History - Marine Corps Cryptologic Association

Prologue
Marine Corps Cryptologic and Signal Intelligence
By Tom Hunnicutt
The history of Marine Corps signal intelligence began with the assignment of Marines to Naval
cryptologic activities in Asia in the late 1920s. In 1927, four enlisted Marine intercept operators, PFC
Otto Kugler, and Pvt’s William L. Kiser, Ogden E. Wilson, and Kermit W. Feist began their training in
Beijing, China. They were trained on a temporary basis, only one tour of duty in the field, and they
became known as the “Orange Men.” -1- (Newman Pages 1-2 and 7, NSG Interview). Four Marine Captains,
(Capt) Shelton C. Zern, Kenneth H. Cornell and Alva B. Lasswell were also assigned to the Naval
activities and trained as cryptanalysts and linguists, and by 1935 they began to function as Officers-inCharge (OIC) of Navy Radio Security Station “A.” Capt Lasswell was the first Marine officer to be
assigned at two of the early Navy intercept stations. His first assignment was with Navy Radio Security
Station “C,” Cavite, Philippines where he worked on Japanese diplomatic codes from August 31, 1938
to June 27, 1939. He was then assigned duty at the Navy Security Station “A,” in Shanghai, China,
which was located with the Fourth Marines Headquarters. Initially scheduled to leave Shanghai on July
13, 1940, he was held over until late July due to an international incident. His language expertise was
needed to insure the situation did not get out of control. -2- (Newman Page 3, NSG Interview) and (Lasswell
MR 3145-32B File).
In March 1936, the Navy asked the Marine Corps to establish a permanent group of intercept
operators, and the Marine Corps planned to establish 20 full time billets for that purpose.-3- (Naval A-9).
However, the goal was short lived as personnel shortages throughout the Corps made it impossible to
achieve at that time. -4- (Naval A-10). Between 1927 and 1937 the Marine intercept operators slowly grew
in numbers, but by August 1938, all the Marine intercept operators had been withdrawn for budgetary
reasons with no plans to establish any viable cryptologic effort. Four of the then active enlisted Marines
(SSgt Stephen Lesko, Cpl Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr., Cpl Cecil T. Carraway and PFC Clarence
Gentilecore) were called back into signal intelligence duty during World War II when the Marine Corps
1
organized the Radio Intelligence Platoons (RI Plt). -5- (MCCA 3084-1) and (Newman Pages 25-26,
NSG Interview).
Prior to 1935 Navy Chief Radiomen (CRM) served as the Assistant Officer-in-Charge (AOIC) of
Navy Radio Security Station “A,” and they ran the intercept operation. While the above mentioned
Marine officers took over the function of being the OIC in 1935 the Navy CRMs continued to supervise
intercept personnel. The officers worked on translations and other cryptanalytic duties. This was
confirmed by both retired LtCol Stephen Lesko in his Navy Security Group (NSG) interview in 1982
and Colonel (Col) Alva B. Lasswell in his National Security Agency (NSA) interview in 1986. -6(Newman – Page 23, NSG Interview) and (Lasswell Six – Page 27, NSA Interview).
Upon Capt Lasswell’s departure from Shanghai in 1940, Marine Corps involvement in
cryptologic efforts and signal intelligence ended. However, one officer, Capt Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.,
remained with Naval Intelligence in the Pacific, as linguist. In late 1941, he was transferred from
Shanghai to Pearl Harbor and in 1943 was assigned duty with Navy Radio Station “F” in Happy Valley,
China (Chungking). The station was also referred to as a Naval Advisory Group. Holcomb spoke both
Japanese and Chinese and was a cousin of the Marine Corps Commandant of the time, Major General
(MajGen) Thomas Holcomb, who also signed the orders for the Marine Radio Intercept Platoons to be
formed in 1942. During the Korean War, Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. was the G-2 of the 1st Marine
Division, and he retired a Brigadier General in 1952. -7- (Holcomb, Bankson T – One –
www.usmc.mil/genbios2ndf/biographies), (Frozen Chosin – usmc, www.usmc.mil/directive.nif) and (Mann
A-24-A-28).
In April 1941 Capt Lasswell was ordered to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (T.H.) as the director of a new
Japanese language course at the University of Hawaii, but upon his arrival he found himself being
drafted back into the Naval Intelligence world. Then Commander (CDR) Joseph J. Rochefort (USN)
had heard of Lasswell and his abilities with the Japanese military and diplomatic codes in the
Philippines and China. Rochefort made him his section chief, which proved to be one of the most
important assignments during the build up to World War II. Lasswell would remain there until
2
October 5, 1944 and then be assigned to Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in Washington, DC until the
end of the war. In 1942, Lasswell’s talent in code recoveries and translations of the Japanese traffic
proved to be invaluable to military commanders throughout the Asiatic Pacific Theater. His first major
translation concerned the Japanese Operation Order for the Battle of Midway, and it was his first major
contribution to the war. The impact of his effort was a turning point of the war in the Pacific and has
gone down in military history as one of the major events of the war. Lasswell was the only Marine
officer in this area of intelligence at the time, and other major events that came off his desk included:
(1) The Shoot Down of Japanese Admiral (Adm) Isoroku Yamamoto in 1943; (2) The Plot to
Ambush General (Gen) MacArthur in 1944; and, (3) Mouse Trapping intelligence that gave tactical
commanders the edge during the Island campaigns.
While the Battle of Midway caught the eye of military men and most civilians of that time,
Lasswell mentions in his memoirs and during the 1986 NSA interview he felt the shoot down of ADM
Yamamoto and the MacArthur affair seemed as important. -8- (Lasswell Three – Page 6, 14 and 15 Archives
University of Colorado, Boulder) and (Lasswell Six – Pages 12-27, NSA Interview).
As World War II evolved many changes occurred concerning funding and recruitment which led
to the development, organization, equipping and training of seven Radio Intelligence (RI) Platoons in
the summer of 1943 at Camp Elliott, California. The personnel had received basic cryptologic training
at Bainbridge Island, Washington. The platoons were designed to become an integral part of Division
and Corps Signal Companies, but there was no Marine Corps precedent for organization or equipment of
RI Platoons. The Platoon Commanders determined what equipment was needed for operations, likely
based in part at least on the experience of the four Marines, mentioned earlier, who had served as
enlisted men in the Navy stations in Shanghai and Beijing. They were then 1st Lieutenant (1st Lt)
Stephen Lesko, who served as the 1st RI Platoon Commander; 2nd Lieutenant (2ndLt) Joseph A.
Petrosky, Jr., who was the 3rd RI Platoon Commander; 2nd Lt Cecil T. Carraway, the 4th RI Platoon
Commander; and, Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt) Clarence F. Gentilecore, Platoon Sergeant of the 3rd RI
3
Platoon.
Six of the platoons were deployed to the Pacific Theater; the seventh was disbanded in April 19,
1944. Their mission was to be three-fold: (1) to intercept Japanese military and naval communications;
(2) to perform radio direction finding operations; and, (3) to monitor friendly communications to ensure
their security. The Department of the Navy authorized the formation of the platoons; however, it
stipulated that the platoons would be under the functional control of the Navy communications
intelligence organization and would, therefore, deal directly with the Navy field activities and support
those activities: (1) by forwarding information gathered by the platoons which could not be used by
Marine Corps intelligence activities; and, (2) with concurrence of the Marine field commands to which
the platoons were assigned, Navy activities could direct the platoons to perform a secondary mission of
furnishing special strategic intercept service. In return, the Navy activities would provide new operating
data and information to the platoons.
The 1st RI Platoon, commanded by 1stLt Lesko, and later the 2nd RI Platoon, commanded by
1stLt Marcus J. Couts, were deployed to serve with I Amphibious Corps (later III Amphibious Corps) in
the Solomons Islands.
Understandably, there was no inherent appreciation for the RI Platoon capabilities by the Corps
Headquarters, and therein may lay a reason for the deactivation of the platoons after World War II.
Since no appropriate tasking was assigned by the Marine tactical commanders, the RI Platoons
organized their own missions and conducted intercept operations against Japanese observation posts in
the New Ireland, New Britain, and Solomons Islands areas. The information was forwarded via the
Corps to Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific (FRUPAC) where it was praised for its value.
The 3rd RI Platoon, under 2nd Lt Petrosky, and later the 4th RI Platoon, under 1st Lt Carraway, the
5th, under 2nd Lt Walter C. Smith, and the 6th RI Platoon, under Capt John W. Webber were deployed to
Hawaii and were assigned to Navy sites at Wahiawa, Hawaii and on Guam and Kwajalein Atoll where
they provided valuable strategic intercept service to the Pacific Fleet and were able to receive further
4
training in cryptologic proficiency, which benefited them and the Marine combat forces.
All or parts of the platoons participated in most of the amphibious operations in the Central and
Western Pacific from 1944 to the end of the war. The 1st RI Platoon participated in the assaults on
Guam and Iwo Jima. The 2nd Platoon participated in the assault on Peleliu; however, it suffered 30%
casualties, including the deaths of Cpls Josephe A. Prete and Stephen J. Weber, and PFC William J.
Hughes, Jr., which resulted in its disbandment and redistribution of its remaining personnel among the
other RI platoons. The 3rd RI Platoon participated in the assault on Okinawa, and the 6th Platoon in the
assaults on Saipan and Tinian. The 4th and 5th RI Platoons did not participate in amphibious assaults but
provided valuable strategic intercept throughout the remainder of the war.
All of the RI Platoons prepared for the assaults on Japan but, after Japan surrendered,
the 1st and 5th Platoons were assigned to occupational duty in Japan and the 3rd and 4th Platoons were
assigned occupational duty in North China. Their primary purpose was to ensure compliance with the
conditions of the treaty. The 1st and 5th Platoons were deactivated in the fall of 1945 and the remainder
in February of 1946. -9- (McIntire – ii, 83, 90)
There can be no doubt about the importance of those who had trained in China because they
could copy the Japanese traffic, and the RI Plt Marines copied extremely valuable Japanese traffic
throughout 1944 and 1945. One example of this came to light when then Capt Lesko stopped in
Hawaii en route back to the United States. Navy officers pulled him into Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific
(FRUPAC) where he was asked to brief several other officers about the intercept. Until that time he
had no idea that their intercept work was useful or valid, but the particular intercept turned out to be of
Japanese coast watchers communicating with each other. -10- (McIntire – ii) and (Newman – Page 29, NSG
Interview).
The RI Platoons were deactivated after World War II, leaving the Marine Corps without an
identifiable signal intelligence capability, and while some efforts were made to correct the situation prior
to the Korean War, there were no Marine signal intelligence units involved in that war.
In the fall of 1949 the 1st Radio Intelligence Platoon was re-established and redesignated the 5th
5
Signal Company - (Supplementary), which was a reserve unit located at Headquarters in Washington, DC.
Its commanding officer was Major (Maj) Victor M. Johnson, who had succeeded 2nd Lt Petrosky as the
3rd RI Plt Commander during World War II. The 5th Signal Company was later to relocate to Quantico,
Virginia and then to Camp Pendleton, California. On February 17, 1951, the company was redesignated
1st Radio Company.-11- (Brown 2, Vol-2, 7) and (Force Troops – Page 133).
Most of the new personnel assigned to the company and its early successors came from the
communications occupational fields, and a number of them attended formal schools of the other services
to acquire the unique skills required for the organization’s mission. In July 1954, with Maj Judson
Vanderhoof, who succeeded Maj Johnson as its Commanding Officer, 1st Radio Company was relocated
to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina -12 (Force –133) and (Source 13). It was redesignated 2nd Radio
Company on September 15, 1958 with Maj Paul W. Barcus as its Commanding Officer and as 2nd
Composite Radio Company on July 22, 1959 with Maj Barcus continuing in command. On September
17, 1963, under the command of Maj James R. Quisenberry, who had succeeded Maj Barcus in
December, 1960, it was again redesignated 2nd Radio Company.
During the period of transition from 2nd Radio Company back to 2nd Radio Company, a separate
occupational series, MOS 257X for enlisted and 251X for officers, was established within the
Communications Field to more readily identify and control the assignment of Marines with signal
intelligence skills. On July 14, 1964, the 2nd Radio Company became the 2nd Radio Battalion, with Maj
James R. Quisenberry as Commanding Officer. -13- (Source 13)
In the early and mid-1950s, the Marine Corps began to train more Marines, officer and
enlisted, in the unique skills required by units such as 5th Signal Company (1st Radio Company). The
specialized training was accomplished at both established formal Army and Navy schools, and has since
been expanded to include the use of Air Force and, recently, Marine formal schools for officers as well
as Marine participation as instructors in “joint” schools sponsored by other services.
In 1956-1957 the Hogaboom Board conducted a comprehensive review of Marine Corps
6
organization and structure. As part of the review, a group was formed under the guidance of then
Colonel Raymond G. Davis, and discussions were held between the Marine Corps and the Navy
concerning the use of Marines in Naval Security Group (NSG) activities and the capability of orderly
withdrawal of certain numbers of Marines for duty with Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) under crisis
situations. The group was also charged with determining the number, strength, and equipment of signal
intelligence units to be established in support of FMF requirements.
A number of officers and enlisted who had served in 5 th Signal Company, or were serving in 1 st
Radio Company, and G Company, HqBn, participated in the deliberations which produced what would be
The basis for the companies, later battalions, supporting the FMF, and agreement was reached as to the
execution of crisis deployment from NSG activities to the Marine signal intelligence units when required.
The result of the Davis group’s recommendations and the deployment capability of Marines
serving in the naval sites being available when required is reflected in activation, phased formation and
redesignation of all of the Marine signal intelligence units, not to mention gain in strength which still
continues because of the proven value of these resources to Marine combat forces -14- (Source 13).
On September 15, 1958 the 2nd RI Plt was reactivated and redesignated 1st Radio Company at
Camp Smith, Hawaii. Under the command of Capt. Richard James Smith(?), it relocated to Marine Corps
Air Station (MCAS) Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii on June 1, 1959 and was redesignated 1st Composite Radio
Company on July 22, 1959 with Capt Henry A. F. von der Heyde, Jr. as Commanding Officer. It was
again redesignated 1st Radio Company on September 17, 1963 with Maj. Richard J. Smith as the
Commanding Officer. It was further redesignated 1st Radio Battalion on July 14, 1964 with Maj.
Patrick J. Fennell as Battalion Commander.
Another cryptologic unit was formed in the summer of 1954 at Headquarters Battalion (HqBn),
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). It was designated Company G, HqBn, HQMC, and located
at U.S. Naval Security Station, Washington, DC on April 1, 1958 with Maj Victor M. Johnson as
Commanding Officer. Maj Johnson remained its Commanding Officer until September 30,
7
1961. On October 1, 1961 the Company was redesignated Marine Support Battalion (MSB) and
LtCol John F. La Spada became the Commanding Officer -15- (MO 3513 Source 132)
On May 15, 1956 the 1st and 2nd Special Communication Platoons (SCP), HqBn, (HQMC),
were formed in San Diego, California. The 1st SCP was ordered to the Naval Communication Facility,
Yokosuka, Japan on May 16, 1956 and then relocated to Kamiseya, Japan. Its Platoon Commander was
Capt Alfred M. Gray, Jr. who later became the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps. This platoon was
redesignated Sub-Unit 5 in April 1958 and as Company E, MSB on October 1, 1961. The 2nd SCP
was ordered to Bremerhaven, Germany on May 16, 1956 and redesignated Sub-Unit 2 in April 1958.
Its Platoon Commander was Capt William H. Allen, and his unit was redesignated Company B, MSB
on October 1, 1961. -16- (MCCHR 3263-3) and (MCCHR 3529-4).
As indicated earlier, the relationship with the Navy grew and more Marines worked at NSG
activities around the world. In addition, Marines of 2nd Radio Company augmented NSG efforts at
Guantanamo, Cuba beginning in 1958/1959, and one or more detachments were deployed with Marine
ground forces during a crisis in Lebanon in 1958 as well.
Beginning almost immediately after the redesignation of 2nd Radio Company and activation of
1st Radio Company in Hawaii, the strong relationship with NSG and the support of Army and Air Force
units with similar missions provided for special operator training (SOT) and advanced active training
with other services in forward areas, called forward area training (FAT), which helped to maintain and
hone the skills of the Marines of the Radio Companies. Detachments were sent to various sites around
the world to complete these training operations, and personnel were rotated to maintain the edge gained
through these deployments. In addition, in 1961, 2nd Composite Radio Company tested the feasibility of
using an LST as a platform to begin its support of Marine forces while at sea and continuing the support
while Echeloning ashore with successful results.
During the early 1960s, Special Security Communications Teams (SSCT) were activated and
assigned to each of the active Divisions and Wings. These teams provided links from the producers of
8
special intelligence information to the intelligence staff of the supported headquarters -17- (Source 13)
In October 1962, 2nd Composite Radio Company was augmented, per arrangements addressed
earlier between the Navy and Marine Corps, by Marines from Naval Security activities, and deployed
detachments in support of Marine ground forces embarked from both the east and west coast which were
bound for a potential engagement with Cuban and other (Russian) forces on the island of Cuba. A
detachment was also deployed by air to Guantanamo in support of naval operations and the base at that
location. -18- (Source 13).
On January 8, 1962 Captain John K. Hyatt, Jr. took Sub-Unit 1, 1st Composite Radio Company
to South Vietnam. Initially assigned to work with a joint command in the Central Highlands, Sub-Unit 1
moved from Pleiku in 1963 to Phu Bai, then to the Da Nang area (Hill 327) in 1965. It eventually
moved to Camp Horn and was collocated with III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) headquarters.
Sub-Unit 1 established platoons with Marine ground forces throughout the III MAF (I Corps) area.
Its actions were sufficiently noteworthy to draw national attention and to be awarded the Travis Trophy
for its efforts during the period in which Capt Russ W. Rader was OIC. LtCol Alfred M. Gray, Jr., who
succeeded Capt Rader and whose tour ended due to a family emergency in late 1967, received the award
on behalf of the Sub-Unit. LtCol James R. Quisenberry succeeded LtCol Gray as the new OIC. -19(MCCHR MO 3086), (MCCHR 3209) and (Source 13, 15)
In 1968 Sub-Unit 1 was augmented with personnel and equipment from 1st Radio Battalion
Headquarters and expanded its support to the Marine forces. In addition, Marine Support Battalion and
Naval Security personnel were assigned Temporary Additional Duties (TAD) to Sub-Unit 1 from 1965
and unit the 1970 period (Sources 32 and 106). On October 4,1968 LtCol Patrick J. Fennell became the last
OIC of Sub-Unit 1, and on March 1, 1969 LtCol Delos M. Hopkins brought the 1st Radio Battalion flag
to South Vietnam. Sub-Unit 1 had remained in South Vietnam for more than 9 years. Maj Donald J.
Hatch, who had earlier served in South Vietnam as Commanding Officer ofCompany L, MSB and who
had previously served in 2nd Radio Company and later would become its Commanding Officer, was the
1st Radio Battalion Executive Officer and succeeded LtCol Hopkins as CO for two months (May and
9
June, 1970) before being succeeded by LtCol Edward D. Resnik. LtCol Resnik, whose detachment of
2nd Composite Radio Company, in 1960, when he was a Captain, had reported evidence of radar
operations in Cuba, brought the 1st Radio Battalion flag back to MCAS Kaneohe, Hawaii on April 28,
1971.
On April 17, 1972, Capt William P. Bau, the OIC of Detachment “N”, 1st Radio Battalion took
this element back to South Vietnam for eight months. Its Headquarters was assigned abroad the USS
Blue Ridge (LCC 19) with the Brigadier General (BrigGen) Edward J. Miller, 9th Marine Amphibious
Brigade (9th MAB), with other elements were detached to various ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
-20- (MCCHR MO-3221-02), (MCCHR MC-3533),(Source 13) and (MCCHR MO 3196 Source 59).
When the 1st Radio Battalion headquarters relocated on March 1, 1969 to South Vietnam,
Sub-Unit 2 was activated at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. The OIC was Maj Leo K. Russell, who had
been wounded in action on September 15, 1967 near Hill 55 while serving with 3rd Battalion,
11th Marines, 1st Marine Division. Sub-Unit 2 was deactivated when 1st Radio Battalion returned to
Hawaii. -21- (MCCHR MO 3260-01 Source 56) and (MCCHR MO 3194-1E Source 59).
On July 30, 1971 LtCol John K. Hyatt, Jr. assumed command of 1st Radio Battalion. He was
succeeded by LtCol Carl W. Kachauskas on September 18, 1974 and he, in turn was succeeded by LtCol
Thomas J. Smyth in September 1977. -22- (3260-01 Source 56) and (Sources 02 & 72)
While this document does not address all the companies of what is now the Marine Cryptologic
Support Battalion, it is deemed appropriate to identify those who gave their lives while serving in that
organization as well as units of the Radio Battalions and their predecessors. In addition to the three men
who lost their lives as a result of the action at Peleliu, in 1964 LCpl Richard E. McKown and Sgt Paul C.
Rodrigues died in a fire in the operations area of the Company E, MSB site. During the attack in
international waters by the Israelis on the USS Liberty in 1967, Sgt Jack L. Raper and Cpl Edward E.
Rehmeyer, members of 2nd Radio Battalion who were serving on the ship, were killed and SSgt Bryce
F. Lockwood, who was from Company F, MSB and on temporary assignment to VQ-1 and was
wounded and later awarded the Silver Star for his heroic actions during the attack. -23- (Assault on the
10
Liberty, 176, AppO) and (Bryce Lockwood)
The following members of Sub-Unit 1 and 1st Radio Battalion lost their lives in Vietnam: Cpl
Stephen L. Traugber, September 10, 1967; LCpl Larry A. Jones, April 4, 1968; Sgt Paul J. Kingery,
May 13, 1968; MGySgt Edward R. Storm, December 29, 1969; Sgt Larry W. Duke, March 10, 1970;
and, Sgt Robert Hrisoulis, January 21, 1971. SSgt Hugh M. Lynch, member of Company E, MSB,
was killed in the shoot-down of an EC-121 (VQ-1) reconnaissance flight on April 15, 1969 over North
Korea. -24- (MCCHR MP 3073-3 Source 59), (MCCHR 3464, 3465-1, 2, and 3 Source 31), (MCCHR 3474-1
Source 95),and (MCCHR 3475-1 Source 59).
In late 1972, a team was formed to study the current MOS structure to further identify the
specific functions to be performed by signal intelligence Marines. Base on the study which was
completed in November, 1973, a new 2600 occupational field was established in 1974. In 1975, the first
female Marine officer, Capt Sally Stansbury, was assigned to 1st Radio Battalion, then commanded by
LtCol Carl W. Kachauskas. Additional female Marines were assigned to Companies of Marine Support
within months thereafter. -25- (Source 13) and (Source 33).
Details of Marine signal intelligence for the last 30 years, except the redesignation of the Marine
Support Battalion to Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion, are not addressed here; however, as strong
evidence of the value of signal intelligence to the Marine Corps, a new battalion was activated on
August 1, 2003, when 1st Radio Battalion was divided, moving its headquarters to Camp Pendleton,
California while leaving a cadre to form the 3rd Radio Battalion which was activated at MCAS,
Kaneohe, Hawaii, under the command of LtCol Mark T. Aycock -26- (MCCHR MP 3419 Source 109).
As this brief summary indicates, the same names appear more than once in Marine signal
intelligence history. Unfortunately, neither the extent of the repetition nor the invaluable impact of
those who are named is obvious. But for the window opened above by mentioning the deaths of signal
intelligence personnel, this summary has not attempted to address the contributions of the various
companies of what is now Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion or the key efforts played by staff
11
members from HQMC to the Divisions and Wings who contributed to the awareness of the potential of
Marine signal intelligence skills and the need for the product of those skills at all levels of Marine
combat forces. These Marines, officer and enlisted, are legion among those who serve in the field, and
this summary closes by citing their role in Marine signal intelligence success to date.
12
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY
By Tom Hunnicutt
EARLY NAVAL – MARINE CORPS CRYPTOLOGY
A Proud Naval Linkage
As with most great discoveries, inventions or endeavors there are also key people who stand out. Yet,
seldom do they stand alone for others who came before them lead them into a particular point of discovery.
Albert Einstein, for example, could not have arrived at his theories without the special form of geometry,
introduced over a half-century earlier by mathematician, George Riemann (Clark 202 - 203). Like Einstein, we
all play a part to some degree in the ongoing adventures and achievements of mankind and this is true of our
cryptologic family as well. Also, like all great discoveries key people involved become the primary
representatives that led to the changing or focal points and so it is in the cryptologic field. As new doors to
enlightenment open we are drawn to it like gravity pulling us down and it is a powerful attraction, which then
leads us to new doors and new challenges. However, as you move through this story you will discover
change does not come easy nor without pain for like all great endeavors such as birth...only after much time
does the final result appear. Then at this stage of discovery we find the process has not been completed for
the end results are like Einstein’s theories and equations...they are someone else’s point of beginning.
Since mankind started his journey through time and space great advances came into being based on
war. Yet, it is shame that we need war to bring the best out in us. However, it is during war that great
discoveries are made and new ideas are born and those deductions drive us to accomplish even greater
discoveries. They had their conception long before its birth and sometimes many of them are lost or simply
just die away. Without war or building toward a possible war, we seem to move at a slow discovery rate.
Many ideas that come into being prior to war or during war are placed on the back burner for a number of
reasons. They might resurface long after the idea was put away for the geometry conceived by Riemann had
little application until Einstein needed it. This is also true about our Marine Corps Cryptologic program for
we bounced off our naval counterparts that started moving into the area of intelligence many years earlier and
continued to focus on molding it into a professional group.
13
Without question, it is truly a unique military achievement of the 20th Century. And while the early concepts
did not allow for rapid tactical application that Marine Corps field commanders could use during those early
days the groundwork had been laid for others to tap into and these new concepts would emerge over the years.
In other words, the seeds had been planted.
The Birth of Naval Cryptology
The actual birth of the Naval Security Group (NSG) is somewhat of a puzzle in that several individuals
become part of its evolution. We will look at some of them, but by no means can it be said that only they
contributed to its birth and growth. However, those individuals mentioned in this book are considered to be
the primary sources that secured its existence. Without them, there is no doubt, the results and successes
would have been poor at best and it would most likely been the end of the early Navy Cryptologic
efforts…which means the Marine Corps would have had no involvement in this field either. However, if I had
to pick one individual who could be considered first…I would have to say it was Vice Admiral (VADM)
Russell Willson for as a young naval officer (Lieutenant) he sets the standards and stage for all future
endeavors early on (Schmidt 7 & 10) and (NCVA 152).
While some efforts had begun as early as 1914 to establish a pliable Naval Cryptologic unit, it was not
until Germany announced they planed unrestricted submarine warfare against all of Great Britain’s shipping in
January 1917. President Woodrow Wilson, who had been neutral concerning the war in Europe changed his
position concerning this issue and America entered the war (Long 14). With this entry the U.S. Navy became
much more serious about developing its cryptologic program. At this time the Navy Cryptologic Code and
Signal Section started to compile, produce, distribute, and account for all codes and ciphers in the Navy. Also,
during this time it is believed some limited intercept of enemy communications was attempted, but there is no
information currently available to either support or dismiss the belief (Schmidt 10).
