1015 Leveraging Specific Plant Features to Manage Internal Hazards
Transcription
1015 Leveraging Specific Plant Features to Manage Internal Hazards
Leveraging Specific Plant Features to Manage Internal Hazards Harri Tuomisto Fortum Power POB 100, Keilaniementie 1 FI-00048 FORTUM, Espoo, Finland [email protected] ABSTRACT Internal hazards and accident progression are often determined by plant-specific features. A typical feature of internal hazards and a special concern of accident progression are that they challenge simultaneously more than one functional level of the defence-in-depth concept or penetrate more than one of the physical barriers against fission product releases. Internal hazards can themselves be initiating events, such as common cause failures, internal fires or floods, missiles, inhomogeneous boron dilution, or primary-to-secondary leakage accident. Internal hazards can also be created during the accident progression such as pressurized thermal shock, loop seal issue, boron crystallization, containment sump clogging, or inherent boron dilution mechanisms. The aim of this paper is to discuss, how various internal hazards are managed at the Loviisa VVER-440 units. The Loviisa plant configuration is quite unique, since the original VVER-440 design has been amended with ice condenser containment, specific reactor coolant pumps and many other features. 1 INTRODUCTION As a consequence of the Fukushima accident management of external hazards and severe accident management (SAM) have been subject to an increased attention at nuclear power plants. The lesson learnt was that there might be cases of paying too little attention to external hazards in comparison to the risks they might pose for the plant. On the other hand, the approaches chosen to the SAM vary significantly across the countries and nuclear power plants. The stress tests and regulatory processes following the Fukushima accident have clearly identified further need to reinforce mitigation of severe accidents and preparedness against all credible external hazards as well as increase the plant security. Although the main attention is currently on the external hazards, one has to keep in mind the fundamental significance of internal hazards being a continuous threat to the successful defence in depth. The plant-specific features of the Loviisa VVER-440 units were extensively utilized when developing and implementing a comprehensive SAM programme to respond to the plant-specific vulnerabilities. The SAM programme development and implementation was carried out during the period from 1986 until 2004 [1], [2]. Respectively, the internal hazards and accident progression are often determined by plantspecific features. A typical feature of internal hazards and a special concern of accident 1015.1 1015.2 progression is that they challenge simultaneously more than one level of the defence-in-depth concept or penetrate more than one of the physical barriers of the fission product releases. Figure 1: Loviisa power plant in summer and winter The aim of this paper is to discuss, how the management approaches were developed and to present how the resolutions were implemented for some of the internal hazards identified for the Loviisa VVER-440 units. The Loviisa plant configuration is in many respects quite unique, since the original VVER-440 design has been added with ice condenser containment, specific reactor coolant pumps and several other features. In many cases we integrated deterministic and probabilistic analyses to study various possibilities and plant capabilities to resolve the raised issues. Most of the presented work has been carried out already many years ago. The reason to revisit these developments is to bring further insights and perspective to the current work done as post-Fukushima actions on external hazards, extensive damage conditions and severe accident mitigation. 2 PLANT-SPECIFIC FEATURES The Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant consists of two VVER-440 units, which started commercial operation in 1977 and 1980. VVER-440 is a pressurized water reactor that has a relatively low power core being originally 1375 MWth that gives about 450 MWe from two turbines (since 1997 with upgraded power 1500 MWth and 500 MWe, respectively). Specific features of VVER-440 are a specific control assembly design with fuel followers, six primary loops (equipped with gate valves both in hot and cold legs), horizontal steam generators and primary loops having so-called loop seals both in the hot and cold leg). The geometry and 3D structure of the Loviisa primary circuit is shown in Fig. 2. Figure 2. Primary circuit of Loviisa VVER-440 1015.3 There are also significant design features that are different from the original VVER-440 design, such as an ice-condenser containment, four train emergency core cooling systems and German I&C system, special type reactor coolant pumps that were all implemented already during the construction phase. Fig. 3 shows the principal design of the ice-condenser containment. The implications of ice condenser design at power operation, internal hazards and SAM were reviewed in an earlier work [3]. The ice condenser design differs significantly in certain respects from the other 12 ice condenser containments built to Westinghouse reactors. Loviisa ice condensers comprise of two separate sections, air handling units are outside containment, and there are no air return fans from the upper compartment to the lower compartment (but there is a small one-way bypass in the reverse direction). Ice condenser Figure 3. Loviisa ice condenser containment After the start-up of Loviisa 1 and 2 in 1977 and 1981, respectively, a large number of technical improvements have been implemented at the plant. Many of these improvements have been installed based on an identified internal hazard. 