Entre Historia y Orientación Filosófica

Transcription

¿Quilates perdidos?-Philosophical Counselling and
Chiang Tzu´s Philosophy of love- Relevancia de la
filosofía oriental para el asesoramiento filosófico Sofistas: Antiphon of Rhamnous – Philosophical
Counsellor- Parménides: The Pre-Socratic Parmenides
and Philosophical ‘Practice’? - Las cuatro muertes de
Diógenes el perro - On Becoming and Being Hospitable:
The Modern Socratic Dialogue and the Hospitality
Industry - Philosophical Midwifery from Problems of
Addiction to the Anagogic Level - Plato’s Theory of
Love: Rationality as Passion - La Asesoría Filosófica en
el legado de Platón y Aristóteles - Los antiguos médicos
I the flexible mind:
del alma - Epicteto:Volumen
Cultivation
Filosofía Antigua,
Epictetus and reframing
- Christian Philosophical
Moderna Nasruddin Hodja,
Practice and WayMedieval
of Life - yNasrudin:
a master of the negative way - Thomas Hobbes: La
cesión estratégica -René Descartes, Philosophical
Counsellor of Elisabeth -Filosofía moderna española:
Entre Historia y
Orientación Filosófica
José Barrientos Rastrojo - Jess Flemming - Monica Cavallé
Cruz -Trevor Curnow - Gerhard Stamer - Roxana Kreimer Bernard Roy - Pierre Grimes - Lydia Amir - Claudio
Altisen - Montserrat Martín - Antti Mattila - Sussan
Robbins
- Godofredo J. Chillida Mejías Sarah Ellenbog -Oscar Brenifier
e
Jorge Díaz - Mariano Betés de Toro -David O´Donaghue Helve Svare - Neri Pollastri - Dean Pickard - Shlomit
Schuster - Sarah Ellenbogen - Francisco Barrera Rodríguez
- Eduardo Rodríguez - Rayda Guzmán González - Manuel
Jesús López Baroni - Ramón Queraltó Moreno - Gabriela
Berti - Ricardo Aranovichn - Julia Taviel de Andrade
José Barrientos Rastrojo
hilosohers as
hilosophical
ratitioners
(La Orientación Filosófica en la Historia del Pensamiento)
(Volume I)
(Coord.)
Ediciones X-XI
Primera edición: Septiembre de 2006.
ISBN de la obra completa: 84-611-2664-5
ISBN: 84-611-2666-8
Edita:
Asociación de Estudios Humanísticos y Filosofía Práctica X-XI
Diseño Portada e Interior de la Obra: José Barrientos Rastrojo.
© José Barrientos Rastrojo, 2006
www.josebarrientos.net
Pueden solicitarse copias de la edición de esta obra en los siguientes correos electrónicos
[email protected] y [email protected]
2
2. F i l o s o f í a
Griega y
2. Filosofía Griega y Romana
¿QUILATES PERDIDOS?
5
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING AND
CHUANG TZU’S PHILOSOPHY OF
LOVE
Jess Fleming
1
11
1
RELEVANCIA DE LA FILOSOFÍA
ORIENTAL PARA EL ASESORAMIENTO
LA ASESORÍA FILOSÓFICA EN EL
PLATÓN Y ARISTÓTELES
Claudio Altisen
9
93
3
LEGADO DE
LOS ANTIGUOS MÉDICOS DEL
ALMA
Montserrat Martí Linares
1
10
03
3
CULTIVATION THE FLEXIBLE MIND:
EPICTETUS AND REFRAMING
Antti Mattila
1
11
17
7
FILOSÓFICO
Mónica Cavallé Cruz
2
21
1
3. Filosofía Medieval
Romana
1. Filosofías Orientales
v
ANTIPHON OF RHAMNOUS,
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLOR
Trevor Curnow
3
37
7
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PARMENIDES
AND PHILOSOPHICAL ‘PRACTICE’?
Gerhard Stamer
4
45
5
LAS CUATRO MUERTES DE
DIÓGENES EL PERRO
Roxana Kreimer
5
53
3
THE MODERN SOCRATIC DIALOGUE
AND THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY
Bernard R. Roy
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL
PRACTICE AND WAY OF LIFE
Susan Robbins
1
12
27
7
NASRUDDIN HODJA, A MASTER OF
THE NEGATIVE WAY
Oscar Brenifier
1
13
37
7
THOMAS HOBBES: LA CESIÓN
4. F i l o s o f í a M o d e r n a
Introuducción
INDICE
5
59
9
PHILOSOPHICAL MIDWIFERY FROM
PROBLEMS OF ADDICTION TO THE
ANAGOGIC LEVEL
Pierre Grimes
6
69
9
PLATO’S THEORY OF LOVE:
RATIONALITY AS PASSION
Lydia B. Amir
7
77
7
3
ESTRATÉGICA
Godofredo Chillida
1
15
55
5
RENÉ DESCARTES, PHILOSOPHICAL
COUNSELLOR OF ELISABETH
Jorge Humberto Dias 1
17
71
1
EL CONOCIMIENTO DE SÍ MISMO
DE MIGUEL SABUCO
Mariano Betés de Toro 1
18
85
5
SPINOZA’S CONATUS IN LIGHT OF
THANATOS AND SELF-DESTRUCTION
David O´donaghue
2
20
07
7
José Barrientos Rastrojo (coord)
Introducción
¿Quilates perdidos?
Quien no tiene proyectos no tiene futuro
La filosofía no sirve para nada… para nada más que para aprender a vivir
José ORTEGA Y GASSET
¡Qué fría es la vida que no se relaciona, que no busca el calor de la amistad!
Lucio Anneo SÉNECA
Afirmaba Peter Raabe en la introducción a un manual de Orientación
Filosóficva que esta nueva profesión servía para ayudarnos a adaptarnos a un mundo que nos
roba nuestro asiento vital. Es cierto, todo ha tornado en una evanescencia cruel. Con las
prisas acampa en nosotros la falta de descanso y un desasosiego que nos altera. La imagen
calmosa de nosotros en una tarde de playa pertenece a un trasunto trasnochado, al de Julia en
Verano Azul contemplando el atardecer mientras llegan Tito y el Piraña con un griterio que la
levanta de su descanso estético.
Hoy, más de una década después de que Ran Lahav y Lou Marinoff iniciasen el
Primer Congreso Mundial de Prácticas Filosóficas, casi diez años después de que el segundo
publicase su bestseller Más Platón y menos Prozac, más de un lustro después de que una
conciencia despierta y con proyectos desarrollase la primera tesis doctoral en Canadá sobre la
disciplina… hoy, decíamos, de forma silente pero progresiva nuestro país empieza a cambiar
de la mano de la Orientación Filosófica y de parte de las diversas prácticas filosóficas que se
desarrollan en toda España.
En Barcelona se afianza un Máster en Orientación Filosófica en la Universidad, se
abren tés filosóficos e incluso he oido que se ha desarrollado un Vino Filosófico. La AFPC y
otros orientadores de forma individual llevan adelante este proyecto común.
5
Philosophers as Philosophical Pratitioners
En Madrid, los proyectos de ASEPRAF también avanzan (cursos de prácticas,
filosóficas, talleres filosóficos, cafés filosóficos, gabinetes de Orientación Filosófica como
Aletheia o Logos).
En el Sur, la situación es igual de prolífica: colaboraciones con asociaciones de
fibromialgia, cursos en la facultad desde hace casi 5 años, vinos y cafés filosóficos, consultas
individuales, publicación de las actas del congreso Iberoamericano, publicación de la Revista
Internacional de Filosofía Práctica, desarrollo de Experto Universitario de Filosofía Práctica
y Orientación Filosófica en la Universidad e incluso el grupo ETOR consiguió arribar a buen
puerto con la realización del Octavo Congreso Mundial de Filosofía Práctica. Raabe,
Marinoff, Lahav, Amir, Gutcknecht y los presidentes de las principales asociaciones
nacionales se dieron cita en aquel encuentro para el trabajo, el encuentro y la amistad.
Por todo ello ahora es el momento de avanzar con mayor seguridad.
Hacía depender Ortega y Gasset el futuro personal de los proyectos, puesto que
quien no tiene proyectos no posee un futuro. Si esto es así, hemos de sonreir cuando alzamos
la mirada a nuestro alrededor y vemos la labor de todos aquellos filósofos comprometidos en
este proyecto común. La Orientación Filosófica es ya una realidad práctica en nuestro país 1 .
Pero la Orientación Filosófica no ceja, se está haciendo ambiciosa. No quiere
cualquier tipo de futuro, no le sirve una actitud de anorexia intelectiva, si se me permite la
metáfora, o de miopía conceptual que nos conmine a ser una disciplina y un estudio de
segundo orden. Si bien hace un lustro nuestras actividades se movían del lado de la ilusión
hoy pueden hacerlo desde la exigencia y la seriedad con que han sido escritos los artículos
que leerán a continuación. La Filosofía Práctica es ante todo una acción, un movimiento con
un fundamento teórico necesario. Porque sólo haciéndose consciente de qué es y qué ha sido
podrá establecer qué desea ser, se aproximará al futuro desde la autoridad que le dan los
actos y la reflexión pausada de sus éxitos y errores.
Entre los artículos dispuestos en este volumen contamos con contribuciones de
orientadores de diversas partes del mundo y también de diversos rincones de España.
Cuando este proyecto nació apenas ocupaba en el pensamiento poco más de unas cien
páginas y unos ocho ó diez artículos. No obstante, la Orientación Filosófica no deja nunca de
sorprendernos. Hoy son más de treinta artículos en dos volúmenes que hospedan a los
filósofos prácticos más conocidos y reconocidos. Ellos nos han hablado de cómo Descartes,
Kant, Husserl, Ortega y Gasset o María Zambrano guardan en sus escritos respuestas para
nuestras vidas y conflictos cotidianos.
La satisfacción es un concepto que procede de un trabajo cumplido. A veces ésta no
es suficiente porque no cuenta con el beneplácito de la amistad, elemento esencial según los
clásicos para una vida feliz. La amistad ha sido otro de los elementos que han transido la
1
En el momento presente tengo constancia de actividades vinculadas a nuestro campo en Andalucía, Principado
de Asturias, Islas Canarias, Cataluña, Castilla la Mancha, Extremadura, Galicia, Islas Baleares, La Rioja,
Madrid y Valencia. Esto supone que más de un 70% de las comunidades autónomas de España ya cuenta con
los servicios de Orientadores Filosóficos formados para desarrollar su profesión.
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coordinación de este libro. La respuesta personal a mi llamamiento colma mi esperanza
dentro un mundo contemporáneo dónde la perdida de ella y de la ilusión se defienden como
síntomas de maduración (¡cruel psicología evolutiva!). El adulto con ilusiones es un iluso,
dicen, el anciano con esperanzas ha perdido la cordura (yo me pregunto si no será el mundo
quien ha perdido la razón cuando cree tales cosas…).
Si tuviéramos que completar el currículum profesional de estos dos volúmenes no lo
dejaríamos en mal lugar al conocer la currícula de la autoría de los diversos artículos. Son
pensadores, como decíamos, que han trabajado durante años en el campo de la filosofía
práctica y/o orientación filosófica y, además, especialista en los autores sobre los que han
escrito. Las conversaciones personales con cada uno de ellos ha hecho posible el encuentro
con sus intereses filosóficos particulares y esto gestó la posibilidad de brindar al público un
material que confiamos sea de utilidad a estudiosos de la disciplina y a no iniciados.
Éste no es un trabajo sólo para profesionales sino una obra para que profundicen
también aquellos que no se han acercado nunca a la filosofía pero que encuentran en sus
vidas una necesidad a la que ni siquiera saben nombrar. Este libro puede ser un primer paso
en la comprensión de nuestras capacidades creativas y su aplicación en nuestras vidas, una
apuesta por el entendimiento mutuo a través de la hermeneútica, un momento para curiosear
a través de los diversos casos de orientación filosófica planteados o en las cartas entre la una
reina y un filósofo de principios de la modernidad, el instante para desvelar que más allá de
la filosofía oficial hay pensadores en China que tienen mucho que decirnos sobre el amor al
igual que lo hiciera Platón siglos más tarde. En definitiva, una obra para darle tiempo a su
lectura y disfrutar a través de ella.
Para Ortega el objetivo de la filosofía era aprender a vivir. No andaba mal
encaminado nuestro filósofo más universal. Séneca, otro de nuestros filósofos universales
aseveraba que la filosofía no nos pide nuestro tiempo sino que es ella la que nos proporciona
tiempo, pues ¿de qué nos sirve el tiempo si no somos consciente de él? ¿de qué nos sirve la
vida si no hacemos acopio de ella?
Sabemos que la filosofía nos ayuda a aprender a vivir porque abre respuestas al mayor
de todos los enigmas. Ahora bien, la filosofía también nos enseña a vivir porque nos ayuda a
disfrutar del instante (carpe diem, concepto de los románticos hoy tergiversado), extraer de él
todas sus posibilidades, estrujar el día para arrancarle todo aquello que pueda contribuir a
nuestra felicidad y a nuestro deseo de conocer la verdad.
Hace algunos años me encontré en las prácticas de Enfermería a un catedrático de
historia retirado. Estaba en la UCI, pero su aspecto era insulto a su incardinación en aquella
ala del hospital. Rápidamente entablamos un fecundo dialogo. Me habló de la historia oficial
y de aquella que había transitado por sus investigaciones. Yo en aquella época simultáneaba
con dificultad dos carreras y estaba deseoso por acabar Enfermería para implicarme
totalmente en Filosofía.
-¡Filosofía!- dijo sorprendido -¿Filosofía Pura? ¿Eso quieres estudiar?
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Se giró pensativo como recordando a algún familiar o algún estudiante que había
dejado de ser correligionario suyo por una decisión tan absurda como la mía.
-¿Y eso para que sirve? – se rascó la calva con gesto hipocrático – ¿No es más
práctico ser enfermero?
Al cabo de los años, después de ver miles de noticias en televisión o de leer sobre la
situación social pienso si ya la pregunta de aquel excatedrático sencillamente queda fuera de
lugar.
La Orientación Filosófica se ha tejido durante años con la fibra ilusionada de los
sueños. Esa fibra hoy se cotiza al alza y empieza a venderse a precio de oro.
Sevilla, Octubre de 2006
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1. FILOSOFIAS ORIENTALES
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10
Jess Fleming, Ph.D. (East/West Comparative Philosophy, University of Hawai), and
Associate Professor at Tamkang University, Taiwan, is working on a second Ph.D. in
psychotherapy and counselling at Regent's College, London. His doctoral thesis at Regent's
College is on Asian Philosophy and Philosophical Counselling/Practice. In July, 2000, he
was invited to visit Kyoto University (Japan) for a month as a visiting scholar, and gave a
lecture there on ‘Self and (In)finitude: Embodiment and the Other’ which has been translated
into Japanese and will be published in Japan. In August 2000, he taught a short course at
Regent's College, School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, on ‘Philosophical Counselling
and Chinese Philosophy.’ He has attended the first five international conferences on
philosophical counselling/practice, and written several papers on this topic. He practises
philosophical counselling in Taiwan, and is starting a philo-cafe there.
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING AND CHUANG
TZU’S PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE
Jess Fleming
Taiwan, Japón – Inglaterra
To have a friend come from afar (to visit), is this not a pleasure?
Confucius Analects
It is widely recognised that the Chuang Tzu contains a profound, wise, and soothing
philosophy of death, but even though the word ai (‘love’) is only mentioned 36 times and the
word yu (‘friend’) is only mentioned 19 times, we will see that Chuang Tzu also has an
equally deep philosophy of love and friendship, which in fact cannot be conceptually
disengaged from his philosophy of life and death. 2 Among the vicissitudes of human life,
loss in its various forms (loss of a loved one through death or divorce, loss of employment,
loss of joie de vivre, etc.) commonly causes great suffering. Perhaps we can find in Chuang
Tzu some sage advice to help ourselves and others cope with such stressful, often traumatic,
life-experiences. In particular, I am interested in how a ‘philosophical counsellor’ might use
Taoist philosophy to help someone grieving over the loss of a loved one (whether due to
death, or break-up of a relationship). Let me begin by briefly explaining the history and
theory of ‘philosophical counselling’ as I understand it.
Almost twenty years ago a German philosopher named Gerd Achenbach began to
practice what is called in German, Philosophische Praxis (‘philosophical practice’ or
‘philosophical counselling’). His idea was that just as Socrates or the Buddha aimed to
deploy philosophy as a way of enlightening people and alleviating their misery, so too today
philosophers might venture to attempt to assist ‘clients’ facing various life problems by
helping them think through their own worldviews, value systems, assumptions and
implications of patterns of thinking and acting. This movement among practical
2
For an authoritative survey of most major Western thinkers’ views on love, see Irving Singer (1987) The Nature of Love (3
vols.). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
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philosophers who would provide an alternative to standard forms of psychotherapy, for
persons facing difficulties which are not psychopathological, has spread now to other
European countries such as Holland, France and Britain, each of which has its own
association or society to promote the theory and practice of philosophical counselling. No
consensus, however, has been reached on a number of important questions such as whether a
philosophical counsellor should be required to have an advanced degree in philosophy (or
any formal academic training, for that matter), and whether certification and/or licensing
should be required. There are some things, though, that are generally agreed, for example
that the philosophical counsellor (like psychotherapists) should be skilled at listening.
Though I cannot here go into the details of my own philosophy of philosophical counselling,
there are many ideas from Asian (especially Chinese) philosophy which should prove useful
in the theory and practice of philosophical counselling. 3 One example is the importance of
sometimes ‘doing nothing’ (or wu wei, as it is known in Taoism). Silence and stillness are
often effective in counselling, just as they are in life, love, and death, as we will see below.
One way, of course, to begin delineating Chuang Tzu’s philosophy of love, is by
clarifying what according to Chuang Tzu love is not. Based on Chuang Tzu’s general view
that emotions should be moderate and transient, and his advocacy of a life of carefree
detachment, simplicity and spontaneity, recognising that all ‘things’ are really interconnected
processes in flux, I think we can begin by saying that Chuang Tzu would say the best kind of
love (and here I am thinking primarily of love between male and female partners, but also of
love between parents and children, friends, etc.) is not ‘romantic’ or passionate; a Taoist
lover would never ‘fall madly in love’ or get a broken heart (much less commit suicide over a
failed romantic relationship); nor would a Taoist lover have extreme or excessive desire
(sexual or otherwise) for his friend or beloved. While I think Chuang Tzu would agree with
Freud that love is often as not mingled with its ‘opposite’ (hate), and thus ambivalence is
normal, Chuang Tzu’s philosophy of cyclic reversion whereby all processes reach a point of
over-ripeness and then swing back in the other direction (as the seasons do) implies that
excessive love or desire can easily evolve into hate or revulsion. Continuing our via negativa
characterisation of love, for Chuang Tzu it also is not jealous, not possessive, not clinging,
not selfish, and not logical. One of the points I want to maintain is that Chuang Tzu is a
mystic (defined here as anyone who thinks the most important truths about the human
condition cannot be derived from mere logic, nor conveyed fully in language); hence, there is
and always ought to be a certain mysteriousness about life, love, and death. To be overly
rational and analyse everything is equivalent to killing and dissecting whatever it is one is
trying to trap in the net of logic and language (love, for example, whether as an abstract
concept or a concrete instance). Love is, for Chuang Tzu, I think, also not based on need or
loneliness. So often Chuang Tzu provides us with fables showing that animals such as birds,
fish, frogs, and monkeys are at least as wise as we humans. The implication would seem to
be that we should couple and copulate in a natural way. Our notion of ‘love’ is false and
artificial (as are our notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’), and is a cultural construct, a part of the
3
For further information about ‘philosophical counselling’, see Ran Lahav and Maria Tillmanns (eds) Essays on
Philosophical Counselling, (New York: University Press of America), 1995. For further information on my own philosophy
of philosophical counselling and what Chinese philosophy can contribute to it, see Jesse Fleming, ‘Philosophical
Counselling and the I Ching,’ Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Sept. 1998.
12
ideology which surrounds us unconsciously in our music, art, literature, and so on; we would
be wise to note our limited, culture-bound, conceptions of love, life, death, etc. and
remember that there are other human cultures at other times and places in which people have
very different notions of love, friendship, death, etc. Furthermore the perspectives of fish
‘culture’ or monkey ‘culture’ not only provide us with alternative standards and definitions
of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’, ‘useful’ and ‘useless’, ‘love’ and ‘hate’,
‘friend’ and ‘enemy,’ etc. according to such cultures, but also these alien cultures remind us
that no single perspective is absolutely correct and complete - including Chuang Tzu’s of
course! As he says, ‘When I say you are dreaming, I am dreaming too.’ Chuang Tzu’s
conception of philosophy is not that of the contemporary analytic philosopher who seeks to
set forth a proposition and demonstrate its truth, such that its opposite (contrary or
contradictory) is absolutely false. Instead, Chuang Tzu plays (literally and figuratively) with
various possible perspectives on death, love, etc. and wants to encourage his reader to do
likewise; in this way Chuang Tzu subverts or deconstructs his own philosophy in a very
‘postmodern’ way by means of dialectical, paradoxical, and ironical strategies that are meant
to undermine themselves. Chuang Tzu is hard to pin down, preferring to stimulate our
imaginations rather than stifle us with dogma. Later, while we will see that Chuang Tzu’s
explicit (as well as implied) position on love and friendship is generally consistent and
coherent, he does (as he so frequently does in regard to death) sometimes seem to contradict
himself, when in fact he is only showing us different angles on love and friendship which
actually complement each other rather than conflict with each other or exclude each other.
Now that we know fairly well what according to Chuang Tzu ‘love’ is not, let us
continue to clarify what in his view love is. I will try to support my interpretation of (my
‘perspective’ on) Chuang Tzu’s conception of love and friendship with both quotes and
anecdotes from the text. Sometimes we will have to extrapolate when he does not mention
love or friendship explicitly. First of all as I said earlier, love is not selfish; in other words
love is selfless, but in a metaphysical as well as in moral and psychological senses. Several
times Chuang Tzu, in a rather Buddhistic way, states that the ‘true man’ (chen jen, or chih
jen, or sheng jen), the sage, has ‘no self’. 4 In Chuang Tzu’s process metaphysics where
everything is shifting and evolving and interdependent, there is no place for a fixed and
definite personal identity. Psychologically, this means the wise lover has the habit of not
being self-conscious (for one thing this would only induce self-consciousness and artificiality
in others, including the loved one). Morally, of course, this means that the wise lover seeks
no selfish advantage from the relationship with the loved one, just as in general the sage is
characterised (similar to Confucius’ chun-tzu) as not interested in profit, fame, or (political)
power; this also bears comparison with Aristotle’s analysis of friendship (in book eight of the
Nicomachean Ethics), where Aristotle distinguishes between friendship based on pleasure or
utility from friendship based on virtue and mutual respect. However, it should be noted that
whereas Plato and Aristotle (and Confucius) claim that only morally good persons are worthy
of our love and friendship, Chuang Tzu in at least one place suggests that a Taoist sage might
befriend even someone like the infamous Robber Chih (who snacked on human livers), or at
4
For an interesting discussion of the concepts of ‘selflessness’ and ‘self-forgetfulness’ in Taoist thought, see Wolfgang
Bauer (1990) Das Antlitz Chinas (Munchen: Carl Hanser Verlag), especially pp. 63-8, ‘Taoistische Selbstvergessenheit’
(‘Taoist Self-forgetting’).
13
least the elder brother of such a cruel criminal. Chuang Tzu’s all-accepting, non-judgmental
attitude reminds one of the sublime section in Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass (‘Song of
Myself’), where he says ‘murderers, etc., come to me…’ On the other hand, the many stories
in the Chuang Tzu of deformed, pug-uglies, for whom the people have fondness and
affection, suggests that like Plato and Aristotle, Chuang Tzu would agree that ‘beauty is only
skin deep’, and it is unwise to love someone (like the famous beauty, Hsi Shih) merely for
their external, physical beauty.
Certainly one of the key ideas in all of Taoist philosophy is wu wei (so-called
‘inaction’), which we have already referred to in connection with the role of a philosophical
counsellor (who sometimes ‘does nothing’ except listen, and refrains from giving advice
since people usually know what they have to do in order to cope with their problems, and
won’t follow advice anyway). In the case of one who loves another or wishes to befriend
another, or in the case of one whose love and friendship have been rejected, often the best
thing to do is let it happen, rather than make it happen. This passive, yielding, submissive
attitude of letting things happen without forcing them, or trying too hard, is not easy,
especially for most Western people. Love, life, and death should all be ‘easy’, simple,
natural, spontaneous, taking the path of least resistance, maintaining a childlike innocence
and a playfulness, sense of humour, and recognition that life is often ironic (calling for an
ironic stance or response). None of this is possible if we struggle ambitiously and singlemindedly (whether in matters of love, life, or death). Take it easy, Chuang Tzu seems to say.
We should also be imaginative and creative in loving, living, and dying. Do the unexpected.
Let go. Let it happen.
If there is any concept more fundamental to Taoist thought than wu wei, it could only
be the concept of Tao itself. Tao seems in general to signify Nature or the natural process of
cyclic (sometimes emergent, novel) change. The Tao also connotes the unity and intimate
interconnectedness of all things. For Mo Tzu, Confucius’ moral concepts of jen (brotherly
love), hsiao (filial piety), etc. are too narrow and partial, but in Chuang Tzu’s eyes, even Mo
Tzu’s concept of chien ai (‘universal love’) is still too narrow and partial. 5 The proper
‘object’ of love is the totality of all things (processes), designated as the Tao. As Chuang Tzu
quite often repeats, life and death are one (process), and hence if life is good so is death. ‘All
the ten-thousand things and I are one,’ says Chuang Tzu. One should not only be in love
with life, but with death, ugliness, injustice, war, crime and all the other ‘evils’ that
philosophers enumerate when discussing the ‘problem of evil’. For Chuang Tzu there is no
problem of evil, because there is no evil, at least no evil simpliciter, nothing which it is
impossible to view from an alternative perspective as both good and evil, or better, beyond
good and evil. In chapter five of the Chuang Tzu (‘The Sign of Virtue Complete’, 14/5/73), 6
Chuang Tzu tells us a little story about baby pigs who continue to love their mother’s body
even after she died; what they love, he says, is not her physical form, but that which animates
or gives her a physical form - i.e. the Tao (often referred to metaphorically as the ‘Creator’).
By loving the Tao, I suspect that Chuang Tzu means to accept with a mischievous glee
5
For a clear comparison of Chuang Tzu’s philosophy of love and Mo Tzu’s philosophy of love, see Ch’en P’in-liao (1983)
Chuang-hsueh Hsin-t’an. Taipei: Che Wen ch’u-pan she.
6
All such references to the Chuang Tzu are from the Harvard-Yenching Concordance to the Chuang Tzu; the first number
refers to page, the second to chapter, and the third to line.
14
whatever life brings, whatever transitions seem inevitable. This is demonstrated in the sage’s
remark addressed to the weeping, wailing family of his dead friend, when he says, ‘Sh, don’t
disturb the process of nature!’ This also explains what Chuang Tzu means when he says the
‘life and death are fated’ or ‘a son’s love for his parents is fated and cannot be erased from
his mind.’ 7 Many modern Chinese believe strongly that love, life, and death are ‘fated,’
meaning that some things are beyond our control and we must just accept them and hope for
good ‘luck’. This is similar to Chuang Tzu’s view that each of us has an allotted period of
time which we should not foolishly cut short by hustle and bustle; nor should we seek
extreme measures in the attempt to prolong life indefinitely (as the religious Taoists tried,
using diet, breathing meditations, drugs, etc.) In the same way, love and friendship (like most
things in life) are largely fortuitous, and working hard to achieve or maintain them is often
not only useless, but positively counterproductive and harmful. As the Chuang Tzu (10/4/434) says, ‘to understand what you can do nothing about and to be content with it as with fate this is the perfection of virtue [te] … If you act in accordance with the state of affairs and
forget yourself, then what leisure will you have to love life and hate death? Act in this way
and you will be all right.’ I think that Chuang Tzu would also agree with the Zen masters that
one way to cope with big problems is to concentrate fully on carrying out our daily duties,
‘chopping wood, carrying water’, and so forth; too often, in fact, obsessive mourning and
melancholy over loss of a loved one is a kind of ‘secondary benefit’ providing one with an
(unconscious) excuse to avoid dealing with these tedious life chores, just as personal illness
can be an excuse when in fact it is not so serious or disabling, gaining the sympathy of
others.
Another idea in Chuang Tzu’s philosophy which we can apply to his philosophy of
love and friendship is the importance of freedom, or, as Chuang Tzu says, ‘free and easy
roaming’. Freedom in Chuang Tzu has many meanings, but mainly it means free from the
tyranny of ‘culture’, traditional mores, the prevailing ideology, and freedom from selfconstraint, so that one is free to react to whatever arises like the hinge of a socket which can
rotate in any direction according to what is required at the moment. About the sage, as he
conceives him, Chuang Tzu remarks that ‘no one knows what his limits are’ - i.e. he is so
free from others and himself that he might do anything, even he himself cannot say for sure
what he will do next - because it all depends on the situation. One must be flexible and react
not according to some fixed plan, but creatively (just as Nature, or the Tao, is unpredictable
in its creativity). One might go so far as to say that Chuang Tzu would agree that the sage
does not know who he is, what he wants, or what he is doing. Such goal-directed singleminded behaviour would be stifling to the sage. So, in matters of love, what counts is
freedom - freedom both for the lover and the beloved. In Heideggerian terms, an ‘authentic’
love would be one which always seeks to maximise the Other’s freedom and potential including the possibility which we cannot outrun or do on another’s behalf, namely die.
One thing I must remember to discuss is the importance of ‘forgetting’ in Chuang
Tzu’s philosophy. Just above the preceding paragraph we saw that Chuang Tzu emphasises
the importance of ‘forgetting oneself’ (wang ch’i shen, or wang chi). This concept is similar
to Chuang Tzu’s description of the sage as having ‘no self’ (wu chi) which we have also
7
Most of the translations from Chinese are my own, although some, such as this one, are ‘borrowed’ from Burton Watson’s
translation, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
15
discussed, and both together are crucial for understanding how Chuang Tzu would counsel us
when facing problems related to life, love, friendship, and death. The word ‘forget’ (wang)
occurs surprisingly often (at least 77 times, often in the ‘inner chapters’), and while
numerical frequency is no guarantee of importance (just as infrequency is no guarantee of
unimportance), it is obvious that forgetting, like dreaming, is an important concept in the
Chuang Tzu. Chuang Tzu refers to ‘forgetting ‘right’ and ‘wrong’’ (wang shih fei),
‘forgetting those above’ (i.e. one’s superiors), ‘forgetting one’s physical form’ (wang hsing),
‘forgetting personal benefit’ (wang li), and ‘forgetting one’s mind’ (wang hsin). Here Chuang
Tzu seems to contradict himself, since elsewhere he says that one has only to rely upon one’s
own ‘mind’ (hsin) in order to live contentedly; the contradiction is resolved however when
one remembers that Chuang Tzu distinguishes between ‘constant mind’ (ch’ang hsin) which
is good since it is the ability always to attune harmoniously to changing circumstances, and
‘complete mind’ (ch’eng hsin) which is harmful since it is an inflexible attitude based on
fixed notions of what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, what is ‘useful’ and what is ‘useless’, etc. So,
we may infer that Chuang Tzu would agree that one should ‘forget’ the way things have been
in the past (in human relationships, for example) and always keep an open mind, ready for
change and adaptation to new developments. The Taoist sage/lover is unlikely to say ‘I will
love you forever’, since nothing whatever lasts forever. The sage not only ‘sits in
forgetfulness’ (dzwo wang), forgetting himself completely, along with all
distinctions/differentiations/dichotomies, but also in interacting with others (e.g.
friends/lovers) ‘they forget each other’ (hsiang wang), just as animals do (fish for example or
birds which swim or fly together in easy, effortless, thoughtless harmony - without thoughts
of rights or duties, profit or loss, future or past). I think this idea of living, loving, and dying
‘forgetfully’, ‘thoughtlessly’ is of profound importance. Not only is it wise to live without
thinking too much about others or yourself, even in intimate relationships between friends,
family, and lovers, but even (or especially) after we lose a loved one (again, no matter
whether due to death, or disintegration of a relationship), it is unwise to dwell on the past
excessively as though this were a sign of one’s undying love and unconditional devotion.
Often life, love, and death are paradoxical and the best way of showing one’s love is by not
showing it, or even by not feeling it anymore, in order to go on with life. To be inflexible or
rigid is to be dead yourself already, whereas to let things go and move on and adjust, adapt, is
a sign of life. Not only should one forget the past (past wrongs, past sweet memories, etc.),
but also one should forget to remember the future. Much like Zen, Taoism is a philosophy
which emphasises the here and now (unlike existentialism, for example which emphasises
the future, or psychoanalysis which emphasises the past). Rather than ‘hold on for dear life’,
perhaps one should ‘let go for dear life’. In the end, of course, one even forgets to forget, and
then is able to move deftly, agilely, easily through life in the same effortless yet cautious way
that Cook Ting carved oxen - without fighting the situation, without struggling against things
beyond our control, or even trying too hard to manage things within our control. In the end,
living well, loving well, and dying well are, like the cook’s skill, or the master carver’s skill,
or the skill of the fisherman, swimmer, or cicada catcher – all are ‘knacks’ as A. C. Graham
says, which one can perhaps do, but cannot explain how one does, and which one cannot
teach others (with words) how to do. 8 For the philosophical counsellor, this means teaching
8
See for example, Graham, A. C. (1989) Disputers of the Tao. La Salle: Open Court9.
16
by example. It is often remarked by psychotherapists that regardless of one’s theoretical
orientation (psychodynamic, behavioural, cognitive-emotive, etc.), it is the personality of the
therapist which is healing or sickening, just as for Chuang Tzu the sage’s mere presence in a
community is auspicious and conducive to the harmonious flourishing of the community,
even though he seems to ‘do nothing’. The same, of course, also holds true for governments
and rulers. Chuang Tzu says of the sage (or ruler) that his ‘love of the people is the
commencement of his harming the people’ (65/24/20), and the people love the sage (or ruler)
even though he ‘does nothing’ (wu wei ai chih: 14/5/40), and the sage helps all under heaven
yet ‘has no love for the people’ (pu wei ai jen: 15/6/11). This seems to contradict what
Chuang Tzu says elsewhere (60/22/76, and 70/25/13) that ‘the sage’s love for people never
comes to an end.’ But we must remember that for Chuang Tzu the sage’s love is
unintentional, indirect, and in a sense ‘beyond good and evil’. ‘Great benevolence is not
benevolent’ (ta jen pu jen). The love of the unwise is like the lover of horses who was too
affectionate and attentive (in caring for his horses by slapping the flies on their behinds,
causing them to buck and injure themselves). In general it is true that actions speak louder
than words, but benevolent actions must often be indirect (in charity to the poor in
undeveloped countries, e.g.), and one must not make the mistake of giving to others or doing
to others what one would oneself want (despite the famous moral maxim in Confucius’
Analects, his ‘golden rule’ about doing nothing to others which we would not want them to
do to us). Chuang Tzu emphasises that species all have their own inborn natures (which
successful monkey, horse, and tiger trainers know, respect, and act in accord with), and that
all individuals have their own unique ‘virtue’ (te), or potentiality to be fulfilled. This is
important not only for lovers and friends, but for philosophical counsellors (and teachers we
might add); one’s interactions with friends, clients, students, etc. must be tailored to the
unique characteristics of that particular individual, and that particular time and circumstance.
The importance of timing in living well, loving well, and dying well is also fundamental to
the philosophy of the I Ching (The Book of Changes).
Finally, perhaps Chuang Tzu’s most original contribution to the philosophy of love
and friendship is the idea that only those who have gotten beyond all fear of death (and overattachment to life), can be friends. Chuang Tzu suggests this in his many stories about
various ‘masters’ (i.e. philosophers) sitting, chatting together when one of them suddenly
falls mortally ill. When his friends ask if he is afraid of death or resentful of death, typically
the dying sage asks rhetorically why he should rebel against the great ‘Creator’ (i.e.
Tao/Nature) which burdened him with life and now is ready to give him rest and relief in
death. These eccentric sages, who are the ‘companions of Heaven and earth,’ and are not
easily befriended by dukes and nobles (especially when offered ‘the throne’ - political
office), and who smile silently at one another in situations where most people would be
overcome with emotion and grief, remind one of the Seven Sages of the Bamboo Grove (in
the Shih Shwo Hsin Yu). 9 Many of these stories (especially in chapter 6, ‘The Great and
Venerable Teacher’) actually seem to rejoice in their impending transformation and return to
the ultimate source of all things (i.e. Nature or Tao). They joke about looking upon life as a
boil and death as one’s rump, even as death approaches. Their outlook on life seems to be
that just as ‘life and death are one’, they are inseparable aspects of a single cosmic ongoing
9
Translated by Richard Mather as New Tales of the World.
17
cycle of change, likewise the ‘tragic’ and the ‘comic’ are inseparable. Their attitude toward
all things is sublime. They not only reject our usual distinction between life and death, the
tragic and the comic, but also all absolute distinctions between ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘useful’
and ‘useless,’ ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’, etc. So, it seems likely that while Chuang Tzu
sometimes suggests one can befriend and love the apparently immoral and unlovely, the best
form of friendship and love is between persons who have transcended all such distinctions as
the above. One wonders if they would even accept the distinction between friend and nonfriend, or if they would ever openly declare their friendship and love for each other. While
there are cases of ‘friends’ taking care of each other, such as the sage who visited his
impoverished friend and brought him a bag of rice to eat, in general Chuang Tzu seems to
say that love or friendship which go by the name of ‘love’ or ‘friendship’ are at best
damaged, degenerate forms of love and friendship. Love and friendship should go
unannounced and unnamed. The Chuang Tzu contains a crucial passage which reasons that
‘when the Tao was lost, virtue [te] arose; when virtue was lost, benevolence [jen] arose;
when benevolence was lost, justice [yi] arose.’ In other words, what is commonly,
traditionally considered to be love, benevolence, morality, and so forth are all signs of
spiritual degeneration, damaging to the Tao itself and damaging to our original, pure, amoral
nature; the Taoist sage is one who tries to recover that lost innocence when men lived
together harmoniously, without any thoughts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’,
etc.
As for specific instances or statements to the effect that ‘friends’ are those who share
an indifference (or even jubilation) in the face of death, we may begin with an anecdote in
chapter 3 (‘The Secret of Caring for Life’) of the Chuang Tzu. Here we have the story of Lao
Tan’s (i.e. Lao Tzu’s) death and funeral. A Taoist sage arrives and upon seeing so many
weeping and wailing relatives and disciples, starts to flee, when Lao Tzu’s disciples ask,
‘Weren’t you a friend of the Master (i.e. Lao Tzu)?’ The sage responds that if Lao Tzu’s
followers are so overwhelmed with grief at his death, they must have not understood the Tao
very well, and so he flees from their excessive, artificial, mourning since it betrays the
‘Master’s’ own teaching. Another example is in chapter 6 (‘The Great and Venerable
Teacher’: 17/6/46), where four ‘Masters’ are conversing together and someone asks, ‘Who
knows that life and death, existence and annihilation, are all a single body? I will be his
friend!’ The story continues, ‘The four men looked at each other and smiled. There was no
disagreement in their hearts and so the four of them became friends.’ There follow in the
same chapter similar stories about sage friends communing with one another and with
Heaven and earth, smiling silently at one another and becoming friends, following which one
them dies and the others shock Confucius by their unconventional behaviour, singing and
playing the lute, rejoicing that their friend has returned to his ‘true form’. In chapter 11 (‘Let
it Be, Leave it Alone’), there is a very poetic description of the ‘great man’ (ta jen), who is
the ‘companion of the world’ (wei T’ien-hsia p’ei), is ‘selfless’ (wu chi), blends with the
‘Great Unity’ (ta t’ung), fixes his eyes on ‘nothingness’ (wu), and ‘is the true friend of
Heaven and earth.’ In this case, we see the sage not only does not fear ‘nothingness’, but
takes a philosophical and personal interest in it. In chapter 23 (Kang-Seng Ch’u: 63/23/61)
we have another very explicit statement by a Taoist sage regarding friendship and death,
‘Who knows that being and nonbeing, life and death are a single way? I will be his friend!’
18
In conclusion, let me repeat that all I have tried to do in this paper is present my own
limited perspective on Chuang Tzu’s perspective on love and friendship (and death). Lao Tzu
says that beautiful language is not believable and believable language is not beautiful, but
much of the language of both the Tao Te Ching and the Chuang Tzu is both beautiful and
believable. As so often in philosophy, the problem is how to put theory into practice. It is
easy enough to say that death follows life as naturally as night follows day, or winter follows
summer, and therefore we ought not fear it or mourn over it too much, but in real life this is
not easy to do. And, how is the prospective philosophical counsellor attuned to Taoist
philosophy to counsel a person suffering from fear of death, or a ‘broken heart’? By
lecturing them on the Tao, Heaven and earth, etc.? We may be sure that Chuang Tzu would
counsel the counsellor that such a direct approach is likely to backfire and be
counterproductive, or at best ‘useless.’ I still suggest, as I did at the beginning of this paper,
that the only way to ‘counsel’ another person is by example, by showing rather than saying.
Perhaps the only thing to be done now is smile and say nothing.
19
20
Mónica Cavallé Cruz es presidenta de ASEPRAF, una de las tres
asociaciones que desarrolla en España la Orientación Filosófica.
Allí dirige un curso de formación para Asesores Filosóficos.
Doctora en Filosofía por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid
(especialista en Filosofía oriental). Ha coordinado e impartido,
durante varios años, un seminario de "Introducción filosófica al
Hinduismo y al Budismo" en la UCM. Autora de los libros:
Hinduismo y Budismo. Introducción filosófica, Étnos, Madrid, 1999
(escrito en colaboración); La sabiduría recobrada, Oberón, Grupo
Anaya, 2002; La filosofía, maestra de vida, Aguilar, 2004.
Actualmente ejerce como Asesora Filosófica Individual
RELEVANCIA DE LA FILOSOFÍA ORIENTAL PARA EL
ASESORAMIENTO FILOSÓFICO
Mónica Cavallé Cruz
Madrid, España
Explicar cuál puede ser la relevancia de la filosofía oriental para el asesoramiento
filosófico en el espacio de unas pocas páginas es, en principio, una tarea desmedida, pues el
pensamiento oriental es aún más diverso e internamente complejo que lo comúnmente
denominado “filosofía occidental”. Es, además, una tarea dudosa, pues la expresión “filosofía
oriental”, aunque generalizada en los ambientes no especializados, es equívoca y, según
algunos estudiosos, cuestionable. Frente a estas posibles objeciones matizo que, en este
contexto, utilizaré la expresión “filosofía oriental” en una acepción restringida: con ella
aludiré a las filosofías sapienciales del mundo índico, de China y de Japón 10 y, dentro de
éstas, en particular, a las que considero más paradigmáticas: el vedanta, el yoga, el taoísmo y
el budismo.
En la primera parte de este artículo intentaré mostrar dónde considero que radica la
relevancia de la filosofía sapiencial de Oriente para el asesoramiento filosófico: en una cierta
afinidad de espíritu entre ambas y, muy en particular, en lo relativo a su concepción de la
filosofía. En la segunda parte, pondré un ejemplo del modo en que las intuiciones de dichas
filosofías sapienciales pueden enriquecer e iluminar la actividad del filósofo asesor; en
concreto, reflexionaré sobre la intuición de la naturaleza del “yo” y su condición de “testigo”
de la tradición vedanta de la India.
10
Excluyo por cuestión de conveniencia (para evitar introducir excesivas matizaciones) el pensamiento del
próximo Oriente.
21
Afinidad entre las filosofías sapienciales de Oriente y el asesoramiento filosófico
Al inicio de su obra Psicoterapia del Este, psicoterapia del Oeste, afirma Alan Watts:
“Cuando nos internamos en estilos de vida como el budismo y el taoísmo, el vedanta y el
yoga, no hallamos un material de carácter filosófico ni religioso en el sentido occidental. Lo
que hallamos se aproxima más a la psicoterapia” 11 .
¿Por qué los “estilos de vida” señalados no son un material filosófico ni religioso en
el sentido occidental? Y ¿qué hay que entender por “filosofía” y “religión” en el “sentido
occidental”?
En nuestro contexto cultural occidental, y ya desde inicios de la Edad Media, la
filosofía se concebirá prioritariamente como aquella actividad por la que el hombre intenta
comprender los últimos “porqués” de la realidad y orientarse en ella contando básicamente
con el instrumento de su razón individual. La filosofía se entenderá como una actividad
estrictamente teórica, es decir, que considera la realidad de forma especulativa: el que
especula no busca, en principio, transformar la realidad ni transformarse a sí mismo.
Será la religión cristiana la que en Occidente se atribuirá, frente a la filosofía así
devenida, una función auto-transformadora, salvífica y liberadora. Esta liberación no
equivale a aquella que el hombre puede lograr íntegramente aquí y ahora, la que va ganando
para sí mediante el incremento de su nivel de conciencia; la obtiene en virtud de su
pertenencia al seno de la institución eclesiástica y sólo será plena y efectiva en el “más allá”.
A diferencia de la filosofía, que no reconoce autoridad exterior a la que haya de otorgar un
asentimiento incondicional —lo permite el libre ejercicio del pensamiento—, la religión en
Occidente, con el asentamiento del cristianismo oficial, elaborará un cuerpo de doctrina
sustentado en dogmas que han de ser aceptados por fe (en la autoridad de la fuente de la
revelación y, más en concreto, en quienes históricamente dicen encarnarla: las autoridades
eclesiásticas). Desde que se concibe así la religión, la duda, la indagación crítica y la libertad
de pensamiento ya no tienen en ella un campo libre de expresión.
Considero importante advertir que la filosofía y la religión así entendidas son dos
productos característicamente eurocristianos. De hecho, estas acepciones de filosofía y de
religión no son aplicables a las principales filosofías sapienciales de Oriente. Más aún, ni
siquiera la noción descrita de filosofía se corresponde con lo que ésta fue originariamente en
Occidente 12 . La generalización de estas dudosas acepciones de filosofía y de religión ha dado
lugar a una falacia en nuestra cultura, la que disocia e incluso hace parecer como antagónicos
dos ámbitos indisolubles de la experiencia humana: el del conocimiento objetivo, crítico y
desinteresado de la realidad, y el relativo a los medios que conducen hacia nuestra plena
realización y liberación interior. Estas categorías culturalmente condicionadas han de ser
dejadas de lado en el acercamiento a las sabidurías de Oriente; si no, caeremos
inevitablemente en los malentendidos característicos de muchos estudios occidentales que
versan sobre ellas, en los que se afirma indistintamente: “son religión, por lo tanto no son
11
Psicoterapia del Este, psicoterapia del Oeste, Kairós, Barcelona, 1973, p. 15. Estas palabras de Watts nos
sirven de inspiración, si bien en lo que expondré a continuación mi reflexión sigue otro rumbo que la suya.
12
Cfr. “La sabiduría recobrada. Filosofía como terapia”, Martínez Roca (Grupo Planeta), Madrid, 2006; “La
filosofía, maestra de vida”, Aguilar, Madrid, 2004.
22
filosofía”, “son filosofía, por lo que no son religión”, “son filosofía y religión a la vez”,
“confunden filosofía y religión”, etc.
En mi opinión, sólo si nos remitimos, dentro de nuestro marco cultural, a la noción
originaria de filosofía previa a la escisión artificial entre la filosofía especulativa y las
disciplinas de liberación que ha sellado la historia de Occidente, podremos contextualizar sin
distorsiones las enseñanzas orientales. El antiguo concepto de filosofía como sabiduría que
conduce a la liberación interior —lo que en anteriores escritos he optado por denominar
“filosofía sapiencial” — integra, de hecho, esos dos ámbitos de la experiencia humana que a
la luz de los conceptos de filosofía y religión más generalizados han llegado equívocamente a
parecernos irreconciliables. Esta integración, insistimos, es también característica de las
filosofías sapienciales de Oriente señaladas. Así, es propio de estas últimas:
a) El libre ejercicio del pensamiento. Su método por excelencia es la indagación
crítica sustentada en la propia experiencia, y de ahí que estas enseñanzas carezcan de todo
sesgo confesional o dogmático. 13 Como afirma Krishnamurti, la duda, el escepticismo, el
cuestionamiento, estas actitudes que con su inmensa vitalidad limpian a la mente de sus
ilusiones, lejos de ser propias del hereje, han sido y son en la India y el mundo asiático el
método por excelencia de la investigación filosófica y espiritual 14 .
b) Esta indagación crítica se vale del instrumento de la razón; ahora bien, se trata de
una razón que no se agota en su dimensión individual y lógico-conceptual, sino que tiene una
raíz supraindividual (de modo análogo a la noción griega originaria de logos) e incluye
modalidades diversas y superiores de conocimiento, algunas de ellas indisociables del amor.
c) Como se deduce de lo anterior, para las filosofías sapienciales de Oriente la
indagación filosófica no incumbe a un nivel específico del hombre —el mental—, sino a
todas las dimensiones de su ser. El sabio oriental no equivale al pandit (término con el que
en la India se alude al mero erudito, al que con ironía se describe en ocasiones como el
“burro cargado de libros”). Es significativo a este respecto que Alan Watts califique a estas
enseñanzas de “estilos de vida”, y no, por ejemplo, de doctrinas teóricas o sistemas de
pensamiento.
d) El conocimiento filosófico no es para estas enseñanzas algo que se “tiene”, sino
algo que se “es”: una experiencia lúcida de vida, un estado de ser/conciencia. De aquí se
deriva otro rasgo característico de las filosofías orientales: su relativización de las doctrinas
teóricas (“El Tao que puede ser enunciado no es el verdadero tao”. Tao Te King, I).
Consideran que el discurso intelectual, la filosofía en su contenido conceptual, no tiene valor
en sí mismo; su valor radica en su capacidad para constituirse como un conjunto de
13
“No creáis en nada simplemente porque lo diga la tradición, ni siquiera aunque muchas generaciones de
personas nacidas en muchos lugares hayan creído en ello durante muchos siglos. No creáis en nada por el
simple hecho de que muchos lo crean o finjan que lo creen. No creáis en nada sólo porque así lo hayan creído
los sabios de otras épocas. No creáis en lo que vuestra propia imaginación os propone cayendo en la trampa de
pensar que Dios os inspira. No creáis en lo que dicen las sagradas escrituras sólo porque ellas lo digan. No
creáis a los sacerdotes ni a ningún otro ser humano. Creed únicamente en lo que vosotros mismos habéis
experimentado, verificado o aceptado después de someterlo al dictamen del a razón y a la voz de la conciencia”.
Buda, Kalama Sutra.
14
Cfr. Pupul Jayakar, Krishnamurti. A biography, Arkana (Penguin Books), London, 1996, pp. 399 y 400.
23
sugerencias, instrucciones o indicaciones orientadas a posibilitar que cada cual verifique,
mediante su propia experiencia directa y a través de cierta praxis existencial, la verdad de una
enseñanza. Las enseñanzas orientales vienen a decirnos: “Si quieres saber esto, has de hacer
esto otro, has de llevar a cabo cierta práctica, transformarte interiormente” (acudiendo a una
analogía sencilla: si queremos trasmitir a alguien a qué sabe un pastel que degustamos en
cierta ocasión, no podemos explicarle su sabor, pero sí darle la receta para que lo elabore y
luego lo deguste). Para las filosofías sapienciales de Oriente, sólo donde tiene lugar la
experiencia íntima y directa de algo cabe hablar de conocimiento filosófico real. Las
explicaciones intelectuales no tienen valor en sí mismas y son sólo una apariencia ilusoria de
saber.
e) Es característico de estas enseñanzas su énfasis en las cuestiones existenciales.
Todas ellas, por ejemplo, coinciden en afirmar que su interés prioritario se centra en
comprender el sufrimiento y en la liberación del sufrimiento. Hay quienes han querido ver en
este énfasis un signo de su carácter de “filosofías de orden inferior”, pues supuestamente
conlleva una subordinación del conocimiento puro a la praxis, lo que distorsiona el deseable
carácter desinteresado del conocimiento filosófico: éste ya no sería un fin en sí mismo, como
propugnaba Aristóteles (la “Metafísica es la ciencia que se elige por sí misma y por saber”.
Metafísica A, 2, 928 a, 15). De nuevo, en esta crítica se opera una errada traslación de
categorías occidentales a Oriente, en concreto, de la moderna y cuestionable dualidad teoríapraxis (una dualidad que, por cierto, no estuvo presente en los orígenes de la filosofía en
Occidente. El mismo Aristóteles entendía que teoría era sinónimo de contemplación, y
consideraba a ésta última un estilo de vida y la forma más elevada de acción).
En las enseñanzas orientales no hay tal subordinación de la teoría a la praxis pues no
conciben la liberación interior como un efecto extrínseco del conocimiento al que este último
se subordinaría, sino como idéntica a él: la fuente de la esclavitud interior y del sufrimiento
innecesario es la ignorancia de la realidad, y ésta se desvanece con la luz del conocimiento
del mismo modo en que la luz física disipa la oscuridad, porque tienen naturalezas contrarias.
Conocimiento y liberación, sencillamente, coinciden.
f) Las tradiciones orientales de sabiduría han comparado la adquisición de este
conocimiento liberador a un despertar: el que accede a este tipo de conocimiento, al igual
que el que despierta, no adquiere simplemente unos cuantos conocimientos nuevos, sino que,
literalmente, no es el mismo de antes ni el mundo que contempla es el mismo; se alumbra
otro nivel de ser, de percepción y de realidad, y se advierte la ilusoriedad del estado de
conciencia anterior —simbolizado por el estado de “sueño”— con relación al estado de
mayor lucidez, de “vigilia”, en el que, ahora, el que ha despertado se desenvuelve. No
conciben la liberación como algo que ha de suceder en un supuesto “más allá”; es siempre
una posibilidad humana presente pues equivale a un salto de nivel de conciencia que permite
trascender nuestro estado habitual de ignorancia y ofuscación.
Hemos explicado por qué los “estilos de vida” orientales no son un material filosófico
ni religioso “al modo occidental”. De todo lo dicho se deduce, además, en qué sentido estos
estilos de vida se aproximan a la psicoterapia (al menos, a ciertos desarrollos de la
24
psicoterapia). Esta semejanza queda compendiada en lo que considero el principal objetivo
de ambas: el de favorecer modificaciones en nuestro estado de conciencia, es decir, un tipo
de “comprensión” o “toma de conciencia” que tiene la cualidad de un despertar y que es
intrínsecamente liberadora.
Ahora bien, no conviene llevar demasiado lejos el paralelismo entre las tradiciones de
sabiduría y las psicoterapias. Así, una diferencia obvia entre ambas radica en el prefijo
“psico” del término psicoterapia, pues este prefijo circunscribe el marco de esta última al
ámbito del psiquismo individual y con frecuencia presupone una visión del ser humano según
la cuál éste equivale a su organismo psicosomático, y según la cual es en su psiquismo
individual donde radica su sentido del yo. Para las grandes tradiciones de sabiduría —como
pasaremos a ver— la toma de conciencia liberadora a la que hemos aludido no es una función
del psiquismo individual, sino de una dimensión más originaria en la que radica la identidad
última del hombre, el verdadero centro de gravedad del yo, y que, si bien tiene una vertiente
individual, en su raíz es de naturaleza supra-individual y tiene igualmente una vertiente
cósmica. Los filósofos presocráticos la denominaron logos, el pensamiento taoísta: tao, la
tradición vedanta de la India: atman, al que describieron como conciencia pura 15 .
Nos decía Alan Watts que, en el contexto de nuestra cultura occidental
contemporánea, las psicoterapias son más afines en espíritu a los estilos de vida orientales
que incluso la misma filosofía o la religión. Ahora bien, me atrevería a decir que el
asesoramiento filosófico constituye un referente contemporáneo aún más apropiado que las
psicoterapias para establecer esta proximidad 16 , pues comparte la similitud apuntada entre las
filosofías sapienciales y las psicoterapias y, a su vez, salva muchas de las objeciones que
limitan la semejanza de estas últimas. Así, el asesoramiento filosófico no tiene como objeto
nuestro mero psiquismo individual, nuestros problemas privados, sino nuestro ser total: su
dimensión individual, socio-cultural, histórica, cósmica y transpersonal. Parte de la existencia
de una relación indisociable entre el conocimiento profundo de la realidad (que incluye
nuestro auto-conocimiento no meramente psicológico, sino ontológico) y el despliegue de
nuestras potencialidades. Y si bien esta actividad tiene como instrumento la razón, el logos,
éste no se entiende únicamente como capacidad individual lógico-discursiva, sino como una
instancia que, siendo la más íntima al individuo, a su vez lo trasciende y le conecta y
armoniza con el Logos mismo de la realidad, con la totalidad de la vida.
15
La psicología transpersonal y algunas vertientes de la psicología humanista, de clara inspiración filosófica, se
salvarían de esta objeción. La psicología transpersonal, por ejemplo, ha apuntado reiteradamente la
conveniencia de sustituir la noción de psique (entendida no en su acepción originaria, sinónimo de “alma”, sino
en su significado psicológico de mente individual) por la más originaria de conciencia (en una acepción
inspirada en las sabidurías orientales), para poder dar cuenta del hombre en su integridad, en su dimensión
personal y transpersonal.
16
No sé que opinaría al respecto Alan Watts, quien falleció antes del surgimiento de esta nueva forma de
entender la práctica de la filosofía.
25
La naturaleza del “yo” y su condición de”testigo” según el vedanta advaita
Tras describir sumariamente por qué considero que el asesoramiento filosófico y las
filosofías sapienciales de Oriente comparten una similar concepción de la filosofía y tienen
una cierta afinidad de espíritu, pasaré a ilustrar con un ejemplo concreto el modo en que las
intuiciones de dichas filosofías sapienciales pueden ser iluminadoras y útiles para la práctica
del filósofo asesor. En concreto, y como ya indiqué, reflexionaré sobre la concepción de la
naturaleza del “yo” y su condición de “testigo” de la tradición vedanta de la India.
Son muchas las tradiciones y escuelas entre las que podía haber elegido, pero
considero que profundizar en el vedanta es hacerlo también en el espíritu oriental en su
conjunto pues esta tradición de pensamiento es particularmente representativa de lo más
genuino de las metafísicas específicamente orientales; de hecho, sus discernimientos
centrales son idénticos o análogos a las que constituyen el núcleo de taoísmo, del budismo
(fundamentalmente del mahayana y del zen), del sufismo, etc.
El vedanta es una de las escuelas de pensamiento y de espiritualidad más importantes
e influyentes de la India. El vedanta advaita, a su vez, es una subescuela del vedanta fundada
por Samkara en el siglo VIII y cuyos principales representantes en el siglo XX han sido, en
mi opinión, Ramana Maharshi y Nisargadatta Majaraj (estos dos últimos pensadores tienen
algo en común, carecen de formación académica, lo cual es ya significativo sobre el eminente
carácter de “estilo de vida” de la tradición en la que se insertan). El vedanta toma su nombre
de las Upanisad, unos textos redactados entre el 800 y 400 a.C. que constituyen su principal
fuente de inspiración y que son conocidos también como “vedanta” (literalmente: “el fin del
Veda”, pues constituyen el final de las compilaciones védicas). La escuela vedanta se inspira
en las intuiciones centrales de las Upanisad, que pueden resumirse en estas dos, cuyo sentido
pasaremos a dilucidar:
1-La identidad atman-brahman.
El término “atman” alude al fondo último del yo, a nuestro más íntimo “sí mismo”. El
término “brahman” alude, a su vez, al sí mismo o fondo último de todo lo que es. La esencia
de nuestro sí mismo es, por lo tanto, idéntica a la esencia última de todo de existente.
2-Brahman es Conciencia pura.
El objetivo del vedanta advaita, como el de toda tradición de sabiduría, es el
conocimiento de nuestra verdadera identidad, la observancia de lo que en Occidente se
expresó en el mandato de la divinidad de Delfos: “Hombre, conócete a ti mismo y conocerás
el Universo y a los dioses”. Para el vedanta, como para todas las filosofías sapienciales de
Oriente, en la falta de conocimiento propio radica la esencia de la ignorancia.
Una de las prácticas que propone el vedanta para alcanzar este objetivo es la autoindagación: una indagación en la naturaleza del “yo” (atma-vicara) que tiene como eje la
pregunta “¿quién soy yo?”. Esta auto-indagación no ha de ser confundida con el auto-análisis
psicológico, aunque no lo excluya, pues, como veremos, su meta última es el conocimiento y
la realización del ser (atman, el fondo último del “yo”), que es la esencia y raíz de todo lo
que es (brahman). Precisamente porque se trata de un auto-conocimiento que quiebra los
márgenes de nuestra individualidad, tiene sentido la máxima escrita en el frontispicio del
26
templo de Apolo en Delfos, o la sentencia análoga de la Mundaka Upanisad: “Conoce en ti
aquello que conociéndolo, todo se torna conocido” 17 .
La autoindagación a la que nos invita el vedanta tampoco es una pesquisa intelectual,
ni un conocimiento que se adquiera mediante asentimiento a autoridad alguna. Es una vía
estrictamente experiencial:
“La elocuencia sonora de un río de palabras, la habilidad de exponer o comentar las
escrituras, la erudición misma, sirven sólo para la satisfacción personal; para la liberación
todo esto es perfectamente inútil (...). Los Vedas, formados por miles de palabras, no son más
que un bosque impenetrable en el que se pierde la mente con facilidad. El sabio aspirante
debe aplicarse con celo a experimentar por sí mismo la auténtica naturaleza de atman”
(Vivekacudamani) 18 .
La experiencia de atman-brahman es, por tanto, intransferible. El único criterio es el
de la propia experiencia inmediata. Ahora bien, ¿no contradice esto último la importancia
que tiene en el contexto índico la trasmisión maestro-discípulo? Según el vedanta, no hay tal
contradicción, pues aquel que aún no posee la certeza que sólo procede de la propia
experiencia ha de confiar de modo provisional, con una confianza estrictamente científica,
funcional (no se trata de “fe” en sentido religioso, sino de confianza racional), en aquellos
que han tenido la experiencia de atman/brahman. Este proceder, lejos de conllevar sumisión
a un criterio externo de autoridad, es el propio de la metodología científica ordinaria:
“En ciencia se llama la vía experimental. Para probar una teoría uno lleva a cabo un
experimento según las instrucciones operacionales dejadas por aquellos que han realizado el
experimento antes que usted. Cuando un científico describe un experimento y sus resultados,
usted acepta usualmente sus afirmaciones y repite el experimento tal y como él lo describe.
Una vez que obtiene los mismos resultados o similares, no necesita seguir confiando en él;
usted cree en su propia experiencia. En la búsqueda espiritual, la cadena de experimentos
que uno debe realizar se llama ‘yoga’” (Nisargadatta) 19 .
El vedanta es, por consiguiente, una sabiduría de base empírica: a partir de ciertas
instrucciones operacionales se busca alcanzar la certeza experiencial que aún no se posee.
Ahora bien, para ello hay que tomar como punto de partida algún dato que sea para el
buscador intrínsecamente cierto, incuestionable; es preciso descartar todo supuesto
meramente teórico, todo conocimiento indirecto o de segunda mano, todo lo que no sea autoevidente. Para el vedanta advaita, este hecho absolutamente incontrovertible y evidente por sí
mismo, y, por lo tanto, el único que puede constituirse en punto de partida y eje de esta autoindagación (atma-vicara) es la certeza de ser, de la propia presencia consciente: el sentido
puro de ser, de identidad, de lucidez que nos permite exclamar “yo” y sentir “yo soy”.
Que “yo soy” y que soy “conciencia” o “presencia consciente” —afirma el vedanta—
es absolutamente incuestionable porque la conciencia es la condición de posibilidad de toda
17
I, 1, 3.
18
58, 60. Obra tradicionalmente atribuida a Shamkara, aunque las investigaciones actuales cuestionan esta
autoría.
19
I Am That. Talks with Sri Nisargadatta Maharaj, Chetana, Bombay, 19813, p. 367. Esta obra recoge diálogos
y conversaciones que Nisargadatta mantuvo con sus discípulos y visitantes.
