title: Ike`s Spies : Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment

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Ike'sSpies:EisenhowerandtheEspionage
Establishment
Ambrose,StephenE.;Immerman,RichardH.
UniversityPressofMississippi
1578062071
9781578062072
9780585179926
English
Intelligenceservice--UnitedStates,Eisenhower,
DwightD.--(DwightDavid),--1890-1969,United
States--Politicsandgovernment--1953-1961,World
War,1939-1945--Secretservice.
1999
JK468.I6A831999eb
940.54/8673
Intelligenceservice--UnitedStates,Eisenhower,
DwightD.--(DwightDavid),--1890-1969,United
States--Politicsandgovernment--1953-1961,World
War,1939-1945--Secretservice.
Pagei
Ike'sSpies
EisenhowerandtheEspionageEstablishment
Pageii
BOOKSBYSTEPHENE.AMBROSE
TheAmericanHeritageNewHistoryofWorldWarII
AmericansatWar
BandofBrothers:ECompany,506thRegiment,101stAirbornefromNormandyto
HitlersEagleNest
CitizenSoldiers:TheU.S.ArmyfromtheNormandyBeaches
totheBulgetotheSurrenderofGermany,June7,1944-May7,1945
Comrades:Brothers,Fathers,Heroes,Sons,Pals
CrazyHorseandCuster:TheParallelLivesofTwoAmericanWarriors
D-Day:June6,1944:TheClimacticBattleofWorldWarII
Duty,Honor,Country:AHistoryofWestPoint
Eisenhower:ACentenaryAssessment,Editor
Eisenhower:Soldier,GeneraloftheArmy,President-Elect1890-1952
Eisenhower:SoldierandPresident
EisenhowerandBerlin,1945:TheDecisiontoHaltattheElbe
EisenhowerandtheGermanPOWs:FactsAgainstFalsehood,Editor
Halleck:Lincoln'sChiefofStaff
Ike:AbilenetoBerlin:TheLifeofDwightD.EisenhowerfromHisChildhoodinAbilene,
Kansas,
ThroughHisCommandoftheAlliedForcesinEurope
InstitutionsinModernAmerica:InnovationinStructureandProcess,Editor
LewisandClark:VoyageofDiscovery
TheMilitaryandAmericanSociety,Editor
MiltonS.Eisenhower:EducationalStatesman
NewHistoryofWorldWarII
Nixon:TheEducationofaPolitician1913-1962
Nixon:RuinandRecovery1973-1990
Nixon:TheTriumphofaPolitician1962-1972
ThePapersofDwightDavidEisenhower,TheWarYears,AssociateEditor
PegasusBridge:June6,1944
RisetoGlobalism:AmericanForeignPolicySince1938
TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYearsofGeneralDwightD.Eisenhower
UndauntedCourage:MeriwetherLewis,ThomasJefferson
andtheOpeningoftheAmericanWest
UptonandtheArmy
TheVictors:EisenhowerandHisBoys-TheMenofWorldWarII
AWisconsinBoyinDixie:CivilWarLettersofJamesKNewton,Editor
TheWisdomofDwightD.Eisenhower:QuotationsfromIke'sSpeeches&Writings19391969
WitnesstoAmerica:AnIllustratedDocumentaryHistory
oftheUnitedStatesfromtheRevolutiontoToday
Pageiii
Ike'sSpies
EisenhowerandtheEspionageEstablishment
StephenE.Ambrose
withRichardH.Immerman,ResearchAssociate
IntroductionbyDouglasBrinkley
UNIVERSITYPRESSOFMISSISSIPPIJACKSON
Pageiv
www.upress.state.ms.us
Firstpublishedin1981byDoubleday
Copyright©StephenE.Ambrose
PublishedbyarrangementwithDoubleday,adivisionofRandomHouse,Inc.
Introductioncopyright©1999byUniversityPressofMississippi
Allrightsreserved
ManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica
0706050403020099432
ISBN1-57806-207-1
BritishLibraryCataloging-in-PublicationDataavailable
Pagev
ForWilliamB.Hesseltine,1902-1964
and
T.HarryWilliams,1909-1979
greatteachers,both
Pagevii
CONTENTS
Introduction
Preface
ix
xiii
PartOne:
WorldWarII1942-45
Chapter1
ChurchillIntroducesIketotheULTRASecret
3
Chapter2
PreparingTORCH
14
Chapter3
LightingtheTORCH
29
Chapter4
WhoMurderedtheAdmiral?
39
Chapter5
IkeandULTRAinAfrica,Sicily,andItaly
57
Chapter6
TheSecretSideofOVERLORD
75
Chapter7
D-DayandtheFrenchResistance
95
Chapter8
TheBattleofMortain-ULTRA'sGreatestTriumph
110
Chapter9
Ike,Strong,Monty,andtheBridgeTooFar
125
Chapter10
Ike'sIntelligenceFailureattheBulge
136
Interlude:
1945-53
Chapter11
EisenhowerBetweenSHAEFandthePresidency
155
Chapter12
TheBirthandEarlyYearsoftheCIA,1945-53
162
PartTwo:
ThePresidency
Chapter13
PresidentEisenhowerandtheCommunistMenace
181
Chapter14
Iran:ThePreparation
189
Chapter15
Iran:TheAct
206
Chapter16
Guatemala
215
Chapter17
Hungary,Vietnam,andIndonesia
235
Chapter18
TheNationalIntelligenceEstimates
252
Chapter19
TheU-2andIke'sDefensePolicy
265
Chapter20
FrancisGaryPowersandtheSummitThatNeverWas
279
Chapter21
IkeandtheCIA'sAssassinationPlots
293
Chapter22
IkeandtheBayofPigs
307
Chapter23
IkeandHisSpies
317
Pageviii
Notes
323
Glossary
344
AnEssayontheSourcesbyRichardH.Immerman
347
Bibliography
350
Acknowledgments
356
Index
359
Pageix
INTRODUCTION
OnMay1,1960,U.S.militarypilotFrancisGaryPowerswasconductingaflyoverof
strategicSovietsiteswhenhishigh-altitudeU-2surveillanceplanewashitbyasurfaceto-airmissile.TheincidentwouldquicklyturnintotheUnitedStates'greatest
embarrassmentoftheColdWarera:fourdayslaterPremierNikitaKhrushchevappeared
beforetheSupremeSovietandannouncedthattheU.S.S.R.hadshotdownanAmerican
spyplane.
AtfirstPresidentDwightD.EisenhowerdeniedthatPowershadbeenonaspying
mission;inanaddresstothenationthreeweekslater,however,headmittedthatthe
UnitedStateshadindeedbeenusingtheU-2tokeepaneyeontheSoviets.Theensuing
controversynotonlyreflectedbadlyonEisenhower,italsoaffordedtheAmericanpeople
theirfirstrealglimpseintothemurkyworldofinternationalespionage.
AndthatisjustwhatStephenE.Ambrose'sIke'sSpiesdoesformodernreaders:it
indulgesourJamesBondfantasiesbylettingusinonthehighestanddeepestofonetime
governmentsecrets.Ambrose'slivelynarrative,writtenwithRichardH.Immerman,
drawsoneintotheexcitinglyshadowyrealmofnotonlyspyplanesbutdoubleagents,
politicalcoups,andassassinationplots-theexecutive-levelunderbellyofthesupposedly
benignlydullEisenhoweradministration.
Originallypublishedin1981byDoubleday,thisnewUniversityPressofMississippi
editioncomesatanappropriatetime,consideringthecurrentsorrystateofthespy
business.Ambrosedealsonlywiththeperiodfrom1942to1961,coveringEisenhower's
presidencyandtheWorldWarIImilitarysuccessesthatledhimtoit,butthemost
interestingaspectofthebookmaybethetocsinsitringsfortoday.
ForEisenhowerwasthefirstleaderofthefreeworldtoembraceespionageasa
geopoliticaltacticdespitetheethicalpitfallsthatinhereinit.TheformerArmygeneral
mayhavebeenpromptedbyaboyishenthusiasmforthecloak-and-daggertrade,butthat
innocentmotivehelpedsettheUnitedStatesdownadarkpaththateventuallyledtothe
BayofPigsdisasterinCubain1961,totheUnitedStates'implicationintheassassination
ofMarxistPresidentSalvadorAllendeGossensofChilein1973,totheWatergatescandal
thatbroughtdownPresidentRichardNixonin1974,andlatertoawholeseriesof
shamefulcasesofAmericanssellingsecretstotheSoviets(and
Pagex
thentotheRussians),suchasformernavalofficerJohnArthurWalkerin1985,CIA
counterintelligenceexpertAldrichAmesin1994,andCIAofficialHaroldNicholsonin
1997.Itisincidentssuchasthesethatspawnedthethoroughdisgustwithcovert
intelligenceoperationsthatprevailsamongthepublictoday.
NohistorianaliveisbetterequippedtowriteaboutanyaspectofEisenhower's
presidency,goodorbad,thanStephenAmbrose.Afterall,uponreadinghis1962
biographyHalleck:Lincoln'sChiefofStaff,theformerpresidentcalledtheauthor
himselftorequestameeting.ShortlythereafterEisenhowerhandpickedAmbrosetowrite
hisbiographyandtoserveasanassociateeditorofhispresidentialpapers.
Inthecourseofthedozensofhourshespentinterviewingtheformerpresidentforhis
biography,AmbrosediscoveredthatIkewaslikeakidinacandyshopwhenitcameto
spystuff,particularlythepowerandpotentialoftheespionageestablishment.Eisenhower
revealedthathehadfirstbeenalertedtothepossibilitiesofcounterintelligenceearlyin
WorldWarIIbyBritishPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchill,whoconveyedtohis
Americancounterparttheseeminglylimitlesswaysthespygamecouldbeplayed.
EisenhowercouldhavehadnobettermodelthantheBritishSecretService,whichamong
otherwartimetriumphsconcoctedULTRA,thecode-breakingmechanismthatallowed
theBritishtoreadinterceptedmessagesfromtheGermanenemy.TheAmerican
commanderalsolearnedofBritishadvancesinradar,theunprecedentedinformationgatheringtechnologyScotsmanSirRobertWatson-Watthadfirstputtothepracticaluse
ofradio-wavedetectionandrangingin1934,aprocessheperfectedin1940.Churchill
alsosharedpartofhisvisionforthefutureofespionageafterWorldWarII.Whatthe
Britishleaderdidn'tknowwasthathewasopeningaPandora'sboxinEisenhower.
