Monthly Kidnap Newsletter – May 2016

Transcription

MONTHLY
KIDNAP
BRIEFING
ISSUE 123 | May 2016
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
BRIEF ON LATIN AMERICA
Extortion in Colombia
4
Common criminals
4
Incarcerated extortion gangs
5
Illegal armed groups
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
Africa: First quarter of 2016
sees surge in offshore
kidnapping and piracy cases 6
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
This is the 123rd issue in a series of kidnap-focused
reports prepared by Control Risks on behalf of Hiscox.
The Monthly Kidnap Briefing is distributed to select
clients in order to keep you informed of the trends in
kidnapping worldwide and assess the risk of kidnapping
to your business.
This issue includes an overview of kidnapping-for-ransom
trends in April 2016, a brief on extortion in Colombia and a
focus on the surge in offshore kidnapping and piracy
incidents in Africa in the first quarter of 2016.
If you would like to provide us with
feedback on the Monthly Kidnap Briefing
or inform us of your interest in a specific
country or theme that you would like us
to cover in a subsequent issue, then
please write to [email protected]
Prepared by
for
Note: Hiscox and Control Risks request that recipients do not forward the contents outside the distribution list. Any breach of this will lead to removal from the distribution list.
GLOBAL INSIGHT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
4
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
Americas
PERU: NEW TACTICS UNDERSCORE THREAT OF
EXPRESS KIDNAPPING IN AREQUIPA
National media outlet Diario Correo on 24 April reported the emergence
of a new form of express kidnapping in Arequipa (Arequipa region). According to police
sources, express kidnappers are stealing their victims’ National Identity Documents (DNI)
which contain personal information including their address. To prevent the victims from
reporting the incident to the authorities, the perpetrators issue threats against the victim or
their family. In one incident cited by Diario Correo, the victim was told that if she reported
the express kidnap to the authorities, the perpetrators would look for her at her house to
take revenge.
Express kidnappers commonly select their victims opportunistically based on their
perceived wealth, meaning that local business personnel and even foreign nationals are
targeted. This crime normally involves the abduction of a victim who is forced, under
threat of injury or death, to withdraw funds from automated teller machines (ATMs). It is
a commonly under-reported crime, though additional pressure applied by perpetrators on
their victims is likely to reduce further their inclination to report incidents to the authorities,
thus facilitating the involvement of criminals in the crime.
The crime is likely to remain common in major urban areas including Arequipa and Lima in
the medium-to-long term. This trend is largely fuelled by an abundance of unlicensed taxis,
which are often used to stage express kidnaps. According to national media outlet Perú 21
on 26 February, more than 40,000 unlicensed taxis operate in Lima alone. Meanwhile, the
US government has prohibited its personnel from hailing taxis off the street in Arequipa,
according to the 2015 Crime and Safety report published by the Overseas Security
Advisory Council (OSAC). Within Lima, incidents commonly occur in San Borja, Miraflores,
La Molina, San Isidro and Surco. According to Diario Correo, in Arequipa victims are
frequently targeted at Terminal Terrestre, Avenida Ejercito, Avenida Independencia, and at
the Plaza de Armas and in surrounding streets.
VENEZUELA: CONSOLIDATION OF ‘PEACE ZONES’ LEADS TO RISE IN
KIDNAPPING IN 2016
Local daily El Nacional on 24 April reported that cases of kidnapping in 2016 had increased
161% when compared with the same period in 2015. A similar increase is registered in
Control Risks records. Meanwhile, El Universal on 31 March reported that kidnapping
had become a principal source of income for gangs, and unofficial figures suggest that an
average of 200 short-duration or express kidnaps occur every day. The newspaper also
stated that the increase is directly related to the consolidation of so-called ‘peace zones’,
where criminal gangs maintain control of large neighbourhoods.
Prepared by
In September 2013, the government designated certain areas with the highest crime rates
in Miranda state as ‘peace zones’, in an attempt to pacify gangs and reintegrate their
members into society. In exchange for the gangs’ commitment to disarm, the government
agreed to provide resources and construction materials to these areas. The initiative was
subsequently extended to areas of the Capital District, Zulia, Táchira, Aragua and Guárico
states. The security forces have had a limited presence within these areas since their
