Why the EAS Will Not Increase the EU’s Visibility In... Affairs: How Coordination Hinders News Coverage

Why the EAS Will Not Increase the EU’s Visibility In External
Affairs: How Coordination Hinders News Coverage
By
Stephanie B. Anderson
University of Wyoming
Abstract: The European External Action Service (EAS) is of limited use in
increasing EU visibility in international affairs because of its emphasis on
consolidation of instruments rather than on the intergovernmentalism that
dominates foreign and security affairs, and that creates a culture of risk
aversion. The EU must compete with member states for media attention; at the
same time, it cannot issue a press statement without first securing member state
consensus.
As a result, public statements are technical and reactive.
EAS
spokespeople must use carefully worded, lowest-common denominator
statements that are slow to produce. These constraints work especially badly in
the new media environment of 24 hour news cycles and social network sites and
budget cuts.
For over forty years, the European project has attempted to use foreign
policy as a way to gain visibility as a political actor. In 1973, the member states
agreed to European Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign policy in order “to
demonstrate to all that Europe has a political vocation”.1 Twenty years later, in
1993, the Maastricht treaty established the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CSDP) “to assert its identity on the international scene.” 2 In the Cologne
Presidency Conclusions in June 1999, the member states echoed Saint-Mâlo
declaring they were resolved that “the European Union shall play its full role on
1“First Report of the Foreign Ministers to the Heads of State and Government of the Member
States of the European Community of 27 October 1970 (Luxembourg Report)” in European
Political Co-operation, fifth edition, (Bonn: Press and Information Office of the Federal
Government, 1988), 26-27.
2 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Common Provisions, article B.
the international stage.”3 In 2003, the fledgling European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) launched its first crisis management mission.
By 2010, the
European External Action Service, the EU’s ‘foreign ministry’ had coordinated all
the different tools of EU external policy under one roof. Yet, in 2011, the Greeks
circulated an unpublished document to the Political and Security Committee
(PSC) proposing ways to better coordinate EU external policy in order to increase
visibility.
Why is visibility so important and why have all the previous efforts to
increase visibility failed, at least to some extent? This paper argues that visibility
and communication strategies are vital to the success of the Union and to its
prestige. If EU external action is perceived as successful and valuable, the EU
will be welcomed to any negotiating table and will continue to garner support
among the European general public both to fund and to man its policies.
However, if it is not, then EU will have less influence both at home and abroad.
Certainly, the stakes are high, and the different factions in Brussels
recognize the importance, or they would not have made so many attempts to
improve visibility, usually through coordination of Commission and Council
activities. However, the same problems that plagued the EPC continue to plague
the EAS today: intergovernmentalism in a culture of risk aversion. EU foreign
policy is dominated by member states whose deliberations are hidden behind
closed doors. In many cases, they cooperate, but agree to disagree, for example,
in EULEX Kosovo, where several MS (Cyprus, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, and
Romania) do not recognize Kosovar independence. Were it to become public that
one or two member states were stymying proceedings, that government in
question would be vulnerable to an onslaught from the press and public. Such a
spotlight would put the national government in an awkward position: it is legally
responsible to its own people and practically must follow its national interest, but
it may also find itself under international pressure to change its views.
The Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex III:
European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and
Defence, http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3
3
Under these circumstances, the member state might find it prudent not to
participate in European foreign policy at all.
As a result, the EAS’s High
Representative does not make a press statement until all 27 PSC ambassadors
agree. The subsequent press statements are technical and reactive, as well as
slow in coming. In a 24/7 news context, EU press statements are almost no news
at all. In other words, the intergovernmentalism and risk aversion may be good
for the member states, but it does not benefit the EU per se. Moreover, the EAS
allows the member states to use the EU as a scapegoat when policies go awry. The
article concludes that unless this structural problem can be overcome, EU news
will not be viewed as ‘newsworthy’ by the press, and therefore will not increase its
visibility.
This study evaluates the communication strategy of the EU in foreign and
security policy, in other words, its public relations strategy. The article begins
with a discussion of the EU’s need for visibility in the international arena. Next,
it explains the basis of intergovernmentalism in European foreign and security
policy, and how it pits the member states against the EU. The following section
explores how the resulting lowest-common denominator, garbled statements play
out in a media world disrupted by the Internet. The author concludes that no
amount of tweaking or coordinating can repair the problem or the damage done
to date.
