Bulletin TAS CAS Bulletin 2 / 2012

Transcription

Bulletin TAS
CAS Bulletin
2 / 2012
Table des matières / Table of contents
Message du Président du CIAS / Message of the ICAS President
Message of the ICAS President ................................................................................................................................................ 1
Articles et commentaires / Articles and commentaries
When is a “Swiss ” “award ” appealable ? ................................................................................................................................... 2
Dr. Charles Poncet
La preuve du dopage dans les cas de présence d’une substance interdite ....................................................................... 15
Me Estelle de La Rochefoucauld, Conseiller auprès du TAS
Jurisprudence majeure / Leading cases
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2360 & CAS 2011/A/2392 ......................................................................................................... 26
English Chess Federation & Georgian Chess Federation v. Fédération Internationale des Echecs (FIDE)
3 July 2012
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2425 ................................................................................................................................................ 33
Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
8 March 2012
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2563 ............................................................................................................................................... 50
CD Nacional v. FK Sutjeska
30 March 2012
Arbitrage TAS 2011/A/2585.................................................................................................................................................... 55
Agence Mondiale Antidopage (AMA) c. Ramiro Marino & Union Ciclista Republica Argentina (UCRA)
21 mai 2012
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2615................................................................................................................................................. 60
Thibaut Fauconnet v. International Skating Union (ISU)
&
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2618
International Skating Union (ISU) v. Thibaut Fauconnet
19 April 2012
Arbitrage TAS 2011/A/2616 .................................................................................................................................................... 67
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) c. Oscar Sevilla Rivera & Real Federación Española de Ciclismo (RFEC)
15 mai 2012
David Savic v. Professional Tennis Integrity Officers (PTIOs)
5 September 2012
Club Rangers de Talca v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
30 April 2012
British Olympic Association (BOA) v. World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
30 April 2012
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2671 ............................................................................................................................................. 103
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. Alex Rasmussen & The National Olympic Committee and Sports
Confederation of Denmark (Dansk Idraetsforbund)
4 July 2012
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2677 ...............................................................................................................................................114
Dmitry Lapikov v. International Weightlifting Federation (IWF)
10 July 2012
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2678 .............................................................................................................................................120
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. Real Federación Española de Atletismo (RFEA)
& Francisco Fernández Peláez
17 April 2012
Arbitration CAS 2012/A/2689 ............................................................................................................................................. 131
S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui v Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
13 April 2012
Jugements du Tribunal Fédéral / Judgments of the Federal Tribunal
4A_558/2011, Judgment of 27 March 2012, First Civil Law Court................................................................................ 135
4A_246/2011, Judgment of 7 November 2011, First Civil Law Court .......................................................................... 142
4A_627/2011, Judgment of 8 March 2012, First Civil Law Court ................................................................................. 148
4A_488/2011, Arrêt du 18 juin 2012, Ire Cour de droit civil .......................................................................................... 155
4A_636/2011, Judgment of 18 June 2012, First Civil Law Court ................................................................................... 164
4A_134/2012, Arrêt du 16 juillet 2012, Ire Cour de droit civil ....................................................................................... 168
Informations diverses / Miscellaneous
Publications récentes relatives au TAS / Recent publications related to CAS ...............................................................173
Message of the ICAS President
The last months have been particularly busy with a
significant number of high profile cases handled
by the Court of Arbitration for Sport. Among the
‘leading cases’ selected for the Bulletin are several
cases related to doping. A few “doping ” cases are
of interest with respect to the recent developments
regarding the conditions to benefit from a reduced
sanction for the use of specified substances. The case
UCI v. Rasmussen & DIF deals with the whereabouts
failure issue whereas the conditions to benefit from
a reduction of the sanction based on Substantial
Assistance are clearly defined in the case IAAF v.
RFEA & Francisco Fernandez. The CAS has also
confirmed the notable “USOC award ” in the British
Olympic Association v. WADA case by considering
that an NOC’s provision providing that an athlete
found guilty of a doping offence is ineligible to
compete in the Olympic Games is an “extra ” or
“double ” doping sanction not in compliance with the
World Anti-Doping Code. Turning to football, the case
CD Nacional v. FK Sutjeska specifically considers the
meaning of Article 15 of the FIFA Rules Governing
the Procedures of the Players’ Status Committee
and the Dispute Resolution Chamber. The case Club
Rangers de Talca v. FIFA is of interest with respect to
the bankruptcy of a club while the decision rendered
in Fusimalohi v. FIFA contemplates the consequences
of the infringement of the Code of Ethics by a FIFA
official and addresses the issue of illegal evidence in
arbitration. On another sporting field, the case Savic
v. PTIO looks at the issue of corruption/match fixing
in tennis and to the standard of proof requested while
the chess case English Chess Federation & Georgian
Chess Federation v. Fédération Internationale des
Echecs (FIDE) deals interestingly with the scope of
Article R49 of the CAS Code.
Last summer, the CAS ad hoc Division (CAS AHD)
selected by the ICAS for the Olympic Games in London composed of twelve arbitrators rendered eleven
(11) awards. Since 1996 and the first CAS ad hoc Division, only the Sydney Games generated more decisions in one edition of the Games (15). Most of the
cases heard were related to the selection and qualification of athletes. During a major international sporting
event such as the Olympic Games, expediency is obviously a key element of the rules applicable. Indeed,
according to Art. 18 of the Arbitration Rules for the
Olympic Games, the CAS AHD shall resolve any dispute arising on the occasion of or in connection with
the Olympic Games within 24 hours of the lodging
of the application. The “London” decisions will be
gathered in a coming digest entitled “CAS Awards
Olympic Games 2012 ”.
Eight (8) new arbitrators have been appointed in order to strengthen the current group of CAS members
in view of the heavy workload placed on them and
the increasing number of arbitrations (297 so far in
2012). To date, five (5) mediators have been appointed this year which make a total number of fifty seven
(57) mediators.
I wish you a pleasant reading of this new edition of
the CAS Bulletin.
John Coates
The article of Dr. Charles Poncet entitled “When is a
“Swiss” “award” appealable ? ” included in this issue is of
great practical importance. In concrete terms, it aims
at helping foreign readers to ascertain which “awards ”
issued by an international arbitral tribunal sitting in
Switzerland should be appealed, as opposed to other
decisions.
Message du Président du CIAS / Message from the ICAS Président
-
1
When is a “Swiss” “award” appealable ?*
Dr. Charles Poncet*
I.
The appeal ...............................................................................................................................................................................4
II.
Grounds for appeal ..............................................................................................................................................................4
III.
Appealable decisions: a deceptively “simple ” system ......................................................................................................4
IV.
“Final ”......................................................................................................................................................................................5
V.
“Interim ” or “preliminary” but “partial ” ..............................................................................................................................6
VI.
Not “partial ” yet appealable as “interim ” or “preliminary ” ? ............................................................................................8
VII. “Implicitly ” “interim ” or “preliminary ” and therefore appealable on limited grounds ? ..............................................10
VIII. Decisions on costs: a duck-billed platypus ? ...................................................................................................................12
IX.
Practical considerations and need for a change ..............................................................................................................13
* This article was fi rst published in the the Paris Journal of International Arbitration 2012/1.
* The author is a former Member of the Swiss Parliament and a partner in the Geneva law fi rm ZPG. [email protected]
International arbitral awards issued in Switzerland are
“Swiss ” only to the extent that they may be appealed
to the Swiss Federal Tribunal (“ FT ”). That is their
main connection with the Swiss legal system, yet an
important one because ultimately Swiss judges will
decide whether the award is annulled or upheld by
the courts of the “seat ” of arbitration. If annulled,
the award will not be enforceable abroad, except in
jurisdictions which recognize an award otherwise
annulled by the courts of the seat1. How tenuous and
even artificial the connection between the “seat ” of
the arbitration and the national courts is will be
clear already from the fact that most arbitrations
conducted in Switzerland involve foreign parties
and more and more frequently, foreign arbitrators
and foreign counsel with hardly any Swiss interest
of any kind involved. The connection is also very
questionable from a scholarly point of view, as has
been authoritatively demonstrated 2 although some
legal writing 3 still considers it appropriate. The same
applies to other venues of international arbitrations
1. See Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation v. Hilmarton ( June 10,
1997) 1997 Rev. Arb. 376 and note FOUCHARD, and 22 Y.B. Com. Arb.
696 (1997); P.T. Putrabali Adyamulia v. Rena Holding ( June 29, 2007)
2007 Rev. Arb. 507; ROSNEFT/YUKOS, Netherlands Supreme Court,
June 25, 2010 (LJN: BM1679). The decisions have been the object
of many comments and the issues involved are well summarized by
Bernard H ANOTIAU, International Arbitration in a Global Economy:
The Challenges of the Future in (ed) 2011 Journal of International
Arbitration 89 – 103.
2. See Emmanuel GAILLARD Aspects philosophiques du droit de
l’arbitrage international p.55-60 and 188-207 (2008).
3. See POUDRET/SÉBASTIEN/BESSON, Droit comparé de l’arbitrage
international p.86-91 (2002).
but Switzerland is probably the most remarkable
example in view of its small size and the number of
arbitrations held in that country 4.
Yet the fact remains: a “Swiss ” award will be subject
to scrutiny by the Swiss judiciary, albeit of a limited
nature, but only to the extent that it qualifies as an
“award ” pursuant to the lex fori and depending upon
its nature, it may be appealable on two grounds only
instead of five, or not at all. The purpose of this
article is therefore to help foreign readers ascertain
which “awards ” issued by an international arbitral
tribunal sitting in Switzerland should be appealed
immediately, as opposed to other decisions. These
may or may not qualify as “awards ” for Swiss
purposes and they may be subject to judicial review
immediately, or only with the final award or on more
limited grounds, or not all. The issue is of great
practical importance as will be seen hereunder and
4. In 2009, 630 ICC arbitrations were conducted in 53 countries.
Switzerland (1.88% of the countries) was host to 119 arbitrations (18.9
% of the total) ahead of the UK (73), the USA (36) and even France
(113). Also, out of a population of fewer than 8 million, Swiss arbitrators
(1.73 % of 73 countries concerned) represented 202 appointments out
of 1’305 or 15 %, ahead of the UK (196), Germany (104) the USA (99)
and France (96). Whilst limited to ICC arbitrations, these figures clearly
show that the role of the country in international arbitrations is out
of proportion to its size or political importance. The figures for 2010
show more arbitrations taking place in France (124 out of a total of
591) than in Switzerland (86) but still about 15% of all ICC arbitrations
and therefore considerably more than what Switzerland’s population
or geopolitical importance would suggest. However, Swiss arbitrators
(180) were still 13.52 % of the total more than the UK (177), France
(120) and the USA (100). See 21 ICC International Court of Arbitration
Bulletin 5 – 17 (2010). In 2010 See 22 ICC International Court of
Arbitration Bulletin 7 – 14 (2011).
-
2
it requires at first a general understanding of the
functioning of the Swiss judiciary.
The FT is Switzerland’s highest court. It consists of
38 full time judges, 11 of whom are women, with
19 alternate judges who sit occasionally. The judges
are elected by the Swiss parliament after a screening
process by a special committee of 17 MPs of both
chambers and the candidates are expected to be at
least loosely affi liated with one of the political parties
in parliament, a somewhat questionable practice in
terms of judicial independence; they are elected for
a four year term, renewable – or not… – and the
compulsory retirement age is 68. The FT – like the
rest of the Swiss judiciary – is immaculately clean
and judicial corruption is unknown in Switzerland.
The FT is divided into seven sections, dealing with
various types of appeals, a detailed review of which
would go beyond the scope of this article. Suffice
it to say that whilst Swiss judges do not have the
power to declare federal legislation unconstitutional
– which makes the FT hardly “supreme ” as a court
compared to other federal systems – they certainly
can annul international arbitral awards and they do
so occasionally. Yet their law is not “judge made ” to
the extent that the grounds for appeal are contained
in federal legislation5: the FT may interpret them
but it does not have the power to create new ones.
Appeals against international awards are adjudicated
by the First Civil Court, which comprises five
judges. There is no “chief justice ” for, true to the Swiss
tradition of reticence towards personal power of
any kind, the FT has a rotating presidency lasting
two years. In turn, each court has a presiding judge
on a rotating basis. The current presiding judge of
the First Civil Court is judge Kathrin Klett. The
Court is trilingual and handles appeals in German,
French and Italian. Materials in English – arbitral
awards for instance – are frequently allowed without
translations.
All legislative attempts to introduce a sort of certiorari
system allowing the FT to hear fewer cases have
basically failed in the past6 although the creation of a
Federal Criminal Court and a Federal Administrative
Court in 2003 and 20057 has eased the burden of the
FT as appeals against their decisions are somewhat
limited. However the number of cases decided by
the FT remains staggering: the Court handles close
5. They are set forth in Chapter 12 of the Federal Law on Private
International law of December 18 1987 (“PILA”). PILA is the most
commonly used English abbreviation.
6. An attempt made in 1989 was rejected by the Swiss voters on April 1st
1990. See 1989 FF II 741.
7. Both courts were accepted by the Swiss voters on March 12, 2000.
The Federal Criminal Court came into force on April 1st, 2003 and the
Federal Administrative Court on September 1st, 2005.
to 7’500 appeals per year. The First Civil Court alone
deals with more than 800 cases, arithmetically giving
each judge the insurmountable burden of being in
charge of about 160 opinions per year in addition to
reviewing the others. Whilst a team of competent
clerks help with the drafting of opinions and legal
research – and a lot of appeals are quite simple - the
volume remains excessive and it affects the quality
of the work of the Court. Fortunately the number
of international arbitration awards appealed remains
modest at about 40 to 50 a year8. The recent trend
shows a majority of appeals directed at awards issued
by the Court of Arbitration for Sports (“CAS ”)
in Lausanne, some of which are quite simple or
even should not have been appealed at all and are
consequently rejected out of hand9. In other words,
when an award raises significant and important legal
issues it will probably receive the thorough review it
deserves10. By the standards of the English speaking
word, Swiss appeals are somewhat peculiar: hearings
are almost unknown and in any event if oral
arguments are allowed – a rarity – the draft court
opinion is likely to be prepared before oral arguments,
rendering the exercise somewhat futile. Most cases
are thus disposed of by a three judge panel with
opinions circulated among them. Five judge panels
deal only with cases raising an issue of principle
or upon request by one of the judges, or in certain
specific cases11. On the other hand, in some cases12 ,
a five judge panel still deliberates in open court
as opposed to in camera. This is a very interesting
practice, which used to be ubiquitous until the
number of appeals made it practically impossible.
It remains applicable in cases the importance of
which requires debate in open court. The judge
in charge of the case reads or summarizes his/her
8. See in this respect Felix DASSER , International Arbitration and Setting
Aside Proceedings in Switzerland: a Statistical Analysis, 25 ASA
Bulletin 444-472 (2007) and the update ibidem 82-100 (2010).
9. For a recent example see Azerbaijan Wrestling Federation (“AWF”) v.
the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”) and the International
Federation of Associated Wrestling Styles (“FILA”) 4A_416/2008
Judgment of March 17, 2009, 2010 ASA Bulletin 367; full English
translation at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/cas-jurisdiction-on-adoping-case-confi rmed-no-procedural-violat/; also see 2009 Swiss Int’l
Arb.L Rep 219.
10. To give but two examples, see the “famous” Tensacciai Judgment of
March 8, 2006, holding that EU competition law is not part of public
policy for the purposes of art.190 (2) (e) PILA, ATF 132 III 389, 2006
ASA Bulletin 363; full English translation at http://www.praetor.ch/
arbitrage/violation-of-public-policy-notion-of-public-policy-exclusionof-/. For a detailed criticism of the decision see Andreas BUCHER ,op.
cit hereunder at note 19 p.1702-1704 nr.124-128. Another example is
the equally famous annulment of the 1996 Thales award in revision
proceedings in 2009, 4A_596/2008 Judgment of October 6, 2009,
2010 ASA Bulletin 318; full English translation at http://www.praetor.
ch/arbitrage/revision-of-award-accepted-arbitral-tribunal-misledby-evidence-/. See Charles PONCET, Obtaining Revision of “Swiss”
International Arbitral Awards : Whence After Thalès ? 2009 Stockholm
International Arbitration Review vol.2 39-53 (2011).
11. See article20 of the Federal Law on the Federal Tribunal of June 17,
2005 (“LFT”), which came into force as of January 1st, 2007. Appeals
against cantonal laws subject to a referendum or in matters of cantonal
ballot initiatives are also adjudicated by a five judge panel.
12. See art.58 LFT.
-
3
draft opinion and submits a proposal. Then each of
the four other judges opines and it is by no means
certain that the proposal will meet the agreement of
a majority. The draft opinion is then either rewritten
or supplemented with the comments and suggestions
made during the deliberation. Since Swiss FT judges
often have scholarly interests and publish articles
in law journals13 or write commentaries, these open
court deliberations can be quite interesting. On the
other hand, FT judges are not allowed to dissent and
the opinion is supposed to reflect the majority view
without any opportunity for the minority to make
its point. This sometimes produces the frustrating
result that a lively discussion may be reduced to a
few fuzzy compromise paragraphs in the written
opinion. Since 2000 the opinions of the FT are all
available on the Court’s web site14, generally with
the names of the parties blanked out on privacy
grounds, with some exceptions. Civil law systems
do not (in principle) recognize the rule of stare decisis
but a number of the FT opinions are published in
the Federal Court Reporter, albeit not necessarily
in their entirety and they do constitute a body of
precedents to be followed by all courts of the land.
I. The appeal
Unless the parties have opted out of appeals, which
they may do in part or completely pursuant to
art.192 PILA if they are not Swiss or domiciled or
resident in Switzerland, international awards issued
in Switzerland are subject to an appeal to the FT
directly. Originally, the parties could – but rarely
did – confer appeal jurisdiction to a cantonal court
pursuant to the arbitration clause or (even more
unlikely) in a separate agreement. This has been
abolished by the new federal law organizing the FT
of June 17, 2005 (“LFT ”) which came into force as
of January 1st, 2007. An interesting feature of the new
law since January 1st, 2011 is that its article 77(3) now
specifically exempts international arbitration from
the provisions of art. 91, 92 and 93 LFT pursuant
to which a preliminary or interlocutory decision
of a lower court may be appealed under certain
circumstances. This had been a source of difficulties
under the previous regime and the situation has now
been clarified: PILA and not the LFT sets forth the
grounds on which an international award issued in
Switzerland may be set aside15.
13. A good example is federal judge Bernard CORBOZ , whose scholarly
interests have led him to many publications. Among those related to
our topic, see his commentary of Article 77 LFT in Commentaire de
la loi sur le Tribunal fédéral (Bernard CORBOZ et al. eds., 2009); also
see Introduction à la nouvelle loi sur le Tribunal fédéral, 2006 Sem.
Jud. 321-325 and Le recours au Tribunal fédéral en matière d’arbitrage
international, 2002 Sem. Jud. 1-32.
14. www.bger.ch.
15. Although art.77 (3) LFT specifically states that the FT will review
only the grievances (i) specifically raised in the appeal brief and (ii)
II. Grounds for appeal
The grounds for appeal are spelled out at art. 190
PILA exclusively, which starts with a statement that the
award is enforceable (“final ”) from its notification.
In line with international instruments16 they are very
limited and make an annulment possible only in the
following cases:
190(2)(a) : irregular appointment of an arbitrator or
irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal;
190(2)(b) : jurisdiction incorrectly denied or accepted;
190(2)(c) : awarding more than the submissions (ultra
petita) or refusing to issue a decision on some of them
(infra petita);
190(2)(d) : violating due process (“the right to be heard
in contradictory proceedings”) or denying a party equal
treatment with the other;
190(2)(e) : incompatibility of the award with public
policy.
III. Appealable decisions: a deceptively
“simple” system
The concept of “award” is defined at art. 188 and
189 PILA. Art.188 empowers the arbitral tribunal to
issue partial awards unless the parties agreed to the
contrary. A “partial ” award is therefore not final but
as we will see it may or may not be a Vorentscheid
(preliminary award) or even an “award ” as “defined ”
by art. 189, which merely provides that the award
is (i) issued according to the procedure and in the
format agreed by the parties and (ii) in the absence
of an agreement by a majority, by the chairperson
in writing, with a date and a signature17. The
chairperson’s signature suffices. As most arbitrations
tend to be institutional nowadays, the arbitration
rules of the specific institution involved will
generally contain additional provisions clarifying
the required contents of an “award ” and sometimes
more18. Even in ad hoc arbitrations the longa consuetudo
properly argued by the Appellant. In other words, the Court performs
no ex officio judicial review.
16. See art. 34 of the 1985 - U CITRAL odel Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, with 2006 amendments and Art V of the 1958
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
( ew ork Convention).
17. Similar to art.31 of the U CITRAL odel Law.
18. Thus Art. 2 (iii) of the ICC Rules includes “partial” “interim” and
“fi nal” in the concept of an ICC “award”. Art.25 states that an award
should be unanimous, or issued by a majority of arbitrators and if
there is no majority, by the chairperson. Reasons need to be stated.
Furthermore the ICC Secretariat sends guidelines to ICC arbitrators
and draft awards are reviewed (“scrutinized”) by the ICC Court of
Arbitration, frequently resulting in useful suggestions. The same
applies to other institutions such as the Court of Arbitration for Sports
in Lausanne (“CAS”) whose Secretary General is entitled not only to
-
4
of most arbitrators and counsel makes it unlikely
that any serious disagreement could arise as to what
an award should contain: it is a decision as to one or
several issues, notified to the parties in writing with
at least some reasons in support (unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, which they almost never do
in commercial arbitration, let alone in investment
matters).
Legal writers19 have analyzed the legal provisions
with a view to creating a systematic picture that can
enable litigants to determine when an “award ” that
is not final must or can be appealed. It will be seen
hereunder that case law of the FT has also made
several helpful attempts at clarifying the situation.
In this writer’s opinion however, it is far from
assured that things have become clear enough and
an overhaul of art.190 PILA is probably overdue.
make formal modifications to draft awards but also to draw the Panel’s
attention on fundamental issues of principle that the arbitrator(s) may
have overlooked or misconstrued (art. R46 of the Code).
19. In the vast literature on this subject, I am particularly indebted to
Andreas Bucher’s very recent and masterful commentary on Articles
187 to 194 PILA, particularly Art.190 of course. See Andreas BUCHER ,
Loi sur le droit international privé - Convention de Lugano, in
Commentaire Romand 1639 – 1767 (2011) ; also of great interest for
the issues addressed hereunder, see Gabrielle K AUFMANN-KOHLER/
A NTONIO R IGOZZI, Arbitrage international Droit et pratique à la
lumière de la LDIP 449-570 (2010) (“K AUFMANN-KOHLER/R IGOZZI”);
in English, see Elliott GEISINGER and Viviane FROSSARD, Challenge
and Revision of the Award in Gabrielle K AUFMANN-KOHLER/ Blaise
STUCKI, International Arbitration in Switzerland, A Handbook for
Pratctitioners 135-165 (2004); Bernhard BERGER/Franz K ELLERHALS,
International and Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland 438-494 (2010)
(“BERGER/K ELLERHALS”) contains a good presentation in English;
Christoph MÜLLER , Swiss Case Law in International Arbitration 225319 (2010) provides a clear and systematic outline in English of Swiss
case law concerning art.190 PILA. Also see Stephe V. BERTI and Anton
K. SCHNYDER International Arbitration in Switzerland 569-587 (2000).
With no pretension to being exhaustive, I have also consulted and
relied on Bernard CORBOZ et al. Commentaire de la loi sur le Tribunal
fédéral 607-656; by the same author, Le recours au Tribunal fédéral en
matière d’arbitrage international 2002 Sem. Jud 1-32 ; of further interest
is Cesare JERMINI’s Phd. thesis, Die Anfechtung von Schiedssprüchen
im internationalen Privatrecht (Zürich 1997) ; Bernhard BERGER ,
Appeals in International Arbitration Under the New Swiss Federal
Tribunal Statute 155-163, in New Developments in International
Commercial Arbitration (2007) ; Sébastien BESSON, Le recours contre
la sentence arbitrale internationale selon la nouvelle LTF (aspects
procéduraux) 2007 ASA Bulletin 2-35 ; Myriam GEHRI, Die Anfechtung
internationaler Schiedssprüche nach IPRG 71-116¸ in Internationales
Zivilprozess- und Verfahrensrecht IV (2005); Yves DONZALLAZ ,
Loi sur le Tribunal fédéral 921-935 (2008); Philipp GELZER , Zum
Anfechtungsobjekt der Vorentscheide gemäss Art. 190 Abs.3 IPRG
2000 ASA Bulletin 487-500 ; Jean-François POUDRET, Les recours au
Tribunal fédéral Suisse en matière d’arbitrage international 2007 ASA
Bulletin 669-703; by the same author and in English, Challenge and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Switzerland, 1988 Arbitration
International 278-299 ; Philippe SCHWEIZER , L’ordre public de l’art. 2
lit.e LDIP : le caméléon court toujours 271-285¸ in Mélanges Bernard
DUTOIT (2002) ; Bernard DUTOIT, Commentaire de la loi fédérale du
18 décembre 1987 664-680 (2005); Erich TAGWERGER , Zur Anfechtung
schiedsgerichtlicher Vor- und Zwischentscheide nach Art.190
IPRG (2009). Finally, in a comparative perspective, I was helped by
FOUCHARD/GAILLARD/G OLDMAN International Commercial Arbitration
888-960 (1999); Gary B. BORN, International Commercial Arbitration
2551-2699 (2009); Julian D M L EW/Loukas A M ISTELIS /Stefan M
K RÖLL , Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 663-686
(2003); The Review of International Arbitral Awards, IAI Series No 6
(2010), particularly the articles on France by Dominique H ASCHER at 97111 and England by Jonhatan Mance 119-143. The introductory report
by Bernard H ANOTIAU and Olivier CAPRASSE at 7-97 is also quite useful.
IV. “Final”
When there is one award only in the arbitration and it
disposes of all the issues before the arbitral tribunal
– fortunately not too rare an occurrence even in the
ever more litigious climate of the age – the situation
is simple: the parties have thirty days to appeal the
award on all the grounds spelled out at art. 190 PILA.
Some tautology is unavoidable to define a “final ”
award: that which puts an end to the arbitration. It
may do so by disposing of all the issues at hand or by
incorporating a settlement between the parties into
the decision of the arbitral tribunal. Yet an award
is also final when it refuses to address the issues on
procedural or other grounds (lack of jurisdiction for
instance). Other grounds are conceivable (lack of
standing to sue or defend, failure to pay the deposit)
but as Andreas Bucher rightly points out 20, the most
likely situation in which an arbitration will terminate
without a decision on the merits or a settlement is a
finding that the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction
at all or as to some parties only.
Whilst appeals against awards granting jurisdiction
are relatively frequent and sometimes lead to
annulment 21, there are few recent22 examples of a
final award appealed after denying jurisdiction and
they involved partial denials of jurisdiction only. In
a decision of February 29, 200823 the FT reviewed
a case involving a German and a Russian company
bound by two agreements for the delivery of certain
metals, governed by Swiss law with arbitration in
Zurich. Five further agreements were concluded with
Russian law governing and arbitration in Moscow.
Then came an addendum providing for arbitration
in Zurich under the Swiss Rules. When a dispute
arose, the arbitrators24 accepted jurisdiction on one
20. Op.cit 1673 nr. 12.
21. Among recent decisions see 4A 456/2009 a judgment of May 3,
2010, 2010 ASA Bulletin 786; full English translation at http://www.
praetor.ch/arbitrage/arbitration-clause-interpretation-of-declarationsbased-on-the-p/. The case involves a long-distance runner that the
International Association of Athletics Federations (“IAAF”) banned
from late April 25, 2006 until early December 2008 for doping. The
athlete appealed the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the
IAAF to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”). In an award issued
on July 24, 2009, the CAS upheld the appeal and annulled the decision.
Its award was annulled by the FT for lack of jurisdiction. For another
example, see the much commented judgment in the case of Busch v.
WADA of 4A 358/2009 of November 6, 2009, 2011 ASA Bulletin 166;
full English translation at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/lack-ofjurisdiction-of-the-cas-arbitration-clause-by-reference/; also see 2009
Swiss Int’l Arb.L.Rep 495. A hockey player signed a registration form
for the Ice Hockey World Championship, from which WADA sought
to deduce blanket consent to CAS jurisdiction as to other issues – illicit
substances – only remotely related to the event the player was signing
up for.
22. Unless absolutely necessary to illustrate a specific point , the cases
quoted hereunder were decided in 2008 or later, thus making reference
possible to the full English translation of the opinion.
23. 4A 452/2007 Judgement of February 29, 2008, 2008 ASA Bulletin
376; full English translation at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/
interpretation-of-an-arbitration-clause/. Also see 2008 Swiss Int’l
Arb.L.Rep 169.
24. Pierre A. K ARRER , Daniel GIRSBERGER , arbitrators and Daniel
-
5
of the claims but not the other and the FT stated the
following on appeal: “In granting the Respondent’s partial
objection on jurisdiction the Arbitral Tribunal found that it
had jurisdiction on one part of the claim and not on the other.
The award is appealed only to the extent that the Arbitral
Tribunal denied jurisdiction. An award in which an arbitral
tribunal denies jurisdiction is a final award 25”.
In the case of Vivendi et al v. Deutsche Telekom et al 26
there was a contract providing for ICC arbitration
in Zurich. One of the parties was a Polish
company, which went bankrupt after the arbitration
had commenced. The Polish Bankruptcy Act
automatically cancelled any arbitration agreements
and /or proceedings entered into by the bankrupt.
The arbitrators27 held that the standing to act in a
Swiss arbitration was determined according to the
general Swiss confl ict of law rules, which pointed to
Polish law and accordingly they denied jurisdiction.
The FT upheld the award and stated the following
as to the nature of the decision: “If the arbitral tribunal
denies jurisdiction, it issues a final decision, which may be
challenged before the Federal Tribunal on all the grounds
set forth in Art. 190 (2) PILA. In this case, the Arbitral
Tribunal issued a decision in which it denied jurisdiction with
respect to Respondent 6. A decision denying jurisdiction in
respect of one or several Respondents is an award (Art. 91 (b)
BGG 28), which may be appealed in accordance with Art. 190
(2) PILA in the same way as a final award 29”.
V. “Interim” or “preliminary” but “partial”
An “interim ” or “preliminary ” and “partial ” award
(“Teilentscheid”, “sentence partielle”) decides some of
the substantive issues at hand and leaves others to
further, subsequent proceedings. It falls squarely
within art.188 PILA, which, however, contains no
substantive definition of an “interim” award and
there are all sorts of decisions an arbitral tribunal
may issue whilst leaving some others for the future.
To constitute an “award ” for the purposes of art. 190
PILA – thus allowing but also requiring an immediate
appeal under penalty of forfeiting one’s right to appeal
- the decision must really adjudicate the matter on the
merits albeit in part only. Hence the not altogether
very clear concept of the interim award stricto sensu,
as opposed, one may logically surmise, to lato sensu
where the “interim” award would not be “partial ”
WEHRLI, chairman.
2 . 1.2 of the nglish version p. .
2 . udgment A 28/2008 of arch 1, 2009, 2010 ASA Bulletin 10
full nglish translation at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/effect-offoreign-bankruptcy-on-icc-arbitration-in-swit erland-c/ also see 2009
Swiss Int’l Arb.L. ep 2 1.
27. ves FORTIER , chairman, arl H EMPEL and acques WERNER ,
arbitrators.
28. B
is the erman abbreviation for the LFT.
29. 2.2 of the nglish version p. .
enough to justify and require immediate appeal for
Swiss purposes. In fairness it must be said that the
very concept was developed in connection with the
previous law organi ing the FT 0, which basically
required interim decisions – not only arbitral awards
but any decisions – to create irretrievable harm
in order to be capable of appeal. This generated a
pattern of circular definitions that the new law
abolished by creating in effect a special category for
arbitral awards 1. In several cases 2 , the FT wrestled
with the need for a definition of the “interim partial
award ” that would also fit the requirements of the
LO . In one of the latest attempts in 2002, the
Court was faced with a igerian corporation and
an allegedly Te an counterpart going into a joint
venture governed by igerian law to gather and
recycle oil residues. The arbitration clause provided
for eneva Chamber of Commerce arbitration in
eneva. hen a dispute arose, the arbitrators held
in an interim award issued in 2000 that the “Texan”
entity had locus standi. However in a final award
rendered in 2001, the arbitral tribunal found that
the “Texan” entity was not a validly constituted legal
person and accordingly terminated the arbitration.
It was argued in the appeal that the contradiction
between the 2000 decision and the subsequent final
award violated public policy, thus requiring the FT
to define the procedural nature of the first award.
The FT thus considered that interim Partial awards
stricto sensu decide part of the issues at hand and are res
judicata but only with regard to the issues adjudicated.
Other “awards” (preliminary or interlocutory awards)
decide substantive or procedural preliminary issues
and they are not res judicata but they bind the arbitral
tribunal, as opposed to mere procedural orders,
which may be rescinded or amended later in the
proceedings. The FT added: “Thus, to give but one
example, an arbitral tribunal which issued a preliminary
award deciding the principle of the Respondent’s liability is
bound by its decision when, in the final award, it adjudicates
the Claimant’s monetary claims 33”. Helpfully – or perhaps
not – the Court added: “Res judicata applies only to
the award itself. It does not extend to the reasons. However
one sometimes has to resort to the reasons to know the exact
meaning, the nature and the precise scope of the award 34”.
The Court then analy ed the two awards and found
that by deciding at the end of the arbitration that
the “Texan” entity was not a validly constituted legal
entity, the arbitral tribunal had not disregarded the
binding effect of the previous decision holding that
0. Loi f d rale d’organisation judiciaire (“LO ”) of ecember 1 , 19 ,
amended several times.
1. See art.77 ( ) LFT.
2. See in particular ATF 11 II 80 (1990) and ATF 128 III 191 (2002).
Both decisions are in French.
. Translation of part of the opinion at p. 19 of ATF 128 III 191ff.
. Ibidem.
-
6
the non-existing entity had standing to sue. In other
words future litigants would have to ascertain if the
award was interim and partial - in which case it would
have to be appealed immediately – or interim but
not partial, thus making it incapable of appeal until
the final award was pronounced. That making the
wrong choice in this respect might entail some very
significant costs in large international arbitrations
will be clear from the fact that in this case the FT
imposed CHF 100’000 of court costs and CHF
400’000 of other party costs on the appellant, i.e
CHF 2’057 per line (the opinion contained 243 lines,
title and signatures included) or a still impressive
CHF 89.30 per word.
The approach was not fully persuasive and had to
be modified. In 200435 the FT rejected an appeal
by a Dutch company against an ICC partial award
assessing the value of certain shares and reserving
other issues for the subsequent proceedings. The FT
stated the following: “The nexus heretofore established
by case law between art.87 LOJ and art. 190 PILA 36must
accordingly be broken once and for all. Consequently, whether
or not an interim award lato sensu is capable of a public law
appeal shall be examined exclusively under the aegis of the
latter provision. As to the partial interim awards within the
meaning of art.188 PILA it follows that they may be appealed
under the same conditions as final awards, considering that
they too are awards falling within the scope of art.190 (1) and
(2) PILA. To conclude, present case law must be abandoned
and it must be admitted with legal writers that three types of
awards may be capable of immediate appeal to the Federal
Tribunal : firstly, final awards on all the grounds set forth
at art.190 (2) PILA; secondly interim partial awards on
the same grounds; thirdly interlocutory awards, yet only on the
grounds set forth at art.190(2) (a) and (b) PILA”37.
Thus the subsequent formal change in the statutory
law 38 that made somewhat redundant “stricto” or
“lato” sensu “interim partial ” or merely “interim”
awards in 2011 was indeed welcome. Unfortunately
we will see that there is still room for doubt.
The landscape being thus clarified in part, one may
follow Andreas Bucher’s convincing attempt39 at a
typology of various awards or decisions and point
out that partial awards for Swiss purposes are those
which decide some but not all the substantive issues
in front of the arbitral tribunal: for instance the
35. ATF 130 III 755 (2004) (in French).
36. Article 87 of the loi fédérale d’organisation judiciaire (“LOJ”) in
force at the time read as follows: “A public law appeal for violation of
art. 4 of the Federal Constitution is available only against fi nal decisions;
preliminary decisions taken in last instance are capable of appeal only if
they cause irretrievable harm to the interest party”.
37. ATF 130 III at 761 and 762 (in German).
38. Art. 77(2) LFT.
39. Op.cit 1674 nr. 14 et 15.
claim is adjudicated but the counterclaim remains
outstanding, as in a case40 between a French
and an Italian company involving several joint
venture cooperation agreements, which led to a
majority award in which the arbitrators41 rejected
the substantive claims but allowed one of the
counterclaims, reserving one or more future awards
concerning the decisions still pending as well as the
costs of the arbitration. In line with the new case
law, the FT stated the following: “The actual partial
award or partial award stricto sensu mentioned at art. 188
PILA is that by which the arbitral tribunal decides some
of the claims or one of the various claims in dispute (…). It
is distinguished from the interlocutory award, which decides
one or several preliminary issues, whether procedural or on
the merits (...). According to case law, a partial award may
be appealed immediately under the same conditions as a final
award because, like the latter, it is an award falling under art.
190 (1) and (2) PILA (…).The award under appeal does
not put an end to the proceedings between the parties, since
the Arbitral Tribunal must still rule on the amount of the
counterclaim it allowed as well as on the costs of the arbitration.
However it disposed of the Claimant’s submissions. Therefore
it is an actual partial award subject to Civil law appeal on all
the grounds provided at art. 190 (2) PILA.” 42 Conversely
only the counterclaim could have been decided43
with the fate of the claim differed until later.
An award rejecting jurisdiction as we have seen
above44 in the Vivendi case is final with regard to
the party as to which jurisdiction is denied but
partial for those as to which the arbitral tribunal
accepts jurisdiction. It is also conceivable that a
“partial ” award could decide every substantive issue
in the case but still leave the costs to a subsequent
determination45.
The important point to bear in mind is that if an
“interim and partial ” award gets it wrong, it must be
appealed forthwith. Swiss law does not afford a
litigant the choice of appealing it together with the
final award. If it qualifies as an “interim and partial ”
award – i.e disposing of at least one substantive issue
in the arbitration – failure to appeal immediately will
result in the party’s total forfeiture of the right to
have the same issues reviewed by the FT at all.
40. See 4A_584/2009 Judgment of March 18, 2010 2011 ASA Bulletin
alleged-violation-of-due-process-rejected-no-review-of-the-arbit/.
41. Bernard H ANOTIAU, chairman, Piero BERNARDINI and this writer,
arbitrators.
42. 2.2 of the English version p.5.
43. See 4P_134/2006 Judgment of September 7, 2006, 2007 ASA
Bulletin 373.
44. See above note 15.
45. Bucher op.cit at p.1674 nr.15.
-
7
VI. Not “partial” yet appealable as “interim”
or “preliminary”?
It will be clear to the reader by now that the
Cartesian distinction outlined above – whilst
perfectly clear and sound in theory – was unlikely
to stand the rigorous tests of practice: it produces
some thoroughly confusing situations in which the
only ones who know whether the award is indeed
preliminary but partial – or interim and not partial
but still appealable on limited grounds - will be the
federal judges deciding the case in the end, mainly
because their views are final and impermeable to
challenge in a higher court. Mere mortals –such as
counsel – remain confined to the realm of doubt,
wondering as to the nature of the decision on which
they are expected to give guidance – is it capable of
appeal or not ? - and reduced to suggesting an appeal
as a “precaution” 46, thereby exposing their clients to
very high and perhaps totally superfluous additional
costs in pursuit of an unpredictable outcome.
There are “preliminary” issues in almost any
arbitration. International arbitrators sitting in
Switzerland may address them even though they
may be outside the scope of the arbitration clause.
A good example is a recent case47 involving basically
two sets of agreements, one of which – “the CFA” –
was not within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators48.
The argument was that the arbitral tribunal had
really decided pursuant to the CFA when it had
jurisdiction only with regard to the other set of
agreements. The respondent and the arbitral tribunal
took the view that it was necessary to interpret the
CFA in order to determine whether or not a portion
of the customer base had been appropriated during
a certain period and to determine the number of
customers transferred from the one to the other,
thus leading to an assessment of damages due
under the agreement over which the arbitrators had
jurisdiction. The FT granted that it was “(…) clear
that the Arbitral tribunal did not have jurisdiction to render
a judgment having the force of res judicata on the claims that
the Parties to the CFA might have submitted to it regarding
the winding-up of this agreement. (….) The Arbitral tribunal
itself refused to accept jurisdiction ratione materiae relating
to the winding-up of the CFA.” Yet the Court added the
following: “It is appropriate here to recall that an arbitral
tribunal is authorized to decide preliminary issues that are not
within the scope of the arbitration clause (…) and that it may
clarify points on a preliminary basis that were not eligible for
arbitration as such (…). Along the same lines and with regard
46. If for no other reason than avoiding professional liability.
47. 4A_482/2010 Judgment of 7 February 2011, 2011 ASA Bulletin 721;
full English translation at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/
jurisdiction-of-arbitral-tribunal-to-rule-upon-a-preliminary-iss/.
48. Yves DERAINS, José P EREZ-L ORCA- RODRIGO, arbitrators and Horacio
GRIGERA-NAON, chairman.
to the set-off, the tendency is to generalize the principle of “the
judge of the action is the judge of the objection,” which suggests,
as stated in the language of art. 21 (5) of the Swiss Rules
of International Arbitration, that the arbitral tribunal has
jurisdiction to hear a set-off defense even when the relationship
out of which this defense is said to arise is not within the scope
of the arbitration clause or is the object of another arbitration
agreement or forum-selection clause (references omitted)49”.
Such preliminary issues arise “on the way ” as
Andreas Bucher puts it50 but they do not cause the
award to be interim and partial because they are a
mere preliminary to the adjudication of the real
substantive issue(s) in the arbitration. In the example
above – according to this logic – the arbitrators
could still reject the claim on other grounds and
the decision was therefore “interim ” or “preliminary ”
but not “partial ”. The same would apply to a claim
which is allegedly time barred: if it is, the award is
final; if it is not, the issue is a mere preliminary to
the substantive determination of the case and any
appeal can (and must) be postponed until the final
award. The interim or preliminary decisions within
that universe do bind the arbitral tribunal: they may
not be rescinded or amended at will, as opposed
to procedural orders; yet, somewhat confusingly,
they do not constitute res judicata for they are only
“preliminary” to the award on the merits and, one
assumes, if they enjoyed res judicata status they would
(probably) be “partial ” – and therefore appealable –
as one hardly sees how res judicata could extend to a
non-substantive issue.
The terminology used in German is somewhat
clearer than its English or French counterparts: a
“preliminary” or “interim ” (but not “partial ”) award
becomes a “Vorentscheid” – as stated at art. 190(3) and
also at art. 186(3)51 PILA – literally a “pre-decision” or
a “Zwischenentscheid”, namely an “in-between decision”.
Both are more precise than the French “décision
incidente” and do suggest that the decision is either
preliminary to a subsequent determination or takes
place between several phases in an arbitration.
However such decisions are not immune from
appeal. They may be appealed – and again they must
be under penalty of forfeiting one’s right52 – but
only on limited grounds: only those of art. 190 (3)
49. 4.3 of the English version p.7
50. Op.cit 1674 nr.16
51. Art. 186(3) PILA reads as follows: “ The arbitral tribunal shall, in
general, decide on its jurisdiction by a preliminary decision.”
52. Sébastien BESSON, La recevabilité du recours au Tribunal Fédéral
contre les sentences préjudicielles, incidentes ou partielles rendues
en mati re d’arbitrage international, 2006 Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage
187-193; Le recours contre la sentence arbitrale internationale selon
la nouvelle LTF (aspect procéduraux) 2007 ASA Bulletin 9 n. 19 ;
K AUFMANN-KOHLER/ R IGOZZI, Arbitrage international, n. 720 and the
other commentaries quoted p. 309, note 340 ; BERGER/ K ELLERHALS,
Internationale und interne Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz, n.
1530.
-
8
(a) and (b) PILA, namely the irregular appointment
or composition of the arbitral tribunal and its
inaccurate assumption or rejection of jurisdiction53.
Cesare Jermini suggests that it might be either 190 (3)
(a) or 190 (3) (b)54 but not both, although the literal
wording of the provision and other legal writing55
point in a different direction.
Be this as it may, if the arbitral tribunal accepts
jurisdiction, a jurisdictional award is obviously
preliminary in nature and appealing it on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction is a simple proposition. But what
if the appellant argues that his right to introduce
witnesses in a jurisdictional hearing was not
observed ? That is within the due process of article
190 (d) PILA, yet the award is capable of appeal only
for the purposes of art.190 (b) PILA, which would
not encompass an argument of due process as that is
in the realm of art. 190(2)(d) only. This would lead
to the illogical result that the same violation of due
process would cause the annulment of the award if
it took place during the evidentiary hearing on the
merits but not for jurisdiction purposes. It could also
mean that a violation of due process may be argued
in an appeal against an award denying jurisdiction –
which would be final for Swiss purposes – but not if
the award upheld it. This led several commentators56
to hold the view that in a jurisdictional appeal the
grievance that due process was violated is admissible
if it is indispensable to assess the soundness of the
argument based on art. 190(2)(b).
Whilst emphasizing that an appeal based on art.190
(2)(a) or (b) PILA should not be used to introduce
other grievances – such as a violation of due process
– in defiance of the legal provisions limiting the
admissible grievances to (i) irregular composition
or appointment of the arbitral tribunal and (ii)
inappropriate acceptance or denial of jurisdiction,
the FT seems to agree. The Court has consistently
taken the view that it is bound by the factual
findings of the arbitral tribunal and will not address
any criticism relating to them unless a properly
reasoned grievance is raised and it seems to follow
the same rule even though the appeal is limited to
jurisdiction. A good example is a recent case57 in
which a company in charge of the DVD rights for
the Olympic Games in Beijing signed two “Deal
53. Note that an award rejecting jurisdiction is not «preliminary» but of
course fi nal and as such not subject to the limitations in art. 190(3)
PILA.
54. Op.cit nr. 150-152.
55. The writers quoted above at note 52 and Andreas BUCHER , op.cit 1675.
56. BUCHER , op.cit 1675; Jermini op.cit 250-255; K AUFMANN-KOHLER/
R IGOZZI op.cit 717; BERGER/K ELLERHALS op.cit 1537.
57. 4A_579/2010 Judgment of January 11, 2011, 2011 ASA Bullet in 716;
full English translation is at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/claim-oflack-of-jurisdiction-arbitration-clause-not-signed-no-r/.
memos subject to the subsequent execution of two
license agreements. Swiss law was applicable with
Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS ) arbitration
in Lausanne. A dispute arose and the respondent
challenged the jurisdiction of the CAS because the
license agreements had allegedly not been validly
concluded. The arbitrator5 rejected the argument
and issued a final award. In the appeal it was argued
that the arbitrator wrongly found that the license
agreements had been entered into but the FT rejected
the argument and restated its often expressed view
on the binding character of the factual findings of
the arbitral tribunal in the following terms: “Seized
of an argument of lack of jurisdiction, the Federal Tribunal
freely reviews the legal issues, including the preliminary issues
determining jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral
Tribunal (…). However it reviews the factual findings on which
the award under appeal relies only to the extent that one of the
grievances mentioned at Art. 190 (2) PILA is raised against
them or when some new facts or evidence are exceptionally taken
into account within the frameworks of the Civil law appeal
proceedings (...).(…) The Appellant claims in substance that
the License Agreements containing the arbitral clause were
never concluded because it is not established that it would have
received a signed copy before May 20, 2009. According to the
Appellant the CAS would have failed to notice that under
Swiss law both an offer and its acceptance are subject to being
received. The argument relies on an allegation departing from
the factual findings of the CAS, yet the Appellant raised none
of the aforesaid exceptions 59”.
Admittedly, the award in that case was final – thus
escaping the limitation of art.190(3) PILA - but the
same was held with regard to a purely jurisdictional
award in the dispute as to Gibraltar s application for
membership of the EFA60. When a CAS Panel of
three arbitrators61 accepted jurisdiction, the EFA
appealed and the FT stated the following: “In
jurisdictional matters, the Federal Tribunal freely reviews
the legal issues, including preliminary issues determining
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
However, it reviews the facts on which the award under
appeal was based – even when the issue is jurisdiction 62
– only if one of the grievances mentioned at Art. 190 (2)
PILA is raised against the factual findings or when some
new facts or evidence (see Art. 99 (1) LFT) are exceptionally
taken into account in the framework of the Civil law appeal
(…) 63 .
5 . Brigitte STERN.
59. 2.1 and 2.2 of the English version p.3.
60. 4A_392/200 Judgement of December 22, 200 , 2009 ASA Bulletin
review-by-the-federal-tribunal-of-an-award-upholding-jurisdictio/.
Also see 2009 Swiss Int l Arb.L. ep 1.
61. Peter L EAVER , Stephan NETZLE , arbitrators and aj HOBER ,
chairman.
62. Emphasis supplied.
63. 3.2 of the English version p.10.
-
9
The distinction between a “partial ” preliminary or
interim award, which must be appealed immediately
under penalty of forfeiting the right to any subsequent
judicial review of its contents and a preliminary
or interim award that may be appealed only on
the grounds at art.190 (2)(a) and (b) has become
clearer with case law and the 2011 amendment of
the LFT but some doubts remain: if an arbitral
tribunal finds that a contract was breached pursuant
to a specific submission by one of the parties but
leaves the financial consequences of the breach to
a subsequent determination, does it issue a partial
award or not ? A football player entered into a
contract with a Greek club. The club had an option
to extend the contract after two years and did so
but the player refused to stay. The club sued and the
FIFA Players Status Committee held that the option
was invalid. The club appealed to the CAS and the
FIFA decision was reversed: the option clause was
indeed valid and the Players Status Committee must
now determine the consequences of the breach of
contract. Was the CAS award “partial ” and therefore
to be appealed immediately ? Not according to the
FT, which held that “such a decision remanding the case
is an interim decision according to case law of the Federal
Tribunal (…). In international arbitration proceedings
interim or preliminary awards may only be appealed in a
public law appeal on the grounds contained at art.190(2)(a)
and (b) PILA (appointment and composition of the arbitral
tribunal; jurisdiction or lack thereof). Other grievances are not
admissible (…)64.”
Similarly, a German manufacturer of machines and
an English company entered into a commission
agreement containing an ICC arbitration clause
with a seat in Geneva. A dispute arose and the
claimant submitted that certain orders from Nigeria
and Malaysia must be included in the litigious
statements of commissions (submissions 1 and 2); it
also asked for an order that the respondents pay a
certain amount with interest (submissions 3 and 4).
The arbitrators65 issued an interlocutory and partial
award accepting jurisdiction, finding that the orders
placed by Nigeria and Malaysia were to be included
in the statements of commissions, yet reserving
submission 3 and the costs for a later phase whilst
rejecting submission 4. On appeal the FT held the
following66 as to the nature of the award: “(…) the
Arbitral Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction ratione
materiae, thus issuing a decision within the meaning of
64. 4P.298/2006 Judgment of February 14 2007, 2006 ASA Bulletin356
(original in German, excerpt translated by this writer). English
translation in 2007 Swiss Int’l Arb.L.Rep 31.
65. Philipp H ABEGGER , Rudolf FIEBINGER and Hans PATRY, chairman.
66. 4A_438/2008 Judgement of November 17, 2008, 2011 ASA Bulletin
distinction-between-interlocutory-and-partial-awards-legal-natur/#_
ftn2 ; also see 2008 Swiss Int’l Arb.L.Rep 535.
Art. 186 (3) PILA, which could be challenged only on the
grounds set forth at Art. 190 (2)(a) and (b) PILA (Art.
190 (3) PILA). (…) Whether or not it is capable of appeal
is a much more delicate question with regard to paragraphs
2 and 3 of the award under appeal. The arbitrators found
there that the orders from Nigeria and Malaysia should be
included in the statements of commissions. Such a finding is
only preliminary to the admission of Respondent’s submission
3, seeking payment of the commissions related to such orders,
on which the Arbitral Tribunal will issue a decision later on.
Therefore the award under appeal, which must be qualified as
an interlocutory award with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3,
could be challenged, with regard to these two items, only on the
grounds stated at Art. 190 (2)(a) and (b) PILA (…), to the
exclusion of the grievance of a violation of the right to be heard
(Art. 190 (2)(d) PILA) raised by the Appellants in that
context (…). The matter is therefore not capable of appeal in
this respect.” Probably sensing that the issue was quite
delicate, the Court added: “It is true that the litigious
finding was made on the basis of specific submissions made
by the Respondent (…), which the arbitrators found to be
acceptable notwithstanding the existence of submissions for the
payment of commissions relating to the orders included in the
submissions for findings. Be this as it may, notwithstanding
the finding made in their respect at paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
award under appeal, the litigious monetary claims have not
yet been dealt with, even in parte qua, as the award does
not provide the Respondent with a decision it could enforce,
albeit in part, against the Appellants. In other words, this is a
somewhat peculiar case in which a decision was issued on one of
the submissions relating to the same monetary claim without an
enforceable decision being issued in this respect. Hence, unless
(formal) submissions and (mere) claim are to be confused, it
must be found that with regard to the commissions relating to
the orders from Nigeria and Malaysia, the Arbitral Tribunal
did not issue a decision on part of the Respondent’s claim but
merely found that one of the elements of that claim existed,
namely the fact that the litigious orders were placed during
the time frame referred to in the Commission Agreement. In
doing so, it issued an interlocutory award and not a partial
award, against which a violation of the right to be heard could
be claimed 67”.
VII. “Implicitly” “interim” or “preliminary” and
therefore appealable on limited grounds ?
On the audacious assumption that the issues
addressed so far may have become fully clear to
the reader, an additional complication must now be
introduced: the contents of a decision may render
it “preliminary” but appealable on limited grounds
– and therefore require an appeal under penalty of
forfeiting one’s right pursuant to art. 190(3) PILA –
although it appears to be an innocuous procedural
order (“P.O.”). A preliminary “award ” may thus lurk
67. 2.3 of the English version pp 6-7.
-
10
under the disguise of a P.O if the arbitral tribunal, in
order to issue the P.O., implicity assumes jurisdiction
(no arbitrator would deny jurisdiction under the
pretense of a P.O. of course). It is more difficult to see
how an arbitral tribunal could “implicitly” decide that
it is properly composed but one could envisage that
rejecting a request by a unanimous decision could
perhaps reflect an “implicit” finding that the arbitral
tribunal’s composition or independence leaves
nothing to be desired. Furthermore, the “implicit”
preliminary award may not necessarily take the form
of an explicit holding in the “procedural order”: it might
just as well be in the reasons. The “criteria” to decide
whether it should be immediately appealed or not lie
in the spirit of the document: if it merely organizes
the proceedings, it is a P.O. but if it implicitly affirms
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and expresses
the intention of the arbitrators to assert jurisdiction
or proclaim that the panel is properly composed,
then it would have to be appealed immediately. In
other words, a decision may have to be appealed
when there is no formal disposition of any issues
simply because the wording of its reasons makes it
a preliminary award for the purposes of art. 190 (3)
PILA. The FT’s concern in this respect is to avoid
creating situations that would cause the parties to
run through the entire length of the arbitration and
undergo all the expenses entailed only to be told in
the end that there is no jurisdiction (or that the panel
was not properly composed). The preoccupation is
commendable but with all due respect to the Swiss
Supreme Court, requiring litigants to guess that a
decision implicitly decided jurisdictional issues – or
implicitly held that the arbitral tribunal was properly
composed – even though the document notified to
the parties does not say so and requiring that they
immediately appeal it or forfeit their right to do so, is
the source of great procedural uncertainty68, as will
be clear from two recent examples.
A French football player entered into a contract
with a French club in 2003, providing for his
training for three years and an obligation to sign
his first subsequent employment as a professional
with the club. Three years later the player went off
to the UK: the French club then sued the English
club and the player. The FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber (“DRC”) issued two decisions, the first
(November 2, 2004) set a time limit for the two
clubs to settle the matter and when they did not, the
second (November 26, 2004) rejected the claim on
jurisdictional and substantive grounds. The French
club appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(“CAS”). The CAS issued a P.O. in May, 2005 finding
that it had jurisdiction based on the FIFA Statutes
68. And is rightly criticized by Andreas BUCHER op.cit 1679 nr. 32.
and the Code of Arbitration for Sport and taking
notice that the parties agreed to submit their dispute
to the CAS. In October 2005 the CAS pronounced a
“partial award ” reversing the DRC in part and finding
a breach of contract, with the parties to be invited
to state their position on possible compensation
later. In uly 2007, a final award was issued, granting
financial compensation. The player appealed to the
FT, arguing among other things that the CAS lacked
jurisdiction to award damages. The FT found that
he should have appealed the October 2005 “partial
award ” and no longer could submit the jurisdictional
issue to the FT. The Court stated: “Contrary to what
he is claiming, the Appellant, assisted by counsel, could not in
good faith consider on the basis of the reasons of the October
2005 award that the CAS would deny jurisdiction in its
final award as to the claims for damages that the Respondent
may raise against the Appellant in its written pleadings to
be filed. In other words, nothing allowed the Appellant to
consider that the October 27, 2005 award purported to limit
the number of potential debtors towards the Respondent who
could be the object of a monetary award in the final award
and to exclude the Appellant therefrom. Thus, the Appellant
should have immediately appealed the first award (…) under
penalty of forfeiting the right to appeal if he meant to deny to
the CAS the jurisdiction to order him personally to compensate
the Respondent. Having failed to do so, he is no longer allowed
to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal
in the framework of his Civil law appeal against the final
award of July 17, 2007. The matter is accordingly not capable
of appeal to the extent that the Appellant seeks to demonstrate
the lack of jurisdiction of the CAS ratione personae, since
the issue of jurisdiction was already implicitly decided in the
award of October 27, 2005 69”.
Conversely in a dispute which developed into two
arbitrations based on a license agreement an ICC
arbitral tribunal sitting in eneva issued a partial
award in 2007 upholding the claim in principle
but differing quantum to a later stage. The license
agreement was then invalidated and a new, separate
arbitration commenced70. A stay of the proceedings
on quantum until determination by the second arbitral
tribunal as to the validity of the invalidation of the
license agreement was applied for but rejected in a
decision entitled “Procedural order nr.4”. A challenge
against the first arbitral tribunal was made to the
ICC and rejected, then the “Procedural order” was
appealed to the FT. The respondent claimed that as
a mere procedural order it was not capable of appeal.
The FT disagreed in the following terms: “(…) in
69. 4A 370 2007 udgment of February 28, 2008, 2008 ASA ulletin
334 full English translation at http: www.praetor.ch arbitrage
appeal-against-interlocutory-and-partial-awards-violation-of-pub .
Emphasis supplied. See 4.2 of the English version p.12. Also see 2008
Swiss Int’l Arb.L.Rep. 89.
70. This writer feels bound to disclose that he was on one of the two
panels, but not the one whose decision was appealed to the FT and
therefore feels free to comment on it.
-
11
order to decide if the matter is capable of appeal, the decisive
factor is not the name of the decision under review but its
contents. From that point of view, there is no doubt that the
Arbitral Tribunal did not limit itself to organizing the rest of
the proceedings. (….) as appears from the reasons it stated, if
the Arbitral Tribunal refused to stay the arbitral proceedings,
it was because it considered that it had jurisdiction to decide
the validity of the invalidation of the Second Amendment. By
doing so, it issued, at least implicitly, an interlocutory decision
relating to its jurisdiction ratione materiae, which is subject
to an appeal 71(….)The same reasoning may be followed with
regard to the developments in the decision under appeal in
which the Arbitral Tribunal rejected the argument relating to
the regularity of its composition in order to decide the issue of
the invalidation. Therefore, the nature of the decision under
appeal does not cause the matter to be incapable of appeal 72
(see Art. 190 (3) LDIP) 73”.
As a matter of principle it should be a rare occurrence
for an arbitral tribunal seized of an objection as to
jurisdiction or as to the composition of the panel
(which, as is well known, would also encompass
any objection made as to an arbitrator’s alleged
lack of independence or objectivity) to continue
the proceedings without addressing the issue(s)
appropriately but experience shows that it may and
does happen. Separate decisions should therefore
be required to do away with the risk of an “implicit”
determination in some procedural order addressing
other issues. This raises no difficulties at all as it is
established beyond any doubt that jurisdictional and
other challenges must be raised immediately by the
allegedly aggrieved party74.
VIII. Decisions on costs: a duck-billed platypus ?
A bizarre duck-billed creature, ornithorhynchus anatinus
is a mammal that lays eggs, has a beaver tail but
otter feet and a venomous wasp- like sting defying
naturalists’ classification: the procedural nature of a
“Swiss” decision on arbitration costs appears similarly
baffl ing. No one would deny that apportioning costs
is a “decision”: after all that is how the parties know
which one is going to foot the bill of the arbitration,
entirely or in part. Even in institutional arbitrations,
such as ICC proceedings, where the costs of the
proceedings and the fees of the arbitrators are the
object of a separate assessment by the institution, the
award contains the decision apportioning them. In ad
73. 4A_210/2008 Judgment of October 29, 2008, 2009 ASA Bulletin
admissibility-of-appeal-against-interlocutory-decision-procedura/. See
2.1 of the English version p.5.
74. For a recent example see 4A_258/2009 Judgment of January 11,
2010, 2010 ASA Bulletin 540; full English translation at http://www.
praetor.ch/arbitrage/invalid-waiver-of-the-appeal-to-the-federaltribunal-through-ref1/.
hoc arbitration the arbitrators themselves determine
both75. In a Zurich Chamber of Commerce arbitration
initiated in 2008 the arbitrators76 decided to limit the
proceedings to jurisdiction at first and advised the
parties as to the deposit according to the applicable
Swiss Rules. The deposit was not paid and in June
2010 the arbitral tribunal stayed the proceedings,
demanded payment of the deposit again and issued a
decision on costs, ordering each of the parties to pay
half the arbitration costs incurred so far (there were
two claimants and in excess of ten respondents so it
was to be “jointly and severally” within both groups).
The respondents appealed and the FT found that
the matter was not capable of appeal. To the extent
that the proceedings were stayed no appeal could
be made against a procedural decision that could be
rescinded at any time and the same applied to the
section of the “interim award ” demanding payment
of the deposit. The Court added that generally
speaking an arbitral tribunal has no authority to
issue a decision on costs which would entitle the
arbitrators to collect from the parties. It is only
between the parties that the decision on costs is res judicata
according to the FT, which relied in this respect
on legal writing77 holding the view that Swiss law
contains no specific provision that would empower
the arbitral tribunal to issue a binding decision as to
its own costs in international matters78. The Court
added the following: “This is because claims resulting
from the relationship between the arbitral tribunal and the
parties do not fall within the arbitration clause; also because
this would be an unacceptable decision in one’s own case (…).
The decision on costs in an arbitral award is therefore nothing
else than a rendering of account which does not bind the
parties 79 (…) or a circumscription of the arbitrators’ private
law claim based on the arbitration agreement on which in case
of dispute the state court 80will have to decide (…) It is only in
the relationship between the parties that the indication of the
amount of the procedural costs in the arbitral award has the
effect of an enforceable judgment, namely to the extent only that
it decides on the allocation of and liability for the costs between
75. And in arbitrations under the Swiss Rules, where the institution
(Chamber of Commerce) puts forward its costs only but not the fees
of the arbitrators. The fi nal decision is made by the arbitral tribunal
in consultation with the institution . See Articles 38 and 40(4) of the
Swiss Rules.
76. Richard K REINDLER , chairman, Dominique DREYER and Laurent
K ILLIAS, arbitrators.
77. Anton H EINI, Zürcher Kommentar zur IPRG ad art.186 nr.26;
BERGER/K ELLERHALS, op.cit par. 1479; H.H Inderkum, Der
Schiedsrichtervertrag, p. 150.
78. In national arbitrations there is a specific provision, namely art. 384
(1)(f) of the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure.
80. Emphasis supplied. It would have been interesting for the FT to
explain which state court would have jurisdiction when the three
arbitrators are in different countries – none in Switzerland quite often –
and the parties come from five or six other and different jurisdictions.
One does not see why the court at the “seat” of the arbitration would
have jurisdiction as to this “rendering of account” and it is likely that
if seized, a foreign court would demur precisely because the arbitration
was “Swiss”, thus creating a hopeless procedural conundrum.
-
12
the parties. (…) Lacking authority of the arbitral tribunal
to decide the issue, (…) the “interim awards” under appeal
may not contain decisional orders even if one were to see in
them the liquidation of previously incurred costs of the arbitral
tribunal and not a request for the payment of a deposit. They
are therefore mere presentations of accounts which lack the
characteristics of an award subject to appeal (…) 81”.
This (isolated) decision has been rightly criticized
by Andreas Bucher 82 who points out among other
things that the dichotomy between the impact as to
the parties and the alleged “rendering of account” by
the arbitrators would lead to the illogical result that
the arbitrators could claim their fee pursuant to the
receptum arbitrii – the “contract” between the arbitrator
and the parties – even though the award may have
been annulled on public policy grounds because
the costs would have been entirely inappropriate.
Conversely an award upheld would still not entitle
the arbitrator to collect the fee “decided” in the award.
foreign and Swiss counsel will be reduced to a
minimum by the constraints of time unless one takes
the precaution of associating Swiss counsel to one’s
team well in advance. Whilst undoubtedly helpful
to the prosperity of Swiss law firms, this seems to
defeat the very purpose of international arbitration,
which is to make it possible for a party to appear
with counsel it feels comfortable with without
resorting to expensive and sometimes hardly useful
local assistance.
Last but not least, as we have seen above83, the costs
involved in Swiss appeal proceedings can be very
significant when the amount in dispute is high, which
is a very frequent occurrence in modern commercial
or investment arbitration. It is hardly advisable for
a jurisdiction wishing to remain a favorite venue of
international arbitrations to cause litigants to spend
hundreds of thousands of dollars to be told merely
that the matter is not capable of appeal or that an
appeal should have been made earlier.
IX. Practical considerations and need for a change
The time-limit to appeal a Swiss award is extremely
short: thirty days and unlike otherwise comparable
systems a fully reasoned and argued brief is expected
within that time limit. Any argument raised later –
in a reply for instance – will be rejected by the Court
if it was not already developed in the original appeal.
This makes counsel’s task quite arduous: within
thirty days a fi le needs to be mastered, at least
as to the facts, testimony and legal arguments
germane to the issues to be argued in the appeal.
As international arbitrations develop into ever more
complex litigations this may be quite a challenge
given so little time. The appealing party is unlikely
to be able to handle French, German or Italian,
thus making English or other translations of the
draft brief a necessary, albeit almost impossible
requirement because by the time one or several
lawyers have (i) become acquainted with the facts
and the record of the arbitration (ii) recognized the
legal issues to be raised in the appeal (iii) drafted a
thorough brief meeting the fairly strict requirements
of the LFT and case law, there will be merely a few
days – sometimes a few hours – left before the fi ling
deadline. Whilst theoretically possible, appeals
drafted by foreign counsel only are not advisable in
practical terms. It takes a fairly experienced Swiss
lawyer to work her way through the pitfalls of
admissibility requirements, yet cooperation between
81. 4A_391/2010 Judgment of November 10, 2010, ATF 136 III 597
(excerpts in German); 2011 ASA Bulletin 110; full English translation
at http://www.praetor.ch/arbitrage/procedural-order-of-the-arbitraltribunal-directing-payment-of-t/. See 5.2.1 of the English version p.7.
82. Op.cit 1681 nr. 37-39.
Yet the system is unlikely to change in respect of
the time limits because the Swiss parliament would
be most reluctant to extend the deadline to appeal
an international award to a more manageable sixty
or ninety days, perhaps with a requirement that the
appeal be announced within thirty days and the appeal
brief due sixty days later84. Doing so for international
arbitral awards only would fall under the suspicion
of making appeals by “foreigners” easier than for the
average Swiss litigant, a proposition unlikely to be
endorsed by any member of the Swiss parliament
except one remarkably keen on political suicide.
Extending the time limit for all appeals would raise
some other delicate policy issues and is probably a
non-starter either. Any attempts at extending the
time limits to appeal to the FT appears therefore
doomed for the time being and probably for several
years or even decades ahead85.
However, a parliamentary initiative by National
Counselor Christian Lüscher86 to amend art. 7 PILA
with a view to anchoring the negative effect of the
rule of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 87, whilst already adopted
83. See section V para. 5.
84. This would not affect enforcement because the award is immediately
enforceable and remains so during the appeal proceedings unless a stay
of enforcement is granted by the FT, which often refuses to do so.
85. As a young Swiss MP full of eagerness and illusions, this writer
raised that very issue with some colleagues in 1993, only to realize
that his fellow legislators saw no wisdom at all in giving it rich lawyers
(in their view) additional time and opportunities to obfuscate things
and create even more confusion and delays than they already did.
Interestingly, several federal judges of the time appeared to share this
unquestionably pragmatic view.
86. A Swiss politician, partner of ZPG and the author of a leading
commentary of the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure. See David
HOFFMANN/Christian LÜSCHER Le Code de procédure civile (2009).
87. Individual bill (“Parliamentary initiative”) LÜSCHER 08.417 of March
20, 2008 – Amendment of article 7 of the Federal Law of December 18
-
13
by the Swiss Parliament, might evolve towards a
“brushing up” of the entire chapter 12 of PILA. If this
view ultimately prevails in the Swiss parliament, a
closer look at art.190 may be advisable as well because
a redrafting of the provision appears quite necessary
in light of the uncertainties described above. A
possible way to address the issues the provision
raises sic stante would be to amend it as follows:
Art. 190 88
IX. Finality, appeal
1. General rule
(1) The award shall be final when communicated.
(2) It can be challenged only:
a. If a sole arbitrator was designated irregularly or the
arbitral tribunal was constituted irregularly;
b. If the arbitral tribunal erroneously held that it had
or did not have jurisdiction;
c. If the arbitral tribunal ruled on matters beyond the
claims submitted to it or if it failed to
rule on one of the claims;
d. If the equality of the parties or their right to be
heard in an adversarial proceeding was not
respected;
e. If the award is incompatible with public policy.
(3) (new) Decisions as to the allegedly irregular
constitution of the arbitral tribunal {art. 190 (2)
(a)} and as to jurisdiction {art.190 (2) (b)} shall
be issued in a formal preliminary decision
meeting the requirements of art. 186 (3) and 189,
appealable immediately pursuant to art.191.
(4) (new) Other partial awards and preliminary
decisions may not be appealed before the final
award.
1987 on International Private Law, adopted by both Chambers of the
Swiss Parliament. See the legislative history of the bill at http://www.
parlament.ch/f/suche/pages/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id=20080417.
88. The English translation used here is due to the Zurich law fi rm of
Umbricht and may be found at http://www.umbricht.ch/pdf/SwissPIL.
pdf except for art.190(2)(e) which I have slightly modified in line with
the terminology used in this article.
-
14
La preuve du dopage dans les cas de présence d’une substance interdite
Me Estelle de La Rochefoucauld, Conseiller auprès du TAS
I.
La Réglementation applicable................................................................................................................................................16
A. Les textes applicables........................................................................................................................................................16
1. La loi fédérale suisse sur le Droit International Privé (LDIP)..............................................................................16
2. Le Code de l’Arbitrage en matière de Sport & les règlements des organisations sportives ............................16
3. Le Code Mondial Antidopage ....................................................................................................................................16
B. Le régime de la preuve selon le CMA ...........................................................................................................................18
1. L’article 3.1 CMA...........................................................................................................................................................18
2. Le fardeau de la preuve ...............................................................................................................................................18
3. Le degré de la preuve fonction de la qualité des parties ........................................................................................18
4. Les moyens de preuve...................................................................................................................................................18
5. Le concept de responsabilité objective ou ‘strict liability’ lié à la présence d’une substance interdite..........18
5.1 Présomption de violation de la réglementation antidopage et disqualification............................................19
5.2 Présomption de culpabilité et sanction en cas de présence de substance interdite .....................................19
5.3 Présomption de culpabilité et sanction en cas de présence d’une substance spécifiée ...............................19
II. Le fardeau et de degré de la preuve au regard du droit et de la jurisprudence .............................................................20
A. Le fardeau de la preuve ....................................................................................................................................................20
1. L’application du droit applicable au fond ..................................................................................................................20
2. Les cas particuliers ........................................................................................................................................................20
B. Défi nition du degré de la preuve par la jurisprudence du TAS ................................................................................20
III. L’appréciation de la preuve.....................................................................................................................................................21
IV. Le dopage lié à la présence d’une substance interdite dans la jurisprudence du TAS ................................................22
A. Conditions de réduction de la période de suspension lié à la présence de substances interdites:
le cas du Clenbuterol .........................................................................................................................................................22
B. Condition de réduction de la période de suspension liée à la présence de substances spécifiées ......................23
1. Négligence non significative .......................................................................................................................................23
2. Négligence significative ...............................................................................................................................................23
3. Révision du CMA..........................................................................................................................................................25
Après avoir défini les notions de fardeau et de degré
de la preuve, nous nous attacherons à examiner
l’administration de la preuve dans les affaires de
dopage et plus particulièrement dans les cas de
présence d’une substance interdite dans l’organisme
d’un sportif, qui restent à ce jour, les plus nombreux
devant le Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS).
En matière de dopage, c’est l’autorité sportive qui
rapportera la preuve du dopage commis par un
athlète. Ce dernier pourra ensuite tenter de prouver
son innocence.
D’une manière générale, la preuve peut être définie
comme la démonstration de la réalité d’un fait.
La charge de la preuve (onus probandi) ou encore le
fardeau, reposent sur la partie qui se prévaut de ce
fait. Ainsi, la charge de la preuve est l’obligation qui
est faite à l’une des parties au litige de prouver ce que
celle-ci avance, soit les faits nécessaires au succès de
sa prétention. On peut également noter les adages
suivants, necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, “la nécessité
de la preuve incombe à celui qui se plaint ” ou encore Actori
incubit probatio, “celui qui se prétend titulaire d’un droit doit
le prouver ”.
Le degré de preuve requis n’est pas identique dans tous
les domaines du droit. Dans les affaires civiles, le degré
de preuve à atteindre pour obtenir le résultat souhaité
est la prépondérance. Celle-ci est atteinte lorsque celui
ou celle qui avance un fait est parvenu à convaincre le
juge que l’existence d’un fait est plus probable que son
-
15
inexistence. Dans les affaires pénales, la loi exige une
preuve plus convaincante. Autrement dit, le degré de
preuve requis est plus élevé. Il s’agit de la preuve audelà du doute raisonnable. En matière disciplinaire,
le degré de preuve habituellement applicable est la
satisfaction de l’instance d’audition. Il s’agit d’un
degré de preuve moindre que la preuve au-delà du
doute raisonnable et plus élevé que la prépondérance
des probabilités. Comme nous le verrons, la solution
retenue en matière de sport varie en fonction de
la qualité de la personne ou de l’organisation sur
laquelle repose le fardeau de la preuve et du système
de présomptions mis en place par le Code Mondial
Antidopage (CMA).
Le juste équilibre entre autonomie des associations,
intégrité du sport, harmonisation au niveau
international et droit de la personnalité en matière de
lutte contre le dopage a donné lieu a un important
débat qui a abouti à une collaboration inédite entre
gouvernements et fédérations sportives. Le CMA a
établi, dans ce cadre, un système de présomptions
destiné à lutter efficacement contre le dopage, système
qui se répercute sur l’administration de la preuve et
sur les sanctions applicables.
Dans ce contexte, nous nous attacherons à étudier
plus particulièrement certains cas de présence de
substances interdites dans l’organisme d’un sportif
comme le Clenbuterol, ainsi que des cas liées à la
présence de substances spécifiées. Si le choix des
sentences du TAS retenues pour illustrer notre
propos n’est pas exhaustif, il nous a cependant paru
représentatif des développements récents dans ce
domaine.
I. La Réglementation applicable
A. Les textes applicables
1.
La loi Fédérale suisse sur le Droit International
Privé (LDIP)
Le chapitre 12 de la LDIP intitulé Arbitrage
international dispose à l’article 182:
“VI. Procédure
1. Principe
1
Les parties peuvent, directement ou par référence à un
règlement d’arbitrage, régler la procédure arbitrale; elles
peuvent aussi soumettre celle-ci à la loi de procédure de leur
choix.
2
Si les parties n’ont pas réglé la procédure, celle-ci sera, au
besoin, fixée par le tribunal arbitral, soit directement, soit
par référence à une loi ou à un règlement d’arbitrage.
3
Quelle que soit la procédure choisie, le tribunal arbitral doit
garantir l’égalité entre les parties et leur droit d’être entendues
en procédure contradictoire”.
L’art. 182 établit une hiérarchie des sources. Ainsi,
en matière d’arbitrage international, le choix du
règlement d’arbitrage applicable appartient en premier
lieu aux parties.
En cas d’absence de choix des parties, l’art. 182 LDIP
prévoit que la procédure sera fixée par le tribunal
arbitral, soit directement, soit par référence à une loi
ou à un règlement d’arbitrage. Dans ce cas, les arbitres
ne sont pas liés par la procédure suisse et peuvent
se référer à des règles transnationales comme par
exemple les règles de l’International Bar Association
(IBA). Dans tous les cas, les arbitres devront garantir
l’égalité entre les parties et leur droit d’être entendues
en procédure contradictoire.
2. Le Code de l’Arbitrage en matière de Sport et les
règlements des organisations sportives
Le Code de l’Arbitrage en matière de Sport (le
Code) et les règles de procédure contenues dans la
réglementation des fédérations sportives sont le plus
souvent applicables en vertu de la reconnaissance
de la compétence du TAS par les règlements des
organisations sportives et de l’art. R58 du Code
qui dispose “[L]a Formation statue selon les règlements
applicables et selon les règles de droit choisies par les parties… ”.
L’ art. R58 du Code prévoit qu’à défaut de choix, la
Formation statue “selon le droit du pays dans lequel la
fédération, association ou autre organisme sportif ayant rendu
la décision attaquée a son domicile ou selon les règles de droit
dont la Formation estime l’application appropriée. Dans ce
dernier cas, la décision de la Formation doit être motivée”.
3. Le Code Mondial Antidopage (CMA)
Le Code Mondial Antidopage (CMA) adopté en 2003
et révisé en 2009, détermine les règles applicables
au dopage. Ces règles définissent notamment les
différentes violations des règles antidopage, le régime
de la preuve et les sanctions applicables. L’application
des principes et des règles antidopage du CMA est
garantie par leur adoption et leur mise en œuvre
par l’ensemble des signataires que constituent le
Comité International Olympique (CIO), le Comité
International Paralympique (CIP), les Fédérations
Internationales (FI), les Comités Nationaux
Olympiques (CNO) et Paralympiques (CNP), les
organisations nationales antidopage, les organisations
responsables des grandes manifestations telles que
-
16
les Jeux Olympiques (JO) et l’Agence Mondiale
Antidopage (AMA). L’application de ces règles
par les Fédérations Nationales (FN) est à son tour
garantie par le fait que l’affi liation des FN aux FI
est subordonnée à la conformité de leurs principes,
règles et programmes au CMA.
L’objectif du CMA est double. Il s’agit d’une part de
“[P]rotéger le droit fondamental des sportifs de participer à des
activités sportives exemptes de dopage, promouvoir la santé et
garantir ainsi aux sportifs du monde entier l’équité et l’égalité
dans le sport ” et d’autre part de “[V]eiller à l’harmonisation,
à la coordination et à l’efficacité des programmes antidopage
aux niveaux international et national en matière de détection,
de dissuasion et de prévention du dopage” (CMA p. 11).
Concrètement, le Code Mondial Antidopage établit
des règles et des principes antidopage qui, à des
fins d’harmonisation, doivent être suivies par les
organisations antidopage. Il existe deux types de
dispositions. Certaines dispositions doivent être
reprises par les signataires dans leurs propres règles
sans changement de fond (les changements de forme
liés à la mention du nom de l’organisation, du sport
visé, des numéros de section etc. sont autorisés).
Parmi ces dispositions figurent notamment les règles
relatives à la définition du dopage, aux violations
des règles antidopage, à la preuve du dopage, aux
substances spécifiées, à l’établissement par l’AMA de
la liste des interdictions, à l’annulation automatique
des résultats individuels, aux sanctions à l’encontre
des individus (voir art. 23.2.2 CMA).
D’autres dispositions sont transposables conformément aux directives données et laissent aux organisations sportives une plus grande latitude dans le
libellé des règles ou, lorsque les exigences définies
n’imposent pas nécessairement leur reprise dans
des règles, le respect de ces dernières. Par exemple,
l’harmonisation recherchée n’oblige pas les signataires à utiliser la même procédure d’audition.
En conséquence, ce n’est pas le CMA mais les
réglementations antidopage des Fédérations qui sont
directement applicables an tant que lex specialis. Il
en résulte certaines différences selon les sports. Les
groupes cibles de sportifs soumis aux contrôles et les
processus de gestion des résultats ne sont ainsi pas
nécessairement identiques pour chaque sport.
Dans ce contexte, le TAS a récemment eu à
examiner le cas d’une FI dont la réglementation
antidopage prévoyait des sanctions différant de
celles figurant dans le CMA. Ainsi, l’article 10.2 du
règlement antidopage de la fédération internationale
d’Haltérophilie (IWF) prévoyait une suspension de 4
ans en lieu et place de la suspension de 2 ans prévue
par le CMA pour une première violation (art. 10.2
CMA). Il s’agit d’une différence substantielle, un
changement de fond, contraire aux termes de l’art.
23.2.2 CMA susvisé.
Dans la jurisprudence CAS 2011/A/2612, la
Formation arbitrale a tout d’abord considéré que
les exigences listées dans le CMA doivent, en
principe, non seulement être interprétés comme des
standards minimum mais aussi comme des standards
maximum1 et qu’en devenant signataire du CMA,
l’IWF s’était contractuellement engagée à adopter et
mettre en œuvre des règles antidopage conformes au
CMA. Cependant, la Formation a ajouté que selon
la jurisprudence constante du TAS, le CMA n’est
pas directement applicable à l’IWF et à ses athlètes
affi liés2. Comme indiqué précédemment, ce sont
les réglementations antidopage des Fédérations qui
sont directement applicables an tant que lex specialis.
Il s’ensuit que l’IWF peut, de façon consciente ou
inconsciente, être en violation des ses obligations visà-vis de l’AMA et du CIO sans que cela ait un impact
sur la relation contractuelle distincte existant entre
l’IWF et l’athlète sanctionné par la suspension de 4
ans prévue pour une première violation. L’autonomie
de la relation entre la fédération internationale et un
athlète affi lié n’est pas limitée par les engagements
contractuels éventuels existants entre la fédération
internationale et des tiers3.
Cependant, la Formation saisie a souligné que
l’autonomie de l’IWF en matière de réglementation
sur le dopage vis-à-vis de ses affi liées était limitée
par le droit suisse de l’association applicable
à titre subsidiaire. Or, selon le droit suisse de
l’association, une fédération doit établir les mesures
disciplinaires prises à l’encontre de ses membres sur
des dispositions claires sur lesquelles repose son
autorité4. Ces principes sont d’ailleurs confirmés par
la jurisprudence du TAS indépendamment du droit
applicable au fond5. Dans ce contexte, la Formation
a souligné que l’IWF n’avait pas été particulièrement
diligente dans la mise en œuvre de sa réglementation
antidopage et que ces règles, vues dans leur ensemble,
sont ambigües et contradictoires. Par exemple, la
préface de la réglementation antidopage de l’IWF
1. CAS 2011/A/2612 para. 90.
2. CAS 2008/A/1718-1724, para. 61.
3. CAS 2011/A/2612 para. 99.
4. CAS 2011/A/2612 para. 103 et références doctrinales citées (cf. BSKZGB/Heini/Sherrer, 4th ed. 2010, Art. 70 no. 22 ; Sherrer/Ludwig,
Sportrecht, 2. Aufl. 2010, S. 303 ; BK-ZGB/Riemer, 1990, Art. 70 no.
210 ; Heini/Portmann/Seeman, Grundriss Vereinsrecht, 2009, no. 265).
5. CAS 94/129 (no. 30, 34): “Any legal regime should seek to enable its
subjects to assess the consequences of their actions …”… while “the
fight against doping is arduous, and … may require strict rules, …
the rule-makers and the rule-appliers must begin by being strict with
themselves.”
-
17
stipule que les règles sont adoptées et mises en œuvre
conformément aux responsabilités de l’IWF à l’égard
du CMA. De même, le commentaire de l’art. 10.2 de
ladite réglementation semble indiquer, contrairement
aux termes de l’art. 10.2, que la sanction de base est
une suspension de 2 ans et non pas de 4 ans.
En outre, la Formation a tenu compte du fait que
la réglementation antidopage de l’IWF est formulée
unilatéralement et que les parties à la relation
contractuelle ont un pouvoir de négociation inégal.
La Formation a ainsi considéré qu’il était approprié
d’appliquer le principe “contra proferentem” avec
la conséquence que les sanctions prévues par la
réglementation antidopage de l’IWF doivent être
atténuées afin de se conformer au CMA.
Aujourd’hui, la divergence entre le règlement
antidopage de l’IWF et le CMA a cessé puisque la
commission exécutive de l’IWF a, par décision du
9 mai 2012, réduit la période d’inéligibilité de 4 à 2
ans pour une première infraction à la réglementation
antidopage.
B. Le régime de la preuve selon le CMA
1.
3. Le degré de la preuve fonction de la qualité des
parties
Le degré de la preuve auquel l’organisation antidopage
est astreinte consiste à établir la violation des règles
antidopage à la satisfaction de l’instance d’audition
(art. 3.1 CMA).
En ce qui concerne l’athlète ou toute autre personne
présumée avoir commis une violation des règles
antidopage et devant renverser la présomption
de violation des règles antidopage ou établir des
circonstances ou des faits spécifiques, le degré de
preuve requis est un juste équilibre des probabilités.
Le degré de la preuve est moins élevé que pour
l’organisation antidopage. Il ne serait en effet pas
justifié de demander un degré de preuve plus élevé à
l’athlète qui est confronté à la règle de ‘strict liability’
et aux difficultés inhérentes au régime de la preuve
(Infra).
4. Les moyens de preuve
“Les faits liés aux violations des règles antidopage peuvent être
établis par tout moyen fiable, y compris des aveux ” (art. 3.2
CMA).
