Models for the Provision, Regulation and Integration of Public

Transcription

MODELS FOR THE PROVISION,
REGULATION AND INTEGRATION
OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT
SERVICES
A Final Report for the Public
Transport Partnership Forum
Prepared by NERA
and TIS.PT
July 2001
London
Project Team
NERA
John Dodgson
Emma Kelso
Jan Peter van der Veer
Nicola Tully
TIS.PT
Professor José Viegas
Rosário Macário
Manolo de la Fuente
n/e/r/a
National Economic Research Associates
Economic Consultants
15 Stratford Place
London W1N 9AF
Tel:
(+44) 20 7659 8500
Fax:
(+44) 20 7659 8501
Web: http://www.nera.com
An MMC Company
Av. 5 de Outubro
No 75 – 7
1050 Lisbon, Portugal
Tel:
(+351) 21 359 30 20
Fax:
(+351) 21 359 30 21
Web:
www.tis.pt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1.
1.2.
The Scope of this Report
A Note on Currencies
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2
2.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
2.7.
2.8.
Introduction
Economic Criteria
Service Quality Criteria
Integration Criteria
Social Cohesion
Dealing with Change
Economic Growth
Environmental Criteria
3.
IRELAND’S CURRENT SITUATION
3.1.
3.2.
Dublin
Other Irish Cities
4.
CITY STUDY: ADELAIDE
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.5.
4.6.
Key Facts
City Description
Institutional/Regulatory Framework
Performance against Criteria for Evaluation
Summary of Performance Against Criteria
Adelaide “Scorecard”
5.
CITY STUDY: COPENHAGEN
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
Key Facts
City Description
Performance Against Criteria for Evaluation
Copenhagen “Scorecard”
6.
CITY STUDY: ÉVORA
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
Key Facts
City Description
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6.6.
Évora “Scorecard”
7.
CITY STUDY: LYON
7.1.
7.2.
7.3.
7.4.
7.5.
7.6.
Key Facts
City Description
Lyon “Scorecard”
8.
CITY STUDY: MANCHESTER
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
8.4.
8.5.
8.6.
Key Facts
City Description
Manchester “Scorecard”
9.
CITY STUDY: PRESTON
9.1.
9.2.
9.3.
9.4.
9.5.
9.6.
Key Facts
City Description
Preston “Scorecard”
10.
CITY STUDY: THE HAGUE
10.1.
10.2.
10.3.
10.4.
10.5.
10.6.
Key Facts
City Description
The Hague “Scorecard”
11.
CITY STUDY: TORONTO
11.1.
11.2.
11.3.
11.4.
11.5.
11.6.
Key Facts
General Description
Toronto “Scorecard”
12.
CITY STUDY: ZURICH
12.1.
12.2.
Key Facts
City Description
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12.3.
12.4.
12.5.
12.6.
Zurich “Scorecard”
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13.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE MODELS
13.1.
13.2.
13.3.
13.4.
13.5.
13.6.
13.7.
13.8.
13.9.
Adelaide
Copenhagen
Évora
Lyon
Manchester
Preston
The Hague
Toronto
Zurich
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14.
CONCLUSIONS
14.1.
14.2.
14.3.
14.4.
14.5.
Introduction
Responsibility for Public Transport Services
Provision of Bus Services
Provision of Rail-Based Modes (Light Rail and Heavy Rail)
Achieving Transition
APPENDIX A.
A.1.
A.2.
A.3.
A.4.
A.5.
A.6.
A.7.
A.8.
A.9.
A.10.
A.11.
A.12.
SOURCES AND INTERVIEWS
Dublin
Regional Irish Cities
Adelaide
Copenhagen
Évora
Lyon
Manchester
Preston
The Hague
Toronto
Zurich
Conclusions
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REF: Anne Mace/2/17-7-01/F:\ANNE.MACE\MSOFFICE\WINWORD\NERA 2001\FINAL REPORT_170701.DOC
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Transport Modal Splits in Dublin (%)
Table 3.2 Dublin Bus Patronage 1987-2000
Table 3.3 Development of Bus Fares in Dublin, 1986 to 2000
Table 3.4 Bus Kilometres in Dublin, 1995-2000
Table 3.5 DART Service Patronage
Table 3.6 Bus Revenue in Dublin, 1997-2000
Table 3.7 Bus Costs and Revenues per Vehicle Kilometre and Passenger Journey in Dublin, 1995-2000
Table 3.8 DART Costs and Revenues per Train km and per Passenger Journey 1995-1999
Table 3.9 Bus Éireann Provincial City Passenger Journeys
Table 3.10 Weekly Bus Use in Galway
Table 3.11 Patronage on Cork – Cobh Suburban Rail Line
Table 3.12 Method of Travel to Work Used by Cork City Residents, 1991
Table 3.13 Bus Éireann Fare Levels in Regional Irish Cities
Table 3.14 Bus Éireann Provincial City Bus Kilometres
Table 3.15 Bus Éireann Provincial City Finances
Table 3.16 Cost per Vehicle Kilometre and Passenger Journey in Bus Éireann Provincial Cities
Table 3.17 Services Departing on Bus Éireann Service 5W from Galway Eyre Square to Rahoon on Weekdays from 08:00 to
12:00
Table 4.1 Modal Splits for Journeys to Work in the City of Adelaide 1986 to 1996
Table 4.2 Patronage Figures 1988/9 – 1998/9 (millions)
Table 4.3 Metro Adelaide Public Transport Fares (as of 1st July 2001).
Table 4.4 Adelaide Performance Against Criteria
Table 4.5 Adelaide Summary “Scorecard”
Table 5.1 General Data Copenhagen
Table 5.2 The Members of the HUR
Table 5.3 Principal Bus Operators in Copenhagen, May 2001
Table 5.4 Bus Passenger Traffic in Copenhagen, 1990 to 2000
Table 5.5 Ticket Prices in Copenhagen 1997-2002
Table 5.6 Bus Production Data in Copenhagen, 1990-2000
Table 5.7 HUR/HT Revenue and Costs, 1998, 1999
Table 5.8 Operator’s Scores on Concessions
Table 5.9 Copenhagen Performance Against Criteria
Table 5.10 Copenhagen Summary “Scorecard”
Table 6.1 Modal Split in 1999 and 2000
Table 6.2 Information About the Buses Used in Évora
Table 6.3 Costs of the System
Table 6.4 Income
Table 6.5 Total Personnel Costs (€)
Table 6.6 Évora Performance Against Criteria
Table 6.7 Évora Summary “Scorecard”
Table 7.1 Public and Private Transport Modal Split, 1986 and 1995
Table 7.2 Public Transport Patronage in Lyon, 1998-1999
Table 7.3 Prices of Key Tickets
Table 7.4 Operational Details of Lyon Bus System
Table 7.5 Operational Details of Lyon Metro System
Table 7.6 Revenue and Costs of Lyon Public Transport System
Table 7.7 Lyon Farebox Revenue, 1996-1999
Table 7.8 Prices for Interurban Monthly Tickets
Table 7.9 Lyon Performance Against Criteria
Table 7.10 Lyon Summary “Scorecard”
Table 8.1 Annualised Bus Vehicle Kilometres of 20 Largest Operators
Table 8.2 Greater Manchester Bus Patronage 1986-2000
Table 8.3 Metrolink Patronage 1993-1998
Table 8.4 Development of Bus Fares in Greater Manchester, 1986-1998
Table 8.5 Bus Kilometres in Greater Manchester, 1986-1998
Table 8.6 Bus Revenue and Support in Greater Manchester, 1986-1997
Table 8.7 Operating Costs and Vehicle Kilometres of the Two Largest Bus Operators
Table 8.8 Costs per Vehicle Kilometre and Passenger Journey in English Metropolitan Areas (excluding London)
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Table 8.9 Performance Data for Rail Services into Greater Manchester
Table 8.10 Examples of Travelcard Prices in Greater Manchester
Table 8.11 Earnings and Hours per Week Worked by Industry
Table 8.12 Manchester Performance Against Criteria
Table 8.13 Manchester Summary “Scorecard”
Table 9.1 Modal Splits in Preston and Lancashire (Travel to Work), 1991
Table 9.2 Indicative Preston Bus Fares
Table 9.3 Preston Bus Rambler Tickets
Table 9.4 Satisfaction with Bus Services in Preston
Table 9.5 Preston Performance Against Criteria
Table 9.6 Preston Summary “Scorecard”
Table 10.1 Haaglanden Modal Split, 1998
Table 10.2 HTM Tram Patronage 1992-2000
Table 10.3 HTM Bus Patronage 1992-2000
Table 10.4 Current Fare Levels in National Fare System
Table 10.5 Tram and Bus Kilometres and Staff Numbers in The Hague, 1992-2000
Table 10.6 Paying Travellers on HTM
Table 10.7 HTM Financial Details 1998-1999
Table 10.8 Customer Satisfaction among HTM Passengers
Table 10.9 The Hague Performance Against Criteria
Table 10.10 The Hague Summary “Scorecard”
Table 11.1 Modal Splits for Toronto : 1996
Table 11.2 Modal Splits on Specific Screen Lines during the Morning Peak
Table 11.3 TTC Total Passenger Journeys (millions)
Table 11.4 TTC fares (from 3rd June 200)
Table 11.5 TTC Adult Single Fare 1990 to 2000
Table 11.6 Sample GO Transit Fares (March 2001)
Table 11.7 Kilometres Operated 1990 to 1999 (millions)
Table 11.8 TTC’s Revenue-Cost Ratio
Table 11.9 TTC Operating and Capital Subsidies (millions, 2001 prices)
Table 11.10 TTC Acceptable Maximum Hour Average Vehicle Loads
Table 11.11 TTC Employment and Wages
Table 11.12 Toronto Performance Against Criteria
Table 11.13 Toronto Summary “Scorecard”
Table 12.1 Bus and Rail Patronage in Zurich on an Average Day (000)
Table 12.2 Public Transport Patronage in the City of Zurich
Table 12.3 Summary of Key ZVV Fares
Table 12.4 VBZ Route Network in the City of Zurich
Table 12.5 Public Transport Services in Canton of Zurich (1999/00)
Table 12.6 ZVV Revenues and Costs, 1991/92-1999/00 (€, millions)
Table 12.7 Zurich Performance Against Criteria
Table 12.8 Zurich Summary “Scorecard”
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Criteria for Evaluation
Figure 5.1 The Current HUR Organisation
Figure 5.2 Fare Levels
Figure 5.3 Per cent of Low Floor Buses in Copenhagen
Figure 5.4 Passenger Rating of Bus Service Quality
Figure 6.1 Map of Public Transport Routes in Évora
Figure 7.1 Links between the City, the Département, SYTRAL and SLTC
Figure 10.1 Changes in Funding and Governance Arrangements
Figure 11.1 TTC Service Area
Figure 11.2 GO Transit’s Service Area
Figure 12.1 ZVV Organisation Scheme
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Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Scope of the Study and the Structure of the Report
Proposals to reform public transport in Ireland have been published in the Government’s
Consultation Paper A New Institutional and Regulatory Framework for Public Transport.
This report has been prepared by NERA (National Economic Research Associates) and
TIS.PT to inform the Public Transport Partnership Forum of the alternative ways in which
public transport services are organised in different selected cities around the world. The aim
of this exercise was to assist the Forum in making a formal statement of its views in response
to the Consultation Paper.
The report identifies the relevant criteria by which transport services in a city should be
judged. The project team also selected, in co-operation with the Forum, a set of key cities for
detailed study. The set, which consists of Adelaide (Australia), Copenhagen (Denmark),
Evora (Portugal), Lyon (France), Manchester (England), Preston (England), The Hague
(Netherlands), Toronto (Canada) and Zurich (Switzerland), was chosen to be representative
of the wide range of approaches to public transport that have been used in recent years.
The project team undertook detailed investigations of each of these cities, and the results of
these are set out in individual city chapters, with discussion organised around the criteria
for evaluation. For each city we summarise the advantages and disadvantages of the
approach used in a series of scorecards, while we also summarise key aspects of each city’s
performance in regard to the criteria.
The report then draws our conclusions about the lessons from experience in the selected
cities for the way in which urban public transport services might be reformed in Ireland.
Criteria for Urban Transport Services
Chapter 2 of the report sets out the evaluation criteria agreed with the Forum for use in this
study. These criteria for evaluation were then used to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the different urban transport models considered.
The criteria (though not necessarily in order of importance) are:
•
Economic criteria, consisting of efficient use of the transport system, efficient
operation of the public transport system, and value for money, including level of
subsidy in terms of cost recovery;
•
Service quality criteria, including average speed, frequency, reliability and
overcrowding;
•
Integration criteria, including physical integration, integration of tariffs, integrated
provision of information, and integration with land use planning;
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Executive Summary
•
Social cohesion, including accessibility and affordability of services to the elderly,
those with disabilities, and those on low incomes;
•
Ability to deal with change, including both change in response to external factors like
changing demand, and change due to internal reforms;
•
Contribution to economic growth, both in regard to assistance in the general working
of the city’s labour market, and in regard to the specific issue of provision of good
links to the local airport;
•
Environmental criteria, including deliberate use of public transport policy to achieve
environmental ends.
Urban Public Transport in Ireland
In the Dublin conurbation, an area suffering from serious traffic congestion, the two main
providers of public transport services are Bus Átha Cliath and Iarnród Éireann (the latter
primarily though not exclusively through the DART electrified services). In addition,
commuter bus services from the outer Dublin areas are provided by Bus Éireann, the third
of the three CIE companies, and by some private operators. The Office of the Director of
Traffic of Dublin Corporation is responsible for traffic management in the Dublin
Corporation area. The Dublin Transportation Office is responsible for public transport
planning and strategy in Dublin.
Bus Átha Cliath operates a network of about 150 bus routes with a fleet of some 1020 buses,
and is protected from competition from other operators by the regulatory system. Much of
the fleet has been renewed in the last few years, and Quality Bus Corridors have improved
service quality on a number of Dublin’s radial corridors. Journey numbers grew in the first
part of the 1990s, but have remained relatively stable since. Fares have generally fallen in
inflation-adjusted terms.
Traffic on the DART suburban rail network has been rising in recent years, and costs per
passenger carried have been falling. Other heavy rail commuter services operated by
Iarnród Éireann have been developed, though passenger figures have not been available.
The public transport services in the Irish provincial cities are, with the exception of the
Cork-Cobh rail service, entirely bus-based. Most services are operated by Bus Éireann,
though there are some privately-operated services in Galway and Waterford. Local
government involvement with the provision of public transport services is limited,
compared with that in similar-sized cities in other countries.
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Executive Summary
Experience in the Selected Cities
Adelaide
The public transport system in Adelaide consists of a bus network, a guided busway (the OBahn), a commuter rail network, and a single-route tramway. The Passenger Transport
Board has overall responsibility for public transport, setting fares and minimum service
standards, and providing integrated information. Competitive tendering has been used in
the bus sector, with area-based contracts using gross cost contracts with output incentives.
However, the current contracts with the public rail and tram operator have been negotiated
rather than having been subject to a competitive process.
Adelaide scores well on service reliability, and the low fares encourage public transport use
by the socially excluded, while there are also good facilities for the mobility-impaired. The
switch to competitive tendering has slowed – but not reversed - the decline in public
transport use, but the use of area-based tenders (in comparison with the route-based tenders
that are more common elsewhere) did not lead to as much innovation in the provision of
new services as had been hoped. Industrial relations are bad, and the transition to
competitive contracts was poorly managed in its early stages.
Copenhagen
Public transport in Copenhagen consists of bus and heavy rail. There is a central authority,
HUR, with overall responsibility for public transport, including fare levels, routes,
timetables, service quality and provision of information. There is competitive tendering of
bus services using gross cost contracts, and with operator remuneration linked to service
quality levels as measured in customer surveys. Three bus operators control over 90 per
cent of the market.
Copenhagen is often cited as a good example of the approach to use in the competitive
provision of services. There is an integrated system with a common fares structure and
common branding of services. In addition, the transition to the present tendering system
was phased over a number of years, with protection of staff working conditions in the event
of concession transfer. However, the gross cost contract system does not provide incentives
for operators to expand output of services.
Évora
Évora is a small historic town in Portugal. The central public transport planning and
management body consists of the local municipality, the public transport operator and the
parking-meter company. There is a bus-based system, with a single private operator
providing services under a long-tem concession agreement. Parking meter revenue is used
to subsidise public transport. There is good service reliability, though frequency is only
moderate.
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Executive Summary
Lyon
The public transport network in Lyon consists of bus, metro and tram, as well as some heavy
rail services provided by SNCF. A major feature of the Lyon system is that public transport
services are provided by a single operator under a six year management contract. A central
public transport agency, SYTRAL, is responsible for public transport planning, including
service levels and fares. STRAL also owns the infrastructure and the public transport
vehicles, and it retains the revenue risk.
The existence of a single transport planner, and a single operator, aid network integration.
The fact that the transport authority retains ownership of the vehicles reduces entry barriers,
but the fact that it is only possible to compete for provision of all services at once means that
smaller organisations cannot contribute in the competitive process so the number of bids
each round is low. Cost recovery is low, and industrial relations appear to be poor.
Manchester
Public transport services in Manchester consist of buses, the Metrolink light rail system, and
heavy rail services. Bus services are deregulated, and the private operators can set their own
fares and decide on their service levels. The central authority, the Greater Manchester
Passenger Transport Executive, decides on gaps in the commercial bus service that need to
be filled by competitive tendering. The contracts are mainly awarded on a net cost basis.
The Metrolink system is owned by the public sector, but built and operated by the private
sector, though there are arrangements for the operating contract to be re-let. Rail services
are provided by private train operating companies operating under contract with
government subsidy.
Manchester provides an example of extensive involvement of the private sector in public
transport provision. The system scores well on economic criteria, with a high level of cost
efficiency and high cost recovery. Provision of information is good despite the multioperator system. The light rail system has been a big success, providing a high quality
system and attracting people out of their cars. The funding and concessioning solutions
adopted for Metrolink have been innovative.
However, public transport fare levels are relatively high, there is poor tariff integration
compared with comparable cities in other countries and a lack of physical integration
between services. Transition to the deregulated environment in bus services was painful:
there was considerable instability in services, and bus staff earnings fell. The service quality
of heavy rail services fell after rail privatisation and tendering, in particular because of an
over-ambitious franchise bid by the main company providing local rail services in the
Greater Manchester area.
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Executive Summary
Preston
Preston is a medium-sized city with an all-bus network. As in Manchester, bus services are
deregulated, and gaps in the commercial network are filled by competitive tendering, with a
mixture of gross and net cost contracts. There are three bus operators in the city: a
subsidiary of one of the main private bus operators in Britain, Stagecoach; a former
municipal operator now employee-owned, and a long-standing private operator. The
County Council has overall responsibility for public transport services, funding
concessionary fares, tendering out non-commercial services and providing some
information, but its public transport planning responsibilities are limited.
Frequency levels and network coverage are good, as are cost efficiency and cost recovery.
The system is also very flexible because of the freedom that operators have to choose routes
and timetables. Staff at the main operator own the company themselves and enjoy good
working conditions. Following deregulation in 1986 there was initial instability as a result of
a major “bus war”, but competition has now disappeared, and operators tend to stick to
their own areas. Neither tariff nor information integration are good, and operators will not
always include information about other companies’ services in their timetables. As in
Manchester, fare levels are relatively high.
The Hague
Public transport services in The Hague are provided by tram and bus services, and by local
rail services operated by NS (Dutch railways). A regional body, Haaglanden, is responsible
for public transport including the setting of service standards, while fares are set under a
uniform National Fare System. Competitive tendering is being introduced, though
gradually, and with the first concession awarded to the existing operator.
The Hague benefits from a good integrated ticketing system with relatively low fares which
will be preserved despite the planned changes in the public transport market. These
changes will take gradually, and there will be employment guarantees to tram and bus staff.
The low fares are reflected by low cost recovery. While industrial relations in the bus and
tram operations are good, those on the railways are poor. There is a shortage of appropriate
skills in the public transport authority. The different modes are not presented as an
integrated public transport network.
Toronto
Toronto is a large North American city, with low population density, especially in the
extensive outer suburban areas, and high car ownership. However, it is a city with a strong
commitment to public transport. There is a publicly-owned system controlled at the
city/municipal level. In the city itself, the Toronto Transit Commission is responsible for
planning and operation of the tram system, buses and the subway and light rail systems.
Longer distance commuter rail and bus services are provided by GO, with rail services
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Executive Summary
operated over the tracks of the national rail system. There are also individual bus operators
in each of the outer municipal areas.
There is good integration of fares and information provision, and cost recovery is good.
There is a strong public transport culture. The GO operation provides good lessons for
contracting out aspects of the provision of rail commuter services to the private sector.
Training and employee benefits systems are good, and there are clear and comprehensive
procedures to ensure transparency and accountability in the provision of public transport
services. There are also good facilities for the mobility impaired. However, there have been
problems. Current funding arrangements are inadequate, especially in regard to future
investment. There is relatively poor service provision in the outer Greater Toronto Area,
especially for non-radial journeys. The flat fare system that is common in North America
discourages short journeys.
Zurich
Zurich is a city noted for its emphasis on public transport, with a high modal share for
public transport on journeys to and from the city centre. The backbone of the public
transport system is the conventional tram system, supplemented by buses and by
conventional heavy rail services provided by the national operator. Bus and tram services
are provided by a single operator, and there is very little tendering of services. The Zurich
Public Transport Authority is responsible for co-ordination, funding and setting fares.
Consequently Zurich has a well-integrated public transport system with high quality and
reliability. There has been a consistent emphasis on the importance of public transport over
the years, and so public transport is given priority, and this has been reflected in its high
market share. Industrial relations are good. But incentives for cost efficiency are weakened
because of the lack of competition for the provision of services.
Lessons for Ireland
We do not believe that there is a single “city model” that is most appropriate, but that
Ireland should adopt the strengths, and avoid the weaknesses, that our case study cities
have revealed. Solutions for individual cities will also depend in part on the mix of modes
that presently provide public transport services in a particular city. The role that public
transport is able to play in the provision of good quality services in a city’s transport
network will also depend on attitudes to the private car, and the way in which car use is
controlled, for example by use of parking restrictions and/or charges, and the way in which
the car is required to yield priority to public transport vehicles.
A clear lesson for larger cities is the need to have a strong transport planning agency
responsible for all aspects of public transport services in each city. Most public transport
authorities have achieved integrated networks, tariff integration and an overall coordination of the development of the system. We therefore support the proposals to create
such an authority for Dublin. The authority will need to be able to establish minimum
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Executive Summary
service levels and quality standards, and it will need to be responsible for co-ordination of
clear information for passengers. It will organise any process of competitive tendering or
franchising. Given our recommendations for the bus market, we also believe that it should
be responsible for the level and structure of fares. One issue to be considered will be that of
whether it should also take over responsibility for ownership of the bus fleet. There will
certainly be a need to establish its sources and level of funding. Care will be needed to
ensure that it can draw on the appropriate range and level of planning skills.
In regard to provision of bus services in Dublin, we believe that it would not be appropriate
to adopt deregulation of services on the British model. This results in too much instability of
services, and can increase congestion if a number of companies provide services. While the
fully integrated publicly-operated systems in Toronto and Zurich have much to commend
them, we do not believe they create enough pressure for internal efficiency (while they may
also not be compatible with future European legislation). In any event, forms of competitive
tendering have been shown to work well in practice, and have been widely adopted.
We therefore support introduction of some form of competitive tendering for bus services in
Dublin, with suitable safeguards for employees and for the transitional process. We believe
that a form of route-based tendering would be more appropriate than area-based tendering,
and we suggest that groups of routes should be offered for tender, but with packages
designed so that smaller firms do have the opportunity to compete. We also recommend
that, at least initially, gross cost contracts are used to reduce risk to entrants.
In the Irish provincial cities we see merit in a system of management contracts for their bus
services. One reason is the shortage of transport planning experience at local government
level. Successful tenderers could then have opportunities to develop the bus systems in
these cities, though the contracts would need to specify minimum service levels and
maximum fare levels. However, experience in Preston has shown that permitting full
deregulation would be a practicable alternative option for these cities, especially if fares
were capped, while competitive tendering of routes would also be a possible option.
The approach to be adopted for commuter rail services in Dublin will in part be dependent
on ultimate decisions about restructuring of Iarnród Éireann, but we see merit in the Dublin
public transport authority taking an increasing role in regard to the services provided,
including the setting of fare levels and their integration with those it sets for bus and light
rail services. It might also provide the mechanism by which public funds are channelled to
the rail infrastructure and train service operators. As a first step we recommend setting up a
more separate organisation within IE responsible for operation of DART, and possibly other
Dublin suburban rail services.
Finally, one of the most important lessons from our case studies is the importance of
managing the transitional process, both for the consumer (in terms of fares, service quality
and service integration) and for staff (of both existing and new transport operators, and of
planning/regulatory agencies). We consider it useful to adopt a gradual approach to
vii
Executive Summary
change, to ensure that operators, staff and customers have adequate time to adjust to the
new arrangements. This will also allow time for appropriate legislation.
In regard to passengers it will be important to ensure that there are not major revisions to
services (unless these can be clearly justified by shifts in demand) and that service levels
then remain stable. It will be particularly important to ensure that service quality standards
do not fall, and that operators have incentives to improve service standards. Changes in
fares and service levels that are planned should be clearly explained to passengers in
advance.
In order to minimise negative impacts on staff, we recommend careful consideration be
given to setting up schemes to allow redeployment of staff, while still retaining incentives to
employ staff productively and for staff to act efficiently. Consideration might also be given
to ensuring that pay levels or benefits do not suffer in the transition. It will also be
important to ensure that new bodies set up with planning, co-ordinating or regulatory
responsibilities are staffed with adequately trained and experienced staff.
viii
Introduction
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1.
The Scope of this Report
Proposals to reform public transport services in Ireland have been published in the
Government’s consultation paper, A New Institutional and Regulatory Framework for
Public Transport.
NERA and TIS were appointed as independent consultants to carry out a comparative
evaluation of the various approaches to the provision, regulation and integration of public
transport services in major urban areas. The aim of these is to assist the Public Transport
Partnership Forum in making a formal statement of its views in response to the consultation
paper.
This Report sets out criteria which we will use to evaluate different public transport systems
in the different cities that have been selected for comparison. The criteria, which have
already been discussed with the Public Transport Partnership Forum, are detailed in
Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 of the report provides a relatively brief review of the provision of urban transport
services in Ireland, first in Dublin, and then in the four provincial cities of Cork, Galway,
Limerick and Waterford.
Chapters 4 to 12 consider each of the nine cities selected for detailed evaluation. The nine
cities, selected in discussion with the Forum, are:
•
Adelaide, Australia;
•
Copenhagen, Denmark;
•
Évora, Portugal;
•
Lyon, France;
•
Manchester, England;
•
Preston, England;
•
The Hague, Netherlands;
•
Toronto, Canada; and
•
Zurich, Switzerland.
At the end of each of these chapters we summarise the main positive and negative features
of each city’s performance on a “scorecard”. Results from the “scorecards” are then
1
Introduction
summarised in Chapter 13, where we review the advantages and disadvantages of each of
the individual city models.
In Chapter 14 we provide our conclusions and recommendations in regard to the situation in
Ireland.
Appendix A provides details of the information sources we have consulted in undertaking
this work, including the face-to-face interviews we held as part of our interview programme.
1.2.
A Note on Currencies
Throughout this document, financial figures are given in euros, converted from the local
currency using current exchange rates. We have only shown financial figures in the local
currency where they refer to fares and are useful in illustrating the extent to which fares are
rounded to the nearest convenient sum in order to increase traveller convenience and to
reduce the need for giving change.
Where meaningful, we have converted financial figures provided for a time series (eg wages
or operating costs over time) into 2001 prices (ie, adjusted for inflation) in order to help the
reader make comparisons over different years.
2
Criteria for Evaluation
2.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
2.1.
Introduction
As part of the study, we identified and agreed with the Forum a range of transportation,
social, economic and other relevant criteria for evaluation, which we have used to evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of each of the urban transport models that we consider in the
rest of this report.
Before discussing the criteria in detail, it is worth making some general observations. First
of all, we note that the cities we are analysing all have their own particular characteristics.
As a result, the indicators below may be different for various cities just because of
differences in traffic density, geographical circumstances and so on. It can be difficult to
compare the indicators as such between cities and use these comparisons as a basis for
drawing conclusions on, for example, the effectiveness of the public transport system. We
are therefore cautious when making such comparisons and only make them where we feel
they are justified. We mainly use these indicators to analyse changes over time, for example
changes after a major change in the organisational structure of the public transport system in
a city. Even then, it is necessary to carefully examine other factors that may also have
contributed to any changes.
For the same reasons, it is necessary to be very careful when evaluating any of the indicators
in isolation. For example, when a local transport authority decides to franchise its urban bus
routes and requires bidders to improve the quality of its services, provide better information
and so on, it may well be that the cost per passenger mile will increase. Obviously, in such
cases, examining the cost indicator only will give an entirely wrong view of the effectiveness
of the new policy.
Copies of the data we have compiled are being provided to the Steering Committee, so that
it will be possible for the Forum to carry out further analysis of indicators of their own,
should they wish to do so.
In general, of course, it is necessary to consider the quality of the data available within each
of the cities being studied. For this type of investigation comprehensive data are needed on
public transport provision and use, car and other road vehicle traffic levels, traffic speeds by
time of day, and financial results for public transport operators. While this chapter sets out
the criteria for evaluation we will use, we acknowledge that in some cases data availability
is a constraint.
The criteria we use are presented in Figure 2.1 below. In the remainder of the present
chapter, each of these criteria will be discussed in greater detail. We note that social,
economic, environmental and other criteria all have an important role when evaluating
public transport systems, and that the order in which criteria are discussed in this report in
no way reflects relative importance.
3
Figure 2.1
Efficient
Efficient use
use of
of the
the transport
transport system
system
Economic
Economic criteria
criteria
Efficient
Efficient operation
operation of
of the
the public
public transport
transport system
system
Value
Value for
for money,
money, including
including subsidy
subsidy level
level
Service
Service quality
quality criteria
criteria
Physical
Physical integration
integration
Integration
Integration criteria
criteria
Tariff
Tariff integration
integration
Information
Integration
Information integration
Integration
Integration
Integration with
with land
land use
use
Social
Social cohesion
cohesion
Responding
Responding to
to external
external changes
changes
Dealing
Change
Dealing with
with change
Change
Responding
Responding to
to internal
internal changes
changes
Public
Public transport
transport and
and labour
labour markets
markets
Economic
Economic growth
growth
Access
Access to
to airports
airports
Environmental
Environmental criteria
criteria
2.2.
Economic Criteria
2.2.1. Efficient use of the transport system
A transport system is efficient when all users have to pay for the costs, including external
costs, that they impose on the system and on other users. In more technical terms, economic
efficiency is achieved when all prices are set equal to marginal social costs, where these
marginal social costs include external costs such as air pollution costs, noise costs and
congestion costs imposed on other road users. This is the known as the “first best”
optimum. To achieve the first best optimum in a city it would be necessary that road users
would pay a congestion charge when traffic levels exceed free-flow conditions. In practice,
such road pricing is often difficult to introduce, not least for political reasons, so that the
prices that road users pay will be below the costs they impose. In this case the “second-best”
optimum involves setting prices for public transport services below their marginal social
costs, as long as there is some substitution between the two modes.
4
Consequently, congestion is likely to occur.1 A key indicator for the occurrence of
congestion in a city is the average traffic speed that is achieved, during peak hours but also
outside these hours. However, changes in traffic speeds can be caused by a wide variety
of factors. Some of these factors relate to the public transport system and we will
study these. One key indicator here is the modal split, the shares of people using
private cars on the one hand and of those using public transport, walking and cycling
on the other hand. Modal split figures need to be examined both in the centre of the
city and in the city as a whole. Public transport patronage figures, especially changes
in them, will be relevant as well, and so too will be public transport fare levels. When
analysing the latter, we distinguish between various categories of fares, for example
full fares, concessionary fares and so on, and compare changes in them against changes
in the retail price index. We adjust fare levels data between cities into Euros using
current exchange rates. We also consider the impact of any changes in the structure of
fares.
We also look at how demand and traffic management in the best practice cities are
organised and examine what the effects of these policies are. Examples of such policies
include traffic calming measures, access restrictions, on-street and off-street parking
controls and charges, workplace parking levies and electronic road pricing.
2.2.2. Efficient operation of the public transport system
This category examines whether the public transport system is operated at a minimum
reasonable cost.
As noted above, comparisons of cost levels are not always easy. Differences in factors
outside the control of the operator, such as congestion levels, can cause cost levels to be
higher even if the operator manages the factors that are within its control in the best possible
way. We therefore avoid analysing unit cost levels in isolation.
There are a number of “performance indicators” that can be used to measure operator
efficiency. We consider the use of appropriate indicators based on standard measures of
public transport operator performance based on public transport statistics such as numbers
of passengers carried, passenger miles, bus or train miles, staff numbers and costs, total
costs, and resources used.
Other criteria that we evaluate to assess the operational efficiency of the public transport
system, and if possible analyse in a similar way as described above, include:
•
total number of hours that each employee works per week;
•
proportion of hours worked spent driving; and
1
Even with road pricing there would be some congestion, since the optimal level of congestion may not be zero.
5
•
overhead costs as a percentage of total costs.
2.2.3. Value for money criteria, including subsidy level
Most public transport systems in the developed world receive subsidy payments from local
or national governments. Although it is desirable to subsidise public transport to a certain
extent, there are always many alternative uses for the funds involved. Public transport
systems should therefore be organised such that the subsidy costs do not exceed efficient
levels and we will include the amount of subsidy (as a percentage of total costs) as a key
criterion in our evaluation. If possible, we distinguish between various subsidy categories,
such as subsidy payments to cover concessionary fares, subsidy payments to cover
operational deficits, subsidy payments for specific capital investment projects and so on, as
well as examining how subsidies are broken down between modes We have also looked for
hidden forms of subsidy, such as fuel tax rebates for bus operators, or provision of land and
buildings by local authorities at zero cost.
When considering overall value for money to both the consumer and the taxpayer (ie via
subsidy), we also examine arrangements in place for ensuring accountability and
transparency in the treatment of public transport operator finances and their operations as a
whole. Another area for consideration is the opportunities and incentives given to operators
to maximise revenue from sources other than subsidy and farebox, for example the
exploitation of other commercial opportunities such as advertising.
2.3.
Service Quality Criteria
A passenger making an urban transport trip incurs two types of costs: the fare payable and
the time spent while travelling. The concept of quality in urban public transport is very
important, as this influences both the amount of time spent travelling and the valuation of it
(the time cost will be lower if the journey is made in a pleasant environment). Key quality
criteria we examine are:
•
average speed of the public transport modes (which will influence journey times);
•
overcrowding levels;
•
quality of timetable information;
•
accessibility of the public transport system (e.g. average distance that people have to
walk to the nearest bus stop and access facilities for the mobility impaired); and
•
average age of vehicles.
Key service level criteria we examine are:
•
frequency levels (which are a major determinant of average waiting times);
6
•
reliability (percentage of vehicle trips on time, percentage of vehicle trips cancelled);
•
number of route miles operated and geographical coverage;
We also consider how service levels and quality requirements for public transport operators
are enforced, and the nature of penalties levied for infringement.
2.4.
Integration Criteria
When a public transport trip involves using multiple vehicles or multiple modes, the quality
of the trip will also be heavily influenced by the extent to which the public transport system
is integrated. A distinction can be made between four different types of integration:
•
physical integration: are different bus stops located close enough to each other to
facilitate easy interchange? Are the main train station and the main bus station
adjacent to each other? Are there facilities for park and ride at, for example, rail
commuter stations, or dedicated park and ride bus services? Are interchanges
between different rail modes, such as heavy rail and LRT located close to one
another? Who is responsible for integration in multi-operator systems?
•
tariff integration: do bus tickets allow for through journeys on other buses, even if
the other bus is operated by a different firm? Are through rail-bus tickets available
and are multi-operator travelcards available? How are season tickets made available
across different modes and different operators? What arrangements are in place for
agreeing revenue sharing between operators? How are disputes between operators
resolved?
•
information integration: do different operators or the local authority publish joint
timetables? Are maps available at public transport stops, and in the public transport
vehicles, of all routes operated by all operators?
•
integration with land use: how far is transport planning integrated with land use
planning? Are decisions to permit new developments linked to provision of public
transport facilities? Do decisions to approve new facilities (such as new out-of-town
shopping facilities) take account of potential increases in private car trips and
journey lengths?
We examine all four categories, by a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis
where appropriate. We also analyse how arrangements for integration are co-ordinated and
enforced in multi-operator systems, including issues such as the authority responsible for
integration requirements, regulation and monitoring, and the imposition of penalties for
failure to comply.
7
2.5.
Social Cohesion
A further criterion is the impact of transport policy, and especially changes as a result of
structural and/or institutional changes, on social cohesion. In particular, how does
transport policy impact on less well-off members of society, including the elderly, those
with disabilities (particularly those which restrict movement), the young, and those on low
incomes? Of particular concern with generally-rising incomes and car ownership is the
impact on those who do not have direct or indirect (via family members or friends) access to
a private car. Does the public transport system provide these important groups, and the
areas in which they live, with good quality and affordable alternative transport facilities to
enable them to access educational facilities, the labour market, shopping centres, health
facilities, places of entertainment, and family and friends in a way that does not increase
relative deprivation? Is geographical coverage of the public transport system reasonably
comprehensive? Are there adequate service levels at off-peak times, in evenings, and at
weekends? How do changes in fare levels impact on those groups with lower disposable
income? Are there concessionary fare schemes that ameliorate the impact of general fare
increases?
A further aspect of social cohesion is that of whether changes are widely-accepted, that is of
whether there is widespread political approval, and/or whether key minority groups feel
disadvantaged and aggrieved by changes.
2.6.
Dealing with Change
This brings us to the more general issue of dealing with change. An important evaluation
criterion will also be how a public transport system can cope with change. It is useful to
make a distinction here between two types of change:
•
Responding to external changes. This category includes the ability of a public
transport organisation model to adjust to changing demand patterns (for example, as
locations of employment and residence change), innovative technologies (for
example smart-card ticketing technology) or new government policies.
•
Responding to internal changes. This refers to the ability of a public transport
system to respond to structural changes to the model itself. Examples of questions
that we address include:
-
Have the changes been politically controversial? What has been the attitude
towards the change of the various stakeholders involved?
-
Did the transition process go smoothly? How was change managed? Did a
co-ordinating body for implementation exist, and have a clear
implementation strategy and timetable? How was the co-ordinating body
constituted? Has it been possible to complete the process within the original
timetable?
8
2.7.
-
Has it been possible to resolve issues relating to staff levels in a way that was
satisfactory to all stakeholders? Has staff real income been affected? Has job
security and job satisfaction changed2? Did industrial disputes occur? What
has been the impact of the transitory period on staff turnover? How easy is it
to recruit good staff given local labour market conditions? In particular,
when considering the impacts of the transition process on the labour force in
the public transport sector, we will examine criteria such as basic pay, and
other payments, hours of work, and other conditions of employment such as
annual leave entitlements, training, pensions and where appropriate, other
benefits such as medical schemes, again focussing particularly on changes in
these criteria as a result of the public transport policy initiatives (considering
the wider economic context within which these changes occur – eg general
employment legislation, business cycles, etc.).
-
Did the changes cause major shocks or instability to the timetable and the
services offered, including fares and fare structures? What has been the
impact of any such problems on public transport patronage?
Economic Growth
A further criterion is the impact of the public transport system on economic prosperity and
growth. Here we highlight two aspects, labour market impacts, and links for air travellers.
2.7.1. Public transport and local labour markets
The availability and quality of the public transport system plays a key role in assisting the
future economic growth of a city. An important issue here is the extent to which public
transport systems enable local employers to draw on as wide a pool as possible of labour
market skills, as well as allowing employees easy access to areas of employment. This may
be particularly relevant for city centre employers and those working in these areas, but will
also be important for places of employment located sin suburban centres, and for factories
and other larger scale industrial employers. Success in these matters will be closely related
to the network coverage of routes and to the integration between different routes and
modes.
Public transport also plays an important role in helping to reduce overall congestion levels,
which can act as a constraint on the economic growth of a city due to the restrictions that it
places on mobility, both for employers, employees, and those conducting business within
the city. The ease with which people, goods, and services can flow within, into and out of
the city will have an impact on the decisions of businesses as to where they locate. A good
2
As it can be often be difficult to measure job satisfaction in a quantitative way, we will make clear the basis on
which we conduct analysis of these issues, for example by examining patterns of industrial unrest, staff surveys, or
interviews with unions and employers.
9
transport system that helps to minimise congestion will help encourage businesses to locate
in or near the city, thus helping economic growth.
2.7.2. Access to airports
Another issue of concern to business will be ease of access for passengers on international
and domestic air routes. For those cities large enough to support a local or regional airport,
how good are public transport links to the city centre? Is there a regular bus service, and are
journey times and frequencies satisfactory? Alternatively, is there some form of fixed link,
light rail or heavy rail, that provides a faster better quality direct link between airport and
city centre? How well are proposals to improve the link being handled?
2.8.
Environmental Criteria
A final consideration is environmental criteria. Public transport is generally regarded as
being more environmentally-friendly than the private car. How are environmental
considerations taken into account in transport planning and regulation? Are there specific
environmental standards that must be met?
More specifically, are changes in modal split deliberately used as a policy instrument to
reduce the environmental costs of private car use? How are the environmental impacts of
buses reduced: are there any policies in place to control vehicle emissions from buses, or to
encourage use of more environmentally-friendly fuels by public transport vehicles? How
are noise costs from buses and rail vehicles controlled? Where systems such as road pricing
are in operation, are hypothecated taxes used to ensure that revenues are channelled into
other environmental initiatives? Are any subsidies provided for environmental aspects of
public transport, and if so of what size and form?
10
Ireland’s Current Situation
3.
IRELAND’S CURRENT SITUATION
3.1.
Dublin
3.1.1. City description
3.1.1.1.
Geographical and economic features
Dublin is the capital of Ireland. There are some 1.5 million inhabitants in the total Greater
Dublin metropolitan area (GDA). The Greater Dublin area comprises Dublin County
Borough and the counties of Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown, Fingal, Kildare, Meath, South
Dublin and Wicklow.
Dublin is currently experiencing strong economic and population growth, with the
population of the GDA expected to reach 1.75 million by 2016. This growth is being
accompanied by a strong increase in car ownership, expected to rise from 342 per 1,000 of
the population in 1999 to 480 per 1,000 of the population in 2016. Congestion is now a
significant problem, especially during the morning and afternoon peaks.
3.1.1.2.
Political context/governance arrangements
There is currently no central responsibility for transport services in Dublin.
The main public transport operators within metropolitan Dublin are Bus Átha Cliath
(Dublin Bus) and Iarnród Eirann (Irish Rail), which are both part of the state-owned
transport group Córas Iompair Éireann (CIE). Commuter services by bus from the outer
regions of the Greater Dublin Area are provided by the sister company Bus Éireann, which
also operates the intercity services into Dublin. Iarnród Éireann also runs commuter and
intercity train services.
The Office of the Director of Traffic of Dublin Corporation is responsible for traffic
management in the Dublin Corporation area. There are five divisions: Traffic Control and
Management Division, which is responsible for traffic control, traffic signals, road markings,
traffic calming and roadworks control; Parking Control and Enforcement; Environmental
Traffic Planning section, whose responsibilities include Quality Bus Partnerships; Noise and
Air Quality; and Road Safety.
The Dublin Transportation Office is responsible for public transport planning/strategy in
Dublin. It co-ordinates inputs from the other transport bodies in the GDA (the local
authorities, the Department of Public Enterprise, the Department of the Environment, to
which it is formally accountable, the operators, the Gardai and the National Roads
Authority).
11
3.1.2. Public transport in Dublin
Data from the DTO model from 1991 and 1997 show changes in mode split between 1991
and 1997. Table 3.1 shows mode split in terms of morning peak journeys, and off-peak
journeys, in these two years.
Table 3.1
Transport Modal Splits in Dublin (%)
Car
Bus
Rail
Total
AM Peak 1991
64
26
10
100
AM Peak 1997
72
19
9
100
Off Peak 1991
72
25
3
100
Off Peak 1997
76
19
5
100
Source: DTO
Car is the predominant mode, increasing its share of morning peak journeys between 1991
and 1997 from 64 per cent to 72 per cent, and increasing its share of off-peak journeys from
72 per cent to 76 per cent. Bus accounted for around 25 per cent of morning peak and off
peak trips in 1991, falling to 19 per cent of both types of trip in 1997. Rail mode share of
morning peak trips fell slightly from 10 per cent in 1991 to nine per cent in 1997, but rail’s
share of off-peak trips rose from three per cent to five per cent.
Both the total number of morning peak trips and off-peak trips in Dublin rose by around 45
per cent between 1991 and 1997. Average traffic speeds in the morning peak fell by 23 per
cent, from 18 km/hr in 1991 to 14 km/hr in 1997. The DTO has estimated that on certain
key routes to the city centre, journey times rose by an average of 62 per cent between 1991
and 1997.
Until the light rail system (LUAS) currently under construction is completed, there are two
public transport modes in Dublin: bus and heavy rail.
The main public transport system in metropolitan Dublin is the extensive bus network
operated mainly by Dublin Bus over an unduplicated route network of 930 kms, providing
54 million bus kilometres each year, on about 150 different routes. The bus market is
regulated under the 1932 Road Traffic Act. In November 2000 private bus operators were
invited to submit applications for annual licences in the Greater Dublin area, though the
primary objective of new licences would be that they expanded the public transport network
rather than competed for market share on existing routes served by licensed or exempted
operators.
Commuter services into the centre of Dublin are mainly provided by Bus Éireann, although
there are also some smaller private operators. Bus Éireann operates commuter services out
towards Drogheda in the North, Maynooth and Kildare in the West, and Wicklow and
Arklow in the South.
12
Heavy rail services in Greater Dublin are provided by Iarnród Éireann. The main service is
the electrified DART system running now from Malahide in the north to Greystones in the
south, with a branch to a terminus at Howth. The DART system covers 51 kms of route,
with 29 stations. In the centre DART serves stations at Connolly, Pearce and Tara St.
In addition to DART, diesel-operated services are provided from Heuston terminus to
Kildare (the Arrow commuter service) on the main Cork line, from Connolly to Maynooth
on the Sligo line, and beyond the electrified DART network to Drogheda/Dundalk in the
North and Arklow in the South.
3.1.3. Performance against criteria for evaluation
3.1.3.1.
Economic criteria: transport system use
Details on bus patronage on Dublin Bus services from 1987 to 2000 are presented in Table 3.2
below.
Table 3.2
Dublin Bus Patronage 1987-2000
Calendar
year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Passenger
journeys
per
year
(millions )
160
164
161
167
173
176
171
178
185
186
188
192
193
186
Index
(1986=100)
100
102
101
105
108
110
107
111
116
116
118
120
121
116
Source: Dublin Bus
Table 3.2 shows that the number of bus journeys on Dublin Bus services grew quite strongly
overall from 1987 to 1995 (apart from 1993 when there was a strike by maintenance staff),
grew again in the late 1990s, but have fallen off a little in 2000, back to 1995 levels.
Information is not available on average trip length, so passenger kilometres cannot be
calculated. Unfortunately patronage figures and similar statistics for Bus Éireann commuter
services only are not available.
When evaluating the trends in bus patronage, it is important to take trends in real fare levels
into account. In Table 3.3, data on adult single cash fares are given.
13
Table 3.3
Development of Bus Fares in Dublin, 1986 to 2000
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Adult single fare 1-3 stages €, current prices
0.57
0.57
0.63
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.76
Adult single fare 8-13 stages €, current prices
0.89
0.95
1.08
1.20
1.27
1.27
1.27
1.33
Adult single fare 1-3 stages €, Jan 2001 prices
0.83
0.78
0.81
0.86
0.81
0.79
0.76
0.77
Adult single fare 8-13 stages, €, Jan 2001 prices
1.29
1.30
1.38
1.48
1.48
1.44
1.38
1.35
Source: Dublin Bus Website
The table shows that following steady increases in adult fares throughout the late 1980s and
early 1990s, fares were frozen from 1994 (in fact most fares were frozen from 1991), leading
to a fall in real prices. Indeed, for the period as a whole, the fare for a 1-3 stage ride has
fallen in real terms from 1986 to 2000, and the fare for a 8 to 13 stage ride has only increased
slightly.
3.1.3.2.
Economic criteria: transport system operation
Table 3.4 shows that bus kilometres run by Dublin Bus between 1995 and 2000 have been
rising relatively slowly.
Table 3.4
Bus Kilometres in Dublin, 1995-2000
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Total bus kilometres (millions )
50.8
51.5
52.5
52.6
52.9
Index (1986=100)
100
101
103
103
104
Source: Dublin Bus
An important development is that of the provision of Quality Bus Corridors (QBC). These
provide dedicated road space, good quality vehicles and a frequent service. The QBC
network is a radial one, with four corridors currently open (Lucan, Malahide, Stillorgan and
Finglas) and a further six proposed and seeking approval.
As regards output of Dublin suburban rail services operated, there has been only a very
small increase in DART total train kms from 1.96 million in 1995 to 1.97 million in 2000.
Total passenger kms and passenger journeys have however risen steadily from 1995 to 1999
as Table 3.5 shows, although a small drop-off is observed in 2000.
14
Table 3.5
DART Service Patronage
Passenger journeys (m)
Passenger kms (m)
Average length of trip (kms)
1995
16.7
177.4
10.6
1996
17.3
169.1
9.8
1997
18.2
185.3
10.2
1998
19.8
213.9
10.8
1999
20.0
223.9
11.2
2000
19.6
216.4
11.0
Source: Iarnród Éireann
Unfortunately, similar statistics for other rail commuter services operating in the GDA and
beyond are not available at this level of aggregation.
3.1.3.3.
Economic Criteria: value for money and accountability
Table 3.6 below provides data on bus revenue in Dublin between 1997 and 2000.
Table 3.6
Bus Revenue in Dublin, 1997-2000
Total farebox revenue €m, current prices)
Index (1997=100)
Total farebox revenue (€m, January 2001 prices)
Index (1997=100)
1997
1998
1999
2000
124.0
100
138.6
100
129.1
104
140.8
102
128.2
104
137.6
99
135.7
109
137.8
99
Source: Dublin Bus
While revenue rose in monetary terms over this four year period, it fell in real terms after
adjusting for inflation.
Data on the costs of providing bus services in Dublin are shown in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7
Bus Costs and Revenues per Vehicle Kilometre and Passenger Journey in
Dublin, 1995-2000
Calendar year
Costs per vehicle kilometre (€, including
depreciation, Jan 2001 prices)
Cost per passenger journey (€, including
depreciation, Jan 2001 prices)
Farebox revenue per vehicle kilometre (€,
Jan 2001 prices)
Farebox revenue per passenger journey (€,
Jan 2001 prices)
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
3.17
3.22
2.89
2.96
3.06
n.a.
0.87
0.89
0.81
0.81
0.84
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2.62
2.67
2.60
2.56
n.a.
n.a.
0.73
0.73
0.71
0.75
Source: Dublin Bus
15
Table 3.7 shows that the costs per vehicle kilometre and per passenger journey fell in real
terms between 1996 and 1999. Farebox revenues per vehicle kilometre and per passenger
journey both remained relatively stable during this period.
Dublin Bus earned farebox revenue of €136,059,000 in 1999, and incurred operating costs
including depreciation of€149,019,533, a farebox revenue/cost ratio of 0.91.
The company received a state grant through its holding company CIE in accordance with
EU Regulation 1107/70 governing State aid to transport undertakings of €16,775,733. In
1998 the State grant to Dublin Bus had been €11,267,000.
Average staff wage/salary was €25,579 in 1998, and €26,751 in 1999, an increase before
adjusting for inflation of 4.6 per cent. The average number of employees rose from 2,901 in
1998 to 3,004 in 1999.3
Table 3.8 shows revenue and costs on DART services. It shows that real costs per train km
and per passenger journey have fallen from 1995 to 1999 quite considerably. Revenue per
train km increased in real terms during the same period, with revenue per passenger
journey remaining broadly constant. Cost data were not available for other suburban rail
services at this level of aggregation.
Table 3.8
DART Costs and Revenues per Train km and per Passenger Journey 1995-1999
Total costs/train km (2001 €)
Total cost/pax journey (2001 €)
Total revenue/train km (2001 €)
Total revenue/pax journey (2001 €)
3.1.3.4.
1995
20.0
2.4
9.8
1.1
1996
18.9
2.2
10.4
1.2
1997
19.6
2.2
10.5
1.1
1998
17.6
1.8
11.3
1.1
1999
17.5
1.8
11.4
1.1
Service quality criteria
The average age of Dublin buses has fallen significantly over the past five years, from
around 8.3 years to 4.3 years (excluding mini/midibuses). This has been the result of a
significant expansion in the number of new buses.
Dublin Bus operates a Passenger Charter with targets for example on cleanliness, staff
courtesy, and reliability. However the charter is voluntary and there are no penalties to
Dublin Bus for failing to meet its targets. Iarnród Éireann and Bus Éireann operate
passenger charters on a similar basis.
3
Information in these paragraphs from Bus Átha Cliath Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999, p.13.
16
The DTO report that Dublin Buses are frequently unable to run to timetable as a result of
congestion.
3.1.3.5.
The main bus terminals and rail stations are located separately in the centre of Dublin, and
involve several minutes walk for passengers wishing to transfer.
Some bus services,
provide links between the rail stations and the central bus station, including the airport
buses and DART feeder buses. Links between the different modes of public transport do
however leave some room for improvement. Bicycles are not permitted on DART trains,
and there are wide restrictions on when they are permitted on other services.
3.1.3.6.
Tariff integration
Tariff integration within Dublin is relatively good within modes, but less so between modes.
Dublin Bus operates a distance-based fare structure, based on the number of stages ridden
with prepaid travel cards useable on all routes. The same system is in operation on all
Dublin Buses, except for express buses, night buses, Airlink buses and services in outer
suburban areas. Different fares are charged for bus and rail services. It is possible to buy
prepaid tickets which are valid on both bus, DART, and other suburban rail services, but it is
not possible to buy integrated tickets for cash fares at the time of travel, except on DART
feeder bus routes. There is no ticket integration between Bus Éireann and Dublin Bus or
Iarnród Éireann.
Passengers are able to buy tickets at stations on the vehicle (exact fare only on buses) and
from a variety of other outlets such as newsagents and shopping centres.
3.1.3.7.
Information on public transport services in Dublin is provided by the operators themselves.
Timetable and route information is provided at bus/train stations and at bus stops, and on
the internet or by telephone.
Real time passenger information is due to be introduced on QBC routes from Summer 2001
and is already in place on much of the DART network.
3.1.3.8.
Integration with land use
Local authorities are required to consult with the DTO on all planning applications and
development plans. The DTO has no formal powers to approve or decline an application,
but they can make recommendations. If planning applications go to appeal, the DTO is
often asked to provide advice. Again, although it has no formal powers appeals have in the
past been successful via this route. These links are strengthened by the fact that the seven
local authorities servicing the Dublin area all have representatives on the DTO board.
17
It is envisaged that the DTO will continue to have a role in strategic land use planning under
the new Dublin transport authority.
3.1.3.9.
Social cohesion
There are a number of features of the Dublin Public Transport fares system which aid social
cohesion. Concessionary cash fares are offered to children (around half fare), to students of
16 to 18 years for two-way fares only (no discount on cash single fares). For pre-paid tickets,
discounts are available to both children and students, and in the form of family tickets. Irish
Rail (including DART) and Bus Éireann also offer concessionary fares for children and
students. Free travel is available for senior citizens over the age of 66 in possession of a valid
pass.
Accessibility for the mobility impaired is mixed. Around 25 per cent of Dublin Buses are
low floor buses. Routes are gradually being converted to be accessible to the mobility
impaired (about 20 are now fully accessible), and all buses purchased from 2000 onwards
are to be fully accessible (low floor plus kneeling suspension). The main rail stations
provide lift access to platforms where needed, and portable ramp access to trains, but this
facility is not offered at all stations. Most but not all trains are able to accommodate
wheelchairs. Some of Bus Éireann’s fleet are wheelchair accessible, but such services are not
comprehensive.
3.1.3.10.
Economic growth: airport links
Bus services are provided to Dublin Airport by Dublin Bus and by the private firm Aircoach.
Dublin Bus runs two services, departing every 10 to 30 minutes depending on the time of
day/week. There is no light or heavy rail link to the airport currently, although a light rail
link is planned.
3.1.3.11.
Economic growth: environmental criteria
Dublin public transport operators are not subject to any formal environmental targets.
However Dublin Bus has undertaken to ensure that all new buses will be low-emission
buses.
18
3.2.
Other Irish Cities
3.2.1. Introduction
In this section we briefly discuss the current situation in the regional Irish cities. To this end,
we have visited Cork and Galway and held discussions there with relevant officials of local
authorities, Iarnród Éireann and Bus Éireann. Furthermore, we have requested data on the
city services from Bus Éireann. Although the company has responded, it has only provided
a limited amount of non-commercially sensitive information. As a result, we are unable to
provide an in-depth analysis of the situation in the regional cities.
3.2.2. Institutional and regulatory framework
Public transport in the regional Irish cities is mainly provided by Bus Éireann, who also
operate the rural and long distance bus services. It should be noted that a large number of
private operators also provide long distance bus services from the various cities in Ireland.
However, there is private competition in Waterford and to a lesser extent in Galway. In
Cork, there is a suburban heavy rail line from Cork to Cobh that is operated by Iarnród
Éireann. Systems are almost entirely bus-based (there is some heavy rail in Cork). We
consider this to be appropriate given their size.
Bus Éireann is part of the umbrella company CIE, which in turn is regulated and funded by
the Department of Public Enterprise. The Minister approves the maximum single fare –
service levels are a matter for the company, as are promotional or return fares. Under
direction issued by the Minister in January 2001, Bus Éireann is required to notify the
Department of proposals for service alterations or new services, subject to a four-week
notice period. Matters such as temporary diversions because of road work etc are not
required to be notified. However, Bus Éireann officials have indicated that approval is
required for a two-minute timetable change or for a (non-temporary) diversion.
At the moment, Bus Éireann is funded using yearly lump-sum budgets, although there is a
tendency to move into longer-term public service contracts.