designation as ‘peace zones’. This led to the consolidation of criminal gangs in
these areas.
1
for
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
In July 2015, the security forces were sent in to regain control of many ‘peace zones’ as
part of the Operation Liberation and Protection of the People (OLP). Nevertheless, criminal
gangs continue to use safe houses in these areas to hold their victims captive. Media source
Runrun.es in November 2015 reported that gangs in four peace zones, including Cota 905 and
El Cementerio, were involved in 25% of kidnaps reported in Caracas in 2015 until that time.
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
Africa
4
MALI: DETENTION OF AID WORKERS UNDERLINES
SEVERE KIDNAP THREAT IN NORTH
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
A local community on 16 April reportedly detained three employees of an international NGO
who were travelling between project sites in a remote area of the north. One victim was
quickly released, and reported that the group had been detained over a grievance relating
to the arrest of a local guide by French troops deployed as part of Operation Barkhane.
The remaining two victims were released on 22 April.
The detention underscores the EXTREME kidnap threat in the northern regions of Gao,
Timbuktu and Kidal. The region is home to a number of armed groups, including
ethnic-Tuareg militias, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates,
and smuggling gangs, all of which operate with relative impunity. Continuing French
counterterrorism operations have the potential to anger local communities, which have few
legal alternatives to express grievances and often have ties with armed actors.
Both local and foreign nationals remain at risk of kidnap in the north. Despite periodic
operations and existing deployments by security forces, including French Operation
Barkhane, the forces lack the capacity to secure the vast territory from a shifting network
of Islamist groups. Foreign operators in the north should take concerted precautions to
reduce their exposure to kidnap, with Western nationals viewed as highly desirable targets
by militants. NGO employees remain particularly susceptible to kidnap owing to their
requirement to operate in remote and underdeveloped regions. The need to appear neutral
and non-politicised means that many aid workers travel without overt or heavy security
precautions, making them more susceptible to kidnap attempts.
Middle East
SYRIA: ISLAMIC STATE DEMONSTRATES KIDNAP
CAPABILITY, ABDUCTS UP TO 300 EMPLOYEES
NEAR DAMASCUS
Islamic State (IS) in April continued to demonstrate its significant capability to carry out
mass kidnaps. In early April, the group attacked a cement plant in Dumayr (Rif Dimashq
governorate), 30 miles (50km) east of the capital Damascus, and kidnapped dozens of
employees. The exact number of victims was not clear; reports ranged from 170 to more
than 300. Media reporting later in the month indicated that the majority of victims were later
released, though a small number had been killed when the group accused them of spying
and some were still being held.
Prepared by
Mass abductions of Syrian and Iraqi nationals have been a common feature of IS’s rule over
parts of Syria and Iraq. The group regularly uses kidnapping as a tactic to curb dissent. In Iraq, it
has rounded up large groups of people who planned to leave IS territory for a life elsewhere.
IS retains the intent to kidnap foreign nationals, but incidents have been few since June 2014.
The group’s public beheadings of foreign nationals have encouraged few to venture into IS
territory. Nevertheless, IS retains the intent and the capability to kidnap any foreign nationals
who do enter areas of Iraq and Syria under its control.
2
for
Asia
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
4
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
PHILIPPINES/MALAYSIA: ABU SAYYAF GROUP
ADOPTS MARITIME KIDNAP-FOR-RANSOM, BEHEADS
FOREIGN NATIONAL
The Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in March and April adopted a new
tactic in pursuit of lucrative foreigners to ransom. Beginning in late March, the group
targeted three vessels in the Sulu Sea within a three-week period. In each incident, the
kidnappers boarded the vessel and discharged their weapons before escaping with the
foreign national crew members. In some cases, the vessels were ransacked and crew
possessions were stolen. None of the vessels were seized.
The first incident occurred on 25 March offshore Omapoy Island, Philippines. The ten
Indonesian crew members were removed from the vessel and likely taken to an ASG
stronghold in Sulu. Unconfirmed media reporting suggested the company had made an
offer of USD 1.5m for their release. The second and third incidents both occurred offshore
Pulau Sipadan, Malaysia. The first, which occurred on 1 April, resulted in the kidnap of four
