4Newbuild EPR reactors

AREVA
Newbuid EPR Reactors
AREVA
Reactors Safety
Two Aspects of the Nuclear Safety for Reactors:
Design considerations:
Barriers,
Safety functions,
Safeguard system
Safety management in operation
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Principles of a safe design for a PWR
First barrier :
Fuel Cladding
Second barrier :
The Primary
System
Enveloppe
Third barrier :
The containment
Building
> A serie of independant protection barriers, , protect in depth the workers
and the public from the radioactivity produced in the nuclear fuel
> The safety systems are redundant and independant
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Principles of a safe design for a PWR
Three safety functions
Controlling chain reaction
control rods position
boron concentration
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Fuel
Fuelcooling
cooling
Heat
Heat removal
removal ::
by
by steam
steam generators
generators in
in
operation
operation
by
by residual
residual heat
heat removal
removal
on
plant
shutdown
on plant shutdown (RRA)
by
by safety
safety injection
injection (RIS)
Radioactivity containment
By the 3 barriers :
fuel cladding
closed primary cooling
system
containment building
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Principles of a safe design for a PWR
Three main safeguard systems
Containment
spray (EAS)
Safety
injection (RIS)
Auxiliary
feedwater
supply (ASG)
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Nuclear Safety requirements in operation
Energy production with strict respect to nuclear safety (in
the frame of the Technical Specification Rules)
Efficient organization
Internal independent assessment
External assessment
Suitable human resource (at the heart of safety)
Communication principles : « openness and
transparency »
Emergency organization in case of incident or accident in
relation with the Nuclear and the governmental
authorities
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The TMI Accident
In Spring 1979 occurred at Three Mile Island, in Pennsylvania, the most
severe accident which ever happened on a light water reactor.
Mislead by an ambiguous instrumentation,
the operators reacted erroneously
during more than two hours
Résult :
• One third of the core melt
• A huge investment unavailable
• However No impact
neither on man nor on environment...
This TMI accident showed advances were
necessary in order to avoid
renewal of such occurences.
Consequently many design improvements
took place.
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Lessons driven from the Three Mile Island
accident
The defense in depth principle had demonstrated its
efficiency at TMI as the containment had entirely
protected the public from any radioactive exposure.
However, it showed that the application of the defense
in depth principle needed further extension.
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Feedback following Three Miles Island, main
improvements
Improvement of man-machine interface in order to ease the operator
understanding of the real physical status of the reactor
Implementation of a safety panel in the control .The safety panel shows
synthetically the important parameters in case of incidental situation
Qualified instrumentation for accidental conditions
Specific procedures for accidental conditions These procedures are
based on a state analysis of the core thermohydraulic conditions. This new concept
relies on the qualified instrumentation. In this approach, the objective is not only to
prevent postulated accidents, but also, basing oneselves on the plant status, to limit
the damage on the reactor core and to come back to a safe status
Hydrogen recombiners
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GEN 3 : Expanded Defense-in-depth concept
1st level: Prevention of abnormal operation and failures
Conservative design and high quality in construction and in operation
Transient Plant Behavior
Reinforced protection against external hazards
2nd level: Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures
Full use of the benefit of digital I&C
Limitation system
Improved Man Machine Interface
3rd level: Control of accidents within the design basis
redundant and diversified safety systems
Detailed failure analysis on safety and support systems
Prevention of common mode failures
4th level: Control of severe accidents
Practical preclusion of energetic scenarios that could lead to early
containment failure
Leaktightness of the containment in case of low pressure core melt
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EPR - An Evolutionary Design
built on Experience from the most recent Reactors
EPR
N4
Framatome
Konvoi
Siemens
Thermal power
MWth
4300-4500
4250
3850
Electrical power
Mwe
~1600
1500
~1400
%
~37
~35
~36
4
4
4
241
205
193
60
40
40
Efficiency
Number of primary loops
Number of fuel assemblies
Service lifetime
years
• Chooz 1+2
• Civaux 1+2
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• Neckar 2
• Emsland
• Isar 2
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EPR safety: a decisive step towards harmonized
cross-country standards
For EPR design, three main safety objectives were defined:
Evolutionary rather than revolutionary design;
Significant improvement by reducing the probability of core
meltdown and improving the reactor’s containment capability
(also for severe accidents);
Improvement of operating conditions:
- radiation protection,
- waste management,
- maintenance improvement,
- reduction of human error risk.