In July 1922, a very important thing happened that would affect the direction of all future Navy and
Marine Corps endeavors concerning electronic intelligence. The Navy created the Navy Cryptologic Element
under the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) and it was designated OP-20-G, which was designed to serve
as a meaningful link between Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence Departments (Brown Vol-3-3, 8) and
(Schmidt 10). This vital link led to greater teamwork and technologic growth that is still ongoing today.
Therefore, from this earliest period of Naval Communication Intelligence (SIGINT) history, changes have
been unending as both the Navy and Marine Corps continues to search for new methods and technologies to
meet the new-sprung challenges as they become evident.
The Naval Communications and Naval Intelligence Departments, which were sparked by the earlier
successes with naval linguists working on the Japanese Naval Code, continued to move forward in creating a
highly efficient intelligence organization . In addition, communications security concerns were also recognized
14
as being a vital part in future naval warfare. This was especially true as those leaders also understood the need
for faster and more secure machine systems, and thus, communication means and methods were rapidly
changing (Brown Vol-3-3, 8), (Harper 349-350), (Naval A-2 - A-4, A-6 – A-8) and (Schmidt 10).
MARINE CORPS CRYPTOLOGIC HERITAGE
No one knows who the first Cryptologic minded souls were, but we can look back in time and see it
goes back at least to 1508. It appears Johannes Trithemius was involved in it and wrote six books on
cryptology. Two years after his death the books were published as “Polygraphia”, which tells us it was in fact
visualized by him (Quisenberry RL Vol-8 – 2, 10). The art of cryptography was used for many years, but after the
turn of the century a new era found radio waves carrying these encrypted messages. This new method of
transmitting messages was termed initially as “radio intelligence” and used by both the Army and Navy. In
1916, General Pershing took the first mobile intercept vans into northern Mexico. They were called “radio
tractors” (www.nsa.gov) & (NCVA 38-39). The early beginnings of Navy SIGINT can also be examined for some
records were made and many outstanding leaders of those days recorded their stories for future generations.
For example in the mid-1940s Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) Malcolm W. Lyon (USN) wrote several
history accounts of his time with the Navy Code and Cipher Desk and his involvement from 1924 – 1945.
While the “On The Roof Gang” (OTRG) did mention Marines in some of their writings in the 1970s there
were no actual Marine accounts or reports until Mr. I. G. Newman interviewed Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol)
Stephen Lesko in 1982.
Major Herbert Osborne Yardley (USA)
While there is no direct connection between Herbert Osborne Yardley and subsequent Navy or Marine
Corps cryptologic operations Yardley is included in the volume because he is the first notable cryptologist in
American history and his work in this field certainly must have influenced the Navy by demonstrating the
intelligence value derived from reading decrypted communications generated by foreign entities.
Herbert Osborne Yardley was born in Worthington, Indiana in April 1889. The son of a railroad
telegraph operator, he learned to send and receive the manual Morse code by the time he completed high
school in 1907. After high school, he worked as a telegrapher for the railroad for about five years. By this
time, Yardley became very adept as a poker player; a skill he used throughout his life to augment his regular
salary. In 1912, he passed the government’s civil service examination and went to work as a telegraph
operator/code clerk for the State Department.
In June 1917, with the entry of the United. States (U. S.) into World War I (WW-I), Yardley accepted a
reserve commission as a Second Lieutenant (2nd Lt) in the Army Signal Corps where he became a Cryptologic
officer in France until leaving the Army, as a Major, in 1919. Also, his previous experience with the breaking
15
of U. S. government codes caused him to turn his attention to codes employed by other countries. With his
charismatic nature and strong belief that encoded messages generated by foreign nations could be intercepted
and exploited for intelligence purposes, Yardley was instrumental in convincing his superiors in the State and
War Departments of the need to establish an organization to accomplish this mission. This resulted in the
creation of the Cipher Bureau, Military Intelligence 8 (MI-8) in May 1919 with Yardley being placed in
charge. His civilian bureau became known as the “The American Black Chamber,” which was officially called
the “Cipher Bureau” and it immediately became the target of politicians during the 1920s.
Yardley’s bureau started out with a few people, but shortly it grew to 150 working analyst in this new
field of code breaking. He was given a budget of $100,000 a year and things looked good for this new
endeavor, but as early as 1921 that budget and his organization ran into opposition coming from the military
services, which were now competing for funding for their own cryptanalytic efforts. As a result, his budget
had been reduced to $25,000 a year, by 1921.
During the twelve years it existed this bureau had broken the codes of some 20 nations and solved
more than 45,000 cryptograms. Yet, even success does not guarantee he would not have enemies or
competing authorities, as mentioned above, to attack him for at that time there was no organized control to
govern them. In 1929, Yardley found he had more problems for the new Secretary of State (Henry L.
Stimson) was also against such efforts and Yardley soon found his personnel reduced to a hand full. When
President Herbert Hoover took office in 1929 he appointed Stimson, a lawyer and Yale man, to his post
based on his past credentials and positions, which were Secretary of War under President Taft in 1911-1913
and former governor of the Philippines. His political views were based on a misplaced belief nations should
not spy on each other. For example, his comments from an interview with McGeorge Bundy stated:
“Stimson said that because of the special relationship between diplomats and the countries to which they were
accredited, it was ‘highly unethical’ for the State Department as a host to read the messages of its guests. He had
adopted as his guide in foreign policy a principle he always tried to follow in personal relations – The principle that the
way to make men trustworthy is to trust them. According to his biography, it was in this spirit that he decided to close
the Black Chamber.”
Yardley did not have the military support or other support needed to endure and survive as a major
component of the cryptologic family during this period of history. Yet, all was not completely wasted, as
much of his work moved into the U.S. Army in May 1929. In addition, the various intelligence branches
had a better understanding of what to disclose and what to keep secret and how they should request funds
for their ongoing endeavors, which will come into more light under the Budget Warriors section of this book.
This is also important to the Navy Cryptologic commanders because many of their earlier
16
operations were aimed at the Japanese diplomatic codes, which be became known as the “Orange Targets”
and the operators coping those message became known as “Orange Men”. Our early Marine intercept
operators were in fact known as “Orange Men”.
Later in Yardley’s life, he wrote a book that became famous in those days. It was titled, “The
American Black Chamber” and it dealt with things even the military establishments wished remained a secret.
Apparently, he wrote this book for two reasons. First, he was unemployed and this allowed for some
financial relief. Second, because he was angry with the political leadership in Washington, DC at that time.
Unlike the active duty military men engaged in the same activity as Yardley he had no support base
concerning his future. He relied on the government to be there for him, which was not the case. Military
officers could be reassigned to other duties and their careers had the support of fellow officers who believed
in what they were doing. Also, they could hide some information under the umbrella of “need-to-know” for
national security. It appears that Yardley made enemies in and out of uniform and therefore no one cared
about his departure or personal problems. One reason I suggest this fact is based on how the Navy groomed a
relationship with the U.S. Army between 1925 and 1931. The Army had earlier refused any assistance to the
Navy or even to admit that Yardley’s Black Chamber ever existed. The Navy leadership decided on a spirit
of cooperation between the two services rather than fan the flames of division. They had information they
knew the Army needed, which was Japanese Diplomatic keys that they had recovered after Yardley’s unit had
been shut down. It is in this period the Navy and Army began to assist each other from time to time rather
than seeing themselves as enemies out to destroy each other. This also shows us the military, unlike
Yardley’s group, did not fall victims to Stimson (NCVA 18, 25, 232-243) & (www.nsa.gov).
There was other fallout concerning Yardley’s book. First, it was a big embarrassment to the U. S.
government and it led to a significant breakdown in relationship between Japanese and the United States. The
Japanese immediately changed their encryption systems, which gave the Navy cryptologists some difficulties.
Also, at the time the U.S. espionage laws changed in order to prevent others from following Yardley’s
example. New laws imposed stiff penalties for anyone revealing secrets derived from cryptology efforts
(NCVA 18, 25, 232-243).
Yardley later worked as a cryptanalyst for Chiang Kai-shek in China and for the Canadian
government. From 1941 – 1958 he held minor positions in the U.S. government; none of which were
Cryptologic Intelligence related. Suffering a massive stroke in 1958, Yardley passed away on 7 August at the
age of 69. He was buried with full military honors at Arlington National Cemetery. In recognition of his
work leading to the development of the U.S. SIGINT efforts, he was inducted into the National Security
Agency’s (NSA) National Cryptologic Museum Hall of Fame in 1999 (NCVA 18, 25, 232-243).and (www.nsa.gov).
17
Captain Stanford C. Hooper (USN)
Navy Lieutenant (LT) Standford C. Hooper, who was serving aboard the Atlantic Flagship USS
WYOMING (BB-32) during a fleet exercise in 1913, demonstrated the advantages of using wireless
communications. He was able to predict the time of attack some four hours before it began and he did this by
monitoring other ship’s radio strengths, tones and operator characteristics (Brown Vol-3-3, 8). You might say he
performed the first Communication Security (COMSEC) operations, but none-the-less, he impressed the
leadership of that day. This might also account for him later becoming the Director of Naval
Communications (DNC - OP-20) and this meant the Navy had someone in a key position that supported a
firm cryptologic effort and within a few years the Navy started building a unique group of cryptologist, which
later becomes the Naval Security Group (NSG).
2
1
Naval Source Online Archive 1910-1919
Naval Source Online Archive 1910-1919
Photograph by Unknown
USNHC # NH 53320 1913
Photograph by
John D. Fielden, MM2, Northridge, California
Circa 1913-1915
USS Wyoming (BB-32)
Starboard side, shortly after commissioning.
USS Wyoming (BB-32)
1. LT Gardner L. Caskey, USN; 2. LTCDR Walton R.
Sexton, USN; 3. LTCDR Frank R. McCrary, USN; 4. LT
Standford C. Hooper, USN; 5. Major Albertus W. Catlin,
USMC; and 6. CDR Carl T. Vogelgesang, USN.
Vice Admiral Russell Willson (USN)
In 1916, as a young Navy officer, Lieutenant (LT) Russell Willson created the first Navy cipher device
used during the late years of WW-I (NCVA 153-159). It was called the Navy Code Box (N.C.B.) and in short
order it was ready to be used by the fleet. He was promoted to Lieutenant Commander (LtCom), but
remained involved in this new field, as he continued to put forth new and creative concepts. First, he
modified the N.C.B. (now called the “Navy Cipher Box”) and in 1918 he produced a (two-part) codebook,
thereby creating a much better and secure encryption device. At the end of WW-I he was promoted to
Commander (CDR) and awarded the Navy Cross for his efforts (NCVA x & 152) and (Schmidt 10-11). In 1923,
hewas brought back to Washington, D. C. to serve on the panel that was evaluating the Hebern Electric
18
3
4
Photograph Courtesy of Eunice W. Rice
And the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association
Photograph Courtesy of Eunice W. Rice
And the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association
Lieutenant Russell Willson
United State Navy
Captain Laurance F. Safford
United State Navy
Cipher Machine for a more modern Navy. However, the N.C.B. was the first mechanical encryption device
adopted by the United States Navy. In 1935, the Congress of the United States honored Captain (CAPT)
Russell Willson for his contribution. We Marines owe him acknowledgment too for his N.C.B. was the
forerunner for our own “Off-Line Cryptographers Machines” (Harper 349-350) and (Schmidt 10-12).
Captain Laurance Fry Safford (USN)
The next individual to come into focus was also a Navy officer, LT Laurance Fry Safford, who, in
1924, became the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Cryptologic Research Desk in the Code and Cipher Section.
Under his leadership, this section grew from a small unit of one officer, four civilians, and two Navy
radiomen into a viable organization. As events unfolded in the Pacific area the stage was already set and his
insight gave the naval commanders reasons to follow his lead. Shortly after WW-I the Navy had realized that
warfare at sea was rapidly changing and new concepts were needed in order to assure military victory in
future wars. In 1958, the Congress of the United States honored him by awarding him $100,000 for his
wartime inventions and without question he is remembered as one of the pioneers that guided the naval
cryptologic endeavors (NCVA viii & x, 15-17 & 201). In 1999, he was honored by NSA for his many
contributions from1924 to the beginning of World War – II (WW-II) and he was inducted into NSA’s Hall of
Honor in 1999 (www.nsa.gov).
19
5
Department of the Navy – Naval Historical Center
Online Library of Images – Pictures
(Photo Number: NH 57302)
Sends greetings to President Woodrow Wilson, who is on board the USS
George Washington at Sea in December 1918. (PHOTO ID # 3018)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Mr. Haradon Pratt (expert radio aid)
Commander Stanford C. Hooper, USN
Lieutenant Arnold H. Vanderhoof, USN
Rear Admiral Robert S. Griffin (Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
Commander Percy W. Foote (USN Aid to Secretary Daniels)
MCCHR MP File MP 3550 - 01
20
Captain Joseph John Rochefort (USN)
Captain (CAPT) Joseph John Rochefort enlisted in the Navy in 1918 and was commissioned upon
graduating from Stevens Institute of Technology. His early training in cryptology came under the tutorship of
CAPT Laurance F. Safford in 1925. From 1926 to 1929 he became the second chief of the newly formed
cryptanalytic organization, OP-20-G, in Department of Naval Communications. While Rochefort served for
fourteen years at sea and U. S. Fleet positions his nine years in cryptologic and intelligence-related
assignments did not go unnoticed. He was trained as a Japanese linguist in 1929, which kept him interested in
the mission of the Navy cryptologic endeavors. In early 1941, he was ordered to Hawaii to become the
Officer in Charge (OIC) of Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPAC) in Pearl Harbor. During this tour of duty he
is credited with hand picking the best cryptanalysts, traffic analysts, and linguists of that period to work in
what was to become known as the Dungeon. One off these individuals was Marine Corps Colonel (Col) Alva
B. “Red” Lasswell, who was the last officer to head the Navy Radio Security Station “A” in Shanghai, China
in 1939-40. Rochefort’s last duty was in 1942-46, where he headed the Pacific Strategic Intelligence Group
in Washington. He died in 1976 and for his support to the Battle of Midway he was posthumously awarded
the President’s Nation Defense Service Medal in 1986, the highest military award during peacetime. In
2000, the NSA honored him by inducting him into the NSA Hall of Honor (www.nsa.gov) and (NCVA 156 -168).
7
6
U.S. Navy Photographs
U.S. Navy Historical Society
(MCCA Historic Files MP 3548)
Captain Joseph John Rochefort, USN
21
MCCHR File MP 3548
The Downfall of Rochefort
In a November 16, 1942 letter to CAPT Wilfred Jay “Jasper” Holmes (USN), CDR Rochefort
describes the political problems he is having because of military envy and resentment. When Rochefort got
wind of the transfer he questioned the Director Naval Communications, Carl Holden, but was told by him that
he had ordered all messages concerning his transfer be burned and issued an order that no more messages be
sent. Rochefort mentions that Holden seemed disinclined to become involved in it. Therefore, he went to the
Communication Intelligence Chief, George Dryer, who informed him they had been informed by Chief
Yeoman Richman that he had been squabbling with CDR Layton, as if that was the problem. Rochefort was
very upset by this time and wanted to know why they had taking the word of an enlisted man concerning
problems between officers? Rochefort then mentioned, Dyer, made no reply, other than to mention the
Intelligence Center was being bypassed by unknown parties and he (Rochefort) was suspected of causing this
problem. He was then blamed for not keeping proper authority informed of intelligence matters. He was
further informed that he had been openly hostile to CincPac staff on matters concerning the proper chain of
command.
Rockefort wrote, “In short the story was too flimsy to even merit discussion and boiled down to either
Holden and Dryer being stupid, which they are not or else of being a party to a deal of putting their friends in
charge of Radio Intelligence organization regardless of experience and ability.”
“I intend to write to Admiral Bagley, as soon as I can, but will appreciate it if you will communicate
the contents of this to him. I am most anxious that he not think I arranged this transfer myself, as I value his
good opinion of me highly.”
“I wangled out of the OPNAV assignment and will go to Communications Western Sea Frontier for
temporary duty in connection with setting up certain organizations. After a month or so of that I have the
promise of a command at sea so you may see me shortly.”
“My best regards to all and my sincere regrets on leaving under such circumstances. I am very
grateful to you and the entire crew for your unselfish and tireless work which resulted in the best damm (sic)
Intelligence organization the U.S. Navy or any other Navy has ever seen. I hope you will all be as loyal to
Goggins, as to you have been to me.”
Prior to December 7, 1941, FRUPac under Rochefort’s control was not allowed to work on many of
the Japanese military codes. After the attack, they were allowed to analyze and translate all such traffic. In
early 1942, Rochefort’s senior cryptanalyst and translator, Maj Alva B. Lasswell, decoded and translated a
message that would change the course of the war and save thousands of American lives. Shortly after this
began…problems between Washington, DC (NEGAT) and FRUPAC developed. Later, Lasswell and others
also pay a price for doing an extremely outstanding job (Boulder Archives – 23-24) and (Smith 182-183).
22
A second letter is found that gives additional light to the downfall of Rochefort. It was written on July
12, 1979 by CAPT W. “Jasper” Holmes and sent to CAPT Roger Pineau. However, it starts out with, “Dear
Eddie,”, but it is not believed to be CAPT Eddie Layton for he is mentioned in the letter.
CAPT Wilfred Jay “Jasper” Holmes’ Letter
Dear Eddie,
I knew that Admiral Nimitz appreciated Rochefort’s work because he approved of the
recommendation for a DSM that we induced Bagly (sic) to origination, but I honestly did not know that he
had batched King about the transfers until recently. Your letter has brought me new information on this
subject.
I still have Rochefort’s letter, written to me from Pasadena on 16 November 1942, in which he
informed me of his trouble in Washington. As I mention in my book I have always felt guilty because I did not
bring this letter directly to Admiral Nimitz; but from what you say it probably would not had made any
difference because apparently King’s mind had been made up and he did not intend to change it. At the time
I realized only that a lot had been going on of which I was completely unaware and I was afraid that any
thing I might do would backfire on Rochefort.
Rochefort’s letter is now so faded with age and the paper on which it was typed is so tattered that it
will not stand much handling. It possibly curtains information bearing on who was behind the conspiracy to
get rid of both Rochefort and Layton, which you would recognize because you know the people involved
better than I did.
I was about to offer to send it to you if you would promise to send it back when I had a bright idea to
Xerox it. Much to my surprise the Xerox turned out much brighter than the original, so here it is.
It seems apparent to me only that Joe never knew who his enemies were, - only that he had no friends
in Cominch office. I might add only that I knew Wenger after the war and he vigorously denied knowing any
part in the downfall of Rochefort and generally deplored it.
I would be interested in how much new information they been hiding.
Thank you very much for your letter,
Sincerely,
Jasper
Analytical Motivation
The reason I decide to put such information in this book is because it too, is a unique part of history.
It is not my goal or aim to attack any particular individual. These were difficult times and unlike the Navy
and Marine Corps of today, times have changed. However, I do believe even such things need to at least be
mentioned for the sake of history. We can either learn from it or go on repeating it. I personally believe the
Navy has already learned much from such situations and I doubt such events occurred only in one field or in
23
one military service. Rochefort set the stage for the early successes of his unit, that did the unthinkable and
that is simply a matter of record…and no one can take that away from him or the Navy.
The Code and Signal Section
The newly established Cryptographic Research Desk of the Code and Signal Section, Navy
Cryptologic Service (NCS) was part of the Naval OP-20-G element. As the OIC, LT Safford soon
demonstrated his ability by organizing and training personnel for naval cryptologic duties, which continued
on into WW-II. Safford’s early initiatives pointed out the need to establish better training for the collection,
analyzing, processing and reporting of electronic intelligence in a meaningful way. It is from his efforts we
find that term still being used today – Processing and Reporting Sections (better known as the P & R
Sections). He went on to identify the need for intercept facilities, locations and special equipment to assist in
the collection efforts. However, it would be many, many years before these problems were truly resolved, but
at least the problems had been truly identified and the stage set for what was to come (Brown Vol. 3-3, 8-9),
(Harper 349), (Naval A-2, A-4, A-6 & A-14) and NCVA 15-17 & 152).
In 1926, a training course was instituted in the Code and Signal Section and the first student was
Ensign (ENS) Joseph N. Wenger. The training consisted of “On-The-Job” (OJT) and semiformal instructions
by LT Safford. In that same year two more officers, LT Joseph J. Rochefort and Captain (Capt) Leo F. S.
Horan (USMC) began their training. As mentioned above, Rochefort goes on to become a major player in the
cryptologic field. However, Capt. Horan was not involved in the early Marine Corps intercept stations or
training. Most likely he returned to the regular Marine Corps and worked in the intelligence field. This
would be in keeping with Marine Corps policy at that time and throughout WW-II. However, Capt Horan is
the first Marine to be identified as been actually trained in the newly established section (Rayburn 11-14-2206 email), (McIntire 85) and (www.history.navy.mil/books/comint),.
CRM H. A. Williams (USN)
As the head of the newly formed Code and Cipher Section (also known as OP-20-G), LT Stafford
determined in 1924-25 that the Navy was ill prepared for a true cryptologic effort. This was especially true
concerning the Japanese Government that was spending much more money for their military. For example, at
that time the Navy had only one individual, Chief Radio Man (CRM) H.A. Williams, who could copy actual
Japanese Manual Morse Code (also known as Japanese Kana Code), which was designated Orange
Communications (Naval A-2 & A-6).
A Unique Relationship
Most Marines in the cryptologic field today have no idea who Russell Willson, Stanford C. Hooper
and Laurence F. Safford are, and yet, without them the story might have been different, but for sure it would
24
have taken longer to unfold. Our birth as a viable military intelligence organization links directly back to
them and they should be placed into our historic teachings.
Like John Paul Jones (1742-92), who went to sea at twelve as a cabin boy and rose in rank and
greatness beyond most people’s imaginations. Thus, his body now lies in state at our own U.S. Naval
Academy and while Willson, Hooper, and Stafford may never have sailed the seas or adventured into battles
such as his…they did open the minds of military leaders to see what could be gained from forming a good
reliable signal intelligence group (Naval A-2 - A-6).
8
Photographer Unknown
MCCHR File MP 3520-5
This picture was given to Colonel (Col) James R. McIntire by the families of LtCol Stephen
Lesko and LtCol Joseph A. Petrosky. It was only one of many, plus other information that will be
made evident as this story moves along. It is important to point to Beijing, China, as it is here that
the Marine Corps truly became involved in the field of cryptology in 1927. From only four Marines
in 1927 to four battalions in 2003 demonstrates the outstanding job these early SIGINT Marines did
in those years. It is off their legacy the Marine Corps went from four Marines in 1927 to four
battalions in 2003. Without their efforts and those who followed them the story might have had a
different ending.
Note: Beijing was earlier spelled Peking, Pekin and Peiping.
25
Naval Signal Intelligence Timeline (1882 – 1942)
1882 –
U. S. Navy establishes the first U. S. Military Intelligence unit, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in March 1882
(Harper 350).
1899 –
Sailors and Marines assumed duties at sea in the newly created radio billets (Brown Vol. 3-1, 8).
1913 –
The first Communications Security (COMSEC) was demonstrated aboard the USS Wyoming (BB-32) by LT Stanford
C. Hooper, USN, in the Atlantic Fleet with great success (Brown Vol. 3-3, 8).
1917 –
LT Russell Willson, created the first Navy cipher device used during the late years of World War I. It was called the
“Navy Code Box” (N.C.B.) (Harper 349-350) & (Schimidt 10-12).
1919 –
The U. S. State Department began a cryptologic effort with their “Black Chamber” element against the Japanese
government’s diplomatic messages. The “Black Chamber” was a unique part of the State Department under Mr.
Herbert O. Yardely (Brown Vol. 3 –3, 9).
1922 – 24 The Code and Cipher Section (later known as OP-20-G) was created as the Naval Communications Intelligence
(COMINT) unit (Brown Vol. 3-3, 8) (Harper 350).
1924 –
The Navy established two the first intercept facilities in the Western Pacific Theater in support of the Asiatic Fleet
(CINCAF). One was located in Shanghai, China and the other aboard the Flagship, USS HURON (CA-09), CINCAF
(Brown Vol-3-3, 9) (Harper 349) & (Naval A-4 & A-6).
1925 - 27
The U. S. Navy established two additional intercept sites. The first one was in Honolulu, Hawaii (1925) and the
second one at Beijing (Peking), China (1927). The first Shanghai Station relocates aboard the USS GENERAL
ALAVA (AG-5) in October 1927 and is deactivated in March 1929 (Brown Vol. 3-3, 9) & (Naval A-6).
1927 - 28
In 1927, the United States Marines became involved in the Cryptologic intelligence gathering. The first Marine
intercept operators were: PFC Otto Kugler; PVT William L. Kiser; PVT Ogden E. Wilson; and PVT Kermit W. Feist
(Brown Vol. 3. 3, 9 - 10) & (Newman 1, 2 & 8).
1927- 32 - In addition to the first four Marines that became intercept operators there were seven other Marines trained at the
Beijing site. They were: PVT Stephen Lesko; PVT Thomas V. Delva; PVT George F. Knight; PVT William R.
White; PVT Paul L. Wasson; PVT Ogden E. Wilson; and PVT C. Tatoo (Brown Vol. 3-3, 10) & (Newman 1 & 2).
1931 -
On 18 September 1931, Marine Cpl Stephen Lesko, who was the only intercept operator on watch, noticed an unusual
amount of radio traffic being passed by the Japanese. This was the first known identification of the 1931 Mukden
Incident or the Japanese military conquest of Manchuria (Newman 15 & 22) & (Petrosky MO 3116 – 2).
1932 –
On 8 March 1932, PVT Charles J. Smith received a Letter of Commendation signed by Marine Commandant, Major
General Ben Hebard Fuller, for his work as an intercept operator. However, according to Stephen Lesko this
commendation was awarded to all of the radio operators at the Beijing (Peking) Station for that period (Newman 22)
& (Petrosky MP 3110 & MO 3111).
1935 –
On March 30, 1935, the U. S. Navy recognized OP-20-G on their military organizational charts with the word “Group:
in its title. It was titled as Communication Security Group, but later changed to Naval Security Group (NSG). This is
the date the Navy officially uses to commemorate as the birth date (Brown Vol. 3-3, 9), (Naval A-8) & (NCVA 153).
1935 -
In July 28, 1935, the Naval Radio Station at Beijing (Peking or Peiping) was relocated to Shanghai (Naval A-4) &
(Petrosky PP 3120-6).
1938 -
In August 1938, the last Marine intercept operator (Sgt Jesse L. Randle) leaves the Shanghai Radio Security Station
(Naval A-10 & A-11).
