historical/ethnic, administrative and political. Economic regions are territories with defined economic characteristics that meet certain criteria, for example industrial and non-industrial, urban and rural, or regions where a certain
type of economic activity is concentrated, such as steel production, shipyards,
tourism. Economic regions can also refer to territories of economic development
indicated by central authorities. Keating and Loughlin note, however, that the
latest concepts of the economic region seem to point to endogenous growth, technological innovation and changes in the composition of production factors, rather
than the above features. 2 Historical regions are identified as territories marked
by the activity of societies with common roots and cultural or linguistic features
other than those dominating in the given territory of a nation-state culture, where
these societies function or functioned. Administrative regions are the objects of
administrative activity at one level below the central authorities, or territories
distinguished for statistical reasons. To differentiate between administrative and
1 For a detailed explanation of the reasons to apply the notion of ‘residuum’ and how it is understood see:
Parysek [2009, p. 104].
2
88
Keating and Loughlin define it is a “new emerging economic region”, cf.: Keating and Loughlin [2004, p. 2].
political regions, Keating and Loughlin indicate that the latter have democratically elected authorities with a defined range of powers to make autonomous politico-administrative decisions. Hölcker [2004, p. 13] presents a typical typology,
dividing regions into administrative, economic, social and cultural.
Roth [2007, p. 18] takes a different stand, assuming the level of spatial organization as a criterion to distinguish regions. He lists microregions, mezoregions,
macroregions and global regions.
• Microregions are the smallest regions, ranging from a spatial unit at a community level (e.g. town, locality, village) to an administrative district. Their
sizes are relatively small and correspond to the area of everyday interactions
and activities of their inhabitants. In EU NUTS terminology they equate to the
NUTS 3 level (e.g. the region of Belgrade, Bucharest or Saloniki).
• Mezoregions are medium-sized units. The common use of the notion of ‘region’ refers to these entities. They usually encompass an area larger than a microregion but smaller than the territory of a state. They usually have their own
name or history and they exist in the social consciousness. Mezoregions are
equivalent to the NUTS 2 or NUTS 1 level (e.g. Istria, North-West Bulgaria).
• Macroregions exceed the territory of a state but are smaller than a continent
(e.g. the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, Scandinavia).
• Global regions occupy significant parts of continents, or areas that go beyond
the borders of the continents and function in general consciousness as regions
(e.g. the Baltic Region, the Mediterranean, the Pacific Region).
Schmitt-Egner [2002] presents another typology developed on the basis of two
contradictory notions of vertical and horizontal regions. A horizontal region is a
unit, or niche of activity or operations. This group encompasses structural and
administrative regions as well as regions of cultural identification, providing an
arena of interregional exchange and interaction. A vertical region is a space of
activity performed primarily by states or international organizations, local authorities and local communities. In his characteristics of these types of regions,
Schmitt-Egner concentrates on the dominating actors, the relations of the region
with its environment and internal relations, as well as on the fields of activity and
ways of functioning (Table 3).
A typology constructed in this manner can be perceived as a certain compilation of distinguishing regions on the basis of the following criteria: the level of
spatial organization, function, and a set of properties and features. It encompasses
regions of various scales – international, transnational and subnational, as well
as regions of various functions – regions of cultural identification, administrative
89
Table 3.Typology of regions according to Schmitt-Egner. Source: Schmitt-Egner (2002, pp. 184-188),
adapted.
Type of region
Horizontal regions
Dominating actors
Dominating type of
relations
Dominating type of abilities/skills
Region of cultural
identification
cultural and political
internal relations
symbolical and formal
abilities
Administrative
region
political
balanced internal and
external relations
formal and physical abilities
Structural region
economic
external relations
physical abilities
Vertical regions
Type of region
Ways of functioning
Dominating actors
Fields of activity
International region
international regional organizations
states
geopolitics, economy and
international governance
Transnational region
transnational regional organizations
subnational and
transnational operating units (e.g.
euroregions)
integration of goals of regional policies, economies,
culture and environmental
goals
Subnational region
regional and local
authorities
regional actors:
individuals, groups,
communities
preservation, management
and development of tangible and intangible heritage
and structural regions. The above two typology criteria are most frequently applied with respect to distinguishing and classifying regions in general. For their
particular type, socio-economic regions, other criteria related to the level of their
development or the degree or quality of their well-being are also applied. Spatial
criteria are frequently related to them, accounting for a specific localization of
the region in its environment, national spatial structure or international space.
The literature on the subject, whether in the field of regional studies, spatial management, socio-economic geography or other area, abounds in various examples
of region typologies. They also emerge in publications from other social and humanistic sciences. They are an object of interest for sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy and studies on development. Therefore one comes across
interdisciplinary approaches to the issue of distinguishing and describing regions
as an object of study.
Other examples of typologies of regions that refer to socio-economic regions
have been developed, among others, by Klaassen [1979], Friedmann [1972] and
90
Table 4. Typology of regions according to Klaassen. Source: Friedmann and Weaver (1979, p. 141),
adapted.
Pace of income growth in a region
as compared to the pace of national income growth
Level of income in a region as compared to the national
level of income
High
Low
High
I – prosperity areas
II – distressed area in the
process of development
Low
III – declining prosperity
areas
IV – distressed areas
Berry, Conkling and Ray [1976]. Their studies are considered exemplary classifications of these types of regions. Each typology refers to the differently handled
level of their economic development.
Klaassen’s typology is based on two fundamental criteria: the pace of growth
of regional income as compared to the pace of national income growth, and the
level of income in the region as compared to the national level of income (Table 4). This framework allows for four basic types of territories (regions) to be
identified.
Type I, prosperity areas, are highly developed territories with a high development dynamics. This allows them to maintain primacy in their socio-economic environment and the ongoing improvement in their development advantage.
Type II, a distressed area in the process of development, is an underdeveloped
territory with a high development potential. Taking advantage of this potential
they seek to increase the level of their development. Klaasen defines type III as
declining prosperity areas. These are highly developed territories with a declining pace of economic growth which results in their diminishing competitiveness. They are either not using their potential or have lost it. Type IV, distressed
areas, are areas of poverty and exclusion. In their case, both the level and pace
of development are low, which produces increasing disparities between them
and other types of areas. Poverty areas are devoid of development potential and
growth factors, which further affects their situation [Friedmann and Weaver
1979, pp. 141].
In Poland, Gorzelak [1989] has drawn up a similar description of regions and
their classification. He indicates the following ordering criteria: the pace of regional development as compared to the pace of national development and regional contribution to a national economy development vis-à-vis the national outlays
incurred in the region’s development. He has also identified four types of regions:
91
• strong regions, where the pace of development is higher than the pace of national development and the economic results are positive,
• exploiting regions, growing faster than the national economy, but generating a
negative result in terms of national balance,
• exploited regions, where the level of economic development is lower than the
national level but the economic results are positive in terms of national balance,
• weak regions, where the level of economic development is lower than the national level, and the region’s contribution to the national economy is negative.
In his concept of the core and peripheries, Friedmann proposed a division of
space into four types of spatial structures: cores, peripheries, upwards transition
regions and downward transition regions. 3 He defined cores as territorially organized social subsystems characterized by a high ability to generate innovation.
Peripheries are all areas except the core, whose development and changeability
are determined by their dependence on the cores. Upwards transition regions are
expanding areas of growth that are ‘small centers’ other than the core. They are
characterized by high development dynamics and a consistent inflow of population, but the level of their development and potential is clearly lower than those
of the core. These areas are frequently located between, or joining, two core regions. Such locations, providing good access and the opportunity to take direct
advantage of external effects, increase their attractiveness and potential. Downward transition regions tend to be located near the peripheries and their adverse
socio-economic situation may be a consequence of various factors. Friedmann
mentions the depletion of the region’s natural resources and deindustrialization as
being among the most significant [Friedmann and Alonso 1964, pp. 1-13].
Berry, Conkling and Ray [1976, pp. 478-480] suggested a dynamic approach
to the classification of regions. Their classification combines the issues of regional studies with the theory of systems. Applying the concept of the system, they
distinguish three types of systems, depending on the sources of stimuli that contribute to their development or decline. The first type are falling (no-growth) systems, whose development potential is decreasing or halted due to the depletion
of natural resources, dwindling population, or unfavorable demographic changes.
The second group, self-maintaining systems, encompasses the regions that may
be subjected to the processes of decline (collapse) or development as a result of
3 Different publications by Friedmann refer to slightly different terminology to describe various types of
region: cf. Friedmann [1964], Friedmann [1972], and Berry, Conkling and Ray [1976]. They refer to cores and
peripheries as well as development axes, border regions and depressed regions.
92
different stimuli. In the third group, growing open systems, the authors include
the regions that are developing on account of external aid.
The diversity of the above-presented typologies in research reflects the complexity of the issue of investigating regions. Even at the stage of definition, a
range of individual concepts and manners of description emerges. Some are applied on a broader scale in certain research trends or scientific fields. For example, the evolutionary economy and system approach to spatial management apply
the concept of the region as a system, and classify it according to the sources
of stimuli contributing to its development or decline. Sociology and philosophy
frequently approach the region as an intellectual concept, emphasizing its autonomy and individualization. Finally, spatial management and regional studies are
realms where the concepts and typologies based on the level of regional development and regions’ spatial relations apply. It seems, though, that the number
of ‘universal’ definitions and original typologies is at present too large for any
future ones to bring a significant breakthrough in how this element of reality is
perceived and described.
Literature:
Berry, B.J., Conkling, E.C., Ray, D.M., 1976, The geography of economic systems, Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.
Chojnicki, Z., 1996, Region w ujęciu geograficzno-systemowym, in: Czyż, T. (ed.), Podstawy regionalizacji
geograficznej, Bogucki Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Poznań
Domański, R., 2000, Zasady geografii społeczno-ekonomicznej, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa –
Poznań.
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94
Supporters and Opponents
of Autonomous Solutions
TOMASZ BRANKA
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland
The existence of a dispute about autonomy is a fact. The very term autonomy
is increasingly frequent in documents and scientific studies, as well as in journalism. Minorities and indigenous peoples refer to it, and the development of
separatist and autonomous movements is characteristic of the ethnic processes in
recent decades.
Loud and clear opposition to autonomous solutions dates back to the time
when the League of Nations was established. On the forum of this organization,
the representative of Brazil, Mello Franco, said “We must avoid creating a state
within a state. We must prevent the minority from transforming itself into a privileged caste and taking definite form as a foreign group instead of becoming fused
in the society in which it lives. If we carry the exaggerated conception of the autonomy of minorities to the last extreme, these minorities will become disruptive
elements in the state and a source of national disorganization.”1
Although several decades have passed, states continue to be disinclined to
adopt autonomous solutions, perceiving their implementation as the establishment
of a center of a competitor for power. Common arguments involve the potential
threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a nation state. In line with this
logic, autonomy may lead to acts of violence, destruction, loss of life and material
damage. 2 Thus some states perceive this solution as being among the most dan-
1 B. Heyking, The International Protection of Minorities: The Achilles’ Heel of the League of Nations,
“Problems of Peace and War” 1928, vol. 13, p. 44, quote after: G. Welhengama, The Legitimacy of Minorities’
Claim for Autonomy through the Right to Self-Determination, “Nordic Journal of International Law” 1999,
vol. 68, nr 4, p. 416.
2 R. Mullerson, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS,
Routledge and LSE, London and New York, 1994, p. 60.
95
gerous constructs. 3 The demands of a minority requiring autonomy can be seen
even as a national tragedy that will lead to the breakdown of the state and an escalation of violence. In its preliminary report, an unofficial commission appointed to
examine the Singhalese demands in Sri Lanka described the autonomous solution
as an “impractical internal agreement” that will lead to a scenario where everybody fights everybody. 4 Similar sentiments emerged among the Italian-speaking
minority in South Tyrol. In the mid-1980s, their increasing sense of discrimination
was expressed via increasing support for the neo-fascist party of the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI) and growing emigration from
the region. 5 Before Eritrea was incorporated in 1952 as an autonomous entity of
Ethiopia, there were opinions that this solution was harmful to the sovereignty of
Ethiopia, and the supporters of this solution were simply called traitors.6
Some states fear that granting minorities with extensive autonomy can invite
further activity aimed at complete independence, eventually leading to secession
or irredenta. Taking this attitude, autonomy can lead to a scenario most governments want to avoid – posing a threat to the territorial integrity of a given state.
History abounds in telling examples.
After autonomy for the Basque Country was approved in 1979, the political
wing of ETA, Harris Batasuna, said that “autonomy should be cunningly used as
the first step towards full independence, and eventually secession from Spain.”7
A similar operational strategy was also considered by the moderate leaders of
Kosovo separatists and the six-nation Contact Group during a meeting in Rambouillet in 1999. The former appeared to have accepted autonomy for a period of
three years leading to a referendum among the Albanian population of Kosovo
on the further status of this territory.8 When Southern Sudan was granted autonomous rights by virtue of the Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government Act
in 1972, there were objections that the inhabitants of this region would use the
new status as a pretext to intensify their partisan activities against the central
3
G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 416.
4
Sri Lanka Monitor, 1 September 1997, p. 111, quote after: G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 417.
5 R. Lapidoth, Autonomy. Flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts, United States Institute of Peace, Washington
1997, p. 111. For more on South Tyrol, see: A. E. Alcock, The History of the South Tyrol Question, Graduate
Institute of International Studies, London 1970.
6 H. Erlich, The Eritrean Autonomy 1952-1962: Its failure and Its Contribution to Further Escalation [in:]
Models of Autonomy, ed. Y. Dinstein, Transaction Books, New Brunswick 1981, pp. 183-212. In 1950, the UN
General Assembly ran a vote on the issue of Eritrea to decide whether it would be integrated with the state of
Ethiopia following federation principles. The decision came into force on September 15, 1952 but the Ethiopian-Eritrean federation lasted only ten years.
7
S. Ben-Ami, The Catalan and Basque Movements for Autonomy [in:] Models of Autonomy…, op. cit., p. 83.
8
G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 418.
96
government. Similarly, Serbian authorities accused the Albanians from Kosovo
of abusing the autonomous status they had enjoyed since 1989.
It can plausibly be assumed that autonomous status supports the development
of an ethnic awareness that can lay the foundations for a future state. The clear
examples of Croatia and Slovenia corroborate this assumption, as do corresponding events in the former Soviet Union.9
Some governments also fear that their support for granting autonomous rights
to minorities might be interpreted as weakness and result in a decreased electorate,
as was the case in Sri Lanka. It is also frequent that the supporters of such a solution are not convinced about the practical side of its implementation, especially
when autonomous status depends on a change to the constitution or a referendum.10
There are also concerns that granting autonomy to a given territory may lead to
the emergence of new minorities, as was the case with the Muslims in north-east
Sri Lanka, or Christians in Mindanao, the Philippines. The representatives of these
“new minorities” can demand autonomous rights which will lead to further fragmentation of the state, claim the opponents of this solution. Central governments
are afraid of creating precedents that may trigger an avalanche of further demands
for autonomy for various social groups. Economic and administrative efficiency
can be impaired while cultural, religious or other diversity following from autonomous solutions, can pose a threat to fundamental state values. Finally, it is claimed
that history itself proves that autonomous solutions aimed at mitigating ethnic conflicts are no guarantee of success, and that in many cases autonomy has failed.11
The events that took place after 1990 in the former USSR, Yugoslavia, and
Rwanda placed a particular emphasis on the significance of the issue of ethnic
conflicts. The discussions on the role of international organizations and individual states in circumstances of a stark violation of basic human rights intensified,
and academics and politicians began to make increasingly frequent references to
such terms as ‘ethnicity,’ ‘self-determination,’ and ‘minority rights.’12
What is exceptionally interesting and telling in this context, is the response of
various states to the motion submitted in 1993 by the government of Lichtenstein
to the UN General Assembly. Lichtenstein proposed that “communities with a full
9 Some authors are of the opinion that it was the autonomous republics of the former Soviet Union that
played the role of a catalyst in the process of the state’s dissolution; cf. G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 419.
10 Democracy and deep-rooted conflict: options for negotiators, eds. P. Harris, B. Reilly, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm 1998, p. 163.
11 The example of former Yugoslavia is frequently referred to in this context.
12 For the list of publications on this topic see: H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination.
The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1990, footnote
1322, p. 503.
97
social and territorial identity” had a right to autonomy as a means of exercising
their right to self-determination, including the right to a free choice of political
system as an inherent and inalienable right.13 This proposition went much further,
however, and remarked that, under specific conditions, the communities in question
should be able to transform into independent states.14 During the debate, Lichtenstein claimed that “[t]he concept of self-determination, namely, the attainment of
independence by peoples under colonial domination, has virtually been completed.
Since then, the concept of self-determination has evolved, with minorities seeking
greater autonomy within the nation State in which they resided. Many conflicts occurred because there were no channels in the parent State through which minorities
could assert their distinctive identities. Often, they saw secession as the only solution, even though the parent State was likely to resist the option – by force of arms,
if necessary… the realization by minorities of some degree of self-determination
was crucial to the maintenance of international peace and security.”15
Lichtenstein’s proposal was received with a wave of severe, sometimes even
fanatical, criticism. Negative outcomes for the stability of international order
were suggested. A number of states, in particular in Asia and Africa, had serious
concerns whether the concept of autonomy could be considered within the framework of a right to autonomy. Both India and Pakistan clearly opposed any attempts
to introduce autonomy ‘disguised as’ self-determination. In the opinion of the Indian representatives, autonomy should not be identified within the framework of
a right to self-determination, and the right to grant the status of autonomy should
be the sole power of the central government in a given state.16 Pakistan presented
a similar interpretation, as it emphasized that the former colonial states that had
won independence were not obliged to apply such a “destructive policy”17 whatsoever. The delegation from Nepal highlighted that if autonomy was recognized
as a right following from self-determination, it would only “encourage state fragmentation,”18 which could be taken advantage of by movements seeking secession. Malaysia was also against the interpretation of autonomy in the light of the
right to self-determination. This state was only ready to accept a right to “internal
self-determination” that should be nothing more than the significantly limited
13 See UN Doc. A/Res/48/147, 1993.
14 A/C.3/48/SR.22, 20 November 1993, para. 5, p. 3, after: G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 420.
15 A/C.3/51/SR.27, 13 August 1997, para. 5, pp. 2-3, quote after: G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 420.