3 VARIOUS INTERNAL HAZARDS This section collects various internal hazards that were raised mainly during the first fifteen years operation of the plant. A common feature of these hazards is that they penetrate multiple functional levels of the defence-in-depth concept, or even multiple physical barriers against fission product releases. Successful management of the hazards significantly reduces the overall risk evaluated with probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). The studied and managed hazards have been listed in Table 1 in two groups: Internal hazards occurring during a transient or accident, and Internal hazards as an initiating event. Plant-specific features that create the given hazard or have been utilized for resolving it are included for each hazard. Table 1 also offers a speculation of the origin of the concern raised, approximate or indicative period of resolution and references to original works. Some of the hazards and their treatment are further explained in the following subsections. 1015.4 Table 1: Internal hazards considered in Loviisa safety analyses Internal hazard Plant-specific features Concern raised from Resolution period Ref. Internal hazards occurring during an accident High neutron fluence on the RPV wall. Impurities (Cu, P) in the critical weld RPV surveillance results Regulatory issue 1980 – 2011 1996 cont. [4] [6] [6] In-house concern 1984 - 1994 [14] Regulatory issue 1979-1981 1991-1994 2010-2011 [7] [8] TMI-2 accident Regulatory issue 1979-1981 1997-2000 [9] Regulatory concern 1990-1995 [10] [12] In-house concern about equipment qualification 1987-1990 [3] Nonunifrom ice sublimation Ice condenser design In-house concern Regulatory concern 1980 - [15] [17] Skyshine In-house concern 1980 - [16] PTS: pressurized thermal shock to reactor pressure vessel (RPV) Boron crystallization (during Hot leg loop seals: No reflux boiling loss-of-coolant accidents) Ice condenser: Borax contained in ice Fuel assemblies with shroud Sump clogging by insulation debris (during loss-of-coolant accidents) Rock wool insulation of pipes Sump strainer design Fuel assemblies with shrouds Loop seal issue (during loss- Loop seals both in the hot and cold legs of-coolant accidents) RCP design Horizontal SGs Inherent inhomogeneous boron dilution Superheat in lower compartment during steam line break accidents Horizontal steam generators Loop seals Isolated lower compartment from the main containment volume. Containment roof structure Internal hazards as an initiating event PRISE: large primary-tosecondary leakage accident Horizontal steam generator: primary collector cover Regulatory issue 1984-1995 Turbine hall fire Emergency feed water pumps located in the turbine hall In-house concern Regulatory issue 1980 - External inhomogeneous boron dilution Primary circuit: main gate valves, loop seals Regulatory concern 1991-1995 Internal flood Emergency feed water pumps located in the turbine hall In-house concern 1989 - 3.1 [18] [19][18] [21] [10] [11] [20] Pressurized Thermal Shock to the Reactor Pressure Vessel The first surveillance specimen test results of Loviisa 1 in 1980 showed a higher neutron irradiation embrittlement than expected for a rector pressure vessel (RPV) weld. To ensure safe operation of the RPV, several modifications were accomplished in the plant. The reactor core size was reduced in order to reduce neutron fluence on the RPV wall by replacing 36 peripheral fuel assemblies with stainless steel dummies. The temperature of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water tank was increased to 55C, and the temperature in the ECCS accumulators injecting directly to the downcomer was increased to 100C. The decisions of plant modifications were based on the brittle fracture calculations for postulated large break and medium size break LOCAs. Soon it was realized that potential risk from slower overcooling events characterized by high system pressure (Pressurized Thermal Shock, PTS) might be higher than from postulated LOCAs. An extensive PTS analysis started 1015.5 with deterministic assumptions. Structural analysis assessments include detailed 3D fracture mechanics calculations assuming nonuniform temperature and heat transfer fields in the RPV downcomer. Since a lot of uncertainties remained and system interactions are very complex, the assessment was complemented with a probabilistic PTS study [4]. Probabilistic assessment covered all potential PTS initiators, and all the plant conditions including full power, hot zero power and plant cooldown and heatup phases, and a large number of transients were included. The probabilistic approach gives a quantitative estimate of the importance of the PTS issue in relation to the overall safety [5]. New modifications were done such as upgrading the whole secondary circuit safety actuation signals. The critical weld area of the RPV of Loviisa 1 was thermally treated in 1996 to recover the ductile properties of weld material. [6] The RPV licensing is based on the deterministic assessments, even though the probabilistic PTS risk is updated regularly. Only a few transients (typically six) have been selected to represent assumed limiting cases according to the deterministic failure criteria for design basis events. The selection of these transients is based on the PTS risk results and they satisfy also the deterministic considerations. External flooding of the reactor vessel has been included to the considered transients. 