Ike'sSpiesisthestoryofwhathappenedoncethatboxwasbreached.Bythetimethe
AlliedforcesunderhiscommandlandedatNormandyonJune6,1944,Eisenhowerhad
learnedhowespionagecouldbeputtowinningthewar.Ambrosedetailshowthefuture
presidentdesignedOperationFORTITUDEasadecoyfromtheactualD-Daylandingsto
fooltheGermansintobelievingtheAllieswouldlandelsewherethanNormandy.Butin
tracingEisenhower'suseofspytacticsthroughtherestofWorldWarII,Ambrose
exposesnotonlythesuccessesbutalsothefailures,suchaswhensuperiorGerman
counterintelligenceexposedthelimitsofespionageintheDecember1944Battleofthe
Bulge.
Ike'sSpiesgoesontochroniclethechangesinintelligencepolicyusheredinbypostwar
PresidentHarryS.Truman,whoin1945disbandedtheOfficeofStrategicServicesthat
hadrunAmerica'sspyoperationsduringWorldWarII.ByJuly1947,
Pagexi
however,Trumanhadchangedhismindabouttheusefulnessofespionageandsupported
theestablishmentoftheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),inwhichhissuccessorwould
takeanactiveinterest.
HereAmbrosepresentsaverydifferentpictureofDwightEisenhowerfromhispublic
imageasthenation'skindlygrandfather,moreinterestedingolfingandfishingthanin
governanceandrightlycriticizedforspendingmoretimeonhishobbiesthanchartingthe
courseofthecountry.AsAmbrosereveals,however,aspresidenttheformergeneral
actuallyspentfarmoretimeinthewarroomthanthelockerroom.
ThechaptershereonEisenhower'sfirstmajorcovertactionreadlikeanIanFleming
novelindescribingtheU.S.government'sdispatchofthedashingKermit''Kim"
RoosevelttoreturntheShahofIrantohisthronetocounterSovietinfluencesonthe
Mideast.BackedbyamobpaidforbytheCIA,RooseveltforcedcoupleaderMohammed
MossadeghtofleeandmakewayfortheShah'sreturnin1953.PresidentEisenhower's
firstintelligenceoperationwasasuccessifnotalastingone.InJanuary1979afull-scale
revolutioninIranledbyAyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniforcedtheShahtoflee,andin
thosemorecomplicatedtimestherewaslittletheCIAcoulddoaboutit.AsAmbrose
details,manyoftheconsequencesoftheEisenhoweradministration'sintelligence
activitieswouldnotcometolightuntillongafterhehadleftofficesuchasinVietnam.
Ike'sSpiespresentsbutaportionofthemid-centurypresidentwhoalsotackledissues
suchasatomicenergy,theinterstatehighwaysystem,andAmerica'sgrowingcivilrights
crisis.InthisthoroughlyresearchedaccountStephenAmbroseshedslightonamajorpart
ofthestoryofoneofAmerica'sscariesttimesthedawnyearsoftheColdWarbyfocusing
onPresidentEisenhower'senthusiasmforespionage,whichhasresonatedthrough
Americanforeignpolicyeversince.
IoweaspecialthankstoShelbySadlerandMatthewEllefsonfortheirhelpwiththis
introduction.
DOUGLASBRINKLEY
NEWORLEANS,LOUISIANA
JULY31,1999
Pagexiii
PREFACE
BetweenWorldWarIandWorldWarII,theU.S.Governmentdidalmostnospyingon
anyone.Spyingwasnotagentleman'sprofession,itwasthought,andanywayan
isolationistAmericahadnoneedforspies.HarryTrumanrevertedtothisposition
immediatelyafterWorldWarII.
Butduringthewar,theUnitedStateswasforcedtousespies.ThesuccessoftheBritish
SecretServicehadimpressedDwightEisenhower.AsSupremeCommanderoftheAllied
ForcesinEurope,IkewasthebeneficiaryofinformationobtainedbythecreamofBritish
society,academia,andthearts.Hewasalsoatthecenterofasuccessfuldeception
programthatfooledtheGermanstimeaftertime,whilesimultaneouslyhecommandeda
seriesofcovertoperationsthatplayedacrucialroleinthefinalvictory.
So,whenEisenhowerbecamePresident,heencouragedthegrowthoftheCIA,which
underhisdirectionandordersgrewinsize,expandingthescopeofitsactivitiesand
becomingoneofAmerica'schiefweaponsintheColdWar.Ithelpedtooverthrow
governmentsintheMiddleEastandLatinAmerica,triedtodosoinCentralandEastern
Europe,flewspyflightsovertheSovietUnionandothercountries,andhatched
assassinationplotsagainstforeignleaders.Toitscritics,itwasarogueelephant,totally
outofcontrol;toitsdefenders,itwasavitalinstrumentinthefighttokeeptheFree
Worldfree.ToIke,itwasnecessary.
1981
Page1
PARTONE
WORLDWARII
1942-45
Page3
ChapterOne
ChurchillIntroducesIketotheULTRASecret
LATEJUNE,1942.Oneofthosebeginning-of-summerdaysinBritainwhenitseems
thattwilightwilllastforever.AtChequers,thePrimeMinister'sofficialweekend
retreat,thebutlerinformsWinstonChurchillthatthecarwiththeAmericangeneralin
ithasjustarrived.Churchillgoestothefrontdoortopersonallygreethisovernight
guest.ThePrimeMinisterwatchesasthegeneralemergesfromhiscarandreachesfor
hisbags.
Studyingtheofficer,Churchillmaywellhavethoughtofhowlittleheknewaboutthis
mantowhomhewasabouttotellsomuch.Churchillhadseenhiminactionathigh-level
staffconferences,knewthathewasthorough,well-prepared,thoughtful,andrespected
byhispeers.Churchillhadalsobeentoldthathewasimmenselypopularwithhis
associates,whocalledhim"Ike"asamarkoftheiraffection.
ChurchillrealizedthatthisIkehadChiefofStaffGeorgeC.Marshall'sunlimited
confidence,somuchsothatMarshallhadjustmadeGeneralDwightD.Eisenhowerthe
commanderoftheAmericanmilitaryforcesinGreatBritain.Marshallhadindicatedthat
hefelttherewasnojobtoobigforIke.Churchillhadalsobeenimpressedwhentoldthat
EisenhowerhadspentfiveyearswritingspeechesforMarshall'spredecessor,General
DouglasMacArthur,whosestandardsforclarityofexpressionandthoughtinwritten
EnglishwerenearlyashighasChurchill'sown.
Mostofall,ChurchillrealizedthattheSupremeCommanderfortheAnglo-American
counteroffensiveagainstHitlerwouldhave
Page4
tobeanAmerican.ThatwasinevitablyoneofthepricesBritainwouldhavetopayto
keepAmericafromturningherbackontheEuropeanwarandconcentratinginsteadon
Japan.KnowingthatPresidentFranklinRooseveltstoodalmostinaweofGeneral
Marshall,andwouldcertainlynotbuckhimonapurelymilitaryassignment,and
knowingMarshall'sattitudetowardEisenhower,Churchillrealizedthatthisgeneral
walkingtowardhim,suitcaseinonehand,briefcaseintheother,wouldbeincommand
ofthefirstAnglo-AmericanamphibiousassaultsincetheFrenchandIndianWar.
ChurchillhadcalledIketohimbecausethetimehadcometointroducethefuture
SupremeCommandertothewizardwar,thatsilentbackstagebattlebetweentheBritish
intelligentsiaandtheGermanintelligentsiathatwasascriticalasitwasunknown.This
big,hearty,raw-boned,grinningYankwasaprofessionalsoldier,fifty-twoyearsold,
withnearlythirtyyearsofactiveduty,butheknewalmostnothingaboutcodesorcode
breaking,aboutnewweapons,oraboutspies,counterspies,covertactions,oranyother
aspectofthedarkarts.HisignorancecameaboutbecausetheU.S.Armyandthenationit
defendedhadvirtuallynointelligencearm.In1929,SecretaryofWarHenryL.Stimson
hadabolishedthesmallcode-breakingapparatusoftheArmyonthegroundsthat
"gentlemendon'treadeachother'smail."TheintelligencebranchoftheArmywasso
small,unimportant,infactdespised,thatitwaswidelyassumedthatnoofficerofability
everwentintoit.
ThemanapproachingthefrontdooratChequerswastrulyaninnocentabroad.Waiting
forhimwithacigarinonehand,somedocumentsintheother,andasmileonhisface,
wasChurchill,whodelightedinthetaskofintroducingthisnaiveYanktothelabyrinthof
theBritishSecretService.OverintheNewWorldtheymightbesayingthatBritainwas
finished,thatherdaywasdone,andChurchillknewpainfullywellthattheBritishcould
neverbythemselvesproducethegunsordivisionsinsufficientnumbertoovercomethe
Germans,but-byGod!-inthiswarofbrains,theBritishwerethebestintheworld,and
Churchillwasjustifiablyproudofthatfact.
Ikeputdownhisbagsandinhiswarm,friendly,casualAmericanfashionstuckouthis
hand.Churchillshookhandsheartily,meanwhilelookingIkeupanddown.As
Eisenhowerremovedhishat,twofeaturesstoodout-hisfullgrin,andhislarge,
prominent
Page5
forehead.Boththegrinandthebaldpateseemedaswide,broad,andsunnyastheKansas
prairie.
Hehadnomiddle-agedsag,eitherunderhiseyesoraroundhisbelly.Instead,hehadthe
broadshouldersandpowerfulbuildofastarathlete(whichhehadbeen),andhecarried
himselflightly,almostcatlike.Hishandswerelarge,hishandshakefirm.Helooked
Churchillrightintheeye,nottryingtoavoideitherhisgazeorhisfirstquestions.Overall,
hegavetheimpressionofstraightforwardness,strength,boundlessenergy,andgreat
determination.Churchilllikedhimatonce.