27
experiencia. No hay percepción, ni mundo, ni existencia fenoménica, ni experiencia de
ningún tipo sin conciencia. Más allá de la naturaleza de los contenidos de nuestra
experiencia, que en sí son cuestionables (lo que percibimos en este instante, por ejemplo,
puede ser el fruto de una alucinación), el hecho de la experiencia y, por consiguiente, la
realidad del experimentador, son indiscutibles; constituyen su propia prueba.
“Pregunta (P): La experiencia puede ser errónea y engañosa.
Nisargadatta (N): Así es, pero no el hecho de la experiencia. Sea cual sea la experiencia,
verdadera o falsa, no puede negarse el hecho de que la experiencia ocurre. Ella es su
verdadera prueba. Obsérvese a sí mismo íntimamente y verá que cualquiera que sea el
contenido de la conciencia, el atestiguarlo —el hecho de ser consciente— no depende del
contenido” 20
Esta presencia consciente es el fondo no cambiante que atestigua todo cambio. Es lo
que nos permite decir “yo” a cada instante, más allá de lo que en nosotros cambia, puesto que
es lo que atestigua el cambio sin implicarse en él. Lo que ordinariamente denominamos “yo”,
(nuestro “yo empírico”, nuestro organismo psicofísico), no ha dejado de cambiar en el
decurso del tiempo; pero lo que dice “yo” y es consciente de dichos cambios (nuestro “yo
metafísico”) permanece.
Shamkara, al inicio de su obra Brahma-sutras, invita a vislumbrar la diferencia entre
el yo empírico y el yo metafísico a través de la consideración de cómo aquello que puede ser
conocido como un objeto nunca puede ser sujeto. Una cosa es aquello que es objeto de
conocimiento, aquello que puede ser conocido, y otra radicalmente distinta aquello que
conoce, que es sujeto o conocedor. El conocedor no puede ser conocido como un objeto de
conocimiento; si fuera conocido, ya no sería sujeto sino objeto.
“(...) si el conocedor y la relación entre el conocedor y la cosa conocida fueran cognoscibles,
habría que imaginar un nuevo conocedor. Y luego habría que imaginar otro conocedor del
anterior y otro de este último, y así tendría lugar un ilimitado regreso al infinito (...). Lo
conocido es simplemente lo conocido. Similarmente, el conocedor es simplemente el
conocedor y nunca puede llegar a ser algo cognoscible” (Shamkara) 21 .
O como expresa de un modo más sencillo en su obra Vivekacudamani: “Lo visto no puede
confundirse jamás con el que ve” 22 .
Nuestro cuerpo, nuestras sensaciones físicas, nuestros pensamientos, emociones e
impulsos son experimentables, es decir, no son sujeto, sino objeto; no son “yo”, pues “yo”,
en sentido propio, es aquello que en nosotros siempre es sujeto y en ningún caso algo
cognoscible. Nuestro verdadero sí mismo —afirma la sabiduría vedanta— es el sujeto o
experimentador puro, la luz del conocimiento que ilumina todo lo que es, pero que no puede
ser iluminada como un objeto. El vedanta denomina a este sujeto que es nuestro más íntimo
yo, el testigo (saksi), y nos enseña que su naturaleza es luz o conciencia pura.
20
I Am That, p. 437.
Bhagavad Gita Bhasya, XIII, 2.
22
183.
21
28
Aquello que ve no puede tener la naturaleza de lo visto. La conciencia del cuerpo y de
la mente no puede ser corporal ni mental. La conciencia de la confusión —lo que ve la
confusión— no puede estar confundida. La conciencia de nuestros condicionamientos
psicológicos no puede estar condicionada. Nuestro yo superior, el Testigo es la única
dimensión que en nosotros es realmente incondicionada y libre.
La meta del atma-vicara, por consiguiente, no es conocer cualesquiera de los objetos
pertenecientes al mundo (y nuestro yo empírico, objeto de la psicoterapia, es parte de ellos),
sino precisamente al conocedor de todo lo conocido.
“No es el habla lo que deberíamos querer conocer; deberíamos querer conocer al hablante.
No es lo visto lo que deberíamos querer conocer; deberíamos querer conocer al vidente. No
es el sonido lo que deberíamos querer conocer; deberíamos querer conocer al oyente. No es
el pensamiento lo que deberíamos querer conocer; deberíamos querer conocer al pensador”
(Kausítaki Upanisad) 23 .
Pero: “¿Cómo se puede conocer —afirma la Brihadaranyaka Upanisad— a Aquel por el
cual todo es conocido?” 24 .
“Como el ojo mira y no llega a vislumbrarlo, lo llama lo evasivo. Como el oído escucha sin
poder oírlo, lo llama lo inaudible. Como la mano busca sin poder asirlo, lo llama lo
incorpóreo” (Lao Tse) 25 .
No podemos conocer al conocedor al modo en que se conoce una realidad objetiva.
No hablamos, pues, de un conocimiento intencional, sino de un conocimiento por identidad:
lo conocemos porque lo somos. De ahí su carácter auto-evidente.
En resumen:
“Decir: ‘me conozco a mí mismo’ es una contradicción de términos porque lo conocido no
puede ser ‘mí mismo’ ” (Nisargadatta) 26 .
“Aquello que puede ser descrito no puede ser usted y lo que usted es no puede ser descrito.
Sólo puede conocerse a sí mismo siendo sí mismo sin ningún intento de auto-definición o
auto-descripción. Una vez que ha comprendido que usted no es nada perceptible o
concebible, que todo cuanto aparece en el campo de la conciencia no puede ser usted,
entonces se dedicará a la erradicación de toda auto-identificación”.
“P: Entonces, ¿qué soy yo?
N: Es suficiente saber lo que usted no es. No necesita saber lo que es, ya que mientras el
conocimiento signifique descripción en términos de lo ya conocido, perceptual o conceptual,
no puede haber auto-conocimiento, puesto que lo que uno es no puede ser descrito, excepto
como negación total. Todo lo que puede decir es: ‘yo no soy esto, yo no soy aquello’; usted no
puede decir verdaderamente ‘esto es lo que soy’. Sencillamente no tiene sentido. Lo que
puede señalar como ‘esto’ o ‘aquello’ no puede ser usted. Ni tampoco puede ser ‘otra cosa’.
Uno no es algo que pueda ser percibido o imaginado. Y, a su vez, sin uno no puede haber
percepción ni imaginación” (Nisargadatta) 27 .
“Lo que usted es ya lo es. Conociendo lo que usted no es se libera de ello y permanece en su
23
V, III, 8.
24
BU II, 4, 14.
Tao Te King, XIV.
26
I Am That, p. 395.
27
I Am That, p. 2.
25
29
propio estado natural. Todo ocurre muy espontáneamente y sin esfuerzo” (Nisargadatta) 28 .
“El estado de realización del Ser no es llegar a una meta distante o adquirir algo nuevo, sino
meramente ser lo que uno siempre es y lo que uno siempre ha sido. Lo único que se requiere
es percibir lo falso como falso” (Ramana Maharshi) 29 .
En este “percibir lo falso como falso” radica el método negativo de auto-indagación
que propone el vedanta advaita, y que queda resumido en la expresión “neti-neti” (ni esto, ni
aquello): “yo no soy esto, yo no soy aquello”, es decir, nada objetivable. La meta de la
autoindagación es llegar a ser uno mismo, sin más, tras abandonar todo intento de
autoidentificación o autodescripción.
La indagación en la naturaleza del yo que venimos describiendo culmina, según el
vedanta advaita, en la constatación experiencial de que el más íntimo sí mismo es un puro
centro inobjetivable de percepción consciente: lo inamovible, más allá de la fluctuación de
los contenidos y estados particulares de la conciencia, al modo del centro vacío de la rueda
del alfarero, siempre inafectado en medio del movimiento.
“Debe realizarse a sí mismo como lo inamovible detrás y más allá de lo movible, el
testigo silencioso de todo cuanto sucede” (Nisargadatta) 30 .
Aquello que se creía sujeto (el yo empírico) se revela como un objeto más de la
conciencia en el mismo sentido en que lo es cualquiera de los objetos del mundo. Lo que
antes consideraba el “yo” “su cuerpo”, “su mente”, “sus pensamientos”, “sus acciones”, etc.,
llegan a ser tan suyos como el movimiento del oleaje o el transitar de las nubes. En otras
palabras, se descubre que la raíz del sí-mismo es universal, porque no está constreñida a un
organismo psico-físico, aunque éste le sirva de vehículo; porque la mente y el cuerpo son
“objetos” o contenidos de la conciencia, pero no su límite. Según el vedanta, si solemos
pensar que “nuestra” conciencia es una realidad limitada, constreñida a un organismo,
separada de las otras conciencias y de la totalidad de la vida, es porque habitualmente nos
identificamos de forma exclusiva con nuestro cuerpo y con los contenidos de nuestra vida
psíquica y olvidamos al experimentador puro. El yo metafísico ve, conoce, pero no puede ser
visto ni conocido. Por eso, por su carácter evasivo, lo confundimos con lo que sí podemos
ver y conocer.
A la luz de esta intuición cobran sentido las siguientes palabras, en principio
desconcertantes, de Nisargadatta:
“Vd. no está es en el cuerpo. El cuerpo está en usted. La mente está en usted. Le ocurren a
usted” 31 .
“No diga: ‘todos son conscientes’. Diga: ‘hay conciencia’, en la que todo aparece y
desaparece. Conózcase a sí mismo como el océano del ser, el útero de toda existencia” 32 .
28
I Am That, p. 26.
Sé lo que eres. Las enseñanzas de Ramana Maharshi, Sri Ramanasram, Tiruvannamalai, 1994, p. 17.
30
I Am That, p. 319.
31
I Am That, p. 212.
32
I Am That, p. 221.
29
30
Relevancia de la intuición del “testigo” para el asesoramiento filosófico
¿En qué sentido considero que la concepción de la naturaleza del yo del vedanta
advaita, tan contraria a nuestro sentido común de occidentales, puede ser relevante para el
asesor filosófico?
Es importante tener presente que al asesor filosófico no le compete trasmitir teorías ni
doctrinas filosóficas. Como afirma Ran Lahav, la mayoría de las corrientes y doctrinas que
componen la historia de la filosofía se caracterizan por proponer un modo específico de vida
al que considerar el modo “correcto” de vivir:
“Se presentan como conociendo la verdad acerca de cómo la vida debería ser vivida e
imponen dicho modo a los individuos, dejándoles poco espacio para que encuentren sus
propias respuestas personales a las cuestiones de la vida. Pero he aquí que el asesoramiento
filosófico contemporáneo difiere de la mayoría de esas tradiciones precursoras. Así, en su
forma moderna, el asesoramiento filosófico no provee de teorías filosóficas, sin más bien de
herramientas de pensamiento filosófico. No ofrece verdades prefabricadas acerca de cómo la
vida debe ser vivida, sino que permite que cada individuo desarrolle su propia comprensión
filosófica” (Ran Lahav y Maria da Venza Tillmanns) 33 .
Esta forma de entender el asesoramiento filosófico, continúan Lahav y Tillmanns,
encuentra un referente privilegiado dentro de la historia de la filosofía en la figura de
Sócrates, pues éste, lejos de postular teorías de modo dogmático, ayudaba mediante un hábil
cuestionamiento a que cada cual tomara conciencia de sus creencias erróneas y alumbrara sus
propias comprensiones. Desde este supuesto, el interés que para la práctica del asesor
filosófico pueda tener la sabiduría vedanta no radica en lo que ésta tiene de “teoría” sobre el
hombre y la realidad —no se trata de trasmitir filosofía vedanta ni de cualquier otra índole—,
sino en lo que en ella hay de directamente vivencial, empírico y operativo. No radica en lo
que tiene de “contenido” teórico (e incluso las conclusiones experienciales a las que han
accedido otros son, para quien no las ha alcanzado, contenido teórico), sino en lo que tiene
“herramienta” favorecedora de la comprensión filosófica de cada cual.
Desde mi punto de vista, el vedanta ilumina una intuición clave, no dogmática sino
experiencial, fruto de la experiencia fenomenológica directa, fundamental para el
asesoramiento filosófico y para toda actividad orientada al conocimiento propio: la de que
nuestra realidad más íntima no equivale a nuestros pensamientos, emociones, sensaciones e
impulsos; la de que somos “algo más” que todo ello.
Es imposible trabajar con nosotros mismos si estamos totalmente identificados con
los contenidos de nuestra vida psíquica, con nuestros pensamientos y emociones, con
nuestros estados internos de confusión, sufrimiento, duda o conflicto. Si no existiera en
nosotros la capacidad de tomar perspectiva frente a dichos contenidos o estados, nuestra
voluntad de comprenderlos o superarlos carecería completamente de sentido. Esta toma de
distancia es posible en la medida en que existe en nosotros una instancia interior
cualitativamente diferente que nuestros cambiantes contenidos de conciencia que se
caracteriza por la atención lúcida e imparcial. Esta instancia nos permite la señalada toma de
33
Essays on Philosophical Counseling. Edited by Ran Lahav & Maria da Venza Tillmanns, University Press of
America, London, 1995, p. xi.
31
perspectiva que nos libera de la identificación con los contenidos de la mente, una
identificación que está en la raíz de los procesos de pensamiento inútiles, compulsivos y
repetitivos, aquellos en los que ya no pensamos o usamos de forma activa y libre el
pensamiento, sino en los que, más bien, somos manejados por él a nuestro pesar. También
nos permite modificar o cuestionar las creencias infundadas fruto del condicionamiento
familiar o social, sostenidas por la inercia y el hábito.
La capacidad de “atestiguar” nuestro diálogo interno, nuestros pensamientos y
emociones (el reflejo somático de nuestros pensamientos conscientes o inconscientes), nos
revela algo decisivo: que la conciencia no equivale al pensamiento. La primera es más amplia
que el segundo pues, de hecho, podemos atestiguar o ser conscientes del flujo del
pensamiento. Esta atestiguación nos muestra, además, que la conciencia es “bifásica” o de
doble sentido: la conciencia intencional, dirigida hacia el objeto de experiencia, y la
conciencia inobjetiva, no “conocida” sino “sentida”, de uno mismo como presencia lúcida
(el sentido “yo soy”), como sujeto, testigo o conciencia pura, como acto espontáneo y directo
de ser.
Este nuevo sentir sobre nuestra identidad también nos revela que lo que usualmente
denominamos “yo” suele ser sólo un “imagen” o “idea” de nosotros mismos (la
identificación mental con ciertos atributos que se traduce en la creencia: “yo soy esto, yo soy
aquello”). Este sentido del yo es legítimo, pero derivado. Cuando este uso derivado se
convierte en el único modo de sentirnos ser, la identificación/confusión con los contenidos de
nuestra conciencia se convierte en nuestro estado habitual, pues es precisamente esta
identificación la que creemos que nos otorga identidad, que nos hace ser lo que somos.
Reconocernos —no teóricamente, sino experiencialmente— como esa presencia
lúcida, equivale a situarnos en el centro de la rueda de la que nos habla el Tao Te King 34 : ese
espacio vacío de su interior, que posibilita el movimiento de la periferia (el flujo del
pensamiento, nuestros estados anímicos pasajeros) pero que, a su vez, es inafectado y no
arrastrado por él. Descubrimos que el núcleo de nuestra identidad es incondicionado y libre.
Aquellos enfoques, disciplinas o psicoterapias que pretenden superar las
contradicciones y condicionamientos de la mente individual sin ir más allá de la mente, caen
necesariamente en falacias y contradicciones internas. Ningún problema puede resolverse en
el mismo nivel de conciencia en el que se creó. Su resolución ha de conllevar siempre un
salto de nivel, y este último, a su vez, un ahondamiento en el sentido de nuestra identidad. Es
esencial situarla en un nivel más originario: lo que la tradición vedanta denomina “testigo”, y
la tradición estoica el “regente” (Epicteto) o el “promontorio interior” (Marco Aurelio) 35 .
En mi obra “La sabiduría recobrada”36 explico detalladamente cuál es la naturaleza de
la atestiguación característica de esa instancia interior que la tradición vedanta denomina
testigo, en qué difiere de nuestro estado ordinario de atención, y cuáles son sus frutos. Lo
resumiré a continuación:
34
XI.
El uso del lenguaje hace inevitable la sustantivación, pero, para el vedanta, el “testigo” -como se deduce de lo
dicho- no es una realidad sustancial u objetiva, es acción pura de atestiguar.
36
Para ampliar estas ideas, cfr. Cap. III (3.3).
35
32
En dicha atestiguación no hay identificación con lo observado, con nuestros
contenidos de conciencia. El testigo no juzga ni valora, pues los juicios de valor, y las
sensaciones consiguientes de agrado o disgusto, son también parte del flujo del pensamiento,
parte de lo observado. Como el testigo no juzga, no resiste la experiencia presente sea del
tipo que sea (dolor, confusión, aburrimiento, euforia...); la experimenta plenamente sin
resistencias, pero también sin identificación. La atención del testigo no es selectiva ni
excluyente, y no se orienta al logro de una meta, no es un medio para obtener un resultado.
La práctica de la atestiguación nos ayuda a dejar de tomar los contenidos de nuestra
mente —nuestros pensamientos y emociones— demasiado “en serio”, pues nos revela que de
ellos no depende lo que esencialmente somos. Dejamos de otorgar un valor absoluto a lo que
denominamos “mi cuerpo, mis pensamientos, mis emociones, mis acciones, mi vida, mi
persona...”. Abandonamos poco a poco el hábito de dramatizar nuestras experiencias, de ver
el mundo como el telón de fondo de dicho drama, y a las demás personas como los actores
secundarios del mismo. Nuestra mirada y nuestra vida adquieren un sabor más impersonal
(en el sentido de objetivo y universal). Adquirimos una creciente ecuanimidad y libertad
interior al no confundirnos con nuestros pensamientos y sentimientos, positivos o negativos,
pues la identificación nos movía con ellos impidiéndonos alcanzar la paz y la estabilidad. Se
operan en nosotros transformaciones espontáneas y “no pretendidas”; descubrimos que el
empeño en ser mejores es con frecuencia contraproducente y que sólo cuando no resistimos
“lo que es”, es decir, cuando otorgamos a todo una atención incondicional, también a lo que
solíamos calificar de negativo, experimentamos las más revolucionarias transformaciones;
que sólo cuando aceptamos una situación nos podemos elevar sobre ella. Esta asunción de
todo —también de la propia ignorancia y confusión— propicia una actitud de lucidez
desimplicada y objetiva que nos hace más penetrantes, que favorece la comprensión; se
agudiza en nosotros esa “inteligencia” que no equivale a erudición ni a mera capacidad
lógica-discursiva. Por último, al dejar de resistir o de identificarnos (a través del rechazo y el
apego) con aquello que tiene lugar en nuestro campo de conciencia, comenzamos a
apropiarnos de la totalidad de nuestra experiencia. Nos volvemos más íntegros, más
unificados y totales, y también más solidarios, pues hemos aprendido a no negar ninguna
dimensión de nuestra experiencia y, consiguientemente, tampoco de los demás y de la
realidad en su conjunto.
Obviamente, la expresión madura de estos frutos es el resultado de un largo camino y
de un compromiso firme y sincero con el conocimiento propio, pero ya desde el inicio la
práctica de la atestiguación —que, de modo explícito o implícito, sustenta el trabajo con uno
mismo que invita a realizar el filósofo asesor— nos permite saborear una nueva e
inconfundible libertad:
“Compare usted la conciencia y su contenido con una nube. Usted está dentro de la nube,
mientras que yo la miro. Está usted perdido en ella, casi incapaz de ver la punta de sus dedos,
mientras que yo veo la nube y otras muchas nubes y también el cielo azul, el Sol, la Luna y las
estrellas. La realidad es una para nosotros dos, pero para usted es una prisión y para mí es
un hogar” (Nisargadatta) 37 .
37
I Am That, p. 295.
33
34
2. FILOSOFÍA GRIEGA
35
36
Trevor Curnow is a senior lecturer in philosophy at St Martin’s
College, Lancaster England. He was one of the organisers of the fifth
international conference on philosophy in practice held in Oxford in
1999 and edited the papers from that conference, published as
Thinking through Dialogue (Oxted, Practical Philosophy Press, 2001).
His other books include Wisdom, Intuition and Ethics (Aldershot,
Ashgate 1999) and The Oracles of the Ancient World (London,
Duckworth, 2004). A book on ancient philosophy and modern life has
been published in Spanish in 2005 (Cómo vivían los filósofos en la
antigüedad). He is working on an A to Z of ancient philosophers to be
published in 2006. He is a regular visitor to Spain and in 2002 walked
from Burgos to Finisterre.
ANTIPHON OF RHAMNOUS,
PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLOR
Trevor Curnow
Lancaster, Inglaterra
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Antiphon of Rhamnous was the first philosophical
counsellor. The fact that he is not normally considered to be a philosopher is not a problem
because I also argue that modern philosophical counselling can be seen as closely connected
to what at least some of the sophists of antiquity did. This has implications for understanding
the nature of philosophical counselling and the uses it makes of ancient philosophy.
‘Antiphon achieved an extraordinary power of persuasion.’
Philostratus, Lives of the Philosophers.
In this essay I will argue that Antiphon of Rhamnous was the first philosophical
counsellor. Many will find this surprising for two main reasons. First, Antiphon rarely, if
ever, appears in the literature on philosophical counselling. Secondly, few regard Antiphon
as a philosopher at all. Nevertheless, I believe that my claim can be supported and that it has
some implications that may be surprising.
37
There are many uncertainties about Antiphon’s life and career. There were several
people called Antiphon who made their mark in Athens during the fifth century BC. In later
centuries there have been many disagreements concerning which person called Antiphon did
what, and how many people called Antiphon there were. The account I give of his life is
therefore not the only possible one, but it is not intended to be controversial. Fortunately, as
will be seen, only very few facts are relevant to my claim that he was the first philosophical
counsellor and it is not really important for the purposes of this essay what else he did.
He was born in around 480 BC in Rhamnous, a fortified city on the coast to the north
of Marathon. He may have studied with Gorgias of Leontini, and he certainly achieved fame
as a writer of speeches and an authority on rhetoric. He was also a teacher and the historian
Thucydides was probably one of his students. According to Thucydides, Antiphon was
widely distrusted for his cleverness, but his skills were eagerly sought out by those who
needed them. In 411 BC an oligarchic group seized power in Athens and Antiphon was one
of them. They were soon defeated and he was put on trial. After making an eloquent speech
in his own defence, he was condemned to death. In his Memorabilia, Xenophon tells of a
sophist called Antiphon who criticised Socrates for not taking enough interest in making
money and he is probably talking about the same person. If so, then in addition to many
speeches, Antiphon wrote several books. One was entitled On Truth, another On Concord
and another On the Interpretation of Dreams.
Clearly none of this is sufficient to justify the claim that Antiphon was the first
philosophical counsellor. However a story was told about him that he spent some time in
Corinth where he lived in a house near the centre of the city. There he opened a business that
claimed to be able to cure people’s problems. Called the ‘Pain and Suffering Clinic’, the
treatment it offered worked by means of words. Many think that this story is an invention of
comic writers, but I am not so sure. At the very least, satire only works when reality can be
seen behind and through its distorting image, and so it seems extremely unlikely that the
story has no connection whatsoever with the truth. Related to this story is another one, that
Antiphon claimed to possess an ‘Art of Avoiding Troubles’. This ‘Art’ seems to be the basis
of the treatment offered at the ‘Clinic’. Even if some of the details of the story have been
invented, I believe that its basic element, the idea that Antiphon claimed to possess some
kind of ‘Art of Avoiding Troubles’, is probably true. If that is the case, then the further idea
of the ‘Pain and Suffering Clinic’ suggests at least that he sought to make money from this
‘Art’, whether or not he opened a formal establishment with that name. If the ‘Clinic’ really
is the invention of comic writers, then these seem to me to be the minimum facts required to
make the idea of the ‘Clinic’ funny. The obvious alternative is that the ‘Clinic’ was not an
invention at all, which I think is entirely possible (although its name might be?).
The precise nature of Antiphon’s ‘Art’ is unclear. The Greek word used to describe it
is logoi, which can mean not only ‘words’ but also ‘reasons’ and ‘arguments’. But whatever
the precise interpretation or translation of logoi here, the obvious implication is that people
came to Antiphon to talk through their problems. This seems to me to be sufficient to support
the claim that he can certainly be regarded as a counsellor. Indeed, he may even have been
38
the first counsellor as there is no obvious known precedent for the kind of occupation
practised by Antiphon. If there had been, then it makes little sense to suppose that he would
have been of interest to comic writers. It seems to have been the novelty of his occupation
that people found funny. While there are many stories of presocratic philosophers offering
advice of various kinds, that is very different from working with people on a one-to-one basis
in return for payment. Antiphon seems to have initiated this kind of activity.
However, my main interest here is not with whether Antiphon was a counsellor, but
more specifically with whether he was a philosophical counsellor. Here I want to introduce
what may appear to be something of a paradox. The more likely it is that Antiphon was a
sophist, the greater the reason for calling him the first philosophical counsellor. The apparent
paradox, which I hope is obvious, lies in the fact that the sophists have long been regarded as
quite different from philosophers. In large part this is due to the propaganda of Plato who
vividly contrasted his hero Socrates with people like Protagoras of Abdera. The stereotypical
sophist is without firm beliefs about anything whereas the stereotypical philosopher is a
person of principle. Socrates died for his beliefs, whereas Protagoras is said to have claimed
that every argument has a counter-argument. Xenophon is quite clear that the Antiphon he is
talking about is a sophist.
The sources say that Antiphon talked to his clients to find out what was troubling
them, and then offered them consolation. There are two obvious and possible ways in which
he could have done this. If he were a philosopher like Epicurus, he could have tried to
persuade his clients that their concerns were based on false beliefs. The idea that philosophy
was a cure for suffering was absolutely central to the Epicurean outlook. On the other hand,
if he were a sophist like Protagoras, he could have tried to persuade his clients that the beliefs
that lay behind their suffering might be wrong, and were certainly no better than alternative
ones, making their suffering needless.
The main difference between the approach taken by someone like Epicurus and the
one taken by someone like Protagoras is that one was fundamentally dogmatic and the other
was fundamentally sceptical. Epicurus sought to replace what he regarded as wrong beliefs
by what he considered to be correct ones. Protagoras, and later the Sceptics, sought to
undermine faith in beliefs as such. In the Sceptics, it might be said, the sophists and the
philosophers converged. However, the Sceptics differed from the sophists because there was
a principle underlying their approach. This principle was that tranquillity might be gained
through the suspension of judgement concerning beliefs, although, in order to be consistent,
they could not be dogmatic about this.
The idea that tranquillity could be gained through lessons learnt from the sophists is
clearly an interesting one as it is said that Antiphon was able to provide people with
consolation through his words. One possible interpretation of this is that not only was
Antiphon the first counsellor and the first philosophical counsellor, but he was also the first
Sceptic. However this does not appear to be the case for at least two reasons. First, if the
sophists really were Sceptics, then Protagoras probably preceded Antiphon in this respect, if
39
only by a few years. The second reason is more significant. Although the differences between
the sophists and the philosophers may have been exaggerated by Plato to some degree, there
do appear to have been genuine differences. Perhaps these differences are best summarised
by saying that while the sophists primarily offered skills that would lead to success in public
life, the philosophers offered an approach to life as a whole. Certainly the skills offered by
the sophists, including the ability to see both sides of every issue, might have applications
outside of public life, but they were not intended to serve as the basis of a complete way of
life. The kind of scepticism practised by Protagoras and Antiphon was very different from
that practised by Pyrrho of Elis who based his whole life around it.
It is dangerous to generalise too much about what philosophy was like in the time of
Antiphon because our view of ancient philosophy has been strongly shaped by the ideas and
practices of the great schools, the Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa and the Garden, and none
of these existed until after he died. What came before is often obscure, and while the
Pythagoreans certainly taught a way of life, it is not at all clear that the great philosophers of
Miletus such as Anaximander ever did. But, thanks to Socrates, the time of Antiphon was
also the period of transition between the presocratics and the schools. Furthermore, the
schools, both the major and the minor ones, all in one way or another took their inspiration
from Socrates. If there is some truth in the testimony of Xenophon, then Socrates represented
the emerging archetype of the philosopher while Antiphon represented the emerging
archetype of the sophist.
What Socrates actually taught and the extent to which the Socrates of Plato’s
dialogues is genuinely historical are well-known problems and I have nothing new or
interesting to say about them. However, it is generally agreed that the Euthyphro is one of
Plato’s earlier works and, as such, one of those most likely to reveal the teachings and
methods of Socrates himself. Anyone who has ever read it knows that whatever it is about, it
is definitely not about philosophical counselling. At the opening of the dialogue Euthyphro
does not have a problem, but when it finishes he does. At the beginning he is clear about
things in his own mind, at the end he is in a state of confusion. And this is all because of
Socrates. It is difficult to imagine the Socrates of Euthyphro being of very much help at
Antiphon’s ‘Pain and Suffering Clinic’.
This is not surprising once it is understood that what Antiphon was trying to achieve
was not the same thing that Socrates was trying to achieve. It is like the difference between
someone coming to mend a broken window and someone coming to renovate a whole
building. Socrates wanted people to lead a different kind of life. Antiphon wanted to help
people solve the particular problems they brought to him.
After the time of Socrates, the aim of the schools that emerged was to help people to
lead particular kinds of lives. To join a school was to take a decision that was existential and
life-transforming in its implications. When ancient philosophers identified themselves as
Stoics or Epicureans they revealed a lot about themselves. When modern philosophers
identify themselves as rationalists or phenomenologists, what do they reveal? In terms of
40
existential weight, the modern equivalent of ‘I am a Stoic’ or ‘I am an Epicurean’ would be ‘I
am a Christian’ or ‘I am a Moslem’ rather than ‘I am a rationalist’ or ‘I am a postmodernist’.
To go to a philosophical counsellor today is not to seek to join a philosophical school.
A philosophical counselling practice much more resembles the ‘Pain and Suffering Clinic’
than it does the Stoa or the Garden. But if that is so, then philosophical counsellors resemble
Antiphon more than Socrates, which is why I began this essay by suggesting that Antiphon
was the first philosophical counsellor. It is also why I said that the more likely it was that
Antiphon was a sophist, the more likely it was that he was the first philosophical counsellor.
The reason why this is only an apparent paradox is, I hope, now clear.
But even if this is all true, does it matter? This is not an easy question to answer and it
can be approached in more than one way. The first and obvious way, perhaps, is to note that
philosophy has changed since the time of Socrates and Antiphon. They lived nearly two and
a half thousand years ago and it would be very surprising if nothing had changed during that
time. However, although I think this is a valid point, the problem is that Socrates remains a
hero to modern philosophers and philosophical counsellors while most of them, I suspect,
have never heard of Antiphon. Furthermore, while there has perhaps been a partial
rehabilitation of the sophists, it remains incomplete. Plato’s propaganda has been extremely
effective.
The sophists were not clones and they did not all teach exactly the same thing. For
that reason, there seems to have been more than one philosophical objection to them. The
first was that they claimed to teach knowledge they did not have. Some of the dialogues of
Plato seem designed to illustrate this point. Under the questioning of Socrates, it emerges that
a particular sophist’s claim is baseless. The second objection was that the ‘knowledge’ the
sophists taught was false. The important point about both of these objections is that they can
be interpreted in two different ways. It makes a great deal of difference whether or not a
sophist knows that a claim to knowledge is false. Anyone who knowingly makes a false
claim is dishonest, and this seems to be Plato’s view of the sophists. On the other hand, for
centuries after Plato’s death the various schools, including his own, accused each other of
making baseless claims and teaching false doctrines without, at the same time, accusing each
other of being sophists. On the contrary, they recognised each other as philosophers.
The third objection was that the sophists taught that there was no such thing as certain
knowledge. As I have already pointed out, this was the basis of Scepticism, which became
acknowledged as a philosophical school in its own right. Consequently, one way of
addressing the question of whether it matters that Antiphon the sophist was the first
philosophical counsellor is to narrow the gap between the sophists and the philosophers.
What is important is not whether someone was a sophist or not, but whether someone was an
honest sophist or not.
But this is only one way of addressing the question. I suggested earlier that one of the
things that distinguished the sophists from the philosophers was that the philosophers taught
41
a whole way of life but the sophists did not. From this perspective, the issue is not so much
with what knowledge someone claimed to teach, but with what that knowledge was actually
about. Seen from this perspective, there may be a greater similarity between modern
philosophers and Antiphon than there is between modern philosophers and Socrates. To put it
very crudely, perhaps we idolise Socrates but emulate Antiphon?
Unfortunately, for many reasons Socrates is a problematic figure. He wrote nothing
and there are disagreements concerning what the way of life he taught actually was. In
examining the nature of ancient philosophy it is easier to look at the schools that came after
him than it is to look at Socrates himself. Although our knowledge of them is also far from
perfect, we have a much better sense of what the schools taught and believed. It may also be
noted that the development of philosophical counselling has occurred at the same time as a
renewal of interest in the schools, and in particular Stoicism. When people seek for
philosophical guidance in life, ancient philosophy often seems more attractive than what
came later.
However there has been a serious problem with this return to philosophy’s distant
past. On the whole, those who go to philosophical counsellors are more like clients of
Antiphon’s ‘Pain and Suffering Clinic’ than they are like those who made a lifelong
commitment to the Stoa or the Garden. Although they can obviously be connected, problemsolving rather than life-reorientation is what is sought. Because of this, and perhaps
understandably, there is a widespread tendency to misuse the surviving texts from the world
of ancient philosophy. To select items from them to suit the occasion or, what is even worse,
to regard them simply as some kind of thesaurus of useful quotations, is to seriously
misrepresent the teachings of the schools.
I will give one extreme example, taken from a book so bad that I will not mention its
name. It included a quotation from Epicurus concerning pleasure, but failed to put the
quotation in any kind of context. Epicureanism had a very distinctive understanding of
pleasure and defined it as the absence of pain. Without knowing this, it is impossible to
understand the quotation correctly as an expression of the Epicurean philosophical outlook.
However helpful someone might have found the quotation to be, presented outside its proper
context it conveyed nothing at all about Epicureanism. As I said, this is an extreme example,
but it is one thing to be extreme and another to be rare.
From a therapeutic point of view there is absolutely nothing wrong with this.
However, the fact that a quotation comes from a philosopher does not make every use of that
quotation philosophical. It is entirely possible that Antiphon had an enormous collection of
quotations from the presocratic philosophers at his ‘Pain and Suffering Clinic’ and would
choose an appropriate one for each client. But that does not make him a philosopher any
more than someone who quotes from the books of Isaiah or Jeremiah becomes a prophet by
doing so. If a style or method of counselling brings benefits to clients, it is to be welcomed.
However, if it calls itself philosophical, it should be true to philosophy in general, and if it
claims to make use of specific philosophies, then it should be true to them in particular. My
42
concern is that philosophical counsellors should not give clients a false sense of what
philosophy is or of what individual philosophies are.
I hope by now it is obvious now why I think Antiphon was the first philosophical
counsellor and why I believe that philosophical counselling may owe a significant debt to the
sophists of the ancient world. Antiphon must have been a fascinating character and his ‘Pain
and Suffering Clinic’ must have been an interesting place to visit (if it existed). I hope this
essay will encourage philosophical counsellors to take an interest in him. If philosophical
counselling is the ‘Art of Avoiding Troubles’, then Antiphon, not Socrates, should be its
hero.
Bibliography
There is very little about Antiphon to be found anywhere in any language. All the fragments
of text attributed to him as well as ancient writings about him can be found translated into
English in:
Sprague, Rosemary Kent, The Older Sophists, Indianapolis, Hackett, 2001 (pp. 106-240).
This book is a reprint of the edition published by the University of South Carolina Press in
1972.
There is an essay in French by Michel Narcy in:
Goulet, Richard (ed.), Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques I, Paris, CNRS, 1994 (pp. 225244). NB in this book he is referred to as ‘Antiphon d’Athènes’.
In Italian there is:
Bignone, E., Studi sul pensiero antico, Napoli, Loffredo, 1938.
The sophists are discussed collectively in:
Kerferd, G.B., The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
(Italian translation, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1987.)
43
44
Gerhard Stamer es Vicepresidente de la Asociación Internacional de
Filosofía Práctica, Internationalen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, y
fundador de Reflex, Institut für Praktische Philosophie. Estudió en el
Instituto de Ciencia Social de Theodor Adorno y Max Horheimer,
haciendo su dissertationsprojekt con Jürgen Habermas.
El profesor Stamer es especialista en el pensamiento de Parménides, lo
cual queda constatado en su obra Parmenides - Kurzer Traktat über
die Ursprungserfahrung der Philosophie o en la ponencia que
impartió en el 7th Internacional Conference on Philosophical Practice
(Copenhague, 2004) con el título: “Why is the pre-socratic Parménides
importat for todays philosophical practice?”
Actualmente trabaja impartiendo seminarios de filosofía y con
distintas prácticas filosóficas dentro del ámbito de la filosofía práctica.
THE PRE-SOCRATIC PARMENIDES AND
PHILOSOPHICAL ‘PRACTICE’?
Gerhard Stamer
Hanover, Germany
The Importance of Parmenides
Parmenides ist important like Heraklit. We need only to look to the dialogue
Parmenides to confirm that Plato himself had the highest estimation of Parmenides. And
Plato refers to Parmenides elsewhere too. In the Theaitetos, Plato has Socrates say of
Parmenides that he ‘is, as Homer says, venerable to me and frightening at the same time. I
was together with him when I still was very young, but he was old already, and he showed a
very rare and admiring depth of mind. I am afraid, then, that partly we will not understand
what he said, partly we will understand far less...’
The high rank Parmenides has among the giants of philosophy is shown by another
witness, namely, Hegel. Hegel speaks about the Being of Parmenides in the first chapter of
his Logic thus: ‘The simple thought of pure being was first had by the Eleatics, above all by
Parmenides, and in the fragments left by him, as the absolute and single truth. With the pure
enthusiasm of thinking that grasps itself for the first time and in its absolute abstraction, it
declares: only being is, and nothing is nothing at all.’
Elsewhere Hegel writes: ‘That thinking or imagining that has before it only a definite
being, Dasein (being there), is to be refused as the already-noted beginning of science. Here
strats Parmenides, the thinker who has purified and raised his own understanding, and
therefore the understanding of the time following, to the pure thought of being as such, and
has thereby given rise to the basis of science. What is the first in science had to reveal itself
as the first in history. And the Eleatic One or Being has to be seen as the first in the
knowledge of thinking. Water and the other material principles aim at generality, but they are
45
materials, not pure thoughts, while numbers are neither primary simples nor the thought of
being as such, but only the outward form of thought’.
It is interesting to see Karl Popper taking his own place in this line-up, as he turns to
Parmenides to see him as one of the founders of scientific knowledge and scientific theory:
‘One could define Parmenides’ account as the first hypothetic-deductive theory of the
world.’38 Those who are better acquainted with Popper will easily recognize the internal
logic that leads from Popper’s ‘three worlds’ theory to Parmenides. Popper identifies the
spatio-temporal physical world as the first world distinct from the second world, that of
mental experience, as well as from the third, that of pure theoretical objectivity.
Popper´s third world is made up of purely theoretical ‘objects’, that is, theories and
concepts. The other two worlds, the world of subjective, mental awareness and the world of
sptiao-temporal physical processes, both accord perfectly with the formula often quoted from
Heraklitus (whether rightly understood or not): ‘Everything flows’. Theoretical propositions
may be restricted or even found to be invalid when tested against experience, but once
formed they claim both universality and necessity. It is this that makes such propositions
scientific. This was recognised by Popper, and among the Greek philosophers, it was first
recognised by Parmenides who drew from it a series of most interesting and fundamental
propositions.
Before saying more about what is involved here, I want to tell you frankly why the
reading of Parmenides seems to be so important to me. The reason can be quickly stated: In a
world in which everything seems fluid and accelerated – a world that exhibits, as Jürgen
Habermas says, a new form of obscurity (Unübersichtlichkeit) – to state in such a world that
there is something independent of space and time, independent of all subjectivity, and
universally valid, seems to me a most eminent human possibility.
2. Parmenides’ Way of Truth
The fragments of Parmenides’ poem that have come down to us are introduced by a
noble man’s description of his journey to heaven, where, on arrival, he is met by a goddess
who proclaims:
“Come now – listen and heed my saying – I shall tell you of the two paths of inquiry that
alone thought may take. The first, that it is, and that it is impossible for it not to be, is the way
of persuasion, for truth is its companion. The other, that it is not, and that it must necessarily
not be, that, I tell you, is a path wholly unthinkable. For you cannot know what is not (that is
impossible) nor point it out.”39
In this opening proclamation, the goddess clearly indicates that what is at issue is the
thinking inquiry that aims at truth – it is not a matter of redemption or contemplative vision –
and that this inquiry proceeds only by way of being. The inquiry into nature is a human
practice, undertaken within the human life-world, but, no matter how non-being is here
understood, the decision for being is the decision for truth.
38
39
Karl R. Popper, Die Welt des Parmenides, Der Ursprung des europäischen Denkens, München 1998, p.47.
Translation here and below based on existing translations by Randall, Gallop and others.
46
Up to this point, the interpretation of the text does not seem to be particularly difficult
(although there are different interpretations available), but in the fragments that follow –
fragments in which the goddess reveals the nature of truth– what is said seems to defy our
commonsense way of looking at the world. Being is said to be truth, and it is characterised as
follows:
“…what-is, being ungenerated, is also imperishable, whole, of a single kind, immovable and
complete. Nor was it once, nor will it be, since it is, now, all together, one and continuous …
Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is. Nor is there any more of it here than there, to hinder it
from holding together, nor any less of it, but it is all a plenum, full of what-is…Moreover,
unchanging in the limits of great bonds, it is without beginning or end, since coming-to-be and
perishing were banished far away, and true conviction drove them out. Remaining the same, in
the same place, it lies in itself, and thus firmly remains there…One and unchanging is that for
which as a whole the name is: 'to be'.”
Not coming-to-be, never ending, immovable, without change, calm, one, whole, the
same with itself, coherent, inseperable, homogenous present - these are the predicates of
being. But how can we understand this claim that the one that is being is truth?
The goddess does not stop with her first surprising proclamation. In what follows she
asserts that being and thinking belong intimately together. ‘The same thing is there for
thinking and for being’, she says frankly and shortly, and elsewhere, ‘It is the same thing, to
think of something and to think that it is, since you will never find thought without what-is’
Without diving into the classic debates over these passages, what is at issue is without
question the identity of thinking and being. Being, already understood as a unity, has to be
understood as a unity of thinking and being. Popper is right in his claim that in Parmenides
we have the first empirically based theory of the world, but such an interpretation also
involving closely oneself off to the deeper sense that is present in Parmenides’ poem. What is
really at issue is a fundamental ‘anthropological’ relation towards reality – a relation that
makes human beings different to all other living beings in nature.
In that moment when man first rises to his being as human, not only does he use,
consume, and so on, the things relevant to his needs, but he thinks and speaks them – he
proclaims what they are.
It is something quite other than instinctual or ‘driven’ behaviour to think what
something is – to drink water is totally different from the saying ‘this is water’. The ability to
grasp proposition, bound to the ability to form concepts, creates a new relation to reality that
is totally different from the natural.
In the single word ‘being’ there is no single relation to time. ‘Being’ is now and
forever – the concept of water remains invariable, even though water flows. In the concept
there lies something that goes beyond the changing situation. In the very moment that a
human being thinks and says what something is, in that moment he looses his immediateness
with nature. Being within nature, being as it occurs in the processes of nature, is
extinguished. With thinking human beings create another relation towards reality, and so
reality is, in a sense, doubled. Yet the doubling is the doubling of a single reality – reality
does not duplicate itself.
Human existence is constituted by the ability to perceive permanence in a world that
is itself flux. Without this ability to perceive the permanent in the flowing or to make flowing
47
things permanent, there would be no knowledge and no thinking. Flowing comes to a stop,
but only in thinking. In this standing still is to be found the truth of everything in flow or
movement. You may call this standing still ‘identification’. Identifiable things or facts arise
out of the flowing multiplicity. That which Parmenides places in contrast with life, and with
the living – that which is absolute rest, which is the everlasting, the one, the same, the pure
abstraction – reveals itself that which founds human life as such. It is in thinking that this
second founding relation of the human to reality is created.
Parmenides shows us that being is still more general than the elements – water, earth,
air and fire – that previous philosophers had declared to be fundamental. He shows us that
being lies behind every material cause. Something may be thought without water or earth or
air or fire, but not without being.
Being is the most general. Yet since there is nothing more general than the general as
such – there is no superlative that goes beyond the general – so being must be the general.
Being, then, encompasses all and everything. So to the question, what is the primary
substance, we must add the condition that, whatever it is, it is that which is fundamental to all
things. But this already shifts the character of the question. It is no longer a matter of
searching for an origin out of which everything emerges, but an origin in which everything is
encompassed. For such a conception of origin, being fits far better than the candidates
proposed by those who came before Parmenides – water, as in Thales, or air, as in
Anaximenes.
By taking nature as being, humans step out of their immediate connection with nature.
In the immediate situation is to be found only connections between individuals; in that which
goes beyond such immediacy, things appear, not only in their use or effect, but in terms of
what they are. Thus are things set within the realm of universality – a universality that lies in
the fact that all things are, and are what they are, through their relation to generality, to being.
Through their relation to universality human subjects dissolve their immediate connection
with nature.
Parmenides brings into view the openness that is characteristic of human existence
and that arises with the loss of immediacy. By means of the concept of being Parmenides
sets up that which already stands in opposition to nature – objectivity – and from which
nature is rendered both practically and theoretically ‘disposable’. At the same time, but from
the opposite perspective, being is itself rendered as objectivity. It is this that is embedded in
the practice of every natural scientist today.
The ice-cold dogmatism of Parmenides sets truth into the abstraction of being –
against all evidence to the contrary. And it roots it in the original relation of individual and
general that is given in and by BEING. The radical conclusion is that there IS nothing that is
not set in relation to the universal through the concept of being. All knowledge that is not
knowledge of being, and so stands without any relation to the universal – knowledge such as
is constituted in perceptive impressions and myths – must thus be viewed as minor and
insecure.
By the loss of immediateness and situatedness that occurs with the move to the
universal, humanity, at the same time, wins the relation to being. This concept of pure being
gets its effective strength through the foundation in the objectivity of theory, in principal. The
concept of being is independent of the subject, it refers us to a dimension that is independent
48
of every natural change. The existence of such a realm is a condition both for the
development of theories and for their validity.
3. Modernity, Life – and Critique of Abstraction
What is the point of this exposition of Parmenides? What does it have to do with
today’s philosophical practice?
Inasmuch as philosophical practice is educational it must also be contemporary.
Philosophical practice is thus not about determining what education is and how it should be
realised in general, but about its task in relation to a specific time. My claim is that today the
task is to come to terms with abstraction!
Abstraction is a fundamental human capacity that has been misunderstood. Parmenides was
the first who recognized the fundamental meaning of abstraction. But why is abstraction
important? – Because it is essential, first, to grasping the ideas of objectivity and validity.
We need abstraction if we are to understand objectivity and if we are to avoid the decent of
our time into relativism.
Parmenides defined truth as being, and thought thinking and being as a single unity.
He realized that the unity of thinking and being is realised through the realm of inquiry which
is always oriented towards truth. Moreover, Parmenides recognised that this realm exists in a
way that is quite apart from and independent of the realm of sensory perception. In short,
what Parmenides uncovered was the realm of objectivity that underlies all theorisation.
Parmenides grasped the full weight of the fact that we humans are properly at home in
a realm that is not merely that of the sensible world of nature, nor of perception, but of
reflection on the process of our conscious thought. Clearly it is this to which the goddess
refers in the fragments of Parmenides: ‘But judge by reason the highly contentious refutation
that I have spoken.’
It is not theory as such that is at issue here, then, because talk of theory is only a way
of expressing the fact that we humans are at home in the sphere of being as well as in the
world of space and time as perceived by our senses. Parmenides recognized the extreme
abstraction in which all perceptivity perishes, along with every spatio-temporal happening, as
the essential core of typical human ‘being-there’, the core of the ‘rational animal’, and
grasped it as fixed in the unitary concept of being. Parmenides recognized that abstraction
belongs to the essence of human being. Abstraction is not a taking away from reality, but
reality itself.
We moderns are naturally not so easily given over to abstraction and the abstract –
and there are reasons for this Abstraction seems to be destructive of our life-world. From
Goethe’s Philosophy of Nature up to Romantic Life-Philosophy, from the original Youthmovement at the beginning of the 20th Century to the Ecology-movement and
Postmodernism at its end, the culture of our modern society seems to unite in resistance to
abstraction. So it seems as if a curse lies upon the notion. In the idea of ‘alienation’, Karl
Marx sees the rise of a form of abstraction through the rule of the economic over the human
that would only overcome by the destruction of the capitalist order. In Alexandrine
rationality, Nietzsche sees abstraction and suppression of life. In the rule of the objectivity of
science against the living mind, Edmund Husserl sees the rule of the abstract. In the all-
49
encompassing power of the ‘Framing’ (Gestell) of technological modernity, Heidegger sees
the calculable, the representational and the abstract, and by connecting this idea with obscure
phrases such as the ‘sending of being’, Heidegger thereby dooms humanity to powerlessness
in the face of history. Even the young Karl Popper attacked, on the basis of his own
understanding of the abstraction of its theories, what he viewed as the false model of human
social life provided by the model of the ‘closed society’. Adorno finally reveals the principle
of identification as that which underlies all forms of abstraction and by this refers to the idea
of totalisation as that which comes to realise itself in individual life, society, and thinking.
The negation of individuality – what Adorno calls non-identity – is the primary marker of the
abstraction that has, he claims, become absolute and inescapable in modernity. Only modern
art seems to have a positive attitude towards the abstract. It seems to have found the core of
creativity in abstraction and so ‘abstract art’ came into being. The Spanish philosopher
Ortega y Gasset in his writing ‘The Dehumanisation of Art’ gave his support to this form of
creativity. Nevertheless, modern art and y Gasset aside, as a whole we seem to celebrate the
concrete in opposition to the abstract that would otherwise seem to be destructive of
individuality and life.
We seem to have misunderstood something in our own history and in our own
essence! Abstraction is a special ability of reason. It rules social reality, too. In modernity,
exspecially in the last two centuries, something peculiar is going on, different forms of
Weltanschauung are united in the opinion to degrade human ability of abstraction in a way,
that it seems to be superseded in our minds. The reality and effectivity seems to get out of
sight whereas abstraction in forms of scientific objectivity, technical practicability and
economic profitability is expanded on and corroborated in all realms of human life. This is
important and of great consequence by the fact, that abstraction originally is a phenomenon
of reason and by that an inner ability of humanity, that now is coming from outward against
humans. Not any longer recognized as something from inside and own, but perceived and
suffered as something from outside and strange: this is the modern relation of thinking and
being under the aspect of the abstract. More precisely it is the relation of our modern
Lebenswelt, created by abstract abilities of thinking, and the unconsciousness and negation of
abstraction as a fundamental ability. Humanity has to make peace with its own ability of
abstraction to overcome this situation. To avoid it is impossible.
4. Abstraction as a Positive Concept
As a consequence, we must not deny abstraction. Abstraction is a productive human
capacity and humanity would not be what it is without it. The question is: what connection
has abstraction with the concrete? The question is a necessary one, since the concrete
certainly cannot be ignored. The two completely different realms of natural life and rational
abstraction come together in humanity, and are indeed constitutive of human existence. We
thus have to find a way to come to terms with abstraction. We cannot eliminate the
conditions of our own life – to do so would be at the cost of our own essence.
Understandably enough, we vote for life. But as much as abstraction is a part of
thinking, so it belongs to humanity and its essence. We cannot negate abstraction without
50
negating ourselves, and yet such self-negation seems to be characteristic of our time.
Abstraction appears as something that comes to us from outside ourselves through the
apparently alienating effects of science, technology and the economy. At the same time, we
are materialistic in our self-estimation and self-interpretation. Thus brain research, one of the
leading scientific disciplines, tries to reduce consciousness to a mere appearance that arises
out of the fundamental processes of the brain.
To the extent that modernity sees itself as having left idealism behind, so the realm of
thought, consciousness and mind is either not a focus for discussion or else is not seen as
having any fundamental significance in its own right. Whereas we see abstraction in the form
of alienation as something that comes from without and is imposed upon the human lifeworld, so we do not acknowledge abstraction as an original ability of human beings. Because
we do not grasp this connection, we stand in an incorrect relation to ourselves. There seem,
then, to be two possibilities: either we give in to alienation because, for example, we reduce
philosophy to philosophy of science or linguistic analysis, and thereby negate the vitality of
human life; or else we stand on the side of life, but, in doing so, risk overlooking the dynamic
and productive character of modernity, and instead lapse into a form of fundamentalism. To
prefer the latter of these two alternatives is understandable, but it is neither practical nor
realistic, precisely because it denies the character of abstraction as a properly human
capacity. The only course available to us is to accept abstraction as something that properly
belongs to us. And when we do that, then we can also recognise that alienation is not
something foreign to us either, but is equally our own – it belongs to what we ourselves are.
On that basis, we need no longer struggle against alienation as something that arises from
without, but can begin to understand it as something that comes from within ourselves. If we
understand alienation as our own, then:
-We will not see ourselves as ‘anachronisms’ within the frame of modernity – as
productive of abstraction we come before the products of abstraction.
-We will be able to recognize the connection between abstraction and freedom.
Without abstraction, there is no freedom.
-We will be able to understand the way in which abstraction functions as the basis for
human rights – for instance, in the idea that all human beings are equal in front of the law or
in that most profound formulation of the foundation of ethics, the Categorical Imperative,
abstraction plays a crucial role.
-We will, on the basis of all these considerations, be able to arrive at an understanding
of abstraction, not as something that is primarily negative, but as actually enabling a
recompilation between abstraction and life.
How can we imagine such a reconciliation?
The most important step would for the abstraction of natural science to be recognised
as itself constituted by life. That means that natural science would have to begin, as one of its
own first principles, with an acknowledgement of the capacities of living human
consciousness. And further, such living consciousness would have to be recognised as an
fundamental and essential quality of Nature. The mental would then be seen as part of the
order of nature and so as constituting an objective domain central to natural science itself.
The separation of humanities and natural science would, in this respect, no longer be
51
acceptable – res extensa belongs to nature along with the res cogitans. If Physics were to
recognise that not all ordering is the ordering of space and time, energy and movement, then
it would have to open itself to Metaphysics, and the equation of the physical with the real
would no longer be acceptable. This would be a revolution in the way of thinking of a sort of
which Kant did not dream, but a revolution that cannot be halted. It would be eminently
practical if philosophical practice were to take up the epochal task of advancing such a
revolution by means of education.
It would be totally counter-productive if the inner abstraction of thought were coupled
with the principle of life so as to counter the social abstraction of alienation. This would only
be self-destructive and prevent the possibility of understanding. Yet neither can we take only
one side – abstraction or life – against the other, for this leads only to the closing-off of
oneself that comes with fundamentalism. The reconciliation of both principles, of life and
abstraction, is not something that can be achieved once and for all. It is a task that must
always be attempted anew, for the facts that contribute to that task are manifold and can only
be grasped through culture .
52
Roxana Kreimer es Licenciada en Filosofía y Doctora en Ciencias
Sociales (Universidad de Buenos Aires). Fue becaria del Consejo
Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas de la Argentina
(CONICET). Publicó Historia del mérito (2000), Artes del buen vivir:
Filosofía para la vida cotidiana (2002), Falacias del amor (¿Por qué
Occidente anudó amor y sufrimiento?).
Ha sido docente de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, la Universidad
Nacional de Jujuy, en la Asociación Argentina de Investigaciones Eticas,
en la Asociación Psicoanalítica Apertura de La Plata y en el Centro
Cultural Ricardo Rojas. Desde el año 2002 coordina un Café Filosófico
todos los fines de semana. En la actualidad concurren a esa actividad
entre 400 y 600 personas cada mes.
Convocada por el Dr. Ricardo Maliandi, titular durante años de la cátedra
de Etica de la Universidad de Buenos Aires y director de la carrera de
Filosofía de la UCES, durante el 2005 impartió un seminario sobre
Orientación Filosófica.
LAS CUATRO MUERTES DE
DIÓGENES EL PERRO
Roxana Kreimer
Buenos Aires, Argentina
En culturas de transmisión de conocimiento primariamente oral y subsidiariamente
escrito, en las que la poesía en general y el mito y el enigma en particular aún figuran como
formas de verdad, la idea de historia aún no ha perdido su sentido original de narración, de
relato 40 , connotación que tiende a diluirse casi por completo con el acrecentamiento del
prestigio de la letra impresa y la escrupulosidad en las citas propios de la modernidad. Es ese
sentido primigenio de la noción de historia el que conservan las anécdotas como
composiciones colectivas de enunciación que, a la manera de los fastos romanos, en tanto
registros públicos que atesoran acciones memorables, animan las Vidas de los filósofos más
ilustres, de Diógenes Laercio.
Entre las narraciones sobre los filósofos antiguos acopiadas o fabuladas por Laercio –
no será relevante aquí discernir si en efecto los hechos relatados tuvieron o no lugar, ya que
en uno u otro caso se trata de panegíricos de los que en mayor o menor medida la posteridad
se ha hecho eco-, las que corresponden a las distintas versiones acerca de la muerte de
Diógenes el cínico resultan de peculiar significación. Una de ellas presume que Alejandro el
Grande y Diógenes el perro murieron el mismo día del mismo año 41 “Hay varias versiones
sobre la muerte de Diógenes –escribe Laercio-. Una es que murió de un cólico luego de
ingerir un pulpo crudo. Otra indica que habría muerto voluntariamente conteniendo la
40
41
Aún hoy la palabra historia también es sinónimo de relato.
Diógenes Laercio. Lives of eminent Philosophers, trad. R. D. Hicks, London, William Heinemann Ltd. VI 79
53
respiración (...). Otra versión afirma que, al tratar de compartir un pulpo con los perros, fue
mordido con tal ferocidad en que esto causó su muerte” 42 El fin de Diógenes el perro sugiere
menos un fenómeno biológico que narrativo: la razón cínica aparece abreviada en un puñado
de réquiems que no solo resultan consecuentes con su vida sino que en cierto modo la crean.
Apunta Laercio que de acuerdo al trabajo de Demetrio Hombres con el mismo
nombre, “el día que Alejandro murió en Babilonia, Diógenes murió en Corinto” 43 Michel
Onfray niega la coincidencia de ambas muertes: “Hoy sabemos que Diógenes murió a causa
de la ingestión del pulpo crudo cinco años antes que Alejandro” 44 Sea como fuere, subyace
en la coincidencia marcada por Demetrio la voluntad de reunir a dos figuras disímiles en una
fecha precisa (el día de su muerte), y en un sitio preciso (la plaza de Atenas): “Alejandro se
paró delante de Diógenes y le dijo: ´Pídeme lo que quieras, que te lo concederé´, a lo que
Diógenes respondió: Ćórrete, que me tapas el sol´” 45 Ambas citas –en espacio y tiempooponen por un lado a Alejandro el Grande, el conquistador que sueña con adueñarse del
mundo erigiendo una monarquía universal, con la cuota de crímenes y rapiña que supone
tamaña empresa; y por el otro a Diógenes el perro, el “linyera” dueño de sí mismo que recusa
radicalmente toda forma de poder.
Razón de Estado y razón individual confrontadas en la frase que consigna Hecato en
Anécdotas, de acuerdo al testimonio de Laercio: “Si no hubiera sido Alejandro, me hubiera
gustado ser Diógenes” 46. Los siglos que median entre la existencia histórica del cínico y el
escrito de Laercio parecen haber enhebrado dos emblemas divergentes en la megalomanía y
en la práctica iconoclasta de Alejandro y Diógenes respectivamente (el perro simbolizó la
impudicia entre los griegos; “Una breve reflexión sobre las cosas que los perros hacen en
público –advierte Amstrong- pondrá de manifiesto cuál fue la dirección seguida por los
cínicos en su escarnio de las convenciones. De manera particular, Diógenes llevó al extremo
está actitud”) 47
Expuesto a la venta por unos piratas que lo habían capturado como esclavo en
Aegina, un posible comprador le pregunta por sus destrezas: “Gobernar hombres”,
responde 48. La ironía plantea una ética lúdica que no está ausente en la simultaneidad
cronológica de las muertes de Diógenes y Alejandro, coincidencia que hoy sabemos que solo
tuvo lugar en el imaginario de la antigüedad clásica..
Otra de las versiones acerca de la muerte de Diógenes indica que murió
voluntariamente conteniendo la respiración, tal como habrían consignado sus amigos y
Cercidas de Magalópolis 49 . Conocida técnica de autodominio, el control de la respiración
permite a Diógenes adueñarse de su muerte del mismo modo que se adueña de su vida.
Muerte biológica improbable –es imposible asfixiarse apretando los dientes y conteniendo la
respiración-, la metáfora pretende que hasta el último acto de Diógenes encarne su voluntad
42
Ibid. VI 76
Ibid. VI 79
44
Michel Onfray. Cynismes. París. Grasset & Fasquelle. 1990 p.129
45
Diógenes Laercio. Ibid VI 38
46
Ibid VI 32
47
Amstrong. Introducción a la filosofía antigua. Trad. De Carlos Fayard. Buenos Aires. Edueba. 1983 p 195
48
Diógenes Laercio. Ibid VI 74
49
Ibid. VI 46
43
54
de autodeterminación. Cercidas vincula el dominio que Diógenes ejerce sobre sí mismo con
la auténtica estirpe divina: en la morada de los dioses Diógenes es consagrado “sabueso
celestial”.
Exponente de la más puntual tradición socrática, Diógenes estima que solo puede ser
dueño de sí mismo quien toma a la sabiduría como única moneda de buena ley y por ella está
dispuesto a cambiar todas las demás cosas. Como Sócrates, que pasea por el mercado y
exclama “Cuántas cosas hay que no necesito” 50, Diógenes sabe que solo es pobre quien desea
más de lo que puede adquirir. De las narraciones de Laercio se infiere que los discípulos de
Diógenes menosprecian el dinero de manera espectacular. Crates lo deposita en casa de un
cambista con la condición de que lo distribuya entre sus hijos si se convierten en “gente
común”, y entre la gente de pueblo si sus hijos deciden ser filósofos. Diocles arroja su dinero
al mar y dona sus tierras para pasto de ganado. Mónimo Siracusano finje un brote de locura y
desparrama por la calle buena parte de la moneda depositada en el banco corintio para el que
trabaja 51.
El emblema de autodeterminación cifrado en la asfixia por mano propia –muerte que
también habría elegido el cínico Metrocles 52 , no aparece vinculado solo a condiciones
sociales sino también a un estado del espíritu que aqueja tanto al amo como al esclavo. La
razón cínica juzga esclavo a quien complica su existencia innecesariamente, a quien prefiere
ser conducido a gobernarse a sí mismo, a quien impone a los demás y se impone a sí mismo
trabajos inútiles, y a quien debe velar por objetos y sujetos que figuran servirlo. Esclavo es
para el cínico quien se propone dominar y pone a todas las cosas –y especialmente a sí
mismo- en tensión. Porque esclavo es también quien ignora su propia esclavitud. Crates
propone filosofar “hasta el punto en que los generales del ejército parezcan conductores de
monos” 53.
Morir conteniendo la respiración supone también cierta economía para eludir la
servidumbre que puede deparar la prolongación de la vida. Aguardar la muerte como un
descanso erige a la inmortalidad y no al fin de la vida en verdadera amenaza. La muerte es
para Diógenes una instancia de reunión con la naturaleza. Por ello, tal como escribe Laercio,
dejó órdenes estrictas para que después de muerto lo arrojaran en una zanja y esparcieran
cenizas sobre su cadáver 54 . Razones análogas justifican su aceptación de la antropofagia,
práctica cuya naturalidad, recalca Diógenes, atestiguan las costumbres de varios pueblos 55 .
Explica Laercio que para Diógenes “todos los elementos están contenidos en todas las cosas:
la carne constituye el pan así como el pan constituye los vegetales” 56.
