Reducing Traffic Congestion in Bogotá Through Bus Rapid Transit
Transcription
Reducing Traffic Congestion in Bogotá Through Bus Rapid Transit
TRANSPORT Reducing Traffic Congestion in Bogotá Through Bus Rapid Transit and Non-Motorized Transport STEERING CLEAR OF CONGESTION Rapid transit and routes for human-powered transportation are key to addressing traffic congestion in Bogotá, Colombia Bogotá’s bus rapid transit system and network of non-motorized transport infrastructure has become the exemplar for nations grappling with congested roadways, growing urban populations, and rising transport-related greenhouse gas emissions. Centered around the TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit, the city’s multimodal transit system and innovative policies have made inroads in reducing traffic congestion, accidents, crime, and air pollution. For example, before TransMilenio, commutes averaged 1.5 hours in each direction, with private vehicles accounting for less than one-fifth of trips yet occupying 95 percent of roads.1 Now, average commute times in Bogotá have been cut by 20 minutes, air quality has improved by 40 percent, and accidents have decreased by 79 percent. 2,3 While problems still exist, such as crime and traffic congestion, Bogotá remains a commonly cited success story of comprehensive transportation planning. In the early 1990’s, Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus initiated a Citizen Culture campaign with the intention of changing public behavior towards community and civility. Using unorthodox techniques such as mimes, Mockus was able alter how residents viewed the relationship between motor vehicles and pedestrians, thereby laying the foundation for investment in a pioneering public transport system. The subsequent administration, led by Mayor Enrique Peñalosa, responded to the transit crisis with a Mobility Strategy that prioritized public transit and non-motorized transport modes, reduced private vehicle use, and induced a behavioral shift towards the TransMilenio Station and Express Lanes use of alternative transport options. The national government has since built upon Bogotá’s success by expanding comprehensively planned transit systems to eight other cities. Colombia is also considering implementing a Sustainable Urban Development Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) to focus real estate development 2 around high-quality transit systems supported by pedestrian-accessible land use. The NAMA would create a framework to overcome financial and procedural barriers to transit-oriented development with pilot launches in two Colombian cities and national policy and capacity-building to expand sustainable urban development in cities across Colombia. HUMAN POWERED AND CAR-FREE Bogotá implemented four notable projects to promote non-motorized mobility. The city built a 344 km city-wide network of bicycle routes for daily commuting. On Sundays and holidays, the government also closes 121 km of roads to create temporary bike paths for recreational use from 7 am to 2 pm. A citizen ballot consultation on vehicle use lead to the establishment of an annual Car Free Day the first Thursday of every February, during which private vehicle use is prohibited across the city. Walking is an important mode of transportation for many—especially the urban poor —thus the city created a 17 km pedestrian corridor that connects low-income neighborhoods with commercial and business districts. To reduce the use of private vehicles, Bogotá created a roadway restriction based on license plate numbers. Vehicles with license plates ending in odd numbers are prohibited from using roadways on odd-numbered days, and those with plates ending in even numbers are prohibited from using roadways on even-numbered days. The restriction is in effect during morning and evening weekday commuting hours.4 The keystone of Bogotá’s Mobility Strategy is the TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit system. The TransMilenio operates 87 km of trunk corridors that receive passengers from an integrated feeder system. The system increased efficiency through preboarding automated fare collection, free transfers, raised platforms for quick boarding and exiting, high occupancy vehicles (160 to 260 passengers), segregated bus lanes, and express routes. A single fare cross-subsidizes the poor, who often live on the city periphery. All buses comply with Euro II emission standards and are equipped with GPS that allows a centralized management system to respond in real-time to contingencies and re-route buses to meet demand. Pedestrian and bike pathways are integrated into the system, with free bike parking available at many terminals. TransMilenio is a public-private partnership. The government entity TransMilenio S.A. is comprised of technical experts and was created specifically to plan, manage, and control the Bus Rapid Transit system. A consolidated management structure allows companies to compete through an open bidding process for concessions to supply and operate the bus fleet and the fare collection and validation system. Infrastructure costs are paid for by the city and national government, and operational costs are