3.2 Inhomogeneous boron dilution The boron dilution transients covered originally in the scope of the Safety Analysis Report dealt solely with homogeneous external dilution. Water of low or zero boron concentration being injected to the primary circuit, was assumed to mix quite perfectly with all the primary coolant inventory. No significant safety concerns remained in regard to the homogeneous dilution. When reactivity accidents were reassessed independently after the Chernobyl accident in various countries, inhomogeneous external dilution events were recognized. Steam generators, chemical and volume control system, diluted accumulator or diluted refueling water storage tank and diluted containment sump were identified as potential sources of diluted water. Dilution may occur during any operating conditions. The sequence of events may vary significantly in different scenarios such as pure water from the secondary side flow to the primary circuit due to maintenance errors during shutdown, reactor coolant pumps (RCP) may stop during inadvertent dilution thus initiating slug formation or inadvertently diluted accumulators may leak into the primary circuit. Probabilistic risk assessment turned out to be a viable tool for analysing the importance of these events. Because of the complex geometry of the primary loops and the main gates valves in both the hot and cold legs, there are various extra aspects of slug formation and transport in VVER-440 reactors. The risk of a serious reactivity accident was found to be too high. Consequently, various actions were taken, including changes in automation, operating procedures and equipment [11]. The measures ensure interruption of dilution when one or more RCPs stop, maintain adequate boron concentration in the pipelines of the make-up water system, and flush the loop by reverse flow before starting a RCP. A new dilution tank was installed in 1994 containing mild boron solution with minimum controlled boron concentration (1200 ppm below the hot zero power critical boron concentration). After the performed modifications the frequency of a serious reactivity accident due to an external boron dilution is much less than 10-6 per reactor year. When primary coolant inventory decreases during such accidents as small break LOCAs, anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) and primary-to-secondary leakage 1015.6 accidents, a boiling/condensing heat transfer mode may be established between the core and steam generators. During such inherent dilution conditions condensate with very low boric acid concentration can accumulate in the loop seal leading to creation of a nonborated slug. The slug can be transported to the core after re-establishing the natural circulation or starting a RCP in the primary circuit. Another inherent dilution mechanism considered is a possible backflow of water from the steam generator secondary side to the primary circuit during primary-to-secondary leakage accidents. The mechanism of inherent boron dilution was introduced by Finnish regulatory authority STUK [12] and inherent dilution research program was initiated. In an OECD Specialist Meeting on Boron Dilution in 1995 [10], a series of papers were presented on slug formation and transport at Loviisa. The experience gained from these studies were later disseminated through European research project EUBORA [13], which emphasized the fluid mixing phenomena in mitigating the consequences of such dilution events. Interestingly enough, we had carried out an extensive experimental and analytical research programme in collaboration with VTT and Lappeenranta University of Technology during 1980’s concerning a reverse problem i.e. a possibility of boron crystallization in the reactor during long-term phase of LOCAs. The identified threat was that solidified boric acid could block the fuel assemblies and lead to heatup of the fuel. The issue was finally solved through detailed consideration of the specific features of Loviisa reactors. [14] 3.3 Primary-to-Secondary Leakage Accidents (PRISE) PRISE is a particular concern for VVERs that are equipped with horizontal steam generators. The original design of primary collectors inside the steam generator made a fair likelihood for large PRISE with equivalent leakage to tens of tube failures. Design measures have been taken to eliminate this leakage path. PRISE management is tricky as there are various and sometimes contradictory objectives: strict limits have to be met for the doses caused by releases (design basis domain) accident progression to core damage has to be prevented excessive PTS to the RPV has to be prevented inherent boron dilution mechanisms have to be prevented The analyses from the each objective’s viewpoint have to be made separately [18]. Cases of PTS and boron dilution were discussed above. Extensive plant modifications were done to obtain the design basis goal for the doses.