El principio de autodeterminación, pilar de la razón cínica, supone el rechazo del
trabajo como precio para ser admitido en la civilización. La tradición prefiere recordar a
Diógenes viviendo en un tonel, desprovisto de posesiones, aguijoneando como un tábano a
sus conciudadanos en los espacios públicos a la manera de Sócrates: también para el cínico la
50
Ibid. II 25
Ibid. VI 87
52
Ibid. VI 92
53
Ibid. VI 92
54
Ibid. VI 79
55
Ibid. VI 73
56
Ibid. VI 73
51
55
sabiduría está en la plaza y se adquiere en la vida práctica. Pero, a diferencia de la dominante
tradición platónico-aristotélica, Diógenes no rechaza el trabajo para que otros lo realicen por
él. Cuenta Laercio que, de acuerdo a ciertos autores, cuando Platón vio a Diógenes lavando
lechuga, se acercó calladamente y le dijo: ´Si estuvieras en la corte de Dionisos, no estarías
lavando lechuga´” 57, y que Diógenes, con idéntica calma, respondió: ´Si lavaras lechuga, no
precisarías seducir a Dionisos´”. Tal como se señaló párrafos atrás, poco importa si el relato
de Laercio corresponde o no a una verdad histórica; el valor de la narración reside en el
contraste entre dos modelos de comportamiento, en la confrontación de dos actitudes
antagónicas respecto al trabajo manual58[19], al poder y a la esclavitud. Diógenes no precisa
convencer a ningún dictador acerca de la posibilidad de llevar a cabo una utopia: la suya
nunca extralimita su propia voluntad de autodeterminación. El relato confronta dos “precios”
opuestos: lavar lechuga y negociar con el tirano; Diógenes no duda acerca de cual de los dos
salvaguarda su libertad.
Poner fin a la propia vida conteniendo la respiración y lavar lechuga aparecen así
como fórmulas simbólicas análogas. En este punto la continuidad socrática es claramente
encarnada por Diógenes y no por Platón (que no por casualidad llamaba al cínico “El
Sócrates loco” 59 ). La tradición platónico-aristotélica suele eclipsar la consideración de que
no todos los atenienses aprobaban la esclavitud ni despreciaban el trabajo manual 60, tarea
ineludible si se trata de no lograr la propia emancipación en base a la esclavitud del prójimo.
La autonomía cínica prescribe contentarse con lo que se tiene y pasar a otro deseo
cuando un combate exige demasiada voluntad. “Los amantes derivan sus placeres de sus
infortunios”, declara Diógenes 61 . Frente a los amores desavenidos, promueve la
masturbación, una práctica que le resulta infinitamente más accesible que la satisfacción del
hambre: “Ojalá pudiéramos saciar nuestro hambre restregándonos el estómago”, afirma 62.
La autonomía cínica es esencialmente económica: Diógenes arroja su vaso y su plato
al ver que un hombre come sobre un trozo de pan y otro bebe en la palma ahuecada de la
mano 63.
La razón cínica resume una crítica general al estado civilizado, presente en la
fórmula simbólica que cifra otro réquiem concebido para Diógenes, el que pretende una
muerte ocasionada por la ingestión de pulpo crudo 64 , víctima de la náusea provocada por el
emblema del fuego prometeico como símbolo de la civilización, fuego que (junto con las
57
Ibid. VI 58
Rodolfo Mondolfo (Los orígenes de la filosofía de la cultura, “Trabajo manual y trabajo intelectual desde la
antigüedad hasta el renacimiento”, Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1960 p.137) demuestra cómo el desprecio por el
trabajo manual no fue unívoco en la antigüedad. En referencia a los cínicos apunta: “Los cínicos proclaman la
necesidad recíproca e indisoluble de las dos actividades, manual e intelectual: “hay un doble ejercicio, el del
cuerpo y el del alma, y el uno sin el otro queda imperfecto´. (Cf. Diógenes Laercio. VI. 70 y ss)
59
Diógenes Laercio. Ibid. VI 53
60
Con todo, en Política Aristóteles da cuenta de que no todos aprobaban la esclavitud: “Para otros, la
dominación del amo va contra la naturaleza: es solamente en virtud de la ley que uno es esclavo y otro libre;
según ellos por naturaleza no hay ninguna diferencia y, por tanto, la esclavitud no es justa por su violencia”.
61 Diógenes Laercio. Ibid. VI 68
62
Ibid. VI 46
63
Ibid. VI 37
64
Ibid VI 76
58
56
técnicas) Zeus juzga responsable de volver la espalda a la naturaleza e introducir crecientes
dosis de lujuria y corrupción.
Diógenes derriba uno a uno los valores encomiados por la civilización: impugna el
trabajo, la propiedad (incluso la de mujeres e hijos), la lógica del honor y la vanidad
expresada en la profusión de mercancías, palabras e indumentaria. Vida de los filósofos más
ilustres es pródigo en ejemplos que ilustran esta posición. Crates, discípulo de Diógenes,
recibe una cachetada de Nicódromo y no responde con otra cachetada ni lo reta a duelo ni
pide a un tercero que lo defienda; se pega un cartel en la frente que testimonia: “Nicódromo
lo hizo” 65. Sócrates promueve una economía equivalente cuando explica a sus discípulos por
qué no lo ofenden las sátiras de Aristófanes: “Si satiriza mis verdaderas faltas, nos hará un
bien, pero si sus sátiras carecen de fundamento, ¿para qué molestarme si no se aplican a
mí?” 66.
El cínico utiliza como única indumentaria una capa que le sirve de sábana por la
67.
noche Años antes Sócrates había incriminado al maestro de Diógenes, Antístenes, cuando
doblaba su capa para que luciera más vistosa: “Veo que buscas la vana gloria”, dijo 68. Un
hombre lee en voz alta un texto larguísimo; Diógenes, que está cerca de él, ve que falta poco
para que termine y vocifera al grupo que escucha: “Aleluya, amigos, por fin diviso la
orilla” 69.
En la clave simbólica cifrada en la ingestión de carne cruda figura, junto al rechazo
del fuego, el escarnio a las falsas promesas de felicidad que imponen sacrificios en aras de la
patria, la familia y la producción: “Trabajar, casarse, criar niños y defender a la patria –
advierte Michel Onfray en relación a la actualidad que presenta hoy el pensamiento cínico-,
tal el programa virtuoso que las iglesias, los estados y los moralistas nos presentan como
ideal, todas instancias por las que es necesario sacrificarse. Producir riquezas, niños,
nacionalismo y orden: tal la actividad programada para el ciudadano modelo” 70. Nemotécnica
como la rima, la narración cínica alude, es implícita, lúdica y económica; no urge a comer
carne humana, a romper la vajilla y a masturbarse en la plaza pública. Como todo lenguaje
simbólico renuncia a presentar el original en todas y cada una de sus cualidades y
dimensiones concretas: su estirpe hiperbólica desfocaliza toda posible literalidad.
En tanto epigrama oral, la muerte poética resume en un único acto –el último- el
sentido de toda una vida. El leit-motiv de Heráclito, cifrado para la tradición en las aguas que
fluyen como imagen del cambio, es objeto de la metáfora según la cual Heráclito muere de
hidropesía, preguntando enigmáticamente a los médicos si acaso podrá convertir la lluvia en
sequía. La muerte de Heráclito, desencadenada por superabundancia de fluidos (o de
cambios: la muerte lo es), trasunta una atmósfera que no está ausente en una última versión
sobre la muerte de Diógenes, según la cual habría sido mordido fatalmente por unos perros
tras compartir con ellos un pulpo crudo 71 . La narración podría ser leída en la misma clave
65
Ibid. VI 89
Ibid II 36
67
Ibid. VI 76
68
Ibid II 36
69
Ibid VI 38
70
Onfray Ibid p.133
71 Ibid VI 77
66
57
que la muerte que simboliza el rechazo al fuego prometeico, o como una ironía formulada
contra el cinismo, o incluso por quienes simpatizan con él y con la posibilidad de reirse de sí
mismos. Diógenes se reconoce como perro porque satisface cada una de sus necesidades al
aire libre. Del mismo modo que Heráclito muere por superabundancia de agua –junto al
fuego, emblema con que lo identifica la tradición-, Diógenes el perro muere como
consecuencia de las heridas que le infligen tarascones análogos a los suyos.
Dos equívocos signan la valoración de la anécdota que proviene de culturas en las
que la oralidad sigue siendo la forma predominante en la transmisión de conocimientos: por
un lado su elucidación como verdad histórica; por el otro su vinculación a un sujeto
individual. En tanto discurso referido, como relato oral que se crea cuando la leyenda ya ha
sido fundada y pulida, la anécdota pierde así su carácter mítico y polisémico de construcción
simbólica.
Las muertes de Diógenes articulan la fábula de su vida. Rechazo a la civilización en
el emblema de la carne cruda. Sublevación e ironía en la mordedura del perro. Autonomía en
el control de la respiración. Poder (Alejandro) y resistencia (Diógenes).
Un puñado de epitafios orales simbolizan la crítica más radical a la civilización que
nos ha legado la antigüedad clásica, la carcajada más tenaz e irreverente que revela el único
método que un cínico griego considera digno de aplicar a la filosofía: el de preguntarse si es
posible o no vivir de acuerdo a sus principios.
58
Bernard Roy is a professor at Sarah Lawrence College,
Bronxville New York. He has been teaching philosophy
since 1989. Twenty years before then he obtained a BS
in Hotel Administration from Cornell University, and
thereafter spent many years in various executive
positions within the hospitality field. For some time he
was proprietor of the celebrated Entre Nous French
restaurant in New York City. Since moving into
philosophy he has published in the areas of the history
of logic and modern Socratic dialogue, as well as
hospitality education. He is currently working on a book
which explores the connections between the thought of
Descartes and the logic of Port-Royal.
ON BECOMING AND BEING HOSPITABLE:
THE MODERN SOCRATIC DIALOGUE AND THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY
Bernard R. Roy
Nueva York, USA
The ancient Socratic dialogue
In this paper I set out to show that the modern Socratic dialogue is the only viable
method to convey a heartfelt understanding of hospitality to all personnel of the hospitality
industry. It takes two points for granted: the first one is that a genuinely hospitable staff is the
sine qua non condition of an establishment that considers itself part of the hospitality
industry; and the second one is that, although hospitality begins with an attitude, it only
becomes complete with training. This paper is a way for me to reconcile my two careers. I
spent 20 years in the hospitality industry and 15 in academic philosophy. Although I have
come up with numerous explanations - and this paper is yet another possible one - for my
mid-career conversion from hotels and restaurant to philosophy, the shift essentially remains
a mystery.
Today, a trade show beckons and assembles under one (large) embracing roof the
‘experts’ of a particular profession. In Antiquity, the Athenian agora beckoned and
assembled under the warm Mediterranean sky the ‘experts’ of all professions. Both the
modern trade show and the Athenian agora are as much social phenomena as they are
professional ones. It was in the Athenian agora where Socrates, some two thousand four
hundred years ago, unrelentingly engaged in dialogues with experts hoping to plumb the
essence of their trade. Thus, Socrates could be seen intercepting a magistrate or a
geometrician and asking either: ‘Tell me, your honour, what is justice?’ or, ‘Tell me,
59
professor, what is knowledge?’ This was the beginning of a long tiresome exchange, which a
crowd would witness, sometimes with amusement, other times with awe, but always with
intensity. Although the dialogue rarely yielded a conclusive answer, it uncovered the abuse
of buzzwords or soundbites.
As I was sauntering about the aisles of Jacob Javits Center during the 83rd
International Hotel/Motel and Restaurant Show, I wondered how some of the ‘experts’ of the
hospitality industry would have fared under Socrates’ dialectical scrutiny. I could not help
but imagine a Mr Marriott being stopped and asked by a unkempt bearded older gentleman:
‘My good man, so many people go to you for hospitality. Please tell us, what is hospitality?’
I then imagined a group of people, some of them employees of Mr Marriott, forming a circle
around the duo, and intently listening as Socrates and Mr Marriott alternatively explored and
abandoned various hypotheses until Mr Marriott, frustrated by the intractability of the
language, and exhausted by the intensity of Socrates’ focus would leave the dialogue.
What could be gained from such an experience? Or, to put it more bluntly: what’s in
it (the dialogue) for me (the business)? Without hesitation, I say ‘more profits’, with the
proviso that the structure of the Socratic dialogue undergo some modernisation (I’ll address
the modernisation of the dialogue in the last section). There is a demonstrable ‘bottom line’
gain in the sense that the modern Socratic dialogue supplies an experienced knowledge that is
put in practice in the workplace. That practice, without a doubt, will bring about a reduction
in employee turnover, an increase in repeat business, and, without wishing to appear like a
messenger of doom - but businesses do move in cycles - a hedge against future downtrends.
When cycles change and the economy is more staid, those establishments that will continue
to succeed are those which have built a reputation for hospitality because everyone, no matter
how financially strained, needs some hospitality sometime. Hospitality is, after all, about our
interaction with people who do not live with us, such as strangers, friends and the extended
family. But we all take turn at being away from home, at being strangers, in which case we
search for the reliably hospitable establishment, and we generally know those establishments
that have a reputation for hospitality. Finally, the practice promises to reduce operating costs
other than those related to employee turnover. Because repeat business is that business which
takes no bite out of the advertising budget, repeat business is free advertising, and the
advertising costs will go down. Thus, there is profitability in being hospitable: in fact, one’s
survival in the world of hospitality depends on one’s being hospitable.
Hospitality, then, is desirable, but why a dialogue? The point of the ancient dialogue
was not, as the detractors of Socrates rumoured, to amuse or to humiliate, the point was to
reach an experienced understanding of a concept of ethical import that was widely mentioned
but rarely examined. Hospitality, justice, and knowledge are all good examples of such
concepts, because so many people unreflectively claim, wish, or strive to be hospitable, just
and knowledgeable. The dialogue, then, is intended as a method of discovery, and this
intention needs be retained in the modern version. A method of discovery is a path to
knowledge, as we would say that experimentation is today’s method of science. Clearly,
experimentation does not have to be the method of science any more than the dialogue had to
be the Socratic method. However, the dialectic method is worth preserving on pragmatic
grounds. It has worked; it has yielded good results, and we know that the alternative path to
knowledge, namely the classroom, is not adequate for that purpose. Socrates had his own
60
reasons for favouring the dialogue over the then competing method of oratory. A genuine
dialogue seemed to be the only way to exchange shared experiences, no matter how
minuscule the experience was, and only experienced knowledge, as I will later argue,
compels one to act in accordance with that knowledge.
Some may wish to argue that hospitality is a personality, a ‘natural’ disposition, and
that no one could turn a rude individual into a hospitable one. Those who hold such a view
miss the point. Within the hospitality industry the Socratic dialogue is not operating as a
rehabilitation programme, it functions as a honing process. Only accomplished musicians can
train with a master; likewise, only those who have an inclination toward hospitality can be
trained to be hospitable. However, caution is necessary in deciding who has such inclination
or disposition. A personality is a very complex phenomenon and much too often hospitality
is conflated with a good first impression or with the proverbial ‘boy/girl next door’ image.
Such judgements are too expedient (and often discriminatory) and can deprive an
establishment of a solidly hospitable individual. It is too readily assumed that a polite,
gregarious and outgoing individual will be hospitable without giving much thought to that
individual’s behaviour under pressure. This assumption is unstated wishful thinking: it is
tantamount to leaving hospitality to the workings of good fortune. A hospitable disposition is
more than skin deep: a good first impression should only be a criterion, and not something an
operator should rest contented with.
Sceptics may demur at the suggestion, pointing at the present success of the industry.
They clamour that the hospitality industry is enjoying unprecedented successes. Hotels are
running close to full occupancy; an increasing number of restaurants require reservations a
month in advance; and the icy deep blue oceans as well as the sheer turquoise seas get more
and more crowded with cruise ships that are getting bigger and bigger. The sceptics,
however, overlook the demise of so called theme restaurants, and the enormous fines that
cruise ship companies are paying for ignoring anti-pollution laws (a truly hospitable cruise
ship company would never dump waste in the ocean - this is a nice corollary of hospitality).
Furthermore, although it is true that the industry is prosperous, it does not mean that it is
healthy. For example, there is an ever-widening gap between the demand for qualified
personnel and the supply. Large corporations attempt to rectify the potentially damaging
unbalance by opening their own ‘universities’ to train prospective staff. Others, less
financially able, rely on the increasing numbers of graduates from hospitality programmes,
which two-year, four-year or graduate institutions offer. However, this cannot be enough
because none of these programmes address the issue of hospitality; it is nearly as if there was
no issue. They all focus on the administrative and technical aspect of the trade. Typically,
one may learn marketing, financial planning, cooking, cost controls, table service, and the
like. The hospitality industry, however, is much more complex than the sum of its technical
skills: it is also about social skills. Possibly, the issue of hospitality is ignored, not so much
because educators and professionals have not thought about it, but because everyone realises
that a classroom is not the adequate venue. Hospitality does not lend itself to a lecture format.
Since no formal schooling ever includes a course that remotely resembles hospitality
training, hospitality is left to the workings of good fortune, or to the ambiguities of past
experience in the trade. But this is a bit like saying that because there is no tool for making
pommes gaufrettes there will be no pommes gaufrettes despite the fact that there is a great
61
public demand for them. I’m presenting you with that tool: it is the modern Socratic dialogue
that takes place in the context of an ongoing establishment.
The hospitality industry is about being hospitable; it is a spirit, an atmosphere that
infuses the whole environment. It concerns the back of the house staff as much as the front of
the house. Yes, back of the house employees and administrators also need to understand
hospitality; hospitality must not an exclusive feature of the front of the house, it must and can
be a spirit that infuses an entire establishment by osmosis or contagion. The hospitality of a
cook is apparent in the care he or she takes in preparation and presentation; the hospitality of
a kitchen porter is reflected in the sanitary shine of the pots; the hospitality of an
administrator is visible in the vision of his or her policies. Hospitality extends beyond the
boundary of the establishment: the hospitable establishment has a community spirit. That is
why a hospitable cruise ship company would never knowingly pollute its environment. If a
staff genuinely understands what hospitality is about then each member will want to be
hospitable; if they can practise hospitality in a hospitable environment, they’ll want to stay. A
hospitable staff enjoys being hospitable. The understanding of hospitality is the nectar and
the ambrosia of the staff.
How knowing implies doing
Socrates’ desire to understand concepts like justice and knowledge was justified by
his belief that the knowing of a particular concept that concerned our behaviour necessitated
the practice of that knowledge. Modern Socratic Dialogues uphold that spirit. But what does
‘necessitating’ mean? It means that an individual who is authentically cognisant of
hospitality cannot help but be hospitable. How can that be? An analogy may help: if you
really know how to read, you can’t help but read in accordance with that knowledge. Ask
yourself whether you could look at a text in your own language and ignore that it is a text,
whether you could ‘see’ it as meaningless scratch marks, for example. Even the occasional
gestalt switch that we may experience is not enough to convince me that I can look at a text
as something other than a text simply because I am not able to legislate those switches. The
viewing of language as language is much more entrenched in our psyche than the viewing of
a Necker cube or of a Wittgensteinian duck/rabbit representation. It is likewise with
hospitality: if you really know what hospitality is, you can’t help but be hospitable in
accordance with that knowledge. Socrates’ point was that the experienced knowledge of
hospitality makes it impossible for the possessor of that knowledge to ignore hospitality
when faced with a context that calls for it.
Before I go further, I need to clarify a point of language. The analogy of reading with
hospitality conflates two kinds of knowledge, namely knowing how and knowing that.
Knowing how to read is not the same kind of knowledge as knowing that hospitality consists
in doing such and such, or that Calder Willingham wrote Rambling Rose. The former has to
do with practical skills, and the latter has to do with theoretical truths, and, following
Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), most contemporary
philosophers limit their studies to the second kind of knowledge, knowledge of truths. If all I
had wished to do were to use the analogy as an illustration, there would have been no
difficulty. However, I owe a justification because I want this analogy to be argumentative.
Whatever goes on in my mind as I read is not identifiable by any neurophysiological account,
62
but is recognisable by my behaviour: I read. No other alternative presents itself to me.
Likewise, whatever goes on in my mind when I contemplate the thought of hospitality is
recognisable by my behaviour. I am hospitable, and no other alternative is present. The
concrete intentionality of my knowledge of reading, once I know how to read, is a
disposition. It is no more under my control than the intentionality of my knowledge of
hospitality, once I know hospitality. I become disposed toward it. So, there is a great deal in
common between the two kinds of knowledge, but only provided that the knowledge of
truths includes some form of personal experience.
Knowledge, to count as such, must be experienced. If it isn’t, then its possessor is a
CD-ROM or an encyclopaedia. The mind contains a concatenation of trivia. The parroting of
a dictate of behaviour cannot compel you to act in accordance to what the dictate says; on the
other hand, an understanding of a dictate of behaviour grounded in a heartfelt and complete
experience becomes, so to speak, second nature to the holder of that understanding. Not all
individuals who claim to know that Calder Willingham wrote Rambling Rose know it in the
same way. Someone who knows it from just reading about it knows it in a trivial sense.
Someone who knows it from having read, discussed and written about it and its author knows
it from having some experience of the novel and knows it better than the one who knows it in
a trivial sense. No one, of course, knows it better than the author himself does, for he
experienced the recounting of personal experiences. In a modern Socratic Dialogue, the
participants become authors, and as such they can’t help but continue to relive the
experience, that is, they can’t help but be hospitable. Experience must be part of knowledge.
As we all remember from our youth, it was not enough to be told that fire burnt, we also
wanted to know it, and, then, it seemed that the way to know it was to experience it. Our
intuition was not misguided; something like what happened with the fire must happen with
hospitality. However, it need not be that painful. How, then, can the experience of the burn
be recreated without the pain? The answer to the question is the methodology of a modern
Socratic Dialogue.
But, how does the knowledge of the good necessarily imply the doing of it? Are we
justified in upholding Socrates’ belief? The argument that Socrates uses to support his
position is explicit in Plato’s dialogue, the Protagoras. Knowledge can and ought to have
normative force. In the dialogue, he, a very young man, and Protagoras, a mature and wellestablished teacher of things like hospitality, both agree that ‘Knowledge is a fine thing
capable of ruling a person, and, if someone were to know what is good and bad, then he
would not be forced by anything to act otherwise than knowledge dictates, and intelligence
would be sufficient to save a person.’ (352c) The ‘popular’ view, which holds that emotions
(love, hatred, jealousy, pleasure, and pain) dictate our behaviour, stands in opposition to the
‘learned’ view of the two philosophers. Socrates supports his view by showing that the
‘popular’ view is misguided. He argues that if an agent acts from emotion, he or she acts out
of ignorance because the emotions shield the agent’s rationality. Without the transparent use
of reason the agent cannot calculate the consequences of his or her actions; he or she is
unable to see beyond the immediacy of the moment.
I want to raise two difficulties. First, although no one can dispute that a fit of passion
blurs rational lines, it is not so evident that a ‘pure’ intellect, i.e., one devoid of emotional
content, is ever at work when one considers a particular course of action. Even scientists and
63
mathematicians in the context of their research are, wittingly or unwittingly, influenced by
some emotions. Today, thanks to the work of nineteenth and twentieth century psychologists
and philosophers, we have learned to accept and use the contradictory forces that are at play
in shaping our social identities. We are reconciled with the thought that reason alone cannot
account for everything. But even supposing that Socrates is right and that reason can do it all,
it still remains that many future factors are simply not measurable in the sense suggested by
him. There are just too many possibilities for the mind to entertain. An essentially rational
agent is not all-knowing.
Second, Socrates’ position suggests that the knowledge of the good necessitates the
doing of the good. The argument assumes that the knowledge of the good includes
knowledge of the self such that no emotions will ever overcome its rational part. But, what
kind of self-knowledge does the good confer? It cannot be the kind of knowledge that would
guarantee in some reliable manner that I could never be offended or angered by someone’s
remarks or behaviour. This self-knowledge comes from honest self-examination of my
interactions with others, and Socrates’ dialectic, unlike the modern Socratic dialogue, did not
address this aspect of interpersonal dynamics. In fact, Socrates often seemed to delight in his
interlocutor’s discomfort.
We need an argument stronger than the one given by Socrates to show that the
knowledge of the good necessitates the doing of it. We need one that shows how moral
weakness (akrasia) can be overcome, how I can remain hospitable in the face of rudeness. To
be the subject of moral weakness is to do wrong in defiance of one’s better judgement. Thus,
my inability to resist a tempting chocolate mousse in spite of my knowledge of the damage it
will cause, is a good example of akrasia. An example that will hit close to home is rudeness
in the face of unrequited hospitality or rudeness: how can I be caring and kind (not just
polite) to a rogue? The general spirit is simple: the understanding of hospitality, because it is
accompanied by a heartfelt experience, contains the desire to be hospitable the same way the
understanding of friendship, when it is supported by an actual experience, contains the desire
to be friends. Some examples from history and literature may help bring my point across.
The paradoxical ‘love thy enemies’, enjoined to a hostile crowd on a certain mount,
describes the most extreme case of hospitality. How can I love my enemy? Well, if you are a
Pharisee, a Zealot or a Sadduccee and you understand the distinction between an earthly
kingdom and a heavenly one then you accept it with everything that understanding implies.
One implication is that you can’t help but love everyone. I don’t mean to sound preachy here;
I’m bringing the example only because, historically, we are told that it happened. Some
people understood it, accepted it and went on to love everyone. Hospitality, as I earlier noted,
is about the treatment of strangers or foreigners (including foreign enemies, like the Romans
in my example); the new metaphysical distinction between two ‘cities’ attempts to eliminate
all boundaries on earth. Anyone who understands and accepts this inevitably loves everyone.
This historical example dramatises how our understanding can govern our behaviour.
I found the example from literature in the novel Rambling Rose written by Calder
Willingham (New York: Delacorte, 1972). The story takes place in the American south, and
is about a beautiful young woman, Rose, whom a well-to-do family hires as a household
helper. Rose is honest, kind and loving, in fact a bit too loving, for she possesses an
insatiable sex drive. Her loving kindness and her sex-appeal create a certain tension in a
64
household that is otherwise described as harmonious and intelligent. Both the father and the
eldest son, still a teenager, have difficulties hiding their affection and attraction towards her,
although neither recognises it in the other. When Rose is diagnosed as having an ovarian
cyst, a doctor, the father and the mother sit down to discuss the options. After the father, in a
seemingly reluctant manner, agrees with the doctor that both ovaries should be removed
although just one is affected, he splutters out with characteristic flippancy and male
complicity: ‘The girl is oversexed and I say - spay her!’ (p. 197) The text provides an
enthymematic sigh of relief from both men, the result of their dog-in-a-manger realisation
that if they can’t have the girl - they are both married - no one will. At this point, the mother,
red with fury yet maintaining a critical calm typical of well-educated southerners, stands up
and startles the two men out of their paternalistic slumber: ‘Over…my…dead…body!’ she
says and then goes on to explain to the men that such an operation essentially would deprive
Rose of her womanhood. Her message is so clear, her tone so sincere that the father
eventually understands and concedes that he was wrong: ‘You are right about that, for her it
would…well, I didn’t think about it. The doctor said it and it sounded reasonable, but I didn’t
think it through. And you are right, you are dead right, completely and totally right, it would
be an awful and horrible thing to do. I am sorry. I am sorry, honey, forgive me, I didn’t mean
it.’ The honesty of the father’s concession signals a drastic change in his attitude toward
women, an attitude that is the result of reflection and understanding, rather than rote reaction.
From that moment on, it was obvious that, no matter what company the father would keep,
he would remain sensitised to some issues concerning women. The newly found sensitivity
was to compel him to act in the way that he understood. There is a similar dynamics taking
place during the dialogue.
The modern Socratic dialogue
A modern Socratic dialogue provides a pain free climate that will produce the desired
heartfelt experiences. By pain free, I mean free of the kind of intense sensations caused by
getting burnt. No such intensity reigns, but dialogues do require effort and honesty. Thus,
although no one will get scorched, someone may occasionally sweat.
The modern Socratic dialogue that I have in mind here is the kind developed and
practised by Leonard Nelson, Jos Kessels and Dries Boele. 72 The dialogues owe their
‘Socraticity’ to the emphasis they place on maieutic and elenchic processes. That is to say,
they enable the retrieval of latent knowledge (this the maieutic part) through successive
stages of consent and dissent (this is the elenchic part). Although Socrates (469-399),
according to Plato (426-347), demanded of his interlocutors that they share ‘experienced’
knowledge, ‘if human beings didn’t share common experiences, some sharing one, others
sharing another, but one of us had some unique experience not shared by others, it wouldn’t
be easy for him to communicate what he experienced to the other’. 73 the level of the
72
Leonard Nelson, The Socratic method, in Leonard Nelson (1949) Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy: Selected
Essays. New York: Dover; Dries Boele, The training of a philosophical counselor, in Ran Lahav and Maria Tillmanns (eds)
(1995) Essays on Philosophical Counselling. New York: University Press of America. Jos Kessels has published works in
the Dutch language.
73
Plato’s Gorgias, 481c-d. (John M. Cooper (ed.) (1997) Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett.
65
experience was noetic (both felt and intellectual) rather than empirical, and this noetic
experience was thought to have been acquired in ‘previous’ lives.
The modern dialogue strives for common sense and simplicity; as a result it deviates
from its ancestral parent by eliminating the experience of ‘previous’ lives, and by focusing
on this-life, albeit past, empirical experiences. In fact, it owes some of that modernity to
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804); the sought-after knowledge has its source in the manifold of
representations or appearances, that is to say that it is of an empirical nature. According to
Kant, the matrix of the understanding (the mental mechanics that allow us to have
experiences) assigned to human beings is useless unless activated by sensory intuitions and
assisted by the imagination. His highly celebrated claim is that ‘Thoughts without contents
are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.’ 74 Kant, by being the first philosopher to
give the faculty of the imagination some cognitive value, provides dialogue facilitators with
an epistemological receptacle full of untapped ‘full thoughts’. The maieutic process consists
in bringing these full thoughts to consciousness. It permits the reliving of experiences
esteemed to have been hospitable.
Although each facilitator brings into the dialogue his or her own rules, all dialogues
share a common structure and goal. The graphic representation of an hourglass is often used
to represent the structure of these dialogues: through various stages of consent and dissent, as
many individual stories as there are participants are condensed and funneled down to a core
statement, the comprehension of which is expanded so as to yield as close to a universal
definition as it is possible to reach. A critical aspect, therefore, of the modern Socratic
dialogue is the metamorphosis of multifarious experiences into universality without loss of
individual experience. The dialogue moves from the particular to the general, and the general
is always conditional on the particular. As such, the goal of the dialogues is for every
participant to have an intuition-based experience of the universality of concepts. The
experience, therefore, is much broader than the noetic experience favoured by Socrates,
although it cannot entirely exclude it.
More specifically, a dialogue on hospitality would consist of a maximum of twelve
participants; it would take place in a quiet and comfortable room and ideally would last one
day (eight hours). It would begin with each participant giving an instance of what he or she
considers to have been a personal experience of the concept under discussion. Generalities
and hypotheses are excluded because they cannot be experienced. This gathering of personal
experiences gives rise to one of the most crucial and critical movement of the dialogue,
namely the narrowing down from a list of as many instances as there are participants to a
single instance to which each participant sincerely relates. The movement is crucial because
the participants whose personal experience was not selected must still feel that they are very
much part of the dialogue. There is no method or algorithm to follow; here, it is the
facilitator’s patience and perseverance that keeps everyone inside the project. By remaining
‘inside the project’, I mean that at no time the dialogue should drift into generalities.
The participant, called the exemplar, whose instance was selected, then anatomises
the instance into minute sequences of events. The other participants are then encouraged by
the facilitator to ask as many clarifying and interpretative questions to the exemplar as are
needed for all of them to empathise with the exemplar’s experience. The empathy must be
74
Immanuel Kant (1965) Critique of Pure Reason (tr. Kemp Smith). New York: St. Martin's Press. A 51/B 75.
66
sincere and here again the facilitator’s role is key in probing each participant for his or her
sincerity. Moreover, the probing may reveal unperceived or stored away information. This
often arduous and gruelling process, which somehow mirrors the passage in Plato’s
‘Allegory of the Cave’, where the cave dweller rebels against the philosopher’s muscled
‘assistance’ in the ascent out of the cave and in the light, eventually leads to the selection of
one particular sequence of the anatomy of the experience, the ‘core statement’. The core
statement is the light, it is that which best captures the spirit of the concept in question. The
participants are then asked to figure out why the core statement instantiates the topic under
discussion. The responses will make up a list of statements, Q1,…,Qn, which are meaningful
to every participants, and the final version of the statement will have the form: X is P, where
P is the core statement, because Q1,...,Qn. It looks formal and theoretical, but it’s not because
the content of any Qi corresponds to some part of an individual experience. That knowledge
of hospitality is comparable to the knowledge that fire burns, and it has been acquired
without the intensity of the burning sensation.
Some human resources directors I have spoken to have balked at the suggestion of the
dialogue fearing that the participants, because of their established relationship to each other
in the work place, would not be co-operative during the dialogue. For example, a manager
would not want to appear vulnerable in front of his or her subordinates; and peers,
anticipating ridicule, may not get into the dialogue. This is a legitimate concern, but it can be
overcome by conducting pre-dialogue interviews, and at first, avoiding to pair individuals
likely to feel that way. It also became clear to me that the establishments that have these
concerns are the ones most in need of the dialogue. It may even take a plurality of dialogues.
One thing is sure: if such establishments continue to operate in this atmosphere of mistrust,
there is no doubt in my mind that they gradually will erode their raison d’être, and in its
stead build their slow demise. Mistrust breeds tension and tension is too arid a ground for
hospitality. Even if such establishments try to compensate by conducting frequent searches,
the energy and resources are misspent. The right combination is not out there waiting to be
culled - as we’ve seen, no training programme undertakes the task - the right combination
must be crafted, and the best tool to craft it is the Socratic dialogue.
To be in the hospitality industry means to be hospitable. A hospitable establishment
will have reduced employee turnover, lower advertising costs and a greater chance of
surviving business cycles than the one that is just efficient. Hospitality is a skill that can be
learned through recreated experiences, The modern Socratic dialogue provides the
environment that encourages these experiences.
67
68
Pierre Grimes es el fundador mundial del método Philosophical
Midwifering.Sobre la base teórica de esta teoría creo el programa
informático To Artemis: The Challenge to Know Thyself. Director y
fundador de la Academia Opening Mind y de la Noetic Society, Inc.,
institución esta última dedicada al estudio y análisis del pensamiento
platónico y neoplatónico.
Actualmente el Dr. Grimes es profesor de Filosofía en Golden West
College en Huntington Beach, California.
Pierre Grietes es autor de New Paradigm for Understanding Human
Problems: The Pathologos and Its Validation.
PHILOSOPHICAL MIDWIFERY FROM PROBLEMS OF
ADDICTION TO THE ANAGOGIC LEVEL
Pierre Grimes
Estados Unidos
The art of philosophical midwifery is a mode of philosophical practice developed by
Pierre Grimes, and as a “mode” it is a special discipline, or way of practicing philosophy.
Philosophical midwifery offers to understand and deal with a problem that Plato left
unanswered. The problem is not knowing why we accepted a false belief about ourselves
and the nature of reality. For to be fundamentally mistaken about what we should know is a
kind of ignorance. In Plato’s allegory of the cave he presents the condition of the nature of
man in respect to his struggles with ignorance and his urgently felt need to emerge into the
light of reality. He pictures man chained from childhood, believing the images and echoes in
the cave to represent reality. However, the mystery of why man accepts these false images of
himself and reality as true is not deal with.
Through philosophical midwifery 75 we learn that these false images of what is taken
to be real are irreconcilable with the truth about the nature of man. These images are so
powerful that they create a binding loyalty and shape one’s view of the nature of what is true
and real. As a consequence one sacrifices all else to protect and maintain these false images.
Thus, the questions we shall ask are “What makes false beliefs about oneself believable?
How can we have been deluded into accepting a false image of virtue and excellence?”
However, before we explore this theory it is necessary to discuss the circumstances of its
birth and development.
75
Grimes, Pierre and Regina L. Uliana. Philosophical Midwifery: a New paraddigm for Understanding Human
Problems..Costa Mesa, California, Hyparxis Press, 1998
69
Philosophical midwifery was first introduced as a dialectical mode of psychotherapy
by Pierre Grimes 76 . The early articles were in the style of Platonic dialogues with Socrates
unveiling the root cause of the inner conflict of those who aborted their victories rather than
work through the tensions linked to those victories. These articles were designed as a
dialogical model and they outlined the stages of thought in patterns of addiction.
In referring to philosophical midwifery as an art we draw attention to the way of
practicing a knowledge. For any activity to be called an art there must be a knowledge that
brings a needed excellence to the subject. This idea of an art has its origin in Plato’s
Republic 77 . It is an art when a practitioner possesses a knowledge and exercises it so that a
willing subject benefits by being brought into a more ideal state than when they entered
treatment.
The development of this philosophical movement went hand in hand with the
formation in California of the Noetic Society, Inc. It was in 1968 that Pierre Grimes and a
group of friends and students from Golden West College 78 and Long Beach State University
began to meet regularly to discuss Platonic dialogues and the dialectic, and they formed the
Noetic Society. This began a philosophical study group with reading that later included going
through the cycle of Platonic dialogues, and the Parmenides, the Republic, the Phaedrus as
well as the great works of Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, his Commentary of
Plato's Timaeus, his Elements of Theology, The Letters of Pseudo Dionysius, Diamond
Sutra, and other Eastern philosophical works.
As the members of the society became dedicated to the mastery of the material they
naturally experienced difficulties and when some became formidable blocks to their success
they sought help from Pierre Grimes. To meet this growing need the Noetic Society
Incorporated as a non profit educational corporation in 1978 and began its philosophical
midwifery program under the direction of the author. This program has continued to this
date.
Some of the Noetic Society members wanted to explore the spiritual side of Platonism
and engage in the contemplative arts, but since they were aware that the living Platonic
tradition ended with its suppression during the Christian era, they turned to Zen Buddhist
meditation, yoga and participated in their meditation retreats as well as those conducted by
the Noetic Society. As it turned out these members found that their blocks, or pathologos,
manifested themselves even in their meditation. Hence, this was another area in which
philosophical midwifery was applied successfully.
The Theory:
We find everywhere that man is blocked in this quest to achieve those goals that he
believes to be most significant, and instead he settles for secondary and practical goals. The
study of philosophical midwifery has found that in one’s youth that one concluded falsely
76
Grimes, Pierre. “Alcibiades: A Dialogue Exploring the Dialectic as a Mode of Psychotherapy for
Alcoholism”, Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol 22 (1961) : 277-297.Yale U
Grimes, Pierre. “Vinodorus: A Dialogue Exploring a Frame of Reference for Dialectic as a Mode of
Psychotherapy in the Treatment of Alcoholism,” Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol 27 (1966): 693-716
77
Plato, The Great Dialogues of Plato. Trans. W.H.D. Rouse. New York New American Library, 1956.
78
Where the author was Professor of Philosophy from 1964-2004
70
about oneself and accepted an image of oneself that was irreconcilable with the free
expression of one’s primary interests.
By way of example let us take an exploration that provided insights into philosophical
midwifery: 79
Consider a parent of a child standing in the doorway telling her child in a pleasant sort
of way that it was good for him to go out and play but remember don’t come home without
your shield, come home either with your shield or on it. The child was in an open and free
state and excited to play with his friends. The parent was unusually sincere, seemed most
direct, seemed caring and sensitive, and the child was for a brief moment the center of
parental concern. Now going out and playing took on the image of a warrior confronting a
do or die game, of fulfilling a parental desire, and in accepting all this he took on an image
that play and all else was to be guided by a Spartan warrior’s ethic. The child could not have
realized that the danger the parent saw was not in play, but in his free, open, and sensitive
state of mind that suggested a freedom to explore indifferent from all that the parent feared.
The usual state of mind of his parents was for work and household affairs with little
attention directed toward their son. Thus, it was through the shield scenes that the conditions
for a belief was transmitted.
Since the child cannot question such statements and believes the authorities were
revealing what they had discovered about life and were sharing it with him he innocently
accepts as true what seems so true. He gains a self-image and everything is evaluated
through that image.
These false beliefs are powerful and extend throughout the whole mind system and
they function as axioms within the mind set of the individual, and all else is reconciled and
made to be consistent with them. This kind of powerful false belief is what undermines the
higher goals and desires of the believer, it adversely shapes the personality, making the very
gestures of the personality a shadow of the real self. It differs from other beliefs both in its
scope, pervasiveness, and precision of functioning, we call it the pathologos, that is a sick
belief. Thus, the discovery of the pathologos as a new member of the class of belief is the
result of our explorations into the dynamic aspect of cognitive functioning. 80
What made these beliefs believable was that at these times the authorities appeared
most sincere, caring, knowing, and powerful so that to deny or reject as false the most
positive appearance of these parental figures would be tantamount to rejecting them and all
they represented. As the authorities appeared their best so the youth imitated that mode of
being for themselves and forgoes exploring the free open state they once enjoyed.
The authority gains a victory and excercises a subtle mode of control over the youth,
the control is perfect in giving the youth the appearance of freedom while their volition has
been captured. Unknowingly they subject themselves to exist and be confined within the
79
This was one of the earliest philosophical midwife explorations, 1960, that exhibited most of the features of
philosophical midiwfery.
80
Grimes, Pierre, and Uliana L. Uliana. “Philosophical Midwifery: The Grimes Dialectic and its Validation as
a mode of Rational Psychology.” 94th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association,
Washington, D.C., 1986
71
boundary of the transmitted belief. The belief the youth accepted about themselves as
inevitable and true becomes the model that fetters their soul to the folly of false belief. Thus,
most curiously, the appearance of virtue is the cause of vice. Thus, the process of making
what is manifestly false and base to appear true and beyond question is the art of sophistry,
and it is the art of our Socratic philosophical practice to challenge and remove its hold on the
unsuspecting soul.
The effort to realize what is most personally significant and meaningful invariably
surfaces these unsuspected beliefs because these utterly false beliefs about the self are
fundamentally irreconcilable with the attainment of those goals. For, we act out what we
believe, knowingly or not, and depreciate even the profound when it is inconsistent with
these core beliefs of the self. These beliefs are different from all the other kinds because
these we have been convinced they are true, yet have not articulated them. To be convinced
that the false is true, to defend them before oneself and others, and to remain loyal to them to
our very death is the result of having, unknowingly, applied the art of sophistry against
ourselves. To free ourselves of such folly is the ancient art of Socratic midwifery.
As the philosophical midwifery program continued and many benefited from it, a
fundamental weakness in the program became obvious. The entry into a philosophical
midwifery exploration begins when the subject acknowledges they have a problem and gives
an example of it from their immediate experience. However, the goal they may be seeking to
realize may be only of personal or practical significance and might not advance the subject
philosophically. To meet this condition the goal to explore in philosophical midwifery was
redefined as not only personally significant to the subject but meaningful. Thus, a new class
of problems became our study. However, even with this addition conflict appeared over
whether or not this goal was as important as the philosophical and spiritual goals such as to
know thyself. Those who were struggling with this problem discussed their dreams and
sought recourse there for answers difficult to gain elsewhere. As we explored dreams under
this condition we found something we had undervalued before. We had not realized there
was great depth to the positive features of dreams.
As a result we began exploring the anagogic level of human existence. The anagogic
state can be said to occur in dreams when a previously unrecognized spiritual meaning is
disclosed by the methods of philosophical midwifery. 81
This surfaces a profound dimension of existence unsuspected by the dreamer. It is the
reflections upon the dream material that brings to light what was previously ignored or
depreciated. Concurrently with this surfacing a deeper level of personally significant
insights into the dreamer's life is also achieved. For to come to see what previously was
depreciated kept the dreamer from discovering the same block is at the root of their problem.
It comes as a shock for the dreamer to be brought to acknowledge that their dream
experience contained scenes that can be justly compared and contrasted with those mystical
states of mind that that Plato, Plotinus, and others have described. Those who previously had
experienced these states of mind in various spiritual disciplines come to realize the method of
reflection they engaged in produces a union of the rational power and spiritual, a harmony
between the personally significant and that which transcends the personal. They saw most
81
Current Research Study of the Noetic Society, to be avialable as a DVD publication in 2006
72
directly how the role of mind can be brought to discover the depth of the mind through
philosophical midwifery.
The most brilliant light of being is experienced in some anagogic dreams and it
enriches the dreamers understanding of metaphysics because by reflecting upon it one can
make distinctions within it: Being, Same, Other or Different, Motion and Rest, which are the
Platonic forms. For they recognize while the nature of reality (that which is, or Being)
remains what it is throughout the experience (that which is the Same), yet it is Different since
it can be participated more deeply; while experiencing its vitality it is easily seen as a vital
dynamic (that which is in Motion) and since one settles within it since it one knows Rest.
Implication:
For dreams to function in the way we have described it is necessary to credit them
with a profound understanding of our problems. The scope of dreams include an intimate
knowledge of our present and past and has the precision to present the struggles, conflicts,
and the causes of our pathologos. This craftsman creates a drama out of this material that
captures the nature of our problems and presents, through similes, metaphors and analogies, a
unique drama for us to contemplate. In contemplating it through philosophical midwifery we
learn the language of our dreams.
Further, there must be some kind of map of consciousness known to the craftsman
such that for each of us there can be crafted a dream totally appropriate to our circumstances
that matches our unique own spiritual and philosophical development. There is a wisdom
unparalleled and therefore this master deserves the title of the Dream Master 82 .
With the anagogic dream and its realization we see a philosophical unfoldment that
includes an intelligible grasp of the spiritual life of man coupled with a perfectly rational
understanding of how their pathologos had undervalued the most valuable, the philosophical
and spiritual side of man. Thus the anagogic dream study brings evidence that a state of mind
can be developed that unites into one the philosophical and spiritual nature of man.
The method of philosophical midwifery guides one along a well established road of
inquiry without any need to interpret the contents of the dream or the nature of the problem
being discussed. This non-interpretive method proceeds by asking a series of questions
designed to uncover the obstacles that block the realization of goals 83 . These questions
unfold patterns of thought that begin with the statement of the problem, finding parallels in
the present, tracing these patterns to past events, and then focusing on early learning scenes
that can be understood as the conditions for the transmission of family-clan belief, thereby
completing the acculturalization process. The process culminates in the naming how each of
the participants in these transmissions scenes function. This naming is called the justification
of names because in being able to give a proper name that describes the roles and functions
of the participants it frees oneself from the false images that dominated one's life. The
process of midwifery then ends and there is nothing left for the midwife to do except wait to
see if the individual can proceed through what formerly blocked them and if not to see what
else must be examined before the force of the pathologos can be dissipated. Enlisting this
rational procedure they in turn learn the value of this kind of understanding, an understanding
82
83
Grimes, Pierre. “The Return of the Gods”, unpublished, 2005
Grimes, Pierre. To Artemis: The Challenge to Know Thyself.” available at website: openingmind.com
73
that invites the participant to seek meaning behind the patterns and cycles of their life. seeks
meaning in learning to name For the pathologos has many sides, much like a finely cut glass
has its facets, and until each side is seen for what it is and the role it plays in the whole one is
still caught in some part of the problem. This verification in one's experience is the final test
and this tests the individuals courage and understanding of their problem.
The Platonic tradition and midwifery
Philosophical midwifery functions within the structure of Socratic midwifery and, so,
includes within itself the elements of his midwifery. The principle elements are found in
Plato’s Theatetus, Symposium, and Proclus’ remarks on Plato’s Parmenides.
From the Theatetus we see that the midwife assists men who are blocked, or in
labour, in bringing to birth those ideas that they are pregnant with 84 ; can judge if the birth is
a true and noble birth 85 86 ; can bring about the abortion of those ideas that are not true and
noble births, but rather mere "wind eggs" 87 ; are barren and past giving birth themselves 88 ;
know and pursue which questions are truly philosophical and which not 89 ; and can function
as a matchmaker in bringing together those whose needs and teaching best contributes to a
proper learning 90 . From the Symposium we note the begetting culminates in the union of
the philosopher and true sophist, as Socrates and Diotima, and it gives birth to that which can
rival the inspired works of Homer and Hesiod 91 and, then, after gaining the vision of Beauty
itself begets and nurtures a true excellence, arete, gaining immortality 92 . The seventh and
eighth elements are the high points of midwifery since the birth that rivals the works of
Homer and Hesiod is the Socratic theory of midwifery. The seventh element indicates that
the goal is the participation in that vision of Beauty itself, often called the Idea of the Good.
Proclus often cites Parmenides’ dialogue with Socrates as midwifery since it perfects
Socrates’ understanding of participation 93. Proclus makes clear that the proper objects of
midwifery are the misunderstandings of Platonic metaphysics. Clearly, philosophical
midwifery takes on another task as it explores the reasons for the difficulties in understanding
metaphysics.
Implications:
With the findings of philosophical midwifery comes the recognition of the failure of
the anti-metaphysical, empirical and contemporary positivistic thought to either address or
answer man’s fundamental problems. Since the social sciences have adopted the world view
84
Plato.Theaetetus, Sophist.Trans. H.N.Fowler.Cambridge: Harvard UP. 1977, p. 35 (150c)
Ibid.p.35 (150C)
86
Ibid. p.35 (150C)
87
Ibid. p.39 (151C-D)
88
Ibid. p.33 (149D)
89
Ibid. p.125-7 (175C_D)
90
Ibib. p.37 (150E)
91
Plato. Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Trans. W.R.M.Lamb.Harvard UP.1925. p.201 (209D)
92
Ibid. p.209 (212A-B)
93
Proclus. “Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides”.Trans.Glen R. Morrow andJohn M/ Dillon.Princeton,NJ,
Princeton UP. 1987. pages 143, 192, 211, 218-219, and 226
85
74
of positivism, psychotherapy’s scope has restricted itself to the study of psychogenic
disorders and ignored the problem of the effect of false beliefs about oneself on behavior.
This gap is being filled by philosophical midwifery, a philosophical discipline. For it is a
time honored and most fundamental goal of philosophy to unmask sophistry whether it
expresses itself within the individual, or society, since the distinguishing mark of the pretense
to sophia, wisdom, is sophistry.
75
76
Lydia Amir es profesora en la Universidad de Tel-Aviv. Profesora
Invitada en la Universidad de Maryland, en la Universidad de
Helsinki, en la Universidad de Edimburgo.
Ha colaborado en diversos medios internacionales de difusión sobre
Orientación Filosófica: International Journal of Applied Philosophy,
en Practical Philosophy, Reason in Practice, etc. Ha participado en
todas las ediciones del Congreso Internacional de Filosofía Práctica.
Ha publicado decenas de artículos sobre la disciplina en todo el
mundo y sus últimos libros tratan sobre la vinculación del humor y
la Orientación Filosófica.
PLATO’S THEORY OF LOVE:
RATIONALITY AS PASSION1
Lydia B. Amir
Israel
“I…profess to understand nothing but matters of love.”
Socrates in Plato’s Symposium.
Introduction
One of the most influential traditions of love in the Western world is Platonism.
Originating with Plato’s writings on love (mainly the Symposium whose explicit subject is
the nature of love and Phaedrus, but also the Republic and the Laws), the tradition flourished
through Aristotle, Plotinus and the revival of neo-Platonism in the Renaissance. But Plato’s
influence expanded beyond the tradition he started: the Courtly Love of the Middle-Ages, the
Romanticism of the 19th century, important characteristics of religious love and even many
Freudian ideas are rooted in his theory of love. (de Rougemont, 1983) Today, interest in
Plato’s view of love is being renewed (Nussbaum, 2001, chapt. 6; Levy 1979; Vlastos, 1973;
Moravicsik, 1972).
In the popular mind Platonism is associated with the concept of Platonic love, which
is understood today as a non-sexual relationship between heterosexual friends. As the
concept of Platonic love is far from doing justice to Plato’s complex theory of love and sex,
French scholars found it helpful to distinguish between amour platonique (the concept of
non-sexual love) and amour platonicien (love according to Plato). (Gould, 1963, p.1)
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Two rectifications of the popular concept of Platonic love seem necessary in order to
appreciate the relevance of Plato’s theory of love to contemporary problems. The first is
related to the non-sexual aspect of the loving relationship, for Plato’s theory of love includes
sex. The second is related to the heterosexual aspect of the loving relationship. Indeed, Plato
considers love between people solely as a homosexual phenomenon, whereas his discussion
of sex includes both heterosexual and homosexual relationships. The sociological setting of
Platonism explains it: in 5th century Athens, apart from some outstanding exceptions, like
Pericles’ legendary love for Aspasia, men were married for reproductive ends, yet reserved
the term love and the passionate activity of sexual love for homosexual relationships.
(Gonzalez-Reigosa, 1989; O’Connor 1991; Tannahil, 1989). Nevertheless, in my opinion,
nothing in Plato’s philosophy stands in the way of adapting it to modern times, when due to
their education and to political changes, women earned the right to love and to be loved as
equals to men.
When one dispels these misunderstandings related to the popular notion of Platonic
love, one finds a great richness and depth in Plato’s theory of love. In explaining why love is
so important to us and yet why it fails us so often, Plato’s view of love seems applicable to
our time. It is common knowledge that a very high rate of divorce threatens our marriages.
We expect a lot from the sexual passion we call love, but usually end up disappointed when
the romance goes away. Yet we keep getting married, thinking that we are going to be the
ones that will beat the system. If we fail, we change our partner and try again. We end up our
love life as we began it, confused, afraid and as disappointed as we were hopeful.
The malaise that characterizes our love lives finds naturally its way to the
philosophical consulting room. In this paper I shall attempt to show how Plato’s view of love
can be helpful both in dispelling our confusion about love and in proposing some solutions to
our suffering.
A comprehensive account of Plato’s complex theory of love, an exhaustive
presentation of the controversies involved in interpreting it or a thorough discussion of the
problems it creates, all are beyond the scope of this paper. What one may hope to do is to
introduce the reader to some basic characteristics of Plato’s view of love, and then to share
some thoughts about its applicability to our contemporary view of the blessings and
predicaments involved in what we call love.
I shall therefore begin with Plato’s definitions of love (sections 1 and 2), followed by
a description of the path to successful love (section 3). Some difficulties in Plato’s theory of
love will be then explained, as well as their import on the applicability of Plato’ s view to
philosophical counseling (section 4). I shall conclude with some positive applications of
Plato’s conception of love to contemporary problems (section 5).
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1. Love as desire for the perpetual possession of the good
The Symposium is a Platonic dialogue, which describes a symposium on the nature of
love or eros. From the five speeches related there, the one delivered by the great playwright
Aristophanes was perhaps the most popular and influential over the years, and the one most
in accordance with people’s romantic desires. Yet, it is to Socrates, or more precisely to a
priestess named Diotima, whom Socrates allegedly met in the past and who told him the
secrets of love, that Plato gives the honor of explaining his own theory of love.
Aristophanes had explained through a comical and colorful myth that love is our
search for our alter ago, that part of us that will make us whole again. Love is a remedy for
an ancient wound inflicted on us by the gods, which divided us in two as a punishment for
our arrogance. Since those primordial times, each of us is only half of himself or herself,
searching relentlessly for completion.
When Socrates’ turn to speak comes, he refers to Aristophanes’ theory, but adds
something that changes everything: we don’t yearn for the half or the whole unless it is good.
By this he means that the motive force in love is a yearning for goodness, not just
completion. From this he concludes that love is always directed toward what is good, indeed
that goodness itself is the only object of love. When we love something, we are really
seeking to possess the goodness, which is in it. Not temporarily of course, but permanently.
And from there Plato gives his first definition of love: ‘Love is desire for the perpetual
possession of the good.’ (Plato, 1951, p. 86)
Everything in this definition is innovative and interesting. First, ‘love is desire’
already articulates a fundamental presupposition, to wit, that human beings are basically
acquisitive. Our life is a continuous search for things that will satisfy and fulfill our needs,
that will provide happiness. Second, desiring always implies a desire to have what is good.
We desire something because we at least think that it will do us some good. Plato always
explains whatever we do, desire or strive for, as a direct or circuitous means of acquiring
goodness. Since Plato believes that everything, not just human beings, strives for the
attainment of some good, the entire universe seems to be continuously in love. Indeed, it is
love that makes the world go round, without it nothing could exist. But although all things
love and all men are in some sense lovers, few recognize the object of their love, that which
motivates their striving, that which underlies their every desire, that which will ensure
‘perpetual possession’. This object Plato calls the Good or absolute beauty.
Let us say a word about this identification of goodness and beauty. Was not Socrates
good but ugly? Can’t a woman be beautiful and mean? Not really, at least not according to
Plato. To the Greeks, beauty was a function of harmony; it arose from a harmonious
relationship between parts that could not cohere unless they were good for one another. From
this Plato concludes that what is truly beautiful must be good and what is truly good must be
beautiful.
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In order to understand what Plato means by the Good or absolute beauty, some
understanding of his theory of forms is required. Ultimate reality according to Plato is not the
world that we perceive with our senses, but some eternal entities, which he calls, forms
(ideas). As all things that exist are instances of these essences, knowledge about the world is
always knowledge about forms. The universe being not random but purposive, the highest
knowledge shows us how everything strives to attain that which is good for itself and for the
fulfillment of its being. Since all things participate in a single world-order, there must be a
single good for which they yearn. This is the Good or the Beautiful, absolute goodness or
absolute beauty, the highest of the forms, the ultimate category in terms of which all other
realities are to be explained. It is present to all existence in the sense that everything aims for
it. But its being is not limited to anything in nature or to nature itself, and the height of love
consists in knowing it in its metaphysical purity. Lovers are often carried away by a sense of
beauty in the beloved. The greatest love, according to Plato, would disclose the secret beauty
in everything, that hidden harmony which directs all beings toward the best of all possible
ends. We all wish to elope with absolute beauty, or so Plato thinks. For nothing else would
assure the ‘perpetual possession of the good’, because all instances of goodness or beauty are
only partial to the highest form, only flickering hints of true and therefore eternal beauty or
goodness.
As the supreme object of desire, the Good or the beautiful must be present in all
phases of human life. It is what everyone seeks, that for the sake of which everything is
sought. But few people recognize it, for in the confusion of their lives human beings know
that they have desires, but they do not know what will satisfy. When hungry, they eat;
thinking that food is the object of their desire. But once they have eaten, they desire other
things, and so on, till death puts (hopefully) an end to it. They may never realize that all their
striving is motivated by a search for beauty and goodness. To that extent, they live in
ignorance and are incapable of loving properly.
2. Love as desire for immortality
So important is the notion of ‘perpetual possession’ of the Good, that in the
Symposium Socrates modifies his earlier definition: to love beauty is to wish to bring forth in
beauty. To possess it perpetually would be to re-create it endlessly. Consequently, love must
by its very nature be the love of immortality as well as of the Beautiful. That explains why
love is associated with the reproduction of the species. Love issues into a desire to procreate
because procreation is our nearest approach to perpetuity. We cherish our children because
through them we may partake of the future. Also the sacrifices of heroes stem from a love of
fame, which is none other than the love of immortality. Yet the philosopher’s love brings him
as close to immortality as possible. When we contemplate absolute beauty with an unfettered
soul, we are in contact with the eternal in a way that secures perpetuity. We may never bring
forth children nor create works of art or even enact a deed of great importance. Nevertheless,
the philosopher’s achievement will be supreme: ‘he will have the privilege of being beloved
of God, and becoming, if ever a man can, immortal himself.’ (Plato, 1951, p. 95) He is
described in the Republic as follows:
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‘He contemplates a world of unchanging and harmonious order, where reason governs and
nothing can do or suffer wrong; and like one who imitates an admired companion, he cannot
fail to fashion himself in its likeness. So the philosopher, in constant companionship with the
divine order of the world, will reproduce that order in his soul and, so far as man can,
become godlike; though here, as elsewhere, there will be scope for detraction.’ (Plato, 1941,
p. 208)
Also in Phaedrus, the search for absolute good or beauty is considered in terms of
problems that the soul faces in becoming immortal. According to Plato’s dualistic view of
human nature, the soul is immaterial and indestructible, therefore in itself immortal. But once
it descends to the world of nature, it is enclosed with the material casing of a material body.
In its original state the soul lived among the gods, enjoying the true being of the eternal
forms. As they become human beings, most souls forget their divine origin. Immersion in
matter blunts the awareness of their spiritual source. Nevertheless, that past remains as a state
of wholeness to which all men secretly aspire. Though it may act with confusion, the soul
wishes to reunite itself with the realm of essences, particularly that absolute good or beauty
which shimmers through the world of sense but can be properly enjoyed only in its own
domain.
In Plato’s view the nature of the human being is double, an unstable composition of
body and soul, each governed by contrary impulses. Each part struggles to move the human
being in its own direction, both impelled by the dictates of love, but love for different kinds
of objects. The body allows carnal temptations to drag it down to the mire of sensuality. The
soul wants to move upward toward its home among the eternal forms. The latter cares only
about the achievement of excellence, through a pure, noble, spiritual relationship that enables
both lover and beloved to improve in the search for virtue. Yet human nature finds it easier to
follow the lure of the flesh.
In the Symposium love generally appears calm and serene, like Socrates’ character
and like the orderly advance toward absolute beauty. In the Phaedrus it is turbulent and
overwhelming enough to deserve to be called ‘the divine madness’. Madness can be
pathological, resulting from human infirmity. Or it can be, as all creative inspiration is, ‘a
divine release of the soul from the yoke of custom and convention’. True love is madness of
the latter sort and it is highly desirable. When the enlightened spirit finally wrenches itself
from the debasing but pervasive influence of the body, it seems to lose all sense of
equilibrium. Actually, it is only regaining freedom and the true sanity of man.
The sight of beauty, which the soul encountered in its previous state but quickly
forgot, stirs the spirit anew whenever it appears before the lover. Plato very vividly describes
the excitement of the lover who sees in another person an expression of divine beauty:
‘At first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him; then
looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if he were not afraid
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of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a
god; then while he gazes on him there is a sort of reaction, and the shudder passes into an
unusual heat and perspiration.’ (Plato, 1937, p. 225)
We may interpret the reaction as a sexual response, yet this is not what Plato has in
mind. He explains through the language of emotion how the soul grows wings. For
Platonism, such adoration is the beginning of love. When ascending the ladder of love, the
true lover possesses the good by enabling the Good to take possession of him. When this
happens, the lover attains knowledge of reality. The path leading to this state is a life-long
adventure, yet structured through determined stages. The steps in the ladder of love are
described in the next section.
3. The path to successful love
At the beginning of his search, the lover will naturally contemplate physical beauty.
He will eventually fall in love with one particular person, whom he founds particularly
attractive. Love being ephemeral at this stage, the lover will move from one beautiful person
to another. Realizing that physical beauty is not limited to any one beloved, he will become a
lover of all physical beauty. Therefore he ‘will relax the intensity of his passion for one
particular person, because he will realize that such a passion is beneath him and of small
account.’ (Plato, 1951, p. 92) This is a beneficial consequence, in Plato’s opinion, because it
finally liberates us from the tyranny of the senses.
The next stage is the realization that beauty of the soul is more valuable than beauty
of the body. In the company of good and beautiful souls, which might be trapped in ugly
bodies, he will move to the next stage. There he will appreciate social and moral beauty and
contemplate the beauty of institutions and noble activities. The fourth stage is the study of
science and the acquisition of knowledge. There he will be free at last from any attachment to
an individual instance of beauty – whether of body, soul, or society. He will give birth to
‘many beautiful and magnificent sentiments and ideas, until at last, strengthened and
increased in stature by his experience, he catches sight of one unique science whose object is
the beauty of which I am about to speak.’ (p. 93)
This beauty is absolute beauty. It culminates the mysteries of love as it also reveals
the nature of the universe:
‘This beauty is first of all eternal; it neither comes into being nor passes away, neither
waxes nor wanes; next, it is not beautiful in part and ugly in part, nor beautiful at one time
and ugly at another, not beautiful in this relation and ugly in that, nor beautiful here and ugly
there, as varying according to its beholders; nor again will this beauty appear to him like the
beauty of a thought or a science, or like beauty which has its seat in something other than
itself, be it a living thing or the earth or the sky or anything else whatever; he will see it as
absolute, existing alone with itself, unique, eternal, and other beautiful things as partaking of
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it, yet in such a manner that while they come into being and pass away, it neither undergoes
any increase or diminution nor suffers any change.’ (pp. 93-4)
‘The supreme knowledge whose sole object is that absolute beauty’ portrayed above,
is the final step in this platonic ladder. (pp. 93-4) Plato refused to write about that stage,
though he is said to have delivered a lecture on the Good, which left his audience breathless.