Private operators can compete by applying for a licence. The licensing system for passenger
licences does not generally accommodate head to head competition between private
operators or between private operators and Bus Éireann. The licences specify the route to be
served, the frequencies and the times of operation. The Department reviews licence
applications in the light of existing services and whether a case has been made by a private
operator that services currently being provided by Bus Éireann or another private operator
are inadequate. Many licences are issued for the same routes services by Bus Éireann,
however the general policy is to licence services where there is an hour or more gap between
existing services in the case of regional or interurban services and a 20 minute or more gap
in urban areas. The private operator competing with Bus Éireann on the Salthill – City
Centre corridor in Galway was granted a licence as a different route was proposed from the
19
existing Bus Éireann services. The Department affords equal treatment to Bus Éireann and
to private operators, which implies that whether or not DPE approves Bus Éireann
proposals for service changes also partly depends on whether the proposed services would
compete with existing private services.
The responsibility for public transport is centralised without formal involvement of the
relevant local councils. In Galway, the only local involvement comes from individual
councillors who occasionally make specific requests to Bus Éireann regarding bus services in
their area. Otherwise, Bus Éireann have only a limited interaction with Galway Corporation
and almost none with Galway County Council, although both bodies do have to give
planning permission for the construction of bus shelters. Bus Éireann officials in Galway
have indicated that they would be keen to have more interaction with the Corporation and
the County Council.
In Cork, however, Cork Corporation and Cork County Council are more actively involved in
the public transport services in the city, though it is the Department that makes the ultimate
decisions. A problem in Cork and Galway is the fact that the Corporation is responsible for
a quite narrowly defined area, which may exclude some suburbs, whereas the County
Council is responsible for a much larger area, mainly rural in nature. This means that the
County Council has a rural focus and is not really equipped to deal with problems of a more
urban nature that occur in the areas immediately surrounding the Corporation areas. In
Waterford and Limerick, similar issues can occur, compounded by the fact that these cities
are surrounded by two counties as opposed to just one. It has been suggested that the
County Councils should have urban departments as well to avoid boundary problems
occurring.
There are a number of other bodies that constrain the freedom of action of Bus Éireann in the
regional Irish cities. One of these is the National Roads Authority, which has views on
whether to allow bus stops along national roads and often constrains what Bus Éireann can
do. Another is the Gardai, who are also involved in determining the locations of bus stops.
3.2.3. Performance against Criteria for Evaluation
Economic criteria: transport system use
Table 3.9 contains details of bus patronage in the four provincial cities. For 2000, figures are
available per city, whereas only totals are available for 1998 and 1999. It can be seen that
from 1999 to 2000, total patronage in terms of passenger journeys has grown by about 4 per
cent.
20
Table 3.9
Bus Éireann Provincial City Passenger Journeys
City
Cork
2000
(millions)
4.00
Galway
3.85
Waterford
0.64
Index (1998=100)
1998
(millions)
10.98
Limerick
Total
1999
(millions)
19.47
18.73
18.90
103
99
100
Sources: Data provided by Bus Éireann (2000 figures); Bus Éireann Annual Report and Financial Statements
1999 (1998 and 1999 totals)
Some more details on the situation in Galway are available from the Galway Transportation
and Planning Study, carried out in 1999. The bus patronage figures contained in this study
are presented in Table 3.10.
Table 3.10
Weekly Bus Use in Galway
Number of bus trips
Number of passengers
Passengers per trip
January
Summer
October
2512
2796
2512
48220
79578
50229
19
20
28.5
Source: Galway Corporation and Galway County Council (1999) Galway Transportation and Planning
Study.
The study mentions that total patronage in Galway was (in 1998/99) around 3.2 million
passengers per year. This would mean one single trip per week per person resident in the
City (53 trips per year), and the report suggests that this is a very low figure bearing in mind
tourist visitors. Bus Éireann officials in Galway have however indicated that patronage has
grown by about 20 per cent over the last two years as a result of service improvements (see
below). They also mentioned however that costs have increased by more than that.
In Cork, data are available on the development of patronage on the suburban rail line
between Cork and Cobh, which show that the number of passengers on the line is growing
strongly. Table 3.11 contains the patronage figures for this line.
21
Table 3.11
Patronage on Cork – Cobh Suburban Rail Line
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Number of passengers
284
265
309
399
439
474
Index (1993=100)
100
93
109
140
155
167
Source: Report of Joint Committee of Public Enterprise and Transport
Table 3.12 contains the most recent available modal split for travel to work by Cork City
Residents.
Table 3.12
Method of Travel to Work Used by Cork City Residents, 1991
Mode
Percentage
Car driver
29.6
Car passenger
8.3
Bus
10.9
Rail
0.3
Pedal cycle
7.5
Motor cycle
1.6
On foot
28.9
Other/unspecified
12.9
Total
100
Source: Cork City Development Plan 1998
Information on key adult fare levels in the regional Irish cities is provided in Table 3.13.
Table 3.13
Bus Éireann Fare Levels in Regional Irish Cities
Cork
Limerick
Galway
Waterford
Adult single fare
IR£0.75/€0.95
IR£0.75/€0.95
IR£0.75/€0.95
IR£0.75/€0.95
Adult weekly city ticket
IR£9.00/€11.42
IR£9.00/€11.42
IR£9.00/€11.42
4
Adult monthly city ticket
IR£34.00/€43.15
IR£30.00/€38.08
IR£31.00/€39.34
IR£32.00/€40.61
Source: Bus Éireann
In all cities, there is a €0.95 (75p) flat fare level. If a journey involves two or more bus trips, a
new fare is payable for each separate leg. In addition, weekly and monthly tickets are
available that are valid on all city buses. There are however no day tickets allowing
4
The Bus Éireann official at the Waterford travel centre advised that weekly tickets are not available in Waterford.
22
unlimited bus use. The private operator in Galway competing on the City Centre to Salthill
corridor charges fares that, according to Bus Éireann, are around 20 per cent below the Bus
Éireann fares.
The fact that the adult single fare is the same in all cities is remarkable. Although the same
is true in for example the Netherlands, the reason there is that all fares in the Netherlands
are part of the nationwide integrated fare system, which currently prevents tariff
differentiation between cities. This however does not apply to the Irish situation.
Economic criteria: transport system operation
Table 3.14 contains details on the number of bus kilometres run by Bus Éireann in the four
provincial cities. For 2000, figures are available per city, whereas only totals are available for
1998 and 1999. It can be seen that from 1998 to 2000, the total number of bus kilometres run
by Bus Éireann in the four cities has grown by about 5 per cent. In addition to the routes
operated by Bus Éireann, one route in Waterford and two in Galway are provided by private
operators.
Table 3.14
Bus Éireann Provincial City Bus Kilometres
City
2000
(millions)
Cork (16 routes)
3.734
Limerick (10 routes)
1.202
Galway (9 routes)
0.927
Waterford (4 routes)
0.275
Total
Index (1998=100)
1999
(millions)
1998
(millions)
6.144
5.927
5.856
105
101
100
Sources: Data provided by Bus Éireann (2000 figures); Bus Éireann Annual Report and Financial Statements
1999 (1998 and 1999 totals)
Economic criteria: value for money
In the Bus Éireann annual reports, the financial figures are split out between the city services
and the other services that are provided by Bus Éireann. The 1998 and 1999 details for the
city services are contained in Table 3.15, after converting them to January 2001 prices.
23
Table 3.15
Bus Éireann Provincial City Finances5
Revenue
1999
€000
15.901
1998
€000
16.138
Maintenance
Other operating costs
Operating depreciation
Total expenditure before interest
4.105
14.971
2.349
21.425
3.906
13.660
2.710
20.276
Operating deficit before interest
(5.524)
(4.138)
Source: Bus Éireann Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999
Table 3.15 shows that from 1998 to 1999, revenue has fallen by about 1.5 per cent in real
terms. Total expenditure however has risen by about 5 per cent and as a result, the
operating deficit has increased by 33 per cent in real terms. The percentage of total
expenditure (before interest) covered by revenue has decreased from 80 per cent in 1998 to
74 per cent in 1999.
On the basis of the information contained in Table 3.9, Table 3.14 and Table 3.15, some basic
statistics on the financial performance of Bus Éireann have been calculated. It should be
emphasised that these are crude statistics only. Care should be taken when interpreting
them and especially when comparing them with similar statistics for other cities, as the
simple ratios do not take any differences in operating environment between cities into
account. Nevertheless, the figures given in Table 3.16 provide some useful insights.
Table 3.16
Cost per Vehicle Kilometre and Passenger Journey in Bus Éireann Provincial Cities
1999
€000
1998
€000
Total operating costs (million €; including depreciation, January
2001 prices)
21.425
20.276
Total vehicle kilometres operated (millions)
5.927
5.856
Total passenger journeys (millions)
18.73
18.90
Cost per vehicle kilometre (€, January 2001 prices)
3.61
3.46
Cost per passenger journey (€, January 2001 prices)
1.14
1.07
Source: calculated from Bus Éireann Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999
5
The figures have been obtained by converting the values in the Bus Éireann Annual Report to January 2001 prices
and subsequently into Euros.
24
Service quality criteria
As part of the National Development Plan, money has been made available to Bus Éireann
for a large fleet replacement and expansion programme. As a result, the average age of the
vehicle fleet is now low, many buses are fitted with low floors (100 per cent in Limerick and
Galway, 69 per cent in Cork and 45 per cent in Waterford) and the increased fleet has
allowed substantial frequency increases. For example, in Cork, services have increased by
26 per cent in 2000, compared to 1999. In Galway, the increase over this period was, at 43
per cent, even higher.
A general problem affecting service quality in both Cork and Galway is traffic congestion
and, importantly, the lack of bus priority measures. This adversely affects both journey
times and bus punctuality. The lack of local authority involvement in the provision of bus
services in their area may partly explain the fact that bus priority measures have so far not
been a great priority for the local councils. We do however note that bus priority measures
are now on the agenda, partly as a result of the National Development Plan.
No data are available on punctuality and reliability of Bus Éireann’s city operations. The
Bus Éireann Customer Charter aims are to operate 98 per cent of all scheduled services, and
to operate no scheduled service ahead of its timetable. The punctuality target in the
Customer Charter refers to Expressway services only, i.e. there is no punctuality target for
urban services.
The Galway Transportation and Planning study concludes the following on the quality of
the Galway public transport system:
“The present network consists of too many routes, unattractive timetables (many not on
recognisable or memorable frequencies), a high flat fare (though reasonable Season Ticket
prices), unattractive and poorly presented vehicles, little or no information at stops, militant
staff attitudes and a ‘take it or leave it’ overall image. Unsurprisingly, most residents and
visitors choose to leave it: bus use at one single trip per resident per week is negligible – it is a
system of last resort rather than first choice” 6
It is clear that since the publication of this report in September 1999, the situation has
improved, mainly as a result of the new vehicles that have come in and the associated
frequency improvements. However, frequency levels in the regional Irish cities can still not
be regarded as very high, especially compared to a city like Preston in the United Kingdom
(see Chapter 9). In Preston, a city with 130,000 inhabitants, many routes operate at 10minute frequencies, with some routes operated by minibuses even being served at 5 or 6minute headways. The relative lack of routes served by minibuses with their associated
high frequencies is probably one of the main weaknesses of the public transport system in
the regional Irish cities. We do however note that the Bus Éireann development plans for
6
Galway Corporation and Galway County Council (1999) Galway Transportation and Planning Study, p 6-6.
25
the next few years will involve the purchase of a substantial number of minibuses for the
regional city operations.
In all four regional cities, there is a central bus station that is served by all or almost all bus
lines, enabling easy interchange between lines. In Galway, Limerick and Waterford, the bus
station is adjacent or very close to the railway station.7 In Cork, however, the bus and
railway stations are some way apart. The bus station has an excellent location in the city
centre, but the railway station is somewhat further out. Although there is a bus route
serving the station, services on it are limited due to difficult traffic conditions and an
adverse road layout. The service does however meet most of the trains arriving from the
Cobh suburban line.
Furthermore, there is a Park & Ride scheme in Cork, which is run by Cork Corporation and
which is claimed to be the only P&R scheme in Ireland so far. Although the scheme is loss
making and situated on a temporary site, it is considered successful.
Tariff integration
Fares are reasonably well integrated as far as weekly and monthly tickets are concerned.
These are valid on all Bus Éireann services, but not on any private services operating in the
area. In Cork, monthly tickets are available that allow travel on just the city buses, on city
and suburban buses or on all buses plus the Cobh rail services. The requirement in Cork
that monthly tickets can only be valid for a calendar month is however not very customerfriendly, as applies to a lesser extent to weekly tickets only being able to commence on a
Sunday.
However, there is no integration as far as single cash fares are concerned. If a journey
involves changing from one Bus Éireann city bus to another, a single fare is payable for each
leg of the journey. The flat fare system has the additional disadvantage that it discourages
short journeys, for example within the city centre.
The quality of the information provision in the two cities Cork and Galway that have been
examined is variable. In Galway, there is a timetable booklet that contains all Bus Éireann
city services. Also, most of the bus stops contain clear timetable information. A map
showing all bus lines does not exist.
7
In Galway there is no real bus station but all buses stop at Eyre Square which is opposite the railway station. A bus
station is planned directly adjacent to the railway station.
26
In Cork, on the other hand, there are severe shortcomings in the provision of information.
The leaflets that are available by line are of a poor quality and difficult to understand for the
inexperienced user. The same is true for the timetable information at bus stops, where it is
often not clear whether any times shown refer to the bus stop in question or to the starting
point of the service. Furthermore, no map exists of the Cork public transport system.
A general problem is also that the schedules of services can be hard to memorise, as there is
not always a fixed pattern of services even on frequent services where this would not seem
too difficult to realise. The timetable in Table 3.17 below provides an example of a route
where this occurs.
Table 3.17
Services Departing on Bus Éireann Service 5W from Galway Eyre Square to Rahoon
on Weekdays from 08:00 to 12:00
0800
0815
0830
0845
0905
0920
0935
0950
1010
1025
1040
1055
1115
1130
1145
1200
Finally, the integration between land use and transport policies in Ireland appears to be
developing in the right direction, at least in the two cities Cork and Galway that have been
examined. In both cities, integrated land use/transportation studies have been carried out.
In the case of Cork, it is intended to situate the majority of future development along the
railway lines. However, nothing has actually been done yet in Cork and Galway.
27
City Study: Adelaide
4.
CITY STUDY: ADELAIDE
4.1.
Key Facts
•
System consists of bus, O-Bahn (guided busway), heavy rail, and tram services.
•
Bus sector: competitive tendering using gross-cost contracts with output
incentives. Multiple, area-based contracts.
•
Rail/tram sector: current contracts negotiated with incumbent rather than
competitive.
•
Central authority (Passenger Transport Board - PTB) has overall responsibility for
public transport, recommends fare levels, sets minimum quality of service levels,
and provides integrated service information.
•
PTB provides buses to the operators.
4.2.
City Description
4.2.1. Geographical & economic features
Adelaide is the capital of South Australia and is situated on the coast at the mouth of the
Torrens River. The metropolitan population totals 1.05 million, and the urban area covers
1,925 square kilometres.
Adelaide has traditionally been an industrialised city with factories producing automobile
components, machinery, textiles, and chemicals. The area also contains two petroleum
refineries. However, recent years have seen some decline in industrial activity and a shift
towards the service sector. Adelaide is the chief port for South Australia, and the harbour is
located some seven miles outside the city centre. The population density of the city is low
(at 550 per square km) and the city is separated from the suburbs by extensive areas of
parklands.
The bulk of the City’s employment is situated in the outer suburbs (South, North and West
of Adelaide), but employment in the city centre has been declining in recent years (by about
4 per cent from 1987 to 1992, and a further 4 per cent from 1992 to 1997). Population growth
in South Australia is also slow, at 0.5 per cent per annum, less that half that of the national
rate.
Congestion in metropolitan Adelaide is considered to be relatively mild compared to that
experienced in many capital cities, with congestion occurring for only relatively short
28
periods during the morning and afternoon peaks, and even then, not considered to be
excessive.8 The city has a total of 18 inlet roads serving the “Square Mile” of the City.
4.2.2. Political context/governance arrangements
Metropolitan Adelaide falls under three main levels of government: the Federal Government
of Australia, the State Government of South Australia, and several metropolitan
governments. Transport policy is the primary responsibility of the South Australia state
government Department of Transport, Planning and the Arts, which regulates passenger
transport services through its Passenger Transport Board (PTB).
4.3.
4.3.1. Current transportation services and the market access regime
Within Adelaide, public transport is provided by on street buses, O-Bahn buses (the high
speed, guided busway), heavy rail and tram.
The Adelaide bus network is divided into six geographical areas plus the free services
operated in the CBD, each of which has been contracted through competitive tendering.
Contracts are awarded in the form of concessions (initially for a period of five years, but
extendable to ten if eg service levels are met and there is agreement on price) based on
tendered service and price. There are currently four bus operators: Serco, Australian
Transport Enterprises (ATE), Torrens Transit and Transitplus (which is a joint venture
between ATE and TransAdelaide, the publicly owned corporation). The bus service
contracts set minimum standards for routes, timetables and vehicle types (supplied by PTB)
but beyond this, operators have some freedom to develop services within their area.
Operation of the rail network and the tram network, is also contracted. There is a separate
contract for the rail and tram network, which has been awarded to the incumbent operator,
TransAdelaide by negotiation rather than by open competitive tender (despite a generally
widespread view that there are opportunities for savings to be made here). TransAdelaide
currently remains a state-owned entity.
Transport SA (part of the Department of Transport, Planning and the Arts) retains
ownership of all bus infrastructure (buses, depots) and leases them to the operators.
Area franchising was preferred over route franchising both for historical reasons (the city
was previously divided up into eleven areas) to encourage innovation in route development.
This policy was relatively unsuccessful during the first contracting phase, when contract
payments were linked very closely to patronage levels, potentially due to risk averse
8
City of Adelaide Economic Profile 1999 – City of Adelaide and City of Adelaide Traffic Management Study – Murray F
Young & Associates.
29
behaviour by operators, as route changes typically result in a drop in patronage over the
short term. However, more recently, route changes are now starting to be proposed, which
may be due to the reduction in the size of the patronage-based component of the contractor
fees.
For 20 years prior to the introduction of competitive tendering, the public transport network
was operated by the State Transit Authority. This period had seen falling patronage levels,
increasing subsidy levels, and cuts in services. Competitive tendering was introduced with
the intention to reverse these trends.
Structure of contract payments
Bus operators’ contracts were awarded as a result of a competitive tender process. The
actual contract payments are commercially confidential, however, the general structure of
the contract amounts are as follows:
There is an incentive type payment/penalty for operators for patronage above, and now,
after the first year, below, an agreed base line level. The actual amount per passenger varies
between operators. This is justified as some operators’ routes are much longer than others
and as such have a lower opportunity for patronage volume and higher costs per passenger.
Those with longer routes receive a higher payment per passenger, those with shorter routes
have a lower payment. These payments lie somewhere within the region of €0.40 and €0.62
per passenger . As patronage has increased this year for the first time in a number of years
these payments have proved to be greater than originally expected.9
The larger part of each operators contract payments is on the basis of a fixed fee for
providing the service, which is likely to be broadly related to operating costs.
In earlier tender rounds the patronage component of the contracts represented a large
percentage (approx. 50 per cent) of their total payments. In this most recent round, the
patronage component has been scaled back owing to risk averse behaviour of the operators
in terms of route innovation and as such the fixed component now represents a much more
significant chunk of their total payments.
Price indices are used to adjust components of the contract payments on a monthly basis,
largely to adjust for volatility in fuel prices.
Contract amounts can also be adjusted in the event of route changes, according to the bid
route km rates. At the time of tendering all operators had to bid a ‘route km’ rate for new
services or adjustments to existing services and this is used by the PTB when adjusting
routes. The initiative for a change to routes can come from either the PTB or the operator.
9
PTB acknowledges that the increase in fuel prices has contributed to patronage increases along with service
improvements and marketing initiatives.
30
4.3.2. Responsibility for planning, regulation and funding
All sectors of Adelaide public transport are regulated by the Passenger Transport Board
(PTB), which is a division of the Department for Transport, Urban Planning and the Arts.
The PTB was set up under the 1994 Passenger Transport Act. The objectives of the PTB are
to promote innovation in the delivery of passenger transport services and reduce the cost of
operating Adelaide’s public transport system. Among other things, the PTB is required to
create and maintain an integrated network of services; to promote efficient and effective
services; to review services and fares; to establish and maintain various passenger transport
infrastructure and facilities; and to provide information about services to the public. The
PTB does not operate any services itself. The PTB is theoretically the only body that is
responsible for setting fares but in practice always needs political consent to any changes.
The PTB is also responsible for local public transport in the rest of South Australia.
The contracts between the PTB and the operators are gross cost contracts with output
incentives, in which the PTB retains all revenue. The operators have considerable freedom
to set service levels themselves, subject to minimum standards, and are paid an output
subsidy for every passenger carried. The operators retain the production risk, whereas the
revenue risk is shared between the operators and the PTB. The minimum standards are
generally those previously maintained by the state operator and are relatively tight.
Contracts are let for five years, with a five-year extension option dependent on satisfactory
performance and agreement on price.
4.4.
4.4.1. Economic criteria: transport system use
4.4.1.1.
Modal Splits
Table 4.1 provides information on the splits between alternative transport modes for
journeys to work in the City of Adelaide in 1986, 1991 and 1996. Examining trips to work is
particularly useful because they tend (generally) to coincide with the peak. During this
period, total journeys to work in the City increased by 6.8 per cent from 71,396 million to
76,238 million, although the total numbers of people entering the City has fallen in recent
years.
31
Table 4.1
Modal Splits for Journeys to Work in the City of Adelaide 1986 to 1996
Train
Bus
Car driver
Car passenger
Bicycle
Walk
Two or more modes
Other*
Total
1986 (%)
7
24
47
11
2
2
3
5
100
1991 (%)
5
20
52
10
2
2
2
6
100
1996 (%)
4
18
57
10
2
2
2
5
100
Source: City of Adelaide Economic Profile 1999, taken from ABS Census of Population and Housing
* Eg tram, motorbike, taxi.
As Table 4.1 shows, car journeys, particularly car journeys with only one occupant,
dominate trips to work in Adelaide. Private car trips as a whole currently account for 67 per
cent of journeys, while public transport’s share totals 22 per cent. In terms of public transit,
the bus dominates as the most used transport mode. If all journeys rather than just journeys
to work are considered, the domination of the private car is even greater. For example, in
1986, only 8 per cent of trips in the Adelaide metropolitan area were made by public transit.
Since then, it has probably fallen further and could be as low as 5 per cent.
One important picture emerging from Table 4.1 is that while a modal share of 22 per cent is
reasonable by international standards, especially in a relatively low density area, the modal
share of public transit has fallen quite significantly in the ten year period shown (from 31 per
cent to 22 per cent). Cycling and walking have not changed as a proportion of total journeys
to work. All of the increase has been in car use, and all of this is in car drivers rather than car
passengers. While it would be more instructive if more recent data could be examined it
would appear that Adelaide’s transport system has been relatively unsuccessful as a whole
in attracting people to public transport for commuting, and also unsuccessful in retaining
the modal splits of the early 1990s. When competitive tendering was introduced, one of the
motivations was fears that the then centralised control over bus services had led to a
reduction in ridership. While it is difficult to judge what the counterfactual would have
been, it would appear that the current model has not been successful in reversing this trend.
However, it should be noted that the rate of fall in transport’s modal share in the second
period shown is tangibly lower than that in the first period, suggesting that the rate of
decline has at least been slowed.
4.4.1.2.
Patronage
In terms of overall patronage figures, just over 41 million trips were made on Adelaide
Metro public transport services in 2000 (as measured by total Metroticket sales). Table 4.2
32
shows patronage figures since 1998/9 in terms of both boarding and total passenger
journeys.
Table 4.2
Patronage Figures 1988/9 – 1998/9 (millions)
Boardings
Journeys
1988/9
72.36
53.93
1989/90
73.06
54.22
1990/1
77.60
56.86
1991/2
71.95
52.81
1992/3
66.17
49.09
1993/4
65.43
48.65
1994/5
62.46
46.37
1995/6
60.92
45.63
1996/7
60.14
44.87
1997/8
59.34
44.10
1998/9
56.24
41.61
Source: PTB Annual Report 1998/99
As the data above show, patronage of Adelaide public transport has been falling steadily
since 1990/91. While the rate of decline slowed markedly from 1995/6 to 1997/8, ie, in the
period immediately following the introduction of contracting, the most recent year’s figures
again show a fairly substantial fall. While these falls mirror the decline in public transport
modal splits discussed above, it should be borne in mind that they also reflect a period of
significant recession for the City in the early/mid ‘90s, and the fact that the total number of
journeys made into the City is also falling. Figures from PTB show that the fall has
happened on both bus/tram and train services, and across both regular and concession fare
groups (but with a significantly larger drop in the former). However, in 1998/99, PTB
estimated that by the end of 1999/00 the annual percentage decline in public transport
patronage will have halved since the introduction of contracting in 1995. The PTB also
reports that patronage for the most recent year (2000/01) has increased slightly, reversing
the previous trend. In 2000/01 there was a 3.1 per cent increase in boardings (4.6 per cent
train, 2.6 per cent tram, and 2.7 per cent bus). Total boardings were 57 million for this year
(of which 17.5 per cent were train, 3.5 per cent tram, and 79 per cent bus).
4.4.1.3.
Fares
All operators within Metro Adelaide are required to charge the same fares. The Metro
Adelaide area covers almost all of metropolitan Adelaide, apart from a few small pockets in
the far North and South of the area.10 The same fare policy applies across all modes. Tickets
are valid on all modes and also for transfers between modes. Table 4.3 provides a summary
of the main fares available (as of 1st July 2001). Fares will be increased in August 2001.
10
This is more due to accident than design, due to shifts in the metropolitan boundaries, and the fact that ticketing
has not kept pace with these shifts.
33
Table 4.3
Metro Adelaide Public Transport Fares (as of 1st July 2001).
Adult single
€
Aus $
Adult single
off-peak
Adult 10 trip
ticket
2
section
Zone
2
section
Zone
2
section
Zone
Day
trip
ticket
-
0.99
1.60
1.79
2.90
0.68
1.10
1.05
1.70
6.49
10.50
12.05
19.50
3.46
5.60
Student/
concession
single
-
Student/
concession
10 trip ticket
-
Child
single
Child
10trip
-
-
0.86
1.40
5.99
9.70
0.74
1.20
4.02
6.50
As Table 4.3 shows, the Adelaide fares system is a combination of a flat fare and a distancebased system. For short trips of approximately three kms or under, a “2 section” ticket is the
cheapest ticket available. For journeys above three kms, passengers can purchase a Zone
ticket, which acts as a flat fare ticket, allowing the user to travel anywhere on the network,
including free transfers on to other services and modes, within two hours of the initial
boarding time.
Concessionary fares with significant discounts are offered for concession holders (senior
citizens, other pensioners and the unemployed) and tertiary students, and even lower fares
are offered for primary and secondary students. Children under five travel free. Discounts
are also available for those travelling off-peak (after 9.01am and before 3pm Monday to
Friday) – in addition to the information shown in Table 4.3, off peak fares are also available
for concession holders, tertiary students and primary and secondary school students,
covering the whole network for €0.49 (80 AUS cents). Discounts are also available for those
buying 10 trip tickets. No monthly or annual tickets are offered.
Public transport operators are reimbursed for the cost of concessionary fares as each
passenger is counted as one full passenger in the calculation of the operator’s payments to
the PTB.
Fare levels are decided by the South Australian Government as part of the annual budget
review, with the PTB making recommendations. Fares were frozen for all Metroticket types
from 1998 to July 1st 2000, partially with the aim of encouraging greater public transport use.
This amounted to a small decrease in the real fare, as inflation was 1.3 per cent in Adelaide
from 1998/99 to 1999/00. Prior to that, the adult single fare (2 section or zonal) was
increased by €0.06 (10 AUS cents) in July 1998. Single concession fares were held constant,
and concession multitrip fares rose by €0.12 (20 AUS cents).
4.4.1.4.
Demand and traffic management
There are few forms of demand and traffic management schemes in use in Adelaide. There
is no use of multiple occupant car pool lanes, and there is almost no use of bus lanes.
Adelaide uses fixed median strips and one operator, Torrens Transit, has been lobbying for
34
the introduction of variable median strips that would allow for bus lanes. At present there
are no plans for such a change.
A southern O’Bahn has been considered but it is not going to be implemented owing to cost.
Alternative options are now being considered, in particular a bus priority lane, although
there have been some complaints of a lack of consultation by PTB and Transport South
Australia on this issue.
The City of Adelaide makes relatively extensive use of controlled on-street parking,
including ticket and meter parking, time limit parking, designated loading zones and permit
parking. Total controlled on-street car parking spaces have increased from 9,250 in 1992 to
15,075 in 1998.
The City of Adelaide Traffic Management Strategy report by Murray F Young & Associates
(1997) reports the Adelaide road system to be generally good, with little congestion, and a
good level of road infrastructure (traffic signals, road marking etc.).
4.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
Information on average traffic speeds in Adelaide shows significant variation, from up to 60
or 80kph at non-congested times and places (ie, the speed limit) and even higher on the OBahn, to an average of 25kph on Torrens Transit’s contract areas. The average travel time in
metropolitan Adelaide has been slowly but steadily increasing in recent years. Average all
day travel times have increased by three per cent from 1996/7 to 1999/00, while the average
morning peak times have seen the largest increase of nine per cent during the same period.
4.4.2. Economic criteria: transport system operation
The operators in Adelaide metro together currently operate 50 million vehicle kilometres per
year. There are 1,150 kms of bus routes (153 routes in total). The tramline is 10.8 kms long,
and the six train lines total 120 kms.
4.4.3. Economic criteria: value for money and accountability
4.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
PTB reports that total farebox receipts made up 19 per cent of operating revenue for
transport operators as a whole. This figure is low by international standards. However,
there is a hierarchy by mode in terms of cost recovery from passengers. The O’Bahn is the
most efficient in terms of ticket revenue keeping pace with operating and capital costs, with
the trains being the least efficient. Buses are the next most efficient after the O’Bahn,
followed by trams.
Unfortunately, detailed cost and employment data are not available for the individual
transport operators, for reasons of confidentiality.
35
4.4.3.2.
Funding/subsidy arrangements
The PTB coordinates all of the public transport in South Australia and subsidises the public
transport system through government appropriations. Payments to Metropolitan service
contractors were €131.5 million in 1999-2000. These payments have been growing slowly
over the last few years (€128.0 million in 1998-1999 and €123.7 million in 1997/98 in a period
of close to zero inflation). This amount includes cash flows from PTB to the operators and
transfers from PTB to Transport SA for the payment of the leases of capital assets for bus
operators (eg, buses, depots), ie, there is an explicit cash subsidy to operators for providing
the service and there is a subsidy in the form of all capital assets to bus operators.
TransAdelaide owns its rolling stock but bus operators lease almost all assets from PTB.
Serco leases a few buses from a third party and Torrens Transit is constructing two further
depots for its use, otherwise the bus operators lease all their capital assets from
Government.11
The PTB is primarily funded from Parliamentary appropriations, however it also receives all
money from metropolitan ticket sales, advertising revenue from buses, and a payment to
cover concession ticket subsidies from other government departments which fund
concession travel. Subsidies apply to the train, tram and bus services. 12 PTB’s revenues are
reported as:
•
66 per cent appropriation from government;
•
19 per cent ticket sales;
•
11 per cent concession ticket subsidies; and
•
4 per cent other (including advertising revenue).
Concessionary fares are funded by the state government. As far as operators are concerned
there is no distinction between a concession fare and a full fare passenger in terms of the
patronage component of their contract payments from PTB. Each passenger counts as one
full passenger in terms of calculating the operators’ payments. The PTB collects all farebox
revenue and for Adelaide metropolitan passengers they recover an estimate of the ‘gap’
between full fare revenue from concession holders and actual farebox revenue from the two
other government departments who fund concession travel.13 There are therefore no
incentives on operators to promote either concessionary ridership or full adult ridership.
Should PTB fail to accurately predict the level/proportion of concessionary travel in any one
year, it risks over/under recovery of revenues from the state government.
11
Transport SA owns all the bus capital assets and leases them to the operators contracted to PTB to provide bus
services. Bus operators are obliged to use Transport SA infrastructure. PTB pays the lease costs.
12
http://www.audit.sa.gov.au/99-00/b2/passenger.htm
13
For ‘country’ passengers the PTB accurately recovers the concession ticket gap as they claim actual amounts from
the relevant government departments.
36
Transport SA retains ownership of all bus infrastructure (buses, depots) and leases them to
the bus operators with PTB paying Transport SA the lease cost. In earlier contract rounds
Transport SA leased the assets to the operators, the operators paid Transport SA and
received funding for the assets from the PTB. This financial flow has been shortened by PTB
paying Transport SA directly. There are no financial flows for infrastructure to or from the
operators. Operators bid for operating costs only and a required level of infrastructure
resources.
4.4.3.3.
Commercial revenues other than farebox
The PTB holds all rights to advertising on the buses and therefore earns all advertising
related revenues. The PTB contracts this function out to another firm to manage.
Bus operators’ only other apparent avenue for revenue generation is chartering. ATE does
operate a charter service but as it is using buses leased from Transport SA, ATE pays
Transport SA a km charge for all charter business of €0.22 per km. ATE’s view is this
renders them uncompetitive with most commercial bus charter operators and so their
opportunities in this area are limited. They can only make charters for short trips
commercially viable. Torrens Transit does not operate a charter service and views it as a
distraction from their core business.
4.4.3.4.
Arrangements for accountability and transparency
The PTB is subject to usual South Australian government reporting requirements that
provide aggregated details of financial statements as part of the annual report for the
Department of Transport, Urban Planning and the Arts. There is internal government
reporting and the Auditor-General audits the PTB annually. The Department of Treasury
and Finance can investigate the PTB at any time although this has not occurred as yet.
The amount of information made public in South Australia is relatively limited. The
Minister does announce ‘Defective Service Amounts’ (DSA) and operators relative
performance is reported. The total level of public transport subsidy is reported in the annual
report and government budget papers are on the web.
4.4.4. Service quality criteria
4.4.4.1.
Frequency
As would be expected, service frequency varies between routes and modes. On trains and
trams, frequency varies from approximately every fifteen minutes at peak times to every
hour during off-peak times (especially evenings and weekends). On the O-Bahn, services
run every one to three minutes during weekday peak periods, every five minutes for
weekday off-peak periods, every 12 to 15 minutes on weekends and public holidays, and
every 12 minutes at night. For bus services, Adelaide Metro operates nine Go Zones, where
37
passengers have only to wait a maximum of 5 to 15 minutes (the maximum is specified for
each route) on weekdays, and a maximum of 30 minutes at weekends and at night.
On Friday and Saturday nights, there is a night bus service (NightMoves) which runs on five
routes between midnight and 4am, and stops at city centre locations and taxi stops.
4.4.4.2.
Reliability
Service punctuality is reported by operators to be good, with over 99 per cent of buses and
trams arriving on time, and 98 per cent of trains. However, given that a vehicle is recorded
on time when it arrives less than 10 minutes late, it is less clear whether the public also
perceives service punctuality as good. Only 0.5 per cent of bus and tram services are
reported to be cancelled, and less than two per cent of train services.
One of the factors that may have contributed to such good reliability levels are the Defective
Service Amounts (DSAs). Bus, train and tram operators can be charged DSAs for failing to
keep to on-time running. In the first phase, operators are charged €185 for instances of
running early by more than two minutes and €124 for running late by more than 10 minutes.
If a vehicle fails to run then there is a €309 charge. In the second phase DSAs of the same
amounts will be charged for any running early and for running more than five minutes late.
Late running is logged by the companies themselves, with drivers calling-in when they are
running late. The PTB carries out quarterly spot checks on reported lateness levels.
On-time running is one of the factors that also features in the quarterly benchmarking of all
public transport operators. Operators are required to obtain a certain percentage score in
these benchmarking exercises, otherwise their contracts may be terminated. Scores will also
have an impact on whether or not an operator is likely to secure a five-year renewal to their
contract at the end of the first five-year term. Other factors that feature in the quarterly
benchmarking analysis include amenity levels (such as cleanliness and staff courtesy),
customer satisfaction, customer perceptions of safety and a mechanical inspection of
vehicles.
4.4.4.3.
Accessibility
Adelaide’s record on accessibility appears to be somewhat mixed. Services are largely
arranged on a radial pattern out of the city centre, including the tramway, which runs
roughly East-West from the City Centre towards the coast, and the O-Bahn, which runs
North East out of the City Centre. Provision in the city centre is fairly good, but is less
comprehensive outside this area. While the North-East to South West corridor appears to be
well served, the North West, and Southern areas, and areas East of the City Centre are less
well catered for. We note that in their 1997 City of Adelaide Traffic Management Strategy
report, Murray F Young & Associates reported a high concentration of public transport in
only a few streets.
38
However, the average distance to bus stop in Adelaide Metro is reported as 400 metres. For
train services, it varies from 400 metres to 1km. Only five per cent of passengers are
reported to need to make a transfer between services to complete a journey. (Note that we
understand this figure to be for those already using public transport.)
Particular initiatives to improve accessibility for the mobility impaired and sociallydisadvantaged groups are discussed in the section on social cohesion. However, initiatives
worthy of note are the wheelchair-accessible AdelaideFree buses which operate on two
routes within the City of Adelaide, the South Australian Transport Subsidy Scheme (SATSS)
providing subsidised taxi services for the physically disabled, and the special services that
are laid on in times of high demand (for example for football matches).
Other service quality initiatives
PTB themselves have a service charter, which covers their dealings with customers, staff,
suppliers and government. Pledges are set out in descriptive terms rather than in terms of
specific standards.
There is some overcrowding on services, with the ratio of passengers to seats recorded at 47
per cent for buses, 42 per cent for trams, and 49 per cent for trains (potentially implying
significantly higher ratios in peak times). The average age of rolling stock is 13.2 years for
buses, 15 years for rail cars, and 71 years for tram cars. There are plans to rate vehicles on
levels of passenger amenity and to apply a DSA of €124 where given standards are not
enforced. However, the standard has yet to be set.
If an operator observes overcrowding then they should contact the PTB to discuss options of
larger buses/more carriages for that service or more buses/trains on the route. Bus
operators have indicated that should they actually do this then the PTB will advise them
there are no more buses to be provided and that to meet the overcrowding they should
transfer buses from another route.
The PTB recently commissioned Market Equity to undertake a passenger satisfaction survey
across the metropolitan Adelaide public transport system. The survey reported that 82 per
cent of passengers were satisfied or very satisfied with their overall trip, with similar results
for each of the modes (85 per cent for tram, 83 per cent for bus, and 80 per cent for train).
4.4.5. Integration criteria
The PTB controls all of the public transport in Adelaide and is responsible for ensuring
services are integrated. PTB owns all of the ticketing infrastructure, collects all farebox
revenue, organises information sources, and prints timetables.
39
4.4.5.1.
Within the city centre, physical integration appears to be reasonable, with all the major
transport modes converging on the same central area. For example the O-Bahn links directly
into the main bus-stop area. The main railway station (Adelaide Station), the central bus
station, and the main tram station are all located within a few of blocks of one another, but
passengers changing modes do have to make a (relatively short) walk between them. The
bus service from the airport also links into this central area and stops at the main bus station,
the tram station and Adelaide Train Station. The tram and rail services connect with oneanother at a number of interchanges along their routes.
The Rail, Bus and Tram Workers Union (RBTU) believes that the public transport system is
less integrated as a result of the privatisation. RBTU report that there is less scope for
flexibility in terms of buses meeting trains etc. Formerly, there was a central controller who
would co-ordinate late running buses, trains etc. Today, RBTU report that drivers of one
operator can not talk to another other than via their own central offices and as such it
happens less. PTB reports that wherever possible services will be delayed to enable
passengers to meet connecting services.
Where PTB determines that a new route ought to be provided then they can direct the
operator to do so. If this is an additional service then the contract payments will be adjusted
according to the contractor’s bid route km rate. Given PTB’s fixed budget then it is more
likely that any change in routes to meet changes in demand will be achieved through the
transfer of one service from one route to another. That is, resources are more likely to be
reallocated rather than increased. The Government recently allocated some of the savings
achieved from the competitive tendering of the metropolitan bus services to increase
services on the trains and buses.
Adelaide has 65 formal park & ride facilities located at railway stations, tram stops, O-Bahn
interchanges and key locations on the road network. The park and ride facilities are located
adjacent to fixed track facilities (rail, O-Bahn and tram) or at transit link stops, which
provide a fast limited stop service to the city, to take advantage of the faster travel times.
The park and ride facilities provide 4,650 car park spaces and are served by public transport
services with frequency that varies between a service every 30 minutes to a service every 10
minutes in the peak.
There are bicycle locks at some train stations and major bus hub points.
4.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
Tariff integration within the Adelaide Metro area is very good in that there is a single fare
schedule for all operators in Adelaide Metro, and Metrotickets are valid on all operators’
services. This integration is further enhanced by the fact that with a Zone ticket (either
single trip or multi trip), passengers can transfer between services – either of the same mode
or between modes within two hours of the initial boarding.
40
Ticket purchasing facilities are also good. Tickets can be bought on board busses, trams
and trains, at staffed railway stations, operator depots, and from a range of other vendors,
including newsagents, post offices, some schools and university campuses, some snack bars,
cafes and delis.
4.4.5.3.
Information integration is generally good within Adelaide Metro. All ticket retailers have
public transport “InfoBars” – free standing display units which contain leaflets on service
fares, routes, timetables and other information. In addition, a number of other outlets
throughout the city have InfoBars (for example local information centres). This information
is also available via the internet and via telephone. Information points at bus stops are also
currently being introduced.
There are no real-time information arrangements in operation within Adelaide. The
possibility of introducing such a service has been discussed, but these ideas are still in their
early stages.
4.4.5.4.
Responsibility for integration of public transport policy with land use policy lies with
Transport South Australia and Planning South Australia, which along with PTB are
divisions of the Department of Transport, Urban Planning and the Arts. PTB has indicated
that co-ordination between these three bodies has improved following their amalgamation
into one department four years ago, but operators have suggested that co-ordination is still
quite limited.
4.4.6. Social cohesion
Adelaide public transport generally appears to cater well for socially disadvantaged groups.
4.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
The section on fares in section 4.4 provides details of the features of the Adelaide fares
structure that are potentially helpful to those on low incomes or with limited mobility.
Concessionary fares are offered to children, students, senior citizens, other pensioners and
the unemployed, and children under five travel free. The price of a concessionary fare is less
than half that of the normal adult fare, and the child fare (for primary and secondary
students) is even lower. During off peak periods concession holders and tertiary students
can travel anywhere within Adelaide Metro for €0.49 (80 cents). The ten trip and day trip
tickets offer reasonable savings of up to 30 per cent on single fares for those using the system
regularly. The “2 section” ticket allows people using public transport for relatively short
journeys to benefit from a lower charge. However, we note that the 2 section ticket is only
available for those paying the full adult fare.
41
The relative popularity of the reduced rate fares is reflected in the fact that concessionary
fare journeys accounted for 64 per cent of total journeys on Metro Adelaide public transport
in 1998/99. Multitrip tickets also accounted for over half of total tickets sold.
4.4.6.2.
Access for the mobility impaired
General accessibility issues are discussed in Section 4.4.4. AdelaideFree buses are free buses
that run on two routes (the Central Loop and the Beeline). They include facilities for those
with pushchairs, and are low floor buses. They are also equipped with a ramp for
wheelchair access. The AdelaideFree service currently records two million passenger
journeys per year and the annual costs are around €1.8 million.
For those physically unable to use regular public transport services, the South Australian
Transport Subsidy Scheme (SATSS) provides subsidised taxi travel. Taxis in the scheme are
wheelchair accessible. The SATSS scheme provides vouchers to those with permanent
mobility disabilities that can be used to reduce their taxi fares on the first €18.50 ($30) of the
fare by 75 per cent for those who are wheelchair-bound, and by 50 per cent for those with
other permanent mobility disabilities. Further subsidies are also available to wheelchair
users in the form of the Journey to Work Scheme, which also offers 75 per cent discounts on
taxi fares to and from work, and the Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme which offers 100
per cent subsidies on taxi journeys made for study purposes. The total value of subsidy
vouchers in 1998/99 was around €3.6 million.
All main public transport interchanges and stations and some shopping centres are
equipped with information units which provide information on timetables and routes for
the disabled including Braille and push button recorded information.
The PTB and the State Government Office of the Ageing also support a community-led
initiative, the Community Passenger Network which acts as a co-ordinator for existing
community transport schemes. In 1998/9, there were a total of 34,176 passenger journeys on
the Community Passenger Network, up on 25,494 in 1997/8.
4.4.7. Dealing with change: responding to external changes
There is a strategic planning division within the PTB to co-ordinate services with changes in
demand patterns. New technology such as real time information is being considered by the
PTB, and all technology is the responsibility of PTB (eg, ticket equipment, real time
information) or Transport SA (buses, depots, gas refuelling facilities etc). There is little
opportunity for the operators to spearhead such changes other than route adjustments.
42
4.4.8. Dealing with change: responding to internal changes
4.4.8.1.
Staffing issues
The privatisation of public transport in 1994 brought about significant internal change for
the public transport operators. The re-organisation of the incumbent publicly owned
operator (TransAdelaide) led to a significant cut in the number of jobs, both of head office
staff (about 25 per cent were lost) and of drivers.
TransAdelaide was provided with a government grant to allow it to make relatively
generous redundancy packages. In the last round of tendering TransAdelaide staff were
offered either “separation” from TransAdelaide (ie termination of employment) with a
substantial one-off payment from TransAdelaide, and the option to then seek employment
with the new operators on that company’s pay and conditions, or redeployment to either
other departments of TransAdelaide, or other parts of the public sector.
From
approximately 1600 TransAdelaide staff, there are around 280 who stayed in the public
sector and approximately 200 who have not been successfully re-deployed. The RBTU
estimates around 600 took the redeployment option.
In the earlier tendering rounds, drivers received separation payouts but only if they did not
accept similar work for the following three years. This prevented the private operators from
hiring them and dissuaded many from accepting retrenchment. Therefore in the early
rounds many opted for redeployment within the public sector and operators largely did not
hire former TransAdelaide staff. However, in the latest round, drivers were offered a
separation package regardless of their employment position after leaving and the other
operators hired close to 100 per cent of the ex-TransAdelaide staff. It is thought that these
changes arose due to a combination of both political pressure and practical necessity.
The changes did meet with industrial disquiet. There was some industrial action when
contracts were lost, and there were reports of sabotage of buses, bus routes and way
markers. In the latest contracting round, security was stepped up to help discourage any
repeat of the sabotage witnessed in the initial round and no sabotage has been reported.
A further problem that arose in the first contracting phase was that while all operators were
required to have a full staff signed up for work by the new contracts start date, as it turned
out most of the drivers were interviewing with all the operators and accepting jobs with all
of the operators, so there was some uncertainty about exactly how many drivers were
actually going to turn up for work on the first day of business.
The changes also led to a significant shift in unionisation arrangements with the Rail, Bus
and Tram Workers Union (RBTU) losing all of their bus driver members since privatisation.
43
Driver salaries are reported to have fallen under the private operators, according to the
RBTU in the order of €93 to €105 per week. The RBTU also reports that the private operators
are rostering less effectively in terms of driver comfort, with many drivers unable to return
to the depot for lunch breaks etc. These reports have however not been substantiated by the
current operators.
14
The RBTU conduct staff attitude surveys for TransAdelaide staff and reportedly there is a
high level of dissatisfaction. This lies particularly with the management who were
perceived to have ‘lost’ the contracts through poor tendering. Remaining employees are
reported to enjoy little job security as they expect the train operations to be competitively
tendered in the not too distant future.
While the PTB reports no significant industrial dispute or staffing issues arising from the
franchising of bus operations currently, there was some unrest with TransAdelaide staff
prior to the latest changeover, with staff going on an unofficial strike for up to three weeks.
Since then there has been one court case between the Rail, Bus and Tram Workers Union
(RBTU) and Torrens Transit with respect to pay and conditions. Otherwise industrial
relations currently appear to be comparatively harmonious, although one operator has
suggested that all sides were perhaps still finding their place within the new contracts.
Changes to how staffing issues have been handled are not the only improvements that have
been made between the initial contracting rounds and the latest ones. For example, when
the initial contract areas were set, there were eleven contract areas, with four additional tram
and rail contracts. There was also a requirement that no single area could exceed 100 buses.
This led to the break-up of a number of previously through-services into separate services,
thus reducing overall service quality.
The total number of tenderers was also
disappointingly low, and in the second tendering round the program had to be put on hold.
Following these problems, a number of changes were made, with the total number of bus
areas being reduced to seven, and the upper limit of 100 buses being removed.
It would seem that Adelaide has learned some of the lessons emerging from the first
contracting rounds, and has since made improvements (including the new separation
packages for drivers) which have made the last contracting round more successful.
4.4.9. Economic growth
4.4.9.1.
Public transport and labour markets
Congestion is not considered to be very severe in Adelaide, and so does not currently
impose a constraint on the growth of the economy. There do not appear to be any specific
14
Since the move to private operators the RBTU has lost membership as they can only represent public transport
workers. The Transport Workers Union (TWU) now represent drivers for the private bus operators. The TWU
also chose to not meet with me.
44
initiatives in place to link the growth of public transport with the growth of the economy.
However, Adelaide Metro does produce publicity material (in the form of leaflets available
for example at ticket outlets/stations and over the web) that emphasise the savings that
commuters can make by opting for public transport instead of the car.
4.4.9.2.
Access to airports
A privately-run shuttle bus service connects the airport with the city centre, including the
main bus, rail and tram stations. It has a scheduled timetable to meet flights and you can
call to make arrangements to meet it. Transit Regency pays no concession or licence fees
and receives no subsidy from the PTB. It does not have an exclusive right to the route.
However, no other public transport operator has been given the option of that route and
according to Torrens Transit it is not one of PTB’s objectives. The shuttle service is perceived
to offer an adequate service, and it is thought unlikely that any other airport link will be
established in the foreseeable future. Fares for this service are significantly higher than
standard fares, at €4.08 ($6.60) for a single trip from the airport to the city centre (€6.80 for a
return ticket, and €1.36 for a single child fare).
4.4.10. Environmental criteria
There is a move towards the use of compressed natural gas-powered (CNG) busses in a bid
to reduce emissions. The Federal Government has provided subsidies to the South
Australian Government for CNG buses. At July 2001, 20 per cent of buses are fuelled by
CNG and this is due to rise to 28 per cent by May 2002.
Bus contractors with gas facilities receive CNG buses when older buses are retired and
replaced with new buses.15 However, at least two operators, Southlink and Transitplus have
no gas facilities and only receive diesel buses. Serco and Torrens Transit operate gas buses.
The O’Bahn has no gas facilities so Serco only operates diesel buses on the O’Bahn. There
appear to be some planning failures however. For example, the PTB wanted gas buses on
the O’Bahn but without any gas facilities. Torrens Transit’s fleet has been undergoing major
replacement at present, and so their number of gas buses has increased significantly
however, gas pump facilities have not been increased to match. Thus Torrens Transit now
has approximately 80 gas buses with the capacity to refuel only 50. There is over a year
waiting time for the supply of new gas facilities so Torrens Transit is now trying to source
temporary pump facilities to rent in the meantime. Transport SA owns all (or almost all) of
the fleet, depots and infrastructure such as gas facilities and is responsible for fleet
replacement policy etc.
The decision to freeze fare levels from 1998 to 2000 to try and increase ridership on Adelaide
public transport was partially motivated by a desire to reduce emissions. There have been a
number of publicity campaigns to try and encourage public transport use, which have
15
All new buses are also now wheelchair accessible.
45
included stressing the environmental benefits. Other campaigns have included direct
comparisons of the cost of commuting by car with the cost of commuting by public
transport, illustrating how much money can be saved by the latter for different commuting
distances.
4.5.
Table 4.4 below summarises what we consider to be the most significant positive and
negative aspects of the Adelaide system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
46
Table 4.4
Adelaide Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
•
Low cost recovery
•
Low and falling modal splits, falling
patronage.
•
Rate of decline in modal
splits/patronage slowing since
competitive tendering introduced.
Short journeys are not penalised by
the fare system. Off peak use
encouraged.
Service quality
•
Clear performance regime with
monetary penalties will help ensure
good service quality.
•
Frequency quite good, reliability very
good.
Service quality
•
Very well integrated fare system.
•
•
Established park and ride system.
•
Good information provision.
Social cohesion
•
Good facilities for mobility impaired
with subsidised taxi service.
•
Good concessionary fares (levels and
availability).
Physical integration may have
suffered since contracting introduced.
Social cohesion
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
•
Badly managed transition to
competitive contracts in early stages
•
Employee wages have fallen
New severance contracts have
increased the number of staff being
redeployed to the new operators
Economic growth
Economic growth
•
Programme to replace fleet with
CNG fuelled buses well underway.
•
Public transport advertising includes
emphasis on environmental benefits.
47
4.6.
Adelaide “Scorecard”
To complete this chapter we present a summary “scorecard” summarising the main
advantages and disadvantages of the Adelaide system.
Table 4.5
Adelaide Summary “Scorecard”
Adelaide
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
Low fares encourage public
transport use by socially excluded
•
Very low cost recovery
•
•
History of bad industrial relations
•
•
New contracts were intended to
encourage innovation in provision
of services
competitive contracts in early stages,
including staff redeployment
•
•
Good service reliability
Poor incentives to increase patronage
with new contracts
•
Falling ridership and modal splits
(although rate of decline slowing)
48
City Study: Copenhagen
5.
CITY STUDY: COPENHAGEN
5.1.
Key Facts
•
Services consist of: bus, heavy rail.
•
Competitive tendering of bus services using gross cost contracts, with operator
remuneration linked to service quality levels as measured by consumer surveys.
•
Central authority (HUR) with overall responsibility for public transport, including
fare levels, routes, timetables, service quality regime and information provision.
5.2.
City Description
Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark, situated in the east of the country on the island of
Zealand (Sjaelland). The metropolitan area has a population of 1.7 million inhabitants,
which is one third of the entire population of Denmark. The city of Copenhagen itself has
around 500,000 inhabitants.
Table 5.1
General Data Copenhagen
Authority
City of Copenhagen
City of Frederiksberg
Copenhagen County
Frederiksborg County
Roskilde County
Greater Copenhagen Area Total:
Inhabitants
1st January 2000
496,000
90,000
613,000
365,000
232,000
1,796,000
Area square kilometres
90
10
530
1350
890
2,870
Source: HUR
The population has increased from 1,711,000 in 1990 to 1,739,000 in 1995 to 1,796,000 in the
year 2000.
Copenhagen faces the Sont, the sea separating Denmark from the southern tip of Sweden,
placing it opposite to the Swedish urban area of Malmö. Recently, a fixed rail and road link
has been opened that eliminated the need to cross the Sont by ferry. The structure of the
urbanised area of the Capital region is organised along six radial regional railway corridors.
This is based upon the so-called “Finger Plan” developed in 1948. According to this plan the
densely urbanised area of Copenhagen forms the palm of the hand, while the suburban
areas form the five fingers. Recreational areas separate the fingers.
49
Overall responsibility for public transport rests with the Greater Copenhagen Authority.
Further details of the regulatory structure are given below in Section 5.3.1.
5.3.
Public transport in Copenhagen consists of bus and heavy rail. Copenhagen Transport (HT)
was established in 1974 as a consolidation of twelve mainly publicly owned transport
companies. Copenhagen Transport became the joint public transport authority and the
operator at the same time. From 1980, 80 per cent of the operation in the area was carried out
by Copenhagen Transport whereas the remaining 20 per cent was produced by small
individual private operators on a gross-cost contractual basis.
A fundamental feature of the Copenhagen model was – and still is – that the right of
initiative remained with HT, the public transport authority. Operators are allowed to
suggest new routes and time tables, but the public transport authority takes the final
decision. All contracts are gross-cost contracts.
For HT and its politicians, it is absolutely crucial that the customer perceive public transport
in Copenhagen as one integrated company and not as a fragmented number of individual
operators. Therefore all buses today have the same identity. The operators believe this
standard setting by HT/HUR is too strict, leaving no entrepreneurial freedom for the
operators.
Current organisation
The current organisation of HUR dates from July 2000 when HT ceased to exist as an
independent company. On 1st July 2000 Copenhagen transport was incorporated into the
newly created Greater Copenhagen Authority – much along the lines of the Greater London
Authority. Like HT more than 25 years ago, HUR was established by law. HUR consists of
the planning, the transport, and the service divisions (Figure 5.1). Many of the present
challenges are solved in co-operation between the different departments. A ”Project-product
development council” and a ”Quality council” connect the departments in a matrix
organisation.
The eleven members of the HUR council come from the two city councils and three counties
– among them, the five mayors (Table 5.2). A political committee, the Transport Committee,
supervises the public transport management in HUR.
50
Figure 5.1
The Current HUR Organisation
General Management
Planning Division
(Regional Planning, Traffic Planning,
Analysis and Statistics, Planning Coordination)
Transport Division
Service Division
(Press and Information, Internal Services, Finances,
HR Administration and Development, Legal)
Travel Card Project
Marketing and Information Dept.
Revenue and Data Analysis Dept.
IT and Development Dept.
Construction Dept.
Schedule and Analysis Dept.
HT Customer Center Dept.
Contract and Quality Dept.
The authority is responsible for regional planning, comprehensive transportation planning,
business development policies, the interregional co-operation with South Sweden due to the
newly opened bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö and for some cultural institutions as
well. HUR has followed the recommendations of the ISOTOPE16 study about the three
levels of organisation (see paragraph 5.3.2).
Table 5.2
The Members of the HUR
Authority
City of Copenhagen
City of Frederiksberg
Copenhagen County
Frederiksborg County
Roskilde County
Greater Copenhagen Area Total:
Members in Greater Copenhagen Authority
3
1
3
2
2
11
Source: HUR
From 2001, HUR takes over six small local railways, one in Southern and five in Northern
Zealand. The national railway companies, DSB (Danish State Railways), S-tog and
Banestyrelsen will still own the central railway system and the suburban S-trains. From
2002, the Ørestad Development Corporation (Ørestadsselskabet) will run the first metro line
- a company owned by the State and the two cities.