L’article 3.1 du Code AMA
3.1 Charge de la preuve et degré de preuve
“La charge de la preuve incombera à l’organisation antidopage,
qui devra établir la violation d’une règle antidopage. Le degré
de preuve auquel l’organisation antidopage est astreinte consiste
à établir la violation des règles antidopage à la satisfaction de
l’instance d’audition, qui appréciera la gravité de l’allégation.
Le degré de preuve, dans tous les cas, devra être plus important
qu’une simple prépondérance des probabilités, mais moindre
qu’une preuve au-delà du doute raisonnable. Lorsque le
Code impose à un sportif, ou à toute autre personne présumée
avoir commis une violation des règles antidopage, la charge de
renverser la présomption ou d’établir des circonstances ou des
faits spécifiques, le degré est établi par la prépondérance des
probabilités, sauf dans les cas prévus aux articles 10.4 et 10.6,
ou le sportif doit satisfaire à une charge de preuve plus élevée”.
2. Le fardeau de la preuve
En application du principe général du droit, c’est la
partie revendiquant un droit reposant sur un fait qui
a la charge de prouver ce fait.
Par ailleurs, selon l’Art. 3.1 CMA, la charge de la
preuve repose sur l’organisation antidopage qui doit
établir la violation de la règle antidopage.
Jusqu’à présent, la preuve du dopage est le plus
souvent rapportée par les autorités sportives par le
biais des analyses des échantillons A et B réalisées
par les laboratoires accrédités par l’Agence Mondiale
Antidopage (AMA). C’est l’infraction liée à la présence
d’une substance interdite dans un échantillon fourni
par un sportif (art. 2.1 CMA). Lorsqu’il n’y a pas de
résultat d’analyse anormal, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il n’y
a pas de test révélant la présence d’une substance
interdite dans l’organisme d’un athlète, la preuve de
la violation de la règle antidopage peut être rapportée
par tout moyen fiable y compris les témoignages6, la
compilation des profi ls biologiques7, et l’obtention de
renseignements relatifs à la localisation des athlètes8.
5. Le concept de responsabilité objective ou ‘strict
liability’ lié à la présence d’une substance interdite
En application de l’Art. 2.1.1 CMA, l’athlète est
considéré responsable de toute substance interdite
dont la présence est décelée dans ses échantillons
indépendamment de son intention, de sa faute ou
de sa négligence. Ce système de présomptions a des
conséquences au regard de la preuve et des sanctions
applicables.
6. Voir par exemple CAS 2004/O/649.
7. Voir par exemple CAS 2009/A/1912-1913.
8. 2009/A/1831; 2011/A/2499; 2011/A/2526; 2011/A/2671.
-
18
5.1 Présomption de violation de la réglementation
antidopage et disqualification
Une violation des règles antidopage est établie
lorsqu’une substance interdite est détectée dans
l’organisme d’un athlète sans qu’il soit besoin de
prouver l’intention, la faute, la négligence ou l’usage
conscient de la substance interdite par l’athlète. Une
telle violation conduit automatiquement à l’annulation
des résultats obtenus, le cas échéant, en compétition,
et à toutes les conséquences en résultant (art. 9 CMA).
Pour renverser la présomption de violation des règles
antidopage ou établir des circonstances ou des faits
spécifiques, l’athlète pourra tenter de démontrer
qu’un écart par rapport aux Standards Internationaux
est à l’origine du résultat d’analyse anormal (art. 3.2.2
CMA). Dans ce cas, l’organisation antidopage pourra
à son tour tenter de renverser la preuve. L’athlète
pourra aussi démontrer qu’il est autorisé à utiliser
la substance ou la méthode interdite car il bénéficie
d’une Autorisation d’Usage à des fins Thérapeutique
(AUT) (art. 4.4 CMA).
Si l’athlète réussit à démontrer qu’un écart par rapport
aux Standards Internationaux a causé le résultat
d’analyse anormal ou qu’il bénéficie d’une AUT
justifiée par des motifs médicaux, il n’y aura pas de
violation des normes antidopage.
Les tentatives ayant pour but de contester des résultats
d’analyse anormaux en faisant valoir un écart par
rapport aux Standards Internationaux sont, sauf dans
quelques cas9, souvent infructueuses10. En pratique,
la preuve d’un écart par rapport aux Standards
Internationaux est difficile à rapporter, d’autant
que pour les écarts par rapports aux Standards
Internationaux des Laboratoires (SIL), les laboratoires
accrédités par l’AMA sont présumés avoir conduit la
procédure conformément aux standards.
5.2 Présomption de culpabilité et sanction en cas de
présence de substance interdite
Dès lors que la présence d’une substance interdite
est décelée dans l’organisme d’un athlète, celui-ci est
présumé fautif. Il s’agit, là aussi, d’une règle objective
puisque la seule présence fonde la présomption de
culpabilité. Dans ce cas, pour une première violation
des règles antidopage liées à la présence d’une
substance interdite dans l’organisme d’un sportif, la
période de suspension sera de 2 ans (art. 10.2 CMA).
9. Voir CAS 2006/A/1119 où un coureur cycliste est parvenu à
démontrer un écart par rapport aux Standards Internationaux des
Laboratoires (SIL) et à renverser la présomption et CAS 2009/A/1767.
10. Par exemple CAS 2007/A/1394, CAS 2009/A/1755 paras. 76 s ; CAS
2011/A/2612 paras. 60 s.
Cependant, cette présomption peut être renversée
lorsque l’athlète démontre comment la substance
interdite est entrée dans son organisme et rapporte
la preuve qu’il n’a pas commis de faute ou qu’il n’a
pas été négligent (art. 10.5.1), ou bien que cette
faute ou cette négligence n’est pas significative (art.
10.5.2). Dans ce cas, afin de démontrer l’absence de
faute ou de négligence, l’athlète doit prouver qu’il ne
savait pas (absence d’intention) ou qu’il ne se doutait
pas (absence de négligence), même en ayant fait la
preuve de la plus extrême prudence (“utmost caution”),
qu’il avait utilisé ou qu’on lui avait administré une
substance interdite11. L’enjeu de cette démonstration
est l’annulation (absence de faute ou de négligence)
ou la réduction (absence de faute ou de négligence
significative) de la suspension12. Il va sans dire
que cette preuve est difficile à rapporter comme le
montrent de nombreux cas de jurisprudence13.
5.3 Présomption de culpabilité et sanction en cas de
présence d’une substance spécifiée
L’article 10.4 a été introduit dans le Code Mondial
lors de la révision de 2009 afin de garantir un
“juste équilibre entre les sanctions inflexibles qui favorisent
l’harmonisation de l’application des règles et les sanctions
plus souples qui tiennent davantage compte des circonstances
individuelles ”14. La liste des substances interdites établie
par l’Agence Mondiale Antidopage (AMA) distingue
les substances et les méthodes interdites en et hors
compétition des substances et méthodes interdites
en compétition. Parmi les substances interdites en
compétition, on trouve les stimulants (Art. S6 de la
liste). Les “stimulants non spécifiés” font l’objet d’une
liste détaillée. L’art. S6a in fine indique qu’un stimulant
qui n’est pas expressément nommé est “une substance
spécifiée”.
Lorsqu’une substance spécifiée est en cause, que le
sportif peut établir comment celle-ci s’est retrouvée
dans son organisme et que l’instance d’audition
est satisfaite que le sportif n’avait pas l’intention
d’améliorer sa performance ni de masquer l’usage
d’une substance améliorant la performance (art. 10.4
CMA), la suspension peut être annulée ou réduite.
Pour une première violation, la sanction sera au
moins une réprimande, sans période de suspension,
et au maximum 2 ans de suspension. L’art. 10.4
prévoit que le sportif devra produire des preuves. La
gravité de la faute du sportif sera le critère applicable
11. Voir CAS 2005/A/990 qui représente un cas exceptionnel
d’annulation de la sanction où l’athlète est parvenu à démontrer
comment la substance interdite était entrée dans son organisme et son
absence de faute.
12. Voir CAS 2009/A/1870 sur la faute non significative de l’athlète
justifiant une réduction de la sanction.
13. Voir par exemple CAS 2006/A/1067.
14. Voir Commentaire sur l’article 4.2.2 CMA.
-
19
pour l’examen de toute réduction de la période de
suspension.
II. Le fardeau et de degré de la preuve au regard
du droit et de la jurisprudence
A. Le fardeau de la preuve
1.
L’ application du droit applicable au fond
Les réglementations applicables, ne définissent pas
le terme “charge de la preuve ”. Dans son ensemble,
la doctrine considère que, dans les affaires
internationales, la charge de la preuve est régie par la
lex causae, soit par la loi applicable au fond du litige et
non par la loi applicable à la procédure15.
Selon le droit suisse, la charge de la preuve est
réglementée par l’Art. 8 du Code Civil (CC), qui,
en stipulant quelle partie en a la charge, détermine
les conséquences de l’absence de preuve16. L’Art. 8
CC dispose que “Chaque partie doit, si la loi ne prescrit
le contraire, prouver les faits qu’elle allègue pour en déduire
son droit ”. Il en résulte qu’à contrario, le cas devra
être décidé contre la partie qui n’a pu décharger son
fardeau de preuve.
Ainsi, la jurisprudence du TAS précise qu’une
simple allégation non étayée par une preuve n’est pas
suffisante pour satisfaire l’obligation liée au fardeau
de la preuve17.
Toujours selon le droit suisse, pour être valide, la
contestation d’un fait doit être spécifique. En d’autres
termes, la contestation doit être dirigée et attribuée à
un fait individuel par la partie qui supporte le fardeau
de la preuve18.
2. Les cas particuliers
Ces cas se rencontrent lorsqu’une partie est confrontée
à une difficulté sérieuse pour décharger son fardeau
de preuve. C’est ce qu’on appelle l’ “état de nécessité ” ou
“Beweisnostand ”. Une des raisons pouvant expliquer
cette difficulté est que les informations pertinentes se
trouvent être entre les mains ou sous le contrôle de la
partie adverse et qu’elles sont, de ce fait, inaccessibles
pour la partie ayant le fardeau de la preuve19. Une
autre raison pourrait être que, de par sa nature, le fait
15. POUDRET/BESSON, Comparative Law of International Arbitration,
2nd ed, 2007, n°643 ; K AUFMANN-KOFLER/R IGOZZI, Arbitrage
International, 2nd ed.,2010, n°653a ; BERGER/K ELLERHALS, International
and Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland, 2nd ed, 2010, n°1203.
16. BSK-ZGB/SCHMID/L ARDELLI, 4E ED., 2010, A RT. 8 NO4; KUKOZGB/M ARRO, 2012, A RT. 8 NO 1.
17. CAS 2007/A/1413 para. 76.
18. DIKE-ZPO/Leu, 2011, Art 150 no 59.
19. ATF 117Ib 197, 208 et seq.
allégué ne peut être rapporté par des moyens directs.
C’est le cas lorsqu’une partie doit prouver un “ fait
négatif ”20(Infra).
Selon la jurisprudence du Tribunal Fédéral suisse
(TF), dans de tels cas, les principes de bonne foi
imposent à la partie adverse un devoir de coopération
à l’administration de la preuve. Ce devoir se traduit
par une obligation de clarification des faits de la cause.
Concrètement, la partie adverse pourra par exemple
donner des raisons détaillées expliquant pourquoi elle
considère les faits allégués par l’autre partie comme
infondés ou faux21. Ce devoir ne saurait cependant
conduire à un renversement de la charge de la preuve.
La coopération ou l’absence de coopération de la
partie adverse sera prise en compte par le juge dans le
cadre de l’appréciation de la preuve.
Le Tribunal fédéral a décrit de la manière suivante
cette obligation de coopération de la partie adverse22:
“Dans une jurisprudence constante, le Tribunal fédéral a précisé
que la règle de l’art. 8 CC s’applique en principe également
lorsque la preuve porte sur des faits négatifs. Cette exigence est
toutefois tempérée par les règles de la bonne foi qui obligent le
défendeur à coopérer à la procédure probatoire, notamment en
offrant la preuve du contraire (ATF 106 II 31 consid. 2 et les
arrêts cités). L’obligation, faite à la partie adverse, de collaborer
à l’administration de la preuve, même si elle découle du principe
général de la bonne foi (art. 2 CC), est de nature procédurale
et est donc exorbitante du droit fédéral - singulièrement de
l’art. 8 CC -, car elle ne touche pas au fardeau de la preuve et
n’implique nullement un renversement de celui-ci. C’est dans le
cadre de l’appréciation des preuves que le juge se prononcera sur
le résultat de la collaboration de la partie adverse ou qu’il tirera
les conséquences d’un refus de collaborer à l’administration de
la preuve”.
B. Définition du degré de la preuve par la
jurisprudence du TAS
Selon le droit suisse, le degré de la preuve est régi par
les règles de droit applicables au fond du litige.
Comme indiqué précédemment, lorsque la présence
d’une substance interdite dans l’organisme d’un
sportif a été rapportée par une autorité sportive,
l’athlète présumé avoir commis une violation des
règles antidopage aura la charge de renverser cette
présomption. Dans ce cas, le degré de preuve est
établi par la prépondérance des probabilités (voir
Supra).
20. oir dans ce sens Infra CAS 2011/A/2384 2386 Contador.
21. ATF 106 ii 29, 31 E. 2 ; 95 II 231, 234 ; 81 II 50, 54 E 3; FT 5P1/2007
E. 3.1; KuKO-ZGB/ arro, 2012, Art 8 no 14; CPC- aldy, 2011, Art
55 no 6.
22. ATF 119 II 305, 306 E 1b.
-
20
Le TAS a eu l’occasion de préciser la notion de
prépondérance des probabilités.
Dans la jurisprudence CAS 2008/A/151523,
la Formation arbitrale a précisé la notion de
prépondérance des probabilités qui est le degré de
preuve auquel est soumis toute personne présumée
avoir commis une violation des règles antidopage.
Cette notion implique que l’athlète a la charge
de persuader la Formation que la survenance
des circonstances invoquées par l’athlète est plus
probable que leur non survenance ou plus probable
qu’une autre explication relative au résultat positif
de l’analyse24. En tout état de cause, la théorie de
l’athlète doit être établie en tenant compte des autres
possibilités alléguées, la Formation ne devant pas
transférer le fardeau de la preuve sur la partie adverse.
Dans la jurisprudence CAS 2009/A/193025, la
Formation arbitrale a encore précisé que lorsque
plusieurs explications alternatives sont avancées
relativement à l’ingestion d’une substance interdite,
mais que l’une d’entre elle parait plus probable que
les autres, l’athlète a satisfait au degré de preuve
requis. Dans ce cas, il est indifférent que d’autres
possibilités d’ingestion existent, dès lors qu’elles sont
considérées par la Formation moins probables. En
d’autres termes, la Formation sera convaincue qu’un
moyen d’ingestion est établi par la prépondérance
des probabilités si, en termes de pourcentage, il y
a 51% de chance que ce moyen ait eu lieu. L’athlète
doit montrer qu’un moyen spécifique d’ingestion
est légèrement plus probable d’être intervenu que le
contraire.
III. L’appréciation de la preuve
D’après l’Article 184 alinéa 1 LDIP “le tribunal arbitral
procède lui-même à l’administration des preuves”. Cette
clause confère aux arbitres le pouvoir de statuer sur
la recevabilité des preuves soumises par les parties26.
En pratique, l’autorité arbitrale compétente est libre
d’apprécier le poids de toute preuve produite par les
parties.
L’art. R44.2 du Code le l’Arbitrage en matière de
Sport TAS met en lumière le pouvoir de la Formation
de statuer sur la recevabilité de la preuve.
Par ailleurs, selon le droit de l’arbitrage international,
un tribunal arbitral n’est pas lié par les règles
23. CAS 2008/A/1515, p. 23 para. 116.
24. Voir aussi CAS 2006/A/1067 para. 6.8 ; CAS 2007/A/1370 & 1376
para. 127.
25. CAS 2009/A/1930 para. 5.9.
26. Antonio R IGOZZI, A RBITRAGE I NTERNATIONAL , 2006, NO. 464, NO.
478.
applicables à l’administration de la preuve devant
les tribunaux civils étatiques du siège du tribunal
arbitral 27. Le pouvoir du tribunal arbitral en matière
d’administration de la preuve n’est limité que par
l’ordre public procédural 28, les droits procéduraux
des parties et, le cas échéant, par les réglementations
sportives applicables. Ainsi, selon une jurisprudence
constante du TAS et au regard de ses pleins pouvoirs
de révision des faits et du droit, une formation
arbitrale n’est pas liée par les décisions d’un autre
organe juridictionnel en tant que forum indépendant 29.
A titre d’exemple, dans l’affaire Valverde, la
Formation a considéré que les présumées violations
des règles relatives à la coopération judiciaire qui ne
sont pas de nature d’ordre public, ne font pas obstacle
à la possibilité pour la Formation d’apprécier une
preuve telle que le résultat des analyses d’une poche
de plasma30 obtenue par le biais d’une commission
rogatoire.
Le pouvoir discrétionnaire de la Formation arbitrale
en matière d’appréciation de la preuve est également
mis en avant dans la jurisprudence Contador. Dans
cette affaire, la Formation a admis, sous certaines
conditions, la méthode polygraphique comme
moyen de preuve. Celle-ci consiste à vérifier la
véracité des déclarations des personnes relativement
à des événements spécifiques faisant l’objet d’une
enquête. Se fondant sur le pouvoir conféré par l’art.
184 PILA en matière d’administration de la preuve,
tenant compte de l’acceptation par les Appelants de
l’admissibilité de la méthode polygraphique comme
preuve per se et de l’application du CMA, la Formation
a admis que les résultats de l’analyse polygraphique
de l’athlète étaient admissibles dans le cas particulier,
sachant que leur crédibilité devait être vérifiés à la
lumière des autres éléments de preuves soumis31.
27. Voir, POUDRET/BESSON, op. cit. ote de bas de page 15, no. 644 “The
arbitral tribunal is not bound to follo the rules applicable to the ta ing
of evidence before the courts of the seat”.
28. D’après le Tribunal fédéral, l’ordre public procédural n’est pas
facilement violé. L’ordre public procédural n’est violé que “lorsque des
principes fondamentaux et généralement reconnus ont été violés, ce qui
conduit à une contradiction insupportable avec le sentiment de justice,
de telle sorte que la décision appara t incompatible avec les valeurs
reconnues dans un Etat de droit” TF ull ASA 2001, 566, 570 .
29. Voir TAS 2001/A/354 et TAS 2001/A/355, para. 6; et CAS
2002/A/399, para. 13 . De plus, spécifiquement sur l’admissibilité des
preuves, la Formation “ is not bound by the rules of evidence and
may inform itself in such a manner as the arbitrators thin fit” TAS
2008/A/1574, para. 23 .
30. TAS 2009/A/1879 Alejandro Valverde elmonte c. Comitato
limpico a ionale Italiano C
I , sentence du 16 mars 2010 para.
97s.
31. CAS 2011/A/2384 & CAS 2011/A/2386 paras. 391-395.
-
21
IV. Le dopage lié à la présence d’une substance
interdite dans la jurisprudence du TAS
A. Conditions de réduction de la période de
suspension lié à la présence de substances
interdites: le cas du Clenbuterol
Le Clenbuterol est une substance figurant sur la
liste des substances interdites de l’Agence Mondiale
Antidopage (AMA), à l’art. S1.2 (autres agents
anabolisants), interdite en tout temps (en et hors
compétition) et pour laquelle la seule présence dans
un échantillon, aussi faible soit-elle, constitue un
résultat d’analyse anormal32. Lorsque la présence de
Clenbuterol est détectée dans l’organisme d’un athlète,
celui-ci pourra tenter de renverser la présomption
de violation en démontrant qu’un écart par rapport
aux Standards Internationaux est à l’origine du
résultat anormal. Il pourra aussi tenter de renverser
la présomption de culpabilité en établissant comment
la substance est parvenue dans son organisme et qu’il
n’a pas commis de faute ou de négligence ou que
celle-ci n’est pas significative. Ce denier cas de figure
a récemment été examiné à plusieurs reprises par des
formations du TAS et montre combien il est difficile
pour les athlètes de prouver comment une substance
interdite est entrée dans leurs organismes au regard
de la prépondérance des probabilités. Si cette preuve
n’est pas rapportée, la première condition nécessaire
à l’obtention d’une diminution de la sanction n’est
pas remplie. Il s’ensuit qu’il devient superflu pour la
Formation d’examiner les autres conditions requises
à cette fin. Ces deux exemples en apportent une
illustration.
-
CAS 2011/A/2357 Raphael Menezes dos Santos
v. International Triathlon Union (ITU)
Le 8 octobre 2010, un triathlète fournit un échantillon
d’urine lors d’un contrôle hors compétition qui se
déroula au Mexique. L’analyse révéla la présence de
Clenbuterol dans l’organisme de l’athlète. La formation
antidopage de l’International Triathlon Union (ITU)
imposa une suspension de 2 ans à l’athlète qui forma
un appel devant le TAS. L’appelant allégua de pas
avoir utilisé la substance interdite et qu’étant donné sa
situation géographique lors de la prise d’échantillons,
le Mexique, et son régime alimentaire la veille du
contrôle (poulet et pâtes sauce bolognaise), de fortes
probabilités existent que la viande consommée ait été
contaminée avec du Clenbuterol.
La Formation considéra que l’athlète n’était pas
parvenu, au regard de la prépondérance des
probabilités, à montrer, en application de l’Art.
10.5 des Règles ITU, comment le Clenbuterol était
entré dans son organisme. L’athlète n’avait pas pu
prouver que du Clenbuterol avait contaminé la
viande qu’il avait consommé avant le contrôle. La
Formation reconnût qu’il existait une possibilité de
contamination de la viande de bœuf au Mexique.
Cependant, en raison de l’absence de preuve de la
contamination de la viande de poulet en général,
consommée avant le contrôle, et étant donné le taux
élevé de Clenbuterol dans l’organisme de l’athlète, la
possibilité de contamination de la viande utilisée dans
les seuls spaghettis bolognaise était trop improbable.
Par ailleurs, en dehors d’un prétendu mal de tête,
l’athlète n’était pas suffisamment affecté au regard
de la concentration de Clenbuterol trouvée dans ses
échantillons. La Formation a jugé qu’il était plus
probable que l’athlète ait développé une tolérance à
la substance.
-
CAS 2011/A/2384 Union Cycliste Internationale
(UCI) v. Alberto Contador Velasco & Real
Federación Española de Ciclismo (RFEC) &
CAS 2011/A/2386 World Anti-Doping Agency
(WADA) v. Alberto Contador Velasco & RFEC
Le 21 juillet 2010, lors du Tour de France 2010, Alberto
Contador, coureur cycliste de nationalité espagnole,
fut soumis à un test antidopage. L’échantillon d’urine
du coureur révéla la présence de Clenbuterol. Contador
fit l’objet d’une suspension provisoire. L’analyse
de l’échantillon B confirma l’échantillon A. Le 25
janvier 2011, le Comité Nacional de Competicion y
Disciplina Deportiva (CNCDD) de la Real Federacion
Espanola de Ciclismo (RFEC) proposa à Contador
une suspension d’une année pour violation de la
règlementation antidopage. Contador refusa. Le 14
février 2011, le CNCDD décida d’acquitter Contador
considérant que la contamination de la viande était
hautement probable. L’UCI forma appel devant le
TAS contre cette décision.
Dans le cas d’espèce, le coureur soutint que la présence
de Clenbuterol dans son organisme était du à la
consommation de viande contaminée. Pour renverser
la présomption de violation de la règle antidopage
et décharger son fardeau de la preuve, l’athlète
devait prouver d’une part que (1) la contamination
de la viande était possible et d’autre part que (2) la
contamination de la viande était la seule source
permettant d’expliquer le résultat d’analyse anormal
ou une source plus probable que les autres scénarios
avancés par les parties adverses. Ainsi, la Formation
pourrait être convaincue si, la contamination de la
viande représentait, en termes de probabilités, 50%
+ 1%.
32. Voir CAS 2009/A/1755 para. 69.
-
22
Comme la preuve ne pouvait être rapportée par des
moyens directs et impliquait une forme de fait négatif
puisque la viande en question avait été consommée, la
Formation, en se fondant sur la jurisprudence du TFS
précitée, imposa à l’UCI et l’AMA de collaborer à
l’administration de la preuve (Supra). Cette obligation
de collaboration fut déchargée par les appelants
qui avancèrent des scénarios alternatifs relatifs à la
contamination de la viande.
La Formation considéra que le coureur n’avait pas
réussi à démontrer comment le Clenbuterol s’était
retrouvé dans son organisme. La théorie de la viande
contaminée ne satisfit pas le test de la prépondérance
des probabilités. La Formation considéra notamment
que l’Espagne, pays sur le territoire duquel le coureur
aurait consommé la viande contaminée, n’est pas
connue pour avoir un problème de contamination
de la viande au Clenbuterol, contrairement à certains
pays non européens. Par ailleurs, le fait qu’aucun
athlète n’ait jamais été testé au Clenbuterol en relation
avec une consommation de viande espagnole fut
pris en considération. En conséquence, le coureur
fut reconnu avoir commis une violation de la
règlementation antidopage (présence d’une substance
interdite) pour laquelle une suspension de 2 ans est
applicable.
B. Condition de réduction de la période
de suspension liée à la présence de
substances spécifiées
Depuis la modification du Code Mondial Antidopage
en 2009 permettant une flexibilité de la sanction en
cas de présence d’une substance spécifiée en fonction
des circonstances et du degré de faute de l’athlète
(Art. 10.4), le TAS a eu à connaître un nombre
croissant de cas où sportifs et organisations sportives
ont recouru au TAS pour obtenir une réduction ou
une augmentation de la sanction décidée en amont.
Afin de bénéficier d’une réduction de la sanction, les
athlètes doivent, dans tous les cas, établir l’origine de
la substance et l’absence de volonté d’augmenter leur
performance. Lorsque ces conditions sont réunies,
l’importance de la sanction dépendra du degré de la
faute du sportif, comme le montrent la jurisprudence.
1.
Négligence non significative
-
CAS 2011/A/2495-2496-1497-2498 Fédération
Internationale de Natation (FINA) v. César
Augusto Cielo Filho & Confederação Brasileria
de Desportos Aquáticos (CBDA)
Dans cette affaire, des athlètes brésiliens firent l’objet
de contrôles antidopage lors d’une compétition
nationale de natation. Les échantillons A prélevés
révélèrent la présence de Furosemide, une substance
appartenant à la classe des substances spécifiées (art.
4.2.2 CMA). Les athlètes ne contestèrent pas les
résultats et renoncèrent à l’analyse des échantillons
B devant la Confederaçao Brasiliera de Desportos
Aquaticos (CBDA). Ils expliquèrent la présence de
Furosemide par la consommation de capsules de
caféine contaminées. La CBDA disqualifia les athlètes
pour les résultats obtenus lors de cette rencontre
sportive et prononça une réprimande à leur encontre.
La Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)
déposa un appel urgent devant le TAS à l’encontre
de la décision de la CBDA du fait de la sélection de
M. Cielo, l’un des nageurs, pour les championnats du
monde de natation de 2011 à Shangai (Chine).
La Formation considéra que les conditions préalables
à l’application de l’art. DC 10.4 du Règlement de
Contrôle Antidopage de la FINA étaient réunies. En
effet, aucune des allégations relatives au fait de savoir
comment les substances interdites étaient entrées dans
l’organisme des athlètes n’étaient contestés et il était
admis que les athlètes n’entendaient pas améliorer leur
performance sportive. Le degré de faute de l’athlète
était, dans ce cas, le seul critère déterminant pour fixer
la sanction adéquate dans la fourchette de l’art. 10.4.
A cet égard, outre le fait que la caféine n’est pas en
soi une substance interdite, le fait que les comprimés
aient été prescrits par un médecin expérimenté et
spécialisé en médecine sportive, qu’ils aient été
préparés par une pharmacie de renom contrôlée qui
savait qu’ils étaient destinés à des athlètes de haut
niveau et que le risque de contamination devait être
évité, que lesdits comprimés aient été consommés lors
de plusieurs rencontre en 2010 et 2011 sans donner
lieu à des résultats anormaux, que les nageurs aient
demandé conseil à leur médecin avant de consommer
les comprimés, qu’enfin, un certificat de pureté relatif
aux comprimés ait été délivré par la pharmacie, furent
pris en considération. La Formation considéra, dans
ce contexte, que des précautions supplémentaires ne
pouvaient pas être attendues de la part des nageurs.
Au vu de ces circonstances, une réprimande fut jugée
adéquate.
2. Négligence significative
-
CAS 2011/A/2515 Fédération Internationale
de Natation (FINA) v. Fabiola Molina &
Confederação Brasileria de Desportos Aquáticos
(CBDA)
Le 22 avril 2011, Fabiola Molina, une nageuse
brésilienne fit l’objet d’un test en compétition
lors des championnats ‘Seletiva Mundial’ de Rio de
Janeiro. L’échantillon testé révéla la présence de
methhylexaneamine (MHA), substance interdite
-
23
spécifiée figurant sur la liste des substances interdites
de l’AMA 2011 sous la catégorie S.6 (stimulant).
Molina fut suspendue pour une durée de 2 mois.
La Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA),
estimant que la suspension de 2 mois était en dehors
de la fourchette acceptable des sanctions impliquant
une substance spécifiée, appela devant le TAS afin
d’obtenir une sanction de 6 mois au minimum.
L’origine de la substance interdite (un supplément
alimentaire) et le fait que la nageuse n’avait pas eu
l’intention d’améliorer ses performances n’étaient pas
contestés par la FINA.
La Formation considéra que les circonstances à
prendre en considération pour apprécier la faute de
l’athlète devaient être spécifiques et pertinentes pour
expliquer le manquement de cette dernière. En outre,
ces circonstances spécifiques devaient être appréciées
en tenant compte du devoir de tout athlète d’éviter par
tous les moyens, l’ingestion d’une substance interdite.
La Formation considéra, au regard des circonstances,
que la négligence de l’athlète était significative. Loin
de faire tout ce qui était en son pouvoir, elle s’était
aveuglément reposée sur son expérience passée avec
le vendeur en ligne qui lui avait fourni les suppléments
alimentaires et n’avait fait aucune vérification sur
internet ni demandé conseil à quiconque. Par ailleurs
l’étiquetage du produit indiquait la présence de
MHA. La Formation considéra la sanction de 2 mois
trop clémente et la remplaça par une suspension de 6
mois33. La Formation releva notamment que le degré
exceptionnel de précaution exercé par M. Cielo était
absent dans ce cas.
Cette affaire donna l’occasion à la Formation
arbitrale de rappeler certains principes et de préciser
sa jurisprudence.
Concernant l’absence d’intention d’améliorer la
performance sportive, la Formation établit que
l’athlète doit seulement prouver qu’il ou elle n’a
pas pris la substance spécifiée, et non le produit en
question, en connaissance de cause avec l’intention
d’améliorer sa performance sportive.
De manière intéressante, la Formation précisa
l’étendue du pouvoir d’examen du TAS en soulignant
que la compétence de l’organe disciplinaire d’une
fédération en matière de sanction ne peut pas
être invoquée comme principe et ce, même si la
jurisprudence du TAS a considéré qu’une sanction
prise par un organe disciplinaire pouvait seulement
être révisée par le TAS lorsqu’elle était évidemment
et grossièrement disproportionnée34. En effet,
en déterminant la sanction appropriée en qualité
d’instance d’appel, les formations arbitrales du
TAS doivent également chercher à préserver une
cohérence parmi les décisions prises par les différentes
fédérations sportives dans des cas comparables afin
de sauvegarder le principe d’égalité de traitement
des athlètes dans les différents sports et d’assurer
l’harmonisation des programmes antidopage. En
outre, une formation est toujours compétente, en
vertu de l’art. R57 du Code, pour revoir les faits et le
droit avec un plein pouvoir d’examen.
Dans cette affaire, Thibault Fauconet, patineur
sur glace, fit l’objet d’un contrôle positif à la
Tuaminoheptane, une substance spécifiée, lors de la
Coupe du Monde de Shangai, en Chine, en décembre
2010. Fauconnet expliqua qu’il avait utilisé du
Rhinofluimicil, un spray nasal destiné à combattre
le rhume. Il reconnut qu’il aurait du savoir que le
produit contenait de la Tuaminoheptane et admit
qu’il avait commis une erreur. Tenant compte du fait
que l’athlète avait expliqué comment la substance
interdite était entrée dans son corps et qu’il n’y
avait pas d’intention d’améliorer les performances
sportives, la Commission Disciplinaire de l’ISU
suspendit Fauconnet pour une période réduite de 18
mois. L’athlète fit appel au TAS contre cette décision
afin d’obtenir une diminution de la suspension.
Enfin, en appréciant le degré de la faute de l’athlète et
la possibilité de réduire la sanction, la Formation prit
en compte des affaires similaires et considéra qu’en
utilisant le médicament contenant la substance spécifiée
sans avoir pris de renseignement, l’athlète n’avait pas
pris les précautions que l’on peut attendre d’un sportif
expérimenté et qu’il avait été grossièrement négligent.
La preuve de bonne moralité produite par l’athlète
ne pouvait pas atténuer sa culpabilité et justifier une
diminution de la sanction. Par ailleurs, la Formation
énonça que l’absence d’infraction antérieure à la
réglementation antidopage et la coopération de
l’athlète, sont seulement pertinentes pour déterminer
la fourchette de sanctions applicables et non pour
réduire la sanction donnée pour une première
violation35. Conformément au commentaire de l’art.
10.4 des Règles de l’ISU, le fait de manquer des
compétitions importantes comme des championnats
du monde, fut jugé non pertinent pour justifier une
réduction de la sanction et considérer celle-ci comme
disproportionnée. La suspension de 18 mois fut
considérée appropriée et confirmée par la Formation.
33. Voir dans le même sens CAS 2011/A/2518 où l’athlète légèrement
plus négligent que dans l’affaire Molina a été condamné à une suspension
de 8 mois.
34. Voir CAS 2009/A/1870, para. 48 et CAS 2009/A/1978, para. 59.
35. Voir CAS 2005/A/847, para. 30 ; CAS 2007/A/1364, para. 19 ; CAS
2010/A/2307.
-
CAS 2011/A/2615 Thibaut Fauconnet v.
International Skating Union (ISU) & CAS
2011/A/2618 ISU v. Thibault Fauconnet
-
24
3. Révision du CMA
Une nouvelle version du CMA doit entrer en
vigueur en 2015. Le projet de code que l’on peut
trouver en ligne en anglais uniquement, ne prévoit
pas de modifications substantielles relativement à
l’art. 10.4. Une modification terminologique figure
au paragraphe 2 “ [T]o justify any elimination or
reduction, the Athlete or other Person must produce
corroborating credible evidence in addition to his
or her word which establishes to the comfortable
satisfaction of the hearing panel the absence of an
intent to enhance sport performance or mask the Use
of a performance enhancing substance. The Athlete’s
or the other Person’s degree of Fault shall be the
criterion considered in assessing any reduction of the
period of Ineligibility”.
Le commentaire de l’art. 10.4.1 apporte une
modification plus substantielle en disposant que
contrairement à la jurisprudence CAS 2010/A/2107
Oliveira v. USADA, dès lors qu’un athlète utilise
ou possède un produit destiné à augmenter ses
performances, l’art. 10.4.1 ne sera pas applicable
indépendamment du fait de savoir si l’athlète savait
que le produit en cause contenait une substance
interdite.
-
25
Arbitration CAS 2011/A/2360 & CAS 2011/A/2392
English Chess Federation & Georgian Chess Federation v. Fédération
Internationale des Echecs (FIDE)
3 July 2012
3.3 Elections for the Continental Presidents
3.4 Nomination of the Vice Presidents
Chess; appointment of the FIDE Vice
Presidents; application of both national
laws and other applicable principles of
law according to Article R58 CAS Code;
appealable decision according to Article
R47 CAS Code; difference between
decisions null and void eo ipso and
“annullable” decisions under Swiss law;
relationship between Article R49 of the
CAS Code and substantive Swiss law;
characterisation of a decision as “null and
void ” or “challengeable ” and admissibility
of the claim under Article R49 of the
CAS Code
Panel:
Prof. Jan Paulsson (France), President
Prof. Ulrich Haas (Germany)
Mr. Quentin Byrne-Sutton (Switzerland)
3.5 Election of Additional Vice Presidents
On 29 September 2010, the elections for the
Presidential ticket took place, pursuant to which
Kirsan Illyumzhinov was elected as President of
FIDE (the “President ”). On that same date, the
elections of Continental Presidents commenced.
On 30 September 2010, the elections of the
Continental Presidents were completed. Whilst the
agenda provided for the election of the Continental
Presidents to be followed by the nomination of the
Vice Presidents, the transcript of the FIDE Congress
recordings evidence a deferral, in the following terms:
“Our next point is the nomination from the President. Kirsan
is not here you know, and in any case because he is talking with
Karpov which he has invited to accept the ... the place of one
of the Vice Presidents, he doesn’t – he prefers that he does not
make the nominations at this moment, so we will proceed with
the elections of the Vice Presidents”.
Relevant facts
The two Claimants are the national chess federations
of England and Georgia. They are member federations
of the Respondent.
The Respondent is the Fédération Internationale des
Echecs (FIDE), the governing international body of
the sport of chess.
This dispute revolves around the nomination, during
the 81st FIDE Congress in Khanty-Mansiysk from 29
September to 2 October 2010 (the “FIDE Congress ”),
of five individuals – Chu Bo, Ali Nihat Yazici, Israel
Gelfer, Ilya Levitov and Boris Kutin – as FIDE Vice
Presidents (the “Five Vice Presidents ”).
On 17 August 2010, the agenda for the FIDE
Congress was published on the FIDE web site listing,
inter alia, the following:
3.2 Validity of the candidacies and election for the combined
Presidential ticket
On that same date, the elections of the three Vice
Presidents to be individually elected by the FIDE
General Assembly (the “GA”) were commenced and
were completed on 2 October.
On 2 October 2010, the President announced his
nominations for the position of Vice Presidents, to
which Mr. Zurab Azmaiparashvili, the representative
of the Georgian Chess Federation (the “Georgian
Representative”) objected. The transcript of the FIDE
Congress’s recording provides, inter alia, as follows:
“FIDE President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov
Dear Delegates,
Now I want to announce my nominations. You know that I
want to concentrate all my time now for FIDE activities and
chess development in all countries and you know that the main
programme now for me this is Chess in schools and that’s why
I need my assistants, people who help me because now as I have
only one position …
-
26
I want to ask your approval. [small pause] Nomination of
Vice Presidents: - Mr. Chu Bo, China [applause]. You know
him. Ilya Levitov, you know him [applause]. You should all
know him because Ilya did a lot, did a lot for preparation and
organisation of this Olympiad in Khanty-Mansiysk. Thank
you. Ali Yazici, Turkey [applause]. Israel Gelfer [applause].
…Thank you. Boris Kutin [applause]. You know him.
I will go for legal procedures.
…
The minutes of the FIDE Congress broadly reflect
the transcript of the recordings, and provide as
follows:
Mr. Azmaiparashvili
Dear Mr. President, dear delegates. It is strange what
President is doing here because he violated our Statutes. He
cannot nominate, you know, 5 Vice Presidents, we only have
two places there, even Deputy President was trying yesterday
to put my name there without consultation with me. I declined
this because we have to follow the Statutes, I object what Mr.
President offered. And it should be in the Minutes I will use all
my rights if Mr. President do not change his decision. Thank
you.
Mr. Makropoulos
There is any other objection ? There is any other objection ?
Zurab please. There is any other objection? Thank you very
much. There is one objection from Azmaiparashvili.
“President announced his nominations and submitted them to
the General Assembly to confirm their appointment. He said
that he wanted to concentrate all his time on FIDE and he
needed extra assistants to help him carry out his programme,
especially with Chess in Schools. He would concentrate all his
efforts, connections and all his money on FIDE activities.
Vice Presidents – Mr. Chu Bo (CHN), Mr. Ilya Levitov
(RUS), Mr. Ali Nihat Yazici (TUR), Mr. Israel Gelfer
(ISR) and Mr.Boris Kutin (SLO)
FIDE President Kirsan Illyumzhinov
Thank you, Zurab, for your information. Yes, I understand.
We discussed you know, that after our elections, because opposite
team of Anatoly Karpov and that’s why I decided to discuss
how we can work for the next four years …
Mr. Azmaiparashvili
Excuse me, objection
Mr. Makropoulos
Please
FIDE President Kirsan Illyumzhinov
Georgios, please.
Mr. Makropoulos
There is a procedure.
Mr. Azmaiparashvili
I am a delegate and do not stop me here. I am not Mr.
Kasparov. The President is lying here. I want to say that decline
any position, including what they are offering now. I decline any
position in FIDE.
Mr. Makropoulos
Zurab, can we respect the procedure.
Mr. Azmaiparashvili
Honorary Vice Presidents – Prof. Kurt Jungwirth (AUT),
Prof. Vanik Zakarian (ARM), Mr. Dabilani Buthali
(BOT), Mr. Khalifa Al-Hitmi (QAT). FIDE Ambassador
for Life – GM A. Karpov (RUS).
He had talked with Mr. Karpov who said that he wants to
work for FIDE. He requested him to ask the delegates of the
General Assembly for a position as FIDE Ambassador for
Life.
Mr. Azmaiparashvili said that the President is violating the
Statutes. He cannot nominate 5 Vice-Presidents, he only has
two positions. He objected and we have to follow the statutes.
Mr. Ilyumzhinov thanked Mr. Azmaiparashvili and said that
is why he decided to discuss with all parties how we can work
for the next four years. He had invited Mr. Karpov to be a
Vice President and he had asked his opinion regarding who
he wants to nominate in the team. Mr Karpov suggested Mr.
Kurchenkov, head of the Karpov team to have a position in
FIDE.
He had discussed the future work with members of his former
team and with many delegates. He wanted to involve everyone
and he wanted their active work, as he wants to work for FIDE
24 hours a day. He wanted chess in schools in all 170 member
federations. He had announced that he will put 1 mln USD
from his private foundation for the preparation of trainers and
arbiters. And many FIDE people will work in this and many
other Commissions.
Mr. Azmaiparashvili said he had declined all positions and he
will go for a legal procedure, this is an official objection from
Georgia.
-
27
The Deputy President, Mr Makropoulos, asked the meeting if
there were any objections to the confirmation of the nominations.
He said there is one objection from Mr. Azmaiparashvili of
Georgia. He asked if there were any further objections but no
other objections were raised”.
On 8 October 2010, FIDE issued an announcement
entitled “Elections and Nominations from KhantyMansiysk”, listing the Five Vice Presidents as
“Nominated Vice Presidents”.
On 25 October 2010, Silvio Danailov, the President
of the European Chess Union, sent FIDE a letter
on behalf of fourteen member federations of FIDE,
including the Appellants, protesting the Vice
Presidential appointments on the basis that such
nominations violate Article 9.6 of the FIDE Statutes
and Article 2 of the FIDE Electoral Regulations.
The letter requested that FIDE (i) immediately
remove all the Five Vice Presidents; and ensure that a
proper procedure is followed in the nomination and
confirmation of vice presidents; or (ii) alternatively,
that at least three of the Vice Presidential appointments
be revoked.
On 10 November 2010, Mr. Makropoulos, FIDE’s
Deputy President, responded to the federations’
letter noting that the decision was taken by an
overwhelming majority of the GA, which exceeded
the 2/3 majority required to amend the statutes.
He noted that only one objection was raised to the
decision, and that alterations to the FIDE statutes
by the GA had taken place on a number of previous
occasions, listing a number of examples.
On 7 January 2011, the President of the European
Chess Union sent FIDE a letter on behalf of the
Appellants and 16 other chess federations noting
that they wished to appeal the nomination of the
five Vice Presidents, and requesting details of the
deadline and procedure for an appeal to the FIDE
Presidential Board (PB). The letter noted that the
FIDE Presidential Board was the appropriate body
for the appeal, for the following reasons:
According to Article 9.4 of the FIDE Statutes, “[e]very party
concerned may appeal against the decisions of the President to
the General Assembly”. The next General Assembly will take
place in 2012. We cannot wait two years, as this would lead
to deciding on the impropriety of the nominations only after the
Vice Presidents had already served half their terms. Article 4.1
of the FIDE Statutes, among other things, transfers the powers
of the General Assembly to the Executive Board when the
General Assembly is not in session. But the Executive Board
will not convene in the ordinary course for nearly another year.
This is also too long a period to wait for a decision regarding
the improper appointment by the FIDE President of five Vice
Presidents. The Presidential Board is charged with the “day-today management of FIDE … and exercises the rights of the
General Assembly and the Executive Board between meetings
of the General Assembly and Executive Board respectively.
A Court of Arbitration for Sport arbitral tribunal recently
confirmed the interim decision-making power of the FIDE
Presidential Board in decision CAS 2010/O/2166.
On 21 January, Mr. Jarret, an executive director of
FIDE, responded to the federations’ letter noting
that the 7 January 2011 letter was unsigned. The
letter noted that the “decision of the General Assembly
became final and entered into force. Nobody challenged it which
is not surprising since all FIDE members (except one) agreed
with the confirmation of the nominations”.
On that same date, the Appellants submitted an appeal
to the PB by means of a letter to the FIDE Secretariat,
enclosing a number of factual and legal exhibits, and
requesting the appeal be considered during the PB’s
meeting of 3-6 February 2011 in Antlya, Turkey. The
appeal contended that the appointment of the Vice
Presidents was a decision of the President, and not of
the GA. In the alternative, it noted that to the extent
the decision was one of the GA, such decision was
null and void under Swiss law. The letter requested
that the PB: (a) determine that the nominations of the
Five Vice Presidents were invalid; (b) immediately
remove all Five Vice Presidents from office; and (c)
ensure that FIDE observes the proper nomination
process.
On 8 February 2011, the Georgian Representative
wrote to FIDE requesting information about the
pending appeal. On that same day, Mr. Jarrett
responded noting that the minutes of the PB meeting
would state that “[t]he Presidential Board has seen Annex
34. Without discussion, it notes that the issue has been decided
by the last General Assembly”. This was confirmed in an
excerpt of the minutes of the PB.
In accordance with Articles R47 and R48 of the
Code, the Appellants fi led their Statement of Appeal
in the procedure CAS 2011/A/2360 on 24 February
2011, challenging an alleged refusal by the PB to set
aside the appointment of the Five Vice Presidents by
the President.
On 2 March 2011, the Respondent wrote to CAS
requesting the appeal be dismissed pursuant to
Article R49 of the CAS Code as it was “manifestly late”.
On 10 March 2011, the Respondent fi led a request
pursuant to Article R49 of the CAS Code, arguing
that the appeal fi led by the Appellants was “manifestly
late”.
-
28
On 10 March 2010, the Appellants responded to the
Respondent’s R49 Request.
On 16 March 2011, the Deputy President of the CAS
Appeals Arbitration Division informed the parties
that he was not satisfied that the appeal was “manifestly
late” and that any issue as to the admissibility of the
appeal would be considered by the Panel in due
course.
In accordance with Articles R47 and R48 of the Code,
on 29 March 2011, the Appellants fi led a Statement
of Appeal in the procedure CAS 2011/A/2392,
challenging an alleged decision by the GA to confirm
the appointment of the Five Vice Presidents.
In accordance with Article R51 of the Code, and in
light of a decision by the Deputy Division President
of CAS to consolidate the two appeal procedures, on
18 April 2011 the Appellants fi led an Appeal Brief,
dealing with both procedures.
Extracts from the legal findings
A. Preliminary issue – the nature of the vice
presidents’ appointment
The rationale underlying the commencement of
two separate appeals by the Appellants lies in the
disputed characterisation of the initial decision to
appoint the Five Vice Presidents. As outlined above,
the Appellants’ primary claim seeks to characterise
the appointment as one made unilaterally by the
President, whereas the Respondent argues that the
decision was ultimately taken by the GA.
The characterisation of the appointment of the
Five Vice Presidents thus goes to the heart of both
appeals, and has a significant bearing on the relevance
of a number of arguments made by the parties, as
well as on the admissibility of each appeal. In light
of this, the Panel has examined as a preliminary
matter the parties’ contentions as regards the precise
characterisation of the original decision to appoint
the Five Vice Presidents.
The Appellants argue that the appointment of the
Five Vice Presidents was a decision by the President.
They explain that the Five Vice Presidents were
nominated pursuant to the power granted to the
President by Article 9.6 of the FIDE Statutes, and
that the GA was never required to “confirm” the
appointments. They contend that the reference to
“confirmation” in the Electoral Regulations simply
allows the GA to “confirm that [the] appointments have
been made”. In that respect, they submit that FIDE
procedure distinguishes between elections, where
votes are counted, and appointments, and that FIDE’s
practice of announcing nominations and asking for
any objections does not transform the process into an
election. They contend that the Agenda of the FIDE
Congress, and the Minutes of the FIDE Congress,
provide for the “nomination” of Vice Presidents.
They explain that the power to nominate two Vice
Presidents has been validly delegated under Swiss law
from the GA to the President.
In the Panel’s view, the characterisation of the
decision to appoint the Five Vice President requires
an analysis of both the constitutional framework
of FIDE underpinning the decision, as well as the
specific events which occurred during the GA.
Looking first at FIDE’s constitutional framework,
the Panel considers that the FIDE Statutes and
the Electoral Regulations contemplate the GA
confirming the nomination of Vice Presidents. In
reaching this conclusion, the Panel acknowledges
that a level of ambiguity exists insofar as Article 9.6
of the FIDE Statutes refers to a “nomination” of the
Vice Presidents by the President whereas Article 2 of
the Electoral Regulations provides for the “nomination
and confirmation” of the Vice Presidents.
However, this ambiguity is, in the Panel’s view,
resolved by considering that the Electoral Regulations
constitute the more detailed - the lex specialis – set
of electoral rules against which the FIDE Statutes
must be read. Thus, it becomes clear that the
process of “nomination” set out in Article 9.6 of the
FIDE Statutes is effectively completed once it is
“confirmed ” by the GA, as required by Article 2 of the
Electoral Regulations, an act which formalises the
appointment process. When read alongside Chapter 3
of the FIDE Statutes, which provide that “the President
and all other FIDE officials and organizations are elected or
nominated and confirmed”, it is clear to the Panel that a
“confirmation” process by the GA is thus required for
the appointment of Vice Presidents.
This interpretation of the FIDE constitutional
framework is, in the Panel’s opinion, borne out by
the actual events during the GA. In particular, the
Panel considers that the President’s request for the
FIDE Delegates’ “approval” for the appointments and
the fact that Mr. Makropoulos – however abruptly –
made requests for objections to the appointments,
clearly suggests that the process was seen as an
effective confirmation by the GA, rather than a
unilateral decision by the President.
For these reasons, it is the Panel’s view that the
decision to appoint the Five Vice Presidents was
-
29
a decision taken by the GA. However, whilst the
existence of such a decision is accepted by the Panel,
the validity of the decision is a matter which relates to
the merits of this claim.
B. CAS 2011/A/2360
1.
Admissibility of the appeal
The principal admissibility thresholds relevant to this
appeal are set out in Articles R47 and R49 of the CAS
Code, viz:
It submits in any event that the PB’s statement to
the effect that the decision had already be taken was
correct as the Georgian Representative’s objection,
during the GA, to the nomination of the Presidents
was fully considered, in light of the Georgian
Representative’s objection, and then rejected by
the GA immediately pursuant to Article 4.4 of the
FIDE Statutes. Consequently, it argues that the PB
never had the power to hear the appeal raised by the
Appellants, and could thus not have made a decision
relating to it.
The Panel has considered the admissibility of CAS
2011/A/2360 in light of the three admissibility thresholds set
out above.
In the case at hand, the Appellants by letter dated
21 January 2011 lodged an internal appeal to the
PB against the (alleged) appointments of the VicePresidents by the President. In this letter the
Appellants made it clear that they wanted the PB
– in its function as an (alleged) internal review body
of FIDE – to annul the appointments made by the
President. The PB refused to entertain this internal
appeal and, thus, in effect, dismissed the claim of the
Appellants for lack of jurisdiction. Whether the PB
was materially correct or not in its appreciation of the
extent of its jurisdiction as an internal reviewing body,
the Panel find that this refusal of the PB amounts to
a “decision ”.
1.1. Was there an appealable decision ?
1.2.
The Appellants contend that the decision being
appealed to CAS is the refusal of the PB to set aside
the decision to appoint the Five Vice Presidents, and
that this constitutes an appealable decision pursuant
to Chapter 14 of the FIDE Statutes, as it has been
interpreted under Swiss law.
The Appellants lodged the appeal with CAS against
the refusal of the PB to act as an internal reviewing
body on 24 February 2011. This refusal of FIDE
was communicated to the Appellants – pursuant to
a request for information about the pending internal
appeal – on 8 February 2011. Thus, the deadline for
appeal to CAS provided for in Article R49 of the
CAS Code was complied with.
That a “decision” has been rendered by the relevant association
(Article R47);
That the appellant has “exhausted the legal remedies available
to him prior to the appeal” (Article R47); and
That the appeal has been filed within the time limit of “twentyone days from the receipt of the decision appealed against”
(Article R49).
The Appellants argue that the PB’s refusal to make
a decision is appealable under CAS case law. They
explain that the nature of the decision of the PB
was a decision of refusal to consider a case for lack
of jurisdiction, which is considered an example of
negative decision. Alternatively, they note that the
statement to the effect that “the issue had been decided by
the last General Assembly”, as set out in the minutes of
the PB meeting, constituted a challengeable implicit
decision.
The Respondent contends that whilst formal
decisions with a negative content can be challenged
under Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code and/or
Article R47 of the CAS Code, these provisions do
not apply in cases where no decision has been taken
at all. It argues that the statement by the PB to the
effect that the issue had been decided by the General
Assembly was not a decision within the meaning of
Article 75 SCC and/or Article R47 of the CAS Code.
Other admissibility thresholds
Finally, the Panel must examine whether or not all
means of internal recourse have been exhausted.
In the Panel’s view that is the case. Nowhere in the
statutes and regulations of the FIDE is it provided
that a second internal level of review must be
accessed prior to appealing to the CAS. Since the
PB was called upon to decide upon the Appellants’
request dated 21 February 2011 as a first instance
internal reviewing body and since the PB refused to
entertain the appeal and, by doing so, drew to a close
the internal reviewing process, the appeal to CAS is
admissible.
2. On the Merits
The Panel considers that the present appeal to CAS
must be dismissed on the merits whether or not the
PB was correct in not entertaining the appeal. Mr.
Chu Bo (CHN), Mr. Ilya Levitov (RUS), Mr. Ali
-
30
Nihat Yazici (TUR), Mr. Israel Gelfer (ISR) and
Mr.Boris Kutin (SLO) acquired the position as VicePresidents only through the act of confirmation/
approval by the GA. Hence, it is only this final act – if
any – that could have interfered with and potentially
violated the Appellants’ rights. However, that final
act is not the object of the appeal in the case CAS
2011/A/2360. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal
must be dismissed on the merits.
C. CAS 2011/A/2392
1.
Admissibility
The Panel has considered the admissibility of CAS
2011/A/2360 in light of the three admissibility
thresholds set out above, in turn.
1.1. Was there an appealable decision ?
The Panel is satisfied that the decision of the GA
to appoint the Five Vice Presidents constitutes an
appealable decision pursuant to Article R47 of the
CAS Code.
1.2 Has the Appellant exhausted internal remedies ?
The Panel is satisfied that the GA is the highest
decision making body in FIDE, and that no internal
appeal can be made against the decisions of the GA.
Thus, the Panel is satisfied that internal remedies
have been exhausted as required by Article R47 of
the CAS Code.
1.3 Was the appeal timely ?
The Appellants contend that the appeal is timely,
insofar that the decision of the GA is “null and void”
under Swiss law and under lex sportiva. The Appellants’
arguments as regards the nullity of the GA’s decision
are outlined above.
The Appellants argue that a null and void decision is
not subject to the time limit set out in Article 75 of
the Swiss Civil Code (the “SCC ”) or Article R49 of
the CAS Code.
The Respondent has contested the Appellants’
characterisation of the decision as “null and void”. The
Respondent’s arguments as regards the nullity of the
GA’s decision are outlined above.
The Respondent also argued, during the oral
hearing, that by agreeing to Article R49 of the CAS
Code the Parties have altered the scope of exercise
of their rights under the applicable substantive law
(Swiss law), in the sense that even if the breach of
an association member’s rights is serious enough to
render the association’s decision null and void eo ipso.,
the validity of that decision may only be challenged
through an appeal lodged with CAS within the time
limit of Article R49 of the CAS Code.
It is undisputed between the Parties that on the
merits – inter alia – Swiss law applies. Nor do the
Parties differ as to Swiss law in relation to decisions or
resolutions of the general assembly of an association
that breach state law or the statutes or regulations
of the association. Under Swiss law, the decision or
resolution may be either null and void eo ispo or only
“annullable”. If a decision is null and void eo ipso it is
deprived of any legal effect from the outset and any
person can rely on this finding at any point in time,
i.e. a person is not time barred in claiming that the
decision is null and void. In order for an “annullable”
decision to cease having any legal effect, a court must
render a judgment in that respect in accordance with
Article 75 SCC, and may do so only if seized within a
time limit of 30 days.
It is further undisputed between the Parties that they
agreed to the application of the CAS Code, which
under Article R28 refers to Lausanne as the seat of the
arbitration. Consequently, by virtue of the arbitration
being seated in Switzerland and involving at least one
non-Swiss party, the present appeals are subject to the
Arbitration chapter of Switzerland’s Federal Code on
Private International Law of 18 December 1987 (the
“Swiss PIL Code ”), as the lex arbitri, which provides,
inter alia, that “the parties may directly or by reference to rules
of arbitration regulate the arbitral procedure” (Article 182).
It is also undisputed that the Parties are thus subject
to Article R49 of the CAS Code, whereby appeals
against decisions must be fi led, in principle, within a
deadline of 21 days.
What is disputed between the Parties is the
relationship between Article R49 of the CAS Code
and the above-summarized contents of the Swiss law
applicable to the merits, since at first sight they could
appear contradictory. Thus far, the cases forming
CAS jurisprudence have not resolved this issue. In
CAS 1997/O/168, cited by the Appellants, the Panel
acknowledged that there might be a confl ict between
Article R49 of the CAS Code and substantive Swiss
law. However, in the end the arbitrators there did not
need to decide how to resolve the confl ict, since the
parties in that case agreed on the non-applicability
of Article R49 of the CAS Code. The situation is
different here, since the Respondent has not waived
the applicability of Article R49 of the CAS Code.
Contrary to the view held by the Appellants, the
Panel finds that Article R49 of the CAS Code is not
-
31
limited to appeals fi led against “annullable” decisions.
First, nothing in the wording indicates such a limited
scope of applicability of said provision. Second, in
the Panel’s opinion, the Appellants’ argument that
Article R49 of the CAS Code must be applied in light
of article 75 of the SCC and the distinction made
in that connection between “null and void” decisions
on the one hand and “annullable” decisions on the
other, simply cannot fit with what must have been
the intention of the drafters of Article R49, since that
provision is designed to apply to all parties appealing
decisions to the CAS whatever the substantive law
applicable to the dispute. In other words, subject to
the parties being entitled to agree on a different time
limit, Article R49 purports to place an admissibility
threshold upon all appeals, without reference to the
substantive law applicable to a dispute before CAS.
Whether an exception to this rule must be accepted
and an appeal allowed after the expiry of the deadline
if a decision of an association violates international
public policy can be left unanswered, since in the
view of the Panel no such violation has occurred in
the case here.
For sake of clarity, the Panel underlines that in its
view Article R49 of the CAS Code is not intended
to alter the law applicable on the merits. If the latter
differentiates between decisions that are null and
void and those that are only “annullable” this situation
remains unchanged. Article R49 of the Code comes
into play at a different level. It only deals with the
admissibility of the claim in front of the CAS and
not with the merits of a specific claim. Thus, in a case
where an association’s decision were null and void,
it would not become materially valid merely because
the time limit in R49 of the CAS Code has expired.
Instead, the member would only be procedurally
barred from fi ling a principal action against said
decision. However, nothing would prevent the same
member to avail himself in a different context of the
fact that the decision is null and void.
Swiss law clearly gives precedence to the will of
the parties as regards the applicable procedure
for international arbitrations subject to the Swiss
PIL Code. Therefore, the time limit for the
commencement of claims set out in Article R49 of the
CAS Code, being part of the procedural rules chosen
by the parties to these arbitration proceedings, is
applicable irrespective of the fact that other time
limits may exist for fi ling appeals in front of State
courts as provided for example by Article 75 of the
SCC as interpreted by Swiss law.
limit set out in Article 75 of the SCC are irrelevant
to the procedural admissibility of the claim under
Article R49 of the CAS Code.
It is thus unavailing for the Appellants to seek to
circumvent the 21 days time limit set out in the
procedural rules of the CAS Appeal procedure, as
the Appellant seeks to do in the present instance, by
reference to Article 75 of the SCC.
For these reasons, the Panel holds that CAS
2011/A/2392 is inadmissible, having been brought
later than 21 days following the receipt of the decision
being challenged.
2. The Panel’s finding on the merits
The Panel has reviewed and duly considered both
parties’ pleadings on the merits, and notes that
these at the very least raise a number of prima facie
issues regarding the clarity of the FIDE Statutes and
Electoral Regulations, and regarding the internal
governance of FIDE. However, having decided that
CAS 2011/A/2392 is inadmissible, the Panel will not
address in this award the parties’ pleadings on the
merits, which have been outlined above.
Nevertheless, the Panel would encourage FIDE to
assess critically its past practice in light of the texts
of its statutes and regulations, so as to maintain an
appropriate level of transparency in its decisionmaking process.
D. Other claims
The Panel, having considered and dismissed the
Appellants’ appeals, will not address the arguments
raised by the Respondent relating to the Appellants’
lack of standing to commence the proceedings, the
Respondent’s allegation that the appeal is an abuse
of right by the Appellants and the Respondent’s
allegation that the source of financing of the
Appellants’ claim raises questions of standing.
E. Conclusion
The appeal fi led by the Appellants on 24 February
2011 (CAS 2011/A/2360) is dismissed, whereas the
appeal fi led by the Appellants on 29 March 2011
(CAS 2011/A/2392) is inadmissible.
Consequently, the substantive characterisation of the
underlying decision as “null and void” or “challengeable”
and the effect of such characterisation on the time
-
32
Ahongalu Fusimalohi v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
8 March 2012
Football; disciplinary sanctions against
a FIFA official for infringement of the
Code of Ethics; duty of good faith in
obtaining evidence; power to admit
illegally obtained evidence; standard
and evaluation of proof; admissibility
of evidence; protection of personality
rights; duty of loyalty and good faith;
degree of guilt
Panel:
Prof. Massimo Coccia (Italy), President
Judge Catherine Anne Davani (Papua New Guinea)
Mr. Michele Bernasconi (Switzerland)
Tournaments (the “FIFA Olympic Tournaments
Committee”). He had been a member of the FIFA
Executive Committee from 2002 to 2007.
In relation to the 2018 FIFA World Cup, the national
football federations of the following countries
submitted bids for the right to host the final
phase: Russia, England, Belgium jointly with the
Netherlands, and Spain jointly with Portugal. The
bidders to stage the 2022 edition of the FIFA World
Cup were the national federations of Qatar, Australia,
Korea Republic, Japan and USA. The United States
federation had initially submitted bids to FIFA for
both editions of the World Cup but, in October 2010,
withdrew from the 2018 bid process to focus solely
on the 2022 contest.
On 2 December 2010, the FIFA Executive Committee
chose Russia to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup and
awarded the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar.
Relevant facts
This appeal is brought by Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi
(the “Appellant ”), former member of the Executive
Committee of the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA; the “Respondent ”), against
a decision of the FIFA Appeal Committee, which held
him responsible for breaching articles 3, 9, 11 and 14
of the FIFA Code of Ethics and which imposed on
him a ban from taking part in any football-related
activity at national and international level for a period
of two years as well as a fine of CHF 7,500.
The facts from which the appeal emanates are that
the Appellant was secretly filmed and recorded by a
hidden camera and an audio recording device, while
meeting with an undercover Sunday Times journalist
posing as a lobbyist purporting to support the United
States football federation’s bid for the 2018 and 2022
FIFA World Cups. The video and audio recordings of
that meeting (“the Recordings”), passed on by the Sunday
Times to FIFA, are the evidentiary basis of the case
against Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi.
At the time the Appellant met with the Sunday Times
journalist, he was the General Secretary of the Tonga
Football Association (“Tonga FA”), a member of
the Executive Committee of the Oceania Football
Confederation (OFC) and a member of the FIFA
Organising Committee for the Olympic Football
On 17 October 2010, the British weekly newspaper
Sunday Times published an article entitled “Foul play
threatens England’s Cup bid; Nations spend vast amounts
in an attempt to be named World Cup host but as insight
finds, $ 800,000 offered to a FIFA official can be far more
effective”. The newspaper reported strong suspicions
of corruption within FIFA in connection with the
selection process to host the FIFA World Cups. The
article suggested that corruption was widespread
within FIFA and came to the conclusion that, in the
current state of affairs, it was more effective and less
costly to obtain the organisation of the World Cup by
offering bribes rather than by preparing and filing a
thorough and well-documented bid. As a final point,
the article concluded that “Football has enough trouble
maintaining fair play on the field. FIFA has to ensure that
there is fair play off it, too, by stamping out corruption and
cleaning up the World Cup bidding process. FIFA badly needs
to introduce more transparency into the process and keep its
decision makers under tighter control. That means an end to
payments into private bank accounts or pet projects. It means
each committee member judging the merits of the bids, not the
bribes on offer. The Olympics has cleaned up its act after a series
of bribery scandals, culminating in Salt Lake City in 2002.
We have a right to expect no less of the World Cup”.
The covert inquiry was conducted by some Sunday
Times journalists, who had approached several current
and former high-ranking FIFA officials pretending
-
33
to be lobbyists working for a private company called
Franklin Jones, allegedly hired by a group of United
States companies eager to secure deals in order to
unofficially support the official bids presented by the
United States football federation for the 2018 and the
2022 FIFA World Cups.
would be great if we could meet to discuss this proposal further.
With specific regard to Mr Fusimalohi, on 22 July
2010, a Sunday Times journalist who did not reveal her
true identity and profession but introduced herself as
“Claire Murray”, Director of Franklin Jones, sent to the
Appellant the following e-mail:
On 28 July 2010, the Appellant wrote back to Ms
Claire Murray, confirming his interest in joining
Franklin Jones in “an advisory capacity” and in “receiving
further information on [his] recruitment”.
“I work for a London based communication company. To
meet our client’s needs we will be expanding our International
Advisory Board and are looking for a small number of
authoritative figures to help us develop our expertise.
One of the areas we are interested in developing is Sport and
your name came up as someone who has tremendous expertise
and contacts in this area.
I wonder if we could arrange a telephone call to discuss the
possibility of you working with us in the future? I would very
much like to arrange a meeting, but perhaps we can talk about
that when we speak on the telephone”.
On 27 July 2010, the Appellant had a first phone
conversation with “Claire Murray”, who subsequently
e-mailed him the following message:
“[…]
However, our search for the right person has become more
urgent as we have recently taken on a major client: a Chicago
based consortium of American companies who are willing to
make substantial investments to bring the USA’s faltering bid
for the 2018 World Cup (the 2022 is their second target) back
in contention.
This means that the person we require, our “Sports Board
Member”, needs to be someone who is familiar with the inner
workings of the [FIFA]. Our clients recognise that 2018 is a
tough field and the Europeans are favourites but they want us
to aim high and hope to gain some ground on the 2022 bid if
they fail on 2018. If you were to become our “Sports Board
Member” we would be looking for advice on how the USA
could identify key decision makers and maximise its votes from
the members of the FIFA executive committee.
We feel that a key part of our expansion involves developing our
presence in Asia and the Pacific – something we think you are
well placed to help us achieve in terms of contacts and location!
Our board members usually do about one day a month for us,
although if you wished to be more involved, we would be happy
to develop your role. Other areas we are looking to develop are
sports travel, ticketing and stadium security at major events. It
You will appreciate that in order to give you a flavour of the
job, we have had to reveal some of our business plans. So
we appreciate it if you could keep the contents of this email
private”.
On 25 September 2010, the Appellant met an
undercover reporter of the Sunday Times who
presented himself as a colleague of “Claire Murray”
named “David Brewster ” (the “Reporter ”), working for
the (fictitious) company Franklin Jones. The meeting
took place in a hotel in Auckland, New Zealand
(the “Auckland Meeting”). It lasted about two and a
half hours and was video and audio recorded by the
Reporter, without the knowledge of the Appellant.
On 15 October 2010, the “Insight Editor” of the Sunday
Times sent an email to the Appellant informing him of
the fact that an article was about to be published in the
coming week-end, and that the article would report
his meetings with the supposed representatives of
Franklin Jones and his acceptance to assist the company
in its project of bribing some members of the FIFA
Executive Committee. The Sunday Times’ Insight
Editor gave a short summary of what was allegedly
said during the Appellant’s interaction with the
undercover Reporter and gave him the opportunity to
state his position, if he so wished.
On 16 October 2010, the Appellant signed a statement
of apology dated 15 October 2010 to the attention of
the OFC President, OFC Executive Members, OFC
Member Associations’ Presidents and OFC staff. In
this document, he acknowledged having declared to
the Reporter (i) that the OFC members would vote for
the Australian bid for the 2022 FIFA World Cup only
because the Australian Football Federation persuaded
its government to pay Oceania 4 million Australian
dollars, (ii) that Mr Reynald Temarii – at the time OFC
President and vice-president of FIFA – would vote
for the Spanish bid in exchange of training facilities
in South America for Oceania national teams, (iii) that
Mr Temarii’s vote could certainly be bought for the
American bid and that, in this regard, a direct offer
should be made to him. Then, the Appellant stated (iv)
that the above declarations made to the Reporter were
“pure lies”, (v) that in a 2008 meeting, the members of
the OFC Executive Committee unanimously agreed
to support the Australian bid based on their common
history as well as on very objective criteria, and (vi)
that the OFC President committed himself to vote in
-
34
accordance with the decision of the OFC Executive
Committee members, who were regularly consulted
and updated about his meetings with the bidding
committees.
“1.
The official, Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi, is found
guilty of infringement of art. 3 par. 1, par. 2 and
par. 3 (General Rules), art. 9 par. 1 (Loyalty and
confidentiality), art. 11 par. 1 (Bribery) and art. 14
par. 1 (Duty of disclosure and reporting) of the FIFA
Code of Ethics.
2.
The official, Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi, is hereby
banned from taking part in any kind of footballrelated activity at national and international level
(administrative, sports or any other) for a period of
three (3) years as from 20 October 2010, in accordance
with art. 22 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code and in
connection with art. 17 of the FIFA Code of Ethics.
3.
On 18 October 2010, upon FIFA’s request just after
the publication of the article, the Sunday Times sent to
FIFA a copy of the Recordings.
The official, Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi, is ordered
to pay a fine to the amount of CHF 10,000, in
accordance with art. 10 c) of the FIFA Disciplinary
Code and in connection with art. 17 of the FIFA Code
of Ethics. The fine is to be paid within 30 days of
notification of the decision. (…)
4.
On the same day, the FIFA Secretary General
requested the chairman of the FIFA Ethics
Committee to commence disciplinary proceedings
against the Appellant, in accordance with article 16 of
the FIFA Code of Ethics (the “FCE”).
Costs and expenses of these proceedings, in the amount
of CHF 2,000 are borne by the official, Mr Ahongalu
Fusimalohi, in accordance with art. 105 par. 1 of the
FIFA Disciplinary Code and shall be paid according
to the modalities stipulated under point no. 3 above.
5.
The official, Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi, shall bear his
own legal and other costs incurred in connection with the
present proceedings.
6.
This decision has been sent to Mr Ahongalu Fusimalohi
[…] by fax, in accordance with art. 103 par. 1 of the
FIFA Disciplinary Code”.
At the hearing, the Appellant claimed that he did not
write the above letter but that it was prepared for him
by Mr Temarii and Mr Tai Nicholas, the OFC General
Secretary, who made him sign it while he was sick at
home, and that he was too sick to actually read or
understand what he was signing.
On 17 October 2010, the Sunday Times published
on paper and on its website the already mentioned
article entitled “Foul play threatens England’s Cup bid
[...]”. In particular, the article contained an account of
the contacts between the undercover journalists and
the Appellant as well as excerpts of the Recordings
secretly taken in Auckland, quoted verbatim.
On 20 October 2010, the FIFA Ethics Committee
provisionally suspended the Appellant from taking
part in any football related activity at national or
international level.
On 21 October 2010, the FIFA Ethics Committee
commenced proceedings against the Appellant on
grounds of possible violations of article 7 of the
FIFA Statutes, article 62 of the FIFA Disciplinary
Code (FDC) and articles 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12 as well
as 14 of the FCE. The Appellant was notified of the
said charges in a letter of the same date.
On 27 October 2010, the Appellant received, via
the Tonga FA, a package containing a copy of the
Recordings.
On 5 November 2010, the Appellant filed his written
position before the FIFA Ethics Committee within
the allotted time limit. In his submission he explained,
inter alia, that he was not in a financial position to
attend, or to be represented at, a hearing to be held
in Switzerland.
On 16 November 2010, the FIFA Ethics Committee
decided the following:
On 17 January 2011, the full reasoning for such
decision was issued and notified to the Appellant.
The Appellant lodged with the FIFA Appeal
Committee a timely appeal against the decision of the
FIFA Ethics Committee.
On 2 February 2011, the FIFA Appeal Committee
held a hearing by telephone conference attended by
the Appellant and his counsel. On 14 April 2011,
the FIFA Appeal Committee issued its full decision
(the “Appealed Decision”), which was received by the
Appellant on 15 April 2011 (Oceania date).
The FIFA Appeal Committee found among other
things that the proceedings before the FIFA Ethics
Committee were properly carried out and that the
Recordings constituted admissible evidence as the
investigations conducted by the Sunday Times were
necessary and appropriate, served a justified purpose
(i.e. the information of the public of the possibility
-
35
of corruption among high ranking FIFA officials)
and were achieved in the public interest, which
“clearly outweighed any disadvantages to the Appellant that
might have resulted from the breach of any law during the
procurement of the information in question”. The FIFA
Appeal Committee held that there was sufficient
evidence to establish that the Appellant accepted
unjustified advantage against his services in favour of
the American bid and that the requirements of article
11 para. 1 of the FCE (Bribery) were met. The FIFA
Ethics Committee deemed that the Appellant violated
the principles set forth in article 9 of the FCE (Loyalty
and confidentiality) as his behaviour was clearly in
breach of the specific standard of conduct requested
by a “CEO/Secretary of the Tonga Football Association a
person who was in FIFA from 2002 to 2007 and during this
time was a member of several FIFA committees among which
the FIFA Executive Committee, a member of the Executive
Committee of the OFC and of the board of the OFC”.
The FIFA Appeal Committee also confirmed that
the Appellant did not respect his general obligations
(as provided by article 3 of the FCE) as well as his
duty of disclosure of illicit approaches prescribed by
the applicable regulations, in failing immediately to
report to FIFA that he had been in receipt of offers
by certain individuals to take an active part in their
illegitimate scheme. On account of his violation
of article 11 para. 1 of the FCE, the FIFA Appeal
Committee deemed appropriate to sanction the
Appellant with a 16 months ban from taking part in
any football-related activity, to be increased due to the
violation of articles 3, 9 para. 1 and 14 para. 1 of the
FCE by 8 months to a total of two years.
The FIFA Appeal Committee also imposed upon the
Appellant a fine of CHF 5,000 for the infringement
of article 11 para. 1 of the FCE and a fine of CHF
2,500 for the infringement of articles 3, 9 para. 1 and
14 para. 1 of the FCE, to a total fine of CHF 7,500.
As a consequence, the appeal lodged by the Appellant
was partially upheld as the decision of the FIFA
Ethics Committee was confirmed but the sanctions
were reduced to a two-year ban from taking part in any
football-related activity (instead of a three-year ban)
and a fine of CHF 7,500 (instead of CHF 10,000).
On 2 May 2011, the Appellant filed a statement of
appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS). On 16 May 2011, he lodged his appeal brief.
A. Admissibility of the evidence
According to the Appellant, the Recordings that
FIFA obtained from the Sunday Times must be
considered as illegally obtained evidence because the
journalists’ undercover investigation deceived the
Appellant, did not serve to achieve a justified purpose,
used unnecessary and inappropriate methods and
compromised the Appellant’s right to privacy by
pursuing a less significant interest than that of the
Appellant. Therefore, it is the Appellant’s case that
the evidence is procedurally inadmissible.
1. Illegal nature of the evidence ?
Preliminarily, with regard to the alleged illegality of
the evidence, the Panel notes that pursuant to the
general duties of good faith and respect for the arbitral
process a party to an arbitration may not cheat the
other party and illegally obtain some evidence. Should
that happen, the evidentiary materials thus obtained
may be deemed as inadmissible by the arbitral tribunal
(cf. BERGER/KELLERHALS, International Arbitration in
Switzerland, 2nd ed., London 2010, p. 343). A couple
of examples can be given of arbitral proceedings
where a violation of the principles of good faith and
of respect for the arbitral process occurred:
- an international arbitral tribunal made clear that
all parties owe a general duty to the others and to
the tribunal to conduct themselves in good faith
during the arbitration proceedings and that it is not
acceptable for a party to an arbitration to gather
evidence by having private detectives covertly
trespassing into the other party’s office building
(UNCITRAL, Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final
Award, 3 August 2005, pt. II, ch. A, at 13);
- another international arbitral tribunal, in a
situation where a State who was a party to an
ICSID arbitration had used its police powers and
intelligence services to eavesdrop on the other
party’s telephone conversations, stated that “parties
have an obligation to arbitrate fairly and in good faith
and [...] an arbitral tribunal has the inherent jurisdiction
to ensure that this obligation is complied with; this
principle applies in all arbitration” (ICSID Case No.
ARB/06/8, Libananco Holdings Co. v. Turkey,
Award on Jurisdiction, 23 June 2008 at 78).
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Panel finds
that the case at hand is very different from the just
mentioned examples, as FIFA did not perform any
illegal activity and did not cheat the Appellant in order
to obtain the Recordings. There is no evidence on file,
and the Appellant does not contend, that the Sunday
Times’ investigation was prompted or supported
by FIFA or by anybody close to FIFA. FIFA
transparently solicited and received such evidentiary
material from the Sunday Times immediately after the
publication of the article on 17 October 2010 and the
-
36
disclosure of important portions of the Recordings’
content. The Panel thus finds that FIFA did not
violate the duties of good faith and respect for the
arbitral process incumbent on all who participate
in international arbitration; as a consequence, such
procedural principles may not constitute a legal
basis to exclude the disputed evidence from these
arbitration proceedings.
However, the Appellant argues that the Sunday Times’
Reporter intentionally intruded into his private
life to gather the Recordings and, consequently,
such evidence cannot be used in these arbitration
proceedings, even if FIFA itself is not responsible for
the journalists’ conduct.
The Panel observes that, in assessing the lawfulness
or not of the journalists’ conduct, two different rights
would have to be comparatively weighed – the right
to respect for private life and the right to freedom of
expression. Both rights are protected in any democratic
society but neither one is absolute, being subject to a
number of legitimate exceptions and restrictions (cf.
articles 8.2 and 10.2 ECHR). According to the current
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, neither right has automatic precedence over
the other and, in principle, both merit equal respect
(European Court of Human Rights, Judgment 23 July
2009, Hachette Filipacchi Associés “Ici Paris” v. France,
Application no. 12268/03, at para. 41).
With specific regard to interferences by the media
in a person’s private life, the European Court of
Human Rights has recently emphasised the vital
role of the press in informing the public and being
a “public watchdog”, underlining that not only does the
press have the task of imparting information and
ideas on matters of public interest but the public
also has a right to receive them (European Court of
Human Rights, Judgment 10 May 2011, Mosley v. UK,
Application no. 48009/08, at para. 112). According to
the European Court (ibidem, at para. 114):
“the pre-eminent role of the press in a democracy and its duty
to act as a ‘public watchdog’ are important considerations in
favour of a narrow construction of any limitations on freedom
of expression. However, different considerations apply to press
reports concentrating on sensational and, at times, lurid news,
intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying
the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of
a person’s strictly private life. [...] the Court stresses that in
assessing in the context of a particular publication whether
there is a public interest which justifies an interference with the
right to respect for private life, the focus must be on whether the
publication is in the interest of the public and not whether the
public might be interested in reading it” (citations omitted).
The Panel notes that the Sunday Times did not look
for sensational or lurid aspects of the Appellant’s
strictly private life to lure the curiosity of the public.
Rather, the Sunday Times tried to expose possible
cases of corruption in the FIFA World Cup bidding
process, thus acting as “public watchdogs” (to use the
European Court’s terminology). The Panel finds
it difficult to maintain that the exposure of illegal
conduct in relation to important sports events – be
it corruption, doping or match-fixing – would not be
in the interest of the public. Taking into account the
above recent jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights, it is not self evident that the
Reporter’s conduct, albeit sneaky, was unlawful; if it
were, the Appellant would be entitled to seek justice
on that count by filing a criminal complaint and/or a
civil action against the Sunday Times or its journalists.
The fact that at the time of the hearing – about one
year after the relevant facts – the Appellant had not
started any lawsuit certainly does not lend support to
the argument that the journalists illegally obtained the
Recordings.
In any event, the Panel deems it unnecessary to assess
whether or not the Recordings were illegally procured
and whether or not the evidence remained illegal
when it arrived in the hands of FIFA. The Panel is
even prepared to assume in the Appellant’s favour
that the evidence was illegally obtained, given that an
international arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland
is not necessarily precluded from admitting illegally
procured evidence into the proceedings and from
taking it into account for its award (see BERGER/
KELLERHALS, op. cit., p. 343). Indeed, an international
arbitral tribunal sitting in Switzerland is not bound to
follow the rules of procedure, and thus the rules of
evidence, applicable before Swiss civil courts, or even
less before Swiss criminal courts. As emphasized in
the Swiss legal literature on international arbitration
(translated in English):
“Arbitral proceedings are not subject to the rules applicable
before State tribunals. This is, after all, an often mentioned
benefit of arbitration” (KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI,
Arbitrage international. Droit et pratique à la lumière de la
LDIP, 2nd ed., Bern 2010, at 294).
Accordingly, with regard to the admissibility of
evidence, the Panel endorses the position articulated by
a CAS panel in the recent matter CAS 2009/A/1879,
paras. 134 ff (the “A. case”; translated in English):
“ The internal Swiss legal order does not set forth a general
principle according to which illicit evidence would be generally
inadmissible in civil proceedings before State courts. On the
contrary and according to the long-standing jurisprudence of
the Federal Tribunal, whether the evidence is admissible or
-
37
inadmissible depends on the evaluation of various aspects and
legal interests. For example, the nature of the infringement, the
interest in getting at the truth, the evidentiary difficulties for
the interested party, the behaviour of the victim, the parties’
legitimate interests and the possibility to obtain the (same)
evidence in a lawful manner are relevant in this context. The
prevailing scholarly writings agree with the jurisprudence of the
Swiss Federal Tribunal. The approach taken by the Federal
Tribunal and by most of the scholars has actually been codified
in the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) (Article 152
paragraph 2), which will come into force on 1 January 2011
[…].
2. The applicable rules of evidence
The above described principles are only a feeble source of
inspiration for arbitral tribunals. […] In particular, the
prohibition to rely on illegal evidence in State court proceedings
is not binding per se upon an arbitral tribunal. According
to international arbitration law, an arbitral tribunal is not
bound by the rules of evidence applicable before the civil State
courts of the seat of the arbitral tribunal. As seen above, the
discretion of the arbitrator to decide on the admissibility of
evidence is exclusively limited by procedural public policy. In
this respect, the use of illegal evidence does not automatically
concern Swiss public policy, which is violated only in the presence
of an intolerable contradiction with the sentiment of justice, to
the effect that the decision appears incompatible with the values
recognized in a State governed by the rule of law”.
This provision confirms the A. panel’s statement that
“an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence
applicable before the civil State courts of the seat of the arbitral
tribunal”. This is particularly so if the parties make use
of their private autonomy to lay down some rules of
evidence.
In light of these principles and under the particular
circumstances of that matter, the CAS panel in the A.
case considered as admissible a piece of evidence – a
blood sample – which a Spanish first instance judge,
whose order was subsequently confirmed by the
Madrid Court of Appeals, (a) had expressly declared
to have been illegally obtained and (b) had expressly
prohibited to be used in any judicial or disciplinary
proceedings. The CAS panel in the A. case held on
the basis of such evidence that the athlete had at least
tried to engage in prohibited doping practices and,
consequently, imposed on him a disciplinary sanction.
A. lodged an appeal before the Swiss Federal Tribunal,
which upheld the decision without however dealing
with this evidentiary issue (Judgment of 29 October
2010, 4A_234/2010, ATF 136 III 605).
The Panel remarks that, in the case at hand, not
only has there been no judicial court finding that the
evidence was unlawfully obtained and prohibiting its
use but, as observed, it is open to debate whether
the Sunday Times Reporter acted illegally. In light of
the foregoing considerations the Panel finds that,
even assuming in the Appellant’s favour the illegal
acquisition of the Recordings, this does not prevent
their use as evidence in disciplinary proceedings
conducted within a private association or in related
appeal proceedings before an arbitral institution, in
this case the CAS.
2.1 Private autonomy and Swiss evidentiary rules
Chapter 12 PILA grants an important role to private
autonomy in international arbitration, as it gives the
parties the option to determine their own procedural
rules, including rules relating to evidence. In particular,
article 182 para. 1 PILA states that “[t]he parties may,
directly or by reference to rules of arbitration, determine the
arbitral procedure; they may also submit the arbitral procedure
to a procedural law of their choice”.
The Panel notes that the parties to this arbitration
did make use of their private autonomy – FIFA by
adopting its rules and the Appellant by accepting
them when he voluntarily became an indirect member
of FIFA – and did agree to the application of rules of
evidence in FIFA disciplinary proceedings. Therefore,
the Panel finds that the evidentiary issues in this case
will be addressed applying those rules privately agreed
between the parties and not the rules of evidence
applicable before Swiss civil or criminal courts.
As a consequence, the criteria on the admissibility
of evidence that can be found in the Swiss civil or
criminal jurisprudence will not be relied on by the
Panel. In particular, the Panel will not discuss some
decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, such as the
judgments of 2 July 2010 (5A_57/2010, ATF 136 III
410) and of 15 June 2009 (8C_807/2008, ATF 135 I
169), that concern covert surveillance and secret video
recordings of insured individuals made by private or
public insurance bodies. Indeed, those cases do not
concern arbitration proceedings but the application of
Swiss rules of civil procedure. Incidentally, the Panel
observes that those Swiss cases can be distinguished
from the case at hand, as they concern intrusions into
privacy committed with the objective of gathering
evidence by the same party which then introduced
the evidence before the court, whereas FIFA – as
already noted – cannot be blamed for having spied
on the Appellant. Rather FIFA was confronted with
evidence derived from a fait accompli.