“Asserting its Identity on the World Stage”: Visibility and Public Support
The European Union’s foreign and security policy has long been conceived
as a way to increase the profile of the EU both at home and abroad. In 1975, Leo
Tindemans remarked that, while doing research on the subject, he “was struck by
the widespread feeling that we are vulnerable and powerless.” At the same time,
“Our peoples are conscious that they embody certain values which have had an
inestimable influence on the development of civilization. Why should we cease to
spread our ideas abroad when we have always done so?” His solution was a both
a European foreign and security policy.
Presenting a united front in world
discussions would offset public malaise; “our vulnerability and our relative
impotence are in the thoughts of everyone.” As a result, “external relations are
one of the main reasons for building Europe, and make it essential for the
European Union to have an external policy.” 4
This goal has been reiterated time and again in the Davingon Report of
1970, the Document on European Identity (1973), the Klepsch Report in 1978, the
Davignon-Greenwood Report of 1980, and the Delligent Report of 1981, as well as
in the Maastricht treaty.
The Saint-Mâlo Declaration in December 1998
continued the tradition allowing the formation of the European Security and
Defence Policy (ESDP)5 “in order that Europe c[ould] make its voice heard in
world affairs.” According to the 2003 Concept for EU Monitoring Missions, one
of the “basic principles” was to “enhance EU visibility”. In 2006, the Commission
proposed to the Council “Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for
Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility.”6 In 2010, the European External
Action Service was established with the same goal in mind: to “increase the
Union’s political and economic influence in the world.”
7
Commission
spokeswoman Pia Arkenhilde explained “it's obvious that visibility is part of
being effective. It's important for the recipients of the aid to know who they are
dealing with and for the European tax payer, the donors of the aid, to see the
actions on the ground, in terms of their future engagement.” 8
The EU’s communication strategy for external policy is aimed at two
separate audiences: non-member states; and EU citizens. By introducing to EU
citizens, and to the world, a new actor on the international scene, by defining its
Report on Europe Union in Bulletin of the European Communities, 1976, supplement 1, 11-35 as
found in European Navigator, http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm
5 The Lisbon Treaty later changed the name of the policy to the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP).
6 European Commission, Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater
Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, Communication from the Commission to the European
Council of June 2006, 08.06.2006, COM(2006) 278 final.
http://ec.europa.eu/councils/bx20060615/euw_com06_278_en.pdf
7 25 March 2010, Council Draft 8029/10.
8 Andrew Rettman, “EU commission justifies Haiti 'visibility' concerns” euboserver.org, 28
January 2010.
4
values, goals, its missions to propagate those values, the EU’s prestige and
popularity increases both inside and outside the Union.
Public diplomacy, that is communication aimed at the outside world, seeks
to create a favorable environment in which foreign policy can flourish. In 2006,
External Affairs Commissioner Benito Ferrero-Waldner wrote in an unpublished
draft communication on the subject: “The task before us is therefore to build on
this positive image [third countries have of the EU] and to better inform a
broader audience in third countries about the Union’s policies, but also about its
underpinning values and objectives as global actor.”
However, the European Union must communicate with its citizens as well
or risk losing support for development aid, humanitarian aid, and crisis
management missions. In its Long-Term Vision, the European Defence Agency
warned that the CNN effect could jeopardize public support for interventions
abroad.9 Without public support, citizens could lobby their national governments
to withdraw from CSDP missions’ de facto ‘coalitions of the willing’10, thereby
crippling the credibility of the EU, both at home and abroad, altogether. As a
result, politicians are very sensitive to polling data and to the popularity of
missions. Referring to Eurobarometer data, Franz Kernic, from the Institute for
Strategy and Security Policy in Vienna, said, “the polls should not only be used to
bolster current EU policy but also as an early warning device in policymaking.”11
Political Reaction to Lack of Media Coverage
Crisis management missions are perhaps the most concrete example of EU
external action, and yet, according to a report to the Western European Union
(WEU) Assembly, neither the media nor the people pay much attention. The
“An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs,” European
Defence Agency, 3 October 2006.
10 To date, no EU mission has included all 27 member states as participants. A member state may
give tacit approval, but that does not mean that the state will contribute. Moreover, in almost all
cases, non-EU countries will participate, for example, Norway and Turkey.
11 WEU assembly seminar on the role of parliaments in shaping public opinion on European
security and defence: parliamentarian should lead public opinion, WEU Assembly press release,
Paris, 28 April 2006.