16 A/C.3/48/SR.22, 30 November 1993, para. 29, p. 7, quote: G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 421.
98
right to “make a free decision in free and fair national elections.”19 If states were
obliged to grant autonomy with an extensive range of powers, this could “seriously threaten the structure of nation states that make the contemporary international
order.”20 The Malaysian delegation warned that granting the right to autonomy
would encourage minorities to make demands that would be completely incompatible with the territorial integrity of states.21 Indonesia was another state to
express its unfavorable attitude towards autonomy, making similar claims of the
threat to the cohesion of state. Referring to its own example, Indonesia, inhabited
by nearly three hundred ethnic communities, argued that autonomy would probably be abused, it would pose a threat to newly established states and it “could
pose a serious threat to national efforts to promote unity through diversity.”22 It
was emphasized that, being a democratic state, Indonesia was ready to promote
the fundamental values of freedom and democracy, but considered it pointless
to support an idea that would finally lead to the establishment of three hundred
ethnic mini-states. The Iraqi delegation openly declared their opposition to any
“erroneous attempts to reinterpret the principle of the right to self-determination”
that would expand the sense of autonomy as contrary to the spirit of the Charter
of the United Nations.23 The prevailing majority of African states were concerned
about the foreseeable outcomes following the recognition of the right to autonomy on their continent. The delegation from Ghana explained that implementation
of Lichtenstein’s proposal would result in the emergence of “multifold political
loyalty” and simultaneously contribute to squandering the progress that had taken
place in the process of transforming communities into nations. It was indicated
further on that the implementation of the autonomous solution in Africa would
inevitably lead to a scenario of “never-ending Balkanization.”24 Subscribing to
the arguments of Ghana, Kenya added that there was no certainty whatsoever that
autonomous solutions would guarantee the absence of conflicts. Numerous states
also agreed with the thesis of the Kenyan delegation that the demands of minorities to be granted autonomy were intended to “[t]ake control of natural resources
for the exclusive use of their community to the detriment of others.”25
20 A/C.3/48/SR.22, 30 November 1993, para. 16, p. 4-5, quote: G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 419.
21 A/C.3/48/SR.22, 30 November 1993, para. 16-17, p. 5, quote: G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 419.
99
Autonomy is not a new phenomenon – discussions on the issue of autonomy
or autonomous regimes were a popular topic of academic consideration in the late
19th and early 20th century.26 It was only in the late 20th century, however, that
this concept made its way beyond the decolonization context, albeit with serious
difficulties. It is seeking its place in international relations and its practical application is slowly being found in international law. Analysis of several international
documents is used to confirm at least the indirect right to autonomy. The fact that
a majority of conflicts take place internally rather than between states means autonomous solutions, which continue to be applied very reluctantly, win cautious
appreciation from the international community as a relatively efficient and highly
flexible method to defuse social unrest. This solution is also listed among options
to end decades-long conflicts in various parts of the world, and the constructs
applied in the Aland Islands and in South Tyrol are presented as a model to be
followed. That is why, despite the definition problems and concerns related to the
threats to state territorial integrity, there are voices advocating the necessity for
the right to autonomy to be commonly recognized.
What follows from the previous considerations, however, is that the international community refuses to recognize the right to autonomy for minorities. This
is what R. A. Friedlander says: “Those who seek to obtain a juridical definition
of autonomy from international law treaties books will quest in vain. Although
self-determination has been elevated by many to the status of an international
human ‘right’, or at the very least a normative principle, autonomy has been often
neglected and on occasion totally disregarded by legal scholars and commentators. Viewed from the perspective of international law, autonomy is therefore an
artificial concept of dubious legal consequence. Admittedly, it still is invoked by
politicians, historians, and political analysts, though its twentieth-century historical role has only been that of a political instrumentality.”27
Given the negative position and practice of numerous states claiming that
there is a common right to autonomy would be dubious.28 It is however indicated
that in some situations autonomy can be a “practical necessity,” or “the best of the
worst solutions that is undoubtedly much more desirable than the progressing violence and systemic oppression.”29 Thomas Buergenthal has observed that some
26 R. Robinson, Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure? Institute of Jewish Affairs, New York 1943; P.
Thonberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991.
27 R. A. Friedlander, Autonomy and the Thirteen Colonies: Was the American Revolution Really Necessary?
[in:] Models of Autonomy…, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
28 R. Lapidoth, op. cit., p. 177.
29 H. J. Steiner, Ideas and Counter-Ideas in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities, “Notre
Dame Law Review” 1991, vol. 66, p. 1557.
100
groups should have the right, and states should be obliged, to conduct negotiations on the possibilities of introducing an autonomous regime in a given territory, or for a given group of people.30 The recognition of this right with respect to
the indigenous population is approached with slightly more openness.31
Although autonomy has not found its place in international law yet, various
international documents point to the possibility of applying autonomous solutions. 32Some authors claim that the relevant regulations in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights from 1996 can be interpreted as at least
partial support for some forms of autonomy. What is referred to are: Article 1,
granting the right to self-determination, Article 25, stipulating each citizen’s right
to participate in public life, and Article 27, concerning the right to maintain and
develop identity.33 The advocates of autonomy point to the provision made in the
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities from 1992 where minorities have a right to participate
in the public life of the state: “Persons belonging to minorities have the right to
participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which
they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.”34 It is obvious,
however, that the right to autonomy cannot be concluded from the right to participation. What is more, the right to participation is an individual right vested
in every person who is a member of a minority. More far-reaching conclusions
can be drawn on the basis of Article 4(2) of the Declaration, which states that
“States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their culture,
language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific practices are
in violation of national law and contrary to international standards.”35 It can
be concluded from this provision that it makes an indirect reference to cultural
(personal) autonomy, and not to territorial autonomy. It is beyond doubt that both
provisions quoted above indicate the need for plurality and variety within a dem30 Za: R. Lapidoth, op. cit., p. 177.
31 Some states have regulated this matter by relevant constitutional regulations, see for example the constitution of Nicaragua from 1986, the constitution of the Philippines from 1987, the Canada Constitution Act from
1992 and the solutions applied in Norway, Sweden and Finland with respect to the Saami population.
32 M. Suksi, On the Entrenchment of Autonomy [in:] Autonomy: Applications and Implications, ed. by M.
Suksi, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, p. 152.
33 See for example: N. Chandrahasan, Minorities, Autonomy, and the Intervention of Third States: A droit de
regard, “Israel Yearbook on Human Rights”, 1993, vol. 23, p. 129.
34 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Minorities,
General Assembly Resolution 47/135, Article 2(3).
35 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging…, op. cit., Article 4(2)
101
ocratic state.36 This leads to the conclusion that the quoted document does not
include the right to autonomy, but “‘effective’ participation via local or national
organizations may require for the autonomy to be established in order to meet the
standards set in the Declaration.”37
Autonomy is a solution the Council of Europe (CE) supports in a consistent,
although mostly indirect, manner. It should be remembered that the European
Charter of Local Self-Government, adopted by the CE in 1985, in Article 3 defines the activity of local self-government in the following way: “Local self-government denotes the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of
the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their
own responsibility and in the interests of the local population.”38 Article 4 stipulates that local authorities should be vested with all powers that have not been
excluded from their competence nor assigned to any other authority. Any changes
in local authority boundaries should be preceded by consultation, and if there are
no significant obstacles – approved in a referendum (Article 5). It can be seen that
the regulations in the European Charter of Local Self-Government are clearly in
line with the philosophy of territorial autonomy.
An earlier document of the CE, the 1978 Bordeaux Declaration, described
cultural autonomy, with particular emphasis on educational aspects. The Declaration also indicated the need to equip the regions with the power to enter into cultural agreements with other European regions, and to establish local mass media.
This document highlighted the significance of cultural and linguistic diversity,
and called for respect for the rights of all minorities. Finally, the Declaration
referred to autonomy as a panacea for conflicts rooted in cultural, ethnic and
linguistic diversity.39
The Bordeaux Declaration provided the foundation for work on the issue
of minority languages which resulted in adopting the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1992.40 The principal goal of this document was
36 G. Welhengama, op. cit., p. 429.
37 P. Thornberry, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Linguistic
and Religious Minorities: Background, Analysis and Observations [in:] The UN Minority Rights Declaration, eds. A. Phillips and A. Rosas, Abo-Akademi University Institute for Human Rights and Minority Rights
Group International, Turku/London 1993, pp. 42-43.
38 European Charter of Local Self-Government…, op. cit.
39 R. Locatelli, International Agreements [in:] Autonomy. Challenge and/or solution, ed. V. Ágoston, Matthias Corvinus Publishing Co., Buffalo-Toronto, 1993. Lectures held at the Conference on Autonomy, November
18-20, 1993.
40 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg, 2 X 1992, Council of Europe,
European Treaties ETS No. 148 [in:] Documents on autonomy and minority rights, ed. H. Hannum, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1993, pp. 86-101.
102
to protect and promote minority languages, especially threatened ones, which
constituted an inseparable part of European heritage. Not only did the Charter
prohibit language discrimination, but it went further, ordering states to provide
active and efficient aid to develop such languages.41 Even this document did not
make a direct reference to autonomy, though. The relevant provision was not
even adopted in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,42 adopted three years later, although a number of goals set by this document could have been achieved by the introduction of autonomy.
The document adopted by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of
the Council of Europe, Recommendation 43 on territorial autonomy and national
minorities43 is interesting. It highlighted the fact that the protection of national minorities had to be considered in the context of human rights. Great importance was
attached to the subsidiarity principle. It expressed the belief that the application of
this principle, understood as decision-making at the level closest to the citizen, could
help solve problems related to the protection of the rights of national minorities. It
indicated that it was autonomy that could provide a concrete form to implement the
subsidiarity principle. It emphasized that the concept of territorial autonomy did not
provide a single, permanent model of the division of power, but that it should be
implemented with regard to the economic, geographical, historical, social, cultural
and language context. In anticipation of potential criticism, it added that the subsidiarity principle did not pose a threat to state unity, and it could actually provide “the
opportunity to strengthen the community and solidarity of the state.”44
Recommendation 43 refers to two groups of states: those that have already
decided to introduce the autonomous solution in a territory where a minority
accounts for a significant portion of the population, and states that are only planning to introduce this construct in similar regions. As concerns the former group
of states, Recommendation 43 says that it is necessary to avoid such corrections
to the borders of the region that would aim at a change of the ethnic composition
there. At the same time, the transfer of extensive powers which may serve the protection of national minorities, powers defined by law but in particular concerning
the fields of language, education and culture, is encouraged. The need to provide
41Ibidem.
42 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report http://www.coe.
int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/PDF_H(1995)010_FCNM_ExplanReport_en.pdf.
43 See: Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Local_and_regional_Democracy/Regional_or_Minority_languages/Documentation/6_Other_documents/6-1_CLARE/CLRAE_rec_43_98%20(E).asp
(11 March 2005). The Congress was initiated in 1994 as an advisory body of the Council of Europe replacing
in this capacity the Permanent Conference of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe.
44Ibidem.
103
relevant financial resources to enable the tasks to be actually performed is also
stressed in this context. The authors of Recommendation 43 promote the cooperation of various levels of communities sharing similar properties, in particular in
terms of language and culture. The use of minority languages on a broader scale
is also recommended in administrations and contacts with a minority.
On top of the above recommendations, states that are only planning to introduce autonomous solutions are encouraged to create areas that would prevent
the geographical spread of minorities. The borders of these regions should be
established with the consent of the population concerned. The document also
calls for the actual power to promote the rights of a minority to be transferred,
thus allowing for the full use of the potential of the history and tradition of a
multicultural society. In this context, the most far-reaching document is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which began to be
developed as early as 1985. It is worth bearing in mind that in 2006, Namibia put
forward a motion on the forum of the UN General Assembly for the decision on
this document to be temporarily suspended, which was supported. In practice this
postponed the adoption of the Declaration. In September 2007, a vote was taken
on the modified contents of the Declaration, which was supported by 144 states.
Eleven states abstained, while Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United
States voted against. Article 4 of the Declaration is of key importance for the
concept of autonomy, stating that “[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right
to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing
their autonomous functions.”45 Such precise wording stirred discussion during
the debate on the content of the Declaration. Lichtenstein consistently supported
this standpoint. Its representative explained that “the introduction to the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to internal and local affairs,
including their financial aspect, offered a promising new approach which would
help to genuinely address the aspirations and needs of many peoples to create
an enabling environment for the full protection and promotion of human rights,
without resorting to violence and strife.”46 The Mexican representative emphasized in turn that any introduction of autonomy must be exercised in conformity
with the constitution of a given state.47
45 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (A/RES/61/295), http://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf (September 17, 2008).
46 General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples http://www.un.org/News/Press/
docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm (September 17, 2008).
47Ibidem.
104
For now, the demands of minorities to be granted autonomy lack strong legal
basis. Nevertheless, they should be considered by every responsible government.
State sovereignty does not assume that a single particular political or economic
system must be maintained while sensitivity to justified demands made by minorities is a litmus paper of a central government’s respect for human rights, the
rights of all citizens.48
It is one of the characteristic features of modern international law that there
are many participants in international relations, including states, international,
regional and non-governmental organizations, public companies, private law
companies and natural persons. It is thus even more pressing to find an adequate
answer to the postulates to maintain one’s own, separate identity. The modern
world displays a tendency to become regionalized, and increasing ethnic awareness forces the international community to seek new solutions to meet the demands made by minorities and indigenous peoples, among others. The threats to
peace and security that are embedded in numerous ethnic conflicts intensify, as
exemplified by the current situation in Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Cashmere. Ruth
Lapidoth commented on that saying that the “illusion of purely national states
was destroyed long ago.” Under such circumstances, national and international
law is becoming increasingly flexible and this process allows for autonomous
solutions to find their place.
Literature:
Autonomy, Self Governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative approaches to Institutional Design in Divided
Societies, ed. Marc Weller, Stefan Wolff, Routledge, New York 2005.
Autonomy: Applications and Implications, ed. by M. Suksi, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998.
Hannum H., Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights,
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1990.
Lapidoth R., Autonomy. Flexible solutions to ethnic conflicts, United States Institute of Peace, Washington
1997.
Models of Autonomy, ed. Y. Dinstein, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick 1981.
Suksi M., Frames of Autonomy and the Åland Islands, Åbo University, Åbo 1995.
Suksi M., On the Entrenchment of Autonomy [in:] Autonomy: Applications and Implications, Kluwer Law
International, The Hague 1998.
48 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty…, op. cit., p. 469.
105
The Process of Building Civil Society
against the Shortcomings of
Polish Planning Legislation
TOMASZ ROZWADOWSKI
Gdansk University of Technology, Poland
Abstract:
The article presents the main assumptions of the project of Coastal Strip development in Gdańsk. According to the author’s best knowledge, this is the first pro
publico bono project in Poland in a large area of the city, formed on the initiative
of and elaborated by the city’s inhabitants supported by two NGOs. Successive
stages of the project’s preparation are discussed on the background of the shortcomings of Polish planning law and the difficulties faced by the public participation process in terms of building a civil society.
1. The Planning System as a Victim of Economic Success
The year 1989 in Poland was the beginning of the so-called transformation, consisting of the transition from a centrally planned economy with a command and
distribution system to a free market economy operating on the basis of the law
of supply and demand. Although the centralised system had promised to be more
effective than the market, its implementation led to economic disaster. Still in
1980, Polish GDP per capita was 46% of median income in the EU-27,1 in 1989
it was already 38% of the average GDP of EU-27.2 The Polish economy in 1989
experienced huge inflation and a total collapse of the currency.
After seventeen years of transformation Poland is now a member of the
OECD and the European Community. The economy is getting better every year
and it is becoming more competitive. Between 2006 and 2007, Poland was one
1
EU-27 – twenty seven member states of the European Union.
2
IMF – World Economic Outlook Database, Eurostat 2000-2005, 09.2005.
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of the fastest developing countries in the European Community. In 2009, Polish
GDP per capita amounted to 60.4% of average EU GDP 3 (PPS)4 and the growth
of income per capita (PPP)5 amounted to 275% (1989/2009).6
But economic development is only one component of a welfare society.
Quality management of a place is directly related to the legal system and spatial
management. In the case of Polish planning regulation, rapid economic development has brought a number of threats to the quality of space which the legislature
could not effectively prevent.
The process of Polish planning law reform which began after 1989, having
as one of the fundamental objectives the increase of the supply of investment
areas in cities, resulted in a significant liberalisation of building regulations. The
legal liberalisation, acting as a natural reaction to half a century of socialist system constraints and stimulated by a postmodern tendency towards deregulation
(Böhm, 2007), in practice, however, led to a significant fall in spatial management culture. According to many experts, the current planning system functioning in a market economy is leading to rising chaos or even results in the cluttering
of Polish space (Jędraszko, 2005).
The biggest beneficiary of the reforms after 1989 was the real estate sector. Amendments to the law transformed land-use planning into an instrument of
(mass) building permission production, with the bulk of profits transferred into
the hands of housing developers and land speculators (Billart, 2007).
Also, the public sector, freed by law from the obligation to submit real estate
trade to long-term, integrated development plans, began to benefit from the sale
of municipal land, subordinating the public good and common interest to an ad
hoc patching of holes in municipal budgets.
In many cases, spatial policy has boiled down to the mere response of local
plans to the demands of individual private investors. Local authorities are not so
interested in creating long term and detailed plans, perceiving them as restrictions on the freedom to invest, while in turn, a whole planning system aimed
at facilitating the completion of a single investment is not capable of securing
orderly development. As Andreas Billert writes, the consequences of both a lack
of coherent policy and a sustainable spatial and socio-economic community, as
3 Biuro Inwestycji i Cykli Ekonomicznych BIEC, Szacunek PKB per capita i bezpośrednich inwestycji
zagranicznych w województwach oraz wskaźniki wyprzedzające koniunktury, Warszawa, May 2011.
4
PPS – Purchasing Power Standard , see: http://www.unece.org/stats/documents/2001/11/ecp/wp.6.e.pdf.
5 PPP – Purchasing Power Parity – see: http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34357_1_1_1_
1_1,00.html.
6
Polish GDP - Central Statistical Office - http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_11589_ENG_HTML.htm.
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well as a failure to actively manage space and desirable development, manifest
themselves in a lack of will and the lack of a specific political culture, breeding
corruption and preferences for the implementation of corporate interests (Billert,
2007). Customary respect for beauty in the human environment also erodes.
Money itself does not create chaos of forms. It is people who can give money
its disruptive power.7 Poland aspires to European standards and has entered the
twenty-first century and the market economy with a completely anachronistic and
inefficient planning system which does not satisfy the requirements and expectations of modern society. “European standard” concepts are used primarily as a
rhetorical instrument in political discussions and either carried out selectively, or
only superficially implemented. According to Billert, Poland’s ostentatious rejection of the principles of environmental protection expected by the EU, Polish law
and its spatial planning policy are specific examples of persistent undermining of
European standards. Regardless of how we assess the current situation in the context of rapid economic growth – the question of the far-reaching implications of
contemporary changes and the related organisation of urban public space appears
to gain importance.