Success in love is not promised to everyone: it depends ultimately on mysterious forces that
defy human comprehension.
The five stages outlined above indicate the direction for the ideal lover, as described
in the Symposium. In the Republic, however, dozens of pages are dedicated to the education
of the philosopher, which include moral training, scientific education and spiritual discipline.
One difference, however, between the view of the ideal lover presented in the Symposium
and the Republic and the one presented in Phaedrus is worth mentioning here: in the former,
there is a new decision that it is not necessary, or perhaps even possible, for the philosopher
to fall out of love and cease to need his special friend. If they are truly lovers of wisdom, the
only intercourse that will appeal to them is rational exploration together. If, however, they
are men of the second order, their constant proximity may be too much for them and they
will find a sexual expression for their love. Being essentially good men, they will indulge in
sexual pleasures only very rarely, understanding the regrettable effects that these have on the
freedom of the mind in the search of the forms.
Plato invested great efforts in trying to develop a method that would help us clarifying
our desire, and direct it overtly and authentically towards its real objective. For till we
realize that all our striving is motivated by a search for beauty and goodness, we live in
ignorance and are incapable of loving properly.
4. Difficulties in Plato’s theory of love
There are many difficulties in Plato’s theory of love: there is an ambivalent attitude
towards sex that seems to be inherent in Plato’s thought; there are some contradictions in his
attitude towards homosexuality, and of course, his attitude towards women is utterly
problematic. Interesting as these issues might be, I shall not address them here. Rather, I shall
concentrate on the relationship between rationality and emotion in Plato’s theory of love.
Two possible interpretations of this issue seem to me worth mentioning: one is that
Plato’s highest love is predominantly intellectual, possibly fervent but always a form of
rational activity. His ideal lover leaves emotionality behind, his love being not an attempt to
express or purify sensuous feelings but rather to suppress them by sheer rationality. Even
when true love is described as a divine madness, emotions merely attend the condition,
bespeaking the eagerness of the soul to enter into relationship with absolute beauty. The
relationship itself is intellectual, the attainment of wisdom, of knowledge about the highest
form. (Singer, 1984, vol. 1, pp.72-3)
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The other interpretation is that there is in Plato a new view of the nature of rationality.
As men become more splendid examples of what men should be, they may indeed loose their
need for irrational attachment, like consolation, stimulation and help, but not because they
feel the absence of desire; it is because they have come to desire that alone which is truly
rewarding. Men think that to be rational is to be able coolly to discount all passions, but
rationality really consists in a passion so powerful and happy that what most men conceive
passions for is finally seen to be really irrational, that is, not rewarding at all. (Gould, 1963,
pp. 164-5)
I think that the latter view represents more faithfully Plato’s intention. Plato’s theory
of love seems, therefore, successful in creating a very special synthesis of rationality and
emotion. Yet, before considering its applicability to counsellees’ problems, there is one
obstacle to overcome: is this synthesis of rationality and emotion possible only for the
(Platonic) philosopher? For, underlying all difficulties in Platonic love, there resides a
fundamental paradox. As Irving Singer formulates it:
‘Everything in nature is motivated by eros; but nothing can ‘really’ gratify its love
within the limits of nature itself. That is why the true Platonic lover must be a philosopher. In
being the desire for the perpetual possession of the good, love strives for union with a
metaphysical principle that does not exist (in nature or anywhere else) and shows itself only
to philosophic intuition. In Platonism true love and true rationality coincide. As the basis of
both knowledge and valuation, the Good is the only object worthy of being loved or capable
of giving knowledge about reality. Consequently, no search for natural goods could possibly
satisfy the definition of love. That requires a highly intellectual, purely rational, nonsensuous striving for transcendental insight, a love of wisdom which may have little or no
relation to a love of life. Starting with a vision of everything being in love, Plato ends up with
the incredible suggestion that only the (Platonic) philosopher really is.’ (Singer, 1984, vol. 1,
pp. 83-4)
This paradox raises more clearly than anything else does the question of the relevance
of Plato’s ideas on love for everyone, including counselees who might not be platonic
philosophers. In the next section, the issue of the practicability of Plato’s theory will be
addressed.
5. Applying Plato’s theory of love to contemporary problems
I shall begin by stating the obvious: though I love challenges, I dislike impossibilities;
in other words, I would not have chosen this subject unless I had thought that one can learn a
great deal from Plato’s theory of love. Yet, I admit that the philosophical consultant for
common problems of love might more easily apply any other philosopher’s view on love
(with the possible exception of the Stoics). (Nussbaum, 1994, pp. 359-401; Nussbaum, 2001;
Vlastos, 1973)
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Before addressing the question of how Plato can be applied to the counseling, I would
like to address some preliminary questions. First, does the counselor have to be a Platonist in
order to use Plato’s theory of love in consultation? Second, does the counselee have to
endorse Platonism in order to be helped by Plato’s theory of love? If by ‘being a Platonist’
we understand knowing or believing that Plato’s account of the forms is true, and therefore
that the good is a metaphysical entity, then I believe that the answer to both questions is
negative.
Allow me to answer the first question according to my own experience as a
philosophical counselor. I cannot know that Platonism is true anymore than I can know, for
example, that Spinoza’s or Schopenhauer’s philosophies are true. I do suspend my judgement
about the truth of their metaphysics. But then, I have also to suspend my judgement about the
truth of their respective ethics, and of the various other interesting insights on life they might
offer. For, as philosophies are usually coherent theories, their respective ethics follow from
their metaphysics. It is true that, with the help of experience and age, we seem to have more
say in matters of ethics and of what I referred to as ‘other interesting insights on life’ than on
metaphysics,. But we still don’t know if these are true. Nevertheless, I use in consultation not
only Socratic tools aimed at giving birth to the counselee’s own ideas; or analytic tools aimed
at clarifying her thought. I also use philosophical theories from the general corpus of the
history of philosophy, which I think are relevant to the issue at hand. I hope, by using these
theories, to enrich the counselee with interesting, deep and challenging views regarding the
subject that we investigate. I might suggest some reading of these philosophies; we may
challenge Plato’s or Spinoza’s metaphysical premises and discuss the relations they have to
the ideas that the counselee found interesting. But I cannot endorse any of these philosophies
in the sense of saying that their metaphysics is true or that their view of love is true.
Moreover, were I to believe that any of these philosophies is true, my opinion is that I ought
not try to convince the counselee of its truth.
This is one way of doing philosophical counseling. Of course, other counselors might
handle the problem of using speculative theories in philosophical consultations quite
differently. They may even abstain from using them, because of the very problem of
establishing their veracity. Yet, I still think that Plato’s views on love are important, even if
false. Therefore, personally I have a negative answer to the question: does the counselor have
to endorse Platonism in order to make use of Platonic views in a consultation?
As to the second question, namely, does the counselee have to endorse Platonism in
order to be helped by Plato’s theory of love? I believe the answer is still negative. Some of
the argument is similar to that presented in the previous answer: the counselee, no more than
the counselor, can know if Plato is right in his account of the world. But she can tell if some
of the things Plato says make sense to her, if they describe accurately the way she feels, if
they disclose important aspects of her suffering or of her confusion about love. In short, she
can know if she would like to listen to what Plato has to say, better, if she would like to begin
a conversation with him, if his thought is worth the effort of communicating with it. This
communication would take place through discussing his views with the help of the counselor,
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through reading some of his texts, through thinking alone along some of his insights. But
what if Plato is wrong? Is there any value in discussing with someone whose views are
wrong? Does the sole value of such a conversation lie in disclosing the other’s errors? Or
rather, are we enriched by having been challenged in our own views, by having been exposed
to someone else’s views, and even more so if these views are deep, interesting and bearing on
important aspects of the human condition? Plato might be wrong, but his mistake is profound
in that it reveals some needs that we all share and makes a very ambitious attempt to meet
them. As we do not know the truth about love, we might as well consider various views
about it. Plato being the deep and wise thinker that he is, his view of love is not the last of
them: neither in importance, nor relevance, nor interest, as I hoped to show above.
If neither counselor nor counselee have to endorse Platonism in order to make use of
Platonic ideas, let’s ask the following practical question: which counselees and which
problems would best benefit from Plato’s views on love? And from which views? In my
experience, there are many possibilities of introducing Plato’s thought on love in a consulting
setting and of applying it to various predicaments. I will present three general contexts in
which I have used Plato’s thoughts on love. Of course, as counselors are required to be
creative in their craft, other counselors might use Plato differently.
I shall begin with a short account of how one aspect of Plato’s theory of love may be
used in the context of parental love. More specifically, how it may help in easing the tension
between parental love, as frequently encountered, and grown-up children’s expectations.
Second, I shall briefly introduce some interesting Platonic thoughts concerning sex and its
relation to beauty, and shall question the applicability of those insights to the case of the nonvulgar Don Juan. Finally, I shall dwell at length on what, in my opinion, is Plato’s strongest
point: his criticism of the prevailing fashion in matters of love. I am referring to the
Romantic tradition of love, which contends that we can all be saved by loving passionately
another human being. Let’s begin with the relatively easy issue of parental love.
A. Parental love and grown-up children’s expectations
‘The relations between parents and children’ writes Bertrand Russell in the Conquest
of Happiness ‘are in nine out of ten cases a source of dissatisfaction for both sides, and in
ninety-nine out of hundred a source of suffering and agony at least to one of the sides… The
adult, who wants happy relations with his children, or wants to provide them with a life of
happiness, must think deeply about fatherhood…’ (Russell, 1930, p.120) Plato’s view of
love as love of immortality, and love of immortality as the key to parental love can be helpful
in discussing parental love, its ambitions, its shortcomings, especially the feasibility of its
ideal unconditionality. Grown-up children often complain about the fact that their parents are
too protective, do not see them as autonomous adults and generally fail to recognize that they
have a right to live their life as they choose. What may appear at first sight as disappointing
shortcomings of parental love, might be better understood as inherent characteristics of this
love, provided that we see its essence or at least its main characteristic as love of immortality.
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B. Sex and its relation to beauty: the extreme case of the non-vulgar Don Juan
According to Plato, sex is a completely natural but somewhat unimaginative device to
get what we want. To act when we see beauty as if we wanted children is not the most
intelligent response to it. Beauty awakes in us a much deeper longing, of which we should at
least be aware and which we should at most fulfill. Plato proposes an interpretation of the
meaning of beauty that cannot be exhausted by any amount of sexual relations. Even if we do
not agree with him, his views challenge us to figure out for ourselves what is so disturbing in
beauty.
More specifically, Plato can be helpful in the case of the non-vulgar Don Juan. He is the
type of man that doesn’t look vulgarly for sheer conquest of an endless number of women,
but for a je-ne-sais-quoi that tortures him. In Plato’s language, he is stuck in the second
stage, moving endlessly from one beauty to another. As we have seen, Plato’s philosophy
gives a compelling account of our fascination with beauty, by identifying our yearning as a
desire to bring forth in beauty. Unfortunately, even experts on physical beauty, who should
be delighted by the variety, will still be unsatisfied, or so Plato predicts. His diagnosis is
that their yearning for absolute beauty will be frustrated. To quote Santayana on this second
platonic stage: ‘all beauties attract by suggesting the ideal and then fail to satisfy by not
fulfilling it’. (Singer, 1956, p. 99) Plato’s analysis sometimes rings a bell for the non-vulgar
Don Juan and helps him clarify his real goal. When he realizes that this goal won’t be
achieved by the means he is taking, change might occur. This is especially valuable because
as far as I know, we do not have too many philosophical sources for clarifying the
phenomenon of Don Juan, the only other philosophical source being Kierkegaard.
(Kierkegaard, 1978)
C. Salvation through love of another person: the Romantic
The richness and depth of Plato’s theory of love allows us the choice of being
impressed by its crudest aspects (the love of immortality as the key to parental love and as an
explanation for a hero’s behavior); or by its subtlest ones (the ultimate dissatisfaction linked
with sexual relationships, even in a loving relationship). Yet its edge lies somewhere else.
Though Plato’s theory might be irrelevant for anyone who happens to be in love, its
importance appears as soon as there is trouble in paradise and even more so, when a love
affair is over, or simply when the affair is not over, but love is. Allow me to explain this
point by relying on the analysis of love of a great psychologist, Theodore Reik.
Reik viewed love as arising out of dissatisfaction with oneself and one’s lot in life.
‘People seek out love and especially passion’ explains R.J. Sternberg in summarizing Reik’s
view on love ‘when life is disappointing and when they need someone else to fill the void
within’. Moreover,
‘Some people seek salvation in love, much as other people do in religion, hoping to
find in another the perfection they cannot find in themselves. At first, they may well think
that salvation is at hand. Early in a relationship, their partner may indeed seem to be just
what they are looking for, and their being in love is tantamount to being saved – from the
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world and from themselves. But eventually disillusionment is almost certain to set in. They
discover two facts. First, the other person has flaws: they cannot maintain the illusion of
perfection is the face of ever more evidence that the partner is not, in fact, perfect. Second,
no other human can save them, not even the love of their life.’
What are the options then? According to the same source,
‘Perhaps one can save oneself, but one cannot expect or even ask this of another.
People have either to adjust to a new kind of love or else forever live with the disappointment
of knowing that they cannot find salvation through love of another. Of course, some people
take a third course: they try to find someone else to save them and once again reenter the
cycle of high hopes followed by disappointment.’ (Sternberg, 1998, p. 126; Reik, 1944).
What we can learn from Plato is that we do not need to give up our longing for
salvation through love. The longing can be fulfilled if directed towards other objects, that is,
not human beings. This hunger called eros should be acknowledged and could even be
fulfilled when supplied with the right nutrition. We need not emphasize the contemplation of
a metaphysical idea of the beautiful, the good and the true as the sole way to fulfillment. We
may choose to stress the idea that the complete fulfillment of eros may pass, yet cannot be
attained, through another human being. After all, Plato points to the transcendent nature of
eros and love, a theme which, following him, Christianity will develop. (Singer, 1984, vol. 1,
chap. 9; Nygren, 1982) And of course, in order to see that Plato could make sense, we have
to doubt the assumptions of the prevalent and fashionable tradition of love in which most of
us partake, namely, the Romantic. (Singer, 1984, vol.2, chapts. 12-13; Gould, 1963, chapts. 1
and 9) That is, we have to re-evaluate a human being’s capacity of saving us, just by loving
us and being loved by us. Allow me to elaborate.
According to my consulting experience, most people experience the end of a
relationship or the death of love in a relationship as a failure. They blame themselves, or their
partners, or both. However, when they recover from the mourning, they search for a new
partner, hoping that this time the relationship won’t fail them or that they won’t fail the
relationship. This hope is usually unfounded, because no real understanding has been
reached, no real work done, nothing that would ensure that the ‘failure’ won’t repeat itself.
When confronted with Plato’s definition of love (‘love is desire for the perpetual
possession of the good’), most people say: yes, this is exactly what I wanted; what I still
want. Moreover, the ‘failure’ is described in those terms: the possession was not ‘perpetual’,
or there was no ‘possession’ contrarily to what was expected, or the partner or the
relationship was no ‘good’ any more.
What most people do not realize is that they cannot both hold this definition of love
and expect a human being to fulfill it. If we keep in mind the stages of the ladder of love
described above (section 3), we understand why changing partners will not help us in the
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long run. To repeat Plato’s argument, the love of one particular beautiful body is the first step
towards fulfilling our desire that the good will be always in our possession. Our incapacity of
being satisfied at this stage stems from the nature of the true object of our search, from that
which we are really looking for, independently of the partner we chose. Therefore, sooner or
later we will be out of love with this particular beautiful body, that is, beyond the first stage
of the ladder.
Some of us repeat this stage, by falling in love again and again, but leave as soon as
love is over. Some reach the second stage, by moving endlessly from one beauty to another,
as we have seen above. Few people realize that there might be something beyond the second
stage. Plato explains how transcending the limitations inherent in a relationship with a person
might fulfill our desire for the good and the beautiful. When we truly understand the
limitations of all human beings in fulfilling our needs, we stop resenting the particular
specimen with which we are living. We adapt our expectations from human beings to that
which can be obtained within the human sphere. For this very reason we can remain faithful
to our original desire, which Plato’s analysis helped us clarify as aiming beyond what a
particular individual can give us.
The limited capacity of human sexual passion, which we call love, to bring us
everlasting love, can be a blessing if we understand why it fails us. For then we might look
for fulfillment by transcending the relationship, without ending it unnecessarily. Moreover,
only if we keep insisting on fulfilling our desire for the perpetual possession of the good, we
have a chance of realizing our dream of happiness. Yet, it is important to stress that we need
not endorse Plato’s interpretation of what that good really is. Suffice it to feel that his
characterization of what we desire or his definition of love echoes our true needs. The rest
might be a personal quest.
A last point is worth emphasizing. In his theory of love, Plato gives us a diagnosis of
human misery by explaining to us what we really want and how we err in searching for it.
Yet, his diagnosis is optimistic in so far as he identifies ignorance and confusion as the
sources of our suffering. For ignorance and confusion can be amended either through the
compelling invitation of his philosophy or through our own determination to further our
understanding of the human condition. In order to appreciate Plato’s optimism, let’s take
another example of a diagnosis of why love fails us. Schopenhauer’s diagnosis, for example,
is a pessimistic one, in so far as he sees in us a passive instrument of the Will that underlies
reality. Our passionate love is no more than a devise of nature for reproducing the species.
Once our work is done, the love we had for our mate leaves us and there is nothing we can do
about it. (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 241)
But Plato tells us, that everything begins where we used to think that everything
ended.
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92
Claudio José María Altisen es argentino, nació en la ciudad de
Rosario, en el mes de Mayo del año 1968. Licenciado en
Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales; Profesor en Filosofía y
Ciencias de la Educación; Master en Educación Psicoinformática;
Diseñador gráfico y Mediador. Actualmente trabaja como
investigador del Área Educativa del CERIR (Centro de Estudios
en Relaciones Internacionales de Rosario, en la Sede de Gobierno
de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina). Profesor en
importantes Universidades Argentinas e Institutos de Nivel
Superior ha desarrollado una nutrida experiencia en el diseño y
dictado de Cursos de Capacitación Docente en ejercicio. También
ha realizado trabajos de Consultoría Educativa para el Gobierno
argentino y para Organismos internacionales. Miembro de la
Comisión de Bioética de la Fundación Fraternitas. Se ha
desempeñado como columnista en medios de comunicación.
Autor de Asesoría filosófica y mediación, Libros en Red, 2004;
Epistemología, Libros en Red, 2001; Diseños de multimedias
educativas, Libros en red, 2001; Alfabetización visual, Libros en
red 2001.
LA ASESORÍA FILOSÓFICA EN EL LEGADO DE
PLATÓN Y ARISTÓTELES
Claudio Altisen
Buenos Aires, Argentina
1) Platón: el socrático por excelencia.
Aristokles, más conocido por su apodo: Platón, tenía 29 años cuando Sócrates, su
maestro durante décadas, fue condenado a muerte. A posteriori del deceso de su mentor
Platón fundó en el año 385 AC su propia escuela de Filosofía en las afueras de Atenas, en el
predio de unos jardines arbolados que debían su nombre al héroe mitológico griego
Academos. Allí, en la Academia de Platón, la conversación viva era la manera más
importante de filosofar. La meta de esos diálogos filosóficos era recorrer el camino que va
desde los conceptos vagos hasta las verdaderas ideas que se encuentran detrás de los
fenómenos de la naturaleza. La pretensión, en definitiva, era que el diálogo permitiera captar
la luminosa realidad que se encuentra más allá de la opacidad del mundo que nos es dado
ver... Para lograrlo, en la Academia hurgaban en las ideas habituales de la gente, tratando de
transitar a partir de ellas hacia la verdadera sabiduría.
También hay que señalar que Platón realiza en la Academia un primer intento de
sistematización del pensamiento. En efecto, la enseñanza de Sócrates era poco dogmática y
sus discípulos la desarrollaron luego en muy diversas direcciones, adhiriéndose a ciertos
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aspectos fragmentarios del pensamiento del maestro y alterándolo en parte. Ante ello, Platón
intenta reunir en un sistema original todo el conjunto de pensamientos que los filósofos
habían dispersado.
Platón se esfuerza por construir un sistema doctrinal que, sin embargo, resulta
prematuro, pues su modo de exposición es más estético que científico. Por momentos
manifiesta vaguedad e impresición, procediendo por metáforas y símbolos. Aunque no llegó
a ser un filósofo del todo sistemático, su labor académica sentó las bases para la posibilidad
de un ulterior filosofar ordenado en diversas disciplinas. Se ha de señalar entonces que, más
que un sistema definitivo, el platonismo fue un movimiento transitorio hacia una
sistematización superior a la que él mismo había logrado. En efecto, la filosofía platónica no
persigue propiamente un fin principalmente teórico. Más bien se ha de señalar que Platón fue
un hombre con un concepto muy ambicioso de la Filosofía. Mediante su temprana labor
sistematizadora pretendía esbozar un itinerario para lograr la purificación y la salvación de la
vida de los hombres. Como en su maestro, también en Platón se manifiesta el afán por
encontrar en la Filosofía un camino de superación personal. Tal camino consistirá en trabajar
por desencadenarse de todo aquello que nos limita, para poder llegar a ser los humanos
plenos que idealmente estamos llamados a ser.
Siguiendo a Sócrates, Platón se aventuró al camino interior propuesto por su maestro
(“conócete a ti mismo”) y arribó a un puerto de ideas dominantes que no resplandecen afuera
—en el mundo sombrío de las meras apariencias sensibles— sino adentro, en la luminosidad
interior del alma. Luego, para ser libre, el hombre está moralmente obligado a purificarse de
los requerimientos distractores de un tipo de vida social que lo sujeta a pautas engañosas que
bien podrían compararse a las cadenas que retienen a un prisionero en el fondo de una oscura
caverna. Una vez liberado, el prisionero ha de trabajar por ascender remontando su propia
existencia hacia la claridad de una Luz estable que brilla más allá del devenir de lo sensible.
En efecto, Platón —siguiendo a Sócrates— está persuadido de que el verdadero saber no
puede referirse a lo que cambia, sino a lo permanente; no a lo múltiple, sino a lo uno. Ese
algo invariable y uno lo había encontrado Sócrates en el Logos del concepto que sale a luz
mediante el dia-logos. Ahora bien, como lo permanente e inmutable de los conceptos no se
encuentra en el mundo de lo sensible (singularizado y múltiple), Platón postula otro mundo;
esto es, el denominado mundo de las ideas o mundo inteligible, del cual el mundo sensible no
es más que copia e imitación. Estos dos mundos —el de lo sensible y el de las ideas—
definen dos órdenes del ser, de los cuales se siguen dos modos principales de conocimiento:
la doxa (mera opinión) y la epistéme (ciencia, sabiduría). El conocimiento propiamente dicho
es el de la ciencia, y para alcanzarlo el alma debe: primero purificarse de las opiniones (de la
mera imaginación y de las creencias) para, luego, ascender hacia el conocimiento más
esclarecido (el entendimiento de las ideas matemáticas, y la inteligencia de las ideas morales
y metafísicas).
Los caminos para lograr esta purificación y ascención son dos: el amor y la
metafísica.
a) Por medio del amor: Atraído por la Belleza —por lo que hay de más noble— el
espíritu supera las tendencias que lo empujan hacia lo bajo, hacia lo meramente sensible. El
vuelo de este amor está en la búsqueda de la belleza y del saber. En efecto, la ascención del
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conocimiento viene puesta en marcha por el amor (eros); es decir, por su ansia de perfección.
Ese ansia proviene del hecho de que el alma se había hallado ya una vez en la serena
contemplación de las ideas, en su preexistencia; es decir, antes de ser desterrada a esta
existencia corporal. El conocimiento verdadero es, por tanto, recuerdo (anámnesis), una
reminiscencia.
b) Por medio de la metafísica: Aquí el hombre recupera la visión pura de las cosas
mediante un discurso conceptual, dialéctico. Como ya señaláramos, este discurso es un modo
de razonar de tipo estético, por medio de armonías y proporciones.
Dialéctica (dialektiké) significa literalmente el arte de conversar y en Platón es el arte de
iluminar progresivamente mediante discurso y contradicción la esencia de las cosas. La
dialéctica es así un proceso de esclarecimiento de la esencia de las cosas por el
entendimiento, en un movimiento de vaivén entre la sensibilidad y la razón: el conocimiento
comienza con ocasión de la experiencia sensible en el mundo, pero no se refiere a esto
mismo, sino que es una elevación del alma espiritual (nous) a la esfera de lo suprasensible y
así es un desasimiento o purificación (kathársis) de lo sensible, para llegar a la visión
(theoría) puramente intelectual de la unidad esencial que rige nuestras particulares
existencias.
Para Platón el filósofo persigue la sabiduría juntamente con otros hombres, pero no
puede esclarecer su tema en una forma sistemática asegurada de antemano, sino que sólo
puede tratar de dilucidarlo dando vueltas en torno a él en la forma interrogante del diálogo
abierto.
En suma: echar luz sobre los pliegues más hondos de la vida para poder remontarla hacia las
cumbres de sus posibilidades de realización, es la labor más noble del filósofo.
¿Por qué el diálogo? Pues bien, el logos es un concepto sumamente importante en
Sócrates y en Platón, por cuanto no es mera expresión verbal (la palabra dicha por alguien),
sino que es, a la vez, el medio que nos vincula con: a) lo que está en lo alto y que pertenece a
los dioses, y b) el que nos encadena a lo que queda en la tierra y permanece con el común de
los hombres. El Logos es, como el amor, una conexión y una reunión (leguein); es decir, una
especie de intermediario entre los hombres y los dioses, encargado de transmitir a unos los
mensajes de los otros. El Logos es, a la vez, rico y pobre, aprisionado entre lo inefable y la
charla trivial donde se degrada. Su sentido original es sumamente amplio: Logos, por un
lado, es la reunión de lo existente en el Ser y, por otro, el lugar de la participación del hombre
en el ser. Es la referencia rectora que permite tomar posición con respecto a sí mismo y al
mundo.
Nótese que todas las obras de Platón son Diálogos, a excepción de la Apología de
Sócrates y de las Cartas. Con el método dialéctico —dialogando— se va operando un
ahondamiento de contacto vivo por la palabra (logos) que —sin dogmatismos— pretende
llevar al hombre al encuentro con el Ser que él es, en un ejercicio reglado de búsqueda
común (dia-logos filosófico).
De este modo, la dialéctica (entendida ya en Platón como razonamiento metódico y
ajustado lógicamente) es un esfuerzo para participar en lo que viene de lo alto y, en el
momento en que esa participación se esclarece mediante el diálogo, se pretende provocar en
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el interlocutor una anámnesis o recuerdo capaz de: 1) hacerle reencontrar la Luz que su alma
contempló frente a frente antes de nacer en esta vida —cuando acompañaba a los dioses en
su cortejo— y 2) reunirse con ella al iluminar con su Luz el caminar cotidiano por esta vida.
De aquella Luz, el alma —desde que perdió las alas y cayó prisionera en este cuerpo, en el
dominio de lo sensible— no tiene más que un mero vislumbre que el Filósofo le ha de ayudar
a esclarecer.
2) Aristóteles: meticuloso discípulo de un excepcional maestro.
Desde los 18 años de edad y durante 20 años Aristóteles fue alumno de la Academia
de Platón.
Después de la muerte de su maestro abandonó Atenas por varios años. Fue el
preceptor de Alejandro. Cuando éste comenzó a reinar regresó a la ciudad y fundó su escuela
en el Liceo (gimnasio dedicado a Apolo Licio), donde enseñaba paseándose con sus alumnos
en los parajes sombreados del lugar.
Desmontando el sistema de su maestro supo poner en orden los principios que Platón
había descubierto. Con mesura y buen juicio potenció todo lo que en el platonismo llevaba en
sí un principio de vida. Salvó de la fragmentación todo lo bueno y recto que había en Platón
y en los demás pensadores de Grecia. De este modo llevó a término la gran obra de síntesis
que Platón había intentado prematuramente.
Lógico riguroso y realista siempre despierto, supo pensar ampliamente sin por ello
proceder a ciegas, con desorden o incoherencia. Fue un filósofo meticuloso y exhaustivo,
pero no fue un pensador rígido, sino que siempre se mantuvo flexible frente a lo que él
mismo llamó "la fuerza de los hechos". Era plenamente conciente de que las cosas de la
lógica no son sin más la lógica de las cosas. La estructura del saber acerca de las cosas, no es
la estructura de las cosas mismas. En efecto, el mapa no es el territorio...
Ahora bien, para Aristóteles toda ciencia es un decir de las cosas. En tal sentido, toda
ciencia se sitúa en el plano del Logos y debe regirse por los logoi; es decir, por principios
lógicos. Siendo el hombre un ser vivo que tiene logos, su relación con la realidad
fundamental se encuentra inexorablemente mediatizada por la palabra racional que la
expresa. Dicho de otro modo: el modo más excelente para el hombre de tener acceso a la
comprensión de las cosas es a través de la palabra racional (logos). Sin embargo, no debe
absolutizarse la función mediadora del logos. Su absolutización e instrumentación utilitaria
fue empresa de los sofistas en tiempos de Sócrates. Anteriormente, identificar el Logos con el
último fundamento de lo real había sido la aspiración sublime de Heráclito. Aristóteles y
Platón, empero, descubrieron una nueva dimensión del Logos. Precisamente, ni se reduce el
Logos a ser mera palabra del hombre, ni se identifica con la mismísima realidad. Platón y
Aristóteles rechazan así la subjetivación sofística del Logos y la objetivación presocrática del
mismo. Ni subjetivo ni objetivo, el Logos es de otra dimensión: es el elemento propicio
donde armoniza y se torna posible tanto la manifestación de lo real como la palabra
significativa del hombre, señala Hernán Zucchi. Es como el medio en el cual la revelación de
las cosas coincide con la intencionalidad de la conciencia. Y continúa Zucchi: Desde el punto
de vista de la conciencia el logos es su expresión, desde el punto de vista del ser es su
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apertura o manifestación. Pero ni se reduce a aquél ni se somete a ésta. En otras palabras,
puede decirse que, en el lenguaje, el Ser y el hombre se encuentran.
Aristóteles abandona el espíritu abstracto e idealista de Platón para fundar un tipo de
saber concreto y realista. Su objeto de estudio ya no es el ser suprasensible, sino el ente en
cuanto ente; es decir: el ser en todos sus matices, en su mutiplicidad y variedad concreta.
Aristóteles estudia los caracteres universales del ente en cuanto ente, pero su universalidad
no reside en la existencia de un abstracto (una Idea presente en otro mundo), sino en el hecho
de existir una ousía primera y concreta que asume el rasgo de fundamento o causa de todos
los demás seres. Lo que existe no es una Idea, sino una realidad fundamental sustentadora.
Ousía es el sujeto de una proposición. Es el sub-jectum, lo sub-stante, lo que está echado
debajo, el sustrato de los accidentes. Es el hogar (estía) de todas las cosas, lo que las reune, el
lugar donde moran.
Desde el punto de vista lingüístico la ousía es el foco significativo que da sentido a las
otras categorías. Es, como pretendía Sócrates, el objeto primario de la inteligencia. Ousía es
el principio, es la presencia de una realidad en torno a la cual giran las demás predicaciones.
Ousía no es la cosa concreta que existe, sino aquello sin lo cual las cosas no pueden existir
concretamente. Ousía es lo existencialmente primero, lo que es lo mismo en lo que no es
igual.
En el plano lingüístico ousía es el sujeto de la atribución y, en el plano físico, el
sustrato del cambio. Es lo que permanece presente en el pasar... Ser es ser presencia.
Presencia por manifestación y ocultación. Presencia independiente del pasar y, como tal,
inasible para los pensadores que también van pasando. La ousía representa los diferentes
sentidos del Ser, pero no lo agota. El Ser desborda a las categorías, incluso a la primera y
fundamental; es decir, a la ousía. Por eso el Ser incita contínuamente al filósofo a una
renovada búsqueda que permanece siempre abierta e indefinida, y que —siendo siempre
perfectible— no puede ser jamás clausurada por los instrumentos lógicos de los cuales el
pensador se vale. El Ser, entonces, no puede ser nunca completamente aprehendido ni
definido, sino que presenta siempre un carácter absolutamente aporemático.
Ahora bien, si lo existente es tan amplio y lo cognoscible es tan profundo, ¿para qué
intenta el hombre conocer una realidad respecto de la cual sabe que siempre lo superará?
Pues bien, para Aristóteles toda vida humana tiene en sí misma —por el solo hecho de
existir— un sentido que debe ser alcanzado. La existencia del hombre tiene un fin absoluto y
definitivo, a cuya consecución deben orientarse todos sus esfuerzos cotidianos. El fin
supremo del hombre es la felicidad (eudaimonía), razón por la cual toda la reflexión
metafísica aristotélica termina siendo aplicada a la problemática antropológica y moral en
procura de ayudar a cubrir la distancia que media entre existencia y plenitud. Es decir, entre
la mera naturaleza humana concreta como manojo de posibilidades y la perfección última
que es posible para esa naturaleza en su existencia.
Por otra parte, si hablamos de un fin supremo, entonces estamos diciendo que ese fin
ha de ser tan abarcador que todos los demás fines se han de constituir como medios para
alcanzarlo, sin que él sea un medio para ningún otro fin. Pero también hemos dicho que ese
fin supremo es la felicidad. Consecuentemente, lo importante a considerar en este planteo
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será la conducta del hombre que se determina a alcanzar la felicidad; es decir, lo que el
hombre ha de obrar para lograr ser feliz.
Cabe preguntarse: ¿Qué es lo que hace feliz a un hombre? Para Aristóteles no será
otra cosa más que el desarrollo pleno de su actividad natural más específica, cuya
consecución conllevará un placer (hedoné). Y esa actividad específica no es cualquier
actividad, sino propiamente la actividad intelectual, ya que la inteligencia es lo que distingue
al hombre de los demás seres. Por lo tanto, la felicidad supone el pleno despliegue de la
potencia racional del hombre.
Escribe Aristóteles en su obra Etica a Nicómaco: "Lo que es propio de cada uno por
naturaleza, es también lo más excelente y lo más agradable para cada uno; para el hombre lo
será, por tanto, la vida conforme al intelecto, ya que eso es primariamente el hombre. Esta
vida será también, por consiguiente, la más feliz".
La distancia que media entre existencia concreta y plenitud del hombre, es, pues, la
distancia entre la naturaleza humana y la culminación operativa (intelectual) adecuada a ella.
Según Aristóteles es tarea obligada de todo ser humano "hacer todo lo que esté a nuestro
alcance por vivir de acuerdo con lo más excelente que hay en nosotros", pues "sería indigno
de un hombre no buscar la ciencia (o la felicidad) a él proporcionada".
Por otra parte, el éxito de esa búsqueda de la felicidad no está garantizado a priori de
ninguna manera, ya que no es un camino desprovisto de dificultades. Sin resistencia no
habría excelencia, ya que la resistencia dinamiza la actividad, por cuanto el hombre
naturalmente in-siste para superar aquello que le re-siste. En su devenir, una persona desea
poder llegar a ser lo que todavía no es (dynamis o potencia). Eso que todavía no es, es objeto
actual de la inteligencia y se encuentra al final del camino a modo de meta, pero ya al inicio
de ese camino el fin deseado que tiene por delante determina el dinamismo desplegado para
conseguirlo. Finalmente, una vez alcanzado el final del camino, la persona que ha llegado a
ser lo que antes no era alcanza la felicidad (eudaimonía). Diremos entonces, que el fin es lo
primero en el orden de la intención (potencia) y lo último en el orden de la consecución
(acto).
Todo hombre tiende a la felicidad, y esa tendencia es su deseo natural, que tiene por
objeto lo bueno para la naturaleza. Pero Aristóteles hace un señalamiento de especial
relevancia: que ser hombre no consiste propiamente en desear, sino en alcanzar la plenitud de
las operaciones específicas de su naturaleza intelectual, que ese deseo dinamiza. Para reforzar
esta idea, apuntemos aquí que no es éste un dinamismo desiderativo de índole biológico;
dado que, aunque el hombre esté sometido al ciclo biológico, el cumplimiento de su deseo
orgánico no indica en ningún caso que se haya cumplido el trayecto hasta su ser en plenitud,
ni tampoco que haya fracasado sin más. Sin embargo, Aristóteles puntualiza —como ya lo
hiciera Sócrates— que el descontrol del deseo orgánico (la intemperancia) incide sobre el
intelecto en la forma precisa de anularlo. Pues el acaparamiento de la atención por los objetos
del deseo orgánico implica una abdicación del pensamiento, amputando del horizonte vital
las realidades supremas accesibles sólo al pensamiento.
He aquí, pues, una de las formas en que la vida humana puede fracasar. Ya que si el
trayecto entre existencia y plenitud del hombre ha de ser cubierto fundamentalmente por la
actividad del intelecto, en la misma medida en que el descontrol del deseo orgánico bloquea
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el intelecto, queda interceptado el itinerario hacia la culminación en plenitud que es propia
del hombre.
Es verdad que en el hombre existe una pluralidad de instancias operativas, pero
ninguna de ellas puede identificarse exclusiva y excluyentemente con el hombre mismo.
Dicho de otra manera, el hombre no se reduce a ninguna de sus instancias operativas: no es
sólo sensibilidad, ni sólo intelectualidad, no consiste en ninguna de ellas, ni tampoco en la
mera suma de todas. Ser hombre es una unidad. Por tanto, no consiste fundamentalmente en
las instancias operativas de índole biológica y menos en una sola de ellas, como por ejemplo
la sexualidad. No obstante, entre todas las instancias operativas, hay algunas que son más
propia y específicamente humanas. En concreto, para Aristóteles la más fundamental es el
intelecto. Escribe que podría decirse incluso "que cada uno es ese elemento suyo
precisamente (el intelecto: nous), si decimos que cada uno es lo principal y mejor que hay en
él".
Lo que significa plenitud del sujeto (ser auténtico, ser según sí mismo), tiene que
consistir, por tanto, en un vivir que fundamentalmente corra por cuenta del intelecto; que es
lo que cada hombre tiene de más propio. "Porque sería absurdo no elegir la vida de uno
mismo sino la de otro", escribe el Filósofo.
Y lo que se intenta puntualizar al exponer el itinerario del devenir hacia la felicidad,
es que si no hubiera que sortear en el camino las dificultades que supone el descontrol del
deseo, tampoco habría excelencia, ya que son los obstáculos los que invitan al hombre a la
superación, los que lo dinamizan para ser más y mejor él mismo.
El arquetipo que nos propone Aristóteles en su «Ética a Nicómaco», es el de un
hombre que explora sus propios límites, y que es un buscador incansable de la excelencia en
su persona.
Desde sus categorizaciones silogísticas, Aristóteles afirmará finalmente que, como la
actividad más noble del hombre es el pensamiento, y lo racional es aquello que le es propio
en cuanto humano, entonces el mejor género de vida para que el hombre sea feliz es la vida
contemplativa.
La contemplación (o visión) de la verdad (aletheia: lo que ha salido a la luz, lo que ha
sido rescatado de las sombras), es la suprema operación intelectual. Al contemplar, el espíritu
conoce al objeto de su intelección y lo goza. Ello hace del hombre un ser independiente,
seguro y dueño de sí mismo (autárquico: con autodominio), en cuanto su felicidad reside ya
dentro de él y no fuera; es decir, no en la procura de honores, ni en el afán desmedido de
lucro, por ejemplo.
Lo que se está diciendo es que hombre no es feliz por lo que tiene, sino por lo que es.
Y lo más importante es que la personalidad que constituimos ahora, contiene potencialmente
el acto que llegará a colmarnos. Sin embargo, hemos de contar con que no estará libre de
obstáculos y de dificultades la senda que lleva a uno mismo.
La labor del filósofo es ayudar a las personas a sobrevivir intelectualmente esta
existencia, desarrollando sus potencialidades más nobles y conduciendo sus deseos con
arreglo a razón (ética).
El deseo del hombre no es aquí considerado desde una perspectiva bio-sociológica
que disuelve la ética en la physis, sino al revés; es decir, desde la fundamentalidad de la
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dinámica deseante: desde su constitución y radicalidad ontológica. Este deseo es asumido
siempre por la ética y modulado por ella, en beneficio de lograr su culminación en la plenitud
del ser humano (la actividad intelectual), la cual no viene dada en términos de mera physis.
La ética es entonces la que ha de regular el deseo según la norma del deber ser. Y la labor del
filósofo será, por tanto, la de ayudar a fortalecer este dinamismo natural cuyo descontrol
provocaría la ruina del ser humano y su completo fracaso existencial. Razón por la cual, lo
que más habrá de importar al hombre sobre su deseo orgánico, no será cómo realizarlo a toda
costa (satisfacción hedonista), sino saber —dentro de la más pura tradición socrática— cómo
evitar su descontrol (mediante la prudencia y la templanza), con el fin de establecer y
mantener unas costumbres (política) que le faciliten el esfuerzo por lograr hacer presente el
bien en su vida.
3) Algunos criterios de aplicación en la Asesoría filosófica.
Contrariamente a lo que algunos piensan, hay que decir que Platón y Aristóteles han
legado la idea de que la Filosofía no es un estudio de ideas abstractas justificado sólo por el
valor intrínseco de esas ideas. Ambos fueron hombres eruditos, por cierto; pero no se
dedicaron a disfrutar el debate de la teoría por la teoría. Muy por el contrario. Su afán teórico
tenía la finalidad de ayudar a la gente a sacar su vida adelante en diversa escala. Es
interesante observar que sus ideas sirven, a la vez, tanto para el hombre particular cuanto
para la sociedad en general.
Estos dos filósofos han desarrollado ideas que sirven para que cada quien pueda
analizar su manera de pensar y su estilo de vida. Es verdad que no se trata de dos pensadores
antiguos a los que cualquier lector medio pueda acceder simplemente, pues encontrará cuanto
menos dificultades terminológicas. Pero son dos pensadores que pueden servirle de mucho a
los asesores filosóficos.
Aristóteles le puso nombre a aquello que la gente necesita saber cultivar para: a)
poder otorgar sentido a las situaciones por las que atraviesa y b) aplicar los principios que
mejor le guíen para superarlas. Aristóteles la conceptualizó como frónesis, que suele
traducirse como prudencia.
Para Platón la prudencia es la principal de las cuatro virtudes cardinales, pues tiene
una función rectora respecto de las demás.
El asesor filosófico ha de ayudar a quienes acuden a él no aleccionándole, sino
acompañándolo en el perfeccionamiento de la prudencia.
En griego frónesis significa: prudencia, razonabilidad, buena idea, sensatez, cordura,
buen juicio, discresión, temple, confianza en sí mismo, propósito elevado, noble y
magnánimo. Aristóteles la definió como "recta ratio agibilium"; es decir: recta razón en el
obrar. El acto propio de la prudencia es dictar (imperando) lo que hay que hacer
concretamente en un momento determinado: aquí y ahora. La prudencia ordena la conducta
particular atendiendo a las circunstancias y después de madura deliberación y consejo. Ahí
puede intervenir entonces el asesor filosófico, ayudando a esa deliberación. En efecto, para el
ejercicio de la prudencia se requiere:
1) Memoria de lo pasado, sopesando éxitos y fracasos.
2) Inteligencia de lo presente, para saber discernir con orden y claridad aquello a lo
que nos enfrentamos.
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3) Voluntaria docilidad, para pedir y aceptar consejo; pues, dado que es infinito el
número de casos que se pueden presentar en la práctica, nadie puede presumir de saber por sí
mismo resolverlos todos.
4) Circunspección, para considerar atentamente las circunstancias y juzgar en vista de
ellas si es o no conveniente realizar tal o cual acto.
5) Cautela o precaución, para saber considerar los impedimentos que pudieran ser
obstáculo o comprometer el éxito de las propias determinaciones.
Por otra parte, el cultivo de la prudencia se ordena al desarrollo de:
1) El buen consejo; es decir, la disposición habitual para saber encontrar los medios
más aptos y oportunos para el fin que en cada caso se pretende.
2) El buen sentido práctico, que suele ser denominado simplemente como "sentido
común" o "sensatez", el cual inclina a juzgar rectamente según las leyes comunes y
ordinarias.
3) El juicio perspicaz para juzgar rectamente según principios más altos y exigentes
que los comunes u ordinarios.
La frónesis aristotélica es potente en la Asesoría filosófica por cuanto no supone un
conocimiento técnico o erudito, sino que expresa un saber surgido de la misma experiencia
de trato cotidiano en diálogo con las cosas mismas de la vida cotidiana. Es una ponderación
que conduce a un juicio particular sobre los asuntos humanos, hecho desde la óptica no del
experto, sino del hombre común. Ese juicio propio es el que determina una conducta
consecuente en una circunstancia concreta, y de ahí el valor práctico de la prudencia.
En tal sentido, la frónesis o prudencia implica una mediación situada entre lo
universal y lo particular (el caso concreto), realizada en el marco de un diálogo esclarecedor
con el asesor. Ahora bien, la prudencia tiene algunas exigencias teóricas. En efecto, ante la
pluralidad de interpretaciones posibles, incluso divergentes, se requieren criterios que
permitan establecer su legitimidad. Precisamente, el valor de la inteligencia no está en el
conocer por el conocer mismo, sino en la posibilidad de que esos conocimientos sirvan de
norma a nuestros actos en la vida cotidiana y en la actuación social. Para orientarse la
persona juzga y dictamina distinguiendo las cosas según determinadas reglas que se llaman
criterios (del griego krino: distinguir, separar). La prudencia, entonces, implica la capacidad
de ordenación de los actos humanos según algunas referencias, para así atribuirle a cada acto
la importancia que realmente tiene, evitando desequilibrios, superficialidades, laxitudes o
escrupulosidades. Ese "sistema de referencias" en el que podamos reunirnos todos los
hombres, Aristóteles lo expresó en su monumental obra metafísica, en la cual desentraña lo
que podríamos denominar una legalidad (universal y necesaria) de toda la realidad en la que
la conducta humana se desenvuelve. Aristóteles define allí un orden del Ser en el que
estriban todos los sucesos contingentes. Pero no se trata de un orden que deba entenderse
como universal y necesariamente "fijo e inmutable", sino siempre existiendo lo mismo en
constante devenir; es decir que, en el orden del lenguaje, define un horizonte de
interpretación para todo aquello que sucede, pero que nunca agota su saber, pues la
experiencia que podamos tener del ser del mundo no se deja traslucir por completo en
nuestras expresiones particulares. Entonces, las "referencias" (el Ser de los entes en el orden
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del tiempo) definen puntos de encuentro para que el diálogo entre alteridades sea posible. En
este diálogo los interlocutores pueden así alcanzar el acuerdo sobre la base de la formación
de un lenguaje compartido que de cuenta de lo real. En tal sentido, será también labor del
asesor filosófico el ayudar en la consulta a depurar y ajustar la mediación lingüística que está
siempre presente el abordaje concreto del mundo que hacemos desde una situación
existencial determinada (que nunca es neutral); precisamente para que el abordaje sea lo más
realista posible, tanto subjetiva como objetivamente.
¿Qué queremos decir cuando decimos tal cosa? ¿Qué observaciones reales nos
permiten sostener eso que decimos? Estas son preguntas que la prudencia misma exige;
hábida cuenta de que el Ser absoluto siempre supera a nuestras categorías y que aquello que
queremos decir nunca coincide plenamente con lo que decimos.
Al respecto, el punto significativo en el pensamiento de Platón y en el de Aristóteles
es que ambos confían en las posibilidades del hombre para penetrar intelectualmente el orden
inteligible de lo real y, en tal sentido, confían en que el lenguaje pueda expresar en cada
época y en cada situación ese orden, cada vez con mayor claridad y profundidad. Luego,
confían en que las personas particulares puedan obrar rectamente según ese mismo orden
inteligido. "Rectamente" quiere decir: según su leal saber y entender, con sensatez acorde a
su peculiar situacionalidad, aun cuando no tengan un conocimiento verdadero de ese orden
profundo del Ser sobre el que se afanan en teorizar los filósofos.
Bibliografía:
1) Altisen, Claudio. Asesoría filosófica y Mediación. Librosenred.com, USA 2004.
2) Altisen, Claudio. Filosofía antigua y medieval. Selección de textos. UCALP, Rosario
2004.
3) Altisen, Claudio. Historia de la Filosofía. USAL, Rosario 2004.
4) Belaval, Yvon. Historia de la Filosofía. Siglo Veintiuno, México 1989.
5) Carpio, Adolfo. Principios de Filosofía. Glauco, Bs.As. 1997.
6) De Rougemont, Denis. La aventura occidental del hombre. Sur, Bs.As. 1968.
7) Gaarder, Jostein. El mundo de Sofía. Siruela, Madrid 1994.
8) Maritain, Jacques. Introducción a la Filosofía. Club de Lectores, Bs.As. 1981.
9) Müller, Max y Halder, Alois. Halder. Breve diccionario de Filosofía. Herder, Barcelona
1986.
10) Zucchi, Hernán. La Metafísica de Aristóteles. Sudamericana, Bs.As. 2004.
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Montse Martí Linares. Licenciada en Filosofía por la Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona. Estudios de Doctorado y Sociología en la
misma Universidad. Miembro fundadora del Gabinete de Filosofía
Práctica Pharos de Barcelona (2000). Asesora certificada por
ASEPRAF. Miembro de la Associació de Filosofia Pràctica de
Catalunya, ASEPRAF y la Asociación Internacional de Práctica
Filosófica. Profesora de filosofía de Bachillerato y asesora
filosófica. Profesora en cursos de formación de asesores en Madrid y
Barcelona. Participante en el Congreso Iberoamericano de
asesoramiento y orientación filosófica 2004 en Sevilla. Autora de
diversos artículos sobre asesoramiento filosófico y aplicación de la
historia de la filosofía al asesoramiento.
LOS ANTIGUOS MÉDICOS DEL ALMA
Montse Martí Linares
Barcelona, España
Abstract
La filosofía helenística (estoicos y epicúreos), por la naturaleza de su origen, resulta
un recurso extraordinariamente rico para el trabajo del asesoramiento. Los antiguos griegos
eran auténticos médicos del alma y así lo manifiesta su pensamiento. Para ellos, la filosofía
se entendía como un arte de vida, lo cual implica que su filosofía está construída para dar
solución a los conflictos que pueden afectarnos cotidianamente. Sus filosofías no son meras
teorías, sino, sobre todo, formas de vida. Este compromiso de la filosofía helenística con la
vida es analizada por autores contemporáneos, como Hadot o Nussbaum y nos ofrecen una
mirada a estos pensadores que ayuda a recuperar este sentido original de la filosofía que
puede inspirar nuestro trabajo.
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Los antiguos médicos del alma
“Los remedios del alma los hallaron los antiguos, pero indagar
cómo y cuándo se han de aplicar es nuestro cometido. Mucho han
conseguido nuestros predecesores, pero no lo han conseguido todo”
(Séneca)
Comparto la idea de Séneca sobre la función que “los antiguos” pueden desempeñar
en nuestra tarea de asesoramiento. Ellos nos proporcionan remedios (ya hablaron de los
problemas que trataremos nosotros), pero al fin y al cabo, es responsabilidad del asesor/a
saber aplicar con acierto esa sabiduría, o generar a partir de ella nuevas perspectivas.
Así pues, podemos concluir que toda la historia de la filosofía puede inspirar nuestro
trabajo, pero aquí me dedicaré a analizar el potencial “terapéutico” de la filosofía que nos han
legado las escuelas helenísticas. Hay algo en esas filosofías, en su origen, que las hace
inseparables de la dimensión orientadora que caracteriza el asesoramiento filosófico. Podría
exponer un listado de citas de los principales autores helenísticos que justificarían mi
afirmación, pero sería poco honrado no ir más allá y no mostrar cómo puede aplicarse de
forma práctica a nuestros conflictos actuales. Por esta razón voy a indicar aquellos aspectos
que hacen que estas filosofías sean susceptibles de aplicarse en el trabajo del asesor/a.
Podríamos partir de la idea conocida por todos de que la filosofía griega nació como
un arte y una forma de vida. Esta es la tesis fundamental que defiende Hadot en su libro
Philosophy as a way of life. La filosofía era un modo de vivir que debía practicarse en cada
momento y debía transformar la vida del individuo. Esta esencia de la filosofía griega se
mantuvo intacta durante todo el periodo clásico y el periodo helenístico.
La razón por la cual se ha ido olvidando este carácter vivencial de la filosofía se halla
en el hecho de que, con el tiempo, la idea de filosofía y la idea de discurso filosófico se han
ido diferenciando. Antes de la filosofía helenística esta distinción no era explícita, por lo
tanto, los primeros filósofos entendían que la filosofía era esencialmente vida, forma de vida.
La evolución posterior de la filosofía ha dado prioridad al discurso sobre el aspecto vivencial
de la misma. Hadot expone divesas razones que justificarían este cambio. Una sería la
satisfacción que proporciona el discurso, ya que es lo que permanece. Pero, sobre todo, hay
una razón sociológica: la llegada de la enseñanza de la filosofía a la Universidad. Los
profesores universitarios forman a otros profesores que serán especialistas, profesionales, y la
filosofía se transforma en eso, una especialidad.
Este ideal de la filosofía como arte de vida entronca perfectamente con la importancia
que daban los griegos a un precepto esencial en su cultura: “conócete a ti mismo”. Este ideal
estaba profundamente vinculado al “ocuparse de sí mismo”y, según defiende Foucault el
primer prepcepto no era el principal, sino que más bien, resultaba necesario ocuparse de uno
mismo antes de iniciar la tarea del conocimiento de sí mismo.La idea de ocuparse de sí
mismo nos remite a la función que los griegos atribuían al arte médico. Esta consideración
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pone de manifiesto la íntima relación que podemos establecer entre la filosofía y la medicina,
un paralelismo bien conocido que diversos autores helenísticos han destacado en sus
reflexiones:
“Existe, os lo aseguro, un arte médico para el alma. Es la filosofía, cuyo auxilio no ha de
buscarse, como en las otras enfermedades del cuerpo, fuera de nosotros mismos. Hemos de
procurar con todos nuestros recursos y todas nuestras fuerzas ser capaces de ejercer de
médicos de nosotros mismos”
(Cicerón)
La filósofa norteamericana Martha Nussbaum defiende en su libro La terapia del
deseo la tesis de que podemos hallar una analogía casi perfecta entre la filosofía helenística y
la medicina, ya que las dos son artes de la vida cuyo principal objetivo es erradicar el
sufrimiento humano. Para demostrar esta analogía, Nussbaum investiga detenidamente si las
filosofías helenísticas se ajustan a lo que ella denomina “argumentos médicos”. A lo largo de
su trabajo va constatando que estas filosofías cumplen estas características, entre las cuales,
destacamos:
-
-
Los argumentos tienen finalidad práctica.
El objetivo es hacer mejor al discípulo o al paciente.
Responden al caso particular.
Los argumentos desarrollados pretenden responder a las necesidades del discípulo.
Los tratamientos tienen por objeto la salud del individuo, no de la comunidad ni del
individuo respecto a la comunidad (algo diferente de lo que era en la filosofía
clásica).
Hay cierta asimetría entre la autoridad experta (maestro o médico) y el sujeto tratado
(discípulo o paciente).
El maestro no propone concepciones alternativas, igual que no lo hace el médico.
El tratamiento lo prescribe el médico y no hay opción de discutirlo.
El maestro tampoco da opción al pluralismo cognoscitivo.
Las respuestas se integran en un sistema global y fuera de él no tienen sentido.
Aceptar una escuela es hacerlo de manera dogmática.
Tal vez algunas de estas características serían discutibles como idóneas para el
asesoramiento (el caso de las dos últimas, por ejemplo), pero lo que nos aporta esta reflexión
es la indiscutible relación entre la filosofía helenística y la voluntad de curar el alma. Este
objetivo último de las filosofías clásicas hace que sus planteamientos sean fácilmente
transportables a nuestra práctica profesional.
Esta concepción general de la filosofía que comparten los pensadores griegos, se
aborda bajo unas condiciones formales específicas que garantizan y consolidan la dimensión
práctica de su pensamiento. Algunas de estas serían las que indico a continuación:
-
Dimensión oral de la filosofía antigua.
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El discurso filosófico griego es oral porque no pretende solamente transmitir
información, sino que busca producir un efecto psíquico en el oyente. Por lo tanto es un
discurso que pretende formar, no sólo informar. En este sentido, los trabajos escritos sólo
eran un complemento de la enseñanza oral. De aquí la importancia del diálogo, una de las
herencias más útiles para el asesoramiento filosófico. Lo más importante no es solucionar
el problema, sino el camino que se construye conjuntamente para llegar a la solución.
Este diálogo permite que el discípulo descubra la verdad por sí mismo y el maestro se
adapta a las necesidades del discípulo (como lo haría el/la asesor/a).
- La filosofía como entrenamiento del alma.
Con el diálogo filosófico, los filósofos pretendían orientar a sus discípulos en el
pensamiento, en la vida de la ciudad o en el mundo. El filósofo era entrenado en saber
hablar y también en saber vivir. Así pues, vemos como la filosofía se ponía al servicio de
la práctica y se presentaba como un arte de vivir que nos cura las enfermedades
enseñándonos una nueva forma de vida. En el caso de las escuelas helenísticas podemos
hablar incluso de “terapias” para asimilar las filosofías propuestas por cada escuela. Los
epicúreos, por ejemplo, proponen la memorización de determinados principios para
disponer de las respuestas necesarias, que les puedan ayudar en los distintos momentos de
su vida.
- Relación entre teoría y praxis.
Las teorías intentan justificar la actitud existencial. Cada actitud existencial implica una
representación del mundo que debe ser expresada en un discurso. Así pues, la sabiduría
no es sólo una visión de las cosas como son a la luz de la razón, sino que es, además, un
modo de vivir que corresponde a esta visión. Para los filósofos griegos, la vida filosófica
implica un esfuerzo para vivir de acuerdo a la norma de la sabiduría. Cada escuela
representa una forma de vida definida por un ideal de sabiduría y cada uno de ellos
implica una actitud determinada. La actividad teórica considerada como una forma de
vida comporta más satisfacción y felicidad que la teoría en sí misma. En esa época,
filosofar era escoger una escuela, seguir su forma de vida y aceptar sus dogmas.
Epicuro (341 a.C.- 270 a.C)
“Vacío es el argumento de aquel filósofo que no permite curar ningún sufrimiento humano.
Pues de la misma manera que de nada sirve un arte médica que no erradique la enfermedad,
tampoco hay utilidad ninguna en la filosofía si no erradica el sufrimiento del alma”.
Esta es una cita muy conocida del padre del epureismo. Estas palabras dan respuesta a
la cuestión principal alrdedor de la cual gira la filosofía de Epicuro. Epicuro se pregunta
cómo vivir bien y qué es lo que tiene que hacer para ser feliz. Es un filósofo que se centra en
el cuidado del alma y esto se ve en todos los aspectos de su filosofía. Sin ir más lejos, vemos
que el lenguaje filosófico de Epicuro no es nada complejo, ya que pretende inmediatez para
llamar la atención del interlocutor y lograr que éste aprenda a vivir mejor. La filosofía de
Epicuro se presenta pues como una nueva filosofía de vida, en la que el saber teórico está al
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servicio de la vida feliz. Este fundamento teórico alrededor del que se organiza el saber
práctico se construye a partir de la observación. Los sentidos constituyen el medio principal a
través del cual nos relacionamos con la realidad, de ahí la importancia de lo corporal para
Epicuro. El método que propone para determinar el camino hacia la felicidad es la
observación atenta de nuestros sentidos y deseos. Esto significa dejarnos llevar y escuchar
nuestros deseos sin tener en cuenta las trabas y los prejuicios sociales, igual que haría un niño
que no estuviera aún corrompido por la cultura. Podríamos resumirlo con la frase: “Lo que
nos pida el cuerpo”. Se trata de una propuesta abierta a todo el mundo porque implica que
cualquier persona, aunque no tenga formación o preparación, puede determinar cuál ha de ser
el objetivo de la vida humana. La respuesta a esta cuestión es sencilla: el ser humano
persigue el placer, persigue evitar el dolor tanto del cuerpo como del alma. Una vez que
hemos averiguado cuál es el obetivo de la vida, sólo nos quedará encontrar los instrumentos
necesarios para alcanzarlo y es ahí donde intervienen la razón y el filósofo.
Si nos centramos en el cuerpo, Epicuro nos dice que cuando el dolor es muy fuerte,
acostumbra a ser corto porque éste conlleva la muerte.Por otro lado, si dura mucho, el
filósofo asegura que los sentidos se embotan y, por tanto, deja de sentirse. El problema de
aliviar el dolor físico recordando la inminencia de la muerte es que pone en evidencia uno de
los problemas que, según Epicuro, más inquieta al ser humano y que más le aleja de la
posibilidad de ser feliz: el temor a la muerte. Pero también para esta inquietante cuestión nos
ofrece una respuesta: mientras existimos, la muerte no está presente y cuando la muerte está
presente, entonces no existimos. “La muerte no es mala para nosotros, porque lo que se ha
disuelto es insensible”. Epicuro entiende que la aceptación de la muerte es una parte más de
la vida y que, por tanto, debe aceptarse con naturalidad. Si lo logramos, conseguiremos
además la revalorización del tiempo finito. Para el filósofo la creencia en la inmortalidad
podría hacer que nos olvidásemos del mundo e incluso podría representar un desprecio a la
vida.
Cabe destacar que en esta lucha contra el dolor físico, el alma tiene un papel
fundamental también. Epicuro defiende que la predisposición del alma es fundamental para
hallar el placer, incluso llega a afirmar que puede contrarestar el dolor físico. Una de la
razones que utiliza para sostener esta afirmación es que el alma puede evocar momentos de
placer. Epicuro defiende con vehemencia que el alma es capaz de sufrir dolores mucho
mayores que los físicos.
Ahora vamos a abordar la reflexión sobre el sufrimiento espiritual. Igual que debemos
evitar el dolor del cuerpo, debemos luchar contra el malestar del alma. Epicuro considera que
el alma sufre cuando sus deseos no son satisfechos. Estos deseos tienen su fundamento en
falsas creencias, por lo que erradicarlos pasa por el diagnóstico de los errores en nuestras
creencias. Para ello propone:
- Separar buenos y malos deseos
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Diagnosticar la génesis de los malos deseos demostrando que se basan en falsas
creencias
-Tratar las falsas creencias y eliminar los malos deseos.
El resultado de este diagnóstico no deja de ser sorprendente, porque aunque la
filosofía de Epicuro es una filosofía del placer, cabe matizar que él no defenderá una
vida dedicada a la “caza y captura” de los placeres. A esta conclusión llegará
analizando la diferencia entre buenos y malos deseos. Para hacerlo establecerá una
distinción entre placeres naturales y necesarios, placeres naturales y no necesarios y
placeres no naturales y no necesarios. Los primeros son los referidos a la
supervivencia y son los más fáciles de satisfacer. Los naturales y no necesarios, serían
los anteriores pero en parte inducidos por la opinión de los que nos rodean.
Consistirían en una satisfacción más elaborada que los naturales y necesarios. Los
deseos no naturales y no necesarios son aquellos que vienen inducidos por la
comunidad y la sociedad en la que vivimos. Epicuro afirma que sólo hay un tipo de
placeres que debemos satisfacer siempre: los naturales y necesarios. Estos placeres
son los referidos a la supervivencia, son fáciles de satisfacer y no hacerlo es lo que
provoca el dolor (justamente lo que debemos evitar). Epicuro defiende la necesidad
de controlar el deseo y practicar lo que denominamos “placeres pasivos”. Esta
aclaración nos permite enlazar con la idea de vivir el presente. Epicuro considera que
la insatisfacción se produce cuando deseamos lo que no tenemos y el consejo que nos
da es desear lo que tenemos y lo que podemos obtener. Conseguir esto pasa por
someter los deseos a la razón, escoger aquéllos que nos proporcionarán felicidad, y
eliminar aquellos otros que nos provocarán dolor y preocupación. Por el contrario, no
hay que satisfacer siempre el segundo tipo de placeres, los naturales y no necesarios,
como por ejemplo, comer bien, porque a veces nos pueden provocar sufrimiento
(beber demasiado, causa borrachera). La razón deberá intervenir para decidir cuáles
deben satisfacerse teniendo en cuenta si pueden provocar un dolor posterior.