9
rapporteur concluded, “the EU’s role in the security of the region [during the
ALTHEA Mission to Bosnia] had not contributed as much as might be hoped
towards enhancing the way in which the ESDP was perceived by the public at
large [emphasis added].” 12 Therefore, “tangible results” needed to be made
“clearer and more accessible to the public.”13
Just a few weeks later, the UK
Parliament hosted a two-day seminar on “Building a secure Europe in a better
world: Parliamentary responsibility and action in shaping public opinion on
security and defence.”
As WEU Assembly President Jean-Pierre Masseret
(France, Socialist group), explained, national parliaments “must address the
security concerns of European citizens and at the same time educate public
opinion on security and defense issues. Parliaments must explain that Europe's
future position in the world was at stake if its common foreign, security and
defense policy stagnated.” Rob de Wijk, director of the Clingendael Institute in
The Hague, argued that parliamentarians needed to “convince public opinion
that the stagnation of Europe would inevitably lead to its marginalisation.”14
The call did not fall on deaf ears.
In 2006, after the failure of the
Constitutional Treaty referenda in France and the Netherlands, the Commission
sent the Council “Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater
Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility” suggesting focusing on key messages to
be coordinated among all DGs involved in external action so their work and
messages are mutually reinforcing.
Nevertheless, decision-makers continued to remark on the limited media
coverage and public support in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the
European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a Changing World:
“Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In
modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping
policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments
Rapporteur on “Public Opinion and the Althea Mission” visiting Sarajevo notes lack of public
awareness of ESDP, WEU Assembly, Paris, 4 April 2006, emphasis added.
13 Althea -- a symbol of the ESDP success, WEU Assembly press release, Paris, 20 June 2006.
14 WEU assembly seminar on the role of parliaments in shaping public opinion on European
security and defence: parliamentarian should lead public opinion, WEU Assembly press release,
Paris, 28 April 2006.
12
abroad.”15
In 2009, the EAS came into force with the goal of increasing coordination,
and thereby efficiency and visibility. However, a year later, in a non-public, white
paper sponsored by Greece in 2010 to the Political and Security Committee titled
“Enhancing the EU’s public diplomacy: Better visibility and efficiency in EU’s
foreign actions The role of the E.E.A.S. and of the PSC” the Greek government
called upon the EEAS to take measures to increase the visibility of the EU on the
world stage. The Greek paper suggests the EEAS increase coordination of foreign
policy actors:
The EEAS, under the auspices of the High Representative/Vice President
of the Commission, and with the contribution of the PSC, should
immediately start elaborating this comprehensive public diplomacy
strategy, fixing targets, priorities and major policy lines concerning
horizontal issues, regions of enhanced European interest, countries, or
even specific entities, of concern. This strategy should be formulated in a
manner that will allow its full and flexible implementation by all the actors
involved.16
The solution suggested by the Greeks is more coordination of all actors within the
EEAS: the Council/PSC, the Commission, and the HR in as many areas as
possible, with the proviso that the public diplomacy strategy should be
formulated in such as way as to allow both full and flexible implementation. In
other words, all the actors should be in lockstep with a common message, but one
that can be implemented in different ways. This was always the ideal of the
‘common’, rather than ‘single’, foreign and security policy.
How Coordination Hinders Media Coverage: Walking in Lock-Step is
Cumbersome
Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08 Report on the Implementation of the European Security
Strategy- Providing Security in a Changing World – p. 12
16 White paper sponsored by Greece in 2010 to the Political and Security Committee titled
“Enhancing the EU’s public diplomacy: Better visibility and efficiency in EU’s foreign actions
The role of the E.E.A.S. and of the PSC”
15
Is lack of coordination the problem as so frequently cited? At first glance,
it seems so. Each of the 27 member states has its own foreign and security policy.
The EAS is the venue within which the member states can coordinate to create a
common (not a single) external policy. With the High Representative also a Vice
President of the Commission, she can coordinate Commission-designated tools
such as development aid to reinforce the decided-upon policy. This paper argues
that the emphasis on coordination actually hinders effective communication of
the policy and perhaps even the policy itself because the EU’s is hostage to the
member states’ position(s). As a result, the foreign policy game is skewed in favor
of the member states. Press statements are the product of LCD negotiations, and
therefore, wooden, technical, reactive, slow, and unappealing to the press.
Member states can take the credit for successes and blame EU for failures. The
member states have no incentive to pay for more press officers. Even if more
existed, they could do nothing until the PSC 27 ambassadors issued a statement.