Malaysian crew members. The second, on 15 April, yielded four Indonesian crew members.
Although the ASG has significant maritime capability, it typically carries out abductions
on land, usually within a short distance of the coast. It has carried out isolated kidnaps at
sea. In April 2014, the group kidnapped two German tourists from a yacht. They released
them in October 2014 for the alleged sum of USD 5.6m. Vessels with low freeboards that
traverse the group’s area of operations (from the Zamboanga Peninsula (Philippines) to
the eastern coast of Sabah (Malaysia)) should take appropriate precautions.
The ASG views foreign nationals as particularly lucrative targets and will continue to
deliberately seek them out. However, the risk to its foreign national victims increased
significantly in late April when the group beheaded a Canadian victim, whom it had
kidnapped in September 2015 along with another Canadian, a Norwegian and a Filipina.
The beheading is a significant escalation in the group’s treatment of kidnap victims.
Previously it has been willing to hold victims for years while waiting for payment.
Prepared by
3
for
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
EXTORTION IN COLOMBIA
Africa2
Extortion has risen markedly in Colombia in recent years. Newspaper El Tiempo in 2013
reported that approximately USD 1bn is paid to extortionists annually. However, the real
sum could be significantly higher. Between 2008 and 2015, there was more than a 500%
rise in cases recorded by the Ministry of Defence. However, extortion is notoriously
under-reported, with estimates frequently suggesting that approximately 80% of cases are
never reported to the authorities.
Middle East 2
Asia 3
4
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
kidnapping and piracy cases 6,000
5,304
5,000
4,805
4,888
4,000
6
3,000
2,316
ABOUT US
Control Risks
Figure 1: Extortion cases by year
2,000
8
Hiscox8
1,373
1,082
1,805
1,352
1,000
830
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Source: Ministry of Defence
The total growth in the crime is unlikely to be as dramatic as suggested by these figures
and some of the growth is likely to be accounted for by an increased willingness amongst
targets to report the crime to the authorities. However, the rise in reporting of the crime is
unlikely to account entirely for this increase. Furthermore, the crime itself has developed,
with new criminal groups engaging in it, adopting a range of new methods, and diversifying
their pool of potential targets.
COMMON CRIMINALS
One of the principal reasons for the increase in extortion is the growing number of
common criminals, locally known as ‘delincuencia común’ or ‘Delco’, engaging in it.
Delco have brought the crime to urban areas and have broadened the pool of potential
targets. They do not simply target wealthy landowners and large businesses. The majority
of victims today tend to be small business owners or merchants from whom extortionists
demand relatively small, but regular, protection payments. While large businesses frequently
have protocol in place to protect them from such low-level schemes, small businesses often
concede to such demands. By throwing the net far and wide, gangs can earn large sums.
Prepared by
Not all Delco take such a targeted approach or are able to display the level of capability
and intent to carry out their threats, which are required to force targets to continue to make
regular payments. Many instead take a scattergun approach, targeting as many people and
businesses as possible, and seeking rapid one-off payments. Many such extortion schemes
bear a resemblance to virtual kidnapping found elsewhere throughout Latin America. In one
form known as ‘Tío Tío’, an extortionist calls their target claiming to be a relative who has
been detained at a roadblock. They then pass the telephone to another person who claims
to be a police officer and promises to resolve the situation in exchange for a payment.
4
for
INCARCERATED EXTORTION GANGS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
4
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
A particularly large proportion of extortion rackets are run by gangs of common criminals
from within prisons. Some of these gangs have affiliates in several prisons. Their network
also often includes criminals on the outside who facilitate the collection of personal
information about potential targets from a range of sources including telephone directories,
advertisements and personal contacts.
The authorities have installed signal blockers at prisons around the country to prevent inmates
from making extortive calls. There are currently 16 prisons with such a system in place, and
there are plans to install them in 60 more, out of the country’s 138 total. However, despite
these attempts, according to a report by the anti-kidnap and extortion unit (Gaula) cited in