[19] 3.4 Sump strainer clogging Sump strainer clogging due to insulation debris was identified as an internal hazard already in early days of plant operation. Containment sump strainers were designed and tested to withstand the clogging. After the Barsebäck incident in 1992, new aspects related to debris formation and properties called for a complete redesign and replacement. [7] Experience in sump straner testing and design was utilized for a number of other VVER plants. Recently the debris issue was raised again, now concerning possible blocking of fuel assemblies in the core by small fiber debris.[8] 3.5 Hazards arising from the containment design Ice condensers suffer from nonuniform sublimation of loaded ice, which raises a concern of ice condenser bypass and containment overpressure during accidents with steam 1015.7 release into the lower compartment. [15] [17] A steam line break leaking to the lower compartment can cause temporary elevated temperature levels that exceed the equipment qualification values because of the limited volume. [3] The containment roof structure is not massive and γ radiation from noble gases released to the containment during accidents can penetrate the roof easily. Backscattering of this radiation down to the plant area, i.e so-called skyshine, can restrict moving on-site and cause significant difficulties to accident management actions. [16] 3.6 Turbine hall fire and internal flood These hazards are typically treated as “external events” in PRA. The risk arising from fires in the turbine hall was identified to be quite high. Plant modifications for ensuring residual heat removal have reduced the risk, since operation of systems located in the turbine hall is no longer necessary.[21] The new autonomous emergency feedwater system (with directly diesel-driven pumps) was installed into a dedicated building. Additionally, a number of structural changes have been performed to improve fire protection in the turbine hall. One of the most important findings was that water jets from feedwater system on top of the control building could fail the floor and harm I&C and electrical systems. Another important initiator was a break in the circulating water system in the turbine building. This event could lead to flooding of the reactor building basement through cable tunnels and fail reactor coolant pump seal cooling pumps and ECCS equipment. Walls have been built to prevent this sequence. High sea level could lead to same consequences during annual outage when the circulating water system is under maintenance and isolated from the sea by a temporary dam. A new procedure and a higher dam have been established. These changes have reduced the risk nearly with two orders of magnitude.[20] Table 2. Potential penetration of defence-in-depth caused by internal hazards Internal hazard Functional level 1 2 3 4 Extra challenge to physical barriers 5 Fuel cladding Primary circuit Containment PTS: pressurized thermal shock Boron crystallization Sump clogging Loop seal issue Inherent inhomog. boron dilution Superheat in lower compartment Nonunifrom ice sublimation Skyshine PRISE Turbine hall fire External inhomog. boron dilution Internal flood Explanation of colours in penetration of physical barriers: Caused by initiating event 4 Direct threat Potential threat CONCLUSIONS Internal hazards can be a serious threat to nuclear safety as they can penetrate more than one functional level and physical barriers of the defence-in-depth concept. Their resolution requires good understanding of various disciplines, application of multiphysics methods and integration of deterministic and probabilistic analyses. Many of the identified internal hazards and particularly their resolution are related to plant-specific features and necessitate a plant-specific assessment. 1015.8 REFERENCES [1] H. Tuomisto, T.G. Theofanous: "A consistent approach to severe accident management", Nuclear Engineering and Design 148 (1994) 171-183 [2] P. Lundström, O. Kymäläinen, H. Tuomisto, "Implementation of Severe Accident Management strategy at the Loviisa NPP", OECD Workshop on the Implementation of Severe Accident Management Measures, Villigen, Switzerland, 10-12 September 2001 [3] H. Tuomisto, "Specific mitigative features of the Loviisa ice condenser containments", Int. Conf. on Nuclear Containment, Cambridge, UK, 23-25 September 1996 [4] M. Komsi, R. Ahlstrand, T. Larm, B. Mohsen, A. Neuvonen, H. Tuomisto, U. Vuorio: "The probabilistic PTS study of the Loviisa Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel", Int. Topical Conf. on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Risk Management PSA'87, Zürich, Switzerland, 30.8.-49.1987, Vol.III, pp. 823-828 [5] H. Tuomisto, P. Rajamäki: "Experience from overcooling transient selection, thermal hydraulic analyses and structural calculations in the Loviisa assessments", Topical Mtg on WWER-440/230 Reactor Pressure Vessel Pressurized Thermal Shock Analysis, Pieštany, Slovak Republic, May 22-26, 1995 [6] J. Kohopää, H. Jokineva, ”Loviisa 1 successfully annealed”, Nuclear Engineering International, November 1996, pp. 18-19 [7] T. Hyrsky: “Sump strainers at Loviisa plant”, Proc. OECD/NEA Workshop on the Barsebäck Strainer Incident, Stockholm, Sweden, 25-27 January 1994. [8] S. Tarkiainen, O. Hongisto, T. Hyrsky, H. Kantee, I. Paavola: " Safety impact of the insulation fibers penetrating sump strainers and accumulating in Loviisa VVER-440 fuel bundles", Proc. 7th Int. Scientific and Tech. Conf. 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