assumed by the private sector. The government retains control over the operation schedule, thereby shifting demand risk to the private sector. Phase I of the TransMilenio became operational in 2001. Phase II came on-line in 2006, and became the first transportation project to receive approval as a Clean Development Mechanism. To meet monitoring, reporting and verification requirements, a special unit under the supervision of TransMilenio S.A. collects, reports, and stores all data. Passenger surveys supply information on prior transport mode, fuel type, and fuel efficiency to determine emissions abatement through modal shifts. Ultimately, Bogotá expects to build a total of 388 km of corridors at a cost of USD 5 million per km.5 Phase I and II are complete and Phase III, which will extend the corridors an additional 36 km, is currently under construction. Phase I of the TransMilenio cost USD 240 million (USD 5.9 million per km) and was financed 3 through local fuel taxes (46 percent), national government grants (20 percent), a World Bank loan (6 percent) and other local funds (28 percent).6 Phase II cost USD 545 million (USD 13 million per km) and was financed through the national government (66 percent) and a local fuel surcharge (34 percent).7 Unlike many public transport systems, the TransMilenio does not receive any operational subsidies. Bogotá is also moving forward with its first metro rail system; funding has been approved by the World Bank and detailed engineering studies have begun. Finally, Bogotá implemented an education campaign to generate awareness and demand for the new system. Partially funded by a private bank, the city held community and business meetings, advertisements and events, and offered three weeks of free service on the TransMilenio. EASING THE COMMUTE, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASES The Mobility Strategy has successfully shifted residents to non-motorized and public transportation. At a cost of USD 147,000 per km, the bicycle routes are utilized by 200,000 to 285,000 people per day, quadrupling bike ridership since their inception.8,9 In addition, over one million riders are estimated to use the temporary bike paths each weekend.10 Car restrictions coupled with easy access to transport alternatives have caused 9 percent of car owners to shift to public transport. Before the TransMilenio, buses traveled at average speeds of 17 km per hour, with some corridors below five km per hour. Bogotá’s policies increased average bus speed to 26 km per hour, reducing the average commute time by 32 percent (20 minutes). Of Bogotá’s 8.5 million residents, the TransMilenio moves 47,000 passengers per hour per direction, or over 1.5 million riders each day.11,12 One of the most significant challenges in implementing the Bus Rapid Transit system was resistance from existing bus operators who feared loss of business and hesitated to use new processes such as awarding concessions through open bidding. They were also concerned about financial risks from investments in a new fleet and government capacity to build planned infrastructure and eliminate current operators. These challenges were overcome by prioritizing existing operators in the bidding process, establishing a fund to offset negative impacts to the operators, and including these companies in a dialogue with the city during the planning and implementation phases.13 Temporary Weekend Bike Paths 4 The TransMilenio’s impact on emissions has been significant: from 2001 to 2010, the Bus Rapid Transit system abated 1.9 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent, with an annual average of 144,000 tons under Phase I alone (2001-2005) and 236,000 tons under Phases I and II combined (2006-2010).14 This greenhouse gas estimate is likely conservative due to multiplier effects from transit-oriented development that enhance non-motorized transport and reduce trip lengths.15 Moving forward, Colombia is pursuing a national sustainable urban development policy and NAMA to further amplify these benefits. Figure 1: Benefits Achieved by Bogotá’s Mobility Strategy BENEFITS ACHIEVED BY BOGOTÁ’S MOBILITY STRATEGY • Commute times reduced by 32% • Bus driver work days shortened by 6 hours • Air quality improved by 40% • GHGs reduced by 2 million tonnes CO2-equivalent • Bus fuel use reduced by 59% • Collisions along trunk lines decreased by 79% • Fatalities along trunk lines decreased by 92% • Injuries along trunk lines decreased by 75% • Robberies at traffic stops decreased by 83% • Property values along trunk lines increased by 15-20% • Improved health outcomes from reduced pollution and exercise • Overall improved quality of life for residents Source: Adapted from the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. By 2009, Bogotá was able to decommission 7,000 small private buses from its roads, reducing the use of bus fuel by more than 59 percent.16 According to the United Nations Development Program, the system has reduced air pollutants by 40 percent; and decreased fatalities by 92 percent, injuries by 75 percent, and collisions by 79 percent along its trunk lines.17 Robberies at traffic stops have also been reduced by 83 percent.18 The Bus Rapid