1940 -
Shanghai, Navy Security Station “A” is officially deactivated in December 1940. Capt Alva B. “Red” Lasswell
(USMC) was the last station OIC, but had been transferred on July 10, 1940 to the 8th Marines in California. This
marked the end of Marine Corps involvement in the Cryptologic efforts unit 1941 and 1942 (Naval A-10 & A-11)
1941 – 42 A Combat Intelligence Unit, commanded by LT Joseph J. Rochefort (USN) was established at Pearl Harbor. This is
the unit that worked on Japanese codes and ciphers during World War II (Harper 358), (Lasswell One 33 – 34),,
(Smith 182-183) and. (Aiken 1).
MCCHR FILE - MC 3482 - FILE
26
MARINES IN CHINA
(1900 – 1941)
Marines participation in military action in the China Relief Expeditions in 1900 – 1901. The action was
better known as the Boxer Rebellion. Some of those Marines led by Maj Littleton W. T. Waller (USMC)
marched to Tientsin in five days, which was some 97 miles of walking and fighting to get there (Montross 91).
Other nations had joined in that action to save their citizens from becoming victims of unruly mobs known as
Boxers. In 1911 Marines were sent to China to become what was known as “Peiping (Beijing) Legation
Guard Battalion”, which was formed to protect the American interest and personnel in that region of China.
However the situation deteriorated and more Marines returned to China on May 5, 1922, as part of the Asiatic
Fleet and part of this unit (Fourth Marines) remained there until the eve of WW-II. This was the beginning of
what became known as the “China Duty or Old China Hands” (Montross 23). Marines stationed in China
found they could live like a king even on a private’s pay. The first Marine Corps intercept operators were part
of the American Legation from 1927 to 1935 during this trying time. In 1927 the situation worsened and the
3rd Marine Brigade was formed as part of an international military force commanded by Brigadier General
(BrigGen) Smedley D. Butler (Old Gimlet Eye) (Montross 23 and 143). The following dates and identities give
you a good idea of how things were rapidly changing in the world at that time:
Marine Units in China:
1900 – 1901 1st Relief Expedition (2 Battalions) *
July 13, 1900 2nd Lieutenant Smedley D. Butler (Medal of Honor) at Tientsin.
August 14, 1900 Private Dan Daily (Medal of Honor) at Peking (Beijing).
1911 – 1938? Peking (Beijing) Legation Guard Battalion
1927 – 1928 (1929) (1931)
3rd Marine Brigade (April 4, 1927 – early 1928) **
1927 – 1941 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines ***
1927 – 1929 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines
1927 – 1928 1st Battalion, 10th Marines
1927 – 1928 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines ****
1927 – 1929 5th Engineer Company
1927 – 1928 Provisional Military Police Company
1927 – 1929 Light Tank Platoon
1927 – 1928 VF-3M (?) *****
1928 - 1928
VF-6M (?) *****
1928 - 1928
VO-1M (?) *****
1937 – 1938 2nd Marine Brigade (September 23, 1937 – February 17, 1938)
1937 – 1938 Battery F
27
1937 – 1938 2nd Marine Anti-Aircraft Battalion
1937 - 1938
6th Marines, 1st and 2nd Battalions & 4th Marines.
(Gailey 40), (Montross 91), (Nofi 53, 114 -15) and (Santelli, James S. 18, 21) .
* The 1st Relief Expedition Battalion and one Battalion of the 2nd Relief Expedition (June 1900)
(Montross 91).
** The Marines were brought up to brigade level in 1927 and it remained at that level until 1929 or 1931 (Nofi
114-15), (Montross 147), and (Gailey 40). Yet, two sources (Montross and Gailey) identify 1931 as the date of the
3rd Brigade’s departure.
** The source Santelli simply states that “(...) the United States ordered the evacuation of the ”The 3d Marine
Brigade in early 1928” (Santelli, James S. 18 & 21).
*** The Fourth Marines remained in Shanghai, China until November 28, 1941 and transferred to the
Philippines and many of those Marines became prisoners of war after the Japanese force took over all of
China and moved into the Philippines (Montross 147).
**** The 12th Marines was first organized as an infantry regiment in China in 1927 and deactivated in 1928.
It was reactivated as an artillery regiment in 1942 (Nofi 81). I mention the 12th Marines for personal reason
too. Several individuals who served in the 12th Marines, such as myself, later became Cryptologic Marines.
Ernie Brown (USMC Retired) and I both served with this unit in 1957 (Japan) and 1958 (Okinawa), so our
military lineage has two faces to it and both of them take us back to China...the birth of the 12th Marines and
Marine Legation Guard and our Marine Corps Cryptology roots.
Initially designated 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines this unit was later redesignated on October 4, 1927 as the
2nd Battalion, 12th Marines, Tientsin, China. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 10th
Marine Regiment were deactivated about the same time, as was the Provisional Regiment
(Santelli 14).
***** The 3rd Battalion - 6th Regiment, 1st Battalion - 10th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion – 12th Regiment
appear to be the VF-3M, VF-6M and VO-1M units noted above (Nofi 115). These three battalions formed the
nucleus of the Provisional Regiment that first entered China and moved to Tientsin (Santelli 14).
28
9
10
11
12
13
14
4
15
MCCHR Pictures
Photographer Unknown
(Circa 1927-38)
9. Great Wall of China. (MP 3120-5)
10. Temple of the Forbidden City, Peking (sic) Beijing, China. .(MP 3120-5)
11. Peking (sic) U. S. Legation Guard Inspection and/or parade, Beijing, China. (MP 3120-5) *
12. Moss Hall, Peking (sic), Beijing, China. This is the enlisted quarters for the American Legation Guard. (MP 3150-3)
13. This building appears to be the Legation Guard Headquarters in Peking (sic), Beijing, China. (MP 3120-5)
14. Enlisted sleeping quarters, Moss Hall, Peking (sic), Beijing, China. (MP 3150-3)
15. Enlisted messing facility, Moss Hall, Peking (sic), Beijing, China. (MP 3150-3)
29
Short Overview of 1927-37 Periods
When studying the events and times in China with units activating only to deactivate or be resigned to
another unit it becomes somewhat confusion. Yet, I feel they need to be mentioned as we move into the heart
and soul of our Marine Corps Cryptologic birth. It was from this chaotic period of time we fine Marines
uniting with their naval partners in a military adventure that slowly forms and shapes our own requirements
and over the years it matures into an adult military organization. Since time began there has never been such
a unique tactical grouping of warriors that could work hand-in-hand with their infantry units. In years to
come tactical commanders would come to rely on vital intercepted intelligence without delay, which gives
them the military edge when making quick and timely decisions. Yet, it did not come into focus for many
years for many reasons, which will also come to light in later parts of this volume.
Also, as you review some of the pictures you will see individuals from that period of time. They
reflect upon those days through the eye of the camera for there was ongoing activity in China during this
period of history. Therefore, the picture of the 1st Battalion, Green Howards (Page 100 Photograph Number 98),
which was a famous British regiment, gives us an idea of how our own Marines lived and worked. There
were also many other military units from such countries as France, Japan, Portugal, Dutch (German), Italy,
Spain and the warring Chinese. Therefore, throughout this period of history there were ongoing problems and
crisis that popped up from time to time. While some peace had been established in the Shanghai region, the
out lying areas were places of uncertainty. Later our Beijing (Peking) Marines had to relocated to Shanghai
in 1935 (Santelli 14) and (Newman 19).
A NEW FIELD IS BORN IN CHINA
The need of monitoring and intercepting enemy transmissions came into being as radio became the
main means of communicating. As that began to unfold the need for trained personnel also became a priority.
Unlike today’s Marines that are taken from associated fields or assigned to billets within a new Military
Occupation Specialty (MOS) they were drawn from the infantry units until a formal training school was
established in Washington, D.C. in October 1928. It appears the Navy had established a temporary intercept
station in the Shanghai area around 1924-27 and began training personnel for that duty, but the Marines had
no participation in that effort. However, at some stage it was decided to open or move the existing station in
the Beijing and this appears to be the first time Marines became involved. The exact dates Marines started
training in this field is not known. However, available information indicates it was in 1927 in Beijing.
According to LtCol Stephen Lesko’s account there was four Marines already trained as intercept operators
when he began his training in November1928 (Brown Vol-1, 7), (Brown Vol-3-3 9-10) and (Newman 1- 2-3 and 9).
30
The First Four Marines
(1927)
Private First Class (PFC) Otto Kugler
Private (PVT) William L. Kaiser (Kiser) {sic}*
PVT Ogden E. Wilson
PVT Kermit W. Feist **
The Fifth and Sixth Marines
(November 1928)
PVT Stephen Lesko
PVT Thomas V. Delva
(Brown Vol-1 7 & Vol-3 10) and (Newman 2, 3, 7-9)
* Leaves Beijing as a Sergeant (1932).
** PVT Kermit W. Feist becomes the first Marine to lose his security clearance or rating when he becomes
involved with a Japanese female. This event occurred prior to Lesko joining the Legation Guard in August
1928 (Newman 3 and 7).
Additional Marines Trained in China
(Between 1929 and 1932)
PVT George F. Knight
PVT William R. White
PVT C. Tatoo
PVT R. M. White
(Brown Vol. 1-1, 10) & (Naval A-4)
Many Years Later
While this field has grown since those early days it did not become a field unto itself until 1974, when
the new MOS designator “2600” was fully established. In late 1972, under the supervision of Maj Donald L.
Whisnant (USMC), a team was formed to study the current MOS structure in order to form a new one for the
Cryptologic Marines. This team was initiated and briefed by Col James R. Quisenberry at Headquarters
Marine Corps (HQMC) prior to starting their assigned task. That study lasted until November 1973 and from
it the 2600 field came into being in 1974. In 1975, the first female Marine officer, Capt Sally Stansbury was
assigned to the 1st Radio Battalion (BN), Fleet Marine Force, in Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii and within months
additional women Marines joined their ranks. This subject will be revisited in more detail in later volumes of
the Marine Corps Cryptologic History (Quisenberry RS-13G).
31
(Naval Radio Station and Radio Security Station)
I mentioned earlier that LT Laurance Safford’s recommendation to find good locations for intercept
operations in 1924. At that time the Navy only had one intercept operator, CRM H. A. Williams and LT
Safford stated they needed intercept sites in the Pacific. The first one is believed to have been located at
Shanghai aboard the USS HURON (CA-09) (Brown Vol. 3-3), (Harper 349) & (Naval A-4 & A-6). A memorandum
dated October 29, 1943 from LTJG M. W. Lyon and LTJG C. E. Daniels stated that there was a radio
intercept station at Shanghai as early 1924. That memorandum further stated that these naval personnel were
self-trained radiomen and concentrated only on Japanese naval traffic (Naval A-6). Therefore, it would appear
that these unknown Navy men were the first intercept operators in China, but not the only intercept operators
trained at that time. As mentioned earlier, CRM Williams was beginning to train them in Washington about
the same time. In another naval memorandum dated 22 August 1928 it stated that there were two primary
intercept sites in China - Shanghai and Beijing copying Orange Code traffic (Japanese diplomatic traffic)
satisfactory at that time. That memorandum suggested other intercept sites were also being explored during
this period of history (Naval A-2). Also, another memorandum dated 23 June 1926 from OP-20-G to the
Director of Naval Communication they mentioned they had six-radiomen at Shanghai, including CRM J.
Duvall (Naval A-6). In October 1927, the Navy moved the early Shanghai intercept operators to the USS
GENERAL ALAVA (AG-5), which remained in the Shanghai area (Naval – A-6). It appears the Shanghai
station closed down at some point and after moving to the USS ALAVA and a new shore station was
established in Beijing, China. This explains the reason LtCol Stephen Lesko never heard of a Shanghai
intercept site and it reinforces the theory that Marines were the first intercept operators to train and work in
Beijing in 1927-28, discounting CRM Chauncey (USN), who was the senior enlisted man in this group (Naval
A-6) and (Newman 3 & 14). This early intercept site was initially collocated with Legation Guard Radio Station
and later assigned an alphabetic letter to identify it. For example, the Navy Radio Intercept Station in Beijing
(Peking) was later identified as Navy Radio Security Station “A”, which means it was the first officially
named station (Naval A-2 & A-4) and (Newman 2).
Shanghai was the home of the Fourth Marines and Beijing was the home of the 38th Machine Gun
Company, Legation Guard. In August 1928, PVT Stephen Lesko was transferred from the 3rd Marine Brigade
in Tientsin, China to the 38th Machine Gun Company in Beijing (Newman 8 & 11). Lesko was transferred to
the communications section of the Legation Guard around November 1928 and trained as an intercept
operator. As mentioned earlier, he found that other Marines had already been trained and working as “Orange
Men” (Newman 1-3 & 7-8). However, the reason Marines became intercept operators was not necessarily done
by design, but rather because necessity for there were few naval hands in that area (Naval A-9).
32
The Marine Corps’ role in early cryptologic work was seen as a temporary endeavor. Marines were
trained with the understanding they would only serve a short tour of duty in that field and then return to the
regular Marine Corps (Naval A-4 &A-9). This hurt the Naval Cryptologic authority as they attempted to
become more professional in this field and it hurt the Marine intercept operators because they were penalized
for being involved. For example, Lesko stated that, “But I was told later the reason you ended up on the
bottom of that list, you’d spent most of your time working for the Navy” (Newman 22). During this period of
history funding was tight and the Navy was pushing for the Marines to increase their involvement and
funding in their budget that did not allow for full time Marine intercept operators. This was also caused by
the ongoing problems in the United States for the economy was showing signs that led up to the October 1929
stock market crash (Harper 2). Nonetheless, even with the budget limitations that caused the Marine Corps to
eliminate training of intercept operators it was a blessing. In later years it the Marine Corps had individuals
to call on with the needed experience to form Cryptologic units of WW-II and the Vietnam War, and it
continues to do so even today...2007 (Newman 10). Many battles have been won and many Marines saved and
that spells “VICKORY” in any warrior’s book!
The Beijing Navy Intercept Station
The Beijing (also spelled Pekin, Peking and Peiping) station came into existence most likely in 1927,
but no exact date has been confirmed. The first time it is officially mentioned was in a August 22, 1928
memorandum from possibly the Naval Research Desk (Code and Signal Section) to the Director of Naval
Communications. In his interview LtCol Lesko stated the station had three Marine intercept operators when
he began his own training in August of 1928. He also stated that there had been a fourth Marine (PVT Kermit
W. Feist) trained earlier, who had been sent back to the United States because of his involvement with a
Japanese woman. The other Marines were PFC Otto Kugler, PVT William L. Kiser and PVT Ogden E.
Wilson. In that same interview he also stated he was trained with another Marine, PVT Thomas V. Delva,
and their training was conductive by CRM Dorman A. Chauncey (USN) (Naval A-2) and (Newman 3 & 7 - 9).
The OIC of the Beijing Navy Radio Station in 1928 was a Marine Corps officer, 1stLt. Walter A.
Wachtler, who had several Marines serving there. His senior enlisted man was Gunnery Sergeant (GySgt)
Glen C. Personius, who served as the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) and he had a group of
Marine Corps field communicators. At that time the Navy had only one intercept operator serving
at this facility, which was CRM Dorman A. Chauncey mentioned above (Brown Vol-3-3, 10). In that same
interview Lesko’s mentions that they became “Orange Men” within this small element of communication
personnel. He goes on to state that PVT Marcus J. Couts was later commissioned in 1942 and assigned to
help him establish the WW-II Radio Intelligence Platoons (RI PLT). Yet, during those early days in China,
Couts was a General Service (GENSER) Communicator and not an “Orange Man” (Newman 8 &26).
33
CRM Dorman A. Chauncey (USN)
As mentioned above the Navy had only one communicator working at the Beijing Navy Radio Station
and it was CRM Dorman A. Chauncey. However, unlike the other communicators, Chauncey had been
assigned there to intercept Japanese diplomatic and naval communications. It could be said that Chauncey
was the first special operations (SPLOPS) in signal intelligence (SIGINT). According to records Chauncey
was carried on the rolls as “Assistant to the Officer in Charge (AOIC)”, which tells us his duties were in fact
not to be changed. This most likely was the first time in our military history we see a communicator being
placed into a position that insured the command would not take him away from his assigned duties (Brown
Vol-3-3, 10). However, during these early years there was apparently some conflict concerning intercept
operators being assigned additional duties, as this subject is mentioned as an ongoing problem area (Naval A-9)
& (Newman 22).
Another very important fact that also surfaces during this period (1920s-30s) was actual training. How
did intercept operators train for there was a vast difference between copying normal naval messages and
copying the Japanese Kata Kana characters (Japanese phonetic script known as Kata Kana). At this time
there were no formal training schools or facilities to send personnel to and thus, the training fell on the
commanders. Therefore, on-the-job training (OJT) was an ongoing thing in those days. CRM Chauncey was
one of those individuals who taught both Navy and Marines early on and later he became one of the main
instructors of the Navy Department’s formal training. That training began sometime in October 1928 in the
Main Navy Building in Washington, DC. Today, the Vietnam Memorial is located where once proud Sailors
and Marines trained years before to copy the Japanese Kata Kana Codes (Brown Vol-3-3, 10), (Naval A-6) and
(Newman 1-3 & A-8).
LTJG Malcolm Wirt Lyon (USN)
In the October 27, 1924 memorandum mentioned earlier there was only one intercept operator at that
time, which was CRM H. A. Williams. However, also mentioned earlier, there were some self trained
intercept operators working in Shanghai and aboard the USS ALAVA (AG-5). According to this report the
ship remained in Shanghai until March 1929. This same message stated that all of the personnel who manned
these stations were transferred back to regular GENSER duties, except for M. W. Lyon, who was transferred
to Guam to establish the first intercept station there (Naval A-4 & A-6).
CRM Harry Kidder (USN)
In recent years many Marines have heard about the early training intercept operators in the city of
Washington. They became known as the “On The Floor Gang” (OTRG), but little is known about how it
came into being. I feel it is important to mention this training because Marines were also trained there
during 1929 – 1935. The actual beginning of the OTRG training started when Admiral (ADM) C. F.
34
Hughes, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) signed a letter on July 16, 1928 that directed the Navy begin this
training officially. This historic letter gave the Navy the authority to start training intercept operators in
Orange communications, which was learning to copy Japanese Diplomatic Kata Kana Code. Upon
completion these operators were to be assigned to the Asiatic Fleet Intercept Stations. ADM Hughes also
established a screening process in order to insure only qualified individuals with good military records were
assigned to such training. In other words, don’t dump unwanted individuals into this program as a means of
getting rid of them. The first class had seven sailors in it and it convened in October 1928, which is the same
time fame a young PVT Lesko was under going OJT in China. CRM Kidder was the first instructor of the
formal training and he conducted a total of six classes. However, the earlier self-training Marines in China
were given the honor of being considered members of this unique group of military men. Therefore, their
names appear later as being members of select classes by date under Marine members of the OTRG (NCVA 96,
254-255).
17
16
Picture 16. A copy of the final examination
of RM3C James W. Pearson Kana Intercept
Operators Course. Thirty 30 words per
minute with no mistakes (MP 3121 File)
Picture 17 The U. S. Naval Training
Building, Washington, D. C. where both
Marines and Sailors trained as Kata Kana
Intercept Operators. The area to the left of
this building is the general location of the
Vietnam Memorial (MP 3120 File).
Special Foot Note: While only enlisted Marines were trained as intercept operators by the Navy during this early period Marine
officers were also being trained as linguists and in cryptanalyst. After Navy Radio Security Station “A” relocated to Shanghai, China in
1935 all the OIC were Marine officers trained in this field. In 1937 Navy intercept operators began to merge into the Shanghai station
and by August 1938 they took over completely, except for the OIC, who was a Marine officer. Yet, for a brief time both enlisted
Marines and Sailors manned the Shanghai Station in a joint operation. In years to come Marines would again train and work with Navy
intercept operators around the world in the Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion. Therefore, the history of the three Radio Battalions
and the Marine Cryptologic Battalion history can be traced to these early SIGINT pioneers.
35
18
19
20
MCCHR Files
18. In this photograph the individual is listed as “Doc” Robertson. This man may have been a member of the Navy
Medical Corps. Notice the spelling of Beijing at that time “Pekin”. This is how LtCol Stephen Lesko stated it was
spelled in his 1982 interview (MP 3486-1 & Newman 1).
19. Looking at the Beijing (Peking) Legation Headquarters Building from the rear side. This is the building where the
first Marines trained and worked as “Orange Men” in 1927-35 (MP 3119).
20. This is a photograph of OTRG Class 5, Navy’s Kata Kana Intercept Operator’s Course in Washington, D. C, taken in
1930. Left to right: Cpl William A. Wilder; PVT Charles J. Smith; CRM Dorman A. Chauncey (USN); PVT Hubert N.
Thomas; PVT Phillip R. Miller (or Phillip M. Miller) and PVT Maurice M. Overstreet (MP 3118).
36
Beijing (Peking), China – 1932
(MCCHR File MP 3150)
Intercept Station Marines
Pictured left to right standing:
PVT Phillip Miller, Cpl Stephen Lesko, CMR Clarence M.
Reynolds (USN) and PFC George F. Knight.
Pictured left to right kneeling:
PFC Walter B. Robertson, PVT Charles J. Smith, PVT
Maurice M. Overstreet and Cpl Hubert N. Thomas, Jr.
21 - MP 3150
These are the Marine who received a Letter of
Commendation from Major General Ben Hebard Fuller,
15th Commandant of the Marine Corps for their work in
1931 – The Mukden Incident in Manchuria.
Beijing (Peking), China – 1934
(MCCHR File MP 3149
)
Navy Intercept Station Marines
No names were listed on this photograph, but
based on input from the Naval Cryptologic Veterans
Association (NCVA) they could be as follows:
Sgt J. H. Easter, Sgt C. S. Southerland, Cpl A. Rainey,
PFC H. V. Jones, PVT H. L. Butler, PFC C. F. Gentlicore,
PVT J. A. Petrosky, and PVT N. F. Robertson (Naval A-4)
(Not listed in order.)
22 - MP 3149
According to available records the Beijing
(Peking) Naval Radio Intercept Station closed down on
July 28, 1935 (Naval –A-4)
Beijing (Peking), China – 1934
(MCCHR File PP 3133)
(March 31, 1934)
Legation Guard Marines, Beijing, China
On the bottom of this photograph the following hand written note
states:
“Mounted and Radio 31 March 1934”
LtCol Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr., as a Marine Private,
graduated from the Navy Intercept Operator Course #12 in April
1934 and was stationed at Radio Intercept Station “A” located in
Beijing, China for about a year. According to LtCol Stephen
23 - PP 3333
Lesko they worked in close proximity to the Legation
Guard Radio Operators.
Note concerning these pictures. While some of these names are correct some questions remains about most of them because they are
based on limited information. Therefore, it is recommended that they be reviewed with some discretion. However, it is felt they do need to
be placed into this book for the records. This will aid in future research or for family members looking to find information concerning
them.
37
Another factor concerning CRM Kidder should be mentioned for the record. It appears he is one of
the first self-taught Kata Kana intercept operators. In 1923, Kidder was serving in the Philippines and with
the aid of his wife, who just happened to be Japanese, he learned the Kata Kana syllabary and taught himself
the telegraphic equivalent of the code characters. He immediately started copying actual Japanese traffic.
While this is not meant to take anything away from CMR Williams or others, it does demonstrate that enlisted
men of that time period were also men of vision and action, and they also understood the need for someone to
take the initiative…and he did exactly that (NCVA 95-96).
The Japanese Kana Code Machine (RIP-5)
Without a doubt LT Safford set the stage for all future Navy/Marine Corps endeavors in the
cryptologic field for years to come. His model for electronic gathering, processing and reporting remains to
this very day the mainstay of most units on land or sea. The early intercept equipment also came into being
based on his recommendations and a special typewriter, Japanese Kana Code Machine (RIP-5 Underwood),
was adopted by Navy and Marine Corps units engaged in this activity during the 1930 period and WW-II.
However, the first RIP-5 typewriters where bought in 1924 out of a special “Slush Fund”, which allowed for
the purchase of 40 machines and funds to repair and update them (...) (Naval A-6), (Newman 14), (MCCHR PP
3117 - 1) and (Safford A – 8.).
The RIP-5 was used to copy a unique syllabary in the Japanese telegraphic communications. It was
called “Kata Kana” and consisted of some 73 phonetic characters, each of which represented a Romanized
equivalent when copied (Nakao xv - xvi) (Hadamitzky 30) (PP 3121). In addition, the Japanese became very good
at sending and receiving their code at high rates of speed. The RIP-5 became the main device used to copy
those Japanese messages by early Marines intercept operators. LtCol Lesko told his interviewer in 1982 that
the RIP-5 was used from day one without any questions about it. He stated when asked about it, “I’m sure. If
I’d been on watch with a stack of paper and a pencil, I sure would remember that. But no, right from the
beginning, the old Kata Rip-5 was there” (Newman 14). However, Lesko also informed his interviewer that his
first training with CMR Chauncey was done by copying the Kata Kana Code with pencil and Chauncey beat
code out on an old Army WW-I buzzer key (Naval 2 & 8).
Looking at the example below you will see the difference between learning to copy American letters
for Yokohama as compared to copying the Japanese equivalent:
1. The American Manual Morse Code Equivalent.
Y = (- . -- ) O = (- - -) K = ( - . - ) O = ( - - - ) H = ( …. ) A = ( . - ) M = ( - - ) A = ( . - )
2. The Japanese Manual Morse Code Equivalent.
YO = ( - - ) KO = ( - - - - ) HA = ( - . . . ) MA = - . . - )
38
25
24
(From the MCCHR Files)
(Circa 1928-42.)
RIP-5 UNDERWOOD CODE MACHINE
24. The RIP-5 Underwood Code Machine was initially
constructed in 1924 and purchased by the U.S. Navy at the
cost of $161.50 each. The nomenclature describes the
complexity of design, but belies its simplicity of
construction. It was a specially designed typewriter having
46 Kana and Latin Keys. The lower case, as well as two
upper case keys typed Kana characters. The remaining
upper case keys typed Japanese accent marks, English
capital letters, Arabic numerals and English punctuation
marks. LT Safford recommended it specifically to reduce
operator-training time by not having to learn the Kana by
having to write it by hand, as well as to improve copy
legibility from actual intercept. (MP 3117 File)
26
25. Communication room that shows desk area and a
standard typewriter. You will notice the old telephone used
for important messages. (MP 3404 File)
26. Another view of the same communication room desk,
but notice the safe. This safe stored various U. S. Off-Line
Codes and other classified material. (MP 3404 File)
27. Receiving room “A”. This radio was the RAL-2 Model
and it had a complete power unit (Serial No. 209), mounted
on a stand. The white line on the floor to rear of the stand is
a cable to the receiver which is Belden Braid which had a
Twin-conductor power supply 110V, AC; Twin-conductor
antenna for either doublet or straight wire to the antenna
control panel; Twin-conductor receiver output to monitoring
panel below the line-amplifier. The Belden Braid acts as a
ground for the set. This combination works excellent and
was available to any operator at any position. (MP 3151 File)
27
39
Formal Marine Training Begins
As mentioned earlier the formal Navy Kata Kana Course came into existence after ADM C. F. Hughes
(CNO) put forth a letter in July 1928 authorizing it. The first two class were solely Navy men and the first
Marine intercept operator to train there was PVT C. A. Cameron in 1929-1930, Class 3 (MC 3081). In spite of
the budget battles, the Navy OP-20-G leadership understood the need to continue this training throughout the
1930 period, which led it to becoming the world’s foremost military intelligence organization (Naval A-2, A-4,
A-6 & A-10) & Newman 1-3 & 7-8).
