Evaluation of the Afrobarometer Round 4

Transcription

Final Report
Evaluation of
Round 4
Delivered on October 20, 2010, to
PROGSAM/TEAM REPS
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
SE-105 25 Stockholm
Sweden
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Table of Contents
List of Boxes and Tables ..............................................................................................................................................................iii
List of Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................................................... iv
Executive Summary
Background and Scope .................................................................................................................................................................. v
Summary of Main Findings ......................................................................................................................................................... v
Summary of Recommendations .................................................................................................................................................. x
1. Background .................................................................................................................................................................. 1
The Afrobarometer and Round 4 ............................................................................................................................................. 1
Scope of, and Sources for, the Evaluation ............................................................................................................................. 3
2. Findings .......................................................................................................................................................................... 5
A) Improve and Expand the AB Survey Data Base ............................................................................................................ 5
Recommendations ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
B) Building Capacity for Survey Research, Analysis, and Management .................................................................. 8
High Quality Analysis of Data .......................................................................................................................................................................... 9
Capacity Building ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 11
Recommendations .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 13
C) Increasing the Visibility of the Afrobarometer among African Policy Actors .............................................. 13
Dissemination ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15
Outreach ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 17
D) Project and Financial Management ................................................................................................................................ 22
Transition of Project and Financial Management .............................................................................................................................. 24
Project Management and the Other Core Partners............................................................................................................................ 27
E) Regional Public Good and Peace & Security? ............................................................................................................. 31
Peace and Security............................................................................................................................................................................................. 31
Regional Public Good ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 31
3. Final Remarks ........................................................................................................................................................... 32
Appendix 1: Summary Observations from Field Missions ........................................................................... 33
CDD-Ghana, (Core Partner for Anglophone Africa and Host for PMU, Ghana). ................................................ 33
IDASA (Core Partner for Southern Africa, South Africa) ............................................................................................. 39
PAS, University of Botswana (National Partner, Botswana) ..................................................................................... 47
IDS, University of Nairobi (National Partner, Kenya)................................................................................................... 53
GREAT (National Partner, Mali) ............................................................................................................................................. 59
CPA, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (National Partner, Mozambique) .......................................................... 63
GERCOP, Gaston Berger University (National Partner, Senegal) ............................................................................ 69
Appendix 2: Results of Survey with AB Partners ............................................................................................. 74
Appendix 3: List of Interviewees Consulted ....................................................................................................... 77
Appendix 4: List of Documents Consulted for the Evaluation: .................................................................... 82
Afrobarometer Briefing Papers .............................................................................................................................................. 89
Afrobarometer Working Papers ............................................................................................................................................ 90
Appendix 5: Evaluation Team ................................................................................................................................ 92
Appendix 6: Response of the AB Executive Committee to The Draft Final Report .............................. 94
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List of Boxes and Tables
Box 1. Team Composition ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Box 2. Number of AB Surveys ................................................................................................................................... 2
Box 3. Partners, Support Units, and Personnel ........................................................................................................ 2
Box 4. Number of AB Interviews 1999-2010 ............................................................................................................ 6
Box 5. Citations of AB Data and Publications ......................................................................................................... 10
Table 1. Gender Composition of Field Workers R2 – R4. ......................................................................................... 6
Table 2. Production of Bulletins and Briefing Papers by AB Partners ...................................................................... 9
Table 3. AB R4 Field Work, Media, and Dissemination .......................................................................................... 16
Table 4. Outreach Events and Impact..................................................................................................................... 18
Table 5. Budget Allocations of Staff Resources At Present (2010) ......................................................................... 25
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List of Abbreviations
AB
ABEC
ANC
BP
CDD
Afrobarometer
Afrobarometer Executive Committee
African National Congress
Briefing Paper
Ghana Center of Democratic
Development
CEPA Center for Policy Analysis
CIDA Canadian International Development
Agency
CP
Core Partner
CSO
Civil Society Organization
CSSR Center for Social Science Research
D&G Democracy and Governance
DANIDA Danish International Development
Agency
DARU Democracy in Africa Research Unit
DD
Deputy Director
DFID Department for International
Development (UK)
DM
Data Manager
EA
Electoral Area
ED
Executive Director
EIU
European Intelligence Unit
FTE
Full-Time Equivalent
GCIS Government Central Information
Services
GERCOP Groupe d’Études et de Recherches
Constitutionnelles et Politiques
GREAT Groupe de recherche en économie
appliquée et théorique
HR
IDASA
IDP
IDS
IREEP
Human Rights
Institute for a Democratic South Africa
Internally Displaced People
Institute for Development Studies
Institute for Empirical Research in
Political Economy
ISS
M&E
MDBS
MP
MSU
NDC
NGO
NI
NP
PAS
PMU
PPS
PSI
PSU
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
REPS
Institute for Security Studies
Monitoring and Evaluation
Multi-Donor
Member of Parliament
Michigan State University
National Democratic Congress
Non-Governmental Organization
National Investigator
National Partner
Department of Public Administration
Studies
Program Management Unit
Proportional Population Size
Public Services International
Primary Sampling Unit
Round One
Round Two
Round Three
Round Four
Round Five
Regional Team for Empowerment,
Peace and Security in Africa
SIDA Swedish International Development
Agency
SOR
Summary of Results
TOR
Terms of Reference
UB
University of Botswana
UCLA University of California, Los Angeles
UCT
University of Cape Town
UK
United Kingdom
US
The United States
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
WP
Working Paper
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Background and Scope
The Afrobarometer (AB) Network conducts comparative national probability-sample surveys
measuring public opinion and attitudes on democracy, governance, market reform, social conflict, and
civil society in 20 African countries. In 2007, SIDA TEAM/REPS signed an agreement with Ghana
Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) for support for Round 4 of the Afrobarometer (20082010). Eventually, SIDA’s total contribution to AB R4 was SEK 9,500,000 and USD 66,531.
A contract for this evaluation was signed between SIDA and Context/INKA Consult/HN Consultants
AS on July 26, 2010. The Terms of Reference (TOR) state that the AB R4 was to be analyzed with a
view to the overall achievements and in particular in relation to its present four core objectives:

Increase visibility of the Afrobarometer among African policy actors;

Continue to build capacity for survey research, analysis and management;

Improve and expand the Afrobarometer database;

To improve project and financial management including the transfer of those responsibilities to
African partners
This is the final report submitted to SIDA TEAM/REPS on October 20, 2010.
The evaluation is based principally on all available AB documentation, public as well as internal;
informal interviews with more than 170 individuals; field missions to seven countries; and a survey
administered to all AB partners (N=20). While the data available through these sources is limited and
possibly skewed in certain respects, the volume far exceeds the minimum requirements stated in the
TORs, and tentative findings have been discussed with representatives of the AB Networks at all
levels on numerous occasions.
In order to further ensure a balanced reporting, and at their own suggestion, the AB Executive
Committee’s written response to the draft version of this report, is included as Appendix 6. Naturally,
the comments have in many cases led to revisions in this final report.
The Evaluation Team’s core ambition has been to present a balanced report that is fair to all, yet that
does not shy away from controversial issues. Our mission has been to inform, not to debate, and we
have done our very best to achieve that goal.
Summary of Main Findings
The Afrobarometer (AB) is one of the most successful social science projects in the last few decades
that has incalculable significance for not only research, but perhaps in particular for policy-making.
Its future instrumental value simply cannot be estimated. The AB’s comparative- and time-series data
collection is a unique resource for future generations of policy-makers and actors. Overall, R4 should
be seen as a successful continuation and improvement on R1-R3, which largely achieved core goals.
We also find that the AB project can be further strengthened in certain areas, in particular with
regards to dissemination and outreach, as well as project management. The latter is particularly
important, given the specter of a rapid expansion in several more countries in the coming R5. The
evaluation team does not claim to have the answer to how the organizational structure can be made
optimized for the multiple goals of the AB project, but we maintain that the status quo involves
weaknesses that at a minimum should be carefully examined.
A) Improve and Expand the AB Survey Data Base
The AB R4 succeeded in producing high quality data and making it available largely according to its
established protocol with small variations. The number of interviews conducted in R4 was 27,713
increasing the total number (R1-R4) to 107,109. This is an impressive record.
The country data sets and the merged 20-country data set were released within the stipulated 12month period after completion of data collection. The evaluation team finds it reasonable to keep the
one-year embargo on release of the data itself. The availability of AB data sets and related materials is
restricted by the limited provision in French.
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The data is gender sensitive achieving an almost perfect 1:1 ratio of interviewees. The temporary
fieldwork staff varies from the gender imbalance in favor of women in South Africa (74% women) to
the imbalance favoring men in Benin (90% men). In 13 out of the 20 countries, however, the gender
ratio lies within acceptable 2:3 (i.e. 40%/60%) in either direction. In terms of permanent staffing at
AB partners, a majority of AB partners have a reasonable balance but there are also countries in
which the staffing is unbalanced resulting in an overall ratio of about 2:1 (i.e. 32% women).
The standard sample size (N=1,200) is adequate for national estimates but not for disaggregated
analysis of regional and/or ethnic patterns critical to be policy relevant in many countries, and for the
AB to be more relevant to peace and security issues. The field missions suggest that in many countries
local foreign missions would consider funding such initiatives.
The evaluation team recognizes that the AB Network has in the past considered and tested the use of
hand-held computers in data collection. We find that the rapid technological advancements in this
area create a potential to save time and money while improving quality control.
B) Building Capacity for Survey Research, Analysis, and Management
Overall, the AB’s capacity for carrying out survey research has reached highest international level in
most, if not all AB partner countries. The project has affected academic scholarship on Africa rapidly
and fundamentally. The lion share of this production is authored by US-based scholars. There is also a
growing and impressive body of policy-relevant analysis emerging from the AB African partners. Yet,
there are visible signs that capacity for analysis also in this regard needs further strengthening.
High Quality Analysis of Data
In terms of directly policy-relevant publications, the AB project has so far generated 91 AB Briefing
Papers out of the many more Bulletins produced in each country after each round. The standard AB
contract during R4 required each AB partner to produce a minimum of 3 bulletins. All countries
except one achieved this goal during R4 and 6 countries exceeded the target by producing from 4 up
to 7 bulletins, resulting in a total of 74 bulletins. Almost all (85%) of these 74 bulletins were produced
by African partners, another indicator of AB’s success.
Roughly a third of the NPs produce bulletins that are of the quality that requires only ‘normal’ editing
before being published as ‘AB Briefing Papers’. The other two-thirds require significant input from AB
staff at CPs and the support staff at MSU. 20% of the bulletins are rejected. Thus, there is still room for
improvement of capacity even at this basic level of analysis.
R1 through R3 over 9 years produced 49 briefing papers altogether. R4 alone has produced the same
amount of output in just 3 years demonstrating much improved contractual specification of
deliverables in R4 and a positive trend in terms of increasing policy-relevant publications. This is
evidence that the AB has achieved one of the important targets in terms of demonstrating impact on
capacity as well as visibility.
There are gender-imbalances in terms of output. According to the evaluation survey, 13% of all AB
Bulletins and 6% of AB WPs submitted were authored by women. The acceptance rate for women’s
AB Bulletins is even lower so that only 7% of accepted AB Bulletins were authored by females.
In terms of academic output, the project has generated 1 book, 47 peer-refereed articles, 21 book
chapters, and 120 AB Working Papers. These publications have been cited in the scientific literature
on an impressive number of 958 occasions as of July 2010. A very high level of scholarship is reflected
in many of these publications. AB’s impact is also clearly demonstrated where a simple Google-search
turns up 64,600 matches, and Goggle Scholar, brings 2,090 hits (13 September 2010).
Authorship of academic publications is dominated by US-based scholars (although efforts have been
made to co-author with suitable candidates from Africa). The situation is in part reflecting the lack of
solid training in research methodology and the dominance of qualitative, critical analysis in Africa’s
recent past. It also reflects that African universities do not have research- and publications-based
tenure and promotion system, and that faculty is over-burdened by large teaching loads while
awarded with low wages and low status. Academics hence rather make time for work at a consultancy
firm, a think-tank, commissions, or CSOs. This constraint must be acknowledged.
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Capacity Building
It is promising that AB support unit DARU/CSSR/UCT is blazing a trail in African post-graduate
education and that AB CP IREEP has recently become an educational institution grooming a new
generation of MA students in economics, public administration, and statistical analysis.
In terms of capacity building, 4 capacity building workshops/summer schools have been organized
during R4. The DARU/UCT summer school in 2009 had 27 students participating from 15 different
countries (out of which 13 where AB countries and this included students from 3 Francophone and
Lusophone countries). DARU/UCT also held a workshop to build capacity for data analysis in 2008.
The summer school organized by IREEP the same year had 33 students participating from 5
countries. 14 of the students were from IREEP itself. The situation was similar in 2010.
The two summer schools’ different ‘profiles’ and curricula are not the result of strategic thinking by
the AB Executive Committee. Given scarce financial resources, it is unclear why curricula have not
been reviewed to make sure the training benefit the AB project the most in terms of achieving the
core goals.
3 AB fellowships to participate in training at Oxford and ICPSR have been awarded. IREEP and
DARU/CSSR have also allocated AB writing fellowships a large number of individuals.
Capacity building efforts are display some gender imbalance. 5 out of 17 AB fellowships (29%) and 16
out of 67 (24%) summer school participants (as reported in the evaluation survey with AB partners)
were female. This reflects in the shares of women who have statistical abilities at basic and advanced
levels, which hovers at the same level.
4 technical assistance exchanges have taken place during R4. Should the AB project expand to a
significant number of new partner countries, the technical assistant program can be expected to grow
substantially and the demand for summer school training increase equally.
C) Increasing the Visibility of the Afrobarometer among African Policy Actors
The AB Network has taken this new top priority seriously and formulated an Outreach Strategy;
incorporated a detailed protocol for dissemination with clear deliverables in the contracts with NPs;
installed outreach coordinators at each of the 3 CPs; and started to build up and staff a process for
monitoring and evaluation. There are notable successes in this area and yet, it is a work in progress.
Dissemination and outreach need a revised strategy for R5.
Dissemination
The AB website has become a widely used source of data and information to many academics and
policy actors internationally. For example, the mean number of monthly hits on the website has
increased from around 40,000 in 2002, to over 315,000 already for the first 6 months of 2010. This is
very impressive and a clear marker of success. Between 2005 and 2009, some 15,000 users have
downloaded AB data sets, and more than 13,000 users (1,500 of them from Africa) have already used
the on-line data analysis program available at the website since 2009. The website with all its
resources is definitely an extremely important tool of dissemination and policy input but mainly so in
the Americas and Europe. Those together constitute 78% of the use at present.
The AB partners are regularly, and increasingly, invited as speakers to conferences, workshops, and
other events in the US, in Europe and in Africa. This is an important indicator of success.
The global release was also a success resulting in wide media coverage. The country-specific media
coverage has been encouraging ranging from Lesotho (2 media reports), and Mozambique (2) with
way to go, to Ghana (85), Botswana (53), and South Africa (82). Yet, the numbers reflect typically a
few days of attention around the main dissemination event in each country.
When it comes to impact in terms of requests for analysis or further information, the AB CV and the
survey gives widely divergent results. The AB CV lists 57 requests while in the survey AB partners
claim to have processed 461 requests. In any case, it is a clear marker of success that the AB Network
is increasingly being used by policy-actors.
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The fact that in most countries you can only really expect to have a direct and independent impact on
policy debates during the first few months after data collection, means that the AB Network must plan
the dissemination much more deliberately and start executing it even before data collection begins.
Outreach
Outreach was a new activity instigated for R4. The AB produced an outreach strategy listing 7
activities to be carried out: 1) Cultivating of informal networks, 2) Developing outreach materials, 3)
Convening training workshops, 4) Establishing web-based data analysis, 5) Enhancing internet
dissemination, 6) Conducting a policy-user survey, and 7) Conducting a policy conference.
The AB Network has successfully implemented 2 – 7. That is great achievement. The evaluation team
finds that the omission of cultivating informal networks has undermined much of the other efforts.
The outreach as currently designed is principally based on three outreach coordinators (one at each
CP) and the most significant activity consists of training workshops: half to a full day event budgeted
at $5,000. Specifically designated outreach activities in the 20 AB countries numbers 44, or slightly
above 2 per country. 18 out of the 44 events (41%) have been conducted in the three CP countries.
Attendance typically varies from 4 to around 40 per event. This is not cost effective.
The assumption that undergirds the current strategy, namely that if given training workshops policy
actors will start using the AB raw data to analyze various issues, is not plausible and we have found
no evidence that it is happening. The evaluation shows that what can be ‘sold’ to policy actors are
mostly descriptive results. Secondly, the results must be newsworthy, and for many actors, recent.
Thirdly, dissemination and outreach must be more specifically tailored to targeted audiences. Finally,
to be well received and have an impact, a foundation of informal networking must be done.
The evaluation suggests that there are off-the-shelf solutions to contracting and reporting on informal
networking that international organizations such as the World Bank are already using. The World
Bank representative also indicated a willingness to apply for funds to cover the costs.
D) Project and Financial Management
The evaluation recognizes that the AB Network has accomplished a lot with very small resources. The
evaluation team also wishes to put on record that the AB Network has come a long way in a very short
time with its process of ‘Africanization’ that only got started with R4. We are confident that in the
coming years the AB Network can make further progress, and we hope that the findings presented
below can be informative and help facilitate this process.
We find that under difficult circumstances, CDD has successfully taken over many core
responsibilities for the AB project and in many ways performed very well. The lack of an overall
administrator with strong organizational skills is particularly burdensome.
The transfer of financial management has been successful. The much-improved contracts with CPs
and NPs specify deliverables in a detailed and generally clear manner, and reporting are satisfactory.
The basket funding mechanism has in all likelihood contributed to the success of the transfer of
financial management reducing the complexity of both budgeting and reporting significantly.
We find no major risks of corruption or other irregular financial activities.
The evaluation after R3 suggested that the organizational scheme (largely unchanged today) was
inadequate since it did not enlist the specific functions and concrete tasks to be the responsibility of
officers at different levels inside the boxes of the scheme. This specification of tasks and functions has
not been done.
The new organizational structure devised in 2007 is not fully implemented resulting in residual
confusion among staff at both CPs and NPs. With the expansion over the last round, and with the
specter of an even greater expansion in the near future, the organizational structure of the AB
Network should be revisited. At a minimum, it needs to be clarified and further specified as the R3
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evaluation recommended. At the same time, overextension because of involvement with other large
projects is a risk at CDD, IDASA, and IREEP and this is something we suggest the ABEC reviews.
While noting the ABEC’s disagreement with our conclusion, we think that the AB Network is possibly
already at a point where the complexities and functional demands of managing a multi-country,
multi-dimensional, and highly public project, exceeds the possibilities of a highly decentralized
network structure. While keeping the network character of the AB, centralization of some additional
core functions of administration and management, along with recruitment to new positions and
greater functional specialization of staff, would in our assessment enhance organizational efficiency
and counter risks associated with future expansion into a number of new countries.
We recognize the ABEC’s felt need to ‘follow the talent’. We also note the ABEC’s different view on the
appropriateness of the existing division of functions between IDASA and UCT in South Africa. The
evaluation team, however, has not been convinced that an expanded project covering 35 or more
countries, can be administrated effectively with several core management, administrative, and
organizational functions being spread out at different institutions in the current fashion.
Data Management is spread out on MSU (DD and assistant data manager), IDASA (Data Manager), and
IREEP and CDD (regional data managers). The evaluation team is not convinced this is efficient.
PMU/CDD is under-resourced for the network management tasks they are supposed to perform. The
AB Network needs to have a designate and specialized top-level administrator, preferably bilingual,
capable of handle a complex 20-country (possibly soon 35) program. There may be need of one ‘pure’
project administrator at each CP. Redefinition of outreach frees up some resources for administration.
There are no systematic records at CDD, IDASA, or IREEP logging the exchanges with regards to
handling of exchanges with the now large number of various partners in the network. For some time,
the email system of CDD has made it difficult for outside actors to contact CDD staff. AB staff in
various parts of the network has indicated that both CDD and IREEP are slow in responding to
various requests and that information sometimes are lost or not acted upon. Meanwhile, the Deputy
Director (DD) at MSU is commended throughout the Network in terms of huge efforts, rapid
responses, executive ability, and organizational skills. We note that AB staff in various countries
question the readiness for project management to be entirely ‘Africanized’ in terms of PMU/CDD
taking over all the DD/MSU’s responsibilities. We see reforms in areas such as these as part of vital
upgrading of administrative standards and efficiency.
The AB Executive Committee’s consultation with AB staff at CPs is limited. In particular, financial
officers of CPs should be consulted on the budget for R5.
It is a concern that the AB Executive Director is allocated only 25% of full-time to the AB project,
especially given that the second Deputy Director stationed at CDD had to be fired in 2009.
The AB international Advisory Board has not been utilized much during R4.
The CP for Francophone countries, IREEP, is facing relational issues with regards to the NPs in Mali
and Senegal that hamper project management.
Peace and Security
The AB project can be of great value to issues of peace and security. The presence of reliable data is
an important tool in keeping the peace. Conflicts in Africa are often stirred up using tactics like
instigating fears that other groups are different and intend to exploit others. Public data and analysis
of the real situation on the ground can in such situations be powerful means of making it harder to
instigate such misconceptions. Doubling the standard N of 1,200 and thus enable more disaggregated
analyses would enhance the value of the AB project to peace and security issues significantly.
Regional Public Good
The AB data sets, the bulletins, briefing papers, working papers and other publications have already
become a regional public good in Africa. The AB products stimulate domestic policy debates on a
range of issues to an increasing degree by its growing presence in the media and growing use by
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various actors in civil society. The AB also contributes to a larger degree to domestic thinking about
policy by politicians and top-level civil servants in the 20 AB countries, and provide for donors
program benchmarks, data for tracking and reporting and in some cases even analysis that feeds into
the design of new programs.
Bottom-Line
The Afrobarometer project has become a ‘gold standard’ for data collection, quality control, and
analysis of matters of great significance to Africa’s future. The body of scholarship radiating from the
AB project is vast and varied, and rapidly growing.
It is encouraging that the body of policy-relevant AB analyses is the fastest growing and that this body
of publications is largely authored by Africans. It will be of immense importance in the future and is
already having significant and visible impact among policy actors in Africa.
Revision of the dissemination and outreach strategy, and improvements of organizational efficiency
are the two areas where the AB Network can make the most important changes in the coming years.
Summary of Recommendations
Overall, we recommend that funding agencies commit to financing the necessary components of the
Afrobarometer project R5.
We recommend:
 that a French version of the website pages be set as a goal for R5.
 that all AB partners are contractually required for R5 to employ balanced (within 2:3 range)
teams of temporary field workers for data collection.
 that everything else being equal, hiring of female staff and bringing on board females for
research, is given priority at CPs and that NPs are encouraged to do the same.
 that the present opportunity be taken to put in place a sustainable Africanized data management
at an institution suitable for this task.
 that the AB make a concerted effort to seek basket-, and local funding to allow for the standard
sample size be increased to allow for the disaggregated analyses along regional and/or ethnic
lines often needed to be policy relevant within the AB countries.
 an adjustment of the protocol for data entry and its quality control to enable much faster release
of key results as per the recommendation for a new dissemination and outreach strategy (see
section C below).
 a serious reexamination of the use of hand-held computers that brings in available expertise
from among others the AB International Advisory Board.
We recommend:
 that in addition to the 3 bulletins contractually required by the NP, the AB project issue a call for
short bulletins on other topics in each country to increase output. These bulletins, once accepted
as briefing papers, would be given a financial award for the author(s).
 continued capacity training of the AB staff in terms of research methodology, statistical analysis,
social science theory, and writing; thus A continuation of the AB Summer Schools but only after
the ABEC made sure that scarce resources are used in the most efficient manner possible to
further the AB needs.
 that summer schools are planned to give notice 9 months in advance so as to enable full
participation, and that both summer schools make it a principle to allocate designated seats per
CP/NP and always allow the NPs full autonomy to decide who to send to the summer school.
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 that the ABEC develop a policy for the AB Writing Fellowships based on strategic thinking to use
scarce resources most efficiently furthering primary goals.
 that everything else being equal, females be given priority access to summer school training and
AB Fellowships.
 that the AB project consider launching ‘AB Co-Author Fellowships’: Stipends to pairs of authors
(one African scholar or AB staff and one established professor in the US or Europe) for writing a
paper that is accepted as an AB Working Paper.
C) Increasing the Visibility of the AB among African Policy Actors
We recommend:
 that the AB rethinks the image of holding large events where policy actors are expected to come
to the AB as the main dissemination and outreach tool to get to listen to what the AB thinks is
important. The core of the dissemination and outreach should instead be going to them and meet
the policy actors at their offices, work with them on their issues, and are perceived as useful for
the work they are already doing.
 a new strategy (for details, see section C) that integrates dissemination and outreach, puts much
more emphasis on reaching out to policy actors, shifts the burden towards the NPs, and reduce
the need for outreach coordinators in all 3 CPs.1 Informal networking should principally be
carried out by NPs, and a staged, piece-meal dissemination and outreach are corner-stones of
this proposed revision of strategy.
 that s a matter of protocol we recommend that it be mandatory that all AB partners brief the core
donors’ local missions both before data collection starts, as well as when the results are in.
 that AB partners and the AB main website are reciprocally required to prominently feature links
each others’ website and publications.
 that the AB Network be given/reallocate funds to produce large numbers of CD-ROMs for some
target groups (in particular journalists and academics/students), and large series of the AB
briefing papers and relevant working papers for each country. We recommend that each briefing
paper should be printed with a nice cover in 500-1,500 copies and that at a minimum 1,000 CDROMs/country be produced with all working papers, all briefing papers, the full series of data
sets, and ultimately also the on-line data analysis facility.
 that the AB Network assign the M&E officer to keep a ‘most successful practices’ database to
facilitate evaluation of current activities.
We recommend:
 that the basket funding mechanism be continued.
 that the organizational structure of the AB Network must be revisited and at a minimum,
clarified and further specified as the R3 evaluation recommended. As a first step, the AB Network
should elaborate on the current organizational scheme as suggested by the R3 evaluation; then
map out which functions are de facto performed by whom in the current structure and how lines
of reporting looks like; and then the AB should think strategically about how the organization
can become more efficient.
 not that most or all management functions be centralized at PMU/CDD, but we do recommend
that the AB Network recruit a designate top-level administrator, preferably bilingual and
stationed at PMU/CDD, capable of handle a complex 20-country program that may well expand
into another 17 countries in the near future.
 that the AB Network build a human resource development plan.
 that the reduced level of staff resources needed for outreach under the strategy recommended in
this evaluation, be reallocated following the review above.
The AB Executive Committee have reservations against part of this proposal (Appendix 6), but outreach coordinators,
data managers, and NPs in the AB Network have been supportive in our discussions with them.
1
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 the AB consider moving responsibilities from IDASA to DARU/CSSR at UCT
 that the AB consider having one point of data deposit instead of three and allocate assistants to
the DM to handle the process of cleaning national data sets.
 (strongly) that each CP immediately implement a log system for incoming/outgoing requests
between the AB partners, that among other things will make it possible to monitor and evaluate
the responsiveness and administrative efficiency of both CPs and NPs. We suggest that donors
offer technical assistance with setting up this system.
 that PMU/CDD-Ghana needs French-speaking capacity.
 that CDD immediately solve their perennial problem with emails.
 that the AB Executive Committee implement more participatory procedures to reduce the
distance between them and the staff below this level. At a minimum core partner staff be
consulted in the preparation of the R5 proposal and budgeting.
 much more systematic and more frequent use of the International Advisory Board.
Bottom Line
We recommend that funding agencies commit to financing the core components of the AB R5.
1. BACKGROUND
The Swedish International Development Agency’s REPS (Regional Team for Empowerment, Peace
and Security in Africa) belongs to the Department for Long-Term Cooperation, and deals with
regional cooperation within the field on peace and security, human rights & good governance,
research and institutional development.
In December 2007, SIDA TEAM/REPS signed an agreement with Centre for Democratic Development
(CDD-Ghana) for support for Round 4 (R4) of the Afrobarometer (2008-2010). This three-year grant
provides support for surveys, institutional capacity building, networking and management,
dissemination of results, and outreach to policy actors. SIDA decided to support the Afrobarometer
(AB) activities initially with SEK7,500,000; an additional SEK500,000 was allocated for an external
evaluation during 2010. On the 12th of May 2009, SIDA amended its support for the AB project by
adding an additional USD66,531 via transfer of Round 3 funds remaining at Michigan State
University, and by adding an additional SEK2,000,000 to the Agreement with CDD, to raise SIDA’s
total contribution to SEK 9,500,000 and USD 66,531.
A contract for this evaluation was signed between SIDA and Context/INKA Consult/HN Consultants
AS on July 26, 2010. Within the Consortium, Context is the ‘lead company’ and HN Consultants ApS is a
Service Manager. A draft inception report was submitted to SIDA on August 5, 2010, and after
comments provided by SIDA, a final inception report was submitted on August 9, 2010. Field
missions were carried out in seven AB countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique,
Senegal, and South Africa) between August 9 and September 6, 2010. In each country, informal
debriefings were conducted, and a two debriefing sessions were held at CDD in Accra on August 2627, 2010. A debriefing report was submitted to SIDA TEAM REPS on August 28, 2010. The AB
Executive Committee (ABEC) provided feedback on the debriefing report on September 6, 2010. A
draft final report was submitted to SIDA TEAM REPS on September 15, 2010, and this draft was
presented and discussed at a meeting with the ABEC and donors in Accra on September 25, 2010.
Written comments on the draft final report were submitted by the ABEC on October 4, and by SIDA
TEAM REPS on October 11, 2010. This is the final report submitted to SIDA TEAM/REPS on October
20, 2010.
The Team Leader holds a PhD in Political Science, has experience as Research Director, PI, and
Project Leader from three multi-country research collaborations. He also has extensive experience
with organizing national and international large-scale network projects and as manager for 40+ staff.
The evaluation team consists in total of four members who have the necessary quantitative and
qualitative analytical skills, prior extensive familiarity with the AB network and the data being
produced, as well as intimate knowledge of Africa. For details on the team, see Appendix 5.
Box 1. Team Composition
Research Director and Associate Professor Staffan I. Lindberg (PhD
Political Science, Extensive Organizational and Management
Experience)
Ann W. Witulski (Ph. D. Cand., Political Science, M.A. Political
Science, B.A. Government, B.A. French Literature and Language)
Winifred Pankani (PhD Cand., M.A. International Development
Studies, Post-Grad. Certificate Non-Profit Management, M.A.
Political Science, B.A. Theater Arts)
Ramon Galiñanes Jr. (Ph.D. Cand. Political Science, M.A. Political
Science, B.A. History)
Team Leader.
Team Member. Support to review of French-speaking
material and field visits in Francophone Africa.
Team Member. Support to review of materials from,
and field visits to Southern Africa.
Team Member. Support to review of materials from,
and field visits to Lusophone Africa.
The Afrobarometer and Round 4
The Afrobarometer (AB) Network conducts comparative national randomized probability-sample
surveys measuring public opinion and attitudes in Africa on democracy, governance, market reform,
social conflict, and civil society. The Network2 emerged out of public attitude surveys done in Zambia
(by MSU 1993), South Africa (by IDASA 1994), and Ghana (by CDD 1997). In 1999, the first round of
2
www.afrobarometer.org/origins.html.
Final Report – 2
AB (R1) surveys covering 12 countries was launched in Cape Town (South Africa) and completed in
2001. Round 2 and 3 were carried out between 2002 and 2006 followed by R4 in 2008-2009.
Box 2. Number of AB Surveys
Number of Round 1 Surveys, 1999-2001
12
Number of Other Surveys (Rounds 1.5, 2.5 and 3.5)
Total Number of Surveys completed to date
16
18
20
4
70
The AB is an international collaborative enterprise consisting of 20 partners, divided into core (3)
and network (17) partners (Appendix 6). The three core partners (CPs) lead the project: the Center
for Democratic Development- Ghana, (CDD), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and
the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP).
Box 3. Partners, Support Units, and Personnel
Number of Core Partners, Afrobarometer Network
Number of National Partners, Afrobarometer Network
Number of Support Units
Total National Survey Personnel (temporary)
Ratio of Females, Round 4
3
17
2
over 800
49:51
After being managed both administratively and financially at Michigan State University, the AB’s
Executive Director (ED) and the Project Management Unit (PMU) are since 2009 based at CDD under
the leadership of Professor Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi. The National Partners (NPs) execute surveys,
data entry, analysis and writing-up of the first set of results, and dissemination in each country.
Outreach is the primary responsibility of the CPs.
The Department of Political Science, Michigan State University (Distinguished Professor Michael
Bratton, AB Senior Advisor and Associate Professor Carolyn Logan, AB Deputy Director, and
associates) and the Democracy in Africa Research Unit/Center for Social Science Research, University
of Cape Town (Professor Robert Mattes, AB Senior Advisor, and associates), now serve as support
units providing technical support, capacity building, scientific analysis, and advisory services.
The modular questionnaires, which can be adapted to specific conditions while retaining their
comparability, are proposed through face-to-face interviews to a national probability sample3
typically determined in close collaboration with a national central statistical service. Building on field
experiences the network developed a multi-level quality control protocol of both data gathering and
entry now codified in a survey manual. The gender sensitivity of the data gathering and analysis
phases are ensured on the basis of a 1:1 ratio of male and female respondents. The standard sample
size (N=1,200) typically allows for a confidence interval of +/- 2.5 at 95% probability.
During R4, the AB undertook to reverse the priority order of the goals of the Network; making policy
visibility among African policy actors it’s top priority. In addition, the AB undertook a major
reorganization aimed at shifting the bulk of management responsibility to its African partners, while
also adding two new countries – Burkina Faso and Liberia – to the database.
During R4, the project’s main objectives are defined as:

Increase visibility of the Afrobarometer among African policy actors;

Continue to build capacity for survey research, analysis and management;

Improve and expand the Afrobarometer database;