El Tiempo, six of the 12 prisons that account for the highest levels of extortion already have
signal blockers in place. As telephone technology and network coverage develops, many
extortionists are able to circumvent the measure. Furthermore, although according to the
National Penitentiary and Prison Institute (INPEC) 65,000 telephones were confiscated from
prisons in the last six years, inmates continue to smuggle in new handsets. This all suggests
that extortion rackets will continue to thrive within prisons in the medium-to-long term.
FOCUS ON
ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS
kidnapping and piracy cases Although Delco and relatively low-level schemes have accounted for a large proportion
of the growth in extortion in recent years, a range of illegal armed groups also continue
to engage in the crime. Along with drug-trafficking, neo-paramilitary groups such as Clan
Úsuga and Los Rastrojos rely on extortion for much of their income. Their extortion rackets
tend to be focused in urban areas, though some of the groups maintain rural strongholds –
for example Clan Úsuga in the Urabá region of Antioquia department.
6
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
In the context of swift progress in its ongoing peace talks with the government since mid-2015,
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been markedly less belligerent
and has reduced its involvement in high-profile kidnapping. However, it has not reduced its
involvement in extortion in rural areas to the same degree. The National Liberation Army (ELN)
has also formalised its own peace talks with the government while remaining more bellicose than
the FARC, and has continued to use kidnapping as a means of enforcing extortion payments.
Large businesses, including those working in the extractive and construction industries, as well
as transport companies and wealthy ranchers, are likely to remain their primary targets.
In relation to unpaid extortion – ‘quotas de tránsito’ – members of the ELN’s Cacique
Calarcá Front torched eight vehicles and kidnapped two drivers on the road between Quibdó
(Chocó department) and Pereira (Risaralda department) in early April. The victims were
released approximately ten days later. Meanwhile, in mid-March, the Colombian Chamber of
Infrastructure (CCI) denounced ELN and FARC fronts for extensively extorting construction
businesses operating in Casanare department. The guerrilla groups had demanded 10% of
the value of projects in the area. The CCI reported that when payment was not forthcoming,
guerrillas had torched machinery leading to losses of close to COP 8bn (USD 2.5m).
Many Delco also continue to masquerade as members of guerrilla groups to extort funds. As well
as claiming affiliation with an armed group, they frequently adopt the name or alias of a guerrilla
fighter. This adds credibility to their threats and urgency to their demands, especially when that
fighter is known to operate in the area. Extortionists have been known to masquerade brazenly
as both guerrilla and neo-paramilitary groups to demand payments from the same target.
OUTLOOK
Prepared by
Extortion is likely to remain firmly entrenched in Colombia and diverse in nature in the
medium-to-long term, especially given the large proportion of incidents involving low-level
criminals. Despite the FARC moving closer to signing a peace deal with the government,
and the ELN formalising its own peace talks, both have remained involved in the crime.
Furthermore, with national media sources estimating that up to 1,500 criminal gangs or
groups operate throughout the country, there will likely be competition to fill the vacuum left
by FARC or ELN fronts’ eventual demobilisation.
5
for
FOCUS ON
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
4
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
AFRICA: FIRST QUARTER OF 2016 SEES SURGE IN OFFSHORE
KIDNAPPING AND PIRACY CASES
Since the beginning of 2016, at least 13 recorded cases of maritime kidnap-for-ransom
have occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. Most of these have occurred off the coast of Nigeria.
The kidnap cases represent just a quarter of the approximately 45 maritime security
incidents recorded by Control Risks since the start of the year. These include robberies
on anchored vessels, unsuccessful approaches involving gunfire, and the boarding of
underway vessels for cargo theft and looting. Taken together, the events represent a
significant jump in security incidents in the Gulf of Guinea, producing the highest rate of
attacks since the height of pirate activity in the region pre-2008. The ratio of confirmed
abductions versus the number of approaches is also notable, representing the highest
rate of success for kidnap-focused pirate gangs trying their luck in the waters of the Gulf of