2. The Coastal Strip in Gdańsk and the Civic Proposal for Its Development
The Coastal Strip (Pas Nadmorski) is the common name of the area extending
about 5km at the interface of the built-up areas in Gdańsk and the Baltic Sea.
This mostly unbuilt terrain is covered by coastal forest and meadows. A number
of walking and cycling paths and the beaches extending the entire length of the
coast, make this area a natural recreation site for the whole agglomeration of
Gdańsk, in particular, for nearly one hundred thousand inhabitants of the three
nearby districts. The Coastal Strip, because of its natural potential is also a refuge
for many species of fauna and rare species of plants and an important part of the
biologically active areas of Gdańsk.
In the opinion of Edward Böhm, the role of such undeveloped natural landscape, when the shaping of space is dominated by an ad hoc factor of profit maximization, becomes particularly important and worthy of special concern (Böhm,
2007).
The undeniable value of the Coastal Strip and its attractive location within
the city has caused increasingly stronger investment tension in this area. In recent
years, owing to the absence of a coherent approach to development for this area
proposed by the city, enclaves of the coastal forest have been turned into two
housing estates completed as “gated communities.” A successive investment pro7
C. Bielecki: Gra w miasto, Wydawnictwo Fundacja Dom Dostępny, Warszawa 1996, p. 138.
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Fig 1. Aerial photo of the Coastal Strip in Gdańsk.View towards the southeast showing potential of
the green landscape in the urban environment (photo K. Gierszewski)
posal put forward a plan for the construction of a group of residential buildings
with a height of more than 200 meters in the eastern part of the Coastal Strip. This
investment, however, was postponed only due to the withdrawal of investors.
In 2010, on the initiative of the Polish Ecological Club, a group of people
joined together to develop a civic concept for the development of the Coastal
Strip, to present an alternative vision of the future for the site and to stop its
progressive disintegration. The group, numbering about 20 people, included academics from the University of Gdańsk and Gdańsk University of Technology.
Some students and practicing designers were also invited to cooperate. The project consists of the description and inventory of natural resources and an urban
development proposal, the preparation of which was undertaken by a team of
several urban planners and architects under the leadership of the author of this
article.8 The implementation phase of the project was preceded by public consultation and research survey results. According to the author’s best knowledge,
this is the first urban development project in Poland covering a large part of a city
and constructed as a citizens’ pro bono initiative, carried out entirely outside the
structures of government and business.
8 Civic Project of the Coastal Strip Development in Gdańsk – (Społeczna Koncepcja Rozwoju Pasa Nadmorskiego w Gdańsku) - main authors of the urban section of the project: J. Danilewicz, G. Dziewulska, B.
Macikowski, T. Rozwadowski, P. Samól.
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Fig. 2. One of the housing settlements realised in Coastal Strip as a ‘gated community’ and the visualisation of five high-rise buildings proposed by a developer in the eastern part of the area (photo:
K. Gierszewski / developer’s website promotion materials) (photo: K. Gierszewski / developer’s
website promotion materials)
The project has set out to achieve three main objectives:
1.Show that the participation of residents in strategic planning is both possible
and necessary to achieve the highest possible standards of spatial development
for the city;
2.Demonstrate in the context of Coastal Strip the necessity of analysing and designing urban space in a consistent manner, taking into account not only local
but also the supra-local conditions of such a process;
3.Propose alternatives to the municipal vision of spatial policy for the Coastal
Strip’s development (expressed in the local master plans), with particular emphasis on natural values, landscape and culture of the area.
The first objective has been realised through public consultations and a survey
which involved nearly 500 people. The conclusions of the meetings and the survey results were used as guidelines for the forthcoming project. The main appeal,
which was expressed in the survey, was to preserve the natural and landscape
values of the area and to develop its recreational infrastructure. At the same time
building up the Coastal Strip with bulky objects (such as large hotels or high-rise
apartment buildings) was seen as a threat to those values that were considered
most valuable.
3. A Civic Project to Defend the Interests of the Community
As architects involved in the Civic Project, we agreed that the main threats to the
building of quality Polish cities are the current practice of project management
by means of scattered and small, local development plans, the arbitrariness of
administrative zoning decisions issued under the provisions of officials which
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Fig. 3. Answering the Civic Project survey questions. The participation process begins… (The
Coastal Strip beach, April 2010) (photo: J. Kopeć)
are decisions based on analyses prepared by an investor, usually only taking into
account private interests. Until now, the weaknesses of the Polish legislation have
resulted in the realisation of the aforementioned controversial housing estates
built as “gated communities” within a shared recreational area.
The authors of the Civic Project recognised that focusing on and protecting
only the most valuable areas would copy the errors of the urban doctrine applied
in Gdańsk. Thus, the decision was made to develop a general but overall concept
covering the coastal area, with a wide context of function and meaning. In our
opinion, this approach highlighted the interconnections and relationships of individual sites, treating them as elements of one urban ecosystem, and not as artificial
“planning units.” Moreover, analysis conducted by the authors took into account
existing and potential links that the Coastal Strip has with the surrounding neighbourhoods of adjoining districts. The Civic Project differs from detailed solutions
that are found in local land use plans in that it serves as a guideline for building
urban spatial policy in the Coastal Strip area and proposes a method for developing a coherent and socially agreed vision of the city (Macikowski, Samól 2011).
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The Study for Location of High-rise Objects9 that was prepared by the city
authority in 2008, together with a number of local spatial plans, all allowed the
location of high-rise buildings in the heart of the Coastal Strip and in its vicinity.
Although the main owner of the land in the Coastal Strip is a municipality, private developers are the most interested in this attractively located land. The Civic
Project is opposed to a policy that supports plans for randomly placed, isolated
skyscrapers based on the argument of real-estate business profitability.10 Historically, Gdańsk is a city where nearly 90% of the downtown urban structure was
destroyed in World War II, and only thanks to the great efforts of rehabilitation
and reconstruction has it succeeded in keeping its identity. That identity is just
now being threatened by the blurring of traditional urban landscape definition
caused by chaotic building patterns that do not integrate into existing neighbourhood structures.
While the need for development of the city is undeniable, there should be
clear objection to any activity that is not based on sound research and a plan that
clearly defines the context in which areas are designated suitable for intensive
build up or restricted from high-rise building, where the land should remain free
of buildings. In part, the Civic Project of the Coastal Strip Development attempts
to compensate for the absence of such a vision in Gdańsk.
The authors of the Civic Project are of the opinion that continuing the municipal policy of development based on a lack of coherent vision is inappropriate and
remains at odds with contemporary urban knowledge. The Project opposes progressive chaotic investments in the inner area of the Coastal Strip and suggests
urban infill in the surrounding urban structures, which as an alternative would
retain a clear boundary between the densely built-up areas and the open green
expanse. The result would be the creation of a unique “city garden” as a potentially high-quality public space that could provide not only streets and squares
but also areas of parks, or in the specific case of the Gdańsk Coastal Strip – even
an inner-city forest.
Contemporary transformations in many densely built-up European cities
would suggest that the coexistence of these two types of structures is not only viable, but also by all means purposeful. The importance of maintaining biologically
active areas and corridors is therefore an ecological postulate that originated in
the field of urban science, and is understood within an interdisciplinary context.
9 The Study for the Location of High-rise Objects (SLOW – Studium Lokalizacji Obiektów Wysokich) is the
urban study elaborated by municipal planning office to identify ways to deal with high-rise objects in Gdańsk.
A cursory survey performed among the residents and the lack of the proposed vision have resulted in a document that operates with very general conclusions.
10 P.W. Kowalski, Miasto z rzeki i wiatru od morza, [in:] “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 6.06. 2008.
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Fig.4. Reality of planning in Poland: scattered pattern of the land use plans in force for the Coastal
Strip vicinity. Achieving coherent and purposeful development is improbable under these particular
regulations (source: Gdańsk website)
As the Gdańsk Coastal Strip is connected to the network of ecological corridors
of the Tricity Landscape Park11 it will provide democratic access for all residents
to recreation areas.
Elaboration of the Civic Project of the Coastal Strip Development with respect to some of the issues presented above, helped to formulate three postulates
about land use planning in the area:
1.Treatment of green urban space as a common good, and thus the formulation
of spatial policy in a spirit of respect for resources and environmental, cultural,
and spatial amenities and taking economic aspects of sustainable development
into account;
2. Broad consensus in planning and design activities based on collaboration with
residents, following the cases in European cities where democratic structures
are developed;
11 Tricity Landscape Park - (Trójmiejski Park Krajobrazowy) is a protected area, established in 1979, and
covering the area of 19 930 hectares. The Park lies within administrative area of Wejherowo, Szemud, Gdynia,
Sopot and Gdańsk.
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Fig.5. Canonical examples of urban parks. The comparison shows the relationship of park area to
dense urban area. Against this background, the Coastal Strip in Gdańsk shown with the two housing estates realised within its borders (source: author’s own analysis)
3.Creation of development plans based on a pre-determined and comprehensive
vision of the city that is essentially forward-thinking with respect for the needs
of future generations. In contrast to current plans which are incidental and
random, such plans would duly take into account the broader context of urban,
environmental and social interactions.
Completion of the project does not mean the end of the whole undertaking. The
proposals were presented at the office of the President of Gdańsk and in the Council of the City. Currently, meetings in the councils of the individual districts and
NGO forums are being held to promote the ideas contained in the Project and to
build space for a wider social dialogue. Over the coming months “charette” design workshops for the residents of Gdańsk will be conducted and an exhibition
showing the current status of work on the Project will be presented.
The friendly reception of the proposals contained in the Civil Project and
the large support of an increasing number of people has so far failed to interest
the city authorities in establishing a discussion. The authors hope there is still a
chance to build a broad consensus over the realisation of the Civil Project’s principles, which in turn could contribute to the development of Gdańsk Coastal Strip
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in a way that makes full use of the natural, recreational and cultural resources so
precious in this area.
4. Final Conclusions
The loss of a fully-developed urban culture and a lack of thinking about the
public interest can be observed in every place where the polis has become only
“an urbanised area.” Lack of understanding of the public interest generally hinders solutions to urban problems12 and furthermore causes serious consequences
which are expressed in the general trend towards private appropriation of that
which has been the essence of the city for centuries – public space.13
Currently, Polish legal and institutional conditions are not conducive to the
establishment of spatial order as a major issue deserving of special attention. Deregulation of the planning system carried out in recent years and implementation
of rules similar to those applied at early stages of capitalism have relegated land
to use based on purely economic determiners – maximum profit from the investment at minimal cost for development of the plan.14
The low level of awareness and civic culture in the understanding of the public good also hinders the process of building civilisation standards in this area.
Local authorities are not steadfast in their management under strong investor
pressure. A bad situation is worsened by the growing expectation for economic
growth, and the temptation to simply multiply the profits that can be generated
through sales and investment in attractive urban areas. The historically justified
individualism and lack of identification with the state and the law which is deeply
rooted in Polish society is another issue probably requiring deeper study, like
other main factors affecting progress.15
On the other hand, it seems one can observe two processes that have succeeded in building certain optimism in recent years. The growing influence of
environmental conditions is the first. Stronger integration with European Union
structures calls for changes both in the formation of the law and in the social understanding of development processes conditioned by limited natural resources
and space. The second process can be seen in the example of the Coastal Strip
Development Project initiative, which demonstrates increased inhabitant interest
12 C. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 163.
13 M. Dymnicka, Osiedla za bramą a ciągłość kulturowa i społeczna w kształtowaniu przestrzeni miejskiej,
[in:] B. Jałowiecki, W. Łukowski (eds.), Gettoizacja polskiej przestrzeni miejskiej Academica, Scholar Warsaw
2007.
14 M. Dymnicka, T. Rozwadowski, Urban space in the consumerist regime, [in:] Estetyka i Krytyka, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2008-2009, p. 28.
15 Ibid., p. 34.
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in their surroundings and a willingness to engage in joint activities. The processes of social participation still stand at a relatively low stage of development, but
slowly the growing number of NGOs in Poland gives rise to optimism. It also
indicates the need for organised awareness-raising, citizen-based activities. The
role of academic education is not to be underestimated in this process. It is the
opinion of the author that Polish education should increasingly emphasise issues
of the common good and the building of a civil society.
Difficulties in the conduct of the Civil Project of the Coastal Strip Development arose due to rigid administrative structures and the city authorities’ lack of
interest in the implementation of the Project’s idea. The experience revealed a
strong need to develop legal instruments for the effective “support” of opposition
to the laws of the free market, and to encourage the pursuit of “higher” needs in
relation to space that is understood as belonging to the common good. Spatial
management of a city is one of the most important ways to build a cultural code
in society, therefore it is difficult to overestimate the importance of raising public
interest in the formation and enforcement of rules that enhance the aesthetic and
functional quality of urban space.
A modern strategy of urban space design must be the response to the real and
well-identified needs of residents, so a city will be built on their aspirations. Additionally, in the well-understood interest of all residents, planning should ensure
high quality common areas by protecting and enriching their development for the
purpose of diversifying potential for urban activities.
Literature:
Billert A., Planowanie przestrzenne a polityka –„trzecia droga” do „trzeciego świata”? , [in:] Urbanistyka
w działaniu. Teoria i praktyka. Materiały II KongresuUrbanistyki Polskiej, T. Ossowicz, T. Zipser (eds.),
”Urbanista”, Warsaw 2006;
Böhm A., The role of landscape in creation of spatial order, Archiwum Fotogrametrii, Kartografii i Teledetekcji,
Vol. 17a, 2007;
Jędraszko A., Zagospodarowanie przestrzenne w Polsce – drogi i bezdroża regulacji ustawowych, Warsaw
2005;
Macikowski B., Samól P., Jak chronić Pas Nadmorski?, Aura, vol. 8/11, Kraków 2011, pp. 21-25.
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Rule of Law and Political Development
in the Baltic Sea Region
LARS RYDÉN
Uppsala University, Sweden
Background – Development of the Baltic Sea Region since the End of the
Cold War
The development of democracy and in general the political systems’ cultures in
the countries of the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) during the 20 years since the end of
the Cold War has been dramatic and extremely important. Key landmarks in the
eastern part of the region during these years have been national independence and
the dissolution of the eastern bloc (1991); first free elections (1989 in Poland and
1991 in the three Baltic States and Czechoslovakia, later independent Slovakia and
the Czech Republic); transition from a centrally planned to market economy and
increasing decentralisation. Since 1991 we have had free travel, removal of visa
requirements between the three Baltic States and Poland, Slovakia and the Czech
Republic vs. the European Union (1996) and membership in the European Union
(2004), and finally joining the Schengen agreement (2007) making travel very easy.
For the three Eastern Slavic states, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, the development has been different. From an early “melting” period in the 1990s these states
have become increasingly state controlled and authoritarian. Belarus is today a
completely authoritarian state with thousands of political prisoners and is often referred to as the last dictatorship in Europe. Ukraine attempted to get rid of state manipulated elections in its Orange Revolution, but is now back into a situation similar
to before 2004, while Russia under Putin has become increasingly anti-democratic
and centralised. These countries all require visas for EU citizens. In Ukraine, in
contrast to Russia and Belarus, there seems today to be a majority for approaching
the European Union and some political steps on this path have been taken.
The political development and today’s situation in the region may be examined from several different perspectives. Here, I will look at the rule-of-law
117
in a comprehensive meaning, that is all aspects of how a legal and fair society
functions, especially the proper role of the governing bodies (government and
parliament) and the judicial system, as well as security of citizens. I will rely
mainly on the recent reports of the World Justice Project (WJP)1 and look for
similarities and differences between the countries in the region. Thus, in focus
will be how the political culture in the countries is developing and how the law
is applied, rather than the formal requirements for democracy (elections etc.) or
written law.
The Rule of Law
Instead of focusing on the question of democracy, we will thus take a much
broader perspective, that of the rule of law. Issues to address include:
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
What is the rule of law?
Who is concerned with the rule of law?
How is the rule of law implemented in the BSR?
State-civil society relationship;
Corruption;
Equity and distribution of wealth;
How does the rule of law, or its absence, influence the development of our
societies?
The World Justice Project (WJP) states that [o]ur mission is to lead a global,
multidisciplinary effort to strengthen the rule of law for the development of communities of opportunity and equity.
The WJP uses a working definition of the rule of law based on four universal
principles:
1.The government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law.
2.The laws are clear, publicised, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights,
including the security of persons and property.
3.The process by which laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient.
4.Access to justice is provided by competent, independent, and ethical adjudicators,
attorneys or representatives and judicial officers who are of sufficient number, have
adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.
1 Data overview of distribution of income http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_
equality
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The Rule of Law should thus not be understood as a concern only for the courts.
It is much more a concern for the entire society. If the society as a whole supports
the rule of law and refers to the rule of law when so needed, for example in case
of a dispute, it will contribute to its best function. In the absence of a culture
promoting and protecting the rule of law, we will have societies where corruption
and power decides the outcome of conflicts, and the courts will base their decisions on factors other than the law of the country. It is clear that in a society where
the rule of law is weak, it is not easy to promote the rule of law, but for a change
to occur, one prerequisite is that broad layers of the society are for, and want to
support such a change.
The rule of law is also a concern for education on all levels. If the population in general does not know about it, or does not know which laws exist in the
country or understand them, how can people then be expected to follow the rule
of law? It follows that one needs to keep alive the concepts of responsibility, and
of right and wrong. How one should act needs to be seen in the perspective of
ethics, the values in the society, and not only in the context of power and ability
to act.
These concerns are present every day and in every profession of a society.
The engineer who conducts an audit of an industry should issue permits based on
valid law rather than bribes, or the fact the he or she has a friend in the industry.
Since these are examples of corruption, one should perhaps already here note
that corruption is both destructive and difficult to fight, since so many individuals take advantage of it, and those who are the victims of it often are remote and
weak. If a factory continues to produce malfunctioning products and pollutes its
environment, those who suffer – customers and the population in the neighbourhood – are not present. One of the informers of the World Justice Project says:
[c]orruption can fundamentally undermine the entire enterprise of rule of law if
it is not dealt with. In the environmental area in particular, where often the people that are harming the environment are very well-moneyed interests, that is of
particular importance.
This also illustrates the huge difference between having good laws and seeing them enforced in real life. This is not only a concern for the courts. It is
equally important for all officials who work for the authorities in the country,
and in fact everyone in the country. The most typical duty for a general citizen
may be paying tax legally, not hiding income or in other ways avoiding contributing to the tax income of the country. Here, the victims are those depending on
state support, or in general on common projects in the country, from railroads
to hospitals.
