Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za XXI vek

Transcription

Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija
budućnosti za XXI vek
Zbornik tekstova
transconflict
FORUM ZA ETNIČKE ODNOSE
FORUM FOR ETHNIC RELATIONS
Beograd, 2011.
“Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za XXI vek”
Izdavači:
TransConflict Serbia
Forum za etničke odnose
Klub 21
Urednici:
Mirjana Kosić
Milan Karagaća
Prevod:
Mirjana Kosić
Lektorisanje i korektura:
Ian Bancroft
Vladimir Ninković
Grafički dizajn i prelom:
Digital Art Company
Dizajn i štampa:
Digital Art Company
Tiraž:
500
ISBN 978-86-914589-0-4
Sadržaj
Uvodne napomene
Predgovor
Mirjana Kosić ............................................................................................
7
Uvod
Milan Karagaća .........................................................................................
9
Nova Srbija, novi NATO – vizija budućnosti za XXI vek
Nj. E. Hana Hubačkova
Nova Srbija, novi NATO – Vizija budućnosti za 21. vek ........................
11
Ambasador Lawrence Rossin
Nova Srbija, novi NATO – Vizija budućnosti za 21. vek ........................
15
Julian Harston
Novi Strateški koncept NATO-a i sistem globalne bezbednosti .................
25
Matthew Rhodes
Novi Strateški koncept NATO-a: Kontekst i značaj .................................
35
Aleksandar Fatić
Strateška dilema Srbije - Između NATO-a i Rusije .................................
39
Jasminka Simić
Misija NATO-a i Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni
identitet (ESDI): komplementarnost ili takmičenje? ................................
49
Filip Ejdus
Republika Srbija i Zajednička beznednosna i odbrambena politika .......
67
Mladen Nakić
NATO nakonLisabona: Zapadni Balkan u Alijanci do 2020. godine .....
83
Sanda Vučić
Iskustvo Crne Gore na putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama ................
Nano Ružin
Zapadni Balkan nakon NATO samita u Lisbonu 2010
i usvajanja novog Strateškog koncepta .....................................................
93
99
Armin Kržalić
Bosna i Hercegovina i NATO – Značaj novog Strateškog koncepta ........ 113
Miloš Šolaja
Bosna i Hercegovina i novi Strateški koncept NATO-a ................................ 127
Arshim Çela
Uticaj novog Strateškog koncepta i Evropske
bezbednosne i odbrambene politike na
“Bezbednosnu arhitekturu jugoistočne Evrope” ....................................... 139
Milan Karagaća
Budući bezbednosni koncept Srbije ..........................................................
147
Mihajlo Basara
Novi NATO i nova Srbija: Šta sa neutralnošću? ...................................... 159
Predrag Simić
Evroatlantizam i stvaranje “Bezbednosne zajednice” na Balkanu .......... 171
Table of Contents
Introductory Remarks
Foreword
Mirjana Kosić ............................................................................................ 187
Introduction
Milan Karagaća ......................................................................................... 191
New Serbia, New NATO: Future Vision for the 21st Century
Hana Hubáčková
Contribution to the conference „New Serbia, new NATO –
Future Vision for the 21st Century“ .......................................................... 193
Lawrence Rossin
New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st Century ................ 197
Julian Harston
NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the System of Global Security .......... 207
Matthew Rhodes
NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Context and Significance ...................... 217
Aleksandar Fatić
Serbia’s Strategic Dilemma - Between NATO and Russia ........................ 221
Jasminka Simić
The mission of NATO and European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI): complementarity or competition? .................................. 231
Filip Ejdus
The Republic of Serbia and the Common
Security and Defence Policy ...................................................................... 249
Mladen Nakić
NATO after Lisbon: The Western Balkans in the Alliance by 2020 ............. 267
Sanda Vučić
Experience of Montenegro on its path to Euro-Atlantic Integrations ...... 279
Nano Ružin
The Western Balkans after NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010
and adoption of a new Strategic Concept ................................................. 285
Armin Kržalić
Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO - the importance
of the new Strategic Concept ........................ ....................... ....................... 301
Miloš Šolaja
Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s new Strategic Concept ................. 317
Arshim Çela
The Impact Of the new Strategic Concept and the European
Security and Defence Policy on the
“Security architecture of South East-Europe” ........................................... 331
Milan Karagaća
The Future Security Concept of Serbia ..................................................... 339
Mihajlo Basara
New NATO and New Serbia: What to do with neutrality? ..................... 353
Predrag Simić
Euroatlanticism and Creation of
“Security Community” in the Balkans ...................................................... 367
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Predgovor
2010. je bila godina obeležena ponovnim definisanjem i daljim razvijanjem
uloge, svrhe i misije NATO-a u svetlu savremenih i budućih bezbednosnih
pretnji i izazova. Po prvi put u svojoj istoriji, Alijansa je učinila taj proces otvorenim i sveobuhvatnim ne samo kroz angažovanje vlada država članica NATO-a, već - što je gotovo još važnije – kroz konsultacije sa i uključivanjem
različitih aktera širom sveta.
Naglašavajući važnost partnerstava i globalne saradnje, NATO je pokrenuo
novu fazu u međunarodnim odnosima, pri čemu su izbrisana mnoga neprijateljstva i nekadašnje podele, dok je istovremeno otvoren novi prostor za uspostavljanje odnosa na osnovu uzajamnog savetovanja i saradnje, koji prevazilaze postojeće okvire partnerstava. Ova odluka je posebno važna za Srbiju koja
- kao članica programa Partnerstvo za mir (PzM) - još uvek nije u potpunosti
istražila, niti iskoristila sve potencijale Partnerstva za mir, ali koji bi mogli ponuditi obilje pogodnosti, posebno za odnedavno profesionalizovane oružane
snage Srbije.
Iako se novi Strateški koncept Alijanse nije fokusirao posebno na zapadni Balkan, zemlje ovog regiona koje trenutno teže ka punopravnom članstvu
(Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija i Crna Gora), dočekale su najavu Alijanse o
nastavljanju politike “otvorenih vrata” kao značajnu poruku i znak ohrabrenja.
Dok kolektivna odbrana ostaje suštinski razlog postojanja NATO-a, novi
Strateški koncept stavlja naglasak na član 4 Vašingtonskog ugovora, koji definiše Alijansu “kao jedinstven i suštinski transatlantski forum za konsultacije
o svim pitanjima koja se tiču teritorijalnog integriteta, političke nezavisnosti i
bezbednosti svojih članova”, čime je organizacija napravila određeni pomak ka
svojoj političkoj dimenziji i nadležnostima.
Svi ovi i mnogi drugi zaključci su analizirani i diskutovani na konferenciji
“Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za 21. vek”, koja je održana 3.-4.
decembra 2010. Usledivši svega dve nedelje nakon NATO Samita u Lisabonu,
ova konferenciji je poslužila kao platforma za kritičko vrednovanje novog Strateškog koncepta NATO-a usvojenog nedugo pre toga, i otvorenu diskusiju o
budućim kretanjima u oblasti bezbednosti – kako onima sa kojima se suočava
NATO, tako i iz perspektive Srbije.
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Međutim, šest meseci nakon konferencije, mnogo toga se dogodilo na svetskoj sceni što je na izvestan način testiralo neke od odredbi Koncepta, kao i
spremnost Alijanse da odgovori na nove krize i izvore bezbednosnih pretnji.
Talas nezadovoljstva i pobune koje su potresle afrički kontinent imali su domino efekat, što je kulminiralo građanskim ratom u Libiji. Odluka NATO-a da se
uključi u sukob Libiji nije olako, niti brzo donesena. Iako se ovog puta NATO
odlučio na intervenciju tek nakon poziva za pomoć od strane američkog predsednika - kada je Alijansa preuzela jedinstvenu komandu nad međunarodnim
vazdušnim operacijama nad Libijom, u skladu sa Rezolucijama 1970 i 1973
Saveta bezbednosti UN – ovu intervenciju nisu u potpunosti podržale sve zemlje saveznice. Turska je izrazila ozbiljne primedbe na angažovanje NATO-a u
Libiji, dok je Nemačka odlučila da ne učestvuje u vojnoj operaciji koja, kako
je navedeno, “nema nikakve veze sa odbranom Evrope”.
Iako je takav scenarij bilo teško predvideti pre šest meseci, učesnici u našoj
konferenciji u decembru su ispravno procenili regionalne i globalne političke
tokove, i stavili naglasak na određene izazove i slabosti na koje nije pronađen
odgovor. Dok je libijska kriza trenutno veliki test za jedinstvo Alijanse, posebno
u pogledu njene buduće svrhe i uloge u globalnoj bezbednosnoj areni, kao i
njene političke ekspeditivnosti i moći, nadamo se da će ovaj zbornik tekstova
svojim čitaocima obezbediti uvid u specifičnosti savremene bezbednosne arhitekture, ali i poslužiti kao polazna tačka za dalju analizu i proširivanje diskusije.
Inače, konferencija je omogućena zahvaljujući podršci Ambasade Češke
Republike u Beogradu i Balkanskog fonda za demokratiju, dok se njen ukupan
uspeh mora pripisati isključivo našim izuzetnim gostima. Govori i diskusije
predstavljeni na konferenciji skupljeni su u ovom zborniku, koji je ugledao
svetlost dana zahvaljujući velikodušnoj podršci Fonda za otvoreno društvo;
Fond je s pravom procenio važnost i blagovremenost ovakve diskusije u Srbiji,
te im ovom prilikom izražavamo najdublju zahvalnost.
Nadamo se da će ovaj zbornik tekstova biti primljen sa velikim interesovanjem, ne samo od strane organizacija civilnog društva, akademske i šire javnosti u Srbiji, već i da će naći čitaoce u čitavom regionu i šire.
Sve greške ostaju naša odgovornost i za njih se najiskrenije izvinjavamo autorima.
Mirjana Kosić
Izvršni direktor, TransConflict Serbia
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Uvod
NATO se nalazi u stalnom procesu transformacije, a ključne determinante
tih promena su da je hladni rat odavno završen, vreme unipolarnosti je takođe prošlo, dok je svet danas suočen sa globalnim bezbednosnim izazovima i
rizicima.
Krajnji ishod i model tog procesa još uvek su otvoreni, što je potvrđeno
Deklaracijom i novim Strateškim konceptom usvojenim na samitu u Lisabonu
u novembru 2010. godine. Dosta je verovatno da će se Alijansa od kolektivnog
vojnog saveza pod američkim vođstvom, transformisati u globalnu bezbednosno-političku organizaciju koja bi imala konstruktivan odnos sa susedima, naročito Rusijom, koja bi dugoročno mogla i da pristupi ovoj zajednici. Primarne
vojne funkcije bi se sastojale u omogućavanju formiranja ad-hoc koalicija, te bi
takva OEBS-izacija bila bi kompatibilna sa Ujedinjenim nacijama jer bi NATO
uvažavao odluke Saveta Bezbednosi Ujedinjenih nacija u očuvanju mira.
U kom pravcu će se ova transformacija odvijati zavisi od toga u kojoj meri
će jačati unilateralne tendencije američke politike, koliko će evropski uticaj u
Sjedinjenim Državama dalje opadati i konačno, od budućnosti Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike i rešenosti Evrope da snažnije istakne svoju
samosvojnost.
Nije ni sasvim isključeno da će akronim NATO-a (Not Activity Talking
Only, kako je često prevođeno tokom 90-ih prošlog veka), u budućnosti da
dobije novi smisao u četiri S: Sada Skoro Sasvim Staromodan (Now Almost
Totally Obsolete), posebno ukoliko se zaista realizuje transformacija Alijanse
od kolektivnog vojnog saveza ka otvorenoj bezbednosnoj zajednici sa sasvim
drugačijim unutrašnjim odnosima i strukturom.
Na samitu u Lisabonu je promovisana namera da NATO bude fleksibilan,
efikasan i isplativ instrument u službi mira. U tom svetlu treba posmatrati i angažovanje NATO-a u Libiji, povlačenje Sjedinjenih Država iz vojnih operacija
i prepuštanje težišnih aktivnosti Evropskoj Uniji. Vreme će pokazati koliko su
namere Sjedinjenih Država iskrene, a koliko test za Evropsku Uniju, te u kojoj
meri su u skladu sa tačkom 2. Deklaracije samita u Lisabonu, kojom se generalnom sekretaru NATO-a nalaže da tesno sarađuje sa visokim predstavnikom
za spoljnu politiku Evropske Unije upravo s ciljem što efikasnijeg delovanja u
sprečavanju kriza.
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S druge strane, dinamika eskalacije događanja u arapskom svetu i relativno
lako donete odluke o borbenom angažovanju NATO-a bacaju novo svetlo ne
samo na nove bezbednosne rizike i izazove, već i odnose na relacijama UNNATO-EU, kao i na odnose sa Rusijom, Kinom, Indijom i drugim globalnim
i regionalnim činiocima.
Srbija je izložena svim globalnim, regionalnim i specifičnim rizicima i izazovima koji su nepredvidivi i ne poštuju nikakve granice, te u tim okvirima
mora da razmišlja o svojoj bezbednosti.
Bez obzira na aktuelnu vojnu neutralnost, postoji mnogo razloga zbog kojih Srbija mora da razmišlja o najoptimalnijem konceptu bezbednosti za budućnost, uključujući i novi sadržaj partnerstava, bezbednosnu konfiguraciju
u regionu i projekcije trendova. Svakako je potrebno imati u vidu da je Srbija
članica programa Partnerstvo za mir; potpisala je i Sporazum o stabilizaciji i
pridruživanju, u procesu je dobijanja kadidature, a teži ka punopravnom članstvu u EU, što podrazumeva i potpuno uvažavanje Evropske bezbednosne i
odbrambene politike i potpisivanje odgovarajućeg bezbednosnog sporazuma
sa EU.
U tom smislu, cilj konferencije je bio da se analizom različitih aspekata i
sa što više relevantnih činjenica, barem preliminarno, formulišu osnovni elementi vizije koncepta bezbednosti Srbije u savremenom svetu.
Nadamo se da smo u tome uspeli i da ova publikacija to potvrđuje.
Milan Karagaća
Pukovnik u penziji, nezavisni politički analitičar
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Izlaganje Nj.E. Hane Hubáčkove na koferenciji
“Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za 21. vek”1
Mirno i stabilno okruženje u evroatlantskoj regiji danas nije nešto što se sme
uzeti zdravo za gotovo - ono je rezultat izvesnog broja ključnih odluka donesenih od završetka hladnog rata do danas. Kolektivna odbrana i dalje predstavlja
suštinu postojanja NATO-a. Ona podrazumeva ne samo potrebu za efikasnim,
fleksibilnim i razmestivim vojnim kapacitetima, već i pripremljenost Alijanse za
suočavanje sa novim bezbednosnim izazovima. Terorizam, oružje za masovno
uništenje, sajber-napadi ili prekidi vitalnih isporuka energije nisu potpuno nove
pretnje; međutim, ono što jeste novo su njihova snaga, učestalost i obim potencijalne štete koju mogu naneti našim društvima. Strateški koncept potvrđuje da
izvor direktnih pretnji za evro-atlantske teritorije može da bude i u veoma udaljenim oblastima.Lekcije iz Avganistana ukazuju da za mirovne, kao i operacije
stabilizacije, nisu dovoljne samo vojne sposobnosti, već da iste moraju biti propraćene ne-vojnim sredstvima kako bi se osigurali dugoročni razvoj i stabilizacija. Stoga će NATO morati da izgradi minimum sopstvenih civilnih kapaciteta
kako bi bio u stanju da uzajamno deluje i sarađuje sa nizom aktera, bilo da su u
pitanju države, druge međunarodne organizacije, kao što su UN ili EU, ili nevladine organizacije koje upravljaju složenim krizama.
1 Nj.E. Hana Hubáčková je Ambasador Češke Republike u Srbiji
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Najpre, dozvolite mi da u nekoliko reči izrazim zahvalnost organizatorima
ove konferencije – organizaciji TransConflict Serbia - za preuzimanje inicijative
i omogućavanje ove konferencije. Ovo je još jedan značajan doprinos nevladine
organizacije sve većoj zainteresovanosti javnosti za najnovija dešavanja po pitanjima bezbednosti i odbrane, i upoznavanju sa politikama formulisanima od
strane glavnih međunarodnih aktera i organizacija u sitacijama kada se suočavaju sa tradicionalnim, ali i sa novim bezbednosnim rizicima i izazovima.
Naše je veliko zadovoljstvo što smo podržali ovu inicijativu ne samo kao
NATO kontakt ambasada u Srbiji, već prvenstveno zbog toga što okuplja širok
spektar učesnika i pruža priliku za raspravu o važnim pitanjima koja su podjednako relevantna za Srbiju, kao i za njene partnere.
Osvrćući se na samit NATO-a u Lisabonu koji je održan pre dve nedelje2,
važno je imati na umu da mirno i stabilno okruženje u evro-atlantskoj regiji
danas nije nešto što se može ili čak sme uzeti zdravo za gotovo. Ono je rezultat izvesnog broja ključnih odluka naših država, počevši od završetka hladnog
rata naovamo.
Moje zemlja je mogla realno početi da učestvuje u donošenju tih odluka
tek kada smo se ostvarili kao nezavisna i suverena država, nakon decenija komunizma koji je gušio sposobnost zemlje da se samostalno uključi u tokove
međunarodne politike.
Kolektivna odbrana i dalje predstavlja suštinu postojanja NATO-a. Ona podrazumeva ne samo potrebu za efikasnim, fleksibilnim i razmestivim vojnim
kapacitetima, već uključuje i buduću teritorijalnu protivraketnu odbranu.
Takođe, NATO mora biti bolje pripremljen za suočavanje sa novim bezbednosnim izazovima. Terorizam, oružje za masovno uništenje, sajber-napadi ili
prekidi vitalnih isporuka energije nisu potpuno nove pretnje; međutim, ono
što jeste novo su njihova snaga, učestalost i obim potencijalne štete koju mogu
naneti našim društvima.
Strateški koncept potvrđuje da izvor direktnih pretnji za evro-atlantske teritorije može da bude i u veoma udaljenim oblastima. Prema tome, NATO će
nejverovatnije biti više angažovan u udaljenim operacijama za koje će morati
2 Konferencija je održana 3.-4. decembra 2010. godine (prim. prev.)
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da bude dobro pripremljen. Lekcije naučene u Avganistanu, gde Češka Republika doprinosi sa više od 600 svojih vojnika i obezbeđuje jedan od Pokrajinskih timova za rekonstrukciju (Provincial Reconstruction Team) u pokrajini
Loghar, ukazuju da za mirovne, kao i operacije stabilizacije, nisu dovoljne samo
vojne sposobnosti. Vojne sposobnosti moraju da budu propraćene ne-vojnim
sredstvima kako bi se osigurali dugoročni razvoj i stabilizacija. Iako NATO
neće biti prva opcija za obavljanje razvojnih zadataka, moraće da izgradi minimum sopstvenih civilnih kapaciteta kako bi bio u stanju da uzajamno deluje
i sarađuje sa nizom aktera, bilo da su u pitanju države, druge međunarodne
organizacije, kao što su Ujedinjene nacije ili Evropska Unija, ili nevladine organizacije koje su često uključene u upravljanje složenim krizama.
Poslednje, ali ne i manje važno, strateški koncept daje odgovarajući značaj
partnerstvima NATO-a sa zemljama koje nisu članice. Mnoge zemlje širom
sveta dele isti interes i aktivnosti sa NATO-om u očuvanju međunarodnog
mira i stabilnosti. Značajan broj njih daje i najveći doprinos nekim od operacija pod vođstvom NATO-a, kao što je ISAF. Strateški koncept stoga predviđa
šire i fleksibilnije mogućnosti za partnere u njihovom angažovanju sa NATOom, te predviđa i njihovo učešće u oblikovanju odluka ove organizacije. Razvijanje konkretnih mehanizama u tom pravcu je zadatak koji će biti kritički
razmatran i odobren tokom nastupajućih ministarskih samita.
U tom kontekstu, partnerstvo sa Rusijom ima nezamenljivu ulogu. Rusiju i
NATO povezuje veliki broj zajedničkih interesa. Savet NATO-Rusija, na kojem
je učestvovao predsednik Medevedev, se tokom samita u Lisabonu osvrnuo na
niz mogućnosti za političke konsultacije i praktičnu saradnju. Postoji zajednički osećaj da je Savet NATO-Rusija potencijal koji još uvek nije u potpunosti
iskorišćen. Mi se nadamo da značajna očekivanja koja su probuđena ovim samitom neće biti izneverena.
U svojoj celosti, novi strateški koncept predstavlja veliki podstrek za dalju transformaciju NATO-a u moderniji, efikasniji i sposobniji savez, koje će
morati da nastavi delovati pod mnogo strožijim budžetskim propisima nego
ikada pre.
Mnogo posla je sada pred saveznicima da pretoče ove strateške smernice u
konkretne korake i razviju mnoge oblasti u saradnji sa partnerskim zemljama.
Ambasador Rossin je juče dao pregled onoga što nas očekuje u narednom periodu i u kojim vremenskim rokovima.
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Srbija će za nas biti važan partner u sprovođenju zadataka koje su nam dodelili šefovi naših vlada u Lisabonu. Novo-uspostavljena misija Srbije u sedištu
NATO-a postepeno dobija formu kroz nekoliko zaposlenih koji su već prisutni
tamo. Uz puno funkcionisanje misije, Srbija će steći sposobnost da zajedno sa
44 partnera učestvuje u svim razmatranjima u okviru programa Partnerstvo za
mir koja su relevantna za nju, kao i da otpočne sa iskorištavanjem mogućnosti
koje ovaj program pruža. Praktična saradnja je već razvila korene, ali u osnovi
još mnogo više toga se nudi. Na osnovu odluke u Lisabonu, dalji razvoj partnerstava u fleksibilniji i fokusiraniji aranžman je prioritet koji će kao takav biti
od veće koristi i partnerima, kao i NATO-u. Na Srbiji je da odluči dubinu, intenzitet i suštinu svojih partnerskih odnosa sa NATO-om. I samo Srbija može
da se ograniči, kao što je to slučaj i sa svim ostalim partnerima.
Da zaključimo, dozvolite mi da naglasim svoje uverenje da su dobre odluke
zasnovane na čvrstom znanju.
To me vodi natrag do organizatora ove konferencije koji rade upravo ono
što je potrebno – stvaraju mogućnosti za razumevanje dinamike i razvoja u
jednoj veoma važnoj oblasti. Želela bih da im se još jednom zahvalim.
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Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za 21. vek
Ambasador Lawrence Rossin3
U svom današnjem izlaganju, uglavnom ću se baviti sa tri sledeća pitanja:
• prvo, najznačajniji zaključci samita NATO-a, održanog u Lisabonu pre
dve nedelje;
• potom, razvijanje i – ukoliko to Srbija bude želela – moguće unapređenje odnosa sa NATO-om;
• i konačno, angažman NATO-a na Kosovu kroz delovanje KFOR-a.
Samit u Lisabonu i novi strateški koncept NATO-a
Za početak, samit u Lisabonu i novi strateški koncept NATO-a, te naglasak
na izgradnji niza globalnih partnerstava.
Nije preterano reći - kao što je naš generalni sekretar Rasmussen izjavio na
samom kraju samita - da je Lisabonski samit od istorijskog značaja za NATO.
Značajan broj odluka je donet tokom niza sastanaka u kojima su učestvovale
prvenstveno same zemlje saveznice; potom saveznice i partneri angažovani u
Avganistanu, uključujući Predsednika Karzaija, generalnog sekretara UN-a
Ban Ki-Muna i lidere Evropske unije, te na samom kraju, lidere NATO-a zajedno sa ruskim Predsednikom Medvedevim putem Saveta NATO-Rusija.
Zaokruživši svoja ukupna razmišljanja, šefovi država i vlada NATO-a su
usvojili novi strateški koncept Alijanse, zamenivši njime Koncept koji je usvojen u Vašingtonu 1999. godine. Kao što naglašavaju konkretne odluke lidera
NATO-a na samitu, ovaj strateški koncept predstavlja dokument koji je veoma okrenut ka budućnosti i kojim će se rukovoditi delovanje NATO-a. U
današnjoj Evropi, čak i regionalni oružani sukob je malo verovatan. Umesto
toga, uglavnom se suočavamo sa transnacionalnim pretnjama. Međunarodni
terorizam, sajber-napadi i širenje oružja za masovno uništenje su izazovi koji
3 Ambasador Rossin je Zamenik pomoćnika generalnog sekretara NATO-a za operacije
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ne poštuju nikakve granice i čije posledice mogu biti globalne u svom obimu.
Novi strateški koncept stavlja NATO u poziciju da se pozabavi ovim pitanjima,
oslanjajući se istovremeno na naše civilne, kao i vojne snage.
Novi strateški koncept određuje tri glavna prioriteta za aktivnosti NATO-a
tokom narednih godina:
•
Prvo - da budemo efikasniji ulaganjem u moderne sposobnosti koje
zadovoljavaju savremene potrebe. Dok je fokus NATO-a i dalje na osnovnim tradicionalnim vojnim sredstvima, istovremeno se preusmeravamo ka borbi protiv izazova kao što su terorizam, sajber-napadi i ostali
budući bezbednosni izazovi. To, takođe, podrazumeva veći angažman
na sveobuhvatnom pristupu dopunjavanjem vojnih instrumenata civilnim naporima, što me dovodi do drugog prioriteta, a to je • Osiguravanje aktivnijeg i dubljeg angažmana šire u svetu. Izazovi sa kojima se NATO suočava ne ugrožavaju samo interese NATO-a. Alijansa
je već uspostavila važna partnerstva sa državama koje nisu članice NATO-a i međunarodnim organizacijama. Širok spekar zemalja koje nisu
članice NATO-a podržavaju operacije NATO-a na Kosovu, u Iraku i
Avganistanu, dok su sve naše aktivnosti koordinisane sa multinacionalnim naporima u borbi protiv piratstva kod Roga Afrike. I mi sledimo
naše struktuirane mehanizme partnerstava - Partnerstva za mir i Evroatlantskog partnerskog saveta, u kojima učestvuje i Srbija, kao i strukture sa državama Mediterana i Persijskog zaliva. Novi strateški koncept
daje još veći značaj NATO partnerstvima, što podrazumeva i intenzivniji angažman sa Rusijom. Predsednik Medvedev i njegove kolege iz
NATO-a su u Lisabonu obavili konstruktivne razgovore o Avganistanu i zajedničkim bezbednosnim pretnjama, kao i saradnji u rešavanju
istih. Ovaj akcenat na nova partnerstva bi mogao imati pozitivan efekat
na naše odnose sa partnerima kao što je Srbija.
• Treće, strateški koncept nam daje zadatak da unapredimo svoje strukture kako bi bile sposobnije da brzo, efikasno i ekonomično odgovore
na pretnje.
Novi strateški koncept je osmišljen tako da formuliše aktivnosti NATO-a za
celi niz godina. Već u Lisabonu, naši lideri su doneli nekoliko sledećih odluka
kako bi se pokrenuli napori unutar tog okvira:
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1. Proširiti, kao osnovni element kolektivne odbrane NATO-a, naš trenutni
aktivni slojeviti sistem balističkih raketa za odbranu. On je trenutno dizajniran tako da štiti raspoređene snage NATO-a; no, sada će biti unapređen kako bi zaštitio evropsku populaciju i teritorije u sastavu NATO-a.
2. Razviti do kraja marta 2011. godine političke smernice za nastavak
transformacije odbrambenih sposobnosti i snaga NATO-a i otpočeti
vojnu primenu novog strateškog koncepta.
3. Razviti do juna 2011. godine temeljnu politiku sajber-odbrane za
NATO, i Akcioni plan za njeno sprovođenje.
4. Ojačati Sveobuhvatni pristup Akcionog plana NATO-a do aprila 2011.
godine, kako bi NATO bio u mogućnosti da bliže sarađuje sa partnerima koji mogu da deluju sa svojim civilnim snagama u složenim konfliktnim situacijama, kao i da bi stvorio sopstvene civilne snage za stabilizaciju i rekonstrukciju. To je, pre svega, plod iskustva iz Avganistana,
gde je samo vojna pobeda nemoguća.
5. I po pitanju Avganistana, naši lideri i lideri naših partnera u ISAF-u4 su
odlučili, zajedno sa predsednikom Karzaijem, da otpočnu sa tranzicijom ISAF-a ka snagama pod avganistanskom odgovornošću početkom
2011. godine, uz dogovoreni cilj da tranzicija bude realizovana širom
zemlje do kraja 2014. godine, kao i da stupe u Trajno partnerstvo, čak i
posle završetka borbenih operacija ISAF-a.
Konačno, nešto više o partnerstvima, što možda i jeste deo lisabonskih odluka koji je neposredno najrelevantniji za Srbiju i za ovu konferenciju. NATO
partnerstva obuhvataju evro-atlantsku, ali i širu međunarodnu bezbednost i
stabilnost, i jačaju zajedničke vrednosti. Partnerstva daju okvir za politički,
bezbednosni i odbrambeni dijalog i regionalnu saradnju i od suštinskog su
značaja za uspeh operacija NATO-a. Partnerstva nam omogućavaju uzajamnu
razmenu stručnosti, davanje podršku širim reformama, pružanje pomoći partnerima u razvoju njihovih sposobnosti i pripremanje zainteresovanih nacija
za njihovo članstvo u NATO-u. Osim toga, partnerstva imaju obostranu vrednost u zajedničkom rešavanju već pomenutih transnacionalnih izazova.
Zbog toga je u Lisabonu dogovoreno da se osnaži rad Partnerstva za mir
(PzM) i Evro-atlantskog partnerskog saveta (EAPC) - u kojima je Srbija aktivna članica - kao osnovnog okvira za značajan politički dijalog i praktičnu
4 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force (Međunarodne snage za bezbednosnu pomoć)
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saradnju. PzM, EAPC i drugi partnerski formati NATO-a su već dosta evoluirali, ali je dogovoreno da će partnerstva, kao i sam NATO, imati koristi od fokusiranog napora za reformom. Identifikovano je nekoliko specifičnih oblasti
za takve reforme i o njima će se, tokom priprema za aprilski sastanak ministara
spoljnih poslova NATO-a u Berlinu, razgovarati interno, ali i sa partnerima.
Zapadni Balkan i NATO, Partnerstvo Srbija - NATO
Sada ću se, upravo u tom kontekstu jačanja partnerstava NATO-a, osvrnuti
na region zapadnog Balkana, i posebno na Srbiju.
Stabilnost i sigurnost na zapadnom Balkanu su od ključnog značaja za evroatlantsku bezbednost. Većina nacija u regionu su se već pridružile NATO-u, ili
su izrazile želju da to učine:
•
•
•
•
•
Albanija, Hrvatska i Slovenija su članice NATO-a;
Bivša Jugoslovenska Republika Makedonija će postati članica čim bude
rešen takozvani “problem imena”;
Crna Gora je u Akcionom planu za članstvo (MAP) i aktivno ga sprovodi;
Bosna i Hercegovina je takođe je u okviru Akcionog plana za članstvo
(MAP), čije sprovođenje će početi čim sva nepokretna imovina koja
priprada sektoru odbrane, a koja ja identifikovana kao neophodna za
buduće odbrambene svrhe, bude zvanično registrovana kao državna
imovina Bosne i Hercegovine, koja će se koristiti za potrebe Ministarstva odbrane ove zemlje;
I Srbija je članica Partnerstva za mir.
NATO želi da ostvari plodne odnose sa svim zemljama u regionu. Vrata za
članstvo ostaju otvorena za sve one koji se pridržavaju zajedničkih vrednosti
i posebnih uslova za članstvo u NATO-u, ali je prvenstveno do svake zemlje
pojedinačno da odredi kakvi će biti njeni odnosi sa NATO-om.
U konkretnom slučaju Srbije, NATO nastoji da produbi bilateralne odnose.
Srbija i NATO su u poslednjih nekoliko godina unapredili nivo saradnje po
pitanjima kao što su reforma odbrane i planiranje za vanredne situacije, i veru-
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jemo da postoji još mnogo toga što bismo mogli učiniti u našim bilateralnim
odnosima, a od čega bismo imali uzajamnu korist.
U praktičnom smislu, saradnja NATO-a i Srbije kroz program Partnerstvo
za mir je uglavnom fokusirana na jačanje vojne interoperabilnosti Vojske Srbije
sa državama članicama NATO-a, kako bi mogla da učestvuje u međunarodnim
operacijama podrške miru. Ta saradnja može omogućiti Srbiji da svojim snagama doprinese operacijama pod vođstvom NATO-a. Ona podjednako unapređuje sposobnost Srbije da doprinese i međunarodnim mirovnim operacijama
koje predvode Ujedinjene nacije ili Evropska unija. Naravno, NATO pozdravlja
angažman srpskih snaga u mirovnim operacijama u bilo kom okviru.
Srbija i NATO su se u aprilu 2009. godine usaglasili oko prvog seta od 19
Partnerskih ciljeva. U maju 2010. godine, taj set ciljeva je znatno proširen.
NATO i Srbija su osnovali Grupu za reformu odbrane NATO-Srbija kako bi
podržali reformu sistema odbrane i pomogli u sprovođenju Partnerskih ciljeva. Grupa za reformu odbrane je sačinjena od šest sektorskih radnih grupa, a plenarnim sastancima, koji se održavaju svaka četiri meseca, zajednički
predsedavaju Srbija i NATO. Inače, poslednji Plenarni sastanak je održan pre
mesec dana ovde u Beogradu5.
Mi u NATO-u smo zadovoljni uspostavljanjem diplomatske misije Srbije
pri NATO-u 2010. godine, na čijem je čelu moj prijatelj, ambasador Branko
Milinković. Bilo nam je drago kada su u septembru predstavnici oružanih snaga Srbije dopunili diplomatsku misiju.
Sve ovo je dosta dobro, i mi bismo mogli predložiti još mnogo toga, no, kao
što su lideri NATO-a ponovili više puta - odluka je Srbije da podesi tempo
razvijanja ovog odnosa.
•
•
•
Ako Srbija odluči da njena budućnost leži u daljem produbljivanju partnerstva sa NATO-om, naći će spremnog partnera među naših 28 članica.
Ako ne želi da produbi partnerstvo, to će takođe biti prihvatljivo za
NATO, mada bismo bili razočarani gubitkom uzajamnih mogućnosti.
Ako Srbija odluči da možda želi članstvo u NATO-u, kao i njeni susedi,
naći će vrata Akcionog plana za članstvo otvorenima.
5 Početkom novembra 2010. godine (prim. prev.)
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•
Ako Srbija odluči da ne želi da uđe u NATO, to je takođe u redu, je se od
nikoga ne zahteva da postane članicom NATO-a, niti naši dobri odnosi
zavise od toga. NATO i nacije u njegovom sastavu imaju veoma blisku
i plodnu interakciju sa svim zemljama u Evropi koje iz bilo kog razloga
nisu pristupila NATO-u, Partnerstvu za mir, a pogotovo ne operacijama. Isto bi trebalo da bude slučaj sa Srbija izvan NATO-a, ukoliko to
bude pravac koji odaberete.
Ono što je važno za NATO je da u svakom trenutku - bez obzira u kojem
okviru - sa Srbijom održi snažan politički dijalog i dobru praktičnu saradnju s
ciljem rešavanje zajedničkih bezbednosnih izazova, koje će biti zasnovana na
međusobnom poštovanju.
Misija KFOR-a i njena evolucija
Što se tiče KFOR-a, vojni kontakti između NATO-a i Vojske Srbije su i dalje
besprekorni u kontekstu Zajedničke komisije za implementaciju. Dozvolite mi
stoga da se sada osvrnem na operaciju NATO-a na Kosovu.
Kao što znate, Rezolucijom 1244 u junu 1999. godine su uspostavljeni parametri za okončanje sukoba i međunarodni angažman na Kosovu. Savet bezbednosti je bio nadležan za razmeštanje međunarodnog bezbednosnog prisustva na Kosovu, dok je Severno-atlantski savet odlučio da će KFOR preuzeti
ulogu tog međunarodnog bezbednosnog prisustva. U toj ulozi KFOR deluje
od 1999. godine. Rezolucija 1244 definiše zadatke za međunarodno bezbednosno prisustvo u stavki 9 svog teksta. Mnogi od tih zadataka su završeni ili su
ih preduhitrili događaji na terenu. Osnovni zadaci koji su preostali KFOR-u su
održavanje sigurnog i bezbednog okruženja, sprovođenje dužnosti nadgledanja granica po potrebi, i obezbeđivanje zaštite i slobode kretanja svojoj misiji,
međunarodnom civilnom prisustvu, kao i drugim međunarodnim organizacijama.
Tokom jedanaest i po godina, KFOR je ispunio sve svoje zadatke, uz nekoliko pogrešnih koraka. U tom periodu, KFOR-u je pružen adekvatan doprinos
od strane NATO-a, kao i zemalja koje nisu članice NATO-a. Misija je redovno prilagođavana i njen broj je smanjivan kao odgovor na opšte poboljšanje
bezbednosnih uslova na samom Kosovu, kao i na nastanak drugih elemenata
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na Kosovu koji čine kontekst za aktivnosti KFOR-a. U ocenjivanju delovanja
KFOR-a, misija je konstantno dobijala visoke ocene od svih grupa stanovništva na samom Kosovu, kao i regionalnih aktera, uključujući i Srbiju.
Na misiju KFOR-a, koju je definisao Severno-atlantski savet u okviru parametara Rezolucije 1244, nisu uticala dramatična politička zbivanja tokom niza
godina, posebno od kraja 2006. godine. NATO je podržao napore Specijalnog
izaslanika UN-a, predsednika Ahtisaari-ja, a kasnije i napore pregovaračke
trojke sačinjene od predstavnika Evropske unije–Rusije-Sjedinjenih Država,
koja je nastojala da privede kraju napore predsednika Ahtisaari-ja. KFOR je
pomagao u očuvanju bezbednosti i stabilnosti na terenu, osiguravajući kontinuirani nastavak pregovora. Ova, nepristrasna uloga KFOR-a, nastavljena je
bez prekida i kada ja Trojka - nakon proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova - generalnom sekretaru UN-a prijavila svoju nesposobnost da posreduje u ostvarenje
sporazuma o statusu. Do današnjeg dana. KFOR nastavlja da obavlja tu nepristrasnu ulogu, i tako će i nastaviti.
Važno je shvatiti da su u sastavu NATO-a i države koje priznaju nezavisnost
Kosova, kao i one druge koje tu nezavisnost nisu priznale, ali da NATO kao
organizacija ne preuzima nikakav stav u vezi sa pravnim statusom Kosova.
Kao međuvladina organizacija, NATO ne priznaje države, niti ih ne priznaje,
to je isključivo pravo samih nacija. Kao što je naš prethodni generalni sekretar,
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, rekao: “NATO se ne bavi priznavanjima.” To znači da
NATO i KFOR nisu “statusno neutralni” – već samo nepristrasni u načinima
na koje KFOR obavlja svoje zadatke.
Na samitu u Bukureštu u aprilu 2008. godine, NATO se složio da će NATO
i KFOR, u okviru operativnih zadataka KFOR-a, nastaviti da rade sa svim akterima na Kosovu s ciljem pružanja podrške stabilnosti, demokratiji i multietničnosti. Pored toga, najavljeno je da je NATO spreman da odigra ulogu u
primeni budućih bezbednosnih aranžmana. U junu 2008. godine, NATO je
pristao da pomogne u dostojanstvenom raspuštanju Kosovskog zaštitnog korpusa i postavljanju na noge Kosovskih snaga bezbednosti i civilnih struktura
za nadzor istih. Prvi zadatak je završen. NATO i KFOR trenutno sprovode
drugi i treći zadatak u bliskoj koordinaciji i uz konsultacije sa relevantnim
domaćim i međunarodnim institucijama.
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Ovakva politika NATO-a ostaje na snazi, i doprinosi održavanju sigurnog i
bezbednog okruženja na Kosovu za sve narode koji žive tamo.
KFOR-ovo prisustvo odvraćanja
Nedavno, odnosno u junu 2009. godine, nacije u sastavu NATO-a su odlučile da će sprovesti postepeno prilagođavanje snaga KFOR-a do stadija koji se
naziva “odvraćajućim prisustvom”. To znači da će, kada to bude prikladno, u
skladu sa razvojem događaja i na postepen način, uz periodične procene Severno-atlantskog saveta, NATO tokom vremena smanjiti broj snaga KFOR-a s
ciljem obezbeđivanja manjih, fleksibilnijih snaga koje će i dalje biti u stanju da
u potpunosti obavljaju sve zadatke KFOR-a.
Prva faza u prilagođavanju KFOR-a, takozvana “Kapija 1”, je ostvarena u
januaru 2010. godine. KFOR je smanjen na svega nešto više od 10.000 vojnika.
Nakon višemesečnih procena situacije na Kosovu, Severno-atlantski savet
je u oktobru odobrio preporuku SACEUR-a6 za pokretanje takozvane “Kapije 2” u položaj odvraćanja. Ovaj potez, za čije sprovođenje je potrebno nešto
više od 4 meseca, značajno će konsolidovati geografsko razmeštanje KFOR-a,
fokusiraće se na oblasti u kojima povremeno dolazi do izbijanja bezbednosnih
problema ili gde su rizici evidentni.
Ovaj potez odražava pozitivnu procenu bezbednosne situacije na Kosovu
od strane NATO-a tokom kontiunuiranog vremenskog perioda, te pokazuje
sve veću sposobnost kosovske policije, uz podršku EULEKS-a i sa KFOR-om kao trećim pružaocem bezbednosti - da se nosi sa izazovima održavanja javne
bezbednosti i reda.
SACEUR, naš generalni sekretar i nacije u sastavu NATO-a su sa ogromnim oprezom prišli smanjenju snaga KFOR-a. Posvećenost Alijanse Kosovu i
održavanju sigurnog i bezbednog okruženja ostaju čvrsti.
6 Vrhovni komandant savezničkih snaga u Evropi
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Zaključak
Dozvolite mi da ovde završim.
Nastojao sam da vam kroz ova opažanja dam jezgrovit pregled istorijskih
odluka šefova država i vlada NATO-a na samitu Lisabonu. Te odluke su jedna
od tema ove konferencije, ali takođe mogu poslužiti i kao okvir za razmatranje
implikacija za dalji razvoj odnosa između NATO-a i Srbije unutar okvira Partnerstava na čijem unapređenju ćemo raditi posle Lisabonu.
Malo sam se zadržao na zadacima KFOR-a i evoluciji ove misije kako bih
preneo vesti o najnovijim dešavanjima, ali i da bih istakao značajnu stvar koja,
čini mi se, ovde ponekad nije sasvim jasna - a to je da uloga NATO-a na Kosovu služi stabilnosti i bezbednosti svih naroda na Kosovu, a samim tim i celog
regiona, nepristrasno i bez pozivanja na pravne ili političke razloge koji su izvan nadležnosti NATO-a. Dakle, operacija NATO-a na Kosovu ne bi smela da
bude prepreka za razvoj našeg partnerstva. U onoj meri u kojoj je neki navode
kao prepreku, možda postoji izvesno nerazumevanje onoga što KFOR i NATO-a rade ili ne rade na Kosovu, ili zbog čega.
Novi strateški koncept stavlja partnerstva u središte programa NATO-a u
narednim godinama. Alijansa će ove godine delovati u pravcu oblikovanja daljeg puta sa partnerima, i sarađivaće sa njima tokom tog procesa. Lisabon nam
je dao fleksibilnost da nadogradimo na ono što je već učinjeno kako bismo
stvorili partnerstvo koje će najbolje odgovarati potrebama Srbije, kao i našim
potrebama. Kao što sam rekao, mi vidimo značajan potencijal u produbljivanju odnosa sa Srbijom, pod uslovom da je to ono što Srbija, njena Vlada i
njen narod žele. Sa pozicije našeg generalnog sekretara Rasmussen-a i nacija
NATO-a, Srbija poseduje ogroman potencijal da doprinese stabilnosti i bezbednosti, ne samo na ovim prostorima, već u celoj evro-atlantskoj regiji, dok i
sa njihove strane postoji veliko interesovanje za izgradnju našeg partnerstva.
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Novi strateški koncept NATO-a i
sistem globalne bezbednosti
Julian Harston7
Živimo u kompleksnom i opasnom okruženju ispunjenom višestrukim pretnjama. Umesto međudržavnih izazova i pitanja, sada smo suočeni sa nedržavnim i asimetričnim pretnjama. U prva dva strateška dokumenta NATO-a
koja su izrađena nakon hladnog rata, pokušalo se odgovoriti na nove pretnje
okruženju koje u tom trenutku nije bilo ugroženo istinskim pretnjama, uz istovremeno zalaganje za dalje proširenje Alijanse. Dokumentom iz 1999. godine,
koji je napisan tokom vazdušne kampanje NATO-a na Balkanu, uspostavljen
je presedan za širenje operacija NATO-a koje prevazilaze definiciju puke samoodbrane, kako bi se obrazložile humanitarne intervencije i sprečavanje sukoba. To je sasvim sigurno bila značajna promena u odnosu na dokument iz
1991. godine, kada je misija glasila “Alijansa je čisto defanzivna u svojoj svrsi:
nijedno od njenih oružja neće nikada biti korišteno, osim u samoodbrani”.
Ono što je nesporno jeste da NATO neće nestati. Međutim, imajući u vidu
različite suštinske interese država članica, pitanje je koja značajna pretnja bi
mogla objediniti NATO-a u narednoj deceniji kako bi podstakla Alijansu da
se upusti u onu vrstu investicija i reformi koje novi strateški koncept predviđa.
7 Autor je bivši Pomoćnik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih nacija
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Na samom početku bih želeo staviti karte na sto. Kao diplomata koji je dvadeset i pet godina radio za Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo, bio sam plaćen da budem pobornik NATO-a, što sam i radio sa izvesnim entuzijazmom zbog bitnih elemenata uzajamne asistencije koji su sastavni deo tog posla. Pa ipak, ja sam oduvek
bio Gaullista8. Nikada nisam verovao da bi Sjedinjene Države dovele Njujork ili
Vašingtonu u opasnost zbog Londona ili Pariza ... i kakav god mogući scenario
da bih zamislio, Sjedinjene Države bi u najboljem slučaju imale svega nekoliko
dana, umesto uobičajenih dve do četiri godine, da donesu odluku.9
Ne tako davno, bio sam pomoćnik generalnog sekretara Ujedinjenih nacija i posmatrao agoniju zemalja osnivačica te organizacije, a koje su, takođe,
vodeće članice NATO-a, svaki put kada bi morale da donesu odluku da li da
obezbede dodatni legitimitet za operacije koje Savet bezbednosti u određenim
situacijama može odobriti, a kada da to ignorišu.
Tokom poslednjih 15 godina, veći deo sam bio u službi na Balkanu, i veliki
deo tog vremena sam proveo u Beogradu. Video sam kako je Srbija iz diktature prešla u demokratiju, kao i kako je postala metom NATO bombardovanja
tokom tog procesa. To je bila akcija koja je označila početak politike ekspanzije koja je NATO dovela tamo gde je danas - u Avganistan, i koja je pomerila
NATO daleko od principa samoodbrane do principa napada, iako je to zarad
opšteg dobra, ili se bar tako kaže.
U ovom tekstu bih najpre želeo da razmotrim neke pretnje globalnoj bezbednosti, da se osvrnem na novi strateški koncept NATO-a koji je usvojen u
Lisabonu u novembru 2010. godine, a potom da napravim određene procene
o tome da li taj koncept nudi odgovor na pretnje, te da završim sa nekoliko
reči na kraju o tome kako bi Srbija trebala da planira svoje mesto u budućoj
bezbednosnoj arhitekturi.
Osvrnimo se na pretnje po globalnu bezbednost.
Da li srljamo ka globalnim neredima? Koje će mesto u budućnosti imati
vojne alijanse i njihova politička moć?
8 Gaullism je francuska politička ideologija koja počiva na razmišljanju i delovanju vođe
Otpora, a tadašnjeg Predsednika Charles de Gaulle-a. Videti: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaullism (prim. prev.)
9 Opaska na Drugi svetski rat. (prim. prev.)
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Živimo u kompleksnom i opasnom okruženju ispunjenom višestrukim
pretnjama, koje analitičari bezbednosti nazivaju “punim spektrom pretnji”.
Umesto međudržavnih izazova i pitanja na koja smo navikli, sada smo suočeni sa nedržavnim pretnjama i izazovima u vidu banditskih država. Suočeni
smo sa proliferacijom oružja za masovno uništenje i raketnom tehnologijom, kao i ostalim dugoročnim globalnim izazovima koji nam postaju sve
poznatiji: globalno zagrevanje, pandemije, nestanak fosilnih goriva. Dodajte
tome veoma realnu opasnost sajber-rata protiv vlada i oružanih snaga koje
su sve ugroženije, i dobićete jedan od onih raznobojnih koktela sa malim
kišobranom, gde su sve lepe boje prepoznatljive, ali vas bez obzira na to vaše
piće može ubiti.
Međunarodni terorizam i radikalizovani islam, bez obzira na uzroke, predstavljaju Veliki rat, u kojem su domaći teroristi inspirisani celovitom globalnom ideološkom osnovom. Do sada su protiv-terorističke i obaveštajne aktivnosti uspele da spreče drugi 9/11, ali koliko još dugo? Mi moramo da budemo
uspešni svaki put. Oni moraju da budu uspešni jednom.
Dugoročna budućnost Avganistana je, u najboljem slučaju, neizvesna. Talibani stalno vrše pregrupisavanja, premda bi nedostatak jedinstvenosti svrhe
među tim grupama možda mogao biti izvestan znak nade. Sve to vreme, pokušaji NATO-a da zaustavi trgovinu drogom (glavni raison d’être za prisustvo
NATO-a u Avganistanu) su bezuspešni. NATO se – onda kada otvoreno razmatra svoju izlaznu strategiju – čini slabim i podeljenim. Strateški neuspeh u
Iraku postaje još očigledniji, i pored dobrih vesti prošlog meseca10 da se trenutno uspostavlja nekakva vlada.
Regionalni protivnici - Iran, Sirija, Al-kaida, Hezbolah, Hamas - su svi
ohrabreni onim što karakterišu neuspehom SAD u Iraku i neuspehom Izraela
u Libanu. SAD i Izrael se više ne čine neranjivima, dok će iranski nuklearni i
raketni štit koji se sigurno razvija, verovatno u značajnoj meri oblikovati bezbednosno okruženje u narednih deset godina. Iransku hegemoniju će potpomoći šiitska milicija u regionu, inspirisana, opremljena, obučena i finansirana
od strane Irana. Budite sigurni da Teheran smatra kako je nuklearna energija
ključni element za iransku moć i prestiž.
10 Novembar 2010 (prim. prev)
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Proliferacija oružja za masovno uništenje je sledeća na dnevnom redu. Ona se
trenutno ubrzava i širi. Dvostruki izazov koji predstavljaju Iran i Severna Koreja
su u skorije vreme često u vestima zahvaljujući Vikiliksu, no sada postoji mogućnost širenja pravog požara. Ne zaboravimo da su i Saudijska Arabija i Egipat
najavile nuklearne programe 2006. godine, te da čak i Japan razmatra istupanje
iz Sporazuma o sprečavanju širenja oružja za masovno uništenje11 iz 1968. godine, kao odgovor na pretnje Severne Koreje. Imajući u vidu sve propuste kojima
je Sporazum ispunjen, koliko nuklearnih država će postojati u 2025. godini? I da
nastavim ceremoniju loših vesti, već postoji mreža država opremljenih oružjem
za masovno uništenje i pretendirajućih terorističkih organizacija. Biološka i radiološka oružja su glavni kratkoročni problem. Bivše sovjetsko nuklearno oružje
je i dalje na raspolaganju za prodaju ili krađu. Znamo i za sub-državne ‘puteve’
širenja tehnologija i znanja. Prisetite se A. Q. Khan-a iz Pakistana.
Da li je unipolarni svetski poredak na izdisaju?
Rusija trenutno uživa preporod bogatstva i problema, zajedno sa opasnom
samo-percepcijom moći i uticaja, i obnovljenim imperijalnim pretenzijama.
Međutim, tu je i njena dugoročna otpornost koja će omogućiti iskorištavanja
energetskih resursa kao oružja prinude protiv suseda i konkurenata, dok mi
posmatramo kako matica polako klizi nazad u autoritarizam. A šta je sa Kinom, koja već jeste ekonomska super-sila, ili Japanom – koji traži status ‘normalne odbrambene moći’ kao odgovor na veće izazove lokalnog bezbednosnog okruženja?
I pre nego što se udaljimo od mojih opažanja pretnji po naše okruženje u
kratkom i srednjem periodu, dodajmo tome i klimatske promene koje su dovele do pražnjenja resursa i demografskog pritiska u zemljama u razvoju.
Globalizacija ugrožava državnost na načine koji su istovremeni i dobri i
veoma, veoma opasni. I ne samo zbog toga što se onima, kojima je sve uskraćeno, globalizacija može lako prodati kao obnovljeni zapadni imperijalizam i
iskoristiti za odgajanje snaga koje mobilišu nezadovoljstvo i bes naroda.
Kakvo olakšanje, stoga, donosi spoznaja da je u svom novom strateškom
konceptu NATO identifikovao sve ove pretnje i čini se da nudi barem delimična rešenja za veći deo njih.
11 Sporazum o neširenju nuklearnog oružja
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Dokument, koji otpočinje izjavom o misiji organizacije tolike dužine da čak
i najmanje skeptični među čitaocioma moraju da se zapitaju kuda ih to vodi,
hrabar je pokušaj suočavanja sa pretnjama, dok istovremeno samo prividno
pokriva pukotine u Alijansi nastale usled veoma različitih percepcija tih pretnji među njenim članicama, te ignoriše izvor krize kroz koju Alijansa prolazi i
zbog koje će u doglednoj budućnosti snositi posledice.
U prva dva strateška dokumenta NATO-a koja su izrađena nakon hladnog
rata, odnosno 1991. i 1999. godine, pokušalo se odgovoriti na nove pretnje
okruženju koje u tom trenutku nije bilo ugroženo istinskim pretnjama, uz istovremeno zalaganje za dalje proširenje Alijanse. Dokumentom iz 1999. godine,
koji je napisan tokom vazdušne kampanje NATO-a na Balkanu, uspostavljen
je presedan za širenje operacija NATO-a koje prevazilaze definiciju puke samoodbrane, kako bi se obrazložile humanitarne intervencije i sprečavanje sukoba. To je uistinu značajna promena u odnosu na dokument iz 1991. godine,
kada je misija glasila “Alijansa je čisto defanzivna u svojoj svrsi: nijedno od
njenih oružja neće nikada biti korišteno, osim u samoodbrani”.
Poslednjih 10 godina smo svedoci pokretanja najvećeg vojnog angažmana
NATO-a u Avganistanu, potom uključivanja u borbi protiv piratstva nedaleko
od Roga Afrike i obučavanja bezbednosnih snaga u Iraku. NATO je pred sobom imao izazov da formuliše novi strateški koncept koji bi zadovoljio svih 28
članica, te da istovremeno upravlja svojim angažmanom u Avganistanu i odgovori na bojazni nekih od svojih članica u vezi sa postepenim približavanjem
Rusije. Nije jasno da li je pronađen odgovarajući odgovor na ovaj izazov, i da li
se, zapravo, uopšte može naći.
Umesto iscrpnog i iscrpljujućeg osvrta na sadržaj strateškog koncepta od
skoro 4.000 reči, samo bih želeo napomenuti da Koncept obuhvata sve - od
energetske bezbednosti, do mreža bezbednosti i klimatskih promena. Zadovoljen je zahtev centralno-evropskih zemalja da princip samoodbrane i dalje ima
središnje mesto, jer se pominje kao prvi u svakom odeljku. No, biće potrebno
mnogo više od otpočinjanja svakog pasusa aludiranjem na princip samoodbrane NATO-a kako bi se centralno-evropske zemlje dale uveriti da je Alijansa
iskrena po ovom pitanju.
I upravo u ovom kontekstu bih želeo da se fokusiram na Rusiju kao katalizator uspeha ili neuspeha NATO-a ili čak njegovog samog opstanka. Možda
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najupečatljivija od svih ironija je da Rusija i dalje drži ključ za postojanje NATO-a, ili možda čak i njegovo srozavanje ka tome da postane mnogo manje
bitan elemenat u odbrambenoj arhitekturi Evrope.
Dok države članice NATO-a prave planove za naredne decenije, Rusija
agresivno deluje s ciljem ponovnog uspostavljanja nekadašnje moći u zemlji
i regionu nakon razadoblja post-sovjetskog dremeža. Rusija danas počinje da
pomalo izgleda kao Sovjetski Savez koji je tokom hladnog rata bio glavni motiv postojanja NATO-a. Iako NATO više ne posmatra Rusiju kao svog glavnog
protivnika, Rusiji je dato dovoljno vremena da nakon pada Sovjetskog Saveza i
haosa 1990-ih godina pregrupiše svoje snage, dok su agresivne i - neki bi rekli
– opsesivne odluke NATO-a ka proširenju poslužile kao podsticaj Moskvi, a ja
verujem i kao legitimacija za njen preporod.
Dok je NATO više fokusiran na islamski svet, Rusija je vojno intervenisala
u Gruziji12 (što je rezultovalo de-facto okupacijom četvrtine zemlje), preselila
je svoje vojne baze na jug centralne Azije i Jermenije, objedinila je Belorusiju i
Kazahstan13 u ekonomsku uniju i omogućila izbor pro-ruskih snaga u Ukrajini
i Kirgistanu14.
Stratfor, američki think-tank, i Madeleine Albright, su podelili NATO u tri
grupe na osnovu ovog, ali i ostalih pitanja (sa Rusijom, kao glavnom tačkom
sporenja), odnosno: na Sjedinjene Države i njene „atlantske“ saveznice (kao
što su Holandija, Danska i Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo), suštinsku Evropu (koju
predvode Nemačka i Francuska), te centralno-evropske zemlje. Vašington i
njegovi najjači NATO saveznici su umorni od Rusije i sumnjičavi su prema
njenim namerama, no oni takođe žele da Alijansa stavi naglasak na pitanja
kao što su post-konfliktne operacije i terorizam, a ne samo odbrana od Rusije.
Zemlje koje čine jezgro Evrope žele da održe dobre odnose sa Rusijom, i da je
ne provociraju Alijansom koja je fokusirana na zaustavljanje kontrole Moskve
nad njenom sferom uticaja. Zemlje centralne Evrope žele da dobiju uverenje,
dok Berlin i Pariz – upravo zbog njihovog odnosa sa Moskvom - ne žele da
centralnoj Evropi daju ništa više od simboličnog uveravanja . Osim Rusije, Sje12 Videti: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/real_world_order
13 Videti:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151436/analysis/20091230_russia_belarus_kazakhstan_customs_deal_and_way_forward_moscow
14 Videti: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/160817/analysis/20100426_russia_unrest_foreign_policy_tool
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dinjene Države bi želele da se NATO usmeri na terorističke pretnje, da poveća
trošenje za vojne svrhe15 i da pomogne u post-konfliktnim misijama. Suštinska
Evropa je posebno izmorena daljim angažmanom NATO-a i želi da NATO
potvrdi primat Saveta bezbednosti UN-a u međunarodnim odnosima - kako
bi se ograničio unilateralizam Sjedinjenih Država koji odvodi Alijansu u razne
“avanture” - i da više stremi ka prevenciji konflikata, nego izgradnji država u
post-konfliktnim uslovima. Zemlje centralne Evrope su takođe skeptične po
pitanju daljih izvora razonode Sjedinjenih Država.
U trenutku kada ja predsednik Barak Obama preuzeo dužnost izgledalo je
da su Vašington i Moskva odustali od svojih agresivnih stavova. Promenom
taktike, obe zemlje su se usaglasile da je u to vreme svaka od njih imala veće
probleme na koje se trebalo fokusirati, tako da su sva neprijateljstva - barem
privremeno - stavljena na čekanje. Takvo shvatanje je, naravno, klimavo, ali i
Vašington i Moskva su znali šta se dešava.
Izgleda da sporazum između Moskve i Vašingtona ne uključuje usporavanje ponovnog jačanja Rusije. Kada su se Sjedinjene Države povukle iz agresivne borbe protiv Rusije, zemlje koje su bile pod zaštitom Vašingtona - centralna
Evropa i Gruzija – osetile su se napuštenima i bespomoćnima. Takođe, ove
države nisu bile u mogućnosti da se okrenu tradicionalnim evropskim silama, jer su Nemačka i Francuska već odlučile da je bolje da izbalansiraju svoje
odnose sa Rusijom nego da budu protiv nje - a posebno ne zbog toga da bi
zaštitile centralnu Evropu.
Međutim, postoje znaci koji upućuju da je ovo zbližavanje tanko poput papira. Nasmejana lica na kraju samita u Lisabonu i sporazum o protivraketnoj
odbrani koji je navodno ostvaren tom prilikom već su pod velikim pritiskom.
Na detalje o učešću Rusije će se morati sačekati do juna 2011. godine, no, izgleda da bez obzira kakvo da je bilo učešće Moskve, neće joj se dati zajednička
kontrola nad balističkim projektilima. Da li je neko zaista poverovao da bi se
Rusija vezala u jedno ozbiljno partnerstvo bez prava na veto?
Učestvujući na samitu NATO-a, mnoge države zapadne Evrope su računale
da će otopljavanje odnosa između SAD-a i Rusije i dalje biti na snazi, što bi
15 Videti: http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/173818/analysis/20101015_us_and_europe_face_military_spending
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im omogućilo da se osećaju prijatnije u pregovorima i sa NATO-om i sa Rusijom. Međutim, države centralne Evrope su doživele olakšanje zbog toga što su
pukotine u popuštanju počele da se pokazuju, jer će im to omogućiti da budu
agresivnije prema Rusiji. Dakle, raspad odnosa između SAD-a i Rusije će dodatno podeliti već podeljenu Alijansu.
Ono što države centralne Evrope smatraju najproblematičnijim je to što
je ruski izaslanik u NATO-u, Dmitri Rogozin, novi strateški koncept nazvao
„balansiranim“. Srećan Rogozin, znači srećan Kremlj, a to znači da centralna
Evropa nije dobila garancije od Sjedinjenih Država i zemalja koje čine jezgro
Evrope koje bi na bilo koji način zabrinule Rusiju.
NATO neće nestati. On je ovde kako bi ostao, ako ni zbog čega drugog,
onda iz inercije. I dalje će imati korisnu ulogu u borbi protiv piratstva, u rešavanjima situacija poslije konflikata i kao pečat odobrenja za nekoliko država
zapadnog Balkana koje tek treba da se pridruže Zapadu. No, Evropljani već
rade na razvijanju alternativnih rešenja, dok se države centralne Evrope uzdaju
u bilateralne sporazume sa Sjedinjenim Državama.
Države centralne Evrope imaju poteškoća u pronalaženju druge zapadnoevropske sile, osim Švedske, koja bi bila prijemčiva za njihove brige oko bezbednosti. Osećaju potrebu da se samostalno suprotstave Rusiji, uz ograničenu
podršku. Tu je uvek Nemačka, kojoj bi se države centralne Evrope teoretski
mogle obratiti za pomoć. Barem na papiru, Berlin je saveznik i EU i NATO-a.
Međutim, ono što je specifično za bojazni centralne Evrope – a što je realnost
o kojoj se retko govori u javnosti u centralnoj Evropi - jeste činjenica da se
Nemačka izvlači iz institucija hladnog rata. Rusija možda jeste očigledna bezbednosna pretnja, međutim, sve snažnija uloga Nemačke - i, što je najvažnije,
njeni sve topliji odnosi sa Moskvom – je ono što uznemirava Varšavu i ostale
centralno-evropske metropole, upravo zbog toga što nije jasno u kom pravcu
je Berlin krenuo.
Ostale evropske zemlje će uzajamno formirati sporazume. Skandinavske
zemlje, koje su podeljene između članica NATO-a i onih koje to nisu, već su
ostvarile vojne sporazume sa baltičkim državama koje Švedska i Finska posmatraju kao svoju sferu uticaja. Francuzi samostalno razvijaju amfibijske sposobnosti sa Ujedinjenim Kraljevstvom i mediteranskim zemljama, a potpisali su i
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sporazum o odbrani sa Ujedinjenim Kraljevstvom kako bi balansirali svoje političke i ekonomske odnose sa Nemačkom. Ovi nezavisni koraci među članicama i nečlanicama NATO-a samo su još jedan dokaz da dugogodišnja održivost
i egzistencija Alijanse nisu dovoljni da je spase od nerelevantnosti.
Imajući u vidu različite suštinske interese država članica, pitanje je koja značajna pretnja bi mogla objediniti NATO u narednoj deceniji kako bi podstakla
Alijansu da se upusti u onu vrstu investicija i reformi koje novi strateški koncept predviđa.
NATO će osigurati svoj značaj relevantnog aktera ukoliko se fokusira na
evropske snage, i ne dopusti da bude ugrožen nedostatkom kredibilne strategije. Evropski saveznici bi trebali da se fokusiraju na koji način da razviju
vojne sposobnosti potrebne za podršku njihovih strategija bezbednosti u okviru projektovanih ograničenja resursa. S obzirom na ograničene kapacitete za
ekspedicione operacije (nije moguće rasporediti niti održavati više od 2-3%
NATO snaga van Evrope), evropski saveznici bi trebalo da unaprede sopstvene sposobnosti u operacijama slabog intenziteta, kao što su rekonstrukcija,
sajber-bezbednost, organizovani kriminal i nadzor kretanja unutar svojih
granica. Dakle, korišćenjem ograničenih resursa dostupnih za specijalizaciju,
Evropa će biti bolje pozicionirana da garantuje svoju bezbednost i da postane
sposobniji partner. Takođe, Sjedinjene Države bi izbegle vojnu i stratešku rastegnutost, što bi im omogućilo da razmotre nove strateške odnose sa Indijom
i drugima koji će bolje odgovoriti na izazove bezbednosnom okruženju 21.
veka koje sam opisao ranije.
Sada ću se osvrnuti na to gde sve ovo ostavlja Srbiju.
NATO je u procesu stalnih promena, novi strateški koncept je zakrpao pukotine, ali ne daje jasnu sliku o tome gde će NATO biti za pet godina.
Dakle, da li iko razuman ulazi u autobus, ne znajući kuda autobus ide?
Uglavnom ...........ne ...........
No, u ovom slučaju, mislim da je odgovor potvrdan.
Znam da Srbija nikada nije bila članica vojnog saveza, razumem emotivne argumente koji počivaju na brutalnosti NATO bombardovanja, znam da je
34
Vuk Jeremić ponudio alternativu politike tri stuba, iako se ista čini pomalo nestvarnom, no ja verujem da Srbija ima luksuz vremena. Držite se Partnerstva
za mir (PzM), izvucite maksimalnu korist iz toga, uverite posebno SAD koje i
dalje prikazuju Srbiju u liku potencijalne otpadničke države, uverite evropske
prijatelje Srbije, i sačekajte da vidite u kom pravcu će se NATO razvijati i da li
možda postoji nova bezbednosna arhitektura, koji bi obuhvatila i NATO, a u
kojoj bi se Srbija osećala udobnije u srednjoročnom periodu.
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Novi strateški koncept NATO-a: kontekst i značaj
Dr Matthew Rhodes16
Usvajanjem novog Strateškog koncepta na samitu u Lisabonu, ojačan je kredibilitet Alijanse kao kamena temeljca međunarodne bezbednosti, ali i održivosti
evroatlantskog partnerstva i integracija. Međutim, usvajanje novog strateškog
koncepta nije bio neminovan zaključak. Saveznici su mogli da odlože napore u
izradi Koncepta za kasnije ili da jednostavno objave deklaraciju o relevatnosti
prethodne verzije. Umesto toga, ne samo da su se držali ambicioznog radnog
plana za izradu Koncepta, koji je utvrđen na samitu u Strazburu/Kelu u proleće
2009. godine, već su to učinili putem širokog inkluzivnog procesa koji je obuhvatio i doprinos starijih državnika i nevladinih stručnjaka. Konačan proizvod koji
je usvojen u Lisabonu krajem 2010. godine je savladao katkad suštinski gorke
razlike o nizu ključnih pitanja. U vreme sve većih sumnji, usvajanje novog strateškog koncepta je iznova potvrdilo visoku vrednost koju članice pripisuju Alijansi, kao i njihovu sposobnost i volju da ostvare konsenzus o bezbednosnoj agendi
21. veka. Kao neophodna, čak i ako nedovoljna polazna tačka, novi strateški
koncept NATO-a je već obezbedio blagovremeni podsticaj snagama i prestižu
evroatlantske zajednice.
16 Autor je Direktor Programa za više studije bezbednosti i profesor nacionalne bezbednosti Marshall Centra.
36
Ono što je najznačajnije u vezi novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a jeste
da je dogovor uopšte postignut. Neuspeh da se izradi ozbiljan dokument ili
bojazan da se tako nešto čak i pokuša, bi samo dodatno osnažili nedavnu krizu
samouverenosti evroatlantske zajednice. Uspeh na samitu u Lisabonu ojačava
kredibilitet Alijanse kao kamena temeljca međunarodne bezbednosti, ali i održivosti evroatlantskog partnerstva i integracija kao tačaka orjentacije za zemlje
ne-članice u Jugoistočnoj Evropi i šire.
Uz nešto drugačiji naglasak na suprotnim stranama okeana, evroatlantska
zajednica je izašla iz hladnog rata u velikoj meri ubeđena u dve značajne stvari. Prva je da zajednica poseduje dovoljno resursa, tehničke stručnosti, kao
i profesionalne sposobnosti da reši gotovo svaki bezbednosni izazov koji bi
se mogao pojaviti. Druga je da se liberalno-demokratska kapitalizam, kakav
se praktikuje širom ove zajednice, dokazao kao najuspešnija forma društvene
organizacije u istoriji, za šta je verovatno posedovao univerzalnu primenjivost.
Kao rezultat, bilo je moguće očekivati stalna unapređenja sposobnosti i uslova
u zajednici čak i nakon njenog proširenja, jer je sve veći broj zemalja usvajao
njene principe.
Sasvim sigurno, stvarna kretanja su u više navrata dovodili u pitanje taj osećaj samo-uverenosti. U početku pomalo zbrkan multilateralizam, kojim je zajednica odgovorila na nasilje u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i drugim mestima, jedan je od
početnih primera. Teroristički napadi u gradovima kao što su Njujork, Madrid,
London i Istanbul, kao i prirodne katastrofe poput uragana Katrine, naknadno
su istakle prethodno potcenjene domaće slabosti. Zažarene rasprave oko intervencije u Iraku (koju je američki ambasador Nikolas Burns nazvao “iskustvom
gotove smrti” za NATO), kao i dugotrajne, krvave pobune u toj zemlji i u Avganistanu, dodatno su naglasile ograničenja evro-atlantske efikasnosti.
Međutim, više od bilo čega drugoga, globalna finansijska kriza je taj
trijumfalni optimizam zamenila sumnjom. Čak i nakon što je zajednica
zabeležila kvalifikovani napredak u većini drugih oblasti, iznenada se našla
suočenom sa najvećom svetskom ekonomskom krizom od 1930-ih. Kriza
do koje je došlo slomom tržišta nekretnina u SAD-u u proleće 2007. godine,
dovela je do velikih gubitaka i gotovo potpune paralize finansijskih tržišta do
jeseni 2008. godine, dramatičnog skoka nezaposlenosti i budžetskih deficita
tokom 2009. godine, te potencijalno fatalnog pritiska na valutu evrozone u
2010. godini.
Kumulativno, ovi efekti su umanjili pažnju i sredstva za međunarodni
angažman, te su ubrzali prebacivanje globalne moći na Aziju i druge eko-
37
nomije u razvoju. Narušili se ugled evroatlantskih država za stručnost i njihove tvrdnje o superiornosti liberalne demokratije kao sistema.
Ono što je bilo podjednako zloslutno za postizanje dogovora o novom
strateškom konceptu jeste da je tokom ovog perioda evroatlantska saradnja
ostala u razočaravajućem, pa čak i stanju pogoršavanja. Značajna lična popularnost novo-izabranog američkog predsednika Barak Obame u Evropi,
nije pretočena u veću posvećenost zajedničkom delovanju po pitanjima visokog profila. Uprkos upozorenju američkog Sekretara za odbranu, Bob Gejtsa, o “dva nivoa saveza”, evropski saveznici su dočekali Obaminu odluku o
utrostručivanju američkih snaga u Avganistanu sa mešavinom relativno skromnih, delimično privremenih uvećavanja svojih snaga, i najavama povlačenja.
Što se tiče Obame, ubrzo nakon što je izbegao obeležavanje dvadesetodišnjice
od pada Berlinskog zida i nakon što se proglasio “prvim američkim predsednikom pacifistom”, on je tokom samita Ujedinjenih nacija o klimatskim promenama u Kopenhagenu izostavio svoje evropske kolege iz završnih razgovora
sa liderima drugih velikih nacija. Što se tiče same finansijske krize, zajednica je ostala podeljena oko relativnog prioriteta koordiniranog stimulansa ili
smanjenje duga. Tadašnji češki premijer, Miroslav Topolanek, čija je zemlja u
proleće 2009. godine predsedavala EU, svojom čuvenom izjavom je željenu putanju Obamine administracije za podsticaj nazvao “putem u pakao.” Nemački
lideri se podelili ovo mišljenje, doduše uz nešto manje živopisan rečnik.
Naspram te pozadine, usvajanje novog, smislenog strateškog koncepta od
strane NATO-a nije bio neminovan zaključak. Saveznici su mogli da odlože
napore u izradi Koncepta za kasnije ili da jednostavno objave deklaraciju o
relevatnosti prethodne verzije. Umesto toga, ne samo da su se držali ambicioznog radnog plana za izradu Koncepta, koji je utvrđen na samitu u Strazburu/Kelu u proleće 2009. godine, već su to učinili putem širokog inkluzivnog procesa koji je obuhvatio i doprinos starijih državnika i nevladinih
stručnjaka. Konačan proizvod koji je usvojen u Lisabonu krajem 2010. godine je savladao katkad suštinski gorke razlike o nizu ključnih pitanja. Njime
je dogovoren put napred u Avganistanu, ojačana je spremnost za teritorijalnu odbranu, kao i za ekspedicione misije, potvrđena je velika uloga Saveza
u nuklearnom odvraćanju i raketnoj odbrani, sajber i energetska bezbednost
su identifikovane kao potencijalna pitanja vezana za primenu člana 5, navedeni su principi odnosa sa Evropskom unijom i Rusijom, i potvrđena je
otvorenost za buduće proširenje.
38
Nije iznenađujuće da u velikoj meri sadržaj novog Koncepta u ovim oblastima ne predstavlja radikalno odstupanje od prethodnih izjava Alijanse. Ipak,
premostivši neke od značajnih nesuglasica i ponudivši trenutne, autoritativne
strateške smernice, ovaj dokument ima veoma važnu funkciju. U vreme sve
većih sumnji, usvajanje novog strateškog koncepta je iznova potvrdilo visoku
vrednost koju članice pripisuju Alijansi, kao i njihovu sposobnost i volju da
ostvare konsenzus o bezbednosnoj agendi 21. veka.
Izazovi implementacije će sigurno ostati prisutni, ne samo u raspodeli sredstava za predviđene sposobnosti. Paralelna pitanja se odnose na “Lisabonsku
agendu” Evropske unije, nakon sporazuma te organizacije o reformama, koji
je pukim slučajem potpisan u istom gradu. Ipak, kao neophodna, čak i ako
nedovoljna polazna tačka, novi strateški koncept NATO-a je već obezbedio
blagovremeni podsticaj snagama i prestižu evroatlantske zajednice.
39
Srpska strateška dilema između NATO-a i Rusije
Dr Aleksandar Fatić17
Unutrašnja debata i politička napetost u Srbiji u vezi sa članstvom u NATO
savezu pokazuje tendenciju „usisavanja“ širih strateških argumenata. Ova debata se pre svega vodi u odnosu na normativna i moralna pitanja, dok su šira
strateška pitanja ostavljena po strani. Normativna pitanja se odnose na postojeći
Ustav Srbije, na probleme u vezi sa odnosom NATO-a i novoproglašenu nezavisnu državu Kosovo nastalu odvajanjem od Srbije, kao i na rezoluciju Skupštine
Srbije o vojnoj neutralnosti, koju veći deo političke javnosti interpretira kao zabranu za članstvo u NATO-u. Moralna pitanja se tiču uloge NATO-a u rasparčavanju srpske državne teritorije, čiji je najdrastičniji primer odvajanje Kosova
i NATO bombardovanje 1999. godine. Sva ova pitanja koja nose emocionalni
potencijal, zaobilaze ključno, strateško pitanje o tome da li je u odbrambenom,
civilizacijskom, kulturnom i političkom interesu Srbije da postane punopravna
članica NATO-a, ili je njen interes suprotstavljen takvom projektu. Ovaj tekst se
bavi navedenom strateškom dilemom polazeći od teze da je osnovna strateška
prepreka članstvu Srbije u NATO-u nedovoljno jasan odnos između Srbije i Ruske Federacije.
17 Autor je Naučni savetnik pri Institutu za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
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Uvod
Osnovni argument ovog teksta je da je suštinski razlog za oklevanje Srbije
u pogledu učlanjenja u NATO pritisak koji dolazi iz Moskve, jer je stvaranje
monolitnog NATO geostrateškog prostora u Evropi direktno suprotstavljeno
objektivnim strateškim interesima Ruske Federacije. Ovaj pritisak ima ekonomske, energetske i političke dimenzije. On je kulminirao posetom ruskog
predsednika Dmitrija Medvedeva Beogradu oktobra 2009. godine i njegovom
obraćanju srpskim parlamentarcima, kojom prilikom je potpisan niz bilateralnih sporazuma. Posle značajnog srpskog oklevanja, 2009. godine je finalizovan
sporazum o prodaji monopolističke srpske naftne kompanije NIS Jugopetrol
ruskom Gazpromu sa 51% vlasništva, kao jedan od uslova za izgradnju ruskog
gasovoda Južni tok kroz Srbiju, sa krakom kroz Republiku Srpsku. Istovremeno je dogovoreno osnivanje ruske vojne baze „za intervencije u elementarnim
nepogodama“ u Nišu (jug Srbije), a pitanje o tome čije trupe će obezbeđivati
budući gasovod koji će biti postavljen nadzemno nije otvarano. Istovremeno,
ruski ministar za vanredne situacije Sergej Šojgu, koji je kao ključni pregovarač
učestvovao u pripremi Medvedevljeve posete, prilikom odlaska iz Beograda je
na pitanje o tome da li će u budućoj bazi biti stacionirane samo trupe ruske
„unutrašnje vojske“ koja je pod njegovom komandom, ili i regularna ruska armija, odgovorio da „odluku o tome može doneti samo predsednik Medvedev“,
ostavljajući time otvorenu mogućnost ruske militarizacije Srbije. Uz sve ove
neposredne bilateralne pritiske, Rusija je najpouzdaniji diplomatski saveznik
Srbije u sprečavanju donošenja rezolucija u Savetu bezbednosti UN koje bi dodatno konsolidovale nezavisnost Kosova, kao i u onemogućavanju da Kosovo
postane punopravni član niza drugih međunarodnih organizacija i foruma.
Stoga je srpska zavisnost od Moskve značajna i Beograd nije u stanju da zauzme odlučan kurs prema NATO-u bez prećutnog odobrenja Kremlja.
Ruska spoljna politika je tokom protekle decenije doživela niz transformacija u svom odnosu prema NATO-u, a ta tema je sastavni deo razmatranja
ruskih interesa prema Srbiji i njenoj politici u odnosu na NATO. Moskva ima
racionalne razloge da se protivi daljem proširivanju NATO-a i zaokruživanju
NATO strateškog prostora sve do ruskih granica, ali se u tom stavu prema proširivanju suočava sa realnim nedostatkom strateških saveznika. U stvari, moglo bi se smatrati da je jedini nevoljni saveznik Rusije u istočnoj Evropi danas
41
Srbija, koja je ostala izvan NATO-a. Istovremeno, što je ruska politika diplomatskog i strateškog protivljena širenju NATO-a neuspešnija, verovatnije je da
će dolaziti do sve većeg zaoštravanja ruske Odbrambene doktrine i Strateškog
koncepta, dva ključna odbrambena dokumenta Ruske Federacije, a samim tim
i do sve većeg rasta klasične bezbednosne dileme između Rusije i NATO. Stoga
je u interesu globalne bezbednosti da se proširivanje NATO-a zaustavi, radije
nego da bezbednosna dilema sa Moskvom eskalira, što to ne znači i da je u
strateškom interesu malih zemalja poput Srbije da ostanu izvan NATO.18
Strateška pozicija Rusija vis-à-vis NATO
Svako razmatranje odbrambene strategije Rusije mora poći od njene tradicionalne konvencionalne odbrambene doktrine iz posthladnoratovskog vremena, koja se zasnivala na dubini strateške teritorije kojom bi se apsorbovao
prvi konvencionalni udar neprijatelja. Doktrina potom predviđa kumulativnu
mobilizaciju ruskih rezervnih snaga, postepeno zaokruživanje neprijatelja i
isterivanje van teritorije Rusije. Ova doktrina je tradicionalno bila primarna
u odnosu na paralelnu, nuklearnu doktrinu, koja se sastoji iz principa „proširenog zastrašivanja i prvog udara“. Pošto je ruska konvencionalna doktrina
sasvim defanzivna, u globalnom je interesu da se ona očuva i da ostane realna
opcija ruske odbrane, kako Moskva ne bi morala da pribegava više preventivnim, a time i agresivnijim pozicijama u protokolima aktivacije svojih oružanih
snaga, jer takvi protokoli istovremeno ugrožavaju susede i povećavaju opasnost od izbijanja vojnih sukoba.
Proširivanje NATO-a ka ruskim granicama je politika koja direktno urušava održivost konvencionalne ruske odbrambene doktrine. Osim toga što Rusija više nije konvencionalno superiorna u naoružanju i broju vojnika u odnosu
na NATO - za razliku od perioda hladnog rata - i njena odbrambena geografija
se dramatično menja usled proširivanja NATO-a. Osamdesetih godina prošlog
veka sovjetska armija je imala gotovo četiri miliona vojnika, 10.000 strateških
i 30.000 taktičkih nuklearnih projektila, uz godišnju proizvodnju 3.000 tenkova, 600 borbenih aviona i 20 ratnih brodova. Današnja ruska vojska ima oko
milion vojnika, a budžetska kriza Kremlja direktno potkopava održavanje drastično redukovanog nuklearnog arsenala i mornarice.19 Istovremeno, ukoliko
18 Za detaljnija razmatranja videti moj tekst “A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts
Southeast Europe”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 3, Decembdr 2010, str. 441–464.
19 Alexei Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from
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se proširivanje NATO-a nastavi prijemom Ukrajine i Gruzije, to će značiti da
bi Moskovska vojna oblast postala prva linija ruske odbrane, drugim rečima
da bi konvencionalna odbrambena doktrina postala potpuno neprimenljiva.
Stoga je Moskva prinuđena da razmatra promenu konvencionalne doktrine od
defanzivne ka proaktivnoj, a to bi uključivalo trajno stacioniranje većine trupe
u blizini granica i aktivacione protokole koji podrazumevaju povećani stepen
borbene gotovosti i princip „eksplodiranja prema neprijatelju“ van ruskih granica na prvi nagoveštaj pretnje.
Kada je reč o nuklearnoj doktrini, ona je već pokazala ruski osećaj nesigurnosti pred širenjem NATO-a. Iako je sporazum o nuklearnom razoružanju
START 2 ratifikovan od strane ruske Dume 14. aprila 2000. godine, kada su
se SAD povukle iz Sporazuma o ograničavanju antibalističkih projektila, 13.
juna 2002. godine, Rusija se - svega dan kasnije - povukla iz START-a 2. Tek su
predsednici Barak Obama i Dmitri Medvedev prevazišli ovu pat poziciju u nuklearnom razoružanju, potpisujući u Pragu, 8. aprila 2010. godine, sporazum
Novi START, koji ograničava broj postavljenih strateških nuklearnih glava na
1.550 i broj strateških lansirnih rampi na 800, u periodu od sedam godina.
Kao što je tokom hladnog rata, kada je NATO bio konvencionalno inferioran u odnosu na SSSR, primarna vojna doktrina NATO-a bila nuklearna
(Strateški koncept NATO-a je insistirao na „prvoj upotrebi“ nuklearnog oružja), tako je i Ruska Federacija, usled sopstvene konvencionalne inferiornosti u
odnosu na NATO, 2000. godine svoju nuklearnu doktrinu pretvorila u primarnu odbrambenu doktrinu. Sama ta promena je radikalno zaoštrila globalnu
bezbednosnu jednačinu. Ruski predsednik, Vladimir Putin, je 21. aprila 2000.
godine potpisao novu Vojnu doktrinu Ruske Federacije, koja se od prethodne
- usvojene 1997. godine - razlikuje po tome što spušta nivo pretnje potreban
za upotrebu nuklearnog oružja. Doktrina iz 1997. godine je predviđala upotrebu nuklearnog naoružanja u situacijama kada je „ugrožena sama egzistencija Ruske Federacije“. Doktrina iz 2000. godine predviđa aktiviranje nuklearnog arsenala kao odgovora na „konvencionalnu agresiju velikih razmera“,
uz garantovanje zaštite ruskog „nuklearnog kišobrana“ ruskim saveznicima.20
Kremlj je tokom prve decenije 21. veka stavio naglasak na raspoređivanje i
razvoj taktičkih nuklearnih projektila, dometa ispod 500 kilometara, koji nisu
Kosovo and Chechnya, Marshall Centre Papers, no. 2, George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, juli 2000, str. 14.
20 Nazavisimaya Gazeta, 22. april 2000.
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ograničeni sporazumima o smanjenju strateškog nuklearnog naoružanja i koji
su očigledno nuklearno oružje izbora za napad na konvencionalne snage u
neposrednom susedstvu. Moskva je uložila značajan napor u razvoj poznatog
Iskander balističkog projektila i rad na novom „superborbenom“ avionu kojim
bi se ojačale vazdušne snage.21
Međutim, ekonomski napredak i jačanje Rusije tokom 2010. godine omogućavaju radikalnu promenu vojne doktrine koju je uveo predsednik Medvedev. Vojna doktrina koju je potpisao 5. februara iste godine „vraća“ mandat
za upotrebu nuklearnog oružja na nivo „pretnje egzistenciji Ruske Federacije“, ali uvodi kao prioritet skupu i ambicioznu politiku razvijanja strateških
konvencionalnih projektila, poznatih „hiruških bombi“ visoke preciznosti, u
otvorenom nadmetanju sa NATO-om, koji već celu deceniju razvija upravo
takvo naoružanje kao oružje prvog izbora u intervencijama. Naglasak na strateškim projektilima ponovo pokazuje da Rusija primarnu pretnju svojoj bezbednosti vidi na Zapadu, a ne u svom neposrednom geografskom okruženju.22
Međutim, Rusiji su za primenu nove doktrine neophodni strateški saveznici u
Evropi koji bi pomogli da se konvencionalna snaga oružja projektuje što dalje prema Zapadu. Osim Belorusije, koja se u Vojnoj doktrini iz 2010. godine
eksplicitno pominje kao saveznik, Rusija ima samo još jednog potencijalnog
saveznika u Evropi, a to je Srbija.
Energetska strategija Rusije prema Srbiji
Osim činjenice da su ruska preduzeća vlasnici obe velike naftne kompanije u Srbiji, Beopetrola i, odnedavno, Jugopetrola, čime već kontrolišu tržište
energenata u ovoj zemlji, ključni aspekt ruske energetske strategije prema Srbiji je planirana izgradnja gasovoda Južni tok kroz Srbiju, sa krakom koji se, preko Republike Srpske, odvaja ka Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine (videti mapu).
Projektovano je da Južni tok bude u funkciji 2015. godine, sa godišnjim kapacitetom transporta od oko 63 milijarde kubnih metara gasa, što je 35% ukupnog ruskog izvoza gasa u Evropi. Kada se ima u vidu da evropske zemlje od
Rusije uvoze gas koji pokriva između 23 i 40% njihove ukupne potrošnje, jasno
je koliki je strateški značaj Južnog toka za Rusiju i za sve zemlje kroz koje bi on
21 Alexei Arbatov, Ibid, str. 28–29.
22 Vojna doktrina Ruske Federacije, 5. februar 2010, beleška br. 5.
44
Copyright Centar za bezbednosne studije (Centre for Security Studies), Beograd
prolazio. Gasovod treba da prođe ispod Crnog mora do Bugarske, odakle će
se račvati na krak preko Grčke do Italije, i na drugi krak koji povezuje Srbiju,
Hrvatsku, Sloveniju, Mađarsku i Austriju. U svetlu projekta Južni tok značajno
je postojanje nezvaničnog dokumenta ruskog ministarstva spoljnih poslova,
pod nazivom „Program za efikasnu upotrebu spoljne politike u dugoročnom
razvoju Rusije“, koji su 2010. godine objavili rusko izdanje časopisa Newsweek
i hrvatski Jutarnji list. Ovaj dokument navodi plan da se izgradi naftni cevovod
pod nazivom „Družba Adria“, dužine 3.200 kilometara, sa kapacitetom od 5 do
15 miliona tona nafte godišnje u toku tri faze postepenog aktiviranja. Naftovod
bi počinjao u ruskom gradu Samara i protezao bi se preko Belorusije, Ukrajine,
Slovačke i Mađarske do Omiša, na hrvatskom ostrvu Krk.23 Izgradnjom Južnog
toka, Družba Adria i NATO zemlje u regionu, kao i Srbija, bile bi uvučene u
ruski gasni projekt i stavljene pod rusku gasnu zavisnost.
23 Krešimir Žabec, „Tajni naputak Rusa: Morate biti u projektu Družba Adria“, Jutarnji list,
18. maj 2010.
45
Srpski problemi u vezi sa Rusijom i NATO-om
Srpska politika prema Moskvi je izrazito pragmatična, zasnovana pre svega
na konkretnoj potrebi da se zadrži rusko diplomatsko sponzorstvo u vezi sa
multilateralnim tretmanom nezavisnosti Kosova. Srbija ima razloga za strahovanje da bi se proces cepanja bivše Jugoslavije koji traje već dve decenije
mogao nastaviti kroz predstojeću unutrašnju decentralizaciju same Srbije.
To se posebno odnosi na sve izraženije ambicije političara u južnom regionu
Sandžaka ili Raške, i u severozapadnoj provinciji Vojvodini, da izraze i institucionalizuju svoje posebne identitete kroz državne i paradržavne atribute i
politiku. Takva politika je formalno u skladu sa načelima evropskog regionalizma, ali je istovremeno prirodno i da izaziva bojazni u Beogradu, koji je bio
predmet dugotrajne i uporne državne dezintegracije. Stoga je srpskim vlastima
veoma važno da Moskva ostane principijelno suprotstavljena formiranju dodatnih novih država na Balkanu.
Pored konkretne političke zavisnosti, uz koju idu ekonomska i energetska
zavisnost (tokom poslednje posete predsednika Medvedeva dogovorena je ruska pomoć srpskom budžetu, između ostalih oblika pomoći), Srbija je oslonjena na Rusiju i u identitetskom smislu. Kolektivni identiteti su u bivšoj Jugoslaviji prošli kroz niz lomova, a veliki deo njih je traumatizovao srpski kolektivni
identitet. Danas, posle svih državnih fraktura, Srbija je najmultikulturalnija
država na Balkanu, sa značajnim muslimanskim stanovništvom koje je politički aktivno i ima bliske porodične, religijske i političke veze sa bošnjačkom državnom većinom u susednoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Muslimani traže novu afirmaciju svog identiteta kroz političke projekte u Srbiji, a nosilac tih inicijativa
danas je sandžački galvni muftija Muamer Zukorlić, koji je predmet upornih
kritika medija u Beogradu. Istovremeno, unutrašnja politička i kulturna podela srpske javnosti na takozvane „dve Srbije“, jednu autoritarnu, sklonu očuvanju države po cenu diktature, koja je, po oceni kritičara, podržavala režim
Slobodana Miloševića i njegovu politiku, i druga, demokratska i evropska, ne
samo da ne nestaju, nego se produbljuju kroz debatu o eventualnoj promeni
Ustava Srbije, o budućnosti Kosova i na kraju, o mogućem učlanjenju Srbije u
NATO. Jedan deo konzervativne javnosti sve se više nalazi na antievropskim i
anti-NATO pozicijama pozivajući se na patriotizam, dok se drugi deo, blizak
aktuelnoj vlasti, plaši da bude suviše eksplicitan u svom pro-NATO stavu kako
ne bi bio optužen za nacionalnu izdaju.
46
Objektivno posmatrano, Srbija nema mnogo izbora u vezi sa eventualnim pridruživanjem NATO-u s obzirom na svoju regionalnu situaciju.
Albanija, Bugarska, Hrvatska i Slovenija su već članice NATO-a, a Bosna i
Makedonija su u procesu pridruživanja. To znači da je Srbija jedini potencijalni strateški saveznik Rusije u njenom protivljenju daljem proširivanju
NATO-a. Sve zemlje regiona su postavile članstvo u EU kao svoj najvažniji
spoljnopolitički prioritet, što je u skladu i sa transatlantskom orjentacijom
spoljne politike. Stoga Srbija, zbog specifične unutrašnjopolitičke situacije, trenutno „štrči“ iz ostatka regiona, i to pre svega u dimenziji odnosa
prema NATO-u. To odstupanje od politike ostalih zemalja je zasnovano
na činjenici da je Srbija 1999. godine bila bombardovana od strane NATO-a, te da su zemlje članice NATO-a priznale nezavisnost Kosova, tako
da se, objektivno, Srbija suočava sa kontradiktornim faktorima za opredeljivanje prema NATO-u. S jedne strane, ona ima snažne moralne razloge
da ne postane članica, a s druge, strogo strateški posmatrano, ima dilemu
između očigledno logičnog stava da zajedno sa svim susedima pristupi
NATO-u i svojih posebnih interesa u odnosu na Rusiju. Zbog svega toga,
Srbija će morati da odluku o članstvu u NATO-u donosi na više nivoa,
uključujući kako dovršavanje unutrašnje političke debate o kolektivnom
identitetu i osnovnim smerovima spoljne politike, tako i formulisanje jasnih strateških zaključaka o tome koji od njenih strateških interesa su važniji za njenu budućnost.
