GRIFFITH COLLEGE DUBLIN Assignment Cover Sheet
Transcription
GRIFFITH COLLEGE DUBLIN Assignment Cover Sheet
GRIFFITH COLLEGE DUBLIN Assignment Cover Sheet Result Awarded: ____ % Late Penalty: ____ % Overall Result: 67 % Student name: Joanna Krasuska Student number: 2823306 Course: LLB(Hons) in Irish Law Stage/year: 2nd semester/ 2nd year Subject: Criminal Law Study Mode: Full time: _____ Lecturer Name: Elaine Finneran BCL, LLM Assignment Title: (please see page 2) No. of pages: 14 Additional Information: Part time: x (e.g. number of piece submitted etc.) 1 piece submitted, Word count: 2704 (excluding bibliography and foot notes) Date due: 24th of March 2014 Date submitted: 20th of March 2014 Academic Misconduct: I understand that I will be subject to the penalties imposed for the breaches of academic conduct as defined in the College’s Academic Misconduct Procedure (QA J4). Signed: Joanna Krasuska Date: 14-March-2014 LATE ASSIGNMENTS: Penalisation for late assignments is 5% per day. Any assignment submitted after the designated hours on the submission day will be considered a late assignment and will be penalised at 5%. It will therefore be 10% if the assignment is handed in the day after the submission date. If assignments are more than 1 week late, they are not accepted and will be recorded as not having been presented 1|Page Assignment Title [s.20 may be charged if the accused ] “knowing that they are suffering HIV or some other serious sexual disease, recklessly transmit it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflict grievous bodily harm on a person from whom the risk is concealed and who is not consenting to it.” Judge LJ, R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, at 59. In this quotation Lord Justice Judge was commenting on the ability to prosecute a person for transmitting HIV during sexual activity. In light of this statement discuss the criminalisation of the transmission of HIV in England and Wales, including the potential for such prosecutions pursuant to the provisions of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. [Word Limit: 2500 – 3000 words] 2|Page Bibliography Table of Cases Ireland i. People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360 ii. McGee v AG [1971] 8,9 June 1972 31 July 1972 6-9 Nov. 1973 19 Dec. 1973 iii. Ryan v Attorney General [1965] 1 IR 294 England and Wales iv. R v. B [2007] 1 WLR 1567 v. R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 vi. R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371 vii. R v Clarence [1888] 22 QBD 23 viii. Regina v Mohammed Dica [2005] EWCA Crim, ix. R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 x. R v Dica [2005] EWCA Crim 2304 xi. R v Emmett (unreported, 18th of June 1999) xii. R v Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025 xiii. R v Hancock and another [1986] 1 All ER 641 xiv. R v Nedrick [1986] 3 All ER 1 Court of Appeal, (Criminal Division) xv. R v Woolin [1999] AC 82 xvi. Hyam v Director of Public Prosecution [1974] 2 All ER 41 xvii. R v Kouassi Adaye [2004] Unreported xviii. R v Cunnigham [1957] 2 All ER 412 Other Jurisdictions (Canada) i. R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371 Table of Legislation i. Constitution of Ireland, Article 40.3.1 3|Page ii. Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 iii. Sexual Offences Act 2003 (England) iv. Offences Against the Person Act 1861 Primary Sources – Textbooks v. Criminal Law, Peter Charleton, P.A. McDermott, M. Bolger, Tottel Publishing Ltd 2006 vi. Criminal Law in Ireland, Liz Campbell, Shane Kilcommins, Catherine O’Sullivan, Clarus Press 2010 vii. Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, David Ormerod, Oxford University 11th Edition, at 599-600 Secondary Sources - Articles and Academic Commentary i. Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review, The criminalisation of HIV transmission in England and Wales: question of law and policy; Volume 10, Number 2, August 2005 ii. After Cuerrier: Canadian Criminal Law and the Non-Disclosure of HIV-Positive Status; Richard Elliot, Canadian HIV AIDS Legal Network iii. Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica, Matthew Weait, The Modern Law Review Limited 2005, 68(1) MLR 121-134 iv. Butterworths PI Litigation Service Bulletin/Bulletin 75/11 Letter from America v. http://www.aidsmap.com/Timeline-of-developments-in-the-criminalisation-of-HIV-and-STItransmission-in-the-UK/page/1504201/ accessed 10th of March 2014 vi. http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infectio n_guidance/ accessed 10th of March 2014 vii. S Ramage, ‘The Criminal Offence of Causing Infection of HIV Virus’ viii. H Carter, ‘Bigamist Passed HIV Recklessly’ (The Guardian, 13th January 2004) ix. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jan/13/southafrica.aids accessed 14th of March 2014 x. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/merseyside/3389735.stm accessed 14th of March 2014 xi. http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/Report-on-Social-Media-July-2013-Website.pdf accessed on the 14th of March 2014 [Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Transport and Communications, “Report Addressing the Growth of Social Media and Tackling Cyberbullying”]. xii. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf accessed on the 14th of March 2014 xiii. http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/workingpapers?task=document.viewdoc&id=90 accessed on the 16th of March 2014 4|Page xiv. http://www.jwatch.org/id200603100000002/2006/03/10/what-s-optimal-initial-art-regimenhiv accessd on the 16th of March 2014 xv. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/north_east/8469238.stm accessed on the 16th of March 2014 xvi. http://napwa.org.au/living-with-hiv/hiv-and-the-law/criminalisation-of-hiv-transmission accessed on the 16 of March 2014 xvii. http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/planetAIDS/Transmission.aspx accessed on the 16th of March 2014 xviii. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/74 accessed on the 20th of March 2014 5|Page Introduction The purpose of this article is to investigate different approaches to treatment of the consensual intercourse involving a seropositive person who withholds their HIV status. Firstly, comparison of the pertinent legislation in the common law jurisdiction will be undertaken, namely Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997. To counterbalance the existing legislation that justifies criminalisation of reckless and intentional infliction of HIV, right to privacy will be considered in the light of decision in McGee v AG1. Therefore, in order to assess whether the current statutory provision are sufficient to protect the infected person and the person engaging in unprotected sexual act with a HIV positive individual, a multimodal approach needs to be taken to illustrate the current approach to tackling the social issue. As is seen from the current decisions, modern approach is to broaden the scope of the existing legislation to include criminalisation of reckless or harmful behaviour and acts, rather than addressing the problem through awareness, education and health consciousness. An example similar approach can be seen in the current bill for the criminalisation of cyber bullying,2 where parents are calling for legislation to be enacted to combat such form of wrongdoing. Although in their view legislation would act as a deterrent it is education that is the key in prevention of bullying and cyber bullying rather than criminalisation of individuals before they reach the age of majority. Recent judicial decisions will be scrutinised in regard to the existing approach to criminalisation of reckless and intentional transmission of HIV. The lack of precedent in Ireland will allow the opportunity to explore other common law jurisdictions like England, Wales, Canada, Scotland and Australia which have persuasive authority in the courts of the Republic of Ireland. Legislation Section 4 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 provides that “A person who intentionally or recklessly causes serious harm to another shall be guilty of an offence.”3 Further section 13(1) states that “A person shall be guilty of an offence who intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of death or serious harm to 1 McGee v Ireland [1971] 8,9 June 1972 31 July 1972 6-9 Nov. 1973 19 Dec. 1973 http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/Report-on-Social-Media-July-2013-Website.pdf accessed on the 14th of March 2014 [Houses of the Oireachtas, Joint Committee on Transport and Communications, “Report Addressing the Growth of Social Media and Tackling Cyberbullying”]. 3 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0026/sec0004.html#sec4 accessed on the 08th of March 2014 2 6|Page another.”4 As suggested by Charleton,5 those provisions of Irish legislation, similarly to section 20 of English Offences Against the Person Act 1861, have the potential to capture the act of infection should it be carried out maliciously and with intention. Therefore if an infected person has a cause of action resulting from recklessness and intention of his or her sexual partner, it will be dealt in Irish courts on case to case basis. This possibility of conviction derives from decisions in the neighbouring jurisdictions of England and Wales, which relies on section 20 of the 1861 Act, recognises that reckless or intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm extends to infecting a consensual but unaware partner with a Sexually Transmitted Infection.6,7 Additionally, constitutional protection of the bodily integrity of every citizen8 affords further defence to people exposed to such acts of malice. Art. 40, 3, 1 and 2, of the Constitution is a right to bodily integrity and any interference with bodily constitution without the consent of the person concerned constitutes an infringement of this right to bodily integrity.9 Also the Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights secures the right of a democratic state to interfere in order to defend health or morals.10 On the other hand the same provision protects privacy, to which the seropositive person is also entitled, unless intention to transmit the virus is proven. Countries like the USA, Russia, Australia, China, and others11 established specific laws criminalizing reckless transmission of HIV. Recklessness and Intention Recklessness can be defined as unwarranted or advertent risk taking. Therefore a person acts recklessly with respect to a situation when is aware that a risk exists or will result from an action and nevertheless takes the risk. Failure to consider a risk – as obvious as it might be – does not amount to recklessness, however being aware of a risk but taking the approach of 4 http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0026/ accessed on the 10th of March 2014 - Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997 5 Criminal Law, Peter Charleton, P.A. McDermott, M. Bolger, Tottel Publishing Ltd 2006, at 632-633 6 Regina v Mohammed Dica [2005] EWCA Crim 2304 7 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review, The criminalisation of HIV transmission in England and Wales: question of law and policy; Volume 10, Number 2, August 2005 