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Measuring the Rule of Law
There are several projects which over time have attempted to systematically monitor and measure some aspects of the rule of law, usually parameters connected to
democratisation, such as election systems and practice, the situation of the press,
and human rights. Most often the data collected has been indirect, that is from a
third source, or the results of questionnaires to e.g. the authorities of the countries. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index2 is a first attempt at quantifying
systematically and comprehensively a set of rule of law outcomes by linking the
conceptual definitions to concrete questions. The questions are asked to a sample
population of a country, which includes the general public and local experts. The
answers are then analysed and cross-checked. The result is reported in the World
Justice Project Rule of Law Index.
The Index has become one of the world’s largest and most comprehensive
data sets, regarding adherence to the rule of law in practice. The data collection
is an immense undertaking. The 2011 Index is the result of asking a total of 400
questions to 1,000 individuals of the “general population” and some 30 experts
in different fields in each of the reported countries. It should be noted that the
questions do not refer to the laws of the countries but what the practice is. For
example, one question is “have you been beaten by the police during the last three
years?”
The World Justice Project wants, by its Index, to contribute to strengthening
the rule of law in the world. And already the Index has had impacts in several
ways, since it points to shortcomings, in many cases serious shortcomings, in the
exercising of the rule of law in countries. In some cases, for example Colombia,
the government chose to cooperate with the WJP to improve the situation. In
other cases, for example the United States and Canada, the data has been used
by the press and independent NGOs. An obvious disadvantage of the Index is, of
course, that there is not yet a timeline, since it is a new project. We cannot see the
development taking place in a country. That has to come with time.
The World Justice Project is not connected to any authority. It was initiated
by a group of American Lawyers and still gets much of its financial support from
donors in the United States, although members of the project come from all over
the world. It is registered as an NGO.
The Index uses basic and universally accepted aspects of the rule of law to
make it comparable all over the world. It monitors four primary aspects of the
rule of law (see for example Independent Commission Against Corruption www.
icac.nsw.gov.au and Ingelstam, 2006):
2
Global Witness www.globalwitness.org/
120
1)that the government and its officials and agents are accountable for their actions under the law;
2)that clear, publicised, stable and fair laws protect fundamental rights, personal
security and property;
3)that laws are enacted, administered and enforced through accessible, fair and
efficient processes; and
4)that the legal system is manned by competent, independent, and ethical people in large enough numbers who reflect their community’s demographics and
who have adequate resources to do their jobs effectively.
These aspects have been translated into nine dimensions of the rule of law:
1)Limited government powers;
2)Absence of corruption;
3)Order and security;
4)Fundamental rights;
5)Open government;
6)Effective regulatory enforcement;
7)Access to civil justice;
8)Effective criminal justice;
9)Informal justice.
A general presentation of the WJP project and the Index is found at 3 Below I will
mainly use the data relevant to whether government and its officials and agents
are accountable for their actions under the law. This is measured by the first two
dimensions, Limited Government Powers and Absence of Corruption. Those interested in other aspects are referred to the Index itself4.
Limited Government Powers
The first basic aspect of the rule of law, that the government and its officials and
agents are accountable for their actions under the law, has been translated into
two factors, Limited Government Powers and Absence of Corruption.
The first factor, Limited Government Powers, measures the extent to which
those who govern are subject to the law. It comprises the means, both constitutional and institutional, by which the powers of the government and its officials
and agents are limited, and by which they are held accountable under the law. It
3
Independent Commission Against Corruption www.icac.nsw.gov.au
4
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also includes non-governmental checks on the government’s power, such as a
free and independent press.
Limited power is a basic component of a functioning democracy. Distribution
of power is primarily made between the three actors in governing the country –
the government, the parliament and the courts. But it has to go beyond that for
establishing a functioning rule of law. Sometimes the media are nicknamed “the
fourth power of the state” pointing to their crucial role in a democracy. Distribution of power to the regional and local level is another important part. One may
continue to point to the fact that the private sector should be able to develop business – adhering to the laws of the country – without governmental intervention,
and that churches should be able to operate without interference, and so on.
In the WJP Index Limited Government Powers are broken down into 7 parameters which are measured. These are:
1.1 Government powers are defined in the fundamental law.
1.2 Government powers are effectively limited by the legislature.
1.3 Government powers are effectively limited by the judiciary.
1.4 Government powers are effectively limited by independent auditing and review.
1.5 Government officials are sanctioned for misconduct.
1.6 Government powers are effectively limited by non-governmental checks.
1.7 Transfers of power occur in accordance with the law.
It should be noted that even if the constitution (fundamental law) of a country
gives the government full power, this is not accepted as the rule of law. Some
laws are not acceptable, as they break universal principles. Thus, anti-Jewish laws
during the Nazi regime in Germany would not be accepted as the rule of law, even
if they had been passed through the parliament. One may, of course, ask why the
German population then obeyed the anti-Jewish laws. Psychologists studying this
issue tell us that, in general, a person follows the rules and orders delivered by
what is seen as a legitimate authority. A government is most often seen as legitimate, even if it breaks universal rights. One important mission of the World Justice
Project is to make this distinction very clear. One should not respect a government
and its authorities unless they respect universal principles of rule of law. It is, of
course, clear that often an individual does not have much of a choice, but still,
what constitutes the rule of law society becomes very clear in this project.
In practice, when a government attempts to concentrate all power in itself
in an authoritarian development, the free press often becomes the first victim. In
some countries this becomes very ugly, with systematic arrests, torture and mur-
122
der of journalists. In other situations, government becomes the owner and thus
controls the media, and typically we see a development towards self-censorship.
For example, in Italy, former Prime Minister Berlusconi owned most of the TV
channels, and in Russia most media are state owned. In an opposite development
a first step is typically that the media become free. We saw this in Ukraine in 2004
and 2005 as part of the Orange Revolution.
Transfer of power is another sensitive indicator of authoritarian government.
Transfer of power in a democracy occurs in fair and free elections in which the
citizens of a country elect their representatives. If the rule of law works in a
country, elections are not manipulated, individuals who want to run for office are
allowed to do so, and the media are free to report on all parties in the election
campaigns. More typical in less democratic countries is that elections are manipulated, competitors are removed from election campaigns and the media are
controlled to support the power holders. During the last decade this has been most
flagrant in Belarus, also in Russia, less so in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution.
In the other states of CEE transfer of power has been largely correct after the system change and former power holders have been able to withdraw to private life
without repression. In this respect, Ukraine in a sad exception, after the arrest of
former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.
Absence of Corruption
The second factor of the aspect that government and its officials and agents are
accountable for their actions under the law is the Absence of Corruption. The
WJP Index considers three forms of corruption: bribery, improper influence by
public or private interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other resources. In the WJP Index this aspect is measured by 4 parameters:
• Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for private gain.
• Government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for private
gain.
• Government officials in the police and the military do not use public office for
private gain.
• Government officials in the legislature do not use public office for private gain.
Corruption is a crucial component in the rule of law, and in general of the development of a society. Sadly, corruption seems to be increasing in the world
as a whole, despite efforts at democratisation. Corruption has become, as one
anti-corruption prosecutor said, “the pest of our time.”
123
There are many kinds of corruption, such as political corruption, police corruption, corporate corruption and corruption in local government. We see in many
countries a culture of corruption, meaning that it is an established means of becoming successful in politics, in business and in private life. In a corruption culture, members of society are accustomed to the fact that money under the table
is needed to get anything done at all. It is understandable that in jobs where the
salary is so low that it does not allow a family to survive on it, anyone will do
whatever they can to improve their economic situation. Nevertheless, corruption
is a bad thing, especially if in this way it becomes an argument not to pay a decent
salary. If this is not fought, the younger generations will understand that corruption is acceptable and the only normal way to have a future, a family and a good
life, which is a very sad perspective.
In reality, corruption is not only theft and serious economic crime. On the
state level, it is a systematic way to channel the resources of a country to some
individuals who are becoming increasingly rich, increasingly greedy, quite often
far beyond the limits where money is meaningful (“grand corruption”). In this
way resources are removed from where they could be useful to the entire society. When governmental officials illegally steal money in this way, it is often tax
money, meaning that this money is not used for hospitals, child care, schools
and other obligations of the state on which many, often poor, families depend.
Every year, in this way millions of dollars are squandered on bribes paid to public officials in exchange for business advantages. The results are shoddy roads,
crumbling bridges, sub-standard hospitals and schools, and food and medicines
that do not meet safety standards.
When corruption allows family members access to office where this should
not happen, or where friends are treated differently than others by officials we may
not be dealing with money, but it is still negative for the development of the society. Areas where we see corruption more often are in public contracting, foreign
aid in developing countries, access to information, in education (false certificates
and diplomas) and the judiciary (not everyone being equal before the law). In the
business sector, the arms trade has an especially strong culture of corruption.
124
Germany
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Figure 1. The case of Germany illustrates how the data in the WJP Rule of Law Index is presented.
Source: http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Report.pdf.
125
largest cities
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62
In 2000 the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention8 entered into force as an effective anti-corruption instrument, and the only one focused directly on foreign
bribery. It is one of several efforts to reduce corruption in international affairs. It
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6
Rule of Law Index presentation http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4lGtrJrcO9w
7 “The Legal Finance Journal”, Dec 8, 2011 http://legalfinancejournal.com/u-s-justice-and-the-rule-of-lawindex/
8 Transparency International corruption perception index (CPI) 2011 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/
results/
126
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The 2011 WJP Index includes data for 66 countries in the world. Of these, 12
are countries in Western Europe and the USA and 12 are in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. The WJP intends to report from a total of 100 countries during
20129. We will look at the data for six BSR countries: Germany, Sweden, Poland,
Estonia, Russia and Ukraine.
In the Index, results in each of the four domains are shown in a wheel diagram, with each parameter measured plotted on a radius with a figure from 0 to
1, 1 meaning full implementation of the rule of law, and 0 meaning absence of
the rule of law (see the case of Germany in Fig. 1). The data for the best country
in the group is also given. In a table, the96ranking of the country, compared to its
peers in the region, in the world, and in the same income group, is also given.
For Germany, the Accountable Government parameters (Fig. 2) have values
between 0.73 and 0.88. Its ranking in the region is between 4 and 7 (out of 12) and
ranking in the world is between 2 and 12 (out of 66) for 8 parameters. The lowest
value is for Open Government.
For Sweden, values for Accountable Government (Fig. 3) are between 0.76
and 0.92. The lowest value refers to access to civil justice, meaning that the court
system is not working well enough in the country. Its regional ranking is between
1 and 4 for the 8 parameters.
Absence of corruption has the value 0.92, which is second best in the region.
What does this mean in practice? Certainly corruption exists. Recently a number
of cases of corruption in local administrations have been disclosed and taken to
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court. In the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) on
corruption in the public sector, Sweden is presently number 4, while Denmark
and Finland are sharing second place, making them the least corrupt countries in
the world. The results, however, are not that precise. The first few countries all
fall in the same confidence range. The extent of economic crime in Sweden – the
black economy, completely dominated by tax evasion – has been estimated to
form about 1% of the total economy11. This is not the same as corruption in the
public sector, but may be related, as it reflects the values in society.
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Rule of Law in the Baltic Sea Region – Estonia and Poland
In central Europe, results are available for Estonia and Poland. Both countries
have moved from a communist political system to democracy and a market economy since 1991, although Estonia did so from being a Soviet Republic. A big
difference is the size of the countries, where Estonia has 1.4mln and Poland about
39mln inhabitants. For the 8 parameters we are studying, Poland (Fig. 4) has values between 0.56 and 0.83, while Estonia’s values (Fig. 5) are from 0.73 to 0.84.
The lowest values for Poland are for Open Government, Regulatory Enforcement
and Access to Justice, meaning the court system is not so good. These parameters
are also the lowest in Estonia. In the regional ranking, Estonia holds first place in
all parameters except one in the group of 12 countries, while the ranking of Poland varies between 2 and 5. The corruption value is 0.86 for Estonia and 0.74 for
Poland. In the Transparency International 2011 CPI Estonia is found in 29th place
10 Transparency International http://cpi.transparency.org/
11 Wilkinson R. and Pickett K., The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin 2009
128
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and Poland in 41st place. When looking at the period of 1991-2011, Estonia has
made remarkable progress in reducing corruption. Of the former Soviet republics, the two most successful at reducing corruption are Estonia and Georgia. The
many stories how this was achieved are quite interesting. Some of the measures
are, perhaps, difficult to use in bigger countries.
Referring to the parameter of Transfer of Power, it is interesting to note that
the government in both countries has been replaced at each election since 1991 up
90
to
2011. In 2011, however, the government100was re-elected in both countries. This
may be interpreted as reflecting that in the long struggle for modernisation all the
governments achieved less than they promised and less than what was hoped for,
and thus were not re-elected. However, today, the electorate has become more
politically mature and understands what is possible and what is not and accepts a
more limited result. In all the other countries in central Europe (new EU members
since 2004) thus far each election has seen a change in government.
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Rule of Law in the Baltic Sea Region – Russia and Ukraine
We shall also look at the results of the two Slavic countries – Russia and Ukraine.
For Russia, the values for the 8 parameters measuring Accountable Government
(Fig. 6) range from 0.41 to 0.67, while for Ukraine (Fig. 7) they are from 0.30 to
0.79. The lowest values are for Limited Government Powers with 0.41 (Russia) and
0.33 (Ukraine), as political power is strongly centralised. The lowest value for Russia is Open Government (0.41), and for Ukraine Regulatory Enforcement (0.30).
Absence of Corruption has values of 0.49 for Russia and 0.32 for Ukraine.
Transparency International (9) rated Russia in 154th place out of 178 nations
in its CPI 2010 alongside Cambodia, Kenya and Laos. It was Russia’s lowest
129
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ranking since the index began in 1995. In 2009 it was 146th and in CPI 2011
Russia placed 143rd, tied with Mauritania and Nigeria. Corruption appears to be
a way of life in Russia, from small bribes slipped into the pockets of traffic police or doctors, to the vast kickbacks which investors say senior officials demand
for access to state contracts in the natural resources sector. An unofficial estimate is that close to 70% of the Russian state budget is corrupt. How is it, then,
in Ukraine, which has a considerably worse result? In the CPI 2011 Ukraine is
found in 152nd place, neighbouring the Central African Republic, indicating that
the general perception is that corruption is overwhelming in Ukrainian society.
Equity and Distribution of Wealth
Another aspect of how societies develop is connected to the distribution of wealth.
Less developed and poor countries typically have a very uneven distribution of
wealth, while in a modern welfare state this distribution is much more even. In
these countries the state takes responsibility for providing a minimum level of income for those who are less successful, for example by regulating minimum salaries, providing pensions and social security. Of course, a high level of corruption
leads to a more skewed distribution of wealth, as some individuals have greater
opportunities to generate unlawful income. The most typical example recently
may be Greece, where distribution of wealth is very uneven and there is also a
very high level of corruption.
Distribution of wealth is measured by a number of actors, many of them in
the financial system but also by the UN through the UNDP and others, such as the
World Bank (see e.g. http://worldjusticeproject.org/ for an overview). The data is
expressed in several ways, such as the ratio of the average income of the richest
10% to the poorest 10%. The most relevant measure is the Gini coefficient. This
coefficient measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution (for
example levels of income). A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality
(all values are the same), while a coefficient of one expresses maximum inequality (for example only one person has all the wealth).
In general, the distribution of wealth in the world has become increasingly
unequal, both between and within states since the 1970s. During this period, total
wealth has, however, increased considerably, and many countries have seen a
growing middle income sector. This has led to dramatic improvements in many
countries, most clearly in Asia. This has also happened in CEE, e.g. in Russia
the growing numbers of middle income families is obvious. Still, distribution of
wealth in Russia is the most uneven in the Baltic Sea Region, while the Nordic
130
countries are among the most economically equal in the world12. If the proposal
that democratisation in a society requires a minimum amount of middle income
citizens is correct, we should expect pressure on the Russian government to increase democratisation, e.g. to have correct and not manipulated elections, and
allow a free media. It appears that some such tendencies are becoming more
visible in Russia recently.
Unequal distribution of wealth has considerable drawbacks in societies as
reported in a number of research projects recently13. Thus, inequality is typically
connected to a higher level of crime, lower level of health, both physical and
mental, lower social capital, and lower levels of gender equality. The drawbacks
hit everyone, not only the poor section of society. There are, thus, a range of reasons for improving equality in a country.
Literature:
Data overview of distribution of income http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_income_equality
Ingelstam L., Ekonomi på plats, (Economy of place, in Swedish) Linköping University, 2006
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, see for example http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,
en_2649_34859_2027102_1_1_1_1,00.html
Rule of Law Index presentation http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4lGtrJrcO9w
“The Legal Finance Journal”, Dec 8, 2011 http://legalfinancejournal.com/u-s-justice-and-the-rule-of-law-index/
Transparency International corruption perception index (CPI) 2011 http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/
Transparency International http://cpi.transparency.org/
Wilkinson R. and Pickett K., The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin 2009
World Justice Project (WJP) http://worldjusticeproject.org/
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Report.pdf
12 World Justice Project (WJP) http://worldjusticeproject.org/
13 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/
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Problems of Democracy Development
in the Post-Soviet Space:
Cases of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia
VICTOR SHADURSKI
Belarusian State University, Minsk, Belarus
1. Transformation of political regime in Russia: from the “liberal democracy” of
Yeltsin’s presidency to the “sovereign democracy” of V. Putin.
2. Competing “two Ukraines” projects as a factor of democratic development of
the country.
3. Social and economic contract between the authorities and population in Belarus: realities and prospects.
Twenty years ago, on 8th December, 1991, in the Belovezhskaya Pushsha forest,
the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed the Agreement on Establishing
the Commonwealth of Independent States, which implied the rejection of the
Treaty on establishing the USSR of 1922. This agreement became the final stage
of the “parade of sovereignty,” which began at the end of perestroika.
After the events of December 1991, 15 new post-Soviet independent states
gained the ability to conduct independent internal and foreign policies. Belarus,
Russia and Ukraine, despite considerable differences in population size and size
of territory, had similar starting positions in the living standards and cultural and
educational levels of their citizens. During the first years of independent development the countries made similar steps to expand democratic reforms. However,
two decades later, both common trends and significant differences in the political
and socio-economic models of the three countries can be seen.
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Russia
Russia, which became the successor of the USSR, despite serious internal and
external contradictions, continued to be one of the world’s centres of power. The
resolution of many regional and global problems depends on the situation in Russia and the actions of its leadership.