Uključenje ostalih zemalja Balkana u NATO se odvija na osnovu unekoliko različitih pretpostavki i normativnih predložaka. Dok su ostale zemlje srednje i istočne Evrope tokom hladnog rata bile pod represivnom
dominacijom Moskve i u kolektivnom sećanju naroda čuvaju doživljaj
Rusije kao okupatora, Srbija je imala nešto drugačiji sistem socijalizma u
kome je glavnu represiju sprovodila domaća komunistička oligarhija, dok
se Rusija shvatala kao daleki ideal slovenskog bratstva koji nije direktno
povezan sa zločinima režima Josipa Broza Tita. Stoga je i danas otklon od
Rusije u kulturnom i strateškom smislu, koji je bio osnovni motiv učlanjenja zemalja srednje, a donekle i istočne Evrope, prvo u Partnerstvo za
mir, a potom u NATO, u Srbiji nije izražen. Iz tog razloga, politička elita
nema dovoljno javne podrške da bude agresivna u vezi sa inicijativama da
se takav otklon napravi, a on je neophodan za kristalisanje javne podrške
za učlanjenje u NATO.
47
Srpskoj javnosti bi koristila nezavisna analiza strateških mogućnosti u vezi
sa perspektivom članstva u NATO-u. Za Srbiju to pitanje nije jednostavno, jer
ono podrazumeva niz vrednosnih i identitetskih enigmi, ali je silina sa kojom
se ono postavlja na dnevnopolitičkom planu i jasnoća srpske geopolitičke situacije, u potpunom okruženju zemljama članicama NATO-a, neizbežan faktor
pritiska da se ta dilema rešava.
49
Misija NATO-a i Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni
identitet (ESDI): komplementarnost ili konkurencija?
Dr Jasminka Simić24
Proces transformacije NATO-a pokrenut političkim i geostrateškim promenama početkom ‘90-tih godina dvadesetog veka praćen je procesom sazrevanja
politike i strategije Evropske unije na polju zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike. Napori EU da rukovodi jugoslovenskom krizom u njenoj početnoj fazi i
kasnije vojno angažovanje NATO-a u ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini i NATO bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije, doveli su do uzajamnog nepoverenja, ali i nesuglasica u pogledu sposobnosti one druge strane da deluje i upravlja krizama. Ipak,
vremenom se pokazalo da ta vrsta uzajamnog nepoverenja u osnovi ima pitanje
traženja usklađenosti, jer NATO i EU često imaju dve vizije, ali isti cilj. U tom
okviru deluju vojne i misije održavanja mira dve organizacije.
24 Autorka je doktor političkih nauka, novinar-urednik na RTS, Beograd
50
Uvod
NATO i Evropska unija posmatraju bezbednost u 21. veku u najširem smislu reči, odnosno, onako kako je bezbednost shvatio NATO na samitu u Lisabonu (19.-20. novembar 2010.), pod tim podrazumevajući - pored zaštite država članica organizacije i borbe protiv terorizma - i oblast zaštite i reagovanja
na sajber kriminal ili upade u kompjuterske sisteme, smatrajući to prioritetom
ove organizacije u narednoj dekadi.25 Istovremeno, tako shvaćena globalna
bezbednost predmet je delovanja Službe za spoljnopolitičke poslove Evropske
unije, koja je počela da radi 1. decembra 2010. godine - na godišnjicu stupanja
Ugovora iz Lisabona kojim je i uvedena, od rešavanja sukoba preko pomoći u
razvoju ili u slučaju prirodnih katastrofa, pandemija, migracije stanovništva,
do energetske bezbednosti. U Evropskoj uniji je zauzet zajednički stav o tome
kako da se unaprede odgovori na bezbednosne izazove i pretnje.26 Dakle, bezbednosne pretnje koje su i NATO i EU percipirale kao glavne u drugoj dekadi
21. veka i za koje je neophodna kombinacija zajedničkih napora i akcija kako
bi se poboljšala bezbednost građana, preduzeća i društva u državama članicama, su: terorizam (organizovani, prekogranični), sajber kriminal, kao i krize i
prirodne nesreće.
25 Afera Wikileaks je najeklatantniji primer pretnji tako shvaćenoj bezbednosti. NATO je
osudio objavljivanje američke diplomatske prepiske o razmeštanju američkog taktičkog nuklearnog oružja u Evropi na sajtu Wikileaks-a i ocenio ga “ilegalnim i opasnim”, jer dokumenta
pokazuju da se većina od oko 200 američkih nuklearnih glava, koliko ih je preostalo u Evropi,
nalazi u Belgiji, Holandiji, Nemačkoj i Turskoj. Odavno se pretpostavlja da se nuklearno oružje
nalazi u ove četiri države, ali su i NATO i vlade tih zemalja do sada odbijale da to potvrde (nuklearne bombe tipa B-61, najstarije američko nuklearno oružje koje se još uvek nalazi u arsenalu,
a napravljeno je 1950-tih godina 20. veka).
26 Evropska komisija donela je set mera koje imaju za cilj da obezbedi bolju zaštitu građana
EU od bezbednosnih pretnji među kojima su: a) zajednička agenda za rasturanje kriminalnih
i terorističkih mreža, za šta se predlaže brza i efikasna zaplena imovine i profita ostvarenog na
ovaj način, upotreba spiskova evropskih putnika i pomoć u borbi protiv korupcije u državama
članicama; b) zaštita od sajber-kriminala, tj. podizanje nivoa bezbednosti za privatna i pravna
lica u sajber prostoru što bi se ostvarilo uspostavljanjem Evropskog centra za borbu protiv sajber-kriminala, mreže timova za brzo reagovanje u informatičkom svetu i uspostavljanje evropskog sistema za razmenu informacija i upozoravanje, i c) jačanje spremnosti Unije da se izbori
sa kriznim situacijama, što se može postići sprovođenjem “klauzule o solidarnosti”, stvaranjem
evropskog kapaciteta za vanredne situacije i uspostavljanjem politike koja će povezivati procene
o opasnostima i rizicima sa donošenjem odluka. Videti: The EU Internal Security Strategy, 26.
novembar 2010., http://www.parliament.uk
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Ovo su novi izazovi novog veka, ali za jasniju viziju bezbednosti u budućnosti, potreban je odgovor na pitanje: koliko su u vojno-odbrambenom smislu
transatlantske veze bile jednake, odnosno da li su bezbednosni sistem NATOa i Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni identitet (ESDI) komplementarni ili
konkurencija jedan drugom i kakav je njihov odnos prema globalnoj i bezbednosnoj arhitekturi zapadnog Balkana, regiona kome pripada i Srbija.
Suštinski princip sistema bezbednosti NATO-a utemeljen je u članu 5. Vašingtonskog ugovora o osnivanju organizacije, po kome je napad na jednu državu potpisnicu napad na sve, što je i srž sistema kolektivne odbrane (bezbednosti). U tradicionalnom vojnom smislu, transatlantska veza bila je nejednaka.
Tokom hladnog rata, ona je suštinski bila zasnovana na američkom zaštitničkom tipu partnerstva nad zapadno-evropljanima. Po okončanju hladnog rata,
evropske članice NATO-a su nastavile da se oslanjaju na vojno prisustvo i angažovanje Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (na Balkanu) i u odnosu na njih su
zaostajale u procesu vojne modernizacije (rat na Kosovu i Metohiji je pokazao
jaz između vojnih kapaciteta SAD-a i kapaciteta zemalja članica EU).
S druge strane, Ugovorom iz Mastrihta (1992) u njegovom tzv. drugom stubu, je uvedena Zajednička spoljna i bezbednosna politika EU, radi poboljšanja
saradnje u oblasti spoljne politike utvrđivanjem pravila za zajedničko delovanje zemalja EU, uključujući i formulisanje zajedničke odbrambene politike.
Uprkos postojanju u to vreme devetočlane Zapadnoevropske unije (ZEU)27
kao integralnog dela razvoja Unije i njenog vojnog ogranka kome je u zadatak
stavljeno razvijanje tešnjih međusobnih institucionalnih odnosa uz mogućnost
integracije u Uniju, bavljenje humanitarnim poslovima, kao i preduzimanje
mirovnih misija, NATO je ostao stub evropske odbrambene politike. Ovaj deo
Ugovora iz Mastrihta predstavlja zametak nove zajedničke evropske odbrambene politike, uz naglasak da ona mora da bude spojiva sa NATO-om.
27 Briselski ugovor iz 1948. kao prvi korak ka posleratnoj konsolidaciji bezbednosnih prilika u zapadnoevropskim zemljama bio je osnivački dokument Zapadnoevropske unije (ZEU).
Taj ugovor je izmenjen 1984. godine. Zapadnoevropska unija formalno ne postoji od 2000. godine, a nadležnosti su prebačene na EU. Stupanjem na snagu Ugovora iz Lisabona, nadležnosti
ZEU prelaze na EU i do jula 2011. ZEU prestaje sa radom. Ipak, tokom čitavog perioda ZEU
funkcioniše kao organizacija sa sedištem u Parizu, i u okviru nje se nalazi Institut za bezbednosne studije koji organizujuje međunarodne konferencije i seminare i redovno izdaje zbornik
radova pod nazivom „Chaillot Papers“ svetski poznatih stručnjaka međunarodnih odnosa i bezbednosti. Videti: http://www.weu.int/institute
52
Na ministarskom sastanku NATO-a u Berlinu (1996) dogovoreno je da
ZEU nadgleda stvaranje Evropskog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog identiteta (ESDI) u okviru strukture NATO-a.28 Evropski bezbednosni i odbrambeni identitet trebalo je da stvori tzv. evropski stub u okviru NATO-a,
delimično omogućavajući evropskim zemljama da vojno deluju tamo gde
NATO to ne želi, ali i da bi olakšao američko finansijsko opterećenje u
održavanju vojnih baza u Evropi, koje tu poseduje od hladnog rata. Sporazum iz Berlina omogućio je evropskim zemljama da, ukoliko to žele, kroz
ZEU koristi aktivu NATO-a. Ovaj sporazum je kasnije izmenjen kako bi
dozvolio EU da upravlja takvim misijama, i poznat je kao Sporazum Berlin
plus (2002).
Zajednička spoljna i bezbednosna politika EU se lagano izgrađivala i na
terenu se intenzivnije angažovala delom i kao posledica transatlantskog nejedinstva 90-tih godina 20. veka. Dok je iskustvo na Kosovu i Metohiji (1999)
vodilo ka pojavljivanju Evropskog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog identiteta,
dotle je transatlantski jaz povodom Iraka (2003) intenzivirao angažovanje evropskih članica NATO-a okupljenih u EU na njegovoj daljoj razradi i formiranju evropskih vojnih snaga.
Na francusko-britanskom samitu u Sen Malou (4. decembar 1998)29 trasiran je put Evropskoj bezbednosnoj i vojnoj politici (European Security
and Defence Policy - ESDP), uz zahtev da se obezbede sredstva i kapaciteti
neophodni za sprovođenje takve politike, što je značilo da je Evropi dat
autonomni glas na međunarodnoj sceni i kapacitet da interveniše u službi
mira, čime je pokrenut proces formiranja evropskih snaga za brzo reagovanje. Inače, u vreme održavanja ovog skupa vladala je posebna politička klima
28 Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3. juni
1996. Videti: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm
29 Na sastanku je rečeno da se sve odluke vezane za evropsku bezbednost i odbrambeni
identitet (ESDI) ubuduće moraju vezivati za EU, a ne više za ZEU. EU je data mogućnost da
preduzima autonomne vojne akcije kada NATO savez u celini nije zainteresovan za angažovanje
svojih snaga, tj. “EU mora da ima sposobnost za autonomnu akciju, podržanu kredibilnim vojnim snagama, sredstvima za odlučivanje o njihovom korišćenju i spremnošću da se to učini u
sklopu reakcije na međunarodne krize”, ali da razvoj takvih autonomnih evropskih snaga ne sme
da znači dupliranje postojećih snaga NATO-a, dok kolektivna odbrana ostaje i dalje u okviru
NATO-a. Videti: Joint Statement by British and French Governments, Franco-British Summit,
Saint-Malo, France, 4. decembar 1998.
53
u Evropi, stvorena zahtevima za internacionalizacijom kosovskog problema,
pripremama za međunarodnu konferenciju o Kosovu i Metohiji, te nagoveštajima moguće vojne intervencije NATO-a u slučaju propadanja diplomatskih napora.
Za EU je, takođe, bilo značajno da je u maju 1999. godine, u vreme intenzivnog bombardovanja SRJ, na snagu stupio Ugovor iz Amsterdama, pošto
je on obuhvatao tzv. zadatke iz Petersberga o preduzimanju akcija humanitarnog karaktera, održavanja mira, upravljanja krizama, uključujući i uspostavljanje mira. Značaj ovog akta je u tome što je Evropska unija trasirala put
za svoje kasnije misije održavanja mira, sa kojima je otpočela na prostoru
bivše SFRJ.
U junu 1999., Evropski Savet je u Kelnu odlučio da do eventualnog zatvaranja ZEU inkorporira ulogu ZEU u okvire EU. Havijar Solana je tada imenovan za Visokog predstavnika za zajedničku spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku i
postavljen je za generalnog sekretara ZEU (uz ovlašćenje da nadležnosti ZEU
prebaci na EU), kako bi se ostvario napredak i Zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike i Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike. EU je svoj prvi
konkretni korak ka jačanju vojnih sposobnosti u skladu sa Evropskom bezbednosnom i odbrambenom politikom načinila kada su njene države članice
potpisale „Helsinške glavne ciljeve“ (1999).
Naime, vojna zavisnost evropskih članica NATO-a od Sjedinjenih država
u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja se ponovila tokom bombardovanja NATO-a na
Kosovu i Metohiji, (to se vremenski dogodilo između skupa u Sen Malou i
samita u Kelnu), duboko je uticala na vlade država članica EU. Na samitu EU
u Helsinkiju (decembar 1999.) dogovoreno je da se kroz plan „Helsinški glavni
ciljevi“ do 2003. godine oko 60.000 vojnika stavi na raspolaganje (i da se održe
bar na jednu godinu) za operacije upravljanja krizama, čime bi bili realizovani
Petersburški zadaci postavljeni u Ugovoru iz Amsterdama. EU je tada istakla svoju rešenost da „razvije autonomne kapacitete radi donošenja odluka
i - tamo gde NATO kao celina nije angažovan - da pokrene i vodi vojne operacije kao odgovor na međunarodne krize“... Ovaj proces će izbeći nepotrebno
dupliranje i ne implicira stvaranje evropske vojske.30
30 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. Videti:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm
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Na samitu Evropskog Saveta u Santa Marija da Feira (jun 2000) utvrđeni su
„modaliteti za razvoj odnosa EU-NATO u četiri oblasti koje pokrivaju bezbednosna pitanja, kapacitete, modalitete pristupa EU aktivi NATO-a i utvrđivanje
dogovora o stalnim konsultacijama“.31 EU je na samitu u Lakenu (decembar
2001) pokrenula „Evropski akcioni plan sposobnosti“ (European Capabilities
Action Plan - ECAP). Međutim, postalo je jasno da „Helsinški glavni ciljevi“
nisu brzo dostižni. U maju 2004. ministri odbrane država članica EU odobrili su
„Glavne ciljeve 2010“, time produžujući rok za realizovanje projekata EU.
Okvir za odnos NATO-EU izgrađen je na osnovu dokumenta usvojenog na
samitu NATO-a u Vašingtonu (april 1999), na zaključcima Evropskog Saveta
na samitu u Nici (decembar 2000) i Severnoatlantskog saveta na samitu u Briselu (decembar 2000) o privrženosti jedinstvenom partnerstu dve organizacije
u upravljanju krizama,32 kao i Zajedničkom deklaracijom EU-NATO (decembar 2002). Naime, uoči samita u Vašingtonu usvojen je dokument NATO-a
o “Strateškom konceptu Saveza” u kome se ističe da će razvijanje koncepta
evropske bezbednosti i odbrambenog identiteta biti nastavljeno isključivo unutar NATO-a, a umesto ZEU, sva pitanja vezana za evropsku odbranu NATO
će ubuduće rešavati isključivo sa EU-om. Ovaj novi odnos NATO-a prema
Evropskom bezbednosnom i odbrambenom identitetu kasnije će prerasti u
tzv. sporazum Berlin plus (2002), prema kome EU za operacije koje predvodi
može da koristi NATO vojnu aktivu, ukoliko postoji potreba za tim. Ovim
sporazumom je omogućeno da NATO podrži operacije upravljanja krizama
pod vođstvom EU, a u kojima NATO kao celina nije angažovan.
EU je uspostavila odgovarajuće modalitete uključenja u svoje operacije
onih država koje nisu članice EU-e, ali jesu članice NATO-a. U to vreme, pet
zemalja je pripadalo ovoj grupi: Bugarska, Rumunija, Island, Norveška i Turska. Na taj način je Zajednička deklaracija NATO-EU o Evropskoj bezbednosnoj i odbrambenoj politici delovala podsticajno u brojnim aspektima.
31 Presidency Conclusion, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000. Videti: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/csm_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-rl.en0.htm
32 Pozitivni rezultat konsultacija i saradnje bilo je regulisanje situacije u južnom delu Srbije
(kraj 2000), kada je, uz evroatlantsku pomoć i učešće jugoslovenske strane, uklonjen rizik od civilnog sukoba između albanske i srpske strane, i popravljene bezbednosne prilike u Makedoniji,
gde je NATO imao zadatak da obezbedi misiju Evropske unije i posmatračku misiju OEBS-a.
55
Sporazum Berlin plus
Pregovori između NATO-a i EU doveli su do Zajedničke deklaracije o uspostavljanju strateškog partnerstva između dve organizacije u oblasti upravljanja
krizama, koja je objavljena 16. decembra 2002.33 Konačni sporazum završen je
11. marta 2003. kao sporazum Berlin plus, i njegov naziv ukazuje da je usledio
posle sporazuma sa samita u Berlinu (1996), na kome je zvanično započela
saradnja ZEU-NATO. Sporazum Berlin plus ima nekoliko glavnih delova:34
• Pristup Evropske unije kapacitetima NATO-a za planiranje, sposobnih
da doprinesu vojnom planiranju za operacije EU;
• Uspostavljanje liste aktive i kapaciteta NATO-a koji bi mogli da se stave
na raspolaganje EU za korišćenje u operacijama koje ona predvodi;
• Označavanje opsega evropskih komandnih opcija (European Command
Options) za operacije EU, dalje razvijanje uloge zamenika Vrhovnog
komandanta savezničkih snaga u Evropi (DSACEUR)35, kako bi u potpunosti i efikasno preuzele svoje (evropske) odgovornosti;
• Dalje prilagođavanje odbrambenog sistema planiranja NATO-a, kako
bi raspoložive snage za operacije koje predvodi EU bile sveobuhvatnije
inkorporirane;
• Sporazum NATO-a i EU obuhvata razmenu klasifikovanih informacija
pod recipročnim pravilima bezbednosne zaštite;
• Procedure za oslobađanje, nadgledanje, povratak i opoziv aktive i kapaciteta NATO-a;
• Sporazum NATO-a i EU o konsultacijama u kontekstu operacija upravljanja krizom od strane EU podrazumeva upotrebu aktive i kapaciteta
NATO-a.
U praksi, procedura nalaže da se upotreba aktive NATO-a od strane EU
mora podvrgnuti načelu „pravo prvog odbijanja“, što znači da NATO prvo
33 Videti: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm
34 Sporazum Berlin plus nije javni dokument i nije ratifikovan od strane nacionalnih parlamenata.Videti: http:/www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20
Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf
35 Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR), ima značajnu ulogu u sporazumima određenim kao komandne operacije. Vojno osoblje EU (EUMS, EU Military Staff)
osnovalo je ćeliju u okviru Vrhovnog štaba Savezničkih snaga za Evropu (Suprime Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE) čije je sedište u Monsu, kako bi poboljšao pripreme za operacije
EU koje zahtevaju aktivu i kapacitete NATO-a, dok je NATO uspostavio stalne kancelarijske
veze u okviru Vojnog osoblja EU.
56
mora da odbije da interveniše u datom slučaju. Odobravanje upotrebe aktive
mora da bude jednoglasno među državama članicama NATO-a. Na primer,
uzdržanost Turske u pogledu korišćenja aktive NATO-a u operaciji „Konkordija“ odložila je njeno angažovanje za više od pet meseci. Strateško partnerstvo između NATO-a i EU kroz sporazum Berlin plus veoma brzo je
dobilo praktičnu primenu na terenu. EU je vodila dve operacije sa podrškom
NATO-a.
Operacija „Konkordija“ u bivšoj jugoslovenskoj republici (BJR) Makedoniji
je prva misija zasnovana na sporazumu Berlin plus i prva vojna misija EU
koja je realizovana u okviru Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike. U
periodu od avgusta 2001. do marta 2003. godine, NATO je osiguravao bezbednost osoblja EU i OEBS-a, te sprovodio obaveze održavanja mira u BJR
Makedoniji. Operaciju NATO-a, „Saveznička harmonija“, koja je završena 31.
marta 2003., je preuzela EU pod nazivom operacija „Konkordija“ angažujući
oko 300 vojnika s ciljem garantovanja bezbednost, i posmatrače OEBS-a koji
su nadgledali sprovođenje Okvirnog sporazuma iz Ohrida. Operacija „Konkordija“ je kompletirana 15. decembra 2003. NATO je predvodio strateško,
operacionalno i taktičko planiranje operacije. Operativni komandant bio je
zamenik Vrhovne savezničke komande u Evropi, sa sedištem u Vrhovnom
štabu Savezničkih snaga za Evropu i sa jednom komandnom jedinicom uspostavljenom u regionalnoj komandi NATO-a u Napulju (trenutno zajedničke
komandne snage - Joint Force Command, JFC).
Druga misija vođena u skladu sa sporazumom Berlin plus je „EUFOR Altea“ u Bosni i Hercegovini, koja je počela 2004. godine. U junu te godine, NATO
je odlučio da okonča svoju misiju Stabilizacionih snaga (SFOR), dok se Savet
EU 12. jula 2004. složio da pokrene evropsku vojnu operaciju u BiH (EUFOR
Althea), kao deo globalne politike u cilju stabilizacije zemlje.36 Prateći odluku
NATO-a sa samita u Istanbulu (2004) o završetku NATO misije Snaga za stabi36 Joint Action 2004/570/FSP adopted by the Council on 12 July 2004. Videti: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:252:0010:0014:FR:PDE. U BiH je Evropska unija
ponudila svoje usluge u preuzimanju misije međunarodnih policijskih snaga (misija SFOR
uključuivala je i međunarodne policijske snage). Policijska misija EU osnovana je u januaru
2003. sa ciljem formiranja održivih, profesionalnih i multietničkih policijskih snaga u skladu
sa evropskim i međunarodnim standardima. Deluje u skladu sa obavezama koje su deo procesa
stabilizacije i pridruživanja EU, posebno u oblastima borbe protiv organizovanog kriminala i
policijske reforme.
57
lizaciju (SFOR) do kraja iste godine, EU je započela svoju misiju u BiH sa 7.000
vojnika, sa ciljem da sprovede vojni aspekt Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma
i održi bezbednu i sigurnu sredinu. Savet bezbednosti UN-a usvojio je (22.
novembar 2004) rezoluciju 1575 kojom se odobrava angažovanje operacije
shodno Glavi VII Povelje. Ponovo je zamenik Vrhovne savezničke komande
u Evropi imenovan za operativnog komandanta operacije EU. Prema rezoluciji 1948 Saveta bezbednosti UN-a, mandat operacije „Althea“ je produžen do
kraja 2011. godine (obnavlja se svake godine).
Između dve prethodno pomenute vojne operacije, EU je pokrenula operaciju
„Artemis“ u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo (12. juni 2003) koju je autonomno
vodila u skladu sa rezolucijom 1484 Saveta bezbednosti UN-a (30. maj 2003)
o angažovanju Privremenih hitnih multinacionalnih snaga (Interim Multinational Emergency Force) u mestu Bunia sa zadatkom obezbeđivanja aerodroma i zašite interno raseljenih lica. Operacija „Artemis“ je bila prva autonomna
vojna misija izvan Evrope, značajan kamen temeljac u razvoju Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike. Ova misija je uspešno stabilizovala situaciju u
mestu Bunia i ojačala prisustvo UN-a u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo. I tokom
izvršavanja ove misije, NATO je bio redovno informisan o namerama EU, uz
puno poštovanje duha i slova dogovora o konsultacijama u slučaju kriza.
Sporazum Berlin plus otvara i nekoliko pitanja u pogledu ovako koncipirane strateške saradnje između NATO-a i EU. Samo dve od svih operacija EU
se vode u skladu sa sporazumom Berlin plus. Kada EU i NATO sprovode dve
istovremene, ali odvojene kopnene ili pomorske operacije, sporazum Berlin
plus se ne primenjuje. Sporazum ne obezbeđuje mogućnost kombinovanja
civilnih i vojnih instrumenata. Davanje nadležnosti širokog obima Evropskoj
uniji - poput ekonomskih, vojnih, političkih i pravnih - stvara mogućnost
formiranja civilnih kapaciteta upravljanja krizom i njihovog stavljanja na raspolaganje NATO-u, što bi u određenoj formi moglo da proširi sporazum Belin plus stvaranjem civilne komponente ovog Sporazuma.
Kada su dve organizacije istovremeno angažovane u jednoj operaciji,
podela klasifikovanih informacija može da stvori problem, kao što je bio
slučaj tokom bombardovanja SRJ, u Avganistanu, ili na obali Somalije gde su
operacije bile komplikovane usled nedostaka zvanične komunikacije. Ovakve
operacionalne teškoće često potiču od političkog neslaganja dve organizacije
58
što ima štetan efekat na terenu (pitanje Kipra ili Turske), a njihovo rešavanje je
u pregovorima i kompromisu. Kako bi se obezbedila operativna komplementarnost između NATO-a i EU, neophodno je da se dalje razradi sporazum
Berlin plus, koji ne pokriva čitav obim moguće saradnje dve organizacije, ali
ima potencijala za to.37
Evropska odbrana
Od 2003. godine zahtevi za akcijama EU su povećani, tako da je EU godišnje preuzimala oko 4 misije, kojih je trenutno 14 (npr. misija nadgledanja mira
u Gruziji, pomorska operacija u blizini obale Somalije).38 Operacije variraju
u pogledu zadataka, koristeći - a ponekad i mešajući - civilne i vojne resurse.
EU se oslanja na nacionalne, kao i štabove NATO-a za vojne operacije. Na
Kosovu i Metohiji, misija EU (EULEX) je preuzela (decembar 2008.) Civilnu
misiju UN-a (UNMIK). Misije EU su se stacionirale i izvan Balkana, tako da u
kontekstu razvoja evropske odbrane možemo razmatrati i budućnost NATO-a
i njegove misije, na koji način će se dalje redefinisati i preusmeravati na nove
oblike delovanje i nove oblasti angažovanja.
Predlog za strukturu evropske odbrane u sedam tačaka su tokom 2003.
godine podnele Nemačka, Francuska, Belgija i Luksemburg. Prema tom
planu do kraja 2003. godine je trebao da bude formiran pokretljivi multinacionalni štab za vojne operacije evropskih intervencionih snaga u rešavanju
kriza i zavođenju mira, koji bi bio nezavisan od NATO-a. Okosnicu evropskih snaga bi činila već postojeća francusko-nemačka brigada, pojačana
trupama iz Belgije i Luksemburga. Za razliku od snaga za brzo delovanje
koje su dobile podršku zbog svog partnerstva sa snagama NATO-a, plan
o evropskoj odbrani je naišao na kritiku SAD-a i Velike Britanije, s obzirom da su ove dve zemlje bile aktivno angažovane u Iraku i da im stvaranje
evropske odbrane nije išlo u prilog, imajući u vidu postojanje NATO strukture. Ovim je produbljen transatlantski jaz nastao povodom angloameričke
intervencije u Iraku.
37 Više o tome: Robert Walter, What future for the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreements?,
European Defence and NATO, Towards which developments and complementaire, European
files, December-January 2011, br. 21, European Security and Defence Assembly of WEU, Paris,
http://www.assembly-weu.eu
38 Izvor: Issues, Quarterly published by the EU Institut for Security Studies, no 27, The European Foreign&Security Policy Institute, Oktobar 2008., Paris, www.iss.europa.eu
59
Anglo-američka koncepcija, za razliku od francusko-nemačkog predloga,
je podrazumevala da se kolektivna odbrana Evrope što više prepusti NATO-u,
te da umesto 60.000 pripadnika iz pomenutog predloga, u snagama za brzo reagovanje sadrži maksimalno 20.000 vojnika. Na samitu EU koji je organizovala predsedavajuća Grčka (2003.), zvanično je dogovoreno da visoki predstavnik EU za spoljnu politiku, Havijer Solana, izradi nacrt evropske bezbednosne
strategije (European Security Strategy), koja je usvojena iste godine.
Formiranje evropskih vojnih snaga u osnovi predstavlja želju da se dovrši
sa stvaranjem evropskog vojnog identiteta. Pomenute snage bi bile embrion
buduće evropske vojske. Ukoliko bi se to ostvarilo, Evropa bi mogla da postane jedinstvena konfederalna država kao što su to Sjedinjene Države. Evropska
ekonomska integracija počela je da obuhvata i oblast vojne industrije, što je
dodatni podsticaj realizovanju jedne takve ideje. Stvaranje ovih snaga nije bilo
samo u domenu teorijskog razmatranja i želje većine država članica EU, već i
praktična potreba koju je zahtevala situacija na terenu, jer je sa odlaskom američkih vojnika iz misija na prostoru bivše SFRJ u mirovne misije na Istok (Irak
i Avganistan) ostavljen prostor za delovanje evropskih snaga.
Predlog da se formiraju evropske vojne snage posredstvom kojih bi Evropa stekla relevantan uticaj u svetu, mnogi - poput Andreja Moravščika - su
primili sa kritikom.39 On je smatrao da je to gubljenje vremena i resursa,
tek “pusta želja” Evrope, a da je stvarna snaga EU u trgovini i misijama
očuvanja mira. Moravščik uzima primer Iraka i njegovu posleratnu obnovu
i ponovno uspostavljanje insitucija vlasti. Po njemu, u tom poslu postoji
samo jedna, “tiha super sila” - Evropa. Ako Evropa teži jačoj globalnoj ulozi,
treba da se fokusira na one komparativne prednosti i da radi ono u čemu
je najbolja, a to su trgovina i misije održavanja mira, smatra Moravščik. U
prilog ovom stavu je i primer Avganistana, gde su Sjedinjene Države obavile
vojnu akciju, nakon čega je usledilo dostavljanje obimne strane pomoći, gde
zapadna Evropa isporučuje 70% ukupne strane pomoći i više od 90% zapadne pomoći Avganistanu. Slično je i u Iraku. Robert Hanter ima potpuno
negativan stav prema evropskim vojnim snagama, nazivajući ih “imitacijom
NATO-a”.40
39 Andrej Moravščik je direktor programa Evropske unije na Univerzitetu u Harvardu. U
svom tekstu “Posle svega, svet je bipolaran” piše o lekcijama koje je Evropa izvukla posle rata u
Iraku. Newsweek, 5. maj 2003. New York, str. 39.
40 Robert Hanter je viši savetnik u korporaciji RAND u Vašingtonu, D.C. Od 1993-98, bio je
60
U osnovi stavova koji se protive formiranju evropskih vojnih snaga nalazi
se zahtev za racionalnom “podelom rada” između Sjedinjenih Država, sa jedne, i evropskih članica NATO-a ,sa druge strane. Sjedinjene Države i EU su
dva najkrupnija aktera na međunarodnoj sceni. Ali ukoliko uzmemo u obzir
prethodno iznetu “podelu rada” u kriznim regionima ili zemljama, kao i porast
ekonomsko-političke uloge Kine i Indije, te ekonomsko-politički oporavak
Rusije, sve to ukazuje da se približavamo multilateralizmu oličenom u UN-u.
Budućnost strateškog partnerstva NATO-a i EU
Uprkos nesuglasicama između evroatlantskih partnera u pogledu formiranja evropske odbrane koja je shvaćena kao konkurencija snagama NATO-a i
protivljenju angažovanja u ratu u Iraku, između snaga EU za brzo reagovanje
i misije NATO-a je uspostavljen komplementaran i odnos partnerstva. Takav
uzajamni odnos čini suštinu transformacije NATO-a i napretka unutar EU u
posthladnoratovskom periodu. 41
Ugovorom iz Lisabona (1. decembar 2009.) EU je stekla međunarodnopravni subjektivitet, ai uvedene su i dve nove ključne funkcije: funkcija predsednika Evropskog Saveta (predsednik EU) i funkcija Visokog predstavnika
EU za spoljnu politiku i bezbednost (šef evropske diplomatije). U Ugovoru
iz Lisabona se kaže da „imajući na umu da politika Unije u skladu sa članom
42. neće prejudicirati specifični karakter bezbednosne i odbrambene politike
izvesnih država članica i da će poštovati obaveze izvesnih država članica koje
svoju zajedničku odbranu vide ostvarenu u NATO-u i u skladu sa Ugovorom o
Severnoatlantskom paktu, biće kompatibilna sa zajedničkom bezbednosnom
i odbrambenom politikom uspostavljenom unutar tog okvira“.42 U skladu sa
postignutim dogovorom ovo je postao aneks Ugovora o Evropskoj uniji i Ugovora o funkcionisanju EU.
američki ambasador u NATO-u. Članak pod nazivom “How deep is Ocean?” (Koliko je dubok
Atlantik?) objavljen je u časopisu Newsday, 23. februar 2003. Videti: http//www.rand.org/hot/
op-eds/022303.html
41 Videti: Др Нано Ружин, „НАТО во современите мегународни односи“, Фондација
„Фридрих Еберт“, канцеларија Скопје, Скопје, 2010., tačke 15 i 16.
42 Treaty on European Union (amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, potpisan 13. decembra
2007), Protocol (No 11) on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the
European Union (OJEU), 9. maj 2008., No C115, str.278. Videti: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0201:0328:EN:PDF
61
Što se odbrambenih perspektiva tiče, Ugovor iz Lisabona je predvideo da
će Evropska bezbednosna i odbrambena politika voditi zajedničkom odbrambenom dogovoru za EU kada o tome jednoglasno odluči Evropski Savet i biće
moguć kada sve države članice daju svoj pristanak kroz uobičajene ustavne
procedure. Uz to, oblast odbrane na raspolaganju je unapređenje saradnje,
stvarajući mogućnost za odbrambene integracije koje isključuju države članice
sa neutralnim politikama (ne ispunjavaju kriterijume i izjave iz člana 1. i 2.
Protokola o Stalnoj strukturnoj saradnji). Države sa značajnim vojnim kapacitetima su predočile formu Stalne strukturne saradnje u odbrani.43
To što je Ugovor iz Lisabona promovisao korake ka izgradnji jače zajedničke odbrambene politike EU koja će „tražiti napredniji okvir za zajedničku
odbrambenu politiku“ i koja „će voditi ka zajedničkoj odbrani“44, u izvesnim
krugovima je ponovo izazvalo strah da bi veća koordinacija EU u pogledu odbrane koja bi mogla da dovede do razvoja njenih vojnih struktura, za posledicu
imala dupliranje NATO strukture i slabljenje tranatlantske veze. Ujedinjena i
kompaktnija Evropa je čak viđena kao potencijalni američki rival u mnogim
političkim oblastima.
Na samitu NATO-a u Lisabonu (19-20 novembar 2010.) usvojen je Novi
strateški koncept organizacije, u kome se kaže da „aktivna i efikasna EU doprinosi opštoj bezbednosti evroatlantske oblasti. Stoga je EU jedinstven i ključni
partner za NATO. Dve organizacije dele većinu članica, a sve države članice
obe organizacije dele zajedničke vrednosti. NATO potvrđuje značaj jače i sposobnije evropske odbrane“.45 NATO i EU mogu i treba da imaju komplementarnu i uzajamno pojačanu ulogu u održavanju međunarodnog mira i bezbednosti kroz unapređenje praktične saradnje u operacijama u čitavom spektru
kriza, od koordinacije do uzajamne podrške, kao i širenje političkih konsultacija kako bi bila obuhvaćena sva pitanja od zajedničkog interesa, navodi se u
ovom dokumentu.
43 Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of ESDP, Egmont Royal
Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2010. http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/
ep20.pdf
44 Videti: Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index-en.htm
45 Paragraf 32. „Strateškog koncepta za odbranu i bezbednost članica Organizacije Severnoatlantskog pakta“, usvojen od strane šefova država i vlada u Lisabonu (novembar 2010); Videti: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic.concept.2010-eng.pdf
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Činjenica je da NATO i EU nisu samodovoljne institucije, već su potrebne
jedna drugoj kako bi upravljale krizama ili održavale mir. EU je uspela da
izgradi instrumente delovanja jedne „meke sile“,46 koji su adekvatniji u procesu
stabilizovanja situacije i u rukovođenju civilnim misijama, u poređenju sa delovanjem SAD-a kao „čvrste sile“, samostalno ili kroz misije NATO-a. Ugovor
EU iz Lisabona i Novi strateški koncept NATO-a pokazuju da su bezbednosni
i odbrambeni odnosi između dve organizacije razvijeni, te da su sazreli do stepena da mogu da idu i dalje od odredaba sporazuma Berlin plus, pribegavajući
komplementarnim civilnim i vojnim kapacitetima. Komplementarnost i potencijalna sinergija između dve organizacije, koje do sada nisu u potpunosti
iskorišćene, sada dobijaju priliku za to.
Rad EU na usavršavanju sopstvenog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog identiteta
vrlo je intenzivan, ali još uvek nedovoljan kako bi se moglo konstatovati da EU
„gospodari“ evropskim kontinentom, tako što je usavršila sopstvene mogućnosti
da predupredi ili reši sve negativne tokove koji mogu dovesti do eventualnog povratka sukoba na kontinentu. Uprkos određenim uspesima u evropskoj spoljnoj
politici (angažovanje u rešavanju sukoba u Gruziji), EU je u odnosu na svog
atlantskog partnera i dalje daleko od toga da postane „jaka“ vojna sila i koherentan globalni akter. Pragmatizam će učiniti svoje, a to znači da će prema potrebi
evropski partneri nastaviti da se vojno oslanjaju na američkog partnera i NATO
strukturu. I danas imamo podele u viđenju buduće uloge NATO-a među evroatlantskim partnerima (atlantisti, evropejci i centralnoevropske zemlje). Mesto
Saveza u sadašnjim transatlantskim odnosima odrediće, najpre, smanjenje
značaja Saveza za same Sjedinjene Države, kao što je pokazano tokom operacije
u Avganistanu i smanjenje nivoa američkog vojnog učešća u misijama NATOa; i drugo, porast spremnosti i sposobnosti EU (veličina, intenzitet i otpornost
misija EU) da se vojno angažuje u mirovnim misijama i misijama očuvanja
mira u inostranstvu, razvijajući istovremeno sopstveni diplomatski profil, što je
učinjeno sa Službom za spoljnopolitičke poslove.
U sklopu razmatranja budućeg bezbednosnog sistema u svetu i Evropi ne treba zaboraviti ni predlog ruskog predsednika Dimitrija Medvedeva na skupu sa
nemačkim političkim, parlamentarnim i civilnim liderima (5. jun 2008., Berlin,
Nemačka) o stvaranju novog sistema bezbednosti u Evropi i potpisivanju panevropskog bezbednosnog Pakta. Medvedev je pozvao sve evropske države da
46 Pojam „meke moći“ lansirao je devedesetih godina 21. veka Džozef Naj, profesor na
Harvard Univerzitetu i definisao je kao sposobnost uticaja u međunarodnim odnosima kroz
kulturne, političke i institucionalne vrednosti.
63
učestvuju u ovom procesu, „svaka u skladu sa svojim nacionalnim mogućnostima,
dok bi svaka ideja o alijansama i grupama država trebalo bi da ostane izvan ovih
okvira“. To podrazumeva da NATO i države članice EU ne treba, bar ne zvanično,
da koordiniraju svoje stavove u pregovorima, ukoliko proces bude napredovao. Taj panevropski bezbednosni Pakt treba da, u duhu Povelje UN, „konačno
razjasni ulogu upotrebe sile u evroatlantskoj oblasti“, što implicira da bi za odluke
NATO-a bilo potrebno odobrenje izvan Saveza. Ovu rusku ideju o transformaciji
postojećeg sistema bezbednosnih institucija i potpisivanju panevropskog Pakta,
predsednik Dimitrij Medvedev je ponovio na forumu o Svetskoj politici (8. oktobar 2008., Evijan, Francuska). Inače, jaču saradnju EU sa Rusijom podržavaju
njene najveće države članice, Francuska, Nemačka i Italija.47
EU je prihvatljivija za zemlje zapadnog Balkana; u Srbiji postoji podrška
EU, ali istovremeno i emotivni otklon prema NATO-u (zbog bombardovanja SRJ). Zemlje zapadnog Balkana, osim Srbije, prihvatile su Akcioni plan
članstva u NATO-u i učestvuju u mirovnim misijama u Avganistanu. Pripadnici Vojske Srbije, Ministarstco unutrašnjih poslova i medicinsko osoblje
koji već učestvuju u mirovnim misijama UN,48 su spremni da učestvuju i u
mirovnim misijama EU.49 S obzirom na prožimanje NATO-a i EU kada su u
pitanju mirovne misije, kao i tesan zajednički ili sukcesivni rad, to znači da bi
u određenom trenutku - iako zvanično ne učestvuje u misijama NATO-a – za
Srbiju postojala izvesna tačka dodirivanja sa njima. Učešćem u mirovnim operacijama u svetu se povećava i spoljnopolitički kredibilitet države, dok vojnici
stiču iskustva na terenu, unapređuju svoje sposobnosti i interoperabilnost.
Delovanje samostalnih misija EU na i izvan evropskog kontinenta paralelno
sa misijama NATO ukazuje na vrednost i potrebu traženja multilateralnog
47 Videti: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press
Department, http://www.in.mid.ru/brp4.nsf/2008/06/05/html i http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/
speeches/2008/10/08/html
48 Pripadnici sistema odbrane trenutno su samostalno angažovani u mirovnim misijama
UN u Kongu, Liberiji i Obali Slonovače; u Čadu su zajedno sa pripadnicima norveškog kontingenta, a na Kipru su u sastavu slovačko-mađarskog kontingenta. Predstoji mirovna misija UN
u Libanu zajedno sa španskim kontingentom i na obali Somalijskog mora. Pripadnici Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova Srbije su angažovani u mirovnim misijama UN u Liberiji i na Haitiju
(gde su posle razornog zemljotresa u januaru 2010. godine pomogli spasavanju povređenih i
raščišćavanju ruševina, a početkom 2011. rade na sprečavanju širenja kolere među stanovništvom Haitija).
49 Skupština Narodne Republike Srbije je usvojila odluku o učešću ukupno 134 pripadnika
Ministarstva odbrane i Vojske Srbije (98 osoba) i Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova (36) u ovim
misijama.
64
rešenja kriza, tj. drugih alternativa koje su tokom poslednje decenije 20. veka
bile marginalizovane ili tek u razvoju. Multilateralni pristup u upravljanju krizama olakšava transatlantsku saradnju i omogućava efikasnije suočavanje sa
globalnim izazovima. U 21. veku se stvoreni uslovi za reafirmisanje zajedničkih
ciljeva uz dijalog i bez nametanja rešenja. Vodeće države članice NATO-a i
EU imaju ključna mesta u glavnoj instituciji UN – Savetu bezbednosti - koji
treba da bude težište zajedničkog rada i odlučivanja o svetskim bezbednosnim
pitanjima. U skladu sa relevantnim rezolucijama Saveta bezbednosti UN i u
saradnji sa drugim akterima, uključujući i EU, NATO je preduzeo operacije u
Africi.50 Širi kontekst saradnje NATO-a i EU im omogućava da budu pomoćno
sredstvo u realizovanju ciljeva i zadataka svetske organizacije, UN, ali i da time
pojačaju međusobnu političku i operacionalnu koheziju.
Zaključak
Strateško partnerstvo između NATO-a i EU u upravljanju krizama građeno
je kroz pregovore koji su rezultovali sporazumom Berlin plus (period od 16.
decembra 2002. do 11. marta 2003.), a koji je veoma brzo dobio praktičnu
primenu na terenu – najpre u BJR Makedoniji (2003), a potom i u Bosni i
Hercegovini (2004). Tada je EU preuzela misije od NATO-a, koje su bile prve
u skladu sa Evropskom bezbednosnom i odbrambenom politikom. Evropske
misije na Balkanu su bile predvorje za evropsko angažovanje izvan evropskog
kontinenta (npr. u Demokratskoj Republici Kongo), te istovremeno pokazale
želju EU da se izgradi i postane globalni politički akter. To je povremeno izazivalo osećaj konkurencije kod NATO-a i njegove vodeće države članice, SAD,
a želja EU da formira evropsku odbranu je oštro kritikovana, naročito ako se
ima u vidu reakcija bivše američke državne sekretarke, Madlen Olbrajt, na formiranje Evropskih snaga za brzo reagovanje (Sen Malo, 1998), oličena u „tri
D“, koja su označila američka očekivanja u pogledu Evropske bezbednosne i
odbrambene politike: nema Dupliranja (no Duplication) onoga što je efikasno
50 Slučaj piraterije u Adenskom zalivu i na Rogu Afrike preti da ugrozi međunarodnu humanitarnu pomoć u Africi, kao i bezbednost pomorskog trgovinskog puta. Na zahtev generalnog sekretara UN, 2008. godine, NATO je pokrenuo operaciju „Saveznički snabdevač“ (Allied
Provider) kako bi se obezbedila pratnja brodu Svetskog programa UN za hranu. Usledila je operacija „Saveznički zaštitnik“ (Allied Protector) 2009. godine, a sadašnja pod nazivom „Okeanski
štit“ (Ocean Shield) dodatno obučava regionalne zemlje u izgradnji sopstvenih mogućnosti u
borbi protiv piraterije.
65
urađeno u NATO-u, nema razdvajanja (no Decoupling) od SAD-a i NATO-a,
nema diskriminacije (no Discrimination) prema državama ne članicama EU,
kao što je Turska.
Suština odnosa dve organizacije je u opredeljenju da, iako možda ne izgleda
moguće da sve preduzmu zajedno, imperativ je da obezbede uslove da učine
sve za ono što jesu zajednički preduzele. Strateško partnerstvo između ove dve
organizacije ukazuje na neophodnost unapređenja globalnog pristupa upravljanja krizama i prihvatanja šireg konteksta za transatlantsko delovanje oličeno
u sve prisutnijem multilateralizmu i ulozi UN u svetu. Unapređenje političke
i operacionalne kohezije NATO-a i EU tek predstoji u novoj dekadi 21. veka.
66
67
Republika Srbija i Zajednička bezbednosna i
odbrambena politika51
Filip Ejdus52
Kada je gvozdena zavesa u Evropi pala, gotovo sve bivše istočnoevropske komunističke države su najpre zatražile, a zatim i stekle članstvo u EU i NATO-u.
Dok se ostatak Evrope tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka u miru ujedinjavao, prostor zapadnog Balkana se politički usitnjavao. Čim su oružani sukobi
okončani, novonastale države na ovim prostorima su uključivanje u evroatlantske bezbednosne tokove prepoznale kao svoj primarni nacionalni interes. Sve do
kraja 2007. godine Srbija nije predstavljala izuzetak u tom pogledu. Međutim,
u decembru 2007. godine, uoči jednostranog proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova i
Metohije, Narodna skupština je proglasila vojnu neutralnost Republike Srbije.
Time je atlantska komponenta bezbednosne integracije Republike Srbije za sada
ograničena na članstvo u NATO programu „Partnerstvo za mir“ (PzM). Evropska komponenta bezbednosnih integracija ostala je za Srbiju otvorena, ali još
uvek neiskorišćena, mogućnost.
51 Tekst je objavljen kao deo publikacije „Ka Borbenoj grupi Zapadni Balkan –
Vizija odbrambene integracije Srbije u EU 2010–2020“, Autori: Filip Ejdus, Marko Savković i
Nataša Dragojlović, Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku, maj 2010
52 Autor je asistent i doktorant na Fakultetu političkih nauka, Univerziteta u Beogradu.
68
Evropska komponenta bezbednosnih integracija –
neiskorišćena mogućnost?
Nakon jednostranog proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova i Metohije u februaru 2008. godine, Republika Srbija je nastavila svoj put ka EU. On je najpre
bio potvrđen potpisivanjem Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SSP) u
aprilu 2008. godine, a zatim i odmrzavanjem Prelaznog trgovinskog sporazuma, kao i liberalizacijom viznog režima u decembru 2009. godine. U prvoj polovini 2011. godine očekuje se i dobijanje statusa kandidata za članstvo u EU.
Članstvo Srbije u Evropskoj uniji predstavlja ključni spoljnopolitički prioritet
Republike Srbije. Aktuelna Vlada je pristupanje EU, pored očuvanja teritorijalnog integriteta Srbije i regionalne saradnje, postavila kao jedan od tri prioriteta spoljne politike. Usklađivanje domaćih zakona i propisa sa evropskim
predstavlja u ovoj fazi integracije prioritet reformi i u ostalim oblastima politike. Međutim, za razliku od gotovo svih ostalih država u regionu zapadnog Balkana, Republika Srbija do sada, osim reformi u oblasti pravosuđa i unutrašnjih
poslova koje su bile preduslov za viznu liberalizaciju, nije učinila značajniji napor da se uključi u bezbednosne integrativne tokove unutar EU. To se posebno
odnosi na Zajedniču bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku (ZBOP), što je u
ovoj fazi procesa integracije donekle razumljivo. Iako se, formalno gledano, to
može odlagati sve do sticanja punopravnog članstva u EU, autori ovog teksta
smatraju da je u nacionalnom interesu Republike Srbije da što pre počne da
učestvuje u ZBOP.
Da je proaktivno učestvovanje u ZBOP u nacionalnom interesu Republike
Srbije, posredno proističe i iz Strategije nacionalne bezbednosti, koju je Narodna skupština usvojila u oktobru 2009. godine. U ovom dokumentu, koji je
definisao osnovne nacionalne interese u oblasti bezbednosti, navedeno je da
„poseban značaj za razvoj i napredak Srbije imaju očuvanje unutrašnje stabilnosti, vladavina prava i razvoj demokratije i demokratskih institucija i integracija u Evropsku uniju i druge međunarodne strukture“.53 Takođe, u njoj
piše da „svojom spoljnom politikom, unapređivanjem saradnje sa susedima i
izgradnjom zajedničkih kapaciteta i mehanizama za rešavanje protivrečnosti,
sporova i svih vrsta izazova, rizika i pretnji na regionalnom i globalnom planu,
Republika Srbija doprinosi stvaranju mirnog, stabilnog i sigurnog bezbedno53 Republika Srbija, Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, oktobar 2009, str. 13.
69
snog okruženja“.54 Takođe, Strategija ističe da se „Republika Srbija (se) zalaže
za regionalnu saradnju u oblastima zajedničke obuke i angažovanja elemenata
sistema bezbednosti u multinacionalnim operacijama, upravljanju krizama i
upravljanju granicom”.55 Dalje, u ovom dokumentu navodi se da „kroz proces
evropskih integracija, Republika Srbija izražava spremnost da izgrađuje kapacitete i sposobnosti sistema nacionalne bezbednosti, u skladu sa standardima i
obavezama koje proizilaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike“.56
Nažalost, ostali strateški dokumenti Republike Srbije ovu mogućnost za
sada nisu u dovoljnoj meri prepoznali kao važnu. U Nacionalnoj strategiji Srbije za pristupanje Srbije i Crne Gore EU, koju je Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila
u junu 2005. godine, piše da će „Srbija nastojati da svoju spoljnu politiku vodi
što više u skladu sa načelima Zajedničke spoljne i bezbednosne politike EU“.57
Međutim, ovaj dokument nijednom rečju ne pominje Evropsku bezbednosnu
i odbrambenu politiku. U Nacionalnom programu za integraciju u EU, koji je
Vlada Republike Srbije usvojila 2008. godine, piše da „Republika Srbija kontinuirano unapređuje dijalog sa Evropskom unijom i reformiše civilne i vojne
kapacitete kako bi, između ostalog, bila spremna da nakon punopravnog članstva preuzme obaveze koje proizilaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene
politike i učestvuje u operacijama upravljanja krizama pod vođstvom EU“.58
Međutim, na primeru ostalih država u regionu vidi se da je nepotrebno odlagati integraciju u ZBOP do punopravnog članstva u EU. U poslednjoj verziji
ovog dokumenta iz decembra 2009. godine, u prilogu koje je dalo Ministarstvo odbrane, kaže se da je „Republika Srbija (je) spremna da učestvovanjem
u aktivnostima Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, učestvovanjem
u NATO programu „Partnerstvo za mir“, kao i u okviru regionalnih inicijativa, jača sopstvenu bezbednost i da dijalogom i saradnjom doprinosi miru i
54 Ibid, str. 11.
55 Ibid., str. 16.
56 Ibid. str. 16. Ovakva strateška opredeljenja potvrđena su i Strategijom odbrane (2009).
Autori ovog teksta smatraju da je ovo opredeljenje potrebno potvrditi i konkretizovati izradom
i usvajanjem ostalih strategijsko-doktrinarnih dokumenata, čija je izrada u toku, a usvajanje
najavljeno u dokumentu „Nacionalni plan integracija“ do kraja 2010. godine. To su Strategijski
pregled odbrane, Doktrina vojske, Dugoročni program razvoja sistema odbrane i Srednjoročni
programi i planovi razvoja sistema odbrane.
57 Vlada Republike Srbije, Nacionalna strategija Srbije za pristupanje Srbije i Crne Gore,
Beograd, juni 2005, str. 43.
58 Ibid, str. 785.
70
stabilnosti“.59 Takođe, ističe se spremnost Republike Srbije da, nakon stupanja
na snagu SSP, intenzivira dijalog sa EU o pitanjima koja se odnose na bezbednost i odbranu.
Uprkos polovičnom deklarativnom zalaganju, donosioci odluka u Republici Srbiji su do sada bili izuzetno pasivni kada je reč o ZBOP. Oni su se do
sada, koliko je poznato autorima ovog teksta, samo u nekoliko navrata javno
izjasnili o mogućem učestvovanju Srbije u ZBOP. Prvi put je novembra 2008.
godine tadašnji načelnik Generalštaba Zdravko Ponoš, nakon susreta sa šefom
Vojnog komiteta generalom Anri Bantežeom u Briselu, izneo nekoliko ideja
koje su išle u ovom pravcu. Tom prilikom on je izjavio da Srbija treba da razvija saradnju u okviru EBOP, a potencijalno i u borbenim grupama EU kao i da
„postoji mogućnost da na vojnom planu uradimo čak i korak dalje u odnosu
na neke druge oblasti pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji”, jer je stvorena „mogućnost da naši oficiri učestvuju u vežbama EU u statusu posmatrača, isto kao i
da oficiri iz EU budu pozvani da prisustvuju vežbama Vojske Srbije”.60 Takođe,
ministar unutrašnjih poslova Ivica Dačić je, najpre u aprilu a potom i u julu
2009. godine, nagovestio mogućnost učestvovanja srpske policije u operacijama EU.61 Mediji se ovom temom u Srbiji nisu mnogo bavili, a njihova pažnja
je uglavnom usmerena na odnos Srbije i NATO-a. Osim toga, stručna javnost
se, uz nekoliko izuzetaka, nije značajnije bavila problemom integracije Srbije
u ZBOP.62 Osim na nekoliko obrazovnih seminara, o ovoj temi se još uvek nije
povela šira stručna, odnosno javna rasprava.63 Postavlja se, stoga, pitanje da li
59 Ovaj dokument se periodično revidira, tako da ova formulacija u skoroj budućnosti
može opet biti promenjena.
60 Vojska Srbije, „General Ponoš na sastanku vojnog komiteta Evroatlantskog partnerstva”.
Videti: http://www.vs.rs/index.php?news_article=219be3cc-0cfb-102c-ad2f-79b934d89d8d
61 RTS, 1. april 2009, „Srpski policajci u misijama EU“, Videti: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/53278/Srpski+policajci+u+misijama++EU.html;
RTS, 2. jul 2009, „Policija spremna za mirovne misije“, Videti: http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Društvo/71345/Policija+spremna+za+mirovne+misije.html
62 Jedan od prvih koji je predložio proaktivan stav Srbije u ovoj oblasti bio je Srđan Gligorijević iz ISAC fonda. Videti: Srđan Gligorijević, „Partnerstvo je moguće”, Evropski forum,
novembar - decembar 2006, br. 11–12.
63 Državni službenici Republike Srbije u nekoliko ciklusa učestvovali su u kursevima o
EBOP koji se sprovode u saradnji MO Austrije, Nemačke, Mađarske i Evropskog bezbednosnog i odbrambenog koledža. Videti: ESDP Course open to Western Balkan states, http://www.
eu2006.at/en/News/information/2905esvp.html. Takođe, u okviru nevladinog sektora održano
je nekoliko kurseva specijalizovanih za EBOP, kao na primer u okviru ISAC fonda ili Škole za
evropsku bezbednost Centra za civilno-vojne odnose. Videti: ISAC fond: http://www.isac-fund.
71
Srbija zaista treba da čeka da postane punopravni član EU kako bi počela da
učestvuje najpre u civilnim i vojnim operacijama kriznog menadžmenta EU,
a zatim i u njenim borbenim grupama. Iako proaktivan pristup ovoj oblasti
nije formalna obaveza države koja još nije postala ni kandidat za članstvo, on
bi predstavljao snažan adut diplomatije Republike Srbije u procesu evropske
integracije.64 Osim toga, integracija kroz ZBOP može delimično predstavljati
kompenzaciju za prilike propuštene privremenim ili trajnim odustajanjem od
članstva u NATO-u. Konačno, time bi Srbija pokazala da može da bude konstruktivan partner, kao i da može da doprinese bezbednosti Evrope. Kao što
smo videli, to su već uveliko prepoznale druge države zapadnog Balkana, koje
su otpočele integraciju u ZBOP i već učestvuju u misijama EU. Takođe, i u
samoj EU postoji pozitivan stav o uključivanju Srbije u ZBOP. O tome svedoči
i izjava pomenutog generala Bantaža da bi „Evropska unija (bi) veoma cenila
kada bi se Srbija uključila u mirovne operacije EU“.65
Potrebno je napomenuti da EU u ovoj fazi pregovora o učlanjenju Srbije
neće insistirati na ZBOP, s obzirom na to da i sama nema izgrađene kriterijume i standarde u ovoj oblasti. U prethodnim talasima proširenja, koordinacija
reformi sistema odbrane i odbrambena integracija tekla je uglavnom posredstvom NATO-a. Članstvo bivših komunističkih država u ovom vojnom savezu
bilo je dovoljan signal Evropskoj uniji da su ove zemlje obavile neophodne
reforme u ovoj oblasti.66 Međutim, Lisabonski ugovor, koji je stupio na snagu
1. decembra 2009. godine, dalekosežno e uticati na sposobnost EU da se nosi
sa izazovima 21. veka, posebno u oblasti spoljne i bezbednosne politike. Ukoliko želi da ubrza proces svoje evropske integracije i da nadoknadi izgubljeno
org/lat/esdp.php
Videti: CCVO: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/Obrazovanje/3158/Skola+za+evropsku+bez
bednost+%282008-2009
64 U Sporazumu o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju strane se obavezuju da će unapređivati politički dijalog radi većeg približavanja „stavova strana o međunarodnim pitanjima, uključujući
u to i pitanja u vezi sa Zajedničkom spoljnom i bezbednosnom politikom“. Međutim, u ovom
Sporazumu uopšte se ne spominju približavanja u oblasti ZBOP.
65 „Srbija treba da se uključi u mirovne misije“, intervju sa generalom Anri Bantažeom. Videti: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090619_Politika_Daily-Tereza_Bojkovic.pdf
66 Izuzetak su, naravno, neutralne države. Kada je Irska ušla u EZ 1973. godine još uvek nije
postojala Zajednička spoljna, bezbednosna i odbrambena politika. Austrija, Finska i Švedska
ušle su EU 1995. godine. Tada je EU već stvorila Zajedničku spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku,
ali još uvek ne i Evropsku bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku. Kipar i Malta, koje su u EU ušle
2004. godine, i dalje imaju prilično ograničenu ulogu u EBOP.
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vreme, Srbija nesumnjivo treba da, mnogo pre sticanja punopravnog članstva,
otpočne i svoju bezbednosnu integraciju u EU. Jedan od načina da to učini jeste taj da u periodu između 2010. i 2020. godine zajedno sa ostalim državama
zapadnog Balkana razvije borbenu grupu.
Stvaranjem zajedničke borbene grupe države zapadnog Balkana bi učinile simboličan gest, ne samo istorijskog pomirenja među narodima na ovom
prostoru, već i nagoveštaja nove ere u kojoj bi region, od bezbednosnog tereta za EU, prerastao u bezbednosni dobitak. Prednosti i izazovi Borbene grupe zapadni Balkan Postavlja se pitanje zašto bi države na zapadnom Balkanu
osnivale posebnu borbenu grupu kada jednostavno mogu da sarađuju unutar
drugih postojećih borbenih grupa i da na taj način izbegnu čitav niz komplikovanih političkih, finansijskih i tehničkih izazova. Postoji niz argumenata zbog
kojih je usvajanje upravo ovakvog regionalnog pristupa u interesu svih država
regiona. Prvo, kulturne i jezičke sličnosti koje postoje na zapadnom Balkanu
bi olakšale komunikaciju unutar BGZB. Jezička interoperabilnost je izuzetno
važan kohezioni faktor međunarodne vojne integracije. Dakle, kulturna i jezička bliskost, baš kao što je slučaj u ostalim borbenim grupama EU, mogle bi
da budu vezivno tkivo efikasnijeg funkcionisanja i BGZB.
Drugo, učestvovanje u mnogobrojnim regionalnim inicijativama, članstvo u
programu „Partnerstvo za mir“ i prihvatanje NATO standarda učiniće ove vojske
tehnički i organizaciono interoperabilnim. Iako su njihove doktrine nacionalno
obojene, činjenica da je nekoliko vojski zapadnog Balkana izraslo iz bivše JNA, u
izvesnoj meri utiče na sličnosti obuka. Pri tom, vojske na zapadnom Balkanu koriste slično naoružanje i vojnu opremu, koji su u dobroj meri nasleđeni od JNA.
Stvaranje zajedničke borbene grupe od država zapadnog Balkana zahtevalo
bi i funkcionalnu podelu posla, u kojoj bi svaka država pored borbenih elemenata razvijala svoje „posebne sposobnosti“. Na primer, Hrvatska bi mogla da
doprinese svojim transportnim kapacitetima, Srbija sanitetom i ABHO, BiH
svojim timovima za deminiranje, a Makedonija svojim iskustvom specijalne
jedinice, koja je angažovana u Iraku. Time bi bili smanjeni troškovi i dodatno unapređena profesionalizacija oružanih snaga. Međutim, za punu interoperabilnost nesumnjivo su potrebni zajednička obuka i vojne vežbe. Ovo bi
otpočelo najpre učestvovanjem u drugim borbenim grupama EU, a kasnije i
učestvovanjem unutar zajedničke BGZB.
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Treće, ovakav regionalni pristup doprineo bi razvoju međusobnog poverenja između nekada zaraćenih strana. Baš kao što je francusko-nemačka brigada osnovana 1987. godine predstavljala simbol ujedinjene Evrope, tako bi
i BGZB mogla da predstavlja simbol trajnog pomirenja država i naroda zapadnog Balkana integrisanog u EU. Osim toga, ovakav angažman doprineo bi
integraciji odbrambene industrije, usaglašavanju zajedničkih programa modernizacije i nabavke naoružanja i vojne opreme. Zajedničko iskustvo u oblasti
odbrambene politike pozitivno bi uticalo na jačanje poverenja kako unutar
zapadnog Balkana, tako i između zemalja zapadnog Balkana i EU. Multinacionalna borbena grupa, sastavljena od nekada zaraćenih strana, mogla bi da
predstavlja izuzetno snažan simbolični doprinos Zajedničkoj spoljnoj i bezbednosnoj politici EU. Time bi EU
ojačala svoju poziciju „meke super sile“, koja je u stanju da ratom zahvaćene
regione transformiše u bezbednosne zajednice, a „neuspešne države“ u uspešne demokratije.
Svakako je neophodno imati u vidu potencijalne teškoće i izazove formiranja BGZB. Prvi izazov predstavlja još uvek sveže sećanje na međusobne sukobe do kojih je došlo tokom raspada Jugoslavije devedesetih godina dvadesetog
veka. Postavlja se pitanje kako bi nekada sukobljene vojske sarađivale u jednom multinacionalnom bataljonu. Međutim, iz evropskog iskustva je poznato
da ukoliko dođe do pomirenja na političkom nivou vojske ne predstavljaju
prepreku u saradnji. Drugi, naizgled mnogo veći izazov, predstavljaju nerešeni
politički problemi i teritorijalni sporovi. Da li je realno očekivati da države,
čije odnose opterećuju nerazrešeni politički sporovi, odluče zajedno oforme
borbenu grupu? Međutim, kao što je pokazao proces evropske integracije, međudržavne probleme je mnogo lakše rešavati u atmosferi saradnje. Odbrambenom saradnjom moguće je izgraditi poverenje, a poverenje odstranjuje neizvesnost, umanjuje bezbednosnu dilemu i uklanja revizionističke motive. Vojna
integracija država zapadnog Balkana je deo rešenja a ne deo problema.
Treći problem je organizacioni i odnosi se, na prvom mestu, na problem
„vodeće države“ (framework nation), odnosno na problem države koja bi bila
predvodnik BGZB. Za sada je teško pretpostaviti da bi se lokalne države mogle dogovoriti oko toga da neka od dve najveće države u regionu, tj. Srbija ili
Hrvatska, bude „vodeća država“. Možda je najbolje da tu ulogu stoga preuzme
Bosna i Hercegovina, koja bi u međuvremenu mogla da bude opcija koja je
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prihvatljiva za sve. Međutim, ukoliko do dogovora ne bi moglo da dođe, možda je moguće pronaći treću vanregionalnu državu koja bi bila prihvatljiva za
sve i koja ima relevantno iskustvo učestvovanja u borbenim grupama EU. Države koje bi bile prihvatljive za ceo region mogle bi da budu Grčka, Rumunija
i Austrija. Izazov bi mogli da predstavljaju i unutrašnji politički otpori desno
orijentisanih snaga u državama zapadnog Balkana, ali i levo orijentisanih snaga, za koje bi u perspektivi angažovanje u operacijama nametanja mira moglo
biti neprihvatljivo. Svaka država u ovom multinacionalnom bataljonu oslanjala bi se na sopstvene posebne sposobnosti. Iako je u ovom trenutku moguće
iznositi samo spekulacije, navešćemo neke od posebnih sposobnosti na koje
države u regionu mogu da računaju. Bosna i Hercegovina bi mogla da iskoristi svoje dokazano uspešno razvijene snage za deminiranje, dok bi Hrvatska
mogla da iskoristi iskustvo svog voda vojne policije, koji se u ovom trenutku
nalazi u Avganistanu. Pripadnici makedonskih specijalnih snaga imaju iskustvo asimetričnog ratovanja u Iraku, te bi u tom pogledu mogli da doprinesu
BGZB. Načelni nivo ambicija ukupnog učešća jedinica Vojske Srbije mogao bi
da bude jedan pešadijski bataljon, vod vojne policije, vod ABHO, medicinski
timovi, laka poljska bolnica, što predstavlja strukturne elemente slične onima
koji su već deklarisani kroz učešće Vojske Srbije u NATO Procesu planiranja i
revizije (PARP).
Takođe, odlučioci i planeri će tokom implementacije koncepta BG morati,
između ostalog, da reše pitanje obuke, odnosno pitanje toga da li će se ona
odvijati zajednički ili odvojeno. Primera radi, obuka za HELBROC najpre je
realizovana posebno po kontingentima, da bi u kasnijoj fazi realizacije bili
iskorišćeni kapaciteti Centra za obuku učesnika u multinacionalnim operacijama u mestu Kilkis, u Grčkoj. Takav model bi mogao da bude iskorišćen
i u BGZB, a Srbija bi mogla da ponudi kapacitete na Vojnoj akademiji, svoj
Centar za mirovne operacije u Beogradu, kao i kapacitete novoizgrađene baze
„Jug“ („Cepotina“). Veoma važno je i pitanje taktičkog i strateškog transporta.
Kao što smo ranije u tekstu naveli, borbena grupa može da bude razmeštena
na udaljenosti do 6.000 km. Ovaj problem je u slučaju HELBROC rešen tako
što su oružane snage Grčke ustupile transportne avione Antonov An-14 i Herkules C-130. Oružane snage država u regionu mogle bi zajednički da pristupe
ovom problemu i da udruženim naporima i investicijama, zajedno sa ostalim
državama EU, razviju sposobnosti za taktički i strateški transport.
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Neformalne pregovore o osnivanju BGZB neophodno je započeti što pre.
Teško je reći kako će za par godina izgledati procedure za oblikovanje, trening
i sertifikaciju borbenih grupa, s obzirom na činjenicu da se u ovom trenutku
odvija proces prilagođavanja procedura za odlučivanje u ZSBP promenama
koje je doneo Lisabonski sporazum. Stoga, i za prilagođavanje u ovoj oblasti i
za dostizanje standarda važi poznata teza da je Evropska unija za sve zemlje u
procesu pristupanja pokretna meta.
U svakom slučaju, do formalnog osnivanja borbene grupe svakako je potrebno uspešno okončati pregovore u Vojnom komitetu EU, zatim pregovore sa partnerima koji učestvuju u stvaranju borbene grupe, a potom odabrati
„vodeću državu“ i dovršiti usaglašavanje standarda za oblikovanje, trening i
sertifikaciju borbene grupe. U narednom delu teksta iznećemo četvorofaznu
mapu puta koja bi do 2020. godine dovela do formiranja BGZB.
Mapa puta uključivanja Republike Srbije u ZBOP
1. Faza pripremanja i posmatranja (2010–2012)
Iz nekoliko razloga upravo je 2010. godina pogodna za otpočinjanje prve
faze. Najpre, Lisabonski sporazum je stupio na snagu 1. decembra 2009. godine, čime su otvorena vrata za dalje proširenje EU. Odnosi Srbije i EU su
unapređeni stupanjem na snagu odluke o viznoj liberalizaciji, 19. decembra
2009. godine, kao i stupanjem na snagu Prelaznog trgovinskog sporazuma, 1.
februara 2010. godine. Srbija je 22. decembra 2009. godine podnela i zahtev za
dobijanje statusa kandidata, a očekuje se da bi ovaj status mogla dobiti tokom
prve polovine 2011. godine. Osim toga, na mesto evropskog komesara za proširenje i susedsku politiku je izabran nekadašnji ambasador Češke Republike
pri NATO-u i ministar za evropske integracije Štefan File. Češka Republika
snažno podržava ulazak Srbije u EU, a i sam komesar File je u nekoliko navrata podržao brzu evrointegraciju Srbije.67 I ostale države u regionu mogu u
2010. godini da očekuju ubrzanje evropskih integracija. Tokom 2011. godine,
Hrvatska bi mogla da završi pregovore, a Makedonija da ih otpočne. Konačno,
svetska ekonomska kriza i evropska monetarna kriza bez sumnje su u pojedinim evropskim prestonicama pojačali skepticizam prema daljem proširenju
67 Primera radi, prva delegacija koju je komesar File primio početkom februara 2010. godine bila je delegacija Republike Srbije.
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Unije nakon ulaska Hrvatske. Stvaranje BGZB biće najsnažniji adut država u
regionu protiv ovakvih negativnih tendencija.
Španija, sa kojom Srbija ima odlične diplomatske odnose, predsedava EU
tokom prve polovine 2010. godine. Tokom ovog perioda Srbija je mogla da završi sve pripremne radnje kako bi pripadnici srpskih oružanih snaga mogli da
od druge polovine 2010. godine budu poslati kao posmatrači u redove španske
borbene grupe, koja će biti na „dežurstvu“ u drugoj polovini 2010. godine.68
Taj proces može biti nastavljen i u drugoj polovini 2011. godine u okviru grčke
borbene grupe HELBROC, koja se još naziva i Balkanskom borbenom grupom. Grčka i Španija, kao članice EU i NATO-a koje nisu priznale nezavisnost
Kosova i Metohije i sa kojima Srbija ima izuzetno dobre diplomatske odnose,
mogle bi dugoročno da postanu ključni partneri u integrisanju Srbije u ZBOP.
U fazi pripremanja i posmatranja Republika Srbija treba da usmeri svoje
napore u tri pravca. Prvi pravac bio bi institucionalno pripremanje za učestvovanje u ZBOP. To najpre podrazumeva sve aktivnosti koje su usmerene
na izgradnju i jačanje institucionalnih i ljudskih kapaciteta unutar Ministarstva odbrane. Posebno je značajno postići punu funkcionalnost organizacione јedinice unutar Ministarstva odbrane Republike Srbije koјa radi na poslovima ZBOP. Ministarstvo odbrane je, uz Ministarstvo spoljnih poslova,
Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova, Ministarstvo finansija, Ministarstvo ekonomije i regionalnog razvoja i Kancelarije za evropske integracije, nadležno
za sprovođenje aktivnosti Republike Srbije u oblasti evropske bezbednosne i
odbrambene politike (Podgrupa stručne grupe 31). U institucionalnom pogledu, u ovoj fazi neophodno je stvoriti pretpostavke za horizontalnu saradnju ovih institucija. U prilogu koje je Ministarstvo odbrane dalo za NPI piše
da je prioritet u institucionalnom smislu za 2010. godinu osnivanje odseka
za Evropske integracije i regionalne inicijative, koji će se u okviru sektora za
politiku odbrane baviti studijsko- analitičkim i stručno-operativnim poslovima iz oblasti saradnje sa institucijama EU. Dalje, „imajući u vidu definisane
misije vojske, Centar za mirovne operacije Združene operativne komande
Generalštaba Vojske Srbije je intenzivirao aktivnosti radi pripreme pripad68 Španski ministar spoljnih poslova Migel Anhel Moratinos (Miguel Ángel Moratinos )
posetio je 12. decembra Beograd, a dan kasnije srpski ministar odbrane izavio je da Srbija ima
nameru da, zajedno sa španskim kontingentom, učestvuje u misiji UN u Libanu, kao i da će vrlo
brzo otpočeti pripreme za te aktivnosti. Videti: „Šutanovac o budžetu za Vojsku“, 13. decembar.
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=12&dd=13&nav_
category=11&nav_id=398049
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nika Vojske Srbije za učešće u multinacionalnim operacijama“. Uvažavajući
relevantnost ovakvog opredeljenja, poželjno je formirati i јezgro nacionalnog
elementa EU voјnog osoblja u sastavu Generalštaba. Osim toga, u Ministarstvu odbrane bilo bi poželjno razviti komunikacionu strategiju za pristupanje Srbije Evropskoj uniji u oblasti ZBOP. Takođe, treba intenzivirati proces
obrazovanja i osposobljavanja zaposlenih u Ministarstvu odbrane za rad u
oblasti ZBOP. Težište ovog procesa treba da bude na njihovoj praktičnoj obuci, tj. na praksi u instituciјama EU/ZBOP, ministarstvima i generalštabovima
država članica EU. Takođe, potrebno je osposobiti službenike i oficire koji bi,
po pristupanju Srbije u EU, bili upućeni u Vojni štab EU. Stoga je u godišnji plan školovanja pripadnika MO i VS potrebno uvrstiti i obuku iz oblasti
ZBOP, koju organizuje i sprovodi EU kako za države članice, tako i za države
kandidate. Poželjno je otpočeti i pripremanje stalnog voјnog predstavnika
Republike Srbije pri Voјnom komitetu EU. Dalje, moguće je otpočeti opremanje, uvežbavanje, pripremu i sertifikaciјu za pripremu snaga Vojske Srbije
za učestvovanje u borbenim grupama EU. Paralelno sa ovim, potrebno je da
Vojska Srbije dostigne punu usklađenost sa standardima i procedurama NATO-a. Konačno, potrebno je započeti uključivanje planiranih aktivnosti Vojske Srbije u borbenim grupama EU u Godišnji plan upotrebe Vojske Srbije
i drugih snaga odbrane u multinacionalnim operacijama. Ovim će biti stvorene pravne i tehničke pretpostavke za učestvovanje Vojske Srbije u vojnim
operacijama EU koje se sprovode uz pomoć kapaciteta NATO-a, a u okviru
Berlin plus sporazuma.69
Drugi pravac u kome je potrebno usmeriti napore u prvoj fazi bio bi
ostvarivanje niza političkih i vojnih oblika saradnje sa EU. To se, pre svega,
odnosi na uspostavljanje redovnih konsultacija sa Političko-bezbednosnim
komitetom (Political-Security Committee), telom Saveta EU koje upravlja
ZBOP. Zatim, moguće je otpočinjanje projekata „bratimljenja“ (twinning),
odnosno otpočinjanje postavljanja eksperata iz EU u Ministarstvo odbrane
Republike Srbije. Po pravilu, zemlja korisnik bira partnera među zemljama
69 Sa ovim je saglasan i NPI, u kome Ministarstvo odbrane kaže da „u okviru NATO programa Partnerstvo za mir, Republika Srbija postepeno ispunjava preuzete obaveze i razvija saradnju
sa ostalim članicama ovog Programa. U 2009. godini usvojen je dokument Procena PARP, koji
obuhvata 19 ciljeva partnerstva za Republiku Srbiju. Planirano je da Republika Srbija do 2012.
godine pripremi deklarisane snage za angažovanje u operacijama u okviru Partnerstva za mir“.
Pošto ovaj dokument (PARP) nije dostupan javnosti, nije moguće proceniti da li su te snage
pogodne i za učestvovanje u operacijama kriznog menadžmenta EU ili za učestvovanje u borbenim grupama.
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članicama EU, a ovakvi projekti doprinose ostvarivanju konkretnih operativnih rezultata u okviru neke od politika EU (u ovom slučaju ZBOP). Takođe,
dobro bi bilo da odabrani pripadnici MO i Vojske Srbije stažiraju u institucijama, u kojim mogu posmatrati rad svojih kolega angažovanih na poslovima
vezanim za ZBOP, i to kako u državama EU, tako i u državama regiona koje
u ovoj politici učestvuju. Osim toga, poželjno bi bilo otpočeti redovne konsultativne sastanke ministara odbrane država članica EU i država zapadnog
Balkana u sklopu Vojnog komiteta EU (EU Military Committee), kao i otpočeti kontakte sa predstavnicima Vojnog štaba EU (EU Military Staff). Tokom ovog perioda bilo bi poželjno završiti pregovore i potpisati bezbednosni
sporazum sa EU, koji će omogućiti razmenu poverljivih podataka između
Republike Srbije i EU.70 Konačno, bilo bi korisno da Odbor za odbranu i
bezbednost, eventualno i Odbor za spoljne poslove Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije, uspostavi kontakt sa Potkomitetom za bezbednost i odbranu
Komiteta za spoljne poslove Evropskog parlamenta71, kao i da sa nadležnim
parlamentarnim odborima država u regionu otpočne razmenu iskustava iz
oblasti ZBOP.72
Time bi na vreme bilo otpočeto izgrađivanje kapaciteta za demokratsku
kontrolu učestvovanja Vojske Republike Srbije u operacijama EU. Konačno,
domaća odbrambena industrija bi u ovoj fazi već mogla da počne da pronalazi
svoje mesto u poslovnim planovima Evropske odbrambene agencije (Europe70 O tome govori u svom intervjuu listu „Danas“ državni sekretar Ministarstva odbrane Dušan Spasojević. „Inicirali smo i zaključenje Sporazuma o bezbednosnim procedurama za razmenu poverljivih informacija sa Evropskom unijom, što će stvoriti mogućnost da se angažujemo i u
misijama EU.“ Videti: http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi.php?action=fullnews&id=1968.
Pored toga, trebalo bi, možda, uporediti zakonska rešenja zemalja iz regiona koja su u vezi
sa prisustvom pripadnika stranih oružanih snaga na teritoriji države (npr. zajedničke vežbe,
manevri i sl.). To se odnosi na slučaj da je potrebno održati zajedničke vežbe ili obuku. Takođe,
razmena poverljivih informacija između zemalja u regionu treba da bude propisana na odogovarajući način. Naznake o tome pogledati u http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/vesti-dana/Sporazum-ovojnoj-saradnji-Srbije-i-Hrvatske.sr.html.
71 S tim u vezi, svakako je celishodno slediti praksu drugih članica EU i odrediti predstavnika nacionalnog parlamenta – NSRS u Evropskom parlamentu, makar i na neredovnoj (neformalnoj) osnovi. Videti: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/lang/en/pid/18/cache/
offonce
72 Jedan od najefikasnijih vidova međuparlamentarne saradnje u ovoj oblasti, sasvim izvesno, biće i održavanje interparlamentarne konferencije (na redovnoj osnovi) za razmatranje
pitanja iz oblasti ZSBP/ZBOP, koja je predviđena članom 9 Protokola Lisabonskog ugovora o
ulozi nacionalnih predstavnika država članica. Očekuje se da će na ove sastanke biti pozivani i
predstavnici zemalja kandidata (npr. COSAC).
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an Defence Agency). Faza pripremanja i posmatranja bila bi krunisana stavljanjem snaga Vojske Srbije na rednu listu operativnih borbenih grupa EU po
odluci Političko-bezbednosnog komiteta EU, a na predlog Vojnog štaba EU.
Treći pravac aktivnosti u fazi pripremanja i posmatranja bio bi započinjanje političkog dijaloga koji bi vodio stvaranju BGZB. Kako bi 2020. godine BGZB bila sertifikovana i stavljena na raspolaganje, o njoj je neophodno
otvoriti dijalog već 2010. godine. Kako kaže Terje Haverstad, nekadašnji vojni ataše Kraljevine Norveške u Beogradu, „naravno da je sada suviše rano za
realizaciju ove vizije. Međutim, ovo ne bi trebalo da spreči donosioce odluka
u državama zapadnog Balkana da već sada počnu razgovor o tome kako je
moguće ostvariti ovu viziju. Potrebno je mnogo vremena da se uspostavi
BGZB zbog velike složenosti, investicija koje su neophodne i političkih pitanja koja treba rešavati.“73
2. Faza prilagođavanja (2013–2015)
Za otpočinjanje druge faze prilagođavanja i planiranja potrebno je ispuniti
dva uslova. Prvi je da Vojska Srbije raspolaže osposobljenim snagama koje su
obučene i sertifikovane za angažovanje u borbenim grupama EU. Drugo, potrebno je postizanje političke saglasnosti sa EU o učestvovanju Srbije u nekoj
od borbenih grupa EU.
U ovoj fazi jedinice Vojske Srbije bi se postepeno prilagođavale integrisanjem u neku od postojećih borbenih grupa EU. Zbog vojne intervencije NATO-a protiv SRJ 1999. godine, kao i zbog nerešenog statusa Kosova i Metohije,
javno mnjenje u Srbiji postalo je dosta skeptično kada je reč o učestvovanju
Vojske Srbije u multinacionalnim operacijama.74 Zbog toga je u fazi prilagođavanja preporučljivo ograničeno učestvovanje Vojske Srbije u borbenim grupama EU. To, pre svega, znači da će u njima učestvovati isključivo službe koje
nisu direktno uključene u borbena dejstva.
Takođe, bilo bi poželjno da jedinice Vojske Srbije budu integrisane u borbenu grupu EU u u kojoj su države učesnice vojno neutralne (Švedska, Austrija,
Finska i Kipar) ili pak države koje nisu priznale nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije
(Španija, Slovačka, Grčka, Rumunija). Republika Kipar je jedina država koja
73 Intervju obavljen elektronskim putem 13. 10. 2009. godine.
74 Više o tome vidi: Miroslav Hadžić i Milorad Timotić, Javnost i vojska, Centar za civilnovojne odnose, Beograd, 2006., str. 42
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je vojno nesvrstana i koja nije priznala nezavisnost Kosova i Metohije, tako
da svaka vojna saradnja sa ovom državom u okviru Balkanske borbene grupe
HELBROC ima dobre šanse da naiđe na odobravanje javnog mnjenja. Balkanska borbena grupa biće dežurna tokom prve polovine 2014. godine što je
odlična prilika i za učestvovanje srpskog kontigenta. On bi mogao biti jačine
do 50 pripadnika iz redova vojne policije, timova za deminiranje, medicinskih
timova i, svakako, štabnih oficira.
Tokom ove faze potrebno je intenzivirati i političke pripreme za stvaranje
BGZB. Ovo pitanje je, najpre, moguće pokrenuti u bilateralnim kontaktima
kako sa ostalim državama regiona, tako i sa državama članicama EU. Kada
ideja bude prihvaćena, moguće je sazvati i regionalnu konferenciju na kojoj
je neophodno postići multilateralni politički konsenzus o stvaranju BGZB do
2020. godine. Regionalnu konferenciju poželjno je organizovati u saradnji sa
Grčkom koja će tokom prve polovine 2014. godine predsedavati EU. Tokom
ove konferencije, osim iskazivanja opšte političke volje, bilo bi odlučeno i to
koja država će biti kontaktdržava (Point of Contact) za koordinaciju planiranja i pripremanja borbene grupe, kao i to koja država bi mogla da igra ulogu
“vodeće države“. Prema postojećim procedurama, proces formalnog osnivanja
borbene grupe započinje na zasedanju Saveta EU za opšte i spoljne poslove
(General Affairs and External Relations Council, skr. GAERC). Tada ministri
odbrana država učesnica u borbenoj grupi potpisuju pismo u kome izražavaju
nameru da u određenom roku Evropskoj uniji ponude svoju borbenu grupu
kao potpuno operativnu.
3. Faza unapređenog učestvovanja, planiranja i pripreme (2016–2017)
Tokom ove faze Republika Srbija bi mogla da unapredi svoje učestvovanje
u borbenim grupama EU uključivanjem drugih rodova Vojske Srbije, poput
pešadije, artiljerije, transportne avijacije i helikopterske jedinice. Jedan od
najtežih izazova u fazi unapređenog učestvovanja biće pridobijanje podrške
javnosti u Srbiji. To će posebno biti komplikovano ukoliko borbena grupa EU
u kojoj Srbija učestvuje bude upotrebljena za sprovođenje neke misije EU. Profesionalizacija Vojske Srbije i dodatne investicije u obuku pripadnika koji će
učestvovati u borbenoj grupi EU mogu smanjiti, ali ne mogu u potpunosti
isključiti rizik od toga da, ukoliko borbena grupa bude upotrebljena za neku
operaciju ZBOP, može biti žrtava među pripadnicima Vojske Srbije. Stoga je,
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ukoliko do toga ipak dođe, na vreme potrebno napraviti strategiju komunikacije sa javnošću. Osim toga, potrebno je napraviti detaljan plan socijalnog
zbrinjavanja žrtava i njihovih porodica. Tokom ove faze potrebno je otpočeti i
sa planiranjem stvaranja BGZB.75
U tom cilju poželjno je nastaviti politički dijalog sa budućim državama
učesnica. Politički osetljivim temama, kao što su proces donošenja odluka za
razmeštanje borbene grupe, pravni mandat i nacionalna ograničenja, potrebno je posvetiti posebnu pažnju. Ovaj dijalog bio bi krunisan potpisivanjem
Memoranduma o razumevanju između budućih država kontributora. Ovi dokumenti mogu da sadrže principe: donošenja odluka za razmeštanje borbene
grupe; konsultacija između država kontributora tokom planiranja i pripremanja BGZB, kao i nakon sticanja sertifikacije u tzv. stand-by fazi; komandovanja
i kontrole tokom operacija u kojima bi bile uključene borbene grupe; uvežbavanja i obuke; kao i ostala pravna i finansijska pitanja. Pored Memoranduma
o razumevanju države kontributori potpisuju i na njima zasnovane Tehničke sporazume kojima se definišu postavljanje osoblja u strukturama borbene
grupe, obuka i uvežbavanje, kao i upotreba borbene grupe. Ukoliko pojedina
pitanja ostanu nerešena, pored Memoranduma o razumevanju i Tehničkih
sporazuma, u ovoj fazi moguće je sklopiti i druge multilateralne, odnosno bilateralne sporazume. Koordinaciju ovog procesa vršiće kontakt-država.
4. Faza razvoja inicijalnih operativnih sposobnosti i formiranja Borbene
grupe zapadni Balkan (2018–2020)
U ovoj fazi Srbija bi, zajedno sa ostalim državama učesnicama, nastavila pripremanje BGZB. Najpre je potrebno započeti proces razvijanja paketa BGZB,
koji koordinira kontakt-država. Iz ovog procesa treba da proisteknu sastav i
sposobnosti paketa borbene grupe, tzv. ORBAT (order of battle), uključujući
u to i nacionalna ograničenja. Takođe, neophodno je dogovoriti standardne
operativne procedure za funkcionisanje BGZB. Kontakt-država je zadužena
i za planiranje osposobljavanja komande snaga BGZB. Osim toga, potrebno
je napraviti dobru koordinaciju procesa donošenja odluka o upotrebi BGZB,
koji obavljaju države učesnice. Poželjno je da se ovaj proces maksimalno ubrza
i harmonizuje kako bi BGZB mogla da poštuje predviđeni rok za brzo raz75 Za standardizovan vodič kroz stvaranje borbene grupe pogledati: Council of the European Union, Military Staff, EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide, Brussels, 8. septembar 2009.
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meštanje u periodu od 5 do 10 dana nakon odluke Saveta EU. Neophodno je
razviti i obaveštajnu zajednicu BGZB, koja bi se sastajala dva puta godišnje.
Bilo bi dobro da na ovim sastancima učestvuju i obaveštajni oficiri drugih borbenih grupa, po mogućstvu i iz one borbene grupe koja će biti dežurna kada i
BGZB, tako i iz borbenih grupa koje će biti dežurne u polugodištu pre dežurstva BGZB i posle njega.
Za uspešnu sertifikaciju BGZB ključni su obuka i uvežbavanje. Kontaktdržava koordinira proces obuke, uvežbavanja i sertifikacije. Oni treba da budu
usaglašeni sa NATO procedurama koje su predviđene za Snage za brzo reagovanje (NRF). Proces obuke sastoji se od četiri nivoa: individualna obuka, obuka jedinice, obuka jezgra BG (pešadijskog bataljona) i obuka paketa BGZB.
Interoperabilnost i operativna efikasnost postižu se združenim kombinovanim
uvežbavanjem. Sertifikacija borbene grupe u nadležnosti je država učesnica,
ali se odvija u skladu sa procedurama koje su dogovorene na nivou EU. Vojni
komitet Evropske unije je organ koji vrši praćenje procesa evaluacije i sertifikacije borbene grupe. Kontakt-država dužna je da, najkasnije mesec dana pre
stavljanja u pripravnost, sertifikuje to da paket BGZB odgovara dogovorenim
kriterijumima BG. Druge države članice EU mogu, takođe, biti pozvane da
posmatraju proces sertifikacije BGZB, što bi bilo izuzetno poželjno s obzirom
na to da će BGZB uglavnom ili u potpunosti činiti države koje još uvek nisu
članice EU. Ova faza bila bi okončana najpre stavljanjem BGZB u pripravnost
(standby) za vreme predsedavanja Finske u prvom polugodištu 2020. godine,
a zatim i na rednu listu tokom prve naredne Konferencije za koordinaciju.
Time bi države zapadnog Balkana, prilikom ulaska u EU, pokazale ne samo to
da mogu individualno da budu one koje obezbeđuju bezbednost, već i mnogo
više od toga. Stvaranje BGZB bio bi najbolji dokaz toga da su one prevazišle
sukobe iz prošlosti i da su u stanju da integrišu svoje odbrambene kapacitete
kako bi zajednički doprinele evropskoj bezbednosti.
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NATO nakon Lisabona: zapadni Balkan u Savezu
do 2020. godine
Dr Mladen Nakić76
Novi strateški koncept NATO-a, donesen na samitu u Lisabonu krajem 2010.,
ima za cilj odgovoriti na novi spektar izazova i prijetnji koje će prevladavati
u narednih deset godina. Savez je formalno završio svoju post-hladnoratovsku
tranziciju i više nije samo klasična obrambena organizacija kako se navodilo u
ranijim strateškim dokumentima. Iako članak 5. ostaje glavni stup savezništva,
globalni sigurnosni angažman od članica Saveza traži promišljanje „veće slike“
svijeta nego li je to samo euroatlantski prostor država članica. Posebnu važnost u
promijenjenim međunarodnim odnosima sve više imaju razna partnerstva kroz
koja NATO može legitimno djelovati na sigurnost i stabilnost međunarodnog poretka. Bez obzira na snagu i moć svojih članica, Savez neće moći igrati samostalnu ulogu na međunarodnoj političkoj ploči i zato su partnerstva s EU, UN-om,
OESS-om, ali i s Rusijom te ostalim regionalnim organizacijama i državama od
ključnog značaja. Područje jugoistočne Europe bi u narednih desetak godina trebalo biti sigurnosno definirano, što znači da bi sve države regije mogle i formalno
biti integrirane u euroatlantski politički i sigurnosni prostor.
76 Autor je doktor znanosti iz područja međunarodnih odnosa i nacionalne sigurnosti i
izvršni direktor Centra za međunarodne studije iz Zagreba
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Savez je kroz šezdeset i jednu godinu postojanja prošao različite faze razvoja međunarodnih odnosa – od hladnog rata do pokušaja stvaranja globalnog
partnerstva. Posebno je bilo izazovno razdoblje koje je obilježila poljska Solidarnost i rušenje Berlinskog zida 1989. godine, kao početak pada komunizma
u istočnoj Europi, što je prethodilo raspadu SSSR-a i Varšavskog pakta, a što je
Putin nazvao „najvećom geopolitičkom katastrofom stoljeća“.
Upravo je nestanak ideološkog i vojnog suparnika s političke scene početkom ‘90-tih godina prošlog stoljeća poslužio kritičarima Saveza za jačanje
negativnog stava koji je dovodio u pitanje daljnje postojanje Saveza i svrsishodnost njegove buduće misije.77 Iako danas Savez u svom članstvu okuplja i
većinu najrazvijenijih i najbogatijih demokratskih država svijeta, kontinuirano
se suočava s novim izazovima, kako onim u međunarodnim odnosima tako i s
vlastitim promišljanjima kako na njih adekvatno odgovoriti.
Rat na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije – početak redefiniranja
nove misije NATO-a
Gotovo cijelo jedno desetljeće (1990-1999) trajale su rasprave unutar i izvan
Saveza o njegovoj budućnosti. Do 1995. godine kritičari Saveza su dovodili u
pitanje samu svrhu daljnjeg opstanka NATO-a, a od sredine 1990-tih rasprava
se više odnosila na buduću misiju Saveza. Ratna tragedija na prostoru bivše
Jugoslavije, etnička čišćenja i genocid pokazala su kako Europa pedeset godina
od završetka 2. svjetskog rata nije bila spremna i/ili voljna sama preventivno
spriječiti rat na vlastitom teritoriju.
Vojna intervencija Saveza u BiH 1995. označila je početak nove misije NATO-a.