16
ISOTOPE was a research study conducted as part of the EC Transport RTD programme. The report described and
compared the organisational and legal structures used in urban public transport in European countries. It analysed
the pros and cons of these alternative structures and considered how organisational structures might be improved.
Summary details can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/extra/res-isotope.html
51
HUR is the fare-determining authority of the region, and the board makes decisions
subsequent to a hearing of other involved parties. All revenue collected by the three public
transport authorities of the region (DSB, the local railways and HUR) is re-allocated to
operators according to a ”revenue distribution model”. The Metro will be fully integrated in
this system. We discuss fare arrangements in more detail in the economic criteria section.
Tendering for bus concessions
The public transport lines in Copenhagen are subject to tendering. Concessions can be
allocated to public as well as to private operators. The contractual relationship between
HUR and its operators is a so-called gross-cost contract with quality incentives. The first 45
per cent of operations were allocated in the period 1990-1995 and the second 55 per cent in
the period of 1995 to 2002. The non-tendered lines are operated by the Bus Division – later
“BusDanmark A/S” in 1995, and from 1999 “Arriva Danmark A/S”. The non-tendered lines
are operated on regular standard contracts like any tendered contract.
The Copenhagen-model describes how HUR has increased the quality of service to the
passengers and reduced costs without resorting to full privatisation or deregulation. It is
based on two key principles:
1.
HUR continues its role as a public transport authority by determining routes,
timetables and fares. It routinely conducts passenger surveys and handles
information and complaints, sets the service standard and determines bus design.
Bus operations are tendered according to routes in packages of six-year contracts to
all bus operators complying with the European Union tendering rules. Operators are
allowed to liaise and give a common bid on a maximum of three packages at one
time. Packages are made rather small to ensure that small operators have equal
accessibility to the market. Approximately once a year a tendering round is made
containing several packages of routes.
2.
HUR has set up a number of objectives for the tendering process. A primary
objective is to choose the best and cheapest bid. In the tender strategy set by HUR, it
is specified that tenders must be attractive for large as well as for small operators.
Bids are calculated according to various stipulations stated by HUR (for instance the
state of the rolling stock, organisation, previous performance, and price). If an
operator has new buses, he may set a higher price and still win the tender.
Except for Arhus and Odense most of the bus transport market in Copenhagen has been
tendered out. This resulted in a drastic fall in the number of operators in Denmark from
about 200 to just 40. A handful of these 40 control 80 per cent of the Danish market. The
situation in Copenhagen is presented in Table 5.3 which shows market shares of the
different bus operators.
52
Table 5.3
Principal Bus Operators in Copenhagen, May 2001
Operators
Arriva Danmark A/S
City-Trafik A/S
Connex Transport Danmark A/S
De Hvide Busser
Fjordbus A/S
Partner Bus A/S
Østtrafik a/s
Market share* (%)
45.4
15.7
31.3
2.1
2.4
1.7
0.4
* Telebus and service buses have a total market share of 1 per cent.
Source: HUR
The operators are paid on a monthly basis, according to a price-index formula. The
tendering system does not allow operators to compete on working conditions. Therefore,
bids have to be based on average salary costs for the purpose of bid ranking. The true
contractual prices are then adjusted for the personnel that have actually been taken over.
During the entire contract period, the contractor is required to provide terms in respect of
pay and pensions according to one of the three labour agreements. These are between: the
Union of Public Employees and the Association of Country Councils in Denmark, the Semiskilled workers Union and the Association of Country Councils in Denmark, between the
Federation of Bus Owners and the Semi-skilled workers Union and finally in accordance
with the “National agreement for scheduled bus services” and related “supplementary
agreement”.
At the beginning of 2001, one of the main operators, Combus A/S has been taken over by
Arriva. Its concessions for Copenhagen however are taken over by Connex. Combus had a
19.8 per cent market share in Copenhagen.
Regarding the organisational framework, Copenhagen follows the MARETOPE17-concept
which disaggregate into three levels of organisation:
17
MARETOPE is an ongoing European-wide project, and a follow-up on the ISOTOPE project. MARETOPE will
provide details of the current legal, organisational and financial frameworks of local public transport systems, and
the processes and impacts of changes in these systems, based on specific case studies.
53
•
Strategic level, represented by the management of the city of Copenhagen and other
local authorities in the greater Copenhagen area. Strategic management is involved
in the formulation of general aims, areas, target groups and general service as well as
the determination in broad terms of the means that can be used to attain these, or in
short supply an answer to the question: what do we want to achieve?
•
Tactical level, represented in Copenhagen by HUR. This makes decisions on
acquiring means that can help reach the aims, and on how to use these means most
efficiently. For public transport this means that the tactical level is concerned with
fares, routes, timetables and service type.
•
Operational level, represented by the operators. The operators make sure that the
orders are carried out and that this happens in an efficient way. It is about answering
the question: how do we produce the product? For public transport operators this
means vehicle rostering, drivers rostering, personnel management, maintenance,
purchase of consumables, fleet renewal management.
Routes are tendered on gross-cost contracts to seven operators – some of them still rather
small local bus companies. The large international firms are however slowly taking over the
market. HUR decides about the schedules and level of fares and sets standards for quality,
service, and the design of the buses. HUR receives all fare revenue from the passengers,
subsidies from the five public owners and pays the operators for their operations regardless
of the number of customers using the individual route. This model has been chosen to
ensure that a public transport authority that offers what is sensible for citizens from a social
point of view determines available bus services. HUR is responsible for route planning, but
this is carried out in detail in co-operation with the operators. The operator is responsible for
the operation of the buses.
Copenhagen culture of co-ordination
There is not really a constitutional arrangement, but generally recognised common practice
is to talk with the stakeholders when something new happens or a relatively big change
occurs, for example before deciding on building a new terminal/hub. The stakeholders are:
railway operator, metro operator, local authorities, road authorities, HUR. These
organisations meet up in regular steering groups with rotating chairmen and meeting
places.
5.4.
5.4.1.1.
Modal splits
In 1992 the market share of public transport was 20 per cent. The aim of HUR is to increase
this towards 24 per cent in 2010. Part of the public transport will then be provided by the
54
new metro system, to be opened in 2002. The number of bus journeys in the same period
must increase by 15 per cent. In 1998 HUR had already measured an increase of 7 per cent.
5.4.1.2.
Patronage
Table 5.4 shows bus passenger traffic in Copenhagen between 1990 and 2000. The number
of passenger journeys fluctuated between 238 and 256 million and the amount of passenger
kilometres between 937 and 1058 million. The average trip length seems to be stable for the
last six years between 4.11 and 4.13 kilometres.
Table 5.4
Bus Passenger Traffic in Copenhagen, 1990 to 2000
Passenger trips per year (millions)
Passenger kilometres per year (millions)
Average trip length (km)
1990
238
1012
4.52
1992
238
1018
4.28
1994
244
937
3.84
1996
256
1051
4.11
1998
256
1058
4.13
2000
244
1007
4.13
Source: HUR
5.4.1.3.
Fares
The fare depends on the distance travelled according to the zone system introduced in 1978
and is independent of the public transport mode used. The basic idea of the system is that
the customer should not be bothered by the fact that a number of authorities work ”behind
the curtain” to provide public transport for the actual service provision as well as for
ticketing and fares. In 1978, a common fare system was put in place to make it possible for
passengers to interchange freely between bus and train. The Copenhagen region was
divided into 95 different zones. The passenger pays for each zone he or she travels through.
Tickets can be purchased from ticket offices at the stations, vending machines at stations or
from bus drivers. The tickets are stamped with time, date and departure zone. The
passenger pays for the number of zones needed. The minimum fare covers two zones, and
the maximum fare covers seven zones and over. 10-Clip cards are available for journeys
within two, three, four, five, six or all zones.
One clip entitles the passenger to travel within the number of zones printed on the face of
the card. Several simultaneous clips extend the period of travel and increase the number of
zones the passenger can travel in. The passenger can clip for a maximum of seven zones
enabling the passenger to travel in all zones for a period of two hours. Discount clip cards
for two, three or more zones are available from more than 900 outlets all over the Greater
Copenhagen Area. Travelling on a monthly pass, the passenger is allowed to travel in
certain zones - or the whole area. Monthly passes are available from 200 of the card-outlets.
55
Development of fare levels
Figure 5.2 below shows the development of fares up to 1999. Fare rises kept pace with
general inflation until 1997. In that year Parliament decided to finance a reduction of the
fares in local and regional public transport in Denmark. As a consequence, the fare level was
reduced by approximately 9 per cent.
Figure 5.2
Fare Levels
Index
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Inflation
1994
1995
Fares
1996
1997.1 1997.2
1998
1999
Real fares
Source: HUR
A broad outline with some important tickets and prices is presented in Table 5.5. This
shows the development of prices from 1997 to 2002. Special discounts are available for
children, youngsters under 18, pensioners, pre-pensioners and students.
Children pay only pay 50 per cent of the normal fare for tickets bought in the bus and 24
hour tickets and even less for the 10 clips and the monthly card. Details are provided in
Table [5.6] below.
Table 5.5
Ticket Prices in Copenhagen 1997-2002
19-01-97 /
27-09-97
Minimum
Maximum
price (2
price (all
zones, in €)
zones, in €)
24-hour ticket
10-clip
card
adults
Monthly
personal
pass
adults
28-09-97 /
16-01-99
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
9.42
17-01-99 /
15-01-00
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
9.42
16-01-00 /
20-01-01
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
9.42
21-01-01 /
20-01-02
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
9.42
10.09
10.09
32.30
9.42
30.96
10.09
32.30
10.77
34.32
11.44
36.34
32.97
96.90
28.94
87.48
29.61
91.52
30.28
99.60
31.63
106.33
Source: HUR
56
Table 5.6
Ticket Prices in Copenhagen for special groups in 2001
children
Minimum
price (2
zones, in €)
24-hour ticket
10-clip
adults
Monthly
personal
adults
card
Maximum
price (all
zones, in €)
5.05
5.38
(2 zones)
16.15
7.40
(3 zones)
53.16
youngsters
under 18
pensioners
pre-pensioners
students
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
10.09
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
10.09
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
10.09
Minimum
Maximum
(2 zones, in
price (all
€)
zones, in €)
10.09
11.44
(2 zones)
16.15
36.34
(all zones)
53.16
pass
11.44
(2 zones)
27.59 (3
zones per 3
months)
36.34
(all zones)
36.34 (all
zones per 3
months)
11.44
(2 zones)
11.04
36.34
(all zones)
37.28
11.44
(2 zones)
31.63
36.34
(all zones)
66.08
Source: HUR
New development on fares: introduction of a smartcard
While fares in Copenhagen are now based on a zone system, in 2004 a smartcard system is to
be introduced. This will change the system towards paying for the distance travelled instead
of zones travelled.
5.4.1.4.
Some demand and traffic management initiatives have been undertaken, with the
introduction of priority for buses at some junctions and the setting up of some bus lanes.
However, these initiatives have so far been relatively inadequate, and traffic speeds have not
increased as a result of them. Further initiatives are therefore planned.
5.4.1.5.
Average traffic speed
The average speed of the buses in central parts of Copenhagen is well below 10mph while in
the outer districts of Copenhagen the situation is slowly getting worse. In 1997 the average
speed was above 20 kms/hr, but by 1999 it had fallen slightly below 20 kms/hr. The
situation in Copenhagen county is improving, from 28 kms/hr in 1997 to 30 kms/hr in 1999.
In Copenhagen, 1,048 buses were operational in the year 2000 on about 270 routes. There are
10,000 bus stops. The total production of bus hours is more than four million. Table 5.6
shows that the amount of vehicle kms per year is slowly decreasing as well as the number of
operators, while the number of vehicles is slowly increasing.
57
Table 5.6
Bus Production Data in Copenhagen, 1990-2000
Vehicles kms per year (millions of
km)
Number of vehicles
Number of operators
1990
94
1992
93
1994
94
1996
92
1998
89
2000
88
12
12
8
1007
9
1014
7
1048
7
Source: HUR
5.4.3. Economic Criteria: value for money and accountability
5.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Table 5.7 below provides details of HUR costs and revenues. From this table, the ratio of
farebox revenues to costs for 1999 can be calculated at 0.74 for farebox revenues to operating
costs, and 0.55 for farebox revenues to total costs.
Table 5.7
HUR/HT Revenue and Costs, 1998, 1999
Costs:
- Operation exclusively
- PTA costs
- Other (pensions,
handicap services, etc.)
Total costs
Revenue:
- Ticket sales for HUR
- Subsidies
* from the 5 counties
* from the State, EU
- Other (rental of property,
service bus transport, etc.)
Total Revenue
1998
€ million
201
24
48
1999
€ million
206
26
47
273
279
148
119
118
1
3
153
121
121
0
4
270
278
Source: HUR
Competition has led to declining tender prices for bus operations. From the first tendering
round in 1990 to the seventh round in 1998, the costs per bus hour had fallen by 24 per cent.
At the same time, patronage has increased. In the period 1993-97, the number of annual
passengers boarding increased more than 8 per cent. However, patronage decreased slightly
in 1999. HUR believes that the lowest bus costs per hour have been reached with operators
operating almost without profits. Probably as a result of that during the latest rounds, the
hourly costs have risen.
58
5.4.3.2.
Funding/Subsidy Arrangements
HUR receives a subsidy from the owners (the counties), with a subsidy rate of about 44 per
cent. See the cost and revenue data below for more quantitative data. A large part is to pay
the pensioners, former employees from when they were still part of the local government.
HUR also gets compensation for the 9 per cent lower fare rates as from 1997 and for the
lower fares for early-retired travellers and students.
Investments in the buses are made by the operators while HUR undertakes investments in
IT, marketing, information, overall finances, bus-stops and terminals. Certain investments
are made in co-operation with DSB, whilst others are made with various local and regional
authorities. HUR does not receive income from specific earmarked taxes.
5.4.3.3.
In 1999, HUR’s income other than from subsidies and farebox amounted to €4 million, and
included property rental incomes.
5.4.3.4.
Arrangement for accountability and transparency
HUR publishes annual report and accounts. In addition, HUR is required by law to provide
further information to any interested party on request, subject to confidentiality and public
safety limitations.
5.4.4.1.
Frequency
Services in the centre have generally good frequencies, with a service every ten minutes or
less on the main route into the city centre from 7am to 6pm, and a slightly less frequent
service in the evenings (up to midnight) and early mornings (from 5am). For those services
that are mainly commuter services, frequencies fall from around every ten minutes in the
peak and during the day to around every twenty minutes in the evenings. Some services
only operate at peak hours.
5.4.4.2.
Reliability
The services are not very reliable. Some solutions are already in place, like preferential
treatment at intersections and a few miles of bus lanes. These measures however do not
increase the average speed enough. Therefore a “city network” like in Stockholm is currently
under development. This means concentrating the majority of the network in a relatively
limited number of streets.
59
The advantages are a more efficient use of bus lanes and a good use of preferential treatment
of buses at intersections. At the same time on-line information will be provided to the
passengers. Services can also become cheaper because of increasing average bus speed.
HUR checks the percentages of completed journeys and overcrowding as well. The
percentage of completed journeys varies between 99.80 and 99.87 between 1996 and 1999. In
2000, this figure was further increased to 99.91 per cent.
5.4.4.3.
Accessibility
Most of the buses today are low floor buses suitable for elderly and disabled people and
prams. Special services for the disabled are also operated with almost 400,000 journeys a
year in specially equipped buses. By next tendering session in June 2001 all busses will be
equipped for the mobility impaired. Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of low floor buses in
the fleet.
Figure 5.3
Per cent of Low Floor Buses in Copenhagen
Source: HUR
Geographical coverage is generally good, with 96 per cent of the population living within
600 metres of a bus stop, and 82 per cent of the population living within 300 metres of a bus
stop.
60
5.4.4.4.
Other service quality initiatives
A unique feature of the Copenhagen-model is that it was the first in the world to use
customer surveys as the basis for an incentive programme for bus operators. Each year,
HUR asks more than 20,000 randomly selected passengers to rate bus service on the basis of
several criteria. The operator’s quality level is assessed on 11 different points, 9 of which are
based solely on the passengers’ perception of quality. The quality surveys form the basis of
a ranking of operators every three months, according to which a quality bonus will be
paid. The passengers assess the quality of services, indicating how satisfied they are with the
quality of each point mentioned below - on the journey they are presently on - and how
important each point is to the passenger. It is possible to reset an individual measuring
point if external factors, such as street works, are beyond the operator’s control.
The results of the surveys feed into the incentive system or ”carrot and stick-model”. In the
ninth tendering round it is stated that operators that do not live up to the previously set
quality standards are fined up to 1.5 per cent of the contract sum by HUR. Conversely,
operators who meet or exceed standards are awarded a bonus of 1.5 per cent per bus hour.
Each operator can obtain a maximum of 5 per cent extra. All information about bidding,
operating costs and quality ratings is freely available to the public and to the media.
The operator must meet all the quality standards in the contract in order to obtain the bonus.
If the survey shows that an operator is below the minimum objective on one or several
points, a penalty in the payment will be made in proportion to the level of non-performance
and the importance of the measuring point to the passengers. In addition, the operator must
draw up an action plan showing how quality will be enhanced.
HUR is entitled to check the operator’s performance under the contract through inspection
of the buses while in operation. HUR may make a set-off in the payment of 30-400 Euro per
occurrence in some situations, for instance:
•
Early departure from terminus;
•
Missing tickets;
•
Failure to replace defective ticketing equipment;
•
Operation of another bus type than the agreed one;
•
Delayed departure from terminus by more than two minutes;
•
Incorrect signposts;
•
Missing information folders; and
•
Failure to meet the cleaning standards.
61
Table 5.8
Operator’s Scores on Concessions
Punctuality
Driving
Driver’s
behaviour
Inside
cleaning
Outside
cleaning
Noise
Outside
clearing
Ventilation
Contractor
Contractor A, Concession A
Contractor A, Concession B
Contractor B, Concession C
Contractor B, Concession D
Contractor B, Concession E
Contractor C, Concession F
Contractor D, Concession G
Contractor E, Concession H
Contractor G, Concession I
79.4
79.6
82.5
82.8
80.6
86.5
82.6
82.9
82.6
81.9
78.5
84.9
84.3
84.5
86.3
83.8
82.7
82.6
82.2
78.3
87.8
85.2
84.9
87.5
84.2
83.8
84.8
79.0
78.4
77.4
81.1
80.3
79.4
76.1
79.9
78.8
76.7
72.7
75.5
76.2
75.9
77.3
70.4
76.5
72.5
69.0
69.0
71.1
67.9
74.1
75.6
71.3
75.0
67.0
80.9
78.5
79.1
80.0
81.4
83.5
84.3
81.2
75.5
83.5
84.1
81.2
82.7
85.3
85.1
82.3
85.9
81.9
Contract level
Minimum level
HT, average
83.3
81.3
82.0
83.3
81.3
83.2
83.3
81.3
84.1
79.0
77.0
79.1
76.0
74.0
75.0
71.0
69.0
71.2
80.0
78.0
80.5
83.3
81.3
83.7
Other instruments to measure and improve customer satisfaction are improving the image,
introducing a customers panel, a customer care programme and integration of this
programme with the customer centre. A travelplanner and extensive website (www.ht.dk)
have also been introduced.
From the introduction of quality incentives in the contracts, customers have estimated the
quality level to increase steadily. However, in 1999 there was a fall in the passengers’
ratings of quality in the buses, shown in Figure 5.4. HUR believes this stems from various
reasons, for instance, bus operators having market shares that are too big. To overcome this
problem, HUR has implemented certain measures. In order to not only focus on the size of
the financial bid, HUR has started including previous performance in the choice of operator
from the ninth tendering round from 2000 onwards, as well as quality of the bus equipment,
and the organisation of the operators.
Figure 5.4
Passenger Rating of Bus Service Quality
835
830
825
820
815
810
805
800
1.
Quarter
1995
3.
Quarter
1995
1.
Quarter
1996
3.
Quarter
1996
1.
Quarter
1997
3.
Quarter
1997
1.
Quarter
1998
3.
Quarter
1998
1.
Quarter
1999
3.
Quarter
1999
Source: HUR
62
The incentive system based on consumer satisfaction helps to compensate for one of the
disadvantages of the gross contract system that is currently being operated. Although there
are plans to introduce net contracts for some time now, currently no such contract or pilot is
being implemented. In gross contracts revenue and production risk are both the
responsibility of HUR. This means operators are less interested in the customer and
customers’ satisfaction. Therefore a quality incentive system is in operation.
If part of the agreed journeys are cancelled, HUR may effectuate a set-off in the payment
according to a rising rate. If the operator fails to acquire a certain piece of equipment, to use
environmental-friendly fuel or meet cleaning standards, HUR is entitled to reduce the
payment to the operator. The fine also depends on the type of contract in force between the
operator and HUR. If the operator is in material breach of contract, HUR may cancel the
contract, or part of the contract. If the operator continues to neglect his contractual duties
despite written notification, or if the operation provides less than 75 per cent of scheduled
services, HUR is entitled to cancel the contract as well.
HUR also checks the operators for on-time departures from the terminus and the degree of
service, measured on basis of the operator’s own report. More than 6,000 journeys are
checked during a year, and each bus is checked 4-5 times yearly. Drivers are checked once
or twice per year. HUR then calculates an index that serves two main purposes: a quality
rating of the bus system in general, but more importantly, an evaluation of the individual
bus operators. Surveys in 1998 showed that 87 per cent of the passengers were satisfied with
the bus service, and only 2 per cent were directly dissatisfied.
The average age of vehicles in Copenhagen is 5.7 years.
5.4.5.1.
HUR has the financial responsibility for the provision of public transport in Copenhagen.
They therefore have the responsibility of planning the bus routes, connecting all local and
regional bus services in one system connecting towns to the city. HUR has to co-operate
with the national DSB, the national state railway, for the rail connections and the transport
to and from Sweden over the new Oresund bridge. The train-bus connections in the city
centre are well organised. The four train stations in the city centre: Hovedbanegarden,
Vesterport, Norreport and Osterport are connected with the number 11, 10, 16 and 6 bus
lines respectively.
5.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
In 1978, a common fare system was put in place to make it possible for passengers to
interchange freely between bus and train. The area was divided into the 95 zone system that
is still in existence. Further details of the fares system are given above in the fares section.
63
In 1997 joint ticketing was implemented in Denmark on a national scale. Since 1997 in
principle all public transport tickets are valid across the bus and train modes. Although joint
ticketing has some major advantages for the user, good information has to be made
available.
5.4.5.3.
HUR is responsible for proving information to the public. Besides the information on
platforms and a map with all the bus and train lines for the Copenhagen region, they also
provide brochures about new developments such as the new smart card. HUR has a website
in Danish only with an introduction about the organisation, downloadable documents and
news flashes to inform customer about new developments. An e-mail address for
information and a telephone number are added as well.
The website from HT (www.ht.dk), the predecessor of HUR, is far more extensive with all
the bus lines, a bus travel planner, information about ticket and pass prices, helpdesk
telephone number, information by using wap-services and an e-mail service specifically for
complaints. There is also a tourist section in which the tourist can find information about
train and bus in English, French and German and a customer service telephone number.
Information is also available for the handicapped wanting to use public transport.
Although managed by different operators, all buses in Copenhagen have the same
appearance, logo and colour in order not to confuse the user.
Currently HUR is testing real time information on buses and bus platforms, though this is
regarded as very expensive.
5.4.5.4.
HUR has a major responsibility for integration, and both public transport and land use
planning are now the responsibility of HUR.
Greater Copenhagen has about 92 train stations in the area. They all have facilities to park
cars. There are less than 10 “official” park and ride stations, all situated in the suburbs
around Copenhagen.
5.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
Some special groups are recognised by HUR enabling them to use the public transport for a
lower price. These groups are: children, youngsters, pensioners, pre-pensioners and
students. Details of the discounts given are reported in the fares section on this chapter. In
1997 the parliament decided to finance a reduction of the fares in local and regional public
64
transport in Denmark. As a consequence the fare level was reduced by approximately 9 per
cent.
5.4.6.2.
The accessibility section in the section on service quality provides details of low floor bus
use. Special services for the disabled are also in existence with almost 400,000 journeys a
year in specially equipped buses. By next tendering session in June 2001 all busses will be
equipped for the mobility impaired.
5.4.7. Dealing with change: internal and external change
5.4.7.1.
Dealing with transition
During the early 1980s, Copenhagen Transport faced increasing problems. The level of
quality as well as patronage decreased, strong unions initiated strikes, and fares increased
despite falling fuel prices. The reasons were weak political and company management. At
the same time, private operators began claiming that they were able to operate routes
cheaper than those of Copenhagen Transport. In this spirit, Parliament - under the
leadership of the liberal-conservative government then in power - considered privatising
Copenhagen Transport. This would reduce costs, but it remained obvious that regional and
urban public transport still needed to be managed and co-ordinated centrally. Customers
were to benefit from one, seamless system, and not from a patchwork of several overlapping
ones. The solution was to allow Copenhagen Transport to remain as the central planner and
manager of bus operations in the Greater Copenhagen Area, but without operating buses
itself.
In 1990, the Copenhagen Transport Act 1990 was passed in Parliament stating that at least 45
per cent of all operations were to be subject to tender within the next five years. Public
companies and Copenhagen Transport were not permitted to make bids. In the same year
Copenhagen Transport was divided into two separate divisions: an administrative division
called HT and a division that was in charge of operations, the so-called ”Busdivisionen”. HT
got a business-oriented board – consisting of 5 persons, one from each of the counties
instead of the 37 members the Greater Copenhagen Council had. Responsibilities for train
services were given back to the state, the Ministry of Transport. The key word to continue
integration between buses and trains became “co-operation” – only in case of any dispute
concerning fares, HT would have the final word as the fare deciding authority.
Authorities were 100 per cent in charge of all subsidisation and financing, HT received its
subsidies from the counties whereas DSB (national railway operator) received its subsidies
from the state. The local railways received most subsidies from the state but also a minor
part from HT and the local authorities. Terminals and constructions were normally financed
jointly between HT and the local authorities. All revenue went to HT, which reallocated the
money to DSB according to passenger counts, and to the operators according to the number
of bus hours performed and the level of quality.
65
Results came quickly. Operational costs decreased by 20 per cent in the period from 19901994. The bus fleet was renewed and quality improved. At the same time, a new business
strategy - ”Vision 2005” - was established. Patronage increased and the financial situation of
Copenhagen Transport was improved remarkably.
In 1995, a revised Copenhagen Transport Act was passed. All bus operations were to be
tendered by 2002 and public operators were permitted to bid on routes on the same grounds
as private operators. Busdivisionen became an independent limited company, although it
was still owned by the five public owners of Copenhagen Transport. Simultaneously, it
changed its name to ”BusDanmark A/S”. Since then a clear allocation of responsibilities has
been put in place. Since 1995, BusDanmark A/S has won several tenders. In 1999,
BusDanmark A/S was sold to the British operating company Arriva, leaving Combus
(formerly the Danish State Railways Bus Company) as the sole publicly owned operator.
The aims from the reforms starting in 1990 were to decrease costs, increase the level of
quality and at the same time attract more passengers. Tendering is seen as a means to reach
these goals, not as a goal on its own. Furthermore it was very important that the personnel
was not victimised by lower wages. The EEC regulative on mandatory company take-over
of personnel secured all drivers. This meant that HT did not enter a period of work conflicts
and strikes as one could have feared. What helped in this respect is that HT employed its
last civil servant as a bus driver in 1974. In 1974, when HT was established, the unions and
the management worked together on levelling the wage level of the drivers in private sector
and the public sector. In 1990 when tendering began this meant that there was hardly any
wage gap between the public and the private sector.
5.4.7.2.
Staffing issues
As all operators in Copenhagen are private companies, data on staff issues are not readily
available.
However, an interesting decision was taken in 1990 with the Copenhagen Transport Act.
Although the bus lines were going to be tendered out in Copenhagen, as stated in the act, it
was very important that the personnel was not victimised by lower wages. The EEC
regulative on mandatory company take-over of personnel secured all drivers. This meant
that HT did not enter a period of work conflicts and strikes as one could have feared. In
1974, when HT was established, the unions and the management worked together on
levelling the wage level of the drivers in private sector and the public sector. In 1990 when
tendering began this meant that there was hardly any wage gap between the public and the
private sector.
Bus drivers and their training are the operator’s responsibilities. There are currently about
4,000 drivers. Due to EU regulation on company take-overs, and due to Danish legislation
on company acquisitions, a new operator must offer the present driver a job at an equal
wage level and with equal working conditions when the company is taken over by another
company.
66
During the last few years HUR has focussed more strongly on driver satisfaction. The tools
used are the introduction of certification of the drivers, improving the work conditions as
well as introducing a drivers’ panel.
Further details of the protection offered to staff during the contracting process are described
in the section on tendering for bus concessions in Section 5.3.1.
Unions
There are two unions involved in the public transport system in Copenhagen. One is the
Union for public and civil service and the other one for the private sector called the SID. The
Union for public and civil service is involved because of formerly state owned transport
companies now integrated in privately owned companies. Until now it is not perfectly clear
which of the two has the mandate and which of the two has to organise the communication
with the operators. For the suburbs it is SID, for the city of Copenhagen it is mixed. The
biggest two public transport companies have a mixed membership.
The tendering documents, including the position of employees during and after transition
and acquisition / mergers periods has not been established in co-operation with the unions
but is based on national legal constraints and requirements.
Employees from the operators can only go on strike when this is legally allowed. When
there are strikes during the period a collective agreement (like the period an operator has the
licence to run public transport lines) then this is considered as a violation of that agreement.
Because of the agreement the partners who have signed the agreement have an obligation of
peace. Strikes are only allowed during the process of renewing the collective agreement.
There however exist “wild cat strikes”, spontaneous occurrences by some or more
employees. The union has to disapprove of these strikes. The employees will usually be
fined the number of hours they have been on strike.
Conflicts are solved, according to procedures established in labour laws that are over 100
years old. Conflicts should first be negotiated on a local level. If this does not work the
conflict can be negotiated on a regional level. If an agreement has not been reached there is
the possibility to go to the labour court or to voluntary arbitration. The arbitration is usually
done by a judge of the supreme court. No appeal is possible after the verdict of the labour
court or the voluntary arbitration. The labour court usually takes a year to come to its final
decision. In the case of arbitration it is one or two months. Voluntary arbitration is often
used for interpretation of collective agreements, while the labour court is often used for
when there is a breach or violation of an agreement. The verdict is usually a fine.
Comparative models for solving labour conflicts are used all over Scandinavia.
SID considers the training of the drivers as adequate. The training is run by the government
and does not only include learning how to drive a bus, but also about conflict management
and about psychology. In the initial stage of the tendering, the operators bid so low that
they tried to cut costs and save time where possible, having to do with timetables, breaks,
67
uniforms in short benefits that are custom but not mentioned in the contract. The labour
conditions are now slowly improving.
5.4.8.1.
The authorities in the Copenhagen area are keen to encourage the increased use of public
transport as a way of minimising congestion and the limitations that this puts on economic
growth. HUR have been set a target to increase the model share of public transport to 24%
by 2010.
5.4.8.2.
Access to airports
Currently there is a bus service as well as a train running from the Copenhagen city centre to
the airport. The train service has just one stop between the centre and the airport. From the
airport to the city centre takes about 12 minutes by train, with a train running every ten
minutes. Bus and train tickets have the same price due to ticket integration. The price of the
tickets varies between €1.48 and €2.42 (11 and 18 Crowns). It has not yet been decided
whether the metro system will be extended towards the airport as well. If this occurs then
the tickets will have the same price as the bus and train tickets.
HUR has stated various objectives to be fulfilled in the coming decade. These are means to
fulfil VISION 2005. One of the objectives is an environmental objective; of sustainable
development in the transport sector, with fewer car drivers, and more public transport
users. Emission of local damaging substances must be halved by 2002; emission of
greenhouse gasses must be stabilised at the 1996-level. Green accounts reports are now
published every year. To reach the objective the owners of HUR – the counties and the two
cities – have accepted higher fare prices for improved environment measures.
5.5.
negative aspects of the Copenhagen system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
68
Table 5.9
Copenhagen Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
Fairly good cost recovery
Service quality
Service quality
•
•
Reliability could be improved.
•
No output incentives in the gross cost
contracts.
Pioneering use of customer surveys
as part of the quality of service
incentive programme. Service
quality incentives especially useful in
a gross cost contract system such as
this.
•
Strong central authority helps ensure
service integration.
•
Relatively good information
provision and good ticketing
integration.
Social cohesion
•
•
Gradual approach to transition to a
concession system.
•
Explicit provision for staff working
conditions in the event of concession
transfer. The fact that bidders cannot
compete on working conditions is an
interesting feature.
Economic growth
Dealing with change
Economic growth
Good access to airport.
•
Social cohesion
High proportion of low floor buses,
plus special services for the disabled.
Dealing with change
•
Specific environmental objectives.
69
5.6.
Copenhagen “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Copenhagen system.
Table 5.10
Copenhagen Summary “Scorecard”
Copenhagen
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
Integrated system with common
fares structure and common service
branding
•
•
Phased transition to concession
system
•
Performance regime based on
customer satisfaction surveys
The gross cost contract system fails to
include any output incentives.
70
City Study: Évora
6.
CITY STUDY: ÉVORA
6.1.
Key Facts
•
Bus-based system with a single operator contract.
•
Private operator on a long-term concession contract.
•
Central public transport planning and management body comprised of the local
municipality, the public transport operator and the parking-meter company.
•
Parking meter revenues used to subsidise public transport.
6.2.
City Description
6.2.1. Geographical and economic features
Évora, the capital of the Alentejo Region, is an historical city located in the Southeast of
Portugal. The historical centre of Évora has kept its old design characteristics, dated from
medieval times, with very narrow streets and a wall surrounding it. About 75 per cent of
the streets have a width of less than 5 metres, while 46 per cent of the streets do not exceed a
width of 3.5 metres. The traffic flow between the centre and the periphery is made through
the old medieval “gates”.
The county of Évora has a population of around 55,000 of which 87 per cent is located in the
city (inside and outside the walls). The residents in the historical centre area represent 17 per
cent of the county’s population. The level of motorisation in the city is higher than the
national average and indeed one of the highest rates in Portugal.
The employment in the service sector is mainly concentrated in the historical centre and
represents about 60 per cent of the total employment. The city centre is also the location for
many key facilities including the University and main hospital.
In 1986 the city was classified by UNESCO as World Patrimony, which caused a significant
increase in tourists visiting the region and the city centre.
Political initiatives at the National, Regional and Municipal levels all impact on
transportation policy in Évora, although local initiatives have the most direct impacts.
The National Program of social and economic development (PNDES), sets out goals for the
Alentejo region in terms of its developments, which have been translated into a Regional
71
City Study: Évora
Plan for the region (PROALENTEJO). The first and most relevant objective relates to
overcoming the economic, demographic and social depression that had characterised the
region during the last decades. Among the different goals established the following ones
assumes special relevance in this context:
•
promote competitiveness and quality of Alentejo;
•
create conditions to fix population in the region;
•
take advantages of the endogenous potential of the region;
•
promote the entrepreneurial role of the stakeholders in the development of new
projects;
•
promote the competitiveness of the economic sector; and
•
establish a network of cities at regional context, based on a hierarchy of functions.
6.3.
Public Transport in Évora is bus-based. The municipality of Évora has responsibility for
transport at the strategic level. The municipality also manages the tariff system including
both the type of and level of fares.
A body known as SITEE is in charge of planning and managing the urban transport system.
SITEE brings together the Municipality of Évora, the Bus operator Belos Transportes and the
private parking meter company (Resopre). SITEE is 51 per cent owned by the Municipality,
44 per cent by Belos and 5 per cent by Resopre.
The aim of this partnership is to promote the conditions for sustainable mobility, by
restraining the access of private cars to the city centre, and promoting the use of public
transport. The second reason that stimulated the conception of the SITEE project is to cover
the financial deficit of the public transport system. By integrating public and private
transport management in one entity (SITEE), public transport can now be cross-financed
with the revenues coming from the parking meters.
There were some major constraints that caused delays in establishing SITEE:
•
The national legal and regulatory environment for urban public transport in Portugal
is far from clear. Therefore the municipalities, sometimes even without having a
dedicated public transport department, often perform Strategic and Tactical
functions of the system.
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City Study: Évora
•
The “Basic Law on Terrestrial Transports” (Law 10/90) is not totally implemented.
This prevents the existence of more than one municipal concession in each city, even
if more than one network exists. This situation required that an agreement was made
between the municipality and the actual operator in Évora.
•
The legislation that regulates the local power was only reviewed recently, enabling
the establishment of municipal companies with private capital.
One of the main successes of SITEE is the acceptance of the programme. This is due to
several public discussions with citizens and other stakeholders in which the different aspects
of the programme were explained as well as the implementation of an information
programme during the period of public discussion. An important aspect increasing its
acceptance was the immediate improvements of public transport introduced simultaneously
with the restrictions to car use.
A second success factor was the participation of the bus operator Belos Transportes who
provided all the (commercially sensitive) information of its operation and financial details.
This information is necessary for the municipality to estimate the revenue needed from
parking metres to cover the deficits of the public transport system, and for linking financial
costs and benefits to the transport plan. The advantage for Belos will be a new integrated
system to solve the financial deficit of the urban public transport operation.
6.4.
6.4.1.1.
Modal splits
The table below presents the modal split in 1999 and 2000, which gives an idea of the impact
of the recent changes (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1
Modal Split in 1999 and 2000
Mode
Bus
Taxi & other individual / collective modes (e.g. employer)
Private car
Bicycle
Walk
Total
1999 share (%)
5
16
75
4
2000 share (%)
8
16
70
6
100
100
Source: Évora
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City Study: Évora
6.4.1.2.
Patronage
The average public transport user makes 2.2 trips per day, or 803 per year. The total amount
of passenger kilometres is 9,279 per week. The amount of passenger kilometres over the last
few years is slowly decreasing.
6.4.1.3.
Fares
A single cash ticket costs €0.90 (180 Escudos). When bought in advance it costs €0.36 (73
Escudos). A monthly pass costs €14 (2,810 Escudos). There is only one place where these
passes can be obtained. A concessionary fare monthly pass is available for the following
three groups of people, all paying €7.48 (1,500 Escudos) for the pass:
•
the youth pass, for people under 26 years old;
•
the school pass. For all people attending school and higher education; and
•
the pensioners’ pass, for people aged 65 and older.
Tickets can be bought in advance at three locations, one of them being open on Saturdays
and Sundays.
Until the year 2000 two zones existed. Now there is only one zone.
6.4.1.4.
The demand management and traffic management will be improved soon with the
introduction of a new radio system, which permits real time demand management. More
complex systems are currently too expensive given the size of the public transport system in
Évora.
A new traffic plan was implemented inside the city in order to make access to the city centre
difficult and therefore to reduce the amount of traffic. This has been done by reorganising
the road network in order to eliminate the traffic just passing through the city centre,
reorganising the ring roads around the city centre, introducing more one way streets,
reorganising crossings, introducing bus priority lanes and implementing new rules for
loading and unloading of vehicles.
6.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
There is no information available on traffic speeds in Évora.
The total amount of line kilometres is 384 (one way). Running these lines takes in total 19.4
hours. The longest line is 19.6 kilometres, the shortest only 7.9 kilometres. In total the city
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City Study: Évora
has 16 lines providing 82 services per week, running in total 9,485 kilometres. The average
speed is 19.8 kilometres. The fastest service runs 29 kilometres per hour, the slowest almost
14 kilometres per hour. See Table 6.2 for more information about the buses in Évora.
Table 6.2
Information About the Buses Used in Évora
Buses
Type
Amount
Mercedes (1)
Mercedes (2)
Volvo
Renault
2
7
3
3
Maximum number of passengers
Number of seats
Passengers
Total
standing
passengers
43
18
61
43
13
56
29
21
50
22
25
47
Source: SITEE
SITEE consists of the following employees:
•
Management
3
•
Financial department
2
•
Bus drivers
20 (public transport)
•
Inspector
1 (public transport)
•
Inspector
7 (parking)
•
Management and administration
2 (parking)
All the SITEE services are outsourced. This means that from the 35 people as stated above
only one is really working for SITEE. The rest are hired from e.g. the public transport
operator and the parking operations company. The manager works 35 hours per week, as
well as the seven people for the parking services. The bus drivers and the bus inspector
work 40 hours per week. The other two people that are part of the management are only
working and paid for a monthly management meeting. Of the 40 hours per week the bus
drivers are paid, they drive about 25 per cent of the time.
6.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 show income and costs are for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th trimester of 2000.
This because SITEE has just been established. From these tables, it can be calculated that
revenues from the farebox cover 57% of total public transport costs, or 69% of public
transport operating costs.
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City Study: Évora
Table 6.3
Costs of the System
Costs
Costs for representatives and administration
€
1,015
381
381
254
Administration:
Representative Belos
Representative municipality of Évora
Representative Resopre
Public transport costs
Employees Belos
Maintenance by Belos
Belos other costs
Depreciation costs
Other costs
256,656
121,491
14,676
68,143
19,017
Costs for parking
Maintenance
Police
Depreciation costs
Other costs
TOTAL
16,178
70,603
58,089
12,315
1,117,151
Source: SITEE
The forecast costs were €441,944 compared with an outturn of €479,983.
Table 6.4
Income
Income
Ticket sales
Euro
59,002
130,678
83,558
Tickets sold by the driver
Tickets bought in advance
Passes
Income from parking fees
Residential passes
Reserved parking spaces
Parking spaces available to the public
29,950
15,623
330,458
Other
Other income
TOTAL
12,655
661,923
Source: SITEE
The income for tickets and passes has been less than predicted. The total income for tickets
and passes was €273,237, while the forecast was €322,429. The income from parking spaces
was also less than forecast at €458,531, the main reason being insufficient ticket control.
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City Study: Évora
6.4.3.2.
Funding and subsidy arrangements
The level of subsidy depends on factors that vary during and over the years. The income
from parking fees depends on the amount of available parking spaces and public works that
temporarily decrease the number of parking places. In 2000 this subsidy was €14,970. The
subsidy for public transport depends on the introduction of new lines and the introduction
of more reduced fares was €34,930. Part of the subsidy will be used to improve the quality of
the buses as well as improving the supply of parking spaces.
6.4.3.3.
Commercial revenues other than the farebox
In the year 2001 a deal has been made with an advertising management company regarding
the advertising on buses and the reverse of tickets. It is estimated that with this extra income
the deficit of SITEE will be diminished by 25 per cent.
6.4.3.4.
The annual accounts and the accounting scheme of the firm are according to the national
rules and guidelines.
6.4.4.1.
Frequency
Services typically operate two or three times an hour at peak times, but services are less
frequent on the off peak and at weekends, when some services do not run.
6.4.4.2.
Reliability
The number of cancelled bus rides is insignificant, at less than one service per week, out of
822 services per week. The rule is that a service cannot be cancelled if there is not an
alternative available within 20 minutes of that service.
The number of services with a delay of more than 15 minutes is also insignificant. About 80
per cent of the services arrive within 0 to 5 minutes of the planned time.
6.4.4.3.
Accessibility
Accessibility has recently been improved with the introduction of small environmental
friendly high quality buses, readjustment of timetables and routes and increase of frequency.
New routes are implemented linking neighbourhoods to the centre and to main social
institutions, like schools, the hospital and the university. Research showed that 23 per cent
of the users of the new bus lines started to use public transport after the introduction of the
SITEE-project.
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City Study: Évora
The average distance of the bus stops is 150 to 200 metres in the urban part of the
municipality and 150 to 400 metres in the more rural area.
Figure 6.1 shows the map of the Évora bus system.
individual “suburbs” of the city are served.
This maps illustrates that all the
Figure 6.1
Map of Public Transport Routes in Évora
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City Study: Évora
6.4.4.4.
Other service quality issues
For trips from near the city centre to the city centre less than 100 per cent of the seats are
generally occupied. Outside the rush hour this is the same for other vehicles. In the rush
hour loading is between 132 per cent and 172 per cent, depending on the type of bus and the
destination.
The bus lines run through the whole of the urban area and the more densely populated
areas in the less urbanised parts. The average age of the SITEE vehicles is about 13.5 years.
The last customer research projects are from before SITEE started. A new project, in
accordance with the plan of activities, will however start soon. In accordance with the law
SITEE must listen to the complaints and suggestions of the users, and it runs a complaints
book.
The contract imposes penalties when specific service quality criteria cannot be met.
6.4.5.1.
To restrain the access of private cars to the city centre and promote the use of public
transport some complementary measures have been developed covering different aspects,
such as the creation of several free parking areas, outside the city walls but near the main
entrances of the city, and installing parking metres in the city centre. There are 1,350
parking spaces in the historical centre with parking metres and 1,300 parking spaces
reserved for inhabitants.
Extra attention is paid to the connection between the free parking areas and public transport,
good pedestrian access to the centre and surveillance of the parked cars. Inside the walls all
the streets have paid parking. The network of parking metres is computerised to identify
the free parking spaces still available, different zones have different tariffs, parking for
residents is free and businesses inside the city walls have price discounts. Integrating public
and private transport management in SITEE enables the cross-subsidisation of public
transport with the revenues from the parking system.
6.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
Since there is only one public transport mode and one zone tariff integration is complete.
There are plans to make it possible to pay for car parking with a card that can also be used
for public transport.
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City Study: Évora
6.4.5.3.
SITEE is responsible for providing information about the public transport. The timetables
are available on all the main bus stops. The timetables are also available at points of sale.
A maps is available with the printed bus lines, line numbers and destinations (see Figure
6.1).
There are two websites for SITEE. The most extensive one is http://www.cm-evora.pt/sitee.
Here more in depth information can be obtained about the company itself, a map,
timetables, tickets and the parking system as well. The other website of SITEE
(http://www.evora.net/sitee/horarios.htm) also contains the public transport information.
6.4.5.4.
SITEE integrates both public transport and use of public (parking) space. All the car parks
are near a main bus stop, while at the same time new or changed bus routes will always take
into consideration the car parking situation.
There are a number of free parking areas very near the entrances of the old city of Évora.
The old city of Évora has very limited parking facilities, which have to be paid for and it is
difficult to drive through because of the width of the street and the circulation plan.
6.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
There are special youth, school and pensioners passes. Instead of €14, they pay €7.48 for a
monthly pass.
6.4.6.2.
There is no real provision for the mobility impaired on Évora public transport, with none of
the current vehicle fleet adapted for eg wheelchair access.
The prices of all the tariffs can be adjusted in accordance with the consumer price index with
an extra of 1 per cent.
A study into the introduction of new technologies for tickets and for the management of
traffic and public transport demand is currently underway.
Every month there is a meeting between SITEE and the owners of SITEE to co-operate and
co-ordinate the individual and joined actions. SITEE sends three monthly reports to inform
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City Study: Évora
the municipality of Évora about the progress and meeting the requirements for the
concession.
6.4.8.1.
Staffing issues
Since SITEE was started no strikes have taken place. In the years before that strikes were
also very uncommon, in fact the last strike was five to six years ago. Before that, hardly any
incidents occurred.
There are two unions representing the labour force in Évora. One is the Union for the
Southern Road Transport. One person is dealing with the transport in whole region of the
Alentejo. Since Belos is part of a bigger transport operator, called Setubalense, operating in
the Alentejo, the Union only negotiates with the main office in Azeitão and not with Belos in
Évora. The Union has never spoken with SITEE. The same is the case with the second
Union, the Union of Local Public Administration Workers. They cover the country per
region and are therefore also oriented towards the Alentejo as a whole.
The costs for personnel are presented in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5
Total Personnel Costs (€)
Management18
Inspector
Financial
department
Bus driver
Inspector (bus)
Administratio
n services
(bus)
Inspector
(parking
services)
Management
and
administration
(parking
services)
TOTAL €
Annual
income
31,544
-
Represent
ation costs
3,394
-
Other
Overtime
4,344
1,147
2,339
Holidays
and Xmas
5,257
-
-
Travel
costs
variable
-
Social
security
3,494
-
171,882
6,041
26,688
-
-
20,135
1,432
3,235
74,960
9,998
12,744
-
47,813
2,960
7,616
46,759
-
576
1,113
1,567
-
4,787
13,360
-
192
1,113
-
-
1,447
296,274
3,394
8,598
32,285
99,269
variable
68,117
Source: SITEE
18
Only a part of the wages is paid by SITEE
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City Study: Évora
Next to the base payment, the (future) employees will receive an extra 10 per cent. Overtime
pay is set in accordance with that for all public officers. As the basic income for bus drivers
is low (about €475 per month), they are often working extra hours to increase their income.
Unions are sometimes worried about this.
The amount of holidays per person varies from 22 (drivers, bus inspector), 23 (people hired
from municipality) to 26 days (manager).
The inspectors have about 70 hours of training per year. The manager has 15 hours training
per year. When the bus drivers start to work they get 32 hours of theory lessons, 80 hours of
driving lessons and 50 hours of practise with the inspector and an experienced bus driver.
Next to these initial hours there are refreshment courses when new cars, ticketing systems
and traffic control systems are being introduced.
Employee evaluation forms are not used as yet. There are however regular meetings with
the union.
6.4.9.1.
The way in which Évora has sought to integrate car parking and public transport initiatives
reflects the importance of trying to ensure good access to the city centre for business,
employees and others. This is especially important in Évora given the historic nature of the
city layout.
6.4.9.2.
Access to airports
Not applicable.
The municipality of Évora and Belos were already busy introducing alternative energy
(biodiesel) in some of the urban buses before the start of SITEE. It was the costs of
transporting this fuel to Évora that made Belos and Évora decide to stop this programme.
Currently one of the activities of SITEE is to make contact with suppliers of hybrid vehicles
(electricity and diesel).
There are some ideas to implement a special pass with reduced costs to everybody parking
near public transport terminals which permits transport between the city centre and the
terminal. Another idea is to supply free public transport to the city centre for cars carrying
four or five people.
The national government has two different environmental subsidies for the implementation
of projects and plans for the reduction of pollution by using alternative energy and the
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City Study: Évora
introduction of technologies that permit the increase of public transport users. SITEE will
soon present a project that will make use of both the subsidies.
6.5.
Table 6.6below summarises what we consider to be the most significant positive and
negative aspects of the Évora system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
Table 6.6
Évora Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
•
Low modal splits.
•
Reasonably good cost recovery, but
could be higher with better ticket
checks.
Link between parking revenues and
public transport subsidies is an
Service quality
•
Service quality
Good reliability, although frequency
is only moderate.
•
Good ticketing integration.
•
Explicit links between parking areas
and bus routes, including some free
parking outside the city centre.
•
Experience of the local operator is
used directly in the planning agency
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
•
Very poor provision for the
mobility impaired
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
•
Transition has taken place smoothly.
Economic growth
•
Bus drivers have to work overtime to
compensate low basic pay levels
Economic growth
Explicit linking of parking and public
transport initiatives to try and reduce
congestion.
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City Study: Évora
Positive
Negative
•
6.6.
Initiative to introduce biodiesel fuel
proved too costly.
Évora “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Évora system.
Table 6.7
Évora Summary “Scorecard”
Évora
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
•
•
Public transport planning and
management body includes the local
operator
Car parking funds used to help fund public
transport, making SITEE less dependent on
governmental loans and subsidies, while
limiting car use in the city centre at the
same time
•
•
Revenues lower than expected due to
lack of ticket checks
Very poor access for mobility impaired
Good service reliability combined with
cheap public transport
High acceptance of SITEE because of
public discussions, immediate visible
improvement in public transport and
restricted use of car in old city centre
Complete and simple tariff integration
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City Study: Lyon
7.
CITY STUDY: LYON
7.1.
Key Facts
•
Public transport system consists of bus, metro, tram, and heavy rail.
•
Central public agency responsible for public transport provision, including service
levels and fares, and ownership of the infrastructure and public transport vehicles.
•
Single operator, management contract with some freedom on service planning
within the authority’s constraints. Authority retains revenue risk.
7.2.
City Description
The Lyon conurbation is geographically a flat alluvial plain in its eastern part, separated
from the hills located to the west and the north by the two rivers Rhône and Saône. This
situation leads to a rather divided territory: the Rhône valley upstream of Lyon, the eastern
plain, the plateau of Caluire prolonged by the Bresse area of the Département de l'Ain,
(between Rhône and Saône), the western hills and the right bank of the Rhône to the south of
the city. The whole urban region includes the city of Saint Etienne and has a population of
around 2.5 million. About 80 per cent of them live in Greater Lyon.
The regional council Département du Rhône covers twice the area of the urban council
committee Communauté Urbaine but includes only 30 per cent of the population. Compared
to the urban council, the regional council is more concerned with the development of its
hilly or mountainous western areas (Beaujolais, Monts de Tarare). Therefore, the town
planning of the conurbation is sometimes hampered by conflicting wishes of the regional
and urban councils.
Major economic activities in the Lyon conurbation include chemical, petrochemical and
metallurgical industries as well as universities, research laboratories, commercial activities,
paramedical businesses and engineering companies.
The town planning agency of the Lyon urban council (Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté
Urbaine de Lyon) is in charge of all town-planning studies related to Greater Lyon and to the
Lyon urban region. It is not an executive body but it has a recognised expertise. In general,
its advice is taken into account for transport and regional policy matters as well. It also has
an arbitration function.
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City Study: Lyon
The town planning agency has produced the Lyon 2010 developments and the townplanning scheme (Schéma Directeur d'Aménagement de la Région Lyonnaise), which were
submitted to the elected bodies and are a basis for the land use documents (Plan
d'Occupation des Sols or P.O.S). These documents regulate all aspects related to land use,
parking facilities, road, railway, and public transport infrastructures. They include
compulsory measures (number of parking places per dwelling or per 1,000 square meters of
office buildings for example), as well as intended infrastructure developments.
SYTRAL is the transport planner. The area of responsibility of SYTRAL is equal to the area
of the urban council committee. The 20 members of the board of SYTRAL are elected. Ten
are from the urban council committee and 10 from the regional council. Every three years
half of the board is replaced, with the members being elected for six years. More than 99 per
cent of the public transport in Lyon is operated by Société Lyonnaise de Transport en Commun
(SLTC), belonging to the KEOLIS group. Figure 7.1 shows a schematic presentation of the
organisational framework.
Figure 7.1
Links between the City, the Département, SYTRAL and SLTC
10 elected
people
Departement
Rhône
(19 districts)
SYTRAL
10 elected
people
Urban
communities
(55 cities)
Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communauté
Urbaine de Lyon
SLTC >99% of the market
7.3.
The core of the Lyon public transport system is formed by four metro-lines. In addition, a
new tramline opened on January 1st, 2001. Buses and trolley buses operate the remainder of
the public transport network. There are also a number of funiculars.
Public transport in Lyon is regulated through management contracts. Every six years, the
regional transport authority organises a tendering procedure for the management of the
existing public transport network. SYTRAL, the public transport authority, retains the
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City Study: Lyon
ownership of infrastructure and vehicles and retains both the revenue risk as well as a part
of the production cost risk. SYTRAL is responsible for demand and traffic management,
meaning among other things planning of the lines, frequency levels, pricing and ticketing as
well as introduction of new bus and tram line. The urban communities can however make
proposals for introduction or changes of lines and the operator can assist them in studying
proposed bus lines. It is however the SYTRAL management that ultimately decides about
introduction of changes of lines.
The operator is paid a fee of around €205 million according to the mileage actually run. This
means that mileage lost is not paid for, e.g. in the case of strikes. Lost mileage as a result of
strikes has already cost the operator €3 million in 2001.
For both passenger and freight transport operators in France, a certificate called capacité de
transport is required. It is not a real degree, but the candidate needs to invest some time in
legal transport matters, technical and managerial ones. Alternatively, being an executive in
the transport industry entitles a person to be appointed as head of a company on the basis of
experience, without having to pass the exam.
Because of the importance of personal contacts in France, as well as because of the minimum
size requested by the transport authority to be accepted as a competitor, competition is in
fact limited to the small group of large transport operators in France (Via Transport,
Transdev, CGEA-CGFTE, Verney and Cariane). Moreover, foreign companies appear very
infrequently in the tendering process.
Bus, trolleybus, metro and two funicular services are currently operated by Société Lyonnaise
de Transport en Commun (SLTC). SLTC belongs to the KEOLIS group, a public transport
holding with more than 25,000 employees operating in 80 cities and 50 regions in the EU.
SLTC won the tender in 1999 and will operate until 2004. In 1999 the only two competitors
were Arriva and Transdev, although SLTC expects fiercer competition in 2004. SLTC
receives a payment per public transport kilometre operated.
The second operator in Lyon is OPTIBUS, a non-profit society which deals with the
transport of the disabled and has less than 1 per cent of the total market. Out of the total
costs, two thirds are covered by SYTRAL and the rest by passenger payments.
The degree of competition in the Lyon system appears to be limited. In spite of the fact that
the contracts are tendered every six years and the fact that the investment required by
operators is very limited, the entry barriers still seem high. Managing the whole of a
network the size of Lyon is a complicated task and it appears that an incumbent operator
would develop major advantages, which is reflected by the limited number of competitors
tendering for the contract.
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City Study: Lyon
SYTRAL, the planner, mainly has the duty to cover the area of urban public transport. It
acts also as an adviser to the regional council Département du Rhône. It is also responsible for
the specification of heavy rail transport within the boundaries of the regional council, with
the exception of tariffs. The regulatory powers may be described as follows:
•
The specifications for the level and quality of the public transport service are fixed at
every call for tender (every six years since 1985). They are modified when needed, as
provided for in the contract, against an amendment to the fee charged to SYTRAL.
Broadly speaking the fee is modified according to the extra man-hours and vehiclekilometres that the operator needs. Any extra vehicles will be brought into the
system by SYTRAL, which remains in charge of investment.
•
The decisions related to major investment projects are taken by the board of
SYTRAL, within the framework of a medium/long term investment plan derived
from the public transport strategy, or alternatively from an urban transportation plan
(plan de déplacements urbains).
Fare levels are set by SYTRAL. The fare is a flat fare, based on the constitutional
(interpretation of) citizens' rights, which implies equal treatment for all, irrespective of the
variations of the cost of public service according to the place where they live or work.
SYTRAL can also contract out studies, for example on planning, to the urban town planning
agency or to any consultant relevant to its responsibilities.
The operator in turn is required to:
•
determine the actual timetables; adjustments are regularly made by common
understanding between SYTRAL and the operator, although they have to be
submitted to the vote of SYTRAL's board;
•
use its right of initiative, act as a consultant and make use of its market knowledge at
both local (Lyon area) and national level (it has operations in more than 80
conurbations); and
•
propose any improvements to the service and to supply its expertise to SYTRAL.