The applicable FIFA evidentiary rules in this case
are those set forth by the FDC, which includes rules
governing (i) the burden of proof, (ii) the standard
and evaluation of proof, and (iii) the admissibility of
evidence.
-
38
2.2 The FIFA rule on burden of proof
2.4 The FIFA rule on admissibility of evidence
With regard to burden of proof, article 99 para.1 of
the FDC provides as follows:
With regards to the admissibility of evidence – the
evidentiary issue in controversy here – article 96 of
the FDC provides as follows:
“Article 99 Burden of proof
“Article 96 Various types of proof
1.
The burden of proof regarding disciplinary infringements
rests on FIFA”.
The Panel notes that this FIFA provision is in line with
the general principle for disciplinary cases, which is
that the burden of proof lies with the accuser. Hence,
notwithstanding the fact that FIFA is the Respondent
in this arbitration, it is up to FIFA to prove its case
against the Appellant.
2.3 The FIFA rule on standard and evaluation of
proof
With regard to standard and evaluation of proof,
article 97 of the FDC provides as follows:
“Article 97 Evaluation of proof
1.
The bodies will have absolute discretion regarding proof.
2.
They may, in particular, take account of the parties’
attitudes during proceedings, especially the manner in
which they cooperate with the judicial bodies and the
secretariat (cf. art. 110).
3.
They decide on the basis of their personal convictions”.
The Panel notes that, under article 97 FDC, the Panel
has wide powers and may freely form its opinion after
examining all the available evidence. The applicable
standard of proof is the “personal conviction” of the
Panel.
The Panel is of the view that, in practical terms, this
standard of proof of personal conviction coincides
with the “comfortable satisfaction” standard widely
applied by CAS panels in disciplinary proceedings.
According to this standard of proof, the sanctioning
authority must establish the disciplinary violation
to the comfortable satisfaction of the judging body
bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation.
It is a standard that is higher than the civil standard
of “balance of probability” but lower than the criminal
standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt ” (cf. CAS
2010/A/2172, para. 53; CAS 2009/A/1920, para.
85). The Panel will thus give such a meaning to the
applicable standard of proof of personal conviction.
1.
Any type of proof may be produced.
2.
Proof that violates human dignity or obviously does not
serve to establish relevant facts shall be rejected.
3.
The following are, in particular, admissible: reports
from referees, assistant referees, match commissioners
and referee inspectors, declarations from the parties and
witnesses, material evidence, expert opinions and audio or
video recordings”.
The Panel notes that, pursuant to Article 96 para. 1
FDC, all means of evidence may be admitted without
restriction in disciplinary proceedings to which FIFA
rules are applicable. The Panel also notes that para.
3 of this provision expressly includes “audio or video
recordings ”. It thus appears that the FDC allows
virtually all types of evidence, with the exception of
those that violate “human dignity ” or that are obviously
immaterial (para. 2), the latter exception being clearly
irrelevant in the case at hand. Incidentally, the Panel
observes that such a liberal attitude in the admission
of evidence should not come as a surprise, given
that intra-association disciplinary proceedings (and
thus the ensuing appeal arbitration proceedings) are,
by their very nature, less formalistic and guaranteedriven than criminal proceedings.
According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the normative
content of “human dignity” cannot be determined
explicitly and exhaustively. Nevertheless, the Federal
Tribunal stressed that human dignity is inseparable
from the human condition and from the human
beings (ATF 132 I 49, at consid. 5.1). In view of this,
the Panel is of the opinion that the quoted FIFA rule
tends to exclude from the evidentiary process proofs
obtained as a result of, or connected with, acts of
physical or psychological violence, brutality or any
other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment. In
the Panel’s view, the facts of this case do not allow to
conclude that the taking of the Recordings violated
human dignity. The Panel remarks that the Appellant
was not subject to any threat or violence, his meeting
with the Reporter was freely agreed upon and was
comfortably held in a hotel bar, and his video images
do not show him in any degrading situation. In short,
the Recordings appear to be permissible evidence
under article 96 of the FDC.
-
39
Nevertheless, it is not enough for FIFA to respect its
own rules. Indeed, while Swiss law endows associations
with a large autonomy, their regulations cannot
infringe their members’ personality rights, unless
such infringement is legitimate within the meaning
of Swiss law (JEANNERET/HARI, in PICHONNAZ/FOËX
(eds.), Commentaire romand – CC I, Basle 2010, ad
art. 63, paras. 2 ff, p. 474; PERRIN/CHAPPUIS, Droit de
l’association, 3rd ed., Geneva et al. 2008, ad art. 63, p.
41).
The Panel harbours no doubt that, in general terms,
the right to privacy lies within the personality rights
protected by article 28 CC. The Panel is also convinced
that the Reporter’s furtive conduct intruded into the
Appellant’s private life, as he was not advised that his
private conversation was being recorded. However,
the question here at stake is not whether the Reporter
violated the Appellant’s right to privacy but, rather,
whether the use of the Recordings as evidence in this
arbitration might violate his personality rights.
Accordingly, the evidence allowed by article 96 para. 2
FDC must in any event be in compliance with the
principle of protection of personality rights within
the meaning of article 28 of the Swiss Civil Code
(“CC”).
Taking into account the three possible justifications
under article 28 para. 2 CC, two can be easily discarded
– the victim’s consent and the law – as they are clearly
inapplicable to the case at hand. Therefore, the case
falls on the evaluation whether there is an “overriding
private or public interest” that might justify the use of the
Recordings as evidence in these proceedings.
3. The protection of the Appellant’s personality
rights
The legal basis for personality rights are articles 27
and 28 CC. Article 27 CC protects the personality
from excessive contractual duties and article 28 CC
from illegal infringements by a third party. Only the
latter provision is relevant here.
Article 28 CC states the following:
“1
Any person whose personality rights are unlawfully
infringed may apply to the court for protection against all
those causing the infringement.
2
An infringement is unlawful unless it is justified by the
consent of the person whose rights are infringed or by an
overriding private or public interest or by law”.
The guarantee of article 28 CC extends to all of the
essential values of an individual that are inherent
to him by his mere existence and may be subject
to attack (ATF 134 III 193, at consid. 4.5, p. 200).
According to article 28 para. 2 CC, an attack on
personality is unlawful, unless it is justified by (i) the
victim’s consent, (ii) an overriding private or public
interest, or (iii) the law. It follows from this provision
that such an attack is in principle unlawful but it
can be redeemed to lawfulness if one of the three
listed justifications is proven by the perpetrator.
Unlawfulness is an objective concept, such that it is
not crucial that the perpetrator be in good faith or be
ignorant that he is involved in harming a personality
right (ATF 134 III 193, at consid. 4.6.2, p. 201). The
Panel will need to assess the situation on the basis of
an objective scale of values and not in consideration
of the victim’s perception or sensitivity (JEANDIN N.,
in PICHONNAZ/FOËX (eds.), Commentaire romand –
CC I, Basle 2010, ad art. 28, paras. 67 ff, p. 261).
4. The balance between the Appellant’s and other
private or public interest
The Panel has to conduct a balancing exercise to
decide which interest should prevail, namely the
Appellant’s private interest in not suffering an attack
on his personality or the private interest of other
individuals or entities, or the public interest, in
perpetrating such attack. In this case, the balancing
exercise must assess whether the Appellant’s interest
to keep his conversation private prevails over the
FIFA’s (and others’) interest in disclosing them within
these disciplinary proceedings.
With regard to the Appellant’s interest, the Panel
observes that at the time of the disciplinary proceedings
some details of the Appellant’s conversation with the
undercover Reporter – including the most relevant
and sensitive parts of the Recordings – had already
fallen into the public domain with the publication
of the article in the Sunday Times and on the Internet
(publication that the Appellant, as said, has not
attempted to judicially impede or restrain). The
newspaper had not only reported the existence of the
Recordings but also disclosed some of their contents.
As a result, the Appellant’s sphere of privacy with
respect to his conversation with the Reporter has
already been significantly narrowed. He can no longer
reasonably expect to fully protect the privacy of
a conversation that has already been partially read
by hundreds of thousands of people. However,
the Panel is persuaded that there still is a residual
sphere of privacy of Mr Fusimalohi which is worth
protecting, as (i) a good portion of his conversation
with the Reporter has never been disclosed to the
public so far and (ii) the publication of this award,
including the transcript of the Auckland Meeting, will
draw the public attention once again on that private
-
40
conversation. Therefore, Mr Fusimalohi retains a
concrete interest to impede the full disclosure of his
conversation with the Reporter and, to that end, to
block the use of the Recordings as evidence in these
arbitral proceedings.
Yet, the Panel finds that the Appellant’s interest in
keeping the Recordings confidential is contradicted
by the interest of FIFA and of other private and
public stakeholders in disclosing the full content of
the Recordings and in using them for disciplinary
purposes:
- There certainly exists a general public interest in
the exposure of illegal or unethical conduct, such
as corruption or other forms of dishonesty in
relation to the awarding of the organization of a
renown sporting event;
- There certainly is a private interest of FIFA
to verify the accuracy and veracity of the
information included in the Sunday Times article
and, if necessary, to restore the truth and its
image, given that the article described the whole
FIFA organization as prone to corruption and
questioned the impartiality and transparency of
the bidding process for the organization of the
World Cup;
- FIFA, like any other private association, has also
a vested interest in identifying and sanctioning
any wrongdoing among its officials and its direct
or indirect members so as to dissuade similar
conducts in the future;
- There is also a private interest of all the national
football associations which were or will be
candidates to host the FIFA World Cup in being
fully informed and possibly reassured about the
efficacy, transparency and correctness of the
bidding process;
- Given the amount of public money notoriously
spent by governments and public organisations
to support the bids presented by their football
federations and the well-known impact of the FIFA
World Cup on a country’s economy, there clearly
is a public interest of each government pledging
to support a bid (as well as of its taxpayers) to
know whether the awarding of the FIFA World
Cup is conditioned or altered by corrupt practices
of football officials;
- Finally, there is an interest of the general public,
and especially of the football fans and of the
peoples of the unsuccessful candidate countries,
in being comforted about the fact that the FIFA
2018 and 2022 World Cups were awarded in a fair,
impartial and objective manner.
In light of the above, the Panel has no difficulty in
finding that the balance of interests definitely tilts in
favour of the disclosure and utilization as evidence in
these arbitral proceedings of the evidentiary material
collected by the Sunday Times and passed on to FIFA.
Considering that the infringement of the Appellant’s
personality rights is justified by overriding public
and private interests, the Panel thus holds that the
Recordings submitted by the Respondent must be
admitted as evidence into these arbitral proceedings.
The Panel must also ascertain whether the use
of the Recordings might be in violation of Swiss
procedural public policy. To this end, the Panel deems
it appropriate to take particularly into account the
following elements:
(i)
the nature of the conduct in question and the
seriousness of the allegations that have been
made;
(ii) the ethical need to discover the truth and to
expose and sanction any wrongdoing;
(iii) the accountability that in a democratic context is
necessarily linked to the achievement of an elite
position (be it in a public or private organization);
(iv) the general consensus among sporting and
governmental institutions that corrupt practices
are a growing concern in all major sports and
that they strike at the heart of sport’s credibility
and must thus be fought with the utmost
earnestness (cf. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
– CZECH REPUBLIC, Why sport is not immune
to corruption, Council of Europe – EPAS, 1
December 2008); and
(v) the limited investigative powers of sports
governing bodies in comparison to public
authorities.
On the basis of those considerations, the Panel is of
the view that in this case the use of the Recordings in
a disciplinary context does not lead to an “intolerable
contradiction with the sentiment of justice” and is not
“incompatible with the values recognized in a State governed
by the rule of law”. Therefore, the Panel holds that
the admission of the Recordings as evidence in
these arbitration proceedings does not violate Swiss
procedural public policy.
Finally, the Panel is not persuaded by the Appellant’s
contention that the evidentiary value of the
-
41
Recordings is impaired by the fact that FIFA allegedly
refused to obtain from the Sunday Times further
phone conversations that the A ppellant had with the
supposed representatives of Franklin Jones and which
were probably recorded. First, the Panel notes that
FIFA did request all the recordings and that if the
Sunday Times did not provide everything it had, this
is not the responsibility of FIFA. Second, the Panel
is of the opinion that even if further recordings did
exist, whatever their content, they could not change
the content of what was said in the Auckland Meeting.
In this connection, the Panel remarks that the
Appellant has not claimed, nor is there any proof,
that the Recordings are not authentic or have been
manipulated. In addition, the arbitrators have
extensively and personally listened to and watched the
Recordings, and find them to be absolutely reliable
in showing in all details the Appellant’s attitude and
conduct during the Auckland Meeting with regard to
the FIFA World Cup bidding process.
11 FCE are not met, because the Reporter made no
unequivocal offer or promise to him in return for
the information given and the Appellant has never
confirmed that a salary for his services as a board
member of Franklin Jones was agreed. In addition, he
has not accepted nor taken any money. Any possible
salary including any possible involvement was still
being negotiated and the “information that was given
at the 25 September meeting was given freely and without
any certainty or commitment of a money payment or actual
engagement for services on the Advisor Board”. According
to the Appellant, Article 11 para. 1 FCE “requires
that the official must not accept a bribe i.e. actually do it. To
merely discuss, negotiate or do something that appear to be a
bribery or possible bribery is not sufficient for a conviction under
article 11”. The Appellant alleges that, in his mind, he
was having a job interview and was simply trying to
impress his prospective employers.
Article 11 para. 1 FCE reads as follows:
“11. Bribery
In conclusion, the Panel finds that the Recordings
are admissible and reliable evidence in this arbitration
and that no proof or convincing argument was
adduced in this case indicating that FIFA has been
acting improperly in relying on such evidence in the
disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant and in
the ensuing appellate arbitration.
However, these findings do not imply that the Panel
believes FIFA is entitled to remain passive and to
occasionally rely on accidental evidence in addressing
issues of corruption. In order to promote transparency
in its organization and correctly implement its ethical
rules, FIFA is expected to continue to be proactive to
prevent risks of corruption among its officials and to
vigorously investigate, with lawful means and possibly
seeking cooperation with judicial authorities, any
attitudes or acts that appear suspicious.
1. Officials may not accept bribes; in other words, any gifts or
other advantages that are offered, promised or sent to them to
incite breach of duty or dishonest conduct for the benefit of a
third party shall be refused”.
The Panel observes that article 11 para. 1 FCE
consists of two phrases. The first phrase reflects the
basic principle according to which officials may not
accept bribes. The second phrase makes clear that
football officials must be liable to a high standard of
ethical behaviour and actively turn down any potential
involvement in dishonest practices, by setting out
three cumulative elements of the offence:
a)
A gifts or other advantage must be offered,
promised or sent to an official;
b)
The official must be incited to breach some
duty or to behave dishonestly for the benefit
of a third party;
c)
The official has an obligation to refuse.
B. Merits
The FIFA Appeal Committee found the Appellant
guilty of infringement of article 3 para. 1, article
3 para. 2, article 3 para. 3 (General Rules), article 9
para. 1 (Loyalty and confidentiality), article 11 para.
1 (Bribery) and article 14 para. 1 (Duty of disclosure
and reporting) of the FCE. In this appeal arbitration
the Appellant claims to be innocent while FIFA
confirms its charges against him.
Article 11 FCE requires that these three elements are
all present in order to find a violation. They will be
separately examined hereafter.
1.1 Gifts or other advantages offered, promised or
sent
1. Article 11 para. 1 FCE (Bribery)
In essence, the Appellant claims that the available
evidence does not establish that he has breached the
FCE. He contends that the requirements of article
With respect to the first element, the Panel notes
that the wording of article 11 para. 1 FCE – “any gifts
or other advantages that are offered, promised or sent” – is
deliberately broad. The advantage can take any form
-
42
and need not actually materialize as it is sufficient
that someone “offers” or “promises” it. In other words,
article 11 para. 1 FCE does not require that a gift or
other advantage is actually agreed upon or received by
the official.
The Panel also notes that article 11 para. 1 FCE
makes reference to the offer, promise or delivery of
“any” gifts or other advantage. In the Panel’s view, this
means that the type or form of the advantage is of no
relevance; it can be money or any other benefit, even
not economically quantifiable (for instance, a career
advancement).
The Panel is of the view that in the case at hand an
advantage was indeed offered to the Appellant in
connection with the pursuit of votes for the American
bid. The offered position on the Franklin Jones advisory
board would have been well paid and was clearly
connected, at least in the first period, to the lobbying
activity within FIFA. While the preliminary emails
from “Claire Murray” could still be taken as making
reference to a wholly transparent activity – this might
explain why, when a Tongan lawyer (Mr […]) read
those emails, that he did not find them suspicious or
objectionable – the proposition made by the Reporter
very early in the Auckland Meeting obviously linked
the offered position to the Appellant’s task of
lobbying in favour of the United States bid among
the FIFA Executive Committee members:
“… if we were to hire you, then you might be able to open doors
for us, talk to people you knew in FIFA, maybe sound out some
of the FIFA Executive Committee members …”.
The evidence demonstrates that, immediately after
that clear proposition, the Appellant wanted to
know how his collaboration with Franklin Jones would
benefit him, what it would cover and how much
his remuneration would amount to. The Appellant
confirmed that he would not work for less than the rate
fixed at FIFA level, which amounted to approximately
USD 100,000 a year. The Appellant also entered into
the details of his travelling expenses and daily pocket
allowance. Concerning the expenses incurred by the
Appellant in connection with the Auckland Meeting,
the Reporter expressly gave his word that they would
be paid for.
In the Panel’s view, the Appellant’s explanation
according to which he only went to a job interview
does not lend much support to his case. The Panel
remarks that the job for which the Appellant was being
interviewed quickly appeared to be of objectionable
nature; however, this did not hold him back and did
not make him try to disengage from the interview. As
already noted, at the outset of the Auckland Meeting
the Reporter made clear that the idea was to find
unofficial ways to promote the American bid, by
looking for behind-the-scenes deals. This was clearly
understood by the Appellant, who rapidly addressed
the core issue, i.e. who were the members of the
FIFA Executive Committee whose voting could be
influenced.
The Panel finds also quite unpersuasive the
Appellant’s argument that he could perform a
legitimate testimonial campaign for the United States’
bid in the same way as Zinedine Zidane supported
the Qatari bid. The argument is implausible because,
independently of whether Mr Zidane is or is not a
FIFA official, Mr Zidane’s support for the Quatari bid
was public and transparent while the Appellant did
not want to be publicly acknowledged for his role in
helping the American bid (he said: “I need to be kept
quiet”, “I’m supposed to be silent on all of this” and “this
is all strictly confidential”). In addition, the notoriety of
Mr Fusimalohi is not even comparable to that of Mr
Zidane and it does not seem that he can seriously
claim to be a celebrity that could play a testimonial
role in a marketing campaign in favour of a bidding
country.
The Panel is also not persuaded by the Appellant’s
argument that in Auckland he simply gave away his
information and advice for free. In the Panel’s opinion,
the Appellant was clearly expecting to be rewarded for
his valuable insider information. The careful manner
in which he negotiated with the Reporter the details
of his remuneration, his reimbursements and his daily
pocket allowance proves beyond any doubt that he
expected a financial return.
At the hearing, the Appellant declared that he was
interested in the position at Franklin Jones not so much
with regard to the activity related to the awarding
of the FIFA World Cups but for the other aspects
involved, such as marketing and communication.
However, as acknowledged by the Appellant himself,
those other aspects of the job were not specifically
discussed during the Auckland Meeting. The Panel
notes that the Reporter made it clear that the
Appellant’s assistance was required until December
2010 but that their collaboration might be extended,
depending on the success obtained with the World
Cup bid project.
On the basis of the evidence before it, the Panel is
of the view that the Appellant realized that he was
offered some significant money in exchange for an
improper and shady lobbying activity. In spite of this
awareness, the Appellant set out the conditions under
which he would assist Franklin Jones. The attitude
of the Appellant throughout the whole Auckland
-
43
Meeting clearly establishes that his collaboration with
the alleged lobbyists was linked to the personal profit
he could make.
In short, the Panel is comfortably satisfied that a gift
or other advantage was offered to the Appellant and
that, accordingly, the first requirement of article 11
para. 1 FCE is met.
1.2 Incitement to breach duty or behave dishonestly
for the benefit of a third party
This second element of article 11 para. 1 FCE relates
to the purpose for which the advantage is offered
and focuses on the offeror’s intent, not the offeree’s.
The offeror must aim at inciting football officials to
breach their duties or to engage in dishonest conduct
which would – if it eventually occurs – benefit a third
party. It results from the wording of the provision
that the offeror is not necessarily the beneficiary of
the offence and that there is no need for an actual
breach of duty or dishonest conduct to occur, as it
is enough for the offeror to “incite” (i.e. to encourage,
instigate or provoke) such behaviour.
In view of the foregoing, it appears that the advantage
offered or promised need not have effectively
influenced the conduct of the official. As a matter
of fact, article 11 para. 1 FCE links the official’s
obligation to refuse the offer to the purpose for which
the offer is made, that is to incite breach of duty or
dishonest conduct. Article 11 para. 1 FCE does not
require that the official actually breach duty or behave
dishonestly. Obviously, the official must realize that
the offer of an advantage is linked to some breach of
duty or dishonest conduct that the offeror requires
from him; otherwise, the official’s obligation to refuse
would not be prompted.
In the Panel’s opinion, the evidence clearly shows
that the offer made by the Reporter was to incite the
Appellant to breach his duty or to act dishonestly for
the benefit of a third party. The supposed lobbyist
expressly mentioned the link between the advantage
offered and the way the Appellant was required
to act. In particular and in the beginning of the
Auckland Meeting, the Reporter pointed out that the
Appellant’s role was to use his connections to open
doors, to approach members of the FIFA Executive
Committee in order to influence their vote and/or
to advise Franklin Jones on the best possible ways to
assist the American bid. In response, the Appellant
confirmed that his personal status due to the various
former and present positions within FIFA and OFC
“doesn’t deny [him] the many privileges of contacts at FIFA”
and so “[he has] a great deal of friends out there” and that
he was “happy to give [the Reporter/consortium] as much
advice and inside information to what’s going on”.
The Panel finds that the Appellant understood the
Reporter’s intention and purpose very well, because
of the following circumstances:
- At an early stage of the conversation, the
Appellant offered to “sit down, go through the list of
the 24 members”, obviously in order to identify who
could and who could not be influenced and on
whom Franklin Jones should concentrate its efforts.
The Appellant even offered to gather as much
information as possible during the FIFA and
OFC meetings to be held in October 2010, then
to report to Franklin Jones, before they “go one by
one with the whole 24 members” and work out exactly
how to proceed from there. The Appellant also
concluded: “As I said, I should know everything by then.
And then we can use it as a benchmark to other offers, but
I don’t think it’s gonna be ten million. It would be a bit
outrageous for anyone to offer ten million to us”.
- More than once the Appellant gave his guidance
or assent on how to influence members of the
FIFA Executive Committee. He suggested or
approved the ideas to offer assistance in training
and development for the national teams of the
concerned members of the FIFA Executive
Committee, to buy the votes with plain money or
with real estate in the United Kingdom owned by
an off-shore company. He even said that to offer
real estate owned by an off-shore company was a
better solution than money as it does not leave any
trace. The Appellant also suggested Franklin Jones
to organize meetings in Zurich to meet as many
people as possible.
- The Appellant was also aware of the unethical
nature of what he was doing and ready to do, as
he underlined that he was “supposed to be silent on all
of this”, and despite the fact that “this is all strictly
confidential”, he was letting the Reporter “in a lot
of information”. He did not ignore the conflict of
interests between his assistance to Franklin Jones
and his position within the OFC, as he could not
be seen “to not support Australia” or to be seen as
being actively involved for another bid.
- When the Reporter asked him “if FIFA were to
find out that we were offering members incentives, would
they do anything about it?”, the Appellant answered
that “Oh yes, yes, it’s going to be a big problem”, that “It
has to be strictly confidential” and he suggested that
many FIFA officials abide by the alleged eleventh
commandment of the CIA “just don’t get caught, don’t
get caught”.
-
44
- The Appellant appears to be perfectly proficient in
English. His international career, his conversations
with the Reporter and his testimony at the hearing
prove beyond any doubt that he understands and
expresses himself in English very well.
In view of the above circumstances, the Panel
is comfortably satisfied that the Appellant well
understood that he was being incited by some
American companies to behave dishonestly – i.e. to
actively cooperate in corrupting the voting process
related to the awarding of the FIFA World Cups – in
order to enhance the chances of the United States bid
and benefit the American companies. Accordingly,
the Panel holds that the second requirement of article
11 para. 1 FCE is thoroughly satisfied in accordance
with the required standard of proof.
1.3 Obligation to refuse the improper offer
The third element of article 11 para. 1 FCE is the
obligation for an official who receives an improper
offer to positively refuse such offer upon its making
rather than to merely omit to act upon it. In other
words, an official cannot escape liability by remaining
inactive or silent in response to an attempt to
corrupt him. In that regard, the Panel remarks that
if no obligation were provided to actively refuse an
improper offer, bribery could only be found once
the bribe was actually accepted and collected, which
would often be impossible to prove for a private
association with no investigative powers, compared to
those of a judicial authority.
The Panel is of the view that there cannot be any
ambiguity or uncertainty in fighting corruption in
sports (cf. CAS 2009/A/1920, para. 85). By the same
token, there cannot be any ambiguity or uncertainty
on the part of officials in refusing any improper offer.
In particular, officials as highly ranked as the Appellant
must always, in all manner of circumstances, display
a behaviour that is completely honest and beyond
any suspicion. In the absence of such flawless,
impeccable and transparent behaviour by top football
officials, the public at large and football stakeholders
will seriously doubt the rectitude and integrity of
football organizations as a whole. This public distrust
may eventually extend to the authenticity of sporting
results and can destroy the essence of the sport. In
this respect, the Panel wishes to refer to a previous
CAS award, whose words, mutatis mutandis, could
serve as guidance in this case:
“ The Panel notes, quite obviously, that honesty and uprightness
are fundamental moral qualities that are required in every field
of life and of business, and football is no exception. More
specifically, however, the Panel is of the opinion that the notion
of integrity as applied to football requires something more than
mere honesty and uprightness, both from a sporting and from
a business point of view. The Panel considers that integrity, in
football, is crucially related to the authenticity of results, and
has a critical core which is that, in the public’s perception, both
single matches and entire championships must be a true test of
the best possible athletic, technical, coaching and management
skills of the opposing sides” (CAS 98/200, para. 56).
Indeed, in the Panel’s opinion, the football officials’
obligation to actively and unambiguously – one could
even say loudly – refuse any bribe or other forms of
corruption is importantly related to the fact that the
public must perceive football organizations as being
upright and trustworthy, otherwise both the sporting
and business appeal of football would quickly decline.
It is not merely of some importance but is of crucial
importance that top football officials should not only
be honest, but should always be seen to be honest.
The required standard of behaviour for top football
officials is very high; therefore, their conduct both
on and off the field, must be impeccable. They must
not allow themselves to be dissuaded by an improper
interference.
Therefore, the question is whether the Appellant’s
conduct was such that it was unambiguously a
rejection of the offered bribe and that the offeror (as
well as any bystander) would imply and conclude that
the attempted corruption failed.
In the Panel’s view, the answer to that question is
clearly negative. For the reasons referred to above, the
Appellant agreed to work for Franklin Jones and was
ready to start “at any time”. He is the one who suggested
to meet again in the second half of October 2010
to discuss more thoroughly “the list of 24 members”, in
order to “quickly go through everything before the Ex-Co
meeting of the 22nd”.
The Appellant contends that, after the Auckland
Meeting, there were some further phone conversations
between him and the Reporter, implying that in those
conversations he might have refused the Franklin Jones’
offer. The Appellant argues that he has been prevented
from proving his case because FIFA did not try to
obtain those recordings from the Sunday Times. In this
respect, the Panel is of the view that the recordings
of those alleged further conversations would not have
helped the Appellant’s case. Indeed, even if he had in
fact rejected the offer at that stage, it would have been
too late. An obviously dishonest, shady and illegal
offer such as that put forward by Franklin Jones should
have been refused by the Appellant on the spot. As
already noted, top football officials are held in high
regard and must display a very high standard of
behaviour, to prevent the obvious suspicion that they
-
45
are being lured into a dishonest conduct. In short,
the Panel is of the view that the supposedly missing
evidence, whatever its content, would not affect the
outcome of this case.
In conclusion, in view of the evidence before it, the
Panel is fully satisfied, bearing in mind the seriousness
of the charge, that the Appellant actively, explicitly and
specifically “accepted ” the improper offer, rather than
refused it by his conduct, as he claims. Accordingly,
the Panel holds that the third requirement of article
11 para. 1 FCE is also met.
2. Article 14 para. 1 (Duty of disclosure and
reporting)
In his appeal brief, the Appellant did not submit any
argument in relation to his alleged breach of duty of
disclosure and reporting. At the hearing before the
CAS Panel, he simply explained that he had nothing
to report to FIFA as he felt like he had done nothing
wrong.
Article 14 para. 1 FCE reads as follows:
“14. Duty of disclosure and reporting
1.
Officials shall report any evidence of violations of conduct
to the FIFA Secretary General, who shall report it to the
competent body”.
This provision lays down an obligation to disclose, in
the sense that the officials must fully and immediately
report to FIFA “any evidence of violations of conduct”,
which obviously include any inappropriate approach
made.
There is no doubt that the Appellant was well aware
of the fact that the objectives pursued by Franklin
Jones constituted a “violation of conduct ”. He even
informed the Reporter that, should FIFA know
about the lobbyists’ scheme and intention, “it’s going
to be a big problem”. He insisted on the fact that their
collaboration had to remain “strictly confidential”. In
that context, he even made reference to the alleged
eleventh commandment of the CIA “just don’t get
caught, don’t get caught”.
In other words, the Appellant deliberately wanted
concealed from FIFA deeds which he knew to be in
breach of the FIFA rules of conduct. The evidence
shows that he never had the intention to report to
FIFA or to the OFC the fact that a company operating
under the name Franklin Jones approached him and
asked him to assist it in its scheme to bribe some
members of the FIFA Executive Committee.
Finally, at the hearing before the CAS, the Appellant
declared that, after the Auckland Meeting and because
he had doubts about Franklin Jones’ true identity, he
allegedly contacted the Reporter to let him know
that he would not work with him as long as he
did not get more information regarding the said
company. However and in spite of his suspicions,
the Appellant did not feel compelled to immediately
and spontaneously report to FIFA the Reporter’s
approach.
In conclusion, the Panel is comfortably satisfied, in
accordance with its personal conviction and keeping
in mind the seriousness of the allegation, that the
Appellant did violate article 14 para. 1 FCE.
3. Article 3 (General Rules) and Article 9 para. 1
FCE (Loyalty and Confidentiality)
The Appellant is of the opinion that during the
Auckland Meeting he was not acting “in the performance
of his duties” as he genuinely believed that he was being
interviewed for a job. Besides, the Appellant asserts
that the type of advice he gave to the Reporter was
general and could have been given by anybody and
was definitely not linked to his position as a FIFA
official. Therefore, the requirements of articles 3
and 9 FCE are not met. He further insists that in the
absence of any ethical guidelines from FIFA, officials
cannot be expected to guess when the boundaries of
what is acceptable are overstepped.
Article 3 FCE reads as follows:
“1. Officials are expected to be aware of the importance of their
function and concomitant obligations and responsibilities.
Their conduct shall reflect the fact that they support
and further the principles and objectives of FIFA, the
confederations, associations, leagues and clubs in every way
and refrain from anything that could be harmful to these
aims and objectives. They shall respect the significance of
their allegiance to FIFA, the confederations, associations,
leagues and clubs and represent them honestly, worthily,
respectably and with integrity.
2.
Officials shall show commitment to an ethical attitude
while performing their duties. They shall pledge to behave
in a dignified manner. They shall behave and act with
complete credibility and integrity.
3.
Officials may not abuse their position as part of their
function in any way, especially to take advantage of their
function for private aims or gains”.
This provision of the FCE provides for the manner in
which an official can behave. The standards are high
as the officials are required to “refrain from anything
-
46
that could be harmful to these [FIFA’s] objectives” (article 3
para. 1 FCE), “behave with complete credibility and integrity”
(article 3 para. 2 FCE) and “not abuse their position as
part of their function in any way, especially to take advantage
of their function for private aims or gains” (article 3 para.
3 FCE).
Article 9 para. 1 FCE states as follows: “While
performing their duties, officials shall recognise their fiduciary
duty, especially to FIFA, the confederations, associations,
leagues and clubs”. This provision imposes on officials
the duty to comply with obligations of loyalty and
good faith, which include the obligation to put FIFA’s
interest first and abstain from doing anything which
could be contrary to FIFA’s interests.
The Panel is not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument
that he was not “performing his duties” when he took part
in the Auckland Meeting and that, therefore, articles
9 para. 1 and 3 para. 2 FCE should not be applied.
It is the Panel’s view that an official is “performing his
duties ” whenever he/she is involved in something
(a conversation, an activity, etc.) that is related to or
connected with his position(s) in football. The Panel
finds that the Appellant was given an offer exactly
because he still held important positions in football,
both at national and international level; indeed, at
the commencement of the Auckland Meeting the
Appellant told the Reporter of his positions within
the Tonga FA and the FIFA Olympic Tournaments
Committee as well as his former position as a member
of the FIFA Executive Committee. The Appellant
thus took part in the meeting being aware that he
was sought after for his high-ranking positions within
football; accordingly, the Panel is of the view that the
Appellant was (disloyally) “performing his duties” during
the Auckland Meeting and that, whilst performing
these duties, he always had to bear in mind, as a high
ranking official, his “fiduciary duty” to FIFA, the OFC
and the Tonga FA. The intent of articles 9 para. 1
and 3 para. 2 of the FCE should not be interpreted
the way the appellant submits, that a violation may
occur only during official meetings, because if that
were to be so, then the rule would specifically state
that officials perform their duties only during official
meetings. But that is not the case here.
This said, the Panel is convinced that, through his
actions (as described above in relation with article
11 FCE), the Appellant damaged FIFA’s image and
credibility. The Appellant’s conduct was obviously
harmful to FIFA’s objective of preventing all methods
or practices which might jeopardise the integrity of
matches or competitions or give rise to abuse of
Association Football (article 2 b and e of its Statutes).
By giving insider information to Franklin Jones on the
Executive Committee members likely to be bribed,
the Appellant took an active part in attempting to
compromise the bidding process to host the World
Cup. As said, the Appellant was approached by the
journalists because of his former and present positions
within FIFA and OFC and because of his connections
which could “open doors” for Franklin Jones and give
access to “inside information”, which the Appellant was
“happy to give”, in particular after he had attended an
OFC meeting. He was eager to accept a job which
was in clear contradiction with the interests of FIFA
and of his own confederation, the OFC, which had a
member federation (Australia) having submitted a bid
for the right to host the World Cup. The Appellant
was aware of this conflict of interests. Besides, he was
willing to use his position as a member of the OFC
Executive Committee to “question Australia’s stand in
[an] Ex-Co meeting” and to help evaluate the chances
of bribing the OFC President, Mr Reynald Temarii.
Therefore and contrary to his contentions, it appears
that the Appellant did abuse his position and did not
behave with integrity when he made himself available
to assist Franklin Jones in its project.
Finally, in this regard, the Panel finds unconvincing
the Appellant’s contentions that, in the absence of
clear ethical guidelines from FIFA, he was not in a
position to appreciate whether his actions were in
compliance with the standards of conduct and duty
of loyalty expected from officials. On the one hand,
in case of any doubt, he could have contacted FIFA
and sought assistance to assess whether there was a
contradiction between his official duties and the job
offered by Franklin Jones. For the reasons already raised
in relation to article 11 para. 1 FCE, the Appellant was
very much aware of the said contradictions.
On the other hand, the Appellant was approached by
a company willing to pay him a considerable amount
of money for his active assistance to buy votes in
favour of the American bid for the 2018 and 2022
FIFA World Cups. The alleged representative of
the said company seemed all the more determined
to implement his project laced with bribes, as he
travelled across the world to meet the Appellant
and was considering paying members of the FIFA
Executive Committee several millions in cash and/
or in properties. Under such circumstances, the
Appellant cannot reasonably contend that he failed to
see that such an approach would not be acceptable to
FIFA or not be compliant with articles 3 and 9 FCE.
In view of the above, the Panel is comfortably
satisfied, in accordance with its personal conviction
and keeping in mind the seriousness of the allegation,
that the Appellant breached article 3 para. 1, article
3 para. 2 , article 3 para. 3 and article 9 para. 1 FCE.
-
47
C. Sanction
Article 17 FCE together with article 59 of the FIFA
Statutes and articles 10 ff FDC indicate which types
of sanctions are applicable.
As held above, the Panel found the Appellant guilty of
breaching article 3 FCE (general rules), article 9 para.
1 FCE (loyalty and confidentiality), article 11 para. 1
FCE (bribery) and 14 para. 1 (duty of disclosure and
reporting) FCE.
Match-fixing, money-laundering, kickbacks, extortion, bribery and the like are a growing concern in
many major sports. The conduct of economic and
business affairs related to sporting events requires the
observance of certain “rules of the game” for the related
activities to proceed in an orderly fashion. The very
essence of sport is that competition must be fair. This
is also true for the organization of an event of the
importance and magnitude of the FIFA World Cup,
where dishonesty has no place. In the Panel’s view, it is
therefore essential for sporting regulators not to tolerate any kinds of corruption and to impose sanctions
sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent to people
who might otherwise be tempted to consider adopting improper conducts for their personal gain. FIFA
insiders are an obvious target for those who wish to
influence the appointment of the host country for the
FIFA World Cup.
When evaluating the degree of the Appellant’s guilt,
the Panel must take into account the objective and
subjective elements constituting the infringement, the
seriousness of the facts as well as the damage that
the Appellant’s deeds have caused, namely to those
who are directly and indirectly involved with the FIFA
World Cup selection process, to the image of the
FIFA and to the sport of football in general.
In the present case, considering the extent and
consequences of the Appellant’s misconduct and the
positions he held at the time of the relevant facts, the
various violations of the FCE must be regarded as
serious.
To summarize, the Appellant was involved in a
bribery scandal over FIFA World Cup votes, which
has received extensive media coverage. The Appellant
did not act only in a negligent way but deliberately
violated several provisions of the FCE. In spite of
the fact that the alleged lobbyist rapidly revealed his
intention to corrupt members of the FIFA Executive
Committee, the Appellant continued to converse with
the lobbyist for more than two hours and to actually
offer his services, even though he was expected not
to act against the general interest of FIFA and the
specific interest of his own Confederation. For the
reasons already stated and revealed, the fact that the
Appellant did not receive anything is of no relevance.
Significantly, the Appellant was willing to engage
in this illicit activity and his conduct was obviously
motivated by the pursuit of personal benefit and gain.
The Appellant’s behaviour is particularly reprehensible
given his position as a member of the OFC Executive
Committee and of the FIFA Olympic Tournaments
Committee, and even as a public figure politically
involved at national level. Whilst holding those
positions and necessarily being familiar with the FCE,
the Appellant could not have ignored the unethical
and unlawful nature of the Franklin Jones lobbyists’
approach. In fact, in light of his responsibilities
within FIFA and OFC, he had an ethical duty to act
responsibly, to comply with ethical standards and to
be a role model.
In view of the importance of the FIFA World Cup,
of the level of this competition and of the sporting
and financial interests at stake, the highest standards
of behaviour must be demanded of all the people
involved, in particular of members of Executive
Committees at Confederation level. The whole bribery
scandal and in particular the allegation related to the
manipulation of the voting process regarding the
FIFA World Cup selection, tarnished the reputation
of the entire FIFA organization.
In setting the sanction, it is also necessary to take into
account the range of the applicable sanctions, which
include a warning, a reprimand, a fine that shall be
no less than CHF 200 or 300 and no more than CHF
1,000,000, a ban from dressing rooms and/or the
substitutes’ bench, a ban from entering a stadium and
a ban from taking part in any football-related activity.
These sanctions equally apply for each of the relevant
violations (article 3, article 9 para. 1, article 11 para. 1
and article 14 para. 1) of the FCE.
As a source of inspiration, it is interesting to observe
that article 62 FDC (which is not applicable under the
lex specialis principle) punishes active as well as passive
corruption with the three following cumulative
sanctions: a) a fine of at least CHF 10,000, b) a ban
on taking part in any football-related activity, and c) a
ban on entering any stadium. In serious cases and in
the case of repetition, the ban on taking part in any
football-related activity may be pronounced for life
(article 62 para. 3 FDC).
In the present case, the FIFA Appeal Committee
confirmed the decision of the FIFA Ethics Committee
but reduced the sanctions to a two-year ban from
taking part in any football-related activity (instead of
-
48
a three-year ban) and a fine of CHF 7,500 (instead of
CHF 10,000).
The Panel finds no mitigating factor in the Appellant’s
case. Indeed, the Appellant did not express any
regrets for the bad publicity and damage caused to
FIFA’s image by the coverage of his meeting with the
Reporter. Moreover, he has constantly denied any
wrongdoing, let alone the violation of any provision
of the FCE. At the hearing before the CAS Panel, the
Appellant even claimed that he had been forced to
sign the statement of apology dated 15 October 2010,
thus turning down another chance to at least partially
redeem himself.
The Appellant submits that, given his clean record
and the fact that he was not the instigator of the
bribery, the sanction imposed is by far too severe.
The Panel accepts that, until the recent events under
scrutiny in this appeal, the Appellant’s reputation was
untarnished.
In weighing the proportionality of the sanction, the
Panel has also taken into account a precedent CAS
case where a life ban was imposed upon a referee
who failed to report repeated contacts with a criminal
organization which offered him EUR 50,000 to
influence a UEFA Europa League match in November
2009 (CAS 2010/A/2172).
Accordingly, the Panel finds that, pursuant to articles
22 and 10.c FDC in connection with art. 17 FCE, a
ban from taking part in any football-related activity at
national and international level (administrative, sports
or any other) for a period of two years as from 20
October 2010 as well as a fine of CHF 7,500 is not a
disproportionate sanction and might even be deemed
to be a relatively mild sanction given the seriousness
of the offence. Therefore, the Panel holds that the
Appealed Decision must be upheld in its entirety,
without any modification.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for the Panel to
consider the other requests submitted by the parties.
Accordingly, all other motions or prayers for relief are
rejected.
-
49
CD Nacional v. FK Sutjeska
30 March 2012
Football; compensation for training;
conformity of a time limit to request the
grounds of a decision with fundamental
rights and principles; conformity of
that time limit with the FIFA Statutes;
principles of interpretation of the
rules and statutes of an association;
meaning of Article 15 of the FIFA Rules
Governing the Procedures of the PSC
and the DRC
Resolution Chamber (the “FIFA DRC ”) awarded
the Respondent training compensation in relation to
the Player in the sum of EUR 335,000 (the “Appealed
Decision”).
On 17 August 2011 the Appealed Decision was
notified to the parties. Annexed to the Appealed
Decision was a notice from FIFA that advised the
parties that they had 10 (ten) days to request the
grounds of the Appealed Decision, else the same
would become “final and binding”.
On 1 September 2011 the Appellant wrote to FIFA:
Panel:
Mr. Mark Hovell (United Kingdom), President
Mr. João Nogueira da Rocha (Portugal)
“(…) we kindly request the findings of the decision, whose
deadline we request you to be extended based on FIFA’s
current jurisprudence (…). We inform you that we’ll make the
payment of the costs immediately”.
On 5 September 2011 FIFA wrote to the Appellant
stating that the request was outside the given deadline.
Relevant facts
Club Desportivo Nacional (“Nacional ” or the
“Appellant ”) is a football club with its registered
office in Funchal, Portugal. It is a member of the
Portuguese Football Federation (PFF) and plays in
the Portuguese First Division, Primeira Liga.
On 6 September 2011 the Appellant lodged its
Statement of Appeal with the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS) submitting the following request for
relief:
a)
“to reform the Appealed Decision recognizing that the
hiring of the Player Giljen Vladan, by Nacional, should
not be considered as a transfer during the contract period
of the employment contract that linked him to the previous
Club, here Respondent, because such expiry was imposed
to the Player by the previous Club, here Respondent, due
to failure by the Respondent of its obligations, including
wages;
b)
there cannot be training compensation because on the
date of his hiring by Nacional the Player already had the
professional status; and
c)
was a free Player, was unemployed, whose unemployment
was assigned to him by the Club Sutjeska, here
Respondent”.
FC Sutjeska (“Sutjeska” or the “Respondent ”) is a
football club with its registered office in Nikšić,
Montenegro. It is a member of the Football
Association of Montenegro (FAM) and plays in the
First League of Montenegro.
On 17 June 2010 the footballer V. (the “Player ”)
and the Respondent entered into an agreement to
terminate the professional contract between them
(the “Rescission Agreement”).
On 11 August 2010 the Player signed for the
Appellant, entering into a professional contract with
it. A reference was included on the Transfer Matching
System (TMS) by the Respondent that it was claiming
training compensation for the Player.
On 7 March 2011 the Respondent lodged a complaint
with the Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) requesting the payment of EUR
340,000. On 10 August 2011 the FIFA Dispute
On 8 October 2011 the Respondent filed its Answer
with the CAS with the following request for relief:
a)
“The CAS shall not deal with the appeal of the
Appellant against the FIFA DRC Decision dated 10
August 2011 – case reference ROV.11-00670. However
-
50
the Appellant’s appeal against the FIFA DRC decision
dated 10 August 2011 – case reference ROV.11-00670
shall be dismissed and the FIFA DRC decision dated 10
August 2011 shall be confirmed.
b)
The Appellant shall bear all costs of the procedure before
the CAS.
c)
The Appellant shall compensate the Respondent all
expenses of this appeal arbitration procedure.
d)
The Appellant to pay the Respondents total expenses
for legal representatives of the Respondent, also legal
assistance and all the expenses of the Respondent related
to this appeal arbitration procedure”.
On 12 October 2011 FIFA wrote to the CAS and
gave its view on the applicable time limits.
A hearing was held on 24 January 2012 at the CAS
premises in Lausanne, Switzerland.
A. In general
Article R49 of the Code directs the Panel to look
within the statutes and regulations of the federation
issuing the Appealed Decision for the time limit for
bringing the appeal.
The Respondent submitted that as the Appellant had
failed to request the grounds of the Appealed Decision
within 10 (ten) days of receipt, the Appellant has not
fulfi lled the terms and conditions of the relevant
Rules Governing the Procedures of the Players’ Status
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber
(the “FIFA Procedural Rules”). Reference was made to
Article 15 of the FIFA Procedural Rules:
“1. The Players Status Committee, the DRC, the Single
Judge and the DRC Judge may decide not to communicate
the grounds of a decision and instead communicate only
the findings of the decision. At the same time, the parties
shall be informed that they have 10 days from receipt
of the findings of the decision to request, in writing, the
grounds of the decision, and that failure to do so will result
in the decision becoming final and binding.
2.
If a party requests the grounds of a decision, the motivated
decision will be communicated to the parties in full,
written form. The time limit to lodge an appeal begins
upon receipt of this motivated decision.
3.
If the parties do not request the grounds of a decision, a
short explanation of the decision should be recorded in the
case files.
4.
All decisions that lead to sporting sanctions may only be
communicated with grounds”.
The Panel noted that on 17 August 2011 FIFA
notified the parties of the Appealed Decision by fax.
The Appellant therefore had until 27 August 2011
to request the grounds for the Appealed Decision to
comply with the FIFA Procedural Rules.
Further the Panel noted that the Appealed Decision
contained the following addendum:
“Note relating to the findings of the decision (article 15 and
18 of the Rules governing the procedures of the Players Status
Committee and the Dispute Resolution Chamber):
A request for the ground of the decision must be sent, in writing,
to the FIFA General Secretariat within 10 days of receipt of
notification of the findings of a decision. Failure to do so within
the stated deadline will result in the decision becoming final and
binding.
No costs (cf. point 5.) shall be charged if a party decides not to
ask for the grounds of the decision any advance of costs shall be
reimbursed to the party concerned”.
The Panel noted that by a fax to FIFA on 1 September
2011, the Appellant requested the grounds for the
Appealed Decision and requested an extension of
the 10-days deadline. On 5 September 2011, FIFA
replied, stating the Appellant was too late and could
not request the grounds.
The Panel noted that the Appellant referred to FIFA
Statutes at Article 63.1, which provides:
“Appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA’s legal bodies
and against decisions passed by confederations, members or
leagues shall be lodged with CAS within 21 days of notification
of the decision in question”.
The Appellant argued that the FIFA Statutes allowed
it 21 days in which to bring its appeal to CAS. It did
so on 5 September 2011, as such the appeal should be
admissible.
B. Validity of Art. 15 FIFA Procedural Rules
The Panel notes the common view of previous CAS
panels that the FIFA Procedural Rules do not infringe
any fundamental rights and adopts that position too:
As stated in the case CAS 2008/A/1705, it is true that
“the time limit of ten days is short. However, little is required
from an appellant within this time frame. He doesn’t need to
file a full brief that outlines his legal position. He is not even
required to file specific motions or requests. The only thing he
has to do in order to preserve his right of appeal is to solicit (in
-
51
writing) a reasoned decision. In addition, the provision applies
to all appellants and, thus, guarantees equal treatment among
all (indirect) members of FIFA. Additionally, the 10 daysdeadline of Art. 15(1) of the DRC Procedural Rules does not
shorten the deadline which is applicable for filing an appeal,
once the grounds of the decision are served to the parties. Indeed,
the relevant 21 days-deadline remains untouched by Art. 15(1)
of the DRC Procedural Rules” (paragraph 8.2.8).
Furthermore, the provision serves a legitimate
purpose, which is a more efficient administration
of the dispute resolution system offered by FIFA
to its (direct and indirect) members. Furthermore,
such purpose has been well accepted within the
international football community, as submitted by
FIFA during the hearing.
The Panel further notes that the provision is indeed
not an “invention” of FIFA and that a similar restriction
can be found also in relation to access to state courts:
In fact, as indicated above, it is accepted under Swiss
law that a party may be deemed to have waived its
right to challenge a decision by appeal or objection
if that party does not request the grounds of the
decision within a certain deadline (cf. Art. 239(2) of
the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure).
For all the above reasons the Panel is satisfied that
Article 15 of the FIFA Procedural Rules is compatible
with the fundamental legal principles belonging to
the ordre public and does not infringe any fundamental
rights nor any Swiss mandatory provision.
In principle, Swiss associations have the right to
freely establish the rules governing their internal life.
Swiss law has a well established tradition of respect
of the freedom of the associations and their right to
set up the legal framework for the association and its
members. The number of mandatory provisions to be
respected is indeed very low.
The statutes of an association are, similar to the
articles of incorporation of other legal entities,
the fundamental set of rules of an association (cf.
R IEMER H.M., Berner Kommentar, Die Vereine –
Systematischer Teil vor Art. 60-79 ZGB, N 320). But
statutes are often not the only source of valid and
binding legal rules of an association: rules of a higher
federation, decisions of the association, regulations,
agreements with a member or with a third party and
even simply stable consistent practice within the
association can contain part of the legal binding set
of rules.
In Swiss jurisprudence it is disputed whether a
stable, consistent practice can deviate from the rules
originally set out in the statutes (cf. R IEMER, op. cit., N
354). It seems questionable that the above mentioned
principle of hierarchy of norms must always be applied
in a strict way. In any event, whether or not a specific
regulation of an association that deviates from the
original content of the statutes is per se invalid is a
legal issue that can be left open in the present case,
because Article 15 of the FIFA Procedural Rules
does not contradict nor change the FIFA Statutes.
The Panel shares the view of the Sole Arbitrator in
the case CAS 2011/A/2439 according to which “the
10-days time limit to request the grounds of a decision shall be
deemed complementary to the deadline of 21 days foreseen in
article 63 of the FIFA Statutes” (paragraph 51).
In fact, the existence of Article 15 of the FIFA
Procedural Rules triggers de facto an extension of
the 21-days deadline foreseen in the FIFA Statutes.
A party, after having requested the grounds of the
decision, will have several weeks to consider whether
or not to appeal, first on the basis of the simple ruling
received from FIFA. Upon receipt of the reasoned
decision, the 21-days deadline will start: “It is not only
that the term of 21 days to lodge an appeal remains the same,
but also that in practice, it becomes enlarged as regards of the
time that FIFA takes in issuing the full motivated decision”
(case CAS 2011/A/2439, paragraph 53).
Finally, the Panel wishes to add that whether or not
CAS, pursuant to Article R57 of the Code can hear
any appeal de novo, does not prohibit to an association
to set up rules which govern its dispute resolution
system and the compliance of which, for instance,
limits the possibility for a party to appeal against a
decision (cf. CAS 2004/A/674, paragraph 47).
To sum up, for all the reasons above, the Panel
concludes as a first interim result, that Art. 15 of the
FIFA Procedural Rules is neither incompatible with
Swiss mandatory rules nor with fundamental legal
principles nor is in contradiction with the Statutes of
FIFA.
C. Meaning of Art. 15 FIFA Procedural Rules
The Panel first notes FIFA’s position regarding its
refusal to grant to the Appellant an extension of
the 10-days deadline, when asked to do so by the
Appellant in its fax of 1 September 2011. Having
missed that deadline, FIFA stated, the Appealed
Decision became “final and binding”.
The issue is what does “final and binding” mean? Does
it mean the decision is no longer capable of being
appealed or not ?
On one side, the Panel is aware that there are
references within the FIFA Statutes dealing with the
-
52
process of appealing an “internally final and binding”
decision to the CAS. The Panel notes in particular
references within Article 63 of the FIFA Statutes
itself. At Article 63.5 and again at article 63.6 there is
scope for FIFA and WADA respectively “to appeal to
CAS any internally final and binding doping-related decision”.
On the other side, the rules and the statutes of
an association have to be interpreted either in
accordance with the subjective will of the rulemaking
persons (the so-called “Willensprinzip”, i.e. principle
of the will) or with the objective meaning that the
addressees of the rule would give to that rule, in good
faith (the so-called “Vertrauensprinzip”, i.e. principle of
confidence or of good faith). Swiss jurisprudence has
applied from time to time one or the other principle
(cf. R IEMER, op. cit., N 329 et seq.). However, in the
present case, the Panel is satisfied that the rule at
stake, i.e. Article 15 FIFA Procedural Rule, can and
shall be interpreted in the same way, independently
on which principle is applied.
“Subjective” point of view: The Panel found it extremely
helpful to hear from FIFA in this matter and to be
provided with information on the context behind the
FIFA Procedural Rules. The genesis of the rule, its
drafting, the way its conception and introduction was
communicated by FIFA to its members, all this clearly
show that FIFA’s intention was to give to the users of
the FIFA dispute resolution process the possibility
to accept a decision on the basis of its ruling only,
and by doing so to save time and money, or ask the
grounds of the decision to be issued, postponing the
party’s own decision about fi ling of an appeal against
the FIFA’s decision at a later stage, after receipt of the
grounds. The goal of FIFA was therefore evidently
to facilitate a more efficient administration of the
caseload within the FIFA dispute resolution bodies,
by offering to the parties a “two-steps” system already
in use in relation with the access to state courts and
giving to parties a possibility of better considering
whether or not a dispute should be continued at CAS
level.
Further, by declaring that the parties had to ask
for the reasons of the decisions with 10 days of the
notification, failing which the decision would become
“final and binding”, the intention of FIFA was also clear:
first of all, it was using the words explicitly suggested
by the CAS in the case CAS 2008/A/1708. Second,
it was also using the same terms used by the Para.
158 of the Law governing the Organization of the
Judiciary of the Canton of Zurich (see its translation
in case CAS 2008/A/1705, paragraph 8.2.8). Third,
FIFA clarified its will even more by indicating,
in the second paragraph of Article 15 of the FIFA
Procedural Rules, that the deadline “to lodge an appeal
begins upon receipt of this motivated decision”.
There can be therefore no doubt that the intention
of the rule maker when introducing the system of
Article 15 of the FIFA Procedural Rules – and even
more when amending its wording to “comply” with
the suggestion of the CAS Panel of the case CAS
2008/A/1708 – was to introduce a 10 days-deadline
for a party to request the grounds of a decision, failing
which the FIFA decision would become final and
binding and no appeal against it would be possible
any longer.
“Objective” point of view: The same conclusion
is reached if instead of focusing on the meaning
resulting from the will of the rule maker one does
look at the way the addressees of Art. 15 of the
FIFA Procedural Rules could have and should have
interpreted in good faith the rule.
First, the information submitted by FIFA at the
hearing in relation with the almost unanimous
interpretation, understanding and acceptance of
the rule given by hundreds of parties has remained
undisputed. The Panel has not been provided with
any other information and it has indeed no reason
to believe that the numbers provided by FIFA were
incorrect: it seems therefore clear that for the vast
majority of the users of the FIFA dispute resolution
system an appeal against a FIFA decision is only
possible if (i) one does request the grounds of it
within the deadline of 10 days and (ii) one does fi le
an appeal with CAS within 21 days upon receipt of
the reasoned decision.
Second, and differently from the situation existing
in 2008 when the two-steps system of notification
of decisions without grounds was introduced, the
Panel is satisfied that FIFA (i) has removed such
inconsistencies in the wording of the rules that were
held against FIFA for instance in the case CAS
2008/A/1705, (ii) has amended the wording of the
rules to follow the suggestions of CAS and of the
case CAS 2008/A/1708 in particular and (iii) issued
notices to the parties in a clear way so that in good
faith no doubt can exist on what action a party is
requested and entitled to do upon receipt of a FIFA
decision without grounds.
Third, in the present case, the Appellant was made
aware of the FIFA Procedural Rules in advance of
the receipt of the Appealed Decision. A first time
was when FIFA forwarded the Respondent’s original
complaint to the Appellant via the Portuguese
Football Federation on 14 April 2011, numerous
references and directions were made to the FIFA
Procedural Rules. The Panel also noted the express
-
53
reference in the notice annexed to the Appealed
Decision, directing the parties to Article 15.1.
Fourth and finally, the Panel notes ad abundantiam
that the Appellant clearly showed to be well aware
of the FIFA Procedural Rules: in fact, Appellant
requested the grounds before fi ling any appeal with
CAS. However, it made a mistake and missed the 10days deadline. It asked FIFA to extend the deadline,
which FIFA, in line with its rules, refused to do.
The Panel is therefore satisfied that in general the
addressees of the FIFA Procedural Rules do, in
good faith, correctly understand Article 15 FIFA
Procedural Rules in the meaning it was enacted, i.e. as
a first deadline of 10 (ten) days to request the grounds,
failing which no appeal against the FIFA decision
would be possible, and with an untouched deadline
of 21 days to fi le an appeal with CAS, such deadline
starting upon receipt of the reasoned decision.
The Panel therefore determines that the Appellant
was aware and accepted the FIFA Procedural Rules
as part of the FIFA dispute resolution process. The
Panel is satisfied that from a subjective and from an
objective point of view the wording of Article 15
FIFA Procedural Rules shall be interpreted in the way
that a party wishing to appeal against a FIFA decision
must first request the grounds of the decision. If no
grounds are requested within said deadline, FIFA as
well as the other party affected by the FIFA decision,
can consider that the other party has waived its right
to appeal against the decision.
Accordingly, in the case at hand, Article 15 of the
FIFA Procedural Rules can be held against the
Appellant: it fi led its request for grounds when the
applicable deadline had already expired and, therefore,
the appeal fi led against the Appealed Decision of 17
August 2011 is inadmissible.
the Panel submits that FIFA would have to inform
the parties that such “appeal” would be treated as a
request to issue a reasoned decision. The affected
party will have 21 days to appeal (in other words:
to “confirm its will to appeal”) at a later stage, i.e. upon
receipt of the reasoned decision.
In the event that – instead of a request for issuance
of the grounds – an “appeal ” against an unreasoned
decision would be fi led within ten days with CAS
directly, the Panel, taking into due consideration
the statements made by FIFA at the occasion of the
hearing, submits that CAS would have to inform the
parties that (a) the “appeal ” seems to be premature,
(b) the “appeal ” would be forwarded to FIFA which
shall consider such “appeal ” as a proper request to
issue a reasoned decision and (c) upon receipt of the
reasoned decision the appellant would then have a
deadline of 21 days to decide whether he/it would
fi le or not an appeal against the (reasoned) decision
of FIFA.
Finally, even though the vast majority of the parties
to FIFA dispute resolution cases seem to well
understand the meaning of Article 15 of the FIFA
Procedural Rules, FIFA may consider to follow
the example of the Swiss federal rule maker and
indicate in the said provision and/or at the end of its
decisions that failing a request for grounds within the
applicable deadline, the FIFA decision would become
final and binding and the parties will be deemed to
have waived their rights to fi le an appeal with CAS.
Since such a provision does not contradict the FIFA
Statutes, an amendment of those is not necessary
but may be taken nevertheless into consideration by
FIFA.
The Panel determines that the Appellant’s appeal is
inadmissible and therefore cannot be entertained and
is rejected.
As a final comment, the Panel wishes to clarify that
it can see circumstances in which a party that did not
request the grounds of a FIFA decision within the
10-days deadline may nevertheless not be considered
to have waived its right to appeal against the decision.
This would be the case where a party upon receipt of
a FIFA decision without grounds would fi le within
the 10-days deadline directly an appeal against the
decision, independently on whether such appeal
would be fi led with FIFA or with CAS directly. These
two alternatives have to be considered separately, as
follows:
In the event that – instead of a request for issuance
of the grounds – an appeal against an unreasoned
decision would be fi led within ten days with FIFA,
-
54
Arbitrage TAS 2011/A/2585
Agence Mondiale Antidopage (AMA) c. Ramiro Marino & Union Ciclista
Republica Argentina (UCRA)
21 mai 2012
Cyclisme; dopage (méthylhéxaneamine);
fardeau de la preuve pour l’athlète; degré
de la faute ou négligence; annulation des
résultats; amende
Formation:
Me Jean Gay (Suisse), Président
Me Olivier Carrard (Suisse)
Me Jean-Mathias Goerens (Luxembourg)
Faits pertinents
L’Agence Mondiale Antidopage (AMA) est une
fondation internationale indépendante, responsable
de promouvoir, coordonner et superviser la lutte
contre le dopage dans le sport.
M. Ramiro Marino (“M. Marino”) est ressortissant de
la République d’Argentine. Il est domicilié à Buenos
Aires en Argentine. Coureur cycliste de BMX, il est
titulaire d’une licence UCI lui ayant été accordée par
l’Union ciclista de la Republica Argentina.
L’Union ciclista de la Republica Argentina (UCRA)
est la fédération nationale de cyclisme en Argentine,
membre de l’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI)
et de la fédération panaméricaine de cyclisme. En
particulier, l’UCRA adopte des mesures de prévention
et de répression à l’égard de la prise de substances
altérant les prestations physiques des athlètes durant
leur activité sportive. La Commission Antidopage
de l’UCRA est l’organisme chargé d’enquêter sur les
violations des normes antidopage conformément
au Code Mondial Antidopage (le “Code AMA”) de
l’AMA.
Le 26 février 2011, M. Marino a participé à une
compétition officielle de BMX à Paulinia, au Brésil,
la Copa Internacional de BMX. Lors du déroulement de
cette épreuve sportive, l’UCI a diligenté et conduit un
contrôle antidopage auquel M. Marino a été soumis
en date du 26 février 2011. L’échantillon d’urine de
M. Marino, portant le no 2582486, a été communiqué
pour analyse au Laboratoire de contrôle du dopage
INRS - Institut Armand-Frappier à Montréal,
Canada.
L’examen de cet échantillon, intervenu le 5 avril
2011, a révélé la présence de Méthylhéxaneamine,
soit l’une des substances énoncées dans la liste des
substances interdites établie par l’UCI. Par courrier
du 23 mai 2011, l’UCI a transmis un rapport
analytique du laboratoire confirmant la présence de
Méthylhexéneamine dans l’échantillon B de l’athlète.
L’UCI a dès lors requis l’ouverture d’une procédure
disciplinaire par l’UCRA au regard des articles 249 à
348 du Règlement antidopage de l’UCI (le “R AD ”).
Elle a confirmé également par ce courrier que M.
Marino avait décidé de s’auto-suspendre de manière
volontaire depuis le 9 mai 2011.
En date du 21 juin 2011, M. Marino a écrit à l’UCRA
pour lui donner ses explications quant à la présence
de la substance interdite dans son sang. Il a allégué
avoir eu de la fièvre 48 heures avant la compétition
et avoir ingurgité un analgésique, qui était selon ses
dires, soit du paracétamol, soit du diclofénac, que son
entraîneur serait allé acheter à la pharmacie.
En date du 5 juillet 2011, la Commission Antidopage
de l’UCRA a prononcé contre M. Marino un
avertissement, assorti d’un blâme, en lui rappelant
qu’en cas de nouveau résultat non négatif, il encourra
la peine maximum. En outre, la Commission
Antidopage de l’UCRA a décidé de renoncer à infl iger
une quelconque période de suspension à M. Marino.
A l’appui de sa décision, la Commission Antidopage
de l’UCRA a retenu que, même si la présence de
substances interdites avait effectivement été trouvée
dans les analyses de M. Marino, sans que celui-ci ne
l’ait par ailleurs contestée, il fallait toutefois considérer
qu’il s’agissait d’une quantité si minime que cela ne
permettait pas de considérer que M. Marino avait
eu l’intention d’améliorer son rendement sportif par
l’absorption de telles substances. La Commission
Antidopage de l’UCRA a également mentionné qu’il
fallait tenir compte, à titre de circonstance atténuante,
de la prise d’analgésiques pendant une période de
temps très courte.
-
55
Par courriel du 2 août 2011, l’UCI a accusé réception
de la décision de la Commission Antidopage de
l’UCRA. L’UCI n’a pas recouru contre cette décision.
Le 3 octobre 2011, l’AMA a déposé auprès du TAS
une déclaration d’appel contre la décision rendue le
5 juillet 2011 par l’UCRA à l’encontre de M. Marino.
Dans sa déclaration, l’AMA a précisé fonder son
appel sur les articles 272, 329 à 348 du RAD. L’AMA
a en outre mentionné avoir été avertie par l’UCI
que l’UCRA envisageait une reconsidération de sa
décision prise le 5 juillet 2011. L’Appelante a dès lors
conclu à l’opportunité de suspendre la procédure
devant le TAS jusqu’à clarification de la situation par
l’UCRA.
Par courrier du TAS du 5 octobre 2011, les parties ont
été informées de l’ouverture d’une procédure devant
cette juridiction. Un délai de 10 jours a été accordé
aux Intimés pour désigner un arbitre, ainsi que pour
faire part de leurs observations sur la demande de
suspension de la procédure requise par l’AMA.
L’attention des Intimés était attirée sur le fait que “leur
silence sera considéré comme un accord avec cette requête”. Les
Intimés n’ont pas déposé d’observations ni désigné
d’arbitre dans le délai qui leur avait été imparti.
En date du 17 octobre 2011, le Conseil de l’Appelante
a confirmé au TAS que la décision entreprise faisait
actuellement l’objet d’un réexamen de la part de
l’UCRA, ainsi qu’il le lui avait été annoncé par un
courrier de l’UCI du 13 octobre 2011. L’Appelante
a par conséquent requis une prolongation de la
suspension de la procédure devant le TAS jusqu’au
prononcé d’une nouvelle décision de l’UCRA. Par
courrier du 8 novembre 2011, le TAS a confirmé
aux parties que la procédure était suspendue jusqu’à
nouvel avis.
Parallèlement à la procédure devant le TAS, l’UCRA
a effectivement rendu une seconde décision dans
l’affaire impliquant M. Marino en date du 5 décembre
2011, dans laquelle elle a conclu au maintien de sa
décision du 5 juillet 2011. En substance, l’UCRA a
justifié la confirmation de sa décision du 5 juillet 2011
en invoquant de nouveaux éléments à décharge qui
auraient été présentés par M. Marino et son père en
date du 21 novembre 2011. En effet, l’Intimé aurait
expliqué avoir subi une transplantation de la rate le 12
mai 1999, comme cela résulte des pièces produites par
l’Appelante, contenant un certificat médical non daté
et une attestation du médecin de M. Marino datée du
21 novembre 2011. Il aurait également expliqué que
la présence de substances interdites dans son sang
serait due à la prise de médicaments antigrippaux et
fébrifuges, qui avait pour seul but d’éviter au cycliste
d’avoir des symptômes de fièvre qui pourraient
se révéler dangereux dans son état particulier de
personne ayant subi une greffe. M. Marino aurait en
effet invoqué avoir été pris de fièvre la veille de la
Copa Internacional de BMX, raison pour laquelle son
entraîneur lui aurait fait prendre des comprimés de
diclofénac contenant du paracétamol, toutes les six
heures pendant 24 heures. Selon les explications
de l’athlète, la découverte des substances interdites
dans son sang ne résulterait ainsi pas d’une intention
d’améliorer ses performances sportives mais
découlait de la situation particulière de personne
greffée de M. Marino. Sur la base de ces explications,
la Commission Antidopage de l’UCRA a dès lors
estimé que la présence de la substance interdite était
justifiée par la situation personnelle du coureur, en
raison de sa greffe de la rate, et ne constituait pas une
infraction au RAD. La Commission Antidopage de
l’UCRA a par conséquent décidé de “conserver, en tous
ses points, la décision adoptée dans la résolution du 5 juillet
2011 (...)”.
Le 23 décembre 2011, l’AMA a déposé auprès du TAS
un “document valant mémoire d’appel ou nouvelle déclaration
d’appel et mémoire d’appel”. L’Appelante a allégué que,
à la suite de la décision de l’UCRA du 5 décembre
2011, il fallait se demander si cette seconde décision
constituait une nouvelle décision ou une simple
confirmation de la décision du 5 juillet 2011. Elle a
indiqué s’en remettre au TAS quant à la qualification
de la décision du 5 décembre 2011, mentionnant que,
dans tous les cas, elle avait respecté le délai d’appel.
Elle a en effet allégué, à l’appui de son argumentation,
que l’art. 334 RAD octroyait à l’AMA un délai de vingt
et un jours après la date finale à laquelle toute autre
partie à l’affaire aurait pu faire appel pour déposer
elle-même un appel. En l’espèce, que la décision
du 5 juillet 2011 ou celle du 5 décembre 2011 soit
considérée comme décision querellée, le délai d’appel
avait en tous les cas été respecté par l’AMA, celle-ci
ayant pris la précaution de recourir contre les deux
décisions dans le délai imparti de vingt et un jours.
Une audience de jugement a eu lieu le 1er mai 2012
au TAS. M. Marino et l’UCRA n’ont pas pris part et
n’étaient pas représentés à cette audience.
Extraits des considérants
A. Recevabilité de l’appel
A titre liminaire, il convient d’examiner quelle décision
de l’UCRA, du 5 juillet 2011 ou du 5 décembre 2011,
devait faire l’objet d’un appel devant le TAS.
A cet égard, il sied de constater que la décision du
5 décembre 2011 ne fait que confirmer la sentence
rendue dans la décision du 5 juillet 2011. On en veut
-
56
pour preuve la décision du 5 décembre 2011, dans
laquelle la Commission Antidopage de l’UCRA a
clairement mentionné “conserver, en tous ses points, la
décision adoptée dans la résolution du 5 juillet 2011 (...)”.
confirmé l’envoi de la totalité du dossier à l’UCI par
courriel du 10 août 2011. L’UCI avait donc jusqu’au 10
septembre 2011 pour faire appel de la décision rendue
par l’UCRA le 5 juillet 2011.
En outre, même si la décision du 5 décembre 2011
évoque effectivement un nouveau motif invoqué par
M. Marino, à savoir l’ablation de la rate subie en 1999
et la prise de médicaments fébrifuges et antigrippaux
avant la Copa Internacional de BMX, force est de
constater que cet argument ne constitue nullement
un fait nouveau. En effet, l’Intimé avait déjà
connaissance de cette opération lorsque la première
décision datée du 5 juillet 2011 a été rendue, et il aurait
dû déjà lors de la première procédure devant l’UCRA
soulever ce point. En l’espèce, on constate que ce
n’est qu’ultérieurement que M. Marino a donné cette
explication, qui n’a de toute manière pas modifié la
décision du 5 juillet 2011.
L’UCI n’ayant pas fait appel de la décision de l’UCRA
au 10 août 2011, l’AMA disposait donc d’un délai
supplémentaire de 21 jours pour déposer elle-même
un appel auprès du TAS. Le délai de 21 jours arrivant
à échéance le samedi 1er octobre 2011, l’AMA a
déposé sa déclaration d’appel le 3 octobre 2011, soit le
premier jour utile à teneur de l’art. R32 du Code TAS.
L’appel a donc été formé dans le délai prescrit.
Au vu de ce qui précède, il est dès lors judicieux de
considérer que la décision contre laquelle il fallait
déposer un appel était la décision du 5 juillet 2011.
A titre supplétif, la Formation arbitrale analysera
toutefois également la situation dans le cas où la
décision du 5 décembre 2011 devait être considérée
comme une décision indépendante et propre.
Pour le surplus, on soulignera que l’AMA a, ainsi
qu’il le sera démontré ci-dessous, de toute évidence
également respecté le délai d’appel contre la seconde
décision du 5 décembre 2011, qui est identique à la
décision du 5 juillet 2011, de sorte que la question
de savoir contre quelle décision l’AMA a agi est
purement académique.
En outre, la question d’un “fait nouveau” peut
parfaitement être prise en considération dans le cadre
d’un appel devant le TAS, celui-ci bénéficiant d’un
pouvoir d’examen complet au fond et en fait dans
l’instruction de la cause.
La Formation arbitrale a donc examiné si l’appel
formé contre la décision du 5 juillet 2011 de l’UCRA
était recevable.
En application de l’art. 330 RAD, “dans les cas relevant
des articles 329.1 à 329.7, les parties suivantes ont le droit
de faire appel devant le TAS: (…) f) l’A MA”. La qualité
pour appeler de l’AMA est donc établie.
Le délai pour former appel est d’un mois suivant la
réception de l’intégralité du dossier par l’UCI, si cette
dernière a requis ce dossier à l’intérieur du délai de
quinze jours dès réception de la décision intégrale
(art. 334, 1ère phrase RAD). L’art. 334, 2ème phrase
RAD dispose en outre qu’ “en tout état de cause, l’A MA
dispose d’un délai d’appel de vingt et un jours après le dernier
jour où toute autre partie en cause aurait pu faire appel”.
En l’espèce, il ressort du dossier que l’UCRA a
Par ailleurs, la déclaration d’appel répond aux
exigences de forme de l’art. R48 du Code TAS.
Par conséquent, l’appel est, pour cette première raison
déjà, recevable.
En tout état de cause, et même dans cette situation,
il convient de reconnaître que l’AMA a respecté le
délai d’appel de 21 jours qui lui était accordé en vertu
des art. 330 et 334 RAD susmentionnés. En effet,
l’AMA a déposé sa “déclaration d’appel et mémoire” auprès
du Greffe du TAS en date du 23 décembre 2011,
soit moins de 21 jours après que l’UCRA a rendu sa
seconde décision.
Dès lors, l’appel est en tout état recevable.
B. Examen des moyens de droit
1.
La sanction: suspension
L’Intimé a expliqué la présence de Méthylhéxaneamine
dans son organisme par l’ingestion d’un médicament
de type “paracétamol / daine” au Brésil, la veille de
la compétition Copa Internacional de BMX. Celui-ci
aurait été ingurgité pour soigner une forte fièvre qui
pouvait être dangereuse pour M. Marino en raison de
l’ablation de la rate qu’il avait subie en 1999. Il n’aurait
donc commis aucune faute ou négligence. L’UCRA
fait sienne cette argumentation.
En outre, l’UCRA allègue que, seule une quantité
minime de Méthylhéxaneamine aurait été décelée et
que celle-ci serait insuffisante pour avoir le moindre
effet stimulant.
L’absence de faute ou négligence se définit comme
suit: “Démonstration par le coureur du fait qu’il ignorait ou ne
-
57
soupçonnait pas, et n’aurait raisonnablement pas pu savoir ni
soupçonner, même en faisant preuve de la plus grande vigilance,
qu’il avait utilisé ou s’était fait administrer une substance
interdite ou une méthode interdite” (annexe 1 RAD).
En outre, l’avertissement de l’article 21.1 RAD est
absolument limpide: “Les coureurs doivent s’abstenir
d’utiliser toute substance, denrée alimentaire, complément
alimentaire ou boisson dont ils ignorent la composition”.
Selon la jurisprudence constante du TAS, les
exigences quant au fardeau de la preuve reposant sur
l’athlète pour établir qu’il n’aurait commis aucune
faute ou exigence sont extrêmement élevées (CAS
2005/A/847; CAS 2006/A/1025, n°11.4). Les sportifs
doivent par conséquent démontrer qu’ils ont respecté
un très haut degré de vigilance ou une prudence
extrême.
Dans le cas d’espèce, l’Intimé n’a jamais démontré
les mesures de précaution qu’il aurait prises avant
d’ingérer les prétendues médicaments contaminés.
En particulier, il ne semble avoir effectué aucune
recherche sur le produit utilisé, alors qu’il était dans
un pays étranger et qu’il allègue ne pas connaître le
médicament. La Formation relève à ce sujet que M.
Ramiro Marino n’a pas apporté la preuve que les
substances retrouvées dans ses analyses étaient dues
à la contamination d’un médicament antigrippal et
fébrifuge.
En outre, selon le Dr Mario Zorzoli, médecin et
conseiller scientifique de l’UCI entendu en qualité de
témoin lors de l’audience du 1er mai 2012, il n’existe
à l’heure actuelle aucun médicament comportant de
la Méthylhéxaneamine. Le Dr Zorzoli a par ailleurs
confirmé que la prise des médicaments paracétamol
et ibufenac, que l’athlète soutient avoir pris, ne peut
permettre d’expliquer la présence de la substance
interdite dans son sang. En effet, selon son expérience,
il n’a jamais été démontré que la prise de paracétamol
ou d’ibufenac pouvait contenir un échantillon
de Méthylhéxaneamine. La Méthylhéxaneamine
serait en revanche fréquemment retrouvé dans des
suppléments nutritionnels.
S’agissant de l’intention, l’UCRA a retenu que M.
Marino n’aurait pas cherché à améliorer artificiellement
ses performances en ingérant cette substance, dès
lors que la quantité ingérée était si minime que les
effets supposés l’auraient été d’autant moins. Sur ce
point, les Intimés n’ont toutefois produit aucune pièce
permettant d’étayer leurs allégués. Au contraire, la
Formation retient que la Méthylhéxaneamine faisant
partie de la famille des substances spécifiées proscrites
par le Règlement de l’UCI, il n’y a dès lors pas lieu
de remettre en question les effets de cette substance
sur l’organisme d’un coureur, sa seule consommation
étant en soi constitutive d’une violation et emportant
une présomption d’intention de dopage.
Il a en outre été confirmé par les experts qu’une
concentration de Méthylhéxaneamine supérieure
à 3 μg/ml était déjà considérée comme très forte.
En l’espèce, la quantité de Méthylhéxaneamine
retrouvée dans le sang de M. Marino fait près de
sept fois ce chiffre: elle ne peut dès lors pas être
considérée comme minime. La présence d’un taux de
Méthylhéxaneamine de 22 μg/ml justifie déjà, à elle
seule, une sanction.
Au bénéfice des explications qui précèdent, le
caractère significatif de la négligence dont a fait
preuve M. Marino est incontestable, de sorte que
les conditions énoncées par l’article 295 RAD ne
sont manifestement pas remplies en l’espèce. En
conclusion, la Formation estime qu’il n’y a pas
matière à prononcer une diminution de la période de
suspension, celle-ci étant ainsi maintenue à deux ans.
Il convient ainsi de réformer en ce sens la décision de
la Commission Antidopage de l’UCRA.
2. Annulation des résultats
Conformément à l’article 288 RAD, une violation
des règles antidopage en liaison avec un contrôle en
compétition entraîne automatiquement l’annulation
du résultat individuel obtenu dans cette compétition.
En outre, selon l’article 313 RAD, “outre l’annulation
automatique des résultats dans la compétition conformément à
l’article 288 et sauf dispositions des articles 289 à 292, tous
les autres résultats de compétitions obtenus à partir de la date
de prélèvement d’un échantillon positif (tant en compétition que
hors compétition) ou de la date où une autre violation des règles
antidopage a été commise, jusqu’au commencement de toute
période de suspension provisoire ou de suspension, sont annulés
à moins que l’équité ne s’y oppose”.
La Formation considère qu’il serait inéquitable
de faire subir à M. Marino les conséquences de
l’appréciation erronée qu’a faite la Commission
Antidopage de l’UCRA dans sa décision du 5 juillet
2011, confirmée le 5 décembre 2011. En effet, cette
dernière l’a libéré, à tort, de toute sanction, ce qui lui
a permis de reprendre et continuer la compétition.
Les résultats qu’il a alors pu obtenir à la suite de cette
décision infondée ne doivent, dans ces circonstances,
pas être annulés. Seuls doivent l’être les résultats
obtenus lors de la compétition du 26 février 2011
durant laquelle s’est déroulé le contrôle antidopage,
soit la Copa Internacional de BMX à Paulinia, au Brésil.
3. L’amende
La Formation examinera ci-dessous les conclusions
-
58
de l’AMA, qui demande le prononcé en faveur de
l’UCI d’une sanction financière de CHF 3’000.en application de l’art. 326 RAD, lequel prévoit
clairement le principe d’une telle sanction financière.
Par ailleurs, selon l’art. 286 RAD, les dispositions
de ce règlement seront interprétées et appliquées
conformément aux droits de l’homme et aux
principes généraux du droit, en particulier celui
de la proportionnalité. Selon la jurisprudence, il
faut considérer que la réglementation UCI accorde
une certaine importance à la notion d’équité,
notamment afin d’éviter de pénaliser l’athlète pour
des circonstances qui ne lui seraient pas imputables
(TAS 2007/A/1368).
Ainsi, la Formation arbitrale considère en l’espèce
qu’il serait injuste de pénaliser l’athlète en raison
d’une décision prise par l’UCRA, contre laquelle
l’UCI n’a de toute manière pas recouru. La Formation
arbitrale constate ainsi que l’UCI n’est pas partie à
la présente procédure et qu’il n’y a dès lors pas de
raison d’infl iger une amende à M. Marino requise par
l’AMA en faveur d’un tiers.
Pour le surplus, il convient de préciser que le BMX
n’est de toute évidence pas un sport d’équipe et que
M. Marino ne dispose pas d’un contrat avec une
équipe de cyclisme. Il concourt à titre personnel et
ne peut donc se voir infl iger une amende au sens de
l’art. 326 RAD.
Par conséquent, la Formation arbitrale décide de ne
pas appliquer l’art. 326 RAD au cas d’espèce et de
libérer M. Marino de toute amende.
-
59
Thibaut Fauconnet v. International Skating Union (ISU)
&
International Skating Union (ISU) v. Thibaut Fauconnet
19 April 2012
Short track speed skating; doping (tuaminoheptane); CAS power of review
and right to be heard; conditions to
benefit from a reduced sanction; CAS
scope of review of the applicable sanction; degree of fault; starting date of the
ineligibility period; disqualification of
the results
Panel:
Mr. Romano Subiotto QC (United Kingdom), President
Mr. François-Charles Bernard (France)
Mr. Beat Hodler (Switzerland)
Relevant facts
Thibaut Fauconnet (“Fauconnet ”, the “Athlete” or the
“Skater ”) is an international level short track skater,
who was 26 at the time of the in-competition doping
control that gave rise to this case. He is a member of
the Féderation Française des Sports de Glace (FFSG)
and is registered as an “elite ” athlete in the list of high
level athletes of the French Ministry of Sports.
The International Skating Union (ISU) is the
international governing body of speed skating, short
track speed skating, figure skating, and synchronized
skating based in Lausanne, Switzerland.
In December 2010, Fauconnet competed in the Short
Track World Cup held by the ISU in Shanghai, China.
On December 12, 2010, Fauconnet was subject to a
doping control. He signed the doping control form
in which he declared that he was not taking any
medication or other pharmaceutical substances at the
time of the control. Following the test, the ISU received
an adverse analytical finding for sample 1930429.
Said sample was found to contain Tuaminoheptane, a
substance that is listed as a Specified Substance under
the 2010 World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA ”)
List of Prohibited Substances and Methods which
forms an integral part of the ISU Anti-Doping Rules
(the “ISU Rules ”) on the basis of Article 4.1 of these
rules (the “Prohibited List ”).
On March 23, 2011, Fauconnet explained, by letter,
that he used Rhinofluimucil (the “Product ”) in order
to solve his breathing problems due to a cold that
occurred first in Changchun and then in Shanghai
during World Cups 3 and 4. Fauconnet recognized
that he should have known that the Product contained
Tuaminoheptane, a prohibited substance according
to the Prohibited List. The athlete also admitted that
he had made a mistake. He acknowledged that he
made another mistake by not notifying the use of the
product to the ISU in order to obtain a therapeutic
use exemption. In the same letter, Fauconnet
waived his right to have the B sample examined and
mentioned that he had had 8 urine tests during the
season starting in October 2010 and 3 blood tests
during the season starting in January 2011. Finally,
Fauconnet apologized for his carelessness.
On April 1, 2011, the ISU’s General Secretary requested, by letter, additional information concerning
the circumstances in which Fauconnet acquired and
used the Product.
On April 11, 2011, Fauconnet answered with a letter,
explaining (i) that he took the Product only once in
the morning, in Changchun, during the 3rd world
cup, due to a cold; (ii) that he took the Product during
the 4th world cup in Shanghai for the first 3 days with
the same dosage; (iii) that he took the Product from
his girlfriend’s shelf and put it into his first aid box;
(iv) that he had made a mistake by failing to check
whether it was prohibited; (v) that he thought that it
was an insignificant product; and (vi) that no team
doctor accompanied the French delegation during
the two world cups.
After the doping test of December 12, 2010, Fauconnet
competed in the 2011 ISU European Championships
in Heeren, in the 2010/2011 ISU World Cup in
Moscow and Dresden and in the 2011 ISU World
Track Championships in Sheffield. There has been no
suggestion or evidence to indicate that Fauconnet has
-
60
ever ingested performance-enhancing substances, or
that his results were affected in any way by his antidoping rule violation on December 12, 2010. On the
contrary, Fauconnet was subject to multiple doping
controls during these championships, which were all
negative. Finally, at the time of these competitions,
Fauconnet had no reason to believe that the ISU’s
investigation would lead to proceedings against him.