Bilo je jasno da rat na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije ne predstavlja direktnu sigurnosnu prijetnju bilo kojoj članici Saveza. Postalo je očigledno kako samo obrambena
77 Teorija ravnoteže snaga polazi od činjenice da savezi prestaju jačati kada njihova svrha
postaje zadovoljena. Waltz kao realist smatra da NATO ide polako svome kraju iako to nije pitanje dana, ali za nekoliko godina bi se to pitanje moglo aktualizirati. Kao razloge navodi činjenicu
da je Europa prihvatila američku hegemoniju te time preventivno spriječila povratak ravnoteže
snaga. Isto tako, realisti su smatrali da unipolarnost ne može biti dugovječna, jer dominantna
država preuzima sve više obaveza i odgovornosti te s vremenom i slabi. S tom tvrdnjom se treba
složiti budući da unipolaran poredak dugoročno ne može biti stabilan zato što se ostale države
osjećaju nesigurnima. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, Cornell University Press, 2002., str.
11,12.
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zadaća Saveza nije dovoljna u promijenjenim odnosima koji su uspostavljeni u
međunarodnoj zajednici. Bacevich prepoznaje činjenicu da je Clinton pretvorio
NATO od defanzivne organizacije u nešto što ponajprije mora politički i vojno djelovati prema vani.78 Kolektivna obrana ostala je brand Saveza, međutim definicija
kolektivne obrane podrazumijevala je više pasivni instrument kolektivne zaštite, a
ne konkretno sredstvo za jačanje kolektivne sigurnosti na europskom kontinentu,
ali i šire. Zapravo se radilo o ugrožavanju osnovnih transatlantskih vrijednosti država članica i njihovih zajedničkih demokratskih tradicija. Zajedničke vrijednosti
iz kojih su definirani i načelni zajednički interesi u osnovi su jedina preostala nit
koja povezuje države članice Saveza nakon onih ideoloških i vojnih koji su nestali s padom komunizma, raspadom SSSR-a i Varšavskog pakta. Kao i u slučaju
NATO-ove intervencije u BiH, tako se i u intervenciji na Kosovu 1999. godine
primarno radilo o zaštiti demokratskih vrijednosti (individualnih i kolektivnih), a
manje o sigurnosnoj ugrozi samih članica Saveza. Zapravo, tu počinje konkretna
post-hladnoratovska transformacija Saveza u pravcu zaštite zajedničkih vrijednosti, najprije u Europi, a kasnije i izvan transatlantskog prostora.
Washington - Lisabon - Washington
Jedna od smjernica Washingtonskog strateškog koncepta iz 1999. godine
bila je jačanje raspoloživih kapaciteta Saveza za nove misije kao odgovora na
nove prijetnje zajedničkim interesima i vrijednostima. Pri tome su se u vidu
imali regionalni sukobi poput BiH i Kosova. Transnacionalna prijetnja terorizmom samo je spomenuta u kontekstu prijetnji oružjem za masovno uništenje.
Međutim, terorističkim napadom na Sjedinjene Države 11. septembra 2001.,
međunarodni terorizam postaje ključno polazište u svim kasnijim smjernicama i djelovanjima Saveza, ali i predmet određenih neslaganja u fazi zajedničkog donošenja odluka. Napad terorista pomoću otetih putničkih zrakoplova
na vojne i civilne ciljeve u SAD, otvorio je rasprave oko sustava kolektivne
obrane unutar Saveza i njegovog mehanizma brzog odgovora. Opravdano je
po prvi puta u povijesti Saveza aktiviran članak 5. Ugovora bez obzira što se
nije radilo o klasičnom napadu konvencionalnim snagama na jednu od članica. Međutim, otvorile su se i rasprave o načinu i uvjetima pod kojima se može
ili treba pozvati na članak 5. radi kolektivne obrane.
78 Bacevich Andrew, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy,
Harward University Press, Cambridge, 2002., str.75.
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Novi strateški koncept koji je usvojen u Lisabonu reafirmirao je važnost
i nepromjenjivost članka 5. kao nositelja kolektivne obrane. Imajući u vidu
nekonvencionalne prijetnje ne samo prema državama članicama Saveza
već i širem euroatlantskom sigurnosnom okruženju, članak 5. i kolektivna
obrana bi se trebali shvaćati u smislu zaštite kolektivne sigurnosti posebno
u odnosu na terorističke prijetnje, moguću upotrebu oružja za masovno
uništenje, te kemijsko i biološko ratovanje. Korištenje članka 5. izvan teritorija država članica Saveza u smislu šire (preventivne) kolektivne sigurnosti,
posebno treba učiniti proceduralno jasnijim u fazi donošenja odluke i konkretnog postupanja kako bi se izbjegla situacija koja je prethodila napadu
na Irak 2003. godine.
Pri tome, dva osnovna cilja imaju posebnu važnost – a) sigurnost u Europi i
Sjevernoj Americi – što bi trebala biti poveznica sa „starim“ ili tradicionalnim
NATO-om pod člankom 5. i b) sigurnost za Europu i Sjevernu Ameriku, ali
i za zemlje sa zapadnim vrijednostima koje nisu članice Saveza. To je „novi“
NATO koji promovira zajedničke vrijednosti i pri čemu se posebno naglašava važnost članka 4., odnosno potreba za konzultacijama tj. usuglašavanjem
stavova unutar Saveza, a nerijetko i s vanjskim partnerima. Za oboje je važna
činjenica kako je atlantska ideja temelj suradnje SAD-a i Europe.79
Savez bi narednih godina dodatno trebao pokazati kako je nešto više od
klasične obrambene organizacije. Zaštita zapadnih vrijednosti poput slobode,
jednakosti, zajedničkog demokratskog nasljeđa, vladavine zakona i sl., predstavljati će polazište za izgradnju globalnog partnerstva.
Globalnim partnerstvom u sljedeće desetljeće
EU i NATO stvaraju novo strateško partnerstvo koje neće biti samo u okvirima transatlantskog prostora. Ako se riječ partnerstvo shvati u širem smislu
osiguranja efikasnog sustava upravljanja krizama onda je glavno pitanje – kako
79 Važnost Atlantske zajednice SAD-a i Europe Brzezinski pokazuje još vidljivijom u nekim
pokazateljima. 13% svjetske populacije živi u zemljama NATO-a i/ili Europe, ali oni zajedno
čine 63% svjetskog BDP i proizvode 27 trilijuna USD vrijednosti roba u 2005. i 77% ukupne
svjetske vojne potrošnje. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Second Chance, Three Presidents and the Crisis of
American Superpower, Basic Book, New York, 2007., str. 188.
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najbolje odgovoriti na te krize? Zato svrha, ali i cilj buduće misije NATO-a
nije samo njegova transatlantska povezanost, već prvenstveno volja i riješenost
demokratskih zemalja da štite zajedničku sigurnost i demokratsko nasljeđe.
Partnerstvo ima višedimenzionalan karakter i ne bi ga trebalo svesti samo
na institucionalnu razinu suradnje koje ostale države imaju sa Savezom. Ako
se uzme u obzir pojednostavljeno institucionalno povezivanje može se dobiti
pogrešna slika prioriteta, pa čak i važnosti partnerskih veza. Tako bi na prvom
mjestu moglo biti partnerstvo sa zemljama kao budućim članicama Saveza u
sklopu Partnerstva za mir (PzM) kao priprema za članstvo. U drugi krug partnerskih zemalja mogle bi ići zemlje članice PzM koje nemaju aspiracije za
članstvom, ali sudjeluju u projektu zbog vlastitih interesa. Zatim, tu je partnerstvo koje Savez želi učvrstiti sa ostalim organizacijama kolektivne sigurnosti
poput UN-a i OESS-a. Naposljetku, Savez gradi i sigurnosno partnerstvo sa
zemljama izvan transatlantske regije poput Australije, Novog Zelanda, Japana
i Južne Koreje ili pak u prostoru Mediterana. Svako od navedenih oblika partnerstva ima svoju težinu i teško ih je navesti prema važnosti. Sadašnji oblik
partnerstva sa zemljama iz Azije i Oceanije vjerojatno je važniji i konkretniji
sa stanovišta borbe protiv terorizma i ostalih sigurnosnih izazova (npr. u Afganistanu) od suradnje s aspiranticama za članstvo u okviru PzM (BiH, Crna
Gora i Makedonija). Međutim, pojam partnerstva treba promatrati u kontekstu balansiranja regionalnog pristupa raznim sigurnosnim izazovima. Dok su
ti izazovi bili naglašeni u prostoru JIE i Balkanskog poluotoka, važnost je bila
na širenju Saveza prema žarištima potencijalnih kriza u Europi (BiH, Kosovo).
Trenutno su ti izazovi usredotočeni na prostor Azije (Afganistan, Irak), pa se
i partnerski angažman zemalja poput Australije i Novog Zelanda posebno cijene.
Neka posebno važna partnerstva koje Savez želi razvijati vezana su za Rusiju, ali i odnose s Kinom. Regionalna partnerstva Saveza poput suradnje sa zemljama ASEAN-a koji neki vole nazivati „Azijskim NATO-om“, daju dodatnu
važnost odnosima na relaciji NATO-Rusija-Kina.
Stvaranje sigurnosne zajednice kako ju je nazvao Karl Deutsch prije šezdesetak godina, nije utopijski cilj, ali vremenski završetak te misije nije lako predvidljiv. Stvaranje globalnog partnerstva koje će naglasiti i novi NATO-ov strateški koncept samo je jedna važna dionica na tom putu. Stoga i pravni okvir za
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upotrebu snaga izvan teritorija članica („out of area operations“) te NATO-ov
globalni angažman mora biti kompatibilan s nastavkom izgradnje funkcionalnog odnosa Saveza s UN-om, OESS-om i drugim organizacijama kolektivne
sigurnosti čije se aktivnosti temelje na međunarodnom pravu. U narednih deset godina, Savez bi u suradnji s ostalim međunarodnim ključnim subjektima
trebao dati jasan odgovor na sve češće pitanje – treba li NATO postati globalni
sigurnosni savez? Takvu ambiciju nije izrazila niti jedna članica Saveza imajući
u vidu realnosti međunarodnih odnosa. Isto bi se moglo odnositi i na rješenje
da se za globalne izazove i probleme prakticira stvaranje različitih oblika ad
hoc „koalicija dobre volje“. Rješenje je u svakom slučaju poželjno tražiti u koordiniranju aktivnosti Saveza s UN-om i ostalim relevantnim organizacijama
kolektivne sigurnosti na temeljima međunarodnog prava. Pri tome se članak
51. Povelje UN-a ne bi trebao koristiti kao opravdanje za preventivne napade.
Zapadni Balkan u Savezu do 2020
Prema Artu, NATO je uspio u nakani da postane respektabilna sigurnosna organizacija s ciljem angažmana u regionalnim misijama nametanja mira
i stabilnosti.80 Prostor bivše Jugoslavije poslužio je kao poligon za redefiniranje
buduće misije Saveza sredinom ‘90-tih godina prošlog stoljeća. To je prostor
gdje je ujedno prvi puta iskušana legitimnost savezničkog angažmana izvan
teritorija država članica. Ujedno to je bio prostor gdje je NATO prvi puta vojno
djelovao od svog osnivanja, jer tijekom hladnog rata nikada nije došlo do upotrebe vojnih sredstava u borbenim djelovanjima suprotstavljenih strana uslijed
postignute strateške ravnoteže dva bloka.
Iako je situacija u regiji stabilna i nema prijetnje od otvorenih sukoba, dugoročna regionalna sigurnost tek treba biti definirana. Ključan i ohrabrujući
čimbenik na tom putu predstavljaju euroatlantski integracijski procesi.
Odličan primjer je suradnja Hrvatske, Albanije i Makedonije u okviru
Američko-Jadranske povelje kojima su se pridružile BiH i Crna Gora, dok je
80 Angažman u BiH pokazuje transformaciju NATO-a koji uz svoju političku dimenziju,
u prvi plan stavlja sigurnosnu, a tek tada obrambenu što pokazuje i bit njegove promijenjene
misije. Anton Grizold, A Reconceptualization of NATO’s Transformation: the Next Round, Šipan
Yearbook 2006, Politička kultura, 2006., str. 40.
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Srbija u statusu neformalnog promatrača. BiH je jedan od ključeva regionalne sigurnosti i najsloženije pitanje na koje tek treba dati odgovor. Kao zemlja
koja želi postati članica NATO-a, BiH se suočava s vrlo ozbiljnim problemima.
Unatoč uvjetovano dobivenom Akcijskom planu za članstvo (MAP), BiH nije
uspjela regulirati pitanje vlasništva državnom imovinom, odnosno 69 vojnih
nekretnina nije upisano u vlasništvo središnje vlasti, jer je proces blokiran od
strane Republike Srpske čime je na godinu dana zamrznut početak Akcijskog
plana za članstvo.
Makedonija je zadovoljila sve kriterije za članstvo u Savezu prije sastanka
na vrhu u Bukureštu 2008. godine, ali nije pozvana u članstvo na sastanku na
vrhu u Strasbourgu-Kehlu uslijed problema s imenom koje osporava Grčka.
Grčki veto na makedonsko članstvo u Savezu nema jasnu perspektivu rješavanja čime to postaje važno makedonsko unutarnje političko pitanje.
Crna Gora je dobila MAP krajem 2009. godine, ali se suočava s problemom
nedovoljne potpore javnosti unatoč provođenja komunikacijske strategije.
Dodatan problem je podijeljenost relevantnih političkih stranaka oko definiranja strateškog nacionalnog interesa odnosno ne postoji politički konsenzus
po tom pitanju. Sa statusom kandidata za članstvo u EU, Crna Gora otvara
jasne perspektive nastavka euroatlantskih integracija.
Srbija je u Skupštini proglasila „vojnu neutralnost“, članica je Partnerstva
za mir i nedavno je otvorila ured u sjedištu NATO-a. Iako nitko od političara
(osim Liberalno demokratske partije) ne govori glasno o budućem članstvu
Srbije u NATO-u, tema se sve više nameće u društvu. Trenutno oko 25% građana podupiru članstvo Srbije u Savezu, a veliki dio javnosti je još uvijek opterećen negativnim emocijama prema NATO-u. S obzirom na iskustva iz 1999.
godine to je odličan rezultat. Treba podsjetiti da je tek nešto malo veća potpora
bila u Hrvatskoj na početku sustavnog informiranja građana o prednostima
hrvatskog članstva u NATO-u. Tako da uz primjerenu komunikacijsku strategiju realno se može očekivati da građani Srbije počnu svoju budućnost promatraju kroz vlastite interese - sigurnosne, gospodarske političke, a manje kroz
emocije.
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Što zemlje regije mogu očekivati nakon Lisabona?
Iako politika „otvorenih vrata“ nije visoko pozicionirana na dnevnom redu
Saveza i u nacrtu novog strateškog koncepta, ona se uvijek naglašava kao kontinuitet. Članak 10. Ugovora ostaje aktualan u omogućavanju daljnjeg širenja
Saveza. S druge strane, nameće se objektivno pitanje granica širenja Saveza.
Iako je to posebno osjetljivo pitanje za prostor Azije, odnosno bivšeg SSSR-a,
regija jugoistočne Europe ima svoje osjetljive geostrateške elemente u odnosu na širenje Saveza. Unatoč ruskom negativnom stavu prema crnogorskom
približavanju članstvu u NATO-u i pokušaja zadržavanja neutralnog statusa
Srbije, stvari u regiji polako, ali sigurno kreću u pravcu integriranja cijelog
prostora u transatlantski sigurnosni sustav. Cijela regija bi mogla do 2020. godine biti sigurnosno definirana kroz članstva regionalnih zemalja u NATO-u i
većine u EU. U tom kontekstu, širenje NATO-a u regiji znači nastavak političko-sigurnosnog projekta stabilizacije Europe.
Modernizacija NATO-a i regije
NATO će ostati glavni jamac euroatlantske sigurnosti. Novo desetljeće
neće biti pošteđeno već poznatih prijetnji poput terorističkih napada, korištenja subverzivnih sredstava za masovna uništenja, nuklearne proliferacije i
sl. NATO ne bi trebao imati ambiciju postati svjetski sudac i izvršitelj vlastitih
presuda. Međutim, različiti su aspekti sigurnosnih prijetnji koje ugrožavaju
države članice Saveza i njene stanovnike. Pozornost bi se trebala usmjeriti s
kolektivne sigurnosti pod kojom se primarno misli na sigurnost institucija, na
individualnu sigurnost samih građana odnosno stanovništva.
U tim nastojanjima ostaje i nadalje veliki prostor za preventivno djelovanje koje je nerijetko nedovoljno zastupljeno u sagledavanju svih uzroka navedenih prijetnji. Intervencija bi uvijek trebala ostati (zadnje) sredstvo ukoliko
preventivne mjere ne poluče željeni rezultat. Preventivna mjera može biti i
proturaketna obrana ako se shvaća u kontekstu daljnjeg smanjenja nuklearnih
kapaciteta.
Važan će biti i kontinuitet načela konsenzusa u donošenju odluka kao jamstva manje utjecajnih članica da se čuje i njihov glas.
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Nastavak razvijanja partnerskih veza s Rusijom i poželjno otpočinjanje institucionalnih odnosa s Kinom predstavljaju izazov za NATO, ali i za navedene
zemlje. Problem u rješavanju situacije u Afganistanu predstavlja zajedničko
polazište za jačanje partnerskog angažmana s obzirom da tu sve strane imaju naglašene gospodarske i sigurnosne interese. Širenje članstva Saveza biti će
aktualno i u narednih deset godina. Vjerojatnije je da će ono biti realnije na jugoistoku Europe (Crna Gora, Makedonija, Kosovo, BiH i Srbija) nego li ispred
„dvorišta“ Rusije (Ukrajina, Gruzija).
Ranije politike velikih sila nisu bile najsretnije za narode naše regije.
Bush I nije želio uvući Sjedinjene Države u rat vezan za raspad bivše Jugoslavije. Isto se dogodilo i kasnije u svezi BiH i Kosova želeći to prepustiti Europi, iako je znao da ona to nije spremna niti sposobna. Clinton, s
druge strane, ipak Balkan prepoznaje ne samo kao vrlo važan regionalni
interes za SAD, već i za sigurnost šire regije (Makedonija, Grčka, Turska,
Albanija).81
Nakon dvadeset godina obilježenih ratovima i tragedijama, prostor Balkanskog poluotoka je na dobrom putu institucionalnog „vraćanja“ u Europu.
Jugoistočna Europa u narednih pet do deset godina mora dobiti jasnu sliku
političke i sigurnosne europske pripadnosti. To podrazumijeva rješavanje nekoliko otvorenih regionalnih izazova. BiH mora osigurati vlastitu funkcionalnost na ravnopravnim osnovama, kako građana tako i konstitutivnih naroda.
U suprotnom, države NATO-a očekuje ozbiljan posao.
Makedonija i Grčka moraju konačno riješiti problem oko imena, jer je svima u interesu nastavak odnosno završetak makedonskih euro-integracijskih
procesa.
Priština kroz predstojeće razgovore s Beogradom treba završiti proces međunarodnog priznanja vlastite nezavisnosti i krenuti u ozbiljne reformske izazove koji tek predstoje.
81 Nuechterlein s pravom postavlja osjetljivo pitanje upotrebe američke vojne moći pa navodi i slučaj BiH gdje ne bi trebao biti vitalan američki interes. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America
Recommitted, The University Press of Kentucky, 2001., str. 239. Međutim, slučaj s BiH jest bilo,
uz ono humanitarno, i pitanje funkcioniranja svjetskog poretka kao i stabilnosti Europe što
predstavlja deklarirani američki vitalan interes. To se može odnositi i na slučaj Kosova.
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Srbija napokon mora izručiti Mladića i Hadžića, regulirati odnose s Kosovom i nastaviti s reformama ako želi dobiti status kandidata za članstvo u EU
do kraja 2011. godine.
Zaključak
Savezu je trebala nova strategija za novo vrijeme. To svakako ne bi trebao
biti samo komad papira već održiva strategija za narednih deset godina djelovanja Saveza kao važnog međunarodnog čimbenika. Koncept bi trebao kombinirati ranije odrednice o kolektivnoj obrani kao glavnoj svrsi Saveza, ali i
naglasiti sve potrebne elemente za učinkovito i legitimno djelovanje u operacijama izvan teritorija država članica. Članak 4. bi trebao dobiti jaču važnost,
jer su konzultacije direktno povezane sa postizanjem nužnog konsenzusa kao
načela odlučivanja unutar Saveza.
Svijet se drastično promijenio od kraja hladnog rata, te se s tom činjenicom
mijenjao i NATO, ali je njegova osnovna misija ostala nepromijenjena – od
održavanja mira i stabilnosti do odgovora na nove sigurnosne prijetnje poput
informatičkog kriminala, energetske sigurnosti i piratstva.
Države članice Saveza su svjesne da NATO ima ograničene kapacitete. Važno je postaviti prioritete, definirati glavne izazove i realno procijeniti raspoložive resurse. Pri tome je partnerstvo s ostalim međunarodnim subjektima od
ključnog interesa kako za promicanje multilateralne suradnje tako i za kvalitetno podizanje razine međunarodne sigurnosti.
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Dosadašnja iskustva Crne Gore na putu ka
evroatlantskim integracijama
Sanda Vučić82
U ovom tekstu posebna pažnja je posvećena dosadašnjim iskustvima Crne
Gore na njenom putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama, dok je posebno akcentovan razvoj podrške javnog mnjenja za članstvo Crne gore u NATO-u u periodu od sticanja njene nezavisnosti do danas. U drugom dijelu teksta se navode
preporuke za dalju i efikasniju implementaciju komunikacione strategije u cilju
kvalitetnijeg informisanja javnosti o ovom Savezu, kao i argumenti koji se najčešće navode za i protiv punopravnog članstva Crne Gore u NATO-u. Poruka
teksta jeste da je u svijetu savremenih izazova, rizika i prijetnji neophodno razumjeti da nijedna država nije u mogućnosti da sama upravlja bezbjednosnim
izazovima 21. vijeka; stoga je potrebno ojačati kapacitete za zajednički rad, kako
na regionalnom tako i na globalnom nivou i biti dio jednog sistema bezbjednosti
koji može djelovati povratno u interesu svih.
82 Autorka je portparol Evro-atlantskog kluba Crne Gore
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Obnovom svoje državnosti 2006. godine, Crna Gora se jasno opredijelila da
krene putem evroatlantskih integracija koje predstavljaju jednu od prioritetnih
aktivnosti Vlade Crne Gore. U skladu sa tim, Crna Gora je preuzela niz obaveza usmjerenih ka reformi cjelokupnog sistema bezbjednosti. Četiri godine
nakon referenduma nije teško zaključiti da je Crna Gora ostala vjerna svom
cilju ulaska u NATO i EU, o čemu svjedoči izuzetna saradnja sa svim zapadnim
državama, kao i reforme sprovedene u sistemu bezbjednosti, koje nekadašnji socijalistički sistem transformišu u sistem koji će biti komplementaran sa
NATO standardima koji se primjenjuju u svim državama članicama Alijanse,
kao i državama koje pretenduju da to postanu. Jedino takva Crna Gora, kao
dio sigurne i bezbjedne Alijanse, može biti garant bezbjednosti budućim generacijama u zemlji i faktor stabilnosti u regionu.
Crna Gora je na svom putu ka punopravnom članstvu u NATO ispunila
većinu kriterijuma. Međutim, statistički podaci pokazuju da je stepen informisanosti građana Crne Gore o tome šta evroatlantske integracije predstavljaju i šta je NATO, izuzetno nizak. Prema istraživanjima koja je sproveo
CEDEM u julu 2010. godine, 32% stanovništva se izjasnilo da bi na referendumu o članstvu Crne Gore zaokružilo DA; 40.1% protiv, dok je 28%
njih bilo neopredjeljeno. Razloga je svakako više, ali dva najbitnija su velika
neinformisanost građana o današnjoj ulozi i značaju NATO saveza, kao i
bombardovanje SR Jugoslavije 1999. godine, u čijem sastavu je tada bila i
Crna Gora.
S ciljem informisanja građana o procesu evroatlantskih integracija, Vlada
Crne Gore je oformila Komunikacioni tim koji radi na implementaciji Komunikacione strategije o evroatlantskim integracijama. Međutim, dosadašnja
implementacija Komunikacione strategije nije se odvijala u željenom pravcu.
Prekretnica u njenoj implementaciji je bila konferencija: „Dijalog o NATO-u
- Zajednički napori na podizanju javne svijesti u Crnoj Gori“, koju je organizovao Evro-atlantski klub Crne Gore, a u kojoj su učestvovali predstavnici kako
vladajućih, tako i opozicionih partija.
Zaključci do kojih se došlo zajedničkim radom na konferenciji su sljedeći:
• Vlada ne smije imati monopol nad procesom evroatlantskih integracija;
• Uključivanje političara, tj. Parlamentaraca, mora biti na mnogo većem
nivou nego što je trenutno slučaj. Potrebno je uključiti sve partije u taj
proces i predstaviti ga kao državni, a ne kao projekat Vlade ili određenog pojedinca;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Cilj Komunikacione strategije mora biti edukacija građana, odnosno
direktna komunikacija sa građanima jer komunikacija je dijalog a ne
propaganda;
Ciljne grupe se moraju jasno definisati i u njih treba uključiti i medije
kao izuzetno bitnog partnera u ovom procesu;
Cilj mora biti jasno definisan! Potrebno je stvoriti tim eksperata koji će
biti na raspolaganju medijima i građanima;
Poruke moraju da budu jasne, precizne i razumljive običnim građanima;
Kako bi te poruke bile efikasno prenesene običnim građanima, potrebno je koristiti sva raspoloživa sredstva. Jedna od preporuka je da mnogo šira i intenzivnija upotreba Interneta, a ne samo zvaničnih site-ova
Vlade i Komunikacionog tima;
Poruke koje su jasne i na koje treba staviti akcenat su sljedeće: osigurana bezbjednost, zaštita teritorijalnog integriteta (očuvanje državnih
granica), ekonomska perspektiva (veći stepen povjerenja u državu,
i samim time u investicije stranih ulagača), pripadnost eliti i društvu najmoćnijih demokratskih država svijeta, jednako pravo glasa, i
profesionalizacija vojske, što znači da će ratovati samo profesionalno
obučeni vojnici;
Vlada treba da nastavi sa aktivnim promovisanjem ovih ideja, ali je potrebno da u taj proces uvede osobe i institucije sa kredibilitetom van
političke sfere (npr. ekonomiste, analitičare, akademike, stručnjake iz
raznih oblasti, javne ličnosti - sportiste, glumce, pjevače, kao i obične
građane).
Takođe, veoma je bitno shvatiti da samo postojanje akcionog plana za
implementaciju Komunikacione strategije nije dovoljno. Ono što je
mnogo važnije jeste kako će se taj akcioni plan implementirati, te ko će
vršiti njegovu implementaciju.
Pored nedovoljnog stepena informisanosti građana i bombardovanja 1999.
godine, jedan od argumenata koji se često navodi jeste percepcija NATO-a kao
prvenstveno vojne alijanse. Takođe se koristi i argument da bi Crna Gora, kao
članica NATO-a, slala svoje vojnike u Irak i Afganistan zarad ciljeva Amerike,
Velike Britanije ili neke druge velike sile, a ne zbog sopstvenih interesa. Zatim,
finansijski aspekt, pri čemu se navodi da je članstvo u NATO-u mnogo skuplje
nego što se to građanima predstavlja, itd.
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Međutim, NATO je prvenstveno političko-vojni savez i kao najrazvijeniji
sistem kolektivne bezbjednosti čini nezamjenljiv oslonac svojim članicama.
Princip donošenja odluka konsenzusom se primjenjuje u okviru čitavog saveza, što znači da su sve zemlje članice uključene u postupak donošenja odluka.
Primjer za to je Makedonija, koja je ispunila sve kriterijume predviđene za punopravno članstvo u ovoj Alijansi, ali čije pristupanje istoj blokira Grčka. Tek
kada ove dvije države riješe spor oko imena Makedonije na bilateralnoj osnovi,
Makedonija će biti primljena u članstvo. Iz ovog primjera je jasno da glas samo
jedne zemlje može da utiče na donošenje ili nedonošenje odluka u Alijansi.
U skladu sa tim, članstvo u NATO-u bi Crnoj Gori omogućilo da ravnopravno sa svim članicama Alijanse donosi odluke koje su od važnosti za kolektivnu bezbjednost. Članstvo u Alijansi, ne samo Crne Gore, već i ostalih
zemalja u regionu je od prioritetnog značaja za stabilnost regiona. Posmatrano
sa ekonomskog aspekta, ulaskom u NATO Crna Gora bi „otvorila vrata“ stranim ulagačima, i što je najbitnije, smanjila bi troškove koje bi imala ukoliko
ostane izvan Saveza.
Nepostojanje jasnih neprijatelja u vojnom smislu kao i novi vidovi prijetnji
su motivisali Crnu Goru da svoju odbranu organizuje kroz saradnje sa partnerima koji dijele iste vrijednosti. Stoga, Vojska Crne Gore učestvuje u mirovnim
misijama u Avganistanu, Liberiji i Somaliji, što potvrđuje da je Crna Gora za
vrlo kratak period uspjela da profesionalizuje i osposobi svoju vojsku u skladu
sa NATO standardima. To, ujedno, predstavlja i korak bliže članstvu u Alijansi.
U ovom trenutku se u mađarskoj bazi ‘Panonija’ u mjestu Pol-e Khomri u Avganistanu nalazi drugi vojni kontingent Vojske Crne Gore, dok su pripadnici
trećeg kontingenta upućeni na obuku u Mađarsku.
U sigurnosnom okruženju koje je podložno neprestanim promjenama, i
NATO neprestano razmatra svoje prioritete, zadatke i strukturu. S tim ciljem
je razvijen i novi Strateški koncept koji Alijansi omogućava da se odupre budućim bezbjednosnim izazovima. Ovakav NATO odgovara Crnoj Gori, koja
svojim skromnim političkim, a prije svega vojnim kapacitetima, mora da pronađe odgovarajući način da zadovolji svoj bezbjednosni aspekt i zahtjeve. Pristupanje NATO-u predstavlja garant spoljne bezbjednosti i dobru osnovu za
jačanje diplomatskog uticaja zemlje kroz članstvo u „klubu odabranih“. Ako
tome dodamo i način donošenja odluka u Savezu, onda je sve jasno. To nadalje podrazumjeva i kompatibilnost sa procesom evropeizacije, modernizacije
i demokratizacije Crne Gore, u kojoj tranzicija traje predugo bez obzira na to
što su putevi pristupanja EU i NATO-u različiti i po dužini, i po suštini. Crna
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Gora, vođena sopstvenim državnim interesom, omogućava sebi da jednim potezom izvede višestruki efekat, odnosno da izvuče višestranu korist.
Neophodno je razumjeti da nijedna država u svijetu nije u mogućnosti da
sama upravlja bezbjednosnim izazovima 21. vijeka, te je stoga potrebno ojačati
kapacitete za zajednički rad, kako na regionalnom tako i na globalnom nivou.
Članstvo u NATO-u bi Crnoj Gori omogućilo pravo glasa u svim forumima
odlučivanja Alijanse, te bi unaprijedilo i sposobnost Crne Gore da doprinese
nacionalnoj i regionalnoj bezbjednosti. Imajući u vidu težinu izbora u raspodjeli budžeta, logično je da nacije mogu imati koristi tako što će teret odbrane
podijeliti sa ostalim pouzdanim partnerima. NATO obezbjeđuje uspostavljeni
mehanizam za zajedničko koordinisanje partnerskih zemalja razvijanjem svojih snaga i specijalizovanih kapaciteta za optimalno korišćenje resursa.
Obzirom da je značaj evroatlantskih integracija prepoznala i većina opozicionih političkih partija Crne Gore (tačnije, sve izuzev jedne), kao i na to da
je Rusija promijenila stav prema članstvu Crne Gore u NATO-u, nama ostaje
da se u narednom periodu posvetimo kvalitetnom i preciznom informisanju
građana o tome šta je NATO, šta NATO nudi i šta bi Crna Gora dobila, a šta
izgubila, punopravnim članstvom u Alijansi, kako bi - kada dođe vrijeme za to
- na referendumu ili u Skupštini donijeli ispravnu odluku o tome da li će Crna
Gora biti članica Alijanse.
Potrebno je shvatiti da je ulazak u NATO dugotrajan proces u kome se ništa
ne dešava preko noći. Takođe je potrebno shvatiti da sam NATO ne želi Crnu
Goru, niti bilo koju drugu državu, koja u potpunosti ne ispunjava uslove za
članstvo i u kojoj ne postoji većinska volja građana za ispunjavanje obaveza
prema Alijansi. Neophodno je nastaviti sa reformama i završiti započeti posao
- ne zbog samog NATO-a, niti zbog bilo koga, već prvenstveno zbog nas samih
i budućnosti naše zemlje.
Kada je riječ o Srbiji i njenom putu ka evroatlantskim integracijama, stav
Evro-atlantskog kluba je da neutralnost Srbije, u ovom trenutku, nije rješenje.
Naime, Srbija je isuviše bitna, i mogu slobodno reći „lokomotiva“ cijele regije,
tako da cjelokupna priča o evroatlantskim integracijama neće imati smisla ukoliko Srbija ostane izvan Alijanse. Balkanske države, u sastavu NATO-a, predstavljaju garant stabilnosti i bezbjednosti u cijelom regionu.
Stoga je u interesu Srbije da započne proces pristupanja NATO-u, jer sve prijetnje koju su identifikovane u novom Strateškom konceptu ne zaobilaze ni Srbiju. Sagledavajući sve pozitivne i negativne aspekte članstva, potrebno je istaći kao
najbitniji očuvanje suvereniteta Srbije i njenog teritorijalnog integriteta.
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Zapadni Balkan posle Samita NATO-a u Lisabonu 2010 i
usvajanja novog Strateškog koncepta
Prof. dr Nano Ružin83
Novi strateški koncept, usvojen na lisabonskom samitu u jesen 2010. godine,
označio je novu epohu u bezbednosnom domenu Evrope i sveta jer je to prvi
strateški koncept koji se suočio sa novim izazovima današnjice i identifikovao
nove bezbednosne pretnje svetu. Koje su karakteristike NSK? Šta ovaj dokument
znači za NATO, za Evropu, za partnere kao što su Rusija, Ukrajina ili Gruzija?
Novi Strateški koncept se ne bavi isključivo sa državama zapadnog Balkana, ali
određeni elementi ovog dokumenta, kao što su unapređenje partnerskih odnosa,
princip ‘otvorenih vrata’, zajednički odbrambeni štit ili ostale savremene bezbednosne pretnje koje predstavljaju realnu opasnost za sve države kontinenta, imaju
izvesne implikacije i po bezbednosni status država zapadnog Balkana. U tom
kontekstu se postavlja pitanje budućeg statusa država iz regiona. Grčka, Mađarska, Slovenija, Rumunija, Bugarska, Hrvatska i Albanija su već postale članice
Alijanse, Makedonija od 1999. ima kandidatski MAP status, Crna Gora je dobila taj status na poslednjem Samitu, BiH mora da ispuni dodatne uslove kako bi
dobila MAP status, dok je Srbija jedina zemlja u regionu koja nema pro-atlanske
ambicije.
83 Autor je Dekan na Fakuletu političkih nauka, Univerziteta FON u Skoplju, kao i bivši
Ambasador Republike Makedonije u NATO-u u periodu od 2001.-2008. godine
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Pretnje, rizici i izazovi 21. veka
Pretnje, rizici i izazovi sa kojima se Alijansa suočava danas precizno su definisani i veoma se razlikuju u odnosu na njihov sadržaj iz vremena hladnoga
rata. Više se ne smatra da bi teritorije i populacije država članica Alijanse
mogle da budu cilj klasičnih, konvencionalnih vojnih pretnji širih razmera.
Nasuprot tome, pretnje koje sada ugrožavaju globalnu bezbednost su daleko
brojnije i, između ostalih, uključuju i političku nestabilnost, etničke i verske
rivalitete, rat za pristup prirodnim resursima i bogatstvima, proliferaciju oružja za masovno uništenje, bankrot-države, genocid, velike migracione talase,
organizovani kriminal, sajber-napade i terorizam.
Svi ti izazovi globalnoj bezbednosti iziskuju nalaženje odgovora od strane
Alijanse putem novih vidova operacija s ciljem zaustavljanja sve većeg broja
pretnji. Upravo stoga su saveznici rešeni da nastave sa transformacijom svojih
odbrambenih strategija. Dosadašnja iskustva i naučene lekcije pokazuju da su
za uspešno vođenje sadašnjih i budućih operacija neophodne elastične i interoperativne snage koje su dobro pripremljene, savremeno obučene i upotrebljive na većim geografskim distancama.
U funkciji ovih ciljeva koje pronalazimo u dokumentu Comprehensive Political Guidance, na novembarskom samitu Alijanse u Lisabonu je usvojen novi
strateški koncept (New Strategic Concept), kojim će se NATO rukovoditi u
suočavanju sa bezbednosnim rizicima u sledećoj deceniji. U okviru ovog dokumenta, NATO-krati su se fokusirali na četiri teme: odnos između NATO-a i
EU, nove mirovne misije, odnos između Rusije i NATO-a, i NATO i globalna
partnerstva. Međutim, ono što je tokom poslednjih nekoliko godina prouzrokovalo najveću debatu je pitanje antiraketnog štita.
Antiraketni sistem, čija je osnovna svrha zaštita građana i teritorija zemalja
članica Alijanse, zauzima značajno mesto u novom strateškom konceptu Alijanse. Po rečima Generalnog sekretara NATO-a, Andersa Fogh Rasmussena,
antiraketni sistem je jedan “od centralnih elemenata naše odbrane”. 84
Sličan optimizam i zadovoljstvo ostvarenim konsenzusom u Lisabonu je
izrazio i američki Predsednik Barak Obama. “SAD i naši saveznici u NATO-u
danas su postigli suštinski progres. Srećan sam što mogu da objavim da smo se
84 Konferencija za štampu održana 21. novembra 2010. godine
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po prvi put dogovorili da razvijemo jedan antiraketni sistem koji je dovoljno
moćan da pokrije evropsku teritoriju NATO-a i SAD”.
Epiteti poput istorijski i senzacionalan samit, nisu dobijeni samo zahvaljujući konsenzusu o raketnom sistemu, već i zbog učešća Rusije na najvišem nivou.
Uostalom kao i na prethodnim samitima. a kao što je akcentirano na jubilarnom Samitu u Strazburu/Kilu 2009. godine, Alijansa se izjasnila “za jačanje
dijaloga sa Moskvom u okviru Saveta NATO-Rusija”, osnovanog 2002. godine
na sastanku Alijanse u Rimu, kada je usvojena Deklaracija iz Rima. Na Samitu
u Lisabonu 2010. godine, bilo je primetno značajno otopljavanje odnosa između Rusije i NATO-a. Za takav pozitivan razvoj odnosa veliku zaslugu ima
Predsednik Obama koji je odstupio od realizacije projekta antiraketnog štita
u Evropi, tačnije u Poljskoj, i izgradnje velikog radara u Češkoj Republici. U
istom kontekstu je i pitanje proširenja Alijanse u pravcu Gruzije i Ukrajine, odnosno dobijanje statusa za članstvo (Membership Action Plan - MAP), što nije
bilo na dnevnom redu Samita u Lisabonu. Ujedno je i dogovor START između
Rusije i SAD-a u vezi smanjivanja bojevih nuklearnih glava ušao u završnu
fazu, dok istovremeno Rusija i NATO dele i neke zajedničke brige kao što su
rat protiv terorizma i borba protiv proliferacije nuklearnog oružja (Iran).
Novi strateški koncept evocira deo pomenutih elementa. Prema ovom dokumentu, NATO će “zatražiti od Rusije i ostalih partnera da sarađuju u realizaciji antiraketnog sistema.” Ujedno, Barak Obama je dobio značajnu podršku
od strane evropskih saveznika u pogledu brze ratifikacije rusko-američkog dogovora o nuklearnom razoružanju START koji je potpisan u aprilu 2010. godine, ali koji je tek u decembru 2010. odobren od strane republikanskih senatora.
Novi START jača Alijansu i celokupnu evropsku bezbednost, ističu NATOkrati. Stoga ne iznenađuje izraženo žaljenje Generalnog sekretara Rasmussena
“zbog odlaganja ratifikacije dogovora START od strane Kongresa”. Inače, novi
START predviđa smanjenje bojevih glava za 30% od strane dveju super-sila.
Celokupna arhitektura novog strateškog koncepta počiva na ambicijama da
se stvori jedan sigurniji i predvidljiviji svet. To je, uostalom, treća osovina istorijski značajnog lisabonskog Samita NATO-a. Novi strateški koncept bi morao
da doprinese “globalizaciji odbrambenih kapaciteta Alijanse”. S ciljem realizacije opisanih ambicija u vremenu velikih ekonomskih i finansijskih promena,
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kao imperativ za pojačanom saradnjom se nameće bolje korišćenje izvora nezavisno od reduciranih budžeta članica NATO-a.
Avganistanizacija
Drugi radni dan Samita prošao je u znaku afirmacije nove strategije za izlaz
Alijanse iz Avganistana, čiji je vodeći lajt-motiv transfer bezbednosti u korist
vojno-policijskih snaga Avganistana do 2014. godine. Predviđeno je da se ovaj
proces odvija u nekoliko faza, te je u skladu sa time predviđeno da 37, od
ukupno 238 regiona, pređu pod kontrolu avganistanskih snaga do kraja 2010.
godine. Pravci delovanja Alijanse su jasni, i kako je istakao generalni sekretar
Rasmussen, podrazumevaju “napredak i priprema avganistanizacije Avganistana, prema principu korak po korak - region po region”. U tom kontekstu
će biti sprovedeno i postepeno povlačenje snaga ISAF-a85. Francuska i Kanada
su odlučile da povuku svoje snage iz mirnijih u manje stabilne regione, dok je
britanski premijer David Cameron najavio da će svi britanski vojnici iz Avganistana biti povučeni do 2015. godine. Istovremeno su i Holandija, kao i većina ostalih država partnera, među kojima je i Republika Makedonija, najavile
povlačenje. Alijansa je tom prilikom najavila najmanje 35% od svojih efektiva
i postojećih struktura u skladu sa Deklaracijom iz Lisabona. S druge strane,
planirano je da vojska Avganistana dostigne broj od 300.000 ljudi. Konačno,
dobra vest je što će i Rusija da uzme učešće u rešavanju avganstanske krize
korišćenjem velikih transportnih helikoptera.
Novi strateški koncept Alijanse
Od usvajanja poslednjeg strateškog koncepta u aprilu 1999. godine, u vreme
žestoke vazdušne kampanje NATO-a protiv Srbije, došlo je do značajne promene brojnih parametara i subjekata: osnove transatlantske bezbednosne strukture
su evoluirale, povećan je broj članica NATO-a, gotovo sve američke snage su povučene iz Evrope i preusmerene ka srednjem Istoku i Aziji, dok je uporedo sa tim
procesima afirmisana i Evropska bezbednosna i odbrambena politika (European
Security and Defence Policy - ESDP). EU se nametnula kao novi strateški akter,
dok se na Samitu u Bukureštu 2008. godine i Francuska vratila u integrisanu voj85 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
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nu komandu i celovito pristupila Alijansi. Nakon terorističkih napada na New
York 11. septembra 2001. godine, Alijansa je aktivirala član 5 Vašingtonskog
sporazuma i angažovala se u antiterorističkom ratu u Avganistanu. Istovremeno
je otpočela sveobuhvatnu transformaciju i reforme sopstvenih vojnih struktura,
stvaranjem Savezničke komande za transformaciju i Sila za reakciju NATO-a,
dok je partnerstvo u NATO-u doživelo novi uspon i nove kvalitete.
Tokom Samita u Strazburu/Kilu86, upućen je poziv za izradu novog strateškog koncepta. Donošenje ovog dokumenta je realizovano u tri faze: reflektivna, konsultativna i završna, dok je na čelu ekspertskog tima bila Madeleine
Albright, državna sekretarka iz perioda Klintonove vlade.
Novi strateški koncept potvrđuje angažovanje članica Alijanse u suočavanju
sa novim izovima i pretnjama, u upravljanju krizama i stabilizovanju postkonfliktnih situacija, a u bliskoj saradnji sa Ujedinjenim nacijama i EU. Novi
strateški koncept je usmeren ka jednom svetu bez nuklearnog oružja, uz isticanje generalnog sekretara NATO-a Rassmussena da “sve dok postoju nuklearno oružje u svetu, NATO će ostati nuklearna Alijansa”.
Među 6 osnovnih programskih ciljeva Alijanse koji su izneseni u uvodnom delu
dokumenta, politika “otvorenih vrata” ostaje važeća za sve evropske demokratije
koje su zainteresovane za članstvo u NATO-u. U delu koji se odnosi na najznačajnije zadatke i ciljeve Alijanse, novi strateški koncept ističe oko tridesetak tačaka, u
čijoj realizaciji bi učestvovao NATO. Osnovni cilj NATO-a ostaje očuvanje slobode
i bezbednosti njenih članica putem upotrebe političkih i vojnih sredstava.
U četvrtoj tački novog strateškog koncepta, Alijansa se fokusira na tri fundamentalna zadatka u očuvanju bezbednosti svog stanovništva i teritorija:
a) kolektivna odbrana, što znači da bi u slučaju agresije na bilo koju od
svojih članica, Alijansa aktivirala član 5 Vašingtonskog dogovora i intervenisala u odbrani svoje članice;
b) upravljanje krizom znači da je Alijansa jedina sila koja raspolaže moćnim političkim i vojnim sposobnostima pomoću kojih bi mogla da utiče na
tok i smirivanje krize - pre, tokom i nakon konflikta;
86 Samit je održan 03. aprila 2009
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c) kooperativna bezbednost, što znači da će se Alijansa aktivno angažovati
u jačanju međunarodne bezbednosti, prihvaćajući i nudeći kooperativno
partnerstvo sa određenim zemljama i međunarodnim organizacijama, u
kontroli naoružanja, neproliferacije i razoružavanja.
Alijansa i dalje ostaje jedinstveni forum za transatlanske konsultacije za
sva pitanja koje se odnose na bezbednost. U odnosu na bezbednosnu okolinu, izdvojeno je devet značajnih tačaka među kojima su naročito značajne sledeće: iako je opasnost od konvencionalnih napada na države članice
otklonjena, klasično oružje se ne sme zanemarivati; proliferacija nuklearnog oružja, kao i drugih oružja za masovno uništenje, predstavljaju ozbiljnu pretnju za stabilnost i prosperitet u svetu; terorizam predstavlja direktnu
pretnju za bezbednost građana NATO-a i šire; opasnost raste ukoliko terorističke ćelije uspeju da se snabdeju nuklearnim oružjem; svaki konflikt koji
je u granicama ili van granica teritorije NATO-a predstavlja pretnju miru i
stabilnosti za Alijansu; u porastu su i sajber-napadi, opasnosti za transnacionalne transportnu infrastrukturu, komunikacije, kao i vitalne energetske
arterije koje moraju da budu zaštićene i obezbeđene kako bi se izbegle ekonomske i ekološke katastrofe većeg obima; razne tehnološke inovacije kao
što su lasersko oružje, elektronski rat i tehnologije koje onemogućavaju pristup određenom prostoru mogu da predstavljaju ozbiljnu pretnju za globalni mir. Istovremeno, klimatske promene, sanitarni rizici, nedostatak vode,
ugrožavaju bezbednost i okolinu.
U domenu odbrane - u slučaju agresije - Alijansa će zaštititi teritorije i populaciju svojih država članica aktiviranjem člana 5 Vašingtonskog ugovora, što
nikako ne znači da Alijansa smatra bilo koju državu za neprijatelja. Vrhovnu
garanciju bezbednosti saveznika pružaju strateške nuklearne sile Alijanse, a to
su: SAD, Velika Britanija i Francuska, koje u najvećoj meri doprinose globalnoj
anti-nuklearnoj odbrani NATO-a. S tim ciljem novi strateški koncept ističe da
će “Alijansa zadržati nuklearne i konvencionalne snage koje i dalje moraju da
budu mobilne, robusne i reaktivne, kako bi uspešno odgovorile imperativima
člana 5. Ujedno novi strateški koncept ističe da je mir nedeljiv i da Alijansa traži aktivnu saradnju sa Rusijom i ostalim partnerima.” Alijansa će istovremeno
nastaviti da se suočava i sa ostalim vidovima pretnji, kao što su proliferacija
hemijsko-biološkog oružja, sajber-napadi, međunarodni terorizam, itd.
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U odnosu na upravljanje krizom, novi strateški koncept ističe da svi konflikti van granica NATO-a mogu da predstavljaju direktnu pretnju za teritoriju i
stanovništvo članica Alijanse. Iskustva sa Balkana i iz Avganistana su pokazala
da je globalni pristup sačinjen od političkih, civilnih i vojnih elemenata neophodan za uspešno upravljanje krizom. Svakako, najefikasniji način upravljanja
krizom je “njeno izbegavanje”, i upravo stoga Alijansa sprovodi stalne analize
i procene međunarodnih događaja, te moguće načine upravljanja istima. Čak
i u slučajevima kada dođe do smirivanja situacije, međunarodna zajednica je
primorana da nastavi sa svojom podrškom u uspostavljanju mira u post-konfliktnom periodu.
Pitanja kontrole naoružanja, razoružavanje i neproliferacije nuklearnog
oružja ostaju suštinski ciljevi Alijanse. I pored velikog uspeha u smanjenju
broja bojevih glava u Evropi, neophodno je nastaviti sa stvaranjem uslova za
dalju redukciju naoružanja. U ovom kontekstu je veoma značajna uloga Rusije, koja bi trebala da demonstrira veću transparentnost u vezi sa nuklearnim
oružjem sa kratkim dometom kojim raspolaže. Inače, saradnja Rusije i NATOa je od strateškog značaja jer doprinosi stvaranju zajedničkog prostora mira,
stabilnosti i sigurnosti (tačka 33, str.9, NSC).
Program Partnerstvo za mir doprinosi jačanju međunarodne bezbednosti,
odbrani vrednosti i operacijama Alijanse, dok istovremeno služi i kao svojevrsna priprema država-aspiranata za njihovo članstvo u NATO-u. Evroatlantski
partnerski Savet i program Partnerstvo za mir se nalaze u centru koncepcije
jedne slobodne, celovite i Evrope mira. Zato se novi strateški koncept zalaže za
razvoj prijateljskih odnosa i saradnju sa državama Mediterana u cilju što većeg
intenziteta Mediteranskog dijaloga. Novi strateški koncept nastoji da unapredi
proces konsultacija i vojnu saradnju sa Ukrajinom i Gruzijom, uzimajući u
obzir i evroatlanske aspiracije ove dve države. Ujedno, novi strateški koncept
nastoji da olakša proces evroatlanskih integracija zemalja zapadnog Balkana i
da obezbedi trajni mir, garantuje demokratske vrednosti, te omogući regionalnu saradnju i dobrosusedske odnose.
NATO je jedini primer u istoriji koji predstavlja jednu Alijansu koja se zalaže za veću efikasnost i sposobnost, dok njena sposobnost zavisi od finansijskih,
vojnih i ljudskih resursa u vršenju svojih misija. Samo takva Alijansa će biti u
stanju da se suoči sa bezbednosnim pretnjama 21. veka.
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Zapadni Balkan posle lisabonskog samita Alijanse – novembar 2010.
godine
Kakvo je značenje novog strateškog koncepta za Balkan? Iako se dokument
na bavi posebno balkanskim regionom, ipak sadrži reference na lekcije naučene na Balkanu i u Avganistanu, dok se u tački 35 sugeriše olakšanje procesa evroatlanskih integracija zapadnog Balkana s ciljem obezbeđivanja mira i
razvoja tog regiona. Uz ovu sugestiju, značajno je da novi strateški koncept
potvrđuje nastavak politike “otvorenih vrata” za prijem novih članica Evrope,
u skladu sa članom 10. Vašingtonskog ugovora.
Geopolitički prostor Balkana u širem značenju obuhvata države bivše jugoslovenske Federacije, Mađarsku, Rumuniju, Bugarsku, Grčku, Tursku i Albaniju. U nešto užem značenju, geopolitički prostor Balkana obuhvata sve države
bivše SFRJ, bez Slovenije, uz Albaniju.
Što se tiče velike balkanske grupe, Grčka i Turska su već dugogodišnje članice
Alijanse, Mađarska je zajedno sa Poljskom i Češkom Republikom (Višegradska
grupa) pristupila Alijansi u prvom krugu proširenja (1997-1999); Slovenija, Rumunija i Bugarska su dobile poziv za članstvo posle terorističkih napada protiv
SAD-a na samitu u Pragu 2002. godine (tzv. big-bang) u okviru neformalne grupe “Vilnus”, dok su Albanija i Hrvatska dobile pozive za članstvo na samitu u Bukureštu u okviru Jadranske grupe, što nije bio slučaj i sa trećim članom ove grupe,
Republikom Makedonijom.87 Ostale države zapadnog Balkana, osim Srbije, su
pokazale želju za članstvom u Alijansi. Crna Gora je dobila kandidatski status
(MAP), BiH očekuje isti status, čije je dobijanje zaustavljeno usled nerešenih imovinsko-pravnih odnosa nekretnina i vojne imovine do rešenja ovog problema.
Srbija se izjasnila za neutralnu poziciju, dok se Kosovo jos uvek suočava sa procesom međunarodnog priznavanja, naročito od strane onih članica NATO-a koje
još uvek nisu priznale njegovu nezavisnost. (Španija, Slovačka, Rumunija i Grčka)
Republika Makedonija između evroatlanskih aspiracija i skepticizma
Najduže se u ‘čekaonici’ Alijanse zadržala Republika Makedonija, koja je
svoj partnerski status dobila 1995. godine - čitavih 6 godina pre Hrvatske. To87 Za detaljniju analizu, Nano Ružin: “NATO vo sovremenite megjunarodni odnosi”, Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010
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kom 1999. godine, Makedonija je dobila kandidatski status (MAP), a danas je
u procesu pripreme svog jedanaestog Godišnjeg akcionog plana za članstvo.
Republika Makedonija je na putu ka evroatlanskim integracijama bila najposlušniji učenik od svih država članica zapadnog Balkana: intenzivirala je proces
reformi; usvojila je Ohridski okvirni dogovor i time promenila svoj Ustav; proglasila je opštu amnestiju za borce UCK iz 2001. godine; sprovela je snažnu decentralizaciju, dvojezičnost i univerzitetsko obrazovanje na albanskom jeziku, što je
rezultovalo stvaranjem multietničkog društva koje je primer modela demokratije
za balkanske narode, ali i koje je teško prihvatljivo za balkanski mentalitet.
Međutim, posle veta Grčke na napredovanje Republike Makedonije ka punopravnom članstvu u Alijansi tokom samita u Bukureštu 2008. godine, što
je zvanično obrazloženo “lošim (dobro)susedskim odnosima”, a nezvanično
zbog spora oko imena države, Makedonija nije dobila poziv za otpočinjanje
razgovora o pristupanju. Ovaj konsenzualni stav Alijanse je među političkim
elitama Republike Makedonije izazvao veliko razočarenje, NATO-skepticizam
i prezasićenost temom članstva u NATO-u. To je, takođe, uticalo i na usporavanje reformi i smanjenje ambicija ka realizaciji evroatlanskih integracija;
došlo je do smanjenja vojnog budžeta sa prethodnih 2.3–2.6% na 1.38% BNP;
izigravanja demokratskih procesa; partizaciju administracije, povećanu kontrolu nad medijima; ugrožavanja političkog dijaloga; intenziviranja populizma
i još snažnijeg zaokreta ka antici u potrazi za nekim drugim i značajnijim identitetom; monumentalizacije istorijskih ličnosti i opadanja pro-evroatlanskog
raspoloženja.
Na primer, prema poslednjim istraživanjima javnog mnjenja konstatovano
je da je i pored opadanja podrške javnosti, trenutna podrška ipak dovoljna za
ispunjavanje uslova za dobijanje poziva za članstvo. Međutim, kada se postavi
pitanje izbora između imena ili članstva u NATO-u i EU, gotovo 70% građana
su za zadržavanje imena po ceni da se ne postane članicom NATO-a i EU. S
obzirom da sinergija između kandidature za članstvo u NATO-u i EU zavisi
od konsenzusa ovih institucija koje podržavaju grčku poziciju blokiranja Makedonije ka članstvu u obe organizacije, problem sa imenom je postao glavna
kočnica procesu integracija Republike Makedonije u EU i NATO. Imajući u
vidu da je u ovom trenutku raspoloženje obeju strana jasno određeno i nepromenjivo (Republika Makedonija insistira na dvojnoj formuli – odnosno,
da Grčka može da koristi bilo koji naziv za Republiku Makedoniju, a ostale
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države prema afinitetu, dok Grčka insistira na geografskoj odrednici, odnosno
Severna, Gornja ili Vardarska Makedonija, uz izmenu naziva i ostalih elementa
kao što su jezik, pismo, pasoši, itd). Sve prognoze u vezi brzog rešavanja ovog
semantičkog problema su veoma skeptične, čime se šanse Republike Makedonije za dobijanje članstva u EU i NATO-u svode na apsolutni minimum.
Ceo ovaj bagaž bi mogao da dovede Republiku Makedoniju do nove političke
i među-etničke krize, te verovatno otrežnjavanja svih onih koji trenutno koče
put Republike Makedonije prema EU i NATO-u.
Republika Srbija, vojna neutralnost ili nešto treće ?
Strateška opredeljenja Republike Srbije su sasvim različita u odnosu na
NATO. Posle pada Miloševićevog režima i vazdušne intervencije NATO-a
1999. godine, pitanje odnosa Srbije prema Alijansi postepeno je počelo da se
aktuelizuje. Kako je jačao proces demokratizacije, tako je i debata o NATO-u u
Srbiji postajala sve aktuelnija. Sa aspekta spoljnih gledišta, na osnovu vođenih
debata i zvaničnih pozicija vlasti moguće je konstatovati tri nivoa razmišljanja
o odnosu Srbije prema Alijansi, a to su: a) pozicija odbijanja b) pozicija neutralnosti i c) pro-atlanska pozicija.
a) Pozicija odbijanja mogućeg članstva u NATO-u se zasniva na najmanje tri razloga: prvi razlog proizilazi iz vremena vladavine Miloševića kada
je Alijansa 1995. godine bombardovala srpske pozicije u BiH, što je imalo
dalekosežne posledice na tok i ishod rata u Krajini i u Bosni, a potom i velika vazdušna kampanja iz 1999. godine (Milosrdni anđeo ili Merciful Angel),
čime je po prvi put u svojoj istoriji Alijansa prekršila pravilo o neintervenciji
van zone NATO-a. Posle ovih intervencija, Srbija je pretrpela velike ljudske,
finansijske, ekonomske i ostale gubitke, a ujedno je izgubila i teritoriju - pokrajinu Kosovo i Metohiju. Razumljivo je da svaka pomisao o potencijalnom
članstvu u NATO-u nije prihvatljiva za šire srpsko javno mnjenje, niti za veći
deo političke elite.
Drugi razlog odbijanja je ‘proces Kosovo’ i post-kosovski period oko kojeg
se sukobljavaju dve suprotstavljene koncepcije. Jednu koncepciju, koja je rezultirala proglašenjem nezavisnosti Republike Kosovo, je zastupala međunarodna
zajednica podržana od strane NATO-a . Kao glavni argument je iskorišteno to
što Albanci predstavljaju ogromnu većinu u odnosu na srpsku manjinu, a za-
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tim neizvesnost, te finansijska i ostala zavisnost Kosova koja je pretila eskalacijom i širenjem krize po principu spojenih sudova u celom regionu. Druga koncepcija koju zastupa Srbija je ona prema kojoj je Kosovo sastavni deo srpske
teritorije i srpskog suvereniteta čije otcepljenje je suprotno međunarodnom
pravu, i čiju nezavisnost neće priznati niti jedna srpska vlada. Tokom ‘procesa
Kosovo’ i u vreme post-kriznog perioda, ostale članice Alijanse, izuzev četiri
države, su priznale nezavisnost Kosova. Razumljivo je da je Alijansa koja je
oduzela teritoriju jednoj državi ipso facto nepoželjna za partnera.
Treći razlog odbijanja je povezan sa bilateralnim odnosima Srbije sa Rusijom. Iako Rusija nije bila u stanju da spreči vazdušnu intervenciju protiv Srbije,
te je povukla svoje mirovne snage sa Kosova, ipak je ostala je značajan saveznik
Srbije i nije priznala nezavisnost Kosova. Rusija se suprotstavlja širenju NATO-a ka njenim granicama, čak i kada se radi o Srbiji koja je geografski udaljenija od Rumunije, Poljske i Baltičkih zemalja. Ruska diplomatija je u najmanje
dva navrata dala do znanja Beogradu da se suprostavlja eventualnom članstvu
Srbije u NATO-u. Najpre je ruski Ambasador u Beogradu, Aleksandar Konuzin, izjavio “ukoliko Srbija reši da uđe u NATO, Rusija će i formalno priznati
nezavisnost Kosova, jer ta vojna organizacija ne smatra Kosovo za sastavni deo
teritorije Srbije.” U isto vreme, i Ambasador Rusije u NATO-u, Dmitri Rogozin, je u istom stilu dopunio svog kolegu iz Beograda rečima “ne mogu Rusi
biti veći Srbi od Srba.”
b) Pozicija vojne neutralnosti kao spoljno-politička opcija Srbije je rezultat tri prethodno izložena razloga anti-NATO raspoloženja Srbije. Narodna
Skupštine Srbije je 26. decembra 2007. godine usvoijila Rezoluciju o zaštiti
suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog poretka Srbije, kojom se Srbija proglasila za vojno neutralnu državu. Šta takva strategija znači za Srbiju?
Prema mišljenju Generala Zdravka Ponoša, “vojno neutralne države nemaju
saveznike i zato takva neutralnost može da košta jer suočena sa vojnim pretnjama, neutralna država treba sama da se suprotstavi”. Drugi autori se pozivaju na zaključke Haške konferencije iz 1907. godine i ističu značaj principa
aktivne neutralnosti. U ovom kontekstu neki autori smatraju da Srbija može
da unapredi svoje aktivnosti u okviru programa Partnerstvo za mir (PzM), kao
što to čine Austrija, Švajcarska, Finska, Švedska i Irska, ali koji ne vodi neizostavno ka članstvu u Alijansi ili aktivnom vođenju rata protiv terorizma i bez
primene sile. Srbija bi ujedno mogla da se promoviše i kao faktor neutralnosti
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na Balkanu, čime bi delovanje Srbije kao neutralne države bilo ograničeno na
krizni menadžment, post-konfliktnu rekonstrukciju, humanitarne i ne-vojne
intervencije.
Međutim, neki autori poput Milana Pajevića smatraju da je ideja o neutralnosti Srbije “zastarela opcija, jer stvarna i puna neutralnost ne postoji
u današnjem svetu i to definitivno nije realno i održivo rešenje za Srbiju na
duže staze.”
c) Pro-atlansku poziciju za članstvo u NATO zastupa nekoliko savremenih
analitičara, dok su među političkim strankama najjasniji zagovarači pro-atlanske strategije s ciljem punopravnog članstva u NATO-u Liberalno-demokratska partija (LDP), G17+ i Srpski pokret obnove (SPO), nezavisno od činjenice
što dve trećine javnosti Srbije ne podržavaju pro-atlansku opciju.
U zvaničnom osvrtu LDP-a, ističe se pet razloga zbog kojih je potrebno da
Republika Srbija postane članicom Alijanse: politički, bezbednosni, ekonomski,
razlozi vezani za politički imidž i značaj Republike Srbije, i neodrživost koncepta vojne neutralnosti. U odnosu na bezbednosne aspekte, ističe se činjenica da
bi pristupanjem kolektivnoj bezbednosti sistema Alijanse, Srbija osigurala svoju
bezbednost i odbranu i dobila najmoćnije države za saveznike. Uostalom, Republika Srbija nije u stanju da sama garantuje sopstvenu bezbednost; što se političkih razloga tiče, LDP smatra da se samim činom prihvaćanja kandidatskog statusa, država obavezuje na veću transparentnost, demokratiju i stabilnost institucija.
Sredinom juna 2010. godine, predstavnici G17+ i SPO su se zauzeli za ukidanje odluke o uspostavljanju vojne neutralnosti Republike Srbije i za prihvaćanje pro-atlanske pozicije s ciljem članstva u NATO-u. Sa svoje strane, srpska
diplomatija je i pored unapređenja bilateralnih odnosa sa NATO-om koje se
odvija na nivou ambasada, jasno dala do znanja preko Ministra spoljnih poslova, g-dina Vuka Jeremića, da “Beograd nema nameru da preuzme bilo kakve
korake koji vode ka vezivanju sa NATO-om ili bilo kojim drugim vojnim savezom .... politika vojne neutralnosti Srbije neće se menjati.” U prilog ove teze
ide i konstatacija da “članstvo u NATO-u nije uslov za članstvo u EU”, iako je u
dosadašnjih tri kruga proširenja Alijanse posle 1989. godine to bio uobičajeni
put ka članstvu u EU.
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Atlantske perspektive ostalih država zapadnog Balakana su heterogene i
kreću se između onih država za koje je samo pitanje vremena kada će da ispune obaveze iz Akcionog plana za članstvo kako bi na sledećem samitu Alijanse
dobile poziv za početak pristupnih prgovora (Crna Gora); zatim države koje u
očekivanju Akcionog plana za članstvo moraju da razreše određene unutrašnje
probleme (Bosna i Hercegovina); odnosno, da dobiju međunarodno priznanje
od strane svih članica Alijanse kako bi dobile partnerski status (Kosovo).
Vizije i prepreke
Nema nimalo sumnje da je spoljno-politička orijentacija država zapadnog
Balkana pro-evropska i - sa izuzetkom Republike Srbije - pro-atlantska. Između političkih ambicija i želje političkih elita s jedne strane, te realnosti i raspoloženja javnosti balkanskih naroda s druge strane, nameće se više prepreka i
poteškoća koje blokiraju ili usporavaju put ka članstvu u EU i NATO-u. U tom
kontekstu, napravićemo malu komparativnu analizu između Srbije i Makedonije u pogledu članstva u NATO-u.
Obe države su proizašle iz bivše jugoslovenske Federacije koja je kao lider
nesvrstane politike (1960-1980) bila veliki protivnik blokovske politike i članstva u vojno-političkim paktovima (Varšavski ugovor i NATO pakt) u periodu
hladnoga rata. Stoga su se političke elite koje su početkom 1990-ih došle na
vlast u Srbiji i Makedoniji u odsustvu kredibilne spoljno-političke orijentacije
okrenule ka Titovoj strategiji. U Republici Makedoniji, Predsednik Gligorov
je u prvoj polovini 1990-ih afirmisao strategiju ekvidistance, koja predstavlja
vrstu neutralne politike, dok se Milošević zbog vazdušne intervencije NATO-a
u BiH 1995. godine zadržao na nesvrstanoj spoljnoj politici.
Republika Makedonija se kasnija pridružila opštem trendu pro-atlanske
orijentacije ostalih post-komunističkih država pristupanjem programu Partnerstvo za mir (1995) i približavanjem kandidatskom statusu prihvaćanjem
izrade Akcionog plana za članstvo 1999. godine.
Sa druge strane, vazdušna kampanja protiv Srbije i ‘proces Kosovo’ su uticali na anti-natovsko raspoloženje stanovništva Srbije (oko 70% se suprotstavlja
članstvu u NATO-u). Nasuprot tome, uloga NATO-a u upravljanju kriznim situacijama u Republici Makedoniji 2001. godine, kao i želja za većim stepenom
bezbednosti putem članstva u Alijansi, povećali su evroatlantsko raspoloženje
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građana Makedonije na 85-90%. Međutim, nasuprot aspiracijama i ambicijama, diplomatski neuspeh u Bukureštu 2008. godine je smanjio popularnost
Alijanse. I pored značajnog pro-atlanskog raspoloženja koji iznosi oko 70%,
kada bi građani morali da biraju između članstva u NATO-u (ili EU) i promene imena, 20% se nije izjasnilo, dok je gotovo 70% ispitanih građana za zadržavanje imena i neulazak u NATO i EU. S druge strane, ovaj procenat je još
veći među etničkim Makedoncima, dok nasuprot njima više od 95% etničkih
Albanaca daje prednost daje članstvu u NATO-u umesto imenu.
Po pitanju statusa u Alijansi, obe države imaju svoje misije na nivou ambasadora, odnosno Šefova misija; obe poseduju članstvo u programu Partnerstvo
za mir, dok je Republika Makedonija dobila i Akcioni plan za članstvo. Republika Srbija, kao i Republika Makedonija, su pristupile društvenim reformama
(tržišna privreda, višepartijski sistem, liberalna demokratija), kao i reformama svojih vojski (veća transparentnost u usvajanju i trošenju vojnog budžeta,
civilna kontrola vojske, profesionalizacija vojske). Srbija je praktično krenula
istim putem kao i Republika Makedonija u reformama i reduciranju vojske,
koja se u prošlosti odlikovala sovjetskim organizacionim modelom. Reforme
vojske su vršene u sinergiji sa stručnjacima NATO-a, u čemu je veliku ulogu
odigrao program Partnerstvo za mir.
Ako bismo pokušali da rezimiramo uporedni odnos Srbije i Makedonije,
došli bismo do nekih paradoksalnih konstatacija.
Naime, Srbija koja je bila cilj vazdušne kampanje i izgubila deo svoje teritorije
usled te kampanje (Kosovo), nije zainteresirana za članstvo u Alijansi nezavisno
od toga što je pristupila intenzivnim reformama u sektoru odbrane, i to upravo u
saradnji sa NATO-om. Republika Srbija nije zainteresovana za kandidatski status, nije MAP država, ali ukoliko odluči da dobije MAP status i postane članica
NATO-a, uspeće na relativno lakši način u odnosu na Makedoniju. Nasuprot
tome, Republika Makedonija koja je već 11 godina (od 1999) aspirant za članstvo u Alijansi, te koja je posle krize iz 2001. godine usvojila Ohridski okvirni
dogovor, promenila svoj Ustav i politički sistem, pristupila decentralizaciji, proporcionalnoj zastupljenosti ostalih etničkih zajednica u administraciji, i uspešno
ispunila reforme predviđene Akcionim planom za članstvo, pretvorila se od ‘korisnika’ bezbednosti u ‘izvoznika’ bezbednosti slanjem 4% svojih oružanih sila u
mirovne misije Alijanse. Međutim, čak i uz ogromno pro-atlansko raspoloženje
populacije, Republika Makedonija ne može da dobije poziv za članstvo i uđe u
NATO-klub ukoliko ne promeni svoje ustavno ime.
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Bosna i Hercegovina i NATO – značaj novog
Strateškog koncepta iz Lisabona
Doc. Dr Armin Kržalić88
Bosna i Hercegovina je pristupanje Europskoj uniji i NATO-u postavila kao
ciljeve svoje vanjske politike. Reforme u oblasti odbrane koje je Bosna i Hercegovina preduzela u 2004. godini, označene su kao važni koraci na putu ka euroatlantskim integracijama. Provedba reforme odbrane je započeta stupanjem
na snagu novog Zakona o odbrani BiH i Zakona o službi u Oružanim snagama
BiH, ali je prvi značajniji datum bio 1. januar 2006. godine kada su institucije
odbrane BiH preuzele entitetska Ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande, te počele
primjenjivati novi jedinstveni budžet za odbranu. Sve ove reformske aktivnosti
rezultirale su članstvom BiH u Partnerstvu za mir i Akcionom planu za članstvo (MAP). U pogledu budućnosti i novog strateškog koncepta, najvažnije je
da je NATO zadržao politiku ‘otvorenih vrata’, što znači da BiH može postati
punopravna članica kada ispuni sve demokratske kriterije. U cilju ispunjavanja
uslova ka punom članstvu u Europskoj uniji i NATO-u, neophodno je ostvariti
dodatni napor da se deklarativni stavovi političara, iznešeni u njihovim političkim deklaracijama, pretoče u konkretna ostvarenja koja će građanima donijeti
blagodeti članstva.
88 Autor je doktorirao na Fakultetu za kriminalistiku, kriminologiju i sigurnosne studije,
Univerziteta u Sarajevu. Autor je knjige Privatna sigurnost, kao i velikog broja istraživanja na
temu sigurnosti i sigurnosnih pojava, posebno onih koje se tiču ljudske sigurnosti. Zaposlen je
Centru za sigurnosne studije BiH kao Direktor projekta.
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Uvod
Posmatrajući sigurnost Bosne i Hercegovine (dalje u tekstu, BiH), može se
reći da je ona nerazdvojno povezana sa sigurnošću i perspektivama neposrednog okruženja, regije, Europe i međunarodne zajednice u cjelini. Zbog toga se
integracija u okviru regionalnih, europskih i euroatlantskih kolektivnih sigurnosnih struktura za BiH smatra prioritetnim područjem djelovanja. Ono što je
pozitivno, a što se u dosadašnjim aktivnostima pokazalo kao dobro, jeste činjenica da BiH razumije i prihvaća koncept vojne sigurnosti kao kamen temeljac
dugoročne vojne strategije.
Definisanjem prioriteta na vanjsko-političkom planu u dokumentu
Predsjedništva BiH iz 2003. godine, BiH je pristupanje Evropskoj uniji i
NATO-u postavila kao ciljeve svoje vanjske politike. Zastoj koji se u posljednje vrijeme uočava na euroatlanskom putu BiH, ostavlja dilemu da li
su te odrednice vanjske politike još uvijek validne. Kakav je značaj i utjecaj
Novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a, usvojenog 19. i 20. novembra 2010.
godine u Lisabonu, na odrednice ovakve politike BiH, vidjet ćemo u nastavku teksta.
1. Put Bosne i Hercegovine u NATO
Historijske činjenice pokazuju da je članstvo u NATO-u glavna prekretnica
za države koje žele članstvo u Europskoj uniji. Tako gotovo sve države u regionu žele članstvo u NATO-u i EU. Hrvatska i Albanija su članice NATO-a,
Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija i Crna Gora su članice Akcionog plana za
članstvo (MAP), te teže ka članstvu i u NATO-u i EU, dok je Srbija u programu
Partnerstvo za mir (PzM), i želi članstvo u EU.
Kada je u pitanju put BiH ka NATO-u, odnosno postepena transformacija
odbrambenog sektora u BiH, može se reći da je on najvećim dijelom trasiran
i izgrađen pod pokroviteljstvom NATO-a i OSCE-a. Taj proces se kretao od
razoružavanja, demobilizacije i reintegracije pripadnika vojski unutar BiH, do
izgradnje mjera povjerenja i promovisanja demokratskih principa u sektoru
sigurnosti. Broj pripadnika do tada zaraćenih strana, koji je tokom rata bio oko
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400.000, do sredine 1996. godine je smanjen na blizu 150.000,89 te je smanjen
na prihvatljivih 30.000 u toku 2001/2002 godine.
Bitno je napomenuti da su vojne strukture isprva funkcionisale kao tri zasebne strukture u okviru Hrvatskog vijeća odbrane, Vojske Republike Srpske
i Armije BiH, a potom su se Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane i Armija BiH ujedinile
u Vojsku Federacije BiH. Entitetska nadležnost nad vojnim strukturama zadržana je sve do značajnijih reformi u ovom sektoru poduzetih tokom 2003.
godine.
Postepeni napredak u odnosu na vojna pitanja, koji se odvijao pod pokroviteljstvom NATO-a i OSCE-a, doveo je i do promjena u političkom dijalogu
vezanom za budući odbrambeni sistem BiH. Političke odluke koje su slijedile
iskazale su jasno opredjeljenje političkih krugova za pristupanje kolektivnim
odbrambenim sistemima.
U julu 2001. godine, Predsjedništvo BiH je donijelo zaključak i uputilo ga
generalnom sekretaru NATO-a, kojim se izražava spremnost Bosne i Hercegovine da prihvati obaveze i prava u porodici ravnopravnih euroatlantskih naroda, te da sudjeluje i aktivno doprinosi kolektivnoj sigurnosti. Predsjedništvo
BiH je takođe jasno izrazilo opredjeljenje za uključenje BiH u evropske i euroatlantske integracije i program Partnerstvo za mir, kao i za provedbu potrebnih
reformi odbrambenog sistema i reorganizacije oružanih snaga.90
Neadekvatan postojeći sistem odbrane nije mogao odgovoriti iskazanim
političkim ciljevima, pa je postalo jasno da će morati pretrpjeti određene izmjene. Na ovu disproporciju političkog određenja i prakse, treba dodati i visinu budžeta koju su trošile vojne strukture, a koja nije bila u skladu sa ekonomskim mogućnostima zemlje.
Uprkos deklarisanim političkim ciljevima političkih partija, nije bilo moguće postići faktički dogovor od strane unutrašnjih političkih elita, te je došlo do
intervencije visokog predstavnika za BiH. Kao prigoda toj neophodnoj intervenciji iskorištena je afera ‘Orao’ u oktobru 2002. godine, kada je ustanovljeno
da je ova vojna kompanija iz Republike Srpske prodavala naoružanje Iraku,
89 Bonn International Center for Conversion (2003), “Turning Soldiers into a work force,
Demobilisation and reintegration in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brief 26 , str.9.
90 Džemal Najetović (2007), “Geopolitički položaj BiH u euroatlantskim integracijama Zapadnog Balkana”, DES, Sarajevo, str.195.
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koji je u to vrijeme bio pod sankcijama UN-a, odnosno pod embargom za
prodaju naoružanja.
Koristeći ovlaštenja koja su mu data Dejtonskim mirovnim ugovorom, visoki predstavnik je ustrajao u zahtjevu da se obezbjedi komanda i kontrola nad
vojnim sektorom od strane državnih institucija. U tu svrhu, svojom odlukom
je formirao Komisiju za reformu odbrane koja je ponudila preporuke za unaprjeđenje sektora odbrane.
Legitimitet za rad Komisije za reformu odbrane nalazio se u četiri odredbe
Ustava BiH, a jedna od njih - odnosno član II stav 5 - predviđa da će država
preuzeti odgovornosti neophodne za očuvanje suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta, političke nezavisnosti i međunarodnog subjektiviteta Bosne i Hercegovine i da dodatne institucije mogu biti uspostavljene prema potrebi za vršenje ovih nadležnosti.91
Tim ovlaštenjima su stvorene zakonske pretpostavke za donošenje novog
Zakona o odbrani BiH, koji je predložila Komisija, kao i predložene amandmane na ustave entiteta, zakone o odbrani i Zakon o Vojsci Republike Srpske. Pored ovih prijedloga zakona, Komisija je predložila i novi Zakon o Vojsci Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i zakonodavni okvir za novo ministarstvo
odbrane na državnom nivou. Ovaj okvir uključuje i amandmane na Zakon o
Vijeću ministara BiH i Zakon o ministarstvima i prijedlog Odluke Predsjedništva BiH o prijenosu nadležnosti sa Stalnog komiteta za vojna pitanja na
novo Ministarstvo odbrane.
Možda najznačajniji prijedlozi Komisije su se odnosili na uspostavu vrhovne komande od strane države po pitanjima odbrane. Usvojena je jedinstvena
odbrambena struktura BiH, sa izvodljivom podjelom odgovornosti između
institucija države i entiteta. Po njoj je Predsjedništvo BiH kolektivno djelovalo
u obavljanju komande i kontrole Oružanih snaga BiH u miru, tokom kriznih
situacija i u ratu.
Odredbama Zakona formirano je Ministarstvo odbrane na državnom nivou. Ministar je postao punopravan član Vijeća ministara BiH sa pravom glasa
i imenovan je kao i svi ostali državni ministri. Ministar je djelovao u lancu ko91 Ustav BiH
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mandovanja za vojne operacije, poznatom kao operativni lanac komandovanja, te u lancu komandovanja za popunu, obuku i opremanje oružanih snaga,
poznatom kao administrativni lanac komandovanja.
Entiteti su i dalje davali značajan doprinos odbrani BiH. Oni su nastavili
sa obavljanjem administrativnih funkcija u popuni, obuci i opremanju Vojske
Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i Vojske Republike Srpske. Svaki od entiteta je
imao ministarstvo odbrane na čelu sa ministrom, koji su za svoj rad sada bili
odgovorni državnom ministru odbrane.
Značajnije nadležnosti date su državnoj parlamentarnoj skupštini a bile su
bazirane na principima demokratske civilne kontrole nad oružanim snagama,
transparentnosti u planiranju i izradi budžeta za odbranu, kao i potrebom za
fiskalnim ograničenjima za odbranu koja trebaju ustanoviti politički organi
na demokratski način. Ključna od predloženih reformi u sferi demokratske
kontrole je i uspostava nove Zajedničke komisije za odbranu i sigurnost Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine.�
Reforme u oblasti odbrane koje je BiH preduzela u 2004. godini, označene
su kao važni koraci na putu ka euroatlanskim integracijama. Političko rukovodstvo i javnost u BiH su sa pravom očekivali da će za ostvarene značajne rezultate međunarodna zajednica odlučiti da za ove napore nagradi BiH pozivom za
članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir. Na žalost, očekivanja se nisu ispunila, i na Samitu
NATO-a, održanom juna 2004. godine u Istanbulu, pozdravljen je napredak ali
su šefovi zemalja i vlada članica Sjeverno-atlanskog vijeća ponovno apelirali na
BiH da ostvari dodatni napredak prema uspostavi jedne vojne sile. Naglašeno
je da BiH treba da preduzme sistemske reforme koje će joj omogućiti da u potpunosti sarađuje sa Haškim tribunalom, te da brže počne jačati državni nivo
komande i kontrole time što će nadležnost entitetskih ministarstava odbrane i
komandi prenijeti na odgovarajuće državne odbrambene institucije.
Sve ovo je utjecalo na potrebu da visoki predstavnik ponovno reaguje, u političkom okruženju koje nije blagonaklono gledalo na daljnje reforme u ovom
sistemu. Posebno su glasne kritike dolazile iz Republike Srpske, čije rukovodstvo nije bilo voljno da prenosi dalje nadležnosti na državni nivo, posebno u
uslovima kada se nisu ispunila njihova obećanja da će prethodnim reformama
ostvariti članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir.
Ipak, koristeći se podrškom Upravnog odbora Vijeća za implementaciju
mira u BiH, visoki predstavnik je u decembru 2004. godine donio odluku o
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produženju mandata Komisiji za odbrambenu reformu.92 Preporuke nove, stare Komisije za reformu odbrane, bile su bazirane na dvije osnovne promjene: stvaranju jedne odbrambene strukture i jedne vojne sile u BiH pod punom
funkcionalnom državnom komandom i kontrolom, i reorganizaciji Oružanih
snaga BiH kako bi se ispunili kriteriji državnih nastojanja u pogledu vanjske,
odbrambene i sigurnosne politike, a posebno kolektivne odbrane i sigurnosti.
Da bi jasnije dočarali sliku ostvarenih reformi pod mandatom Komisije za
reformu odbrane tokom 2005. godine, predočićemo neke od najvažnijih rezultata do kojih se došlo tokom jednogodišnjeg pregovaranja.
U oblasti komande i kontrole uspostavljen je jedan lanac komandovanja.
On polazi od Predsjedništva BiH, koje odlučuje konsenzusom, preko ministra
odbrane, načelnika Zajedničkog štaba, komandanta Operativne komande i komandanta Komande za podršku, a preko njih do njima podređenih elemenata.
Ministarstvo odbrane, zajedno sa Zajedničkim štabom je nadležno za politike
i planove. Operativna komanda, Komanda za podršku i njima podređeni elementi su nadležni za provođenje planova i politika koje donose Ministarstvo
odbrane i Zajednički štab, u skladu sa zakonima i propisima. Parlamentarna
skupština BiH zadržava svoju nadležnost za parlamentarni nadzor nad institucijama odbrane u skladu sa Zakonom o odbrani iz 2003. godine.�
Izmjene u regrutnom i rezervnom sastavu odnose se na to da su nove Oružane snage BiH sastavljene isključivo od profesionalnih lica. Regrutni sastav je
ukinut sa 1. januarom 2006. godine, kao i obaveza regruta u slučaju mobilizacije (40 godina u RS i 60 godina u Federaciji). Evidencije o regrutnom sastavu i
druga dokumentacija o vojnoj službi, koje su se nalazile u općinskim uredima
entitetskih Ministarstava odbrane, prebačene su na civilne općinske organe
vlasti, kako bi svi dokazi o obuci i zvanična dokumentacija koju bi mogli potraživati građani bili na raspolaganju. Pasivna rezerva od 60.000 pripadnika
(40.000 u Federaciji i 20.000 u RS), ukinuta je također 1. januara 2006. godine,
a nova aktivna rezerva će se formirati u narednih nekoliko godina i njena veličina će biti 50% od brojnosti aktivnog sastava.
Uspostavljen je sistem pukova Oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine
(OSBiH), kao jedne vojne sile kompatibilne sa NATO-om. Postoje tri pješadijska puka, od kojih je svaki odgovoran za očuvanje i njegovanje vojnog nasli92 Pogledati http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=33874
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jeđa i identiteta jedinica od kojih potiču, tj. komponenti ARBiH i HVO bivše
Vojske Federacije i bivše VRS. Ostali, manji rodovi OSBiH, poput inženjerije,
veze i artiljerije, organizirani su u pojedinačne pukove i u njihovom sastavu su
jedinice dodijeljene trima brigadama kao podrška.
Veličina aktivnog sastava OSBiH je smanjena ukidanjem onih pozicija na
kojima su radila lica trenutno angažirana na poslovima obuke i upravljanja
regrutnim sastavom i pasivnom rezervom. Veličina OSBiH je oko 10.000 profesionalnih lica. OSBiH se sastoje od tri manevarske brigade, jedne brigade za
taktičku podršku i jedne avijacijske brigade, a sve su pod kontrolom Operativne komande. Svaka od tri manevarske brigade se sastoji od tri pješadijska
bataljona, po jedan iz svakog od tri nova pješadijska puka. Svaka manevarska
brigada ima svoje rodove podrške, poput artiljerije, inženjerije, veze, itd.
OSBiH pripadaju BiH i odražavaju sastav BiH kao države tri konstitutivna
naroda i ostalih. Tri konstitutivna naroda su jednako zastupljena na svim visokim nivoima na kojima se donose odluke, počevši od Predsjedništva, pa do
Operativne komande i Komande za podršku. Ministar odbrane, načelnik Zajedničkog štaba, komandant Operativne komande i komandant Komande za
podršku svaki imaju po dva zamjenika, čije su odgovornosti definirane zakonom. On i njegovi zamjenici ne mogu biti iz reda istog konstitutivnog naroda.
Predsjedništvo BiH je odgovorno za utvrđivanje nivoa nacionalne zastupljenosti u OSBiH, uzimajući u obzir ustav, zakone, posljednji popis stanovništva,
operativnu gotovost, popunu, moral i koheziju OSBiH.
Funkcije koje su obavljala entitetska ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande
preuzelo je Ministarstvo odbrane BiH, odnosno Zajednički štab BiH, ili su prebačene na nove odjele za ljudstvo, logistiku i obuku i doktrinu Komande za podršku. Entitetska ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande su ukinuta 1. januara 2006.
godine. Od tog datuma, uspostavljen je jedinstveni budžet za odbranu na nivou
države. Troškovi za odbranu su smanjeni za 55% u odnosu na 2002. godinu.
Provedba je započeta stupanjem na snagu novog Zakona o odbrani BiH i
Zakona o službi u Oružanim snagama BiH,� ali je prvi značajniji datum bio 1.
januar 2006. godine kada su institucije odbrane BiH preuzela entitetska ministarstva odbrane i vojne komande, te počele primjenjivati novi jedinstveni
budžet za odbranu.
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Sve ove aktivnosti, kao i niz drugih koje su bosanskohercegovačke vlasti
uradile, doprinijele su da je BiH, zajedno sa Srbijom i Crnom Gorom na Samitu NATO-a u Rigi 29. novembra 2006. godine dobila poziv za članstvo u
programu Partnerstvo za mir (PzM), a 14. decembra 2006. godine potpisom
na Okvirni dokument u Briselu, BiH je i formalno pristupila ovom programu.�
Uprkos ovim ostvarenjima u odbrambenom sektoru, mišljenja pojedinih
autora je da reforma odbrane nije u potpunosti ispunila očekivanja, posebno u
odnosu na OSCE Pravila ponašanja o političko-vojnim aspektima sigurnosti.
Tako neki od njih ističu da su donešeni zakoni u stvari kopije starih komunističkih zakona bivše Jugoslavije o odbrani i oružanim snagama, te da su njihove odredbe često nekompatibilne sa osnovnim principima ljudskih prava,
principima slobode i međunarodnim humanitarnim pravom.�
Ipak, uprkos ovim kritikama BiH je ulaskom u Partnerstvo za mir uspjela
da ostvari jedan od svojih vanjsko-političkih ciljeva. Sektor odbrane se može
posmatrati kao najnapredniji društveni sektor u kojem je sačinjen prvi institucionalni iskorak, koji se ogleda u formalnom uključivanju BiH u zvanične
euroatlantske strukture.
Članstvo BiH u PzM otvorilo je novo poglavlje u reformi odbrane, koje se
sada ogleda u povećanoj saradnji sa međunarodnim snagama i ispunjavanju
obaveza koje sa sobom nosi članstvo u PzM. Još jedan od dokaza napretka BiH
u reformi odbrane, ogleda se u preuzimanju svih nadležnosti od EUFOR-a,
odnosno dobijanje nadležnosti Oružanih snaga BiH u pogledu deminiranja,
kontrole vojnog kretanja i kretanja naoružanja i opreme, inspekcije vojnih
skladišta i sličnih vojnih poslova.
U okviru PzM, BiH je u toku prve godine svog učešća u ovom NATO programu uspjela realizovati sve zacrtane ciljeve. Tako je tokom 2007. godine sačinjen Prezentacijski dokument BiH za PzM, potpisan sigurnosni sporazum sa
NATO-om, kao i PzM sporazum o statusu stranih vojnih snaga, te dostavljen
upitnik o Procesu planiranja i revizije.
Saradnja koja se odnosila na Individualni partnerski program realizovana
je u 17 oblasti saradnje sa 42 događaja, dok je u 2008. godini taj broj povećan
na 155 događaja u 23 oblasti saradnje. I u 2009. godini je nastavljeno sa sličnim
tempom saradnje koji je u određenoj mjeri redefinisan u odnosu na planirano
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usljed utjecaja svjetske recesijske krize kojom je bilo pogođeno i Ministarstvo
odbrane.
Usljed takvog opredjeljenja unutar sektora odbrane, NATO je dodatno
osnažio put BiH ka punopravnom članstvu uspostavom Individualnog akcionog plana saradnje (IPAP), koji se često naziva partnerstvo prve klase. Kao
daljnji poticaj uloženim naporima BiH u sektoru odbrane, na Samitu u Bukureštu aprila 2008. godine NATO je saradnju sa BiH podigao na viši nivo - nivo
Intenziviranog dijaloga.
Naredni korak prije punopravnog članstva u NATO-u se odnosi na pristupanje Akcionom planu članstva (MAP), koji predstavlja završni korak u reformskim procesima i zahtjeva od države sveobuhvatne promjene, ne samo u
sektoru odbrane već i ostalim društvenim segmentima. Bosna i Hercegovina je
podnijela aplikaciju za članstvo u MAP-u krajem 2009. godine, no zvaničnici
NATO-a nisu pozitivno odogovorili na istu. Na njihovu odluku vjerovatno je
uticalo neispunjavanje obaveza BiH vezanih za realizaciju sporazuma za korištenje i upravljanje pokretnom i nepokretnom imovinom, što uz kašnjenje odluke o načinu rješavanja viška naoružanja i municije, predstavlja uzrok zastoja
reformi i osnovni preduslov njenog nastavka.
Ovakva situacija nagnala je političare u BiH da učine dodatne napore na
ispunjavanju obaveza vezanih za prijem u MAP. Shodno tome, te nakon nekoliko posjeta visokih zvaničnika međunarodne zajednice, Predsjedništvo BiH je
donijelo odluku o uništavanju dijela viška municije, te na svojoj 44. sjednici,
održanoj 14. aprila 2010. godine, dalo saglasnost za angažovanje pješadijske
jedinice OSBiH za osiguranje u misiji ISAF-a u Afganistanu.93
Iskazani stav političkog vrha BiH prema međunarodnim obavezama na
promovisanju mira i sigurnosti u svijetu, veoma je pozitivno primljen od strane članica NATO-a. Nakon toga i - mora se priznati - izraženog lobiranja diplomatskih predstavnika Republike Turske uoči neformalnog sastanka ministara odbrane NATO-a u Talinu, Estonija, ministri odbrane su konstatovali da
je BiH načinila značajan progres u reformi od dana podnošenja aplikacije za
MAP. Tako su, na sastanku u Talinu, 22. aprila 2010. godine, odlučili da BiH
pozovu u MAP, te ovlastili Sjeverno-atlansko vijeće (NAC) da prihvati prvi
93 Za više detalja, pogledati http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/zaklj/sjed/1/?cid=14601,2,1
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Godišnji nacionalni program BiH kada BiH riješi pitanje nepokretne vojne
imovine.94
Ovakav uslovni prijem BiH u MAP svakako je značajan za daljnji reformski put BiH u odbrambenom sektoru, ali ponovno otvara prostor za
unutrašnje političke nesporazume. Tako je srpski član Predsjedništva BiH,
Nebojša Radmanović, već komentarisao da NATO ovakvim uslovljavanjem
vrši dodatni pritisak na Republiku Srpsku.95 Naime, uslov NATO-a vezan za
nepokretnu vojnu imovinu, doslovno kaže da se identifikovana imovina koja
će služiti za buduće potrebe odbrambenih struktura mora registrovati kao
državna imovina BiH, kojom će se služiti Ministarstvo odbrane. Dosadašnji
stav predstavnika iz Republike Srpske, bio je da se imovina registruje kao
vlasništvo entiteta na kojemu se nalazi vojna imovina, te da se ista ustupi
na korištenje Ministarstvu odbrane BiH. Za nadati se da će se u dogledno
vrijeme postići potreban politički dogovor koji će omogućiti punopravno
članstvo BiH u MAP-u.
Sagledavajući ovaj proces možemo uočiti da je BiH napravila ogroman
iskorak u reformi svojih odbrambenih struktura. Od pukog primaoca međunarodne vojne pomoći, dostigla je nivo u kojem njene oružane snage svojim
učešćem u mirovnim misijama daju doprinos izgradnji mira i sigurnosti u
svijetu. Očigledno je da je reforma, koja je vođena pod budnom paskom međunarodne zajednice, dala pozitivne rezultate i odbrambeni sektor nastavlja
reformski put ka unaprijeđenju svoje interoperabilnosti sa NATO snagama.
2. Novi strateški koncept NATO-a
Kao prvo, potrebno je istaći da je NATO usvojio svoj značajan dokument na
samitu u Lisabonu 19. i 20. novembra 2010. godine. Na izradi ovog dokumenta
radili su mnogobrojni eksperti u ovoj oblasti, a istim je predsjedavala bivša
državna sekretarka Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Madeleine Albright. Sam
dokument, Novi strateški koncept NATO-a, daje smjernice za naredni period
djelovanja.