Finalmente habrá una última categoría de placeres, los no naturales y no necesarios,
que no deben satisfacerse jamás. Epicuro opina que estos deseos vanos se fundamentan en
creencias falsas acerca del mundo y del valor de las cosas. Los genera la sociedad y nos
encaminan a un proceso de deseos insatisfechos inacabable. Esta concepción de los placeres
respondería a la idea de que no es más rico el que más tiene sino el que menos desea, y éste
es, sin duda, un buen consejo para vivir con más tranquilidad en una sociedad que nos
empuja a acumular bienes y a medirnos más por lo que tenemos que por lo que somos.
Para acabar, quisiera apuntar un último aspecto (más bien formal) de la filosofía de
Epicuro, que también nos puede ser útil en nuestro trabajo de asesoramiento. Como he
comentado, su interés se centra fundamentalmente en modificar las creencias. Aunque esta
tarea es complicada, Epicuro también establece un camino para desarrollarla. Él parte de la
idea de que la creencias penetran en el alma influyendo por debajo del nivel de la
consciencia. Si esto es así, lo más importante es acceder a todas las capas posibles que
contiene la mente del discípulo. Para lograrlo considera que es indispensable que el discípulo
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exponga claramente sus actos, sus pensamientos, sus deseos... (lo que denomina confesión),
con la finalidad de poder captar en su totalidad al interlocutor y averiguar cuál es el origen de
sus creencias.
Al mismo tiempo, utiliza una de las prácticas terapéuticas acordes a esta
consideración, que es la memorización. El discípulo debe memorizar los principios que le
propone el maestro, para poder dar una respuesta automática a los conflictos que le surjan de
manera automática. Memorizar le servirá para que la nueva filosofía que va a ayudarle a
superar sus problemas penetre en lo más profundo de su alma.
Estoicismo
El fundador de la escuela fue Zenón de Citio (332-262 a.C) y su pensamiento da lugar
al primer estoicismo o estoicismo antiguo. Algunos discípulos relevantes son Cleantes o
Crisipo. Un segundo periodo seía el estoicismo medio que, tiene como protagonistas a
Panecio de Rodas, Posidonio y Cicerón.
Finalmente destacamos de manera especial el llamado estoicismo imperial, con
figuras tan destacadas como Séneca, Epicteto o Marco Aurelio. Esta última escuela es la que
se centra de manera más inequívoca en la reflexión sobre la moral. Las ideas que iré
exponiendo son fundamentalmente de los autores adscritos a este periodo, que es del que nos
han llegado más textos.
A pesar de que los estoicos son tan útiles para el asesoramiento como los epicúreos,
nos hallamos ante dos planteamientos muy diferenciados e incluso, a veces, opuestos. Esto lo
vemos, por ejemplo, en la concepción que tienen de la relación maestro-discípulo. Los
epicúreos defienden una relación asimétrica, basada en la autoridad del maestro que
adoctrina a sus discípulos. Frente a este planteamiento los estoicos consideran fundamental el
respeto por el razonamiento práctico de cada persona. Esto significa que el discípulo debe
convertirse en su propio “médico”. El discípulo ha de ser crítico respecto a cómo ve el
mundo, ya que a menudo esta visión está influida por elementos culturales. La filosofía le ha
de proporcionar un análisis de la cultura y las creencias que le permitan hacerse cargo de su
pensamiento y vivir conforme a la propia razón.
Si bien, tradicionalmente la filosofía estoica se divide en dos ámbitos (teoría: física y
lógica y práctica: ética), Hadot considera errónea esta distinción ya que para él las dos partes
son necesarias en la construcción de una filosofía, entendida como forma de vida. La física y
la lógica sirven para eliminar las creencias falsas y para aprender a vivir sintiéndonos
integrados y formando parte del cosmos. La ética nos muestra qué es actuar éticamente.
Teniendo en cuenta la estrecha relación entre teoría y práctica, vivir según la filosofía
propuesta, implica realizar continuamente ejercicios espirituales para mantener en la mente
los principios aprendidos en el discurso teórico. Esto quedará fijado en las técnicas que
proponen los estoicos.
Seguramente el concepto que más directamente asociamos al estoicismo es el de
resignación. Cabe destacar, logicamente, que no es el único concepto que define a esta
escuela. El objetivo de adoptar esta actitud ante la vida es evitar el sufrimiento y el dolor.
Para los estoicos, la idea de resignación no significa una defensa gratuita del conformismo.
Ellos entienden la resignación como la consecución de la armonía absoluta entre la razón
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individual y la razón universal. Los estoicos creen que para evitar el sufrimiento debemos
aceptar la ley natural, “desear” la ley natural (querer que las cosas sean como son). Para
adoptar esta actitud ante la vida y los acontecimientos, el conocimiento juega un papel
fundamental, ya que ayuda a comprender mejor la naturaleza y, por lo tanto, a aceptarla. Es
mucho más fácil adoptar esta actitud si tenemos conciencia de que somos una parte del
cosmos y de sus leyes (de las que no podemos escapar) y si pensamos que el Todo tiene más
importancia que uno mismo. En definitiva se trata de enfocar la vida humana desde una
perspectiva cósmica.
El estoicismo afirma que la manera de alcanzar una situación de armonía y de total
aceptación de la realidad es vivir sin depender de lo exterior. La propuesta estoica es la de
vivir dependiendo tan sólo de lo que está en nuestras manos. Ellos parten de la distinción
fundamental entre: las cosas que dependen de nosotros y las cosas que no dependen de
nosotros. La idea de no depender del exterior no significa que no podamos preferir ningún
tipo de bien o que tengamos que renunciar a todo, más bien, la idea es que no lleguemos a ser
esclavos de esos bienes o de esas circunstancias. Todo lo que tenemos o somos puede no ser,
por lo tanto es mejor que nuestra felicidad no dependa de las cosas externas, o de aquello
sobre lo que no podemos ejercer ningún control. Para los estoicos, los bienes externos no son
parte de la felicidad ni necesarios para ella: “Son cosas que no tienen poder alguno para
hecernos vivir de manera feliz o desgraciada”. La virtud tiene en sí misma la ventaja de que
es autosuficiente. Los estoicos defienden esta idea, arguyendo que es más fácil vencerse a sí
mismo que vencer a la fortuna. Ellos entienden que es mejor cambiar los propios deseos que
cambiar el orden del mundo, pues una actitud como ésta nos permitirá acomodar nuestra
voluntad a los acontecimientos. La física y la lógica pueden ser de gran ayuda para lograr que
esta idea arraigue en nuestro pensamiento. La física puede enseñarnos a que nos tomemos
con indiferencia aquello que no depende de nosotros, porque es algo que está sometido a las
leyes de la naturaleza y contra eso no podemos luchar. Ser indiferente implica no hacer
ninguna diferencia entre las distintas cosas, es decir significa quererlas a todas por igual, tal
como hace la naturaleza. Por otro lado, la lógica puede ayudarnos a comprender que el error
está en los juicios que elaboramos acerca de las cosas. Cambiando estos juicios podemos
dejar de entender como bueno aquello que no depende de nosotros. La cuestión es revisar
nuestros juicios sobre las cosas y dar valor a aquello que depende de uno mismo.
Los errores en nuestros juicios provienen de que atribuimos los sentimientos que nos
produce determinada situación a las características de la situación. Así pues llegamos a
juzgar tal o cual hecho como bueno o malo, en función del sentimiento quenos produce a
nosotros mismos. Los estoicos insisten en que los acontecimientos no son ni buenos ni
malos; el mal o el bien de los acontecimientos está en nuestra relación con ellos. Ahí es
donde debemos poner en práctica la indiferencia. No debemos irritarnos ni culpar a los
demás de nuestras desgracias. Los estoicos proponen la extirpación total de la pasiones y,
teniendo en cuenta que dependen de nuestras creencias, simplemente debemos cambiar
nuestro juicio respecto a los hechos. Distinguen cuatro emociones básicas: disfrute, apetito,
aflicción y temor. Todas ellas se manifiestan como dolores y trastornos violentos del
organismo. La persona que está sujeta a ellas se siente débil y cansada; por lo tanto, incluso
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las emociones positivas aparecen como causantes de trastornos o perturbación. El sabio es
alguien totalmente libre de pasiones, lo contrario sólo lo hacen los insensatos.
Tal como ocurre con Epicuro, los estoicos (respondiendo al caráter curativo que
atribuyen a la filosofía), también proponen técnicas concretas para el cuidado de uno mismo
y la para la práctica activa de su filosofía. Entre estas técnicas cabría destacar el examen de
conciencia y la ascesis. Sobre el examen de conciencia , hay que destacar que los estoicos
persiguen con él revisar hasta qué punto se está actuando según las reglas de conducta que
uno mismo se ha propuesto. Tomando conciencia de los errores que uno comete se puede
ver la distancia que hay entre lo que uno va haciendo y lo que debería haber hecho. Para
ejercitar este examen de conciencia, proponen la escritura como ayuda. A través de la
escritura, en cualquiera de sus formas (cartas, tratados..) y detallando incluso los aspectos
más cotidianos, se alcanza un buen nivel de autoconciencia que favorece ese examen.
Para acabar, nos referiremos también a la práctica de la ascesis. Este concepto se
vincula a la capacidad de desarrollar un alto dominio de si mismo. Para llegar a este objetivo
, los estocios proponen ejercicios en los que el sujeto se pone en situaciones especiales para
verificar si es capaz de afrontarlas usando los recursos teóricos de los que dispone. Uno de
estos ejercicios consiste, por ejemplo, en imaginar que va a ocurrir lo peor que puede suceder
en relación a determinada circunstancia . Esto serviría para anticipar la reacción de uno
mismo ante esa hipótesis . El objetivo de un ejercicio como éste, es relativizar aquello que
creemos que son desgracias insuperables.
Aplicación en la consulta
El “uso” de los referentes de la historia filosofía en la consulta es una cuestión
delicada. El asesor/a no puede convertirse en un mero transmisor de teorías filosóficas que
responden a los diversos conflictos que pueden plantearnos nuestros consultantes. Limitarse a
esto sería traicionar, a mi entender, el espíritu del asesoramiento filosófico. No nos podemos
convertir en “sabios” adoctrinadores de nuestros consultantes ni en charlatanes
incomprendidos por nuestro lenguaje críptico.
Las filosofías que conocemos han de ayudarnos a pensar los conflictos que nos
plantean los asesorados desde perspectivas diferentes a la propia, para evitar caer en el
consejo o en la identificación con nuestros propios problemas y las soluciones que nosotros
adoptamos. Creo que estas filosofías ayudan al distanciamiento y por lo tanto, a actuar con
más profesionalidad y, en consecuencia a diferenciarnos del papel que podría tener una
amigo o amiga.
Anoto estas reflexiones con la intención de mostrar cómo deberíamos aplicar las
filosofías de las que he hablado. La idea es que la filosofía epicúrea y la filosofía estoica, las
veo útiles para pensar determinados confictos. No son soluciones si no nacen de nuestros
asesorados/as. Nosotros debemos conducir a nuestros consultantes a hallar sus propias
filosofías, sus propias actitudes, porque son las únicas que seguirán, son las únicas con las
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que se comprometerán y gracias a las cuales darán solución a sus conflictos. Lo que podemos
propiciar es ese desvelamiento de la solución inspirándonos en nuestros conocimientos y
ponerlos a disposición de los asesorados/as para compartir y generar nuevas perspectivas de
reflexión.
Epicuro en la consulta
La relación de la filosofía de Epicuro con el placer podría llevarnos a pensar que
puede ser útil para superar cualquier situación de dolor, sea físico o moral. A pesar de que
casi todas las personas que acuden a nuestra consulta padecen algún tipo de dolor o
sufrimiento, no a todos les servirán los consejos de Epicuro.Como en todos los casos, no hay
soluciones milagrosas para los males, pero Epicuro puede orientar la manera de abordar el
mal del cuerpo y del alma.
En ambos casos nos servirá la sentencia epicúrea de que no todos los placeres son
buenos y deseables y no debemos rechazar todos los males o sufrimientos. Algunos
sufrimientos tienen valor cuando implican algún tipo de bien (y son más de los que
pensamos) y, al revés, algunos placeres implican dolor y son por ello descartables. Así pues,
en algunas ocasiones tendremos que ayudar a nuestros consultantes a entender la necesidad
de tomar medidas dolorosas y difíciles en aras a conseguir un bien ulterior. Puede ser el caso
de una madre o un padre en relación a la educación de sus hijos, o con una pareja, romper
una relación amorosa “improductiva” aunque no haya un conflicto explícito que evitar, dejar
un empleo que daña nuestras relaciones personales o conyugales...
Veremos en primer lugar, qué provecho podemos sacar de las reflexiones del filósofo
de Samos para abordar la reflexión sobre el dolor físico. Esta reflexión nos conduce
lógicamente a acercarnos a posibles consultantes que padezcan alguna enfermedad que les
provoque dolor o malestar. A menudo, las personas que padecen algún sufrimiento físico
continuo son incapaces de imaginar su vida sin dolor, lo cual les sume en una tristeza que les
puede llevar a situaciones de desesperación. Ya hemos visto que Epicuro, para relativizar la
importancia del dolor físico, nos remite a la reflexión sobre la muerte. Afirma que cuando el
dolor es duradero, nos embota los sentidos y dejamos de percibirlo y cuando es fuerte e
intenso dura poco porque causa la muerte.No estoy segura de que el planteamiento tal como
lo propone Epicuro, sea válido para aliviar estos dolores del cuerpo que pueden afectar a
nuestros asesorados. De lo que estoy más segura es de que estas reflexiones pueden ayudar a
que el consultante se aleje de su situación inmediata. Sé por experiencia que las personas que
sufren algún mal físico, tienden a responsabilizar a ese mal del resto de conflictos que les
afectan. Las reflexiones de Epicuro pueden ayudar a relativizar la importancia del mal físico
y así relajar la ansiedad de la persona afectada para poder abordar nuevas perspectivas de
reflexión y hallar la verdadera naturaleza de sus preocupaciones.
La otra dimensión que abarca la reflexión sobre el dolor y el placer es la referente al
alma. El sufrimiento del alma es el tema que ocupa la parte más importante del trabajo del
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filósofo de Samos y el que nos permite abordar otro tipo de problemas, como puede ser el de
la insatisfacción ante la vida.
A menudo nos encontramos con personas que vienen angustiadas a nuestra consulta
porque están insatisfechas con sus vidas y se plantean cuál es el sentido de su existencia.
Antes de abordar la construcción de un nuevo sentido para la vida, es imprescindible el
análisis del fundamento de nuestras creencias. En este sentido, el planteamiento de Epicuro
puede ser enriquecedor, ya que vincula de manera inmediata las creencias y los deseos. En
muchas ocasiones el problema no se resuelve cambiando los deseos, sino que requiere una
revisión de las creencias y ,en consecuencia, de los deseos que se les asocian.
A lo mejor es arriesgado afirmar que gran parte de los deseos que causan el
sentimiento de insatisfacción ante la vida,provienen de creencias inducidas por el entorno,
pero es lo que he encontrado más a menudo en la consulta. Si esto es cierto, podemos
vincular directamente estos deseos y creencias a aquellos placeres no naturales y no
necesarios, que Epicuro pretende que no satisfazamos. Estos placeres son los que la mayoría
de las veces nos acosan en nuestro mundo y los que pueden provocar angustia en nuestros
clientes. Se trata de las necesidades que nos crea la misma sociedad: tener poder, riquezas,
status social... Querer satisfacer estas necesidades nos lleva a pensar en el futuro, (cómo lo
conseguiré y cómo lo conservaré) y no nos permite disfrutar de lo que tenemos en el
presente, lo cuál crea un vacío en nuestras vidas. Esta clase de preocupación puede aparecer
en personas que han pasado por una quiebra económica, que han perdido su trabajo, o bien en
aquéllas que, teniéndolo todo, no encuentran el sentido de su vida. El trabajo del filósofo/a en
este caso, debería consistir en analizar el origen de los deseos que angustian al consultante
para determinar hasta qué punto se fundamentan en creencias constrastadas e interiorizadas,
o más bien son fruto de la inercia a la que nos induce la sociedad y nuestro entorno. Si fuese
el caso de creencias inducidas por el entorno, deberíamos ayudar a nuestro asesorado/a a
crear su propia escala de valores y a generar recursos para poder desarrollar los nuevos
deseos que surgirían a partir de ahí. Si ,en cambio, nos encontramos con el caso de una
persona con creencias bien afirmadas e interiorizadas, si éstas causan angustia y malestar, se
deberían abordar de manera crítica para acabar con ellas y generar también un nuevo sistema
de referencias.
Finalmente podríamos referirmos brevemente a la aplicación de las técnicas que nos
ofrecían los epicúreos para abordar la reflexión y el cuidado del alma. La práctica de lo que
hemos denominado confesión, en nuestro caso, nos serviría para plantear preguntas sobre la
vida de nuestro cliente, a través de las cuales podemos ir descubriendo su particular filosofía
de vida. A menudo los hechos nos pueden informar más que las palabras y conocer aspectos
concretos de la biografía del cliente nos pueden ayudar mucho a comprender mejor su
situación actual. O simplemente conocer sus hábitos o sus reacciones ante determinadas
situaciones cotidianas...
Para acabar, propondré de qué manera puede inspirarnos la técnica de la
memorización que propone Epicuro. No se trataría tanto de memorizar principios que
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impongamos nosotros, sino más bien, usar referentes filosóficos ( o no filosóficos o
inventados por el asesorado/a o por nosotros...) concretos: frases, citas... a los que
atribuyamos un contenido significativo para el consultante. Logicamente esto requiere un
trabajo profundo en la consulta. No se trata de dejar dicha la frase y pasar a otra cuestión. Se
trataría de ver las implicaciones que tiene su aplicación . Este sistema se puede usar en
momentos de bloqueo y de dificultad para pensar y discernir las acciones adecuadas. Las
frases o pensamientos pueden actuar como “brújula” en momentos de desorientación y
pueden evitar el gasto de energía que supone dar vueltas a un pensamiento que no sea
productivo.
Los estoicos en la consulta
Para empezar,es interesante mencionar que los estoicos nos proponen una relación
con el discípulo que nos sirve para establecer el modelo de relación entre asesor y asesorado.
El modelo maestro-discípulo que proponen parte de la base de que esta relación ha de ser
simétrica y antiautoritaria, tal como debería ocurrir, a mi parecer, en el caso del asesor/a
cliente/a.
Hay otro aspecto del planteamiento general de los estoicos que podemos aplicar al
asesoramiento, que es la íntima relación que establecen entre teoría y práctica, algo que
también comparten el resto de filósofos helenísticos. La perspectiva cósmica que proponen
los estoicos ayuda a enmarcar nuestros actos y a aceptarlos con mayor “apathia”. La
adquisición de esta perspectiva requiere un esfuerzo que nos permite conocer lo más
profundamente posible las leyes de la naturaleza.
En alguna ocasión, nuestro cliente puede ser una persona que sabe muy bien lo que
tiene que hacer, pero a quien le faltan argumentos para justificar sus acciones y eso le puede
producir, en determinados momentos, confusión o duda. En estos casos, nuestro trabajo
consistirá precisamente en ayudarle a construir su “física” o su “lógica”, o simplemente
recordárselas para poder contextualizar y dar mayor sentido a sus acciones.
A esta idea de la adquisición de la perspectiva cósmica, yo le atribuyo otra dimensión que la
convierte en una herramienta muy útil para el AF (no estoy segura que sea una interpretación
acertada de la propuesta estoica). Entiendo que, a menudo, la superación de una situación
difícil, no pasa solamente por la comprensión de la misma y su amplio conocimiento. Lo que
ayuda más es saber encajarla según el contexto de la manera de ser de cada persona. Es ahí
donde podemos aplicar también esta idea de la dimensión cósmica del yo. Lo que nos ocurre,
nos afecta más o menos dependiendo de las características de ese microcosmos que es cada
individuo. La posibilidad de aceptar mejor las circunstancias depende también de la
comprensión de ese yo interior y de hallar el espacio en el que se produce el desencaje y el
malestar, para repararlo y reconstruir ese todo (el yo), integrando aquella situación que
hemos vivido como problemática. En definitiva, se trataría de dar al conflicto una dimensión
cósmica, en relación a la comprensión de la totalidad del yo.
Una filosofía que aconseja tal manera de vivir puede ser especialmente útil para
aquellas personas que han sufrido alguna situación imprevista difícil de aceptar: un
114
accidente, una muerte, la pérdida de trabajo, una separación o el diagnóstico de una
enfermedad. Normalmente, situaciones como las que he mencionado provocan un rechazo
inicial en las personas que las viven y exigen una adaptación de los esquemas mentales
“antiguos” a la nueva situación. Este proceso de adaptación, que podría orientarse hacia la
resignación y aceptación de los hechos, exige la construcción de nuevos valores que los
estoicos nos pueden proporcionar. Mentalizar a nuestros asesorados/as de la inevitabilidad
del sufrimiento, no como algo censurable, sino, mas bien, como algo natural, les puede
ayudar a dejar de luchar contra aquello que le conviene acabar aceptando para poderlo
superar y generar una nueva perspectiva de vida.
Para acabar, me referiré también a las técnicas propuestas por los estoicos para
garantizar una vida filosófica. Creo que recurrir a la escritura como herramienta para el
examen de conciencia es, sin duda, algo que podemos aplicar perfectamente. En mi
experiencia, esta práctica me ha sido muy útil para suscitar el compromiso de los asesorados.
Una parte difícil de nuestro trabajo es conseguir que se comprometan a continuar fuera de la
consulta el trabajo que se inicia en ésta. No olvidemos que el asesor/a puede orientar y abrir
puertas que inviten a la reflexión, pero si eso no es correspondido con un compromiso
personal, la tarea es más difícil. En relación a esto la escritura, el diario, nos puede ayudar. A
esos escritos se les debería dar un valor en la consulta, como tema de trabajo en ella, y
deberían servirnos para evaluar los avances que se van realizando y los caminos nuevos que
deben emprenderse. Este trabajo se puede hacer con el asesor/a en un primer momento, pero
puede convertirse en un hábito que ayude a los asesorados a revisar la coherencia de sus
actitudes y acciones en el futuro.
Bibliografía
CAPELLETTI, Angel J. Los estoicos antiguos, Madrid, Gredos, 1996
DIÓGENES LAERCIO. Vida de filósofos ilustres, Barcelona, Omega, 2003
FOUCAULT, M. Tecnologías del yo, Barcelona, Paidós Ibérica, 1990
GARCÍA GUAL. Epicuro, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1985
HADOT, P. Philosophy as a way of life, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999
NUSSBAUM, M. La terapia del deseo, Barcelona, Paidós, 2003
115
116
Antti Mattila es la presidenta de la Asociación Finlandesa de Filosofía Práctica.
Licenciada en Filosofía y Medicina ha practicado durante 10 años terapia familiar en el
Child Guidance Centre.
Autora de Seeing Things in a New Light.’ Reframing in Therapeutic Conversation.
Helsinki University Press, Helsinky, 2001.
CULTIVATING THE FLEXIBLE MIND:
Antti Mattila
Helsinki, Finland
SUMMARY 94
This paper explores some of the similarities between the “spiritual exercises”
recommended by the stoic philosopher Epictetus and the psychotherapeutic technique of
reframing widely used in family and systemic therapies. Similarities are so extensive that
Epictetus could be called the father of reframing. In conclusion it will be argued that the
ability to use reframing, to see thing in a new light, is needed in most areas of life. The
cultivation of such ability – mental flexibility – should be part of our elementary education.
CULTIVATING THE FLEXIBLE MIND:
Ancient philosophers in the Hellenistic Age (323-31 BC) and under the Roman
Empire (31 BC onwards) often emphasized the analogy between philosophy and medicine.
As philosopher Martha Nussbaum has noted:
”Philosophy heals human diseases, diseases produced by false beliefs. Its arguments are to the
soul as the doctor’s remedies are to the body. They can heal, and they are to be evaluated in
94
Este artículo due presentado en el ”Fifth International Conference on Philosophy in
Practice”, Wadham College, Oxford, Britain, 27-30 July, 1999. Además se publicaron en las
actas CURNOW, T. (ed): Thinking through dialogue. Practical Philosophy Press, Surrey,
2001. Págs. 73-76.
117
terms of their power to heal…this general picture of philosophy’s task is common to all three
major Hellenistic schools, at both Greece and Rome” (Nussbaum, 1994, 14)
So, too, the Roman Stoic philosopher Epictetus’ (c. AD 55 – c. 135) teachings in his
Discourses, as we know them through the writings of Arrian, are designed to be
”therapeutic” or ”advisory”. The main advice that Epictetus repeats in various formulations is
that we should learn to master our inner discourse: ”It is not the things themselves”, says
Epictetus, ”that disturbs people but their judgments about those things.” (Epictetus,
Handbook, §5, in Gill, 1995, 289)
In this article I will compare some of Epictetus’ ideas with the idea of “reframing”,
seeing things in a new light, taking new points of view, in family and systemic therapies.
First we will explore some of Epictetus’ views. After this, when we look at what reframing
is, we shall see why Epictetus can be called the first master of reframing. In conclusion we
shall see how these ideas are connected with mental flexibility.
Epictetus
Epictetus recommends various ”spiritual exercises” (Hadot, 1995) that train us to
”the right use of impressions” (Epictetus, II, 19,32) and to maintain, even in very difficult
situations, one’s peace of mind and serenity. These exercises are grouped into three
disciplines that correspond to the three activities or functions of the soul that Epictetus
distinguished: desire, impulsion or inclination, and judgement (Hadot, 1995, 11).”The
discipline of desire” can free us from ”worries, agitations and grief” (Epictetus, III, 2, 3), ”the
discipline of impulses” can teach us to live with our family and our city (Hadot, 1998, 94),
and ”the discipline of judgment or assent” can help us to handle seductive or attractive
impressions:
“The third area of study has to do with assent, and what is plausible and attractive. For, just as
Socrates used to say that we are not to lead an unexamined life, so neither are we to accept an
unexamined impression…” (Epictetus, III, 12, 14-15)
The eminent scholar of Stoic philosophy A.A. Long finds interesting tension in
Epictetus’ writings. On the one hand, Epictetus emphasizes that we have the ability and
freedom to examine our representations and impressions, interpret their content and accept or
reject actions that these representations recommend. On the other hand, Epictetus
occasionally notes that “people cannot fail to act in accordance with their representation of
what is dominantly in their interests” (Long, quoted in Gill, 1995, 343).
Long notes that this tension is a standing problem for ethical psychology: if people
are free to resist unethical impulses, they should be held responsible for wrongdoing.
However, we have many theories that seem to suggest that people’s desires, interests, mental
states and actions are strongly shaped by the circumstances and upbringing they have
experienced – they should be pitied or treated, not blamed, for wrongdoing.
118
Epictetus’ solution to this tension is to offer his version of living “an examined life”.
Long notes that Epictetus sticks to the thesis that people act in accordance with their
representations of what appears suitable to them (334). People are not, however, slaves of
their first impressions, but free to change their point of view and to produce alternative
representations. This opens for them other ways to act and react.
In the field of psychotherapy such an ability to change one’s point of view, to see
things in a new light, is known as “reframing. We can say that Epictetus was the first master
of reframing. This is clear when we look at some examples from Epictetus’ Discourses:
“But you are wretched and discontented, and if you are alone, you call it desolation,
but if you are with men, you call them cheats and robbers and you find fault with
even your parents and children and brothers and neighbors. Whereas you ought, when
you live alone, to call that peace and freedom, and compare yourself to the gods; and
when you are in company, not to call it a crowd and tumult and vexation, but a feast
and a festival, and thus accept all things with contentment.” (I, 12, 20-21)
“Difficulties are the things that show what men are. Henceforth, when some difficulty
befalls you, remember that god, like a wrestling master, has matched you with a
rough young man. For what end? That you may become an Olympic victor and that
cannot be done without sweat. No man, in my opinion, has a more advantageous
difficulty on his hands than you have, if only you will but use it as an athlete uses the
young man he is wrestling against.” (I, 24, 1-2)
“Why, if things turn out in such a way that you live alone or with a few other people,
call this tranquillity and make use of it as you ought. Converse with yourself, work at
your impressions, perfect your preconceptions. But if you fall in with a crowd, call it
the games, a grand assembly, a festival.” (IV, 4, 26)
Reframing
Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch (1974) first introduced the psychotherapeutic
technique of reframing, seeing things in a new light or from a new point of view. They gave
the “classical” definition of reframing, which has been used by most commentators since:
”To reframe, then, means to change the conceptual and/or emotional setting or viewpoint in
relation to which a situation is experienced and to place it in another frame which fits the
”facts” of the same concrete situation equally well or even better, and thereby changes its
entire meaning.” (Watzlawick et al., 1974, 95)
The main source for Watzlawick et al’s ideas were the curious therapeutic
techniques by psychiatrist Milton H. Erickson (1901-1980), who used reframing-like
interventions as early as the 1950s. In an interview with Jay Haley and John Weakland in
1959 Erickson was asked:
119
”W: How did you ever develop the ability to get such a view of the positive side of a whole lot
of things that everybody else would probably be considering difficult as hell?“ (Haley, 1985,
182)
Erickson answers that most people in the field of psychiatry are too fascinated by
Freud and they forget that there are other books on the shelves:
”E:…You also ought to wonder what Jung and Adler say about it, and what would
Westermark say about it?
H: How is this relevant to the positive attitude?
E: Then when a patient comes into your office and presents you an awfully negative thing,
you’re always looking at this side of it, and that side, above it and below it, beyond it and in
front of it. Because there’s always obverse and reverse to a coin.” (Haley, 1985, 182)
Milton H. Erickson developed his skills in reframing (although he did not use that
word) in connection with his experiments with hypnotic techniques. He viewed hypnosis as a
collaborative relationship between the client and the therapist. In order to develop and retain
such a cooperation, the hypnotist needed to be very flexible in his responses to client’s
actions.
The technique of reframing is now an important part of most forms of family and
systemic therapies, such as the Mental Research Institute model of brief strategic therapy
(Watzlawick et al., 1974); Strategic family therapy (Haley, 1987; Madanes, 1981); Structural
family therapy (Minuchin & Fishman, 1981); Milan systemic family therapy (Selvini, 1988;
Boscolo et al., 1987); Solution-focused brief therapy (De Shazer, 1985; Berg, 1994);
Solution-oriented brief therapy (O’Hanlon & Weiner-Davis, 1989; Cade & O’Hanlon, 1993;
Furman & Ahola, 1992); Narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990); Collaborative language
systems therapy (Anderson & Goolishian, 1992); Neuro linguistic programming (NLP)
(Bandler & Grinder, 1982); Single-session therapy (Talmon, 1993), etc.
Similar techniques can be found in most forms of psychotherapy and some writers
consider such a “communication of a new perspective” (Strupp, 1988) as the most important
and essential factor for psychotherapeutic change (Cade & O’Hanlon, 1993). Similar
techniques are for example “cognitive reorganization” in cognitive therapy, “rational
restructuring” in cognitive-behavioral therapy, “interpretation” in psychodynamic therapies
and “disputation” in Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT). Several philosophers who
practice philosophical counseling have described their work in terms of “perspectives”:
“enlarging of perspectives” (Achenbach, 1997, 14),“proposing alternative perspectives”
(Boele, 1995, 43), “the purpose is to give the counselee a cleare[r] and/or larger view of his
problem or question and to offer him new (philosophical) perspectives…” (Prins, 1997, 88).
Albert Ellis, the founder of REBT, was perhaps the first psychotherapist to explicitly
use Epictetus’ idea that “Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of
them” (Ellis, 1962, 54). Ellis based his approach on these ideas by trying to help his clients to
find different ways to respond to situations. For example, instead of becoming upset over
frustrating situations, his client could change his ”internalized sentences”. Instead of saying
to himself: ”Oh, my Lord! How terrible this situation is; I positively cannot stand it!”, he
120
should challenge such ”catastrophizing” by saying to himself: ”It’s too bad that conditions
are this frustrating. But they won’t kill me; and I surely can stand living in this unfortunate
but hardly catastrophic way.” (Ellis, 1962, 71). Another way of responding to difficult
situations is:
”Whenever possible, he should try to make the most of frustrating situations: to learn by them,
accept them as challenges, integrate them usefully into his life.” (Ellis, 1962, 71)
Guterman (1992) has explored several differences between REBT disputation
technique and reframing. He thinks that the assumptions between these techniques are so
different that they are incommensurate. The most important differences are:
a. Reframing does not challenge client’s beliefs that are deemed irrational as REBT does.
Instead, therapists at the MRI are really accepting client’s premises and seeking
cooperation through flexibility.
b. REBT openly teaches its language to clients, whereas MRI therapists try to learn the
client’s language and try to fit their suggestions to the client’s worldview.
I would claim that the spirit of Ericksonian-MRI psychotherapy and reframing is
much closer to Epictetus’ attitude, than the sometimes militant attitude of REBT. As
Epictetus notes:
“Here is approximately what we think the philosopher’s task is. He must adapt his own will to
events…(Epictetus, II, 14, 7, in Hadot, 1998, 91)
Conclusion
Reframing can be usefully analyzed from perspectives of research in categorization,
analogical thinking, metaphors, “seeing as”, interpretation and especially frame theory. The
constraints of the present study prevent us to explore these aspects here.
The ability to see things in a different light, to use reframing, is so useful in most
areas of life that we must wonder why it is not part of the curriculum in schools. The ability
is clearly connected to our ability to adapt to situations. As Gordon & Meyers-Anderson
(1981) have described Milton Erickson’s approach to therapy:
“The more choices (flexibility, variety) you have available in your behavior, the more likely it
is that you will be able to successfully accommodate yourself to the vagaries of daily life.”
(28)
Such a mental flexibility is needed for example in talking and listening, reading and
writing, in deciding how to act and in understanding other people. The same ability is also
needed in humor, problem solving, creativity and philosophy. To return to the ethical
dilemma we noted in Epictetus’ writings, modern cognitive scientist have recently been
noticing the importance of points of view in ethics. Des Autels (1996) argues that changes in
our point of view are common and possible in most moral situations. Such shifts “play a
121
significant role in the mental processes used to determine the moral saliences of particular
situations” (Des Autels, 1996, 130). Philosopher Mark Johnson has also emphasized how
new points of view can greatly influence our moral decisions in concrete situations (Johnson,
1993; 1996). It is important to note that reframing ability does not just provide us with more
ways to just “take it”, i.e. to stay passive and endure situations, as Epictetus sometimes seems
to recommend. It can just as well open up new possibilities and ways to act.
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O’Hanlon, W.H. & Weiner-Davis, M. In search of solutions. New York: Norton, 1989.
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3. FILOSOFÍA MEDIEVAL
125
126
Susan Robbins, PhD en Filosofía. Ha participado en el
7th Internatinal Conference on Philosophical Practice.
Especialista en pensamiento religioso y lectura
filosófica espiritual. Presentó en el 1st International
“Sophia” Retreat on Contemplative Philosophy un
taller sobre los diversos tipos de lecturas filosoficas
existentes focalizando su exposición en la lectura
espiritual.
Actualmente trabaja como profesora en Lithuania en
la Cooperative Studies and Klaipeda University.
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE AND WAY
OF LIFE
Susan Robbins
Lithuania
I. Introduction
Philosophical practice has many facets, including attention to individual character
formation and self-actualization. Currently the focus has been for the most part on
philosophical counselling as the means or primary vehicle to address this concern. However,
some philosophers have also addressed this topic through the concepts of self-counseling,
self-construction, self-creation, and the like. The idea is that a person is to work out for
themselves, both the means and the end of their own search for the good life. Richard
Shusterman, for example, has analyzed how philosophers such as Dewey, Wittgenstein and
Foucault have done this for themselves in very different ways, and also shows how he
himself is in the pursuit of philosophical life. 95 This pursuit, for Shusterman, is through the
fields of aesthetics and American pragmatism. Others gravitate towards ethics, metaphysics,
and other subfields to facilitate their practice of philosophy. But due to the
compartmentalization of the fields of learning in the modern academy, religion is understood
as an entirely different discipline than philosophy. Although philosophy of religion is one of
the subfields of philosophy, to practice religion is, by modern categories and definition, not
to practice philosophy. It is this separation that I would like to challenge. At first glance one
might think I would get support in this task from Pierre Hadot since Hadot has recognized
95
Richard Shusterman, Practicing Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1997).
127
Christianity as a way of life and therefore a philosophy. 96 Unfortunately, Hadot presents
Christian philosophy and way of life in its first few centuries as merely an appropriation and
distortion of Stoicism. In addition to his inability to accept mystery, the “ineffable working of
the divine through the earthly” 97 which is at the heart of Christianity, there are two issues that
prevent Hadot from defending Christianity as another philosophical way of life, along with
Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and other schools of ancient philosophy. The first is the question of
authority in the relationship between theory and practice, and the broad vision and worldview
that is bound up with attention to this question. The second question concerns issues of the
self, including self identity, self-critique, self-control, and the point or purpose of spiritual
exercises and the telos of self-transformation. Hadot cannot see any value in the Christian
approach to these questions because he is firmly committed to a Kantian distrust of any
“authority, whether that of revelation in general or of texts in particular.” 98 He thus sees
philosophical discourse as necessarily ahistorical, disembodied, purely rational and is
unsuccessful in uniting such discourse into any possible contemporary way of life.
Shusterman does not share Hadot’s Enlightenment prejudices and thus is more successful at
elucidating philosophy as a way of life and not merely a discourse. He includes somatic
experience as both important for living philosophically and for philosophical discourse,
especially in pragmatism and aesthetics. He also includes a discussion of self-realization
through the question of ethnic Jewish identity. 99 He is very careful to make clear that it is
secular Jewish identity which is at issue, since “despite some exceptional, dramatic
conversions to religious orthodoxy, it is not a live option for secularly reared American Jews
to realize their Jewish identity through orthodox religious life.” 100 Therefore he also does not
give much help in dispelling the notion that a philosophical way of life in the contemporary
world must be secular and nonreligious. But since he opens the discourse on practicing
philosophy to the somatic and ethnic side of philosophical life, following his lead it can be
opened even further to the historical, communal and traditional side of philosophical life, all
of which were excluded by the Enlightenment definitions of “rational” discourse and which
are part of the essence of religious life.
II. Theory and Practice
The distaste for the concept of authority is so pervasive in both academic philosophy
and philosophical practice that I shall not make the least attempt to try to rehabilitate it as
something to be esteemed. That would be an enormous task, quite beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead I will attempt the more modest goal of simply trying to make it a little more
comprehensible. I would like to address the question of the relationship between theory and
practice, as the same relationship as that between conviction and conduct, doctrine and life.
These have not only been present together in Christianity for 2000 years, they have been
essentially interconnected.
96
Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), 248.
Paige Hochschild, “Unprofessional Conduct” Books and Culture, Vol. , No. 1, 2003.
98
Ibid.
99
Shusterman, op.cit., chapters 6 and 7, 157-195.
100
Ibid. 180.
97
128
I illustrate this with the question of how to read a text. I begin with two quotations.
One is from an introductory philosophy text, the other is from one of the Church Fathers. As
part of his advice to beginning students of philosophy, Mark Woodhouse tells his readers to
“employ the principle of charity” when reading a text for the first time. By this he means that
Observing this principle, you should at first construe the text in the most favorable
reading. – in short, you should give it the interpretation that would make the author
the most correct. . . . Fairness and prudence . . . require that you hold off your critical
reading until later. . . . you should give the author every benefit of the doubt. 101
The other comes from Maximus the Confessor (580-662). In the foreword of his Four
Hundred Texts on Love he says that this work
may not fulfil your expectations, but it was the best that I could do. . . . If anything in
these chapters should prove useful to the soul, it will be revealed to the reader by the
grace of God, provided that he reads, not out of curiosity, but in the fear and love of
God. If a man reads this or any other work not to gain spiritual benefit, but to track
down matter with which to abuse the author, so that in his conceit he can show
himself to be the more learned, nothing profitable will ever be revealed to him in
anything. 102
In Woodhouse’s case the end of reading is to understand the text; in Maximus’ case it
is spiritual benefit to the soul. But in either case, lack of charity entails lack of profit. Charity
is pre-eminently a Christian virtue, and when it is employed in the act of reading, the text is
given an authority over and above the control or interpretive wish of the reader. Iris Murdoch
understands this to be the authority of an independently existing reality. She writes:
Good art, . . . is something pre-eminently outside us and resistant to our
consciousness. We surrender ourselves to its authority with a love which is
unpossessive and unselfish. . . . If I am learning, for instance, Russian, I am
confronted by an authoritative structure which commands my respect. The task is
difficult and perhaps never entirely attainable. My work is a progressive revelation of
something which exists independently of me. Attention is rewarded by a knowledge
of reality. Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards something alien to
me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, swallow up, deny, or make
unreal.
This is how the believer sees the authority of the Scriptures, the creeds and early councils,
and the Church. It is not an imposition on the believer of “ready-made answers” 103 which
shuts down the projects of exploration, reflection, and self-transformation. Instead it is a
great liberation from the narrow, myopic, solipsistic circles of my own consciousness.
Surrender, submission, obedience; these are spiritual disciplines which free us from
entrapment in our own little selves, and which open the door to Reality.
One great character who truly exemplifies this vision of freedom through obedience is
St. Thomas Aquinas. Even though our contemporaries tend to think of him only as a
101
Mark B. Woodhouse, A Preface to Philosophy (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1994), 106.
Quoted in Daniel B. Clendenin, Eastern Orthodox Christianity (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1994), 8.
103
Hadot, op. cit., 274
102
129
towering if pedantic intellect, he is in fact anything but boring, In his life, his philosophy and
his philosophy as his way of life, he fuses into a seamless whole the theory and practice, the
doctrine and life that are the hallmarks of a Christian philosopher. No one who knows
something of his life could think Aquinas was “imposed on” by the Christian tradition or by
the Dominican Friars. Aquinas was born into the nobility, the seventh of eight sons of Count
Landulf and a cousin of the Holy Roman Emperor. When his affinity for philosophy became
known, his father arranged for him to be admitted into a Benedictine abbey with the eventual
end of becoming the Abbot of Monte Cassino, a position commensurate with his noble birth.
Aquinas not only refused the wealth and political power he could have had, he also refused
any ecclesiastical ambition or position of authority in the Church. He joined the Begging
Friars of the new order of Dominic of Spain. Like the Franciscans, the Dominicans were a
revolutionary new order that had no power or prestige in the society; in fact they were
disreputable and even infamous in their own time. Aquinas was subjected to sever pressure
from his family to give up the Begging Friars and go somewhere respectable. He was
kidnapped by two of his brothers, his friar’s robes half torn off, and was locked up in a tower
of the family castle. Chesterton notes that “We might say that the central governing class of
Europe, which partly consisted of his family, were in a turmoil over the deplorable youth;
even the Pope was asked for tactful intervention.” 104 Aquinas won the battle, and remained a
Dominican Friar, the lowest position in the Dominican order, all his life.
Not only does his chosen way of life show a very different view of authority than we
are accustomed to, his writing also demonstrates the holistic integration of theory and
practice. His style demonstrates the virtues of patience, clarity and courtesy towards his
readers. His tone is never aggressive towards his opponents, never condescending or
contemptuous, never insulting or abusive. “Nobody could feel for a moment that Thomas
Aquinas was showing off. The very dullness of diction, of which some complain, was
enormously convincing.” 105 We have noted that there are barely one or two occasions on
which St. Thomas indulged in a denunciation. There is not a single occasion on which he
indulged in a sneer.” 106 The patience in which he pursued the most exacting details of an
argument, the clarity in which he expressed these details, and the courtesy and respect shown
to the reader were all practical qualities for him. His primary intended audience were the
Muslims, the Averroists and others, and these were the qualities that influenced the chances
of conversion. 107
His humility in the practice of philosophy is shown in another way. The doctrines of
Creation and the Incarnation were embodied in his philosophical program. He did not disdain
to study matter, human nature and the physical world since God did not disdain to create it
and Incarnate Himself in it. Since the study of the humblest fact will lead to the study of the
highest truth, both logically and spiritually he was willing to begin at the bottom and move
up at an ordered pace. “St. Thomas was willing to begin by recording the facts and sensations
of the material world, just as he would have been willing to begin by washing up the plates
104
G. K. Chesterton, Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: Image Books, 1956), 60.
Ibid., 91.
106
Ibid., 126.
107
Ibid., 139.
105
130
and dishes in the monastery.” 108 So both his doctrine and his chosen lifestyle set the agenda
and tone for his philosophy, and his philosophy is all the better for it.
St. Thomas is an excellent example of Christian philosophical practice in that his
whole life as a philosopher dispels the modern prejudice that humility and submission to
authority restrict personal growth and development. According to Lahav and Tillmans, the
traditional approaches to philosophical practice that prescribe a way of living “present
themselves as knowing the truth about how life should be lived and impose it on individuals,
leaving them little room for finding their own personal answers to life’s questions.” 109
Aquinas’ determined and tenacious choice to be a Begging Friar, and his huge philosophical
output show that he was neither imposed upon by the Dominicans, not was he restricted in
working out his own answers to his questions. His extreme humility and even shyness, and
his respect and courtesy towards his readers and opponents preclude any charge of imposing
his views on other people. One more thing St. Thomas taught us is how to argue charitably.
In his dispute with Sigor of Brabant he pointed out concerning his own argument: “It is not
based on documents of faith, but on the reasons and statements of the philosophers
themselves.” 110 MacIntyre describes this as “to offer them what I take to be good reasons for
acting in one way rather than another, but to leave it to them to evaluate those reasons. It is to
be unwilling to influence another except by reasons which that other he or she judges to be
good.” 111 Aquinas not only gave us this principle, he demonstrated it in his own life as a
philosopher.
III. Self-Transformation
The second issue concerning the fusion of the religious and the philosophical way of
life is the issue of the self, including self-identity, self-examination, and self-transformation.
The means of addressing this whole issue is rooted in the practice of spiritual exercises or
disciplines. Hadot acknowledges that “the practice of spiritual exercises is likely to be rooted
in traditions going back to immemorial times.” 112 Christianity inherited such traditions both
from Judaism and from Greek philosophy. Two of these were the attention to peace of mind
and to examination of the conscience. The early Christians had their minds steeped in the
Hebrew Scriptures, just as the worshiping Jews did. Thus texts such as “You will keep him in
perfect peace whose mind is stayed on You because he trusts in You.” (Isaiah 26:3), and
“Search me, O God, and know my heart, . . . and see if there is any wicked way in me, and
lead me in the way everlasting.” (Psalm 139:24) would have been in common use in the
practice of Christian communities, long before the New Testament canon was established.
Hadot claims that peace of mind and examination of the conscience were secular categories
appropriated by monastic life, 113 but this cannot be the case since they were in practice in
Christian and Jewish communities that were clearly not monastic; that included farmers,
108
Ibid., 117.
Ran Lahav and Maria Tillmanns, editors, Essays on Philosophical Counseling (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1995), xi.
110
Quoted in Chesterton, op. cit., 95.
111
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2/e, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 23-24.
112
Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 89.
113
Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, 241, 247.
109
131
merchants, parents, and children. Augustine, in The City of God, specifies three modes of
Christian life, the contemplative, the active, and the contemplative-active, as three equally
acceptable and accessible routes to happiness, peace and union with God. He also goes on to
say that some contemplation ought to be a part of every Christian’s life. 114 Hence it follows
that Christian philosophy, as a style of life and a mode of being supported by the appropriate
spiritual exercises, is open and taught to every believer, not just those who enter the monastic
life.
Of all four of the great traditions in Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman
Catholicism, Protestantism and the Anabaptist tradition, we find that the questions of selfidentity, self-examination, and self-transformation, while being matters of serious import for
all, are most clearly emphasized and given the center of attention in Eastern Orthodoxy.
Western Christianity has tended to stress the legal metaphors and juridical concepts of
justification by faith, appeasement, penance, canon law, and penal substitution in elucidating
the doctrine of salvation. In the Eastern tradition the emphasis has been on the process of
deification or moving towards mystical union with Christ. The Philokalia 115 gives the
explanation of this process of self-transformation and the means through spiritual exercises
by which it is realized. Hadot is very astute in selecting those passages from the early
Christians, especially Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius and the Desert Fathers, and
Dorotheus of Gaza, which are inherited from the Greek traditions. By ignoring that part of
early Christian philosophical practice which diverges sharply from Greek philosophy, Hadot
gives the impression that a modern philosophical practitioner may safely skip over
Christianity or set it aside, and not miss anything if she concentrates exclusively on the Greek
philosophical practices to inspire and inform her own. Nevertheless there are some
substantial differences between the Christian and the secular philosophical understanding and
approach to self-identity, self criticism and self-transformation aimed for in the practice of
spiritual exercises.
The question of self-identity differs both in definition and in direction from secular
philosophical orientation. The believer’s identity is rooted in history in tradition, in the
concrete reality of the People of God, which is outside the nebulously identified self. Since
the Church has a visible, tangible reality and a spiritual mystical reality, the search for selfdefinition is directed outside the narrow confines of the self. The contemporary practitioner
uses techniques of guided imaging, centering and grounding, etc to look deep within the self
and its own consciousness for guidance and identity. The Christian looks outward, to a reality
not contained by the self, for her guidance and definition. Even in those varieties that stress
the inner light or the guidance of the Holy Spirit, there is still always maintained the major
distinction between the self and God. In all the discussion of becoming like God, union with
Christ, all Christian discourse categorically rejects any hint of pantheism. This is attested to
by Maximus, John of Damascus, Macarius of Egypt, Chrysostom, and a host of others all
through the Christian tradition. 116 Nussbaum also links this with a Platonic metaphysic
concerning the good, “the idea of the radical independence of true good from human need
114
Augustine, The City of God, Book XIX, Chapter 19.
A collection of Orthodox spiritual texts, written between the 4th and the 15th centuries, complied and edited
by Nicodemos of Athos and first published in 1782.
116
These are quoted in Clendenin, op. cit., 130.
115
132
and desire. For both Platonists and these Christians, digging more deeply into ourselves is not
the right way to proceed in ethical inqiury. For the possibility must always be left open that
everything we are and want and believe is totally in error.” 117 With the possibility of sin,
error and self-deception always open, the exercises associated with self-examination, selfcriticism and self-mastery also have a different orientation and telos.
While the Hellenistic schools take medical therapy as their model or metaphor, and
aim for the subjective sense of well-being or happiness, the telos of Christian and Platonic
philosophical practice is change and transformation of the self towards something truly
beyond the self: God or the Good. While the grace of God is necessary for such
transformation to be achieved or even to be begun, such transformation is not passive with
regard to the role of the believer. A great deal of strenuous spiritual effort is also required to
progress in union with God. In the Orthodox tradition, this effort is described using the Greek
term nepsis, which denotes spiritual vigilance, alertness, watchfulness, attentiveness and zeal,
all of which are New Testament concepts describing a spiritual wariness towards sin and the
vices. The asceticism in the Philokalia, the discussion entitled “Self-Denial” in Calvin’s
Institutes, and many other expressions of the disciplines aimed at the uprooting of sins and
vices in the soul, all give the impression that Christian philosophical practice is a gloomy
affair, bent on stealing all joy and happiness out of human life. In fact just the opposite is
true. Asceticism is never an end in itself. Self-denial is not the same as self-rejection. The
doctrine of the Fall is preceded by the doctrine of Creation and the unwavering affirmation
that existence and reality are good. The chief end of man, according to the Westminster
Confession, is to glorify God and to fully enjoy Him forever. In the Philokalia, the
Theoretikon explains our end this way: “Now the purpose of our life is blessedness . . . not
only to behold the Trinity, supreme in kingship, but also to receive an influx of the
divine.” 118
IV. Conclusion
Hadot is not a pluralist. He claims that “philosophical practice is relatively
independent from philosophical discourse. The same spiritual exercise can be justified
after the fact by widely different philosophical discourses.” 119 On the strength of this claim
he recommends, in a very Kantian way, abstracting “from their antiquated cosmological and
mythical elements” in order to find a fundamental, universal essence that corresponds “to
permanent, fundamental attitudes which all human beings find necessary when they set about
seeking wisdom.” 120 The choices on offer from the different schools, “Socrates, Pyrrho,
Epicurus, the Stoics, the Cynics, and the Skeptics, correspond to constant, universal models
which are found, in various forms, in every civilization.” 121 The particular reasons each
school offers for practicing a particular exercise are irrelevant, since the point was “not to
communicate to them some ready-made knowledge, but to form them. . . . to change people’s
117
Martha Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 19.
Theoretikon, in Philokalia, trans. And ed. G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware, 4 vols.
(London: Faber and Faber, 1979-90), 2:43.
119
Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, 277.
120
Ibid., 278.
121
Ibid.
118
133
way of living and of seeing the world.” 122 “The practice of philosophy transcends the
oppositions of particular philosophies.” 123 In short, Hadot really has only one option on offer
to the contemporary practitioner. He would like us to believe that we can dispense with the
theory behind the exercises, and doesn’t acknowledge that every way of seeing the world
entails a theory both of the world and of what it is to see it.
Also Hadot is not a postmodern philosopher. After dismissing all the philosophical
discourses of the ancients, he claims a universal humanity, “an original state: the quiet and
peace which exist deep within us.” Access to this original state will “enable us to achieve
inner peace and communion with other human beings, or with the universe.” The spiritual
exercises are the means to this access; they enable one to move beyond one’s individuality
and egocentrism to a universal nature connecting us to other people and to the universe.124
He then gives pride of place to his own philosophical discourse without any justification for
doing so. “The philosophical way of life must be justified in rational, motivated discourse,
and such discourse is inseparable from the way of life. . . . We must try to render explicit the
reasons we act in such-and-such a way, and reflect on our experience and that of others. . . .
living as a philosopher also means to reflect, to reason, to conceptualize in a rigorous,
technical way . . . .” 125 Hadot seems to take it on faith, that if we only abstract from all our
particularities we can access some universal rational human nature and all find peace and
harmony together. In the aftermath of the horrors of the 20th century this appears hopelessly
naive. Kant, for Hadot, is the true heir to the essence of ancient philosophical practice.
Shusterman doesn’t even try to smuggle in ancient discourse under the guise of the
Enlightenment outlook or even his own preferred discourse of pragmatism. He points out that
“ancient thought is far too dated to provide real options for today’s pursuit of philosophical
life.” 126 But his criterion for selecting real options is not mere chronology. Instead he
advocates investigating those philosophical lives that have been practiced in actual social,
political economic, etc., conditions close to our own. Then we will get at least the possibility
that a particular philosophical practice could become a live option for us.
There are three reasons for allowing traditional Christianity (and orthodox Judaism,
and others) room on the options table of the philosophical practice movement. First, it allows
access to genuinely different ways of seeing the world. For example I will take the contrast
between the phenomenon that Joseph Weiler has termed “Christophobia” and the views of
Leonidas Donskis, a Lithuanian philosopher. Christophobia, in Weiler’s judgment, is an
ideological mesh of eight things that make it “virtually impossible to see, much less
acknowledge, the possibility that Christian ideas, Christian ethics, and Christian history have
anything to do with a Europe committed to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.” 127
One of these components is the conviction that the Holocaust was the logical outcome of
Christian anti-Semitism, and that saying “No” to Christianity is necessary to prevent such a
122
Ibid., 274.
Ibid., 276.
124
Ibid., 278-279.
125
Ibid., 280, cf 268.
126
Shusterman, op.cit., 7.
127
J.H.H. Weiler, Un’ Europa cristiana: Un saggio esplorativo (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2003).
Discussed in George Weigel, The Cube and the Cathedral (New Your: Basic Books, 2005), 72.
123
134
thing from ever happening again. Another is the denial that the Revolution of 1989 was
decisively influenced by Eastern European Christians, especially by Pope John Paul II. There
are more.
But I will contrast this Christophobic way of seeing recent European history with that
of Professor Donskis. He and many others in Eastern Europe have “a profound suspicion of
scientific ideologies.” In a commencement address in 1998 Donskis expressed the view that
One of the most dangerous ideas ever produced throughout history is the
notion that true science has to put aside such things as human values and free
choices. . . . Nazism and Marxism are examples of this dangerous and antipluralist idea. . . .These supposedly objective systems brought immense
destruction and suffering on the Lithuanian nation. Professor Donskis
observed that the Christian faith has nurtured humane qualities, respect for the
person, and freedom in Western civilization. Christian faith, he said, has
sustained pluralist society and made possible the respectful dialogue that is
essential for democracy. 128
The contrast between these ways of seeing is profound. But it is clear that both sides
must employ the principle of charity in listening to the other if any dialogue is to happen. If
either view is not permitted to be heard, then imaginative understanding of how otherwise
intelligent people could disagree so profoundly with one’s own views is lost.
The second reason for including Christianity on the table of options in philosophical
practice is its historical features. It may not be a live option for most North American and
Western European practitioners, but it could become so since it meets Shusterman’s criteria
for having something relevant to offer to the contemporary pursuit of the philosophical life. It
is a live option all over the world. It has been continually practiced and lived for 2000 years,
not merely relegated to the museum as an artefact to be studied. Accordingly, there is a
tremendous wealth of material on the spiritual disciplines, character growth, and
transformation which is mot merely discoursive or academic, but which has come out of the
actual experience and practice of living communities. 129 Also, because there are many
communities of Christian philosophical practitioners, finding a congenial companion, a group
of friends or a whole community to practice with is not terribly difficult. One need not fear
having to go it alone. Digging into the self is essentially a solitary activity, even if one is
sitting in a circle of others who are also doing such digging. “It is not surprising, therefore, to
find that solipsism is one of the more representative infirmities of the modern soul.” 130
Because Christian philosophical attention to the self looks outward, this danger is averted.
Finally, the Christian tradition takes seriously the concept of vice or sin. We need not
be reminded of Solzhenitzen’s statement that the line dividing good from evil runs through
the heart of every person, or Arendt’s insights on the thoughtlessness and banality of evil to
128
David Shenk and Linford Stutzman, Practicing Truth (Scottsdale: Herald Press, 1999), 21.
See, for example, Dallas Willard, Renovations of the Heart (Colorado Springs: Navpress, 2002) or Richard J.
Foster, Celebration of Discipline (HarperSanFrancisco, 1998).
130
Craig Gay, The Way of the (Modern) World: Or; Why It’s Tempting to Live as if God Doesn’t Exist
(Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1998), 196.
129
135
realize that to ignore the possibility of being wrong is extremely dangerous, both to our souls
and to our society.
136
Óscar Brenifier es doctor en filosofía por la
Universidad de la Sorbona (París) y está
especializado en didáctica de la filosofía, talleres
de filosofía y filosofía para niños.
Ha viajado por todo el mundo para desarrollar la
práctica filosófica, tanto dentro del ámbito
universitario como para el gran público, mediante
el café filosófico y el asesoramiento filosófico. Su
colección de libros para niños Philozenfants
(Filoniños) ha sido publicado en diversos idiomas
y multitud de países. Ediciones Idea ha publicado
El diálogo en clase (traducido por Gabriel del
Pilar Arnáiz).
NASRUDDIN HODJA, A MASTER OF THE NEGATIVE
WAY
Oscar Brenifier
París, Francia
A - The negative way
In the beginning of the Hippias minor dialogue, a discussion sets in between Hippias
and Socrates, on the question of who is the best man in the Iliad, between Odysseus (Ulysses)
and Achilles. The debate centers on the issue of lying, and Hippias claims that Achilles is a
better man because he does not lie, contrary to Odysseus, who is the most cunning and doe
not hesitate to hold a false discourse. At a certain point, Socrates shows that Achilles makes
as well statements which are not true, but Hippias then uses as a defense of his hero the fact
he does not lie consciously: he just changed his mind, but he is very sincere. A debate
Socrates concludes by claiming that Odysseus is better than Achilles, since when he lies, he
very well knows that he is lying, so he knows the truth more than Achilles.
We would like to use this example of a classical philosophical text to introduce what
we can call the “via negativa” – negative path - of philosophical practice. We call it “via
negativa” just like the traditional concept of “via negativa” used in particular in theology
137
which is commonly used to determine for example the nature of God though the denial of
what he is not. Thus Socrates defends lying in order to defend the truth, with the same irony
that he claims his own ignorance in order to teach. And what is here used in a more
conceptual and rational way is encountered as well in more playful way by the clown, the
actor, the novelist, the caricaturist, the humorist, etc. All these very common modes of
expression describe or stage certain schemes, behaviors, characters and situations, as a way
to denounce them and obviously prone the opposite of what they represent. Thus the
pretentious, the selfish, the hypocrite, the ambitious or any other typical defect will be
presented in such a ridiculous, gross or exaggerated fashion, that this scenic posture will
evidently criticize the ones who are affected by these defaults in order to encourage the
quality opposite to it. Or at minimum, it represents a “Know thyself” injunction.
An interesting aspect of this scheme is the large proportion of “unsaid” in those
modalities of expression, which leave tremendous room to ambiguity, and as the same time a
lot of space for freedom, since it does not saturate meaning, since it permits multiple
representation and interpretation. The emergence of the comedy in renaissance Europe is a
clear example of this freedom to criticize, both society and the power in place, therefore
giving permission to think. Or what allowed the court jester to play his role of mocking even
the king while going unpunished was precisely the dimension and tremendous ambiguity,
that for example allowed the punning, the spirited playing with words. Harsh criticism came
out of the fool’s mouth, but in such an indirect way that if one would get offended, he would
reveal himself and become the laughing stock of all. The baroque conception where world
and stage become one single entity, making us a distant spectator of our selves, is a good
illustration of this general principle.
1 - Philosophy as science
But negative theology is mystical and comedy is a mere show, when philosophy is
supposed be of a rather scientific order: it should found itself on reason, on logic, on
demonstration, draw a system, therefore ambiguity, innuendos, allusions, exaggeration and
other such “literary tricks” are not exactly welcome. We can here just remember the Hegel
lectures on Plato, where the mere fact that Plato tells a story like the Allegory of the cave
signifies that at this time he is not producing a philosophical discourse. Philosophy can only
be rational and scientific, and this Hegelian heritage will definitely model the face of
philosophy. Therefore the image of the philosopher, as the nature of his productions, tends to
be wise and direct, more than foolish and indirect. After all, in a culture founded within the
matrix of Christian values, let us not forget that the “oblique” is the devil, for the devil is
crafty. In French, the word “malin” means smart or shrewd, but it refers as well to the devil,
since it comes come “malus”: bad.
To be moral therefore mean to say the truth, to say things the way they are, and to
behave according to established standards of the good and the recommendable. In fact, in the
mentioned Plato dialogue, Hippias shows a rather often occulted but fundamental aspect of
the sophist: the sophist is the one who knows, he says the truth, he is the specialist of the
good, the technician of knowledge, the keeper of rightness and morality. Calicles claiming
that one has to follow his impulses and desires and Gorgias reducing speech to mere rhetoric
138
is only an attempt by Socrates to show the fundamental immorality of such a position. Since,
as Pascal said, true morality laughs at morality. And knowledge is in itself immoral, for its
pretensions and hypocrisy, its fundamental negligence of virtue, its disdain for the good, and
moreover its ignorance of being, its absence of being. The rational and moral speech is
merely the discourse of convenience and convention, of good conscience, the philosophical
correctness that Nietzsche criticizes as the “small reason”, in opposition to the “great reason”
of life, or when he denounces the illusory concept of human conscience. For even though this
trend of negative philosophy is not the hegemonic one and is even contrary to it, it maintains
itself as the regular “other” of philosophy: its enemy brother, its shadow and denigrator.