Russia is the major aspirant for dominance in the post-Soviet Eurasian region. The Kremlin’s policy has traditionally been a subject of criticism from the
West (EU and USA). Russia is accused of increased authoritarianism, violation of
democratic principles, monopoly in the supply of energy, and so on.
One argument of those who criticise the Russian leadership is that the Putin-Medvedev period contrasts with Yeltsin’s presidency. It is argued that the
Kremlin is drifting away from democracy. But a deeper analysis shows that the
Kremlin’s political agendas of the 1990s and 2000s do not differ much. The Russia of Yeltsin’s presidency can hardly be described as more democratic compared
to the Russia of the following decade.
The argument that the rapid privatisation of state property was a clear manifestation of democratic development in Yeltsin’s Russia is still common in academic and journalistic literature. Indeed, rapid and wide-scale privatisation did
take place in Russia. However, the country’s wealth has concentrated in the hands
of a small group of oligarchs who were closely connected with the government.
Nowadays, many of them are actively involved in running the country. The concentration of wealth, especially of natural resources, occurred against a background of destitution of the main part of the society, the growth of criminality and
corruption, brain drain and capital drain.
In 2011, there were 101 billionaires in Russia (out of 1,210 persons on the
Forbes list, including 413 from the USA, and 115 from China).1 In this respect
Russia traditionally followed the USA and China.
Supporters of rapid privatisation argue that privatisation automatically leads
to a market economy, industrial growth and other positive effects. However, as
already mentioned, the model of “oligarchic capitalism” implemented in Russia
contributed to the retention of a commodity economy, deeper social inequalities
and increased influence of central, regional and local bureaucracy.
In the 1990s, there was more media freedom in Russia. During the election
campaigns, a strong rivalry between the leading Russian TV channels (ORT and
NTV) was observed. However, a closer look at this rivalry shows that it was
in fact a struggle for influence between Berezovsky’s and Gusinsky’s oligarchic
1 Мировые миллиардеры – 2011, http://www.forbes.ru/rating/ekonomika-package/lyudi/64547-milliardery-2011-goda-novyi-reiting-forbes#pages-1, 17.01.2012.
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clans. Looking at mass media development in the 2000s, one has to acknowledge
that the Internet is becoming an alternative to television, which is controlled by
the government both in Russia and other post-Soviet states.
No political party has had a stable majority in the Duma (the Parliament).
Those parties which formed the parliamentary opposition – the Communists and
Zhirinovsky’s party – could hardly be described as adherents and promoters of
democracy. Even today, Zhirinovsky has been elected as a vice-speaker of the
Duma, being the most prominent representative of the “political showmen.”
In the 1990s, with weakening central power in Moscow, the “parade of sovereignties” of the regions and the autonomies began. It threatened the very existence of a multinational and multi-religious Russia as an integral state. From this
point of view, strengthening of central power cannot be considered an anti-democratic action. The methods of war in Chechnya, or the storming of the Parliament
in the autumn of 1993 could not be attributed to a democratic government, either.
Thus, Russia’s political model in the 1990s was in fact “oligarchic capitalism” (a
mix of oligarchy, bureaucracy and criminal circles), which was not interested in
real democracy.
Putin’s rise to power in 2000 marked the beginning of consolidation of central power, which in such a big territory, in our opinion, was the right course.
Otherwise, Russia could become only a geographical concept. The disintegration
of Russia would almost automatically lead to armed conflicts in the region, and
the destabilisation of the situation around it. Most people understand the situation, and support the established “duumvirate,” especially because the country’s
leaders declared their commitment to democratic values and the rule of law. To
defend deviations of current Russia’s regime from the western standards of liberal democracy, the term “sovereign democracy” was introduced.
Obviously, the growing authoritarianism in Russia is leading to serious negative consequences. The consolidation of power has strengthened imperial and extreme nationalistic sentiments. A belief that the West, because of its geopolitical
interests, is not interested in a strong and prosperous Russia, and wants to transform it into a supplier of raw materials for the “golden billion,” is widespread
in all layers of Russia’s population. Putin and Medvedev are not able to defeat
this “oligarchic capitalism” which has closely merged with the state bureaucracy.
With the help of repressive measures (the Khodorkovsky case) they managed
only to limit political aspirations of the oligarchs. The reduction of powers of
the regions caused serious criticism both inside and outside the country. In 2005,
“Freedom House” experts began to refer to Russia as to a non-free country.2
2
Freedom House, Свобода в мире 2007: Россия, 2007.
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Obviously, the strengthening of authoritarian methods of governance is an
objective period in Russia’s development. How long it will last depends on many
factors: the development of civil society, human welfare, cooperation with EU
countries and USA, and so on.
The political situation in Russia has considerably worsened after the parliamentary elections in December 2011. As was expected, the so-called party
of power “Edinaya Russia” (“United Russia”) won the majority of seats in the
Duma. However, the resulting percentage of votes (49.32%) was significantly
lower than during the previous election in 2007 (64.3%).3 After the publication of
the results, mass protests started all over the country. The main motto that united the protesters was criticism of the election process, in which, as demonstrators believed, a lot of fraud was allowed. The second most important idea of the
demonstrations was the call not to vote for V. Putin in the upcoming presidential
election (March 2012).
On the one hand, the mass protests showed an increase in political culture of
a considerable part of Russia’s population, for whom democratic freedoms have
become an important intrinsic value. They also demonstrated the willingness of
an active part of Russia’s society to uphold these values openly.
On the other hand, the protests forced state leaders to think seriously about
the further development of Russia. It became clear that the Kremlin had exhausted the effects of making democratic promises and declarations without putting
them into action. Russia’s leadership is facing the challenge of conducting genuine political and economic modernisation which would contribute to economic
growth, an increase in living standards, strengthening the socio-political stability in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country. Thus, in the pre-election article “Russia concentrates the challenges that we must address,” published in the
newspaper Izvestiya on 16th January, 2012, Putin said: [t]he recovery period has
passed. The post-Soviet stage in the development of Russia, however, as in the
development of the whole world, is over… I see our task in the upcoming years as
to remove from the national development avenue all those things which prevent
us from going forward.4
Thus, Russia is on the verge of important changes. If the planned reforms are
successful, Russia’s prestige will increase and it will become a country with a
socially oriented market economy and established democratic traditions. The failure of the modernisation will lead to serious negative consequences, not only in
3 История Партии. Становление современной партии парламентского большинства, http://er.ru/party/
history/, 22.01.2012
4 В. Путин, Россия сосредотачивается – вызовы, на которые мы должны ответить, Известия, 16
января 2012.
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the post-Soviet space but also in the whole world. Political and economic development in other post-Soviet countries, including Belarus and Ukraine, strongly
depends on the development of the situation in Russia.
Ukraine
It should be noted that of all CIS member states, Ukraine adheres to democratic
principles to a greater extent. In many ways, this fact has contributed to a new,
national-motivated and European-oriented elite which is more powerful than in
other countries.
This Ukrainian national-democratic elite was able, despite strong pro-Russian sentiment in eastern and southern Ukraine, to implement a robust language
policy. As is well known, the Ukrainian language is the only official language,
in contrast to Belarus, where since 1995 both Belarusian and Russian have had
the status of official state languages, naturally meaning that Russian dominates.
Kiev continues to refrain from active participation in the integration processes in the framework of the former Soviet Union. The political class, and most
of the society, support the policy of political and economic integration with the
EU. However, the issue of Ukraine joining NATO has strong resistance from the
population.
Historically, the stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism is western Ukraine,
with its centre in Lviv, which has managed to extend its influence in Kyiv.
Rivalry between a nationally-oriented western Ukraine (Lviv) and the more
powerful in economic terms eastern Ukraine (Donetsk) with strong pro-Russian
sentiments has made it not possible to establish a strong central government in
Kyiv, as happened in Belarus. This rivalry contributed to the strengthening of
other regional centres (Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Simferopol, Odessa, etc.).
Regional conflicts have been reflected in the party system of the country.
Many experts saw a threat to the unity of the country in the strong regional polarisation (the existence of “two Ukraines”). Like other phenomena of political
life, the rivalry of eastern and western Ukraine has both negative and positive
consequences.
Thus, the regional rivalry demanded political forces establish certain rules
of the game and contributed to an active debate in the media, thereby enhancing
political participation of all areas of the country.
During the presidential elections in Ukraine (December 2004) millions of
Ukrainians demanded fair and transparent elections. The events on the Maidan
(Independence square) in the city centre, known as the “Orange Revolution,” ensured the victory of Viktor Yushchenko – a representative of the national-liberal
forces in the country with a pro-Western orientation.
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Corruption has become a consequence of the lack of a strong political centre
that hampers the development of the economy, causing serious damage to the
country’s image in the international arena.
After the elections in 2009, Viktor Yanukovych became president. According
to many experts, the elections marked a crisis in the liberal, pro-Western Viktor
Yushchenko’s policies and strengthened authoritarian principles in the governance of the country’s new leadership. And although several experts accused the
new government of pro-Russian sentiment, in our opinion, it is fully “pro-Ukrainian.”
However, there is a very high probability that Ukrainian society might not escape the contradictions of this transitional period, where the hopes for democratic
changes are replaced by the requirements of a “strong hand.”
The rise of authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine after the election of V. Yanukovych as president was clearly manifested by the sensational trial of former
Prime Minister of Ukraine, leader of the “Батьківщина” (“Fatherland”) party
Yulia Tymoshenko. She was sentenced to 7 years in prison for abuse of authority
when signing a contract on natural gas supplies between Naftogaz of Ukraine and
Gazprom in 2009. Opponents of the official authorities claimed that the main purpose of prosecuting a popular politician was the desire to remove her from the political arena of the country, as the strongest rival of the incumbent president. Kyiv
took this step despite strong protests from the West. It appears that Yanukovych’s
team’s desire to defeat Tymoshenko was stronger than their fears of “deprivation
of sympathy” of the EU and the USA.
In the formation of a new political configuration of Ukraine, in our opinion,
the further weakening of the role of western Ukraine is becoming noticeable. This
is happening not only in the economic, but also in the political life of the country.
The ongoing processes in Ukraine that objectively bring together Moscow
and Kyiv are obviously arranged by the Russian political leadership. They have
hopes of changing the Ukrainian foreign policy vector from West to East. Russia
is actively encouraging Ukraine to join the Customs Union and the Common
Economic Space (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan). For this purpose, both propagandistic and economic means are used. For example, the Russian company
Gazprom has set a price of $165.6 for a thousand cubic meters of natural gas for
Belarus, and for Ukraine – a much higher one – around $350.5 The media are
spreading information that, should Ukraine enter the Common Economic Space,
it will receive raw materials at lower prices.
5
Украина пострадает из-за дешевого газа в Беларуси, http://minprom.ua/news/83348.html..
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Thus, at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century Ukraine faces a geopolitical choice. The first way – the continuation of the policy towards
integration into EU structures. The second way – the turn to participation in the
activities of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space. The choice of
integration strategy will be reflected in the socio-political model of the country,
as each “integration club” has its socio-political preferences. In the first case,
the construction of a liberal democracy in accordance with European standards
will be continued. In the second case, Ukraine will develop a governance model
which is closer to the Russian one. Which of the strategies will become dominant
depends on many factors. Yet the choice of Ukraine is not obvious.
Belarus
During the first years of independence, Belarus followed the same development
scenario as Ukraine did. The country achieved significant success in the direction
of democratic standards.
However, the period of active democratic reforms in Belarus has coincided
with a period of severe economic crisis in the former Soviet Union, caused by
the collapse of economic relations established during socialism and the transition
from a planned to a market economy. It should also be noted that the socialist system in Belarus was less discredited than in other former Soviet republics, including Russia and Ukraine. The difficulties of the transitional period in Belarus, as
in other former Soviet countries, have increased sentiment in favour of a “strong
hand” in power. The lack of experience of life in a sovereign national democratic state and the low political culture of the majority of population worked
against democratisation. Economic well-being was valued higher than freedom
of self-expression. The national-democratic Belarusian elite were much weaker
than in Ukraine. The party in power has not been as consolidated as in Russia.
As a result of the most democratic elections in the history of Belarus (1994) Alexander Lukashenko came to power. He had a certain charisma, natural intuition and
considerable oratorical skills. From the first months in office, he began to consolidate personal power, turning Belarus into an authoritarian state which received the
definition of “the last dictatorship in Europe” in the international media. The power
pattern is that the president positions himself as the trunk of a power tree, while the
executive, legislative and judicial powers become its branches. Thus, an authoritarian form of government in Belarus received Lukashenko as its face. It should be
noted that authoritarian tendencies also grew in other former Soviet countries, but
they have other faces, other specifics (Nazarbayev, Aliyev, Putin, etc).
The specifics of the Belarusian political regime, connected for many years
with the name Lukashenko, were associated with the establishment of the Be-
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larusian political and socio-economic model. Propagandists called this model
the “Belarusian miracle.” The essence of this model was as follows: government
through a rigidly centralised vertical power structure ensured a low but stable
standard of living in the country and retained many of the previous social safeguards. In return, the government demanded from the public renunciation of the
right of public criticism of power politics, participation in collective protest, and
so on.
A considerable part of the population was satisfied with the internal policy of the government. It believed the official media and went along with the
presidential line. Another part of the population was dissatisfied with the lack
of democratic reforms but due to various circumstances preferred to criticise the
government only “in the kitchen,” and formally demonstrated its loyalty.
Only a small proportion of the population was engaged in active oppositional activities, including many former associates of Lukashenko. The political
opposition had almost no access to television – the main source of information
for the Belarusian population. It could carry out its activities only with support
from foreign funders, and was therefore very vulnerable in its conflicts with the
authorities.
Powerful and numerous law enforcement agencies were created to counter the
opposition and external influences in the country. Thus, the Belarusian model of
the scheme was simple: “gingerbread for the people,” a “whip for the dissatisfied.”
The sources of Belarusian economic development are of particular note. This
is, above all, preserved from the Soviet period industrial-agricultural complex
(8% of world production of tractors, 30% of heavy trucks, highly profitable petrochemical processing, production of milk and meat, etc).
Its second aspect is cheap energy supplies from Russia.
The third aspect is the geographic location of the country, which is favourable
for transit.
This situation changed dramatically after the presidential election in December 2010. After the brutal dispersal of protests in which thousands of citizens participated, the West got tough with the Belarusian authorities. Russia realised that
Belarus had no freedom to manoeuvre and began active measures to strengthen
its control over the neighbouring economy (privatisation of the most profitable
economic projects, etc.).
Thus, the economy has become the main “opposition” of the Belarusian regime. In the spring of 2011, the Belarusian ruble collapsed. Prices began to rise
dramatically. Discontent of the population grew stronger. “The gingerbread disappeared.” The authority had only “the whip.” Despite the significant drop in living standards, social protests have not reached a significant scale. The authorities
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proclaimed the aspiration to return to the pre-crisis level of wages in the coming
months, due to economic growth in the country.
In our opinion, the situation will become clearer in the immediate future. The
main thing is that the situation should change for the better in an evolutionary but
not revolutionary manner, because “the next night after the revolution belongs to
looters.”
The situation in Belarus, along with the internal influence, has external factors: support of the government from Russia and the position of Western countries.
The Russian Factor in the Evolution of Belarus
It should be acknowledged that Russia has not been interested in deep democratic
reforms in Belarus, or in other former Soviet states. The coming to power of democratic forces in the newly independent states could very likely contribute to the
strengthening of Euro-Atlantic cooperation (for instance, in the Baltic states) and
escape from the guardianship of Moscow. Therefore, support from the Kremlin,
mainly economic, goes to those politicians who demonstrate hostility to the West.
This is increasingly enjoyed by the Belarusian president who gets cheap energy
in exchange for “kisses.”
The Factor of the West
The EU and the USA had considerable influence in the CIS. However, their influence was noticeably inferior to Russia’s. Moscow was ready to give more resources than the EU and the USA to achieve its interests in neighbouring countries.
This is mainly because many countries of “old” Europe considered the territory of the CIS as the traditional zone of Russia’s influence. In the 1990s, the EU
and the United States provided significant assistance to Ukraine and Belarus, but
their help to Poland and the Baltic States was much stronger and more comprehensive.
In the first years of independence, foreign political players poorly understood
the national features of Belarus. The information about the young state was not
sufficient. Ukraine was in a much better position. Thus, the agreement between
Belarus and the EU was signed only in 1995, after the election of Alexander
Lukashenko.
Attention given to Belarus and Ukraine from the EU significantly increased
after the EU enlargement in 2004. The conductors of a more active Eastern policy
were primarily Poland and the Baltic states, which did not want to have a long
border with Russia. An example of a more proactive approach was the “Eastern
Partnership” Programme, initiated by Poland and Sweden, which was launched
in May 2008.
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However, events show that the impact of the EU and USA on the political
processes in Belarus remains limited. The USA is geographically removed. In the
EU, it is difficult to formulate a common approach with regard to Belarus by all
27 member states, which have their own interests.
On the one hand, the promotion of democratic values is an important goal of
democratic countries. On the other hand, the interest of neighbouring countries is
seen in expansion of business with Belarus, which forces them to make contact
and negotiate with the Belarusian authorities.
Reprisals against dissidents in the post-Soviet countries are exposed to harsh
criticism in democratic countries. However, geopolitical interests enhance dialogue with the rulers of countries when they come into confrontation with Russia
(Saakashvili and others).
The President of Belarus also played the anti-Russian card, from 2008 to
December 2010, in relation to the EU. In my opinion, he hopes to use this card
in the future.
The conclusion may be reached that, throughout the period of independent
development, the political and economic situation in Belarus is, to a great extent,
determined by Belarusian-Russian relations. Russia remains the main, though not
the only market for Belarusian industry and agriculture. The Belarusian economy is heavily dependent on the prices for Russian energy resources. Despite the
desire of the EU and the USA to increase their influence in Belarus, they defer in
the “struggle” for a young, Eastern European country to Russia, which is ready
to allocate large-scale political effort and huge resources to keep Minsk officially
in its zone of influence. The point is that the current geopolitical scheme in the
region has been formed for centuries, and it is difficult to change it in a short
period of time. However, a social layer that links development prospects with
integration into common European structures is gradually developing in Belarus.
Thus, Belarusian society is facing the challenge of creating a kind of political and
economic model which will not contribute to the interests of either its eastern or
western neighbours.
1.We can say that the transitional period – the transition to a market economy
and democratic rule in the development of all post-Soviet republics – has not
yet ended (except for the Baltic states). Authoritarian methods of governance,
in our opinion, are an objective phenomenon of transition. Another thing is
that authoritarianism can be manifested in different ways, depending on the
personality of the leader.