Forhispart,IkewasmeetingChurchillprivatelyforthefirsttime.Churchillhadthe
appearanceandmannersofaBritisharistocrat,whileIkewasonlyayearortwoaway
fromhavingbeenanobscurecolonelinaminusculearmy.Despitethedifferenceintheir
backgrounds,prestige,power,andreputation,Ikewasnotawestruck.Hewascurious
aboutthisgreatmanwhohadralliedtheBritishpeopletostandaloneforayearagainst
HitlerandhisNazis,andhewasanxioustogetalongwithChurchill.Togetherwith
Roosevelt,Stalin,andHitler,thePrimeMinisterwasoneofthefourbest-knownand
mostpowerfulmenintheworld.EveryoneinAmericahadseenhispicture,cigar
clampedbetweenhisteeth,standingovertheruinsofbombed-outLondon,holdinghis
firsttwofingersapart,highintheair,intheV-for-Victorysignal.Plump,almostcherubic
intheface,hecouldresembleabulldogwhenhewasdeterminedtohavehisway(which
wasnearlyallthetime).Hisfacewouldbecomeaviolentredwhenhewasangryor
crossed.Hetoohadboundlessenergyandhadthereforestuckhisfingerintoeverypiein
Britain,mostofallthewarofwitswiththeGermans,whichexcitedhisimaginationand
limitlesscuriosity.
Throughcocktails,throughdinner,throughthebrandy,coffee,andmorebrandy,oninto
theearlyhoursofthemorning,IkelistenedenthralledastheP.M.briefedhimonthe
secretwar.Heexplainedradar,itsshortcomingsanditspromise,howitwasbeingusedin
theBattleofBritain,whattheBritishhopeditcoulddointhefuture.Churchillfairly
glowedashedescribedtheBattleoftheBeams.Germannight-bomberswerefindingtheir
targetsoverblacked-outLondonbyflyingalongradiobeamssentbytransmitterslocated
ontheFrenchcoast.Crossbeams,sentfromanotherspotonthecoast,intersectedthe
beamoverthetarget,lettingtheGermanbombersknowtheprecisemomenttodroptheir
bombs.A
Page6
youngBritishscientist,R.V.Jones,hadfiguredouthowthesystemworked,whichgave
theBritishanopportunitytojamthesignals,ormisdirecttheGermans,ormisleadthem
intodroppingtheirbombsoveropencountryside.1
Withachuckle,ChurchilldescribedsomeofthewilderideasBritishscientistshad
produced,suchassuspendingtimebombsbyparachuteinthepathofapproaching
Germanbomberformations,orthesearchfor"deathrays"forbothhumansandengines.
AnideaChurchilllikedandintendedtofollowupwastotakemassesofseaweed,mix
themwithhugequantitiesofdryice,andtherebycreateanunsinkableaircraftcarrierthat
couldbetowedupanddownthecoastofEurope.
Ikewasnevertemptedtolaugh,howeverabsurdsomeideasseemed,becauseheknew
thatitwasthissameChurchillwhohad,in1914,foundprivatefundstosupportthe
researchforanddevelopmentofanewweaponofwarthatallthegeneralslaughedat.
Thatweaponbecamethetank,andin1917IkehadbeenoneofthefirstofficersoftheU.
S.Armytorecognizeitspotential.Hetookcommandofthe"TankCorps"andtraineditat
Gettysburg,Pennsylvania.Inlate1918,withinaweekofhisreceivingorderstotakehis
unittoFrancetoenterthebattle,thearmisticecame.Ikehadthereforeneverhelda
combatcommand,buthisappreciationofthetankandhisrespectforChurchillforhis
keyroleinitscreationremainedundiminished.
ChurchilltoldIkeofsomeofthefearshisscientistshadwithrespecttowhattheGermans
weredevelopinginthewayofnewweapons.TheGermanNavywasmakingrapid
progresswithitsdieselsubmarines,whiletheLuftwaffewasthoughttobeexperimenting
withsomesortofjet-propelledaircraft.Rocketresearchwasalsogoingforward.Itwas
thoughtthattheGermansmighthaveanoperationalpilotlessaircraft,orevenatrue
rocket,withinayearortwo.AnotherinnovationwasabombwitheyestheGermanswere
experimentingwithaballisticbombwhichwouldbesteeredfromthelaunchingaircraft
onthereceiptofpictures"televised"backbythebomb.
MorecheerfulnewswasthatGermanatomicresearchseemedtobemisdirected.
ChurchillandRoosevelt,meanwhile,hadagreedtopooltheirresources,andBritish
physicistsalongwithsomeofthebestEuropeanphysicists,whohadfledHitler'sEurope
towork
Page7
attheirspecialtieswerenowparticipatingfullyintheManhattanProjectinAmerica.
Asforspies,ChurchillwaspleasedtoreportthattheBritishhadmanagedtomaintain
contactwiththePolishandFrenchsecretservicesthroughMI-6oftheBritishSecret
Service,headedbyBrigadierStewartMenzies.TheSpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE),a
branchofMenzies'SecretService,wasestablishingcontactswiththeFrenchunderground
forces.Bestofall,MenziesbelievedthattheBritishhadmanagedtoidentifyandthen
eitherexecuteor"turn"everyGermanspyintheUnitedKingdom,whichiftruemeant
thattheBritishSecretServicecontrolledeverypieceofinformationtheGermansreceived
fromtheirspies.Therewasrichpotentialinsuchasituation.
(ChurchillwouldnothavebeenquitesopleasedwithMI-6ifhehadknownthatthe
GermanshaddonethesametohisMI-6agentsinHolland.TheBritishhadparachuted
sabotageagentsintothatcountry,buttheGermanshadcaughtthefirstoneandforced
himtosendbacksuitablemessagestoLondon.TheGermansthenknewwhere
subsequentagentsweretobedropped,asMI-6sentradiomessagestotheiragentstobe
readyforthem.TheNaziscapturedeveryoneofthem,atthesametimesendingmessages
backtoLondonthatledMI-6tobelievethattheagentswereatlargeandoperatinga
successfulcampaign.2)
Finally,triumphantly,ChurchillturnedtowhathecalledULTRA.Beforeexplainingthe
term,however,heratherdramaticallymadeIkeswearthathewouldneverexposehimself
tocaptureduringtheremainderofthewar,whichmeantexplicitlythathewasnevertogo
intoawarzoneorflyoverone.EveryonewhoknewaboutULTRAhadtomakethat
promise,Churchillexplained,becausethiswasthemostvaluablesecretofthewar,and
theGermanshadtheirownwaysofmakingcapturedmentalk.
ULTRA,Churchillthendeclared,wasthetermtheBritishusedfortheirsystematic
breakingoftheGermancode.Byitself,difficultthoughthefeatmayhavebeen(andwas,
infact),breakinganenemy'scodewasnotadecisivefactor,primarilybecausetheenemy
changedhiscodeatregularintervals,andwhenhedid,thecodebreakershadtostartall
overatpointzero.Butinthiscase,adelightedChurchilldeclared,theGermansbelieved
theyhadanabsolutelysafeencodingmachine,whichwascalledEnigma.It
Page8
consistedoftwomachinessomewhatlikeelectrictypewriters,whichwereattachedto
threerotatingdrums,whichinturnwereinterconnectedbyanintricatesetofelectric
wires.Anoperatorwouldtypeaplaintextononetypewriter;thedrumswouldrotate
accordingtoapredeterminedsetting,andtheothertypewriterwouldrapouttheencoded
message,whichwasthensentovertheairwaves.Atthereceivingend,alltheoperator
neededtodowasputthemachineonthepropersetting,feedintheencodedmessage,
andtakeouttheplaintext.
TheGermansbelievedthesystemtobefoolproofbecauseeveniftheenemyhadan
Enigmamachine,itwoulddohimnogoodwithoutthesettings.Thepossiblevariations
werenumberedinthetensofthousandsandacodebreakerwouldgocrazybefore
crackingevenoneofthem.Enigmacouldproduceanalmostinfinitenumberofcipher
alphabetsmerelybychangingthekeyingprocedure.
ButtheBritishhadbrokenthesystem,andtheGermansdidnotknowit,whichgavethe
BritishamajorassetintheBattleofBritainandtheBattleoftheAtlantic.Thewayin
whichtheBritishhadearnedthisassetwasinitselfafascinatingstory,involvingspies,
double-agents,traitors,andthecreamofBritishuniversities.3
TheFrenchandthePoleshadbothmadecontributionstoULTRA.APolishJewwhohad
workedonanEnigmamachineinBerlinmanagedtocontactMI-6;theBritisharrangedto
gethimfromWarsawtoLondontodirectthebuildingofaduplicate.TheFrenchhad
obtainedearlier,commercialmodelsoftheEnigmamachine,whichtheymadeavailable
toMI-6.Withtheseexamplesbeforethem,theBritishproceededtoconstructastrange
contraption,eightfeetbyeightfeet,called"theBomb,"whichwasinstalledatHutThree,
aNissenhutunderthetreesatawretchedestatenamedBletchleyPark.TheBomb,as
describedbyitschiefengineer,HaroldKeen,wasnotacomputer,and"therewasnoother
machinelikeit.Itwasunique,builtespeciallyforthispurpose.Neitherwasitacomplex
tabulatingmachine,whichwassometimesusedincryptanalysis.Whatitdidwastomatch
theelectricalcircuitsofEnigma.ItssecretwasintheinternalwiringofEnigma'srotors,
which'theBomb'soughttoimitate."4
BletchleyPark,orBPasitinevitablycametobecalled,soonhadanoverflowofBritish
intelligentsia.Nissenhutscoveredthegrounds.TheywerestaffedbyGerman-language
experts,military
Page9
technicians,andcodebreakers,withaheavyemphasisonmathematicians,whichmeanta
highnumberofeccentricsand"absentminded"professors.
"Therewasanamazingspiritattheplace,"AlfredFriendly,whowasthere,laterwrote.