2 - Antiphilosophy
This minority current of philosophy, this antiphilosophy, which pretends to show and
shock more than it pretends to tell and explain, is already very present and visible within
philosophy itself, for example in the character of Socrates, and its devastating irony, this
form of speech that says the contrary of what it says. What a historical joke we have there in
Socrates, that we can recognize as the founding figure of philosophy, its hero and martyr,
with someone that preaches the false to know the true, and even worse, someone that shows
that we are condemned to falsehood since truth cannot be known. He had necessarily to be
killed, he who preached an antilogic, for example in the Parmenides dialogue where every
proposition and its contrary is both tenable and untenable. If the false is true and the true is
false, we don’t know anymore where we stand, we don’t know anymore if we exist: the
carpet has been pulled from under our feet. But what amazing freedom is given to us: the
right to think the unthinkable, all the way into absurdity. Nevertheless, the agonistic
dimension of this otherness, the crossing over on the other side of the mirror, the fragmented
“this sidedness” of reality which refuses the establishment of any system, of any conceptual
and ethical map, is unbearable for both the common man and the knowledgeable man, since
both compose, as raw or cultured as they are, the hierarchy of self evidence and good horse
sense, a worldview where coherency has to be granted.
The cynic, with its total lack of respect for anything and anyone, provides in this
context an interesting historical example: it is the rare case of a philosophical school whose
name is used as well as a moral condemnation. Alongside with nihilism, although someone
like Nietzsche will try to show that contrary to the appearance, the nihilist are not the ones
who appear so to the superficial understanding. And what both cynicism and nihilism
indicate, what they have in common with the Socratic method, is their power of denial, their
heavy dose of contempt. It is not so much here the place to learn, but the place to unlearn.
One should not teach principles, but on the contrary corrode those principles in order to
think. Knowledge is here largely conceived in opposition to thinking, the former conceived
here as a possession of fixed ideas that crystallizes, rigidifies and sterilizes mental processes.
So the main task of the teacher, if teacher be, is to untie or break the knots that knowledge
represents, a knowledge that is characterized as opinion - be it common opinion or educated
opinion, as Socrates distinguishes - in order to free the mind and allow thinking. Just like in
eastern practices such as Zen, what is needed is to short circuit the usual paths of thoughts,
seize them through some shock effect, by mean of some conceptual paradox, critical analysis
139
or some strange behavior, which should hopefully produce some illumination. And when the
mind will wake up to itself, it will know where to go, since mind is naturally inclined to
think, unless it is hindered in its proper activity.
3 - Dialectics
“It is not doubt which makes one crazy, it is certitude” says Nietzsche. Even though
the Nietzschean abrupt interpellation is definitely not the Socratic laborious questioning, they
both agree on this idea that one’s mind should not be jailed within its own thoughts. The
thoughts we entertain necessarily stop us from having other thoughts, especially if those
thoughts are the kind of general principles that determine what is acceptable and what is not.
This has an echo in Heidegger, when he writes: “What gives the most to think in our time
which gives us a lot to think is that we do not think yet.” So we have to become a stranger to
ourselves in order to think, we have to alienate ourselves in order to be. And those
hypotheses are at the heart of the philosophical function as we see it: they found our
philosophical practice. Therefore negativity becomes a major part of our activity, of the
activity we invite our interlocutor to get involved in. The work of negativity, in a more
conceptual way, as Hegel and others define it, is the work of criticism, the crucial step that
allows and conditions dialectical thinking. This is what the German philosopher defines as
the moment following “A is A”, when “A is not A”. But the other form of negativity that
concerns us here is more linked toward open-ended dialectics, when the synthetic moment
that traces the path to the absolute is not definable, not even searched for. This is what we
find in Heraclites, in Socrates, Kant and others: the aporetic perspective, the antinomy, the
open ended tension that leads to the gap, to the abyss, leaving us with a intuitive and strong
presence of the absolute, but an unspeakable one, the thought that Plato calls the
unhypothetical, the unconditioned that conditions the conditioned, the indescribable
vanishing point from which perspective every point can be described.
This general frame work might sound strange to the “reasonable”, “rational”, “down
to earth” or “horse sense” practical person, for whom this looks irrational, unpractical,
mysterious or even mystical. But it is indeed a very simple principle: it is more or less the
reminiscence theory of Plato that operates. Everyone knows everything already, but one has
to remember, a reminiscence that is the job of the philosopher in each one of us. We don’t
know because we forget, and especially because we don’t want to know, we prefer not to
know. So there is no use explaining something to someone when he does not want to know.
There is only to attract his attention to his own attitude through some device that will surprise
or seize him, and he will know by himself, unless the will to know is very profound.
4 - Methods
The way Socrates operated this cognitive shock was through questioning, provoking
the interlocutor into discovering his own incoherency and ignorance, a process which
allowed the person to give birth to new concepts: maïeutics. For Heraclites, the struggle of
contraries engenders being, so the emergence of those contraries allowed us to think and to
be. For the cynics, man is so deeply entrenched in conventions that the only way to get him
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to think is to behave in the most abrupt fashion toward him: by fornicating in public, eating
with the hands, going around naked or living in barrel, by pretending men are not men, etc.
All these theatrics should affect the individual mind more than any speech should do. In the
Far East, the master would produce a strange paradox, or act in a strange way, and the
student should by himself meditate on the meaning of it, without any explanations ever given
to him. And in some schools, the master would not hesitate to become violent in order to
produce the desired “pedagogical” effect. A rather rash perspective which comes as a
repellent for those that think philosophical practice is geared at making one feel at ease or
happy! And a very “unethical” posture indeed since the individual does not constitute his
own end anymore: he is the mere instrument of truth. In a more subdued and formal fashion,
Kant’s antinomies are a conceptual reduction from the same inspiration. In order to think,
you have to know that you operate from a biased partial perspective, from a limited postulate
that could be totally inversed without any problem. For example the hypothesis that the
universe is finite is not less valid than its opposite, the hypothesis that the universe is infinite.
To conclude this rather long preamble, let us add a few words on our own practice, in order
to establish briefly how it inscribes itself in this current of “negative way”. Our postulate is
that most questions we ask ourselves, most problem that haunt us, have their solution in our
own selves, at least more than anywhere else. Thus our main task, with the person we engage
in a philosophical dialogue with, is to become conscious of herself. First by asking her to be
conscious of her own question: through analysis, conceptualization, explanation, and other
forms of deepening the signification and implications of it. Second through inviting this
person to observe carefully her own thought and behaviors and pass judgments on herself.
Thirdly by periodically asking to take the counterpoint of her own ideas and dwelling in
depth this counter perspective. Fourthly to accept and enjoy the “unthinkable” that she has
necessarily produced in the process, which most likely deal in a profound fashion to her own
problem or question. But this particular way of working implies much resistance from our
interlocutor, often stunned at her own ideas, and we therefore have to devise a battery of
“tricks” in order to accomplish the described task and overcome the intense desire to tell
oneself lies and stories of delusion, to avoid the denial. Some observers watching this
practice criticize the fact that we work very closely with the words, just like if the words had
a reality of their own. And we agree with this observation, since this is the way for us to talk
about a practice. The words are not any more what we want, but they constitute an objective
substance that oblige us to confront a “material” reality, what specifies a practice and
distinguishes it from theory. The harsh relationship to the words makes the being visible,
including its own tremendous capacity of self-denial capacity. Therefore we show and act,
rather that say and describe, even though our work constitute primarily of words and ideas.
B - The case of Nasruddin Hodja
There are different reasons why among a number of case studies of the negative way
or antiphilosophy figureheads we chose Nasruddin Hodja. The first reason is that he did not
exist as an actual person, and one of the requirements or our practice is precisely to develop
the capacity of the person not to exist. Nasruddin is a myth more than anything else, even
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though in the city of Akshehir (Anatolia) in Turkey, some will pretend to show you the grave
where he was apparently buried in 1284. If such a historical being did exist, he was only the
starting point for a very large body of stories. The hero of those numerous funny and absurd
tales encounters many situations and can alternately be a peasant, an imam, a boatman, a
roaming predicator, a doctor, a teacher, or a judge, he can have no wife, one wife, two wives
and does not hesitate to practice homosexuality, but more conclusive on the mythical aspect
of his existence is the fact he is portrayed periodically as the jester of Tamerlane, when the
latter conquered Turkey only at the end of the fourteenth century. Like Ulysses, Nasruddin is
no one and everyone, he represents a tradition – oral and written - more than a specific
person, from which he draws his strength as a school of life more than as a petrified hero or a
petrified opus, a nature that is more conform to his being. Even his name changes totally,
since in his fame around the Mediterranean he will come for example to bear the name of
Jiha in Maghreb. And even his original Turkish name Nasruddin is very common in this part
of the world: it means “glory of religion”, Hodja referring to the vague title of “master”.
The second reason we chose him is the popular aspect of his person and what is told
about him, for the nature of the tales that are told easily make him a folk hero, if only
because they are funny and lively, and therefore efficient and pedagogical. Out of those
stories, each listener will hear and understand what he can, with his own means, a
phenomenon that is interesting to watch when one tells those different tales to different
public. The reactions to the different contexts, to the degrees of subtleties, to concreteness or
absurdity, will reveal more than many words who the listener is and how he thinks. Even the
incomprehension of the story will be useful, since it will send back each one to his own
ignorance or blindness.
The third reason is the width of the field covered by those stories, precisely because
they represent a tradition more than a particular author. Questions of ethics, of logic, of
attitudes, existential issues, sociological issues, marital issues, political issues, metaphysical
issues, the list is long that can be drawn of the type of far ranging problems or paradoxes
posed to the person that comes in contact with this body of critical knowledge. The apparent
lightness of many of them reveal and hide a profound understanding of the reality of being,
even if one can easily remain on a superficial external apprehension of them. But if the
“classical” philosopher will claim than the conceptualization and analysis – like the one we
indulge in – is necessary in order to constitute philosophizing, one can as well respond that
this formalization of the content can accomplish a sterilizing function and give the illusion of
knowledge. But let’s leave for another occasion the debate about the nature and form of
philosophy. Although one hint that can be useful as a contextual information, is the close
relationship of Nasruddin to the Sufi tradition, the latter which helped transmit the stories of
Nasruddin, contemporary and neighbor of the great mystique poet Rumi.
The forth reason is the terribly provocative personality of this living myth. At a
moment where political or philosophical correctness tries to promote ethics and “good
behavior” to varnish the civilized brutality of our society, Nasruddin can be very useful, since
he is endowed with about all major defaults of character. He is a liar, a coward, a thief, a
hypocrite, he is selfish, gross, abusive, lazy, stingy, unreliable and impious, but especially he
is an idiot and a fool, and a very accomplished one. But he generously offers all those
grotesque traits of character to the reader, who will see himself just like in a mirror, more
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visible in its exaggerated deformity. He invites us to examine, accept and enjoy the absurdity
of our self, the nothingness of our personal being, as a way to free our own mind and
existence from all those pretensions that are geared at giving us a good conscience, but that
do more to induce personal and social compulsive lies that anything else. His way of being
deals a terrible and appropriate blow to the idolatry of the individual self, so characteristic or
our occidental modern culture, to our factitious and permanent search for identity and
happiness. Through his atrocious “small lies”, Nasruddin helps us set up in broad daylight the
“big lie”. And little by little, we would like to take the place of his best and eternal friend: his
donkey.
But for now let us cut short the rationalization of our own choice in order to comment
and analyze some key stories of Nasruddin Hodja, from which we can get a sense of the
significance of his philosophical content and the implications for life and understanding. We
cannot deal in such a short article with all the themes dealt with in the numerous stories, but
we will give some insight on some of important themes. As well, we will add some hints on
the way that those stories can help in the teaching of philosophical practice, in the
philosophical guidance or consulting work.
As a little philosophical reading exercise or meditation, we suggest to our reader, after
reading each little story, to attempt producing his own analysis before reading ours, in order
to appreciate the difference of interpretation, and we ask him to not hesitate send us his own
so we can as well benefit from it.
1 - Teaching
The preacher
Nasruddin on a trip stops by a small town where the imam just died. Hearing he is a preacher, a
group of faithful comes to get him in order to give the Friday sermon. But Nasruddin does not
really want to do it, he feels tired and protests. But the people insist and he finally accepts. Once on
the pulpit, he asks “Dear brothers, do you know what I will talk about?” And everybody answer in
one voice: “Yes!” So Nasruddin answers: “Well then, there is no use for me to stay here!” and he
leaves. But the people, frustrated of the good word, fetch him once more in spite of his resistance,
and when he asks again the question “ Do you know what I will talk about?” everyone answers
“No!”. To this, Nasruddin answers with a tone of anger: “Then what I am doing with such a bunch
of infidels and pagans !”, and he leaves in a huff. But another time again, the faithful, somewhat
irritated fetch him, in spite of his protests, and he comes back. Everybody is ready for his terrible
question. “Well, do you know what I will talk about? asks he for the third time. “Yes!” shouts half
the crowd. “No!” shouts the other half of the crowd. So Nasruddin answers: “Well I propose that
the ones who know explain everything to the ones who don’t know!” and he leaves.
The preacher is a very interesting story that poses the paradox of teaching in a
Socratic way. The postulate of it is that a teacher can only teach what the students already
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know, implying for example that it is not worth teaching someone if the ideas involved do
not speak already to him, and if it does, he can teach himself. For this reason, the students
actually do not need a teacher, as tries to show Nasruddin when by three times he leaves the
assembly. And the only way the group can teach itself is through discussion, a sort of mutual
teaching, where each student is a teacher. The lazy teacher, or foolish teacher, is therefore a
good teacher: he gets the students to be active and “force” them to mobilize their own
knowledge and be creative, therefore practicing Socratic maïeutics. And of course he does
not explain this to his students: he expects them to figure it out, because he trusts them, even
though he treats them in an apparently “rude” way, which can hurt their “feelings”. And he
should not be worried that they merely stay at the level of appearance: his laziness. That is
the risk to take. No teaching, even the “best”, guarantees understanding anyhow, especially
when there are long explanations.
In our work as a philosopher, many interlocutors will act as the faithful and expect
from us the good word, if not the truth itself, especially when they have difficulties they want
to resolve, or simply because they want to be charmed by a “beautiful speech”. And they will
be very unhappy if they do not get what they want, not understanding that the “man of
knowledge” does not do his duty. But our work here is to teach them to trust themselves, not
by explaining this to them, which would prolong an infantile relationship to the authority, but
by posing a paradox that will make them become conscious - by themselves - of their own
heteronomy, the statute of minority that they impose on their own self. This situation is even
more acute when someone is looking for “motherly” consolation, asking for a soft touch that
will make them feel better: for those, such a behavior is actually intolerable, it will make
them feel rejected, and maybe rightly so. Nasruddin’s practice is pitiless, a lack of mercy that
might just have its own legitimacy. It might make one angry, but on the long run, it might
make him think in a more profound way.
2 - Truth
The key
Late at night, Nasruddin and his neighbor come home from a feast. While trying to open his door,
Nasruddin drops his key on the sidewalk. Hearing this, his friend comes to help him find it. But
Nasruddin leaves him in the dark and start searching in the middle of the street, where beams a
beautiful moonshine. His neighbor, surprised, asks him: “Why are you looking for your key over
there? You lost it over here!”. To which Nasruddin answers: “Do as you wish! I prefer to search
where there is light!”.
This story is very famous in various forms under different climates. It has sometimes
lost some of its strength and significance by loosing the context, when it is known for
example as the story of a drunken man. The fact it comes from Nasruddin, known as wise
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even though foolish in appearance, invites the listener not just to laugh at the silliness, but to
search deeper, behind the surface. And indeed this story about light and dark, the key and the
opening, deals directly with the question of truth. For often, when he is in need, man prefers
to look where he thinks the desired object is, instead of where he has a better chance of
finding it. But the paradox would be too simple, if it was not that as well we can affirm that
man, just like Nasruddin, searches for truth where it more comfortable, where he prefers it to
be, even though he has no chance to find it in this very place. So Nasruddin, depending on
the interpretation, is behaving in the correct way – although appearing foolish - or he is
behaving in an outright foolish way. But maybe in this incertitude lays the crux of the matter:
truth maybe necessary of a paradoxical nature, and we never know what is light and what is
darkness since both are as blinding one as the other.
In our practice, we have noticed that incertitude is one of the most unbearable
situation the human mind knows. We want to know “for sure”. Many ideas come to us, and
because we feel uncertain, we claim we don’t know, or even that we can’t know, a certitude
from which comes despair. But we prefer this certitude of ignorance, including the profound
sense of impotence and the resentment that comes with it, to the incertitude of knowing, to
the anguish of indetermination. Thus to avoid this problem, most of us will cling to certain
ideas or principles, that we will repeat forever like some incantatory mantra, and whenever
we will be asked to look elsewhere and envisage different ideas, we will forcefully refuse to
relinquish what we consider “our ideas” like a snail so attached to his shelter that he will
shrivel up inside his shell whenever anything strange or new seems to threaten him. Our main
task as a philosopher is to invite our interlocutor to allow himself to think bold and daring
thoughts, thoughts which are bold and daring merely because we are not used to think them.
We call this “thinking the unthinkable”. And once these thoughts appear, the problem is to
hear them, accept them and even enjoy them, for even if those thoughts come from itself, the
individual mind wiggles and giggles in order to avoid those ideas and reject them, because
our own thoughts, like unwanted children, make us feel uncomfortable.
3 – Choice
The two wives
Nasruddin has two wives, his older wife Khadidja and her young cousin, but both quarrel a lot to
know which one their husband loves best. They regularly ask him which one he prefers, but
Nasruddin, who likes peace in the household and does not want to risk himself in such a dangerous
endeavor, cautiously prefers to avoid answering their questions, answering that he loves both. But
one day, the two women, tenaciously try to corner him and ask him the following question:
“Suppose that the three of us are in boat and both of us fall in the water. Which one do you help
first?” Nasruddin hesitates then answers: “Well Khadidja, I think that at your age, you must know
a little bit how to swim!”
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Once again, this story captures a number of different issues. In appearance, Nasruddin
is a coward, lying in order to avoid problems, since we “discover” he actually prefers his
younger wife, choosing the “newer” being a classical choice, like children do. And a most
common way to lie is to deny having preferences, refusing to recognize our own tendencies
and subjectivity, thus avoiding making decisions by claiming a certain neutrality in order to
detain everything at the same time. Choosing is full of consequences, and any particular
choice implies the finitude of self. Hence Nasruddin is very human again by claiming he has
no preference. At the same time, the parallel issue is the one of recognition, for if we don’t
like to choose, at least not in a conscious way, on the reverse not only do we like to be
chosen, but also we want at all cost to be chosen, one way or another, like the wives of the
story. To be the elected one is to be special, it gives importance to our self and meaning to
our life. Otherwise, we blend in the generality of humanity, feeling utmost loneliness, a
perspective that is equivalent to a symbolic death. To be loved, or its equivalent, to be the
first, or to be the only one, remains therefore a major existential issue. But although
Nasruddin acts as a coward by not answering, as a liar for not admitting his choice, as a
macho for not taking in account the sensitivity of his wives and as a brute for answering the
way he does, he actually points out in a profound way to the resolution of the problem raised:
autonomy – knowing how to swim - is here the key concept. Indeed, being “older”, Khadidja
should know better than look for outside recognition. She should have less worries about
other’s opinion of her, be more distant about the perception of her self, and deal with reality
in a more autonomous way.
A frequent reason why one looks for the philosopher’s company is the seaming meaningless
of one’s life. This absence of significance is often due to the feeling a lack of recognition: by
the parents, the children, the mate, society, working place, peers, with the consequence of
lack of recognition by one self. Many questions that will be asked, many issues that will be
raised, have this situation as a background or as the only reason. At the same time, the
reverse can be said, that the reason we look for recognition is that we don’t accept or love our
own self. And this is generally the case because we have a number of entrenched ideas about
what we should be and what we are not. The role of the philosopher in all this is first to
dedramatize the issue, but bringing in the reality principle in order to deflate the balloon, so
actual thinking can take place in all sobriety. Especially since in general those issues, when
one comes to discuss them, have taken quite an obsessive turn in the mind of their beholder.
We are what we are, and life is not what our desires and fears make out of it. We know how
to swim, don’t we? We just forget that we know, and that is reason often we are capable to
drown ourselves in a glass of water. And like a drowning person who refuses to be helped,
whom motivated by panic even threatens and molests the helping hand, the needy mind will
throw every stick and stones at her disposal to everyone around in order not to think, before
admitting that this was nothing but a big “schwarmereï”, as Hegel calls it. The hustling and
bustling of whirling emotions that looks like thoughts, but actually completely hinder any
actual thinking. Therefore, how can the philosopher on those premises avoid being
straightforward and rude? If in order to think one has to stop thinking – an excellent guiding
principle - any indulging in a “nice discussion” might only reinforce the non-thinking. The
reality principle is then an excellent master and guide.
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4 – Morality and logic
The rooster
A couple of young men, known pranksters, wanted to play a trick on Nasruddin at the public bath.
They each take one egg, hide it, and then propose to Nasruddin a wager. Each one will try to lay an
egg, and the one who cannot will have to undress in front of everyone. Nasruddin accepts, and the
two start wiggling their ass, clucking like hens, and finally drop their egg. Seeing this, Nasruddin
lets down his towel, and visibly animated by an intense physical desire starts pursuing the two
“hens”. The two young men, scared and scandalized at this sight, start screaming. “ Nasruddin!
What are you doing? Have you gone crazy?” “Well my little chicks, calm down!” answers the
Hodja. “How can you lay an egg again if you don’t let the rooster climb on you?”
A major theme covered by this story is actually a very common one in the Nasruddin
story: the question of logic, of consistency and coherency, of sense, up to its limits, the
confrontation to the absurd, to the senseless. A confrontation of meaning to meaninglessness,
which explains why in so many of those stories, Nasruddin has all the appearance of a
lunatic, of a fool, of an insane person. What is happening here? Two persons want to be
smart, smarter than a third one, and the gain they get is that by making the latter a fool, they
will prove their smartness to themselves and everyone. But the trap closes down on them,
since Nasruddin takes their “game” even further, to such an extremity that they recoil and
shriek: they fear for themselves and rules of morality are being breached. Who knows what
can then happen! The reaction of the “master” is to teach not with words and explanations
but with actions, unwholesome actions, with theatrics, for this will speak more, in a more
striking and efficient way. In this case Nasruddin runs after his “students” in order to
sodomize them in public. They thought he would be scared of exposing his nudity, and he
exposes even more of himself, thus exposing them! We are here at the heart of
antiphilosophy. Nasruddin shows rather than demonstrate. The immorality or foolishness of
the pranksters initiative is not denounced by some kind of lecture or rational discourse, but
by setting a course even more foolish or immoral, although some “open minded” modern
readers might have a hard time with this aspect of things… Ironically, there is a pharisaic
dimension to these two young men, very typical of immoral behavior: who, more than the
immoral is more willing to denounce immorality, as they do here? Is it not a nice and easy
way to pretend or regain certain “virginity”? Or simply because one is scared of pursuing or
just envisaging the consequences of one’s actions. “This goes too far!” they will say: they are
shocked! Just like if they were not already well engaged in this path. Nasruddin here is a
teacher of the cynic kind, who wants to act as a mirror, by putting into light and amplifying a
certain way of thinking. True morality laughs at morality.
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The philosophical consultant has for major obstacle in his work what many a
philosopher has called “good conscience”, although this “good conscience” has a mirror
image: “bad conscience”. Moral conscience – a fundamental faculty - is often contrary to
consciousness, although funnily in a number of Latin languages the word is the same. Since
there is a “bad” judgment put on some of our thoughts and actions, we don’t want to see
them for what they are. We want to feel good, we want to enjoy the feeling that we are on the
right side of things, with the “good guys”, when the “bad guys” are way on the other side. As
a result of this pressure, be it of personal origin, familial or social, the subject does not dare
think what he thinks, does not want to recognize his own thoughts, or will refuse to pass
judgment on them. There is a powerful form of self-denegation, a denial of one’s own
thinking or desires, just to conform to some established principles or values. Nasruddin is
here useful, since he invites us to freedom of thought and action, he incites us to abandon at
least momentarily any fear of the “others”, their glare and their judgments. If one wants to
please the others, look moral or intelligent, the chances are he will think and act stupid and
immoral, even if the “others” grant him the expected award. Convention is a pact where by
everyone agrees to act and think in the same way in order to congratulate each other. In order
to think freely, the question is not simply to denounce systematically the conventions: this
could amount to a mere reactive adolescent behavior. It is necessary to examine them,
recognize their statute, evaluate them, their pros and cons, and determine with a “free” mind
if they are worth abiding by. But unless one is capable in some way to break the law, the law
is only a reign of terror, since no law, moral or legal can pretend to any kind of absolute.
Therefore one should learn to respect the law, learn to violate the law, and especially learn
when either is appropriate and necessary. At least in the perspective of philosophical
counseling as we see it.
As for logic, the interesting point is that logic, often perceived as a constraint that
“limits” our thinking, is here used as a crucial tool in order to become conscious of one’s
own thinking. For indeed, as Nasruddin did, if we prolong the “logical” course of any
perspective, we will have a good insight into its value or significance. As absurd as the ideas
are, we will be able to think them instead of shutting our eyes in order to protect our good
intentions, through pseudo-reasonable rationalizations. But we have to transgress certain
well-established principles, for example the prohibition to exaggerate. The “logical”
projections of our own ideas, however absurd they seem, is always a liberating and
enlightening thought experiment, a simple procedure very useful for the philosophy
practitioner. This is what the two young men should understand from their teacher.
5 - Fault
The turban
Nasruddin while on a trip stops late at night at the inn. There is only one room left, with two beds,
one of which is already occupied. No problem, says our man. Just wake me up at dawn: I have to
leave early. And don’t make the mistake, I am the one with the turban, adds he, while taking it off
and putting it on the chair next to the bed.
At daybreak he rushes out and leaves on his donkey. At midday, seeing a fountain he wants to
quench his thirst. While bending over, the water mirrors him, and he notices his head is bare.
“What an imbecile this innkeeper! exclaims he, irritated, I told him explicitly: the one with the
turban. And he woke up the wrong person!”
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“I am fine and the world is wrong”. Or “It’s their fault”, is a recurrent theme in the
Nasruddin corpus, to shed light on a typical human mental habit. Especially when this takes
place in the context of intense activity, when the busy little beings we are have no time to
think, take no time to think. The “other” is the easy way out, like little children “He made me
do it!”. Other form, very classical, the Cassandra syndrome: “I told them and they did not
listen to me!”. Once again, the form of the “argument” or its internal localized “logic” is very
coherent. After all, Nasruddin did tell the innkeeper to wake up a man with a turban, and he
did not: he woke up a bare headed man… You really cannot trust anyone. What is at stake
here, beside the question of avoiding personal responsibility and taking the time and liberty
to think? It is once more the problem of universality, of objectivity, of reason, of reality. The
tendency for each one of us is to produce a speech that fits us, that makes us feel
comfortable. This usual speech, we don’t even have to think about it, it comes naturally, as a
defense mechanism, as a sort of conatus of our ego who wants to survive and protect itself:
we are ready to think and say just about anything in order to rationalize our little self and the
image it projects. And if someone dares attempt to interrupt it, either we claim his speech
makes no sense, or we just send him back to his own reduced subjectivity, which is not more
legitimate than ours: it is just his opinion. His against ours.
The insight or help Nasruddin provides here to the philosophy practitioner is the
understanding of the gap or discrepancy between any “particular reason” and the wider
ranging reason which Descartes claims is “the most widely shared thing in the world”. When
someone comes to meet the philosopher, he outlines a “home made” rationality, a sort of
personal architecture that he inhabits, in which he might just be a blind prisoner. So the role
of the counselor here is to invite his interlocutor to momentarily step out of himself, by
proposing to conceive some other imaginary self which would think otherwise, or that would
have to entertain a discussion with the neighbor, with the common man, with a group or
persons. At that point, it can be hoped that the guest will glimpse the arbitrariness or
foolishness of his own path, the limitedness of it. And if for some reason, which may seem
legitimate or not for the practitioner, the interlocutor wants to maintain his position, he will
do it we a more conscious mind, and that is the whole point. The requirement here is
therefore to dedouble ourself, as Hegel invites us to do, as a condition for consciousness: in
order to think, we have to see ourself thinking. The mind has to become and object to itself,
on which it can act. It has to dare see itself thinking, in particular in all those little
ratiocinations it knows so well how to concoct. And the role of the philosopher is here
nothing but to create the conditions of this visibility.
C - The Punch line
There is general paradox in the character of Nasruddin. He is terrible with us, he is
devastating and pitiless with our egos, but we love him for it. In a period where reigns
philosophical correctness, where we are supposed to be so nice and make everyone happy,
when there is so much discourse on ethics probably because there is so little ethics,
Nasruddin does not try to “value” the individual and make him feel good. To philosophize is
for him to show the nothingness of the particular being, so egocentric and blind. But then,
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why do we accept from him the kind of terrible criticisms we would not accept even from our
best friend? One reason might be that he is actually pitiless for himself as well, which makes
him our own brother, our better self. A brother that sacrifices himself to show us how foolish
we are, who laughs at himself in order to laugh at us, a thwarted and funny kind of
compassion. As a sort of inverted Christ like figure, who goes one step further that Socrates
on the irony, as a good humored cynic, he takes on his own back all the stupidity, lies and
mediocrity of the human species. But we should beware of making a martyr out of
Nasruddin, for he would laugh at us for such a silly and sentimental idea. Just one more trick
we invent to feel good! At the same time, let us entertain silly ideas about him. For it seems
to us that the Nasruddinian perspective is not so much that men won’t be fools anymore, but
that they will know a little bit they are great fools. The question here is not to cure, if only
because there is no way to cure, or because there is nothing to cure...
There is nothing left to do but to watch the wonderful spectacle of the pathology, and to
enjoy it as a Punch and Judy show, as grand theatre. Let us be entertained by this comedy of
errors, let us laugh at the human drama. Much to do about nothing. That would be an
excellent title. So let’s keep on being foolish and enjoy it. Maybe something will come out of
all this joke and laughter.
------------------Some extra stories (to be spread throughout the introduction)
The toothache
Nasruddin suffers atrociously from a toothache. But being rather soft, he is too scared to go the
barber that would take care of him.
A neighbor, impressed by his red and inflated mouth asks him to open his mouth.
“By Allah! What an abscess! If your tooth was in my mouth, I would have it pulled out right
away.”
“ So would I!” answers Nasruddin.
The guest
Once more, Nasruddin has managed to enter a feast where he was not invited. But this time, the
host has noticed his presence.
“What are you doing here, Nasruddin? As far as I know I did not invite you!”
“Well, Omar, it is not because you fail on your essential duties that it will deter me from the right
path!”
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The poet
A man of the town who indulges in poetic pretensions asks Nasruddin to listen to some of his
poems. After patiently listening the long declamation, Nasruddin renders a very frank judgment:
the work is turgid, pompous and vain. At those words, the author becomes red with anger, and for
five good minutes, he insults Nasruddin, throwing at him all the possible names.
When the man calms down, Nasruddin comments: “Your poetry is atrocious, but your prose is
really excellent!”
Ignorance
A man was jealous of Nasruddin’s reputation as a man of knowledge. In order to challenge him
and proves he is much wiser, he sends a list of forty very difficult questions. The Hodja takes them,
and one by one, answers “I don’t know”. His wife Khadidja, a practical woman, seeing this, tells
him: “Since you cannot answer any of them, why don’t you write just once “I don’t know”, instead
of repeating all the time.” To which Nasruddin answers: “Oh ungrateful woman! Don’ you see this
poor man has spent all his efforts trying to spread his knowledge for me. The least I can do, with
my answers, by sheer politeness is to spread my ignorance for him.
A good deal
Nasruddin has a job helping people cross the river on his back. Five blind men hire him and ask for
the price. “Five coins” says he. He carries four of them on the other shore without any problem, but
the fifth one is heavier and our man is getting tired. The blind man falls, gets carried away by the
stream, and drowns. The others had heard his screams and ask if there is any problem. “Not at all!
answers Nasruddin, on the contrary you have now a much better deal: it will cost you only four
coins!”
The first one
In the middle of the afternoon, when everyone is taking a nap behind closed shutters, Nasruddin
stays in the middle of the town square under a terrible sun. A neighbor sees him and asks him what
he is doing there, risking a sunstroke when nothing is going on around there. Nasruddin answers:
“Yes, but in case something happens, I want to be the first one!”
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Words
Ali wants to borrow Nasruddin’s donkey. “My donkey is not here”, answers Nasruddin. But Ali
hears from behind the house the bray of the donkey. Ali gets mad: “What kind of friend are you,
you who claim your donkey is not there when it is in your garden!”. Nasruddin answers: “And you,
what kind of friend are you, who prefer to believe my donkey than believe me!”.
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5. FILOSOFÍA MODERNA I
153
154
Godofredo Jesús Chillida Mejías (Valencia, 1972) Licenciado en Filosofía por la
Universidad de Valencia. Actualmente reside en Barcelona en donde ha cursado
una Diplomatura de Postgrado (U.A.B) y en estos momentos prepara el trabajo de
investigación para la conclusión del Máster. Es miembro de la Associació de
Filosofia Pràctica de Catalunya (A.F.P.C) interesándose Chillida Mejías trabaja
como agente en una multinacional de origen sueco, llevando a cabo sus funciones
dentro de una campaña de productos financieros, en donde también ha llevado a
cabo labores de formador. Así mismo ha confeccionado diversos artículos para la
publicación que gestiona la propia empresa, tratando temas como: la
comunicabilidad dentro del ámbito empresarial o la gestión de conflictos en la
toma de decisiones. Recientemente ha participado en las Jornadas de Ética
Aplicada (Universidad Ramón Llull) presentando la comunicación “La empresa
como agente social”.
THOMAS HOBBES: LA CESIÓN ESTRATÉGICA
Godofredo J. Chillida Mejías
Barcelona, España
La felicidad es un continuo progreso en el deseo; un continuo pasar de un objeto a
otro. Conseguir una cosa es sólo un medio para lograr la siguiente. La razón de esto
es que el objeto del deseo de un hombre no es gozar una vez solamente, y por un
instante, sino asegurar para siempre el camino de sus deseos futuros. Por lo tanto,
las acciones voluntarias y las inclinaciones de todos los hombres no sólo tienden a
procurar una vida feliz, sino a asegurarla. Sólo difieren unos de otros en los modos
de hacerlo. Estas diferencias provienen, en parte, de la diversidad de pasiones que
tienen lugar entre hombres diversos, y en parte, de las diferencias de conocimiento y
opinión que cada uno tiene en lo que respecta a las causas que producen el efecto
deseado.
De manera que doy como primera inclinación natural de toda la humanidad un
perpetuo e incansable deseo de conseguir poder tras poder, que sólo cesa con la
muerte 131 .
Thomas Hobbes
ABSTRACT
En el presente trabajo propongo la utilización de diferentes conceptos hobbesianos
como: acción racional, violencia, intereses, beneficios, acuerdo, etc., pensando que su
aplicación al ámbito empresarial puede resultar útil para el asesor filosófico, allí donde la
toma de decisiones compromete algo más que la aceptación de un taxativo y conclusivo
resultado. El uso de estas ideas y conceptos puede servir de ayuda a la práctica del
131
HOBBES, Thomas: Leviatán. Madrid, Alianza., 2002. Cap. XI. Un incansable deseo de poder en todos los
hombres. (Pág. 93)
155
Philosophical Consulting para comprender y analizar los momentos en los que se producen
conflictivos.
Al situar el punto de atención sobre Thomas Hobbes, pretendo poner de relieve las
nociones que este pensador nos brinda en torno a la cuestión de las acciones racionales,
básicas para la elaboración de un contrato pacificador que evite el imperio de la pura
violencia. Mi pretensión se centra especialmente en la articulación entre la visión hobbesiana
respecto de los momentos de enfrentamiento enérgico individual (y la solución diseñada por
él), y las situaciones conflictivas dadas en el seno de la empresa, a la hora de llevar a cabo la
toma de decisiones en casos tales como: acuerdos inter-departamentales, aplicación de
sanciones o incluso despido de empleados.
El texto teórico irá acompañado de un ejemplo práctico, en el que llevaré a cabo la
aplicación de las conclusiones extraídas en la primera parte del estudio, con el fin de poder
ofrecer las herramientas necesarias para la solución del conflicto presentado en el caso.
Introducción:
En el presente escrito deseo mostrar la articulación que permita advertir el vínculo
entre algunas nociones teóricas del pensamiento hobessiano, contenidas en el análisis sobre
el diseño político-social y, las múltiples situaciones conflictivas dadas en el desarrollo de la
empresa actual. Apuesto por esta decisión al entender que la empresa no permanece ajena a
lo que acontece en el núcleo social que la sustenta, sino que la atención entre comunidad y
corporación es dinámica y atenta.
Pese a ser consciente de la distancia temporal existente y, por tanto, reconociendo que
el tema de estudio que Hobbes afronta no es el de la empresa (cosa imposible en el siglo
XVII) creo que conceptos tales como acuerdo, poder, orgullo o insensatez, hallados en el
Leviatán, pueden ser útiles para interpretar y analizar el comportamiento de los individuos
dentro de la empresa, en especial en casos en los que la disputa se hace explícita y las
tensiones impiden el avance en conjunto, cosa que resulta nociva para los intereses de la
organización empresarial.
La puesta al día del pensamiento hobbesiano dentro de la actividad económicoempresarial contemporánea, en la que cualquier acción cooperativa se transforma en un gesto
cargado de sobreesfuerzo, permite observar como ciertas decisiones tomadas a la hora de
obtener el fin deseado (por ejemplo: recortar gastos en los materiales de oficina o implantar
un producto nuevo en el mercado) poseen un origen y desarrollo que refuerzan el ego
individual o corporativo. Sin embargo, en los últimos años dentro de la acción empresarial ha
crecido el interés por establecer medios que posibiliten mayor comunicación y entendimiento
entre todos aquellos afectados por su actividad, es decir, entre quienes pertenecen a su
propio funcionamiento y, sobre los que redunda de forma directa sus decisiones, léase, el
conjunto social. Aunar esfuerzos es el modo más racional de conseguir el objetivo pretendido
y por tanto, colaborar es mucho más beneficioso que mantener posiciones beligerantes.
Si alguien desarrolla un pensamiento que permite atisbar a la empresa como un
terreno en el que sólo reina la acción agresiva, obliga a reducirla a un estado de excesiva
incomprensión entre los sujetos que la componen, por el contrario, si asegura que el sector
empresarial tiene que definirse por medio de un talante de voluntariado cooperante, también
156
está incurriendo en una hipérbole. Quizá lo más interesante sea aproximar ambas posiciones.
El tema, visto desde este posicionamiento abierto, se presenta como un reto para el asesor
filosófico, al poder colaborar con su práctica a desarrollar herramientas interpretativas
acordes con las demandas establecidas dentro del contexto plural y global en el que el ser
humano, imbricado en la corporación empresarial, lleva a cabo la acción electora que le
permite continuar reconociéndose dentro del cambio sufrido en cada toma de decisión
profesional.
Antes de pasar a vehicular la exposición del tema, quisiera reconocer que si bien la
psicología, la sociología o incluso la antropología se han acercado al mundo empresarial de
forma directa, la filosofía no parece haberse aproximado extensamente de un modo práctico,
es decir, definido y concreto con ánimo de aportar herramientas válidas que puedan ser
aplicadas en el sector empresarial. Sin embargo hay que reconocer que el análisis e
interpretación filosófico pueden ser de extrema utilidad para un ámbito en el que el juego
discursivo adquiere un papel fundamental. Desde esta perspectiva es desde donde se inicia la
justificación del Philosophical Consulting aplicado al universo empresarial.
Un acuerdo beneficioso para todas las partes implicadas:
Creo que el interés que despierta el pensamiento de Thomas Hobbes estriba en como
solventa el problema creado, en el intento de hacer congeniar los intereses individuales con
los grupales, en donde cada individuo se inter-relaciona lidiando con diferentes intereses,
también, individuales. Hobbes pone el acento en el individuo insertado en el grupo, como un
ser egoísta cuyo deseo básico es ver cumplidas sus voliciones. Este razonamiento empuja al
filósofo inglés a advertir cómo el individuo, al querer progresar dentro de un grupo social,
debe pactar con el resto de miembros. De ese modo se ve obligado a ceder parte de sus
derechos personales (por ej., recortar su libertad de acción cuando ésta resulte lesiva para
otro miembro del grupo) si quiere concretar aquellos deseos que estimulan su acción. Este
movimiento responde al hecho de buscar siempre el mejor resultado posible, sin llegar a
poner en peligro ni la propia integridad (física y moral) ni el propósito buscado. Es preferible
sacrificar aspectos accesorios a perder definitivamente la posibilidad de obtener el beneficio
deseado.
En términos generales, el individuo pone en marcha el diseño de acciones racionales,
sabedor y temeroso de los elevados riesgos de vivir en un estado de pura violencia (de
conflicto abierto), por ello decide establecer estrategias que le permitan obtener los objetos
deseados con el costo menos elevado y con el resultado más óptimo posible. El individuo es
capaz de diseñar un conjunto de acciones que le llevan a dar el paso contractual para quedar
unido a otros individuos que, por supuesto, también poseen deseos que materializar tales
como: el reconocimiento social, la obtención de bienes materiales, el llevar una vida sencilla
y tranquila (sin excesivas preocupaciones), etc. sin que ello signifique que todas las
intenciones desiderativas (de todos los individuos) deban coincidir.
157
A la hora de salvar la distancia establecida entre individuo y comunidad, me
gustaría hacer patente el valor que Hobbes da a la figura del contrato, como elemento básico
para afrontar circunstancias de enfrentamiento abierto y de difícil reconciliación. Con el
establecimiento del contrato se acentúa la acción negociadora que el individuo debe llevar a
cabo en los espacios comunes, en donde se dan diferentes intereses, sin que ello suponga
desistir en la consecución de los propios fines. La empresa, tomada como ejemplo, es un
campo paradigmático en el que acontecen situaciones tensas entre individuos, debido a la
importancia de tomar decisiones adecuadas que ayuden a conseguir los intereses de la
corporación, lo cual supone una inversión considerable de tiempo, recursos y dinero por parte
de los entes empresariales, al enfocar el rumbo de sus acciones hacia los objetivos
pretendidos.
Ante lo apuntado, tal vez sea interesante destacar el esfuerzo que el individuo debe
realizar para establecer vías transitables entre sus deseos y los deseos de los demás, de tal
modo que posibiliten un entramado comunicativo mínimo pero efectivo, válido para
entretejer un espacio habitable pese a los puntos de choque entre las intenciones particulares.
La solución contractual permite la posibilidad fáctica de asentar la convivencia entre
individuos con diferentes intereses. El contrato posibilita el acuerdo entre posiciones
dispares, estableciendo un espacio intermedio en el que se cede parte de la vehemencia
individual para sacar provecho de la nueva situación, lo que supone ser capaz de utilizar la
fuerza que las partes implicadas vierten en ese artificial espacio común, en beneficio propio.
Es en este paso en donde la acción racional alcanza su expresión más nítida La cesión
estratégica es el punto básico para agilizar el entendimiento de los diferentes sujetos que
conforman la sociedad y, por supuesto, de quienes llevan a cabo su labor dentro del campo
empresarial. Ponerse de acuerdo, convenir respecto a qué decisión tomar para que ésta dé una
respuesta válida a la situación conflictiva, es el paso que ofrece sentido a la puesta en común
de desiguales niveles de discursos e intereses.
Para Hobbes el ser humano no tiene un carácter naturalmente político, lo cual
significa que no busca la vía del entendimiento, en primera instancia, para poner solución a
su co-existir en el grupo en el que se inserta. Pues bien, si el Philosophical Consulting es
una actividad encaminada a dotar de herramientas racionales al sujeto para facilitar el mayor
grado de entendimiento sobre el mundo que le circunda (tanto como del que contiene en sí)
no parece erróneo el diagnóstico del filósofo inglés como piedra de toque, sobre la que
afianzar la perspectiva dialogante en la que el hombre se define como individuo que, actúa
desde la voluntad privada de obtener aquello que desea, siendo que para ello desarrollará
todas las estrategias que considere necesarias con la única intención de poseer el objetivo que
quiere, tratando de evitar un daño excesivo para sí.
Con motivo de la justificación sobre la validez teórica de Hobbes, parece necesario
valorar su mirada a la hora de advertir que el ser humano se define por su carácter y actitud
individual, lo que supone destacarlo como aquel ser que se basta a sí mismo al estar dotado
de razón. Por eso, y gracias al contrato, se puede conciliar la acción individualista de modo
que se llegue a construir una zona común en la que los distintos intereses tengan cabida. La
empresa como elemento social activo también debe buscar atemperar las diferentes
posiciones desiderativas, nada cooperativas, que se puedan dar en su seno.
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Si los individuos se asocian política y económicamente para conseguir mejor sus
fines, es decir, para optimizar sus resultados, parece coherente apuntar la necesaria
interacción entre todos. Pero este modo de actuar debe ser mediado, para salvaguardar tanto
la integridad física del individuo como la moral. Concretando, el acto contractual es un acto
defensivo, un movimiento estratégico que permite seguridad a la acción individual aislada, ya
que en la acción humana inter-actúan múltiples factores y no todos ellos intervienen con
patrones de lógica racional.
Respecto a esto, el filósofo inglés también se fija en los motivos que impulsan al
individuo a actuar de modo ajeno al grupo, al señalar el sentimiento de ‘orgullo’ como motor
impulsor de su acción. Ello se da cuando el individuo desea sentir disfrute de la superioridad
que sobre los demás le reportan sus acciones, dándose por definición una situación de
dominador y dominados. Por otro lado necesita llevar adelante sus proyectos apoyándose en
los sujetos, ante los que se jacta, para posibilitar sus propios fines debido a que en su fuero
interno se reconoce débil, temeroso e incapaz para afrontar en soledad tal empresa. El riesgo
reside en que la búsqueda de seguridad puede llegar a transformarse en orgullo, lo que
supone una exploración encaminada a la obtención de un poder excesivo 132 . Si pensamos en
un grupo elevado de individuos (supongamos una empresa) en el que su relación no estuviera
mediada por el gesto contractual, la posibilidad de un final lesivo en el enfrentamiento por
conseguir el objeto de deseo sería habitual. Sin embargo, gracias al uso de la razón
estratégica, la violencia 133 queda reducida al producirse el establecimiento de un espacio
común concebido tras la cesión de la fuerza, de todos y cada uno, de los participantes en la
situación conflictiva por mor de la reconstitución del orden 134 .
Hobbes anota: ...la RAZÓN, en este sentido, no es otra cosa que un calcular, es decir,
un sumar y restar consecuencias de los nombres universales que hemos convenido para
“marcar” y “significar” nuestros pensamientos. Digo” marcar”, cuando lo que hacemos es
razonar por nosotros mismos, y “significar”, cuando lo que hacemos es demostrar o probar
nuestros razonamientos a otros hombres. 135
Esta razón estratégica permite inferir que la defensa de los propios intereses alcanza
firmeza al suavizar el deseo de conseguir aquello que uno se propone. Dentro de este proceso
el sujeto continúa viendo como privado al objeto del deseo, observando con mayor claridad
la posibilidad de poder defenderlo haciendo uso del derecho individual que le ampara,
obtenido al participar en el espacio común. No obstante, al reconocer la existencia de otros
intereses (también personales) en los sujetos que le rodean, concluye que por medio del
egoísmo superlativo no conseguirá su pretensión sin entrar en un enfrentamiento erosivo que,
mientras duré, le alejará de lo que verdaderamente desea. La salida que se abre es la
cooperación, aunque ello suponga ceder parte de aquello que sólo a uno le pertenece. Al
tomar en cuenta a los demás (sus voluntades específicas e intereses personales) se pretende
obtener lo propiamente deseado, pues estos objetivos permiten la acción constructora del
camino individual, al ir adquiriendo jalón tras jalón aquello que motiva y define la propia
132
Op. Cit.: Cap. XIII. De la igualdad procede la desconfianza / De la desconfianza, la guerra. (Pág. 113)
Dentro del campo empresarial se podría crear sustituir la palabra violencia por: “no consecución de objetivos
(pérdidas)”, “mala negociación”, “enfriamiento de beneficios”, “pérdida de clientes”…
134
Op. Cit. : Cap. XI. Del miedo a la muerte o a ser herido.
135
Op. Cit.: Cap. V. La razón definida. (Pág.: 46)
133
159
existencia, aunque a primera vista los resultados obtenidos se conciban como sub-óptimos
respecto del deseo original.
Desde luego esta cesión del interés individual hacia un proyecto común, no se da sin
la puesta en práctica del voto de confianza que todos los miembros del grupo deben ofrecer a
los demás. Esta confianza queda sustentada por el marco legal que rige la actividad humana
específica, dentro de los diferentes ámbitos en los que se desarrolla.
El individuo ante la necesidad de ceder parte de su espacio privado, no duda en
construir un marco legal para dibujar el entorno en el que la acción compartida puede ser
beneficiosa para todos los participantes. Ello significa que no toma las leyes de la naturaleza
como si se tratara de un simple recolector de “guías para la acción”, sino que por el contrario
las leyes son desarrolladas por demanda de la praxis individual, que acentúa el
enfrentamiento de un sujeto con respecto del otro, de un sujeto con respecto a todos los
demás que no son él y, facilitándose la libre actuación dentro de los parámetros acordados.
Éste es uno de los motivos por los que el asesor filosófico puede colaborar en la dilucidación
de salidas a problemas empresariales, ya que es capaz de ofrecer lecturas interpretativas que
permitan el análisis racional de las tensiones producidas en la práctica de la empresa.
Comprender por qué suceden ayuda a evitar su repetición y, es en este momento en el que
hay que considerar como beneficiosas las acciones emprendidas por el filósofo. Aquí es
donde adquiere valor para la empresa la inversión realizada en la asesoría.
Por supuesto no hay que entender el resultado obtenido como una panacea, ya que en
el estado de cosas siempre en movimiento dentro de la empresa, la confrontación de intereses
fuerza al agente (bien sea corporativo o individual) a generar el mínimo de acciones
desinteresadas (no egoístas) puesto que éstas tienden siempre a someterse a aquellas otras
interesadas, en cuanto se enfrentan en algún contexto de conflicto abierto. Un ejemplo claro
de esto acontece a diario en cualquier ambiente laboral, en donde se puede advertir sin
mucho esfuerzo que, un número elevado de individuos, en el mayor número de ocasiones,
sólo llega a sacrificar sus intereses personales por los ajenos en dos casos exclusivos; bien
cuando el sacrificio sea de una proporción menor al fin ajeno conseguido, bien cuando el
sacrificio pese a ser mayor, ofrezca un beneficio redundante en seres o causas cercanas al
agente. Aquí se observa de nuevo la pugna de fuerzas que merman la confianza, una
confianza que debe renovarse a cada instante y que sólo se lleva a efecto si comprendemos la
posición del otro ante el que nos situamos. Si realizamos individualmente una cesión
estratégica de los deseos, nos acercamos a resultados más interesantes, nos acercamos al
interés perseguido con mayor seguridad.
Para ahondar en el entendimiento de la justificación de la razón estratégica en los
casos de toma de decisiones, podemos tener en cuenta otro elemento importante dentro del
ámbito corporativo de la empresa, pues su peso es decisivo a la hora de elegir una acción u
otra, a saber: el poder. El poder puesto en juego como valor ponderable, no se busca por sí
mismo sino que más bien su búsqueda hay que entenderla como un modo para asegurar
aquellos objetivos que interesan obtenerse. El poder es el dominio que sobre los demás se
propone el individuo, para así lograr aquello que cree bueno para sí.
Hobbes es explícito al respecto cuando señala que:
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...el PODER de un hombre lo constituyen los medios que tiene a su mano para obtener un
bien futuro que se le presenta como bueno... El más grande de los poderes humanos es el
que está compuesto de los poderes de la mayoría, unidos, por consentimiento, en una sola
persona natural o civil que puede usarlos todos según su propia voluntad –como es el caso
en el poder de una república- o dependiendo de las voluntades de cada hombre en particular
–como es el caso en el poder de una facción o de varias facciones aliadas. Por tanto, tener
siervos es poder; tener amigos es poder: son fuerzas unidas... Asimismo, las riquezas,
acompañadas de liberalidad, son poder, porque procuran amigos y sirvientes. Sin liberalidad
no ocurre así, porque en ese caso las riquezas no defienden, sino que provocan la envidia de
los hombres y se convierten en una presa codiciada. 136
La razón de cálculo, entendida dentro del actual panorama empresarial, queda
identificada como herramienta por medio de la que se pretende asegurar la obtención de unos
fines específicos en situación de conflicto. El sistema de anticipación elaborado por el
cálculo estratégico lleva hacia el grado de control necesario para bloquear otro poder
existente, de igual o superior energía al nuestro y que representa un peligro efectivo a los
intereses que nos proponemos. A sí mismo sirve para evaluar la repercusión de tal toma de
decisión, al reconocer la ubicación individual dentro del grupo en el que lleva a cabo los
propios proyectos. La razón estratégica conlleva la toma de conciencia sobre la existencia del
otro pero, cómo separarse del impulso individual que define la acción egoísta.
El problema de resolución lineal adquiere carácter de prisma abierto hacia un
conjunto más complejo de opciones. Esta complejidad se deriva, en parte, de la necesidad
que el individuo tiene de contar con los demás sujetos que no son él, si desea aunar esfuerzos
en pro de intereses similares. Pues bien, si la filosofía es capaz de profundizar en los motivos
por los que se actúa en los momentos de confrontación de intereses, entonces su utilidad
queda más que asegurada en aquellos casos en los que sea necesario disolver antagonismos
que de otro modo no se sostendrían de modo racional. En el ámbito de la empresa es capaz
de desarrollar vías de análisis que encaminan hacia la comprensión y aproximación de las
posturas enfrentadas, ahorrando esfuerzos que pueden ser canalizados hacia otros espacios de
acción más rentables para los objetivos que la empresa desea.
Es interesante advertir como a partir de este contexto, el análisis filosófico permite
percibir el carácter moral del sujeto en el desarrollo de la acción cooperativa, transformada
en voluntaria tras descubrir y asumir el volumen de rentabilidad obtenible al participar en un
proyecto común. Dentro de estos parámetros, que permiten el trabajo en equipo, las leyes
sólo obligan a intentar cumplirlas sinceramente, lo que significa adaptar los hábitos
correspondientes (aunque no a actuar siempre de acuerdo con ellos). La solución a los
conflictos no es única y sempiterna, sino más bien se traduce en la adecuación a cada caso
particular, siempre y cuando la disolución de las tensiones esté supeditada a la puesta en
común del problema a dilucidar. Es en este espacio en el que el asesoramiento filosófico
tendría margen de movilidad, al ser capaz de analizar las complejidades surgidas ante la
contraposición de diferentes voluntades que, pretenden imponerse unas a otras sin respetar a
las demás.
Por lo dicho, resulta interesante destacar que la filosofía práctica posibilita la
localización e investigación de la acción racional, con el fin de poder obtener una sólida base
136
Op. Cit.: Cap. X. Poder. (Pág. 83)
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de conocimiento con la que afrontar el estudio de la empresa en su siempre compleja
actividad. La detección y seguimiento de la acción racional ayuda a la interpretación de las
posiciones y actos realizados en casos de conflicto, es decir, permite adentrarse en las causas,
observar lo acontecido y desarrollar un plan paliativo o resolutivo del conflicto.
Para ello la filosofía se pregunta, y pregunta a las partes en conflicto, cuál sería la
primera condición para que el comportamiento del ser humano alcance el estatus de racional.
Pues bien, parece que sin un conjunto ordenado y relativamente estable de preferencias,
difícilmente se puede atribuir la etiqueta de racional a acto alguno. Por tal motivo me
detendré un instante en señalar los diferentes caracteres que lo perfilan, para poder destacar
el re-conocimiento de éstos dentro de la práctica del Philosophical Consulting aplicada a la
empresa.
Quizá resultará adecuado efectuar una más ajustada definición de racionalidad
individual, para ofrecer una visión aproximada a la aplicación empresarial y, así, elaborar una
re-lectura de los pensamientos hobbesianos. Por esta causa me gustaría apoyar el discurso en
la descripción que L. Robbins 137 realiza sobre dicha racionalidad, quien destaca los
siguientes rasgos: a) Los fines que pueden ser propuestos son múltiples y diversos. b) La
importancia que los fines tienen para los diferentes individuos es distinta. c) Existe una
limitación en tiempo y medios a la hora de pretender conseguir esos fines. d) Tanto el tiempo
como los medios pueden aplicarse de forma alternativa.
Tras esta caracterización y sumando lo apuntado hasta el momento, encontramos a la
acción racional entendida como aquella que satisface de modo óptimo las preferencias del
individuo. Al centralizar esta definición en el contexto empresarial se puede observar el nexo
fijado entre ese modo óptimo de satisfacer las preferencias y el coste de oportunidad 138
resultante.
Si el tiempo y los medios son limitados, entonces, la satisfacción de algunas
preferencias supondrá la renuncia a la satisfacción de otras. Las preferencias que dejamos
aparcadas son el coste de oportunidad. Dicho esto no sonará extraño si indico que el
significado de la acción racional apunta hacia la maximización de la función de utilidad, en
donde la función de utilidad vendría a significar la cuantificación de preferencias
relacionada con determinado estado de cosas, un estado de cosas que puede lograrse
haciendo uso de las oportunidades. Éste es el motivo por el cual el coste de oportunidad
englobaría a aquellas acciones a las que hay que renunciar si se quiere maximizar la función
de utilidad. Por consiguiente, habría que tener en cuenta que una acción se transforma en
racional cuando la utilidad obtenida (una vez realizada la elección de acuerdo con la
ordenación de preferencias) es superior al coste de oportunidad.
No es difícil observar que el cruce de decisiones de los diferente sujetos (físicos o
corporativos) en busca de la maximización de la propia utilidad, es el eje central de la
racionalidad colectiva. Esto supone que su descanso recae sobre el lecho fundamental de la
racionalidad individual. Dicho de un modo sucinto; la teoría de la racionalidad colectiva nace
137
ROBBINS, Lionel: Ensayo sobre la naturaleza y significación de la Ciencia Económica. México, F.C.E.,
1980.
138
El uso de terminología económico empresarial tiene que entenderse como parte del acercamiento que la
filosofía hace a la empresa, sin que ello suponga en absoluto la pérdida de su identidad autónoma y reflexiva.
162
del hecho que en muchas situaciones sociales (siendo las empresariales partes insertadas en
éstas) el resultado que un individuo espera lograr con su decisión depende no sólo de esa
decisión, sino también de la decisión de otra u otras personas. Al mismo tiempo este otro
(singular o plural) toma decisiones contando con las ajenas para obtener sus fines
interesados.
Poco a poco he intentado guiar el desarrollo (arrancando desde concepciones
hobbesianas) de tal manera que se apreciara el valor de saber gestionar el egoísmo
metodológico, ubicado en la base de la sociedad neo-liberal actual, en cuyo seno queda
acomodado el ejercicio económico-empresarial como gesto propio fundamentado en los
principios reconocibles que la identifican. El eje del escrito ha pivotado en torno a cómo la
obtención de los objetivos personales requiere adquirir la colaboración de los otros,
venciendo su oposición inicial, al limitar estratégicamente nuestra fuerza desiderativa para de
ese modo facilitar también sus propios objetivos. Estas formas estratégicas para la
consecución de los intereses, se desarrollan dentro de una madeja de decisiones individuales
que se entrelazan, se pierden y se reencuentran en el acto electivo. Intereses diversos que se
ponen en juego dando forma y solidez al ovillo multifactorial que alcanza expresión nítida en
la actividad empresarial, siendo éste el terreno en donde la aplicación del asesoramiento
filosófico no puede por menos que adquirir razón de ser.
163
THOMAS HOBBES
INDIVIDUO
ESTADO DE
NATURALEZA
-
ESTADO DE SOCIEDAD
Lucha.
No
entendimiento.
Posible final
catastrófico.
Acción irracional
-
Empresa (como parte
del ejercicio económicosocial)
Dilema del prisionero:
Maximin
164
Contrato.
Consecución de los
objetivos por pacto.
Evitar el mal mayor.
Acción Racional
Estrategia
Poner en ejercicio la capacidad de
entender la acción llevada a cabo en
la toma de decisión, cuando existen
diferentes posibilidades viables.
- Buscar la coordinación de los
diferentes deseos.
- Buscar la cooperación para
conseguir
los
propios
intereses.
Caso práctico: FreeConnection.
Una vez defendida la utilidad de ciertos conceptos hobbesianos para la práctica del
asesoramiento filosófico dentro del ámbito empresarial, desearía ser capaz de demostrar los
argumentos esgrimidos, realizando un ajuste actualizado del modo en el que el filósofo inglés
concibe la relación entre individuos en casos de enfrentamiento de intereses. Para ello tomaré
como ejemplo la tensión acontecida en la empresa FreeConnection (nombre ficticio) debido a
un fraude registrado en el departamento de ventas. La herramienta de análisis que utilizaré
estará guiada por los parámetros que establece la estrategia racional denominada Dilema del
Prisionero 139 (D.P), insertada en la conocida Teoría de Juegos 140 , de amplia aplicación en la
teoría económica. Realizo este giro al entender que el D.P es un ejemplar análisis para la
comprensión del funcionamiento de los mecanismos que entran en funcionamiento en los
casos de toma de decisión en situaciones de enfrentamiento de intereses, problema básico que
se presenta en la apuesta contractualista hobbesiana.
Por medio del director del Departamento de Recursos Humanos de la empresa
transnacional FreeConnection, dedicada al telemarketing, se contrata un servicio de asesoría
filosófica. En este caso la toma de decisión respecto al conflicto ya ha sido tomada, pero las
pérdidas en base a acuerdos económicos personales cuyo fin era evitar llegar a los juzgados,
así como el tiempo empleado y la repercusión negativa en la imagen de la empresa, ha hecho
necesario establecer un estudio de la situación para ésta no se repita en el futuro.
La actividad de FreeConnection se desarrolla dando apoyo técnico mediante sistemas
informáticos, así como ofreciendo una plantilla de agentes que realizan funciones de venta y
asesoramiento sobre los productos que diferentes empresas deciden externalizar, dentro de
una política expansiva. Estas empresas serán clientes de FreeConnection y mantendrán la
adjudicación de confianza siempre y cuando ésta les ofrezca resultados que se muevan dentro
del margen pautado (en cifras) y pactado a priori. Es decir, la relación entre cliente y empresa
es cuantitativamente numérica, lo que significa que la calidad de la relación se supedita a los
balances parciales y generales que se van estableciendo. Estaríamos ante una relación de
vivos intereses, por lo que la unión entre cliente y empresa se afianzará a medida que los
beneficios se identifiquen con los objetivos que el cliente desea obtener.
139
Para ver desarrollo histórico : POUNDSTONE, William: El dilema del prisionero. Alianza. Madrid, 1992.
Texto de referencia básica: MORGENSTERN, Oskar y NEUMANN, John von: Theory of games and
Economic Behavior New Jersey, Princeton University Press., 1980.
140
165
Dentro del transcurrir diario en la actividad de FreeConnection se empieza a observar,
por parte del Departamento de Calidad, ciertas irregularidades en el modo en cómo algunos
agentes efectúan ventas de un producto dedicado al consumo de internet. Sin embargo, en
primera instancia, no se toma ninguna medida puesto que los objetivos se están cumpliendo
(en cierto modo) gracias a estas arbitrariedades individuales. El hecho, por tanto, queda
obviado ya que el cliente exige que los resultados se mantengan e incluso aumenten en lo
sucesivo.
Pero pasado un tiempo, el Departamento de Calidad advierte al de Operaciones que la
situación ha dejado de ser esporádica para pasar a ser una práctica común entre los agentes
implicados. Una vez realizado el examen pertinente, se reconoce la práctica de ventas
fraudulentas. La medida tomada por FreeConnection es de acción inmediata: se procede al
cierre de la campaña 141 . Las consecuencias: los agentes infractores son despedidos
automáticamente, el resto se ve afectado también ya que son reubicados bien en otras
campañas bien en otras plataformas 142 . Los coordinadores y cargos medios asumen el fracaso
en su desarrollo de funciones, sin embargo por parte de los máximos responsables no se
procede a sanción alguna sobre ellos.