8 Constitution of Ireland, Article 40.3.1 9 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] 1 IR 294 10 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf accessed on the 14th of March 2014 11 http://www.aidsfreeworld.org/planetAIDS/Transmission.aspx accessed on the 16th of March 2014 7|Page irresponsible disregard to the result of taking the risk in question does amount to recklessness. This definition has the potential to be applied both to the seropositive person as well as uninfected individual engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse.12 “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offence when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.”13 Whether a risk taking is justified or not is measured by an objective statndard and depends on social implications of the activity in question.14 Consequently a seropositive person engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse creates a very severe social implication as the infliction of HIV on a person affects not only the individual but also their family.15 Finally to ascertain if the defendant had acted recklessly it is necessary to establish what was his state of mind at the time of involving in the act and what objective resulted in taking the unjustified risk causing harm. Campbell outlines three possibilities:16 (i) knew of the risk, but proceeded anyway, or (ii) may not have considered the risk, but the reasonable person would have; or (iii) may have considered the risk but mistakenly concluded that there was no risk. Therefore a HIV positive person aware of being seropositive but nevertheless engaging in an unprotected sexual intercourse, without revealing this status to the sexual partner, acts with reckless disregard to the health and life of that person, which falls within the first category. As stated by Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone at p. 56: “Where the defendant knows that there is a serious risk that death or grievous bodily harm will ensue from his acts, and commits those acts deliberately and without lawful excuse, the intention to expose a potential victim to that risk as the result of those acts. It does not matter in such circumstances whether the defendant desires those consequences to ensue or not.”17 12 Criminal Law in Ireland, Liz Campbell, Shane Kilcommins, Catherine O’Sullivan, Clarus Press 2010, at 131 People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360 14 Criminal Law in Ireland, Liz Campbell, Shane Kilcommins, Catherine O’Sullivan, Clarus Press 2010, at 133 15 R v Dica [2005] EWCA Crim 2304 16 Criminal Law in Ireland, Liz Campbell, Shane Kilcommins, Catherine O’Sullivan, Clarus Press 2010, at 133 17 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecution [1974] 2 All ER 41 13 8|Page The question is whether a person acting with reckless disregard in relation to the life or health of another has the intention to cause such harm. In Hyam intention could have been imposed by mere probability, however further decisions were based on foresight of virtual certaintly of a result.18 In Moloney and Hancock foresight of virtual certainty constitutes evidence of the accused’s intention to harm. In an arson case, R v Nedrick,19 the Court of Appeal concluded that intention doesn’t have to be proven but may be inferred from the actor’s foresight of virtual certaintty of consequences. This decision has been reaffirmed in Woolin,20 where Lord Steyn concluded that intention can be imposed in cases where accussed had been aware of the consequences of his actions.21 The first category of subjective/advertent recklessness derives from judgment in the Cunnigham case.22 The court agreed that the defendant acted recklessly and could have foreseen that damaging gas installation can lead to serious consequences. In the context of judgment in Cunnigham, the state of mind of a seropositive person who engages in sexual intercourse despite being aware of the risk but proceeded anyway amount to the highest standard of recklessness and foresight test. This very standard could be applicable to seronegative persons in an analogue situtations. English and Welsh decisions on reckless infliction of HIV Despite media commotion in 1992, after a man from Cornes has been accused of reckless and intentional infliction of Human Immunodeficiency Virus on a woman, the Home Secretary stated in the UK Parliament that he had no plans to legislate to make the deliberate transmission of HIV a criminal offence. However the following year the Law Commission proposed changes to include such offence into the operating statute.23 Although no specific legislation has been enacted so far, the existing 1861 Act has been interpreted in a way to include such cases. 18 R v Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025 and R v Hancock and another [1986] 1 All ER 641 R v Nedrick [1986] 3 All ER 1 Court of Appeal, (Criminal Division) 20 R v Woolin [1999] AC 82 21 Criminal Law in Ireland, Liz Campbell, Shane Kilcommins, Catherine O’Sullivan, Clarus Press 2010, at 129 22 R v Cunnigham [1957] 2 All ER 412 The defendant was convicted under section 23 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for “unlawfull and maliciously administering a noxious thing so as to endanger life.” The court have allowed appeal and quashed Cunnigham’s conviction on the basis of misdirection to the jury in regard to the meaning of the word “maliciously” in the context of section 23. 