"Moralewashighbecauseeveryoneknewthefantasticallysuccessfulresultsofourdailyand-nightlyendeavours.Itwasoneplaceinthemilitarywheretherewasnosenseof
futility,oruselessworkorofnonsense.Hadheservedthere,Hellerwouldhavehadno
materialforCatch22."5WilliamFilby,aBritisherwhoservedthroughthewaratBP,
laterscoffedattheideaofavacationorevenashortleave."Youcouldn'twaittogetback
inthemorningtoseewhathadhappenedovernight,"hesaidinaninterview."Itwaslike
yourbabyyouneverwantedtoleaveit.''6AtBP,inbrief,therewasatremendousfeeling
ofexcitementandcontribution.ChurchillconveyedsomeofthatfeelingtoEisenhowerin
hisdescriptionoftheplaceanditswork.
BreakingtheEnigmasecretsopenhadbeenabrilliantteameffort,buttherewere
problems.Thecodesneededtobebrokenonacontinuousbasis,astheGermanswere
consistentlychangingthekey.Thenewsettingshadtobefoundbeforeeachnewcode
couldbemastered.Asthewarwentalongthethousandsofmenandwomenworkingat
BPgotbetteratit,butintheearlyyearstheywerebaffledmoreoftenthannot.ULTRA
wasnotanimportantfactorintheAugust-September1940BattleofBritain;evenby
October,BP,afterstrainingeveryresourceofhumanintelligenceandendurance,could
breakonlyonemessageinthreeintimetoactontheinformation.Withthedecoded
messages,asR.V.Jonespointedout,"IwasabletotelltheDutyAirCommodoreat
FighterCommandtheexactplaceoftheGermanbomberattack,thetimeofthefirst
bombtowithintenminutesorso,theexpectedgroundspeedofthebombers,theirlineof
approachtowithin100yards,andtheirheighttowithintwotothreehundredmetres.
Couldanyairdefensesystemaskformore?"
Andyet,thebombersstillgotthrough.Jonescomplainedthat"readingtheEnigmasignals
wasjustlikereadingtomorrow'spapertoday."Asanextremeexample,herecordedthat
theBritishknewoftheGermaninvasionplansfortheislandofCreteatleastthreeweeks
inadvance,andstillcouldnotstoptheenemy.InpartthiswasbecauseofBritishmilitary
weakness,inpartbecausetheydared
Page10
makeonlythemostlimiteduseoftheirULTRA-derivedinformation.7
RonaldLewin,authorofUltraGoestoWar,thefirstdetailedexaminationoftheuseof
ULTRAinthecampaignsofWorldWarII,writes,"Itwasimpossibletoriskdisclosingits
intelligencetothoseinactualcontactwiththeenemy,orliabletocaptureforother
reasons,eventhoughtheknowledgemightimprovetheirchanceofsuccessorsurvival."8
SoitwasatCrete.
Aninabilitytotakeadvantageoftheinformation,oraninabilitytouseitforfearof
revealingitssource,putdefinitelimitsonwhatULTRAcouldcontribute.Another
limitationwasdistribution,gettingtherightinformationtotherightmanattherighttime,
andwithouttippingtheirhand.Onlytheveryhighest-rankingofficersintheBritish
serviceknewaboutULTRA.Itwasthebest-keptsecretofthewar,asecretthatlastedfor
almostafullgenerationaftertheNazisurrender.
Then,in1974,GroupCaptainF.W.WinterbothamrevealedTheUltraSecretinabook
bythatname.*9WinterbothamwastheofficerwhobroughttheULTRAinterceptsdirectly
toChurchill,whodelightedinreadingHitler'smessages.BecauseWinterbothamwasso
closetothePrimeMinisterthroughoutthewar,hismemoirswerefilledwithinsidestories
thatmadeanexcitingtaleevenmoreappealing.
Inthemid-1970sTheUltraSecretcameasasurprisetothepublic,aswellastomost
WorldWarIIscholars.Itsimmediatereceptionwasoneofpuzzlementbythepublic,
angerbythescholars(theywouldhavetorewritetheirbooks).Why,thepublic
wondered,iftheAllieslistenedinoneverythingtheGermanssaidtoeachotheroverthe
radio,didittakesolongtowinthewar?Andwhywasthevictorysocostly?
Churchill'sinitialreactionstoULTRAweresimilar.In1941andthroughout1942,for
example,hekeptreadingRommel'smessagesfromAfrica,messagesinwhichRommel
complainedthathisgasolinehadnotarrived,norhisspareparts,norhisreinforcements,
norhisnewtanks,norhiscommunicationsequipment.BecauseChurchillknewthat
Rommelwasshortoneverything,hecouldnotunderstandwhyhisMiddleEast
commandershesitatedtoattack,
*Hedidso"tothemortificationofthoseofuswhohadkeptouroathofsecrecy,"accordingtoone
insider.
Page11
andonebyonehesackedthem.ThankstoULTRA,Churchillknewwhatthegenerals
knew,anditmadethegeneralsfuriousandapprehensivebecauseitinvitedcriticismby
Churchill,whowasalwaysathishappiestwhenhewasdressingdownageneral.
ButalthoughChurchillcalledULTRAanoracle(whichitwaswhenitworked)andthe
keytovictory(whichitcouldbeiftherightlockwerefound),itcouldprovideonly
intelligence,notastrategyorthepowertoenforceone.GeneralBernardLaw
MontgomerypointedouttoChurchilltimeandtimeagaintheobviousfactthatknowing
aboutRommel'ssupplyshortagesdidnotsolvetheBritishsupplyproblems.
TheGermansnevercaughtontotheULTRAoperation,however.TheyusedEnigmato
thelastdayofthewar.Sothequestionpersists:WhydidtheAlliesnotwinsooner,atless
cost?AnAmericanfootballanalogymayhelptheperspectivehere.Supposeyouwere
coachingagainstaNationalFootballLeagueteam,andyourintelligencesystemwasso
goodthatyouknewnotonlytheheight,weight,speed,andcharacteristicsofevery
opponent(allgatheredfromopensources,mainlyfilms)butyoualsokneweveryoneof
youropponent'splays.Evenbetter,supposeyoumanagedtohookuparadiotransmitter
inthequarterback'shelmet,whileeachofyourplayershadreceiversintheirhelmets.
Yourinformationabouttheenemy'sstrengthandintentionswouldthenbeperfect,as
wouldyoursystemofgettingthatinformationintotherighthandsintimetoactonit.
Butifyourteamconsistedofelevenout-of-shapeofficeworkerswhohadneverplayed
togetherandwhowereallsmallerandslowerthantheiroppositenumbers,allthatperfect
informationwoulddoyounogood.Theprofessionalteamwouldstillscoreonevery
play.
Codebreakingcouldworkbothways,ofcourse,sincetheAlliesalsousedtheradio.
PatrickBeesly,whoworkedintheNavalIntelligenceDivisionoftheAdmiralty,points
outinhisexcellentworkVerySpecialIntelligencethat"noserviceinanyofthe
belligerentpowersduringtheSecondWorldWarsucceededinkeepingeverycipherit
usedsecure."BeforeWinterbothambroketheULTRAsecret,theupsanddownsinthe
crucialBattleoftheAtlanticwereinexplicable.GermansinkingsofAlliedmerchant
vesselswouldrisedramaticallyonemonth,thenfalloffsharplywhileAlliedsinkingsof
Germansubmarineswentup.Theexplanationlay
Page12
withthethousandsofmenandwomen,inGermanyandEngland,whotoilednightand
daytobreaktheotherside'scode.Successatthistremendouslydifficultanddemanding
taskwasimmediatelytranslatedintoshipssunkatsea.Theupsanddownscameasone
sideortheotherchangeditscode,orbrokethecodetheenemywasusingthatmonth.
TheBritishwontheBattleoftheAtlanticpartlybecausetheRoyalNavywasgood,partly
becauseofAmericanreinforcements,butmainlybecauseChurchill'scodebreakerswere
betterthanHitler's.Toalesserextentthiswasalsotrueonland,althoughsomeof
Rommel'svictoriesinNorthAfricacameaboutbecausehispeoplehadbrokentheBritish
codeandwerereadingtheradiotraffic.Beeslypointsout,"Whileeachnationaccepted
thefactthatitsowncryptanalystscouldreadatleastsomeoftheirenemy'sciphers,they
werecuriouslyblindtothefactthattheythemselveswerebeingsubjectedtoexactlythe
sameformofeavesdropping."10
Curious,too,wasthefactthatsomeAmericanshadtobesoldonthevalueofULTRA.
IkefairlybeamedasChurchillbroughthiminonthesecret,butothersweretobe
dubiousatbest,especiallyEisenhower'sdeputy,GeneralMarkClark.Shortlyafter
Eisenhower'svisittoChequers,WinterbothamwenttoEisenhower'sheadquartersin
LondontobriefClark.AccompanyinghimwasthelegendaryMenzies,headofMI-6,"to
lendabitofweighttotheproceedings."EisenhowerintroducedClarkandthreemembers
ofhisintelligencestaff,thenexcusedhimselfsincehealreadyknewaboutULTRA.Itisa
measureofthetightnessofsecurityaroundULTRAthatthisvisitbyWinterbothamand
MenziesdidnotgetenteredintoEisenhower'sofficialofficelog,whichmakesitaunique
event.
Winterbothamrecordedwhathappened:"MarkClarkwasrestlessfromthestart.I
explainednotonlywhatthesourcewas,butinanendeavourtocatchMarkClark's
interestgavesomepertinentexamplesofwhatitcoulddo.Ihadintendedtofollowthis
withanexplanationofhowtheinformationwouldreachhim,andthesecurityregulations
whichaccompanieditsuse.ButMarkClarkdidn'tappeartobelievethefirstpart,and
afteraquarterofanhourheexcusedhimselfandhisofficersonthegroundsthathehad
somethingelsetodo."11
Pattonwasequallycavalier.WhenWinterbothamsoughtto
Page13
briefhiminAlgiers,Pattoncuthimshort,saying,"Youknow,youngman,Ithinkyou
hadbettertellallthistomyIntelligencestaff,Idon'tgomuchonthissortofthingmyself.
YouseeIjustlikefighting."12
Ikewasnotsofoolish.HesawatoncethevalueofULTRA,bothimmediateand
potential,justasherespondedtoeverythingChurchillhadtoldhim.Oneofthereasons
IkehadwonMarshall'sconfidencewashisopennesstonewideas,newtechniques,new
approachestooldproblems.MarshalllikedtosaythatIkewasbroad-based,notnarrow
ortraditional.ChurchillandEisenhowerwereneitherscientistsnorengineers,butthey
bothlovedgadgets,inventions,technology,especiallywhenthenewdevicescouldhelp
themwinawar.