Tras un primer acercamiento se advierte que los agentes llevaron a cabo una mala
práctica de sus funciones, pero los cargos de responsabilidad no aplicaron ninguna medida
paliativa. Tomaron la elección de jugar dentro de un espacio que quedaba al margen tanto de
lo legalmente permitido como de lo empresarialmente recomendable, ya que el beneficio
ofrecido por las gestiones fraudulentas resultó, con el tiempo, menor que el valor de
reconocimiento, estimación y notoriedad adquirido ante los ojos de potenciales clientes. Por
otro lado, las empresas que pertenecen a su mismo sector decidieron alejarse
momentáneamente de cualquier acuerdo con FreeConnection para evitar verse implicadas.
Teniendo en cuenta cual ha sido la determinación de FreeConnection se puede
anunciar que, a la hora de negociar la empresa hizo un uso excesivo de su status de poder,
adoptando una solución monologada. La falla en la comunicación 143 queda patente ya que
nadie cedió en sus razones. Respectos de los agentes, algunos miraron por sus únicos
intereses personales, sin importarles ni el trabajo en cooperación con sus compañeros ni
mucho menos la contribución a la obtención de objetivos comunes de la empresa. Los
vendedores aseguraron, en la única reunión que hubo entre ambas partes, que se sentían
infravalorados, desmotivados, ya que la empresa no escuchaba sus demandas y sin embargo
no relajaba su presión buscando mayor número de ventas. Matizan que el salario es bajo y
que lo único que les satisface es el dinero que cobran y no la función que desempeñan, por
eso han decidido falsear contratos de venta, para obtener los incentivos económicos
correspondientes al cierre de dichas ventas.
El Business Manager encargado de la campaña cree que desde la empresa se ha
hecho todo lo posible para cuidar a los agentes, incluso asegura que su deseo era (en el
141
Departamento que cubre expresamente las necesidades de venta y atención al cliente de productos
específicos
142
Espacios físicos creados para la externalización de la venta de productos, en los que pueden tener cabida
varias campañas.
143
Por supuesto la incomunicación no es el problema, sino una pista básica para detectarlo.
166
futuro) hacer fija a una amplia parte de la plantilla, con lo que daría tranquilidad a los
agentes haciéndoles sentirse, además, parte de un proyecto común. Sin embargo ahora se
encuentra en una situación incómoda, motivada por la mala gestión de un conflicto que se
estaba dando desde hacía ya tiempo. Ante el cliente la empresa ha perdido toda credibilidad.
Ha sido incapaz de gestionar el problema que tenía y le ha hecho perder una considerable
cantidad de capital.
Ante esta situación el asesor tendrá que ayudar a la empresa a desarrollar un esquema
de prevención. Para ello cree necesario llevar adelante un análisis que ofrezca a
FreeConection una visión amplia del panorama en el que puede intervenir, para de ese modo
obtener la suficiente información sobre sus posibilidades de acción y así poder anticiparse un
resultado nada deseado. El asesor no actuará como un oráculo sino más bien será un ojo
crítico externo que intentará poner sobre la mesa determinadas reflexiones, cuyo contenido
racional sea eminentemente práctico.
Análisis por medio del Dilema del prisionero 144 :
El asesor, buscando posibles herramientas que le sirvan para aportar valoraciones
efectivas para el análisis del caso, prestará atención al D.P al creer que su aplicación ofrece
una explicación satisfactoria respecto del funcionamiento de la racionalidad colectiva, ya que
hace un incisivo análisis sobre situaciones en las que se tercia una tensión entre dos polos
bien diferenciados, a saber, uno cooperativo y otro no, por ello podría ser una herramienta
útil para examinar situaciones conflictivas tales como las encontradas en el caso de
FreeConnection.
Desde la perspectiva objetiva del asesor se advierten dos intenciones que han
imposibilitado el acercamiento de las partes (empresa y agentes) por un lado se ha buscado
presionar al otro mediante acciones duras, sin pretensión de establecer un mínimo
acercamiento, por otro lado cada uno ha defendido sus posicionamientos de modo estricto.
Vemos pues que tanto FreeConnection como los agentes han presupuesto que el otro no se
sentaría a negociar ninguna medida que mejorara la situación. Antes de iniciar cualquier
ademán que llevara hacia alguna zona más cómoda, ambas partes, de forma separada,
decidieron llevar adelante una política de crispación. En su reflexión individualizada sólo
veían dos opciones, ceder en sus posiciones o afianzarse en ellas. Ante este panorama tanto la
empresa como los agentes tienen presente tres posibilidades básicas: si uno cede y el otro no,
144
Hasta la aparición de Thomas Hobbes no se elabora una nítida separación entre racionalidad individual
y racionalidad colectiva, será pues el pensador inglés quien por primera vez destaque las bases de la razón
colectiva haciendo expreso su objetivo: Coordinar los deseos individuales de tal modo que se pueda llegar a
obtener el máximo número de deseos, siempre y cuando sea compatible con una igual satisfacción de los deseos
de los demás. Resumiendo, la racionalidad colectiva busca la coordinación equitativa de las racionalidades
colectivas.
La importancia de la Teoría de Juegos reside en que toma en cuenta el entrelazamiento de decisiones,
no desde una perspectiva caótica sino a partir de una regulación que se adecuará a las diversas situaciones
conflictivas, lo que permite concebirla como una teoría de elección racional.
167
gana el que no cede; si no cede ninguno, el conflicto se alargará y el final será altamente
lesivo para todos o, si los dos ceden la solución no tardará en llegar, pero esta poción
comporta una gran duda, cómo fiarse de que el otro cederá si yo lo hago. Aunque afirme que
sí lo hará, la seguridad no es total, por ello prefiero no arriesgarme.
Tratando de ilustrar estas reflexiones a continuación presento una matriz de D.P.
adaptada al caso que nos ocupa 145 :
EMPRESA
Cede
No cede
Ceden
3,3
1,4
No ceden
4,1
2,2
AGENTES
Interpretando los resultados el asesor apunta que los agentes actúan de acuerdo al
siguiente razonamiento: Si cedemos ante las peticiones de la empresa, la empresa sale
ganando y reforzaría su posición, además no podríamos negociar si se diera de nuevo la
situación ya que se habrá sentado un precedente. Sin embargo, si no cedemos afianzamos
nuestra actitud haciéndonos fuertes ante cualquier posible presión empresarial.
La empresa por su lado entiende que: Si cedemos perdemos credibilidad y fuerza
además, ante cualquier contratiempo, los trabajadores podrían abusar de la confianza
depositada en ellos. Somos nosotros quienes organizamos y dirigimos las acciones. Si no
cedemos conseguiremos imponer nuestra voluntad, al demostrar que no se pueden imponer
acciones que vayan en contra de los medios y objetivos que la empresa marca.
Recuperaremos nuestro poder imponiendo un carácter duro.
En lo que sí coinciden ambos es en pensar la siguiente estrategia 146 : Si el otro no
cede, será mejor que yo tampoco ceda, pues de lo contrario perdería la ventaja. Si el otro
cede y yo no, podría beneficiarme de la posición débil en la que queda. Así pues, haga lo que
haga el otro, para mí será mejor no ceder.
145
Los valores cardinales se leen del siguiente modo: (4) indica lo más preferible y (1) lo menos.
Los valores a la izquierda de la coma corresponden a la respuesta de los agentes, los de la derecha pertenecen
a la empresa.
146
Se aplica estrategia maximin: Aquella cuyo peor resultado posible es superior a los peores resultados de las
demás estrategias posibles.
168
Por supuesto ninguno de los dos acaba cediendo, por lo que el conflicto se alarga
hasta que el resultado dista mucho de ser el mejor 147 . El asesor señala a la empresa que la
acción individual racional lleva al fracaso colectivo si las partes no actúan teniendo en cuenta
a la otra. Por supuesto la colaboración se daría de forma condicionada, es decir, siempre y
cuando el otro también lo hiciera. Si falta información, si la comunicación no se abre, los
implicados no saben que decidirán los demás y, por tanto, se corre el riesgo de acabar dentro
de las reglas del D.P, debido a que no tienen garantías de poder prever un resultado de
beneficio común.
El asesor señala a la dirección local de FreeConnection que ante todo, y por medio de
un diseño de acción más comunicativo y participativo, la empresa tendría que evitar en lo
sucesivo comportarse como si de un sujeto insensato se tratara, así como también paliar
acciones de miembros insensatos dentro de la misma empresa.
El asesor ha tenido presente el punto de vista de Thomas Hobbes, pues al respecto
advierte, como si de un epítome se tratara, que “el insensato se dice, en su corazón, y a veces
lo dice también con su lengua, que no existe tal cosa como la justicia. Y alega con toda
seriedad que, como la conservación de la felicidad de cada hombre está encomendada al
cuidado que cada cual tiene de sí mismo, no puede haber razón que impida a cada uno hacer
todo lo que crea que puede conducirlo a alcanzar esos fines. Y así, hacer o no hacer
convenios, cumplirlos o no cumplirlos, no es proceder contra la razón, si ello redunda en
beneficio propio”. 148
Bibliografía:
BOBBIO, Norberto: Thomas Hobbes. Barcelona, Pirámide, 1991.
DUMONT, Louis: Ensayos sobre el individualismo. Madrid, Alianza, 1983
GAUTHIER, David P.: The logic of Leviathan: The moral and politica theory of Thomas
Hobbes. Oxford, Clarendon, 1973.
HOBBES, Thomas: Leviatán. Madrid, Alianza., 2002.
KAVKA, Gregory S.: Hobbesian moral and political theory. New Jersey, Princeton
MACPHERSON, Crawford B.: The political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to
Locke. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979.
MORGENSTERN, Oskar y NEUMANN, John von: Theory of games and Economic
Behavior New Jersey, Princeton University Press., 1980.
POUNDSTONE, William: El dilema del prisionero. Alianza. Madrid, 1992.
ROBBINS, Lionel: Ensayo sobre la naturaleza y significación de la Ciencia Económica.
México, F.C.E., 1980.
STRAUSS, Leo: The political philosophy of Hobbes. Chicago, University Chicago Press,
1984.
147
Se llega a un punto de equilibrio sub-óptimo (2,2) Mucho mejor habría sido (3,3) ello hubiera significado
ceder cada uno en algo, para de tal modo llegar a un mejor resultado final, del cual se habrían beneficiado los
dos.
148
HOBBES, Thomas:Leviatán: Madrid, Alianza., 2002. Cap. XV. La justicia no es contraria a la razón. (Pág.
132)
169
170
Jorge Dias is President of National Executive Council of «Portuguese
Ethical and Philosophical Counselling Association», is Professor of
Philosophy and is writing his Doctoral Dissertation on the New
University of Lisbon, about: Body, Sense and Affectivity in MerleauPonty – From Phenomenology to Ethics.
Dias is the first International Member of «Associación para la Filosofia
Pratica en Catalunya» and of «American Philosophical Association»
and finished is Licensure in Ethics and Politics at 1998, in Catholic
University of Portugal, in Lisbon, with a thesis: The Human Happiness
on the Philosophy of Julián Marías.
Dr. Dias has writing his last article to «Metaritica Review», Lusófona
University, Lisbon, about: Fundaments for an Ethical Reflection on
Merleau-Ponty.
Works in progress: The Ethical Actuality of Merleau-Ponty (Article)
Portuguese Review of Philosophy, Braga, Catholic University of
Philosophy, January 2006.
The Professional Statute of Philosopher (Conference) «I National
Meeting of Philosophical Practice», APAEF, Lisbon, New University
of Lisbon, August 29 2005.
RENÉ DESCARTES, PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLOR
OF ELISABETH
Jorge Humberto Dias
Lisboa, Portugal
ABSTRACT
In this article I will analyze the work of René Descartes as a Philosophical
Counsellor of Princess Elisabeth. The correspondence between both shows us a very
interesting way of consulting Dr. Descartes. First of all, they will philosophize by regular
mail. Next, we could ask if we find in these letters a feminine philosophy. After reading
some letters, we could say that Elisabeth is a melancholic Princess. In a specific way,
Descartes will consider that as a philosophical problem.
So, by the hand of Elisabeth, we will meet another Descartes. Indeed, a very
practical one. The counsel of the Philosopher will be both: to take care of his “client” and to
help in the most important issues, to cogitate on them.
With this help we will find a dense enigma: the paradoxical nature of man. A very
known classical question on the philosophy of Descartes. But in this context, we have a
different point of view: a practical reflection to make some changes in the thought of
Elisabeth.
171
In this work, Descartes will give to Elisabeth a philosophical help applying his
Cartesian method. And in the conclusion, we will get a non-intellectualist Moral: a real art of
decision.
In the conclusion, I will refer an example on the practical utility of the pragmatic
and provisional moral method of Descartes.
CONSULTING DESCARTES
The Letters of Elisabeth
Preface
I will begin this article with a commentary of Alfredo Diniz about actuality of
Descartes, saying that is justified by the similarity between the cultural context of the French
philosopher and our time. Descartes was born in 1596, when a cultural change is happening,
and which has marked the origin of modernity149, in a very uncertain world, with a great
confusion – this is the analysis of Alexandre Koyré, too.
The critics of the past have destroyed everything and nothing new was done. So,
without his traditional norms of judgment and decision, man feels lost. And doubt is
installed. Seeing the French philosopher as a peregrine of truth, I think we could consider
Descartes as a contemporary philosophical counsellor. The case of Elisabeth it will be a
proof. The same has happened with some of my clients.
Rafael Alvira establishes the difference between Socratic method and Cartesian
method. Socrates applied his method to ethics. “Descartes is secure about the method, with
his application to the medicine, which permit dominates the objective nature, and makes him
free.”150 The ulterior reflection of this author is about philosophical practice: “For Socrates,
is love which open to memory and gives him the key to interiority; for Descartes, is freedom
which open creativity and gives him the key of dominium.”151
Otherwise, Luis Araújo refers the fundament of the Cartesian ethics: “the
progressive dominium of the human and rational autonomy oriented to an ideal of perfection,
based on prudence, wisdom and generosity.”152
In my practical work with clients, I think, with Luis Araújo, that Descartes has an
ethical thought, with a great pragmatic character which called provisional moral. In the Les
Principes de la Philosophie, Descartes said that is necessary make decisions, to cross
conflicts, doing a personal effort to be a moral person.153
149
Cfr. Rafael Alvira, , Sócrates y Descartes frente al Método, in Actas do Colóquio Internacional «Descartes,
reflexão sobre a modernidade», Porto, Fundação Engenheiro António de Almeida, 1996, p. 63.
150
Rafael Alvira, Op. Cit., p. 65.
151
Rafael Alvira, Op. Cit., p. 67.
152
Luís Araujo, , Descartes – uma Ética Racionalista?, in Actas do Colóquio Internacional «Descartes, reflexão
sobre a modernidade», Porto, Fundação Engenheiro António de Almeida, 1996, p. 69.
153
Descartes, Príncipes de la Philosophie and Discours de la Methode, In Oeuvres Philosophiques, V. I and III,
Paris, Garnier Frères. Cfr. Luís Araújo, Op. Cit., p. 74.
172
1. Philosophizing by Regular Mail
I consider the letters are not so secondary philosophical documents; they are the way
we have to access the global thought of any author. The letters, not only in Descartes, but
also in Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, in Heidegger, etc., they show us the clarity of the thought,
where we could see some obvious answers and some direct references. In the formal works
of the philosopher, I think we could not see so easily the practical role of some topics and
issues. So, the letter is the place where thought and life interact. In these letters, is revealed
the concrete man of Descartes, living in a space and habiting one body. The interiority,
subjectivity and the frontal character are very clear in this correspondence. And these
elements are very precious to the reader, to entry in the systematic thought of the
philosopher.
My inspiration for this article was found in another article. Luis Machado de Abreu,
from University of Aveiro, writes about As Paixões Racionalistas de Descartes e Espinosa,
and says this important orientation to my article: “The introduction of the topic of the passion
gives to any philosophical system a note of intervene to some chaotic realities, irrationals.
When the system wants to realize with method a rational reading, complete, about the
universe of the human experience, it is much more disturbing the intellectual challenge
represented by the phenomenology of the passion and with the wish of finding a proper
logic.”154
Isahiah Berlin in his work Introduction to Philosophy says that the great philosophies
talk to everybody and the stranger mode and difficulties of the people are in the technical
language and closed words of them.155 I think that the correspondence between
philosophers and non-specialists constitute a very good opportunity to prove that idea.
The letters between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth, they open a very actual
reflection and a marked one: the role of the women as an interlocutor. And it is La Bruyère
who writes some words about this feminine vocation, when she considers the woman as very
good correspondents.156
2. Feminine Philosophizing
I have my all body with some of the great weakness of my sex, which feels it very
easely in the afflictions of my soul… [Elisabeth to Descartes, May 24, 1645]
154
Luís Machado Abreu, As Paixões Racionalistas de Descartes e Espinosa (The rationalist passions of
Descartes and Spinoza), in Actas do Colóquio Internacional «Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade», Porto,
Fundação Engenheiro António de Almeida, 1996, p. 49.
155
See Isahiah Berlin, «An Introduction to Philosophy» in Brian Magee, Men of Ideas, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1989, pp. 26-27.
156
La Bruyère, Les Caracteres ou les Moeurs de ce Siècle, Lausanne, La Guilde du Livre, 1964, p. 95.
173
I refer two women who have produced a lot in philosophy: Mary Warnock157 and
Geneviève Lloyd158. To the first one, the women do philosophy, but she doesn’t agree with
a specific feminine philosophy. Warnock characterizes the requirements of a philosophical
thought: rationality, capacity to generalize, argumentative character and abstract grade.
Different is the position of Lloyd, she considers that occidental reason was made very
masculine, and with that it looks for another way of thought the real, not only the rationality,
but the imagination and the affectivity. That’s the true: the worldviews with not reason work,
they has been identified as feminine perspectives.
I consider that it is possible to find in the letters of Elisabeth some “constants” that
may characterize her as women: the concrete way of thought. I think that all issues are
referenced to a being which defines itself as women. She assumes his body in its particularity
and differences. To the abstract being identified by the thought (Descartes), she opposes
(Elisabeth), the concrete being which is very afflictive with the pain of the body. The
disturbance that Elisabeth refers, but support, forward us to a dialectic thought/live, to a
thought that emerges from the daily life. “Since I write this letter I was interrupted more than
seven times by uncomfortable visits…”159
I think it is very clear, when we read the letters that Elisabeth has the habit of
following the method, to thinking rationally, to argument with agility and efficacy, to be
rigorous in the intellectual course, to conceptualizing and theorizing. Talking with Descartes
about the body, she forces the philosopher being cartesian and accepting the body, because
the Princess refuses his statute of machine.
Based on his intimate experience of his body, in the vividness of his proper-body,
“which be so disturbed, that I need some months to put him well again “160, it interests her
to know the role it has in the passions of the soul.
3. A melancholic Princess
Elisabeth is an erring Princess, in spite of her material and social tranquillity. She
leaves Prague with two years old and stay in some countries. The correspondence with
Descartes was in a period of politic agitation, which will be revealed in her personal life.
Her close relatives cause some problems. The ups and downs of her brothers bring her some
physique and psychic unbalance, a discomfort and put in her body some physical signs as
fevers, disturbs and other sufferings which she complaints to Descartes.
The responsibilities of the Court, as refers in the letter of June 20, 1643, aggravate
the melancholic tendency of a depressive temperament. Distrusting in the doctors, Elisabeth
will trust his in Descartes to help her solving his problems. Besides the moral dilemmas and
anthropological problems, the letters will design, one by one, an authentic treatise of
philosophical counseling.
But which is the complaint of the Princess?
157
See Mary Warnock, Women Philosophers, Londres, Everyman, 1996.
Geneviève Lloyd, The man of reason: Male and female in western culture, Londres, Routledge, 1993.
159
See Letter of de 30 de Setembro de 1645.
160
See Letter of June 22, 1645.
158
174
In the first letters, Elisabeth refers that she has a weak spirit, referring her stupidity
and deficient reasoning,161 the ignorance and imprudence.162 Descartes set oppose and
eulogy the physical and spiritual beauty of the Princess.
There is a break on the correspondence between August 1644 and May 1645. They
retake the topic of the disease, assuming Descartes the role of philosophical counsellor,163
referring to the role of the passions in the origin of some corporeal sufferings. The counsel of
Descartes is philosophical: try to satisfy the soul, besides the troubles of the fortune. Besides
he recognizes the difficulties of his counsel, Descartes believes in the capacity of the
Princess, with his great spirit, of dominating the passion trough the reasoning.
In the letter of June 22, we have a reference to the melancholia, which is
aggravating with the obstacles of life. Here too, the counsels of Descartes follow the same
rule: treating the body, distracting the mind.
Elisabeth recognize her improvements, accepting that are the results of the
philosophical counselling, but the efficacy of the method is under doubt always she has a
difficulty: the caring to of his family – a worry which follows her – destroys a weak balance,
obtained with very control of herself.
In a letter of November 30, 1645, Elisabeth refers to the madness of his brother as
one of the worst incident of his life, and which brings her very unhappiness. “I have all the
difficulties of the world to live me from the hands of the doctors, to do not pay for those
ignorance” – say Descartes in a letter of November 29, 1646. Elisabeth continues her
complaints: the abscess in February 21 of 1647, the inflate in June 30 of 1648.
The philosophical counselling is a reality in this correspondence, where the
philosophical dialogue is a very good way to make some changes in the thought of the
Princess. But the most interesting are the changes of the counsellor too. We will see this later
on.
On the 28th June of 1643, Descartes counsels Elisabeth to relax the spirit and to rest
the sense, moderating the studies. Elisabeth is attracted by the debate of ideas. Descartes
refers that he only study Metaphysics a few hours by year, because is too hard for the bodily
brain.
After counselling the Princess to read Séneca and she did not like, the dialogue takes
the direction of the Ethics, as it understands Descartes in his Passions of the Soul.164
It is the difficulties of the thought of Descartes that contribute to the Princess forget his
problems, giving to her some spiritual tranquillity and giving peace to his bodily suffering.
The big question is right here: the medicaments don’t have the power to help the princess
putting an end to her melancholia, and the princess only feels good when studying
philosophy.
161
See Letter of June, 20 1643.
See Letter of July 1644.
163
See Letter of May, 18 1645.
164
See Descartes, Les passions de l’Âme, Portuguese Edition, translated by Newton de Macedo, As Paixões da
Alma, Lisbon, Clássicos Sá da Costa, 1976.
162
175
4. By the hand of Elisabeth: Another Descartes
But one critic was made by Jean-Marie Beyssade: Descartes has lucky with the
correspondent which did not made any trick.165 To this author, the objective of the princess
was carrying Descartes to his revelation, and that Elisabeth utilized some strategies to affect
Descartes. So, in this sense, the letters end with a very natural appeasement.
In a letter of May or June of 1945, Descartes refers his mother and gives notice to
us a Descartes very weak at his birth, marked by the disease of his mother and by the
diagnostic of a premature death. Thus, we understand better why Descartes has dedicated so
strongly to the topic of the health. In September 1 of 1645, Descartes revels too a fear from
the unbalance of the body.
In September of 1646 we know that Descartes gives a saint statute to the friendship
and that value the respect for the compromises, the dignity, the privacy and the firmness.
These letters don’t permit us to classify the moral of Descartes like provisional. But
show us a hedonist dimension, biological and with some voluntarism. Fit to the will maintain
the health, find the happiness and manage with responsibility all the passions.
On the 15th September, Descartes list the concepts which permit to the man to
fortify the understanding and to aging correctly. Elisabeth, with her doubts, carries Descartes
to show his humanism and his pedagogy of the passions.
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves in her article O «Homem Verdadeiro», Segundo
Descartes, analyze two aspects of the unity of man: the sensible data and the capacity of
error. “The sensibility, in particular, the affectivity, which is caused in the soul by the boy,
and the capacity of error, which is caused by the imperfection of man, because he has a body,
they reveal the co-existence of body and soul in man.”166
In the IV Meditation, Descartes said the origin of the error is in the limitation of the
human understanding, when facing will and freedom. So, in the Les Passions de l’Âme,
Descartes assumed the moral implications of human freedom as a real, practical and
philosophical question to think about. And in this sense, Moral is wisdom of the concrete
man, which possession realizes man as a «true man».
5. The counsel of the Philosopher: To take care and to cogitate
First of all, we could not forget what Maria José Cantista said in her article: O
cogito de Descartes na génese do pensar transcendental. Evidência cartesiana e vivência
fenomenológica: “The ego cogito of Descartes was one of the most important inspirations to
the philosophy of the transcendental consciousness, when this one has been transformed in
perceptive consciousness, as existence or co-existence in Merleau-Ponty or as in-der-weltsein in Heidegger.”167 In this sense, the cogito is temporality, meaning, bodily vividness,
165
Jean-Marie Beyssade, Descartes, Correspondence avec Elisabeth et Autres Lettres, Paris, GarnierFlammarion, 1989, p. 36.
166
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, O «Homem Verdadeiro», segundo Descartes, In Descartes – reflexão sobre a
modernidade, Actas do Colóquio Internacional, Porto, Fundação Eng.º António de Almeida, 1996, p. 358.
167
Maria José Cantista, O cogito de Descartes na génese do pensar transcendental. Evidência cartesiana e
vivência fenomenológica, In Descartes – reflexão sobre a modernidade, Actas do Colóquio Internacional, Porto,
Fundação Eng.º António de Almeida, 1996, p. 483.
176
affectivity, love to happiness168 – with this proceeds, Merleau-Ponty finishes the
Phenomenologie de la Perception with Saint Exupery:
Your son is imprisoned in a fire, you will save him… If there is an obstacle, you will
sell your hand for a help. You live in your act. Your act is you… You will be transformed…
This is your duty, your anger, your love, your fidelity, your invention… Men is just a bow of
relations, only relations count to man.169
Although, Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves, in his article A Obra cartesiana e as
hodiernas questões ecológicas, considered the reflection of Descartes as very actual,
especially, because he doesn’t start from a world already done, but from an infinite horizon
of possibilities.170 This justifies why Descartes was interested in scientific and technical
progress, especially in a sort of “medicine of the soul”, that we call: Philosophical
Counselling.
Cogitare, a latin word. It is very interesting how the etymology is so common to
both words which we refer the medical act and the philosophical thought. In the Dialogues of
Love,171 Leão Hebreu, with a neoplatonic anthropology, the cogitation is in all the semantic.
With an hierarchy: body-soul-intellect, the cogitation is an union from the soul with the
intellect. Some commentators agree with this position: a confused thought because of the
double concern between the body and the soul.172
The health is an important objective of the cogitation. In the order of the good
values, Leão Hebreu distinguishes: useful, agreeable, and honest. The first ones constitute the
moral regulated by the principle of the mean-just; the last one is in the spirituality, which the
proper ethos is an excess.
The health has a relation with these three goods, because it goes toward the all man
while an integrative unity. Health is the fundament of all other “goods”, we could have in this
life,173 and which conservation Descartes promote with his studies.174 Descartes takes care
and cogitate, in which the same act recover both operations. Galeno has already said: the
perfect philosopher is doctor too.175
As it will be seen, the case of Elisabeth appeals to a “new medicine”, which implicates a
renovation of the Cartesianism. To help the Princess, Descartes has to leave the exact
168
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception, Paris, Gallimard, 2000,. (Portuguese Edition, of Carlos
Moura, Fenomenologia da Percepção, São Paulo, Martins Fontes, 1994, p. 493-612.) See the Article of Luis
Abreu, As paixões racionalistas de Descartes e Spinoza, In Descartes – reflexão sobre a modernidade, Actas do
Colóquio Internacional, Porto, Fundação Eng.º António de Almeida, 1996, p. 62, with a reference to the
affective cogito of Descartes.
169
A.ntoine de Saint-Exupéry, Pilote de Guerre, pp. 171 and 174, In Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la
Perception, Op. Cit., pág. 612.
170
Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves, A Obra cartesiana e as hodiernas questões ecológicas, In Descartes –
reflexão sobre a modernidade, Actas do Colóquio Internacional, Porto, Fundação Eng.º António de Almeida,
1996, p. 249.
171
See Leão Hebreu, Dialogues of Love, portuguese Edition, Diálogos de Amor, Lisboa, INIC, 1983, p. 28.
172
See Marc Richir, Le corps: Essai sur l’Interiorité, Paris, Hatier, 1993, p. 64. See too the second meditation
of Descartes.
173
Descartes, Letter of May/June, 1645.
174
Descartes, Letter to Marquis of Newcastle, October 1645, p. 329.
175
Galeno, Opera Omnia, I, pp. 53-63.
177
sciences and to go inside the philosophical counselling of the soul of Elisabeth. Here we have
a personal method, dealing with some concepts, values, thought experiments and beliefs,
using the critical thinking and some counselling skills, using only some communication
skills, because all of the sessions were by regular mail.
Descartes and Elisabeth related each other in 1642 (eight years before Descartes’s
death. Elisabeth died in 1680), one year after the publication of the Meditations. Descartes
was writing the Principes de la Philosophie. Elisabeth, with 24 years old, is interested in the
very had questions of philosophy, finding an orientation, to get a cure on her scepticism.
Descartes decided to have a personal relation, through Pollot176, a common friend.
They became friends. And the correct questions of Elisabeth, promote a reformulation of the
thought of Descartes.
In the first letter, Elisabeth considers Descartes as the “best doctor of her soul”.
Again, we have here the philosophy as a therapy of the soul, like it happens with Socrates.
Doing so, Descartes was a Philosophical Counsellor, who has treated the vulnerability of
Elisabeth to the scepticism177, and who regenerate and fortify her mind with intelligible
principles and who treated too her affections of the body. Moral and counselling approach
each other in the work of Descartes: here is the beginning of Descartes as Philosophical
Counsellor.
In the preface, dedicated to Picot, in the Principia, it puts the Physique as the
common trunk. In this article, as I said, I could not agree with this, because I think the way is
more over the human counselling, dealing with spiritual values and passions…
6. The dense enigma: the paradoxical nature of man
In the Traité de l’Homme, from 1633, Descartes has the guide of mechanics. The
question is if that approach is correct to develop the philosophical help that Elisabeth needs
or if he requires a new point of view.
The controversy with Regius increases in two letters, one of December of 1641 and
another of January of 1642. To Regius, the man is an accidental being without true reality,
affirming an anthropological dualism. Descartes criticizes Regius, affirming the
substantiality of the composite body and soul, because those real union.
Later, Regius develops his system to a monist thesis, saying that soul is a simple
mode of being body, without proper reality. Descartes signs the difference with Regius.
For Descartes, the only way to conceive the union is considerer the soul as
material.178 And it was the way of Regius: the material reductionism, as a coherent and
rational solution to explicate the human composite.
In the first letter, Elisabeth asked to Descartes: how the soul, being a simple
intellectual substance, could determinate the spirits in the body doing voluntary actions? The
answer of Descartes takes us to the principle of the union, which gains the statute of
primitive notion, irreducible of any other.
176
Letter of October 6, 1642.
Letter of July 1, 1643.
178
Letter of June 26, 1643. Elisabeth has made the question on the letter of June, 20 1643.
177
178
In the end of the life, Descartes, in a letter to the neoplatonic Morus, considers a
functional dualism in the soul, to which correspond distinct principles: a corporeal soul and
an intellective soul. The Philosophical Counselling and Practice exercised by the philosopher
in the treatment of Elisabeth send us, I think, to this new Anthropology.
José Carrascoso in his article about Subjectividad racional y “cogito” cartesiano,
said that we recognize a finality in the human action and a behavioral dimension in the
perception. So, the subject doesn’t live in the immanence of an ideal consciousness. There is
a great relation between the ideas of subjectivity, perception, feeling and finality.179 For
José Carrascoso, the feeling is a psychic function, which requires the efficacy of the
intelligence. So, subject has a centrifugal dimension and operator intentionality. The same
said Merleau-Ponty.180
Otherwise, the study of affectivity, takes Descartes to Moral – says Maria do Céu
Patrão Neves. In the moral point of view, the question of passions is in the equilibrium
between spontaneous movements and voluntary movements (actions): ones could take us to
error, but are important to survivor; the others are a great contribute to the good use of
passions (without repress them). The natural perspective of Descartes says that we have to
accept and live with passions as a human way of being man. In this sense, Moral is defined as
science of the human behaviour or aims; or art of being happy, with an equilibrium between
will and passions.181 So, the good use of the free will affirms man in his singularity.
7. The philosophical help: Cartesian Method
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves considers a great evolution in the work of Descartes:
from irreducible subjectivity, Descartes bet in man; from the metaphysical project, Descartes
constitute a moral. And here, «true man» is defined by his ethos.182
The Elisabeth’s case is one of those in which the influence of the “bad thoughts” on
the physic is evident. Personal and familiar misfortune provoke in her very affections. So,
could we say that Elisabeth is sick? Descartes said that the origin of the fever is an emotion
caused by a weak reasoning – a philosophical problem.183
Descartes proposes to Elisabeth a radical cure, which did not have the limit of only
solve the symptoms, but goes to the causes of the evil. With no doubt the diet and the
physical exercise helps the health of the Princess to being well, but is necessary to act on the
soul, put it in a good way of reasoning, and with that, take a good influence on the body.
Descartes says: (…) the soul has very strong with the body, as we could see the great changes
anger, fear and other passions excite in it.184
After the stay of Elisabeth in Berlin, Descartes demarcates from the clinical practice, in
which the treatment of the affections was treated with chemicals, with the presupposition that
the disease is originated by an external and pathogenic agent.185
179
José Carrascoso, Subjectivida racional y “Cogito” cartesiano, In Descartes – reflexão sobre a modernidade,
Actas do Colóquio Internacional, Porto, Fundação Eng.º António de Almeida, 1996, p. 93.
180
Ibidem.
181
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, Op. Cit., p. 359.
182
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves, Op. Cit., p. 361.
183
Letter of Maio, 18 1645.
184
Letter of July 1644.
185
Letter of March 1647.
179
For me, it is here a real mark and relevant fact for the philosophical counselling of
Descartes, which could be seen in this answer: how could we impress the soul, in which point
we could touch her? For Descartes, the soul is a unitary reality, but with a plurality of
functions organized in a hierarchy: sensations (feelings), imagination, understanding and
will. The question is to know which function of the Elisabeth’s soul, may her will be
stimulated to cure her sadness, melancholia and apprehension. The answer of the
philosophical counsellor is very precise: the imagination is the potency with which the soul
could influence the body. Descartes clarify: but when the soul use the will to make any
thought which is not intelligible, but imaginable, that thought produce a new impression in
the brain, that isn’t passion, but an action, which calls properly imagination”186 The
imagination is a very positive function of the soul, co-relative of the passion, defined this one
as the internal feeling the soul experiment when connected to the body.
Thus, the remedy to the sadness which origins physical affections it is not in the
study of philosophy or metaphysics, but in the exercise on the imagination. (It is necessary)
to regenerate the body by the power of the joy.187
It demonstrated that life it is not a simple event of an extensive body with physical
and geometrical properties, but a subjective experience with an affective tonality. The joy
expresses an adhesion to life (…) and the sadness expresses the discomfort of the soul in her
corporeal habitation, and is a factor of mental weakness.188 Descartes refers this when
expresses the genesis of the passion, in the letter to Chanut, on February 1st 1647.189
Rui Magalhães in his article about Método e Moral: Descartes, a Modernidade e a
Filosofia, said that the French philosopher uses the metaphor of the “road to the truth and
good”. The author refers the critics of the proper system of Descartes, in which the method
needs to prove his validity. The reference is the first rule of Les Regles pour la Direction de
L’Esprit. One more time, reason is the criteria against empirical sensations. “The method is
the process to approach the action of the thought to the essential nature of things.”190
Philosophy is the method supported in the mathesis universalis as an interface between
metaphysics and the subject, who applies it. The peculiar analysis of Rui Magalhães says that
the method is already a truth, which exists before the Truth that Descartes is in search of.
Descartes is looking for a method, says him, is his Discours de la Method: “the
desire of learning to distinguish true from false, to see clear in my actions and to proceed
with security.” Rui Magalhães says that the Cartesian critic is a rational simulation, an
orthopaedic therapy and is an ascetic philosophy.” Here, we see the contrary of moral, e.g.,
the ethics.191 Thus, Moral is the norm for those who are out of truth. The Cartesian system,
based on the method, doesn’t need an expressed moral, because the process is ascetic, but
186
Letter of October 6 from 1645. Descartes explicit the meaning of these words, feeling and passion. Passion
is all thought excited in the soul, without the intervention of the will, by the simple impressions in the brain,
because if it is not action, otherwise it is passion. Everything that origins from the exterior things or from
interior dispositions of the body, like perception of the colors, sounds, hungry, pain, we call feelings.
187
Adelino Cardoso, (2001), p. 21.
188
Ibidem.
189
See «Letter to Chanut from February 1 from 1647», Analise, p. 191-206.
190
Rui Magalhães, Método e Moral: Descartes, a Modernidade e a Filosofia, In Descartes – reflexão sobre a
modernidade, Actas do Colóquio Internacional, Porto, Fundação Eng.º António de Almeida, 1996, p. 328.
191
Rui Magalhães, Op. Cit., p. 334.
180
needs a provisional moral, which is not a theoretical element of the system, but an imperative
of the practical life. So, it seems a contradiction when we find in the correspondence with
Elisabeth, that provisional moral is the definitive moral, and returned being an element of the
system.
8. A non-intelectualist moral: an art of decision
Luis Araujo said that subject disciplines his will, moderating his passions and
desires, experimenting happiness, without possessing all truth, but in a real art of living
oriented for a pragmatic security.192
As we could see, the moral action is the rational action, and rationality is similar to
cogito. Here we have the theory of passions and the resignation attitude. It is an appeal to
virtue.193 All of this is in the ascetic process. The beatitude is the final aim of the subject
free from passions, and it is a “perfect and interior satisfaction of the spirit, and happiness is
dependent of the external things.”194 So, the Wisdom teaches us how to become a master of
my self.
Passions are the space where we could insert moral, as an answer to freedom. “Be
moral is to follow virtue, using well the free-will, doing what we think it is better for our
rational thought.”195
Rui Magalhães said that Descartes never broach the ethics plan, excepting in the Les
Passions de l’Âme, with the description of the subjective scene, in which it is possible the
constitution of a methodical process as an ascetic proceed.196
The joy is a lasting satisfaction, where we live the experience of happiness.197 The
question posed by the case of Elisabeth is this one: can we be happy when everything goes
wrong? The way of this question remember us the moral of the stoics, which had a very
important vogue in the Europe of the Renaissance: happiness gets by the capacity of
resistance on those situations of “bad whether”. The Stoicism is a moral that it is not
accessible to anyone, requiring a great wisdom. Wise is that one who learns to support all bad
things in life, without being affected in his innermost. It is the ideal of apatheia.
Philosophical Counselling practiced by Descartes has a stoic mark: contrarieties
belong to the economy of happiness, only accessible to the best souls, who can find
consolation in everything it happens to them and feel good with the those victory against the
pain.198
Descartes suggests Elisabeth to read the De Vita Beata (The happy life) from
Séneca. Stimulated by the difficulties and proposes of Elisabeth, Descartes demarks from the
Stoicism, affirming that he doesn’t defends the insensibility of the wise.199
The Cartesian moral is a moral of the passions, of the good use of the passions, very
useful to life, to give it the meaning; the moral is directed to the whole man, and is this sense,
192
Luís Araújo, Op. Cit., p. 71.
Descartes, Passion de l’Âme, § 148.
194
Descartes, Letter to Elisabeth from August, 4 1645.
195
Descartes, Passions de L’Âme, § 48 and 153.
196
Rui Magalhães, Op. Cit., p. 336.
197
See Letters of September 4 and 18 from 1645.
198
See Letter of May 18 and July 21 from 1645.
199
See Letter of May 18 from 1645.
193
181
the confession of Descartes to Chanut, saying that he has passions; it is not the recognition of
a weakness, but of the human way to perfection and to happiness.200
This Moral is a way of interiority, but it isn’t a code of universal conduct. It is an art
of living, which we could learn by doing some practical exercise.
The first point of the Cartesian moral it is not an evident truth and universally valid,
but the urgency of action. In the Discours de la Methode and in the Principes de la
Philosophie, the moral is retired from the order of reasons, because of that urgency: in the
daily life, the decision could not wait by a correct and infallible judgment, based in the
analysis of the positive and the negative of each possible option.201
The most interesting point in the Cartesian moral is to understand that the error of
the judgment, when accomplished by a correct intention, doesn’t produce a moral
imperfection.202
It is not possible to typify the situations and to give rules of conduct, because the
vividness of the situation, it belongs to the same thing: the feelings grow in us and give the
form of our life in the situations.203
Elisabeth says that our passions are created without sensibility, so they escape to the
control of the consciousness – in a letter of September, 30 from 1645.
For a conclusion, the moral could be seen as an art of decision, with an objective: to
growth and to give more perfection to the interior capacity of the subject. The subjective
criterion is this: is good what increase the perfection of the subject; is bad what reduces it.
The moral is a way to happiness too, because this one requires the moral perfection of the
agent.
In my practical work with individual clients, I had some months ago, a person very
similar with Elisabeth. The problem was about “destiny”, and she could not get a boy-friend
to love and to live together. Why? Because she thinks wrong and that “bad thought” affects
her action and her choices in life. She never gives a second opportunity to men. Why?
Because she has some principles about an ideal man, that does not exists. And the great
problem is in the fact that she didn’t believe in love as a construction and discover in time: a
real adventure of good and bad feelings. So, like the Elisabeth’s case, we have the classical
and basic concept of philosophical counselling: first, we have to make an approach to the
common fallacies. And sometimes, some problems are just in that simple question: a logical
misunderstanding.
The ethos of the Cartesian moral it is not that one of a submissive ego to the norm,
refraining his force, but the excited state of an ego who lives in an excess of goods.
The Cartesian excess204 proposes an ideal of perfection similar of the lover who is
transformed in the loved thing. As the lover goes in ecstasy with the image of his sweetheart,
the man morally perfect affirms the infinite in his life.
200
See Letter of November 1 from 1646.
See Descartes, Principes de la Philosophie, portuguese edition, Princípios da Filosofia, I parte, art. 3, AT
IX-2, p. 26.
202
See Letter of October 6 1645.
203
See Letter to Marquis of Newcastle of November 23 1646.
204
See Letter of November 3 1645.
201
182
Conclusion
I could conclude this article with Luis Araújo, saying this: the ideal of love and
generosity has begun the construction of a new humanity, a politics with moral and a new
utility to philosophy. Descartes said that philosophical formation gives value to a civilization.
So, to civilize the human being as the great task of philosophy seems to us as the most
important ethical vocation. Thus, we think Descartes as our contemporaneous, and a very
good alternative to do philosophical counselling, in an empty time. That’s why I have my
proper method entitled «Project Method» applied in my Philosophical Practice, with clients
and with participants on my Courses. The method is based on the existential phenomenology:
Merleau-Ponty and all Philosophical Systems which developed the question of project:
Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Kierkegaard, Sartre, Agostinho da Silva, Julián Marías, Peter
Singer, Gilles Lipovetsky, etc. The objective is to study if people have some life project and
if so, try to understand it, try to find his values, cognitions, beliefs and concepts. The
meaning is always the project of the person, and all of other questions and problems are
involved on it.
Like Elisabeth, I had a client who was very sad because he could not live with the problems
of his family. In some consults, I knew that he has a project of love which was incompatible
with the problems of his family. In his first visit to my office, he said he believes on destiny
and that God will help him. After some sessions, my client has changed his way of thinking.
He was reading a book I suggested. His arguments turned more rational, clear, solid and
positive. My client decided for his project, which gives him very happiness, while his family
tries to solve the problems. He understands that he cannot solve those problems and he was
not responsible of them. The provisional moral was very important at the moment, but the
ascetic ethics was the great motive to solve his philosophical problem.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books by Descartes:
Descartes, René, Discourse du Methode, portuguese edition Discurso do Metodo, Lisboa,
Livraria Sá da Costa, 1990.
Descartes, René, Les Passions de l’Âme, portuguese edition, Paixões da Alma, Lisboa,
Livraria Sá da Costa, 1990.
Descartes, René, Les Prinicipes de la Philosophie, portuguese edition Principios da
Filosofia, Lisboa, Editora Guimaráes, 1999.
Books about Descartes:
Adam & Tannery, Oeuvres de Descartes, Paris, PUF, 1974, III and IV.
Alquié, Ferdinand, A Filosofia de Descartes, Lisboa, Editorial Presença, 1986.
Beyssade, Jean-Marie, Descartes, Correspondance avec Elisabeth et autres Lettres, Paris,
Garnier-Flammarion, 1989.
Beck, L. J., The method of Descartes, Oxford, Calrendon Press, 1966.
Blazquez, F. J., Moral y Voluntad en Descartes, Córdoba, 1984.
183
Cardoso, Adelino and Maria Ferreira Descartes, René, Correspondence avec Elisabeth, in
portuguese edition, translated by Inês Cardoso, Medicina dos Afectos, Lisboa, Celta Editora,
2002.
Gouthier, Henri, Descartes. Essais sur le «Discours de la Methode», la Metaphysique et la
Morale, Paris, Vrin, 1973.
Guenancia, Pierre, Bien conduire sa raison, (découvertes) Paris, Gallimard, 1996.
Koyré, Alexandre, Considerações sobre Descartes, 4ª edição, Editorial Presença, Lisboa,
1992.
Articles about Descartes:
Abreu, Luis Machado, As Paixões Racionalistas de Descartes e Espinosa, In Actas do
Colóquio Internacional – Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 49-62.
Alvira, Rafael, Sócrates y Descartes frente al Método, In Actas do Colóquio Internacional
– Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 63-67.
Araujo, Henrique Costa Gomes, Descartes e a Modernidade. Razão, Emoção e Afecto, in
Trabalhos de Antropologia e Etnologia, XXXVII, 1997.
Araujo, Luis de, Descartes – Uma Ética Racionalista?, In Actas do Colóquio Internacional
– Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 69-74.
Brito, José Henrique Silveira de, Descartes e a Filosofia, In Actas do Colóquio
Internacional – Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 447-450.
Cantista, Maria José Pinto, O Cogito de Descartes na génese do pensar transcendental.
Evidência cartesiana e Vivência fenomenológica, In Descartes – reflexão sobre a
modernidade, Actas do colóquio internacional, Porto, Fundação Eng.º António Almeida,
1996, pp. 111-120.
Carrascoso, José Luis Arce, Subjectividad racional y “Cogito” cartesiano, In Actas do
Colóquio Internacional – Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 75-94.
Dinis, Alfredo, Sobre a Contemporaneidade de Descartes, In Actas do Colóquio
Internacional – Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 431-434.
Duarte, Irene Borges, Descartes e o sonho, In Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, tomo LIX,
2003, fasc. 2.
Henriques, Mendo Castro, A possibilidade da Ética, In Actas do Colóquio Internacional –
Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 253-266.
Magalhães, Rui, Método e Moral: Descartes, a modernidade e a filosofia, In Actas do
Colóquio Internacional – Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 323338.
Neves, Maria do Céu Patrão, O «Homem Verdadeiro», Segundo Descartes, In Actas do
Colóquio Internacional – Descartes, reflexão sobre a modernidade, Porto, 1996, pp. 347361.
184
Mariano Betés de Toro es asesor filosófico.
Médico-Psiquiatra y psicólogo. Doctor en
Medicina y Farmacia. Licenciado en CC.
Biológicas, Geografía e Historia y en Historia
del Arte. Magíster en Bioética (Univ.
Complutense de Madrid). Becario en el Collège
de France y en el Hospital de la Salpêtrière de
Paris. Catedrático de Farmacología. Profesor de
la Facultad de Medicina, Universidad de Alcalá
(Madrid).
EL CONOCIMIENTO DE SÍ MISMO
DE MIGUEL SABUCO
Mariano Betés de Toro
Madrid, España
“Sólo el hombre tiene dolor entendido,
espiritual de lo presente, pesar de lo pasado,
temor, congoja y cuidado de lo por venir”.
(Miguel Sabuco, Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo, Título III).
Resumen
El “Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo” de Miguel Sabuco, fue publicado por
primera vez en 1587. Escrito en forma de diálogo entre tres pastores “filósofos”, insiste
en la importancia de que el hombre se conozca a sí mismo para percibir mejor su realidad
y ser feliz. El conocimiento de sí mismo está basado en la comprensión de uno mismo
como microcosmos, un mundo pequeño que contiene todos los elementos de la
naturaleza.
Una vez ubicado el hombre como parte integrante de la naturaleza, Sabuco
comenta los principales males a los que está sometido (el enojo y el pesar) y sus
contrarios (el afecto de placer y alegría). Describe las principales virtudes del hombre, en
185
especial, la magnanimidad, la prudencia y la sabiduría, y nos brinda las claves del
manejo de uno mismo para ser felices y guiar mejor la relación con los demás y con
nuestro entorno. Por sus brillantes comentarios, su sencilla erudición y su magnífica
prosa, esta obra mantiene una fresca actualidad y puede ser de utilidad para la orientación
filosófica.
Publicado con el nombre de una hija de don Miguel, llamada Oliva, ha sido uno
de los baluartes del feminismo durante más de tres siglos, hasta el descubrimiento de su
autoría por José Marco de Hidalgo (1903).
1. Introducción
El lema gnothi seauton (conócete a ti mismo) era bien conocido por los griegos.
Lo habían escrito con letras de oro en el templo de Apolo en Delfos (lo recuerda Sabuco
en su obra) y lo había desarrollado Sócrates y un gran número de filósofos griegos. Nosce
te ipsum (conócete a ti mismo) era, según Plinio, uno de los tres preceptos délficos
atribuidos al espartano Quilón 205 . De Plinio debió pasar a Sabuco, gran lector y
admirador del naturalista romano.
Miguel Sabuco cree escribir una obra original, el “Coloquio sobre el
conocimiento de sí mismo” puesto que, según él, los antiguos no habían profundizado en
este precepto y él iba a desentrañar el misterio del conocimiento interior. Por tanto,
Sabuco propone un cambio en la investigación filosófica que inició Sócrates, que
consiste en abandonar la especulación cosmológica para centrar su atención en lo
propiamente humano.
Sin embargo, no se queda en lo estrictamente filosófico. Su concepción filosófica
del hombre consiste en el conocimiento de su disposición natural psicológica y física, es
decir, tener en cuenta de que el hombre está formado por cuerpo, cerebro y alma.
En consecuencia, el conocimiento del hombre no se puede reducir a meras
determinaciones somáticas 206 . La investigación de la vida anímica de las personas
(sentimientos, afectos y preocupaciones) es de vital importancia, porque es una de las
causas determinantes del grado de salud y enfermedad, del vivir e incluso del morir.
Para Sabuco, la filosofía como conocimiento de la naturaleza humana, esto es, el
estudio de los “afectos y sus mudanzas”, es la base y fundamento de la Medicina. Con la
filosofía se sana el alma y, por tanto, el cuerpo, dada la íntima conexión entre ambos.
205
Los tres preceptos eran: “Conócete a ti mismo”, “No desees nada en demasía” y “La
compañía de deudas y litigios es miseria” (Historia Natural, Libro VII, par. XXXII).
206
Este planteamiento ha sido llamado “fisiologismo renacentista”, y estuvo representado por
personajes tan ilustres como Vallés, Pereira, Mercado o Huarte de San Juan.
186
No hay que perder de vista que la combinación de conocimientos médicos y
filosóficos que Sabuco propone tiene un objetivo terapéutico. Por ello, una de las
originalidades de Sabuco es haber ido contra-corriente, pero con idea de futuro, en una
época muy influida por la tradición galénica.
2. El “Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo”, de Miguel Sabuco
El “Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo” es el primer tratado de los siete que
comprende la colección “Nueva Filosofía de la Naturaleza del hombre”, impresa por
primera vez en Madrid en 1587.
El “Coloquio” está estructurado en 70 títulos o capítulos, y desarrollado en forma
de conversación entre “tres pastores Filósofos en vida solitaria, nombrados Antonio,
Veronio y Rodonio”, que hablan sobre temas médicos, filosóficos, astronómicos y
políticos.
La base del verdadero conocimiento del hombre es la estrecha vinculación entre
lo fisiológico y lo psicológico. Por ello, parte de un primer principio fundamental: la
unidad psicosomática del hombre.
a) Análisis
Para comprender al hombre como una unidad psicosomática, la obra comienza
con un proceso de análisis, en el que estudia el efecto de las pasiones, las virtudes y los
estados de ánimo en la salud del hombre.
Las pasiones ocupan gran parte de este tratado: el enojo, el pesar, la ira, el miedo,
el amor, el deseo, el odio, la desconfianza, los celos, que llegan no sólo a producir
enfermedades, sino incluso la muerte.
A continuación, analiza los efectos positivos sobre el cuerpo, el placer, la alegría,
la templanza, la esperanza, el amor a los semejantes, la amistad y la buena conversación.
Termina tratando las grandes virtudes, la magnanimidad, la prudencia, la sabiduría y la
felicidad.
b) Síntesis: las dos metáforas
La armonía entre los elementos psicológicos y fisiológicos forman un cuerpo de
doctrina que se llama “Filosofía”, la Nueva Filosofía del hombre. Esta armonía
187
psicosomática es expresada desde el punto de vista filosófico con dos metáforas: la del
hombre como “microcosmos” y como “árbol del revés”:
1) Sobre el microcosmos, dice: “en el mundo pequeño que es el hombre, hay un
príncipe que es causa de todos los actos, afectos, movimientos y acciones que tiene, que
es entendimiento, razón y voluntad, que [es] el ánima, que descendió del cielo 207 , que
mora en la cabeza, miembro divino y capaz de todos los movimientos del cuerpo”.
2) Sobre la metáfora del árbol al revés, comenta: “el hombre se dijo árbol del
revés por la similitud que tiene con el árbol, la raíz arriba y las ramas abajo; la raíz es el
cerebro y sus tres celdas de médula anterior, media y posterior.
Las dos metáforas expresan la unidad del hombre y su vinculación con el cielo,
por un lado, y por otra parte, la importancia del cerebro en los estados de salud y
enfermedad.
En conclusión, la doctrina de Sabuco ofrece una doctrina integradora, de carácter
médico-filosófico, donde integra magistralmente los elementos psíquicos y somáticos,
anticipándose al desarrollo de la medicina psicosomática, donde destaca el cerebro como
órgano de control de la vida vegetativa, sensitiva e intelectiva. Estas ideas innovadoras se
mezclan con elementos míticos tradicionales (las metáforas del microcosmos y del árbol
al revés) y explicaciones ingenuas, dando a la obra un carácter fresco, atractivo y
literario.
3. Ideas de Sabuco útiles a la orientación filosófica
El “Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo” de Sabuco tiene un objetivo práctico:
la felicidad de las personas a través del conocimiento de sí mismos. Sabuco nos brinda
unos consejos útiles sobre el “arte del saber vivir”, porque el conocimiento de sí mismo
nos brinda la oportunidad de vivir mejor.
Por la abundancia de sus consejos, esta obra puede considerarse precursora de los
libros de auto-ayuda; sin embargo, la profundidad de sus pensamientos y matizaciones
nos llevan a juzgar esta obra como filosófica, con vocación integradora de los
conocimientos fisiológicos, filosóficos y morales de la época.
La mayoría de títulos o capítulos tienen interés en la orientación filosófica, en
especial, los dedicados a los afectos, tanto positivos como negativos, el dolor, la
imaginación, los ornatos del alma, el mismo concepto de alma, y la lista de las grandes
virtudes: la magnanimidad, la prudencia, la sapiencia y la felicidad.
207
Estas palabras en cursiva fueron censuradas por la Inquisición.
188
3.1. Las cuestiones iniciales
Cuatro cuestiones fundamentales se plantean al principio del “Coloquio” y
constituyen el eje de la obra:
a. La necesidad del conocimiento de sí mismo para que el hombre se entienda y se
comprenda (es decir, para saber cómo pensamos) 208 ;
b. Conocer mejor nuestras relaciones con el medio, para saber cómo respondemos a
nuestro entorno 209 ;
c. La búsqueda de la felicidad en este mundo: ¿Cómo ser feliz? 210
d. ¿Por qué viene la muerte? 211
Para contestar a estas preguntas, Sabuco hace un recorrido de todo aquello que
considera que la persona debe conocer de sí mismo: “entendiendo los contrarios afectos
y ornatos que tiene el hombre, y sus efectos” (Título 62).
Se estudian los afectos negativos (el enojo y el pesar, principalmente), los
positivos (la alegría, el placer y la esperanza de bien), y algunos elementos terapéuticos
(como la palabra o la música). Los últimos capítulos tratan de las grandes virtudes: la
magnanimidad (el saber estar), la prudencia (madre de las virtudes), la sabiduría (el
mayor ornato del ánima) y la felicidad (obra del entendimiento, razón y prudencia, con
alegría), con un planteamiento final del hombre como microcosmos.
3.2. Afectos que dan enfermedad y muerte
Muchos sentimientos intensos, como el miedo, el acoso, la tristeza o la soledad,
que Sabuco denomina afectos de la sensitiva 212 , son capaces que paralizar el deseo de
vivir y adormecer el instinto de supervivencia, que es uno de los más arraigados en la
naturaleza (Título 2). De ahí que, siendo la muerte un proceso natural, necesario y
espontáneo, el hombre puede forzarla, de forma consciente o inconsciente, a través de sus
afectos de miedo, tristeza o soledad. Estos “afectos de la sensitiva” son, pues, fuerzas de
gran intensidad que es necesario conocer y controlar.
208
Análisis de las relaciones con uno mismo.
Análisis de las relaciones con los demás.
210
Intento de armonizar las relaciones con uno mismo y con los demás, y darles un sentido.
211
La muerte se convierte en el principal fenómeno que da sentido a la vida.
212
Del alma sensitiva, es decir, propia de los animales y el hombre.
209
189
3.2.1. El enojo y el pesar
Sabuco califica los afectos del alma, el enojo y el pesar, como los principales
enemigos de la naturaleza humana, porque acarrean muertes y enfermedades a los
hombres. Por tanto, hay que tomar conciencia del mal que pueden producir el enojo y el
pesar, y convencerse de que es mejor “sufrir este pequeño daño que pudiera ser mayor,
que añadir otro mal mayor encima y perderlo todo” (Título 5).
3.2.2. La imaginación
La imaginación es una cualidad necesaria para realizar grandes obras, pero
también puede generar y desarrollar muchos problemas, como la infelicidad. A veces,
basta con la imaginación, con creer en las cosas, para sentir como si hubiesen ocurrido.
Por ejemplo, los ataques de celos son causa de muchas desgracias, aunque sólo sea en la
imaginación de las personas (Título 3).
3.2.3. Reflexión y decisión
Es necesario saber por qué tomamos una decisión en cada momento, para conocer
los motivos que dirigen nuestras vidas. Conociendo las razones que nos mueven a hacer
las cosas, probablemente tengamos tiempo de reflexionar antes de actuar, porque:
“Menos hieren los dardos, que primero se ven venir” (Título 4).
3.2.4. Las adversidades y sus beneficios
Las adversidades hacen madurar al hombre. Pero, para que el hombre madure,
debe reflexionar sobre esa adversidad, sacarle partido, y extraer la lección de que “no hay
mal que por bien no venga”: “¿Cuántas cosas juzga el hombre algunas veces por
dañosas, que después se convierten en bien y en provecho?” (Título 5).
3.2.5. La tristeza y desesperanza de bien
La tristeza “hace el daño poco a poco, como la envidia, y de la misma manera,
los tristes se secan y consumen...”. Para la tristeza recomienda “buscar o imaginar otra
esperanza, otro objeto de espera, alejar lo que genera tristeza, prevenirla y desecharla”
(Título 7).
La desesperanza de bien alude al estado de ánimo depresivo consecuencia de la
pérdida de la cosa amada y deseada. Ante los que padecen de esta situación tan
lamentable, recomienda: “guárdate de aquellos que no tienen esperanza de bien, y
190
cuando con ellos te vieres o tratares, el remedio es ponerles esperanza de bien, aunque
sea fingida” (Título 11).
3.2.6. El miedo
“El miedo y el temor de lo que está por venir” es una emoción muy intensa,
incrustada en la naturaleza humana, debido nuestra vida siempre incierta. El miedo a un
acontecimiento cualquiera produce a veces un efecto superior al acontecimiento mismo,
porque “más daño hace el temor que no la cosa temida cuando llega”. Para el miedo,
Sabuco recomienda:
1º. “Conocer la condición y naturaleza, para no darle crédito”.
2º. “Alegría, buen olor, música, el campo, el sonido de los árboles y el agua, buena
conversación, tomar placeres, y contentos por todas vías” (Título 8).
3.2.7. Males del amor
El amor hace al hombre más feliz: “El amor ciega, convierte el amante en la cosa
amada, lo feo hace hermoso, y lo falto perfecto, todo lo allana, y pone igual: lo
dificultoso hace fácil, alivia todo trabajo, da salud cuando lo amado se goza”.
Pero también existen los males del amor, que describe con bellas metáforas:
“Este afecto no engendra mal humor, antes mueren sin frío, ni calentura,
secándose, porque como en aquello que mucho aman y desean, tienen empleado su
entendimiento y voluntad y todas las potencias de su alma, no toma gusto en otra
cosa del mundo, ni en comer, ni en beber, ni conversación y así la vegetativa no
hace su oficio, y se va consumiendo, porque la discordia del cuerpo y alma, y gran
afecto del alma, estorba la operación del cuerpo”.
(El amor) “mata en dos maneras, o perdiendo lo que se ama, o no
pudiendo alcanzar lo que se ama y desea”.
Y termina dando algunos remedios para los males de amor:
1º. “Saber y conocer al enemigo que mata, y sus afectos y obras”.
2º. Prevenir los males del amor: a) En la primera manera, preguntarse: “Si yo perdiese
esto que tanto amo, ¿perderé la vida también por ello?” b) En la segunda manera: Si no se
alcanza lo que se ama, el remedio es “buscar y tomar otros amores, que un clavo con otro
se saca” (Título 9).
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3.2.8. Los celos
Los celos, para Sabuco: “Es un temor, y miedo de perder lo que se ama, que luego
se sigue al grande amor, derriba del cerebro mal humor melancólico, y así sospechan lo
que no es, y todo les parece más o menos”. Pero no da consejos para tratarlo.
3.2.9. Las preocupaciones (afecto de congoxa)
Las grandes congojas “dan fatiga, envejecen y traen canas, estorban la digestión y
vegetativa”. Para tratar las preocupaciones y los cuidados de lo futuro, “se han de dejar a
tiempos, y ponerlos en un lugar, como en un papel, haciendo lista, y fijarla en la pared, y
alivia la congoja, y miedo de la memoria, y sin pena se miran allí los cuidados, y se hacen, y
a la noche se duerme mejor”.
Pero los grandes problemas de la vida tienen un tratamiento más filosófico: “La gran
congoja se aliviará con razones del alma, lo que es, ya es, o lo que ha de ser, será, mi fatiga
no lo mejora ni remedia”.
3.2.10. Siete afectos que son pecado mortal
Califica los siete afectos que son pecado mortal en el hombre como “males del
hombre que les dañan principalmente al alma, pero también al cuerpo”. Son la soberbia,
la avaricia (“la insaciable sed del dinero”), la ira y la venganza, la envidia (“pesar del
bien ajeno”), la gula, (“más mata la gula que la espada”), la lujuria (“consume la vida de
todo viviente”) y la pereza “y el ocio demasiado” (Título 17).
De la pereza y el ocio, comenta que “la ociosidad es imagen de la muerte...
inventor de vicios y pecados”, y recomienda el paseo por el campo y el ejercicio
moderado, porque “da gran salud, porque de otra manera el mucho ocio sin exercicio, y
mucho dormir, hace muy blando, tierno, y aguanoso el cerebro, y se derrite, y cae
fácilmente y así vienen los daños dichos, y muchas enfermedades...” (Título 19).
Respecto a la venganza, “es una presencia, y memoria del daño que recibió”,
recomienda el aplazamiento prudente de ejecutarla: “El apetito de la venganza se ha de
saber dexar para tiempo oportuno”.
Respecto a las relaciones sexuales, recomienda: “...no uses del acto venereo, sino
es à la mañana en ayunas, aviendo dormido, y es bueno reiterar el sueño después del
coytu”. (Título 18).