Improve project and financial management including the transfer of those responsibilities to
African partners
3
For further specifications, see www.afrobarometer.org/sampling.html.
Final Report – 3
Scope of, and Sources for, the Evaluation
The AB R4 is in the following analyzed with a view to its four core objectives. Since the evaluation
should also serve as a learning tool for the AB and SIDA, as well as an instrument for SIDA’s overall
assessment of Afrobarometer R4, the evaluation was characterized by a participatory approach. The
evaluation was organized around four main components: A desk study resulting in an inception
report commented on by SIDA August 9th 2010; a series of field missions resulting in a de-briefing
report presented to and discussed with CDD-Ghana on August 26th and 27th 2010, submitted to the
AB Network August 28th, commented on by the AB ED on August September 6th 2010; a review and
analysis period resulting in a draft final report submitted on September 15th 2010 presented to, and
discussed by, the ABEC and donors on September 25th 2010; written comments on the draft final
report were submitted by the ABEC on October 4, and by SIDA TEAM REPS on October 11, 2010; and
a final period of revisions and supplementary analysis resulting in the a final report submitted on
October 20th, 2010.
The countries selected for field missions were chosen to ensure a rough balance of (i) Anglophone,
Francophone, and Lusophone countries, (ii) new and old partners in the AB Network, as well as (iii)
regions within Africa. The evaluation team judged it inadequate to visit the minimum number of
countries stipulated in the TOR (4 countries) and after approval from SIDA slated seven AB countries
for field missions: Ghana and South Africa (CPs); Botswana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal
(NPs). The reasoning was as follows:
In order to make enough room for non-core partners to be included, we decided to include only two
of the three core partners. Because CDD-Ghana is a CP and hosts the PMU, it was decided that CDD
should be the first and last stop. It was also decided that South Africa as the ‘hub’ for the AB in
Southern Africa region with its many countries (8 in total) also had to be visited. CDD and IDASA are
also the longest serving CPs to the AB Network. Among the East African countries, Uganda was part
of the evaluation last time and Tanzania is more of an outlier in political terms with the near-total
dominance of ruling party. Kenya adds a recent experience with civil conflict and perspectives on the
carrying out AB data collection and dissemination in such a context. There are various pros and cons
of choosing Senegal and Mali among the Francophone West African countries but Senegal is a
regionally important player politically as well as economically, and Mali is one of the poorest
countries of all with very low levels of education, just like Burkina Faso and we essentially flipped the
coin between the two. In order not to upset the regional balance we also excluded Nigeria although it
is a very important country in almost all thinkable ways. We offered to add Liberia to the list of
countries to visit as a case of more recent and atrocious civil conflict, but SIDA decided against it.
Among the many Southern African countries, it was decided to visit the longest lasting democracy in
Africa, in part because one of the team members will already be on location, and in part for its unique
place among African countries. Lesotho is interesting but a relatively insignificant and particular
country engulfed by South Africa. Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, and Zambia could have been chosen
but were not included for essentially random reasons in favor of Botswana as the second southern
African country to be included alongside South Africa. Zimbabwe’s unique challenges in terms of AB
data collection and dissemination made it a less interesting country to visit for the purposes of this
evaluation. The countries we suggested to SIDA for the critical six field missions were thus Ghana,
South Africa, Kenya, Botswana, Mali, and Senegal. In order to include a Lusophone country we
suggested adding Mozambique (rather than Cape Verde that is a small island state and in regional
terms relatively insignificant country), which is also a post-conflict country (and to some extent that
can be said of Kenya as well after the post-2007 election violence). This selection of countries also
took advantage from the fact that two Team Members will already be in the field at or close to
location. SIDA approved the suggested selection.
A principal source of information for the report derives from informal interviews conducted
separately and in groups with more than 170 individuals before, during, and after the field missions
to the seven countries. In each country visited, the evaluation team sought to interview at minimum
2-3 representatives of each of the key policy actors, as defined in the TOR: media, academics, NGOs,
politicians/government institutions, and development partners. Given the close and iterative
relationships between many of the individuals interviewed, we decided to ensure a certain level of
de-linking of data and individuals. Thus, we provide a full list of interviews in Appendix 3 but do not
Final Report – 4
identify who has provided which information in the main text of this final report or in the reports of
the various country field missions.
A second source of information was a survey with all AB CPs and NPs conducted by the evaluation
team. The summary of results from the survey is enclosed (Appendix 2). While the TOR and the
proposal for the evaluation states that the survey would be sent only to partners of the AB Network
that would not be visited during the field work, we decided in consultation with SIDA to ask all
partners in the Network to participate. The survey also included an open ended general question
allowing all partners to provide the evaluation team with whatever information they felt important.
Again, we decided to protect the country-identity of these comments.
Thirdly, the evaluation included a review of publicly available materials produced by the AB Network
such as the 120 working papers with a focus on the 29 resulting from R4, 91 briefing papers out of
which 42 have been produced during R4 and were looked at in more depth, the book and a selection
of the some 50+ peer reviewed journal articles (again, with a focus on the 6 so far published during
R4), book chapters, and occasional papers. Publicly available materials also include a larger number
of newspaper articles, fieldwork and sampling reports from the 20 countries of R4. The evaluation
team also consulted a large number of internal documents from the AB Network. A comprehensive
list of all materials consulted during the evaluation can be found in Appendix 4.
Finally, the evaluation team has invited the AB Network partners, support units, PMU, and members
of the international advisory board, to provide not only input but also feedback on preliminary
findings at several stages of the process. Through an iterative “down-and-up” participatory
assessment process, the field mission thus ensured both richness in qualitative as well as
quantitative data, and a participatory and collaborative process. For further discussion of the
methodology, see the proposal and inception report referenced above.
Substantial portions of our findings presented below are based on the country-by-country analysis of
the AB Core and National partners in the seven countries (Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mali,
Mozambique, Senegal, and South Africa) found in Appendix 1. When bringing together the case
studies we used a structured, focused comparative approach so as to maximize the analytical and
causal leverage (e.g. Adcock 2008, Collier 1993, George & Bennett 2006, Gerring 2007, Munck 2004,
Lijphart 1971, 1975, Ragin 1987, Sartori 1971, Tilly 1997). A caveat is necessary however. The
delinking of data and individuals consulted during the field missions could in a few instances only
take us so far. Hence, on these rare occasions we felt it necessary to remove some of the information
from the reports of the field missions and present the findings in the main text only without a specific
reference to a particular country, in order to protect the identity of the source(s).
In addition, we have sought to integrate findings from the field missions reported in Appendix 1, with
the analysis of the vast documentation available, but also the interviews conducted with a number of
individuals outside of the field missions. These include several interviews with representatives of the
ABEC, persons at the AB International Advisory board, and a representative of the World Bank.
While the data available through these sources is limited and possibly skewed in certain respects, the
volume far exceeds the minimum requirements stated in the TORs, and tentative findings have been
discussed with representatives of the AB Networks at all levels on numerous occasions. We have
sought not to accept any information at face value, whether from policy-actors, donors, the ABEC,
National Investigators (NIs) in AB countries, or from junior staff in the AB Network.
Finally, we have taken very seriously the feedback received through our multiple interactions with
the ABEC and the oral as well as written feedback they have provided on both the debriefing report,
and on the draft final report.
The Evaluation Team has made it our outmost priority to present a balanced report that is fair to all
parties, yet that does not shy away from difficult issues. Our mission in this regard has been to
inform, not to debate, and we have done our very best to achieve that goal.
Final Report – 5
In order to further ensure a balanced reporting, and on the suggestion from the AB Executive
Committee, the latter’s written comments on the draft version of this report, have been included as
Appendix 6. Naturally, these comments have been taken into serious consideration and in many
cases led to significant revisions in the final report compared to the draft.
The following text represents our synthesized analysis that to the best of our judgment is a balanced
representation of our findings that treats everyone fairly while staying true to our mission to be as
truthful and informative as we could be.
2. FINDINGS
The AB is one of the most successful social science projects in the last few decades that has had
immense significance for not only research, but in particular for policy-making. The latter is
especially true if we for a moment raise our time horizon. A decade or two from today, when policymakers and analysts in public service as well as in civil society organization in the average African
country have come to a place to make efficient and more sophisticated use of quantitative data, the
AB datasets will be an source with significant instrumental value for policy actors in Africa.
It is important that the series of AB data collection is continued or the value will be lost and can
never be regained. It is not possible to go back and collect or estimate the data back in time. In short,
the AB R4 is a very valuable continuation of R1-3. Even in a world of scarce resources, the AB project
remains one of the most important projects, and its comparative- and time-series data collection is a
unique resource for future generations of African policy actors.
The AB project is also one of the few, perhaps the only of its kind, of large-scale research and capacity
building programs that have been ‘Africanized’ and the executive directorship handed over to a
successful African NGO (CDD-Ghana). It can serve as a model for others to follow.
Policy actors in Africa generally hold the AB methodology, quality control and quality of data, as well
as the output of results and findings, in very high regard. This is an important and impressive
accomplishment after only 10 years of existence. It is imperative that AB continues to track and
evaluate public perceptions about democracy, governance, health, local public services, economic
policy, corruption, ethnicity, and a host of other issues.
While the AB dissemination and outreach strategy have accomplished significant improvements on
the visibility and use of AB results among African policy actors, it could benefit from revision.
Finally, while recognizing that the ‘Africanization’ of project management has come a long way in a
very short time and that the AB Network has accomplished a lot with very limited resources, we find
that the organizational structure can benefit from, at a minimum, clarification and further
specification.
Beyond that, the evaluation team believes that there is a need to reduce organizational complexity
and increase functional specialization within the organization. We suggest a few ways this could be
accomplished. We are aware that some of these are not favored by the ABEC but we also note that AB
staff at lower levels has been supportive of many of our suggestions in our discussions with them.
These overall assessments build on the analysis presented below. We report on the findings under
each of the four main areas identified in the TOR (which are the same as AB’s four core objectives).
While the survey for obvious reasons covers countries in Africa that are more democratic than the
average African country, there is still significant variation.4 In R4 a post-conflict country (Liberia)
and an electoral authoritarian country (Burkina Faso) were added to the list of 18 countries
The average Freedom House rating on the political rights’ scale from 7 to 1 for AB countries improved from 3.50 to
2.89 between R1 and R3, while the average of all other African states has worsen from 4.83 to 5.03 in the same period.
The freest of those surveyed by AB include Botswana (democratic since independence in 1966) and South Africa. At
the other end of the spectrum are Uganda and Zimbabwe.
4
Final Report – 6
surveyed in R3. The preliminary analysis in the inception report suggested that the AB network
continues to produce high quality data and making it available according to protocol. The final report
was to focus on two issues from the TOR:
 To what extent has the AB been successful in assessing and analyzing the data in the best way
possible?
 To what extent are the various elements of data collection and analysis gender sensitive?
Overall, the AB network succeeded in producing high quality data and making it available largely
according to its established protocol during R4. The security situation in Zimbabwe delayed the R4
survey there. The data collection in Zambia had to be redone after failure by the local partner to
follow the AB protocol. The fact that this was discovered and actions taken to correct the mistake
before any data or results were released, speaks highly of the AB Network’s procedures for quality
control. Eventually, the data collection for R4 was completed on June 24, 2009. The total number of
interviews conducted in R4 then stood at 27,713 and the total number of interviews of the entire AB
project R1 through R4 thus increased to 107,109. This is a very impressive record, quite an
unprecedented accomplishment in the study of African politics and society.
Box 4. Number of AB Interviews 1999-2010
Minimum / Maximum National Sample Size
Number of Interviews, Round 1 and 1.5
Number of Interviews, Rounds 2 and 2.5
Number of Interviews, Round 3 and 3.5
Number of Interviews, Round 4
Total Number of Interviews to date (through June 2009)
1,104 / 3,603
24,941
26,648
27,807
27,713
107,109
All the country data sets as well as the merged 20-country data set were released to the public
domain within the stipulated 12-month period after completion of the data collection. The evaluation
team finds it reasonable to keep the one-year embargo on release of the data itself. It is a wellestablished practice in social science research that data can be embargoed to allow for a period of
analysis and writing by the principal researchers. Secondly, extremely few policy-actors in Africa
ever request the data itself to conduct their own analysis. What is needed is a timelier, thorough, and
a more encompassing dissemination of key results (see section C, below).
Table 1. Gender Composition of Field Workers R2 – R4.
1 Benin
2 Botswana
3 Burkina Faso
4 Cape Verde
5 Ghana
6 Kenya
7 Lesotho
8 Liberia
9 Madagascar
10 Malawi
11 Mali
12 Mozambique
13 Namibia
14 Nigeria
15 Senegal
16 South Africa
17 Tanzania
18 Uganda
19 Zambia
20 Zimbabwe
By Round
R4
R3
Male Female % females
18
2 10%
12
13 52%
12
8 40%
12
14 54%
28
20 42%
17
10 37%
8
6 43%
13
12 48%
30
13 30%
14
6 30%
17
11 39%
13
11 46%
6
11 65%
72
71 50%
10
6 38%
43
120 74%
11
9 45%
40
26 39%
26
11 30%
14
14 50%
416
394
51%
49%
Male Female
11
7
12
12
R2
13
28
20
6
9
16
18
8
12
8
17
12
8
15
15
51
16
23
20
11
298
49%
16
8
11
40
8
15
8
82
10
9
23
9
309
51%
Male Female % females R1-R3
24%
8
8
51%
40%
48%
41
23
38%
43%
13
2
37%
48%
41%
10
8
41%
22
9
36%
67%
8
11
58%
97
60
44%
36%
79
109
64%
20
9
37%
19
16
38%
15
4
38%
7
11
52%
339
270
48%
56%
44%
Final Report – 7
The data collection was gender sensitive achieving an almost perfect 1:1 ratio of interviewees. The
temporary fieldwork staff shows variation between countries from the gender imbalance in favor of
women in South Africa (74% women) to the imbalance favoring men in Benin (90% men). One
should recognize the limited supply of female research assistants with adequate qualifications in
some countries. Most AB partners are doing a good job recruiting females (see Table 1).
However, one CP (IREEP) fielded a highly unbalanced team with less than 30% women. The NPs in
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, and Zambia had male to female ratios of 2:1 or worse and
need to do better in R5. In 13 out of the 20 countries, however, the gender ratio lies within
acceptable 2:3 in either direction. In terms of permanent staffing of AB partners, the ratio is overall
about 2:1. Botswana is a particular case where the ratio is 7:0.
Most partners have a fully functional data management system and it seems that adherence to the
demanding AB protocol was successfully implemented across the 20 countries, probably for the first
time. This is an achievement. A few of the partners still need assistance, especially with sampling, and
most still require some form of overseeing in order to guarantee the adherence to the protocol. The
demands of the protocol are significantly higher than what several AB partners are used to, and the
level of micro-management necessary to make sure it is adhered to, creates a certain amount of
frustration among some of the AB NPs.
The Network’s Data Manager (Francis Kirbirige) is stationed at IDASA in South Africa while he works
most closely with the Deputy Director (Carolyn Logan) at MSU. Kirbirige also performs many
functions for the network that the Data Manager (DM) as such should preferably not be doing, such
as providing technical assistance to a wide array of countries. From a functional point of view, it
would be preferable to centralize some CP functions when it comes to data cleaning and release. It is
unclear how having three points of data submission (at CPs) from NPs makes the process more
efficient and resulting in higher quality of data. It would probably be better if the DM was given
additional human resources and these functions were performed in one place. A full ‘Africanization’
of this function would require hiring one or two assistants to the DM. It is clear that the DM will not
continue working at IDASA, so network data management will have to be rethought in any case, and
IDASA will lose 1 out of 3 staff this way.
The limited provisions in French restrict the availability of the AB data sets and other outputs. For
Francophone countries the website provides codebooks in French for R4, and a few briefing papers
are available in French as well as in English. While this is an improvement over previous rounds
(nothing available in French), it is still imperfect.
A similar issue pertains to Portuguese. At present, only Cape Verde and Mozambique are part of the
AB survey, thus the per capita cost of providing all materials in Portuguese may prohibit translation.
Nevertheless, key materials should be available in Portuguese as well and appropriate funders could
be approached locally.
We recognize that non-sampling errors can increase with the size of the sample size, since it becomes
more difficult to control the quality of a larger field operation. The sample size thus needs to be
operationally manageable for all survey activities. Nonetheless, the standard AB sample size
(N=1,200) allows for analyses of national aggregates at conventional confidence levels, but does
usually not permit the disaggregated analysis of regional and/or ethnic patterns that is crucial to be
policy relevant in many countries. The field missions suggest that local foreign missions in many
cases would consider funding such initiatives (another reason for increased emphasis on informal
networking, see section C below).
The evaluation team recognizes that the AB Network has in the past considered and tested the use of
hand-held computers in data collection. We find that the rapid technological advancements in this
area create a potential to save time and money while improving quality control. We think that not
enough effort has gone into investigating the latest advancements and possibilities that could make
the data collection and processing stages more efficient. For example, one member of AB’s
International Advisory Board has significant experience in this area but has not been consulted. The
evaluation team is aware of other scientific data collection efforts in Africa who are using hand-held
Final Report – 8
computers. Battery capacity, gadgets’ resistance to dust, water, and mishandling, as well as user
friendliness have all improved significantly compared to just a couple of years ago.
Hand-held computers could reduce the cost of quality control, provide additional precision to spatial
coordinates, and can make it possible to use multiple languages in the same interview. It is fairly
common that people in Africa are used to constantly switch between languages depending on the
issue of the conversation. In such contexts, using one language throughout the same interview across
topics actually undermines data validity rather than enhances it.
Recommendations
We recommend that a French version of the website pages be set as a goal for R5. Providing
sampling/fieldwork reports as well as the data sets with French versions of the questions and coding
categories for at least the Francophone countries also seems like desirable goal. Ultimately, one
would want a French version of the merged data sets of all 20 countries, as well as French versions of
all briefing papers, or at the very least, the main summary of comparative results that MSU usually
produces. This would naturally require significant extra funds but it does not seem unreasonable that
French or Canadian funding organizations could be approached and the labor is outsourced to
professionals.
We recommend that all AB partners are contractually required for R5 to employ balanced (within 2:3
range) teams of temporary field workers for data collection. Deviations from the norm must be
justified in writing and approved by the relevant CP’s Regional Field Coordinator.
We recommend that everything else being equal, hiring of female staff and bringing on board females
for research, be given priority.
We recommend the ABEC and donors to consider taking the present opportunity to put in place a
sustainable Africanized data management at an institution suitable for this task, and in harmony with
other possible adjustments of the AB organizational structure (see section D below).
We recommend that the ABEC and the AB partners make a concerted effort to seek funding to allow
for the standard sample size be increased, generally doubled. We recommend that funding is
provided by core donors and/or local missions to increase the sample size from N=1,200 to N=2,400
in order to allow for the disaggregated analyses along regional and/or ethnic lines often needed to be
policy relevant within the AB countries.
We recommend an adjustment of the protocol for data quality control to enable faster release of key
results as per the recommendation for a new dissemination and outreach strategy (see section C).
We recommend a reexamination of the use of hand-held computers that brings in available expertise
from among others the AB International Advisory Board, to evaluate the pros and cons.
The review after R3 acknowledged the high level of capacity of the AB core and national partners.
The preliminary analysis during the inception period of the current evaluation suggested that
capacity for survey research seems to be ensured within the existing AB Network but that capacity
for analysis remains underdeveloped. It was therefore decided to focus on one issue from the TOR
and address the various components as sub-questions:

What capacity gaps remain for conducting AB surveys and producing high quality
analysis?
 To what extent have the existing steps to build capacity worked?
 Are there more effective ways of closing these gaps?
 Are existing strategies gender sensitive?
The capacity for conducting AB surveys has been discussed above in the first section, and here we
will therefore focus here on producing high quality analysis and building capacity.
Final Report – 9
High Quality Analysis of Data
With regards to analysis of the collected data, the evaluation of R3 was relatively silent and our
preliminary analysis of AB documents for the inception report of seemed to suggest that significant
capacity is still lacking in this regard. In initial discussions, the AB’s ED also pointed to this as an area
he is still concerned about. In the written comments from the AB ED on the debriefing report
submitted by the evaluation team, the AB Network’s concern was expressed again. The evaluation
team largely shares their unease with the level of capacity in Africa in general, as well as the
inadequate breadth of authors of high quality analysis in the AB Network, even as we recognize the
AB project’s successes.
In terms of directly policy-relevant publications, the AB project has so far generated 91 AB Briefing
Papers out of the many more Bulletins produced in each country after each round. Table 2 displays
the production of bulletins and briefing papers by the AB Network during R4 as per 12 August, 2010.
The last column includes the published 42 briefing papers along with another 6 that are at the final
stages of editing making 48. This is a substantial and very impressive list of publications directly
relevant for policy dialogue and policy-making.
Table 2. Production of Bulletins and Briefing Papers by AB Partners
Country
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Namibia
Nigeria
Senegal
South Africa
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Global release
Total
# Bulletins
Submitted
4
3
3
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
7
3
3
3
3
6
3
2
3
3
4
74
# by
African
Authors
4
3
3
4
4
4
# in
Review/
Edit
#
Rejected
1
4
1
1
3
3
3
7
3
1
1
5
1
2
1
3
5
3
2
3
3
2
63
Published
/soon
3
3
2
1
1
3
4
3
1
3
3
2
2
2
1
2
2
3
3
2
1
10
15
2
3
4
48
Bulletins are produced in the 3-month period between the ends of data collection and holding of
dissemination events. The standard AB contract during R4 required each AB partner to produce a
minimum of 3 bulletins. All countries except one (Uganda) achieved this target goal and 6 countries
exceeded the target by producing from 4 up to 7 bulletins, resulting in a total number of 74 bulletins
produced for 20 countries and the global release.
Almost all (85%) of these 74 bulletins were produced by African partners, another indicator of AB’s
success. The larger number of bulletins produced by South Africa reflects in part the program at
DARU/CSSR/UCT run by Professor Robert Mattes. He and a student produced the three ‘extra’
bulletins beyond the required 3 that IDASA subcontracted to a political scientist in Pretoria to write.
Roughly a third of the NPs produce bulletins that are of a quality that require relatively little editing
and ‘normal’ revisions. The other two-thirds require a significant amount of work from both, AB staff
Final Report – 10
at CP institutions and then the support staff at MSU. A smaller proportion of the bulletins never make
it to that stage (about 20%) and they are eventually rejected5.
In short, the AB Network has demonstrated a great success in producing an impressive array of
bulletins and briefing papers, mostly by African authors, for domestic consumption by local policyactors and thus achieved one of the important targets in terms of demonstrating impact on capacity
as well as increasing visibility among African policy actors.
There are gender-imbalances in terms of policy-relevant research output. Only 13% of all AB
Bulletins submitted by AB CPs and NPs were authored by women. The acceptance rate for women’s
AB Bulletins is even lower so that females authored only 7% of accepted AB Bulletins.
When it comes to academic analysis and publications, there is still a gap in capacity among many of
the African partners, and there is also generally a severe undersupply of good analytic capacity
among scholars and practitioners in Africa.
The project has generated 1 book, 47 peer-refereed articles, 21 book chapters, and 120 AB Working
Papers these publications have been cited in the scientific literature on an impressive number of 958
occasions as of July 2010. It is impressive body of scholarship and policy-analysis emerging from the
use of the data. Just about 10 years after the first round of surveys took off in 1999, the AB has
become a highly respected and widely used source of data for academic and policy analysis. The
project has affected the world of academic scholarship on Africa rapidly and fundamentally.
Box 5. Citations of AB Data and Publications
Total Citations at December 2006
Total Citations at June 2008
Total Citations at July 2010
= 216
= 364 (69% increase 2006-2008)
= 958 (172% increase 2008-2010)
It is especially important to note the increasing trend in number of citations. One should be aware
that it usually takes 2 years or more after a book, an article, or a working paper before citations start
to register. What we see below in Box 5 thus is mostly the effect of publications appearing in 2007 or
before, and yet there is a dramatic increase in impact of the AB productions. If anything, this is an
underestimation of the real impact of the AB project. The evaluation team has seen several more
publications not captured by the AB collation and thus not included in the citation count.
We wish to point out the very high level of scholarship in many of these publications. A number of
the peer-refereed articles have appeared in top-tier journals such as American Political Science
Review, American Journal of Political Science, American Behavioral Scientist, British Journal of Political
Science, Comparative Political Studies, and Electoral Studies. Many of the academic publications also
appeared in widely read, leading Africa- and policy-influential journals such as African Affairs, African
Security Review, Journal of Modern African Studies, Journal of Democracy, Politics & Policy, and World
Development. AB’s impact is also demonstrated by a simple Google-search turning up 64,600
matches, and using the same search term in Goggle Scholar, brings 2,090 hits (Evaluation Team, 13
September 2010).
A review of the AB scientific publications reveal that authorship of these are heavily dominated by
US-based scholars at MSU (Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan) and other universities, and the senior
AB staff at CDD (E. Gyimah-Boadi) and the support unit DARU/CSSR at University of Cape Town
(Robert Mattes). Nevertheless, one should recognize that these authors have made strides to coauthor with suitable candidates from the AB Network and thus increased the capacity and output of
Africans. We note that according to our survey, only 6% of AB Working Papers submitted by AB CPs
and NPs were authored by women.
Mali is somewhat of a special case where 5 out of an impressive 7 bulletins were eventually rejected. This situation
has an explanation in that the NI in Mali writes the bulletins in a particular style to appropriately target audiences in
Mali, that the evaluation finds is very effective in the local setting and thus have been very effective in dissemination
and outreach there. We recognize that they are not sufficiently analytic for the AB Network’s briefing paper series.
5
Final Report – 11
While many of the staff at CDD has great credentials, the capacity for qualified scientific analysis of
data remains limited. In part, could be a constraint imposed by the many commitments CDD has
besides the AB Network. Staff may not have enough time allocated to analysis. In part, it is an issue of
analytical capabilities and training.
The capacity at IDASA to analyze survey data is limited and the environment at IDASA is not
conducive to stimulating high-quality, research-based quantitative analysis. Most of the output and
analysis emanating out of South Africa beyond the bulletins, have been produced by DARU/CSSR and
the senior advisor to the AB Network and his adepts, Professor Robert Mattes with his PhD from
University of Illinois, Urban-Champaign, and whose work in well known among the scholarly
community. The two most capable individuals at IDASA (the DM and the ED) are leaving soon.
The third CP, IREEP in Benin, is emerging as a center in Africa that can compete for championship of
African-based research output. IREEP’s Director Leonard Wantchekon has a PhD in Economics and is
a professor at the methodologically sophisticated Department of Political Science, New York
University. While most of the staff at IREEP holds various MA-degrees, these are typically in statistics
and economics and as far as we can tell they are very skilled in methodology and statistical analysis.
IREEP has recently started an MA program in Public Economics and Statistics, and the students from
the institution are beginning to make a mark by producing papers.
When it comes to capacity for research at many of the NPs, the output indicates lower capacity. This
is partly the case and reflecting the lack of solid training in research methodology and dominance of
qualitative, critical analysis in the 1970s, 1980s and into the 1990s in Africa. There is still a very
strong need for continued capacity training of the AB staff in terms of research methodology,
statistical analysis, social science theory, and writing to advance the AB results and make the many
interesting findings well known in the 20 countries.
Upon closer inspection of the credentials of many within the AB Network and with information from
the field missions, it is clear that lack of training and actual capacity is only one part of the problem.
There is also an inherent problem with what seems to have been an assumption in the AB project,
namely those university-based scholars in Africa would like their American and European
counterparts spontaneously make use of the AB data for their own research once available. While
this is happening in a few instances, one must recognize that it is not realistic to expect this to
happen on a larger scale. African universities generally do not provide the incentives for research.
There are no research- and publications-based tenure and promotion system in most places, faculty
are almost always over-burdened by large teaching loads while awarded with low wages and
relatively low status. Academics hence, in many places, do not use their universities as the base for
much. More typically, they rather finish up their obligations at the university outfit as quickly as
possible in order to make time for work at a consultancy firm, a think-tank, commissions, or CSOs.
These assignments pay well and provide higher status and better personal networks.
In terms of more sophisticated output in terms of working papers, peer-review journal articles, book
chapters and books, the dominance of Western-based scholars will probably continue for the
foreseeable future. There is a big gap in capacity in Africa in general, the incentives for investing a lot
of time and effort in academic-type publications is lacking, AB staff at core and national partners
have to tend to other projects besides the AB, and/or face high alternative costs if they are to
sacrifice consultancy-type work.
We cannot say we know the solution to this issue but we know that it must be recognized for what it
is. It is particularly important that donors recognize that without real financial incentives, Africanbased scholars cannot generally be expected to produce much policy-relevant academic output. In
the next section on dissemination and outreach, we discuss some suggestions that may help address
this issue.
Capacity Building
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) and the Center for social Science Research (CSSR) at
University of Cape Town (UCT) is blazing a trail in African post-graduate education by grooming
students drawing primarily on AB data. As of the time of the evaluation, at least 3 PhD dissertations
Final Report – 12
and several MA-theses have been produced at DARU/CSSR/UCT using AB data more or less
exclusively for the empirical part of the analysis. In so doing, it is building capacity for the kind of
analysis, according to many of the policy makers interviewed, needed for policy-making. There is also
an undocumented number of PhD dissertations produced at American universities that have relied
heavily on AB data. IREEP has recently become an educational institution and is grooming a new
generation of MA students in economics and public administration statistics. A large number of what
promises to be highly qualified papers are in the pipeline from that initiative.
3 fellowships to participate in training at Oxford and ICPSR have been distributed to two individuals
(the Regional Field Coordinator at IDASA and the NI at the NP in Burkina Faso). In addition, IREEP
and DARU/CSSR have been allocated smaller funds (roughly $30,000 per institution over the three
years) to give out ‘AB writing fellowships’. It has been hard to get good data across the years on
exactly how many have been awarded these fellowships and for what purposes but it seems that the
size of these fellowship grants have been too small to attract more qualified individuals. In the case of
Benin, it seems that the fellowship funds have been used to reward the best papers coming out of the
summer schools with an extra check at the tune of $400-$850.
It may be time to consider if, for example, AB Fellowships should be used primarily to stimulate
academic-style products that can result in the more sophisticated working papers, or should AB
Fellowships be used primarily to improve on the skills of AB staff to write briefing papers and
perhaps even shorter publications like press briefs on single issues?
Capacity building efforts are still suffering from gender imbalance although it is better than the
research output noted above. 5 out of 17 AB fellowships (29%), and 16 out of 67 (24%) summer
school participants reported in our survey with AB partners, were female. This reflects in the shares
of women who have statistical abilities at basic and advanced levels, which hovers at the same level.
4 technical assistance exchanges have taken place during R4 from which the partners in Burkina
Faso, Mozambique, Namibia, and Senegal benefited. Given that some partners still need assistance
with sampling and quality control, it seems reasonable that funds be allocated for continued
technical assistance in R5.
Summer Schools (SS)
4 capacity building workshops/summer schools have been organized during R4, 2 at IREEP in Benin
for Francophone individuals and 2 at UCT for Anglophones, in addition to the 1 summer school
arranged by IREEP and 1 summer school and 1 briefing paper workshop organized by DARU/CSSR
during R3. The two summer schools are both about 3 weeks long and include research methodology
and statistical analysis, as well as substantive courses. Beyond that, the AB Network has agreed to let
the two develop according to their own style to have different profiles and structures.
The DARU/UCT summer school in 2009 for example, had 27 students participating from 15 different
countries (out of which 13 where AB countries and this included students from 3 Francophone and
Lusophone countries). Only one of the participants did not come from one of the AB partners, and
only 3 students came from South Africa out of which 2 were from IDASA. 5 of the participants were in
some way or the other affiliated with UCT itself.
The summer school organized by IREEP the same year had 33 students participating from (what we
think was) 5 countries. 14 of the students were from IREEP itself. The situation was similar in 2010.
Our field missions and other sources indicate that the summer school at DARU/CSSR is structured in
a way that is perceived to cater more to the needs of many AB partners. The research methodology
and statistical training is less dependent on students being relatively advanced when they arrive;
fewer lecturers who base their teaching more on the individual prerequisites of the AB staff; and
more geared toward building capacity to write bulletins/briefing papers rather than academic-type
articles.
In some cases, the issue of rank also plays a part in creating obstacles. Professors coming to a
summer school are much less likely to appreciate being ‘pushed’ by teachers to work extra hours and
be ‘graded’ on their accomplishments, or compared negatively with for example young MA students.
Final Report – 13
The evaluation team does not have a specific recommendation on how to address this but it should
be acknowledged and discussed.
The ‘profiles’ are not the result of strategic thinking by the ABEC but rather the result of the
preferences of individuals involved. Given scarce financial resources, it would be preferable to have a
policy on what curriculum would benefit the AB project the most in terms of achieving the core goals
of the project. For example, the AB Network combines NGO-type institutions where most staff has an
MA from an African university, with university-type institutes where many have PhDs often from
American or European universities. There may need to be different summer school curricula for
these two groups. Likewise, if the Network continues to combine what are largely
economists/statisticians in many Francophone partner organizations with the many more political
scientists and other social science-trained staff among the Anglophone and southern African
partners, we recommend that different summer school curricula are developed to reflect the
different needs of such groups.
Both summer schools receive critiques from NPs that they are not advertised far enough in advance
to facilitate full participation. The evaluation recorded a few instances when NPs have been unable to
send individuals for training because of this.
Recommendations
We recommend continued capacity training of the AB staff in terms of research methodology,
statistical analysis, social science theory, and writing.
We recommend that everything else being equal, females be given priority access to summer school
training and AB Fellowships.
We recommend that the ABEC develops a policy for the AB Writing Fellowships based on strategic
thinking around how scarce resources can be used most efficiently to further the primary goals of the
project.
To increase quality of policy-relevant AB Bulletins and hence AB Briefing Papers, we recommend
continuation of the AB Summer Schools but only after the ABEC has undertaken a thorough review of
existing curricula to make sure that scarce resources are used in the most efficient manner possible
to further this goal.
We recommend that summer schools are planned well in advance and notice given preferably 9
months in advance so as to enable full participation.
We also recommend that both summer schools make it a principle to allocate 2, 3, or 4 designated
seats per CP/NP and always allow the NPs full autonomy to decide whom to send to the summer
school. In return, the NP or the participants themselves should be required to send in more detailed
information regarding the prior training and capabilities, well in advance. The summer schools could
then be designed to fit the particular needs of the participants from the AB Network, rather than
present a general formula that does not always cater to the specific needs of AB affiliates.
In order to also further advanced analysis by Africans, we recommend that instead of, or in addition
to, the existing AB writing fellowships, the AB project launch ‘AB Co-Author Fellowships’ providing a
stipend for writing a paper that is accepted as an AB working paper to pairs of authors (one African
scholar or AB staff and one established professor in the US or Europe). The bulk of the stipend should
go to the African author(s) but with a portion to the US/European scholar as an added incentive.
C) Increasing the Visibility of the Afrobarometer among African Policy Actors
Following the review after AB R3, and acknowledging the relatively modest impact of the AB on
debate and policy-making in Africa by then, this area was made the top priority for R4. The inception
report of the current evaluation identified two main issues from the TOR to focus on:

How successfully has the AB Dissemination and Outreach Strategy been (to what extent
has the AB managed to reach “policy actors”)?

Which institutions are using the AB results and how?
Final Report – 14
The AB Network has taken this challenge seriously. The Network formulated an Outreach Strategy,
detailed a protocol for dissemination with deliverables in the contracts with NPs, hired outreach
coordinators at each of the 3 CPs, and started to build a process for monitoring and evaluation. This
in itself constitutes a large step towards achieving the goal for R4.
There are also notable successes in this area. Media coverage of the AB and its results has expanded
greatly during R4. There is an encouraging record and increasing number of requests for further
analyses and information from a variety of policy actors in a number of countries. Around the time of
dissemination of results in each country, there is typically a lot of ‘buzz’ around the AB and its
findings, and news coverage is very good in that (short) period. Despite delays in staffing, the
outreach program has taken off and the minimum number of outreach workshops has been held
across the continent save a couple of countries slated for interventions now in the fall 2010.
Yet, dissemination and outreach are still both works in progress and the success of the AB strategy is
uneven. We recognize that this is due in part to varying levels of commitment by AB partners,
language barriers, and the fact that it takes time to establish a public awareness and credibility. At
the same time, the main reason seems to be that the current dissemination and outreach strategy is
less effective than it could be.
There are several unresolved tensions in the AB project when it comes to how to handle
dissemination and outreach. First, there is a tension between the strive for highest possible quality
data and sophisticated, academic-type analysis on the one hand, and the demand for rapid
dissemination of descriptive results among African policy-actors. We do not believe the AB should
compromise its data quality in any way, nor do we recommend that sophisticated analyzes should
not be conducted. But in order to be more policy-relevant the AB needs to further accommodate the
fact that what in most countries can be ‘sold’ to politicians, CSOs, media, and in truth many donors,
are relatively unsophisticated analyses and mostly descriptive results. The interpretation of these
results, naturally, can be sophisticated and the AB should indeed continue to strive towards higher
levels in that regard.
The second tension is between the slowness of several layers of quality control and sense of need to
crosscheck every data point in the entire data sets by the DD/MSU, and the demand for newsworthy,
small slices of results. This implies a need for a) much faster processing of data, and b) a staged,
incremental release of select findings that can make news many times over a 2-4 month period after
data collection.
The third tension is between the organizational set-up to run outreach from CPs, and the reality that
both dissemination and outreach must be more specifically tailored to targeted audiences and build
on personal contact networks that primarily can be built by local ‘notables’. News media is
approached a particular way and with issues that can make news – can make the editors say ‘clean
the page’ to use one of the interviewee’s expression. Donors have their own different agendas and
take a leading role in different sectors. USAID’s D&G program for example is largely about
decentralization whereas SIDA in southern Africa is all about HIV/AIDS and the Norwegians care
mostly about HR. Having one dissemination for all of them together focusing on for example
economic policy, as is currently done, is not very effective.
Politicians, to take another example, are not one target group as per the current outreach strategy
but many. MPs tend to be most interested in their own constituency in the many single-member
district systems and hence not terrible amendable to AB results. Ministers and their top civil servants
are only interested in results that pertain to their specific activities and mainly the questions that are
highest on their agenda for the moment. The electoral commissions, human rights’ bodies, the body
for civic education, the police and security apparatus, and so on all have their own particular areas of
interest. Again, all these need targeted but highly specific information in order for the AB to be
perceived as policy relevant to them.
In general, the AB strategy is to organize events at conference hotels or similar and send out
invitation letters to policy-actors. The result is that many policy actors do not show up, or send
lower-level surrogates. Many interviewees stress that much more emphasis is placed on seeking out,
Final Report – 15
and courting policy actors. It is also less costly and we strongly believe, much more effective as a
dissemination and outreach tool that the dominant hotel luncheon strategy.
Dissemination
Dissemination of AB data, results, and findings are done using 4 principal means: The AB website
hosted by MSU; presentations at various conferences and workshops; a ‘Global Release’ event held
simultaneously in Accra, Cotonou, Kampala, and Pretoria; and dissemination events organized by AB
partners in each country where Summaries of Results (SORs) and bulletins are distributed.
The AB website
The AB website has become a widely used source of data and information to many academics and
policy actors internationally, if not in Africa. The mean number of monthly hits on the website has
increased from around 40,000 in 2002, to over 300,000 in 2008, over 400,000 in 2009 excluding
three months of data, and already 315,000 for the first 6 months of 2010. This is very impressive and
a clear marker of success. Between 2005 and 2009, some 15,000 users have downloaded AB data
sets, and more than 13,000 users (1,500 of them from Africa) have already used the on-line data
analysis program available at the website since 2009. The website with all its resources is definitely
an extremely important tool of dissemination and policy input.
Website access is heavily dominated by the Americas and Europe (78% of the use). African users
represent some 17% of the total number of hits 2009-present. Among the Africa users, South Africa
dominates with 1/3 of the African hits and almost 50% of the distinct users (654 out of 1,523 distinct
African users).
Local foreign missions in Africa frequently use the website. We found many examples of DFID, CIDA,
USAID, SIDA, DANIDA, and other missions who either used AB results and findings as benchmarking
for their programs, as indicators of the political situation in the country, to compare the status of a
particular issue such as local service delivery or corruption in ‘their’ country with neighboring states,
and even to based new programs on. They would typically go to the website for this information.
Even among the highly educated domestic elites we interviewed in 7 countries, it was rare to find
anyone who uses the website; much less used it to download results, not to speak about the raw data.
For the time being, the website is mainly a window towards the developed world. In part this can be
addressed by contractually making sure that AB partners put links to the AB website and its
publications on their own websites but this should also be reciprocal. The current AB website
promotion of the AB partners, especially the NPs, is very poor to say the least.
Having access to the internet is still a luxury for most, even at established universities and CSOs, not
to mention the slow connections are not exactly downloading friendly. Most have to resort to using
expensive solutions where downloading one AB working paper can cost the individual up to
SEK150.00 (≈$20.00).
Many interviewees requested that the AB and the funding agencies produce large numbers of CDROMs for some target groups (in particular journalists and academics/students prefer this medium),
and at the same time print large series of the AB briefing papers and relevant working papers for
each country. We wish to stress the large numbers required here. The present allocation in the
budget ($1,000 for printing per country) seems ridiculously low.
To clarify what is needed: Each news editor needs not one but 10 copies of each paper and the CDROM so (s)he can distribute them to journalists freely; Each university needs not one copy of the data
or paper to be locked up in the library but dozens; Each local foreign mission and each CSO also
needs five or ten copies of papers and possibly CD-ROMs; Each relevant ministry also needs 10
copies or perhaps 20 of papers that are relevant to them; The main findings needs to be given to all
MPs as well as extra copies to staff; and so on.
This is probably the easiest and most cost-effective single activity that the AB can do to increase
visibility and outreach. The cost of such a production would still be a small share of the total cost of
each survey round but would increase the visibility, outreach, and policy impact of the AB project
Final Report – 16
significantly. In cost-benefit terms, the impact of such a distribution of results, findings, and the data
would probably far exceed the current outreach strategy while being significantly less expensive.
Presentations at Conferences and Workshops
The AB partners are regularly, and increasingly, invited as speakers to conferences, workshops, and
other events in the US, in Europe and in Africa. The AB documentation does not clearly distinguish
between self-propelled events such as submitting a proposal to an academic conference, or
organizing a half-day event for media practitioners, and ‘real’ evidence of the increasing demand for
AB data and analysis such as invited paper presentations and keynotes. We nonetheless note 27
events for 2008, 32 for 2009, and already 33 for the first half of 2010. Again, this is an important
indicator of the success of the AB project although we also note that American-based scholars
conduct a vast majority of these presentations. If the much wider distribution of AB materials
suggested above is implemented, one can expect the demand for presentations by the African
authors of bulletins and briefing papers to increase. The revised dissemination strategy suggested
below should have the same effect.
Dissemination Events
The global release concurrently held in Accra, Cotonou, Kampala and Pretoria seems to have been a
success with wide coverage in the media. This may well be something to repeat.
The evaluation conducted after R3 as well as the AB’s internal documentation, notably the first Policy
User Survey carried out in Ghana point to that coverage of the AB findings in the media (radio, TV,
newspapers, popular internet sites) is the most effective way to raise awareness of the survey. The
second survey carried out in South Africa did not point as strongly in the direction of media. Two
more such surveys were recently carried out in Uganda and Benin but the results have not been
available to the evaluation team. We can thus not say for sure what the sum of these surveys is
suggesting. We did however get the distinct impression during the field missions that the foundation
for a successful dissemination as well as outreach is a visible presence in the media that reoccurs
many times. This informs our suggestion for a revised dissemination and outreach strategy.
Table 3. AB R4 Field Work, Media, and Dissemination
Partner
All/mean
Core Partner /mean
National Partner /mean
IREEP-group/mean
Benin
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Mali
Senegal
CDD-group/mean
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Nigeria
Tanzania
Uganda
IDASA-group/mean
Botswana
Lesotho
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Totals
AB CV:
Dissem. Events
3.5
6.3
2.9
2.6
1
1
3
7
1
3.3
3
6
3
3
1
1
6
4.1
2
3
4
2
3
12
3
4
69
Our Survey:
Dissem. Events
5.5
6.7
5.3
7.4
4
8
15
7
3
6.3
6
7
3
1
5
16
3.8
1
2
5
3
2
10
3
4
105
AB CV:
Media Reports
25.6
60.7
19.4
22.0
15
21
44
8
22
29.0
11
85
12
7
8
22
58
24.8
53
3
8
2
35
82
5
10
511
Our Survey:
Media Reports
29.8
78.0
20.8
58.4
85
90
85
22
10
33.5
119
11
18
3
20
30
9.1
8
5
11
6
4
30
5
4
566
Final Report – 17
We note that the media coverage of the AB R4 in many of the 20 countries has been encouraging.
While the AB partners in countries like Lesotho (2 media reports), and Mozambique (2) has a way to
go, Ghana (85), Botswana (53), and South Africa (82), are doing exceedingly well in quantitative
terms. Table 3 displays the situation as of June 30, 2010 according to the AB CV, but it also includes
the information from our own survey carried out as part of the evaluation.
We are not sure what to make out of the discrepancies between the figures reported by partners in
the survey, and the AB CV, as seen in Table 3. In a few cases the differences are enormous such as the
difference between the 15 media reports reported for Benin in the AB CV, and the 85 they report in
the survey. Similar situations are found with Burkina Faso, and Madagascar. The same three
countries also report a much larger number of dissemination events held than the AB CV has
recorded. For Botswana, Senegal, and South Africa the situation is reversed: These two partners
reported dramatically fewer media reports in the survey than were found in the AB CV. Two of the
countries with the largest discrepancies are CPs of the AB Network and the evaluation team note that
CPs and the PMU at CDD do not provide even remotely consistent data. This is indicative of pointing
to the organizational issues discussed later in this report).
The big take-home lesson, however, when inspecting these records further is that almost all media
reporting in all countries reflect a few, often not more than 1 or 2, days of attention around the main
dissemination events. A couple of days of media attention over a 3-year is a great beginning but does
not establish the AB as a major source of data, results, and findings in Africa.
Many policy actors we interviewed pointed out the importance of ‘fresh’ data. Many policy actors
consider data to be outdated within a few months in some cases, but at least after a year. The fact
that in most countries you can only expect to have a direct impact on policy debates during the first
3-4 months after data collection means that the AB Network should plan dissemination much more
deliberately and start executing it even before data collection begins. The current strategy where
dissemination typically starts as late as 3 months after the data collection is completed in each
country should therefore be revisited.
There is very limited interaction between dissemination & outreach on the one hand, and monitoring
& evaluation apart from sharing formal reports. The monitoring & evaluation team at PMU/CDD
would evaluate current practices to give feedback on activities and thus drive revisions and create
internal learning, but this seems not to be the case as of yet.
Outreach
Outreach was a new activity the AB Network during for R4. The AB define outreach as “a deliberate
intervention by AB staff to sell and sponsor the uptake of empirical analysis with a selected audience
of practitioner … unlike dissemination, outreach is a planned, long-term program …and employs a
continuous set of repeated activities” (Afrobarometer Outreach Strategy, 2007: 4).
The outreach strategy lists 6 audiences: Government, civil society, media, academia, donor
community, and the general public. The document contains a log frame with specification of the
targets in these groups, and performance targets. It is clear to us that the outreach coordinators are
not using the log frame. It is also clear that the de facto strategy has been altered since the document
was produced but without updating the written strategy or the log frame.
The outreach strategy lists 7 activities to be carried out: 1) Cultivating of informal networks, 2)
Developing outreach materials, 3) Convening training workshops, 4) Establishing web-based data
analysis, 5) Enhancing internet dissemination, 6) Conducting a policy-user survey, and 7) Conducting
a policy conference. The AB Network has successfully implemented 2 – 7. That is great achievement.
What has not been done, generally speaking, is cultivating informal networks using leading
individuals at NP institutions. The evaluation team finds that this omission has undermined much of
the other efforts. 6
The outreach as currently designed is principally based on three outreach coordinators (one at each
CP). It should also be noted that while IDASA already had one person in the AB staff, CDD-Ghana and
We found that among the countries we visited, CDD in Ghana and GREAT in Mali have done much more in terms of
informal networking than other CPs and NPs.
6
Final Report – 18
IREEP had to conduct a search and were only able to staff the new positions effectively from 2009.
The most significant activity consists of training workshops organized by outreach coordinators
sometimes liaising with NPs but sometimes acting on their own. Such a workshop is the typical
conference-hotel, half to a full day event with lunch, snacks, coffee, transportation fees, and
sometimes per diems/sitting allowance. Each event is budgeted at $5,000. Attendance typically
varies from 4 to around 40 per event. The outreach workshops spend considerable time on
explaining the AB sampling protocol and field methodology, as well as basic understanding of
statistical findings, and then seek to present some findings relevant specifically to the audience in
question. Standard outreach power-point presentations have been developed that to some extent are
adjusted for the specific audience and country.
The AB CV lists 93 activities under this area. However, the evaluation team disagrees with some of
the listings as outreach. 20 of them are presentations at academic conferences in North America, 5 of
the activities listed in South Africa, 1 in Kenya, 2 in Korea, and 1 in Australia are also presentations
clearly outside the scope of the definition in the outreach strategy, thus 64 events can be said to be
some form of outreach.
Yet, as Table 4 indicates, if we look at the specifically designated outreach activities in the 20 AB
countries, the number is 44 according to the AB CV, or slightly above 2 per country: In 4 countries
there has not been a single outreach event, and in 5 countries there has only been one activity. 18 out
of the 44 events (41%) have been conducted in the three CP countries. It is to some extent
understandable that the CP countries are the first to expand on a new activity, but it also points
toward the need to address the outreach strategy.
Table 4. Outreach Events and Impact
Our Survey:
AB CV:
Partner
All/mean
Core Partner /mean
National Partner /mean
IREEP/mean
Benin
Burkina Faso
Madagascar
Mali
Senegal
CDD/mean
Cape Verde
Ghana
Kenya
Liberia
Nigeria
Tanzania
Uganda
IDASA/mean
Botswana
Lesotho
Malawi
Mozambique
Namibia
South Africa
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Totals
Outreach
Events
2.2
6.0
1.5
1.6
4
1
0
0
3
2.1
0
5
3
1
0
4
2
2.6
2
2
2
1
1
9
3
1
44
Info.
/Analysis
Requests
1.1
1
26
1
18
46
Outreach
Events
2.4
3.3
2.2
1.8
4
1
1
0
3
5.0
3
6
3
1
0
2
20
0.5
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
45
Info.
/Analysis
Requests
23.1
23.0
23.1
60.4
28
213
9
0
52
10.7
0
30
16
4
0
3
22
10.5
7
0
17
7
0
11
6
36
461
#Times AB Used
by Politicians
/Ministry Off.
8.3
8.7
8.2
11.8
4
30
2
#Times AB Used
by CSOs /ThinkTanks
6.5
8.3
6.1
7.0
6
15
2
11
10.3
30
20
3
4
0
5
11.2
30
15
3
6
1
5
4.0
2
0
12
2.3
0
20
2
0
103
0
1
1
0
4
5
5
81
We also asked about outreach in the survey carried out as part of the evaluation. Overall, the figures
match with the AB CV relatively well, except (and surprisingly since outreach is coordinated by staff
at IDASA) for South Africa where the AB CV lists 9 outreach events, while the team at IDASA has
answered that outreach is planned for 2010 and so far no events have taken place. In short, there is
Final Report – 19
still confusion even within CPs’ units what constitutes an outreach event and what does not. Again, it
also points to the administrative weakness of the AB Network discussed in further detail in the next
section.
The total cost of the core components of this strategy is high. Outreach coordinators and outreach
events were budgeted at a total of $355,400 for R4 based on coordinators working at 50% of fulltime. At least IDASA and CDD, however, have full-time employed to do this work so the real cost
should be higher. This can be compared to the budget for printing of what policy-actors actually use
(bulletins, briefing papers, and so on): $20,000. When it comes to impact in terms of requests for
analysis or further information, the AB CV and the survey gives widely divergent results. The AB CV
lists 57 requests but 11 are from USA and thus not included in Table 4, while in the survey AB
partners claim to have processed 461 requests.
Some of these figures are more believable than others, however. The 213 requests claimed by the AB
partner in Burkina Faso are probably less accurate than most others. Yet, we also find it plausible
that the AB partners have received many requests, and responded to them, without this information
having reached the monitoring and evaluation officer at PMU/CDD. We note that the third CP
(IREEP) report in the survey to have received 28 requests but the AB CV has none of these listed.
During field missions, AB staff at both CPs and NPs also question the current focus on outreach as
defined in the Outreach Strategy. While there is certainly a need for many editors and journalists,
MPs and their research assistants, CSO-activists, donors and academics to be trained in using and
analyzing survey data, it is not clear that this should be among the AB’s core tasks.
The evaluation team questions the assumption that seems to undergird the current strategy, namely
that if given training workshops media actors will start analyzing the raw AB data. Similarly, CSOs,
donors, government officials, and local governments are supposed to act in this way. We do not find
that credible, at least not yet in most countries, and thus it seems the AB Network could make more
efficient use of the available funds. We find it much more credible that the vast majority of policy
actors will consume and occasionally use results of analysis already done, principally by AB staff and
affiliated researchers. We come to this conclusion after not finding one single external actor who
could show one concrete example of an external policy actor conducting his or her own analysis of
the raw data7.
It is also clear that the current outreach strategy and organizational design suffers from lack of
attention paid to the first order of activities as per the outreach strategy: cultivating informal
networks. The outreach coordinators at CPs have probably done all they can but this is not an activity
appropriate for their level. African politics is decisively informal and personal and very sensitive to
status and recognition. It is simply not realistic that relatively unknown figures from another country
with less than doctoral degrees will be effective in informal networking on their own. Leading
individuals at CP institutions must be active for the approach to work even in their own country. The
same goes for NIs at NPs in their countries.
The AB outreach coordinators themselves acknowledge the unrealistic expectations of how they are
to network in the various countries from afar and successfully mobilize key constituencies at a high
enough level. While the networking skills of the coordinator are crucial, it is probably impossible to
achieve what the outreach strategy supposes coordinators can do. Finally, the current strategy has
alienated some NPs from the process.
We have been convinced that informal networking is severely underdeveloped in the AB activities,
and that to be effective it requires the involvement of NPs. In most countries, the NPs include widely
recognized individuals with the stature, prestige and vast personal networks, but who are simply not
mobilized for outreach, just as they are not used much for dissemination.
The issue is partly one of finding a contractual solution that involves financial enumeration for these
services. The evaluation team’s discussions with among others, the World Bank on this topic suggests
We exclude here a couple of instances where previous AB staff or students of the AB Senior Advisors have continued
to conduct analyses after the termination of an official affiliation with the AB Network.
7
Final Report – 20
that there are off-the-shelf solutions to this that international organizations such as the World Bank
already are using. The World Bank representative also indicated a willingness to apply for funds to
cover the costs of the informal networking as suggested in this evaluation.
The evaluation finds that African policy actors are supportive of such a re-definition of the
communication strategy. Many interviewees also suggest that the AB look at what organizations like
the Gallup, EIU, Amnesty Intl, Brookings Institute, Human Rights Watch, and others do. Several local
donors indicate that with more intensive engagement with them at the local level by CPs and NPs,
they could fund some of these dissemination and outreach activities, as well as be active helping with
the networking and lobbying that needs to be done. This is an untapped resource.
Academics and students have not been targeted much yet. This has been a deliberate strategy in
order to achieve the key target goals prioritizing media and civil society organizations. The most
effective outreach in terms of academics and students is probably also the cheapest. For example,
during the visit to Kenya, United States International University immediately offered to make AB
presentations part of one of the colloquiums they already run.
Recommendations
We strongly recommend that the AB Network rethinks the image of holding large events where
policy actors are expected to come to the AB to listen to what the AB thinks is important as the main
dissemination and outreach tool. The core of the dissemination and outreach should instead be going
to African policy actors and meet them at their offices, work with them on their issues, and be
perceived as useful for the work they are already doing.
We recommend a new strategy that integrates dissemination and outreach, and that puts much more
heavy emphasis on reaching out to policy actors through individual meetings, and on multiple,
staged, piece-meal dissemination of results, hence, shifting the burden for dissemination and
outreach towards the NPs and reducing the need for outreach coordinators in all 3 CPs:
Part 1. Networking: Networking as used here means seeking out and meeting with key actors among
all the target groups: News editors in media houses and talk show hosts at TV/radio stations, the
Government Spokesman, ministers and their aides, the Speaker, chairs of committees, and principal
clerks in parliament, directors of commissions and other state bodies as well as at CSOs, heads of
missions, chief political counselors among foreign missions, chairs and leading professors at relevant
university departments and centers.
Networking means that the NI and other individuals with some statue in the country affiliated with
the AB NP, commit time to hold these informal meetings long before the actual data collection starts
for R5. The purpose is to make sure they have a positive and informed view of the AB, to give them
whatever information they feel they need, and crucially ask them how they want to be kept abreast
with the developments. Certain actors can also be invited to come with suggestions for the countryspecific questions for the questionnaire. By doing so, the AB creates a commitment to the project, a
personal relationship that can be drawn upon later. It also provides a wealth of qualitative
information on how to best approach dissemination and outreach later. In particular, the goal is to
prepare the ground for dissemination and outreach that can be done immediately after data
collection.
Core and other donors may then for example consider funding a rider with additional questions, or
provide extra funds to increase sample size so that analyses can be disaggregated on regions/ethnic
groups. Politicians and directors of state bodies can point out which areas they will be particularly
interested in and work can begin to prepare dissemination meetings at their offices shortly after data
has been collected.
NPs should be contractually bound to submit a work-plan and schedule, and conduct such
networking. A very brief note following a standard format can document each informal meeting.
These notes can constitute the deliverables (and the World Bank has praxis for contracts and such
reporting). The NPs should also be required to keep and share a database of all such contacts to
prevent loss of networks if/when an individual leave. The AB CPs could then have a data base of
contacts from the individual countries and use it to send out something like quarterly briefings to
Final Report – 21
policy-actors along the models of organizations like the HR Watch, EIU, Amnesty International, and
the Brookings Institute.
During data collection, key actors should be kept in the loop so as to be alerted to the fact that data
will soon be available and results will come out. The ‘name of the game’ is to create expectations.
Part 2. Staged, Piecemeal Public Dissemination
We recommend a piecemeal, staged and multi-facetted dissemination building on a few steps taken
earlier.
First, the 3 topics for bulletins to be used for the eventual large-scale public dissemination should be
decided before data collection begins. This can be handled as part of the contracts with NP. This is
necessary to plan and execute the rest of the strategy efficiently. Ideas for bulletin topics can also
come from the networking described above. Second, before data collection begins AB Network should
identify 10-20 survey questions to be used for the initial phase of the dissemination that are different
from the 3 issues the bulletins address. Third, protocol for data cleaning and quality control, as well
as dissemination should be revised to make it possible to start dissemination 1-2 weeks after data
collection ends8.
The dissemination should consist of a series of piecemeal releases of the 10-20 questions selected.
The first week a 1-2 page text is sent out reporting on the results on one or two of the questions
pertaining to corruption, for example. It is sent out as a press release to the now ‘networked’ editors
and journalists but also as an email bulletin to donors and CSO etc., and a briefing note to politicians
and other actors. A short press conference may well be held by the NP at their offices to further
spread the news. Next week, or 2 weeks later, another such 1-2page note/press release is sent out
possibly with another small press conference held. This is repeated for 2-4 months creating not 1 or
2 days of attention to the AB and the results, but many weeks. As the PR people like to say, it is not
about what you hear about a product, but how many times you hear about it.
At the end of this sequence (its length adjusted to local conditions), the main dissemination event or
events are taking place following the format currently used with a longer presentation of the main
bulletins and Q&A, and provision of both paper copies (several to each actor) of bulletins, as well as
freely available CD ROMs with all the AB materials on them. Following this, the commissioned
bulletins can be disseminated as email attachments and by handing out paper copies.
Part 3. Parallel In-Depth Dissemination & Outreach
Parallel with and beyond part 2, we recommend that networking continues with targeted briefings
that include handing over several copies of each bulletin as well as several copies of the CD-ROM. Key
actors are again, personally visited by the NI and others involved in the networking. Results
specifically interesting to x are presented in person, strengthening the personal relationship and the
commitment to the project. Core donors must be personally briefed as a matter of protocol. Synergies
with other projects can be explored such as joint workshops and other forms of dissemination and
outreach.
Several types of further activities may follow. For example, editors can provide feedback on results
they want presented in particular ways, ask questions, and decide to send reporters to the NP to
work on a story. Representatives of government bodies seeing the relevance of the AB can invite the
NP to participate in workshops and hold special briefings for specific departments. Donors can invite
NPs to sector-group meetings to discuss the implications of the results, and so on. The evaluation
team came across several such possibilities; for example, the USAID would have been positively
inclined to fund oversampling in Kenya in R4 in order to make possible analyses disaggregated on
the lager ethnic groups and regions. Representatives from various missions in other countries
expressed similar interests. The Swedish and Norwegian missions in South Africa would have been
We recognize that the ABEC response (Appendix 6) questions if this is possible but the evaluation team’s discussions
with data managers at different levels suggest that quality control of a limited set of questions should be possible
within the suggested time frame. We do not wish to debate this issue, only stress that cutting down the time between
data collection and release of results to the absolute minimum is critical to being successful in being visible in the
media and becoming relevant to African policy actors.
8
Final Report – 22
interested in funding additional survey research on HIV in several southern African countries.
Several government representatives from a series of countries said that if they had been approach
and had had the opportunity to include one or two specific questions included in the survey in R4,
they would have been very interested in analyzing and using the bulk of the AB questions on
governance, public service delivery. For example, the Government’s Spokesman in Kenya is a
professor and after being briefed on the AB by the evaluation team, was excited and promised that
given a proper briefing and materials, he would organize a cabinet session on the AB results.
Part 4. Outreach Workshops
The current style of outreach workshops would eventually be a possible outcome of all the above and
not the starting point, growing organically out of the networking and targeted dissemination. They
would be conducted at the request of policy actors with participants who are already committed and
informed attending and achieve effectiveness of this type of quite expensive training.
We recommend, however, that scholars and students are targeted by AB CPs and NPs holding talks at
relevant department colloquiums and if possible, as talks in large lecture halls. The NP can be
contracted to make x number of presentations at department/institute’s speaker series at x number
of different universities in the country, as well as (perhaps) x number of presentations for
undergraduate students in one of the large lecture halls. At these events, the NP should also
distribute CD-ROMs and paper copies of bulletins.
As a matter of protocol we recommend that it be mandatory that all AB partners brief the core
donors’ local missions both before data collection starts, as well as when the results are in.
More than one local mission of the core funders of the AB project had never had a personal visit from
the local AB partner, and a couple of cases where the local mission did not even know who the local
AB partner was.
When implementing this, or any other strategy, we also strongly recommend that the AB Network
assigns one person to accumulate a ‘most successful practices’ data base on which others in the
Network can draw and get inspiration from, as well as to facilitate evaluation of current activities.
We recommend that AB partners prominently feature links to the AB website and its publications on
their own websites and that the AB website at MSU advertises the various CPs and NPs much more
prominently and provide links to their websites.
We recommend that each briefing paper should be printed with a nice folder-cover in 500-1,500
copies depending on the size of the country. Equally, something like 1,000 CD-ROMs per country
should be produced and if possible they should include all working papers, all briefing papers, the
full series of data sets, and the on-line data analysis tool.
This area entails not only to assess the extent and success to which responsibilities have been
transferred from MSU to CDD-Ghana (and to a lesser extent IDASA and IREEP), but also the extent
and success to which the PMU at CDD-Ghana, as well as IDASA and IREEP, are satisfactorily
responding to the needs and duties of the national partners. Field missions were conducted in
Botswana, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal, and several of these belong to the most critical
NPs according to our survey, so the field data were probably not entirely representative and we have
tried to account for that in the following analysis. We have never taken any of the information at face
value, have used historical methods to evaluate the sources, and have sought to triangulate
information as far as possible. In addition, we have taken oral as well as written responses from the
ABEC seriously and re-evaluated our preliminary analysis continuously.
The preliminary analysis during the inception period suggested that the AB network has come a long
way towards transferring project and management responsibilities to the African core partners.
There were also some indications that the core partners have additional work to do in order to build
capacity and engage with the national partners is a fully satisfactorily way and it was decided that the
final report should focus on one issue from the TOR:
Final Report – 23