2.The reason for the difficulties in initiating democratisation, and popular support for a “strong hand” is the lack of experience among citizens of living in a
141
democratic society, the low level of political culture, an association of democratic reforms with the economic crisis during the first years of independence.
3.The existence of a strong national-democratic elite (e.g., Ukraine and Moldova), a more developed civil society, parliamentary form of governance, the
active support of democratic countries (as it was in the Baltic states) contribute
to the evolution of democratic processes. These processes, despite some deviations, are growing.
4.Democratic processes in post-Soviet space largely depend on the political and
economic situation in Russia, which is, first of all, the dominant power in the
region.
Literature
Bennett B., The Last Dictatorship in Europe: Belarus Under Lukashenko, Columbia/Hurst, 2011
Bohn T.M., Shadurski V.(Hg.), Ein weißer Fleck in Europa ... Die Imagination der Belarus als Kontaktzone
zwischen Ost und West, Bielefeld: transcript, 2011
Teurtrie D., Géopolitique de la Russie, L’Harmattan 2010
Wilson A., Belarus: the Last European Dictatorship, Yale University Press 2011
Wilson A., Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith, Cambridge University Press, 2006
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Sweden and Poland:
Nordicization Versus Europeanization Processes
AGNIESZKA WÓJCICKA
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland
Introduction
This article 1 focuses on the processes of Nordicization and Europeanization. The
aim is to depict their evolution and mutual influence, through a comparison between paths of Sweden and Poland towards accession into the European Union.
The thesis is that the concepts of Europe and Norden complement each another
and influence each other to such an extent that the Europeanization of Norden
triggers the Nordicization of Europe.
The cases of the Swedish and Polish as models of Europeanization through
accession into the European Union are analyzed through perspective of their origins, goals, and results, from the theoretical perspective of social constructivism,
neo-Gramscism, neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism or the theory of fusion. The goals of these two models are to be presented through the primordial,
instrumental, and constructivist approaches. Bearing in mind Georg Jellinek’s
tripartite definition of the state – territory, power, and citizens/people2 it is clear
that the process of Europeanization is, in each country, influenced by the specific
territorial or geopolitical dimensions and the power relations, namely the political
parties agendas and the situation of the economic sector, as well as by the role of
the people, who were called to express themselves in referenda. Therefore, the
origins, goals and results of the Swedish and Polish models of EU accession are
to be viewed through the analysis of the position of their respective political par-
1 This article is the outcome of the project that was implemented with the support of Iceland, Liechtenstein
and Norway through the funding from the European Economic Area Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian
Financial Mechanism within the Scholarship and Training Fund.
2 J. Kostrubiec, Typy historyczne państwa Georga Jellinka, [in:] Idee jako źródło instytucji politycznych i
prawnych, L. Dubela, (ed.), Lublin 2003, pp. 429 – 451.
143
Sweden and Poland Nordicization versus Europeanization processes
ties, covering all the political spectrum, and through the particular outcome of the
accession referendum in each country.
The analysis of both countries as case studies reveals a certain division between the idea of “Western” and “Eastern” Europeanization. Sweden represents,
to a certain extent, the “Western” way of Europeanization3 in which Nordicization has a relevant impact, and Poland the “Eastern” path. If treated as open-structures, that is not static but dynamic, these two models of Europeanization stress
various values that can complement each other – this is why the fact of Europeanization of Norden as Nordicization of Europe can be highlighted.
Defining the concepts of Europeanization and Nordicization
The notions of change, fluidity, and flexibility of the social phenomena, provided by the theoretical perspective of social constructivism help reveal Europeanization and Nordicization as dynamic, ever-ongoing processes. The future of
Europe, as well as Norden, is still a valid discussion, therefore the notions of Europeanization and Nordicization are themselves evolving, as some new elements
are added and some lose their importance.
It is difficult to find a stable meaning or a shared definition of Europeanization. Some authors4 use this term as a synonym for “European integration” and
as a reference to the impact of EU rules on domestic change. Helen Wallace5
has coined the phrase “EU-ization” to stress more accurately this specific influence. The complexity of Europeanization brings also notions of “Europeanization
West” 6 (concerning old member states) and “Europeanization East” 7 (regarding
the Central and Eastern European Countries – CEECs) that differ significantly
but share also commonalities.
3 Although Sweden is not an old member state, she can be included in the definition of Western Europeanization because before accession in 1995 she was – despite a policy of neutrality – actively involved in
international activities regarding an economic nature. Without requiring Sweden to accept full membership
status, she attempted to secure a close economic relation with the then European Community (EC) and take
advantage of the Single European Market being built. So, according to a distinction of three categories of
states taking part in Europeanization (see more: European Integration and National Adaptations. A Theoretical Inquiry, H. Mouritzen, O. Wæver, H. Wiberg (eds.), New York 1996, p. 3): insiders (EU members), wouldbe insiders and outsiders, paradoxically, Sweden was more of an insider without full membership before
accession in 1995.
4 Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, M. G. Cowles, J. A. Caporaso, T. Risse
(eds.), Ithaca 2001, p. 180.
5 The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, F. Schimmelfennig, U. Sedelmeier (eds.), Ithaca-London 2005, p. 1.
6 A. Héritier, Europeanization Research East and West: a Comparative Assessment, [in:] The Europeanization of Central…, op.cit., p. 199.
7Ibidem.
144
Attempts to measure the dynamics of Europeanization are also often unclear.
This can be a result of the fact that there are the certain limitations in the European integration theories, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism8) which
in this dynamics have the role of doctrine. Some authors9, in order to overcome
the shortcomings of these theories, propose to combine them to explain European
integration. It turns to be artificial, however, since these are opposed approaches. That is why Andreas Bieler suggests a neo-Gramscian alternative which is
considered to be particularly useful because it treats the state – as well as the
international system and human nature itself – “not as unchanging substances but
as continuing creation of new forms”10. A. Bieler introduced the notion of “the
integral state” which implies that states cannot be treated as unitary actors but as
structures within and through which social forces operate11. Hence the explanation of structural change (here Europeanization) requires a theory which “does
not take institutions and social and power relations for granted (…)”12.
Europeanization, for the sake of this article, is to be purposefully narrowed
down to the Swedish and Polish models of EU accession. There is the awareness
that Europeanization processes occur on different levels and that domestic perspective is not being prioritized. The process of Europeanization can be either
EU-driven or domestically driven13. It is a kind of synergy – since the states are
not the only actors that create this phenomenon. The definition of Europeaniza-
8 Neo-functionalism stresses that the integration begins with economic problems which - in order to be
tackled – are raised to the supranational level. The notions of economic, political and cultivated “spill-over(s)”
are essential to mark the further integration. According to Andreas Bieler there are the two major shortcomings of neo-functionalism. First is based on “the notion of spill-over which implies an inevitable, teleological
process of further integration along an objective economic rationality”. Second regards the explanation of European integration through “an emphasis on the internal dynamics of European politics”. See more: A. Bieler,
Globalization and Enlargement of the European Union. Austrian and Swedish Social Forces in the Struggle
over Membership, London-New York 2000, p. 6. These shortcomings do not allow considering structural
changes as globalization or the end of Cold War. On the other hand, intergovernmentalism is the state-centric
approach neglecting ideas and transnational actors as independent forces behind the integration - as for instance – the interests groups or transnational corporations (TNCs). Moreover, it gives priority of international
security and military capacities over economic issues.
9 See more: T. Pedersen, European Union and EFTA Countries: Enlargement and Integration, London-New York 1994; L. Miles, Sweden, Security and Accession to the European Union, School of Economics
and International Studies/University of Humberside: Occasional Papers in Nordic Studies, 1995.
10 R. W. Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, “Millennium: Journal of International Studies”, vol. 10, no 2/1981, p. 132.
11 A. Bieler, Globalization and Enlargement…, op.cit., p. 12.
12 R. W. Cox, Social Forces, op.cit..., p.129.
13 The Europeanization of Central…, op.cit., p. 8.
145
tion by Johan Olsen14 is being adapted. It represents the institutionalism-ridden
perspective and the impact of the neo-Gramscian alternative that is being added
to it.
As for Nordicization (Swedish: nordisering), the term is, in analogy to the
term Europeanization, most often used as an equivalent of the Nordic integration and cooperation processes within the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of
Ministers or Council of the Baltic Sea States, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. Therefore, all the
conditions needed for defining the concept of Europeanization are to be kept in
mind in case of Nordicization as well. In order to define this notion it is necessary
to distinguish it from terms such as: Norden, Nordicness (Swedish: nordiskhet),
Nordicism, Gothicism, Scandinavism, the Northern dimension or Balticism.
The terms and problems that are to be described below have different connotation in Norden and in Europe15. Norden is considered to be the Swedish equivalent of the concept which embraces the Nordic states. In geographical and historical terms it refers to the periphery of the European continent. Historically, European culture is the opposition to what is considered the “pagan” or “northern”.
Stereotypical patterns of characteristics of Norden are: “non-intellectualism” and
the “non-scientific” approach (German: Unwissenschaftlichkeit16), in opposition
to the philosophical tradition of Continental Europe and Latin cultural heritage.
Moreover, Norden functions, especially within the Nordic Region, as a construct
representing non-European, non-Catholic, anti-Latin, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial principles, not exploitative but based on peace and social-democratic
values17. This results in the establishment of the phenomenon of demarcation
of Norden and Continental Europe according to which Scandinavia as the progressive, liberal and Protestant states is opposed to the capitalist, conservative,
Catholic, and historically colonial Europe (the theory of “four Cs” introduced by
Lars Trägårdh18).
14 J. Olsen focuses on the institutional dynamics and the political order emerging in Europe. Firstly, it’s
important to solve what is changing; secondly, how Europeanization takes place; and thirdly, why certain
European change takes place. See more: J. P. Olsen, The many faces…, op.cit., pp. 922-925.
15 See more: A. Wójcicka, Europa i Norden: pojęcia uzupełniające się czy pozostające w konflikcie?, [in:]
50 lat i co dalej? Europa i Unia Europejska między integracją a atomizacją, Z. Czachór (ed.), Poznań 2007,
pp. 147-165.
16 M. Klinge, Fińska tradycja. Eseje o strukturach i tożsamości Północy, Wrocław 2006, p. 25.
17 L. Trägårdh, Sweden and EU, [in:] European Integration and National Identity: the Challenge of the Nordic States, L. Hansen, Ole Wäver (eds.), London 2002, p. 154.
18Ibidem.
146
Nordicness (Swedish: nordiskhet) can be divided into six phases. At first,
according to Olof Rudbeck at the turn of the 17th/18th century, this ideology was
a trial of proving a political, moral supremacy and superiority of the Northern
Europe’s civilization (especially of Sweden). Secondly, in Sweden of the 18th
century, Nordicness was the state ideology of Gothicism, according to which
Sweden was regarded as a great power state. Gothicism as the past ideology of
absolute power was externally oriented. Thirdly, in the 19th century, universalization of the Nordic ideology took place. From the 19th century, Scandinavism
was an ideology internally aimed – with an emphasis on the sense of community
creation. So inevitably, the Swedish design of Nordicness could be regarded as
an important subcategory of the Norden concept. Fourthly, in the 19th century the
construction of Nordicness was based on the moral and axiological supremacy.
Additionally, the concept of racial superiority was incorporated into Nordicness
in the 20th century; and finally, the idea of Scandinavian welfare state model in
the 21st century. At the turn of 20th and 21st centuries the return of traditional,
political concept of Norden, which accepts international cooperation but rejects
political integration (taking into consideration the crisis of nation-states) could
be observed.
Nordicism, being an outcome of the Nordicization process (Swedish: nordisering), often functions as a kind of subcategory of European or universal (e.g.
Christian) identity and as the so- called “nationalism” of the Nordic cooperation
(term used by Bernard Piotrowski19). Nordicism is the only one out of the 19th
century national movements that is currently ongoing, while Pan-Germanism,
panitalianizm or Slavism are now merely historical phenomena.
The difference between the definitions of Balticism and Nordicism stress that
politically and economically, Balticism can be assumed as a weaker movement
than Nordicism. There is a lack of common features and elements that could support the idea of the “absorption” of Nordicism by Balticism. On the other hand,
it can be stated that the traditional concept of Nordicism is being replaced by the
Balticism because the Baltic Region is the larger area in territorial/geographical
terms. There is even the approach of Pertti Joenniemi20, justifying that after 1991,
Nordicism became Balticism and that is why the extension of the Scandinavian
Northern Europe by the Baltic Europe can be observed.
The commonalities and differences between the processes of Nordicization
and Europeanization are succinctly presented in the following table.
19 B. Piotrowski, Integracja Skandynawii. Od Rady Nordyckiej do wspólnoty europejskiej, Poznań 2006, p.
6.
20 S. Jervell, A Report from Europe Northern Periphery, [in:] The Baltic Sea Area a Region in the Making,
M. Kuuk, S. Jervell, P. Joenniemi (eds.), Oslo 1992, p. 191.
147
Table no. 1. Nordicization versus Europeanization. Source: Author’s own analysis.
Process of change/
the difference markers
Origins
Actors and main
organizations/institutions
Functions/agenda
Impact put on building of
international order
Nordicization
Europeanization
Economic and cultural
discussion platform.
- Nordic countries;
- the Baltic Sea Region;
- Nordic Council, Nordic Council of Ministers, Council of the
Baltic Sea States;
- associated actors, nonmembers21.
Mainly economical reasons
of integration.
- the Western, Central, and Northern
European countries – the member
states;
- the non-European states, institutions cooperating/being associated
with EU;
- the future-members, associated
actors, nonmembers;
- European Union;
- NATO.
- Economic and cultural discus- - Nowadays political, military or
sion platform without the signifi- cultural cooperation besides economcant executive power/impact on ic
- Fully institutionalized with a great
international politics;
impact on international politics;
- The lack of supranational
- The supranational power.
power.
Nordicization processes co-func- The great impact put on building
tion within the network of Euro- of international order – EU as the
peanization processes/ essential crucial actor which creates the funcomponent of Europeanization. dament of the contemporary international order next to USA, Russia
or China.
The role of Nordicization in the context of Europeanization can be analyzed
through three different approaches, graphically represented in the three diagrams
below.
Diagram no. 1 stresses the domination of Europeanization and includes Nordicization as its component therefore the table no. 1 showing the “difference
markers” of Nordicization and Europeanization notions could rationalize the diagram no. 1.21
The thesis of absorption of Nordicization by Europeanization can be supported by analyzing the roles played by the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council
of Ministers and the EU in Scandinavia and in Europe. Firstly, there are different origins that triggered Nordicization and Europeanization processes. The
goal of European integration was to improve the economic situation of post-war
Europe. Nowadays the agenda of the EU, besides economic, concerns also political, military or cultural cooperation towards the rule of “ever closer union” with
21 There is an impact of EFTA-states (the European Free Trade Association) and states which signed the
European Economic Area (EEA) agreement.
148
Nordiciization
Europeanization
Diagram no. 1. Nordicization as a subcategory of Europeanization. Source:
Author’s own analysis.
an impact of federal approach or confederation idea of “Europe of Homelands”.
The European cooperation is also fully institutionalized. On the other hand, the
Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers22 is an intergovernmental
forum for cooperation between the Nordic countries. It was established following World War II and its first concrete result was the introduction in 1952 of a
common labor market and free movement across borders without passports for
the countries’ citizens. Nowadays, it is still an economic and cultural discussion
platform with a great emphasis put on environmental or educational issues. It
does not have the significant executive power that can influence the international
politics and the level of institutionalization is not as advanced as in case of the
EU. Nordic cooperation institutions lack supranational power; its measures are
non-binding and methods informal in comparison with those of the EU. That is
why the impact of Nordic organization on political integration is minimal23 and
the economic dimension of Nordic cooperation is not one of the main goals of
the long-term unification or one of its successful results. Moreover, an integrative
dysfunctionality can be observed in Scandinavia24 because of the fact that the
EU took over the most important functions of Nordic integration. Furthermore,
there is a weakening of the role of the EU’s Northern Dimension being observed
because of lack of agreement among Nordic states on issues of EU membership
(Denmark, Finland and Sweden as EU members), the EMU entrance (Denmark
opt-out from the EMU and Sweden not joining ERM II) or NATO accession
(Denmark, Norway and Iceland are NATO members).
22 Nordic Council, http://www.norden.org/en, 11.09.2009.
23 E. Solem, The Nordic Council and Scandinavian Integration, New York 1977, p. 15.
24 Ibidem, p. 16.
149
Europeanization
Nordiciization
Diagram no. 2. Commonalities and differences of Europeanization and Nordicization processes. Source: Author’s
own analysis.
Secondly, Europeanization includes more actors than Nordicization and is
geopolitically more spread. Moreover, it can be assumed that Nordicization processes co-function within the network of Europeanization processes and are the
essential component of Europeanization (especially when Iceland and Norway
make a decision about EU accession or if the cooperation within EFTA-states
and those which signed EEA agreement is to be taken into consideration). So,
Europeanization has a greater impact put on the building of international order
than Nordicization. The EU is the crucial actor which creates the fundament of
the contemporary international order next to USA, Russia or China.
Diagram no. 2 highlights that the two processes differ significantly but also
have some features in common. It could be justified by underlining the distinctiveness the Swedish and Polish model of EU integration and by stressing the
commonalities of these two models. It could be also rationalized by the fact that
Sweden takes part in Europeanization as well as in Nordicization processes as
well as Poland (being a member of The Council of the Baltic Sea States and of the
EU) – if Balticism is to be included into definition of Nordicization.
Finally, diagram no. 3 exposes the roles and mutual interference of each process with the important influence of the future EU member states, European but
also non-European states, associated actors or nonmembers. In that sense, diagram no. 2 could be included into diagram no. 3. Europeanization itself is indeed
a broader concept than the domestic effect of European integration and reveals a
non-EU-centric notion of “Europe”. This graph could represent the most realistic
approach to answering the question of the extent to which the processes of Europeanization of Norden and the Nordicization of Europe can be observed.
150
Nordicization
The influence of
diagram no. 2
Europeanization
the future
members,
associated
actors,
nonmember
Diagram no. 3. The mutual interference of Europeanization and Nordicization with an impact of the
future EU member states, associated actors or nonmembers. Source: Author’s own analysis.
The Swedish model of integration with European Union
There are specific terms in the literature to describe the Swedish approach towards EU accession: reluctant European 25 rejecting notions of supranationalism,
“federo-skeptic” 26 stressing the skepticism towards the vision of federal Europe
and stronger political bonds created within the EU or “one of the more problematic members of the Union”27. There is also the “4 C’s theory”, introduced by L.