94
Za više detalja, pogledati
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62811.
htm?selectedLocale=en
95 Za više detalja, pogledati http://www.vijesti.ba/politika/10060-Radmanovic-Uvjet-prijenosu-imovine---novi-pritisak-Srpsku.html
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Globalno posmatrajući, kolektivna odbrana ostaje osnovni instrument saradnje i u narednih deset godina, dok su uz terorizam i oružje za masovno
uništavanje, dodate i neke nove prijetnje poput piratstva, cyber napada, raketnih napada i dr. Takođe, ono što je bitno napomenuti jeste ostvareni dogovor
o razmještanju protivraketnog štita sa Rusijom, kao i dogovor o unapređenju
saradnje, odnosno dogovor da se NATO i Rusija više neće uzajamno posmatrati kao neprijatelji.
NATO će i ubuduće nastaviti politiku ‘otvorenih vrata’, omogućavajući da
u njegovo članstvo uđu sve zemlje koje ispune kriterije i žele biti članicama,
rekao je Rasmussen. Možemo reći da je ova izjava glavnog sekretara NATO-a
ohrabrila one snage u BiH koje rade na ostvarenju punopravnog članstva BiH
u NATO-u. Zašto smo izdvojili baš ovu rečenicu?
U prvom redu, smatramo izuzetno značajnom odluku NATO-a da zadrži
politiku ‘otvorenih vrata’, što znači da BiH može postati punopravnom članicom kada ispuni sve demokratske kriterije. Drugi bitan aspekt je da je potvrđeno
opredjeljenje članica NATO-a da BiH pristupi MAP-u kada ispuni uslov koji
je vezan za rješavanje pitanja uknjižbe vojne imovine koju koriste Ministarstvo
odbrane i Oružane snage BiH. Pored spomenutog, smatramo bitnim i pomak
saradnje NATO-a sa Rusijom. Oni će pozitivno utjecati na stavove kako građana
Srbije tako i građana iz Republike Srpske po pitanju članstva u NATO. Može se
reći i da se srpski ministar odbrane Šutanovac, kao jedan od malobrojnih zvaničnika vlasti u Srbiji, u svom intervjuu od 1. decembra 2010. godine pozitivno
opredjelio prema pristupanju Srbije NATO-u i teškom sprovođenju neutralnosti
za koju se Srbija opredjelila. Svakao da stavovi Srbije imaju značajnog utjecaja na
građane iz Republike Srpske, pa je ovo možda način da se prevaziđu povremene
trzavice u BiH vezane za pristupanje BiH NATO-u, odnosno nagovještaji raspisivanja referenduma u Republici Srpskoj povodom članstva u NATO-u.
Uz ovo, strateški koncept će u BiH vjerovatno imati i značajnog utjecaja na
formulisanje dokumenta Odbrambenog pregleda BiH do 2020. godine koji se
trenutno nalazi u fazi izrade u Ministarstvu odbrane.
Kada je u pitanju Europska odbrambena politike, može se reći da ona nije
dovoljno promovisana u BiH, kao ni u drugim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana,
pa je stoga i odnos institucija prema ovoj oblasti dosta inertan. Europska od-
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brambena politika nije ni uvrštena u dosadašnje pregovore između EU i BiH,
te je taj domen saradnje na marginama ostalih politika.
Ono što može biti interesantno je to da su u BiH zastupljeni elementi vanjske politike kroz djelovanje vojne misije EUFOR (misija broji oko 1.400 vojnika i produžen joj je mandat do kraja 2011. godine), policijske misije EUPM i
Ureda specijalnog predstavnika EU. S obzirom na prisustvo ovih snaga, institucije BiH sarađuju sa njima i postepeno dostižu standarde. EUFOR je započeo sa sprovođenjem treninga za naše vojnike, a u EUPM dosta pomaže našim
policijskim snagama u dostizanju najboljih praksi u policijskim poslovima i
saradnji sa pravosudnim organima.
Umjesto zaključka
Politika “otvorenih vrata” u narednih deset godina koju zagovara novi strateški koncept NATO-a, pruža jedinstvenu šansu za BiH da ostvari svoje ciljeve
na vanjsko-političkom i sigurnosnom planu. Ono što je neophodno učiniti je
ostvariti dodatni napor da se deklarativni stavovi političara, izneseni u njihovim političkim izjavama, pretoče u konkretna ostvarenja koja će građanima
donijeti blagodeti članstva u NATO-u i EU.
Analizirajući političko djelovanje pozicije na vlasti, stiče se dojam da je komplikovani društveni sistem BiH počeo da se koristi kao ograničavajući faktor na
putu integrisanja BiH u euroatlanske strukture. Sve češće posezanje za mehanizmom entitetskog glasanja u Parlamentarnoj skupštini BiH i zahtjevi za većim
ovlastima entitetskih parlamenata, znatno su usporili euroatlantski put BiH.
Takva dešavanja na političkoj sceni dovela su u određeni ćorsokak i
međunarodnu zajednicu, koja je ohrabrena napretkom u reformama koje je
BiH ostvarila u periodu od 2000. do 2005. godine, donijela odluku da smanji
svoje uplitanje u politički život BiH. Tako je u junu 2006. godine, Vijeće za
implementaciju mira (Peace Implementation Council, PIC) čak najavilo i svoj
plan o zatvaranju Kancelarije visokog predstavnika (Office of High Representative OHR) u roku od jedne godine, a samim tim i o ukidanju Bonskih ovlasti.
Ipak, preuzimanje pune odgovornosti domaćih vlasti za svoju budućnost,
odnosno budućnost građana BiH, nije pošlo u očekivanom smjeru i prema
procjenama međunarodne zajednice. BiH jeste prešla iz faze implementacije
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mira u fazu euroatlantskih integracija, no kako se pokazalo, to nije bilo dovoljno za uspostavu funkcionalne i održive državne zajednice.
Vidjeli smo da je cjelokupna reforma sigurnosnog sektora u BiH provedena
uz snažnu podršku međunarodne zajednice. Činjenica je da se nijedna reforma ne bi mogla dovršiti bez intervencije međunarodnih zvaničnika, prvenstveno visokog predstavnika u BiH, na jedan ili drugi način. Ono što je ostalo
nedovršeno i što predstavlja izazov na daljnu izgradnju sigurnosnog sistema
je nedovoljno snažno promovisanje ustavnih reformi, odnosno neuvrštavanje
ostvarenih reformi u ustavni aranžman.
Ovakav status provedenih reformi, koje još nisu formalno pravno-ustavna
kategorija ili su, kao u slučaju reforme policije, pregovori odgođeni do postizanja političkog kompromisa o novom teritorijalnom ustavnom ustrojstvu,
ostavlja prostor za ugrožavanje dostignutog stepena reformi.
Stoga je još uvijek prilično smjelo ustvrditi da sve etničke strukture u BiH
imaju jedinstven i iskren odnos prema unutrašnjoj i vanjskoj politici, odnosno
da su istinski opredjeljeni ka izgradnji moderne demokratske države. Vanjski
faktor, predstavljen u formi prisutnosti međunarodne zajednice u političkom
životu BiH, zasigurno održava onu minimalnu društvenu koherentnost po pitanjima strateške orjentacije, odnosno vanjskih, odbrambenih i sigurnosnih
prioriteta.
Također, ne treba izgubiti iz vida ni trenutnu političku situaciju koja bi
se mogla reflektovati na moguća opredjeljenja i dileme u budućnosti. Kao
što je poznato Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (SNSD), najjača politička
partija u Republici Srpskoj, kontinuirano zagovara demilitarizaciju BiH i u
posljednje vrijeme podriva napore koje je BiH ostvarila na reformi odbrambenog sistema. Na jedan ovakav pristup vjerovatno značajnog utjecaja ima
odluka političke elite u Srbiji da proglasi vojnu neutralnost i ne razmatra
kao političku opciju priključenje NATO-u, već samo EU. Ovom stavu, koji
još uvijek nije zvanično iznešen u institucijama na državnom nivou, postepeno se priklanjaju i ostale političke partije u Republici Srpskoj, ali je takvo
mišljenje sve više zastupljeno u medijskim istupima političara. Svakako da
ovakva stajališta kako u Srbiji, tako i u Republici Srpskoj, zahtjevaju znatno
veću pozornost predstavnika međunarodne zajednice i ozbiljnije razmatranje
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stavova koji u mnogome mogu biti veoma važni za integrisanje regiona u euroatlantske strukture.
Ovakvo razmimoilaženje u stavovima po pitanju članstva u NATO-u, koje
je prisutno u Federaciji BiH i Republici Srpskoj, može predstavljati kamen
spoticanja daljem putu ka punopravnom članstu.
Utjecaj politike susjednih zemalja na BiH mogao bi ovo pitanje dodatno zakomplikovati, ako se ovakva tendencija nastavi u narednom periodu.
Opredjeljenje za protežiranje vojnih aktivnosti EU i usporavanje napretka
prema integraciji u NATO moglo bi otvoriti unutrašnji politički front, na koji
međunarodna zajednica zasigurno ne bi blagonaklono gledala.
Sličan scenario već je primjenjen u proteklim godinama u odnosu na
proračun odbrambenih snaga. Iako sve političke partije deklarativno pružaju
podršku priključenju NATO-u, budžetskim vojnim ograničenjima taj put je
znatno otežavan. Odobreni odbrambeni proračuni dovoljni su samo za operativno funkcionisnaje odbrambenih struktura, a tek neznatnim dijelom zadovoljavaju potrebe za modernizacijom opreme i postizanje interoperabilnosti sa
NATO snagama.
Odustajanje od pristupanja NATO-u, pod krinkom ispunjavanja europskih uslova za priključenje EU, moglo bi postati tema na političkom obzorju
u narednom periodu. Taj čin bi za BiH zasigurno bio višestruko negativan sa
stajališta međunarodne zajednice. U sam proces reforme odbrambenog sektora uloženo je mnogo finansijskih resursa i napora međunarodnih aktera, pa
bi ovakvo političko skretanje sa dogovorenog kursa poslalo veoma negativnu
poruku o kredibilitetu naše zemlje. Posebno bi takva odluka bila negativno
primljena od strane SAD-a i nekih većih članica NATO-a, poput Velike Britanije ili Turske, koje su i najviše investirale u reformu ovog sektora.
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Bosna i Hercegovina i novi Strateški koncept NATO-a
Dr Miloš Šolaja96
Bosna i Hercegovina je, poput ostalih post-socijalističkih zemalja jugoistočne
Evrope, svoj tranzicioni put vezala za priključenje evropskim i evroatlantskim integracijama. S tim ciljem je postignut unutrašnji politički konsenzus i sproveden
niz reformi koje su pred BiH postavili NATO i EU. Sprovedena je reforma sistema
odbrane koja je završena uspostavljanjem jedinstvene odbrambene strukture i
vojske. Kroz niz promjena, BiH je takođe oslobođena viznog režima za putovanje
u zemlje Šengena. Ono što otežava put BiH prema bezbjednosnim i ekonomskim
integracijama jeste nedostatak unutrašnje suverenosti i funkcionalnog ustavnog
i političkog sistema, kao i opšta unutrašnja nestabilnost. Iako je načelno jasno
da BiH neće dovršiti integracione procese ukoliko odgovornost sa međunarodnih
institucija ne bude prenesena na unutrašnje institucije, odgovarajući koncepti još
uvijek ne postoje. Zbog nepostojanja unutrašnjeg konsenzusa oko suštinskih pitanja i jasnog koncepta tranzicije sa međunarodnih organizacija na unutrašnje
institucije, BiH je na vratima Akcionog plana za članstvo (MAP), jer je članstvo
uslovljeno određenim odlukama čije je usvajanje još daleko. U međuvremenu,
pojavile su se nove bezbjednosne inicijative i intenzivnija uloga Rusije i Turske
u regionu.
96 Autor je Direktor Centra za međunarodne odnose Banja Luka
128
Petnaest godina nakon potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, politički status i unutrašnja organizacija Bosne i Hercegovine (BiH) izazivaju
brojne političke nedoumice. Većina subjekata političkih procesa još ima dileme u pogledu baznog koncepta BiH kako u pogledu njenog unutrašnjeg uređenja, tako i u pogledu međunarodnih odnosa koje ona sama treba da gradi.
Neizvjesnosti i nedoumice prisutni su u procesima evroatlantskih i evropskih
integracija i pored političke saglasnosti gotovo svih institucija i aktera političkog života o kretanju BiH u ovom pravcu. „Konstitutivni elementi BiH - dva
entiteta i tri naroda“ ne slažu se oko elementarnih osnova ustavnog uređenja
i političkog sistema. Koncepti aktera političkih procesa u pogledu unutrašnjeg
uređenja BiH razlikuju se od centralističkih do separatističkih. To u znatnoj
mjeri usporava razvoj unutrašnjih procesa i uspostavljanje unutrašnji stabilnog i sigurnog institucionalnog okvira kao nužnog uslova za izgradnju vrijednosnog okvira i dostizanje standarda neophodnih za prihvatanje članstva
BiH u bezbjednosnim i ekonomskim asocijacijama. Deklarativna orijentacija i
isprazna retorika u pogledu integracionih procesa nisu više dovoljni kao pokazatelj održavanja BiH u tim procesima.
Blokada formiranja institucija u procesu primjene rezultata izbora u BiH,
održanih početkom oktobra 2010., pokazuje potpunu konceptualnu konfuziju političkog sistema, u suštini postavljenom na tri nacionalna konstituenta,
koji nastoje da institucionalne pozicije i političku moć ostvare u veoma kompleksnom korišćenju ustavnog i izbornog legaliteta i političkog legitimiteta
određenog nacionalnom pripadnošću i interesima. U međuvremenu, posebno
u okviru predizborne kampanje u Republici Srpskoj porasli su evroatlantski
skepticizam i anti-NATO retorika. Takvi retrogradni stavovi nameću pitanja
kako će se pomiriti novi politički pristup i insitutcionalno-pravni okvir koji je
BiH postavila na putu ka evroatlatnskim integracijama i NATO-u.
Pozivnica za Akcioni plan za članstvo (Membership Action Plan – MAP)
upućena je Bosni i Hercegovini na ministarskom sastanku zemalja članica
NATO-a u Tallinnu (Estonija) 24. aprila 2010. Ta pozivnica je, međutim, uslovljena neophodnim dogovorom i sporazumom između entiteta o korišćenju
određenog broja „perspektivnih“ lokacija i objekata, važnih za funkcioniranje Vojske BiH. Ta uslovljenost je postavila dilemu: da li je BiH zaista postala
članica MAP ili će to postati kada ispuni dati uslov. Političari i predstavnici
institucija koje su čvrsto opredijeljene za članstvo u NATO-u tvrde da je BiH
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dio programa MAP, a oni koji prema NATO-u pokazaju uzdržanost tvrde suprotno. Zbog toga je dilema da li je BiH članica MAP ili nije i dalje prisutna.
Uslovna pozivnica BiH za pristupanje jedan je od posljednjih koraka zaokruživanja evropskog prostora kao jedinstvenog bezbjednosnog prostora u
čijim okvirima NATO predstavlja jedinstveni sistem bezbjednosti Evrope u
kojem je „bezbjednosna zajednica“ (community security) rezultat kvalitativne
transformacije od individualne ka kolektivnoj bezbjednosti. Put post-hladnoratovske izgradnje jedinstvenog bezbjednosnog sistema do procesa pridruživanja BiH evroatlantskim integracijama obilježavaju dva paralelna procesa:
postsocijalistička tranzicija u istočnoevropskim zemljama i geopolitičke promjene, ratovi i konflikti na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije koja više nije bila „simbol
razlika u komunističkom svijetu”, niti je bila potrebna kao “buffer (ili tampon)
zona”, te je u zapadnim političkim doktrinama jednostavno svrstana u zemlje
(jugo)istočne Europe.97
U vrijeme ratova na Balkanu tokom posljednje decenije 20. vijeka, NATO se
pojavio s konceptom širenja. Učešće Alijanse u ratu u BiH predstavljalo je promjenu principa kolektivne odbrane „out of area” po kojem NATO nije trebalo
da dejstvuje izvan svog područja. Od saradnje s misijama Ujedinjenih nacija
1992. do bombardovanja položaja Vojske Republike Srpske 1995. godine, Sjevernoatlantski savez je prešao put od pomoći u humanitarnim operacijama do
otvorenih napadnih oružanih dejstava. To su mnogi protumačili kao kršenje
člana 5. Ugovora o osnivanju Alijanse, koji je osnova njenog odbrambenog
jedinstva, ali i „izlazak izvan svog područja (teritorije)”, čime je naznačena još
jedna nova karakteristika NATO-a koja će se pokazati u budućnosti: pored
izgradnje evropskog sistema bezbjednosti, postali su jasni i njegovi globalni
ciljevi. To se pokazalo kroz ključnu ulogu NATO-a u primjeni Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma i uspostavljanja mira u BiH. Od 20. decembra 1995. do danas, NATO je odigrao ključnu ulogu u ostvarivanju unutrašnje stabilnosti BiH.
Pozicioniranje Alijanse na Balkanu odigralo je jednu od najznačajnijih uloga u
strateškom prepozicioniranju globalnih odnosa. „Sjedinjene Države nisu posmatrale interese prema Balkanu na isti način kao i evropski saveznici, pa su
angažovale političke potencijale i vojnu moć 1995. godine kada su procijenile
da razlike u pogledu BiH mogu da dovedu u pitanje opstanak NATO-a”.98 Za
97 Susan Woodward: Tragedija Balkana, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, str. 108.
98 Kori Schake: „NATO and the Balkans Challenge: An American Perspective“, str. 351. u
„The Strategic Triangle“, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stepehen F. Szabo and
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SAD je bilo važno da njihove trupe učestvuju u mirovnoj operaciji, jer su time
zadržavale primat u evropskoj bezbjednosti, te je „nametanje mira na Balkanu
za njih tek drugorazredna motivacija”.99
Ratovi na jugoistoku Evrope u vrijeme izgradnje novih međunarodnih
post-hladnoratovskih odnosa unijeli su novi pogled na realizaciju strateškog koncepta NATO-a i uspostavljanja kolektivnog bezbjednosnog sistema
Evrope. Vojno-strateški koncept je promijenjen u pravcu vojnih intervencija
„izvan područja”, zbog kojih je NATO kao vojni savez dobio mogućnost preuzimanja mandata za uspostavljanje i održavanje mira koji je do tada pripadao isključivo oružanim snagama UN-a. Ostvarujući koncept širenja, NATO
je morao da osmisli kada i kako će bivšim socijalističkim državama dodijeliti
status člana.
Akcioni plan za članstvo (MAP) predviđa intenzivni individualni dijalog
NATO-a i zemalja-kandidata usmjeren na kreiranje programa pomoći tim
državama. Princip saradnje jeste projekat svake države ponaosob, kojii sama
usvaja i realizuje svake godine. Godišnji nacionalni program se odnosi na pet
oblasti: politiku i ekonomiju, odbranu i vojsku, obezbjeđenje finansijskih sredstava, bezbjednosna i pravna pitanja, koja se ažuriraju godišnje. Ti izvještaji
su osnova za diskusiju između Sjeverno-atlantskog savjeta i zemlje-kandidata. „Akcioni plan za članstvo nije puko ispunjavanje uslova koji se očekuju
od potencijalne zemlje-članice, kao što ni učešće u MAP-u nije garancija za
buduće članstvo. Odluke da se zemlje aspirantice pozovu da počnu pristupne
pregovore, donose konsenzusom zemlje članice NATO-a, za svaku zemlju
pojedinačno”.100 Države „prvog kruga” koje su primljene u MAP 2004. godine,
su provele u Akcionom planu četiri godine, Albanija osam, Hrvatska sedam,
Makedonija deset godina i još nije postala članica Alijanse.
Bosna i Hercegovina, kao zemlja koja je proživjela težak unutrašnji ratni
sukob i koja je još uvijek pod neposrednom paskom međunarodne zajednice,
prošla je težak put do uslovnog članstva u MAP. Transformacija odbrambenog
sistema je počela uvođenjem Komisije za reformu odbrane (Defense Reform
Commission). Reforma odbrambenog sistema se smatra možda i najuspješnijom reformom u BiH. Od 419.000 pripadnika dvije vojske, danas je u BiH
Samuel F. Wells Jr. str. 351 - 369.
99 Ibid, str. 351.
100 NATO Priručnik, Brisel 2006., str. 197.
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uspostavljen jedinstven sistem odbrane i jedna vojska uključujući i promjene
neophodne za članstvo u programu Partnerstvu za mir i nastavak evroatlatnskih integracija. U nekoliko faza je smanjen broj vojnika, uspostavljeno je
jedinstveno Ministarstvo odbrane, organizovana jedna vojska u BiH, objedinjen odbrambeni budžet. Uspostavljeni su institucionalni mehanizmi demokratske kontrole nad odbrambenim sektorom, transparentost u planiranju i
budžetiranju, te je stvorena osnova za učešće predstavnika BiH u mirovnim
operacijama. U samopolaznom dokumentu Komisije sa reformu odbrane, naslovljenom „Put u Partnerstvo za mir”, Komisija je predložila da „dugoročan
cilj BiH bude članstvo u NATO-u”, te predlaže preporuke za učlanjenje u Planu
djelovanja za članstvo (MAP).101 Stav o ulasku u NATO je ušao i u Zakon o
odbrani BiH, gdje se članom 84. izričito obavezuju „Parlamentarna skupština,
Savjet ministara Bosne i Hercegovine, Predsjedništvo, te svi subjekti odbrane,
u okviru vlastite ustavne i zakonske nadležnosti, da sprovedu potrebne aktivnosti za prijem Bosne i Hercegovine u članstvo NATO-a“.102 Usvajanjem Zakona dovršen je institucionalni okvir reforme odbrane i postavljena orijentacija
za članstvo u NATO-u. Reforma odbrane u BiH počela je sa strahom odbijanja u Republici Srpskoj, iako je bilo jasno da je uspostavljanje jedinstvenog
sistema odbrane u BiH, bilo uslov za ulazak zemlje u evroatlantske strukture
i približavanja NATO-u i Evropskoj uniji. Politička potvrda takvog stava došla
je kroz izjavu predsjednika 12 parlamentarnih stranaka u BiH od 18. februara
2004., „u želji da se ubrza provođenje reformi u BiH, da se na vrijeme ispune
svi uslovi za uspješno zaključivanje SAA, kojim se otvaraju putevi za prijem u
EU, kao i neophodni uslovi za prijem u PfP, a kasnije i u NATO“.103 Politička volja u BiH za pristupanje evroatlantskim integracijama s krajnjim ciljem ulaska
u NATO je zaokružena Deklaracijom o strateškim opredjeljenjima Republike
Srpske u sistemu odbrane Bosne i Hercegovine104 i Zaključkom Narodne skupštine Republike Srpske.105 BiH je od tada krenula punim kapacitetom u pravcu
101
pdf
Vidjeti: http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Partnerstvo-za-mir-sr.
102 Vidjeti: http://www.oscebih.org/documents/8286-eng.pdf
103 Parlamentarna skupština BiH, Predstavnički dom, broj 01-50-180/04. od 18.
februara 2004.
104 Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, broj 63. od 4. jula 2005. str. 2-5. Deklaracija se odnosi na demilitarizaciju kao krajnji cilj, dok se članstvo u NATO-u tretira indirektno, ali se ne
odbija navodeći da bi BiH kao „član Partnerstva za mir, političkog krila NATO saveza i Evropske unije bila ravnopravan partner, stabilan subjekat i primjer izgradnje demokratskog društva
nakon tragičnog ratnog sukoba“.
105 Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, broj 82. od 8. septembra 2005. str. 1-2. „Narodna
132
evroatlantskih integracija što je, primjereno ranijim iskustvima istočne Evrope,
postavljeno kao nužna faza u procesu pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji. NATO je u
institucijama BiH prihvaćen kao nesumnjivi zajednički oblik evropske bezbjednosti izgrađen nakon hladnog rata. Bezbjednost BiH je u tom pogledu imala
paradigmatsku vrijednost uspješnog conflict resolution-a u etnički diverzifikovanim društvima nakon otvorenih unutrašnjih oružanih sukoba.
Uspješno sprovedena reforma odbrane predstavljala je osnovu za poziv za
članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir (PzM). Članstvo u PzM za BiH je imalo veliko
značenje za unutrašnju bezbjednost i jedinstvo zemlje, ali isto tako i za njene
međunarodne odnose u kojima bi kao država s nestabilnim unutrašnjim odnosima trebala da participira na ravnopravnim odnosima. Evroatlantske integracije se time postavljaju kao izuzetno značajno unutrašnjo-političko pitanje.
Članstvo u Partnerstvu za mir ne iscrpljuje sve potencijale za evroatlantske
integracije. „Suština PzM-a jeste partnerstvo oblikovano između zemlje-partnera i NATO-a, skrojeno prema individualnim potrebama i zajedno sprovedeno prema individualnim potrebama na nivou i ritmom koje vlada svake
zemlje-učesnika sama odabere“.106 Nakon samita u Washingtonu „pokrenute
su značajne inicijative za povećanjem operativne dimenzije PzM, za učešćem
zemalja-partnera u donošenju odluka i planiranju.“107 PzM je proširen čitavim
nizom odnosa koji se odnose na interoperabilnost partnera i NATO-a osnaživanjem zajedničkog rada na partnerskim zadacima. BiH je, zajedno sa Srbijom
i Crnom Gorom, pozvana da pristupi programu Partnerstvo za mir na samitu
NATO-a u Rigi (Letonija) krajem novembra 2006. Partnerski ugovor je potpisan u decembru iste godine.
Iako su Crna Gora i BiH neposredno nakon toga izrazile političku volju za
pristupanje MAP, sporost u sprovođenju političkih i ekonomskih reformi nije
dozvoljavala tako brzo donošenje odluke za uključivanje obe države u Akcioni plan za članstvo. Da bi zadržala aktivan odnos prema NATO integracijama, Alijansa je primijenila formulu s početka procesa proširenja nazvanu
„Intenzivirani dijalog.“ To je trebalo da znači da se komunikacija nastavlja i
pojačava, ali da se nastavlja i monitoring, i to ne samo u okvirima obaveza deskupština Republike Srpske zahtijeva od Predsjednišva Bosne i Hercegovine da kod zvaničnih
institucija NATO saveza tekuću reformu Oružanih snaga Bosne i Hercegovine verifikuje kao
konačnu fazu strukturne reforme, koja će omogućiti uključenje oružanih snaga BiH u NATO
savez“.
106 NATO Priručnik, Brisel 2006. str. 205.
107 Ibid, str. 207.
133
finisanim Partnerstvom za mir, već u okvirima onih procesa koji su definisani
Akcionim planom za članstvo.
Program MAP ima mnogo šire dimenzije nego što bi se moglo zaključiti
na prvi pogled gdje izgleda da za cilj ima isključivo evroatlantske integracije.
Polazeći od činjenice da u integracije ne ulaze ni vojske ni sami odbrambeni
sistemi, već države u svim svojim aspektima i društveno-ekonomskim okruženjem, MAP se postavlja kao ključni unutrašnji proces društvenih promjena
koje vode pridruživanju NATO-u „kao ključnom političkom akteru na Balkanu čije je širenje imperativ“. Cilj koji ova strategija podrazumijeva je razvoj
bezbjednosnih kapaciteta u uslovima demokratske građanske kontrole u svakoj balkanskoj državi i eventualna transformacija jedinstvene uloge NATO-a
u pojedinačnim oblastima, do razvoja bezbjednosnih snaga..“108 Za međunarodnu zajednicu to postavlja tri prioriteta: uspostavljanje procesa stabilizacije i
pridruživanja, i Akcioni plan za članstvo NATO-a kao bazni putokaz evolucije
u regionu i odgovarajuću racionalizaciju prisustva u skladu sa međunarodnim
zahtjevima i prioritetima; drugo, kampanje međunarodne zajednice, prvenstveno u BiH i na Kosovu, za eliminisanje političko-kriminalne organizacije kao najveće prijetnje unutrašnjoj i regionalnoj stabilnosti; rekonstrukcija
međunarodnog prisustva u cilju eliminisanja nezavisnog vođenja političkih
procesa od strane ad hoc struktura, posebnu u BiH i na Kosovu, i transfer
odgovornosti na stalne evropske ili lokalne institucije.109 Zbog svega toga, međunarodna zajednica je definisala pristup po kojem se njeno intenzivno prisustvo uspostavlja oko procesa pridruživanja Evropskoj uniji i Akcionog plana
za članstvo. U vrijeme definisanja procesa stabilizacije na Balkanu, koncept
kolektivne bezbjednosti koji je NATO razvio kao evropski sistem bezbjednosti je odnio prevagu nad dogovornim konceptom koji se razvija u okvirima
Evropske unije ili univerzalnim konceptom razvijenim u okvirima Organizacije za evropsku bezbjednost i saradnju (OSCE) ili globalne bezbjednosti, kao
koncepta Ujedinjenih nacija.
Predsjedništvo BiH donijelo je juna 2009. godine odluku o aplikaciji za članstvo u MAP koju je član predsjedništva Željko Komšić predao 2. oktobra 2009.
„Saveznici su se složili da se Bosna i Hercegovina pridruži MAP čim se uoči
108 „The Balkans“, Report of an Independent task Force Sponsored by the Council od Foreign Relations –Centre for Preventive Acton, Council on Foreign Relations ,2002., str. 29.
109 Ibid, str. 29.
134
progres u reformama“110. Stabilnost BiH i dalje zavisi od prisustva međunarodnih subjekata: Kancelarije visokog predstavnika (OHR), Misije NATO-a, EUFOR-a, OSCE-a. Proces članstva u MAP koji treba da bude dovršen članstvom
u NATO-u u Bosni i Hercegovini još nije formalno osporen, ali je u brojnim
javnim istupima pojedinih političkih predstavnika u Republici Srpskoj doveden u pitanje kroz dilemu da li BiH treba da postane članica NATO-a, kao i
da je za takvu odluku potrebno tražiti referendumsku potvrdu stanovnika RS.
„Srpska demokratska stranka (SDS) saopštila je danas da odluku o eventualnom ulasku u NATO mogu doneti jedino građani Republike Srpske (RS) na
referendumu.“111 Insistiranje na referendumu za ulazak u NATO pokrenuto od
strane desnog političkog krila u Republici Srpskoj može da se potraži u izjavi
generalnog sekretara NATO-a Jaap de Hoop Shefera novembra 2010. da BiH
mora da sprovede ustavne promjene kao put za ulazak u evroatlantske integracije. Takav stav je u Republici Srpskoj protumačen kao pokušaj uslovljavanja
promjene unutrašnje strukture, zbog čega su reagovale sve političke struje u
Republici Srpskoj, iz čega je konsenzualno proistekao zaključak da RS neće
prihvatiti promjenu postojeće unutrašnje kompozicije u BiH koja podrazumijeva entitetsku teritorijalno-političku podjelu i promjenu dejtonskih ustavnih
aranžmana kako bi ostvarila punu integraciju u evroatlantske integracije kao
krajnji cilj.
Potencijalno članstvo u NATO-u ima veliku podršku u javnom mnjenju
Federacije BiH (FBiH), ali veoma malu u Republici Srpskoj. Dok u FBiH 88%
ispitanika potpuno, a tek 9% donekle, podržava pristupanje BiH NATO-u, u
Republici Srpskoj svega 30% podržava, a čak 64% se apsolutno protivi pridruživanju NATO-u.112 Ovakav stav javnog mnjenja u Republici Srpskoj koriste
opozicione političke snage u Republici Srpskoj kako bi postavile pitanje budućeg članstva BiH u NATO-u i vezali ga za eventualni ulazak Srbije u Alijansu.
Pored niske podrške javnosti u RS, čiji se uzrok nalazi u nedavnoj prošlosti
i ratovima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, a posebno oružanim akcijama NATO-a protiv Republike Srpske i Jugoslavije, na promjenu političke orijentacije
uticalo je i sve češće i snažnije zagovaranje novog evropskog bezbjednosnog
110
Vidjeti: http://www.skupstina.me/cms/site_data/novo/informacija%20o%20prijemu%20u%20MAP.pdf
111 Vidjeti: http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/politika/25831-Srpska-demokratska-strankasmije-biti-zrtva-kratkorocnih-interesa-SNSD-.html
112 Ipsos: Javno mnjenje u BiH, 2010. pripremljeno za National Democratic Institute, april
2010., str. 14.
135
sistema koje dolazi iz Rusije. Insistiranje na referendumu za ulazak u NATO
bilo je jedan od uzroka donošenja novog zakona o referendumu i građanskom
izjašnjavanju u Republici Srpskoj koji je pitanje pridruživanja evroatlantskim
integracijama izuzeo iz kruga referendumskih pitanja, dok je jak anti-evroatlantski naboj i dalje ostao.
Bez obzira na kritike koje dolaze iz Banja Luke i pokušaj da se ta pitanje
prevedu na teren opštegrađanskog izjašnjavanja, niko nije doveo u sumnju
aplikaciju BiH za MAP. S obzirom na činjenicu da se MAP smatra praktično
prvim korakom prema NATO-u, može se zaključiti da će se sve strane dugoročno orijentisati upravo prema njemu kao krajnjem cilju. Na tom putu, politička elita u Republici Srpskoj će morati da se suoči s pitanjem javne podrške
članstvu u NATO-u koja je jedan od uslova koji se odnosi na demokratsku
podršku članstvu u Allijansi, a koju procjenjuje Savjet Alijanse. Sve političke
elite u BiH moraće da se suoče s tri bitna procesa ukoliko žele da ispune uslove
postavljene na tom putu:
1. Pitanje realizacije i evaluacije godišnjih planova u pet oblasti predviđenih MAP, što je potpuno u skladu s obavezama iz Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju. Ispunjavanjem obaveza iz MAP ne stiču se
samo uslovi za pozivnicu u članstvo u NATO-u, već je to i svojevrsna
transformacija koja svaku državu-aspiranta po standardima znatno približava ispunjavanju zahtjeva potrebnih za pristupanje Evropskoj uniji;
2. Pitanje reformi političkog sistema i društvenih reformi uopšte, bez kojih je nemoguće očekivati zatvaranje Kancelarije visokog predstavnika,
odlazak međunarodnih snaga za održavanje mira i preuzimanje odgovornosti od strane domaćih institucija i njihovih predstavnika i samostalno funkcionisanje političkog sistema.
3. Rješavanje pitanja 69 perspektivnih vojnih lokacija kao uslov postavljen
od strane Savjeta NATO-a113, što se dovodi u vezu i sa ukupnim rješavanjem problema državne imovine.114 Sam problem i različiti pristupi
113 “MAP za Bosnu je usvojen, ali uz jasne uslove potrebne za primjenu”, rekao je portparol Apaturai na konferenciji za novinare u četvrtak poslije sastanka ministara spoljnih poslova
NATO-a u Talinu u Estoniji, prenio je Reuters. Vidjeti: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/
Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioni-plan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print
114 Komunike Savjeta za implementaciju mira: „Cilj jedan - prihvatljivo rješenje podjele
imovine između države i drugih nivoa Vlasti: vrijeme je da politički lideri nastave sa napretkom
koji je postignut u drugim oblastima i preuzmu vođstvo i postignu dogovor o ovom pitanju ko-
136
njegovom rješavanju u pogledu državne imovine zadiru u samu suštinu
BiH kao političke zajednice, i već sada je jasno da će široka diskusija o
ključnim problemima BiH uključivati i pitanje državne imovine kao dio
ukupne javne diskusije u vezi sa predstojećim ustavnim promjenama
kao osnove društvenog konsenzusa koji bi zemlji omogućio dugoročnu
stabilnost.
Bosna i Hercegovina je „uslovno“ pozvana u MAP, što de facto ne predstavlja članstvo, već je vješto politički postavljena barijera na kojoj domaći
politički subjekti treba da pokažu političku volju i spremnost, kao i kulturu
konsenzusa posebno kada su u pitanju „perspektivne vojne lokacije“. Dogovor
na tom polju treba pokazati da li će evroatlantske integracije biti zadržane kao
bazno političko opredjeljenje, kao i da li će se taj proces koristiti za rješavanje
političkih ciljeva pojedinih političkih subjekata. Spremnost za konsenzus u
vezi MAP će služiti kao putokaz, kao i za konsenzus u vezi ustavnih promjena
kao osnovni preduslov za preuzimanje odgovornosti za situaciju u BiH. Kako
je izgledalo u trenutku odluke o pozivu u MAP, BiH je čekala oktobarske izbore i novo odlaganje rješenja, barem sudeći prema riječima ministra inostranih
poslova Svena Alkalaja: „Bila su jasna tri uslova - uništavanje eksplozivnih materijala i uništavanje pokretne vojne imovine, određivanje kontingenta vojnika
BiH koji se upućuju u misiju ISAF, znači u Avganistan, i ovaj treći - da se 69
perspektivnih lokacija uknjiže na Ministarstvo odbrane. Prethodni uslov je da
prvi ciklus počne onda kada se tih 69 lokacija uknjiži.“115
Spremnost za napredak u rješavanju pitanja državne imovine i vojnih pitanja govori i o spremnosti političkih elita da vode BiH u evroatlantske i evropske integracije. Reforma odbrambenog sistema jeste potreban, ali ne i dovoljan
uslov, jer u integracije ulaze države u cjelini sa svim institucijama i kapacitetima u skladu s političkim i drugim uslovima. Ukoliko nema unutrašnjeg
društvenog konsenzusa, teško je očekivati brze reforme i društvene promjene
u tom pravcu.
Novi strateški koncept NATO-a usvojen na samitu NATO-a u Lisabonu
(Portugalija) 2010. godine, zatekao je BiH upetljanu u dva važna procesa.
jim bi se omogućilo državi da vrši svoje ustavne obaveze“. Vidjeti: www.ohr.int/print?content_
id=41879
115 Vidjeti: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioniplan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print
137
Prvi je redefinicija globalnih bezbjednosnih izazova, pri čemu BiH ne može
da se prepozna kao važan usmjerivač međunarodnih događaja, što je u izvjesnoj mjeri bila tokom devedesetih godina prošlog vijeka; drugi je potreba za
unutrašnjom samodefinicijom državnog okvira uspostavljenog pregovorima u
Dejtonu 1995. godine i unutrašnjim promjenama koje treba da odrede i nove
odnose međunarodne zajednice prema BiH. Evropska unija je 2010. godine
počela primjenu Lisabonskog sporazuma kao svojevrsnog ustavnog rješenja,
što je nametnulo i potrebu (re)definisanja zajedničke spoljne politike Evropske
unije kao sistematski nedovoljno izgrađenog političkog principa i političkog
mehanizma. U naporima da se i politički i institucionalno uspostave mehanizmi definisanja i vođenja spoljne politike EU, BiH ima važno mjesto i kao
poligon za isprobavanje ‘policy’ pristupa, ali i kao mogućnost za ostvarivnje
početnog uspjeha kao što se već desilo početkom 90-tih godina kada je EU
transformisana na politikama Evropske ekonomske zajednice.
Od uspostavljanja mira 1995. godine, međunarodna zajednica je pokušala s
nekoliko različitih koncepata u postratnoj „izgradnji države“ (state-building) u
BiH koji su se zasnivali na direktivnom učešću i neograničenim izvršnim ovlašćenjima Kancelarije visokog predstavnika (OHR). Globalni plan, kao i ekonomska kriza 2008. godine, su usporili kako unutrašnje procese u BiH, tako
i one koji je približavaju evroatlantskim i evropskim integracijama. Složena
kompozicija zemlje omogućava naglašene uloge nacije i nacionalnog mišljenja
u definisanju politika institucija političkog sistema i partija kao reprezentativnih predstavnika nacionalnih zajednica. Kriza globalnih institucija i retrogradni unutrašnji procesi u BiH pojačavaju težnje pojedinih političkih elita i partija za autoritarnim političkim i ekonomskim rješenjima koja i u nacionalnom
javnom mnjenju imaju veliku podršku. Tako usmjereni društveno-ekonomski
procesi udaljavaju BiH od bezbjednosnih i ekonomskih integracija, i uprkos
deklarativno postavljenim ciljevima i politikama pokazuju da nisu okrenute
ka vizijama budućnosti zemlje već više ka populističkoj realizaciji održavanja
na vlasti. Unutarnacionalna diskusija o političkim, ekonomskim i socijalnim
problemima BiH se predstavlja kao nacionalna izdaja, dok se rasprava među
političkim predstavnicima nacionalnih zajednica isključivo svodi na pitanje
formiranja institucija i vlasti, a ne na programsko-razvojne koncepte.
Novi strateški koncept NATO-a, nove inicijative za kolektivnu bezbjednost
od strane Rusije, pojačavanje prisustva nekih država na Balkanu poput Tur-
138
ske, redefinisanje spoljne i bezbjednosne politike EU, redefinisanje koncepata
evropske bezbjednosti, kao i Organizacije za evropsku bezbjednost i saradnju,
svi polaze od neophodnosti rješavanja kriznih žarišta u Evropi. Upravo je jugoistok Evrope područje koje predstavlja najveći izvor bezbjednosnih izazova.
Nestabilnost na južnom Balkanu (južna Srbija, Makedonija, Crna Gora i Albanija), se pojačava i pretvara u otvorene bezbjednosne izazove, posebno kroz
sve otvorenije isticanje albanskog nacionalnog pitanja i pitanja autonomije
Sandžaka koju zagovara bošnjačka nacionalna manjina. Otvorene probleme na
Balkanu izazivaju ekonomska i finansijska kriza u Grčkoj, kritike za korupciju
u Bugarskoj i Rumuniji, odnosi Srbije prema nepriznatom Kosovu, korupcionaške afere u Hrvatskoj i, nadasve, regionalna mreža kriminala. Pred BiH se
postavljaju kompleksni zahtjevi za ostvarivanjem stabilnosti i bezbjednosti kao
neophodnog uslova daljeg napretka ka evroatlantskim i evropskim integracijama. Da bi u tome uspjela, BiH mora da se opredjeli za uspostavljanje političke
stabilnosti, kako bi iz te pozicije mogla da krene u realizaciju ekonomskog i
socijalnog razvoja. Primarni koraci u tom pravcu su postizanje unutrašnjeg
konsenzusa nacionalnih i političkih predstavnika BiH bez direktivne uloge
međunarodne zajednice, odnosno postizanje kompromisa oko mnogih pitanja, te baznog unutrašnjeg konsenzusa oko nekoliko elementarnih političkih
pitanja. Hronološki se kao primarna obaveza postavlja dogovor oko popisa
stanovništva planiranog u 2011. godini koji je već izazvao brojne polemike i
zaglavio se u neuspješnom dogovaranju. Drugi, još važniji proces, jeste proces
ustavnih promjena Dejtonskog, „oktroisanog“, ustava kao proizvoda međunarodnih pregovora, i uspostavljanje konsekventnog političkog sistema na osnovama društvenog konsenzusa. S obzirom na činjenicu da ni u evroatlantske integracije ni u Evropsku uniju ne ulaze samo vlade ili ministarstva, već društva
u cjelini organizovana u državne institucije i odgovarajuće odnose, pred BiH
se nalaze elementarni procesi uspostavljanja političkog sistema i institucija
sposobnih da iznesu unutrašnje promjene i da sprovedu procese koji bi BiH
poveli ka evroatlantskim i evropskim integracijama.
139
Uticaj novog Strateškog koncepta i Evropske
bezbednosne i odbrambene politike na “Bezbednosnu
arhitekturu jugo-istočne Evrope”
Dr Arshim Çela116
Dokumenti koji se odnose na stratešku politiku u pogledu bezbednosti, odbrane i vojske jedan su od pokazatelja na koji način sektor bezbednosti ima za cilj
da u budućnosti koordinira svoje aktivnosti. Prema Ustavu Republike Albanije,
Parlament je najviše zakonodavno telo iz koga ostale institucije crpe legitimitet. Dakle, dužnosti i funkcije Parlamenta mogu biti ojačane s ciljem efikasnog
nadzora nad civilnom kontrolom vojske i bezbednosnih struktura, te kako bi se
obezbedila bolja koordinacija i korišćenje finansijskih sredstava. Okončavši fazu
“članstva u NATO-u”, Albanija bi sada trebalo da pređe na novu fazu razvoja
svoje odbrambene strategije. U skladu sa novim strateškim konceptom Alijanse,
Albanija mora da preispita svoje finansijske i ljudske kapacitete, kao i da analizira obaveza koje proizilaze iz učešća u međunarodnim misijama NATO-a. Shodno tome, Albanija će morati da mnogo preciznije proceni stvarne, prepoznate,
verodostojne rizike i pretnje, s obzirom da su same države predmet bezbednosnih
institucija i aktivnosti. Pregled glavnih doktrina odbrane i bezbednosti je potreban, ne zbog obaveza koje proizilaze iz članstva u NATO-u, već i zbog geopolitičkih promena u regionu. Srbija se trenutno približava članstvu u EU, što je, u tom
kontekstu, veoma značajna činjenica.
116 Autor je pukovnik u penziji, trenutno zaposlen u Institutu za demokratiju i medijaciju,
Tirana, Albanija.
140
Uvod
Veoma sam počastvovan što imam priliku da izlažem na ovoj, dobro organizovanoj konferenciji, na kojoj preovladava duh razumevanja i demokratske
rasprave. Svi učesnici, iz moje zemlje, kao i susednih zemalja, izražavaju istu
zabrinutost i dele istu viziju u pogledu uticaja novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a na naše prostore.
Posmatran u celini, čini se da novi strateški koncept nije ni po čemu problematičan za zemlje regiona, bez obzira da li su članice NATO-a ili samo partneri, i izgleda kao da se prioriteti novog viđenja budućih bezbednosnih pretnji i
rizika prvenstveno odnose na interese velikih evropskih i svetskih aktera.
U svakom slučaju, zemlje jugoistočne Evrope ne mogu tek da bace pogled
na ovaj dokument iz Lisabona – najpre zbog toga što ovaj dokument takođe
navodi i date obaveze zemalja regije, i drugo, zato što smo se ovde okupili kako
bismo razmenili ideje i mišljenja u vezi zajedničkih izazova, kako sadašnjih,
tako i onih budućih.
Sa zvanične tačke gledišta, Republika Albanija je jasno izrazila svoju poruku na samitu u Lisabonu, i kao članica NATO-a, njene obaveze proizilaze
iz ovog i drugih pravnih dokumenata kojima se regulišu aktivnosti Alijanse.
Ono što ću danas reći ovde je uglavnom slobodna i otvorena vizija civilnog
društva, odnosno Instituta za demokratiju i medijaciju iz Tirane. Naš Institut
je - pre, tokom i nakon usvajanja novog strateškog koncepta NATO-a - preduzeo nekoliko inicijativa vezanih za sâmo razumevanje pitanja koja se tiču
bezbednosti i odbrane, kao i potrebe za strukturisanjem i restrukturisanjem
bezbednosnih institucija na osnovu dobro osmišljenih dokumenata. Zbog
naše istorije u okviru odnosa sa NATO-om i drugim zemljama, ali i zbog
složenosti pozicije jedne male zemlje, Albanija je u većini slučajeva usvojila
klišeizirane dokumente umesto da je sama formulisala jednostavna, realna i
opipljiva pitanja.
Prema tome, mislim da će moja zemlja morati da mnogo preciznije proceni
stvarne, priznate i verodostojne rizike i pretnje, s obzirom da su same države
predmet bezbednosnih institucija i aktivnosti.
141
Isto se može konstatovati i za predviđanje budućih rizika i planiranja.
Sve to će nam pomoći da jasno definišemo svoje odgovornosti za pojedinačne oblasti delovanja, na taj način garantujući uravnoteženu raspodelu.
Usvajanje globalnih slogana o realnim rizicima i pretnjama u javnoj sferi
će Vladi i državnim akterima otežati da kroz preterano ambiciozne angažmane, koji često prevazilaze naše stvarne kapacitete, prikupljaju političke
poene.
Interna koherentnost i stabilnost strateškog okvira
Niz dokumenata koji sačinjavaju stratešku politiku u pogledu bezbednosti,
odbrane i vojske su, između ostalog, i jedan od pokazatelja na koji način
sektor bezbednosti namerava da u budućnosti koordiniše svoje aktivnosti.
Imajući u vidu činjenicu da je Albanija, po svome Ustavu, parlamentarna
republika, zadaci i odgovornosti Parlamenta Albanije u oblasti bezbednosti i
odbrane se ogledaju u demokratskom nadzoru i odgovornosti. S druge strane, uzimajući u obzir hijerarhijsku strukturu bezbednosnih institucija, Vlada
je dužna da primeni strateški okvir doktrina kroz relevantna ministarsta i
agencije117.
Treba reći da je podela zadataka i uloga između zakonodavne i izvršne vlasti
u oblasti bezbednosti i odbrane već konsolidovana kroz niz zakona i praktičnu primenu. Prema Ustavu Republike Albanije, Parlament je najviše zakonodavno telo iz koga sve druge institucije crpe svoj legitimitet. Dakle, u slučaju
Albanije, dužnosti i funkcija Parlamenta mogu biti ojačani kako se osigurali
efikasan nadzor i profesionalna kontrola nad civilnom kontrolom vojske i bezbednosnih struktura, ali i da bi se garantovala bolja koordinacija i upotreba
finansijskih sredstava u korist nacionalne bezbednosti.
U tom kontekstu, Parlamentarni odbor za bezbednost bi mogao da proširi
svoju stručnu savetodavnu mrežu, ne samo zapošljavanjem profesionalaca,
već i kroz saradnju sa nezavisnim ekspertima, kada su u pitanju bezbednost
i odbrana ili strateški doktrinarni okvir. Iako se činilo da su posle 2000. i
2004. godine - kada su usvojene strategije bezbednosti - značajna kontrola i
operativno vođstvo dati Parlamentu proširivanjem ovlašćenja Odbora za bez117 Zakon br. 8417, 21. oktobar 1998, za usvajanje Ustava Republike Albanije (Službeni
glasnik, br. 28, 1998, str. 1073)
142
bednost i unutrašnje poslove, događaji u selu Gërdec 2008. godine, koje je
postalo važan simbol bezbednosti i strateških pitanja u Albaniji, pokazali su
da je Vlada dobila kontrolu i još više ovlašćenja i nad osnovnim bezbednosnim institucijama.
Takav pristup je izazvao određenu zabrinutost među albanskim bezbednosnim partnerima na Zapadu, što se odrazilo u nacrtu zakona o izvesnim promenama u vezi sa odgovornostima albanske obaveštajne službe.118
S druge strane, uprkos činjenici da sadašnji zakon jasno definiše savetodavnu ulogu Nacionalnog saveta za bezbednost koji sarađuje direktno sa predsednikom Republike, postojanje Među-ministarskog odbora za bezbednosna
pitanja kao savetodavnog tela bliskog premijeru, stvara “skriveno institucijsko
rivalstvo”, umesto da omogući bolju koordinaciju aktivnosti između institucija
državne bezbednosti.
Iz tog razloga, sveukupna koordinacija i saradnja bezbednosnih institucija
u obezbeđivanju sveobuhvatnog strateškog doktrinarnog okvira ostaje jedan
od primarnih zadataka države. Priprema ovih strateških dokumenata treba da
prođe kroz stručne procene izazova, rizika i pretnji (IRP), koji treba da osiguraju što značajniji angažman institucija i aktera koji učestvuju u njihovoj
praktičnoj primeni.
Ukoliko bi tokom procesa pripreme i sprovođenja ovih strategija, učešće
eksperata iz različitih institucionalnih aktera bilo veće, to bi bilo znak koherentne politike. Evidentno je da postoji određeni stepen ispravnosti u strukturama demokratskog nadzora snaga bezbednosti i odbrane (uglavnom u parlamentarnim i vladinim strukturama), kao i određeno učešće civilnog društva
u izradi i implementaciji tih strategija. Međutim, to učešće tek treba da se poboljša, i o tome ću reći nešto više dalje u tekstu.
Ustav jasno definiše uloge i osnovne bezbednosne koncepte države. Oni se
zasnivaju na miru, dobrosusedskim odnosima i aktivnom učešću u kolektivnim odbrambenim strukturama. Dakle, ovi pojmovi su utrli put opštim principima koji podržavaju strateški doktrinarni okvir.
118
2010
Za dodatne informacije, proverite albansku štampu u periodu od februara do aprila
143
Međutim, postojeći zakoni i dalje treba da pruže više informacija o procesu izrade i usvajanja različitih strateških dokumenata. Na taj način bi bilo moguće uključiti i stručnjake i predstavnike nevladinih organizacija, pri čemu
celi taj proces ne bi bio isključivo u diskreciji institucija državne bezbednosti
- odnosno, time bi bio ojačan legitimitet ovog procesa i dobijena neophodna
podrška.
Rezultati analize rizika
Dokumenti strategija nacionalne bezbednosti i odbrane bi trebalo da konstatuju da je osnovni koncept bezbednosne strategije uglavnom usmeren na
“poštovanje vladavine prava” i “integracijski pristup”.119 Nacionalna bezbednost
i vojne strategije, kao i dokumenti odbrambene politike, definisali su izazove,
pretnje i rizike sledeći ‘top-down’ pristup, što znači da relevantne bezbednosne
institucije nisu bile prijemčive za sveobuhvatniji pristup (npr. putem prethodnih ispitavanja percepcije javnosti o pretnjama i rizicima). Kao rezultat toga,
izazovi, pretnje i rizici su u ovim dokumentima rangirani na tri nivoa: lokalnom, regionalnom i globalnom, bez jasnih prioriteta i diferencijacije.120 Stoga,
u slučaju Nacionalne strategije bezbednosti, kao prioritetni su praćeni kriterijumi koji se odnose na lokalni nivo, umesto sveobuhvatnog pristupa kojim bi
se pokušalo nadograditi na detaljniju klasifikaciju ovih.
Bezbednosne strategije i doktrinarni okvir na lokalnom nivou, identifikuju
četiri kategorije pretnji i rizika za Albaniju: organizovani kriminal, terorizam,
prirodne katastrofe i probleme vezani za tranziciju. U slučaju organizovanog
kriminala, ovaj pojam se odnosi na različite oblike nelegalne trgovine, prvenstveno drogom, ljudima, konvencionalnim naoružanjem, itd. U slučaju Albanije, poseban akcenat je stavljen na unutrašnju bezbednost, ilegalne migracije
(npr. problem albanskih emigranata u drugim zemljama) ili nekontrolisano
naseljavanje stanovništva u samoj zemlji.
119 Pogledati Zakon br. 9322, 25. novembar 2004., “O odobravanju Nacionalne strategije
bezbednosti Republike Albanije” (Službeni glasnik, br. 98, 2004, str. 6697) i Zakon br. 9858,
27. decembar 2007., „Usvajanje Vojne strategije Republike Albanije” (Službeni glasnik, br. 184,
2007, str. 5802).
120 Za analitički pregled dokumenta Nacionalne strategije bezbednosti i opaženih pretnji,
pogledajte: Sotiraq Hroni, Gjen.Let, Pellumb Qazimi: View from Albania-Study on assessment
og regional security and Challenges in the Western Balkans, Istvam Gyarmati i Darko Stančić
(eds.), DCAF (Ženevski centar za demokratsku kontrolu oružanih snaga), 2007, str.57.
144
Međutim, ono što se može naći u Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti su nejasni i nedovoljno razrađeni pojmovi koji se smatraju terminima za označavanje rizika, kao što su “dezinformisanje javnog mnjenja” ili “nedovoljan razvoj
obrazovanja, nauke i kulture”. S obzirom na pretnje i izazove za regionalnu
bezbednost, važno je napomenuti da su Nacionalna strategija bezbednosti i
vojska bili pod uticajem istorijskog nasleđa i geostrateškog značaja zemlje kao
ključnih faktora u određivanju bezbednosnog okruženja. U tom kontekstu,
nacionalni dokumenat bezbednosti jasno definiše da „destabilizacija regiona
kroz oživljavanje želje za ostvarenjem preuveličanih nacionalističkih projekata
i razvoja trans-nacionalnih etničkih sukoba, predstavlja opasnost za bezbednost Republike Albanije“.121
S druge strane, oba dokumenta zvanično potvrđuju ubeđenje kreatora politike da susedi nisu glavna pretnja bezbednosti u regionu, već da su pretnje pre
internog porekla, kao što su politička nestabilnost, slaba ekonomija i organizovani kriminal. U slučaju Albanije, takozvano “albansko nacionalno pitanje” je
postavljeno kao jedan od prioriteta među strateškim bezbednosnim ciljevima i
predloženo je da se „albansko nacionalno pitanje ostvari kroz evropske i evroatlantske integracije“. Dakle, čini se da je Albanija više fokusirana na pitanja
evropeizacije izbegavanjem bilo kakvog nacionalističkog pristupa i traženjem
rešenja za “albansko pitanje” u okviru svog članstva u NATO-u i budućeg članstva u EU.
U međuvremenu, u prvom istraživanju u vezi sa bezbednosnim pretnjama
i NATO integracijama koje je sproveo Institut za demokratiju i medijaciju u
aprilu-maju 2007. godine, od ispitanika se tražilo da rangiraju pretnje na skali
rizika od 1 do 6 (najveći broj označava najveći rizik). Pretnje su rangirali sledećim redosledom: korupcija (4.6), siromaštvo i ekonomska stagnacija (4.4),
neuspeh demokratskih reformi (3.64)122. Ova četiri elementa se smatraju još
opasnijim za nacionalnu bezbednost od spoljnih faktora, kao što su terorizam,
regionalni sukobi, i tako dalje.
121 Kastriot Islami (bivši Ministar spoljnih poslova Albanije 2003-2005), Nacionalna bezbednost u kontekstu regionalnih rizika i pretnji (izveštaj sa međunarodne konferencije): “On
the development of the national security strategy”, Tirana 21. septembar 2007, u organizaciji
Instituta za demokratiju i medijaciju i Ženevskog centra za demokratsku kontrolu oružanih
snaga (DCAF)
122 Besnik Baka, Albanija: Bezbednosne pretnje i percepcije (ÇËSHTJE TË SIGURISË),
Tromesečni žurnal br. 11, Institut za demokratiju i medijaciju, Tirana, 2009, str. 74-90.
145
Na ovaj način, jasno definisanje izazova, rizika i pretnji na nacionalnom,
regionalnom i globalnom nivou ostaje nedovršeno, posebno u okviru dokumenata nacionalne strategije bezbednosti. Samo “mapiranje rizika i pretnji”,
zasnovano na jasnim kriterijumima, može da pomogne u određivanju najvišeg
holističkog koncepta strategija nacionalne bezbednost i odbrane. Diferencijacija i prioritizacija izazova, rizika i pretnji trebali bi biti nužno povezani sa
drugim aspektima, a ne tradicionalnim bezbednosnim konceptima, kao što su
državni suverenitet, teritorijalni integritet, itd. Pridržavajući se tih koncepata,
strategija nacionalne bezbednosti je izgubila mogućnost da bude osmišljena u
okviru ljudske bezbednosti.
Sa stanovišta klasifikacije izazova, rizika i pretnji, oba dokumenta nacionalne bezbednosti jednostavno slede red geografske raspodele rizika (globalni,
regionalni ili lokalni nivo), međutim, svakome od njih nedostaje definicija
skale i intenziteta izazova, rizika i pretnji u kratkom, u srednjem i dugom roku.
S obzirom da se nalaze u istom regionu i da se suočavaju sa gotovo istim
pretnjama, zemlje jugoistočne Evrope, ili, kako se često nazivaju - zemlje zapadnog Balkana - verovatno nemaju različite vizije u pogledu uticaja novog
strateškog koncepta NATO-a. Kao što je pokazano tokom ove konferencije,
uprkos različitih političkih odnosa između zemalja regiona sa NATO-om,
zajednička i očigledna briga za region su mir, sigurno i stabilno okruženje.
Mišljenja eksperata iz civilnog društva, istraživačkih institucija iz Srbije, Crne
Gore, Bosne i Hercegovine, Republike Srpske (kao dela Bosne i Hercegovine),
uglavnom su usaglašena oko toga da su bezbednosna pitanja istovremeno nacionalna, kao i regionalna pitanja.
Strategije naspram strategijskog pregleda odbrane
Za glavne političke i institucionalne aktere u Albaniji, periodični pregled
osnovnih bezbednost dokumenata Republike Albanije, poznat kao “Nacionalna strategija bezbednosti”, je potreban i zakonski obavezan. Ovaj pregled
postavlja dosta pitanja uglavnom zbog dinamike u bezbednosnom okruženju,
bilo na lokalnom, regionalnom ili globalnom nivou. Strateški dokumenti Albanije nisu promenjeni od 2007. godine, dok je češći pregled vojne strategije
(2002, 2005 i 2007) ubrzan samo zbog budućeg članstva u NATO-u.
146
Poslednji pregled dokumenta strategije odbrane je sproveden skoro dve godine pre nego što je Albanija postala punopravna članica NATO-a (3. april
2009). Ovaj dokument ostaje na snazi i još uvek nije predmet bilo kakvih razmatranja, s obzirom da se odnosi na strategiju Ministarstva odbrane za period od 2007 do 2013. godine. Taj dokument je postao važan za predvođenje
oružanih snaga u njihovim naporima da ispune ciljeve predviđene u okvoru
strateške doktrine. To je kasnije omogućilo da na samitu u Bukureštu, 3. aprila
2008. godine, Albaniji budu upućen poziv za članstvo u NATO-u.
Po završetku “faze članstva u NATO-u”, te uzimajući u obzir da je Albanija
postala punopravna članica Alijanse, sada bi trebalo preći na novu fazu razvoja
odbrambene strategije. U skladu sa novim strateškim konceptom, od Albanije
se zahteva da preispita svoje finansijske i ljudske kapacitete, kao i da analizira
obaveze koje proizilaze iz učešća u međunarodnim misijama NATO-a.
Albanija uvažava i deli mišljenje da je pregled dokumenata koji se odnose
na odbranu i bezbednost proces diktiran ne samo obavezama koje proizilaze
iz članstva u NATO-u, već i geopolitičkim promenama u regionu. Srbija se
trenutno približava članstvu u EU, što je, u tom kontekstu, veoma značajna
činjenica.
147
“Budući bezbednosni koncept Srbije“
Milan Karagaća123
Svedoci smo svakodnevnih sporenja da li je za Srbiju bolje članstvo u NATOu ili vojna neutralnost. Po tom pitanju se delimo na patriote i izdajnike, evroentuzijaste i evroskeptike, pa čak i NATO plaćenike, i one druge. Međutim, sve to
je više u funkciji dnevnopolitičkih interesa, nego ozbiljnog formulisanja vizije i
koncepta bezbednosti Srbije. Bezbednost se isključivo ili pretežno svodi na vojsku
i odbranu, pri čemu se zanemaruju ostali, izuzetno važni segmenti bezbednosti.
Odnos Srbije prema NATO-u je prevashodno spoljno-političko pitanje i zato se
mora posmatrati u celokupnom kontekstu spoljne politike, jer je to pitanje države, a ne samo vojske. To i jesu neki od ključnih uzroka odsustva ozbiljnih rasprava o budućem bezbednosnom konceptu Srbije. Bez ozbiljne rasprave koja ništa
a priori ne prihvata niti odbacuje, nema ni optimalnih ni državno-odgovornih
rešenja. U svakom slučaju, Srbija ne može da vodi politiku duplih koloseka kada
su u pitanju Zajednička bezbednosna i odbrambena politika EU i NATO, naručito uzevši u obzir njihovu kompatibilnost.
123 Autor je penzionisani pukovnik, član Foruma za međunarodne odnose Evropskog
pokreta u Srbiji
148
Srbija u traženju bezbednosnog koncepta za
budućnost – opcije i fikcije
Rasprava o budućem bezbednosnom konceptu ne može i ne sme biti svedena na kviz pitalice da li volimo NATO ili ne, da li želimo članstvo u toj organizaciji ili ne, da li će to doneti nekoliko izbornih poena ili ne, već da li NATO
jeste i može li biti okvir za najoptimalniji bezbednosni koncept Srbije. U Srbiji
još uvek preovladava uprošćen pristup po kome se bezbednost isključivo ili
pretežno svodi na vojsku i odbranu, pri čemu se zanemaruju izuzetno važni
segmenti bezbednosti države i građana, kao što su energetska, ekološka, informatička, socijalna, ekonomska i ljudska bezbednost, kao i sigurnost građana
od svih oblika ugrožavanja. To podrazumeva sistem umrežene bezbednosti na
državnom nivou uz aktivno učešće svih vladinih i nevladinih aktera, a ne samo
vojske i policije.
Kada je formulisana i u Skupštini usvojena deklaracija kojom se Srbija opredeljuje za vojnu neutralnost, niko nije tražio da se o tome građani izjasne na
referendumu. Sada zagovornici vojne neutralnosti insistiraju na referendumu
po pitanju članstva u NATO-u. Međutim, kao što je ministar Šutanovac rekao,
„da je Ataturk organizovao referendum, nikada ne bi sproveo reforme“, ili „da
je Vuk Karadžić išao na referendum o pravopisu, mi danas ne bismo imali
moderno pismo“. Dakle, politička elita je izabrana, preuzela je odgovornost, i
stoga mora imati dovoljno hrabrosti da donese odluke koje se nekome i neće
svideti.
Srbija je izložena najvećem broju globalnih i svim regionalnim rizicima,
pretnjama i izazovima, kao i nekim specifičnim sa kojim se mnoge druge zemlje ne suočavaju. Kao balkanska, centralnoervropska, podunavska i evropska
država, Srbija najveći broj svojih strateških ciljeva i vitalnih nacionalnih interesa, uključujući i njene legitimne interese na Kosovu, ostvaruje u realnom
okruženju u kome EU i NATO determinišu politički, ekonomski i bezbednosni okvir. To mora biti polazna osnova za svako ozbiljno i državno odgovorno
razmatranje interesa Srbije u odnosima sa EU i NATO-om.
Savremeni izazovi, rizici i pretnje zahtevaju da taj koncept bude pouzdan,
dugoročan, siguran, efikasan, interoperabilan, ali i racionalan i ekonomski
optimalan. Ciljevi kojima se stalno mora težiti je bezbednija Srbija u jednom
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boljem regionu, bezbedniji region u jednoj boljoj Evropi i bezbednija Evropa u
jednom boljem svetu, upravo kako je formulisano Evropskom bezbednosnom
strategijom.
Upravo stoga, Srbija mora da vrlo pažljivo i odgovorno formuliše viziju svoje bezbednosti za 21. vek i da dođe do strateškog koncepta kao dugoročnog i
održivog projekta državne i nacionalne bezbednosti. Kao mala zemlja, Srbija
može da bira između nekoliko poznatih strateških opcija:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
neutralnosti ili nesvrstanog angažmana;
bezbednosnog partnerstva i inicijativa;
kolektivne bezbednosti u okviru OUN;
kooperativne bezbednosti u okviru OEBS-a;
ad-hoc saveza;
solidarnosti u okviru EU; i
kolektivne odbrane i partnerstva u okviru NATO-a.
Kako doći do najboljeg koncepta? Tako što ćemo se njime ozbiljno pozabaviti. Mogli bismo poći od proste kvantifikacije i komparacije efikasnosti svake
opcije u odnosu na svaki savremeni izazov.
Vojna neutralnost je, za sada, zvanična opcija. Svi relevantni činioci geostrateškog položaja Srbije svrstavaju je u red malih zemalja u svetu, sa svim bezbednosnim dodatnim rizicima koji proizilaze iz takvog statusa. Ona je izložena najvećem broju globalnih rizika, a nekima i više od mnogih drugih zemalja.
Odluka za opciju vojne neutralnosti najpre podrazumeva da država odluči
da li je sprema i sposobna da se sama suprotstavi pretnjama, ili će pak imati saveznike. Neutralnost podrazumeva da država nema vojnih saveznika, što
znači da mora da ima adekvatnu sopstvenu vojsku koja će po brojnosti i opremljenosti moći da odgovori izazovima, i koja će biti argument za uvažavanje
takvog statusa od strane drugih. Da bi zemlja bila neutralna, ona mora da vodi
neutralnu spoljnu politiku koja je međunarodno prihvaćena kao takva. Srbija
nikako ne može da se pozove na istoriju neutralne spoljne politike. Ne može
se reći da je Srbija izbegavala učešće u vojnim konfliktima, niti je racionalno
očekivati da bi bila neutralna u nekim budućim vojnim sukobima u kojima bi
njeni interesi bili ugroženi.
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Neutralnost Srbije nije međunarodno priznata, ni prećutno ni izričito, niti
je realno očekivati da će se to dogoditi. S druge strane, nisu ispunjene ključne
pretpostavke vojne neutralnosti, kao što su:
• povoljan odnos subjekata međunarodnih odnosa prema proklamovanoj neutralnosti;
• odgovarajući geostrateški položaj zemlje;
• stabilna unutrašnja bezbednosna situacija;
• sposobnost razvijanja autonomnih odbrambenih kapaciteta;
• razvijena i stabilna ekonomija;
• visok BDP;
• izjava države da se opredeljuje za taj status;
• prihvatanje, priznavanje i garantovanje takvog statusa od strane trećih
država;
• poseban ili specifičan istorijski kontekst ubedljivih razloga.
To samo po sebi dovoljno govori da je vojna neutralnost samo fikcija, a
nikako ozbiljna opcija.
Opravdavanje zalaganja za vojnu neutralnost time da je srpski narod najveći
stradalnik u Evropi u 20. veku, te da je Srbija najpogodnija veza između Evrope, Azije, Bliskog Istoka i Sredozemlja i da se nalazi na osetljivom području
jugo-istočne Evrope, gde se prepliću raznovrsni strategijski interesi, zapravo su
najjači argumenti protiv vojne neutralnosti, pogotovo ako ne želimo da nam se
ta stradanja ponove.
Ako se uporedimo sa nekim od neutralnih evropskih zemalja, tek tada dolazimo do argumenata koji ne idu u prilog neutralnosti, jer bi građani Srbije
morali mnogo više da plaćaju, dok im pri tome bezbednost ne bi bila potpuno
zagarantovana. Austrija ima vojni budžet od 2.263 milijarde dolara, što je 278
dolara po stanovniku ili 57.148 dolara po vojniku; Finska raspolaže sa 2.758
milijardi, odnosno 527 dolara po stanovniku ili 94.13 po vojniku. Iste, 2007.
godine, Srbija je imala budžet od 578 miliona, što podrazumeva izdvajanje od
80 dolara po stanovniku ili 12.500 po vojniku godišnje. Pri tome, Austrija je
imala 336 milijardi dolara BDP, Finska 213, a Srbija tek 54 milijarde.
Iz svega ovoga je jasno da je za Srbiju toliko izdvajanje za potrebe odbrane
preskupo. Ako bi se posmatralo sa pozicije Austrije, izdvajanje za odbranu bi
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za nas bilo 4,2 %, sve dok ne dostignemo BDP Austrije. S obzirom da je položaj
Srbije u bezbednosnom pogledu mnogo složeniji u odnosu na bilo koju od
navedenih zemalja, to bi značilo da bi neutralna Srbija morala posedovati brojnije i opremljenije oružane snage. Pri tome treba uzeti u obzir da bi se odmah
na početku morala izdvojiti ogromna suma kako bi se dostigao sadašnji stepen
opremljenosti oružanih snaga jedne Austrije.
Fizionomija savremenih pretnji, rizika, izazova i mogućnosti da im se u
uslovima okruženosti članicama NATO-a i EU uspešno parira jasno pokazuje da je za Srbiju vojna neutralnost neadekvatna, neefikasna i ekonomski
iscrpljujuća opcija. Spekulisanje da bi Srbija teoretski mogla da uđe u EU, a
ostane van NATO-a, kao što su to učinile zemlje poput Irske, Austrije, Finske,
Švedske, Malte i Kipra, te da je članstvo u EU solidna garancija bezbednosti
jer EU ima autonomnu zajedničku bezbednosnu i odbrambenu politiku, je u
osnovi na mestu, ali samo ako zanemarimo činjenicu da Srbija niti u geografskom, ni u bilo kom drugom smislu nije ni Austrija ni Finska.
Savezništvo sa nekom drugom zemljom ili grupom zemalja pretpostavlja
spremnost te zemlje ili te grupe zemalja da preuzmu obavezu da doprinose
bezbednosti Srbije. Pod uslovom da se Rusija i NATO nađu u konfrontaciji,
što trenutno nije u izgledu, vojno savezništvo sa Rusijom bi vodilo značajnom
povećanju rizika upravo po bezbednost Srbije i njenih građana jer bi umanjilo
saradnju sa Severno-atlantskim savezom koji je okružuje.
Promenljivo savezništvo očito nije prihvatljivo niti podnošljivo za male
zemlje, jer takav “luksuz’ mogu priuštiti samo velike i regionalne sile.
Bezbednosno partnerstvo i inicijative se podrazumevaju prvenstveno
u regionu, ali oni sami po sebi nisu dovoljni, kao ni isključivo oslanjanje na
kolektivnu bezbednost u okviru OUN-a ili kooperativnu bezbednost u okviru
OEBS-a.
Kolektivna odbrana i partnerstvo u okviru NATO-a je opcija koja svakako
zaslužuje posebnu pažnju. Naime, zbog sopstvene bezbednosti, interesovanje Srbije za NATO je mnogo veće nego obrnuto, dok interes Alijanse za unapređenje
odnosa sa Srbijom proizilazi iz činjenice da je ona realni i nezaobilazan činilac
na Balkanu, te je utoliko bolje ako Srbija bude deo rešenja a ne problema.
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Istorijsko nasleđe, nedovoljno poznavanje NATO-a, kao i stranačke i medijske manipulacije, tri su ključne odrednice našeg odnosa prema NATO-u i prepreke su za ozbiljnije rasprave. Rezultat toga je i pogrešan celokupan pristup
tom pitanju, tretiranjem ovog, prvenstveno spoljno-političkog pitanja, kao da
je pitanje unutrašnje politike, gde emotivno dominira nad racionalnim, i koje
se posmatra više kao vrednosno nego bezbednosno pitanje. Ozbiljan pristup
zahteva da se razmotri šta je zapravo NATO, na koji način se do sada transformisao i u kom pravcu ide, u kakvim smo danas odnosima i kakva je njihova
percepcija budućnosti.
Po okončanju hladnog rata, NATO se našao u procesu transformacije čiji je
krajnji rezultat još uvek otvoren. Verovatno je da će se od kolektivnog vojnog
saveza pod američkim vođstvom transformisati u bezbednosnu zajednicu
demokratskih država koja će multilateralno povezivati njihove vojne kapacitete. Bila bi to bezbednosno-politička organizacija, čije bi se primarne vojne
funkcije sastojale u omogućavanju formiranja ad-hoc koalicija, dok bi prema
susedima imala konstruktivan odnos, posebno Rusiji koja bi u dugoročnoj
perspektivi mogla da pristupi ovoj zajednici ili bi s njom ostvarila vrlo bliske
odnose. Takva ‘OEBS-izacija’ NATO-a bi bila kompatibilna sa UN-om, jer bi
NATO uvažavao odluke Saveta bezbednosti UN-a u očuvanju mira.
U kojem pravcu će se odvijati transformacija najpre zavisi od toga koliko
će jačati unilateralne tendencije američke politike, koliko će evropski uticaj
u SAD-u nastaviti sa slabljenjem i konačno, od budućnosti Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike i rešenosti Evrope da snažnije istakne svoju samosvojnost.
Nije sasvim isključeno da će skraćenica NATO-a (Not Activity Talking
Only, kako su je često prevodili do 90-ih godina prošlog veka) u budućnosti
dobiti novi smisao u četiri S: Sada Skoro Sasvim Staromodan (Now Almost
Totally Obsolete). NATO je prošao dug proces promena i transformacije, danas nije ono što je bio pre 10 godina, niti će za 10 godina će biti ono što je
danas, jer se nalazi u procesu transformacije od kolektivnog vojnog saveza ka
otvorenoj bezbednosnoj zajednici. Shodno tome, vreme je da i Srbija shvati
da ni ona sama nije ono što je bila pre 10 godina, a da će za 10 godina biti
drugačija, i nadamo se, mnogo bolja nego danas.
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Razmatranjima odnosa Srbije i NATO-a, prvenstveno iz dnevnopolitičkih
razloga, dominiraju emocije, a ne argumenti, što je sa stanovišta nacionalnog
i državnog interesa neodgovorno posezanje za podelama za i protiv, na patriote i nepatriote, one kojima je do „nacionalnog dostojanstva i identiteta“ i
one koji ne razumeju „dušu našeg naroda“. Imajući u vidu nesrećnu hipoteku
prošlosti, svaka kvalifikacija krivice osim obostrane bila bi neodgovorna i ne
vodi konstruktivnoj raspravi, iako je nesporno da je NATO bombardovao
Srbiju.
Da je to mnogo više unutrašnjepolitička manipulacija političara govori
činjenica da smo odmah posle peto-oktobarskih promena, znači samo dve
godine nakon bombardovanja, uspešno sarađivali sa NATO-om u sprečavanju sukoba i rešavanju krize na jugu Srbije, a u martu 2003. godine u zaustavljanju pogroma i nasilja nad Srbima na Kosovu. Uporedo sa tim, počeli smo
sondiranje, izražavanje namere i traženje podrške za što skoriji napredak ka
evroatlantskim integracijama i NATO-u. Dakle, u kratkom periodu pređen
je put od konfrontacije do dijaloga, dok je svega 3 godine nakon bombardovanja, krajem aprila 2002. godine, Vrhovni savet odbrane kojim je predsedavao dr. Vojislav Koštunica, uputio Saveznoj vladi preporuku o pokretanju
procesa pristupanja programu Partnerstvo za mir (PzM). Imali smo ekspanziju saradnje sa zemljama NATO-a i samom Alijansom, insistirali smo da što
pre budemo primljeni u PzM sa vizijom da idemo ka punopravnom članstvu
u NATO-u, kako bismo se u jednom trenutku prisetili da su nas oni, ipak,
bombardovali.
Do kraja 2003. godine smo normalizovali odnose sa NATO-om i sa više od
20 država potpisali sporazume o bilateralnoj saradnji. Do polovine 2004. godine, oko 800 vojnih i civilnih lica iz sistema odbrane je bilo obuhvaćeno raznim
programima školovanja, kurseva, serminara, konferencija i drugih aktivnosti
u inostranstvu, a preko 200 oficira su stekli znanje stranih jezika (engleskog,
nemačkog, francuskog, italijanskog, grčkog) u skladu sa NATO standardima.
Troškove, u iznosu od preko 2 miliona eura, snosile su najvećim delom zemlje
članice NATO-a, ali i neke druge zemlje među kojima i Švajcarska.
Intenzivna saradnja na svim poljima rezultirala je i prijemom Srbije u PzM
bez pominjanja Mladića kao preduslov, što je do tada bila nepremostiva prepreka. Interesantno je istaći da su pojedinci koji se sada najviše protive nor-
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malizaciji odnosa sa NATO-om tokom perioda, od 2001. do 2007. godine bili
na vodećim funkcijama u tadašnjoj Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, odnosno
Srbiji.
Koliko je dosledno ako se svaki razgovor o NATO-u odbija argumentom da
nas je NATO bombardovao, no kad je u pitanju PzM ili članstvo EU, gde su
iste te zemlje, onda nam to ne smeta? Naravno, nije moguće jednostavno zaboraviti na prošlost i činjenice, međutim, stalno insistiranje na tome i korišćenje
tog argumenta za političke kampanje je beskorisno i nikuda ne vodi. Bilo bi
mudrije ugledati se na pragmatizam drugih zemalja, pa i same Srbije. Srbija je
već 1951. godine normalizovala odnose sa Nemačkom – zemljom koja je 1945.
godine bila sravnjena sa zemljom od strane američke i britanske avijacije, a
koja je već 1955. godine postala članicom Alijanse, u kojoj su upravo SAD i
Velika Britanija bile vodeće sile. Zar nam zajedničko rešavanje krize na jugu
Srbije 2001. godine nije najbolji primer uspešne saradnje Srbije sa NATO-om
u sprečavanju sukoba na prostoru Preševske doline, ili u martu 2003.godine,
kada je NATO zaustavio pogrom i nasilje nad Srbima na Kosovu?
Upravo ta iskustva bi trebala biti najbolji dokaz pozitivnih strana članstva u
NATO-u, jer da je Srbija u to vreme bila članica PzM ili NATO-a, do bombardovanja ne bi došlo jer bismo bili u položaju da takvu mogućnost isključimo
kao faktor pritiska u pregovorima. To treba da se ima u vidu kad se razmišlja o
budućnosti, jer je bolje biti onaj koji razgovara nego neko o kome se razgovara
- jednom rečju, uvek je bolje biti subjekat nego objekat.
Zapravo, tokom neuspešnih pregovora oko rešavanja pitanja Kosova, već
2007. godine nastupa period sve glasnije konfrontacije sa NATO-om i EU.
Neke stranke, političari, javne ličnosti i mediji odjednom ponovo ističu da nas
je NATO bombardovao; medijski se oživljavaju sećanja na 1999. godinu uz napomenu “da nam NATO otima Kosovo, da je tamo okupirao deo naše suverene
teritorije, da sprovodi Ahtisatijev plan i pravi NATO državu na našoj teritoriji“, dok evroatlantske integracije postaju nepoželjan pojam i čak se iz ranijih
dokumenata brišu. Sve to se koristi za izgovor protiv članstva u NATO-u, dok
se zapravo radi i o odnosu prema EU.
Nešto ubedljivije je obrazloženje da je Srbija od 2000. godine bila uključena u politički proces u pravcu integracija u NATO ali da je, nakon prizna-
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vanja nezavisnosti Kosova od strane velikog broja članica NATO-a, koje su
potom učestvovale i u formiranju kosovskih bezbednosnih snaga, nastupila
nova politička realnost. Premda i dalje ostaje činjenica da nisu sve države članice NATO priznale nezavisnost Kosova, i nameće se pitanje zbog čega nam
ne smeta članstvo u EU ako su sve, izuzev njenih pet članica priznale, priznale
to isto nezavisno Kosovo.
Da je u pitanju unutrašnje-političko i stranačko nadmudrivanje koje narod
vodi u svojevrsnu trilemu, pokazuje i činjenica da smo od opredeljenosti za
evroatlantske integracije evoluirali ka vojnoj neutralnosti, doneli skupštinsku
deklaraciju, a onda se u “Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti” neutralnost i ne
pominje.
Dakle, novembra 2004. godine je usvojena “Strategija odbrane Srbije i Crne
Gore”, gde je kao cilj proklamovan ulazak u program Partnerstvo za mir i
NATO, dok u „Strategijskom pregledu odbrane“, koji je usvojen 7. juna 2006.
godine na Kolegijumu ministra odbrane, stoji: “Vitalni bezbednosni i odbrambeni interesi su: odbrana Republike Srbije, saradnja i pristupanje evroatlantskim integracijama, Evropskoj uniji i drugim međunarodnim organizacijama
i institucijama, izgradnja poverenja, bezbednosti i stabilnosti u regionu i sprovođenje Rezolucije 1244 Saveta bezbednosti UN o Kosovu i Metohiji“.
„Osnovu politike odbrane Republike Srbije čini njena evroatlantska spoljnopolitička orijentacija, i opredeljenje da se aktivno uključi u proces saradnje
i zajedničkog delovanja sa drugim državama i subjektima međunarodnih odnosa, na izgradnji globalne, regionalne i nacionalne bezbednosti“ i „razvijanje
i unapređivanje partnerskih odnosa sa sistemom kolektivne bezbednosti, susednim i drugim državama.“
U Deklaraciji Narodne skupštine od 26. decembra 2007. godine, se navodi
“Zbog celokupne uloge NATO pakta, od protivpravnog bombardovanja Srbije
1999. godine bez odluke Saveta bezbednosti do Aneksa 11 odbačenog Ahtisarijevog plana, u kome se određuje da je NATO konačni organ vlasti u nezavisnom Kosovu, Narodna skupština Republike Srbije donosi odluku o proglašavanju vojne neutralnosti Republike Srbije u odnosu na postojeće vojne saveze
do eventualnog raspisivanja referenduma na kojem bi se donela konačna odluka o tom.”
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Zatim, u “Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti”, koja je usvojena krajem 2009.
godine, neutralnost se ne pominje već se kaže da “politika odbrane afirmiše
sistem kooperativne bezbednosti, integracija u evropske i druge međunarodne
bezbednosne strukture i učešće u NATO programu Partnerstvo za mir”,
i “dostizanje interoperabilnosti sa sistemima odbrane tih država”, te da će
“izgrađivati kapacitete i sposobnosti sistema nacionalne bezbednosti u skladu
sa standardima i obavezama koje proizilaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike“.
Odnosi Srbije i NATO-a su prošli kroz nekoliko faza, počevši od
međusobnog uvažavanja, konfrontacije i neprijateljstva, preko dijaloga i normalizacije odnosa, do kooperacije. Trenutno su odnosi prilično ambivalentni
jer kao članica PzM, Srbija zvanično nastoji da unapredi saradnju do stepena
dobijanja statusa kandidata, dok se s druge strane odvija izuzetno snažna anti-NATO kampanja koja počiva na percepciji NATO-a u hladnoratovskom
mentalnom sklopu i, naravno, oživljava medijski podgrejanu uvređenost zbog
bombardovanja srpskih položaja u BiH i agresije na Srbiju 1999. godine. Potencira se da zbog toga „narod ima psihološku barijeru i odbojnost prema
ulasku u NATO-u“, iako jedno vreme to nije bilo slučaj, čak i onda kada su
sećanja bila mnogo svežija.
NATO kao opcija nije nužno sudbina, ali jeste realnost Srbije. NATO
je okruženje koje bitno utiče na njen celokupni bezbednosno-politički i
međunarodni položaj, bez obzira na odsustvo Srbije kada se o tim pitanjima
razgovara. Odgovoran pristup prema budućnosti podrazumeva odgovor na
ključno pitanje da li bi i na koji način naša bezbednost bila čvršće zagarantovana, po koju ekonomsku i, eventualno, političku cenu, odnosno, koje su
prednosti, a koje moguće negativne posledice svake opcije, uključujući i partnerstvo sa NATO-om, kao i ulazak u Savez. U tom smislu, već sada je moguće
odgovoriti na nekoliko dilema.
• Ulaskom Srbije u Savez, njena bezbednost se povećava samim time što
isključuje neprijateljstvo sa NATO-om, a naročito zbog toga što bi ušla
u sistem kolektivne odbrane i postala deo moćne partnerske političkobezbednosne organizacije, ravnopravan partner sa njenim članicama i
našim susedima.
• Odluke donete u NATO-u utiču na globalnu, evropsku, regionalnu,
kao i bezbednost Srbije, bez obzira da li je Srbija članica Alijanse ili ne.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Međutim, ako bi Srbija bila članica, NATO ne bi mogao da donosi odluke koje, posredno ili neposredno, imaju negativne posledice po bezbednost Srbije, jer se odluke donose jednoglasno.
Ulaskom u Alijansu, Srbija bi ojačala svoj međunarodni položaj jer
bi poluge njene spoljne i bezbednosne politike bile jače, te bi bila
privlačnija za strana ulaganja, što bi omogućilo brži ekonomski razvoj.
Otvara se i mogućnost ne samo za modernizaciju i konverziju vojne
industrije, već i za proizvodnju i prodaju robe široke potrošnje tržištu
koje obuhvata preko 900 miliona stanovnika, a čiji je vojska veliki
potrošač. Modernizacija i opremanje sopsvenih oružanih snaga je ekonomski podnošljivije od neutralnosti koja je daleko skuplja, a pruža
manje sigurnosti.
Ako Srbija ostane izvan NATO-a, sve navedene prednosti otpadaju jer
bi bila okružena članicama Saveza, i u svakom pogledu bi bila u inferiornom položaju, jer su sredstva Srbije za očuvanje bezbednosti daleko
ograničenija od sredstava koja bi imala kao deo Saveza.
S obzirom da se Kosovo uvek koristi kao emotivni izgovor, treba postaviti pitanje na koji način će Srbija biti sigurnija i lakše rešavati i pitanje Kosova, efikasnije ga „odbraniti i vratiti pod puni suverenitet
Srbije“, ako smo zbog neutralnosti u zategnutim, a ne normalnim i
prijateljskim odnosima sa okruženjem. Zapravo, potrebno je postaviti
pitanje koliko je štetno da svoje zalaganje za neutralnost dokazujemo
neprijateljstvom prema NATO-u, dok su istovremeno snage KFOR-a i
EULEX-a na Kosovu.
Bojazan da bi Rusija postala neprijatelj Srbije je neosnovana jer Rusija
nije u neprijateljskim odnosima sa NATO-om, niti sa pojedinačnim
zemljama članicama. Najnovije približavanje Rusije NATO-u će uticati
i na pozitivniju percepciju NATO kod nas.
Neosnovane su takođe i tvrdnje da bi Srbija ulaskom u NATO nanela
štetu strateškim interesima Rusije i time dovela u pitanje političke (KiM) i
ekonomske (snabdevanje energijom) interese koji zavise od podrške Rusije. Veoma je diskutabilno da li Rusija smatra Srbiju toliko strateški značajnom. Rusija isporučuje energente članicama NATO-a, a što se Kosova
tiče, ono će se svakako rešavati i uz rusku podršku dijalogu.
Već sada je deplasirano pitanje da li bi ulaskom u NATO Srbija indirektno priznala legitimitet vojne intervencije protiv SRJ 1999. godine, i svim
odlukama o konačnom statusu Kosova koje se kose sa njenim interesima.
158
•
Opasnost da će Srbija biti izložena većim rizicima i novim transnacionalnim i asimetričnim pretnjama, kao što su međunarodni terorizam
i islamski fundamentalizam, takođe je samo jedan od izgovora. Opasnosti postoje i inače, a Srbija nema aspiracije ni da u okviru NATO-a
šalje svoje intervencionističke kontingente bilo gde. Kako stvari stoje,
ni NATO to više neće činiti u istoj formi jer je svima jasno da se mir ne
donosi ratom već njegovim sprečavanjem.
Iako se na prvi pogled vidi da je NATO najpouzdaniji koncept, a neutralnost samo fikcija i politička floskula, ipak ne znači da treba srljati u NATO i
opstruisati konstruktivnu raspravu, već da svaku opciju treba svestrano razmotriti i ništa unapred ne odbacivati.
Odbacivanje NATO-a pozivanjem na patriotizam nije niša drugo do maskiranje otpora prema evropskom putu modernizaciji Srbije. S druge strane,
nekritičko zalaganje nekih nevladinih organizacija za ulazak Srbije u NATO,
koje pri tome bezrezervno opravdavaju bombardovanje SRJ, predstavlja zapravo najbolju anti-NATO kampanju.
Uporedo sa otvaranjem dijaloga sa Kosovom i deblokiranjem procesa pridruživanja EU, čini se da se stvaraju uslovi da se konačno i bez ostrašćenosti
započne ozbiljna i argumentovana rasprava o odnosima Srbije sa NATO-om.
Da smo u NATO-u, verovatno bi i format pregovora oko Kosova bio drugačiji.
Da smo od početka 1990-ih bili u NATO-u, verovatno nam se ne bi desilo ono
što se desilo; da smo tada ušli u NATO, ne bi bilo razloga da NATO na tako
brutalan način ulazi kod nas.
Patriotizam se ne dokazuje suštim ponavljanjem kako nas je NATO bombardovao, već iznalaženjem okvira i koncepta koji će Srbiji i njenim građanima
omogućiti najbezbedniji i najsigurniji život, pa makar to bio i savez sa NATOom. Pri tome, odnosi NATO-Rusija i trend njihovog razvoja nas uopšte ne
sputavaju da izaberemo NATO kao opciju. Štaviše. S druge strane, ako podržavamo sve naše susede da postanu članice NATO-a, kao što je izjavio naš
predsednik u Crnoj Gori, zašto ne bi smo podržali i sebe na tom putu? Ako je
interes Srbije iznad svega, onda to mora biti i merilo za izbor najboljeg koncepta koji osigurava ostvarenje tih interesa.
159
Novi NATO i nova Srbija: šta sa neutralnošću?
Dr Mihajlo Basara124
Tokom 2000-ih postalo je jasnije da Srbija nema kritičnu masu za reforme.
Velike nade koje je pobudio 5. oktobar pokazale su se kao trenutni kompromis
o prevratu i istopile su se u ideološkom regradiranju i neiscrpnim stranačkim
borbama za vlast. Da put Srbije bude teži, ovim unutrašnjim negativnim tendencijama pridružuje se NATO svojom podrškom nezavisnom Kosovu i time
učvršćuje antinatovsko raspoloženje u Srbiji, te otežava reformski put Srbije ka
EU. Davanjem podrške nezavisnosti Kosova, broj bezbednosnih rizika u regionu
sa državnim, etničkim i verskim korenima je povećan, a srpska reakcija Rezolucijom o neutralnosti više odražava nemoć, nego racionalno zasnovano strateško
opredeljenje. Uprkos ovim negativnim trendovima, izvesnu nadu pruža činjenica da u istom periodu evropska orijentacija postaje nepovratno većinska. To,
takođe, upućuje na zaključak da političke elite i stranke razumeju da su bezbednosna i razvojna strategija oduvek bile u istom paketu. Stoga je jedina razumna
opcija jedan bezbednosni kišobran sa susedima i zemljama sa kojima je nivo
ekonomske razmene najobimniji i sa kojima Srbija deli ste vrednosti.
124 Autor je Pukovnik u penziji
160
Dve negativne evolucije
Od 5. oktobra 2000. godine - kada su probuđene nade građana Srbije u
samu mogućnost promene i prosperitetniju budućnost - do danas, promenio
se svet, i regionalno okruženje, pa i sama Srbija. Posle duboke ekonomske krize koja se zametnula u centru savremenog demokratskog sveta, demokratija
je, kao uzoran društveni i državni model, izgubila na nekadašnjem ugledu.
Region nije postao bezbedniji u posleratnom vremenu, a bezbednosne pretnje
i rizici postali su i brojniji i ozbiljniji. Rešenja koja su prekinula ratove (Dejtonski i Kumanovski sporazumi) nisu na srpskoj strani (ni na drugim stranama)
donela smirivanje, niti posleratnu mobilnost i preorijentaciju na mirnodopsku
izgradnju zemlje. Samoproglašena deklaracija o nezavisnom Kosovu za Srbiju
je „nova” tema na kojoj gubi dah u priključivanju evropskim demokratijama.
Konačno, Srbija nema konsenzus ni po jednom strateški važnom pitanju svoga
razvoja, a ostala su otvorena pitanja nacionalnog i državnog konstituisanja.
Takav razvoj događaja zapravo je negativna evolucija jednog procesa koji je 5.
oktobra 2000. započeo velikim nadama.