Guinea since the first quarter of 2013.
While piracy rates in the Gulf of Guinea had slowed since 2013, they had never diminished
to the extent seen off the Horn of Africa, after a multinational naval taskforce succeeded in
reducing the practice to all but insignificant levels there. Their resurgence in the first quarter
of this year can be attributed to a series of domestic factors in Nigeria that have combined
to create a perfect storm of conditions for a return of widespread maritime insecurity in the
Gulf. According to Control Risks’ sources in Nigeria and anecdotal corroboration in media
reports, local political and security stakeholders in the Niger Delta were pressured to do
their part to keep pirate gangs quiet and levels of maritime insecurity at bay in the run-up
to the presidential election in 2015 (resulting in a shift that year towards Akwa Ibom State,
not traditionally part of the piracy ‘Big 3’ of Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa). Then-president
Goodluck Jonathan, a native of the region, considered a peaceful Delta region key to his
re-election chances and his ability to turn the violence on and off in the region a vital point
of leverage with international partners. Throughout the region during the election cycle,
fewer offshore incidents were recorded compared to previous years, and the kidnap-for-ransom
environment was largely focused around targeting local nationals of higher-than-average
wealth or employees of multinationals based onshore. During this period, Rivers and
Bayelsa states still accounted for the majority of national kidnap activity, representing
the locations of 29.5% of all incidents recorded in Nigeria. The targeting and sabotage
of oil infrastructure, such as pipelines and well heads, also subsided noticeably, and the
authorities succeeded in locating and shutting down hundreds of illegal bush refineries.
However, all of these measures were temporary solutions and cemented the inevitability of
a significant security backlash as pressure mounted under the surface. Jonathan’s electoral
loss, combined with spiralling oil prices and the accompanying impact on multinationals’
operations and local workforces in the Delta was exacerbated by the destruction of the
illegal refineries and a nation-wide fuel shortage in the latter half of 2015 (which continues
at the time of writing). The weight of these combined factors lit the fuse for the eruption of
pirate activity in January 2016. Furthermore, the political establishment in the Niger Delta,
overwhelmingly belonging to Jonathan’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and sharing
his ethnic roots, have a vested interest in convincingly discrediting President Muhammadu
Buhari, a northerner of Fulani descent, before the next election by taking a backseat
approach to the problem.
Prepared by
Politics aside, the levels of sophistication and co-ordination of pirate gangs seem to have
evolved during the fallow season. Control Risks has identified the likely presence of a small
number of main pirate gangs, possibly only one, focused on kidnapping out of Bayelsa
State. The pirates are able to operate a significant distance from shore, with one kidnap
taking place 110 nautical miles (204km) off the coast, and have been reported to use
‘mother ships’ and large skiffs to conduct their operations. In at least one reported incident,
pirates boarded a larger vessel and immediately used it as a mother ship in a subsequent,
6
for
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Middle East 2
Asia 3
4
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
unsuccessful attempt to attack another. There is a sharpened focus on the kidnapping
of expatriate crew from commercial tankers, despite the higher freeboard and security
measures of these vessels. Once captured, victims are brought to shore to pirate camps
deep in the creeks and rivers, where they are held for an average of 13 days. In more recent
cases, however, durations of captivity have been longer, with some cases lasting for five
or six weeks, indicating a level of discipline and logistical sophistication likely developed
through repetition – another argument for the existence of only a few major pirate gangs.
Financially, ransom demands for captured crews average around USD 1m, though demands
as high as USD 5m have also been recorded. Control Risks has noted that settlement
payments, where reported, average around the USD 100,000 mark. Ransom settlement
averages recorded thus far in 2016 are higher than those in 2015, but roughly even to those
recorded in 2014.
Operators in the area continue to employ mitigation practices, including the use of Nigerian
navy armed guards, citadels and hardened access points, but these measures have proven
insufficient against determined pirate crews. The ongoing and contentious debate over