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3.2.11. El fastidio
La variedad da alegría, porque las nuevas cosas agradan. La satisfacción es difícil
de alcanzar porque: “La capacidad infinita de nuestra anima divina no puede henchir
sino es con cosa infinita (que es Dios) y así todo lo de este mundo harta y da fastidio, y
busca las variedades, pensando dar hartura y contento” (Título 52).
El fastidio es lo contrario de la variedad. Incluso lo más satisfactorio, cuando
genera cansancio, se hace negativo y tedioso. Sabuco nos da un par de consejos contra el
fastidio:
1º. “Gozar del campo y de su variedad, que se puede hacer con sana intención,
gozando de lo que Dios crió para el hombre”.
2º. “Cuando el estudio te da fastidio o no te contenta lo que haces, es mejor
dexarlo para otro día”.
3.3. Afectos que dan salud
3.3.1. Los tres pilares
Los afectos positivos proporcionan una vida feliz a sí mismos y a los demás. Son
esencialmente, la alegría y la esperanza de bien. Estos dos afectos son los contrarios al
mayor enemigo, el enojo y el pesar. Constituyen la primera armonía, la armonía
principal del cerebro.
Además, Sabuco añade un tercer elemento, el “buen calor del estómago”, que
denomina segunda armonía, que se origina a través de la buena alimentación (Tabla I):
1ª. Alegría y placer
2ª. Esperanza de bien
3ª. Buena alimentación (buen calor del estómago)
Tabla I. Los “tres pilares” que sustentan la salud y la vida humana (Títulos 22 y 23)
Los tres pilares están muy relacionados: la alegría y el placer son la “principal
causa porque vive el hombre”. Constituye, como decía Platón, la “concordia del alma y
del cuerpo”. La esperanza de bien “da alegría, contento, fuerzas y aliento para cualquier
trabajo”. Contrarrestan al enojo y pesar, y “hace lo dificultoso fácil, alivia todo trabajo...
193
hace obrar las virtudes y buenas obras... Guárdate de aquel que no tiene esperanza de
bien”.
En los tres pilares, Sabuco vuelve a integrar los elementos somáticos del cuerpo
(alimentación) con los elementos espirituales del alma (alegría y esperanza de bien), a
través de estos tres afectos, que constituyen los pilares o columnas que sustentan la salud
y la vida humana.
3.3.2. La templanza
La templanza consiste en realizar las actividades en su proporción. Las
actividades que deben gobernadas por la templanza son, sobre todo, el trabajo, el
ejercicio, la comida y la bebida, el sueño, el ocio y el apetito sensitivo. Fuera de la
proporción hacen el daño, proporcionan tristeza, enfermedad y muerte; dentro de la
proporción, surge la salud, el contento y la alegría, los bienes y la felicidad. Para actuar
con templanza, propone:
En toda cosa huye el extremo y demasía: ayrado, no determines cosa alguna:
ayrado, ni comas ni bebas. Esta gran virtud templanza, solamente el hombre la
tiene... Consiste en la voluntad deliberada, primero, por el entendimiento, que es el
anima divina celestial (Título 26).
3.3.3. Amor a los semejantes
El amor a su semejante es afecto natural, da salud y alegría, porque el hombre es
animal sociable, quiere y ama a su semejante. La soledad le es muy contraria, y
causa melancolía, cuando no hay compañía consigo mismo”.
El hombre necesita emplear este afecto de amor, “porque si no lo hay, causa
tristeza y melancolía”. Recomienda amar con mesura, siguiendo también el precepto
griego: “No amarás, ni desearás nada demasiadamente”. Y avisa contra el exceso de
amor: “el demasiado amor es muy peligroso, y acarrea muchas muertes”.
3.3.4. La amistad y la buena conversación
Sabuco concede una gran importancia al diálogo, y dedica un precioso capítulo (el
Título 28) a desarrollar algunos matices:
La amistad y buena conversación, es muy necesaria para la salud al hombre,
porque el hombre es animal sociable, quiere y ama la conversación de su
semejante, en tanto que algunos llamaron a la buena conversación, quinto elemento
con que vive el hombre.
Y dedica unas bellísimas palabras a la amistad:
194
También por otra razón son necesarios los amigos, porque si el alma no tiene en
qué emplear su amor natural, que brota para fuera, ni con qué llenar sus deseos, y
gran capacidad, la cual se llena con lo amado, luego se marchita y desmaya y
hace melancolía y tristeza, quedándose como vacía, y frustrado su apetito, deseo
y acción natural
Algunos consejos sobre la amistad aparecen en la Tabla II:
“El amigo es otro yo, y así como el ser es la mayor felicidad, y dejar
de ser la mayor miseria, así es gran felicidad ser hombre dos veces, teniendo
amigo verdadero”.
“Con el buen amigo, los bienes comunicados crecen y se hacen
mayores, y los males y congoxas se alivian y hacen menores”.
“El amigo procura las cosas del amigo, como las suyas”.
“Guarda el secreto, y con él han de ser comunes los secretos del
alma, y también las riquezas corporales”.
“Todo lo de los amigos ha de ser común”.
Tabla II. Consejos sobre la amistad (Título 28).
3.3.5. La soledad
La soledad puede tener diferentes sentidos, incluso opuestos, en función de cómo
lo viva la persona y sus necesidades. Sabuco decide colocarla en el capítulo de los
afectos positivos:
Esta soledad, silencio y tranquilidad son diferentes, porque a ratos son buenas y a
ratos son malas. Es buena en la comida, reposo y sueño, o para el buen cristiano, a
sus tiempos y horas, en la oración vocal o mental. Por el contrario, la soledad es
mala para los tristes y melancólicos (Título 29).
3.3.6. La imaginación
Anteriormente (Título 3) se había comentado que la imaginación puede aumentar
el dolor e incluso producir la muerte. Pero también puede ser útil. Este doble significado
es explicado magistralmente por Sabuco en el siguiente comentario:
La imaginación es un afecto muy fuerte, y de grande eficacia, es general para todo,
es como un molde vacío, que lo que le echan eso imprime. Y así si la imaginación
es de efecto que mata, también mata, como si fuera verdad
195
Descubrimos que el hombre tiene dentro de sí una poderosa dimensión subjetiva,
que puede tener consecuencias agradables o desagradables. El hecho de creer algo con
fuerza, hace que el individuo actúe como si así fuera:
Así el hombre, lo que tiene en su imaginación (ora sea en vigilia, ora sea e sueño),
aquello es para él; en tanto que si se sueñan o piensan dichosos y felices, obra en
ellos como si fuera verdad
Un consejo para utilizar bien la imaginación: “Juzga el día presente por felice”
(Título 53).
3.4. Las grandes virtudes
3.4.1. La magnanimidad
La magnanimidad es el prototipo de virtud que engloba a las demás en el
conocimiento de sí mismo. Es la más consistente y la que da sentido a las demás. Por
ello, Sabuco le dedica una atención especial.
En mi opinión, la magnanimidad de Sabuco tiene cuatro dimensiones: la primera,
está en relación con su esencia: lo que caracteriza al magnánimo es la búsqueda de cosas
elevadas y nuevas. El magnánimo siempre piensa en cosas grandes y nobles, en relación
con el entendimiento y el razonamiento, y por tanto, pertenecientes al alma racional. Para
ello, debe saber discernir entre lo fundamental (lo esencial) y lo accesorio (lo superfluo).
La segunda dimensión corresponde al estado de ánimo: su ánimo es constante, no
se hunde ante las circunstancias adversas ni se acuerda de los malos momentos, pero
tampoco se exalta ante las circunstancias favorables.
La tercera dimensión afecta a su actitud personal y su comportamiento: es
sosegado y tranquilo, sus palabras son calmadas, sin crítica, sus movimientos son lentos,
discretos, callados, sin prisa.
Su cuarta dimensión está en relación con los demás: no es vengativo, se olvida del
mal recibido pero no olvida el bien que recibe. Y es generoso: “el dar es un género de
señorío, de mayoridad”.
En síntesis, el magnánimo tiene unas cualidades que le hacen estar cerca de sí
mismo, puesto que busca la autenticidad de sí mismo y el bien de los demás. A
continuación, resumo las principales cualidades del magnánimo, según Sabuco:
pone su afición y estudio en pocas y grandes cosas, habla poco y despacio, no
habla de sí mismo mucho, es fácil para perdonar, más se goza en dar que en recibir,
siempre está constante su ánimo, ni en las cosas adversas se cae, ni en las prósperas
se alza, no se acuerda mucho del mal pasado para entristecerse (Título 58).
196
3.4.2. La prudencia
La prudencia nace de la razón. Proporciona alegría, porque la prudencia avisa de
lo que no entiende y libra de muchos peligros para sí y para los demás. La recomienda en
todas las actividades, especialmente en la política.
Para Sabuco, las tres grandes virtudes, la magnanimidad, la prudencia y la
sabiduría van siempre juntas. La prudencia sólo se halla en el hombre de buen juicio y
entendimiento.
3.4.3. La sabiduría
La sapiencia es una ciencia de las cosas divinas y naturales y conocimiento de las
causas de todas las cosas. Es una virtud y ornato en el hombre, la más alta y divina y a
todas las perfecciona. Es la cosa más amable que hay en el mundo y todo hombre desea
saber. Sólo está perfecta en Dios, y de allí mana el ánima del hombre, que él sólo la tiene.
Da gran contento y alegría, y eso da salud.
La sapiencia hace felices y dichosos en este mundo, y sin ella no hay felicidad.
Sus deseos son el término medio de todas las cosas: de ahí su relación con la prudencia.
Algunos rasgos de la sabiduría son (Título 60):
o “El prudente no se perturba por los daños futuros; los pasados no le
entristecen, goza de lo presente sin miedo de lo futuro ni pesar de lo
pasado”.
o “No hay mal que no tenga consigo algún bien. Los bienes y los males
están mezclados en toda la vida del hombre y se siguen unos a otros”
(Platón, Filebo).
o “El sabio y prudente no teme a la muerte: la muerte es la puerta y entrada
de la eterna felicidad, la vida es una prolija muerte, siempre disminuyendo
y quitando”.
3.4.4. La felicidad
La felicidad consiste en el “conocimiento de las causas y en obra del
entendimiento, contemplando y entendiendo todas las cosas de este mundo como son, y
en la elección de la prudencia, sabiendo tomar el medio en todas las cosas... obrando las
virtudes (que es el medio entre dos vicios) con alegría y buena conciencia; y en los
deleites, tomando el medio necesario de todo bien, para el sustento de la vida, y no más”.
197
La felicidad está relacionada con el bien: “No puede ser ninguno feliz sin que sea
sabio y bueno”.
La felicidad es un estado de alegría: “Es una alegría, contento y placer de gozar
todos los bienes de este mundo... pero con muchas riquezas no se puede ser feliz, porque
traen consigo muchos males... alegría de buena conciencia, sirviendo y conociendo a
Dios”.
Para ser feliz, se requiere “justicia, queriendo para el prójimo lo que quieres para
ti”. Además “es preciso fortaleza, para defenderte de tus afectos, iras y apetitos
sensuales, y para sufrir los daños, palabras e importunidades de tu prójimo.
Se puede ser feliz sin ser sabio: “De la sapiencia, te digo que puedes ser feliz sin
ella, que poco saber te basta”. Es suficiente leer un rato cada día “este librito, Fray Luis
de Granada y la Vanidad de Estella y el Contemptus mundi (tratado de ascética, muy
leído en la baja Edad Media, atribuido a Inocencio III en la segunda mitad del siglo
XII). Sin más libros, puedes ser feliz, haciendo paradas en la vida, contemplando tu ser y
entendiéndote a ti mismo, y mirando el camino que llevas y adonde vas a parar, y
contemplando este mundo y sus maravillas y el fin de él”.
Respecto a las posesiones, advierte: “No te conviene tener riquezas, y si las tienes
no amarlas, sino usar bien de ellas socorriendo a los pobres. Y de esta manera, con la
alegría verdadera de la buena conciencia, serás feliz y te escaparás de la mala bestia, y
conservarás tu vida hasta la muerte natural y gozarás de la otra vida eterna del alma...”
3.5. Remedios y técnicas
3.5.1. Las palabras
Un buen tratamiento contra las enfermedades por daño o enojo son las palabras, si
son “conformes al caso acontecido” (Título 5). Para la ira213 , recomienda un remedio
muy eficaz: la eutrapelia, que para Sabuco es, sobre todo, la buena conversación con un
amigo 214 . Durante el diálogo, la persona es persuadida del daño potencial que puede
cometer dejándose llevar por la ira (Título 6).
213
“La ira es una breve locura, y no se debe dar crédito, que de allí a un rato sentirá de otra
manera” (título 6).
214
Eutrapelia es una palabra griega, que procede de eu, bien y trépo, distraerse. Es una virtud
que modera el exceso de las diversiones o entretenimientos. Se puede aplicar a cualquier
actividad u ocupación moderada que entretiene o divierte.
198
3.5.2. La insinuación retórica
Ya se ha comentado que Sabuco está considerado como uno de los precursores de
la medicina psicosomática. Muestra de ello es la propuesta que denomina insinuación
retórica, técnica psicoterapéutica que consiste en tres pasos: a) ganarse la confianza del
otro; b) pedirle que no haga nada sin consultar, y c) por último, con más calma, “miremos
los fines en que se pueden parar esas nuestras iras, que quién no mira el fin, no usa de
razón de hombre” (Título 6).
3.5.3. La música
Sabuco fue un amante de la música. Reconoce que hay sonidos desagradables,
pero también puede ser eficaz para paliar y corregir muchos problemas. Por eso, se le
considera también como uno de los precursores de la musicoterapia moderna 215 :
La música alegra y afirma el celebro y da salud a toda enfermedad.
La música es el contrario del mal sonido desproporcionado, y así hace el
contrario efecto, es la cosa que más conforta, alegra y afirma el cerebro de las
que hay fuera del hombre, porque como sea un género de alegría espiritual, que
alegra el anima, se le pega... ayuda también el ejercicio y calor del movimiento y
baile” (Título 38-39).
4. Conclusión: El mensaje de Miguel Sabuco
La “Nueva Filosofía de la Naturaleza del hombre”, compendio de varias obras de
medicina y filosofía práctica, consagra a su autor como una de las figuras más relevantes
del pensamiento español del Renacimiento, por la novedad de sus planteamientos, ya
alejados de los modelos medievales, por su conocimiento enciclopédico y por la
elegancia de su castellano.
El hombre del Renacimiento es centro y medida de todas las cosas. El nosce te
ipsum era también el lema del hombre renacentista, formado culturalmente en la
conjunción de humanismo grecorromano (la fascinación del mundo clásico) y del
cristiano. El hombre como animal racional debía utilizar sus capacidades intelectuales
para actuar de árbitro y garantía del orden natural de las cosas.
Sabuco propone el conocimiento de sí mismo, es decir, la toma de conciencia
exacta de sus propias posibilidades, de sus limitaciones y la aceptación de su propia
realidad, para situar al hombre en el lugar óptimo para ejercer de moderador ante sí
mismo 216 . El mensaje de Sabuco podría resumirse en una frase: la consistencia de la vida
215
Ref. M. Betés de Toro, “Bases históricas del uso terapéutico de la música”, en M. Betés,
comp., Fundamentos de musicoterapia, Morata, 2000, p. 28.
216
Ref. A. Martínez Tomé, Nueva Filosofía..., 1981, p. 21.
199
debe buscarse dentro de sí mismo. Hay que trabajar desde dentro, buscando las claves de
nuestro propio conocimiento, para después ir hacia fuera, hacia los demás, libre de
prejuicios y proyecciones personales.
La “Nueva Filosofía” de Miguel Sabuco es una obra muy actual, y tiene mucho
que decir en el siglo XXI, ya que puede ayudar a esta sociedad perdida entre el consumo,
el estrés y el desorden en su escala de valores, a encontrarse a sí misma: “solamente
mediante la reflexión serena y prolongada, el hombre es capaz de conocer el inmenso y
complicado mundo interior que le acompaña en cada momento de la existencia” 217 .
5. Esquema final: Selección de frases
La Tabla III recoge una selección de frases y sentencias extraídas del “Coloquio
del conocimiento de sí mismo”. Están bien elaboradas y pueden ser de utilidad en la
orientación filosófica. Sin embargo, sólo serán realmente útiles si se ponen en práctica.
Tabla III. Selección de frases del “Coloquio sobre el conocimiento de sí mismo” de
Miguel Sabuco, aplicables a la orientación filosófica 218 .
“Las armas de la muerte y de la fortuna adversa, son tristezas y pesares que
el hombre se toma: éstas conoce para que te sepas guardar de ellas” (Sección 2ª,
Máxima 9ª).
“Más hombres han muerto por efecto de las pasiones, que por la espada y
la gula” (34).
“No entristecerse con el mal es vencer a la fortuna adversa, y quitarle sus
armas y poder” (10).
“El temor es mayor mal que la cosa temida cuando llega” (11).
“El mal futuro inminente desasosiega y da fatiga al prudente; el hecho ya y
pasado al imprudente” (12).
“No amarás, ni desearás, ni estimarás en mucho ninguna cosa” (13).
“Tus enojos e iras has de atar con la cadena de la prudencia” (14).
“El airado y el celoso, y el melancólico, y el mancebo en la juventud, no se
crean a sí mismos” (15).
“El magnánimo no siente la afrenta del tonto” (16). “Ríete de tus afrentas y
no las estimes” (17).
“La esperanza de bien hace todas las cosas, y también da la salud. Cuando
217
Ref. A. Martínez Tomé, o.c., p. 24.
Entre paréntesis, los números corresponden a la Máxima correspondiente, que aparecen en
el apartado “Máximas terapéuticas y fisiológicas”, sección 2ª (I. MARTÍNEZ, Notas a la edición
de Nueva Filosofía de la naturaleza del hombre, Madrid, 1847, pp. 486-493).
218
200
la esperanza de tu bien perezca, busca, piensa e imagina otra” (18).
“Los bienes con los males están siempre mezclados: todo bien tiene su
mal, y todo mal tiene su bien, por tanto, teme al mal de los bienes y ama al bien de
los males” (19).
“Al día presente juzga por felice y dichoso, y no pierdas este con deseo de
otro mas dichoso” (20), o “con miedo de otro mas infelice, porque al día dichoso ó
desdichado el fin lo juzga” (21).
“Huye del ocio, porque el ánima es activa y atenta, y empleada en algo
aprovecha a la salud” (25). “No quieras la ociosidad, porque la mente debe ser
activa, que siempre aprovecha intentar algo” (44).
“Toda forma se muda con el tiempo, ascendiendo a la perfección, o
descendiendo a la corrupción” (43).
“El hombre a cada paso se muda, ya quiere y ama conversación, ya soledad
y silencio” (27).
“Conoce tus mudanzas, que el decremento hace, y no darás la culpa a
causas exteriores” (26).
“No hay enemigo más nocivo y dañoso que tú mismo para ti” (28).
“Tú solo puedes hacerte feliz (33).
“Los males imaginados igualmente dañan que los verdaderos, porque los
pintan con tan vivos colores” (31).
“Gusto y alegría es aumento de salud” (32).
“No determines ninguna cosa estando airado” (36).
“No hagas daño al enemigo: conócele para precaverte” (38).
“No te dejes engañar de los placeres y el amor” (39).
”Todo cuanto se obra se hace por el bien, porque es el amor la causa de la
acción” (41).
“No doblegarse en la desgracia es vencer la fortuna; te darás fuerza si te
irritas por su causa” (42).
“La hora idónea para los actos venéreos es por la mañana en ayunas, a fin
después de reiterar el sueño” (45).
6. Bibliografía
a) Fuentes
•
SABUCO, O. “Un Coloquio del conocimiento de sí mismo, en el qual hablan tres
pastores Filósofos en vida solitaria, nombrados Antonio, Veronio, Rodonio”, en Obras
de Doña Oliva Sabuco de Nantes. Prólogo de Octavio Cuartero. Madrid, Establecimiento
tipográfico de Ricardo Fé, 1888, pp. 1-160.
201
b) Estudios específicos sobre su obra
•
GARCÍA GÓMEZ, M. C. La concepción de la naturaleza humana en la obra de
Miguel Sabuco (Tesis Doctoral, Universidad de Valencia, 1990). Albacete, Instituto de
Estudios Albacetenses, 1992.
•
HENARES, D. El bachiller Sabuco en la filosofía médica del Renacimiento español.
Albacete, Gráficas Panadero, 1976.
•
MARCO DE HIDALGO, J. “Doña Oliva de Sabuco no fue escritora”, en Revista de
Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, Madrid, vol. IX, julio-diciembre de 1903.
•
MARCOS, B. Miguel Sabuco (antes doña Oliva). Prólogo del Dr. D. Tomás Maestre,
catedrático de la Facultad de Medicina. Madrid, Biblioteca Filosófica Los grandes
filósofos españoles. Imprenta de Caro Raggio, 1923.
•
MARTÍNEZ TOMÉ, A. Edición de Oliva Sabuco de Nantes y Barrera, Nueva
Filosofía de la naturaleza del hombre y otros escritos. Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1981.
•
MARTÍNEZ, I. Notas a la edición de Nueva Filosofía de la naturaleza del hombre.
Madrid, Imprenta del Colegio de Sordo-Mudos y Ciegos. Madrid, 1847.
•
SÁNCHEZ GRANJEL, L. “La doctrina antropológico-médica de Miguel Sabuco”, en
Humanismo y Medicina, Salamanca, 1968.
•
TORNER, F. M. Doña Oliva Sabuco de Nantes. Siglo XVI. Aguilar, Madrid, s/f.
(alrededor de 1936).
c) Otros estudios
•
GILSON, É. “El conocimiento de sí mismo y el socratismo cristiano”. En E. Gilson,
El espíritu de la Filosofía Medieval. Madrid, Rialp, 22004, págs. 213-231.
•
HUARTE DE SAN JUAN, J. Examen de ingenios para las ciencias. Edición de
Esteban Torre. Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1976.
APÉNDICE: EL AUTOR Y SU OBRA
La autoría de la “Nueva Filosofía de la Naturaleza del hombre”
202
Miguel Sabuco fue un gran escritor: está considerado por la Academia Española
como una autoridad en el conocimiento y buen uso de nuestra lengua. La obra “Nueva
Filosofía de la Naturaleza del hombre” está compuesta por varios opúsculos
independientes. La “Nueva Filosofía” vio la luz en Madrid, en la imprenta de P.
Madrigal, en 1587. Figura como autora Doña Oliva Sabuco, hija del bachiller Miguel
Sabuco.
a) Miguel Sabuco
Existen muy pocos datos biográficos de don Miguel. Esto es debido
probablemente a que, a lo largo de más de tres siglos (concretamente, de 1587 a 1903),
los autores han dedicado a ensalzar el talento de Doña Oliva y no han prestado apenas
atención a su padre Miguel.
Miguel Sabuco pudo haber nacido probablemente en la ciudad de Alcaraz en
torno a 1525 219 y muerto con posterioridad a 1590 220 . Fue vecino de Alcaraz y estudió
Cánones en la Universidad de Alcalá, donde pudo también haber seguido cursos de
Medicina 221 .
b) La familia de Miguel Sabuco
Miguel Sabuco tuvo un total de 9 hijos, ocho de ellos con su primera mujer, doña
Francisca de Cózar, vecina de la localidad próxima de Vianos 222 . Oliva fue, pues, la
quinta de este matrimonio y la hija más pequeña de don Miguel. Esta circunstancia
podría explicar el deseo de don Miguel de beneficiarla.
El 18 de diciembre de 1580, apenas cumplidos 18 años, doña Oliva se casa con
Acacio de Buedo, vecino de Alcaraz. La relación de don Miguel con el matrimonio
219
Ref. José Luis Abellán, Historia crítica del pensamiento español, Madrid, Circulo de
Lectores, 1979, vol. 2, p. 251.
220
Poco se sabe de don Miguel en los últimos años de su vida. Varios documentos le
conceden cargos de importancia: el 7 de octubre de 1590 se le nombra letrado de
Alcaraz, por lo que su muerte debió ser posterior a esta fecha, aunque no se conoce con
exactitud (Ref. Florentino M. Torner, Doña Oliva Sabuco de Nantes, siglo XVI, Aguilar,
Madrid, 1936?).
221
Ref. J. L. Abellán, op. cit, p. 251.
222
La relación de los hijos es: 1º, Alonso (nacido en 1550); 2º, Mateo (1551), 3º, Catalina
(1553), 4º, Juan (1557), 5ª, Luisa Oliva (1562), 6º, Juan (por fallecimiento temprano del
4º, 1564); 7º, Lorenzo (1566) y 8º, Mateo (por fallecimiento temprano del 2º, 1568). El
noveno y último hijo, llamado Miguel como su padre (1583), fue fruto de su segundo
matrimonio con doña Ana Navarra, también vecina de Vianos.
203
fue incómoda. En su testamento, don Miguel alega una falta de entendimiento en la
dote, que estimaba don Miguel excesiva.
c) Documentos que avalan la autoría de D. Miguel
El autor que descubre la paternidad de la obra fue José Marco Hidalgo en 1903 223 .
Para ello, aporta una interesante documentación, entre la que destaca la siguiente:
a) Escritura por la que su hijo Alonso y su mujer Ana de Espinosa, se comprometen a
pagar una suma de dinero en relación con la edición del libro que nos ocupa, Nueva
Filosofía..., en Portugal. Miguel Sabuco controlaba económicamente la edición del libro,
aunque su presunta autora ya era mayor de edad:
... conviene a saber ciento e veinte ducados los cuales son de razón quel dicho
bachiller Sabuco mi padre me dio en razón del privilegio y merced que tiene
de su majestad para poder imprimir el libro llamado Ńueva Filosofía´, para
que pueda yo hacer imprimir el dicho libro en el reino de Portugal... 224 .
b) Escritura de poder por la que el bachiller otorgaba a su hijo mayor, Alonso, un día
después del documento anterior, en 1587, el mismo año de la publicación de la primera
edición de “Nueva Filosofía”, la autorización para imprimir una edición en Portugal.
Aquí ya aparece de forma explícita que don Miguel es el autor y las razones por las que
permite a su hija que aparezca como autora de la obra:
Sepan cuantos esta carta de poder vieren como yo el bachiller Miguel Sabuco, vecino
desta ciudad de Alcaraz, autor del libro intitulado Ńueva Filosofía´, padre que soy de
Doña Oliva, mi hija, a quien puse por autor sólo para darle honra, y no el provecho ni
interés... 225
c) El documento decisivo es el testamento de don Miguel Sabuco, donde claramente
vuelve a erigirse en el autor de la obra, con una grave amenaza hacia su hija. Aquí se
ofrecen datos acerca de la tirante relación de don Miguel y su hija:
Item, aclaro que yo compuse un libro intitulado Nueva Filosofía o norma y otro
libro que se imprimieron, en los quales todos puse e pongo por autora a la dicha
Luisa de Oliva, my hija, sólo por darle el nombre e la onrra, y reservo el fruto y
provecho que resultare de los dichos libros para my, y mando a la dicha my hija
Luisa de Oliva no se entremeta en el dicho privilegio, so pena de mi maldición,
223
Ref. José Marco Hidalgo, “Doña Oliva de Sabuco no fue escritora”, en Revista de Archivos,
Bibliotecas y Museos, Madrid, vol. IX, julio-diciembre de 1903.
224
Este documento tiene fecha de 10 de septiembre de 1587 (citado, entre otros, por Benjamín
Marcos, Miguel Sabuco (antes doña Oliva). Imprenta de Caro Raggio. Madrid, 1923, p. 95).
225
Este documento tiene fecha de 11 de septiembre de 1587 (citado por J. Marco Hidalgo, “Doña
Oliva de Sabuco no fue escritora”, 1903). La negrita es mía.
204
atento lo dicho, demás que tengo fecha información de cómo yo soy el autor y no
ella. La cual información está en una scriptura que paso ante Villarreal scribano 226 .
d) Otros argumentos que apoyan la autoría de D. Miguel
El libro debía estar escrito bastante tiempo antes de 1587, año de la primera
edición de la obra. La autorización real tiene fecha de un año antes (1586), cuando la
obra estaba presumiblemente terminada. Ese año, Doña Oliva no había cumplido los 24
años de edad, ya que había nacido el 2 de diciembre de 1562 227 .
Entre las razones que podían explicar la atribución de la autoría a su hija Dª
Oliva, aparte de las razones que don Miguel expresa en su testamento, se aduce el posible
origen converso del autor, “del que tenemos motivos para sospechar” 228 .
Ildefonso Martínez, en sus notas finales a la “Nueva Filosofía” de 1847, y
refiriéndose a doña Oliva, cuando aún no se conocía la verdadera autoría de la obra, dice:
“Por sus mismas palabras, consta que no hizo estudios en escuela pública”, y continúa
Martínez, en un intento de explicar la sorprendente erudición de la joven, “por lo que es
probable que los hiciese privados y a fuerza de mucha asiduidad y desvelos, cuando tan
instruida estaba en todos los sistemas filosóficos” 229 .
En la Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos, aparecida en julio de 1903, los
documentos aportados por Marco Hidalgo demuestran finalmente que doña Oliva no fue
la autora de “Nueva Filosofía” 230 . A partir de ese momento, la autoría de Miguel Sabuco
se consolida casi unánimemente. Todavía hay autores, como Atilano Martínez, en sus
comentarios de la obra de Sabuco publicados en 1981, que tienen dudas sobre la autoría
de don Miguel, aunque el peso de las pruebas sobre la autoría de don Miguel sea
claramente superior al de su hija 231 .
226
Este documento tiene fecha de 20 de febrero de 1588 (citado, entre otros, por Benjamín
Marcos, Miguel Sabuco (antes doña Oliva), Imprenta de Caro Raggio. Madrid, 1923, pp. 108109). La negrita es mía.
227
Los datos de la partida de bautismo aparecen ampliamente comentados, entre otros, por
Octavio Cuartero (Prólogo de las Obras de Doña Oliva Sabuco de Nantes. Madrid, 1888, p. XXIIXXIII), y por Benjamín Marcos (Miguel Sabuco, antes doña Oliva, Madrid, 1923, p. 82).
228
Ref. José Luis Abellán, Historia crítica del pensamiento español, Madrid, Circulo de Lectores,
1979, vol. 2, p. 252.
229
Ref. Ildefonso Martínez, Notas a la edición de Nueva filosofía de la naturaleza del hombre.
Madrid, 1847, p. 641.
230
Ref. José Marco Hidalgo, “Doña Oliva de Sabuco no fue escritora”, en Revista de Archivos,
Bibliotecas y Museos, Madrid, vol. IX, julio-diciembre de 1903.
231
Después de exponer argumentos en ambos sentidos, A. Martínez concluye: “Todo esto no
impide como diremos en su lugar, dudar sobre el verdadero autor e inclinarse, siempre con
ciertas reservas, a favor del padre” (Atilano Martínez: Comentarios a la edición de Nueva
filosofía de la naturaleza del hombre, y otros escritos, de Dª Oliva Sabuco, 1981, p. 51).
205
206
David O'Donaghue, Psy.D is a clinical psychologist and the
director of the Lyceum Learning Collective. He has a
doctorate in clinical psychology and five years of doctoral
studies in philosophy and cultural studies. He has taught on
the core faculty of Antioch University and at the University
of South Carolina and addressed special topics in
philosophy, psychology and creativity at the University of
Moscow; the Danish Pedagogical University; Simon Frazer
University, Vancouver, BC; University of New Mexico.
David has also published and presented papers at numerous
conferences on the interface of cultural, philosophical and
historical forms and personal experience.
SPINOZA’S CONATUS IN LIGHT OF THANATOS
AND SELF-DESTRUCTION
David O´donaghue
Nueva Orleans, USA
I am writing this paper out of the wonder which I have developed through my
psychological practice in seeing the manifestations of self-destructive impulses in my clients
ranging from self-mutilation and suicide to conscious choice to follow paths which will
ultimately lead to ruin. If a wide experience of working with people can lead one to affirm
certain psychological tendencies, I can say that I have recognized a latent and sometimes
manifest desire for self-destruction existing, to varying degrees, in many people. I have
come to believe in Freud’s “dual instinct hypothesis” which states that humans are
instinctually motivated by two drives: one toward self-preservation and self-propagating,
called eros, and the other, directed toward death, called thanatos.
Benedict Spinoza presents a challenge to this view in his conception of the conatus.
He defined conatus as the effort by which everything endeavors to persevere in its own
being. “Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being,” which is
“nothing else by the actual essence of the thing in questions” (Ethics III, 7). He also claims
that “nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself” (III, 4).
How are we to reconcile a death instinct with the conatus? Are they mutually
exclusive? Or is there a way to view the death instinct in such a way as to conform to the
requirements of Spinoza’s conception of the conatus as the very essence of our being. This is
the topic of this paper. I will explicate Spinoza’s concept of the conatus, then describe
Freud’s thanatos and particular symptomatology of major depression as a challenge to the
universality of the conatus as the essence of all beings. I will then return to Spinoza for what
might be his response to modern psychological findings and evaluate whether it succeeds in
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confirming the conatus while accounting for the self-destructive component of human
behavior. If this defense succeeds then I will suggest some clinical ramifications when the
conatus is taken as fundamental for human functioning. Perhaps, in this way, Spinoza can be
seen as quite relevant for the clinical treatment of depressed and self-destructive individuals.
The roots of the conatus can probably be traced to Aristotle’s notion that a thing’s
form is its natural end. As he states in the De Anima, “In living things the natural end is the
soul” and the soul is the actuality or form of the body” (I.4.17). since Spinoza maintains that
all things, animate and inanimate, have conatus as their essential component, the “striving”
must be taken in a metaphysical sense as that which preserves the being of each thing in its
essentiality. Thomas Aquinas develops Aristotle’s metaphysical conception of the power by
which things maintain in their being when he writes of the appetitive powers in Question 80
of the Summa Theologia:
We must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is
inclined to rise, and to generate its like…in those [things] which lack knowledge, the form is
found to determine each thing only to its own being - that is, to the being which is natural to
each. Now this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural
appetite…Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in
which it is found in all things (LXXX, 1).
I understand Thomas’ use of natural appetite to refer to the inclination in all things to
maintain and generate form to be analogous to Spinoza’s conatus.
The conatus is alike in all things, animate and inanimate, through being the essence of
all things maintained through the power of God, divine self-activity or “causa sui.” The
divine self-activity is responsible for maintaining all things in existence. The conatus is not
an act of free will since it is determined out of the necessity of the divine nature. We seek to
preserve our essence as part of our necessary being. It is impossible to cease in this striving.
Thus, on this level, conatus is viewed as maintaining the formal essence of a thing within a
network of determined relations.
Conatus is identified with human nature in so far as it is active. At this level, a
person’s conatus not only strives to persist in its being but it also seeks to prevent any
decrease in her power of acting and also strives to do whatever will increase those powers.
Pleasure and joy are the resulting feelings when one’s power to act is increased, while pain
and sadness are feelings resulting from the diminishment of one’s power. Sometimes the
power of acting can simultaneously be increased in certain respects and decreased in others.
Another distinguishing characteristic of the conatus in human beings is that it is
conscious. As Rotenstreich writes,
The mind is prompted by conatus and thus endeavors to persist in its being for an infinite
period of time…But since reference now is made to the mind, the conatus is conscious, since
consciousness is the essence of the mind. Thus the essence of the mind as an entity manifests
itself among other manifestations in its consciousness of its own conatus (p. 120).
It would seem that the metaphysical principle of the preservation of essential being is
not in the same logical category as consciousness since, for example, I don’t need to be
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conscious to preserve my being, rather my life maintains itself while I sleep or while I
occupy my consciousness with other matters. Indeed, most of the life sustaining activities of
my body (my heart beat, breathing and neuro-firings, for example) are unconscious activities
of the body that occur without my conscious awareness. Spinoza expands the notion of
conatus beyond a merely metaphysical requirement for being, in the case of human beings, to
include the conscious striving to increase one’s power of acting.
This conscious striving is nothing other than the striving toward knowledge, since, as
Zac has pointed out, considered in its formal reality, the being of the soul is knowing.
Therefore, for the soul, to preserve in being is to preserve in knowing (1996, p. 160). The
knowledge of ideas, for Spinoza, is composed of two different types: those ideas which are
adequate and those which are inadequate. Upon this distinction rests Spinoza’s entire
determination of what is required for the mind to be the active source of its own ideas versus
the condition in which the mind remains dependent on external factors for its ideas.
To have adequate ideas is to have ideas that can be explained or understood without
reference to anything other than themselves. The mind is then the sole source of its own
ideas and feelings and not anything in the external world. Ideas are said to be inadequate in
that they do not represent a full understanding of the self-causation of all ideas, rather they
appear to arise as a result of external forces on the mind. The person becomes passive with
regard to the force of the ideas that determine further ideas and the passions. Spinoza does
not claim that inadequate ideas are an aberration of nature, rather he sees humans as naturally
subject to the passions since humans are a part of the natural order which exerts an impact on
their minds. The more inadequate the ideas are in the mind the more the individual is under
the influence of the passions. Passive emotions, insofar as they are created by objects outside
the individual, diminish her power of rational response or action, whereas affects arising
from an adequate understanding of the nature of the object increase ones’ power of action.
In order to gain a clear and distinct (i.e. adequate) idea of an emotion one must be
able to grasp the condition that brought it about. As Kashap writes,
If our knowledge of the explanatory conditions of our emotions is adequate and true, then the
affect of the mind correlative to this knowledge will necessarily give rise to a desire or will to
act in a way which is consistent with our understanding. When we think truly we will be less
agitated by our passions, shall have greater control over our responses to them and therefore
suffer less from them (p. 165).
In this way, Spinoza defines human freedom as the capacity to choose to act only
according to the adequate ideas that originate in the mind’s own self-activity. One action is
both necessary and free: necessary in accordance with reason and free in the sense of arising
solely from the self and not from external sources. This has a particular Kantian ring to it.
The power of external causes and the self-generating power are not rival powers but rather
represent different conatus. The conatus of the individual can be diminished and even
destroyed through being effected by powers outside of it. Indeed, Spinoza maintains this is
the only way it can come to an end, since he views the individual conatus as eternal if it is
not interfered with by external sources (EthicsIII.8). The diminishment of the power of the
conatus is experienced as pain whereas its increase is experienced as pleasure.
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The conatus, as conceived by Spinoza, is not only self-preserving but is also selfenhancing, in that it extends its power beyond the maintenance of being to efforts directed
toward increasing its power. This differentiates the conatus of living beings from the static
determination of being of inanimate objects. One and the same principle account for the
being of both animate and inanimate things, but animate things have the additional aspect of
conatus that allows them to further their own being. In plants this might be as simple as
turning toward the sun. with animals it may evidence itself through the natural instincts that
both preserve the species and lead them to more effective means of propagation. With
humans, the conatus becomes more complex with the addition of the rational faculty.
Spinoza maintains that the conatus that is attributable simply to the mind is called will
(voluntas), and that which arises from both the mind and the body is called appetite
(appetitas) or desire (cupiditas).
The conatus is essentially related to the emotions in that its diminishment is felt to be
painful and its enhancement is experienced as pleasure. Pleasure and desire arise as active
emotions when the individual is the full cause of them, whereas pain and sadness are passive
in the sense that they arise as a result of inadequate ideas that external forces are impinging
on the self. As Wolfson writes: “Desire is the effort as self-preservation by the dictates of
reason and pleasure is the enjoyment experienced from the mind’s contemplation of itself
whenever it conceives of a true and adequate idea” (p. 218).
Sometimes power of acting can be increased in certain respects and decreased in others, since
one kind of effect may cancel the possibilities of other effects. I may become a great
baseball player at the expense of my aspirations of being a concert pianist.
To conclude this section I will only reiterate that the conatus is the principle of selfperseverance in a thing which accounts both for its essential nature (in the case of inanimate
objects) and for its striving to increase its power of being, thus assuring itself of pleasure
over the pain resulting from the diminishment of power. The natural tendency toward the
avoidance of pain and the maximization of pleasure has been demonstrated experimentally as
foundational to living processes. The conatus can be seen as foundational in Spinoza’s
understanding of the passions in that all emotions arise out of the three primary affects of the
conatus: pleasure, pain and desire. These result from the individual’s capacity to hold
adequate ideas which arise solely from the mind or, failing this of falling back upon
inadequate ideas which abandons the individual to the mercy of external forces.
Thanatos
Walter Bernard beings his article comparing Spinoza and Freud with these words:
Any student of Spinoza who has had occasion to acquaint himself with the contributions of
psychoanalytic school of psychology cannot fail to be impressed by the many points of
contact between the basic views of Freud and those of the seventeenth century philosopher
(p. 99).
Bernard goes on to cite other sources that have noted a similar affinity. He quotes
Bickel’s words, “an Spinoza wird man bei der Lekture Freuds errinert und wundert sich, wie
bei so starker Verwandtschaft der Gadankengange man doch nirgends ausdrucklich an den
Philosophen gemahnt wird” (p. 221). Freud undoubtedly read Spinoza although he never
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directly referred to him in his work. However, de does give homage to the philosopher in a
letter turning down an invitation to contribute to the “Spinoza-Festschift” on the occasion of
the tercentenary celebration of Spinoza’s birth in 1932, in these words:
Ich habe mein langes Leben hindurch der Person wie der Denkleistung des grossen
Philosophen Spinoza eine ausserordentliche, etwas scheue Hochachtung
entgegengebracht. Aber ich glaube diese Einstellung gibt mir nach das Recht,
etwas uber ihn vor aller Welt zu sagen wusste, was nicht schon von Anderen gesagt
worden ist” (Hessing, 1932, p. 167).
In order to draw affinities between Freud’s theory and Spinoza’s both Bernard and
Nails (1979) have had to either discount the emphasis Freud placed on the death-instinct in
his later work, or reinterpret it in a manner that is more in line with Spinoza’s conatus. Both
Bernard and Nails see that as it stands in its original formulation in Freud’s work of 1920
entitled Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the concept of thanatos contradicts the ever-present
persevering force of the conatus. In this section I will examine the apparent contract between
these two terms and offer my own resolution, which neither Bernard or Nails suggest.
Freud appears to the reader to be thinking out loud in the development of his notion of
the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. He seems to be groping for an adequate
definition of thanatos as the instinct that stands in contrast to eros, the libidinal drive. After
reflecting on his clinical observations of the tendency of his patients to compulsively repeat
traumatic events in unbidden memories or dreams, Freud comes to the conclusion that such
activity is an attempt of the psyche to bind the free-flowing stimulation that is released
during the initial trauma. This unbound psychic energy is felt to be intensely unpleasant by
the patient so she repeats the event in her mind until she can attain some mastery over it, i.e.
so the energy it arouses is sufficiently bound by ego defenses.
This phenomena can not be accounted for solely through the libidinal drive which is
directed towards pleasure, but must be the result of another basic drive. This instinct is “an
urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things” (p. 43). Freud makes this
apparent metapsychological leap through examining the biological evidence that all
organisms must neutralize the new unbound energy to the system that results from sudden
change to it, since this unbound energy is experienced by the organism as intensely
unpleasurable. This brings about the tendency for the organism to return to an earlier state of
its development while it copes with the internal changes. Freud notes that this is exactly
what occurs when patients regress to earlier stages of their development during analysis in
order to cope with the influx of newly acquired conscious insights that the analysis is
bringing about. Freud identifies this pulling away from change and growth as an instinct
towards death (as the final state of inertia) since all organic life has as its precedent the
inorganic state.
I find that Freud’s reasoning in Beyond the Pleasure Principle is suspect. He himself
is not entirely satisfied with the direction of his thought:
“It may be asked whether and how far I am myself convinced of the hypotheses
that have been set out in these pages. My answer would be that I am not convinced
myself and that I do not seek to persuade other people to believe in them. Or, more
precisely, that I do not know how far I believe in them” (p. 71).
211
Indeed, the death instinct is a very controversial concept in psychoanalytic literature.
Some analysts find that the mechanism of binding energy in cathexes can be fully accounted
for by the pleasure principle, since the goal of the repetition compulsion is ego mastery over
the initial trauma, which then ultimately leads to pleasure for the organism or at least a
release from pain. Others have seen that thanatos is necessary to account for self-destructive
behaviors and aggression.
The focus of this paper is to examine whether the death instinct, taken in Freud’s
formulation, is incongruous with Spinoza’s conatus. I do not think it is. In looking at the
original clinical evidence that alerted Freud to the possibility that another instinct needed to
account for the compulsion to repeat traumatic events, I see that it can be accounted for not
only through the self-persevering force of the conatus, but also as a means by which the
patient attempts to replace inadequate ideas with adequate ones in a thoroughly Spinozistic
fashion. Instead of leading to the death of the organism, the coping strategy of repeating
traumatic events until they come under ego mastery serves the survival of the organism. In
the case of human beings the repetition serves the additional function of transforming an
outer event (a cause of ideas that arise from outside the mind) into a causal chain of ideas that
arise solely in the mind. Through the repetition of the memory of the traumatic event, the
event loses its origins in the inadequate ideas of external causation for feelings and ideas and
finds new origins in the mental mechanism itself. Even though the person may feel a lack of
control of her thoughts and feelings that the repetition arouses, ultimately this is the means by
which her mind takes over the event as its own and thus, all her feelings and thoughts arise
from it alone and not from the external world at all. Eventually she begins to gain conscious
control over these thoughts and feelings, so that the compulsion to repeat the trauma can be
seen as a necessary stage in the process by which the trauma is integrated into her psychic
life.
In dispatching the death instinct as a necessary premise to account for the repetition
compulsion I do not want to deny that Freud is perhaps on to something important in his
hypothesis. Thanatos has also been called the “nirvana principle” in the recognition that it is
grounded on the desire to extinguish all stimulation to annihilate the very qualities of activity
and energetics inherent in the life process, replacing them with the flatline of stasis and
inertia. This understanding of thanatos, I believe, comes right from Schopenhauer, who
Freud also read extensively. Schopenhauer concludes his major work, The World as Will
and Representation with these words:
Instead of the restless pressure and effort; instead of the constant transition from
desire to apprehension and from joy to sorrow; instead of the never-satisfied and
never-dying hope that constitutes the life dream of the man who wills, we see
that peace this is higher than all reason, that ocean-like calmness of the spirit,
that tranquility, that unshakable confidence and serenity…is a complete and
certain gospel. Only knowledge remains; the will has vanished (p. 441).
I would suggest that the extinguishing of the will, which Schopenhauer advocates, is
none other than the death instinct, the drive, through the cessation of all stimulation, toward a
condition of inertia. Schopenhauer goes on in the conclusion: “we freely admit that what
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remains after the complete abolition of the will is, for all who are still full of the will,
assuredly nothing” (p. 441). Since Freud’s entire project of psychoanalysis is based on
various negotiations of the drives, ending in the compromises of the will with the demands of
external reality, he could only view a position such as advocated by Schopenhauer as a death
instinct, self-destructive in nature, since the self is nothing more than a bundle of negotiated
drives.
However, would Spinoza have viewed Schopenhauer’s position as nihilistic and selfdestructive? Given Spinoza’s completely deterministic system, it is quite likely that he
would have agreed with Schopenhauer that the most adequate ideas are those which do not
arise from the human will (which must be an illusion, an inadequate idea), but which arise
solely from the self-sufficiency of knowledge itself. He would be in complete agreement that
the result of this attainment is serenity and confidence, but he would also add joy, because of
the ultimate attainment of the Amor Dei, the intellectual love of God. Thus, if thanatos can
come to represent the drive toward this state, Spinoza would see it as part of the essential
nature of the conatus. If that can be so construed, then we are left with a curious paradox:
One the one hand, Conatus is defined as a striving to persevere in one’s essential being and
even a striving to increase in one’s power, while, on the other hand, the conatus has come to
mean a cessation of striving all together to attain a state of perfection beyond striving
altogether. I do believe this is a fundamental paradox for Spinoza’s attempt to write an
Ethics which makes sense within a totally deterministic worldview.
I have tried to show in this section that the conatus can be reconciled with the
thanatos in two different ways. First, if thanatos is to be taken only as Freud’s explanatory
hypothesis for accounting for why people are compelled to repeat traumatic experiences in
unbidden memories and dreams, then these repetitions, which slowly transform an external,
non-mental event into an exclusive mental event, can be seen as the attempt of the individual
to transform inadequate ideas, which are a result of external causation, to adequate ideas,
which are solely self-caused. Of course the road to full adequation moves well beyond the
distress of the flashbacks of the event itself, but this is the way in which the psyche slowly
takes control of the effects of the event on the organism. With this conceptualization,
thanatos is completely in keeping with the striving of self-perseverance of the conatus.
Secondly, if thanatos is taken as the striving to rise above the illusions of the will, then it
would be a key aspect of Spinoza’s ethic which comes to total acceptance and affirmation of
the determination of the world which allows no room for the will as independent of necessary
causality. Freud’s determinism and his view that analysis is interminable may suggest that
this is the only final solution to the suffering of the endless desiring in the human condition.
Unfortunately, unlike Spinoza or Schopenhauer, Freud shunned any appeal to higher spiritual
principles such as the Amor Dei or Nirvana.
Symptoms of Depression
I would now like to describe some of the common symptoms of clinically diagnosed
depression and examine how these relate to conatus. Current research maintains that at least
25% of all people who suffer from some form of depression, do so as a result of a geological
predisposition for the condition. Studies have shown that the occurrence of depression
among biologically related family members is much higher than in the general population.
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These occurrences are correlated with non-residential relatives to negate the influences of the
social learning of depressive behaviors. The account given for endogenous (i.e. biologically
based) depression is that in the brains of the depression-prone individuals there is a depletion
of the neuro-transmitter, sarotonin, which is important in conveying neuro firings and
stimulating brain activity. When this neuro-transmitter is at low levels, the individual is
more vulnerable to feelings of low energy, pain (such as headaches), and despondency.
Many sufferers from depression respond quite favorably to medications such as Prozac and
Zoloft that help to restore sarotonin levels.
Some of the symptoms are major depression, listed in the latest Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV) which are relevant for our discussion are:
1)
marked diminishment of interest of pleasure in all, or almost all activities
2)
psychomotor retardation
3)
fatigue or loss of energy
4)
feelings of worthlessness
5)
diminished ability to think or concentrate
6)
recurrent thoughts of death, recurrent suicidal ideation
These form a general picture of a person who is lacking in the energy and desire to engage
with life in an active and productive manner. How would Spinoza understand this condition?
Certainly he would view these symptoms are arising from inadequate ideas, since the power
of being of the conatus is diminished and the resulting feelings are sadness and apathy. It
appears from this brief description that the depressed person does not feel themselves to the
source of their ideas but rather feels powerless with regard to external factors. This would
account for the feelings of worthlessness, the lack of energy, and the inability to concentrate
as well as suicidal ideation and the lack of pleasure in activities. Adequate ideas, according
to Spinoza, bring joy in that they are accounted for solely as arising from the self-causation
of the thinker. This experience of the freedom from external causation brings a feeling of joy
and ultimately reverence in the intellectual love of God. Inadequate ideas, on the other hand,
bring sadness and feelings of enslavement to external circumstances, since all ideas seem to
be bound to factors that are out of the control of the individual.
A common complaint among depressed people is a feeling of being trapped and
powerlessness in the midst of their situation. The life situation of the individual becomes too
large and diminishes the powers inherent in the self. Spinoza would call this the
diminishment of the conatus that would weaken the individual’s resolve to persevere and
protect oneself against the onslaught of forces that could diminish one’s power. This would
provide an explanatory account of why depressed people become suicidal and are observed
to exhibit certain “victim behaviors” and are more prone to infection and illness. They suffer
from a diminishment of the essential conatus which is necessary in the preservation of their
being through the will and the appetite.
Can the conatus, as the very essence of the subject, be taken to be increased and
diminished? Can essentiality be quantified and measured and shown to be diminished in
certain cases and increased in others? Spinoza recognizes that the powers of the mind and
body can be increased and decreased:
214
Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of
activity of body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the
power of thought in our mind (III, 11). The mind, as far as can, endeavors to
conceive those tings, which increase or help the power of activity in the body
(III, 12).
He maintains this as a natural fact, a fact which depression would seem to contradict. I am
reminded of a passage from William Blake, “Some are born to pure delight. Some are born
to eternal night.” Even though the power of mind and body can be increased or diminished
does this necessarily require that we take the conatus as increasing and diminishing?
Help with answering this question may come from looking at what Spinoza means by
two important words in his definition of conatus: endeavor and essence. Endeavor is likely
to come as a direct translation of the definition of the Latin term conatus: “1. An effort to
accomplish a desired end, endeavor, exertion, attempt, b) with emphasis on physical effort, c)
an instinctive effort, impulse. 2. An attempted action, enterprise, design” (Oxford Latin
Dictionary, 1968). The action of the concept is clearly emphasized here as well as its
voluntarist quality. Other interesting aspects of conatus are revealed here, such as its tie to
instinctive and physical action and its secondary use of designating the enterprise or project
to which the effort is being directed. It appears clearly that, at least from the Latin origins,
conatus must be a conscious endeavoring and can’t be taken as a mere quality of selfsubsistence, at least not when applied to rational beings.
Does this contradict with the notion that conatus is the very essence of our being?
How can conscious effort be necessary to maintain one’s essentiality? Let us look at what
Spinoza means by essence. The essence of a thing is inextricably bound to the intelligence of
God as the source of both its cause and its form.
The truth and formal essence of things is as it is, because it exists by representation as such in
the intellect of God. Wherefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute
God’s essence is, in reality, the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence (I,
18, note).
Thinking, as a specific modification of an attribute of God, is the very essence of
humankind. Since all thought is an attribute of God, the intellect can comprehend nothing
but the various modifications of God as thinking substance (I, 30). Thinking, therefore, is
essential to the conatus and this squares quite well with the understanding that the conatus
must be a conscious endeavor of thought. It reveals to us that the conatus, as Spinoza
conceives it, is not some metaphysical given, but is an action which strives to persevere in its
own essentiality. This conceptualization lends itself quite easily to the claim that the conatus
can increase or diminish according to a person’s mental and emotional state.
Spinoza deals specifically with an aspect of depression when he writes about suicide
in the note of proposition 20 in the fourth book of the Ethics. Here he says:
No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or persevering, his own
being, unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his nature. No
one, I say, from the necessity of his own nature, or otherwise than under
compulsion from external causes, shrinks from food, or kills himself: which
latter may be done in a variety of ways.
215
Spinoza goes on to describe two ways external causes may result in suicide. The first
is the overt one, in which, as in the case of Seneca and Socrates, humans are compelled to
terminate their lives by the command of others. The second external cause Spinoza attributes
to disorders of the imagination that effect both mind and body so that the mind may “assume
a nature contrary to its former one, and the idea thereof cannot exist in the mind.” This will
need some unpacking.
I would like to trace out a series of steps that are implied in Spinoza’s second
explanation of suicide and show how these are reflected in particular passages of the Ethics.
This will be paradigmatic for how he is likely to address other symptoms of depression and
so should provide us with a clear idea of how Spinoza understands the problems that lead to
suicidal thoughts. I will then conclude this section by working out the solution that Spinoza
proposes to solve these problems.
First, the human imagination creates false, confused and inadequate ideas out of its
faulty assessment of external causation from a lack of sufficient knowledge. He states that
“falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused
ideas involve” (II, 35). These ideas arise out of necessity and are said to be in God (since no
ideas, whether adequate or inadequate can be outside of God), but these are inadequate in
that they are not referred to God by the particular mind that thinks them (II, 36). The
significance of this is not immediately apparent here but will become so when we look at the
solution to depression that Spinoza proposes.
Inadequate ideas bring about a passive state of mind with regard to determining
factors outside the individual (III,3) and thus they diminish the power of the conatus. Since
the conatus is the endeavor of self-sufficiency and essentiality, and will persist indefinitely
unless interfered with by external causes (III,8), it loses its power through the inadequate
ideas which attribute causation outside the individual. Spinoza writes that “things that are
naturally contrary cannot exist in the same object” (III,5), so that when the mind is passive to
the forces outside of it, it is contrary to the conatus. This, therefore, diminishes the power of
the conatus in the individual who feels pain, suffering or melancholy (III,11,note) as a result
thereof. Spinoza writes “Pain diminishes or constrains man’s power of activity, in other
words, diminishes or constrains the effort, wherewith he endeavors to persist in his own
being” (III,37,proof).
Individuals are likely to become overpowered by the passions since they are passive
to them at this point. Spinoza astutely recognizes that “the force of any passion or emotion
can overcome the rest of a man’s activities and power, so that the emotion becomes
obstinately fixed in him” (IV,6). Melancholy, as arising from the decrease of hindrance of
the bodies power of activity (IV,42,proof), is one of the emotions to which man is prone to
become fixated. The feelings around melancholy are a result of inadequate ignorance of self
and infirmity of spirit (IV,56,corollary). Thus, they are more likely to have ideas of selfdestruction that run contrary to the natural conatus.
Spinoza proposes a radical therapy for these conditions that go well beyond anything
recommended in cognitive-behavioral therapies or psychoanalysis. He advises no less than
that depressed individuals recognize that all their ideas ultimately have their source in God
216
and that they arise purely out of necessity and do not come about through a contingency of
circumstances. He writes,
The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things
may be referred to the idea of God (V,14).
He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves
God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and
his emotions (V,15).
This love of God must hold the chief place in the mind (V,16).
The cure for depression is nothing less than the intellectual love of God, through which we
can reorganize our chaotic and painful lives into a rational order and harmony.
Clinical Application
I would like to describe what I would imagine a Spinozistic type of therapy might
look like. This will help the reader better understand how Spinoza conceives of the way out
of depressive and self-destructive conditions and how he might help patients transform their
inadequate ideas into adequate ones. Let us suppose that a very depressed and suicidal
individual came to Spinoza - call him Jim, a 26 year old Caucasian man with the distinctive
tattoos and piercings that designate his generation. Jim reports that he sees no value in life
and that he has lived “it all” and there is nothing to look forward to. He sees the world
falling apart and therefore sees very little hope in any positive changes happening for him or
collectively. He has withdrawn from social interactions for the most parts, has a poor
appetite, mostly watches TV, and has trouble sleeping through the night.
A psychologist might try to have Jim relate his current problems to determinate
factors in the past that have created a set of beliefs, out of which he is now living. Or she
might have Jim try out new non-depressive behaviors with the belief that changes in behavior
can alter affective states. Or she might try to link Jim’s feelings with broader cultural and
existential conditions, thereby helping him de-pathologize his experiences and recognize
their collective roots.
Spinoza would do something quite different. First he would try to show Jim that it
was absolutely necessary that his life has gone the way it has and that the outcome as he is
experiencing it now directly follows from the causal necessity of a completely deterministic
universe. How can this help Jim? If Jim can accept this with all of its implications, he can
be released from any feelings of guilt, badness, inadequacy, and other negative personal
judgments that follow from maintaining the illusion of personal human freedom. He would
see that the condition that he is now in is exactly the one and only condition he could be in
and therefore, paradoxically, it is perfect. This would be a great leap from the typical
depressive melancholy of regret, guilt and tragedy.
It is not likely, however, to diminish Jim’s suicidal wishes. In fact, these might
increase, because now Jim would feel that whatever he determines to do is the way things are
meant to be and that is fated to end his life. What Spinoza might do at this point is to say to
Jim something like the following, “It may well be that suicide is the most rational choice for
you but that would depend on whether it follows solely form adequate ideas. Let’s see if this
217
is the case.” If Jim will accept the challenge to explore whether his suicidal wishes follow
from adequate ideas then the counseling can move into looking at the determinates of Jim’s
depression and suicidal ideation.
Spinoza’s standards for adequate ideas are quite high. Henry Alison describes
adequate ideas as necessarily being complete in that no part of the idea can be vague or
indeterminate. “Knowing a thing in this manner involves seeing how all the its properties
follow necessarily from its nature or definition. In such cases, nothing remains ambiguous;
nothing is left unexplained, undetermined or uncertain” (p. 104). Given this criteria, Jim
would need to demonstrate that his depression and suicidal wishes arise completely,
unambiguously, and necessarily from his mind as the sole source of their origin.
This would then lead to a discussion of the nature of Jim’s conatus, since it is the
extreme weakness of Jim’s striving for self-perseverance that is under examination at this
point. Is Jim justified in judging the complete nature of his conatus from the perspective of
how his conatus is experienced by him (since Spinoza notes that one is conscious of their
conatus [III,9,proof] at this particular time? Can one determine the nature of ‘health’ in the
midst of the flu, for example? Can one have a clear and adequate idea of the conatus at a
point when it is functioning at a particularly low point? This is part of the rationale for why
mental health professionals are required to intervene to prevent actions when patients are
extremely suicidal, since, so the standard story goes, the patient may not be able to judge
adequately under conditions of extreme depression and despair. The question for Jim is: is
he making his decisions form a position of adequate knowledge and discernment?
An example that might help Jim understand his current situation would be one
Spinoza employs to show how experiences do not necessarily give us adequate ideas.
Spinoza uses the example of our judgment of the distance of the sun from us. It appears to be
only about 200 feet away from us and though, according to Spinoza, it is not intrinsically true
that it appears so to us, it is false to claim that because it appears so, it is indeed the case that
the sun is 200 feet from us. This is because the claim to truth about the sun is based on
inadequate causes (i.e. that our perception of the sun’s distance is sufficient to give us proper
knowledge of the sun’s actual distance from us). This I the same condition under which Jim
is judging the adequacy of his suicidal wishes. They are true s far as Jim feels them and that
they are affecting his life, but they are false if they were to be taken under Spinoza’s
standards of adequacy since they arise form a perspective that makes them only appear to be
true. The course of the discussion with Jim could go many different ways but I think the
result would be that Jim would need to acknowledge that his suicidal ideation arises form
inadequate ideas and therefore he has not established enough grounds for maintaining these
ideas without question.
This may prevent Jim from acting rashly on his suicidal wishes but does it help him
move through his depression? According to a purely Spinozistic perspective this may require
that Jim make a radical leap in his understanding of his life and world which may be a very
difficult one to make. Indeed, it is difficult for any of us to maintain consistently. That leap
is the acknowledgement that life as it is in the present is just as it must be since it is
absolutely determined and therefore perfect. If Jim could begin to experience his life as
perfect he would approach what Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God. I define the
recognition that all of reality is present in each moment as the face of God in its
218
completeness. There is no lack, insufficiency, elsewhere, or better world. Jim’s experience
in its pain, troubles, momentary joys and rest comprise God for him.
Change, for Jim, would result from another paradox in Spinoza. As soon as Jim
recognizes that all is completely determined and complete, he can also see that the ultimate
source of all his ideas are self-caused and thus he is not under the power of any external
condition. This allows for him to take control of his life and be the acknowledged author of
it. This radical redescription of his life would, according to Spinoza, enable him to be more
of the active source of his ideas and thereby bringing more joy into his life; and since his
reality would change, the face of God would change as well. What is important in this
approach is that the face of reality, the face of God need not always be pleasant, but, through
an acceptance of whatever the face is that presents itself at any moment is God, then one can
more adequately accept and move through the inevitable painful periods that inevitably flow
in everyone’s life. For Jim, I think this would be a powerful stabilizing bulkward against the
onslaught of periodic depressive episodes.
I have tried to show in this paper how the philosophy of Spinoza and especially his
conception of the conatus can be utilized in clinical work around depression. I believe that
Spinoza’s philosophy can go much further in personal transformation than anything that
current psychological methods provide. There is a caveat to this: ultimately, I think that
Spinoza’s approach is a spiritual one and requires that the client be ready for a spiritual
confrontation which necessarily involves questioning the nature of reality itself and the
nature of God. One may need not have a belief in a theistic God; indeed Spinoza’s God is
not a personal God in the sense of standard western religions. What would be essential,
though, is that the client have some appreciation for an ultimate principle that could account
for the nature of reality. If the client understands this as merely a deterministic material
principle, then it would be difficult for me to see how Spinoza’s understanding could console
one out of a depressive condition. The best that could be hoped for in that case may be an
acceptance of one’s necessary participation in the completeness of the world. If, however,
one puts more significant on ‘God’ as the ultimate source of all goodness, being and truth,
then Spinoza’s conceptualization may be truly revolutionary. It was in my life.
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