As mentioned earlier, the formal training in the Navy Manual Morse Course was instituted at the Old
Navy Building on Constitution Avenue in Washington, DC. The graduates of these classes became known as
the “On The Roof Gang” (ORTG), which gave them the unique identification belonging to a special group.
While Lesko and others did not train in Washington they were still considered as part of the OTRG group.
Their training was designated as the OTRG Class 00. The ORTG title is still used today to identify special
individuals with an award…OTRG Award (Brown Vol.3. 2 & 8).
Marine Members - On The Roof Gang (OTRG)
(On The Job Training – OJT Marines)
CLASS
00 (1)
DATES
1927-28
LOCATIONS
NAMES
OJT, Beijing, China
PFC Otto Kugler
PVT William L. Kiser
PVT Ogden E. Wilson
PVT Kermit W. Feist
00 (2)
1928-29
OJT, Beijing, China
PVT Stephen Lesko *
PVT Thomas V. Delva
00 (3)
1929-1932?
OJT, Beijing, China
PVT George F. Knight
PVT William R. White
PVT Paul L. Wasson
PVT C. Tatoo
PVT C. M. Smith
Unknown
Sgt Jesse J. Randle
40
.
Kana Intercept Operators Course
(Washington, DC Naval Training)
3
November 1929 to May 5, 1930
PFC Charles A. Cameron
5
February 6 to May 1930
PVT Phillip R. Miller
PVT Maurice M. Overstreet
PVT Charles J. Smith
PVT Hubert N. Thomas Jr.
PVT William A. Wilder
6
August 10 to December 20, 1931
Cpl Joel H. Easter
Cpl Carl H. Gustaveson
Cpl John Hibbard
9
October 1 1932 to February 4, 1933
Sgt Richard A. Hardisty
PFC Virgil W. Morgan
11
July 5 to December 4, 1933
PVT Clarence F. Gentilcore *
PVT Alvin Rainey
PFC Charles S. Southerland
12
December 6, 1933 to April 7, 1934
PVT Harry L. Butler
PVT Harold V. Jones
PVT Joseph A. Petrosky Jr. *
PVT Norman F. Robertson
PVT Walter B. Robertson
15
January 2 to May 10, 1935
PFC Cecil T. Carraway *
PVT Curtis W. Crow (Crowe)
PVT Lombard R. Hingle
PVT Carl G. Suber
PFC James W. Winborn
41
* Remain in the Marine Corps and move into WW-II.
(Brown RL Vol-3-2, 8), (Naval A-10 & A-11) and (Newman 1-3, 7-8 & 25)
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lesko
When most men enter the military service they do not see themselves becoming part of a unique
history and seldom would they consider themselves to being a key factor in it. Yet, LtCol Stephen Lesko fits
into this category. As a matter of fact, he becomes the prime “Mover and Shaker” and could be considered
the Godfather of Marine Corps Signal Intelligence. (While four other Marines were trained as intercept
operators prior to his becoming one of them. They did not remain in the Marine Corps or contribute to the
growth of this new field.) Three other names that can and should be recognized as early leaders in the field
are: LtCol Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr., Maj Cecil T. Carraway and MSgt Clarence F. Gentilcore. However, Lesko
was the first of this unique group to make the Marine Corps a career, he first be trained out of this group in
1928 and the first to find himself being brought back time after time. It was Marine Corps policy to let
Marine intercept operators serve only one short tour of duty in the field...and then to return to regular Marine
units. For those who did stay on, such as Lesko, promotions came slow and they were not held in high
esteem, but rather looked at by many senior Marines in negative way. He mentioned in the 1982 interview
with Newman that he was told, “In fact, I heard that some years later that some wheel at Personnel in
Washington made the remark that (don’t worry about him too much, he’s working for the Navy anyway, we
don’t get no use out of him)” (Newman 21-22).
In 1927, then PVT Stephen Lesko went to Tientsin, China as an infantryman with the 3rd Marine
Brigade. The brigade had been sent to China in response to the requirement for protecting American citizens
and property in that country due to its Civil War. In January 1929, there was a sufficient return to stability for
departure of the brigade. However, PVT Lesko had earlier been reassigned to the 38th Machine Gun
Company, Marine Legation Guard in Beijing (Peking) for duty, as a Browning Automatic Rifleman (BAR).
A few months after his arrival Lesko saw a notice on his unit’s bulletin board, which solicited volunteers for
training as radio operators. He was interested and turned his name in to the company office. A short while
later he was told to report to CRM Chauncey for an interview in connection with turning in his name. He was
interviewed by Chauncey and given a radio aptitude test. Following this interview and test Lesko was later
informed that he was selected for the training and to report to CRM Chauncey on a daily basis at the Marine
Detachment Headquarters. In a small room on the second floor of the headquarters he was joined by another
Marine who had successfully passed Chauncey’s interview and test: PVT Thomas V. Delva, who was from
the 39th Machine Gun Company, Marine Legation Guard. Together, Lesko and Delva were informed by
42
Chauncey that they were going to be trained to copy Japanese Kata Kana Code for the Naval Signal
Intelligence. According to Lesko, Chauncey used a WW-I, U.S. Army Signal Corps telegrapher’s buzzer as a
teaching aid, while Lesko and Delva copied the Kata Kana with pencil and paper during their initial training
periods. When Chauncey was eventually satisfied that both Marines were capable of copying the code, they
were transferred on May 1, 1929 to the Headquarters Company of the Marine Legation Guard for duty with
the Navy Radio Security Station “A” (Brown Vol-3-2, 8) and (Newman 1 – 3 & 14).
It might seem strange to the untrained eye, but according to the dates Lesko gave his interviewer he
trained from about October or November 1928 to May 1, 1929 before being assigned to actual duty.
However, these early Marines had to perform other duties, which he did not mention. Yet, those were the
days when Marines were assigned to working parties, interior guard and even some mess duty. He makes no
mention of why it took so long to train, but it did demonstrate the needed formal schools that allowed for
study without extra duties.
While Lesko mentions a sense of satisfaction concerning the work they were doing in Beijing during
that period he also mentions that they got little inspiration from the any leaders, which meant both the Marine
Corps and the Navy. Yet, like unquestionable love it was something they simply enjoyed and got into, but
they never were told they were doing a good job or keep up the good work. However, in 1931 something
happened to change that when the Japanese started a major push into Manchuria. It has been called the
Mukden Incident, which will be covered in more detail later. However, Lesko was the mid-watch when
things started to happen. He told Newman:
“(...) But the big one was the morning that I was on watch all by myself and all—everything broke loose
when the Japanese grabbed off Manchuria. All of them had top priority traffic. All wanted to send.
Between Tokyo and the other stations and the outer stations of Tokyo. I reported it to the Chief and said
“...boy, something’s happening out there, they went crazy early this morning before it was even daylight.
All of them were on the air and all of a sudden top priority traffic so some things happening somewhere
around here. Well, it happened to the north in Manchuria. They grabbed it off and got everything all set
up. They renamed Manchuria to the name of Manchakuo and got Emperor Fuyee, the last of the Chinese
dynasty that was dethroned in 1911 and picked him up were he was living quietly in his palace in Peking
(sic), I think, and moved him up there and made him an emperor and he was their puppet. I think that was
about the biggest one. I can’t think of any other ones.”
43
28
29
30
31
MCCHR File
(circa 1930-35)
28. PVT Bill Spurrier, rifle range La Jolla (Camp Matthews). May 7, 1933 with orders to the 4th Marines, Pekin (sic),
China. (Information taken from back of picture in LtCol Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. and/or LtCol Stephen Lesko personal
photographs.) (PP 3499-1 File)
29. Unidentified First Sergeant or Gunnery Sergeant washing up at the tent area. Most like at Beijing or Tientsin,
China. (PP 3499-1 File)
30. Japanese troops during inspection. Notice the “discipline” appearance of these troops. (PP 3399-1 File)
31. A unidentified Marine standing in the doorway to the Meteorological Station in Shanghai, China. This is the same
Marine standing guard duty on page 80 (Picture 58)…Marine of the Month. (PP 3402 File)
44
(From MCCHR File 3148)
32
(circa 1936)
SSgt STEPHEN LESKO
4th Marines, Shanghai, China
This picture is cropped from a group
photograph. From PVT to LtCol Lesko may well
have been the first Limited Duty Officer (LDO)
in the cryptologic field. However, his
commissioning program is unknown. In WW-II,
while serving with the RIP units he is listed as an
0200 (Platoon Commander)
33
(MCCHR File MP 3153) (Circa 1938)
FOURTH MARINES, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
Headquarters Company & Communication Building
Billet No. 1, 1607 Sinza Road, Shanghai, China
LOCATION OF NAVAL RADIO SECURITY STATION “A”
1.
2.
3.
4.
Main section, 1st floor: Regimental Telephone Exchange, Communication Office, Radio Room (receiving room) U.S.
Naval Radio Station, Shanghai, Office of the Communication Officer, 4th U.S. Marine.
Right Wing, 1st floor: Two Rooms for the accommodation of communication personnel (Marine radio and telephone
operators) and Headquarters Company, Office.
Main section, 2nd floor: Station A – Radio Room and office of the Officer-in-Charge, one room for the
accommodation of four operators, repair shop, switch-board, electrical supply distribution for all activities in Billett,
located in hall.
Right Wing, 2nd floor: Two rooms for the accommodation of Marine Radio personnel attached to the Radio Station on
1st floor.
45
34
MCCHR File MP 3147
(Circa 1937)
Fourth Marines, Shanghai, China
(Navy Radio Security Station “A”)
This picture was taken on the roof of the Fourth Marines Headquarters on Haiphong Road, Shanghai, China.
Left to right standing: PFC Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr.; PFC Harold V. Jones; PFC Harry L. Butler; PFC James W. Windborn;; PVT
Curtis W. Crow (Crowe); and Capt Shelton C. Zern (Station OIC).
Left to right kneeling: Sgt. Jesse L. Randle; Cpl Cecil T. Carraway; PFC Carl G. Suber,
CRM Daryl W. Wigle (USN) and SSgt Stephen Lesko
MCCHR Files PP 3120-5
35
(Circa 1935)
This picture is believed to be taken in
Shanghai, China at the 4th Marines Headquarters.
There are two men on the top building a small looking
shake. On the back of this photograph is written “This
is the house Lesko built.” This is the location of Navy
Radio Security Station “A” after July 1934 until the
Navy personnel moved it to a new location. The Navy
moved to two difference locations as they expanded
their operations to include direction finding.
46
* * * Timeline * * *
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Lesko
(1927 – 1942)
1928................... 3rd Marine Brigade, Tientsin, China as a BAR (Browning Automatic Rifle) infantryman and transferred to
the 38th Machine Gun Company, Legation Guard, Beijing (Peking) in August 28, 1928 (Newman 8).
1928................... After about 3 months he saw a notice on the company bulleting board looking for volunteers to be trained
as radio operators. After thinking about it he volunteered to do the training. A short time later he reported
to Chief Radioman Chauncey and took an aptitude test. It turned out there were two of them...the second
one was PVT Delva. After completing the training they were transferred to the “Radio Crew” called the
“ Orange Men” (Newman 1).
1929-32.............. In May 1929 he began his duty as an intercept operator and remained there until September. There were
five “Orange Men” operators when he started. There were three former members (Kugler, Kaiser, and
Wilson) and he and Delva (Newman 1 and 2).
1931................... The Japanese took over Manchuria...”I had the graveyard watch, an unusual hour at making my regular
searches over the frequency spectrums.” That night/morning...they started receiving more than then
normal flow of traffic (Newman 4, 5 and 15).
1931................... Made Corporal after a couple of years of working as an intercept operator (Newman 9).
1932....................Group photograph of Radio Security Station Marines in Beijing (Peking), China in 1932 (MP 3150-1 & 2).
1932/33?........... Promoted to Sergeant (Newman 7).
1933.....................At age 24-25 he attended the Navy Bellevue Electronic School, Class #18 during first half of 1933 (Lesko
13 and 16).
1935? ................. Second tour of duty with the “Orange Men” in Shanghai, which was in the late spring of 1935. After
spending a few months aboard the USS AUGUSTA (CA-31) he went to Shanghai and helped build the
new radio site, which could have been in June. The OIC of group was Captain Shelton C. Zern
.......................... (Newman 19).
1937................... Promoted to Staff Sergeant (Newman 21).
1937.....................Photograph of SSgt Lesko in 1937 (MP 3147) & (Newman 21).
1937
After 25 months in Shanghai, Lesko returns to regular Marine Corps duty (Newman 21).
1938................... The U.S. Navy started manning the intercept positions in 1938 in Shanghai (Newman 30).
1941................... Lesko was on Midway prior to the Battle of Midway with the 6th Defense Battalion (Harber 9) & (Newman
25).
1941................... December 7, 1941 The Japanese attack Pearl Harbor and World War II officially begins (Harper 8).
1941-42? ............ Lesko becomes a Signal Supply Officer at San Diego, California (Newman 25).
1941-42? ............ Lesko might have also been a member of the 12th Defense Battalion, San Diego, California prior to
receiving orders to Washington, DC (Lesko – Genealogy).
1942 .................. Lesko was ordered to report to Nebraska Ave., Washington DC where he joins up with 2nd Lieutenants
Petrosky and Couts (Newman 25).
1942 .................. Lesko’s military pay grade was 1st Lieutenant. The two other officers had prior China duty. Petrosky was
in China about the mid-1935 and served at both Beijing (Peiping) and Shanghai and Couts had been in the
Peking area early on as a regular radio operator, but he was not an “Orange Man” and Couts had a
nickname of “Coos” (Newman 26).
1943 ................. Lesko was ordered to Camp Elliot, California to set up the first radio intelligence platoons of World War
II. He received all types of portable equipment; vans, recon-jeeps, power supplies...and he states he had
everything (Newman 26).
1944................... Lesko took the first two Radio Intelligence Platoons overseas on April 14, 1944. One of them to
Guadalcanal (Newman 26).
1982................... LtCol . Stephen Lesko is interviewed by Mr. I. Newman at the Naval Security Group Headquarters in
Washington, DC on October 24, 1982 (Newman 1).
47
Lesko then mentions that they received a letter of commendation from the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (CMC) about their work in 1931. He pointed out a sense of satisfaction for he was told by some
ranking individual, “...boy, you sure did good work…the last four years, especially last...” He then
mentioned another very important point, which was personal recognition for doing a good job. He stated,
“Even then I thought why don’t they let us know how we’re doing?” In other words, some form of
recognition would have been appreciated by them.
Lesko left Beijing in 1932 period and returned to the United States and went to Bellevue, which was a
Naval Communication School in Washington, DC and then was assigned to Fifth Marines in Quantico,
Virginia. He stated things were going good for him and he was happy. Therefore, his return to duty with a
regular Marine unit did not cause him any problems. Then one day without warning he was ordered to report
to his headquarters and was immediately transferred. In February 1935, he found himself boarding the USS
AUGUSTA (CA-31) at Subic Bay in the Philippines and heading back to China.
Prior to arriving in China he found himself working for the Navy aboard the AUGUSTA as an
intercept operator in Japanese waters. This short tour of duty would again put his name into Marine and Navy
history for the second time, but this time with only his name being associated in one major event. Lesko was
now copying Japanese military targets. He mentions that Naval Commander in Chief (CIC) of the Fleet
would stop by to check on things from time to time. He, also, mentioned the CIC even got involved and took
interest in the work when he visited them. It appeared the higher authority within the Navy appreciated the
type work he was doing and this was a new experience for him. It helped to improve his morale for he now
understood it must really be important. Then, on one very dark night an event occurred that sounds more like
a movie plot than a real one. According to Lesko’s account it was after midnight and all of the Japanese
stations had connected with the main Japanese fleet and the circuits all became very active and the signals
were very strong. Lesko informed his watch officer to alert the brass about the situation. He was surprised to
see the CIC had been awaken up and he was now asking direct questions. The CIC then had an officer wake
the Fleet Intelligence Officer and had him come down to review the events. Lesko said, the CIC then asked
him who was up and he said, “I told them that all known circuits that we had pretty well identified by then, by
frequencies, and station calls the main units and they were so close that not the sky wave component of the
signal was doing it, it was the ground wave component of the signal blocking my receivers.” He went on to
say, “In fact the Commander in Chief looked at me—and there’s a four star Admiral looking at a little old
three-stripes Marine Sergeant, he said ‘how close do you think they are?’ I said, they’re very close, they’re
probably very near us. In fact, I would hazard a guess that they’re all around us. In other words, I think we
are in the middle of them.”
48
According to his account the most beautiful sight a person ever saw came that morning as the sun rose
for the Japanese Imperial Fleet was in fact all around them.
Lesko then told his interview, “From then on, I
couldn’t do no wrong.” (Newman 17-19)
As summer approached the USS AUGUSTA (CA-31) anchored in Shanghai...but prior to leaving the
ship Lesko was introduced to Captain Sheldon C. Zern, a Marine officer, who had been trained in cryptologic
duties. This was the first Marine officer to be trained as such. Captain Zern informed him he would be going
ashore to build an intercept site for the new Radio Security Station in Shanghai and that they would be
assigned to the Fourth Marines. He was further informed they planned to bring Marine intercept operators in
as soon as the station was finished (Newman 20).
The Shanghai Radio Security Station was built in late spring on top of the Fourth Marine
Headquarters. According to Lesko it was a little better than being called a shack, but later Navy personnel
would describe it as exactly that…a shack. However, that would be a normal way for Marines to look at it.
In a Marines’ thinking, they’re in Heaven if the tent doesn’t leak or they have running water. Lesko tells us,
“I was a jack of all trades. Put in radio receiver rooms, stand watches and whatnot and nobody said thank
you and nobody said your’re doing well” (Newman 20).
Lesko then describes how he used his 1933 training
from Bellevue to put the receivers and power packs in and he noted if you modified anything you could get in
deep trouble for Navy regulations were very strict concerning this issue. He stated, “As I recall I had to do
something in which I changed something in those receivers. Maybe I had to redo all the tube leads, I don’t
recall. But I did what was proper. I didn’t tell nobody. Captain Zern or no body. I just checked them out
and they worked beautifully. But do you know how I got the parts to make those packs? Out of my own
pocket. Out of my own big old $50 a month. I got $54 a month a.....(end of tape). (...) So in downtown
Shanghai on Nanking Road was a radio amateur store and part supply. So I sat down and made a diagram
and everything that I’d need and I went down to the amateur radio store on one of the main streets in
downtown Shanghai. I think it was Nanking Road and bought the parts out of my own pocket. Took them
back and assembled them. I used the work shop of the regular crew. (...) (...) I had made them and put them
in, and as far as I know it was still the same equipment when I left in July 1937” (Newman 20 & 21).
Lesko maked Staff Sergeant (SSgt) just prior to leaving the intercept assignment for the second time in
1937. He returned to the regular Marine Corps for duty in GENSER communications. Some time prior to
WW-II he was commissioned to 2nd Lieutenant. He was a 1st Lieutenant in 1942 when he was called back
into cryptologic service to form the Radio Intelligence Platoons (RI/) of WW-II. Two other former members
of the Beijing Legation Guard unit join him in at that time. They were 2ndLt Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. and 2ndLt
Marcus J. Couts (Newman 25 – 26).
49
As mentioned above Stephen Lesko (now deceased) retired from the Marine Corps as a LtCol and
while his name is not often mentioned his leadership provided much of the insight needed to accomplish a
difficult mission during WW-II. His leadership and devotion to duty are the key factors in the establishment
of the RI Platoons of WW-II and his insight and continued ability set the stage for future Marines to build
upon in later years. In the next volume, which details the WW-II period it will be made apparent that the
Marine Corps and its Cryptologic units, and the Naval Security Group owe him a great debt and they should
recognize him, as they did with many Navy officers…for he was the leader of the pack and today we have
four unique Cryptologic Battalions due much to his early efforts. While there are other key figures that came
into view in the later years it was LtCol Stephen Lesko who set the standards and future direction of forging
the Marine Corps Cryptologic field. There is no way to fully measure the many battles won and Marine lives
saved over the years. Even today, Marines around the world and on battlefields are achieving many unique
things that came into being from his leadership. Had he failed in achieving the successes in his
endeavors…most likely we would never have achieve the things our units are achieving today or at least not
in the same manner with the same results.
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr.
Another individual to join The Navy Radio Security Station “A” in Beijing, China in 1934 was PVT
Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. and it is his widow who gave a box of pictures with some notes on many of them to
Col McIntire in the mid 1980s. In later years, both Lesko and Petrosky served together as Marine officers at
Camp Elliott, California and in the Pacific during WW-II. However, as a young PVT, he was first assigned to
Beijing after graduating from the Navy Kata Kana Operators Course in 1934. He was one of the last enlisted
men to be assigned duty there. In 1935, he was transferred to the USS AUGUSTA (CA-31) for a short period
of time and then to the new Shanghai station around August 1935. He and Lesko worked together for about a
year and a half. In 1942, he was ordered to report to Washington, DC where he reunited with Lesko again.
By then Petrosky had also been commissioned and both he and 2ndLt Marcus J. Couts join with 1stLt Lesko to
form the first RI Platoons of WW-II at Camp Elliott, California (Naval A-10) and (Newman 16 & 25).
The First Marine Corps Cryptologic Intelligence Officers
Many of the Marine Corps Cryptologic Association (MCCA) Marines take great pride in telling folks
that the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen Alfred M. Gray, had a lot to do with our units in the
1950s and 1960s. In like manner, many of us remember a Capt B. D. Lynch, who became a MajGen and
Commanding General (CG) of Camp Pendleton, California in 1992 and later the CG of Research and
Development at Quantico, Virginia in 1993. However, we can also take pride in knowing two other officers
rose to the general ranks. One OIC of the Navy Radio Security Station “A” in Shanghai, China from May
50
1935 to 1938 became a Brigadier General upon retiring. He was BrigGen Shelton C. Zern (OIC from 19351938). The second one is BrigGen Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr., who initially worked as a Japanese linguist at
Pearl Harbor prior to WW-II. Holcomb later worked in China with Navy Radio Security Station “F”, which
was also a Radio Direction Finding Station.
Brigadier General Shelton C. Zern
BrigGen Zern initially was assigned duty as the Communications Officer for the Legation Guard in
Beijing, but his orders were changed because CINCAF (Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet)(also CICAF))
felt they needed an OIC with some formal training in cryptology. Prior to his departure from the United
States he had completed a course in Communications Security under the direction of OP-20-G in Washington
DC. He was then ordered to report to the Fourth Marines in June 1935 as the Radio Intelligence Officer. The
Commanding Officer, Fourth Marines was informed the Capt Zern was to be assigned only limited collateral
duties and that the true nature of his duties were not to be disclosed. After the arrival of Sgt Lesko, who had
been on the USS AUGUSTA (CA-31), he set out to finish building the new radio site. It was reported to
higher authority the station would be fully operational by July or August (Naval A-8, A-9 & A-11) and (Newman
20 & 22).
According to Lesko, Capt Zern worked in private and did not convey any information concerning the
nature of what he was doing, but it appeared to be some form of analysis on their intercepted transmissions.
Lesko, also mentioned to his interviewer that Capt Zern was promoted to Major, Lieutenant Colonel and full
Colonel during WW II and upon his retirement he was promoted to Brigadier General. Lesko referred to it as
a tombstone rank that senior officer received in those days, but not a rank he carried while on active duty.
Nonetheless, he remains the first to achieve that unique distinction (Newman 22). One source mentions that in
August 1944, then LtCol Zern was the Command Operations Officer of clean-up activities on the Island of
Guam (USMC Historical Monograph, P160, Major O. R. Lodge, USMC). Capt Zern remained the OIC of Shanghai Radio
Security Station “A” until early 1938.
Captain Kenneth H. Cornell
There is not much known about Capt Kenneth H. Cornell, the OIC of Navy Radio Security Station
“A” from 1938 – July 2, 1939 (MCCHR MC 3145-35B). However, after obtaining several pages of Colonel
Alva Bryan Lasswell’s personal files we find Cornell had trained in Tokyo, Japan in Japanese language prior
to 1935. He was working in Naval Intelligence in Washington, DC where Lasswell met him prior to leaving
for Japan on July 1, 1935 (Lasswell One 24). While Lasswell was studying in Japan, Cornell was sent to
Shanghai in the fall of 1937 to relieve Capt Zern, as the OIC of Navy Radio Security Station “A”. It was
during Capt Cornell’s time that the Marine enlisted personnel were replaced my Navy intercept operators.
51
Also, it was during this period the Navy began using direction finding equipment at this station. After August
1938, Marine Corps intercept operators fade into history until WW-II begins and the Radio Intelligence
Platoons are formed. Capt Cornell was carried on the Fourth Marines rolls as: (1) Staff 4th Marines and (2)
Public Relations Officer, Sixteenth Naval District, Asiatic Fleet (MCCHR MC 3448-29C).
Brigadier General Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.
Brigadier General Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. was born in Wilmington, Delaware on April 14, 1908,
enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1925 and served in the Legation Guard in Beijing, China and was appointed to
the Naval Academy in June 1927. He was commissioned a Marine 2nd Lieutenant in June 1931; to 1st Lt in
November 1932 and Capt in January 1939. He returned to China in 1934 and served as the Naval Attache’ in
Shanghai, China and a student of the Chinese language. In 1936 he was order to Tokyo, Japan where he studied
the Japanese language for two years. He was assigned duty with Naval Intelligence in Hawaii prior to WW-II
breaking out and commended for his efficient performance of duty during the attack on December 7, 1941.
After war had broken out, he became a “Special Intelligence Officer” with the U.S. Pacific Fleet and became a
part of a Naval Advisory Group in Chungking, China. It was during this time he worked with Navy Radio
Security Station “F” (Intercept and Direction Finding), which was located in a place called “Happy Valley”
(Chungking, China). This station opened in September 1942 and LtCol Holcomb served there during the 1943
– 1944 period. During this period in support of the Nationalist Chinese he also took part in guerrilla warfare.
In a later stage of the war he participated in the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In 1949, he attended the
Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia and then assigned duty in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre as Chief
of Staff of the Pacific Fleet Marine Force on Guam. During the Korean War he served as the G-2, 1st Marine
Division and participated in action, which included the Chosin Reservoir (Changjin Reservoir). Upon leaving
Korea he served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence) Section of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.
(McIntire 3), (Naval Personal NCVA Vol. 7 No. 2, A-24), (Holcomb – 1) and (Simmons 10-12).