How effective has the Network been in building management capacity at African core partner
institutions to allow them to take over lead responsibility for all aspects of project management
(fundraising and grants management, survey implementation, coordination of dissemination
and outreach activities, as well as capacity building programs, overall network management,
scientific analysis and reporting writing, publications and quality assurance)?
It important to remember, as pointed out by the ABEC (Appendix 6), that the AB project is a network
of 25 partner organizations. The institutions in the network are of varied nature from advocacy-type
NGOs to science-based research university outfits. They contribute with an equally varied set of
strong personalities with diverse experiences coloring their views. It is natural with this kind of setup that there will be differences and at times management will be challenging.
We also wish to put on record that the evaluation recognizes that the transfer of project management
responsibilities was initiated after R4 started. It has only had 2.5 years to develop. Overall, we find
that the AB Network has engaged this difficult and complex process with determination yet in a
careful manner demonstrating the Network’s conscientious approach.
The transfer of financial management has been very successful. The financial manager at CDD is, as is
the financial manager at IDASA, very competent and efficient, as far as we can determine without
being specialists. The loss of the original financial manager at CDD and installment of the current one
has not had any discernable negative consequences and speaks well of CDD. Inspection of contracts
and documentation of deliverables at CDD was satisfactory. The much-improved contracts with CPs
and NPs specify deliverables in a detailed and generally clear manner. As far as we could discern,
funds are only paid when deliverables have been submitted both by the PMU and by CPs, although
we remind the reader that we did not visit the CP in Benin. The difficulties following insufficient
funding for year 1, and delays in disbursements after that have been handled well.
The basket funding mechanism has in all likelihood contributed to the success of the transfer of
financial management reducing the complexity of both budgeting and reporting significantly.
We find no major risks of corruption or other irregular financial activities. One concern raised by the
financial manager at IDASA was that CPs have not carried out internal audits of NPs’ financial control
systems and the manager felt uncomfortable with certifying financial reports from the NPs. The AB
PMU argues that this is not a problem since partners only get paid when deliverables are certified. As
far as the evaluation team can discern, the system of payment against deliverables does not fully
address the concern raised. Hypothetically, it is still possible that some of the funds are paid out in
illicit ways, if an NP manages to produce the deliverables with fewer funds than budgeted.
Several part of the transition process are still works in progress, and the process suffered setbacks
such as the hiring of an inadequate Deputy Director who had to be fired in 2009. Given the
organizational complexity of the AB project as such, the multilayered, decentralized, and somewhat
unclear operational structure of the AB Network, the high staff turnover in the CPs and general lack
of administrative skills; it is not surprising that the transition from MSU to a fully African-owned
project and financial management has not yet been completed.
The AB Network has accomplished a lot with very small resources. The evaluation team also wishes
to put on record that the AB Network has come a long way in a very short time with its process of
‘Africanization’ that only got started with R4. We are confident that in the coming years the AB
Network can make further progress, and we hope that the findings presented below can be
informative to the AB and the donors in this process. We also recognize that the network approach
has advantages in terms of drawing on the various advantages that different organizations have. Yet,
with expansion there comes a time when networks become too complex to effectively pursue
decisive set of goals and activities.
The AB Network should also recognize that the nature, advantages and disadvantages of its
constituent organizations have changed, and will continue to change. The perception of what a
particular organization has brought to the Network in the past is not necessarily the same as what
the organization contributes at present.
Final Report – 24
The AB Network has a legacy of a few individuals running the project from several different
institutions necessitating everyone to be multi-tasking fulfilling several different functional needs.
We recognize the cyclical nature of several aspects of the project. With the expansion over the last
round, and with the specter of an even greater expansion in the near future, the multi-functional
nature of most staff-positions can become a hindrance. We recognize that steps have been taken
towards functional specialization but concur that more needs to be done to avoid too many people
being spread out wide and thin becoming ‘jacks of all trades’ but masters at none, in terms of
performance. We see this as a risk for the sustainability of the project.
There are costs to lack of functional differentiation and decentralized network structures. The
evaluation after R3 suggested that the organizational scheme (largely unchanged today) was
inadequate since it did not enlist the specific functions and concrete tasks to be the responsibility of
officers at different levels inside the boxes of the scheme. This specification of tasks and functions has
neither been done nor is the organizational structure devised in 2007 fully implemented yet,
resulting in residual confusion among staff at both CPs and NPs. With the expansion over the last
round, and with the specter of an even greater expansion in the near future, the organizational
structure of the AB Network needs be revisited and at a minimum, clarified and further specified as
the R3 evaluation recommended. At the same time, overextension because of involvement with other
large projects is a risk at CPs and this is something we suggest the AB Network takes seriously.
While noting the ABEC’s disagreement with this conclusion, we think that the AB Network is possibly
already at a point where the complexities and functional demands of managing a multi-country,
multi-dimensional, and highly public project exceeds the possibilities of a highly decentralized
network structure. While keeping the network character of the AB, centralization of certain core
functions of administration and management, along with recruitment to new positions and greater
functional specialization of staff, would enhance organizational efficiency and counter risks
associated with future expansion into a number of new countries. These considerations merit a fuller
analysis and discussion, hence, the following.
Transition of Project and Financial Management
A transition, or ‘Africanization’, of project and financial management was set in motion with R4. We
recognize that this has always been the goal of the architects of the AB project. The executive
directorship was transferred with R4 from Distinguished Professor Michael Bratton at MSU to
Professor E. Gyimah-Boadi (budgeted at .25 Full-Time Equivalent, FTE) at CDD, assisted by a
Program Management Unit (PMU)9 at CDD consisting of a second Deputy Director (1.00 FTE), a
Financial Manager (.50 FTE), and a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (.50 FTE). The Deputy Director
was fired in 2009 and has not been replaced leaving the PMU at CDD short-handed with 1.25 FTE.
At IDASA, the Regional Field Coordinator (a function located below PMU-level) is also responsible for
overall network management of outreach activities. This is one example of the organizational
complexities of the AB Network that exacts information and communication costs. The outreach
coordinator at CDD reports to the regional coordinator at IDASA, who reports to the DD at MSU, who
shares the information with the M&E Manager at CDD. IDASA is also hosting the Network Data
Manager (1.00 FTE).
MSU still retains a significant share of PMU-level functions: The DD (1.00 FTE), website manager (.25
FTE), donor liaison/Intl M&E officer (.50 FTE), publications editor (.50 FTE), and a secondary data
manager (.50 FTE). Totaling the budget allocations of PMU-level staff, MSU has 2.75 FTE, or more
than double the staff that CDD-Ghana has. IDASA has 1.25 FTE at PMU level. In the end, CDD-Ghana
has roughly a quarter of the total staff at PMU-level, and half of the staff for overall program
management is found at MSU. There are also cost-benefit implications to these allocations given
differential salary levels. MSU staff (excluding here the DD, Senior Advisor, and the post-doc) is
budgeted at about the same level as a DD at CDD. The cost of an AB Regional Coordinator hired
Other network-wide management functions that the evaluation team considers to be PMU-functions are located at
other institutions. While the AB Network like to distinguish between the PMU at CDD with its limited functions, and
other program management, this is not very helpful for the purposes of this review. Project management needs to be
assessed in its entirety thus when we refer to ‘PMU-level’ we are indicating the project and financial management
level, not the restricted use of ‘the PMU’ as defined by the AB.
9
Final Report – 25
through IDASA was budgeted at 3-4 times the cost of a bilingual person who is also highly skilled
administrator (a needed) at IREEP. The AB Network could consider taking advantage of
differentiated salary levels in Africa.
Table 5. Budget Allocations of Staff Resources as of current (2010)
CDD
Network Management Functions
Executive Director
Deputy Director
Data Management
Outreach Coordination
M&E
Financial Management
Publications Manager
Website Manager
Donor/Intl M&E
Sum FTE
Core Partner Functions
Core Partner Director
Regional Field Coordination
Outreach Coordination
Sum FTE
Other
Snr Advising
SS manager
Sum FTE
TOTAL SUM FTE
IDASA
IREEP
MSU
UCT
.25
1.00
.50
1.00
.25
.50
.50
.50
.25
.50
2.75
1.25
1.25
1.00
.50
1.50
.75
.50
.1.25
.20
.50
.50
1.20
2.50
.50
.50
1.70
.20
2.75
.20
2.95
.20
.50
.70
.70
The fact that the AB ED at CDD-Ghana is only budgeted for the project at 25% is a concern. Key actors
even at CPs did not even know about the ED’s limited time commitment but point to the fact that they
rarely experience the ED to be directly involved in everyday activities. We acknowledge that there
was supposed to have been a capable DD at CDD-Ghana (the person hired in 2008 and fired in 2009
for underperformance). The failure to hire an adequate person at that time and the inability to
replace her is unfortunate.
In the organizational structure, CDD also has an Outreach Coordinator (.50 FTE) and a Field
Coordinator (1.00 FTE) but these are at CP-level. IDASA and IREEP have roughly the same resources.
In addition, IREEP has funding for the Director (at .20 FTE), which IDASA does not have.
R4 posed particular challenging circumstances to CDD. At the CP level, CDD took on managing three
new NPs while losing two of its more senior AB staff to PhD programs in the UK and the US. At PMUlevel, the new organization involved hiring two new officers for outreach, and monitoring and
evaluation, and start up these functions from scratch at CDD. Financial management came with a
significant increase in responsibilities. Halfway through R4, CDD lost its financial manager due to a
family move, and a new financial manager had to be installed. The Deputy Director hired to assume a
series of major roles did not perform as hoped and was eventually fired in 2009.
We find that despite difficult circumstances, CDD has successfully taken over many core functions for
the AB project and in many ways performed very well. The lack of an overall administrator with
strong organizational skills is particularly burdensome. The CDD should be adequately recognized
for all its achievements in terms of shouldering many new important responsibilities. The evaluation
team finds that CDD during R4 has demonstrated many strengths and a comforting potential for
further development of its capacity to manage the AB project.
The PMU unit at CDD-Ghana is not at present designed to handle the entire administration of the AB
project, and that CDD ‘lost’ two of its most capable individuals working on the AB to PhD-programs in
the UK and the US respectively. However, the evaluation questions if the current division of functions
between CPs in the network is the best solution from an organizational perspective. We recognize the
ABEC’s difference of opinion here, but feel obliged to concur that organizing several functions to be
performed in parallel at the 3 CPs, reinforces the legacy of multi-functional staff positions. This
makes it harder to hire staff that can excel in several varied tasks, and risk to lead to individuals
becoming ‘jack of all trades’.
Final Report – 26
The gradual transfer of responsibilities during R4, but also the organizational complexity has created
a situation where staff has limited knowledge about each other as organizational units, what each
unit and what each person currently does. To illustrate without pointing fingers: staff at X does not
know the names of staff at unit Y; unit Y does not know if unit Z has bilingual capacity even if they do;
Z thinks a,b,c, are tasks that X does but in reality Y is handling these tasks.
Facing financial limitations in terms of hiring and structural constraints such as residency laws, the
ABEC’s has felt need to ‘follow the talent’ where it happens to be in the Network. We also note the
ABEC’s different view on the appropriateness of the existing division of functions between IDASA and
UCT in South Africa. The evaluation team, however, has not been convinced that an expanded project
covering 35 or more countries in Africa can be administrated effectively with many core
management, administrative, and organizational functions being spread out at different institutions.
Data Management is spread out on MSU (DD and assistant data manager), IDASA (Data Manager),
and IREEP and CDD (regional data managers). The evaluation team is not convinced this is an
efficient organization. This structure builds on three points of data deposit at CPs, from NPs around
Africa. In principle, after NPs have cleaned the data entry, each national data set is then reviewed at
CPs, possibly sent back for questions and revisions, after which it is sent to the DD and assistant DM
at MSU for another round of review, cleaning, and quality control. The DD at MSU and the DM at
IDASA work together to finalize national and merged data sets. To reduce complexity and speed up
the process, one could consider having one point of data deposit instead of three and allocating
assistants to the DM to handle the process of cleaning national data sets.
IDASA is not an organization geared for management of large data sets, storage, and cleaning. Data
management functions are organizationally situated at the PMU-level. An ‘Africanized’ Network data
management could rather be placed either in the PMU at CDD-Ghana (but would require significant
investments in data management infrastructure); or at a unit such as DARU/CSSR/UCT if a merger of
the South African operations would be considered. UCT can (already does) manage large data sets
and have the kinds of resources MSU has always had, e.g. able, committed, and willing advanced MA
and PhD students to work on project basis over extended periods of time. If the AB wants to follow
the talent, a data management unit may have to be set up in Uganda by the current DM and resources
allocated for one or two assistant data managers there.
We ask the ABEC to at a minimum analyze the possible organizational advantages and functional
efficiencies of making DARU/CSSR/UCT the main partner in South Africa. We are aware that this
request will not be welcomed by everyone but feel obligated to make this recommendation given the
facts on the ground as we have found them (see further analysis on this below).
We recognize that CDD participates in several other large-scale projects (e.g. the African Power and
Politics Program, the ACET African Transformation Project, the CODEO/Election Monitoring Project,
CDP, Phase II, etc). The same is true for IREEP that is now in addition engaging in building the
‘African School of Economics’. IDASA runs 9 large programs and the AB is a minor component. The
issue of overextension is thus potentially an issue with the CPs and this is something we suggest the
ABEC takes seriously. The PMU-level at CDD is in need to have a designate and specialized
administrator, preferably bilingual, capable of handle a complex 20-country program that may well
expand into another 17 countries in the near future. It would seem a risk to go into R5 in 6 months
without a full-time, highly competent and specialized administrator in place.
A few examples illustrate the need to have designated administrators for the AB project at this point.
There are no systematic records at CDD, nor at CP-level at IREEP and IDASA, logging the exchanges
with regards to handling of exchanges with the now large number of various partners in the network,
various complaints, processing and providing feedback on bulletins and briefing papers, and so on. If
nothing else, this must be remedied. The largest discrepancies with regards to reporting of media
events, outreach, and other forms of impact come from CPs of the AB Network and the CPs and the
PMU do not provide consistent data. The evaluation revealed that most AB Network partners were
unaware that the present evaluation would take place during this period and the ED had planned
Final Report – 27
medical leave and vacation. While noting the different view on this issue submitted by the ABEC, the
evaluation team takes this as a sign of lack of planning and possibly of overextension.10
The perceptions among staff in the Network and the actual behavior of individuals at other CPs as
well as NPs reinforce this situation. The other two CPs and some NPs sometimes circumvent the
organizational structure in part because of perceived lack of responsiveness and planning at CDD.
Some staff perceives that if more of the key functions were handed over to CDD at present, things
would not work as well. Such comments are in reference for example to that for some time the email
system of CDD has made it difficult to contact CDD staff; that both CDD and IREEP are slow in
responding to various requests and that information sometimes are lost or not acted upon; while the
DD at MSU is commended for her huge efforts, rapid responses, executive ability, organizational
skills, and good planning. We see reforms in areas such as these as part of a desirable upgrading of
administrative standards and efficiency.
In this process of transition, it is understandable that the current DD at MSU is still critical for the
project management providing backstopping, and making executive decisions on an everyday basis.
The DD is greatly appreciated throughout the AB Network. It is clear that the DD is invaluable for
almost all of the components of the AB project, is going far beyond the call of duty, and is doing an
excellent job. Yet, the DD could also act to strengthen the Africanization. During R4, there seems to
have been limited enforcement of the organizational structure so as to allow NPs to turn directly to
the DD at MSU (e.g. the NP in Mali who allegedly ‘never’ go through the CP in Benin; Kenya was
managed directly during R4 by the DD without an explanation to the responsible person at CP-level
at CDD and without the knowledge of the NP in Kenya).11 There are a few gripes about the DD’s
tendency to micro-manage removing some of the sense of responsibility from some staff at CP level
and at NPs. It is unfortunate since commitment from the various partners is important to success.
The AB Network does not have a human resource development program or even an explicit strategy.
While acknowledging the gradual growth of the project over many years that makes this
understandable, it seems that it has come to a point when it is unsustainable to continue without one.
We found instances where there seemed to be a disconnect between the Executive Committee and
the levels below. The R5 proposal for example, has not been shared and discussed with all of them.
There is a risk of creating a sense of alienation from the process, which can lead to lowering of
ambitions and a lesser sense of loyalty to the project.
The International Advisory Board is under-utilized. It seems that when MSU was the organizational
center of the AB Network, the advisory board was more involved. In the last few years, the advisory
board members have hardly ever been contacted to assist. Members on the board are involved in
other large-scale projects from which important lessons could have benefitted the AB project, e.g.
their expertise with running surveys using hand-held computers, wiki-boards for administrative
tasks, use of GPS and satellite technology when sample frames are inadequate, protocols for
reporting of results to donors and other supportive organizations.12
Project Management and the Other Core Partners
The evaluation team was not able to visit IREEP in Benin and the evaluation survey indicates that the
two Francophone NPs we visited are clearly the most critical. Hence, it is likely that our field data is
biased. We have sought to address this bias by triangulating with data from documentation of
activities and interviews with other parts of the network, as well as contacting other NPs outside of
the field mission-countries. We also conducted a two-hour interview with the Director of IREEP,
Professor Leonard Wantchekon, in order to balance the slate of information available to us.
CDD submitted TORs on 9 April 2010 in which the date for submission of the final report of the evaluation was
proposed and from which one can easily calculate when the bulk of the evaluation would take place.
11 The Regional Field Coordinator’s response to the evaluation team did not indicate he knew why this had been done,
and the NI in Kenya was clearly unaware of this. The relationship between the DD and the NP in Kenya had ‘gone sour’
a couple of years before after the DD intervened to stop a person from IDS in Kenya from attending the CSSR/DARU
summer school
12 It remains unclear to us why the International Advisory Board have not invited to participate in such a critical
process as the current review (for example to give input to the drafting of the TORs conducted by CDD), the policy
user conference, and the Executive Board meeting on September 25, 2010 in preparation of R5.
10
Final Report – 28
The quality of the staff at IREEP is very high in areas of survey methodology, statistical analysis, and
econometrics. The network they provide in terms of able economists and statisticians also from
countries the AB may expand to in the near future be also valuable. The Director is a visionary with
lots of energy and big plans for the future in terms of advancing research and policy analysis in
Africa, by Africans, for Africa. The evaluation appreciates these positives and acknowledges the
importance of such individuals and institutions to be part of the network.
IREEP has changed nature from an NGO to more of an educational institution that already runs an
MA-program in public economics and statistical analysis. The foundation has been laid for IREEP to
be part of Director Wantchekon’s new and larger project: starting the “African School of Economics”,
an exclusive, top-notch African university with MA-programs in business administration,
international affairs, mathematics and economics, and development studies, as well as a PhD
program. The foundation stone for this new school was laid on July 22, 2010.
IREEP’s development towards an educational institution geared for highest possible internationalstandard education provides opportunities to build on affiliations of renowned scholars, greater
administrative efficiency, and the possibility of a larger body of graduate students. The latter will be
valuable for analysis as well as organizational functions, and can bring use of AB data with them after
graduating in much the same way that students at MSU have done for years, and in much the same
way DARU/CSSR/UCT already are doing.
The above development of IREEP may also explain to some extent what we perceive to be inadequate
attention paid by IREEP and its Director to its CP duties in the AB Network. We note that IREEP has
experienced problems when it comes to retention similar to CDD and IDASA. A particular case was
the sudden passing away of the person in charge of administrating IREEP’s duties in terms of the AB
project in August 2009. Two other key staff also left IREEP during the last few years. With the funds
available, less qualified staff has been hired. For example, by their own admission in order to get
bilingual capacity (English and French), IREEP decided to lower the bar on the person’s
administrative and organizational skills. This should not be necessary even in a situation of
unchanged level of funding, if the AB Network took advantage of the price-differentials between
countries where Benin has a comparative advantage. On the other hand, the IREEP Director’s salary
is based on his salary at New York University in the US rather than salary levels in Benin, which may
seem less efficient use of scarce resources. This principle is something the AB Network might want to
revisit.
Having said this, the information at hand indicates that IREEP has not fulfilled its responsibilities as a
CP to a satisfying degree. It is not productive or fair to put the responsibility on the NPs only. IREEP
receives critique not only from NPs. Just as is the case with the other CPs, there are no records at
IREEP logging the exchanges with regards to processing of financial claims, deliverables, selection
procedures for the summer schools, handling of complaints, processing and providing feedback on
bulletins and briefing papers, and so on. The NPs and others have substantial complaints about these
issues and the evaluation finds it likely that there are grounds for several of them. The AB project is
suffering in terms of commitment by the AB NPs in terms of productivity, visibility, and capacity
building as an effect and it is the CP’s responsibility to effectively manage the NPs. The question of
whether IREEP has discriminated against the two partners in Mali and Senegal in the past with
regards to treatment on bulletins/briefing papers, summer school training opportunities, AB
Fellowships, and administrative support should be revisited.
IDASA is an independent advocacy organization committed to promoting sustainable democracy
based on active citizenship, democratic institutions, and social justice founded in 1986. IDASA
combines the traditional donor-funded model with a fee-for-service component and supplements
funds accruing from these sources with a domestic fund-raising program. The organization also
maintains a mix of fulltime, permanent and/or contract staff and conducts its own training and
recruitment programs. IDASA is organized along 9 programs and then the AB as a separate entity and
being the smallest.
Final Report – 29
The Regional Field Coordinator’s administrative and analytical capabilities are evidently strong, but
at IDASA she has little operative backing of someone such as a professor with higher status, which
helps in the management of many NPs. The Network DM is extremely competent in his area and
highly motivated but is clearly uncomfortable with being stationed in South Africa. The Outreach
Coordinator, another MA, has been at IDASA since 2002 and worked with the AB since 2005 but
works in very limited sense directly with the national partners in the region.
IDASA’s financial management seems beyond doubt highly professional and reliable and the AB
could benefit from her being involved more in financial accounting discussions given her experience
working with national partners and IDASA’s unique accounting system. She expressed her concern
with certifying financial reports from national partners which she has not had the opportunity to
certify that they have appropriate internal systems for financial control.
IDASA’s work with the AB has suffered from high rates of turnover and its inability to keep staff for
the AB project speaks to its disadvantage. The present AB staff at IDASA is relatively new. The
Regional Field Coordinator only came on board mid-way through year one of R4. Moral within the
present team is notably low, even though individually the staff is passionate about the AB. The
evaluation team has received information to the effect that IDASA’s Executive Director is leaving the
organization; the DM will leave IDASA in December 2010 (although continue as the AB DM), and that
it is unclear if the Outreach Coordinator will stay. That would leave 1 AB staff at IDASA besides the
financial management support.
We recognize the ABEC’s notes of evidence (Appendix 6) that IDASA’s Executive Director is
committed to the AB project as showed by his unpaid participation in ABEC meetings and the many
AB presentations he has given. We accept that the level of institutional commitment to the AB was
probably higher in the past and that IDASA has been a resource to the project during a long period.
Yet, the present level of commitment to the AB project by IDASA as an institution is lower than the
evaluation team had expected it to be. As the only exception at IDASA, the AB project is outside of this
main structure and is IDASA’s smallest activity, the least resourced, as well as the most research
driven and academic of IDASA’s programs. The IDASA webpage nowhere features the AB project. A
search on the webpage reveals that AB briefings and papers can be found only by using the
webpage’s search engine. Entering the facilities in Pretoria, there is nothing to indicate that this is the
home of the AB in southern Africa, even though the main programs all have their logos and names
displayed. The three full-time staff are located in two small rooms with little in terms of support.
IDASA is not an organization geared for management of large data sets, storage, and cleaning, and its
in-house understanding for basic requirements of the AB project such as high-powered computers to
manage the large data sets, seems inadequate.
The expected strengths of IDASA did not show up during the evaluation. As an advocacy organization
we expected dissemination and outreach and the AB’s visibility to be particularly strong. We find that
even IDASA’s strongest allies testified to the contrary. An often cited example that policy-actors
suggest IDASA could follow in terms of both successful analysis as well as dissemination and
outreach for the AB, is the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and in particular the work by former
IDASA employee and Robert Matte’s former student, Collette Schulz–Herzenberg.
We found a relative high degree of ignorance about the AB even among IDASA’s most supporting
agencies. For example, one of the AB R4 core donor’s local mission who support one of the other
IDASA programs and meet regularly with the Executive Director but had not been made aware that
IDASA is the local AB partner, much less AB’s CP in southern Africa. Others testify that the IDASA
promotion of the AB project has over the last few years been very weak. A contractor of IDASA testify
that one has to ‘be a digging researcher’ to know about the AB, and emphasized that other
organizations prepare the ground with target audiences long before they even start data collection so
that they know something is coming and feel part of it.
Recommendations
We recommend that the basket funding mechanism be continued.
We see a need to reduce organizational complexity and increase functional specialization in order to
run the expanding project without losing too much efficiency. We ask that the AB Network take
seriously the difference between where the Network came from, and where they are going.
Final Report – 30
We recommend that the organizational structure of the AB Network be revisited and at a minimum,
be clarified and further specified as the R3 evaluation recommended. We recommend that as a first
step, the AB Network should elaborate on the current organizational scheme and map out which
functions are de facto performed by whom in the current structure and how lines of reporting looks
like. Then the Network should think strategically about how the current de facto organization could
be made more efficient.
Our only specific and most important recommendation in this regard is that the AB Network revisits
the issue of spreading out management functions at different institutions. We do not recommend that
most or all management functions be centralized at PMU/CDD, but we do recommend that the AB
Network recruit a designate and specialized top-level administrator, preferably bilingual and
preferably stationed at PMU/CDD, capable of handle a complex 20-country program that may well
expand into another 17 countries in the near future. At the same time, there is continued need for an
individual with academic and personal statue to handle certain aspects of the network management
vs. a number of the NPs.
In conjunction with the above, we recommend that a plan for human resource development in
relation to AB’s core goals be drafted, and then discussed by ABEC, the International Advisory Board,
as well as CPs and NPs for feedback, before adopted.
We recommend that the reduced level of staff resources needed for outreach under the strategy
recommended in this evaluation, be reallocated for project management. At CDD, the outreach
coordinator impressed the evaluation team greatly both in terms of organizational and interpersonal
skills, and she should be more than apt for this kind of redefinition of tasks.
Given that the DM will not stay at IDASA for long and that the Executive Director may be leaving, we
recommend that the ABEC consider moving responsibilities from IDASA to DARU/CSSR at UCT
justified on the grounds that IDASA no longer seems to have the necessary level of commitment to
the AB; the staff situation has been and remains highly unstable; IDASA does not have the
institutional profile the AB needs; and that staff do not have a inspirational and motivating
environment.
We recommend that the ABEC consider having one point of data deposit instead of three and allocate
assistants to the DM to handle the process of cleaning national data sets. The DM could be stationed
at DARU/UCT since they already have data storage capacity and procedures at UCT. An alternative
could be with PMU at CDD but this would require significant investments in both internet access and
in data storage facilities. A third option would be to fall in line with ABEC’s current policy of
‘following the talent’ and when the DM is leaving South Africa this coming December, allocate
resources for him set up a data management facility in Uganda.
We strongly recommend that each CP immediately implement a log system for incoming/outgoing
requests between the AB partners that among other things will make it possible to monitor and
evaluate the responsiveness and administrative efficiency of both CPs and NPs. We suggest that
donors offer technical assistance with setting up this system.
We recommend that PMU/CDD-Ghana needs French-speaking capacity.
We recommend that CDD immediately solve their perennial problem with emails.
We recommend that the ABEC implement more participatory procedures to reduce the distance
between them and the staff below this level. At a minimum core partner staff be consulted in the
preparation of the R5 proposal and budgeting.
The AB ED is recommended to make much better, systematic, and more frequent use of the
International Advisory Board.
Final Report – 31
E) Regional Public Good and Peace & Security?
Two additional central issues that we were asked to assess are to what extent the AB is becoming a
regional public good; and to what extent the AB is useful for other purposes such as peace and
security. These were also judged to constitute important parts of the evaluation but it was not clear
at the time for the inception report exactly how far we would be able to follow up and evaluate these.
Peace and Security
That the AB project is already relevant to issues of peace and security and its potential for becoming
more relevant in the future is great. In particular, an increase of the standard sample size would
enable more sophisticated analyses of national samples disaggregated by ethnic group or region for
example, typically critical for topics related to peace and security.
For the sake of brevity, we would like to cite one very concrete example, from Ghana, to illustrate the
point. During the lead-up to the general elections in the country in 2008, shortly after the chaos had
erupted and devastated parts of Kenya in the wake of her 2007 general elections, fears of violence
were running high. While Ghana’s very active civil society were being mobilized in various conflictprevention efforts, there were few sources of reliable data available on where the likelihood was
greatest for conflict. The AB data collection in Ghana was conducted 4-27 March 2008. The data on
perceptions of the risk of conflict and other indicators of strong tensions were quickly analyzed
identifying a few areas that stood out, among them the town of Tamale in the Northern Region. Our
informants cite this as instrumental to them in directing their scarce resources towards the hottest
spots. In the end, Ghana’s 2008 elections passed without any major incidents of violence despite a
high risk and high stakes. The last round of data collection in Kenya that took place after the electionrelated violence in late 2007 and early 2008, could here be of important use for the AB Network. The
fieldwork reports enumerate a number of conflict-area specific issues the data collection mission had
to deal with and solve.
It is also easy to imagine situations in conflict-prone environments where the presence of reliable
data would be an important tool in keeping the peace. Conflicts in Africa are often stirred up using
tactics like instigating fears that other groups are different and intend to exploit others. Public data
and analysis of the real situation on the ground can in such situations be very powerful means of
making it harder to instigate such misconceptions. In many countries, however, such more
disaggregated analyses would require larger samples than the standard AB number of around 1,200.
But it seems likely that local missions and international organizations should be able to come up with
the funds to draw slightly larger samples for these cases.
We thus recommend that if and when the AB expands to countries or encounter areas in other AB
countries recently victimized by large-scale violence, they actively involve the individuals in
operational capacity for the latest data collection in Kenya and make use of their experiences.
Regional Public Good
Although perhaps not emphasized enough throughout this report, it is evidently clear to the
evaluation team that the AB data sets, the bulletins, briefing papers, working papers and articles have
already become a regional public good in Africa.
The flood of AB products stimulate domestic policy debates on a range of issues to an increasing
degree by its growing presence in the media and growing use by various actors in civil society. The
AB also contributes to a larger degree to domestic thinking about policy by politicians and top-level
civil servants in the 20 AB countries, and provide for donors program benchmarks, data for tracking
and reporting and in some cases even analysis that feeds into the design of new programs. While
academic analysis by African scholars based on AB data or use of the results is still in its infancy, the
output is growing and provides an invaluable source and stimulus for homegrown academic
excellence in the coming years.
It is also a true public good in the sense that no one’s use of the AB data or results diminishes others’
benefits of using the same data13, and in that the provision of the AB project of data collection and
analysis of results, is a non-divisible good as long as it is in the public realm.
13
Except perhaps for academics seeking to publish in peer-review journals.
Final Report – 32
While only a few contribute to the costs of this enterprise, many actors benefit and the temptation for
free riding by actual and potential funders must be strong. We strongly urge current donors to resist
this pull and recommend potential donors to step up and be good citizens for Africa.
3. FINAL REMARKS
This evaluation has not been like just any other donor-sponsored project assessment. Hence, we will
allow ourselves to end with a non-orthodox set of remarks.
The vision of the Afrobarometer project was not exactly embraced with open arms to begin with. The
community of scholars working on Africa as late as in the mid-1990s was highly skeptical (the honest
thing is probably to say many were outright hostile) towards large-N analysis in Africa and the use of
mass public opinion data. Many individuals working with and in Africa for international
organizations, foreign missions, and donors were, at that time, not much different from the scholars
and viewed this novelty with great skepticism.
Yet, here we are only 15 years later with the AB being in most scholars and practitioners’ view the
‘gold standard’ for data collection, quality control, and analysis in Africa. The body of scholarship
radiating from the AB project is vast and varied, and rapidly growing. There is no doubt this body of
work will continue to fill a dominant position in the study of Africa in the foreseeable future. We are
also witnessing the analysis of AB data in conjunction with data from other parts of the world.
The body of policy-relevant analysis and publications is nonetheless the fastest growing. There is no
doubt that this collection of papers and bulletins along with the press releases and reporting, talkshow discussions and local presentations, impact African politics and society. Its impact is growing.
The financial supporters of the AB project has done a great service by not only providing the
necessary funds for the project, but also by pushing the AB project in a direction of producing more
in terms of short briefs and bulletins to become more visible and active in the domestic debates
about policy.
We wish to stress the importance of donors continuing to apply such pressure. The AB is a great
success and has already paid off greatly in terms of policy impact in Africa. Yet, the potential for this
unique project to penetrate and inform the nature of debate, public administration, and politics in
Africa is much greater.
With such an opportunity, and recognizing that the provision of a public good for coming generations
comes at a cost, our last recommendation to funding agencies is to firmly commit to financing the
necessary components of the Afrobarometer project now and in the future.
In case of any questions, please do not hesitate to contact:
Staffan I. Lindberg
[email protected]
+46-(0)733-761-540
Team Leader
Researcher Director, World Values Survey Sweden
Research Fellow, Quality of Government Institute
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
University of Gothenburg
PO Box 711, 405 50 Goteborg, Sweden
+46-(0)31-786 1226
Associate Professor(on leave)
Department of Political Science
/Center for African Studies
University of Florida
234 Anderson Hall, PO Box 117 325
Gainesville, FL 32611
APPENDIX 1: SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS FROM FIELD MISSIONS
CDD-Ghana, (Core Partner for Anglophone Africa and Host for PMU, Ghana).
Organization of Study
The study was carried out from July 25, 2010 until September 4, 2010. Initially, a desk study was
conducted to obtain a general overview of the implementation and outreach of AB R4 in Ghana and as
well as the role of Ghana as a core partner and host to the Program Management Unit (PMU). The desk
study was conducted from July 26, 2010 through August 8, 2010 during which AB working and briefing
papers, dissemination reports and many other internal and publically available documents related to
R4 were analyzed. Several emails were exchanged requesting CDD’s assistance in identifying and
setting up meetings with stakeholders in preparation for the field research as well as provide the
evaluation team with the necessary documentation associated with both CP and PMU activities. A first
interview was also conducted by phone with the AB ED Professor E. Gyimah-Boadi on 28 July, 2010 (in
attendance were Sharon Asare, Kathy Addy, and Nathan Okang). The field mission part of the study
was conducted Accra 9-13 and 26-28 August, 2010.
Despite notice since 23 July, much of the requested materials for the evaluation were not provided until
the evaluation team arrived in Accra, making parts of the intended preparatory analysis difficult. The
list of informants eventually grew substantially but again only after the evaluation team had arrived on
site. On the impressive side, CDD arranged 2 focus groups with media and CSOs respectively, which
were very helpful. In the end, 27 informants were heard, besides the AB ED during the field mission,
among them CDD staff (7 individuals), journalists (5), academics (2), leaders of civil society
organizations (5), members of the donor community (3), and upper level bureaucrats (2), Members of
Parliament and representatives of political parties (3).
There was a potential bias in the respondents selected for this study. Almost all of the respondents
interviewed (with the exception of the MPs and Clerks of Parliament) were selected by the national
partner.
Introduction
The Center is an independent, nonpartisan and nonprofit research-based and policy-oriented think
tank in Accra, Ghana. Founded in 1998, the Center’s mission is to promote democracy, good governance
and the development of liberal economic environment in Ghana in particular and Africa in general. The
Center has been engaged in activities that have helped shape and influence policy formulation in
governance, peace and security, human rights, and corporate governance in Ghana. The Center has also
been organizing training for senior government officials, policy makers, civil society leaders and the
private sector and conducts research on matters related to governance.
CDD’s Resource Center provides a wide range of current literature and other materials for researchers,
scholars, policymakers and practitioners interested in issues of democracy, good governance,
corruption control, human rights, conflict management, peace building and development. The Library
currently has the following resources available for registered users: over 1000 books, reports and
journals; compilations of Ghanaian newspapers dating from 1998 to the present; CDD publications
dating from 1998; and computers and online access to the Internet. The Resource Center is equipped to
provide literature on a broad range of issues to policy makers, researchers, Members of Parliament,
journalists, and students of governance and democracy.
Improve and Expand the Afrobarometer Survey Database
Four rounds of AB surveys (rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4) have been conducted in Ghana. CDD has been the
organization in charge of the AB in Ghana since the project’s inception.
R4 Afrobarometer surveys were completed in Ghana between 4 and 27 March, 2008. The survey was
sub-contracted to Public Services International (PSI). The sampling, field methodology and execution of
the survey were as far as we can determine professionally done. The sampling frame of enumeration
areas used for the 2000 Ghana Population and Housing Census (and subsequently updated through
household listing exercises) constituted the sampling frame for the 2008 Afrobarometer survey.
Appendix - 34
The Ghana 2008 Afrobarometer survey sample was drawn by a sampling expert at the Ghana Statistical
Service (GSS) is based on a three-stage stratified, random nationally representative design. The first
stage of sampling entails the random selection of 150 EAs (PSUs) with probability proportional to size
(PPS method). 67 urban and 83 rural, a total of 150, enumeration areas which contain between 150 –
200 households on average were drawn. Determination of the sampling rates by size strata uses
proportional allocation based on each region’s share of the national population. The units were
allocated proportionally to urban and rural localities of residence within each regional stratum. At the
second stage, 8 households were selected systematically and randomly, with a random start and
interval, separately for each EA to produce a total of 1,200 households nationwide. The list of all the
households for each selected EA, compiled during the Ghana 2000 Population and Housing Census and
subsequent updates, were available at the Ghana Statistical Service for this exercise. To ensure that
women are not underrepresented, the sex of respondents alternates for each field interview.
The evaluation team was very impressed by the capacity of the Data Manager in his role to expand and
improve the AB data base, and provide what we understand has been excellent technical assistance to
several countries, in particular to the new partner in Liberia for R4.
As CP, CDD coordinated outreach events in 6 countries, data collection, quality control, technical
assistance, and communication with the Anglophone (non-southern) African countries, and provided
much of the analysis of the data as well as initial reviews of bulletins produced by NPs.
Gender Sensitivity
The staff at CDD/Afrobarometer includes 3 male and 2 female staff. Interviewers for R4 included 28
males and 20 females, which is an improvement from R3 (28:16) and to be commended even as CDD
should be encouraged to increase female participation.
Data collection did maintain an appropriate balance of male and female respondents. The method was
to alternative; every other respondent had to be female.
Building Capacity for Survey Research, Analysis and Management
E. Gyimah-Boadi is the AB ED of both the AB Network and the Ghana Center for Democratic
Development (CDD-Ghana), and professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of
Ghana. He holds an MA and PhD from the University of California and a BA from the University of
Ghana. His consultancy assignments include reviewing the African Development Bank’s activities to
promote governance in Regional Member Countries and NEPAD/APRM and making recommendations
