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Phenomenal Epiphany
or Zombie Illusion:
What are the Building Blocks of
Phenomenal Experience?
E.M. Rissler
Abstract
Imagine a creature very similar to yourself. Imagine this creature eating, sleeping
and going to work (if you have one) just like you do. In other words, imagine this
creature functioning, acting and behaving just like you in all physical respects but
with one important difference. There is no consciousness. Whenever you are tasting
and munching away on your favourite chocolate muffin, sipping your favourite
wine, perceiving a vividly red rose in wonderment, perhaps get pierced by one of
its thorns and feel pain, the creature feels and experience nothing. It is just dark
inside. This is what a philosophical zombie is.1 For you there is something it feels
like and something it is like to experience all of the above phenomena but there is
nothing it 'feels like' or 'is like' to be your zombie twin. Now, philosophical zombies
are a little bit different and less scary than their biting counterparts from Hollywood
movies and comic books. While the later are used for entertainment, philosophical
zombies or entire zombie worlds2 can be used to investigate matters regarding consciousness and its place in nature and the universe. One particular thing relevant to
this text is that they can be used to investigate if property dualism3 (PD) which
claim that the phenomenal is nonphysical is true or if property physicalism (PP)4 a
subspecies of physicalism is true instead. Since one can argue in favour of different
1
The term 'zombie' was introduced into the contemporary philosophy of mind by Robert Kirk in his
(1974) "Sentience and Behaviour". However, similar ideas and concepts have been used since at
least Descartes and his 'automatons' and 'machines' (cf. 1637, Discourse V, pp. 54-60; 1641, Meditation VI, p. 78:54) as well as Leibniz´s 'Mill scenario' (1714, Monadology, section 17). See also
Campbell´s (1970) 'imitation man'.
2
Zombie worlds are physically identical duplicates of an original world containing phenomenal
consciousness but without themselves containing phenomenal consciousness.
3
See Chalmers (1996, pp. 124-131, 161ff.; 2010, p. 125-137, 138-139, 198-199) and Nagel (1998,
p. 338). Examples of these theories are, 'epiphenomenalism' (cf. Jackson, 1982), 'dual attribute'- or
'dual aspect' theories (cf. Spinoza, 1677; Nagel, 1986) and ‘F-monism’, or as Chalmers also calls it,
'neutral'- or 'Russelian monism' (cf. Russell, 1927; Chalmers, 2010, pp.133-139). Chalmers has also
developed a version of F-monism that he has named ‘panprotopsychism’ (2010, pp. 134-139). Many
theories of mind can be straightforwardly sorted into to the category of 'property dualism' whereas
other theories at least can be interpreted as belonging to the category.
4
The term 'property physicalism' originates from Ansgar Beckerman (1997). See also his (2009).
interpretations and hence different versions of PP I call the version I advocate and
will scrutinize in this text constitutional property physicalism (CPP) to avoid it from
being conflated by mistake with other versions of PP. CPP claims that everything
in the universe including consciousness is identical to something physical in the
sense that everything is constituted entirely by physical building blocks that undergo entirely physical events and processes that only has entirely physical properties and relations.
One of the most influential and prominent defenders of the zombie idea is David
Chalmers (cf. 1996; 2010). He has developed a systematic use of zombie arguments
as a compelling case against physicalism (or materialism as Chalmers often calls
it). This supports, according to him that some form of PD is true. Chalmers zombie
arguments could all be regarded as different versions of the same main conceivability argument, let us call it Chalmers master argument and as of yet it have resisted
any conclusive refutation.5 Conceivability arguments like the zombie argument(s)
have a somewhat similar logical form or structure and Chalmers diligent work has
clarified this matter to an even greater extent (See, 2010, pp. 105-111, 141 ff., 306
ff.). In this text I unearth this common logical form even further and also notice that
Chalmers master argument follows this form quite closely as well. First the argument infers an epistemic (or explanatory) gap between the physical and the phenomenal. This could be done by appeal to what I call Chalmers´s The hard problem
argument (2010, Ch. 1, pp. 105-106) other anti physicalist arguments as for example The knowledge argument (Jackson, 1982, 1986, pp. 291-293, 1995) or it can
just be inferred from "brute intuition" Chalmers (1996, p. 96; 2004, p. 183). From
the epistemic gap a metaphysical gap is inferred through different modal bridge
principles that is part of Chalmers conceivability-possibility (CP) theory and framework and his two dimensional (2D) modal logic and possible worlds semantics
framework (1996, 2002, 2010, Ch. 6 and Appendix). Once the metaphysical gap in
the physicalist account is established the conclusion follows straightforwardly that
physicalism (including CPP) is false. I distinguish three issues that is problematic
with Chalmers case for PD and frame them in the form of three critical arguments.