AsIkedrovebacktoLondonafterhiseveningatChequers,hereflectedonhowlucky
theUnitedStateswastohavetheBritishforallies.Whataninheritancetofallinto!
Churchill,forhispart,lookedforwardtoworkingwiththisAmericangeneral,whodid
notseemsostuckinthemud,soresistanttoscientificandtechnologicalchange,ashis
Britishgenerals.Together,theywouldmakeafineteam.
Page14
ChapterTwo
PreparingtheTORCH
DAWN,September15,1942.AgroupofFlyingFortressesisabouttotakeofffroman
ArmyAirForcefieldnearWashington,D.C.TheirdestinationisPrestwick,Scotland,
wherethebigbomberswillbethrownintothebattleragingoverEurope'sskies.Atall
passengercalledMcGowan,inaU.S.Armyuniformandwearingtheinsigniaofa
lieutenantcolonel,ducksunderthewingofoneoftheplanesandscramblesaboard.
Hesighswithreliefsurehehasn'tbeenseen.
McGowanwasrelievedbecausehewasnotthemanheseemedtobe.Hehadnothingto
dowiththehighlypublicizedairwarthathisplanewasabouttojoin.Hisuniformwas
fake,hisnamewasfalse,hisinstructionsweresecret.Thoseinstructionshadcome
directlyfromthePresidenthimself,afterasecretmeetingatHydePark.Franklin
Roosevelt'slastwordstoMcGowanwere,"Don'ttellanybodyintheStateDepartment
aboutthis.Thatplaceisasieve!"ThedisguisecameaboutbecauseArmyChiefofStaff
GeorgeC.Marshallbelieved"nobodyeverpaysanyattentiontoalieutenantcolonel."
McGowan'ssecrecywasaresultofanorderfromtheCommanderoftheEuropean
TheaterofOperations,U.S.Army,LieutenantGeneralDwightDavidEisenhower.1
"McGowan's"realnamewasRobertMurphy.HehadbeenaStateDepartmentemployee
fortwentyyears,butwasnowonspecialassignment,reportingdirectlytothePresident.
HismissionwastobriefEisenhoweronthepoliticalandmilitarysituationinFrench
NorthAfrica,andonOSSactivitiesinthearea.Murphy
Page15
thoughtallthesecrecystuffrathersillyandwasnotinclinedtotakeitseriouslyuntilthe
morningofSeptember16,whenhisplanetoucheddownatPrestwick.Murphygotoutto
stretchwhiletheplanewasbeingrefueledfortheflighttoLondonandheardafamiliar
voicecallout,"Why,Bob!Whatareyoudoinghere?"Itwasanoldfriendfromthe
ForeignService,DonCoster.Eisenhower'schiefsecurityofficer,ColonelJuliusHolmes,
hadCosterarrestedalmostbeforehefinishedspeaking.AsMurphygaped,Costerwas
hustledoffbytwoburlypolicemen.
Atnoon,MurphylandedatamilitaryairfieldnearLondon.Therehewaspickedupinan
unmarkedcardrivenbyLieutenantKaySummersby,Eisenhower'spersonaldriver.They
wentbyacircuitousroutearoundtheoutskirtsofLondonuntiltheyarrivedinmidafternoonatIke'sprivateretreat,TelegraphCottage.
ThefirstofIke'sspieshadcometoreport.Overthenexttwentyyears,Eisenhowerwould
hearhundredsofsecretreportsfromdozensofspies,butnoneeversurpassedMurphy's
inexcitement,ifonlybecausehiswasthefirst.AndthefirstthingIkewantedtoknow
fromMurphywas,"Whoisyourboss?"2
Murphyreallydidnotknow.AlthoughhispaycheckcamefromtheDepartmentofState,
hewasunderdirectordersfromthePresidenttoavoidallcontactwithSecretaryofState
CordellHulloranyothermemberofthedepartmenthierarchy.InAlgiers,Murphy
directedtheactivitiesofafewdozenOSSagents,buthedidnotworkforortakeorders
fromtheOSS.HewastheprincipalAmericanofficialinNorthAfrica,whichwassoona
theaterofwarunderEisenhower'scommand,buthehadnoconnectionwithIke's
headquarters.Thelinesofauthoritywerebadlyblurred,evennonexistent.Inhisinitial
encounterwiththeworldofspies,therefore,Eisenhowerhadtofaceproblemsthatwould
persistforthenexttwodecadesandbeyond:Towhomdoesthespyreport?Whogives
himorders?Whodecideswhereandwhencovertoperationswilltakeplace?Inshort,
whoisincharge?
ItwasnotanewproblemtoEisenhower,becausehehadbeeninvolvedsince1941inthe
attemptstocreateclear-cutlinesofauthorityforAmerica'sfirstintelligence-gatheringand
covertoperationsagency.OnJuly11,1941,Roosevelt,actingatPrimeMinisterWinston
Churchill'ssuggestion,hadcreatedanewoffice,theCoordinatorofInformation(COI)
underWilliamDonovan,
Page16
whohadinsistedonamilitarytitleandhadbeengrantedtherankofcolonel.FDR's
directivetoDonovanhadgivenhimawidescope,andthePresident'sfondnessfor
Donovanandhisinterestinthesecretwarhadledhimtogivevirtuallyunlimitedfundsto
theCOI.
Thearrangementupsetthemilitary,wherethechainofcommandissacrosanctevenin
peacetime.Withaworldwidewargoingon,theJointChiefsofStaffwantedtoensure
thatallactivitiescarriedonbyAmericansanywherewerecontrolledbythem.Donovan,a
free-wheelingtypewhohatedrestraintofanykind,resisted.Eisenhowerbecame
involvedfourmonthsafterPearlHarbor,whenheurgedhisboss,GeneralMarshall,to
advisethePresidenttomaketheCOIdirectlyresponsibletotheJCS.ButtheArmydid
notwanttosullyitsreputationbyhavingitsofficersengageinspyingorsubversive
actions,soIkerecommendedthatsuchworkinforeigncountries"shouldbeconducted
byindividualsoccupyingacivilianratherthanamilitarystatus."Despitetheirstatus,Ike
recommendedthatthey"shouldbesubjecttothehighercontroloftheJointChiefsof
Staff."3
MarshallacceptedEisenhower'sproposal,whichremainedineffectuntilJune1942.
Meanwhile,therewasafuriousbureaucraticstrugglegoingonforcontrolofintelligence
andcovertoperationsbetweentheArmy,theNavy,theStateDepartment,theWhite
House,andvariousotheragenciesanddepartments,allofwhomcouldseethathowever
restrictedCOIwasatthetime,itsgrowthpotentialwasunlimited.Butinwartime,the
militaryusuallygetswhatitwants,andsoitwashere.InJune1942,Rooseveltchanged
thenameofCOItoOfficeofStrategicServices,putDonovanatitshead,andplacedOSS
directlyundertheJCSinthechainofcommand.4
Donovanstillhopedthathecouldoperateindependently,asFDRhadintendedthathe
should,butEisenhowerhadnotspentalifetimeintheArmywithoutlearningthecrucial
importanceofflowchartsandlinesofauthority.Afterhebecamecommanderofthe
EuropeanTheaterofOperationsandwasplacedattheheadoftheinvasionforcefor
NorthAfrica(codenamedTORCH),IkemovedtobringDonovanunderhisauthority.
OnSeptember10,aweekbeforeMurphy'sarrivalinLondon,hegotwhathewanted.The
JCSinformedDonovanthathisactivitiesinEngland,Europe,andNorthAfricawereall
subjecttothesupervisionanddirection
Page17
ofGeneralEisenhower,includingsuchmattersaspayingbribemoney,propagandaradio
broadcasts,equipmenttobesuppliedtoguerrillagroups,distributionofleaflets,andthe
collectionanddisseminationofintelligence.5
ThatdirectiveputDonovanwhereEisenhowerwantedhim,butwhatofMurphy?Hedid
notbelongtotheOSS,althoughFDRhadcasuallyplacedOSSagentsinNorthAfrica
underhisauthority.Eisenhowerwouldnothaveanyoneinhistheaterofoperationswho
wasnotunderhiscommand.BothassoldierandlaterasPresident,Ikewasaselfconfessedfanaticonthesubjectofunityofcommand,perhapsbecausehecameto
commandsolateinlife(hewasfifty-twoyearsoldwhenhetookoveratETO,hisfirst
realcommand)."AsIamresponsibleforthesuccessoftheoperationsIfeelthatitis
essentialthatfinalauthorityinallmattersinthattheaterrestinme."6*Further,itwas
importantthattheAlliespresenttheFrenchwith"acleancutandsingleauthority."7
RooseveltthenmadeMurphya"politicaladviser,"responsibledirectlytoIke.
WithMurphy'sstatussettled,Ikewasreadytolistentohisreport.Thetwomenwentout
ontothelawnofTelegraphCottage.Theysatdownundersomepinetrees,facingthefifth
greenoftheneighboringgolfcourse.Hedgesprotectedthemfromcuriouseyes.Ike
listenedwithwhathisaide,HarryButcher,describedas"horrifiedintentness"asMurphy
spenttheafternoontellinghislongandcomplexstory.Murphy,Butchersaid,"talkedmore
likeanAmericanbusinessmancanvassingtheinsandoutsofaprospectivemergerthan
eitheradiplomatorasoldier."9
Murphy'sstorywasfullofplotsandintrigues,proposedassassinations,possiblecoups,
secretcontactswiththeenemy,thewholetangledmessofFrenchpoliticsunderthe
Germanoccupation,andbureaucraticin-fightingamongvariousAmericanagenciesas
wellasbetweenAmericanandBritishgroupsmaneuveringforpower.Themilitary
operationEisenhowerwasabouttolaunchaddedtothecomplications.TheUnitedStates,
alongwiththeBritish,was
*Eisenhower'sinsistenceoncontrolofhisowntheaterwasnicelyillustratedinNovember1942
whenmovieproducerDarrylZanuckarrivedinAlgierstomakeamovieabouttheinvasion.He
actedasifhecouldgowherehewanted,whenhewanted,filmingwhateverhewished.Iketoldhis
subordinate,GeneralMarkClark,totellZanuck"thathewillobeymyordersaslongasheisinthis
theater,orIwillhavehimoutofheresofasthewon'tknowwhat'shappeningtohim.Iamnotgoing
tohaveabunchoffree-lancersdashingaroundhereandfloutingestablishedauthority.Pleasetell
himthisinnouncertainterms."8
Page18
goingtoinvadeaneutralnationinasurpriseattackwithoutprovocationandwithouta
declarationofwar.Murphy'sjobwastoarrangefortheactivecooperationofthearmed
forcesofthenationbeingattacked!