for enhanced governance programming at the Bank; and reviewing progress with the implementation
of the African Peer Review Mechanism; severing as the lead political economist to review the
democratic accountability effects of Ghana’s multi-donor budget support (MDBS). He has been the
moderator for the forums of the German Federal President’s Partnership with Africa Initiative. He is a
member is a member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Democracy (USA), and International
Advisory Board of Development Policy Review (UK), among other academic and policy journals. He is a
also a member of the Governing Council of the Ghana Integrity Initiative (the Ghana chapter of
Transparency International) and Board Member of the International Center for Transitional Justice
(New York), among others. His publications include “Ghana and South Africa, Assessing the Quality of
Democracy” (with Robert Mattes) in Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino eds., Assessing the Quality
of Democracy (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Public Opinion, Democracy and
Market Reform in Africa (with Mike Bratton and Robert Mattes) Cambridge University Press (2005);
and Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
(2004).
The PMU/Monitoring and Evaluation manager is Sharon Parku. Besides her position as M&E
coordinator for the AB project, she is also CDD’s focal person for its Media Policy Literacy Project. She
holds an MSc in management of Non-Governmental Organizations and Social Policy, LSE, UK, and a BA
in Law/Sociology from KNUST, Ghana. Parku has been at CDD since early 2008 in her present position.
Before that she worked for Barclays Bank for half a year after having consulted a few times on capacity
building. M&E at CDD is still in its infancy nevertheless the evaluation team found that it seemed less
than optimal. Requests from the evaluation team were responded to relatively slowly giving credence
to concerns raised by other AB CPs and NPs, the vigilance with which record keeping and information
Appendix - 35
gathering was done, and the general level of knowledge of basic information did not seem fully
satisfactory.
The PMU/Financial Manager is Nathaniel Okang, He holds an MA in Business Administration (Banking
and Finance) from Paris Graduate School of Management, France, and a BA in Business Administration
from University of Ghana, Legon. Okang took over as the Financial Manager for the AB project at CDD
after the previous manager left CDD in 2009. Before coming to CDD, Okang worked as Chief Financial
Officer at First African Group Ltd. The financial management at CDD is as far as we could determine,
solid and professional.
The PMU/Outreach Coordinator is Kathleen Addy. She holds an MA in Communication Studies from
University of Ghana and a BA in Psychology from the same university. She took up her position as
outreach coordinator late in 2009. Before coming to CDD, Ms. Addy worked as Research Officer at the
Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA), a well recognized outfit in Ghana. The evaluation team was
impressed by the performance of the coordinator and the efficiency demonstrated in responding to
requests, having fully updated and accurate information, and the inter-personal skills she displayed.
The Regional Field Coordinator and CDD Data Manager is Daniel Armah-Attoh. He holds an MPhil. in
Economics from University of Cape Coast, Ghana, and a BA in Economics from University of Ghana,
Legon. He also has a diploma in Advertising and Public Relations from Cambridge International College,
UK. He has been at CDD since July 2004 hired decisively to work with the AB project but has every year
shouldered important responsibilities in a number of other research projects at CDD. The
coordinator/data manager is very competent is his area and very committed to the AB project.
As the ABEC have noted in their remarks on the draft final report, it is only the AB ED and the Regional
Field Coordinator/Data Manager who have analytic writing as part of the job description. We note
however, that all staff express that they feel that analytic writing is part of what is expected of them,
whether in their job description or not. The ABEC is a highly esteemed academic with a long publication
record, whose credentials cannot be questioned. The Regional Coordinator/Data Manager has
demonstrated significant capacity for analytic writing at the level of AB Bulletins and Briefing Papers.
His has the ability to perform more advanced statistical analysis, and have been important in the review
process of bulletins and briefing papers from other NPs. The rest of the AB team’s capabilities in this
area are presumably less developed. We note that two more capable individuals left CDD (possibly to
come back) for PhD programs in the UK and the US. There are several other individuals at CDD with
relatively strong analytical skills that could do more writing but they are not on the AB team, and there
are few resources set aside for analytic writing.
CDD thus have adequate capacity for conducting well-qualified policy-relevant analyses and the AB ED
is one of the most well published scholars in the AB Network. A concern is that the rate of publications
at CDD is lower than one perhaps would expect from a prolific and leading organization such as CDD.
One must recognize that different from IREEP, MSU, and DARU/UCT, as a NGO, CDD does not have
access to the cadres of MA and PhD students around who have educational and career incentives to use
the AB data for independent analysis. One option is to budget for more time to be allocated for analysis
if possible. Another would be for the AB Network to launch more of writing type grants that can be
taken up by individuals outside of CDD and thus produce more policy-relevant analysis in Ghana.
While many of the staff at CDD-Ghana has great credentials, the capacity for qualified academic-type
analysis of data remains limited. In part, this seems to be a constraint imposed by the many
commitments CDD has besides the AB Network. Staff may just not have enough time allocated to
analysis. But in part, it seems that it is also still an issue of analytical capabilities and training. Only the
Executive Director has a PhD degree and accordingly dominates heavily in the production of academic
analyses.
Increasing the Visibility of the Afrobarometer’s among African Policy Actors
The large number of media reports as well as requests from policy-actors for additional analysis and
information recorded in Ghana points to the relatively large impact on policy the AB project has
reached. CDD is commended for its trail-blazing role in this regard.
Appendix - 36
We also note that among the AB partners we visited as part of this evaluation, CDD seems to be the
organization that have been the most vigilant and successful in conducting informal networking among
various policy actors. This is not only done as part of the AB project, but something that CDD has been
doing for a long time as part of a general strategy. However, as different from for examples IDASA, CDD
is unequivocally associated with the AB project in Ghana and there is no doubt that CDD’s informal
networking includes promoting the AB project alongside with the many other programs it runs.
CDD held 6 dissemination events in Ghana. The first was the typical main dissemination event held at
Golden Tulip Hotel on May 23, 2008 for a collation of media, CSOs, academics and donors. Following
the AB protocol, the three bulletins were presented, SORs were available in hard copies, and Q&A
followed the presentations. It generated a lot of media attention, not the least because of the results
from the question who respondents would vote for giving the ruling NPP a lead. Two of these were
confidential briefings with the two main political parties on the June 19, 2008. The briefing with the
main opposition party NDC was hampered (technically boycotted) stemming from the controversy
following the release of the results to media in May the same year giving the ruling NPP a lead in the
race towards the election to be held in December the same year. It seems that next time, the leaders of
the main political parties should be briefed before the main dissemination event is held in order to
avoid the kind of negative publicity that came out of this.
CDD also conducted three more targeted briefings to media on June 23, 2008 at CDD, to development
partners on July 3, 2008 hosted by the Danish Embassy, and to CSOs and governance institutions on
July 4, 2008 at CDD.
Among others, donors were more aware and better informed in Ghana than in any other country we
visited. They have also made a number of requests for additional analysis based on AB data, and many
of them use it as benchmarks in the program reporting. CSOs still do not use the results and findings
much, other than refer to them in various circumstances. Similarly with politicians of different types,
who tend to be most interested in the predictions of who will win the next election.
Despite this impressive record of dissemination, more events are needed to increase the visibility of AB.
AB data remains under-utilized specifically by academics, but also by donors, politicians and, to some
extent, journalists. The field mission revealed among other things, that even highly skilled end-users at
places such as CEPA, do not know if ‘it would be right’ to download and analyze the AB raw data
directly. For all practical ends and purposes, however, this is a smaller issue since so few policy-actors
have the capacity to perform even rudimentary statistical analysis and very few would consider
downloading raw data. Policy-actors, including journalists, are primarily demanding ready-made
results that have been analyzed. But they also point out in our interviews that the typical Summary of
Results-compilations are not very helpful. These 30 or so pages of descriptive tables without much of
analysis covering the entire range of questions is dizzying to most. What Ghanaian policy actors, just
like we found in the other countries request, is piece-meal dissemination of small slices of focused
results on specific topics. According to informants, these can preferably be disseminated as 1-2 page
briefs.
Many policy-actors could be engaged more and this was evident in many interviews. Yet, the ED and his
Head of Programs, Kojo Asante, have done a relatively good job where many other AB partners have
failed: to network and create personal relationships to many top-level policy actors.
The evaluation team was very impressed with the outreach coordinator, Kathleen Addy. Her
performance and responsiveness was perhaps the most professional and efficient we met in all the field
missions. Judging from our experience with her, she could shoulder much greater organizational and
administrative responsibilities than she has at present. The limited output in terms of outreach can
thus not be attributed to her performance but rather to the deficiencies in the outreach strategy as
such, and the short time she has been in office.
Project and Financial Management
The executive directorship was transferred with R4 from Distinguished Professor Michael Bratton at
MSU to Professor E. Gyimah-Boadi (at 25%) at CDD-Ghana, assisted by a Program Management Unit
(PMU) at CDD consisting of a second Deputy Director (100%), a Financial Manager (50%), and a
Appendix - 37
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (50%). The Deputy Director was fired in 2009 and has not been
replaced leaving the PMU at CDD short-handed, with 1.25 full-time staff.
In the new organizational structure, CDD also has an Outreach Coordinator (50%) and a Regional Field
Coordinator/Data Manager (100%) but these are at CP-level and do not in principle belong to the PMU.
R4 posed particular challenging circumstances to CDD. At the CP level, CDD took on managing three
new NPs while loosing two of its more senior AB staff to PhD programs in the UK and the US. At PMUlevel, the new organization involved hiring two new officers for outreach, and monitoring and
evaluation, and start up these functions from scratch at CDD. Financial management came with a
significant increase in responsibilities. Halfway through R4, CDD lost its financial manager due to a
family move, and a new financial manager had to be installed. The Deputy Director hired to assume a
series of major roles did not perform as hoped and was eventually fired in 2009.
We find that under difficult circumstances, CDD has nevertheless successfully taken over many core
responsibilities for the AB project and in many ways performed very well. The lack of an overall
administrator with strong organizational skills is particularly burdensome.
The fact that the AB ED at CDD-Ghana is only budgeted for the project at 25% is a concern throughout
the network. Key actors even at CPs did not even know about the ED’s limited time commitment but
point to the fact that they rarely experience the ED to be directly involved in everyday activities. We
acknowledge that there was supposed to have been a capable DD at CDD (the person hired in 2008 and
fired in 2009 for underperformance). The failure to hire an adequate person at that time and the
inability to replace her is unfortunate. We also recognize that CDD recently lost (temporarily) two of
their most capable individuals who worked on the AB project: Edem Selorme and Joseph Asunka who
are pursuing PhDs at UK, and UCLA respectively.
We acknowledge that the PMU unit at CDD-Ghana is not designed to handle the entire administration of
the AB project, and that CDD ‘lost’ two of its most capable individuals working on the AB to PhDprograms in the UK and the US respectively. However, the evaluation questions if the current division
of functions between CPs in the network is the best solution from an organizational perspective. It is
symptomatic of the organizational complexity and lack of functional differentiation that the staff at
PMU have limited knowledge about other CPs as organizational units, what each unit and each person
does, what they are currently working on, how they operate, and so on. The AB CV and the survey with
AB partners carried out as part of the evaluation, gives widely divergent results on several items. This
may also be taken as pointing to lapses in sharing information by the NPs/CP but it also points towards
a capacity gaps at PMU/CDD.
We recognize that CDD-Ghana participates in several other large-scale projects (e.g. the African Power
and Politics Program, the ACET African Transformation Project, the CODEO/Election Monitoring
Project, CDP, Phase II, etc), and that more than one of them are also cyclical and just like the AB project
had a peak in 2008. The issue of overextension may be a concern and something the AB Network may
want to review.
The PMU at CDD is in need to have a designate and specialized administrator with strong organizational
skills, preferably bilingual, capable of handle a complex 20-country program that may well expand into
another 17 countries in the near future. It would seem irresponsible to go into R5 in 6 months without
a full-time, highly competent and specialized administrator in place at CDD-Ghana.
We offer a few examples illustrating the need to have designated administrators for the AB project at
this point. There are no systematic records at CDD, nor at CP-level at IREEP and IDASA, logging the
exchanges with regards to handling of exchanges with the now large number of various partners in the
network, various complaints, processing and providing feedback on bulletins and briefing papers, and
so on. If nothing else, this must be remedied. The largest discrepancies with regards to reporting of
media events, outreach, and other forms of impact come from CPs of the AB Network and the CPs and
the PMU do not provide consistent data. The inception period of the evaluation revealed that most AB
Network partners were unaware that the evaluation was to take place during this period and the ED
had planned medical leave and vacation. CDD submitted TORs on 9 April 2010 in which the date for
Appendix - 38
submission of the final report of the evaluation was proposed (and from which one can easily calculate
when the bulk of the evaluation would take place). While noting the different view on this issue
submitted by the ABEC, the evaluation team takes this as a sign of lack of planning and possibly result
of overextension.
Our assessment is that significant management functions are located at MSU and that CDD-Ghana’s
position as ‘in charge’ of project management is partial. Not only are most staff resources at other
institutions, but also the perceptions and actual behavior of individuals at other CPs as well as NPs
reinforce this situation. The perceptions among staff in the Network and the actual behavior of
individuals at other CPs as well as NPs reinforce this situation. The evaluation found that the other two
CPs and some NPs sometimes circumvent the organizational structure in part because of perceived lack
of responsiveness and planning at CDD. Some staff in the Network perceives that if more of the key
functions were handed over to CDD at present, things would not work. Such comments are in reference
for example to that for some time the email system of CDD has made it difficult to contact CDD staff. AB
staff in various parts of the network has indicated that both CDD and IREEP are slow in responding to
various requests and that information sometimes are lost or not acted upon. Meanwhile, the DD at MSU
is commended throughout the Network in terms of huge efforts, rapid responses, executive ability, and
organizational skills. We note that some AB staff question the readiness for project management to be
entirely ‘Africanized’ in terms of PMU/CDD taking over all the MSU/DD’s responsibilities. We see
reforms in areas such as these as part of a desirable upgrading of administrative standards and
efficiency.
Finally, the evaluation team found the organizational culture at CDD in terms of time management and
in terms of dedication to planning well in order to avoid having to ‘put out many small fires’ all the time,
to be wanting. Again, this is a little worrying given the enormous organizational and management
challenges that the AB project entails.
Final Reflections
CDD is highly committed to the AB project and it should be noted that during peak times, we suspect
that a great number of staff at CDD who are not compensated through the AB budget at all, participate
in the large-scale operation in order for it to work. That is a mark of commitment and the resources
CDD can draw on when the AB project needs it. But it also points to the fact that CDD may be
overextended that could undermine the development of organizational units within CDD that can fully
manage projects like the AB and take it towards new heights.
CDD is under-resourced for the network management tasks they are supposed to perform and this
situation as we see it, must be addressed before planning for R5 starts.
There is a need for at least one ‘pure’ specialized administrative program manager at PMU/CDD,
ultimately probably three (one at each core partner), with no academic/analytical/writingexpectations. At the same time, the type of partners the AB Network consists of with professors that are
highly recognized in their country, there is a need for a person with academic and personal statue to
handle certain aspects of the network management, thus assisting the administration but not doing the
administration. The AB ED at CDD is encouraged to increase his time commitment in order to be
involved in everyday executive decisions today taken primarily by the DD at MSU.
We find that PMU/CDD-Ghana needs French-speaking capacity and we recommend that it immediately
implement a log system for incoming/outgoing requests between the AB partners. Its absence enables
issues to be forgotten or ignored. A logging system is a basic requirement of any well-run organization
and constitutes an important tracking-tool for evaluation of administrative competence and efficiency.
Appendix - 39
IDASA (Core Partner for Southern Africa, South Africa)
conducted from Gainesville, Florida to obtain a general overview of the implementation and outreach of
AB R4 in South Africa and as well as the role of South Africa as a core partner. The desk study was
conducted from July 26, 2010 through August 14, 2010 during which period AB working and briefing
papers, dissemination reports and many other internal and publically available documents related to
R4 were consulted and analyzed. Several emails were exchanged between IDASA and the evaluation
team requesting IDASA’s assistance in identifying and setting up meetings with stakeholders in
preparation for the field research. The field research for the study was conducted in Pretoria and
Johannesburg from August 19th, 2010 through September 26th, 2010. IDASA in its dual roles was helpful
and forthcoming in sending materials and preparing the logistics for this study.
Despite the helpfulness, IDASA proved less than impressive when it came to organizing interviews for
the field mission. Given the vast scope of programs IDASA is engaged in with no doubt networks of
imperial proportions, the richness of South Africa’s institutional and organizational landscape, and the
fact that IDASA is a core partner in the AB Network with three full time staff, we were a little
disappointed to only have around five appointments scheduled per day. In the end, 25 informal
interviews were conducted during the field mission, but many of these were with IDASA staff (several
interviews with 6 individuals), and a smaller number with journalists (1), academics (3), leaders of civil
society organizations (4) members of the donor community (5), and upper level bureaucrats (3). Even
taking into consideration that the Regional Field Coordinator was just returning from training in the
UK, IDASA staff explicitly acknowledged they had had problems with finding policy actors who would
agree to be interviewed regarding the AB.
All studies of this scope have their limitations and this study is no exception. Two limitations of this
study are particularly noteworthy. First, there was a fairly small sample of respondents interviewed for
this study. Secondly, there was a bias in the respondents selected for this study. Almost all of the
respondents interviewed for this study (with the exception of one of the donors) were selected by the
national partner.
Introduction
IDASA is an independent advocacy organization committed to promoting sustainable democracy based
on active citizenship, democratic institutions, and social justice. Drs. Alex Boraine and Frederik van Zyl
Slabbert founded IDASA in 1986 upon resigning from parliament in protest of the apartheid regime.
IDASA is committed to fostering and strengthening a culture of democracy and finding solutions to
addressing the deepening polarization between blacks and whites in South Africa. IDASA as core
partner oversees AB surveys, coordinates outreach events and communication with the press in South
Africa and Southern Africa, conducts technical assistance missions, and hosts the Network’s Data
Manager.
IDASA combines the traditional donor-funded model with a fee-for-service component and
supplements funds accruing from these sources with a domestic fund-raising program. The
organization also maintains a mix of fulltime, permanent and/or contract staff and conducts its own
training and recruitment programs. IDASA is renowned both internationally and nationally for its
advocacy work and has many national, provincial and local government contracts14. IDASA is organized
along programs line, 9 in all. Nestled within each of these programs are its many projects. Even though
IDASA, like many post-apartheid NGOs had to reinvent itself by expanding beyond the borders of South
Africa to the wider continent its fundamental mission remains the same. IDASA remains at its core an
advocacy organization. IDASA’s 9 program areas differ in terms of size, resources and focus.
The Afrobarometer project is by far IDASA’s smallest activity and is also the least resourced and
perhaps the most research driven and academic of IDASA’s programs 15. In fact, the evaluation team was
surprised to learn that the IDASA webpage nowhere features the AB project – not even under ‘Special
According to its website IDASA has successfully concluded contracts in Nigeria, Rwanda, Angola, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Bangladesh, Kosovo.
15 The evaluation term was informed that IDASA is moving away from “pure research” – the kind conducted by the
Afrobarometer.
14
Appendix - 40
Topics’. A search on the webpage reveals that some AB briefings and papers can be found but only by
using the webpage’s search engine. Entering the impressive facilities in Pretoria, there is also nothing to
indicate that this is the home of the AB in southern Africa, even though the 9 main programs all have
their logos and names brightly displayed. The three full-time staff are huddling together in two small
rooms with little in terms of institutional support.
Improving and Expanding the Afrobarometer Survey Data Base
Four rounds of AB surveys (rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4) have been conducted in South Africa. IDASA has been
involved with the AB in South Africa since the project’s inception although after Professor Robert
Mattes left IDASA, significant portions of analytic writing and capacity building has been conducted by
him and his associates at Center for Social Science Research at University of Cape Town (CSSR/UCT),
and later the Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) within CSSR.
The AB R4 surveys were completed in South Africa between 27th October and 3rd November 2008. The
surveys were sub-contracted to Citizen Surveys by IDASA. Citizen Surveys is a fast-growing Cape Townbased in research outfit specializing in social and market research. The organization was founded about
a decade ago and its’ staff rang in expertise from philosophy, business science, economics, marketing,
computer science and social science. Washeelah Kapery is the co-founder and Executive Director who
runs the organization with co-founder Jan Coetzee and are supported, according to its website, by a
core staff of eight. Their website lists an impressive array of collaborations, publications, datasets and
other information. Even though IDASA is listed as a client and even though Citizen Surveys were
contracted to administer the Round 4 surveys, Citizen Surveys only has a link to Round 2 (see
http://www. citizensurveys.com) and no where on its website is Afrobarometer Round 4 mentioned.
Both IDASA and Citizen Surveys have the ANC and clients, in addition to some other high-powered
clients.
The sampling, field methodology and execution of the survey through Citizen Surveys, were as far as we
can determine professionally done. 2400 respondents was drawn using multi-stage stratified sampling
stratified by province, race, and urban/rural. Since the statistical services of South Africa did not
release an enumeration area sampling frame based on the 2001 population census, a new census 2001
EA sampling frame was constructed by superimposing the 1996 released EA data on the 2001 set of
EAs. This 2001 EA sampling frame was adjusted to the 2007 Community Survey (Statistics South
Africa) to meet on a municipality level: the population number of people, number of households, gender
and race groups as well as five-year age groups. In 2008, the EA sampling frame was benchmarked to
2008 midyear estimates of population numbers per province, five-year age groups and gender as well
as countrywide population number per race group. This 2008-benchmarked EA data were used as the
sampling frame for the Afrobarometer Round Four Survey. 600 EAs were drawn using PPS sampling
with the number of persons 18 years and older per EA as a measure of size. Weights were assigned to
make weighted sample records represent target population. At the selected household a random
member of the household was selected to be interviewed and alternating interviews between men and
women filled gender quotas. Field managers back checked at least one in every four interviews
conducted in an EA, which resulted in 25% of the sample and the regional field manager or the
administrative staff carried out further 22% telephone back-checks from Citizen Surveys’ office.
The evaluation team was very impressed by the capacity of the Network Data Manager in his role to
expand and improve the AB database, as well as his knowledge of the various partners in the AB
Network including their strengths and weaknesses.
Gender Sensitivity
The staff at IDASA/Afrobarometer includes 2 male and 1 female full time staff. Interviewers for R4
included 19 42 males and 12 females, given the storage of skilled individuals in South Africa IDASA
should be commended, even as it should be encourage to increase female participation. Data collection
did maintain an appropriate balance of male and female respondents. The method was to alternative;
every other respondent had to be female.
Building Capacity for Survey Research, Analysis, and Management
IDASA has three full-time staff devoted to the AB project. The AB staff is made up of three full time staff:
Zenobia Ismail, the Regional field Coordinator who has also been assigned to coordinate outreach for
Appendix - 41
the entire Network. Ismail holds a MSc in Management from 1997 at London School of Economics, UK,
and a BA in Commerce from University of the Witwatersrand from 1995. She attended Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research’s Summer Program in Research Methods, in 2009, at Ann
Arbour, Michigan, USA, where she took courses in regression analysis and mathematics for social
science. Before coming to IDASA, Ismail was research project manager at Community Agency for Social
Enquiry (CASE) from 2006 to 2008. She was also a lecturer in the School of Economic and Business
Science at University of the Witwatersrand 2001 to 2005. Ismail has presented several papers at
academic and policy-oriented conferences and is the co-author of two journal articles and one AB WP.
Francis Kibirige is the AB Network’s Data Manager but also doubles on technical assistance missions
and other training activities. He holds an upper-second Bachelors Degree in Agricultural Engineering,
Machine (Engineering) Design, Farm Power System Designs and Food Processing Engineering,
majoring in Soil and Water Engineering of Makerere University Kampala. Kibirge has a long list of work
experience and training in areas directly relevant to his work for the AB. Among other things can be
mentioned that besides being participant in 3 AB summer schools and workshops, he attended the
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research’s Summer Program in Research Methods,
at Ann Arbour, Michigan, USA to receive training in advanced statistical modeling; the research and
development workshop for research managers intended to improve use of research methodologies to
solve social problems, East African Statistical Training Centre, EAST-CENTRE, Dar-es-salaam Tanzania,
2002; he supported local and international election monitoring teams to develop efficient, grass-root
election monitoring systems, tools and training of resource persons/teams to monitor
presidential/parliamentary and local government elections in Uganda’s 2000 (referendum), 2001 and
2005 (referendum) and 2006; as a consultant on development projects, including upgrade of telesave
95x communications interface for Uganda telecom, health and adult education/literacy projects as well
as developing in-house project monitoring and evaluation systems for local NGOs, government/donor
interventions as well as private enterprises; he has planned and managed over 60 national social
science surveys across Africa. He has liaised with national statistics bureaus to access information and
data for the efficient planning and design of national representative sample surveys in health, finance,
governance, social service delivery assessments and planning census exercises for major distributors,
manufactures and government corporations.
Mxolisi Sibanyoni the Outreach Coordinator for Southern Africa. Sibanyoni is currently enrolled to
complete an MPhil in South African Politics and Political Economy at the University of Port Elizabeth,
holds an MA in African Literature and Politics from 1998 at Wits University 1998. Sibanyoni has been at
IDASA since 2002 working first as curriculum developer for the ‘All Media Group’; then as researcher
and trainer for the ‘Local Government Centre’; before joining the AB team in 2005.
Paul Graham is the Director of IDASA and is a long-time serving member on the ABEC for AB. We
recognize the ABEC’s notes of evidence (Appendix 6) that IDASA’s Executive Director is committed to
the AB project as showed by his unpaid participation in ABEC meetings and the regular AB
presentations he has given.
While the number of fulltime staff at IDASA is no doubt small and often under-resourced, their capacity
for organization and management are quite good. For example, the efficiency with which IDASA
handled our many requests for documentation was laudable. Data management is clearly one of the
office’s strong points. The data manager is well versed in this area, as is their regional coordinator. The
capacity of the actual enumerators however remains unknown.
All three IDASA/Afrobarometer staffers have attended summer schools in Cape Town. The data
manager and the regional coordinator has also been to ICPSR for advanced methodological training,
and the latter had just returned from Oxford University when the evaluation team arrived, where she
received training in theoretical perspectives in the social sciences.
All three of the staff (two males and 1 female) have been awarded fellowships. All three received some
kind of basic training in quantitative data analysis at the University of Cape Town. Kibirige has attended
at least three of these as both a participant and resource person. Ismail is listed both as a participant
2009 and as one of the two-member support team from IDASA. Likewise Sibanyoni has also been to
Cape Town both as a participant and support staff. However due to time limitations this training was
Appendix - 42
not enough to make some comfortable with statistical analysis. IDASA has no money these days to
training of new hires and the recidivism rates have not helped in justifying the cost either.
There is little doubt that Francis Kirbirige, the network data manager, is passionate about his job.
IDASA does a great job at data collection and cleaning even though some national partners still smut at
IDASA/Afrobarometer for telling them how to conduct research. To this end support of, and hand-on
approach of the Deputy Director at MSU has been crucial in that it lends the IDASA-team the legitimacy
it lacks with some academics when it comes to giving advise and guidance. In this way Dr. Logan’s
relationship with IDASA is very important although one wonders the degree to which Africanization
can overcome rankism.
Getting academic collaborators to publish with AB is still a challenge. AB data remains under-utilized,
specifically by academics in South Africa. Several of the academics we interviewed appear to be
uninformed, even though they had been involved with IDASA/Afrobarometer about the availability of
AB data and the webpage, the working papers and the caliber of scholars publishing with AB data.
Scholars typically do not use the online data analysis tool or download the data.
Increasing the Visibility of the Afrobarometer among African Policy Actors
To effectively evaluate Afrobarometer’s current dissemination strategy one needs to understand the
environment within which Afrobarometer operates in South Africa. South Africa’s impressive array of
research organizations run the gamut from government funded agencies like the Government
Communication Information Services (GCIS) and the Human Science Research Council 16 to privately
funded industry giants like Future Fact17 and nonprofits like the Afrobarometer. South Africa’s private
and public sectors are fixated with relevance (i.e. current and timely data), brands and branding. The
Afrobarometer is clearly out-manned and under-resourced by its more well funded and staffed
competitors in South Africa. Yet, the Afrobarometer remains sought after mainly because it is still
perceived as having the most rigorous approach to data collection and that its data, was of the highest
quality though often outdated. Not many of our informants mentioned Afrobarometer’s true
comparative advantage and we had to, time and again remind them about the Afrobarometer’s unique
distinction – its one of a kind comparative time series database.
In none of the countries we visited was the ‘buzz’ more important than in South Africa. Nowhere was
the launch more critical than in the media-saturated environs of Johannesburg and Pretoria. South
Africa has a comparatively small newspaper readership and radio audience but there is intense
competition for this small but politically important audience. Consequently the standard format of the
press release, briefings to key stakeholders and TV appearances to discuss findings are constantly being
creatively recombined for maximum effect. While the standard launch does indeed generate some buzz,
the attention lasts as long as the next launch and in this crowded context attention is short. Given the
environment, the stature of those leading the effort and the number of times one generate some ‘buzz’
are critical to visibility.
Afrobarometer as a brand in South Africa still has ways to go 18. Afrobarometer’s visibility is directly
tied to its dissemination strategy as specified in the Outreach Strategy. Dissemination as specified in
this document applies only to the initial release of Afrobarometer surveys. The aim here is to “make
results available as quickly as possible to multiple audiences and in various formats” according to the
document these events are “ one-off events without programmatic follow up, [and] are broadly
distributed [rather than] specifically targeted and are meant to create basic awareness of African public
opinion. (Afrobarometer Outreach Strategy 2007:3-4).
R4, the first survey taken after the Outreach Strategy document was drawn and adopted was
disseminated as stipulated in the document: press releases were sent to both the national and
The latter is probably Afrobarometer’s stiffest competitor. One informant summed up the general sentiment of
some of the people by observing that HSRC have status because they are a government agency and that HSCR is
more widely known because of its frequent releases whereas knowing AB require more of effort.
17 Also called the mindset of South Africa is a syndicated service that collects and sells quantitative time series
perception data. Their surveys are done biannually.
18 Confirmed end users include: Human Sciences Research Council, Government Communication Information
Services (GCIS), South Africa National Treasury, Univ. of Western Cape, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Centre for Policy
Studies, Royal Embassy of Sweden, Institute for Security Studies.
16
Appendix - 43
international media. This event was held in Pretoria and in attendance were international newspapers
and magazines like the Le Monde (French newspaper) and the French Radio Internationale, the Swedish
Paper Dagens Nyheter and Swedish TV 4. A summary briefing was held separately for important
stakeholders in government. 16 people attended this event hosted by the Government Communication
and Information Services (GCIS) in Pretoria. NGO activists were briefed on another event organized by
IDASA and held in Johannesburg attended by 9 organizations among them Konrad Adenauer
Foundation, and Centre for Policy Studies who the evaluation team interviewed. 19 The donor
community briefing was hosted by USAID in their Pretoria office and in attendance were the National
Treasury, Swiss Development Co-operation, and the Belgium Embassy with a total of 8 participants.
Documents provided by IDASA show that these events were held over a week (Tuesday 2nd March 2009
through Monday 9th March, 2009). True to the South African context the IDASA/AB blitz saturated the
airways for that week and dissemination was done for the next three years. 20
Examinations of the South African press suggested that R4 was widely covered but we also found that
there were several problems with the dissemination of AB results. All the informants from all twelve
(12) organizations we interviewed had complaints about Afrobarometer’s dissemination strategy.
These critiques ranged from not knowing about Afrobarometer to more worrying complaints like
learning about Afrobarometer through non-Afrobarometer related events. For the most part, key
stakeholders were quick to admit not hearing about the AB much except during its’ launches.
Ironically, an often cited example that policy-actors suggest IDASA could follow in terms of both
successful analysis as well as dissemination and outreach, is the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and
in particular the work by former IDASA employee and Robert Matte’s former student, Collette Schulz–
Herzenberg. A plausible model could also be the Economic Intelligence Unit, Amnesty, or ICRG briefs
several of the people we spoke to in South Africa favor. We are not suggesting AB discard its particular
flavor, but rather that AB take seriously what the intended end-users favor.
Even taking the context into account, the evaluation team noted how limited the visibility and use of the
AB results and findings are. One reason for this given by many was that in South Africa many actors
consider the data outdated when it is 2-3 months old – which is about the time the AB protocol makes it
possible to start dissemination. Adjusting the protocol to allow for speedy release of key findings in a
staged manner starting one or two weeks after data collection is complete would according to our
informants greatly enhance the AB’s potential for high visibility and policy impact (exactly the same
reactions we got in Kenya for example).
Of particular concern where those institutions that worked very closely with IDASA and very
conversant with IDASA’s other programs and projects but knew very little about Afrobarometer than
might be expected, even as they admitted the occasional use of AB data 21. Many of the people we spoke
with were quick to point out that they were never contacted after the initial briefing on R4. We must
add that very few of these organizations have ever requested briefings from Afrobarometer and in the
rare event22 an organization requested a briefing they were very pleased with the AB staff and the work
of AB. But the evaluation team was overall surprised to learn about the relative high degree of
ignorance about the AB even among IDASA’s most close allies and supporting agencies.
For example, we encountered one of the AB R4 core donor’s local mission who support one of the other
IDASA programs and meet regularly with its Executive Director but had not been made aware that
IDASA is the local AB partner, much less AB’s CP in southern Africa. Several others testify that the
IDASA promotion of the AB project has over the last few years been weak. Even allies of IDASA testify
that one has to ‘be a digging researcher’ to know about the AB, and emphasized that other
organizations prepare the ground with target audiences long before they even start data collection so
that they know something is coming and feel part of it.
The following organizations we in attendance: Human Rights Resource Initiative, Development Bank of Southern
Africa, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Delegation from the European union, Red Cross, Center for Policy Studies,
Community Agency for Social Enquiry, CARE South Africa, Valued Citizen Initiative.
20 At least two well-connected people were quick to point out about IDASA “they seem to do a good job of their
book launches but badly on the AB”.
21 IDASA’s Democracy Index was better than known that Afrobarometer’s
22 We counted two instances for R4
19
Appendix - 44
IDASA’s outreach strategy like any of the core or national partners’ is driven my the Afrobarometer
Outreach Strategy which defines outreach as “a deliberate intervention by AB staff to sell and sponsor
the uptake of empirical analysis with a selected audience of practitioner … unlike dissemination,
outreach is a planned, long-term program …and employs a continuous set of repeated activities”
(Afrobarometer Outreach Strategy, 2007: 4). Documents consulted during the drafting of the inception
report indicated that IDASA was doing a good job of creating exposure for its Afrobarometer work.
Interviews conducted in Pretoria and Johannesburg did not fully corroborate this initial impression. It
was quiet clear to the evaluation team that not many people know of AB as a standalone entity, this is
mostly due to the fact that AB is not out there marketing itself in a rigorous and effective manner. We
also noted significant lack of networking and promotion of the AB project from the leadership of IDASA,
principally its Executive Director who is incidentally also a member of the AB Network’s Executive
Committee. We recognize the ABEC’s notes of evidence (Appendix 6) that IDASA’s Executive Director is
committed to the AB project as showed by his unpaid participation in ABEC meetings and the regular
AB presentations he has given. Yet, the in-house support to the staff of the AB was evidently weak.
It is worth noting that of those who attend Afrobarometer briefings, the quality of IDASA’s
presentations was one of the most admired qualities of these events. Dr. Robert Mattes seems to be a
perennial favorite, especially those who hadn’t attended any of the more recent briefings. Mr. Paul
Graham was also mentioned for his knowledge of South African/IDASA issues. Dr. Robert Mattes’
presentation skills, knowledge of AB and command over both the quantitative and qualitative aspects
of AB impressed many and was held as the model for all AB briefings. While the quality of AB’s
presentations was generally perceived to be high, there was a sense among some that they were
becoming increasingly dry, and too technical. Several also mentioned the materials that were handed
out during these presentations are being overly quantitative. This was a favorite compliant of
journalists and Afrobarometer’s NGO partners who felt more could be done by way of making the
SORs23 less boring/intimidating.
During our field mission, the Norwegians, Swedes and the Government Communication Information
Services (GCIS) indicated a willingness to have a few questions included on subsequent AB
questionnaires and would be willing to pay for this privilege.
Informal interviews confirmed that IDASA makes results and findings as well as data available to
policy-actors if and when requested and helps with analysis of the data. In more than one interview the
Outreach Coordinator was mentioned as having gone the extra step of collating data and helping the
persons in question work through the data to make it intelligible to these “non-quantitative types”. For
one of these informants, this became the main reason she draws on AB data for a policy related work.
But IDASA’s website has no easily available links to Afrobarometer material or even the briefest
information. Overall, IDASA could do a much better job at marketing Afrobarometer and that includes
making its data more easily available on its website.
IDASA’s work with the AB has suffered from high rates of turnover and its inability to keep staff for the
AB project speaks to its disadvantage. Moral within the team was low, even though individually the staff
is passionate about the AB. Another indication is that the national partners in southern Africa had more
positives to say about UCT/CSSR/DARU and MSU, than IDASA.
The level of commitment to the AB project by IDASA as an institution is lower than the evaluation team
had expected. It is indicative that the AB staff at IDASA do not have the AB logo on their business cards,
there is no display of the AB or its materials anywhere at the IDASA offices, and that the AB staff had to
struggle to be allowed to offer the evaluation team coffee and tea when we arrived. More serious
indications of this are that even IDASA’s allies and closest collaborators point out that the organizations
seems not to promote the AB seriously, and that local foreign missions who have working relationships
with IDASA have not been sensitized even to the fact that the AB is run by IDASA in South Africa.
The SORs in particular was singled out as an example of i) AB’s overly academic nature, ii) as not user friendly,
iii) having little practical implication or relevance.
23
Appendix - 45
Overall, we are more than confident in the present Regional Field Coordinator’s capabilities as
administrator, but from the perspective of inter-Network status to manage other AB partners, she is
‘only’ an MSc and has only been with IDASA and the AB since 2008.
The Network Data Manager is extremely competent in his area, highly motivated and recognized but
also does not have a PhD which complicates the project management tasks towards some AB national
partners. The DM is intent on leaving IDASA and South Africa very soon, where he has been the last
couple of years. The Outreach Coordinator, another MA graduate, has been at IDASA since 2002 and
with the AB since late 2005 but works in very limited sense directly with the national partners in the
region. The coordinator’s relationship to IDASA’s Executive Director is not fully functional and it is
unclear how long he will stay with IDASA. The organization’s Director Paul Graham has also made it
known that he is leaving IDASA in the near future. This would leave this AB CP with one operational
staff (the Regional Field Coordinator) who has only been with the AB for 2 years.
IDASA’s financial management seems beyond doubt highly professional and reliable. Interviews with
the Financial Manager proved her very capable and we recommend she be involved more in financial
accounting discussions given her experience working with national partners and IDASA’s unique
accounting system. She expressed her concern with certifying financial reports from national partners
which she has not had the opportunity to certify that they have appropriate internal systems for
financial control.
The institutional hierarchy of AB also appears to be unstable in the South African case. IDASA staffers
are still enmeshed with MSU, rather than to CDD. By their own account, the staff is only accountable to
the Deputy Director at MSU and not to PMU at CDD-Ghana, and they almost never have any contact