The first argument is The zombie per impossibile argument which raises the issue that the way Chalmers´s define the original individuals or worlds that is physically duplicated are unsound and no threat for CPP in any relevant sense since only
those worlds where the phenomenal is nonphysical can have physically identical
duplicates that do not contain the phenomenal. If the original world containing consciousness is entirely physical as CPP claims then a physical duplicate of that world
should also contain consciousness. To claim that the duplicate would be a ZW is
incoherent and CPP would never accept a definition of original individuals or
worlds where the phenomenal is nonphysical.
The second argument is The causal interaction argument against PD and appeals
to The problem of causal interaction which raises the issue that if the building
blocks of the universe postulated by Chalmers PD is nonphysical they cannot causally interact with the physical building blocks of the universe since they are part of
different causal domains.
5
Notable predecessors to Chalmers argument are Descartes and his 'Disembodiment argument'
(1641, Meditation VI, p. 78:54) and Leibniz´s 'Mill argument' (1714, Monadology, section 17). More
contemporary versions can be found in among others, Campbell (1970), Kirk (1974), Kripke (1980,
pp. 144-148), Nagel (1974 and 1986, pp. 46-49), Bealer (1994) and Levine (1983, 1993, 2001).
Counter arguments and critical expositions relevant to this text can be found in Searl (1997); Perry
(2001; 2004); Stoljar, (2003); Frankish (2007); Brown (2010) and Kirk (2005; 2012).
The third argument is The mental dilemma argument which raises the issue that
if one postulate that PD is true, then that postulate is very hard to test, confirm or
falsify because of The problem of causal interaction. From this follows that it seems
impossible to create experiments that independently can study the phenomenal directly or indirectly through causally observable and measurable consequences if it
is indeed nonphysical. However, if one postulate that CPP is true, then that postulate
is not as hard to test, confirm or falsify as the postulate of PD because it can at least
accommodate The problem of causal interaction.
After having made a thorough analysis and clarification of the most important
notions concerning Chalmers case for PD I first conclude that even though many
components are contentious, there seems to be no substantial arguments against
Chalmers CP and 2D-framework that are relevant for the use of them in his argument(s). However, contrary to what many might think, Chalmers CP and 2D-framework cannot in themselves tip the balance in favour of PD in Chalmers´s arguments
because they are dependent on what original or actual world you feed into them as
background assumption and auxiliary hypothesis in the first premise of Chalmers
master argument(s).
This leaves us with the question of how to determine from our current knowledge
what original or actual world we should regard as most justified as a background
hypothesis, a PD world or a CPP world? I agree with Chalmers that the methods of
everyday science who only appeals to the physical faces great challenges (ibid.,
2010, pp. 15, 105-106) when studying the phenomenal. But it seems a little bit too
premature to infer the metaphysical conclusion from that fact that no methods of
everyday science (perhaps of the future) who only appeal to the physical can be
developed that have the potential of sufficiently explaining the phenomenal. Furthermore, if any kind of account or explanation could be given at all, then physicalism and CPP seems to be a little more up for the task than Chalmers PD since any
form of PD faces the grave challenges of The causal interaction argument and The
mental dilemma argument.
Key Words:
A priori, A posteriori, Concept, Conceptual Analysis, Conditional, Conceivability, Consciousness, Dualism, Epistemic, Epistemology, Empiricism, Entailment, Experience, Explanation, Gap, Identity, Logic, Metaphysical, Metaphysics, Modal Epistemology, Models,
Necessity, Nonphysical Phenomenology, Philosophy of Mind, Physical, Physicalism, Possibility, Property, Qualia, Reduction, Semantics, Two Dimensional Semantics
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