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The EUR: ten major European utilities towards common
LWR standards
Ten participants from the beginning, ensuring a wide legitimacy of the
standards:
British Energy/Nuclear Electric (UK) DTN (Spain), EDF (France), Fortum
and TVO (Finland), NRG (Netherlands), SOGIN (Italy), Tractebel
(Belgium), Vattenfall/FKA (Sweden), UAK (Switzerland), VDEW
(Germany)
Strong connections established with other utilities, vendors and
regulators
Four volumes covering the whole range of requirements:
-Main policies and objectives
-Generic NI requirements
-Application of EUR to specific projects
-Power generation plant requirements
An efficient tool for specification of the NPPs
to be built in Europe
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EPR:
Limitation system to eliminate avoidable reactor trip
Limitation functions and protection of the reactor
Four-channel limitation functions are implemented
to rule out impermissible operational conditions that would
otherwise cause reactor trips actions to be initiated
to ensure that process variables are kept within the range on
which the safety analysis is based
to initiate actions to counteract disturbances that are not so
serious as to require the protection system to trip the reactor
Man-Machine Interface
Sufficient and appropriate information is made available to
the operators for their clear understanding of the actual plant
status.
Normal operation
enhancement through sound
protection system design
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EPR provides optimal operating conditions
Evolutionary design:
State-of-the art digital
I&C
Ergonomic control room
Control system
P17 –S2
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Thoroughly trained operators:
Training
Simulator
State-of-the-art I&C and outstanding training
programs improve overall reliability
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Design and responsiveness improvements
reduce considerably the probability of core damage
Engineering design improvements allow:
Break preclusion of primary piping and main secondary pipes
Reduction of risk of Reactor Pressure Vessel Brittle fracture
Increased operator reaction time
for loss of Steam Generator cooling
event thanks to increase primary
and secondary coolant volume
Improved response to loss
of Off-site power events: additional
diversified diesel generators
EPR reinforces Public acceptance
P20 –S1
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Redundant and diverse EPR safety systems
EPR is protected against:
Multiple failure while
providing online
maintenance flexibility
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2
4 times redundant
safeguard systems
Common cause failures
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safety system diversity:
-
Every system has a
diversified back-up
1
Four Train concept
and physical separation
External hazards through
systematic physical
separation of the safety
systems
Proven yet evolutionary safety systems
deliver high reliability levels
P19 –S1
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Severe Accident (SA) Approach
Specific EPR design assumption :
The event may ultimately lead to RPV failure (loss of the
second barrier)
⇒ Confinement of radioactivity must therefore be
ensured by the containment (third barrier)
EPR approach :
Reduce the probability of core damage by a
factor of ~ 10 compared to reactors in operation.
Regardless the very little likelihood of reactor core damage, prevent and
mitigate SA consequences, i.e. :
Practically eliminate sequences leading to large early radioactive releases
Timing and magnitude of possible releases following any plausible core
damage event must result in very limited off-site doses
Hardened Containment Design to Ensure its Integrity
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Consequences of a severe accident are limited
by both passive and active safety systems
Passive System (Short term)
Active System (Long term)
Reactor pit
&
IRWST
Sacrificial
concrete
Spreading
area
1.
Temporary retainment in the reactor pit
(gravity and metal gate)
2.
Spreading in the large surface dedicated
area (metal gate melting and gravity)
3.
Flooding and cooling of the spreading
area using IRWST (In-containment
Refueling Water Storage Tank)
1.