The adverse analytical findings were notified to the
athlete on March 17, 2011.
On October 10, 2011, the ISU Disciplinary
Commission issued a decision (the “ISU Decision”)
in which Fauconnet was found to have committed
an anti-doping offence contrary to Article 2.1 of the
ISU Rules. Article 10.2 of the ISU Rules provides for
a sanction of up to two years of ineligibility for such
an offence. However, the Disciplinary Commission
found that – taking into account the specific
circumstances of the case – Fauconnet had explained
how the substance had entered his body and had had
no intention of enhancing his sporting performance.
As a result, pursuant to Article 10.4 of the ISU Rules,
the Disciplinary Commission sanctioned Fauconnet
with a reduced suspension of eighteen months. The
ISU Decision considered that, pursuant to Article
10.9.2 of the ISU Rules, the period of ineligibility
would start as early as the date of sample collection,
December 27, 2010 and would end on June 26, 2012.
On October 21, 2011, Fauconnet fi led a Statement of
Appeal against the ISU Decision (CAS 2011/A/2615)
with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
Together with his Statement of Appeal, Fauconnet
fi led a request for a stay of the challenged decision.
On November 23, 2011 Fauconnet sent a letter to
the CAS insisting that exceptional circumstances
justified the acceleration of the procedure. In that
letter, Fauconnet insisted that he had already been
excluded from the Korean Air ISU World Cup Short
track held in Salt Lake City, USA from October 21-23,
2011 and from the Korean Air ISU World Cup Short
Track held in Saguenay, in Canada, from October
28-30, 2011. In the letter, Fauconnet also insisted
that, should he be excluded from the two world
championships in Nagoya, Japan, December 2-4,
2011 and in China, December 9-11, 2011, his sports
career would be definitively damaged. The President
of the Appeals Arbitration Division granted the stay
by Order of November 28, 2011.
On October 24, 2011, Fauconnet sent a letter with
evidence of a medical prescription of the Product
dated June, 17, 2008.
On October 31, 2011, the ISU fi led its Statement
of Appeal, which shall be considered as the Appeal
Brief, against the ISU Decision (CAS 2011/A/2618).
The ISU’s Appeal Brief contains the following
Request for Relief:
All competitive results obtained by Respondent from December
12, 2010, to date, including but not limited to:
-
his results obtained at the 2011 ISU European
Championshps in Heerenveen (14. – 16.01.2011);
-
his results obtained at the ISU World Cup 2010/2011 in
Moscow (11. – 13.2.2011);
-
his results obtained at the ISU World Cup 2010/2011 in
Dresden (18. – 20.02.2011);
-
his results obtained at the 2011 ISU World Short Track
Championships in Sheffield (11. – 13.3.2011),
are disqualified with all the resulting consequences including
for feature of any medals, points and prices.
All competitive results obtained by any Short Track Team in
which the Respondent competed as a member of the team from
December 12, 2010 to date, including but not limited to the
6th place reached by the French team at the ISU European
Championships in Heerenveen (14. – 16.01.2011), in 5’000
meter relay, the second place reached by the French team at the
ISU World Cup 2010/2011 in Moscow (11. – 13.2.2011)
in 5’000 meter relay ant the 8th places reached by the French
team at the ISU World Championships in Sheffield (11. –
13.3.2011) are disqualified with all the resulting consequences
including for feature of any medals, points and prices.
On November 30, 2011, Fauconnet fi led his answer
to the ISU’s Appeal with his Appeal Brief pursuant
to Rule 51 of the Code, which contains the following
Request for Relief:
It is hereby asked to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
-
to reject the appeal lodged by the International Skate Union
on October 31st, 2011, registered under the reference CAS
2011/A/2618
-
to annul the challenged decision as having infringed the
principles of fair hearing
In the alternative, and in the event that the CAS does
not annul the challenged decision, it is hereby asked of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport:
-
to amend the decision of October 10th, 2011, rendered by the
Disciplinary Commission of International Skate Union
(case n°01/2011)
-
to impose on Mister Thibaut Fauconnet the penalty of
-
61
reprimand without period of ineligibility, under Article
10.4 of the ISU Anti-doping rules.
In the alternative, and in the event that the CAS imposes
on the athlete a period of ineligibility,
Athlete or other Person can clearly demonstrate that he or she
did not intend to enhance sport performance. The change to
Article 4.2 and related changes to Article 10 provide this
additional flexibility for violations involving many Prohibited
Substances.
-
to take under consideration the period of effective ineligibility
running from October 10th, 2011, until November 28th,
2011, and remove it from the total period of ineligibility
imposed by the final award;
Article 4.2.2 of the WADA Code thus sought to
introduce some flexibility when determining a
sanction for an athlete that has ingested a Specified
Substance.
-
to maintain the challenged decision inasmuch as it provided
for the disqualification of the athlete only on December
12th, 2010, without cancelling the results obtained both
individually and as a member of the French team since
December 2010, in accordance with Article 10.8 of the
ISU Anti-doping rules.
Article 10.4 of the ISU Rules provides for more
flexible sanction, and the commentary to Article 10.4
further explains why Specified Substances are treated
differently to other Prohibited Substances:
On December 22, 2011, the ISU fi led its Answer,
which contained the following Request for Relief:
For all the above reasons, Appellant’s appeal is to be dismissed,
the 18 months’ ineligibility period imposed on him by the
attacked decision to be confirmed and supplemented according
to point I.4 of Respondent’s statement of appeal and appeal
brief of October 31, 2011.
A. Fulfilment of the Conditions to Benefit
from a Reduced Sanction
As indicated above, Tuaminoheptane is a component
of Rhinofluimucil, which appears in category S6(b)
(Specified Stimulants) on the Prohibited List of the
WADA Code (implemented by Article 4.1 of the ISU
Rules). Tuaminoheptane is thus a Specified Substance.
The commentary to Article 4.2.2 of the WADA Code,
which provides a definition of Specified Substances,
(and which is implemented by Article 4.2.2 of the
ISU Rules) explains the reason for providing specific
rules for Specified Substances:
In drafting the Code there was considerable debate among
stakeholders over the appropriate balance between inflexible
sanctions which promote harmonization in the application of
the rules and more flexible sanctions which better take into
consideration the circumstances of each individual case. This
balance continued to be discussed in various CAS decisions
interpreting the Code. After three years experience with the
Code, the strong consensus of stakeholders is that while the
occurrence of an antidoping rule violation under Articles
2.1 (Presence of a Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or
Markers) and 2.2 (Use of a Prohibited Substance or Prohibited
Method) should still be based on the principle of strict liability,
the Code sanctions should be made more flexible where the
[T]here is a greater likelihood that Specified Substances, as
opposed to other Prohibited Substances, could be susceptible to a
credible, non-doping explanation.
Nevertheless, to benefit from the elimination or
reduction of the period of ineligibility under article
10.4 of the ISU Rules, an athlete must establish:
a)
How a Specified Substance entered his or her
body or came into his or her possession; and
b)
That such Specified Substance was not intended
to enhance the athlete’s sporting performance
or mask the use of a performance-enhancing
substance.
Regarding the first condition, the commentary to
Article 10.4 of the ISU Rules provides that “the Skater
may establish how the Specified Substance entered the body by
a balance of probability”. In other words, a panel should
simply find the explanation of a Skater concerning
the presence of a Specified Substance more probable
than not.
With respect to the second condition, a panel must be
“comfortably satisfied by the objective circumstances of the case
that the Skater in taking or possessing a Prohibited Substance
did not intend to enhance his or her sport performance”. In
case CAS 2010/A/2107, para. 9.14, the panel clarified
that an athlete only needs to prove that he/she did not
knowingly take the specified substance, rather than
the product, with an intent to enhance his sporting
performance.
It follows that the second condition is met when
a skater can produce corroborating evidence in
addition to his or her word, which establishes to the
comfortable satisfaction of a panel that he or she
ingested a specified substance unknowingly, e.g., by
ingesting a contaminated product.
-
62
As already indicated, it is uncontested that Fauconnet
meets the two foregoing conditions, i.e., that he
established how the Product entered his body and that
he did not knowingly ingest the Specified Substance
in question, i.e. Tuaminoheptane (contained in
the Product), with the intent of enhancing his
performance.
Consequently, the question that remains to be
addressed is what sanction must be applied to the
Athlete in the circumstances of this case.
B. Applicable sanction
1.
Scope of review
The ISU requests that the period of ineligibility of
eighteen months decided in the first instance be
confirmed.
Furthermore, the ISU claims that the applicable
sanction set by the Disciplinary Commission falls
within its discretion.
The Panel disagrees that such discretion can be
invoked as a matter of law and principle, even if CAS
panels may consider that the circumstances warrant
it following a disciplinary body’s judgment and if in
certain cases CAS has considered that the sanction
should only be reviewed if it is evidently and grossly
disproportionate to the offence (see e.g. cases CAS
2009/A/1870, para. 48 and references therein; CAS
2009/A/1918, para. 59 and references therein).
Indeed, in determining, as an international appellate
body, the correct and proportionate sanction, CAS
panels must also seek to preserve some coherence
between the decisions of the different federations in
comparable cases in order to preserve the principle
of equal treatment of athletes in different sports.
In that connection the introduction to the WADA
Code expressly states that two of its purposes are
to promote equality for Athletes worldwide and to
ensure harmonization of anti-doping programs. As
the Panel in CAS 2010/A/2107 notes, a sanction must
further comply with WADA’s “objective of proportionate
and consistent sanctions for doping offences based on an athlete’s
level of fault under the totality of circumstances”.
Moreover, the Panel has full power to review the
matter in dispute pursuant to Article R57 of the
Arbitration Code.
The Panel will therefore examine with full powers
what it deems the appropriate sanction.
As shall now be examined, in making that
determination, the Panel must focus on the Skater’s
degree of fault.
2. The degree of fault
In keeping with Article 10.4 of the WADA Code,
Article 10.4 of the ISU Rules provides that “The Skater
or other Person’s degree of fault shall be the criterion considered
in assessing any reduction of the period of Ineligibility”.
The commentary to Article 10.4 of the ISU Code
indicates that “[i]n assessing the Skater’s or other Person’s
degree of fault, the circumstances considered must be specific
and relevant to explain the Skater’s or other Person’s departure
from the expected standard of behaviour”.
Fauconnet argues that the case shows significant
overlap with six decisions from sports disciplinary
commissions and the French Anti-doping Agency
sanctioning athletes for using Tuaminoheptane
through the use of Rhinofluimucil. Three of these
decisions were first instance decisions and, as such,
cannot be relied on. Regarding the two decisions of
the French Anti-Doping Agency, the circumstances of
these cases cannot be compared to the circumstances
in the current case due to the substantial differences
between the applicable anti-doping rules and the
ISU Rules. As for the decision of the International
Olympic Committee dated February 10, 2010, the
circumstances of that case differed from the present
case since it concerned an out-of-competition antidoping test.
However, a large number of cases may usefully guide
the Panel in determining the appropriate sanction.
In general, the Panel distinguishes between three
categories of cases.
The first category concerns cases in which
circumstances are of such exceptional nature that
a tribunal substantially lowered the period of
ineligibility (often up to the date of the decision) (see e.g.
CAS 2005/A/826). In line with CAS jurisprudence, a
reduction of a sanction is possible in extremely rare and
unusual circumstances (see e.g. CAS 2010/A/2307).
Such circumstances do not apply in the present case.
For instance, in CAS 2006/A/1025, the athlete tested
positive for etilefrene, a prohibited substance, after
drinking water he had poured into a glass he believed
to be his own, but which had in fact been used by
his wife moments earlier to take a colorless, odorless,
and tasteless liquid medication to ease hypertension
and menstrual pain. Unlike this athlete, the Skater
was not a victim of “an extraordinary and unpredictable
sequence of events ”. The Skater voluntarily took the
Product.
-
63
The second category consists of cases where a
tribunal finds that an athlete has exercised at least
a certain degree of care or where other mitigating
circumstances lead to a reduction in the sanction
(see e.g. CAS 2005/A/847; CAS 2005/A/958; CAS
2008/A/1490). All concern cases whereby the panel
took into consideration factors such as inexperience
at the professional level, the lack of any formal drug
education, the athlete’s age and the fact that the
athlete made inquiries about the product with the
distributor.
The third category of cases concerns those in which
a panel finds that a reduction to the period of
ineligibility would not be appropriate. A number of
these cases show similarities with the present case.
Case CAS 2003/A/484 concerned an athlete who
had taken a contaminated vitamin supplement. The
athlete had failed to make “even the most rudimentary
inquiry” about the product and relied solely on the
product labels and statements of friends. The panel
found that the athlete’s conduct amounted to “a total
disregard of his positive duty to ensure that no prohibited
substance enters his body” and applied no reduction to
the sanction.
Case CAS 2008/A/1489 also concerned an athlete,
who had taken a contaminated supplement.
According to the panel, the athlete – who had only
conducted limited internet research – had failed to
take “clear and obvious precautions”. The panel found
that the circumstances were not truly exceptional,
and applied no reduction to the sanction.
Cases CAS 2008/A/1588 and 1629 concerned an
athlete who had ingested a contaminated supplement
without making any enquiries about the nature of
this product. The panel found that the athlete had
“committed gross negligence which does not justify that the
period of suspension be reduced”.
Case CAS 2010/A/2229 concerned an athlete who
had ingested a contaminated supplement and merely
conducted a limited internet search and relied on a
health shop employee’s recommendation. The panel
found that the athlete’s degree of negligence was
quite significant and, as a result, refused to reduce
the sanction below the one-year suspension that was
requested by WADA.
Fauconnet’s “unreasonable conduct ” – ingesting a
nasal decongestant containing Tuaminoheptane, a
Specified Substance, without making any enquiries –
is comparable to the conduct of the athletes in the
above-mentioned cases. In all of these cases, the
panel decided not to reduce the period of ineligibility
initially imposed. The Panel believes that these
cases provide useful analogies for the present case,
particularly the last case since it concerned a Specified
Substance.
The Panel finds that Fauconnet has failed to exercise
at least some degree of reasonable care, and finds, on
the contrary, that he was grossly negligent, notably
for the following reasons combined:
- It is within the athletes’ responsibilities to take
care to avoid the use of any doping products.
Athletes in general must be on their guard when
considering the ingestion of any medication.
- As a very experienced international athlete
required to be knowledgeable of doping issues
and risks, Fauconnet had no excuse not to be very
careful in that respect.
- Fauconnet however overlooked even the most basic
prudent steps, which he could easily and should
have taken in the circumstances, particularly in the
case of a pharmaceutical product. He could have
conducted research on the Internet, which would
have warned him that the Product contained
Tuaminoheptane, a substance that could induce
positive results to an anti-doping test. Indeed, a
simple internet search shows that Rhinofluimucil
contains a substance that could register as positive
to anti-doping controls and that athletes ought to
be careful in using the Product.
- Fauconnet failed to follow another basic prudent
step, which would have been to consult his
doctor (or his team’s medical staff), who could
have warned him that the Product contained
Tuaminoheptane. The circumstance that there
was no team doctor present at the time Fauconnet
used Rhinofuimucil did not prevent him from
seeking advice from another physician present in
Changchun or in Shanghai or from a doctor in
France by any means of communication.
- Fauconnet first stated that he took the medication
from his girlfriend’s shelf. He then explained
that the Product was prescribed by a doctor in
2008. Regardless of whether Fauconnet actually
took the medication from his girlfriend’s shelf or
whether he obtained it through an old medical
prescription, by packing it into his first aid kit
without making any enquiry as to the nature of
such product, Fauconnet demonstrated a lack of
the most basic care that can be expected from a
high level athlete.
- Fauconnet did not mention taking the medication
-
64
during the doping control.
- Fauconnet kept neither the box nor the leaflet of
the Product. The leaflet of the Product specifically
mentions that it contains Tuaminoheptane and
warns athletes that it may lead to positive results
in anti-doping controls.
Such carelessness is reinforced by Fauconnet’s age,
experience and drug education. Indeed, Fauconnet
participated in ISU events since 2002 and was a
member of the French Olympic team twice. Fauconnet
is 26 years old and has already been submitted to
various anti-doping controls. As such, it cannot be
claimed that Fauconnet was not sufficiently aware of
an athlete’s duty to ensure that he did not ingest any
prohibited substance.
In addition, the Panel does not accept Fauconnet’s
argument according to which the better the results
before and after a doping test, the less the Athlete
should be sanctioned. The Panel takes the view that
good results reinforce the Athlete’s responsibility to
be extremely careful regarding doping offenses.
Moreover, the Panel finds that the good character
evidence submitted by the Athlete, which the Panel
accepts, cannot mitigate his culpability so as to reduce
his sanction. The absence of past anti-doping offences
and the athlete’s cooperation is solely relevant for
determining the applicable range of sanctions, not to
reduce the sanction given for a first offence (see e.g.
CAS 2005/A//847, at para. 30, CAS 2007/A/1364, at
para. 19, CAS 2010/A/2307).
Finally, the Respondent’s submission that the sanction
is disproportionate since it has caused Fauconnet to
miss the first two World Cups of season 2011-2012
must be rejected. As the commentary to Article 10.4
of the ISU Rules explains, “[t]he fact that a Skater would
lose the opportunity to earn large sums of money during a period
of Ineligibility or the fact that the Skater only has a short time
left in his or her career or the timing of the sporting calendar
would not be relevant factors to be considered in reducing the
period of Ineligibility under this Article”. These facts can
therefore not be taken into consideration by the Panel
when determining the sanction.
enhance his sporting performance. It is therefore
unfortunate that he made this mistake that is
inconsistent with his otherwise clean anti-doping
record. To be in keeping with the applicable rules
and to meet the need of promoting equality of
athletes worldwide, the Panel must nevertheless
apply a sanction that is proportionate to the quite
significant lack of diligence Fauconnet demonstrated
in ingesting the Product. Thus, for the reasons
indicated above, Fauconnet is declared ineligible to
compete in all sporting competitions for a period of
eighteen months.
3. Start Date of Ineligibility Period
The Panel is of the opinion that Article 10.9.1 and
10.9.2 of the ISU Rules are both applicable in the
present matter. The Panel takes note of the fact
that when confronted with the results, Fauconnet
waived his right to have the B sample tested, thereby
acknowledging the anti-doping rule violation.
Fauconnet responded promptly to all the ISU letters
so as to obtain an explanation relating to the offence.
Despite Fauconnet’s cooperative attitude in advancing
the process, it took almost ten months, from the date
of the sample collection, for a decision to be rendered.
Due to this duration of the adjudicating process, not
attributable to the Athlete, the Panel deems it fair to
apply the principle set forth in Article 10.9.1 of the
ISU Rules and start the period of ineligibility at an
earlier date than the day of notification of this award.
Based on article 10.9.1 and 10.9.2 of the ISU Rules
which enables to “(…) start the period of Ineligibility at
an earlier date commencing as early as the date of Sample
collection (…)”, the Panel determines that Fauconnet’
suspension will run from December 12, 2010. The
Panel does not find any element in the file justifying
starting the ineligibility period on December 27,
2010. On the contrary, the Panel finds that evidence
provided by the Athlete specifically state that the date
of Sample collection was December 12, 2010. The
Panel therefore considers December 12, 2010 as the
starting date of the ineligibility period and amends
the ISU Decision in that respect.
4. Disqualification of the Results
Having found that Fauconnet’s degree of negligence
is significant for the above reasons and in light of the
above-mentioned cases, the Panel considers it was not
disproportionate to reduce the period of ineligibility
by one quarter of the maximum sanction of two
years, as stipulated in Article 10.4 of the ISU Rules.
In conclusion, the Panel wishes to underline that it
believes that Fauconnet did not intend to cheat or
In his answer, Fauconnet submits that it is abusive to
request the disqualification of both the athlete and the
French team results obtained from December 2010
until October 2011 because the delay in rendering
a decision is attributable to the ISU Disciplinary
Commission and the ISU are responsible for the delay.
Fauconnet argues that, should the ISU Decision have
been rendered earlier, the question of the results’
-
65
disqualification would not have been an issue.
during the latter period shall be disqualified.
The ISU submits that Article 11.4 and Article 10.8
clearly provide that the individual results and the
team results obtained from December 12, 2010 must
be disqualified.
The Panel considers that the considerations invoked
by the Athlete do not apply in this case because he
is in effect requesting that results obtained after
the commencement of the ineligibility period be
maintained.
According to CAS jurisprudence, “[t]hat would not only
be in contradiction with the sanction of ineligibility itself, but
would also be unfair compared to the treatment of the majority
of athletes who are provisionally suspended from the outset due
to non-contested positive anti-doping test and whose provisional
sanction is never lifted, thereby never having the opportunity
to enter any competitions and obtain results/prizes pending
the final resolution of the anti-doping violations charges. For
reasons of fairness, the Panel has decided above to start the
Athlete’s ineligibility period at a much earlier date than what
would in principle apply. The consequence of that cannot be
that the results obtained after the beginning of such period
would not be affected” (CAS 2011/A/2384-2386; CAS
2008/A/1744, para. 55; CAS 2008/A/1675, para. 47;
CAS 2007/A/1362, para. 64).
Moreover, the Panel considered whether it should
refrain from disqualifying Fauconnet’s results during
the period of ineligibility prior to this award (This issue
does not arise with respect to prospective ineligibility
because it implies disqualification by virtue of the bar
on the athlete’s participation in competitions during
the prospective period of ineligibility). The Panel has
concluded that ineligibility cannot be severed from
disqualification in the absence of a clear provision in
the applicable rules supporting such severance, which
might plausibly have been justified in cases, such as
the present one, in which the period of ineligibility
begins before the date of the award and where the
nature of the violation of the applicable rules is such
that it can be presumed that the violation has not
affected the results in other competitions in which
the athlete has participated during the period of
ineligibility prior to the award.
For the above reasons, the Panel decides that the
results obtained by Fauconnet from December
12, 2010, which is the date when, according to the
Panel’s decision, the ineligibility period is deemed
to have started, including the ones obtained from
November 28, 2011 (date of the CAS Order for
stay) are disqualified. Pursuant to Article 11.4 of the
ISU Rules, the results of Fauconnet’s Team, when
Fauconnet competed as a member of the Team,
-
66
Arbitrage TAS 2011/A/2616
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) c. Oscar Sevilla Rivera & Real Federación
Española de Ciclismo (RFEC)
15 mai 2012
Cyclisme; dopage (hydroxyethylamidon – HES); mesures d’instructions
complémentaires; fardeau de la preuve;
élimination ou réduction de la période de suspension; degré de la preuve;
élimination ou réduction de la période
de suspension en vertu de circonstances
particulières; degré de la faute en vertu
de l’art. 295 RAD; examen de la faute ou
négligence; responsabilité objective
Formation:
M. Bernard Foucher (France), Président
Prof. Massimo Coccia (Italie)
Me José Juan Pintó (Espagne)
Faits pertinents
L’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) est une
association de droit suisse, dont le siège est à Aigle,
en Suisse. L’activité de l’UCI est réglementée par
ses statuts ainsi que par différents règlements, dont
le “Règlement UCI du sport cycliste ” et le “Règlement
antidopage de l’UCI ” (le “R AD ”).
M. Oscar Sevilla Rivera (“l’Athlète ”) est né le 29
septembre 1976 et est de nationalité espagnole. Il
est coureur cycliste de la catégorie élite. Il a été
professionnel durant de nombreuses années et a fait
partie d’équipes prestigieuses. Il est titulaire d’une
licence délivrée par la Real Federación Española
de Ciclismo, mais est actuellement domicilié en
Colombie.
La Real Federación Española de Ciclismo (RFEC) est
la fédération nationale espagnole du cyclisme. Elle a
son siège à Madrid, en Espagne, et est affi liée à l’UCI.
L’Athlète a participé à la course cycliste “Vuelta Pilsen
a Colombia ”, qui s’est déroulée du 1er au 15 août 2010
en Colombie. Il a terminé deuxième au classement
général, à 1 minute 49 secondes du vainqueur. La
“Vuelta Pilsen a Colombia ” est inscrite au calendrier
international de l’UCI et est de classe 2.2, ouverte
notamment aux équipes régionales et de clubs. Au
moment de cette compétition, l’Athlète ainsi que
tous les membres de son équipe étaient des coureurs
cyclistes non professionnels et courraient au sein
d’une équipe colombienne non-enregistrée auprès de
l’UCI.
Le 12 août 2010, au cours d’une étape longue de 204
kilomètres et se terminant à Pereira, en Colombie,
l’Athlète a été victime d’une chute suffisamment
grave pour l’obliger à se soumettre à un contrôle
médical. Néanmoins, il franchit la ligne d’arrivée de
l’étape en 7ème position, à 3 secondes du vainqueur. Le
13 août 2010, l’Athlète termina deuxième d’une étape
longue de 117 kilomètres, à 2 secondes du vainqueur.
Le lendemain, il termina neuvième d’une étape de
montagne de 206 kilomètres.
Le 15 août 2010, à l’occasion d’un contre-la-montre
qu’il remporta, l’Athlète a fait l’objet d’un contrôle
antidopage, au cours duquel des échantillons d’urine
ont été prélevés. Sur le formulaire de contrôle du
dopage, l’Athlète a signé une déclaration par laquelle
il reconnaissait a) que la procédure de prélèvement
avait été conduite de manière conforme, b) qu’elle
n’appelait pas de commentaire et c) qu’il consentait à
se soumettre audit contrôle. Sur ce même document,
il a déclaré avoir pris comme seuls médicaments de la
triamcinolone ainsi que de la lidocaïne.
Les échantillons de l’Athlète ont été acheminés au
“Laboratorio de Control al Dopaje Coldeportes Nacional ”,
à Bogota en Colombie, qui possède l’accréditation
de l’Agence Mondiale Antidopage (AMA). Le
laboratoire a procédé à l’analyse de l’échantillon A de
l’Athlète, laquelle a révélé la présence de métabolites
de Hydroxyethylamidon (HES). Selon le rapport du
7 septembre 2010 de ce laboratoire, le HES est un
produit compris dans la liste des interdictions 2010
de l’AMA et est plus spécifiquement connu pour être
un agent masquant.
Le 16 septembre 2010, l’UCI a notifié les résultats
de l’analyse à l’Athlète. Considérant – à tort – que le
HES n’est pas une “substance spécifiée” et se fondant
sur l’article 235 RAD, l’UCI a informé l’Athlète qu’il
était suspendu avec effet immédiat jusqu’à ce que
sa culpabilité soit ou non reconnue par l’instance
d’audition. Le 17 septembre 2010, l’Athlète a requis
-
67
qu’il soit procédé à une contre-analyse. Le 7 octobre
2010 et en présence de l’Athlète, l’échantillon B a été
ouvert puis analysé par le “Laboratorio de Control al
Dopaje Coldeportes Nacional ” à Bogota, Colombie. La
présence du HES a été confirmée dans un rapport
daté du 11 octobre 2010.
Le 22 novembre 2010 et conformément à l’article 234
RAD, l’UCI a invité la RFEC à ouvrir une procédure
disciplinaire à l’encontre de l’Athlète. Dans ce même
courrier, l’UCI a précisé que, contrairement à ce qui
avait été indiqué dans son courrier du 16 septembre
2010, le HES est une “substance spécifiée” aux termes
de la liste des interdictions, et que, dès lors, l’Athlète
n’avait pas à être suspendu provisoirement.
Par courrier du 25 novembre 2010, la RFEC a
chargé son comité national de compétition et de
discipline sportive (CNCDD) de mener la procédure
disciplinaire à l’encontre de l’Athlète. Au cours de la
procédure devant le CNCDD, l’Athlète a présenté
deux lignes de défense radicalement opposées,
la première contestant le bien-fondé des résultats
positifs au HES et la seconde expliquant comment
et à quelles fins le HES est entré dans son organisme.
En ce qui concerne la deuxième ligne de défense de
l’Athlète et dans la prolongation du délai qui lui a été
accordée, l’Athlète a adressé au CNCDD, le 11 août
2011, un nouveau mémoire, où il a évoqué, pour la
première fois, sa chute du 12 août 2010 et les soins
reçus. Il a notamment relevé ce qui suit:
“En effet, le 12 août 2010, au sein du service des urgences
médicales de l’hôpital Luis Carlos Galan Sarmiento, M. le
Docteur J. a administré au concluant un traitement à base de
substances liquides intraveineuses, et notamment le produit
dénommé Hestar 10 %, dans la composition duquel entre la
substance dénommée Hydroxyéthilamidon.
Ledit traitement a dû être administré suite à la chute subie
par le cycliste le jour même, à savoir le 12 août 2010, date à
laquelle, une fois l’étape de la course cycliste finalisée, il a dû
être pris en charge par le service d’urgences médicales de l’hôpital
précité. La gravité des lésions subies à l’occasion de ladite chute
a eu pour conséquence que M. Oscar Sevilla ait été contraint de
continuer de recevoir, une fois le Tour cycliste colombine finalisé,
des soins médicaux au sein des services médicaux officiels de
l’État colombien (Coldeportes)”.
Cette version des faits était appuyée a) par une
déclaration devant notaire datée du 10 août 2011 du
Dr J., b) par le descriptif du produit “Hestar ” mis à
disposition par son fabriquant sur internet, c) par
une attestation datée du 10 aout 2011 de P., présenté
comme étant le directeur administratif de l’équipe
de l’Athlète et d) par une certificat de consultation
médicale daté du 17 août 2010 et dressé par le Dr M.
Le 16 septembre 2011, le CNCDD a tenu audience et,
par décision du même jour, a notamment considéré
a) qu’il n’y avait pas de motifs à mettre en doute les
résultats des analyses effectuées par le laboratoire
accrédité de contrôle du dopage de Bogota, b) que
la présence dans l’organisme de l’Athlète du HES,
avait été établie à satisfaction, c) que le HES est
une substance spécifiée qui fait partie de la liste
des produits interdits de l’AMA, d) que l’Athlète
s’est rendu coupable d’une violation d’une règle
antidopage devant être sanctionnée par une période
de suspension de 2 ans, conformément à l’article
293 RAD, e) qu’en vertu de l’article 295 RAD et en
présence de substance spécifiée, cette période peut
être éliminée ou réduite pour autant que l’Athlète ait
pu établir de manière convaincante comment le HES
est entré dans son organisme et que ce produit n’a
pas été utilisé en vue d’améliorer ses performances
sportives, f) qu’en l’espèce il a su apporter cette
preuve et doit dès lors être mis au bénéfice de l’article
295 RAD, réduisant ainsi la période de suspension de
2 ans à 9 mois, g) qu’il “est impossible d’affirmer qu’aucune
faute ou négligence n’a été commise par le cycliste dans le cadre
de l’infraction susmentionnée, et ainsi d’éliminer la période
de suspension pouvant lui être infligée” comme le prévoit
l’article 296 RAD, mais h) que la faute ou la négligence
de l’Athlète peut être considérée comme étant non
significative, ce qui permet de réduire encore une fois
la période de suspension, conformément à l’article
297 RAD et, donc, de la ramener de 9 mois à 6 mois.
Le 16 septembre 2011, le CNCDD a rendu la décision
suivante:
“DE SANCTIONNER M. Oscar SEVILLA
RIVER A, titulaire de la licence Elite no 44394926,
conformément aux dispositions de l’article 295, en relation
avec les dispositions de l’article 297, du Règlement de
I’UCI, par une SUSPENSION DE SIX MOIS DE
LICENCE, à compte de la notification de la présente, pour
violation des règles antidopage de l’article 21.2 du Règlement
susmentionné, du fait de la présence dans son organisme
d’HYDROXYETHYLAMIDON (HES) détectée lors
du contrôle antidopage réalisé lors de la Vuelta Ciclista a
Colombia 2010, dans la ville de Medellin (Colombie) le 15
août 2010 et d’annuler tous les résultats obtenus depuis la date
de collecte du premier échantillon (15/09/2010) (sic).
Obligation lui est faite d’assumer le paiement d’une amende de
1 500 CHF, conformément: aux dispositions de l’article 326.1
b) du R AD, ainsi que des frais de procédure, conformément
aux dispositions de l’article 275 du R AD, repartis comme
suit:
-
Frais relatifs aux démarches de la présente procédure établis
de manière définitive par le CNCDD et la RFEC, fixés
-
68
-
prudentiellement à 900 euros (neuf cents euros)
1 000 CHF, fixés par I’UCI pour la gestion des résultats
réalisée par la Commission antidopage
Coûts d’analyse de l’échantillon B
Conformément aux dispositions des articles 329.1 et 333
du Règlement antidopage de I’UCI, la présente résolution
peut faire l’objet d’un recours devant la cour d’arbitrage du
sport (TAS/CAS) dans un délai d’un mois à compter de
sa notification”.
Par déclaration d’appel du 27 octobre 2011, l’UCI a
saisi le Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS). Dans son
mémoire d’appel, daté du 14 novembre 2011, l’UCI a
formulé les conclusions suivantes:
“1) de réformer la décision du Comité National de
Compétition et Discipline de la RFEC;
2)
de condamner M. Sevilla à une suspension de 4 ans,
conformément aux articles 293 et 305 R AD;
cette procédure, soit une somme de CHF 10’000”.
Par courrier du 19 décembre 2011, la RFEC a déposé
sa réponse, laquelle contient les conclusions suivantes:
“ La Real Federación Española de Ciclismo prie le Tribunal
que
a)
L’UCI soit intégralement déboutée de l’appel qu’elle a
interjeté contre la décision du [CNCDD] de la RFEC
du 16 septembre 2011.
b)
Que la décision du 16 septembre 2011, prononcée par
le [CNCDD] de la RFEC soit confirmée, à tous les
niveaux.
c)
Que la décision prononcée par le TAS condamne
expressément l’UCI aux dépens.
d)
Que dans le cas improbable où le TAS estimerait que
la sanction prononcée par le [CNCDD] de la RFEC
contre le sportif ne serait pas proportionnée et que celui-ci
a commis une quelconque violation du R AD, la RFEC
n’ait pas à payer les frais de la procédure”.
3)
de condamner M. Sevilla au paiement d’une amende de
CHF 100’000.-;
4)
de prononcer la disqualification de M. Sevilla de la Vuelta
a Colombia 2010 (article 288 R AD) et d’annuler tous
les résultats obtenus à partir du 15 août 2010 (article
313 R AD). Il résulte de l’article 313 R AD que tous
les résultats obtenus par M. Sevilla à partir du 15 août
2010 doivent être annulés;
En date du 21 mars 2012, une audience a été tenue à
Lausanne, au siège du TAS. La Formation arbitrale a
entendu le témoignage des personnes suivantes, après
les avoir invitées à dire la vérité, ce qu’elles se sont
expressément engagées à faire:
5)
de condamner M. Sevilla à payer à l’UCI un montant de
CHF 1’000.- à titre de frais de gestion des résultats (art.
275.2 R AD);
- Dr R., médecin adjoint au service de médecine
intensive adulte du centre hospitalier universitaire
vaudois (CHUV).
6)
de condamner M. Sevilla et la RFEC, solidairement à
rembourser à l’UCI l’émolument de CHF 500.- et à tous
les autres frais, y compris une contribution aux frais de
l’UCI”.
- Dr J. Ce dernier a été entendu par téléconférence
avec l’accord de la Formation arbitrale, en
application de l’article R44.2 du Code de l’arbitrage
en matière de sport (le “Code”). Son identité
ainsi que ses états de services auprès de l’hôpital
Doce De Octubre Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento,
à Medellin ont été vérifiés et confirmés au moyen
d’une mesure d’instruction complémentaire
diligentée par la Formation arbitrale (voir ciaprès).
Au cours de l’audience qui s’est tenue devant le TAS
en date du 21 mars 2012, l’UCI a précisé sa 3ème
conclusion de manière à ce que l’amende soit fixée
à CHF 9’000, conformément à la nouvelle teneur
de l’article 326 RAD, qui est entré en vigueur le 1er
octobre 2011 et qui doit être appliqué en vertu du
principe de la lex mitior.
Par courrier du 16 décembre 2011, l’Athlète a déposé
sa réponse, laquelle contient les conclusions suivantes:
“Au vu de ce qui précède,
JE SOLLICITE AU TRIBUNAL ARBITR AL:
1.De rejeter le recours en appel de l’UCI.
2.De confirmer la décision de la RFEC.
3.De condamner l’UCI à payer les frais de procédure.
4.De condamner l’UCI à payer les frais du coureur dans
Extraits des considérants
A. Mesures d’instruction complémentaires
Après en avoir préalablement informé les parties en
cours d’audience et en application des articles R44.2
et R44.3 du Code, la Formation arbitrale a souhaité
procéder à l’établissement de l’identité et du profi l
professionnel du Dr J., lequel n’a pas pu témoigner
par vidéo conférence, faute de moyens techniques à
disposition.
-
69
Ainsi, par courrier du 22 mars 2012, le Dr J. a été
invité à adresser au Greffe du TAS:
- Une copie de son passeport, carte d’identité, ou
tout autre moyen permettant d’établir son identité.
- Une copie de sa carte professionnelle, ou tout autre
document permettant d’établir sa profession.
- Une attestation de l’hôpital qui l’emploie, sur
papier à en-tête officiel de l’hôpital, qui certifie
qu’il fait partie du personnel médical de cet hôpital
et qui permette d’établir quelle est sa fonction au
sein de l’institution.
Il a également été demandé au Dr J. d’indiquer s’il
existe un site internet qui permette de trouver son
nom parmi les médecins qui officient pour le compte
de l’Hôpital Doce De Octubre Luis Carlos Galán
Sarmiento. A ce sujet, la Formation arbitrale lui a fait
part de son étonnement quant au fait que son nom
ne figure pas dans le “Guía Médica y Hospitalaria de
Medellín” (www.guiamedicahospitalaria.com), lequel
indique pourtant l’Hospital Doce De Octubre Luis
Carlos Galán Sarmiento parmi les “Instituciones” qu’il
recense.
En date du 30 mars 2012, le Dr J. a adressé au Greffe
du TAS les documents suivants:
- Une déclaration qui est attribuée à la directrice
générale de “Guía Médica y Hospitalaria de
Medellín”, mais qui est transmise dans un courrier
électronique du Dr J.
Ce document comprend toutefois le sigle du “Guía
Médica y Hospitalaria de Medellín”, le nom, prénom
de la directrice ainsi que ses coordonnées, son
numéro de téléphone et son adresse e-mail.
Il résulte de ce document que le site “Guía Médica
y Hospitalaria de Medellín” ne répertorie pas tous
les médecins de Medellin, seuls les praticiens
privés et/ou issus de certaines institutions y étant
recensés. Par ailleurs, ne figurent pas sur ce site,
les médecins qui ne désirent pas y être désignés,
pour des raisons personnelles.
- Une copie de sa pièce d’identité confirmant sa
citoyenneté colombienne ainsi qu’une attestation
à l’en-tête de Metroslaud confirmant qu’il est
employé auprès de Metrosalud depuis le 26
septembre 1984 et qu’il travaille actuellement à
plein temps comme médecin généraliste au sein
de l’Hôpital Doce De Octubre Luis Carlos Galán
Sarmiento.
La Formation arbitrale observe que la signature
figurant sur la pièce d’identité précitée présente de très
grandes similarités avec celle figurant sur les autres
pièces versées au dossier par les parties, en particulier
sur le document intitulé “Atencion de Urgencias, epicrisis
– resumen de atencion - contrarreferencia”, avec l’en-tête
“Metrosalud ”. Il est ici à noter que le Dr J. a apposé
sa signature ainsi que son sceau (J., Medico U. de
A, Reg: 15337) sur ce dernier document à plusieurs
endroits.
A cela s’ajoute le fait qu’au cours de l’audience du
21 mars 2012, le Dr J. a su répondre de manière
précise et circonstanciée tant aux questions liées
au fonctionnement de Metrosalud qu’à celles liées
aux caractéristiques du Hestar et aux spécificités du
traitement administré à l’Athlète.
Par courrier du 17 avril 2012, l’UCI s’est référée
aux pièces remises par le Dr J. et s’est étonnée de a)
“l’homonymie des patronymes du Dr J., de la personne ayant
conduit ce dernier à l’hôpital de San Luis (Mr J.) et de la
personne ayant signé l’attestation de l’hôpital de Luis Carlos
Galan du 22 mars 2012 (Mme J.)”, b) du fait que “sur
l’attestation délivrée par l’hôpital Luis Carlos Galan le 22
mars 2012, il est indiqué que le Dr J. est médecin généraliste” et
c) du fait que “M. Sevilla a été soigné au service des urgences
par un médecin généraliste le 12 août 2010 plutôt que par un
médecin urgentiste”. Sur la base de ces constats, l’UCI a
demandé à la Formation arbitrale qu’elle sollicite “la
production de la liste des médecins urgentistes de l’hôpital Luis
Carlos Galan”.
Le 24 avril 2012, le Greffe du TAS a informé les
parties que la Formation arbitrale avait rejeté cette
nouvelle demande de l’UCI du 17 avril 2012.
D’une manière générale, et selon le droit suisse,
applicable à titre supplétif, “Chaque partie doit, si la loi
ne prescrit le contraire, prouver les faits qu’elle allègue pour
en déduire son droit” (article 8 du Code civil suisse).
Cette disposition répartit le fardeau de la preuve
et détermine sur cette base qui doit assumer les
conséquences de l’échec de la preuve (ATF 126 III
189; ATF 129 III 18; ATF 132 III 449). En l’espèce,
l’UCI n’a pas apporté un seul élément permettant de
mettre sérieusement en doute l’identité ou la fonction
médicale du Dr J., se contentant à chaque fois
d’inviter la Formation arbitrale à procéder elle-même
à des mesures d’investigations. L’UCI s’est limitée à
de vagues recherches sur internet et indique avoir
interpellé par téléphone, une personne qu’elle n’a pas
pu identifier auprès de Metrosalud pour savoir si cette
dernière pouvait confirmer que le Dr J. travaillait bien
auprès de l’Hôpital Doce De Octubre Luis Carlos
Galán Sarmiento. Ces démarches se sont révélées
infructueuses. Si l’UCI avait vraiment souhaité faire
-
70
la démonstration de l’imposture alléguée du Dr J., elle
aurait au moins pu interpeller par écrit Metrosalud
et/ou charger un avocat local d’entreprendre les
démarches nécessaires auprès de l’hôpital pour en
connaître ses éventuels liens avec le Dr J.
Plus particulièrement et en ce qui concerne la
demande de l’UCI formulée après l’audience,
tendant à “la production de la liste des médecins urgentistes
de l’hôpital Luis Carlos Galan”, il apparaît qu’elle vise
à nouveau, à combler des lacunes dans les preuves
qu’il lui appartenait d’apporter à l’appui de son appel.
Dès lors, la Formation arbitrale estime qu’elle n’a
pas à entrer en matière et, à cet égard, fait siennes
les considérations formulées dans un arrêt récent du
TAS (TAS 2009/A/2014, par. 34):
“Quoi qu’il en soit, l’article R44.1 alinéa 2 du Code TAS
exprime très clairement le principe de la responsabilité des parties
en matière de production de pièces: “Les parties produisent avec
leurs écritures toutes les pièces dont elles entendent se prévaloir”.
Elles ne sauraient dès lors tirer argument, a posteriori, du
caractère incomplet du dossier dont elles seraient elles-mêmes
à l’origine. De même, elles ne sauraient reprocher au TAS de
vouloir statuer sur la base du dossier dans son état au jour de
la clôture de l’instruction écrite. Ces principes ont notamment
été rappelés dans une jurisprudence CAS 2003/O/506:
“On a preliminary basis, the Panel points out that in CAS
arbitration any party wishing to prevail on a disputed issue
must discharge its “burden of proof”, i.e. it must meet the onus
to substantiate its allegations and to affirmatively prove the facts
on which it relies with respect to that issue. Indeed, Art. R44.1
of the CAS Code provides that “together with their written
submissions, the parties shall produce all written evidence upon
which they intend to rely”, and that “the parties shall specify
any witnesses and experts which they intend to call and state
any other evidentiary measure which they request”. Therefore,
the Panel does not accept the Respondent’s submission that
“the Panel has an obligation to instruct the case ex officio
and cannot simply take its decision on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the parties, if it deems it insufficient” (...) Surely,
Art. R44.3 of the CAS Code empowers the Panel to order
further evidentiary proceedings “if it deems it appropriate to
supplement the presentations of the parties”. However, in the
Panel’s opinion, this is clearly a discretionary power which a
CAS panel may exert with an ample margin of appreciation “if it deems it appropriate” - and which cannot be characterized
as an obligation. In particular, the CAS Code does not grant
such discretionary power to panels in order to substitute for
the parties’ burden of introducing evidence sufficient to avoid
an adverse ruling; this is clearly confirmed by the circumstance
that, in CAS practice, panels resort very rarely to such power.
Indeed, it is the Panel’s opinion that the CAS Code sets
forth an adversarial system of arbitral justice, rather than an
inquisitorial one”.
Au vu de ces éléments, des pièces au dossiers ainsi que
des propos tenus par le Dr J. lors de son témoignage
au cours de l’audience du 21 mars 2012, la Formation
arbitrale estime que l’identité de ce dernier ainsi
que ses liens professionnels avec l’Hôpital Doce De
Octubre Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento, ont été établis
de manière suffisante au vu du degré de preuve
applicable aux faits à prouver par l’Athlète (dans ce
cas “prépondérance des probabilités” selon l’article 22
RAD).
B. Le fond
Les faits suivants sont admis par les parties: i) le HES
est une substance interdite, au sens de la “liste des
interdictions 2010”, qui fait partie intégrante du RAD
en vertu de son article 29; ii) lLe HES est incorporé
dans la classe “S5. Diurétiques et autres agents masquants”
de la “liste des interdictions 2010” et doit dès lors être
qualifié de substance spécifiée; iii) la présence d’une
substance interdite, de ses métabolites ou de ses
marqueurs dans un échantillon fourni par un coureur
constitue un cas de violation des règles antidopage
(article 21 RAD); iv) l’Athlète a été déclaré positif au
HES à la suite du contrôle antidopage effectué le 15
août 2010; v) c’est la première fois que l’Athlète se
voit formellement reprocher la violation d’une règle
antidopage.
Il résulte de ce qui précède que l’UCI a établi la
violation d’une règle antidopage. En application de
l’article 293 RAD, l’Athlète doit être suspendu pour
une durée de deux ans pour une première violation
des règles antidopage.
Toutefois, le RAD offre à l’Athlète la possibilité
d’obtenir une élimination ou une réduction de la
période de suspension, à condition qu’il prouve
comment la substance spécifiée a pénétré dans son
organisme, que ladite substance spécifiée n’était
pas destinée à améliorer les performances sportive
ou à masquer l’usage d’une substance améliorant
les performances (article 295 RAD) et/ou qu’il n’a
commis aucune faute ou négligence significative
(article 297 RAD).
Dès lors, seules sont litigieuses les questions de savoir
si l’Athlète a valablement établi l’existence d’un motif
de réduction de la période de suspension et, le cas
échéant, si les sanctions prononcées par le CNCDD
sont en adéquation avec la faute ou la négligence
commise par l’Athlète.
D’un côté, l’UCI estime que la version des faits
présentée par l’Athlète dans sa deuxième ligne de
défense n’est pas crédible, ni vraisemblable et qu’elle
constitue une circonstance aggravante justifiant une
suspension de 4 ans. De l’autre côté, les intimés sont
d’avis que l’Athlète a su expliquer la présence du HES
-
71
dans son organisme et le fait que le HES avait été
utilisé exclusivement à des fins thérapeutiques. Selon
les intimés, la suspension prononcée par le CNCDD
est juste et doit être confirmée.
1.
L’Athlète a-t-il établi un motif de réduction de
la période de suspension au sens de l’article 295
RAD ?
1.1 Le degré de la preuve qui incombe à l’Athlète
A la lecture de l’article 295 RAD et pour être en
mesure de requérir une réduction de la période de
suspension, l’Athlète doit établir:
-
“comment une substance spécifiée a pénétré dans son
organisme” et
“que ladite substance spécifiée n’était pas destinée à
améliorer [ses] performances sportives (…) ou à masquer
l’usage d’une substance améliorant les performances”.
A titre liminaire, se pose donc la question de savoir
quelles sont les exigences minimales auxquelles doit
satisfaire l’Athlète en relation avec son fardeau de la
preuve.
Le RAD ayant été adopté conformément aux
dispositions applicables du Code Mondial Antidopage,
il doit être interprété d’une manière cohérente par
rapport à ce code. Le cas échéant, les commentaires
annotant les diverses dispositions du Code Mondial
Antidopage peuvent aider à la compréhension et à
l’interprétation du RAD (voir article 369 RAD).
Le commentaire sur l’article 10.4 du Code Mondial
Antidopage, qui est la disposition correspondante à
l’article 295 RAD, précise ce qui suit:
“(…) il est plus vraisemblable que la présence de substances
spécifiées, par opposition aux autres substances interdites,
puisse s’expliquer par une cause crédible non liée au dopage.
Cet article s’applique seulement dans les cas où l’instance
d’audition est satisfaite, eu égard aux circonstances objectives
entourant l’affaire, que le sportif, lorsqu’il a absorbé ou eu
en sa possession la substance interdite, n’avait pas l’intention
d’améliorer sa performance sportive. Le type de circonstances
objectives dont la combinaison pourrait satisfaire l’instance
d’audition de l’absence d’intention d’amélioration de la
performance comprendrait, par exemple: le fait que la nature
de la substance spécifiée ou le moment de son ingestion n’aurait
pas été bénéfique pour le sportif; l’usage non dissimulé ou la
déclaration d’usage de la substance spécifiée par le sportif; et
un dossier médical récent corroborant le fait que la substance
spécifiée fait l’objet d’une ordonnance médicale non liée au
sport. En règle générale, plus le potentiel d’amélioration de la
performance est grand, plus la charge de la preuve imposée au
sportif en ce qui concerne l’absence d’intention d’amélioration de
la performance sportive est élevée.
L’absence d’intention d’amélioration de la performance sportive
doit être établie à la satisfaction de l’instance d’audition, mais le
sportif peut établir comment la substance spécifiée s’est retrouvée
dans son organisme par la prépondérance des probabilités”.
Il résulte de ce qui précède que la prépondérance
des probabilités est le degré de preuve à apporter par
l’Athlète quant à la question de savoir comment le
HES est entré dans son organisme. Il lui appartient
de convaincre la Formation arbitrale qu’il est plus
probable que les faits qu’il allègue se sont bien
déroulés comme il le prétend et non autrement (CAS
2010/A/2230, par. 11.7; CAS 2009/A/1926 & 1930,
par. 3.6.1 et arrêts cités; CAS 2008/A/1515, par. 116
et arrêts cités, CAS 2011/A/2384, par. 259 ss; CAS
2010/A/2107, par. 9.2).
Il incombe à l’Athlète d’établir que le HES “n’était
pas destinée à améliorer [ses] performances sportives (…) ou à
masquer l’usage d’une substance améliorant [ses] performances”
à la satisfaction de l’instance de jugement, qui
appréciera la gravité des accusations. Il en découle
que le degré de preuve doit être plus important que le
standard de simple prépondérance des probabilités,
mais moins important que le standard de preuve
allant au-delà d’un doute raisonnable. Des preuves
corroborantes doivent en outre être produites à
l’appui des assertions de l’Athlète (CAS 2010/A/2230,
para. 11.7; CAS 2010/A/2229, para. 84 ss; CAS
2010/A/2107, para. 9.2).
1.2 L’Athlète a-t-il valablement établi comment la
substance spécifiée a pénétré dans son organisme?
L’Athlète explique la présence du HES dans son
organisme par le traitement qui lui a été administré
dans un hôpital de Medellin par le Dr J., suite à sa
chute intervenue le 12 août 2010, lors d’une étape de
la “Vuelta Pilsen a Colombia”. A l’appui de ses dires,
l’Athlète a produit une série de pièces.
De son côté, l’UCI estime que l’authenticité des
documents est douteuse et que, dans le meilleur des
cas, ils ont été établis de manière complaisante.
Les documents corroborant la version des faits
présentée par l’Athlète sont les suivants:
- Une déclaration signée par le Dr F., datée du 25
novembre 2011, figurant sur une page blanche,
sans en-tête. Cette personne se présente comme
le médecin officiel de la “Vuelta Pilsen a Colombia ”.
Son nom figure sur une copie a) d’une pièce
d’identité ainsi que b) sur une liste d’une brochure
-
72
publicitaire liée à la “Vuelta Pilsen a Colombia ” 2010.
Selon le Dr F., l’Athlète est tombé lors de l’étape
9, ce qui lui a valu de multiples lacérations et
abrasions ainsi que des traumatismes aux tissus
mous. Trois jours plus tard, lors de la 12ème étape,
l’Athlète est à nouveau tombé. Au vu de ses
douleurs, l’Athlète a d’abord été amené à l’hôpital
universitaire San Jorge de Pereira afin de prendre
les mesures permettant d’évaluer son état de santé
ainsi que ses chances de poursuivre sa course.
Compte tenu du volume important de patients, la
prise en charge de l’Athlète le jour même n’était
pas garantie. C’est la raison pour laquelle le Dr
F. a suggéré à l’Athlète ainsi qu’à son directeur
d’équipe de se rendre dans un autre hôpital. Il
est toutefois précisé que ni la vie ni la santé de
l’Athlète n’était en péril. Le Directeur sportif de
l’Athlète a alors déclaré avoir un contact dans un
hôpital de Medellin, situé à environ deux heures.
En raison de ses fonctions au sein de la “Vuelta
Pilsen a Colombia ”, le Dr F. n’a pas pu accompagner
l’Athlète à Medellin.
- Différentes coupures de presse, relatant les
difficultés financières et logistiques rencontrées
par le passé par l’hôpital universitaire San Jorge de
Pereira.
- Une déclaration signée par Mr J., datée de
novembre 2011, figurant sur une page blanche,
sans en-tête. Cette personne confirme avoir
amené l’Athlète à l’hôpital Doce De Octubre Luis
Carlos Galán Sarmiento, à Medellin, en date du 12
août 2010, sur recommandation du Dr F.
- Un document intitulé “Atencion de Urgencias, epicrisis
– resumen de atencion - contrarreferencia”, avec l’en-tête
“Metrosalud”, qui est la raison sociale d’un réseau
de soins en Colombie. Cette pièce est datée du
12 août 2010 et est émise dans le cadre de soins
apportés au sein de l’Hôpital Doce De Octubre
Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento, à Medellin.
Il apparaît que c’est le Dr J. qui a traité l’Athlète,
lequel était accompagné par Mr J. La consultation
a eu lieu à 17 heures 10 et fait suite à une chute
de vélo au cours d’une compétition. L’Athlète
présentait un état neurologique normal et avait la
pression artérielle, les pulsations et une fréquence
respiratoires d’une personne en bonne santé.
Toutefois, il avait plusieurs lacérations prononcées
au genou gauche, des saignements modérés et
ressentait des douleurs au toucher.
Un polytraumatisme a été diagnostiqué par le Dr
J., lequel a alors administré un litre de Hestar (qui
contient du HES) à l’Athlète par voie intraveineuse,
durant 3 heures.
- Une déclaration devant notaire du Dr J., établie le
10 août 2011. Une traduction de ce document a été
versée au dossier par l’UCI et a le contenu suivant:
“En date du 12 août de l’année 2010, j’ai pris en charge,
à l’hôpital Luis Carlos Galan, le patient M. OSCAR
SEVILLA RIVER A, avec carte nationale d’identité
no 44.394.925, hospitalisé dans ledit établissement alors
qu’il présentait de multiples lacérations et contusions,
provoquées par sa chute de vélo. II y a été procédé à un
lavage abondant de ses blessures, ainsi qu’à l’application
de substances liquides intraveineuses (expansion
plasmatique (Hestar 10 %), d’une anatoxine tétanique et
d’antibiotiques prophylactiques (ceftriaxone). Après deux
heures d’observation, le patient a été autorisé à quitter
l’hôpital, avec des consignes à respecter et sans que quelque
complication que ce soit ne soit intervenue”.
- Un document intitulé “Apoyo Rendimiento Deportivo
– Historica Clinica” avec l’en-tête “Coldportes”. Cette
pièce est datée du 17 août 2010 et a été signée par
le Dr M. Seule la première page de ce document
(qui en comporte quatre) a été versée au dossier.
Selon cette pièce, la consultation avait pour objet
la contusion du genou de l’Athlète. Le médecin
déclare que l’Athlète a été victime d’une chute au
cours de la “Vuelta Pilsen a Colombia” ayant entrainé
une contusion au genou gauche, lequel a été traité
dans un hôpital à Medellin. Les douleurs et les
inflammations sont persistantes.
Il est à relever que l’UCI a produit un document
de contenu et de format similaires, daté du 17
août 2010, également signé par le Dr M. mais
qui concerne exclusivement le genou droit de
l’Athlète. Seule la deuxième page de ce document
(qui en comporte deux) a été produite.
Dans le cadre de l’examen de la probabilité de la
version des faits présentée par l’Athlète, la Formation
arbitrale a d’abord déterminé quel crédit il y avait lieu
d’accorder aux documents produits. A cet égard, elle
relève qu’elle ne dispose d’aucun élément concret lui
permettant de conclure qu’il s’agit de faux ou que ces
pièces ont été établies de manière complaisante.
Il est vrai que les auteurs de toutes les pièces en
cause ne peuvent pas être identifiés avec certitude.
En outre, la production tardive de preuves en
cours de procédure ne manque pas de susciter des
interrogations légitimes. De même, la Formation
arbitrale a été troublée par la constatation que le Dr
M. a rempli deux formulaires quasi identiques, à la
-
73
seule exception que l’un concerne le genou droit de
l’Athlète et l’autre le genou gauche. La Formation
arbitrale ne peut pas exclure que le Dr M. ait choisi
de rédiger un formulaire par genou, ce qui semble
douteux mais pas de nature à remettre en cause les
autres documents produits par l’Athlète. Cela est
d’autant plus vrai que les documents liés au Dr M.
n’ont été que partiellement produits et ont trait à un
contrôle médical intervenu plusieurs jours après les
soins apportés par le Dr J. et le contrôle antidopage.
poursuivre la course, au vu des douleurs dont il se
plaignait et de son excellent classement. Enfin, il est à
noter que la 12ème étape s’est achevée aux alentours de
13 heures. L’UCI estime qu’il y a 2h30 de route entre
Pereira et Medellin. Selon le document “Atencion de
Urgencias, epicrisis – resumen de atencion – contrarreferencia”,
l’Athlète a été pris en charge par le Dr J. à 17h10. De
même, il ressort de la déclaration notariée du Dr J.
que l’Athlète a pu quitter l’hôpital deux heures après
son admission.
Parmi les documents dont l’auteur, le Dr J., doit être
considéré comme identifié, figurent la déclaration
notariée ainsi que le “Atencion de Urgencias, epicrisis
– resumen de atencion – contrarreferencia”. Lors du
témoignage de ce dernier, au cours de l’audience du
21 mars 2012, celui-ci a confirmé le contenu de ces
deux pièces, qui authentifient la présence de l’Athlète
et sa prise en charge au sein de l’hôpital de Medellin
en date du 12 août 2010. Par là, la vraisemblance
des autres pièces (qui tendent à expliquer pourquoi,
comment et avec qui l’Athlète s’est rendu à Medellin)
est renforcée. Soutenir le contraire, reviendrait à
dire que le Dr J. a non seulement commis des faux
mais qu’il a menti tant devant le notaire que devant
la Formation arbitrale dans l’intérêt de l’Athlète. Or,
aucun élément dans le dossier ne permet de penser
que le Dr J. connaissait l’Athlète, ce qu’il a démenti
lors de son témoignage.
La chronologie des événements n’est donc pas
incompatible avec la version des faits présentée par
l’Athlète.
En outre, si le Dr J. avait participé à une collusion de
personnes mal intentionnées pour fabriquer de toutes
pièces un scénario disculpant l’Athlète, l’intervention
d’autres acteurs aurait été inévitable. En l’état actuel,
une telle théorie du complot relève de la pure
spéculation et l’UCI ne produit, en tout cas, aucun
élément concret permettant d’en établir l’existence ou
même un début d’existence.
Au vu de ce qui précède, il est plus probable que
les pièces produites par l’Athlète présentent plus un
caractère d’authenticité que de fausseté.
Dès lors que les preuves soumises par l’Athlète sont
admises comme étant vraisemblables, il est également
plus que probable que ce dernier se soit effectivement
rendu à Medellin pour y être traité ensuite de sa chute
au cours de la “Vuelta Pilsen a Colombia ”.
La Formation arbitrale n’est pas sceptique quant
aux explications de l’Athlète, selon lesquelles il a
choisi de se rendre à Medellin, une fois que l’hôpital
universitaire San Jorge de Pereira lui a fait savoir qu’il
ne pouvait lui assurer une prise en charge le jour de
l’accident. En effet, elle ne trouve pas déraisonnable
de penser que l’équipe de l’Athlète souhaitait pouvoir
évaluer précisément les chances pour l’Athlète de
Pour toutes ces raisons, la Formation arbitrale est
d’avis qu’il est également plus que probable que
l’Athlète se soit effectivement rendu à Medellin le
12 août 2010 pour y être traité médicalement et qu’à
cette occasion du HES lui a été administré.
Pour les motifs évoqués ci-dessus, l’Athlète a pu faire
la démonstration à la Formation arbitrale qu’il est
plus probable que les faits qu’il allègue se sont bien
déroulés comme il le prétend et non autrement. Par
conséquent il a satisfait au fardeau de la preuve qui
lui incombait pour démontrer comment la substance
spécifiée a pénétré dans son organisme.
1.3 L’Athlète a-t-il valablement établi que le HES
“n’était pas destiné à améliorer [ses] performances sportives
(…) ou à masquer l’usage d’une substance améliorant [ses]
performances” ?
L’UCI estime que le traitement à base de Hestar,
administré par le Dr J. à l’Athlète, était déplacé et
n’a pas pu être utilisé à des fins thérapeutiques. Elle
s’appuie sur une expertise commandée au Dr R.,
médecin adjoint au service de médecine intensive
adulte du CHUV.
En audience, le Dr R. a confirmé à la Formation
arbitrale que le HES n’est utilisé que pour des patients
qui souffrent de lésions bien plus sévères que celles de
l’Athlète et/ou qui ont perdu un tel volume sanguin,
qu’il leur faut plusieurs jours de récupération. Au vu
des données comprises dans le document “Atencion de
Urgencias, epicrisis – resumen de atencion – contrarreferencia”,
en particulier celles liées à la pression artérielle, les
pulsations et la fréquence respiratoire qui indiquent
que l’Athlète était en parfaite santé, le Dr R. n’aurait
jamais eu recours au HES. Ce dernier a cependant
confirmé que le HES est un médicament très
controversé et qu’il n’y a pas de contre-indication à
l’administrer même pour des lésions superficielles.
Dans un tel cas, le recours au HES présente le risque
de favoriser des hémorragies ou des saignements,
-
74
sans aucun bénéfice thérapeutique.
Interpellé par la Formation arbitrale, le Dr J. a justifié
l’administration du HES par le fait que l’Athlète avait
manifestement beaucoup saigné. Sa chute remontait
à plusieurs heures et les plaies saignaient encore
lors de son admission à l’Hôpital Doce De Octubre
Luis Carlos Galán Sarmiento, à Medellin. Ignorant
précisément quelle quantité de sang avait été perdue,
l’administration du HES était parfaitement indiquée
puisqu’il s’agit d’un expanseur de plasma permettant
de combler des pertes de sang qui, en l’occurrence,
pouvaient être importantes. L’usage de ce médicament
est courant.
Il apparaît comme étant incontesté, d’une part, que
l’Athlète a perdu du sang et que, d’autre part, le HES
a comme propriété de compenser la perte de sang.
Dans ce contexte, le recours par le Dr J. au HES paraît
défendable. Le fait que l’usage de cette substance
dans une telle situation soit controversé et/ou contreindiqué ne change pas le fait que ce médicament a été
administré sur la seule initiative du Dr J. dans le but
de compenser l’éventuelle perte de sang de l’Athlète
et non afin d’améliorer les performances sportives
ou à masquer l’usage d’une substance améliorant les
performances de l’Athlète.
A partir du moment où la Formation arbitrale admet
comme étant plus que probable que 1) l’Athlète est
lourdement tombé en date du 12 août 2010, b) qu’il
n’était pas certain qu’il puisse être soigné à Pereira,
Colombie, c) qu’il était raisonnable de penser qu’au
vu des circonstances, un examen médical s’imposait,
d) que de l’avis du médecin de la “Vuelta Pilsen a
Colombia ”, la structure hospitalière la plus adaptée
se trouvait à Medellin, e) que la chronologie des
événements est cohérente, f) que l’Athlète n’a pas de
lien particulier avec le Dr J., elle estime qu’il a été
démontré que le recours au HES n’était pas destiné
à améliorer les performances sportives de l’Athlète
ou à masquer l’usage d’une substance améliorant ses
performances.
Par voie de conséquence, l’Athlète a établi un motif
de réduction de la période de suspension au sens de
l’article 295 RAD.
Au regard de cette conclusion, il y a lieu de rejeter
sans autre considération l’argumentation de l’UCI,
selon laquelle “le caractère improbable de la nouvelle défense
de M. Sevilla présentée le 11 août 2011” constitue une
circonstance aggravante “justifiant l’imposition d’une
période de suspension de 4 ans et ce conformément à l’article
305 R AD”. A ce titre, la Formation arbitrale souligne
qu’il ne peut être reproché ab initio, à un prévenu de
présenter tous les moyens de défense à sa disposition,
au besoin en faisant évoluer leur contenu, sans que
cela ne porte atteinte au droit de la défense.
2. Si les conditions de l’article 295 RAD sont
remplies, quelle doit être la période de suspension?
L’UCI voit des analogies entre le cas de l’Athlète et celui
de l’Athlète L. (TAS 2009/A/1766). Contrairement à
ce que soutient l’UCI, l’affaire L. présente plusieurs
grandes distinctions avec la présente cause:
- D’une part, la substance interdite retrouvée dans
l’organisme de Mme L. n’était pas une substance
spécifiée aux termes de la liste des interdictions
de l’AMA. A ce propos, il y a lieu de rappeler que
selon le commentaire sur l’article 10.4 du Code
Mondial Antidopage, “(…) il est plus vraisemblable
que la présence de substances spécifiées, par opposition aux
autres substances interdites, puisse s’expliquer par une
cause crédible non liée au dopage”.
- D’autre part, et c’est essentiel, la formation
arbitrale appelée à se pencher sur l’affaire L. a
constaté que les explications fournies par l’athlète
roumaine pour justifier la présence de l’EPO dans
son organisme révélaient des contradictions et
n’avaient pas déchargé Mme L. du fardeau de la
preuve lui incombant.
- Dans l’affaire L., la “Formation est ainsi convaincue
qu’aucune des circonstances invoquées par l’Appelante –
même si elles étaient établies – n’est propre à constituer
une «circonstance exceptionnelle» ouvrant la voie à une
réduction de la sanction de deux ans” (para. 76, pages
22 et 23). Or les cas relevant de circonstances
exceptionnelles tombent sous le coup de l’article
296 RAD et non 295, qui ne vise “que” des
“circonstances particulières”.
Le titre de l’article 295 RAD est “Elimination ou
réduction de la période de suspension pour des substances
spécifiées en vertu de circonstances particulières”. Comme déjà
évoqué, pour que l’article 295 RAD soit applicable,
il n’est pas nécessaire que les circonstances soient
exceptionnelles.
En outre et en vertu de l’article 295 RAD, dernière
phrase, le “degré de faute du licencié est le critère pris en compte
pour évaluer toute réduction de la période de suspension”. Dans
le cadre de l’examen de la réduction de la période
de suspension fondée sur l’article 295 RAD, il n’y a
pas lieu de déterminer si la faute ou la négligence de
l’Athlète est “significative”, comme le prévoit l’article
297 RAD (CAS 2010/A/2107, para. 9.32, page 21).
L’examen de la faute ou négligence doit être fait en
fonction des circonstances particulières de chaque
-
75
cas d’espèce. Il doit nécessairement tenir compte
du but – à la fois répressif et éducatif – recherché
par les règles disciplinaires applicables. Il serait
particulièrement inéquitable de sanctionner de la
même manière, d’une part, celui qui refuse d’admettre
avoir pris intentionnellement des produits dopants et
qui conteste les résultats pourtant clairs des analyses
et, d’autre part, un sportif tel que l’Athlète qui a su
démontrer de manière satisfaisante comment la
substance spécifiée a pénétré dans son organisme et
que cette substance n’était pas destinée à améliorer
ses performances sportives ou à masquer l’usage
d’une substance améliorant ses performances.
Il n’est pas contesté que l’Athlète se soit montré
particulièrement négligent à plus d’un titre et qu’il
en est d’autant plus responsable qu’il est un coureur
cycliste expérimenté. Au moment de son admission
à l’hôpital Doce De Octubre Luis Carlos Galán
Sarmiento, l’Athlète était en possession de toutes ses
facultés et était dès lors en mesure de s’enquérir sur le
traitement qui allait lui être appliqué. Le simple fait que
l’Hestar lui ait été administré a) par voie intraveineuse
et b) pendant plusieurs heures, auraient dû amener
l’Athlète à procéder aux vérifications nécessaires et,
cas échéant, à demander une autorisation d’usage
à des fins thérapeutiques. En outre, la faute et/ou
négligence de l’Athlète est d’autant plus importante
qu’il a omis d’invoquer son traitement à l’Hestar au
cours du contrôle antidopage intervenu deux jours
plus tard. De même, ce n’est que dans la dernière
phase de la procédure disciplinaire ouverte à son
encontre par la RFEC, que l’Athlète a finalement fait
état pour la première fois, des incidents intervenus le
12 août 2010.
Toutefois, dès lors qu’il a été démontré a) que le
HES a été administré sur la seule initiative du Dr
J., b) afin de traiter les pertes de sang consécutives
à des lésions provoquées lors d’une chute intervenue
le jour même et c) sans intention d’améliorer les
performances sportives de l’Athlète ou de masquer
l’usage d’une substance améliorant ses performances,
il paraît disproportionné de sanctionner l’Athlète qui
a commis une négligence isolée aussi sévèrement que
le tricheur, pris “la main dans le sac ” (normalement
sanctionné par une période de suspension de 2 ans).
Par conséquent, en application de l’article 295 RAD,
la Formation arbitrale estime une réduction jusqu’à
12 mois de la période de suspension comme étant
proportionnée aux faits retenus à charge de l’Athlète.
En revanche et contrairement à ce qu’à retenu le
CNCDD dans sa décision du 16 septembre 2011, au vu
de l’article 297 RAD, la Formation arbitrale est d’avis
que la négligence et la faute imputables à l’Athlète sont
d’un degré élevé. En effet, l’Athlète a manifestement
fait preuve d’une très grande désinvolture lorsqu’il
a accepté sans autre investigation le traitement
administré par le Dr J. Ce faisant, il a fait très peu
de cas du principe cardinal selon lequel un “traitement
médical ne constitue pas une excuse à l’usage de substances
interdites ou de méthodes interdites, sauf en cas de conformité
avec les règles relatives aux autorisations d’usage à des fins
thérapeutiques” (article 21.1.1 RAD).
En sanctionnant l’Athlète avec une suspension de
six mois, le CNCDD minimise l’obligation faite
à l’Athlète “de s’assurer qu’aucune substance interdite ne
pénètre dans son organisme” (article 21.1.1 RAD). Cette
règle de conduite a d’ailleurs été qualifiée par d’autres
formations arbitrales comme étant absolue (CAS
2003/A/484, para. 62). Il y a lieu de dissuader les
sportifs, en particulier s’ils sont aussi expérimentés
que l’Athlète, de s’en remettre aveuglément aux soins
ou aux conseils de médecins, surtout s’ils ne sont pas
spécialisés en médecine sportive. Le fait d’adopter
l’attitude du “ne rien dire, ne rien voir, ne rien entendre ”
et de ne prendre aucune précaution est incompatible
avec le rôle que les athlètes sont appelés à jouer
dans un univers sportif bien trop gangréné par le
fléau du dopage (CAS 2007/A/1370-1376, para. 142
et suivants). De plus, selon le commentaire sur les
articles 10.5.1 et 10.5.2 du Code Mondial Antidopage
(équivalents aux articles 296 et 297 RAD), “[l]es articles
10.5.1 et 10.5.2 ne trouvent application que dans les cas où les
circonstances sont véritablement exceptionnelles et non dans la
grande majorité des cas”.
Au vu de ce qui précède et des circonstances
particulières du cas d’espèce, la Formation arbitrale
est d’avis qu’une suspension de 12 mois permet de
distinguer le cas de l’Athlète de celui du sportif qui
commet volontairement une violation d’une règle
antidopage, tout en n’atténuant pas de manière
inacceptable l’obligation élémentaire faite à un sportif
de haut niveau de “s’assurer qu’aucune substance interdite ne
pénètre dans son organisme”.
Il résulte de ce qui précède que l’Athlète ne peut pas
se prévaloir de l’absence de faute ou de négligence
significative au sens de l’article 297 RAD. Par
ailleurs, il faut noter que le commentaire sur l’article
10.5.2 du Code Mondial Antidopage (équivalent à
l’article 297 RAD) précise ce qui suit: “L’article 10.5.2
ne devrait pas s’appliquer dans les cas où l’article 10.3.3 ou
10.4 [équivalent à l’article 295 RAD] s’applique, car ces
articles tiennent déjà compte de la gravité de la faute du sportif
ou de l’autre personne aux fins de l’établissement de la période
de suspension applicable”.
Au vu de ce qui précède, il y a lieu de rejeter les
arguments des intimés en relation avec l’article 297
RAD, sans autre considération.
-
76
David Savic v. Professional Tennis Integrity Officers (PTIOs)
5 September 2012
Tennis; corruption/match fi xing; standard of proof; proportionality of the
sanction
Panel:
Mr. Dirk-Reiner Martens (Germany), President
Mr. Michael J. Beloff QC (United Kingdom)
Mr. David W. Rivkin (USA)
M. was in his hotel room in Beijing. Late in the
evening he received two calls on his mobile phone
from the telephone number +381 638 493 231, which
is the mobile telephone number that the Appellant
had provided to M. in Belgrade. He did not answer
the calls. Soon after that, M. answered a call on his
hotel room telephone. M. claims to have recognised
the voice of the caller as that of the Appellant, who
also identified himself by the Appellant’s name.
Shortly thereafter, they agreed to continue their
conversation on Skype. On the Skype call, the caller
who was using the Skype account name “David Savic”,
offered M. USD 30,000 if he would agree to lose the
first set of his first round match. The caller added
that if M. would do so, A. would allow him to win the
second and third set and, therefore, the match itself.
No Skype video call was used and both conversations
were held in English. M. rejected the offer.
Relevant facts
M. reported the telephone and Skype conversations.
David Savic (the “Appellant ”) is a Serbian professional
tennis player who is a member of the Association of
Tennis Professionals (“ATP”).
Jeff Rees, Director of Integrity at the Tennis Integrity
Unit (“TIU”), together with Nigel Willerton, an
investigator with the TIU, interviewed M. about the
events of [...]. The interview was recorded. During
the interview, M. also showed the TIU investigators
the missed calls on the display of his mobile phone,
as well as the contents of his Skype account.
The Professional Tennis Integrity Officers (“PTIOs ”
or the “Respondent ”) are appointed by each of the
following governing bodies of professional tennis:
ATP Tour, Inc. (ATP Tour), Grand Slam Committee
(GSC), International Tennis Federation (ITF) and
WTA Tour, Inc. (WTA). These governing bodies
participate in the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption
Program, which they adopted in 2009 in order to
put in place a stringent code of conduct to combat
gambling-related corruption worldwide. The
objectives of the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption
Program (2010 version, “UTAP” or the “Program ”),
as stated in the Program’s introduction, are to:
“(i) maintain the integrity of tennis, (ii) protect against any
efforts to impact improperly the results of any match and (iii)
establish a uniform rule and consistent scheme of enforcement
and sanctions applicable to all professional tennis events and to
all Governing Bodies”.
M. is a professional tennis player and a member of
the ATP. He and the Appellant came to know each
other and became close friends. They last met in
person in Belgrade, Serbia, and on that occasion they
exchanged their mobile telephone numbers.
[...] M. received a text message on his mobile telephone
from the Appellant’s telephone number +381 638
493 231, which read: “I have the same question for u
like 2 weeks ago … Did u change your mind ? David ”. M.
phoned Rees immediately and, since they were both
staying at the same hotel in Moscow, they met shortly
thereafter. M. showed Rees the text message on his
mobile telephone and Rees advised him to reply
“No”, which he did. Rees also asked M. to forward
to Willerton the text message he had received, which
he did as well.
Following M’s’ allegations, TIU initiated an
investigation against the Appellant in order to
ascertain whether he had committed an offence of
corruption contrary to the UTAP regulations.
On 21 December 2010, Willerton contacted the
Appellant by e-mail and requested him to provide
to TIU all information related to the telephone and
mobile telephone numbers in his possession, the
-
77
billing records of such telephone numbers, as well as
statements of his bank accounts and betting accounts,
if any.
On 11 January 2011, the Appellant replied to
Willerton and confirmed that his mobile telephone
number is +381 638 493 231 and that he owns two
bank accounts but no betting accounts. He also sent
to him scanned copies of the contract and the billing
records of his mobile telephone. These records did not
show any outgoing calls made from the Appellant’s
mobile telephone number to M’s mobile telephone
or his hotel [...]. There was only one entry of a text
message sent through the server of the Appellant’s
mobile telephone service provider [...] at 14:22:51.
On 15 February 2011, the Appellant was interviewed
by Willerton and Dee Bain, who is also a TIU
investigator. The Appellant denied all the allegations
[...] and was not able to provide an explanation for
them.
On 27 October 2011, the Appellant fi led a statement
of appeal dated 18 October 2011 with the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) pursuant to the Code of
Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code ”) to challenge
the AHO Decision. He submitted the following
prayers for relief:
“… this Court is invited to re-visit the facts and the law de
novo, annulling the original Decision and either substituting its
own Decision or remitting the case for re-hearing by a different
AHO”,
and/or
“… to impose a different and much lower fine which there
is some hope of the Appellant being able to pay within a
reasonable period of time, which is proportionate and which the
public would consider fair”.
On 4 November 2011, the Appellant fi led the
Appeal brief including an expert report from the
telecommunications expert Goran Bozic.
On 22 March 2011 in Miami, USA, Willerton and
Bain interviewed A. and A’s coach. They both denied
being aware of any of M’s allegations and also denied
having any information relative to attempts by the
Appellant or anyone else to influence the outcome of
[...] the match [...].
By letter dated 8 November 2011, CAS acknowledged
receipt of the Court Office fee, notified the appeal to
the Respondent and noted that English would be the
language of the present arbitration proceedings.
On 24 May 2011, the PTIO sent an e-mail to the
Appellant charging him with Corruption Offences
under the UTAP.
By letter dated 16 November 2011, the Respondent
requested a thirty day extension of the deadline to
submit its answer in order to be able to consult with
an expert with respect to the issues raised by the
expert report fi led on behalf of the Appellant.
A copy of the e-mail was sent to Professor Richard
H. McLaren who holds an appointment as the AntiCorruption-Hearing Officer under Article F.1 of the
UTAP (“AHO”).
On 12 September 2011, the case was heard in London,
UK, where both parties presented their case before
the AHO.
On 30 September 2011, the AHO issued a decision
(“AHO Decision”), finding that the Appellant had
violated three sections of the Corruption Offences
portion of the Program and ordered that:
On 24 November 2011, the CAS Court Office
granted the Respondent an extension of time until 29
December 2011 to fi le its answer.
By letter dated 20 December 2011, the Respondent
requested an additional thirty day extension for its
response in order to complete its examination and
report.
By letter sent on 23 December 2011, the Appellant
agreed to an extension of time for a maximum of two
(2) weeks for the Respondent to fi le its answer.
“Savic (a Covered Person) having committed a Corruption
Offense under Article D.1.c, d. and f. is to be fined in the amount
of US $100,000 and declared to be permanently ineligible to
compete or participate in any event organized or sanctioned by
any Governing Body as all of these terms are defined under the
2010 Program and in particular Rule H.1.c.”.
On 23 December 2011, the Panel granted the
Respondent until 16 January 2012 to fi le its answer.
On 4 October 2011 the Appellant received the AHO
Decision.
“… the sanction of a lifetime period of ineligibility and a
$100,000 fine imposed by the Anti-Corruption Hearing
Officer is not disproportionate to the offences committed by
On 13 January 2012, the Respondent fi led its answer
to the appeal. The Respondent requested CAS to
decide that:
-
78
Mr. Savic and should be upheld by the Panel”.
On 17 January 2012, the CAS Court Office informed
the parties that in accordance with Article R56 of the
Code,
“unless the parties agree otherwise or the Panel order otherwise
on the basis of exceptional circumstances, the parties shall not
be authorised to supplement or amend their requests or their
argument, nor to produce new exhibits, nor to specify further
evidence on which they intend to rely after the submission of the
appeal brief and of the answer”.
By letter dated 10 February 2010, the CAS Court
Office invited the parties pursuant to Article R44.3
of the Code to fi le a second round of submissions,
in order to allow the Appellant to respond to the
PTIO’s answer.
By letter to the CAS Court Office dated 22 February
2012, the Appellant requested an extension of time of
ten days to fi le its second written submission.
On 28 February 2012, the Appellant fi led with CAS
his second submission, including his response to the
answer and statement of defence of the Respondent.
On 19 March 2012, the Respondent fi led with CAS
its reply to the Appellant’s response to the answer
and statement of defence.
On 27 March 2012, the Respondent informed the
CAS Court Office that he would not be able to attend
the hearing in person, but would give his testimony
during the hearing via video-conference, assisted by
his counsel.
A hearing was held on 29 March 2012 at the CAS
premises in Lausanne, Switzerland.
A. Applicable Law
Article R58 of the Code provides as follows:
“The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable
regulations and the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the
absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in
which the federation, association or sports-related body which
has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according
to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems
appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for
its decision”.
Pursuant to Article C.1 of the UTAP, “(A)ll Players,
Related Persons, and Tournament Support Personnel shall be
bound by and shall comply with all of the provisions of this
Program and shall be deemed to accept all terms set out herein”.
Furthermore, Article B.18 of the UTAP provides that
““Player” refers to any player who enters or participates in any
competition, event or activity organized or sanctioned by any
Governing Body”.
The Appellant is a member of the ATP and,
therefore, the Panel finds that in this case the
applicable regulations are all pertinent UTAP rules
and regulations. Since the alleged offences occurred
in 2010, the 2010 version of the Program shall be
applicable.
The applicable UTAP rules are the following:
“D. Offenses
Commission of any offense set forth in Article D or E of this
Program or any other violation of the provisions of this Program
shall constitute a Corruption Offense for all purposes of this
Program.
By CAS letters dated 13 and 19 April 2012, the parties
were invited to comment on whether the Judgment
of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in Matuzalem v. FIFA
(4A_558/2011), issued on 27 March 2012, and of the
award in CAS 2011/A/2490, issued on 23 March 2012
would have any impact on the present case.
1.
On 27 April 2012 the Appellant submitted his
comments.
d.
On 30 April 2012 the Respondent submitted its
comments.
Corruption Offenses
(…)
c.
No covered Person shall, directly or indirectly, contrive or
attempt to contrive the outcome or any other aspect of any
event.
No covered Person shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or
facilitate any Player to not use his or her best efforts in any
event.
(…)
f.
No covered Person shall, directly or indirectly, offer or
provide any money, benefit or Consideration to any other
Covered Person with the intention of negatively influencing
a Player’s best efforts in any event.
-
79
G. Due Process
special provisions applicable to the Appeal Arbitration
Proceedings, by either the Covered Person who is the
subject of the Decision being appealed, or the TIB.
(…)
3. Burdens and Standards of Proof
a.
The PTIO (which may be represented by legal counsel at
the Hearing) shall have the burden of establishing that a
Corruption Offense has been committed. The standard
of proof shall be whether the PTIO has established
the commission of the alleged Corruption Offense by a
preponderance of the evidence.
2.
Any Decision appealed to CAS shall remain in effect
while under appeal unless CAS orders otherwise.
3.
The deadline for filing an appeal with CAS shall
be twenty business days from the date of receipt of the
Decision by the appealing party.
4.
The decision of CAS shall be final, non-reviewable,
non-appealable and enforceable. No claim, arbitration,
lawsuit or litigation concerning the dispute shall be
brought in any other court or tribunal.”
(…)
H. Sanctions
Article J.3 of the UTAP further provides that:
1.
a.
The penalty for any Corruption Offense shall be determined
by the AHO in accordance with the procedures set forth
in Article G, and may include:
With respect to any Player, (i) a fine of up to $250,000
plus an amount equal to the value of any winnings or
other amounts received by such Covered Person in
connection with any Corruption Offense, (ii) ineligibility
for participation in any event organized or sanctioned by
any Governing Body for a period of up to three years,
and (iii) with respect to any violation of clauses (c) - (i)
of Article D.1, ineligibility for participation in any event
organized or sanctioned by any Governing Body for a
maximum period of permanent ineligibility.
(…)
c.
No Player who has been declared ineligible may, during
the period of ineligibility, participate in any capacity
in any event (other than authorized anti-gambling or
anti-corruption education or rehabilitation programs)
organized or sanctioned by any Governing Body. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, such Player shall
not be given accreditation for, or otherwise granted access
to, any competition or event to which access is controlled by
any Governing Body, nor shall the Player be credited with
any points for any competition played during the period of
ineligibility.
“This Program shall be governed in all respects (including, but
not limited to, matters concerning the arbitrability of disputes)
by the laws of the State of Florida, without reference to conflict
of laws principles”.
It follows that the laws of the State of Florida also
apply complementarily.
B. Merits
According to Article R57 of the Code, the Panel has
“full power to review the facts and the law”. As repeatedly
stated in CAS jurisprudence, by reference to this
provision the CAS appellate arbitration procedure
entails a de novo review of the merits of the case,
and is not confined merely to deciding whether the
ruling appealed was correct or not. Accordingly, it is
the function of this Panel to make an independent
determination as to merits (see CAS 2007/A/1394,
para. 21).
In that context, the Panel must address the following
three main issues:
A. the applicable standard of proof;
B.
whether the evidence relative to the alleged
events of [...] supports a finding of violation and
(…)
I.
Appeals
1.