23 http://www.aidsmap.com/Timeline-of-developments-in-the-criminalisation-of-HIV-and-STI-transmission-inthe-UK/page/1504201/ accessed on the 10th of March 2014 19 9|Page Section 20 of the 1861 Act provides the statutory basis which gave rise to the conviction of Mohammed Dica24. English courts has departed the same from the decision in Clarence25 and recognised that assault is not only a direct infliction of physical force, but extends to the reckless infliction of HIV, which amounts to grievous bodily harm. In Dica’s decision the court has been able to separate the concept of consent to sexual intercourse from consent to infection causing grievous bodily harm. Furthermore, the courts have recognised that without full disclosure there is no true consent. In criminalising reckless infliction of HIV the court exercised its legal function to protect the society against offences described by section 20 of 1861 Act.26 Lord Justice Judge in passing the sentence held that the defendant has demonstrated a “cynical disregard” for the consequences of his act despite having knowledge of his HIV status and the certainty of devastating results of unprotected sexual intercourse. The learned judge rationalized imposing the maximum sentence available for crimes described by section 20 stating that “it is difficult to imagine a case of section 20 of greater seriousness than this”. The application for leave to appeal has been denied.27 Further decisions followed the precedent set in Dica. The issue of consent has been given consideration in Konzani28. In direction to the jury the trial judge stated that it shall be proven beyond doubt that the complainant would not engage in a sexual intercourse should the true HIV status had been disclosed. The purpose of such proof is to establish that the complainant would not consent to risk of suffering the infection. It has been highlighted by the trial judge in direction to the jury that such decision would have been undertaken willingly, which means in full knowledge of all implications that carrying out such risk involves. On appeal this direction to the jury has been endorsed.29 Two other successful prosecutions considered convictions of Kouassi Adaye30 and Paolo Matias31 and were upheld on the strength of section 20 of the 1861 Act. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution and requires that the defendant inflicted bodily harm and was fully conscious of the consequences. 24 [EWCA] Crim 1103 (05 May 2004), [2004] 3 All ER 593; R v Clarence [1888] 22 QBD 23 26 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 27 R v Dica [2005] EWCA Crim 2304 28 R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706 29 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infection_guidance/ accessed on the 10th of March 2014 30 R v Kouassi Adaye [2004] Unreported; http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/merseyside/3389735.stm 25 accessed 14th of March 2014; http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/jan/13/southafrica.aids accessed 14th of March 2014 31 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review, The criminalisation of HIV transmission in England and Wales: question of law and policy; Volume 10, Number 2, August 2005 10 | P a g e Question of consent Accordingly to mentioned judgments in cases that have tried the discussed offence, consent does not constitute a defence.32 “Without disclosure of HIV status there cannot be a true consent. The consent cannot simply be to have sexual intercourse. Rather it must be consent to have intercourse with a partner who is HIV positive. True consent cannot be given if there has not been a disclosure by the accused of his HIV positive status. A consent that is not based upon knowledge of the significant relevant factors is not a valid consent.”33 Section 74 provides that “a person consents if he agrees by choice, and had the freedom and capacity to make that choice”.34 This provisions is designed to emphasize that lack of objections, struggle or any form of resistance otherwise does not expressly amount to consent. Consensual agreement to involve in a sexual intercourse must be an informed one, meaning there cannot be any hidden agenda in the form of sexually transmitted infection like HIV. 35 In English law, consent to bodily harm is not recognised36 except for medical purposes such as surgical operation or in contact sports. Lord Justice Judge in considering the difference between consent to bodily harm and consent to the risk of such harm referred to R v Brown stating that the decision was correct. Further he held that violent conduct in spite of “private consensual sexual element to it” is not acceptable. For the same reasons of public policy it is unacceptable to spread infections, including Sexually Transmitted Infections (STI) like HIV.37 The courts’ approach to consent does not recognise it as a viable defence for those who harm others. In R v Emmett38 the court denied the respondent the defence of consent as he set fire to his partner’s breast with lighter fuel and almost asphyxiated her. The reason for the court’s 32 R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371, Regina v Mohammed Dica [2005] EWCA Crim, R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706, 33 R v Cuerrier [1998] 2 SCR 371 34 Sexual Offences Act 2003; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/42/section/74 accessed on the 10th of March 2014 35 Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, David Ormerod, Oxford University 11th Edition, at 599-600 36 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica, Matthew Weait, The Modern Law Review Limited 2005, 68(1) MLR 121-134 38 R v Emmett (unreported, 18th of June 1999) 37 11 | P a g e decision has been unacceptably high risk to which he had exposed his partner, similarly to facts in R v