Onthefaceofit,thiswasanabsurdsituation.Itcameaboutasaresultoftheinglorious
surrenderoftheFrenchArmytoGermanyin1940,andthearmisticethatfollowed.Hitler
hadallowedtheFrenchtoretainadministrativecontroloverthesouthernpartofFrance
andovertheFrenchcolonies,themostimportantofwhichwasAlgeria.Thecapitalof
"independent"FrancewasinVichy;theheadofgovernmentwastheagingheroofWorld
WarI,MarshalHenriPétain.Vichywascollaborationist,butthatdidnotnecessarilymean
thatitwasunpopular,especiallywiththehierarchyintheFrenchArmyandinthe
colonies.ManyFrenchleadersincivilservice,inbusiness,inthemilitary,andinthe
Churchwelcomedasemi-fascistgovernmentthatemphasizedwork,discipline,andlaw
andorder.
ButFrenchpoliticallifedidnotcometoanendjustbecausetheGermansoccupiedParis
andMarshalPétainruledfromVichy.Therewereright-wingplotterswhohatedPétain,
notbecauseofhispolitics,butbecauseofhissupinegrovelingundertheGermanheel.
Democratsandsocialistsalsoplottedagainstthegovernment,whiletheCommunistswere
beginningtoformundergroundorganizationsthatcouldsomedayparticipatein
subversiveactions.Inthecolonies,afewhigh-rankingofficerswerecastingaboutfor
someformofsupportfromtheUnitedStatesorBritainasapreliminarytotheirbreaking
freeofVichy.InLondon,meanwhile,anobscureFrenchgeneralhaddenouncedPétain
asatraitorandclaimedthathe-CharlesdeGaulle-wasthetrueheadofthetrue
governmentoftherealFrance.MostoftheFrenchsoldierswhohadescapedtoBritain
hadralliedtotheGaullistcause.IntheFrenchcolonies,meanwhile,thenative
populationswereseekingopportunitiestoexploitFrance'sweaknesstowintheirown
independence,andtheytoolookedtotheUnitedStatesforhelp.Finally,Pétain'shighestrankingmilitaryofficer,AdmiralJeanDarlan,hadhintedtotheAmericansthatifthey
cameinforcetoNorthAfrica,hewouldbereadytothrowinwiththem.
MarshalPétain,inshort,didnotenjoyfullandenthusiasticsupport.Nopollsweretaken,
butitisdoubtfulthatevenoneintenFrenchmenwouldhaveexpressedloyaltytoVichy.
Itwasprecisely
Page19
thisunpopularitythathadmadeVichyterritorythefirstobjectiveofthefirstAllied
offensiveofWorldWarII.ChurchillandRoosevelthadselectedNorthAfricaasthe
target,againstthevigorousobjectionsofGeneralsMarshallandEisenhower,whowanted
toinvadeFranceitself,primarilybecausethepoliticiansneededasurevictoryinthe
initialbattle.Thiswaspartlyfordomesticpoliticalreasons,butitalsoservedapurpose
ChurchillandtheBritishthoughtwasessential''blooding"thegreenAmericantroops.Far
bettertomakethemintoveteransbyfightingtheunderequipped,divided,unmotivated,
demoralizedFrenchinAlgeriathanbyfightingcrackWehrmachtpanzerdivisionsin
NormandyorFlanders.
Withluck,theremightbenofightingatall,oronlyafewtokenexchangesofgunfire.The
AllieswantedtransitrightsinAlgeriaandTunisiainordertotrapGeneralErwin
Rommel'sAfrikaKorpsinatwo-frontbattle,withGeneralBernardMontgomery'sBritish
EighthArmyattackingRommel'spanzersfromtheeastwhileIke'stroopshithimfrom
thewest.ButalthoughtheAllieswantedFrenchcooperation,theywereunwillingtotake
theFrenchintotheirconfidence.ItwasassumedamongtheAlliesthatnoFrenchman
couldkeepasecret,andsurprisewasessentialtosuccessinTORCH.
MurphytoldEisenhowerthat,despitetheseandotherdifficulties,hehopedtoobtainfull
Frenchcooperationoncetheinvasionbegan.AsacareerStateDepartmentofficial
stationedinNorthAfrica,Murphy,in1941,hadworkedoutaneconomicaccord(the
Murphy-WeygandAccord)betweentheUnitedStatesandVichy.Undertheterms,the
UnitedStatessentfood,clothing,andothersuppliestoNorthAfricafordistributiontothe
nativepopulation.MurphysenttwelveagentstodifferentlocationsintheFrenchcolonies
tocheckonthedistributionofthesuppliesinordertomakecertainnoneweredivertedto
Germanuse.Murphy's"twelvedisciples"werethefirstAmericanspiesinthearea,or
anywhereelse,forthatmatter,atleastonasystematicbasis.AsRayCline,formerDeputy
DirectoroftheCIA,haswrittenofMurphy'sdisciples,"Forthefirsttime...Americans
listedasdiplomaticofficialsfoundthemselvescompetingforscrapsofinformationinthe
cafesandcasinoswithforeigndiplomatsandassortedspiesofallcountries."10
Althoughtherewerealmostnosuppliestodistribute,Murphy's
Page20
discipleswereabletomakevaluablereportsonFrenchmilitarydispositionsandstrength
inNorthAfrica,andtomakeastartonthejoboforganizingundergroundgroupsfor
subversiveoperations.Murphy,meanwhile,hadattemptedtoinduceGeneralMaxime
Weygand,Vichy'schiefofficerinFrenchNorthAfrica,tothrowinontheAlliedside.
UnfortunatelyforMurphyandfortheAllies,Weygandshowedinterest.Itwas
unfortunatebecausetheGermanshadbrokentheStateDepartment'scodeandwere
readingMurphy'smessagesreportingonWeygand'sgrowingdefianceoftheGermans;
indeed,Murphy'stelegramswereregularlycirculatedinBerlin.Asaresult,inNovember
1941,HitlerforcedPétaintoretireWeygand.11
TheWeygandconnectionbroken,Murphyestablishedcontactwithasmallgroupof
Frenchconspiratorsofthefarright.AconservativeCatholic,Murphywas,indeGaulle's
words,"skillfulanddetermined,longfamiliarwiththebestsocietyandapparently
inclinedtobelievethatFranceconsistedofthepeoplehedinedwithintown."12
Thosehedinedwithincludedavegetable-oilmagnate,JacquesLemaigreDubreuil,leader
ofagroupcalled"TheFive."AsdescribedinonesecretOSSreport,Dubreuilwas"abig
businessman"andoneofthefoundersand"MinisterofFinance"ofthesecretanticommunistmovementknownas"LaCagoule.''Thismovementwassupportedby
Frenchrightistswho,accordingtoanotherOSSreport,were"politicallytheequivalentof
anygroupofstockbrokersinanexclusiveLongIslandClub."Butaccordingtoathird
OSSsource,theKuKluxKlanwouldhavebeenamorefittinganalogy.TheCagoulards
(literally"hoodedmen")hadstagedanalmostsuccessfulcoupagainsttheRepublicin
1937,withGeneralHenriGiraudasoneoftheleaders,alongwithsomeofthebiggest
bankersinFrance.TheOSSagentsalsonotedthatDubreuilandhisfriendshad
"renderedvaluableservices"toFrancoduringtheSpanishCivilWar.
Inearly1942,thisleadingcollaborationistcametoMurphywiththeimprobablestorythat
hisrecordwas"deceptive,thathewasactuallyacourageous,patrioticFrenchmanwho
hatestheGermansandItalianswithanintelligentimplacabilityandfavorstheAllies."
DubreuiltoldMurphythat"hehadarrangedacarefullyconcoctedpolicerecordof
himselfwhichindicatedthathehadbeenapro-Nazicollaboratorlongbeforethewar,and
thathehad
Page21
placedthisfalserecordinfilesavailabletotheGermans."ThereforetheGermanstrusted
him,whichexplainedwhyhewasallowedtotravelfreelythroughouttheFrenchEmpire
andEurope.13
Itmightbethoughtthatanyonewhocouldbelievesuchatalecouldbelieveanything,but
Murphywasconvinced.*HesetabouttocooperatewithDubreuilinoverthrowingthe
authorityofVichyinNorthAfricawhilesimultaneouslypreventingdeGaulleandthe
FreeFrenchfromseizingpower(DubreuilandMurphyhadcometoaquickagreement
abouttheneedtokeepthesupposedlyradicalFreeFrenchisolated).Dubreuilanda
friendofhis,GeneralCharlesMast,chiefofstafftotheArmycorpscommanderin
Algiers,convincedMurphythattheFrenchArmyinNorthAfricawasreadytosupport
theAlliesifonlyGeneralGiraudcouldbebroughtovertoAlgiersfromFrance.14
Murphy'sdealingswithDubreuilwereonlyoneofmanysecretcontactstheOSShad
managedtoestablishwithFrenchdissidents.IkelistenedcarefullyasMurphydescribed
someoftheactivitiesofhischiefassistant,U.S.MarineColonelWilliamA.Eddy.Eddy
wasoneofthoseOSScharacterssobelovedbyDonovanascholarwithatastefor
intrigueandadventure,awarherowithanappreciationofclandestineandunorthodox
methods.EddywastheheadoftheOSSmissioninTangier,whattheCIAwouldlatercall
ChiefofStation.BorninSyriaofmissionaryparents,hewastheonlyintelligenceofficer
intheU.S.armedforceswhospokeArabic.HewasaprofessorofEnglishatthe
AmericanUniversityinCairo,apublishedscholar,andacollegepresident(Hobart)no
ordinaryofficer.WhenhefirstmetGeneralGeorgeS.Patton,oneofIke'schief
lieutenantsinTORCH,EddyhadwornallhiscampaignribbonsandmedalsfromWorld
WarI.NoticingthefiverowsofribbonsandEddy'semptysleeve,Pattonburstout,"The
son-of-abitchhasreallybeenshotat,hasn'the!"15
AfterpersuadingtheBritishtogiveOSSafreehandinNorthAfrica,Eddysetouttohelp
winthewar.Hisfirstplotwasaschemetoreplacethepro-VichyArabprimeministerin
TuniswithanArableaderwhowaspro-Ally.InMarch1942,Donovanmade$50,000
availabletouseasabribe,ifnecessary.Murphyvetoed
*Andremainedso.Afterthewar,Murphywrote,"Dubreuil,hischarmingwifeandtwofine
children,allanti-NaziandeagerfortheFrenchtoresumecombat,wereasourceofinspirationand
comforttome."