Any Decision (i) that a Corruption Offense has been
committed, (ii) that no Corruption Offense has been
committed, (iii) imposing sanctions for a Corruption
Offense, or (iv) that the AHO lacks jurisdiction to
rule on an alleged Corruption Offense or its sanctions,
may be appealed exclusively to CAS in accordance with
CAS’s Code of Sports-Related Arbitration and the
C. if a finding of violation be established, the
proportionality of the imposed sanctions.
1.
The applicable standard of proof
Pursuant to Article R58 of the Code, the regulations
and rules of law that govern the present dispute are
primarily those chosen by the parties. Accordingly,
the regulations of the UTAP and the law of the State
of Florida are applicable.
-
80
The UTAP provides that the applicable standard of
proof shall be whether the PTIO have established the
commission of the alleged corruption offences by a
preponderance of the evidence (Article G.3).
With respect to the limits in the application of the
rules of law chosen by the parties, the Panel endorses
the position articulated in CAS 2009/A/1926 & CAS
2009/A/1930, para. 11:
“(…) The application of the (rules of) law chosen by the parties
has its confines in the ordre public (HEINI A., Zürcher
Kommentar zum IPRG, 2nd edition 2004, Art. 187 marg.
no. 18; see also KAUFMANN-KOHLER/RIGOZZI,
Arbitrage International, 2006, marg. no. 657). Usually, the
term ordre public is thereby divested of its purely Swiss character
and is understood in the sense of a universal, international
or transnational sense (KAUFMANN-KOHLER/
RIGOZZI, Arbitrage International, 2006, margin no. 666;
HEINI A., Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG, 2nd edition
2004, Art. 187 margin no. 18; cf. also PORTMANN W.,
causa sport 2/2006 pp. 200, 203 and 205). The ordre public
proviso is meant to prevent a decision conflicting with basic legal
or moral principles that apply supranationally. This, in turn,
is to be assumed if the application of the rules of law agreed
by the parties were to breach fundamental legal doctrines or
were simply incompatible with the system of law and values
(TF 8.3.2006, 4P.278/2005 marg. no. 2.2.2; HEINI A.,
Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG, 2nd edition 2004, Art.
190 margin no. 44; CAS 2006/A/1180, no. 7.4; CAS
2005/A/983 & 984, no. 70).”
Therefore, the Panel notes that the applicable
standard of proof in this particular case will be
“preponderance of the evidence”, unless (i) the law of the
State of Florida mandatorily suggests otherwise, or
(ii) the application of such standard is incompatible
with some relevant aspect of ordre public.
2. Evaluation of the evidence relative to the alleged
events of […].
When evaluating the evidence, the Panel is well
aware that corruption is, by its very nature, likely to
be concealed as the parties involved will seek to use
evasive means to ensure that they leave no trail of
their wrongdoing.
In the appealed Decision, the AHO reached the
following conclusions:
“I have found that it has been proven on a preponderance of
the evidence that in the Skype conversation during the late
evening on […], Savic by verbal communication approached
M.and offered to pay him if he would contrive to lose the
first set of his professional tennis match […]. In so doing, a
Corruption Offence was committed under the provisions of
D.1.c to contrive the outcome of a professional tennis match.
The Player also committed an offence under D.1.d in that he
directly solicited M. to not use his best efforts in the first set of
the match. Finally, in committing the above two offences a third
rule infraction occurred in that he offered money to M. with the
intention of negatively influencing his best efforts in the first set
of the match in violation of D.1.f of the 2010 Program. […]
an SMS was sent by Savic to M. in a further attempt to entice
M. to contrive the outcome of some future match in violation of
Article D.1.c of the Program” (paragraphs 30, 31 of the
AHO Decision).
As previously explained, the Appellant alleges that
he never attempted or successfully managed to
contact M. by using telephone and Skype calls or text
messages, either on […], and that it was some third
person who contacted M. on all occasions.
The Panel will examine separately the two occasions
on which the contested facts allegedly occurred, and
will then establish if the disputed offences took place
or not.
2.1 The telephone and Skype calls of […]
The Panel is satisfied that on […] M. received two
calls on his mobile telephone from a number that
was the same as the one the Appellant had provided
to M.[…]. The Panel also accepts the testimony of
M. that later that night he received a Skype call by
someone who was using the Skype account name
“David Savic ”.
M. indeed showed to Rees and Willerton the entry of
a missed call dated […] from the Appellant’s mobile
telephone number appearing on the display of his
mobile telephone, as well as the screen of his laptop
on which the Appellant’s name was shown as a friend
on M.’s Skype account. Photographs were taken of
both the telephone and the laptop.
The Panel notes that, contrary to the Appellant’s
submission, M. testified not only at the hearing
before the CAS, but also before the TIU investigators
and the AHO, that he recognised the voice of the
Appellant in the person who called him on his
hotel room telephone and on Skype […] and that
the Appellant made him an offer to fix his […] first
round match […]. During the video-conference on
the day of the CAS hearing, he clearly stated that he
was certain that it was the Appellant’s voice, and that
the voice was not distorted as a result of the longdistance calls.
The Appellant suggested that the billing records of
his mobile telephone provided no evidence of him
making any calls to M.
-
81
The Panel notes, however, that, as both experts of
the parties agreed in their common statement of 23
March 2012, missed calls are not billable and therefore
they do not appear on the billing records. Moreover,
the call on M.’s hotel room telephone could have
easily been made using another telephone number or
even the same Skype account that was used for the
Skype call to M. later that same evening and would
therefore also not have appeared in the Appellant’s
billing records.
The Appellant further suggested that voice
recognition cannot be a reliable form of identification,
given the fact that during the last years he and M. had
met only very rarely.
are a number of explanations, all as consistent with
the Appellant’s guilt as with his innocence, the most
obvious being that without M.’s cooperation, no
purpose would be served by approaching A. as well.
The Panel therefore accepts the testimony of M. as to
the existence and content of the telephone and Skype
calls of […] and as to the fact that he was able to
recognise the voice of the Appellant over the phone.
There is no apparent reason why M. would try to
invent such a story so damaging to the Appellant –
and none was successfully advanced by the Appellant
either; the Panel discounts the suggestion that M.
had himself unsuccessfully invited the Appellant to
‘throw’ a match when both were juniors.
The Panel is of the opinion that it is possible to
recognise a person’s voice if one was a close friend
of that person and has spent considerable time
with him, even if only when both were younger.
In addition, the Appellant had met with M. in […],
where they discussed for a few minutes and M. was
thus acquainted with the adult voice of the Appellant
as well. It accepts M’s testimony that he accurately
recognized the Appellant on the occasions in issue.
Furthermore, voice recognition over the phone has
been also accepted by the CAS in its award in the
Köllerer case (cf. para. 113), which was the first case
brought before this Court under the UTAP.
The Appellant’s explanation for those calls was that
some third person impersonated him by “spoofing” his
mobile telephone and Skype communications.
The Appellant argued that the mere coincidence of
timing of the text messages on his billing records and
on M’s mobile telephone is not sufficiently strong
evidence to inculpate him.
The Panel accepts that it is possible to “spoof ”
telephone, text message and Skype communications,
in line with the joint statement of both parties’
experts of 23 March 2012.
However, the Appellant failed to provide any evidence
that such an impersonation actually occurred on the
occasions in issue or any reason why someone would
choose to impersonate him or who that person might
be, in particular since such person must have been
able convincingly to imitate the Appellant’s voice,
tone and content, which would significantly limit the
field of potential candidates.
It is true that the former relationship between the
Appellant and M. could explain why an alleged
impersonator would choose to impersonate the
Appellant to approach M.. It is equally true, however,
that the very fact of the relationship between the two
would also explain why the Appellant himself might
select M. as the object of his corrupt offer.
Finally, it was suggested by the Appellant that there
was no evidence that A. was approached in order to
fix his match with M.; in fact, A. denied that such
an approach was made. This, however, does not
seem to the Panel to be of itself significant. There
2.2 The text message […]
The Panel notes that the content of the text message
is undisputed.
The Panel agrees that it cannot be determined from
the billing records of the Appellant who was the final
recipient of the text message. However, the Panel
also notes that the Appellant has made no efforts to
prove who that final recipient was - for instance, by
requesting information from the mobile telephone
service provider or by conducting a forensic
examination of his telephone, even if the chances
of gathering such information may have been low
because of the lapse of time.
The Panel notes that the content of the text message
received by M. […], as well as its relationship in
terms of subject matter with the communication that
took place […], convincingly demonstrate that the
sender of that text message was the same person who
initiated the calls […].
In addition, as regards the third person scenario put
forward by the Appellant, the Panel is of the opinion
that it would make little sense, if any, for any such
third person to try to approach M. impersonating the
Appellant for a second time, given the outcome of
his first effort.
The Panel in summary finds that the logical
-
82
explanation for both telephone calls and text is that
they were initiated by the Appellant and not by any
third person. Not only is the Appellant’s version
entirely speculative but it defies common sense. Why,
for example, should a third person having reached M.
by telephone […] hang up and start a new Skype call?
The Panel had the advantage of seeing and hearing
both the Appellant and, albeit by video conferencing
facility only, M.. It does not accept the former’s
evidence, and does accept the latter’s.
- According to constant CAS jurisprudence in
doping cases: “To adopt a criminal standard (at any
rate where the disciplinary charge is not of one of a criminal
offence) is to confuse the public law of the state with the
private law of an association (…)” (CAS 98/208, para.
13).
2.3 The applicable standard of proof
3. Proportionality of the sanctions
In the light of the above, the Panel concludes that
the disputed facts have been proven not only by
preponderance of the evidence, but indeed to the
Panel’s comfortable satisfaction. The evidence
provided by the Respondent was sufficiently strong
and convincing to persuade the Panel even if applying
a higher standard of proof than that required under
Article G.3 of the Program.
3.1 The lifetime ban
Therefore, the Panel finds it does not need to
determine what standard of proof was required.
However it would, given the debate, make these
observations.
- Florida law does not seem to prevent an application
of preponderance of the evidence as a standard
of proof, since it accepts that such a standard
does not violate due process (see The Florida Bar
v. Mogil, 763 So.2d 303 (Fla. 2000)). The same
opinion is endorsed in CAS 2011/A/2490, para.
85.
- The comfortable satisfaction standard applied by
the Panel is in line with constant CAS jurisprudence
and does not constitute a violation of ordre public.
According to CAS 2011/A/2490, para. 87, even
the application of a lower standard of proof, such
as the preponderance of the evidence, cannot lead
to a violation of public policy.
- The Judgment of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in
Matuzalem v. FIFA, while acknowledging that
public policy has both substantive and procedural
contents and is violated when some fundamental
legal principles are disregarded (para. 4.1), says
nothing more precise about the applicable
standard of proof in a case such as the present.
- In principle, the criminal standard “beyond reasonable
doubt ” does not apply in a disciplinary case in the
context of a private association. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal has pointed out in its review of several
CAS decisions that: “the duty of proof and assessment of
evidence are problems which cannot be regulated, in private
law cases, on the basis of concepts specific to criminal law”
(2nd civil Division, Judgement of 31 March 1999,
5P.83/1999, para. 3.d).d).
The Panel takes account of the following matters:
- Pursuant to the provisions of the Program, the
AHO has a measure of discretion in setting a
sanction.
- According to CAS jurisprudence, the sanction
imposed on an athlete must not be disproportionate
to the offence and must always reflect the extent
of the athlete’s guilt (CAS 2001/A/330).
- CAS has accepted in match-fixing cases in football
that a life ban can constitute a proportionate
sanction because of the damage caused to
the integrity and the image of the sport (CAS
2010/A/2172).
- Match fixing is the most serious corruption
offence in tennis and a threat to the integrity of
professional sport, as well as to the physical and
moral integrity of players. It also constitutes a
violation of the principle of fairness in sporting
competitions.
- In the case at hand, the Appellant tried to corrupt
another player.
- Applying a similar reasoning, the Panel in CAS
2011/A/2490, deemed it irrelevant whether a
person is successful in actually fixing a match
or not (para. 120) and found for the reasons
expressed there:
“no option other than to confirm the lifetime ban imposed by
the AHO. As explained in detail by the Governing Bodies,
the sport of tennis is extremely vulnerable to corruption as a
match-fixer only needs to corrupt one player (rather than a
full team). It is therefore imperative that, once a Player gets
caught, the Governing Bodies send out a clear signal to the
entire tennis community that such actions are not tolerated.
This Panel agrees that any sanction shorter than a lifetime
ban would not have the deterrent effect that is required to
-
83
make players aware that it is simply not worth the risk.
Therefore, the Panel concludes that the sanction of a life ban
imposed by the AHO Decision is not disproportionate to
the offence” (para. 123).
The Panel agrees with that reasoning. (Moreover
while stare decisis does not apply to CAS decisions,
comity suggests that respect ought in any event be
paid to previous decisions of obvious relevance).
- In Matuzalem, the Swiss Federal Tribunal
approached the question of whether disciplinary
sanctions violated public policy not in abstracto, but
by reference to the specific interest the sanctioning
sport governing body wishes to pursue.
“ The measures taken by such sport federations which
gravely harm the development of individuals who practice
the sport as a profession are licit only when the interests of
the federation justify the infringement of privacy” (para.
4.3.3 in fine).
Applying that test in the present case, the interest
that the sanctioning authority is seeking to enforce
is the protection of the integrity of sport against
corruption, a fundamental sporting principle explicitly mentioned in the UTAP provisions. This is a
compelling interest to balance against the Appellant’s
rights to work unlike the obviously lesser interest of
contractual stability sought to be relied on by FIFA in
Matuzalem to justify a life ban. There are other means
to enforce a debt than as lifetime ban; but such a ban
is the only truly effective means of purging a sport of
corruption.
Therefore for all these reasons, the Panel concludes
that the sanction of a life ban imposed by the AHO
Decision does not violate public policy and is not
disproportionate to the offences committed in the
present case.
3.2
“it would be inappropriate to impose a financial penalty in
addition to the lifetime ban, as the sanction of permanent
ineligibility provides for the deterrence that corruption offences
call for” (CAS 2011/A/2490, para. 127)
taking into account that
“ The lifetime ban also has a considerable financial effect on
the Player because it significantly impacts the Player’s future
earnings by eliminating tennis as a source of revenue. In this
respect, the AHO noted that the Player’s means are limited
(…). Indeed, no evidence was put forward that the Player
benefited (financially or otherwise) from any of the charges for
which he has been found liable” (CAS 2011/A/2490, para.
129).
In the present case, the Panel is content to adopt the
position articulated by the CAS in the Köllerer case for
the reasons expressed there and, therefore, considers
that the life ban in itself is sufficiently severe to reflect
the gravity of the corruption offences. The Panel
therefore sets aside the part of the AHO Decision
imposing a fine of USD 100,000.
The Panel finds, consistently with the AHO, that the
Appellant has committed the corruption offences
under Articles D.1.c, d and f of the Program.
The Panel finds that the life time ban is not
disproportionate given the nature of the offences
committed and, therefore, upholds the sanction of
life time ineligibility of the Appellant to compete or
participate in any event organised or sanctioned by
any Governing Body under the Program.
The Panel lifts the fine of USD 100,000 imposed by
the AHO Decision.
As a result, for all the above reasons, the Appeal is
partially upheld.
The fine of USD 100,000
In CAS 2011/A/2490, where, as noted, a professional
tennis player was found guilty of match-fixing under
the provisions of the UTAP. The Panel upheld the
imposed sanction of a lifetime ban on the athlete for
the reasons there expressed, but did not confirm the
financial penalty of USD 100,000 imposed by the
AHO in the contested decision.
In the same award, the Panel expressly acknowledged
that any sanction should be sufficiently high to
confirm that corruption offences are not taken lightly.
It added however that
-
84
Club Rangers de Talca v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
30 April 2012
Football; bankruptcy of a club; succession of the club; inequity in the
football market due to the bankruptcy
proceedings; inactivity of the player in
the bankruptcy proceedings
On 10 August 2010, within the referred bankruptcy
proceedings followed before the Courts of Talca,
the Extraordinary Assembly of Creditors of Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca agreed on the
terms for sale, in public auction, of the economic
unit composed of the assets of the referred club (the
“Terms ”). Among these Terms, the following are to
be highlighted in light of the object of the dispute
having given rise to these arbitration proceedings
(informal translation):
General Terms:
Panel:
Mr. José Juan Pintó Sala (Spain), President
Mr. Hernán Jorge Ferrari (Argentina)
Mr. Rui Botica Santos (Portugal)
These terms shall apply to the sale, in public auction to the highest
bidder, of the economic unit composed of all the assets seized
under the bankruptcy proceedings of CLUB DEPORTES
R ANGERS DE TALCA.
(…)
Relevant facts
1.2 Bankruptcy
Club Rangers de Talca (the “Appellant ”) is a
professional football club with seat in Talca (Chile),
affi liated to the Chilean Football Federation.
Club de Deportes Rangers de Talca requested the
declaration of bankruptcy by virtue of an agreement taken
by its General Assembly.
Fédération International Football Association (FIFA;
the “Respondent ”) is an association submitted to Swiss
Law governing the sport of football worldwide with
seat in Zurich, Switzerland.
The bankruptcy decision was issued by the 3rd Court of
Talca, in the proceedings 840-2009, on 8 May 2009,
folio 167, and was published in the Official Gazette on
27 May 2009, folio 236.
On 8 May 2009, the Courts of Talca (Chile) declared
the football club “Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de
Talca ” in bankruptcy.
On 18 June 2009, the FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber (DRC) rendered a decision ordering Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca to pay to its
former player Mr Horacio José Chiorazzo (the
“Player ”) the amount of USD 21.000 plus interest.
On 10 September 2009, the Player sent a letter to
FIFA requesting the application of disciplinary
measures against Club Social y Deportivo Rangers
de Talca in light of the failure of such club to pay the
amount due within the given deadline.
On 4 August 2010, the Player claimed again that FIFA
disciplinary bodies opened proceedings against Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca.
Nowadays the decision declaring the bankruptcy is final
and binding.
II
PUBLIC AUCTION
2.1 The economic unit is composed of:
-
Federative Rights at the National Association of
Professional Football.
-
Player’s transfers
-
Trophies
-
Sporting equipment, and
-
All the goods inventoried in the bankruptcy proceedings
until the award’s date which are not excluded due to legal
reasons during the usual activity of the bankrupt entity. It
-
85
shall be noted that these assets have been subject to regular
use and/or consumption derived from the continuity of the
ordinary activities of the bankrupt entity.
In this regard, it shall be noted that all the assets to be
auctioned are related to Club de Deportes Rangers de
Talca, which articles of association still in force were
granted in public document dated 28 December 1955,
with the purpose of developing and fostering the practice of
sport in general and football in particular, promoting the
moral and intellectual improvement of the members of the
community, looking for the development of the community
and the social solidarity among its members, observing the
strictest political and religious impartiality.
(…)
2.2 The purchaser shall devote the auctioned assets
corresponding to Club Deportivo Rangers Talca to the
development of sporting activities.
2.3 Furthermore, the purchaser undertakes to fulfil with the
National Association of Professional Football all the
pecuniary, administrative, sporting and any other kind
of obligations which are currently held by the bankrupt
entity and the Professional Sport Fund of Club de
Deportes Rangers de Talca and which are in relation,
directly or indirectly, to its affiliation to the referred body
and the practice of professional sport.
2.4 The following elements are essential, and therefore, the
purchaser is obliged to maintain them unaltered and
indivisible:
-
-
-
The image of Club de Deportes Rangers de Talca, its
names, badges, hymns, emblems, t-shirts and colours red
and black.
Club de Deportes Rangers shall remain in the city of Talca,
as it is traditional, and shall maintain its domicile for
sporting events in this city, unless temporary impediment
due to act of god or force majeure takes place and only
during the period of time in which the impediment exists.
3.5. The participation in the auction implies the express consent
and knowledge of these terms as well as the legal and
commercial obligation to be submitted to the conditions,
requirements and obligations stipulated therein.
On 19 August 2010, the company Piduco S.A.D.P.
(“Piduco ”) was set up in accordance with Chilean Law,
with the following corporate purpose as per article 4
of its articles of association (informal translation):
The company shall have as exclusive purpose the organization,
production, commercialization and participation in professional
sporting activities or others related to or deriving from them, in
the terms stipulated in Act 20019 and its Regulations. To
such effects and in accordance with article 17 of Act 20019,
the essential assets of the company for the purpose of developing
the sporting project of Club de Deportes Rangers de Talca
are the following: (a) the federative and association rights of
Club de Deportes Rangers de Talca at the Chilean National
Association of Professional Football; (b) The image of Club de
Deportes Rangers de Talca, its names, badges, hymns, t-shirts
and the colours red and black; (c) The sporting premises that
the company would build for the execution of the referred project
or premises that would use or enjoy for the development of the
activities related to Club de Deportes Rangers de Talca.
On 26 August 2010, the public auction of Club Social
y Deportivo Rangers de Talca’s assets took place.
Piduco became the awardee in such auction, offering
a price of 550.000.000 Chilean Pesos.
On 25 November 2010, the above-mentioned
acquisition of assets was formalized in public
document granted before a Notary of Talca.
On 14 June 2011, the Appellant sent a letter to FIFA
in the following terms (informal translation):
In response to the letter dated 10 June 2011, referred to FIFA’s
communication of 7th June, regarding the player Horacio José
Chiorazzo, we hereby inform you of the following:
1.
Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca was declared
bankrupt in accordance with Chilean Law. Therefore the
bankruptcy receiver sold off all the assets of the entity
and PIDUCO S.A.P.D. acquired in public auction
the economic unit comprising the participation rights in
the Chilean football championship, the use of the name
Rangers de Talca and the use of the traditional colors,
which are red and white, this being executed on 15
November 2010.
2.
The receiver was in charge of selling off the assets of Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca and was also in
charge of verifying and challenging the debts that this
entity had. As a result, the receiver established a deadline
to accredit debts and paid the creditors with the amounts
The purchaser shall respect the name of the institution and
shall not use it for political purposes.
(…)
3.1 (…) Furthermore, Act 20.019 stipulates that the
foundations, corporations or legal entities which by means
of any act, agreement or legal fact acquire or enjoy the
same federative right and place in the sporting professional
association, are considered as legal successors of the current
clubs.
(…)
-
86
collected in the sale of assets of the entity.
3.
1.
Therefore, PIDUCO SADP, as the owner of the
federative rights which were acquired in public auction,
has not assumed any prior debt corresponding to Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca or any other debt
which is not foreseen in the document of acquisition of the
economic unit.
In order to avoid any terminological or semantic confusion,
it shall be clarified that Corporación Civil Club Social y
Deportivo Rangers de Talca, to which this answer refers
to, is not affiliated to this Association anymore as it was
declared bankrupt, being it acquired by new owners.
For the above mentioned reasons, I hereby inform FIFA
that Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca has
no corporate relationship with PIDUCO SADP and
the latter has only acquired in public auction the rights
mentioned in point 1.
2.
On 15 August 2011, FIFA, in accordance with article
64 of its Disciplinary Code, opened disciplinary
proceedings against Club Social y Deportivo Rangers
de Talca as regards the failure of such club to comply
with the terms of the FIFA DRC’s decision dated 18
June 2009 mentioned above.
3.
2.
Furthermore, PIDUCO SADP is not a successor and it
did not assume any liability or claim which corresponds
to the bankrupt entity Club Social Rangers de Talca,
being all those issues object of the referred bankruptcy
proceedings and, thus, it has no link or corporate,
economic, sporting or disciplinary relationship with such
entity. Both are different legal entities.
4.
On 6 September 2011, FIFA sent a letter to the Chilean
Football Federation asking for some information on
the situation of Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de
Talca, this request being answered by the referred
federation on 12th October 2011 in the following
terms (informal translation):
Did Club Rangers de Talca maintain the same name,
colors and sporting rights of the players that previously
belonged to Club Social Rangers de Talca ?
PIDUCO S.A.D.P. maintained the same sporting
purposes, name and colours of the bankrupt club but
it did not assume the sporting right of the players, who
terminated their labour relationship due to the bankruptcy
of the precedent club.
Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca was declared
bankrupt in accordance with Chilean Law and as such,
it does not exist anymore. For your reference, PIDUCO
SADP has only acquired the federative rights of the
relevant club for competing as such in the championships
organized by the Chilean National Association of
Professional Football.
Therefore, PIDUCO SADP has not assumed any prior
debt corresponding to Club Social y Deportivo Rangers
de Talca or any other debt that is not provided for in the
document of acquisition of the economic unit.
Once the winding up proceedings of the Club Social
Rangers de Talca have ended, does Club Rangers de
Talca remain in the same division than the winded-up
club ?
The bankruptcy proceedings are still ongoing. Rangers de
Talca is nowadays a new entity (PIDUCO SADP) that
competes in the same category of the bankrupt club.
In response to your letter dated 26 August 2011 (…), we
hereby inform you that:
1.
Does the Chilean Football Federation recognize Club
Rangers de Talca as the owner of the Federative Rights of
the Club Social Rangers de Talca?
I refer to my precedent answer.
On 26 August 2011, FIFA informed Club Social y
Deportivo Rangers de Talca and the Player that
the case would be submitted to the Disciplinary
Committee on 13 September 2011 and also granted a
final deadline to Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de
Talca for the payment of the amount due as regards
the DRC’s decision dated 18 June 2009.
On 1 September 2011, the Appellant sent a letter
to FIFA in the following pertinent terms (informal
translation):
Is Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca still
affiliated to your Federation ?
In accordance with our records, the current Club Deportivo
has no relationship of any kind with the claimant in these
proceedings.
On 13 October 2011, the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee passed the following decision (the
“Decision ”) in the proceedings opened on the basis of
article 64 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (informal
translation):
1.
Club Rangers de Talca is found guilty of failing to comply
with a decision of a FIFA body in accordance with art.
64 of the FDC.
-
87
2.
3.
Club Rangers de Talca is ordered to pay a fine for an
amount of CHF 2,000. The fine is to be paid within 30
days of notification of the decision.
The debtor is granted a final period of grace of 30 days as
from notification of the decision to settle the debt.
did not oppose to the referred stay.
On 5 December 2011, the Appellant fi led its Appeal
Brief before the CAS, in which it requested the CAS
(informal translation):
1.
The decision of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee is left
without effect.
2.
PIDUCO S.A., CLUB R ANGERS DE TALCA
is not liable for the payment of the labour debt to the
player Horacio Chiorazzo.
3.
There is no legal ground under Swiss Law (art 333.
CO) for extending to PIDUCO S.A. the liability for
the labour debts accrued before the bankruptcy of the
Asociación Civil Rangers.
4.
PIDUCO S.A., CLUB R ANGERS DE TALCA
acquired the federative registry of the club, being obliged
to use the name, records and colours, in a public auction
celebrated within the frame of bankruptcy proceedings, in
which it was established -with res judicata nature- that
PIDUCO SA would not assume any of the debts prior
to the acquisition in auction.
5.
Therefore, the fine of CHF 2.000 is also left without
effect (point 2 of the appealed decision).
6.
Therefore, the sanction of 3 points deduction if the payment
to Chiorazzo is not verified within 30 days (point 4 of the
appealed decision), is left without effect.
7.
All other sanctions provided for and/or envisaged by
the appealed decision (points 5 and 6 of the appealed
decision) are left without effect.
The creditor is directed to notify the secretariat to the
FIFA Disciplinary Committee of every payment received.
8.
The costs of the disciplinary proceedings (CHF 500,
point 7 of the appealed decision) are left without effect.
FIFA mainly grounds this Decision in the fact that
even if Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca
became bankrupt, the sanction based on article 64
of the FIFA Disciplinary Code is extendable to the
Appellant as sporting successor of the former entity,
given that it (i) has recognized being the owner of the
federative rights of the former club, (ii) competes in
the same category of the former club, (iii) maintains
the name, badge, and colours of the former club and
(iv) assumes as its own history the one of the former
club.
9.
The costs of the present proceedings shall be borne by
FIFA in its entirety, as well as an amount of CHF
10.000 as contribution for the costs incurred by the
Appellant.
1.
To reject the Appellant’s requests’ for relief in their
entirety.
On 23 November 2011, the Appellant fi led the
relevant Statement of Appeal against the Decision
before the CAS, and a request for provisional
measures (stay of execution of the Decision), which
afterwards was withdrawn given that the Respondent
2.
To confirm the decision hereby appealed.
3.
To order the Appellant to bear all costs incurred with the
present procedure and to cover all legal expenses of the
Respondent related to the present procedure.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
If payment is not made within this deadline, the creditor
may demand in writing from FIFA that three (3) points
be deducted from the debtor’s first team in the domestic
championship. Once the creditor has filed this request,
the points will be deducted automatically without a
further formal decision having to be taken by the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee. The order to implement the
points’ deduction will be issued to the association concerned
by the secretariat to the FIFA Disciplinary Committee.
If the debtor still fails to pay the amount due even after
deduction of the points in accordance with point III./4.,
the FIFA Disciplinary Committee will decide on a
possible relegation of the debtor’s first team to the next
lower division.
As a member of FIFA, the Chilean Football Federation
is reminded of its duty to implement this decision and, if so
requested, provide FIFA with proof that the points have
been deducted. If the Chilean [sic.] Football Federation
does not comply with the decision despite being ordered to
do so, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee will decide on
appropriate sanctions on the member. This can lead to
expulsion from all FIFA competitions.
The costs of these proceedings amounting to CHF 500
are to be borne by the debtor. The costs shall be paid
according to modalities established under point III./2.
above.
On 9 January 2012, FIFA fi led its answer to the
Appeal Brief, in which it requested the CAS to render
an award in the following terms:
-
88
A hearing took place in Lausanne on 20 March 2012.
A. The object of the dispute
According to the parties’ written submissions and the
arguments raised by them in the hearing, the object
of the dispute may be briefly summarized as follows:
(i)
The Appellant considers that the Decision
should be set aside as, in its opinion, the
sanction imposed therein (a) does not refer to it,
but to a club (Club Social y Deportivo Rangers
de Talca) which does not exist anymore, and (b)
is not extendable to the Appellant, which is a
different entity that only purchased assets from
the former extinct club.
(ii) The Respondent claims that the Decision,
based on article 64 of the FIFA Disciplinary
Code, be confirmed, essentially on the basis
that the Appellant is a mere successor of Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca and thus
the sanction imposed in the Decision has to be
served by it.
B. Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca vs.
Club Rangers de Talca (Piduco). Succession
In light of the argumentation followed by FIFA in its
Decision, the Panel shall start its considerations and
the examination of the quaestio litis by determining
if the Appellant is to be considered a successor of
Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca, the entity
which was ordered by the FIFA DRC to pay the sum
of 21.000 USD to the Player and against which the
disciplinary proceedings under article 64 of the FIFA
Disciplinary Code were opened.
In this respect the Panel, after examining the facts
and evidence brought to the proceedings, has noted
that:
(i)
Piduco was set up with the specific purpose of
acquiring the assets of Club Social y Deportivo
Rangers de Talca. The terms of Piduco’s
incorporation deed are crystal clear in this
regard.
(ii) The Appellant acquired from Club Social y
Deportivo Rangers de Talca, within the frame
of the bankruptcy proceedings followed before
the Courts of Talca, the “economic unit composed of
all the assets seized under the bankruptcy proceedings of
CLUB DEPORTES R ANGERS DE TALCA,
this including (i) Federative Rights at the National
Association of Professional Football, (ii) Player’s
transfers, (iii) Trophies, (iv) Sporting equipment and (v)
All the goods inventoried in the bankruptcy proceedings
until the award’s date which are not excluded due to legal
reasons during the usual activity of the bankrupt entity”,
with the purpose of devoting such economic
unit to the development of sporting activities
(clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the Terms).
(iii) In the referred acquisition, the Appellant
accepted and committed itself to maintain
unaltered “the image of Club de Deportes Rangers de
Talca, its names, badges, hymns, emblems, t-shirts and
colours red and black” (clause 2.4 of the Terms),
and in fact it complied with this commitment, at
least according to the parties’ statements and the
evidence taken in these proceedings.
(iv) After the acquisition of assets and until today’s
date, Club Rangers de Talca remained in the city
of Talca as requested in the Terms (clause 2.4).
(v) Clause 3.1 of the Terms expressly states in
pertinent part that “Act 20.019 stipulates that the
foundations, corporations or legal entities which by means
of any act, agreement or legal fact acquire or enjoy the
same federative right and place in the sporting professional
association, are considered as legal successors of the current
clubs” [emphasis added].
(vi) Clause 2.3 of the Terms foresees the obligation
of the assets’ purchaser of fulfi lling some
commitments of the bankrupt entity (not all of
them, as FIFA wrongfully holds in its answer to
the appeal, but some of them):
“Furthermore, the purchaser undertakes to fulfil with
the National Association of Professional Football all the
pecuniary, administrative, sporting and any other kind of
obligations which are currently held by the bankrupt entity
and the Professional Sport Fund of Club de Deportes
Rangers de Talca and which are in relation, directly or
indirectly, to its affiliation to the referred body and the
practice of professional sport” [emphasis added].
In the same line, the Panel shall underscore that Club
Rangers de Talca took the position formerly held
by Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca in the
Chilean sporting institutions and championships.
In fact, one of the assets acquired by Piduco is
the “federative rights in the Asociación Nacional de
Fútbol Profesional”. This has been confirmed by the
Appellant in (i) its letter of 14 June 2011, in which
it is stated that the Appellant acquired from Club
Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca “the participation
rights in the Chilean football championship”, and (ii) in its
letter of 1st September 2011, in which the Appellant
-
89
acknowledges to have “acquired the federative rights of
the relevant club for competing as such in the championships
organized by the Chilean National Association of Professional
Football”. The Chilean Football Federation, in its
letter of 30 September 2011, confirmed this position
as well.
of an employee which fell due prior to the transfer
of the company or of part of it (“L’ancien employeur et
l’acquéreur répondent solidairement des créances du travailleur
échues dès avant le transfert jusqu’au moment où les rapports
de travail pourrait normalement prendre fin ou ont pris fin par
suite de l’opposition du travailleur”).
All the above-mentioned considerations have led
the Panel to conclude that indeed, the Appellant
is to be understood as a successor of Club Social y
Deportivo Rangers de Talca. It is clear for the Panel
that with the assets purchased to Club Social y
Deportivo Rangers de Talca, it continued the activity
formerly developed by the referred club with the
same image, badge, hymn, representative colours,
emblems and placement, and is on the basis of the
federative rights acquired in the auction that it has
been participating, and currently participates, in the
Chilean competitions replacing the former club. In
other words and in practice, the “new club” took
the position and activities performed by the former
one, with the consent and approval of the Chilean
Football Federation.
Taking this provision into account, in the case at stake
one could hold that the Appellant, which acquired an
“economic unit ” from Club Social y Deportivo Rangers
de Talca, should be liable for labour debts of such
former club, and that the effects of the failure to
pay these debts (i.e. sanctions under article 64 of the
FIFA Disciplinary Code) should be also applied on it
as successor.
It is precisely on the basis of this situation of succession
that FIFA, even if it was entitled (not obliged) to
close disciplinary proceedings under article 107 of
the FIFA Disciplinary Code in light of the situation
of bankruptcy of Club Social y Deportivo Rangers
de Talca, could legitimately decide to continue with
such proceedings as it did, being unacceptable, in the
Panel’s view, that in this case FIFA was compelled to
drop or close the case by any customary practice on
the application of the mentioned article 107, which
in addition, if such practice exists, has not been
sufficiently proven by the Appellant.
C. Effects of the succession in the case at stake.
Does it necessarily mean that the
Appellant is to be sanctioned ?
The next issue to addressed by the Panel is if in spite
of its quality of successor of Club Social y Deportivo
Rangers de Talca, the Appellant is to be sanctioned in
the way foreseen in the Decision or not.
1.
General considerations
In this respect, the Panel shall firstly recall that the
sanction imposed in the Decision is based on the
previous failure to comply with a FIFA order to pay a
sum deriving from a labour credit.
In accordance with Swiss Law, and in particular with
article 333 para. 3 of the Swiss Code of Obligations,
the new employer (acquirer) and the former employer
(transferor) are joint and severally liable for any claims
Against the above-explained position the Appellant
has argued that in this specific case, the fact that
the sanctioned club was in bankruptcy makes a
difference and prevents the application of the effects
of the succession on the Appellant (i.e. the sanction
imposed by Decision).
The Appellant intends to rely on a Decision of the
Swiss Federal Court (ATF 129 III 335) related to
article 333 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (the “TF
Decision ”), which considers that an exception to the
cited principle of succession has to be made in certain
cases of acquisition of bankrupt entities (informal
translation):
The purchaser of a company which keep the employees which
contracts existed before the re-activation is not liable for
pending salary credits which have become demandable before
the re-activation, if such re-activation takes place following the
bankruptcy of the former employer.
After analyzing this argument raised by the
Appellant, the Panel cannot share its view on the
non-applicability of the Decision on the Appellant
based on the cited alleged exception to the general
principle of succession in cases of bankruptcy, mainly
for the following reasons:
(i)
The Panel is not persuaded that the exception
gathered in the TF Decision shall apply to
the present case, as the circumstances of one
case and the other are neither equivalent
nor completely comparable. In our case, the
transaction involved was a transfer of assets
from a bankrupt entity to a newly incorporated
company (and not of a bankrupt company or
entity), and no re-activation of the transferring
entity (Club Social y Deportivo Rangers de Talca)
took place – in fact it was not possible, as this
entity disappeared and did not exist anymore.
Needless to say that only this TF Decision, and
-
90
not broad and consolidated Swiss jurisprudence,
has been brought by the Appellant to sustain its
position.
(ii) In any case, at the time of the opening of the
disciplinary proceedings (August 2011), the
situation of bankruptcy had been removed
months ago, and thus payment of credits were at
that time not restricted at all by legal provisions
ruling the bankruptcy proceedings.
The Panel is aware that in most bankruptcy
legal systems worldwide (including the Chilean
“Ley de Quiebras ”), a bankrupt entity, while
the bankruptcy proceedings are still going on,
cannot freely pay the debts accrued before the
declaration of bankruptcy, this mainly as regards
the general principle of par conditio creditorum.
In fact, in the last times it is not unusual to
see in the market of football that clubs which
are declared bankrupt become, in accordance
with the national laws ruling the bankruptcy
proceedings, prevented from paying their debts
in an immediate and entire manner. This situation
is logically provoking undesired inequities in
the referred market at international level, where
clubs in bankruptcy enjoy the privileges of the
bankruptcy proceedings while the other clubs
are forced to honour their commitments in full
and timely manner, all of them playing in the
same competitions. Such inequity of treatment
and opportunities is clearly against the essential
principles of the so-called “lex sportiva”.
It may be thus discussible that a club which
in accordance with its national laws, is not
allowed to make payments due to its situation
of bankruptcy, can be sanctioned as regards a
failure to pay something which it is not allowed
to pay, but this is not the case hereto, as no
restriction to the capacity to pay could take place
in August 2011, as the bankruptcy proceedings
had finalized well before (it shall be recalled
that the sale of assets was formalised in public
deed on 25 November 2010). In other words, it
was on the Appellant’s hands to pay and avoid
the sanction, not being limited by any legal
prohibition or restriction.
Therefore, in the Panel’s opinion, the Appellant,
successor of the entity obliged to the payment of
the labour debt ordered in the FIFA DRC in its
Decision of 18 June 2009, (i) became bound to pay
such debt, (ii) was not legally prevented from paying
it and (iii) thus, should, at least theoretically, bear the
consequences of such failure to pay.
In line with the above-mentioned, the Panel resolves
that the requests for relief contained in points 2,
3 and 4 of the Appeal’s brief petitum, even if it is
discussible that a decision on them shall be rendered
given its declarative nature and the scope of this
appeal (confirm or revoke a sanction), are in any case
to be dismissed.
2. In casu
At this stage, the Panel shall decide if in this particular
case and in spite of the considerations made above,
the Appellant shall bear the consequences (sanctions)
foreseen in the Decision.
For the reasons explained below, the Panel considers
that it shall not.
The Panel shall remind again in this respect that the
Decision, and the sanctions imposed therein under
article 64 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, are based
on the previous failure of a club to comply with an
order of FIFA to pay a labour credit to a player.
Having this in mind, in accordance with the letter
sent by the Player to FIFA on 10 September 2009,
the Panel deems undisputed that the Player (i) knew
from the very beginning about the existence of the
bankruptcy proceedings and (ii) even declared his
intention to claim for his credit in these proceedings.
This letter, in pertinent part, reads as follows
(translation into English):
We hereby inform FIFA that this party has notified the
Respondent and this Respondent has informed us about its
inability to pay the amounts due as it is under bankruptcy
proceedings before the Ordinary Court of Talca.
This statement leads us to request that this issue is dealt with
in the Disciplinary Committee.
Furthermore, should these requests or sanctions of the
Disciplinary Committee have no effect, we request to be
provided with the decision of the Dispute Resolution Chamber
in writing, with the apostille of The Hague, by regular post to
Sarmiento 1574, piso 3º of “D” (CP 1042) of Buenos Aires
in order to allow this player (regardless the actions that FIFA
could take) to file its claim before the Court dealing with the
bankruptcy of the condemned club.
It is also clear that in accordance with Chilean Law
(and in particular with article 148 of the “Ley de
Quiebras” and article 2472 of the Chilean Civil Code),
the salary credits, as it happens in other bankruptcy
legal systems like the Swiss one, are considered
privileged credits in the bankruptcy proceedings, that
is to say, with priority of recovery before the ordinary
-
91
ones, and are claimable within the bankruptcy
proceedings.
This being said, in accordance with the evidence
taken in these proceedings (i.e. the letter of the
bankruptcy’s receiver – “síndico” – dated 6 March
2012, not challenged by FIFA), the Player apparently
decided not to claim for his labour debt in the
bankruptcy proceedings, in spite of (i) being aware
of these proceedings and (ii) having announced his
intention to do so.
particularities described above, the Panel resolves
that the Decision shall be revoked and thus that the
sanctions imposed on the Appellant therein are left
without effect.
This, in the Panel’s opinion, is to be considered as a
lack of dilligence of the Player in recovering his credit
that shall have an impact in the present case.
It has been proven in the present proceedings that
the Appellant paid a considerable amount of money
to acquire the assets of the bankrupt entity, and that
this amount was used to pay the credits of such entity.
The Player, who held a privileged labour credit, could
thus have moved forward to recover such prioritary
credit from this amount arising out of the assets’ sale,
but he failed to do so.
Therefore, the Player somehow contributed not
to remove the prerequisite leading to the sanction
imposed on the Decision: the lack of payment of the
debt ordered in the FIFA DRC decision of 18 June
2009. His inactivity did not foster the recovery of the
debt and hence the elimination of the circumstances
of fact which gave rise to the sanction imposed by
the Decision.
At the present stage the Panel cannot ascertain if
the Player would have received the sum of his credit
in case he had duly claimed for it in the bankruptcy
proceedings, but it was at least a feasible theoretical
possibility that could have happened (especially
taking into account the privileged nature of his
credit) and which would have provoked that the order
of payment issued by the FIFA DRC was complied
and thus, that the sanction imposed in the Decision
became groundless. The Panel is of the view that the
Player should have explored such possibility, should
have communicated his credit in the bankruptcy
proceedings as he previously announced, should have
tried to get the money and not simply remain passive,
additionally pretending that disciplinary sanctions are
imposed irrespective of his diligence or negligence in
trying to achieve a result (recovery of the debt) that
would remove the ground of the sanction.
In this state of affairs, the Panel considers that no
sanction shall be applied in this case.
Therefore, in this specific case and given the
-
92
British Olympic Association (BOA) v. World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)
30 April 2012
Doping; Legal nature of the WADA
Code; purpose of the WADA Code;
meaning of a sanction according to
the WADA Code; appeal procedure
at national level and non-compliance
with the WADA Code; inconsistency
of a regulation of a National Olympic
Committee (NOC) with the WADA
Code
Panel:
Prof. Richard H. McLaren (Canada), President
Mr. Michele A.R. Bernasconi (Switzerland)
Mr. David W. Rivkin (USA)
Relevant facts
The British Olympic Association (BOA or the
“Appellant ”) is the National Olympic Committee
of the United Kingdom (UK), responsible for UK
Olympic Teams. It is a company incorporated under
the laws of England with registered company number
01576093. Its address is 60 Charlotte Street, London
W1T 2NU.
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA or the
“Respondent ”) is a Swiss private law foundation whose
headquarters is in Montréal, Canada, but whose seat
is in Lausanne, Switzerland. WADA is the global
regulator of the World Anti-Doping Agency Code
(WADA Code).
This Award concerns a Bye-Law that the BOA adopted
about twenty years ago and has been amended several
times since; the most recent version is in force since 1
January 2009. The Bye-Law essentially provides that
any British athlete “who has been found guilty of a doping
offence … shall not … thereafter be eligible for consideration
as a member of a Team GB or be considered eligible by the
BOA to receive or to continue to benefit from any accreditation
as a member of the Team GB delegation for or in relation
to any Olympic Games, any Olympic Winter Games or any
European Olympic Youth Festivals” (the “Bye-Law”).
WADA challenged the Bye-Law following and on
the basis of an award of the Court of Arbitration
for Sport (CAS) issued by a panel on 4 October
2011: U.S. Olympic Committee v. International
Olympic Committee, CAS 2011/O/2422 (the “USOC
Award ”). The USOC Award, which is described in
more detail below, considered the validity of a rule of
the International Olympic Committee according to
which “any person who has been sanctioned with a suspension
of more than six months by any anti-doping organization for
any violation of any anti-doping regulations may not participate
… in the next edition of the Games of the Olympiad and
of the Olympic Winter Games following the date of expiry
of such suspension” (the “IOC Regulation”). The USOC
Award held that the IOC Regulation was invalid and
unenforceable because it violated Article 23.2.2 of
the WADA Code, which provides that a Signatory
must implement enumerated Articles of the Code
“without substantive change” and that no Signatory to the
WADA Code may “add additional provisions” to its rules
“which change the effect of …” the enumerated Articles.
The IOC Regulation was found to have changed the
substance of the sanctions imposed in the WADA
Code.
After the USOC Award was issued, the WADA
Foundation Board reviewed at its 20 November
2011 meeting in Montréal, Canada, a document
entitled “WADA Compliance Report ” (the “Compliance
Report ”) and available at the website of WADA. The
Compliance Report, under the heading “National
Olympic Committees”, stated the following: The BOA’s
non-compliance is based on the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS) decision of October 4, 2011 that advised the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) that its Rule 45 was
non-compliant because it was, in effect, a double sanction. In
light of this ruling, the BOA’s bye-law number 74 [sic: 7.4]
renders the BOA non-compliant.
Therefore, in a letter dated 21 November 2011,
WADA advised the BOA “… that the British Olympic
Association has been determined to be non-compliant with the
(WADA) Code because your rule on selection for the Olympic
Games is an extra sanction, and non-compliant for the same
reason the IOC eligibility rule was deemed non-compliant by
the Court of Arbitration for Sport”. This determination
constitutes the decision against which BOA appeals
in this proceeding (the “Decision”).
As noted above, the Bye-Law has been in effect for
about twenty years, including for more than 10 years
-
93
before the WADA Code was introduced in March
2003 (and came into effect on 1 July 2004). The
current revised version of the Bye-Law has been in
effect since 1 January 2009.
The present Bye-Law, titled “Bye-Law of the National
Olympic Committee: Eligibility for Membership of Team GB
of Persons Found Guilty of a Doping Offence” contains six
recitals and reads, in part, as follows:
“1.
Any person who has been found guilty of a doping
offence either
(i)
by the National Governing Body of his/her sport in
the United Kingdom; or
(ii)
by any sporting authority inside or outside the United
Kingdom whose decision is recognised by the World
Anti-Doping Agency (a “Sporting Authority”)
shall not, subject as provided below, thereafter be
eligible for consideration as a member of a Team
GB or be considered eligible by the BOA to receive
or to continue to benefit from any accreditation as a
member of the Team GB delegation for or in relation
to any Olympic Games, any Olympic Winter Games
or any European Olympic Youth Festivals”.
...
Paragraphs 2 through 7 provide for the establishment
of an Appeals Panel (“AP”) and the procedures to be
followed “to consider any appeal by a person made ineligible
pursuant to paragraph 1 above” (the text of the By-Law is
set out in detail below under “applicable law”).
Since March 1992, a number of British athletes have
been ineligible for selection for the Olympic Games
as a result of the Bye-Law. Leaving aside equine cases
relating to the doping of horses, to date there have
been 25 appeals under the procedures described in
paragraphs 2 through 7 of the Bye-Law. All but one
of the 25 athletes who appealed the effect of the ByeLaw have been successful in having the application
of the Bye-Law ameliorated. Two athletes (Dwain
Chambers, sprinting, and David Millar, cycling)
affected by the Bye-Law never activated the AP
process, and one (Carl Myerscough, shot put) was
unsuccessful in commencing the AP process.
Prior to the hearing in this matter, the most recent oral
hearing in a non-equine appeal under the Bye-Law
had been that of Christine Ohuruogu (“Ohuruogu”). In
December 2007, Ohuruogu had received a one-year
ban for a third missed doping control test. Ohuruogu
successfully invoked the Bye-Law appeal process, so
she could represent the country as part of Team GB
after her one year ban was served (Decision of the
Appeal Panel of the British Olympic Association,
dated 4 December 2007).
As part of the implementation of the 2009 version of
the WADA Code, each National Olympic Committee
(NOC) had to present to WADA its WADA Code
compliant anti-doping rules (WADA Code Article
20.4.1 and 2.4.2). On 11 February 2008, the BOA
submitted to WADA a draft of its anti-doping rules,
which included a reference to the Bye-Law. In a letter
dated 3 March 2009, WADA advised the BOA that:
“… the Rules are in line with the 2009 World Anti-Doping
Code. This correspondence therefore constitutes your assurance
that the Rules are in line with the 2009 World Anti-Doping
Code”. [Emphasis Added].
Therefore, on 11 March 2009, the BOA accepted
the revised 2009 WADA Code as a Signatory. On
that day, the BOA adopted a “Bye-Law Relating to
Anti-Doping” (the “Anti-Doping Bye-Law”). The AntiDoping Bye-Law refers to and incorporates in Rule
7.4 the Bye-Law under consideration in this matter in
the following manner:
“7.4 Any Person who is found to have committed an AntiDoping Rule violation will be ineligible for membership or
selection to the Great Britain Olympic Team or to receive
funding from or to hold any position with the BOA as
determined by the Executive Board in accordance with the
BOA’s Bye-Law on Eligibility for future membership of
the Great Britain Olympic Team”.
From March 2009 until the USOC Award of 4
October 2011 was issued, both Parties acted under
the presumption that the Bye-Law was not contrary
to the WADA Code. However, in a letter dated 7
October 2011, the day following the publication of
the USOC Award, WADA wrote to the BOA about
the impact of that award. WADA stated that it had
previously viewed the Bye-Law as being a selection
policy and not an anti-doping rule and therefore not
falling within the scope of the WADA Code. This
position had been consistent with WADA’s view that
Rule 45 of the Olympic Charter had been considered
by the IOC to be an ineligibility rule and not a
sanction. However, WADA elaborated that because
the USOC Award “has determined Rule 45 to be noncompliant with the Code, [i]t is possible that your selection
policy [i.e. the Bye-Law] now falls into the same category”
(In the 8 July 2011 version of the Olympic Charter
(OC), Rule 45 is renumbered as Rule 44). WADA
invited the BOA to consider the Bye-Law in light of
the USOC Award (WADA sent similar letters to the
NOCs of Canada, Denmark and New Zealand, which
had provisions similar to the IOC Regulation. These
NOCs subsequently abandoned their respective rules
-
94
following the CAS decision in the USOC Award.
None of the remaining 199 NOCs in the Olympic
movement has ever adopted a provision similar to the
BOA Bye-Law, except for Norway, which dropped
it upon the introduction of the 2003 version of the
WADA Code).
Following this letter, there was various
correspondence between the BOA and WADA, in
which the BOA took the position that the Bye-Law
was a selection policy and neither a rule of ineligibility
nor a sanction, and that it therefore did not fall within
the scope of the WADA Code. The BOA also noted
that, as WADA had itself noted in its 7 October 2011
letter, WADA had previously found the Bye-Law to
be compliant with the WADA Code.
As noted above, on 20 November 2011, the WADA
Foundation Board found that the Bye-Law was not
compliant with the WADA Code, and WADA so
advised the BOA on 21 November 2011.
On 12 December 2011, the BOA fi led an appeal
against the Decision with the CAS in accordance
with Article R47 of the 2010 Edition of the Code of
Sport-related Arbitration and Mediation Rules (the
CAS Code).
In the Statement of Appeal, the BOA advised the
CAS that the Parties had agreed to a timetable for
the fi ling of the Appeal Brief, including a request to
extend the time for fi ling and to have a second round
of written submissions. These and other interim
relief matters were set out in the Statement of Appeal
and were the subject of agreement by the Parties or
disposal by CAS or by the Panel.
The Parties executed a Procedural Order on 12
January 2012, which was subsequently amended by
agreement of counsel for the Parties and the Panel on
3 February 2012.
The BOA fi led its Appeal Brief on 13 January 2012. It
sought the following relief pursuant to Articles R57
and R64.5 of the CAS Code:
The annulment of the WADA Decision;
The issue of a new Decision replacing the WADA Decision,
to the effect that:
1.
The BOA’s rule on selection for the Olympic Games is
not an extra sanction for commission of a doping offence
contrary to the WADA Code;
2.
The BOA is therefore compliant with the WADA
Code;
Costs (At the Hearing, the BOA stated that its preferredposition was that each party bear its own costs).
WADA fi led its Answer Brief on 10 February 2012.
Its requests for relief were as follows:
The Bye-Law is correctly characterized as a doping sanction
additional to those set out in Code Article 10;
The BOA Bye-Law is therefore contrary to Code Article
23.2.2;
The BOA is therefore non-compliant with the Code;
The WADA Foundation Board’s Decision is therefore correct,
and the BOA’s appeal should be dismissed in its entirety;
In accordance with Article R65.3 of the CAS Code, the BOA
should be required to pay the costs that WADA has been forced
to incur on this appeal (which have been unnecessarily increased
by the voluminous and largely irrelevant submissions and
evidence submitted by the BOA on this appeal); and finally
The fees and costs of the CAS Panel should be borne by the
CAS, in accordance with Article R65.2 of the CAS Code.
A. Applicable Law
Article R58 of the CAS Code provides as follows:
The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the applicable
its decision.
The “applicable regulations” within Article R58 of the
CAS Code are those of the WADA Code, the ByeLaw and the BOA Anti-Doping Bye-Law.
The BOA submitted that the WADA Code should
be interpreted according to the special principles
applicable to international treaties between state
parties. WADA submitted the applicable principles
are those of the private law of contract. The Panel
held in the USOC Award at paragraph 8.21 that “the
WADA Code is neither a law nor an international treaty.
It is rather a contract instrument binding its signatories in
accordance with private international law”. The Panel is
applying its prior conclusion to this proceeding.
Both Parties agree that the Bye-Law is governed by
-
95
and is to be construed in accordance with English
law.
Kingdom whose decision is recognised by the World AntiDoping Agency (a “Sporting Authority”)
The Bye-Law reads in full:
shall not, subject as provided below, thereafter be eligible
for consideration as a member of a Team GB or be
considered eligible by the BOA to receive or to continue to
benefit from any accreditation as a member of the Team
GB delegation for or in relation to any Olympic Games,
any Olympic Winter Games or any European Olympic
Youth Festivals.
“Bye-law of the National Olympic Committee: Eligibility for
Membership of Team GB of Persons Found Guilty of a Doping
Offence
Whereas
(i)
the British Olympic Association (the “BOA”) is
responsible for the selection of athletes and other support
personnel to represent Great Britain and other territories
as specified by the International Olympic Committee
(“Team GB”);
2.
The Executive Board of the BOA shall establish an
Appeals Panel made up of three individuals (two of
whom shall be drawn from members of the Executive
Board or elsewhere and the third of whom, the chairman,
shall be appointed by the Sports Dispute Resolution
Panel (SDRP)) to consider any appeal by a person made
ineligible pursuant to paragraph 1 above. The respondent
to the appeal will be the British Olympic Association.
None of the members of an Appeals Panel shall (a) be
from or connected with the National Governing Body of
the appellant, (b) have presented an appeal under this
bye-law for an/or on behalf of the BOA or (c) discuss
any appeal in progress with any member of the BOA,
the BOA Executive Board or the National Olympic
Committee unless such member is a member of such an
Appeals Panel hearing such an appeal.
3.
The Executive Board shall instruct the SDRP to act
as secretariat to the Appeals Panel. The costs associated
with SDRP carrying out its duties as secretariat will be
borne by the BOA.
4.
The Appeals Panel shall first consider written submissions
by or on behalf of the appellant and the respondent and
shall, where possible, render its decision based on those
submissions. If the Appeals Panel is not minded to allow
an appeal based on written submissions or if requested by
an appellant the Appeals Panel shall allow the parties to
appear in person and/or be represented before it. Subject
thereto, it shall regulate its own procedure as set out in the
BOA’s Rules for the Appeal Panel under the BOA Byelaw (in force at the time any appeal is commenced).
5.
A person made ineligible pursuant to paragraph 1 above
may appeal on one or more of the following grounds (but
not otherwise)
(vi) the BOA has accordingly adopted this bye-law.
(i)
the doping offence was minor; or
1.
Any person who has been found guilty of a doping offence
either
(i)
by the National Governing Body of his/her sport
in the United Kingdom; or
(ii) for an offence that was committed after the WADC came
into force and was adopted by the relevant body, that there
was a finding of no fault or negligence or of no significant
fault or negligence in respect of the doping offence; or
(ii) the BOA strongly disapproves of doping in sport and does
not regard it as appropriate that Team GB should include
athletes or other individuals (including but not limited
to coaches, medical and administrative staff) who have
doped or been found guilty of a doping offence including
but not limited to the supply or trafficking of prohibited
substances;
(iii) the BOA, in compliance with the World Anti-Doping
Code (“the WADC”), recognizes adjudication of
competent authorities under the WADC by not selecting
athletes or other individuals for accreditation to Team GB
while they are subject to a ban from competition under
such adjudications;
(iv) the BOA does not regard it as appropriate to select
athletes or other individuals for accreditation to Team GB
who have at any point committed a serious doping offence
involving fault or negligence and without any mitigating
factors;
(v)
the BOA regards it as appropriate to take as a starting
point that any athlete or individual guilty of a doping
offence at any point should be ineligible for selection for
Team GB, but to provide that an athlete or individual
who can establish before an Appeals Panel that on the
balance of probabilities his or her offence was minor or
committed without fault or negligence or that there were
mitigating circumstances for it, may be declared eligible for
selection;
(ii) by any sporting authority inside or outside the United
(iii) the appellant can show that, on the balance of probabilities,
significant mitigating circumstance existed in relation to
-
96
the doping offence.
• Article 4.2.2 (Specified Substances)
In the event of a successful appeal, the Appeals Panel shall
restore eligibility for selection at such time and subject to
such conditions as it considers appropriate.
• Article 4.3.3 (WADA’s Determination of the Prohibited
List)
• Article 7.6 (Retirement from Sport)
6.
In determining whether a doping offence is minor for the
purposes of paragraph 5 above, the Appeals Panel shall
take account of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping
Code or the World Anti-Doping Code in force at the time
the offence was committed (the “Codes”) and the rules
relating to doping of the National Governing Body or the
International Federation of the appellant. The Appeals
Panel shall consider as minor any offence which under the
Codes carries a suspension of less than or equal to six
months.
• Article 9 (Automatic Disqualification of Individual
Results)
• Article 10 (Sanctions on Individuals)
• Article 11 (Consequences to Teams)
• Article 13 (Appeals) with the exception of 13.2.2 and 13.5
• Article 15.4 (Mutual Recognition)
7.
In determining whether significant mitigating circumstances
exist the Appeals Panel shall take account of all relevant
facts and matters including any circumstances permitting
greater leniency under the Codes. The Appeals Panel
shall not consider as a significant mitigating circumstance
(without more) any admission of guilt by or on behalf of
the appellant.
8.
The above provisions apply only to persons found guilty
of a doping offence as referred to in paragraph 1 above
committed on or after 25th March 1992.
9.
Each National Governing Body in membership of the
BOA shall inform the Chief Executive of the BOA
forthwith of the name of any person found guilty under the
rules relating to doping of that National Governing Body
or any Sporting Authority and supply a certified copy of
the decision of the body making such findings and, where
possible, a full transcript of the proceedings.
• Article 17 (Statute of Limitations)
• Article 24 (Interpretation of the Code)
• Appendix 1 – Definitions
No additional provision may be added to a Signatory’s rules
which changes the effect of the Articles enumerated in this
Article”.
WADA Code, Article 10.2, reads as follows:
This bye-law was passed by the National Olympic
Committee on 25th March 1992 and modified on 25th
March 1998, 14 February 2001 and 3 November
2004”.
“Ineligibility for Presence, Use or Attempted use, or Possession
of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods
The period of Ineligibility imposed for a violation of Article
2.1 (Presence of Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or
Markers), Article 2.2 (Use or Attempted Use of Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method) or Article 2.6 (Possession
of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods) shall be as
follows, unless the conditions for eliminating or reducing the
period of Ineligibility, as provided in Articles 10.4 and 10.5,
or the conditions for increasing the period of Ineligibility, as
provided in Article 10.6, are met:
WADA Code, Article 23.2.2, reads as follows:
First violation: Two (2) years Ineligibility”.
“The following Articles (and corresponding Comments) as
applicable to the scope of the anti-doping activity which the
Anti-Doping Organization performs must be implemented
by Signatories without substantive change (allowing for any
non-substantive changes to the language in order to refer to the
organization’s name, sport, section numbers, etc.):
• Article 1 (Definition of Doping)
• Article 2 (Anti-Doping Rule Violations)
• Article 3 (Proof of Doping)
B. Merits
Based on the information disclosed by the Parties,
the Panel does not have any reason to doubt that both
Parties are strong advocates in the fight against doping
in sport. In fact, BOA and WADA both recognise
that doping is fundamentally contrary to the spirit
of sport. Neither party condones doping in sport
and both recognise the need to pursue aggressively
the goal of its eradication. Therefore, neither party
should be seen to be “soft” or easy on doping in sport.
The dispute between the Parties here involves one
-
97
means of pursuing the fight against doping, not the
fight itself. The Bye-Law prevents an athlete who
has had a doping offence from being selected to
represent the British Olympic Team. The core issue
to be determined here is whether BOA may pursue
that policy on its own or whether that policy must
be pursued, if at all, through the world-harmonized
WADA Code.
The essential issues for this appeal are framed by this
Panel’s decision in the USOC Award. As described
above, that decision involved an IOC Regulation that
any athlete suspended for doping and sanctioned for
a period of six months or more may not participate
in the next Olympic Games following the end of the
suspension. The CAS Panel in the USOC Award held
that the IOC Regulation violated Article 23.2.2 of the
WADA Code, because it made a “substantive change” to
the sanctions for doping found in Article 10 of the
WADA Code. The IOC Regulation was incorporated
into the Olympic Charter (“OC”) in violation of the
WADA Code and of the principles of the OC itself.
Therefore, the IOC Regulation was held to be invalid
and unenforceable because the IOC had not complied
with its own statutory rules.
In reaching the decision in the USOC Award, the
Panel noted that sanctions under Article 10 of the
WADA Code are described as a “period of ineligibility”
, which in turn is defined as the athlete being
“barred for a specified period of time from participating in
any Competition”. The Olympic Games are such a
Competition. Thus, the requirement in the IOC
Regulation that an athlete “may not participate” in
the next Olympic Games is identical to the WADA
Code’s definition of “ineligibility”. The essence of both
provisions is disbarment from participation (USOC
Award, para. 8.12.).
As a result, the IOC Regulation operated as a
sanction in the same manner as Article 10 of the
WADA Code. The effect on the athlete – ineligibility
to participate in a Competition, the Olympic Games
– is the same. However, the IOC Regulation prevents
an athlete from participating in a Competition after
the sanction provided in the WADA Code has been
completed. By implementing this additional sanction,
the IOC Regulation made a substantive change to
Article 10 of the WADA Code, which Article 23.2.2
WADA Code does not permit. The Panel added,
“Even if one accepts that the Regulation has elements of both
an eligibility rule and a sanction, it nevertheless operates as,
and has the effect of, a disciplinary sanction” (USOC Award,
para. 8.19).
The WADA Foundation Board Decision followed and
was based upon the reasoning of the USOC Award.
The WADA Foundation Board determined that the
BOA was likely non-compliant with the WADA
Code because the Bye-Law was an “extra sanction” and
“non-compliant for the same reason the IOC eligibility rule was
deemed non-compliant by the Court of Arbitration for Sport”
in the USOC Award. The WADA Compliance Report
used by the WADA Foundation Board to inform its
decision described the non-compliance as “in effect, a
double sanction”.
The issue before this Panel is thus whether the ByeLaw is not compliant with the WADA Code because
it is an extra sanction, in the same way that the IOC
Regulation was held to be non-compliant in the
USOC Award.
1.
The Roles of Selection Policies and the WADA
Code
The BOA states that the Bye-Law is part of an
overall team selection policy. That policy is aimed
at choosing the most appropriate athletes to be
representatives of Team GB at a sporting festival that
celebrates athleticism and fair play. In developing a
selection policy, and in selecting appropriate athlete
representatives for Team GB, the BOA enjoys
autonomy as expressed in the OC (Rules 27(3), 27(7)
and Rule 28; together with the Bye-Law to Rules 27
and 28 in particular 2.1).
When the Bye-Law has effect on an athlete, it operates
to preclude selection of that person to Team GB.
The BOA calls this effect “non-selection”. The BOA
argues that the non-selection is not a sanction, but
rather is the simple application of a selection policy.
According to the BOA, the non-selection results from
the fact that the athlete is not an appropriate person
to represent the country in sporting competition in
relation to any Winter or Summer Olympic Games or
European Olympic Youth Festivals, and it is based on
the spirit of Olympism.
The Panel accepts the proposition of counsel for the
BOA that generally the application of a selection
function is separate and distinct from the imposition
of a sanction for a doping offence. NOCs may develop
criteria for selection to their Olympic teams. At the
same time, the WADA Code prescribes the various
forms of doping infractions and the consequent
sanctions arising from such infractions.
As the BOA argued, NOCs have great autonomy to
develop their selection of representatives to a national
Olympic team. The WADA Code does not and is not
intended to intrude upon the autonomy of an NOC
(such as the BOA) in developing these policies. In
the normal course of events, the WADA Code and
-
98
an NOC’s selection policy rarely intersect each other.
However, NOCs like BOA have agreed to limit
their autonomy by accepting the WADA Code. In
particular, Article 23.2.2 WADA Code, requires
that its Signatories, including NOCs, do not make
any additional provisions in their rules which would
change the substantive effect to any enumerated
provisions of the WADA Code, including its sanctions
for doping. The purpose of Article 23.2.2 WADA
Code is indeed the very purpose of the WADA
Code: the harmonization throughout the world of a
doping code for use in the fight against doping. This
worldwide harmony is crucial to the success of the
fight against doping. The WADA Code is intended
to be an all-encompassing code that directs affected
organizations and athletes. The WADA Code ensures
that, in principle, any athlete in any sport will not
be exposed to a lesser or greater sanction than any
other athlete; rather, they will be sanctioned equally.
By requiring consistency in treatment of athletes who
are charged with doping infractions or convicted of
it – regardless of the athlete’s nationality or sport –
fairness and proper enforcement are achieved. Any
disharmony between different parties undermines
the success of the fight against doping. For these good
reasons, NOCs and other Signatories agreed to limit
their autonomy to act within their own spheres with
respect to activities covered by the WADA Code.
The Panel determines that the Bye-Law operates
within the sphere of activity governed by the WADA
Code. The Panel comes to this conclusion because:
The Bye-Law is based on the same considerations
and operates in connection with the same behaviour
as the WADA Code; and
The Bye-Law has the same effect as a sanction under
the WADA Code: “ineligibility ”.
Moreover, because the Bye-Law imposes an additional
sanction beyond those provided in the WADA Code,
it is not compliant with the Code.
2. The Characterisation and Operation of the ByeLaw
While BOA has argued that it is applying principles
of character and Olympism in defining the policies of
the Bye-Law, an examination of the Bye-Law terms
and the manner in which it has been applied shows
that in fact the Bye-Law relies on the same principles
and conduct as the WADA Code. This can be seen
immediately in the Recitals to the Bye-Law:
Recital 2 states that the BOA strongly disapproves of doping
in sport;
Recital 3 references compliance with the WADA Code; and
Recital 5 sets out the need for an Appeal Panel to assess if a
doping offence is minor, committed without fault or negligence,
or where other mitigating circumstances make it suitable to
declare the athlete as eligible for selection.
Once an athlete has been found guilty of committing
a doping offence pursuant to the WADA Code, a
sanction may be imposed under Article 10 of the
WADA Code. That same doping offence also triggers
the application of the BOA selection policy: Under
the Bye-Law, the individual who committed the
doping offence is ineligible for membership in Team
GB. Without a sanction under the WADA Code, the
Bye-Law has no applicability: The foundation for the
application of the Bye-Law is not present.
The non-selection, or ineligibility, effect of the ByeLaw may be reversed by the Appeal Panel (AP).
However, once again, the provisions of the WADA
Code are essential in guiding the AP in its assessment
of the application of the Bye-Law to the particular
athlete. Notably, paragraph 5 of the Bye-Law permits
a person to appeal the effect of the Bye-Law on three
grounds:
(i) Minor offences;
(ii) There was a finding under the WADA Code of no fault/
negligence or no significant fault/negligence; or
(iii) If significant mitigating circumstances existed in relation
to the doping offense.
In applying these criteria, paragraph 6 of the Bye-Law
guides the AP in its assessment of “minor offence” by
referring to the WADA Code. The AP is specifically
directed, in determining whether a doping offence
is minor for the purposes of paragraph 5, to “take
account” of the WADA Code, among others and to
find that it is minor if the offence carries a suspension
of six months or less “under the Code” (the Bye-Law
in paragraph 6 also makes reference to the Olympic
Movement Anti-Doping Code (the OMADC).
That Code is based upon the WADA Code but is
implemented by the IOC for the particular Olympic
Games and carries with it the same obligation as
Article 23.2.2 of the WADA Code. This process of
adopting the WADA Code by the IOC is similar to the
exercise engaged in by the International Federations).
Similarly, the second ground of appeal to the AP
is if the offence committed was one which would
be considered under the WADA Code to be of “no
fault or negligence or no significant fault or negligence”. The
AP must thus assess the athlete’s degree of fault in
-
99
respect of the doping offence within the framework
of the WADA Code.
The other ground of appeal under paragraph 5 is
if “significant mitigating circumstances existed in relation to
the doping offence”. It is only on this ground that the
AP is relatively free to exercise its discretion in a
manner less directly connected to the WADA Code.
However, even on this ground of appeal, paragraph
7 directs the AP to take account of any “circumstances
permitting greater leniency under the Codes”.
These provisions of the Bye-Law itself show that, far
from being divorced from the WADA Code, the ByeLaw rests on the foundation of the WADA Code. It
follows the same rationale – “strongly disapproves of
doping in sport” – and, the applicability of the Bye-Law,
both in determining the initial non-selection and in
considering an appeal of that non-selection, depends
on the same criteria as laid out in the WADA Code.
3. The Effect of the Bye-Law
Once an athlete is found guilty of a doping offence
in accordance with the WADA Code, that finding,
by operation of the Bye-Law, automatically makes
an athlete ineligible to be selected to Team GB: “Any
person … found guilty of a doping offence … shall not …
thereafter be eligible for consideration as a member of a Team
GB … in relation to any Olympic Games …”. (paragraph
1 of the Bye-Law).
As described in the USOC Award, e.g., paragraphs 6.9
and 8.12, in dealing with “Sanctions on Individuals”
Article 10.2 of the WADA Code prescribes a “period
of ineligibility” to be imposed for a doping offence.
The Panel there found that the IOC Regulation was
a sanction because it made an athlete ineligible to
participate and, thus, compete in the next Olympic
Games (see USOC Award, para. 8.12). That ineligibility
fell squarely within the nature of sanctions provided
in the WADA Code. Once the IOC Regulation was
used to bar the participation of an athlete from the
Olympics, its effect was disqualification from the
Olympics, a Competition within the meaning of
the WADA Code. Such a consequence, according to
the Panel, was undeniably disciplinary in nature and
within the scope of the WADA Code.
Similarly, the effect of the Bye-Law in rendering
the athlete found guilty of a doping offence to be
ineligible to be selected to Team GB is immediate,
automatic and for life (In contrast, the IOC
Regulation discussed in the USOC case had only a
one time effect at the next Olympic Games, and there
could be no appeal of that effect. In the Panel’s view
while these are distinctions in the operation of the
IOC Regulation and the BOA Bye-Law, they have no
impact upon the substantive merits of the analysis).
While the BOA argues that the athlete is ineligible
for “consideration to be a member of Team GB” and not to
compete, disbarment from the Team for life carries
with it the direct consequence of never being able to
participate in the Olympics and as a consequence to
compete in the Games. That is the underlying reality
of ineligibility.
The difference in the wording of the Bye-Law and the
IOC Regulation is inconsequential. Any athlete who
had committed an anti-doping offence as described
in the Bye-Law for which he or she was sanctioned
becomes, by virtue of the operation of the ByeLaw, automatically ineligible for consideration as a
member of the Team GB delegation in relation to any
Summer or Winter Olympic Games or any European
Olympic Youth Festivals. Whether he or she cannot
be selected or whether he or she is ineligible is, as
counsel for WADA stated, a distinction without a
difference. As has been noted, the WADA Code itself
defines “ineligibility” as the inability to “participate” in a
Competition, including the Olympics. The fact of the
matter is that, by operation of the Bye-Law, an athlete
is unable to participate in the Olympics.
Accordingly, this Panel finds that the Bye-Law
renders an athlete ineligible to compete – a sanction
like those provided for under the WADA Code.
The availability of the AP does not change this
analysis. While the BOA argued that this ability
to apply to the AP has the effect of ensuring that
only deliberate cheats are affected by this rule, the
Panel finds that this is not exactly the case (the same
observation was made in passing by Nicholas Stewart
QC in the most recent oral hearing under the appeal
process involving the athlete Christine Ohuruogu in
December 2007). In order to avoid the ineligibility
that arises from the first paragraph of the Bye-Law,
an athlete must choose to activate the appeals process.
Otherwise, the Bye-Law automatically makes the
athlete ineligible for membership of Team GB and,
therefore, participation on the Olympic Team at the
Olympics.
Moreover, this ineligibility is caused by an antidoping violation as the relevant prior undesirable
behaviour, which is the hallmark of an anti-doping
sanction (see USOC Award at para. 8.10). The
foregoing analysis of the operation and text of the
Bye-Law reveals that such criteria as Olympism and
appropriate representation may be values reflected in
the Bye-Law, but they are not what actually triggers
the operation of the Bye-Law. While the BOA claims
-
100
this selection policy is part of a greater policy that
the BOA will select only athletes of good character,
the fact is that the only behaviour that is explicitly
referred to in the Bye-Law and that renders one
ineligible to compete is the commission of a doping
violation under the WADA Code.
The focus by the Bye-Law on the behaviour of the
athlete can be further illustrated by a review of the
appeals process. If the selection policy were purely
designed as a means by which the BOA could have
only the athletes of the best character, it would be
unnecessary to have an appeals process to assess
the “proportionality ” of the application of the ByeLaw. In other words, the only thing that matters in a
proportionality determination is the behaviour of the
individual. Whether the punishment fits the crime
is purely an analysis of an individual’s character and
prior behaviour.
It is also noted that the Rules for the AP at paragraph
1.2 explicitly state that in the event of a finding in
favour of the athlete, “the Panel shall restore eligibility at
such time and subject to such conditions and/or impose such
penalty as it considers appropriate”. [Emphasis added]
An examination of the AP decision in the Whitlock
case is helpful in describing the purpose of the
Bye-Law as nothing other than sanctioning an
athlete for prior undesirable behaviour (see Janine
Whitlock – Decision of Appeals Panel of British
Olympic Association dated 9 March 2004). In that
case, Ms. Whitlock contended that significant
mitigating circumstances existed in relation to her
doping offence which ought to allow her to compete
in the Olympics in Athens in 2004. The BOA had
considerable sympathy for Ms. Whitlock’s position in
that case and itself did not seek to suggest that there
was evidence to indicate that she had deliberately
cheated. However, the BOA stressed the importance
of ensuring that athletics was “drug-free” and
therefore nevertheless sought to have her appeal
denied. The AP likewise in its reasoning stated that,
while there was no reason not to accept the statement
of Ms. Whitlock that she did not knowingly ingest
the banned substance, “drug use is a cancer on the good
name of the sport”. The AP relied on this reasoning in
choosing not to restore Ms. Whitlock’s eligibility.
Unfortunately, it simply does not follow that, if the
purpose of the rule is to select persons of good
character, Ms. Whitlock ought not be selected.
In the Ohuruogu matter, the AP specifically stated
that “we also reject the related submission by the BOA that the
BOA Bye-law is a selection rule and not an anti-doping rule.
We see no value in any such distinction. It is clearly an antidoping rule”. Inherent in any anti-doping rule is the
imposition of a sanction on an athlete for engaging
in the undesirable behaviour of committing a doping
offense. Furthermore, the factors on which the AP
chose to restore Ms. Ohuruogu’s eligibility were all
related to her behaviour and degree of fault, namely:
The fact that she had never intended to use prohibited substances;
The fact that she never sought to deliberately avoid an advance
notice out of competition testing;
There were deficiencies and difficulties in training athletes about
providing whereabouts information during the relevant time;
and
This was her first and only offense.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Panel finds
that the Bye-Law renders an athlete ineligible to
compete and does so on the basis of prior undesirable
behaviour: the commission of a doping offence under
the WADA Code. The fact that the Bye-Law foresees
a possibility of an Appeal Procedure is certainly a
good instrument to avoid totally disproportionate
decisions. However, this does not change the nature
of the (disciplinary) consequences of the Bye-Law
and, accordingly, its non-compliance with the
WADA Code: The proportionality of sanctions for
anti-doping offences shall be evaluated within the
worldwide harmonized system of the WADA Code –
and cannot be the object of an additional disciplinary
proceedings triggered by the same offence.
4. Inconsistency with the WADA Code
The WADA Code defines Ineligibility as “the Athlete
or other Person is barred for a specified period of time from
participating in any Competition or other activity or funding”.
[Emphasis added]
A Competition, according to the WADA Code is
“A single race, match, game or singular athletic contest. For
example, a basketball game or the finals of the Olympic
100-meter race in athletics […]”. The Olympic Games is,
according to the WADA Code definition of an Event,
a series of individual Competitions.
When an athlete is, by virtue of the operation of the
Bye-Law, not eligible “… for consideration as a member
of Team GB”, he or she is barred from ever being
selected to Team GB, assuming either no appeal or
an unsuccessful appeal to the AP. The Panel finds
that the effect of that non-selection or inability
to be selected to the Olympic team is (permanent)
disbarment from participating in a Competition,
the Olympic Games. That inability to participate
is similar in effect to the sanction provided in the
WADA Code for a doping offence. The Bye-Law
imposes a permanent ineligibility to participate in the
Olympic Games, which does not appear in Article 10
-
101
of the WADA Code or anywhere else in that Code.
Therefore, the non-selection is a sanction in addition
to those in the WADA Code, and it is of a much
lengthier duration.
the Parties are apart only on an isolated issue as to
the appropriate process to further the fight against
doping. They are not apart on the fundamental issue
of the eradication of doping.
Article 23.2.2 of the WADA Code provides that
certain provisions must be implemented by Signatories
without substantive change (including the provisions
regarding sanctions found in Article 10 WADA
Code). Article 23.2.2 WADA Code further provides
that: “no additional provision may be added to a Signatory’s
rules which changes the effect of the Articles enumerated in this
Article”. [Emphasis added]
C. Conclusion
As a Signatory to the Code, the BOA bound itself
through Article 23.2.2 of the WADA Code not to
add any additional provision to its “rules which changes
the effect of the Articles enumerated in this Article [being
23.2.2]”.
The Bye-Law has the effect of changing the sanctions
and their effect under the WADA Code as set out in
the above analysis. Therefore, the BOA has breached
its obligation not to add any provisions to its rules
that change the effect of Article 10 WADA Code.
The Panel concludes that the Bye-Law is a doping
sanction and is therefore not in compliance with the
WADA Code. It confirms the view of the WADA
Foundation Board as indicated in its Decision.
Therefore, the appeal of BOA is rejected, and
the Decision of the WADA Foundation Board is
confirmed.
Based on the prayers for relief submitted by the
Parties, the Panel does not have any jurisdiction to
implement further directions. It is up to the Parties to
give effect to the present Award in good faith and in
accordance with the spirit of Olympism shown by the
Parties already in the course of these proceedings.
All further and other claims for relief are dismissed.
When the BOA chose to become a Signatory of
the WADA Code, it in fact gave up – like any
other Signatory – some of its autonomy, including
agreeing not to impose a sanction other than those
imposed by Article 10 WADA Code. Contrary to this
obligation, no British athlete can ever compete in
the Olympic Games as a result of a doping offence.
That consequence is an “extra” or a “double sanction”, as
referred to in WADA’s Decision.
In making the foregoing determination, the Panel
wishes to reiterate its comments in paragraph 8.27
of the USOC Award, which indicate that the Panel’s
Award is not an opposition to the sanctions imposed
by the IOC Regulation or, in this case, the BOA ByeLaw. Rather, the awards in both cases simply reflect
the fact that the international anti-doping movement
has recognized the crucial importance of a worldwide
harmonized and consistent fight against doping in
sport, and it has agreed (in Article 23.2.2 WADA
Code) to comply with such a principle, without any
substantial deviation in any direction. In addition
to those comments, the Panel notes that the BOA
and the IOC are free, as are others, to persuade
other stakeholders that an additional sanction of
inability to participate in the Olympic Games may
be a proportionate, appropriate sanction of an antidoping offence and may therefore form part of a
revised WADA Code. At the moment, the system in
place does not permit what the BOA has done. It is
for this reason that the Panel said at the outset that
-
102
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. Alex Rasmussen & The National Olympic
Committee and Sports Confederation of Denmark (Dansk Idraetsforbund)
4 July 2012
Cycling; doping; whereabouts failure
within a period of 18 months; departure
from the rule providing for a notice
within 14 days of the unsuccessful
testing attempt; sanction.
Panel:
Mr. Luigi Fumagalli (Italy), President
Mr. Lars Halgreen (Denmark)
Relevant facts
The Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI or the
“Appellant ”) is the international governing body for
the sport of cycling. UCI is an association under Swiss
law and has its headquarters in Aigle (Switzerland).
Mr Alexander Rasmussen (“Rasmussen” or the “First
Respondent”) is a professional road racing cyclist of
Danish nationality, born on 4 May 1981, holding
a license issued by the Danish Cycling Federation
(Danmarks Cykle Union).
The National Olympic Committee and Sports
Confederation of Denmark (Dansk Idraetsforbund)
(“DIF” or the “Second Respondent ”) is the National
Olympic Committee in Denmark and is the
confederation of the Danish sports federations.
Rasmussen and the DIF are hereinafter jointly
referred to as the “Respondents”.
According to the rules governing the doping control
program of UCI (the UCI Anti-Doping Rules: “UCI
ADR”) and of DIF (the Danish National AntiDoping Rules: “NADR”), Rasmussen has been
included since 2009 in the Registered Testing Pool of
athletes (RTP) both of DIF (“DIF RTP”) and UCI
(“UCI RTP”).
The World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) of the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), in fact, requires the
signatories, which include UCI and DIF, to define a
group of athletes as their RTP. Each athlete included
in the RTP has the obligation to provide regular
and updated whereabouts information, i.e. a three
month schedule containing information, before
the commencement of each quarterly period, about
where he or she can be met for unannounced outof-competition testing. In order to avoid unnecessary
burden on athletes obliged to provide such information
both to their National Anti-Doping Organisations
and to the International Federation they belong
to, WADA has developed a web-based application,
called ADAMS – Anti-Doping Administration and
Management System (“ADAMS”) to enable athletes
to enter their whereabouts into a single system.
International Federations are then provided access
by the relevant National Anti-Doping Organisation
to the information entered into ADAMS by each
athlete.
As a result of the above, Rasmussen had the obligation
to enter, and keep updated, his whereabouts
into ADAMS. UCI was allowed to access such
information.
On 1 February 2010, officers of the Danish National
Anti-Doping Organisation (Anti-Doping Denmark,
ADD) unsuccessfully tried to locate Rasmussen for
an out-of-competition doping control at the place he
had indicated on ADAMS for that day: instead of
being in Denmark, he was in Germany competing in
the Berlin Six Days (from 28 January to 2 February
2011). A whereabouts failure was therefore recorded
pursuant to Article 5.4.5 NADR and notified to
Rasmussen on 16 February 2010, as the explanations
he had provided were considered to be insufficient
by ADD.
On 4 October 2010, ADD notified Rasmussen of a
potential failure to fi le his whereabouts information
for the fourth quarter of 2011 by the deadline of 30
September 2010: at the same time, ADD indicated to
Rasmussen that it had remarked “that you did not state
your participation in the World Championships in Australia
that has just taken place”. Following said notification,
Rasmussen fi led the missing information on 5
October 2010, without providing any explanations.
-
103
Therefore, on 26 October 2010, ADD recorded and
notified to Rasmussen a fi ling failure for the purposes
of Article 5.4.5 NADR.
On 28 April 2011, officers of the UCI unsuccessfully
tried to locate Rasmussen for an out-of-competition
doping control at the place in Spain he had indicated
in ADAMS for that day: the UCI officers could only
get in touch with Rasmussen on the phone, to discover
that he was in Denmark, for his sister’s confirmation.
On 14 July 2011, UCI notified Rasmussen of such
potential missed test, which was recorded on 18
August 2011.
On 13 September 2011, UCI informed ADD of
the recording of the missed test of 28 April 2011,
being “the 3rd whereabouts failure of … Rasmussen”, to
indicate that according to Article 110 of the UCI
ADR, ADD was “responsible to bring proceedings against
Rasmussen under art. 21.4 [UCI] ADR as his previous
whereabouts failures were recorded by your organization”. On
the same day, ADD referred the case to the AntiDoping Committee (Dopingudvalg) of DIF for further
proceedings.
On 14 September 2011, the Anti-Doping Committee
of DIF imposed on Rasmussen a provisional
suspension pursuant to Article 7.6.2 NADR.
by the UCI in accordance with UCI Antidoping Rules.