the presence of private armed guards on vessels operating in Nigerian waters continues,
withholding a mitigation measure that proved significant in slowing the rates of successful
pirate attacks in the western Indian Ocean.
It remains to be seen whether the rates of piracy will continue apace during the rest of 2016.
While it would require a lot of effort and co-ordination by pirate gangs to sustain the rate of
successful attacks so far offshore as seen this year, the incidents registered to date indicate
an offshore security environment consistent with the zenith of the Niger Delta militancy.
This suggests that, even if rates do slow slightly, 2016 is on course to be the busiest year
for pirates since the introduction of the militant amnesty programme. That programme,
justifiably accorded a large share of the credit for slowing the violence since 2009, is one
of the PDP’s legacies that Buhari promised during his campaign to reform and eventually
eliminate. He has already slashed the budget by two-thirds and removed thousands of
participants, while promising to end it definitively in 2018. Combined with the low oil price,
dire socio-economic and employment figures, and with Jonathan’s yoke of restraint cast off,
the region is unlikely to feel a reprieve from maritime piracy, oil theft and sabotage in the
coming year.
Prepared by
7
for
ABOUT US
TABLE OF CONTENTS
GLOBAL INSIGHT
Americas1
Africa2
Control Risks’ services are exclusively retained by Hiscox. In the event of a kidnap,
detention or extortion incident covered by Hiscox, clients will benefit from Control Risks’
services as part of their insurance policy.
Middle East 2
Asia 3
CONTROL RISKS
4
Control Risks is a leading international business risk consultancy. It offers a range of
integrated political risk, investigative, security and crisis management services to corporate,
government and private clients worldwide.
Common criminals
4
5
5
Outlook
5
FOCUS ON
ABOUT US
Control Risks
8
Hiscox8
Since its foundation in 1975, Control Risks has advised clients on the resolution of
2,891 kidnap and extortion cases in 135 different countries, with 48,464 person-days
aggregate duration. Cases have ranged from traditional kidnaps-for-ransom, express
kidnaps, hostage takings, ship and aircraft hijacks to political detentions, product extortion
and contamination and other threat extortions. Control Risks has a full-time team of
Response Consultants, available for immediate deployment in response to a crisis
anywhere in the world. Response Consultants will advise on negotiation strategies and
on how to manage the various interests of the victim, family, employers, the media, the
government and local law enforcement agencies.
The Response Division has its own dedicated team of research analysts. As well as
supporting consultants deployed on cases, they maintain the International Kidnap Online
Service (IKOS) which follows the trends in kidnapping worldwide and allows clients to
assess the risk to their business. In addition to IKOS, Response Research produces
commissioned kidnap and extortion analysis of any country or sector. If you are interested
in any of these services, please write to [email protected]
For more information about Control Risks, please visit our website at
www.controlrisks.com
HISCOX
Hiscox is the world’s largest provider of specialist kidnap, detention and extortion insurance,
with a market share of 60-70% by premium income. We cover companies and individuals
against all forms of extortion and can protect your assets from illegal demands and the
consequential associated expenses.
Our clients include multinational companies operating in high risk regions of the world, key
executives working in commercially sensitive positions and individuals whose wealth or
fame may attract the attention of criminals.
Hiscox kidnap and ransom underwriters are the most experienced in the field. Our knowledge
of the sector enables us to make quick decisions on cover, no matter how unusual the
request. We are highly skilled in handling what may be a very difficult and sensitive emergency.
Our specialist policies can be tailored to suit individual needs and circumstances.
We have underwriting teams based in Guernsey, Paris, Cologne, New York, Los Angeles,
Chicago, San Francisco and at Lloyd’s of London.
For further information, please contact us at
[email protected]
Prepared by
8
for

Monthly Kidnap Newsletter – May 2016

Transcription

Similar documents

Latin America Quarterly Newsletter – October

- Hiscox London Market

04-01-1971 - Flyer News

the greatest loss of all - Jackie Robinson Family YMCA

annotated index - National Immigrant Justice Center

Global Kidnap Report – April 2016

Global Kidnap for Ransom Update – April 2015

texaco petronius

Prison Gangs and Disruptive Groups

Gangs in San Jose Powerpoint

Northwest Indiana Gangs

Untitled - Coremar

Full text (Adobe PDF, 3.90 MB)