The emphasis on coordination creates an environment of risk aversion that ties
the hands of press officers. Such a communication strategy works very poorly in
the context of 24/7 media.
The European Union versus the Member States
Although the EAS is nominally independent, to quote Ashton Spokesman
Michael Mann’s response from the Economist:
‘The idea that the high
representative for foreign affairs can forge her own foreign policy against the will
of member states is unrealistic. She can prod, push and pull, as she often does,
but she cannot charge ahead without the backing of the 27.’17 In other words,
Ashton has an impossible task: She is to promote the EU’s foreign and security
policy, but, at the same time, is hostage to the negotiations of the Political and
Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors.
In her work on European public diplomacy, Mai’a David-Cross argued that
member states are to blame “because national-level public diplomacy rarely
Michael Mann, Spokesman for Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative, Brussels, Belgium,
letter to the editors of the Economist, 17 May 2012.
17
includes the EU in its messages to foreign publics.”18 Why is this the case? With
regard to CSDP missions, it is because member states bear almost all the risks,
and so take the lion’s share of the ‘profits’, that is the credit when a mission is
successful. Most missions have a lead country, and that lead country will often
coordinate press coverage at home using the government’s large and
sophisticated press office. In contrast, on the EU side, CSDP missions must
manage on their own with very few people. Significantly, since the first CSDP
mission, the number of press officers, even today, has never exceeded four people.
In 2003, a few months into the first CSDP mission, EUPM Bosnia, a
German journalist knocked on the door of the headquarters and asked to speak
with the press officer.
When told the mission had none, the journalist
volunteered and took the post.19 It would be another four years until there was
audio-visual for Council missions.20 Initially, there was no funding for press
relations. Traditionally, the Council secretariat had no communication budget
because there was no need: the member states each had their own press team,
and the Council did not implement policy like the Commission or debate it like
the Parliament.
However, Solana recognized that along side the greater
responsibility of running CSDP missions came the responsibility of explaining the
missions to the public. However, getting a line-item budget for communication
was problematic. PRINCE funding was for Commission projects; member states
already had their own teams. His press team was composed of one spokesperson
and three officers, a total of four people.
Solana found a way to build in a communications budget into each joint
action, along side funding for transportation and supplies. When asking member
states for personnel, some states would volunteer press officers, usually for a total
of three. These three people would have no previous knowledge of either each
other or the mission, and would have to be trained by Solana’s press team.
The remoteness of the CSDP operations also hindered media coverage.
EU Public Diplomacy: A Coherent Message? Dr. Mai’a K. Davis Cross
Interview with anonymous EU official I, Brussels, 11 October 2011.
20 Interview with anonymous EU official II, Brussels, 11 October 2011.
18
19
They were often difficult to get to.
For example, for Operation Atalanta, a
journalist would have to fly to Djibuti, very expensive and time consuming, and,
even if he or she did manage to get in touch with the naval ships, a very big ‘if’
considering the poor transportation infrastructure and limited government in the
region as well piracy, there were no satellites available to get the story back to
Europe. With limited budgets and limited time, journalists chose to direct their
energy elsewhere. Moreover, back home at military headquarters in Norwood,
England, the HQ had no desire to do media relations, especially considering that
the headquarters was a secure building for guarding military secrets. However,
Whitehall stepped in and insisted they speak to the press.
The Council secretariat had its own strategy. It would call up national
newspapers and say “Did you know there were Dutch soldiers in this CSDP
mission?” After 2007, when they started sending in audio-visual teams to make
footage for television broadcasts, they always found soldiers to speak in their own
language – Dutch, Danish, etc, not the more widely spoken languages of English
or French. The goal was to provide attractive footage for the local and national
market. It was the only way to get on the news.21
Using EUFOR Tchad as another example, French Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchener sent his own press team accompanied by journalists, and
paid for all their expenses. Solana’s press officer had to find the money to take a
commercial flight to N'Djamena and then find a helicopter to take her to
Farchana, Abéché. EU publicity was not the primary goal of the French foreign
ministry. Luckily, in that case, the head of mission was a telegenic Irishman who
understood the importance of the media, especially in relations with NGOs,
which was of extreme importance in the Chad mission. Solana’s office did pay to
send journalists down a second time, but, although done all the time, it does
bring up some ethical issues.