The problem in the current case is the difference between
WADA’s International Standard for Testing art. 11.6.3.b
and the UCI’s ADR art. 105.
(…)
As can be seen, the UCI has not in its own rules repeated the
obligation for the ADO to notify the rider no later than 14
days after the missed test. In fact, the UCI has not set up a
deadline for itself at all, (…)
In fact, in the case we are currently reviewing, the UCI notified
the rider of the missed test 10 weeks after the day of the
unsuccessful attempt. (…)
As the notification was 8 weeks late according to the mandatory
rules in the International Standard for Testing, the athlete
and his lawyer has challenged whether the missed test can be
considered properly recorded according to mandatory rules in the
World Anti Doping Code/International Standard for Testing.
As the late notification was nevertheless in accordance with
a UCI Rule that differs from the “mandatory” WADA
Standard, we believe the matter needs to be clarified, which is
why we seek WADA’s advice on the matter”.
On 13 October 2011, WADA answered as follows:
On 12 October 2011, the Anti-Doping Committee
sent to WADA an email as follows:
“… the Doping Commission of the NOC and Sports
Confederation of Denmark urgently needs WADA’s advice in
an unusual case we are currently reviewing…
While reviewing the case, we have noticed a slight, but probably
important difference between the whereabouts regulations
of WADA’s International Standard for Testing and the
whereabouts regulations of the IF. A difference in the procedural
rules that is to the disadvantage of the athlete.
“In our opinion, for the UCI recorded strike, UCI rules shall
apply as an athlete shall be able to rely on his IF rules first,
even if the Standard is mandatory.
We will contact UCI to ensure their rules are amended shortly
in order to properly implement the IST rules.
In the case at hand, if the UCI strike has been notified to the
rider before the next filing failure/missed test occurred, the delay
taken by the UCI should not constitute an issue.
This was the rationale of this 14-day rule”.
(…)
Our question is therefore if WADA can confirm that the
International Standard for Testing is indeed considered
mandatory for IFs and NADOs and, consequently, that no
changes from the Standard should be made when drafting the
principles and procedural guidelines in the regulations of the IFs
and the NADOs ?”.
In an email of 13 October 2011, the Anti-Doping
Committee then added the following:
“The case we are reviewing involves one missed test and one filing
failure both recorded by ADD in accordance with WADA’s
International Standard for Testing and one missed test recorded
After an exchange of submissions with the counsel
for Rasmussen, on 27 October 2011, the AntiDoping Committee brought the case of Rasmussen
before the Anti-Doping Board (Dopingnaevn) of
DIF in accordance with Article 8 NADR. In its
referral to the Anti-Doping Board, the Anti-Doping
Commission requested that Rasmussen “be banned for
one year from all sport under the auspices of DIF, and this ban
be counted from 28 April 2011” and that Rasmussen “be
disqualified from all competitions he has participated in during
the period 28 April 2011 – 14 September 2011”.
On 17 November 2011, the Anti-Doping Board
issued a decision (“Decision”) holding as follows:
-
104
“Alex Rasmussen is hereby acquitted”.
In support of its Decision, the Anti-Doping Board
stated the following:
“ (…)
The World Anti-Doping Code and the associated international
testing standard, ITS, constitute the overarching set of rules,
which are supplemented by UCI’s rules and by the national
anti-doping rules in Denmark. UCI’s rules must therefore be
interpreted in accordance with the rules that are mandatory in
the WADA rules, including the ITS rules, cf. the preamble to
ITS. Compliance with the international standards, including
ITS, is also mandatory according to the national Danish antidoping rules, cf. the preface to these rules.
It emerges from ITS art. 11.6.3.b that the athlete must be
informed and be consulted concerning any violation of the
whereabouts rules no later than 14 days after the violation
in question occurred. This was not done in time after UCI’s
attempt to perform an anti-doping test on 28 April 2011, with
notification and consultation only being given on 14 July 2011.
matter of Mr Alex Rasmussen is upheld.
- and b. (...)
c. (...)
- or d. That the Court sanctions Mr Rasmussen by a period of
ineligibility no longer than on year, to be started from the
time of the 3rd inaccuracy on 28th of April 2011”.
Finally, the Respondents request the Panel, should it
find that Rasmussen has to be sanctioned, to impose a
sanction of “no more than a 12 months period of ineligibility,
starting from the missed test of 28th of April 2011”,
(...)
At the same time, and in any case, the Respondents
request that “the DIF is not condemned”, since it correctly
implemented the WADA rules.
A. Applicable law
Because UCI did not meet the deadline in ITS art. 11.6.3.b,
the third violation of the whereabouts rules on 28 April 2011
cannot result it sanctions in the form of a ban or disqualification”.
The law applicable in the present arbitration is
identified by the Panel in accordance with Article
R58 of the Code.
On 22 December 2011, UCI fi led a statement of
appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS),
pursuant to Article R48 of the Code of Sports-related
Arbitration (“Code”), to challenge the Decision.
Pursuant to Article R58 of the Code, the Panel is
required to decide the dispute
The UCI’s requests for relief, as indicated in its appeal
brief, is the following:
“May it please to the Arbitration Tribunal:
-
To set aside the contested decision;
To sanction Mr Rasmussen with a period of ineligibility
of two years starting on the date of the Panel’s decision;
To state that the period of provisional suspension from
14 September 2011 until 17 November 2011 shall be
credited against the period of ineligibility;
To disqualify Mr Rasmussen’s results from 28 April
2011 until the date of the CAS award;
To condemn Mr Rasmussen to repay all the prizes money
he won from 28 April 2011 until the date of the CAS
award;
(...)
“… according to the applicable regulations and the rules of law
chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according
to the law of the country in which the federation, association
or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision
is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of
which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel
shall give reasons for its decision”.
As a result of such provision, the Panel considers that
the DIF rules (and more specifically those adopted
in the NADR) are the applicable regulations for the
purposes of Article R58 of the Code, with a possible
reservation for the application on specific points of
the UCI ADR (below).The laws of Denmark apply
subsidiarily. However, no party led any evidence of
the content of relevant Danish law, nor was the Panel
asked to consider or apply any provision of Danish
law.
In their answer, the Respondents requested the CAS
to rule:
The provisions set in the IDF ADR in force in July
2011 which are relevant in this arbitration include the
following:
“a. That the appealed Decision rendered on 17th of November
2011 by the Doping Board of the National Olympic
Committee and Sports Confederation of Denmark in the
Article 1
“… These anti-doping rules apply to Anti Doping Denmark,
the Sports Confederation of Denmark, all member organisations
-
105
under the NOC and Sports Confederation of Denmark
(hereafter “national federations”), and all persons involved
in activities by membership, accreditation or participation in
any activity under a national federation under the NOC and
Sports Confederation of Denmark.
Exempted from these rules are athletes who neither participates
in sport at an international or national level, but who
exclusively participates in sport at a recreational level, including
competitions at a lower level under the NOC and Sports
Confederation of Denmark. These persons are covered by the
Danish Anti-Doping Regulations for Recreational Athletes
…”
Article 2
“Doping is defined as the occurrence of one or more of the
anti-doping rule violations set forth in Article 2.1 through
Article 2.8 of these Anti-Doping Rules (Anti-Doping Rule
Violations). …
2.4
Violation of applicable requirements regarding
Athlete availability for Out-of-Competition Testing, including
failure to file required whereabouts information and missed
tests which are declared based on rules which comply with the
International Standard for Testing. Any combination of three
missed tests and/or filing failures within an eighteen-month
period as determined by Anti-Doping Organizations with
jurisdiction over the Athlete shall constitute an anti-doping rule
violation”
Article 3.2
“Facts related to anti-doping rule violations may be established
by any reliable means, including admissions. The following
rules of proof shall be applicable in doping cases: …
3.2.2 Departures from any other International Standard or
other anti-doping rule or policy which did not cause an Adverse
Analytical Finding or other anti-doping rule violation shall not
invalidate such results. If the Athlete or other Person establishes
that a departure from another International Standard or
other anti-doping rule or policy which could reasonably have
caused the Adverse Analytical Finding or other anti-doping
rule violation occurred, then the Doping Commission under the
NOC and Sports Confederation of Denmark shall have the
burden to establish that such a departure did not cause the
Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the antidoping rule violation”
Article 5.4.2
“Anti Doping Denmark shall notify all athletes of his/her
inclusion in the national registered testing pool and inform
him/her of his/her responsibilities according to these antidoping rules. All athletes included in the national registered
testing pool shall file whereabouts with Anti Doping Denmark
in accordance with the international standard for testing and
the guidelines provided by Anti Doping Denmark. Athletes
must specify on a daily basis the locations where he/she will be
training, and/or competing each day of a quarter or conduct any
other regular activity. Athletes shall update their information
as necessary so that it is current at all times. In addition to this
information athletes shall also specify for each day during the
following quarter a 60 minutes testing slot where the athlete
must be available for sample collection at the specified location.
However, this does not limit in any way the possibility to test the
athlete at any time or place outside the 60 minutes time slot”
Article 5.4.3
“Where athletes are included in Anti Doping Denmark’s
registered testing pool and a registered testing pool under his/
her international federation and who are required to provide
whereabouts to her/his international federation shall provide
Anti Doping Denmark with a copy”
Article 5.4.4
“Failure by any athlete included in Anti Doping Denmark’s
registered testing pool to submit a mandatory whereabouts or
failure to submit correct whereabouts will be considered an
anti-doping rule violation in accordance with article 2.4 of the
Code where the conditions of Article 11.3.5 of the International
Standard for Testing are met”
Article 5.4.5
“Unsuccessful attempts made by Anti Doping Denmark to
locate an athlete during the 60 minute time slot specified by the
athlete in his/her whereabouts will be reported to Anti Doping
Denmark in accordance with the International Standard for
Testing.
Anti Doping Denmark will subsequently evaluate the
circumstances described in the report and determine whether the
failure by the athlete to be present constitutes a missed test.
3 missed tests within an 18 month period will be considered
an anti-doping rule violation according to article 2.4 of the
Code where the conditions or Article 11.4.3 of the International
Standard for Testing are met.
Written notification shall be sent to the athlete in respect of each
missed test”
Article 10.3
“The period of Ineligibility for anti-doping rule violations other
than as provided in Article 10.2 shall be as follows: …
10.3.3 For violations of Article 2.4 (Whereabouts Filing
Failures and/or Missed Tests), the period of Ineligibility shall
be at a minimum one (1) year and at a maximum two (2) years
based on the Athlete’s degree of fault”
Article 10.8
“In addition to the automatic Disqualification of the results
in the Competition which produced the positive Sample under
Article 9 (Automatic Disqualification of Individual Results),
all other competitive results obtained from the date a positive
Sample was collected (whether In-Competition or Out-ofJurisprudence majeure / Leading cases
-
106
Competition), or other anti-doping rule violation occurred,
through the commencement of any Provisional Suspension or
Ineligibility period, shall, unless fairness requires otherwise,
be Disqualified with all the resulting Consequences including
forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes”
Article 10.9.1
“Except as provided below, the period of Ineligibility shall start
on the date of the hearing decision providing for Ineligibility
or, if the hearing is waived, on the date Ineligibility is accepted
or otherwise imposed. Any period of Provisional Suspension
(whether imposed or voluntarily accepted) shall be credited
against the total period of Ineligibility imposed”
Article 10.9.2
“Any period of Provisional Suspension (whether imposed or
voluntarily accepted) shall be credited against the total period of
Ineligibility imposed”
Article 10.9.3
“Where there have been substantial delays in the hearing
process or other aspects of Doping Control not attributable to
the Athlete or other Person, the Doping Tribunal may start the
period of Ineligibility at an earlier date commencing as early as
the date of Sample collection or the date on which another antidoping rule violation last occurred”.
The provisions set in the UCI ADR in force in July
2011 which have been invoked in this arbitration
include the following:
Article 21
“The following constitute anti-doping rule violations: …
4. Violation of applicable requirements regarding Rider
availability for Out-of-Competition Testing. Any combination
of three Missed Tests and/or Filing Failures (as defined in
chapter V) committed within an eighteen-month period, as
declared by UCI or any other Anti-Doping Organization with
jurisdiction over the Rider, shall constitute an anti-doping rule
violation”
Article 25
“Departures from any other International Standard, these
Anti-Doping Rules, the Procedural Guidelines set by the
Anti-Doping Commission or any other applicable anti-doping
rule or policy or technical document which did not cause an
Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for any other
anti-doping rule violation shall not invalidate such findings or
results. If the License-Holder establishes that any such departure
which could reasonably have caused the Adverse Analytical
Finding or factual basis for any other anti-doping rule violation
occurred, then the UCI or its National Federation shall have
the burden to establish that such a departure did not cause the
Adverse Analytical Finding or the factual basis for the antidoping rule violation”
Article 99
“A Rider in a Registered Testing Pool shall be deemed to have
committed an anti-doping rule violation under article 21.4 if he
commits a total of three Whereabouts Failures (which may be
any combination of Filing Failures and/or Missed Tests adding
up to three in total) within any 18 (eighteen) month period,
irrespective of which Anti-Doping Organization(s) has/have
declared the Whereabouts Failures in question”
Article 105
“UCI shall give notice to the Rider of any apparent
Whereabouts Failure inviting a response within 14 (fourteen)
days of receipt of the notice”
Article 110
“Where it is alleged that a Rider has committed 3 (three)
Whereabouts Failures within any 18-month period and
two or more of those Whereabouts Failures were alleged
by an Anti-Doping Organisation that had the Rider in its
Registered Testing Pool at the time of those failures, then that
Anti-Doping Organization (whether the UCI or a National
Anti-Doping Organisation) shall be the responsible AntiDoping Organization for purposes of bringing proceedings
against the Rider under article 21.4. If not (for example, if the
Whereabouts Failures were alleged by UCI and two National
Anti-Doping Organizations respectively), then the responsible
Anti-Doping Organisation for these purposes will be the AntiDoping Organization whose Registered Testing Pool the Rider
was in as of the date of the third Whereabouts Failure. If the
Rider was in both UCI’s and a national Registered Testing
Pool as of that date, the responsible Anti-Doping Organization
for these purposes shall be the UCI”
Article 111
“Where the UCI is the responsible Anti-Doping Organization
and does not bring proceedings against a Rider under article
21.4 within 30 (thirty) days of WADA receiving notice of that
Rider’s third alleged Whereabouts Failure in any 18-month
period, then it shall be deemed that the UCI has decided that
no anti-doping rule violation was committed, for purposes of
triggering the appeal rights set out at article 329”.
The provisions set in the IST in force in July 2011
which are relevant in this arbitration include the
following:
Article 11.4.3
“An Athlete may only be declared to have committed a Missed
Test where the Responsible ADO, following the results
management procedure set out in Clause 11.6.3, can establish
each of the following:
a.
that when the Athlete was given notice that he/she had
been designated for inclusion in a Registered Testing Pool,
he/she was advised of his/her liability for a Missed Test if
he/she was unavailable for Testing during the 60-minute
time slot specified in his/her Whereabouts Filing at the
-
107
location specified for that time slot;
b.
c.
that a DCO attempted to test the Athlete on a given day
in the quarter, during the 60-minute time slot specified in
the Athlete’s Whereabouts Filing for that day, by visiting
the location specified for that time slot;
that during that specified 60-minute time slot, the DCO
did what was reasonable in the circumstances (i.e. given
the nature of the specified location) to try to locate the
Athlete, short of giving the Athlete any Advance Notice
of the test;
d.
that the provisions of Clause 11.4.4 (if applicable) have
been met; and
e.
that the Athlete’s failure to be available for Testing at
the specified location during the specified 60-minute time
slot was at least negligent. For these purposes, the Athlete
will be presumed to have been negligent upon proof
of the matters set out at sub-Clauses 11.4.3(a) to (d).
That presumption may only be rebutted by the Athlete
establishing that no negligent behaviour on his/her part
caused or contributed to him/her (i) being unavailable
for Testing at such location during such time slot; and
(ii) failing to update his/her most recent Whereabouts
Filing to give notice of a different location where he/she
would instead be available for Testing during a specified
60-minute time slot on the relevant day”
ii. of the consequences to the Athlete if a hearing panel
upholds the alleged Missed Test.
c.
Where the Athlete disputes the apparent Missed Test,
the Responsible ADO must re-assess whether all of the
Clause 11.4.3 requirements are met. The Responsible
ADO must advise the Athlete, by letter sent no later
than 14 (fourteen) days after receipt of the Athlete’s
response, whether or not it maintains that there has been
a Missed Test.
d.
If no response is received from the Athlete by the
relevant deadline, or if the Responsible ADO maintains
(notwithstanding the Athlete’s response) that there has
been a Missed Test, the Responsible ADO shall send
notice to the Athlete that an alleged Missed Test is to be
recorded against him/her. The Responsible ADO shall
at the same time advise the Athlete that he/she has the
right to request an administrative review of the alleged
Missed Test. The Unsuccessful Attempt Report must be
provided to the Athlete at this point if it has not been
provided earlier in the process.
e.
Where requested, such administrative review shall be
conducted by a designee of the Responsible ADO who
was not involved in the previous assessment of the alleged
Missed Test, shall be based on written submissions alone,
and shall consider whether all of the requirements of Clause
11.4.3 are met. If necessary, the relevant DCO may be
asked to provide further information to the designee. The
review shall be completed within 14 (fourteen) days of
receipt of the Athlete’s request and the decision shall be
communicated to the Athlete by letter sent no more than 7
(seven) days after the decision is made.
f.
If it appears to the designee that the requirements of Clause
11.4.3 have not been met, then the unsuccessful attempt to
test the Athlete shall not be treated as a Missed Test for
any purpose; and
g.
If the Athlete does not request an administrative review of
the alleged Missed Test by the relevant deadline, or if the
administrative review leads to the conclusion that all of
the requirements of Clause 11.4.3 have been met, then the
Responsible ADO shall record an alleged Missed Test
against the Athlete and shall notify the Athlete and (on a
confidential basis) WADA and all other relevant ADOs
of that alleged Missed Test and the date of its occurrence”
Article 11.6.3
“ The results management process in the case of an apparent
Missed Test shall be as follows:
a.
b.
The DCO shall file an Unsuccessful Attempt Report
with his/her ADO, setting out the details of the attempted
Sample collection, including the date of the attempt, the
location visited, the exact arrival and departure times at
the location, the step(s) taken at the location to try to
find the Athlete, including details of any contact made
with third parties, and any other relevant details about
the attempted Sample collection.
If it appears that all of the Clause 11.4.3 requirements
relating to Missed Tests are satisfied, then no later than 14
(fourteen) days after the date of the unsuccessful attempt,
the Responsible ADO (i.e. the ADO on whose behalf
the test was attempted) must send notice to the Athlete
of the unsuccessful attempt, inviting a response within 14
(fourteen) days of receipt of the notice. In the notice, the
Responsible ADO should warn the Athlete:
i. that unless the Athlete persuades the Responsible
ADO that there has not been any Missed Test, then
(subject to the remainder of the results management
process set out below) an alleged Missed Test will be
recorded against the Athlete; and
Article 11.6.5
“The Responsible ADO shall keep a record of all Whereabouts
Failures alleged in respect of each Athlete within its Registered
Testing Pool. Where it is alleged that such an Athlete has
committed 3 (three) Whereabouts Failures within any 18-month
period:
a.
Where two or more of those Whereabouts Failures were
-
108
alleged by an ADO that had the Athlete in its Registered
Testing Pool at the time of those failures, then that ADO
(whether the IF or a NADO) shall be the Responsible
ADO for purposes of bringing proceedings against the
Athlete under Code Article 2.4. If not (for example, if
the Whereabouts Failures were alleged by three different
ADOs), then the Responsible ADO for these purposes
will be the ADO whose Registered Testing Pool the
Athlete was in as of the date of the third Whereabouts
Failure. If the Athlete was in both the international and
a national Registered Testing Pool as of that date, the
Responsible ADO for these purposes shall be the IF.
b.
Where the Responsible ADO fails to bring proceedings
against an Athlete under Code Article 2.4 within 30
(thirty) days of WADA receiving notice of that Athlete’s
third alleged Whereabouts Failure in any 18-month
period, then it shall be deemed that the Responsible
ADO has decided that no anti-doping rule violation was
committed, for purposes of triggering the appeal rights set
out at Code Article 13 (in particular Article 13.2)”
Article 11.6.6
“An Athlete alleged to have committed an anti-doping rule
violation under Code Article 2.4 shall have the right to have such
allegation determined at a full evidentiary hearing in accordance
with Code Article 8. The hearing panel shall not be bound by
any determination made during the results management process,
whether as to the adequacy of any explanation offered for a
Whereabouts Failure or otherwise. Instead, the burden shall
be on the ADO bringing the proceedings to establish all of the
requisite elements of each alleged Whereabouts Failure”.
B. Merits
As a result of the parties’ submissions and requests,
there are two main questions that the Panel has to
examine in these proceedings:
a.
the first concerns the determination of whether
the First Respondent committed the anti-doping
rule violation contemplated by Article 2.4 NADR
(corresponding to Article 21.4 UCI ADR), i.e.
whether Rasmussen committed, under the rules
held to be applicable, three whereabouts failures
within a period of eighteen months;
b.
the second, to be addressed in the event such
anti-doping rule violation is found, concerns the
identification of the consequences to be imposed
on Rasmussen.
The Panel shall consider each of said questions
separately.
1.
Has the anti-doping rule violation contemplated
by Article 2.4 NADR been committed by Rasmussen ?
Under Article 2.4 NADR (as well as under the
corresponding provision – Article 21.4 – of the UCI
ADR), any combination of three missed tests and/
or fi ling failures within eighteen months constitutes
an anti-doping rule violation. Such provision matches
the obligation of the athletes, included in a RTP, to
provide, and keep updated, his/her whereabouts
information, in order to be located for out-ofcompetition testing. Out-of-competition testing is at
the heart of any effective anti-doping programme. To
carry out effective testing of this nature, it is vital that
athletes produce accurate and timely whereabouts
information, so that they can be tested by surprise.
The question in this case, as already mentioned, is
whether Rasmussen committed within a period of
eighteen months three missed tests and/or fi ling
failures, which, under the applicable rules, could
be considered to be violations of his whereabouts
obligations.
In this respect, it is common ground between the
parties that a first whereabouts failure, in the form
of a missed test, was committed by Rasmussen on 1
February 2010, when the ADD unsuccessfully tried
to locate him at the place he had indicated for such
date; and that a second whereabouts failure, in the
form of a fi ling failure, was committed when, at the
end of the third quarter of 2010, Rasmussen failed to
timely provide his whereabouts information for the
following, fourth quarter.
The parties, however, disagree as whether Rasmussen
committed a third whereabouts failure, when on
28 April 2011 the UCI anti-doping officers could
not meet him at the place he had indicated: the
Respondents defend the Decision that held that such
missed test could not be recorded as a whereabouts
failure; the Appellant submit that the Decision is
wrong, and that on 28 April 2011 (i.e. within an
eighteen month period of the first failure, committed
on 1 February 2010) a third whereabouts failure was
committed by Rasmussen, triggering the application
of Article 2.4 NADR.
More specifically, the parties do not argue on the fact
that the Rasmussen had been included in the UCI
RTP, that he had been informed of his responsibilities
according to the relevant anti-doping rules, and that
on 28 April 2011 a doping control officer of UCI could
not locate him by visiting the location specified for
the time slot indicated in his whereabouts fi ling for
that day. Such points, corresponding to the conditions
indicated in Article 11.4.3(a)-(c) IST, are not disputed.
-
109
On such basis, it is also common ground that that
the whereabouts information provided by Rasmussen
through ADAMS for 28 April 2011 were not correct.
The dispute concerns the way the apparent missed test
of 28 April 2011 was managed by the UCI, which (the
parties agree also on this point) was the responsible
anti-doping organization for such purposes, since
the test was attempted on its behalf. In essence, on
one hand, the Respondents submit that UCI failed
to comply with the rule set by Article 11.6.3(b) IST,
since the notice of the unsuccessful attempt was sent
to Rasmussen much later than fourteen days after
its date; on the other hand, UCI contends that it
complied with Article 105 of the UCI ADR, which
does not provide for any deadline for such notice,
that Article 11.6.3(b) IST does not apply and that
in any case a deviation from that provision cannot
invalidate the recording of a missed test on 28 April
2011.
Indeed, different rules can be found in Article 105
UCI ADR and Article 11.6.3(b) IST. While the
former simply indicates that the “UCI shall give notice
to the Rider of any apparent Whereabouts Failure inviting
a response within 14 (fourteen) days of receipt of the notice”,
the latter specifies that the notice of the unsuccessful
attempt must be sent by the responsible anti-doping
organization “no later than 14 (fourteen) days of the
attempt”. As a result, the question, discussed by the
parties in this arbitration, concerns the binding force
for UCI of Article 11.6.3(b) IST, and the effects for
Rasmussen of the non compliance by UCI with the
provisions therein established.
This Panel, however, finds it unnecessary to settle the
issue: the Panel, in fact, finds that, even conceding that
Article 11.6.3(b) IST had to be applied, the failure by
UCI to send a notice to Rasmussen within fourteen
days of the unsuccessful attempt of 28 April 2011 did
not prevent UCI from recording it as a missed test.
The Decision, which held otherwise, is wrong.
The Panel is led to such conclusion by several reasons.
The first reason relates to the wording of Article
11.6.3 IST. Under such provision, at its para. (c), in
fact, in the event the athlete, who has received the
notice of the unsuccessful testing attempt, disputes
the apparent missed test, a re-assessment procedure
must be started by the responsible anti-doping
organization. Such process is intended to determine
whether the requirements set by Article 11.4.3 IST are
met: a missed test can be recorded as such only if the
responsible anti-doping organization concludes that
said conditions are satisfied. Therefore, no weight is
given in this re-assessment procedure to a deviation
from the 14-day rule contained in Article 11.6.3(b).
In the same way, in the event an administrative
review is subsequently conducted upon request, the
subject in charge of it shall only consider (again)
the requirements set by Article 11.4.3 IST: only if it
is determined that these conditions are not satisfied
shall the unsuccessful attempt not be treated as a
missed test. No room is given for any consideration,
in the determination of a missed test, of the respect
by the responsible anti-doping organization of the
deadline to send a notice of the unsuccessful testing
attempt. Therefore, the Panel finds in the wording of
Article 11.6.3 IST no basis for finding that a deviation
from the 14-day rule mentioned at para. (b) of that
provision affects the possibility that a missed test be
recorded as such.
The second reason refers to the purpose of the notice
mentioned by Article 11.6.3(b) IST. Its function,
indeed, appears that of offering the athlete the
opportunity to give explanations – before a missed
test is recorded – with respect to the fact that an
anti-doping officer had failed to meet him/her for
unannounced testing, and therefore persuade the
responsible anti-doping organization that there has
been no missed test. In that context, the notice to
the athlete plays an important role. Article 11.6.3 IST
describes the results management process in the case
of an apparent missed test; in such “administrative”
process, the fundamental rights of the athlete must be
respected: the athlete must be informed and be given
the opportunity to state his/her case and persuade the
responsible anti-doping organization that the apparent
missed test must not be registered as such. Said role,
however, defines also the consequences of the failure
by the responsible anti-doping organization to respect
the 14-day rule mentioned at Article 11.6.3(b) IST. In
fact, the purpose of the notice of the attempted test
can be considered satisfied even though the notice
has been given after the 14-day deadline had passed,
in the event the athlete has had the actual possibility
to give explanations – before a missed test is recorded
– with respect to the fact that an anti-doping officer
had failed to meet him/her for unannounced testing,
and indeed has exercised the right to state his/her
case. In that situation, no breach of the athlete’s right
to be heard is committed. This is the situation that
occurred in the Rasmussen’s case. Indeed, as the
parties themselves concede, the First Respondent
was put in the position to give reasons for his failure
to be at the place he was supposed on 28 April 2011
to be according to the whereabouts details he had
provided; reasons which were re-assessed by the UCI,
but found unsatisfactory. Therefore, the recording as
such of the missed test of 28 April 2011 by the UCI,
even though notice of the unsuccessful attempt had
been given past the 14-day deadline contemplated by
-
110
Article 11.6.3(b) IST, was not inconsistent with the
respect of Rasmussen’s rights and did not run against
the purposes of the rule intended to protect them.
The third reason is linked to the effects of a violation
of Article 11.6.3(b) IST. The Panel underlines that
a violation of the deadline contemplated by Article
11.6.3(b) IST is relevant in the results management
process of an apparent missed test also in another
direction, producing effects which, however, do not
preclude the finding that, in the Rasmussen’s case, a
missed test occurred on 28 April 2011. As mentioned
by WADA in an email of 13 October 2011 to the AntiDoping Committee of DIF (above), and stated in the
CAS award of 24 August 2011 (CAS 2011/A/2499,
at para. 27) with respect to fi ling failures, notice of a
whereabouts failure is necessary in order to prevent
an athlete from committing unknowingly the same
infringement again. In other words, an athlete cannot
be notified of a second (or third) failure unless the
first (or second) failure has been properly notified to
him/her: the athlete must be given the opportunity
to rectify his/her failure and to know how many
violations he/she has committed. This principle
means that a fourth (hypothetical) failure could not
be recorded against Rasmussen if committed before
the notice of the missed test of 28 April 2001; but
does not preclude the recording as a missed test of
the unsuccessful attempt to test him on 28 April 2011.
The fourth, and final, reason relates to the impact
of Article 3.2.2 NADR on a deviation from Article
11.6.3(b) IST. Under Article 3.2.2 NADR, a
departure from the IST can invalidate the finding of
an anti-doping rule violation only in the event said
anti-doping rule violation has been caused by the
departure itself. In the Rasmussen’s case, a departure
from the rule providing for a notice within fourteen
days of the unsuccessful testing attempt on 28 April
2011 did not cause the anti-doping rule violation for
which the First Respondent is held responsible: the
basis of the anti-doping rule violation contemplated
by Article 2.4 NADR is (in addition to the first two
failures) the fact that on 28 April 2011 Rasmussen was
not met by the competent anti-doping officer for outof-competition testing at the time and place he had
indicated in compliance with his obligation to provide
accurate whereabouts information. Such factual basis
is obviously not affected by events pertaining to the
subsequent administration process regarding it: the
fact that an unsuccessful testing attempt was notified
within, or past, fourteen days thereof does change the
fact that a test was missed by Rasmussen on 28 April
2001. Therefore, also pursuant to Art. 3.22 NADR,
a departure from Article 11.6.3(b) IST cannot be
invoked to invalidate the missed test of 28 April
2011. Whether in another set of circumstances a non-
respect of the notice period would make impossible
for an athlete to state the reasons for his/her failure
and whether such impossibility could have an impact
on the acceptance of the existence of a failure is an
issue that, for the above reasons, can be left open in
the present case.
The above finding leads to the conclusion that a
whereabouts failure was committed by the First
Respondent on 28 April 2011. Such failure was the
third in an eighteen month period, as it followed the
missed test of 1 February 2010 and the fi ling failure
for the fourth quarter of 2011. As a result of the above,
the Panel holds that Rasmussen committed the antidoping rule violation contemplated by Article 2.4
NADR.
2. What are the consequences to be applied for
the anti-doping rule violation committed by
Rasmussen ?
The second question that the Panel has to answer
concerns the consequences of the anti-doping
rule violation committed by Rasmussen: while the
Appellant holds that the maximum sanction of
two years of ineligibility, together with the ensuing
disqualification of results and other consequences,
has to be applied, the Respondents allege that only
the minimum sanction of one year, with the starting
date backdated to the moment of the missed test of
28 April 2011, has to be imposed.
The first point, therefore, concerns ineligibility. The
period of ineligibility which, under Article 10.3.3
NADR, could be imposed on Rasmussen for the
anti-doping rule violation contemplated by Article
2.4 NADR ranges from one to two years. The closing
period of Article 10.3.3 NADR makes it clear, then,
that the measure of the sanction depends on the
assessment of Rasmussen’s degree of fault: the AntiDoping Board decided not to impose any period of
ineligibility; the UCI disputes this conclusion, and
maintains that the level of negligence shown by the
First Respondent in dealing with his whereabouts
obligations was such as to command a sanction of
two years’ ineligibility.
The Panel finds that a period of eighteen months is
the appropriate measure of ineligibility for the First
Respondent, proportional to his degree of fault.
On one side, the Panel notes that the behaviour
of Rasmussen shows a patent disregard of his
whereabouts obligations, commanding a sanction
much higher than the minimum stipulated by
Article 10.3.3 NADR: the missed tests for which
he is responsible were in fact due not to unexpected
occurrences, but to circumstances (participation in a
-
111
competition in Germany or attendance at the sister’s
confirmation in Denmark) which had been scheduled
in advance, and therefore had left him with sufficient
time to keep his whereabouts information updated;
the fi ling failure concerning the fourth quarter of
2010 was explained by an oversight (amounting to
carelessness). On the other hand, the Panel remarks
that there is no suggestion (let alone evidence) that
Rasmussen committed the whereabouts failures, for
which he is held responsible, in order to hide from
testing and undergo a doping practice. For instance,
when the first missed test occurred, on 1 February
2010, Rasmussen was publicly competing in Berlin,
available for any form of doping control; then, on 28
April 2011, his location could be immediately traced.
A sanction lower than the maximum therefore
appears to be proportionate.
With respect to disqualification, however, the parties
dispute as to its starting date. Pursuant to Article
10.9.1 NADR, the period of ineligibility starts on the
date of the decision imposing the sanction. Therefore,
as in the present case this Panel is imposing a
sanction not applied by the Anti-Doping Board, the
date of this award would be the starting moment
of the ineligibility. Article 10.9.3 NADR, however,
gives this Panel the possibility to start the period of
ineligibility at an earlier date than the date of this
award, if “there have been substantial delays in the hearing
process or other aspects of doping control not attributable to the
athlete”. Such earlier date could be the date on which
the anti-doping rule violation last occurred.
On the basis of Article 10.9.3 NADR, and by taking
into due consideration the chronology of this case
and factual elements, but without making any strict
arithmetical calculation, the Panel finds it proper
to set on 1 October 2011 the starting moment of
the period of ineligibility imposed on Rasmussen.
The Panel comes to this conclusion by considering
that on 17 November 2011, when the Decision was
issued, Rasmussen was ready to accept an ineligibility
sanction of one year. If not for the Decision, which
went beyond the parties’ requests and expectations,
Rasmussen would have started to serve the sanction
on that date. In addition, the Panel notes that delays
occurred in the results management of the third
whereabouts failure by UCI. The failure of the UCI
to comply with the deadline indicated in Article
11.6.3(b) IST delayed in fact by around two months
the administrative procedure for the recording of
the missed test of 28 April 2011, and therefore the
ensuing disciplinary proceedings before the DIF
anti-doping bodies, which could in that event be
completed by 1 October 2011.
Pursuant to Article 10.9.2 NADR, any period of
provisional suspension is to be credited against the
total period of ineligibility imposed. Rasmussen was
provisionally suspended on 14 September 2011. The
period of provisional suspension served by Rasmussen
between 14 September 2011 and 1 October 2011,
the starting date of the ineligibility, is to be credited
against the eighteen months of ineligibility imposed
on him.
The second point concerns disqualification. The
UCI, in fact, requests that Rasmussen’s results
between 28 April 2011 and the date of the CAS award
be disqualified.
Under Article 10.8 NADR, all competitive results
obtained from the date an anti-doping rule violation
occurred, through the commencement of any
provisional suspension or ineligibility period, shall,
unless fairness requires otherwise, be disqualified
with all of the resulting consequences including
forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes.
In this case, the Panel finds that fairness requires
that no disqualification be imposed on the First
Respondent with respect to the results obtained in
the period between 28 April 2011, date of the third
whereabouts failure, and 14 September 2001, date
of the provisional suspension. In addition to the
fact that Rasmussen was not responsible for the
delay in the management of his case, the Panel finds
it important to emphasize the circumstance that,
as conceded by the UCI at the hearing, the First
Respondent’s competitive results after 28 April 2011
had not been affected by any doping practice, and
were fairly obtained by Rasmussen. Therefore, the
Panel sees no reason to disqualify them. At the same
time, the Panel underlines that the declaration that
Rasmussen is ineligible to compete as from 1 October
2011 implies the forfeiture of the results (including
medals, points and prizes) achieved in the period for
which ineligibility is retroactively imposed (award of
27 July 2009, CAS 2008/A/1744, para. 79-80).
In connection with above, the Appellant requests the
Panel also to condemn the First Respondent “to repay
all the prizes money” Rasmussen has won after 28 April
2011. The Panel, however, finds that, in addition to
the holding concerning disqualification as well as
forfeiture of results in the period of ineligibility, it has
no power, failing a legal basis, to condemn Rasmussen
to such repayment. Therefore, the request of the UCI
in that respect cannot be granted. The Panel only
notes that repayment of all prize money forfeited is a
condition of regaining eligibility pursuant to Article
10.8.1 NADR.
-
112
C. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Panel holds that the
appeal brought by UCI against the Decision is to
be partially granted: the Decision is to be set aside;
Rasmussen, having committed an anti-doping rule
violation under Article 2.4 NADR, is sanctioned,
in accordance with Article 10.3.3 NADR, with a
period of ineligibility of eighteen months, starting on
1 October 2011, with credit given for the period of
provisional suspension at that time already served.
The relief requested by the UCI with respect to
disqualification of results and repayment of prize
money is, on the other hand, to be dismissed to the
extent not covered by the sanction of ineligibility.
-
113
Dmitry Lapikov v. International Weightlifting Federation (IWF)
10 July 2012
Weightlifting; doping; specified substance; Methylhexaneamine (dimethylpentylamine) / S6 Stimulant; lex mitior;
intent to enhance performance; conditions of application of the reduction of
the period of ineligibility provided for
under art. 10.4 IWF ADP
Panel:
Mr. Martin Schimke (Germany), President
Ms. Alexandra Brilliantova (Russia)
Mr. Denis Oswald (Switzerland)
Relevant facts
Mr Dmitry Lapikov (“the Appellant ” or “the Athlete ”)
is an international athlete practicing weightlifting
and a member of the national team of the Russian
Weightlifting Federation (RWF).
The International Weightlifting Federation (“the
Respondent ” or “the IWF ”) is a permanent not for profit
organization composed of 189 affi liated national
federations worldwide, from all five continents. It
has its seat in Lausanne, Switzerland. The IWF is
governed by Swiss law, in particular Articles 60-79 of
the Swiss Civil Code.
On 19 and 26 August 2010, the Appellant underwent
two operations at the St Petersburg State Clinical
Hospital in order to address calculus (stones) in his
salivary glands. He was kept in hospital until early
September 2010. The Appellant caught the flu in
early January 2011.
The Appellant was advised by the then RWF team
doctor, Dr Alexander Cheliumov, to supplement
his daily food intake with more vitamins and amino
acids as a means of helping to prevent a recurrence
of his illness.
The Appellant consulted the internet, and with the
support of Dr Petrov, the RWF’s vice-president
for medical and anti-doping support, a qualified
but non-practicing doctor, selected the supplement
M5 Extreme (“the Supplement ”) produced by the
company Cellucor. The Appellant and Dr Petrov
compared the ingredients listed on the Cellucor
website with the 2011 Prohibited List of the WADA
Code. No reference was made on the website to
“methylhexanamine ” or “dimethylamylamine ” as being an
ingredient of the Supplement.
In order to obtain the Supplement more quickly, the
Appellant asked the RWF Vice-President, Maxim
Agapitov, who was visiting the USA between 15 and
23 January 2011, to take delivery of the Supplement
while in the USA, which Mr Agapitov did.
Mr Agapitov passed the Supplement over to Dr Petrov,
who gave it to the Appellant. On the Supplement’s
box, reference was made to “dimethylamylamine” as
being an ingredient of the Supplement. On the box
it was also explicitly mentioned: “[…] enhances athletic
performance ”.
Despite the reference to “dimethylamylamine ” on
the Supplement’s box, Dr Petrov still advised the
Appellant to take the Supplement in four courses,
these being 7-13 February, 28 February – 6 March,
21-27 March and 10-16 April 2011.
The Appellant was tested ahead of the 2011
European Weightlifting Championships in Kazan
by the Russian National Anti-Doping Agency on
31 March 2011 and 4 April 2011, four respectively
eight days after the end of the third course of intake
of the Supplement by the Appellant. No trace of a
Prohibited Substance was found in the sample.
On 17 April 2011, the Appellant won a gold medal.
He was then subjected to a drug test. The Appellant
disclosed on the doping control form that he had
been taking vitamins and amino acids.
On 13 May 2011, the Respondent notified the Russian
Weightlifting Federation (“the RWF”) of an Adverse
Analytical Finding (“AAF ”) of the presence of a
specified substance within the meaning of the World
Antidoping Code of the World Antidoping Agency
(“the WADA Code”), namely “methylhexanamine
-
114
(dimethylpentylamine)” ( “the Specified Substance”), in the
urine sample taken from the Appellant on 17 April
2011.
Respondent therefore confirmed that, in application
of the principle of the lex mitior, the Appellant should
be sanctioned with a two-year period of ineligibility.
The Appellant did not request an analysis of the B
sample, and he was provisionally suspended from 13
May 2011 onwards.
A hearing of the IWF Doping Hearing Panel (“the
IWF Panel ”) took place in Paris on 7 November
2011. The Appellant did not attend the hearing but
was represented by Mr Syrtsov, the President of the
RWF, who was accompanied by Dr Petrov and Mr
Krokhin.
Article R58 of the CAS Code sets out the law
applicable to resolving disputes using the Appeal
Arbitration Procedure. That provision provides as
follows:
During the hearing, Dr Petrov informed the IWF
Panel that the Appellant had not spoken to any coach
or team doctor before purchasing the Supplement.
Dr Petrov added that the Appellant was a very
experienced sportsman who would not have willingly
broken anti-doping rules, knowing particularly that
he would in any case be tested during the European
championships and that an AAF would prevent him
from competing in the London Olympics.
Following the hearing, the IWF Panel passed a
decision sanctioning the Appellant with four years’
ineligibility starting on 13 May 2011. Such decision,
dated 23 November 2011, was communicated to the
Appellant on 5 December 2011.
The Appellant fi led his statement of appeal to CAS
on 26 December 2011 and his appeal brief on 3
February 2012.
Based on the submissions made in his appeal brief,
the Appellant “reduced ” his requests for relief, inviting
the CAS Panel to “allow his appeal, and to substitute a
sanction of 9 months from 13 May 2011, alternatively a
sanction which would not prevent him from competing at the
London Olympics”.
The Respondent submitted its answer on 29 February
2012.
The award requested by the Respondent is as follows:
“ I. The Appeal filed by Mr. Dmitry Lapikov is dismissed.
II. The International Weightlifting Federation is granted an
award for costs”.
A. Applicable law
absence of such choice, according to the law of the country in
to the rule of law, the application of which the Panel deems
its decision”.
In the case at hand, the applicable regulations are the
IWF ADP, which is not in dispute after both parties
had confirmed at the hearing that the issue related
to the four-year ban had been resolved. Subsidiarily,
Swiss law is applicable as the IWF is domiciled in
Switzerland, which is also not in dispute.
B. Merits
1.
The four-year ban and the issue of proportionality
Article 10 of the IWF ADP “Sanctions on Individuals”
states:
(…)
10.2 Ineligibility for Presence, Use or Attempted Use, or
Possession of Prohibited Substances and Prohibited Methods
The period of Ineligibility imposed for a violation of Article
2.1 (Presence of Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or
Markers), Article 2.2 (Use or Attempted Use of Prohibited
Substance or Prohibited Method) or Article 2.6 (Possession
of Prohibited Substances and Methods) shall be as follows,
unless the conditions for eliminating or reducing the period of
Ineligibility, as provided in Articles 10.4 and 10.5, or the
conditions for increasing the period of Ineligibility, as provided
in Article 10.6, are met:
First violation: Four (4) years’ Ineligibility.
On 15 May 2012, the Respondent informed CAS that
the IWF executive board had met on 9 May 2012 and
had decided inter alia “to amend the IWF Anti-Doping
Policy (IWF ADP) in the sense that the sanction for specified
substances is reduced to two years, with immediate effect”. The
(…)”
The wording of Article 10.2 of the IWF ADP is
identical to the wording of Article 10.2 of the WADA
-
115
Code, with the sole exception that the WADA Code
provides for two (2) years’ ineligibility for a first
offence. At the outset of the appeal proceedings, the
parties were arguing about the compatibility of article
10.2 IWF ADP with the WADA Code and about the
proportionality and compatibility with Swiss law, and
the Appellant’s personality rights pursuant to the
latter law.
With the decision passed on 9 May 2012 by the IWF
Executive Board to reduce the ineligibility period
from 4 to 2 years, the discrepancy between the IWF
ADP and the WADA Code no longer exists.
In other words, since 9 May 2012, article 10.2 of the
IWF ADP provides a two-year ineligibility period
for a first offence. In application of the principle of
the lex mitior, the Panel decides that the Appellant is
to benefit from the amended version of article 10.2
of the IWF ADP. This has been put forward by the
Respondent itself in its letter to CAS dated 15 May
2012. In addition, both parties have agreed on this
during the hearing, so that the application of the
amended article 10.2 of the IWF ADP to the present
proceedings is undisputed.
Based on the above, and in the absence of any
of the aggravating circumstances alleged by the
Respondent, the Panel finds that the Appellant’s
period of ineligibility is not to exceed two years
starting on 13 May 2011.
2. Reduction of the period of ineligibility based on
article 10.4 of the IWF ADP
The second of the Appellant’s grounds for appeal is
that the period of ineligibility should be eliminated
altogether or reduced pursuant to article 10.4 of the
IWF ADP.
The relevant parts of Article 10.4 IWF ADP provides
as follows:
“Where an Athlete or other Person can establish how a
Specified Substance entered his or her body or came into his
or her possession and that such Specified Substance was not
intended to enhance the Athlete’s sport performance or mask
the use of a performance-enhancing substance, the period of
ineligibility found in Article 10.2 shall be replaced with the
following:
First violation: At a minimum, a reprimand and no period of
ineligibility from future Events, and at a maximum, two (2)
years of Ineligibility.
To justify any elimination or reduction, the Athlete or other
Person must produce corroborating evidence in addition to his
or her word which establishes to the comfortable satisfaction
of the hearing panel the absence of an intent to enhance sport
performance or mask the use of a performance enhancing
substance. The Athlete’s or other Person’s degree of fault shall be
the criterion considered in assessing any reduction of the period
of ineligibility”.
The commentary to article 10.4 IWF ADP explains
the scope of the article in the sense that “there is a
greater likelihood that Specified Substances, as opposed to other
Prohibited Substances, could be susceptible to a credible, non
doping explanation”.
The Appellant tested positive to methylhexanamine
(dimethylpentylamine) following the anti-doping
control of 17 April 2011. Methylhexanamine
(dimethylpentylamine) is a Specified Substance
listed under class S6 Stimulants and is prohibited in
competition according to the IWF ADP and the 2011
WADA list of prohibited substances. All this is not
in dispute.
The Appellant was able to explain the presence of
the Specified Substance in his bodily sample by the
ingestion of the Supplement M5 Extreme. This is not
disputed either.
What the parties are arguing about are the reasons
why the Athlete took the Supplement.
The Appellant claims that he had to recover from two
surgical operations and from the flu and was advised
by his team doctor to take vitamins and amino acids.
With the approval of Dr Petrov, a non-practicing
doctor but a vice-president of the RWF for antidoping support, the Appellant took the supplement
M5 Extreme in order to recover from his operations
and from the flu. Before the IWF Hearing Panel, the
Appellant explained that he took the Supplement for
“ergogenic effect and better well feeling”. During the hearing,
the Appellant’s counsel maintained the argument that
a Specified Substance could actually be taken during
training and was only prohibited during competition.
According to the Appellant’s counsel, what is crucial
is that the Appellant did not intend to enhance his
athletic performance during the competition.
The Respondent argues that the clear description on
the Supplement’s box of its effects on the user, as well
as the contradictions between the first and second
and last statements of the Appellant, show that his
intention was to improve his athletic performance.
After having carefully reviewed all the evidence
produced during the proceedings, notably the
statements of the Appellant and Dr Petrov, the Panel
finds that the Appellant was not able to establish to
-
116
the Panel’s comfortable satisfaction that it was not
the Appellant’s intention to enhance his athletic
performance.
Substance “Methylhexanamine (dimethylpentylamine)”.
Indeed, the Panel finds that article 10.4 IWF ADP
covers cases where a Specified Substance enters an
athlete’s body without him knowing it at the time of
the intake. This point is essential in order to give any
sense to the possibility of reducing a sanction on the
basis of article 10.4 IWF ADP. It goes without saying
that an athlete who knowingly takes a Specified
Substance and who is eventually tested positive cannot
benefit from a reduction of the period of ineligibility
simply by arguing that he did not take the Specified
Substance to improve his athletic performance, as
allowed for by article 10.4 IWF ADP.
- the large degree of similarity between the
description of the Supplement on its box, which
contained a clear reference to its performanceenhancing effect, and the relevant WADA-List of
prohibited substances with;
The Panel also refers here to the possibility of
granting TUEs, which when granted allow an athlete
to take a Prohibited Substance, notably a Specified
Substance. If article 10.4 IWF ADP were to apply to
cases where athletes knowingly ingested Specified
Substances, the system of granting TUEs would be
rendered useless, which obviously is not the intention
of the IWF ADP.
It is therefore worth pointing out that all of the athletes
in, for example, CAS 2007/A/1395, 2010/A/2107,
CAS A2/2011, CAS 2011/A/2645 did not know that
the supplement they had taken contained a Specified
Substance. It is only in such cases where the athlete
does not know that the supplement contained a
Specified Substance will such athlete only have to
prove that he/she did not take the Specified Substance
with the intent to enhance athletic performance and
will not have to prove that he/she did not take the
product (e.g. a food supplement) with the intent to
enhance athletic performance (see the discussions in
CAS 2011/A/2645 para. 80 sec.; CAS 2010/A/2107
para. 9.14 and 9.17; against it CAS A2/2011 para. 47).
In the present case, the Panel thus finds it decisive
that the Athlete confirmed on 5 July 2011 and – on
explicit request – at the hearing that he and Dr Petrov
checked the ingredients contained in the Supplement
against the WADA-List and had noticed the presence
of dimethylamilamine. The Athlete admitted in his
statement dated 5 July 2011 that this substance had a
“similar name however not from the WADA list of prohibited
substances”. Dr Petrov admitted that the name was
similar, but apparently had realized that this was the
same substance only upon further inquiries after the
Appellant had been tested positive.
However, a quick research in the internet would have
directly revealed to the Appellant and Dr Petrov that
“dimethylamilamine” was another word for the Specified
In light of:
- the numerous warnings made by WADA, the IOC,
and nearly all of the sport federations on the risks
associated with the intake of food supplements
(see notably CAS 2003/A/484; 2005/A/847 or
CAS 2009/A/1915);
- the fact that the Appellant, a top professional
athlete with many years of experience, had to
have known that he was personally responsible
for checking whether or not the Supplement
contained a Specified Substance; and
- the fact that the 2011 WADA list, which the
Appellant had admitted on several occasions to
have carefully consulted both on his own and with
his doctor, makes reference to “methylhexaneamine
(dimethylpentylamine) (…) and other substances with a
similar chemical structure or similar biological effect(s)”.
[Emphasis added],
the Panel holds that by not checking whether the
substance “dimethylamilamine”, which the Athlete
had found on the Supplement’s box, was the same
substance as the substance “dimethylpentylamine”,
which the Athlete had found on the 2011 WADA
List, the Athlete took the risk of ingesting a Specified
Substance when taking the Supplement and therefore
of enhancing his athletic performance. In other words,
whether with full intent or per “dolus eventualis”, the
Panel finds that the Appellant’s approach indicates
an intent on the part of the Appellant to enhance
his athletic performance within the meaning of Art.
10.4. IWF ADP.
Based on the foregoing, the Panel finds that this
degree of intent on the part of the Appellant excludes
any application of the reduction provided for under
article 10.4 IWF ADP. Indeed, an athlete who
intentionally ingests a Prohibited Substance accepts,
beyond any reasonable doubt, that it may enhance
his/her athletic performance. The Appellant’s intent
to ingest the Prohibited Substance therefore prevents
him per se from comfortably satisfying the Panel
that he did not intend to enhance his performance.
Notwithstanding this, the requirements for such
proof would have been extremely difficult in light of
the fact that the supplement’s box explicitly mentions
-
117
the quality/feature “[…] enhances athletic performance”.
In his situation, the Athlete should have clearly
switched to another product that contained vitamins
and amino acids, bearing in mind that his doctor had
not advised him to take any other type of supplements.
Alternatively, the Athlete should have made sure that
no trace of the Specified Substance would remain in
his body during the competition. In this respect, Dr
Petrov himself admitted that the intake program of
the Athlete had perhaps been “too ambitious”.
The Athlete not only took the risk of ingesting a
Prohibited Substance, but decided to take it up to
the last moment in order to benefit from the effects
of the Supplement as long as possible. This double
acceptance of the risk by the Athlete led to the
Adverse Analytical Finding.
Again the Panel stresses that it carefully reviewed the
extensive case law put forward by the Appellant and
found support for its interpretation of article 10.4
IWF ADP. In all of the cases cited by the Appellant,
there was no intent on the part of the athlete to ingest
the prohibited substance. The athletes in those cases
were able to demonstrate that the ingestion was not
intentional and that it was accidental, either due to
contamination, wrong labelling, or light degrees of
negligence. The case of the Appellant - who was
ingesting a Supplement that contained a prohibited
substance indicated on its box - is therefore not
comparable to the cases cited in the appeal brief and
at the hearing.
After a careful review of the relevant case law, the
Panel is thus convinced that a period of ineligibility
of two years is appropriate as far as article 10.4 IWF
ADP is concerned.
3. Reduction of the period of ineligibility based on
article 10.5.2 of the IWF ADP
Article 10.5.2 IWF ADP provides in its relevant part
as follows:
“If an Athlete or other Person establishes in an individual
case that he or she bears no Significant Fault or Negligence,
then the period of Ineligibility may be reduced, but the
reduced period of Ineligibility may not be less than one-half
of the period of Ineligibility otherwise applicable (…) when a
Prohibited Substance or its Markers or Metabolites is detected
in an Athlete’s Sample in violation of Article 2.1 (Presence of
Prohibited Substance or its Metabolites or Markers), the Athlete
must also establish how the Prohibited Substance entered his or
her system in order to have the period of Ineligibility reduced”.
The Appellant’s arguments in relation to this ground
of the appeal are similar to those in relation to the
previous one, namely that the Appellant did not
know that the Supplement contained a Prohibited
Substance and that it was not his intention to enhance
his athletic performance.
The Panel finds again here that the approach taken
by the Appellant speaks against him. Referring to the
reasoning developed above, the Panel stresses again
that the Supplement’s box indicated the presence of
a Prohibited Substance in that product and that the
Appellant can therefore not insist on benefitting from
a reduction of the applicable period of ineligibility
only for the simple fact that he could explain that
the Prohibited Substance entered his system through
the intentional intake of such Prohibited Substance,
which was expressly indicated on the Supplement’s
box, with reference to the 2011 WADA List.
Furthermore, under this article 10.2.5 IWF ADP, the
Panel considers that even without reference to the
Athlete’s intention to take the Prohibited Substance,
the approach taken by the Athlete lacks any
satisfactory justification and excludes any reduction
of the period of ineligibility provided for under
article 10.2 IWF ADP.
After a careful review of article 10.5.2 and its related
case law, notably CAS 2011/A/2518, 2010/A/2107,
2010/A/2229, 2008/A/1489 and 2009/A/1870, where
all the athletes did not know about the presence of
the Prohibited Substance in the food supplement they
had ingested before being tested positive, the Panel
is thus convinced that this article does not apply to
the present case, and that in any case, the approach
taken by the Appellant cannot allow a reduction of
the period of ineligibility of two years.
The Panel eventually wishes to underline that it
is perfectly aware of the harsh consequences of its
decision, which will prevent the Appellant from taking
part in the London 2012 Olympics. Nevertheless, for
all the reasons explained above, the Panel does not
see any legal justification for a reduction of the period
of ineligibility, for example and in particular based
on the doctrine of proportionality. Proportionality
has focused on perceived fairness to the athlete
based upon the pretence that the sanction imposed
is deemed excessive or unfair on its face (see Richard
H. McLaren, CAS Doping Jurisprudence: What
Can We Learn ?, Paper delivered at the seminar for
the members of CAS held in Divonne, France on
15th & 16th June 2005, p. 26, 27). Accordingly, CAS
case law shows that an athlete has a high hurdle to
overcome if he or she wants to prove the existence of
such exceptional circumstances (see for example CAS
2005/A/830, 10.24 et seq., CAS 2010/A/2268, 133 et
-
118
seq.). Likewise the Swiss Federal Court held that the
issue of proportionality would only be a legitimate
issue if a CAS award constituted an infringement
on individual rights that was extremely serious
and completely disproportionate to the behaviour
penalised (see Richard H. McLaren, ibidem, p. 30). In
the case at hand such exceptional circumstances have
neither been asserted by the Appellant, nor are they
evident. The risk that an important sports event such
as the Olympic Games may accidentally fall within
the period of a ban is inherent in the system and
even constitutes a crucial element of this sanction.
Therefore, a reduction solely based on the occurrence
of an important sports event would undermine the
whole system of doping sanctions.
Based on all of the above, and after reviewing the
evidence, the submissions, and the case law produced
in the written proceedings and at the hearing, the
Panel comes to the conclusion that the Appellant
is to be sanctioned with a period of two years of
ineligibility starting on 13 May 2011.
-
119
International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. Real Federación
Española de Atletismo (RFEA) & Francisco Fernández Peláez
17 April 2012
integral part of the 2011 IAAF Anti-Doping Rules
(the “IAAF Rules”), as provided by the IAAF Rules
themselves (the “Prohibited List ”).
Athletics; doping; Substantial Assistance; international Federations’ power
of review of decision taken at national
level in doping cases; condition to benefit from a reduction of the sanction
based on Substantial Assistance; scope
of the factors considered in assessing
Substantial Assistance
Panel:
Mr. Romano Subiotto QC (Belgium and United Kingdom),
Sole Arbitrator
Relevant facts
The International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF), the Appellant, is the international governing
body for track and field athletics.
The Real Federación Española de Atletismo (RFEA)
is the national federation of athletics in Spain and is a
member of the IAAF.
Francisco Fernández Peláez (the “Athlete ” or
“Fernández ”), the second Respondent, is a Spanish
race walker. Fernández is a member of the RFEA and
has competed at an international level for Spain on
numerous occasions. The IAAF, the RFEA and the
Athlete are collectively referred to as the “Parties”.
In November 2009, the Spanish Guardia Civil carried
out a number of police raids in locations across
Spain that targeted an alleged doping ring involving
doctors, pharmacists and athletes. This police
operation, called “Operación Grial ”. Fernández’s home
was one of the locations raided by the Civil Guard,
where EPO and other performance-enhancing
drugs were reportedly found. These substances
feature in the list of Prohibited Substances under the
2010 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) List of
Prohibited Substances and Methods, which forms an
On February 10, 2010, Fernández appeared
voluntarily at the Guardia Civil’s Central Operative
Unit (the “UCO ”) headquarters in Madrid.
On the same day, Fernández also appeared
voluntarily (and absent disciplinary proceedings or
adverse analytical findings formally lodged against
him) before the Chairman of the RFEA and declared
that (i) to date, no prohibited substance had ever
been detected in his body; (ii) he violated the IAAF
Rules due to the possession of substances included
in the Prohibited List; (iii) he was not aware of the
exact composition of these substances, which were
provided by a doctor, but he believed they featured
in sections S1 and S2 of the Prohibited List (iv) he
had cooperated with the Spanish judicial authorities
and the police, providing testimony in the context
of “Operacíon Grial ”; (v) his cooperation aimed at
revealing information about medical treatments, the
sale and distribution of prohibited substances, the
organisation of the doping ring , and other data; and
(vi) the Spanish police considered his cooperation
to be substantial for the purpose of establishing
criminal violations by third Parties in a Spanish
Criminal Court.
On February 11, 2010, Fernández was provisionally
suspended from competitions.
On February 25, 2010, Fernández appeared
voluntarily for a second time before the UCO.
On June, 10, 2010, Fernández appeared before the
Spanish judge in charge of the criminal case at the
Investigating Magistrate’s Court no.14 in Valencia
and confirmed the evidence that he had previously
given to the police.
On November 30, 2010, the Parties signed an
“Agreement to Co-operate ” (the “Agreement ”).
On April 7, 2011, Fernández informed the IAAF
that the criminal proceedings were now before the
Audiencia Nacional de Madrid and that, pursuant
to Article 301 of the Spanish Law on criminal
-
120
proceedings, proceedings had to remain secret until
the oral phase, and that he would therefore be unable
to provide more information to the IAAF at this
stage.
A. Proceedings at national level
In December 2009, the Commission for Control
and Monitoring Health and Doping of the Council
for Sport (the “CMHD Commission”) decided to start
proceedings against Fernández.
On February 11, 2010, the Competition and
Jurisdiction Committee, (the “RFEA Committee on
Sports Discipline”) initiated disciplinary proceedings
against Fernández and provisionally suspended the
athlete.
On February 24, 2010, the case-handler within the
RFEA Committee on Sports Discipline proposed
that Fernández be suspended for a period of two
years due to a breach of the IAAF Rules, pursuant
to Article 15.1 of the Organic Act of 7/2006 of
November 21, 2006 on the protection of health
care and against doping in sport (the “Organic Act”),
Article 40.2 of the IAAF Rules, and Article 10.2 of
the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADA Code”).
On March 18, 2010, Fernández’s request for a reduced
penalty was rejected, because of the lack of evidence
on the extent of his cooperation with the authorities,
and the case was referred to the RFEA Committee
on Sports Discipline for further review.
On March 24, 2010, the RFEA Committee on Sports
Discipline found Fernández guilty of an anti-doping
rule violation, declared him ineligible for 2 years,
and disqualified his results pursuant to the Organic
Act, the WADA Code and the IAAF Rules. This
period was reduced by the period already served
by the Athlete during his provisional suspension.
This decision did not take Fernández’s cooperation
with the UCO into consideration, given that this
cooperation had not been sufficiently evidenced.
On March 29, 2010, Fernández forwarded a statement
to the RFEA Committee on Sports Discipline which
he had obtained from the Police Chief in charge of
the UCO, which sought to confirm the nature of his
assistance to the police authorities.
On April 7, 2010, the RFEA informed the IAAF that
Fernández had been found guilty of an anti-doping
rule violation.
On April 9, 2010, Fernández appealed the decision
dated March 24, 2010 before the Spanish Committee
on Sports Discipline.
On April 12, 2010, upon receipt of the UCO’s
certificate, the RFEA Committee on Sports
Discipline requested the CMHD Commission to
provide a report concerning Fernández’s assistance
to the Spanish authorities.
On April 20, 2010, the CMHD Commission issued
an official statement concerning the cooperation of
Fernández.
On May 10, 2010, the RFEA Committee on Sports
Discipline decided (i) to send to the Spanish
Committee on Sports Discipline the report favouring
exoneration Article 26 of the Organic Act issued by
the CMHD Commission on April 20, 2010; (ii) to
notify the IAAF of the petition for exoneration and
of the reports favouring exoneration dated April 20,
2010, and (iii) to declare that the RFEA Committee
on Sports Discipline did not have jurisdiction to
decide on Fernández’s exoneration, since such a
decision was within the exclusive competence of the
IAAF’s Doping Review Board (DRB).
On June 11, 2010, the Arbitrator of the Spanish
Committee on Sports Discipline decided to reject
Fernández’s appeal against the decision of the RFEA
Committee on Sports Discipline, and to refer the
appeal back to the RFEA Committee on Sports
Discipline.
On June 28, 2010, the RFEA Committee on Sports
Discipline decided to reduce the 2-year penalty
period of ineligibility and to reduce his ineligibility to
one year, on the grounds that it had been proven that
Fernández was cooperating as a witness in the case of
an alleged crime.
On July 16, 2010, the IAAF informed the RFEA
that pursuant to Article 40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules,
any reduction of a sanction based on Substantial
Assistance could only be decided after the DRB had
determined that there was Substantial Assistance
and even then, only if the WADA agreed with such
consideration.
Discipline agreed not to extend the Athlete’s
ineligibility beyond the reduced one-year term (the
“RFEA Decision”).
Upon receipt, the IAAF wrote, by letter dated July
7, 2011, to the RFEA that only a final decision
adopted by the RFEA would be open to an appeal
before the CAS either by the IAAF or the WADA.
The IAAF then invited the RFEA to provide further
-
121
clarification as to its position and in particular, as to
the final status of the RFEA Decision, by July 13,
2011 at the latest.
Since the RFEA had not provided the information
the DRB had requested, the DRB extended the time
for an appeal to the CAS several times.
Fernández’s case was subsequently referred back to
the DRB pursuant to IAAF Rule 42.15 to decide
whether to appeal the RFEA Decision to the CAS.
The DRB therefore decided, given the continuing
absence of any evidence of Substantial Assistance in
accordance with the IAAF Rules, that the RFEA’s
decision was erroneous and that there was no option
but to fi le an appeal with the CAS.
On December 9, 2011, the DRB re-imposed a
provisional suspension on Fernández pending the
CAS hearing (the “IAAF Decision”).
B. Proceedings before the CAS
On December 20, 2011, the IAAF fi led its Statement
of Appeal against the RFEA and Fernández with
respect to the RFEA Decision.
On February 24, 2012, the IAAF fi led its Appeal
Brief with the CAS requesting the CAS set aside the
RFEA Decision and impose a two-year ineligibility
period on Fernández, less the period of ineligibility
already executed by him.
On February 28, 2012, Fernández fi led his Answer
to the IAAF’s Appeal Brief arguing that the appeal
was inadmissible and subsidiarily, that the RFEA
Decision be confirmed.
On March 1, 2012, the IAAF fi led its Reply Brief.
On March 5, 2012, the RFEA informed the CAS
that it did not intend to take any action in its defense
in the proceedings before the CAS. However, the
RFEA explained, in that letter, the actions of the
RFEA Committee on Sports Discipline.
On March 5, 2012, Fernández fi led his Reply Brief
to the CAS.
This Arbitrator shall decide the dispute according to the
applicable regulations and the rules of law chosen by the Parties
or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the
country in which the federation, association or sports-related
body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled
or according to the rules of law, the application of which the
Arbitrator deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Arbitrator
shall give reasons for its decision.
The Sole Arbitrator notes that the decisions of the
RFEA applied the IAAF Rules in determining
whether an anti-doping rule violation had been
committed and in setting the sanctions to be imposed
on Fernández.
The Sole Arbitrator therefore concludes that this
dispute has to be determined on the basis of the
IAAF Rules, and this is not contested by the Parties.
B. Admissibility
In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of
the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or of
a previous agreement, the time limit for appeal shall be twentyone days from the receipt of the decision appealed against. After
having consulted the Parties, the Division President may refuse
to entertain an appeal if it is manifestly late.
Article 42.13 of the IAAF Rules provides as follows:
Unless stated otherwise in these Rules (or the Doping Review
Board determines otherwise in cases where the IAAF is the
prospective appellant), the appellant shall have forty-five (45)
days in which to file his statement of appeal with CAS starting
from the date of communication of the written reasons of the
decision to be appealed (in English or French where the IAAF
is the prospective appellant) or from the last day on which the
decision could have been appealed to the national level appeal
body in accordance with Rule 42.8(b). Within fifteen (15) days
of the deadline for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant
shall file his appeal brief with CAS and, within thirty (30)
days of receipt of the appeal brief, the respondent shall file his
answer with CAS.
As a preliminary point, the Arbitrator wishes to recall
the facts relevant to the deadline to fi le the appeal in
this case.
A. Applicable Law
Article R58 Law Applicable
On November 30, 2010, the Parties signed the
Agreement in which they agreed that the decision of
the RFEA would be subject to appeal to the CAS, in
accordance with the IAAF Rules.
On February 10, 2011, the IAAF requested, by
e-mail, that the RFEA review Fernández’s case as
-
122
provided for by the Agreement. This e-mail was left
unanswered.
On May 12, 2011, the IAAF sent a letter to the RFEA
reminding it that it had to review Fernández’s case
pursuant to the Agreement and that, since the date
had passed, the IAAF asked the RFEA what steps
had been taken to review the matter.
Discipline approved the one-year sanction imposed
on the Athlete. On May 18, 2011, the RFEA answered
the IAAF and informed it of the result of the hearing
of the RFEA Committee on Sports Discipline.
On July 7, 2011, the IAAF wrote to the RFEA in
an attempt to obtain clarification of the RFEA
Committee on Sports Discipline’s ruling and to seek
whether the RFEA would take a subsequent decision,
in conformity with the Agreement, which would then
be subject to appeal to the CAS. The IAAF requested
the RFEA to answer by July 13, 2011. This was left
unanswered.
Pending such clarification, on July 4, 2011, the IAAF
took the precaution to extend the time for appealing
to the CAS until August 5, 2011, and this was
communicated to the RFEA on July 7, 2011, by letter.
Since the IAAF’s request for clarification was left
unanswered, on July 18, 2011, the IAAF reminded
the RFEA to provide the IAAF with clarification as
to Fernández’s case. This was left unanswered.
On August 3, 2011, the IAAF reminded the
RFEA, again, that it had failed to answer the
request for clarification on Fernández’s case. This
communication was left unanswered.
Since the IAAF’s communication remained
unanswered, on August 3, 2011, the DRB further
extended time for appealing to the CAS until
September 16, 2011.
The RFEA finally replied, by e-mail, on August 5,
2011, attaching a letter of the RFEA Committee on
Sports Discipline, confirming that it had taken a final
decision on May 17, 2011, and explaining the reasons
for such decision.
The second extension of the deadline was notified to
the RFEA on August 15, 2011, along with a request
for information concerning the facts and documents
relied upon in reaching the RFEA Decision. This
attempt of clarification was left unanswered. A
reminder was sent on September 8, 2011, requesting
clarification by September 9, 2011. The reminder was
also left unanswered.
Due to the absence of the information requested
(either from the RFEA or from Fernández), on
September 16, 2011, the DRB further extended time
for appealing under Article 42.13 of the IAAF Rules
until October 17, 2011. This was notified to the
RFEA by letter on September 16, 2011, along with a
request to provide information as to Fernández’s case
by September 23, 2011.
On October 17, 2011, after a meeting with the RFEA
to advance the IAAF’s previous request, which had
hitherto remained unanswered, the DRB further
extended the time for an appeal under Article 42.13
until October 25, 2011, and then until November 30,
2011, in order to allow the members to meet in person
to review the updated information in Fernández’s
case and to discuss the IAAF’s position on appeal.
This was notified to the RFEA, by letter, on October
22, 2011.
On November 30, 2011, the DRB finally extended
the time for appealing to CAS until 20 December
2011. This was notified to the RFEA on November
30, 2011.
In accordance with the DRB’s final extension of time
on November 30, 2011, the IAAF fi led its appeal
with the CAS on December 20, 2011.
Concerning the first deadline of 45 days, the Sole
Arbitrator holds that time could not run before
August 5, 2011 since the IAAF, despite numerous
reminders, had not received any answer to its basic
question of whether the RFEA Decision was a
binding act against which an appeal could be fi led.
The Sole Arbitrator acknowledges that the RFEA
mentioned in its Decision that it was a final decision,
but such statement was contested because it did not
comply with the Agreement and this was precisely
the reason why the IAAF was seeking clarification.
In addition, Article 40.5 of the IAAF Rules provides
that “If the Member suspends any part of the period of
Ineligibility under this Rule, the Member shall promptly provide
a written justification for its decision to the IAAF and any
other party”. Since no justification had been provided
concerning the RFEA’s departure from the terms of
the Agreement, the IAAF could justifiably question
the binding character of the RFEA Decision.
Fernández’s allegation that the RFEA Decision was
identical to the communication of the reasoning
dated August 5, 2011 is therefore rejected.
In any case, according to Article 42.13 of the IAAF
Rules, “the appellant shall have forty-five (45) days in which
-
123
to file his statement of appeal with CAS starting from the
date of communication of the written reasons of the decision to
be appealed”. Since the written reasons of the RFEA
Decision were communicated on August 5, 2011, the
Sole Arbitrator considers that the 45-day deadline
had not passed when the DRB took the first decision
to extend it.
The Sole Arbitrator acknowledges that, should the
deadline have started to run on May 18, 2010, the
IAAF extended the time to fi le an appeal, pursuant
to Article 42.13, on July 4, 2011, which was clearly
within the deadline of 45 days from the date of the
reception of the RFEA Decision.
As to the second extension of the deadline to fi le
an appeal, the Sole Arbitrator notes that, on August
3, 2011, the IAAF extended the deadline to fi le an
appeal until September 16, 2011, in conformity with
Article 42.13 of the IAAF Rules.
Concerning the extension of the deadline agreed on
November 30, 2011, the Sole Arbitrator considers
that it was duly extended, in conformity with Article
42.13, until December 20, 2011.
The Sole Arbitrator finds that, in deciding whether
a decision to extend the deadline was duly adopted
before the expiration of the applicable deadline at
that time, the date of the notification of the extension
to the relevant entity, rather than the minutes of
meetings at which the decision to extend was taken,
or the decision itself, is relevant.
The Sole Arbitrator further finds that the IAAF
Rules do not provide for a notification of the DRB’s
decisions to the Athlete. The IAAF’s contractual
relationship is with the RFEA. In any case, Article
30.7 of the IAAF Rules mentions expressly that
“Notice under these Anti-Doping Rules to an Athlete or
other Person who is under the jurisdiction of a Member may be
accomplished by delivery of the notice to the Member concerned.
The Member shall be responsible for making immediate
contact with the Athlete or other Person to whom the notice
is applicable.” Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator considers
that the IAAF did not need to notify the DRB’s
decisions to Fernández.
The Sole Arbitrator holds that, since the decisions
to extend the deadlines were notified to the RFEA
within the required deadlines and in conformity with
the IAAF Rules, they were not arbitrary.
particular the desirability for the IAAF, and any
international federation for that matter, to have
all the elements in its possession in order to take a
reasoned decision on whether to appeal (particularly
when the prospective appellant was not a party to the
first instance proceedings), are sufficient grounds to
warrant a postponement of the deadlines to appeal a
decision rendered by a national federation until such
time as the IAAF has been sufficiently informed
on the meaning, nature, and scope of the national
federation’s decision.
In this case, the correspondence shows that the
IAAF addressed questions repeatedly to the RFEA;
it either received no answers, or received them very
late. The Sole Arbitrator considers that the difficulties
encountered by the IAAF in obtaining information
from the RFEA, and in particular on such a basic
issue as the binding nature of the RFEA Decision,
clearly justified the extensions of the deadline to
appeal in this case. Taking into consideration all
the documents submitted by the Parties, it clearly
appears that the IAAF made its best efforts to seek
clarification from the RFEA from the outset of the
case. It is unfortunate that its numerous attempts
were left unanswered. The absence of clarification on
the part of the RFEA was precisely the reason why
the IAAF was left with no other choice but to extend
the deadline to fi le an appeal, in order for its rights
of appeal to remain unaffected. The Sole Arbitrator
acknowledges that the IAAF extended the deadline
to fi le an appeal, in conformity with Article 42.13, in
an attempt to protect its rights, given that the RFEA
was not answering its requests for clarification.
For all the above-mentioned reasons, the Sole
Arbitrator finds that the appeal was fi led within the
deadline provided by the IAAF Rules. It complied
with all other requirements of Article R48 of the
CAS Code, including the payment of the CAS Court
office fee. It follows that the appeal is admissible.
C. Violation of doping Rule
Article 32.2(f) of the IAAF Rules prohibits the
possession of prohibited substances.
Fernández does not contest the fact that he was found
in possession of sport enhancing substances and that
these substances appear on the Prohibited List.
Fernández therefore admits to having committed a
doping offence under the IAAF Rules.
The Sole Arbitrator finds that the IAAF Rules do
not require a particular justification for extending
the deadline to fi le an appeal. However, it cannot
be contested that administrative efficiency, and in
-
124
D. Merits
1.
Applicability of Spanish Law within the RFEA
Decision
The IAAF considers that, in taking the RFEA
Decision, the RFEA Committee on Sports Discipline
was wrong to have given precedence to Spanish Law
over the IAAF Rules.
The Sole Arbitrator notes that the RFEA is the
Member Federation of the IAAF for Spain, and is,
as such, required to apply the IAAF Rules. Indeed,
Member Federations are required to comply with all
applicable IAAF Rules and Regulations pursuant to
Article 4.8 of the IAAF Constitution. Furthermore,
according to Article 30.1 of the IAAF Rules, the
IAAF Rules shall apply to the IAAF, its Members and
to Athletes. Finally, Article 30.2 of the IAAF Rules
provides that all Members and Area Associations
are required to comply with the IAAF Anti-Doping
Rules and Regulations. The RFEA recognized itself
in its Decision that Fernández “is subject to the Spanish
disciplinary rules and administrative procedure, without
prejudice to his also being subject to the rules of the IAAF”.
Moreover, Fernández acknowledged, at various stage
of the procedure, that the IAAF Rules are applicable.
Indeed, he referred the case to the DRB pursuant
to Article 40.5 (c) of the IAAF Rules; and he signed
the Agreement according to which the issue of
Substantial Assistance would be determined under
the IAAF Rules.
Therefore, the Sole Arbitrator considers that, while
deciding to disregard the IAAF Rules, the RFEA
violated its obligations as a member of the IAAF.
2. Violation of the Agreement by the RFEA
On November 30, 2010, the Parties signed the
Agreement. The Sole Arbitrator finds that the
Agreement provides clearly that the RFEA had to
review the Athlete’s case so as to verify that Fernández
had complied with the conditions set forth in the
DRB’s Decision. However, the RFEA deliberately
violated the terms of the Agreement it had signed
by deciding to take a final decision confirming
a reduction of the sanction to one year, without
explaining Fernández’s fulfi lment of the conditions
and without requiring any further assistance after the
adoption of the RFEA Decision.
Fernández’s allegation that the Agreement was not
renewed must be rejected since Fernández provides
no evidence to support this statement. In addition,
the IAAF contests such allegation. In any case,
even in the absence of the Agreement, the Sole
Arbitrator’s reasoning would not change materially
for the following reasons.
3. Clash between Disciplinary Proceedings and
Criminal Proceedings
The Sole Arbitrator notes that the Athlete invoked
Spanish Law, according to which the Athlete’s
testimonies must remain secret, to justify why he
could not provide information on his assistance to
the Spanish Authorities in the context of the criminal
investigation.
Moreover, the RFEA itself, in its decisions and in its
declaration to the CAS, invoked Spanish Law and
mentioned that there was a clash between disciplinary
and criminal proceedings.
The Sole Arbitrator acknowledges the potential
difficulties resulting from the interplay of criminal
and sport disciplinary proceedings. However, the
rules and procedures in one of these proceedings
cannot interfere with the other proceedings. In
this case, the Sole Arbitrator holds that the Spanish
criminal law provisions concerning confidentiality
cannot justify non-compliance with the relevant
IAAF provisions in order to obtain a reduction in the
ineligibility period pursuant to the IAAF provisions,
for the following reasons.
The IAAF Rules provide for anti-doping sanctions
that apply to athletes licensed by the IAAF. In cases
of Substantial Assistance, the IAAF has provided
for a possible reduction in the ineligibility periods
resulting from doping violations. The IAAF Rules
provide that the arbiter of whether an athlete has
provided Substantial Assistance is the DBR. Allowing
national courts or others to judge whether Substantial
Assistance has been given in any given case would
effectively delegate the key decision on whether the
applicable conditions have been met to entities or
persons other than the DBR, with the result that
(i) the consistent application of this provision could
not be ensured, and (ii) its application could well be
influenced by a range of factors and considerations
straying from the need to fight doping.
More generally, the enforcement of anti-doping
provisions contained in the rules of sports federations
cannot be subject to provisions of national law that
may or may not reflect the same anti-doping spirit
and objectives, nor can they be subject to the vagaries
of national judicial systems, particularly at a time
when not all countries have shown the same degree
of devotion to fighting doping.
-
125
As a result, the provisions of Spanish criminal law that
prevent, or that are interpreted as preventing, athletes
from complying with the relevant IAAF provision
have the direct consequence that Spanish athletes
will be unable to avail themselves of the Substantial
Assistance ground to reduce their sanctions, until and
unless such provisions are changed or interpreted in
a manner that allows athletes to comply with the
relevant provision of the IAAF Rules.
That the division between criminal and disciplinary
anti-doping enforcement, as currently reflected in
Spain, is not indispensable to protect any fundamental
human rights is demonstrated by the approach
adopted in a number of other countries in Europe,
for example Italy, where criminal and administrative
anti-doping enforcement work hand-in-hand, thereby
achieving a more effective system to fight doping (as
was obvious in case CAS 2009/A/1879).
It is of utmost importance that national sporting
federations be controlled by international bodies,
of which they are members, in order to promote,
coordinate and monitor the fight against doping in all
its forms internationally and on a level playing field.
Moreover, the CAS must also seek to preserve some
coherence between the decisions of the different
federations in comparable cases in order to preserve
the principle of equal treatment of athletes in
different sports. If athletes were able to invoke their
national laws to justify departures from international
standards, the fundamental principle of equality
between athletes would be severely undermined.
According to CAS jurisprudence (CAS 96/156;
CAS 98/214; CAS 2005/A/872; CAS 2006/A/1119;
CAS 2009/A/2014; CAS 2009/A/2020; CAS
2009/A/2021), it is fundamental that decisions
taken at a national level in doping cases, particularly
regarding the imposition of sanctions, be subject
to the review of the relevant international sporting
federations. The power conferred to the national
federation aims, inter alia, at maintaining the integrity
of international competitions by preventing national
federations from not imposing any sanction at all
on an athlete or imposing a less severe sanction
than justified merely in order to allow the athlete to
compete at international level.
Furthermore, the Sole Arbitrator takes account of
Fernández’s statement of January 3, 2012, according
to which, his status under Spanish Law had changed
and he was therefore allowed to provide clarification
during a meeting to be held on February 3, 2012.
Then, Fernández mentioned that he would not
be able to participate in the meeting for personal
reasons, without further specification, and that he
wished the case to proceed to the CAS. Later, in his
Reply Brief, Fernández retracted from his statement
that personal reasons had caused the cancellation of
the meeting and mentioned that his cancellation of
the meeting was due to confidentiality issues. The
Sole Arbitrator considers that the Athlete has not
sufficiently assessed why his status changed in the
first place, and then suddenly changed again due to
a publication in the Spanish media. Furthermore, it
does not appear from the file that Fernández sought
confidentiality for the meeting.
The Sole Arbitrator would also refer to the Athlete’s
signature of an agreement according to which he
would provide full cooperation in the investigation
and adjudication of any case related to information in
his possession. The agreement specifically provides
that “for the avoidance of doubt, this condition relates to the
investigation and adjudication of both criminal cases under
Spanish or other applicable law and to cases brought under
IAAF Anti-Doping Rules and/or the rules of any other sport
compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code”.
To conclude, the decision regarding the exception
for Substantial Assistance must, in the last instance,
remain under the control of the entity charged with
enforcing the corresponding anti-doping rules,
or to a body appointed by that entity. This is why
it is indispensable to comply with the IAAF rules
provisions, which require the DRB to sign off on the
application of this exception.
4. Existence of the Anti-Doping Rule Violation
It is undisputed that Fernández committed an antidoping rule violation within the meaning of the
IAAF Rules.
According to Article 40.3 of the IAAF Rules, such
a violation is sanctioned with a two-year period of
ineligibility, unless the conditions for eliminating,
reducing or increasing this period are met.
Since the IAAF Rules apply in this case, the
question that must therefore be decided is whether
the conditions of Article 40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules
concerning a reduction of sanctions on the grounds
of Substantial Assistance are met, and whether the
appropriate sanction was imposed, given all the
relevant circumstances.
5. Fulfi lment of the Conditions to Benefit from a
Reduction of the Sanction according to Article
40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules
As indicated above, the Athlete was found guilty of
a serious anti-doping rule violation under the IAAF
-
126
Rules resulting from the possession of more than one
prohibited substance listed under S1 and S2 of the
Prohibited List.
Article 40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules provides as follows:
Substantial Assistance in Discovering or Establishing AntiDoping Rule Violations: The relevant tribunal of a Member
may, prior to a final appellate decision under Rule 42 or the
expiration of the time to appeal (where applicable in the case
of an International-Level Athlete having referred the matter
to the Doping Review Board for its determination under Rule
38.16) suspend a part of the period of Ineligibility imposed
in an individual case where the Athlete or other Person has
provided Substantial Assistance to the IAAF, his National
Federation, an Anti-Doping Organisation, criminal
authority or professional disciplinary body resulting in the
IAAF, National Federation or Anti-Doping Organisation
discovering or establishing an antidoping rule violation by
another Person or resulting in a criminal or disciplinary body
discovering or establishing a criminal offence or the breach of
professional rules by another Person. After a final appellate
decision under Rule 42 or the expiration of time to appeal,
an Athlete or other Person’s period of Ineligibility may only
be suspended by a Member if the Doping Review Board so
determines and WADA agrees. If the Doping Review Board
determines that there has been no Substantial Assistance, the
determination shall be binding on the Member and there shall
be no suspension of Ineligibility. If the Doping Review Board
determines that there has been Substantial Assistance, the
Member shall decide on the period of Ineligibility that shall
be suspended. The extent to which the otherwise applicable
period of Ineligibility may be suspended shall be based on the
seriousness of the anti-doping rule violation committed by the
Athlete or other Person and the significance of the Substantial
Assistance provided by the Athlete or other Person to the
effort to eliminate doping in Athletics. No more than threequarters of the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility may
be suspended. If the otherwise applicable period of Ineligibility
is a lifetime, the non-suspended period under this Rule must
be no less than eight (8) years. If the Member suspends any
part of the period of Ineligibility under this Rule, the Member
shall promptly provide a written justification for its decision to
the IAAF and any other party having a right to appeal the
decision. If the Member subsequently reinstates any part of the
suspended period of Ineligibility because the Athlete or other
Person has failed to provide the Substantial Assistance which
was anticipated, the Athlete or other Person may appeal the
reinstatement.
In other words, in order to benefit from the reduction
of the period of ineligibility under Article 40.5(c) of
the IAAF Rules, it must be established that (i) the
Athlete has provided Substantial Assistance to the
IAAF, his National Federation, an Anti-Doping
Organisation, criminal authority or professional
disciplinary body, (ii) resulting in the IAAF, National
Federation or Anti-Doping Organisation discovering
or establishing an anti-doping rule violation by
another Person, or, (iii) resulting in a criminal or
disciplinary body discovering or establishing a
criminal offence or the breach of professional rules
by another Person.