The main operator undertakes some subcontracting, as regional coach operators and taxi
operators are involved in running a small number of services. From January 1st, 1997, the
regional coach transport routes are integrated into the SYTRAL system. Since then,
incoming coaches are allowed to pick up passengers enter at specific stops, thereby offering
express services for journeys within the urban area.
The case of Lyon is the largest contract at fixed cost in France (exceeding €180 million per
year). The formula was initiated in 1986. The initiator was the operator who felt
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City Study: Lyon
competition approaching its territory under the former scheme of contract against a
management fee, which was less than one per cent of turnover. As the financial risk to the
operator under the new structure is higher, fewer competitors now try to enter the Lyon
(management contract) market.
The authority was also in favour of the new structure. The operator would now bear a
larger part of the production cost risk and therefore have a larger incentive to reduce its
costs. Under the previous scheme of contract against a management fee, the production risk
rested with the authority.
7.4.
7.4.1.1.
Modal splits
The modal split over all the modes in Lyon is presented in Table 7.1. This table shows that
the market share of taxis and private cars has increased by about 5 per cent-points in the
period from 1986 to 1995, mainly at the expense of walking. The decline of the market share
of public transport has been relatively limited.
Table 7.1
Public and Private Transport Modal Split, 1986 and 1995
Mode
Bus
Tram/light rail
Metro/underground
Heavy rail
Taxi & private car
Bicycle
Walk
Other
Total
7.4.1.2.
1986
1995
14.5
48.0
2.0
34.5
1.0
100.0
13.5
53.0
1.5
31.5
0.5
100.0
Patronage
On a typical day in 1999, around 1,173,000 trips were made by public transport. This was
divided over the various modes as follows:
•
474,300 for buses;
•
231,000 for metro line A;
•
230,700 for metro line D;
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City Study: Lyon
•
110,100 for metro line B;
•
81,000 for trolley-buses;
•
29,700 for metro line C; and
•
16,200 for the funiculars.
It can be seen that almost half of these trips were made by metro, although buses account for
a significant number of journeys as well.
In 1999, the total number of passenger kilometres was:
•
2.55 million for trolley buses;
•
38.9 million for buses;
•
13.2 million for the metro system; and
•
0.93 million for private buses.
The total amount of passenger journeys in 1999 was 256 millions. A trip involving a change
using for example the bus and the metro is counted twice in this figure. Without counting
the individual legs of journeys, the total number of passengers in 1999 was 159 million. The
large difference between the two figures implies that many passengers use more than one
public transport line to and from the city.
The 1998 and 1999 patronage figures are contained in Table 7.2. This shows that between
1998 and 1999, public transport patronage increased slightly. In 2000, however, the use of
public transport increased by about 5 per cent.
Table 7.2
Public Transport Patronage in Lyon, 1998-1999
Passengers
Total (in millions)
Total per inhabitant
1998
157
135
journey-legs
1999
159
136
1998
253
218
1999
256
219
Source: SLTC
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City Study: Lyon
7.4.1.3.
Fares
The key tickets are presented in Table 7.3.
Table 7.3
Prices of Key Tickets
Ticket unité
Price € (FF)
1.30 (8.50)
Carnet of 10 tickets
Day ticket
10.45 (68.50)
3.74 (24.50)
Monthly pass - adult
43.16 (283.00)
Monthly pass – student (under 28)
30.64 (201.00)
Monthly pass – child (under 13)
18.45 (121.00)
Monthly pass – senior (over 65)
30.64 (201.00)
Description
Single ticket within the urban
area, time limit is one hour
A booklet of 10 single tickets
Day ticket on name within the
area greater Lyon urban area
Provides access to the entire
greater Lyon urban area
Source: SLTC
In addition, senior citizens aged over 65 who also receive state low income benefits are
entitled to a “free” pass (in exchange for a €5.03 administration charge).
7.4.1.4.
The town planning agency of the Lyon urban council is responsible for town planning
scheme proposals, including roads and parking facilities. SYTRAL is responsible for public
transport demand management, including the planning of routes and frequencies.
7.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
The average traffic speed in the centre of Lyon is about 13 km/h. It is 17 km/h for the main
lines and 20 km/hr for the lines out of the centre. For the metro it is 24 to 25 km/h for line
A/B, 17 km/h for line C and about 29 km/h for D. The new tramway has a planned
average speed of 19 to 20 km/h.
In Lyon there are 1002 buses: 24 minibuses, 778 standard buses, 113 long buses, and 87
trolley buses. There are 32 metro vehicles for metro lines A and B, with three carriages each,
five vehicles for line C (two carriages each) and 36 vehicles for line D (two carriages each).
Lines A and B have more carriages as they serve the major business areas and the two main
train stations. The total amount of route kilometres is 1,300 for regular buses and 1,110 for
school buses. Summaries of transport operation details in Lyon are provided in Table 7.4
and Table 7.5.
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City Study: Lyon
Table 7.4
Operational Details of Lyon Bus System
Number of bus lines
123
6
7
111
Bus
Mini bus
Trolley
School bus
Line kilometres
1300
20
43
1110
Number of vehicles
819
24
73
87
Source: SYTRAL
Table 7.5
Operational Details of Lyon Metro System
Number of stations
Line kilometres
Number of carriages
Metro line A
13
8,2
96
Metro line B
6
3,7
Metro line C
5
2,4
10
Metro line D
15
12,9
72
Funiculars
5
1,2
6
Source: SYTRAL
Some 55.5 million public transport kilometres are provided per year. The bus takes the
biggest slice with 38.9 million kilometres.
SYTRAL owns the buildings and buses and is currently buying about 55 buses per year.
7.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Table 7.6 contains the revenues and costs of the public transport system in Lyon. It shows
that the proportion of costs covered by farebox revenue is low and that there are significant
deficits.
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City Study: Lyon
Table 7.6
Revenue and Costs of Lyon Public Transport System
Amount (€)
100.5
120.4
100.5
11.4
332.8
Fare income
Subsidies
Versement (see below)
Other sources
Total revenue
Operating costs
Equipment costs
SYTRAL administration
Total operating costs
205.3
242.7
4.4
452.4
Table 7.7
Lyon Farebox Revenue, 1996-1999
1996
1997
1998
1999
Fare income (million €)
90.9
94.8
95.6
96.1
Source: SLTC
7.4.3.2.
The “Versement Transport” is a specific tax imposed by law to subsidise the improvement
and development of public transport in France. The Versement Transport comprises a
percentage of the salaries paid by all the companies with more than nine employees. For
large cities like Lyon, there are two maximum rates: 1 per cent and 1.75 per cent. The 1.75
per cent rate applies to cities where public transport has exclusive right of way such as a
tram network or a metro network.19 For the Paris region, the maximum rate is 2.20%. The
Lyon the tax level is 1.62 per cent. Most of the income (1.5 per cent) goes to SYTRAL.
The “Versement Transport” had its origins in a report of the National Assembly in 1973 (the
Valleix report), which stated that a good transport policy is a major element of urban
development. Today, the Versement Transport has two main objectives:
•
19
giving local authorities a financing capacity for improving their public transport
networks, without resorting to state subvention or additional loans; and
Information retrieved on the world wide web, 28/06/2001: http://www.ils.nrw.de/netz/leda/pdf/dv3-an01.pdf
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City Study: Lyon
•
enabling local authorities to reduce their operating deficits, by transferring financing
from their general budgets to this tax on salaries.
It is thought that the Versement Transport does not have a significant effect on labour costs,
nor on company location. It also has a very limited taxation impact (less than 1 per cent of
the overall French tax burden).
This tax levy on companies is a very powerful tool for financing and developing public
transport in France. The Versement Transport has been introduced in more than 85 per cent
of urban areas with more than 20,000 inhabitants. Almost 40 per cent of the costs of public
transport in France are financed by this measure.
The income for the subsidies is raised by a local income tax, of which 50 per cent is levied by
the urban council committee and 50 per cent by the regional authority. The fare income is
gradually increasing, as can be seen in Table 7.7. About 50 per cent of it comes from ticket
sales and the other 50 per cent from travel cards.
7.4.3.3.
The income from advertising goes to SYTRAL. This is about € 4.5 million per year for
advertising on buses and metros. For the tram there is a special contract, with all the money
obtained from advertising being earmarked for cleaning the tram. The same kind of contract
is in operation for bus stops where income from advertising is also sufficient to clean the
stops.
7.4.3.4.
Accountability is enhanced by the fact that SYTRAL’s board is made up of elected members
from the urban council committee and the regional council. There are regular elections, with
half the board being replaced every three years.
The public transport operators produce annual reports, which are available to the public.
7.4.4.1.
Frequency
The service frequencies are as follows:
•
for metros during peak hours: a service every three minutes, with a service interval
of less than two minutes on line D during peak hours;
•
for buses during peak hours: every three or four minutes for the most important
lines, six to eight minutes for the main lines and about 10 to 15 minutes for secondary
lines; and
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City Study: Lyon
•
7.4.4.2.
during off-peak hours: every 5 to 10 minutes for metro and 6 to 30 or 60 minutes for
buses.
Reliability
The objective in the contract with the operator is to have more than 70 per cent of buses per
line arriving on time. A vehicle is on time if it arrives between one minute before the
scheduled time and three minutes after the scheduled time. No more than eight lines are
allowed to score below this level. Performance will soon be measured with the use of a
Global Positioning System, with which the first buses will be equipped in the summer of
2001.
Other provisions regarding service quality in the contract include a requirement that for bus
lines, no more than three lines are allowed a percentage of cancelled trips in excess of 1 per
cent. For the metro system, the requirement is that 99 per cent of planned metro kilometres
must be delivered.
7.4.4.3.
Accessibility
Accessibility in terms of geographical coverage is generally considered to be good, with a
relatively dense network of rail, metro, tram and bus lines.
The average distance to bus stops is 300 metres and 500 to 600 metres to metro stations. The
average number of passenger interchanges per trip (inter- or intra-modal) is 1.62 and the
average age of the buses is around eight years.
7.4.4.4.
The quality of the performance of the operators is monitored by SYTRAL and evaluated
according to the following ten quality dimensions:
•
cleanliness;
•
punctuality;
•
information to the passengers;
•
fraud control;
•
production;
•
availability of equipment;
•
behaviour;
•
security; and
•
environmental care.
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City Study: Lyon
The performance regarding these dimensions is checked by SLTC staff, who are specially
employed for this purpose. Last year, the operator failed to meet the objectives for
information to the passengers and for fraud control. If the agreed targets are not met,
penalties become payable by the operator. The main penalties are as follows:
•
for punctuality, cleanliness and information, the penalties are € 46,000 per threemonth period. The dimension of cleanliness was introduced last year;
•
failing to meet the fraud control target is penalised by a € 137,000 per three-month
period;
•
in 2001 the criteria of behaviour and security were introduced. Both have small
penalties of €7,600 if the agreed standards are not reached. The security measure
relates to performance indicators like the amount of visible staff after 20.00 hours;
•
environmental care also has a minor penalty of about €7,600. It is being measured by
e.g. bus noise and switching off bus engines where possible.
The public transport system in Lyon is currently introducing a quality system according to
the AFNOR norm developed in France. The main aspect of this norm is that it only looks at
the level of quality for the customers and is outcome oriented, as opposed to the ISO norms
that focus mainly on procedures.
SLTC is currently working on a customer charter, which clearly interlinks with the five most
important features according to their customers: welcoming; driving; punctuality;
information; and cleanliness. Price and frequency will not be taken into consideration,
because these are determined by the public transport authority SYTRAL.
7.4.5.1.
The physical integration of the Lyon public transport system can be considered as good as it
contains an extensive network of rail, metro, tram and bus lines. The Lyon public transport
system operates about twice as much vehicle kilometres as the systems in Lille and
Marseille, even though the cities are of similar size.
The Lyon centre has two main train stations: Perrache and Part-Dieu. Both are well
connected to the rest of the city with metro, tram and bus lines. Perrache has connections
with eight local bus lines, two tramlines, 10 regional bus lines and metro line A. There is
also a bus connection to the airport. Part-Dieu is linked to Metro B, a tramline and 13 bus
lines. A direct connection to the Eurexpo fair is also available, as well as a bus connection to
the airport.
There are also a number of Park&Ride schemes in the area, for which SYTRAL is
responsible. There are about 3,000 parking spaces in the area. The sites that are linked to
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City Study: Lyon
the metro system are much more successful than the ones that are linked to the tram system.
The reason might be that the tramlines are also easy to travel by car.
7.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
Tariff integration is generally good. Tickets bought within the Lyon area can be used for
bus, tram and metro.
The Lyon urban transport system extends to 55 cities around Lyon. This means that coordination with other operators is not very important. There are however contracts with
private bus companies and with SNCF for travelcards. For these cards the Rhône area is
divided in seven zones. Price integration with the other six zones is available on trains and
interurban buses. There is so far no integrated rail-urban transport single ticket but mainly
multimodal season tickets according to the national railway fare system. This national
system is rather rigid. Outside Greater Lyon there is another system with only private
operators. The Department of Rhône only deals with them in relation to fare levels.
The prices for co-ordinated TCL – interurban bus tickets and TCL – Train (SNCF) are
contained in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8
Prices for Interurban Monthly Tickets
TCL – interurban bus (in €)
1 zone
2 zones
3 zones
4 zones
5 zones
6 zones
7 zones
41.16
48.78
56.41
65.55
-
TCL – Train (SNCF) in €
50.31
56.41
71.65
86.90
91.47
96.04
100.62
Source: SLTC
7.4.5.3.
It is the operator that is responsible for providing the information, with SYTRAL checking if
the provision of information is in accordance with the agreed standards. As there is only
one operator, the level of information integration in Greater Lyon can be considered as good.
Currently, a real time information programme is being installed in the buses, containing 500
stops. In buses fitted with the system, the name of the next stop will appear during the
journeys. The system will later be extended to include 3,500 stops. The idea is to implement
this for the tramway stops as well.
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City Study: Lyon
7.4.5.4.
Recently, the urban council committee has produced a transport plan named “Le plan des
déplacement urbains de l’agglomération Lyonnaise” in which public transport has an important
role. One of the main pillars is the way to try and make the public transport compete with
private transport (car). This is conceptualised on several spatial levels.
Six territorial levels are distinguished (1 to 6) for the different scales for which trips take
place. Levels 5 and 6 relate to Intercontinental, Europe, Euro-region and regional trips.
Public transport can compete with planes and cars by using TGVs and other major train
lines as far as regions and possibly euro regions. For transport within the “bassin de vie”, an
area slightly extending beyond the Greater Lyon area, public transport can compete with
private transport by providing metro and tramway lines. In the “secteur”, for example the
centre of Lyon, there should be a distribution network between centres of work, leisure,
services etc. For urban centres, which consist of several districts the main source of
competition is providing inter-district links. Within a district public transport should be
provided by minibuses.
This plan will be used for the extension of the public transport services in Lyon. The six
levels show for example that the metro and tram networks should be extended in order to be
competitive on level 4. In the lower levels 1, 2 and 3, public transport is competitive with 22
to 25 per cent of passengers using public transport. For the periphery, this is much lower,
which means that the developments should be taken place on this scale. On level 4, a real
network should be developed integrating metro, train and tramlines providing transport to
key areas.
The aim of the plan is to reverse the decline in market share of the public transport system.
The plan has been produced with all the relevant partners in the area: regional and urban
(public) transport organisations as well as sectoral governmental organisations, SYTRAL,
SNCF (French national railways) and RFF (rail infrastructure manager).
7.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
Details of concessionary fares are given in Section 7.4.1.
7.4.6.2.
Around 30 per cent of the buses are equipped for the mobility-impaired. There is also a
special dial-a-ride service for the disabled, operated by Optibus. Optibus is funded by
SYTRAL and receives an annual subsidy of around € 1.2 million. The section on fares above
gives details of the discounts available for children, students, senior citizens and families.
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City Study: Lyon
7.4.7. Dealing with change: external changes
During the last 10 years, no fundamental changes to the Lyon public transport system have
occurred.
A successful change was the introduction of a special reduction card for students and a
special two-hour ticket. The two-hour tickets give the users an extra hour to travel in the
city. The student ticket resulted in a considerable increase of the use of public transport by
students. Both the two-hour ticket and the student ticket resulted in increased revenue for
SYTRAL.
7.4.8. Dealing with change: internal changes
The most significant changes within SLTC have been the internal decentralisation,
introduction of quality management and training and the extensions of the public transport,
like the metro lines and the introduction of the tram.
7.4.8.1.
Staffing issues
SLTC is part of KEOLIS, a holding company that employs some 25,000 people. Only a few
hundred have KEOLIS-contracts. The rest, including most SLTC staff, have local contracts
and working conditions. In Lyon there are only 20 people with a KEOLIS contract.
There are about 3,842 staff employed by SLTC, of which about 60 per cent are drivers and
other operators, 5 per cent administration, 11 per cent technical, 15 per cent for site gang
labour, 2 per cent for management and 7 per cent for labour. Nearly 10 per cent of the staff
are women with around 6 per cent of the drivers being female. The total staff costs are about
FRF 900 million FRF (€ 137 million), which implies an average cost per member of staff of
around € 36,000. The employees work 35 hours per week and have 25 holidays per year.
The pension scheme is a state system and is the same all over France.
Bus drivers who are hired and have driving licence D get a 15 day training programme
when they start. They are offered a fixed contract for 152 hours per month. If they only have
driving licence B and are over 26, the training is extended by one month to obtain license D
and they are offered a gross salary of €1,494.14 per month plus an extra thirteenth month.
People who start as bus driver not in the possession of driving license D can get a fixed
contract after passing the exam and will receive the following salary: €722.46 from month 1
to month 4, €925.98 from month 5 to month 12 and €1,094.58 from month 13 to month 18.
On a national level in France there are five unions recognised by the national government to
negotiate with public authority and private companies and sectors. Next to these five, “free”
unions also exist. There are three unions in Lyon with which the local public transport
organisations negotiate: CGT, FO and FGTECFDT. For issues of major importance the three
unions often work together.
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City Study: Lyon
There is a national collective agreement for urban transport. However, each union, on a
company, local, regional or national level, can decide on its own what it is going to do
regarding the operator in Lyon. Unions do not have to notify in advance that they are going
on strike.
Strikes occur every year, although some years are better than others. It is difficult to explain
why there are more strikes in Lyon than for example in Évora, Zurich and Copenhagen,
where hardly any strikes takes place. The last big strike in Lyon was in 1999. It lasted for
five days and was related to the introduction of the 35-hour workweek. Before 1999, people
used to work 40 hours per week and staff went on strike for compensation measures. So far
in the year 2001 there was a one day strike in January, three days in March, one day in April
and two days in May.
SLTC has a quality charter for the staff, which is not public. They aim to achieve an 80 per
cent overall satisfaction score.
7.4.9.1.
No details to report.
7.4.9.2.
Access to airports
There is an airport, Lyon Satolas, which is served from the city centre by buses and taxis.
The service is provided by the county of Rhône and does not fall under the responsibility of
SYTRAL. The frequency is about three buses per hour. The buses that depart from the two
multi-modal stations in the centre of Lyon are however not easy to find, especially for
people without a knowledge of the French language. The bus fare from the airport to the
city centre is €7.49 (FF49), €13.46 for a return ticket, or €8.46 for a single ticket which is also
valid on Lyon metro. A single child fare is €3.82.
7.5.
negative aspects of the Lyon system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
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City Study: Lyon
Table 7.9
Lyon Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
•
No output incentives in the gross cost
contract.
•
Poor cost recovery.
•
Modal share fairly low and declining
slightly.
The national versement system is an
Service quality
•
Accessibility is good.
•
Service quality monitoring
programme. Customer charter
currently under development.
•
Strong central planning agency helps
service integration.
•
Good physical, information and tariff
integration.
•
Park and ride schemes
Service quality
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
•
•
A range of concessionary fares
avaialable.
Flat rate fare system may
discriminate against those needing to
make short journeys.
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
•
Authority ownership of buses
reduces barriers to entry.
Single contract for the whole area
prevents smaller companies for
bidding, potentially restricting
competition.
Economic growth
Economic growth
•
No specific initiatives.
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City Study: Lyon
7.6.
Lyon “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Lyon system.
Table 7.10
Lyon Summary “Scorecard”
Lyon
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
Powerful transport planner
•
•
Ownership of vehicles by transport
planner facilitates investment and
reduces barriers to entry
The gross cost contract used does
not give the operator an incentive to
increase revenue
•
Tendering the whole network at
once increases entry barriers, with
typically only two or three bids
received per tendering round
•
Poor labour relations with very
frequent strikes
•
Low cost recovery
•
Having a single operator for the bus,
tram and metro network facilitates
integration
•
Versement Transport
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City Study: Manchester
8.
CITY STUDY: MANCHESTER20
8.1.
Key Facts
•
Bus, light rail and heavy rail-based system.
•
Central public transport authority (GMPTE) with overall responsibility including
information provision.
•
Deregulated bus system with mainly net-cost contracts. Operators have freedom
to set fares. Private heavy rail operator on a franchise contract.
•
Light rail system built and operated by private firms, but GMPTE retains
ownership. Operators set fares, but GMPTE sets service levels.
8.2.
City Description
The city of Manchester is situated in the North West of England, just west of the Pennines.
The city itself has around 500,000 inhabitants, but there are some 2.5 million inhabitants in
the total Greater Manchester metropolitan area. Its growth had originally been driven by
the Industrial Revolution, but by the 20th century, the city was facing increasing industrial
problems associated with the decline of the textile trades as a result of foreign competition
and technological obsolescence. Manchester remains an industrial city, although the service
sector has become much more important in the last few decades.
In Greater Manchester, around 70.4 per cent of people of working age were in employment
in 1998/99, compared with an average of 73.5 per cent for the United Kingdom.21 The ILO
unemployment rate was 6.2 per cent in this period, almost equal to the UK average.22 The
average gross weekly full-time earnings in Greater Manchester were € 675 per week as at
April 1999, about 5 per cent below the UK average.23 The earnings figure however compares
favourably with the other metropolitan counties in the United Kingdom.
The figures for Manchester itself are considerably worse those for the Greater Manchester
area. For example, in February 2000, around 20 per cent of the Manchester population aged
20
All prices mentioned in this chapter have been converted into January 2001 prices and then into euros. An
exchange rate of €1 = £0.62 has been used.
21
Source of this and the other statistics in this section: Office for National Statistics (2000) Regional Trends. Data refer
to the period March 1998 to February 1999.
22
The ILO unemployment rate is the unemployment rate as a percentage of the economically active.
23
In January 2001 prices, the figure is £435 (€700)
103
over 16 received income support, as opposed to 12 per cent for Greater Manchester. The 20
per cent figure is among the highest in the entire country.
Greater Manchester is governed by ten Metropolitan District Councils, one of them being
Manchester City Council which is responsible for Manchester itself. The body that is
responsible for public transport in the area is the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport
Authority (GMPTA), which is made up of 33 Councillors from each of the District Councils
in Greater Manchester. GMPTA assesses the public transport needs of the county and
makes policy decisions about the provision of public transport in the area, mainly focusing
on those services and facilities that are not provided by the market. GMPTA is funded by
local taxation, raised by the District Councils but with financial contributions from Central
Government, and passes these funds on to its executive body, the Greater Manchester
Passenger Transport Executive (GMPTE). GMPTE is one of seven Passenger Transport
Executives (PTEs) in the United Kingdom.
The main duties of GMPTE are the following:
•
GMPTE subsidises bus services that are not provided commercially by bus operators;
•
GMPTE provides timetable information ;
•
GMPTE subsidises concessionary fares;
•
GMPTE is, with the Strategic Rail Authority, responsible for local rail services in
Greater Manchester; and
•
GMPTE owns the Metrolink light rail system and manages its development.
Other bodies at a national level are involved in public transport in Greater Manchester as
well. As indicated above, the Strategic Rail Authority is jointly responsible with GMPTE for
the provision of local rail services in the area. The Department of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions (DETR) provides funding and is responsible for the policy
framework.24
24
Following the recent General Elections in the United Kingdom, this department has been renamed to Department of
Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR).
104
8.3.
8.3.1.1.
Public transport in Manchester
Greater Manchester has three important public transport modes: heavy rail, light rail and
bus. Of these, bus is by far the most important mode, with approximately 90 per cent of
local public transport journeys made by bus, with heavy rail and Metrolink each accounting
for approximately 5 per cent. In terms of passenger kilometres, buses account for around 75
per cent of the total passenger kilometres travelled by local public transport, with around 15
per cent by rail and 10 per cent by Metrolink.
There is a very extensive bus network in Greater Manchester with several hundreds of
routes. The bus market is deregulated and there are currently around 26 privately owned
firms active in the bus market. The market is however dominated by the two largest firms,
First Manchester and Stagecoach Manchester, both part of large UK bus groups.
Subsidiaries of these two groups operate almost 80 per cent of the total of vehicle miles in
Manchester. Many of the other firms only operate a limited service on one or two routes.
The heavy rail network is also extensive with around ten railway lines running into
Manchester city centre. The network comprises 228 route kilometres with 98 stations. There
are two main stations in the centre: Piccadilly in the south and Victoria in the north. Many
services terminate at one of these stations, but there are some through services via either
Piccadilly or Victoria (but none serving both). The suburban network is mainly operated by
First North Western under a seven year franchise.
The light rail network is marketed under the name Metrolink, the first line of which opened
in 1992. The light rail plans were drawn up in the 1980s in relation to a heavy rail scheme
that was carried out at the time and involved the construction of two new chord lines that
enabled more trains to reach the main Piccadilly station. This left a number of lines with
local traffic only, which required both increasing subsidy and considerable capital
expenditure to renew life expired equipment. Eventually, this resulted in a proposal for a
six-line Metrolink network. Due to funding constraints, the network was to be constructed
in phases.
The first phase involved the conversion of two existing railway lines, one from Bury in the
north and the other from Altrincham in the south. The line from Altrincham used to
terminate at Piccadilly station in the southeast of the city centre, whereas the link from Bury
ran into Victoria, situated in the north of the centre. Therefore, a new on-street section was
constructed through the city centre, linking the two former railway lines and with a spur to
Piccadilly. The line proved very successful and a second line, consisting of a 9.5 km
extension into Eccles, opened in July 2000. This section is different from the other parts of
the network in that it has not been constructed by converting an existing railway line.
Instead, a new line has been built, partially running on the streets and partially on its own
105
right-of-way. The contract for the Eccles extension was won by Altram, which took over the
operation of the existing routes.
8.3.1.2.
Market access regime
As the framework is rather different for each of the three modes, we consider each of the
modes in turn.
Bus
History
The 1985 Transport Act radically altered the bus market in the United Kingdom with full
deregulation occurring outside London and Northern Ireland. The main elements of the Act
were:25
•
Removal of control of entry to and exit from the local bus market, subject to a 42-day
notice period.
•
Compulsory competitive tendering for loss-making services, provided there is no
undue interference with the viability of commercial services.
•
Changes in ownership and control of the bus companies; the state-owned National
Bus Company was privatised as 70 different area companies, whereas the municipal
operators were put at arms length from the authority. Many of the latter companies
were sold at a later stage.
•
Limiting the local authority powers and duties to, among other things,
supplementing commercial services, operating a concessionary fares scheme,
running bus stations and promoting voluntary travelcards.
•
Introduction of general competition law to the bus market.
•
Subsidy cuts, especially in the metropolitan areas.
In Greater Manchester, the PTE ran some 96 per cent of the vehicle mileage in the area prior
to deregulation, with the remainder mainly provided by National Bus Company
subsidiaries. After deregulation, no serious competition emerged until early 1987, when
Manchester Minibuses entered the south Manchester market, quickly expanding until
eventually a fleet of 230 vehicles was operated. Greater Manchester Buses Ltd, the new
operating company owned by the PTE but at arm’s length from it, reacted by introducing its
own minibus services in south Manchester. Manchester Minibuses did not compete on price
but followed Greater Manchester Buses distance-related scale. Other operators entered as
25
See Mackie, P and Preston, J (1996) The Local Bus Market: A Case Study of Regulatory Change. Avebury (Aldershot,
Hants).
106
well and by July 1988, over 20 per cent of the bus kilometres run in the area was operated by
private companies. Competition was very intense with over 70 companies competing for
business at one point.
However, in September 1988, a consolidation process started that would eventually see
much on-the-road competition disappear. In that month, Manchester Minibuses was sold to
Ribble, which was in turn bought by Stagecoach in mid-1989. In 1994, Greater Manchester
Buses was split up into a northern and a southern part, and both parts were privatised via
an employee buy-out. In 1996, these companies were bought by FirstGroup and Stagecoach
Holdings respectively, who went on to buy out many smaller operators. In an attempt to
segment the market, Stagecoach launched its Magic Bus brand in 1996, offering low fares on
a number of routes using older double decker buses in a distinct blue livery, while retaining
higher priced services using modern single deckers. This move was successful in both
attracting passengers and in further reducing competition.
Current situation
At present, the two main operators account for some 78 per cent of the total vehicle
kilometres run. FirstGroup and Stagecoach operate about 83 per cent of commercial vehicle
kilometres and about 55 per cent of tendered kilometres. Of the total vehicle kilometres run
by all operators, around 85 per cent is operated commercially. An overview is provided in
Table 8.1. It should be noted that the totals are higher then the sum of the entries in the
Tables as only the 20 largest operators are included.
Table 8.1
Annualised Bus Vehicle Kilometres of 20 Largest Operators
Operator
Kilometres (000s)
Commercial
Subsidised
Total
First Manchester,
Pennine & Rochdale
49547
7826
57373
Stagecoach Manchester
& Ribble
34069
3450
37519
Arriva Manchester &
North West
5294
2365
7659
Rossendale Transport
1846
1311
3157
Blue Bus
2043
423
2466
Others
8267
4510
12777
Source: GMPTE
Operators are free to register and deregister commercial services, subject to a 42-day notice
period. Everyone can register services, although under the 1981 Public Passenger Vehicles
Act, certain criteria regarding financial standing and vehicle safety must be met. The Traffic
Commissioners are responsible for applying entry standards for the bus industry and then
making sure that these standards are maintained. Penalties under the 1981 Act for failing to
107
adhere to the vehicle safety standards or to the financial standing requirements include
revocation or suspension of the licence, a reduction in vehicles authorised on the licence, the
imposition of other conditions on the licence and the issuing of formal warnings.
Once a timetable is registered, it must be adhered to, although deviations of up to 5 minutes
around the published times are allowed. Under the 1985 Transport Act26, failure to run the
services punctually can result in a fine or in a temporary withdrawal of the right to register
services. Imposition of the latter penalty can have serious consequences and, in their risk
assessments, the large UK bus groups consider the sanction to be one of the most significant
risks they face. The fine that can be imposed is 20 per cent of the operator’s fuel duty rebate
over the three months prior to the data of imposing the fine. It should be noted that this
refers to operators and not to services, and that the Act does not provide for lower fines. As
a result, the fine is often disproportionate, especially in the case of large operators, and the
penalty is therefore rarely used. The Government has therefore proposed changes to the Act
to allow the imposition of lower fines.27
The tendered services fall under the responsibility of GMPTE. GMPTE apply accessibility
criteria to determine which services should be put out to tender (see Section 8.4.6).
However, as a guideline figure, services are not worthwhile if they require more than €3.22
support per passenger. If a tender replaces a deregistered service, the tendered service may
not fully replace the previous level of service. Occasionally, it is possible to divert another
operator’s service, thereby avoiding the need for a tender. Sometimes, commercial operators
devise their route networks so as to make it difficult to devise feasible tender packages.
To evaluate whether it is worthwhile to put a service out to tender, GMPTE may use
emergency contracts for a couple of months. To this end, it is possible to use de minimis
contracts, which are small contracts that do not need to be put out to tender. A de minimis
contract must not involve expenditure of more than €19,300 per annum on a particular
route, and not more than €112,900 per annum for any operator.
For scheduled services, minimum subsidy (net cost) contracts are used in most cases. This
gives the bus operators an incentive to increase revenue and it makes it easier for GMPTE to
budget for services as it does not have to bear the revenue risk. However, about four to five
years ago, it became difficult to find bidders for some school contracts and hence some of
those contracts have since been switched to minimum cost (gross cost) agreements.
Contracts for school services often do not involve a timetable; instead the operator just
makes a specified number of buses available during specified hours. The lack of a timetable
makes the estimation of revenue difficult and consequently, gross cost contracts are often the
preferred option for such tenders.
26
See Sections 26 and 111.
27
See chapter 10 of DETR (1999) From Workhorse to Thoroughbred: A Better Role for Bus Travel.
108
Contracts for scheduled services are put out by route. GMPTE specifies a timetable and the
type of vehicle that must be used. The vehicle specification includes an age limit and a
minimum number of seats. It also provides an estimate of the annual mileage involved and
an estimate of the annual number of passenger trips. Operators are free to submit noncompliant bids or single bids for a group of tenders, but should for comparability purposes
also submit a compliant bid.
There is no fares regulation on tendered services. This means that, when daytime
commercial services and evening tendered services are operated by different companies,
there may well be differences between the fares charged during daytime and those charged
during evenings.28 In such cases, the situation also often occurs that single operator
travelcards, e.g. Stagecoach’s Megarider ticket, are only valid during daytime on a particular
route and not on the evening services. One of the reasons for not controlling fares is that if
fares were controlled, it would be GMPTE that would be blamed for any increases.
GMPTE continuously monitors the quality of the tendered services and will terminate
contracts that are not adhered to. In that case, the operator is liable for any losses that
GMPTE incurs if the replacement tender is more expensive than the contract that is being
terminated. However, the operator may also choose to switch to running the service
commercially if the resulting losses are less than the fine that would be payable to GMPTE.
Increasingly, the contractual option to terminate agreements in cases of non-performance is
being supplemented by a system of financial penalties. Penalties already exist for nonoperated mileage as a result of cancellations. This involves disproportionate deductions
from the tender price, i.e. it is not just the payment for the lost mileage that is being withheld
but there is also a penalty element. Penalty provisions also exist for lateness.
Tender costs have been rising sharply in recent years, with annualised percentage increases
well into double figures. The main reason is significant increases in operator costs, mainly
related to increased fuel and insurance charges. However, reduced patronage, a reduced
competitiveness of the bus market and staff shortages are of influence as well. On a small
scale, operators are also deregistering their commercial services in the hope of winning the
resulting tender. However, the proportion of vehicle kilometres run commercially has been
relatively stable over the last decade at around 85 per cent.
Future developments
In its policy document From Workhorse to Thoroughbred: A Better Role for Bus Travel (DETR,
1999), the Government has set out its policy in regard to the bus market for the next few
years. The main aim of the measures announced in the document is to improve the quality
of bus services. It is believed that only by improving the quality of bus services can the
28
It is estimated that between 25 and 50 per cent of evening contracts are awarded to other operators than the one
operating the daytime service.
109
decline in bus use in the United Kingdom be reversed and will the bus become a realistic
alternative to the private car.
A key element in the proposals is the idea of Quality Partnerships. These are voluntary
agreements between local authorities and operators, whereby operators provide new, high
quality vehicles in return for the authority investing in infrastructure like bus priority
measures, new shelters or more radical options like guided busways. The idea is not a new
idea, but the document proposes a statutory backing for them. This would allow authorities
to set quality standards for Quality Partnership facilities they provide, with powers to
exclude buses that did not meet the standards. The Government also proposes the option of
Quality Contracts for areas where Quality Partnerships might not work. For those areas,
this would effectively mean the deregulated system being replaced by a franchised system.
However, authorities would have to go through a lengthy application process for Quality
Contracts and ultimately need Ministerial Approval. The authorities would need to
demonstrate that the benefits of Quality Contracts in terms of modal shift could not be met
by other means, and that any extra costs involved would be offset by other benefits.
Partly as a result of the threat of moving to Quality Contracts, the operators have so far been
keen to sign up to the voluntary partnerships. In Greater Manchester, there are actually two
types of Quality Partnership Agreement: a countywide agreement involving all operators
and all other parties concerned, and specific agreements for individual corridors. The
countywide agreement includes the following main provisions:
•
the introduction of intermodal one-day travelcards;
•
a passenger information programme, including a commitment to confine bus service
changes to 12 dates per year, with a further commitment to reduce this number
further to three or four a year. The notice period for changes to the commercial
network will increase from 6 to 9 weeks. Similarly, GMPTE will give operators more
notice of tender invitations; and
•
a commitment to the programme of Quality Bus Corridors.
There are however concerns as to whether the section of the countywide agreement dealing
with ticketing is consistent with Chapter I of the 1998 Competition Act. This will be
discussed in more detail in Section 8.4.5.2 on tariff integration.
Heavy rail
Prior to 1994, local transport services in the Greater Manchester area were operated by
British Rail (BR) under contract to GMPTE. Effectively, GMPTE paid BR the marginal cost of
providing these local services. Funding was provided by central government to the
Metropolitan District Councils, who in turn funded GMPTE.
110
In April 1994, however, the railway industry in Great Britain was restructured on the basis
of the 1993 Railways Act. The industry was split up into an infrastructure manager
(Railtrack), three rolling stock leasing companies, 25 passenger train operating companies
and a variety of other companies. From then on, the train operating companies paid access
charges to Railtrack for the use of the infrastructure and leasing charges to the rolling stock
companies for the use of the trains. Both Railtrack and the rolling stock companies were
required to earn a commercial rate of return on their assets, in order to facilitate their later
privatisation. This requirement meant however that the operating companies’ costs
increased significantly, so that the subsidy that would be required to allow them to operate
profitably did too. These subsidies would be paid to the operators by the Office of
Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF)29, which would in return specify minimum service
levels, quality standards and regulate a number of fares.
The operators were sold through a competitive bidding process for their franchises. In the
case of Greater Manchester, the local franchise Regional Railways North West was awarded
to North Western Trains, later sold on to FirstGroup and renamed First North Western.
Another franchise with some services running into Manchester was sold to the Liverpool
bus operator MTL. This franchise is now owned by Arriva.
It was regarded as desirable that the PTEs would continue to be a party in the specification
of local rail services in their area. However, the new structure of the railway industry no
longer allowed them to buy services on a marginal cost basis, which meant that the cost of
providing the services to the PTE would increase considerably. Three transitional years
followed, in which the gap between the existing costs and the costs under the new regime
were met by government grants to the Metropolitan District Councils or, in 1996/97, to the
operators by means of a Revenue Support Grant. In that year, GMPTE was not involved at
all in the provision of local rail services in Greater Manchester. From 1997/98 onwards,
DETR pays a Metropolitan Railway Passenger Services Grant directly to the PTEs. This
grant allows the PTEs to continue to specify service levels and fares in their area and to pay
for it. To this end, they are now co-signatories to the franchise agreements with the relevant
operators. In the case of GMPTE, this concerns the agreements with First North Western
and, to a lesser extent, Arriva Northern.
An important question for the PTEs to address was whether or not to take the revenue risk
on the services they had specified. Assuming the revenue risk would allow the PTE to take
the commercial decisions, effectively using the operator as an agent. Five of the seven PTEs
have taken this approach. GMPTE however was one of two PTEs not to bear the revenue
risk. The revenue risk would be great because a lot of revenue of the main operator of local
rail services, First North Western, is related to the revenue of the mainline operator Virgin
Trains. This would mean that there would be uncertainty about a significant part of the
PTE’s budget. In addition, the PTE did not wish to get involved in revenue protection. It
29
This body has now been absorbed into the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA).
111
should be noted that in the future, the Strategic Rail Authority wants all operators to take
the revenue risk on their suburban services.
However, GMPTE did decide to exercise as much control over fare levels as possible. To
this end, most fares were included in a basket of regulated fares that, on average, are not
currently allowed to increase by more than the inflation level minus one per cent. The fares
in the basket include season tickets, standard singles, standard returns and day returns. The
contracts with the operator also contain other incentives, such as for punctuality and
reliability. In addition, all the PTEs operate the Service Quality Incentive Regime, which
involves inspections by the PTEs of specific attributes of station and on-train service, with
rewards for improvements and penalties for failures to meet agreed standards.
Light rail
Although successive governments agreed to provide funding for the construction of the
various phases of the Metrolink network, all did so on condition that private sector funds
were brought in as well. Consequently, the various links are built and operated by the
private sector, with GMPTE retaining ownership of the system.
The first line between Bury and Altrincham was built by the GMLL consortium, which
included GEC, Amey and Mowlem. In spite of the government’s desire to attract private
funding, in the end the consortium paid only about €8 million of the construction costs of
the project, on a total of around €242 million. The consortium, that would also be
responsible for operating the line, would not receive any operating subsidy and apparently
expected to lose out if it offered to contribute more to the capital costs of the project. In the
event, however, the link proved very successful and by 1997 the system was generating an
operating surplus of around €6.5 million per year.
The original contract allowed the PTE to re-let the Metrolink contract (although the existing
concessionaire did have to be compensated) and the contract to build and operate the Eccles
extension (as well as run the rest of the system) was awarded to Altram, a consortium of
Ansaldo, Laing, 3i Venture Capital and Serco. As the winning consortium would also take
over the profitable existing line, this time the private sector was prepared to fund a
significant part of the capital costs of the extension in order to get access to these profits.
The extension, which opened in July 2000, cost around € 258 million, of which €173 million
was funded by Altram and the remainder by GMPTA, the European Regional Development
Fund and the Department of the Environment Capital Challenge.
The current contract with Altram, which again can be re-let, runs to 2014. It specifies
minimum service levels, but the operator is free to set fares. There is a set of penalty clauses
for failure to operate the service. The operator has to request permission for the timetable,
but agreement cannot be reasonably withheld. One issue with the present structure is the
fact that the concessionaire borrows from banks, which tightly control what can be done
with the money. As a result, little money is available for advertising the system.
Improvements, for example on stations, will only be made if it is built into the contract.
112
Some trams are currently being extended with a middle section, but it is GMPTE that has to
pay for this.
In March 2000, a €403 million funding package was made available by the national
government for the further extension of Metrolink. Three or four lines will be added to the
network, one (a short link to a busy shopping centre) on condition that it can be wholly
funded by the private sector. There will a single contract for the extensions, and the winning
consortium will also take over the operation of the existing network. Again, the previous
contract allowed this provided the existing operator would be compensated. The new
contract is likely to be for 25 years and GMPTE is considering including some form of fares
control in it. Because of the success of the existing lines, services are often overcrowded and
GMPTE is worried that the new operator will take advantage of this by raising peak fares to
ration capacity. The decision as to who to let the new contract to will be based on trade-offs
between criteria, not just on the lowest level of public funds required.
8.4.
8.4.1.1.
Modal splits
The Greater Manchester Local Transport Plan indicates that in 1991, car accounted for 60 per
cent of all trips (up from 45 per cent in 1976). Bus use accounted from 21 per cent of all trips
in 1976 and decreased to 14 per cent in 1991. It also indicates, without giving exact numbers,
that the share of walking and cycling fell as well between 1976 and 1991, but that the share
of rail remained fairly constant, although small in absolute terms. No more recent modal
split data are available and while the Plan recognises that the data are in need of updating, it
is thought that the trends exhibited above are still relevant.
It is also indicated that in 1997, public transport accounted for 52 per cent of all trips into the
regional centre made by car or public transport. The target is to reduce this to 44 per cent by
2005/6.
8.4.1.2.
Patronage
Details on bus patronage in Greater Manchester from 1986 to 2000 are presented in Table 8.2
below.
113
Table 8.2
Greater Manchester Bus Patronage 1986-2000
Year ending 31 March
1986
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Passenger journeys per year (millions )
355
269
249
236
227
217
Index (1986=100)
100
76
70
66
64
61
1474
1226
1138
1081
1041
994
Index (1986=100)
100
83
77
73
71
67
Average trip length (kilometres)
4.15
4.56
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.58
Source: Greater Manchester Local Transport Plan
Table 8.2 shows that the number of bus journeys in the six years after deregulation declined
by about 25 per cent. The average trip length increased, however, and the decrease in
passenger kilometres is therefore lower than the decrease in passenger journeys over this
period. From 1992 onwards, the average trip length stayed constant. Both passenger
journeys and passenger kilometres declined by a further 20 per cent in the six years to 2000.
The bus patronage figures may have been influenced by Metrolink, although the latter
mainly replaced two existing railway lines. Table 8.3 contains patronage figures for
Metrolink from 1993 onwards.30 In addition, it should be noted that the two railway lines
that were replaced by Metrolink carried around 7.5 million passengers per year.
Table 8.3
Metrolink Patronage 1993-199831
1993
1995
1996
1997
1998
Passenger journeys per year (millions )
7.64
12.38
12.71
13.63
13.82
Index (1993=100)
100
162
166
178
181
67.7
109.7
112.6
120.7
122.4
Index (1993=100)
100
162
166
178
181
Source: GMPTE (1999)
Table 8.3 shows that, after a slow start, Metrolink patronage grew spectacularly in the period
between 1993 and 1995. The slow start has probably been caused by the fact that the two
lines were closed for about a year while they were converted; it has taken some time to win
back lost patronage. After 1995, patronage continued to grow at an average annual rate of
around 3.75 per cent.
30
Phase I of Metrolink opened in 1992.
31
The average trip length on the basis of the figures in the table is 5.51 miles for all the years given. Whereas this
may be true in practice, it may also be the case that the average trip length has simply been assumed constant
when calculating the passenger miles figures. These therefore need to be interpreted with care.
114
Although some details on heavy rail patronage in Greater Manchester are available, these
are distorted by the opening of Metrolink and by the fact that in 1996/97, GMPTE was not
involved in the provision of local rail services in its area. These figures are not therefore
reported here. The figures suggest that patronage fell by around 10 per cent between 1993
and 1996, and countrywide trends suggest that they will have been growing strongly since
then.
8.4.1.3.
Fares
When evaluating the bus patronage figure, it is important to take the development of fare
levels into account. In Table 8.4, data on selected fares are given. The data in the Table refer
to single adult cash fares only.
Table 8.4
Development of Bus Fares in Greater Manchester, 1986-1998
Cost of bus travel: 2.4 km cash fare
(€, January 2001 prices)
Index (1986=100)
Cost of bus travel: 15 km cash fare
Index (1986=100)
Cost of bus travel: concessionary fare
Index (1986=100)
1986
0.65
1992
1.03
1994
1.06
1996
1.10
1998
1.24
100
2.02
158
2.66
163
2.63
169
2.68
191
2.95
100
0.29
132
0.47
130
0.58
133
0.58
146
0.58
100
162
200
200
200
As a result of the growth in availability of discounted fares, especially through travelcardtype tickets, these figures significantly overstate the actual increases in average fares paid.
GMPTE estimates that, after allowing for discounts, average adult fares are now
approximately 25 per cent below the adult single fare.
Nevertheless, Table 8.4 shows that all single cash fares have risen significantly in real terms
and some have almost doubled. It is interesting to note that longer distance passengers have
not been facing fare increases to the same extent as passengers making shorter trips.
Table 8.5 contains data on the amount of bus kilometres run in Greater Manchester from
1986 to 1998.
115
Table 8.5
Bus Kilometres in Greater Manchester, 1986-1998
1986
1992
1994
1996
1998
116.0
133.0
146.3
137.6
132.6
100
115
126
119
114
11.633
20.3
16.3
18.2
17.9
Index (1986=100)
100
175
140
157
154
Percentage of bus kilometres run commercially
8934
85
89
87
86
Total bus kilometres (millions )
Index (1986=100)
Annualised
(millions)32
subsidised
bus
kilometres
Table 8.5 shows that in the years following deregulation, the number of bus kilometres run
in Greater Manchester increased significantly, with the level in 1994 around 25 per cent
higher than in 1986. After 1994, the level of bus kilometres run declined somewhat.
However, the number of bus kilometres remains around 10 per cent higher than prederegulation. The proportion of kilometres run commercially does not show a clear trend
and GMPTE officials have indicated that it may be characterised as a circular pattern,
influenced by market forces. In the last few years, it has been on the decrease as a result of
large operators deregistering commercial services.
Reliable data on local train kilometres are unavailable due to the impact of Metrolink and
the impact of organisational and institutional changes. It is clear, however, that the
structural changes in the railway industry have not had a similar impact on kilometre
figures as the changes in the bus industry had. The minimum service level specifications for
the operators were based on the 1994 timetable. Although some successful operators have
expanded services beyond this minimum level, this is unlikely to be the case for First North
Western, which has been financially troubled due to an overly ambitious franchise bid. It is
likely that rail services in Greater Manchester will have been fairly constant in the years
since 1994.
Table 8.6 below provides data on the development of on-bus revenue, bus concessionary
support and total bus support in Greater Manchester from 1986 to 1997.
32
The figures have been annualised from the April data for the relevant year.
33
Figure refers to 1987 as opposed to 1986.
34
This has been calculated using the annualised subsidised kilometre figure given and a total number of bus miles in
1987 of 64.9.
116
Table 8.6
Bus Revenue and Support in Greater Manchester, 1986-1997
1986
1992
1994
1996
1997
230.3
204.0
205.2
193.0
179.8
Index (1986=100)
100
89
89
84
78
Total GMPTE concessionary support (€m;
January 2001 prices)
65.8
72.4
57.6
59.2
58.7
Index (1986=100)
100
110
88
90
89
100.5
66.0
44.7
48.2
47.6
Index (1986=100)
100
83
44
48
47
Percentage of revenue from farebox (including
concessionary support as farebox revenue)
75
81
85
84
83
Percentage of revenue from farebox (including
concessionary support as subsidy)
58
60
67
64
63
Total on-bus revenue (€m, January 2001 prices)
Total GMPTE subsidy (€m; excl. concessionary
support; January 2001 prices)
It can be seen that in the period to 1994, the total of GMPTE subsidy payments to the bus
industry (excluding concessionary fares support) decreased by about 55 per cent, slightly
increasing again afterwards. In combination with the reduction of on-bus revenue during
this period, the farebox revenue as a proportion of total revenue increased from 75 to 85 per
cent during this period.
Data on the costs of providing bus services in Greater Manchester are available as both First
Manchester and Stagecoach Manchester publish annual reports. In combination with details
on bus miles published by GMPTE, some basis statistics can be calculated. These are
contained in Table 8.7. Only 1998 data are presented, as this is the only year for which both
financial figures and kilometre figures are available. As with all similar ratios, these need to
be interpreted with great care.
Table 8.7
Operating Costs and Vehicle Kilometres of the Two Largest Bus Operators
Year ending 31 March 1998
First Manchester
Stagecoach Manchester
(€000; including depreciation, January 2001 prices)
95,600
73,43235
Total vehicle kilometres operated (000)
48983
36003
1.95
2.05
Cost per vehicle kilometre (€, January 2001 prices)
Source: First Manchester, Stagecoach Manchester annual reports; GMPTE
35
This figure refers to the year ending 30 April 1998.
117
More instructive than the above are aggregate data on the development of bus operating
costs for local bus services in metropolitan areas. These are presented in Table 8.8.
Table 8.8
Costs per Vehicle Kilometre and Passenger Journey in English Metropolitan Areas
(excluding London)
Year ending 31 March
1986
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Costs per vehicle kilometre (€; including
depreciation; January 2001 prices)
3.21
1.97
1.73
1.66
1.53
1.52
Cost per passenger journey (€; including
depreciation, January 2001 prices)
0.90
0.87
0.89
0.87
0.84
0.84
Source: DETR (2000)
Table 8.8 shows that the costs per vehicle kilometre have fallen dramatically in real terms in
the six years after deregulation and continued to fall afterwards. However, the cost per
passenger journey have only fallen by, in total, around 7 per cent in the 14 years after
deregulation. Furthermore, a comparison of Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 shows that the
operating costs per vehicle kilometre of the two largest Manchester operators are somewhat
above the average for English metropolitan areas (excluding London). This may be due to
situations specific to Manchester, to the fact that the largest operators may have higher costs
than smaller operators, to measurement differences or to other factors.
For Metrolink, cost and revenue data are not available due to data confidentiality problems.
Limited data on rail revenue and support are available until 1996, but again distorted by the
impact of Metrolink and especially by the structural changes to the rail industry since 1994.
Even if data were available, it would not be possible to analyse them within the scope of the
present study due to the current complexity of the industry and the multitude of payments
between the various players. We regret that we are unable to provide further insights here.
8.4.4.1.
Frequency
Due to the deregulated nature of the Greater Manchester bus market, frequency levels vary
considerably. Frequency levels on individual services are rather low with only a limited
number of services having more than six buses an hour. However, as most routes are often
served by a substantial number of (sometimes competing) services, frequency levels on most
corridors are very high. In addition, the commercial network is dense. However, during
evenings and Sundays, when many services are subsidised, the level of service on the
network is considerably lower. Most individual services operate at 30 or 60-minute intervals
during these times, although they again combine to result in higher frequencies along busy
corridors.
118
The high commercial frequency levels are partly due to entry deterrence strategies of the
incumbent operators. By running as many buses per hour as possible, they avoid leaving
“gaps” in which a competitor could profitably enter. The same applies to the number of
routes.
8.4.4.2.
Reliability
Unfortunately, GMPTE do not publish details on service quality on the Greater Manchester
public transport system. Data are however available from the Strategic Rail Authority on
the punctuality and reliability of local rail services into Greater Manchester. Punctuality is
defined as percentage of trains arriving within five minutes of scheduled time. Reliability is
defined as percentage of scheduled trains actually running.
Table 8.9
Performance Data for Rail Services into Greater Manchester
Line group
Manchester North
Manchester South
Year ending
Punctuality
Reliability
Dec 1997
93.9
98.9
Dec 1998
85.8
97.2
Jan 2000
89.6
99.0
Dec 1997
94.6
98.6
Dec 1998
90.8
98.2
Jan 2000
91.7
99.1
Source: Strategic Rail Authority Performance Bulletins
Table 8.9 shows that from 1997 to 1998, performance declined significantly as First North
Western was hit by the rapidly declining subsidy profiles and had to implement consequent
cost cutting measures. In fact, in the three-month period from April 1998 to June 1998,
performance on the Manchester North lines dropped as low as 90.6 for reliability (i.e. almost
10 per cent of trains cancelled) and 70.8 for punctuality (i.e. almost 30 per cent of trains
running more than five minutes late). This was subsequently deemed a breach of First
North Western’s franchise agreement and a compensation package for passengers has been
negotiated. Since then, performance has improved again.
8.4.4.3.
Accessibility
When evaluating whether or not a service should be put out to tender, GMPTE try to
provide as many people as possible with a reasonable bus service at a reasonable walking
distance. Specifically, GMPTE try to maximise the number of people living within:
daytime
evening/
Sundays
either within
or within
either within
or within
250 metres of a bus stop with a service every 30 minutes
119
There are however budgetary constraints that limit the number of people that can be served
by bus services. In principle, no more than €3.25 per passenger is paid in subsidy to bus
services. Services sometimes have to be withdrawn altogether, especially during evenings,
when there is violence against staff. This is often related to farebox theft. On weekdays
during daytime, 92 per cent of the population have access to public transport in terms of the
above criteria. During evenings and weekends, the figure tends to be between 80 and 85 per
cent.
8.4.4.4.
Since 2000, performance figures have been calculated by the SRA using a new methodology,
focusing more on passengers’ experience. The resulting figures are not comparable with the
ones presented in Table 8.9. Performance in the last months of 2000 and in 2001 has been
adversely affected by the implications of the crash near Hatfield. This crash was found to
have been caused by so-called “gauge corner cracking” of rails, which resulted in the
imposition of severe speed limits across Railtrack’s network.
8.4.5.1.
With the construction of the first phases of Metrolink, the degree of physical integration in
the areas concerned has improved substantially. Some excellent interchanges have been
built and Metrolink of course enables many new through journeys to be made.
The integration between bus and rail is more problematic. Neither the Victoria nor the
Piccadilly rail stations have a bus station and for most connecting bus services, a walk is
required. This is also true for a lot of interchanges between bus services in Manchester city
centre as there is no central bus station (though there are some smaller interchanges served
by a limited number of routes).
The biggest problem with physical integration in Greater Manchester is caused by the way
the deregulated bus market works. There is no central planning of routes and the result is
an extremely complicated route network. Although the network is now much more stable
than it used to be, it is still very difficult to understand and, for the inexperienced, to use. In
addition, a deregulated bus market implies that it is not possible to have a bus line “feed”
into, for example, a railway line if it would be profitable for the bus operator to operate a
through service to the city centre itself. Such a situation is not necessarily detrimental, it for
example enhances competition and increases the range of journey opportunities available to
the general public, but it is not an ideal situation from the viewpoint of physical integration.
Metrolink for example did experience some initial competition on one of its corridors.
Overall, we would adopt a mixed view as to the level of physical integration of public
transport services in Greater Manchester. It is very good in some areas, especially where
Metrolink is involved, but rather poor especially in relation to the bus network.
120
8.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
In Greater Manchester, there is a different degree of tariff integration according to whether
single tickets or multi-journey travelcards are concerned. We will discuss these in turn and
then pay attention to the 1998 Competition Act and its implications for tariff integration.
Generally speaking, there is no tariff integration for single and return tickets. In the majority
of cases, customers buy single fares from the operators they travel with. Some operators
offer return tickets, but these cannot generally be used for a return trip by another operator.
When a journey involves changing between vehicles or between modes, generally separate
tickets are required for each leg of the journey.
There are however a few exceptions, notably:
•
passengers with a train ticket to Manchester city centre from any train station in
Greater Manchester can travel free on Metrolink trams in the city centre; and
•
passengers arriving in Manchester travelling by Virgin Trains can by a bus add-on
ticket for €1.60 (GB£1).
The picture regarding travelcards is more mixed. A variety of travelcards is available that
allow unlimited travel on almost all public transport services in Greater Manchester,
marketed under the brand System 1.36 However, the large operators also have their own
travelcards, valid on their services only. An overview of the price levels and the differences
between general and operator-specific travelcards is provided in Table 8.10.
Table 8.10
Examples of Travelcard Prices in Greater Manchester
First Manchester
Stagecoach
Manchester
System 1
Day ticket bus
€4.03 (GB£2.50)
€4.03 (GB£2.50)
€4.84 (GB£3.00)
Concessionary
-
€1.77 (GB£1.10)
€ 2.02 (GB£1.25)
entire area :€14.52
(GB£9.00)
inner city: €10.48
(GB£6.50)
€11.29 (GB£7.00)
€20.97 (GB£13.00)
€6.61 (GB£4.10)
€6.45 (GB£4.00)
under 16s: €7.82
(GB£4.85)
€55 (GB£34)
-
€73 (GB£45)
Weekly ticket bus
Concessionary
Monthly ticket bus
Source: First Manchester, Stagecoach Manchester, GMPTE
36
As it is not currently possible to force operators to participate, there are a limited number of small operators that
do not accept these countywide travelcards.