Navy Radio Security Station “F”
FRUPac, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
Holcomb remained in the Pearl Harbor area
for a while, but he was later ordered to China and
served with the Navy’s Intercept and DF Station in
Happy Valley, China from 1943 to 1944. There were
most likely other Marine officers working with the
Navy at this time, but their names have not yet been
identified.
Both Lasswell and Holcomb worked at
the FRUPac at Pearl Harbor during the early part
of World War II. Lasswell remained on station as
the Chief Translator until 1944.
52
Brigadier General
Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr.
36
(Online USMC Biographies Retired Generals)
BrigGen Bankson T. Holcomb was a cousin to General
Thomas Holcomb, the Seventeenth Commandant of the
Marine Corps from December 1, 1936 to December 31,
1943. It was on Gen Thomas Holcomb’s watch that orders
were given to form the Radio Intelligence Platoons of World
War-II in 1942. The first platoon was activated on June 14,
1943 at Camp Linda Vista, Camp Elliott, California. While
we cannot say BrigGen Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. had a hand
it, there is a strong possibility he gave some direct input
based on his position at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941
and his relationship to CMC. In addition, a young PVT
Banskson T. Holcomb served in the Beijing Legation Guard
Battalion from 1925 – 1927, when he was selected to attend
the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. He
returned to China in 1934 and began his Japanese linguist
training in Tokyo, Japan in 1936 (Holcomb, Bankson T – One).
37
Online Library of Selected Images:
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
901 M STREET SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto
(1884-1943)
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto planed the Pearl Harbor
attack on December 7, 1941. He also planed the attack on
the Island of Midway in early 1942, but he plans fell apart
thanks to a Marine officer, Major Alva B. “Red” Lasswell,
who recovered key code groups and translated the one of
the most important messages of WWII. This was the US
Navy’s turning point in the war, as they completely
dominated the Battle of Midway.
Admiral Yamamoto was educated in the United States,
attending Harvard University in 1919 to study English.
He returned to the U.S.A in 1926, as the Japanese naval
attaché in Washington. He had little respect for the U.S.
Navy and referred to them as a group of golfers and bridge
players, but he did have respect for the abilities of
Americans as a nation (Navy 1).
Photographs Curtsey of the Lasswell Family
(James & John Lasswell)
38
Lasswell playing chess with Ham Wright (USN) in their
quarters. In later life, Lasswell became quite a golfer too. It
appears Lasswell, while self-educated, was given this talent for a
reason. At any rate, he took the Japanese admiral down the hard
way. Ham Wright was also a key player in the Dungeon, but much
of their work still remains hidden in the archives of time.
(MCCHR PP 3145-08).
53
The Marine That Turned the Tide in World War II
MIDWAY
and then took down
JAPANESE ADMIRAL ISOROKU YAMAMOTO
(Who planned the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941)
Colonel Alva Bryan “Red” Lasswell (USMC)
Colonel Alva Bryan “Red” Lasswell was raised in Piggott, Arkansas from 1905 to 1921. He initially
tried to enlist in the Marine Corps as the age of 13 at Jonesboro, Arkansas, but was not accepted at that time.
His dream of being a Marine remained strong in his mind and in 1925 he found himself headed for Marine
Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD), Paris Island, South Carolina. He was commissioned to 2nd Lt in 1929 and
found himself doing Marine Barracks duty and three years of sea duty aboard the USS ARIZONA (BB-39).
In 1934, he became involved in rifle range activity and he taught FBI agents at Quantico, Virginia in the use
of small arms. In early 1935, he was assigned to the 5th Marines at Quantico, Virginia and mentioned to his
commanding officer during a briefing he was thinking about applying for language training. His
commanding officer told him it was a great idea and to go for it and then wrote Lasswell a two page
recommendation, which he hand carried for Lasswell to Washington, DC himself. In short order Lasswell
found himself in Washington, DC in the office of Naval Intelligence. During this time he met Captain Ken
Cornell, who had been to Japan for training and was now working for the Navy in Washington, DC. They
would meet again for in 1939, when Lasswell relieves Cornell in Shanghai, China at Navy Radio Security
Station “A” (Lasswell One 1 - 24).
After completing his Japanese language studies in Japan he was assigned duty with the Navy Radio
Security Station “C” in Cavite, Philippines, where he worked on Japanese military codes and translations. In
1939, he was transferred to Shanghai to assume the duty of the OIC of Station Alfa. Little did he know he
would be the last officer of the Shanghai station for its days were numbered and in December 1940 it was
deactivated. Most of the Navy enlisted personnel were transferred to Cavite, Philippines. They remained
there unit being relocated to Corregidor and disestablished in 1942.
54
According to Lasswell he had only worked on military targets during his time in the Philippines.
While the diplomatic codes were a bit different he had no problems learning how to decrypt and translate the
traffic. While all three of the Marine officers at the Shanghai station had language training and performed
similar duties…Lasswell stands out for other reasons. In addition to his abilities as a Japanese linguist he was
also highly skilled with weapons. Therefore, the CO of the Fourth Marines had use of those talents in July
1940, which will be covered in more detail under the Four Incidents in this volume.
Like the earlier enlisted Marines, the officers serving as the OIC of Navy Radio Security Station “A”
had cover titles for their assignments too. For example, both Capt Cornell and Capt Lasswell were listed on
the Fourth Marine Regiment’s rolls as “Assistant Public Relations Officers”. Therefore, if you review the
official records you will find no reference or mention of their involvement in Communication Intelligence.
This is also true concerning Lasswell’s duty with the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPac) at Pearl Harbor. He
is listed only as Fleet Staff, Pearl Harbor (MCCHR Files MR-3145 – 1 & MO-3145-6).
In 1940, Capt Alva B. “Red” Lasswell was ordered to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii as the Chief Translator for
CDR Joseph J. Rochefort. It appears he had made quite a name for himself as a Japanese linguist for he was
hand picked by Rochefort and he became part of a unique group known as “The Dungeon”. There were only
five key individuals that stood out according to CAPT Forrest R. “Tex” Biard (USN Retired) during his
speech to the National Cryptologic Museum Foundation on July 12, 2002. One of them was Lasswell.
According to CAPT Biard, Lasswell, was trained as a Japanese linguist from 1935 to 1938 in Tokyo, Japan.
CAPT Biard described Lasswell as our steady, dependable, long-enduring, right-as-rain Lou Gehrig type of
person. Also, Lasswell did not really want to be code-breaker, but rather a competition rifle shooter, but fate
had other plans for him (Aiken 1-7).
Prior to Pearl Harbor being attacked on December 7, 1941, Lasswell became the Chief Translator in
the Communications Security Intelligence Unit headed by CDR Joseph J. Rochefort, USN (Congress - 1) &
(Navy - 2). This was a trying period because this group had only begun its operation on May 1, 1941. Several
of the officers had only recently been trained in Japanese language, which explains the reason Rochefort
wanted Lasswell. With only 10 officers and 30 enlisted men they began their work in the basement of the
Administration Building in Pearl Harbor…and that basement was known as “The Dungeon” (Aiken 1-7).
On April 13, 1943, Major Lasswell decodes and translates a Japanese naval message that becomes part
of Navy history. That message informed us that Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto would be flying from the
Japanese-held island of Rabaul to the Island of Bougainville. It gave the details of his escort fighters and the
exact time of his arrival. With this information ADM Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S.
Pacific Fleet began the process of planning to attack Yamamoto’s aircraft on April 18, 1943, which was the
55
first anniversary of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo. The final planners of this mission were: ADM Mitscher;
BrigGen Field Harris; CDR Stanhop C. Ring; Col Edwin L. Pugh and Maj John P. Condon (Goliath 1-3).
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family – 2007
(James and James Lasswell)
A letter of commendation dated November 24, 1934 from the
Director of the F. B. I. in Washington, DC.
MCCHR File MC 3145 – 5
56
ORGANIZATION and PERSONNEL
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, DEC. 7, 1941
RADM Claude C. Bloch...............................Commandant, Hawaiian Naval Sea Frontier, Pearl
Harbor Navy Yard and Commander Task Force 4, United States Pacific Fleet.
CAPT J. B. Earle..........................................Chief of Staff
CAPT Irving H. Mayfield.............................Intelligence Officer
LT William B. Stephensen ...........................Counterespionage Section
CDR Joseph J. Rochefort .............................Communication Security (Intelligence Unit)
Col Alva B. Lasswell (USMC) .....................Translator/Cryptanalyst *
LTJG F. C. Woodward .................................Cryptanalyst
CDR Wesley A. Wright................................Assistant Communications Officer (TAD Assignment)
(Pearl Harbor 4)
* Listed as a Colonel, but he was a Marine Corps Captain at this time.
FIVE KEY OFFICERS OF THE DUNGEON
CAPT Forrest R. “Tex” Biard (USN Retired)
CDR Joseph J. Rochefort .............................Early Japanese Linguist (1929)
CDR Joe Finnegan ......................................Trained in Japan 1934-1937 (Linguist/Cryptanalyst)
LTCDR Thomas H. Dyer .............................Cryptanalyst
Maj Alva B. “Red” Lasswell ........................Trained in Japan 1935-1938 (Linguist/Cryptanalyst)
LTCDR Wesley A. Wright ...........................Cryptanalyst
(Aiken 3-4 & 6-7)
The Battle of Midway has long captured the hearts and minds of all Americans and it was an event
made for movies…and without question the movie Midway stands out as being one of the best movies ever
made. Yet, that attack on June 4, 1942 only dealt with the action parts of war. Prior to this great battle each
of these Dungeon members helped equally for their work on the Japanese Code JN-25. Long hours in a
basement working day and night is truly a part of being a cryptanalyst and translator…and Lasswell was one
of them. Later they did move into a better area because the unit expanded and it became apparent they were
doing important work that was noticed immediately by ADM Nimitz and other high ranking naval officers.
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family
(James & John Lasswell)Photographs Curtsey of the Lasswell Family
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family
(James & John Lasswell)
(James & John Lasswell)
39
Major Alva B. Lasswell, his wife, Betty (former Betty
Pearce) and unknown Navy couple, believed to be Jack
Holtwich and his wife. His picture was taken prior to their
wives being evacuated to the mainland after the attack on Pearl
Harbor, T. H. on December 7, 1941. While Lasswell wanted to
remain within the Marine Corps at this time…his expertise out
weighed that consideration. He had become a master translator
by this time with good cryptanalytic abilities. CDR Rochefort
knew what he was doing and in the early 1942 his hand-picked
Marine - did the unthinkable (Lasswell One 35) & (MCCHR PP 314508).
57
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family – 2007
(James and James Lasswell)
Captain Alva B. Lasswell’s orders to Shanghai, China dated on May 27, 1939 in relieve of Captain Kenneth H.
Cornell, U.S. Marine Corps
MCCHR File MC 3145 – 36
58
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family – 2007
(James and James Lasswell)
Captain Alva B. Lasswell’s duty assignment orders to Shanghai, China dated on June 29, 1939 as the Assistant
Public Relations Officer in relieve of Captain Kenneth H. Cornell, U.S. Marine Corps
MCCHR File MC 3145 – 35 A
59
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family – 2007
(James and John Lasswell)
Colonel Alva Bryan “Red” Lasswell Military History Record
MCCHR File MC 3145-32B
40
41
(From MCCHR Historic Files MP 3114)
(Unknown Source)
MCCHR Historic File MP 3113
(Unknown Source)
On July 7, 1933 the first intercept of the Japanese
Combined Fleet flagship, the “I.J.M.S.” Mutsu, which was in the
vicinity of Bako, Formosa (now Taiwan) indicated the initial
commencement of Japanese Naval exercise in that area.
60
USS AUGUSTA (CA-31) – 1935
Sgt Lesko served aboard this ship from January to
June 12, 1935 where he served as an intercept operator
during port visits to Yokohama and Kobe, Japan. In was
on this ship he made a name for himself. He left this
ship to join up with Capt Zern and then started building
the new radio station in Shanghai, China.
COLONEL ALVA BRYAN LASSWELL
Military Timeline
(MCCHR 3145 – 30 A - C Files)
1905 – Born at Walpole, Illinois in January 5, 1905. Moved to Piggott, Arkansas at the age of four months
(Lasswell One, 1) & (Lasswell Seven).
1910 – Attended school in Piggott and Rector, Arkansas until 1921 (Lasswell One, 1).
1918 – Attempted to enlist in the Marines at Jonesboro, Arkansas (age 13) (Lasswell One, 1).
1921 – Moved to Blackwell, Oklahoma to find employment (Lasswell One, 5).
1925 – Enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and ordered to Paris Island, South Carolina for recruit
training (Lasswell One, 10).
1926 – He was assigned duty at the Paris Island Post Exchange (Lasswell One, 12) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1927 – Made Private First Class (PFC) (Lasswell One, 12).
1928 – Made Corporal (Cpl). Recommended for Sergeant, but no openings available at that time (Lasswell
One, 12).
1928 – May 1928 to June 7, 1929 assigned Officer’s Candidate School (OCS) in Washington, DC (8th and I
Street, Marine Barracks). Graduated September and commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, USMC (Lasswell
One, 12-13) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1929 – June 8, 1929 to June 23, 1930 assigned to Officer Basic School (OBS) near Hershey, Pennsylvania
(Lasswell One, 13-14) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1930 – Assigned duty at Marine Barracks, Hampton Roads, Virginia (Lasswell One, 16 & 17) & (Lasswell Four,
3145-32).
1931 –Volunteered for duty in Nicaragua, but he received orders for sea duty (U.S. ARIZONA BB-39) - (2 ½
years May 6, 1931 to August 12, 1933) (Lasswell One, 18) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1933 –August 12, 1933 to January 15, 1934 assigned duty at Marine Barracks, Bremerton, Washington
(Lasswell One, 21a) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1934 – Assigned to Flight School, Pensacola, Florida. Class cut short by Act of Congress, returned to duty
(Lasswell One, 21 a & b) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1934 – Assigned duty with 5th Marines, Quantico, Virginia. Orders changed to rifle range duty (Lasswell One,
22) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1934 – Assigned Rifle Range duty…and taught FBI agents at Quantico, Virginia – Received a
Commendation Letter from the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover (Lasswell One, 22) & (Lasswell Four,
3145 – 5).
1935 – Reassigned duty with the Fifth Marines, Quantico, Virginia (Lasswell One, 22 & 24) & (Lasswell Four, 3145
-32).
1935 – Applied for Japanese language training…accepted and initially assigned HQTRS MC from July 15,
1935 to July 31, 1935 (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1935 – July 31, 1935 to August 31, 1938 assigned duty in Tokyo, Japan for language training (Lasswell One,
23) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1936 – Fall of 1936 promoted to the rank of Captain (Lasswell One, 27).
1938 – Married Betty Pearce on June 3, 1938, Japan (Lasswell One, 28 & 29).
1938 – Graduated Language training and transferred to Cavite, Philippines. Introduced to cryptanalytic work
and work as a linguist on Japanese traffic at Navy Radio Security Station “C” from August 31, 1938 to
June 27, 1939 (Lasswell One, 30) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1939 – Transferred to Shanghai, China, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) Navy Radio Security Station “A” and
worked in both cryptanalytic and linguist duties on diplomatic traffic from June 27, 1939 to July 13,
1940. Under the control of the Command-in- Chief, Asiatic Fleet, located with the Fourth Marines
(Lasswell One, 31), (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32), (Lasswell Four, 3145-35A/B) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-36).
61
1940 – In July 1940, Major Japanese incident in Shanghai, China involving Communication Intelligence
(Lasswell One, 32), (Lasswell Three, 46-47) & (Okins A32- & A33).
1940 – September or October 1940, returned to Marine Corps duty. Company Commander and 3rd Battalion
Commander (CO) in the 8th Marines, Camp Elliot, California - July 13, 1940 to April 15, 1941
(Lasswell One, 33) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1940 – In the winter of 1940/41, assigned duty to interview possible officer candidates with Japanese
language backgrounds (Lasswell One, 33).
1941 – Assigned duty from April 15, 1941 to October 1944, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (Hawaii) Staff Pacific
Officer in the Fourteen Naval District as Officer-in-Charge of Marine Corps Language School,
University of Hawaii (Lasswell One, 33-34) & (Lasswell Four, 3145 -32).
1941 – Around May, reassigned to Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPac) as the Chief Code and Translator
Section within the unit under Lt. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort in the Communication Intelligence
Unit (OP-20-G). (Lasswell One, 33-34).
1942 – Broke or recovered code groups and translated the Japanese message containing the Japanese plan to
attack the Island of Midway. Informed Admiral Chester Nimitz of the exact time and location and was
put in for the Distinguish Service Medal (DSM) by Admiral Nimitz. (He never received it.) (Lasswell
One, 37-38), (Lasswell Four, 3145-3) & (Lasswell Four 3145-4).
1943 – Broke or recovered code groups and translated message with the Itinerary of Japanese Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto. The Army Air Corps ambushed him based on this intelligence derived from
LtCol Alva B. Lasswell, USMC (Lasswell One, 39) & (Lasswell Three 6).
1943 – Letter of Commendation and Recommendation from Admiral C. W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, U.
S. Pacific Fleet to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for period of May 7, 1941 to September 2,
1943 (Lasswell Four, MCCA 3145 – 3).
1944 – Letter of Commendation dated May 15, 1944 from Officer-in-Charge, United States Fleet Radio Unit
(FRUPac), Captain W. B. Goggins (USN) (Lasswell Four, MCCA 3145 – 4).
1944 – Assigned from October 44 to October 25, 1945 to Negat, Washington, DC, Naval Communication
Intelligence Department (Lasswell One, 39) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1945 – Advanced to Colonel on January, 1945 (Lasswell Three, 3145-13).
1945 – After the end of WW-II OP-20-G authorized him returning to the regular Marine Corps for duty
(Lasswell One, 40).
1945 – After the war had ended assigned duty from October 25, 1945 to July 17, 1946 as the OIC of the MC
Separation Center, Naval Station, Bainbridge, Maryland (Lasswell One, 41) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1946 – On March 25, 1946 awarded the Legion of Merit Medal (Lasswell Four, 3145-40).
1946 – On July 17, 1946, received orders to report to Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for
assignment (Lasswell One, 42).
1946 – Ordered to the 1st Marine Division, Tientsin, China, as the Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division – July
17, 1946 to July 6, 1947 (Lasswell One, 42) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-21).
1947 – In transit Col Lasswell became the Commanding Officer, 1st Marine Division, the only Colonel to ever
command the 1st Marine Division, arriving back in the U.S.A on the 4th of July, 1947. He turned the
command over to Major General Erskine on the 5th of July, 1947 (Lasswell One, 43).
1947 – Assumed duty as the Commanding Officer, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st MarDiv, Camp Pendleton,
California from July 6, 1947 to May 15, 1948 (Lasswell One, 43) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1948 – From May 15, 1948 to June 23 1950 he assumed duty as Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks,
Yokosuka, Japan (Lasswell One, 43) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1950 – In August 1950, assigned duty under instructions of Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Lasswell
One, 43) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1951 – Assigned duty at Headquarters Marine Corps, as the assignment officer for Marine Corps Colonels
and Generals from July 7, 1951 to November 16, 1953 (Lasswell One 43-44) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
62
1953 – Assumed duty as CO of the Supply Depot…no combat command was consider because his past work
for the Navy in Top Secret Ultra work. The second assignment while in Korea was as an Advisor to
the Commanding General of the Korean Marine Brigade (Lasswell One, 44) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1954 – Assigned duty as Chief of Staff, MCRD, San Diego, CA from October 12, 1954 to April 16, 1956.
Passed over for Brigadier General (Lasswell One, 45) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-32).
1955 – Passed over for Brigadier General for the last time. Was not honored with a Tombstone Ranking for
reasons unknown (Lasswell One, 45).
1956 – Retired from active duty on April 1, 1956…MCRD, San Diego, California with 31
years of military service (Lasswell One, 45) & (Lasswell Four, 3145-31).
42
43
Photographs Curtsey of the Lasswell Family
(James and John Lasswell)
(1942-44 Circa)
Colonel Alva Bryan “Red” Lasswell enjoying his pipe and a nice day in Hawaii. He worked at the
Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific from May 1941 through October 1944…and then at the Washington, DC unit
known as “Negat” until October 1945. He was promoted to full colonel in January 1945.
He worked in the Navy Communication Intelligence from 1938 through 1945. He was known for
his mastery of the Japanese language and ability to recover codes groups other found hard to break or
recover. In 1942, his work on the Japanese intercepted traffic had a major effect on the war effort and
gave the U.S. Navy their first major victory…at the Battle of Midway. He also provided the Itinerary of
Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who was shot down on April 18, 1943.
MCCHR PP3145 – 09 File
63
THE JAPANESE MOVE TOWARD WAR
In the Marine Corps Cryptologic Association Radio Log dated Spring-1993 LtCol Palmer “Pete”
Brown wrote, “The Japanese Navy’s communications posture was changing rapidly during the decade of
1930s. Previously, during the 1920s, the average observation of a typical Japanese naval radio circuit was
that there were wavering radio operator proficiency standards, especially with respect to speed and caliber
of operator. Still further, there was a very poor circuit discipline. Also, there were indications that radio
equipment employed by the shore activities and fleet units at sea were very heterogeneous and of generally
inferior quality both as to design and construction. This was evidenced by a variation in individual ships
keeping on assigned frequencies, transmitter malfunctions, and differences in tones of transmission.
However, by the early 1930s this situation had changed. The Japanese Navy’s standards were adjudged to
have been comparable to those of the U.S. Navy. Observations were made at different times of the Japanese
radio operators and their sending manually (by hand) at a rate of 30 groups a minute for two and three hours
without a break or error. Constant communications drills, of increasing complexity, were noted and their
signal security posture was greatly improving. Then with the introduction of more power equipment and
frequency management, as well the shifting of call signs the new Japanese Navy was becoming very
professional in their communication skills and management procedures” (BrownVol-3, 8-10).
Moving Into the 1930s
In addition to training intercept operators the Navy embarked on training of Traffic Analysts (T/A)
Cryptanalysts (C/A) and Processing and Reporting (P/R) personnel. This was evident during the early 1930s
as they continued to set records as pioneers in SIGINT. While there is nothing to show any Marines were
trained in any of these areas at that time, it appears the some Marine officers did acquire one or more of these
skills. For example, Lesko mentioned in his 1982 NSG interview he thought Capt Zern was attempting some
analysis of intercepted traffic during the 1935-1937 periods. In that same interview Lesko states he
graduated from the Naval Cryptologic School in Washington, DC prior to being ordered to Shanghai in 1935
(Naval A-8) and (Newman 6, 22, 25 & 26).
The Mukden Incidents
There was a unique event that took place in Manchuria when a bomb exploded at the Japanese
operated railway at Liutiaokou (Liutiaogu), which was a suburb of Mukden, Manchuria. The Japanese
military took immediate actions by moving their troops from Korea to the area. While this incident has been
referred to as the Mukden Incident it should be noted that there was another Mukden Incident that happened
years earlier. For the sake of clarity both accounts will be reviewed.
64
The 1913 Mukden Incident
The Mukden Incident actually occurred in 1913 as this is considered the starting point in which the
Japanese began their quest to establish control of Manchuria. Their goal was to override the Russian interest
in Manchuria following the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. They achieved this with the aid of powerful
local warlords, which also kept them from having to move a large military force to the area at that time. Also
at this time the total military strength of the Kwantung Army amounted to only about 10, 400 troops (Funk
361).
The 1931 Mukden Incident
The 1931 incident was actually the Liutiaokou Incident. Shenyang, which was formerly Mukden,
went through a name change long before 1931. Liutiaokou is located near Mukden and therefore, some
people might have decided to use the larger city’s name. On 18 September 1931, a unique event occurred
when the Beijing intercept site copied Japanese traffic. Cpl Lesko was the sole operator on watch. Suddenly
he encountered a tremendous upsurge in priority traffic on the Japanese Diplomatic Circuits. Lesko reported
this to CRM Max C. Gunn that, “Something’s happening out there. They went crazy early this morning even
before it was even daylight.” Actually what had happened following an alleged explosion on the tracks of the
Japanese-operated railway at Liutiaokou (Liutiaogou), which was suburb of Mukden, Manchuria and Gen
Hayassahi, commander of Japanese army forces in Korea, commenced deploying elements of his Kwantung
Army units into Manchuria. By the end of the day he had seized Mukden. Neither the Japanese Foreign
Officer nor the Imperial General Staff had knowledge of the “incident” until after it had occurred.
Essentially, the Japanese government had to accept the accomplished fact and explain it as best it could to the
rest of the world. Although the Sino-Japanese conflict was localized at that time, it nonetheless presaged the
holocaust of a decade later (Edgerton 238 – 239), (Funk 361) and (Newman 4 & 5)
Navy Department reaction to the Mukden Incident was two-fold, and perhaps best indicates the
Beijing site’s value to Navy Cryptology at the time. On 23 December 1931 the CNO (OP-20-G) sent a letter
to CINCAF (CIC Asiatic Fleet) in which it cited from its perspective the increasing threat to the intercept site
as a result of the situation in Manchuria and attendant possibility of disturbances in the vicinity of Beijing.
The letter went on to state (Naval A-2),
“It is therefore suggested that the Intercept Station, Peiping {sic}, be moved…at the earliest time that
is practicable without undue interference with its current activities. A permanent location should be of
sufficient size to accommodate a total of eight receivers.” (Naval A-2).
65
It is only about 400 miles from Mukden to Beijing.
Therefore, we can understand why the Navy wanted to
move the intercept site to a safer location.
MCCA Historic Files (circa 1927 – 1942)
As noted in the written history, the 1931 Incident was at Liutaiokou, which was a smaller town near Mukden. The actual
Mukden Incident occurred in 1913 and the 2nd incident, occurred in 1931. Therefore, we can see the Japanese had been in place a long
time. Prior to the 1931 incident the Japanese used local warlords as a means of controlling the area. However, after this incident they
began to take military control by using their own troops.
(Renamed Shenyang in 1948: Funk. Volume 23, p361.).
66
MCCHR Historic File – MM 3112-1
Traffic Analysis Chart
Of the Japanese Naval Radio Circuits for 1930’s
67
A Critical Date - 1931
There is no doubt that Cpl Lesko had intercepted some unique messages and it marked an important
day and a turning point in the Japanese military conquest of all Manchuria and China. And while it has been
flagged as the Mukden Incident by several individuals it was actually called the Liutiaogou Incident by the
Japanese authorities. And rightfully so, as this was the actual location where the incident took place...and not
Mukden. However, in the initial stages of the Japanese push into Manchuria many of the Japanese called it
the “China Incident” to avoid mounting problems with the local Chinese. Their reasoning was to keep the
Chinese Communists from thinking the Japanese real target was the communists...especially the Russians
whom they saw as a real threat (Edgerton 236 - 239).