Page22
theidea.HehadassuredtheFrenchthattheUnitedStateswasnotdisposed"tomeddle
withthenativepopulations"andinsistedthattheUnitedStateswouldneverinterferewith
relationsbetweenFranceandthenativepeoplesofAfrica.Murphyconfessedthathewas
"shocked"byEddy'splot."Nothing,"hedeclared,''wouldhaveenragedourFrench
colleaguesmorethanthiskindofmonkeybusiness."16
DubreuilwasdelightedwithMurphy'sattitude,andwithMurphy'swillingnesstosupport
hisrequestsforarmsandmoney.HehopedtoarmdissidentelementsinNorthAfricaand
thenestablishapro-Alliedprovisionalgovernmentthere,secretlysupportedbytheUnited
StateswithDubreuilasthepowerbehindthethrone.EddyandMurphybothbackedthis
wildschemeandsentadetailedlistofthenecessaryarmsthatwouldhavetobeshipped
toNorthAfrica.Donovanturnedthemdowncold.Theypleaded.Donovansaidnoagain.
EddythendispatchedthefirstofthousandsofprioritymessagesthatOSSandCIAstation
chiefswouldsendtoheadquartersoverthenexttwentyyears.EddysaidaGerman
invasionofNorthAfricawasimminent(whichwasnottrue)anddeclared,"IfMurphy
andIcannotbetrustedwithafewmillionfrancsinanemergencythenIshouldbecalled
backandsomeonewhocanbetrustedsent."InWashington,oneOSSofficialscrawled
onthemessage,"ThewarmaybewonorlostbyourresponsetoColonelEddy."Such
nonsensedidnotswaytheJointChiefs,whoquicklyvetoedtheproject.17
MurphydidnotneedtotellEisenhoweraboutthreeotheractivitiesEddyhadbegun,
becauseIkehadbeeninvolvedinthem.Thefirstandmostimportantwasstraightforward
intelligencegathering.InthemiddleofAugust1942,Eddyhadobtainedareporton
FrenchmilitarydispositionsfromGeneralMastandothersources.Eddy'sintelligence
gaveIkethefirstclearpictureofwhathemightexpecttoencounterontheNorthAfrican
shores.InapessimisticcabletoMarshall,EisenhowersummedupEddy'sinformation:
TherewerefourteenFrenchdivisionsinNorthAfrica,poorlyequipped.Iftheyactedasa
unittheywouldbestrongenoughto"sodelayandhamperoperationsthattherealobject
oftheexpeditioncouldnotbeachieved,namelytheseizing[of]controlofthenorthshore
ofAfricabefore...theAxis."DespitehisextensivecontactswiththeFrenchofficer
corps,orperhapsbecauseofthem,Eddywasrealistic.HewarnedIketoexpectresistance
in
Page23
OranandCasablanca,whiletheFrenchinAlgiersshouldbefriendly.
Insummingitup,EisenhowertoldMarshallthatchancesofgettingashoresuccessfully
weregood,butthechancesforoverallsuccess,especiallytheearlycaptureofTunis,were
"considerablylessthan50percent."18
Eisenhower'sgloomputthespotlightontheOSS.TheGermans,potentially,
outnumberedtheAlliesatthecriticalspotbecauseGermanaccesstoairfieldsinSicily
gavethemagreatadvantageintheraceforTunisthatwouldensuethemomentTORCH
waslaunched.Eisenhower'sgreatadvantagewassurprise,plusifEddyandMurphycould
arrangeitFrenchcooperation.TheOSSwasresponsibleforarrangingforthecooperation
or,wherethatwasimpossible,subversiveactionsthatwouldparalyzetheFrenchArmy.
NorthAfricawasthetestinggroundforOSS,asDonovanandhissubordinatesknewall
toowell.OSShadexcludedtheBritishSOEfromthearea,claimingthatitcoulddothe
jobitself.KermitRoosevelt,inhisofficial(anduntil1978secret)historyoftheOSS,
writtenin1946,saidthat"successinNorthAfricawasimportant,bothinWashingtonfor
thefutureoftheagency,andinthefieldasademonstrationtothetheatercommandersof
itspotentialitiesinsupportofthemoreorthodoxformsofwarfare."19
This"doordie"attitudehadledtosomedesperateproposals,asIkealreadyknew.On
September11,1942,theJCShadacceptedsomeofEddy'sideasforcovertactions,
subjecttoIke'sapproval.Immediately,Ikehadtodealwiththefirstofmanyassassination
plots.EddyproposedtomurderkeyGestapoofficersinNorthAfricawhenthelandings
began.Eisenhowerrefusedtotaketheideaseriouslyandsquashedit.Healsosquasheda
planofEddy'stostirupaMoslemrevoltagainsttheFrench,partlyforpoliticalreasons,
mainlybecauseEddywanted80,000riflestoarmtheArabs,animpossibledemand.20
JustadayortwobeforeMurphy'sarrivalinLondon,Eisenhowerhadanothercontact
withEddy.TheBritishSOEcomplainedtohimthatEddyhadindulgedin"unauthorized
body-snatching."Hehad,itseemed,kidnapedtwohydrographersfromMorocco,onea
tugboatcaptain,theotherthechiefpilotatPortLyautey.Thekidnaping,theSOEcharged,
mighttipofftheGermansastothesiteofthelandings.Alwayssensitivetohintsthatthe
Americanswereamateursatmakingwar,Eisenhowerwasfurious.He
Page24
demandedtoknowwhytheOSShadtakensuchactionwithouthisapproval.
InvestigationrevealedthatPattonhadaskedEddytoprovidehimwiththehydrographers,
butPattonhadfailedtoinformIke.21
MarshallpointedoutinamessagetoEisenhowerthatthekidnapingwould"rivet
attention"onthePortLyauteyarea.Ikereplied,"Ihavenotrepeatnotbeenconsultedby
OSSoranyotherauthority.MyorderstoOSSrepresentativeshavebeentodonothingin
thatareawithoutmyapprovalandthatnothingunusualistotakeplacethere."22Backin
August,andmanytimesthereafter,IkehadinsistedthattheOSSclearalloperationswith
him.Inthis,itsfirstmajortest,OSShadshownthatitwasindependentlymindedandfelt
freetoactfirstandexplainlater.
Murphywasagreattalker,Eisenhoweragreatlistener.AsMurphyspunhistaleandIke
concentratedonwhathewassaying,thesunstartedtoset.Lightsbegantoblinkonin
TelegraphCottageinthelongend-of-summerBritishtwilight.Itgrewchilly.Murphyand
Eisenhowerwentinsidefordinnerinfrontofabrightcoalfire.HarryButcherhaddriven
theothergueststothesite,waitinguntildarksothatthelocationofTelegraphCottage
wouldremainsecret.Butcherpulledallthedrapes,aneardisasterinaroomfullofcigarsmokingdiplomatsandarmyofficers,plusIke,whoordinarilysmokedapackofCamels
afterdinner(fourpacksinaday).
ItwasagatheringofVeryImportantPersons.ThesupremecommanderforOperation
TORCHwasthehost.Hisdeputy,GeneralMarkClark,wasthere,alongwithhischiefof
staff,GeneralWalterBedellSmith,andColonelJuliusHolmesfromthenewlyestablished
CivilAffairsSection.ThreeAmericancivilianswerepresent:Ambassador(totheCourt
ofSt.James')JohnWinant,PresidentialAdviserW.AverellHarriman,andForeign
ServiceofficialFreemanMatthews.Ike'spoliticaladviserfromtheBritish,HalMack,was
alsothere,alongwithBrigadierEricMockler-FerrymanoftheBritishArmy.MocklerFerrymanwasheadoftheTORCHG-2(intelligence)section.Butcherserved,hewrote,
as"kibitzer,waterboy,cigarettegirl,andflunky."23
Afterdinner,MurphybeganbyexplainingtheattitudeoftheFrenchArmy.Hesaidthe
Alliesshouldnotexpecttofindanenthusiasticwelcome,ifonlybecausemostFrench
officers"cherished
Page25
theiroathoffidelitytoMarshalPétain."Murphysaidhehadtalkedfreelywithanumber
ofFrenchofficersaboutthepossibilitiesofanAlliedinvasionofNorthAfrica.Theywere
anxiousforittohappen,buttheyfearedtheAllieswouldcomeininsufficientforceand
leaveittotheFrenchtodotherest.IkequicklyreassuredMurphyonthelastpoint;
indeed,heoverdidit.HetoldMurphytotellhisFrenchfriendstherewouldbe150,000
troopsintheinitiallandings,witharapidbuildupto500,000.MurphysaidtheFrench
"wouldbegreatlyencouragedbythesizeoftheexpedition,"astheywerewhenhetold
them.Later,however,theFrenchofficerswerebitter,becausetheactualfigureswere
100,000and250,000.24
MurphywantedtotellDubreuilandhisotherFrenchfriendsthedateoftheattack,sothat
theycouldbefullyprepared.Ikeshookhisheaddecisively.Undernocircumstances
wouldhelettheFrenchinonthesecret.Murphypointedoutthatitwouldbedifficultto
arrangeforeffectivecollaborationiftheAlliesdidnottaketheFrenchintotheir
confidence,butEisenhowerwasadamant.IftheFrenchknewonMonday,theGermans
wouldknowonTuesdayandhavetroopsinAlgiersbyWednesday.IketoldMurphyto
telltheFrenchthatthecontemplateddateoftheinvasionwasFebruary1943.