directly with the AB ED.
We find IDASA has little in terms of public identity as a research-based organization, and further less as
an organization that does work based on large databases of quantitative data. The in-house
understanding for basic requirements of the AB project such as high-powered computers to manage the
large data sets has been inadequate.
The cost of administration of the AB project at an institution like IDASA is comparatively high. The
salaries among South Africa’s many highly competent NGOs and think tanks provide an environment
where it is hard to compete. IDASA cannot benefit from using cheaper labor like students who need
fellowships and who nevertheless can put in their heart in projects like the AB.
Final Reflections
We recognize that the AB staff at IDASA is relatively new and that the Regional Field Coordinator only
came on board mid-way through year one of R4.
IDASA is not an organization geared for management of large data sets, storage, and cleaning, and its inhouse understanding for basic requirements of the AB project such as high-powered computers to
manage the large data sets, is inadequate.
The expected strengths of IDASA did not show up during the evaluation. As an advocacy organization
we expected dissemination and outreach and the AB’s visibility to be particularly strong. We find that
even IDASA’s strongest allies testified to the contrary. An often cited example that policy-actors suggest
IDASA could follow in terms of both successful analysis as well as dissemination and outreach for the
AB, is the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and in particular the work by former IDASA employee and
Robert Matte’s former student, Collette Schulz–Herzenberg.
The level of commitment to the AB project by IDASA as an institution is lower than the evaluation team
had expected. We recognize the ABEC’s notes of evidence (Appendix 6) that IDASA’s Executive Director
is committed to the AB project as showed by his unpaid participation in ABEC meetings and the regular
AB presentations he has given. We accept that the level of commitment to the AB was probably high in
the past and that IDASA has been a resource to the project during a long period. It is our impression,
however, that IDASA’s institutional commitment and profile is not the best fit for AB.
Appendix - 46
We found a relative high degree of ignorance about the AB even among IDASA’s most supporting
agencies. For example, one of the AB R4 core donor’s local mission who support one of the other IDASA
programs and meet regularly with the Executive Director but had not been made aware that IDASA is
the local AB partner, much less AB’s CP in southern Africa. Others testify that the IDASA promotion of
the AB project has over the last few years been very weak. A contractor of IDASA testify that one has to
‘be a digging researcher’ to know about the AB, and emphasized that other organizations prepare the
ground with target audiences long before they even start data collection so that they know something is
coming and feel part of it.
As the only exception, the AB project is outside of this main structure and is IDASA’s smallest activity,
the least resourced, as well as the most research driven and academic of IDASA’s programs. The IDASA
webpage nowhere features the AB project. A search on the webpage reveals that some AB briefings and
papers can be found but only by using the webpage’s search engine. Entering the facilities in Pretoria,
there is nothing to indicate that this is the home of the AB in southern Africa, even though the main
programs all have their logos and names displayed. The three full-time staff are located in two small
rooms with little in terms of institutional support.
IDASA’s work with the AB has suffered from high rates of turnover and its inability to keep staff for the
AB project speaks to its disadvantage. Moral within the present team is notably low, even though
individually the staff was passionate about, and believed in AB. IDASA’s Executive Director is leaving,
the DM has made it clear he will not stay at IDASA (although continue as the AB DM), and it is unclear if
the Outreach Coordinator will stay long. That would leave 1 AB staff at IDASA besides the financial
management support.
The Regional Field Coordinator’s administrative and analytical capabilities are evidently strong, but at
IDASA she has little operative backing of someone such as a professor with higher status, which helps
in the management of many NPs. The Network DM is extremely competent in his area and highly
motivated but is clearly uncomfortable with being stationed in South Africa. The Outreach Coordinator,
another MA, has been at IDASA since 2002 and worked with the AB since 2005 but works in very
limited sense directly with the national partners in the region.
IDASA’s financial management seems beyond doubt highly professional and reliable. Interviews with
the Financial Manager proved her very capable and we recommend she be involved more in financial
accounting discussions given her experience working with national partners and IDASA’s unique
accounting system. She expressed her concern with certifying financial reports from national partners
which she has not had the opportunity to certify that they have appropriate internal systems for
financial control.
The feedback the evaluation team got in South Africa is similar compared to for example those in
Botswana where informants did not have as intimate knowledge about the usage of AB data. In South
Africa as in Botswana, we encountered many concerns about the more quantitative bend of AB. While
this is mostly case of perceptions, there is no denying that presenting AB data in a more friendly way
non-quantitatively inclined users will no doubt increase the likelihood of those policy actors using the
data.
An evaluation of the capabilities of IDASA through desk study and a field mission suggest that it is in
many fields a competent organization that has established a longstanding reputation both nationally
and internationally for excellence in advocacy. Yet, it is not particularly effective in promoting the
Afrobarometer project. It also lacks the environment that for example made MSU so successful: access
to numerous graduate students to put in their enthusiasm and hard labor at low cost over several
years; active scholars who are methodologically sophisticated and whose interest is in both research
and policy-relevance; a vibrant research community that stimulate AB staff intellectually; and being the
largest and most important project rather than the smallest and most insignificant one.
Appendix - 47
PAS, University of Botswana (National Partner, Botswana)
papers and electronic sources about AB R4 in Botswana were analyzed for the inception report.
Additionally several emails were exchanged between the Department of Political and Administrative
Studies (PAS) and the evaluation team in preparation for the field evaluation. Two phone calls were
made to the lead investigator in Botswana, Dr. Lekorwe, prior to the field mission. During these phone
conversations, requests were made to help identify local stakeholders in Botswana and set up meetings
with stakeholders in preparation for the field research. It became clear that the local AB partner would
not be in a position to assist as expected with planning for interviews and other meetings. The
evaluation team therefore offered to pay for a local consultant (a MA student at PAS) for one or two
days of work to assist with this service. Eventually, PAS could not find an individual who would take on
this assignment and declined the offer. On the 18th August 2010, the evaluation team member met with
Dr. Lekorwe for a day to plan the informal interviews on way to South Africa for the field mission there.
The field mission was conducted in Gaborone, Botswana from August 26 th, 2010 through 6th September
2010. Overall, the national partners were very helpful and forthcoming in sending materials and
eventually assisting with the logistics for this study.
During the evaluation, Dr. Lekorwe was somewhat behind the curve in securing appointments but once
the field mission started, he was very helpful. Dr. Lekorwe offered his office to the evaluator
immediately upon her arrival, and met with her daily to offer his assistance and personally made phone
calls to set up appointments with upper level bureaucrats. He and his team were forthright with
information. Lekorwe is a busy man who, once the evaluator arrived did all in his power to help. A total
of 23 informal meetings were held during the evaluation. After the completion of the interviews, three
follow up discussions were held with Dr. Lekorwe and Mr. Kabelo K. Moseki for a debriefing and in an
effort at clarifying some lingering questions. A diverse group of stakeholders were interviewed among
them a politician, journalists, academics, leaders of civil society organizations, members of the donor
community, academics and upper level bureaucrats. A second follow up interview with a politician
morphed in a group meeting with three other political operatives.
All studies of this scope have their limitations and this study is no exception. Two limitations of this
study are particularly noteworthy. First, because of time constraints, there was a fairly small sample of
respondents interviewed for this study. Secondly, there was a bias in the respondents selected for this
study. Almost all of the respondents interviewed for this study (with the exception of one individuals)
were selected by the national partner.
Introduction
PAS is home to three academic centers: the Centre for Specialization in Public Administration and
Management (CESPAM), the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), and the Centre for Culture and Peace
Studies (CCPS). CESPAM, according to its website was established in 2000 as the SADC Centre of
learning, training and research in public sector administration and management as part of a long-term
strategy to meet the demand for higher education and training for senior/middle managers and other
officials from the SADC region. CESPAM’s efforts at directed primarily to public sector employees, even
though those from the private sector can also attend their training sessions. CESPAM trains both
masters’ students in Public Administration (MPA) and offers short-term executive programs (STEPS)
for professionals. Most of the center’s research revolves around improvements in public sector
performance and the economies of SADC member states. CESPAM is also actively involved in
consultancies for both SADC member states and international organizations. CESPAM currently has
four full-time employees and is funded by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Kingdom of Belgium and other donors although it is expected to be self-sufficient soon; towards this
end this CESPAM has been charging fees for service. On average CESPAM hosts two to three workshops
a year. For example between March 2008 and September 2009 CESPAM held five (5) workshops for a
total of 90 participants including several participants from West Africa (Courses Offered By CESPAM,
internal document)
The department also hosts the Democracy Research Project, which has attained international
recognition. The staff of the department serves in various academic and professional bodies. Dr.
Appendix - 48
Mogopodi Lekorwe has been the lead National Investigator (NI) for the Afrobarometer project in
Botswana since 1999.
The National Investigator (NI) Dr. Mogopodi Lekorwe is a senior lecturer in Public Administration and
the director of the Centre of Specialization in Public Administration and Management the University of
Botswana (UB). He is a well-known and well-published scholar. Dr. Molomo whose research is on civilmilitary relations, democratization is a comparativist who has many publications to his name: 1 single
authored book, 2 edited books, 13 peer reviewed articles and 23 book chapters. He also consults
extensively. Dr. Sebudubudu, another comparativist works is on state-society relations has 2
monographs to his name, 4 peer reviewed articles, 8 book chapters and has consulted extensively for
the World Bank’s leadership project, the UN and SADC. Their other colleagues are just as accomplished.
Improving and Expanding the Afrobarometer Survey Data Base
Four rounds of AB surveys (rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4) have been conducted in Botswana. For AB R4, a total
of twenty-six participants were recruited for training towards conducting the field interviews. The
qualifications of these recruits varied from being either university graduates or final year degree
students from various academic disciplines. The training that was conducted from 22nd September to
26th September 2008 in the presence Godbertha Kiyondo, AB DD at PMU/CDD. Throughout the training
all the six field supervisors, who included the National Investigator (NI) and the Co-NI were present.
The AB R4 survey in Botswana was conducted between the 28th September and 17th October 2008. The
survey was implemented by PAS. The sampling, field methodology and execution of the survey were as
far as we can determine professionally done. 1,200 respondents were selected by multi-stage,
randomized sampling. In Botswana the stratifying component was the nineteen (19) tribal
administrative and six (6) urban districts. In view of varying characteristics in terms of size of
population and land coverage of these districts, and updated enumeration areas (EA) provided by the
Central Statistics Office (CSO) were used. This study triangulated different probability sampling
procedures at different sampling stages to yield a representative sample. These procedures are
stratification, probability proportional to size (PPS), cluster and modified systematic sampling. The
sample size required to meet the objectives with a 3% margin of error at 95% confidence interval was
calculated to be 1200 respondents in 150 enumeration areas. The sample was drawn by Dr Lucky
Mokgatlhe, a member of the AB Botswana partner, who lectures in the Department of Statistics at the
University of Botswana. The sampling was done in the presence of the Afrobarometer Data Manager
Francis Kibirige. At the selected household a random member of the household was selected to be
interviewed and alternating interviews between men and women filled gender quotas.
Data entry was conducted between 27th October and 13th November, 2008, with eight of the clerks
doing the data entering. A ninth person did double entry on 25% the data from each data set done by
the other clerks. Once the data entry had been completed, a random sample of 35 questionnaires was
selected, and these were used to assess if the error rate had indeed been confined to less than 1%.
Gender Sensitivity
While the Botswana team has done a laudable job maintaining an appropriate balance of male and
female respondents and interviewers - 12 males and 12 females, a lot more can be done within the
faculty team. The UB/PAS team consists of 7 males but female recruitment into the group was well
underway before this evaluation.
A gender quota required that ever other respondent be female, hence, the survey successfully sampled
a roughly equal number of men and women, in urban and rural areas, from every district in the country.
The Botswana team has an impressive array of experienced researchers. Dr. Mogopodi Lekorwe is a
senior lecturer in Public Administration and the director of the Centre of Specialization in Public
Administration and Management the University of Botswana (UB). He is a well-known and wellpublished scholar. Dr. Lekorwe, like his other colleagues on the Botswana team, is a prolific scholar and
practitioner, serving as the NI in Botswana for the Southern Africa Democracy Barometer Project 24. His
research interests are among others, development administration, rural and urban governance and
24
The project covers six countries in the southern African region.
Appendix - 49
democratization. He is an active scholar both regionally and internationally; having authored eight (8)
articles in peer reviewed journals, 11 book chapters, and several co-authored works. He has written a
number of Afrobarometer briefing papers, the last three are based on the R4 data for which he was the
sole author (60, 61, and 62). He has presented at a number of conferences internationally, co-authored
two technical reports on governance and democracy with his fellow colleagues at UB and is the sole
author on three other technical reports for FAO, the Democracy Research Project and the
Afrobarometer. Dr. Lekorwe is very active member of the UB community and within the Southern
African region, and nationally within Botswana. Overall, Lekorwe is competent to be overseeing a
National Partner Office, although he is very busy. He has expertise in survey research and international
consulting and is an expert in governance. He is a visible academic within his own institution and is
active in conferences regionally and internationally.
Dr. Molomo whose research is on civil-military relations, democratization is a comparativist who has
many publications to his name: 1 single authored book, 2 edited books, 13 peer reviewed articles and
23 book chapters. He also consults extensively. Dr. Sebudubudu, another comparativist works is on
state-society relations has 2 monographs to his name, 4 peer reviewed articles, 8 book chapters and has
consulted extensively for the World Bank’s leadership project, the UN and SADC. Their other colleagues
are just as accomplished.
Two of the current seven members of the Botswana team, Drs. Mogopodi Lekorwe and Lucky
Mokgatlhe participated in the 2009 summer school in Cape Town, although Dr. Mokgatlhe is a lecture in
statistics at the UB and was probably over-qualified for the kind of training the summer school provide.
Another member of the UB team, Mr. K.K. Moskei is also well versed in quantitative methods and he
teaches and runs the lab for the statistics department at UB.
The team expressed interests in sending promising students to summer school if summer schools could
be organized in a way that was accommodative of the UB calendar. They noted that they had not had an
opportunity of as now to send people from UB apart from the two noted above. Nobody from UB has
been awarded fellowships. The issue of not using AB raw data is not one of expertise as the researchers
are well qualified and versed in the use of different methodologies. The main issue seems to be that
many of them, including the senior professors, were not clear about the publishing terms and
requirements. Additionally the UB partners were not aware of the increasing prestige of publishing
with AB. The team generally agreed teaching duties also made it very difficult to publish and that the
alternative costs for doing academic analysis compared to consultancies is very high.
Preliminary examinations of PAS’s dissemination and outreach suggested that Afrobarometer R4
received impressive coverage; this initial impression was for the most part corroborated by the field
mission. On average, AB events in Botswana seem to attract high profile politicians and bureaucrats,
compared to other countries. The initial release of R4 on 19/02/2009 was hosted by the Office of the
President, to which IDASA and 10 high-ranking government officials were listed as participants. The
release received wide covered on the nations two TV stations25. Unlike the reports from most other
national partners, no donors or International NGOs are listed on any of PAS’s outreach activity forms.
The second dissemination event held on 20/02/2009 was co-hosted by PAS and IDASA for civil society
organizations, and the media as usual was in attendance. The event was fairly well covered and was
broadcasted nationally, and the total number of participants listed for the event was 28, including the
National Director of the Media Institute of Southern Africa. The third event was held on 22/02/2009
was aimed at Newspaper and Radio journalists, with 12 participants. The fourth and final event was on
25/02/2009. Overall donors and INGOS do not seem to play not as important a role compared to other
countries. PAS also seem to rely heavily on TV, and not radio as the centerpiece of their initial
dissemination strategy26. IDASA’s outreach unit organized the one outreach event held. This time the
target audience was civil society groups; a total number of 20 participants are listed as attending the
event.
25
26
Botswana Television (BTV) and EBotswana
According sources consulted during field interviews we were formed most rural Tswana prefer TV to radio
Appendix - 50
Even though AB is well known in Botswana, its particulars are not. For example, even the more
frequent users among our key informants, believed AB collected only data on citizen’s perceptions
about democracy, and seemed not to know that AB questions included sector-relevant questions on
economic policies, citizens’ attitudes toward government actions/policies, the delivery of public
services, and health and AIDS. The use of AB results and the relevance of the findings is still a
contentious issue. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) constantly refers to AB findings in
relation to the current president’s popularity as well as Botswana’s favorable ratings as a democratic
country to which the opposition counters what mattered was not the president’s personal popularity
but his party’s stance on the issues raised by the Afrobarometer (poverty and employment). Many of
the political operatives we spoke with knew about AB, used AB results. At least one party fashioned its
manifesto around two of the issues (poverty and unemployment) that had been raised in Round 4, but
they were also more likely to understand AB as only tracking perceptions about democracy.
Interviews with key informants however revealed a more nuanced picture. A free-bee publicity in the
R4 saga was the public rebuke of the media by some academics for running a story that based on the
unwitting misinterpretation AB findings. The often-repeated story of the media’s misrepresentation
was driven by journalists’ who had little or of lack of understanding of quantitative research and
therefore misinterpreted the results. While many interviewees recognized this to be an honest mistake,
they were also quick to point out the incident did draw attention, if only for a while, back to the AB
project. Unfortunately there seem to be no effort either on IDASA’s side or PAS part to capitalize on the
free publicity. Similarly, informal interviews with bureaucrats dealing directly with service delivery,
and economic policies, attitudes toward government actions, and health, confirmed the finding that AB
is still synonymous with democracy27. The picture was the same among the donor community, which
was not surprising given the fact that donors were never an important part of dissemination and
outreach efforts.
The environment in Botswana, unlike South Africa, is anything but competitive. The relevant
community-based organizations (CBOs) were uninterested when contacted to arrange interviews.
Phone interviews with many of them proved of little help since they did not use AB findings or knew
much about the AB project. Yet, AB has little if any competition with other research firms. While
dissemination of R4 was clearly a limited success, follow up events are needed to inform a rather
unwilling policy-making sector about the different merits of AB results and findings. Yet, every single
person we met with outside of the University of Botswana-group was a high level official with real
policy influence, who were very interested leveraging AB results for their daily work, but did not know
enough about AB. Also in the case of Botswana thus, we found that informal networking has not been
done nearly at the level of what is needed.
Additionally many of the policy actors in Botswana were particularly dissatisfied with the current
dissemination and outreach strategy and frustrated that results could not be parceled in a relevant way
for presentation to the communities from which samples were drawn. As in South Africa, the main
critiques were AB’s outmoded results at the time of dissemination and the lack of easily assessable and
digestible results. Again, just like in South Africa, stakeholders were very interested in the suggestion
about the possibility of AB quickly providing a series of quick releases on a few relevant variables
immediately after data collection, or periodically if the entity might consider paying for this service,
depending on the issue at hand. The office of the Ombudsman and the Directorate of Corruption and
Economic Crime expressed interest in having a few questions included on subsequent surveys, but
unlike in South Africa, none of these entities were willing to pay for these privileges for now due to
current budgetary constraints.28
During the field interviews it became clear that for politicians the Independent Electoral Commission’s
data has become the go-to place even though there is wide agreement that the data is rough. More
sophisticated political strategist are pushing for the use of AB results in structuring party policies, but
there is little or no capacity among the policy actors for the kind of data analysis desired. Having
someone do this kind of work for the local AB partner would go a long way to help make AB project
Afrobarometer was cited in the obligatory introduction of a report released by this organization as ’s annual
report.
28 Thanks for the assistance of Mr. Lennart Jemt, First secretary, Swedish Embassy in Pretoria in setting up
appointments with some of the informants.
27
Appendix - 51
much more effective in terms of policy influence. Unlike some other countries where distrust survey
research still persists, the people encountered during this evaluation in Botswana seem not to share
this view.
PAS should also be asked to do more in making AB results publicly available on its many websites with
links to the briefing papers, working papers, the online data facility, and the full dataset on the AB page.
PAS could strengthen its websites by providing a description of the information available on the AB
page or linking directly to the resources and the results. The Government of Botswana has done a much
better job at this than PAS.
As in South Africa and Kenya, the evaluation team ended up doing lots of marketing on behalf of the AB.
PAS’ other activities and projects, as well as the teaching load clearly draws lots of time away from AB
issues due to is presence in the department. While the evaluation shows that PAS is more than qualified
to serve as Afrobarometer’s national partner in Botswana, its many competing activities combined with
the many consultancies taken up by the research team have had an adverse effect on AB’s visibility and
policy impact. It is telling that many of the individuals interviewed did not associated AB with PAS, even
though they know CESPAM is run out of the department. Many people thought AB was a University of
Botswana database. The informal networking mentioned in the AB Outreach strategy (which,
incidentally seems to be unknown to the partner in Botswana), has not been done by neither IDASA nor
PAS. The national partner at UB clearly has the capability to conduct this kind of activity but is not
doing it at a significant level at present.
There is general consensus among the national team that more needs to be done by way of
dissemination and outreach to increase visibility. The question is how this is to be done. To increase
funding for networking activities could be one way that at least in the Botswana case would help. They
do not believe that it can be effectively done from South Africa, and not by individuals that lack
personal networks and the statue required to make inroads into policy actors’ networks.
Dissemination could be also improved by hosting events in multiple regions within the country.
Outreach remains a problem as AB data remains under-utilized by academics even inside of the AB
Network. On average, the academics we interviewed appear to be uninformed, even though they had
been involved with the project for a while. To different degrees many of them did not know about the
availability of AB raw data and the webpage, the working papers and the caliber of scholars publishing
with AB data, among other things. Roughly about a third of the scholars had never used the online data
analysis tool or downloaded the data.
AB is nowhere nearing its potential in Botswana. Bureaucrats, political operatives, the donor
community and the media are very receptive to AB and would like to use AB findings. But the current
AB dissemination and outreach strategy has been ineffective, costing AB an important audiences and
fora. Many local-level politicians are aware of the AB, but it is only the very well educated party
operatives with the necessary clout that are able to use AB results to structure party politics and
policies. There is no doubt that even within this niche group there is a general sense of not knowing
what to do with the data. Many are pushing for using the data along the lines of the American political
polls. Even with the current level of discomfort with overly quantitative, AB has had some effect on
policy.
Project and Financial Management Project and Financial Management
PAS implements the surveys in Botswana, conducts dissemination and facilitates outreach events and
communication with the Tswana press, and provides analysis of the data. There seems to be little by
way of an institutional relationship between PAS/UB and IDASA. Communication is very limited with
both IDASA staffers and MSU. PAS has a long and distinguished history and experience managing large
sums of money, as stated earlier the department is home to three seemingly well-funded centers. The
key ‘staff’ affiliated with the AB project are well-established scholars with a certain statue n the
country. They are not necessarily keen on being directed on what and how to do things by what is
perceived as young, inexperienced, and less educated individuals from IDASA. CDD and the PMU there
hardly register on their radar.
Appendix - 52
Final Reflections
The field interviews revealed that key policy actors have a great demand for AB results and findings but
no one outside of the core group of AB affiliated scholars would even think of downloading and use the
raw data. The president’s office has been the most effective marketing tool for AB. But the University of
Botswana together with IDASA needs to do more in the marketing of AB. Dr. Lekorwe is a charismatic
hardworking leader, as many others on the team. Together they have the clout and status to be actively
involved in the selling of AB to interested users. It is also clear that AB is well off in its current home,
but the team might need graduate students to handle some of the daily business of AB if it wants to be a
relevant tool to policy makers. Have one or two graduate students run simply tables on topical issues
that can be mailed monthly to interested organizations will no doubt help AB become relevant. This is
the kind of dissemination and outreach requested by the policy actors.
Several concerns remain about the more quantitative bend of the summer schools. More consideration
should be given to teaching participants how to craft policy relevant papers at least for participants
who know basic statistics. Policy actors do not request and cannot digest results coming out of more
advanced statistical analyses. Also, many of the UB partners are uniquely positioned to contribute in
meaningfully ways to short, policy relevant papers that have been proposed, assuming AB is flexible
enough to consider this. If the AB could provide honorariums for writing such policy briefs, more of
them would be produced and disseminated.
Many of the above suggestions require increased funding if AB is to reach its potential. AB would also
need to consider making long-term commitments with PAS if AB is to retain the current team. There is
a sense of uncertainty with the round-by-round arrangements reducing commitment to the AB project
and leading to lower levels of personal investment in furthering the AB project outside the formal scope
of the contract with IDASA. Additionally, a few of the members were not too pleased with what AB was
paying them. But there is little doubt that a small but influential group has embraced AB and the use of
quantitative data in policy making. AB is at the forefront and should not have to relinquish its pioneer
status.
Appendix - 53
IDS, University of Nairobi (National Partner, Kenya).
papers and electronic sources about AB R4 in Kenya were analyzed for the inception report.
Additionally several emails were exchanged between IDS and the evaluation team in preparation for
the field evaluation. We requested help from IDS in identifying local stakeholders in Kenya and
assistance in setting up meetings with stakeholders in preparation for the field research.
The field research for the study was conducted in Nairobi, Kenya from August 13th, 2010 through 18th
August 2010. Overall, the national partners were very helpful and forthcoming. The fieldwork in Kenya
was to some extent hampered by that the National Investigator (Professor W. Mitullah) was out of the
country. In the morning on August 13, 2010 the team leader arrived in Nairobi and met with the person
who has been the project manager for the AB project at IDS in Kenya for R3 and R4, Mr. Abel Oyuke. At
that point, not one single meeting was scheduled for the purposes of the evaluation.
The team leader then worked with contacts sent by the NI by email, the lists of attendees at AB
outreach events held in Nairobi provided by the project manager, and a contact to MPs provided by one
of the researchers in the AB group at IDS (Dr. J. Kivuva). The team leader also activated his professional
network to get additional meetings. For assistance with arranging meetings and to coordinate the
schedule one of the Team Leader’s PhD students (who happened to be in Nairobi to conduct field
research) was hired for the equivalent of one day as a local consultant.
A total of 33 meetings were held during the evaluation with the AB local partner’s staff and researchers,
as well as a diverse group of stakeholders including a Deputy Speaker, the Government’s spokesman,
editors of the largest news media publishing houses, several executives of civil society organizations
and members of the donor community, opinion-poll consultants, independent academics and seniorlevel government ministry bureaucrats. After the completion of the interviews, follow up discussions
were held in person with the Director of IDS and the project manager for AB in Kenya, and the Deputy
Director for AB at MSU in an effort at clarifying lingering questions and receive feedback on issues that
had come up during the field mission.
One limitation of this study is that there was a fairly small sample of respondents interviewed for this
study.
Introduction
The Institute for Development Studies (IDS) is a multi-disciplinary, multi-purpose organization created
in 1965 to serve as full-time research institute on pressing social and economic development issues for
local and foreigner academics and think tanks. The institute has had four directors in the last decade 29.
Research on issues such as small and micro enterprises, human development, value chains analysis,
higher education policies, civil society and urban development have gained ascendency in the institute.
The institute has also, since its inception, has been devoted to the training of East African social
scientists and has of late been building capacity for the analysis of development issues through its MA
and PhD programs. The Institute for Development Studies also provides research services to
government, non-governmental and private sector organizations. The Institute admitted its first group
of postgraduate students in Development Studies during the 2000/2001 academic year, and registered
its first PhD student in 2004. The first generation of MA students included Abel Oyuke, the project
manager for AB R3 and R4 in Kenya. The lead national investigator (NI) for the AB project is professor
Winnie V. Mitullah.
Three rounds of AB surveys (i.e. rounds 2, 3 and 4) have been conducted in Kenya. IDS has been the
National Partner for the AB throughout this period and also organized the data collection for AB R4 in
Kenya between 19th October and 17th November 2008. The NI undertook the preparations, training, and
data collection with support from the co-NI; two research associates and the project manager. R4
29
Professors Patrick O. Alila, Dorothy McCormick, Winnie Mitullah, and Mohamud A. Jama.
Appendix - 54
training workshops were attended field managers, supervisors, and interviewers. Also in attendance
were the data manager, data entry clerks and an AB officer from MSU.
The project manager, who doubles as data manager, has a high organizational and survey research
capacity. This is evidenced by the fact that during R3 when the then NI for the AB project in Kenya got a
position with the African Development Bank in Tunis, and henceforth left Abel Oyuke more or less on
his own with the entire exercise, which he conducted successfully. For R4, Oyuke was asked again to be
the project and data manager to which he agreed despite the incident in 2006 when he was denied
training (see further below).
It was decided that the Deputy Director (DD) should manage the AB project in Kenya rather than the
Regional Coordinator at CDD as per the organizational structure of the AB Network. This was, as far as
the evaluation team has been able to establish, an executive decision made without adequate
explanation to the Regional Coordinator at CDD 30, as well as without the AB partner I Kenya being
aware of the exception.
Sampling presented challenges since the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics presented a costestimation for a disaggregation of figures from the last census by sampling units and rural vs. urban by
far exceeded the allocation in the AB budget. The national team worked with the DD to use projections
from the 1999 census adjusted for know differences in distribution to 2008. In addition, the large
number of internally displaced people (IDPs) after the 2007-election violence, required additional
adjustments. The Red Cross in Kenya provided estimates of the status of IDPs at the time of sampling
and this was used to draw an additional 12 primary sampling units, as well as a reserve 12 units.
Due to the violence that marred the post-2007 election phase and the lingering tensions in the fall
2008, the data collection phased a number of unusual challenges in Kenya. The process was first
delayed due to the violence. Training of 24 field interviewers, 6 field supervisors, 3 field managers, 1
data manger and 7 data entry clerks, as well as pre-testing was carried out by the NI, Co-NI, and an
officer from MSU. The areas most affected by the violence were Western and North Eastern Provinces.
In some areas there were acute food shortages, and tensions along ethnic lines were very high in some
sampling units. Clan wars in a few areas intensified during the time data collection, and some sampling
units had to be replaced. In other areas, the surveyor teams had to request police escorts in order to be
able to conduct the survey. In all cases, it was extremely important that the ethnic make-up of the
interview teams matched the sampling unit’s tribal affiliation(s) to ensure the safety of the surveyors.
Gender Sensitivity
The issue of gender balance within the national partnership and gender sensitivity of data collection is
still an issue. The gender balance actually worsened in the Kenyan case between R3 and R4 from ratio
of 20:18 to a ratio of 17:10. Because a gender quota required that ever other respondent be female, the
survey successfully sampled a roughly equal number of men and women, in urban and rural areas, from
every district in the country. The AB project team at IDS is also a little unbalanced with one woman and
three other researchers involved, and the project and data manger being a male.
The Kenya team consists of experienced researchers. Winnie V. Mitullah is a researcher and a professor
at the Institute for Development Studies (IDS). She holds a PhD in Political Science and Public
Administration. Her PhD thesis was on urban housing, with a major focus on policies relating to lowincome housing. Over the years, she has researched and consulted in the areas of provision and
management of urban services and institutions and governance and the role of stakeholders in
development. She has also devised and implemented policies in this area informed by her own primary
research into these issues. Dr. Mitullah is a prolific scholar and has published a long series of book
chapters, working papers and a few journal articles in regional journals. International peer reviewed
publications are few but notably she has one co-authored article in American Journal of Agricultural
Economics (2000) and besides this, Mitullah has researched, collaborated and consulted 31 with and for
At least, he response to this question during the field mission gave no indication that a clear explanation of the
reason had been given.
31 The consultancies include commissioned research and evaluations, project development, write-ups and
facilitation of a diverse range of donor projects.
30
Appendix - 55
a number of government ministries, the UN, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNDP, UNDESA, UNIFEM, World
Bank, DFID, USAID, DANIDA and both national and international NGOs.
Dr. Joseph Onjala is an economist with a PhD in Environment, Technology and Social Studies from
Roskilde University, Denmark (2002). He works on resource and environmental economics, industry
and trade issues, and development economics. He has published a few papers in local and regional peer
review journals, some book chapters, and a number of working papers. Dr. Onjala consults regularly for
many different agencies including the UNDP.
Dr. Joshua M. Kivuva is a political scientist with a PhD from University of Pittsburgh (2004). He works
on governance and development, governance and legislative processes, governance and public policy,
governance and conflict management or governance and Human rights. He has published one edited
volume on the Kenyan public service as well as a monograph on ethnicity and national unity in Kenya
and Uganda published by local presses, and a few working papers and reports. He regularly does
consultancies for various bodies including SIDA.
Dr. Adams G. R. Oloo is a political scientist with a PhD from University of Delaware (2003). He works on
political participation, governance, institutional reform, terrorism, and regional organizations. He has
published two articles in local peer review journals, and some 15 book chapters in books produced
mostly by local and regional presses. Most of his work listed in his CV is consultancies.
Mr. Ebel O. Oyuke is a development specialist with an MA in Development Studies from IDS, University
of Nairobi. He also holds a BA in Economics from the same university and has formal training in data
management and statistical analysis, as well as in participatory methodologies. He has working
experience from a series of countries in Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, South Africa), and
has worked as research officer and project assistant, as well as lecturer, for University of Nairobi, Jomo
Kenyatta University, UNESCO, and Action Aid Kenya, among others. He has also done quite a few
consultancies for Kenya Human rights Commission, National Democratic Institute, and others.
The evaluation team found Mr. Oyuke very capable in terms of data collection requirements and
procedures, as well as in terms of data management and statistical analysis. It was clear, and admitted
by the researchers above, that Mr. Oyuke was the one who did all the empirical analysis of the AB data,
and quite a bit of the writing as well, for the four bulletins/briefing papers produced by the Kenya NP
as part of the contractual requirements. Yet, there is certainly additional capacity one would want Mr.
Abel to have.
It was also established that Mr. Oyuke had been nominated by the Kenyan NP for capacity building in
2006 for the workshop/summer school to be held at CSSR/UCT. In an unfortunate process, his
participation was cancelled by the DD at MSU but the information never reached the Kenya NP and Mr.
Oyuke after having prepared his stay abroad, including making arrangements for his family, went to the
airport before he found out. Since then, Mr. Oyuke has not been offered training again. The evaluation
team also found him to be an unusually promising and loyal person, exactly of the kind that can be, and
have been, of very high importance to a network like the AB. His commitment to the AB however, has
suffered as a consequence of the above, which is regrettable.
The commitment of the NI and the rest of the team seem also to have suffered from the incident. In
conjunction with the perceived micro-management by the DD during R4, this has left a sense of not
being trusted and valued. The evaluation team recommends that Kenya be managed by the Regional
Coordinator from now on, and that in light of the past, extra efforts are being made to repair the
relationship.
There is an issue in Kenya with the AB being housed at a university outfit. Universities and their
centers are not generally held in a very high standing in Kenya. They are often viewed as too academic
to be of practical value and guidance, too engulfed in academic analysis along highly abstract lines, and
in addition being unreliable when it comes to meeting deadlines. Within the group of academic
organizations, however, it should be noted that IDS is considered to be among the best.
Appendix - 56
At the same time, the very same professors who are employed at universities, are in many cases also
very active in think tanks and consultancy organizations. When they act in that capacity, the university
reputation does not follow them. In addition, the universities offer very lower enumerations to faculty,
and have no incentives in terms of promotion, tenure, and larger salary increases for academic research
and publishing.
The net effect is that faculty has little reason to invest extra time, energy, and personal contact
networks to advance causes associated with university-based projects such as the AB. The incentives
for using the AB data in their own research and publish academic papers and so on, are also close to
non-existing. This is a general issue relevant for most African countries, but perhaps more pronounced
in some way in Kenya. The evaluation team does not have a solution to this issue but strongly
recommends that it be openly acknowledged and discussed in order to avoid building in the wrong
assumptions in strategies for data analysis, academic production, dissemination and outreach.
Preliminary examination of IDS’s dissemination and outreach suggested that Afrobarometer R4
received good coverage. The dissemination of R4 was discussed on two radio stations and during prime
news on several televisions stations on the Tuesday 7th April 2009.32 IDS also held a meeting to
disseminate R4 to the donor community including foreign missions and international organizations
attended by 24 individuals. This was followed the next day (Wednesday 8 th April, 2009) by two
newspaper articles in The Daily Nation and Business Daily respectively and the next day with articles in
the Daily Nation and Business Daily Newspapers. On the same day the newspaper articles were run, IDS
also hosted another event for another event for Civil Society Organizations that was attended by 14
participants. Another dissemination was held for the academia, policy and research communities at an
event held at Taifa Hall, Kenyatta International Conference Center (KICC), Nairobi, on Wednesday 8th
April 2009 and 15 people were said to have attended this event.
Interviews with key informants also revealed a nuanced picture. One finding is that the AB is not as well
known as it could have in Kenya even the active nature of Kenyan civil society and Kenya’s status as one
of the most well researched countries in Africa. Similarly to the situation in all the countries except
Ghana and to some extent Mali, it was quite clear that the NP has done very little in terms of networking
with key actors in policy-relevant areas such as media (e.g. editors), civil society organizations (e.g. the
directors of programs), and donor community (e.g. first secretary at the mission). The evaluation team
found a number of key actors who had either never heard of the AB, or were only dimly aware of it and
had not registered that IDS is the AB NP in Kenya. We also found that donors were not aware that IDS
and the lead researchers were in charge of the AB in Kenya. This was unexpected given that a) the
leading researchers at IDS including Professor Mitullah but also individuals who are not on the list of
AB affiliated staff but are nonetheless friends of the AB at IDS such as Professor Karuti Kanyinga, are
very prolific in Kenya society and politics, as well as often-used as consultants by foreign missions,
international organizations, and state bodies; and b) that IDS have successfully launched other projects
and made quite an impression on various policy actors.
Additionally, Kenya is also home to quite a number of well-respected organizations that among other
things conduct opinion-poll surveys33. Even though AB is well known by some, its particulars are not.
Just like in Botswana, even the more frequent users among key informants, believed AB collected only
data on citizen’s perceptions about democracy, and seemed not to know that AB questions included
sector-relevant questions (for the informants) on economic policies, citizens’ attitudes toward
government policies, the delivery of public services, and health and AIDS.
The media environment in Kenya, like South Africa, is very competitive and requires a certain amount
of networking. Kenya has gotten used to opinion polls and several competing organizations release
results with much higher frequency, closer after data collection, and with much more country- and
issue-specific questions that together makes it hard for the AB to compete. What many informants
point out in this regard, is that AB’s comparative advantage is the comparative and time-series nature
of the data.
32
33
Radio Q fm and Umoja and KBC and NTV respectively
Like Steadman, IEA’s surveys on perceptions of crisis and ethnicity, APRM, ALP to mention a few
Appendix - 57
Bureaucrats, political operatives, the donor community and the media are very receptive to AB and