On the 19th of September the Japanese Government decided to localize the incident and sent that
decision to the Kwantung Army Headquarters. The Japanese command simply ignored their orders and
proceeded to expand its operations. Within a few months the Japanese Kwantung Army had seized most of
the major cities and towns throughout all of Manchuria. This was the beginning period when the Japanese
military officers began exercising their own policies in a forceful manner. Japanese leadership in Tokyo
became weaker and over the next few years there was growing insubordination throughout the Japanese
military officer ranks as the winds of war were starting to stir.
Legitimate Insubordination
Many American political and military authorities of that period believed that the Japanese military
officers instigated the “Liutiaogou Incident”. Actually it was a unilateral or arbitrary action taken by General
Senjuro Hayashi using an old method of acting independent of the government. This unique Japanese
concept is known as “gekokujo”, which means figuratively as ”legitimate insubordination.” It was first
employed in the Fifteenth Century as a term to describe an act of rebellion that was deemed by it perpetrators
to be in the best interest of the nation. Within the Japanese society it was thought of as a mitigating factor and
viewed with sympathetic reasoning (Edgerton 236 - 239).
The true measure of these earlier Marines and Sailors intercepting the Japanese electronic mail cannot
be underestimated in that they were truly needed at this time. While politicians in the United States were
shifting funds away from the military, the naval leadership continued to support of intelligence gathering in a
meaningful way…and for good reasons. The Japanese military began to become heavy handed in political
areas resulting in factional clashes of ideology, which led to many changes. The lower-ranking officers
became more insubordinate and senior officers seemed helpless. These younger officers were seen as being
cocky and conceited because of their youth, but seldom, if ever, were they punished for their insubordination.
As a matter of fact many of them committed
68
45
44
(Circa 1930-33)
MCCHR File MP 3544
(Circa 1937)
SENJURO HAYASHI
33rd Prime Minister of Japan
Lieutenant General
In 1930(?), LtGen Senjuro Hayashi, was made Commander in Chief of the Chosen Army, in Korea.
On the day after the Mukden Incident on September 19th, he ordered the Imperiel Japanese Infantry (IJI) 20th
Division to split its force, forming the 39th Mixed Brigade. The Japanese cabinet disagreed with the army,
suspecting that the Mukden Incident was a conspiracy by Japanese army officers. Without authorization by
the emperor, Hayashi ordered the 39th Mixed Brigade to depart that same day for Manchuria. The Japanese
cabinet finally gave in to the military authority and the 39th Mixed Brigade was officially authorized on
September 22, 1930(?).
Copyright Information: Photographic images were published before December 31st, 1956, or photographed before
1946 and not published for 10 years thereafter, under jurisdiction of the Government of Japan. Thus, photographic
images are considered to be public domain according to article 21 of old copyright law of Japan and article 2 of
supplement provisions of copyright law of Japan (http://wiki/image-Senjuro-Hayashi) &
(www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/souris/33.html).
Remarks: The date mentioned above “1930” is in question. Other sources inform us this incident occurred in
September 1931 vice 1930. In addition, the Letter of Commendation concerning this incident was given to the Beijing
Naval Radio Intercept Operators on March 8, 1932 (MO 3111), (Edgerton 236-239) & (Newman 15 & 23).
69
outrageous actions only to be transferred to some other unit. Later many general officers failed to keep this
under control as the trend swept through the army, which lead to senior officers being unable to give any
orders without weighing the opinions of the junior officers (Edgerton 236 - 239).
As the senior officer ranks began to change so did the attitudes of the Japanese civilian leaders and
naval commanders. The Japanese Navy had an ongoing battle with the army officers in order to gain funding
for their own projects. As they had to fight for every penny they got. However, the tactical thinking of the
Japanese commanders was also of major concern and in a state of change. After World War I, the Japanese
Army General Staff began to speculate about the conduct of future warfare based on their ability to re-supply
their military. The general feeling was they could not fight a drawn-out war. In order to overcome this
dilemma they made major changes in their overall strategy plans. First, they would position themselves in
specific locations prior to executing any attack; Second, they would not declare war in advance and initiate
hostile actions by surprising the enemy; And third, they would not take any immediate actions, other than low
keyed advances until the appropriate time. Thus, they kept these operational fundamentals in place until
1941. Yet, through good intelligence American commanders could see a buildup was taking place, which
meant future hostile actions were sure to come. Like good weather forecasters they could see that a storm
was heading their way and they intended to be ready for it...or at least as ready as they could be at that
juncture in time (Edgerton 236 - 239).
MCCHR Historic File 3545
September 19, 1931
46
JAPANESE TROOPS ENTER
MANCHURIA
Japanese troops entered Manchuria, China on
September 18, 1931 on orders for LtGen Senjuro
Hayashi on September 19, 1931. The Japanese plan was
to have a valid reason to move military troops into this
region. They caused an explosion in Liutaiogou and
blamed it on the Chinese, which was only a pretext for
the formal invasion.
Copyright Information
The Japanese entered Manchuria as a legitimate
measure to protect a vital railway of the industrial and
economic importance. The Japanese news media called the
site Liutiaogou (Liutiao Ditch) and (Liutiao Bridge), but it
was really just a small railway section. On September 19, the
Japanese artillery opened fire from their location in Mukden
and 500 Japanese soldiers move against some 7,000 Chinese
troops. However, they were no match against the Japanese
well trained troops Most of the Chinese were new conscripts
with no military training (http://wikipedia.org/wki/mMuken-
Photographic images were published before December
31st, 1956, or photographed before 1946 and not
published for 10 years thereafter, under jurisdiction of
the Government of Japan. Thus, photographic images
are considered to be public domain according to article
21 of old copyright law of Japan and article 2 of
supplement provisions of copyright law of Japan
(http: www.kantei.go.jp/jp/rekidai/souris/33.html).
Incident).
70
FIRST INTERCEPT OPERATOR AWARD
Private First Class Charles J. Smith (USMC)
Other Marines also contributed to the ongoing gathering of intelligence in 1932. PFC Charles J. Smith
was one of them. According to Lesko all of the operators were given this award, but only one copy of it has
come to light. PFC Charles J. Smith was awarded this Letter of Commendation dated 8 March 1932 by the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Ben Herhard Fuller. The Commandant letter stated (MO
3111 & Newman 22):
71
MCCHR Historic File MP 3110
(Circa 1932)
PFC CHARLES J. SMITH
(Beijing, China)
Navy Radio Security Station “A”
This was the first known award to be given to
cryptologic Marines. According to LtCol Lesko
all of the operators who worked at the station were
given this award in early 1932. He said, they
mentioned to him it was especially true for the last
six months, which would include the Mukden
Incident. Lesko also stated, “That person had the
decency to call on us and say good work, boys,
now you know you’re appreciated.” (Newman 22).
47
50
Circa 1935 -36
48
49
PVT Jospeh A. Petroksy, Jr.
MCCHR Historic Files – PP 3120
48. Gentleman “Joe”…PVT Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. at Washington, DC in
1933. He was in OTRG Class 12.
49. PVT Joseph A. Petrosky and two unidentified Marines in front of the
YMCA in Manila, Philippines (Circa 1935-36).
50. PVT Jospeh A. Petrosky.
51. Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. and his sister visiting Tijuana, Mexico in 1939.
51
72
3
1
4
2
5
MCCHR Historic File MO 3154
Headquarters Company
Legation Guard Unit Diary, Beijing, China
Detached Marines – February 15, 1935
There were security concerns about communications intelligence during this period of history that had two faces to
it. One was from the Japanese and the other from the politicians like Henry L. Stimson. This is demonstrated by the fact that
the American Minister to China was unaware of Navy Radio Security Station “A” activity within his legation. This resulted
in some of the first covered-assignments for Marine Corps intercept operations. For example, in the February 15, 1935 Unit
Diary for the Marines being detached both PVT Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. and PVT Norman F. Robertson are listed as regular
radio operators. In fact they both graduates from OTRG Class 12 in 1934 and assigned duty with the Legation Guard in
Beijing and now they were being transferred to Shanghai to work at the new station site that Sgt Lesko and Capt Zern were
putting together. Each radio operator is identified in the above Unit Diary by number (1 through 5) as a Radio Operator in
the Signal Platoon. Yet, they were in fact “Orange Men” who copied Japanese diplomatic traffic, which was not authorized
by the civilian authority. Remember what happened to Yardley just a few years earlier. The military leadership learned to
cover all bases concerning such matters.
73
MILITARY WAR COLOR CODES
The United States military designed a War Color Code during the 1920’s to identify other nations by
color rather than nation’s name. This included both friendly and enemy forces. This listing changed from
time to time and is only an example of what was used during this period of history. Notice the color
“Orange” is used in several places in this book to describe or make reference to the individuals or Japanese
traffic. Since the Japan was given this color and we are dealing primarily with the Pacific area. Therefore,
the color “Orange” takes on a special meaning.
COLOR
COUNTRY
Black
Germany
Blue
Brown
Carnation
Citron
Crimson
Emerald
Garnet
Gold
Gray
Green
Indigo
Lemon
Olive
Represents the USA
Philippines
Manchukuo (Manchuria)
Brazil
Canada
Ireland
New Zealand
France
Central America
Mexico
Iceland
Portugal
Spain
Orange
Japan
Pink
Purple
Red
Ruby
Saffron
Scarlet
Russia
Latin America
Britain
India
China
Australia
Silver
Italy
Tan
Violet
White
Yellow
Cuba
Caribbean
U. S. Domestic Disorders
China
Three enemy nations highlighted above: Germany is Black, Italy is Silver and Japan is Orange. Marine
intercept operators worked only in the Pacific theater at that time. Therefore, they make no reference to any
of the other colors.
74
UNITES STATES NAVAL STATION DESIGNATORS
The United States Navy Station Designators used in the Pacific War Theater from 1925 through the
end of World War II are shown. The are as follows:
DESIGNATOR
LOCATION
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
D
E
F
F
F
F
F
G
H
H
H
H
H
Beijing (Peiping or Peking), China (1927 – 1935)
Shanghai, China (1935 – 1940)
Guam (October 1944)
Libugon, Guam (Marianas) (1929)
Bar Harbor, Maine (June 1930)
Melbourne, Australia (1942)
Belconnen, Australia (?)
Olongapo, PI (est. Established 1930)
Mariveles, PI
Cavite, PI
Corregidor Island, PI (est. Disestablished 1942)
Chatham, Massachusetts (October 1942)
Flagship Asiatic Fleet
USS GOLDSTAR (AG-12) (station at Guam)
USS TRENTON (CL-11)
USS OMAHA (CL-4) (Disestablished Sept. 1940)
Kweilin, China ->
Kunming, China ->
FRUCHI Chungking, China (est. 1942-45)
Amagansett, Long Island, NY (est 1939)
Heela. Hawaii
Lualualei, Hawaii
Wailupe, Hawaii
Wahiawa, Hawaii
Station H established in 1925 to 1928, and reestablished in 1931. It was never located at Pearl
Harbor. (Intercept Station Hypo)
NOTE: Marines worked at Navy Radio Security Station “A” until 1938. Prior to joining the Shanghai site in
1935, LtCol Lesko also worked on the USS AUGUSTA (CA-31), but that ship did not have a Radio Station
Designator assigned to it at that time. Also, there are no records or references made to any other Marines
(enlisted or officers) working at any other intercept station during this period of history – 1927 to 1940 (NCVA
166 & 167).
75
EARLY NAVY DIRECTION FINDING
While the early Marine Corps intercept operators did not become involved with Navy Direction
Finding (DF) efforts during their time in China there were attempts to do so. However, LtCol Stephen Lesko
told his interviewer they never engaged in any direction finding at the Beijing station and that he did not
recall any DF gear at all. He indicated there could have been some DF after the 1938 period (Newman 9, 29 &
30). It appears that the attempts came after Navy intercept operators started to merge into the Shanghai station
after 1935. For example, the Navy made a recommendation in February 1935 to send DF equipment to
Shanghai following the arrival of personnel at the station. At that time they listed 1 (one) intermediate
frequency radio direction finder (IFDF). However, the next information concerning DF equipment was sent
to them in June 1938. That equipment was included: 1 Model DR portable DF set (200-18,000kHz) and 1
Model DG DF set (100-1000kHz). The Model DG DF equipment had been received by the Quartermaster,
Fourth Marines from the New York Navy Yard several years earlier…June 25, 1935. According to that repot
it had been previously installed on the USS New York (BB-34). In that report it stated that no work had been
done concerning it because of space limitations at the station (Naval A-12).
Intercept Equipment of Beijing and Shanghai Stations
There is not much information concerning the Beijing station equipment, but the Shanghai station
does detail the equipment they used during most of that station’s life. In the Lesko interview he states they
had trouble getting parts and were thankful to get any supplies during his days in Beijing. Also the radio
receivers at the Shanghai station were powered by batteries and in his days he did some personal
modifications to get better usage out of the HF receivers (Newman 12 & 21).
On the other hand, the Navy did send out official disposition reports that detailed the equipment that
was being used or on hand from October 1931 to January 1940. They are as follows:
1. Beijing Navy Radio Intercept Station.
October 31, 1931 (Naval A-2)
December 1934 (Naval A-3)
? – Model RF low frequency (LF) receiver
2 – Model RF (IF) receivers
1 – Model RF low frequency (LF) receiver
2 – Model RF (LF) receivers
1 – Model RT high frequency (HF) receiver
3 – Model RT (HF) receivers
1 – Model RG high frequency (HF) receiver
1 – Model (HF) receiver
76
February 15, 1935 (Naval A-8)
2 low frequency (LF) receivers
2 intermediate frequency (IF) receivers
2 high frequency measuring devices
1 intermediate frequency radio direction finder (IFDF)
2. Shanghai Navy Radio Intercept Station.
July 1938 (Naval A-10)
1 Model RAA LF/IF receiver w/power pack
2 Model RAB HF receivers w/power packs
3 Model RT-2 HF receivers w/power packs for 220 AC operations
1 Model RS-1 HF receiver w/power pack for AC operation
1 Frequency Meter
2 CRV-50009 line amplifiers
1 220/380V AC generator
1 TBT generator, 220V DC
1 Model DR portable DF set (200-18,000 kHz)
1 Model DG DF set (100-1000kHz)
October 1938 (Naval A-12)
November 1938 (Naval A-12)
Model RAL-2 receiver
Mode HRO receiver
Model RAK-2 receiver
Type 1-10 National receiver
1 Mode RAB receiver
Tediphone
(on loan from USS Augusta)
(Consisting of 1 shaver, 2 recorders and
1 Ediphone and 1 amplifier
January 1940 (Naval A-14)
1 Model RAA LF receiver
1 Model RAB LF receiver
1 Model HRO HF receiver
1 Model RAK-2 LF-HF receiver
1 Model RAL-2 LF-HF receiver
3 Model RT-2 HF-2 HF receivers
1 Model RS-1 HF receiver
77
1 Model 1-1 National SHF receiver
1 Model DR portable DF set *
1 Model DR direction finder *
1 Model DG direction finder **
1 Model DT (XAB-HRO) HFDF ***
*
It was reported that no work had been accomplished with the Model DR direction finder due to a
shortage of personnel and a lack of suitable space for its operation.
**
The Model DG was to be turned in to the Cavite Radio Station, Philippines.
***
Was to be set up if conditions favored it, but things did not look good for DF operations.
January 1940 (Naval A-14)
September 1940 (Naval A-14)
1 Model HRO HF receiver
Model DR & Model DT direction finders
5 Model RAO HF receivers
(Turned in to be sent to Cavite, PI.)
1 Model RAK-2 RAL-2 LF-HF receivers
1 Model 1-1 National SHF receiver
1 Model DR
1 Model DT direction finder
Teledipone equipment had been dismantled.
THE END OF MARINE INTERCEPT DUTY IN CHINA
On February 12, 1936, CNO (OP-20-GX) sent a message requesting CMC, Major General John Henry
Russell, Jr., to establish permanent Marine Corps intercept operators. At that time they were being trained in
this critical skill, but only allowed to serve one tour of duty in it. The Navy felt the Marine Corps should
follow their example of establishing permanent assignments for them. They pointed out the need to increase
the same “(…) high standard of efficiency, morale, and loyalty to intercept duty as the Naval personnel (sic)”.
CMC had earlier approved permanent assignments for Marine intercept operators in a March 6, 1933 letter
(Naval A-9).
However, that was short lived when a letter dated September 23, 1937 informed the CO, Fourth
Marines the Marine Corps would not maintain a permanent quota of Marines due to a personnel shortages in
the Corps. This led to a withdrawal of Marine intercept operators (Naval A-12). It is during this period that
Marine intercept operators faded into the historic background of cryptology. Yet, some of them did remain in
the Corps and in later years called on again, which led to forming Marine RI Platoons during WW-II (Newman
25).
78
Beijing, Peking, Pekin
MCCHR Historic File MP 3505
1.
2.
3.
4.
The Mukden (Shenyang) area is where the 1913 Mukden Incident took place and the 1931 “China Incident” took place.
Beijing (also spelled Pekin, Peking and Peiping). According to LtCol Stephen Lesko it was spelled P-E-K-I-N during the 1928 – 1937 period.
This was also where the American Legation Guard was located. Beijing was the home of Naval Radio Security Station “A” from 1927 to July
28, 1935. Thus, the Marine Corps cryptologic history started at this location in 1927.
Tientsin, China was the home of Brigadier General Smedely D. Bulter’s 3rd Marine Brigade in 1927-1929.
Shanghai, China was the home of the Fourth Marine Regiment and Navy Radio Security Station “A” from July 1935 to December 1940.
According to LtCol Stephen Lesko it was about 900 miles from Beijing to Shanghai and took them about 40 days to make that trip by train.
(Edgerton 238 – 239), (Funk 361) & (Newmen 4-5 & 9)
79
CHIEF RADIOMEN STATION “A”
(Includes Beijing and Shanghai Stations)
1927 – 1929
1929? – 1931?
1931? - 1932
1932 – 1933
1932 – 1933
1933 – 1934
1934 – 1935
1935 - 1936
1937 – 1939
1939 – 1940
1940 – 1940
CRM Dorman A. Chauncey
CRM Max Gunn
CRM C. E. Reynolds
CRM C. E. Reynolds
CRM Clarence M. Reynolds
CRM Fred Lee Freeman
CRM Malcolm Wirt Lyon
CRM Daryl Wilkins Weigle
CRM Max Cellan Gunn
CRM Benjamin Groundwater
CRM Homer L. Kisner
(Newman 6 & 13)
(Newman 6 & 13)
(Newman 6)
(Naval A-2)
(MP 3150-1)
(Naval A-4)
(Naval A-4) *
(Newman 24) & (Naval A-11)
(Naval A-10)
(Naval A-10)
(Naval A-10)
* CRM Malcolm Wirt Lyon becomes a naval officer in later years. He is also one of the first individuals to learn the Japanese
Kata Kana Code and informed Captain L. F. Safford that they had an intercept site at Shanghai in 1924 (Naval A-6).
************************************************************
52
53
MCCHR File MP 3145
Circa 1938-45
MCCHR File MP 3145
(Photographer Unknown)
Circa 1938-40
(Photographer Unknown)
Brigadier General Alva B. Lasswell
3rd OIC Navy Radio Security Station “A”
Shanghai, China
Captain Kenneth H. Cornell
2 OIC Navy Radio Security Station “A”
Shanghai, China
nd
As a Major, Colonel, Lasswell was part of the Navy
Intelligence team in Hawaii on December 7, 1941. He was
hand picked Navy Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN as the
senior translator, Communication Intelligence Unit (Lasswell
Captain Cornell had trained in the Japanese
language in the early 1930s. He was working for
Naval Intelligence in Washington DC in 1935
Four & Five ), (Naval Personnel A-10) & (NSA 1).
(Lasswell Four & Five) & (Naval Personnel A- 3).
80
54
MCCHR File - 3392
Circa 1935 – 1936
(Photographer Unknown)
There are four individual in this picture. One is standing on the left, one in the window and the Marine guard and
PFC Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. identified and standing on the right. The actual date is unknown, but it has to be sometime in
1935 or 1936 because this was the period Petrosky was stationed at the Navy Radio Security Station “A” in Shanghai,
China.
55
56
MCCHR File 3401
Circa 1935-1936
55. U. S. Marine Corps Quartermaster Department, 4th Marines,
Shanghai, China.
56. Meteorological Antenna located
in the general area of the Radio
Quarters and behind the 4th Marines
Headquarters in Shanghai, China.
81
6
5
8
7
MCCHR Files MM 3498 (Naval A-13)
54 Marines Area – 1935
Shanghai, China Map of Fourth
1.
2.
3.
4.
Haiphong Road .
4th Marine Headquarters area.
Ferry Road (Runs toward the north. (See picture 43)
Hart and Sinza Roads.
82
5. Fourth Marines Headquarters
6. International Settlement
7. French Concession
8. Old City
FOUR UNIQUE INCIDENCES AT SHANGHAI
One thing that had been lacking in early Marine Corps intercept duties was the ability to provide direct
support to tactical commanders. Many Marine commanders could hardly get excited about the bigger picture
when they were faced with war up front and personal. Yet, in early stages of Marine cryptologic development
we needed a means to grow and learn and it was found in both Beijing and Shanghai. Without this training we
most likely would not have seen the development of the Marine Corps’ Radio Intelligence Platoons (RI/P) of
WW-II. While all the enlisted Marines had been pulled out of the intercept field by August 1938, the station
and mission continued to operate with Navy personnel and Capt Alva Harold Lasswell was the OIC (Naval A-10).
In 1940 the Japanese controlled and occupied all the area surrounding the International Settlement in
Shanghai. There were refugees from various nations all pushed into this community which could not feed
many of them…and therefore, starvation had become a common factor to deal with. Inflation had taken its
toll on all that lived in this community and the Japanese could care less, as it fit into their plans perfectly.
Therefore, it is not surprising to see events unfolding during this period, but there were four major incidents
that happened that need to be reviewed (Okins A-32 & A-033) & (Santelli 19 & 21).
The First Incident
The first one involved a Marine officer cussing out a Japanese officer at the local firing range. A
Japanese army officer, who appeared to be blind wanted to know what the Marines were shooting at? He was
told at the targets some 200 yards away. He wanted to inspect the targets and after being allowed to do so he
told the Marine officer it was not possible because no one could see targets that far away. The Marine officer
lost his cool and called the Japanese officer a few colorful Marine Corps expressions. However, it ended
when the Fourth Marine CO Col Dewitt Peck had the officer apologize for his remarks (Okins A-32 & A-33).
The Second Incident
The second incident demonstrated the nature of the times and situations involving those who were
stationed at the Shanghai Navy Radio Security Station. LtCol Lesko mentioned in his interview with
Newman that it was not the same for those who follow him to China. Lesko stated they had no restrictions
and they went just about anywhere at any time. Those who followed his time period (after 1937) did not have
the liberty in Beijing or Shanghai that Marines had, and stated it by saying, “On that you got shafted.” This
incident provides an idea of how times had changed over the years (Newman 10-11 & 20).
In E. E. Okins’ account of events in Shanghai in 1940 things had begun to heat up. He states there
was a very nice German restaurant within a short distance from the Fourth Marines Compound on Ferry Road
(See Page 70, item 3.). He liked going there because the food was great and the beer was even better. Since
Germany and Japan had signed a peace agreement they were considered allies…therefore, it was a safe place
to eat and have a few beers. Then one night a car pulled up in front of the restaurant and two Chinese
gentlemen stepped into the restaurant with Tommy Guns and killed everyone present. It was thought of as a
83
Chicago gang style killing and during the investigation it had exactly the same results. No one could
remember what they looked like, other than to say they looked like Chinese (Okins A-33).
The Third Incident
Another large community of foreigners in Shanghai in 1940 was the White Russian refugees. The
international settlement was only two blocks away from the Fourth Marines. They had a very nice settlement,
as their apartments were very modern and kept up nicely. Then one morning without noticing any problems,
a White Russian leader backed out of the complex into the street. His vehicle had stopped in the middle of
the street where a gunman was waiting in ambush to kill him (Okins A-33).
The Fourth Incident – Part One
(The First Known Tactical Use of SIGINT by a Marine Commander)
The fourth incident dealt with a plan that would undermine the Marine commander and the
international community as well, but because of alert signal intelligence operatives this story could have had a
different ending. In a decoded message, the Japanese mentioned, “…Admiral Glassford should have been in
the diplomatic service. He is very intelligent and always seems to know in advance what we are going to
propose and always has a ready answer…”. This could have been a tip off to Tokyo that the U.S. was
reading their mail. However, that appears to have not been the case as Japan continued to rely on their
current system of encryption.
In the spring of 1940, the Japanese began making plans to seize control of the Shanghai International
Settlement. The settlement was a thorn in their side and Japanese authorities needed a means or reason to
enforce Marshall Law in all of the Shanghai International Settlement. Their plan was based on the same logic
used in the Mukden Incident in Manchuria in 1931, which was to cause an incident that they could use as an
excuse to respond too. This plan was to be executed during an upcoming Chinese holiday when more than
the usual number of Chinese would be in the streets. They planned to have Japanese soldiers dress up as
Chinese civilians and then armed them with 45 caliber pistols. After placing them at key places throughout
the Shanghai International Settlement they would start shooting wildly into the Chinese crowds, which would
create panic. At that stage the Japanese army would come to restore order in the settlement. Their plan might
have worked, except the Navy had the ability to break the Japanese diplomatic coded message and learn of
the complete plot before it could happen.
84
Marine Corps History Division
Quantico, Virginia
(MCCHR File MP 3546)
57
Major General DeWitt Peck
(1894 – 1973)
Major General DeWitt Peck, as a Marine Colonel, served
as the Commanding Officer, Fourth Marines in Shanghai, China
from November 1939 to March 1941. He was recognized for his
military duty there and received a Letter of Commendation from
Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet. He later served
as Assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 20
January 1944 until his retirement on 30 July 1945, and retired as a
major general on 1 November 1946. He was the first Marine Corps
officer to use SIGINT against an enemy in the spring of 1940.
Col Dewitt Peck, as shown above as a Major General, was Commanding Officer of the Fourth
Marines who countered the Japanese plan with one of his own. He ordered his staff to pick the tallest
Marines and placed them into stake body trucks with each driver given an exact location of the Japanese
impostors. Prior to the Japanese being allowed to shoot, and having disarmed them, the Marines took control
of the fakes by grabbing them and throwing them into the back of their trucks. They took these individuals
back to the Fourth Marines Compound under the guise of protective custody. In addition, the Japanese had
their army troops ready to move into the International Settlement. They did not get the word and were
heading into the settlement only to meet up with a detachment of Marines at the barricade entranceway with
machine guns. The Japanese had more fire power, but were caught off guard by the Marines who took
control. They had not expected any trouble and now they were facing a new challenge, which their orders did
not cover. Therefore, they pulled back and this situation came out in favor of the good guys, but, as Okins put
it in his article, “Thank God for our intercept and code breaking ability” (Okins A-33).
Of historical importance, the above appears to be the first time in Marine Corps history that
intelligence derived from SIGINT was given directly to a Marine commander which gave him the ability to
formulate an immediate plan of action. In years to come this would be an ongoing part of Marine Corps
tactical operations, but the first time it happened was with the Fourth Marines and after all Marine Corps
intercept operators had been pulled out of this station by mid 1938. Yet, those enlisted Marines were the ones
that started it and kept it going for years and a Marine officer was in charge when this incident occurred.