121
In evaluating Table 8.10, it is worth keeping in mind that the large operators do not actually
compete on the prices of their travelcards, as their operating areas are quite distinct. The
reason why operators find it profitable to introduce their own travelcards is that they keep
the entire revenue from them. By contrast, they would only get a “slice” of the revenue of
multi-operator passes.
As bus services in Greater Manchester operate in a deregulated market, general competition
law is applicable to them. As a result, integrated ticketing becomes more difficult to achieve
as they often involve agreements between operators. Under Chapter I of the 1998
Competition Act, some types of agreements between operators are illegal.
The Act prohibits agreements between companies that result in an appreciable prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in the United Kingdom. In terms of public transport
ticketing schemes, examples of schemes that generally would fall within the prohibition
include agreements that:37
•
raise barriers to entry and keep out new competitors, for example through
exclusivity provisions;
•
dampen competition by carving-up routes between participants;
•
eliminate individual single and return tickets, the fares for which were set at the
discretion of individual operators; or
•
fix fares for tickets sold under the schemes or facilitate this.
However, the UK Office of Fair Trading has recognised that certain other integrated public
transport ticketing schemes that do not include the elements mentioned above should be
permissible because of the benefits they bring. As it would be too expensive to issue a ruling
(costing €21,000) to that extent for each individual scheme, a Block Exemption for such
schemes has been proposed. For schemes to qualify under the Block Exemption, certain
criteria must however be met. One of these is a requirement that revenue obtained from
multi-operator travelcards must be allocated on the basis of passenger miles (as opposed to
revenue foregone). Many in the industry fear that the administration costs of allocating
revenue on this basis will in many cases exceed the entire benefit of the schemes.
Overall, we would regard the degree of tariff integration in Manchester as poor. Whilst
there are multi-operator travelcards and new one-day tickets, the lack of integration as far as
single and return tickets is concerned compares very poorly with our other comparator
cities. The implications of the 1998 Competition Act suggest that improvements will be very
difficult to realise.
37
Office of Fair Trading (2001) Public Transport Ticketing Scheme Block Exemption – Formal Consultation Draft.
122
8.4.5.3.
The responsibility for the provision of information on public transport in Manchester lies
with GMPTE. This applies to all modes and GMPTE are consequently able to pursue an
integrated information policy. The countywide Quality Partnership Agreement has led to
further improvements. For example, the timetable sections of both the First Manchester and
Stagecoach Manchester websites now refer to the GMPTE Journey Planner website.
GMPTE produce several network maps. The map containing all services in Greater
Manchester is difficult to read due to the enormous number of services presented on it, but
there is a useful additional map showing frequent services only. All modes on this map are
presented in a similar way with only colours distinguishing between them. In addition, a
series of clear leaflets are produced by GMPTE with details on the timetables of the various
services. Importantly, these leaflets also include route maps and details on connection
points. For train services, informative leaflets are available showing all trains between
important city pairs, with in addition maps, details on possible connections with other trains
and other modes and platform information.
GMPTE, in conjunction with System 1, also operate a phone information service (at local
rates) with details on all public transport services in Greater Manchester. Unfortunately, the
number used is different from the number used for the national public transport enquiry
service which GMPTE also advertise, possibly because the latter is a national rate number.
Information is also available via the Internet and Teletext.
Overall, we would regard the current level of information integration within the Greater
Manchester area as very good. Having the responsibility for the provision of information
within one body is clearly a beneficiary factor.
8.4.5.4.
Traditionally, the integration of transport with land use in many UK cities has not been very
good due to the development of out-of-town shopping centres and greenfield housing
estates, which are difficult for high-density public transport to access.
In recent years, however, the policy emphasis has been changing. The draft Regional
Planning Guidance acknowledges that the integration of land use and transport planning is
a key aspect of solving the region’s transport problems. It also recognises however that land
use change is a long-term process and that management of transport demand created by the
existing land use pattern must be addressed.
Consequently, the Greater Manchester Strategic Planning Framework concentrates on
reducing decentralisation and on using the planning process to enhance public transport,
cycling and walking infrastructure. It also introduces the concept of a sustainable
neighbourhood, in which an appropriate mix of residential and employment trips can be
123
blended within a locality to encourage shorter trips that can be made on foot or by cycle.
The Greater Manchester Local Transport Plan is based on the Strategic Planning Framework.
In summary, Greater Manchester is suffering today from a lack of integration between land
use and transport in the past. Present policies however show a much higher level of
transport/land use integration.
8.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
Although GMPTE do not have a specific policy aimed at improving social cohesion in the
Greater Manchester metropolitan area, there are nevertheless a number of schemes in place
that are worth mentioning here.
The first and most important one is the concessionary fares scheme. There is a flat fare of
currently €0.65 (GB£0.40) for below 16s and over 60s, as well as for disabled people. This
used to be a very simple scheme, but things have now become more complicated with the
nationwide introduction of a compulsory half-fare concessionary scheme for senior citizens.
For shorter journeys, this would mean that the concessionary fare would have to be below
€0.65. For longer journeys, on the other hand, the concessionary fare would increase
significantly if the nationwide scheme were adopted. A compromise has now been reached
where travellers can pay either €0.65 or half the fare, whichever is the lowest.
GMPTE reimburses operators for the concessionary fares using a formula that takes into
account the fact that concessionary fares generate additional demand. As a result, operators
do not receive the full difference between the concessionary and ordinary fares but only a
part of that. A price elasticity38 of –0.3 is used as a basis for the calculations.
8.4.6.2.
Accessibility for the mobility impaired
Access for the mobility impaired has improved significantly in recent years as a result of a
grant scheme for low-floor buses. The scheme broadly paid operators the extra capital costs
of low-floor buses compared to conventional buses. As a result, Greater Manchester now
has one of the largest fleets of low-floor buses in the United Kingdom. The scheme has now
been discontinued as the cost difference between low-floor and traditional buses has largely
disappeared.
The Metrolink system is fully accessible. The accessibility for the mobility impaired on the
heavy rail system is varies. It is possible to get journey assistance subject to a 24-hour notice
period, but only a number of stations are fully accessible.
38
A price elasticity indicates how much the level of demand changes in response to a small price changes. A price
elasticity of –0.3 implies that if prices increased by 1 per cent, demand would decrease by 0.3 per cent.
124
The current bus market in Greater Manchester, as far as the commercial services are
concerned, is highly flexible and can easily adapt to changes in demand, serve new routes
and so on, subject to a 42-day notice period. In fact, it could be argued that the system is too
flexible as the frequent timetable changes are confusing for the passengers, which is why the
number of annual timetable changes is now being limited under the countywide Quality Bus
Partnership agreement (see Section 8.3.1.2 above).
However, the flexibility is considerably lower as far as the tendered bus services, Metrolink
and the heavy rail services are concerned. In all these cases, GMPTE issues detailed
specifications as to service levels. Operators of tendered bus services and the operator of
Metrolink hardly have any freedom to make adjustments; rail operators only to a limited
extent. For these modes, responding to changes in demand is often only possible by
renegotiating the contract or by waiting until the contract has expired.
8.4.8.1.
Both the bus and rail industry in Greater Manchester have seen radical structural change. In
both cases, this was followed by a turbulent transition periods with adverse impacts on
service quality. In the bus market, the problems were caused by heavy competition. These
problems may have been inherent to the radical deregulation model that was opted for. In
the railway industry, on the other hand, the problems were caused by the operator having
put in an overly ambitious franchise bid, to find itself running into serious financial
difficulties when faced with the rapidly declining subsidy profile. These problems could
have been avoided. It could be argued that the bus industry has settled down now, but the
railways probably have not.
We do not think that the UK authorities have paid sufficient attention to ensuring a smooth
transition between regimes and have failed to note the possible adverse long-term
consequences in terms of patronage of a turbulent transition period. As already suggested
above, in the case of the bus industry, the problems could probably only have been avoided
by choosing an entirely different restructuring model. In the railway industry, more careful
thought and, in particular, more gradual change should have resulted in much less
problems.39
39
Notwithstanding the above, it should be noted that the problems that occurred with rail services in Greater
Manchester are more severe than what happened elsewhere. While problems with service punctuality and
reliability have occurred across the UK rail industry, there have been few cases as severe as the Manchester local
services.
125
8.4.8.2.
Staffing issues
A discussion with a representative from the main union in the Manchester public transport
system has taken place, although on a confidential basis. Membership of unions among
drivers in Greater Manchester is very high; the number of drivers that are non-union
members is negligible. The relationship of the unions with the main operators in
Manchester varies and is better with some operators than with others. At First Manchester,
a series of 14 one-day strikes occurred in late 2000 over pay conditions, with unions mainly
objecting to the fact that new drivers are paid less than existing drivers. Generally speaking,
industrial relations at head-office level of the main UK bus operators are better than at local
level. It is however at local level that wage negotiations take place.
As all operators in Greater Manchester are private companies, data on staff issues are not
readily available. Although one operator has supplied some data, these are of a confidential
nature and cannot be published.
It is however interesting to examine the overall picture that emerges from the UK New
Earnings Survey. This is done in Table 8.11.
Table 8.11
Earnings and Hours per Week Worked by Industry
198640
1991
1994
1996
1998
2000
524
459
459
453
462
466
Male UK train drivers and assistants
667
727
774
865
832
Male UK rail inspectors, supervisors & guards
613
644
618
696
696
522
595
623
636
652
667
48.5
47.2
47.8
48.3
48.5
47.2
43.6
43.8
44.3
42.2
40.7
48.4
47.2
47.3
45.4
42.7
40.4
40.0
40.1
40.2
40.2
39.7
10.82
9.72
9.60
9.36
9.52
9.88
15.30
16.60
17.49
20.49
20.44
12.65
13.64
13.08
15.35
16.29
14.76
15.54
15.82
16.24
16.79
Earnings € per week (January 2001 prices)
Male UK bus and coach drivers
All UK occupations
Total hours works per employee per week
All UK occupations
Earnings € per hour (January 2001 prices)
All UK occupations
12.91
Source: New Earnings Survey
40
No 1986 data available for rail staff due to changes to occupational classifications that were made in 1991.
126
Table 8.11 contains a number of interesting insights. First of all the position of bus and
coach drivers. In the first few years after the deregulation in 1986, their income in real terms
fell by around 12 per cent. Since then, it has remained more or less constant, although
incomes elsewhere in the economy have been continuously increasing. The number of
hours worked by bus and coach drivers has been more or less constant at around 48 per
week, significantly above the UK average which has remained stable at around 40 hours per
week. As a result, the average earnings per hour of a bus driver are now 41 per cent lower
than the UK average, compared to 16 per cent lower in 1992.
The opposite however is true for railway staff. The average weekly earnings have gone up
and the number of hours worked has gone down, both especially in the years immediately
following privatisation. As a result, the average earnings per hour in real terms for both
drivers and guards are now around 30 per cent higher than in 1991. Drivers, who were
earning about an average hourly wage in 1991, now earn significantly more, whereas guards
have caught up and now earn about average hourly wages.
It is not easy to find an explanation for the somewhat surprising result with regard to
railway staff. Staff shortages and a booming labour market may have been of influence.
8.4.9.1.
No specific initiatives to report.
8.4.9.2.
Access to airports
Manchester Airport is an important international airport with a catchment area broadly
equal to the north of England. The airport is served by buses, and a heavy rail link into the
airport opened in 1993. The heavy rail link is operated by First North Western under the
seven year franchise agreement that covers most Manchester local services. There are about
four fast services per hour and some slower ones. A standard open return from Manchester
Piccadilly to Manchester Airport is priced at €9.33 (GB£5.60), a standard day return costs
€8.00 (GB£4.80). For a journey by bus, the adult single fare from the city centre to
Manchester Airport is €3.83 (GB£2.30). Furthermore, one of the proposed new Metrolink
corridors will run into the airport. As a result, a new multimodal interchange has been
proposed at the airport.
The Greater Manchester local transport plan aims to reduce the environmental impact of the
Greater Manchester transport system in terms of air quality, noise and climate change.
However, no specific targets for these indicators have been set. Rather, targets have been
formulated in terms of the use of transport modes and the modal splits. Some key targets
are:
127
•
the market share of public transport in terms on trips into Manchester city centre to
improve from 52 per cent in 1997 to 56 in 2005/6.
•
cycle flows to be doubled between 2002 and 2012; and
•
walk journeys back to 1990 levels by 2012.
8.5.
negative aspects of the Manchester system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
Table 8.12
Manchester Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
Tram system design, construction
and operation generally considered
successful.
•
•
Both cost recovery and cost efficiency
are good.
Relatively high fares
Service quality
Service quality
•
New Quality Partnership
Agreements an attempt to improve
service quality.
•
•
Deregulated market results in high
frequencies and a dense network
during daytime
Timetable changes are frequent
•
•
Poor tariff integration.
•
Poor physical integration, although
Metrolink tram system has improved
this.
•
Information integration good despite
a deregulated system, largely due to
the central planning authority.
Specific targets to improve frequency
and accessibility
Social cohesion
•
Social cohesion
Centrally-operated concessionary
fares subsidy scheme.
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
Transition poorly handled with a lot
of instability discouraging ridership.
•
Staff wages have suffered since
deregulation.
128
Positive
Negative
•
Economic growth
•
Economic growth
Good links to the Airport. Services
are available which do not charge
premium fares.
•
8.6.
Poorly-managed rail franchising led
to an over-optimistic bid, and
subsequently falling service quality.
Environmental criteria form a part of
the Greater Manchester Transport
Plan, and targets have been set in
terms of modal splits.
Manchester “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Manchester system.
Table 8.13
Manchester Summary “Scorecard”
Manchester
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
High level of cost efficiency and high cost
recovery
Metrolink high quality and successful,
innovative funding and concessioning
arrangements,
good
environmental
integration
Very good central information provision
despite multi-operator system
•
•
•
•
•
Instability in the bus network after
deregulation
Lack of physical integration between
services
Poor tariff integration compared with
cities in other countries
Bus staff earnings suffered
Quality of rail services suffered after
privatisation due to an over-ambitious
franchise bid
129
City Study: Preston
9.
CITY STUDY: PRESTON
9.1.
Key Facts
•
Deregulated, bus-based system. Combination of gross-cost and net-cost contracts.
•
County council has overall responsibility, including administration of the
concessionary fares system, tendering-out non-commercial services and some
information provision, but few planning responsibilities.
9.2.
City Description
Preston is a medium sized city in the Northwest of England with around 130,000
inhabitants. It is predicted that by 2006, the population will have increased to 148,000. The
city, which used to have a strong cotton textile industry, now has other industries in
engineering and in vehicle and aircraft manufacturing. It also has a growing service sector.
This includes the main offices of Lancashire County Council, and the University of Central
Lancashire.
As at February 2000, around 13 per cent of the Preston population were income support
beneficiaries. This compares with 10 per cent for the county of Lancashire and also 10 per
cent for the United Kingdom as a whole. The ILO unemployment rate in Lancashire County
was 4.3 per cent in 1998/99, compared with 6.5 per cent for the North West of England and
6.3 per cent for the United Kingdom.41 No recent unemployment figure for Preston itself is
available, but the income support figure suggests that it will be higher than the Lancashire
unemployment figure.
Although the public transport market in Preston is deregulated, there is still an involvement
of local and national government in the public transport system. Lancashire County Council
is responsible for public transport in the entire Lancashire region, including Preston.
Preston also has a Borough Council, with however only minor transport responsibilities like
parking policy. The national government is also involved in various ways, mainly through
the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR). Examples of DETR
involvement include the specification of a mandatory concessionary fares scheme and by
introducing and funding Local Transport Plans.
41
The ILO unemployment rate is the unemployment rate as a percentage of the economically active.
130
City Study: Preston
9.3.
Institutional/Regulatory Framework42
9.3.1.1.
Public transport in Preston
Public transport in Preston is entirely bus based. There is a railway station, which is almost
entirely used for trips to outside the Preston urban area. The majority of public transport
trips in Preston are made to and from the city centre, with around 60 per cent of journeys
originating or terminating at the bus station.
There are three main commercial bus operators, each operating fairly distinct geographical
areas:
•
Preston Bus, the former municipal operator, now employee-owned, broadly serving
the north of the city;
•
Stagecoach Northwest, part of one of the three largest UK bus companies, serving the
southwest and the southeast of the city; and
•
John Fishwick & Sons, an independent, family-owned operator, over 90 years old,
broadly serving the south.
In addition, there is a number of smaller companies operating tendered services.
9.3.1.2.
The market access regime
Bus deregulation in the United Kingdom
The 1985 Transport Act radically altered the bus market in the United Kingdom with full
deregulation occurring outside London and Northern Ireland. The main elements of the Act
were:43
•
Removal of control of entry to and exit from the local bus market, subject to a 42-day
notice period.
•
Compulsory competitive tendering for loss-making services, provided there is no
undue interference with the viability of commercial services.
•
Changes in ownership and control of the bus companies; the state-owned National
Bus Company was privatised as 70 different area companies, whereas the municipal
42
A number of issues have already been discussed in Chapter 8 on Manchester. For ease of reading, some of the key
points are repeated here, although in some cases the reader is referred to the Manchester chapter for more details.
43
See Mackie, P and Preston, J (1996) The Local Bus Market: A Case Study of Regulatory Change. Avebury (Aldershot,
Hants).
131
City Study: Preston
operators were put at arms length from the authority. Many of the latter companies
were sold at a later stage.
•
Limiting the local authority powers and duties to, among other things,
supplementing commercial services, operating a concessionary fares scheme,
running bus stations and promoting voluntary travelcards.
•
Introduction of general competition law to the bus market.
•
Subsidy cuts, especially in the metropolitan areas.
Full deregulation occurred on October 26, 1986.
History of bus competition in Preston44
In Preston, the municipal operator Preston Borough Transport registered some 95 per cent of
its services commercially after deregulation. It had been characterised as a high-cost, highfares operator with high patronage levels. In April 1987, less than six months after
deregulation took place, a new entrant begun operations in the Preston area, trading under
the name Zippy. Zippy entered with some 80 minibuses and operated innovative routes
with high frequencies (including hail and ride services), had new and clean vehicles,
friendly staff and did not operate an exact fares policy. However, it matched the
incumbent’s fares, so that competition took place on frequency and quality but not on price.
Indeed, when Preston Borough Transport introduced a significant fares increase in
November 1987 (over 3 per cent in real terms), the new fares were immediately matched by
Zippy.
The municipal operator responded to the new entrant by purchasing a fleet of minibuses as
well, with the first minibuses being introduced two weeks after the first Zippy minibus
service. In July 1987, it also restructured its network and increased service levels on its most
profitable routes. As a result, the total stage bus mileage in the Preston Borough area
increased by around 130 per cent, i.e. more than doubled, over a period of three months.45
However, Zippy found itself unable to sustain its services. In September 1987, the company
reduced its network and increasingly focused on competing with Ribble, a former National
Bus Company operating south of Preston. Ribble, itself successfully privatised through a
management buy-out, responded by buying out Zippy itself. As a result, in March 1988,
Zippy’s network was again restructured with only 31 vehicles left in operation (as opposed
to the original 80).
44
This section on the nature of competition in the Preston bus market draws heavily on Mackie, P and Preston, J.
(1988) “Competition in the urban bus market: a case study”. Proceedings PTRC Summer Annual Meeting, Seminar C:
Public Transport Planning and Operations, pp 157-170.
45
The increase in seat mileage was much lower as many routes were now operated by minibuses.
132
City Study: Preston
A number of reasons have been suggested for Zippy losing the battle. The main reason
appears to be that the bus market in Preston was not highly contestable. Some of the factors
that contributed to this were:
•
access to bus stations (Zippy could not be prevented from using the central bus
station, but it was alleged they received the less favourably located stands. In any
case, many people in Preston had developed a habit of using certain stands in the bus
station);
•
different financial structures (the municipal operator had not been privatised and
hence a relatively low return on capital might be acceptable);
•
difficulties in retaining staff with many going to the incumbent;
•
local knowledge and experience of the incumbent; and
•
the ability of the incumbent to react quickly, for example by deploying a minibus
fleet only two weeks after the entrant had started its operations.
Current situation
In contrast to the initial frequent changes after deregulation, the bus market in Preston is
now much more stable. Preston Bus, as the former municipal operator is now called,
continues to operate in its traditional area. It operates virtually all its services commercially,
including evening and Sunday services, implying the continued existence of cross-subsidy
between services. The company had been privatised in 1993 by means of an employee buyout and is now the only employee-owned bus operator in the United Kingdom. Although
the company is profitable, the returns that are achieved are not particularly high. It is
therefore becoming more difficult to find sufficient employees interested in the scheme:
many choose not to participate.
Ribble had been sold out to Stagecoach in 1989 and this company has now merged two of its
businesses in the Northwest of England into Stagecoach Northwest. This company operates
a number of its services commercially at all times, but registers some other services only
during daytime Mondays to Saturdays. The third commercial operator, John Fishwick &
Sons, continues to operate in its established area to the South of Preston, where it has been
active for over 90 years. It too operates virtually all services commercially. In recent years,
it has been facing competition on its main corridor from another company, Blue Bus.
Fishwick responded to this entrant by registering a “frequent service” on its main corridor,
which implies a service at least every ten minutes without the need to register the exact
timetable details. This allowed Fishwick to run a flexible timetable, including the
duplication of Blue Bus’s services. Recently, Blue Bus has decreased its service from four to
one buses per hour, which indicates that Fishwick has effectively won the battle
Services that are not run commercially are put out to tender by Lancashire County Council.
However, for this to happen, two criteria must be met. The first criterion is that the revenue
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earned by the service should cover at least 20 per cent of its gross costs. The second criterion
is that the subsidy per passenger should not exceed €3.25. It is also tried to meet certain
minimum service levels, although this is more an issue in rural areas outside Preston. In
Preston itself, the minimum service levels are in almost all cases achieved by the commercial
services. Consequently, with just one exception, there are no routes in Preston that are
entirely tendered (i.e. tendered services not just during evenings and Sundays but also at all
other times).
The invitations to tender specify the timetable, the type of vehicle to be used and the seating
capacity. The authority also specifies fare tables, unlike GMPTE in Manchester, and
provides the operators with a revenue estimate. Operators are allowed to submit noncompliant bids or block bids, but are also required to submit a compliant tender.
Typically, five or six bids per contract are received. This number is fairly stable for school
services but is currently on the increase for scheduled services. The agreed price is indexed
each year according to a transport price index. Most contracts run for four or five years. In
recent years, prices for renewed contracts have been rising fairly rapidly.
A mixture of minimum cost (gross subsidy) and minimum subsidy (net subsidy) contracts is
used. Almost all school contracts are operated on a minimum cost basis. For the scheduled
services, it is the operator’s choice whether to bid on a minimum cost basis, a minimum
subsidy basis, or on both. If the council can choose, it will normally award the contract on a
minimum cost basis in cases where the revenue estimate provided by the operator is
relatively certain, whereas a minimum subsidy contract may be used when the estimated
revenue by the bidder is higher than the authority had thought. Out of 41 contracts in
Preston, 38 contracts are currently on a minimum cost basis. The majority of these are
contracts for school services.
Lancashire County Council monitors the tendered services and can terminate the contracts
without giving notice if they are not adhered to, or can issue formal warnings. Operators
can also terminate agreements but are subject to a 12-week notice period. If services are
cancelled, the subsidy payable is reduced at twice the average rate, i.e. an operator that
cancels services not only does not get paid for them but also incurs a penalty. The Council
also checks the vehicles that are used, in conjunction with the Vehicle Inspectorate. Out of
350 checks that carried out last year, 20 led to a prohibition.
Like in Greater Manchester, a Countywide Quality Bus Partnership is being negotiated in
Lancashire between the County Council and the main operators. The main aims of the
agreement are similar to the Manchester agreement (see section 8.3.1.2 of the Manchester
chapter for details).
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City Study: Preston
9.4.
9.4.1.1.
Modal splits
Unfortunately, the most recent modal split figures from the Preston area date from the 1991
Census (the 2001 Census is currently being analysed). For travel to work in Preston and in
the whole of the Lancashire county, these are the figures presented in Table 9.1. The local
authority has indicated that in recent years, bus use has not fallen, although this does not
necessarily apply to the bus market share.
Table 9.1
Modal Splits in Preston and Lancashire (Travel to Work), 1991
Mode
Rail
Bus
Car
Cycle
Foot
Other/Work at home
Total
Source: Lancashire Local Transport Plan 2001/02 – 2005/06
9.4.1.2.
Preston (%)
0.6
14.5
59.5
3.0
14.9
7.6
100
Lancashire (%)
0.9
8.3
65.4
2.7
13.8
8.9
100
Patronage
The total number of public transport trips in the Preston area is in the order of 20 million per
year. This implies about three trips per resident per week. Due to confidentiality
constraints, it is not possible to give the exact figure or to disaggregate the figure by
operator. Details on the number of passenger kilometres are unknown as not all operators
record these figures.
9.4.1.3.
Fares
The operators in Preston operate a fare system based on stages. Table 9.2 contains indicative
details on fares that are currently charged by Preston Bus.
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City Study: Preston
Table 9.2
Indicative Preston Bus Fares
Indicative fare (€)
Approximate fare per
kilometre (€; based on midpoint of range)
Up to 0.8 km
0.48
1.20
0.8 to 1.6 km
0.81
0.68
1.6 to 2.4 km
1.13
0.57
2.4 to 4.0 km
1.34
0.42
4.0 to 5.6 km
1.48
0.31
5.6 to 6.4 km
1.53
0.26
Length of journey
Source: Preston Bus
In addition, the operators operate daily, weekly and monthly tickets. A daily ticket valid on
all Preston Bus services (not on other operators) costs €4.03 (£2.50). Preston Bus also offers
longer-term Rambler tickets at the following prices:
Table 9.3
Preston Bus Rambler Tickets
7 Day
Monthly
Quarterly
Adult
€12.10 (GB£7.50)
€43.15 (GB£26.75)
€119.35 (GB£74.00)
Child
€7.60 (GB£4.70)
€26.51 (GB£16.50)
€73.80 (GB£45.75)
Student
€10.90 (GB£6.75)
€37.10 (GB£23.00)
n/a
Source: Preston Bus
Stagecoach North West offers, in addition to single cash fares, a weekly ticket priced at
€15.30 (GB£9.50). Fishwick operates single cash fares only, which following includes single
as well as day return tickets.
9.4.1.4.
There are no demand management schemes in Preston. On-street parking is currently free,
although proposals are being developed to introduce charges in areas covered by limited
waiting near the town centre.
There are also little traffic management schemes, although a number of Quality Bus
Corridors (see section 9.4.4) are being developed that include bus priority measures. Again,
there are proposals for traffic management, which will include selected part-time road
closures for vehicles, initially during off-peak periods, in order to improve conditions for
pedestrians and buses. These proposals have not yet been implemented.
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City Study: Preston
9.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
The operators achieve average speeds in the order of 20 km/hr, depending on whether they
mainly operate in urban or in sub-urban areas.
The total number of buses operated by the commercial operators in the Preston area is in the
order of 300, although a number of these run on interurban routes from Preston. These
buses operate around 15 million kilometres per year.
Data on the total number of route kilometres have been provided but unfortunately not on a
consistent basis (apparently there are differences in whether multiple lines along a route are
counted separately or not). These are not therefore reported here.
9.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Data on costs and revenues have been provided by the main commercial operators but, for
reasons of commercial confidentiality, cannot be reported here.
The average cost per vehicle kilometre in the Preston area, weighted by the number of
vehicle kilometres operated, is in the order of €1.60 (GB£1). It should be noted that this is a
very rough approximation, which is useful for indicative purposes only. It should also be
noted that there are major cost differences between operators.
9.4.3.2.
Commercial services in Preston do not receive direct subsidy payments, although they enjoy
a fuel duty rebate and are reimbursed for the costs of carrying concessionary passengers.
Fuel duty rebate is paid at a national level, whereas Lancashire County Council is
responsible for the cost of accepting concessionary fares.
Tendered services also enjoy a fuel duty rebate and concessionary fares reimbursements. In
addition, for these services a general operating subsidy is payable. These subsidies are paid
by Lancashire County Council, which is also responsible for specifying the tendered
services.
9.4.3.3.
All commercial operators in Preston earn a significant proportion of their revenue from nonbus related sources. Fishwick, for example, operates a large private hire and coach holiday
business. The exact figures involved cannot be reported here. However, the deregulated
environment provides very powerful incentives for maximising other commercial revenues.
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City Study: Preston
9.4.3.4.
For commercial services in Preston, there is no accountability and no transparency. Preston
Bus published annual accounts but takes advantage of exemptions in the Companies Act.
As a result, it for example does not declare its turnover. Stagecoach North West publishes
accounts for the North West as a whole, without making disaggregations. Of course, it can
be argued that there is no need for accountability and transparency for services that do not
involve public money.
Accountability for the subsidised services is primarily achieved through the tendering
process: competitive pressures should ensure that subsidies are not higher than necessary.
Once a tender has been awarded, the agreed subsidy becomes payable without the operators
having to justify the actual costs they incur.
9.4.4.1.
Frequency
Frequency levels in Preston are generally good; many routes operate at 10 or 12 minute
frequencies and there are a number of routes operated by minibuses that enjoy 5 or 6 minute
frequencies. Thinner routes have lower frequencies but routes in the urban area without at
least a 30-minute frequency level are rare. Evening and Sunday frequencies are also very
good: a significant number of routes are served by three of four buses per hour during these
times, with hourly services on most of the thinner routes.
The high frequency levels are partly due to entry deterrence strategies of the incumbent
operators. By running as many buses per hour as possible, they avoid leaving “gaps” in
which a competitor could profitably enter. This competitive threat usually causes
commercially operators to run more services than they would do in the absence of potential
competition, and this is certainly the case in Preston.
9.4.4.2.
Reliability
Both Preston Bus and Fishwick aim to provide a high quality service in terms of reliability,
with Fishwick indicating that services are never allowed to be cancelled. The number of
failures at Stagecoach is not very high either, although it increased significantly during
2000/2001. The punctuality of all the operators is however adversely affected by heavy
traffic congestion in Preston. In fact, the fuel consumption per kilometre of buses in Preston
is almost as high as of buses in London. At Stagecoach, where the target is to have 95 per
cent of buses arrive within five minutes of their scheduled arrival time, problems with
punctuality became so severe a few years ago that the company was penalised under the
1985 Transport Act (see section 8.2.2.2 of the Manchester chapter).
One of the main aims of the countywide Quality Bus Partnership programme will be to
relieve these congestion problems. In Preston, the first Quality Corridor (marketed under
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City Study: Preston
the name “SuperRoute”) is already in operation and more are to follow. The improvements
mainly involve bus priority measures, new vehicles and improved bus stops. The Quality
Corridors are certainly an improvement compared to the previous standards. In the context
of our other comparator cities, though, they would probably have to be regarded as
“average”. There are however examples of more radical Quality Bus Partnerships in the
United Kingdom that involve bus lanes or even guided busways.
9.4.4.3.
Accessibility
Not only do the routes in Preston enjoy high frequencies, there is also a very large number of
routes in the first place. With just one exception, Lancashire County Council does not need
to subsidise daytime services to areas that would not otherwise be served. Like the high
frequencies, the dense network is partly caused by the nature of competition in the bus
market. If the operator would run a network as to maximise their profits, there might well
be gaps in the network in which competitors could develop new services. Consequently, the
threat of entry not only causes the incumbent operator to run high frequencies but also to
run dense networks, at least to a larger extent than it would have done in the absence of a
competitive threat.
9.4.4.4.
The quality of the buses used is variable. The average age of the Preston Bus fleet is around
9.5 years. Of the 117 vehicles, 18 double deckers have low floors, which are mainly used
for the Superbus routes (see below). Stagecoach does not operate any low-floor buses at all,
while Fishwick only has a few.
A final useful insight into the quality of the Preston public transport system has been
provided by Lancashire County Council. As part of the Best Value Programme for local
authorities, the Council has measured the satisfaction among users of public transport and
public transport information. Some key results are presented in Table 9.4.
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City Study: Preston
Table 9.4
Satisfaction with Bus Services in Preston
Item
Satisfaction score46
(%)
The frequency of the bus service
80
The provision of bus stops
82
The state of the bus stops
63
The timeliness of the service
70
The bus routes
72
The cost of bus service
34
The local bus service overall
74
The amount of information
71
The clarity of the information
66
The accuracy of the information
65
The provision of public transport information overall
62
Source: Lancashire County Council
The satisfaction levels in Table 9.4 can be regarded as very high, especially as far as the
actual bus services are concerned. However, the provision of information is also generally
rated highly. It should be noted that on all items regarding the service and the information
provision, Preston scored significantly higher than any other area in Lancashire with typical
satisfaction scores elsewhere around 50 per cent. The only remarkable exception is the
satisfaction with the level of fares charged. Not only does this item score low in absolute
terms with only around one third of respondents being satisfied, Preston also hardly rates
any better on this item than the Lancashire average.
9.4.5.1.
Most journeys in Preston are made without making changes between buses; in fact, around
60 per cent of journeys originate and terminate at the bus station. The bus station is
managed by the local authority and used by all operators. This means that those travellers
that do need to change can do so conveniently at the bus station.
For rail passengers arriving into Preston, the picture is rather different. The bus and rail
stations are situated at opposite ends of the city centre and the rail station is not served by
any buses, although a number of routes run nearby.
46
“Satisfied” is defined as the percentage of respondents being “very satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with the item in
question. The percentages are of all users that expressed a view, which includes both public transport users and
non-public transport users. Data for those that have used the service or seen the information are available as well,
but only for the county as a whole.
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A new initiative though is the Preston Shuttle Service, operated and funded jointly by Virgin
Trains and Stagecoach Northwest. The service, which is free to rail passengers and costs
only 20 pence for others, runs every 20 minutes between the railway station, the town centre
and the bus station. The service started in February this year, initially on a trial basis for
three months. However, the link does not appear to be very successful and it is not clear
whether it will continue to operate.
There is also a highly successful P&R scheme in operation in Preston. There are about 400
parking places, which are used by a mixture of commuters and shoppers, and the park is
very full for most of the time. Preston Bus runs a dedicated commercial minibus service
between the site and the city centre with a service every 6 minutes between 8am and 6pm.
The fare (single or return) for the 1.5 km journey is €1.60 (GB£1) before 9.45 am and €1
(GB£0.60) afterwards. The parking fee is €1.60 (GB£1) before 9.45 am, with free parking
afterwards.
9.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
Although individual operators offer integrated tickets for travel across their own networks,
there is no tariff integration between operators in Preston at the moment. There are no
through single and return tickets and there are no multi-operator travelcards. The only
exception is the €1.60 (GB£1) add-on bus ticket that is available to Virgin Trains customers
and is valid on all operators in Preston. However, this scheme is hardly used by customers
with only a few add-on tickets sold each month.
Although the County Council is keen to introduce a countywide multi-operator travelcard
scheme, the operators have so far been unwilling to participate in such a scheme. It should
be kept in mind that the Preston operators operate in fairly distinct areas and that some 60
per cent of trips originate or terminate at the bus station. With few people having to change
between bus services, let alone operators, there is probably less need for integrated ticketing
in Preston than in some other areas.
The extent to which joint ticketing schemes are consistent with competition law is
another potential difficulty in establishing such schemes. Full details are provided in
Section 8.4.5.2 of the Manchester case study. A key problem is for schemes to be
exempted from the Act under the proposed Block Exemption,47 certain criteria must be met.
One of these is a requirement that revenue obtained from multi-operator travelcards must be
allocated on the basis of passenger kilometres (as opposed to revenue foregone). Many in
the industry fear that the administration costs of allocating revenue on this basis will in
many cases exceed the entire benefit of the schemes.
47
Office of Fair Trading (2001) Public Transport Ticketing Scheme Block Exemption – Formal consultation draft.
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City Study: Preston
9.4.5.3.
In Preston, timetables are produced both by Lancashire County Council and by the
commercial operators. The Council timetables include all services on a particular route; the
operator timetables usually do not include any services operated by competitors. A
significant number of routes are however operated by one operator only and in such cases,
two identical timetables will exist, one published by the operator and one by the Council.
This especially applies to Preston Bus routes and the Council and Preston Bus have now
agreed to publish a series of joint timetables.
The operators have varying policies as to whether to include services not operated by
themselves in their timetables. Directly competing services will not normally be included.
For example, the Fishwick Sunday timetable for route 109 only includes its own commercial
two-hourly service, whereas in fact an hourly service exists with alternate commercial
services operated by Fishwick and Stagecoach.
The picture is more mixed as far as including tendered evening and Sunday services are
concerned that are operated by another operator. For example, Fishwick’s timetable
suggests that the last route 117 service on weekdays departs at 16.30 from Preston Bus
Station, whereas there is in fact an 18.30 departure operated on behalf of Lancashire County
Council by a third party. On the other hand, Stagecoach does include in its timetable leaflets
the evening and Sunday services on its routes to Blackpool that are operated by Blackpool
Transport on behalf of the Council.
The Council also produces a network map, with details of all services, information on the
bus station and details of the town centre stops. Also, the Council pioneered the
introduction of a national telephone information number by linking its network of County
Information Centres. The service, operated under contract by Stagecoach, is accessible at
national call rates and provides information on all public transport modes in the county.
Furthermore, the County has a strategy to increase the proportion of bus stops with
timetable displays from 28 per cent at present to 100 per cent by March 2009. Real-time
information will also be introduced at key interchange points.
In spite of these important initiatives, the level of information integration in Preston cannot
currently be regarded as good. The main problems include the complexity of the underlying
network and the poor numbering system. As a result, any information, no matter how well
presented, will be inherently difficult to understand. In addition, changes to the timetable
are frequent, although Preston Bus have tried to limit the number of structural changes.
Although the Council aims to create an integrated, easy to understand network, this is in
practice not easy to realise.
9.4.5.4.
As already indicated in the Manchester chapter, the integration of transport with land use in
many UK cities has traditionally not been very good due to the development of out-of-town
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City Study: Preston
shopping centres and greenfield housing estates. These are often difficult for high-density
public transport to access.
In recent years, however, the policy emphasis has been changing. The draft Regional
Planning Guidance for the North West acknowledges that the integration of land use and
transport planning is a key aspect of solving the region’s transport problems. It also
recognises however that land use change is a long-term process and that management of
transport demand created by the existing land use pattern must be addressed.
Consequently, the North West regional transport strategy has been developed as an integral
part of the review of Regional Planning Guidance, and the Lancashire Local Transport Plan
is consistent with the regional transport strategy. In turn, the Local Plan that has been
developed for the Preston Area is consistent with the Lancashire Local Transport Plan. It
should be noted though that in Preston, the city centre has remained the focal point of
activity. In fact, this has led to severe congestion around the town centre for much of the
day.
In summary, we conclude that the integration between land use and transport policies is
now good, unlike in the past. Past land use developments in Preston have however been
relatively favourable to the public transport network.
9.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
Apart from tendering unprofitable routes for social reasons (see Section 9.3.1.2), the main
other policy to improve social cohesion is the Lancashire concessionary fare scheme.
The scheme applies to single cash fares only and offers half fare travel for men aged 65 years
or over and women aged 60 years or over. However, the reductions are only available to
people in possession of a pass which must be issued in Lancashire or West Yorkshire. The
implication is that only “local” pensioners are eligible for concessionary fares. Persons aged
70 years or over can get free travel in the Preston area, provided they are Preston residents.
The operators are reimbursed by Lancashire county council for accepting the concessionary
fares, but not for the full amount. Account is taken of the fact that concessionary fares
generate additional demand. As a result, operators do not receive the full difference
between the concessionary and ordinary fares but only a part of that. When an elderly
person makes a half-fare trip that would otherwise cost €1, the person will pay a fare of 50ct
and the authority will pay another 35ct to the operator. When the same trip would be made
free of charge by someone aged over 70, the authority would pay around 70ct to the
operator. Of the total budget for the concessionary fare scheme, over 80 per cent is spent on
the free-fare part of the scheme.
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City Study: Preston
9.4.6.2.
General access issues are discussed in Section 9.4.4. As noted there, 18 double deckers of the
117 vehicles operated by Preston Bus have low floors, which are mainly used for the
Superbus routes. Stagecoach does not operate any low-floor buses at all, while Fishwick
only has a few.
As the Preston public transport system is entirely bus-based, deregulated and almost
entirely run commercially, it is probably the most flexible system in terms of responding to
external changes of all cities in our study. Operators set fares and service levels and are free
to make adjustments subject to a 42-day notice period. For the tendered services, mainly
some evening and Sunday services in the Stagecoach area, flexibility is less due to
contractual arrangements specifying services. However, the proportion of tendered services
in Preston is very low. We would therefore rate the flexibility of the Preston public
transport system in terms of responding to external changes as excellent.
9.4.8.1.
The biggest internal change that the Preston public transport system has seen was of course
the 1986 deregulation. As described in Section 9.3.1.2, this led to a period with heavy
competition in Preston and major instability. By contrast, the present situation is
remarkably stable.
In the Manchester chapter, we have suggested that the initial problems could probably only
have been avoided by choosing an entirely different restructuring model. However, the
Preston market is illustrative in that the deregulated market does settle down after the initial
instable phase.
9.4.8.2.
Staffing issues
The wage levels paid by the operators in Preston vary considerably across operators. The
wages paid by Stagecoach are low, even below the UK average for bus and coach drivers of
€9.80.48 The two other commercial operators pay a lot more and have wages significantly
above the UK average. However, bus drivers in Preston work long weeks with the average
being at or well above the average UK levels. Working weeks of 55 hours are by no means
an exception, although it should be added that drivers in Preston are often very happy with
such working weeks and the income they earn as a result. In Section 8.3.6.1 of the
48
Source of the UK average figure: Office for National Statistics (2000) New Earnings Survey. Although the Preston
operators have supplied details on the wage levels they pay to their drivers, they have done so on a confidential
basis. The figures cannot therefore be published here.
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City Study: Preston
Manchester chapter, a table is included which contains details on the average earnings of
bus drivers in the United Kingdom, as well as details on earnings elsewhere in the economy.
The differences in pay levels are reflected in the staff turnover figures, which are very low
for Preston Bus and Fishwick, and rather high for Stagecoach. Stagecoach also experienced a
serious industrial dispute in the summer of 2000 when a series of 15 one-day strikes
occurred.
An interesting feature of the Preston public transport system in terms of labour market
issues is the fact that Preston Bus is employee-owned. When the company was bought from
the council in 1993, an explicit aim was to preserve staff employment conditions and it was
felt that the best way to achieve this was to allow the employees to buy a stake in the
company. All permanent staff were given the option to buy a package of 1000 shares at
€1.60 each (requiring an investment of almost €2,000 at January 2001 prices) on a take it or
leave it basis, i.e. no other packages were available. Management were offered the same
package as the other staff, i.e. directors owned the same amount of shares as drivers. A bank
provided personal loans if required, whereas Preston Bus provided loans to those that had
insufficient credit ratings. Around 90 per cent of those eligible did actually buy the package.
The investment so far would have been worthwhile: the €2,000 initial investment would
now be worth almost €16,000, both at January 2001 prices.
The scheme however is now less popular then it used to be; the number of shareholders is
down from 290 to 160 and a trust owns more than 30 per cent of shares at the moment. New
members tend to be less interested as the share price does not rise very rapidly any more:
the returns on the stock market are often higher. A second factor is the fact that in 1993,
many staff bought shares, as they believed that the scheme would protect their position,
both in terms of employment conditions and pensions. A new member of staff however
does not yet have a position and is therefore less interested in protecting its pension by
buying shares. It is not believed that the share ownership has improved staff attitudes,
although staff attitudes were already relatively good.
Generally speaking, the relationship of the unions with Preston Bus is reasonable. Problems
do however occur from time to time, currently over a recent schedule change and also in
general over the lack of proper grievance procedures. In 1996, there were three one-hour
strikes in 1996 over wage levels. No strikes have however occurred since then. At
Stagecoach North West, industrial relations are more difficult, however. In the summer of
2000, a series of 15 one-day strikes occurred, mainly related to the fact that new drivers earn
substantially less than existing drivers.
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City Study: Preston
9.4.9.1.
9.4.9.2.
Access to airports
Not applicable for Preston.
The Lancashire Local Transport Plan contains several measures to induce a modal shift from
private to public transport, mainly aimed at relieving congestion but also explicitly at
reducing local air pollution, noise problems and greenhouse gas emissions. As far as public
transport is concerned, the main initiative is the countywide Quality Bus Partnerships to
improve the quality of bus services. In Preston, it is indicated that air pollution is a problem,
although a final assessment still has to be made.
In terms of the environmental damage caused directly by public transport, the countywide
Quality Bus Partnership has resulted in a commitment by the operators to increase the
number of buses meeting either Euro Standards or operating with green fuels or catalysts.
Discussions with participating operators are due to be completed by Summer 2001.
9.5.
negative aspects of the Preston system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
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City Study: Preston
Table 9.5
Preston Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
•
•
Competition tends to disappear with
operators limiting themselves to their
established routes
High cost recovery
Service quality
Service quality
•
Frequency and network coverage are
very good.
•
•
Good reliability
Some service instability in the period
immediately following deregulation.
•
•
Physical integration could be
improved.
•
Poor tariff integration.
•
Relatively poor information
integration, although this is
improving.
New initiatives to improve
integration with land use planning.
Social cohesion
•
Social cohesion
Fairly good concessionary fares
system.
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
•
Deregulation led to “bus wars” and
instability in services for some time.
•
Staff working conditions at
Stagecoach deteriorated
Staff continue to enjoy good working
conditions at Preston Bus and
Fishwick
Economic growth
Economic growth
•
9.6.
Specific plans to increase public
transport modal shifts in order to
reduce pollution levels.
Preston “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Preston system.
147
City Study: Preston
Table 9.6
Preston Summary “Scorecard”
Preston
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
•
recovery
•
Very high bus frequencies and network
coverage – a good quality bus-based
public transport system
•
Flexible system due to operator freedom
to determine service levels and timetables
•
Staff at the main operator own the
company themselves and enjoy good
working conditions
•
Initial instability following a major “bus
war”
Competition tends to disappear and
operators stick to their own territory
Poor tariff integration
Information integration is
good,
especially
with
publishing their own
without always including
services
not very
operators
timetables
competing
148
City Study: The Hague
10.
CITY STUDY: THE HAGUE49
10.1. Key Facts
•
Tram, bus and heavy-rail based system.
•
Competitive tendering being introduced. Gradual process with first concession
awarded to incumbent.
•
Regional body responsible for public transport including setting service levels.
•
Fares set under uniform National Fare System.
10.2. City Description
The Hague is the third largest Dutch city with a population of around 450,000. It is the
administrative capital, though Amsterdam is the official capital. The Hague is the home of
both court and government and therefore a city dominated by civil servants. The city is
situated in the west of the country along the coast. It is relatively prosperous with less social
problems than in most of the other large Dutch cities.
There are three layers of government involved in public transport in The Hague. The City
Council (gemeente Den Haag) owns the municipal operator HTM. The City Council also
has a major vote in the next layer of government, the regional body “Stadsgewest
Haaglanden”. This body can be regarded as a Greater The Hague government and will be
referred to as “Haaglanden” in the remainder of this section. In the Haaglanden authority,
The Hague City Council and 12 smaller councils in the surrounding area work together on
issues that go beyond the boundaries of the City of The Hague. Among other things,
Haaglanden is responsible for public transport in the area. The third layer of government is
the national one, mainly the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management.50
This Ministry is currently responsible for the provision of rail transport in Haaglanden and
is responsible for setting fares, although Haaglanden may charge lower fares if they so wish.
The issues in the respective responsibilities of local and national government bodies for
public transport in Haaglanden are discussed in more detail in Sections 10.3.1.2 and 0.
49
All prices mentioned in this chapter have been converted into January 2001 prices and then into euros using the
official conversion rate of €1 = NLG 2.20371
50
Hereafter referred to as Ministry of Transport.
149
10.3. Institutional/Regulatory Framework
10.3.1.1.
Public transport in The Hague
The public transport network in Haaglanden consists of a mix of tram, bus and heavy rail
services. The Hague urban area is well covered by a network of (traditional) tramlines,
running on the street or on separate rights-of-way. The tramlines are supplemented by bus
lines. Heavy rail is important in the interurban transport network. There are frequent local
services on the main lines that are also served by Intercity services. In addition, there are
two dedicated suburban rail lines, one of them constructed in the 1980s. There is one
interurban tramline, with other places without rail connections served by buses. Of the
three modes, tram is the most important one with an indicative market share in the
Haaglanden public transport market of around 60 per cent. This is followed by bus and
heavy rail, with the share of heavy rail estimated as being less than 10 per cent.51
There are currently three operators involved in the provision of public transport in the
Haaglanden area. The municipal operator HTM is responsible for the operation of the tram
network and the urban bus services. Interurban bus services are operated by Connexxion,
the successor company to the former national operator of interurban bus services VSN. NS,
the national heavy rail operator, is responsible for local services on both the main lines and
the dedicated suburban lines.
All operators are public limited companies, with all equity owned by the City of The Hague
(HTM) and the national government (NS and Connexxion).
10.3.1.2.
The market access regime
Tram/bus
Traditionally, public transport in the Netherlands was provided by operators owned by
national or local governments. In The Hague, HTM was given the exclusive rights for the
operation of the tram and urban bus network, with similar rights given to Connexxion for
the interurban bus services. No other operators were allowed to enter the market.
The operators were subsidised by the national government. The Ministry of Transport
allocated a subsidy to the operators on the basis of annual budget rounds. It was also
responsible for setting fare levels. There is an integrated ticketing system in the
Netherlands, the “National Fare System”. This system allows customers to use one ticket for
all tram, bus and underground services in the Netherlands. The fare increases within this
51
These figures are estimated on a very rough basis and are only intended to give the reader an idea of the relative
importance of each of the three modes.
150
system were determined annually by Parliament and were often politically contentious. The
public transport operators were responsible for determining service levels and planning the
services. Their proposals however had to be approved by the relevant local or regional
government.
With the 2000 Passenger Transport Act (Wet Personenvervoer 2000), the traditional situation
has changed. One of the objectives of the Act was to introduce a clearer governance
structure for public transport in the Netherlands, in particular by transferring
responsibilities and funding powers from national to regional government bodies. Another
policy aim was to introduce competition for the market of public transport provision.
The changes are illustrated in Figure 10.1. One of the main changes is the fact that operators
are now funded through regional government instead of through the national Ministry of
Transport. At the same time, the initiative for determining and planning public transport
service levels has shifted from the operators to the regional government bodies. As a result,
regional governments are now able to both specify service levels and to provide subsidy for
them.
Figure 10.1
Changes in Funding and Governance Arrangements
Funds
Old
Situation
National
National
Government
Government
Operator
Operator
Local/Regional
Local/Regional
Government
Government
New
Situation
National
National
Government
Government
Funds
Approves
timetable
Operator
Operator
Local/Regional
Local/Regional
Government
Government
Funds and
sets service
levels
151
The subsidy payments to the operators are no longer determined annually, but agreed upon
in advance for a number of years. To this end, all regional governments are required to
enter into concession agreements with the operators in their area by January 1st, 2002 at the
latest. The existing operator is given exclusive negotiating rights for the first concession,
which may last for a maximum of six years. After expiry of the first concession period, the
regional governments are required to put the concessions out to tender. Concession periods
may be for a maximum of six years, although longer periods may be allowed in certain
circumstances. These include concessions that involve large investments in rolling stock,
where no leasing market can be realised for the vehicles and where the local authority is not
able to own the rolling stock itself.
The Act specifies that 35 per cent of Dutch interurban public transport services (excluding
trains) must be subject to competitive tender by January 1st, 2003, rising to 100 per cent by
January 1st, 2006. For urban transport, the dates are January 1st, 2006 and January 1st, 2007
respectively. However, the articles relating to urban transport will only come in force in
2005, depending on the results of an evaluation of the initial results of the Act in 2004.
As shown in Figure 10.1, the regional governments are being funded by the national
government, which now pays a similar amount of money to the regional bodies as it used to
pay directly to the operators. It is the intention that long-term subsidy agreements will be
agreed between the national government and the regional bodies in order to give them
funding stability. For example, in the case of Haaglanden, a 10-year contract has been
proposed but not yet agreed on.
The subsidy from national to regional government is revenue based: for each € of revenue
earned in the regional government’s area, the national government pays around €1.48 to the
regional authority. The authorities are free to use the same subsidy system in their
agreements with the operators or to use a different method. They are also free to spend the
money as they wish, as long as it is spent on public transport.
The revenue-based subsidy from the national government gives regional governments an
incentive to focus on services that generate demand and thereby revenue. There are
however two main disadvantages to the system, which therefore is currently under review.
The first disadvantage is the impact of the system when patronage and revenue are falling.
In such cases, subsidy from the national government will fall too. This could induce a
vicious circle of patronage falls leading to subsidy cuts, leading to service cuts that in turn
lead to even lower patronage.
The second disadvantage is the potential cost of increased risks. Public transport
expenditure often takes up a large part of the total budget of a regional government. If for
some reason the regional government ends up paying more subsidy to the operators than it
receives from the national government, the consequences for the authority budget could be
serious. In practice, therefore, regional governments usually use the same subsidy formula
in their contracts with operators as in their agreement with the national government.
152
Consequently, operators too are subsidised on the basis of revenue earned and this means
that the operators bear an amplified revenue risk.52 There are concerns that in the future,
private operators bidding for tenders will charge heavy risk premiums for bearing this
amplified revenue risk.
A further problem with the revenue based subsidy approach is the limited freedom of
regional governments to set fare levels for services in their area. In theory, regional
authorities have this freedom, but in practice their actions are very much constrained by the
continued requirement to accept the integrated National Fare System on all public transport
services.53 Fare levels for this system will still be set by the government. In the Netherlands,
there is a high degree of tariff integration in public transport (see Section 10.4.5.2) and it is
not regarded as acceptable if this integration would be lost as a result of institutional and
regulatory reforms in the public transport sector.
In practice, this requirement means that regional governments can only introduce new fares
that are lower than the National Fare System. As the price elasticity for public transport in
the Netherlands tends to be low, lower fares do not generate much additional demand and
often result in lower overall revenue and consequently less subsidy from the national
government. For most regional governments, lower fares are not therefore an attractive
option. It is hoped that the planned nationwide introduction of a smart-card ticketing
scheme between 2003 and 2006 will allow more price differentiation while preserving tariff
integration.
In Haaglanden, a six-year concession has now been agreed with the interurban operator
Connexxion. This contract includes a quality incentive regime: the annual subsidy can be
increased or cut by one per cent if quality levels are above or below the standards agreed. It
is intended that Connexxion’s urban services will be put out to tender in 2003. Haaglanden
is also in the process of agreeing a concession with the urban operator HTM, with it being
likely that a six-year concession will be agreed for HTM’s tram network. HTM’s bus
network however will probably be split up into four parts, all to be tendered in 2002/2003.
The four parts will not be areas, which would make the operation of through services
difficult, but rather groups of lines. Routes, service levels and fares will all be specified
tightly with little freedom for the operators. It looks likely that net cost contracts will be
used for this and all other public transport tenders in the Netherlands.
A final remark on the regulatory framework for trams and buses in Haaglanden is that,
although the urban operator HTM is being put more at arm’s length from the council, it still
needs to justify even the smallest expenditures to the Haaglanden regional authority. As we
will also see below, the authorities in the Haaglanden area do not as yet tend to be prepared
to give operators much commercial and operational freedom. However, the city of The
Hague does intend to sell up 49 per cent of HTM shares in order to provide the company
52
Effectively, the revenue risk that operators face increases by a factor of around 2.5.
53
This excludes most trains and certain long distance coaches (“Interliners”).
153
with capital for expansions. One condition however will be that HTM will continue to exist
as an independent entity. For that reason, it is more likely that an investment company will
be sought as shareholder than another public transport operator.
Heavy rail
Introduction
Until a few years ago, all heavy rail services in the Netherlands were operated by the
national rail operator NS. The operator was subsidised by the Ministry of Transport on an
annual lump-sum basis. Although its service levels and timetable required formal approval
by the Minister, in practice the Ministry did not interfere with the timetabling process,
leaving considerable freedom to the operator. Fares however were set by Parliament in an
often politically contentious process. NS was responsible for both infrastructure and
operation.
From 1995, under influence of EU directives 91/440/EG and its continuations 95/18/EG
and 95/19/EG, this situation changed. Infrastructure and operations were separated and
the new business unit NS Passengers was given more freedom from government
interference. For example, subject to some relatively loose restrictions, it no longer required
government approval to set fares and service levels. In later years, policy developed further
and from 1998, a distinction has been made between the main network and the contract
sector. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
Main rail network
The main network contains those lines that NS is able to operate without subsidy (excluding
infrastructure costs). Both Intercity and local services on these lines are included and this
implies a degree of cross-subsidy from Intercity to local services. These lines will continue
to be operated by NS under a 10-year exclusive concession, which is currently being
discussed in Parliament. No operating subsidy will be payable for those lines and NS is
increasingly required to cover its marginal infrastructure costs.
The proposed contract for the main network defines a number of main performances that
NS must comply with. The most important of these are:
•
a peak hour growth target: by 2005, NS must have increased its peak hour traffic
(measured as the number of people going through the barriers heading for the 12
main Dutch cities) by almost 23 per cent, compared to the 2000 level. There is a
bonus if the target is exceeded, but no specific penalty if the penalty is not met. If
NS’s performance falls substantially below the agreed norm in any year, discussions
will follow on what measures can be taken to achieve the target in future years;
154
•
a punctuality target: by 2005, 92 per cent of trains should arrive within 3 minutes of
the scheduled time. NS has to pay a penalty of €4.5 million for each one per cent that
punctuality falls below the norm, up to a maximum of around €11.5 million per year.
•
NS shall compensate all passengers that are delayed. Half the fare shall be refunded
if the delay is between 30 and 60 minutes, with a full refund for greater delays. Only
in special cases shall force majeure be cited.
•
NS shall comply with minimum levels of provision relating to first/last train times
and service levels. The requirements are based on the 2000/2001 timetable but leave
considerable freedom to NS to make service cuts if required, especially in the case of
smaller stations during off-peak hours.
•
NS shall not increase a basket of key fares by more than the consumer price index
plus 2 per cent.