However, in most cases, heads of mission are not chosen for their
knowledge of public relations, and without a press officer on the ground at all
Interview with anonymous EU official II, Brussels, 11 October 2011 and corroborated with
another EU official in Brussels on 3 October 2011.
21
times, press coverage will be limited or even embarrassing. In February 2011,
Brigadier General Jukka Savolaine in an interview with Judy Dempsey of the
International Herald Tribune and New York Times countered the carefully
negotiated EU policy towards Afghanistan, embarrassing the member states.22
When press officers are sent out, it is usually with little advance notice –
so little in fact that very often no money has been budgeted to pay for the airfare,
hotel, office, computer, photocopying, telephone, Internet that are required to do
the job. Press officers must go on the fly with their personal credit card and only
a vague “master message” to guide them, and no lay of the land. In the case of
Aceh, the press officer found the master message of limited use because it was so
quickly overtaken by events (OBE). Once the journalists had heard the same
message, once, twice, or even three times, they demanded to know how the
mission was proceeding and to receive new information. The press officer had
few options:
ask the journalists to wait until he received new orders from
Brussels; turn them away; tell them the unvarnished truth, or tell them the truth
he thought would least embarrass or go against the master message. A major
issue for the press officers is time: the EU wants time to negotiate a position and
the journalists want their questions answered before their deadlines. However,
getting the facts wrong could embarrass politicians back home.
Risk Aversion and Message Control
Catherine Ashton has come under a great deal of criticism regarding the
EEAS. Part of the reason is because she has not engaged the press. For example,
when a Le Monde reporter asked Ashton’s office several times for an interview,
his request was ignored. He will never ask again.23 She has given very few
interviews overall. She was late with appointing a spokesperson, and there is
almost no institutional memory from the Solana days; only one person was kept.
Today, StratCom has 2.5 people working on external affairs and an additional
Michael Mann, interview October 2011, Brussels. See also Judy Dempsey, “A Rare Voice
Against Plan to Leave Afghanistan” 15 Feb. 2011, New York Times.
23 Interview with anonymous EU journalist, Brussels, 7 October 2011.
22
half-time person hired in September 2011 for CSDP missions in particular. His
main task is to write the CSDP Newsletter, which has not been published for two
years.
One of the main jobs of the strategic communication unit of the EEAS, or
StratCom, is coordinating the EU message so that all entities are singing the same
songsheet regarding the EU position. The former RIC – RELEX Information
Committee has been changed to the External Relations Communications
Committee. It coordinates the communication for all groups, including the
member states. In turn, the small, three-person StratCom unit keeps the EU
delegations/embassies all over the world to a common position on as many issues
as possible. If these delegations are asked a question not addressed by the
handbook or the common position, the delegation is to seek out an approved
answer from Brussels. Heads of mission, ambassadors, and commission officials
are not allowed to speak to journalists without prior approval.
The PSC
negotiates “master messages” for civilian missions originally drafted by the CPCC,
and “communication strategies” for military missions drafted by the EUMS, to be
approved by all the member states in order to guide press officers in Brussels and
on the ground when dealing with journalists. All Facebook pages must be
approved ahead of time.
The broadcasting of pre-approved messages is
acceptable, but not public interactions that could derail delicate negotiations. As
one member of StratCom explained, it is not about putting words in people’s
mouths, but “about getting the facts right.”24
Considering the bad press Catherine Ashton has received, perhaps her
emphasis on message control is understandable: “Ashton's standing was itself
damaged when one of her spokespersons portrayed her as very skeptical about a
no-fly zone [in Libya]. At a stroke, that annoyed Paris and London, the bloc's two
big foreign-policy powers.”25 Perhaps it is understandable that “The repeated
Maria Kokkonen, Deputy Head of Division, Strategic Communications, European External
Action Service (EEAS), Brussels, 10 October 2011.
25 Stephen Castle “Lady in Waiting” Foreign Policy, 31 March 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/31/lady_in_waiting
24
questions about her suitability have fostered have a bunker mentality in Ashton's
inner circle.”26
Moreover, European Commission President of José Manuel Barroso
resisted pleas by DG Communications Commission Margaret Wallstrom to bring
the EU closer to the people. An EU based journalist explained that Barroso had
been deeply alarmed by the fall of the Prodi Commission. Whereas in the past,
the Commission would ‘leak’ documents to gauge public and media reaction,
Barroso changed policy because he was too concerned with losing control.