Later this same Marine officer (Lasswell) will be stationed at Pearl Harbor as the chief Japanese translator for
the Navy intelligence unit (Okins A-33) & (Budiansky – (1) Midway).
85
58
Shanghai SNAFU
(Fourth
Marines’ Regimental Newspaper – 1938)
(Naval A-17)
Shanghai in 1938, was completely surrounded by Japanese troops. Inside the
city, intercept operators were hard at work. One fine day, a Japanese Colonel and
his aide dropped by to pay his respects to the CO of the Fourth Marines. The Marine
sentry on duty at the gate got a little flustered trying to understand them. He
remembered hearing that there was a Japanese Language Officer on the second floor,
so he directed them to that area. You guessed it! The Japanese Colonel and his aide
were directed to the intercept operations room and from then on, PANIC!
MCCHR File 3489
86
The Fourth Incident – Part Two
(Colonel Alva Bryan “Red” Lasswell’s Account)
This is another account of the Fourth Incident and it involved then Capt Alva B. Lasswell and it is
believable for several reasons. First, he was a Japanese linguist and had been the OIC of Navy Radio Security
Station “A” for almost a year and he had worked earlier on Japanese targets in the Philippines (Station CAST)
(NCVA – 95). He was also a Marine that knew how to handle weapons and he was a tall individual. Therefore,
he could speak to the Japanese military personal with authority and if the situation demanded it, he knew how
to use force and weapons. However, another interesting thing concerning his article is the fact he does not try
to take credit for any of the intelligence used, but rather states that it came from the French Intelligence Office
(Lasswell Three, 46-47).
Capt Lasswell was preparing to leave China on July 10, 1940. However, on July 6th he was ordered to
report to Col Dewitt Peck’s office. The Japanese were about to undermine the International Settlement by
causing an incident giving them a reason to move Japanese troops into that area. Lasswell mentions he
realized many wars had been started by such an incident and he was nervous about the assignment, but he had
most of Saturday to plan and think about his actions. He also mentions he believed Col Peck had picked him
for this assignment because he could speak Japanese. Therefore, someone who could relate and speak to the
Japanese soldiers could take control of the situation, which indeed would keep the Marines in control of the
situation (Gazette Two, 54-57) & (Lasswell Three, 46-47).
He received verbal orders concerning this assignment, which delayed his departure from China. His
wife had departed earlier and he planned to join her in Japan for a few days before heading back to the United
States. Col Peck informed him that he would take only one Marine and a truck to where Bubblingwell Road
entered the American Zone on Sunday morning at 10-o’clock and arrest an undetermined number of Japanese
soldiers that would be in 100-yard intervals. They would be armed and dressed as Chinese. As mentioned
above, he was further informed that this information came from the French Intelligence Office. The next
morning he reported to the 4th Marines Headquarters in the uniform of the day and was armed with only a
Colt 45 pistol. He was assigned one strong looking Marine and a truck driver. To insure they looked official
they each placed military police arm bands on prior to leaving (Gazette Two, 54-57) & (Lasswell Three, 46-47).
When they arrived at the first position Lasswell states it was easy to spot the Japanese soldier at that
location. The cloths fit him poorly, but he stood erect in soldier like fashion. There was no doubt about it for
his military bearing stood out next to the Chinese people standing near by. They approach him and he tried to
pull his pistol out, but Lasswell sized his arm…and the enlisted Marine cut the rope that was tied to it with his
bayonet. Lasswell order the soldier to get into the truck, but he remained silent refusing to move. Therefore,
with the help of the enlisted Marine they threw the individual into the back of the truck. They ended up
87
capturing 16 Japanese soldiers in all and took them back to the 4th Marines Headquarters and turned them
over to the Guard of the Day. Lasswell mentioned that each of the soldiers acted the same. Each went for his
pistol and each had to b physically taken into custody and all of them refused to talk about their assignment
(Gazette Two 54-57) & (Lasswell Five).
Prior to night fall the Japanese commanding officer, Major General Saburo Miura arrived at the 4th
Marines Headquarters to make an official apology to Col Peck. At that time they were turned loose.
However, Lasswell’s business in China had not finished for nearly two more weeks because he Col Beck
needed him while meeting with the Japanese officials. Yet, the Americans did most of the talking while the
Japanese sat in silence. It was agreed that they would not mention the event in order to keep from straining
international relations between the two countries. That appeared to be a one-sided agreement for news soon
came from Lasswell’s wife, who was waiting for him in Japan, that the Japanese news papers carried stories
about American atrocities and animal like hypocrisy by degrading these Japanese soldiers. This even hit the
New York Times that quoted the Japanese news paper stories. Thus, the incident did bring on a bit of
ugliness, but the end result was the American Marines (two of them) kept a lot of innocent Chinese from
being killed that day. They also kept the Japanese military in check for it blew their plans to take control of
the International Community. Lasswell had been concerned about the events, but his wife told him they did
not mention his name…rather only that it was a Japanese speaking Marine in Shanghai at that time (Gazette
Two, 54-57-Lasswell Five).
On July 21, 1940 Capt Lasswell left Shanghai, china…closing this chapter of his life. He wrote that
he had good feelings as they sailed out of Shanghai on the SS PRESIDENT COOLIDGE heading for Japan.
He stated he felt a sense of relief as they left the yellow waters of the Yangtse River behind and moved into
the blue waters of the Pacific (Gazette Two, 54-57) & (Lasswell Five).
Upon his arrival in Japan he had to cut his vacation short because of the delay, as his departure date
from Japan had already been set. This allowed for no visit o the mountains near Mount Fuji or to visit with
old friends. For the first time in five years he was finally going home to visit his love ones and to join the
Marine Corps he longed to be a part of for so long. Yet, the stage for future involvement in Naval
Intelligence had been set for little did he know he would become one of them main contributors of vital and
perishable intelligence during WW-II. That intelligence changed the course of the war and saved countless
numbers of American lives. The Battle of Midway was just the beginning for he would continue to use the
knowledge he had acquired throughout the years. The China incident mentioned above seems to be a minor
point when you consider he was also responsible for taken down Japan’s greatest war time leader, Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto in 1943, the same admiral that planned the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941
(Budianshky One), (Gazette Two), Lasswell One, Two, Three, Five and Six), and (Navy -2).
88
59
U.S. Marine Corps Photograph
(Circa 1939-40)
Curtsey of the Lasswell Family
(James & John Lasswell)
60
This picture is part of the Lasswell family’s
photographs. The Lasswell family believes the Marine
standing in the center for picture is Capt Alva B. Lasswell
because it was part of his military photographs. While
Capt Lasswell’s primary job was OIC of Navy Radio
Security Station “A”, he most likely did military work for
Colonel Peck, Commanding Officer, Fourth Marines. See
Fourth Incident Part One and Part Two for more details.
The picture on the right gives us a good
comparison between both pictures…and based on his
account of the Shanghai Incident we can take an educated
guess…it is Capt Lasswell with the Fourth Marines in
Shanghai, China in 1940.
89
FOURTH MARINES
COMMANDING OFFICERS
(1928 – 1942)
Sep
Jan
Nov
Dec
Mar
May
Jul
May
Oct
Dec
Jan
May
27, 1928 14, 1929 21, 1930 24, 1932 13, 1933 7, 1933 11, 1933 7, 1936 24, 1938 4, 1939 3, 1940 14, 1941 -
Jan
Nov
Dec
Mar
May
Jul
May
Oct
Dec
Jan
May
May
13, 1929
20, 1930
3, 1932
12, 1933
6, 1933 ,
10, 1933
6, 1936
23, 1938
3, 1939
2 1940
13, 1941
6, 1942
LtCol Fred D. Kilgore
Col Charles H. Lyman
Col Richard S. Hooker
LtCol Emile P. Moses
Col Fred D. Kilgore
LtCol Emile P. Moses
Col John C. Beaumont
Col Charles F. B. Price
Col Joseph C. Fegan
LtCol Charles I. Murray
Col DeWitt Peck
Col Samuel L. Howard
(Santelli 60)
MCCA Historic File MP 3547 - 2
The graphic above is a representation of a
U.S. military badge, created by the
U.S. military and/or the Department of Defense.
As a work of the U.S. federal government,
this image is in the public domain.
Subject to disclaimers
MCCHR File MP 3547 - 1
90
Listing of Navy Intercept Operators - 1940
There are two lists concerning these intercept operators. The spelling and abbreviations are the same
as given by the sources. The first source is Okins 32 and the second source is Naval A-10 & A-11.
Fourth Marines Commanding Officer – Colonel DeWitt Peck (USMC)
Officer-in-Charge Navy Radio Security Station “A”
Captain Alva B. “Red” Lasswell (USMC)
Source One (Okins 32)
Source Two (Naval A-10 & A-11)
CRM Leroy Lankford (USN)
Lankford, Leroy A. (USN)
CRM Orville Clay Coonce
Coonch, Orville C.
CY Woody Woodard
Woodward, F. C.
RM1c K. E. Carmichael
Carmichael, Kenneth E.
RM1c Elmer Dickey
Not Listed
Not Listed
RM2 Groff, Arthur D.
Not Listed
CRM Groundwater, Benjamin
Not Listed
Harold, Douglas W.
Not Listed
RM1/CRM Kisner, Homer L.
RM1c Clarence Poe Taylor
Taylor, Clarence P.
RM1c Willie Crockett Young
Young, William C.
RM2c Jack Gilmore Kaye
Kaye, Jack Gilmore
RM2c James H. Johnson
Johnson, James H.
RM2c Henry E. Ethier
Eithier, Henry E.
RM2c Roy Sholes
Sholes, Roy C.
Not Listed
RM2 Simmons, W. A.
Not Listed
RM2 Smith, Markle K.
Not Listed
Wesper, Willis H.
Not Listed
Winchester, Samuel H.
RM2c E. E. Okins
Okins, Elliott E.
YN2c Stephen J. Stalter
Not Listed
RM2c Pearly L. Phillips
Phillips, Pearly L.
91
MARINE RADIO INTERCEPT OPERATORS
(1927 – 1938)
(Alphabetical Listing)
1. Butler, Harry L................. 1934
2. Cameron, C. A. ............... 1929-30
3. Carraway, Cecil T. ......... 1935
4. Crowe (Crow), Curtis W. ... 1935
5. Delva, Thomas V. ............ 1928-29
6. Easter, Joel H. .................. 1931-33
7. Feist, Kermit W................ 1927
8. Gentilcore, Clarence F. .. 1933
9. Gustaveson, Carl H. ......... 1931-33?
10. Hardisty, Richard A. ......... 1933
11. Hibbard, J. ........................ 1931
12. Hinkle Lombard R. ........... 1935
13. Jones, Harold V. ............... 1934
14. Kiser, William L............... 1927
15. Knight, George F. ............. 1929?
16. Kugler, Otto ..................... 1927
17. Lesko, Stephen................ 1928-31
18. Miller, Philip R................. 1930
19. Morgan, Vigil W. ............. 1932-33
20. Overstreet, Maurice M...... 1930
21. Petrosky, Joseph A. ........ 1934
22. Randle, Jesse J.................. 1938??
23. Robertson, Norman P........ 1934
24. Robertson, Walter R. ........ 1932-34
25. Rainey, A. ........................ 1933-34
26. Smith, Charles J................ 1931-33
27. Smith, C. M. ..................... 1931-32?
28. Southerland, C. S.............. 1933-34
29. Suber, Carl G.................... 1935
30. Tatoo, C............................ 1932-33?
31. Thomas, Hurbert N........... 1931
32. Wasson, Paul L................. 1932-33?
33. White, R. M...................... 1932-33?
34. Wilder, William A. ........... 1930
35. Wilson, Ogden E. ............. 1927
36. Windborn, James W. ........ 1935
Class 12, Washington, DC (1934)
Class 3, Washington, DC
(1929)
Class 15, Washington, DC (1935)
Class 15, Washington, DC (1935)
OJT Beijing, China
Class 6, Washington, DC
(1931)
OJT Beijing, China
Class 11, Washington, DC (1933)
Class 6, Washington, DC
(1931)
Class 9, Washington, DC
(1933
Class 6, Washington, DC
(1931
Class 15, Washington, DC (1935)
Class 12, Washington, DC (1934)
OJT Beijing, China
OJT Beijing, China
OJT Beijing, China
OJT Beijing, China
Class 5, Washington, DC
(1930)
Class 9, Washington, DC
(1933)
Class 5, Washington, DC
(1930)
Class 12, Washington, DC (1934)
Class (unknown Washington, DC)
Class 12, Washington, DC (1934)
Class 12, Washington, DC (1934)
Class 11, Washington, D
(1933)
Class 5, Washington, DC
(1930)
Unknown (Beijing, China)
Class 11, Washington, DC (1933)
Class 15, Washington, DC (1934)
OJT Beijing, China
Class 5, Washington, DC
(1931)
OJT Beijing, China
OJT Beijing, China
Class 5, Washington, DC
(1930)
OJT Beijing, China
Class 15, Washington, DC (1935)
Researcher Note: There were 35 enlisted Marines who served as radio intercept operators during the 1927 – 1938
period, which is approximately ten to eleven years. The first Marines to be trained were members of the Legation
Guard in Beijing, China. White the names and dates listed are based on good sources they should be given a margin of
error for no actual documents have been found for all of them or their actual service in China.
(Brown Vol-3-3, 9) - (Naval A-2, A-4, A-6, & A-10 - A-12 ) - (Newman 1 & 2)
92
MCCHR FILE MC-3490
MARINE INTERCEPT OPERATORS – 1927 – 1938
(Only known references.)
1927 (Newman 1-3, &7)
PFC Otto Kugler
Pvt. William L. Kaiser (Kiser)
Pvt. Ogden E. Wilson
Pvt. Kermit W. Feist
1928 (Newman 1-3, & 7)
PFC Otto Kugler
Pvt. William L. Kaiser (Kiser)
Pvt. Ogden E. Wislon
Pvt. Stephen Lesko
Pvt. Thomas V. Delva
1929 (Newman 1-3, & 7) (MP 3137)
Pvt. Otto Kugler
Pvt. William L. Kaiser (Kiser)
Pvt. Ogden E. Wilson
Pvt. Stephen Lesko
Pvt. Thomas V. Delva
1930 (MP ) (Naval A-6)
Cpl. William L. Kaiser (Kiser)
PFC Stephen Lesko
PFC Thomas V. Delva
PFC. William A. Wilder
PFC. Hubert N. Thomas, Jr.
Pvt. Phillip M. Miller
Pvt. Maurice M. Overstreet
Pvt. Charles J. Smith
1931 (MP ) (Naval A-6)
Sgt.. William L. Kaiser (Kiser)
Cpl. Stephen Lesko
PFC. William A. Wilder
PFC. Hubert N. Thomas, Jr.
Pvt. Phillip M. Miller
Pvt. Maurice M. Overstreet
Pvt. Charles J. Smith
1932 (MP 3450)
(Spring/Summer)
Sgt. Stephen Lesko
Cpl. Hubert N. Thomas, Jr.
CPL. William A. Wilder
PFC George F. Knight
PFC Walter B. Robertson
Pvt. Phillip M. Miller
Pvt. Maurice M. Overstreet
Pvt. Charles J. Smith
1932 (Naval A-4, A-10-11)
(December) (MP 3050)
Cpl. C. H. Gustaveson
Cpl. J. H. Easter
Cpl. J. Hibbard
Pvt. M. M. Overstreet
Pvt. C. J. Smith
Pvt. W. B. Robertson
Pvt. R. M. White
Pvt. C. M. Smith
Pvt. P. L. Wasson
1933 (Naval A-4 & A-11)
(December)
Sgt. F. L. Hardisty
Cpl. J. H. Easter
Cpl. C. H. Gustaveson
Cpl. C. S. Southerland
Pvt. V. W. Morgan
PFC C. J. Smith
Pvt. C. Tattoo
Pvt. P. L. Wasson
Pvt. R. M. White
1934 (Naval A-11) (Newman 26)
(December)
Sgt. J. H. Easter
Sgt. C. S. Southerland
Cpl. A. Rainey
PFC H. V. Jones
Pvt. H. L. Butler
PFC C. F. Gentlicore
Pvt. J. A. Petrosky
Pvt. N. F. Robertson
1935 (Naval A-4, A10-11)
1936 (Naval A-10-11)
(MR 3154)
(MP 3150)
Sgt. Stephen Lesko
Hingle, ? (Med-Evacuation)
Cpl. H. V. Jones
PFC J. A. Petrosky, Jr.
Cpl. C. S. Southerland (August)
PFC Carl G. Suber
Pvt. N. F. Robertson
Sgt. Stephen Lesko
Sgt. Jesse L. Randle (July)
PFC Harry L. Butler
PFC C. W. Crowe
Cpl. H. V. Jones
Cpl. C. S. Southerland (April)
PFC Carl G. Suber
PFC James W. Winborn
1937 (Naval A-10-11)
SSgt. Stephen Lesko
Sgt. Jesse L. Randle
Cpl. H. V. Jones
PFC C. W. Crowe
PFC James W. Winborn
PFC Harry L. Butler
1937 (Naval A-10-11)(MP 3147)
SSgt. Stephen Lesko
Sgt. Jesse L. Randle
Cpl. Cecil Carraway
PFC Harry L. Bulter
PFC Harold V. Jones
PFC Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr.
PFC Carl G. Suber
PFC James W. Windborn
Pvt. Curtis W. Crowe (Crow)
1938 (Naval A-10-11)
Sgt. Jesse L. Randle (August)
PFC Harry L. Butler (January)
PFC C. W. Crowe (Crow) (March)
Cpl. H. V. Jones (January)
1939 - 1940
None
MCCHA File MO 3497
Researcher Note: These roster listings are based on input that gives general dates
but does not give the actual dates of arrival and departure of each person. Therefore, it
should be reviewed with a margin of error in it & not as an exact date.
93
The Training Pay Off
In 1933 the U.S. Navy’s Beijing Radio Intercept Station site (later called Navy Radio Security Station)
had primary intercept targets in both low and high bands. They were Tokyo, Sasebo and Takaso, Formosa
(now Liausung, Taiwan). This included the Naval District Communications Units, as well as the low
frequency nets of Yokosuka Communication Units.
While problems did continue to plague the Beijing intercept site they continued to establish
procedures to enhance their overall knowledge of the Japanese Communication Nets. Hear-ability of low
frequency circuits could only be accomplished during the afternoon periods, but the Yokosuka circuits could
not be picked up at all. However, there was a fair amount of success with the high frequency circuits,
especially those in Tokyo Communication Units. Despite the ongoing problems the Beijing site did succeed
in the following:
1. On July 7, 1933 it obtained the first intercept of the Japanese flagship, the Imperial Japanese Navy
(I.J.N.) ship, Mutsu, in the vicinity of Bako, Formosa (now Taiwan). This was the initial
indication to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet that the Japanese Fleet had commenced its exercise.
2. On July 12, 1933 it identified the classified call signs of the Japanese Fourth Fleet’s 3rd Submarine
Squadron, off the eastern coast of Honshu Island. From this intercept valuable insight was gained
on the classified call sign systems of the entire Japanese Imperial Fleet.
The Japanese Form an Alliance with Germany and Italy
From 1936 on into the 1940s the activities continued to mount and it was quite evident the world was
heading into a darker period. In 1939 the European conflict began to widen and the nations of the world
attempted to find a permanent peace through the League of Nations. Sanctions against the Germans worked
to a limited degree, but they actually gave the advantage to Hitler. As the Communist and Nazi parties
continued to jockey for power Hitler made a series of subsequent moves, which established him as dictator.
The Japanese moved in the same direction and while they did not adopt Hitler’s fascism, they did start to
impose a similar system of tyranny on the people of Japan and the political leaders. However, the Japanese
were well ahead of Hitler’s movement. As noted before they used a minor clash with the Chinese in
Manchuria in 1913 and again in 1931, and by 1937-38 they occupied all the main Chinese ports. Also, the
treaties between Germany and Italy in May 1939 meant there was an Axis of Power to contend with in Berlin
and Rome (Berlin-Rome Axis). The following year Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940,
which added the third major political and military element that became known as the Axis to most people
during the World War II period (Collier 5), (Harper 2-4, 22, 28 & 141) and Naval A-6).
U.S. Naval Foresight and Persistence
It is always easier to look back and see mistakes and see how things could have been done better, but
that is not the case regarding the Navy Cryptologic leaders or the Navy leadership period. As mentioned
94
before they started out with few personnel and while budgets were tight and political powers ready to pull the
plug they kept their eye on the ball. This is not to say the Marine Corps would not have continued to train
Marines, but it must be remembered the Corps was the smallest of the military services and during this period
they were considered to be part of the Navy. Also, most people cannot understand or relate to the fact that the
earlier Navy Cryptologic development had a direct impact on the ending of WW-II. Therefore, when we hear
about such individuals VADM Russell Willson, CAPT Stanford C. Hooper, CAPT Lawrance Fry Safford and
CAPT Joseph J. Rochefort, as being key figures in the Navy Cryptologic progress and expansion it is due to
them. While other key figures, including the enlisted men mentioned earlier, all played an important role in,
but without the support and leadership of these officers it could not have happened.
From March 1935 to 1941, the total strength of the Navy OP-20-G (group) was approximately 700
Navy personnel. However, that number increased to about 10,000 during WW-II. There were no Marine
Corps RI personnel between August 1938 and December 7, 1941. During WW-II the Marine Corps RI
personnel grew to 150 enlisted personnel. This figure only includes the enlisted men assigned to RI Platoons,
as the officers carried the 0200/0225 MOS (Intelligence Officer and Platoon Commander) and 9330 MOS
(Language Officer) (Brown Vol-3, 3 & 8), (Nofi 34-35) & (MCCHR File 3496).
In reviewing the numbers in Marine Corps Manpower Statistic (page 86), 1927-2003 we can see why
the Marine Corps was forced to pull the Marines out of this new field in the early days of its development.
The leadership had done all they could do under the circumstances, as both funding and personnel was an
ongoing problem. However, as the world stage heated up the Marine Corps found they also had to have other
warriors to insure future successes on the battle fields and a new term came into being…Budget Warriors.
These Budget Warriors played a key role in promoting and establishing a factual basis that insured the needed
funding. In some ways you could and should view them as vital links and unsung heroes for they are far from
being just pencil pushers. Without proper management that allows for training in both the old and new fields
in an ever changing world we would not have the military we have today. Such warriors seldom see the
results of their efforts and labors that come into being at later periods. Also, this is true with all the military
services for Budget Warriors are truly visionarians in many ways and no military force can afford to be
without such creative individuals during such times as the 1920s and 1930s. Many battles have been won and
countless lives saved by far-seeing warriors. Some people will tell you wars are won with bullets and bombs,
but those are just tools of war…thinkers are the key to battlefield success. Therefore, we need to look into
early building blocks that transcend time to see exactly why we even have Cryptologic heritage.
95
THE NAVAL SECURITY GROUP (NSG)
As mentioned earlier, in 1926 the Code and Signal Section consisted of four desks: (1) Registered
Publication; (2) Visual; (3) Code and Cipher; and (4) Research. However, the Registered Publications
Section soon became a separate section (OP-20-P) and it remained as such until 1950. On March 20, 1935,
OP-20-G became the “Communication Security Group” and this date commemorates the actual birth of the
Naval Security Group (NSG) (NCVA 153).
It was broken down into the following sections at that time:
OP-20-G .................. Communication Security Group
OP-20-GC................ Cryptographic Section
OP-20-GX ............... Radio Intercept and Tracking
OP-20-GY ............... Cryptanalytic Section
IO-2—GZ ................ Translation Section
Naval Personnel Distribution 1937
From Communications Intelligence Research Activities by J. N. Wenger on June 30, 1937 (NCVA 69).
The personnel allowances of the various Navy units in the Pacific area of operations. They are as follows:
CAVITE (Navy Radio Security Station “C”, Sangley Point, Philippines.)
1 Officer Cryptanalyst
1 Language Officer (After August 1937)
4 Cryptographic Clerks (Enlisted)
FLAGSHIP ASIATIC FLEET
1 Fleet Radio Intelligence Officer
1 Cryptographic Clerk (Enlisted)
1 Language Officer (Additional Duty)
CINC FLAGSHIP U.S. FLEET
1 Fleet Radio Intelligence Officer
2 Officer Cryptanalysts
1 Language Officer (Additional Duty)
PEARL HARBOR
1 Officer Cryptanalyst
3 Cryptographic Clerks (Enlisted – after 1938)
1 Language Officer (After July 1938)
96
NAVY DEPARTMENT
(a) Administration Section
1 Officer Cryptanalyst
(b) Traffic Preparation Section
3 Cryptographic Clerks (Civil Service)
5 Cryptographic Clerks (Retired CPOs)
(c) Statistical Section
1 Officer Cryptanalyst
2 Cryptographic Clerks (Retired CPOs)
(d) Decrypting Section
2 Cryptographic Clerks (Civilians)
(e) Cryptanalytic Section
3 Cryptanalysts (1P5, 1P2, 1P1)
1 Cryptographic Clerk (Civilian)
(f) Information Section
1 Officer Cryptanalyst (Also – Administrative Section)
1 Analyst (Retired CPO)
(g) Translating Section
1 or 2 Language Officers
2 or 3 Translators (Civilians)
(h) Training Section
1 Officer Instructor
1 Cryptographic Clerk (Civilian)
Total Number of Communication Intelligence personnel in 1937.
Officers.................... 15
Enlisted.................... 8
Civilian .................... 12
Retired CPOs ........... 8
Total ....................... 43
Footnote: These numbers do not reflect the total number of all Navy Communication Intelligence personnel. For
example, there is no mention of the Chief Petty Officer (CPO) or the Marines working at Navy Radio Security Station
“A”, which was located at Shanghai, nor is there any reference to other possible intercept sites.