Transit system has successfully formalized a portion of the transport sector by awarding contracts for the operation of the TransMilenio fleet and related services to select, legal companies; and integrating bus operators and drivers from the informal sector into the new system. This has resulted in shorter work days for bus drivers, from 14 to 8 hours; the provision of social security benefits for employees; and securing tax contributions from bus operators.19 Other co-benefits include temporary jobs created by infrastructure development, a 15 to 20 percent increase in property values along the main trunk route, improved health outcomes from clean air and exercise, and overall improved quality of life. REFERENCES Hidalgo, Dario and Graftieaux, Pierre. “A Critical Look at Major Bus Improvements in Latin America and Asia: Case Study TransMilenio, Bogotá, Colombia.” World Bank. Web. August 2012. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTURBANTRANSPORT/Resources/Hidalgo-GraftieauxBOGOTA.pdf> Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). May 2007. “The CDM in the Transport Sector — Sustainable Transport: A Sourcebook for Policy-makers in Developing Cities.” Web. August 2012. <https://www.giz.de/ Themen/en/SID-9DEECDB1-4ECE4077/dokumente/en-cdmtransport-sector-2007.pdf> Center for Clean Air Policy. January 2012. “Case Study: Colombia’s Bus Rapid Transit Development and Expansion.” Web. August 2012. <http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/ 1080/Colombia-case%20study-final.pdf> Pico y Placa website. <http://www.movilidadbogota.gov.co/ ?sec=410> TransMilenio website. <http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/ WebSite/Default.aspx> 5 ENDNOTES 1 2 Martinez, Astrid. “Energy Efficiency in Massive Public Transport Systems — Transmilenio: A Study Case.” Presentation at the UN Forum on Energy Efficiency and Energy Security, December 18, 2007. Web. August 2012. <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/energy/op/forum_ dec07/presentations/S51_ortiz.pdf> Center for Clean Air Policy. January 2012. “Case Study: Colombia’s Bus Rapid Transit Development and Expansion.” Web. August 2012. <http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/ 1080/Colombia-case%20study-final.pdf> 3 United Nations Development Program. “Bogotá, Colombia Bus Rapid Transit Project —TransMilenio Case Study.” Web. August 2012. <http://www.ncppp.org/undp/bogota.html> 4 City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. Pico y Placa website. Web. July 25, 2012. <http://www.movilidadbogota.gov. co/?sec=410> 5 6 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. October 3, 2012. “Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document— Bogotá, Colombia: TransMilenio Phase II to IV v5.4.” Web. October 2012. <http://cdm.unfccc.int/ Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1159192623.07/view > U.S. Department of Transportation. 2006. “Applicability of Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT System to the United States.” Web. October 2012. <http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/ Bogota_Report_Final_Report_May_2006.pdf> 7 Ibid. 8 NYC Global Partners. May 4, 2011. “Best Practice: Largest Bicycle Path Network.” Web. September 2012. <http:// www.nyc.gov/html/unccp/gprb/downloads/pdf/Bogota_ CycleRoute.pdf> 9 City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. Web. July 30, 2012. <http://www.movilidadbogota.gov.co/?sec=71> 10 City Government of Bogotá. Web. July 26, 2012. <http:// www.bogota.gov.co/portel/libreria/php/frame_detalle_scv. php?h_id=24777> 750 First Street, NE, Suite 940 Washington, DC 20002 11 Penalosa, Enrique. “Equity and Mobility.” New Statesman. February 23, 2012. Web. August 2012. <http://www. newstatesman.com/transport/2012/02/mobility-cars-citybus-cities> 12 City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. Transmilenio website. Web. July 26, 2012. <http://www.transmilenio. gov.co/WebSite/Contenido.aspx?ID=TransmilenioSA_ TransmilenioEnCifras_EstadisticasGenerales> 13 Center for Clean Air Policy, 2012, op cit. 14 TransMilenio, S.A. February 2012. “Informe de Gestión 2011.” Web. August 2012. <http://www.transmilenio.gov.co/ AdmContenidoUpload/administrador.contenido/Documents/ Informe%20de%20Gesti%C3%B3n%202011.pdf> 15 Center for Clean Air Policy. January 14, 2010. “Transportation NAMAs: A Proposed Framework.” Web. August 2012. <http:// ccap.org/docs/resources/924/CCAP_Transport_NAMA.pdf> 16 Rosenthal, Elisabeth. “Buses May Aid Climate Battle in Poor Cities.” New York Times, July 9, 2009. Web. August 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/world/ americas/10degrees.html?_r=2> 17 United Nations Development Program, op cit. 18 Ibid. 19 The World Bank. 2010. “From Chaos to Order: Implementing High-Capacity Urban Transport Systems in Colombia.” Web. August 2012. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/ Resources/Colombia_mass_transit_4-23-10.pdf> Figure References Figure 1: Benefits Achieved by Bogotá’s Mobility Strategy Adapted from the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank, and the City Government of Bogotá, Colombia. p +1.202.408.9260 www.ccap.org CCAP CENTER FOR CLEAN AIR POLICY6