The Athlete alleges that his Assistance was Substantial
given that, inter alia, he cooperated with the Spanish
Civil Guard and provided it information about (i)
Dr Virú’s codes to hide the names of the medical
substances being used; (ii) other persons accused of
doping in addition to Dr. Virú; and (iii) issues related
to doping in general. The Athlete also submits that
the Guardia Civil affirmed that his behaviour was
constructive in connection with the fight against
doping, and the Council for Sport stated that it was
able to continue its investigation as a consequence of
the sportsman’s assistance.
As a preliminary point, the Sole Arbitrator wishes
to underline that the existing mechanism, which
facilitates the provision of information by athletes in
order to discover anti-doping offenses, is essential in
the fight against doping. It is therefore important that
the objective of Article 40.5(c), i.e., to encourage and
incite athletes to come forward if they are aware of
doping offenses committed by other persons, should
not be undermined by an overly restrictive application
of the provision (See e.g. CAS 2007/A/1368).
However, it is equally important that reductions
in sanctions for serious anti-doping violations are
not handed down lightly without clear evidence of
Substantial Assistance. In this context, each word
used to express the nature and scope of the exception
to the normal duration of an anti-doping sanction
must be weighed carefully and interpreted strictly.
In order to evaluate whether the Assistance was
Substantial pursuant to Article 40.5(c) of the IAAF
Rules, the assistance must result in discovering
or establishing an anti-doping rule violation by
another Person, or, discovering or establishing a
criminal offence or the breach of professional rules
by another Person. The Sole Arbitrator considers
that these words must be interpreted literally, in the
sense that assistance will not qualify as substantial
unless and until it actually results in the discovery
or establishment of an anti-doping rule violation by
a third party, or unless and until it actually results in
the discovery or establishment of a criminal offence
or of a breach of professional rules by a third party.
The discovery or establishment of an illegal act by
a third party as a direct result of the information
provided by the athlete seeking to benefit from the
Substantial Assistance exception is the cornerstone
of this mechanism, as there would otherwise be
-
127
no incentive for an anti-doping authority to apply
lesser sanctions, unless it received something in
return, which contributes to fighting doping in
sport. However, the Sole Arbitrator finds that such
a concrete result has not been demonstrated in this
case.
Taking into account the nature of the conduct in
question and the paramount importance of fighting
against doping networks of any kind in sport as well as
the restricted powers of the investigation authorities
of the governing bodies of sport as compared to
national authorities, the Sole Arbitrator is of the
opinion that cases concerning doping networks
should be dealt with in line with the consistent
CAS jurisprudence on disciplinary doping cases.
Therefore, the IAAF must establish the relevant facts
“to the comfortable satisfaction of the Court having in mind
the seriousness of allegation which is made ” (See e.g., for
match-fixing cases; CAS 2005/A/908 para. 6.2; CAS
2009/A/1920).
In addition, according to CAS 2007/A/1368, the
Substantial character of the Assistance must be
assessed on the basis of the qualitative and quantitative
value of the evidence provided by the athlete, and on
its scope and effectiveness in implicating third parties.
That the assistance has been given spontaneously and
voluntarily must also be taken into consideration.
In the present case, the Athlete relies on two letters
from the Guardia Civil and the Council for Sport,
acknowledging that he had assisted the police in its
investigation, and provided cooperation as a witness
to an alleged crime. But none of these letters mention
the implication of third parties resulting directly
from the Athlete’s assistance.
The Athlete also relies on a written statement
evidencing the fact that he was interviewed by the
Guardia Civil. This statement provides no information
on the implication of third parties resulting directly
from the Athlete’s assistance. Neither does the press
release submitted by the Athlete.
Finally, the Athlete relies on an order from the
Investigating Court no. 14 of Valencia. However, it
appears from that order that, while it confirms that
the investigation is still on-going against 4 named
persons, it does not ascertain that there have been
third party violations. It also appears from the order
that Fernández’s name is not included in the names of
individuals required to testify in the procedure. Also,
the order confirms that Fernández himself is still
subject to criminal proceedings. The Sole Arbitrator
considers that no element of the order confirms an
anti-doping rule violation by another person directly
as a result of Fernández’s assistance.
In the Sole Arbitrator’s view, a simple indication of
cooperation, which could hypothetically result in the
discovery of a criminal offense, is not sufficient for
the Assistance to be Substantial pursuant to Article
40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules.
Accordingly, the Sole Arbitrator is comfortably
satisfied that the relevant facts on which Fernández
relies do not meet the criteria set forth in Article
40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules. Indeed, there is no
evidence in the fi le establishing that the Athlete’s
assistance led to the discovery or the establishment
of an anti-doping rule violation or criminal offense
or breach of professional rules by another Person
pursuant to Article 40.5(c), neither at the level of the
IAAF nor at the level of the RFEA or at any other
level.
On the contrary, it appears from the fi le that Dr.
Virú, along with various other persons, was already
incriminated from the beginning of the investigation,
at the same time as Fernández. Fernández’s assistance
may have improved the case brought against the
person’s involved, but the Sole Arbitrator is not even
in a position to determine whether this is actually the
case.
Furthermore, Fernández was given the opportunity
to explain his case in front of the IAAF at a meeting
scheduled for February 3, 2012, in order to provide
further evidence or clarification as to the substance
of his assistance, but he voluntarily did not attend
the meeting for “personal reasons” without further
explanation.
The Sole Arbitrator acknowledges that assistance
may be provided after a case is initiated, as long as
this assistance results in discovering or establishing
doping or criminal offenses or a violation of
professional rules by third parties. The voluntary
character of the assistance is a factor that can be
taken into account in order to assess the extent of the
reduction of the sanction in the case of Substantial
Assistance. However, the sine qua non condition that
the assistance result in discovering or establishing
doping or criminal offenses or a violation of
professional rules by third parties must first be
satisfied. In any event, the Sole Arbitrator notes that
it is questionable whether the assistance provided by
the Athlete was spontaneous nor voluntary. Indeed, it
is only after his implication into the “Operacíon Grial ”
and after the RFEA had already taken steps before
the CMHD Commission to obtain information from
the police record that Fernández decided to come
forward.
-
128
The Sole Arbitrator considers that the fact that
assistance might potentially be given in the future
does not alter the fact that, to date, there is no evidence
in the fi le demonstrating that Fernández’s Assistance
satisfied the conditions of Article 40.5(c) of the IAAf
Rules. In addition, Fernández has only affirmed
that a judge will summon him on the day that the
hearing will be held, in order to confirm his previous
statements. As stated, such confirmation cannot, in
this case, suffice to adduce the evidence required
by Article 40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules. Furthermore,
the order provided by Fernández himself does not
confirm his alleged future testimony.
Concerning Fernández’s reliance on CAS
2011/A/2368, the Sole Arbitrator considers that the
circumstances of that case cannot be compared to
the circumstances in this case, since the Substantial
character of the Assistance was not contested in CAS
2011/A/2368.
Furthermore, the commentary of Article 10.5.3 of
the WADA Code provides as follows:
Factors to be considered in assessing the importance of the
Substantial Assistance would include, for example, the number
of individuals implicated, the status of those individuals in the
sport, whether a scheme involving Trafficking under Article
2.7 or administration under Article 2.8 is involved and
whether the violation involved a substance or method which is
not readily detectible in Testing. The maximum suspension of
the Ineligibility period shall only be applied in very exceptional
cases. An additional factor to be considered in connection
with the seriousness of the anti-doping rule violation is any
performance-enhancing benefit which the Person providing
Substantial Assistance may be likely to still enjoy.
The Athlete considers that the factors set forth in
the commentary of the WADA Code are applicable
given (i) the Athlete’s cooperation in a criminal
investigation involving a group of people; (ii) the
status of the people involved, which include people
holding and not holding a license, and include people
from various sports (iii) the doping network involved
in the trafficking of prohibited substances and (iv)
the Athlete did not benefit from any improvement in
his performance.
The Sole Arbitrator does not contest that such
factors are relevant in assessing the importance of
Substantial Assistance, as the commentary just cited
states. However, the commentary’s text itself is clear:
these criteria are relevant to assess the importance
of the Substantial Assistance, but not the existence
of Substantial Assistance. In other words, the sine
qua non condition that that the assistance result
in discovering or establishing doping or criminal
offenses or a violation of professional rules by third
parties must first be satisfied. The factors set forth
in the commentary can then be taken into account
in assessing the importance of the Substantial
Assistance in order to determine the extent of the
reduction of the ineligibility period in each particular
case. In addition, a commentary of a legal provision
cannot replace the substance of that provision. A
commentary is designed to assist in the interpretation
of a provision. Both the WADA Code and the IAAF
Rules expressly provide that “[r]esults in the Anti-Doping
Organization discovering or establishing an anti-doping rule
violation by another Person or which results in a criminal or
disciplinary body discovering or establishing a criminal offense
or the breach of professional rules by another Person”. As
explained above, these conditions are not satisfied in
this case.
Therefore, while the Sole Arbitrator acknowledges
that Fernández provided at least some assistance to
the authorities, the Sole Arbitrator finds that it cannot
qualify as Substantial within the meaning of Article
40.5(c) of the IAAF Rules.
The Sole Arbitrator adds that, even if the Athlete had
been found to have given Substantial Assistance, past
CAS decisions in this area suggest that a one-year
reduction would have been excessive. An overview
of these cases is set forth below.
In CAS 2005/A/847, the information provided by
the athlete resulted in a large amount of nutritional
supplements being seized and confiscated and, as a
result, products could not have been given to other
athletes. The efficiency of the information provided
was proven at the time of the appeal to the CAS and
a reduction of 6 months was deemed proportionate.
In CAS 2007/A/1368, the athlete’s Substantial
Assistance resulted in the condemnation of third
parties and the panel decided that a reduction of 3
months was appropriate.
In CAS 2008/A/1461-1462, the panel refused to
reduce the sanction given that “while Mr. J. may have
offered as much assistance as he reasonably could have under
the circumstances, this assistance did not lead to the discovery or
establishing of any anti-doping rule violation by any person”.
In CAS 2010/A/2203-2214, the panel decided not
to rule on the question of Substantial Assistance
since it had very little information but, taking into
consideration the circumstances of the case, it
suspended the sanction for 6 months.
In CAS 2011/A/2368, the existence of the Substantial
Assistance was not contested and yet the panel
-
129
decided to reduce the sanction to a period of 18
months of ineligibility.
of the Athlete. However, Article 40.10(b) provides as
follows:
In light of the above-mentioned cases, the Sole
Arbitrator considers that it was, in any event,
disproportionate to reduce the period of ineligibility
in this case by one half of the usually applicable
sanction of two years.
If a Provisional Suspension is imposed and respected by the
Athlete, then the Athlete shall receive a credit for such period of
Provisional Suspension against any period of Ineligibility which
may ultimately be imposed.
6. Start Date of Ineligibility Period
Article in 40.10 of the IAAF Rules determines that:
Except as provided below, the period of Ineligibility shall start
on the date of the hearing decision providing for Ineligibility or,
if the hearing is waived, on the date the Ineligibility is accepted
or otherwise imposed. Any period of Provisional Suspension
(whether imposed or voluntarily accepted) shall be credited
against the total period of Ineligibility to be served.
As a result, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the
period of ineligibility should be a period of 2 years,
commencing on the date of this award, March 14,
2012, less the period of provisional suspension and/
or ineligibility that he has already served namely one
year, three months and four days.
Article 10.9.2 of the WADA Code provides that:
Where there have been substantial delays in the hearing process
or other aspects of Doping Control not attributable to the
Athlete or other Person, the body imposing the sanction may
start the period of Ineligibility at an earlier date, commencing
as early as the date of Sample collection or the date on which
another Anti-Doping Rule violation last occurred.
The Athlete considers that substantial delays in
the case are not attributable to him and that the
ineligibility period should start on May 17, 2011. The
Athlete further argues that he should not suffer as
a result of the decision of the IAAF to extend the
deadlines to appeal to the CAS and that, should the
Sole Arbitrator decide to impose an ineligibility from
the date of this award, namely March 14, 2012, he
would suffer significant harm because he would not
be able to participate in the 2012 Olympic Games in
London.
The IAAF submits that Fernandez should be
required to serve a two-year period of ineligibility
from the date of the hearing of this matter, less any
period of provisional suspension and/or ineligibility
that he has already served.
The Sole Arbitrator recalls that the above provisions
do not provide an automatic right to start the period
of Ineligibility at an earlier date that that stated, but
a discretionary power to appreciate whether, taking
into consideration the circumstances of the case, the
ineligibility period should start earlier.
In light of the all the circumstances of this case,
the Sole Arbitrator holds that no grounds justify
modifying the start date of the period of ineligibility
-
130
S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA)
13 April 2012
Football; confl icting awards; applicable
law; CAS scope of review; lis pendens
Panel:
Mr. Mark A. Hovell (United Kingdom), President
Mr. José Juan Pintó (Spain)
Mr. Luc Argand (Switzerland)
compensation for breach of contract within 30 days as
from the date of notification of this decision. In the event
that this amount of compensation is not paid within the
stated time limit, interest at the rate of 5% p.a. will fall
due as of expiry of the above-mentioned time limit until
the date of effective payment.
4.
In the event that the above-mentioned amounts due to
the Claimant, Marko Ljubinkovic, are not paid by the
Respondent, FC Vaslui, within the stated time limits,
the present matter shall be submitted, upon, request, to
the FIFA Disciplinary Committee for consideration
and decision.
5.
Any further request filed by the Claimant is rejected.
6.
The Respondent, FC Vaslui, shall be banned from
registering any new players either nationally or
internationally, for the two next entire and consecutive
registration periods following the notification of the
present decision.
7.
The Claimant, Marko Ljubinkovic, is directed to
inform the Respondent, FC Vaslui, immediately and
directly of the account number to which the remittance
is to be made and to notify the Dispute Resolution
Chamber of every payment received”.
Relevant facts
S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui (the “Appellant ” or
the “Club ”) is a professional football club with its
registered office in Vaslui, Romania. It is a member
of the Romanian Football Federation (the “RFF ”)
and plays in Romania’s top division, Liga I.
The Federation Internationale de Football Association
(the “Respondent ” or “FIFA ”) is the world governing
body for the sport of football, having its headquarters
in Zurich, Switzerland.
On 13 October 2010 the FIFA Dispute Resolution
Chamber (DRC), adjudicating a dispute related to the
termination of the employment relationship between
the Club and Marko Ljubinkovic (the “Player ”) ruled
as follows (the “DRC Decision ”):
“1.
The claim of the Claimant, Marko Ljubinkovic, is
partially accepted.
2.
The Respondent, FC Vaslui, has to pay the Claimant,
Mark Ljubinkovic, outstanding remuneration in the
amount of EUR 96,535 plus 5% interest p.a. as from
29 January 2010, within 30 days as from the date of
notification of this decision.
3.
The Respondent, FC Vaslui, has to pay to the claimant,
Marko Ljubinkovic, the amount of EUR 385,000 as
In parallel to the proceedings before FIFA, on 15
June 2010, the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the
Romanian Professional Football League (the “DRC of
the RPFL ”) passed a decision arising from exactly the
same dispute between the Player and the Club and
sanctioned the Player with an obligation to pay the
Club EUR 502,458.50 combined with a suspension of
16 competition rounds (the “RPFL Decision”).
On 24 November 2010, the Appellant fi led a
statement of appeal with the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS) against the DRC Decision
Following a hearing held on 11 May 2011, the
appointed CAS panel issued its award on case CAS
2010/A/2289 on 17 June 2011, ruling as follows (the
“CAS Decision ”):
“1.
S.C Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui’s appeal against the
decision dated 13 October 2010 of the FIFA Dispute
Resolution Chamber is dismissed and the decision of
-
131
FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber is upheld.
2.
3.
4.
in accordance with point [4], the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee will decide on a possible relegation of the
debtor’s first team to the next lower division.
The costs of the arbitration to be determined and served
on the Parties by the CAS Court Office shall be borne
by S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui.
7.
S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui is ordered to pay
CHF 6,000 (six thousand Swiss Francs) to Mr
Marko Ljubinkovic as a contribution towards his legal
and other costs in this arbitration.
On 5 January 2012 the Club lodged a Statement of
Appeal with the CAS against the FIFA DC Decision.
All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed”.
On 1 August 2011 the Club had the RPFL Decision
affirmed in the Vaslui Court of Law.
On 15 August 2011 and on 8 September 2011, the
RFF and the legal representative of the Appellant
respectively petitioned the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee (the “FIFA DC”) to take into account
the RPFL Decision. The RFF referred to Romanian
Civil Law which provides for mutual debts between
parties to be compensated up to the minor amount.
The costs of these proceedings amounting to CHF 2,000
are to be borne by the club S.C. Sporting Club S.A.
Vaslui. (…)”
On 14 January 2012 the Appellant fi led its Appeal
Brief with the following revised prayers for relief:
On 6 February 2012 FIFA submitted its Answer.
Neither of the Parties requested a hearing and as
per R57 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration
and Mediation Rules (the “CAS Code”) the Panel
concluded that a hearing was not required as it was
sufficiently able to render this award from the written
submissions and evidence.
On 29 September 2011 the secretariat to the FIFA DC
urged the Appellant to pay the outstanding amount
by 4 October 2011 and informed the Appellant that
failing this the case would be submitted to the FIFA
DC on 13 October 2011.
On 13 October 2011 the FIFA DC passed decision
110441 PST ROU ZH (the “FIFA DC Decision”) and
decided that in the most relevant part:
“1.
The club S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui is pronounced
guilty of failing to comply with a decision of a FIFA
body in accordance with art.64 of the FDC.
2.
The club S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui is ordered to
pay a fine to the amount of CHF 25,000. The fine is
to be paid within 30 days of notification of the decision
(…)
3.
4.
5.
The club S.C. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui is granted a
final period of grace of 30 days from notification of the
decision in which to settle its debt to the creditor.
A. Applicable Law
Art. R58 of the CAS Code provides as follows:
its decision”.
Art. 62.2 of the FIFA Statutes provides the following:
“The provisions of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration
shall apply to the proceedings. CAS shall primarily apply the
various regulations of FIFA and, additionally, Swiss Law”.
The Appellant has argued that Romanian Law and the
Lugano Convention apply in this case, whereas the
Respondent maintains that the Lugano Convention
does not apply to appeals from decisions of arbitral
bodies such as the DRC or the FIFA DC that FIFA
regulations and Swiss law applies, not Romanian Law.
If payment is not made by this deadline, the creditor
may demand in writing from FIFA that six (6) points
be deducted from the debtor’s first team in the domestic
league championship. Once the creditor has filed this
request, the points will be deducted automatically
without a further formal decision having to be taken by
the FIFA Disciplinary Committee.
The “Federation ” in the sense of Art. R58 of the CAS
Code i.e. FIFA is domiciled in Switzerland, a fact that
requires that Swiss Law be applied.
If the club S.A. Sporting Club S.A. Vaslui still fails
to pay the amount due even after deduction of the points
As there is a dispute to the law which applies,
the Panel has decided that in this case, the FIFA
-
132
regulations will be applied primarily, and Swiss law
shall be applied subsidarily.
B. Scope of Review
The CAS panel which rendered an award in case CAS
2010/A/2135 Football Federation Islamic Republic of Iran
v Mr Branko Ivankovic & FIFA stated the following:
“(…) as the authority of the FIFA DC is limited, pursuant to
article 64 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, to verifying whether
anyone has failed to comply with a previous decision rendered
by a body, a committee or an instance of FIFA or CAS, the
Panel’s scope of review in this appeal is restricted to the same
mandate, because an appeal may not, by definition, go beyond
the formal and substantive scope of the procedure and decision
of first instance.
This means in particular that this CAS Panel has no authority
to deal with the merits of the dispute between the IRIFF and
the Coach which led to the decision of the FIFA PSC of 23
September 2008 and to the subsequent CAS award of 4
November 2009. Indeed, the merits of that dispute are clearly
outside the scope of the review of this Panel.
In other terms, this Panel may only deal with the event which
gave rise to the disciplinary proceedings culminated in the
Appealed Decision (i.e. whether the IRIFF complied or not
with the decision taken by FIFA PSC and confirmed by
the CAS) and with the consequence thereof (i.e. whether the
disciplinary sanction imposed on the IRIFF was appropriate,
respectful of the applicable rules and the proportionate to the
violation).
As a consequence, the Panel must discard as inappropriate and
not consider all the arguments and exhibits submitted by the
Appellant with reference to the substance of the dispute decided
by the FIFA PSC and upheld in full by the CAS award of 4
November 2009”.
The Panel follows this previous decision of the CAS
and has determined not to revisit the merits that
have previously been considered by the panel that
delivered the CAS Decision. Rather, this Panel will
concern itself with the decision taken by the FIFA
DC pursuant to the FIFA Disciplinary Code, which
sought to enforce the CAS Decision, not review it.
awarded to the Appellant from the Player pursuant
to the Court of Vaslui’s award ?
- What amounts, if any, should be paid by the
Appellant ?
It is clear to the Panel, and not contested by the
Appellant, that the financial sums awarded to
the Player pursuant to the CAS Decision remain
outstanding. The Panel notes the Appellant has
attempted to discharge such sums, but that FIFA
is unable to operate an escrow account in these
circumstances.
The main issue to consider is whether the award in
favour of the Appellant made by the DRC of the
RPFL and confirmed by the Court of Vaslui should
have been taken into account by the FIFA DC and set
against the award in favour of the Player contained
in the CAS Decision. The Appellant, referring to
Romanian Law and the Lugano Convention, submits
it should and, as the award in its favour is larger than
that in favour of the Player, the FIFA DC should have
determined that it had no obligation to pay anything
further to the Player.
FIFA, on the other hand, point to the non-application
of Romanian Law or the Lugano Convention in
these proceedings or indeed those of the FIFA DC.
FIFA also noted that the panel that delivered the
CAS Decision had already expressed its opinion that
the DRC of the RPFL should never have rendered
a decision as it was the DRC that correctly seized
jurisdiction of the original dispute between the Player
and the Appellant.
The Panel notes that the applicable law in these
proceedings is Swiss Law and that pursuant to Arts.
120 and 124 of the Swiss Code of Obligations the
FIFA DC does have to consider “set off ” claims.
Art. 120 states:
“If two persons owe each other a sum of money or another
performance where the subject of the performance is of the same
kind, each may set off his obligation against his claim, provided
both claims are due.
The obligor may set off even if his counterclaim is contested.
C. Merits of the Appeal
In these present proceedings, the Panel had to
determine the following:- had the Appellant complied with the CAS
Decision ?
- should the FIFA DC have “set off ” the sums
A claim forfeited by the statute of limitations may be set off,
if at the time when it could have been set off against the other
claim, it was not yet forfeited under the statute of limitations”.
Art. 124 states:
“A set off only becomes effective to the extent that the obligor
demonstrates to the oblige that he wishes to take advantage of
his right of set off.
-
133
If this has occurred, it is considered that the claim and
counterclaim, insofar as they compensate each other, have
already been discharged at the earliest possible time they could
have been set off.
The special practices of commercial transactions on current
account remain reserved”.
The Panel further notes that in this particular
instance the two awards both stem from exactly the
same dispute between the Player and the Appellant.
The CAS has already determined that the Appellant
should not have taken its claim to the DRC of the
RPFL; instead leaving the DRC to deal with the
dispute. As such, that CAS panel did not recognize
the decision of the DRC of the RPFL. As mentioned
above, it is not in the scope of this Panel’s jurisdiction
to review the CAS Decision, nor was it for the FIFA
DC to do so either. Further the Panel notes the
Appellant then continued to exacerbate the situation
by asking (without the Player being present) the
Court of Vaslui to confirm the decision of the DRC
at the RPFL.
Decision.
D. Conclusion
The Panel determines to dismiss the Appellant’s
appeal and uphold and confirm the FIFA DC
Decision.
The Panel determines that all other claims or prayers
for relief are hereby dismissed.
The Panel notes the principle of “lis pendens” and that
the parties should seek to avoid parallel proceedings
which can (and, in this case, has) result in confl icting
awards.
The Panel determines that the FIFA DC correctly
disregarded the award in favour of the Appellant and
only considered the award in favour of the Player, as
set out in the CAS Decision. This is not a situation
where there is a claim and counterclaim; there is but
one claim or dispute; but it has been dealt with in two
separate forums. The FIFA DC correctly determined
that only one award should prevail and there should
not therefore be two awards to set against each other,
just one. It was not for the FIFA DC (nor is it for
this Panel) to determine which award should prevail,
as that determination had already been taken by the
CAS and, once the time for any possible appeal to
the Swiss Federal Tribunal had elapsed, the CAS
Decision became final and binding on the parties and
in accordance with the FIFA Disciplinary Code, the
FIFA DC’s role was to deal with the enforcement of
the CAS Decision.
The Panel determines that the FIFA DC correctly
dealt with the matter and upholds its decision
entirely. Much as Swiss law recognizes the possibility
of setting one claim off against another, in this case
there is no application, as in reality there is one claim
and one final and binding decision already taken in
regard of that which is contained within the CAS
Decision. The role of the FIFA DC was to see that
award was enforced, which it did in the FIFA DC
-
134
4A_558/2011**
Judgment of 27 March 2012
First Civil Law Court
Composition
Federal Tribunal Judge Klett, President
Federal Tribunal Judge Corboz
Federal Tribunal Judge Rottenberg Liatowitsch
Federal Tribunal Judge Kolly
Federal Tribunal Judge Kiss
Clerk of the Court: Mr Leemann
Parties
Mr. Francelino da Silva Matuzalem, c/o Gianpaolo Monteneri , Monteneri sports law
& management IIc,
Appellant, represented by Dr. Hansjörg Stutzer and Dr. Patrick Rohn,
versus
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),
Respondent, represented by Mr Christian Jenny
* From Charles Poncet’s translation, courtesy of the law fi rm ZPG/Geneva (www.praetor.ch).
* Translator’s note: Quote as Francelino da Silva Matuzalem v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),
4A_558/2011. The original of the decision is in German. The text is available on the website of the Federal Tribunalwww.bger.ch
Facts
A.
A.a Francelino da Silva Matuzalem, in Rome
(The Appellant), borne on June 10, 1980 is
a professional football player of Brazilian
citizenship. He presently plays with the football
club SS Lazio Spa in Rome.
A.b On June 26, 2004 the Appellant entered into
an employment contract with the Ukrainian
football club FC Shakhtar Donetsk for the time
from July 1st, 2004 until July 1st, 2009. On July 2,
2007 the Appellant terminated his employment
contract with FC Shakhtar Donetsk without
notice yet not for just cause2 nor for sporting just
cause3.
The Fédération Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA; Respondent) is an
association governed by Swiss law (Art. 60 ff
ZGB1) headquarted in Zurich.
In a letter of July 16, 2007 Real Saragossa SAD
undertook to hold the Appellant harmless for
any possible damage claims as a consequence of
the premature termination of the contract.
Real Saragossa SAD is a Spanish football club.
It is a member of the Spanish football federation
which in its turn belongs to FIFA.
On July 19, 2007 the Appellant entered into a
new employment contract with Real Saragossa
SAD and undertook to play with them for the
1. Translator’s note: ZGB is the German abbreviation for the Swiss Civil
Code.
2. Translator’s note: In English in the original text.
-
135
next three seasons until June 30, 2010.
At the end of the 2007/2008 season Real
Saragossa SAD descended into the second
Spanish football league.
Pursuant to a July 17, 2008 agreement Real
Saragossa SAD transferred the Appellant
temporarily for the 2008/2009 season to the SS
Lazio Spa football club in Rome. On July 22,
2008 the Appellant accepted this temporary
transfer and entered into an employment
contract with the Italian club for the period
between July 22, 2008 and June 20, 2011.
At the end of the 2008/2009 season Real
Saragossa SAD returned to the first league.
the corresponding sanctions according to Art.
64 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (2009 edition)
would be imposed and (c) that the case would
be decided during the next meeting of the
Disciplinary Committee.
The FIFA Disciplinary Code applicable at the
time (2009 edition) provided among other
things for the following:
“Article 22 Ban on taking part in any football-related
activity
A person may be banned from taking part in any kind
of football-related activity (administrative, sports or any
other).
...
On July 23, 2009 Real Saragossa SAD agreed
to the definitive transfer of the Appellant to
football club SS Lazio Spa against payment of
a transfer fee of € 5.1 million. On the same day
the SS Lazio Spa entered into a new employment
agreement with the Appellant which substituted
the July 22, 2008 contract and set a fixed
contractual duration until June 30, 2004 as well
as a salary of € [figure omitted] net per season
(in addition to some unspecified bonuses).
A.c In a decision of November 2, 2007, the Dispute
Resolution Chamber of FIFA awarded Shakhtar
Donetsk damages as a consequence of the illicit
termination of the contract in the amount of
€ 6.8 million with interest at 5% from 30 days
after the award. On May 19, 2009 the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) annulled the
decision of November 2, 2007 in part and
ordered the Appellant and football club Real
Saragossa SAD severally to pay € 11’858’934
with interest at 5% from July 5, 2007.
A Civil law appeal by the Appellant and Real
Saragossa SAD against the CAS award of May
19, 2009 was rejected by the Federal Tribunal in
a judgment of June 2, 20104 to the extent that the
matter was capable of appeal.
B.
B.a On July 14, 2010 the Deputy Secretary of the
Disciplinary Committee of FIFA informed
the Appellant and Real Saragossa SAD (a) that
disciplinary proceedings were commenced
against them because they had not complied
with the CAS award of May 19, 2009, (b) that
4. Translator’s note: Full translation available at http://www.praetor.ch/
arbitrage/facts-not-reviewed-by-federal-tribunal-claims-of-violationof-du/
Section 8. Failure to respect decisions
Article 64 [only]
1. Anyone who fails to pay another person (such as a
player, a coach or a club) or FIFA a sum of money in
full or part, even though instructed to do so by a body, a
committee or an instance of FIFA or CAS (financial
decision), or anyone who fails to comply with another
decision (non-financial decision) passed by a body, a
committee or an instance of FIFA or CAS:
a) will be fined at least CHF 5,000 for failing to
comply with a decision;
b) will be granted a final deadline by the judicial bodies
of FIFA in which to pay the amount due or to
comply with the (non-financial) decision;
c) (only for clubs:) will be warned and notified that, in
the case of default or failure to comply with a decision
within the period stipulated, points will be deducted
or demotion to a lower division ordered. A transfer
ban may also be pronounced.
2. If the club disregards the final time limit, the relevant
association shall be requested to implement the sanctions
threatened.
3. If points are deducted, they shall be proportionate to
the amount owed.
4. A ban on any football-related activity may also be
imposed against natural persons. ...”5
On July 26, 2010 Real Saragossa SAD advised
the Disciplinary Committee that it was in
serious financial difficulties which could lead
to insolvency and bankruptcy; the requirements
Jugements du Tribunal Fédéral / Judgment of the Federal Tribunal
-
136
for a sanction according to Art. 64 of the FIFA
Disciplinary Code were not met as the club was
attempting to settle the debt.
On August 20, 2010 the Appellant sent to the
Disciplinary Committee a copy of his letter
of August 19, 2010 by which he had requested
payment of the amount due to FC Shakhtar
Donetsk by Real Saragossa SAD and also of the
statement by which Real Saragossa SAD held
him harmless on July 16, 2007.
In a decision of August 31st, 2010 the Disciplinary
Committee found the Appellant and football
club Real Saragossa SAD guilty of breaching
their obligations under the CAS award of May
19, 2009 (§ 1 of the award). Furthermore the
Disciplinary Committee ordered the Appellant
on the basis of Art. 64 of the FIFA Disciplinary
Code to pay a fine of CHF 30’000 severally with
the club (§ 2 of the award and disposed a last
time limit of 90 days to pay the amount due
(award § 3), under penalty for the Appellant of
a prohibition of any activity in connexion with
football without the necessity of any further
decision by the Disciplinary Committee (award
§ 4):
“4. If payment is not made by this deadline, the creditor
may demand in writing from FIFA that a ban on taking
part in any football related activity be imposed on the
player Matuzalem Francelino da Silva and/or six (6)
points be deducted from the first team of the club Real
Zaragoza SAD in the domestic league championship.
Once the creditor has filed this/these requests, the ban on
taking part in any football-related activity will be imposed
on the player Matuzalem Francelino da Silva and/or the
points will be deducted automatically from the first team
of the club Real Zaragoza SAD without further formal
decisions having to be taken by the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee. The association(s) concerned will be informed
of the ban on taking part in any football-related activity.
Such ban will apply until the total outstanding amount
has been fully paid. ...”6
On September 1st, 2010 Real Saragossa SAD
paid € 500’000 into an account opened in the
name of the FC Shakhtar Donetsk. There were
no further payments by either Real Saragossa
SAD or the Appellant.
B.b The Appellant and Real Saragossa SAD
appealed the decision of the FIFA Disciplinary
Committee of August 31st, 2010 to the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS). In an award of June
29, 2011 the CAS rejected the appeal by Real
Saragossa SAD (award § 1) and the Appellant’s
(award § 2) and confirmed the decision of the
Disciplinary Committee of FIFA of August 31st,
2010 (award § 3). The CAS rejected all other
submissions (award § 4) and disposed of the
costs of the proceedings (award § 5 and 6).
C.
In a Civil law appeal the Appellant submits that
the Federal Tribunal should annul the CAS arbitral
award of June 29, 2011.
The Respondent submits that the appeal should be
rejected to the extent that the matter is capable of
appeal. The CAS did not take a position in the appeal
proceedings.
D.
On October 24, 2011 the Federal Tribunal stayed the
enforcement of the arbitral award.
E.
On January 25, 2010 the Appellant submitted a reply
to the Federal Tribunal and the Respondent submitted
a rejoinder on February 10, 2012. Furthermore on
February 29, 2012 the Appellant sent to the Federal
Tribunal a fax of February 24, 2010 from the
Respondent concerning the bankruptcy proceedings
initiated in the meantime against football club Real
Saragossa SAD.
Reasons
1.
According to Art. 54 (1) BGG7 the Federal Tribunal
issues its judgment in an official language8, as a rule
in the language of the decision under appeal. If the
decision is in another language, the Federal Tribunal
resorts to the official language chosen by the parties.
The award under appeal is in English. As it is not
in an official language and the Parties used German
in front of the Federal Tribunal, the decision of the
Federal Tribunal shall be issued in German.
2.
In the field of international arbitration a Civil law
appeal is allowed pursuant to the requirements of
Art. 190-192 PILA9 (SR 291) (Art. 77 (1) (a) BGG).
7. Translator’s note: BGG is the German abbreviation for the Federal
Statute of June 17, 2005 organizing the Federal Tribunal, RS 173 110.
8. Translator’s note: The official languages of Switzerland are German,
French and Italian.
9. Translator’s note: PILA is the most commonly used English
abbreviation for the Federal Statute on International Private Law of
December 18, 1987, RS 291.
-
137
2.1 The seat of the Arbitral tribunal is in Lausanne
in this case. At the relevant time the Appellant
had his domicile outside Switzerland. As the
Parties did not rule out in writing the provisions
of chapter 12 PILA they are applicable (Art. 176
(1) and (2) PILA).
2.2 A Civil law appeal within the meaning of Art.
77 (1) BGG may in principle only seek the
annulment of the decision under appeal (see Art.
77 (2) BGG ruling out the applicability of Art.
107 (2) BGG to the extent that it empowers the
Federal Tribunal to decide the case itself). The
Appellant’s submission that the CAS award of
June 29, 2001 should be annulled is sufficient
and appropriate here.
2.3 Only the grievances limitatively contained at
Art. 190 (2) PILA are admissible (BGE 134 III
186 at 5 p. 187; 128 III 50 at 1a p. 53; 127 III
279 at 1a p. 282). According to Art. 77 (3) PILA
the Federal Tribunal reviews only the grievances
brought forward and reasoned in the appeal; this
corresponds to the duty to submit reasons in
support of the appeal according to Art. 106 (2)
BGG for the violation of constitutional rights
and of cantonal and intercantonal law (BGE 134
III 186 at 5 p. 187 with references).
The Appellant argues that the award under
appeal violates the right to be heard (Art. 190
(2) (d) PILA) and public policy (Art. 190 (2) (e)
PILA). Therefore he submits some admissible
grievances in this respect. However he does not
explain to what extent a complete annulment of
the CAS award of June 29, 2011 under appeal
would be justified (see BGE 117 II 604 at 3 p.
606). Paragraph 1 of the award rejected the
appeal by Real Saragossa SAD. Nothing in the
appeal is aimed at that first paragraph. To the
extent that it aims at paragraph 1 of the award
under appeal, the matter is not capable of appeal.
3.
The Appellant argues a violation of the right to be
heard (Art. 190 (2) (d) PILA).
He claims exclusively a violation of his right to
be heard in the proceedings in front of the FIFA
Disciplinary Committee; however he does not claim
that in the CAS proceedings he would not have had
the possibility to participate in the proceedings. His
argument is not persuasive as he claims that, contrary
to what was held in the award under appeal, it would
have been impossible to cure in the appeal proceedings
in front of the CAS the allegedly insufficient hearing
in the disciplinary proceedings, irrespective of the
full power of review of the CAS (see R57 (1) of the
CAS Code). Contrary to what the Appellant seems to
assume, the principle of the right to be heard (Art.
190 (2) (d) PILA) contains no entitlement to a double
degree of arbitral proceedings or to two degrees of
jurisdiction (see judgment 4A_530/2011 of October
3, 2011 at 3.3.2; 4A_386/2010 of. January 3, 2011 at
6.2 with references).
4.
The Appellant argues a violation of public policy
within the meaning of Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA.
4.1 Public policy (Art. 190 (2) (e) PILA) has both
substantive and procedural contents (BGE 132
III 389 at 2.2.1 p. 392; 128 III 191 at 4a p. 194;
126 III 249 at 3b p. 253 with references). The
substantive adjudication of a dispute violates
public policy only when it disregards some
fundamental legal principles and consequently
becomes completely inconsistent with the
important, generally recognized values, which
according to dominant opinions in Switzerland
should be the basis of any legal order. Among
such principles are the rule of pacta sunt
servanda, the prohibition of abuse of rights, the
requirement to act in good faith, the prohibition
of expropriation without compensation, the
prohibition of discrimination and the protection
of incapables (BGE 132 III 389 at 2.2.1; 128
III 191 at 6b p. 198 with references). However
the enumeration is not exhaustive (judgment
4A_458/2009 of June 10, 2010 at 4.1, in: SJ
2010 I p. 417). The promise of bribes would also
violate public policy to the extent that it can be
proved (BGE 119 II 380 at 4b p. 384 f.; judgment
4P.208/2004 of December 14, 2004 at 6.1).
Furthermore the Federal Tribunal held that a
judgment which would violate, albeit indirectly,
such a fundamental principle of law as the
prohibition of forced labour, would violate public
policy (judgment 4A_370/2007 of February 21,
2008 at 5.3.2). A breach of public policy is thus
conceivable in case of a violation of Art. 27 ZGB
(see judgment 4A_458/2009 of June 10, 2010 at
4.4.3.2, in: SJ 2010 I p. 417; 4A_320/2009 of
June 2nd, 2010 at 4.4; 4P.12/2000 of June 14,
2000 E. 5b/aa with references). The arbitral
award under appeal is moreover annulled only
when its result contradicts public policy and not
merely its reasons (BGE 120 II 155 at 6a p. 167).
4.2 The Appellant argues that he would in fact
be subject to a prohibition of working as a
football player worldwide and forever should
the creditor so request, because he would not be
in a position to pay to its previous employer FC
-
138
Shakhtar Donetsk the damages of € 11’858’934
with interest at 5% since July 5, 2007. He
sees there a grave violation of the freedom of
profession guaranteed at Art. 27 (2) of the
Federal Constitution (BV) and in international
treaties, as well as an excessive limitation of
personal freedom as substantiated in Art. 27
of the Swiss Civil Code (ZGB). Contrary to
the view expressed in the award under appeal,
the Federal Tribunal did not forestall in its
judgment of June 2, 2010 the issue as to whether
the threat of the imposition of disciplinary
measures may be a grave violation of personality
rights, which could lead to a violation of public
policy by the award under appeal. The Federal
Tribunal merely pointed out that the Appellant’s
obligation to a five years employment contract
was not illicit from the point of view of privacy
protection and also that it could not be found
that the Appellant was bound too tightly
simply because he would have to answer for the
damages arising as a consequence of a breach
of contract (judgment 4A_320/2009 of June
2, 2010 at 4.4). The aforesaid judgment did not
decide the compatibility with public policy of
disciplinary measures imposed by a federation
in case of a failure to pay damages (also see as
to the comparable issue of contractual damages,
judgment 4A_458/2009 of June 10, 2010 at
4.4.8, in: SJ 2010 I p. 417 in which the Federal
Tribunal specifically left open the issue of the
violation of public policy by a sanction issued by
the competent FIFA body as a consequence of
failure to pay).
4.3
4.3.1 As a fundamental legal value, the personality
of the human being requires the protection of
the legal order. In Switzerland it is protected
constitutionally through the guarantee of the
right to personal freedom (Art. 10 (2) BV 10,
which entails all liberties constituting the
elementary manifestations of the unfolding of
personality, in addition to the right to physical
and mental integrity or to freedom of movement
(BGE 134 I 209 at 2.3.1 p. 211; 133 I 110 at 5.2
119; all with references). The free unfolding of
personality is also guaranteed among other by
the constitutional right to economic freedom,
which contains in particular the right to
choose a profession freely and to access and
exercise an occupational activity freely (Art. 27
(2) BV; see BGE 136 I 1 at 5.1 p. 12; 128 I 19 at
4c/aa p. 29).
10. Translator’s note: BV is the German abbreviation for the Swiss
Federal Constitution
The free unfolding of personality is not
protected merely against infringement by the
state but also by private persons (see Art. 27
(f) ZGB which substantiates personal freedom
in private law in Switzerland). It is generally
recognized therein that a person may not
legally pledge to relinquish his freedom entirely
and that there are limits to the curtailment of
one’s freedom. The principle anchored at Art.
27 (2) ZGB belongs to the important generally
recognized order of values, which according
to dominant opinion in Switzerland should be
the basis of any legal order.
4.3.2 A contractual curtailment of economic
freedom is considered excessive within the
meaning of Art. 27 (2) ZGB according to
Swiss concepts when the obligee is subjected
to another person’s arbitrariness, gives up his
economic freedom or curtails it to such an
extent that the foundations of his economic
existence are jeopardized (BGE 123 III 337 at
5 p. 345 f. with references; see also judgement
4P.167/1997 of November 25, 1997 at 2a).
Whilst public policy must not be identified
with mere illegality (Bernard DUTOIT, Droit
international privé suisse, 4. ed. 2005, nr. 8 to
Art. 190 PILA p. 678) and its violation is to be
assessed more restrictively than a breach of the
prohibition of arbitrariness (BGE 132 III 389
at 2.2.2 p. 393), a commitment may be excessive
to such an extent that it becomes contrary to
public policy when it constitutes an obvious
and grave violation of privacy (see judgement
4A_458/2009 of June 10, 2010 at 4.4.3.2, in:
SJ 2010 I p. 417; 4A_320/2009 of June 2nd,
2010 at. 4.4; 4P.12/2000 of June 14, 2000 at 5b/
aa with references; see also Eugen BUCHER,
Berner Kommentar, 3rd ed: 1993, nr. 26 to
Art. 27 ZGB; Walter/Bosch/Brönnimann,
Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der
Schweiz, 1991, p. 236; Anton HEINI, in:
Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG, 2nd ed:.
2004, nr. 45 to Art. 190 PILA; Wolfgang
PORTMANN, Einseitige Optionsklauseln in
Arbeitsverträgen von Fussballspielern, Causa
Sport 2006 p. 209).
4.3.3 The limits to legal commitments due to the
protection of privacy do not apply only to
contractual agreements but also to the statutes
and decisions of legal persons (BUCHER,
a.a.O., nr. 18 to Art. 27 ZGB; see already
BGE 104 II 6 at 2 p. 8 f). Sanctions imposed
by a federation, which do not merely ensure
the correct course of games but actually
encroach upon the legal interests of the person
-
139
concerned are subject to judicial control
according to case law (BGE 120 II 369 at 2
p. 370; 119 II 271 at 3c; 118 II 12 at 2 p. 15
ff.; see already BGE 108 II 15 E. 3 p. 19 ff).
This applies in particular when sanctions
issued by a federation gravely impact the
personal right to economic development; in
such a case the Federal Tribunal has held that
the freedom of an association to exclude its
members is limited by their privacy right when
it is the body of reference for the public in the
profession or the economic branch concerned
(BGE 123 III 193 at 2c/bb und cc p. 197 ff.).
This corresponds to the view that was adopted
in particular for sport federations (BGE 123
III 193 E. 2c/bb p. 198 with references; see
also BGE 134 III 193 at 4.5 p. 200). In such
cases the right of the association to exclude
a member is not reviewed merely from the
point of view of an abuse of rights but also by
balancing the interests involved with a view to
the infringement of privacy in order to assess
whether some important reason is at hand
(BGE 123 III 193 at 2c/cc p. 198 f.; see also
BGE 134 III 193 at. 4.4).
These principles also apply to associations
governed by Swiss law and headquarted in
Switzerland which – like FIFA – regulate
international sport. The measures taken by
such sport federations which gravely harm
the development of individuals who practice
the sport as a profession are licit only when
the interests of the federation justify the
infringement of privacy.
4.3.4 As a professional football player the Appellant
violated his contractual obligations towards the
Ukrainian association FC Shakhtar Donetsk
and was therefore ordered to pay damages
severally with the football club which hired
him at a time when his contract was still in
force (see judgment 4A_320/2009 of June 2nd,
2010). The Federation sanction under dispute,
which the CAS based on the Appellant being
legally bound by the sanctions contained at
Art. 64 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, is in
service of private enforcement of the decision
granting damages if the claim remains unpaid.
Upon a simple request by the creditor the
Appellant should undergo a ban from all
professional activities in connexion with
football until a claim in excess of € 11 million
with interest at 5% from the middle of 2007 (i.
e. € 550’000 yearly) is paid. This is supposed
to uphold the interest of a member of FIFA
to the payment of damages by the employee
in breach and indirectly the interest of the
sport federation to contractual compliance
by football players. The infringement in the
Appellant’s economic freedom would be
suitable to promote the willingness to pay and
to find the funds for the amount due; however
if the Appellant rightly says that he cannot pay
the whole amount anyway, the adequacy of the
sanction to achieve its direct purpose – namely
the payment of the damages – is questionable.
Indeed the prohibition to continue his
previous economic and other activities will
deprive the Appellant from the possibility to
achieve an income in his traditional activity
which would enable him to pay his debt. Yet
the sanction of the Federation is however not
necessary to enforce the damages awarded:
the Appellant’s previous employer can avail
itself of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards of June 10, 1958 (SR 0.277.12) to
enforce the award, as most states are parties
to that treaty and in particular Italy, which is
the Appellant’s present domicile. The sanction
issued by the Federation is also illegitimate to
the extent that the interests which the world
football federation seeks to enforce in this
way do not justify the grave infringement in
the Appellant’s privacy. The abstract goal of
enforcing compliance by football players with
their duties to their employees is clearly of less
weight as the occupational ban against the
Appellant, unlimited in time and worldwide
for any activities in connexion with football.
4.3.5 The threat of an unlimited occupational ban
based on Art. 64 (4) of the FIFA Disciplinary
Code constitutes an obvious and grave
encroachment in the Appellant’s privacy
rights and disregards the fundamental limits
of legal commitments as embodied in Art.
27 (2) ZGB. Should payment fail to take
place, the award under appeal would lead not
only to the Appellant being subjected to his
previous employer’s arbitrariness but also to
an encroachment in his economic freedom
of such gravity that the foundations of his
economic existence are jeopardized without
any possible justification by some prevailing
interest of the world football federation or its
members. In view of the penalty it entails, the
CAS arbitral award of June 29, 2011 contains
an obvious and grave violation of privacy and
is contrary to public policy (Art. 190 (2) (e)
PILA).
-
140
5.
Paragraphs 2-6 of the CAS arbitral award of June 29,
2011 must be annulled and the appeal upheld to the
extent that the matter is capable of appeal. In view
of the outcome of the proceedings the Respondent
will pay the costs and compensate the other party (Ar.
66(1) and Art. 68 (2) BGG).
Therefore the Federal Tribunal pronounces:
1.
The appeal is admitted to the extent that the matter
is capable of appeal and paragraphs 2-6 of the CAS
award of June 29, 2011 are annulled.
2.
The judicial costs set at CHF 25’000 shall be borne by
the Respondent.
3.
The Respondent shall pay to the Appellant CHF
30’000 for the federal judicial proceedings.
4.
This judgment shall be notified in writing to the Parties
and to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
Lausanne, March 27, 2012
In the name of the First Civil Law Court of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.
The Presiding Judge:
Klett(Mrs)
The Clerk:
Leeman
-
141
4A_246/2011**
Judgment of 7 November 2011
Composition
Federal Judge Kolly
Federal Judge Kiss
Clerk of the Court: Mr Leemann
Parties
X.______
Appellant,
versus
Y.________ Sàrl,
Respondent, represented by Mr Antonio Rigozzi.
* Translator’s note: Quote as X._____ v. Y._____ Sàrl, 4A_246/2011. The original of the decision is in German. The text is available on
the website of the Federal Tribunal www.bger.ch
Facts
A.
A.a X.________ (the Appellant) is a football club
based in Z.________. It belongs to the football
federation of Q.________ which in its turn is
a member of the Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (FIFA) with headquarters
in Zurich. Y.________ Sàrl (the Respondent) is
a football agent based in R.________.
A.b On February 19, 2003 the Appellant and
the Respondent entered into an agreement
concerning the transfer of player A.________.
According to that agreement the parties would
jointly bear the transfer fee for the future
transfer of player A.________ to a foreign
club. Article 4 of the Agreement provides the
following (according to the undisputed English
translation): “the competent instance in case of a
dispute concerning this Agreement is the FIFA
Commission, or the UEFA Commission, which
will have to decide the dispute that could arise
between the club and the agent”1. In connection
with A.________’s transfer and that of two
other players some disputes arose between the
Parties with regard to the transfer fees.
B.
B.a On September 10, 2008 the Respondent
initiated arbitral proceedings based on
paragraph 4 of the February 19, 2003 agreement
in front of the FIFA Players Status Committee
and submitted that the Appellant should be
ordered to pay € 534’186 and USD 100’000. In
a letter of December 10, 2008 the FIFA Players
Status Committee took the view that it had no
jurisdiction based on article 6.1 of its Rules as
the Claimant was a company and not a natural
person. When the Respondent questioned that
decision FIFA maintained that its Players Status
Committee had no jurisdiction in a letter of
January 15, 2009.
-
142
B.b On February 25, 2009 the Respondent applied
to the High Court of the canton of Zurich for
the appointment of an arbitrator. On October
20, 2009 the High Court of the canton of
Zurich decided that there were enough clues to
the existence of an arbitration clause and that
the Appellant had not succeeded to produce
summary evidence that there was no arbitration
clause, whereupon the Court appointed Urs
Scherrer as arbitrator.
should be rejected. The Arbitral tribunal did not
express a position. The Appellant submitted a reply
and the Respondent a rebuttal.
B.c In an award of April 10, 2010 the arbitrator
found that he did not have jurisdiction. He
held that the parties had obviously intended to
submit the existing dispute to an arbitral tribunal
specializing in sport law as the Appellant
even took the view that the dispute should be
submitted to a sport arbitral tribunal constituted
according to the rules of a sport arbitration
organization. Therefore the arbitrator considered
that it was not justified to let the arbitration
clause become ineffective; however there was
no direct or indirect intent of the parties to
submit their dispute to a sole arbitrator, which
is why he found that he had no jurisdiction.
The Respondent appealed the arbitral award of
April 13, 2010 to the Federal Tribunal by way
of a Civil law appeal (case 4A_280/2010). The
proceedings were subsequently stayed until a
decision in this case.
1.1 The seat of the Arbitral tribunal is in Lausanne
in this case. Both the Appellant and the
Respondent had their domicile or their seat
outside Switzerland at the decisive time. As the
(1) and (2) PILA).
B.d On May 14, 2010 the Respondent fi led a claim
against the Appellant in front of the Court
of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) essentially
submitting that the Appellant should be ordered
to pay USD 100’000 with interest at 6% from
February 9, 2006 and € 534’186 with interest
at 8% since February 1st, 2008. The Appellant
disputed the CAS jurisdiction. In an interim
award of March 17, 2011 the CAS held that it
had jurisdiction on the basis of the arbitration
clause contained in the agreement of February
19, 2003, with regard to the dispute between
the Parties in connection with the transfer
of player A.________ (award paragraph 1).
Simultaneously, the Arbitral tribunal found that
it had no jurisdiction as to the Respondent’s other
submissions (award paragraph 2). Furthermore
it decided the costs of the proceedings and those
of the parties (award paragraph 3 and 4).
C.
In a Civil law appeal the Appellant submits to the
Federal Tribunal that paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of the
CAS interim award of March 17, 2011 should be
annulled and asks for a finding that the CAS has no
jurisdiction. The Respondent submits that the appeal
Reasons
1.
appeal is allowed under the requirements of Art. 190192 PILA 2 (SR 291) (Art. 77 (1) (a) BGG3).
77 (1) BGG may in principle seek only the
annulment of the decision under appeal (see
Art. 77 (2) BGG ruling out the applicability of
Art. 107 (2) BGG to the extent that it allows
the Federal Tribunal to decide the matter
itself). To the extent that the dispute involves
the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal there
is however an exception to that effect, namely
that the Federal Tribunal itself can decide the
jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal (BGE 136 III 605 at 3.3.4 p. 616 with
references). The Appellant‘s submission is
admissible to that extent.
2.
The Appellant argues that the Arbitral tribunal
wrongly accepted jurisdiction (Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA).
2.1 Based on Art. 178 (2) PILA the Arbitral tribunal
examined whether or not the Parties had entered
into a valid arbitration clause according to Swiss
law. According to Art. 1 (1) and Art. 2 (1) OR4
a contract is entered into when the parties
agreed on all the essential points. The materially
essential points of an arbitration clause include
the intent of the parties to bind themselves to
submit their dispute to decision by an arbitral
tribunal and furthermore the determination
of the object of the dispute, which is to be
submitted to the arbitrators. Additional items,
December 18, 1987, RS 291.
Statute of June 17, 2005 organizing the Federal Tribunal, RS 173
110.
4. Translator’s note: OR is the German abbreviation for the Swiss Code
of obligations.
-
143
such as the seat of the arbitral tribunal, the rules
as to the composition of the arbitral tribunal,
the designation of an arbitral institution, the
choice of the language of the proceedings and
the determination of the applicable procedural
rules, do not belong to the essential contractual
points unless a party would have seen them as
conditio sine qua non for the conclusion of the
agreement in a way that was recognizable for
the other party. Should the interpretation of the
arbitration clause show that the parties wanted
to submit their dispute to an arbitral tribunal
but that there was no agreement as to the course
of the arbitral proceedings, an understanding
of the contract must in principle be sought
which will be in favour of the arbitration clause.
Article 4 of the February 19, 2003 agreement
clearly shows the intention of the Parties to
exclude state courts and to let possible disputes
be decided in arbitral proceedings instead. The
Parties had initially designated an organization,
namely FIFA or UEFA which should decide the
dispute. To the extent that they anticipated that
a committee of FIFA or UEFA would have to
decide a possible dispute in connection with their
agreement, the Parties had clearly agreed on an
institution, which was not a state court and that
was not based in the state of one of the Parties,
yet which would be particularly familiar with the
possible object of the dispute. An interpretation
of article 4 according to the principle of trust
shows that the Parties wanted to submit the
dispute originating from the agreement to an
arbitral tribunal. Except in extraordinary cases
the designation of an arbitral institution or
an arbitral body should be considered as not
subjectively essential to the parties. There were
no indications that the Appellant would have
considered the institution designated in the
arbitration clause as so important that it would
not have decided in favour of arbitration had
it known of the FIFA refusal to adjudicate the
dispute. The CAS saw another indication that
the “FIFA Commission” mentioned in article 4
was not an essential point in the fact that the
clause provided for the alternative jurisdiction
of UEFA besides FIFA. This was an important
indication that the Parties wanted an institution
specialized in sport, which was familiar with
disputes involving the transfer of players but
that they were not set on a specific organization.
Moreover it was to be taken into account that
the FIFA Statutes provide for a general right
of appeal to the CAS of a decision of the FIFA
Committee for the Status of Players. Had the
FIFA Committee not declined jurisdiction to
decide the dispute between the Parties, the CAS
would thus have had jurisdiction on appeal.
For these reasons the validity of the arbitration
clause should be upheld. Yet it was unclear and
needed to be interpreted and supplemented as
to the specifically competent arbitral tribunal.
In this respect the Parties had wanted to submit
their dispute to an arbitral tribunal with several
arbitrators. The Parties had clearly wanted to
submit the dispute to an arbitral tribunal sitting
in Switzerland, whereupon they let the specific
seat open by choosing alternatively FIFA (based
in Zurich) and UEFA (based in Nyon, VD).
Therefore a finding of jurisdiction for the CAS,
which is based in Lausanne – and therefore
also in the canton of Vaud – corresponded to
the choice of venue according to the arbitration
clause. Further interpretation of the clause
showed that the Parties intended to entrust the
decision to an institution specialized in sport
law (in particular in the field of football). In this
respect it was generally known that since 2003 the
CAS has jurisdiction to decide appeals against
FIFA decisions. Thus the CAS had been able to
develop comprehensive case law in the field of
football, in particular as to the FIFA Rules. For
these reasons the CAS was in the best position
to decide the dispute between the Parties once
FIFA denied jurisdiction and the Appellant had
not argued that UEFA would actually decide
the matter. Accordingly the CAS found that it
had jurisdiction as to the Respondent’s claims in
connection with player A.________’s transfer
on the basis of article 4 of the February 19, 2003
agreement.
2.2
2.2.1 The Federal Tribunal exercises free
judicial review according to Art. 190 (2)
(b) PILA as to jurisdiction, including the
substantive preliminary issues from which
the determination of jurisdiction depends.
However even in the framework of an appeal
on jurisdiction the Court reviews the factual
findings of the award under appeal only
when some admissible grievances within the
meaning of Art. 190 (2) PILA are brought
against such factual findings or exceptionally
when new evidence is taken into account
(BGE 134 III 565 at 3.1 p. 567; 133 III 139 at 5
p. 141; 129 III 727 at 5.2.2 p. 733).
2.2.2 The arbitration clause must meet the
requirements of Art. 178 PILA as to form
(Art. 178 (1) PILA). In sport cases the Federal
Tribunal reviews with a certain “benevolence”
the agreement of the parties to call upon
an arbitral tribunal; this is with a view to
-
144
promoting quick disposition of the dispute by
specialized courts which, as the CAS, offer
comprehensive guarantees of independence
and objectivity (BGE 133 235 at 4.3.2.3 p. 244 ff
with references). The generosity of federal case
law in this respect appears in the assessment of
the validity of arbitration clauses by reference
(judgement 4A__460/2010 of April 18, 2011 at
3.2.2; 4A_548/2009 of January 20, 2010 at 4.1;
4A_460/2008 of January 9, 2009 at 6.2 with
references). According to Art. 178 (2) PILA
the validity of an arbitration clause is assessed
as to its contents according to the law chosen
by the parties and applicable to the dispute,
in particularly as to the principal agreement,
or according to Swiss law. In the arbitral
proceedings none of the Parties took the
view that as to the validity of the arbitration
clause the law applicable to the February 19,
2003 agreement had to be determined first;
in particular, the Respondent did not claim
that another law would be more advantageous
than Swiss law as to the material validity of
the arbitration clause. The CAS reviewed the
existence of the arbitration clause in dispute
on the basis of Swiss law according to Art. 178
(2) PILA, which is not disputed by any of the
Parties in front of the Federal Tribunal.
2.2.3 An arbitration clause is an agreement by which
two determined or determinable parties agree
to submit one or several existing or future
disputes to the binding jurisdiction of an
arbitral tribunal to the exclusion of the original
state jurisdiction, on the basis of a legal order
determined directly or indirectly (BGE 130 III
66 at 3.1 p. 70). It is decisive that the intention
of the parties should be expressed to have an
arbitral tribunal, i. e. not a state court, decide
certain disputes (BGE 129 III 675 at 2.3 p.
679 ff). The arbitral tribunal called upon to
decide must be either determined or in any
case determinable. The appointment of the
arbitral tribunal may take place according to
the rules chosen by the parties (Art. 179 (1)
PILA) or by decision of the court at the seat of
the arbitral tribunal (Art. 179 (2) PILA) (BGE
130 III 66 at 3.1 p. 70 ff; 129 III 675 at 2.3
p. 680). Incomplete, unclear or contradictory
provisions in arbitration clauses create
pathological clauses. To the extent that they do
not concern mandatory elements of the arbitral
agreement, namely the binding submission of
the dispute to a private arbitral tribunal, they
do not necessarily lead to invalidity. Instead, a
solution must be sought by interpretation and
if necessary by supplementing the contract
with reference to general contract law, which
respects the fundamental intent of the parties
to submit to arbitral jurisdiction (BGE 130 III
66 at 3.1 p. 71). Should no mutual intent of the
parties be factually certain as to the arbitration
clause, it must be interpreted according to the
principle of trust, i. e. the putative intent is
to be ascertained as it could and should have
been understood by the respective parties
according to the rules of good faith (BGE 130
III 66 at 3.2 p. 71; 129 III 675 at 2.3 p. 680).
When interpretation shows that the parties
intended to submit the dispute to an arbitral
tribunal and to exclude state jurisdiction,
but with differences as to how the arbitral
proceedings should be carried out, the rule
that a contract should be given effect applies
and an understating of the contract must be
sought which will uphold the arbitration
clause. Imprecise or flawed designation of the
arbitral tribunal does not necessarily lead to
invalidity of the arbitral agreement (BGE 130
III 66 at 3.2 p. 71 ff; 129 III 675 at 2.3 p. 681).
2.3
2.3.1 The Appellant firstly challenges that an arbitral
agreement would have come into force. In this
respect it wrongly denies that the expressions
of intent in the contractual clause in dispute,
once interpreted according to the rules of
good faith, shows that the Parties wanted to
have possible disputes as to their contractual
relationship decided by committees of the
football bodies FIFA or UEFA instead of
going to their respective state courts. The
Appellant merely claims generally that the
finding of the CAS that state jurisdiction
was renounced would violate the recognized
principle of federal case law according to
which such renunciation could not be accepted
lightly but instead should be interpreted
restrictively in case of doubt (see BGE 129
III 675 at 2.3 p. 680 ff). However he does not
explain to what extent the contractual clause
would have to be understood in this respect
as meaning that state jurisdiction should be
upheld and concedes that according to Art. 4
of the agreement “the respective Commission
of the football bodies FIFA or UEFA should
have jurisdiction to decide the dispute” and
also sees in another place the clear intent of the
Parties “to submit their dispute to an arbitral
institution, namely to the FIFA Committee”.
Article 4 does not expressly mention “arbitral
jurisdiction” “arbitral tribunal” “arbitrator”
“arbitration clause” or similar wording
(see WERNER WENGER/CHRISTOPH MÜLLER,
-
145
in: Basler Kommentar, Internationales
Privatrecht, 2 Aufl. 2007, N. 32 to Art. 178
PILA) but provides for alternate jurisdiction
of two international football bodies to decide
a possible dispute under the contract. Contrary
to what the Appellant appears to claim, the
wording “competent instance”5 as well as
“decide the dispute”6 cannot be understood
as meaning that the two private sport bodies
mentioned, both familiar with the world of
professional football, would merely mediate or
advise in case of disputes under the contract.
It is instead to be concluded according to good
faith that the Appellant as an internationally
known football club and the Respondent
as a broker of professional football players,
wanted the binding jurisdiction of one of the
two international football organizations as
to a possible dispute based on their transfer
agreement, yet without reserving at the same
time the possibility to go to the state courts
of their respective states. The Appellant
itself takes the view moreover that a decision
of the FIFA Committee for the Status of
Players could have been appealed to the CAS.
Under such circumstances the renunciation
of state jurisdiction is not doubtful, which
would call for restrictive interpretation. The
Appellant’s argument that the interpretation
of the statements of intention of the Parties
according to the principle of trust would not
lead to the exclusion of state jurisdiction is
unfounded. The CAS assumed the existence
of an arbitration clause without violating
federal law.
2.3.2 The Appellant further argues that the
designation of the competent “UEFA
Committee” would be obviously flawed as it is
generally known that no UEFA body accepts to
decide disputes between brokers and football
clubs. Such disputes are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the FIFA Committee for the
Status of Players which, however, found that
it had no jurisdiction in this case as according
to its practice it decides only disputes between
player agents and football clubs when the
broker is a natural person. As the aforesaid
FIFA Committee did not accept the dispute,
the arbitration clause must be considered
extinguished according to the Appellant or
impossible to begin with. The Appellant
rightly points out that the designation of both
FIFA and UEFA Committees proved to be
impossible to begin with (Art. 20 (1) OR) as
both bodies could not address the dispute due
to their internal rules. However this does not
lead to the nullity of the arbitration clause;
instead the CAS rightly analysed whether or
not the bodies designated at article 4 of the
February 19, 2003 agreement were of such
importance that the Parties would have decided
against arbitral jurisdiction had they known
these could not decide a dispute (see also JeanFrançois POUDRET/Sébastien BESSON,
Comparative law of international arbitration,
2 ed. 2007, Rz. 161, mentioned in the appeal,
according to whom the designation of an
inexisting arbitral institution does not lead in
all cases to the nullity of the arbitration clause
but only under specific circumstances). Thus
the CAS examined what the Parties would
have agreed according to their hypothetical
intent (see BGE 131 III 467 at 1.2 p. 470) if
they had been aware of the nullity of the flawed
language already at the time the contract was
concluded (see Art. 20 (2) OR). Contrary
to what the Appellant seems to argue, the
CAS did not merely proceed from a general
premise in its conclusion that an arbitration
clause would also have been entered into if
the Parties had been aware that none of the
bodies designated would decide a dispute as
to a transfer agreement. Instead it recognized
specific indications in support of that view by
considering the individual relationships: thus
the alternative reference to two football bodies
suggests that the Parties were not set upon
one specific institution but principally wanted
an arbitral tribunal familiar with issues as to
the transfer of professional football players.
Moreover the CAS convincingly rejected the
Appellant’s argument that it would not have
entered into an arbitral agreement if it had
known the lack of jurisdiction of the FIFA
Committee for the Status of Players by stating
that a decision of this FIFA Committee could
have been appealed to the CAS according
to the applicable FIFA Rules, which is also
accepted by the Appellant. It is actually
not apparent that the Parties would have
anticipated the possibility to appeal a decision
of the FIFA Committee for the Status of
Players to the CAS whilst maintaining the
jurisdiction of the respective national courts
merely in view of a possibility to seize the CAS
or another arbitral tribunal directly. Why this
should be so is not explained by the Appellant.
Moreover it disregards that according to the
general rules of contract, partial nullity must
be given preference in case of doubt as to the
-
146
existence of complete nullity arising from the
hypothetical intent of the Parties (judgment
4C.156/2006 of August 17, 2006 at 3.2).
The CAS did not violate federal law when
despite the invalid designation of the bodies
mentioned in article 4 of the February 19, 2003
agreement it upheld the arbitration clause.
2.3.3 When the parties excluded state jurisdiction
in favour of an arbitral tribunal, as they did
in this case, it is possible – contrary to the
opinion advanced in the appeal – to seek
a solution which takes into account the
fundamental intent of the parties to submit to
arbitral jurisdiction (see BGE 130 III 66 at 3.2
p. 71 ff). For that purpose the contract may
not only be interpreted but also supplemented
(BGE130 III 66 at 3.1 p. 71; see WENGER/
MÜLLER, a.a.O., n. 53 ff to Art. 178
PILA). Partial nullity (Art. 20 (2) OR) of the
arbitration clause concluded on February 19,
2003 is to be remedied to the extent possible
by supplementing the contract on the basis
of the hypothetical intent of the parties (see
BGE 120 II 35 at 4a p. 40 ff; 114 II 159 at
2c p. 163; 107 II 216 at 3a and b p. 318 ff).
One must enquire as to what the parties would
have agreed had the partial flaw be known
to them already at the time the contract was
concluded (see as to the ascertainment of the
hypothetical intention of the Parties BGE 107
II 216 at 3a p. 218; judgement 4C. 156/2006 of
August, 17 2006 at 3.3; 4C.9/1998 of May, 14
1998 at 4b). Without breaching federal law the
CAS found that the Parties wanted to submit
their dispute to an arbitral tribunal sitting in
Switzerland, which would know sport law
particularly well. The designation of FIFA
as well as UEFA suggests that the Parties
wanted to have a sport body decide their
possible disputes under the transfer contract,
which would be familiar with transfers in the
business of international football. It must be
noticed in particular that the CAS can review
FIFA decisions concerning the transfer of
players on appeal and the Appellant itself
acknowledges that an appeal to the CAS would
have been allowed against the decision of the
FIFA Committee for the Status of Players
if it had accepted jurisdiction in the case at
hand. On the basis of these circumstances it
must be assumed that the Parties would have
submitted the possible disputes arising from
their transfer agreement of February 19, 2003
to the CAS, which regularly addresses transfers
of football players, had they known that the
bodies mentioned in article 4 would not have
jurisdiction. The Appellant’s objection that
direct jurisdiction of the CAS would cause it to
lose some of its rights as a possibility to appeal
pursuant to the pertinent FIFA Rules would
not be available, is not convincing because
the alleged disadvantage arises directly from
the lack of jurisdiction of the aforesaid FIFA
Committee. Moreover the Appellant disputes
the jurisdiction of the CAS merely in general,
yet without showing to what extent the Parties
in the case at hand would have insisted on a
double degree of jurisdiction. The reference
in the appeal to two decisions of the CAS
in which a refusal to accept jurisdiction by
FIFA was upheld is equally unconvincing as
in these cases the jurisdiction of FIFA was
to be decided and a direct claim in front of
the CAS was not at issue. The CAS therefore
did not break federal law when it found that it
had jurisdiction to decide the dispute between
the Parties in connection with the transfer of
player A.________.
3.
The appeal proves unfounded and is to be rejected
to the extent that the matter is capable of appeal. In
view of the outcome of the proceedings the Appellant
must pay the judicial costs and compensate the other
party (Art. 66 (1) and Art. 68 (2) BGG).
1.
The appeal is rejected to the extent that the matter is
capable of appeal.
2.
The judicial costs set at CHF 10’000 shall be borne
by the Appellant.
3.
The Appellant shall pay to the Respondent an amount
of CHF 12’000 for the federal judicial proceedings.
4.
This judgment shall be notified in writing to the
Parties and to the Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS).
Lausanne, November 7, 2011
In the name of the First Civil Law Court of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.
Klett(Mrs)
The Clerk:
Leeman
-
147
4A_627/2011**
Judgment of 8 March 2012
Composition
Federal Judge Kolly
Federal Judge Kiss
Clerk of the Court: Mr Hurni
Parties
International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF),
Appellant, represented by Mr. Daniel Eisele and Mr. Tamir Livschitz,
versus
SCB Ice Hockey AG,
Respondent, represented by Mr. Michael Bader and Mrs. Elena Valli.
* Translator’s note: Quote as International Ice Hockey Federation v. SCB Ice Hockey AG, 4A_627/2011. The original of the decision
is in German. The text is available on the website of the Federal Tribunal www.bger.ch
Facts
A.
A.a The International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF,
Appellant) is an association under Swiss law
based in Zurich and registered at the Registry of
commerce. Among its members is the Swiss Ice
Hockey Federation (SIHF), also an association
under Swiss law based in Zurich. The Swiss
National Hockey League GmbH (NL-GmbH)
based in Ittigen (Bern) belongs to this parent
organization.
SCB Ice Hockey AG (SCB AG, the Respondent)
is a corporation headquarted in Bern. Its
goal is to conduct, organize and manage a
professional hockey team (SCB, Skating Club
Berne), including the conduct of games and the
handling of transfers. It is a member of SIHF
and of NL-GmbH.
A.b In April 2008 the Appellant entered into an
agreement with SIHF and NL-GmbH as to the
participation of Swiss clubs to the Champions
Hockey League, a European hockey tournament
of high level (the CHL-Agreement). This
provides among other things for some financial
contributions for a total amount of € 10’000’000
in favor of the participating clubs (Art. 8) as
well as the rules pursuant to which the clubs
become entitled to participate (Art. 10). The
CHL-Agreement provides for Swiss law to be
applicable and states that “any dispute between
the parties under or relating to the subject
matter of this agreement 1 ” is to be decided
exclusively and finally by an award of the Court
of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne (CAS).
Art. 10 of the CHL-Agreement (“Entries for
the Competition2 ”) contains the following
provisions:
-
148
“10.1 European IIHF member national
association / leagues shall enter a certain
number of clubs for this competition (...).
10.3 (...) For the first season, national associations
/ leagues shall be represented on the following
basis: (...)
c) Switzerland (...) : One representative being the
top league national champion (...).
10.4 Clubs must be entered by the National
Association / League by means of the official
entry form (...).3 ”
The Respondent made an application to the
Appellant to participate in the CHL 2008/2009
by way of a letter of May 19, 2008. The application
form signed by the Respondent (“Entry
Form4 ”) provides that the competition shall
be conducted according to the rules contained
in the corresponding agreements between the
Appellant and the national federation of the
applicant club as well as in the rulebook of the
Appellant and that the applicant club accepts all
obligations contained in these applications and
rules.
On the basis of its results in the national
championship the Respondent met the
requirements to participate in the 2009/10 and
2010/11 CHL.
A.c In January 2009 the company sponsoring the
CHL suspended its payments as a consequence
of the financial crisis. On April 9, 2009 the
Appellant terminated its agreement with
that company and informed various national
federations, including the SIHF, that it was no
longer in a position to finance the CHL 2009/10
and 2010/11 and that it could not guarantee the
prize money of € 10’000’000 each time. In the
middle of June the Appellant decided to suspend
the CHL 2009/10 due to the lack of new
investors. At the end of 2009 the Appellant, the
SIHF and NL-GmbH entered into a “Settlement
agreement5 ” with a view to conducting the CHL
in the season 2010/11 again.
B.
B.a In a request for arbitration of October 13, 2010
the Respondent submitted to the CAS that the
Appellant should be ordered to pay € 107’600
(reduced to € 53’800 later), with interest.
The first two amounts correspond to the alleged
prize money that the Respondent would have
received in any event for participating in the
CHL 2009/10 and 2010/11 pursuant to the CHLAgreement. The third amount corresponds to
the damages that the Respondent would have
suffered as a consequence of the fact that it
bought three players with a view to participating
in the CHL 2009/10.
In its answer of November 11, 2010 the Appellant
mainly submitted that the CAS should decline
jurisdiction. Alternatively it submitted that the
claim should be rejected.
B.b In a “Partial Award on Jurisdiction6 ” of
September 13, 2011 the CAS found that it had
jurisdiction.
The main reason for that finding was that Art.
10 of the CHL-Agreement, which defines which
clubs are entitled to participate in the CHL on
the basis of their performance in the national
championships, constitutes a pure contract in
favor of third parties (namely in favor of the
clubs entitled to participate) within the meaning
of Art. 112 (2) OR7 and that consequently
the arbitration clause contained in the CHL
agreement is also applicable to such third parties.
C.
In a Civil law appeal the Appellant submits that the
Federal Tribunal should annul the partial award of
September 13, 2011 and deny the CAS jurisdiction.
The Respondent submits that the appeal should be
rejected. The CAS submitted some comments and the
Parties filed a reply and a rejoinder.
A stay of enforcement was granted by the Presiding
judge on November 7, 2011.
Reasons
1.
In front of the Federal Tribunal the Parties used
German. The judgment of the Federal Tribunal is
therefore to be issued in German.
2.
2.1 The award under appeal concerns two parties
that are both based in Switzerland. The parties
to the contract or the parties in the arbitration
did not stipulate in the arbitration clause or
7. Translator’s note: OR is the German abbreviation for the Swiss Code
of Obligations.
-
149
later that the provisions as to international
arbitration (Art. 176 ff PILA8) should be applied
(see Art. 353 (2) CCP9). The provisions as to
internal arbitration are accordingly applicable as
provided by Title III of the CCP (Art. 353 ff).
2.2 The award under appeal is an interim award on
jurisdiction. It may be appealed to the Federal
Tribunal by way of a Civil law appeal on the
grounds stated at Art. 393 (a) and (b) CCP (Art.
77 (1) (b) BGG 10 compared with Art. 392 (b)
CCP).
77 (1) BGG may in principle result only in the
decision under appeal being annulled and not
modified (see Art. 77 (2) BGG ruling out the
applicability of Art. 177 (2) BGG to the extent
that the latter provision empowers the Federal
Tribunal to decide the matter itself). To the
extent that the dispute concerns jurisdiction
however, there is an exception and the Federal
Tribunal may find itself in favor or against
jurisdiction (BGE 136 III 605 at 3.3.4 p. 616
with references). The Appellant’s submission for
a finding that the CAS has no jurisdiction in the
case at hand is accordingly admissible.
2.4 The Federal Tribunal reviews only the grounds
for appeal which are brought forward and
reasoned in the appeal (Art. 77 (3) BGG). This
corresponds to the duty to submit reasons
with regard to the violation of constitutional
rights (Art. 110 (2) BGG). As before, the strict
requirements for reasons developed by the
Federal Tribunal under the aegis of Art. 90
(1) (b) of the previous law remain valid (BGE
134 III 186 at 5). The Appellant must specify
which of the various grounds for appeal are met
in its view. It is not for the Federal Tribunal to
research which ground for appeal according
to Art. 393 (a) and (b) CCP should be invoked
with the various arguments raised if that is not
specified by the Appellant in relation to them.
Thus the Appellant must show in details why the
requirements of the grounds for appeal invoked
are met and point out in its criticism which of the
reasons of the lower Court are legally inaccurate
(see BGE 128 III 50 at 1c; further: BGE 134
II 244 at 2.1 p. 245 f.; 133 IV 286 at 1.4 p. 287;
December 18, 1987, RS 291.
9. Translator’s note:CCP stands for Code of Civil Procedure, the English
abbreviation for the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure in force since
January 1st, 2011, RS 272.
134 V 53 at 3.3). Mere references to the record
are inadmissible; to what extent the grounds for
appeal relied upon are met must be explained in
the appeal brief itself (see BGE 133 II 396 at 3.1
p. 400; 126 III 198 at 1d; 116 II 92 at 2; 115 II 83
at 3 p. 85).
3.
The Appellant argues that the Arbitral tribunal
wrongly accepted jurisdiction.
3.1 The jurisdictional appeal provided by Art. 393
(b) CCP as to internal arbitration corresponds to
the one contained at Art. 190 (2) (b) PILA as to
international arbitration (see message of June 28,
2006 as to the Swiss Code of Civil procedure §
5.25.8 ad Art. 391 E CCP, BBl 11 2006 7405).
As to jurisdiction the Federal Tribunal
exercises free judicial review including as to the
substantive preliminary issues from which the
determination of jurisdiction depends. However
this Court does not review the factual findings
of the award under appeal, even in an appeal
concerning jurisdiction, as it is bound by the
factual findings of the arbitral tribunal, which
it may neither supplement nor rectify (see Art.
77 (2) in conjunction with Art. 97 and Art.
105 (2) BGG). It is only when some admissible
grievances within the meaning of Art. 393 CCP
are brought against the factual findings or when
exceptionally some new evidence is taken into
account that the Federal Tribunal may review
the factual findings of the award under appeal
(Art. 99 BGG; see BGE 4A_246/201112 of
November 7, 2011 at 2.2.1).
3.2 The issue as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal also includes the subjective scope of
the arbitration clause. In its review process the
arbitral tribunal must clarify which persons are
bound by the arbitration clause (BGE 134 III
565 at 3.2 S. 567 with references). According
to the principle of the relativity of contractual
commitments (alteri stipulari nemo potest; ULP.
D. 45,1,38,17) an arbitration clause contained in
a contract basically binds only the parties to the
contract. However the Federal Tribunal has long
held that an arbitration clause may under certain
circumstances also bind persons that did not
sign the contract and are not mentioned there,
for instance when a claim is assigned, in case of
11. Translator’s note: BBl is the German abbreviation for the Swiss
Federal Reporter.
12. Translator’s note: Full English translation at http://www.praetor.
ch/arbitrage/jurisdiction-of-the-cas-upheld-a-pathological-clause-hasto-be-s/
-
150
the simple or joint assumption of an obligation,
or when a contractual relationship is taken over
(BGE 134 III 565 at 3.2 p. 567 ff; 129 III 727 at
5.3.1 p. 735).When a third party involves itself
in the performance of a contract containing an
arbitration clause it is furthermore accepted that
by doing so the third party ratifies the arbitration
clause by conclusive behavior and makes known
its intent to become a party to the arbitration
agreement (BGE 134 III 565 at 3.2 p. 568; 129
III 727 at 5.3.2 p. 737). Finally the objective
scope of an arbitration clause is extended to the
beneficiary in case of a pure contract in favor
of a third party within the meaning of Art.
112 (2) OR: when such a contract contains an
arbitration clause the third party may rely on it
to enforce its claim against the promissor unless
the arbitration clause excludes that possibility
(judgment 4A_44/201113 of April 19, 2011 at
2.4.1; Pierre-Yves TSCHANZ, in: Commentaire
romand, 2011, N. 136 ad Art. 178 IPRG). On
objective interpretation of the CHL-Agreement
the Arbitral tribunal reached the conclusion that
the national clubs meeting the requirements
set forth at Art. 10 of the CHL-Agreement
had obtained their own independent right to
claim performance of the various clauses of the
Agreement as provided in a pure contract in
favor of third parties.
3.3 As to issues of consent and interpretation
Swiss contract law recognizes the principle that
concurring subjective intent prevails on what
is stated objectively, yet differently understood
subjectively (BGE 123 III 35 at 2b p. 39). In a
dispute relating to consent and interpretation
the Court must first determine whether the
parties actually expressed the same thing or
not, understood the same and united in this
understanding (subjective interpretation). Is this
the case there is actual consent (BGE 132 III
626 at 3.1 p. 632).
When the parties concurred in their expression
but not in their understanding there is a hidden
disagreement, which results in the contract
being concluded when one of the parties must
be protected on the basis of the principle of trust
in its understanding of the other’s statement of
intent and that accordingly the latter must suffer
objective interpretation of its statements. When
the addressee of a statement of will understands
it differently from the one who makes it or
when it is impossible to ascertain an actual
13. Translator’s note: Full English translation at http://www.praetor.
ch/arbitrage/arbitral-clause-as-contract-in-favor-of-a-third-partybinding/
understanding, the party making the statement
must accept that it be understood as the addressee
could in good faith according to the wording
and context as well as under the circumstances
(objective or normative interpretation). In such
a case there is normative consent (BGE 135 III
410 at 3.2 p. 413; 133 III 675 at 3.3 p. 681; 123 III
35 at 2b p. 39 ff).
3.4 The Appellant criticizes the factual finding of
the Arbitral tribunal that an actual common
intent of the Parties to create rights in favor
of third parties through the CHL-Agreement
cannot be proved. It argues that the finding
is arbitrary within the meaning of Art. 393 (e)
CCP, in particular because some clear statements
of witnesses would have been disregarded. By
entering into the CHL-Agreement it would not
have intended to entitle the clubs to have their
own claims.
3.4.1 The Arbitral tribunal did not issue a finding as
to how SHIF and NL-GmbH as counterparties
understood the text of the CHL-Agreement
in this respect. It does not appear from the
arbitral award that SIHF and NL-GmbH or
their representatives were heard at all as to
this. Only the general secretary of the German
Ice Hockey Federation, Franz Reindl, was
interrogated for in some of the meetings Mr.
Reindl took also part on behalf of the SIHF14
as he had been called as a witness upon the
Appellant’s request. Mr. Reindl testified that
it had been the intention of the parties to
regulate in the CHL Agreement the rights and
obligations of the signatory parties only and
that there had been no intention to create any
rights and obligations for the benefit of third
parties15. The Arbitral tribunal held that his
statement was not decisive to deny the existence
of a contract in favor of third parties because
it emanated from a person without legal
background. Finally the arbitral award held
that the possibility of a contract for the benefit
of a third party was apparently not discussed
or analyzed in the course of the negotiations16
and that it was not proved that at the time the
agreement was concluded the parties wanted
to exclude such an entitlement in favor of
third parties (“such an unanimous will of the
contracting parties cannot be established17”)
that the Appellant on the one hand and SIHF
and NL-GmbH on the other hand both
-
151
agreed to create an entitlement in favor of the
clubs is not proved. Neither is it established
that they agreed in wanting to exclude such
a right. Finally it is not established factually
that SIHF and NL-GmbH wanted to grant
the clubs an entitlement anyway and that they
understood the agreement differently from the
Appellant in this respect. Therefore neither
factual consent nor hidden disagreement is
established or excluded.
3.4.2 According to Art. 393 (e) CPC an award may
be appealed when it is arbitrary in its result
because it relies on factual findings obviously
contrary to the record or on a blatant violation
of the law or equity. The Appellant – and the
Respondent incidentally – disregard the scope
of this ground for appeal, which was taken over
from the earlier Concordate on Arbitration of
March 27, 1969 (Art. 36 (f) KSG 18 (messages
at 5.25.8 Art. 391 Draft CPC, BBl 2006 7405).
An arbitral tribunal issues factual findings
blatantly contrary to the record when due
to oversight it puts itself in contradiction
with the record, whether by overlooking
parts of the record or by giving them other
contents than the accurate ones, or because it
mistakenly assumes that a fact is proved on the
record whilst the record in reality provides no
conclusion in this respect. Contradicting the
record is not equal to arbitrary assessment of
the evidence. The result of the assessment of
the evidence and the evaluations contained
there are not subject to recourse for being
arbitrary but only the factual findings that are
undisputedly contradicted by the record (BGE
131 I 45 at 3.6 p. 50). Furthermore a blatant
violation of the law means only a violation of
substantive law and not a procedural violation
(BGE 131 I 45 at 3.4 p. 48; 112 Ia 350 at 2
p. 352); a blatant violation of equity may only
be claimed when the arbitral tribunal was
entitled to decide ex aequo et bono or when
it applied a norm referring to equity (BGE
107 Ib 63 at 2a p. 65 ff). The Appellant does
not demonstrate any contradiction with the
record in the aforesaid meaning; its argument
is basically criticism of the assessment of the
evidence, which is not admissible. Moreover
the Appellant does not claim that the Arbitral
tribunal would have rejected any submissions
of evidence in respect of the factual issues
that were pertinent and formulated in the
prescribed format. Under such circumstances
it was not objectionable for the CAS to assume
18. Translator’s note: KSG is the German abbreviation for the old
Intercantonal Concordate on Arbitration of March 27, 1969.
the absence of proof of factual consent and to
resort objective interpretation (see BGE 123
III 35 at 2b p. 39 ff).