97
Marine Corps Manpower Statistics 1927 - 2003
Marine
Personnel
Marines Cryptologic
Enlisted Marines
Station
Year
Officers
Enlisted
Total
1927
1,198
17,822
19,154
4
Beijing, China
1928
1,198
17,822
19,020
6
Beijing, China
1929
1,181
17,615
18,796
6
Beijing, China
1932
1,196
15,365
16,561
9
Beijing, China
1933
1,192
14,876
16,068
9
Beijing, China
1934
1,187
15,174
16,361
8
Beijing, China
1935
1,163
16,097
17,234
8 (1 officer)
Beijing, China
1935
1,163
16,097
17,260
8 (1 officer)
Shanghai, China
1937
1,312
16,911
18,223
10 (1 officer)
Shanghai, China
1938
1,359
16,997
18,356
4 (1 officer)
Shanghai, China
1939
1,380
18,052
19,432
0 (1 officer)
Shanghai, China
1940
1,800
26,545
28,345
0 (1 officer)
Shanghai, China
1941
3,339
51,020
54,359
0
Prior to WW-II
1942
7,138
135,475
142,613
3 (officers)
RI Platoons - Birth
1943
21,384
287,139
308,523
6 RI Platoons *
Entered WW-II
1945
37,067
437,613
474,680
7 RI Platoons *
Peak of War
1947
7,506
85,547
93,053
0
After WW-II
1949
7,250
78,081
85,965
unknown
5th Signal Company
1950
7,254
67,025
74,279
unknown
5th Signal Company
1951
15,150
177,770
192,920
96 Enlisted – 4 Officers **
1st Radio Company
1953
18,731
230,488
249,219
96 Enlisted – 4 Officers **
1st Radio Company
1962
16,861
174,101
190,962
3 Companies
1st & 2nd Radio, & Co. G
1964
16,843
172,934
189,777
3 Battalions
2 - RadioBn & MSB
1969
25,698
284,073
309,771
3 Battalions
2 - RadioBn & MSB
1971
21,765
190,604
212,369
3 Battalions
2 - RadioBn & MSB
1972
19,843
178,395
198,238
3 Battalions
2 - RadioBn & MSB
1975
18,591
177,360
195,951
3 Battalions
2 – RadioBn & MSB
1996
17,931
156,952
174,883
3 Battalions
2 – RadioBn & MSB
4 Battalions
3 – RadioBn & MCSB
2003
Remarks
MSB – (Marine Support Battalion) & MCSB – (Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion)
* 150 Enlisted personnel and 20 officers for all of WW-II (McIntire 85, 89-91)
** Information based on Force Troops Album (1952-1953 periods) not official documents, which consisted
of one company (Forest Troops 133-135). Other figures based on source Albert A. Nofi statistics (Nofi 34-35).
MCCHR FILE 3496
98
Naval Building Blocks
There are several interesting aspects to the 1937 personnel distribution. First, this demonstrates the
Navy was committed to formalizing their Communications Intelligence units into a structured organization.
Next they started using retired naval personnel as part of their ongoing formulation. Then they hired civilian
personnel to enhance the overall concept by diversifying their working structure. As mentioned above, this
does not count the allotted number of intercept operators and supervisors at Navy Security Stations around the
Pacific or other parts of the world. It is at this stage we see no Marine Officers working in higher
echelons…only the Officers-in-Charge of Navy Radio Security Station “A” in China and that station was
deactivated in December 1940. It was at that time most of the enlisted men were transferred to the Cavite
unit, Navy Radio Security Station “C” (Chiles A-7) & (NCVA – 166).
In the early formation of Navy Radio Intercept Stations there were no designators used. Many of the
earliest stations came into being prior to an official mandate. As mentioned earlier, they had funding
problems and political problems and therefore, could not officially make them part of their budget request.
This might explain why the first station to be officially recognized was Navy Radio Station “A” in Beijing,
China in 1927 (NCVA-166-167).
Here are a few station designators and locations by date order:
A .........Beijing, China ................... Established 1927 (July 1935) *
A .........Shanghai, China ................. Established 1935 – 1940 (July 1935) *
A .........Guam, Mariana Islands ...... Established 1944 (October) **
B..........Bar Harbor, Main............... Established 1930 (June)
B..........Melbourne, Australia ......... Established 1942
B..........Belconnen, Australia .......... Established (Unknown)
C..........Olongapo, Philippines ........ Established 1930
C..........Marivels, Philippines ......... Unknown
C..........Cavite, Philippines ............. Unknown
C..........Corregidor ......................... Established 1941-42 (Disestablished 1942)
C..........Chatham, Massachusetts .... Established 1942 (October)
D .........Flag Ship Asiatic Fleet ....... Unknown
D .........Dupont, South Carolina...... Unknown
E..........USS GOLDSTAR (AG-12) Guam
H .........Heeia, Lualualei, Wailupe (1925-28)?, Territory Hawaii (T.H) (established at Wahiawa 1931).
* The Navy’s first formal Navy Radio Security Station (Station A) was manned by Marines in China.
99
** Interestingly, we will find Radio Intelligence Marines working at this same station (Station A) in Guam
during the WW – II period.
Naval Breakdown of Personnel Asiatic Radio Intercept Units – 1941
In December 1941, the total number of Navy Cyptologic personnel:
Asiatic Unit..................................... Hawaii Unit
9 officers.......................................... 16 officers
19 crypto clerks................................ 24 crypto-clerks
42 intercept operators....................... 60 intercept operators
In 1942 the Communications Security Section became OP-20-K and the Cryptographic Section
became OP-20-Y. By that time the Naval Security Group (NSG – OP-20-G) had expanded into 17
subsections (NCVA- 153). This did not include the Fleet Radio Unit Pacific (FRUPac) personnel at Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, T.H.
BUDGET WARRIORS
It is a bit strange to review historic records and see the common problems each service had and then
see that the enemy faced the same dilemma. The Japanese were having their own budget wars as their Navy
and Army officers pushed for more funding and larger numbers. Our own Army needed men and money, the
Navy needed more men and money, and the Marine Corps was now moving into a new stage of development
concerning budget wars too. However, even when I entered the Marine Corps in 1956 the general attitude
was to make do with what you have and be happy you got that. To demonstrate this thinking I will mention
the common phrase rendered back in that period of time – THE CORPS IS THE ONLY SERVICE TO TURN
MONEY IN AT THE END OF THE YEAR. There was a great amount of pride in those words and it was
echoed many, many times. Therefore, there had to be some changes made concerning budgets and the need
to ask for funding rather than only hoping to get it. Then future budging requests would be made available
based on logic. Yet, as mentioned earlier in LtCol Lesko interview in 1982 that he scrounged everything and
they conserved for things were not easy to come by (Newman 12).
Early Navy Cryptologic Budgets
Prior to WW-I most codes and ciphers were relatively simple and many of the individuals working to
break them were considered more of a hobby than a profession. According to CAPT Safford they were a
small group of mathematicians and lexicographers who had required some skills in cipher construction. As
mentioned earlier, the first actual cryptanalytic organization came into being in June 1917, and it was headed
by Herbert Osborne Yardley, an ex-State Department telegrapher. His organization started out with only a
few individuals, but grew to 150 personnel and a budget of $100,000, but due to economic conditions that
budget dropped to $25,000 by 1921. The personnel dropped down to only 6 individuals by 1929 and, in short
100
order, the organization was handed over to the U.S. Army…this was known as “The American Black
Chamber”.
At the height of early Navy Cryptologic development in November 1918, it consisted of 18 officers,
24 civilian cryptographers and cryptanalysts and 109 typists and stenographers with an annual budget of
$100,000. This was recommended by G-2 for the MI-8 unit, which was the early designator for the Navy
Cryptologic unit. It was broken down as follows:
Rent ......................... $3,000
Reference Books...... $1,000
Personnel Chief........ $6,000
10 code experts ........ $3,000 each ($30,000)
15 code experts ........ $2,000 each ($30,000)
25 clerks .................. $1,200 each ($30,000)
Total ........................ $100,000
The Depression Years
After the Mukden Incident in 1931 Navy commanders decided to move the Beijing station to a new
location and in July 1935 the Beijing site was deactivated and the Shanghai Navy Radio Security Station was
activated (Naval A-3, A-4 & A-6). The Japanese had started moving into China from Manchuria in 1931 and by
1934 events began moving faster for those in harm’s way (Edgerton 236-239). Yet, the Japanese continued to
play a wait and see game as they worked both the military and political leaders to achieve their long-range
goals. Funding was hard to come by even for the Japanese, as the world was in a state of depression. United
States military intelligence units were especially affected because of the Yardley disclosures in the early
1930s (NCVA 25). Even General Douglas MacArthur could not get the political leadership to put forth more
money and he warned our national leaders that the cost would be far greater once war had started (MacArthur
109). And war loomed in the background like a storm you know is coming, but cannot predict the day or time.
You can only wait and pray you will have time to adjust, train and prepare before any military action is
required.
General Douglas MacArthur (USA)
In his autobiography “Reminiscences” General Douglas MacArthur tells just how hard it was to
achieve the needed funding for the military (MacArthur 109). He wrote: “I stormed, begged, ranted, and roared; I
almost licked the boots of certain gentlemen to get the funds for motorization and mechanization and air power. I
humbled myself seeking allotments to replace leaking, slum-like barracks housing our soldiers. I called for increased
speed, increased fire power, fast machines, airplanes, tanks, guns, trucks, and ammunition.”
101
He served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from November 1930 to October 1935, which is the same
time period we find a young Marine Sergeant Lesko using his own funds to buy equipment for the Shanghai,
China Navy Security Radio Station. Lesko stated, “Do you know how I got the parts to make those packs?
Out of my own pocket. Out of my big old $50.00 a month (Newman 21).
General Douglas MacArthur
January 26, 1880 – April 5, 1964
Photograph 1945 – Photograph # USA C-2413
(Wikipedia Free Encyclopedia)
61
In his autobiography “Reminiscences” he gives the following
budget information while he served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff:
Army/AirCorps
Navy *
1931............................... $347,000,000
($403,243,000)*
1932............................... $335,000,000
($359,199.000)*
1933............................... $304,000,000
($571,927,000)*
1934............................... $277,000,000
($352,433,000)*
1935............................... $284,000,000
($346,296,000)*
(This budget included both the Army and Army Air Corps.)
* Naval History Center – Budgets 1794- 2004)
LtCol Stephen Lesko mentioned to his interviewer
that they preferred to be in China during those days because
of the depression (Newman 12). Yet, while individuals like
Lesko stated they were eking {sic} it out…the senior
officers in all branches of the military were fighting a real
war in Washington, DC…Yes, Budget Warriors were on
the front line fighting for every penny they could get!
Major General Ben Herbard Fuller
(Wikipedia Image – Public Domain)
(1870 – 1937)
62
15th Commandant of the Marine Corps 1930 – 1934
Major General Ben Herbard Fuller was the first
Marine officer to officially recognize Marine intercept
operators for their duty performance. According to LtCol
Lesko all of the Marines at Navy Radio Station “A” received
a personal letter of commendation from him in early 1932
(Newman 22)
Based on that letter (see page 59) we find that
CMC for the first time in our Cryptologic history
understood we had Marines working in this unique field
of Signal Intelligence. This may have been the reason
he sent a message to the Navy in March 1933
authorizing training of permanent Marine intercept
operators.
102
The Marine Corps was still considered to be part of the Navy during this period of history. While they
had some independence concerning their budgets they also had some unique problems because of their
mission, which was to support the Navy. Their budget was therefore tied to the Navy’s budget in some ways.
This was also true of the Army Air Corps for they fell under the U.S. Army budget umbrella.
63
64
Major General John Henry Russell, Jr.
Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb
(USMC Photograph – Wikipedia)
(USMC Photograph – Wikipedia)
16th Commandant of the Marine Corps
1934 - 1936
17th Commandant of the Marine Corps
1936 - 1943
Each of these Marine officers contributed outstanding devotion to their assigned duties and each
worked on developing a more modern Marine Corps during a world wide depression. What they wanted to
do and what they got to do are two completely different things. MajGen Fuller had some working knowledge
of these Marines and rewarded them for the first time in Marine Corps history for their work in the new filed.
Then prior to retiring he tried to make it possible to train such Marines that insured they would be part of a
Marine Corps Cryptologic field. When MajGen Russell became the new CMC in 1934 the process had
already began and while he did not make any unique decision concerning the Cryptologic efforts he did not
harm the effort either. As mentioned earlier, that order came on September 23, 1937 when CMC under LtGen
Holcomb issued an order that stated due to manpower shortages the Marine Corps could not train full time
intercept operators. By the middle of 1938 the last enlisted Marine intercept operator departed Shanghai,
China. All of those who remained in the Marine Corps found themselves back in regular Marine units. While
it would be easy to say LtGen Holcomb insured the death of this new field of intelligence that would be far
from being true. It must be remembered he was also the CMC during the beginning of WW-II and remained
103
there until December 31, 1944. Therefore, there should be no doubt that he was also the officer who issued
the order to form the RI Platoons of WW-II. Yet, more insight concerning General Holcomb will come to
light as we move into World War II, which will be Volume Two of Marine Corps Cryptologic History.
The Naval Slush Fund
When it comes to handling money and putting those funds into the right pot, it is hard to beat the
Navy. For example, in 1917-20, a secret fund of $100,000 was established under the control of the Director
of Naval Intelligence (DNI). Rear Admiral Roger Wells, Jr. (USN) was the first person to control this fund
and, later, Rear Admiral Albert Parker Niblack (USN) assumed custodial duties. According the CAPT
Safford, this fund was expendable at the discretion of the DNI. As it turned out, the Research Desk of the
Code and Signal Section was the primary benefactor of this money. According to Stafford the following
expenditures were made from this fund (NCVA 202-203), (Safford NCVA Vol-8, P A-8) & (Wikipedia – Officer of
Naval Intelligence):
(1) Special bonuses and other expenses in connection with photographing the Japanese Naval
Operations Code.
(2) Compensation of Dr. Haworth and Mrs. Haworth, whom were translating photographs of the
Japanese Naval Codes from 1922 to 1927 inclusive and decrypted messages from 1928 to 1931.
(3) Purchase of about 40 Japanese typewriters and the cost of making special dies for the type heads.
(4) Purchase of Japanese dictionaries, grammar, year books, etc.
(5) Repair of Japanese typewriters.
(6) The unexpended balance of this fund was about $65,000 and it was to be turned in to the Treasurer
of the United States in June 1931, in connection with the retirement of CAPT Harry A. Baldridge
(USN), the DNI in 1931. CAPT William Baggaley (USN), had been assigned the duty of being
the acting DNI and was planning to turn the money in when CDR J. W. McClarne (OP-20-G)
received word of the proposal. He took immediate action by sending a memorandum to the
Director of Communications (DNC) on June 9, 1931 stating:
“If Captain Baggaley is allowed to turn this fund back simply because of his own personal
fear in handling it, I feel; that it will be a great mistake, and it is a safe bet that one year hence
when he leaves, his relieve for many years to come will bemoan the fact that their hands have been
tied by lack of funds to prosecute urgent secret tasks.”
For those of us who have dealt with budgets versus needs for running your unit…we know first hand
each unit commander in our Cryptologic field needs a “Slush Fund” because needs change, as do missions
and other unforeseen events that change the landscape of running an effective operation. We have seen how
LtCol Lesko had to scrounge or buy materials in order to get the job done (Newman 12); how General
MacArthur talked about begging to get needed funding (MacArthur 109); and how CMC was forced to pull
104
Marines out of the new field of intelligence in 1936 because ongoing personnel shortages (Naval A-10). And
yet, CAPT Baggaley was preparing to turn in the “Slush Fund” money. However, the problems did not start
or end with his decision for it has been an ongoing enigma in varying degrees throughout the years.
I reiterate my remarks concerning this issue because the future leaders in our field will also run into
such problems and both Marine officers and NCOs will be called on to go the extra mile…as in Lesko’s case.
In some cases it could lead to misuse of funds for this is human nature, but it has been my experience that I
never saw any officer or NCO abused or mishandled any funds. The reason is simply…honest men; men of
integrity are running things. If you’re dealing with crooks or politicians you can count on having problems.
Of course, there is another good reason for this…they seldom have such funds to begin with. I would venture
a guess that if most officers and NCOs were asked if they ever had to use personal funds for the good of their
section or unit? They would say…YES!!! Lesko blazed that trail for us too!
THE WINDS OF CHANGE
In 1927 we entered a new era when four Marines began training and became radio intercept operators
in Beijing, Chine. This station became the first official Navy Radio Security Station and was given the
alphabet designator of Alfa or “A” and it was manned by enlisted Marines from 1927 until 1938. At this
same time Marine officers began training separately as linguists in other countries. Later some of these
officers became the OICs of this station even when Navy personnel took over its operations. The Marine
enlisted men served and worked faithfully while under stress during difficult times. Yet, they set records for
future Marines to look back on and to take pride in. They received the first formal recognition from CMC for
the work in late 1931, which became known as the Mukden Incident. Several of these Marines remained in
the Corps even after all efforts to keep Marines in this new field failed. The officers continued to serve at
various Navy facilities, which are not all known at this time. When war between Japan and United States
broke out on December 7, 1941 there were at least two Marine officers working in Communication
Intelligence -They were Col Alva Bryan “Red” Lasswell and Col Bankson Holcomb. In 1943, plans were put
in place to form the first Marine units of World War-II…they became known as Radio Intelligence Platoons
(RI). The Marines given the task of forming the platoons and training new Marines as intercept operators
were known as China Marines: 1stLt Stephen Lesko, 2ndLt Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr., 2ndLt Cecil T. Carraway,
and 2ndLt Marcus Couts…and one NCO, GySgt Clarence F. Gentilcore. They formed seven RI Platoons and
six of them were involved in WW-II and it is from these platoons we will find individuals involved in
forming the 1st Radio Company, which later becomes the 2nd Radio Battalion.
The following pictures are being placed into this volume for two reasons. First, these pictures came
from LtCol Stephen Lesko, LtCol Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. and Col Alva B. Lasswell families and they too tell
a story. We can review their uniforms, living conditions, training, liberty and hardships. Thus, it becomes a
photo-essay, which links us back into our historic past.
105
65
MCCHR File 3332
(Photographer Unknown)
(Photograph taken from the box of pictures given to Colonel James L. McIntire, Jr. (USMC Retired) in the mid-1980s.)
MARINE of the MONTH
I don’t know who took this photograph, I don’t know the name
81 of this Marine, I don’t know why it was left in the picture
given to Col McIntire, but I do know he is one fine looking Marine. No doubt about it…he rates being called Marine of the Month
and it was individuals like him that inspired our own Marines’ Hymn. He is what I would call one ‘Salty Marine” from our
historic past and he was indeed a China Marine.
106
66
67
MP 3120-3 File
68
MP 3120-3 File
(Photographer Unknown)
Circa 1927 – 1936
66. Unknown entry gate, Beijing, China.
67. Been there done that…a good old fashion Marine Field day,
but not the kind one does with broom and swab.
68. PVT Lesko was a member of 38th Machine Gun Company in
Beijing, China prior to becoming intercept operators.
MC 3120-3 File
MP 3120-3 File
69
MP 3120-3 File
70
71
(Photographer Unknown)
Circa 1927 – 1936
69. Headquarters Company, Fourth Marine, Shanghai, China
70. Two enlisted Marines of bygone days. Wearing Sam Brown Belts and looking sharp…could this have been on inspection
day?
71. These two Marines have a reason to be smiling. They just got out of the brig…with Brig Style hair cuts of those days.
107
Page 71
Unknown Source – Possibly U. S. Marine Photograph
(Circa 1938-42)
From the beginning of the Marine Corps Cryptologic birth Signal Intelligence Marines
have continued to train with weapons. The old saying, “All Marines Are Riflemen”, with no
exceptions has been the hallmark of their successes on and off the battlefields. While it would be
easy to say that rifle training only occurred in the Old Corps that would not true. From the
beginning, individuals like LtCol Stephen Lesko, who had been a BAR rifleman and Colonel
Alva Bryan Lasswell, who had more than a fascination with the ranges and shooting. Today’s
Signal Intelligence Marines are equally as good as those who went before them for
marksmanship training continues on today. This was truly brought home during the Vietnam
War for they found themselves on hills, trails and places, such as jungles.
Yet, it is interesting to look back in time through photographs of bygone days to see and
feel part of their adventure. They left all Marines a legacy to be proud of…and many of the
events mentioned in this book about the successes by those intercept operators, cryptanalysts and
linguists have not been told, but many young Marines owe them special thanks. Let this be a
silent thanks…for our enemies are real and they are listening too.
108
73
74
75
76
77
78
MCCHR File PP 3120-4
(Photographer Unknown)
Circa 1935 – 1938
Photographs 73 – 7 are unidentified Marines of the 1935-38 period. Photograph 77 shows the Meteorological Antenna behind the
Marine cutting the cake. Photograph 78 has two identified Marines, which are Cecil T. Caraway and Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr.
109
79
80
81
MCCHR File 3120-5
MCCHR File 3120-6
83
82
84
MCCHR File 3397
MCCHR File 3396
85
86
87
88
MCCHR Files
(Photographer Unknown)
Circa 1935 – 1938
79. Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr. (center) and two unidentified Marines. Shanghai, China.
80. The Meteorological Antenna, Fourth Marines Compound, Shanghai, China.
81. Cecil T. Carraway, Shanghai, China.
82. Unidentified Marines in front of the Fourth Marine’s pay office.
83 & 84 Unidentified Marines with Meteorological Antenna in background.
85. Unidentified Marine.
86, 87 and 88 unidentified Marines in front of the Radio Quarters, Shanghai, China. These
could be regular radio personnel of part of the “Orange Men”.
110
89
90
Photographer Unknown
Circa 1927-38
91
89 – 93: Some people will wonder
what these pictures have to do with
the history of the Cryptologic
Marines. For those of who have been
in combat can attest to the fact every
Marine is a rifleman. Captain Chesty
Puller told Lt. Colonel George C.
Marshall, the Commanding Officer
of the Army’s Infantry School at Fort
Benning when asked why the
Marines always win the shooting
matches. Puller replied, “We have
more men to pick from.” Marshall
asked, “Why is that? We have fifty
thousand and you have about
eighteen thousand.” Puller replied,
“Yes, sir but all of our men are
trained to shoot and we pick from all
of them and you don’t”
**************
Puller was stationed in
China in 1933- 34 as the OIC of the
Mounted Marines in Beijing, China.
(MCCHR Files 3120-8)
92
93
111
94
95
MCCHR Files PP 3508
Photographer Unknown
Circa 1935-36
96
95. The only individual that can be identified in this
photograph is Corporal Cecil Carraway. Seems like a
lot Marines passed the time by playing cards.
MCCA Historic Files PP 3508
Photographer Unknown
Circa 1927-38
WAR IS COMING!
Pictures 94 and 97 all appear to be from the
Beijing, China area. The American Legation Guard
was famous in those days for its weekly parade
appearance. Somewhat like the Marine Corps Sunset
Parades in Washington, DC. As these Marines worked
and trained the dark clouds of war began to gather.
Yet, out of those dark days there is light...for Japanese
underestimated the American will to survive and to
achieve stated goals when they are united. Something
the world would do well to remember in this century.
While it may appear that we are divided because we
argue over doing things from many different angles, it
does not mean we will not stand together if attacked.
During such times all Americans will take to arms to
defend and protect the freedom and liberties our
forefathers worked and died for.
97
************* *******
MCCHR Files PP 3508
Photographer Unknown
Circa 1927-38
97. While the individuals in these photographs cannot be
identified we can enjoy reviewing their images. The picture
does show us the mixed military company in China during
those days.
China Marines
The Marines of this period of
history became known as the China
Marines and this is part of our Marine
Corps Cryptologic History too.
112
98
MCCHR File PP 3333-1
Unknown Photographer
(Circa 1934)
Legation Guard Field Meet
In this photograph with Marines of that day from the Legation Guard wearing campaign hats, the
British “Green Howards” in pith helmets, and the Japanese in their military caps.
Our intercept Marines that worked in Beijing Navy Radio Security Station “A” came for
infantry units attached to the Legation Guard. This explains why LtCol Lesko had pictures of this
period of these Marines. He was a BAR man (Browning Automatic Rifle), which was still in use in the
1950s. I know for that was the weapon I was assigned to at that time.
It appears these Marines liked the local beer of that day. Having been at a few “field meets” I
can attest to the fact it was sanctioned by a higher authority. I don’t think it was allowed to have one
without a little beer on hand.
MCCHR PP- 3333-1 File
113
SHANGHAI, CHINA
Unknown Photograph
Circa 1935-37
99
(MCCHR Files PP 3399)
99. An unknown individual and PFC Joseph A.
Petrosky, Jr. in front of the Fourth Marines Radio
Quarters, Shanghai, China. Petrosky had been
transferred from Beijing and arrived some time after the
station was relocated to Shanghai in 1935.
100
Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr.
Cecil T. Carraway
Photographer Unknown
101
100. Cecil T. Carraway on liberty at an unidentified
location. He served at the Shanghai, China Navy Radio
Security Station and was one of the key officers that
held\ped in forming the Radio Intelligence Platoons of
World War – II.
(Circa 1936 - PP 3507- 2)
101. Corporal Stephen Lesko, without question, is one of major
“Movers and Shakers” in our Marine Crops Cryptologic
history. From Private to Lieutenant Colonel. He served at
both Navy Radio Security Station “A” locations, Beijing
and Shanghai. In 1942 he returns to create the Radio
Intelligence Platoons of World War – II. He endured
hardships, but never gave up and continued as a positive
force in seeing the Marine Corps Cryptologic field become
a reality. (Circa 1932 – MP 3150 – 4)
Stephen Lesko
114
102
MCCHR FILE PP 3507
(Circa 1935-36)
Cpl Cecil T. Carraway
On November 1, 1944, 2nd Lt Cecil t. Carraway would
take the newly formed 4th Radio Intelligence Platoon to the
Marianna, Islands with a stop over at Fleet Radio Unit 128
(Station Hypo) at Wahiawa, T. H. They would later adventure
to a little island known as Okinawa and then to Tientsin, China
for post war operations. He retired as a Major, USMC.
115
95
CHINA DETACHMENT
1927 - 1942
(MCCHR Files)
This picture was found in the box of pictures that Colonel James L. McIntire, Jr.
(USMC Retired) sent to the MCCA Historian. He obtained them from Petrosky’s widow
(Sophia) in the mid 1980s. Some of the photographs came from either LtCol Stephen Lesko
or LtCol Joseph Petrosky or other unknown individuals of that period.
MCCHR MP 3155-1 File
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
SILENT WARRIORS
By Tom Hunnicutt
Silent Warriors do not brag,
nor boost of greatness for ego’s sake,
like all good warriors they work each day,
and earn respect - the old-fashioned way.
Silent Warriors think good things,
while working hard to invoke God’s plans,
they reflect a meekness in steadfast ways,
providing strength - against Satan’s schemes.
Silent Warriors are not weak,
they enhance their skills in peace like ways,
for it’s noble hearts - they seek to build,
while gaining access to higher grounds.
Silent Warriors can be found,
embracing all knowledge that comes their way,
for enlightened minds - opens many doors,
so they seek the path, the way and more.
Silent Warriors should be proud,
for the choices made - came with toil and tears,
of passions born - to join God’s clan,
and thus live with Jesus in the Holy Land.
Silent Warriors
A Marine sniper might wait for hours or days for one good shot; the infantry man waits in strange places for the
battle to begin hoping not to get shot; the artillery man hopes they get the word to “repeat your last”; the Wing Marines
wait for targets to come in knowing they too play an important part in the battles to be fought…and Silent Warriors
search the airwaves looking for that enemy too. An old saying tells us “Communication never won a war, but a war
was never won without it!” So they listen, they wait and they search - sometimes for hours – sometimes for days…for
they know the enemy has to communicate too. Silent Warriors, thank God for you…for lives saved, battles won and
freedom secured from the forces of darkness.
125