The peak hour growth and punctuality targets are averages and consequently do not apply
to each of the individual local services running into The Hague, but only to the average of all
services run by NS on the main network. The minimum service level, the price cap and the
delay compensation do however apply to the individual services and stations in the
Haaglanden area.
It should be noted however that the proposed contract is controversial and that the outcome
of the parliamentary debate is uncertain.
At some point in the future, the local rail services on the main network too may be
decentralised and put out to tender, like the lines in the contract sector (see below). An issue
here is the extent to which it is desirable to have a frequent local service and a frequent
Intercity service, operated by different companies, share the same railway track. Some
people in the Netherlands argue that such a situation should be avoided and that local
services on the main network should only be decentralised if dedicated tracks are available,
e.g. on a four-track railway line.
Contract sector
The contract sector includes those lines that NS cannot operate profitably. This includes a
number of rural lines, which are currently in the process of being franchised. It also includes
a number of lines of a more urban nature, including the two dedicated suburban lines in the
Haaglanden region.
For the moment, these lines continue to be operated by NS. There is a framework contract
that covers all the lines (around 30). The main provisions in this contract are the following:
•
There is a minimum level of seat kilometres to be provided, initially equal to the
amount in the 1997/98 timetable. However, each year, this minimum is decreased
155
by 3 per cent, i.e. services may to an extent be rationalised. It is however not allowed
to rationalise services by reducing frequency levels or by closing stations, i.e., the
only way in which services could be reduced is by running shorter trains. The
minimum applies to the total of the 30 lines, not to each line individually.
•
An annual subsidy is payable to NS. This subsidy is indexed annually by averaging
a wage index and a price index. The subsidy is proportionally reduced if less seat
kilometres have been provided than the minimum, but with no additional fine
payable.
The intention is to transfer the responsibility for the contract sector lines to the regional
governments as soon as possible, followed by putting the lines out to tender. In the case of
some rural lines, this has already happened. However, the decentralisation of the urban
networks is politically contentious. It is likely that firstly, there will be an experiment in the
Amsterdam area to examine the implications of the decentralisation of urban networks,
which will include the urban services on the main network. Decentralisation would involve
limiting the staff concerned to the urban network in question: a highly controversial issue
(see Section 10.4.9).
NS have suggested that the contract sector lines are unprofitable even when taking the
subsidy payments into account. The (confidential) financial data supplied for the two
contract lines in the Haaglanden region do indeed suggest that the gap between the
budgeted income and the budgeted costs exceeds the subsidy payable to NS. Consequently,
NS have suggested that if local authorities will be receiving the same budget for the contract
lines as NS currently receives, unpleasant surprises and service cuts may result when the
“real” deficits of the unprofitable lines become clear. However, the most recent tender for
three rural lines in the north of the country resulted in the winning company Noordned
significantly undercutting the subsidy level that NS previously received.54 This suggests
that either the losses claimed by NS are artificial or that there is scope for efficiency
improvements on the lines in question. It should also be noted that Noordned soon faced
significant difficulties in maintaining service quality.
The future for the two dedicated suburban lines in the Haaglanden area will very much be
shaped by the Randstadrail proposal. Currently, many passengers using the lines transfer at
The Hague Central Station to a tram or bus line. Also, the lines are not in too good a
condition and the most important of them is actually loosing patronage. It has therefore
been proposed to convert the lines to light rail operation and to construct a link between
them and the tram network in The Hague. The change would in some ways be similar to
Manchester Metrolink, although the Randstadrail proposal involves using the existing tram
network. Originally, NS, HTM, Connexxion and the Rotterdam urban operator were
involved in a PPP proposal for the conversion. This however failed as the regional
government wanted to transfer risk to the operators but was not prepared to grant them a
54
Noordned is a joint venture of NS and Arriva.
156
sufficient degree of freedom. The current plan is to keep the infrastructure in the hands of
the government and to agree on a concession for the operation of the new system. Here, too,
the existing operators will have exclusive negotiating rights for the first concession period,
with the concession being tendered afterwards.
10.4. Performance against Criteria for Evaluation
10.4.1.1.
Modal splits
Table 10.1 contains the modal split in the Haaglanden area as measured in 1998 and
compares this with the national average.
Table 10.1
Haaglanden Modal Split, 1998
All purposes,
Haaglanden (%)
All purposes,
Netherlands (%)
To/from work,
Haaglanden (%)
To/from work,
Netherlands (%)
Car (driver)
27
32
36
48
Car (passenger)
18
17
5
7
Public transport
8
5
17
10
Cycle
25
27
32
29
Walk
20
18
5
4
Other
2
2
5
3
Total
100
100
100
100
Source: Stadsgewest Haaglanden
10.4.1.2.
Patronage
Table 10.2 and Table 10.3 below contain details of tram and bus patronage of the main
operator HTM.
Table 10.2
HTM Tram Patronage 1992-2000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Passengers journeys per year (millions)
78.4
77.7
74.8
81.3
80.7
Index (1992=100)
100
99
95
104
103
237.0
245.8
244.3
265.5
287.8
Index (1992=100)
100
104
103
112
121
3.02
3.16
3.27
3.27
3.57
Source: HTM
157
Table 10.3
HTM Bus Patronage 1992-2000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
Passengers journeys per year (millions)
44.1
42.3
37.3
38.0
37.0
Index (1992=100)
100
96
85
86
84
159.0
145.8
130.1
132.9
132.6
Index (1992=100)
100
92
82
84
83
3.61
3.45
3.49
3.50
3.58
Source: HTM
It can be seen in the two Tables that, over the last eight years tram use has been fairly
constant in terms of passenger number, but increasing in terms of passenger kilometres due
to a rising average trip length. Bus use has declined by over 15 per cent both in terms of
passenger journeys and passenger kilometres. It is interesting to note that the average trip
length used to be greater for buses than for trams and that this is no longer the case.
NS have supplied patronage data for the stations in the Haaglanden area, but these are
confidential and cannot be published. The figures suggest that in the period from 1996 to
1999, train travel into The Hague has increased by around 5 per cent. However, traffic on
the most important of the two suburban lines in the contract sector has fallen sharply over
this period.
For future years, there is an annual growth target for all public transport in the Haaglanden
area of 3 per cent per year until 2005, and 5 per cent in the years afterwards.
10.4.1.3.
Fares
The current fare levels that apply on public transport throughout the Haaglanden area are
presented in Table 10.4. These fares are integrated fares from the national fare system. For
the purpose of the system, the whole country is divided in zones, each some 4.5 km in
length. In The Hague, there is a city centre zone and a number of zones adjacent to it. Most
journeys in The Hague involve crossing either one or two zones, the fares for which are
presented in the Table. The fares are the same regardless of the mode that is used, although
most rail trips will involve crossing more than two zones. The majority of people use prepaid multiride tickets, although in-vehicle tickets are available as well at a higher fare.
158
Table 10.4
Current Fare Levels in National Fare System
pre-paid (€)
in-vehicle (€)
1 zone single
0.76
1.36
2-zone single
1.13
2.04
One-day travelcard (valid in the entire city)
5.45
5.45
1-zone monthly
28.16
n/a
2-zone monthly
47.80
n/a
Source: HTM
Fare increases are decided by the national government. Since 1994, these have been equal to
or slightly above the rate of inflation. In the three years prior to 1994, however, fares were
increased by 6 per cent per annum (with inflation running at around 3 percent) in order to
reduce public spending on the transport system.
10.4.1.4.
The local authorities are responsibility for local roads and parking policies (i.e. not the
regional authority Haaglanden). There are a number of demand and traffic management,
including part-time closures of selected city centre streets (using flexible barriers) and the
introduction of parking charges in virtually the whole of the city of The Hague. Local
residents can buy parking permits for the streets around their house that vary in price from
€3.11 to €6.19 (city centre) per month.
10.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
The average speed that is achieved by HTM’s buses was 19.9 km/h in 2000, up from 19.6
km/h a year earlier. As far as trams were concerned, the change was significant with an
increase from 18.5 km/h in 1999 to 19.5 km/h in 2000. It is thought that there is scope to
increase the average bus speed to 21 km/h and the speed for trams to 22 km/h.
Table 10.5 contains details on the number of bus and tram seat kilometres, the length of the
bus and tram networks and on staff numbers. All data refer to the main operator HTM.
159
Table 10.5
Tram and Bus Kilometres and Staff Numbers in The Hague, 1992-2000
1992
1994
1996
1998
1999
2000
Total seat kilometres (tram)
1021
1085
1090
1110
1196
n/a
Index (1992=100)
100
106
107
109
117
n/a
Total seat kilometres (bus)
509
499
508
538
535
n/a
Index (1992=100)
100
98
100
106
105
n/a
Total number of staff
2041
1893
1823
1980
2067
2132
Source: HTM
The number of tram seat kilometres has been increasing during the last eight years, broadly
in line with the increases in the number of passenger kilometres (see Table 10.4). The
number of bus seat kilometres has however slightly increased, in spite of the reduction in
bus patronage.
Table 10.6 contains the proportion of HTM passengers that is paying for the use of the public
transport system. There is clearly a problem on the tram network, where the number of
paying passengers has been decreasing due to shortages of inspection staff (see Section
10.4.9). There are however no plans to reintroduce guards on the trams, as was done in
Amsterdam a few years ago.
Table 10.6
Paying Travellers on HTM
1997 (%)
1998 (%)
1999 (%)
2000 (%)
Tram
94.5
93.9
92.4
91.6
Bus
98.5
98.8
98.8
n/a
Source: HTM
10.4.3. Economic Criteria: value for money and accountability
10.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Table 10.7 contains HTM’s financial result for 1998 and 1999.55 It can be seen than in 1999,
HTM received about 36 per cent from its income out of farebox and other income, as
opposed to around 33 per cent in 1998. The farebox and other income covered around 43
per cent of direct operating costs (1998: 37 per cent).56 The 2000 figures are both slightly
below the 1999 figures.
55
Preliminary figures for the year 2000 have been made available, but these have not yet been published.
56
The total operating costs shown here exclude financing expenses and costs for former personnel
160
Table 10.7
HTM Financial Details 1998-1999
1999 (€ in Jan 2001 prices)
1998 (€ in Jan 2001 prices)
Government subsidy
96.9
98.1
Income from passenger transport
49.1
45.8
Other income
7.3
5.5
Capitalised own production
4.4
6.6
Total operating income
157.7
156.0
Personnel costs
81.3
76.2
Depreciation costs
22.2
29.9
Other costs
28.2
32.0
131.7
138.1
Source: HTM Annual Report 1999
It is clear that the percentage of costs that is covered by farebox revenue in the Haaglanden
area is not very high. There are plans to improve the cost recovery ratio to around 40 per
cent in the next few years, but earlier ideas to achieve 50 per cent have now been abandoned.
The low level of cost recovery is not however perceived as a problem in the Netherlands.
Whereas the national government would certainly like to reduce spending on operational
spending somewhat and divert the funds saved to investment projects, it is generally
accepted that an extensive public transport network with low fares and high frequencies
requires significant amounts of public funding. Nevertheless, moving towards tendering of
concessions is certainly expected to generate savings in the order of 10-15 per cent.
However, as the available budget from central government will rise by 2 per cent per year in
the years to 2005 and by 4 per cent a year afterwards, the money saved from tendering will
be largely spent on new and improved services, which will keep the cost recovery
percentage relatively low. However, no lines will be operated that recover less than 30 per
cent of their costs through the farebox. In addition, tramlines are required to carry at least
15,000 passengers per day.
10.4.3.2.
Details of operating subsidies are given in Table 10.7 above. In addition, significant
investment subsidies are made available each year by the national government.
10.4.3.3.
As can be seen in Table 10.7 above, HTM earns small but significant revenue from sources
other than the farebox. These mainly relate to advertising, though HTM also operates a
light-rail service on behalf of Dutch Railways. The company also has a significant
consultancy business.
161
10.4.3.4.
HTM produces an annual report which is available to the public. Under Dutch law, all
public authorities are required to provide information to interested parties on request,
subject to privacy and safety issues.
Although the available data on service quality in the Haaglanden area are not very detailed,
a number of remarks can be made.
10.4.4.1.
Frequency and accessibility
For trams and buses, there is a basic frequency level of six services an hour during daytime
and four per hour during evenings. An extensive network with relatively low frequencies
has been preferred over a sparser network with higher frequencies on key corridors. As a
result, the average distance people have to walk to the nearest tram/bus stop is around 400
metres. The policy emphasis is however changing: the aim is to rationalise the bus network
somewhat to achieve an average walk distance of 500 metres.
Train services on the busiest suburban line run every 10 minutes during peak hours (in the
busy direction only) and every 30 minutes at all other times. After the conversion of the
lines to light rail operation, off-peak frequencies will increase to the basic frequency levels
that currently apply to trams and buses (see above).
10.4.4.2.
Reliability
Around 90 per cent of buses and trams currently run on time, whereas the target is 95 per
cent.57 On train services, only countrywide punctuality averages are available; punctuality
figures by area are confidential and have not been supplied by NS.
10.4.4.3.
The trams that are used by HTM have an average age of 17 years. All buses however have
been renewed in recent years, with a current average age of just 2 years. None of the trams
have low-floor entrances but all buses do. The trains on the suburban heavy rail lines are all
around 20 years old, although they have recently been refurbished.
The overall results of the annual HTM customer satisfaction survey are shown in Table 10.8.
These scores are measures on a scale from 1 to 10. A score of 7.0 is regarded as an “average”
score for this kind of surveys in the Netherlands. Consequently, HTM is now doing
relatively well and clearly improving.
57
It is unfortunately unclear how exactly “on time” is defined.
162
Table 10.8
Customer Satisfaction among HTM Passengers
Year
Overall
satisfaction
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
6.8
6.9
7.0
7.1
7.2
Source: HTM
10.4.5.1.
Although there are some good examples of physical integration of public transport services
in The Hague (for example, the bus station has been built on top of the central train station),
the level of physical integration is not to be regarded as best practice. The main problem is
the fact that historically, the tram/bus services on the one hand and the heavy rail services
on the other hand have been developed and managed separately. Not only is it in many
cases necessary for passengers arriving in The Hague by local rail services to make a change
between modes; the change is also not to be regarded as easy or clearly indicated, especially
for the inexperienced user. There are however several radical plans to improve the
situation. A well advanced proposal is the “Randstadrail” scheme, which involves
converting the existing two dedicated suburban lines to light rail operation and building a
connection between these lines and the existing tram network. This would enable through
services between the networks. Another plan, building on the Randstadrail scheme, is to
radically alter the appearance of the various modes, presenting them as one integrated
network.
There have been a number of major Park&Ride schemes in the Netherlands. However, most
of them have failed to be successful. The emphasis with regard to Park&Ride is therefore on
smaller-scale schemes by providing good car and cycle parking facilities at stations.
10.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
As indicated above, tariff integration in Haaglanden and in the Netherlands can be regarded
as strong. There is a national ticketing scheme which enables passengers to use all buses,
trams and underground services in the country, as well as train services within the large
urban areas.58 In the case of Haaglanden, this system enables passengers to travel on all
public transport services in the area. Passengers arriving by train from outside the
Haaglanden area can buy an add-on to their ticket if this is a daily travelcard or a season
ticket. No add-ons are available to single and return train fares.
58
Certain coach services (“Interliners”) are excluded.
163
It should be noted, however, that there are significant drawbacks associated with the
integrated system. The main problem is to allocate the total revenues over the various
operators that participate in the scheme. Every three years, a major travel survey is
undertaken and the results are used as a basis for allocating the revenues. Consequently,
any changes resulting from the introduction of new services or demand shifts are only taken
into account at three-year intervals. Not only does this influence revenue levels but also
subsidy levels through the revenue-based subsidy system. Also, fare levels are the same
across the country, although the system is zone-based and some differentiation is possible
by varying the size of the zones.
The problems with the present system are consequently a major driver for the development
and introduction of a nationwide smart-card ticketing scheme. This system, which is
already operational in a number of trial areas, will be introduced nationwide between 2003
and 2006. It will allow price differentiation while preserving tariff integration. However,
some people are warning that the possibilities for price discrimination with this system,
when introduced nationwide, will not be as wide-ranging as some other people expect.
10.4.5.3.
The level of information integration in public transport in the Netherlands is mixed. There
are some outstanding examples, such as the National Public Transport Enquiry Service,
available by phone and over the Internet. This system provides the user with a travel advice
for a trip from any address in the country to any other address, using all modes of public
transport.
At the Haaglanden level, however, there is a lack of involvement of the Haaglanden
authority in information provision. Consequently, this is currently left to the operators and
this results in mainly operator-specific information with very limited information on
possible interchanges to other operators. There is however an excellent network map
produced jointly by Connexxion and HTM. At railway stations, maps of the national rail
network are provided but little or no information is available on tram and bus connections
apart from the ones directly serving the railway station in question. The national rail
timetable does however include a few pages with information on connecting urban
transport in The Hague.
10.4.5.4.
The Netherlands have a very strong tradition in the field of spatial planning. Consequently,
the integration between transport and land use in the Netherlands and in Haaglanden is
good. New housing areas are planned either along existing transport links or are provided
with new transport services. In Haaglanden, a new housing area is currently being built
with 33,500 houses to be built by 2005. In 1999, the first tramline to this area was opened
with the second tramline to follow in early 2002, even though by then, only some 40 per cent
of the planned new houses will actually have been built.
164
10.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
There is a national concessionary fare scheme, which allows senior citizens and under 12s
around 40 per cent off all fares in the national fare system, and school children 40 per cent
off season tickets. The operators do not receive a specific reimbursement under this scheme;
the associated costs are recovered via the general public transport subsidy payments.
10.4.6.2.
As indicated in Section 10.4.4.3, almost all buses have low floors entrances but none of the
trams do. NS trains are not accessible for the mobility impaired, but it is possible to get
assistance from a number of stations. Mobility impaired can get a permit with which they
can take a travel companion or, if relevant, a guide dog free of charge.
So far, the public transport system in The Hague has been strong in responding to external
changes, mainly related to the development of large new housing areas. Buses arrived in the
new areas virtually at the same time as the first inhabitants arrived, with the first tramline
already in operation and the second one due to be completed by the end of 2001. As
indicated above, only 40 per cent of new houses will have been completed by then.
It is worth noting however that the flexibility only concerns routes and service levels, not
ticketing. The integrated ticketing system brings many benefits to consumers, but does have
the disadvantage that fares in the Haaglanden area cannot be set according to local demand
conditions.
10.4.8.1.
One point which is especially noteworthy about the public transport reforms in the
Netherlands is the attention that is being paid to the transition process. The key feature of
the transition is that in almost all cases, the existing operator gets exclusive negotiating
rights for the first concession period. Only after this first period has expired does tendering
of the concession become compulsory.
The method chosen has several advantages. As the operators have traditionally had the
initiative in the specification of public transport services in the Haaglanden area, they also
have a significant amount of knowledge about the public transport system. Indeed, it has
been suggested that one of the main problems of the Haaglanden regional authority is that
the new body does not currently have sufficient public transport skills. If the concession
were be tendered immediately and if the incumbent operator lost the tender, a lot of
165
knowledge about the Haaglanden public transport system would suddenly disappear. In
other words, awarding the first concession to the incumbent gives the authority more time
to prepare for the future situation in which it will have the initiative without being able to
fall back on the experience of the incumbent. Another benefit of awarding the first
concession to the incumbent is that staff problems become easier to manage. Finally, it
allows the concession agreement to be “tested”, so that the subsequent invitation to tender
can be specified as appropriately as possible.
It should however be pointed out there is also a significant drawback associated with
awarding the first concession to the incumbent. It allows not only the authority but also the
incumbent to “test” the agreement and to gain experience with it. That way, the incumbent
might be able to strengthen the incumbent advantage that it already enjoys.
10.4.8.2.
Staffing issues
Unions are powerful in the Dutch public transport market and all agreements are subject to
collective bargaining. In the case of HTM, the relationship with the unions is very
constructive; no industrial action has occurred in the last 20 years. This relationship is
constructive from the perspective from the operator but also from the perspective of the
main union FNV. The gross monthly salary for incoming bus and tram drivers starts
approximately €1,550-1,600, increasing with experience to around €2,250.59 In 1999, 9.3 per
cent of hours were registered off sick. Staff turnover in the same year was 5.5 per cent. In
spite of the present difficult labour market conditions in the Haaglanden area, HTM is still
able to find enough bus and tram drivers. Finding ticket inspectors however is more
difficult: the total number of inspectors is currently 125, about 50 below the number that
should be there.
A different story however applies to the interurban operator Connexxion. This company
used to be the national provider of bus transport in the Netherlands outside the eight largest
cities. With the onset of liberalisation and deregulation in the Netherlands, it was seen as
having a dominant position on the Dutch public transport market and was therefore
required to divest a number of its businesses. This led to significant industrial unrest and in
1995, a strike started that lasted for several weeks. Ultimately, the unions were granted
assurances that when a concession transferred from one company to another, all direct staff
and a proportionate amount of indirect staff would be transferred as well. The new
operators would consequently be unable to make staff redundant at the start of a concession
period, but would be free to make staff adjustments during the concession. This however
would be subject to the normal strict procedures with regard to staff adjustments that apply
in the Netherlands, which among other things determine that any compulsory redundancies
need to be approved by a court. At the moment, however, the FNV union regards the
59
Due to the complexity of wage scales in the Netherlands, we do not attempt to make comparisons of these figures
with averages elsewhere in the economy.
166
relationship with Connexxion as good, although it was noted that Connexxion is now
behaving more commercially than it used to do.
An important feature of staff conditions in interurban bus transport is that the same
conditions apply nationally to all employees of all companies. All employees in comparable
positions enjoy exactly the same employment conditions and all operators, including new
entrants, are legally required to accept these nationwide conditions. Similar nationwide
agreements apply in many other sectors in the Netherlands, for example there also exists a
collective agreement for all supermarket staff.
At the rail operator NS, train drivers receive a gross salary that, after a number of years in
service, increases to around €2,150 on the basis of a 36-hour working week. For guards, the
corresponding figure is about €2,000. However, there are significant additional payments
for all duties performed outside normal office hours. The percentage of hours registered offsick is rather high with, in Haaglanden, a figure in excess of 20 per cent. The proportion of
working hours that are productively spent is low with a figure that is believed to be below
50 per cent. NS points out however that similar figures apply to all European railway
companies. Staff turnover in the Haaglanden area is about 13 per cent.
At NS, too, unions are powerful and the relationship between management and unions has
been tense for the last 10 years. At the moment, a serious conflict is being fought out over a
proposal to limit the duties of driver and guards more to specific trains and specific lines, as
opposed to the current situation where staff have a large variety in their work. Several
strikes have occurred and unions repeatedly negotiated a settlement with the operator, only
to find the deal rejected by militant staff.
The FNV union has indicated that the deeper background to the conflict is staff uncertainties
with regard to any future liberalisation of the Dutch railway market, particularly those lines
that are due to be put out to tender. With regard to the rural concessions that have so far
been transferred from NS to new entrants, staff basically have been guaranteed no changes
in their working conditions and compensation levels for at least three years. Those who
transferred voluntarily also received a lump-sum payment.
As nor the NS working conditions, nor the working conditions agreed in the nationwide
agreement for interurban bus operators, are suitable for the new multi-modal companies
that are emerging, a new nationwide agreement for multi-modal operators has been agreed.
This multi-modal agreement applies to NS staff that transfer to one of these new multimodal operators. The employment conditions are similar to the ones in the NS agreement,
although some requirements as to working times etc. have been altered to reflect the fact
that operating practices in a local multi-modal company are different than those in a
national rail operator.
Ideally, the unions would like to have a nationwide agreement for all local public transport.
This however is difficult to achieve as conditions in some areas, for example Amsterdam, are
currently more favourable than in other areas. The unions however expect that in the next
167
two years or so, there will be another discussion about a collective bargaining agreement for
the entire local public transport sector in the Netherlands.
In general, FNV has indicated that while they did not favour the liberalisation of the public
transport market in the first place, they do not regard the results so far as negative.
Basically, the impact of the reforms so far on public transport staff in the Netherlands has
been minimal, although the current transition period does result in significant uncertainties
for the employees.
10.4.9.1.
10.4.9.2.
Access to Airports
Not applicable.
10.4.10.Environmental criteria
Environmental policy and targets in the Netherlands are formulated at the national level.
The “National Traffic and Transport Plan 2001-2020” accepts that mobility will continue to
grow and, unlike the previous Plan, does not set targets to limit the growth. It does however
set environmental targets, mainly to be achieved by making vehicle cleaner and less noisy,
better protection of houses and environmentally sensitive areas against noise etc. Most of
the policies will be implemented at national level.
One exception however is local air quality. The Plan indicates that local governments are to
an extent responsible for improving local air quality in their area. As far as public transport
is concerned, it is suggested that the environmental quality of the vehicles to be used should
be one of the criteria in evaluating concessions for public transport operators. In
Haaglanden, almost all buses are currently being fitted with filters to limit the emission of
pollutants. This is being subsidised by the national government. As the tram is the
dominant mode of public transport in The Hague, local emissions by the public transport
system are less of a problem than they would be if the public transport system were bus
only. The local public transport plan does mention that environmental considerations are
one of the factors in favouring tram links over bus links, provided patronage figures justify
this.
10.5. Summary of Performance Against Criteria
negative aspects of The Hague’s system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
168
Table 10.9
The Hague Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
Modal splits are low, partly due to
the popularity of cycling and
walking.
•
•
Relatively low fares
Low cost recovery
Service quality
Service quality
•
•
Customer satisfaction has been rising
steadily.
Moderate punctuality, but failing to
meet targets.
•
Good tariff integration.
•
Physical integration relatively poor
•
Good integration with land use.
•
Information integration could be
improved by the more active
involvement of the central authority.
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
•
•
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
Gradual approach to transition has
helped minimise potential problems
and allows a learning process.
•
•
Good response to changes in demand
patterns.
•
Awarding the first concession to the
incumbent could be regarded as a
barrier to entry in that the incumbent
will establish a knowledge advantage
over other potential bidders in later
rounds.
Good industrial relations, except at
NS
•
Public transport authority does not
currently have sufficient skills
No specific reimbursement for
concessionary fares.
Economic growth
Economic growth
•
Specific national environmental
targets.
169
10.6. The Hague “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of The Hague’s system.
Table 10.10
The Hague Summary “Scorecard”
The Hague
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
Emphasis on careful transition by
awarding first concession to the
incumbent
Employment guarantee to bus and tram
staff, and good industrial relations in bus
and tram operations
Good integrated ticketing system with
relatively low fares, which will be
preserved despite structural changes to
the public transport market
•
•
•
•
Low cost recovery
Lack of appropriate skills in the public
transport authority
Poor industrial relations on the railways
Transport modes, especially bus/tram
on the one hand and rail on the other,
are not presented as an integrated
network
The public transport market share is not
very high, partly as a result of the
importance of cycling
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City Study: Toronto
11.
CITY STUDY: TORONTO
11.1. Key Facts
•
Bus, tram (streetcar), subway/light rail and heavy rail system.
•
Publicly-owned system controlled at the city/municipal level. No single, central
transport authority.
•
One operator in the city centre (covering all modes), one commuter service
operator, and single operators serving each of the outer municipal areas.
•
Large city with low population density and strong “car culture”, especially on the
city outskirts.
11.2. General Description
Toronto is the capital city of the Canadian province of Ontario, and the largest city in
Canada. The Greater Toronto Authority (GTA) area currently has a population of 5 million
people, and covers an area of almost 8,000 square kms, while the city of Toronto itself has a
population of two and a half million, and covers 632 square kms.
Population and building density in Toronto are relatively low by European standards,
although quite high by North American ones, where the long distances that people have to
travel to work and even local amenities, along with relatively low fuel prices and the
provision of extensive parking facilities encourage a “car culture” and conditions which are
not very applicable to Ireland.
Toronto is located on the shores of Lake Ontario, which forms the southern boundary to the
city. Its location just across the lake from the United States, and its access to Atlantic trading
routes via the St Lawrence Seaway allowed Toronto to develop into a major trading hub.
Toronto has two airports providing international links. Lester B Pearson Airport, situated to
the west of the city deals with the bulk of Toronto’s international air traffic while the much
smaller city airport is located just off the Lake Ontario shore.
Toronto’s city centre is located close to the lake shore, and is the main commercial and
financial hub of the city, providing the location for the financial district, including Toronto’s
stock exchange, the main municipal administrative centre at Metro Hall, plus major
shopping, tourist and recreational areas. While recent years have seen the ongoing
migration of some major employment areas to locations outside the city centre, the city
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City Study: Toronto
centre is still the location for the majority of work trips. The city centre currently provides
over half the 2.5 million jobs available in the GTA.
Toronto’s economy experienced periods of significant recession in the 1990s, but has since
recovered and is now growing quite strongly. Employment in the GTA is estimated to have
grown by 17.8per cent from 1996 to 2001 (12.6per cent in Toronto), and is forecast to grow at
a similar rate over the next ten years, with particularly strong growth in the outer GTA
regions. Population growth is also forecast to be strong, growing by 18 per cent in the GTA
over the next ten years, and by 10 per cent in Toronto, with even higher rates forecast for the
outer GTA regions (particularly York Region, Durham Region and Halton Region). As these
data suggest, while the region as a whole is growing, the outer regions are growing fastest,
and there is a significant and ongoing shift in the proportion of jobs and population located
outside central Toronto. The implications of this shift for transportation in the GTA are
discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
The Toronto area is administered by three levels of government: the federal government,
provincial Government of Ontario and the local municipal-level government. Within the
GTA there are six separate regions, made up of the City of Toronto in the centre, and the
surrounding regions of Durham, York, Peel, Halton and the City of Hamilton.
Each of the regions surrounding the City of Toronto have their own municipal governments.
For example, Peel Region consists of three Municipalities (Caledon, Brampton and
Mississauga), and York Region of nine (Vaughan, Richmond Hill, Markham, King,
Whitchurch Stouffville, Gwillembury East, Newmarket and Aurora). Until 1998, the City of
Toronto had a similar “two tier” structure, of seven separate municipalities, known
collectively as Metro Toronto. However, in 1998 these municipalities were merged into the
new amalgamated City of Toronto, creating a larger and “one tier” level of local government
(with 44 individual wards).
Historically, public transport has been the responsibility of the municipal and provincial
level governments. The federal government does not generally involve itself in these issues,
although it has the potential to have indirect impacts through associated policy areas, such
as environmental policy. The provincial Government of Ontario has traditionally played a
significant role both in terms of funding and responsibility. However, three years ago the
current right-wing government adopted a “downloading” policy, which involved
transferring responsibility and funding for a number of areas wholly to the municipal
governments in return for taking over responsibility for a number of other areas. Public
transit was included in this transfer. This change has had significant impacts on public
transit in the GTA, and is discussed in further detail below.
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City Study: Toronto
11.3.1.1.
Toronto Transit Commission
Public transport in the GTA (except for taxis) is provided by publicly-owned and largely
vertically integrated operators, who have a monopoly over provision. By far the largest
public transport company is the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), which accounts for 85
per cent of public transit trips in the GTA. TTC is fully vertically integrated and has a
monopoly over public transport in the City of Toronto. It is owned and funded by the City
of Toronto, and provides bus, streetcar (ie, tram) and subway services, along with the
Scarborough Rapid Transit (SRT) system, which extends the subway system to the East of
the city.
TTC has been under municipal control in some form since 1921 when the local authorities
experienced difficulties in getting the formerly private sector franchisee to extend services to
growing parts of the city. The Toronto Transit Commission itself came into being in 1954,
under the 1953 Metropolitan Toronto Act, which significantly extended its area of operation.
TTC now operates the second largest transit system in North America after New York,
providing a total of 410.5 million passenger journeys in 2000.
Figure 11.1
TTC Service Area
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City Study: Toronto
Figure 11.1 shows TTC services. The thin lines show bus and streetcar routes, and the
thicker lines the subway network. As Figure 11.1 shows, TTC services cover all of the City
of Toronto (with some gaps in the far North East), but do not as a rule stretch into the
neighbouring regions of the GTA.
11.3.1.2.
GO Transit
Commuter services from the surrounding GTA municipalities, through the outer areas of
the City of Toronto and into the CBD are provided by GO Transit, which is also publicly
owned and has a monopoly over these longer distance commuter services, covering
journeys of up to 60 to 70kms. Its operation is almost exclusively express, long distance
commuter services, and so the services offered by GO and those offered by TTC both remain
effective monopolies. Over 96 per cent of GO’s rail services travel to and from Union
Station, and 70 per cent of its bus ridership is to and from the City of Toronto. Its area of
operation is confined almost exclusively to the GTA region, although some bus routes
extend a bit beyond this, as shown in Figure 11.2.
Figure 11.2
GO Transit’s Service Area
GO Transit operates both heavy rail and bus services on a radial network, for which the
centrally-located Union Station is the hub. GO has grown from a single rail line in 1967
when its services first started, and now operates seven rail corridors and six bus corridors.
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City Study: Toronto
There is some vertical separation in the provision of rail services, where stations and tracks
are owned by the private rail infrastructure companies Canadian Pacific (CP) and Canadian
National (CN). (However, note that there have some been some recent developments in this
area, with GO Transit and the City of Toronto purchasing Union Station and its approaching
tracks from CP and CN, who owned it jointly. This point is covered in more detail later in
this chapter.)
11.3.1.3.
Surrounding municipal transit services
In the GTA regions surrounding the City of Toronto, public transport services have
traditionally been provided by individual municipally-owned operators. For example, in
Peel Region, there are separate transit companies for each of the three municipalities
(Caledon, Brampton and Mississauga). However, in some regions, public transport
provision has recently been amalgamated to the regional level. Examples include the
merger of the municipal public transit companies in York Region into one regional transport
operator, and the merger of Ajax Transit and Pickering Transit in Durham Region (of which
more later in this chapter).
In these areas, operators are again vertically-integrated public sector monopolies, and
services are all bus-based. Operating areas are almost entirely exclusive. These operators
are primarily concerned with the provision of local services and connections to other
services into the city centre, rather than with the provision of urban and urban commuter
public transport services per se. For this reason, TTC and GO transport will be the main
focus of this chapter, but the “local municipality” services are examined to some extent,
particularly when considering integration criteria.
11.3.2.1.
TTC
TTC is both owned by and answerable to the municipal City of Toronto government. It
operates as an independent Commission, known as a “special purpose body” with its own
powers, rights and authorities under the 1953 Metropolitan Toronto Act, and as such, has an
“arms length” relationship with the City. Since the creation of TTC in 1954, there have been
a number of investigations into the relative pros and cons of TTC continuing to operate as an
independent body, or being transferred into an amalgamated part of City Hall. Each
investigation, including the most recent one in 1997 The Track Ahead: Organisation of the TTC
Under the New Amalgamated City of Toronto has supported the status quo. Following this
report, the Council of Metropolitan Toronto unanimously endorsed the current structure.
The main arguments given for supporting the “arms-length” structure were that the current
system appears to work well. The Commissioners at the head of the company are generally
well-informed and devote sufficient time to their duties, and the potential threat of
dissolution or takeover by others keeps the board in check. There is a good corporate
culture with a certain amount of pride in operating one of North America’s most successful
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City Study: Toronto
public transport systems, and there is a fear that an attempt to amalgamate a body
consisting of mainly hourly-paid, very specialised service providers with the general office
workers that make up much of City Hall would be difficult.
TTC is run by a Commission of seven elected members of the City of Toronto council,
increased from five in the early 1990s. These politicians effectively form the board of TCC.
TTC is afforded a large amount of autonomy in day to day operations and also in more
strategic areas such as the setting of fares, quality of service issues, and choice and frequency
of routes. However, the fact that the Commission is made up of elected politicians means
that significant strategic decisions or areas of dispute can be debated at the municipal
council level as well as the TTC Commission level. The monthly meetings of the
Commission are open to the public.
Until 1998, funding for TTC was provided by a combination of the municipal and provincial
governments who funded operating expenditure (opex) not covered by TTC’s own revenues
(note that this includes expenditure on capital maintenance, such as the overhauling of
rolling stock). For capital expenditure, the TTC has been almost wholly reliant on a
combination of municipal and provincial government funding in recent years. Before 1998,
75 per cent of this was provided by the provincial government, and 25 per cent by the
municipal government (the incentive implications of this in a situation where actual capital
investment decisions were made predominantly at the municipal level is discussed further
in Section 11.3.2.4). The federal government has never played a part in the funding of
Canadian municipal/regional-level transit systems.
Until the 1967, TTC recovered enough revenue to be almost totally self-funding in terms of
operating costs, and also contributed a significant amount to capital costs. However, from
that time onwards, funding requirements from both municipal and provincial governments
increased, and as a result, both levels of government began to exert a greater influence over
TTC policy. Examples include the imposition of a single fare system in 1974 (of which more
later), and “tied” funding from the provincial government, based on a requirement to
purchase for example rolling stock from certain Ontario suppliers, even where this was not
the most cost-efficient choice. Provincial government also had a significant input into
decisions on major capital expenditure (capex) projects, as most of these were dependent on
it for funding.
As described in Section 11.2.2, in 1998, as part of the Harris’ Provincial Government policy of
“downloading” responsibility for certain functions to the municipal government in
exchange for taking over other services, all responsibility for TTC, including all funding, was
transferred to the municipal government, and all provincial subsidies were eliminated.
As a result of this change, TTC relies on the City of Toronto for all of its capital and
operational funding above that which is covered by the farebox and other sources of
revenue (such as advertising). Similarly, all planning and regulatory functions (except for
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City Study: Toronto
eg Federal Law) are now conducted at the municipal level. The implications of this change
are discussed further in Section 11.3.2.4.
11.3.2.2.
GO Transit
As was the case for TTC, 1998 saw a significant change to the regulatory and funding
arrangements under which GO Transit operates. Prior to that date, GO Transit, as a
commuter service for the GTA, had been funded and overseen entirely by provincial
government. However, full responsibility including all funding responsibility for GO
Transit was “downloaded” to the municipal level in 1998.
While in the case of TTC it is just the City of Toronto that has overall responsibility, GO is
the joint responsibility of all the municipalities in the GTA, and all the municipalities
contribute to its funding for all capex and all opex not recovered through the farebox or
other revenues. In order to co-ordinate the running of GO, a regulatory board, the Greater
Toronto Services Board (GTSB), was set up in overall charge of GO in 1999.60 The GTSB is
made up of elected politicians from the municipalities in the GTA. The fact that GTSB
members have representatives from the different regions of the GTA allows individual
regions to protect their own public transit interests in relation to commuter services by
contributing to GO’s capital planning and budget processes.
The GTSB’s remit is to “promote and facilitate co-ordinated decision making among the
municipalities in the Greater Toronto Area”, and exercise overall direction and control.
However, currently the GTSB has mainly a funding role in relation to GO, and the day to
day management of GO is carried out at “arms length” by GO’s own internal board.61
The board of GO Transit, (GO is also known as the Greater Toronto Transit Authority, but
still operates as GO Transit), is made up of seven councillors and meets monthly. Meetings
are open to the public on written request.
11.3.2.3.
Other municipal transit companies
The other municipal transit companies report directly to, and are funded by their respective
municipalities.
In some regions, the municipalities have recently decided to merge their transit companies.
One example is York Region, where the five urban municipalities within that region
(Aurora, Markham, Newmarket, Richmond Hill and Vaughan) transferred from municipallevel public transport operation to a single integrated regional transit system in January
60
The GTSB was set up under the “Act to Establish the Greater Toronto Services Board and the Greater Toronto
Transit Authority” 1998, which also amended the Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority Act.
61
The GTSB’s mandate suggests that the organisation could deal with the full range of services provided by
municipal governments, but thus far its focus has been on transportation.
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City Study: Toronto
2001. The main reasons for the amalgamation were to increase service integration across
municipal boundaries, to allow greater operating cost efficiency, to improve links with TTC
and GO, to improve specialized services for the disabled, and to improve co-ordination of
public transport with road improvement decisions being made at the regional level. Given
that the amalgamated service has only just been implemented, a number of these initiatives,
including the better integration of services and the development of a ten year capital plan for
the York region are still underway.
11.3.2.4.
Subsidy arrangements
According to the transit companies themselves and the others interviewed as part of this
project, the new funding arrangements present a significant problem to public transport
operation in the GTA. The “downloading” of funding responsibilities to the municipal
government has left the City of Toronto itself, as well as the other GTA municipalities and
the transit companies themselves, unsure as to how subsidy requirements are going to
continue to be met.
In the case of TTC, it is estimated that the annual subsidy requirement from the City of
Toronto in order to allow TTC to maintain its current services in good working order, and
assuming that it continues to cover approximately 80 per cent of its operating costs from its
own revenues will be some €350 million.62 However, the City projects that it will struggle to
cover these operating subsidies under its current revenue raising powers. These are limited
to the property tax – the municipal government does not have the power to raise funds from
any other source such as sales taxes, road taxes or fuel taxes (either on a hypothecated basis
or not). While there is some facility to raise funds through development charges, the
Provincial Development Charges Act limits this as it specifies that the planned level of
service funded by development charges cannot exceed the average provided by the local
municipality over the last ten years.
Moreover, the City of Toronto reports that it is not currently able to provide funds to TTC
for any capital investment. TTC estimates that it can continue to operate current services
without any such capital expenditure for the next two years. However, by 2003, TTC
expects to need to replace parts of its rolling stock, and states that it will not be able to
maintain current services, let alone extend services should demand require, without capital
investment at that stage.
GO Transit reports that it faces a similar situation, with operating costs currently covered,
but a lack of funds for future capital investment being available from the GTA
municipalities. GO Transit see this as been a particular constraint in its case, as recent years
have seen ridership increasing significantly, both as the result of the continuing growth of
62
“The Track Ahead: Organisation of the TTC under the new amalgamated City of Toronto” 1997. The $€350 million
estimated requirement is made up of €124 million to cover operating losses, €31 million to cover Wheeltranz
services for the mobility impaired, and €194 million to cover repair and maintenance costs.
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City Study: Toronto
the Toronto commuter belt, and as a result of people switching from motor use to GO bus
and train services. GO considers the scope for its future expansion to be significantly limited
by its inability to raise further capital funds. A number of the local governments providing
transit services in the outer regions of the GTA have reported similar concerns (for example,
York Region and the City of Hamilton).
No real signs of a solution to this funding issue have emerged as yet. The provincial
government has promised to provide €194 million for municipal transit services outside of
the TTC area, including GO Transit. GO Transit is currently hoping to secure funding from
the Federal Government for the upgrade of the Lake Ontario line that its heavy rail
commuter services use as part of a wider regional upgrade of rail infrastructure. Another
potential source of Federal funds may be in connection with Canada’s obligations to reduce
fuel emissions under the Kyoto Agreement, part of which the Federal Government may seek
to achieve through the upgrading of municipal public transit services. However, it is
thought unlikely that any of these sources will provide a regular source of funds, and there
is an argument that the inability to tell what funds will be available in the future prevents
the transit companies from conducting investment planning in the most efficient manner.
One more positive aspect of the “downloading” of funding entirely to the municipal level is
the improvement in incentives to make the most efficient capital investment decisions. Prior
to 1998, TTC capital investment projects were funded 75 per cent by the Provincial
Government, and 25 per cent by metropolitan Toronto. However, the main weight of
decision-making for what capital investment to undertake lay with metropolitan Toronto.
Capital investment planners therefore faced a “25 cent dollar” when making investment
decisions. Some interviewees suggested that this may have led to some capital projects
being undertaken that would otherwise not have happened.
11.4. Performance against Criteria for Evaluation
This section of our report considers the performance of Toronto’s public transport services
against the criteria for evaluation that we identify in Chapter 2.
11.4.1.1.
Modal splits
Within the generally car-dominated culture of North America, Toronto has a reputation for
having been relatively successful in public transport system use. Table 11.1 provides details
of splits between the different transport modes.
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City Study: Toronto
Table 11.1
Modal Splits for Toronto : 1996
Mode
All journeys
(%)
All AM peak
journeys (%)
1986 all AM
peak journeys
(%)
All journeys
from 905 area
to Toronto (%)
AM peak journeys
from 905 area to
Toronto (%)
Walking/cycling
9
13
11
0
0
Public transport
25
32
35
12
21
Private car
65
55
53
87
78
Taxi
1
0
0
0
0
Total
100
100
100
100
100
Source: A Transportation Vision for the City of Toronto Official Plan
Note: The 905 area is the part of the GTA covered by the 905 telephone code – ie the area outside City Centre Toronto.
As Table 11.2 shows, the private car dominates, although other modes of transport account
for a total of 35 per cent of all journeys. Public transport and walking/cycling capture a
slightly larger proportion of peak journeys as a whole. However, when the current statistics
are compared to those for 1986, a small erosion in the share of public transport is observed,
some of which has been lost to the private car. A comparison of the modal splits for total
journeys with those for journeys from the 905 area (the parts of the GTA surrounding the
City of Toronto, named after the telephone code for these regions) to Toronto centre shows
that for longer distance trips, a large majority are made by private car, especially out of the
morning peak.
Cordon Counts carried out by the Joint Program in Transportation of the University of
Toronto at a disaggregated level (split by individual screen lines) report the following
results for the morning peak in 1998, compared to 1985:
Table 11.2
Modal Splits on Specific Screen Lines during the Morning Peak
Private Car
Transit
Other
Total
PeelToronto
1998 (%)
PeelToronto
1985 (%)
DurhamToronto
1998 (%)
DurhamToronto
1985 (%)
67
25
8
100
71
21
8
100
75
19
6
100
74
20
6
100
PeelSimcoeYork
1998 (%)
88
1
11
100
PeelSimcoeYork
1985 (%)
84
8
8
100
DurhamYork
1998 (%)
DurhamYork
1985 (%)
87
4
8
100
88
3
9
100
Source: GTA Cordon Count Program Analysis of Traffic Trends 1985 to 1998, University of Toronto Joint Program in
Transportation.
These data provide further evidence that dependence on the car is significantly higher for
trips between the outer regions of the GTA than for trips into the City of Toronto. These
data also suggest a relatively mixed picture in terms of how public transit’s modal share has
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City Study: Toronto
been changing over time, although the general picture appears to be one of relatively little
change from 1985 to 1998.
11.4.1.2.
Patronage
Table 11.3 provides details of patronage figures for TTC, measured as total passenger
journeys.
Table 11.3
TTC Total Passenger Journeys (millions)
Passenger
journeys
1988
463.5
1990
459.0
1991
424.2
1992
404.3
1993
393.5
1994
388.3
1995
388.2
1996
372.4
1997
379.9
1998
388.7
1999
392.6
2000
410.5
As Table 11.3 illustrates, total passenger journeys for TTC fell quite significantly in the late
1980s/early 1990s, but have been making a steady recovery since 1996. TTC report that they
expect this trend to continue, not least because of the steady economic and population
growth that is forecast for Toronto.
GO Transit has also recorded strong growth in ridership in recent years. In 2000, there were
40 million passenger journeys on GO Transit (32.5 million on bus and 7.5 million by train),
an increase of 1.5 million (4 per cent) on the 1999 figure. Like TTC, GO experienced some
fall in ridership levels in the early 1990s, but passenger journeys have now more than
recovered, and GO Transit has been achieving new records in the total number of passenger
journeys for four successive years. GO predict increasingly strong growth over the next 20
years – total ridership by 2020 is expected to exceed 60 million passenger journeys.
However, GO’s 10 Year Capital Plan reports that they will need capital investment of
around €78 million a year to 2011 and €39 million a year for 2011 to 2021 and keep pace with
this growth, particularly to be able to expand peak services which are already at capacity
levels, with crowding on services and in stations at peak times. Discussions with GO
suggest that under the current subsidy arrangements, the ability to achieve the expansion
needed is under significant threat.
When the figures in Table 11.3 are considered against trends in modal splits, along with
further evidence reported by GO Transit, it would appear that for journeys into the city,
Toronto has been relatively successful in maintaining the modal share of transit and
walking/cycling, and has even increased its share on some routes. The growth in ridership
observed is a combination of the increased total number of trips being made, plus some
growth in model share, especially in the case of GO Transit.
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City Study: Toronto
11.4.1.3.
Fares
TTC operates a single, flat fare system in its area of operation, irrespective of the distance
covered or number of modes used for a single trip. Table 11.4 below summarises the main
fares available from TTC.
Table 11.4
TTC fares (from 3rd June 200)
€1.75
€1.17
€0.39
€72.68
€66.66
€5.83
Single adult cash fare
Student/OAP fare
Child fare
Monthly pass
Annual pass (price per month)
Single/group day pass
For longer journeys, the flat rate fare is considered to offer relatively good value for money,
particularly given that passengers can obtain free transfers between different TTC
vehicles/trains that are part of one trip. However, this is less true for passengers needing to
make relatively short trips, perhaps not even entering the CBD. The lack of a zonal or
distance-based charging system means that there is significant cross-subsidisation to the
detriment of those wishing to make shorter journeys. Arguably, such a system could have
poor implications for social cohesion and present difficulties for low income groups reliant
on public transport for local journeys, for example to shops and places of entertainment.
TTC also observed a noticeable step decline in their levels of farebox operating cost recovery
when the flat fare was introduced in 1974.
Table 11.5 shows how TTC fares have increased over time.
Table 11.5
TTC Adult Single Fare 1990 to 2000
Adult single fare (€)
nominal terms63
Adult single fare (€)
2001 prices
Adult single fare ($)
nominal terms
Adult single fare ($)
2001 prices
63
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
0.78
0.83
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.17
1.24
1.24
1.24
1.32
1.55
1.75
0.98
0.99
1.19
1.17
1.16
1.32
1.38
1.36
1.35
1.41
1.61
1.75
1.00
1.07
1.30
1.30
1.30
1.50
1.60
1.60
1.60
1.70
2.00
2.25
1.26
1.28
1.53
1.50
1.50
1.69
1.78
1.75
1.73
1.81
2.07
2.25
ie, “money of the day” not adjusted for inflation.
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City Study: Toronto
The rate of increase has been relatively steady, although 2000 and 2001 saw a relatively high
increases, partially as a result of increased fuel prices. TTC report some initial adverse
reaction from the public in response to fare increases, with potentially a small fall-off in
ridership in the very short term, but in general ridership trends tend to be unaffected.
Unlike TTC, GO Transit fares are based on a zonal system. Rather than splitting the GTA
into a relatively small number of concentric zones or a similar arrangement, there are almost
100 individual zones split by their positions on each of the seven rail and six bus corridors –
ie, the fare system is arguably more distance-based than zonal-based. Minimum adult single
fares for travel within one zone are €2.14 ($2.75), rising to around€12.44 ($16.00) for the very
longest journeys. For example, the single adult fare for a trip from Newcastle in the far East
of GO’s network, to Hamilton in the far west costs €12.79 ($16.45). However, a commuting
trip from these outer regions to the city centre would cost around half this (for example€6.53
($8.40) from Newcastle to Union Station, a distance of over 60kms).
GO offers a range of fares, all of which are also zonally based. Half price fares are offered
for children and OAPs. Discounts are also offered to students and those buying a ten-ride
prepay ticket, monthly passes (including the TTC-GO “Twin Pass” which is discussed
further in the section on tariff integration) and daily group passes. Table 11.6 provides an
example of the magnitude of discounts offered for a single adult fare of €3.89 ($5.00).
Table 11.6
Sample GO Transit Fares (March 2001)
€
$
Single
adult
Adult ten
ride
Adult
monthly
Student
monthly
Child/
OAP
Group
Fare
TTC/GO
Twin Pass
3.89
5.00
35.18
45.25
122.82
158.00
76.18
98.00
1.94
2.50
15.55
20.00
115.05
148.00
Like TTC, GO transit has had to impose fare increases in 2000 and 2001 partially as a result
of fuel price increases, and partially to cover the cost of increases in service. In both years,
the increase was €0.12 ($0.15) for every adult single ticket – ie, the proportionate increase has
fallen most onto customers making shorter journeys. GO report that for the average rider
buying a monthly pass, the fare increase equates to €3.11 to €3.89 per month.
11.4.1.4.
TTC, GO and the local municipal transit providers are only directly involved in demand
management insofar as their services help to draw passengers off the roads and onto less
congesting forms of transport. For example, GO Transit reports that it carries as many
people on the average weekday morning into the city centre as six congested expressways
(ie motorways) would.
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City Study: Toronto
The Transportation Services department of City Hall is responsible for all roads in the City
of Toronto, including road system design, traffic signals, facilities for pedestrians and
cyclists, and the provision of other street furniture such as bus stops. It also operates a series
of 40 traffic cameras across the city (RESCU cameras) and is responsible for monitoring
current traffic conditions. Members of the public can access information on current traffic
conditions either by telephone or internet link.
The City of Toronto recently published an “Official Plan” for the city, detailing how City
Hall proposes to improve services and conditions for the people of Toronto. As part of this
process, significant attention has been paid to public transport. City Hall Commissioned a
paper: “A Transportation Vision for the City of Toronto Official Plan” by Professor Richard
Soberman (formerly of University of Toronto, now a member of Trimap communications
consulting group). Amongst the options considered for improving transport in Toronto
were improvements to transit priority arrangements for buses and streetcars that share
routes with other traffic. Reserved lanes, protected rights of way and signal priority at
intersections have all been suggested as potential improvements on the current Toronto
system.
The construction and maintenance of Provincial highways are the responsibility of the
Government of Ontario, who are also responsible for driver licensing and vehicle testing.
11.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
No detailed data were available on traffic speeds in Toronto. GO Transit noted that their
services generally travel at around the relevant speed limit in outer areas, but that speeds
fall in the centre, especially in more congested areas.
Table 11.7 below shows total kilometres operated by the different TTC public transport
modes from 1990 to 1999.
Table 11.7
Kilometres Operated 1990 to 1999 (millions)
Bus
Streetcar
Subway
Scarborough RT
Total
1990
101.9
13.1
70.9
3.3
194.6
1991
98.8
12.7
67.8
3.3
187.4
1992
102.1
12.0
65.1
3.5
183.2
1993
99.0
11.5
63.6
3.7
178.5
1994
100.5
11.2
63.8
3.6
179.1
1995
100.9
11.1
62.8
3.7
178.5
1996
93.7
10.9
63.9
3.6
172.1
1997
93.7
10.6
65.5
3.7
173.5
1998
94.5
12.1
67.6
4.1
178.3
1999
94.4
11.4
67.4
3.9
177.2
As the table shows, bus is the most important transport mode by volume in central Toronto,
followed by subway. Total kilometres operated fell overall during the 1990s, although the
late ‘90s showed overall growth.
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City Study: Toronto
11.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Within North America, Toronto has a generally good reputation as an efficient transport
operator. One of the statistics often quoted is the ratio of revenues to costs. Table 11.8 below
sets out the ratio of revenues to costs (including capitalised costs) for TTC.
Table 11.8
TTC’s Revenue-Cost Ratio
Revenue to cost ratio
1990
0.67
1991
0.65
1992
0.66
1993
0.66
1994
0.69
1995
0.69
1996
0.76
1997
0.80
1998
0.79
1999
0.81
Note: Figures for 1991 to 1993 are slightly lower than typical, due to the exclusion of revenue from Toronto Coach Terminal
in 1991, and no draws from the Transit Improvement Reserve Fund in 1992 and 1993.
As Table 11.8 shows, TTC’s revenue to cost ratio has increased strongly since 1995.
Operating cost to operating revenue shows a similar trend, but the ratio is slightly higher,
reaching 0.82 in 2000. Much of this observed increase appears to have been due to a
significant increase in operating revenues from €355.5 million in 1995 to €489.7 million in
2000 – a combination of the increase in ridership and the fare increases. Operating costs
have also risen, but to a lesser extent.
TTC has undergone a significant efficiency programme in recent years, the most significant
of which was instigated by the then TTC Managing Director David Gunn from 1995. In
1995, the TTC suffered a fatal subway accident. During the investigations that followed,
questions were raised about the ability of the TTC’s operational structure to operate
efficiently and to have a clear chain of command and responsibility. In response, David
Gunn was appointed and TTC underwent a significant operational overhaul, with reforms
to company structures and chains of command, and arrangements for accountability. Part of
this programme also involved increasing operating efficiency. As a result of this, operating
expenditures per trip, per kilometre, and per employee all fell in the late 1990s. Overall
subsidy levels, and subsidy per trip and per kilometre operated have all also fallen
significantly in recent years (subsidy levels are discussed in greater detail in Section
11.3.2.4).
GO Transit report that the ratio of operating revenues to operating costs to have been
“consistently 80 per cent to 90 per cent” in recent years. Indeed, the reported ratio for 1999
is a record 92.4 per cent, although the fact that GO exclude some of their costs from
payments to the railways for track access, (because they argue that other operators do not
face these charges), fare integration costs and depreciation costs means that this figure
should in fact be a little lower (around 88 per cent). Employee costs (labour and benefits)
account for 28 per cent of GO’s operating costs, although comparisons with other operators
are not possible due to the fact that GO contracts out a lot of its operations.
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City Study: Toronto
GO private sector outsourcing - GO Transport outsources a large proportion of its operation
to the private sector, including train maintenance and station design and construction. GO
trains are operated under contract by Canadian National Railway and St Lawrence and
Hudson Railway using crews supplied by the railways. The railways also own much of the
tracks. GO report that 65 per cent of its budget for services is provided by the private sector.
Discussions with GO revealed that the main motivation for this public sector involvement
was to ensure that cost efficiency is maximised by the competitive process. However, GO
stressed that they have a policy of ensuring that all staff in direct contact with the public are
GO employees, in order to help them control customer service standards, particularly the
helpfulness of staff. GO describe themselves as “a prime example of a public-private
partnership that works”.64
As mentioned in Section 11.3.1.2 GO Transit and the GTSB have recently jointly acquired
Union Station and its approach tracks from the private sector rail companies (CN and CP).
GO report that this has been done because of an unwillingness by the private sector
companies to expand the infrastructure sufficiently at this key bottleneck on the GO system.
The ability to control infrastructure maintenance, which can impact on reliability, has been
cited as a further reason. Rail infrastructure access charges are also not subject to economic
regulation in the way that they are, for example, in the UK. GO and the GTSB have
therefore undertaken to maintain and expand the infrastructure themselves (using private
sector contracting-out), following what they regard as an inadequate service from the
private infrastructure owner. In discussions, GO Transit suggested the reason for CP/CN’s
reluctance to spend more on infrastructure expansion and maintenance was that it did not
offer the same profits for CP/CN shareholders as expenditure on other capital projects
elsewhere. GO has plans to systematically acquire rail corridor tracks over the coming
years.