3.5 The Appellant criticizes the objective interpretation of the CHL-Agreement by the Arbitral
tribunal. Contrary to the opinion of the CAS
this would not be a pure contract in favor of a
third party.
3.5.1 In a pure contract in favor of a third party
(Art. 112 (2) OR) the two parties create a right
for the third party to demand independently
and to claim performance from the obligee of
what was promised. The third party becomes
a creditor without being party to the contract.
The imperfect contract in favor of a third
party (Art. 112 (1) OR) however entitles only
the obligor to claim performance in favor of
the third party from the obligee. The third
party has no immediate claim and is entitled
only to receive performance as a beneficiary.
Whether the third party has an independent
immediate right to claim performance is
decided in principle on the basis of the
statements made by the parties to the contract,
alternatively through a corresponding exercise.
The third party claiming a direct right to claim
and correspondingly alleging the existence of
a contract in favor of a third party has the
burden of proof (Rolf H. WEBER, Berner
Kommentar, N. 6 ff. and 190 to Art. 112 OR).
A pure contract in favor of a third party cannot
be assumed (BGE 123 III 129 at 3d p. 136).
3.5.2 The CAS stated the following with regard
to the issue as to whether or not SIHF
and NL-GmbH, at the time of concluding
the CHL-Agreement and in particular its
Art. 10, on the basis of its wording and the
overall circumstances, must have understood
it objectively in good faith as meaning that a
direct right and therefore a claim was given
to the participating clubs: admittedly no
provision of the CHL-Agreement uses the
concept of a contract in favor of third parties
but there is also no clause which would
exclude interpreting the CHL-Agreement as a
contract in favor of third parties. Art. 10 of
the CHL-Agreement limitatively spells out the
rules to determine which clubs are entitled to
participate. They rely on some purely objective
criteria and the national federations therefore
could not decide freely if they wanted to register
a club. The wording of the registration form
shows that the Respondent itself registered for
the CHL and that SIHF merely confirmed the
-
152
registration. For its part the Appellant could
not reject the registration of a club that met the
requirements for participation as stated in Art.
10 of the CHL-Agreement. From all of this
the CAS concludes that Art. 10 of the CHLAgreement confers a right for the benefit of
the clubs19 and that the right conferred
therein to a club consists of a claim against
both contracting parties to be admitted […]20.
Finally the CAS stated the following: the
German Ice Hockey League together with
two clubs, initiated arbitration proceedings
against the Appellant seeking damages in
connection with the CHL, which would lead
to the conclusion that the German league
assumes a right of the clubs to claim directly.
The Settlement agreement at the end of
2009 provides that the national federations
renounce any claims against the Appellant
as a consequence of the cancellation of the
2009/10 CHL season and also represent that
the clubs will renounce such claims (“the
National Association/League, by signing
this agreement, waive, and ensure that all
clubs will waive, any potential claim they may
have against die IIHF based on the alleged
breach by the IIHF of the CHL Agreement in
connection with the cancellation of the CHL
Season 2009/2010” 21), which presupposes
that claims by the clubs must be considered
possible. The CHL-Agreement was created in
the interest and to the advantage of the clubs
and they were not included as contractual
parties because it was not known in advance
which clubs would be entitled to participate
to the CHL. The clubs were admittedly not
involved in the negotiations but they were
informed early and approved the conclusion of
the CHL-Agreement at the general meetings
of the national federations. Taking part in
the CHL was obviously causing the clubs to
undergo expenses and therefore they needed
certain guarantees, which speaks in favor of a
direct right to claim.
3.5.3 The CHL-Agreement refers neither explicitly
nor tacitly to a direct claiming right of the
participating clubs. According to the CAS at
first sight Art. 10.4 of the CHL Agreement
speaks against such a right to the benefit of the
clubs22. However, contrary to the opinion of
the CAS even a second look at the matter does
not change this. Indeed the CHL-Agreement
contains some wording according to which the
clubs could not register themselves but had
to register for the competition through their
national federations (“national associations/
leagues shall enter a certain number of
clubs for this competition. [...] clubs must be
entered by the National Association / League
by means of the official entry form23 ”) or
according to which the clubs took part in
the CHL as representatives of their national
federations (“national associations / leagues
shall be represented [...]”24). On the other hand
there is no word in the CHL-Agreement as
to any independent rights of the participating
clubs. The wording of the CHL-Agreement
therefore contains nothing that would speak
in favor of a pure contract in favor of third
parties. As the CAS stated the Agreement
rather speaks against it.
The question arises therefore whether CHL
and NL-GmbH should nonetheless have
understood CHL-Agreement differently in
this respect. Nothing can be deducted from
the contractual negotiations in this respect
as the issue of an entitlement of the clubs
was not discussed at all. The CAS attributes
great significance to the fact that the national
federations could not decide freely which club
could participate in the CHL but that they
had to register those which met the qualifying
criteria in the CHL-Agreement. However it is
not clear why this would lead to the conclusion
that the corresponding club had its own right
to claim participation and why it would not
be a simple beneficiary without any creditor
position. Finally it is not explained on what
basis the German federation is claiming
together with two clubs so that nothing can be
concluded from this. In any event a possible
opinion of this federation – obviously not
shared by its own general secretary incidentally
– would not be relevant as to the rights of
the clubs. Indeed even if this federation had
understood the agreement it signed as a pure
contract in favor of third parties, this would
not mean that SIHF and NL-GmbH should
have understood the CHL-Agreement in
the same way in good faith at the time of
conclusion, even if it had the same wording.
-
153
The Settlement agreement says nothing about
possible claims of the clubs. However this is
inconclusive as to the issue at hand namely how
SIHF and NL-GmbH should have understood
the CHL-Agreement six months earlier. Yet
that clause of the Settlement agreement could
be used as a clue in the ascertainment of the
subjective intent of the Parties when they
entered into the CHL-Agreement; however
this is irrelevant to objective interpretation.
Finally the CAS held that granting the clubs
their own direct rights would have been
advantageous in various ways. This may be so
but it is not decisive for objective interpretation.
This circumstance would be important
however if the CHL had been inapplicable
or difficult to apply without such a right for
the clubs. However this was not found and it
cannot be assumed that the implementation
of the CHL would have been markedly
simpler for the Appellant and for the national
federations with such a right being granted.
Why SIHF and NL-GmbH thus would have
had to understand the CHL-Agreement due to
the situation with regard to the interests of the
clubs as meaning according to good faith that
it and the Appellant were granting the clubs a
primary entitlement is not apparent.
3.
The costs of CHF 8’000 shall be paid by the
Respondent.
4.
The Respondent shall pay CHF 9’000 to the Appellant
for the federal proceedings.
5.
(CAS).
Lausanne March 8, 2012
In the name of the First Civil law Court of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.
Klett(Mrs)
The Clerk:
Hurni
Accordingly the grievance with regard to
the objective interpretation of the CHLAgreement appears well founded. A direct
entitlement of the participating clubs cannot
be derived from the CHL-Agreement and
therefore the subjective scope of its arbitration
clause cannot be extended to the Respondent.
4.
The appeal shall be granted, the award under appeal
annulled and it shall be found as requested that the
CAS has no jurisdiction in the dispute at hand.
In such an outcome of the proceedings the
Respondent must pay costs and compensate the other
party (Art. 66(1) BGG and Art. 68 (2) BGG).
1.
The appeal is upheld and the award under appeal of
September 13, 2011 is annulled.
2.
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has no
jurisdiction in the dispute at hand.
-
154
4A_488/2011
Arrêt du 18 juin 2012
Ire Cour de droit civil
Composition
Mmes et M. les Juges Klett, Présidente, Corboz et Rottenberg Liatowitsch
Greffier: M. Carruzzo
Parties
X.________,
recourant, représenté par Me Rocco Taminelli,
contre
Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI),
intimée, représentée par Me Jean-Pierre Morand;
&
Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI),
intimé;
&
Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI)
intimée.
Objet
arbitrage international;
recours en matière civile contre la sentence rendue le 8 mars 2011 par le Tribunal
Arbitral du Sport (TAS).
Faits
a recommandé l’ouverture d’une procédure pour
violation des règles antidopage.
A.
L’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) est l’association
des fédérations nationales de cyclisme. Afin de
lutter contre le dopage dans ce sport, elle a édicté
un règlement antidopage (ci-après: RAD). Elle a, en
outre, élaboré un programme, intitulé “Passeport
biologique de l’athlète” (ci-après: le passeport
biologique), qui constitue une méthode indirecte de
détection du dopage sanguin.
Le 3 mai 2010, l’UCI a informé X.________ que,
conformément au RAD, elle allait demander à
la Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI) d’ouvrir
une procédure disciplinaire. A la suite de cette
communication, le sportif a interrompu toute
participation aux compétitions cyclistes à partir du
4 mai 2010.
X.________, coureur cycliste professionnel de
nationalité italienne, est l’un des sportifs inclus dans
le programme du passeport biologique.
En décembre 2009, un groupe de neuf experts,
désignés par l’UCI pour examiner anonymement
les profi ls sanguins du prénommé, a conclu, à
l’unanimité, que celui-ci avait utilisé une substance ou
une méthode prohibée. Après avoir pris connaissance
des commentaires du coureur cycliste, un collège
de trois experts, considérant qu’ils n’expliquaient
pas de manière satisfaisante les anomalies relevées,
L’affaire disciplinaire a été déférée au Tribunale
Nazionale Antidoping (TNA) du Comitato Olimpico
Nazionale Italiano (CONI) le 27 juillet 2010. L’UCI
est intervenue formellement dans la procédure en
déposant un mémoire en date du 6 septembre 2010.
Par décision du 21 octobre 2010, transmise aux
parties le 19 novembre 2010, le TNA, constatant
que la violation des règles antidopage imputée à
X.________ n’avait pas été établie avec le degré
de probabilité requis, a libéré le coureur cycliste de
l’accusation de dopage et mis les frais de la procédure
à la charge de l’UCI.
-
155
B.
Le 6 décembre 2010, X.________ a interjeté appel
contre cette décision auprès du Tribunal Arbitral du
Sport (TAS). Il a conclu à ce que l’UCI et le CONI
fussent condamnés à lui rembourser un total de
54’964,70 euros comprenant les honoraires de ses
avocats et de son expert, ainsi que ses frais de voyage.
De son côté, l’UCI a déposé sa déclaration d’appel le
13 janvier 2011. Selon elle, il convenait de suspendre
le coureur cycliste pour une durée de quatre ans,
d’annuler les résultats obtenus par lui en compétition
à partir du 29 février 2008 et de lui infl iger une
sanction financière de 404’999,72 euros.
Le 11 février 2011, les deux appelants ont adressé
au TAS un mémoire d’appel motivé. Les 21 et 22 du
même mois, chacun d’eux a déposé son mémoire de
réponse.
En date du 2 mars 2011, X.________ et l’UCI ont
assisté à l’audience du TAS et ont été entendus, de
même que leurs experts. La FCI et le CONI n’ont pas
participé à cette audience.
Par sentence du 8 mars 2011, dont les motifs ont
été communiqués ultérieurement aux parties, le
TAS a rejeté l’appel du coureur cycliste et admis
partiellement celui de l’UCI. Il a annulé la décision
du TNA, constaté la violation par X.________
de l’art. 21.2 RAD, suspendu le coureur cycliste
pour deux ans à compter du 3 mai 2010, ordonné la
disqualification de tous les résultats obtenus par ce
dernier à partir du 7 mai 2009 et condamné l’appelant
à verser à l’UCI un montant de 115’000 euros à titre
de sanction financière.
C.
Le 19 août 2011, X.________ a interjeté un recours
en matière civile au Tribunal fédéral aux fins d’obtenir
l’annulation de ladite sentence.
Au terme de sa réponse du 3 octobre 2011, l’UCI (ciaprès: l’intimée) a conclu au rejet du recours dans la
mesure de sa recevabilité.
Par lettre du 31 octobre 2011, le TAS a fait savoir qu’il
ne déposerait pas de réponse. La FCI et le CONI ont,
eux aussi, renoncé à se déterminer sur le recours au
motif qu’ils n’avaient pas pris une part active à la
procédure arbitrale.
Dans une réplique du 22 novembre 2011 et une
duplique du 9 décembre 2011, le recourant et l’intimée
ont maintenu leurs conclusions respectives.
Considérant en droit
1.
D’après l’art. 54 al. 1 LTF, le Tribunal fédéral rédige
son arrêt dans une langue officielle, en règle générale
dans la langue de la décision attaquée. Le TAS a rendu
sa sentence en français. Dans les mémoires qu’elles
ont adressés au Tribunal fédéral, les parties ont utilisé,
qui l’italien (le recourant), qui le français (l’intimée).
Dès lors, conformément à la règle générale, le présent
arrêt sera rédigé en français.
2.
Dans le domaine de l’arbitrage international, le recours
en matière civile est recevable contre les décisions de
tribunaux arbitraux aux conditions fixées par les art.
190 à 192 LDIP (art. 77 al. 1 LTF). Qu’il s’agisse de
l’objet du recours, de la qualité pour recourir, du délai
de recours ou encore des conclusions prises par le
recourant, aucune de ces conditions de recevabilité
ne fait problème en l’espèce. Rien ne s’oppose donc à
l’entrée en matière.
3.
Le Tribunal fédéral statue sur la base des faits établis
par le Tribunal arbitral (art. 105 al. 1 LTF). Il ne peut
rectifier ou compléter d’office les constatations des
arbitres, même si les faits ont été établis de manière
manifestement inexacte ou en violation du droit (cf.
l’art. 77 al. 2 LTF qui exclut l’application de l’art. 105
al. 2 LTF). En revanche, comme c’était déjà le cas sous
l’empire de la loi fédérale d’organisation judiciaire (cf.
ATF 129 III 727 consid. 5.2.2; 128 III 50 consid.
2a et les arrêts cités), le Tribunal fédéral conserve la
faculté de revoir l’état de fait à la base de la sentence
attaquée si l’un des griefs mentionnés à l’art. 190 al.
2 LDIP est soulevé à l’encontre dudit état de fait ou
que des faits ou des moyens de preuve nouveaux sont
exceptionnellement pris en considération dans le
cadre de la procédure du recours en matière civile (cf.
art. 99 al. 1 LTF).
4.
Le recourant avait excipé de la tardiveté de l’appel
interjeté par l’intimée. Le TAS a écarté ce moyen en
s’appuyant sur l’art. 334 RAD (version 2009). Dans
la mesure où elle est pertinente pour la solution du
cas particulier, cette disposition prévoit que l’UCI
doit déposer sa déclaration d’appel au TAS dans un
délai d’un mois suivant la réception de l’intégralité
du dossier de la part de l’instance d’audition de la
fédération nationale; elle ajoute que, si la partie
appelante ne demande pas le dossier dans un délai
de quinze jours suivant la réception de la décision
intégrale au sens de l’art. 277 RAD, le délai en
question court dès la réception de cette décision.
Quant à la seconde disposition citée, elle précise
-
156
qu’une copie intégrale de la décision, signée au moins
par le président de l’instance d’audition, est envoyée
au licencié et à l’UCI par courrier recommandé avec
accusé de réception, faute de quoi le délai d’appel ne
court pas.
4.1 Selon le TAS, il n’est pas contesté que l’intimée
a reçu la décision du TNA le 19 novembre 2010
et a demandé une copie du dossier complet au
CONI le 3 décembre 2010, soit en temps utile.
Comme le dossier intégral, incluant huit pièces
dont l’intéressée n’avait pas pris connaissance
auparavant, lui a été transmis le 13 décembre
2010, l’intimée, en déposant sa déclaration
d’appel le 13 janvier 2011, a agi dans le délai
d’un mois prévu par l’art. 334 RAD. Pour le
TAS, il n’y a pas lieu de déroger à l’application
de cette disposition, quoi qu’en dise le recourant:
d’abord, l’intimée n’a participé que partiellement
à la procédure de première instance, le premier
acte effectué par elle en tant que partie à cette
procédure ayant été le dépôt de son mémoire
du 6 septembre 2010; ensuite, ce n’est que le 13
décembre 2010 que l’intimée a reçu l’intégralité
des pièces versées au dossier et qu’elle a ainsi
pu fonder son appel sur un dossier complet
conformément à la ratio de l’art. 334 RAD; enfin,
il ne saurait être reproché à l’intimée de ne pas
avoir été en possession de la version intégrale du
dossier avant cette date.
4.2
4.2.1 Invoquant l’art. 190 al. 2 let. b LDIP, le
recourant fait grief au TAS de s’être déclaré
à tort compétent pour connaître de l’appel
interjeté par l’intimée. A l’appui de ce grief,
il expose que l’art. R47 du Code de l’arbitrage
en matière de sport (ci-après: le Code) rendait
applicable, en l’espèce, l’art. 4 ch. 23 de l’annexe
H des normes antidopage italiennes (NSA),
en vertu duquel l’appel visant une décision du
TNA doit être déposé dans les trente jours à
réception de la décision motivée. La décision
rendue le 21 octobre 2010 par le TNA ayant été
notifiée le 19 novembre 2010 aux parties, par
fax selon la pratique usuelle de cette autorité,
l’intimée aurait dû déposer sa déclaration
d’appel dans les trente jours dès cette date, ce
qu’elle n’a pas fait.
S’agissant de l’art. 334 RAD, le recourant estime
que cette disposition n’était pas applicable
en l’espèce, étant donné que l’intimée était
déjà intervenue comme partie au plein sens
du terme devant le TNA. En effet, c’est elle
qui avait demandé, le 3 mai 2010, au CONI
d’ouvrir une procédure disciplinaire contre lui;
qui détenait toute la documentation technique
utilisée par les parties; qui avait transmis, le
5 juillet 2010, une note explicative à l’Ufficio
di Procura Antidoping du CONI (UPA); qui
avait déposé, les 6 et 10 septembre 2010, deux
mémoires accompagnés d’une volumineuse
documentation incluant diverses expertises;
qui avait fait intervenir comme expert, devant
le TAS, le professeur A.________, l’un de
ses neuf experts spécialisés dans l’examen des
passeports biologiques, auquel l’UPA avait
également fait appel in casu; qui avait enfin
participé à l’audience du 21 octobre 2010
devant le TNA par le truchement du médecin
responsable de son agence antidopage, lequel
avait pris la parole à cette occasion. Dans de
telles circonstances, permettre à l’intimée
de se prévaloir de l’art. 334 RAD revenait
à cautionner un abus de droit commis par
l’intimée et à violer le principe général de la
bonne foi procédurale ainsi que les règles du
Code Mondial Antidopage (CMA), tels les art.
8.1 et 13.2.2, prévoyant la tenue d’une audience
dans un délai raisonnable. A supposer d’ailleurs
que l’intimée ne disposât point de l’intégralité
du dossier de la cause lorsqu’elle avait comparu
devant le TNA, elle devrait alors se laisser
opposer sa propre négligence.
Dans le même contexte, le recourant se plaint
encore d’une violation de l’égalité des parties,
sanctionnée par l’art. 190 al. 2 let. d LDIP, du
fait qu’il était lié par le délai d’appel fixé à l’art.
4 ch. 23 de l’annexe H des NSA, alors que
l’intimée disposait d’un délai d’appel extensible
quasiment ad libitum puisqu’il lui suffisait
d’attendre avant de réclamer la transmission du
dossier complet pour pouvoir bénéficier d’un
délai d’appel supplémentaire.
Enfin, aux yeux du recourant, le TAS aurait
rendu une sentence incompatible avec l’ordre
public procédural (art. 190 al. 2 let. e LDIP)
en déclarant recevable un appel interjeté en
violation des règles de la bonne foi.
4.2.2 A l’encontre de cette argumentation, l’intimée
souligne, d’abord, qu’il n’est pas contesté qu’elle
a déposé son appel dans le délai prévu par l’art.
334 RAD. Elle expose ensuite les différentes
étapes de son intervention, expliquant que,
au début de la procédure disciplinaire, elle
n’a fait que répondre à diverses demandes de
renseignements, son premier acte formel en
tant que partie ayant été le dépôt du mémoire du
6 septembre 2010. Aussi, à en croire l’intimée,
son intervention en cours de procédure aurait
-
157
eu notamment pour effet qu’elle n’avait pas
reçu l’intégralité des pièces, en particulier celles
ayant trait à la phase préliminaire d’instruction.
Dès lors, elle n’aurait pas commis d’abus de
droit en déposant son appel, dans le respect
non seulement de la lettre mais aussi de l’esprit
de l’art. 334 RAD, une fois en possession de
l’intégralité du dossier.
A titre subsidiaire, l’intimée soutient qu’elle
a déposé son appel en temps utile, même en
faisant abstraction de l’art. 334 RAD, dans
la mesure où la notification de la décision
motivée du TNA, le 19 novembre 2010,
n’avait pas déclenché le cours du délai d’appel
puisqu’elle avait été faite par fax, contrairement
aux exigences de l’art. 277 RAD précité. Ainsi,
pour l’intimée, seule la réception par courrier,
le 13 décembre 2010, du dossier intégral
contenant ladite décision avait fait courir le
délai d’appel, conformément à cette dernière
disposition.
L’intimée conteste, par ailleurs, avoir violé d’une
quelconque manière la bonne foi procédurale
et dénie au recourant le droit d’invoquer la
prétendue incompatibilité de la sentence avec
l’ordre public procédural pour étayer d’une
autre manière le grief se rapportant au respect
du délai d’appel.
4.3 Saisi du grief d’incompétence, le Tribunal
fédéral examine librement les questions de
droit, y compris les questions préalables, qui
déterminent la compétence ou l’incompétence
du tribunal arbitral (ATF 133 III 139 consid. 5
p. 141 et les arrêts cités). En revanche, il ne revoit
les constatations de fait que dans les limites
susmentionnées (cf. consid. 3).
4.3.1 Le recours pour le motif prévu à l’art. 190 al.
2 let. b LDIP est ouvert lorsque le tribunal
arbitral a statué sur des prétentions qu’il
n’avait pas la compétence d’examiner, soit qu’il
n’existât point de convention d’arbitrage, soit
que celle-ci fût restreinte à certaines questions
ne comprenant pas les prétentions en cause
(extra potestatem). Un tribunal arbitral n’est
en effet compétent, entre autres conditions,
que si le litige entre dans les prévisions de
la convention d’arbitrage et que lui-même
n’excède pas les limites que lui assignent la
requête d’arbitrage et, le cas échéant, l’acte de
mission (arrêt 4A_210/2008 du 29 octobre
2008 consid. 3.1et les références).
Il ne va pas de soi que le grief formulé par
le recourant s’inscrive dans le cadre tracé
par la disposition citée et la jurisprudence
y relative. Savoir si la tardiveté du dépôt de
l’appel entraîne l’incompétence du TAS ou
simplement l’irrecevabilité, voire le rejet, de
ce moyen de droit est une question délicate.
A suivre le recourant, le Tribunal fédéral
aurait déjà tranché cette question au consid.
4.2.3.3 de son arrêt du 22 décembre 2008 en
la cause 4A_392/2008. Il n’en est rien. Dans
le passage cité de ce précédent, la Ire Cour de
droit civil a simplement constaté que le TAS
n’avait pas fait une interprétation incorrecte
des dispositions statutaires pertinentes
en admettant sa compétence de jugement
comme tribunal ordinaire plutôt que comme
juridiction d’appel, raison pour laquelle elle a
estimé qu’il n’était pas nécessaire d’examiner
les arguments avancés par l’intimée au recours,
laquelle faisait valoir, en particulier, que, dans
l’hypothèse où le TAS aurait dû statuer comme
autorité d’appel, le dépôt tardif de l’appel
n’aurait pas eu d’incidence sur sa compétence
(arrêt cité, consid. 4.2.3.3, dernier §, en liaison
avec le consid. 3.1, 2e §).
Sans doute le reproche fait à un tribunal
arbitral de n’avoir pas respecté la limite de
validité temporelle de la convention d’arbitrage
ou un préalable obligatoire de conciliation
ou de médiation a-t-il trait aux conditions
d’exercice de la compétence, plus précisément
à la compétence ratione temporis, et relève-til, comme tel, de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. b LDIP
(arrêts 4P.284/1994 du 17 août 1995 consid.
2 et 4A_18/2007 du 6 juin 2007 consid. 4.2;
K AUFMANN-KOHLER/R IGOZZI,
Arbitrage
international, 2e éd. 2010, n° 813a; BERGER/
K ELLERHALS, International and Domestic
Arbitration in Switzerland, 2e éd. 2010, nos
532a ss). Force est, toutefois, d’observer que
ce principe jurisprudentiel vise essentiellement
l’arbitrage typique ou usuel, qui prend sa source
dans une relation contractuelle et se caractérise
par l’existence d’une clause arbitrale dont il
convient de rechercher la portée dans le temps.
En revanche, il est douteux qu’il vaille aussi
pour l’arbitrage atypique, tel l’arbitrage sportif,
et qu’il envisage en particulier l’hypothèse dans
laquelle la compétence du tribunal arbitral
résulte du renvoi aux statuts d’une fédération
sportive prévoyant une procédure d’arbitrage
pour régler les litiges de nature disciplinaire.
En ce domaine, le Tribunal fédéral a déjà
jugé que le point de savoir si une partie est
recevable à attaquer la décision prise par
-
158
l’organe d’une fédération sportive sur la base
des règles statutaires et des dispositions légales
applicables ne concerne pas la compétence
du tribunal arbitral saisi de la cause, mais la
question de la qualité pour agir, c’est-à-dire un
point de procédure à résoudre selon les règles
pertinentes dont le Tribunal fédéral ne revoit
pas l’application lorsqu’il est saisi d’un recours
contre une sentence arbitrale internationale
(arrêts 4A_428/2011 du 13 février 2012
consid. 4.1.1 et 4A_424/2008 du 22 janvier
2009 consid. 3.3).
Un auteur s’est penché plus avant sur la question
examinée ici. Il signale le résultat insatisfaisant
auquel conduirait la transposition au délai
d’appel prévu par l’art. R49 du Code du principe
général voulant que le dépassement du délai
convenu par les parties entraîne l’incompétence
du tribunal arbitral (en l’occurrence, le TAS)
et, par ricochet, la compétence des tribunaux
étatiques: en bref, l’application de ce principe
aurait pour conséquence qu’après l’expiration
du délai d’appel de vingt et un jours fixé par
cette disposition, les décisions des fédérations
sportives dont le siège est en Suisse pourraient
être portées devant les tribunaux suisses
jusqu’à l’échéance du délai d’un mois prévu
par l’art. 75 CC; une telle conséquence serait
sans doute contraire à l’esprit de l’arbitrage
international dans le domaine du sport, en
ce qu’elle ne permettrait pas de faire en sorte
que les sportifs soient jugés de la même
manière et selon les mêmes procédures; elle
occasionnerait, en outre, des complications
difficilement surmontables. Aussi, pour cet
auteur, le délai d’appel devant le TAS doit-il
être considéré comme un délai de péremption
dont l’inobservation entraîne, non pas
l’incompétence de cette juridiction arbitrale,
mais la perte du droit de soumettre la décision
entreprise à tout contrôle juridictionnel
et, partant, le déboutement de l’appelant
(ANTONIO RIGOZZI, Le délai d’appel
devant le Tribunal arbitral du sport: quelques
considérations à la lumière de la pratique
récente, in Le temps et le droit, 2008, p. 255
ss; le même, L’arbitrage international en
matière de sport, 2005, nos 1028 ss). Semblable
opinion apparaît convaincante prima facie. Au
demeurant, s’il suffisait à une partie d’attendre
l’expiration du délai d’appel de l’art. R49
du Code pour saisir les tribunaux étatiques
suisses, cette partie serait en mesure de courtcircuiter la juridiction arbitrale sportive par sa
seule inaction.
Cela étant, il n’est pas nécessaire de trancher ici
définitivement la question de savoir si le nonrespect du délai d’appel met ou non en cause la
compétence du TAS. En effet, pour les motifs
indiqués ci-après, le grief tiré de la violation
de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. b LDIP, à le supposer
recevable, apparaît de toute façon mal fondé.
4.3.2 S’agissant de l’art. 334 RAD, le recourant
ne semble pas vouloir soutenir que cette
disposition serait de toute façon inapplicable en
l’espèce, même si ses conditions d’application
étaient réalisées, au motif qu’elle devrait céder
le pas à l’art. 4 ch. 23 de l’annexe H des NSA,
voire aux art. 8.1 et 13.2.2 CMA. Il le ferait
du reste en pure perte. Aussi bien, le TAS
constate, de manière à lier le Tribunal fédéral,
d’une part, que les parties n’ont pas remis en
cause l’application du RAD dans la présente
procédure (sentence, n. 29) et, d’autre part, que
les NSA et le droit italien n’étaient applicables
qu’à titre subsidiaire (sentence, n. 32). Quant
aux deux dispositions du CMA invoquées par
le recourant, elles ne règlent pas la question
du délai d’appel mais prescrivent, entre autres
choses, la tenue d’une audience dans un délai
raisonnable.
Il n’est pas non plus contesté, ni contestable
d’ailleurs, que la déclaration d’appel a bien été
déposée par l’intimée dans le délai d’un mois
suivant la réception de l’intégralité du dossier
communiqué par le CONI à la demande de
cette partie, ni que cette dernière a demandé
le dossier dans les quinze jours suivant la
réception de la décision intégrale. Toutes les
conditions d’application de l’art. 334 RAD
étaient donc remplies en l’occurrence. Elles
l’étaient d’autant plus, au demeurant, si, comme
l’intimée le soutient dans son argumentation
subsidiaire, la communication par fax, le 19
novembre 2010, de la décision du TNA n’était
de toute manière pas propre à faire courir le
délai d’appel puisque l’art. 277 RAD prévoit
que seule la réception d’une copie intégrale de
la décision notifiée par courrier recommandé
avec accusé de réception est apte à produire
pareil effet. Il n’est toutefois pas nécessaire
d’examiner plus avant cette argumentation
subsidiaire, non plus que les objections que le
recourant soulève quant à sa recevabilité.
Le seul point litigieux en ce qui concerne la
recevabilité de l’appel de l’intimée consiste
dans l’abus de droit qu’aurait commis cette
partie, au dire du recourant. Le TAS a retenu,
à cet égard, qu’il ne saurait être reproché à
l’UCI de ne pas avoir été en possession de
-
159
la version intégrale du dossier avant le 13
décembre 2010. Quoi qu’en dise le recourant,
cette appréciation juridique du comportement
incriminé n’est pas critiquable. Le TAS constate
en effet, de manière à lier la Cour de céans,
que l’intimée n’a participé que partiellement à
la procédure de première instance, à compter
du 6 septembre 2010, la note explicative
adressée par elle le 5 juillet 2010 à l’UPA du
CONI n’étant qu’une réponse à une requête
d’information de cet organisme. Il était donc
compréhensible que cette partie usât de son
droit de réclamer l’intégralité des pièces du
dossier, y compris celles relatives à la phase
préliminaire de l’instruction, afin de pouvoir
décider en pleine connaissance de cause s’il
y avait matière à interjeter appel contre la
décision du TNA et, dans l’affirmative, pour
être en mesure de motiver son appel sur la
base de tous les éléments pertinents ressortant
du dossier de cette affaire disciplinaire. Il faut
bien voir, par ailleurs, qu’entre la saisine du
TNA, le 27 juillet 2010, et le prononcé de la
décision de cette autorité, en date du 21 octobre
2010, moins de trois mois se sont écoulés, de
sorte qu’il serait irréaliste de venir reprocher à
l’intimée d’avoir volontairement temporisé en
ne réclamant pas l’intégralité du dossier alors
que la cause était encore pendante devant le
TNA. On peine à discerner du reste, sur un
plan plus général, quel eût été l’intérêt de
l’intimée à différer le plus possible le moment
où elle déposerait son appel au TAS, si l’on se
souvient que le coureur cycliste soupçonné
par elle de s’être dopé avait été blanchi par la
juridiction sportive compétente de son pays. Il
était, bien plutôt, dans son intérêt et même de
son devoir d’agir avec diligence afin d’obtenir
dans les meilleurs délais la suspension de
l’intéressé, une fois établi le bien-fondé de
ses soupçons. Enfin, le recourant est d’autant
plus malvenu à fustiger le comportement de
l’intimée que, à sa demande, il a lui-même
obtenu une prolongation substantielle du délai,
prévu à l’art. 51 al. 1 du Code, dans lequel il
aurait dû déposer son mémoire d’appel (dix
jours suivant l’expiration du délai d’appel).
4.4
4.4.1 L’égalité des parties implique que la procédure
soit réglée et conduite de manière à ce que
chaque partie ait les mêmes possibilités de faire
valoir ses moyens. En vertu de ce principe,
le tribunal arbitral doit traiter les parties de
manière semblable à toutes les étapes de
la procédure (ATF 133 III 139 consid. 6.1
p. 143 in medio). Encore faut-il préciser la
notion de procédure. Selon la jurisprudence
et la doctrine, il faut entendre par là la phase
de l’instruction, c’est-à-dire la période allant
de la constitution du tribunal arbitral jusqu’à
la clôture de la procédure d’instruction,
débats inclus le cas échéant, à l’exclusion
de la délibération du tribunal arbitral (arrêt
4A_360/2011 du 31 janvier 2012 consid. 4.1;
BERGER/KELLERHALS, op. cit., nos 1020
s.; voir aussi: JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET,
in POUDRET/LALIVE/REYMOND, Le
droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en
Suisse, 1989, n° 1 ad art. 25 CA, p. 137).
4.4.2 L’argument du recourant tiré de la durée
différente des délais dans lesquels l’intimée
et lui-même devaient interjeter appel contre
la décision du TNA a trait à une phase de la
procédure antérieure à la constitution de la
Formation du TAS désignée pour connaître
des appels de ces deux parties. Il est ainsi
exorbitant du champ d’application ratione
temporis de la garantie en cause.
Au demeurant, il est faux de prétendre, comme
le fait le recourant, que l’intimée pouvait
retarder à discrétion le moment du dépôt
de son appel en ne réclamant pas le dossier
complet de la cause. C’est oublier que l’art. 334
RAD lui commandait de demander ce dossier
dans les quinze jours à réception de la décision
intégrale, sous peine de voir le délai d’appel
commencer à courir dès la réception de cette
décision.
4.5 Selon une jurisprudence constante, l’ordre
public procédural, au sens de l’art. 190 al. 2 let.
e LDIP, n’est qu’une garantie subsidiaire ne
pouvant être invoquée que si aucun des moyens
prévus à l’art. 190 al. 2 let. a à d LDIP n’entre
en ligne de compte. Ainsi conçue, cette garantie
constitue une norme de précaution pour les vices
de procédure auxquels le législateur n’aurait pas
songé en adoptant les autres lettres de l’art.
190 al. 2 LDIP. Elle n’a nullement pour but de
permettre à une partie de soulever un moyen
entrant dans les prévisions de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. a
à d LDIP, mais irrecevable pour une autre raison
(arrêt 4A_14/2012 du 2 mai 2012 consid. 2.3).
Le recourant méconnaît cette jurisprudence
lorsqu’il soutient que le TAS aurait rendu une
sentence incompatible avec l’ordre public
procédural en déclarant recevable un appel
interjeté en violation des règles de la bonne foi.
Il a, en effet, présenté le même argument, mais
-
160
sans succès, sous l’angle de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. b
LDIP.
4.6 D’où il suit que toutes les critiques formulées
par le recourant en rapport avec la recevabilité
de l’appel de l’intimée tombent à faux.
5.
Le recourant reproche, par ailleurs, au TAS d’avoir
violé son droit d’être entendu en ne se prononçant
pas sur un certain nombre d’arguments qu’il lui avait
soumis.
5.1 Le droit d’être entendu en procédure
contradictoire, au sens de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. d
LDIP, n’exige certes pas qu’une sentence arbitrale
internationale soit motivée (ATF 134 III 186
consid. 6.1 et les références). Il impose, toutefois,
aux arbitres un devoir minimum d’examiner et
de traiter les problèmes pertinents (ATF 133
III 235 consid. 5.2 p. 248 et les arrêts cités).
Ce devoir est violé lorsque, par inadvertance
ou malentendu, le tribunal arbitral ne prend
pas en considération des allégués, arguments,
preuves et offres de preuve présentés par l’une
des parties et importants pour la décision à
rendre. Si la sentence passe totalement sous
silence des éléments apparemment importants
pour la solution du litige, c’est aux arbitres ou
à la partie intimée qu’il appartient de justifier
cette omission dans leurs observations sur le
recours. Il leur incombe de démontrer que,
contrairement aux affirmations du recourant,
les éléments omis n’étaient pas pertinents pour
résoudre le cas concret ou, s’ils l’étaient, qu’ils ont
été réfutés implicitement par le tribunal arbitral.
Cependant, les arbitres n’ont pas l’obligation de
discuter tous les arguments invoqués par les
parties, de sorte qu’il ne peut leur être reproché,
au titre de la violation du droit d’être entendu en
procédure contradictoire, de n’avoir pas réfuté,
même implicitement, un moyen objectivement
dénué de toute pertinence (ATF 133 III 235
consid. 5.2 et les arrêts cités).
5.2 Le recourant rappelle qu’il a fondé une grande
partie de sa défense, devant le TAS, sur le fait
qu’un bon nombre des contrôles effectués
auraient débouché sur des résultats de laboratoire
inutilisables en raison de graves lacunes
analytiques et pré-analytiques. Il énumère, à cet
égard, les contrôles incriminés, qu’il s’agisse du
Giro d’Italia 2009 (18 et 31 mai) ou du Tour de
France 2009 (2, 10 et 20 juillet), précise quels
sont les vices les affectant et indique où et quand
ceux-ci ont été soulevés dans la procédure
probatoire écrite de même qu’à l’audience du
2 mars 2011, laquelle a été enregistrée sur un
disque compact audio (CD) versé au dossier de
la cause.
Selon le recourant, le TAS se serait soustrait à
son devoir d’examiner les critiques soulevées par
lui quant à la fiabilité des résultats en se reposant
à tort sur la présomption posée à l’art. 24 RAD,
correspondant à l’art. 3.2.1 CMA, d’après
laquelle les laboratoires accrédités par l’Agence
Mondiale Antidopage (AMA) sont censés
avoir effectué les analyses des échantillons et
respecté les procédures de la chaîne de sécurité
conformément au standard international pour les
laboratoires, à charge pour le coureur cycliste de
démontrer qu’un écart par rapport à ce standard
est survenu et pourrait raisonnablement avoir
causé un résultat d’analyse anormal. Il lui aurait
échappé que la présomption en question ne
vaut qu’en présence d’un tel résultat et non pas,
comme en l’espèce, quand aucun des résultats
inscrits dans le passeport biologique n’apparaît
anormal.
5.3 L’argumentation développée par le recourant ne
suffit pas à établir une violation des principes
jurisprudentiels susmentionnés, relatifs à l’un
des éléments constitutifs de la garantie du droit
d’être entendu, ancrée à l’art. 182 al. 3 LDIP.
Il en appert déjà que, si le TAS n’a prétendument
pas pris en compte certaines critiques formulées
devant lui, ce n’est pas par inadvertance ou
malentendu, mais, à suivre le recourant même,
en raison de l’interprétation qu’il a faite d’une
disposition particulière du RAD, c’est-à-dire
consciemment. Or, l’interprétation d’une norme
figurant dans un règlement antidopage d’une
association sportive ressortit à l’application du
droit et échappe, partant, à l’examen du Tribunal
fédéral lorsqu’il est saisi d’un recours dirigé
contre une sentence arbitrale internationale.
Quoi qu’il en soit, la question de la régularité
des procédures analytiques et pré-analytiques
a été largement débattue lors de l’audience
du 2 mars 2011, avec l’aide des experts des
parties, et le TAS l’a traitée spécifiquement
dans sa sentence, sous le titre “la fiabilité des
résultats” (n. 54 à 65), en y consacrant de longs
développements, pour aboutir, entre autres
conclusions, à la constatation de la validité des
échantillons prélevés sur le recourant lors du
Giro d’Italia 2009 et du Tour de France 2009
(n. 60). Les considérations détaillées émises par
le TAS, quant à la validité des échantillons et
à d’éventuelles irrégularités susceptibles d’avoir
-
161
influé sur les résultats des analyses, relèvent de
l’appréciation des preuves et sont soustraites,
comme telles, à l’examen du Tribunal fédéral.
Dès lors, le recourant les critique en vain par
des arguments qui revêtent, de surcroît, un
caractère clairement appellatoire. C’est l’état de
fait à la base de la sentence attaquée qu’il tente de
remettre en cause, sous le couvert du grief tiré de
la violation de son droit d’être entendu, comme
s’il plaidait devant une juridiction pouvant revoir
librement les faits.
Il s’ensuit que le moyen soulevé au titre de la
violation du droit d’être entendu n’apparaît pas
fondé, si tant est qu’il soit recevable.
6.
En dernier lieu, le recourant fait grief au TAS d’avoir
rendu une sentence incompatible avec l’ordre public
au sens de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. e LDIP.
6.1 Une sentence est incompatible avec l’ordre
public si elle méconnaît les valeurs essentielles et
largement reconnues qui, selon les conceptions
prévalant en Suisse, devraient constituer le
fondement de tout ordre juridique (ATF 132 III
389 consid. 2.2.3).
L’ordre public procédural garantit aux parties
le droit à un jugement indépendant sur les
conclusions et l’état de fait soumis au Tribunal
arbitral d’une manière conforme au droit
de procédure applicable; il y a violation de
l’ordre public procédural lorsque des principes
fondamentaux et généralement reconnus ont
été violés, ce qui conduit à une contradiction
insupportable avec le sentiment de la justice, de
telle sorte que la décision apparaît incompatible
avec les valeurs reconnues dans un Etat de droit
(arrêt cité, consid. 2.2.1).
Une sentence est contraire à l’ordre public
matériel lorsqu’elle viole des principes
fondamentaux du droit de fond au point de ne
plus être conciliable avec l’ordre juridique et le
système de valeurs déterminants; au nombre de
ces principes figurent, notamment, la fidélité
contractuelle, le respect des règles de la bonne
foi, l’interdiction de l’abus de droit, la prohibition
des mesures discriminatoires ou spoliatrices,
ainsi que la protection des personnes civilement
incapables (arrêt cité, ibid.).
6.2 Le recourant soutient, en substance, que le
passeport biologique, à partir duquel le TAS
s’est forgé une conviction au sujet de la violation
des règles antidopage qu’il lui impute, ne repose
pas sur une base scientifique suffisante et
indiscutée, constitue une preuve administrée à
titre exclusif par l’intimée sans aucune garantie
d’indépendance, revêt un caractère indéterminé,
en ce sens qu’il ne permet pas d’établir une
infraction concrète, enfin, et qui plus est,
entraîne un renversement du fardeau de la
preuve, contraire au principe in dubio pro reo,
puisqu’il impose au sportif impliqué dans une
procédure disciplinaire de démontrer que les
variations anormales des marqueurs biologiques
le concernant ont une origine physiologique,
tandis que l’autorité antidopage n’a, de son côté,
pas à prouver une violation concrète.
L’argumentation ainsi résumée est de nature
manifestement appellatoire, étant donné
que la plupart des allégations de fait qui en
constituent le fondement vont bien au-delà des
constatations figurant dans la sentence attaquée,
voire les contredisent, en violation des principes
applicables en la matière (cf. consid. 3 ci-dessus).
Tel est, en particulier, le cas des affirmations
reproduites sous ch. 143 let. a à c du mémoire de
recours, qui reposent sur le seul enregistrement
de l’audience du 2 mars 2011.
Pour le surplus, on ne voit pas qu’il soit possible
de rattacher les critiques formulées par le
recourant à la notion spécifique et strictement
limitée de l’ordre public, telle qu’elle a été
définie par le Tribunal fédéral. C’est d’ailleurs
le lieu de rappeler que, selon une jurisprudence
bien établie, la question du renversement du
fardeau de la preuve dans le domaine du droit
disciplinaire sportif n’a pas trait à l’ordre public
mais à la charge de la preuve et à l’appréciation
des preuves, problèmes qui ne peuvent pas être
réglés, en matière de droit privé, à la lumière des
notions de droit pénal, telles que la présomption
d’innocence et le principe in dubio pro reo, et
des garanties correspondantes figurant dans la
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme
(arrêt 4A_612/2009 du 10 février 2010 consid.
6.3.2; arrêt 5P.83/1999 du 31 mars 1999 consid.
3d; arrêt 4P.217/1992 du 15 mars 1993, consid. 8b
non publié in ATF 119 II 271). Par conséquent,
le recourant tente en vain de démontrer, à ce
stade de la procédure, le manque de fiabilité et
les autres défauts qui affecteraient, selon lui,
la méthode indirecte de détection du dopage
sanguin que constitue le passeport biologique.
En le faisant, il se borne à remettre en cause le
caractère adéquat du moyen de preuve utilisé
pour le confondre ainsi que la manière dont ce
moyen de preuve a été administré dans le cas
concret. Cela ne concerne pas l’ordre public au
-
162
sens de l’art. 190 al. 2 let. e LDIP.
Le recourant en est du reste bien conscient, qui
propose d’interpréter cette notion d’ordre public
avec moins de rigueur que dans le domaine de
l’arbitrage international classique lorsque le
litige a pour objet des sanctions disciplinaires
infl igées à des sportifs. Sans doute est-il exact
que les particularités de l’arbitrage sportif ont
été prises en considération par la jurisprudence
fédérale dans le traitement de certaines questions
de procédure spécifiques, telle la renonciation à
recourir (ATF 133 III 235 consid. 4.3.2.2 p. 244).
Il ne s’ensuit pas pour autant qu’il faille en faire
de même à l’égard du moyen de caractère général
tiré de l’incompatibilité de la sentence avec l’ordre
public, sauf à créer une véritable lex sportiva
par la voie prétorienne, ce qui pourrait soulever
des problèmes du point de vue de la répartition
des compétences entre le pouvoir législatif et
le pouvoir judiciaire de la Confédération. Plus
fondamentalement, l’intimée relève, non sans
pertinence, dans sa réponse au recours, que, si
la mise en oeuvre du principe in dubio pro reo
ne prête pas à discussion dans une procédure
disciplinaire ou pénale ordinaire, en raison des
pouvoirs d’investigation et de coercition étendus
dont dispose l’Etat, l’application stricte du même
principe dans le cas de procédures disciplinaires
conduites par des organismes privés ne pouvant
pas s’appuyer sur un tel rapport de puissance
vis-à-vis des sportifs soupçonnés de pratiques
interdites pourrait empêcher le système mis en
place pour lutter contre le fléau que constitue le
dopage sportif de fonctionner correctement.
3.
Le recourant versera à l’Union Cycliste Internationale
une indemnité de 7’000 fr. à titre de dépens.
4.
Le présent arrêt est communiqué aux parties et au
Tribunal Arbitral du Sport.
Lausanne, le 18 juin 2012
Au nom de la Ire Cour de droit civil du Tribunal
fédéral suisse
La Présidente:
Klett
Le Greffier:
Carruzzo
Cela étant, le dernier moyen soulevé par le
recourant n’apparaît pas plus fondé que les
précédents. Partant, le présent recours doit être
rejeté.
7.
Le recourant, qui succombe, devra payer les frais de
la procédure fédérale (art. 66 al. 1 LTF). Il versera des
dépens à l’intimée (art. 68 al. 1 et 2 LTF), mais pas à
la FCI ni au CONI, puisque ceux-ci n’ont pas déposé
de réponse.
Par ces motifs, le Tribunal fédéral prononce:
1.
Le recours est rejeté dans la mesure où il est recevable.
2.
Les frais judiciaires, arrêtés à 6’000 fr., sont mis à la
charge du recourant.
-
163
4A_636/2011**
Judgment of 18 June 2012
Composition
Federal Tribunal Judge Kolly
Clerk of the Court: Mr Hurni
Parties
X.________ Federation,
Appellant, represented by Dr. Lucien W. Valloni and Dr. Thilo Pachmann,
versus
Fédération Internationale de Hockey (FIH),
Respondent, represented by Dr. Xavier Favre-Bulle and Mrs. Marjolaine Viret,
* Translator’s note: Quote as A._____ v. X._____ Federation, 4A_636/2011. The original of the decision is in German. The text is
available on the website of the Federal Tribunal www.bger.ch.
Facts
A.
A.________ (the Appellant), born on September
12, 1997, is a Polish karting driver. He is a member
of Y.________ racing club, which belongs to the
Polish Motor Racing Federation. The latter in its
turn is a member of X.________ Federation with
headquarters in Z.________.
Between July 16 and 18, 2010, the Appellant, then
twelve years old, and the holder of a karting driver
license of the Polish Motor Racing Federation and of
X.________, took part in a race in the framework
of the German Junior Karting Championship in
Q.________ (Germany) and achieved second place.
On July 18, 2012 he was subjected to a doping test
undertaken by the German national Anti-Doping
Agency (NADA) upon request of the German Motor
Racing Federation (DMSB), which is also a member
of X.________. The laboratory found the presence
of the illicit substance Nikethamide, which was then
confirmed by a blood test.
B.
B.a On October 11, 2011 the Medical Panel of the
Anti-Doping Committee of X.________
held a hearing in Z.________. By decision of
the same day the Panel banned the Appellant
from competitions for two years from July
18, 2010 until July 18, 2012. Furthermore the
Panel banned the Appellant from competing in
Q.________ on July 18, 2010 and annulled all
his results and prizes from that date.
B.b The Appellant appealed the decision of the
Medical Panel of the X.________ Anti-Doping
Committee to the CAS.
In an award of September 15, 2011 (CAS
2010/A/2268) the CAS upheld the appeal in
part (award § 1) reversed the decision of the
Medical Panel of the X.________ Anti-Doping
-
164
Committee of October 11, 2010 (§ 2) and banned
the Appellant from competitions for 18 months
beginning on July 18, 2010 (§ 3). Furthermore
the CAS banned the Appellant from competing
in Q.________ on July 10, 2010 and annulled
all his results and prizes since that date (§ 4). The
administrative costs of CHF 500 were to be paid
by the Appellant; the CAS did not impose any
other arbitration costs (§ 5) and let the Parties
pay their own costs (§ 6).
C.
In a Civil law appeal of October 17, 2011 the
Appellant asks the Federal Tribunal to annul the CAS
award of September 15, 2011 (CAS 2010/A/2268).
Alternatively, § 3 (ban) and § 4 concerning the
annulment of all other results and the ban from
the race in Q.________ Germany on July 18, 2010
should be annulled, as well as § 5-6 (costs and award
of costs). Even more in the alternative, the award
under appeal should be annulled and the matter sent
back to the CAS for a new decision.
On November 7, 2011 the Appellant fi led a new appeal
brief with identical submissions and a procedural
motion asking for the submission of October 17,
2011 to be substituted with the new one in case the
Federal Tribunal would consider it as a timely fi led.
Otherwise the appeal of October 17, 2011 would be
maintained.
The Respondent submits in its brief of December 12,
2011 that the appeal should be rejected to the extent
that the matter is capable of appeal. The CAS submits
in its brief of January 26, 2012 that the appeal should
be rejected. The Parties fi led a reply and a rejoinder.
The arbitration fi le was submitted to the Federal
Tribunal.
Reasons
2.
appeal is allowed pursuant to the requirements of
Art. 190-192 PILA3 (SR 291) (Art. 77 (1) (a) BGG).
2.1 The seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Lausanne in
this case. At the relevant time both Parties had
their headquarters outside Switzerland. As the
(1) and (2) PILA).
2.2
2.2.1 An appeal against an award must be fi led
with the Federal Tribunal within 30 days after
notification of a full copy (Art. 100 (1) BGG).
The time limit cannot be extended (Art. 47
(1) BGG) and applies also to the fi ling of
additional appeal briefs.
According to the case law of the Federal
Tribunal the notification through the mail
determines the start of the time limit to
appeal the award of the CAS, as opposed to
a fax notification (judgment 4A_392/20104 of
January 12, 2011 at 2.3.2).
2.2.2 The decision under appeal is dated September
15, 2011 and was sent to the Appellant by fax
on the same day. The notification through the
mail took place on October 6, 2011 only. Thus
the appeal brief fi led on November 7, 2011
was submitted timely (Art. 44 (1) compared
to Art 100 (1) BGG). In view of its statement
that should the second brief considered
timely it would be the decisive one, the brief
of November 7, 2011 is the only one to be
addressed here.
1.
According to Art. 54 (1) BGG1 the Federal Tribunal
issues its decision in an official language2 , as a rule in
the language of the decision under appeal. Should the
decision be in another language, the Federal Tribunal
resorts to the official language used by the parties.
The award under appeal is in English. As this is not
an official language and the Parties used various
languages in front of the Federal Tribunal, the
judgment of the Federal Tribunal will be issued in the
language of the appeal in accordance with practice.
2.3
2.3.1 A matter is only capable of appeal when the
Appellant has an interest worth protecting,
i.e. a present and practical interest to the
annulment or the modification of the decision
under appeal (Art. 76 (1) (b) BGG; see BGE
133 III 421 at 1.1 p. 425 ff; 127 III 429 at 1b p.
431). The Federal Tribunal may exceptionally
leave aside the requirement of an interest
worthy of protection when the issue at hand
can be repeated and appear again in similar
circumstances and when there is sufficient
public interest to its being addressed due to
2. Translator’s note: The official languages of Switzerland are German,
French and Italian.
December 18, 1987, RS 291.
4. Translator’s note: Full English translation at http://www.praetor.ch/
arbitrage/notification-of-an-award-by-fax-time-limit-to-appeal-doesnot-ru/
-
165
its fundamental nature and when it would be
hardly possible to adjudicate it timely in the
case at hand (BGE 137 I 120 at 2.2; 135 II
430 at 2.2 S. 434; 135 I 79 at 1.1). If there is a
practical interest at the time the appeal is fi led,
which however disappears subsequently, the
case is to be considered as moot according to
Art. 72 FCP5 (SR 273) in connection with Art.
71 BGG.
The Federal Tribunal reviews in principle ex
officio whether a matter is capable of appeal or
not (Art. 29 (1) BGG). However the grounds
for appeal must be explained adequately
(Art. 42 (1) and (2) BGG) and the Appellant
must show that the legal requirements for an
appeal according to Art. 76 (1) BGG are met.
When this is not obvious or not immediately
so, it does not behoove the Federal Tribunal
to search the record or to require additional
documents in order to determine whether and
to what extent an appeal is admissible (see
BGE 133 II 353 at 1 p. 356, 400 at 2 p. 404;
judgment 4A_566/2009 of March 22, 2010 at
1.2, publ. in: ASA Bulletin 2/2011, p. 433 ff.,
4356).
2.3.2 The Civil law appeal at hand does not stay the
enforcement of the decision under appeal per
se (Art. 103 (1) BGG). The Appellant did not
seek a stay of enforcement. Therefore the ban
imposed on him pursuant to § 3 of the award
under appeal expired on January 18, 2012 and
the Appellant can participate in competitions
again since that date. The Appellant’s situation
would not be changed were § 3 of the award
under appeal annulled as requested from this
Court. Therefore there is no obvious interest
in principle that would be personal, actual and
practical and require the annulment of a ban
that expired in the meantime.
In his appeal brief the Appellant bases his
standing to appeal exclusively on the fact that
the decision under appeal prevents him from
practicing his sport. He does not explain and
does not argue that besides the annulment
of the ban that expired in the meantime, he
would have an interest worthy of protection
to the annulment of the decision under appeal
or that public interest would require the issue
to be addressed because of its fundamental
5. Translator’s note: FCP is an English abbreviation for the federal law
of civil procedure of December 4, 1947.
arbitrage/arbitration-clause-interpretation-of-declarations-based-onthe-p/
importance and because timely adjudication
would hardly be possible in the case at hand.
The appeal has therefore become moot as
a consequence of the loss of the standing to
appeal, to the extent that it is made against § 3
of the award under appeal (competition ban).
2.3.3 Pursuant to § 4 of the award under appeal, the
CAS disqualified the Appellant from the race
in Q.________ on July 18, 2010 and canceled
all his results and prizes since that date (§ 4).
The Appellant retains a present and practical
interest to the annulment of his ban from
the race in Q.________ on July 18, 2010 as
according to the factual findings of the CAS,
which bind this Court (Art. 105 (1) BGG) he
achieved second place there (also see judgment
4A_456/2009 of May 3, 2010 at 2.2, publ. in:
ASA Bulletin 2010, p. 786 ff., 789). As to the
annulment of the results and the prizes he
obtained since that date there is no obvious
present and practical interest for the Appellant
to seek annulment. Indeed it does not appear
from the award under appeal or from the briefs
of the Parties that the Appellant would have
taken part in competitions, let alone obtained
results that could be cancelled, between the
race in Q.________ and the expiry of the ban
in January 2012. The Appellant does not claim
that he would have participated in additional
races since. Future results are no longer subject
to annulment as a consequence of the ban
expiring pursuant to § 4 of the award under
appeal. The matter is therefore also incapable
of appeal with regard to the cancellation of all
results and prizes obtained since the race in
Q.________ on July 18, 2010 (§ 4).
2.4 In the framework of an appeal pursuant to Art.
75 BGG the only admissible grounds for appeal
are those limitatively listed at Art. 190 (2) PILA
(BGE 134 III 186 at 5 p. 187; 128 III 50 at 1a p.
53; 127 III 279 at 1a p. 282). According to Art.
77 (3) BGG the Federal Tribunal reviews only
the arguments that are brought forward and
reasoned in the appeal. This corresponds to the
requirement to submit reasons contained in Art.
176 (2) BGG as to the violation of constitutional
rights and cantonal and intercantonal law (BGE
134 III 186 at 5 p. 187 with reference). Criticism
of an appellate nature is not allowed (BGE 119
II 380 at 3b p. 382).
The Appellant presents his grounds for appeal
only against the ban. As to his disqualification
from the race in Q.________ on July 18,
-
166
2010, with regard to which he would have
standing to appeal, the Appellant submits no
arguments. Moreover he acknowledges that in
the case at hand it was “absolutely correct that
the Appellant was excluded from the race in
Q.________, especially because he had in his
body some substances which were not allowed
in competition as this could distort the sporting
balance” (appeal, p. 14 at 35). The matter is
therefore not capable of appeal due to the
absence of pertinent and developed arguments
as to the ban from the race in Q.________ on
July 10, 2010.
3.
Should an appellant lack the standing to appeal or
no longer have a present interest to the annulment
of the main holding of the decision under appeal, he
may nonetheless appeal the costs as they affect his
personal and direct interests (BGE 117 Ia 251 at 1b
p. 255; judgment 4A_604/20107 of April 11, 2011 at
1.2; 4A_352/2011 of August 5, 2011 at 2). However
the imposition of costs does not make it possible to
obtain indirectly judicial review of the merits of the
case (BGE 100 Ia 298 at 4 p. 299). The Appellant
may only claim that the apportionment of the costs
was contrary to the law for another reason than
simply because he lost on the merits (BGE 109 Ia
90; judgment 4A_352/2011 of August 5, 2011 at
2), which means that in the case at hand only the
grounds for appeal at Art. 190 (2) PILA would be
available. As the Appellant does not raise any of the
corresponding grounds of appeal against the decision
concerning costs, the matter is not capable of appeal
with regard to § 5 and 6 of the award under appeal.
purpose (BGE 118 Ia 488 at 4a p. 494).
As the Appellant initiated the proceedings that
became moot and it is not immediately apparent
that the arguments against the ban would have been
admitted, the Appellant must pay the costs and
compensate the other party.
1.
The matter is not capable of appeal to the extent that
it has not become moot.
2.
The court costs at CHF 3’000 shall be paid by the
Appellant.
3.
The Appellant shall pay CHF 3’500 to the Respondent
for the federal judicial proceedings.
4.
(CAS).
Lausanne June 18, 2012
In the name of the First Civil law Court of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal.
Klett(Mrs)
The Clerk:
Hurni
4.
In view of the foregoing the matter is not capable
of appeal to the extent that the case has not become
moot. As a rule the costs of the proceedings are to be
imposed on the losing party (Art. 66 (1) (1) BGG) to
the extent that the appeal has become moot however,
the decision as to the costs of the federal proceedings
is based on Art. 71 BGG in connection with Art. 72
CCP. According to that provision the Court issues a
summary decision on costs on the basis of the factual
situation before the matter became moot. Should the
outcome of the proceedings in the case at hand be
hard to ascertain, the normal procedural criterias
shall be applied. According to these, the party that
pays the costs and must compensate the other party
will be the one that initiated the proceedings that
became moot or the one that has responsibility for
the reasons for which the proceedings lost their
arbitrage/form-of-the-appeal-to-federal-tribunal-legal-interest-toappeal-/
-
167
4A_134/2012
Arrêt du 16 juillet 2012
Ire Cour de droit civil
Composition
Mmes et M. les Juges Klett, Présidente, Kolly et Kiss
Greffière: Mme Godat Zimmermann
Parties
Olympique des Alpes SA,
défenderesse et recourante, Me Philippe Schweizer,
contre
Atlético de Madrid SAD,
intervenant et intimé, représenté par Me Juan de Dios Crespo Pérez,
&
Stade Rennais Football Club,
intervenant et intimé, représenté par Me Juan de Dios Crespo Pérez,
&
Celtic PLC,
intervenant et intimé, représenté par Me Matthew Bennett et Me Chris Anderson,
&
Udinese Calcio SpA
intervenant et intimé, représenté par Me Gianpaolo Monteneri.
Objet
arbitrage interne,
recours contre la sentence rendue le 31 janvier 2012 par le Tribunal Arbitral du
Sport (TAS).
Faits
A.
A.a L’Union des Associations Européennes de
Football (UEFA) est une association de droit
suisse, inscrite au registre du commerce; son
siège est à Nyon. Elle constitue l’une des six
confédérations continentales de la Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).
L’UEFA a pour but de traiter toutes les
questions qui concernent le football européen.
Elle organise des compétitions et tournois
internationaux de football, dont l’UEFA Europa
League (UEL), compétition ouverte aux équipes
de football professionnelles du continent
européen.
Olympique des Alpes SA (OLA) est un club de
football professionnel, constitué sous la forme
d’une société anonyme de droit suisse; son
siège social est à Martigny-Combe. Ce club se
présente usuellement sous le nom de “FC Sion”.
Il dispute le championnat suisse de première
division (“Super League”). Il est membre de la
“Swiss Football League” (SFL) et, partant, de
l’Association Suisse de Football (ASF). Cette
dernière est membre de l’UEFA.
A.b Le 15 février 2008, OLA conclut un contrat de
travail avec un joueur égyptien lié jusqu’en 2010 à
un club égyptien. Ce dernier cita le joueur et OLA
devant la Chambre de Résolution des Litiges de
la FIFA (CRL-FIFA) pour cause de rupture
injustifiée de contrat, respectivement incitation
à une telle rupture. Par décision du 16 avril 2009,
la CRL-FIFA interdit à OLA, à titre de sanction,
de recruter de nouveaux joueurs durant les deux
périodes d’enregistrement suivant la notification
de sa décision. OLA interjeta un recours auprès
du Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS), à Lausanne;
ce dernier le déclara irrecevable. Par arrêt du
12 janvier 2011, le Tribunal fédéral rejeta dans
-
168
la mesure de sa recevabilité le recours déposé
par OLA contre l’arrêt d’irrecevabilité du TAS
(cause 4A_392/2010).
A.c Le 9 mai 2011, Christian Constantin, président
du conseil d’administration de OLA, signa au
nom du club la formule d’inscription à l’UEL
2011/2012, sans faire de réserve.
Cette formule précise entre autres que le
signataire s’engage à respecter les statuts,
règlements, directives et décisions de l’UEFA,
ainsi qu’à reconnaître la compétence du TAS
telle que prévue dans les statuts de l’UEFA.
L’art. 61 des statuts précise que le TAS est
seul compétent, à l’exclusion de tout tribunal
ordinaire ou de tout autre tribunal arbitral, pour
traiter en tant que tribunal arbitral ordinaire des
litiges entre l’UEFA et les associations, ligues,
clubs, joueurs ou officiels ainsi que des litiges
de dimension européenne entre associations,
ligues, clubs, joueurs ou officiels. L’art. 62 des
statuts prévoit que toute décision prise par un
organe de l’UEFA peut être exclusivement
contestée auprès du TAS en tant que tribunal
arbitral d’appel, à l’exclusion de tout tribunal
ordinaire ou de tout autre tribunal arbitral.
A.d Les 5 et 6 juillet 2011, OLA demanda à la SFL
de qualifier six nouveaux joueurs. Se référant à
la décision de la CRL-FIFA du 16 avril 2009, la
SFL s’y refusa. OLA et les six joueurs saisirent
le Tribunal de recours de la SFL, lequel rejeta le
recours en date du 29 juillet 2011. Le 2 août 2011,
OLA recourut au TAS contre cette décision et
requit des mesures provisionnelles.
Le 3 août 2011, les six joueurs déposèrent une
requête de mesures provisionnelles dirigée
contre la SFL et la FIFA auprès du Tribunal des
districts de Martigny et St-Maurice, au motif
que la décision du Tribunal de recours de la SFL
portait atteinte à leurs droits de la personnalité.
Dans une décision rendue le jour même à titre
superprovisionnel, le juge de district déclara
que les six joueurs devaient être considérés, tant
par la SFL que par la FIFA, comme qualifiés
en tant que joueurs de OLA, que cette dernière
pouvait valablement les faire jouer et qu’il était
fait interdiction à la FIFA d’entraver la remise
du certificat international de transfert, ce
jusqu’à droit connu sur la requête de mesures
provisionnelles.
Le 5 août 2011, se pliant à l’injonction du juge
de district, la SFL avisa OLA qu’elle pouvait
valablement faire jouer les six joueurs jusqu’à droit
connu sur la requête de mesures provisionnelles.
La FIFA fera de même ultérieurement. Le 5
août 2011 également, OLA retira la requête de
mesures provisionnelles déposée trois jours plus
tôt auprès du TAS.
A.e Le 8 août 2011, OLA soumit à l’UEFA sa
liste de joueurs pour l’UEL 2011/2012; cinq
des six nouveaux joueurs y figuraient. La liste
fut confirmée par l’ASF et approuvée par
l’administration de l’UEFA.
Les 18 et 25 août 2011, OLA joua deux parties
de barrage de l’UEL 2011/2012 contre le club
écossais de Celtic. Les parties furent jouées sous
protêt de Celtic; ce dernier reprochait à OLA
d’aligner des joueurs qui n’avaient pas le droit de
jouer. La première partie se termina sur un score
nul, la seconde sur une victoire de OLA.
Par décision du 2 septembre 2011, l’Instance
de contrôle et de discipline de l’UEFA (ICDUEFA) retint que les cinq nouveaux joueurs de
OLA n’étaient pas qualifiés au vu des règles de
la SFL et de la FIFA. Elle admit les protêts de
Celtic et déclara que OLA avait perdu les deux
matches par forfait. OLA était ainsi éliminée de
l’UEL 2011/2012.
A.f Le 2 septembre 2011 également, le Tribunal
des districts de Martigny et St-Maurice rejeta
une requête de mesures provisionnelles que les
nouveaux joueurs, invoquant une violation de
leurs droits de la personnalité, avaient introduite
le jour précédent contre l’UEFA, cette fois-ci.
Les joueurs déposèrent une nouvelle requête
le 5 septembre 2011; elle sera derechef rejetée
quelques jours plus tard.
Le 6 septembre 2011, OLA requit des mesures
provisionnelles contre l’UEFA devant le
Tribunal cantonal valaisan, au motif que l’UEFA
violait la législation suisse sur la concurrence.
Le lendemain, le Tribunal cantonal déclara la
requête irrecevable, pour défaut de compétence
ratione loci.
A.g Le 9 septembre 2011, OLA requit des mesures
provisionnelles contre l’UEFA devant le
Tribunal cantonal vaudois. Elle soutenait qu’elle
était victime d’une restriction illicite d’accès à la
concurrence résultant de la décision de l’ICDUEFA du 2 septembre 2011, laquelle constituait
à son sens un abus de position dominante (cf.
art. 7 al. 1 de la loi fédérale sur les cartels et
autres restrictions à la concurrence [LCart; RS
251]).
-
169
Par ordonnance de mesures superprovisionnelles
du 13 septembre 2011, le juge délégué de la Cour
civile du Tribunal cantonal vaudois ordonna
à l’UEFA d’admettre le club valaisan comme
participant à l’UEL 2011/2012 et de prendre
toutes mesures utiles aux fins de l’intégrer
dans la compétition, ainsi que de considérer les
six nouveaux joueurs comme qualifiés en tant
que joueurs de OLA et de les admettre dans
la compétition de l’UEL 2011/2012, jusqu’à
droit connu sur le sort de la requête de mesures
provisionnelles et sous la menace de la peine
prévue à l’art. 292 CP. Par ordonnance de
mesures provisionnelles du 5 octobre 2011, le
juge délégué, après avoir tenu audience, confirma
la décision rendue à titre superprovisoire, jusqu’à
droit connu sur l’action au fond; en outre, il
interdit à l’UEFA de prononcer un forfait au
préjudice de OLA en raison de la participation
des nouveaux joueurs, également jusqu’à droit
connu au fond.
A.h Le 13 septembre 2011, l’Instance d’appel de
l’UEFA rejeta le recours déposé par OLA contre
la décision de l’ICD-UEFA du 2 septembre 2011,
confirma les deux défaites par forfait de OLA
contre Celtic et refusa de prononcer les mesures
provisionnelles requises par le club valaisan.
Par la suite, OLA contestera cette décision
de l’Instance d’appel et ouvrira action contre
l’UEFA pour violation des droits des sociétaires
(art. 75 CC) devant le Tribunal d’arrondissement
de Nyon.
B.
Le 26 septembre 2011, l’UEFA adressa une requête
d’arbitrage au TAS. Elle concluait à ce qu’il fût dit
et prononcé que la réglementation de l’UEFA, en
particulier celle relative à l’UEL 2011/2012, ainsi que
les mesures disciplinaires prises par l’UEFA et ses
organes à l’encontre de OLA n’étaient pas contraires
au droit suisse des cartels et de la concurrence, que
OLA n’était pas en droit d’être réintégrée dans la
compétition de l’UEL 2011/2012, que l’UEFA n’avait
pas violé le droit suisse ni les droits de la personnalité
tant de OLA que des nouveaux joueurs du club, que
ces joueurs n’étaient pas habilités à participer à l’UEL
2011/2012, que les mesures provisionnelles prises par
le Tribunal cantonal vaudois étaient levées, que tout
droit à demander des dommages-intérêts à l’UEFA
était nié et que toute autre conclusion appropriée de
l’UEFA était admise.
OLA conclut à ce que le TAS déclinât sa compétence
et déclarât la requête de l’UEFA irrecevable.
Les quatre clubs de football Atlético de Madrid,
Udinese, Celtic et Stade Rennais furent admis comme
parties intervenantes. A ce titre, ils ne pouvaient pas
prendre de conclusions propres, mais uniquement
soutenir celles des parties principales.
Par sentence arbitrale du 31 janvier 2012, la Formation
du TAS constituée pour connaître de la cause (ciaprès: la Formation) admit d’abord sa compétence
pour statuer par la voie de l’arbitrage ordinaire et
rejeta l’exception d’incompétence soulevée par OLA.
Sur le fond, elle admit partiellement la requête; elle
confirma ainsi que OLA n’était pas en droit d’être
réintégrée dans l’UEL 2011/2012 et leva les mesures
provisionnelles prononcées le 5 octobre 2011 par
le Tribunal cantonal vaudois. Pour le surplus, elle
déclara irrecevables les conclusions au fond de
l’UEFA: celles en constatation de la conformité des
règles et décisions de l’UEFA avec le droit suisse
des cartels et de la concurrence, faute d’intérêt légal;
celles en constatation relatives à la violation des
droits de la personnalité des joueurs de OLA, parce
que ceux-ci n’étaient pas parties à la procédure; celles
en constatation que ces joueurs étaient exclus de
l’UEL 2011/2012, parce qu’elles portaient sur une
question juridique abstraite; celles visant à nier tout
droit à des dommages-intérêts contre l’UEFA, faute
de motivation; celles relatives à d’éventuelles autres
conclusions appropriées, faute de spécification.
La Formation mit deux tiers des frais d’arbitrage à
la charge de OLA; en outre, elle condamna le club
valaisan à verser 40’000 fr. à l’UEFA pour ses dépens.
C.
Par mémoire non daté remis à la poste le 7 mars 2012,
OLA (ci-après: la recourante) interjette un recours en
matière civile, concluant à l’annulation de la sentence
arbitrale du 31 janvier 2012.
L’UEFA (ci-après: l’intimée) ainsi que les intervenants
Udinese, Atlético de Madrid et Celtic concluent
principalement à l’irrecevabilité du recours et
subsidiairement à son rejet. L’intervenant Stade
Rennais n’a pas pris position.
Invité à déposer des observations en qualité d’autorité
précédente, le TAS, par son secrétaire général, a
mandaté un avocat pour y donner suite; il confirme sa
sentence et propose le rejet du recours.
La recourante s’est déterminée sur ces écritures.
Par la suite, l’intimée a encore fourni des observations.
Considérant en droit
1.
Les parties principales à la procédure arbitrale, à savoir
-
170
l’intimée et la recourante, ont leur siège en Suisse, si
bien que la procédure est un arbitrage interne (art.
353 al. 1 CPC; art. 176 al. 1 LDIP). Le fait que les
parties intervenantes, non habilitées à prendre des
conclusions propres, ont leur siège à l’étranger est
sans pertinence à cet égard.
Pour l’arbitrage interne, le recours en matière civile
est recevable aux conditions prévues aux art. 389 à
395 CPC (art. 77 al. 1 let. b LTF). Faute de déclaration
expresse des parties principales prévoyant un recours
devant le tribunal cantonal compétent en vertu de l’art.
356 al. 1 CPC (art. 390 al. 1 CPC), la sentence, contre
laquelle aucune voie de recours arbitrale n’existe (art.
391 CPC), peut faire l’objet d’un recours devant le
Tribunal fédéral (art. 389 al. 1 CPC). La procédure est
régie par la LTF, sauf disposition contraire du CPC
contenue aux art. 389 à 395 (art. 389 al. 2 CPC).
Sauf exception qui n’entre pas en ligne de compte en
l’espèce (cf. art. 395 al. 4 CPC), le recours en matière
civile dirigé contre une sentence arbitrale interne est
de nature cassatoire (cf. art. 77 al. 2 LTF; art. 395
al. 1 CPC; arrêt 4A_424/2011 du 2 novembre 2011
consid. 1.2). La recourante l’a bien vu en concluant
à l’annulation de la sentence attaquée et l’intimée
erre lorsqu’elle prétend que ladite conclusion est
irrecevable.
Le recours porte sur la constatation que la recourante
n’est pas en droit d’être réintégrée dans l’UEL
2011/2012 et sur la levée des mesures provisionnelles
prononcées le 5 octobre 2011 par le Tribunal cantonal
vaudois, ainsi que sur la question accessoire des frais
et dépens. La recourante n’est en revanche pas lésée
par les points du dispositif déclarant irrecevables les
autres conclusions de l’intimée.
2.
Le Tribunal fédéral contrôle d’office et librement la
recevabilité des recours qui lui sont soumis (ATF 137
III 417 consid. 1 et les arrêts cités), ce qui implique
notamment d’examiner la qualité pour recourir.
2.1 Selon l’art. 76 al. 1 let. b LTF, le recourant doit
notamment avoir un intérêt digne de protection
à l’annulation de la décision attaquée. Cette
exigence est identique à celle posée par l’art. 89
al. 1 let. c LTF pour le recours en matière de
droit public (cf. Message du 28 juin 2006 relatif
au code de procédure civile suisse, FF 2006
6890 ch. 5.3.2). L’intérêt digne de protection
consiste dans l’utilité pratique que l’admission du
recours apporterait à son auteur, en lui évitant de
subir un préjudice de nature économique, idéale,
matérielle ou autre que la décision attaquée lui
occasionnerait (ATF 137 II 40 consid. 2.3 p. 43).
L’intérêt doit être actuel, c’est-à-dire qu’il doit
exister non seulement au moment du dépôt du
recours, mais encore au moment où l’arrêt est
rendu (ATF 137 I 296 consid. 4.2 p. 299; 137 II
40 consid. 2.1 p. 41). Le Tribunal fédéral déclare
le recours irrecevable lorsque l’intérêt digne de
protection fait défaut au moment du dépôt du
recours. En revanche, si cet intérêt disparaît
en cours de procédure, le recours devient sans
objet (ATF 137 I 23 consid. 1.3.1 p. 24 s. et les
arrêts cités). Il est dérogé exceptionnellement
à l’exigence d’un intérêt actuel lorsque la
contestation à la base de la décision attaquée
est susceptible de se reproduire en tout temps
dans des circonstances identiques ou analogues,
que sa nature ne permet pas de la trancher avant
qu’elle ne perde son actualité et que, en raison de
sa portée de principe, il existe un intérêt public
suffisamment important à la solution de la
question litigieuse (ATF 137 I 23 consid. 1.3.1 p.
25; 136 II 101 consid. 1.1 p. 103; 135 I 79 consid.
1.1 p. 81).
2.2 Dans son mémoire de mars 2012, la recourante
fait valoir que la compétition de l’UEL 2011/2012
est alors toujours en cours, tout en observant
qu’en cas d’admission du recours, sa réintégration
“semble difficile, sinon impossible”. Elle voit
néanmoins un intérêt au recours dans le fait
qu’elle pourrait mettre en cause la régularité de
la compétition et obtenir des dommages-intérêts
si son exclusion se révélait injustifiée. Dans sa
prise de position, le TAS émet de sérieux doutes
sur l’intérêt actuel de la recourante à obtenir
l’annulation de la sentence du 31 janvier 2012,
alors que la recourante reconnaît elle-même
qu’une réintégration dans la compétition semble
difficile, sinon impossible en cas d’admission du
recours. A cela, la recourante répond, dans ses
observations de juin 2012, que si l›annulation de
la sentence ne permet pas sa réintégration dans
une compétition désormais achevée, c›est parce
que le TAS a tardé à statuer et qu›en agissant
de même à l›avenir, le TAS pourrait “échapper
à toute sanction” chaque fois qu›une situation
comparable se présenterait.
Devant le Tribunal fédéral, la querelle porte sur
la confirmation que la recourante n’est pas en
droit d’être réintégrée dans l’UEL 2011/2012
et sur la levée des mesures provisionnelles
prononcées par le Tribunal cantonal vaudois.
Il est notoire que la compétition de l’UEL
2011/2012 est aujourd’hui terminée. Dans ces
circonstances, on ne discerne pas l’intérêt de la
recourante à obtenir l’annulation d’une sentence
-
171
constatant qu’elle n’a pas le droit d’être réintégrée
dans cette compétition et levant des mesures
provisionnelles qui ordonnent qu’elle puisse y
participer. Même si le défaut d’intérêt au recours
était dû, comme la recourante le soutient, aux
lenteurs du TAS à statuer, cela ne changerait
rien au fait qu’il n’existe plus, à l’heure actuelle,
d’intérêt à une décision au fond. L’intention
de la recourante de demander ultérieurement
réparation du dommage qui aurait été causé
par son exclusion prétendument illicite de la
compétition ne fonde pas, à elle seule, un intérêt
digne de protection; la décision attaquée ne
peut d’ailleurs pas lui être opposée dans une
éventuelle procédure ultérieure en dommagesintérêts (ATF 126 I 144 consid. 2a p. 148; 125
I 394 consid. 4a p. 397). En outre, la recourante
n’allègue pas - et rien ne permet de retenir - que
la situation ayant conduit à son exclusion de
l’UEL 2011/2012 soit susceptible de se répéter à
l’avenir. Une dérogation à l’exigence de l’intérêt
actuel ne se justifie donc pas.
Il s’ensuit que le recours est sans objet sur la
question principale.
3.
La sentence attaquée met des frais et dépens à la
charge de la recourante. Cette dernière a certes un
intérêt légitime et actuel à obtenir l’annulation de
cette condamnation (cf. ATF 117 Ia 251 consid. 1b p.
255). Mais cela ne signifie pas qu’elle peut, par le biais
d’une contestation de sa condamnation à des frais et
dépens, faire examiner de manière indirecte des griefs
sans objet ou irrecevables contre la décision au fond
(cf. ATF 129 II 297 consid. 2.2 p. 300; 100 Ia 298
consid. 4 p. 299). Lorsqu’il ne peut pas être entré en
matière sur les griefs soulevés contre la décision au
fond, le recourant peut faire valoir uniquement que
la décision sur les frais et dépens doit être annulée
ou modifiée pour des motifs autres que ceux qu’il
invoquait à propos de la question principale (cf. ATF
109 Ia 90; plus récemment, arrêt 4A_637/2010 du 2
février 2011 consid. 4).
En l’espèce, le recours ne contient pas de moyens
spécifiques contre la décision sur les frais et dépens
(cf. art. 393 let. f CPC), qui seraient différents de ceux
articulés contre la décision au fond; les griefs contre
la condamnation aux frais et dépens se confondent
avec ceux contre la décision au fond. Le recours est
dès lors irrecevable sur la question des frais et dépens
(cf. art. 77 al. 3 LTF).
4.
Sur le vu de ce qui précède, le recours est irrecevable
dans la mesure où il n’est pas sans objet.
En règle générale, les frais judiciaires et les dépens
de la partie qui a obtenu gain de cause sont mis à
la charge de la partie qui succombe (art. 66 al. 1 et
art. 68 al. 1 LTF). Dans la mesure où le recours est
sans objet, il convient d’appliquer aux frais et dépens
l’art. 72 PCF, par renvoi de l’art. 71 LTF. Le Tribunal
fédéral statue alors par une décision sommairement
motivée en tenant compte de l’état de choses existant
avant le fait qui met fin au litige. Il se fonde en premier
lieu sur l’issue probable qu’aurait eue la procédure.
Si cette issue ne peut être déterminée dans le cas
concret sans plus ample examen, les règles générales
de la procédure civile s’appliquent: les frais et dépens
seront mis à la charge de la partie qui a provoqué la
procédure devenue sans objet ou chez laquelle sont
intervenues les causes ayant conduit à ce que cette
procédure devienne sans objet (cf. ATF 118 Ia 488
consid. 4a p. 494; plus récemment, arrêt 4A_636/2011
du 18 juin 2012 consid. 4).
En l’espèce, la recourante a provoqué la procédure
déclarée sans objet et il n’apparaît pas sans autre que
les griefs soulevés dans le recours étaient bien fondés.
En conséquence, la recourante prendra à sa charge les
frais de la procédure et versera des dépens à l’intimée
ainsi qu’aux trois intervenants qui ont déposé de très
brèves réponses.
Par ces motifs, le Tribunal fédéral prononce:
1.
Le recours est irrecevable dans la mesure où il n’est
pas sans objet.
2.
Les frais judiciaires, arrêtés à 15’000 fr., sont mis à la
charge de la recourante.
3.
La recourante versera, à titre de dépens, une indemnité
de 17’000 fr. à l’intimée et une indemnité de 2’000 fr.
à chacun des intervenants Atlético de Madrid SAD,
Celtic PLC et Udinese Calcio SpA.
4.
Le présent arrêt est communiqué aux mandataires des
parties et au Tribunal Arbitral du Sport (TAS).
Lausanne, le 16 juillet 2012
Au nom de la Ire Cour de droit civil du Tribunal
fédéral suisse
La Présidente:
Klett
Le Greffier:
Godat Zimmermann
-
172
Publications récentes relatives au TAS / Recent publications related to CAS
• Beloff M./Kerr T./Demetriou M./Beloff R.,
Sports Law, new revised and updated 2nd edition,
Hart publishing, November 2012
• Lambertz p./Longree S., WADA Code 2015Abschaffung der B-Probe: Angriff auf die Athletenrechte?, Spurt 4/2012
• Blackshaw I., CAS at the London 2012 Olympics, Association for International Arbitration In
Touch, July 2012
• Marmayou J-M, Le TAS et la juste proportion
entre ordre sportif et ordre public, Editorial, Les
Cahiers de Droit du Sport, n°27-2012, p. 9 ss
• Crespo Perez J. D. (dir.), Tribunal Arbitral, Revista Aranzadi de Derecho de Deporte y Entretenimiento, Año 2012-1, Número 34 p. 391 ss
• Orth J., Abschied ohne Not – Der CAS kippt die
“Osaka-Regel”, Spurt 3/2012
• Haas U./Hossfeld A., Die (neue) ZPO und die
Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit, Bull ASA 2/2012 p.
312
• Patochi P-M. & Favre-Bulle X., Case Notes on
International Arbitration, part II, Revue suisse de
droit international et européen (RSDIE), 2/2012
p. 384
• Haas U., Ex-Doper wilkommen?, Jusletter 2. April
2012, no. 20 et seq.
• Patochi P.M. & Scherer M., The Swiss International Sports Arbitration Reports 1, Juris, 2012
• Haas U./ Köppel J., Abwehransprüche des Sportlers gegen (angeblich rechtswidriges) Verbandsverhalten vor dem Court of Arbitration for Sport
(CAS/TAS), in: Jusletter 16. Juli 2012
• Vogel O./Boccucci D., “Timely Admission” nach
Art 10.9.2 WADC/NADC, insbesondere bei
Verstössen gegen “Whereabouts Information”,:
Jusletter 16 juillet 2012
• Lacabarats A., L’universalité du Sport, Jurisport
juillet-août 2012 p. 36 ss
Informations diverses / Miscellaneous
-
173

Bulletin TAS CAS Bulletin 2 / 2012

Transcription

Similar documents

Guide d`utilisation

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions E

2 - Safco

GRAND VIN DE LÉOVILLE DU MARQUIS DE

üu toi}g1rre§ry$rarchffino" "

Free Radicals in Charcoal and the Combustion of Compositions

Tas-Cas Bulletin 1/2013 - Court of Arbitration for Sport

Ms. Sani Mariama Moussa: H.E. Alpha Souley Bah Mr. Gerardo

0,48 € ZIDANE ET MATERAZZI SE RETROUVENT CE MATIN À LA