Removal of containment heat:
• Recirculation and coolant
heat exchange
• Containment spray system
No need for significant off-site measures
improves Public acceptance
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EPR:
Practical Elimination of Hydrogen Detonation
Oxydation of the Zr fuel cladding results in
hydrogen production
Global detonation is avoided as long as the
average global hydrogen concentration within
containment is below 10 % H2 (vol)
Containment with large volume (about 80 000
m3) and ”open” compartments
No automatic early containment spray for
avoiding steam condensation
Prevention of fast deflagration or detonation
for all relevant scenarios ensured by Multiple
Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PARs)
AREVA PAR
distributed throughout containment
maintains the average concentration of hydrogen in the containment
atmosphere below ignition limits
pressure loads generated from hydrogen on the containment structures is
quasi-static and below the containment design pressure for all
representative sequences
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EPR Safety Improvements
Main Safeguard Systems of the EPR
Double containment with ventilation
and filtration
Melt core
cooling area
Containment heat
dispersion system
Water reserves inside the
containment
Spreading Area
Protection of the Basemat
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Four
Fourredundant
redundant
safety
safetysystems
systems
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EPR aircraft hazard protection in the post 9-11 World
EPR Designed to withstand impact of:
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AREVA
Large Commercial Jet
&
Military Aircraft
At various Elevations
&
From different Sides
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EPR REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
COMPONENTS AND LAYOUT
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EPR design incorporates
worldwide operational experience
EPR design integrates worldwide experience feedback of various
damages that can affect mechanical components
Fatigue
Corrosion
Thermal aging
Irradiation
Wear
Lifetime design improvements mainly focused on
Plant operation
Materials (steel and alloy)
Plant chemistry
Equipment (Reactor Pressure Vessel, Steam Generators, Pressurizers,
pumps)
Secure cash flow
for a minimum of a 60 year period
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EPR COMPONENTS
Many Significant Design Improvements
REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL
ONE INTEGRAL FORGING FOR THE VESSEL FLANGES AND
THE NOZZLE SHELL
SUPPRESSION OF THE BOTTOM PENETRATIONS
INTERNALS
HEAVY REFLECTOR
STEAM-GENERATORS
IMPROVED DESIGN FOR INCREASING STEAM PRESSURE
PRESSURIZER
INCREASED VOLUME
IMPROVED DESIGN AND LAYOUT FOR SAFETY VALVES AND
HEATERS MAINTENANCE
REACTOR COOLANT PIPING
FORGED STAINLESS STEEL
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EPR HEAVY REFLECTOR
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EPR General layout
Reactor
Building
Fuel
Building
Nuclear
Auxiliary
Building
Safeguard
Building 1
Diesel
Building
3+4
Waste
Building
Safeguard
Building
2+3
Safeguard
Building 4
Diesel
Building
1+2
Office
Building
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C.I. Electrical
Building
Access
Building
Turbine
Building
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RB accessible during power operation
: Inaccessible area
(during power operation)
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Maintainability concept for lowering O&M costs
The maintainability of the EPR has been greatly improved by its
evolutionary character leveraging the experience gathered from
previous reactors
Minimization of the needs for In-Service Inspection (ISI)
Reduced number of welds on the primary circuit (suppression of a girth
weld between the flange and the nozzle shell, large nozzles integral to the
main primary piping, small nozzles set-on welded)
Systematic improved accessibility e.g.: access floors to pressurizer safety
valves, pressurizer heaters, primary coolant pumps seals
Optimization of radioprotection for easier maintenance
Use of low Cobalt stainless steel for reduction of source terms
Optimization of layout of systems conveying radioactivity
Additional radiation shielding, e.g. for valves handwheel
Shortening of maintenance operations
Flanges on CRDMs and pressurizer heaters
Dismountable thermal shields e.g. on Steam Generators
Greater flexibility to reduce operational cost
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A COMPETITIVE kWh
Nuclear Island availability objectives
Unscheduled unavailability rate lower than 5 days/year (3
days/year for NI) : < 1,4% / r.y
Refueling Only Outage (ROO): < 11 days
Normal maintenance and refueling Outage (NRO): < 16 days
Ten-year inspection outage (TIO): < 40 days
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EPR designed for flexible and optimized fuel
management
Large size
Heavy Reflector
In/out loadings
Cycle length flexibility
High U235 enrichment
High discharge burnup
Low linear power
MOX recycling capability
Efficient fuel cycle
Low fuel cycle cost
Increased margins
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EPR provides operational flexibility
Load follow operation capability
Daily load follow cycles
Intermediate power level from 2 to 10 hours
Modulation slope (up to +5%/min):
Usual load follow: power variation between 60% and 100% NP,
- Return to 100 % NP possible at 5%/min during 80 % of the fuel cycle
Unusual load follow with intermediate power level between 25% and 60% NP