Instead, he made greater use of Flash Eurobarometer to gauge public reaction; he
cut the press out because they were less predictable. One EEAS official said he
had thought security was supposed to be the area of ‘high’ politics where states
did not give in. Having worked in both security and communications in the EU,
he said it was communications. States would not give up any of their power in
this area.27
The main goal of StratCom is message control to avert risk of
embarrassment. EU leaders cannot be embarrassed. Member state governments
cannot be embarrassed. EU positions are the result of lengthy and behind-thescenes diplomatic negotiations.
As a result, the EEAS employs a one-way
communication strategy that requires pre-approval before information is
released. The situation is so dire, it sometimes seems comical: at the bottom of
every EU Security and Defence newsletter that the EEAS publishes on a weekly
basis is the disclaimer: “The views expressed are not to be taken in any way to
represent the official position of the European External Action Service.”
Despite the fact that member states and EU leaders wanted to promote the
CSDP missions, other needs/wants were still more paramount. Member state
leaders sought positive press for their governments back home in order to win the
next election. They also sought to save money on CSDP missions whose costs had
to be borne through extra funding mechanisms. Within the EU, the desire to
avoid risk and embarrassment, that is, ‘bad’ press, leads to unidirectional
26
27
Ibid..
Interview with anonymous EU official, Brussels, 6 October 2011.
information streams that stilt the communication and even alienate the press.
The result is an overall reduction in news coverage.
As one EEAS official explained, when he began at NATO, there were fifty
press officers and two lawyers. Later, when he moved to the Council secretariat
under Solana, he was struck that there were only two press officers and fifty
lawyers.
He used this example to demonstrate how the EU is much more
concerned with risk aversion than self-promotion.28
Nor was Javier Solana universally loved for his promotion of CSDP
missions, sometimes viewed as self-promotion. In 2007, the Council secretariat
decided to make use of YouTube because it was cheap and easy. Javier Solana’s
video statement, unfiltered and direct to the people, was criticized by older
officials who feared the transparency would hurt the Union as a whole. In the
words of one official, “What are you doing? We are discreet diplomats. We
cannot go public like that. We need to come to agreement with the 27 member
states first.” A public environment hurts the chances of a diplomatic agreement
being negotiated.
Wooden Messages in the 24/7 Media Context
On the other hand, a negotiated message hurts its PR value. As Desmond
Dinan once commented, the member states' response to international events has
been
uninspiring and banal. The rhetoric of EPC is crammed with clichés:
elections should always be "free and fair" (Statement on Nicaragua,
February 28, 1990); political settlements and solutions should always be
either "comprehensive, just and lasting" (Declaration on the Middle East,
June 26, 1990); or "just stable and lasting" (Declaration on Central
America, June 26, 1989); and peace should always be based on
28
Interview with anonymous EU official, Brussels, 4 October 2011.
"sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity" (Declaration on Cyprus and
Lebanon, June 26, 1989).29
Little has changed over the years. Ashton states that Russia should hold ‘free and
fair’ elections30, and that the EU is committed to ‘the unity and sovereignty of
Mali.’31 The contexts may change, but the words remain constant: they represent
the approved language of European compromise.
languages, the message ossifies even further.
When translated into 27
Even these tidbits take time:
‘Events in the Arab world may be moving with dizzying speed, but the job of
building a European Union foreign policy will continue to travel at its own, glacial
pace.’32 Such lukewarm language results in a lack of credibility and influence on
the world scene.
Without a stronger decision making mechanism, any
declarations will reflect the lowest common denominator statements the member
states could agree upon.
Moreover, when translated into 27 languages, the
message ossifies even further.
If journalists need to wait for a position before they can report it, or if
turned away because there is “no news” as of yet, they will not spend their time,
money and effort reporting on EU affairs.
Wooden messages, one-way
communications, emphasis on averting risk, the slow pace of response, and
message control have alienated the press. In 1999, there were more journalists
accredited to the EU than to the White House, about one thousand. Today, there
are only about 300.33 Ten years ago, every Wednesday, the Commission had a
29Desmond Dinan, "European Political Cooperation" in The State of the European Community:
Policies, Instituions, and Debates in the Transitions Years Leon Hurwitz and Chritian Lequesne
(eds.) (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Press, 1991), p. 403.
30 Speech of High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Russia to the European
Parliament, Brussels, 01 February 2012, A 36/12.
31 Catherine Ashton EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice
President of the European Commission Speech on the situation in Mali European Parliament
Strasbourg, 17 April 2012,
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/271 .