would like to use AB findings. But the current AB dissemination and outreach strategy has been
ineffective, costing AB important audiences and fora. Little if any networking prior to data collection
and dissemination has been done costing the AB significant losses in terms of impact.
For example, the evaluation team met with the Government Spokesman Dr. Alfred Mutua. He was not
aware of the AB at all but when briefed by the evaluation team on the nature of the survey and its
findings he was very enthusiastic and promised on the spot that if briefed properly before data
collection begins, and then personally briefed as soon as the results are in, he would organize a cabinet
meeting with their policy advisors to discuss the AB findings. Similarly, one of the MPs in Kenya who is
also one of the deputy speakers and vice chair of one of the more important committees, promised a
very similar response with regards to the legislature. At one point, the Kenya Human Rights
Commission also expressed their strong preference for the AB to come to them, explain the findings and
data they have so that it can be explored how the AB data and results can benefit the KHRC. These
illustrate the untapped potential in Kenya.
The evaluation team brought this issue up with the Director of IDS during the field mission. He assured
us that IDS remains committed and will do everything they can in the future to ramp up their efforts in
terms of dissemination and outreach. He asked to be included on email conversations regarding the AB
project henceforth. Professor Mitullah has responded similarly. Another highly visible scholar at IDS,
Professor Karuti Kanyinga, suggested that he and others form a ‘Advisory Group’ for the AB project in
Kenya and as such, can be much more active in supporting AB dissemination, networking, and outreach
as needed. When for example, IDS launched a volume edited by Kanyinga recently there were over 250
people in attendance and many high-level guests. This is the kind of network one would hope to see
activated for the AB project.
The evaluation team finds it very important that the AB Network take the concerns raised by the NP in
Kenya seriously and chose to adhere to the organizational structure – which incidentally would also
make room for a much needed ‘new beginning’ in the relations with the NP in Kenya.
Project and Financial Management Project and Financial Management
IDS implements the surveys in Kenya, conducts dissemination and facilitates outreach events and
communication with the Kenyan press, and provides analysis of the data. There seems to be little by
way of an institutional relationship between IDS and the PMU at CDD, and there is little in way of a
working relationship between the Regional Coordinator and IDS.
Status and experience remains an issue. The key ‘staff’ affiliated with the AB project are wellestablished scholars with a certain statue in the country. They are not necessarily keen on being
directed on what and how to do things by what is perceived as young, inexperienced, and less educated
individuals from CDD. This must be acknowledged and dealt with. The existence of the PMU at CDD
hardly registers on their radar. A substantial improvement would probably come if the project manager
(Mr. Oyuke) could be more than temporarily employed at IDS and if his commitment could be
strengthened again by restarting the relationship to the AB CPs and Executive as discussed above. The
evaluation team found Mr. Oyuke to be a very valuable and underutilized asset. We see no reason why
he should not be given training at summer schools just like many others in the network that have been
given it, he also has a MA in a relevant subject as well as a wealth of experience.
Final Reflections
The field interviews revealed that key policy actors have a great demand for AB results and findings but
no one outside of the core group of AB affiliated scholars would think of downloading and use the raw
data. The IDS/University of Nairobi together with CDD need to do more in the marketing of AB.
Together they have the clout and status to be actively involved in the selling of AB to interested users.
IDS should be shown greater trust and respect by the AB Network, and Mr. Oyuke could be assigned a
greater role with additional training.
It is clear that the Director of IDS, the AB NI, and significant individuals like professor Kanyinga, view
the AB project as a very valuable asset for the institute and would be willing to put in a lot more effort
Appendix - 58
into it. For this to work, it is important that the ABEC takes the Kenyan NP’s concerns seriously and that
it considers letting the relations to AB get a fresh start via the Regional Coordinator at CDD.
IDS’ other activities and projects, as well as the teaching load draws lots of time away from AB issues
While the evaluation shows that IDS is more than qualified to serve as Afrobarometer’s national
partner in Kenya, it is also clear that competing activities combined with the many consultancies taken
up by the research team, have had an adverse effect on AB’s visibility and policy impact.
IDS should be asked to do a lot more in making AB results publicly available on its website with links to
the briefing papers, working papers, the online data facility, and the full dataset on the AB page. IDS
could strengthen its websites by providing a description of the information available on the AB page or
linking directly to the resources and the results.
The informal networking mentioned in the AB Outreach strategy (which, incidentally seems to be
unknown to the partner in Kenya), has not been done by CDD. The national partner at IDS clearly has
the capability to conduct this kind of activity but is not doing it at a significant level at present. There is
general consensus among the national team that more needs to be done by way of dissemination and
outreach to increase visibility. To increase funding for networking activities could be one way that at
least in the Kenya case would help. They do not believe that it can be effectively done from Ghana and
much less from MSU of course, and not by individuals that lack personal networks and the statue
required to make inroads into policy actors’ networks.
Appendix - 59
GREAT (National Partner, Mali)
Study of the Mali national partner occurred in two phases, a desk study and a field mission. The desk
study took place between July 27th, 2010 and August 2nd, 2010 while the field mission took place
between August 14th, 2010 and August 19th, 2010. The desk study included a preliminary examination
of newspaper coverage of national partners from all rounds of the Afrobarometer. Interviews were
arranged with various national partner employees and two academics. Initially, the national partner did
not respond to emails. Upon follow-up communication, the national partner clarified that there was a
server problem and that emails that were not answered in a timely manner should be resent. After this
issue was cleared up there were no communication difficulties with the national partner.
During the field mission the primary investigator was very hospitable and friendly. He arranged a
number of meetings for the evaluation with national partner employees, including a focus group with a
large number of interviewers and supervisors. He also scheduled meetings with donors, journalists, an
academic and a politician. Further, all requested documentation was supplied including newspaper
articles, briefing papers, and curriculum vitae for all employees and a transcript of a radio address
featuring Afrobarometer. His cooperation was exemplary. Other members of GREAT were also very
helpful and forthright. During the field mission, 21 interviews were completed including 14 with
GREAT employees and 7 with end-users. While several important end-users were interviewed,
including representatives from the British and Canadian High Commission and USAID, only one
journalist and one academic were interviewed.
Introduction
GREAT was established in 1999 in Bamako and has 4 full-time employees. GREAT is lead by a highly
visible (both nationally and internationally) scholar with an impressive record of publishing named
Massa Coulibaly. He is an economist and professor at the University of Bamako as well as an expert on
poverty in Mali. He has been the principal investigator in several major projects including a WAEMU
impact study for USAID in 2001. He has published papers with some of the top scholars in the United
States including Michael Bratton (2002). His publications have appeared in the Canadian Journal of
African Studies, The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa and the European Journal of
Development Research. He has co-authored two Afrobarometer working papers and is the lead author
on one of them. Coulibaly has presented at a number of conferences. He has also hosted a conference in
Bamako using Afrobarometer data to discuss poverty in Mali (June 2004). GREAT’s mission is to
“develop research and competition, promote creativity, spark fruitful intellectual debate, encourage the
emergence of young talent, and to promote the application of science to economic and social
development”(evaluation team's translation of mission statement on www.GREATmali.net). The group
is an independent, non-profit organization that seeks to improve the lives of Malians by strengthening
local capacity and engagement in political economy policy. The institution also strives to encourage
cooperation and debate among social scientists, as well as publication and dissemination of research
through public events such as speaking engagements. Their motto “reflechir { changir” captures their
two main goals of analysis and impact on the policy level. GREAT collects and analyzes its own data,
provides analysis on second hand data, and crafts empirical models for use by practitioners and policy
makers. They distribute their findings through their own publication series titled, “Les GREAT cahiers.”
GREAT has collaborated with the AIRD, the World Economic Forum (to write the Malian section of The
Global Competitiveness Report for 2007-2008 and 2008-2009), UNICEF’s United Nations Children’s
Fund, ECOWAS and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). It has hosted a number of
workshops for USAID and has partnered with the Global Policy Network to provide a report on the
Malian labor market. In 2009, GREAT was one of 29 African think tanks selected to receive 30 million
dollars in grants from Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC), The William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Its record of collaboration with
major agencies suggests it is a strong partner for Afrobarometer.
Initial contact with GREAT through Coulibaly was cordial and supportive of the evaluation. During the
evaluation, Coulibaly was very professional, helpful and hospitable. He facilitated the scheduling of a
number of high profile interviews, gathered a large focus group of interviewers and supervisors
contracted by GREAT for AB R4, and provided all requested documentation in a timely manner.
Appendix - 60
Four rounds of AB surveys (rounds 1, 2, 3 and 4) have been conducted in Ghana. GREAT has been the
organization in charge of the AB in Mali since the project’s inception and Mali was the very first
Francophone and majority-Moslem country to be part of the project. R4 Afrobarometer surveys were
completed in Mali between 15 and 31 December, 2008. The surveys were administered by
Afrobarometer’s national partner in Mali, Groupe de recherche en économie appliquée et théorique
(GREAT) run by Executive Director Massa Coulibaly. The sampling, field methodology and execution of
the survey were as far as we can determine professionally done and in accordance with AB’s strict
protocol. 1,200 respondents were selected by multi-stage, randomized sampling. The sample size
required to meet the objectives with a 3% margin of error at 95% confidence interval was calculated to
be 1200 respondents, and at the selected household a random member of the household was selected
to be interviewed and alternating interviews between men and women filled gender quotas.
Gender Sensitivity
GREAT has an good record of gender sensitivity given the circumstances in Mali. In terms of data
collection, a balance of male and female respondents was assured by alternating genders every
respondent. Further, females always interviewed female respondents (although either males or females
could interview male respondents). GREAT’s executive director, Massa Coulibaly, is intentional about
increasing gender parity at GREAT. For example, Coulibaly recommended two males and two females to
attend the 2010 summer school, (of these four applicants, two males and one female were accepted by
IREEP to participate). Interviewers for R4 included 19 males and 14 females and the full-time staff at
GREAT includes 3 males and 1 female. In a country with low female literacy, this level of inclusion of
female employees is impressive and evidence of the successful strategy of GREAT’s executive director.
The principal investigator, Massa Coulibaly, is more than qualified to oversee the survey research.
While most national partners hire graduate students to carry out the surveys, Coulibaly is joined by a
group of professional economists, experts in econometrics and experienced survey administrators.
Most participants have at least an MA and all full-time staff have at least one masters degrees in
economics. Most have done additional certificate programs as well. The evaluation found no reason for
concern of GREAT’s survey administration and implementation. Half of the staff of GREAT has capacity
in advanced statistical analysis. As addressed above, there is little incentive for these employees to
provide analysis beyond what is required by AB. Massa Coulibaly co-authored AB WPs based on both
Round 1 and Round 2 AB data. He also publishes a series of almost monthly ‘Malian AB Bulletins’ on
themes using AB data. These are very descriptive, short, and idiosyncratic to Mali, hence, we find it
reasonable that so few of the Malian outputs have been published as AB Briefing Papers but also wish
to put on record that they seem to have been influential and useful for the policy debate in Mali.
GREAT’s website provides an extensive number of these and other publications through their series
“les GREAT cahiers” that analyze data collected by the institution. Coulibaly and several of his staff are
more than qualified to be writing working papers on the AB data, but have no incentive to do so. The
executive director is the only academic of the team, and West African universities do not require
publishing for tenure and promotion, so he lacks incentive to publish academic type articles. This is
why he concentrates on monthly bulletins. Coulibaly commented, “Paying for data collection and paying
for analysis are two different things.” More incentives must be provided for GREAT to do more analysis.
In addition, his other staff are employed primarily by the think tank GREAT, and therefore do not need
to do any academic publishing. Further, it would be difficult for them to do any analysis if they wanted
to because of the type of licensing of SPSS software provided by AB. GREAT has thus requested an
individual SPSS license so that multiple employees may utilize the program.
In terms of capacity building, GREAT has sent 4 males and 2 females to AB summer schools. During R4,
three representatives from GREAT attended the Afrobarometer summer school held in Cotonou from
14-31 July 2010. Two of them were interviewed during the evaluation. The students expressed
concerns that the objective of the summer school was unclear and that the curriculum felt scattered.
They suggested narrowing down the objective of the summer school to focus only on methodology
rather than content-related courses such as governance or accountability. They felt that the summer
school was too focused on political science to the detriment of developing statistical expertise. They
also suggested that two tracks might be necessary to accommodate the different levels of statistical
Appendix - 61
ability of the students, with a beginner and advanced track. They commented that if you did not already
know STATA before arriving at the summer school, as some of the other participants did not, then you
could not learn much because the level of training begins at such a high level. In general, they felt that
the summer school tried to do too much in the amount of time that it had and would be better if the
curriculum was narrowed to only address developing statistical capability. They also felt that more
time needed to be allotted to completing the research paper under the supervision of the faculty.
Coulibaly has volunteered that he would be interested in hosting a future summer school with a
narrower curriculum and fewer professors in order to build stronger relationships among teachers and
students and provide more continuity in the classes. No Malian students have received AB fellowships.
In total, six affiliates of GREAT have attended AB summer schools. GREAT is unique as a national
partner in regards to the amount of analysis that it makes available on its own website. It does not,
however, publish AB data. While a link is provided on the GREAT site to the AB page, it is not specified
that full AB data is available on the AB page. GREAT could strengthen its website by providing a
description of the information available on the AB page or linking directly to the questionnaire and the
results. Coulibaly has suggested that until AB develops a French webpage, it may be useful to link
directly from GREAT’s webpage to the online data analysis tool so that it is more visible.
The evaluation revealed no significant capacity gaps at GREAT but a remaining strong need for training
at the AB summer schools for staff at GREAT. There was also discussion that there is a lack of capacity
among Malian academics and other end-users to properly utilize and analyze AB data (and statistical
data in general). This may explain why so few academics are even aware of the data.
Increasing the Visibility of the Afrobarometer’s among African Policy Actors
Examinations of the Malian press suggest that Afrobarometer R4 has received decent press coverage in
Mali. In total, the local press has covered Afrobarometer at least fifteen times. These articles were
written by a number of journalists in all of the leading newspapers in the country suggesting that the
survey project is known among a varied group of journalists, newspapers and readers. Despite the
number of articles written on R4 (at least 10), nearly all of them were written the day after the primary
dissemination event, 13 July 2009, suggesting that the utility of the data is not well understood by
journalists but also that the current AB strategy for dissemination and outreach is ineffective. R4 also
covered AB R4, including one report launched directly following a dissemination event attended by a
broadcast journalist in Koulikoro. An obstacle faced by GREAT in its effort to craft stronger
relationships with journalists, is the high rate of turnover in the profession in Mali. It is thus unlikely
that AB will be able to maintain relationships with specific journalists. Dissemination events specifically
targeting journalists are thus recommended for upcoming rounds. Because access to technology is
uneven among journalists, it is recommended that dissemination continue in hard copy form or that
hard copies be made available in conjunction with CD-ROMs at events targeting journalists.
According to the AB/CV, GREAT held seven dissemination events for R4 data with an average of 31
people in attendance. They have thus held more events than any other AB national partner with the
exception of the SA core partner office. They are also unique in that they have hosted events in regions
across the country while many National Partners have limited dissemination to the capital city. Their
events were hosted at the Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Ségou, opérateurs économiques,
Assemblée régionale de Sikasso, the Centre Djioliba de Bamako and Centre Ahmed Baba des Hautes
études islamiques de Tombouctou among other locations. Audiences have included members of the
business community, journalists, civil society organizations, delegates from local unions, the National
Statistics Institute, and local politicians.
Despite this impressive record of dissemination, more is needed to increase the visibility of AB. AB
results remains under-utilized specifically by academics, but also by donors, politicians and, to some
extent, journalists. Academics outside of Massa Coulibaly’s circle appear to be uninformed about the
availability of AB data. Even those scholars who are aware of it, have not used the online data analysis
tool or downloaded the data and we found it extremely unlikely that they will do so in the foreseeable
future. Scholars have requested disseminations specifically targeting academics. In terms of visibility
among policymakers, the prime minister contacted a host of an AB event requesting the results of the
survey, suggesting that high-level politicians are aware of the project and curious about the results.
When a different minister was interviewed, however, he commented that AB was not very well known
Appendix - 62
among politicians. He further remarked that AB is much better known among organizations than
politicians. A representative from USAID made similar observations. While AB data is used at both the
American embassy and at USAID, it is less well known by other donors. At USAID, AB data has been
used in reports and is a document of reference. There is thus evidence that AB is becoming better
known among all target audiences, but that visibility is uneven. Although Coulibaly knows many
important end-users such as newspaper editors and the staff of donor agencies, it is unclear if he is
engaging in targeted networking to encourage stronger connections between GREAT and potential end
users.
Confirmed end users include: USAID, the United States Embassy in Bamako, multiple journalists and
politicians as well as some civil society groups. Among those interviewed, AB data is seen as reliable
and its methodology has been called “solid,” “serious,” and “remarkable.” It is highly prized by many
because of the unreliability of other statistics produce in Mali. One politician commented that AB is
unique among surveys in Mali for its quality and nonpartisanship. It was mentioned explicitly that
Coulibaly’s position as a scholar and not a politician lends credibility to the project. Other surveys are
commissioned by political parties and are not trusted by end-users. End users could be better engaged
with AB data if GREAT systematically distributed its monthly bulletins, rather than just providing them
at dissemination events. Suggested revisions include the addition of questions on political governance,
institutional efficiency, gender and decentralization.
GREAT implements the surveys in Mali, coordinates dissemination events and communication with the
Malian press, and provides analysis of the data. Massa Coulibaly has experience managing large sums of
money, but his involvement specifically in terms of AB funds is not known. Interviewers and
supervisors employed for the ABR4 survey are paid at the end of each day of work, suggesting that
funds are distributed in a timely fashion. While there are not concerns about GREAT’s expertise in
administering surveys, this is not to suggest that there were not complications during R4. For example,
the timing was not ideal for some districts, because it was harvest season and many people were not in
their homes. In some villages, women were out in their gardens, and in others women were out in rice
fields, which created complications in staying on schedule since it took extra time to locate women.
Some sites also could not be visited due to armed violence and in some cases accessibility was a
problem due to flooding or other environmental concerns. Comparable villages replaced these sites.
Sampling in the city was also somewhat complicated by new construction that caused difficulties in
determining the boundaries of sampling units. During interviews, supervisors explained how they dealt
with such complications. They were well trained, and comfortable enough with the executive director
that they were willing to call him when problems arose outside of their training. Despite the presence
of these complications while implementing the survey, there is no reason to suspect any systematic bias
in the data.
Interviews with GREAT staff suggest the AB institutional hierarchy is unstable. GREAT claims to report
directly to MSU, rather than to IREEP and CDD. For example, after cleaning the data for R4, GREAT sent
it to MSU for feedback, not to the DM at IDASA or to CDD or IREEP, because they feel they get better
feedback from MSU. There is also evidence that there are communication problems in the other
direction, from CDD and IREEP to GREAT. Further, there are complains that when GREAT does report
directly to IREEP, it is later contacted by CDD for information and documents that were already turned
in to IREEP, suggesting there is poor communication between CDD and IREEP and/or that IREEP’s
information management is left wanting.
Final Reflections
An evaluation of the capabilities of GREAT through desk study and a field mission suggest that it is a
highly competent and professional organization that has established a longstanding reputation both
nationally and internationally for excellence in data collection and analysis. It has managed large sums
of money, engaged multiple aid organizations and completed a number of other survey projects. Gender
parity within the staff and communication according to institutional hierarchies could improve the
organization further. While GREAT is a strong partner in terms of dissemination, AB is still unevenly
visible and not adequately used by end-users in Mali. More resources for dissemination are thus
recommended.
Appendix - 63
CPA, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (National Partner, Mozambique)
This study was carried out from July 25, 2010 until September 10, 2010. Initially, a desk study was
conducted from Angola to obtain a general overview of the implementation of AB R4 in Mozambique.
The desk study was conducted from July 26, 2010 until August 19, 2010. During this time period, AB
materials regarding Mozambique analyzed and a web search was conducted of Mozambican
newspapers to collect AB press articles. In addition, three phone interviews were conducted with the
director of AB in Mozambique, Carlos Shenga, prior to the field mission. During these phone
conversations, requests were made to: (1) help identify local stakeholders in Mozambique; (2) send all
locally produced working papers based on AB data; and (3) set up meetings with stakeholders in
Mozambique in preparation for the field research. The field research for this study was conducted in
Mozambique from August 21, 2010 until August 24, 2010. Overall, the national partners in
Mozambique, specifically Carlos Shenga and Amilcar Pereira, were very helpful and forthcoming in
sending materials and preparing the logistics for this study.
Thirteen respondents were interviewed during the field research conducted in Mozambique from
August 21, 2010 until August 24, 2010. Before this field mission, three phone interviews were
conducted with the director of AB in Mozambique, Carlos Shenga. After the completion of the field
research, two follow up interviews were conducted with Carlos Shenga. The respondents interviewed
in the field represent a diverse group of stakeholders in Mozambique. These stakeholders include: (1)
members of parliament, (2) journalists from three newspapers, (3) academics, (4) leaders of civil
society organizations and (5) members of the donor community. Nine interviews were conducted in
English and four interviews were conducted in Portuguese.
Two limitations of this study are particularly noteworthy. First, because of time constraints, there was a
fairly small sample of respondents interviewed for this study. Secondly, there was a bias in the
respondents selected for this study. Almost all of the respondents interviewed for this study (with the
exception of one individual) were selected by the national partners and all of these individuals were
well aware and knowledgeable of AB.
Introduction
Portuguese is the official language of Mozambique but there are another twenty-four local languages
that are spoken throughout the country. As such, the AB survey had to be translated into several
languages to accommodate the linguistic diversity of the country. The AB survey was translated from
English to Portuguese and from Portuguese to four local languages spoken in the country: Changana
spoken in southern Mozambique; Ndau and Sena spoken in central Mozambique; and Macua spoken in
northern Mozambique. The Department of Languages and Linguistics at the Universidade Eduardo
Mondlane translated the AB questionnaire with the help of Professor David Langa.
Improve and Expand the Afrobarometer Data Base
Three rounds of AB surveys (i.e. rounds 2, 3 and 4) were conducted in Mozambique. Mozambique was
not included in AB round 1 but a pilot survey was conducted in the country during this time period that
included many AB questions. Afrobarometer’s national partner in Mozambique, the University of
Eduardo Mondlane, conducted the surveys. João Pereira from the University of Eduardo Mondlane
directed AB rounds 2 and 3 in Mozambique. After directing AB in Mozambique for two rounds, João
resigned from this position and he is currently the director of Civil Society Support Mechanism (CSSM),
which is an NGO in Mozambique. Carlos Shenga from the Centre directed AB R4 for Policy Analysis,
Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. Carlos Shenga is currently a PhD Candidate at the University of Cape
Town. R4 surveys for AB Mozambique were conducted in December of 2008.
For R4, IDASA played an important role in training the national partners in Mozambique. In November
of 2008, IDASA (specifically Zenobia Ismail) helped with the training of field workers in preparation for
the implementation of AB R4 in Mozambique. The training was conducted in the week of 24 to 28
November 2008. A total of 24 field staff attended the five-day training workshop. The AB Data Manager
Francis Kibirige also helped the national partner create a random selection of primary sampling units
for the implementation of AB R4. Respondents interviewed during the field mission, indicated that they
usually communicate directly, via e-mail, with Zenobia Ismail and Francis Kibirige. The national
partners however need more training in sampling techniques and data management. Based on the
Appendix - 64
interviews in the field, the national partners in Mozambique have indicated that they have limited
training and abilities to create the necessary rules and proper codes in a data set.
The population frame based on the 2007 Population and Housing Census from the National Institute of
Statistics (INE) was used to stratify and draw the sample. The sampling frame was stratified by 11
regions/provinces, and within regions by urban/rural locality. 150 enumeration areas, or Primary
Sampling Units (PSU’s) were allocated across the strata based on the proportion of the sample allocated
to each. Mr. Sozinho Cubala, Statistician at the National Institute of Statistics, did this stage of the
sampling. To select starting points within each PSU, a table of random numbers was used to select
random combinations of positions on vertical and horizontal axis of maps of the PSU’s. Within
households, an individual was selected for interview using standard procedure for randomization.
Household substitutions were minimized by conducting fieldwork before and after working hours,
Starting at 5h00 and finishing up to 20h00 and by including Saturdays and Sundays.
The survey occurred in period that the country was expecting municipal election results held on 19
November 2008. Teams deployed for fieldwork on 5 December 2008. One team went to three Northern
provinces/regions, three teams went to four Centre provinces, and two teams worked in three
Southern provinces. All data collection was completed by the 24 th December 2008. At least one out of
eight interviews per PSU was back-checked and field supervisors also ensured that interviews were
back-checked for each individual interviewer in the team over the entire period of fieldwork. The field
supervisor was also required to keep a daily log of observations on sampling and interviewing
conditions. Rainfall and road conditions proved the most significant barrier to fieldwork. Four PSU’s
had to be substituted due those factors.
Gender Sensitivity
Data collection in Mozambique was conducted with an appropriate balance of male and female field
workers. There were 24 field workers that conducted the data collection of AB R4 in Mozambique and
11 of these field workers were female. Given the linguistic diversity of the country, language
competency was an important criterion for selecting field workers. In Mozambique, there is an
appropriate gender balance between males and females field workers but most principal researchers of
AB are male.
During AB R4, field workers occasionally encounter challenges regarding issues of gender in conducting
survey research in rural communities in Mozambique. For example, many female respondents surveyed
for the AB project in rural areas were reluctant to speak with a male field worker. Such situations
would occasionally cause tensions (i.e. “issues of jealousy,” “why is this man speaking to my wife?” etc.)
in the household. In such situations, a female field worker had to be substitute to conduct the survey.
Building Capacity for Survey Research and Analysis
There are very few Mozambicans that hold PhD degrees in the social sciences and these academics have
largely been trained in universities that emphasize more qualitative research methods. Few
Mozambican academics have training in statistical methods. Carlos Shenga is a rare exception since he
has advanced training in statistical methods that includes training in time series analysis.
Other academics associated with AB in Mozambique have very limited training in qualitative and
quantitative research methods. As such, there are very few end users of AB in Mozambique that have
the capacity to accurately analyze the data. The national partners in Mozambique have indicated that
they do not have the appropriate background and expertise in sampling techniques and more training
is needed in this area. Moreover, Mozambique’s current data manager is not likely to remain with the
national partner and as a result training is needed to prepare a new data manager.
Among academics in Mozambique, there also seems to be a distrustful view in the value of survey
research and the quality of data obtained from such studies. Several respondents suggested that the
quality of data from AB is suspect since average Mozambicans are not likely to answer survey questions
in a truthful manner. More than 40 percent of Mozambicans interviewed during AB R4 believed that AB
field workers were working on behalf of the government and/or president of the country. Two
respondents interviewed also stated that the quality of the data obtained from AB surveys was
Appendix - 65
problematic because of the linguistic diversity in the country and the challenges of translating
questions and meaning in such a diverse social context.
Academics working for the AB project in Mozambique are “spread too thin.” These academics are very
busy with teaching responsibilities (often teaching 5 or 6 courses per semester) and involved in
consultancies, which limit their ability to research and analyze AB data. Several structural conditions in
the country significantly impact the availability of academics in Mozambique to pursue research and
publish. There also seems to be a high turnover of staff members that work for AB in Mozambique. This
high turnover is often associated with staff members leaving the country for several months of the year
to pursue graduate studies or staff members being hired to work for local NGOs. As in other countries,
academics are facing a series of incentives adverse to academic analysis and publication.
The University of Eduardo Mondlane is the oldest and most respected university in Mozambique. But
the university, according to most respondents, has strong attachments to the ruling party (i.e.
FRELIMO) in the country. Mozambique’s president, Armando Guebuza, for example appoints the
chancellor of the university. These affiliations to the ruling party in the country have the potential to
undermine the independence and credibility of the institution. In fact, there is a very blurry line that
separates public institutions from the ruling party in the country. Several respondents interviewed
suggested that the lack of separation between public institutions and the ruling party is a historical
legacy that continues to afflict the country and will only gradually change with the passage of time.
Two people from Mozambique attended summer school after R3 (one male and one female participant)
at the University of Cape Town. These students were: (1) Carlos Shenga and (2) Sandra Manuel.
Another two individuals from Mozambique attended the second AB summer school in 2007. These
students are: (1) Vanessa Lopes and (2) Neila Momade. One individual, Custodio Pedro, attended the
third AB summer school in 2009. Students that have attended the summer school sessions have
received basic training in SPSS and data management and have utilized these new acquired research
skills to pursue graduate education at European Universities.
There have been no academics/students in Mozambique that have applied for AB fellowships to obtain
further training in research methods. But several respondents indicated that they are planning to apply
for AB fellowships to attend the University of Michigan’s/UCT summer school training in research
methods.
Increasing Visibility of the Afrobarometer among African Policy Makers
The national partner in Mozambique is responsible for the dissemination of AB data/analysis and the
core partner, IDASA, is responsible for outreach in Mozambique. Carlos Shenga conducted the
dissemination of AB R4 data in 2009. Three dissemination events in 2009 were held on the following
dates: (1) May 20, 2009; (2) May 22, 2009; and (3) October 15, 2009. Around 75 – 90 people attended
the first dissemination event held on May 20, 2009. A fairly diverse group of stakeholders in
Mozambique attended this first dissemination, including:
Representatives of the following Civil Society Organizations and Universities:
CIP, Centro de Integridade Pública
LDH, Liga dos Direitos Humanos
AMODE, Associação Moçambicana......
EISA, Instituto Eleitoral da Africa Austral
AMOPROC, Associação Moçambicana para Promoção da Cidadania
IESE, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos
GDI, Governance and Development Institute
CEDE
FDC, Fundo para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade
Departamento de Administração Pública da Universidade Eduardo Mondlane
A Politécnica
UDM
Editors and Senior Journalists from the following Media Outlets:
Savana (Newspaper)
Appendix - 66
Zambeze
Magazine Independente
Notícias (Newspaper)
País (Newspaper)
TVM, Televisão de Moçambique
STV, Televisão Soico
TV MIRAMAR
TIM, Televisão Independente de Moçambique
Rádio Moçambique
RTP África
Other Stakeholders:
João Pereira, scholar, MASC
Nobre Canhanga, scholar, Departamento de Administração Pública e Ciência Política, UEM
Salvador Cadete, scholar
Custódio Pedro, scholar, ISAP
Paul Fauvet, Journalist
François Beaulne, UNDP CTA for Parliament
Fernando Menete, GMD
Eduardo Namburete, MP Renamo-UE
Ismail Mussá, MP Renamo-UE
...... Frangulis, MP Frelimo
Camal Jamal, TV comentator
Raul Domingos, Politician, PDD
Alfredo Gamito, Presidente da Comissão da Agricultura, Desenvolvimento Regional, Administração
Pública e Poder Local, MP Frelimo, Assembleia da República
Manuel de Araújo, MP Renamo
Filimone Meigos, Departamento de Administração Pública, ISCTEM
Hélder Jauna, Departmento de Sociologia, ISCTEM
Lutero Simango, MP Renamo UE (PCN)
Abel Mabunda, MP Renamo UE (PCN)
Yacub Sibindy, PIMO
Delegação do MDM (Maputo)
Sheik Abdul Carimo, Observatório Eleitoral
Partido Trabalhista
Adriano Biza, Departamento de Antropologia, UEM
José Laimone Adalima, Departamento de Antropologia, UEM
José Palaço, MP Renamo UE
Departamento de Economia (alguém?)
Ossumane Aly Dauto, MP Frelimo
Virgínia Videira, MP Frelimo
Irene Chissancho, Assembleia da República
The results of AB R4 along with three briefing papers were presented and distributed to the attendees
during this dissemination event. A smaller group of stakeholders attended the dissemination event held
on May 22, 2009. Approximately 9 – 10 people attended this event intended to reach members of the
donor community that focus on issues of governance in Mozambique. The results of AB R4 along with
three briefing papers were presented and distributed to the attendees during this dissemination event.
SIDA invited Carlos Shenga to prepare a third dissemination event that was held on October 15, 2009.
Approximately 30 - 35 people from SIDA attended this event. Several high-ranking officials attended,
including the Swedish Ambassador to Mozambique and the chairman of the Swedish Business
Association in Mozambique. The results of AB R4 along with three briefing papers were presented.
Hard copies of these papers were not provided at the event but Carlos e-mailed these documents to the
attendees prior to the meeting. A fourth dissemination event was planned for the office of the
presidency but the meeting never took place.
Appendix - 67
However, one of the problems with the dissemination of AB data is the fact that AB data is only
available in English and most Mozambicans only speak Portuguese. Another issue with the availability
of the data is the fact that delays occurred in posting the briefing papers online. For instance, two
briefing papers from AB R4 were only recently posted on the AB website. As such, it is recommended
that improvements need to be made with the timing and posting of Mozambique’s AB data/papers on
the website.
Three briefing papers were produced from AB R4 in Mozambique on the following topics: (1)
Observance of the Rule of Law in Mozambique (2010); (2) Economic Conditions, Living Conditions and
Poverty in Mozambique (2010); and (3) Performance and Vertical Accountability of Mozambique’s
Local Governments (2009). These briefings papers utilized basic descriptive statistics to better
understand changing trends in Mozambique with regards to the rule of law, poverty and local
democratic accountability. There is also an occasional comparison of Mozambique with other national
partners to situate these changing trends in a comparative perspective.
IDASA is scheduled to implement outreach in Mozambique’s AB R4 in the fall of 2010. According to
respondents interviewed, IDASA’s outreach of AB R3 in Mozambique was not very successful. This
outreach was conducted in English and few people attended these events: approximately 8 – 10 people.
Moreover, there was not much input from the National Partner in coordinating these activities that
were intended to reach policy actors in Mozambique. Several respondents interviewed during the field
mission suggested that the responsibilities of outreach should be transferred to the National Partner
since it is the national partner that is knowledgeable of stakeholders and policy actors in Mozambique.
Another respondent that was interviewed suggested that AB results should be e-mailed and/or mailed
to MPs in Mozambique so that AB attains more visibility among policy actors.
The AB CV includes two known media coverage events/reports of AB R4 in Mozambique. According to
this CV, there is a paucity of AB media coverage in Mozambique in comparison to the other national
partners (with the possible exceptions of the media coverage in Liberia and Lesotho). But there has
actually been more media coverage of AB R4 in Mozambique then what is included in the AB CV. It
remains unclear why a discrepancy exists between the AB CV and the actual media coverage in
Mozambique. It is recommended however that the national partner in Mozambique improve its
strategy of tracking, monitoring and reporting all AB press coverage to the core partner.
Yet, there has not been much press coverage of AB R4 in Mozambique. In 2009, there were only three
newspaper articles in Mozambique that have made references to the AB survey. Some of the press
coverage that has made references to AB data has been somewhat superficial and in some cases it has
been used to provide greater legitimacy to the ruling party in the country. For example, one newspaper
article from 2006 stated, “according to Afrobarometer, 80% of Mozambicans feel very confident about
the president’s performance (Noticias newspaper, ‘Moçambicanos Depositam Confiança e Acreditam no
PR - Revela o Estudo’)” But there was also one newspaper article (from the Savana newspaper) that
used AB data to criticize the government and the president (Beúla, 2009). This more critical newspaper
article claimed that the president’s support, according to AB, is declining in the country. But the
analysis of this one newspaper article was somewhat superficial since support for the president had
only declined by one percentage point, which is not statistically significant.
There are very few policy actors in Mozambique that are aware of AB. Mozambicans who are aware of
AB are largely academics in the social sciences, NGOs that focus on democracy and governance and
journalists who focus on political affairs. Most of these stakeholders have university degrees and know
the English language. Therefore, AB data is only reaching a small minority of educated, English speakers
in Mozambique. Most respondents interviewed in Mozambique indicated that AB questions and data
are very relevant (and not simply donor driven concerns) to the country. The problem of reaching more
policy actors however is a matter of making significant improvements in dissemination and outreach.
There are few Mozambican politicians that are aware of AB. Moreover, few MPs, especially older MPs,
in Mozambique know the English language, hold university degrees and solicit expert knowledge on
voter preferences and behavior. The government of Mozambique, according to one respondent, does
not have a research unit that produces or solicits expert knowledge on voter preferences and behavior.
One Member of Parliament indicated that he was more aware of other surveys and studies conducted in
Appendix - 68
Mozambique because the results of these studies were e-mailed to him directly. Some stakeholders in
Mozambique have also suggested that AB surveys should be conducted more often in the country so
that the AB project gains more press coverage and reaches more policy actors. Moreover, since very
few MPs in the country use e-mail and internet, hard copies of AB briefings should be hand out to these
policy actors in the country.
According to most respondents interviewed, AB data does not seem to be having a direct impact on
influencing debates on peace and security in Mozambique. Instead AB data has occasionally been used
to influence debates and discussions on the following key issues: (1) alleviating poverty; (2) trends in
corruption; and (3) respect for the rule of law in the country. However, these debates – which have
largely occurred between a small group of academics, NGOs and members of the donor community in
the country – may have a more indirect impact on influencing discussions on peace and security in
Mozambique. For instance, if alleviating poverty is central to peace and security, then AB data may be
having a more indirect (and probably insignificant) impact on influencing discussions on peace and
security in the country.
After funds are transferred from IDASA to the national partner, the dean of the faculty at the University
of Eduardo Mondlane manages AB finances. This control over the financial management of AB funds
has occasionally posed problems with the principal researchers working for the national partner in
Mozambique. For example, there was a very long delay in appropriating the funds in 2008 to train the
field workers and implement AB R4. Instead of starting the survey research for AB R4 on December 1,
2008, the implementation of the survey started on December 6, 2008. Such delays led to the surveys
being conducted into Mozambique’s rainy season, which in turn led to logistical difficulties in traveling
to rural communities throughout the country. These logistically difficulties resulted in substitutions of
communities surveyed during the implementation of AB R4. As such, it is recommended that the next
round of AB in Mozambique be conducted before the rainy season and preferably during the dry
months of June through November.
Final Reflections
The national partners in Mozambique are competent in conducting survey research but there is a need
for more training in data management and sampling techniques. The field interviews also revealed that
few policy actors in Mozambique are aware of AB. Given this situation, the following recommendations
are suggested:
Improvements need to be made with the timing and posting of Mozambique’s AB data/papers on the
website. This data should also be translated into Portuguese if it is to be made available and accessible
to policy actors in Mozambique. Since few politicians in the country use e-mail and internet (especially
older MPs), hard copies of AB briefing papers (translated in Portuguese) should be hand out to these
policy actors.
Outreach responsibilities should be transferred to the national partner since it is the national partner
that is knowledgeable of stakeholders and policy actors in Mozambique. The national partner in
Mozambique also needs to improve its strategy of tracking, monitoring and reporting all AB press
coverage to the core partner.
The NP in Mozambique needs more training in sampling techniques and data management. The next
round of AB in Mozambique should be conducted before the rainy season and preferably during the dry
months of June through November.
The Dean of Faculty at the University of Eduardo Mondlane needs to exercise more transparency in
management of AB funds.
Appendix - 69
GERCOP, Gaston Berger University (National Partner, Senegal)
Study of the Senegal national partner occurred in two phases, a desk study and a field mission. The desk
study took place between July 27th, 2010 and August 2nd, 2010 while the field mission took place
between August 20th, 2010 and August 25th, 2010. The desk study included a preliminary examination