NATO je od 2000. godine takođe imao negativnu evoluciju, imajući u vidu
„11.septembar” i akcije u Iraku i Avganistanu.125 Pokušaji da se prema potrebi
pretvara iz vojne u političku organizaciju (i obrnuto, čak da se samodefiniše
kao političko-vojna organizacija) nisu dali rezultate. Njegova nespretnost za
kompleksne civilno-vojne zadatke nervira političare, a vojna nemoć, uprkos
tehnološkoj superiornosti, nervira i političare i vojnike i vojnu industriju. Broj
poginulih civila i vojnika u Iraku i Avganistanu, broj poginulih vojnika NATO-a i koalicionih snaga, nevidljivi rezultati u traganju za međunarodnom
mrežom terorizma i kompromitovanje nehumanim odnosom prema zarobljenicima, dovoljni su građanima zapadnih zemalja (koji su bili propagandno
pripremljeni kako bi podržali ove akcije NATO-a, kao i bombardovanje Jugoslavije) da se, posle trijumfalizma zbog pobede u hladnom ratu, ozbiljnije
zapitaju o funkcionalnosti NATO-a. Stručnjaci su to pitanje postavili odmah
nakon pada Berlinskog zida, ali to nikad nije dovoljno niti za prst na čelu političara.
Pogled na NATO iz Srbije, kao i svi ostali aspekti globalizacije i tranzicionih
reformi, pati od višestrukih i često nepomirljivih perspektiva i interpretacija.
125 Videti: Transatlantic Trends Key findings 2010; (2010_English_Key.pdf); str.15 i 16.
161
Najistaknutije interpretacije izdiferencirale su tzv. dve Srbije. „Prva” Srbija je
pobedila NATO u nepravednom ratu do koga je došlo bez srpske odgovornosti, a „druga” Srbija svu odgovornost za bombardovanje Srbije vidi u srpskoj
politici, koja je, takođe potpuno, odgovorna za krah Jugoslavije i njen ratni
raspad. Količina emocija koja ispunjava njihovu argumentaciju neprimerena
je političkom polju i političkim sredstvima, a pogotovo analitičkom pristupu.
Po tome, dve Srbije liče jedna na drugu, stvarajući samoopravdavajuće koherentne doktrine (ideološko nasleđe socijalizma) o srpskoj istoriji i budućnosti.
Po jednima su Srbi večni heroji, čiji patriotizam nikad nije dolazio u pitanje (iako je baš raspad pokazao suprotno), drugi imaju „teoriju” o neupitnoj
srpskoj ratnoj krivici i večnoj nesposobnosti Srba da se modernizuju. Nosioci
ovakvih ideologija, razume se, imaju (racionalnu) korist za svoju političku poziciju. Oni, naime, politički i egzistencijalno dobro žive od takve argumentacije. Socijalna psihologija uči da se u masama emocije lako pobuđuju, a teško
i sporo gase. Budući da je Srbija posleratna i poražena zemlja, politički procesi u njoj su podjednako intenzivno ispunjeni emotivnim sadržajima kao i
početkom ratnog raspada samoupravne Jugoslavije. Koristeći se time, političke stranke i dalje, kao i tada, svojim populističkim (najčešće ekstremnim i
iracionalnim) nastupom pokušavaju da se dokopaju vlasti nauštrb racionalne
politike i logičke političke argumentacije. Tokom prve decenije 21. veka, postalo je jasnije da Srbija nema kritičnu masu za reforme. Peti oktobar je bio
samo anti-miloševićevski prevrat. Upravo to i jeste najgori rezultat pokušaja
da se Srbija reformiše. Domete i sudbinu postoktobarske Srbije, kao što reče
Hana Arent za sudbinu revolucija126, odredio je režim kojem su „revolucionari” Petog oktobra pripremili kraj. Srbija je, kao što se i predviđalo, nakon što
je NATO zaveo mir, nastavila „rat”, sada sama sa sobom. Nije prošao ni jedan
ceo dan od petog do šestog oktobra 2000. godine, a novi vlastodršci (tada je
veliki deo građana verovao da se radi o novoj demokratski orijentisanoj eliti)
su se vratili svojim ideologijama. Manjinski pokušaji da se odgovori obećanjima i preuzetim obavezama (prema Haškom tribunalu) rezultirali su ubistvom
vodećeg reformiste Zorana Đinđića. Taj unutrašnji sukob, pored različitog viđenja raspada Jugoslavije i srpskog puta integrisanja u savremene ekonomske i
političke tokove, dobio je i nove teme. Otvoreni su komunistički tabui, revalorizuje se i revidira istorija - ponovo ne kao konsenzus o potrebi revalorizacije,
već kao novi razdor. Kako su elite beskompromisno istrajavale na crno-beloj
126 „Ništa ne izgleda razumljivije nego da vrstu i put revolucija određuje režim kome su
pripremile kraj”, Hana Arent, O revoluciji, , “Filip Višnjić”, Beograd 1991., str.136.
162
Srbiji, a stvarnost išla svojim tokom, zaglavljene elite svojim interpretacijama
više ne korespondiraju sa njom. Da put Srbije bude teži, ovim unutrašnjim
negativnim tendencijama pridružuje se NATO svojom podrškom nezavisnom
Kosovu (Deklaracija o nezavisnosti, najavljena decembra 2007. doneta je 17.
februara 2008. godine) i time učvršćuje antinatovsko raspoloženje u Srbiji, a
samim time i reformski put Srbije ka EU.
Tek, za javnost iznenađujući, prelom Srpske radikalne stranke (SRS), na
proevropsko krilo (javno obelodanjeno nakon Nikolićeve izjave da će radikali u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije127 glasati za usvajanje Sporazuma
o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju Evropskoj uniji128 septembra 2008.) i ostatak
SRS, ukazao je na unutarstranačke procene da je izborna baza spremnija na
reforme (racionalnija) od političkih elita. Odlomio se povelik antievropski
lednik i upao u maticu koja plovi ka EU i time povratio nadu od oktobra
2000. godine.
Doprinos NATO-a anti-NATO raspoloženju građana Srbije
Regionalna bezbednost narušena je jednostranim proglašenjem nezavisnog Kosova, pod okriljem SAD, NATO-a i EU. To je danas glavni razlog
što Srbija ne može da mobiliše svoju javnost da prihvati priključivanje NATO-u. Naime, nije više reč o tome da se ubedi opozicija toj ideji i da se preusmeri nasleđeni duh, već da se istovremeno kada NATO, kao izvor agresije, podržava teritorijalno cepanje Srbije, od nje očekuje da priđe vojnom
savezu koji je to stanje proizveo. Kome je bila porebna brzina priznavanja
nezavisnog Kosova, zašto je pokrenuta politika „standardi pre statusa“ (kao
da se nije znalo da je neostvariva), a od koje se potom odustalo? Tim pre
što bi Srbija bila zadovoljena formalnom suverenošću i otvorenim putem
ka EU. To bi i za Kosovo bio brži i manje zahtevan put ka istom cilju. U
okolnostima kada dobici od priključenja EU postanu uočljiviji, jedan novi
referendum o nezavisnosti Kosova verovatno bi bio prihvatljiv za Srbiju. U
isto vreme, pretpostavka da, ukoliko bi Balkan bezbednosno bio prepušten
sam sebi, bez nadzora NATO-a ili EU, verovatnoća nove ratne politike balkanskih zemalja je realna i predvidiva. Podrškom nezavisnom Kosovu ta
pretpostavka je dobila na snazi.
127 Videti:
128 Videti: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sporazum_o_stabilizaciji_i_pridru%C5%BEivanju
163
Pogledajmo najčešće razvijane ideje o razlozima za podršku nezavisnom
Kosovu:
• vojno instaliranje na Kosovu (uključujući bazu Bondstil) čime se pouzdano čuvaju interesi SAD na Balkanu,
• promena geopolitičke ravnoteže na Balkanu, jačanjem državnosti albanskog faktora i uverenost da se time parira srpsko-ruskoj dominaciji,
• ekonomski interesi u materijalnim i ljudskim resursima (rezerve uglja
i jeftine radne snage),
• regrutni rezervat za potrebe intervencija na svetskim ratištima,
• kontrola budućih puteva nafte i gasa iz regiona Zakavkazja i Srednjeg
istoka,
• zaštita ljudskih prava Albanaca koji ne mogu nastaviti zajednički život
sa Srbima u Srbiji,
• kredibilitet NATO-a.
Ma šta od ovoga ili sve zajedno, bilo blisko istini, podrška jednostranom
proglašenju nezavisnosti Kosova ostavlja nerešenim mnogo bezbednosnih problema, te stvara i nove. U periodu Miloševićeve vlasti preuveličavan je značaj
geopolitičkog položaja Srbije i njena geopolitička uloga. Objašnjenje za ponašanje zapada svodilo se na osudu imperijalizma pobednika hladnog rata i njihov
pohod na istok. Verovalo se da je na tom putu, Srbija sa svojim geopolitičkim
položajem, etničkim granicama i ujedinjavajućim ciljevima bila glavna smetnja,
te je drobljenje srpske etničke teritorije i stvaranje malih država sa međusobnim
tenzijama bilo najbolje sredstvo za kontrolu ovog geopolitičkog prostora. Pobornicima tih teza, davanje nezavisnosti Kosovu daju priliku da ponovo progovore.
Guranjem nezavisnosti Kosova, broj bezbednosnih rizika u regionu sa državnim, etničkim i verskim korenima je povećan. Susedi Srbije su naterani da odlučuju protivno sopstvenim bezbednosnim interesima u regionu. Ispod ledenog
brega intenzivirani su otvoreni ili latentni albansko-srpski, albansko-makedonski, albansko-crnogorski albansko-grčki, srpsko-makedonski, srpko-crnogorski, srpsko-hrvatski, srpsko-bošnjački, grčko-makedonski bezbednosni rizici.
Gledajući unapred, teško je očekivati da demografski rast Albanaca može biti
brzo sputan ekonomskim i demokratskim razvojem albanske manjine u Srbiji,
Makedoniji, Crnoj Gori, Albaniji, Grčkoj, što ujedno znači i sporo napredovanje
u oblasti bezbednosti u regionu. Bolno nasleđe održava tenzije preživljenih trauma u odnosima Srbije sa Bosnom i Hercegovinom i Hrvatskom.
164
Prekomponovanje granica i primena nasilnog multikulturalizma je iskustvo srpskog naroda i, takođe, put u nesigurnost. Počelo je sa odbacivanjem
saživota sa Srbijom u Jugoslaviji (multikulturalizam se tada nije ni pominjao).
U nastavku događaja, dvostruki standardi jednostavno nisu mogli da se izbegnu u etničkoj šarolikosti svih novih država. Podržana je neodrživost multikulturne Jugoslavije, dok se insistira na multikulturalnoj Bosni i Hercegovini;
odbacuje se multikulturna Srbija i konačno podržava multikulturalno Kosovo.
Sve navedene pretnje praćene su „modernim“ pretnjama koje najviše zagorčavaju život građanima Srbije, pa i građanima svih drugih zemalja u delu sveta
o kojem govorimo. Tu mislim na terorizam, organizovani kriminal, ekološke
opasnosti, nekontrolisano korišćenje i širenje nuklearnog, hemijskog i biološkog oružja, industrijske akcidente, trgovinu ljudima i ljudskim organima,
institucionalne slabosti. Time je suma pretnji uvećana u odnosu na stanje i
proces u kojem bi teritorijalna celokupnost Srbije ostala nedirnuta.129
Šta sa neutralnošću?
U Narodnoj skupštini su 26. oktobra 2009. usvojene Strategija nacionalne
bezbednosti, Strategija odbrane i zakoni o vojno-obaveštajnoj i vojno-bezbednosnoj agenciji, o radnoj i materijalnoj obavezi, o civilnoj službi, o upotrebi
Vojske u multinacionalnim operacijama van granica Srbije. U skupštinskoj
129 „’Za većinu ljudi danas, osećaj nesigurnosti proističe većim delom od njihovih
dnevnih briga, nego od straha od kataklizmične svetske katastrofe’ (UNDP 1994, str. 22).
Pitanja koja i u Srbiji izazivaju zabrinutost građanki i građana vezana su za sigurnost zaposlenja, zarade, zdravstvenu zaštitu, zdravu životnu sredinu, koja je slobodna i bezbedna od
nasilja i kriminala. UN defniše šest klastera pretnji o kojima svet mora da povede računa danas
i u decenijama koje su ispred nas (Ujedinjene nacije 2004): ekonomske i društvene pretnje,
uključujući siromaštvo, zarazne bolesti i degradaciju životne sredine; međudržavne konfikte;
unutrašnje konfikte, uključujući građanske ratove; nuklearno, radiološko, hemijsko i biološko
oružje; terorizam i transnacionalni organizovani kriminal. Prema istraživanju iz 2005. godine, iako građani Srbije ne smatraju da im organizovani kriminal predstavlja ličnu pretnju,
procenju da organizovani kriminal predstavlja pretnju celom društvu, dok 74% građana obuhvaćenih istraživanjem smatra da Srbija ne može postati prosperitetna bez rešavanja problema
organizovanog kriminala i korupcije (SMMRI 2005). Uspešnost borbe protiv organizovanog
kriminala zavisiće od usaglašene regionalne saradnje, budući da grupe za organizovani kriminal, baš kao i snažne multinacionalne korporacije, u potpunosti usvajaju prednosti ekonomske
liberalizacije i otvorenih granica. Usvajanje UN konvencije protiv transnacionalnog organizovanog kriminala, globalnog instrumenta u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, predstavlja
istorijski iskorak u borbi protiv ove pretnje.“ Iz Izveštaja o humanom razvoju u Srbiji 2008.,
str.156. (Serbia_NHDR-2008-Src.pdf)
165
raspravi je mnogo puta spomenuta Rezolucija Narodne skupštine Republike
Srbije od 26. decembra 2007. godine o vojnoj neutralnosti, ali se termin neutralnost nije pojavio ni u jednoj rečenici Strategije nacionalne bezbednosti,
niti bilo kog drugog akta koji je usvojen. Opoziciono tumačenje se čulo na samoj Skupštini: vladajuća većina namerava da zemlju prevede u NATO, radeći
„kako im se kaže“ iz EU i NATO-a.
U Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti, u odeljku Osnovna opredeljenja politike
nacionalne bezbednosti, u drugom stavu se kaže: „Republika Srbija se zalaže za
poštovanje međunarodnog prava, jačanje uloge OUN, OEBS i EU (u ovom nizu
nema NATO-a kao u drugim, npr. crnogorskoj Strategiji – M.B.) i za stvaranje
mehanizama za očuvanje bezbednosti u svetu, uz ravnopravno uvažavanje interesa svih država, naroda i etničkih grupa. Shodno tome, ne smatra, unapred,
nijednu državu ili savez neprijateljskim.“. U nastavku istog odeljka stoji da je Srbija odlučna da nikad ne prizna samoproklamovano Kosovo, da će svoju spoljnju i bezbednosnu politiku u najvećoj meri usklađivati sa delovanjem EU, da
će kapacitete i sposobnosti sistema nacionalne bezbednosti razvijati u skladu sa
standardima i obavezama koji proizlaze iz Evropske bezbednosne i odbrambene politike, da članstvom u programu Partnerstvu za mir (PzM) pruža doprinos
demokratizaciji i bezbednosti regiona i „naglašava svoje uverenje“ da je aktivna
saradnja svih zemalja regiona sa državama članicama NATO-a i PzM put ka miru
i stabilizaciji. Dalje se, kao spoljnopolitički element nacionalne bezbednosti, ubrzavanje procesa pristupanja EU određuje kao strateški prioritet. Važno je uočiti
da se u taj kontekst stavlja uzajamno prijateljstvo i strateško partnerstvo u oblasti energetike sa Rusijom, a potom sledi ocena važnosti obnavljanja tradicije dobrih odnosa sa SAD, nastavak produbljivanja dobrih odnosa sa Kinom, Indijom
i Brazilom, te zemljama pokreta nesvrstanih i regiona. Konačno, u delu Politika
odbrane decidno stoji da se „Politikom odbrane afirmiše koncept kooperativne
bezbednosti“. Srbija će svojom politikom doprinositi zaštiti nacionalnih interesa,
očuvanju mira, „uz unapređivanje odnosa sa odgovarajućim institucijama sistema kolektivne bezbednosti u susednim i drugim državama.“ Termin neutralnost
nije pomenut, ali se čini da je pojam barem u Strategiji nacionalne bezbednosti,
dobro razrađen. Prethodna vlada je uticala na pojavu i donošenje Rezolucije o
neutralnosti, a ova ju je politički provela i eksploatiše je.
Koliko se zna, ideja o neutralnosti javno je potekla iz Demokratske stranke
Srbije (DSS) koja je donela Deklaraciju o vojnoj neutralnosti Srbije 18. oktobra
166
2007. godine.130 Dva meseca kasnije, Narodna skupšina Republike Srbije donela je „Rezoluciju o zaštiti suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i ustavnog
poretka Republike Srbije“, kojom se proglašava „vojna neutralnost Republike
Srbije u odnosu na postojeće vojne saveze do eventualnog raspisivanja referenduma na kome bi se donela konačna odluka o tom pitanju“. Sredinom februara
2008., Kosovo je jednostrano proglasilo nezavisnost. Javnost, podeljena kao
i uvek, prepustila se crno-belim interpretacijama. Da li je to realan koncept
ili relikt nesvrstanog sentimenta i njegova zloupotreba od najvećih kritičara
komunističkog nasleđa; da li ima samo unutrašnju upotrebnu vrednost (Rezolucija je doneta dva meseca pre samoproglašenja); neutralnost ukazuje na
vrednosnu ambivalentnost; kakve su sličnosti i razlike sa drugim evropskim
neutralnim zemljama; između kojih opcija neutralnost počiva; ko je uvažava
bez međunarodnog sporazuma; kako ćemo uticati na pitanje KiM okruženi
zemljama NATO-a; može li se ući u EU, a da prethodno zemlja nije ušla u
NATO (što je bio slučaj sa svim zemljama u tranziciji koje su danas u NATO-u); neutralnost nije ekonomski isplativa, jer će zemlja biti ignorisana od stranih investitora131; reforma sektora bezbednosti će stagnirati ili će biti potpuno
zaustavljena; standardizacija i profesionalizacija Vojske neće se moći nastaviti,
itd. To su sve legitimna pitanja, međutim ima još mnogo pitanja koja nisu dovoljno ili čak uopšte potencirana.
Na primer, sa stanovišta ideoloških orijentira, kako to da jedna desna partija iz Srbije (ne samo jedna, ali DSS kao inicijator) u trenutno većinski desnoj
Evropi odbacuje NATO; šta znači neutralnost Srbije u kontekstu jednovremenih reformi EU, NATO-a, odnosa Rusija–EU, Rusija-NATO; šta znači neutralnost Srbije u kontekstu priznanja Abhazije i Južne Osetije od strane Rusije,
te istovremeno podrška Rusije da KiM ostane sastavni deo Srbije (konsekvence
se protežu do „male Jugoslavije“ i Republike Srpske); šta predstavlja evropski koncept bezbednosti i može li ga EU uopšte zasnovati; konačno, čemu
služi srpski nevladin sektor u kojem postoji ogromno prazno polje realnosti
između ekstremnih pozicija NVO....Neka od ovih pitanja bila su tema rasprave
u podeljenoj Skupštini i podeljenoj javnosti od pojave Rezolucije, a na neka je
moguće odgovoriti već pažljivim čitanjem same Rezolucije.
130 Videti: http://www.dss.org.rs/
131 U Zborniku Centra za civilno-vojne odnose „Ekonomija i bezednost“ (Beograd, 2009),
T. Karaulac u tekstu „Rizik zemlje, strane incesticije i NATO“ pokazuje da je veoma teško tvrditi
da sam ulazak u NATO pozitivno korelira sa SDI, pogotovo u zemljama koje su izvršile reforme
i jednovremeno sa ulaskom u EU ušle i u NATO.
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Rezolucija je doneta kao politička reakcija na nagoveštaje o samoproklamovanju nezavisnosti Kosova. Srbija je svesna da je vojna reakcija okončana
1999. godine, iako je ona legitimni deo arsenala države u slučaju ugrožavanja
njenog teritorijalnog integriteta. Tom rezolucijom Srbija je proklamovala da je
vojno neutralna u odnosu na postojeće vojne saveze, čime je rekla da privremeno („do eventualnog referenduma“) ne želi da pristupi NATO-u.132 Ovom
formulacijom sam donosilac pokazuje da ne veruje da je to nešto trajno, čvrsto
i samorazumljivo. U Rezoluciji najviše ima nemoći, a najmanje racionalno zasnovanog strateškog opredeljivanja. Istinska dilema i istinski problem Srbije
od 1991. godine i jeste da se izbori sa konfliktnim nasleđem i iracionalnim
odlukama. Nasleđe je za Srbiju bilo srž svakog novog odlučivanja ili novog
spoticanja.133 Rezolucija je u tom smuslu samo ishod niza događaja u kojem
je najistaknutiji iracionalni izbor bila odluka da se uđe u rat sa NATO-om.
Nakon toga, sledbenici su se borili sa novim negativnim nasleđem. Sledom tih
činjenica, februara 2008. godine nije se desilo ništa neobično. Srbiji je izbor
bio sužen, a možda je tačnije da ga nije ni bilo. Srbija je odbila da prihvati nezavisno Kosovo, bori se za diplomatsko i pravno rešenje, a politički nastavlja
saradnju sa svim zemljama članicama NATO i ostalima u svetu, posebno onima koje su podržale njenu teritorijalnu celovitost. Nije bilo reči o povlačenju
iz Partnerstva za mir, što je mehanizam NATO-a, uz ocenu da je za sada PzM
adekvatna mera saradnje sa NATO-om.
Treba reći i da odnosi bivših protivnika u hladnom ratu takođe nisu bez
tragova nasleđa, pri čemu je teško razlučiti interese od senki iracionalnog rezonovanja. Da li je istočna Evropa i dalje pod zaštitom i da li joj je zaštita
potrebna; da li njeni građani imaju realan osećaj pretnje od Rusije ili se on
svesno indukuje iz političke sfere; da li Rusija ima, te da li pokazuje dovoljno
promenjen profil i prodemokratski lik, kojim može da ukloni strepnje i sećanja
na stare pretnje među svojim zapadnim susedima; da li je za vrednosno „po132 Iako se paralele sa neutralnim evropskim zemljama povlače na štetu srpske neutralnosti, reklo bi se da je i njena pojava proizvod jednog bezbednosnoga stanja (postkonflikta,
potencijalnog konflikta, kao i u drugim slučajevima) u kojem se Srbija našla, razume se, ne bez
svojih zasluga.
133 Posle pada Berlinskog zida srpska podrška samoupravnoj ju-zajednici naroda ukazuje
da je i komunizam bolji od nacionalnog cepanja, pogotovo samoupravni, zbog čega je srpski
nacionalni korpus više od drugih držao do Jugoslavije. Ideja da se, uprkos moćnom pobedniku
HR, ratnim sredstvima stvore nove srpske granice bila je iracionalna. Posle ove odluke, koja se
može „pravdati“ navalom istorije u aktuelnu politiku, sve kasnije su uglavnom delo i greh političkih elita, sa malo iracionalnog, a mnogo osveštenog vlastoljubnog interesa.
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mirenje“ i približavanje dobro poistovećivati nacizam i komunizam? S druge
strane, prestankom hladnog rata je bilo reči o tome da se NATO neće širiti na
istok. I Rusima je potrebno više poverenja. Zaustavljanje širenja NATO-a na istok može biti test poverenja koji bi najpre pozdravila Rusija, odnosno dobitak
bi se poentirao u evropsko-ruskim odnosima. To bi bio pravi kraj hladnog
rata. Jednom rečju, nasleđe opterećuje sve aktere. U javnosti Srbije često se
ne uočava da i srpska i evropska i, da je uslovno nazovemo, zapadna strana,
imaju nasleđena predubeđenja, koja, u spletu sa interesima, održavaju nerazumevanje i nepoverenje.
Iz ovih napomena sledi pitanje da li je vojna neutralnost realna i održiva, da li
je opcija ili fikcija? Da li ubrzava ili usporava (stagnira) demokratizaciju srpskog
društva? Nema decidnog odgovora. Ima ih mnogo u kondicionalu „ako...onda“.
To može biti praktična politika i ona to sada i jeste. Finska neutralnost mogla
bi joj biti dobar uzor. Dakle, ukoliko Srbija nastavi svoju društvenu reformu sa
ciljem da postane deo EU i pri tome pokaže kredibilan demokratski potencijal,
EU će za nju imati otvorena vrata. Danas je Srbija okružena susedima koji već
jesu u NATO-u ili će uskoro biti. Uz to, razvojna orijentacija zemalja u tranziciji
ka EU po pravilu se ostvarivala preko ulaska u NATO. Globalna integracija odvija
se preko nacionalnih granica i isto vredi i za Rusiju. Konflikti između nekadašnjih
hladnoratovskih neprijatelja mogu se širiti i rasti, mada logika globalne
međuzavisnosti, kao i sama tranzicija Rusije ka demokratskom društvu, načelno
to ne predviđa. Naime, sukobi između demokratski uređenih društava manje su
verovatni. Ako sukob bude rastao, politika neutralnosti teško će biti moguća, ali
teško je verovati da bi EU ušla u oštrije bezbednosne konflikte sa Rusijom zarad
interesa i politike SAD prema Rusiji. Tome se Evropa opirala i u hladnom ratu.
EU više nije potrebna zaštita kao u hladnom ratu, uprkos pokušajima da se takva
situacija stvori i predstavi politikom antiraketnog štita. Ekonomski život EU i
Rusije približava njihova strateška gledišta i otežava izglede da između Evrope i
Rusije ponovo dođe do uspostavjanja jaza. Zemlje bivšeg istočnog bloka sporije
uočavaju ove promene budući da pate od nasleđenog straha i razumljive krhkosti
pravne države i demokratskog poretka. Srbija je tradicionalni prijatelj Rusije (više
kulturni i politički, nego ekonomski), nema ukorenjen strah od ruskog imperijalizma i ima iskustvo ravnopravnosti sa Rusijom. Stoga, u kontekstu ulaska Srbije
u EU i njenih odnosa sa Rusijom, uvek će izgledati da su Srbija i Rusija u bližim
odnosima nego Srbija i zemlje EU. Nivo ekonomske razmene je uvek realniji
parametar da se proceni odnos sa jednom i drugom stranom.
169
Ukratko, ukoliko se zaustavi hladnoratovski stil širenja NATO-a (antiraketni štit je test, kaže Lavrov) može se očekivati bolje razumevanje evropskog bezbednosnog prostora u kojem je Rusija jedna od evropskih država. Ako budu
prevladavali aktuelni bezbednosni problemi i bezbednosno nasleđe (evropsko
i srpsko), vojna neutralnost će postajati relikt, ali ako se jaz bude produbljivao
(između Srbije i Evrope, Rusije i Evrope...) onda bi vojna neutralnost mogla
dobijati sadržaj političke opcije.
Bezbednosna i razvojna strategija su u jednom paketu
Ovde se, međutim, postavlja pitanje brzine ulaska Srbije u EU u svetlu njenog bezbednosnog koncepta. Srbija je izgubila mnogo vremena i konačno ireverzibilna (?) odluka o priključenju EU je važan rubikon. Da li ga je Srbija
definitivno prešla objavom Srpske napredne stranke da je postala proevropska
partija, ili je i to još jedna stranačka igra, za sada ne možemo znati. Pod pritiskom dugogodišnjih uslovljavanja i utiskivanja krivice, tvrdnje da je alternativa ulasku u EU obnova ratova, društvena anarhija i pretnje da će organizovani
kriminal i korupcija zavladati institucijama i onemogućiti bilo kakav reformski put padaju u senku. Talasi svetske ekonomske krize i uvid da je njen koren
u pohlepi finansijskog kapitala koji davi veliki broj, posebno malih zemalja,
kolebaju ionako teško dostignutu proevropsku većinu. U tom kontekstu, vojna
neutralnost (možda je tačnije reći neodlučnost) usporava proces priključenja
EU. Najveća olakšica koju Srbija može danas da dobije od EU jeste razmevanje
za situaciju u kojoj se našla i odvezivanje procesa priključenja EU od srpskog
stava prema Kosovu i ulasku u NATO. I opet, u nadi da srpske elite nedvosmisleno povedu zemlju u pravcu evroatlanskih integracija.
Zašto evroatlantskih? Načelno, jedan bezbednosni kišobran sa susedima i
zemljama sa kojima je nivo ekonomske razmene i ekonomskog života najobimniji (60% sa EU) jedini je razuman put da se osigura stabilnost i razvoj. Stoga
je dobro što se i u Srbiji većinski shvata da bez evropske orijentacije nije moguće opstati u političkom životu. Bezbednosna i razvojna strategija su oduvek
bili u istom paketu.
Koliko god srpsko iskustvo sa zapadom u proteklih 20 godina bilo kompleksno, Srbija (i Rusija) razvija iste evropske društvene vrednosti.134 U članu 1
134 “Poštovanje ljudskog dostojanstva, sloboda, demokratija, vladavina prava, poštova-
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Ustava Srbije se kaže:„Republika Srbija je država srpskog naroda i svih građana
koji u njoj žive, zasnovana na vladavini prava i socijalnoj pravdi, načelima
građanske demokratije, ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i slobodama i pripadnosti evropskim principima i vrednostima.” A u članu 2 nedavno usvojenog Strateškog koncepta za odbranu i bezbednost članova Severnoatlantskog
saveza usvojenog novembra 2010. u Lisabonu stoji: “Zemlje članice NATO
čine jedinstvenu zajednicu vrednosti privrženu principima individualne slobode, demokratije, ljudskih prava i vladavine zakona“. Član 38 upućuje na isto:
„Naš savez uspeva kao izvor nade jer počiva na zajedničkim vrednostima individualne slobode, demokratije, ljudskih prava i vladavine zakona, kao i zbog
naše zajedničke osnovne i trajne svrhe zaštite slobode i bezbednosti njegovih
članica. Ove vrednosti i ciljevi su univerzalni i trajni, a mi smo odlučni da ih
branimo kroz jedinstvo, solidarnost, snagu i odlučnost.“
Bez evropskih standarda koji su instrument dostizanja tih vrednosti, taj put
je nemoguć. Izolacija je takođe nemoguća. Kad bi je neka politička opcija i
izabrala (mada to više nije moguće u Srbiji), brzo bi bila modifikovana ili čak
srušena. Ta dublja logika nalaže da se povežu strategija razvoja društva i forma
zaštite te strategije.135 Tako bi država svojim racionalnim odlukama smanjila
prostor za Montgomerije i Konuzine, a građani bi postali svesniji vrednosti
sopstvenog izbora.
nje ljudskih i manjinskih prava, pluralizam, tolerancija, pravda, solidarnost, nediskriminacija,
jednakost među polovima„ su vrednosti koje navodi Ustav EU (kasnije zamenjen Lisabonskim
ugovorom). FABUS, Novi Sad, 2005. str. 28.
135 NATO i EU pokrivaju, odnosno štite iste vrednosti različitim sredstvima. Njih verovatno ne bi bilo moguće razviti, niti zaštititi kroz istoriju hladnog rata bez NATO-a. Francuska je
mogla da izađe iz vojne komponente NATO-a, ali ne i iz političke, jer ne može da napusti svoju
razvojnu društvenu strategiju.
171
Evroatlantizam i stvaranje „bezbednosne zajednice“ na
Balkanu
Prof. dr Predrag Simić136
Građanski rat u Jugoslaviji devedesetih godina 20. veka bio je prva ozbiljna
kriza u Evropi posle hladnog rata. Ova kriza je u SAD i EZ/EU „otvorila prvu
ozbiljnu debatu o spoljnoj politici i međunarodnim odnosima posle hladnog rata“137 i uticala na evoluciju glavnih institucija evropske i evroatlantske
bezbednosti, pre svega, Zajedničke evropske spoljne i odbrambene politike
(CFSP) i Severnoatlantskog saveza (NATO).138 I dok su rani posrednički pokušaji EZ/EU na prostoru bivše SFRJ doneli polovične rezultate, NATO je prve
ratne operacije u istoriji ove organizacije izveo 1995. i 1999. godine upravo
na Balkanu. Pritisak EU i NATO zaustavio je građanski rat u Jugoslaviji ali je
ovaj prostor je ostao potencijalno krizno žarište zbog nasleđa rata, otvorenih
etničkih i graničnih problema i međusobnog nepoverenja država-naslednica
biše Jugoslavije.
Jedna od posledica raspada i rata na prostoru bivše SFRJ bila je fragmentacija regiona i stvaranje novih država koje su ostale opterećene posledicama
rata i raspada nekadašnje zajedničke države. Na zaostajanje balkanskih zemalja uticalo je i nasleđe hladnoratovske podele Balkana koji je prethodnih pola
veka bio podeljen između članica NATO-a, Varšavskog pakta, nesvrstanih i
samoizolovanih zemalja. Zbog toga se o Balkanu pre može govoriti kao o geografskom pojmu nego kao o regionu povezanom ekonomskim, socijalnim,
političkim i drugim vezama.139 Čak ni opredeljenje svih ovih zemalja da uđu
136 Autor je Profesor Fakulteta političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu.
137 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Nedrickson, America and Bosnia, National Interest, Fall
1993, str. 14.
138 „Dinamične promene u regionu Balkana tokom devedesetih godina dale su podlogu
i razvoju u Evropi i načinu na koji danas izučavamo međunarodne pojave“, Emilian Kawalski,
Extending the Euroepan Security Community – Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Tauris
Academic Studies, London and New York 2007, str. 3.
139 Šire o tome videti u: Predrag Simić, Do the Balkans Exists?, u: Dimitriou Triantaphilou
(ed.), The Southern Balkans, Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Papers, No. 46, ISS, Paris
172
u EU i većine za ulazak u NATO (izuzev Srbije) automatski ne znači i spremnost na obnovu međusobnih veza i izgradnju regionalnih institucija. Štaviše,
evropsko opredeljenje jugoslovenskih republika početkom devedestih bilo je
pokretano željom za „begom s Balkana“ i priključenjem razvijenom delu Evrope naglašavajući međusobne razlike i neprijateljstvo.
To su bili neki od razloga zbog kojih su glavne inicijative ka obnovi regionalne saradnje na Balkanu došle spolja. Za EU i NATO su fragmentacija
i krize u regionu postale prepreka na putu njegove integracije u evropsku i
evroatlantsku integraciju. Rani pokušaji obnove regionalnih veza („Rojamonska inicijativa“, SECI i sl.) dali su ograničene rezultate. EU je, stoga, posle Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma za Bosnu i Hercegovinu počela sistematske napore u ovom pravcu u okviru tzv. regionalnog pristupa zemljama Zapadnog
Balkana.140 Ovi napori Unije dobili su pun zamah tek posle vojne intervencije
NATO-a protiv tadašnje SR Jugoslavije 1999. godine kada je na samitu EU u
Kelnu osnovan Pakt stabilnosti u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Na evropskim samitima u Zagrebu (2000) i Solunu (2003) zauzet je stav da sve zemlje Zapadnog
Balkana mogu biti primljene u EU ukoliko ispune potrebne uslove. Perspektiva članstva i zahtevi Unije u pogledu regionalne sradnje doprineli su obnovi
međusobnih veza i relativno brzom razvoju regionalnih veza počev od saradnje u oblasti infrastrukture, borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala, uklanjanju
tarifnih i netarifnih barijera i razvoju privredne saradnje do vojne saradnje,
najčešće u okvirima programa Partnerstvo za mir.
Zapadni Balkan je danas okružen članicama EU i NATO-a i na političkoj
karti Evrope jedno je od retkih područja koja nisu u potpunosti uključena u
evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju. Uprkos prestanku oružanih sukoba, ovo
područje i danas opterećuju mnogobrojni problemi zbog kojih je verovatnoća njihove skore integracije u EU (izuzev Hrvatske) malo verovatna. Pored
nasleđa rata i nedovršene tranzicije njihovih privrednih i političkih sistema
ove zemlje i dalje opterećuju etničke napetosti, nerešeni teritorijalni sporovi, migratorni problemi, nerazvijena infrastruktura, korupcija i organizovani
kriminal i dr. Poseban problem su područja koja su dalje pod međunarodnim
protektoratom. Opredeljenje svih ovih zemalja za ulazak u EU i, u većini slučajeva, u NATO ipak otvara mogućnost izgradnje nove bezbednosne arhitekture
2001, str. 17-36.
140 Bivše jugoslovenske republike osim Slovenije (koja je 2004. godine primljena u EU) i
Albanija.
173
regiona ne samo Zapadnog Balkana nego i Balkana u celini. Pored nastavka i
produbljivanja ekonomske integracije regiona često se ističe potreba stvaranja
tzv. bezbednosne zajednice na Balkanu kao okvira za rešavanje međudržavnih
sporova i integracije u EU i NATO.
Bezbednosne zajednice
Koncept bezbednosne zajednice uveo je krajem pedesetih godina XX veka
američki profesor Karl Dojč u svojoj knjizi „Politička zajednica i severnoatlantsko područje“.141 U najkraćem, bezbednosnim zajednicama označavaju se
regioni ili grupe zemalja koje su se dobrovoljno odrekle prava da međusobne
sporove rešavaju silom i u kojima je mogućnost izbijanja nasilja, odnosno, rata
minimalna ili nemoguća. Prema Karlu Dojču, „bezbednosnu zajednicu“ čini
„grupa ljudi koji su integrisani“. On integraciju označava kao „stvaranje ,osećaja zajednice‘ na određenoj teritoriji kao i institucija i prakse dovoljno snažnih i rasprostranjenih da ,dugoročno‘ izgrade uverljiva očekivanja ,miroljubive
promene‘ njenog stanovništva“.142
Pod „osećajem zajednice“ Dojč podrazumeva „uverenje pojedinaca u grupi
da su postigli sporazum barem o jednom pitanju: da se zajednički društveni problemi moraju i mogu rešiti procesom ,miroljubive promene‘“.143 Takva
promena podrazumeva rešavanje društvenih problema putem institucionalizovanih procedura i bez pribegavanja fizičkoj sili velikih razmera. „Bezbednosna zajednica je, stoga, ona zajednica u kojoj postoje realne garancije da se
članovi zajednice neće fizički obračunavati nego da će svoje sporove rešiti na
neki drugi način. Ukoliko bi čitav svet bio integrisan u bezbednosnu zajednicu
ratovi bi bili automatski isključeni“144, zaključuje ovaj autor.
Karl Dojč je u svojoj knjizi identifikovao dve vrste bezbednosnih zajednica. Prve su tzv. amalgamirane zajednice, u kojima se dve ili više nezavisnih
jedinica spajaju u jednu zajedničku i širu jedinicu u kojoj nastaje neka vrsta
zajedničke vlasti posle spajanja. Primer ove vrste su Sjedinjene Države a, mogli
bi dodati, i bivša Jugoslavija koja bi se, prema definiciji ovog autora, mogla
141 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York 1957.
142 Ibid, str. 5.
143 Ibid
144 Ibid
174
označiti kao neuspela bezbednosna zajednica pošto je nestala u građanskom
ratu. Druga vrsta su tzv. pluralističke bezbednosne zajednice u kojima manje
jedinice zadržavaju pravnu nezavisnost i posebne vlade. Dojč je takvu zajednicu video u Severnoj Americi između SAD i Kanade. Pluralističke bezbednosne
zajednice su češće, a kao primeri ove vrste danas bi se mogli navesti evroatlantsko područje koje obuhvata NATO, Evropska unija u Evropi, ASEAN u Aziji ili
Mercosur u Južnoj Americi.
Iako je teorija Karla Dojča nastala još krajem pedesetih godina svoj pun uticaj dobila je tek posle hladnog rata kada su njegove ideje razradili socijalni konstruktivisti Emanuel Adler i Majkl Barnet u knjizi „Bezbednosne zajednice“.145
Prema Adlerovom i Barnetovom shvatanju, bezbednosne zajednice, kao i sve
druge vrste ljudskih zajednica, odlikuju tri osobine. Prvo, članovi zajednice
dele zajednički identitet, vrednosti i značenja. Drugo, pripadnici zajednice
održavaju višestruke i neposredne odnose. Treće, zajednicama je svojevrsan
reciprocitet zasnovan na dugoročnim interesima članova zajednice, pa čak i na
altruizmu: „dugoročni interes nastaje iz poznavanja onoga s kim ste u interakciji dok se altruizam može protumačiti kao osećaj dužnosti i odgovornosti“.146
Adler i Barnet navode da se bezbednosne zajednice postepeno grade: nastajuća zajednica odgovara osnovnim potrebama miroljubive promene dok
zrelu bezbednosnu zajednicu odlikuju mehanizmi kolektivne bezbednosti ali i
supranacionalni i transacionalni elementi. Za razliku od Dojča, Adler i Barnet
razlikuju čvrsto i labavo integrisane zajednice. Na tragu ovih razmišljanja neki
drugi autori govore o međudržavnim bezbednosnim zajednicama (među kojima rat nije moguć) i sveobuhvatnim bezbednosnim zajednicama (u kojima
čak ni građanski rat nije moguć). Komunikacija i transakcije među državama
vode onome što Emanuel Adler naziva „socijalizacijom“ i izgradnjom novog
zajedničkog identiteta na kome počiva solidarnost članova bezbednosne zajednice. Prema Adleru, to znači da „nacionalni političari moraju prihvatiti nova
značenja i interpretacije stvarnosti onako kako se stvaraju u intelektualnim,
birokratskim i političkim krugovima zbog čega moraju menjati svoje interese,
sposobnost i/ili spremnost da razmotre nove pravce delovanja.“147
145 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1998.
146 Ibid, str. 31.
147 Emanuel Adler, Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress, in Adler and Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International
175
Uloga međunarodnih organizacija na Balkanu
U teoriji socijalnog konstuktivizma jedna od najvažnijih ideja je „socijalizacija“ kroz koju individualni akteri svaraju identitete i ideje koji upravljaju
njihovim ponašanjem. Ova ideja, u međuvremenu, prihvaćena je i u konstruktivističkoj teoriji međunarodnih odnosa148 koja međunarodne institucije vidi
kao socijalne institucije oko kojih se grade identiteti, ideje i očekivanja njihovih članova. Prema američkim autorima Džonu Ikenberiju i Čarlsu Kupčanu, socijalizacija u međunarodnim odnosima se javlja najčešće posle ratova
i drugih velikih kriza, u uslovima velikih socijalnih i političkih poremećaja i
kada su domaće institucije spremnije da prihvate uticaje spolja.149 Primer ove
vrste je posleratna Evropa koja je prihvatila Maršalov plan, stvaranje Severnoatlantskog pakta i ideje o prvim evropskim zajednicama iako je čitavo njeno
dotadašnje nasleđe upućivalo u drugom pravcu. Kao rezultat takvog procesa
„socijalizacije“ nastala je savremena Evropa okupljena u Evropskoj uniji i Severnoatlantskom savezu.
Iako se, prema konstruktivističkim shvatanjima, međunarodne organizacije i institucije javljaju kao rezultat ovog procesa, one mogu biti i njegovi pokretači. Mnogi anglosaksonski autori danas potvrdu za to vide u
promenama u srednjoj i istočnoj Evropi posle hladnog rata gde su njihovi
pokretači bili EU, NATO ili OEBS.150 Sledeći ovu logiku, neki autori smatraju da bi EU i NATO sličnu ulogu mogli odigrati i u stvaranju bezbednosne
zajednice i na Balkanu.151 Prema takvom viđenju, za to su potrebne sledeće
tri pretpostavke. Prvo, to bi bilo stvaranje prethodnih uslova, odnosno, čiRelations, str. 52.
148 Videti, na primer: Nicholas G. Onuf, Constructivism: A User’s Manual, u: V. Kubalkova,
N. Onuf, and P. Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, M.E. Sharpe,
Armonk, NY 1998, str. 58-78.
149 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, International Organization, Vol. 44/1990, str. 283-315.
150 U raspravama o ulozi međunarodnih institucija realisti, međutim, osporavaju njihov
značaj u iniciranju promena u državama koje smanjuju rizik upotrebe oružane sile. Videti, na
primer: John J. Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions; International Security, Winter 1994/95, str. 5-49.
151 Na primer: E. Kavalski, navedeni rad, Suzette Grillot et al., Developing Securty Community in the Western Balkans: The Role of EU and NATO, Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth
Biennial International Conference May 17-19, 2007, Montréal, QC, Canada, Srđan Vučetić, The
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution, Southeast
European Politics, October 2001, str. 109-134.
176
nilaca koji mogu podstaći regionalne aktere da se počnu približavati jedni
drugima kao što su tehnološki napredak, demografske, ekonomske i promene u životnoj sredini, spoljašnja pretnja i izmenjene predstave o „socijalnoj stvarnosti“. Na drugom mestu su strukturni i proceduralni činioci
koji vode razvoju bezbednosne zajednice kao što su faktori moći i znanje.
Faktori moći mogu biti i spoljašnji (u ovom slučaju EU i NATO) i unutrašnji
(u vidu novih političkih elita).
Znanje se odnosi na nove ideje kakve su liberalna demokratija, građansko
društvo, vladavina prava, ljudska prava, koji podstiču stvaranje poverenja i
osećaja zajedništva među regionalnim akterima. Od njih se očekuje da intenziviraju različite oblike međusobne komunikacije i razmene, počev od privredne do socijalne, bezbednosne i političke. Treća pretpostavka je kontinuirano
delovanje međunarodnog faktora u pravcu stvaranja bezbednosne zajednice.
Njegova uloga je da „promovišu zajedničke definicije bezbednosti, odgovarajuće unutrašnje i spoljno delovanje i regionalne granice, socijalno učenje
koje podstiče političke aktere da vide jedni druge kao dostojne poverenja. To
upućuje ljude da se identifikuju sa onima s kojima su ranije bili na suprotnim
stranama.“152
Posmatrano iz konstruktivističkog ugla, savremeni Balkan se naizgled uklapa u ovakav model: region je prošao kroz deceniju nasilnih konflikata u kojima je nestala ranija zajednička država, države-naslednice i njihova društva su
opterećena postkonfliktnim traumama, njihove ekonomije su fragmentirane a
njihove političke elite međusobno suprotstavljene. Određene pretpostavke za
proces rekoncilijacije i stvaranja bezbednosne zajednice u regionu, međutim,
postoje: tome u prilog se ističe da su dve vojne intervencije NATO-a (1995. i
1999.) zaustavile oružane sukobe, da su političku scenu napustili njihovi glavni
protagonisti i da su sva ova društva krenula putem tranzicije pridržavajući se,
manje-više, istih načela i vrednosti liberalnog kapitalizma.
Pored Slovenije koja je jedina bivša jugoslovenska republika koja je primljena u članstvo EU i članica je NATO-a, 2009. godine u NATO su primljene
i Hrvatska i Albanija dok su Makedonija, Crna Gora i Bosna i Hercegovina
obuhvaćene Akcionim planom za članstvo u NATO-u (MAP). Izuzetak je, do152 Adler and Barnett, A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, u: Adler and
Barnett, eds., Security Communities, str. 45.
177
nekle, Srbija koja je proglasila neutralnost ali je član programa NATO-a „Partnerstvo za mir“, pridruženi član Parlamentarne skpštine NATO-a i veoma aktivna u vojnoj saradnji sa susedima. Sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana su sklopile
Sporazume o saradnji i pridruživanju sa EU, a neke su počele i pregovore o
članstvu. Najdalje je odmakla Hrvatska koja privodi kraju pregovore u ulasku
u Uniju.
Unija je sredinom devedesetih godina 20. veka, posle potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma za BiH, usvojila politiku prema Balkanu koja je bila
deo njene šire politike prema srednjoj i istočnoj Evropi posle pada Berlinskog
zida. Za razliku od prve i druge generacije „Evropa ugovora“ ovim zemljama
je postavljen zahtev za stabilizacijom kao preduslovom pridruživanja Uniji.
Politika „stabilizacije i pridruživanja“ ima dva glavna instrumenta: regionalni
pristup i politiku uslovljavanja. Regionalni pristup zemljama tzv. Zapadnog
Balkana ima za cilj izgradnju regionalne ekonomske i bezbednosne zajednice
dok uslovljavanje znači da je ovim zemljama otvorena mogućnost da postanu
članice vodećih zapadnih institucija, EU i NATO-a. Uslov za to je proces „socijalizacije“ koji bi ih učinio kompatibilnim sa vrednostima, ciljevima i praksom
na kojima počivaju evropska i evroatlanska zajednica. Stav da je poboljšanje
odnosa i razvoj regionalne saradnje na Zapadnom Balkanu preduslov uspešne
integracije ovih zemalja u EU postao je zvanična politika EU u odnosima sa
svima njima: „Regionalna saradnja je takođe i specifičan zahtev u okviru sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju koji se već primenjuje u BJR Makedoniji
i Hrvatskoj ... regionalna saradnja je stoga ugaoni kamen politike EU na Zapadnom Balkanu“.153
Sa svoje strane, politika NATO-a u regionu oslanja se na njegove mirovne
misije od kojih su dve završene (u BiH i Makedoniji) dok je nastavljena misija
na Kosovu i Metohiji (KFOR), prijem zemalja regiona u članstvo ove organizacije i aktivnosti kroz program „Partnerstvo za mir“. Na ovim temeljima 2005.
godine je potpisana Jadranska povelja kojom je osnovana Jadanska grupa koja
je okupila Hrvatsku, Albaniju i Makedoniju kao neku vrstu regionalnog saveza
u okviru NATO-a. Ovakva politika je posle 2000. godine dala određene rezultate: broj regionalnih inicijativa, organizacija i projekata je povećan, ekonomski i polički odnosi među državama Zapadnog Balkana su vidno napredovali
153 Videti o tome: The Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: A Policy Priority for the
European Union, European Commission, Brussels 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf.
178
(naročito između tri nekada vodeće jugoslovenske republike: Srbije, Hrvatske
i Slovenije) i otklonjene su mnoge prepreke slobodnoj cirkulaciji ljudi i roba
u regionu.
Valja, ipak, primetiti da je razvoj regionalne saradnje rezultat odnosa svake
pojedinačne zemlje sa Evropskom unijom i NATO-om. Štaviše, čak i neki ozbiljni teritorijalni sporovi koji su zapretili da naruše novostvorenu ravnotežu
u regionu (na primer. spor oko Piranskog zaliva između Slovenije i Hrvatske)
rešeni su direktnom diplomatskom intervencijom vodećih članica NATO-a i
EU. Verovatno najveći napredak u pravcu izgradnje bezbednosne zajednice na
Zapadnom Balkanu zabeležen je između Srbije i Hrvatske tokom poslednjih
nekoliko godina. U seriji visoko simboličnih manifestacija rekoncilijacije i izgradnje regionalne saradnje, predsednici dve zemlje nagovestili su mogućnost
stvaranja regionalne zajednice na ovom prostoru koja bi bila kompatibilna sa
EU i NATO-om. Napredak u odnosima između Srbije, Hrvatske i Slovenije
nije, međutim, praćen odgovarajućim napretkom kada su u pitanju Kosovo i
Metohija, Bosna Hercegovina i neka druga područja Zapadnog Balkana gde
je stanje ostalo nepromenjeno ili je čak pogoršano.
Tokom poslednje decenje došlo je i do suštinske promene u obliku prisustva
i ulozi NATO-a na Zapadnom Balkanu. Posle oružanih intervencija 1995. i
1999. godine, NATO je preuzeo misije očuvanja mira u Bosni i Hercegovini
(IFOR, kasnije SFOR) i na Kosovu i Metohiji (KFOR). Mirovna misija u BiH
predstavljala je nesumnjiv uspeh pošto posle potpisvanja Dejtonskog sporazuma i rasporeda snaga NATO-a u ovoj bišoj jugoslovenskoj republici nije zabeležen ni jedan oružani sukob niti je bilo žrtava borbenih operacija. Ova misija
napustila je BiH 2004. godine posle čega su je zamenile ograničene snage EU.
Misija NATO-a na KiM naišla je na daleko komplikovaniju situaciju u kojoj je
bilo više oružanih napada na srpsko stanovništvo, uključujući i napade i etničko čišćenje širokih razmera u martu 2004. godine koje su snage KFOR-a tek
uz velike napore i značajan broj žrtava stavile pod kontrolu. Međutim, u ovom
slučaju samo robusno vojno prisustvo NATO-a je sprečilo nastavak oružanih
sukoba s kraja devedesetih godina i nastavak etničkog čišćenja.
Do preokreta u odnosima između Srbije i NATO-a došlo je u aprilu 2001.
godine kada je izbila pobuna Albanaca u Preševskoj dolini. Iako je u prvom
trenutku izgledalo da će se ponoviti scenario srpsko-albanskog sukoba iz
1998-1999. godine, predstavnici novih vlasti u Beogradu (Nebojša Čović i
Goran Svilanović) su stupili u kontakt sa tadašnjim generalnim sekretarom
NATO-a Džordžom Robertsonom posle čega su srpske snage bezbednosti i
179
snage KFOR-a (tj. NATO-a) zajednički zaustavile delovnje albanskih paravojnih snaga, tzv. Oslobodilačke armije Preševa, Bujanovca i Medveđe. Kao
rezultat ove saradnje ukinuta je tzv. kopnena zona bezbednosti iz kojih su
delovale snage OVPBM dok su srpske snage od KFOR-a preuzele kontrolu
administravne granice sa KiM. Iako je ova epizoda obnovila poverenje između Srbije i NATO-a, do narednog koraka u međusobnom približavanju došlo
je tek 2007. godine kada je Srbija zatražila i dobila prijem u program NATO-a
„Partnerstvo za mir“.
„Preokret u odnosima između NATO i Srbije i Crne Gore je verovatno najspektakularniji događaj u oblasti bezbednosti koji se dogodio u bivšoj Jugoslaviji posle sukoba na Kosovu 1999. godine“, primetio je ekspert NATO-a,
Robert Seri.154 Pristupanje svih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana u Partnerstvo za
mir kao i prijem Hrvatske i Albanije u NATO učvrstili su položaj ove organizacije na Balkanu koja je dobila dugoročni uticaj na razvoj sektora bezbednosti
u svim zemljama regiona, uključujući obim i strukturu nacionalnih oružanih
snaga, njihovu interoperabilnost, zajedničke vojne vežbe i sl.
Snažan spoljni pritisak u pravcu razvoja regionalne saradnje na Balkanu
naveo je pojedine analitičare da postave motive ovih napora. Međunarodni
posrednici u krizama pored opšteg interesa da doprinesu njihovom rešavanju često imaju i posebno, javne ili prikrivene interese. Za neke od analitičara
politike Unije i NATO-a na Balkanu njihovi motivi se, između ostalog, kriju i
u želji da unaprede vlastitu legitimnost. Tako, na primer, Filip Borinski smatra da NATO koristi mogućnost da svojim delovanjem na Balkanu postigne
„dvostruko širenje“, tj. da istovremeno ostvari „širenje i geografskom smislu
i u smislu širenja svoje uloge koje bi, uspešno ostvareno, doprinelo prestižu
ove organizacije.155 Na sličan način se tumači i uloga EU: „samo stabilizacijom
Balkana EU može učiniti svoju Zajedničku spoljnu i bezbednosnu politiku
(CFSP) uverljivijom i predstaviti se kao značajan geopolitički činilac“.156
Analiza efekata nastojanja EU i NATO-a da podstaknu regionalnu saradnju
na Balkanu tokom poslednje decenije govori da, pored postignutih rezultata,
ona ima i neke neočekivane posledice. Uprkos želji svih zemalja Zapadnog
Balkana da postanu članovi Unije, ona autonomski ne utiče na poboljšanje
154 Robert Serry, NATO’s Balkan Odyssey, NATO Review, 2003. Navedeno prema http://
www.nato.int/docu/ review/2003/issue4/english/art3.html.
155 Philip Borinski, NATO Towards the Double Enlargement: The Case of the Balkans, Revue
d’intégration européene, 24/2002, str. 113-136.
156 Milada Anna Vachudova, Strategies for European Integration and Democratization in the
Balkans, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2004, str. 92-105.
180
njihovih međusobnih odnosa.157 Slično devedesetim, svaka od ovih zemalja
zainteresovana je za vlastiti ulazak u Uniju čak i ukoliko to ne povećava izglede
suseda da postignu to isto. Pojedini istraživači procenjuju čak da „napori pojedinih zemalja da ubrzaju proces svoje integracije u EU dovode do slabljenja
regionalne saradnje“.158
Štaviše, članstvo u Uniji ponekad se koristi i kao sredstvo da se blokadom
prijema suseda reše neki teritorijalni i drugi sporovi sa njima. Prijem jedne
podeljene države, Kipra, u Evropsku uniju pre nego što je rešen spor između
grčke i turske etničke zajednice na ostrvu u EU je protumačen kao snažno
upozorenje da se nešto slično ne sme ponoviti u slučaju Zapadnog Balkana.
EU i SAD su, poučeni ovim iskustvom, energično reagovali u graničnom sporu između Slovenije (članice EU) i Hrvatske (kandidata za prijem) koji je, barem privremeno, skinut s dnevnog reda ali je spor između druge članice, Grčke, i Makedonije oko imena ove bivše jugoslovenske republike i dalje razlog
blokade odnosa između EU i NATO-a, s jedne, i ove države, s druge strane.
Suprotno očekivanjima, ovi podaci govore da regionalna saradnja inicirana
spolja ne mora voditi unapređenju poverenja među zemljama regiona a time
ni izgledima za stvaranje trajne „bezbednosne zajednice“ u regionu.
Ovi problemi su još vidljiviji kada je reč o uticaju NATO-a na Balkanu koje
je, na primer, u Srbiji suočeno sa snažnim otporima zbog uloge ove organizacije
tokom građanskog rata u Jugoslaviji i, naročito, vojnih intervencija protiv Republike Srpske 1995. i Srbije 1999. godine. Za veliki deo srpskog javnog mnjenja,
NATO je i dalje protivnik i organizacija koja je počinila ratne zločine protiv Srba
(bombardovanje RTS, uništenje putničkog voza u Grdeličkoj klisuri, bombardovanje mosta u Vladičinom Hanu, upotreba kasetne municije u Nišu, projektila s
osiromašenim uranijumom i sl.). Iako je negativni stav prema NATO-u poslednjih godina donekle ublažen zbog uloge KFOR-a na Kosovu i Metohiji (naročito
marta 2004. godine), podrška negativnim stavovima prema njegovoj ulozi na
Balkanu dolazi i iz zemalja koje se snažno protive njegovom širenju (Rusija i deo
arapskih zemalja). S druge strane, za neke druge bivše jugoslovenske republike
i Albance na Kosovu i Metohiji članstvo u NATO-u je garancija njihove nezavisnosti i bezbednosti od pretnje koja se i dalje vidi prvenstveno u Srbiji.
157 South East European Barometer je 2007. godine sproveo ispitivanje javnog mnjenja u
zemljama Zapadnog Balkana o odnosu njihovih građana prema izgledima suseda da uđu u EU
koje je pokazalo veliki stepen nezainteresovanosti za ovo pitanje. South-East Europe Barometer,
Public Opinion Compared in 7 Countries.
158 East-West Parliamentary Practice Project (EWPPP), Legislatures and Citizens: strengthening democratic institutions and civil society in the Western Balkans, http://www.ewppp.org/
programmes/western_balkans.php.
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Zaključak
Nastojanje da se napredak zemalja regiona u odnosima sa Evropskom unijom i NATO-om uslovi normalizacijom odnosa među zemljama Zapadnog
Balkana i razvojem regionalne privredne, političke i saradnje u oblasti bezbednosti donelo je određene rezultate. Nesumnjivi napredak je ostvaren u obnovi
privrednih odnosa i slobodnog protoka roba između zemalja Zapadnog Balkana, naročito u okvirima Centralnoevropske zone slobodne trgovine (CEFTA).
Slovenija i Hrvatska danas su među najvećim investitorima u Srbiji i drugim
bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama, ali je njihovo tržište i dalje relativno zatvoreno za investitore sa Zapadnog Balkna. Postignut je i znatan napredak saradnje organa unutrašnjih poslova i pravosudnih organa u borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala kao i u nekim drugim oblastima.
Deset godina posle završetka oružanih sukoba u bivšoj Jugoslaviji odnosi
između ovih zemalja su stabilni iako ne i u potpunosti normalizovani. Najveći
problem stvaranju ove regionalne zajednice ostaje problem Kosova i Metohije
čiji je status i dalje otvoren i koji je ne samo nezaobilazni problem na putu
ulaska Srbije u EU, nego i stabilnosti čitavog Južnog dela Balkana. S druge
strane, Bosna i Hercegovina je i šesnaest godina posle Dejtonskog mirovnog
sporazuma pre mehanički spoj tri naroda koji u njoj žive nego zajednica koja
ima izvesnu perspektivu. Čak i odnosi između dve najveće bivše jugoslovenske
republike, Srbije i Hrvatske, koji su tokom poslednje decenije zabeležili veliki
napredak, ostaju opterećeni nasleđem građanskog rata u bivšoj SFRJ. Potvrdu
za to su pružila zbivanja u Hrvatskoj posle osude hrvatskih generala u Međunarodnom tribunalu za ratne zločine u bivšoj Jugoslaviji koja su dovela do
talasa protesta širom ove zemlje i izvesnog zahlađenja između Zagreba i Beograda. Problem povratka izbeglica i interno raseljenih lica još uvek nije rešen
na područjima koja su devedesetih godina bila zahvaćena ratom.
Vladajuće elite i javno mnjenje ostaju podeljeni u odnosu prema nedavnoj prošlosti i uzrocima i posledicama građanskog rata u bivšoj Jugoslaviji.
Između ostalog, o tome govori činjenica da se interpretacije novije istorije
na Zapadnom Balkanu i dalje suštinski razlikuju i da je, na primer, i danas
malo verovatno pisanje zajedničkih udžbenika istorije. Novija ispitivanja
javnog mnjenja govore da i dalje postoji visok stepen etničke distance između stanovnika bivših jugoslovenskih republika. Nacionalni identiteti ostaju
čvrsto ukorenjeni u negativnim stereotipima o „drugom“, „orijentalnom“ i
„zapadnom kulturnom nasleđu“ a susedi se i dalje doživljavaju kao „istorij-
182
ski protivnici“, a ne kao partneri u stvaranju novog evropskog i regionalnog
identiteta. Zahvaljujući pritisku spolja, društva Zapadnog Balkana su prihvatila ideju modernizacije koja se uglavnom identifikuje s „evropeizacijom“,
tj. ulaskom u evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju, ali i dalje postoji snažan
otpor stvaranju zajedničkog regionalnog identiteta s jugoslovenskim ili balkanskim predznakom.
Ova pojava nije, međutim, nepoznata ni u zemljama Evropske unije. U
Španiji, Katalonci i Baskijci svoj lokalni pa čak i evropski identitet po pravilu
stavljaju ispred pripadnosti Španiji. U Belgiji, Flamanci i Valonci svoj identitet
stavljaju ispred pripadnosti Belgiji. U Velikoj Britaniji, škotski, velški ili irski
identitet ima prednost u odnosu na britanski identitet. Čak i u Francuskoj,
kolevci građanskog nacionalnog identiteta prema kome pripadnici jedne države sebe identifikuju s njom nije retko da, na primer, stanovnici Bretanje svoj
bretonski i evropski identitet stavljaju iznad pripadnosti francuskoj naciji. U
takvoj optici susedi se doživljavaju kao protivnici ili ono što se u anglosaksonskoj antropologiji označava kao „konstitutivni drugi“ (constitutive other) koji
se doživljava kao pretnja koja vodi nacionalnoj homogenizaciji. Iskustvo dva
svetska rata i posleratni razvoj evropskog identiteta u velikoj meri je amortizovao, ali ne i uklonio etničke razlike.
Tri oružana sukoba za manje od jednog veka (1870-1871, 1914-1918. i 19391945) između velikih evropskih naroda, Francuza i Nemaca, tokom poslednjih
pedeset godina su doveli do stvaranja evropskih zajednica i kolektivnog evropskog identiteta i novog viđenja zajedničke istorije u kome se ovi sukobi tumače
kao „evropski građanski ratovi“ dok su iz oba jezika nestali pežorativni opisi
druge nacije.159 Taj proces je, međutim, trajao veoma dugo i bio je pod snažnim
uticajem zajedničkih institucija stvorenih posle Drugog svetskog rata kao što
su, na primer, zajednički institut za pisanje udžbenika istorije (Internazionale
schulbuch Insitut u Braunšvajgu) ili zajedničkih medijskih organizacija (francusko-nemački TV kanal „Arte“). Na Zapadnom Balkanu, slični pokušaji kao
što je bilo stvaranje zajedničkih „komisija za istinu i pomirenje“ nisu dali rezultate iako je u oblasti medija i umetničkog stvaralaštva primetno izvesno približavanje. naročito u trouglu Srbija-Hrvatska-Bosna i Hercegovina i, u znatno
manjoj meri, između Srba i Albanaca.
159 To je, na primer, prisutno u novijoj istoriografiji i zajedničkom francusko-nemačkom
udžbeniku istorije (Histoire/Geschichte, L‘Europe et le monde depuis 1945, Klett & Nathan, Paris Studgart 2007) kao i umetničkim delima koja se finansiraju iz fondova unije ako šti je film
„Sretan Božić“ koji je bio evropski kandidat za nagradu Oskar 2007. godine. Valja, međutim,
napomenuti da danas u Nemačkoj ima sve manje onih koji uče francuski jezik i obratno.
183
Ukratko, EU i NATO su tokom poslednje decenije uložili veliki napor da bi
zaustavili spiralu građanskog rata u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i pokrenuli preces rekoncilijacije, regionalne saradnje i stvaranja novih oblika zajedništva na Zapadnom Balkanu. Oslonjeni na zajedničku želju svih društava iz regiona da uđu
u evropsku i evroatlantsku integraciju i tako „pobegnu sa Balkana“ i izmaknu
logici „balkanizacije“ ovi napori su doneli određene rezulate, pre svega u pogledu razvoja evropskog identiteta balkanskih naroda. Rezultati su, međutim,
uglavnom izostali kada je u pitanju razvoj regionalnog identiteta koji je i dalje
pod snažnim uticajem negativnih stereotipa, nasleđa rata i logike „balkanizacije“. Štaviše, problemi Unije i, naročito, svetska ekonomska kriza koja je snažno pogodila balkanske zemlje poslednjih godina su oslabili uticaj EU i NATO
na Zapadnom Balkanu i doveli do znatnog pada raspoloženja ovih društava za
članstvo u njima.
Ispitivanja javnog mnjenja upozoravaju da je procenat podrške ulasku u EU
u Srbiji najniži u poslednjih deset godina, dok je u Hrvatskoj posle osude Gotovine i Markača pala na svega 42%. Procenat podrške članstvu ovih zemalja
u NATO-u je na mnogo nižem nivou, čak i u zemljama koje su obuhvaćene
MAP-om (Membership Action Plan) kakva je Crna Gora. Uz to, uticaj EU i,
naročito, NATO-a na Zapadnom Balkanu se poslednjih godina suočava i sa
konkurencijom novih regionalnih aktera među kojima se neki snažno suprotstavljaju širenju evroatlantske integracije na Balkanu.
New Serbia, New NATO: Future
Vision for the 21st Century
Collection of texts
transconflict
FORUM ZA ETNIČKE ODNOSE
FORUM FOR ETHNIC RELATIONS
Belgrade, 2011.
185
187
Forward
2010 was a year marked by the redefinition of NATO’s role, mission and
purpose in light of contemporary and emerging security threats and challenges. For the first time in its history, the Alliance made this process open and
inclusive; not only by engaging the governments of NATO member states, but
– almost more importantly – by consulting and engaging a variety of actors
around the globe.
By emphasising the importance of partnerships and substantial global exchanges, NATO has initiated a new phase in international relations, whereby
many of the former animosities and divisions have been erased; whilst new
venues have been opened for relationships based upon consultation and cooperation, beyond the existing partnership frameworks. This provision is especially relevant for Serbia which – as a member of the Partnership for Peace
(PfP) Programme – has still not fully explored nor utilised all the potential of
the PfP, but which could yield a plethora of benefits for, in particular, Serbia’s
newly-professionalised armed forces.
Though the new Strategic Concept did not focus on the Western Balkans,
the continuation of NATO’s ‘open door’ policy was received with great reassurance by all countries in the region currently striving for full membership, such
as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro, respectively.
Whilst collective defence remains the main rationale for NATO’s existence,
the new Strategic Concept places an important emphasis on Article 4 of the
Washington Treaty, which defines the Alliance “as the unique and essential
transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters affecting the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members”; thus shifting the
organisation more towards its political dimension and competencies.
All these – and many other conclusions – were analysed and discussed at
the conference, “New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st Century”,
which took place on 3rd- 4th December 2010. Coming only a few weeks after
NATO’s Summit in Lisbon, the conference provided an important platform for
188
a critical evaluation of NATO’s New Strategic Concept and open discussion
about future security developments – both those facing NATO, as well as from
Serbia’s own perspective.
Six months on from the conference, many things have occurred on the
global scene which have already tested some of the Concept’s provisions and
the Alliance’s responsiveness to new crises and sources of security threats. The
wave of discontent and rebellion that shook the African continent has had a
domino effect, culminating in the civil war in Libya. NATO’s decision to engage in the Libyan conflict was neither easy nor too rushed. Though NATO
stepped in only after calls for assistance on the part of the U.S. President –
taking sole command of international air operations over Libya under United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 – the intervention has
not been fully supported by all allies. Turkey expressed its strong objections
to NATO’s engagement in Libya, whilst Germany decided not to participate
militarily in an operation which, as stated, “has nothing to do with the defence
of Europe”.
Though such a scenario could hardly have been predicted six months ago,
the participants in our December conference rightly estimated such regional
and global political developments, and shed light on the challenges and shortcomings which remain to be addressed. Whilst the Libyan crisis is currently a
big test for the Alliance’s unity – particularly in terms of its future purpose and
role in the global security arena, as well as its political expedience and power
– our hope is that this publication will not only provide its readers with an insight into the particularities of the contemporary global security architecture,
but will also serve as a starting point for further analysis and a broadening of
discussion.
This conference was made possible owing to the support of the Czech
Embassy in Belgrade and the Balkan Trust for Democracy, whilst its overall
success is to be solely attributed to the exceptional list of guest speakers. The
speeches and talks presented at the conference have been gathered here in
this publication, which saw the light of day thanks to the kind support of
the Fund for Open Society, who rightly estimated the importance and timeliness of such a discussion in Serbia, and to whom we express our deepest
gratitude.
189
We hope that this publication will be received with great interest, not only
by civil society, think-tanks, academia and the general public in Serbia, but
also by readers throughout the entire region and further afield.
All errors remain our responsibility, and for those we apologise to the authors.
Mirjana Kosić
Executive Director, TransConflict Serbia
191
Introduction
NATO is an organization that is in a constant process of transformation. Its
key tenets are that the Cold War ended a long time ago, the time of unipolarity
is also long gone, and the world of today is faced with contemporary global
security risks and challenges. The ultimate outcome of this process remains open, as was confirmed by the
Declaration and the new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in
November 2010. It is likely that NATO will be transformed from a collective
military alliance under American leadership, into a global security-political
organization which would develop constructive relationships with its neighbours, particularly Russia, which in the longer-term perspective could also
become a member of this community. The primary military function of the
Alliance would consist of allowing the formation of ad-hoc coalitions. Such an
OSCE-isation of NATO would be compatible with the UN, since NATO would
respect the UN Security Council’s decisions on the preservation and maintenance of peace.
In which direction this transformation will be undertaken depends on how
much stronger the unilateralist tendencies of U.S policy will become, and how
much weaker European influence on the U.S. will continue to be. Finally, it
will depend on the future of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
and Europe’s commitment to more prominently emphasise its own ownership
over it. It’s not to be entirely disregarded, however, that the acronym NATO (No
Activity Talking Only, as it was frequently referred to in the nineties) could in
the future acquire an entirely new meaning - Now Almost Totally Obsolete;
especially if the transformation of the Alliance from a collective military alliance to an open security community materialises fully, with very different
internal relationships and structures. The NATO summit in Lisbon promoted
NATO’s intention to be a more flexible, efficient and cost-effective instrument
in the service of peace. 192
NATO’s engagement in Libya, the withdrawal of the U.S. from military operations and the decision to leave key activities to the European Union should
all be viewed in this light. Time will tell to what extent the U.S.’s intentions are
sincere and to what extent are they test for the EU, as well as to how do they
comply with Item 2 of the Lisbon Declaration, which demands that the NATO
Secretary General work closely with the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in order to secure more efficient action in
crises prevention.
On the other hand, the dynamics of the escalation of events in the Arab
world and the relative ease of the decision on NATO’s military engagement
sheds new light not only on the new security risks and challenges, but also on
relations between the UN, NATO and the EU, as well as relations with Russia,
China, India and other global and regional factors.
Serbia is exposed to all global, regional and specific risks and challenges
that are unpredictable and do not respect any borders, and within that framework it has to think about its own security.
Regardless of Serbia’s proclaimed military neutrality, it makes a lot of sense
for Serbia to consider the most optimal security concept for the future, which
will also include the new content of partnerships, security constellations in
the region and the projections of future trends. Certainly, one must have in
mind that Serbia is a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme; it
signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement, therefore, it is in the process
of obtaining EU candidate status and is striving towards full EU membership,
which also assumes full respect of the European Security and Defence Policy,
and the signing of relevant security agreements with the EU.
In line with that, the aim of the conference was to analyse different aspects, and
to include all relevant facts, in order to at least preliminarily formulate the basic
elements of Serbia’s vision of its security concept in the contemporary world.
We hope that we succeeded in that and that this publication is a testimony
of this.
Milan Karagaća
Retired Colonel and Independent Political Analyst
193
Contribution of H.E. Ambassador Hana Hubáčková to the
conference „New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for
the 21st Century“160
A peaceful and stable environment in the Euro-Atlantic area is not something
that should be taken for granted - it is the result of a number of crucial decisions
made since the end of the Cold War up until the present day. Collective defence
still remains the essence of NATO’s existence, implying not only the need for efficient, flexible and deployable military capabilities, but also NATO’s better preparedness to face new security challenges. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks or the interruption of vital deliveries of energy are not entirely
new; what is new, however, is their strength, frequency and the scope of potential
damage they can cause to our societies. The new Strategic Concept recognises that
a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic territories can originate in very distant places.
Lessons learned in Afghanistan indicate that for peace and stabilisation operations to be successful, military capabilities have to be accompanied by substantial
non-military means to ensure long-term development and stabilisation. Accordingly, NATO will need to build a minimum of its own civil capabilities to be able
to interact with a number of actors; be it states, other international organisations, such as the UN or EU, or NGOs involved in managing complex crises.
160 H.E. Hana Hubáčková is the Ambassador of the Czech Republic in Serbia
194
First, let me say a few words of appreciation to the organisers of this conference – TransConflict Serbia – for having taken the initiative and making this
conference happen. It is yet another valuable contribution by a non-governmental organisation to a growing public interest in the most recent securityand defence-related developments, and in getting to know the policies formulated by the main international actors and organisations, when faced both with
traditional and emerging security risks and challenges.
We are pleased to have supported this initiative not only as the current
NATO contact point Embassy in Serbia, but primarily because it gathers a
broad spectrum of participants and provides an opportunity for debating important issues that are clearly relevant to Serbia, as well as to its partners.
Looking back at the NATO summit in Lisbon two weeks ago161, it is important to note that today’s peaceful and stable environment in the Euro-Atlantic
area is not something that might or even should be taken for granted. It is the
result of a number of crucial decisions made by our states, starting from the
time when the Cold War ended.
My own country could in real terms start participating in those decisions
only after we emerged as an independent and sovereign state, after decades
of communism that plagued the country’s ability to independently engage in
international policy making.
Collective defence continues to be the essence of NATO’s existence. It implies not only the need for efficient, flexible and deployable military capabilities, but also includes the future territorial missile defence.
NATO must also be better prepared to face new security challenges. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks or interruptions to vital deliveries of energy are not entirely new; what is new, however, is their
strength, frequency and the scope of potential damage they can cause to our
societies.
The Strategic Concept recognises that a direct threat to the Euro-Atlantic territories can originate in very distant places. Consequently, NATO is more likely
161 The conference was held on 3-4 December 2010, two weeks after the Lisbon Summit.
195
to be engaged in distant operations and it has to be prepared for them. Lessons
learned in Afghanistan, where the Czech Republic contributes more than 600
troops and provides one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) - in the
province of Loghar - indicate that for peace and stabilisation operations, military capabilities cannot stand alone. They have to be accompanied by substantial
non-military means to ensure long-term development and stabilisation. Even
though NATO will not be the first option to perform development tasks, it will
need to build a minimum of its own civil capabilities to be able to interact with a
number of actors; be it states, other international organisations, such as the UN
or EU, or NGOs typically involved in managing complex crises.
Last but not least, the Strategic Concept adheres an appropriate prominence
to NATO’s partnerships with non-member states. A lot of countries worldwide
share the same interests and work with NATO to maintain international peace
and stability. A number of them are major contributors to NATO-led operations, such as ISAF. The Strategic Concept therefore envisages wider and more
flexible possibilities for partners to get engaged with NATO, and also foresees
their involvement in the organisation’s decision shaping. To develop concrete
mechanisms in this regard is a task to be reviewed and approved by the forthcoming ministerial meetings.
In this context, partnership with Russia plays an irreplaceable role. Russia
and NATO are joined by many shared interests. The NATO-Russia Council
Summit in Lisbon, with the participation of President Medvedev, addressed a
number of opportunities for political consultations and practical cooperation.
It is a shared feeling that the potential of the NATO-Russia Council has not
been fully exploited yet. We hope that the considerable expectations the summit raised will not be disappointed.
In its entirety, the new Strategic Concept represents a huge impetus for further transformations of NATO into a more modern, efficient and capable alliance, operating under much stricter budgetary regulations than ever before.
A lot of work is ahead of the allies now to translate these strategic guidelines into concrete steps, and many areas will be developed in cooperation with
partner countries. Ambassador Rossin gave yesterday an overview of what is
ahead of us in the period to come and what the time-lines are.
196
Serbia will be an important partner for us in pursuing the taskings we were
given by our heads of states in Lisbon. Its newly established mission in NATO
HQ is gradually taking shape, with some people already working there. With
its full functioning, Serbia will acquire the capacity to participate together with
44 partners in all Partnership for Peace (PfP) deliberations relevant to her,
and to start exploiting the opportunities the PfP framework offers. Practical
cooperation has already taken some roots, but there is fundamentally more on
offer. Based on the decision in Lisbon, Partnership will be further developed
as a matter of priority into a more flexible and focused arrangement, bringing
additional benefits to both partners as well as NATO. It is up to Serbia to decide the depth, intensity and substance of its partnership relations with NATO.
And, it is only Serbia that can limit itself, as it is the case for all other partners.
To conclude, let me underscore my belief that good decisions are based on
good knowledge.
That leads me back to the organisers of this conference who are doing what
is needed – providing opportunities to understand the dynamism and development in one, yet very important area. I would like to thank them once again.
197
Contribution of H.E. Ambassador Lawrence Rossin to the
conference
“New Serbia, new NATO – Future Vision for the 21st
Century”162
NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which has replaced the Concept adopted
in Washington in 1999, is a very forward-looking charter for NATO’s work. In
Europe today, regional armed conflict is very unlikely; however, we are now
faced with transnational threats, such as international terrorism, cyber-attacks
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which respect
no borders and the consequences of which can be global in scope. The new
Strategic Concept positions NATO to address these, drawing on both our civil
and our military strengths. The new Strategic Concept gives NATO three main
priorities for work over the next years – first, to make itself more effective by
investing in modern capabilities to meet modern needs; second, to ensure that
it engages more actively and deeply with the wider world and, third, it tasks
NATO to streamline our structures to make them better able to respond to
threats quickly, effectively and economically.
In my presentation today, I am going to touch mainly on three matters:
•
•
•
first, highlights from NATO’s Lisbon Summit two weeks ago;
then, the development and – should Serbia want it – the possible way
forward in Serbia’s relationship with NATO;
and finally, NATO’s engagement in Kosovo through KFOR.
162 Ambassador Rossin is NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations
198
The Lisbon Summit and the New Strategic Concept
First, the Lisbon Summit, NATO’s new Strategic Concept and NATO’s stress
on building a range of global partnerships.
It is not an exaggeration to say, as did our Secretary General Rasmussen at
its end, that the Lisbon Summit was historic for NATO. A number of key decisions were taken in a series of meetings that included, firstly, Allies themselves;
then, Allies and partners engaged in Afghanistan including President Karzai,
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and European Union leaders; and finally,
NATO’s leaders along with Russian President Medvedev in the NATO-Russia
Council.
Framing their entire deliberation, NATO’s heads of state and government
first adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. This document replaces
the Concept adopted in Washington in 1999. As the concrete further decisions
taken by NATO’s leaders at the Summit underscore, it is a very forward-looking charter for NATO’s work. In Europe today, even regional armed conflict
is very unlikely. Rather, we all face mainly transnational threats. International
terrorism, cyber-attacks and WMD proliferation are challenges which respect
no borders and the consequences of which can be global in scope. The new
Strategic Concept positions NATO to address these, drawing on both our civil
and our military strengths.
The new Strategic Concept gives NATO three main priorities for our work
over the next years:
•
•
First - To make ourselves more effective by investing in modern capabilities to meet modern needs. While NATO is maintaining a focus on
the traditional essential military assets, we are also re-orienting ourselves towards combating challenges like terrorism, cyber-attacks and
other future security challenges. This also means greater engagement
on a comprehensive approach complementing military instruments
with civilian efforts, which brings me to the second priority, which is -To ensure we engage more actively and deeply with the wider world.
The challenges NATO faces do not threaten only NATO’s interests. Al-
•
199
ready, the Alliance has forged important partnerships with non-NATO
countries and international organizations. NATO’s operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan are supported by a wide range of non-NATO
countries. We work in close coordination with multinational counterpiracy efforts off the Horn of Africa. And we pursue our structured
partnership mechanisms – the Partnership for Peace and Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, in which Serbia participates, as well as structures with Mediterranean and Persian Gulf states. The new Strategic
Concept gives more weight to NATO’s partnerships. This also means
greater engagement with Russia. President Medvedev and his NATO
counterparts had constructive discussions in Lisbon on Afghanistan
and shared security threats, as well cooperation in addressing them.
This new partnership emphasis can have positive implications for our
relationships with partners like Serbia.
Third, the Strategic Concept tasks us to streamline our structures to
make them better able to respond to threats quickly, effectively and economically.
The new Strategic Concept is designed to frame NATO’s activities for years.
Already at Lisbon, our leaders made several decisions to launch efforts within
that framework:
1. To expand, as a core element of NATO’s collective defence task, our
current Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence system. It is
currently designed to protect NATO-deployed forces; now it will be enhanced to protect NATO’s European populations and territory as well.
2. To develop by March political guidance for continuing transformation
of NATO’s defence capabilities and forces, and military implementation
of the new Strategic Concept.
3. To develop by June a substantial cyber-defence policy for NATO, and
an Action Plan for its implementation.
4. To strengthen NATO’s Comprehensive Approach Action Plan by April, so
that NATO can work more closely with partners who can deliver civilian
effect in complex conflict situations, as well as to create NATO’s own civil-
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ian stabilization and reconstruction capability. That is primarily the fruit
of experience in Afghanistan, where military victory alone is impossible.
5.
And on Afghanistan, our leaders and those of our ISAF partners decided, along with President Karzai, to commence transition from ISAF
to Afghan lead responsibility, in early 2011, with an agreed target for
transition to be underway country-wide by the end of 2014; as well as
to enter into an Enduring Partnership even beyond the end of ISAF
combat operations.
Finally, on Partnerships, perhaps the element of the Lisbon decisions most
immediately relevant to Serbia and to this conference. NATO’s partnerships
enhance Euro-Atlantic and wider international security and stability and reinforce shared values. They provide frameworks for political, security and defence dialogue and regional cooperation and are essential to the success of
NATO’s operations. Through them, we can share expertise, support broader
reform, assist our partners in developing their own capabilities, and prepare
interested nations for membership in NATO. They are of mutual value in addressing together the transnational challenges already mentioned.
Therefore at Lisbon it was agreed to strengthen the work of the Partnership
for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), of both
of which Serbia is an active member, as the essential framework for substantive political dialogue and practical cooperation. PfP, EAPC and NATO’s other
Partnership formats have evolved a lot but it was agreed that they, like NATO
itself, would benefit from a focused reform effort. Several specific areas for such
reform were identified and will be discussed internally and with NATO’s partners in the lead-up to the April meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin.
Western Balkans and NATO; NATO-Serbia Partnership
Now, in that context of strengthening NATO’s Partnerships, I will turn to
the Western Balkans region, and Serbia, specifically.
Stability and security in the Western Balkans are crucial to Euro-Atlantic
security. Most nations in the region have already joined NATO, or have expressed a desire to do so:
•
•
•
•
•
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Albania, Croatia and Slovenia are NATO members;
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be a member as soon
as the so-called “name issue” is resolved;
Montenegro is in the Membership Action Plan framework and actively
implementing it;
Bosnia and Herzegovina also is in the MAP framework and its implementation will begin as soon as all immovable defence properties identified as necessary for future defence purposes have been officially registered as the state property of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for use by the
country’s Ministry of Defence;
And Serbia is a member of the Partnership for Peace.
NATO wants to have fruitful relations with every nation in this region. The
door to membership remains open to all who adhere to the shared values and
specific requirements of NATO membership, but it is up to each country in the
first instance to determine what its relations with NATO will be.
In the specific case of Serbia, NATO seeks to deepen our bilateral relationship. Serbia and NATO have increased cooperation on issues like defence reform and civil emergency planning in recent years, and we believe there is
more we can do in our bilateral relationship that will benefit both of us.
Practically, NATO’s cooperation with Serbia in the Partnership for Peace has
mostly focused on the enhancement of military interoperability of the Serbian
Armed Forces with NATO member states, to be able to participate in international
peace support operations. That cooperation can enable Serbia to contribute to
NATO-led operations. It equally enhances Serbia’s capacity to contribute to international peacekeeping led by the United Nations or European Union. Of course,
NATO welcomes Serbian peacekeeping engagement in any framework.
The first set of 19 Partnership Goals and planning targets were agreed between Serbia and NATO in April 2009. In May this year that set of Goals was
significantly expanded. NATO and Serbia established the NATO-Serbia Defence Reform Group to support defence reform and assist in implementation
of Partnership Goals. This Defence Reform Group has six sectoral working
groups. Plenary meetings are co-chaired by Serbia and NATO and take place
every four months - the last Plenary was held a month ago here in Belgrade.
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We at NATO are pleased that Serbia established a diplomatic mission to
NATO this year, headed by my friend Ambassador Branko Milinković. We
were glad when a Serbian Armed Forces representation was added to the diplomatic mission in September.
All these things are good, and we could suggest more. But NATO’s leaders
have said it often: it is up to Serbia to set the pace of developing this relationship.
• If Serbia decides its future lies in ever-deepening Partnership with
NATO, it will find a ready partner in our 28 nations.
• If it does not want to deepen the Partnership, that will be OK with
NATO too, although we would be disappointed at lost mutual opportunities.
• If Serbia decides it might want NATO membership like its neighbours,
it will find the Membership Action Plan door open.
• If Serbia decides it prefers not to enter NATO, that is fine too – nobody
is ever required to become a NATO member, and good relations do
not depend on that. NATO and its nations have very close and fruitful
interaction with all the countries in Europe that have not joined NATO
for whatever reasons, in the PfP and not least in operations. The same
should be the case with a Serbia outside NATO, if that is the course you
choose.
What is important for NATO will be to maintain at all times with Serbia,
regardless of the framework, a strong political dialogue and good practical cooperation to address common security challenges, based on mutual respect.
KFOR’s Mission and Evolution
As to KFOR, military contacts between NATO and the Serbian Armed
Forces continue impeccably in the context of the Joint Implementation Commission. Let me turn now to NATO’s operation in Kosovo.
As you know, Resolution 1244 in June 1999 established the parameters for
the end to the conflict in Kosovo and for international engagement there. The
Security Council directed the deployment in Kosovo of an international security presence. The North Atlantic Council decided that KFOR would assume
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the role of that international security presence. KFOR has acted in that role
since 1999. Resolution 1244 set out tasks for the international security presence in its paragraph 9. Of those, many have been completed or overtaken by
events. The main tasks that remain for KFOR are to maintain a safe and secure
environment, conduct border monitoring duties as required, and ensure the
protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence,
and other international organizations.
For eleven and a half years, KFOR has fulfilled all its tasks, with few missteps. It has been adequately resourced by NATO and non-NATO contributing
nations throughout. It has frequently adapted and downsized in response to
generally improving security conditions in Kosovo itself, as well as the evolution of other elements of the situation in Kosovo that provide the context for
KFOR’s activities. Reflecting on KFOR’s good performance, it has consistently
received high marks from all population groups in Kosovo itself and from regional actors including Serbia.
KFOR’s mission as determined by the North Atlantic Council within the
parameters of Resolution 1244 has been unchanged by dramatic political developments over the years, in particular since late 2006. NATO supported the
efforts of the UN Special Envoy, President Ahtisaari, and subsequently those
of the European Union-Russian-US troika of negotiators that sought to finish President Ahtisaari’s work. KFOR helped maintain safety and stability on
the ground, ensuring that the negotiations could proceed without disruption.
This KFOR role, performed impartially, continued uninterrupted when the
troika reported to the UN Secretary General its inability to broker an agreement on Kosovo’s status, followed by the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. KFOR continues to this day to perform that impartial role, and it will
continue to do so.
It is important to understand that NATO has member states that recognize
Kosovo’s independence and others that do not, but that NATO as an Organization takes no view at all on Kosovo’s juridical status. As an inter-governmental
organization, NATO does not recognize states, nor not recognize them; that is
a prerogative of nations. As our previous Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer
said, “NATO is not in the recognition business.” That means NATO and KFOR
are not “status-neutral” – just impartial in the way KFOR performs its tasks.
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At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO agreed that NATO and KFOR
would, within KFOR’s operational tasks, continue to work with all actors in Kosovo
to support stability, democracy and multi-ethnicity. Additionally, it was announced
that NATO stood ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements. In June 2008, NATO agreed to assist in the dissolution with dignity of
the Kosovo Protection Corps and the standing-up of the Kosovo Security Force and
the civilian structure to oversee the KSF. The first task was completed. The second
and third tasks are now implemented by NATO and KFOR in close coordination
and consultation with the relevant local and international institutions.
These NATO policies remain in force, and contribute to maintaining a safe
and secure environment in Kosovo for all people.
KFOR Deterrent Presence and Unfixing
More recently, in June 2009 NATO’s nations decided to adjust KFOR’s force
posture gradually, to what is called a “deterrent presence”. What that means
is that, when appropriate, according to the evolution of events and in a phased
manner with periodic North Atlantic Council revalidations, NATO is reducing the number of KFOR forces over time to a smaller, more flexible force –
one that remains fully able to perform all KFOR tasks.
The first stage in KFOR’s adaptation, the so-called “Gate 1”, was attained in
January 2010. KFOR reduced to just over 10,000 troops.
After gauging the situation in Kosovo for several months, the North Atlantic Council in October approved SACEUR’s163 recommendation to move
to the so-called “Gate 2” of the move to Deterrent Posture. This move, to be
accomplished over approximately 4 months, will significantly consolidate the
deployment of KFOR geographically, to focus on areas where security problems sometimes flare up or where risks are evident.
This move reflects NATO’s positive assessment of the security situation in
Kosovo over a sustained period of time, as well as of the demonstrated growing
capability of the Kosovo Police, backed by EULEX and with KFOR as the third
security provider, to deal with challenges to public safety and order.
163 Supreme Allied Commander for Europe
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SACEUR, our Secretary General and NATO’s nations all approach this
downsizing of KFOR with an abundance of caution. The Alliance’s commitment to Kosovo and to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment remains firm.
Conclusion
Let me now conclude.
I have sought in these remarks to give you a succinct overview of the historic decisions taken by NATO’s heads of state and government at the Lisbon
Summit. These both speak to one theme of this conference and also can frame
consideration of the implications for the development of the NATO-Serbia relationship within the Partnerships framework we will be working to enhance
post-Lisbon.
I have dwelt a bit on KFOR’s tasks and its evolution both to convey the
latest developments and to underscore a point I think is sometimes not clear
here. That is that NATO’s role in Kosovo serves stability and security for all
people in Kosovo, and therefore for the entire region, impartially and without
reference to juridical or political considerations outside NATO’s remit. Therefore, NATO’s operation in Kosovo should be no impediment to developing
our partnership. To the extent it is cited by some as a roadblock, there may be
misunderstanding of what KFOR and NATO do, and do not do, in Kosovo, or
why.
The new Strategic Concept places partnerships at the centre of NATO’s program for the coming years. The Alliance will be working this year to shape the
way forward with Partners, and working with them as we do that. Lisbon has
given us the flexibility to build on what is already being done to create a partnership which will best suit Serbia’s needs as well as our own. As I have said,
we see significant potential for deepening NATO’s relationship with Serbia,
provided that is what Serbia, its government and its people desire. From the
perspective both of our Secretary-General Rasmussen and of the NATO nations, Serbia has great potential to be a contributor to stability and security,
not just in this region but in the entire Euro-Atlantic area, and there is great
interest in their part in building our partnership.
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NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the System
of Global Security
Julian Harston164
The world we inhabit today is a complex and dangerous multifaceted threat
environment. Instead of inter-state challenges, we now have non-state and asymmetric threats. NATO’s first two Strategic Concepts of the post-Cold War era
attempted to handle a new threat environment that lacked any real threats,
whilst simultaneously pushing for enlargement. The 1999 document, written
during NATO’s air campaign in the Balkans, set the precedent for the expansion
of NATO operations beyond mere self-defence, to account for humanitarian interventions and conflict prevention. That was certainly a change from the 1991
mission statement that, “the Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its
weapons will ever be used except in self-defence.” What is indisputable is that
NATO is here to stay. However, given the inherently divergent core interests of
its member states, the question is what underlying threat will unify NATO in the
decade ahead to galvanize the Alliance into making the investments and reforms
that the Strategic Concept stipulates.
164 Assistant Secretary General (rtd) United Nations
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First of all I should put some cards on the table. As a diplomat working for
the United Kingdom for twenty five years, I was a paid NATO supporter, which I
did with some enthusiasm because of the essential elements of mutual assistance
involved. I was however, always a Gaullist165. I never believed that the United
States would place New York or Washington in jeopardy for London or Paris……and whatever scenario I could imagine would only give the U.S. at most a
couple of days to make up their minds, rather than the usual two to four years.
I have more recently served as an Assistant Secretary General in the United
Nations, and watched the agonizing of founder members of that organization,
also leading members of NATO, choosing when to secure the added legitimacy
for their operations that the Security Council can provide, and when to ignore it.
I have served much of the last 15 years in the Balkans, and much of that in
Belgrade. I have watched Serbia move from dictatorship to democracy, and
watched as it became the target for NATO bombs in the process. This was action that marked the beginning of a policy of expansion that has taken NATO
where it is today - in Afghanistan. And moved NATO away from self-defence
to offence, albeit for the greater good…………….or so the story goes.