32 Castle.
33 Interview with anonymous EU official, Brussels, 3 October 2011.
press conference. The room was overflowing. Today, one journalist estimated
that only twenty show up.34
In a day of limited resources, the press choose to put their best people in
the national capitals where they are more likely to get ‘hot’ news and clear and
quick answers to their questions. In Brussels, the answer will be “see our Website
for our official position” or “let me get back to you”. For the first answer, there is
no need to be in Brussels. For the second, the answer always takes several days,
at which point the deadline has passed. Not surprisingly, the press is leaving
Brussels in droves.
Compared to ten years ago, fewer newspapers have ‘European’ sections.
To save money, they are putting European affairs under the ‘international’
section.35 The content analysis of the CSDP missions supports this claim: 21
percent of missions appeared as “European” in context; the majority, 52 percent
were classified as “international”. For example, Le Monde and Le Figaro no
longer have Europe pages. Whereas Le Monde had four reporters in Brussels four
years ago, today they have only two – a reduction of fifty percent.
With
newspapers literally shrinking (smaller and fewer pages), the EU is getting lost
between international and national affairs.
In an interview with a German
journalist, she would get permission to report on CSDP stories, but once she
handed them in, the editors would invariably put them aside arguing that there
were other issues of more interest to their readers.36
Conclusions: Calculated Risk Taking? The Importance of Engaging the Press
With regard to the CSDP in particular, retired UK MP John Greenway,
former Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) wrote in 2011
“Sadly, the media and public opinion have not yet caught up with this reality (of
Interview with anonymous EU journalist, Brussels, 7 October 2011, but also corroborated by an
interview with anonymous EU official, Brussels, 3 October 2011.
35 Interview with anonymous EU official, Brussels, 3 October 2011.
36 WIIS
34
European security and defence).
He remarked that the public has general
disinterest regarding security and defence issues until a life is lost, at which point,
it causes public anxiety. “How can politicians resolve the dilemma whereby
public opinion may be positive and favourable towards European and
international cooperation at the project stage, but becomes nationalistic and
strongly critical when it comes to the actual implementation of such cooperation?
… Greater transparency and openness”.37
What can the EU do to increase press coverage? One could tweak the
system by hiring more press officers, but the problem is structural: the EAS does
not disguise the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign and security policy. The
member states are in the driver’s seat, and, structurally, the EU is designed to
minimize risk and embarrassment. As a result, EU officials work to control
media messages rather than to release information.
This structure directly
benefits member state governments allowing them to take credit for crisis
mission successes and blame the EU for failures.
Ashton Spokesperson Michael Mann agreed that the EU has not taken
advantage of the good press that could be supplied by publicizing the CSDP
missions, but he also explained that his job is spokesperson for Ashton, not for
publicizing the missions per se. In other words, his job is to make Ashton look
good. The member states want to look good. Barroso wants to look good. Van
Rompuy wants to look good. These people have to work together; they do not
want to embarrass each other. Moreover, despite fifty years, the European Union
is still a somewhat fragile association of member states. It is not clear that it can
survive strife.
Therefore, there is very little transparency and tremendous
message control in the name of preserving the Union.
The risk averse nature of the EAS works very poorly in the context of the
new media climate. Political communications overall have been destabilized by
the Internet.38 Newspapers are losing market-share to the Internet and have less
John Greenway, “How to communicate security and defence” The European – Security and
Defence Union 9 (1/2011).
38 Peter Dahlgren, “The Internet, Public Spheres, and Political Communication: Dispersion and
37
money to spend on reporting. Media outlets are cutting down on reporters and
reporting, especially in Brussels, at the same time as the EU as a whole, and the
EEAS in particular, have clamped down on all its officials to speak to the press
only in prescribed sound bites. As a result, national newspapers are less likely to
cover CSDP missions or Europe at all, unless the news is negative, thereby
undermining the European integration process.
In other words, fear of failure becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy:
To
protect itself, the EU uses one of its few powers – one way channels of
communication -- to do message control and avert risk, which, in turn, alienates
the press and the people who use social media, thereby undermining public
support for the missions.
Transparency and openness contain risks, but, as Bruce Armstrong, Chief
Press Officer at the US Embassy in Berlin argues, not engaging the press is
counter-productive and riskier still. Journalists certainly agree. They still hold
power and can either write negative stories or no stories at all.
Deliberation” Political Communication 22 (2005): 147–162.