of newspaper coverage from all rounds of the Afrobarometer. Interviews were arranged with various
national partner employees, several journalists, a politician and an academic. Initially, the national
partner was not responsive. Upon follow-up communication, the national partner was contacted and
confirmed available for the field mission.
During the field mission the primary investigator made himself available for interview and provided
contact information for other employees. Assistance with scheduling meetings required repeated
requests by the evaluation team. During the field mission, 19 interviews were completed including 11
with GERCOP employees and 8 with end-users. While several important end-users were interviewed
including an organization representing locally elected officials that hosts dissemination events after
each round, several NGOs that employ AB data and the journalists responsible for the most in-depth
coverage and the most vocal criticism of the national partner, no current donors were interviewed.
Results of the desk-study, however, confirm that USAID both employs and recommends Afrobarometer
data for information on Senegal (AB results were listed as a consulted document in the appendix of the
31 August 2007 Corruption Assessment). Babaly Sall’s AB working paper from April 2004 is also hosted
directly on the USAID’s website. USAID has also contracted Babaly Sall through another organization
with which he is affiliated, GESTES, to do survey work (see GESTES webpage for more information).
Introduction
Groupe d’Études et de Recherches Constitutionnelles et Politiques (GERCOP), is a respected and visible
institution located in St. Louis. The group was created in 1996 by the faculty of the Political Science
department at Gaston Berger University. The group maintains a website recognizing its partnership
with Afrobarometer and linking to its page. It contains several press releases from 2006. The website
could be improved by including press releases from the most recent round of Afrobarometer as well as
links to Afrobarometer working papers authored by members of GERCOP. For administrative
purposes, the head of GERCOP is Babaly Sall, and he is also the National Investigator (NI).
In terms of the evaluation, Sall was reached via email despite server problems. During the evaluation,
Sall was somewhat helpful. He contacted the evaluator immediately upon her arrival, and met with her
early the next day. He was forthright with information and provided contact information for other team
members. When the evaluator visited the university at St. Louis, there were no meetings scheduled, as
had been discussed, so they had to be set up last minute. After repeated requests, he facilitated the
scheduling of a number of meetings on the final day of the evaluation.
Three rounds of AB surveys (i.e. rounds 2, 3 and 4) were conducted in Senegal. GERCOP has been the
organizational home for the AB throughout this period. R4 surveys for Afrobarometer in Senegal were
completed between May 19th and June 4th, 2008. Afrobarometer’s national partner in Senegal,
GERCOP, again completed the surveys.
GERCOP has made results publicly available to journalists, locally elected officials, academics and
students. In terms of the website, a link is provided on the GERCOP site to the AB page, but it is not
specified that full data is available on the AB page. GERCOP could strengthen its website by providing a
description of the information available on the AB page or linking directly to the questionnaire and the
results.
Gender Sensitivity
The AB survey in Senegal reached gender parity in some areas but not in others. In terms of the survey
itself, because a gender quota required that ever other respondent be female, the survey successfully
sampled a roughly equal number of men and women, in urban and rural areas, from every region and
department in the country. In terms of administration of the survey, 10 of the interviewers were men
and 10 were women. While gender equality has been maintained in these areas, there is less gender
equality in both staff and training. In terms of the scholars who compose the national partner, GERCOP,
Appendix - 70
the website identifies nine team members, although it is evident that many more scholars are affiliated
with the institution in less formal capacities. Of those scholars identified, only one is female. The survey
has thus adequately included female respondents, but women are not as well represented within
GERCOP itself.
According to the 2010 survey completed as part of this evaluation, GERCOP has 6 male employees and
4 female employees that work specifically on AB, indicating that the organization is moving towards
more gender equity. In terms of training, five males and 2 females have attended summer schools. Male
and female staff has written an equal number of peer-reviewed journal articles, although none of the
papers written by women and only one of the papers written by men was accepted for publication.
Male staff wrote four briefing papers while female staff authored two. To increase female publishing, it
is highly encouraged that female staff members be given preference in training opportunities in
statistical methods (such as summer schools). While gender equality has not been reached on all
indicators, GERCOP is a more balanced organization than many national partners and the presence of
AB working and briefing papers written by female members indicates that it is encouraging its female
staff members to do analysis, much more so than other partners.
Babaly Sall is a doctor of law, the dean of the law and political science department at Gaston Berger
University, and a well-known and well-published scholar. He is a visible professor at Gaston Berger
University, serving as the president of the committee organizing the university’s 20th anniversary
celebration earlier this year and presiding over the event in which the president of Senegal was in
attendance. In addition, he serves as the contact person for an inter-Africa consortium of law schools.
He is an active scholar both regionally and internationally, having co-authored two different
Afrobarometer working papers (36, 77), one of which he was the main author. He has presented at a
number of conferences internationally including public opinion conferences (WAPOR/AAPOR) in
Montreal and Bamako as well as the CSES (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems) plenary session
held in Stockholm in 2003. He is very active in the Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC/OECD) where he
participated in the June 2006 workshop in Burkina Faso titled, “Intergenerational Forum on
Endogenous Governance in West Africa” and the Workshop on Governance and Conflict Prevention
Instruments in Dakar in October of 2007. He also participated in the 2008 workshop in Contonou
evaluating the West Africa Report for ECOWAS. He has experience working as a consultant for aid
agencies and was contracted by IDRC/CRDI in order to evaluate Canadian development projects in
Senegal from 2006-2008.
Overall, Sall is an appropriate person to be overseeing a National Partner Office. He has expertise in
survey research and international consulting and is an expert in governance. He is a visible academic
within his own institution and is active in conferences regionally and internationally.
The principal investigator, Babaly Sall, is also a qualified manager, although his technical skills have not
been confirmed. He has delegated a number of tasks to other well-trained members of his team
including his data manager, office manager, the supervisor of the fieldwork and his primary partner in
data analysis. The majority of individuals involved with AB through GERCOP either holds PhDs or are
PhD students. All have participated in multiple survey projects because GERCOP oversees a number of
surveys, including those funded by major donors such as USAID. There are no concerns about the
national partner’s expertise in administering the survey. The sampling employed relied on census units
determined by the National Statistics and Demography Agency. Eight surveys were completed in 150
census units selected in order to assure the population surveyed was representative of the Senegalese
population. In terms of actual field missions, there were some complaints of poor planning for nights
when interviewers and supervisors had to stay in the field for a night due to the distances traveled.
GERCOP must anticipate the accommodation needs of field workers and make plans in advance to
properly house interviewers and supervisors.
According to the AB 2010 survey, GERCOP staff wrote 6 total briefing papers and 2 working papers
since R4 data collection. Of these papers, only 2 of the briefing papers were accepted by AB for
inclusion on the website. It appears that GERCOP is providing enough analysis, but it is possible that it
needs to be of a higher quality for publication.
Appendix - 71
In total, seven affiliates of GERCOP have attended an AB summer school, including 2 women and 5 men.
Since R4, representatives from GERCOP have attended the Afrobarometer summer schools in Cotonou
in 2009 and 2010 as well as the Anglophone summer school in Cape Town in 2009. Participants were
overall pleased with the experience. It has been requested by the organization that they be able to send
more students on an annual basis to the summer school. A meeting among data managers, which was
last done in 2004, has also been suggested by GERCOP. GERCOP has expressed concern that while the
network offers training to students through summer schools, there have not been adequate training
opportunities for junior researchers. Immersion training at MSU or IDASA was requested to improve
relationships among partners and to provide technical training.
When comparing the Anglophone and Francophone summer schools, however, the former was judged
to be better organized and better suited for learning to analyze AB data. There were more resources,
the information taught was more practical and the working conditions were better as the school was
hosted at the University of Cape Town and not a hotel like the francophone summer schools. The
summer school hosted at IREEP assumes an intermediate level of statistical ability and begins lectures
at this point with no review, yet some students present at the summer school have never had a
statistics course. The statistical courses at the summer school hosted at UCT are at a beginner’s level.
They provide the skills needed to analyze AB data without teaching unnecessarily advanced statistical
models. The students in Cape Town were also present at the summer school for a longer period of time,
and were given more time to work on their research papers under the supervision of faculty. Some of
the students interviewed in Senegal would prefer to attend the summer school in Cape Town than the
one hosted by IREEP in Benin. They feel that the statistical training is more focused at UCT and better
suited for analysis of AB data. No affiliates of GERCOP have received AB fellowships.
According to the 2010 survey completed as part of this evaluation, most GERCOP employees are
capable of basic statistical analysis. At present, however, only 2 male employees at GERCOP are capable
of advanced statistical analysis. If GERCOP is to contribute advanced analyses of AB data, this capacity
gap must be closed. Further, AB, pointing to possible capacity gaps in quality analysis, has accepted few
of GERCOP briefing and working papers for publication. Of the six briefing papers written by GERCOP
staff during R4, none have been published on the AB website, further indicating an unacceptable level
of analysis. When questioned about this lack of publication, GERCOP employees claim there is a bias
against publishing briefing papers written in French, because CDD does not have French-speaking
personnel.
In terms of capacity for analysis outside of GERCOP within Senegal, the standard concerns of countries
with French educational heritage are present. There is little experience of working with quantitative
data beyond basic descriptives among end-users and academics. While there were complaints that
Senegal is becoming “over-surveyed” by NGOs and donors, it does not appear that there is capacity
within the country to utilize such data. There is a marked imbalance, within Senegal as well as within
GERCOP, as academics develop advanced ability in survey administration while remaining beginners in
survey analysis.
Further, this is little or no incentive for academics to develop such capabilities, as the donor community
provides ample opportunities for contracts in collecting data. There is no equivalent incentive for
analyzing the data collected. University promotion processes do not require publications in peerreviewed journals and academics therefore have no incentive to produce analysis. They are highly paid
for contracts involving data collection but receive no benefit for producing analysis that is not required
in the original contract.
Outside of the academic community, the inability to do deal with statistical data is even more severe. In
the dissemination-event with local officials described below, for example, attendees used the Q&A time
following the presentation to question the methodology and findings. The discussion became quite
animated. Because specific political parties commission the majority of survey data produced in
Senegal, survey data in general is viewed as partisan. AB is unique in that it is apolitical among the
other surveys in the country, but because it is one of the only surveys produced by an independent
organization, it is assumed to have the same flaws as other surveys. The NP in Senegal must continue to
counter this criticism through outreach events that teach end-users about AB methodology.
Appendix - 72
GERCOP is not a well-known organization in Senegal. Nevertheless, the release of R4 AB data was
featured in the Senegalese press at least 10 times. In some of these articles, Afrobarometer has been
used as a source of data, evidence that end users are aware of and employing Afrobarometer data. One
article even mentions that GERCOP hosted a workshop for journalists to teach them how to use the
data. Other articles focus specifically on Afrobarometer. Some of these articles have been controversial.
One article details the rejection of Afrobarometer results by Socialist students who argue that by
limiting the sampling size and age of respondents, the survey was overly supportive of President Wade
and misrepresented Senegalese political positions. Although Babaly Sall is a visible academic, it does
not appear that he engages in much (if any) networking to increase visibility of AB data. His data
manager, Alpha Ba, appears much more engaged in this type of promotion. He is well connected among
journalists, NGOs and other academics and can easily contact them on matters related to AB. It may be
advisable to expand his role to include networking as a formal responsibility.
Most interesting to the purposes of this evaluation is a recent article questioning the scientific quality of
the survey. The article, written by Cheikh Tidiane Diop, published 24 July 2010 is titled “Afrobarometre
et son sondage 2008 - 2009 - Ce qui n'est pas la science n'est pas la science.” The article accuses
Afrobarometer of writing questions in a style that encourages respondents to support the incumbent
president and questions the ability of the investigators (GERCOP). When interviewed, Diop explained
that his editorial was written based on information he gleaned from a newspaper article written by
Latir Mane. After he published his critique of AB, he was contacted by the Benin national partner,
IREEP, and was given a copy of the summary of results. After further review of the results, Diop
concluded that his criticisms were misplaced and that GERCOP had followed appropriate procedures.
The international press has also responded to R4, including an article by Bloomburg highlighting the “at
risk” nature of Senegalese democracy based on Afrobarometer data. In a response to the article,
published in L’Observateur, a journalist suggested reasons why the Senegalese may see their
democracy at risk, including the appointment of the President’s son to an important government post.
The coverage also indicates that major donors such as USAID consult Afrobarometer data in forming
their opinions about corruption in Senegal (see 2 June 2010 article from Rewmi). This was confirmed
via interview with a former USAID employee. A review of Afrobarometer’s press coverage in Senegal
thus indicates that it is sparking important debate about democracy while also being a source of debate
itself as regards its methods and conclusions.
According to the Afrobarometer CV, Senegal has hosted one dissemination event since the release of R4
data. On 27 November 2008, GERCOP hosted an event for Senators, Mayors, Local counselors, and
Deputies at the House of Representatives at the Maison des Elus in Dakar. The event was attended by
43 people and was led by Professors Babaly Sall, Ibrahim Gale, and Mauhamaduo Sall. In addition to this
event, four events were held at the end of May in conjunction with the celebration of the 20th
anniversary of Gaston Berger University. One event targeted journalists; another civil society
organizations and two others targeted academics. The national partner’s efforts to reach a variety of
audiences are commendable. As events were held in both Dakar and St. Louis, the geographic scope of
dissemination could be improved by hosting events in other regions of the country than the capital and
the location of the national partner. There is nearly unanimous agreement among national partner
employees and end users that more piecemeal dissemination is needed. AB’s visibility could be further
improved through a more concentrated use of GERCOP’s website, maintaining records of dissemination
events and links to the AB webpage and working papers.
AB results are used by USAID, journalists, some civil society organizations (including Mouvement
Citoyen and RADDHO) and a few academics. Many local-level politicians are aware of AB, but it is
unclear if they are using it. Interviews indicate that they do not know what to do with the data beyond
discussing it on the day of dissemination. An employee of the president has contacted the national
partner in the past for the results, indicating that the highest levels of government officials are aware of
the survey. It cannot be confirmed that the data has been used to impact policy. Despite the
dissemination efforts, there is no evidence of academics downloading the data or using it. There were
no suggestions for changes to the questionnaire. Some complained that it is too long, but others thought
the length was appropriate.
Appendix - 73
GERCOP implements the surveys in Senegal, coordinates dissemination events and communication
with the Senegalese press, and provides analysis of the data. GERCOP has complained that IREEP is too
slow in transferring funds after all required deliverables have been turned in. The primary investigator
of the project advanced his own money to pay employees and had to wait 3-4 months to receive
payment from IREEP. It has been suggested that funds be transferred directly from CDD to the national
partner to improve the speed of transfer and to ensure that as little of project funds as possible are
subject to transfer fees. Babaly Sall has experience managing large sums of money and no GERCOP
employees expressed any concerns with his financial management.
There are a number of complaints about the relationship between the national and core partner. Some
believe that the selection of IREEP as a core partner was an imposition from the United States and that
IREEP is unreliable. There are complaints that both IREEP and CDD lose documents and frequently ask
for the same report repeatedly. There are complaints that when documents are sent they are not
confirmed as received. Communication problems with CDD are believed to be caused by CDD’s lack of
French-speaking personnel and the fact that CDD is involved in “too many things.” Further, there are
complaints that IREEP holds on to financial reimbursements longer than is appropriate (3-4 months
after all deliverables have been turned in) and that IREEP has to be contacted repeatedly in order for
funds to be released. There are also perceptions that IREEP and CDD are purely administrative bodies
that cannot provide technical feedback. IDASA and MSU, on the other hand, are viewed as organizations
capable of providing technical feedback.
Final Reflections
GERCOP is a responsible, well-known organization that is an appropriate national partner for AB. There
is general consensus that more dissemination of AB data is needed from the national partner to
increase visibility. Further, dissemination could be improved by hosting events in multiple regions
within the country. Both of these suggestions will require increased funding in order to be
implemented. Several concerns remain about the francophone summer school including its short
duration, the enumeration offered to professors and its location in Benin that limits the number of
students that can be sent from other national partner countries. Further training in statistics for female
staff members in particular is advised to increase gender parity in analysis of AB data as well as to raise
the overall ability of the national partner to provide analysis. A meeting of data managers from all
national partners as well as an immersion opportunity for junior researchers have been suggested to
improve capacity.
APPENDIX 2: RESULTS OF SURVEY WITH AB PARTNERS
Appendix - 75
Appendix - 76
APPENDIX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES CONSULTED
GHANA
No
Date
Type
Respondent
Organization
Title/Profession
1
10-Aug-10 Group
Sharon Parku
CDD/PMU
2
3
4
5
6
10-Aug-10
10-Aug-10
10-Aug-10
10-Aug-10
10-Aug-10
Group
Group
Group
Face
Face
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Kathy Addy
Nathan O. King
Emil R. Stalis
Mr. Kwakau Kwaerty
CDD/PMU
CDD/PMU
CDD/PMU
USAID-Ghana
National Patriotic Party
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
Face
Face
Group
Group
Group
Group
Face
Group
Sharon Parku
Kathy Addy
Bermi Arle
Beatrice Claire A Adu
Peter Ankomah
David Amodor
Mr. Michael O. Effa
Lynda Ofon-Kwafo
15
11-Aug-10 Group
Sandra Arthur
16
17
18
19
20
21
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
11-Aug-10
12-Aug-10
Genevieve Eba-Peley
Frene Budza
Francis Acquah Jar
Mr. Kojo Asante
Seth J. Boupe
Nathan O. King
CDD/PMU
CDD/PMU
Citi FM
Joy FM
Daily Dispatch
BBC
UK High Commission
Ghana Integrigty Initiative
Ghana Anti-Corruption
Coalition
Center for Economics and
Public Administration
WILDAF
WANEP
CDD-Ghana
Daily Graphic
CDD/PMU
22
12-Aug-10 Face
Daniel A.
CDD/PMU
23
24
25
12-Aug-10 Face
12-Aug-10 Face
12-Aug-10 Face
Mrs. Nuala Lawlor
Mr. Cephas Amevor
Mr. Ebenezer Djietror
Canadian High Commission
Parliament of Ghana
Parliament of Ghana
26
12-Aug-10 Face
Parliament of Ghana
27
12-Aug-10 Face
Hon. Cletus A. Avoka
Hon. Michael Teye
Nyaunu
28
12-Aug-10 Face
Dr. Audrey Gadzekpo
29
12-Aug-10 Face
Dr. Debroah
Parliament of Ghana
School of Communication
Studies, University of Ghana
Dept. of Political Science,
University of Ghana
30
27-Aug-10 Group
Sharon Parku
CDD/PMU
31
32
33
33
27-Aug-10
27-Aug-10
27-Aug-10
27-Aug-10
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Kathy Addy
Nathan O. King
Kojo Asante
CDD/PMU
CDD/PMU
CDD/PMU
CDD
Head of Programs
33
33
27-Aug-10 Group
27-Aug-10 Group
Edem Selorme
Victor Brobbey
CDD
CDD
(on leave)
Program Officer
Group
Group
Group
Face
Face
Face
Group
Group
Group
Group
AB role if any
Monitoring &
Evaluation Manager
Regional Field
Manager
Outreach Coordinator
Finance Manager
Democracy Coordinator
Communications Director
Monitoring &
Evaluation Manager
Talk show host
Journalist
Journalist
Journalist
Political Analyst
Program Officer
Program Officer
Lecturer
Program Officer
Program Officer
Head of Programs
Journalist
Finance Manager
Regional Field
Manager
Counselor,
Political/Economic Relations
Principal Assistant Clerk
Principal Assistant Clerk
Majority Leader, National
Democratic Congress MP for
Zebilla constituency
MP, Lower Manhyia
Constituency
Snr Lecturer
Former External
Resource Person, CDD
Member, Intl.
Advisory Board
Snr Lecturer
Monitoring &
Evaluation Manager
Regional Field
Manager
Finance Manager
former AB Program
Manager
Appendix - 78
KENYA
No
Date
1
13-08-2010
2
13-08-2010
3
13-08-2010
4
14-08-2010
5
14-08-2010
Type
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Respondent
Abel Oyuke
Dr. Kivuva
Dr. Mohamud Jama
Levy Odera
Ben Agina
6
14-08-2010 Face
Dr. Tom Wolf
7
14-08-2010 Email
Maina
9
15-08-2010 Face
MargaretA. Onyangi
10
16-8-2010 Face
Javas Bigambo
11
16-8-2010 Face
Abubakar Zein
12
16-8-2010 Face
Wnjiru Kago
13
16-8-2010 Face
Amb. David K. A. Kikaya
14
16-8-2010 Face
Lorna Y. Ottaro
15
16
16-8-2010 Face
16-8-2010 Face
Dr. Dorothy McCormick
Dr. Karuti Kanyinga
Kennedy Massime
Dr. Albert Mutua
Abel Oyuke
Dr. Adams Oloo
Min. of Local Government
Kenya Human Rights
Commission
Uraia: Kenya National Civic
Education Program
Uraia: Kenya National Civic
Education Program
United States International
University
Millenium Global
Educational Services
IDS/U o Nairobi
IDS/U o Nairobi
Centre for Governance and
Development (CDG)
Government of Kenya
IDS/U o Nairobi
IDS/U o Nairobi
Kenya Human Rights
Commission
Kenya National Assembly
Office of the Prime Minister
Title/Profession
AB role if any
Research Assistant
Project Manager
Snr Lecturer
AB Researcher R4
Associate Professor, Director
PhD Candidate
News Editor
Key staff for R2 in
Independent Consultant
Kenya
former Chair
Pers. Assist. to Director of
Communications,
Program Associate KHR
Institute
Program Manager
Program Officer - Media
Associate Professor
Executive Director
Professor (former Director
of IDS)
Professor
17
18
19
20
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
21
22
23
17-08-2010 Face
17-08-2010 Face
17-08-2010 Face
Florence Jaoko
David Mugonyi
Kipkemoi arap Kirui
24
17-08-2010 Face
Amb. M. Ngali
25
17-08-2010 Face
Ken M. Nyaundi
26
26
27
17-08-2010 Email
18-08-2010 Face
18-08-2010 Face
Dr. Winnie Mitullah
Dr. Mohamud Jama
Jaindi Kisero
28
18-08-2010 Face
Dr. Michael Chege
29
18-08-2010 Face
Dr. Godwin Murunga
30
18-08-2010 Face
Morris Odihambo
IDS/U o Nairobi
IDS/U o Nairobi
The Nation Media Group
Ministry of Finance,
Administration, and Planning
Dept of History, Kenyatta
University / African
Leadership Program
Centre for Law and Research
International / National Civil
Society Congress
31
18-08-2010 Face
Hon. Prof. Philip Kaloki
Kenya National Assembly
32
18-08-2010 Face
Josephine MwangiMweki
Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
33
18-08-2010 Face
Annika Nordin
Jayawardena
Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Executive Director /
President
MP for Kibwezi, Associate
Speaker, Vice Chair Planning
and Trade Committee
Program Officer, Civil
Society, Gender, and Child
Rights
Country Director for
Development Cooperation,
Kenya
Email
Dr. Winnie Mitullah
IDS/U o Nairobi
Professor
AB National
Investigator
Type
Group
Group
Respondent
Zenobia Ismail
Mxolisi Sibayoni
Organization
Idasa
Idasa
Title/Profession
Program manager
AB role if any
Program manager
34
23-08-2010
SOUTH AFRICA
No
Date
1
19-08-2010
2
19-08-2010
Face
Face
Face
Face
Organization
IDS/U o Nairobi
IDS/U o Nairobi
IDS/U o Nairobi
U o Florida
Standard Group
Have worked for UNDP, TI,
USAID, Steadman Group
Kenya Human Rights
Commission
Africa Online / NARC-Kenya
Interim Independent
Electoral Commission
Executive Director
Government Spokesperson
Research Assistant
Snr Lecturer
Project Manager
AB Researcher R2-4
Chair
Press Officer
Secretary
Director / & Taita-Taveta
District Chairman
Commissioner
AB National
Professor
Investigator
Associate Professor, Director
Managing Editor
UNDP Snr. Advisor
Snr Lecturer / Executive
Director
Appendix - 79
3
4
19-08-2010 Group
19-08-2010 Group
Francis Kibirige
Florince Norris
5
23-08-2010 Face
Dr. Marietjie Strydom
6
7
23-08-2010 Face
23-08-2010 Face
Dr. Solly Molayiu
Gunnar A. Holm
8
23-08-2010 Face
Ralph Mathekga
9
23-08-2010 Face
Paul Graham
10
11
23-08-2010 Phone
24-08-2010 Face
12
13
14
24-08-2010 Face
24-08-2010 Face
24-08-2010 Face
15
25-08-2010 Face
16
25-08-2010 Face
17
18
25-08-2010 Face
19-08-2010 Face
19
25-08-2010 Face
20
25-08-2010 Face
21
22
23
24
25
MALI
No
Idasa
Idasa
Government Communication
Information Services (GCIS)
Government Communication
Information Services (GCIS)
Royal Norwegian Embassy
South Africa National
Treasury / Idasa / Edge /
Univ. of Western Cape
IDASA
University of Cape
Town/Center for Social
Science
Research/Democracy in
Prof. Robert Mattes
Africa Research Unit
Nancy Msibi
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
Grad. School of Public
&Develop. Manag., Univ. of
Prof. Susan Booysen
the Witwatersrand
Dr. Thabo Rapoo
Centre for Policy Studies
Percy Mabandu
City Press Newspaper
Royal Embassy of Sweden /
Kaj Persson
Sida
Lennart Jemt
Sida
Johanna Lind
Sida
Florince Norris
Idasa
Human Science Research
Dr. Mcebisi Ndletyana Council
Aids and Governance
Mr. Kondwani Chirambo Program, Idasa
Data Manager
Financial Manager
Director of Research
Researcher
First Secretary / Counselor
Researcher (PhD Cand.)
Executive Director
Professor
Project Manager
First Secretary
Second Secretary
Financial Manager
Senior Research specialist
Institute for Security Studies
25-08-2010
25-08-2010
25-08-2010
25-08-2010
Ms. Jozet Muller
Zenobia Ismail
Mxolisi Sibayoni
Francis Kibirige
European Union
Idasa
Idasa
Idasa
Research Specialist
Project Officer: Governance
& Political Cooperation
Program manager
Data Manager
Respondent
Organization
Title/Profession
Executive Director
Research Assistant
14-08-2010 Face
14-08-2010 Face
Massa Coulibaly
Boubacar Bougoudogo
3
4
15-08-2010 Face
16-8-2010 Face
Aguibou Coulibaly
Fatima Binta Sow
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
102.4 Radio Station of
Koulikoro
GREAT Mali
5
16-8-2010 Face
Francois Kone
GREAT Mali
Research Assistant
Moussa Coulibaly
Makoro Alexis Dembele
Facourore Sinaba
Tiedo Koloma
Diallo Djenela Boro
Yaya Bathily
Mousa Balla Keita
Kadidiaton Diop
Mamadou Camara
Rakiatou Olaiga
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
GREAT Mali
Research Assistant
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
Survey Professional
16-8-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
17-08-2010
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Financial Manager
Author 3 Briefing
Papers
Program Director
1
2
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Senior Advisor
Deputy Head of Mission
Collette Schulz –
Herzenberg
Date Type
Member, Executive
Committee
Professor
Director
Snr Reporter
25-08-2010 Face
Face
Group
Group
Group
Data Manager
Financial Manager
Journalist
Research Assistant
Former employee of
Idasa, former student
of Robert Mattes at
UCT
Formerly D&G at
USAID
Program manager
Data Manager
AB role if any
AB National
Investigator
Employee
Employee and
summer school
employee
Employee and
summer school
employee
Supervisor
Supervisor
Supervisor
Supervisor
Supervisor
Interviewer
Interviewer
Interviewer
Interviewer
Appendix - 80
16
17
18
19
18-08-2010
18-08-2010
18-08-2010
18-08-2010
Face
Face
Face
Face
20
19-08-2010 Face
21
19-08-2010 Face
SENEGAL
No
Date Type
Nouvel Horizon and Le Soir
de Bamako
Koni Expertise
University Mande Bukari
USAID
Journalist
Director
President
Political Officer
Canadian High Commission
British High Commission
Civil Society Officer
Director
Respondent
Organization
Babaly Sall
Cheikh Tidiane Diop
Landing Savane
GERCOP
Le Soleil
Title/Profession
Dean of the Faculty of Law
and Political Science at
Gaston Berger University
Journalist
Politician
Oumar Sidibé
Konimba Sidibé
Chéibane Coulibaly
Yacouba Konaté
Samba Ibrahima
Tembely
Mohamed Habib
1
2
3
22-8-2010 Face
22-8-2010 Face
22-8-2010 Face
4
23-08-2010 Face
Penda Mbow
West African Research
Center
Scholar
5
6
7
8
23-08-2010
23-08-2010
23-08-2010
24-08-2010
Face
Face
Face
Face
Ibrahima Sall
Ibrahima Gaye
Mohamed Sall
Alpha Ba
GERCOP
GERCOP
GERCOP
GERCOP
Student
Professor
Professor
PhD Candidate
9
10
11
12
13
14
24-08-2010
24-08-2010
25-08-2010
25-08-2010
25-08-2010
25-08-2010
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Papa Ibrahima Diagne
Boucar Abdul Ly
Momadou Jdiaye Sow
Alioune Tin
Fatou Kama
Abisilla Sall
GERCOP
GERCOP
GERCOP
RADDHO
RADDHO
UAEL
M.A. Student
M.A. Student
Supervisor
Secretary General
Executive Director
Executive Director
Face
Phone
Phone
Phone
Phone
Latir Mané
Abdul Wahab
Daouda Diop
Niass
Aissatou
L’Observateur
formerly USAID
GERCOP
GERCOP
GERCOP
Journalist
Political Officer
Supervisor
Supervisor
Interviewer
Type
Respondent
Title/Profession
15
25-08-2010
16
25-08-2010
17
25-08-2010
18
25-08-2010
19
25-08-2010
MOZAMBIQUE
No
Date
1
01-Aug-10 Skype
Carlos Shenga
2
07-Aug-10 Skype
Carlos Shenga
3
18-Aug-10 Skype
Carlos Shenga
4
22-Aug-10 Face
Momade Saide
5
6
7
8
22-Aug-10
22-Aug-10
23-Aug-10
23-Aug-10
Carlos Shenga
Abel Mabunda
Mussa Mahomed
Fernando Goncalves
9
23-Aug-10 Face
Sergio Banze
Organization
Universidade Eduardo
Mondlane
Mondlane
Mondlane
APRM (Ministry of Planning
& Development)
Mondlane
MDM (Political Party)
Noticias (Newspaper)
Savana (Newspaper)
O Pais (Newspaper & STV
news reporter)
10
23-Aug-10 Face
Marc De Tollenaere
Swiss Confederation
Face
Face
Face
Face
11
23-Aug-10 Face
Domingos M. Rosario
Mondlane
12
23-Aug-10 Face
Amilcar Pereira
Mondlane
13
24-Aug-10 Face
Paulos Berglof
14
15
24-Aug-10 Face
24-Aug-10 Face
David Langa
Ismael Jamu Mussa
Swedish Emassy (Maputo)
Mondlane
MDM (Political Party)
Lecturer/PhD Candidate
hosted AB event
AB role if any
AB National
Investigator
Director of
Mouvement Citoyen
Summer School
Attendee
Supervisor
Data Manager
Office Manager
Summer School
Attendee
Interviewer
Employee
Hosted AB event
Has attended AB
dissemination event
Employee
Employee
Employee
AB role if any
AB National
Investigator
AB National
Investigator
AB National
Investigator
Executive Director
Former MP
Political Affairs Journalist
Editor
AB National
Investigator
Political Affairs Journalist
Head of Governance (Swiss
Agency for Development
and Cooperation)
Assistant Professor
Lecturer
Program Officer
(Governance)
Professor of Languages
MP
Deputy Researcher of
AB in Mozambique
(R3)
Principal/Deputy
Researcher of AB in
Mozambique
AB Translator
Appendix - 81
16
24-Aug-10 Face
Zefanias Matsimbe
17
04-Sep-10 Skype
Carlos Shenga
18
06-Sep-10 Skype
Carlos Shenga
EISA (Civil Society
Organization focusing on
elections and democracy
promotion)
Mondlane
Mondlane
Type
Respondent
Organization
Title/Profession
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
Face
No
Show
Face
Phone
Phone
Face
Face
Dr. Lekorwe
Mr. Taolo Lucas
Sten Jansson
Mr. Thalepo
Mr. Ndolvu
Kabelo K. Moseki
Mokgatlhe
Dr. Maipose
Emang Basadi
BCP
SIDA
MISA
MISA
Professor
Rose Seretse
Mr. Moletsane
Dr. Serema
Thato Maseho
Mr. Lopodise
M.D. Bokole
Emang Basadi
Directorate of Corruption
Bocongo
BDP
BDP
Ombudsman
Directorate of Public Service
Management
Directorate of Public Service
Management
BOTSWANA
No
Date
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
27--08-2010
27--08-2010
30-08-2010
30-08-2010
30-08-2010
31-08-2010
31-08-2010
31-08-2010
31-08-2010
10
11
12
13
14
15
31-08-2010
1st Sept '10
1st Sept '10
1st Sept '10
1st Sept '10
1st Sept '10
16
1st Sept '10 Face
Dr. Kereteletswe
Program Officer
(Governance)
AB National
Investigator
AB National
Investigator
AB role if any
National Lead
Investigator
Swedish Consultant
Director of MISA
Journalist
Research Affiliate
Research Affiliate
Research Affiliate
Research Affiliate
Director
Director
Deputy Director
Coordinator of Public Service
Reforms
17
18
19
2 Sept '10 Phone
2 Sept '10 Face
2 Sept '10 Face
Dr. Sebudubudu
Chris Ntau
Dr. Lekorwe
20
21
2 Sept '10 Face
2 Sept '10 Face
Professor
Lecture/go to man
22
2 Sept '10 Face
Mr. Thalepo
Kabelo K. Moseki
Botlhalel
Makgekgenene
Directorate of Corruption
and Economic Crime
Deputy Director - Policy
Dr. Lekorwe
Professor
National Lead
Investigator
Respondent
Dr. E. Gyimah-Boadi
Dr. Michael Bratton
Dr. Carolyn Logan
Organization
CDD-Ghana
MSU
MSU
University of Cape
Town/CSSR/Democracy in
MSU
Title/Profession
Professor
Dist. Professor
Associate Professor
AB role if any
Executive Director
Snr. Advisor
Deputy Director
Professor
Associate Professor
Snr. Advisor
Deputy Director
NYU/IREEP
Professor
Director, IREEP (CP)
Lead Specialist, Public Sector
Governance
Dist. Professor
Snr. Advisor
23
3 Sept '10 Face
MISC.
No
Date
Type
1
28-Jul-10 Phone
2
5-Aug-10 Phone
3
15-08-2010 Phone
4
5
23-Aug-10 Phone
3-Sep-10 Face
6
4-Sep-10 Face
Prof. Robert Mattes
Dr. Carolyn Logan
Dr. Leonard
Wantchekon
7
8
4-Sep-10 Face
8-Sep-10 Phone
Dr. Stephen Ndegwa
Dr. Michael Bratton
9
10
8-Sep-10 Phone
10-Sep-10 Phone
Prof. Robert Mattes
Dr Mitchell Seligson
The World Bank
MSU
University of Cape
Town/CSSR/Democracy in
Vanderbuilt University
Professor
Professor
National Lead
Investigator
Snr. Advisor
Intl Adv. Board
Appendix - 82
APPENDIX 4: LIST OF DOCUMENTS CONSULTED FOR THE EVALUATION
15 May 2009 “Botswana’s BDP Dominates Political Climate Angus Reid Global Monitor”.
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/botswanas_bdp_dominates_political_climate/
2003 CSES Plenary Session. 3-4 October 2003. accessed 31 July 2010. available online at:
http://www.umich.edu/~cses/plancom/module3/2003plenary/2003plenary.htm
25 February, 2009. Palapye.com News Blog “Batswana favour democracy”
AB Citations July 2010 (MSU, 28 July 2010)
AB Work plan for 2010 (CDD, no date)
Adcock, Robert. 2008. “The Curious Career of ‘the Comparative Method’: The Case of Mill’s Methods”.
Paper presented at APSA’s Annual Meeting, Boston, August 30, pp. 1-22.
Addy, Kathy, C.V 2010
African Trade and Investment Policy Program for Mali: Policy Analyses and Private Sector
Strengthening. Report submitted to USAID. accessed 31 July 2010. available online at:
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACA678.pdf
Afrobarometer – Botswana Satisfied with their Democratic Institutions, Rule of Law; Majority of
Batswana reject direct election of President, public funding of political parties”.
Africanpressorganization http://appablog.wordpress.com/2009/02/24/afrobarometerbotswana-satisfied-with-their-democratic-institutions-rule-of-law-majority-of-batswana-rejectdirect-election-of-president-public-funding-of-political-parties/. Retrieved August 1, 2010.
Afrobarometer Call for Applications to AB Fellowships 2010
Afrobarometer Call for Applications to AB Visiting Fellowship Program 2006
Afrobarometer Core Partner Workshop Agenda 2007
Afrobarometer Newsletter, December 2008
Afrobarometer Newsletter, December 2009
Afrobarometer Newsletter, Jan-June 2010
Afrobarometer Newsletter, July 2008
Afrobarometer Newsletter, June 2009
Afrobarometer Newsletter, March 2008
Afrobarometer Newsletter, March 2009
Afrobarometer Newsletter, October 2009
Afrobarometer Newsletter,October, 2008
Afrobarometer Outreach Strategy (IDASA, July, 2007)
Afrobarometer Report on AB Fellowship to ICPSR, Francis Kibirgie, 2006
Afrobarometer Report on Website and Online Dataset Usage (MSU, 30 June, 2010)
Afrobarometer Summer School.” accessed 2 August 2010. available online at:
http://www.ireep.org/en/communications/afrobarometer/afrobarometer-summer-school
Afrobarometer Survey: Mali. August 2010.
Agence de Presse Sénégalaise. 13 March 2007. “UGB : atelier de restitution du scrutin du 25 février.”
accessed 1 August 2010. available online at: http://www.aps.sn/spip.php?article28705
Agence de Presse Sénégalaise. 21 January 2010. “Ibrahima Silla publie ‘L'intelligibilité du politique."
accessed 31 July 2010. available online at: http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/201001210954.html
All Africa, 09-10-7, Taking the pulse of our democracy
All Africa, 22/8/2009, Scorecard Shows 20 African States Are Above Threshold of Democracy
All Africa, 25/5/2009, Africa: political freedom brings more wealth says study
Amendment No.1 to Fixed Price Subagreement Between CDD-Ghana and Institute for Empirical
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No.88, Namibia Political Party Prospects Leading to the 2009 Elections.
No.87, Economic Conditions, Living Conditions and Poverty in Mozambique.
No.86, Observance of the Rule of Law in Mozambique.
No.85, The Public Mood on Zimbabwe’s Inclusive Government.
No.84, Green Shoots of Hope: Changing Economic Conditions in Zimbabwe.
No.83, Zimbabwe: People's Development Agenda in 2009.
No.82, Tolerance in South Africa: Exploring Popular Attitudes Toward Foreigners.
No.81, Citizen Perceptions of the Economic and Living Conditions in Zambia.
No.80, Zambian Citizens, Democracy and Political Participation.
No.79, Les opinions de Burkinabè sur la chefferie traditionnelle.
No.78, Situation socioéconomique des Burkinabè et performance du gouvernement.
No.77, Le Performance du Gouvernement du Mali.
No.76, Proportional Representation and Popular Assessments of MP Performance in South Africa : a Desire
for Electoral Reform?
No.75, A Country Turning Blue?: Political Party Support and the End of Regionalism in Malawi.
No.74, Spot the Difference: A Comparison of Presidents and Governments' Performance Since 1999 in
Malawi.
No.73, Popular Opinions of Democracy in Liberia, 2008.
No.72, Land Disputes in Liberia: Disputes From Below, 2008..
No.71, Popular Appraisals of Socio-economic Conditions in Liberia, 2008.
No.70, Are Democratic Citizens Emerging in Africa.
No.69, Citizens of the World? Africans, Media and Telecommunications.
No.68, Poverty Reduction, Economic Growth and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa.
No.67, Neither Consolidating Nor Fully Democratic: The Evolution of African Political Regimes, 19992008.
No.66, Popular Views on Crime in Tanzania.
No.65, Public Attitudes Towards Economic Conditions and Government Performance: First Results of
Afrobarometer 2008 Surveys in Madagascar.
No.65, Perception de la situation économique et des performances du Gouvernement: Premiers résultats
de l'enquête " Afrobaromètre 2008” à Madagascar.
No.64, Madagascans and Democracy: Principles, Practice and Participation
No.64, Les Malgaches et la démocratie: principes, fonctionnement, participation.
No.63, Governance in Madagascar: Scope and Limits of the Fight Against Corruption and Decentralization.
No.63, La governance à Madagascar: Portée et limites de la lutte contre la corruption et du processus de
décentralisation.
No. 62, Perspectives on Economic Management in Botswana: Jobs and Widespread Wealth Elude Even a
Well Managed Economy.
No. 61, Demanding Democratic Rule: Batswana Support Democracy and Reject Non-Democratic Rule.
Appendix - 90
No.60, Batswana Support Press Freedom and Critical Speech.
No.59, Tanzanians and Their MPs: What The People Want, and What They Don't Always Get.
No.58, Popular Perceptions of Shari’ a Law in Nigeria.
No.57, Conditions de vie et situation éconmique au Bénin, 2008.
No.56, Demande et Offre de démocratie au Bénin : qu'en est t'il ?
No.55, Perceptions et Incidence de la corruption au Benin: Evidence a partir des données Afrobaromètre
Round 4.
No.54, East African Federation: Tanzanians Favor Greater Economic Integration, But Wary of Stronger
Political Links.
No.53, Public Opinion and Local Government in Nigeria, 2008
No.52, Popular Opinions on Local Government in Ghana, 2008.
No.51, Popular Attitudes to Democracy in Ghana, 2008.
No.50, Economic Conditions in Ghana in 2008.
No.49, How Ghanaians Rate The Performance Of The NPP Administration.
Afrobarometer Working Papers
No.120, Harding, Robin. "Urban-Rural Differences in Support for Incumbents Across Africa ". 2010.
No.119, Bratton, Michael. "Citizen Perceptions of Local Government Responsiveness in Sub-Saharan
Africa". 2010.
No.118, Keefer, Philip." The Ethnicity Distraction? Political Credibility and Partisan Preferences in
Africas". 2010
No.117, Gadzala, Aleksandra and Marek Hanusch. " African Perspectives on China-Africa: Gauging
Popular Perceptions and their Economic and Political Determinants". 2010
No.116, Chang, Eric and Nicholas Kerr. “Do Voters Have Different Attitudes toward Corruption? The
Sources and Implications of Popular Perceptions and Tolerance of Political Corruption.” 2009.
No.115, Young, Daniel. “Support You Can Count On? Ethnicity, Partisanship, and Retrospective Voting in
Africa.” 2009.
No.114, Kramon, Eric. “Vote-Buying and Political Behavior: Estimating and Explaining Vote-Buying's
Effect on Turnout in Kenya.” 2009.
No.113, McCauley, John F., E. Gyimah-Boadi. "Religious Faith and Democracy: Evidence from the
Afrobarometer Surveys" 2009.
No.112, Robinson, Amanda Lea. "National versus Ethnic Identity in Africa:State, Group, and Individual
Level Correlates of National Identification" 2009.
No.111, Kirwin, Mathew and Wonbin Cho. "Weak States and Political Violence in sub-Saharan Africa."
2009.
No.110, Cho, Wonbin and Carolyn Logan. "Looking Toward the Future: Alternations in Power and
Popular Perspectives on Democratic Durability in Africa." 2009.
No.109, Mattes, Robert and Dangalira Mughogho. The Limited Impacts of Formal Education on
Democratic Citizenship in Africa. 2009.
No.108, Logan, Carolyn and Eric Little. The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa: New Results
from Afrobarometer Round 4. 2009.
No. 107 , Dunning, Thad and Lauren Harrison. Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An
Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali. 2009.
No. 106 , Young, Daniel J. Is Clientelism at Work in African Elections? A Study of Voting Behavior in Kenya
and Zambia. 2009.
No. 105 , Bratton, Michael and Peter Lolojih. Rationality, Cosmopolitanism, and Adjustment Fatigue:
Public Attitudes to Economic Reform in Zambia. 2009.
No. 104, Bratton, Michael. Do Free Elections Foster Capable Governments? The Democracy-Governance
Connection in Africa. 2008.
No. 103, Kimenyi, Mwangi S. and Roxana Gutierrez Romero. Tribalism as a Minimax-Regret Strategy:
Evidence from Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections. 2008.
No. 102, Lavallée, Emmanuelle, Mireille Razafindrakoto and François Roubaud. Corruption and Trust in
Political Institutions in sub-Saharan Africa 2008.
No. 101, Koussihouèdé, Oswald and Damase Sossou. Frustration Relative de Démocratie en Afrique.
2008.
No. 100 , Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and the Evolution of
Mistrust in Africa: An Empirical Investigation. 2008
No. 99, Bratton, Michael. Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Campaign Elections. 2008.
Appendix - 91
No. 98, Mattes, Robert. The Material and Political Bases of Lived Poverty in Africa: Insights from the
Afrobarometer. 2008
No. 97, Sarsfield, Rodolfo and Fabián Echegaray. Looking Behind the Window: Measuring Instrumental
and Normative Reasoning in Support for Democracy. 2008.
No. 96, Kuenzi, Michelle T. Social Capital and Political Trust in West Africa. 2008.
No. 95, Bratton, Michael and Mwangi S. Kimenyi. Voting in Kenya: Putting Ethnicity in Perspective. 2008.
No. 94, Logan, Carolyn. Rejecting the Disloyal Opposition? The Trust Gap in Mass Attitudes Toward Ruling
and Opposition Parties in Africa. 2008.
No. 93 , Logan, Carolyn. Traditional Leaders In Modern Africa: Can Democracy And The Chief Co-Exist?
2008.
No. 92, Dowd, Robert A. and Michael Driessen. Ethnically Dominated Party Systems And The Quality Of
Democracy: Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa. 2008.
Appendix - 92
APPENDIX 5: EVALUATION TEAM
Staffan I. Lindberg is Team Leader for the assignment. Lindberg’s organizational and management
experience includes Coordinator for the national Swedish ‘Operation One-Day’s Work’ in 1984, in which
virtually all class 7-9 pupils in the Swedish schools were organized to work for pay for one day and all
proceeds went to benefit schools in South Africa; Head Project Manager for the largest rock festival in
Sweden in 1985 and 1986 (3 days, 60,000+ visitors); National Project Leader and International
Coordinator for ‘Next Stop Soviet’ in 1988-1990 (a youth project designate to test perestroika and
glasnost 3 large international conferences with 400+ delegates each, and eventually 4,500+ individuals
in 356 multi-country sub-projects operating simultaneously in Soviet Union in September 1989; Stage
Manager, Project Leader, and Production Manager for a series of film, TV, commercial, and theater
productions 1987-1995; Project Leader, PI and Research Director for three multi-country research
projects.
Lindberg holds a PhD from Lund University, Department of Political Science, 2004). He is Associate
Professor (on leave), Department of Political Science and the Center for African Studies, University of
Florida. He is currently Research Director for World Values Survey Sweden, Research Fellow at Quality
of Government institute, and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of
Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the vice chair of ”African Politics Conference Group”, elected member of
IPSA’s Committee on Concepts and Methods, and co-PI for the new project “Measuring Democracy: A
Multidimensional, Tiered, and Historical Approach”. He was the co-PI for the DFID-sponsored research
consortium “African Power and Politics” 2007-2009, and has won several grants from both US and in
European funders. His research has dealt with state building, political clientelism, political parties,
legislative-executive relations, women’s representation, voting behavior, elections and democracy in
Africa. His dissertation won the American Political Science Association’s Juan Linz Prize for Best
Dissertation in 2005. He is the author of Democracy and Elections in Africa (Johns Hopkins UP, 2006)
and the editor of Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition? (Johns Hopkins UP 2009) ,
and his articles on women’s representation, political clientelism, voting behavior, party and electoral
systems, democratization, popular attitudes, and the Ghanaian legislature and executive-legislative
relationships have appeared in for example Journal of Politics, Political Science Quarterly, Electoral
Studies, Studies in International Comparative Development, Journal of Democracy, Government and
Opposition, Journal of Modern African Studies, and Democratization.
Lindberg was invited as participant and paper giver to the AB conference at MSU in 2007, published an
article using AB data from Round 1 through Round 3 as late as last year (co-authored with D. Moehler,
Journal of Politics, 2009), has reviewed numerous article manuscripts using AB data for international
peer review journals, has organized several panels at academic conferences with participation by AB
core and network partners, and collaborated several times with CDD-Ghana on independent survey
research projects in Ghana. He is also well familiar with the AB partners in South Africa, Benin, Senegal,
