Slides - Faculty Directory | Berkeley-Haas
Transcription
Slides - Faculty Directory | Berkeley-Haas
UGBA 103 (Parlour, Spring 2015), Section 10 Capital Structure (With and Without Taxes) Raymond C. W. Leung University of California, Berkeley Haas School of Business, Department of Finance Email: [email protected] Website: faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/r_leung/ugba103 April 17, 2015 Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 1 / 33 Outline 1 Modigliani-Miller Theorems MM Theorems (no tax) MM Theorems (with taxes) 2 (OPTIONAL) Viewing equity and debt as financial derivatives 3 Examples Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 2 / 33 Section 1 Modigliani-Miller Theorems Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 3 / 33 Subsection 1 MM Theorems (no tax) Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 4 / 33 WACC The expected return of the firm’s assets — expected return on a portfolio of all the company’s securities or weighted average cost of capital: D E WACC = rD + rE , V V where D is the market value of debt, E is the market value of equity, and V = D + E is the total value of the firm; and rD is the cost of debt, and rE is the cost of equity. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 5 / 33 Modigliani-Miller Theorems (no taxes) Proposition (MM I (no tax)) The levered value of the firm VL is equal to the unlevered value of the firm VU ; that is, VL = VU Proposition (MM II (no tax)) The cost of equity, rE = rA + Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) D E (rA − rD ). UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 6 / 33 Modigliani-Miller Theorems (no taxes) Notes Just to make it more transparent: MM I is discussing the values of the firm; and MM II is discussing the cost of capital of the firm. Once we use MM I to deduce that rA = WACC, and using the definition of WACC, we can just simply rearrange terms to get MM II: rA = WACC = D E rD + rE D+E D+E =⇒ =⇒ =⇒ (D + E)rA = DrD + ErE D D + 1 rA = rD + rE E E D rE = rA + (rA − rD ). E Recall also how asset, equity and debt betas are related to each other. βE = βA + Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) D E (βA − βD ). UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 7 / 33 Subsection 2 MM Theorems (with taxes) Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 8 / 33 Modigliani-Miller theorems (with taxes) Firstly, with taxes, the expected returns of the firm’s assets are, D E rA = rD + rE . V V Most notably, here with taxes, that rA 6= WACC! Proposition (MM I (with tax)) The levered value of the firm is equal to the unlevered value of the firm plus the present value of its tax shield. That is, VL = VU + tC DL , where tC is the corporate tax rate. Proposition (MM II (with tax)) The cost of equity of the levered firm is equal to, rE = rA + D E (1 − tC )(rA − rD ) Thus, the weighted average cost of capital (with taxes) is equal to, D E D WACC = (1 − tC ) rD + rE = rA 1 − tC . VL VL VL Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 9 / 33 Personal Taxes Suppose there are different tax rates. That is, suppose that the personal income tax rate for interest income is tD and the personal income tax rate for equity income is tE . When $1 in pre-tax is paid to a: Shareholder: he/she receives (1 − tE )(1 − tC ); Bondholder: he/she receives (1 − tD ) (because tax deductible). Thus, the tax advantage of debt in the presence of both corporate and personal taxes become, t∗ = 1 − (1 − tE )(1 − tC ) . 1 − tD Thus, we rewrite MM I (with tax) in the presence of corporate and personal taxes become, VL = VU + t ∗ DL . Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 10 / 33 Bankruptcy and Agency costs Bankruptcy costs: Financial distress due to increased leverage. Agency costs: Risk shifting due to the presence of leverage (i.e. bondholders are paid off first in terms of interest and debt principal, before the shareholders get their dividends.) The levered value of the firm that take into account bankruptcy and agency costs: VL = VU + PV (tax shield) − PV (bankruptcy costs) − PV (agency costs) Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 11 / 33 Section 2 (OPTIONAL) Viewing equity and debt as financial derivatives Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 12 / 33 Financial Options Call option A (European) call option with strike price K with maturity T on an asset with price ST at the maturity date has the time T payoff of, max{ST − K , 0}. Payoff 0 Strike price K Ending stock price ST The call option contract gives the holder the right but not the obligation to buy the stock at price K at maturity date T . The call option is effectively a bullish gamble on the stock price. The cost of this call option is substantially cheaper than buying the stock outright. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 13 / 33 Financial Options Put option A (European) put option with strike price K with maturity T on an asset with price ST at the maturity date has the time T payoff of, max{K − ST , 0}. Payoff 0 Strike price K Ending stock price ST The put option contract gives the holder the right but not the obligation to sell the stock at price K at maturity date T . The call option is effectively a bearish gamble on the stock price. The cost of this put option is substantially cheaper than buying the stock outright. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 14 / 33 Equity and Debt via financial derivatives Suppose the following: A — the payoff of the unlevered firm / assets E — payoff of the levered equity D — payoff of debt with a face value of F Since debt payments have highest priority in claimants to the corporate cash flows and assets, and equity holders are a residual claimant, this implies the payoff of equity is linked through this way: ( A − F , if A ≥ F (solvent firm) E= 0, if A < F (defaulted firm). = max{A − F , 0}. This is the perspective of an individual holding a unit of stock. Relating back to the previous discussion, we see that the payoff of equity E can be viewed as a long position on a call option, where the underlying security is the unlevered value (asset value) of the firm A, and the strike price is the face value F of debt. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 15 / 33 Equity and Debt via financial derivatives What about the perspective of the bond holder? The payoff of the bond holder D then becomes, ( F , if A ≥ F (solvent firm) D= A, if A < F (defaulted firm) = min{A, F } = F − max{F − A, 0}. Relating back to the previous discussion, we see that the payoff of debt D can be viewed as a long position on cash in the amount of F , and a short position on a put option, where the underlying security is the unlevered value (asset value) of the firm A, and the strike price is the face value F of debt. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 16 / 33 Real world relevance? The realization that debt and equity can be viewed as financial derivative contracts was a significant breakthrough. This led to the Nobel winning Merton (1974) paper, which we know of today as the Black-Scholes-Merton model. The realization that (defaultable corporate) debt can be viewed as a put option meant that we can use option pricing methodologies (i.e. Black-Scholes-Merton equation) to compute not only the value of debt, but also compute a “probability of default (PD)” number and a “distance to default (DD)” number. Both of these things are critical inputs for corporate bond investors and risk managers. The Merton (1974) model (and along with Leland (1994) and others) form the backbone of Moody’s Analytics (their KMV model), S&P Capital IQ Credit Analytics, and many other credit analytics methods used in practice. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 17 / 33 Section 3 Examples Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 18 / 33 Problem 15-1 Pelamed Pharmaceuticals has EBIT of $325 million in 2006. In addition, Pelamed has interest expenses of $125 million and a corporate tax rate of 40%. (a) What is Pelamed’s 2006 net income? (b) What is the total of Pelamed’s 2006 net income and interest payments? (c) If Pelamed had no interest expenses, what would its 2006 net income be? How does it compare to your answer in part b? (d) What is the amount of Pelamed’s interest tax shield in 2006? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 19 / 33 Problem 15-1 Solutions (a) Compute, Net Income = EBIT − Interest − Taxes = ($325 − $125) × (1 − 0.40) = $120mil. (b) Compute, Net Income + Interest = $120 + $125 = $245mil. (c) Compute, Net Income = EBIT − Taxes = $325 × (1 − 0.40) = $195mil. This is $245 − $195 = $50mil lower than part (b). (d) Compute, Interest tax shield = $125 × 0.40 = $50mil. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 20 / 33 Problem 15-2 Grommit Engineering expects to have net income next year of $20.75 million and free cash flow of $22.15 million. Grommit’s marginal corporate tax rate is 35%. (a) If Grommit increases leverage so that its interest expense rises by $1 million, how will its net income change? (b) For the same increase in interest expense, how will free cash flow change? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 21 / 33 Problem 15-2 Solutions (a) Net income will fall by the after-tax interest expense to million. (b) Free cash flow is not affected by interest expenses. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 22 / 33 Problem 15-3 Suppose the corporate tax rate is 40%. Consider a firm that earns $1000 before interest and taxes each year with no risk. The firm’s capital expenditures equal its depreciation expenses each year, and it will have no changes to its net working capital. The risk-free interest rate is 5%. (a) Suppose the firm has no debt and pays out its net income as a dividend each year. What is the value of the firm’s equity? (b) Suppose instead the firm makes interest payments of $500 per year. What is the value of equity? What is the value of debt? (c) What is the difference between the total value of the firm with leverage and without leverage? (d) The difference in part (c) is equal to what percentage of the value of the debt? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 23 / 33 Problem 15-3 Solutions (a) Compute, Net income = $1000 × (1 − 0.40) = $600. Thus, equity holders receive dividends of $600 per year with no risk. This implies the value of equity is, $600 = $12, 000. E= 0.05 (b) Compute, Net income = ($1000 − $500) × (1 − 0.40) = $300. This implies the value of equity, E= $300 = $6000. 0.05 The debt holders receive interest of $500 per year. This implies the value of debt is D = $10, 000. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 24 / 33 Problem 15-3 Solutions (c) Observe that the total value of the firm, With leverage = $6, 000 + $10, 000 = $16, 000 Without leverage = $16, 000, and so, Difference in value = $16, 000 − $12, 000 = $4, 000. (d) Observe that, $16, 000 − $12, 000 = 40%, $10, 000 which is exactly the corporate tax rate. Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 25 / 33 Problem 15-6 Arnell Industries has just issued $10 million in debt (at par). The firm will pay interest only on this debt. Arnell’s marginal tax rate is expected to be 35% for the foreseeable future. (a) Suppose Arnell pays interest of 6% per year on its debt. What is its annual interest tax shield? (b) What is the present value of the interest tax shield, assuming its risk is the same as the loan? (c) Suppose instead that the interest rate on the debt is 5%. What is the present value of the interest tax shield in this case? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 26 / 33 Problem 15-6 Solutions (a) Compute, Interest tax shield = $10mil × 6% × 35% = $0.21mil (b) Compute, PV (Interest tax shield) = $0.21mil = $3.5mil 0.06 (c) Compute, Interest tax shield = $10mil × 5% × 35% = $0.175mil, and so PV (Interest tax shield) = Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) $0.175mil = $3.5mil. 0.05 UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 27 / 33 Problem 15-8 Bay Transport Systems (BTS) currently has $30 million in debt outstanding. In addition to 6.5% interest, it plans to repay 5% of the remaining balance each year. If BTS has a marginal corporate tax rate of 40%, and if the interest tax shields have the same risk as the loan, what is the present value of the interest tax shield from the debt? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 28 / 33 Problem 15-8 Solutions Interest tax shield in year 1 = $30 × 6.5% × 40% = $0.78 million. As the outstanding balance declines, so will the interest tax shield. Therefore, we can value the interest tax shield as a growing perpetuity with a growth rate of g = −5% and r = 6.5%: PV = Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) $0.78 = $6.78mil. 0.065 − (−0.05) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 29 / 33 Problem 15-20 Suppose the corporate tax rate is 40%, and investors pay a tax rate of 15% on income from dividends or capital gains and a tax rate of 33.3% on interest income. Your firm decides to add debt so it will pay an additional $15 million in interest each year. It will pay this interest expense by cutting its dividend. (a) How much will debt holders receive after paying taxes on the interest they earn? (b) By how much will the firm need to cut its dividend each year to pay this interest expense? (c) By how much will this cut in the dividend reduce equity holders annual after-tax income? (d) How much less will the government receive in total tax revenues each year? (e) What is the effective tax advantage of debt τ ∗ ? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 30 / 33 Problem 15-20 Solutions (a) $15 × (1 − 0.333) = $10 million each year (b) Given a corporate tax rate of 40%, an interest expense of $15 million per year reduces net income by 15(1 − 0.4) = $9 million after corporate taxes. (c) $9 million dividend cut =⇒ $9 × (1 − 0.15) = $7.65 million per year. (d) Compute, Govt tax revenue changes = Interest taxes − Corporate taxes − Dividend taxes = (0.333 × $15) − (0.40 × $15) − (0.15 × $9) = $5mil − $6mil − $1.35mil = $2.35mil. Note that this equals part (a) less part (c). (e) Here, τ∗ = 1 − Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) (1 − 0.40)(1 − 0.15) = 23.5%. 1 − 0.333 UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 31 / 33 Problem 15-25 With its current leverage, Impi Corporation will have net income next year of $4.5 million. If Impi’s corporate tax rate is 35% and it pays 8% interest on its debt, how much additional debt can Impi issue this year and still receive the benefit of the interest tax shield next year? Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 32 / 33 Problem 15-25 Solutions The net income of $4.5mil implies we have, $4.5mil = $6.923mil 1 − 0.035 in taxable income. Therefore, the firm can increase its interest expenses by $6.923mil, which corresponds to debt of, $6.923 = $86.5mil. D= 0.08 Raymond C. W. Leung (Berkeley-Haas) UGBA 103 Spring 2015, §10 April 17, 2015 33 / 33