11.4.3.2.
Section 11.3.2 provides details of the recent changes to funding arrangements in Toronto.
As mentioned earlier, TTC subsidy levels have fallen quite significantly in recent years.
Table 11.9 shows operating and capital subsidies for 1990 to 1999 in 2001 prices (ie in real
terms).
Table 11.9
TTC Operating and Capital Subsidies (millions, 2001 prices)
Operating
subsidy €
Capital
subsidy €
64
1990
236.7
1991
276.7
1992
287.5
1993
270.3
1994
238.7
1995
242.1
1996
187.8
1997
173.6
1998
158.3
1999
148.2
2000
149.1
2,433.3
2,443.5
2,540.6
2,675.3
2,918.8
3,089.4
3,391.8
3,736.8
4,277.1
4,836.9
n/a
“The State of the System” GO Transit – The Year in Review, 1999-00.
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City Study: Toronto
As might be expected from these figures, operating subsidies per passenger trip have also
fallen significantly, from €0.43 in 1995 to €0.27 in 1999 as have operating subsidies per
kilometre operated, from €0.93 in 1995 to €0.61 in 1999.
GO Transit’s 2001 subsidy will be €1,130 million, made up of €21.1 million operating subsidy
and €92.0 million capital subsidy.
Both GO Transit and TTC receive subsidies as a “lump sum”, based on approval of their
budgets, and views on achievable revenue-cost ratios. Subsidies are not directly related to,
eg the volume of passengers, the number of concessionary fares, and so do not form as such
a direct incentive to, for example, maximise ridership.
11.4.3.3.
While 95 per cent of TTC’s revenue comes from passenger fares, it does have a number of
smaller income streams, the largest of which is advertising, forecast to bring in 2.2 per cent
of TTC’s revenues in 2001 (€10.7 million). In 2001, TTC is also projected to make €5.5 million
from property rental, €4.4 million from outside city services and charters, €1.9 million from
commuter parking, and €1.7 million from other sources. TTC’s revenue from “outside city
services” comes from other municipal transit providers who contract out services on some
sections of their network to TTC (although the extent of this is relatively small).
11.4.3.4.
TTC appears to have very good arrangements for accountability and transparency in place.
Following the organisational reforms under David Gunn from 1995, TTC was restructured
internally to ensure clearer lines of command and responsibility. TTC produces internal
documents annually showing detailed organisational charts for the whole company. It also
produces annually a document setting out the forthcoming years’ departmental goals and
objectives, against which internal performance can be measured ex post. Goals and
objectives are very detailed, and cover all areas of operation, for example ranging from
environmental targets, targets for reducing crime, internal targets for training, absenteeism
rates etc, targets to increase ridership, and operational targets eg on equipment reliability.
TTC operates a detailed and regular reporting system. Every month, TTC produces a report
to the Chief General Manager describing performance against a detailed set of targets,
including performance against opex and capex budgets, projected ridership, and against a
range of operating performance measures. The performance measures include percentage of
bus and streetcar services that are within three minutes of scheduled times, and the number
and duration of delays on the subway. Delays are split into those considered controllable
and uncontrollable. The sections of the report dealing with budgets include detailed
commentary explaining any divergences, for example due to unexpected ridership changes,
and the state of the local economy. Performance against budget is also split by department.
TTC produces annual accounts which are audited by external auditors, and which are
available to the public on request.
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City Study: Toronto
All politicians on the Commission’s board have access to the Chief General Manager’s
report. Other factors that enhance accountability are the fact that the Commission’s monthly
meetings are open to the public, the fact that Commission board members are elected
politicians rather than appointed officials (as was the case originally), and the fact that the
Commission can refer issues for debate at City Council level.
Public access to TTC information is generally good. TTC’s website provides a large amount
of information, including the minutes of Commission board meetings, and summaries of the
Chief General Manager’s reports.
GO Transit also publishes an annual budget plan, which includes details of performance
against the previous year’s budget. It also produces audited financial statements annually
which are also publicly available. As for TTC GO’s internal board is answerable to a board
of elected politicians (the GTSB).
11.4.4.1.
Frequency
Service frequency on the subway is good throughout the day/week. During peak hours,
services typically run every 2 to 3 minutes, and every five minutes or so off peak and at
weekends. After 9pm, services also typically run every five minutes or so. Services start
around 6am and finish around 1.30am. Frequencies on the streetcars vary from about every
five minutes during peak times to every ten minutes in the evenings. Streetcar services run
from about 6am to 1am, although on some lines, the hours of operation are more limited
(7.30 am to 8pm, and later on weekends). For bus services, frequencies vary much more
depending on the route. On ordinary TTC routes, they vary from every 10 minutes for peak
periods/locations, to around every half hour at less popular routes and times. On TTC
“express” services, and on the majority of GO’s heavy rail and bus services, services are only
offered during peak periods. TTC also offer a night bus service (Nightlink).
TTC and GO set frequencies according to average vehicle loading factors per route, although
this is currently being limited in at least some locations by a lack of capital expenditure.
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City Study: Toronto
11.4.4.2.
Reliability
TTC’s Bus and Streetcar routes aim to run 75 per cent of services to within three minutes of
scheduled times. TTC failed to meet this target in 2000, but the information available
suggests that TTC are achieving around 70 per cent compliance. TTC information on
customer complaints shows bus/subway delay to account for a relatively low proportion of
delays (8.7 per cent for 2000). In 2000 the largest causes for complaint were in relation to
staff discourtesy, defective vending machines and complaints concerning fare enforcement.
On the subway, TTC have set 2001 delay targets as follows:
•
incidents of delay per 1,000 hours of subway train operation: 2.9 for TTC controllable
incidents, 3.6 for non-controllable incidents;
•
minutes of delay per 1,000 hours of train operation: 16.2 mins for TTC controllable,
30.9 for other;
•
average length of delay: 5.5 mins for controllable, 7.8 mins for other.
The information available showed TTC to be meeting these targets so far, although the fact
that information was only available for the first few months of the year means that this must
be treated with some caution.
Despite setting itself reliability targets which are published, TTC does not face any formal
external penalty for failing to meet its targets (other than its potential impact on ridership).
The same applies to GO Transit.
Service reliability in Toronto can be affected badly by severe winter weather. For example,
January 1999 saw severe snowstorms which caused delays of several hours on GO services.
11.4.4.3.
Accessibility
Accessibility is good within the city centre, with routes connecting all major streets.
Accessibility is further improved for the mobility impaired/the elderly by the operation of a
network of “community buses” that operate on four routes from 9.30 until 5.30 on weekdays
only, connecting homes for the elderly/infirm with shopping centres, community centres
and hospitals. There are six such buses, providing 83,900 passenger journeys in 1999.
Further details of services for the mobility impaired are provided in the section on social
cohesion.
However, provision of all services is less comprehensive outside the city centre, and
particularly on orbital routes as opposed to routes running into the city centre. In their 1998
report for the University of Toronto Joint Program in Transportation, Transit Realities in the
Suburban GTA, Crowley and Dalton noted that the significant economic development of the
905 Area (ie the GTA area outside the City of Toronto) has contributed to a significant
growth in the number of work trips now being made across the GTA, rather than into the
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city centre. For example, between 1986 and 1996, the number of home to work trips
increased by 40 per cent to Downtown Toronto, but by 65 per cent between GTA regions,
and by 51 per cent for cross boundary trips within a regional municipality. In terms of
absolute numbers, trips within the local municipality increased the most, by 56,000,
compared with a 23,000 increase in trips to Downtown Toronto.
Crowley and Dalton report that Toronto’s public transit system has so far failed to
accommodate this pattern of growth. The inadequacies of public transit links across the
GTA were also raised by Richard Soberman in his report for City Hall on the transportation
aspect of the Official Plan, and in his NERA interview. TTC also acknowledge that “across
town” services are not a strong as “into town” ones.
Given that GO Transit provides almost exclusively a commuter service, accessibility (in
terms of, for example, being able to walk to a station or stop in so many minutes) is
somewhat limited. However, when considering accessibility, this has to be balanced against
the speed the express service offers, the good parking facilities, and the fact that car
ownership levels are high. GO Transit also offer “Train Buses” – buses which operate for a
few hours on their train routes outside peak hours when the trains do not run.
11.4.4.4.
Overcrowding levels are generally quite high in peak periods, when both GO and TTC
services are generally full, with people standing on TTC buses and streetcars and on GO
trains. TTC sets acceptable maximum vehicle load standards as illustrated in Table 11.10. If
these are consistently exceeded, then increased service frequencies are considered.
Table 11.10
TTC Acceptable Maximum Hour Average Vehicle Loads
Vehicle Type
30 foot bus
40 foot bus
articulated bus
streetcar
articulated streetcar
Peak period acceptable loads
40
60
90
75
110
TTC reports that this equates to a ratio of approximately 1.2 persons to a seat, but a small
sample of peak services across all modes suggests that this is often exceeded. Service
reductions are considered when loads fall below half a seated load.
Cleanliness on TTC and GO services is generally good. While TTC vehicles (particularly
buses) have a significantly longer average life than might be observed elsewhere (18 years or
in some cases more), aging vehicles are subject to a complete overhaul and refurbishment
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when needed. Bus/streetcar stops are provided with shelters in some but not all cases in the
city centre, despite the bad winter weather.
The quality of timetable information is relatively good for both TTC and GO. Both
companies provide telephone and internet services giving full details of timetables, and
routes, and regular updates on timetable changes (eg TTC makes a number of changes to its
service on a seasonal basis, as well as to take account of changing patterns in demand).
Timetables are also available at stations, on subway platforms and at bus/streetcar shelters.
TTC route details are available at stations, on the internet, by telephone, at bus/streetcar
shelters and in local Yellow Pages directories.
11.4.5.1.
Physical integration within the City of Toronto is generally good. GO commuter rail and
bus services link in directly with TTC subway services at key locations including Union
Station in the city centre, Kipling Station at the West end of the subway line, Finch, York
Mills and Yorkdale stations to the North, and the Scarborough Centre to the East. There is
also good interconnection between GO services and TTC bus and streetcar services, with the
TTC routes linking directly with all the major GO rail stations and bus terminals. Similarly,
TTC services are generally very well integrated in a physical sense with other TTC services.
For example, many streetcar and bus stops are located on the corners of the main streets,
allowing easy interchange between services.
TTC buses and streetcars generally put down and pick up within the subway concourses –
once past the main entrance ticket barriers, passengers are within a “ticket paid” zone, and
do not have to show tickets again to board the next transport mode within that concourse.
This minimises queues and the need for staff to check tickets.65 Passengers do however have
to pass ticket barriers when moving, eg between GO rail services and TTC subway services
situated within the same concourse. For TTC services, customers can buy pre-paid tokens,
which allow passengers to pass automatically through ticket barriers and speed up
movement.
Integration between the private car and public transit is also good, particularly at the outer
GO commuter rail stations, the majority of which provide extensive parking facilities. The
“park and ride” culture is encouraged by the provision of free parking for Metropass
holders (the GO/TTC monthly travelcard) at most GO stations, the availability of reserved
parking spaces at all GO stations in return for a pre-payment, as well as “pay-as you go”
cash parking. TTC also offers free parking at outer stations. Take up has been good, with
65
This system does present the theoretical opportunity for fare dodging if passengers enter the station concourse eg
along the bus lanes rather than thorough the ticket barriers. Spot checks are carried out but are not extensive.
However, TTC report very low fare evasion levels, which they put down to cultural reasons rather than very good
entry control.
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car parks generally in high demand. In many cases, car parks can reach capacity in peak
periods, and illegal parking can be a problem.
In terms of physical integration with services provided in the municipalities surrounding
City Centre Toronto (eg Brampton, Mississauga, Vaughan, Richmond Hill and Markham),
physical integration is less extensive. GO train services generally link directly with local bus
services run by the local transit companies. GO bus services also link with every municipal
transport system, but links are arguably less comprehensive, as GO bus services are largely
“express” commuter services and make only a limited number of stops in these outer areas.
The bus services offered by the outer municipalities do not generally link with TTC subway
services (links at York Regional Terminal to the North of the city centre being an exception)
due to the fact that the subway system does not generally extend this far. The vast majority
of these connections tend to be with bus services. While there is some physical integration
between TTC bus services and the other municipality bus services, integration is not as
comprehensive as it is in the city centre. In almost all cases, the other municipality bus
routes do not extend into TTC areas and a change of bus is required to reach more central
locations. However, these areas are linked with the centre via GO services, especially during
peak periods.
A rather unique feature of Toronto’s transport integration system is PATH, the underground
walking network that links directly into subway/GO stations, major shopping areas and
places of work and entertainment. PATH provides a fairly comprehensive network for the
CBD. It is particularly relevant to Toronto given the bad winters. GO Transit have observed
a close correlation between the extension of the PATH network, and their ridership levels.
Being able to walk to and from the GO station and their place of work without having to
brave the elements has increased the attractiveness of the public transport option for many
commuters.
11.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
There is full tariff integration between all TTC services. TTC operates a flat-rate cash fare
(€1.75 ($2.25) for adults in Spring 2001) on all of its services, and passengers can obtain free
transfers to other TTC modes (for example subway to bus, streetcar to subway, bus to bus
etc.) so long as the journey is part of one continuous trip (ie, not a return journey or one
broken by eg trips to the shops). Similarly, Metropasses (ie monthly or annual passes) and
day passes are valid on all modes and for all areas within the TTC operating area.
Tariff integration between GO and TTC services exists, but is more limited. Where
passengers use a TTC service immediately before and after a GO service, they can board the
second TTC vehicle on a free transfer. Customers wishing to purchase a monthly Metropass
for both GO and TTC services are able to purchase a Twin Pass, which offers a €7.77 ($10)
discount on the cost of buying the two passes separately. This discount used to be €15.54,
with €7.77 each being contributed by GO and TTC. However, TTC have now withdrawn
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their contribution. There are no similar integration arrangements for cash fares, day passes
or the GO 10 ride tickets.
Perhaps the weakest aspect of Toronto’s integration policy concerns tariff integration
between the TTC and other municipal transit companies and between the municipal transit
companies themselves. Here, integrated tariffs are not available at all for journeys that cross
from a municipal transit company service to a TTC service or another municipal transit
company area. Customers making such trips are required to pay an extra fare when
crossing the border into the TTC area, whatever TTC mode they use.66 The only exception is
the GTA weekly pass, which allows unlimited travel within the GTA, including TTC
services, some GO services (the Yonge C service) and services provided by the other
municipal transit companies. However, this pass is generally regarded as relatively
expensive €28.18 per week or $36.25) and is only suitable for those making a relatively large
number of trips within the GTA.
11.4.5.3.
A Greater Toronto Area Transit Ride Guide is published annually by TTC, which provides a
map of all public transit services (ie covering TTC, GO, and other municipal transit
companies). This map is available at stations and at bus/streetcar shelters and is
downloadable from the internet. TTC, GO and the other municipal transit companies all
provide direct links to other transit company websites.
11.4.5.4.
Land Use planning has traditionally been the remit of City Hall in the City of Toronto, and
of the planning departments of the other municipalities. The City of Toronto Official Plan,
and similar plans adopted by an number of the other GTA regions have set out proposals to
increase the integration between transport planning and land use planning, which, while
reasonably good in the City Centre, is generally seen as having been poor in the outer
municipalities. TTC are consulted by City Hall on all major land use planning
developments (for example the creation of a new office complex). While TTC do not have
formal powers, they are always consulted and can make recommendations. TTC monitor
demand on individual routes closely, and have high levels of autonomy when making
decisions over what routes to open, close or modify.
66
This applies whether or not the passenger has to change vehicles – in some cases this is not always necessary, as
while TTC and surrounding transit company service areas are generally separate, TTC does operate some services
under contract to the local municipalities.
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11.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the flat rate fare that applies to all TTC journeys within
the City of Toronto provides generally good value for money for longer trips, but less good
value for money for shorter trips, which may potentially act to the detriment of those on low
incomes. The flat rate increases of €0.12 ($0.15) on GO services in 2000 and 2001 have also
benefited long-distance travellers at the expense of those travelling shorter distances.
Concessionary fares are offered to students and OAPs (at roughly 75 per cent fare for TTC,
although discounts can be lower for some of the other municipal transit companies). Child
fares are low, at only €0.39 ($0.50) for TTC.
11.4.6.2.
Facilities for the mobility impaired appear to be relatively good, and are improving as
operators upgrade their rolling stock. In addition to the community busses mentioned in
Section 11.4.4, TTC run a Wheeltranz service. This service operates on a telephone bookahead basis, and provides a door-to door fully wheelchair accessible service. The service is
relatively extensive, with 1.4 million passenger trips being made in 1999, operating a total of
10.2 million kms. 18,300 Toronto residents are registered Wheeltranz users, served by 220
vehicles (including some contract vehicles). Wheeltranz is estimated to cost about €31
million per year to run.
TTC currently operates 102 low floor buses. Low floor or lift buses serve 34 of TTC’s bus 134
routes. Accessible elevators are provided at 14 subway stations, including all the major
ones.
GO transit offers full wheelchair access (including onto and off trains) at 30 of its 49 stations.
Some trains have a specifically-designed carriage for wheelchair access, with eight
wheelchair positions – access to non-specialist carriages can be provided by portable ramp.
GO Transit operates a wheelchair accessible service on three of its six route corridors. An
individual who is accompanying a disabled passenger in order to assist them is entitled to
travel free on GO services.
The transit companies of Toronto have been faced with some quite significant external
changes over recent years.
Perhaps the most significant of these has been the
“downloading” of responsibility and all funding obligations to the municipal government
level. (Prior to that date, GO had been run and funded by the Provincial government, and
TTC by a combination of the Metro Toronto and the Provincial government.)
Both TTC and GO (plus some of the other municipal operators) feel that this may seriously
damage their ability to maintain and grow the network, particularly in relation to capital
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investment. TTC argues that there is little excess “fat” in the organisation that can be
removed in order to breach the funding gap. Operational revenue-cost ratios are already
high for both GO and TTC.
The relative autonomy that both TTC and GO have in setting fares and service levels does
give them some flexibility in how they respond to the funding problem, but only in the form
of restrictions on future services or further fare rises. GO Transit has also responded by
lobbying the Provincial and Federal governments for funds for specific initiatives, but these
sources of income are unlikely to be steady ones. A number of interviewees suggested that
the fact that municipal governments can only raise funds for public transport though the
property tax was a significant source of inflexibility. The Provincial government set up a
specific task force to deal with the implementation of all aspects of its “downloading
policy”, and these changes were implemented gradually.
Section 11.4.3 set out how TTC responded to the subway accident of 1995, by fundamentally
restructuring, and at the same time achieving some efficiency gains, this is also discussed
further below.
The ability of Toronto public transit in general to respond to changes in demand is mixed.
While companies monitor demand on routes carefully and aim to tailor their services
accordingly, there is a widespread view, as reported earlier in this chapter, that public
transit has failed to respond to the changes in patterns of demand in terms of the growth of
trips being made across the outer regions of the GTA. The new Sheppard Subway extension
running East-West in the North of TTC’s operating area may provide some help, but it is
only 6.4kms long. Transportation for Toronto (City Hall) have expressed hopes that things
will improve as part of Toronto’s Official Plan, but such initiatives are generally still in their
early stages.
Operators in Toronto are currently considering the possibility of using smart card
technology to improve tariff integration. TTC recently conducted a study into options for
introducing automated ticketing and ticket barriers, particularly on the subway. However,
they concluded that fraud levels are low, and the expense would not be justified.
11.4.8. Economic criteria: responding to internal changes
11.4.8.1.
Not applicable for Toronto
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City Study: Toronto
11.4.8.2.
Staffing issues
Table 11.11
TTC Employment and Wages
Number of
employees
Employees per
million km operated
Average hourly
wages € 2001 prices
1990
10,351
1991
10,218
1992
10,051
1993
9,717
1994
9,621
1995
9,459
1996
9,129
1997
9,133
1998
9,462
1999
10,049
53.2
54.5
54.9
54.4
53.7
53.0
53.0
52.6
53.1
56.7
24.47
24.67
25.86
25.80
25.15
24.77
25.64
24.62
24.45
24.97
Note that wages in 1994 and 1995 were subject to the government’s Social Contract, which froze wages.
Table 11.11 provides data on TTC employees. It shows significant reductions in the number
of employees from 1990 to 1997. Employees per million kms operated fell from 54.9 in 1992
to 52.6 in 1997, but have since increased. Of total employees, 81 per cent are involved in
Operations, and 78 per cent are hourly-paid members of operations branch (ie the “front
line” drivers, station attendants and so on).
Average hourly wages rose only slightly throughout the 1990s after adjusting for inflation.
Indeed, average hourly real wages fell in real terms overall from 1992 to 1998, but recovered
in 1999.
Employee costs, including benefits account for 73 per cent of TTC’s current operating
budget, and total €460.1 million.
As mentioned earlier, the late 1990s efficiency programme saw significant reductions in the
number of TTC employees. Total employees fell from 10,351 in 1990 to 9,133 in 1997 (but
have since expanded due to service expansion). As part of the internal reform process, 1,250
jobs were eliminated, and 450 new ones were created, ie, a fall of around 800 jobs. The
reductions in staff numbers fell particularly heavily upon the administrative workers. While
the overall number of staff fell by 7 per cent, numbers of administrative staff fell by 17 per
cent. The administrative staff at TTC have lower levels of union representation than the
operational staff.
These cuts in employment were met through a combination of “natural wastage”,
redundancies, and redeployment. TTC was able to redeploy a lot of workers into other roles
within TTC, something that was not too difficult given the size of the organisation. One
form of redeployment was the setting up of a consultancy arm within TTC. The consultancy
arm operated for a couple of years, but has since folded. TTC reports that the morale of
workers was adversely affected by the restructuring and downscaling process, but is now
recovering. There was very little staff resistance to the proposed changes, at least partially
due to the fact that they had been initiated by a fatal accident, and there was a feeling
amongst staff of “wanting to help”.
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City Study: Toronto
The current policy is to achieve any further staff reductions needed through natural wastage
where possible. If this is not possible, all employees are offered the option of redeployment
as a matter of policy.
Union representation is high amongst TTC workers, at close to 90 per cent, and union power
is quite strong. TTC workers are represented by the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU),
which represents the largest proportion, the Canadian Public Employees Union and a few
members by Lodge 235 (apprentices and machinists). TTC tends to negotiate a general
agreement with ATU first, and then has more specific discussions with the other workers.
The ATU also represent around 1,000 GO Transit workers.
Relationships between the unions and TTC are reported as generally good by TTC.
Discussions with the ATU have confirmed this. TTC and the unions meet regularly with
TTC staff to discuss any impending changes and to try and avoid any sudden surprises.
Activity by the unions is generally quite high (for example, on grievance procedures
following staff dismissals) but the unions report that it is conducted in a generally
constructive and diplomatic manner.
Industrial unrest is considered to be low, given the size of the organisation and the power of
the unions. The last strike was by ATU workers in 1999. ATU report that the strike was
over the level of pay increases and the levels of allowances including clothing allowances,
safety footwear allowances, and physiotherapy costs allowances. After two days, staff
returned to work and the case went to arbitration, with the unions achieving around 60 per
cent of the original overall package they asked for (this included a 7.75 per cent wage
increase over three years, compared to the 9 per cent asked for).
As part of the restructuring process, there has been an overhaul of training. Training has
generally increased, and each job has a set training programme. TTC have increased their
initial screening of prospective employees and monitor training failure rates. For example
prospective employees are required to spend some time with operators at work before
commencing their job, in order to give them a clearer idea of what is involved.
Salary structures are currently being reviewed in an attempt to reduce the currently large
number of pay bands. Salary levels are compared to those offered in the marketplace on a
regular basis, both to illustrate to unions that pay levels are “fair” and to help staff retention.
TTC do suffer from some retention and recruitment difficulties, but this tends to be at
specialist and management levels rather than in general. During the period of the Social
Contract (1994 to 1995), when the Provincial Government imposed a wages freeze on public
employees, the unions were supportive. More recently, salaries have risen, and are now
considered quite competitive by TTC. The ATU confirmed that wages for hourly–paid
workers are relatively good when compared to the private sector in Toronto, with wages for
drivers being around double those offered to drivers in private sector companies.
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TTC Human Resources report job satisfaction to be generally good. TTC tries to foster a
culture of pride in the running of a good transport system, and seems to have been relatively
successful in doing so. The ATU also report staff morale to be relatively good.
Benefits offered to staff include free TTC travel, life insurance, accidental death and
injury/disability insurance, sickness insurance, a comprehensive medical plan and a dental
plan. Costs are covered for full time employees by TTC, and 50-50 for part-time employees.
Employees can also take out additional life insurance, the cost of which is shared 50-50 with
TTC.
11.4.9.1.
TTC and GO transport service link well with labour market areas in the centre of town, but
as mentioned earlier, they link less well with the more rapidly growing out of town job
locations, which are currently served predominantly by car. Growth in the economy could
potentially be stifled by two major constraints. The first is the relative lack of services
connecting the outer GTA areas. The second is an inability to expand Downtown commuter
services sufficiently to keep pace with demand, due to funding constraints.
11.4.9.2.
Access to airports
Access to Toronto’s airport is by road only. Highways connect the Airport and the city
centre, and regular bus services are run by both TTC and by other companies who offer an
express service (this appears to be the only example of competition). There is no heavy rail
or subway link, and the route to/from the airport can become congested at peak times.
Private operators charge €10.89 ($14.00) for a single adult fare on their express service from
the airport to the city centre. TTC airport services charge standard TTC fares.
To the extent that public transit in Toronto takes people out of their cars and reduces
congestion and total emissions, it makes a valuable contribution to the environment. City
planners have identified public transit as a way of improving Toronto’s environment, along
with initiatives for walking and cycling (for example, Toronto has a “Cycling Master Plan”
which aims to double the number of cycle trips by 2010 by extending the current network of
cycle paths from the current 180kms to 980kms and by improving route connectivity with
major destinations). The Canadian government is signed up to the Kyoto Agreement, and it
is possible that it will contribute funds to provincial and municipal-level public transport
initiatives in order to help achieve this, but there have been no real developments so far.
TTC have an annual environmental program. Much of the work from 2000 involved the
removal of asbestos from subway lines and the upgrading of containment systems (eg for
batteries/transformers) rather than being emissions-orientated. However, TTC has bought
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City Study: Toronto
125 natural gas powered buses in recent years in an attempt to help reduce emissions. Ie,
while some services operate voluntary “eco-friendly” policies, these are not obligatory.
Another example is that GO Transit uses low sulphur diesel in its locomotives during the
summer months to help prevent smog.
negative aspects of the Toronto system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
Table 11.12
Toronto Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
•
Modal splits low in the outer regions.
•
Serious funding difficulties forecast
in the near future.
Good arrangements for
accountability and transparency.
•
Very good cost recovery.
•
Use of contracting put to private
sector an interesting feature.
•
Modal splits reasonably good in the
city centre, especially in the peak.
Service quality
•
Frequency, accessibility and
cleanliness are good.
•
Relaiblility is fairly good.
•
Good tariff, physical and information
integration.
•
Extensive park and ride facilities.
•
Integration with land use historically
low, but now improving.
Service quality
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
•
Good provision for the mobility
impaired partially on general
services, bus especially through
specific services eg Wheeltrans.
•
•
Concessionary fare system.
Flat rat fare is expensive for those
needing to make short journeys.
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
•
Internal changes in the mid to late
1990s took place quite smoothly.
System has not adapted well to shifts
in demand to the outer regions of the
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City Study: Toronto
Positive
Specific provision for staff made
redundant.
•
Negative
city.
•
Good labour relations.
•
Downloading funding responsibility
to the municipal level has led to
funding difficulties.
Good training, wages and benefits
packages for staff.
Economic growth
Economic growth
•
Some initiatives including a “Cycling
Master Plan”, but many current
initiatives are voluntary.
11.6. Toronto “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Toronto system.
Table 11.13
Toronto Summary “Scorecard”
Toronto
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
Good cost recovery
•
•
Good fares and information integration
•
Good lessons in contracting out aspects
of the provision of rail commuter
services to the private sector
•
•
•
•
•
•
Training and employee benefits system
good
Flat fare discourages short journeys
Current funding arrangements are
inadequate, especially for future capex
Relatively poor service provision in outer
GTA, especially for journeys between
regions rather then in/out of central
Toronto. Poor modal share in these areas
Clear and comprehensive procedures for
transparency and accountability
Extensive facilities for the mobility
impaired
Good response to change
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City Study: Zurich
12.
CITY STUDY: ZURICH
12.1. Key Facts
•
Tram and bus services operated by a single, publicly-owned operator. Very little
tendering of services.
•
Heavy rail services also state-owned and operated.
•
Zurich Public Transport Authority responsible for co-ordination, funding, and
fares setting.
12.2. City Description
Zurich, located in the northern part of Switzerland on Lake Zurich and the Limmat River, is
the economic centre of Switzerland. It is also one of the main international financial centres,
with a compact inner city structure. The inner centre also has a public transport orientated
structure, while the surroundings are more similar to other European conurbations.
Switzerland is organised into 26 Cantons, the Canton Zurich is divided into a number of
municipalities, one of which is the city of Zurich. The Canton of Zurich in the biggest
Canton in Switzerland. It covers 1,834 square kms with a population of 1.24 million people
and 700,000 employees. It consists of 171 municipalities.
The city of Zurich covers 91.9 square kms, with 360,850 inhabitants in 1994. Population
density is about 42 inhabitants per hectare. The city has about 800 kms of streets and 180
kms of main roads. In the city itself car ownership is 364 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, while in
the whole Canton it is about 452.
The region is strongly dominated by services, especially in the financial sector, although
technical industry and research and development also play an important role.
Switzerland is organised in a federal structure, with three levels of government: national,
regional (Canton) and local communities (Gemeinden). The national level is primarily
responsible for the road and rail networks although the Canton administration also
contributes to the financing of the road networks. The Traffic Separation Regulation sets the
financing of the different modes based on the revenues raised from fuel taxes. Recently a
general lorry tax was introduced, marking a clear movement towards internalisation of
external costs. The framework for land use planning and policy is established at the national
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City Study: Zurich
level and the Cantons are responsible for developing their own land-use and transport
legislation and plans.
The Cantonal traffic law of Zurich has the target of providing high standard and efficient
public transportation in the Canton of Zurich. The Zurich Public Transport Authority (ZVV)
is in charge of a co-ordinated and economical transport system including an integrated fare
system. It is a Canton owned company. It was established in 1990 by the Canton of Zurich
especially to plan and co-ordinate schedules, frequencies and networks for public transport,
set and integrate fares, market and marketing services, provide capital assistance and
administer operating grants. ZVV does not operate any services itself.
ZVV and other organisations that are involved in the Zurich public transport system are
required to balance their powers carefully. It is not seen as appropriate if one or another
organisation obtains too much power in the Canton when it comes to (public) transport.
The Transport Department (Amt für Verkehr, AFV) is a new organisation that has been in
existence for about a year. This organisation has three goals:
•
to develop an integrated transport concept for the Canton of Zurich;
•
to develop strategic planning of transit and transport; and
•
to exercise strategic control
In contrast to ZVV, AFV is active at a more strategic level and not only deals with public
transport but with all the transport modes within the Canton. It co-ordinates action from the
Bau
direktion
(spatial
planning,
road
construction
and
environment),
Volkswirtschaftsdirektion (ZVV) and the Direction für Soziales und Sicherheit (police). AFV
is currently drafting a long-term strategic plan that will be finished by the end of 2001.
In the Canton there are more than 270 public transport lines, consisting of bus lines, tram
lines, and rail lines, as well as boat connections. Over 180 of these lines are regional bus
lines, and 55 are city bus transport lines. The public transport system is highly integrated.
The rail lines are marketed under the name “S-Bahn”. The first S-Bahn link opened in 1990
and more lines have opened since. The lines were constructed by converting and upgrading
existing railway lines, many of which continue to carry long-distance and freight traffic as
well. Where possible, however, segregated S-Bahn infrastructure has been provided. Most
of the S-Bahn lines are operated by the national rail operator SBB, although some are
provided by one of the regional railway companies in Switzerland.
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In order to pay operators to run these lines a budget is agreed between ZVV, the Canton and
the municipalities. The ZVV must design services and set fares with these resources
available. ZVV enters into two-year agreements with the concessionaires to serve specific
areas. Under these agreements, the operator agrees to provide a given timetable. ZVV pays
operators based on a mutually agreed upon reimbursement system, indexed to the amount
of services rendered and performance criteria. The ZVV has a watchdog role in encouraging
operators to restrain costs where possible.
The operators present a proposed budget, which is accepted if it fits in the funding
authority’s framework. Some parts of the costs, such as the cost of fuel are variable. Under
the gross cost contract used, ZVV collects the fares and pays each operator according to the
negotiated agreements usually based upon their total of vehicle kilometres. At present there
is almost no competition for service operation.
The operators are controlled through the quality of service they deliver. If their quality is
well below the average then ZVV takes action, which can include tendering of services.
However, during the last five years only a few lines have been tendered. As a result, a
handful of lines are now operated by private and leisure operators.
Figure 12.1 shows the links between the Canton of Zurich, the municipalities and the
operators. By law, the Canton sets the strategic objectives. Fifty per cent of the deficit
between income from ticket sales and costs is covered by the Canton, and the other 50 per
cent by the municipalities. The amount to be covered by each individual municipality
depends for 20 per cent on the level of the municipal tax, which is based on the tax capacity
of the community, and for 80 per cent on the service level that the municipality enjoys. The
service level considers the number of departures of public transport weighed by an index
representing the quality of the various modes.
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Figure 12.1
ZVV Organisation Scheme
Canton of Zurich
Executive Council and
Cantonal Council
Guidelines for development,
service fares, credit frame, budget
171 municipalities
consulted on fares, participation in
schedule, planning
ZVV, headed by traffic board
Final decision on fares and services, financing, marketing,
public relation
8 partner companies:
S-Bahn Zürich, VBZ, Postauto Zürich, WV, VBG, SZU,VZO, ZSG
The other 32 operators
ZVV proposes a budget with a certain level of subsidies to the Canton and the
municipalities. The Canton and the municipalities can then agree whether to accept this
budget or not. ZVV pays the operators for the running costs including personnel and
maintenance. Investment for capital equipment is financed by special traffic funds.
There are about 40 public transport operators in the Zurich area. These consist of: two
federal companies (SBB, Postauto); two inter-cantonal railroads (Südostbahn, BremgartenDietikon-Bahn); two municipal transport authorities (Zürich, Winterthur); two private
railroads (Sihltal-Zürich-Uetliberg-Bahn, Forschbahn); 27 bus companies; two boat
companies; two funiculars (Polybahn, Dolderbahn); and a cabin lift. The two biggest players
are VBZ, the operator in the city of Zurich and the SBB (national rail operator).
As effective cooperation between this large number of operators can be difficult, ZVV have
appointed the eight largest companies as partner companies. ZVV organises public
transport together with these organisations. The other 32 operators fall under the
jurisdiction of one of the eight partner companies. ZVV meets up with the eight partner
companies and leaves it to them to communicate with the other operators.
ZVV employs about 80 people. Finance is the biggest department with ten people. Other
people work on planning, marketing, ticket sales, communication and scheduling. The
current idea is to let the eight partner companies do most of the work related to the
tendering procedure.
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12.4. Performance Against Criteria for Evaluation
12.4.1.1.
Modal splits
The market share of public transport in the Zurich area is high. About 41 per cent of the
commuters entering the city of Zurich use car or motorcycle, with the remaining 59 per cent
using public transport. Public transport is used by 22 per cent of journeys for leisure and
shopping in the whole Canton. For transport in the city of Zurich mode share is car (27 per
cent), bicycle (8 per cent), walk (28 per cent) and public transport (37 per cent).
12.4.1.2.
Patronage
The development of rail and bus patronage in the city of Zurich over the last four years is
shown in Table 12.1.
Table 12.1
Bus and Rail Patronage in Zurich on an Average Day (000)
1996/97
1997/98
1998/99
1999/00
Bus (VBZ)
882
865
869
876
Rail (all
operators)
220
220
227
242
Source: ZVV
It can be seen in Table 12.1 that bus patronage on the main bus operator VBZ has been more
or less stable during the last four years. The use of rail in 1999/00 was however some 10 per
cent higher than the 1996/97 level. Patronage on the entire S-Bahn network has grown by 32
per cent in the period from 1989 (pre-conversion) to 1999. Although this is a high growth
rate, it is lower than the some of the rates elsewhere, e.g. Manchester Metrolink. The S-Bahn
conversions however are less radical, whereas the 1989 patronage may already have been
relatively high due to the traffic restraint policies in Zurich that were already in place by that
time.
It is intended to increase overall public transport patronage in the period to 2006 by 15 per
cent, compared to the 1999/00 level.
Table 12.1 shows the journeys, passenger kilometres and average trip length in the city of
Zurich by mode. It can be seen in the table that trams account for 66 per cent of journeys
and 60 per cent of passenger kilometres.
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Table 12.2
Public Transport Patronage in the City of Zurich
Tram
Trolley
Bus city lines
Bus suburban lines
Bus region lines
TOTAL
Journeys (boardings) per year
(million)
189.7
46.5
32.4
2.5
15.9
287.0
Passenger kilometres (million)
333.5
94.8
65.7
4.0
49.2
547.2
Source: VBZ
12.4.1.3.
Fares
The most important ticket types are contained in Table 12.3.
Table 12.3
Summary of Key ZVV Fares
Ticket
Price (€)
Description
Single ticket (short journey)
1.37
Valid for 30 minutes
Child (under 16) short journey
1.02
Valid for 30 minutes
Single fare
2.16
Valid for one hour, covers most single
journeys in the city of Zürich
Child (under 16) single fare
1.56
Valid for one hour, covers most single
journeys in the city of Zürich
Day card
4.72
Valid within the city of Zurich
Child (under 16) day card
3.12
Valid within the city of Zurich
Rainbow monthly pass
45.85
Monthly pass tariff for journeys within the
city of Zurich
Under 25s monthly pass
30.00
Monthly pass tariff for journeys within the
city of Zurich
Rainbow monthly pass
68.12
Monthly pass for journeys into the city of
Zurich from an adjacent zone
Under 25s monthly pass
46.00
Monthly pass for journeys into the city of
Zurich from an adjacent zone
Source: ZVV
Tickets are valid on all public transport modes, and it is possible to transfer between modes
using the same ticket.
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City Study: Zurich
12.4.1.4.
12.4.1.5.
Traffic speeds
The average traffic speed in the city of Zurich is 16 km/h by car and 13 km/h by public
transport. These speeds are measured on a door-to-door basis.
In the city of Zurich the main operator VBZ operates the tram and bus lines. VBZ provides
capacity for about 95,000 seated and standing passengers on a network that provides 270
kilometres of route, including 117 kilometres of tramlines. Most tram and bus services on
these routes run every six to eight minutes. Details on the VBZ public transport network in
the city of Zurich are shown in Table 12.4.
Table 12.4
VBZ Route Network in the City of Zurich
Network
Tram
Trolley
Bus
Small bus
Funicular
Regional network
Total
Route kilometres (million)
109.3
54.0
84.0
28.7
0.4
202.9
479.3
Vehicle kilometres (million)
18.9
5.6
5.4
1.3
0.1
5.4
36.7
Source: VBZ
Some aggregate statistics on public transport services in the entire Canton are presented in
Table 12.5.
Table 12.5
Public Transport Services in Canton of Zurich (1999/00)
Rail
Regional bus
transport
City transport
Other public
transport
Total
Lines
24
181
55
18
278
Network (kms)
900
1,00
300
100
2,00
Number of
vehicles
185
347
670
24
1,226
Vehicle
kilometres per
year (million)
19.5
21.9
26.1
0.4
63.0
Source: ZVV
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City Study: Zurich
12.4.3.1.
Costs and revenues
Table 12.6 contains ZVV’s revenues and costs from 1991/92 to 1999/00. The table includes
subsidy payments as far as these are made by the federal government or by neighbouring
counties. The deficit is the amount to be covered by the local governments.
Table 12.6
ZVV Revenues and Costs, 1991/92-1999/00 (€, millions)
1991/92
1994/95
1996/97
1997/98
1998/99
1999/00
Farebox revenue
Other revenue
Subsidy from neighbouring counties
Federal subsidy
Total revenue
165
49
1
9
224
163
42
1
8
214
158
43
1
21
223
159
41
1
26
227
165
39
1
25
230
165
41
1
24
231
Payments to bus and tram operators
Payments to SBB (rail operator)
Other costs
Total costs
Deficit
414
6
420
196
407
9
416
202
393
40
9
442
219
375
33
10
418
191
364
32
10
406
176
362
29
10
401
170
Source: ZVV
It can be seen in Table 12.6 that the proportion of total costs covered by farebox and other
revenue was around 50 per cent in 1991/92, then declined to around 45 per cent in 1996/97
and increased again to around 50 per cent in 1999/00. It can also be seen that costs have
been reduced in real terms, both in the case of the bus/tram operators and in the case of the
rail operator. As a result, the deficit in real terms increased by about 10 per cent in the
period from 1991/92 to 1996/97, but then declined sharply. Currently, the deficit is more
than 20 per cent below the 1996/97 level and around 15 per cent lower than in 1991/92.
Individual operators cover their costs from the ZVV payments, but do not make any profits
or losses. For example, VBZ in 1999/00 received €236 million from ZVV, which exactly
covered the company’s operating expenses. The €32 million of other income that the
company earned during the year was refunded to ZVV.
12.4.3.2.
ZVV receives subsidies at both the federal and county level. These are set out Table 12.6
above.
12.4.3.3.
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City Study: Zurich
12.4.3.4.
12.4.4.1.
Frequency
Please see the section below on accessibility.
12.4.4.2.
Reliability
About 80 per cent of all the buses and trams have a deviation of less than 30 to 40 seconds
from their scheduled time, and 98 per cent have one less then four minutes, a high level of
reliability. This information is known because 3,000 induction loop sensors are implanted
throughout the city’s road system, providing the traffic control with information. In every
VBZ-tram the driver can see his amount of delay or whether he is ahead of schedule and can
act upon it by speeding up or slowing down. This punctuality information shows that the
service in Zurich runs close to time. Nevertheless when research was undertaken into
punctuality, some 10 per cent of the travellers reported that they missed a connection during
the previous week.
12.4.4.3.
Accessibility
The services in the Canton have an integrated fare structure and uniform service as well as
fares. There are three service levels:
•
base service level, with public transport arriving every 60 minutes;
•
standard service level, with public transport every 30 minutes; and
•
city area service level, with public transport every 5 to 15 minutes.
The Cantonal Public Transport Act of 1988 and the relevant Transport Supply Order call for
the provision of good public transport services for all urban areas with at least 300
inhabitants, jobs or trainees/students. “Good” means that there must be a bus or tram stop
within a distance of 400 meters or a train stop within a distance of 750 metres with at least
one service per hour.
12.4.4.4.
Every two years a passenger survey is carried out. The survey includes questions on:
•
punctuality;
•
driver behaviour;
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City Study: Zurich
•
ticket sales;
•
quality of the public transport vehicle;
•
possibility of transporting packages, bikes etc. while using public transport;
•
the stops on the public transport system;
•
the quality of the public transport network;
•
cleanliness;
•
ticket control;
•
feelings of security;
•
management of failures or disturbances;
•
information supplied in the public transport vehicle;
•
possibilities of obtaining information at home;
•
ticket machines;
•
price and assortment of transport tickets;
•
dealing with complaints; and
•
ZVV itself.
Currently the average satisfaction score is about 77 per cent. The plan is to increase this
towards 81 per cent by the year 2006.
12.4.5.1.
Since 1950, office employment has greatly increased in the city, with serious congestion and
environmental problems as a result. Traffic limitation policies have been implemented since
the mid 1980s and Zurich has become famous for its success in promoting public transport
(bus and tram only) with a high degree of integration between public transport modes. The
backbone of the public transport system is formed by the street running trams, co-ordinated
by an efficient and sophisticated operations control centre assuring the integration with the
complementary bus network and the overall quality of the services. In the 1990s the
integration concept was also successfully spread to the suburban areas. Walking and
cycling are stimulated as well, with political priority given to the implementation and
development of footpath and cycling networks.
Another part of the integration of transport is the disincentive regarding the amount of
parking spaces available in the city centre. The level of parking spaces has been stabilised at
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City Study: Zurich
the 1990 level, at least for visitors. When a new parking garage is build, the same amount of
places is taken out on the street. For the last 25 years however no new parking garages have
been built.
Overall, we regard the degree of physical integration of the (public) transport system in
Zurich as outstanding.
12.4.5.2.
Tariff integration
There is an integrated ticketing system (one ticket for bus, train, tram and boat), which has
been in existence for some time, and is promoted by ZVV. Details of fare levels are given in
Section 12.4.1.
The tickets are valid for all public transport modes and allow changes, i.e. a single journey
involving multiple legs requires one ticket only. Because of these features, we regard the
level of tariff integration in Zurich as very good.
12.4.5.3.
ZVV is responsible for the provision of information, although the operators are allowed to
advertise their own name and brands. ZVV produce very clear network maps that present
the network as an integrated network and show very clearly the interchanges that are
possible, using colours to distinguish between lines and modes.
Although the operators are allowed to advertise themselves, they do not provide their own
timetable or fare information. For example, the electronic timetable on the VBZ website
links automatically to the ZVV timetable.
Some train stations have real time information and for buses it is currently being tested.
Real time information is however regarded as expensive.
We regard the level of information integration in Zurich as good. However, the fact that
individual operators are allowed to advertise themselves alongside ZVV is potentially
confusing. As the operators do not bear the revenue risk on their services, there would not
appear to be an immediate need for them to advertise themselves.
12.4.5.4.
General transport policy
Already some 30 to 40 years ago the city of Zurich responded to worsening traffic
congestion not by expanding capacity, but rather by redistributing road space to public
transport. In the first instance the idea was to introduce a kind of metro system. A premetro however was rejected in the 1960s, and a full underground system was rejected at the
beginning of the 1970s because of loss of accessibility and high costs. This decision by
referendum caused a shock to transport professionals, and had a major influence on
transport policy.
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City Study: Zurich
In 1977 after further discussions and another referendum, it was decided to improve the
already existing public transport system by upgrading the tram service. This cost €131
million instead of the €523 million, which would have been the cost for the first metro line.
A directive by the Zurich City Council in 1979 stated three objectives:
•
build separate bus lanes and more dedicated tracks so as to convert trams more into
LRT type of vehicles;
•
give priority to transit vehicles at intersections regulated by traffic signals that are
directly actuated by trams and buses by means of a dynamic traffic control system;
and
•
install information technology that identifies vehicle location and deviations from
scheduled timetables, allowing for corrective actions
Because even improved public transport can never match the door-to-door service that the
car offers, complementary measures were taken to restrain car use: traffic calming in
residential neighbourhoods, parking management and maintaining city wide road capacity
at a constant level. Today, Zurich’s trams and buses occupy as much highway space as
automobiles.
The improvements took place by increasing the reliability and speed of the tram. During the
1980s for example, the associated reconstruction of the tram system and the installation of
computerised traffic signal systems were undertaken. In the areas not served by tram, the
bus service was also improved.
The conclusion is that Zurich copes very well with its enormous amount of transit trips
Residents make about 560 transit trips per year, almost twice as much as in Europe’s largest
cities: London, Paris and Berlin. Zurich’s success lies largely in the execution of numerous
carefully conceived measures – from efficient management of road space, to neighbourhood
traffic calming, to deeply discounted fares that reward customer loyalty – that altogether
give clear priority and preference to trams, buses, cyclists and pedestrians.
12.4.6.1.
Concessionary fares
There are special fares in the ZVV fare system for children until 16 years old and, to a lesser
extent, for the under 25s. There are also special family tickets. There are however no
discounted tickets for the elderly. Fare levels are set out in section 12.4.1.
12.4.6.2.
The service is not very well equipped for disabled users who cannot gain access to the trams
and some of the S-Bahn services. VBZ has only 82 low floor buses out of the total of 239
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City Study: Zurich
buses. Disabled people can however take an accompanying passenger or a guide dog free of
charge.
Importantly, though, the Swiss take the pragmatic view that it would be very expensive to
build in full access for disabled passengers, and that it is better to provide taxi or special
transport services for their needs. A special service called “Promobil” enables registered
disabled people to use taxis at a deeply discounted rate. The service is however only
available for leisure trips. ZVV supports the service by an annual payment of CHF 6 million
(€3.9 million)
The planners at ZVV change and extend their schedules according to statistics they obtain
about construction works for offices and houses. They also look at the saturation levels of
public transport lines.
One of the main factors behind the success of the Zurich public transport system as seen by
the local government is the stability of local organisation and decision-making. The aims for
public transport have not changed during the last 30 years. In 1974 already, the local
government had formulated its goals, one of them being to stabilise motor vehicle traffic.
There is a wide consensus about the policy. It could be argued that here, it is the absence of
change that has been a particularly beneficial factor.
12.4.8.1.
As mentioned in Section 12.4.7, there has been little change in public transport in Zurich in
recent years.
12.4.8.2.
Staffing Issues
VBZ, one of the main operators in Zurich, has about 2,000 employees. Around 1,240 of them
work as drivers and some 670 in maintenance. Around 15 per cent of VBZ staff is female.
Bus drivers earn between €3,793 and €3,924 per month. The total VBZ wage bill in 1999/00
of €138 million suggests an average cost per member of staff of approximately €69,000.
Although this seems very high, it includes social security payments and should be evaluated
in the light of the generally very high wage (and price) levels in Switzerland.
The bus drivers of the private operators earn around €2,950 per month and have fewer
holidays. These bus drivers often are not native Swiss people. Some staff from operators are
paid as local government officers, like VBZ and Postauto, other have private company
contracts. There have not been any strikes in the public transport system for the last 10
years. Importantly, any new companies entering the market are required to match the
wages of the existing companies.
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City Study: Zurich
Unions
There are two major unions in the Canton of Zurich. One is called Vpod, or SSP. It is the
public service trade union in Zurich, that deals with the urban public transport. The second
major union is the SEV, the regional federation of railway workers. Two smaller ones are
the Post Union and the Christian Union. Vpod is responsible for co-ordinating the
communication between the four unions and the ZVV.
Communication links between ZVV and the unions have only been in place for two years.
The decision to introduce formal links, with Vpod acting as the union co-ordinator arose
when ZVV launched a plan to extend working time by 30 minutes, which resulted in the
threat of strike action by the unions. After the strike had been threatened, the proposed
extension to working hours was dismissed.
In Switzerland for the last few years there have not been any strikes. Next to the one in
Zurich there were only two other threats in Switzerland in the area of public transport: one
in St. Gallen in 1999 where the planner also wanted to extend working hours, and one in
Luzern in 2000 due to proposals to open the public transport market. The Unions wanted a
guarantee of working conditions, which was subsequently agreed on. There is now a
regional contract regarding the definition of wages and working times.
The Unions in Zurich are still negotiating the working conditions for the workers after the
market opens in 2003. Major problems the Unions currently have are the hours public
transport services are provided. Services now run until 2 a.m. in the morning and start again
at 4 a.m., while for example services used to stop at midnight. The second problem is the
work becoming more and more efficient. Short breaks between services are diminished or
skipped completely, causing extra stress and increasing sickness leave.
12.4.9.1.
12.4.9.2.
Access to airports
There is a regular train service running between the airport station and the city centre. This
service runs on average every 10 minutes, and takes about 15 minutes from airport to city
centre. A single ticket costs €3.53 (CHF 5.40), which is more expensive than a standard
single fare elsewhere in the city. Tickets can also be bought over the internet for an extra
charge. The train service is operated by the national rail provider SBB.
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City Study: Zurich
In 1999, ZVV issued a policy to reduce the emissions of the bus fleet operating in its area by
between 90 and 99 per cent. To achieve this ambitious target, two measures are currently
being implemented. The first step is to use sulphur-free fuel, which is currently used by
most buses. The costs for the cleaner fuel are borne by ZVV. The second measure is to
equip all buses with a so-called Continuous Regenerating Trap (CRT)-filter. The system
reduces the emissions of harmful particles by 90 to 98 per cent. Around 100 buses are
currently being equipped with the filter, with all remaining 460 buses to be replaced entirely
by the year 2005.
negative aspects of the Zurich system under each of the criteria for evaluation.
Table 12.7
Zurich Performance Against Criteria
Positive
Negative
Economic criteria
Economic criteria
•
Relatively high modal splits.
•
•
Falling real costs, and moderate but
improving cost recovery levels.
Service quality
•
Common targets are set for frequency
and accessibility.
•
Very good reliability.
•
Regular passenger surveys.
Lack of competition does not give
strong incentives for cost efficiency.
Service quality
•
•
Strong, central transport authority
helps ensure good integration and
Advertising by individual operators
can be confusing.
•
Integrated fare structure.
Social cohesion
Social cohesion
Dealing with change
Dealing with change
•
Little change experienced. Industrial
relations are generally good.
Economic growth
Economic growth
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City Study: Zurich
Positive
Negative
•
Good environmental initiatives with
challenging targets.
12.6. Zurich “Scorecard”
advantages and disadvantages of the Zurich system.
Table 12.8
Zurich Summary “Scorecard”
Zurich
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
•
•
Very well integrated public transport
system, both in physical terms and in
terms of tariff integration
High quality and reliability
Strong and consistent transport policy,
resulting in a high market share of public
transport
Small but strong Canton public transport
authority
Good industrial relations
•
Lack of competition for the provision of
public transport services does not
provide the strongest incentives for cost
efficiency
The fact that individual operators are
allowed
to
advertise
themselves
alongside ZVV (the public transport
authority) does not enhance the
integration of the network in terms of the
way it is being presented to the
customers
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Strengths and Weaknesses of the Models
13.
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE MODELS
This section summarises what we regard as the main strengths and weaknesses of the
different models that we have examined, by bringing together the “scorecards” from the end
of each city study chapter.
13.1. Adelaide
Adelaide
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
Very low cost recovery
•
Bad industrial relations
•
•
•
Low fares encourage public transport use
by socially excluded
•
New contracts were intended to encourage
innovation in provision of services
Good service reliability
•
•
competitive contracts in early stages,
including staff redeployment
Poor incentives to increase patronage
with new contracts
Falling ridership and modal splits
(although rate of decline slowing)
In Adelaide, the public transport system appears to be particularly strong on social cohesion
issues. The structure and level of fares (particularly concessionary fares), the provision of
information in a well-integrated way, and the provision of good facilities for the mobility
impaired all contribute to the popularity of this system with passengers. Indeed, some
services are even provided free of charge. However, it should be remembered that such
good provision does entail a cost. Cost recovery is typically very low, and is particularly
low for heavy rail services where the incumbent operator is still providing the service.
There appear to be two major downsides to the Adelaide model. One is the fact that
opening the system up to competitive tendering (on the buses at least) has not been
successful in stopping the declining ridership and modal splits for public transport.
However, the fact that the decline has slowed, and that the new system has not been fully in
place for many years suggests that strong conclusions cannot yet be drawn in this area.
The second major weakness appears to have been the way that the transition period was
handled. Transition resulted in turmoil within the industry with unrest amongst employees,
difficulties in recruiting drivers, and an assortment of problems with the structure of the
new contracts.
217
13.2. Copenhagen
Copenhagen
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
Integrated system with common fares
structure and common service branding
The gross cost contract system fails
to include any output incentives.
Phased transition to concession system
Performance regime based on customer
satisfaction surveys
The phased approach to the introduction of a concession system in Copenhagen has helped
to minimise some of the turbulence associated with the structural and institutional change
that has been observed elsewhere. Good integration, particularly of ticketing, and the use of
a common service brand have also been beneficial to consumers. Copenhagen has included
service quality regulation as part of the gross cost contracting system that it operates.
Perhaps the main disadvantage of the current contract structure is that it fails to provide any
incentives for the operators to maximise ridership.
13.3. Évora
Évora
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
•
•
Public transport planning and
management body includes the local
operator
Car parking funds used to help fund
public transport, making SITEE less
dependent on governmental loans and
subsidies, while limiting car use in the city
centre at the same time
•
•
Revenues lower than expected due to
lack of ticket checks
Very poor access for mobility impaired
Good service reliability combined with
cheap public transport
High acceptance of SITEE because of
public discussions, immediate visible
improvement in public transport and
restricted use of car in old city centre
Complete and simple tariff integration
The introduction of the new planning and management body, SITEE in Évora includes the
involvement of the local operator, and so can benefit from its expertise. The integration of
car parking revenue collection into this body has also meant that funds raised from car
parking charges can be used to cross-subsidise public transport. Service reliability is good,
218
and the fact that there is only one operator also means that there is good tariff and
information integration. However, Évora offers no facilities for the mobility impaired.
13.4. Lyon
Lyon
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
Powerful transport planner
•
Ownership of vehicles by transport
planner facilitates investment and
reduces barriers to entry
•
•
•
•
Having a single operator for the bus,
tram and metro network facilitates
integration
Versement Transport
•
•
The gross cost contract used does not give
the operator an incentive to increase
revenue
Tendering the whole network at once
increases entry barriers, with typically
only two or three bids received per
tendering round
Poor labour relations with very frequent
strikes
Low cost recovery
In Lyon, the public transport system benefits from a strong, central transport planner who
owns the vehicles, thus helping to ensure that there is sufficient investment in new rolling
stock/vehicle quality, and helps to remove the barriers to entry for firms who would not be
able to buy/bring in large bus fleets and helps remove bias towards the incumbent operator.
The fact that there is only one operator helps ensure a well integrated system in terms of
fares, services and information. However, this in itself does present a significant entry
barrier to smaller potential operators, so that competition for the market is often limited to
only two or three bidders, potentially reducing the overall scope for efficiency gains. The
fact that the operator faces a gross cost contract also reduces incentives to improve eg service
quality, as there is no benefit to increased ridership.
219
13.5. Manchester
Manchester
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
High level of cost efficiency and high
cost recovery
Metrolink high quality and successful,
innovative funding and concessioning
arrangements, good environmental
integration
Very good central information provision
despite multi-operator system
•
•
•
•
•
Instability in the bus network after
deregulation
Lack of physical integration between
services
Poor tariff integration compared with
cities in other countries
Bus staff earnings suffered
Quality of rail services suffered after
privatisation due to an over-ambitious
franchise bid
Manchester suffered a significant amount of instability in services at the time of
deregulation, again highlighting the problems of a very sudden transition. Similarly, rail
service quality fell significantly due to an over ambitious franchise bid. The deregulated
system also gives no incentives for physical integration, and relatively poor tariff integration
although information integration is good despite the multi-operator system. Both customers
and staff have lost out, in the form of high fares and falling earnings. However, the
Metrolink system is generally regarded as a success.