Kenya, Nigeria and Liberia. Lindberg has worked as election observer several times and has undertaken
several consultancies, including on good governance and democratization in Zambia and Ghana with
specific components on support to civil society organizations channeled through international NGOs.
Moreover, alongside HN Consultants, he has carried out an Organizational and Audit Review of the
operations in West Africa of the Danish NGO Ibis. Lindberg has done field work concerning several
African countries, including South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana in Southern Africa. 1999 to 2001 he
was a long-term consultant stationed in Ghana on a SIDA-sponsored West African program led by PGA.
Lindberg is a native speaker of Swedish, and is fluent in English, beginner in French, Twi, and Gonja.
Ann W. Witulski (USA) is a Team Member to the assignment. She is a specialist on Muslim societies
and politics in Africa. She is a PhD Cand. in the Department of Political Science and Center for African
Studies at University of Florida. She also holds an MA in Government and Politics, a Post-Graduate
Certificate in International Law and Diplomacy, and a BA with a double major in French and
Government and Politics. She has a solid training in among other things statistical methods, survey
research and methods, comparative qualitative and mixed methods, religion and politics, Muslim
societies, African politics, and democratic theory. In her own research she has carried out numerous
semi-structured interviews and focus groups, participatory research, and is intimately familiar with the
AB network and the data produced in Round 1 through 3. As member of the editorial board of African
Appendix - 93
Studies Quarterly, she has also reviewed several manuscripts using AB data. Mrs. Witulski has worked
as research assistant and as field researcher on several research projects concerned with countries
including Morocco and with large-N cross-national work. She has worked as assistant to both Professor
Lindberg and Professor Herbert Kitschelt on projects similar to this assignment. Witulski is American
citizen, is fluent in French, an advanced student of Arabic, and has English as her mother tongue.
Winifred Pankani (USA) is a Team Member to the assignment. She is a PhD Cand. in the Department of
Political Science and Center for African Studies at University of Florida. She also holds an MA in Political
Science, and an MA in International Studies as well as a Post-Graduate Certificate in Non-Profit
Management from University of Oregon. Her research is carried out under the guidance of Professor
Göran Hydén. She has a solid training in among other things statistical methods, survey research and
methods, comparative qualitative and mixed methods, survey methods and analysis, political discourse
analysis, public administration, African politics, and democratic theory. In her own research she has
carried out independent survey research, as well as numerous semi-structured interviews and focus
groups, and is intimately familiar with the AB network and the data produced in Round 1 through 3. As
member of the editorial board of African Studies Quarterly, she has also reviewed several manuscripts
using AB data. Pankani has worked as research assistant for the West African Research Association
(WARA), as a consultant for the World Bank on organizational and work ethics reform based on
participatory approaches in developing nations; for Oxfam America on sustainable livelihoods, local
NGOs and trade issues; for Ghana Aids Commission on gender and HIV, policy analysis and
organizational reform. She has also worked as assistant to Professor Lindberg before both on
consultancies for HN Consultants, and as field researcher on a number of research projects concerned
with several countries including Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. She has worked as assistant to
both Professor Lindberg and Professor Herbert Kitschelt (Duke University) on projects similar to this
assignment. Pankani is American citizen but a native from Ghana and has English as one of her mother
tongues.
Remon Galiñanes Jr. (USA) is a Team Member to the assignment. He is a PhD Cand. in the Department
of Political Science and Center for African Studies at University of Florida. He is a specialist in postconflict countries and peace processes. He also holds an MA in Political Science, and MPhil in Politics,
Democracy, and Education from Cambridge University, and a BA in History from Montclair University.
He has a solid training in among other things statistical methods, survey research and methods,
comparative qualitative and mixed methods, peace and security, African politics, and democratic
theory. In his own research he has carried out survey research, numerous semi-structured interviews,
focus groups, and done participatory research, and is intimately familiar with the AB network and the
data produced in Round 1 through 3. As member of the editorial board of African Studies Quarterly, he
has also reviewed several manuscripts using AB data. Mr. Galiñanes has worked as research assistant
and as field researcher on a number of research projects concerned with several countries including
Angola, Namibia, and Tanzania He has worked as assistant to both Professor Lindberg and Professor
Herbert Kitschelt (Duke University) on projects similar to this assignment. Galiñanes is American
citizen with parents from Spain and Portugal, and is fluent in Spanish and English, advanced speaker of
Portuguese, and an intermediate student of Swahili.
Final quality control
Project Leader Finn Hansen from HN Consultants will carry out the final quality control of draft reports.
Finn Hansen has a degree in International Development Studies and Public Administration. He has 20
years of professional experience working on development issues. He has extensive experience from
NGO evaluations in Denmark, involving NGOs with partners in Mozambique, Ghana, Namibia and South
Africa and has also carried out consultancies for SIDA, Finland and the European Union. Likewise, he
has been team leader for assignments on formulation of human rights and democratization programs in
Latin America, including support to the Central American regional research publication “State of the
Region”, where data from the Latinbarometro is being used. Since his quality assurance is part of the
overhead, no hours are assigned to this task.
Appendix - 94
APPENDIX 6: RESPONSE OF THE AB EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE TO THE DRAFT
FINAL REPORT
We are grateful to the Evaluation Team for the effort it made under extreme time pressure to produce
an exhaustive report on the activities envisaged under Afrobarometer Round 4. We appreciate the
strong regard the Report shows for the key project outputs and the achievement of the core objectives
of the Afrobarometer: the production and dissemination of high quality data on African public opinion
for research and policy making.
We have also taken note of the shortcomings cited and valid criticisms, as well as numerous useful
recommendations contained in the Draft Report. We find that there is much of value in the Report,
particularly with regard to some of the suggestions concerning Dissemination and Outreach (although
more on some of the details below). Fortunately, the Afrobarometer Executive Committee (ExCom) is
keenly aware of many of the gaps in the operations of the Network identified in the draft evaluation
report, and will factor many of the report’s comments and suggestions into our planning for
Afrobarometer Round 5 and beyond.
However, we also have serious concerns about a number of assumptions and judgments as well as
recommendations contained in the body of the draft report, especially some of the comments and
suggestions relating to project management. Moreover, we are particularly disturbed by the fact that
the report seems to give little credence to the views and input previously offered by members of the
ExCom, both individually and collectively. The Evaluation Team held lengthy interviews with members
of the AB ExCom except the National Partner representative. It received feedback on an initial debrief
report both directly at CDD on 27 August, and in written comments submitted by the ExCom on 6
September. However, in most cases neither the explanations nor concerns mentioned with respect to
some of the key critiques and suggestions made in the report are even mentioned, much less reflected
in the judgments offered and the recommendations made.
We therefore take this opportunity to restate our position concerning a number of judgments and
recommendations, as well as to correct a number of errors contained in the report. We hope that
providing this additional input will ensure a fair, balanced and constructive critique accompanied by
valuable recommendations for redress and improvements. We do not expect the Evaluation Team to
accept our positions as instructions, or in their entirety. But we expect our response to, at minimum, be
placed on record, possibly as an appendix to the Final Evaluation Report, especially where our positions
are not accepted by the Evaluation Team and are thus not reflected in the Final Evaluation Report.
A summary of our main concerns both about the report in general, and concerning some of its specific
judgments and recommendations, is as follows:
Concerning the Overall Content and Approach of the Report
1) The summary sections of the report do not follow from the details of the analysis. On one hand the
introduction and conclusion offer high praise for Afrobarometer achievements and recommend
continued funding. On the other hand the analysis, particularly Section 2D on Project and Financial
Management, describes a flawed operation whose structure and procedures seem to be barely
functional. If this analysis is correct, how could the Afrobarometer have managed to achieve as much as
the evaluator clearly thinks it has? As presently written, the tone and content of the management
section undermine the positive thrust of the overall evaluation.
2) In our opinion, some of the evaluators’ judgments about management are based more on anecdotal
than systematic evidence. We recognize the difficulty of gaining comprehensive insight into the
operations of a complex operation like the Afrobarometer when time is short and interviews with
clients are sometimes hard to obtain. But these challenges do not justify making sweeping inferences
about organizational performance based on the opinions of single (often junior) individuals or failing to
take into account the efforts of other principals (often senior) to correct the record about unfounded
claims.
3) Related to this is a general concern that the Evaluation Team has failed to adequately contextualize
their findings, and has thus “not seen the forest for the trees.” We certainly acknowledge that project
Appendix - 95
management functions were not always smoothly implemented in Round 4, that mistakes were made,
and that lines of communication were not always clear. As such, the Evaluation Report raises many
valid concerns, and highlights some important issues that need to be addressed as we move into Round
5, especially in terms of completing transfers of responsibility on key issues to African partners, and
clarifying lines of responsibility and reporting, particularly for the benefit of National Partners.
However, we believe the report focuses in on these failures and weaknesses in ways that we find overly
negative, and that fail to take account of a variety of factors that shape implementation of a project like
the Afrobarometer, especially during a period of major transition.
In fact, there seems to be a tendency in the report to treat every comment, critique or complaint from
some informants as valid evidence of a “problem” with how the project is implementing activities, or
with how the Network it is being managed, without any effort to filter such comments and critiques
through a lens of “reasonableness”, i.e., to consider whether the critiques are reasonable, or to evaluate
whether there may be valid reasons why things have been done the way they’ve been done. In
particular, we believe that if these comments, complaints and critiques were viewed through the
following “lenses,” it might temper the some of the Evaluation Team’s assertions:
i)
The complexity of managing a Network that includes more than 25 partners, all with highly
qualified individuals, and strong institutional and individual personalities. We believe that the AB is
somewhat unique in its structure, and also a uniquely challenging management task. It is inevitable
that in any organization of this many partners of this caliber, there will be disagreements and
miscommunications, and that maintaining good relationships among all partners will at times prove
extremely challenging.
ii)
One of the Afrobarometer’s key strengths is of course the very high quality and reliability of
our data and other outputs. We maintain these standards by putting in place detailed protocols, and
requiring strict adherence to those protocols. In general, and as the report occasionally notes, this
stands in sharp contrast to many other data collection projects on the continent. Our tight monitoring
of project implementation procedures is essential to the project. It also, inevitably, leads to situations
in which a partner may feel that they are being managed too tightly, not given enough discretion or
control, or that too much is being demanded of them. The report gives voice to these complaints
without providing balance by recognizing the importance of Afrobarometer’s strict processes
procedures – which are often not negotiable – or of the inevitable tension that comes from requiring
adherence to these standards.
iii)
On a related note, the Evaluation Team seems to overlook the fact that we are a Network of
independent organizations, and as such, we do not have unlimited leverage over National Partners. The
Evaluators seem instead to work on the assumption that all the Network management has to do is ask
National Partners to produce high quality results in a timely manner, while fully reporting outcomes,
and it will happen without further need of “harassment”. Fortunately, with some partners this is
indeed the case. But the reality is that all of our National Partner’s have many demands on their time,
and Afrobarometer tasks compete for their attention and skills with other activities. Thus, it is not
uncommon to find that bulletins are submitted late (leaving reviewers extremely pressed to give timely
feedback and meet planned targets for dissemination), or data cleaning must go through several
iterations before National Partners successfully meet all requirements, or that we must make repeated
requests before various reports or other deliverables are submitted.
iv)
The enormous transition challenges faced in the midst of the Round 4 management transfer,
including: The fact that key staff at Idasa were all new, including one member in a new and much more
demanding position as Network Data Manager, and a Project Manager who was not on board until midway through Year 1. IREEP in position as a new Core Partner without experience of the requirements
and demands of managing other partners in the Network.
CDD taking on an enormous new role in the project at the same time that it lost two of its most senior
and experienced Afrobarometer personnel to Ph.D. programs abroad (and later its Financial Manager to
a family move out of country).
Appendix - 96
Under these circumstances, it is not reasonable to expect that an abrupt and complete transfer of
responsibilities from MSU to African partners could be made. An extended period of training, mentoring,
and aggressive technical support and backstopping was essential to making sure that these major
transfers in responsibility could occur gradually and without threatening the quality of Afrobarometer
outputs. This did indeed make for a situation in which lines of reporting and responsibility were not
always clear – but there were good reasons for this under the circumstances, and these staff are now,
going into Round 5, ready to manage their responsibilities with far less support and supervision, and
lines of reporting and communication can thus be made clearer, and can be adhered to more readily.
In fact, we believe that the report fails to adequately recognize critical management achievements. In
particular, we note CDD’s success in taking on management of three new National Partners, a huge
burden of financial management and contracting responsibilities, and management not just of new staff
members, but entirely new staff functions in the form of Monitoring and Evaluation and Outreach
Officers, as well as donor reporting. We in fact believe that this reflects a remarkably extensive and
successful transfer of responsibility, and a very high level of management success, while nonetheless
recognizing that we still have much further to go.
v)
The resource constraints that inevitably shape all aspects of Network activities. The
Afrobarometer began Round 4 without full funding for all project activities (full funding was not
secured until almost midway through the 3-year project cycle). We have always recognized a strong
need to keep our budgets within limits, to carefully husband the funds that we do receive, and to make
the most of a staff that has always seemed short-handed. This means that we have not simply been at
liberty to hire additional staff, buy additional time from our National Partners, hold more meetings, and
so on. We note, for example, that more frequent face-to-face encounters among Network members can
help to build stronger relationships among individuals and among partner organizations, and allow
more opportunities for Partners to be updated and share information. But budget constraints mean
that we do not have the luxury of holding more Network-wide meetings or sending our staff on more
visits with partners purely for the purpose of building and maintaining relations. This has also been
one of the reasons that we have tended to look for staff who can be “jacks-of-all-trades” within the
Network. And it is also a reason that many of our staff (e.g., the Network Data Manager) at times play
roles that fall outside their primary job description – we all backstop each other all of the time (and it
so happens that the Network Data Manager is also an excellent trainer, and in situations of limited
human resources, it at times made far more sense to take advantage of these skills and have MSU
continue to play a greater-than-planned role in data management).
4) We believe that all references to the Network’s awareness and readiness for this evaluation are
egregiously unfair and should be removed from the report. AB Network Management obviously knew
that this evaluation was approaching, as we had been closely involved in developing the Terms of
Reference. However, the Executive Director did not receive notification of the actual dates of the
evaluation or of the identity of the Evaluation Team – information which he could have immediately
passed to the Network – until after the Evaluation Team had contacted National Partners directly. It is
flatly unreasonable to treat this as evidence of problems in CDD and/or Network management. It
rather reflects errors of communication between both SIDA and the Evaluation Team and CDD. CDD
should obviously have been informed first, precisely so that it had the opportunity to let National
Partners know that a team had been identified and the evaluation was underway – something that was
done shortly after we were notified by the Evaluation Team of the commencement of activities.
Moreover, before the Evaluator’s arrival in Ghana for his initial visit, CDD arranged two focus
discussions, one with the media and another with civil society, as well as several meetings with other
policy actors, all on very short notice. The evaluator had a group meeting with all AB staff (both PMU &
CDD) as well as individual meetings with Sharon, Nat, Daniel, Kathy and Kojo Asante, the CDD Program
Head. Before the evaluator left Accra on the 12th the PMU provided him with most key documents and
information requested, and those that were unavailable at the time were assembled and subsequently
sent to him. It is therefore unclear what the basis is for the claim that CDD was “unprepared” for the
evaluation.
5) Further, it seems odd to us that so much weight is placed on the fact that partners heard about the
evaluation from MSU rather than from CDD. In fact, the message was sent not just by “MSU”, but by the
Appendix - 97
Afrobarometer Deputy Director, who sent the message after consultation with the ED, who was
imminently departing on leave and very pressed for time. It hardly seems inappropriate that the DD of
a project be the one to communicate information to the Network, particularly in the absence (or
imminent absence) of the ED. Much as we plan to see these responsibilities fully transferred to CDD
once a replacement for the missing DD (or a similar position) is completed, it is to be expected that in
the meantime Network-wide communications may emanate from either CDD or the Deputy Director at
MSU. Moreover, the report makes much of the fact that the DD was doing much of the executive
decision making during the course of the evaluation, but as the evaluation team knows, the ED was on
planned leave during most of the evaluation period, and it seems obvious to us that it is precisely the
role of the DD to fill the gap in his absence. We also note that the DD and ED were in regular
communication throughout the ED’s leave regarding many of the decisions being made.
6) We believe that the report would be much easier to digest and use if the recommendations were
identified more concisely and clearly. In its present form, literally dozens of recommendations are
scattered throughout every section of the report. They need to be brought together at minimum within
each section, and preferably for the report as a whole, and some prioritization among them would also
be useful.
7) On a related note, we see a need for more caution in making such a wide array of recommendations,
especially in terms of ensuring that they are not mutually contradictory. For example, the report
recommends both that universities may no longer be the most suitable partner and that think tanks and
advocacy organizations might be better suited to our needs, and at the same time suggests that UCT
would make a better partner than Idasa because of the resources it brings to the project as a university.
It likewise notes that partners need to feel more confident that they have an ongoing role in the
Afrobarometer, while simultaneously recommending that we reconsider many of our partnerships and
think about changing them. A more systematic compilation of the recommendations would help to
alleviate these discrepancies.
Concerning the Judgments on CDD’s Capacity and Management
1) As noted above, we believe the Evaluators generally show far too little appreciation for how much
CDD achieved in terms of successfully taking on an enormous new management burden in Round 4, and
under exceptionally challenging circumstances. CDD lost two of its more experienced AB staff to PhD
programs, one before surveys began, and the other mid-way through the first year. This has of course
left them shorter on analytical and management capacity than they would otherwise be, but for reasons
that are temporary and admirable, rather than indicative of CDD management failures. CDD also
successfully took on an enormous new burden of financial management, an area in which the
Evaluators note no problems, despite a change in financial administrators at the end of Year 1. As a
Core Partner, CDD managed three new countries, and launched a successful Outreach program. As host
of the Project Management Unit, CDD has been responsible for overseeing the most systematic
collection of deliverables and recording of outputs that the Network has ever had. While the M&E
system is still not functioning perfectly (more on this below), these are nonetheless remarkable
achievements.
In contrast, the biggest weakness has been the failure to successfully fill the vacancy in the CDD-based
Deputy Director position. The first candidate, selected after an extensive international search process,
did not in the end have all of the requisite skills required to tackle this complex management task while
also contributing the to intellectual leadership of the project. Clearly filling this gap is essential to
furthering the transfer of responsibility to CDD, and closing some critical management gaps. We are in
the process of initiating a new search.
2) The report suggests that “the organizational culture and standards of what is good management
must be revised upwards at CDD if they are to perform the network management tasks for the AB
Network.” “Organizational culture and good management” are rather broad concepts. CDD does not lay
claim to perfection in its organization and management. If fact, CDD accepts the absence of a formal
logging system as one element of good management that needs to be adopted both by CDD and by other
Core Partners. We are grateful to the evaluator for pointing this out, but do not find it a reasonable
basis for this sweeping verdict. Thus, if there are other specific organizational deficits at the AB PMU,
Appendix - 98
among the AB staff at CDD, or even in the entire CCD organization, it would be more helpful to have
these more clearly identified so that they can be redressed.
We also note, again, the apparent discrepancy between a sweeping judgment of this sort, and what the
organization has achieved, most recently in the extremely successful hosting of the Afrobarometer
Policy Conference and accompanying Donor Meetings. By all accounts this was a well-managed event
that brought together a top-notch group of policy actors from across the continent and beyond that
provided extremely useful input for Round 5 planning, particular in the area of policy outreach. This
success does not seem consistent with the poor ratings for CDD management offered by the Evaluators.
3) On a related note, the report asserts that “several key individuals in the network express their
perception that if more of the key functions were handed over to CDD at present things would not
work.” Considering the gravity of this assertion, we feel that the report should back this statement with
concrete examples of which key functions either the Evaluators or National Partners think cannot be
handled by CDD and why.
4) The report specifically notes concerns about CDD’s capacity for analysis, and suggests that the
organization has too many commitments to allow staff to conduct analysis. It is not clear whether the
Evaluators are referring to core CDD/AB staff, all staff of CDD or all AB staff (including AB PMU). The
Executive Director, Finance Officer (Nat Okang) and M&E officer (Sharon Parku) are the AB PMU staff.
Daniel Attoh, Kathy Addy and Sewor Aikins are the three CDD/AB staff. At least two of them (Daniel and
Sewor), are knowledgeable in statistical matters way beyond bivariate analysis. Yes, there are
analytical capacity gaps in the AB staff at CDD, it is unnecessarily condescending to assume that lack of
PhD degrees makes them incapable of executing and interpreting statistical analyses beyond test of
bivariate relationships.
We also want to place it on record that lack of advanced statistical skills has not impaired the
performance of Sharon Parku as M&E officer or Kathy Addy as Outreach Coordinator.
This is also a good place to challenge the assertion that the staff at CDD (and Idasa) have too much
administrative work to be able to produce research. The Executive Director, who is paid 25% time and
Daniel Attoh Anglophone West Africa and Project Coordinator (50%) are fully involved in AB research
and analytical activities. The rest of the CDD AB staff who undertake exclusively administrative and/or
administration-related responsibilities do so because that is their job description and that is what they
are paid to do. Indeed, many other staff at the Center who are not officially designated as AB staff are
often involved in AB research and analysis. The alleged lack of research output at CDD is not a reflection
of so called too much administrative work.
Finally, we also point out again that, as noted above, the financial resources of the Network are limited,
and this affects our ability to budget staff time for analysis. In particular, CDD’s AB staff (Daniel Attoh
and Sewor Aikins) are not full time Afrobarometer staff, with substantial time available for analysis. In
fact, the budget allowance for their time primarily covers their contribution to survey and data
management. Any analysis they conduct is largely on un-budgeted time which they could, instead be
devoting to other projects.
Concerning the Recommendation for Centralization of Functions at CDD
We will here reiterate and elaborate on concerns about this proposal related to the Evaluation Team
both during individual interviews, and in our response to the Debriefing Report.
The Network is considering further functional specialization among individual staff. But the
distribution of staff and responsibilities across Partners (CPs and Support Units), while at times
cumbersome, has on balance been an effective tool for the Network. It allows the AB to take advantage
of the strengths and capacities of different institutions, while not overburdening any one institution.
This was especially critical in Round 4, as CDD inherited enormous reporting and financial management
responsibilities from MSU. Maintaining important functions at different partners also secures more
commitment from each. In general, we hope that the Evaluation team will keep in mind that there are
in fact trade-offs between centralizing management functions, or continuing to work as a more
decentralized multi-partner organization. We have always been the latter, and despite the fact that it
produces some problems, it also solves others. For example, in general an individual’s skills matter
Appendix - 99
more to us than his/her location. Thus, if we have someone such as the current Project Manager at
Idasa who has the skills to play a Network-wide management role, but who would likely be unwilling to
leave South Africa and live in Ghana, it is far more important for us to keep her in South Africa and
make use of her skills from that location, than to hire someone based in Ghana without the same skills
and experience. We could cite many similar examples.
One persistent challenge the Network has faced when bringing in new staff is finding the right mixture
and level of skills, whether it be the numeric skills of a data manager, the organization and supervisory
skills required of a project manager, the public relations skills required of an Outreach Manager, or the
writing and analytical skills required of members of senior management. Most noticeable is the
challenge of finding, e.g., an Outreach Coordinator with both the necessary public relations skills, but
also a level of comfort and ability with quantitative information that they can do not just outreach in
general, but Afrobarometer Outreach in particular. We frequently find that we do not or cannot find
these skills in the location where we want them when we are attempting to fill specific positions,
whether in Ghana or South Africa. Thus, we increasingly recognize the need, when we encounter
individuals who do possess some of all of the necessary skills, to “follow the skills”. In short, when we
identify an individual who we feel can make a strong contribution to the Network, we try to bring them
on board and keep them on board. This may mean accommodating their requirements in terms of
location, or trying to define positions for them within the Network that take particular advantage of
their individual skill sets, and that respond to their own professional needs and preferences as well.
This stands in sharp contrast to the Evaluation Report’s proposal that the Network centralizes most or
all management functions to CDD. In short, while we have been able to recruit strong individuals in
Ghana, we do not believe it would be possible to successfully recruit the entire management staff from
there. It would mean, among other things, losing strong members of staff from other countries who are
unwilling to relocate to Ghana. It would also mean losing the commitment of other partners. Africa is a
diverse continent, and our in a Network like the Afrobarometer, our management systems must reflect
that diversity. At any rate, residence permit and other laws regarding employment prevailing in Core
Partner countries severely limit the AB management’s freedom to locate move AB personnel around on
a purely individuals efficiency basis.
Concerning the Judgments about Idasa’s Commitment to the AB and the Recommendation that
UCT take over Idasa’s role
1) The Report explicitly suggests that Idasa as an organization, and its Executive Director, Mr. Paul
Graham, in particular, lack commitment to the Afrobarometer. While we recognize that there have
been, and continue to be, some issues at Idasa with respect to the fit between the AB and the rest of
Idasa’s activities and programs, and the level of institutional support that has been provided to the
project, we find this conclusion, particularly concerning Paul’s level of commitment, to be completely
misplaced. We note, among other things:
i.
Despite the fact that he has never been paid any salary by the Afrobarometer, Mr. Graham has
been present at – and made very useful contributions to – virtually every AB Executive Committee
Meeting during Round 4, and in fact has committed Idasa to arranging the two meetings held by
teleconference. This has often involved travel and commitments of several days of his time.
ii.
As evident in the Afrobarometer CV, Mr. Graham has regularly made presentations on behalf of
the Afrobarometer over the past several years.
iii.
He has never asked for compensation for his time from the project, in recognition of the fact
that limited budgets simply could not accommodate it (although we have budgeted for his time in
Round 5). He has found ways to commit an Outreach Coordinator to the project on a full time
basis despite the fact that the project only provides a half time salary, and in other ways has
helped to make up for the fact that the Afrobarometer runs on a tight budget.
iv.
In his opening comments to the Afrobarometer Policy Conference, the Executive Director
highlighted some of the many ways he has found to make use of Afrobarometer findings, including
in behind-the-scenes discussions about political developments in South Africa. While the
particular people interviewed may not have captured this, and that may have been a weakness of
the interview schedule (which we note was set up on short notice, while the Project Manager was
away on training, and which could not always capture the intended targets of the interviews), this
nonetheless does not obviate other evidence of Idasa commitment to this project.
2) The Report further suggests that Idasa should be dropped as a Partner in the Network, and that all
AB functions currently housed at Idasa be moved to UCT. This recommendation overestimates the
Appendix - 10
0
capacity of UCT to effectively house these varied functions. The Data First Unit (which is independent
of DARU and CSSR) may have the capacity to assist the Network in data management, a possibility that
the Network will be exploring. And we expect to continue hosting Capacity Building activities at UCT.
But beyond this, we do not see UCT as a viable option for housing major Afrobarometer functions as
envisaged by the Evaluators.
3) There are sweeping general comments made about Idasa and its strengths and role as an
organization that go far beyond the mandate of this evaluation, and which can in no way be justified
based on the small sample of individuals interviewed concerning the impact of a single activity.
Moreover, given that one of the individuals interviewed has been personally responsible for negotiating
a three-year core grant to Idasa, we doubt that all of those included even in this small group of
interviewees shared these negative assessments. These comments do not belong in this report.
Concerning Recommendations Regarding Dissemination and Outreach
1) The Draft Evaluation Report recommends piecemeal dissemination beginning within 1-2 weeks after
the end of data collection. While we are very open to the idea of piecemeal dissemination as a way to
extend the coverage and heighten the profile of AB surveys, we think it unlikely that a 1-2 week
window after data collection is adequate. It is true that other survey projects manage this in some
countries, but in our experience, this is possible precisely because they do not adhere to rigorous data
management standards. We cannot sacrifice data quality to early coverage, and the Network will lose,
rather than gain, credibility if we have to correct information that has been released prematurely.
2) While we agree with the Evaluators that more active networking by National Partners would indeed
be enormously beneficial for advancing our Outreach program, we also find it highly unlikely that a
requirement for effective networking can be successfully contracted for and, more importantly,
enforced. We have in fact discussed the need for networking with National Partners during the Round 4
Planning Workshop, but that alone has clearly not been enough to make it happen. But a largely
unenforceable contractual requirement does not seem like a realistic solution to us. We may, however,
introduce a requirement that National Partners convene a stakeholders workshop for familiarizing
users with the questionnaire and soliciting input on country-specific questions. We can also explore
with National Partners other avenues for enhancing this aspect of their work. But our own experience
has been that requirements must be readily enforceable through concrete deliverables. We are not
convinced that effective networking is susceptible to the production of deliverables.
3) While we recognize the potential value of individualizing and targeting outputs in the ways the
Report suggests, it is not clear that it is realistic or feasible to take such an approach without major
increases in both human and financial resources. The proposed approaches are extremely labor and
analysis intensive, both on the part of National Partners, but also at the Core Partner and Senior
Management levels for the purposes of management and quality control. We believe this is may be an
overly idealized approach to Outreach that may not be realistic, and may well not provide returns
sufficient to justify the enormous investment. We continue to believe that, as many examples in the
report also suggest, addressing the lack of awareness and capacity to utilize the results in a couple of
key sectors, especially among journalists and editors, will have potentially wider impact in making the
results known to a large audience of potential users.
Other Issues
1) As in the initial debrief, the current Draft Report refers to it as “odd” that responsibility for
overseeing Outreach Activities has been placed with the Regional Project Manager at Idasa, rather than
at CDD. Yet in the Executive Committee’s response to the debriefing report, we explained that this
assignment was made because the Idasa Regional Project Manager is a highly skilled individual with the
potential to play a much-needed role in overall network management. This assignment of
responsibility for managing implementation of the Outreach Program in Year 3 was therefore made
precisely with an eye to grooming her for greater responsibilities in Round 5.
2) The report is factually incorrect about decision making concerning management of the Kenya
partner in Round 4. As was already explained to the Evaluation Team, the DD has ongoing professional
interest in Kenya, and had managed the country in Rounds 2 and 3. She indicated to CDD that she was
willing to continue managing Kenya directly, rather than handing over this responsibility to CDD, both
Appendix - 10
1
because of her own interests in the country, and to lessen the burdens of new responsibilities on CDD
(including management of three other new countries at a time when key experienced staff members
were departing for further studies). CDD welcomed this offer. The statement that this was an executive
decision made by solely the DD made without consulting the ED or CDD is not only incorrect, but also
grossly misrepresents the character of Afrobarometer project management and communications.
3) The Evaluators raise concerns about the fact that the Network Data Manager was performing
functions that he “should not be doing.” As noted above, this critique fails to take into account the
realities the Network faced during Round 4. In particular, the Idasa Regional Project Manager only
came on board in late July 2008. We thus had a new and inexperienced staff member facing a need to
implement surveys in seven countries within just four months. One person could not meet the entire
demand for managing these surveys and providing the necessary technical assistance over such a
compressed period of time. Meanwhile, the Data Manager also has excellent training skills and is very
experienced in providing technical support for fieldwork. Network Management therefore concluded
that it made more sense to devote some of his time to backstopping the Project Manager in the
provision of technical assistance, while MSU bore some additional data cleaning burden due to his
absence from this task. This was a short-term but effective solution to the particular management
demands at the time. While we concur with the Evaluation Team’s recommendation for greater
functional specialization, we also expect that, as we have done in the past, members of the Network will
continue to call on one another to step in to fill gaps when a particular member of team has need of
extra assistance or support.
4) Regarding discrepancies, sometimes large ones, between PMU and Core Partner records of events
and records as reported directly to the Evaluators directly by National Partners, we cannot completely
account for these, but note the following:
Some differences will arise because the PMU has subscribed to a media tracking service (Meltwater)
that may capture some items not picked up by National Partners.
We also note that how National Partners count and/or record specific events may be different from
how the PMU determines they should be counted and reported. We note that in general, keeping a
database of events is a PMU function, not a Core Partner or a National Partner function.
We have constantly sought to impress upon our National Partners the critical importance of reporting
all activities, all coverage, all requests for assistance, etc. to the PMU so that they can be tracked in the
AB CV. This was discussed at length during the Round 4 Planning Workshop, and Partners have been
reminded since then in the AB Newsletter (which solicits and reports updates), and in messages from
Core Partners and from the M&E Officer. Nonetheless, it is quite evident that it took the event of the
Evaluation to bring forth some of the information that we try to collect. This is evidence, first and
foremost, of the challenges, mentioned above, of managing a Network of busy – and independent –
organizations. Once National Partners have completed their contractual commitments, which end with
the submission of a dissemination report, we have limited leverage with which to “force” them to keep
us updated on additional publications, activities, etc. This is a shortcoming that we must continue to try
to address with National Partners, perhaps by setting up a system of concrete financial incentives for
reporting these activities. But we find the report’s overly simplistic conclusion that this simply reflects
more “administrative weakness” on the part of the Network to be insufficiently cognizant of the very
real challenges of centrally monitoring these activities in a dispersed Network of independent actors.
Finally, we note that we are encouraged that National Partners did take the time to put together more
complete information for the Evaluation Team, as it suggests that they do, in the end, recognize the
importance of the information and of ensuring that it is available for evaluators of the project. We will
follow up with each National Partner to resolve discrepancies wherever possible.
5) The Report is incorrect in asserting that Zenobia Ismail’s position is (or should be) primarily
administrative. The Regional Coordinator has the primary responsibility for liaising with and managing
all National Partners in the region, including confirming budgets and work plans, providing technical
backstopping on training and implementation of fieldwork, and various other project management
activities. The position requires advanced knowledge of sampling, research design, and statistical
analysis. The previous incumbents in this position have all held Ph.Ds. It is correct that Zenobia has
fulfilled this role without significant administrative support and so has also handled many
administrative tasks, but her primary mandate is explicitly technical and analytical, while the
administrative tasks are secondary. We see no inconsistency whatsoever in the training provided to
Appendix - 10
2
Zenobia. In fact, we find it odd that on the one hand the Evaluators lament the lack of analytical
capacity at Core Partners, and wonder why staff in similar positions at CDD (like Daniel Attoh) are not
finding enough time for analysis, while suggesting that Zenobia should be restricted to an
administrative position that would grossly underutilize her many skills and strengths, including
analytical skills. The solution here is not to limit Zenobia to administration, but to build provision of
administrative support into the Idasa budget, which has been done for Round 5.
We further note that Zenobia has an M.Sc (with distinction) from the London School of Economics, and
is more than qualified for the role she is expected to play. While we occasionally battle issues of
rankism among our partners, we hardly think it is advisable to give in to these pressures, for example,
by favoring a Ph.D. who is unqualified and ineffective (the former Deputy Director, for example) over a
highly skilled and capable individual who knows her job and the business of the Afrobarometer
extremely well.
6) Regarding the recommendation for use of handheld computers, we are willing to consider this, but
are highly doubtful about the suitability of this technology in most of our countries (if it is even
available outside of South Africa). We did a modest experiment with use of GPS units in Uganda in
Round 4, and even for this, issues such as keeping units charged and working in the field were a
significant impediment. Moreover, many of our teams face extensive travel, sometimes on foot,
sometimes in very wet, and sometimes in very dusty and dry conditions that are extremely hard on
technical gadgets. In addition, we are very reluctant to relinquish a “paper trail”, as at times this has
been instrumental in getting to the bottom of data discrepancies. In fact, one of our biggest data
management problems over the years was during the one survey in South Africa in which these units
were used. We were lucky to discover the problems, but they could easily have been missed given the
lack of hard copies of questionnaires for quality control. In short, we believe that under our current
working conditions in Africa, use of these units would likely be detrimental to data quality.
7) Footnote 16 suggests that GCIS is a competitor to the AB, but we regard them as a user and client –
and they presented themselves in this same light at the AB Policy Conference. They are the conduit for
AB to be a part of the Executive Briefings in South Africa.
8) In footnote 18, we are confused by the reference to Investech as a competitor with or model for the
AB, since the organization has an exclusively financial focus and an entirely different audience and
clientele from AB.
9) Dr. Thabo Rapoo is the Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, not a senior lecturer.
10) We find it unnecessary to reproduce the entire AB CV and the AB Citations tracking documents in
this report. They are otherwise available to donors, and at 45 pages constitute more than one quarter
of the current document.
Concluding Comments
1) Finally, given that no one on the management team is a specialist in organizational management or
has experience managing a complex, multi-partner and multi-country program, we were surprised to
see so many detailed recommendations on this matter. We feel that this lack of experience is evident in
some of the specific recommendations, and in the general failure to put some of the comments and
critiques reported into context.
2) We particularly consider the call to centralize management functions at one location to be misplaced,
as it runs counter to the Afrobarometer’s nature and intentions. While we accept the need for clearer
functional specialization in job descriptions, we see no need to concentrate all senior technical
functions at one central node. Indeed, it is in the nature of a network to draw upon scarce skills and
capacities wherever they may be found and to develop geographical as well as functional specialization.
3) In addition, the Executive Committee is concerned that the Evaluators have insufficiently understood
that Round 4 involved a new organizational structure in its first iteration – lessons are being learned
which need to be implemented in Round 5, rather than embarking on another new structure. We are
committed to: Lodging the Afrobarometer within its existing Core Partners in order to benefit from
their position in civil society rather than the academe, and to situate the AB within the context of
organisations doing other things which attract attention to the barometer and bring potential
synergies; Continuing decentralisation in order to ensure a presence in sub-regions and linguistic
communities.
Appendix - 10
3
4) Finally, we note that the evaluation identifies a number of areas for growth and of opportunities. We
are grateful for these. The report encourages the Executive Committee in its planning for Round 5 and a
number of the detailed recommendations on operational improvements and strategy for outreach will
be looked at closely. We also note, however, that many of these recommendations suggest an increased
capacity within the consortium of partners and therefore they will have to be costed carefully, as they
suggest a substantially increased Round 5 budget.
Appendix - 104

Evaluation of the Afrobarometer Round 4

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