- Return to 100 % NP possible at 2.5%/min during 80 % of the fuel cycle
No constraints for duration of part-load operation
Flexible fuel management
Cycle lengths from 12 to 24 months
In-out / out-in fuel management
Capability to burn ENU*, ERU* and
Actual demand
Load forecast
MOX* fuel
*Note: ENU: Enriched Natural Uranium
ERU: Enriched Reprocessed Uranium
MOX: Mixed Oxide U, Pu
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Progress in construction: activities on site
October 2006
July 2007
February 2008
April 2008
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EPR in Finland: Olkiluoto 3
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EPR the FIRST Generation III+ under construction:
Second project site: Flamanville 3
First of the new EDF EPR fleet
Generating power and revenue
by 2012
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The Future EPR Reactor of Flamanville
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EPR Under Construction: Taishan
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Taishan Project is part of a global agreement
The contract signed on November 26, 2007 includes:
Uranium supply and enrichment services
Delivery of Fuel assemblies over 15 years
Design and supply of 2 EPR nuclear islands
Technology Transfer on EPR NI Technology
together with a view to develop collaboration on the ‘back-end’
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Taishan Project Description
Supply of 2 Nuclear Islands (NI) for 2 EPR Units:
Design & Engineering of NI
Civil Works Basic & Detailed Design
FOB Supply of Heavy Equipment
Safety Digital Control System
Options:
Erection and Commissioning of Primary Loop
Operational Digital Control System
Technology Transfer on EPR NI Technology
Self-Reliance Program for Engineering Activities
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The Taishan Nuclear Power Plant
ACESS
ROAD
TAISHAN NP PLANT AREA
EMERGENCY ROAD
GUOHUA POWER
STATION
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Integrated equipment manufacturing
Continuous quality deliveries of products and integrated process
improvements for existing plants and new build projects
Sfarsteel (Le Creusot)
Heavy forging and machining
Workshops: 85 000 m² (4 sites)
Chalon Saint Marcel
30 years of operations
Workshop: 39 000 m²
Reactor Pressure Vessel Heads,
Steam Generators, Pressurizers,
Safety Injection Accumulators
JSPM (Jeumont)
Start of operation: 1898
Workshop: 13 000 m²
Reactor Coolant Pumps
and Motors, Control Rod Drive
Mechanisms
AREVA
since 2006
2900m²
Extension
in 2006
1200m² Ext.
by 2012
2 new
production
lines by 2011
AREVA is building an industry not just plants
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December 20, 2006
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Pressurizer
Sipping test
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Steam Generator
Manufacturing of steam generator
tube plate, tube support structures
and bundle wrapper introduction at
AREVA Chalon / Saint Marcel
(France)
May 2007
44AREVA
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Reactor Pressure Vessel
Forging at Japan Steel Works (JSW) in Muroran
(Japan)
Manufacturing at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI)
in Kobe (Japan)
Final assembly done
45AREVA
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August 2007
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September 2007
Reactor Coolant Pump
First Casing after Machining at AREVA JSPM (France)
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The EPR design currently being licensed
by leading safety authorities
Construction License
February 2005
April 2007
Design Certification
Application
December 2007
Submission
June 2007
Licensing Launched
AREVA supports a shorter licensing process
by providing comprehensive reference documents
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AREVA’s goal is to deploy EPR plants in the US
AREVA has therefore decided to apply for design certification
Design Certification Official Application: December 2007
Several US utilities have expressed strong interest
and consider the EPR as a viable option for future needs.
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EPR Design Certification Time
schedule
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
DC Rule Issued (Aug '10)
EPR Base Case (w/LWA, no ESP)
Design Certification
Applica. Prep
COL Preparation (24 mos)
COL Review / hearing (39 mos)
Site Prep / Construction (15 / 42
mos)
Start-up (9 mos)
NRC Review
DC Rule
COL Issued (Aug '11)
COL Prep
Provisional Turnover (Oct '15)
Review / Hearings
Construction
S/U
EPR construction
Constellation (4 units)
EDF (1 unit, Flamanville)
TVO (1 unit, Olkiluoto)
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Multinational Design Evaluation Program
Purpose: Multinational regulatory cooperation and convergence of
safety standards
Stage 1
Enhance and formalize multinational cooperation
First demonstration is NRC design certification review for
U.S. EPR
Primary participants are NRC and STUK (DGSNR to a lesser extent)
Sharing of documentation and sharing of resources
Stage 2
International convergence of codes, standards, and safety goals
Conducted in parallel with Stage 1
Build framework for multinational evaluation of Gen IV designs
Steering Committee of regulators
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) will coordinate
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ÇOK TESEKKÜR EDERIM
THANK YOU VERY MUCH
MERCI BEAUCOUP
… HOSÇA KALIN …
AREVA
AREVA