13.6. Preston
Preston
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
•
recovery
•
Very high bus frequencies and network
coverage – a good quality bus-based
public transport system
•
Flexible system due to operator freedom
to determine service levels and timetables
•
Staff at the main operator own the
company themselves and enjoy good
working conditions
•
Initial instability following a major “bus
war”
Competition tends to disappear and
operators stick to their own territory
Poor tariff integration
Information integration is not very good,
especially with operators publishing
their own timetables without always
including competing services
220
As in Manchester, Preston suffered a significant amount of instability in the immediate
aftermath of deregulation, with changes to services and competitors gradually disappearing.
Like Manchester, it also suffers from high fares, and relatively poor tariff integration.
Information integration is also relatively poor. However, cost efficiency and cost recovery
levels are good, and passengers enjoy good network coverage and frequent services. Staff
too enjoy generally good working conditions with the main transport operator, and own the
company themselves.
13.7. The Hague
The Hague
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
Emphasis on careful transition by
awarding first concession to the
incumbent
Employment guarantee to bus and tram
staff, and good industrial relations in bus
and tram operations
Good integrated ticketing system with
relatively low fares, which will be
preserved despite structural changes to
the public transport market
•
•
•
•
Low cost recovery
Lack of appropriate skills in the public
transport authority
Poor industrial relations on the railways
Transport modes, especially bus/tram
on the one hand and rail on the other,
are not presented as an integrated
network
The public transport market share is not
very high, partly as a result of the
importance of cycling
Unlike some of the other cities studied, the Hague seems to have taken a more careful
approach to transition. This was achieved by awarding the first concession to the incumbent
to allow a more gradual transition, and by features such as the employment guarantee for
bus and tram staff. The interests of passengers have also been considered, with a decision to
maintain the current well integrated ticketing system and fare levels. However, the
transition has not been without its problems. There are poor industrial relations in the rail
sector, and the public transport authority suffers from a skills shortage. Physical integration
could also be improved, and the relatively low fares are balanced by low cost recovery
levels.
221
13.8. Toronto
Toronto
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
Good cost recovery
•
•
Good fares and information integration
•
Good lessons in contracting out aspects
of the provision of rail commuter
services to the private sector
•
•
•
•
•
•
Training and employee benefits system
good
Flat fare discourages short journeys
Current funding arrangements are
inadequate, especially for future capex
Relatively poor service provision in outer
GTA, especially for journeys between
regions rather then in/out of central
Toronto. Poor modal share in these areas
Clear and comprehensive procedures for
transparency and accountability
Extensive facilities for the mobility
impaired
Good response to change
The Toronto public transport system is generally regarded as of a good standard with good
fares and information integration, and good provision for the mobility impaired. Both the
main operators achieve very high levels of cost recovery and GO Transit particularly has
taken advantage of contracting-out operations in order to achieve cost efficiencies. Recent
reforms appear to have taken place relatively smoothly with industrial relations generally
good, and have introduced a clear structure for transparency and accountability.
While the TTC flat fare system may be simple and good value for long distance travellers,
we do not regard it as providing good value for money for all users, particularly those
wishing to make shorter trips, who may include socially-disadvantaged groups. Perhaps
the two most serious weaknesses of the Toronto system are the inability of the current
funding system to allow the operators to respond to growing demand, and the inability of
the system to respond to the shift in employment and population patterns, which have led to
strong growth in journeys outside the city centre, which are relatively poorly catered-for.
222
13.9. Zurich
Zurich
Advantages
Disadvantages
•
•
•
•
•
•
Very well integrated public transport
system, both in physical terms and in
terms of tariff integration
High quality and reliability
Strong and consistent transport policy,
resulting in a high market share of public
transport
Small but strong Canton public transport
authority
Good industrial relations
•
Lack of competition for the provision of
public transport services does not
provide the strongest incentives for cost
efficiency
The fact that individual operators are
allowed to advertise themselves
alongside ZVV (the public transport
authority) does not enhance the
integration of the network in terms of the
way it is being presented to the
customers
Zurich benefits from a generally well integrated, high quality, reliable public transport
system, run by a strong transport authority, that enjoys good industrial relations. However,
we regard the current system as failing to meet the full scope for efficiency gains, due to the
lack of competition in provision of services.
223
Conclusions
14.
CONCLUSIONS
14.1. Introduction
This report has identified a set of criteria by which public transport systems can be
evaluated. After providing a relatively brief review of performance in Dublin and the Irish
provincial cities, we have then considered nine separate cities in detail using these criteria.
The cities provide a broad spectrum of different approaches to the provision of urban
transport services, ranging from the fully regulated and largely publicly-operated system in
Toronto, to the deregulated and privately-operated system in Preston. In between are a
variety of approaches for providing public transport services to meet publicly-specified (and
usually publicly-funded) requirements through competitive processes that are designed to
provide incentives for efficiency and innovation.
In this chapter we seek to draw together the lessons from the case studies that we have
investigated in the course of this study, and apply them to the particular circumstances of
Dublin and the provincial Irish cities. Our case studies have been detailed ones, and we
sought to summarise the main lessons from each city together at the end of each of the city
chapters in a brief “scorecard”. We then reviewed these lessons in the previous chapter. On
the basis of this, we do not believe that there is a single “city model” that is most appropriate
for application everywhere. Consequently we wish to draw on the strengths, and avoid the
weaknesses, of each of the cases we have considered.
In determining the appropriate solution to the provision of public transport services, it is
necessary to take account of important aspects of the overall framework within which
services are being provided in a particular city. We believe that this framework has the
following two important components:
•
the way in which the private car is treated; and
•
the mix of modes within the city.
The way in which the private car is treated. In Chapter 2 we noted that the first best
solution to the problem of urban traffic congestion is to charge road users for the marginal
social costs they impose through some form of congestion charge, which is likely to vary by
time of day. Such a form of road pricing was introduced in Singapore in the 1970s in the
form of an Area Licensing Scheme, and in the late 1990s this was converted into a full
electronic road pricing scheme in the Central Business District and on the city centre
expressways. Congestion charging is currently under serious consideration in London, and
in a number of other British cities. However, full congestion charging may be difficult to
introduce because of political objections. Nevertheless, while congestion charging would
restrict car use and increase capacity available for road-based public transport modes, there
are other ways to restrict cars’ use of capacity and improve public transport service quality.
We have seen how the high emphasis on public transport in the centre of Zurich has been
224
Conclusions
achieved by making road capacity available to trams, by giving public transport vehicles
priority, and by restricting parking. Some roads in the centre of Manchester are reserved
exclusively for trams, and trams have priority at intersections. Quality Bus Partnerships in
Great Britain, and the Quality Bus Corridors in Dublin, can make extra capacity available to
buses through dedication of bus lanes. The overall culture and attitude toward the motor
car is an important aspect of the approach to be adopted to improve transport in cities by
placing increased emphasis on public transport.
The mix of modes within the city. The solutions to be adopted in any city will in part
depend on the types of mode that provide services within the city. This mix will in turn be
partly dependent on the way that the city’s transport infrastructure has developed. In
particular, rail-based modes may demand different solutions to bus-based ones, so one
would expect the solution in cities with all-bus systems like Preston and the Irish provincial
cities to be different to those like Dublin with mixed modes of bus, heavy rail and (in due
course) light rail. Cost recovery may be lower in traditional heavy rail operations where
infrastructure costs need to be covered and where traffic densities on some routes may be
low. However, the Manchester experience shows that it is possible for light rail systems to
cover their operating and maintenance costs where systems are designed in such a way as to
generate good traffic volumes.
In the remainder of this chapter we consider the appropriateness of different solutions to
Ireland under the following main headings:
•
Responsibility for public transport services;
•
Provision of bus services;
•
Provision of rail-based modes (light rail and heavy rail); and
•
Managing transition.
14.2. Responsibility for Public Transport Services
A major issue is that of where responsibility for public transport services ultimately lies. A
common approach is to have a single public sector organisation responsible for public
transport services in a city.
There are a number of such organisations in our case study cities:
•
In Toronto the Toronto Transit Commission is a vertically integrated public transit
company having a monopoly over public transport services in the City of Toronto,
providing bus, tram and metro services. The TTC operates at an “arms length”
relationship to the City, and is responsible for setting fares, determining quality of
service standards, and choosing routes and frequencies.
225
Conclusions
•
In Zurich ZVV (the Zurich Public Transport Authority) is responsible for coordinating the public transport system, providing funding and setting fares. ZVV
itself does not operate services. The main operator is VBZ, which operates the tram
and bus network in the city. There is very little tendering of services.
•
In Lyon SYTRAL is the public agency responsible for local transport services.
SYTRAL is responsible for decisions about service levels and fares. It also owns the
infrastructure and public transport vehicles. Services are operated by a single
operator under a management contract. The present contract, which runs for six
years, was won by SLTC in 1999. The operator is responsible for operational service
planning decisions.
•
In Adelaide the Passenger Transport Board (PTB) is responsible for public transport
services. The PTB is required to create and maintain an integrated network of
services, and it controls fares. The PTB also does not operate services itself, but
contracts with other organisations to do so, using gross cost contracts with output
incentives. The PTB is responsible for providing information about services. The
PTB also provides the public transport vehicles to operators, which it in turn leases
from Transport SA.
•
In The Hague the regional body, Haaglanden, is responsible for public transport in
the city region. There is an integrated urban public transport fare system in the
Netherlands, with fares determined nationally, although regional governments like
Haaglanden can set lower fares if they wish.67 Service levels are determined by
Haaglanden, although until recently this was the responsibility of the operators,
subject to approval by Haaglanden. The public transport system is being changed
further, so that from a present system of monopoly publicly-owned transport
operators, competitive tendering will in due course have to be introduced.
•
In Copenhagen bus services are operated by private sector bus companies under a
system of competitive tendering. The public transport authority, HUR, is part of the
Greater Copenhagen Authority, and is responsible for an integrated zone-based fare
system. Contracts with operators are based on gross costs, though there is a
performance regime based on consumer satisfaction surveys. Services are provided
under a common livery, so customers are not immediately aware that there are
different operators.
•
In Manchester, the Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Authority, operating
through the PTE, has overall responsibility for public transport services. However,
unlike transport authorities in the other large cities in our survey, it does not control
all such services, since decisions on commercial bus service levels and fares are
determined by private sector operators. The role of the PTE in regard to bus services
67
But we have seen that the incentives to do so are limited.
226
Conclusions
is limited to filling the gaps left in commercial services and in determining and
funding the concessionary fares system.
•
In Preston the relatively few public transport planning responsibilities are
discharged by the county council, Lancashire County Council, which administers the
concessionary fare system and tenders out non-commercial bus services to private
operators.
All public authorities with responsibility for providing public transport services need a
source of revenue. Such funds are provided by a combination of national, regional and local
governments. Most of these sources are not directly transport-related, though there will be
provision for road pricing revenues to be used locally in Great Britain when congestion
charging is introduced, while in France there is a direct workplace levy, the versement, on
employers which feeds into an urban public transport fund. Financing needs in a city will
primarily be determined by the cost recovery ratio achieved by the public transport system,
which we have seen can vary considerably between cities, as well of course by the overall
scale of operations. The introduction of some form of competition is usually seen as one
way to reduce these financing needs.
Dublin is rather different from the cities we have studied because no overall public transport
authority exists, apart from the Dublin Transportation Office (DTO) that was set up in 1995
with limited powers. Funding for the two CIE subsidiaries that between them provide the
great majority of public transport services in Dublin is the responsibility of the national
government. There is also no centralised fare determination for Dublin public transport
services.
The lessons from our case studies indicate that the existence of a powerful public
transport authority is highly beneficial. Most public transport authorities have achieved
integrated networks, tariff integration and an overall coordination of the development of the
(public) transport system. Given the importance of a well-planned and well-integrated
system if people are to be encouraged to use public transport instead of the private car, we
consider a central authority to have a very important role, especially in larger cities where
the most co-ordination is needed. We therefore conclude that the development of a strong
central public transport authority for Dublin would be highly beneficial.
The city case studies have illustrated the importance of retaining staff with appropriate
experience and capabilities within the planning authority. In the case of Dublin, we
conclude that the Dublin Transportation Office could be expanded both in terms of size and
in terms of powers to become a full public transport authority, having both planning and
regulatory responsibilities.
The role of the expanded Office will be partly dependent on the system of reform that is
eventually adopted. Major headings of responsibility can include:
227
Conclusions
•
determination and funding of minimum service levels, to ensure that citizens all
have minimum access to the public transport system so as to preserve horizontal
equity and preserve social inclusion;
•
determination of fare structure and levels;
•
management of the process to determine which operators provide services; and
•
As can be seen from our review of experience in different cities, the expanded Office might
also own some of the infrastructure used in the provision of public transport services, such
as light rail systems (as in Manchester) or buses (as in Adelaide and Lyon). In Dublin this
could be achieved by transferring ownership of Dublin Bus’ fleet to the Office, which would
then make vehicles available to operators of services, for example successful tenderers if
competitive tendering were to be introduced. We note that in a situation where there is
competitive tendering, this sort of arrangement can have the advantage of opening up the
market to smaller operators who might not otherwise have the resources be able to tender.
We also note that it is one way in which the planning authority can exert direct “quality
control” over the type of vehicle used (eg age, low floor access etc.) Adelaide buses are one
example of this. However, the city studies also highlight the fact that attention needs to be
given to whether the operators are obliged to use these buses only, or whether they can also
use other buses. Another key issue is deciding responsibility for maintenance and safety,
and how these will be monitored effectively.
As mentioned earlier, one requirement for effective planning of public transport services is
that the Office has the required expertise. This will not be easily built up, so any reform will
need to take into account the availability of these skills, both from within and beyond the
city where reform is being contemplated. Such skills will include skills in planning bus
networks that may currently reside with the operators in Dublin and in the other Irish cities.
14.3. Provision of Bus Services
14.3.1. Introduction
In this section, we discuss the options for the provision of bus services in Ireland and form
an opinion on them. In Section 14.3.2, we discuss the issue of who should determine and
provide public transport service levels. Section 14.3.3 deals with the issue of specifying fare
levels.
14.3.2. Service levels
Our case study cities can be divided in a number of general models for the determination
and provision of public transport services. These are:
228
Conclusions
•
A public authority determining and providing service levels without competition
(Toronto);
•
A public authority determining services, which are then provided mainly by
different operators without competition (Zurich);
•
A public authority determining service levels with competitive tendering for either
routes (Copenhagen), areas (Adelaide) or the entire network (Lyon); and
•
The market determining commercial services, with a public authority filling gaps
through competitive tendering (Manchester, Preston)
We have seen in our case studies that the Toronto public transport system, specified and
provided by the same public authorities, functions well. The Toronto system combines a
high quality network with a high cost recovery, steadily falling operating subsidies and a
good integration. Consequently, the Toronto case shows that the model of a public
authority determining and providing service levels without competition can work very well.
Similarly, our Zurich study shows that the model of a public authority determining services,
which are then provided mainly by different operators without competition, can work very
well too. The Zurich public transport is highly integrated and provides an excellent service
quality. In combination with car restraint measures, this results in a very favourable modal
split towards public transport. Cost recovery in Zurich is by no means as high as in Toronto,
but here too, costs have been reduced steadily and deficits have been falling.
However, whereas we have seen that public provision of public transport without
competition can work very well, there is no guarantee that it will work well in all
circumstances. In Manchester and Preston (previously) and The Hague (currently), public
provision of the public transport system was not found to be ideal. In these cases, public
provision led to high costs, poor cost recovery and a lack of customer orientation. Often,
publicly owned public transport providers do not have strong incentives to reduce costs or
to increase revenue. Publicly owned companies cannot generally go bankrupt and their
managers cannot easily be fired when they are performing poorly. These constraints are
often effective in the private sector.
Furthermore, we also note that the Toronto model has not been successful in adapting to the
external change of shifts in transport demand from city centre commuter routes to journeys
from one outer region to another, not least due to the significant funding difficulties that
Toronto is currently suffering, especially with regard to capital expenditure. A number of
recent discussion papers on options for improving public transport services in Toronto, and
a number of people interviewed in Toronto have recently suggested that the way forward to
meet the demand for public transport on the outskirts of the city may be to introduce some
private sector involvement. Examples include the paper A Transportation Vision for the City of
Toronto Official Plan published by the Urban and Development Services Department of the
City of Toronto in April 2000. The results of our interviews with GO Transit also revealed
229
Conclusions
the very high level of contracting-out of non-“front-line” operations to the private sector,
which GO Transit consider to make a very important contribution to their current levels of
operating efficiency.
Further points to consider include the cultural differences between cities such as Toronto
and Zurich, and other cities, such as the cities of Ireland. Our country studies have revealed
that the levels of motivation/culture of pride/wanting to “be the best” observed in for
example Toronto play an important part in the success of those systems but are be no means
a universal culture, and do not seem to apply in many other cities. We therefore believe that
the examples of Toronto and Zurich are the exception rather than the rule. When such a
culture exists or can be created, public provision of public transport can work well.
However, partly as for the reasons described above, we are sceptical as to the possibilities of
establishing such a culture in publicly owned public transport providers in general. We
think that in general, introducing an element of competition into the provision of public
transport can provide stronger incentives for efficiency, customer orientation and quality
than the provision by the public sector can.
Although we have relied upon our case studies to draw our conclusions, we are aware that a
large number of studies have been undertaken in an attempt to identify the level of
efficiency gains that can be captured through the introduction of competitive tendering.
Examples include the studies of London bus tendering by Kennedy, Glaister and Travers
that reported a 20 per cent saving in costs (1995)68, and the study by Mackie and Preston
(1996)69 that reported a thirty five per cent drop in real costs between 1985/86 and 1993/94
as a result of the introduction of competitive tendering, as well as earlier results reported by
Beesley and Glaister (199*).70 It is not part of the scope of this study to review such studies
in detail, but we note that efficiency gains resulting from the introduction of competition are
typically around 20 per cent. Clearly this figure can be lower depending, for example on the
exact transitional arrangements and protections afforded, but significant gains are still
usually reported.
Once again, although we have not relied upon it in drawing our conclusions, we are also
mindful of the recent proposals from the European Commission, supporting the
introduction of competition into the provision of public transport services. These proposals
have significance not only in terms of what may become European law in the future, but also
in terms of the research that has gone on in the drawing up of these proposals, including the
68
Kennedy, D, Glaister, S, and Travers, T (1995) London Bus Tendering London School of Economics.
69
Mackie, P and Preston, J (1996) The Local Bus Market: A Case Study of Regulatory Change Avebury (Aldershot,
Hants).
70
See also the earlier study Beesley, M and Glaister, S (1991) “Bidding for tendered bus routes in London”
Transportation Planning and Technology vol 15.
230
Conclusions
ISOTOPE study.71 We are also aware of the work undertaken within Ireland itself on this
subject (for example by the DPE), but have not used this work to inform our conclusions
directly.
In sum, we conclude that a system which includes some form of competition is the system
that would be most effective in Ireland, given both the findings from our case studies, and
the attention that we have paid to how applicable those findings are to Ireland.
As we have seen earlier, there are two basic models for the introduction of competition into
the provision of public transport. On the one hand, it is possible to have competition for the
market by introducing some form of competitive tendering for the right to operate services.
Of our case studies, Copenhagen, Adelaide and Lyon have adopted different versions of this
model. Competition for the market allows the benefits of competition to be achieved with at
the same time a public authority continuing to specify service levels and manage the
integrated network.
On the other hand, it is possible to have competition in the market by moving towards
complete deregulation of the market. This is the model we have seen in Manchester and
Preston. Supplemented by tendering for gaps in the network identified by a transport
planning authority, this option does provide good coverage of public transport services.
The British experience shows that bus services have been increased, and operators have been
innovative in the provision of services. But without fares regulation, fares can be quite high,
while there can be instability in the provision of services. The transition can be painful for
the workers in the industry. Nevertheless, a medium-sized city like Preston can end up with
a good quality public transport service, which meets the needs of residents for most public
transport trips. However, a large conurbation like Manchester has suffered from an unstable
network, adverse impacts of competition and a lack of public authority influence over fares
and service levels.
71
ISOTOPE was a research study conducted as part of the EC Transport RTD programme. The report described and
compared the organisational and legal structures used in urban public transport in European countries. It
analysed the pros and cons of these alternative structures and considered how organisational structures might be
improved. Summary details can be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/extra/res-isotope.html
The study made a number of general recommendations but emphasised that local circumstances, particularly
concerning the availability of technical competency in the transport authority and the existence of enough
candidate operators, may dictate different choices. In general, though, the study concluded that a system of
limited competition (i.e. competitive tendering) would be preferable over both regulated and deregulated systems,
as such a system can achieve cost reductions while preserving the stability of the system. In large cities, contracts
should be let for sub-networks as opposed to the entire network. It also suggested creating a strong mobility
authority, not just covering public transport.
Within limited competition models, it was suggested that net cost contracts would be the preferred option
provided a number of conditions were met. The conditions included the existence of a strong authority with a
tradition of information gathering, and the need for a monitoring system of the operator to prevent the operator to
build up a dominant possession of information. As we will see in Section 14.3.2.2, not all these conditions are
currently satisfied in Ireland.
231
Conclusions
For the provincial Irish cities, we do not think that the deregulated option is entirely
inappropriate. There is little public authority tradition of planning bus services in these
cities, and local bus operators would be in the best position to identify and meet market
needs. Where existing operators are unable to do so, the potential for new entry would
encourage innovation, and new operators might be able to develop local networks in
particular cities. The scale of entry would not need to be particularly high, so there would
be opportunities for smaller companies to participate.
However, the benefits of this approach would need to be compared with the benefits of a
competitive tendering system. In particular, the Lyon model might be appropriate for the
provincial cities, especially the smaller ones. It might be possible to periodically tender out
the management of the entire network in these cities. Subject to some minimum required
service levels, the operator would have a degree of freedom to develop services and to
respond to changes in demand. The operator would have this freedom both in advance of
the concession period, by being allowed to submit bids to operate more than the minimum
service levels specified, and during the concession period, by being allowed to run any
additional services that earn extra profits. To facilitate entry, the local authority might retain
ownership of vehicles, although the operator would be free to bring in more vehicles as
required.
We believe that this system would achieve much of the benefit of an entirely deregulated
system without the disadvantages, in particular of the painful transition phase. It also
allows some more public influence over the public transport system, for example by setting
minimum service levels and maximum fares, within the limited resources in terms of public
transport skills that the provincial city councils currently have. Therefore, we would prefer
a management contract approach for these cities over complete deregulation, although it
might be feasible to conceive a limited amount of controlled competition within the
management contract framework.
As far as the congested area of Greater Dublin is concerned, we do not think that the
complete deregulation model is appropriate there given the lessons that we have learnt from
our case studies, and particularly from Manchester. Pressure on road space in the Dublin
area is tight and increases in bus-kms run as a result of on-the-road competition would
impact adversely on traffic congestion, and hence too on bus speeds. In addition, one
important issue that we believe will need to be addressed in Dublin before long is the way
that the interaction between bus and light rail services is to be handled. In a fully
deregulated environment bus operators will not want to feed traffic into a light rail system,
but will instead wish to compete directly. They may be able to do this where the geography
of the road network allows and where light rail vehicles are subject to some delays at
intersections. In addition, bus services may have more leeway to compete on fares. This is
certainly what happened in Sheffield, where the light rail right-of-way involves considerable
on-street running and traffic light-controlled junctions between light rail vehicles and road
traffic, so that buses could compete with trams. It also happened in Tyne and Wear where,
before bus deregulation, bus services had been designed to feed passengers into the light rail
232
Conclusions
system: after deregulation bus operators were no longer prepared to do so. Consequently,
the issue of bus-tram competition will need to be addressed in Dublin.
Our recommendation for Dublin therefore is to introduce a form of competitive tendering
for the right to operate bus services. The network can be specified such that direct
competition between bus and light rail in the corridors served by light rail services is limited
or avoided.
There are a number of major issues in designing competitive tendering systems, including in
particular:
•
Whether to tender individual routes, or to adopt some form of area tendering;
•
Whether to use gross cost contracts or net cost contracts;
•
How to split up tenders so as to provide opportunities for different types of operator
to compete, in particular to enable small operators to compete on an equal basis with
larger scale operators.
We will discuss these issues in turn in the next three subsections.
14.3.2.1.
Route or area tendering?
A number of our case studies presently apply some form of competitive tendering for the
provision of bus services. The major examples are:
•
In Copenhagen, where the entire network is tendered out, tender packages are
devised that comprise groups of lines. In The Hague, which will move towards a
tendered system in the next few years, it has been explicitly indicated that the
“Copenhagen model” will be adopted there as well.
•
In Adelaide, an area franchising system has been used by dividing the city up into
seven geographical areas.
•
In Lyon, the area that is tendered out is equal to the entire network.
•
In Manchester and Preston, only specific unprofitable routes are contracted out by
means of competitive tender and consequently, it is the route tendering system that
is used here.
The idea behind the Adelaide area franchise system is that it gives the operator some
freedom to develop services within its area. Clearly, this will only work if either a net cost
contract or gross cost contract with output incentives are used (see Section 14.3.2.2).
However, the policy was relatively unsuccessful during the first contract phase as contract
payments depended heavily on patronage and operators were risk-averse. However, the
233
Conclusions
output incentive in more recent contracts in Adelaide has been reduced and now, route
changes are starting to be proposed.
A disadvantage of an area-franchising model is that it becomes difficult to operate through
services between areas. Although a city like Dublin is relatively strongly focused on the city
centre, there is also a significant number of orbital bus lines. With the construction of LUAS
and with an increased importance of the DART/suburban rail network, the importance of
orbital bus lines, relative to other bus lines, is likely to increase. We do not therefore regard
the area-franchising model as suitable for Dublin.
The Lyon model of tendering the entire network has the advantage that having a single
operator in the city facilitates the integration of the public transport network. The model
however implies significant entry barriers, although these are mitigated by the public
transport authority retaining ownership of the vehicles. This is particularly a problem in
large cities like Dublin. Moreover, it places the operator in a powerful position with regard
to the authority: the authority will not easily terminate the entire contract if the operator
under performs. We do not think that the Lyon model is suitable for Dublin either. As we
have already indicated, it may however have its merits for the provincial cities in Ireland.
For Dublin, we would recommend a route-based tendering system.
While it would be
possible to tender out routes individually, it would seem preferable to devise tenders for
groups of routes because of the increased transactions costs and co-ordination difficulties of
tendering out every route individually. The groups should not be made too large; by
allowing operators to submit single bids for multiple groups, the market will show when it
is efficient to have multiple groups of route operated by a single company. It may be more
practical to use smaller groups of routes and to allow operators to bid for multiple groups,
than to use larger groups of routes and to allow operators to bid for just a part of the group.
14.3.2.2.
Gross or net cost contracts?
In our case study cities, the following types of contract can be found:
•
In Copenhagen, gross cost contracts are used with quality incentives. Payments to
the operator can be increased or decreased if agreed quality benchmarks have or
have not been met.
•
In Adelaide, gross cost contracts with output incentives are being used. The operator
can receive a higher or lower tender payment if output exceeds or falls short of an
agreed base line level. There are also set service standards, with penalties for the
operator if not met.
•
In Manchester, net cost contracts are used for most scheduled services. A few years
ago, however, it became difficult to find bidders for some school contracts under the
net cost system, and some of these have therefore been switched to gross cost
234
Conclusions
contracts. In all cases, the operator has to comply with minimum standards. In the
case of non-performance, the contract can be terminated.
•
In Preston, the choice is left with the operator. If an operator tenders both on a net
cost and a gross cost basis, the authority decides on the basis of the merits of each
individual bid. For school contracts, however, gross costs contracts are used in all
cases. Like Manchester, the operator has to comply with minimum standards with
the possibility of contract termination if it fails to do so.
•
In Lyon, the network is contracted out on a gross cost basis, with penalties if agreed
quality standards are not being met.
A common theme from our case studies is the fact that if gross cost contracts are being used,
additional incentives are required to ensure the operator delivers a quality service. This
usually takes the form of penalties if quality falls short of the agreed levels, although in
Copenhagen, bonuses are payable as well if an operator performs relatively well. In
Adelaide, an alternative approach is taken which focuses on output as well as penalties for
poor service standards. Here, too, the operator can either receive more if it performs well or
receive less if it carries less passengers than the benchmark.
If net cost contracts are used, the operator will automatically get penalised for poor quality
by means of lower patronage and thereby lower revenue. However, the nature of public
transport demand is such that operators can usually provide a poor service without losing
significant numbers of passengers, for example because certain groups of passengers do not
have an alternative means of transport. In other words, the savings to the operator of
cutting quality will often be greater than the costs in terms of revenue foregone. This
implies that, as seen in Manchester and Preston, additional quality incentives are required
even in net cost contracts.
Another lesson from the case studies is that sometimes, net cost contracts can discourage
potential bidders from tendering. Smaller operators in particular may not be prepared to
accept the revenue risk involved with net cost contracts. A related issue is related to tariff
integration and fare levels. Tariff integration can in theory be achieved both with net cost
and gross cost contracts. In both types of contracts, it is possible for the authority to set fare
levels. However, if operators cannot influence the fares they charge, the revenue risk they
bear in net-cost contracts will be increased further. Small operators may be even more
discouraged from bidding, whereas larger operators will increase the risk premium they
require.
On the basis of the future competitiveness of any future tendered public transport market in
Dublin and the other Irish cities, and in view of the lack of, we would recommend that gross
cost contracts be used at least initially. This will enable the existing private operators to
compete as much as possible on an equal basis with the CIE subsidiaries. Also, gross cost
contracts reduce the risk of regulatory capture of the transport authority by the operator,
which is important given the lack of a strong public transport authority tradition in Ireland.
235
Conclusions
Net cost contracts could possibly be used at a later stage, and it should be noted that it is
easy to switch between the two variants when contracts are due for renewal. We would also
recommend that any output-based incentive regime be limited to just a small part of the
contract payment or not introduced at all. Quality incentives will however be essential and
we see merit in the Copenhagen model where the operator cannot just lose by failing to meet
the agreed standards, but can also gain by exceeding them.
14.3.2.3.
Equality of market access
We note the current structure of the public transport market in Ireland and the dominance of
the CIE subsidiaries. To ensure effective competition in any competitive model, it is
essential that smaller companies not be hampered by their size. In Copenhagen, it is
explicitly acknowledged that tender packages should be accessible to both large and small
operators. The Manchester and Preston models are also suitable for attracting smaller
operators but the Adelaide and Lyon models are not.
In the previous subsection, we have already argued that mainly for this reason, a model
using gross contracts should be used, at least initially. We have also argued that in Dublin, a
route-based tendering model is preferable over models based on area franchising.
However, using a route-based model does not necessarily imply that a tender should be
issued for each individual route. As discussed above, we consider the tendering of groups
of routes to be preferable to the tendering of individual routes in Dublin, not least due to the
lower transactions costs that this involves.
14.3.3. Fare levels
The analysis of our case studies has shown two distinct models with respect to the
responsibility for setting fares. In Manchester and Preston, the principle is that it is the
operator who sets fare levels. This applies to commercial services and, in the case of
Manchester, to tendered services as well. As a result, tariff integration in both cities is poor,
although there are multi-operator travelcards in Manchester but not in Preston. Moreover,
fare levels are generally high in both cities.
Attempts to achieve a higher degree of tariff integration are viewed with suspicion by the
British competition authorities, who fear that fare agreements may reduce the
competitiveness of the bus market. The idea is that each operator should be free to compete
on fares. Consequently, only under certain conditions are certain types of agreement
allowed. It should be noted however that, as we have seen in both UK case studies, price
competition in the deregulated bus market is a rare phenomenon.
In all other case studies, the responsibility for setting fare levels rests with a public authority
that usually achieves an integrated tariff system. In Toronto, the public operator has a large
amount of autonomy in setting fare levels. In The Hague, fares are effectively set at a
236
Conclusions
national level. In Adelaide, Lyon, Zurich, Copenhagen and Évora, fares are set by the local
public transport authority or the local government.
We believe that a basic requirement of any public transport fare system is that it is simple to
use and easy to understand. We do not think that the situation in Manchester and Preston
currently meets this requirement. The fact that daytime fares from A to B can differ from
evening fares from B to A does not seem a particularly attractive feature of the system. The
system does offer the theoretical benefit of competition on price, but this does not normally
occur in practice.
Consequently, we recommend that a public authority in Ireland should be responsible for
setting fares, at least in the Greater Dublin market if this market is to be franchised.
Comparing tariff integration in our comparator studies with tariff integration in Greater
Dublin suggests that there is significant scope for improving the Greater Dublin tariff
system. For the regional Irish cities, if their public transport systems are tendered out on the
basis of a management contract, we see merit in the operator having a greater say in setting
fare levels, although the contract should specify maximum levels for key fares.
14.4. Provision of Rail-Based Modes (Light Rail and Heavy Rail)
At present heavy rail services, particularly DART, provide an important component of
Dublin’s public transport services. One possibility would be for present arrangements to
continue, with DART losses subsidised out of IE’s, and thence CIE’s budget, and little coordination between rail and bus services in the Greater Dublin area. This would be rather
similar to the situation in a number of our case study cities, where suburban rail services
continue to be provided by the national rail operator.
However there are alternative possibilities, mainly related to the following:
•
responsibility for determination of service levels and fares could be removed from IE
and placed in the hands of the Dublin Transportation Office, but with IE continuing
to provide services under contract; and
•
responsibility for operation of services could be removed from IE, and a new
operator could contract with the transport authority.
Up until 1968 responsibility for decisions on service and fare levels on suburban rail services
in British conurbations lay with British Railways. However, once the Passenger Transport
Executives had been established in these conurbations, they took over responsibility for such
decisions, and funded these services (with financial assistance from Central Government)
through operating grants under Section 20 of the 1968 Transport Act. Until rail privatisation
in the 1990s, services continued to be operated by the British Railways Board. The
justification for the change to local control had been that decisions on provision of services
by different modes could be co-ordinated to maximise value-for-money from subsidy.
237
Conclusions
The European Commission have required separation of rail operations from infrastructure,
and accounting separation has been achieved in IE. The next step may be to achieve
operational separation, and this raises the possibility of competition for the right to operate
specific groups of services. The most obvious group of these might be the DART electrified
services, or smaller Dublin suburban groups such as individual groups of diesel services.
Franchising of rail services has become commonplace in Great Britain, but suburban rail
services have been let by competitive tenders in other cities, including Melbourne in
Australia, and Stockholm in Sweden.
Another example, considered in detail in the present study is the provision of GO rail
commuter services in the Toronto region, using services operated over the tracks of national
railway operators (in the GO case, both Canadian National, itself a former state-owned
organisation, and Canadian Pacific). We saw in the GO case the extensive use of private
contracting to provide services, as well as the increased desire of the train operator to
exercise greater control over infrastructure use by the acquisition of strategic assets like the
tracks into the city centre station.
One relevant consideration is timing. It does not seem sensible to consider detailed
approaches to be adopted for the rail sector until the solution for the bus sector has been
selected and is on its way to implementation. A possible first step might however be to set
up a more separate organisational unit within Iarnród Éireann for the operation of the
DART, and possibly also the other Dublin suburban services.
14.5. Achieving Transition
Our case studies indicate that one of the most difficult but also one of the most important
tasks is to achieve a smooth transition from the current Irish city models, both for the
consumer (in terms of fares, service quality and service integration), and for the staff (of both
incumbent and any new operators, and of the regulatory agencies involved).
We note that a number of the cities we have examined experienced a variety of problems
during their transition from previous to current institutional and regulatory models. For
example, service quality for passengers in Manchester was adversely affected by the
considerable instability in the bus system in the immediate aftermath of deregulation, with a
large number of new routes opening and subsequently closing. Similar problems were
experienced in Preston, where although services increased due to aggressive competition
shortly after deregulation, these levels of provision were unsustainable, and some services
were subsequently withdrawn. In Manchester too, and more recently, rail passengers have
suffered because the main local rail franchise operator’s bid was based on unrealistic
expectations. We understand that there have also been rail service quality problems in
Stockholm, a city outside our case studies. Another example where passengers suffered is in
the loss of certain “through bus services” in Adelaide following the implementation of area
franchising with limits on the total number of buses per area.
238
Conclusions
Difficulties in transition have also had serious impacts upon employees. In Adelaide, the
introduction of privatisation of the bus industry led to some industrial unrest, low morale,
and some sabotage of buses and bus infrastructure in the early contracting rounds. There
were also difficulties in recruiting old staff into the new companies initially, due to the way
the severance contracts had been arranged. In addition, some staff were retained on the
books of the public authority with no work to do, with consequent waste of resources.
Other examples include the poor industrial relations experienced in Lyon and the fall in
earnings for bus company staff in Manchester.
Lessons for the Irish cities are that careful planning is needed to avoid, or at least minimise,
any negative aspects of the transition period. The incentive impacts of new institutional
arrangements on public transport operators should be considered carefully. For example, is
there a risk that under the new arrangements operators will increase fares sharply, or are
fares subject to control? Are funding arrangements such that they will incentivise operators
to maximise ridership/offer off-peak services/cater for the mobility impaired? (i.e., do the
cost-recovery arrangements allow this?) If fares are fixed, will operators be incentivised to
maintain service quality?
In the context of impacts on the employees undergoing any change, careful consideration is
also needed. In order to minimise negative impacts, we would recommend that careful
consideration is given to setting up schemes to allow the redeployment of staff to other jobs,
while still retaining incentives to employ staff productively and for staff to act efficiently.
Examples might include “guaranteed” job transfer to work for new operators, or
redeployment in to other parts of the company/public sector (perhaps particularly useful
for administrative workers). Consideration might also be given to ensuring pay levels or
benefits such as medical schemes are not lost in the transition. It will also be important to
ensure that any new bodies that are set up (such as planning, co-ordinating and regulatory
bodies) are staffed with adequately trained and experienced staff.
Again, the
encouragement of staff re-deployment, along with close attention to training arrangements
should help to ensure this. Toronto has particularly good lessons in regard to the provision
of good training facilities for public transport staff.
At a high level, we consider it useful to consider a gradual approach to change, so that
lessons can be leant during the process, and to ensure that operators, staff and customers
have adequate time to adjust to the new arrangements. This will also help allow time for the
appropriate legislation to be introduced. In many cases, it would appear that a lot of the
transitional problems that have arisen have done so due to the very sudden nature of the
changeover. The instability in Manchester and Preston are clear examples. Similarly, the
fact that many lessons were learnt in Adelaide during the first few contracting rounds, and
that changes could then be applied to make the subsequent rounds more successful is
perhaps a good example of the advantages of gradual approach. We note that tendering in
Copenhagen was conducted in stages, while it is also planned that the transition to a system
of competitive tendering in The Hague will also be achieved in a phased way by awarding
the first concession for each line group to the incumbent operator and only moving to
239
Conclusions
competitive tendering from the second round onwards. Given the time it will take to set up
or expand the public transport authorities, such an approach may have its merits for the
Irish situation too.
240
Appendix A
APPENDIX A.
SOURCES AND INTERVIEWS
241
Appendix A
A.1. Dublin
A.1.1. Interviews
•
Bus Éireann – Tim Hayes and Paul Delemere – 29th March 2001 (NERA: John
Dodgson, Emma Kelso, TIS: Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Chambers of Commerce of Ireland and Irish Business and Employers Confederation
– 1st March 2001 – Simon Nugent (CEO), John Dunne (South Dublin), Tony Lambert
(Swords Fingal), Michael Geary (Cork), Reg McCabe (IBEC) - (NERA - Emma Kelso)
and 29th March 2001 (also Bus Operators: Eugine Finnigan, Diedre Barrie, and Corla
Cons and Dublin Chamber of Commerce: Declan Martin) – (NERA: John Dodgson,
Emma Kelso, TIS: Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Córas Iompair Éireann (CIE) – Jim Cullen, Chief Financial Officer - 2nd March 2001
(NERA – Emma Kelso, TIS – Rosario Macario)
•
Department of Finance – Paul Byrne – 2nd March 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
•
Department of Public Enterprise – Maev Nic Lochlainn, Orla Corrigan, Fintan Towey
– 2nd March 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso, TIS – Rosario Macario)
•
Dublin Bus – Alan Westwell, Katrina Murphy, Garry Maguire, Shane Doyle, Paddy
Doherty - 29th March 2001 (NERA: John Dodgson and Emma Kelso)
•
Dublin Transportation Office – John Henry, CEO – 28th March 2001 (NERA: John
Dodgson, Emma Kelso, TIS: Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Iarnród Éireann – Joe Meagher and Tom Finn – 29th March 2001 (NERA: John
Dodgson and Emma Kelso, TIS: Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Irish Congress of Trade Unions – 2nd March 2001 (Emma Kelso – NERA)
•
Office of the Director of the Director of Traffic , Dublin Corporation – Eileen Brady,
Eoghan Madden – 28th March 2001 (NERA: John Dodgson, Emma Kelso, TIS: Manolo
de la Fuente)
•
Public Transport Partnership Forum – Steering Committee – 1st March 2001 (NERA –
Emma Kelso) and 29th March 2001 (NERA: John Dodgson, Emma Kelso, TIS: Manolo
de la Fuente)
•
Public Transport Partnership Forum Voluntary Pillar – Dan Boyle and Maeve
Kennedy Grimes – 1st March 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
A.1.2. Documents and data
Central Statistics Office website: www.cso.ie
242
Appendix A
Córas Iompair Éireann (1999) Group Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999
Department of Public Enterprise (August 2000) A New Institutional and Regulatory Framework
for Public Transport
Department of Public Enterprise (May 2000) Regulation of the Bus Market in the Greater Dublin
Area
Department of Public Enterprise (November 2000) Guidelines for the Consideration of
Applications for Annual Bus Passenger Licences in Respect of the Greater Dublin Area Under the
Road Transport Act 1932
Dublin Transportation Office (September 2000) A Platform for Change – Outline of an integrated
transportation strategy for the greater Dublin Area 2000 to 2016
Dublin transportation Office website: www.dto.ie
Dublin Bus (1999) Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999
Dublin Bus website: www.dublinbus.is
Data on operational statistics, costs and revenues supplied by Dublin Bus, Bus Éireann, and
Iarnród Éireann.
Iarnród Éireann website: www.irishrail.ie
Road Transport Act 1932
243
Appendix A
A.2. Regional Irish Cities
A.2.1. Cork
A.2.1.1.
Interviews
•
Joe Fitzgerald, Area Manager Bus Éireann – 24th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der
Veer)
•
Conall Mac Aongusa, Group Engineer WS Atkins – 24th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter
van der Veer)
•
Iarnród Éireann – 24th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
•
Cork Corporation – 24th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
A.2.1.2.
Documents
Bus Éireann (2000) Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999
Cork Corporation (1997) Cork City Development Plan Review 1998
Cork Corporation, Bus Éireann, Iarnród Éireann, Cork County Council (1998) Cork Public
Transport Investment Review
A.2.2. Galway
A.2.2.1.
Interviews
Iarnród Éireann
•
Brian McKiernan – 25th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
Bus Éireann
•
A.2.2.2.
Sean Gleeson, Area Manager – 25th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
Documents
Bus Éireann (2000) Annual Report and Financial Statements 1999
Galway Corporation, Galway County Council (1999) Galway Transportation and Planning
Study
244
Appendix A
A.3. Adelaide
A.3.1. Interviews
•
PTB - Heather Haselgrove – Director, Contracts – 10th May 2001 (NERA – Nicola
Tully)
•
PTB - David Bray – consultant from Economic and Policy Services Pty, working for
PTB – 10th May 2001 (NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
SERCO – Bob Pritchard – Contract Manager – 10th May 2001 (NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
SERCO – Barrie White – Operations Manager (NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
Australian Transit Enterprises (Southlink) – David Hurley – Finance manager – 11th
May 2001 (NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
RBTW Union – Ray Hancox – 10th May 2001 (NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
Transit Systems Australia (Torrens Transit) – Neil E Smith – Director – 11th May 2001
(NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
TransAdelaide – George Erdos – Manager for Infrastructure Services – telephone
interview – May 2001 (NERA – Nicola Tully)
•
Professor Derek Scrafton – Transport Systems Centre, University of South Australia 21st March 2001 (NERA – John Dodgson, Emma Kelso, Jan Peter van der Veer)
A.3.2. Documents
Adelaide website: www.Adelaide-sa.gov.au/About_Adelaide
Adelaide Metro/Passenger Transport Board (PTB) website: www.adelaidemetro.com.au
City of Adelaide (1999) Economic Profile 1999
Department for Transport, Urban Planning and the Arts (2000) 1999-2000 Annual Report
Murray F Young and Associates (1997) City of Adelaide Traffic Management Strategy – Stage 1 –
Draft Preliminary Objectives and Strategies
Passenger Transport Board (1999) Annual Report 1998/99
Passenger Transport Board (2000) Service Contracts: Report of the Passenger Transport Board to
the Minister for Transport and Urban Planning
Scrafton, D and Bray, D (2000) The Adelaide O-Bahn: Ten Years On – Joint Conference on Light
Rail Transit, Dallas, Texas, 2000
245
Appendix A
A.4. Copenhagen
A.4.1. Interviews
People interviewed:
•
Anders Schwarz Lausten (HUR) – telephone interview
•
Fleming Smith – SID Union, Copenhagen – telephone interview
A.4.2. Documents
Information used:
•
Per Als, Making that change – Reorganising Public Transport
•
Website: www.ht.dk, last visited in June 2001 on the World Wide Web
•
Website: www.hur.dk, last visited in June 2001 on the World Wide Web
•
Map: Trafikkort 02-07-2000 / 16-06-2001 , Copenhagen, 2000
•
HUR, From Copenhagen Transport to Greater Copenhagen Authority, Transport
Division, Copenhagen, 2000
•
MARETOPE, first draft of Copenhagen case study, Copenhagen, 2001
•
HT, Hovedstadsomradets Trafikselskab Arsberetning 1999, Copenhagen, 2000
•
HT, Copenhagen Transport Annual Report 1999, Copenhagen, 2000
•
Rejsekort, The Copenhagen Travel Card, Copenhagen, 1998
•
HUR, Greater Copenhagen Authority, HUR, Copenhagen (presentation)
•
IMAGITA, Danish Public Transport Newsletter, www.imagita.dk, last visited in
March 2001 on the World Wide Web
•
HT, Tender Conditions and Specifications, Eighth Invitation to Tender, Copenhagen,
June 1998
246
Appendix A
A.5. Évora
A.5.1. People interviewed:
•
Mauro Fernandes, BELOS
•
António Leirão, SITEE
•
Ines Morais, Municipality of Évora
•
Joao Rato, Sindicato dos Trabalhadores Rodoviarios e Urbanos do Sul (union)
A.5.2. Information used:
•
Website http://www.evora.net/sitee/horarios.htm, last visited in June 2001 on the
World Wide Web
•
Website http://www.cm-evora.pt/sitee , last visited in June 2001 on the World
Wide Web
•
SITEE, paper with replies on questionnaire
•
TRANSPLUS, draft case study Évora, Lisbon, 2001
•
SITEE, year account 2000, Évora, 2001
•
Municipality of Évora, Ratification of the revised Évora general urban plan, Évora,
1993
•
Municipality of Évora, Évora’s integrated transport and parking system: Report and
characterisation of the system, Évora, 1992.
•
CEDRU, Global study about land use and valorisation of planned or potentials for
the establishment of local priority zones
247
Appendix A
A.6. Lyon
A.6.1. Interviews
•
Alain Nérot, SLTC
•
Yvette Lartigau SYTRAL
•
Pascale Gilbert-Ledru, Communauté urbaine de Lyon
A.6.2. Documents
•
Website www.tlc.fr , last visited in June 2001 on the World Wide Web
•
Website: www.sytral.fr, last visited in June 2001 on the World Wide Web
•
Les chifres clés 1999, TCL
•
Plan du résau TCL, TCL
•
Lyon 2010, structure plan for the conurbation, www.iclei.org/egpis/egpc-145.html,
last visited in March 2001 on the World Wide Web
•
Le Grand Lyon, Plans de Déplacement de Secteurs (including several annexes)
•
SYTRAL, Budget 1999, Lyon
•
SYTRAL, Le plan des déplacements urbains de l’agglomération lyonnaise, Lyon,
1997.
•
TCL, mini plan
•
SYTRAL, Satisfaction Clients du Reseau TCL, questionnaire and results
•
TCL, Plan de nuit
•
SLTC, l’annee 1999, Lyon 2000
248
Appendix A
A.7. Manchester
A.7.1. Interviews
Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive
•
Bill Tyson, Head of Integration - May 29th (NERA - John Dodgson)
•
Steve Wurr – May 17th (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
•
George Boswell, Bus Services Coordinator – May 17th (NERA – Jan Peter van der
Veer)
Transport and General Workers’ Union
•
Fred Greer – June 28th (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
A.7.2. Documents
DETR (1999) From Workhorse to Thoroughbred: A Better Role for Bus Travel. London: DETR
DETR (2000) Transport Statistics Bulletin: GB 2000 edition London: DETR
GMPTE (1999a) Moving Forward: Strategic Development Plan for Public Transport in Greater
Manchester 1999
GMPTE (1999b) Trends & Statistics 1986-1998
GMPTE (2000) The Integrate Project Second Annual Report 1999/2000.
Greater Manchester Local Transport Plan 2001/02-2005/06
Mackie, P and Preston, J (1996) The Local Bus Market: A Case Study of Regulatory Change
Avebury (Aldershot, Hants)
Office for National Statistics (2000) New Earnings Survey.
Office for National Statistics (2000) Regional Trends London: The Stationery Office
Office of Fair Trading (2001) Public Transport Ticketing Scheme Block Exemption – Formal
Consultation Draft
Strategic Rail Authority (various years) Performance Bulletins
Transport Act 1985 London: HMSO
249
Appendix A
A.8. Preston
A.8.1. Interviews
Preston Bus
•
Peter Bell, Managing Director – 16th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
Stagecoach North West
•
Christopher Fowles, Commercial Director – 17th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der
Veer)
John Fishwick & Sons
•
John Brindle, Managing Director – 17th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
Lancashire County Council
•
Tony Moreton, Group Manager Bus Services - 17th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van
der Veer)
•
Ray Worthington – 17th May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
Transport and General Workers’ Union
•
Fred Greer – June 28th (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
A.8.2. Documents
Lancashire County Council (2000) Local Transport Plan
Mackie, P and Preston, J. (1988) “Competition in the urban bus market: a case study”.
Proceedings PTRC Summer Annual Meeting, Seminar C: Public Transport Planning and
Operations, pp 157-170
Mackie, P and Preston, J (1996) The Local Bus Market: A Case Study of Regulatory Change
Avebury (Aldershot, Hants)
Office of Fair Trading (2001) Public Transport Ticketing Scheme Block Exemption – Formal
Consultation Draft
250
Appendix A
A.9. The Hague
A.9.1. Interviews
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
•
Roeland Schuurman, Section Governmental Relations and Public Transport Policy –
21st May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
•
Hans van Dijk, Section Governmental Relations and Public Transport Policy – 23rd
May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
Stadsgewest Haaglanden
•
S.D. Renzema, Head of Public Transport – 23rd May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der
Veer)
Haagsche Tramweg Maatschappij (HTM)
•
Hans Derksen, Strategy, Marketing and Communication – 22nd May 2001 (NERA –
Jan Peter van der Veer)
Dutch Railways
•
Donald Hatch, Account Manager Business Development – 22nd May 2001 (NERA –
Jan Peter van der Veer)
•
Yvonne Lentz, Manager Public Affairs – 22nd May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der
Veer)
•
Alex Bruijn, Productmanagement - 22nd May 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
FNV Union
•
Dik Ketting, 4th July 2001 (NERA – Jan Peter van der Veer)
A.9.2. Documents
HTM (2000) Annual Report
Stadsgewest Haaglanden (2001) Meer en Beter Openbaar Vervoer: Beleidsnota Openbaar Vervoer
2001-2010. Unpublished draft
251
Appendix A
A.10. Toronto
A.10.1. Interviews
TTC
•
Paul Buttigieg – Chief Accountant, Financial Services – 15th May 2001 (NERA –
Emma Kelso)
•
Mitch Stambler - Manager, Service Planning – 16th May 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
•
Theresa Clarke – Superintendent – Compensation and Organisational Design –
Human Resources – 16th May 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
GO Transit
•
Gary McNeil - Managing Director – 14th May 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
City of Toronto Transportation and Panning Divisions
•
Tom Mulligan – Director of Transportation – 15th May 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
•
Rod Mc Phail – Toronto Official Plan – 15th May 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
University of Toronto/Trimap Communications
•
Dr Richard Soberman – 14th May 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
Amalgamated Transit Union
•
Paul McLaughlin – Executive Vice-President – 28th June 2001 (NERA – Emma Kelso)
A.10.2. Documents
City of Toronto (2000) Toronto at the Crossroads: Shaping Our Future
City of Toronto Urban Development Services (April 2000) A Transportation Vision for the City
of Toronto Official Plan
City of Toronto Urban Development Services (June 2000) GTA Population and Employment
Projections to 2031
Crowley, D F and Dalton, P (1998) Transit Realities in the Suburban GTA Data Management
Group, Joint Program in Transportation, University of Toronto
252
Appendix A
Data Management Group, Joint Program in Transportation, University of Toronto (1998)
Greater Toronto Area Cordon Count Program: Analysis of Traffic Trends 1985 to 1998
GO Transit (2000) The Year in Review: The State of the System January 1999 to July 2000
GO Transit (August 2000) Route Map to the Future
GO Transit (2000) Year 2001 Budget Plan
GO Transit (March 2001) Fares Customer Bulletin
GO Transit (March 2001) Fare Guide – North Corridor
GO Transit (March 2001) Fare Guide – Lakeshore Corridor
GO Transit (March 2001) Fare Conversion Tables
GO Transit website: www.gotransit.com
Legislative Assembly of Ontario Bill 56 (1998) An Act to establish the Greater Toronto Services
Board and the Greater Toronto Transit Authority and to amend the Toronto Operating Authority Act
Ontario Labour Management Services (various 2000 and 2001) Ontario Quarterly Review on
Ontario Collective Bargaining Developments
Soberman, R M (1997) The Track Ahead: Organisation of the TTC under the new amalgamated City
of Toronto University of Toronto
Soberman, R M (March 2001) Reducing Car Dependence: Transportation Options for the City of
Toronto
TTC (1999) Annual Report 1999
TTC (May 2000) Greater Toronto Area Transit Ride Guide
TTC Transit in Toronto
TTC (May 1990) Service Standards Process
TTC (March 2001) Benefit Plans: Staff
TTC (March 2001) Benefit Plans: Union
TTC (May 2000 and April 2001) Chief General Manager’s Report
253
Appendix A
TTC (2001) Operating Budget and Operating Budget Overview
TTC (1999) Operating Statistics 1999
TTC (2000) 2001 Organisation Charts
TTC (2001) 2001 Departmental Goals and Objectives
TTC website: www.ttc.ca
254
Appendix A
A.11. Zurich
A.11.1. Interviews
•
Christian Schärli, Amt für Verkehr – May 2001 (TIS – Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Ruedi Ott, Tiefbauamt des Stadt Zürich – May 2001 (TIS – Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Dominik Brüwiler, ZVV – May 2001 (TIS – Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Dominik Bernet, ZVV – May 2001 (TIS – Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Michel Jampen, ZVV – May 2001 (TIS – Manolo de la Fuente)
•
Stefan Giger, Vpod union – June 2001 (TIS – Manolo de la Fuente)
A.11.2. Documents
VBZ, Vekehrsbetriebe Zürich, 1999, Fakten, Zurich, 2000
ZVV, Wir sind verantwortlich, Der ZVV in Kürze, Zurich, June 2000
Tiefbauamt der Stadt Zürich, Zürich Stadtplan, Zürich, 1998
VBZ, Geschäftsbericht 1999, Zurich, 2000
ZVV, Vernetzt sind wir stark, 10 Jahre Zürcher Verkerhsverbund, Zürich
ZVV, Wir sind vernatwortlich, Geschäftsbericht 1998/99, Zürich
ZVV, Tickets & Preise
ZVV, ZVV, Making the net work, Zurich, presentation
Tiefbauamt der Stadt Zürich, Kennziffernspiegel, Zürich, 1994
Peter Jones, Study of policies in overseas cities for traffic and transport (S.P.O.T.T.), London,
1993
ZVV, Welcome 24/48, Zürich, 2000
ZVV, 50 Ausflüge im Zürcher Verkehrsverbund, Zürich, 2000
SBB, Der Schritt in die Zukunft
ZVV, S-Bahn undf Busse
255
Appendix A
Amt für Verkehr, Bahnhof Löwenstrasse und weitere Schlüsselinfrastrukturen, Zürich,
November 2000
Amt für Verkehr, Verkehrsentwicklung im Wirtschaftsraum bis 2025, Zurich, 1999
Amt für Verkehr, Hochleistungsstrassen im Kanton Zürich, Strategie und elemente, Zurich,
June 2000
Stadtplanungsamt der Stadt Zürich, 20 Jahre verkehrsberuhigung in Zürich, Zurich 1995
EMTA News, Why measure the satisfaction of customers and how? The Zurich public
survey, Paris, 2001
ZVV, Umfrage zur Kundenzufriedenheit,
Amt für Verkehr, Auftrag regierungsrat (presentation), Zurich, 2001
ZVV, S-Bahn-Vision, Zurich
Socialdata, Mobilität in Zürich, Verhalten, München, 1993.
Socialdata, Mobilität in Zürich, Einschätzungen, München, 1993.
Socialdata, Mobilität in Zürich, Potentiale, München, 1993.
ZVV, Freizetsgenuss im Zürcher Verkehrsverbund,
ZVV, Strategie 2002 – 2006, Zurich, November 2000
Tiefbauamt der Stadt Zürich, Zürich West – Ein Stadtteil entwickelt sich… auch
verkehsmässig, Zurich, 1999
Verkehrspolitik der Stadt Zürich, Stand März 1994
R. Ott, Conurbation transport policy in Zurich, Switzerland (paper)
R. Ott, Cobining landuse and mobility policies in Zürich (paper)
Creating first class transit with transit first policies: Zurich, Switzerland (chapter from book)
256
Appendix A
A.12. Conclusions
TIS et al. (1997) ISOTOPE – Final Report
257

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