Brown.39 Consent to sexual activity has been considered in R v. B40 where the seropositive defendant was charged with raping the complainant as he withheld his HIV positive status. He tried to rely on the defence of consent. The Crown found it applicable to include his HIV status in evidence. The defendant objection as to the relevance of his HIV status has been disregarded. The judge ruled that it was important to establish whether the complainant had consented to the infliction of grievous bodily harm and whether the defendant reasonably believed this was the case. The defendant was convicted and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, as the court established the consent was limited to the sexual act itself and excluded consent to infection. The controversy in criminalising reckless infliction of HIV arose from the dangers of interfering with personal autonomy. Contrary to the judgment in R v Brown, the court considered the invasive nature of criminalising individuals who engage in consensual sexual intercourse. Such procedure would invade the privacy of sexual relationships, whether those involved risk of contracting and sexually transmitted infection or not. Conclusively, it would be contrary to the accepted social standards as it is generally accepted that consenting adults are allowed to take risk in regard to their health, like being the presence of a their child sick with contagious disease and nevertheless having physical contact with that child. Consequently the same standard should apply in the context of sex life.41 This approach however seems not applicable in the context of reckless and intentional transmission of HIV onto an unware partner. Despite a consent partner does take a risk, the seropositive person should still be obliged to disclose their HIV positive status, so the taking of the risk is fully informed. Other jurisdictions (Canada, Scotland, Australia, USA) The ruling in R v Dica has been preceded by the 1998 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Cuerrier.42 The Supreme Court held that where sexual act carries a “significant risk of serious bodily harm,” the seropositive person has a duty to reveal their status. None39 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 R v. B [2007] 1 WLR 1567 41 R v Dica [2005] EWCA Crim 2304 42 R v Cuerrier [1998] S.C.J. No. 64 (SCC) 40 12 | P a g e disclosure may amount to fraud, which in turn renders a sexual partner’s consent to the engagement in a sexual activity, consequently making the otherwise consensual intercourse an assault as defined by Canadian criminal law.43 On the basis of non-disclosure prosecution tooks places in Scotland.44 In countries where criminal law varies from region to region, such as the United States of America and Australia, prevalent inconsistency and variation in the scope, reach and implementation of criminal law exists, resulting in irregularity and confusion for people living with HIV.45,46 Conclusion In favor of criminalization, sexual consent and right to privacy of sexual relationship were not an issue before for the courts to interfere47. Reckless disregard to ones health and life can be treated as a two-way argument, serving both defence and prosecution. Criminal courts trying allegations of exposure are generally interested in facts of exposure and not on the degree risk but whether necessary mechanical barrier has been provided by the persons involving in consensual sex, also whether the HIV positive individual has led the consensual partner to believe that he or she was seronegative. Also this argument may become even more persuasive given the recent HPTN 052 clinical trial that showed ART48 to be 96% effective in reducing HIV transmission in couples where one partner has HIV.49 The guidance for prosecutors enclosed in the Swiss Statements provides that: “There may be varying degrees of infectiousness during the cycle of infection and during any anti-retroviral therapy. Therefore the scientific evidence is extremely helpful here and it should also include specific information on the degree of infectiousness of the suspect at the time of the alleged offence. Prosecutors should consider the need for scientific evidence namely clinical and epidemiological evidence regarding duration of infection, the possible incubation period of the 43 After Cuerrier: Canadian Criminal Law and the Non-Disclosure of HIV-Positive Status; Richard Elliot, Canadian HIV AIDS Legal Network 44 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/north_east/8469238.stm accessed on the 16th of March 2014 45 http://napwa.org.au/living-with-hiv/hiv-and-the-law/criminalisation-of-hiv-transmission accessed on the 16 of March 2014 46 http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/working-papers?task=document.viewdoc&id=90 accessed on the 16th of March 2014 47 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 48 Antiretroviral therapy - http://www.jwatch.org/id200603100000002/2006/03/10/what-s-optimal-initial-artregimen-hiv accessd on the 16th of March 2014 49 http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/working-papers?task=document.viewdoc&id=90 accessed on the 16th of March 2014 13 | P a g e infection and a strong likelihood that the suspect infected the complainant as opposed to any possibility that the complainant may have infected the suspect.”50 HIV awareness education should be a primal deterrent rather than criminalization. In cases of prosecutions line between intention and lack of knowledge should be drawn. 50 http://www.hivlawcommission.org/index.php/working-papers?task=document.viewdoc&id=90 accessed on the 16th of March 2014 14 | P a g e