Trägårdh 28 to explain the phenomenon of Swedish demarcation from continental
Europe29. However, this juxtaposition is nowadays seen as obsolete by some authors who propose, for example, the theory of fusion – “by which national and
community actors increasingly merge resources in joint institutions and complex
procedures”30. The fusion theory by Lee Miles31 offers an approach within which
25 See more: T. Miljan, The Reluctant Europeans, London 1977; L. Miles, Sweden and European Integration, Ashgate-Aldershot 1997; S. Gstöhl, Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden and Switzerland in the
Process of Integration, Boulder-London 2002.
26 See more: L. Miles, Sweden in the European Union: changing expectations?, “Journal of European Integration”, vol. 23/2001, pp. 303-333; L. Miles, Fusing with Europe? Sweden in the European Union, Ashgate
– Aldershot 2005, p. 2.
27 See more: R. Lindahl, Swedish Public Opinion and the EU, [in:] Sweden and European Union Evaluated,
L. Miles (ed.), London 2000, pp. 98-124; L. Miles, Sweden in the European…, op.cit., pp. 303-333.
28 L. Trägårdh, Sweden and EU…, op.cit., p. 154.
29 See more: A. Wójcicka, Skandynawskie a europejskie wartości – analiza porównawcza, [in:] Europa XXI
wieku. Perspektywy i uwarunkowania rozwoju, M. Musiał-Karg (ed.), Poznań 2007, pp. 77-83.
30 W. Wessels, Nice Results: the Millennium IGC in the EU’s Evolution, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, vol. 39/2001, p. 199.
31 L. Miles, Fusing with Europe?..., op.cit., p. 3 and 28.
151
the author argues that the Swedish policy–making is fast becoming fused with the
EU and has become further supranationally-oriented. That is why it is necessary
to distinguish the Swedish pre-1995 (pre-accession) and post-1995 (post-accession) models of integration with the EU.
The several issues that influenced the Swedish model of integration with the
EU can be assumed to be origins of this model. First of all, the particular Swedish
way of modernization influenced the road of Sweden towards membership in the
EU. Thanks to the moderate and peaceful modernization, Sweden became one of
the most developed and technically advanced states in the world. This can be one
of the reasons why European integration was not a goal of Swedish foreign policy
until the economic crises in 1990s. So called “welfare nationalism”32 (manifesting the superiority complex of Sweden and the Swedish system over the other
ones) created the basis for the Swedish pattern of modernization.
Furthermore, the idea of consensual/deliberative33 and integrative democra34
cy that creates a fundament of the social democratic welfare state35 – has a great
impact on the Swedish model of integration with the EU. It explains the rejection
of supranationalism and decision-making processes in the EU based on majority
rule but hardly ever on consensus.
In addition, the success of social liberalism/state-oriented liberalism/welfare
capitalism36/successful corporate market economy or the Swedish Middle Way37
and the popularity of social-democratic solutions created distance and fear towards rising popularity of neo-liberalism within uniting Europe38. The role of
the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and its hegemonic position in the
government (with minor exceptions e.g. in 1991-1994 or since 2006) is also crucial. During the period of social democratic governments a new definition of state
was gradually introduced. It is based on the “folkhem” 39 metaphor (Swedish: the
32 R. Johansson, The Construction of Swedishness, [in:] The Swedish Success Story?, K. Almqvist, K. Glans
(eds.), Stockholm 2003, p. 117.
33 The Consensual Democracies?, N. Elder, A. Thomas, D. Arter (eds.), Oxford 1988.
34 T. Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy, Oxford 1991.
35 Modern Welfare States: Scandinavian Politics and Policy in Global Age, E. S. Einhorn, J. Logue, (eds.),
Westport 2003.
36 G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge 1990.
37 M. Childs, The Middle Way, Yale 1936.
38 A. Bieler, Globalization and enlargement…, op.cit., p. 163.
39 B. Stråth, Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond, Stockholm 2000.
152
people’s home) and “lagom” (Swedish: moderation), the concept of solidarity,
consensus and universality of the values of peace40.
And, finally, the Swedish policy of neutrality (Swedish: alliansfrihet41) lead
since 1815 affected the Swedish accession road. It was issued as a key factor
that was incompatible with joining the EU. Even though it does not have a clear
legal status and there were certain deviations from a neutrality policy – especially
during the Second World War – it can be claimed that alliansfrihet is more an
“ideological” component of the Swedish political identity than the hard core of
foreign policy and in a consequence it is somehow the external dimension of the
Middle Way, influencing not only the Swedish domestic but also foreign affairs.
These elements justify the Swedish reluctance towards membership in the
EU. It can be stated that such achievements as its mature consensual and integrative democracy, the social democratic welfare state, the Middle Way supported by
the ideology of welfare nationalism, and commitments resulting from neutrality
policy, kept Sweden out of the EU until 1995 because the balance of disadvantages of EU membership predominated over advantages.
The main goals of the Swedish model of EU accession are to be analyzed
through the perspective of primordial, instrumental and constructivist approaches42 . These perspectives are influential towards each other. The primordialist perception is to focus on integration with the EU which is treated as something fixed,
inherited or inevitable. The goals of EU membership are to be a natural result of
“spill-over” effect. Therefore, the primordial perspective can show the neo-functionalist of understanding of European integration. The instrumental approach
can explain that the goals of integration with EU that stress economic gains being
used as a state’s tool. Instrumentalism supports the idea of the neo-functionalist
economic “spill-over” as well as it can justify intergovernmental understanding
of European integration – the state-centric approach neglecting ideas and transnational actors (the interests groups or transnational corporations – TNCs) as
independent forces behind the integration. Finally, the constructivist perspective
is to focus on goals of integration with the EU which have their origins in social in-
40 It was established particularly during the era of the Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson (1932-1936 and
1936-1946) and it has still its impact on the contemporary Swedish domestic and foreign affairs.
41 See more: S. Åström, Swedish Neutrality, [in:] The Committed Neutral - Sweden’s Foreign Policy, B. Sundelius (ed.), Stockholm 1989; M. af Malmborg, Neutrality and State-building in Sweden, Houndsmills- Basingstoke-Hampshire-New York 2001; B. Stråth, Neutrality as Self-awareness, [in:] The Swedish Success Story?, K.
Almqvist, K. Glans (eds.), Stockholm 2003; K. Wahlbäck, The Roots of Swedish Neutrality, Stockholm 1986.
42 The interference of these three approaches is shown through the stands of the main political parties before
accession as well as accession referendums outcomes. These approaches are transferred to understanding of
the goals of EU membership on the basis of ethnicity perceptions used in: The International Spread of Ethnic
Conflict, D. A. Lake, D. Rotchild (eds.), Princeton 1998, pp. 5-6.
153
teractions. This approach can be supported by the neo-Gramscian understanding
of European integration.
The “primordial” goals of the Swedish EU accession can be understood in
terms of the necessity of membership once integration becomes inevitable. It can
be assumed that the Swedish political elites – after the geopolitical regime and
security changes that resulted from the end of the Cold War and dismantling of
the USSR – were becoming aware that European integration could be a “natural”
step to be taken. Lee Miles43 enlists essential factors which influenced such a huge
shift of attitude towards the EU in Sweden. The most important are: the frustration of Swedish elites that resulted from the ongoing EEA process; increased
attractiveness of full membership in the EC due to the limitations of any of the
proposed alternatives (EFTA, EEA, Nordic cooperation); major external changes
in Eastern Europe with vital effects on European security and, consequently, on
the neutrality doctrine in Sweden; and – the most crucial according to L. Miles44
– the deep economic recession in Sweden during 1990s. These factors influenced
the “primordial” goals of the Swedish model of EU integration and justify the
“spill-over” effect. This perspective can show in particular, the neo-functionalist
understanding of European integration.
The “instrumental” goals of the Swedish EU accession are also immensely
influenced by the factors described above and mainly used as the social-democratic state’s tool. The instrumental perspective of accession goals stresses the
neo-functionalist economic “spill-over” as well as it justifies intergovernmental
understanding of European integration (the state-centric approach neglecting other actors – especially transnational). The most crucial goal was to secure a close
economic relation with the then European Community (EC) in order to obtain the
economic benefits of full EU membership45. This aim became valuable, despite
the paradox46 of the Swedish economic relation with the EC without a full membership, because of the limitations of such alternatives as: EFTA, EEA, Nordic
cooperation and because of economic recession in Sweden during 1990s. More-
43 L. Miles, Sweden and European Integration, Aldershot-Brookfield-Ashgate 1997, pp. 180-182. Given by:
T. R. Szymczyński, The Public Debate and the Attitude of Sweden and Poland Regarding EU Membership,
[in:] Sweden and Poland from a European Perspective, Y. Choe, B. Hassler, S. Zybrorowicz (eds.), Stockholm
2003, pp. 69-70; T. R. Szymczyński, Negocjowanie granic: od “dwunastki” do “piętnastki”. Rozszerzenie
Północne Unii Europejskiej (1995). Austria, Szwecja, Finlandia w UE, Poznań 2009, pp. 64-65.
44 L. Miles, Sweden and European…, op.cit., pp. 180-182.
45 A. Bieler, Globalization and enlargement…, op.cit., p. 87; L. Miles, Sweden and European…, op.cit., pp.
223-224.
46 J. Waite, The Swedish Paradox: EEC and Neutrality, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, vol. 12/1973,
pp. 319-336.
154
over, regional motives began to underpin the attraction of full EU membership in
order to strengthen the “Northern dimension” within the EU.
The concept of social change constitutes the background for the “constructivist” goals of the Swedish EU membership. Many new circumstances for Sweden
– internal as well as external – were brought about during the 1990s, and these
post-1989 changes in Central and Eastern Europe altered the preconditions for
Sweden’s traditional EC policy. It also resulted in the evolution of political stands
concerning the neutrality policy and its compatibility with EU membership. According to Magnus Jerneck who used Charles Hermann’s model of foreign policy
change47, Swedish policy-makers moved during three phases from an adjustment
change to an international reorientation48. The first one taking place in 1984/851987 represented the adjustment change – a period of renewed Swedish interest
in the EC. The second phase – a period of 1987/88-1990 could be summed up as
a moving from program change towards problem/goal change. It resulted in the
acceptance of the EEA in 1992. The third phase in 1990-1992 could be assumed
to be a movement from a problem/goal change to an international orientation
change, a consequence of which was SAP’s decision to apply for full membership
in October 1990, with the added effect of the neutrality policy losing its severe
significance. On the other hand, Jakob Gustavsson proposes a different approach
to policy change as a result of a three-step procedure. Firstly, the significance
of sources (domestic and international factors) that are secondly, mediated by
individual decision makers who act thirdly, within the decision making-process
(to use C. Hermann’s terminology: adjustment change, program change, problem/goal change and international orientation change)49. J. Gustavsson’s model
stresses the actors-driven role on the second stage. He points out that the altered
perspective of (then) Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson ensured that the premier
became a driving force for change (J. Gustavsson’s second stage of foreign policy change). It led I. Carlsson to establish cooperation with (then) minister of finance, Allan Larsson, to introduce the policy change (J. Gustavsson’s third stage
of foreign policy change). Moreover, according to J. Gustavsson, the Swedish
reorientation policy was not an example of a C. Herman-style international orientation change (as M. Jerneck proposes) but a problem/goal change because the
47 C. F. Hermann, Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: an Empirical Inquiry, “International
Studies Quarterly”, vol. 33/1989, pp. 361-387; C. F. Hermann, Changing Course: When Government Choose
to Redirect Foreign Policy , “International Studies Quarterly”, vol. 34/2000, pp. 3-21.
48 M. Jerneck, Sweden – the Reluctant European?, [in:] The Nordic Countries and EC, T. Tiilikainen, I.
Damgaard Peterson (eds.), Copenhagen 1993, pp. 28-30.
49 J. Gustavsson, The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on the EC
Membership, Lund 1998.
155
discussion of the Swedish EU membership was changed from a political to an
economic issue50. That is why the instrumental approach towards the EU accession goal is so crucial.
Furthermore, in relation to the “constructivist” goals of EU accession – the
Swedish state cannot be treated as a unitary actor. Therefore, as A. Bieler points
out as a contrast to intergovernmental approach towards EU integration, “application to the EU was not the inevitable result of economic necessity, but the outcome of an open-ended struggle <interaction> between different social forces”51.
This debate, in favor of closer cooperation, but not EU membership – oscillated
between certain issues as: the failure of Keynesian way in France in 1981-1983;
the emergence of “Eurocapitalism” (which involved a greater degree of international trade union cooperation, providing the necessary balance for a concentration of transnational capital). Thirdly, the issues of pollution, employment and
peace would require international solutions-cooperation. Finally, a need for the
further development of the social dimension of the Internal Market appeared52.
Therefore it can be seen that the different goals of the Swedish EU accession
interfere with each of these three approaches (primordialism, instrumentalism
and constructivism), while at the same time, complementing each other. The debate outlined above can be better clarified though an analysis of the stands of
political parties before accession (pre-1995) and the outcome of the accession
referendum. Two of seven parties represented in the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) were against EU membership.
The Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) stressed that the EU is becoming a superstate
and that is why is not able to deal with unemployment, divisions within social
classes or the democracy deficit. Vänsterpartiet arguments stressed the instrumental goals of the Swedish model of EU accession which regarded the incompatibility of EU membership with the Swedish welfare state or policy of neutrality.
Similarly, the second party that opposed EU accession – the Greens (Miljöpartiet
de Gröna) – highlighted that the EU represented the opposing values to theirs,
issued in the program as: decentralization, environmental issues and peace.
The other five were in favor but had different approaches towards EU membership. The Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna, SAP) changed that approach
in the early 1990s in order to face the European integration process and the main
changes taking place on the international stage (constructivist approach towards
the goals of EU accession) as well as the severe economic crisis taking place in
50 L. Miles, Fusing with Europe?..., op.cit., p. 6.
51 A. Bieler, Globalization and enlargement…, op.cit., p. 53.
52 Ibidem, p. 71.
156
Sweden in the 1990s (instrumental perspective). There was also a need to fix the
gap between the political elite and its electorate. This party underlined the intergovernmental level of integration with an exception for environmental policy.
The Centre Party (Centerpartiet) was in favor of accession but in opposition
to the common currency policy and accepted the SAP position that membership
was incompatible with neutrality policy. Centerpartiet, representing environmental and agricultural interests, stressed the instrumental approach towards the goals
of EU accession. Similarly, the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) were
for accession but argued for stronger control of the market by political instruments and more influential position of the European People’s Party.
As for the Conservatives (Moderaterna samlingspartiet), they were among the
strongest supporters of EU membership. The Liberals (Folkpartiet) represented the
positive attitude towards the EU and supranational arrangements resulting even in
the European Constitution. At that time these parties stressed the goal of EU accession, by means of elements of all three approaches: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism. Both parties highlighted that the Swedish EU membership
was the inevitable effect of spill-over (primordial approach) and could secure the
economic future (instrumental perspective). As for the constructivist perception,
both parties stressed the change in the European security environment and that neutrality policy should evolve towards compatibility with EU membership.
The referendum on EU membership that took place in November 1994 reflected the discussion held in Riksdag. There was a slight majority of “yes” votes
– 52,27% opposed to “no” votes of 46,83%. The turnout was high – resulting in
83,3%53. Such outcome was influenced by the general election taking place in
September 1994 (the victory of SAP). Lee Miles54 points out that it could have
been influenced in three ways by: a general consensus among the major political
parties regarding domestic issues such as budget deficit, the level of the national
debt, and rising unemployment; the parties which opposed EU membership were
successful during elections and those which were pro-EU suffered. What is more,
as Tomasz R. Szymczyński55 stresses, chances of a positive outcome of the referendum grew in 1990s – especially when SAP lost elections in 1991 and the four
parties of the centre-right coalition (the Centre Party, People’s Party, Moderate
Party, and Christian Democrats) formed a government. But in 1994 SAP returned
to power and that could have justified the growing popularity of anti-EU parties
53 L. Miles, Sweden and European…, op.cit, p. 251.
54 Ibidem, p. 245.
55 T. R. Szymczyński, The Public Debate…, op.cit., p. 77.
157
and marginal majority of pro-EU votes in the referendum in comparison with
those who remained against.
The Polish model of integration with European Union
The Polish model of EU accession can be divided into four periods: 19881989/1990s (the establishment of diplomatic relations between Poland and the
European Economic Community – the Round table talks/the first democratic
parliamentary and presidential elections), pre-1998 (before the accession negotiations were commenced on 31st of March 199856), pre-2004 (before the EU
accession) and post-2004 (Poland as a new EU member state).
The numerous issues that influenced the Polish model of integration with
the EU can be assumed to be origins of this model. These can be external and
internal factors. Firstly, Poland’s geopolitical situation, between – most importantly – Germany to the west and Russia to the east, was crucial and severe in its
outcomes. It is still nowadays due to the fact that since 2004, Poland’s eastern
boundary has been the external border of the EU. This placement on the map resulted in the establishment of Polish messianism, which flourished mainly in the
19th century between the Polish history of uprisings, and as a result had an impact
on the Polish model of integration with the EU. It can be stated that the romantic
messianism of Poland prepared the foundation for of a key role of the Catholic
Church before and after Polish EU accession.
It can be acknowledged that the Polish historical heritage has had a great impact on the Polish model of EU accession. It resulted – most importantly – in the
shadow cast by the partitions era of 1772-1795 (which saw Poland absented from
the political map for a period of one hundred and twenty-three years – 1795-1918).
The post-partition reintegration and the resurrection of an independent Poland was
a dramatic and severe task. A subsequent partition of September 1939 (the Ribbentrop-Mołotow Pact) could not be prevented. The period after World War II influenced the Polish model of EU accession most relevantly. Poland was under the
control of the Soviet Union for forty-five years during the Cold War (1945-1990).
Another factor that affected the Polish model of EU accession was so-called
“false modernization”57. In contrast to the Swedish peaceful/mild way of modernization, Poland underwent modernization forced by industrialization based on
heavy industry-orientation, which made an impact on the post-communist economic transformation.
56 Accession negotiations. Poland on the road to the European Union, Warsaw: Government Plenipotentiary
for Poland’s Accession Negotiations to the European Union, Chancellery of the Prime Minister Republic of
Poland, 2000, pp. 9-10.
57 P. Sztompka, Socjologia zmian…, op.cit., p. 132.
158
There are the internal factors that triggered the integration process with EU
after the bipolar world order finished. Crucial to the political, economic, and social transition were the significant role of the Solidarność movement, the Round
Table talks in 198958 and the first free parliamentary and presidential elections
in the 1990s59. As for the external factors – the end of ideological confrontation
between the East and the West resulted in the dissolution of such structures as: the
Council for Mutual Economic Aid, Warsaw Pact or superpower state of USSR.