In this paper, I would first like to look at the present threats to global security, take a look at the new NATO strategic concept as delivered at Lisbon in
November 2010, and then make some judgements about whether that concept
is appropriate to the threat, and a few words at the end on how Serbia should
be planning for its place in the security architecture of the future.
Let us look at the threats to global security.
Are we racing toward global disorder?
What place will there be for military alliances and their political power in
the future?
We are living in a complex and dangerous multifaceted threat environment.
There is what security analysts call a ‘full threat spectrum’. Instead of the interstate challenges to which we have become used, we now have non-state threats,
as well as rogue state challenges. We are faced with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, and the other longer term
165 Gaullism is a French political ideology based on the thought and action of Resistance
leader then president Charles de Gaulle. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaullism
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global challenges with which we are now becoming so familiar: global warming, pandemics and the disappearance of fossil fuels. Add to that the very real
threat of cyber-warfare against governments and armed forces which are more
and more vulnerable, and you have one of those multi-coloured cocktails, with
a little umbrella, where the pretty colours stay identifiable, but the drink is a
killer nonetheless.
International terrorism and a radicalised Islam, whatever the causes, is a
Big War, with home grown terrorists inspired by a broad global ideological
base. So far counter terrorism and intelligence activities have prevented another 9/11, but for how long? We have to be successful every time. They have
to be successful once.
The long term future of Afghanistan is, at best, uncertain. The Taliban is
regrouping, but the lack of unity of purpose in those groups is perhaps a hopeful sign. All the while, the attempts to stem the drugs trade (a main raison
d’être for the NATO presence in Afghanistan) is failing. NATO - when openly
discussing its exit strategy - seems weak and divided. The strategic failure in
Iraq is becoming more apparent, despite the good news of the last month that
a government of sorts is now being put in place.
Regional adversaries Iran, Syria, Al Quaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas are all emboldened by what they characterize as U.S. failure in Iraq and Israeli failure in
Lebanon. The U.S. and Israel no longer appear invulnerable, and the Iranian
nuclear and missile shield which is for certain being developed, is likely to
shape the security environment significantly over the next ten years. Iranian
hegemony will be aided by Iranian inspired, equipped, trained and funded Shia
militias in the region. Make no mistake, Tehran believes that nuclear power is a
key element for Iranian power and prestige.
The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is next on the agenda. It
is accelerating and broadening. The twin challenges of Iran and North Korea
have been much in the news recently thanks to WikiLeaks, but there is now
the possibility of wildfire proliferation. Let us not forget that Saudi Arabia and
Egypt both announced nuclear programmes in 2006, and that even Japan has
considered a break-out from the 1968 NPT166 in response to perceived threats
166 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
210
from North Korea. Given the loopholes available in NPT, how many nuclear
states will there be in 2025? And to continue the liturgy of bad news, there is
already a nexus of WMD equipped states and aspirant terrorist organizations.
Biological and radiological weapons are a major short term concern. Ex-Soviet
loose nukes are still out there available for sale or theft. We know of sub-state
‘railroads’ for spreading technology and know-how. Think of Pakistan’s A.Q.
Khan.
Is the uni-polar world order at an end?
Russia is enjoying a resurgence of wealth and problems along with a dangerous self-perception of power and influence, and renewed imperial pretensions.
But there is long-term resilience there which will enable energy resources to
be used as a coercive weapon against neighbours and competitors as we watch
the motherland slip back into authoritarianism. And what of China, already an
economic super power, and Japan - as it seeks ‘normal defence power’ status in
response to an increasingly challenging local security environment.
And before we leave my perception of the short to medium term threat
environment, let us just add climate change, leading to resource depletion and
demographic pressures in developing states.
Globalisation is eroding statehood, in ways which are both good and very
very dangerous. Not least because it is easily sold to the deprived as renewed
Western imperialism and used to breed forces which mobilize popular anger.
What a relief then to realize that in its new Strategic Concept NATO has
identified all these threats and would seem to offer at least a partial solution to
most of them.
The document, which starts with a Mission statement of such length that
even the least sceptical readers must wonder where they are being led, is a
brave attempt at facing the identified threats whilst papering over the cracks
in the Alliance brought about by very different perceptions of those threats
among its members, whilst all the while ignoring the resource crisis that the
Alliance is going through and will suffer for the foreseeable future.
NATO’s first two Strategic Concepts of the post-Cold War era, written in
1991 and 1999, attempted to handle a new threat environment that lacked
any true threats, while pushing for enlargement. The 1999 document, writ-
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ten during NATO’s air war in the Balkans, set the precedent for the expansion
of NATO operations beyond mere self-defence, to account for humanitarian
interventions and conflict prevention. What a change from the 1991 mission
statement that, “The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence.”
The last 10 years have seen NATO launch its largest military engagement
in Afghanistan, engage in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa
and train security forces in Iraq. The challenge for NATO was to formulate a
Strategic Concept that satisfies all 28 members while navigating the engagement in Afghanistan and addressing fears among some members about Russian encroachment. It is unclear that this challenge has been, or in fact ever
can be, met.
Rather than an exhaustive and exhausting look at the nearly 4,000-word
Strategic Concept, I would only note that the concept covers everything from
energy security to network security to climate change. The Central European
requirement for reassurances that self-defence is still central is fulfilled, because it is mentioned first in every section. But it will take more than starting
each paragraph by hinting at NATO’s self-defence to assure the Central Europeans that the Alliance is sincere about the issue.
And it is this context that I would like to concentrate on Russia as the catalyst for NATO’s success or failure, or even of its continued existence. It is perhaps the most striking of ironies that Russia still holds the most vital key to
NATO’s existence, or perhaps even its descent into being a far less essential
element in Europe’s defence architecture.
As NATO member states plan for the next decade, Russia is working aggressively to restore its former power at home and in the region after its postSoviet slumber. Russia today is starting to look a bit like the Soviet Union that
was NATO’s raison d’etre during the Cold War. While NATO took its eye off
Russia as its main adversary, Russia was allowed time to regroup after the fall
of the Soviet Union and chaos of the 1990s, while NATO’s aggressive, and some would say - obsessive moves toward enlargement gave Moscow the
impetus, and I believe the legitimization for resurgence.
While NATO focused more on the Islamic world, Russia militarily intervened in Georgia167 (resulting in a de-facto occupation of a quarter of the country), moved military bases into southern Central Asia and Armenia, united
167 See: http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/real_world_order
212
Belarus and Kazakhstan168 into an economic union and facilitated the election
of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan169.
Stratfor, the U.S. based think-tank, and Madeleine Albright, break NATO
into three groups on this and other issues (with Russia as the main point of
contention): the United States and its “Atlanticist” allies (such as the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom), core Europe (led by Germany and
France), and the Central Europeans. Washington and its strongest NATO allies
are wary of Russia and suspicious of its intentions, but they also want the Alliance’s emphasis to include issues like post-conflict operations and terrorism,
not just defence against Russia. Core Europe wants to maintain its good relations with Russia and not provoke it with an alliance that is concentrating on
rolling back Moscow’s control of its sphere of influence. Central Europe wants
to be reassured, but Berlin and Paris do not want to give Central Europe anything but token reassurances due to their relationship with Moscow. Beyond
Russia, the United States wants NATO to concentrate on the terrorist threat,
increase its military spending170 and help in post-conflict missions. The Core
Europeans are particularly wary of any further engagements and want NATO
to both reaffirm the UN Security Council primacy in international affairs —
so as to limit U.S. unilateralism taking the Alliance on various “adventures”
— and to look more to conflict prevention, rather than post-conflict nationbuilding. The Central Europeans are also sceptical of further U.S. distractions.
Washington and Moscow seemed to step back from their aggressive stances
when President Barack Obama took office. Shifting tactics, both countries
brokered an understanding that each had larger issues to focus on at the time,
so the growing hostilities would be put on hold — at least temporarily. Such
an understanding is naturally shaky, but both Washington and Moscow knew
this going in.
The understanding between Moscow and Washington does not seem to have
included a slowdown of Russia’s resurgence. When the United States pulled back
from aggressively countering Russia, the countries Washington was protecting —
the Central Europeans and Georgia —felt abandoned and defenceless. These states
also were unable to turn to the traditional powers in Europe: Germany and France
168 See:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/151436/analysis/20091230_russia_belarus_
kazakhstan_customs_deal_and_way_forward_moscow
169 See:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/160817/analysis/20100426_russia_unrest_
foreign_policy_tool
170
See:http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/173818/analysis/20101015_us_and_europe_face_military_spending
213
had already decided it was better to balance their relations with Russia than stand
up against it — especially to protect the Central Europeans.
But there are signs that the rapprochement is paper thin. The smiling faces
at the end of the Lisbon summit and understandings apparently reached there
on missile defence are already coming under strain. The details of Russian participation will have to wait until June 2011 to be hashed out, but it seems that
whatever Moscow’s participation is, it will not be given joint control over the
BMD171. Did anyone really believe that Russia would tie itself into a serious
partnership without a power of veto?
But going into the NATO summit, many Western Europeans were counting on the U.S.-Russian détente to still be in effect, allowing them to be more
comfortable in negotiations with both NATO members and with Russia. However, the Central European states are relieved that the cracks in the détente are
starting to show, as it will allow them to be more aggressive toward Russia. So
in essence, the disintegration of U.S. - Russian relations will divide the alreadyfracturing NATO even further.
What is most troubling for the Central Europeans is that the Russian Envoy
to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, called the Strategic Concept “balanced.” A happy
Rogozin means a happy Kremlin, and that means the Central Europeans did
not receive guarantees from the United States and Core Europe that in any way
concern Russia.
NATO will not disappear. It is here to stay, if for no other reason than inertia. It will still have a useful role to play in anti-piracy missions, post-conflict
clean-ups and as a seal of approval for the few Western Balkan states which
have yet to join the West. But the Europeans are already developing alternatives. The Central Europeans are looking at bilateral agreements with the
United States.
Central Europeans are having difficulty finding another Western European
power, outside of Sweden, with an ear for their security concerns. They feel
they need to counter Russia on their own, with limited backup. There is always
Germany, which Central Europeans should theoretically be able to turn to for
support. At least on paper, Berlin is an EU and NATO ally. However, specific
to the Central European fears — and a reality that is rarely spoken publicly in
Central Europe — is the fact that Germany is becoming unhinged from the
Cold War-era institutions. Russia may be the obvious security threat, but it is
171 Ballistic Missile Defence
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Germany’s evolving role — and, crucially, its warming relations with Moscow
— that troubles Warsaw and other Central European capitals, most precisely
because it is unclear which way Berlin is heading.
Other European countries will form agreements among themselves.
The Scandinavian countries, which are divided between NATO and
non-NATO states, are already making military agreements with the Baltic States, which Sweden and Finland see as their own sphere of influence. The French are developing amphibious capabilities with the United
Kingdom and Mediterranean countries on their own and have signed
a defensive agreement with the United Kingdom to balance their political and economic relationship with Germany. This independent movement among NATO and non-NATO states is just more evidence that the
Alliance’s continued existence alone may not save it from irrelevancy.
Given the inherently divergent core interests of its member states, the question
is what underlying threat will unify NATO in the decade ahead to galvanize
the Alliance into making the sort of investments and reforms that the Strategic
Concept stipulates.
NATO will ensure it will remain relevant if it focuses on Europe’s strengths
instead of being undermined by its lack of a credible strategy. European allies
should focus on how to develop the military capabilities needed to support
their security strategies within projected resource constraints. Considering
their limited capacity for expeditionary operations (not more than 2 - 3% of
NATO forces can be deployed and sustained outside Europe), European allies should instead enhance their capabilities in low-intensity operations such
as reconstruction, cyber-security, organized crime and policing of movement
within their borders. Hence, by using the finite resources available on role specialization, Europe would be better positioned to guarantee its security and become a more capable partner. Likewise, the United States would avoid military
and strategic over-extension, thereby permitting it to consider new strategic
relationships, with India and others, that will better address the 21st century
security environment which I described earlier.
………………and now, with apologies for taking up even more of your
time, a very quick look at where all this leaves Serbia.
215
NATO is in flux, the new Strategic concept papers over the cracks, but does
little to give a really clear picture of where NATO will be in five years.
So, does anyone sensible climb onto a bus, not knowing where it is going?
Normally..........no.
But in this case, I think the answer is yes.
I know that Serbia has never been a member of a military alliance, I know
the emotional arguments based on the brutality of the NATO bombing, I know
that Vuk Jeremić appears to offer a three-pillar alternative, albeit a somewhat
fanciful one, but on balance I believe that Serbia has the luxury of time. Stick
with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, get the most out of it, reassure
the U.S. in particular which continues to cast Serbia in the guise of a potential
rogue state, reassure European friends of Serbia, and wait to see how NATO
develops and whether there is perhaps a new security architecture, which will
include NATO, where Serbia will feel more comfortable in the medium term.
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NATO’s New Strategic Concept: Context and
Significance
Dr Matthew Rhodes172
Having adopted the new Strategic Concept at the Lisbon summit, the Alliance’s credibility as a cornerstone of international security, as well as the viability
of Euro-Atlantic partnership and integration, has been reinforced. However, its
adoption was no foregone conclusion. Allies could have delayed drafting efforts
or simply released a declaration of the previous version’s continuing relevance.
Instead, they not only stuck to the ambitious timetable set at the Strasbourg/
Kehl summit in spring 2009, but did so through a broadly-inclusive process that
incorporated input from elder statesmen and non-government experts. At a time
of rising doubt, its adoption reaffirmed the high value members ascribe to the
Alliance as well as their ability and will to achieve consensus on a twenty-first
century security agenda. As a necessary - if insufficient starting point - NATO’s
Strategic Concept has already provided a timely boost to the vigour and prestige
of the Euro-Atlantic community.
172 Author is the director of the Program in Advanced Security Studies and professor of
national security studies at the Marshall Center.
218
The most important fact about NATO’s new Strategic Concept is that agreement was reached at all. Failure to produce a serious document or fear to even
try would have reinforced the Euro-Atlantic community’s recent crisis of confidence. Success at the Lisbon summit reinforces the Alliance’s credibility as a
cornerstone of international security as well as the viability of Euro-Atlantic
partnership and integration as points of orientation for non-member states in
South-east Europe and beyond.
With slightly different emphasis on opposite sides of the ocean, the EuroAtlantic community emerged from the Cold War largely convinced of two significant points. The first was that the community possessed sufficient resources,
technical expertise, and professional competence to solve virtually any security
challenge likely to emerge. The second was that liberal democratic capitalism as
practiced across the community had proven itself history’s most successful form
of social organization. It probably possessed universal validity. As a result, steadily
improving opportunities and conditions could be expected within the community even as it enlarged, and more and more countries adopted its principles.
To be sure, actual developments repeatedly called this sense of assurance
into question. The initially fumbling, messy multilateralism of the community’s response to violence in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere presented
an early example. Terrorist attacks in cities such as New York, Madrid, London, and Istanbul, as well as natural disasters such Hurricane Katrina, later
exposed previously underestimated domestic vulnerabilities. Heated disputes
over intervention in Iraq (termed by the U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Burns a
“near-death experience” for NATO) as well as protracted, bloody insurgencies in both that country and Afghanistan further highlighted limits to EuroAtlantic effectiveness.
However, more than anything else the global financial crisis replaced triumphant optimism with doubt. Even as the community registered qualified progress in most of the other areas, it suddenly founded itself confronted with the
world’s deepest economic downturn since the 1930s. Triggered by the bursting
of the U.S. real estate bubble in spring 2007, the crisis produced severe losses
and near-paralysis in financial markets by fall 2008, dramatic surges in unemployment and budget deficits through 2009, and potentially fatal stress on the
Eurozone currency union by 2010.
219
Cumulatively, those effects have diminished attention and resources for international engagement and accelerated the perceived shift of global power to Asia
and other emerging economies. They have undermined Euro-Atlantic states’ reputation for competence and claims for liberal democracy’s superiority as a system.
Equally inauspicious for agreement on a new Strategic Concept, through
this period Euro-Atlantic cooperation remained in a disappointing, even deteriorating state. New U.S. President Barack Obama’s considerable personal
popularity in Europe failed to translate into greater commitment to common
action on high-profile issues. Despite U.S. Secretary of Defence Bob Gates’s
warnings of a “two-tier alliance,” European allies met Obama’s tripling of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan with a mix of comparatively modest, partly temporary
increases and announcements of withdrawal. For Obama’s part, shortly after
skipping twentieth-anniversary commemorations of the fall of the Berlin Wall
and declaring himself America’s “first Pacific President,” he left out European
counterparts from final talks with leaders of other major nations at the United
Nations’ climate change summit in Copenhagen. Regarding the financial crisis
itself, the community remained divided over the relative priority of coordinated stimulus or debt reduction. Then-Czech Prime Minister Miroslav Topolanek, whose country held the EU’s rotating presidency in spring 2009, famously
called the Obama administration’s preferred path of stimulus ”the road to hell.”
In less colourful terms, German leaders shared this sentiment as well.
Against that backdrop, NATO’s adoption of a meaningful new Strategic
Concept was no foregone conclusion. Allies could have further delayed
drafting efforts or simply released a declaration of the previous version’s
continuing relevance. Instead, they not only stuck to the ambitious timetable for a Concept set at the Strasbourg/Kehl summit in spring 2009 but did
so via a broadly-inclusive process that incorporated input from elder statesmen and non-government experts. The final product adopted at Lisbon in
late 2010 overcame sometimes bitter substantive differences on a range of
key issues. It agreed a way ahead in Afghanistan, reinforced preparedness
for both territorial defence and expeditionary missions, affirmed alliancewide roles for nuclear deterrence and missile defence, identified cyber and
energy security as potential Article 5 issues, outlined principles for relations with the European Union and Russia, and reaffirmed openness to
future enlargement.
220
Not surprisingly, much of the Concept’s language in these areas did
not present radical departures from previous Alliance statements. Nonetheless, by bridging some significant areas of disagreement and offering current,
authoritative strategic guidance it performed an important function. At a time
of rising doubt, its adoption reaffirmed the high value members ascribe to the
Alliance as well as their ability and will to achieve consensus on a twenty-first
century security agenda.
Challenges of implementation certainly remain, not least in marshalling
resources for envisioned capabilities. Parallel issues apply to the European
Union’s own “Lisbon Agenda,” after that organization’s reform treaty coincidentally signed in the same city. Nonetheless, as a necessary if insufficient
starting point, NATO’s Concept has already provided a timely boost to the
vigour and prestige of the Euro-Atlantic community.
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Serbia’s Strategic Dilemma – Between NATO and
Russia
Dr Aleksandar Fatić173 Internal debate and political tensions in Serbia regarding its membership in NATO
has demonstrated a tendency to “absorb” broader strategic arguments. This debate is primarily taking place in relation to normative and moral issues, while
broader strategic issues – which are crucial for the answer to the question of a
plausible membership in NATO – are left aside. Normative issues are primarily
related to the existing Constitution of Serbia, i.e., the issue of the relationship between NATO and the newly-proclaimed independent state of Kosovo, as a result
of secession from Serbia, and the Resolution of the Serbian National Assembly
on military neutrality, which majority of the political public has interpreted as a
ban on accession to NATO. Moral questions are concerned with NATO’s role in
dismemberment of Serbian state territory - the most dramatic example of which
was the secession of Kosovo and NATO bombing in 1999. All these issues, which
carry certain emotional potential, actually bypass one crucial strategic question
as to whether it is in the civilizational, cultural, political and defence related interests of Serbia to join NATO, or is it in its interest to oppose such a project. This
text deals with the above stated strategic dilemma, starting from the assumption
that the main obstacle to Serbian strategic membership in NATO is an insufficiently clear relationship between Serbia and the Russian Federation.
173 Author is a Senior Scientific Researcher, Institute for International Politics and Economics, Belgrade
222
Introduction
The main argument of this paper is that the fundamental reason for Serbia’s reluctance concerning NATO membership is the pressure coming from
Moscow, given that the creation of a monolithic NATO geo-strategic space
in Europe directly opposes the strategic interests of the Russian Federation.
This pressure has economic, energy and political dimensions. It culminated
with the visit of Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, to Belgrade in October
2009 and his address to Serbian parliamentarians, when a number of bilateral
agreements were signed. In 2009, after considerable reluctance on the part of
Serbia, an agreement on the sale of the Serbian oil monopoly, NIS Jugopetrol,
to Russia’s Gazprom was finalised; with a 51% stake, as a condition for the construction of Russia’s South Stream pipeline through Serbia, with a branch in
the Republika Srpska. At the same time, it was agreed that a Russian military
base for “intervention in natural disasters and emergency coordination” was to
be opened in Niš, southern Serbia. The question of whose troops would secure
the future pipeline, which will be placed above ground, was not addressed on
that occasion. At the same time, Russia’s Emergency Situations Minister, Sergei Shoigu, who was a key negotiator in the preparations for Medvedev’s visit,
when asked about whether only the troops of Russia’s “inner army” – which
is under his command – will in the future be stationed there, or the regular
Russian army, responded that “such a decision can only be made by President
Medvedev”; thus leaving open the possibility of Russia’s militarization of Serbia. With all these direct bilateral pressures, Russia is the most reliable diplomatic ally of Serbia in preventing the adoption of the resolution in the UN
Security Council that would further consolidate the independence of Kosovo,
as well as in preventing Kosovo from becoming a full member of a number
of international organizations and forums. Therefore, Serbia’s dependence on
Moscow is quite significant and Belgrade is not able to take a decisive course
towards NATO without the tacit approval of the Kremlin.
Over the past decade, Russian foreign policy has undergone a series of transformations in its relations with NATO, and this topic is an integral part of considerations about Russian interests towards Serbia and its politics in relation to
NATO. Moscow has rational reasons for opposing NATO’s further expansion
and “rounding-up’ of NATO’s strategic space all the way to the Russian border.
However, in their attitude towards expansion, they face a real lack of strategic
223
allies. In fact, it can be assumed that the only reluctant ally of Russia in eastern
Europe today is Serbia, which has remained outside NATO. At the same time,
the more unsuccessful the Russian policy of diplomatic and strategic opposition to further NATO expansion will be, the more likely it is that increasing
tension between the Russian defence doctrine and the Strategic Concept will
arise – two key defence documents of the Russian Federation – and thus an
increasing growth in the classic security dilemma between Russia and NATO.
It is therefore in the interest of global security to halt the expansion of NATO
rather than to have an escalation of the security dilemma with Moscow. However, that still does not mean that it is in the strategic interest of small countries
like Serbia to remain outside NATO.174
Russia’s strategic position vis-à-vis NATO
Any consideration of Russia’s defence strategy has to start with its traditional conventional defence doctrine in the post-Cold War period, which was
based on the depth of strategic territory which could absorb the first conventional strike of the enemy. The doctrine then provides for cumulative mobilization of Russian reserve forces, a gradual rounding of the enemy and expulsion
out of Russian territory. This doctrine was traditionally primary to the parallel,
nuclear doctrine, which consists of the principle of “extended intimidation and
first strike.” Given that the conventional Russian doctrine is quite defensive, it
is in the global interest to preserve it as a realistic option of Russian defence, so
that Moscow would not have to resort to more preventive – and hence more
aggressive – positions in protocols of activation of its armed forces, as these
protocols simultaneously threaten its neighbours and increase the danger of
military conflict.
The expansion of NATO towards Russia’s borders is a policy that directly
undermines the sustainability of the conventional Russian defence doctrine.
Apart from the fact that Russia is no longer conventionally superior in terms of
weapons and number of soldiers in relation to NATO, unlike during the Cold
War, its defence geography has also dramatically changed due to NATO’s expansion. In the 1980s, the Soviet Army had nearly four million troops, 10,000
strategic and 30,000 tactical nuclear missiles, with an annual production of
174 For further details, see my text “A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts Southeast
Europe”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 31, no. 3, December 2010, pp. 441–464.
224
3,000 tanks, 600 combat aircraft and 20 warships. Today’s Russian army has
around one million soldiers, whilst a budget crisis in the Kremlin has directly
undermined the maintenance of a drastically reduced nuclear arsenal and navy.175 At the same time, if NATO’s expansion continues with the accession of
Ukraine and Georgia, it would mean that the Moscow military district would
be the first Russian line of defence or, in other words, its conventional defence
doctrine would become completely inapplicable. Therefore, Moscow is forced
to consider changing its conventional doctrine from defensive to pro-active,
which would include permanently stationing a major part of its troops near
the border and activating protocols that include an increased level of combat
readiness and the principle of “explosion towards the enemy”, out of Russia’s
borders, at the first hint of threat.
In terms of nuclear doctrine, Russia has already demonstrated its sense of
insecurity in light of NATO’s expansion. Although the agreement on nuclear
disarmament, START 2, was ratified by the Russian Duma on 14th April 2000,
when the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty on 13th June
2002, Russia withdrew from START 2 only a day later. It was only presidents
Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev, respectively, who overcame this stalemate in nuclear disarmament by signing a new START treaty in Prague on 8th
April 2010, which limits the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550
and the number of strategic launch vehicles to 800, within a period of seven
years.
As during the Cold War – when NATO was conventionally inferior to
the Soviet Union – NATO’s primary military doctrine was nuclear (NATO’s
Strategic Concept insisted on the “first resort to” nuclear weapons), so the
Russian Federation, due to its conventional inferiority in relation to NATO,
transformed its nuclear doctrine into its primary defence doctrine in 2000.
That very transformation radically intensified the global security equation.
On 21st April 2000, President Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine
for the Russian Federation, which differs from the previous one adopted in
1997 in that it lowers the level of threat necessary to use nuclear weapons.
The doctrine from 1997 predicted the use of nuclear weapons in situations
where “the very existence of the Russian Federation was threatened.” The
175 Alexei Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from
Kosovo and Chechnya, Marshall Centre Papers, no. 2, George C. Marshall European Center for
Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, July 2000, p. 14.
225
2000 Doctrine, however, predicts the activation of the nuclear arsenal in
response to a “conventional large-scale aggression”, while guaranteeing the
protection of Russia’s “nuclear umbrella” to Russian allies.176 During the first
decade of the twenty-first century, the Kremlin put an emphasis on the deployment and development of tactical nuclear projects (of a range below
500 kilometres) that are not limited by any agreements on reducing strategic nuclear weapons, and which are obviously nuclear weapons of choice for
an attack on conventional forces in the immediate neighbourhood. Moscow
invested significant effort in the development of a renowned Iskander ballistic missile and the new “super-combat” aircraft that would strengthen its
air forces.177
In 2010, however, economic growth and the strengthening of Russia allowed
for a radical change of military doctrine introduced by President Medvedev.
The military doctrine, which he signed on 5th February of the same year, “returns” a mandate to the use of nuclear weapons at the level of “threat to the
existence of the Russian Federation”, but introduces as a priority an expensive
and ambitious policy of developing strategic conventional missiles – known
as “surgical bombing” of high precision – in open competition with NATO,
which already for a decade has been developing exactly such weapons as a
weapon of first choice in interventions. The emphasis on strategic missiles
demonstrates that Russia sees the West, and not just its geographical encirclement, as a primary threat to its security.178 However, in order to apply a new
doctrine, Russia needs strategic allies in Europe which would help to project
the conventional weapons as far to the West as possible. Except for Belarus,
which was explicitly mentioned as an ally in the 2010 military doctrine, Russia
has only one potential ally in Europe, and that is Serbia.
Russia’s Energy Strategy towards Serbia
Apart from the fact that Russian companies own both major oil companies
in Serbia, Beopetrol and, since recently, Jugopetrol, through which they control the country’s energy market, a key aspect of Russia’s energy strategy towards Serbia is the planned construction of the South Stream pipeline through
176 Nazavisimaya Gazeta, 22 April 2000
177 Alexei Arbatov, Ibid, pp. 28–29.
178 Vojna doktrina Ruske Federacije, 5 February 2010, note No. 5.
226
Serbia, with a branch that, via the Republika Srpska, goes towards the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see map).
It has been scheduled that South Stream will start functioning in 2015,
with an annual transportation capacity of about 63 billion cubic meters of gas;
which is 35% of total Russian gas exports to Europe. Bearing in mind the fact
that European countries import gas from Russia which covers between 23%
and 40% of their total consumption, it is clear how strategically important
South Stream is to Russia and all the countries it passes through. The pipeline
has to pass under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, from where it will bifurcate; with
one branch to Italy via Greece, and the other connecting Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and Austria. In light of the South Stream project, it is important
to note the existence of an unofficial document of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entitled “Programme for the efficient use of foreign policy in the
long-term development of Russia”, that was published in 2010 by the Russian
edition of Newsweek magazine and Croatia’s Jutarnji List. This document outlines a plan to build a 3,200 km long oil pipeline called “Družba Adria”, with an
annual capacity of 5 to 15 million tons of oil, during three stages of gradual ac-
227
tivation. The pipeline would start from the Russian city of Samara and stretch
to Belarus, the Ukraine, Slovakia and Hungary to Omiš, on the Croatian isle
of Krk.179 By constructing the South Stream and “Družba Adria”, both NATO
member states in the region and Serbia would be drawn into the Russian gas
project and thus under Russian gas dependence.
Serbian problems associated with Russia and NATO
Serbia’s policy towards Moscow is highly pragmatic, primarily based on the
particular need to maintain Russia’s diplomatic sponsorship in relation to the
multilateral treatment of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia has reason to fear that
the process of fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia, which has been going
on for two decades, could continue through the impending internal decentralization of Serbia itself. This is especially pertinent for the increasingly more
prominent ambitions of politicians in the southern region of Sandžak and
Raška, and in the north-western province of Vojvodina, to express and institutionalise their distinct identities through their statal and parastatal attributes
and policies. Such a policy is formally in-line with the principles of European
regionalism, yet it is also natural that it causes fear in Belgrade, which was the
subject of lengthy and persistent state disintegration. Therefore, it is very important for the Serbian authorities that Moscow remains opposed, in principle,
to the formation of additional new states in the Balkans.
In addition to this specific political dependence, accompanied with economic and energy dependence (during the last visit of President Medvedev,
Russian assistance to the Serbian budget, amongst other forms of assistance,
was agreed), Serbia also relies on Russia in terms of its identity. Collective
identities in the former Yugoslavia went through a series of fractures, and a
large part of them traumatised the Serbian collective identity. Today, after all
the governmental fractures, Serbia is the most multicultural of all the Balkan
countries, with a significant Muslim population that is politically active and
which has close family, religious and political ties with the Bosniak majority in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina. Muslims seek a new affirmation
of their identity through political projects in Serbia, and the carrier of these
initiatives today is the mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, who has been the
179 Krešimir Žabec, „Tajni naputak Rusa: Morate biti u projektu Družba Adria“, Jutarnji list,
18 May 2010
228
subject of persistent criticism by the Belgrade media. At the same time, internal political and cultural division of the Serbian public into the so-called “two
Serbias” - one authoritarian, prone to preservation of the state even at the cost
of dictatorship, and which, in the opinion of its critics, used to back the regime
of Slobodan Milošević and his politics, and the second, democratic and European, which is not only not disappearing, but rather deepening the debate on
possible changes to the Serbian Constitution, Kosovo’s future and, finally, on
Serbia’s possible membership in NATO. One part of the conservative public
finds itself increasingly embracing anti-European and anti-NATO positions,
calling for patriotism; whilst the second part, close to the current government,
is afraid to be too explicit in its pro-NATO stance in order not to be accused
of treason.
Objectively speaking, Serbia does not have much choice regarding possible
accession to NATO given its regional circumstances. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovenia are already members of NATO, while Bosnia and Macedonia
are in the process of accession. That means that Serbia is the only potential
strategic ally of Russia in its opposition to further NATO expansion. All countries of the region set EU membership as their foreign policy priority, which is
also consistent with the transatlantic orientation of foreign policy. Therefore,
due to its specific internal political situation, Serbia is somewhat “sticking out”
from the rest of the region and primarily so in the dimension of its relationship with NATO. This departure from the politics of other countries is based
on the fact that Serbia experienced the bombing by NATO in 1999, and that
NATO member states recognized the independence of Kosovo; therefore, objectively, Serbia is faced with contradictory factors for deciding its position on
NATO. On the one hand, Serbia has strong moral reasons not to become a
member; while on the other hand, from a strictly strategic perspective, Serbia
has a dilemma between an obvious logical premise to join NATO together
with all its neighbours and its special interests in relation to Russia. Because of
all this, Serbia will have to make its decision on membership in NATO on several levels, also including the completion of an internal political debate about
collective identity and the basic directions of its foreign policy, as well as the
formulation of clear strategic conclusions about which of its strategic interests
are more important for the future.
The inclusion of other Balkan countries into NATO is taking place on the
basis of several different assumptions and normative templates. While other
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countries of Central and Eastern Europe were under the oppressive domination of Moscow during the Cold War, and still keep the memory of Russia as
the occupier in the collective memory of their people, Serbia had a slightly
different socialist system, whereby the major repression was conducted by
a domestic Communist oligarchy, while Russia was understood as a distant
ideal of Slav brotherhood that was not directly connected with the crimes of
the regime of Josip Broz Tito. Therefore, a deviation from Russia in cultural
and strategic contexts, which was the main motive for the countries of Central
and partly of Eastern Europe to join first the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and later NATO, is not very pronounced in Serbia. Thus, the political
elite does not have sufficient public support to be more assertive in those initiatives to make such a shift, which is essential for crystallising public support
for NATO membership.
The Serbian public would benefit from an independent analysis of the strategic
options in relation to its prospects of NATO membership. For Serbia, this issue
is not simple because it involves a series of value and identity-related enigmas.
However, the vehemence with which it is placed on the daily political field and
the clarity of Serbia’s geopolitical situation – completely surrounded by NATO
allies – is an unavoidable factor of pressure to have this dilemma resolved.
231
The mission of NATO and European Security and Defence
Identity (ESDI): complementarity or competition?
Dr Jasminka Simić180
The transformational process of NATO, prompted by political and geo-strategic changes in the early 1990s, has been followed by a process of maturing policies
and strategies of the European Union in the field of common foreign and security
policy. EU efforts to manage the Yugoslav crisis in its early stages, and subsequent
NATO military engagement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s
bombing of Yugoslavia, led to mutual distrust and disagreement about the ability
of the other parties to operate and manage crises. However, time has proved that
this kind of mutual mistrust is basically a question of seeking for compatibility,
since NATO and the EU often have two visions, but the same goal. It is in this
framework that the respective military and peacekeeping missions of these two
organizations operate.
180 Jasminka Simić, PhD in political science, Editor Journalist at the Radio Television of
Serbia RTS, Belgrade
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Introduction
NATO and the European Union view the security of the twenty-first century in its broadest sense, as was confirmed by NATO at the Lisbon Summit (1920th November 2010), which – in addition to the protection of NATO member
states and the fight against terrorism – also assumed protection and response
to cyber-crime or intrusions into computer systems, considering it a priority
in the coming decade.181 At the same time, global security, thus understood, is
a subject of operation of the EU Foreign Affairs Council, which began its work
on December 1st 2010, i.e. on the anniversary of the Treaty of Lisbon by which
it was originally introduced. The Council’s activities range from conflict-resolution through development assistance or in the event of natural disasters, to
pandemics, population migrations and energy security. The EU has taken a
common position on how to improve its response to security challenges and
threats.182 Therefore, security threats perceived as major threats in the second
decade of the twenty-first century both by NATO and the EU, and which require a combination of joint efforts and actions in order to enhance the security of citizens, enterprises and society in general in their member states
181 Wikileaks is the most striking example of threats to security thus conceived. NATO
condemned leaking of information which included the correspondence between American diplomats on deployment of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe on Wikileaks site, describing it as “illegal and dangerous”. Documents show that the major part of around 200 American
nuclear war-heads, which have remained in Europe, are located in Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany and Turkey. It has been assumed for a long time that nuclear weapons was in these
four countries, yet both NATO and governments of these countries, respectively, have all until
now refused to confirm that information (nuclear bombs B-61, the oldest American nuclear
weapons which is still in the armory, though it was made in 1950s).
182 The European Commission issued a set of measures that aim at better protection of EU
citizens from security threats such as: a) a common agenda for dispersal of criminal and terrorist networks, for which it proposed a rapid and effective seizure of assets and profits generated
in this way, the use of European lists of passengers and assistance in fight against corruption in
the Member States, b) protection against cyber-crime, i.e. raising the level of security for private
and legal entities in cyber-space that would be achieved by establishing the European Centre for
fight against cyber-crime, networks of teams for rapid response in the IT world and by establishing an European system for the exchange of information and warning, and, c) strengthening
the Union’s readiness to cope with crisis situations, which can be achieved by implementation
of “solidarity clause”, by creating a European capacity for emergency situations and establishing
policies that will link the assessment of hazards and risks to decision-making. See: The EU’s
Internal Security Strategy, 26 November 2010, http://www.parliament.uk
233
are: terrorism (organized, cross-border) and cyber-crime, as well as crises and
natural disasters.
These are all new challenges for the new century, but in order to have a
clearer vision of security in the future, we need an answer to the following
questions - to what extent have transatlantic links been equal in military and
defence terms, i.e. whether the security system of NATO and the European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) are complementary or competing, and
what is their relationship to the global security architecture and that of the
Western Balkans, which also includes Serbia?
The key principle of NATO’s security system is based on Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, the organisation’s founding document, according to which
an attack on one signatory country is considered as an attack on all; which
itself is the core of the collective defence (security) system. In the traditional
military sense, the transatlantic link has been uneven. During the Cold War,
it was essentially based on American protection of partnerships over Western
Europe. After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s European members continued
to rely on the military presence and engagement of the United States (in the
Balkans) and, due to that, they were falling behind in the process of military
modernization (the war in Kosovo demonstrated a large gap between the military capabilities of the US and those of EU member states).
On the other hand, the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) in its, so-called, second
pillar, introduces the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to
boost cooperation in the area of foreign policy, primarily by establishing rules
for joint action by EU member states, and by including the formulation of a
common defence policy. Despite the existence of a then nine-membered Western European Union (hereinafter, WEU)183 as an integral part of the Union’s
development and its military branch – tasked with developing closer institu183 Brussels Agreement of 1948, as the first step towards post-war consolidation of security in west European countries was the founding document of the Western European Union
(WEU). That Agreement was amended in 1984. The Western European Union is formally nonexistent since 2000, with its authorities transferred onto the EU. With entry into force of the
Lisbon Agreement, competencies of the WEU are transferred onto the EU and by July 2011, the
WEU terminated its functioning. However, during all that time, the organisation with the seat
in Paris has been functioning, and within it, the Institute for Security Studies, which organises conferences and seminars, and regularly publishes Publication entitled „Chaillot Papers“, of
world renowned experts in international defence and security. See: http://www.weu.int/institute
234
tional relations, with an option of integrating into the Union and dealing with
humanitarian affairs and undertaking peacekeeping missions – NATO still remained the central pillar of European defence policy. This part of the Treaty
of Maastricht was the embryo of a common European defence policy, with an
emphasis that it must be compatible with NATO.
At the ministerial meeting of NATO in Berlin (1996), it was agreed that the
WEU would oversee the creation of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO structures.184 ESDI was to create a, so-called, European pillar within NATO, partly allowing European countries to act militarily
where NATO does not want to do so, but also to ease the financial burden on
the U.S. in maintaining its military bases in Europe, which have been there
since the Cold War. The agreement from Berlin enabled European countries to
– through the WEU – use NATO assets, should they wish. This agreement was
later amended to allow the EU to also manage such missions, and is known as
the Berlin-Plus Agreement (2002).
The Common Foreign and Security Policy, which went through a gradual
development, was more intensively engaged in the field; in part as a consequence of transatlantic disunity in the 1990s. While the experience in Kosovo
and Metohija (1999) led to the emergence of the ESDI, the transatlantic gap on
the issue of Iraq (2003) intensified the engagement of European members of
NATO, gathered around the further development and establishment of European military forces.
At the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo (December 4th 1998)185, the
road to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was laid, with
a requirement to provide resources and capacities necessary to implement
184 Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Berlin, 3 June
1996. See: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm
185 It was stated at the meeting that all decisions related to the European security and defence identity will in the future have to be linked to the EU, rather than the WEU. The EU was
given the opportunity to take autonomous military actions when NATO, in its entirety, is not
interested in engagement of its troops, i.e. „the EU has to possess the capacity for autonomous
action, supported by credible military forces, decision-making means on their use and readiness
to do so within response to international crises“, but also that development of such autonomous
European forces must not lead to duplication of existing forces of NATO, while collective defence remains within NATO framework. See: Joint Statement by British and French Governments,
Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 4 December, 1998
235
such policies. This meant that Europe was given an autonomous voice on
the international stage and the capacity to intervene in the service of peace,
whereby the process of forming the European Rapid Reaction Force was
launched. At the time of this meeting, a particular political climate was present in Europe, created by demands for internationalising the Kosovo problem, the preparations for an international conference on Kosovo and Metohija, and suggestions of a possible military intervention by NATO in case all
diplomatic efforts fail.
For the EU itself, it was significant that in May 1999 – during the intense
bombing of Yugoslavia – the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, given
that it included the, so-called, Petersberg tasks, which consisted of actions of
a humanitarian nature, peace-keeping, crisis management, as well as peacemaking. The importance of this act is that the EU thus paved the way for its
subsequent peace-keeping missions, which first started in the former Yugoslavia.
In June 1999, the European Council decided in Cologne to incorporate the
role of the WEU within the EU, until its final closure. It was then that Javier
Solana was appointed the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the WEU Secretary-General (with the authority to
transfer the WEU jurisdiction onto the EU), in order to assist the progress
of both, i.e. the CFSP and ESDP. The EU made its first concrete step towards
strengthening its military capabilities in accordance with the ESDP when its
member states signed the “Helsinki Headline Goal” (1999).
Namely, military dependence of NATO’s European members on the U.S.
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was again demonstrated during the NATO
bombing in Kosovo and Metohija (on a time-scale, it happened between the
meeting in Saint Malo and the Cologne summit), deeply influenced the governments of EU member states. At the EU summit in Helsinki (December
1999), it was agreed that – through the plan of the “Helsinki Headline Goal”
- about 60,000 troops were to be made available (for at least one year) for
crisis management operations by 2003, whereby the St. Petersburg tasks set in
the Treaty of Amsterdam would be realised. The EU then underlined its determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where
NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military oper-
236
ations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary
duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.”186
At the summit of the European Council in Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000),
“modalities for developing EU-NATO relations were identified in four areas
covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for the EU access to
NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements”.187
The EU also launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the
summit in Laeken (December 2001). However, it became clear that the “Helsinki Headline Goal” was not easily attainable. In May 2004, Defence Ministers
of the EU member states approved the “Headline Goal 2010”, thus extending
the deadline for realization of the EU projects.
The framework for NATO-EU relationship was built on the basis of the document adopted at the NATO summit in Washington (April 1999), at the margins of the European Council summit in Nice (December 2000) and the North
Atlantic Council summit in Brussels (December 2000) on commitment to a
single partnership of the two organizations in crisis management,188 and by the
Joint EU-NATO Declaration (December 2002). In fact, the document “Strategic Concept of the Alliance” was adopted ahead of the Washington summit,
emphasising that the development of the concept of European Security and
Defence Identity (ESDI) will be continued exclusively within NATO, while all
issues related to European Defence will be dealt with between NATO and the
EU only, rather than with the WEU. This new relationship between NATO and
the ESDI will later turn into a, so-called, Berlin-Plus Agreement (2002), under
which the EU-led operations are able to use NATO military assets, if there is a
need for that. This agreement allows for NATO’s support to crisis management
operations led by the EU in which NATO as a whole is not engaged.
The EU has established adequate modalities to also involve in EU-led operations those countries that are members of NATO, but not of the EU. At
186 Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999. See: http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm
187 Presidency Conclusion, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19-20 June 2000. See:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/csm_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-rl.en0.htm
188 Positive result of consultations and cooperation was normalisation of situation in the
south of Serbia (end of 2000), when, with the Euro-Atlantic assistance and participation of the
Yugoslav side, a risk of civilian conflict between Albanian and Serbian sides was thus eliminated,
and security situation in Macedonia improved, whereby NATO was tasked to provide for the EU
mission and the monitoring mission of the OSCE.
237
the time, five countries belonged to this group: Bulgaria, Romania, Iceland,
Norway and Turkey. Therefore, the joint NATO-EU Declaration on European
Security and Defence Policy had a stimulating effect in a number of aspects.
Berlin-Plus Agreement
Negotiations between NATO and the EU led to the Joint Declaration on
the establishment of a strategic partnership between the two organizations in
crisis management, published on December 16th 2002.189 The final agreement
was completed on March 11th 2003 as the Berlin-Plus agreement, and its very
name indicates that it ensued from the one adopted at the summit in Berlin
(1996), when official cooperation between NATO and the WEU was initiated.
The Berlin-Plus agreement consists of several main parts:190
• EU’s access to NATO planning capabilities, that can contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
• Creating a list of NATO assets and capabilities that could be made available to the EU for use in EU-led operations;
• Marking the range of European Command Options for EU operations
and further development of the role of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (DSACEUR)191, in order to fully and effectively take
over their (European) responsibilities;
• Further adjustment of NATO’s defence planning system in order to
more comprehensively incorporate forces available for EU-led operations;
• The agreement of NATO and the EU includes the exchange of classified
information under reciprocal security protection rules;
• Procedures for the release, monitoring, recall and return of NATO assets and capacities;
189 See: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-142e.htm
190 Berlin-Plus Agreement is not a public document and it was not ratified by national
parliaments. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20
Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf
191 Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR), has an important role in agreements defined as command operations. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) established a cell within
the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe, SHAPE), with the seat in Mons, in order to
improve preparations for the EU operations which require NATO’s assets and capabilities, while
NATO established permanent liaison through offices within the EU Military Staff.
238
•
NATO-EU agreement on consultations in the context of crisis management operations led by the EU involving the use of NATO assets and
capabilities.
In practice, the procedure requires that the use of NATO assets by the EU
be submitted to a principle of “right of first refusal”, which means that NATO
must first refuse to intervene in a given situation. Approving the use of assets
must be unanimous among NATO member states. For example, reserve on
the part of Turkey regarding the use of NATO assets in operation “Concordia”
postponed its engagement for more than five months.
Strategic partnership between NATO and the EU through the Berlin-Plus
agreement very soon received practical application in the field. The EU conducted two operations with NATO’ support.
Operation “Concordia” in the FYRoM192 was the first mission based on the
Berlin-Plus agreement and the first EU military mission implemented under
the ESDP. In the period from August 2001 until March 2003, NATO safeguarded the security of the EU and the OSCE staff and implemented its obligation to maintain peace in the FYRoM. NATO’s operation, “Allied Harmony”,
was completed on March 21st 2003 and handed over to the EU as Operation
“Concordia”, by hiring about 300 troops to protect the OSCE observers who
monitored the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Operation “Concordia” was completed by December 15th 2003. NATO led the strategic, operational and tactical planning of that operation. The operational commander was the Deputy Supreme Allied Command in Europe (DSACEUR),
headquartered at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, and with a
control unit established in the regional command of NATO in Naples (currently Joint Force Command, JFC).
The second mission conducted under the Berlin-Plus agreement was “EUFOR Althea”, which started in 2004 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June of the
same year, NATO decided to end its mission of Stabilisation Forces (SFOR),
while the EU Council, on July 12th 2004, agreed to launch a European military
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea), as a part of a global
192 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
239
policy with the objective of stabilising the country.193 Following a decision
from the NATO Summit in Istanbul (2004) on completion of the mission of
NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) by the end of the same year, the EU started
its mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 7,000 troops, with the objective of
implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and maintaining a safe and secure environment. The UN Security Council adopted (November 22nd 2004) resolution 1575, which authorises the operation under Chapter VII of the Charter. Again, the Deputy Supreme Allied Command in Europe was appointed the operational commander
of the EU operation. According to resolution 1948 of the UN Security Council,
the mandate of Operation “Althea” was extended until the end of 2011 (it is
renewed annually).
Between the two previously mentioned military operations, the EU
launched operation “Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (June 12th
2003), which was led independently in accordance with resolution 1484 of the
UN Security Council (30 May 2003) on the engagement of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IMEF) in the area of Bunia (in the northeast of
DR Congo) with the task of securing the airport and protecting internally displaced persons. Operation “Artemis” was the first autonomous military mission outside Europe, and a significant milestone in the development of the
ESDP. This mission successfully stabilized the situation in the Bunia area and
strengthened the UN presence in the DR Congo. While performing this mission, NATO was regularly informed about the intentions of the EU, with full
respect for the spirit and letter of the Agreement on consultations in the event
of crisis.
The Berlin-Plus agreement opens up several issues with respect to the conceived strategic cooperation between NATO and the EU. Only two of all EU
operations has been led in accordance with the Berlin-Plus agreement. When
193 Joint Action 2004/570/FSP adopted by the Council on 12 July 2004. See: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:252:0010:0014:FR:PDE. In BiH, th EU offered its
service in assuming the mission of the international police forces (SFOR mission also included
international police forces). The EU Police Mission (EUPM) was established in January 2003,
with the aim of installing sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police forces in line with
European and international standards. It is functioning in accordance with obligations that are
part of the Stabilisation and Accession Process, notably in the fight against organised crime and
police reform.
240
the EU and NATO conduct two simultaneous, yet separate land or maritime
operations, the Berlin-Plus agreement does not apply. The agreement does not
provide the possibility of combining civilian and military instruments. Vesting
the EU with a broad scale of competences, such as economic, military, political and legal, creates the possibility of forming civilian crisis management capacities and making them available to NATO, which – in some ways – could
extend the Berlin-Plus agreement by creating a civilian component.
When the two organizations are simultaneously engaged in a single operation, sharing classified information may create a problem, as was the case during the bombing of Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan, or on the coast of Somalia,
where operations were complicated due to an absence of official communication. These operational difficulties often stem from political disagreements of
the two organizations, which has a detrimental effect on the ground (the issue
of Cyprus and Turkey), and their solution is to be found in negotiations and
compromise. In order to ensure operational complementarity between NATO
and the EU, it is necessary to further develop the Berlin-Plus agreement, which
does not cover the entire scope of possible cooperation between the two organizations, but has the potential to do so.194
European Defence
Since 2003, requirements for EU actions have increased, so the EU
started taking over about four missions a year. Currently, it has 14 missions (e.g. peace-monitoring mission in Georgia, naval operations off the
coast of Somalia).195 These operations vary in terms of tasks; they use and
sometimes mix civilian and military resources. The EU relies on national
and NATO headquarters for military operations. In Kosovo and Metohija,
the EU mission (EULEX) took over from (December 2008) the civilian UN
mission (UNMIK). EU missions are also based outside the Balkans, so in
the context of the further development of European defence, we can also
consider the future of NATO and its missions, how it will be redefined and
194 See: Robert Walter, What future for the EU-NATO Berlin-Plus agreements?, European
Defence and NATO, Towards which developments and complementarity, European files, December-January 2011, No. 21, European Security and Defence Assembly of WEU, Paris, See:
http://www.assembly-weu.eu
195 Source: Issues, Quarterly published by the EU Institute for Security Studies, no 27, The
European Foreign&Security Policy Institute, October, 2008, Paris, See: www.iss.europa.eu
241
in which way it will redirect itself to new forms of action and new areas of
engagement.
In 2003, Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg submitted their respective proposals for a structure of European defence, laid out in seven points.
According to that plan, mobile multinational headquarters for military operations of European interventionist forces in dealing with crises and peace-making were to be formed by the end of 2003, and would be independent of NATO.
The backbone of European power would be the already existing French-German brigade, reinforced by troops from Belgium and Luxembourg. Contrary
to the rapid reaction forces that received support for their designated partnership with NATO forces, the plan for European defence was met with criticism
on the part of the U.S. and the United Kingdom, given that these two countries
were actively engaged in Iraq and the potential creation of European defence
would not work in their favour, considering the existence of NATO structures.
This has deepened the transatlantic gap created on the occasion of the AngloAmerican intervention in Iraq.
The Anglo-American concept, as opposed to the Franco-German proposal,
meant that the collective defence of Europe was to be handed over to NATO,
to as great extent as possible, and that instead of 60,000 troops from the aforementioned proposal, the rapid-reaction would consist of a maximum of 20,000
soldiers. At the EU summit organized by Greece – which held the EU Presidency in 2003 – it was officially agreed that the EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana, would draft a European Security Strategy (ESS),
which was adopted that very same year.
Basically, the formation of European military forces is a desire for the
final creation of a European military identity. The said forces would be the
embryo of a future European army. Should that happen, Europe could become a single confederate state, like the United States. European economic integration also began to include the field of military industry, which
was an additional impetus to realization of such an idea. Creation of these
forces was not only in the domain of theoretical considerations and the
desire of most EU member states, but also the practical need required by
the situation on the ground, since – with the departure of the U.S. troops
from the mission in the former Yugoslavia to peace-keeping mission in
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the East (Iraq and Afghanistan) – a space was left for operations of European powers.
A proposal for the formation of European military forces by which Europe would gain significant influence in the world, was received with criticism by many, like Andrew Moravscik.196 He thought that it was a waste of
time and resources, nothing more than European “wishful thinking”, and
that the real force of the EU is in trade and its peace-keeping missions.
Moravscik takes the example of Iraq, i.e. its post-war reconstruction and
re-establishment of government institutions. According to him, in that kind
of business, there is only one “quiet superpower” - Europe. If Europe seeks
a stronger global role, it should focus on those advantages and do what it is
best at, i.e. trade and peace-keeping missions. In support of this position is
the example of Afghanistan, where the United States conducted the military
action, which was followed by extensive foreign aid, with Western Europe
supplying 70% of total foreign aid and more than 90% of Western aid for
Afghanistan. It is similar in Iraq. Robert Hunter has a completely negative attitude towards European armed forces, calling them an “imitation of
NATO”.197
In the core of these attitudes that are opposed to the formation of European military forces is a demand for a rational “division of lobar” between
the U.S., on one side, and the European members of NATO, on the other.
The U.S. and the EU are the two greatest actors in the international arena.
But if we take into account the previously outlined “division of labour” in
crisis regions or countries, as well as the increase of the economic and political roles of China and India, and the economic and political recovery of
Russia, this all indicates that we are approaching multilateralism embodied
in the UN.
196 Andrew Moravcsik is the Director of the EU programme at the University of Harvard.
In his text „The World is Bipolar After All“, he writes about lessons Europe learned after the war
in Iraq, Newsweek, 5 May 2003, New York, p. 39
197 Robert Hunter is Senior Adviser in RAND Corporation in Washington D.C. Between
1993-98, he was the U.S. Ambassador to NATO. Article entitled „How deep is Ocean?“, published in Newsday magazine, 23 February 2003, See: http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/022303.
html
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Future Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU
Despite disagreements between the Euro-Atlantic partners regarding the
establishment of European defence, perceived as a competitor to NATO forces,
and opposition to engagement in the Iraq war, a complementary partnership
was established between the EU rapid-reaction force and NATO. This mutual
relationship has been the essence of NATO’s transformation and progress attained within the EU in the post Cold War period.198
With the Lisbon Treaty (December 1st 2009), the EU acquired its international legal personality and introduced two new key functions: that of the
President of the European Council (EU President) and the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (Head of European diplomacy).
The Treaty of Lisbon states that, “bearing in mind that the policy of the
Union in accordance with Article 42 shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall
respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common
defence realised in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that
framework.”199 In accordance with the agreement, this has become an annex
to the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU.
When it concerns the defence perspective, the Treaty of Lisbon stipulates
that the ESDP will lead toward a joint EU defence agreement, once the European Council makes an unanimous decision. This agreement will only be
possible when all member states give their consent through their usual constitutional procedures. Additionally, the area of defence can be used for promoting co-operation, creating the possibility for defence integration which excludes member states with neutral policies (they do not fulfill the criteria and
statements given in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Permanent Structured
198 For further information, see: Dr Nano Ružin, „НАТО во современите мегународни
односи“, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Skopje, 2010, points 15 and 16
199 Treaty on European Union (amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed 13 December
2007), Protocol (No 11) on Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the
European Union (OJEU), 9.V 2008., No. C115, p. 278. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0201:0328:EN:PDF
244
Cooperation). States with significant military capabilities presented a form of
permanent structural cooperation in defence.200
The fact that the Treaty of Lisbon promoted steps toward the creation of
a stronger EU Common Security and Defence Policy that shall “seek a more
advanced framework for a common defence policy” and “will lead toward the
common defence”201, has in some circles sparked fears that greater coordination of the EU in terms of defence could lead to the development of its military
structure, consequently resulting in the duplication of NATO structures and
a weakening of transatlantic ties. Even a more unified and compact Europe is
seen as a potential U.S. rival in many political areas.
At the NATO summit in Lisbon (November 19-20th 2010), NATO’s new
Strategic Concept was adopted, stating that “an active and effective European
Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore,
the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations
share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share
common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence.”202 NATO and the EU can and should have a complementary and mutually enhanced role in maintaining international peace
and security through the promotion of practical cooperation in operations in
the broad spectrum of crises, from coordination and mutual support, to the
expansion of political consultations to include all issues of common interest,
stated this document.
It is a fact that NATO and the EU are not self-sufficient institutions, but that
they need each other to manage crises and maintain peace. The EU managed
to develop instruments of action of “soft power”203 that are more adequate in
the process of stabilizing the situation and managing civilian missions, compared to the “hard power” actions of the United States, alone or through NATO
200 Sven Biscop, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the future of ESDP, Egmont Royal
Institute for International Relations, Brussels, 2010 See: http://www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep20.pdf
201 See: Treaty of Lisbon, http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index-en.htm
202 Paragraph 32. of the „Strategic Concept for Defence and Security of members of the
North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation“, adopted by the Heads of States and Governments in Lisbon (November 2010) See: http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic.concept.2010-eng.pdf
203 Concept of „soft power“ was launched in 1990s by Joseph Nye, professor at the Harvard
University, who defined it as the ability of exerting the influence in the international relations
through cultural, political and institutional values.
245
missions. The Treaty of Lisbon and NATO’s new Strategic Concept demonstrate that security and defence relations between the two organizations have
developed and matured to the extent that they can go beyond provisions of
the Berlin-Plus agreement, resorting to complementary civilian and military
capabilities. This complementarity and potential synergy between the two organizations, which has not been fully exploited so far, now has a chance to be
realised.
The engagement of the EU in improving its own security and defence identity is very intense, yet still insufficient to be able to conclude that the EU has
a “mastery” over the continent by having improved its ability to prevent or
solve all negative trends that may lead to a possible return to conflict. Despite
certain success in European foreign policy (engagement in conflict resolution
in Georgia), in comparison with its Atlantic partners, the EU is still far from
being a “strong” military force and a coherent global actor. Pragmatism will
have its effect, which means that European partners will continue to rely on
the U.S. military partnership and NATO. Even today, we have a divided vision of NATO’s future role among Euro-Atlantic partners (Atlanticists, Europeans and Central European countries). The position of the Alliance in current
transatlantic relations will first determine reducing the Alliance’s importance
for the U.S., as demonstrated during the operations in Afghanistan, and reducing the level of U.S. military participation in NATO missions; second, it will
increase the readiness and ability of the EU (size, intensity and resistance of
EU missions) to militarily engage in peace operations and peace-keeping missions abroad, all the while developing its own diplomatic profile, which is done
with the Foreign Affairs Council.
Within considerations of the future security system in the world and Europe, one should not forget the proposal of Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev (at a meeting with German political, parliamentary and civic leaders
on June 5th 2008, Berlin, Germany) to create a new security system in Europe
and to sign a pan-European Security Pact, by which he called on all European
countries to take part in this process; “each in line with its national capabilities, while any idea of alliances and groups of states should remain beyond this
framework”. This means that NATO and the EU member states should not,
at least officially, coordinate their positions in negotiations, should the process continue. The pan-European security pact should, in the spirit of the UN
246
Charter, “finally clarify the role and the use of force in the Euro-Atlantic area”,
which implies that for any NATO’s decision to be made, an approval should be
sought outside the Alliance. President Dmitry Medvedev reiterated this Russian idea of transformation of the current system of security institutions and
the signing of a pan-European Pact at the World Political Forum (October 8th
2008, Evian, France). Otherwise, stronger cooperation between the EU and
Russia is supported by most member states, particularly France, Germany and
Italy.204
For the Western Balkans, the EU is more acceptable. In Serbia there is support for the EU, but also an emotional bias towards NATO (the bombings).
All Western Balkan countries, apart from Serbia, have adopted a Membership
Action Plan and are taking part in peace-keeping missions in Afghanistan.
Members of the Serbian Army, police and medical personnel, who are already
taking part in UN peace-keeping missions, are also willing to participate in EU
peace-keeping missions.205 Given the intertwining of NATO and the EU when
it comes to peace-keeping, and tight joint or successive operations, it would
mean that even though Serbia would not be officially taking part in NATO
missions, there would be some point where these would intersect. Participation in peace-keeping operations in the world also increases the state’s foreign
policy credibility, while soldiers have the opportunity to gain experience in the
field and improve their capabilities and interoperability.
The activities of independent EU missions on and beyond the European
continent, in parallel with NATO missions, point to the value and need for
seeking multilateral solutions to crises, i.e. other alternatives that have been
marginalized or developed in the last decades of the twentieth century. A
multilateral approach to crisis management facilitates transatlantic coopera204 See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press
Department, http://www.in.mid.ru/brp4.nsf/2008/06/05/html i http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/
speeches/2008/10/08/html
205 Representatives of the defence system are currently self-engaged in the UN peace missions in Congo, Liberia and the Ivory Coast; they are in Chad together with representatives of the
Norwegian contingent, while on Cyprus they are part of Slovakian-Hungarian contingent. UN
peace mission in Lebanon, together with Spanish contingent, and on the coast of Somalia, are
next due. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior are engaged in UN peace missions in Liberia and Haiti (where, after the catastrophic earthquake in January 2010, they assisted in saving
the injured people and clearing of demolished sites, and from the beginning of 2011 they have
been engaged in prevention of cholera epidemics among local population).
247
tion and enables more effective ways of coping with global challenges. In the
twenty-first century, the necessary conditions for reaffirming common goals
through dialogue and without imposing solutions were created. Leading members of NATO and the EU have crucial places in the main institution of the
United Nations Security Council, which should be the focus of joint efforts
and decisions on global security issues. In-line with relevant UN Security
Council resolutions, and in cooperation with other stakeholders, including
the EU, NATO took over operations in Africa.206 A comprehensive context
of cooperation between NATO and the EU allows them to serve as an aid in
realizing the goals and tasks of the United Nations, thereby strengthening their
mutual political and operational cohesion.
Conclusion
Strategic partnerships in crisis management between NATO and the EU was
built through negotiations that resulted in the Berlin-Plus Agreement (December 16th 2002 – March 11th 2003). Very soon, this partnership received practical
application in FYRoM (2003) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004). It was then
that the EU took over NATO missions, which were the first operations under the
ESDP. European missions in the Balkans served as a lobby for European commitment outside the European continent (e.g. in the Democratic Republic of Congo),
at the same time indicating a desire of the EU to become a global political actor.
That has occasionally caused a sense of competition with NATO and its leading
member, the United States, while the wish of the EU to establish European defence
received a particularly harsh criticism - especially if one has in mind the reaction
of the former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, to the formation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (Saint-Malo, 1998), embodied in “three Ds”, which
marked the American expectations regarding the ESDP: no Duplication of what
has already been done effectively by NATO, no Decoupling of the U.S. and NATO
and no Discrimination to states that are not members of the EU, such as Turkey.
206 Piracy in the Aden Gulf and off the Horn of Africa threaten to jeopardise international
humanitarian aid in Africa, as well as the security of the maritime trade routes. At the request
of the UN Secretary General in 2008, NATO launched the operation „Allied Provider“, in oder
to escort the ship of the UN World Food Programme. After that, operation „Allied Protector“
followed in 2009, while the current operation „Ocean Shield“ additionally trains regional countries in capacity-building efforts in their fight against piracy.
248
The essence of the relations between the two organizations is in their commitment that – although it may not seem possible to jointly undertake all activities – it is imperative to provide conditions to perform all those tasks they
have undertaken jointly. Strategic partnership between the two organizations
indicates the necessity of improving a global approach to crisis management
and acceptance of a broader context of transatlantic activity, embodied in ever
more present multilateralism and the role of the UN in the world. Improving
the political and operational cohesion of NATO and the EU lies ahead in the
next decade of the twenty-first century.
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The Republic of Serbia and the Common Security and
Defence Policy207
Filip Ejdus208
After the fall of the Iron Curtain, almost all former communist East European
states first of all sought, and later gained, membership of the EU and NATO.
While the rest of Europe was becoming more unified during the 1990s, the Western Balkans was undergoing a process of political division. As soon as armed conflict was over, the new states in this region recognised inclusion in Euro-Atlantic
security systems as their primary national interest. Until the end of 2007, Serbia
was no exception to this. However, in December of that year, shortly before the
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, the Serbian parliament declared Serbia to be a militarily neutral state. This meant that the Atlantic component of Serbia’s security integration was limited to membership of the NATO
programme Partnership for Peace (PfP). The European component of security
integration remained open to Serbia, although it is still an unused possibility.
207 This article was published as a chapter of book „Towards a Western Balkans Battle Group
- A Vision of Serbia’s Defence Integration into the EU 2010–2020“, Authors: Filip Ejdus, Marko
Savković and Nataša Dragojlović, Belgrade Center for Security Policy, May 2010
208 Author is a teaching assistant and PhD candidate at the Faculty of political science,
University of Belgrade
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The European component of security integration – an unused possibility?
Following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February
2008, the Republic of Serbia continued its journey towards EU membership.
This was confirmed most of all by the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2008, following which, in December 2009, the
Interim Trade Agreement was unfrozen and the visa regime was liberalised. It
is expected that Serbia will be granted the status of EU membership candidate
in the first half of 2011. EU membership is a key foreign policy priority of
the Republic of Serbia. The current government has placed EU membership
alongside preservation of Serbia’s territorial integrity and regional cooperation as one of its three foreign policy priorities. At this stage of integration,
harmonisation with European legislation is also a priority in other policy areas. However, in contrast to almost all other Western Balkan states, with the
exception of reforms in the areas of justice and home affairs which were prerequisites for visa liberalisation, Serbia has so far made no significant effort
to engage in security integration processes within the EU. This is especially
true of the CSDP, which may be understandable at this stage in the integration
process. Although, formally speaking, this could be postponed until full EU
membership is gained; the authors of this text consider that it is in the national
interest of the Republic of Serbia to begin participation in the CSDP as soon
as possible.
The assertion that proactive participation in the CSDP is in the Republic of Serbia’s national interest derives indirectly from the National Security
Strategy adopted by parliament in October 2009. This document, which defines basic national interests in the field of security, states that “preservation
of internal stability, the rule of law and the development of democracy and
democratic institutions and integration into the European Union and other
international structures have particular significance for Serbia’s development
and progress.”209 The document also asserts that, “through her foreign policy,
the promotion of cooperation with neighbouring countries and building joint
capacity and mechanisms for resolving contradictions, disputes, and all types
of challenges, risks and threats on the regional and global levels, the Republic
of Serbia is contributing to the creation of a peaceful, stable and safe security
209 Republic of Serbia, Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti, October 2009, p. 13.
251
environment”.210 Likewise, the Strategy points out that “the Republic of Serbia supports and is committed to regional cooperation in the areas of joint
training and deployment of elements of the security services in multinational
operations, crisis management and border control”.211 Further, the document
states that “through the process of European integration, the Republic of Serbia expresses its readiness to build the capacity and capability of the national
security system, in accordance with the standards and obligations deriving
from the European Security and Defence Policy.“212
Unfortunately, other strategic documents in the Republic of Serbia have not
recognised this possibility as sufficiently important. The National Strategy of
Serbia for EU Accession for Serbia and Montenegro, adopted by the government
of the Republic of Serbia in June 2005, states that „Serbia will endeavour, as far
as possible, to keep its foreign policy in line with the principles of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy“.213 However, this document does not even mention the European Security and Defence Policy. The National Programme for
EU Integration, which was adopted by the government of the Republic of Serbia
in 2008 states that “the Republic of Serbia is continuously promoting dialogue
with the European Union and reforming its civilian and military capacities in
order to be prepared, after attaining full membership to, among other things,
take on the obligations arising from the European Security and Defence Policy
and to participate in crisis management operations under EU leadership.”214
However, as the example of other states in the region make it clear, it is not
necessary to delay integration into the CSDP until full EU membership has
been achieved. In the final version of this document from December 2009,
in an appendix by the Ministry of Defence, it is stated that “the Republic of
Serbia is ready, through taking part in the activities of the European Security
and Defence Policy, participating in the Partnership for Peace, and within the
210 Ibid, p. 11.
211 Ibid, p. 16.
212 Ibid, p. 16. Such strategic commitments were confirmed in Defence Strategy (2009)
The authors of this text consider it necessary to confirm and make concrete this commitment
through the drafting and adoption of other strategic-doctrinary documents, which are currently
being drafted, and for their adoption to be announced in the “National Integration Plan” before
the end of 2010. These are the Strategic Defence Review, the Military Doctrine, the Long-term
Plan for Defence Systems Development and the Medium-term Programs and Plans for Defence
Systems Development.
213 Government of the Republic of Serbia, Nacionalna strategija Srbije za pristupanje Srbije
i Crne Gore, Belgrade, June 2005, p. 43.
214 Ibid, p. 785.
252
framework of regional initiatives, to strengthen its own security, and through
dialogue and cooperation contribute to peace and stability”.215 Likewise emphasised is the Republic of Serbia’s readiness to intensify dialogue with the EU
on issues relating to security and defence, once the SAA comes into force.
Despite these statements of at least half-hearted commitment, decision
makers in the Republic of Serbia have until now been exceptionally passive
when it comes to the CSDP. Until now, as far as is known to the authors of
this paper, they have spoken in favour of Serbia’s possible participation in
the CSDP on only a few occasions. The first was in November 2008, when
the then Chief of Staff, Zdravko Ponoš, following a meeting with the head of
the Military Committee Henri Bentegeat in Brussels, put forward a few ideas
heading in this direction. On that occasion he announced that it was necessary for Serbia to develop cooperation within the CSDP framework, and potentially also in EU Battlegroups as well as that “in the military field it is possible to go further than in other areas of EU accession” as it had been made
“possible for our officers to take part in EU exercises as observers and for EU
officers to receive invitation to attend Serbian Army exercises”216. Likewise,
Ivica Dačić, the minister of internal affairs, indicated, firstly in April and
later in July 2009, the possibility of the participation of the Serbian police
in EU operations.217 The media in Serbia have not paid much attention to
this theme, their attention being largely focussed on relations between Serbia and the EU. Besides this, with a few exceptions, experts have paid little
attention to the problem of Serbia’s integration into the CSDP.218 Excepting
a few academic seminars, this theme is still not being discussed in public or
in the wider expert sphere.219 Finally, Minister of Defence Dragan Šutanovac
215 This document is revised periodically, meaning that this formulation could be changed
in the near future.
216 Serbian Army, „General Ponoš na sastanku vojnog komiteta Evroatlantskog partnerstva”, See: http://www.vs.rs/index.php?news_article=219be3cc-0cfb-102c-ad2f-79b934d89d8d
217 RTS, 1 April 2009, „Srpski policajci u misijama EU“, See:
ht t p : / / w w w. r t s . r s / p a g e / s t o r i e s / s r / s t o r y / 9 / S r b i j a / 5 3 2 7 8 /
Srpski+policajci+u+misijama++EU.html
RTS, 2 July 2009, „Policija spremna za mirovne misije“, See:
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/125/Društvo/71345/Policija+spremna+za+mirovne
+misije.html
218 One of the first to suggest that Serbia take a proactive stance in this area was Srđan Gligorijević from the ISAC fund. See: Srđan Gligorijević, „Partnerstvo je moguće”, Evropski forum,
November–December 2006, no. 11–12.
219 Civil servants from the Republic of Serbia have taken part in a series of courses about
253
started to strongly advocate participation of Serbia in CSDP missions in the
second half of 2010 but so far no concrete progress in that direction has been
made.220
The question, then, is whether Serbia must wait for full EU membership
before it can begin to participate in civilian and military EU crisis management operations and in EU Battlegroups. Although a proactive approach in
this area is not a formal obligation for a state which is not yet even a candidate for membership, it would represent Serbian diplomacy’s trump card in
the process of European integration.221 In addition, integration through the
CSDP could partially compensate for opportunities lost through the decision
to forego, temporarily or permanently, NATO membership. Finally, in this way
Serbia can show it can be a constructive partner and can contribute to Europe’s
security. As we have seen, this has on the whole already been recognised by
other Western Balkan states, which have begun integration into the CSDP and
already participate in EU missions. Likewise, even within the EU itself, there is
a positive attitude towards Serbia’s inclusion in the CSDP. This is borne out by
the words of the aforementioned General Bentegeat that „the European Union
would very much appreciate it if Serbia joined EU peacekeeping operations“.222
It should be noted that at this stage of negotiations over Serbia’s membership, the EU will not insist on the CSDP, given that there are no inbuilt criteria
or standards in this area for this phase of integration. In the previous waves of
enlargement, coordination of defence system reform and defence integration
the CSDP run in cooperation with the defence ministries of Austria, Germany, Hungary and the
European Security and Defence College.
See: ESDP Course open to Western Balkan states, http://www.eu2006.at/en/News/
information/2905esvp.html
Likewise, in the NGO sector, several courses specialised for the ESDP were held, as for example by the ISAC fund and the Centre for Civil-Military Relations’ School for European Security.
See: ISAC fund: http://www.isac-fund.org/lat/esdp.php; CCMR: http://www.ccmr-bg.org/Obrazovanje/3158/Skola+za+evropsku+bezbednost+%282008-2009.%29.shtml
220 The Minister’s campaign started around the time when the Serbian version of this publication was published in May 2010.
221 In the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, the parties undertake to advance political dialogue in order to bring closer „the stances of the parties on international issues, including
matters relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.“ However, the Agreement does
not even mention harmonisation in the area of the CSDP.
222 „Srbija treba da se uključi u mirovne misije“, interview with General Henri Bentegeat.
See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090619_Politika_Daily-Tereza_Bojkovic.pdf
254
took place by means of NATO. Membership of this military alliance was sufficient for the European Union to accept that these former Communist states
had carried out the necessary reforms in this area.223 However, the Treaty of
Lisbon, which entered into force on 1st December 2009, will have a far-reaching effect on the EU’s ability to cope with the challenges of the 21st century,
particularly in the areas of foreign and security policy.
If Serbia wants to speed up the process of European integration and make
up for lost time, without doubt it must begin its security integration into the
EU long before achieving full membership. One way to achieve this is to develop a Battlegroup with other Western Balkans states in the period from 2010 to
2020. By creating a common EU Battlegroup, the Western Balkan states would
be making a symbolic gesture, not only of historic reconciliation between the
region’s peoples, but also an indication of a new era in which the region has
grown from a security burden for the EU into its security asset.
Advantages of and challenges to the Western Balkans Battlegroup
Why would Western Balkan states create a separate EU Battlegroup when
they could simply collaborate within other existing EU Battlegroups, and thus
avoid a whole series of complicated political, financial and technical challenges? There are a number of reasons why adopting just this type of regional approach is in the interest of all the region’s states. First, the cultural and linguistic
similarities which exist in the western Balkans would facilitate communication
within WBBG. Linguistic interoperability is an exceptionally important factor
for cohesion in international military integration. Thus, cultural and linguistic
closeness, just as is the case in other EU Battlegroups, could be the connective
tissue of effective functioning of WBBG too.
Secondly, participation in numerous regional initiatives, membership of
the Partnership for Peace programme and acceptance of NATO standards will
make these armies technically and organisationally interoperable. Although
they have nationally tinted doctrines, the fact that several Western Balkans
armies grew out of the former Yugoslav People’s Army (Serbo-Croat: Jugoslov223 Neutral states are, of course, exceptions to this. When Ireland entered the EC in 1973,
the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy did not yet exist. Austria, Finland and Sweden entered the EU in 1995. By then, the EU had already created the Common Foreign, Security
and Defence Policy, but not yet the European Security and Defence Policy. Cyprus and Malta,
who entered in 2004, still have a rather limited role in the ESDP.
255
enska narodna armija – JNA) influences to some degree the similarity of training. In addition, the Western Balkans armies use similar weapons and equipment, largely inherited from the JNA. Creating a common Battlegroup from
Western Balkan states would require a functional division of labour, in which
each state would develop their own “niche capabilities” alongside the combat
elements. This would reduce costs and further improve the professionalization of the armed forces. However, in order to attain full interoperability, joint
training and military exercises would undoubtedly be necessary. This would
begin with participation in other EU Battlegroups, and only later with participation in the common WBBG.
Thirdly, this kind of regional approach would contribute to the development of mutual trust between former belligerents. Just as the Franco-German
brigade founded in 1987 symbolised a united Europe, so could the WBBG
symbolise lasting reconciliation between the states and peoples of a Western
Balkan region integrated into the EU. Moreover, this type of activity would
contribute to the integration of defence industries in the region and the harmonisation of common modernisation programmes and weapons and equipment procurement. A shared experience in the area of defence policy would
have a positive effect on the strengthening of trust both within the Western
Balkans, and between Western Balkan states and the EU. A multinational EU
Battlegroup consisting of former belligerents could provide an exceptionally
powerful symbolic contribution to the EU Common Security and Defence
Policy. In this way, the EU would strengthen its position as a “soft superpower”,
capable of transforming war torn regions into secure communities and “failed
states” into successful democracies.
Of course it is necessary to keep in mind the potential difficulties of and
challenges to formation of the WBBG. The first challenge is the still fresh
memory of the conflicts during the break-up of Yugoslavia during the last decade of the twentieth century. The question arises of why armies which once
fought each other would work together in one multinational battalion. However, European experience shows that once reconciliation has been achieved
on the political level, armies do not present an obstacle to cooperation. The
second, seemingly much larger, challenge is posed by unresolved political
problems and territorial disputes. Is it realistic to expect that states whose relations are burdened with unresolved territorial disputes would decide to form
an EU Battlegroup together? However, as the experience of European integra-
256
tion shows, it is much easier to solve interstate problems in an atmosphere of
cooperation. It is possible to build trust through cooperation in defence, thus
ending uncertainty, reducing security dilemma and banishing motives for revisionism. Military integration in the western Balkans is part of the solution,
not part of the problem.
The third problem is organisational and revolves around, first of all, the
problem of the “lead nation” i.e. the problem of which state will lead the
WBBG. For now it is difficult to believe that agreement can be reached over
one of the two largest states in the region (i.e. Serbia or Croatia) being the
„lead nation“. For that reason it would perhaps be best for Bosnia and Herzegovina to take that role, as in the meantime this option could be acceptable to
all. However, if agreement cannot be reached, it would perhaps be possible to
find, outside the region, a third state, acceptable to all and with relevant experience of participating in EU Battlegroups. States which could be acceptable to
the entire region could be Greece, Romania and Austria.224 Internal political
resistance by right wing forces in the Western Balkans states could present
another challenge in whose view taking part in peace enforcement operations
could be unacceptable.
Each state in this multinational battalion would rely on its own special capabilities. Although at this moment it is only possible to speculate, we will set out
some of the special capabilities which states in the region can rely on. Bosnia
and Herzegovina could make use of its demining forces, proven to be successful,
while Croatia could use the experience of its platoon of military police which
is currently in Afghanistan. Members of the Macedonian Special Forces have
experience of asymmetric warfare in Iraq, and could contribute to WBBG in this
respect. In principle, the Serbian Army could aspire to contribute something in
the region of the following: one infantry battalion, a military police platoon, a
CBRN defence platoon, medical teams and a light field hospital. This list represents structural elements similar to those already declared as part of the Serbian
Army’s participation in the NATO Planning and Review Process (PARP).
Likewise, decision makers and planners must, among other things, during
the implementation of the EU Battlegroup concept, deal with the question of
224 The inclusion of an extra-regional state to act as a lead nation would have its benefits but
also costs. One of them is the loss of linguistic and cultural interoperability.
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whether training will be conducted jointly or separately. For example, the training for HELBROC was first conducted separately by the national contingents, so
that at a later stage of training, the facilities of the Multinational Peace Support
Operation Training Centre in Kiklis, Greece could be used. This model could be
followed by the WBBG, with Serbia offering the capacities of its Military Academy, its Centre for Peacekeeping Operations in Belgrade, and the capacities of its
newly-built military base „South “ (also known as „Cepotina“).
Also highly important is the question of tactical and strategic transport. As
mentioned above, EU Battlegroups should be able to be deployed up to 6000
km from their home region. In the case of HELBROC, this problem was resolved through Greece’s armed forces supplying Antonov An-14 and Hercules
C-130 transport aircraft. The region’s armed forces could address this problem
jointly, and through concerted efforts and investments together with other EU
states develop capabilities for tactical and strategic transport.
It is necessary to begin informal negotiations over the formation of WBBG
as soon as possible. It is difficult to say how procedures for forming, training
and certification of EU Battlegroups will look in a couple of years, given that
the decision making procedure in the CSDP is undergoing a process of adjustment to the changes brought by the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus, the well known
theory that the EU is a moving target for all states in the process of accession is
true of both adjustment in this area, and of attempting to meet set standards.
In any case, until the formal founding of the EU Battlegroup, it is certainly
necessary to successfully complete negotiations with the EU Military Committee as well as talks with partners participating in the creation of the EU
Battlegroup. Following this, the lead nation must be selected, and harmonisation of standards for forming, training and certification of EU Battlegroups
completed. In the following section, we will provide a four-phase road map for
the formation of WBBG by 2020.
A road map for the Republic of Serbia’s inclusion in the CSDP
1. Preparation and observation phase (2010–2012)
For a number of reasons, 2010 is perfectly suitable for the commencement of the first phase. Firstly, the Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1st December 2009, opening the door for further enlargement of the EU. Relations
258
between Serbia and the EU improved when the decision on visa liberalisation came into force on 19th December 2009, as well as the Interim Trade
Agreement, which came into force on 1st February 2010. On 22nd December 2009, Serbia filed a request for candidate status, and it is expected that
this request will be granted in the first half of 2011. Besides this, Štefan Füle,
the Czech Republic’s former ambassador to NATO and minister for European integration was chosen as European Commissioner for Enlargement
and Neighbourhood Policy. The Czech Republic strongly supports Serbia’s
EU entry, and Commissioner Füle himself has on several occasions made
clear his support for Serbia’s rapid Euro integration.225 The region’s other
states can also expect an acceleration of European integration in 2010. During 2011, Croatia could complete negotiations, and Macedonia begin them.
Finally, the world economic crisis and the European monetary crisis have
undoubtedly strengthened scepticism in certain European capitals towards
enlargement proceeding any further than Croatia. The creation of WBBG
will be the strongest card for the region’s states to play against such negative
tendencies.
Spain, with whom Serbia has excellent diplomatic relations, holds the
EU presidency for the first half of 2010, a period in which Serbia could
complete all the preparatory work necessary for members of Serbia’s armed
forces to be sent as observers in the ranks of the Spanish Battlegroup due
to be „on duty“ in the second half of 2010.226 This process can continue in
the second half of 2011, within the framework of the Greek Battlegroup
HELBROC, which also bears the name „Balkan Battlegroup“. Greece and
Spain, as members of the EU and NATO who have not recognised the independence of Kosovo, and with whom Serbia has exceptionally good diplomatic relations, could become key partners for the long term in Serbia’s
integration into the CSDP.
225 For example, the first delegation received by Commissioner Füle, at the beginning of
February 2010, was that of the Republic of Serbia.
226 Miguel Ángel Moratinos, the Spanish foreign minister, visited Belgrade on 12 December 2009, and the following day the Serbian Defence Minister announced that Serbia intends to
take part in a UN mission to Lebanon, alongside a Spanish contingent, and that preparations
for these activities will begin very rapidly. See: „Šutanovac o budžetu za Vojsku“, 13 December, 2009, See: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=12&dd=13&nav_
category=11&nav_id=398049
259
In the Preparation and observation phase the Republic of Serbia must aim its
efforts in three directions. The first direction would be institutional preparation for inclusion in the CSDP. This should be understood to mean all activities
directed towards the building and strengthening of institutional and human
capacity within the Ministry of Defence. It is particularly important to achieve
full functionality of the organisational unit responsible for CSDP matters
within the Serbian Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of Defence, along with
the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Finance Ministry,
the Ministry for Economics and Regional Affairs and the Office for European
Integration, is responsible for implementation of the activities of the Republic
of Serbia in the area of European security and defence policy (a subgroup of
technical group 31).
From an institutional viewpoint, it is necessary to create conditions for
horizontal cooperation between these institutions. The appendix to the NPI
(National Programme for Integration) written by the ministry of defence states
that an institutional priority for 2010 is the creation of a department for European Integration and Regional Initiatives, which in the defence sector will
concern itself with analytical and operational tasks in the area of cooperation
with EU institutions. In addition, “having in mind the defined mission of the
army, the Centre for Peacekeeping Operations of the Joint Operational Command of the Serbian Army Headquarters has intensified its activities in preparation for members of the Serbian Army to take part in multinational operations.” Recognising the relevance of such a commitment, it is also desirable to
form the core of a domestic element of personnel from EU missions based at
Headquarters. Besides which, it would be desirable to develop a communication strategy for Serbia’s EU accession in the area of the CSDP. Likewise, the
process of education and training of Ministry of Defence employees in the
field of the CSDP should be intensified. This process should focus on practical
training, i.e. on the practice of EU/CSDP institutions, ministries and military
headquarters of EU member states. Likewise, it is necessary to train officers
and other officials who, on Serbia’s accession to the EU, would be seconded to
EU military headquarters. For this reason, the annual educational plan for the
Ministry of Defence and Serbian Army should include training related to the
CSDP. The EU organises and carries out such training for both member and
candidate states. It is also desirable to begin preparing a permanent military
representative from Serbia to the EU Military Committee.
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Furthermore, it is possible to begin equipping, training, preparing and certification in preparation for Serbian Army forces to take part in EU Battlegroups. Parallel to this, the Serbian Army must reach full compliance with
NATO standards and procedures. Finally, it is necessary to begin to include
planned Serbian Army activities in EU Battlegroups in the Annual Plan for use
of the Serbian Army and other defence forces in multinational operations. This
way, the legal and technical prerequisites for Serbia’s inclusion in EU military
operations, carried out with the help of NATO capacity, and within the framework of the Berlin Plus agreement, will be met.227
The second direction in which efforts must be directed in the initial
phase would be towards achieving a series of political and military forms
of cooperation with the EU. This relates above all to the establishment of
regular consultations with the Political Security Committee, the EU body
which manages the CSDP. This can be followed by initiating a “twinning”
project, i.e. placing EU experts at the Serbian Ministry of Defence. As a
rule, the user state chooses a partner from EU member states; this type
of project contributes to achieving concrete operative results in the area
of specific EU policies (in this case the CSDP). It would also be a good
idea for the selected individuals to undertake internships in institutions in
which they can observe the work of their colleagues engaged in tasks related to the CSDP. These internships should take place both in EU states and
in regional states participating in this policy. Additionally, it would be desirable to begin regular consultative meetings with defence ministers of EU
member states and of Western Balkans states under the auspices of the EU
Military Committee, as well as to initiate contacts with EU Military Staff
representatives. During this period it would be desirable to complete negotiations and sign a security agreement with the EU, enabling the exchange
of confidential data between the Republic of Serbia and the EU.228 Finally,
227 This is in agreement with the NPI, in which the Minister of Defence says that „within
the framework of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the Republic of Serbia is gradually fulfilling the
commitments it had undertaken, and developing cooperation with the other members of this
Programme. In 2009, the PARP Assessment came into force, listing 19 goals of partnership for
the Republic of Serbia. It is planned that by 2012 the Republic of Serbia will have prepared the
declared forces for engagement in operations within the Partnership for Peace programme.“ As
the PARP document is not available to the public, it is not possible to judge whether these forces
are also suitable for participation in EU crisis management operations or in Battlegroups.
228 State Secretary for Defence Dušan Spasojević talks of this in his interview with the
newspaper „Danas“, „We have also initiated the conclusions of an agreement on secure proce-
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it would be useful for the Defence Committee, and possibly the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the Serbian parliament, to establish contact with the
Subcommittee for Security and Defence (part of the European Parliament’s
Foreign Affairs Committee)229, as well as to begin sharing experience in
the area of the CSDP with relevant parliamentary committees of the region’s states.230 In this way, capacity building for democratic control of the
Serbian Army’s participation in EU operations would be started in time.
Finally, the domestic defence industry at this stage would already be able
to begin to find a place in the plans of the European Defence Agency. The
preparation and observation phase would be crowned with the placement
of Serbian Army Forces on the duty roster of operational Battlegroups according to the decision of the EU Political and Security Committee, and on
the suggestion of the EU military staff.
The third direction of activity in the Preparation and observation phase
would be the opening of the political dialogue leading up to the creation
of WBBG. In order for WBBG to be certified and deployed by 2020, it is
necessary to begin talks about it in 2010. In the words of Terje Haaverstad,
the Kingdom of Norway’s one time military attaché in Belgrade, „it is certainly too soon for the realisation of this vision. However, this should not
prevent decision makers in the Western Balkans from even now beginning
talks about how this vision can be realised. Much time is required due to
dures for the exchange of confidential data with the European Union, which will enable us to
engage in EU missions.“
See: http://www.mod.gov.rs/novi.php?action=fullnews&id=1968
Besides this, it is perhaps necessary to compare legal formulations of the region’s states for
dealing with the presence of foreign armed forces on their territory (e.g. joint exercises, manoeuvres etc.) This applies to cases where it is necessary to hold joint exercises or training. Similarly,
the exchange of confidential information should be regulated in an appropriate manner.
See: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/vesti-dana/Sporazum-o-vojnoj-saradnji-Srbije-i-Hrvatske.sr.html
229 Related to this, it is certainly appropriate to follow the practice of other EU member
states and appoint a representative from the Serbian parliament to the European parliament, at
least on an informal basis. More on this at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/lang/en/
pid/18/cache/offonce
230 One of the most effective forms of inter/parliamentary cooperation in this field, without
doubt, will be to hold inter/parliamentary conferences (on a regular basis) to consider CFSP/
CSDP matters, as foreseen in Article 9 of the Protocol of the Lisbon Agreement on the role of
national representatives of member states. It is expected that representatives of candidate states
will be invited to these meetings (e.g. COSAC).
262
great complexity, the investment required and the political issues which need
to be resolved.“231
2. Adaptation phase (2013–2015)
In order to begin the second phase of planning and adjustment, two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the Serbian Army must have at its disposal
qualified forces, trained and certified to engage in EU Battlegroups. Secondly,
political agreement must be reached with the EU over Serbia’s participation in
some EU Battlegroups.
In this phase, Serbian Army units would be gradually adjusted to integration in one of the existing EU Battlegroups. Due to NATO’s military action
against Yugoslavia in 1999, and also the unresolved status of Kosovo, Serbian
public opinion had become fairly sceptical when it comes to the Serbian Army’s participation in multinational operations.232 For this reason, it is recommended that during the adjustment phase, the Serbian Army’s participation
in EU Battlegroups is limited. This primarily means that only services not directly involved in combat duties will take part.
Likewise, it would be desirable for Serbian Army units to be integrated into
Battlegroups whose contributing states are militarily neutral (Sweden, Austria,
Finland and Cyprus) or states which have not recognised the independence
of Kosovo (Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Romania). The Republic of Cyprus is the
only state which is both militarily neutral and has not recognised the independence of Kosovo, meaning that any military cooperation with this state
within the HELBROC Battlegroup has a good chance of meeting with public
approval. The Balkan Battlegroup will be on duty during the first half of 2014,
which is an excellent opportunity for the participation of a Serbian contingent.
This contingent could have up to 50 members from the ranks of the military
police, demining teams, medical teams and, of course, staff officers.
During this phase, political preparations for the creation of WBBG must
also be intensified. This question may be addressed through bilateral contacts
231 Online interview 13.10.2009
232 For more on this, see: Miroslav Hadžić and Milorad Timotić, Javnost i vojska, Centre for
Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2006.
263
both with other states in the region, and with EU member states. If the idea is
accepted, it will be possible to convene a regional conference at which it will
be necessary to reach consensus on the creation of WBBG by 2020. It is desirable to organise the regional conference in cooperation with Greece, who will
hold the EU presidency during the first half of 2014. At this conference, as well
as expressing general political will, a decision will be made as to which state
will be the BG Point of Contact for coordination of planning and preparation
of the Battlegroup, and also which state can play the role of „lead nation“. According to existing procedures, the process of formally founding a Battlegroup
begins at a meeting of the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
(or GAERC). Following this, defence ministers of the participating states sign
a letter expressing the intention to offer the European Union the services of
their fully operational Battlegroup by a given date.
3. Phase of advance participation, planning and preparation (2016–2017)
During this phase, the Republic of Serbia can advance its participation in
Battlegroups by including other branches of the Serbian Army, such as infantry,
artillery, transport aircraft and helicopter units. One of the most difficult challenges in the phase of advanced participation will be winning public support in
Serbia. This will be especially complicated if the EU Battlegroup in which Serbia is participating is used in implementation of an EU mission. There is a risk
that, if the Battlegroup is used for a CSDP operation, the Serbian Army may
suffer casualties. Professionalization of the Serbian Army, along with added
investment in training those who will participate in the EU Battlegroup may
reduce, but cannot entirely eliminate, this risk. For this reason, if events play
out in this way, a strategy for communication with the public must be devised
in time. A detailed plan for social care of casualties and their families must also
be devised.
During this phase, planning for the creation of WBBG must be begun.233
With this aim it is desirable to continue dialogue with prospective contributor
states. Special attention should be paid to politically sensitive issues, such as
the decision-making process for Battlegroup deployment, the legal mandate
and national responsibilities. This dialogue would be crowned by the signing
233 For a standardised guide to the creation of Battlegroups, see: Council of the European
Union, Military Staff, EU Battlegroup Preparation Guide, Brussels, 8 September 2009.
264
of Memoranda of Understanding between the prospective contributing states.
These documents can deal with the following matters: decision making on Battlegroup deployment; consultation between contributing states during planning and preparation for WBBG, as well as in the so-called stand-by phase
following certification; command and control during operations in which the
Battlegroup is involved; exercises and training; and other legal and financial
matters. Alongside the Memoranda of Understanding, and based on them,
Technical Agreements are also signed by the contributing states, defining how
staff are placed within the Battlegroup structure and dealing with training and
exercises as well as the use of the Battlegroup. If some issues remain unresolved, alongside the Memoranda of Understanding and Technical Agreements,
other multilateral or bilateral agreements may be concluded at this stage. This
process is coordinated by the BG Point of Contact.
4. Phase of development of initial operational capacity and formation of
the Western Balkans Battlegroup (2018–2020)
In this phase, Serbia would, together with other contributing states, continue its preparation of WBBG. First, the development process for the WBBG
package must be started. From this process should derive the composition
and capabilities of the Battlegroup package, the so called ORBAT (Order of
Battle), including national responsibilities. Similarly it is necessary to agree
the standard operation procedure for the functioning of the WB Battlegroup.
The BG Point of Contact is also responsible for planning training of WBBG
force command. It is also necessary to establish a well coordinated decision
making process over the use of WBBG, to be followed by participating states.
It is desirable for this process to be carried out at maximum speed in order for
WBBG to be able to comply with the foreseen timeframe for rapid deployment
in a period of 5 to 10 days after a decision by the EU Council. It is necessary
to develop a WBBG intelligence section, which would meet twice yearly. It
would be good for these meetings to be attended by intelligence officers from
other Battlegroups, if possible from the Battlegroup scheduled to be on duty
alongside WBBG, as well as those due to be on duty in the six month periods
before and after WBBG.
Training and exercises are key for successful certification. The BG Point
of Contact coordinates the process of training, exercises and certification.
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These must be in harmony with NATO procedures set for NATO Response
Forces (NRFs). The training process consists of four levels: individual training,
training of units, training of the BG core (the infantry battalion) and training of the WBBG package. Interoperability and operational effectiveness are
achieved through joint combined exercises. Participating states are responsible
for Battlegroup certification, but it takes place in accordance with procedures
agreed at the EU level. The European Union Military Committee is the organ
which monitors the process of evaluation and certification of the Battlegroup.
The BG Point of Contact is required, at least one month before WBBG is put
on standby, to certify that its package meets the agreed Battlegroup criteria.
Other EU member states may also be invited to observe the certification process, which would be particularly desirable given that WBBG will be largely or
entirely composed of states which are not yet EU members.
This phase would be completed first with the placement of WBBG on standby during Finland’s presidency in the first half of 2020, and then on the EUBG
roster during the next scheduled Coordination Conference. Thus, the Western
Balkan states, upon entering the EU, would be showing much more than that
they can provide security individually. The creation of the WBBG would be the
best way to prove that they have overcome past conflicts, and are in a position
to integrate their defence capabilities and so contribute to European security.
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NATO after Lisbon: The Western Balkans in the Alliance
by 2020
Dr Mladen Nakić234
NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in late 2010, aims
to respond to new threats and challenges that will dominate the next decade. The
Alliance has formally completed its post-Cold War transition and it is no longer
just a classic defensive organization, as was cited in its earlier policy documents.
Although NATO’s Article 5 remains the main pillar of the Alliance, global security engagement requires considerations of a “broader picture” of the world, rather
than only within the Euro-Atlantic area of its member states. Special importance
in changed international relations is increasingly given to various partnerships
through which NATO can legitimately influence the security and stability of the
international order. Regardless of the strength and power of its members, the Alliance will not be able to play an independent role in the international political
arena; therefore, partnerships with EU, UN, OSCE, but also with Russia and other regional organizations and countries, are crucially important. In the next ten
years, the area of South-east Europe should be defined in security terms, which
means that all countries of the region could and need to be formally integrated
into Euro-Atlantic political and security space.
234 Author is a Doctor of Science in the field of international relations and national security.
He is currently Executive Director of the Centre for International Studies from Zagreb.
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In sixty-one years of its existence, the Alliance has undergone various phases of development in international relations – from the Cold War to an attempt
at creating a global partnership. Particularly challenging was the era marked
by the Polish Solidarnost and the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which
marked the beginning of the fall of communism in eastern Europe, which preceded dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; what Putin termed
„the greatest geopolitical disaster of the century“.
It was exactly the disappearance of its ideological and military opponent
from the political scene in early nineties which was used by critics of the Alliance to strengthen negative attitudes which brought into question its future
existence and the expediency of its future mission.235 Although the Alliance
gathers amongst its members a majority of the most developed and wealthiest democratic countries in the world, it is continually facing new challenges,
particularly in international relations, as well as those related to its own considerations as to how best to adequately respond to them.
War in the former Yugoslavia – the beginning of
redefining new NATO’s mission
Discussions on the future of the Alliance were on-going internally and externally for almost the whole decade (1990-1999). Until 1995, critics of the
Alliance used to bring into question the very purpose of NATO’s further existence; whilst from the mid-nineties, this discussion was more focused on the
future mission of the Alliance. The tragedy of the war in the former Yugoslavia – particularly the ethnic cleansing and genocide – demonstrated that, fifty
years after the end of the Second World War, Europe was not ready and/or
willing to prevent war on its own territory.
235 Theory of Balance of Powers starts from the fact that alliances stop growing in strength
once their purpose is satisfied. Waltz, as a realist, is of the opinion that NATO is slowly heading
towards its end, and though it is not the matter of day, that question could once again gain in its
relevance in few years time. As the main reason, he states the fact that Europe accepted the U.S.
hegemony, thus preventing the return to the balance of powers. Realists also believed that unipolarity can not be very long-lasting, since a dominant state increasingly takes over ever more
obligations and responsibilities, which over the time leads to its weakening. One can agree with
that claim, given that unipolar order cannot remain stable for a long time because other countries do not feel safe. John. Ikenberry, America Unrivaled, Cornell University Press, 2002., p. 11,12.
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The Alliance’s military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in
1995, marked the beginning of NATO’s new mission. It was quite clear that the
war in the former Yugoslavia did not pose a direct security threat to any of the
Alliance’s members, and it soon became obvious that the sole task of defence
was not sufficient given the changes in the international community. Bacevich
recognises the fact that Clinton transformed NATO from a defensive organisation into something which primarily needs to react externally, both politically
and militarily.236 Collective security became the brand of the Alliance; however, the definition of collective security became more a passive instrument
of collective protection, rather than a concrete means for strengthening collective security on the European continent and further afield. As a matter of
fact, what was at stake were the basic transatlantic values of member states and
their common democratic traditions. Common values, which served as the
basis for defining essential common interests are the only remaining thread
connecting the Alliance’s member states, apart from ideological and military
ones which emerged after the demise of communism, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As was the case with NATO’s intervention in
BiH, the intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was primarily about the protection of
democratic values (individual and collective), and less about security threats
to its very members. Actually, it was exactly there that the concrete post-Cold
War transformation of the Alliance in the direction of the protection of common values, primarily in Europe, and subsequently beyond the transatlantic
sphere, started.
Washington - Lisbon – Washington
One of the guidelines of the Strategic Concept adopted in Washington
in 1999 was strengthening of the Alliance’s available capacities for new missions in response to new threats to its common interests and values. What
they had in mind were regional conflicts, such as BiH and Kosovo. The transnational threat of terrorism was only mentioned in the context of the threat
from weapons of massive destruction. However, after the terrorist attacks
on the U.S. on 11th September 2001, international terrorism has become the
key starting point in the development of all future guidelines and activities
236 Bacevich Andrew, American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy,
Harward University Press, Cambridge, 2002., p.75.
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of the Alliance, as well as a subject of certain disagreements in the phase of
joint decision-making. The terrorist attack on military and civilian targets
in the U.S., conducted through the use of hijacked planes, opened-up discussions within the Alliance about the system of collective defence and its
mechanism for rapid response. For the first time in the Alliance’s history,
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was justifiably activated, regardless of
the fact that it was not a classical attack with conventional forces on one of
its members. However, this also prompted discussions about the mode and
conditions under which Article 5 can or should be invoked for the purpose
of collective defence.
The new Strategic Concept adopted in Lisbon reaffirmed the relevance and
permanence f Article 5 as the pillar of collective defence. Bearing in mind unconventional threats, not only to NATO’s member states, but to the broader
Euro-Atlantic security environment, Article 5 and collective defence should be
understood in terms of the protection of collective security, particularly in relation to terrorist threats, the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, as
well as biological and chemical warfare. The use of Article 5 outside the territories of the Alliance in terms of broader (preventive) collective security, should
be made procedurally clearer in the phase of decision-making and concrete action, in order to avoid the situation which preceded the attack on Iraq in 2003.
Two main objectives are particularly important – a) security in Europe and
North America – which should be the link with the „old“ or traditional NATO
under Article 5 and b) security for Europe and North America, as well as for
the countries with Western values that are not members of the Alliance. This
is a „new“ NATO which promotes common values, with a particular emphasis
on the importance of Article 4, i.e., the need for consultations or harmonisation of opinions within the Alliance, and often with external partners. The fact
that an Atlantic idea is the corner-stone of cooperation between the U.S. and
Europe is very important for both.237
237 Brzezinski makes the importance of the Atlantic community of the U.S. and Europe even
more visible by showing some indicators. 13% of the world population lives in NATO member
states and/or Europe, but together they make 63% of the world GDP, in 2005 they produced
the goods worth 27 trilion USD, and make 77% of total world military consumption. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Second Chance, Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, Basic Book,
New York, 2007., p. 188.
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In the coming years, the Alliance should also demonstrate that it is something more than a classical defence organisation. Safe-guarding Western values, such as freedom, equality, joint democratic heritage, rule of law, etc., will
be the starting point for the creation of global partnerships.
Through global partnership to the next decade
The EU and NATO are creating a new strategic partnership which will not
remain within the boundaries of transatlantic space only. Should the term
“partnership’ be understood in a broader sense of guaranteeing an efficient
crisis-management system, the main issue is how to best respond to those crises? Therefore, the purpose – as well as the objective of NATO’s future mission – is not only its transatlantic connectedness, but rather the willingness
and resoluteness on the part of democratic countries to protect their common
security and democratic heritage.
Partnerships are of a multi-dimensional character and should not be reduced to solely an institutional level of cooperation that other countries have
with the Alliance. Should we take into consideration simplified institutional
bonding, we can gain a wrong perspective of priorities, and even of the importance of partnership ties. Therefore, we could first take the partnership with
countries that are members of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme as
a preparation for their full membership in the Alliance. In the second circle of
partnerships, we could put those members of PfP which do not have any aspirations towards membership, but are taking part in the programme because
of their own interests. Then, there is a partnership with other organisations of
collective security, such as the UN and OSCE, which the Alliance will seek to
strengthen. Last, the Alliance is also building security partnerships with countries beyond the transatlantic region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan
and South Korea, as well as in the Mediterranean region.
Each of the stated forms of partnership have their weight and it would be
difficult to rank them according to their importance. The current form of partnerships with countries of Asia and the Pacific is most likely more important
and concrete from the perspective of the fight against terrorism and other security threats (for example,. in Afghanistan) than cooperation with aspiring
countries within the PGP (BiH, Montenegro and Macedonia). However, the
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notion of partnerships should be viewed in the context of harmonisation of a
regional approach to a variety of security challenges. Whilst those challenges
were particularly pronounced in the area of South-Eastern Europe and the
Balkan peninsula, the emphasis was on the Alliance’s expansion towards focal
points of potential crisis in Europe (BiH and Kosovo). At the moment, these
challenges are focused on Asia (Afghanistan and Iraq), whereby the engagement of partner countries such as Australia and New Zealand is particularly
appreciated.
Some particularly important partnerships the Alliance is keen to develop
further are those with Russia and China. Regional partnerships – such as cooperation with ASEAN countries, dubbed by some as „Asian NATO“ – give
additional importance to NATO-Russia-China relations.
The creation of a security community, as it was termed by Karl Deutsch
some sixty years ago, was not a utopian objective; however, the time of its
completion is not easy to predict. The creation of global partnerships, which
will also emphasise NATO’s new Strategic Concept, is only one important
stage down that road. Thus, the legal framework for the deployment of forces
outside the territory of member states („out of area operations“) and NATO’s
global arrangements have to be compatible with the continuation of developing functional relationships between the Alliance and the UN and OSCE, as
well as with other collective security actors whose activities are based upon
international law. In the next ten years, the Alliance – in cooperation with
other international key subjects – should be able to provide a clear response to
an increasingly frequent question – whether NATO should become a global
security alliance? Such an ambition was not demonstrated by a single member
of the Alliance, as they took into consideration the reality of international relations. The same could be the case for the decision that creating various forms
of ad hoc „coalitions of good will“ should be practiced as a solution to global
challenges and problems. In any case, the solution should be sought in coordinating the Alliance’s activities with those of the UN and other relevant collective security organisations, based upon international law. That said, Article 51
of the UN Charter should not be used as a justification for preventive attacks.
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Western Balkans in the Alliance by 2020
According to Art, NATO succeeded in its intention to become a respectable
security organisation, with the objective of engaging in regional peace-implementation and stability missions.238 In the mid-nineties, the former Yugoslavia
served as a ground for redefining the Alliance’s future missions. This was the
space where the legitimacy of allied engagement outside the territory of its
member states was tested for the first time. At the same time, this was also the
area where NATO acted militarily for the first time since its inception, given
that during the Cold War military means were never used in fighting between
conflicting parties, due to primarily to the strategic balance established between the two blocks.
Although the situation in the region is stable, without the threat of potential
outbreaks of conflict, long-term regional security is still to be defined. The key
encouraging factor on that road are the Euro-Atlantic integration processes.
One excellent example is cooperation between Croatia, Albania and Macedonia within the American-Adriatic Charter, also joined by BiH and Montenegro, whilst Serbia has the status of an informal observer. BiH is one of the
keys to regional security and also the most complex issue which still demands
an adequate answer to. As a country which aspires towards NATO membership, BiH is faced with very serious problems. Despite being conditionally
granted a Membership Action Plan (MAP), BiH did not succeed in regulating
the ownership of state property, i.e., 69% of military real estate is not registered
as the property of the central government, since this process has been blocked
by the Republika Srpska, which halted the beginning of the Membership Action Plan for another year.
Macedonia fulfilled all the criteria for membership before the Bucharest
summit in 2008, but it was not invited to join the Alliance at the summit in
Strasbourg/Kehl due to its name dispute with Greece. The Greek veto to Macedonian membership in the Alliance does not offer a clear perspective on a po238 Engagement in BiH demonstrates the transformation of NATO which, along its political dimension, puts into first plan its security, and only after that its defence dimension, which
shows the very essence of its hitherto changed mission. Anton Grizold, A Reconceptualization
of NATO’s Transformation: the Next Round, Šipan Yearbook 2006, Politička kultura, 2006., p. 40.
274
tential solution, whereby this issue has become an important internal political
issue for Macedonia.
Montenegro was granted a Membership Action Plan in late 2009; however,
it is now faced with insufficient public support, despite the implementation of
its Communication strategy. An additional problem is the division between
relevant political parties around the definition of strategic national interest,
i.e., a political consensus on that issue is lacking. With candidate status for EU
membership, Montenegro has opened a clear perspective for continuation of
Euro-Atlantic integration.
Serbia’s National Assembly declared „military neutrality“, Serbia is a member of the Partnership for Peace programme and has recently opened its office
in NATO HQ. Though no Serbian politicians (save for the Liberal-Democratic
Party) have clearly spoken out about future membership in NATO, this topic
is increasingly pertinent in the public sphere. At the moment, around 25%
of citizens support Serbia’s membership in NATO, whilst a vast part of the
population is still burdened with negative sentiments towards NATO. Taking
into consideration the experience from 1999, this is still an excellent result. We
should be reminded that at the beginning of the systematic public information campaign on the advantages of Croatian membership in NATO, only a
slightly higher level of support was noted in Croatia. That only means that with
an adequate communication strategy, it can be realistically expected that the
citizens of Serbia will start to view their future through the prism of their own
interests – security, economic and political – and less through their emotions.
What can countries of the region expect after Lisbon?
Though the „open door“ policy is not highly positioned on the Alliance’s
agenda or in the newly drafted Strategic Concept, it is always emphasised as a
matter of continuity. Article 10 of the Treaty remains relevant in terms of facilitating the further expansion of the Alliance. On the other hand, a question
which is imposed as a very objective one concerns the issue of the borders of
further enlargement? Though particularly sensitive for the area of Asia, i.e.,
the former Soviet Union, the region of South-Eastern Europe also has its own
sensitive geostrategic elements in relation to NATO’s enlargement. Despite the
negative attitude of Russia towards Montenegrin accession to NATO membership and its attempt to preserve at least Serbia’s neutral status, developments in
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the region are slowly but surely moving towards integration of the whole area
into the transatlantic security system. By 2020, the security of the whole region
could be defined through the membership of regional countries in NATO and,
of most of them, in the EU. In that context, NATO enlargement in the region
means continuation of the political-security project of stabilizing the European continent.
Modernisation of NATO and the regions
NATO will remain the chief guarantor of Euro-Atlantic security. The new
decade will not be spared from already familiar threats, such as terrorist attacks, the use of subversive weapons of massive destruction or nuclear proliferation, etc. NATO should not aspire to become the world arbiter and executor
of its own verdicts. However, aspects of security threats jeopardising the member states of the Alliance and its population are diverse. Attention should be
redirected from collective security – primarily implying the security of institutions – to the individual security of citizens, i.e., the population.
In these endeavours, a lot of room remains open for preventive actions
which are frequently insufficiently represented in viewing all the causes of
the aforementioned threats. Intervention should always remain a (last) resort,
should all other preventive measures fail to attain the desired results. Antimissile defence can also be one measure of prevention, if viewed in the context
of further reductions of nuclear capacities.
Another important element is the continuity of the consensus principle in
decision-making, as a guarantee to those less influential members that their
voice will also be heard.
The continued development of partnership with Russia, and a desired start
of institutional relations with China, are a challenge both for NATO and these
countries. The problem of resolving the situation in Afghanistan is a common
starting point for strengthening partner engagement, given that all parties
have strong economic and security interests there. The expansion of membership will remain pertinent in the next ten years, as well. It is likely that it
will be more realistic in the south-east of Europe (Montenegro, Macedonia,
Kosovo, BiH and Serbia), rather than in front of Russia’s „courtyard“ (Ukraine
and Georgia).
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Some earlier policies of the great powers did not always bring the best outcomes for the people of our region. Bush Sr. did not want to entangle the U.S.
in the war which led to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The same happened with BiH and Kosovo, when he tried to leave these issues to Europe,
even though he knew that Europe was neither ready nor prepared for them.239
Clinton, on the other hand, recognised the Balkans not only as very important
to U.S. interests, but as an important element for the security of the broader
region (Macedonia, Greece, Turkey and Albania).240
After twenty years marked with wars and tragedies, the area of the Balkan
peninsula is on a good way to institutionally „returning“ to Europe. In the
next five to ten years, South-Eastern Europe will have to be given a clear vision of its political and security belonging within Europe, which implies resolving several regional challenges that remain open. BiH needs to ensure its
own functionality on equal grounds, both of its citizens and its constitutional
peoples. Otherwise, NATO members will be faced with a serious job. Macedonia and Greece have to resolve the name issue, because it is in the interest
of all parties to continue with – i.e. , to complete – Macedonian integrations.
Priština should, in the forthcoming talks with Belgrade, complete the process
of international recognition of its independence and grapple with the serious
challenges that lie ahead. Serbia has to finally extradite Mladić and Hadžić,
regulate its relations with Kosovo and continue with reforms should it want to
obtain candidate status for membership in the EU by the end of 2011.
Conclusion
The Alliance needed a new strategy for new times. Certainly, that strategy
should not be only a piece of paper, but a sustainable strategy for the next ten
years of the Alliance existing as an important international factor. The Con239 Unlike Bush Sr., who was not ready to engage in regional stabilisation endeavours, which
also included BiH, Clinton saw there a very important interest of the U.S. foreign policy there,
which resulted with the Dayton Peace Agreement. Radovan Vukadinović, US Policy in the South
East Europe, Paper Prepared for ISA Conference, Washington, Feb. 1999.
240 Nuechterlein rightly asks a sensitive question of the use of American military power,
thus stating the case of BiH, which should not be a vital American interest. Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Recommitted, The University Press of Kentucky, 2001., p. 239. However, in the
case with BiH, in addition to humanitarian, there was also the question of functioning of the
world order and the stability of Europe, which indeed is declared American vital interest. The
same can be applied to the case of Kosovo.
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cept should combine previous key-points on collective defence being the main
purpose of the Alliance, but also emphasise all necessary elements for its efficient and legitimate performance in out-of-area operations. Article 4 should
be given more importance, since consultations are directly connected with
the attainment of a necessary consensus; the main decision-making principle
within the Alliance.
The world has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, and NATO
has changed accordingly. However, its main mission remains unchanged –
from peacekeeping and stability to responding to new security threats, such as
cyber-crime, energy security and piracy.
Members of the Alliance are aware that NATO has limited capacities. It
is, therefore, important to set out priorities, define the main challenges and
realistically assess all available resources. Partnership with other international
subjects remains a key interest, both for the promotion of multilateral cooperation, as well as for high-quality improvements in international security.
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Experience of Montenegro on its path to Euro-Atlantic
Integrations
Sanda Vučić241
In this paper, special attention is paid to the experience of Montenegro on its
path towards Euro-Atlantic integration, with a particular emphasis on the development of public support for Montenegro’s membership in NATO in the period
since it gained its independence until today. In the second part of the text, recommendations for an effective communication strategy are provided in order to better inform the public about the Alliance, as well as the arguments generally cited
in support of – or against – Montenegro’s full membership in NATO. The message
of this text is that in the world of modern challenges, risks and threats, it is necessary to understand that no country is able to deal with the security challenges of
the twenty-first century on its own; hence the need to strengthen capacities for
joint action, both regionally and globally, and to be part of a security system that
in return can act in everyone’s interest.
241 Author is a spokesperson of Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro
280
Having renewed its statehood in 2006, Montenegro decisively chose the
path of Euro-Atlantic integration, which is also one of the main priorities of
the Montenegrin Government. Accordingly, Montenegro assumed a series of
obligations directed at the overall reform of its security system. Four years after
the referendum on independence, it is not difficult to conclude that Montenegro has remained faithful to its objective of joining NATO and the EU; as demonstrated by the excellent cooperation attained with all Western countries, as
well as the reform processes undertaken in the security sector, intended to
transform this former socialist system into one complementary with NATO
standards applied by all member states, as well as by aspiring members. Only a
Montenegro which is part of a safe and secure Alliance can guarantee security
for future generations in the country and be a stabilizing factor in the region.
On its path towards membership in NATO, Montenegro has fulfilled a majority of the requirements set. However, statistical data demonstrates an extremely low level of awareness and understanding amongst citizens of Montenegro on what Euro-Atlantic integration implies and what NATO actually is.
According to surveys conducted by CEDEM242 in July 2010, 32% of population
stated that they would vote for membership in NATO at a hypothetical referendum; 40.1% stated that they would vote against it, whilst 28% were indecisive. There are several reasons for this, though two major ones are a lack of information on the current role and importance of NATO, and NATO’s bombing
of Yugoslavia in 1999, whose integral part Montenegro still was at that time.
With the aim of informing citizens about the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, the Government of Montenegro set up a communication team working
on implementation of the Communication Strategy on Euro-Atlantic integration. However, current implementation of the Strategy has not taken the desired
course. The milestone in its implementation was a conference, entitled “Dialogue
on NATO - joint efforts in raising public awareness in Montenegro”, organized
by the Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro. Both representatives of parties in office, as well as of those of the opposition, took part in this conference.
The conclusions attained through joint work during the conference were as
follows:
• The Government should not have a monopoly over the process of EuroAtlantic integration;
• The engagement of politicians, i.e., Members of Parliament, has to be
242 Centar za demokratiju i ljudska prava, see: http://www.cedem.me/
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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at a much higher level than it currently is. It is necessary to include all
parties in the process and to present it as a state project, rather that of
the Government or a certain individual;
The objective of the Communication Strategy has to be the education of
citizens, i.e., direct communication with citizens, since communication
is a dialogue, not propaganda;
Target groups have to be clearly defined and should also include the
media, as an extremely significant partner in this process;
The objective has to be clearly defined. It is necessary to establish a team
of experts who will be at disposal of the media and citizens;
Messages have to be concise, precise and understandable to ordinary
citizens;
In order to convey those messages to ordinary citizens as effectively as
possible, it is necessary to use all available resources. One of recommendations is a far more comprehensive and intensive utilisation of
the Internet, rather than only official sites of the Government and the
Communication Team;
Messages which are clear and which should be emphasised in the future
are: guaranteed security; protection of territorial integrity (safeguarding of state borders); economic perspective (higher level of trust in the
state, thus higher levels of foreign investment); being a part of a body
gathering the most powerful democratic countries in the world, with an
equal right to vote; professionalisation of the army, which means that
only professionally trained and equipped soldiers will be sent to war;
The Government should continue with the active promotion of these
ideas, however, it is necessary to also include persons and institutions
with credibility beyond the political sphere (e.g. economists, analysts,
academics, experts in various areas, public personae – athletes, actors,
singers, and ordinary citizens);
Also, it is very important to understand that the very existence of an
action plan for implementation of the Communication strategy is insufficient. What is more important is how that plan is going to be implemented, and who will conduct its implementation.
In addition to insufficient awareness and understanding on the part of the
public and NATO’s bombing campaign in 1999, another argument frequently
used is the prevalent perception of NATO as a solely military alliance. An ar-
282
gument which is also used is that Montenegro, as a full member of NATO,
would have to send its troops to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight for the objectives
of the U.S., Great Britain or any other great power, and not because of its own
interests. There is also a financial aspect, whereby it is customarily claimed
that membership in NATO would be far more expensive than it is presented
to citizens.
However, NATO is primarily a political-military alliance and, as the most
advanced system of collective security, it is an indispensable support to its
members. Decision-making based on the principle of consensus is used within the whole Alliance, which means that all member states are included in
the decision-making processes. One such example is Macedonia, which has
fulfilled all the criteria required for full membership in NATO, yet whose accession to the organisation has been blocked by Greece. Only once these two
states resolve the issue around the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ on a bilateral
basis will Macedonia will be accepted into membership. This example clearly
demonstrates that the voice of a single country can influence whether certain
decisions in the Alliance will be made or not.
Accordingly, NATO membership would enable Montenegro to – as an equal
member of the Alliance – make decisions that are important for collective security. Membership in the Alliance, not only for Montenegro, but for other
countries in the region, is of the highest priority for their stability. Viewed
from an economic perspective, by becoming a NATO member Montenegro
would ‘open a door’ to foreign investors and, even more importantly, it would
reduce the costs it would otherwise have to pay should it remain outside the
Alliance.
A lack of obvious enemies in the military sense, as well as emerging threats
and challenges, motivated Montenegro to organise its defence through cooperation with those partners that share the same values. Therefore, the Montenegrin
Army has taken part in peace-keeping missions in Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia, which only confirms that Montenegro managed to – within a relatively
short period – professionalise and equip its army in accordance with NATO
standards. That also means moving a step closer to membership in the Alliance.
At this moment, the second contingent of the Army of Montenegro is located
in the Hungarian base ‘Pannonia’ in the town of Pol-e Khomri in Afghanistan,
whilst members of the third contingent have been sent to Hungary for training.
In a security environment susceptible to constant changes, NATO is also
constantly reconsidering its priorities, tasks and structure. NATO’s new Strate-
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gic Concept, which will enable the Alliance to face future security challenges,
was developed for exactly that purpose. It is that kind of NATO that suits Montenegro, which – with its modest political, and primarily military capacities
– has to find adequate ways to satisfy its own security aspects and demands.
Accession to NATO is a guarantee of foreign security and a good basis for
strengthening the diplomatic influence of a country through its membership
in the “club of selected ones”, particularly when we take into consideration
the decision-making principles of the Alliance. Furthermore, accession also
assumes compatibility with the process of Europeanisation, modernisation
and democratisation of Montenegro, whose transition has been ongoing for
too long regardless of the fact that accession processes to the EU and NATO,
respectively, are diverse both in their length, as well as their substance. Montenegro, led by its own state interest, would allow itself to attain two objectives
with one process, i.e. to attain multiple gains and benefits.
It is necessary to understand that not a single country in the world is capable of managing the security challenges of the twenty-first century on its
own; therefore, it is imperative to strengthen capacities for joint action, both at
the regional and global levels. Membership in NATO would give Montenegro
the right to vote in all of the Alliance’s decision-making forums, and would improve the capacities of Montenegro to contribute to both national and regional
security. Bearing in mind the difficulties in allocation of the budget, it is logical
that nations can only benefit if the burden of defence is shared with other reliable partners. NATO provides already established mechanism for joint coordination of partners through the development of their strengths and specialised
capacities for optimal utilisation of resources.
Given that the majority of opposition parties in Montenegro (more specifically, all but one) recognise the importance of Euro-Atlantic integration, and
taking into consideration the fact that Russia has changed its position towards
Montenegro’s membership in NATO, what we need to do in the forthcoming
period is to dedicate ourselves to providing high-quality and accurate information on what NATO is, what does it offer and what would Montenegro gain
or lose with its membership in NATO, in order to – when the moment comes
– through a referendum or in the Assembly, be able to make the right decision
on whether it will become a member of the Alliance.
It is necessary to understand that accession to NATO is a lasting process,
whereby nothing happens over night. Also, it is important to understand that
the NATO does not want a Montenegro, or indeed any other country, which
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has not fully satisfied the conditions for membership and does not enjoy the
support of a majority of its citizens for fulfilling these conditions towards the
Alliance. It is especially important to continue with reforms and to finalise the
activities initiated – not because of NATO, nor anyone else, but primarily for
our own sake and the future sake of our country.
When we talk about Serbia and its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration,
the Euro-Atlantic Club of Montenegro is of the opinion that neutrality, in this
moment, is not the solution. Namely, Serbia is too important an actor – and I
dare say, it is an engine of the whole region – therefore, the overall process of
Euro-Atlantic integration will not make any sense should Serbia remain outside the Alliance. All countries of the Balkans, embraced within NATO, are the
guarantor of stability and security in the entire region.
It is, therefore, in the interest of Serbia to initiate the process of accession as
soon as possible, since all those threats identified by the new Strategic Concept
will not bypass Serbia. By considering all the positive and negative aspects of
membership, it is important to particularly emphasise the guarantee of Serbia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity as the most important one.
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The Western Balkans after NATO summit in Lisbon in
2010 and adoption of a new Strategic Concept Prof. Dr Nano Ružin243
The new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in autumn 2010,
marked a new epoch in the security field in Europe and the world, because it is
the very first Concept designed to deal with the new global security threats and
challenges of today, which has identified new security threats worldwide. But,
what are its features? What does this document mean for NATO, for Europe, as
well as for partners such as Russia, Ukraine or Georgia? The NSC is not solely
focused on the Western Balkan countries, yet certain elements of this document,
such as promotion of partnerships, the ‘open door’ policy, a common defence
shield and other modern security threats which pose a real danger for all countries of the continent, also have implications for the security of the Western Balkans. In this context, a question of the future status of countries in the region
arises: Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Albania have
already become members of the Alliance; Macedonia has candidate status since
1999; Montenegro received this status at the last summit, Bosnia and Herzegovina still has to fulfill additional requirements in order to acquire the MAP status,
while Serbia is the only country in the region that does not have any pro-Atlantic
ambitions. 243 Author is the Dean at the Faculty of Political Science, the University FON in Skopje, and
the former Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO between 2001-2008
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Threats, risks and challenges of the 21st century
The threats, risks and challenges the Alliance faces today are precisely defined
and vary greatly in relation to those from the time of the Cold War. It is no
longer considered that the territories and population of the Alliance member states could be the target of a large-scale traditional, conventional military
threat. Contrary to this, threats to global security are now far more numerous
and, among others, also include political instability, ethnic and religious rivalries, wars for access to natural resources and wealth, proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, failed states, genocide, large migration waves, organized
crime, cyber-attacks and terrorism.
All these challenges to global security require that the Alliance finds answers
through new forms of operations aimed at stopping a growing number of
threats. This is exactly why the allies are resolved to continue with the transformation of their defence strategy. Recent experiences and lessons learned
show that for the successful conduct of current and future operations, it is
necessary to have resilient and interoperable forces, well-prepared, trained
according to modern standards and deployable over larger geographical distances. In order to attain the goals that can be found in the document Comprehensive Political Guidance, the Alliance, at the November summit in
Lisbon, adopted its new Strategic Concept, which will guide NATO in
dealing with security risks throughout the next decade. Within the frame
of this document, “NATO-crats” focused on four topics: the relationship
between NATO and the EU, new peacekeeping missions, the relationship
between Russia and NATO, and NATO and global partnerships. However,
what has in recent years caused the biggest stir is the issue of a missile
defence shield.
The anti-missile system, whose main purpose is to provide basic protection
for the citizens and territories of the Alliance members, occupies a significant
place in the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. According to the Secretary General, Andreas Fogh Rasmussen, an anti-missile system is one of “central elements of our defence.”244
244 Press conference held on 21st Novemeber 2010
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Similar optimism and satisfaction with the consensus reached in Lisbon
was expressed by the U.S. President Barack Obama. „The United States and
our allies in NATO have achieved substantial progress today. I am happy to announce that we have for the first time agreed to develop an anti-missile system
that is powerful enough to cover the European territory of NATO and the United
States.”
Attributes such as a historic and sensational summit were not granted solely
thanks to a consensus over the anti-missile system, but also because of Russia’s
participation at the highest level. After all, as well as at previous summits, and
as it was emphasised on the occasion of NATO’s jubilee Summit in Strasbourg/
Kehl in 2009, the Alliance confirmed its commitment “to strengthening the dialogue with Moscow within the NATO-Russia Council“, established in 2002 at the
meeting of the Alliance in Rome, when the Rome Declaration was adopted.
The Lisbon Summit in 2010 saw a notable warming of relations between Russia and NATO. President Obama, who cancelled the anti-missile shield project
in Europe, specifically in Poland, and the construction of a radar in the Czech
Republic, deserves a lot of credit for such a positive development of these relations. In the same context is the question of the Alliance’s further enlargement
toward Georgia and Ukraine, i.e. granting them the status of the Membership
Action Plan (MAP), which was not on the Lisbon Summit agenda. At the same
time, the START agreement between Russia and the United States on reducing
nuclear warheads entered its final stage, while Russia and NATO share common concerns such as the war on terror and the fight against proliferation of
nuclear weapons (Iran).
The new Strategic Concept evokes some of these elements. According to
the document, NATO will “actively seek cooperation on missile defence with
Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners”. Also, Barack Obama received significant support from his European allies regarding the rapid ratification of the
U.S.-Russian agreement on nuclear disarmament, START245, which was signed
in April 2010, but only adopted in December 2010 after on agreement was
reached with Republican senators.
New START strengthens the Alliance and the entire European security,
NATO-crats claim. It does not, therefore, come as a surprise that the Secre245 START - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
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tary General Rasmussen expressed his regret over „delay of ratification of the
START agreement by the Congress”. Other than that, the new START provides
for a 30% reduction in warheads by the two super-powers.
The overall architecture of the new Strategic Concept is based on an ambition to create a safer and more predictable world. That is, indeed, the third
axis of a historically significant Lisbon Summit of NATO. The new Strategic
Concept would have to contribute to the “globalization of the Alliance defence capabilities“. In order to realise these ambitions in a time of great economic and financial changes, increased cooperation – together with a better
use of resources independently of reduced budgets of NATO member states
– is imperative.
Afghanistation
The second working day of the Summit was marked by the affirmation of
a new exit strategy in Afghanistan, whose leitmotif is the transfer of security
control to the military and police forces of Afghanistan by 2014. It is envisaged that this process should take place in several stages; in accordance with
that, it is stipulated that 37 – out of 238 regions – will by the end of 2010 come
under the control of Afghan forces. The Alliance’s course of action is clear and,
as the Secretary General Rasmussen said, it includes “the progress and preparation for Afghanistation of Afghanistan, according to the principle step by
step - region by region”. In the same context, a gradual withdrawal of ISAF246
will be conducted. France and Canada decided to withdraw their troops from
more peaceful to less stable regions, while the British Prime Minister, David
Cameron, announced that all British troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan by 2015. At the same time, the Netherlands, like most other partners,
including the Republic of Macedonia, announced their withdrawal. The Alliance announced at least 35% of its assets and existing structures will be made
available, in accordance with the Lisbon Declaration. On the other hand, it is
planned that the Afghan army reaches 300,000 troops. Finally, the good news
is that Russia will take part in resolving the Afghan crisis by using large transport helicopters.
246 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force
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Alliance’s new Strategic Concept
Since the adoption of the last Strategic Concept in April 1999, at the time
of the fierce NATO air-campaign against Serbia, significant changes in various
parameters and subjects have occurred: the fundamentals of transatlantic security structures have evolved, the number of NATO members has significantly increased, almost all American forces have been withdrawn from Europe
and diverted to the Middle East and Asia, while parallel to these processes,
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was established. The EU
became a new strategic actor, while at the Summit in Bucharest in 2008, France
also returned to the integrated military command and fully joined the Alliance again. After the terrorist attacks on New York on 11th September 2001,
the Alliance activated Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and engaged in an
anti-terror war in Afghanistan. At the same time, it launched a comprehensive
transformation and reform of its own military structures – by creating NATO’s
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and Response Forces – while partnerships in NATO experienced a new rise and a new quality.
During the summit in Strasbourg/Kehl247, a call for the development of a
new Strategic Concept was launched. Development of this document was conducted in three phases: reflective, consultative and final, with the expert team
headed by Madeleine Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State during the Clinton
government.
The new Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance’s commitment in facing
new challenges and threats, and in crisis management and the stabilization of
post-conflict situations in close cooperation with the UN and the EU. The new
Strategic Concept is oriented toward a world without nuclear weapons, with
the emphasis of the Secretary General Rasmussen that “as long as there are
nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.“
Among the six basic programme objectives presented in the introductory part
of the document, the “open door” policy remains valid for all European democracies which share the values of the Alliance and are interested in membership of NATO. In the part related to the most important tasks and goals of
the Alliance, the new Strategic Concept emphasizes about thirty points, in the
247 The summit was held on 3rd April 2009.
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realisation of which NATO would take part. The main objective of NATO is to
safeguard the freedom and security of its members through the use of political
and military means.
In the fourth point of the new Strategic Concept, the Alliance is focused on
three fundamental tasks to ensure the safety of its population and territory:
1. collective defence, which means that NATO members will always assist
each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
2. crisis management, which means that the Alliance is the only force that
has powerful political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises - before, during and after conflicts;
3. cooperative security, which means that the Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security through partnership with relevant
countries and other internationalorganizations, in arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament.
The Alliance remains a unique forum for transatlantic consultations on all
matters pertaining to security. In relation to the security environment, nine
important points were singled out, the most important of which are: although
the threat of conventional attacks on member states has been eliminated, conventional weapons should not be neglected; proliferation of nuclear weapons
and other weapons of mass destruction are a serious threat to stability and
prosperity in the world; terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the
citizens of NATO countries and beyond; the threat and potential impact of terrorist attack increases if the terrorist were to acquire nuclear capabilities; each
conflict within or outside the territory of NATO represents a threat to peace
and stability of the Alliance; cyber-attacks, threats to transnational transportation, supply networks and communications are on the increase, as well as
to vital energy arteries that must be protected and secured in order to avoid
economic and environmental disaster on a large scale; various technological
innovations such as laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that
impede access to space can pose a serious threat to global peace. At the same
time, climate change, sanitation risks, water scarcity, are all a serious threats to
security and the environment.
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In the area of defence – in case of aggression – the Alliance will protect the
territory and population of its member states by activating Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, which by no means implies that the Alliance considers
any state as its enemy. The supreme guarantee of the security of the allies is
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contributing to the
overall deterrence and security of the Allies. To this end, the new Strategic
Concept states that the Alliance will „maintain robust, mobile and deployable
conventional forces to carry out both Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance’s expeditionary operations.“ At the same time, the new Strategic Concept emphasises that „peace is indivisible and that the Alliance will seek active
cooperation with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners.“ The Alliance will
also continue to deal with other types of threats, such as the proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons, cyber-attacks, international terrorism, etc.
In relation to crisis management, the new Strategic Concept states that all
conflicts outside NATO can pose a direct threat to the security of the Alliance’s
territory and population. Experiences from the Balkans and Afghanistan have
shown that a comprehensive approach drawn from political, civil and military
elements is necessary for successful crisis management. Certainly, the most
efficient way to manage the crises is “to prevent them from happening“, and
that’s exactly why the Alliance will engage with other international actors to
encourage continuous analysis and assessment of the international developments, in order to find possible ways to manage them. Even when conflicts
come to an end, the international community still has to provide continued
support and assist in creating the conditions for lasting stability.
Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remain essential goals of the Alliance. After great success in reducing the number of nuclear warheads in Europe, it is now necessary to proceed with the
creation of conditions for the further reduction of armaments. In this context,
Russia has a very important role and should demonstrate greater transparency regarding their short-range nuclear weapons. Otherwise, cooperation between Russia and NATO is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating
a common space of peace, stability and security.248
248 Item 33, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, p.9
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The Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) contributes to strengthening international security, the defence of the Alliance’s values and operations,
whilst at the same time serving as a certain preparation of aspiring states
for their membership in NATO. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and
PfP programme are central for the conception of Europe - free, whole and
in peace. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept is committed to the development of friendly relations and cooperation with all countries of the Mediterranean, with a view to intensifying Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years.
The new Strategic Concept seeks to promote the process of consultations and
military cooperation with the Ukraine and Georgia, taking into account the
Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these two states. At the same time, the new Strategic Concept is trying to facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western
Balkans and to ensure lasting peace, guarantee democratic values and facilitate
regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.
NATO is the unique case in history of an alliance which promotes greater
efficiency and capability, while its own capacities depend on financial, military
and human resources in performing its mission. Only such an Alliance will be
able to cope with security threats of the 21st century.
The Western Balkans after the Lisbon Summit - November 2010
What is the meaning of the new Strategic Concept for the Balkans? Although the document does not specifically deal with the Balkans region, it still
contains references to lessons learned in the Balkans and Afghanistan, while
point 35 of the Concept suggests facilitation of Euro-Atlantic integration of the
Western Balkans, with the aim of ensuring lasting peace and development in
the region. In addition to this suggestion, it is important that the new Strategic
Concept confirms continuation of the “open door” policy for admission of new
members, in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.
The geopolitical space of the Balkans, in a broader sense, includes the states
of the former Yugoslav Federation, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Albania. In a somewhat more narrow sense, the geopolitical area of
the Balkans includes all countries of the former Yugoslavia, excluding Slovenia, with Albania.
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As for the great Balkan group, Greece and Turkey have been NATO members for a long time; Hungary, together with Poland and the Czech Republic
(Višegrad Group) joined the Alliance in the first round of expansion (19971999); Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria received an invitation to join the Alliance, after the terrorist attacks against the U.S., at the Summit in Prague in
2002 (the so-called “Big-Bang”) within the informal group “Vilnus”; while
Albania and Croatia received invitations for membership at the Summit in
Bucharest within the Adriatic group, which was not the case with the third
member of this group, the Republic of Macedonia.249 Other countries of the
Western Balkans, apart from Serbia, have expressed their desire to join the Alliance. Montenegro has received candidate status (a Membership Action Plan),
Bosnia and Herzegovina is expecting the same, which is currently halted due
to unresolved issues of property rights related to military assets. Serbia opted
for neutrality, while Kosovo is still facing the process of international recognition, especially by those NATO members that still have not recognized its
independence (Spain, Slovakia, Romania and Greece).
Republic of Macedonia between the Euro-Atlantic aspirations and
scepticism
The Republic of Macedonia – which gained partnership status in 1995, i.e.
a whole six years before Croatia – has spent the longest time in the Alliance
“waiting room”. During 1999, it obtained candidate status (a Membership Action Plan), while today it is in the process of preparing its 11th Annual Membership Action Plan.
On its way toward Euro-Atlantic integration, the Republic of Macedonia
was the most obedient disciple of all Western Balkans member states: it intensified its reform process; it adopted the Ohrid Framework Agreement and
thereby changed its Constitution; it declared a general amnesty for the Kosovo Liberation Army fighters in 2001; it conducted strong decentralization,
introduced bilingualism and university education in Albanian language,
which resulted in the creation of a multiethnic society that is an example of a
model of democracy for all Balkan peoples, but which the Balkan mentality
still finds difficult to accept.
249 For a more detailed analysis, see Nano Ružin: “NATO vo sovremenite megjunarodni
odnosi”, Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010
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However, after the Greek veto on the Republic of Macedonia’s progress to
full membership in NATO during the Bucharest summit in 2008, which was
formally explained under the pretext of “bad (good) neighbourly relations”
and, informally, as a dispute over the name, Macedonia was not invited to start
accession talks. This consensual view of the Alliance caused great disappointment, NATO-scepticism and a fatigue with the issue of NATO membership
among the political elites of the Republic of Macedonia. It also had the effect of
slowing down reforms and lead to a waning of ambition towards Euro-Atlantic
integration; there was reduction of the military budget from 2.3-2.6% to 1.38%
of GDP; circumvention of democratic processes; politicization of the administration; increased control over the media; threats to political dialogue, intensification of populism and even a stronger shift towards antiquity in search
of some other, more significant identity; commemoration of historical figures
and a decline in pro-Euro-Atlantic mood.
For example, according to recent survey of public opinion, it was concluded
that, despite the decline, the current public support is still sufficient to meet
the conditions necessary to obtain an invitation for membership. However,
when asked to choose between the official name of the country and respective memberships in NATO and the EU, almost 70% of citizens have opted
for preservation of the name at the price of not joining NATO and the EU.
Given that synergy between candidacy for membership in NATO and the EU
depends on the consensus of these institutions which support the Greek position of blocking Macedonia’s membership in both organizations, the problem
with the name has become the main obstacle to Macedonia’s integration to
the EU and NATO. Given that the current mood of both parties is clearly
set and unchangeable (the Republic of Macedonia insists on a dual formula
- namely, that Greece can use any name for the Republic of Macedonia, and
other countries according to their affinities; while Greece insists on geographic
specification, i.e. North, Upper or Vardar Macedonia, with a change of other
elements such as language, alphabet, passports, etc.). All forecasts about rapid
resolution of this semantic problem are rather sceptical, which reduces the
chances of the Republic of Macedonia’s membership in the EU and NATO
to an absolute minimum. The whole baggage could potentially bring the Republic of Macedonia to a new political and inter-ethnic crisis, and the likely
sobering of all those who are currently hampering Macedonian progress to the
EU and NATO.
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The Republic of Serbia, military neutrality or something else?
The Strategic choices of the Republic of Serbia in relation to NATO are
quite different. After the fall of Milošević’s regime and NATO’s air-campaign
in 1999, the question of the relationship between Serbia and the Alliance has
gradually become more relevant, particularly with the strengthening of democratic processes. From an external point of view, on the basis of the on-going
debates and official position of the authorities, it is possible to note three levels
of thinking about the relationship of Serbia with the Alliance: a) position of
rejection b) position of neutrality and c) pro-Atlantic position.
a) The position of rejecting possible membership in NATO is based on at
least three reasons - the first stems from the Milošević times when the Alliance
bombed the positions of Bosnian Serbs in 1995, which had a profound effect on
the course and final outcome of the war in the Krajina and Bosnia. That was followed by the large air campaign in 1999, Merciful Angel, when for the first time
in its history, the Alliance broke its rule of non-intervention outside NATO’s
zone. After these interventions, Serbia suffered huge human, financial, economic
and other losses, also losing its territory - the province of Kosovo and Metohija.
It is, therefore, understandable that any thought about potential membership in
NATO is not acceptable to the wider public, nor to many among the political
elites.
Another reason for rejection is the process Kosovo and post-Kosovo period,
around which two opposing ideas are confronted. One concept, which resulted
in the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Kosovo, was represented by the international community backed by NATO. The main argument was
that as the Albanians were the overwhelming majority compared to the Serbian
minority, then the uncertainty – and financial and other forms of Kosovo’s dependence – threatened to escalate and spread crisis through the region according to the principle of connected vessels. The second concept, represented by
Serbia, is one according to which Kosovo is part of Serbian territory and Serbian sovereignty, and its secession is contrary to international law, and whose
independence will not be recognized by any Serbian government. During the
process Kosovo, and during the post-crisis period, other members of the Alliance
– save from four states – recognized Kosovo’s independence. It is, therefore, understandable that the Alliance, which seized the territory of one state ipso facto,
is an undesirable partner.
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The third reason for rejection is related to bilateral relations between Serbia and Russia. Although Russia was not able to prevent the air-intervention
against Serbia, and withdrew its peacekeeping forces from Kosovo, it has remained an important ally of Serbia, which has not recognized Kosovo’s independence. Russia is opposed to the further expansion of NATO toward its borders, even when it comes to Serbia, which is geographically more distant from
Russia than Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries. Russian diplomacy
has, at least on two occasions, made clear to Belgrade that it opposes possible
membership of Serbia in NATO. First, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade,
Aleksandar Konuzin, said “if Serbia decides to join NATO, Russia will formally recognize the independence of Kosovo, because that military organization
does not consider Kosovo to be an integral part of Serbia.” At the same time,
the Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, complemented his colleague from Belgrade in the same style, saying “Russians can not be more Serb
than the Serbs themselves.”
b) The position of military neutrality as a foreign-policy option was the
result of the three previously explained reasons of anti-NATO sentiment in
Serbia. On 26th December 2007, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted
the „Resolution on the protection of Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity and
Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia“, by which Serbia was proclaimed a militarily neutral country. What does this strategy mean for Serbia? In the opinion of General Zdravko Ponoš, “militarily neutral countries
do not have allies and such neutrality can cost a lot since, when faced with
military threats, a neutral country has to be able to confront them on its
own”. Other authors refer to the conclusions of the Hague Conference of
1907 and emphasize the importance of the principle of active neutrality.
In this context, some authors believe that Serbia can advance its activities
within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, as Austria, Switzerland,
Finland, Sweden and Ireland all do, but which would not necessarily lead to
membership in the Alliance or active warfare against terrorism and without
the use of force. Serbia could also be promoted as a neutral factor in the
Balkans, by which all actions of Serbia – as a neutral state – would be limited to crisis management, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian and
non-military intervention.
However, some authors like Milan Pajević, believe that the idea of Serbia’s
neutrality is an “outmoded option, since real and complete neutrality does no
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longer exist in today’s world and is definitely not a realistic and sustainable
solution for Serbia in the long run.”
c) The Pro-Atlantic position for membership in NATO is represented by
several contemporary analysts, while among political parties, the chief advocates of the pro-Atlantic strategy, with the objective of full membership in
NATO, are the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), G17+ and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO); regardless of the fact that two-thirds of the public do
not support the pro-Atlantic option.
In their official view, the LDP states five reasons as to why it is necessary
that the Republic of Serbia becomes a member of the Alliance: political, security, economic, reasons pertaining to political image and importance of the Republic of Serbia, and unsustainability of the concept of military neutrality. With
respect to security aspects, it emphasizes the fact that by acceding to NATO’s
system of collective security, Serbia would ensure its security and defence and
would have the most powerful countries as its allies. After all, the Republic
of Serbia alone is not able to guarantee its security. When it comes to political
considerations, the LDP believes that by the very act of accepting candidate
status, the government commits itself to greater transparency, democracy and
stability of institutions.
In mid-June 2010, representatives of G17+ and SPO supported the abrogation of the decision on military neutrality of the Republic of Serbia and acceptance of the pro-Atlantic position, with the aim of membership in NATO.
For its part, Serbian diplomacy, despite the improvement of bilateral relations
with NATO which is taking place at the Embassy level, made it clear through
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vuk Jeremić, that “Belgrade does not intend to
take any steps which would lead to its binding with NATO or any other military alliance....[the] policy of military neutrality of Serbia will not be changed.”
This thesis is supported by the statement that “membership in NATO is not a
condition for membership in the EU”, although in the previous three rounds of
the Alliance’s enlargement after 1989, that was the usual path to membership
in the EU.
The Atlantic perspectives of other Western Balkans countries are heterogeneous, ranging from those for which it is only a matter of time before they
fulfill obligations under the Membership Action Plan in order to receive an
invitation to start accession talks (Montenegro) at the next summit of the Al-
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liance, to countries that, in anticipation of the Membership Action Plan, first
have to resolve some internal issues (Bosnia and Herzegovina), or to gain international recognition by all NATO members in order to gain partner status
(Kosovo).
Visions and obstacles
There is no doubt that the foreign policy orientation of the Western Balkans is pro-European and - with the exception of the Republic of Serbia – proAtlantic, as well. Between political ambitions and desires of the political elites
on the one hand, and the reality and mood of the people in the Balkans on the
other, there are more obstacles and barriers blocking or slowing down progress
to membership in the EU and NATO. In this context, we will make a small
comparative analysis between Serbia and Macedonia in terms of membership
in NATO.
Both countries emerged from the former Yugoslav Federation, which – as
a leader of non-aligned movement (1960-1980) – was a prominent opponent
of the politics of blocks and membership in political-military pacts (the Warsaw Pact and NATO) during the Cold War. Therefore, the political elites who
came to power in Serbia and Macedonia in the early-nineties, in absence of a
credible foreign policy orientation, turned to Tito’s strategy. In the Republic of
Macedonia, President Gligorov affirmed a strategy of equidistance in the first
half of the nineties, which is a kind of neutral politics, while Milošević, due
to NATO’s intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, preserved a nonaligned foreign policy.
The Republic of Macedonia joined the general trend of pro-Atlantic orientation of other post-communist countries only later, by acceding to the Partnership for Peace programme (1995) and approaching candidate status by accepting to develop an Action Plan for Membership in 1999.
On the other hand, the air-campaign against Serbia and the “process Kosovo” had a strong effect on anti-NATO mood among the population of Serbia
(about 70% are opposed to membership in NATO). In contrast, the role of
NATO in crisis management in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001, as well as
striving for a greater degree of security through membership in the Alliance,
increased the Euro-Atlantic mood of Macedonian citizens to 85-90%. However, contrary to aspirations and ambitions, diplomatic failure in Bucharest in
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2008 reduced the popularity of the Alliance. Despite the recent pro-Atlantic
mood, which is still about 70%, when asked to choose between membership
in NATO (or the EU) and the name of the country, 20% of surveyed citizens
refused to vote, while nearly 70% of them voted for protection of the name and
non-membership in NATO and the EU. On the other hand, this percentage is
even higher among ethnic Macedonians, while opposed to them, more than
95% of ethnic Albanians give preference to membership in NATO rather than
to the name issue.
In terms of status within the Alliance, both countries have their missions at the
ambassadorial level, i.e. their Heads of missions; both are members of the Partnership for Peace, while the Republic of Macedonia also received the Membership Action Plan. The Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia,
both conducted social reforms (market economy, multi-party system, liberal
democracy), as well as reforms of their armed forces (higher transparency in
adoption and spending of the military budget, civilian control of armed forces,
professionalization of the army). Serbia almost took the same path as the Republic of Macedonia in terms of reforms and reduction of their armies, which
in the past were characterized by the Soviet organizational model. Military
reforms were carried out in synergy with experts from NATO, whereby the
Partnership for Peace had a significant role.
If we would try to summarize parallel relations between Serbia and Macedonia, we would come up with some paradoxical conclusions.
Namely Serbia – which was the target of the air-campaign and lost part of
its territory due to that campaign (Kosovo) – is not interested in membership
in the Alliance, regardless of intensive reforms undertaken in the defence sector, precisely, in cooperation with NATO. The Republic of Serbia is not interested in the status of a candidate country, nor the MAP, but should it decide
to receive MAP status and become a NATO member, it will succeed in a relatively easy way compared to Macedonia. In contrast, the Republic of Macedonia, which for over 11 years (since 1999) has been aspiring to membership in
the Alliance, and which after the crisis in 2001 adopted the Ohrid Framework
Agreement, changed its constitution and political system, conducted decentralization, ensured proportional representation of other ethnic communities
in the administration, and successfully fulfilled the requirements envisaged
by the Action Plan for EU membership, has transformed from a ‘user’ to an
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‘exporter’ of security by sending 4% of its armed forces to peacekeeping missions of the Alliance. However, even with the huge pro-Atlantic mood of the
population, the Republic of Macedonia can not receive an invitation to join
NATO unless it changes its constitutional name.
301
Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO - the importance of
the new Strategic Concept Dr Armin Kržalić250
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) defined accession to the European Union and
NATO as the objective of its foreign policy. Defence reforms undertaken in BiH
in 2004 were seen as important steps on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The reform of the defence sector started with the entry into force of the new
BiH Law on Defence and Law on Service in the Armed Forces of BiH, but the
first major milestone was on January 1st 2006, when BiH’s defence institutions
assumed command over the respective entity Ministries of Defence and military
command, and started applying a new single budget for the defence sector. All
these efforts in the realm of defence reforms have resulted in BiH’s membership in
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Membership Action Plan. When it concerns
the future and the new Strategic Concept, it is very important that NATO will
preserve its open door policy, which means that BiH can become a full member
once it fulfils all democratic criteria. In order to meet the conditions for full membership in the European Union and NATO, BiH will have to make an additional
effort in order to translate the declarative views of politicians – as expressed in
their political statements – into concrete achievements that will bring to all the
benefits of membership.
250 Author received his PhD at the Faculty of Criminology and Security Studies, University
of Sarajevo. He is also the author of a book Privatna sigurnost, as well as of a significant number
of research papers on security and security-related developments, particularly those pertaining
to human security. He is currently employed in the Centre for Security Studies of BiH as the
Project Director.
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Introduction
Looking at the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, BiH), one
can say that it is intrinsically linked to the security and prospects of its immediate environment, the region, Europe and the international community as
a whole. Therefore, integration into the regional, European and Euro-Atlantic
structures of collective security is considered a priority area for BiH. On the
positive side – and what has proved to be good thus far – is the fact that BiH
understands and accepts the concept of military security as the cornerstone of
its long-term military strategy. By defining its priorities in the area of foreign policy in the document of
the Presidency of BiH in 2003, BiH identified accession to the EU and NATO
as one of its main objectives. The stalemate recently noted in the process of
Euro-Atlantic integration leaves a dilemma as to whether these determinants
of foreign policy are still valid. the significance and impact of NATO’s new
Strategic concept adopted in Lisbon on 19-20th November 2010 on the policy
of BiH will be explored in the text below.
1. Road of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO Historical facts show that membership in NATO is the main milestone for
those countries that aspire to membership in the EU. Therefore, almost all
countries in the region want to join both NATO and the EU. Croatia and Albania are members of NATO, BiH, Macedonia and Montenegro are members
of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and also want membership in NATO
and the EU, while Serbia is in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, and
wants to become a EU member.
When it concerns the road of BiH toward NATO – i.e., the gradual transformation of its defence sector – we can say that it set its course and was built
largely under the auspices of NATO and the OSCE. This process moved from
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of the separate
armed forces within BiH, to building confidence and promoting democratic
principles in the security sector. The number of members of the military – of
what once used to be warring parties – that during the war amounted to about
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400,000, was reduced to approximately 150,000 by mid-1996,251 and in subsequent years, i.e. during the period 2001-2002, was further reduced to 30,000
eligible members.
It is important to note that the military initially functioned as three separate structures, with the Croatian Defence Council, the Army of the Republika
Srpska and the Army of BiH. Later, the Croatian Council of Defence and the
BiH Army united to form the Army of the Federation of BiH. Entity authority
over the military structure was preserved until the major reforms in this sector
were undertaken in 2003.
Gradual progress in relation to military issues, which took place under the auspices of NATO and the OSCE, led to a change in political dialogue regarding
the future defence system of BiH. The political decisions that ensued demonstrated the clear commitment of the political circles to join collective defence
systems.
In July 2001, the Presidency of BiH brought a conclusion, and sent it to the
Secretary General of NATO, whereby they expressed the readiness of BiH to
accept the obligations and rights of the family of mutually equal Euro-Atlantic
nations, and to contribute actively to collective security. Also, the Presidency
of BiH clearly expressed their commitment to the inclusion of BiH into the
processes of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and the PfP programme,
as well as to implementation of necessary defence reform and reorganization
of its armed forces.252
An existing defence system, which was inadequate, could not respond to these
stated political goals, and it became apparent that it would have to undergo certain changes. To this disproportionality between political determination and reality, one should also add the amount of budget that was spent by the military
structure, which was not in-line with the economic capacity of the country.
Despite the proclaimed political objectives of political parties, a real agreement within the internal political elite could not be achieved, which subsequent251 Bonn International Center for Conversion (2003), “Turning Soldiers into a work force,
Demobilisation and reintegration in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brief 26 , p.9.
252 Džemal Najetović (2007), “Geopolitički položaj BiH u euroatlantskim integracijama Zapadnog Balkana”, DES, Sarajevo, p.195.
304
ly prompted the intervention of the High Representative. The occasion used
for that necessary intervention was the “Eagle” affair in October 2002, when it
was established that a military company from the Republika Srpska was selling
weapons to Iraq, which at that time was under UN sanctions and an embargo
on arms sales. Using the powers granted by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the
High Representative persisted in his requirement that state institutions provide
command and control over the military sector. To that end, he made a decision
to establish the Defence Reform Commission (hereinafter, DRC), the purpose of
which was to offer recommendations for improving the defence sector.
The legitimacy for the DRC was found in four provisions of the Constitution
of BiH and one of them, i.e., article II, paragraph 5, provides that the state will
assume the responsibilities that are necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and international personality of BiH and that
institutions may be established, as necessary, to carry out such competencies.253
These authorities were used to create legal requirements for the adoption
of the new Defence Law of BiH, which was proposed by the Commission,
together with amendments to the Entity constitutions, laws on defence, the
Law on the Army of the Republika Srpska. In addition to this draft legislation,
the Commission also proposed a new Law on the Army of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the legislative framework for a new Ministry of
Defence at the state-level. This framework has included amendments to the
Law on the Council of Ministers and the Law on Ministries, and a proposed
decision of the Presidency of BiH to transfer jurisdiction from the Standing
Committee on Military Matters to the new Ministry of Defence.254
Perhaps the most significant recommendations of the Commission were related to the establishment of supreme command by the state, tasked to deal with
defence issues. A single defence structure of BiH was adopted, with a feasible
division of responsibilities between state institutions and entities. According
to it, the Presidency of BiH acts collectively in performing the command and
control of the Armed Forces of BiH in peacetime, crisis or war.
By provisions of the Law, the Department of Defence was established at
the state level. The Minister became a full member of the Council of Ministers
253 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
254 Defence Reform Commission (2003), “Put u partnerstvo za mir”, Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina
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with the right to vote, and was appointed in the same way as other state ministers. The Minister acted in the chain of command for military operations,
known as the operational chain of command, and the chain of command for
manning, training and equipping the armed forces, known as the administrative chain of command. Entities still made an important contribution to the
defence of BiH. They continued performing administrative functions of manning, training and equipping the Army of BiH and the Army of the Republika
Srpska, respectively. Each entity had its defence ministry, headed by the ministers, who were now responsible to the state Minister of Defence. Important
responsibilities were given to the national Parliamentary Assembly, and were
based on the principles of democratic civilian control over armed forces, transparency in planning and development of the defence budget and the need for
fiscal constraints for defence sector, which were to be established by political
authorities in a democratic manner. The key among the proposed reforms in
the sphere of democratic control was the establishment of a Joint Commission
for Defence and Security Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.255
The defence reform in BiH undertaken in 2004 were marked as important
steps on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Both the political leadership and the public justly expected that the international community would
decide to reward BiH for such significant results by inviting it to the PfP. Unfortunately, these expectations were not met. At the NATO Summit, held in
Istanbul in June 2004, the progress was welcomed, yet the heads of states and
governments of the North Atlantic Council urged BiH to again achieve further
progress towards the creation of a single military force. It was stressed that
BiH needs to undertake systemic reforms that would allow it to fully cooperate
with the Hague tribunal, and to quickly start with strengthening the national
level of command and control by transferring the authorities of the entity ministries of defence and command to the appropriate state defence institutions.
All this contributed to the need for the High Representative to react again in
a political environment frowning at further reforms to the defence system. Especially vocal criticism came from the Republika Srpska, whose leadership was
not willing to transfer further responsibilities to the state level, given that the
invitation for membership in the PfP was not received, though it was promised
to them as a reward for pursuing these reforms.
255 For further details, see: http://www.parlament.ba/komisija/1/0/32.html
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However, using the support of the Management Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) in BiH, in December 2004 the High Representative
decided to extend the mandate of the DRC.256 The new recommendations of
the old DRC were based on two fundamental changes: the creation of a single
defence structure and a single military force under the fully-functional state
command and control, and reorganization of the Armed Forces of BiH to meet
the criteria in the realms of foreign, defence and security policy, and particularly in relation to collective defence and security.
In order to more clearly portray the image of reforms achieved under the mandate of the DRC in 2005, I will present some of the most important results attained during the one-year long negotiations.
In the area of command and control, a single chain of command was established. It starts from the Presidency of BiH, where decisions are made by
consensus, to the Minister of Defence, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of
the Operational Command and Support Command Commander, and through
them to their subordinate elements. The Ministry of Defence, together with
the Joint Staff, is responsible for policies and plans. Operational Command,
Support Command and their subordinate elements are responsible for the implementation of plans and policies issued by the Ministry of Defence and the
Joint Staff, in accordance with the laws and regulations. The BiH Parliamentary
Assembly retains its responsibility for parliamentary oversight of defence institutions in accordance with the Law on Defence from 2003.257
Changes in recruiting and reserve composition are related to the fact that the
new Armed Forces of BiH are exclusively made-up of professionals. The recruiting system was abolished on 1st January 2006, as well as the liability of
recruits in the case of mobilization (40 years in the RS and 60 years in the
Federation). Official records on recruitment and other documentation related
to military service, which were previously kept in municipal offices of the entity Ministries of Defence, have now been transferred to civilian municipal
authorities, so that all evidence on trainings and other official documents that
could be required by citizens would be easily available. The passive reserve
consisting of 60,000 troops (40,000 in the Federation and 20,000 in the RS),
256
257
See: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=33874
Zakon o odbrani Bosne i Hercegovine, Official Gazette of BiH, No.88/05
307
was also abolished on 1st January 2006, and the new active reserve – which will
consist of 50% of the total number of actice composition – will be created over
the next few years.
The system of regiments of the AFBiH was established as a military force compatible with NATO. There are three infantry regiments which are each responsible for the maintenance and protection of military heritage and identity of
units they derive from, i.e. components of the Army of BiH and the Croatian
Defence Council of the former armies of the Federation, and the former Army
of the Republika Srpska. Other, smaller branches of the Armed Forces of BiH,
such as engineers, signals and artillery, are organized into individual regiments
and are composed of units assigned to three brigades as a support.
The size of active composition of the AFBiH has been reduced by eliminating temporary positions engaged to work on activities pertaining to training, recruitment management and stand-by reserves. The size of the AFBiH
is about 10,000 professionals, and consists of three manoeuvre brigades, one
brigade for tactical support, and one aviation brigade, that are all under the
control of the Operational Command. Each of the three manoeuvre brigades
consists of three infantry battalions; one from each of three new infantry regiments. Each manoeuvre brigade has its support branches, such as artillery,
engineers, signals, etc.
The AFBiH belong to BiH, and they reflect the composition of BiH as a state of
three constituent peoples and others. The three constituent peoples are equally
represented at all senior levels of decision-making, starting from the Presidency, to the Operational Command and Support Command. The Defence
Minister, Chief of Joint Staff, Commander of the Operational Command and
Commander of the Support Command each have two deputies, whose responsibilities are defined by law. He and his deputies can not belong to the same
constituent people. The Presidency of BiH is responsible for determining the
level of national representation in the military, taking into consideration the
Constitution, laws, the last census, operational readiness, manning, morale
and cohesion of the armed forces.
Functions that were previously performed by the entity Ministries of Defence
and military commands were either taken over by the Ministry of Defence, i.e.
the Joint Staff of BiH, or were transferred to new departments for personnel,
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logistics and training and doctrine of the Command for Support.The entity
Ministries of Defence and military commands were abolished on 1st January
2006. Since then, a single defence budget was set-up at the state-level and defence spending has been reduced by 55% compared to 2002.
Implementation started with the BiH Law on Defence and Law on Service
in the Armed Forces of BiH entering into force;258 however, the first milestone
was 1st January 2006, when the defence institutions took over the entity Ministries of Defence and military commands and started applying the new, unified
defence budget.
All of these activities, as well as many others completed by the BiH authorities in the intervening period, contributed to BiH being invited to join the PfP
at the NATO Summit in Riga on 29th November 2006, together with Serbia
and Montenegro. On 14th December 2006, by signing the Framework Document in Brussels, BiH formally acceded to this programme.259
Despite these achievements in the defence sector, some authors are of
the opinion that the defence reform did not fulfil expectations, particularly
in relation to the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of
Security260. Some of them, therefore, emphasise that the laws thus passed
were in fact copies of old communist laws on defence and armed forces
of the former Yugoslavia, and that their provisions are often incompatible
with the basic principles of human rights, freedom and international humanitarian law.261
However, despite these criticisms, by joining the Partnership of Peace, BiH
managed to achieve one of its foreign policy goals. The defence sector can be
seen as the most advanced social sector, where the first institutional step – reflected in the formal inclusion of BiH in the official Euro-Atlantic structures
– was made.
258 Zakon o službi u Oružanim snagama BiH, Official Gazette BiH, No. 88/05
259 Džemal Najetović (2007): Geopolitički položaj Bosne i Hercegovine u euroatlantskim integracijama Zapadnog Balkana, DES, Sarajevo, p.198.
260 See: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/73222
261 Heinz Vetschera and Matthieu Damian, (2006), “Security sector reform in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: The role of the international community”,International Peacekeeping, 13:1, p. 2842
309
BiH’s membership in PfP opened a new chapter in defence reform, which is now
reflected in increased cooperation with international forces and the fulfillment of
obligations that membership in the PfP assumes. Another proof of BiH’s progress
in defence reform has been reflected through its take-over of responsibilities from
EUFOR, i.e. in obtaining the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces in terms of mine
clearance, control of military movements and control of movements of weapons
and equipment, warehouse inspections and other related military activities.
In the first year of its participation in the PfP, BiH succeeded to realize all
objectives set within the framework of this programme. Thus, in 2007, the first
presentation document of BiH for PfP was made, security agreements with
NATO and the PfP agreement on the status of foreign military forces were
signed and the questionnaire on Planning and Review submitted.
Cooperation pertaining to the Individual Partnership Program was realised
in 17 areas of cooperation through 42 events, while in 2008 that number increased to 155 events in 23 areas of cooperation. In 2009, a similar pace of
cooperation continued, which – to a certain extent – was redefined in relation
to what was previously planned, due to the effect of the world recession which
also affected the Ministry of Defence.
As a result of such a choice within the defence sector, NATO further strengthened BiH’s path towards full membership by establishing the Individual Action Plan of Cooperation (IPAP), which is often called the first-class partnership. As a further boost to the efforts of BiH in defence sector, at the Bucharest
Summit in April 2008, NATO upgraded its cooperation with BiH to a higher
level, i.e. the level of Intensified Dialogue.
The next step before full membership in NATO is related to accession to
the Membership Action Plan (MAP), which is the final step in the process of
reforms; requiring comprehensive changes not only in the defence sector, but
also in other segments of society. BiH submitted its application for membership in the MAP in late-2009, but NATO officials did not respond to it favourably. Their decision was probably influenced by BiH’s failure to fulfil the obligations related to implementation of the agreement on use and management
of movable and immovable property, which – together with a delay in deciding
on how to resolve the issue of surplus weapons and ammunition – has delayed
reform, but which is the key requisite for its continuation.
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This situation has prompted politicians in BiH to make further efforts in
order to meet obligations related to the MAP. Accordingly, and after several
visits of high international officials, the BiH Presidency made a decision on
destruction of surplus ammunition, and at its 44th session, held on 14th April
2010, gave approval for engagement of the AFBiH infantry units as support to
the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.262
The proclaimed position of BiH’s political leadership – regarding international
obligations of promoting peace and security in the world – was very positively
received by NATO member states. After that, and thanks to lobbying efforts on
the part of Turkish diplomatic representatives on the eve of the informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Tallinn, Estonia, the ministers concluded
that BiH has made significant reform progress since the date it submitted its
application for the MAP. Thus, at a meeting in Tallinn, on 22nd April 2010, they
decided to invite BiH to the MAP, and authorized the North Atlantic Council
(NAC) to accept the first Annual National Programme of BiH once the issue of
immovable military property is resolved.263
Such conditional accession of BiH to the MAP is certainly very important
for further reform of BiH’s in defence sector, yet it again leaves room for internal political disputes. Hence the Serb member of the Presidency, Nebojša
Radmanović, already commented that by imposing such conditionality,
NATO is putting additional pressure on the Republika Srpska.264 Namely, the
conditionality of NATO which is related to the immovable military property,
specifies that the identified assets that will serve the future needs of the defence structure must be registered as the state property of BiH, and will be
used by the Ministry of Defence. The previous position of the RS representatives was that the property should be registered as the property of the entity
in which it is located, and should be assigned to the Ministry of Defence of
BiH for use. Therefore, one can hope that a necessary political agreement will
be achieved in due course which will allow the full membership of BiH in the
MAP.
262
For further information, see
http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/zaklj/
sjed/1/?cid=14601,2,1
263 For further information, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62811.
htm?selectedLocale=en
264 For further information, see http://www.vijesti.ba/politika/10060-Radmanovic-Uvjetprijenosu-imovine---novi-pritisak-Srpsku.html
311
Looking at this process, we can see that BiH has made a huge step forward in reforming its defence structure. From a mere recipient of international
military assistance, it reached a level where its armed forces – by taking part
in peace-keeping missions – now contribute to peace-building and security
in the world. It is obvious that the reforms, which were conducted under the
watchful scrutiny of the international community, has given positive results
and that the defence sector now continues its reform path to improve its interoperability with NATO forces.
2. NATO’s new Strategic Concept
First, it should be noted that NATO adopted a very significant document at
the Summit held in Lisbon on 19-20th November 2010. Many experts in this
area, who were chaired by the former U.S. State Secretary, Madeleine Albright,
were engaged to work on the development of this document. The very document, NATO’s new Strategic Concept, provides guidance for the next period
of action.
Globally, collective defence remains the main instrument of cooperation
for the next ten years, with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction accompanied by new threats like piracy, cyber-attacks, missile attacks and others. Also, what is important to note is the agreement on deployment of a missile shield with Russia, as well as the agreement on enhancing cooperation;
i.e. the agreement that NATO and Russia will no longer regard each other as
enemies.
In the words of the Secretary General, Rasmussen, NATO will maintain its
“open door” policy, allowing all countries that satisfy the given criteria and
aspire to membership to become full members. We can say that this statement
has encouraged those forces in BiH who are working towards the attainment
of full membership in NATO. But why have we singled out this sentence only?
First, NATO’s decision to preserve its “open door” policy is very important,
as it means that BiH may indeed become a full member once it meets all democratic criteria. Another important aspect is NATO’s confirmed commitment to
BiH’s accession to the MAP, once it fulfils the condition of officially registering
military assets that are to be used by the Ministry of Defence and the Armed
Forces of BiH. Besides, the shift in NATO’s cooperation with Russia is also con-
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sidered as an important development, which will positively affect attitudes of
citizens of both Serbia and the Republika Srpska regarding the issue of NATO
membership. The Serbian Defence Minister, Dragan Šutanovac, in his interview of 1st December 2010, gave positive remarks on Serbia’s potential accession to NATO and noted difficulties in implementing the neutrality for which
Serbia opted. Certainly, the position of Serbia has a significant impact on the
citizens of the Republika Srpska, so this could be the way to overcome some occasional friction in BiH related to its admission to NATO, and announcements
of a referendum in the RS regarding possible membership in NATO.
In addition, the Strategic Concept will probably have a significant influence
on the formulation of the document of BiH Defence overview by 2020, that is
currently being developed at the Ministry of Defence.
When it concern the European defence policy, it can be said that it has not
been promoted enough in BiH, nor in other countries of the Western Balkans,
which makes the relation of institutions toward this area rather inert. The European defence policy is not included in the current negotiations between the
EU and BiH, and that sphere of cooperation is on the margins of other policies.
What is interesting is that the elements of foreign policy are in BiH present through the operation of EUFOR military mission (the mission has about
1,400 soldiers and its mandate has been extended until 2011), the EUPM police mission and the EU Special Representative. Given the presence of these
forces, BiH institutions are working with them and gradually reaching the given standards. EUFOR has started with trainings of our troops, while EUPM is
providing a lot of assistance to our police forces in achieving best practice in
police work and cooperation with law enforcement authorities.
Instead of conclusion
The “open door” policy in the next ten years, advocated by the new Strategic
Concept, provides a unique opportunity for BiH to achieve its objectives pertaining to areas of foreign affairs and security. What is necessary, however, is
to make an additional effort in order to translate the declarative views of politicians into concrete achievements that will bring the benefits of both NATO
and EU membership.
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Analyzing political activities of the parties in power, one has the impression
that the complex social system of BiH was being used as a limiting factor on
its way towards integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. An increasing resort
to the mechanism of entity voting in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and
demands for greater power for entity parliaments, significantly slowed down
the progress of BiH towards Euro-Atlantic structures.
Such developments in the political arena brought to a stalemate even the international community which – encouraged by the progress in reforms made
in the period between 2000 and 2005 – decided to reduce its interference in
BiH political life. Therefore, in June 2006, the PIC even announced its plan to
close down the Office of High Representative within one year, and thus relinquish the Bonn powers.
However, the assumption of full responsibility by national authorities for
their future and the future of BiH citizens did not quite evolve in the expected
direction, nor according to estimates of the international community. BiH
moved from the phase of peace implementation to the phase of Euro-Atlantic
integration, but as it has turned out, that was not enough to establish a functional and viable state community.
We saw that the overall reform of the security sector in BiH was conducted
with the strong support of the international community. It is a fact that not
a single reform could have been completed without the intervention of international officials, particularly the High Representative, in one way or another.
What has remained as incomplete – and which is now a challenge for further
construction of security system – is an insufficiently strong promotion of constitutional reform, i.e. the non-inclusion of achieved reforms into the constitutional arrangement.
Such a status of the reform processes – which are not as yet a formal legalconstitutional category or, as is the case with police reform, negotiations have
been postponed until political compromise on the new territorial constitutional structure is found – is simply leaving more room for the attained reforms to be jeopardised.
Therefore, it is still quite bold to state that all ethnic structures in BiH share
a unique and honest attitude toward internal and foreign policy, i.e. that they
are truly oriented towards building a modern democratic state. The external
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factor, represented by the presence of the international community in the political life of BiH, certainly keeps a minimum social coherence on issues of
strategic orientation, i.e. foreign, defence and security priorities.
Also, one should not lose sight of the current political situation which
could influence possible future choices and dilemmas. As is known, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the strongest political party
in the RS, has continually advocated the demilitarization of BiH. In recent
years, it has undermined the efforts BiH achieved through its defence reform. Such an approach has probably been strongly influenced by the decision of the Serbian political elites to declare military neutrality and not to
consider membership in NATO – but rather only membership in the EU - as
a political option. Over the course of time, even other political parties in
the RS have gradually started adhering to this position. Though not officially presented to authorities at the state level, such opinions are increasingly
more present in the statements of politicians to the media. Certainly, such
attitudes both in Serbia and the RS require considerably more attention from
the international community, as well as a serious consideration of attitudes
that can be very important for the region’s integration into Euro-Atlantic
structures.
Such divergence in attitudes toward membership in NATO, which is present in the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska, could be a stumbling
block for further progress toward full membership.
The impact of neighbouring countries’ policies on BiH could further complicate this issue, should this tendency continue in the future. The position of
favouring EU military activities and slowing down the progress towards integration into NATO could open a domestic political front, which would not be
viewed very favourably by the international community.
A similar scenario has already been implemented in recent years in relation to the budget of the defence forces. Although all political parties declaratively supported BiH’s accession to NATO, constraints on the military budget
significantly hampered any progress. The approved defence budget has only
been sufficient for operational functioning of defence structures, and only a
negligible part satisfies the needs for the modernization of equipment and interoperability with NATO forces.
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Renouncing the decision to join NATO, under the guise of meeting European requirements for EU accession, could become a future topic on the political
horizon. From the point of the international community, this act would certainly have multiple negative effects for BiH. International actors invested a lot
of financial resources and efforts in the process of defence sector reform, and
such political diversion from the agreed course would send a very negative
message about the credibility of our country. Such a decision would especially
be negatively received by the U.S. and some major NATO member sates, such
as Great Britain or Turkey, which also invested most in this sector.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO’s new Strategic
Concept
Dr Miloš Šolaja265
Bosnia and Herzegovina, like other post-socialist countries of SEE, linked its
transitional path to the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In
order to attain that objective, political consensus was achieved and a series of
reforms set by NATO and the EU implemented. Defence reform was completed
by establishing a common defence system and joint army. Owing to a series of
changes, the visa regime for travelling to the Schengen zone countries was abolished. What hinders BiH’s path toward security and economic integration is the
absence of internal sovereignty and functioning of the constitutional and political
system, as well as internal instability. Although it is clear that BiH will not complete the integration process unless the competencies of international institutions
are transferred to domestic ones, adequate conceptions regarding this are still
missing. Lacking the internal consensus on substantial issues and a clear conception of the transition from international organizations to domestic institutions,
BiH finds itself at the door of the Membership Action Plan, since membership is
conditioned by decisions whose adoption is still far away. In the meantime, new
security initiatives have emerged, as well as intensified engagement of Russia and
Turkey in the region.
265 Author is the Director of the Centre for International Relations in Banja Luka
318
Fifteen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, the political status and the
internal organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter, BiH) are still
causing a number of political concerns. A majority of political subjects have
doubts regarding the basic concept of BiH, both in terms of its internal design, as well as in terms of the international relations that the country itself
should be building. Uncertainties and ambiguities are present in the process
of Euro-Atlantic and European integration, despite the political agreement of
almost all institutions and political actors regarding the steps of BiH in that
direction. The “constituent elements of BiH - two entities and three nations”,
disagree about the elementary basis of the constitutional order and political
system. Concerning BiH’s internal organization, the concepts of the respective
political actors differ from centralist to separatist. This has significantly slowed
down the development of internal processes and the establishment of a stable
and secure internal institutional framework; a precondition for creating a system of values, and the fulfilment of standards, necessary for the acceptance of
BiH into security and economic associations. The declarative orientation and
vacuous rhetoric in relation to integration processes are no longer sufficient as
an indicator of BiH’s perseverance with these very processes.
Blocking the establishment of institutions during the process of implementing the results of elections held in early October 2010, shows a complete conceptual confusion of a political system essentially premised on three national
constituents that are trying to institutionalise positions and achieve political
power through the complex use of constitutional and electoral legality, and
political legitimacy, determined by a certain nationality and national interests.
In the meantime, especially in the context of the pre-election campaign in the
Republika Srpska, Euro-Atlantic scepticism and anti-NATO rhetoric continues to intensify. Such retrograde attitudes raises the question of how to reconcile this new political approach and the institutional-legal framework which
set BiH on its road to Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO?266
On 24th April 2010, BiH received an invitation to the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) at the NATO ministerial meeting in Tallinn, Estonia. The invitation, however, has been conditioned by the need to attain necessary agreement
between the entities on the use of a number of sites and facilities that are important for the functioning of the Army of BiH. This conditionality raised a
266 Article 84 of the Law on Defence of BiH, Security Policy of BiH
319
dilemma as to whether BiH had indeed become a member of MAP, or whether
it shall become one once it meets the given precondition. Politicians and representatives of those institutions that are firmly committed to membership in
NATO argue that BiH is a part of MAP, while those who demonstrate a certain
restraint towards NATO claim otherwise. Therefore, the dilemma of whether
BiH is a member of MAP or not is still pertinent.
This conditional invitation is one of the last steps in rounding the European space as a single security space within a framework in which NATO
represents the unique system of European security; where community security is the result of a qualitative transformation from individual to collective security. The road from the post-Cold War creation of a single security system to the process of BiH’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures
has been marked by two parallel processes: post-socialist transition in the
countries of Eastern Europe and geopolitical changes, wars and conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia, which was no longer “a symbol of differences in the
communist world”, nor was it needed as a “buffer zone”, and was therefore
classified by the western political doctrines as a country of (South) Eastern
Europe.267
At the time of the Balkan wars during the last decade of the twentieth
century, NATO had appeared with the concept of expansion. The Alliance’s
participation in the war in BiH was a change in the principle of collective
defence “out of area”, according to which NATO is not supposed to act
outside its area. Since cooperation with missions of the United Nations
in 1992, to the bombing of positions of the Army of Republika Srpska in
1995, NATO has gone from supporting humanitarian operations to openly
offensive military operations. That was interpreted by many as a violation
of Article 5 of the Treaty, which is the basis of its unity in defence, but also
“the exit outside its territory (territories)“, which indicated another new
feature of NATO which will appear in the future. In addition to building
the European security system, NATO’s global objectives have also become
conspicuous. This was proved through NATO’s key role in implementation
of the Dayton Peace Agreement and peace-implementation in BiH. From
20th December 1995 to date, NATO has played a key role in maintaining the
internal stability of BiH. By positioning itself in the Balkans, the Alliance
267 Susan Woodward: Balkan Tragedy, Filip Višnjić, Belgrade, p. 108.
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has had one of the most important roles in the strategic pre-positioning of
global relations. “The United States did not observe the interests in relation
to the Balkans in the same way as the European allies did, so they engaged
their political potential and military power in 1995 when they estimated
that the differences in relation to BiH may jeopardize the very existence of
NATO”.268 It was important for the United States that their troops took part
in the peacekeeping operation, because that allowed them to preserve their
primacy in European security, which made the „peace-enforcement in the
Balkans only a second-rate motivation”.269
The wars in South-Eastern Europe, at the time when new post-Cold War
international relations were being forged, brought a new perspective on the
implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept and establishment of a collective security system in Europe. The military-strategic concept shifted towards
“out of area” military intervention, thanks to which NATO - as a military alliance – gained the opportunity to take over the mandate for peace-implementation and peace-keeping which had previously been the exclusive concern of
UN armed forces. In pursuing the concept of expansion, NATO had to define
when and how were the former socialist countries to be given the status of
members.
The Membership Action Plan (MAP) provides intensive individual dialogue between NATO and candidate countries, with a focus on the creation
of assistance programs for these countries. The principle of cooperation is the
project of each country, respectively, adopted and implemented every year by
each of them. The annual national programme pertains to five areas: politics
and economy, defence and military, financial resources, security and legal issues, which are all updated annually. These reports serve as the basis for discussions between the North Atlantic Council and candidate countries. “MAP
is not, however, simply a check-list for aspiring countries to fulfill, and participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership Decisions to invite
aspirants to start accession talks are taken by consensus among NATO member countries and on a case-by-case basis”.270 Countries of the “first round”
268 Kori Schake: „NATO and the Balkans Challenge: An American Perspective“, p. 351. in
„The Strategic Triangle“, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Georges-Henri Soutou, Stepehen F. Szabo and
Samuel F. Wells Jr., pp. 351-369.
269 Ibid, p.351.
270 NATO Handbook, Brussels 2006., p. 197.
321
that were accepted to MAP in 2004, spent four years in MAP; Albania spent
eight, Croatia seven, while Macedonia – after ten years – has still not become
the member of the Alliance.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that endured a difficult internal conflict
and is still under the direct supervision of the international community, has
undergone a challenging road to conditional membership in the MAP. The
transformation of its defence system started with the introduction of the DRC
(Defence Reform Commission), and this reform is considered to be perhaps
the most successful of all reforms in BiH. Out of 419,000 members of two
armies, BiH now has a unique system of defence and a single army, which
also included the changes necessary for its membership in the Partnership for
Peace and the continuation of Euro-Atlantic integration. The number of troops
was reduced through several stages, a single Ministry of Defence was established, one army was organized and the defence budget unified. Institutional
mechanisms of democratic control over the defence sector were established,
as well as transparency in planning and budgeting, and the basis for the participation of BiH representatives in peace operations was created. In the document of the Defence Reform Commission, entitled “The Path to Partnership
for Peace”, the Commission proposed as a “long-term goal BiH its membership
in NATO”, with recommendations for BiH to also join the Membership Action
Plan (MAP).271 An opinion on membership in NATO entered the Law on Defence of BiH, where Article 84 specifically binds “the Parliamentary Assembly,
Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency, and all defence subjects within their respective constitutional and statutory authority, to
conduct the necessary activities for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s membership in
NATO”.272 By adoption of the Law, an institutional framework for defence reform was completed and the navigation for membership in NATO set. Defence
reform in BiH began with the fear of its rejection in the Republika Srpska,
although it was clear that the establishment of a unified defence system was a
condition for the country’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures and its closer
cooperation with NATO and the EU.
Political confirmation of such an attitude came through the statement of
presidents from 12 parliamentary parties on 18th February 2004, “wishing to
271 See: http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/file/dokumenti/Partnerstvo-za-mir-sr.pdf
272 See: http://www.oscebih.org/documents/8286-eng.pdf
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accelerate the implementation of reforms in BiH, and in order to meet all requirements necessary for successful completion of the SAA, which opens the
venue for EU membership, as well as necessary conditions for accession to the
PfP and ultimately to NATO”.273 The political will of BiH to join the process
of Euro-Atlantic integration – with the ultimate goal of joining NATO – was
completed by the Declaration on the strategic orientation of the Republika
Srpska in the defence system of Bosnia and Herzegovina274 and the Conclusion of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.275 BiH has since moved
towards Euro-Atlantic integration with full capacity which, similar to the earlier experiences of Eastern Europe, is set as a necessary stage in the process
of European accession. NATO has been accepted in the institutions of BiH as
an indisputable common form of European security built after the Cold War.
In that respect, the security of BiH had a paradigmatic value of comprising
successful conflict resolution in an ethnically diverse society after the internal
armed conflict.
Defence reform, successfully carried out, was the basis for an invitation into
the Partnership for Peace (PfP). BiH’s membership in PfP was of a great significance for the internal security and unity of the country, as well as for its
international relations through which, as a country with unstable internal relations, BiH needed to participate on equal terms. Euro-Atlantic integration was
thus set as a very important internal political issue. Membership in the PfP
does not exhaust all potential for Euro-Atlantic integration. “The essence of the
PfP programme is the partnership formed individually between each Partner
country and NATO, tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the
level and pace chosen by each participating government.”276 At the Washington
summit in April 1999, “significant initiatives were launched to increase the op273 Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, House of Representatives, No. 01-50-180/04. of 18
February 2004
274 Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, No. 63. of 4 July 2005, pp. 2-5. Declaration refers to demilitarisation as an ultimate objective, whilst membership in NATO is only indirectly
treated, though it is not rejected, stating that BiH as a member of „Partnership for Peace, political wing of NATO and the European Union, would be equal partner, stable subject and example
of building democratic society following a tragic war“.
275 Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska, No. 82. of 8 September 2005, pp. 1-2. „National
Assembly of the Republika Srpska requires from the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
verify at competent institutions of NATO an on-going reform of the armed forces of BiH as the
final phase of structural reform, which will enable engagement of BiH military in NATO“.
276 NATO Handbook, Brussels 2006. p. 197
323
erational dimension of the PfP and the involvement of Partner countries in PfP
decision-making and planning.”277 PfP was expanded by a number of elements
related to the inter-operability of partners and NATO, through strengthening of
cooperation in joint activities. At the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, held in late
November 2006, BiH, together with Serbia and Montenegro, was invited to join
the PfP. The partnership agreement was signed in December of the same year.
Although Montenegro and BiH expressed their political will to join the
MAP immediately, the slow pace of implementation of political and economic
reforms did not allow for a quick decision to be made to include both countries. In order to maintain an active attitude towards NATO integration, the
Alliance has applied a formula from the beginning of the enlargement process,
called “Intensified Dialogue.” That was supposed to mean that the communication, as well as monitoring, will continue and intensify, not only in terms of
obligations defined by the PfP, but also in terms of those processes defined by
the Membership Action Plan.
MAP has a much wider dimension than it appears at first glance, when
it seems that its sole objective are Euro-Atlantic integration. Assuming that
integration does not include only military or defence systems by themselves,
but rather governments in all their aspects and their socio-economic environment, the MAP is set as the key internal process of social change which leads to
accession to NATO, “as the key political actor in the Balkans, whose imperative
is expansion”. The aim of this strategy is the development of security capacities
under conditions of democratic civilian control in each Balkan country, and a
possible transformation of NATO’s unique role in individual areas, from security forces to the development of security forces.278 That sets three priorities for
the international community: establishment of the Stabilisation and Accession
process and the Membership Action Plan, as basic guidelines of evolution in
the region and an adequate rationalization of its presence in-line with international requirements and priorities; second, the campaign of the international
community, primarily in BiH and Kosovo, to eliminate political-criminal organizations as the largest threat to internal and regional stability; and the reconstruction of the international presence in order to eliminate independent
leadership of the political processes by ad hoc structures, particularly in BiH
and Kosovo, and the transfer of responsibilities to the permanent European
277 NATO Handbook, Brussels 2006. p. 198.
278 „The Balkans“, Report of an Independent task Force Sponsored by the Council od Foreign Relations - Centre for Preventive Acton, Council on Foreign Relations, 2002., p. 29.
324
or local institutions.279 Therefore, the international community has defined an
approach by which its intensive presence is established around the process of
EU accession and the Membership Action Plan. At the time of defining the
process of stabilization in the Balkans, the concept of collective security developed by NATO – as the European security system – took precedence over the
consensual concept developed within the EU or the universal concept developed within the framework of the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) or within global security, as with the concept of the United
Nations.
In June 2009, the Presidency of BiH made a decision on applying for membership in the MAP, which the Presidency member, Željko Komšić, handed
over on 2nd October 2009. “Allies have agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina
joins the MAP as soon as some progress in the reform process is perceived”.280
The stability of BiH is still dependent on the presence of international actors:
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the mission of NATO, EUFOR,
the OSCE. The process of membership in the MAP, which should be completed by membership in NATO, has not as yet been formally challenged in BiH.
However, in numerous public statements of some political representatives of
the RS, it was questioned through the dilemma of whether BiH should become
a member of NATO, and claims that such a decision requires the confirmation
of the RS population through a referendum. “The Serb Democratic Party (SDS)
announced today that a decision on possible NATO membership can only be
made by the citizens of the RS in a referendum.”281 Insistence on a referendum
on NATO membership, launched by the political right wing in the Republika
Srpska, can be found in the statement of the then Secretary General of NATO,
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, of November 2010, that BiH has to implement constitutional changes as a prerequisite for Euro-Atlantic integration. Such an attitude
was interpreted in the RS as an attempt at forcing through changes of BiH’s
internal structure, which provoked reactions from all political powers in the
RS, and from which a conclusion was consensually drawn that the RS will not
accept changes to the existing internal composition of BiH – which includes
the territorial-political division and change of Dayton constitutional arrange279 Idem
280 See: http://www.skupstina.me/cms/site_data/novo/informacija%20o%20prijemu%20
u%20MAP.pdf
281 See: http://www.24sata.info/vijesti/politika/25831-Srpska-demokratska-stranka-smijebiti-zrtva-kratkorocnih-interesa-SNSD-.html
325
ments – in order to achieve full integration into Euro-Atlantic structures as the
ultimate goal.
Potential membership in NATO has wide public support in the Federation
of BiH (FBiH), yet very small support in the RS. While in the FBiH, 88% of
surveyed citizens completely support BiH’s membership in NATO, and only
9% of them partially, in the RS only 30% of surveyed citizens support – with
64% are absolutely opposed to – NATO membership.282 The political opposition in the RS is taking advantage of these results in order to set the question
of future BiH membership in NATO and to link it to the possible accession of
Serbia to the Alliance.