Moreover, the unification of Germany was an essential contributing factor.
The main goals of the Polish model of EU accession are to be analyzed
through the perspective of primordial, instrumental and constructivist approaches which are influential towards each other. The “primordial” goals show that it
was vital and crucial for Poland to enter the EU after the major changes of the
post-1990 period. It became a strategic goal of the Polish foreign policy, together
with entering the NATO structures. There were no specific factors that influenced
the emergence of the “primordial” goals – as in case of Sweden (the limitations
of any of the proposed alternatives such as the EFTA, EEA, Nordic cooperation
or the economic regression). In the case of Poland it could be assumed that it was
a fundamental and obvious decision.
The instrumental perspective of the main goals of the Polish accession stresses that it was not economic security, but the ensuring of future military security
which was more essential. After the Soviet Union and all the structures of the
Eastern bloc were dismantled in 1991, Poland was placed in a kind of security
“vacuum”. The idea of collective security became an aim.
The concept of social change constitutes the background for the “constructivist” goals of the Polish EU membership. Many new circumstances for Poland
– internal as well as external – were brought by the 1990s and these post-1989
changes to the Eastern bloc. In contrast to Sweden, the changes affected Poland
directly and she was a very important subject/actor undergoing transformation.
In the Polish case, both C. Hermann and J. Gustavsson’s models of foreign policy
change could be applicable but with respective differences of purpose for said
policy changes. The Swedish policy-makers moved through three phases from
an adjustment change to an international reorientation due to the “cost-effective
measures” which appeared in the 1990s.
In order to show what/who influenced the Polish model of EU accession according to the second stage of J. Gustavsson’s model of policy change, certain
58 See more: S. Parzymies, Stosunki międzynarodowe w Europie 1945-1999, Warszawa 1999, p. 155.
59 See more: G. W. Kołodko, A Two-thirds of Success. Poland’s Post-communist Transformation 1989-2009,
“Communist and Post-Communist Studies”, vol. 42/2009, pp. 325-327.
159
individual decision makers should be enlisted, such as Lech Wałęsa – the first
presidency of the Republic of Poland; Leszek Balcerowicz who introduced the
economic “shock therapy” remedy60 in the 1990s; and post-communist and proEU politician Aleksander Kwaśniewski – President of the Republic of Poland in
1995 and in 2000.
Just as it can be seen in the case of Sweden’s EU accession, the different
goals of the Polish EU accession interfere with each of these three approaches (primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism), while at the same time,
complement each other. It can be better clarified though the analysis of the stands
of political parties before accession (pre-2004) and the accession referendum outcome. The largest political parties represented in the Polish parliament (Sejm)
were for EU membership61. The Unia Wolności (Freedom Union, UW) was considered to be most in favor of integration, representing a socially liberal and profree market course, along with the Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic
Left Alliance, SLD), with their communist roots. In the case of the Unia Pracy
(Labor Union, UP) the pro-accession shift could be observed as a result of their
having formed a coalition with the SLD. The AWS (Solidarity Election Action)
presented various approach to EU matters. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was
favorable at the declarative level and reserved at the practical one. The Platforma
Obywatelska (Civic Platform, PO), which emerged from liberal fractions of UW
and AWS, was very positive towards integration. On the other hand, it is essential to mention the euroskeptical parties which appeared in Sejm, such as: the
right-wing Liga Polskich Rodzin (the League of Polish Families, LPR) with its
infamous leader Roman Giertych and the populist Samoobrona (the Self-defense)
with its controversial leader Andrzej Lepper. They were not in the government
before the EU accession but their anti-EU arguments remained vivid.
There is also a need to point out the significant role of the Catholic Church
– as a social force – in the Polish model of EU integration. It strengthened its
position after the fall of communism and took an oppositional role towards EU
integration. It became a platform for a populist discussion neglecting the anti-discrimination laws. The strong position of the Catholic Church was built on a reputation of anti-communist underground opposition. That is why the shift towards
60 See more: J. Bielesiak, Poland, [in:] Eastern Europe. Politics, Culture, and Society since 1939, S. P.
Ramet (ed.), Bloomington-Indianapolis, 1998, p. 145.
61 E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, Integracja europejska jako oś podziału sceny politycznej, [in:] Polityka i Sejm.
Formułowanie się elity politycznej, W. Wesołowski, B. Post (eds.), Warszawa 1998, pp. 93-94.
160
populism and the “reintroduction”62 of the Catholic Church of such kind as took
place after the fall of communism influenced the Polish model of accession.
In general, the Polish political parties in Sejm at that time represented all
three approaches towards the goals of EU accession, with great importance
placed upon the instrumental perspective since the integration was considered to
be beneficial for security and the national economy. The constructivist approach
towards goals was also particularly stressed because the integration consequences for geopolitics were seen as beneficial.
The outcome of referendum on Polish European Union membership held in
2003 and ratification of the Treaty of Accession 2003 (Athens’s Treaty) by Poland
supported the fact that the largest parties in Sejm were for EU membership. According to Polish official results, 58,85% of the population voted and 77,45% of
them answered “yes” while 22,55% answered “no”63. So, contrary to the Swedish
model, there was a bigger pro-EU majority. It signifies that the goals of the Polish
model of accession differed from those of the Swedish – with Poland focused
mostly on the ideological choice of “joining democratic and liberal West” and the
assurance of political, economic and military security.
The Swedish and Polish European integration paths. The comparative analysis
The comparison of the Swedish and Polish accession roads is challenging and
difficult because of the essential differences between these two states regarding historical, geopolitical, political, economic, social and cultural issues. That is
why the methodological question arises – whether these two states can be comparable. They can, since there is a common level of comparison: the EU accession
path. The main differences of the Swedish and Polish model are now going to be
outlined, followed by the similarities 64.
The differences regarding the historical and geopolitical background (1) of
Sweden and Poland are crucial for the distinction of the accession roads taken.
The different modernization paths taken by these states are to be the most influential for the Swedish and Polish EU accession roads. Sweden, as a Nordic country on the Scandinavian Peninsula in Northern Europe, was a great power state
mainly in 16th century, a neutral state since 1815 – during both World Wars until
62 D. O. Huseby, The Catholic Church and the Europeanization process – an Empirical Analysis of EU
Democratic Conditionality and Anti-discrimination Protection in Post-communist Poland and Croatia, Trondheim 2009, p. 3.
63 Wyniki referendum europejskiego ogłoszone przez Państwową Komisję Wyborczą, http://referendum.
pkw.gov.pl/sww/kraj/indexA.html.
64 This comparison is based on A. Héritier distinction of Europeanization West and East. Dissimilarities are
numbered from 1 to 10 and similarities from 1 which is divided into 1a and 1b category. See more: A. Héritier, Europeanization Research East and West: a Comparative Assessment, [in:] The Europeanization of Central…, op.cit.
161
nowadays – underwent peaceful modernization and became a successful welfare
state in 20th century. On the contrary, Poland, as a country in Central Europe bordered – most importantly – by Germany to the west and Russia to the east, was
absent from the political map for one hundred and twenty-three years (1795-1918)
due to partitions, with a short interwar period of a semi-democratic system, and
under control of the Soviet Union for a further forty-five years during the Cold
War (1945-1990). Poland, in contrast to the Swedish peaceful/mild modernization,
underwent so called “false modernization”65 forced by industrialization based on
heavy industry-orientation. These facts stress the varying approaches towards the
notions of sovereignty or independence that exist between the Swedish and Polish
citizens, as well as the obviously different starting situations (2) of these countries when the process of their respective EU accession negotiations began. Poland
was undergoing a transition to a democratic political system and a transformation
into market economy in the 1990s while the EU accession negotiations started
in 1998. During the Cold War the EU membership could not be an issue for Poland which was functioning as a satellite state within the Eastern Bloc under the
“iron curtain”. That is why, only after the main democratic changes triggered by
the Round Table negotiations in 1989, could NATO and EU membership become
the strategic and long term goals of the Polish foreign policy. Although Sweden
became an EU member relatively late – in 1995 – it was a matter of her choice.
The negotiations could have been started much earlier than in 1970. What is more,
pre-member Sweden had a close economic relation with the EU through OECD,
EFTA or EEA. So, there are simply different reasons for the EU accession (3) of
these two states. In Sweden it was mainly about fixing the future economic security, in Poland it was the ideological choice of “joining democratic and liberal West”
and the assurance of political, economic and military security – with an emphasis
put on military security.
In addition, there was the different impact and role of political parties and
interest groups that shaped the EU accessions debate (4). Poland underwent profound system transformation in the 1990s, with the debate about the European
integration process proving insufficient until the actual accession in 2004. Hence,
in the case of Poland, the important sources of direct influence on this debate can
be narrowed to political parties and interests groups 66. In Sweden the level of discussion was sufficient and consensus could be observed among the main political
parties – especially after 1990. What is more, one main difference concerns the
significant role and position of the Catholic Church within the debate in Poland,
65 P. Sztompka, Socjologia zmian…, op.cit., p. 132.
66 T. R. Szymczyński, The Public Debate…, op.cit., p. 64.
162
while the Church of Sweden (until 2000 it held the position of state church) did
not play such a role.
It can also be an issue that the different international relations dynamics took
place while the Swedish and Polish EU accession took place (5). Sweden became
a member of EU on 1st of January 1995 as a result of the fourth enlargement of the
European Community together with Finland and Austria (the Third Wave of Enlargement and the Second Northern Enlargement 67). It was the first enlargement
of EU after Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1st of November 1993 and this
treaty led to the creation of the Euro and created the pillar structure of the European Union. It is important because these were profound changes, and for Sweden
– the “federo-skeptic” state – the EC pillar was more difficult to accept than the
other two pillars, they being intergovernmental policy areas. Moreover, Sweden
joined the EU after the Cold War finished, the conclusion of which resulted in a
new geopolitical, political, and economic or security reality. It could be stressed
as having been helpful in making the decision about EU accession. On the other
hand, Poland joined EU in 2004 during the discussion of the Treaty of Nice that
came into force on 1st of February 200368. This enlargement was known as an
Eastern one, and has been in action until the present69. Moreover, the international
relations conditions were very much different than those in 1995. It was the reality
of post-Kosovo War, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, and post-9/11 or
the Iraq War (which began in 2003). The Polish EU accession took place during
the time when the reality of international relations was more complex and more
challenging than the circumstances during the Swedish EU accession.
There is also the essential difference of the course of accession negotiations
(6) – as Adrienne Hértier calls it – the different “shadow of accession negotiations” 70. In Europeanization East the pressure is put on applicants to take on EU
policy outputs – e.g. entire acquis without any “if and buts” with an exception
of transition periods that allow certain delays in the application of the acquis.
In the case of Poland the accession was better in any terms than no accession.
Sweden, controversially, didn’t join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II)
of the European Monetary System and is a member state with a derogation from
67 Ibidem, p. 63.
68 It regarded changing of the vote weighting in the Council, the European Union being endowed with a
legal personality or argument on the pillar structure of EU.
69 Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and Cyprus as the first six candidate states has
been defined as – the Group of Luxembourg. Negocjowanie granic od ”UE-15” do ”UE-27”. Rozszerzenie
Wschodnie Unii Europejskiej część pierwsza – Grupa Luksemburska (2004). Estonia, Polska, Republika
Czeska, Słowenia, Węgry, Cypr w UE, T. R. Szymczyński (ed.), Poznań 2009, p. 8.
70 A. Héritier, Europeanization Research…, op.cit., p. 204.
163
the third stage of the EMU, but is not exempted from participation 71 (Denmark
and Great Britain, in contrast, negotiated an “opt-out” position from the EMU).
There is also a kind of a “threat” of being excluded from membership in the case
of Europeanization East, while Europeanization West is linked with relatively
mild sanctions.
Furthermore, in Europeanization East there is a focus on the wide scope of
policies opposed to the narrow focus (7) in Europeanization West. During accession negotiations in Poland there was an attempt to encompass the entire aquis
or sector e.g. agricultural sector, structural policy, environmental or social policy
while in Sweden the impact was put mainly on narrow policy areas or certain
individual issues.
Additionally, there is a difference in types of policy demands (8). There is a
greater importance of institutional expectations in Europeanization East opposed
to the rarity of institutional requirements in Europeanization West. EU policy
demands directed at Poland included those to change national political, administrative, and judicial structures – to accept the institutional aquis such as the
institutionalization of human rights, and the introduction of administrative or environmental policy reforms. In Europeanization West such explicit demands for
institutional reform are only made under exceptional circumstances 72.
Another difference can be identified with regard to the smoothness or difficulty of the EU policy implementation process (9). This may be linked to the
wide or narrow policy scope. A broad scope does not reveal the analytical problem-type features. Implementation process is more difficult in Europeanization
East and smoother in Europeanization West due to better legal transparency and
more advanced functions of the political or legal institutions. That is why there
is the relative frequency of routine implementation controls in Europeanization
East, as opposed to the relative infrequency in Europeanization West 73.
The difference regarding the process features can be also an issue. A. Hértier
underlines the fact that Europeanization West is a two-way street with changing
member states functioning as policy initiators, whereas Europeanization East is
more of a one-way street where the new member states seem to have taken few
policy initiatives (10). A two-way street symbolizes the mutual interaction (re-
71 Ulf Söderström, Re-Evaluating Swedish Membership in EMU: Evidence from an Estimated Model, “Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series”, no 227/2008, p. 1. http://www.riksbank.se/upload/Dokument_riksbank/
WP227W.pdf.
72 A. Héritier, Europeanization Research…, op.cit., p. 206.
73Ibidem.
164
garding the influence or even proposition of policies) between member states and
EU institutions – especially European Commission.
On the other hand, there are also similarities between the Swedish and Polish
models of EU integration. The mechanisms explaining adjustment or non-adjustment are basically the same (1). The aim of ensuring the future of economic
security is predominately the issue in both states and the advantages that come
from the participation in the Single European Market are being highlighted (1a).
Moreover, the purposes of denying membership are similar (1b). The arguments
raised mainly by the far-right, right-wing and populist or green parties in both
states are comparable. The rise of populism during the period of negotiations
preceding EU membership can be observed in Sweden as in Poland. The arguments such as: the loss of national identity and values, the excessive influence of
foreign investments on national economies, the fear of annihilation of the small
households or the pollution of the environment can be enlisted during the both
states’ accession paths.
Conclusions. Europeanization of Norden, Nordicization of Europe?
Both the Swedish and Polish paths towards EU accession brought specific results
of its models of integration. The act of Swedish accession to the EU resulted in,
firstly, the fact that despite the issue that it is based on notions of: 4 C’s theory,
welfare nationalism, peaceful modernization, consensual democracy, integrative
democracy, social democratic welfare state, the Middle Way, committed neutrality, reluctant European identity and “federo-skepticism”, the specific conditions
were created for this EU member state to be active in economic as well as in the
security common EU area. Secondly, this basis is resulting in Swedish policy–
making to be fast fused with the EU and further supranationally-oriented. It can
be assumed that the Swedish foreign policy became gradually “de-Swedicized”
and “re-Europeanized” (the stand of Mikael af Malmborg 74). In contrast, Bo
Stråth 75 points out that the phenomenon of “de-Swedicization” is more a cosmopolitan ideology than the phenomenon of Europeanization. On the other hand,
despite Sweden’s participation in European integration there is still a kind of
Sweden’s refusal observed – to be placed at the core of the ongoing integration
process. The tradition of alternative forms of association (within Nordic Council,
Nordic Council of Ministers or between EFTA states) is still valid.
74 M. af Malmborg, Europe’s Wars and the Swedicisation of Peace, [in:] The Swedish Success…, op.cit, p.
146.
75 B. Stråth, Myth and Memory…, op.cit., p. 376.
165
The main results of the Polish model of EU accession stress that it is successful although that it is based on the ”heritage” of partitions, Polish messianism, “false modernization”, outcomes of inter-war period, World War I and II,
the “iron curtain” and the Cold War/bipolarity, communism, the post-communist
transition – with certain inevitable young democracy problems. It was the fulfillment of the ideological goal of joining the democratic and liberal West as well as
Euro-Atlantic structures – NATO in 1999. The motivation towards EU accession
was very strong. Poland as an essential geopolitical actor in Europe (a kind of
“wedge” between Germany and Russia) assumes its place in Europe – unlike the
Nordic countries which are still “reluctant” Europeans and represent non-European, non-Catholic, anti-Latin, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial principles, not
exploitative but based on peace and social-democratic values. So, on the one
hand, Poland’s accession road was much harder than Sweden’s one, but once
being a member state, Poland has a greater impact on Europeanization, because
she quickly became one of the core EU member states (i.e. creates the Eastern
external border of the EU). At the same time as Sweden does not have the same
commitment towards Europeanization process. Moreover, it can be stated that
the Polish model is a Christianity-oriented one and seeks for Catholic values to
be stressed at a supranational level – in European legal acts (e.g. in the European
Constitution). Finally, Lee Miles’ theory of fusion can be applicable to the Polish
model of EU accession, however there is no argument for a significant shift from
the severe skepticism to the fusion with the EU and becoming further supranationally-oriented – as in the Swedish case.
Analyzing more general aspects of Nordicization and Europeanization processes, it can be assumed that the phenomena of Europeanization of Norden and
Nordicization of Europe can be observed. Both the Swedish and Polish integration models can highlight this issue. Europeanization of the tasks and aims of
the Nordic Council and the development of the new forms of its activity could
be observed nowadays. This is indicating the process of shaping a “new” Nordic
collective consciousness – where, on the other hand, the common Nordic values
are still a priority. For instance, thanks to the Nordic countries’ membership (especially Sweden) in the EU, such political principles or values are highlighted as:
peaceful coexistence, sustainable development, federo-skepticism, democratic
and humanistic concepts of society, the way of decision-making based on consensus, respect for the principles of regional, community law and social solidarity,
the debate about democratic transparency, access to information in the EU or the
gender equality and the respect for the minorities.
166
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168
The publication Regional Development and the Baltic Sea Region,
edited by Tomasz Branka and Arnold Bernaciak, shows an
interdisciplinary approach to issues of regional development.
The topic is very actual, being discussed theoretically, dealing
with social, environmental and economic issues, as well as on the
level of decision-making and practice in public administration. It
is important that scientific considerations can be applied to the
development of strategies as well as decision-making processes.
This is a very positive aspect of the book – there is a high
practical relevance of the issues dealt with. Strengths of the book
are the wide range of authors dealing with the political, cultural,
social and natural landscape regarding regional development.
Prof. Joost Platje
Review of the book Regional Development and the Baltic Sea Region

Regional Development and the Baltic Sea Region

Transcription

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