In addition to low public support in the RS – the main source of which
can be found in the recent past and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and
particularly because of NATO’s intervention against the Republika Srpska and
Yugoslavia - increasingly frequent and stronger advocacy of a new European
security system coming from Russia seems to have influenced the change in
political orientation. The insistence on a referendum on NATO membership
was one of the reasons the new Law on Referendum and Civic Initiatives was
adopted in the RS, which excluded the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration from
other referendum questions, while strong anti-Euro-Atlantic sentiments still
remain.
Regardless of the criticism coming from Banja Luka and the attempt to shift
these questions into the realm of the general citizens’ right to a referendum, no
one brought into question the application of BiH for MAP. Given the fact that the
MAP is considered as practically a first step towards NATO, it can be concluded
that all sides will in the long-run orient themselves towards it as their ultimate
goal. On that path, the political elites in the RS will have to deal with the issue of
public support for NATO membership, as one of conditions pertaining to democratic support for the membership in the Alliance, which will then be reviewed by
the North Atlantic Council. All political elites in BiH will have to deal with three
important processes if they are to meet the requirements set forth:
1. Issue of implementation and evaluation of annual plans in five areas
282 Ipsos: Public opinion in BiH, 2010, prepared for the National Democratic Institute,
April 2010, p. 14.
326
envisaged by MAP, which is fully consistent with the obligations under
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. By satisfying the commitments from MAP, a country does not solely attain the conditions
necessary for it to be invited to membership. This is also a certain transformation which brings each aspiring country substantially closer to
fulfillment of the requirements necessary for the EU accession;
2. Issue of political system reform and social reforms in general, without
which it is impossible to expect the closure of the OHR, departure of
the international forces maintaining peace, and accountability on the
part of domestic institutions and their representatives, as well as independent functioning of the political system.
3. Resolving the issue of 69 military sites as a condition set by the NATO
Council,283 which is associated with the overall resolution of the problem of state property.284 The very problem, and different approaches to
addressing it in terms of state assets, goes to the very essence of BiH as
a political community. It is already clear that extensive discussion on
key issues will also include the issue of state property as part of overall
public discussion concerning the forthcoming constitutional changes,
as a basis of social consensus that would enable the long-term stability
of the country.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was “conditionally” invited to MAP, which de facto
does not imply membership, but is rather a skilful political barrier whereby
domestic political actors are expected to demonstrate their political will and
readiness, as well as the culture of consensus, especially when it comes to “prospective military sites”. The agreement in this field should indicate whether
Euro-Atlantic integration will be retained as the basic political orientation, and
whether this process will be used to address particular political agendas of certain political subjects. The willingness to achieve consensus on MAP will also
283 „MAP has been granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina today, but with conditions, a clear
condition attached to the implementation of the Membership Action Plan“, stated NATO’s
spokesperson Apatthurai at the press conference on Thursday, after the meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO, according to Reuters. See: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/
BiH-primljena-u-Akcioni-plan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print
284 Communiqué of the Peace Implementation Council: „Objective one - Acceptable and
Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of Property between State and other levels
of government: It is now time for political leaders to build on the progress they have made in
other areas and to take the lead and to reach an agreement on this matter that enables the State
to conduct its constitutional responsibilities“. See: www.ohr.int/print?content_id=41879,
327
serve as a guideline for achieving a consensus on constitutional reform, which
is a key precondition for assuming responsibility for the situation in BiH. On
the day when BiH was invited to MAP, it looked as if BiH was waiting for the
October elections and a new delay to finding solutions, at least judging by the
words of the Foreign Minister, Sven Alkalaj: “There were three clear conditions - destruction of surplus ammunition and arms and destruction of movable military property, new contributions to ISAF mission, i.e., in Afghanistan,
and the third one - to officially register 69 sites as state property for use by the
Ministry of Defence. The prior requirement is that the first cycle begins once
those 69 sites are officially registered.”285
Willingness to achieve progress in resolving the issues of state property and
military issues tells a lot about the willingness of political elites to bring BiH
closer to Euro-Atlantic and European integration. The reform of defence system is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, because the process of integration assumes participation of the state as a whole, with all institutions and
capacities in accordance with political and other conditions. If there is no internal social consensus, it is difficult to expect rapid reform and social changes
in that direction.
The new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO at the Lisbon summit in 2010
found BiH entangled in two important processes. The first is the redefinition
of global security challenges, whereby BiH cannot be recognized as an indicator of important international events, which – to some extent – was the case
during the 1990s. The other is the need for internal self-definition of the state
framework established at Dayton in 1995 and of the internal changes which
should identify the new relation of the international community towards BiH.
In 2010, the EU started implementing the Lisbon Treaty as a kind of constitutional settlement which imposed the need for (re)defining the EU’s common
foreign policy as a systematically under-developed political principle and political mechanism. In an effort to establish the mechanisms, both politically
and institutionally, to define and manage the EU’s foreign policy, BiH is important as a place where policy approaches are tested, as well as providing the
EU with the opportunity to achieve initial success, as already happened in the
early nineties when it was transformed on the basis of the politics of the Euro285
See: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/47282/BiH-primljena-u-Akcioniplan-za-clanstvo-NATOa-/print
328
pean Economic Community.
Since the peace implementation in 1995, the international community tried
several different concepts in post-war state-building efforts in BiH, which were
based on direct participation and unlimited executive powers of the Office of
the High Representative (OHR). Events in the global context, compounded
by the economic crisis in 2008, slowed down both the internal processes in
BiH and those that are bringing the country closer to the Euro-Atlantic and
European integration. The complex composition of the country allows for a
pronounced role of the nation, and national opinion, in defining policies of the
political system and the political parties, as representatives of the respective
national communities. The crisis of global institutions and retrograde internal
processes in BiH have reinforced aspirations of certain political elites and political parties for authoritarian political and economic solutions, which also received significant support from national public opinion. Thus, socio-economic
processes are moving BiH away from security and economic integration, despite the proclaimed goals and policies, and are demonstrating that they are
not oriented towards future visions of the country, but rather towards populist objectives of preserving power as the main objective of the political elites.
Intra-national discussion on BiH’s political, economic and social problems is
presented as a national betrayal, with the debate among political representatives of national communities being exclusively reduced to the question of establishing institutions and authorities, rather than dealing with developmental
programmes and concepts.
NATO’s new Strategic Concept, Russia’s new initiative for collective security, strengthening the presence of certain countries, like Turkey, in the Balkans, redefining the EU’s foreign and security policy, redefining the concept of
European security, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
all start from the necessity of resolving the focal crisis points in Europe. It is
exactly the region of south-east Europe that is currently the greatest source
of security challenges. Instability in the southern Balkans (southern Serbia,
Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania), is growing and transforming into open
security challenges, particularly through an increasingly more open emphasis
on the Albanian national question and the issue of autonomy for Sandžak, as
advocated by the Bosniak ethnic minority. Open problems in the Balkans are
also fuelled by economic and financial crisis in Greece, widespread criticism
of corruption in Bulgaria and Romania, Serbia’s treatment of non-recognized
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Kosovo, corruption scandals in Croatia and, above all, regional criminal networks.
BiH is confronted with complex requirements for achieving stability and
security as a prerequisite for further progress towards Euro-Atlantic and European integration. In order to succeed, BiH has to opt for political stability
should it want to move from its current position towards economic and social
development. The main steps in that direction will be to achieve an internal
consensus between national and political representatives without the direct
role of the international community, i.e., attainment of compromise on many
issues and of a basic internal consensus on several elementary political issues.
Chronologically, the primary obligation is to arrive at an agreement on conducting a census, which has been scheduled for 2011, but which has already
sparked numerous debates and got bogged down in unsuccessful agreement.
Another, even more important process, is changes to the Dayton “octroyed”
constitution, which is the product of international negotiations, and the establishment of a subsequent political system based on social consensus. Given
the fact that neither the government nor ministries alone enter the process
of European integration, but rather societies organized in state institutions
and through corresponding relations, BiH is facing the elementary process
of establishing a political system and institutions, capable to carry out internal changes and implement those processes which would ultimately lead the
country towards Euro-Atlantic and European integration.
331
The Impact Of the new Strategic Concept and the
European Security and Defence Policy on the
“Security architecture of South-East Europe”
Dr Arshim Çela286
Strategic policy documents concerning security, defence and the millitary are
one of the indicators on how the security sector coordinates its activities in the
future. Albania is, by its constitution, a parliamentary republic, so the tasks and
responsibilities of the Albanian parliament in the area of security and defence
are reflected in democratic oversight and accountability. Having completed “the
NATO membership phase”, Albania should now undergo a new phase of development of its defence strategy. In accordance with the new Strategic Concept, it
has to conduct a reassessment of its financial and human capacities, as well as
an analysis of commitment arising from the participation in NATO international
missions. Accordingly, Albania will have to be more accurate in its assessment
of real, recognized and credible risks and threats, given that states themselves
are the object of security institutions and activities. A review of major defence
and security doctrines is necessary, not because of obligations imposed by NATO
membership, but also due to geopolitical changes in the region. Serbia’s pursuit of
EU membership is quite a significant fact in that regard.
286 Author is a retired Colonel, currently employed at the Institute for Democracy and
Mediation in Tirana, Albania
332
I am very honoured to have this opportunity to deliver a speech at this wellorganized conference, where the spirit of understanding and democratic debate prevails. All participants, from our country and neighbouring countries,
express the same concerns and share the same vision regarding the impact of
NATO’s new Strategic Concept on our region.
Seen as a whole, it seems that the new Strategic Concept does not pose any
problems for countries of the region, regardless of whether they are NATO
members or partners. The priorities of the new point of view regarding future
security threats and risks appear as if they are primarily related to the interests
of major European and world actors.
In any case, the countries of South-East Europe can not just have a quick
glance at the Lisbon document; first, because this document also cites the obligations of countries of the region, and, second, because we are all gathered
here today to exchange ideas and opinions concerning our common challenges, both current and future.
From an official point of view, the Republic of Albania clearly expressed its
message at the Lisbon Summit, and as a NATO member-state, its obligations
derive from this and other legal documents which regulate NATO’s activities.
What I will state here is mostly a free and open vision of a civil society institute, i.e,. the Institute for Democracy and Mediation in Tirana. Our Institute
– before, during and after the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept – undertook several initiatives regarding the understanding of issues pertaining to
security and defence, as well as the necessity for structuring and restructuring
of security institutions based on well-drafted documents. Due to our history
within the framework of relations with NATO and other countries, and due
to the complexity of being a small country, Albania has in most cases adopted
clichéd documents instead of formulating simple, real and tangible things on
its own.
Accordingly, I think that my country will have to be more accurate in its
assessment of real, recognized and credible risks and threats, given that states
themselves are the object of security institutions and activities.
The same thing can be stated even for the anticipation of future risks and
planning. All these will help us to clearly define our responsibilities for the
333
respective fields of action, thereby ensuring a harmonious separation. The admission of global slogans on real risks and threats into the public sphere will
make it more difficult for the government and state actors not to draw political
points through overly-ambitious engagements, which sometimes are beyond
our very capacities and capabilities.
Internal coherence and soundness of the Strategic Framework
The set of documents which belong to the strategic policies concerning
security, defence and the military are, among others, one of the indicators
of how the security sector aims to coordinate its activities in the future.
Given the fact that Albania is, by its constitution, a parliamentary republic, the tasks and responsibilities of the Albanian parliament in the area of
security and defence are reflected in democratic oversight and accountability. On the other hand, taking into account the hierarchical structure
of security institutions, the government is obliged to implement this strategic doctrinaire framework throughout all relevant ministries and agencies287.
It should be stated that the division of tasks and roles between the legislative and executive powers in the fields of security and defence is already
consolidated through a series of law and practices. Under the Constitution
of the Republic of Albania, the Albanian parliament is the highest legislative
body from which all other institutions derive their legitimacy. Therefore, in
the case of Albania, the duties and functions assigned to the parliament can
be strengthened to ensure effective oversight and professional civilian control over the army and security structures, as well as to guarantee better coordination and use of financial resources to the benefit of national security.
In this context, the Parliamentary Security Committee could expand its
expert advisory network not only with full-time professionals, but with independent experts, when dealing with security and defence related issues or the
strategic doctrinaire framework. Although it seemed that after 2000 and 2004,
when the security strategies were adopted, a significant control and operational lead was given to the parliament by increasing the powers of its Security
287 Law No. 8417, of 21st October 1998, for the adoption of the Constitution of the Republic
of Albania (Official Journal No. 28, 1998, p. 1073
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and Interior Affairs Committee, events in the village of Gërdec in 2008, which
became an important landmark for security and strategic issues in Albania,
demonstrated that the government gained control and even more power over
the fundamental security institutions.
Such an approach raised concerns on the part of Albania’s security partners
in the West, which were reflected in the draft law on changes with respect to
the responsibilities of the Albanian intelligence service288.
On the other hand, despite the fact that the current law clearly defines the
advisory role of the National Security Council, which is attached to the President of Republic, the existence of an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Security
Affairs as an advisory body close to the Prime Minister creates a “hidden institutions rivalry”, instead of helping in improving the coordination of activities
between state security institutions.
For this reason, the overall coordination and cooperation of security institutions in ensuring a comprehensive strategic doctrinaire framework remains
one of the primary tasks of the State. Preparation of these strategic documents
has to pass through a professional assessment of CRT (“Challenges, Risks
and Threats”), which should ensure as broad participation of institutions and
stake-holders assigned to their practical implementation as possible.
It would be a sign of coherence if, in the process of preparation and implementation of these strategies, the involvement of experts from various institutional actors expands. It is evident that there is a certain degree of soundness
in the structures of democratic security and defence forces oversight (mainly
in parliamentary and governmental structures), as well as the involvement of
civil society in drafting and implementing these strategies. This role is yet to be
improved and will be discussed below.
The Constitution clearly defines the roles and basic security concepts of the
country. They are founded on peace, good neighbourly relations and active
participation in collective defence structures. Therefore, these notions have
paved the way to the general principles which support the strategic doctrinaire
framework.
288 For more information, see Albanian newspapers during the period February-April 2010
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However, the existing laws should still provide more information regarding
the process of drafting and approving various strategic documents. In such
a way, it would be possible to also include experts and NGO representatives,
which would not leave the whole process to the discretion of state security institutions only. Thus, the legitimacy of the process would be further strengthened and necessary support from the general public obtained.
Risk Analysis Results
The documents of the national security and defence strategy, respectively,
should ascertain that the core concept of the security strategy is mainly centred
on “respect of the rule of law” and the “integration approach”289. National security and military strategies, as well as defence policy documents, have defined the
challenges, threats and risks following a top-down approach, which implies that
the relevant security institutions were not receptive to a more comprehensive
approach (i.e., to measure in advance the public perception of threats and risks).
As a result, the challenges, threats and risks are in these documents ranked on
three levels – local, regional and global – lacking a clear prioritization and differentiation.290 Therefore, in the case of the National Security Strategy, the criteria
related to the local level was pursued as a priority, rather than a comprehensive
approach which would seek to build on a detailed classification of these.
Security strategies and the doctrinaire framework at the local level identify four categories of threats and risks for Albania: organized crime, terrorism,
natural disasters and problems of transition. In the case of organized crime,
this notion refers to various forms of illegal trafficking, primarily drugs, humans, conventional weapons, etc. In the case of Albania, special emphasis was
placed on internal security, illegal migration (e.g. Albanian immigrants in other countries) or the uncontrolled settlement of population within the country.
289 See Law No.9322 of 25 November 2004 “On approval of the National Security Strategy
of the Republic of Albania”(Official Journal No. 98, 2004, page 6697) and Law No.9858 of 27
December 2007 “ The adoption of the Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania” (Official
Journal No. 184, 2007, p. 5802).
290 For an analytical review of the document of the National Security Strategy and perceived threats, see also: Sotiraq Hroni, Gjen.Let(in release) Pellumb Qazimi: View from AlbaniaStudy on assessment og regional security and Challenges in the Western Balkans, Istvam Gyarmati and Darko Stančić (eds), DCAF (Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed
Forces), 2007, p.57.
336
However, what can also be found in the National Security Strategy are vague
and insufficiently elaborated notions perceived as risk-terms such as “public
opinion misinformation” or “insufficient development of education, science and
culture”. With respect to threats and challenges to regional security, it is important to mention that the National Security Strategy and the military have been
influenced by historical heritage and the geo-strategic importance of the country as key factors in determining the security environment. In this context, the
national security document has clearly defined that the “destabilization of the
region through the revival of desires for fulfilling exaggerated nationalistic projects and the development of trans-national ethnic conflicts, represents a threat to
the security of the Republic of Albania.291
On the other hand, both documents have officially acknowledged a conviction on the part of policy-makers that the neighbours are not the major threat
to regional security, but that the threat rather has an internal origin, such as
political instability, weak economy and organized crime. In the case of Albania,
the so-called “Albanian national issue” is set as one the top priorities among the
strategic security objectives and suggested that the “Albanian national issue is
going to be achieved through European and Euro-Atlantic integration”. So, Albania seems to be more focused on issues of Europeanisation by avoiding any
nationalistic approach and seeking a solution for “Albanian issue” within the
framework of its future membership in NATO and the EU.
Meanwhile, in the first survey regarding security threats and NATO integration, conducted by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) in
April-May 2007, respondents were asked to rank threats on a risk evaluation
scale ranging from 1 to 6 (the highest number indicates the highest risk). They
ranked threats in the following order: corruption (4.6); poverty and economic
stagnation (4.4); the failure of democratic reforms (3.64).292 These four elements were considered even more of a threat to national security than external
factors, like terrorism, regional conflicts, and so on.
291 Kastriot Islami (former Albanian Foreign Minister 2003-2005) National Security at the
context of regional risks and threats (Proceedings of the International Conference): “On the
development of the national security strategy”, Tirana , 21 September 2007, organized by the
IDM and DCAF
292 Besnik Baka: Albania: Threats and perceptions of security ÇËSHTJE TË SIGURISË
SECURITY ISSUES, Quarterly Journal, No 11 , Published by the Institute for Democracy and
Mediation, Tirane 2009, pp. 74-90.
337
In this way, a clear definition of CRT at national, regional and global level
remains incomplete, particularly within the national security strategies documents. Only a “map of risks and threats”, based on clear criteria, can help
determining the most holistic basic concept for the national security and defence strategies. Differentiation and prioritization of CRT should necessarily
be associated with other aspects, rather than traditional security concepts such
as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. Adhering to these concepts, the
national security strategy has lost the opportunity to be designed within the
human security framework.
From the viewpoint of CRT classification, both security documents simply
follow an order of geographical distribution of risks (global, regional or local).
However, each of them lacks a definition of the scale and intensity of these in
the short, medium and long term. Being in the same region and facing almost
the same threats, the countries of southeastern Europe or, as otherwise used,
the Western Balkans, may not have different visions regarding the impact of
NATO’s new Strategic Concept. As demonstrated during this conference, despite different political relationships between the countries of the region and
NATO, the common and obvious concern for the region is peace, and a secure
and stable environment. Opinions expressed by experts from civil society, research institutions of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc., generally agree that securityrelated issues are both national, as well as regional issues.
Strategies vs Strategic Defence Review
For the main political and institutional actors in Albania, a periodical review of the fundamental security document of the Republic of Albania, known
as the “National Security Strategy”, is necessary and legally obligatory. This
review raises a lot of concerns mainly due to the dynamics in the security environment either at the local, regional or global level. Albania’s strategic documents have not changed since 2007. The most frequent reviews of military
strategy (2002, 2005 and 2007) were accelerated only due to the country’s prospective membership in NATO.
The last review of the defence strategy document was conducted nearly two
years before Albania became a fully-fledged member of NATO on April 3rd
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2009. This document remains in effect and has not been subject to any reviews
as yet, given that it also refers to the Ministry of Defence strategy for the period
from 2007 to 2013. It became an important guiding document to the armed
forces in their effort to meet the objectives foreseen in the strategic doctrinaire
framework. This latter framework facilitated the invitation at the Bucharest
Summit, on 3rd April 2008, for the Republic of Albania to become a member
of NATO.
Having completed “the NATO membership phase”, and taking into consideration that Albania became a full member of the Alliance, it should now
undergo a new phase of development of its defence strategy. In line with the
new Strategic Concept, Albania is required to conduct a reassessment of its
financial and human capacities, as well as an analysis of the commitments arising from participation in NATO’s international missions.
Albania estimates that the review of defence and security documents is a
process dictated not solely by obligations deriving from NATO membership,
but also by geopolitical changes in the region. Serbia’s approximation towards
EU membership is, I believe, quite a significant fact in that regard.
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The Future Security Concept of Serbia
Milan Karagaća293
We are witnessing disputes on a daily basis on whether membership in NATO or
the position of military neutrality would be better for Serbia. When it comes to
that issue, we are divided into patriots and traitors, Euro-enthusiasts and Eurosceptics, even NATO mercenaries and those others. However, all this seems to be
serving the function of daily political interests, rather than the serious formulation of a vision and concept of Serbia’s security. Security is exclusively or predominantly reduced to the military and defence, whilst other, extremely important,
segments of security remain neglected. Serbia’s relationship towards NATO is primarily the issue of foreign policy, hence it has to be viewed in the overall context
of foreign policy, because it is the state issue, rather than solely military one.
These are some of the key reasons for absence of serious discussion on the future
security concept of Serbia. Without serious discussion which does not accept nor
reject anything a priori, no optimal nor state-responsible solutions can be found.
In any case, Serbia cannot lead the politics of double standards in relation to
the European Security and Defence Policy and NATO, particularly taking into
consideration their compatibility.
293 The author is a retired Colonel, and also the member of the Forum for International
Relations of the European Movement in Serbia.
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Serbia in search for its future security concept – Options and Fiction
When the declaration on Serbia’s military neutrality was formulated, and
then also adopted in the Assembly, no one asked for a referendum on that
issue. Now, proponents of neutrality insist on the referendum on the issue of
NATO membership. As Minister Šutanovac said, “if Ataturk had to organize
a referendum, he would have never carried out reforms”, or “if Vuk Karadžić
asked for a referendum on how to spell words, we would not have had a modern alphabet nowadays”. Thus, the political elite was elected, they took over
responsibilities, and they must have enough courage to make even those decisions that will not necessarily be liked by everyone. Debate on the future security concept cannot, and must not, be reduced to
quiz-riddles as to whether we like NATO or not; whether we want membership in the organization or not; whether it will bring some electoral points or
not, but rather whether NATO is, or whether it can be, the framework for Serbia’s optimal security concept. What is prevalent here is a simplistic approach
which reduces security exclusively or predominantly to the military and defence, whereby very important segments of state security, such as energy, environmental, information, social, economic and human security, as well as the
safety of citizens from all forms of threat are entirely neglected. This assumes a
system of networked security at the state level, with active participation of all
governmental and non-governmental actors, not just the military and police.
Serbia is exposed to the greatest number of global and regional risks, threats
and challenges, as well as to some specific risks that many other countries do
not face. Being a country of the Balkans, the central European and Danubean
area and of Europe, most of Serbia’s strategic goals and vital national interests,
including its legitimate interests in Kosovo, are achieved in the real environment in which the EU and NATO determine political, economic and security
framework. This has to be the starting point for any serious and responsible
national consideration of Serbia’s interests in its relations with the EU and
NATO.
Modern challenges, risks and threats require that concept to be reliable,
long-term, safe, efficient, inter-operable, but also rational and economically
optimal. An objective which must constantly be striven for is a secure Serbia
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in a better region, a secure region in a better Europe, and a secure Europe in a
better world, just as it was formulated by the European security strategy.
This is why Serbia has to very carefully and responsibly formulate a vision
for its own security for the 21st century and to arrive to a strategic concept as
a long-term and sustainable project of state and national security. As a small
country, Serbia can choose between several well-known strategic options:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
neutrality or non-aligned engagement;
security partnerships and initiatives;
collective security within the UN;
cooperative security within the OSCE;
Ad-hoc alliances;
solidarity within the EU, and;
collective defence and partnership within the framework of NATO.
How to find the best concept? By dealing with it seriously. We could start with
a simple quantification and comparison of the effectiveness of each option
with respect to any modern challenge.
Armed neutrality is, for now, the official option. All relevant factors of Serbia’s
geo-strategic position are placed in a rank of small countries in the world,
with all additional security risks arising from such a status. It is exposed to
the greatest number of global risks and, to some, even more than many other
countries.
A decision on military neutrality primarily implies that the state decides
whether it is ready and able to confront the threat itself, or whether it will have
allies. Neutrality implies that the state has no military allies, which means that
it must have its own adequate army which – with its number and equipment
– would be able to face-up to the challenge, which would only then be an argument for the recognition of such astatus by others. For a country to be neutral,
it must pursue a neutral foreign policy that is internationally accepted as such.
Serbia certainly can not refer back to a history of pursuing a neutral foreign
policy. One can not say that Serbia avoided participation in military conflicts,
nor would it be reasonable to expect it to be neutral in some future military
conflicts in which its interests could be threatened.
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The neutrality of Serbia is not internationally recognized – neither tacitly
nor expressively – nor is it realistic to expect that to happen. On the other
hand, even the key requirements of military neutrality have not been met, such
as:
• favourable relation of the subjects of international relations towards the
proclaimed neutrality;
• appropriate geo-strategic position of the country;
• stable internal security situation;
• ability to develop autonomous defence capabilities;
• developed and stable economy;
• high GDP;
• declaration of the state to opt for that status;
• acceptance, recognition and granting of such status by third countries;
• special or specific historical context of compelling reasons.
These requirements speak volumes for themselves that Serbia’s neutrality is
just a fiction, and not a serious option. Justifying its commitment to neutrality
by saying that the Serbian people were the biggest victims in Europe during the
twentieth century; that Serbia is the most suitable connection between Europe,
Asia, Middle East and Mediterranean, located in the sensitive area of southeast Europe, where a variety of strategic interests are interwoven, is actually the
strongest argument against military neutrality, especially if we do not want to
experience such suffering ever again.
It is only when we compare Serbia with some of the European countries that
are neutral, that we come to an argument which does not favour neutrality,
given that Serbia’s citizens would have to pay much more while their safety
would still not be completely guaranteed. In 2007, Austria had a military budget of $2,263 billion, which is $278 per capita, or $57,148 per soldier; Finland had a budget of $2,758 billion, or $527 per capita, or $94,130 per soldier.
For the same year, Serbia had a budget of $578 million, or $80 per capita, or
$12,500 per soldier per year. According to that, Austria had $336 billion of
GDP, Finland $213 billion, and Serbia only $54 billion.
It is, therefore, quite clear that such a budget allocation for defence needs is
too expensive for Serbia. If we were to compare it with Austria, we would have
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to allocate 4.2% for defence in order to reach a GDP outlay equivalent to that
of Austria. Given that Serbia’s position in terms of security is far more complex
in comparison with any of these countries, it would mean that a neutral Serbia
would have to have a far more numerous and better equipped armed forces.
What should be taken into account is that a huge sum of money would first
have to be allocated in order to reach the current level of equipment of the
armed forces of, for example, Austria.
The physiognomy of contemporary threats, risks and challenges, and the
possibility to successfully counter them whilst being nearly entirely surrounded by NATO and EU members, clearly demonstrates that Serbia’s military neutrality is an inadequate, inefficient and economically exhausting option. Speculation that Serbia should theoretically be able to join the EU whilst staying out
of NATO – as some countries such as Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Malta
and Cyprus have done previously – and that EU membership is a solid guarantee of security, since the EU has an autonomous common security and defence
policy, are basically well placed; however, only if we ignore the fact that Serbia
is neither geographically, nor in any other sense, Austria or Finland.
An alliance with another country or group of countries implies the willingness of that country or group of countries to assume an obligation to contribute to the stability of Serbia. Under the condition that Russia and NATO
find themselves in a state of confrontation, which at the moment does not look
likely, a military alliance with Russia would lead to a significant increase in risk
for the very security of Serbia and its citizens, as it would reduce cooperation
with the North-Atlantic Alliance that surrounds it.
A changeable alliance is clearly not acceptable, nor tolerable for small countries, since only great and regional powers can afford such a “luxury”.
Security partnership and initiatives are considered primarily in a regional
context, but they themselves are not sufficient, and neither is an exclusive reliance on collective security under the UN or cooperative security within the
OSCE.
Collective defence and partnership within NATO is an option that deserves
special attention. Namely, for the sake of its own security, Serbia’s interest in
NATO is much greater than vice-versa; whilst the interest on the part of the
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Alliance to improve its relations with Serbia stems from the fact that Serbia is
a real and unavoidable factor in the Balkans, and it is therefore much better if
Serbia is part of the solution, rather than a problem.
Historical legacy, insufficient knowledge on and understanding about
NATO, as well as manipulation by political parties and media, are three key
determinants of our current relationship with NATO. They are also obstacles
that deserve a serious discussion. As a result of these, today we have a wrong
approach to the whole question, by treating this – primarily foreign policy
issue – as an issue pertaining to domestic politics, where the emotional dominates over the rational, and which is perceived more as an issue of values,
rather than a security issue. A serious approach requires a consideration of
what NATO actually is, in which ways it has transformed thus far, in which
direction it is heading, what is our present relationship and what is NATO’s
perception of the future?
After the Cold War, NATO found itself in a process of transformation, the
final result of which is still an open question. It is likely that NATO will be
transformed from a collective military alliance under American leadership
into a security community of democratic nations, multilaterally connecting
their military capabilities. It would be a security-political organization, whose
primary military functions would consist of facilitating the formation of adhoc coalitions, while the Alliance would have constructive relations with its
neighbours, especially Russia, which - in the long run – would be able to accede to this community or to achieve very close ties with it. Such “OSCE-isation” of NATO would also be compatible with the UN, since NATO would
respect decisions of the Security Council in preserving peace.
Which direction this transformation will take, primarily depends on how
much stronger the unilateralist tendencies of U.S. politics will become, for how
much longer European influence in the U.S. will continue to decline, and finally, it will depend on the future of European security and defence policy and
the commitment of Europe to more forcefully emphasise its individuality.
It is not entirely ruled out that the acronym NATO – “No Activity, Talking
Only”, as it was frequently translated in the 1990s – could in the future acquire
a new meaning, i.e. Now Almost Totally Obsolete. NATO has come a long way
in the process of change and transformation; it is not what it was ten years ago,
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nor will it in ten years be what it is today, as it is still in the process of transformation from a collective military alliance to an open security community.
Accordingly, it is time Serbia accepted that even Serbia itself is not what it was
ten years ago, and that in ten years it will be different, and hopefully, much
better than today.
Considerations of relations between Serbia and NATO are mostly dominated
by emotions, not arguments, which - from the point of national and state interest – is an irresponsible resort to divisions “for” and “against”, of “patriots”
and “non-patriots”, those who care about “national dignity and identity” and
those who do not understand the “soul of our nation”. Bearing in mind the very
unfortunate heritage from the past, any qualification of guilt other than being
mutual would be irresponsible and would not lead to constructive discussion,
though it remains indisputable that NATO indeed bombed Serbia.
However, that the whole story is much more about domestic political manipulation is proved by the fact that immediately after the changes ensuing
from October 5th – namely, only two years after the bombing – Serbia already
established very successful cooperation with NATO in conflict prevention and
resolution in southern Serbia, as well as in March 2004, in stopping the pogrom and violence against Serbs in Kosovo.
Along with that, we started probing, expressing our intentions and seeking
support for as speedy progress towards Euro-Atlantic integrations and NATO
as possible. Therefore, within a short period we moved from confrontation to
dialogue, while only three years after the bombing, i.e. in late April 2002, the
Supreme Defence Council, chaired by Dr Vojislav Koštunica, sent recommendations to the federal government to initiate the process of joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP). We saw an expansion in cooperation with individual
member states and the Alliance itself; we insisted on being admitted to the PfP
as quickly as possible, with the vision to move forward to full membership in
NATO, only to remember at one point that, alas, we were bombed.
By the end of 2003, we normalised relations with NATO and signed agreements
on bilateral cooperation with more than 20 countries. Until mid-2004, about
800 military and civilian personnel from within the defence system were included in various training programs, courses, seminars, conferences and other
activities abroad, while over 200 officers acquired knowledge of foreign lan-
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guages (English, German, French, Italian, Greek) in accordance with NATO
standards. The costs, amounting to over €2 million, were borne in most part by
NATO member states, as well as some other countries, including Switzerland.
Intensive cooperation in all fields resulted in Serbia’s accession to the PfP
without mentioning Mladić as a precondition, which previously had been an
insurmountable obstacle. It is interesting to note that those individuals who
are currently most opposed to normalisation of relations with NATO, were
during the period from 2001 to 2007 in leadership positions in the FRY, i.e.
Serbia.
How consistent is it if any talk about NATO is rejected by the argument
that NATO bombed us, yet when it comes to membership in PfP or in the
EU, which both gather those very same countries, we do not seem to mind?
Of course, one can not simply forget the past and facts, however, constant
insistence on this, combined with the misuse of that argument for political
campaigns, is useless and leads nowhere. It would be wiser to look towards
the pragmatism of other countries, including Serbia itself; already in 1951, we
normalised relations with Germany – a country which was in 1945 levelled
to the ground by the U.S. and British air forces – and which already in 1955
became a member of NATO, the Alliance in which the U.S. and UK were the
leading powers. Has the joint resolution of crisis in southern Serbia in 2001 not
been the best example of successful cooperation between Serbia and NATO in
conflict prevention in Presevo Valley? Or in March 2004, when NATO stopped
the pogrom and violence against Serbs in Kosovo?
It is exactly these experiences that should provide the best evidence of the
positive aspects of NATO membership, because if Serbia had at the time been
a member of the PfP and NATO, the bombing would not have happened. Instead, we would have been in a position to exclude this possibility as a pressure
factor in the negotiations. This is exactly what one should have in mind when
thinking about the future. It is better to sit at the negotiating table than to be
served on the menu, it is better to be someone who is talking than someone
who is being talked about; in a word, it is always better to be a subject rather
than object. Obviously there have been some changes on our side, as now we
are angry at them for “creating a NATO state” in Kosovo, and now we cannot
forget nor forgive the bombing, although we had already forgiven, and even
withdrawn our complaint against NATO countries.
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In fact, it was during unsuccessful rounds of negotiations on Kosovo
in 2007 that the era of increasingly vocal confrontation with NATO and
the EU began. Some political parties, politicians, public figures and the
media have once again started pointing out that NATO bombed Serbia;
we have a media revival of memories from 1999, with an emphasis that
“NATO is snatching Kosovo away, having occupied the part of our sovereign territory, NATO is now implementing the Ahtisaari plan and creating
a NATO state on our territory”. At the same time, Euro-Atlantic integration is increasingly becoming an unwelcome concept, that is occasionally
even deleted from earlier documents. All of this has been used as an excuse against membership in NATO, while it actually reflects our relation
towards the EU.
Somewhat more convincing is the explanation that from 2000-onwards,
Serbia was indeed involved in a political process of integration to NATO but
that, after recognition of Kosovo’s independence by a number of NATO members that were ultimately engaged in the formation of the Kosovo Security
Force, a new political reality emerged. Given that not all NATO member states
recognized the independence of Kosovo, the question that arises is why is it
that we do not see as problematic Serbia’s membership in the EU, given that all
but five of its members have recognised Kosovo’s independence?
That this is nothing more than intra-party political sophistry – one that
leads people into a kind of trilemma – is illustrated by the fact that Serbia
moved from its original commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration to a declaration on military neutrality adopted by the National Assembly, without a single
mentioning of neutrality in the National Security Strategy. Such inter-party
squabbling does nothing but mislead the people.
In November 2004, the “Defence Strategy of Serbia and Montenegro” was
adopted, whereby one of the main objectives was membership in the Partnership for Peace and NATO. In the “Strategic Defence Review”, which was adopted on 7th June 2006 at the collegium of the Minister of Defence, the following
was stated: “Vital security and defence interests are: defence of the Republic
of Serbia, cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, accession to the EU and
other international organizations and institutions, building of trust, security
and stability in the region and the implementation of the Security Council
Resolution 1244 on Kosovo and Metohija.”
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“The basis of the defence policy of the Republic of Serbia is made of
its Euro-Atlantic foreign policy orientation, and commitment to actively
participate in the process of cooperation and joint activities with other
countries and subjects of international relations, in building of global, regional, and national security” and “developing and promoting partnerships
with the system of collective security, and with neighbouring and other
countries”.
The declaration of the National Assembly of 26th December 2007, stated
that, “due to the overall role of NATO, starting from the illegal bombardment
of Serbia in 1999 without authorisation of the Security Council to Annex 11 of
Ahtisaari’s rejected plan, which stipulates that NATO should be the final authority in independent Kosovo, the National Assembly has decided to declare
the neutrality of the Republic of Serbia in relation to all present military alliances, unless it is decided differently in a referendum.”
Then, the “National Security Strategy”, adopted in late-2009, does not mention neutrality but rather says that the “defence policy affirms the system of
cooperative security, integration into European and other international security structures and participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace”, as well as
“achieving interoperability with defence systems of these countries“, and that it
will “build the capacities and capabilities of the national security system in accordance with standards and obligations deriving from the European Security
and Defence Policy.”
Relations between Serbia and NATO have gone through several phases,
starting with mutual recognition, confrontation and hostility, through dialogue and normalisation of relations, to cooperation. These relations are currently rather ambivalent, because as a member of the PfP, Serbia is officially
seeking to promote cooperation to the degree of obtaining candidate status
whilst, on the other hand, there is an intensive anti-NATO campaign based
on a perception of NATO framed in a Cold War mind-set. This campaign, of
course, revives the media-warmed pique due to the bombing of Serb positions
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and aggression against Serbia in 1999. It is insisted
that it is because of that “people have a psychological barrier and aversion towards membership in NATO”, although at one point in time that was not the
case, even though the memory was much fresher.
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NATO as an option is not necessarily a destiny, but it is Serbia’s reality.
NATO is an environment which significantly affects its overall security, political and international position, notwithstanding the absence of Serbia when
these issues are being discussed. A responsible approach towards the future
implies a response to the key question of whether, and in which way, our security would be more firmly guaranteed, at what economic and possibly political
price, and what are the advantages and possible negative consequences of each
option, including partnership with NATO, as well as membership in the Alliance? In that sense, it is possible to already respond to few dilemmas.
•
By Serbia’s membership in the Alliance, its security would immediately
increase by the very elimination of hostility with NATO, and particularly because Serbia would become a part of a collective defence system,
i.e. of a powerful political and security partner organization, and equal
partner to other members and our neighbours.
• Decisions made at NATO influence the global, European and regional
security, as well as the security of Serbia, regardless of whether Serbia
is a member of the Alliance or not. However, if Serbia were a member,
NATO would not be able to make decisions that, directly or indirectly,
could have negative consequences for Serbia’s security, since all decisions are made unanimously.
• By joining the Alliance, Serbia’s international position would be
strengthened because the leverage of its foreign and security policy
would be stronger, and it would also be more attractive for foreign investment, which would enable faster economic development.
• Opening up opportunities not only for modernization and conversion
of the military industry, but also for manufacturing and the sale of consumer goods in a market that includes over 900 million people, and
whose major consumer is the military. Modernization and equipping of
one’s own armed forces is economically more tolerable than neutrality,
which is far more expensive and provides less security.
• Should Serbia remain outside NATO, all benefits thus stated will be
lost, since Serbia would be surrounded by members of the Alliance,
and it would be in an inferior position in every aspect, because
funds for maintaining Serbia’s security would be far more limited
than the funds Serbia would otherwise have as the part of the Alliance.
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•
•
•
•
•
Given that Kosovo is always used as an emotional excuse, one must ask
in which way will Serbia be safer and how it will be easier to resolve the
Kosovo issue, or to “defend and restore the full sovereignty of Serbia”
more effectively, if our relations with our environment are tense, rather
than normal and friendly, due to our position of neutrality. In fact, it
is necessary to ask how detrimental it is to prove our commitment to
neutrality by hostility to NATO, while at the same time both KFOR and
EULEX are deployed in Kosovo.
Fear that Russia would become Serbia’s enemy is unfounded, because Russia is not in hostile relations with NATO, nor with its individual member
states. The most recent warming of relations between Russia and NATO
will also influence a more positive perception of NATO in this country.
Claims that Serbia’s membership in NATO could harm the strategic
interests of Russia, thereby bringing into question Russia’s political
(Kosovo and Metohija) and economic (energy supplies) support, are
also unsubstantiated. It is questionable whether Russia considers Serbia as strategically important. Russia supplies energy to NATO member
states and, as it concerns Kosovo, this issue will certainly be resolved
through Russian support for dialogue.
It is already out of place to ask whether by joining NATO Serbia would
indirectly recognize the legitimacy of the military intervention against
Yugoslavia in 1999, and of all decisions on Kosovo’s final status that are
in conflict with its interests.
A danger that Serbia would be exposed to greater risks and new transnational and asymmetric threats, such as international terrorism and
Islamic fundamentalism, is also another excuse. Dangers exist regardless, and Serbia has no aspirations to send its intervention contingents
anywhere within NATO missions. As things stand at the moment, it
seems that NATO is no longer going to do the same in the same form,
as it is clear to everyone that peace cannot be made by war, but rather
by its prevention.
Although it is obvious that NATO is the most reliable concept, while neutrality
is only a fiction and political platitude, it still does not mean that Serbia should
rush into NATO and that constructive discussion should be obstructed, but
rather that every option should be thoroughly reviewed and that nothing
should be rejected in advance, nor forced.
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Rejection of NATO by referring to patriotism is nothing more than a mask
of resistance to the European path of Serbia’s modernization. On the other
hand, uncritical efforts regarding Serbia’s accession to NATO by some NGOs,
which at the same time unconditionally justify the bombing of Yugoslavia, actually serve as the best anti-NATO campaign.
Along with opening a dialogue with Kosovo and unblocking the process of
EU accession, it seems that conditions for a dispassionate, serious and wellargued debate on Serbia’s relations with NATO are finally created. If we were
in NATO, the format of negotiations over Kosovo would probably be quite
different. Had we, from the early 1990s been in NATO, what happened to us
probably would not have ever happened; if we joined NATO then, there would
have been no reason for NATO to intervene here in such a brutal way.
Patriotism is not proved by a sheer repetition of how NATO bombed us,
but rather by finding a framework and concept which will guarantee Serbia
and its citizens the safest and most secure life, even if it that means an alliance with NATO. In addition, NATO-Russia relations and the trend of their
development does not prevent us from choosing NATO as an option; quite
the opposite. Moreover, if we support all our neighbours in their pursuit for
membership in NATO, as our president stated during his visit to Montenegro,
why wouldn’t we support ourselves in the same way? If Serbia’s interest stands
above everything else, that should be the criterion for choosing the best concept which would ensure the realization of these interests.
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New NATO and New Serbia: What to do with neutrality?
Dr Mihajlo Basara294
During the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became clear that Serbia lacks the critical mass necessary for reforms. The great hopes aroused by the
October 5th proved to be only a temporary compromise on the upheaval which
melted in ideological regression and inexhaustible party squabbling for power.
To make Serbia’s path even more difficult to pursue, these internal negative tendencies were accompanied by NATO’s support to an independent Kosovo, which
has additionally strengthened the anti-NATO mood in Serbia, and made Serbia’s
road towards the EU more challenging. By pushing for Kosovo’s independence, a
number of security risks in the region with national, ethnic and religious roots
have increased, whilst Serbian reaction through the Resolution on neutrality reflects more its weakness, rather than a rationally grounded strategic decision.
Despite these negative trends, some hope can be gained from the fact that Serbia’s
European orientation has, in the same period, become irreversible. It also suggests that the political elites and parties understand that both security and development strategies has always come in the same package. Therefore, the only reasonable option would be a single security umbrella with neighbouring and other
countries with whom Serbia has the most extensive level of economic exchange
and, with whom it shares common values.
294 Autor is a retired Colonel
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Two negative evolutions
Since 5th October 2000 – when the hopes of Serbia’s citizens for the possibility of change and a more prosperous future were awakened – until today, the world has changed, our regional environment has changed, and so
has Serbia. Following a deep economic crisis whose seeds were planted in
the centre of the modern democratic world, democracy – as an exemplary
social and state model – has lost its former reputation. The region has not
become more secure in the post-war period, while security threats and risks
became even more numerous and serious. Solutions which brought wars to
an end (such as the, Dayton Peace Agreement and the Kumanovo Agreement), did not bring complete pacification to the Serbian side (nor to other
sides), neither did post-war mobility and a reorientation towards peace-time
reconstruction. The self-proclaimed declaration of independence of Kosovo
is a “new” issue for Serbia, which has stifled its progress and accession to
European democracies. Finally, Serbia does not have a consensus on a single
strategically important issue for its development, with questions of national
and state reaffirmation remaining open. These developments are actually a
negative evolution of the process which started on October 5th with great
hopes and expectations.
Since 2000, NATO also underwent a negative evolution, bearing in mind
9/11 and actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.295 Attempts at transforming itself from a military to a political organisation (and the other way around,
even branding itself as a political-military organisation), when required, did
not bear fruit. Its clumsiness in dealing with complex civilian-military tasks
has annoyed politicians, and its military impotence, despite its technological superiority, has annoyed politicians, military and the military industry
alike. The number of civilians and soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the number of NATO and coalition troops who died in combat, the invisible results in the quest for international terrorist networks, and humiliation
due to the inhumane treatment of prisoners, have all been sufficient for citizens of western countries (who were previously well-prepared through their
state propaganda to support all these actions, as well as NATO’s bombing of
Serbia) to – following the triumph felt after their victory in the Cold War –
more seriously question NATO’s functionality. Experts asked the very same
295 See Transatlantic Trends Key findings 2010; (2010_English_Key.pdf); p.15 and 16.
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question immediately after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, however, that is
never sufficient to prompt anything more than a pensive looks on the face of
politicians.
A look at NATO from Serbia, like all other aspects of globalisation and transitional reforms, suffers from multiple and often irreconcilable perspectives
and interpretations. The most prominent interpretations have identified the
so-called “two Serbias”. The “First” Serbia defeated NATO in an unjust war
which broke out without any responsibility on the part of Serbia, whilst the
“other” Serbia finds that the entire responsibility for the bombardment of Serbia lies with Serbian politics, which was, just as well, also fully responsible
for the collapse of Yugoslavia and its war-time break-up. Their arguments are
charged with a quantity of emotions that is rather inappropriate for this sphere
of politics and political means, and particularly for pursuing an analytical approach.
According to this division, the “two Serbias” look alike; each creating selfjustifying coherent doctrines (the real and ideological inheritance of socialism)
about Serbia’s history and future. In the view of the former, Serbs are eternal
heroes, whose patriotism has never been disputed (although the very collapse
of Yugoslavia demonstrated the opposite), whilst the latter have a “theory” on
the indisputable guilt of Serbs for the war and their permanent inability to
modernise. Holders of these ideologies, understandably, seek a (rational) gain
for their political positions. Politically and existentially, they are quite well-off,
and as social psychology teaches us, emotions are easy to arouse amongst the
masses, but very difficult to quench. Given that Serbia is both a post-war and
defeated society, political processes are just as charged with emotional content
as was the case at the beginning of the dissolution of the self-managed Yugoslavia.
By taking advantage of popular feelings, political parties continue, as they
did back then, to secure power with their populist (usually extreme and irrational) approach, at the expense of national political interests and rationale. In
the first decade of the twenty-first century, it became clear that Serbia did not
possess the critical mass necessary to conduct reforms. October 5th was nothing but an anti-Milošević coup, which was exactly the worst possible result
of Serbia’s attempt to undertake reform. The scope and fate of post-October
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Serbia, as Hannah Arendt pointed out in relation to the fate of revolutions,296
was determined by the very regime which was brought down by the “revolutionaries” of October 5th. After NATO imposed peace, Serbia – as was only to
be expected – continued the war with itself. Not a single day passed between
5th and 6th October 2000, and the new elite which assumed power (and which
was believed by a large number of citizens to be a new democratically-oriented
force) reverted back to old ideologies. Minor attempts to respond to promises
and new responsibilities (for example, to the Hague Tribunal) resulted in the
assassination of the leading reformer, Zoran Đinđić.
This internal conflict, apart from differing interpretations of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Serbian path to integration into modern economic
and political currents, also acquired new themes. A number of taboos from
the time of communism were now reopened, whilst history was re-valued
and revised; not, however, as a consensus on the need for its re-evaluation,
but rather as a new schism. As the elites persevered uncompromisingly in
this black and white Serbia, and day-to-day life continued with its usual
pace, interpretations of the elite remained static and no longer corresponded to reality. To make everything even more difficult, these negative internal
tendencies have been accompanied by NATO’s support to an independent
Kosovo (Declaration of Independence, announced in December 2007, officially declared on 17th February 2008), which reinforced anti-NATO sentiment in Serbia and ultimately determined the reform path of Serbia towards
the EU.
It was only the split within the Serb Radical Party on its pro-European wing
(publicly declared after Nikolić’s statement in September 2008 that the Radicals were going to vote in the Serbian National Assembly297 for the adoption
of Stabilisation and Accession Agreement with the EU298), and the remaining
part of the SRS, which threw light on some estimates from within the party
that the electorate was actually more ready for reform (i.e. more rational) than
the political elites themselves. A large anti-European glacier cracked and got
caught in the rapids now moving quickly towards the EU, thus resuscitating
the hope of October 5th.
296 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, „Filip Višnjić“, Belgrade 1991, p. 136
297 See: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narodna_skup%C5%A1tina_Republike_Srbije
298 See: http://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sporazum_o_stabilizaciji_i_pridru%C5%BEivanju
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Contribution of NATO to anti-NATO sentiment amongst Serbian citizens
Regional security has been undermined by the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, declared under the auspices of the U.S. and EU. That
is the main reason why at present Serbia cannot mobilise public support for
accession to NATO. It is not even about persuading the opposition about that
idea or redirecting inherited sentiments, but it rather comes down to expecting Serbia to move closer to a military alliance which was the source of aggression and which supported its territorial fragmentation. But who insisted on
the speedy recognition of Kosovo, why was the policy “standards before status”
launched, as if it was not only too obvious that it was unattainable, and eventually deserted? These questions are even more pertinent since Serbia would
have been satisfied with formal sovereignty and an open path to the EU, whilst
for Kosovo itself this would have been a quicker and less demanding ways
towards achieving the same objective. In those circumstances where the benefits of EU membership would become more conspicuous, a new referendum
on Kosovo’s independence would likely be more acceptable for Serbia. At the
same time, a presumption that should the Balkans be left to itself, without the
supervision of either NATO or the EU, the likelihood of renewal of war politics
of the Balkan countries would be realistic and predictable. By supporting an
independent Kosovo, this assumption gained even more substance.
Let’s look at the most frequently cited reasons for supporting an independent Kosovo:
• military establishment in Kosovo (including Camp Bondstill), which
guarantees protection of U.S. interests in the Balkans;
• change the geopolitical balance in the Balkans by strengthening Albanian statehood and believing that such a change would counteract
Serbian-Russian domination;
• economic interests in material and human resources (coal mines and
cheap labour);
• huge recruitment potential for military interventions around the world;
• control of future oil and gas routes from the Caucasus region and the
Middle East;
• protection of human rights of Albanians who were not able to continue
co-habitation with Serbs in Serbia;
• NATO’s credibility.
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Whichever of these claims – or all of them together – were close to the truth,
support to the unilateral declaration of independence leaves a number of security issues unresolved and creates additional new ones. During Milošević’s
time, the importance of Serbia’s geopolitical position and its geopolitical role
were customarily exaggerated. Explanations for the decisions of the West were
reduced to condemnation of the imperialistic behaviour by the victorious side
in the Cold War and their forays towards the East. It was believed that Serbia, with its geopolitical position, ethnic borders and uniting objectives, was
the main obstacle; therefore, the fragmentation of Serbian territory, and the
creation of small states with mutual tensions, was the best way to control this
geopolitical area. Support to the independence of Kosovo adds even more material to the proponents of such a thesis.
By pushing for the independence of Kosovo, a number of security risks in
the region – rooted in state, ethnic and religious reasons – have increased.
Serbia’s neighbours were forced to decide against their own security interests in the region. Under the tip of the ice-berg, a number of already open
or latent Albanian-Serbian, Albanian-Macedonian, Albanian-Montenegrin,
Albanian-Greek, Serbian-Macedonian, Serbian-Croatian, Serbian-Montenegrin, Serbian-Bosniak, Greek-Macedonian and other security risks have now
been set in motion. Looking ahead, it is difficult to expect that demographic
growth of the Albanian population can be quickly restrained by the economic
and democratic development of the Albanian minority in Serbia, Macedonia,
Montenegro and Greece, respectively, which also implies a slow pace of progress in regional security. This painful inheritance maintains tensions of the
trauma previously experienced in relations between Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia.
The redefinition of borders and the use of forced multiculturalism has been
the experience of Serbs, as well as the path to uncertainty, which started with
the rejection of co-habitation with Serbia in Yugoslavia (multiculturalism was
not even mentioned at the time). In the process, further double standards were
simply impossible to avoid given the ethnic variety of all the new states. Whilst
the untenability of a multicultural Yugoslavia was supported, a multicultural
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been insisted upon; a multicultural Serbia has
been shunned, yet a multicultural Kosovo was supported.
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All these threats are accompanied with „modern“ threats which make the
lives of people in Serbia, as well as in other countries in this part of the world,
quite miserable. What I have in mind are terrorism, organised crime, environmental threats, uncontrolled use and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, industrial accidents, human and organ trafficking, institutional failures etc. A number of threats has thus been enlarged compared
to the situation and process in which Serbia’s territoriality would remain unscathed.299
What to do with neutrality?
On 26th October 2009, the National Assembly of Serbia adopted the Strategy
on National Security, the Strategy on National Defence and legislation on Military counter-intelligence and security Agency, Laws on military, labour and
material duties and civil service, on deployment of the army in multinational
operations outside Serbia. The resolution on military neutrality of Serbia of 26
December 2007 was touched upon many times during the debate, however,
the term “neutrality” was not specifically used in one single sentence in the
Strategy of National Security nor in any other act thus adopted. Opposition
parties voiced their discontent at the very session, by saying that the governing
majority has been trying to bring the country into NATO, by doing „what they
are told to do“ by the EU and NATO.
299 “For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than
from the dread of a cataclysmic world event” (UNDP 1994, p. 22). Common issues that spark
concerns, including in Serbia, are the security of employment, incomes and health care, and a
healthy and safe environment. (UNDP 1994, p. 22). The UN has identified six clusters of threats that the world needs to be concerned about now and in the decades ahead (United Nations
2004): economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental
degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil wars; nuclear, radiological,
chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime. According to a
2005 survey, although Serbians do not perceive organized crime as a threat to personal security,
they see it as a threat to their society as a whole. About 74% of the respondents said that Serbia
cannot become prosperous without staunching organized crime and corruption (SMMRI 2005).
Combating organized crime will depend on concerted regional cooperation, since organized
crime groups, just like powerful multinational companies, take full advantage of economic liberalization and the progressive opening of many frontiers. The adoption of the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, a global instrument to fight organized crime, is a historic step forward in the fight against this threat.“ Taken from the Report on Human Development
in Serbia 2008., p.156. (Serbia_NHDR-2008-Src.pdf)
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In the National Security Strategy, the section entitled „Basic orientation of
national security policy“, second paragraph, stipulates that the „Republic of
Serbia is committed to respecting international law, strengthening the role of
the United Nations, OSCE and EU (NATO is not listed among these organisations, as is the case with, for instance, the National Security Strategy of Montenegro) and to create mechanisms for maintaining security in the world, with
equal respect for the interests of all countries, nations and ethnic groups. Accordingly, it does not consider, in advance, any state or alliance hostile.“ In the
same section, it is also stated that the Republic of Serbia is determined never
to recognise the decision of the provisional institutions of the Autonomous
Province of Kosovo and Metohija on the unilateral declaration of independence; that it will largely harmonise its foreign and security policy with the
positions and activities of the EU; it will build the capacities and capabilities of
the national security system, in accordance with the standards and obligations
deriving from the European security and defence policy; that its accession to
the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme confirms its contribution
to the common democratic values and strengthening of regional security and
„emphasises its belief “ that the active and meaningful cooperation of all countries of the Western Balkans with NATO and Partnership for Peace member
countries is the road to permanent stabilization and prosperity of this region.
Further on, acceleration of the process of European integrations was defined
as one of the strategic priorities of Serbia’s foreign policy. It is important to observe that the historically close and extensive links and strategic partnership
with the Russian Federation in the domain of energy are put in the same context, followed by an emphasis on the importance of restoring the tradition of
good relations with the United States, continuation of the deepening of close
ties with China, India and Brazil, as well as with the Non-Aligned Movement
member states. Finally, in the section „Defence Policy“, it is decisively stated
that „Defence policy promotes the concept of cooperative security“. Serbia, with
its defence policy, will contribute to upholding protection of its national interests, as well as to the preservation of peace, „with the improvement of relations
with the related institutions of the collective security system and the neighbouring and other countries“. The term neutrality was not mentioned, yet the term
seems to be quite well-developed, at least in the National Security Strategy. The
former government influenced adoption of the Resolution on neutrality, which
was politically implemented and exploited by the current Government.
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As far as it is known, the idea of neutrality originated from the Democratic
Party of Serbia, which adopted the Declaration on military neutrality of Serbia
on 18th October 2007.300 Two months later, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Resolution on the Protection of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Constitutional Order of the Republic of Serbia, which declares that „Serbia will remain neutral to all present military alliances unless it
was decided differently in a referendum“. In mid-February 2008, Kosovo simply
declared independence. The public, divided as ever, relied on black and white
interpretations – was it a realistic concept or a relict of non-aligned sentiments
and its abuse by the most vociferous critics of the communist heritage?; has it
only had instrumental value (the Resolution was adopted two months prior
to the self-declaration of independence)?; neutrality refers to the ambivalence
of values; what are the similarities and the differences in comparison to other
neutral countries in Europe?; between which options of neutrality is Serbian
neutrality?; who will respect Serbian neutrality without international agreement?; how are we to exert any influence regarding the Kosovo issue whilst
surrounded by NATO member states?; can Serbia become member of the EU
without prior membership in NATO (which was the path of all transitional
countries that are NATO members today)?; neutrality is not economically viable, as it will discourage foreign investment301?; security sector reform will
stagnate or will be completely terminated; it will not be possible to continue
with standardisation and professionalisation of the Army, and so on.
These are all legitimate questions, however, there are many more questions
which have remained insufficiently dealt with or which were entirely ignored.
For instance, from the point of ideological orientation, how is it possible that
a right-leaning party from Serbia (not only one, though the DSS was the chief
initiator), in today’s Europe which is predominantly governed by political parties of the right, is rejecting NATO?; what does the neutrality of Serbia mean in
the context of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Russia
supporting Serbia’s case by saying that Kosovo and Metohija should remain an
integral part of Serbia (with consequences reaching to the „small Yugoslavia“
300 See: http://www.dss.org.rs/
301 In the publication of the Centre for Civil-Military Relations, entitled „Business and
Security“ (Belgrade, 2009), the text of T. Karaulac „Country risk, foreign direct investments and
NATO“ shows that it is difficult to claim that the very membership in NATO has positive correlation with foreign direct investment, particularly in those countries that conducted all reforms
and acquired both EU and NATO membership at the same time.
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and the Republika Srpska)?; what is the European concept of security and will
the EU be able at all to convey it?; what is the purpose of Serbia’s non-governmental sector?, etc. Following the adoption of the Resolution, some of these
issues were under discussion at the divided Assembly and amongst the public,
also divided, and some of them can be responded to by a thorough reading of
the Resolution itself.
The Resolution was adopted as a political reaction to hints of the self-declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia is aware that military responses were
finalised in 1999, although it is a legitimate right of any country to use it, should
the territorial integrity of that country be jeopardised. With that Resolution,
Serbia proclaimed its neutrality to all present military alliances, by which it
declared that temporarily („unless it was decided differently in a referendum“)
it did not want to join NATO.302 Such a formulation demonstrates that its very
initiators and adopters do not believe that this will be a permanent, solid and
self-understandable decision. The Resolution mostly emanates weakness and
the lack of rationally-grounded strategic orientation. The real dilemma and
problem of Serbia since 1991 has been to overcome its conflicting heritage and
irrational decisions. That heritage was always in the essence of every new decision or new stumbling block.303 In that sense, the Resolution is only the outcome of a series of events, where the most prominent irrational choice was the
decision to start a war with NATO, after which all political successors had to
struggle with its consequences. As a sequence of these facts, February 2008 did
not bring anything unusual. Serbia had a very limited choice, and perhaps it is
not wrong to say that it did not have any choice at all. Serbia refused to accept
an independent Kosovo, it is still fighting for diplomatic and legal solutions,
whilst at the same time it has continued political cooperation with all members of NATO and other countries around the world, especially those which
302 Although all parallels with neutral European countries are made at the expense of Serbian neutrality, one could say that neutrality itself is a product of a security situation (postconflict, potential conflict, like in other cases) in which Serbia found itself, understandably, not
without its own contribution.
303 After the fall of Berlin Wall, support of Serbia to a self-managed community of Yugoslav
peoples shows that even communism is better than the national break-up, especially the one of
self-managed states, which is why Serbian national corp cared more about Yugoslavia than the
others. The idea to, despite the powerful victors of the Cold War, create new Serbian borders
with military means, was irrational. After this decision, which can be “justified” by the surge
of history into contemporary politics, all subsequent decisions were mostly the act and sin of
political elites, with very little of irrational, and a lot of selfish interest.
363
supported its territorial integrity. There was no discussion about withdrawal
from the Partnership for Peace (PfP) – which is a mechanism of NATO – with
an emphasis that, for now, PfP remains an adequate level of cooperation with
NATO.
It should also be mentioned that relations between the former adversaries
in the Cold War have not remained without traces of heritage, whereby it is
difficult to discern interests from the shadows of irrational reasoning. Whether
Eastern Europe is still under protection or whether it needs to be protected?;
whether its citizens feel threatened by Russia or is this threat deliberately induced from the political sphere?; does Russia possess and does it demonstrate
its sufficiently changed profile and pro-democratic face which could help her to
eliminate the fear and reminiscence of old threats amongst its western neighbours?; whether it is wise to equate Nazism and communism in order to attain
„reconciliation“ of values? On the other hand, at the end of the Cold War it was
agreed that NATO was not going to expand eastwards. Russia also need more
reassurance. Halting NATO’s further expansion towards the East could be a test
of confidence which would primarily be welcomed by Russia, i.e. this would improve relations between Europe and Russia. That would be the real termination
of the Cold War, since this heritage is burdensome for all actors. What is not
often seen by the public in Serbia is that both Serbian and European – or should
we say, the Western side – still have inherited presumptions which, in combination with their respective interests, reflect misunderstanding and mistrust.
What ensues from these remarks is the question whether military neutrality is realistic and viable, an option or fiction? Does it accelerate or slow down
the democratisation of Serbian society? There is no single decisive answer; but
many answers in a conditional „if...then“. Neutrality can be a practical policy,
which it is at the moment. Finnish neutrality could serve as a good model.
Therefore, should Serbia continue with social reforms with the ultimate objective of EU membership, at the same time demonstrating credible democratic
potential, the EU will keep its door open. Serbia is today surrounded by neighbouring countries that are either already in NATO or will soon be. In addition,
the developmental orientation of transitional countries towards the EU was
almost by rule realised through membership in NATO.
Global integration is achieved across national borders and the same goes for
Russia, too. Conflict between the former Cold War enemies could potentially
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grow and expand, although the logic of mutual interdependence, as well as the
transition of Russia towards becoming a democratic society, does not envisage such a trend. Namely, conflicts between democratically-ordained societies
are less likely. Should the conflict grow, the politics of neutrality will also be
less possible. Yet it is difficult to believe that the EU would engage in serious
security conflicts with Russia because of US interests and the American policy
towards Russia. Europe refused to do that even during the Cold War. The EU
no longer needs the same kind of protection it had during the Cold War, despite some attempts to portray the situation as such and justify the anti-missile
shield. Economic realities of the EU and Russia are brought closer by their
strategic views, which makes the possibility of a new chasm between them
even less likely. The countries of the former Eastern block are slower to notice
these changes, given that they suffer from an inherited fear and understandable vulnerability of their legal states and democratic orders. Serbia is Russia’s
traditional friend (though more cultural and political than economic). It does
not fear Russian imperialism and possesses the experience of equality with
Russia. Therefore, in the context of Serbia’s accession to the EU and its relations with Russia, it will always appear as if Serbia and Russia are much closer
to each other than Serbia and the EU countries. Yet, the level of economic
exchange is still a more realistic parameter for evaluating relations with both.
In short, should the Cold War-style NATO enlargement cease (the antimissile shield is a test, according to Lavrov), we can expect a better understanding of the European security space, where Russia features as one of the
European countries. Should the current security issues and security inheritance – European and Serbian – prevail, military neutrality will increasingly
become a relict. However, should a gap – between Serbia and Europe, or Russia and Europe, for instance – become deeper, military neutrality may become
political option.
Security and development strategy come in one package
The question which arises here is one about the speed of Serbia’s accession
to Europe in light of its security concept. Serbia lost a lot of time and, finally,
an irreversible decision on accession to the EU is an important Rubicon to
cross. Whether Serbia has already crossed it by the announcement of the SNS
(Serb Progressive Party) that they have become pro-European party (or is that
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yet another political game?), we cannot as yet know. Under the pressure of
years of conditioning and imprinting of blame, claims that the alternative to
EU membership is a relapse into wars, social anarchy, and the threat that organised crime and corruption take over institutions and harness any reform,
now fall short. Waves of world economic crisis and an awareness that it was
rooted in the greed of financial capital which is smothering a large number
of countries – especially those that are small – now make the hardly-attained
pro-European majority increasingly reluctant. In this context, military neutrality (or, more correctly, indecisiveness) has slowed down progress towards
membership. The greatest benefit which Serbia could be given by the EU is its
understanding of the situation and a clear separation of the accession process
from the Serbian policy towards Kosovo and NATO membership. And again,
with the hope that the Serbian elite undoubtedly take the country in the direction of Euro-Atlantic integrations.
Why Euro-Atlantic? Principally because one security umbrella with neighbours and countries with which the level of economic exchange and economic
life is most intensive (60% with the EU) is the only reasonable way to secure
stability and development. It is, therefore, very positive that the majority in
Serbia acknowledge that without a European orientation, it will not be possible
to survive in political life. Security and development strategies always used to
come in the same package.
As complicated as the experience of Serbia with the West in the past 20
years might have been, Serbia (and Russia) is still developing the same European social values.304 Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia states
that „the Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live
in it, based on the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy,
human and minority rights and freedoms, and commitment to European principles and values“. Article 2 of the new Strategic Concept for Security and Defence by members of the North-Atlantic Alliance, adopted in November 2010
in Lisbon, stipulates that „NATO member states form a unique community of
values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human
304 „Respect of human dignity, freedom, democracy, rule of law, respect of human and minority rights, pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, non-discrimination, equality between men
and women“ are the values stated in the EU Constitution (later replaced by the Lisbon Treaty).
FABUS, Novi Sad, p. 28.
366
rights and the rule of law“. Article 38 refers to the same: „Our Alliance thrives
as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty,
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its
members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are
determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve“.
Without European standards, which serve as the instrument for attaining
those values, such a path is impossible. Isolation is also impossible. Even if
some political option opts for it – though it is highly unlikely in Serbia - it
would soon be modified or even toppled down. Such deeper logic dictates
that the strategy of development of society should be connected with the form
of the protection of that strategy,305 which would only enable the country to
reduce the space for various Montgomeries and Konuzins, whilst its citizens
would become more aware of the value of their own choice.
305 NATO and the EU are covering, i.e. protecting the same values by different means. They
would probably be impossible to develop or to protect through the history of the Cold War
without NATO. France could withdraw from NATO’s military component, but not from the
political one, since it could not abandon its developmental social strategy.
367
Euroatlanticism and Creation of „Security Community“
in the Balkans
Prof. dr Predrag Simić306
The civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s was the first serious crisis in Europe
after the Cold War. The crisis in the U.S. and the EU, meanwhile, “has opened
the first serious debate on foreign policy and international relations after the
Cold War”307 and influenced the evolution of the main institutions of European
and Euro-Atlantic security, primarily, the European Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).308 While early attempts of mediation on the part of the EC/EU in the former Yugoslavia brought
only partial results, NATO’s combat operations – the first in the organization’s
history – were conducted in 1995 and 1999 right here in the Balkans. Pressure
from the EU and NATO terminated the civil war in Yugoslavia, but this area
has remained a potential crisis point due to the legacy of war, open ethnic and
border disputes, and mutual mistrust between the successor states of the former
Yugoslavia. 306 The author is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade
307 Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hedrickson, America and Bosnia, National Interest, Fall
1993, p. 14.
308 „Dynamic changes in the Balkans in the nineties also gave the ground for development
in Europe and to the way in which we study international phenomena today”, Emilian Kavalski,
Extending the Euroepan Security Community – Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Extending
the Euroepan Security Community – Constructing the Peace in the Balkans, Tauris Academic
Studies, London and New York 2007, p. 3.
368
One consequence of the dissolution of, and war in, the former Yugoslavia
was the fragmentation of the region and the creation of new states which have
remained burdened by the consequences of war and the disintegration of the
former common state. Countries of the region were lagging behind due to the
legacy of the Cold War division of the Balkans, which in the last half of the
20th century was divided between NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Non-Aligned
movement and self-isolated countries. Hence the Balkans can be referred to
more in geographic terms, rather than as a region connected with economic,
social, political and other links.309 Even the commitment of all of these countries to join the EU, and most of them to join NATO (except Serbia), does
not automatically imply their willingness to restore mutual relations and create regional institutions. Moreover, the European orientation of the Yugoslav
republics in the early 1990s was more driven by a desire to “escape from the
Balkans” and connect with the developed part of Europe, whilst emphasising
their mutual differences and hostility.
These were some of the reasons why major initiatives towards the renewal
of regional cooperation in the Balkans came from without. For the EU and
NATO, fragmentation and crises in the region became obstacles to its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Early attempts at restoring
regional ties (for instance, the Royaumont Initiative, SECI, etc.) all had limited results. The EU, therefore, after the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia
and Herzegovina, began systematic efforts in this direction within the frame of
the so-called regional approach to the Western Balkans.310 These efforts on the
part of the EU were given full swing only after NATO’s military intervention
against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, when the Stability
Pact in South-East Europe was established at the EU summit in Cologne. The
common stand taken at European summits in Zagreb (2000) and Thessaloniki
(2003) was that all Western Balkan countries could be admitted into the EU
if they fulfilled the required conditions. The prospect of membership and the
requirement on the part of the EU pertaining to regional cooperation have
contributed to the restoration of mutual connections and the relatively rapid
development of regional relations, starting from cooperation in the field of
infrastructure, the fight against organized crime, the removal of tariff and non309 For more details, see: Predrag Simić, Do the Balkans Exists?, in Dimitriou Triantaphilou
(ed.), The Southern Balkans, Perspectives from the Region, Chaillot Papers, No. 46, ISS, Paris
2001, pp 17-36.
310 Former Yugoslav republics, except Slovenia (joined the EU in 2004), plus Albania.
369
tariff barriers. and the development of economic and military cooperation,
mainly within the framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.
The Western Balkans is now surrounded by the EU and NATO members
and is one of the few areas on the political map of Europe not fully incorporated into European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Despite the cessation
of armed conflict, this area is still burdened by a number of problems which
make the probability of their integration into the EU (except Croatia) unlikely. In addition to the legacy of war and incomplete transition of their economic
and political systems, these countries continue to be burdened by ethnic tensions, unresolved territorial disputes, migration problems, underdeveloped
infrastructure, corruption and organized crime. A particular problem is the
areas that are still under international protectorate. The commitment of these
countries to EU accession and, in most cases, membership in NATO, opens
the possibility of building a new security architecture; not only in the region
of the Western Balkans, but the Balkans as a whole. In addition to continuing
and deepening the region’s economic integration, the need to create a so-called
security community in the Balkans – which would serve as a framework for
resolving inter-state disputes and integration into the EU and NATO – is frequently emphasized.
Security Communities
The concept of a ‘security community’ was introduced in the late 1950s by
the American Professor Karl Deutsch in his book, “Political community and
the North Atlantic area”.311 In short, security communities define regions or
groups of countries that have voluntarily waived their right to resolve mutual
disputes by force and where the likelihood of violence, i.e., a war, is minimal
or impossible. According to Karl Deutsch, “a security community” is “a group
of people, which has become integrated.” He refers to integration as the “attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and
practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time,
dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population.”312
311 Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Greenwood Press Publishers, New York 1957.
312 Ibid, p. 5.
370
By “sense of community”, Deutsch means “a belief amongst individuals in
the group that they attained an agreement on at least one of the issues: that
common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful
change’”.313 Such a change involves resolving social problems through institutionalized procedures and without resort to physical force on a large scale. A
security community is, therefore, a community where there are, “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically,
but will settle their disputes in some other way. If the whole world was integrated into a security community, wars would be automatically excluded”314,
concludes the author.
Karl Deutsch in his book identified two types of security communities. The
first type are so-called ‘amalgamated communities’, whereby two or more independent units connect into a common and broader unit, within which a
certain form of shared power arises. Such examples are the United States and,
perhaps also, the former Yugoslavia – which, according to the definition of
this author, could be designated as a failed security community, since it disappeared during the civil war. The second type are so-called ‘pluralistic security
communities’, in which smaller units retain legal independence and separate
governments. Deutsch identified such a community in North America between the U.S. and Canada. Pluralistic security communities are more common, and as examples of this type we could specify the Euro-Atlantic area,
which incorporates NATO, the European Union in Europe, ASEAN in Asia
and Mercosur in South America.
Although the theory of Karl Deutsch emerged in the late 1950s, it gained
its full influence only after the Cold War, when his ideas were further developed by social constructivists, Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett,
in their book “Security Communities”.315 According to Adler and Barnett’s
view, security communities, as well as all other types of human communities, are distinguished by three characteristics. First, community members share a common identity, values and meanings. Second, community
members have many-sided and direct relations. Third, communities exhibit some kind of long-term interest of the community members or even
313 Ibid
314 Ibid
315 Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 1998.
371
altruism: “long-term interest arises from the knowledge of the other with
whom you interact while altruism may be interpreted as a sense of obligation and responsibility.”316
Adler and Barnett state that security communities should be built gradually: an emerging community corresponds with the basic needs of peaceful change, while a mature security community is characterized by the collective security mechanisms, as well as by supranational and transnational
elements. In contrast to Deutsch, Adler and Barnett distinguish between
tightly- and loosely-integrated communities. Following in the footsteps of
these ideas, some other authors talk about ‘inter-state security communities’
(between which a war is not possible) and ‘comprehensive security communities’ (in which even civil war is not possible). Communication and transactions between countries lead to what Emanuel Adler calls the »socialization«
and building of a new common identity, on which the solidarity of members
of the security community rests. According to Adler, this means that “national politicians must accept new meanings and interpretations of reality,
as they are created in intellectual, bureaucratic and political circles, due to
which they must change their interests, abilities and/or willingness to consider new courses of action.”317
The role of international organizations in the Balkans In the theory of social constructivism, “socialization” is one of the most
important ideas through which individual actors create identities and ideas
that govern their behaviour. This idea, meanwhile, has also been accepted by
the constructivist theory of international relations318, which perceives international institutions as social institutions around which the identities, ideas and
expectations of their members are built. According to American authors, John
Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, socialization in international relations usually occurs after wars and other major crises, in conditions of great social and
316 Ibid, p. 31.
317 Emanuel Adler, Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International
Relations and Their Progress, in Adler and Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations, p. 52.
318 See, for example: Nicholas G. Onuf, Constructivism: A User’s Manual, in: V. Kubalkova,
N. Onuf, and P. Kowert (Eds.), International Relations in a Constructed World, M.E. Sharpe,
Armonk, NY 1998, pp. 58-78.
372
political turmoil and when the domestic institutions are more willing to accept
external influence.319 An example of this is post-war Europe, which accepted
the Marshall Plan, creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and of the idea of early European communities, even though its previous legacy pointed to a different direction. As a result of the process of “socialization”,
modern Europe emerged, gathered around the European Union and the North
Atlantic Alliance. Even though, according to constructivist views, international organizations and institutions arise as a result of this process, they may also be its
drivers. Many Anglo-Saxon authors today see confirmation of this in changes
that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, where these
changes were driven by the EU, NATO or the OSCE.320 Following this logic, some authors believe that the EU and NATO could play a similar role in
the creation of a security community in the Balkans.321 According to such a
view, the following three assumptions are required. First, that would imply the
creation of preconditions, i.e., factors that can incite regional actors to start
approaching each other through technological advances, demographic, economic and environmental changes, an external threat and changed notions of
“social reality”. Second, structural and procedural factors that lead to development of the security community are important, such as factors of power and
knowledge. Power factors can also be external (in this particular case, the EU
and NATO) and internal (in the form of new political elites). Knowledge relates to new ideas, such as liberal democracy, civil society, the
rule of law, and human rights, which all encourage the development of mutual
trust and a sense of community amongst regional actors. They are expected
to intensify various forms of mutual communication and exchange, starting
from economic to social, security and political. The third assumption is a con319 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, Socialization and Hegemonic Power, International Organization, Vol. 44/1990, pp. 283-315.
320 However, in debates on the role of international institutions, the realists dispute their
importance in triggering those changes in countries which reduce the risk of the use of armed
force. See, for example: John J. Mersheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions; International Security, Winter 1994/95, pp. 5-49.
321 For example: E. Kavalski, Suzette Grillot et al., Developing Securty Community in the
Western Balkans: The Role of EU and NATO, Paper prepared for the EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference May 17-19, 2007, Montréal, QC, Canada, Srđan Vučetić, The Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution, Southeast European
Politics, October 2001, pp. 109-134.
373
tinual action on the part of international factors in the direction of creating a
security community. By “promoting the development of a shared definition of
security, proper domestic and international action, and regional boundaries,
social learning encourages political actors to see each other as trustworthy.
Also it leads people to identify with those who were once on the other side of
cognitive divides.”322
Seen from a constructivist perspective, the contemporary Balkans seemingly fits into this model: the region has gone through a decade of violent conflict
in which the former joint state disappeared, whilst successor states and their
societies are burdened with post-conflict trauma, their economies fragmented
and the political elites mutually opposed. However, certain assumptions for
the process of reconciliation and the creation of a security community in the
region exist: it is emphasised that NATO’s two military interventions (1995
and 1999) terminated armed conflicts, that the political scene was abandoned
by the main protagonists of these conflicts, and that all of these societies have
undergone the process of transition by following, to a lesser or greater extent,
the same principles and values of liberal capitalism. In addition to Slovenia – which was the only former Yugoslav republic to
become a member of both the EU and NATO – Croatia and Albania became
NATO members in 2009, whilst Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been included in the Membership Action Plan (MAP). To some
extent, the only exception is Serbia, which declared neutrality; although it is
a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, an associate
member of NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly and is very active in military cooperation with its neighbours. All Western Balkan countries have concluded
Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the EU and some have started
talks on future membership. The most advanced is Croatia, which is currently
finalizing accession negotiations with the Union. In the mid-1990s – after the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was signed – the EU adopted a policy towards the Balkans
which was a part of its broader policy towards Central and Eastern Europe
following the fall of the Berlin Wall. Unlike the first and second generation
322 Adler and Barnett, A Framework for the Study of Security Communities, in: Adler and
Barnett, eds., Security Communities, p. 45.
374
of “Europe Agreements”, stabilisation has been set as a precondition for these
countries in order to join the EU. The policy of “stabilization and association”
has two main instruments: a regional approach and a policy of conditionality. The regional approach to the so-called countries of the Western Balkans
aims to build a regional economic and security community, whilst conditioning means that these countries now have the opportunity to become members
of the leading western institutions, i.e., the EU and NATO. The condition for
that is a process of “socialization”, which would make them more compatible
with the values, goals and practices underlying the European and Euro-Atlantic community. The view that the improvement of relations and regional
cooperation in the Western Balkans is a precondition for successful integration of these countries into the EU has become the official policy of the EU in
relations with all of them: “Regional cooperation is also a specific requirement
under the stabilisation and association agreements, which are already in place
with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia.....Regional cooperation is therefore a cornerstone of the EU’s policy framework for the western Balkans.”323
For its part, NATO’s policy in the region has relied on its peacekeeping missions, two of which are completed (in BiH and Macedonia), whilst the mission in Kosovo (KFOR) has been prolonged; on receiving new countries as
members and through activities within the PfP programme. On the basis of
this, the Adriatic Charter was signed in 2005, which enabled the creation of
the Adriatic Group, gathering Croatia, Albania and Macedonia as a sort of regional alliance within NATO. This policy has, after 2000, brought some results:
the number of regional initiatives, organizations and projects has increased,
economic and political relations between the Western Balkans countries have
clearly improved (especially between the three formerly leading Yugoslav republics: Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia) and many barriers to the free circulation
of people and goods in the region have been removed.
It should, however, be noted that the development of regional cooperation
is a result of relations of each country with the European Union and NATO,
respectively. Moreover, even some serious territorial disputes that have threatened to undermine the newly-created balance in the region (for example, the
323 See: The Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans: A Policy Priority for the European Union, European Commission, Brussels 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/
nf5703249enc_web_en.pdf.
375
Piran Bay dispute between Slovenia and Croatia) were resolved by direct diplomatic intervention of the leading members of NATO and the EU. Probably
the greatest progress in building a security community in the Western Balkans
was noted between Serbia and Croatia over the past few years. In a series of
highly symbolic manifestations of reconciliation and regional cooperation,
the presidents of both countries indicated the possibility of creating a regional
community in this area which would be compatible with the EU and NATO.
However, the progress in relations between Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia has
not been followed with adequate progress in Kosovo, Bosnia Herzegovina and
some other areas of the Western Balkans, where the situation remains unchanged or has even deteriorated.
During the last decade, a significant change in the form of NATO’s presence
and its role in the Western Balkans occurred. After military interventions in
1995 and 1999, NATO assumed peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR, subsequently SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR). The peacekeeping
mission in BiH was an undoubted success, given that ever since the Dayton
Peace Agreement was signed and NATO forces deployed, there was no single
armed conflict or casualty of combat operations. This mission left BiH in 2004,
after which it was replaced by the EU’s limited forces. The NATO mission in
Kosovo was met with a far more complicated situation, with many more armed
attacks against the Serb population, also including attacks and large-scale ethnic cleansing in March 2004, which KFOR managed bring under control only
with great effort and a significant number of casualties. However, in this case,
only NATO’s robust military presence prevented the continuation of armed
conflict from the late 1990s and the continuation of ethnic cleansing.
A change in relations between Serbia and NATO came in April 2001, with
the outbreak of a revolt by Albanians in the Preševo Valley. Although at first
it seemed as if the scenario of Serb-Albanian conflict from 1998-1999 was to
be repeated, the representatives of the new government in Belgrade (Nebojša
Čović and Goran Svilanović) contacted the then NATO Secretary General,
George Robertson, after which the Serbian security forces and KFOR (i.e.,
NATO) jointly stopped the actions of Albanian paramilitary forces, the socalled Liberation Army of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa (LAPBM). As a
result of this cooperation, a so-called Ground Safety Zone – from which the
LAPBM was acting – was established, while Serbian forces took over control
376
of the administrative border with Kosovo from KFOR. Although this episode
renewed trust between Serbia and NATO, the next step in mutual convergence
occurred as late as 2007, when Serbia requested and received membership in
NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme.
“The turnaround in relations between NATO and Belgrade is probably
the most spectacular security-related development to have taken place in the
former Yugoslavia since the Kosovo campaign in 1999”, noted NATO expert,
Robert Serry.324 Accession of the Western Balkans countries into the PfP, as
well as the accession of Croatia and Albania to NATO, strengthened the position of this organization in the Balkans and has also ensured a long-term influence on security sector development in all countries of the region, including
the scope and structure of their national armed forces, their interoperability
and joint military exercises, etc.
Strong external pressure on the development of regional cooperation in the
Balkans prompted some analysts to question the motives behind these efforts.
International mediators in crises, in addition to a general interest in contributing to resolving problems, often have some special, public or hidden interests.
For some analysts of the EU and NATO’s policies in the Balkans, their motives
are, amongst other things, also hidden in the desire to enhance their own legitimacy. So, for example, Philipp Borinski believes that NATO uses the possibility to achieve a “double expansion” in the Balkans, i.e., to simultaneously
achieve “expansion in geographic terms, as well as in terms of its role which, if
successfully achieved, would contribute to the prestige of the organisation«.325
The role of the EU is interpreted in a similar way: “only by stabilising the Balkans, the EU can make its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more
convincing and present itself as an important geopolitical factor.”326
Analysis of the effects of the EU’s and NATO’s efforts to encourage regional
cooperation in the Balkans over the last decade shows that, in addition to the
results achieved, it has also had some unexpected consequences. Despite the
324 Robert Serry, NATO’s Balkan Odyssey, NATO Review, 2003. Source: http://www.nato.int/
docu/ review/2003/issue4/english/art3.html.
325 Philipp Borinski, NATO Towards the Double Enlargement: The Case of the Balkans, Revue d’intégration européene, 24/2002, pp. 113-136.
326 Milada Anna Vachudova, Strategies for European Integration and Democratization in the
Balkans, Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs, 4/2004, pp. 92-105.
377
desire of all Western Balkans countries to become members of the EU, it does
not automatically affect improvement in their mutual relations.327 Similar to
the 1990s, each of these countries is interested in its own accession to the EU,
even if that does not increase the chances of their neighbours achieving the
same. Some researchers estimate that “attempts on the part of individual countries to accelerate the process of EU integration have resulted in weakened
cooperation at the regional level.”328
Moreover, membership in the EU is sometimes used as a means to resolve
some territorial or other disputes with neighbours by blocking their accession
to the EU. Accession of a divided country, Cyprus, into the European Union
before this dispute was resolved between the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities on the island, was seen in the EU as a strong warning that something
similar should not be repeated in the case of the Western Balkans. The EU
and the U.S., learning from this experience, reacted strongly in the border dispute between Slovenia (EU member) and Croatia (candidate) which, at least
temporarily, was removed from the agenda; though the dispute between its
other member, Greece, and Macedonia, over the name of this former Yugoslav
republic, remains an obstacle in relations between the EU and NATO, on the
one hand, and this country, on the other. Contrary to expectations, such data
indicates that regional cooperation initiated from the outside does not necessarily lead to improvements in trust amongst the countries of the region, nor
to the prospects of creating a permanent “security community”.
These problems are even more conspicuous when it comes to NATO’s influence in the Balkans. For example, this issue faces strong resistance in Serbia
due to NATO’s role during the civil war in Yugoslavia and, in particular, its
military intervention against the Republika Srpska in 1995 and Serbia in 1999.
For a large part of Serbian public, NATO remains an opponent and an organization that committed war crimes against Serbs (bombing of Radio-Television
Serbia, the destruction of a passenger train in Grdelica gorge, bombing of a
bridge in Vladičin Han, the use of cluster bombs in Niš, the use of missiles
327 In 2007, the South East European Barometer conducted a public opinion survey in
the Western Balkans countries on the attitude of their citizens towards the prospects of their
neighbours’ future accession into the EU, which demonstrated a significant lack of interest in
this issue. South-East Europe Barometer, Public Opinion Compared in 7 Countries.
328 East-West Parliamentary Practice Project (EWPPP), Legislatures and Citizens: strengthening democratic institutions and civil society in the Western Balkans, http://www.ewppp.org/programmes/western_balkans.php.
378
with depleted uranium, etc.). Although the negative attitude towards NATO
has somewhat declined in recent years owing to the role of KFOR in Kosovo
and Metohija (especially in March 2004), support to negative attitudes towards
NATO’s role in the Balkans comes from countries that are strongly opposed to
its further enlargement (Russia and some of the Arab countries). On the other
hand, for other former Yugoslav republics and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo,
membership in NATO is a guarantee of their independence and security from
threats that are still primarily perceived as coming from Serbia.
Conclusion
Endeavours to condition the progress of the countries of the region in their
relations with the EU and NATO through normalization of relations between
the Western Balkans countries and the development of regional economic, political and security cooperation has borne some results. Undoubted progress
has been made in the renewal of economic relations and the free flow of goods
between Western Balkan countries, especially within the Central European
Free Trade Area (CEFTA). At present, Slovenia and Croatia are amongst the
largest investors in Serbia and other former Yugoslav republics, though their
markets are still relatively closed to investors from the Western Balkans. Significant progress and cooperation has also been attained between internal affairs institutions and judicial authorities in the fight against organized crime,
as well as in some other areas.
Over ten years after the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, relations
between these countries are stable, though not completely normalized. The
biggest obstacle to the creation of a regional community remains the problem of Kosovo, whose status is still open. Kosovo is not only an unavoidable
problem on Serbia’s path towards the EU, but also an obstacle to the stability
of the entire southern Balkans. On the other hand, even sixteen years after the
Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still more of a mechanical connection of the three peoples living in it, rather than a community with a
certain perspective. Even relations between the two largest former Yugoslav republics, Serbia and Croatia, which in the last decade saw significant progress,
remain burdened with the legacy of civil war. Confirmation of this has been
provided by the recent events in Croatia following the verdict of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on two Croatian
379
generals, which led to a wave of protests across the country and a certain cooling of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade. The problem of refugees and
internally displaced persons from the war-affected areas is still pending.
The ruling elites and public opinion remain divided over the recent past,
as well as over the causes and consequences of the civil war in the former
Yugoslavia. That is confrmed, amongst other things, by the very fact that the
interpretation of recent history in the Western Balkans is still fundamentally
different and that it is quite unlikely that joint history textbooks will be written
soon. Recent polls show that a high degree of ethnic distance between the inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia still exists. National identities remain firmly rooted in negative stereotypes about “the other”, “oriental” and “Western
cultural heritage”, whilst neighbours are still seen as “historic enemies” rather
than partners in the creation of a new European and regional identity. Thanks
to pressure from outside, Western Balkan societies have accepted the idea of
modernization, which is generally identified with “Europeanization”, i.e., European and Euro-Atlantic integration, though there is still strong resistance to
the creation of a common regional identity with a Yugoslav or Balkan prefix.
This phenomenon is not, however, unknown in the European Union itself.
In Spain, the Catalans and Basques, put their local and even their European
identity before their sense of belonging to Spain. In Belgium, the Flemish and
Wallonians put their respective identities before their belonging to Belgium.
In the UK, Scottish, Welsh or Irish identities are given priority over the British identity. Even in France, the cradle of civic national identity, according to
which the citizens of a country identify themselves with it, it is not uncommon that, for example, the inhabitants of Brittany, place their Breton and European identity above their belonging to the French nation. Neighbours are,
through such a lens, seen as opponents or what is in Anglo-Saxon anthropology referred to as a “constitutive other”, which is perceived as a threat leading
to national homogenization. Experience of two world wars and the post-war
development of European identity has largely absorbed, but not eliminated,
ethnic differences.
Three armed conflicts in less than a century (1870-1871, 1914-1918 and
1939-1945) between the major European nations, France and Germany, have
over the last fifty years led to the creation of European communities and the
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collective European identity, as well as to the new vision of a shared history,
whereby these conflicts are interpreted as “European civil wars”, while pejorative descriptions of the other nation have disappered from both languages.329
This process, however, lasted for a very long time and was under the influence of joint institutions created after World War II such as, for example, a joint
institute for writing history textbooks (Internazionale Schulbuch Institute in
Braunschweig) or a common media organization (Franco-German TV channel “Arte”). In the Western Balkans, similar attempts such as creation of a joint
“Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” has not yielded results, though
some approximation within the triangle of Serbia-Croatia- Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the field of media and art has been noted, and to a much smaller
extent, between Serbs and Albanians.
In short, over the last decade the EU and NATO have invested great effort
to stop the spiral of civil war in the former Yugoslavia and have launched the
process of reconciliation, regional cooperation and new forms of community
sense in the Western Balkans. Relying on the common desire of all societies
in the region to become part of European and Euro-Atlantic structrures and
thus “escape from the Balkans” and from the logic of “Balkanization”, these
efforts have brought some results, especially regarding the development of
a European identity amongst the Balkan peoples. The results, however, are
largely absent when it comes to developing a regional identity, which is still
strongly influenced by negative stereotypes, the legacy of war and the logic of
“Balkanization.” Moreover, the problems of the EU and, especially, the global
economic crisis, which has strongly affected the Balkan countries in recent
years, have weakened the impact of the EU and NATO, and led to a substantial
decline in the mood of these societies to join them.
Opinion polls indicate that the percentage of support for the EU in Serbia
is at its lowest in the last ten years, whilst in Croatia – following the verdicts
for Gotovina and Markač – it has dropped to only 42%. The percentage of sup329 That is, for example, present in the recent historiography and in a joint French-German
history textbook (Histoire/Geschichte, L‘Europe et le monde depuis 1945, Klett & Nathan, Paris
Stutgart 2007), as well as in the art projects funded through EU funds, such as the film “Merry
Christmas”, which in 2007 was a European candidate for the Oscars Award. It is, however, important to emphasise that in Germany today, there are increasingly less people learning French
language, and vice-versa.
381
port for membership of some of these countries in NATO is at a much lower
level, even in countries included in the MAP (Membership Action Plan), such
as Montenegro. In addition, the impact of the EU and particularly of NATO
in the Western Balkans in recent years has also faced competition from new
regional actors, some of whom are strongly opposed to further Euro-Atlantic
integration of the Balkans.
382
NOVA Srbija, novi NATO : vizija
budućnosti za XXI vek : zbornik tekstova /
[urednici Mirjana Kosić, Milan Karagaća ;
prevod Mirjana Kosić]. - Beograd :
TransConflict Serbia : Forum za etničke
odnose : Klub 21, 2011 (Beograd : Digital Art
Company). - 382 str. ; 21 cm
Nasl. str. prištampanog engl. prevoda: New
Serbia, New NATO : Future Vision for the 21st
Century : collection of texts. - Uporedo srp.
tekst i engl. prevod. - Podaci o autorima
preuzeti iz kolofona. - Na vrhu nasl. str.:
Fond za otvoreno društvo - Srbija. - Prema
Predgovoru, radovi iz Zbornika predstavljeni
su na istoimenoj konferenciji održanoj 3.-4.
decembra u Beogradu. - Tiraž 500. - Str. 7-8:
Predgovor / Mirjana Kosić. - Str. 9-10: Uvod
/ Milan Karagaća. - Napomene i bibliografske
reference uz tekst.
ISBN 978-86-914589-0-4
a) Северноатлантски пакт - Србија Зборници b) Национална безбедност - Србија
- Зборници c) Србија - Војна политика Зборници
COBISS.SR-ID 183776012

Nova Srbija, novi NATO - vizija budućnosti za XXI vek

Transcription

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