WhowasMurphytotellthisstoryto?Thequestionwascrucial,theoptionsmany.
WhateverFrenchmanorgroupMurphychosetodealwithwouldhavetheinsidetrackto
powerinNorthAfrica.HecouldgotoAdmiralDarlan,viahissoninAlgiersDarlanwas
commanderinchiefofFrencharmedforcesandhadalreadyshownakeeninterestin
involvinghimselfinsuchanoperation.ButDarlanwasknowntobeviolentlyantiBritish,soMurphyhadnotfolloweduphisovertures.*OrMurphycouldapproach
GeneralAlphonseJuin,incommandoftheFrenchNorthAfricanlandandairforces,
withhisheadquartersinAlgiers.Atoughpatriot,amanofgreatintegrityandspirit,and
anout*AsearlyasApril14,1942,MurphyhadreportedthathehadtalkedatlengthwithAdmiral
Darlan'ssonAlainandAdmiralFenard.MurphysaidtheyexpectedandwouldwelcomeanAllied
victory,andthattheywereanxioustothrowinontheAlliedsideattherightmoment."Iwasgreatly
encouragedbytheirapparenteagerness,sincerity,anddesireforFranco-Americancollaboration,"
Murphywrote.25
Page26
standingsoldier,Juinwouldhavebeentheperfectcollaborator.ButMurphyhadnot
reachedouttohim,noranyoftheotherleadersoftheFrencharmedforces.
Therestillremainedanumberofoptions,chiefofwhichwasworkingwithdeGaulle's
FreeFrench,whowereanxioustotakecontrolinNorthAfrica.TheBritish,hatingDarlan
andnottrustingJuin,werereadytobringdeGaulleinontheoperation;Churchillhad
saidthattheFreeFrenchmovementwas"thecoreofFrenchresistanceandtheflameof
Frenchhonour."26ButRooseveltneitherlikednortrusteddeGaulle,whohad
denouncedFDRformaintainingdiplomaticrelationswithVichy.Besides,therewerefew
GaullistsinAlgeriaatthistime,orsoMurphyreported.DeGaullehadchargedFrench
officerswhostayedattheirpostsafterPétainsignedthearmisticewithtreason;such
officerscouldhardlybeexpectedtowelcomedeGaulleastheirleader.
ThatbroughtitdowntoDubreuilonthecivilside,andGeneralsMastandGiraudonthe
militaryside.MurphyhadmaintainedandexpandedhiscontactswithDubreuilandThe
Five,whowerebuildinganundergroundarmyinAlgiersunderthecommandofHenri
d'AstierdelaVigerie,whohasbeendescribedbyhistorianArthurFunkas"acharacter
fromtheItalianRenaissance,abrilliant,persuasivecharmer,fascinatedwithintrigue,at
heartaroyalist,whoexercisedanalmosthypnoticinfluenceontheyoungmenheled."27
D'Astier's"army"wasaneworganizationafewhundredstrongknownastheChantiers
delaJeunesse.Murphy,repeatingwhathehadheardfromd'Astier,saidthegroupwas
wellorganizedandcapableofdecisiveactiononD-Day.WhenTORCHbegan,the
ChantiersdelaJeunessewouldtakepossessionofsuchkeypointsastheradiostationsin
Algiers,thepolicestations,andmilitaryheadquarters.ThenifallwentwelltheAmericans
couldwalkintothecityunopposed.
WithregardtotheregularFrenchArmy,Murphy'scontactwasGeneralMast,chiefof
stafftothecorpscommanderinAlgiers.Mast,afriendofDubreuil's,toldMurphythat
GeneralGiraudwasthekeytosuccess.MurphyexplainedtoIkeandtheothersat
TelegraphCottagethatGiraud,aone-leggedheroofWorldWarI,hadescapedfroma
Germanprisoncampin1941andwasinhidingintheSouthofFrance.
(AsMurphytalkedandtheotherslistenedintently,AmbassadorWinantsignaledto
ButcherwithhisbigCoronacigarhehad
Page27
heardanoiseoutsidethewindow.Butchertookhisflashlightandinvestigated.Hefound
onlythesergeantonpatrolduty,whohadstubbedhistoeinmarchingaroundthe
cottage.)
MurphysaidthatMasthadtoldhimthatGiraudmightbewillingtocomeoutofFranceto
leadOperationTORCH,andthatifhedidcome,GiraudwouldrallytheFrenchArmyto
hiscause.Onthefaceofit,thatwashighlyimprobable.Giraudhadparticipatedinthe
attemptedCagoulardcoupof1937,hadnoplaceinthehierarchyoftheFrenchArmy,no
popularfollowing,noorganization,nosocialimagination,noprogram,andno
administrativeabilities.ButMurphyinsistedthathissourceswerecorrect.Giraudwasthe
man.
Murphywasawareofonepossibledifficulty.Giraud,Mastsaid,wouldinsistonhaving
thesupremecommandofallAlliedforcesfightinginNorthAfrica.Ikescowled,hisface
reddened,asitalwaysdidwhenhewasangry.Hewouldneverhandoverhiscommand
toanunknownFrenchman,evenifhehadtheauthoritytodosoandthoughtitagood
idea,whichhemostemphaticallydidnot.IketoldMurphytotellMasttotellGiraudthat
theAlliescouldnotplaceahalfmillionoftheirfightingmenunderaFrenchcommander.
Withthat,themeetingbrokeup,Butcherdrivingtheguestshome.Atbreakfastthenext
morning,IkeandMurphytalkedagain,aboutcivilaffairs,abouttheneedtobringinfood
andothersuppliesforthenativepopulation,andsoon.Overcoffee,Murphysuggested
thatIkesecretlysendahigh-rankingofficertoAlgeria,possiblybysubmarine,sothathe
couldconferwithMurphy'sFrenchArmyfriendsaboutfifth-columnactivitiesatstrategic
points,suchasseizureofairfields,thedesignationofcoastartillerytobesilencedbythe
Frenchconspiratorsfromtherear,andsignalstotheconvoysbylightsastowhetheror
notoppositionshouldbeexpected.Ikemusedthatifsuchanofficerwerecaptured,it
wouldbeatip-offtotheenemy.Still,theideaofasurreptitiouslandingbysubmarineof
anAmericangeneralontheFrenchNorthAfricancoastappealedtohimandhepromised
tothinkitover.Murphythenleft,tobedrivenbyButchertoanearbyBritishairfield
whereawaitingplanecarriedhimtoPrestwick,whencehegotonaTWAStratoliner
boundforWashington.AfterreportingtothePresident,heflewacrosstheAtlanticagain,
backtoAlgiers.28
TwodaysafterMurphyleftLondon,Eisenhowerreportedto
Page28
Marshallonhisreactionstohisfirstspy."IwasverymuchimpressedbyMr.Murphy.We
hadanafternoonandeveningconferenceonthemostsecretivebasispossible,andI
believemuchgoodwasaccomplishedbyhistriptothiscountry."29
Page29
ChapterThree
LightingtheTORCH
DAWN,Saturday,October17,1942.AmonthafterMurphy'sdeparture.Eisenhower
arrivesathisofficeat20GrosvenorSquare,inthemiddleofLondon,withinwalking
distanceofHydeParkand10DowningStreet.SocompletelyhavetheAmericanstaken
overGrosvenorSquarethatLondonerscallit"Eisenhowerplatz."Ikepicksupaseries
ofmessagesthathadcomeinovernightfromMurphy,readsthem,andimmediately
telephonesClark.
"Comeup,"Iketellshim."Comeuprightaway."
Eisenhower'sChiefofStaff,BedellSmith,wasalreadythere.WhenClarkjoinedthem,
thethreeAmericangeneralsbeganalivelydiscussionofMurphy'smessages.
Murphyhadtworequests.ThefirstwastosendaseniorAmericangeneral,accompanied
byasmallstaff,toasecretrendezvousontheNorthAfricancoast,nearCherchel.They
weretolandonalonelybeachaboutseventy-fivemileswestofAlgiers.Atthehomeofa
closefriendofHenrid'Astier's,whowastheheadoftheundergroundresistance
movementcalledtheChantiersdelaJeunesseandamemberofDubreuil'sgroup,the
AmericanteamwouldbemetbyFrenchGeneralCharlesMast,whohadinsistedonthe
meeting.MasthadconvincedMurphythatiftheAmericanstookhimintotheir
confidence,andiftheybroughtGeneralGiraudinontheconspiracyascommanderin
chiefoftheFrenchandAlliedforces,hecouldarrangeapeacefulreceptionforTORCH.
ClarktookonelookatthemessagefromMurphyandblurtedout,"WhendoIgo?"
Page30
Fromthepointofviewofaprofessionalintelligenceservice,itwasobviouslyaterrible
idea.IfClarkweretobecaptured,theVichyauthoritiesinAlgeriawouldcertainlyturn
himovertotheGermans.Clark,Ike'sdeputy,kneweverythingaboutTORCH.Butto
ignoreMast'srequest,ortosendalow-rankingsubordinate,couldaccordingtoMurphy,
Ike'schiefspyjeopardizethewholeoperation.SoIkegrinnedasClarkaskedwhenhe
couldleaveandreplied,"Probablyrightaway."ItwasalreadythemorningofOctober17
andMasthadscheduledthemeetingfortheeveningofOctober20.1HarryButcher,who
sawhimlaterintheday,said"Clarkwasashappyasaboywithanewknife."
Inanothermessage,MurphyreportedthatMastremainedunhappywiththeideaof
GiraudservingunderIkeandproposedinsteadthatIkeretaincommandoftheAmerican
troopswhileGiraudbecamesupremecommander.TheFrenchknewtheterrain,Giraud
outrankedEisenhower,andwithGiraudincommandtheAlliescouldenterAlgiers
withoutfiringashot,Mastclaimed.
AthirdmessagefromMurphysaidthatAdmiralDarlanhadagainconveyedtoMurphy
hiswillingnesstocooperatewiththeAllies.MurphyhadgoodreasontobelieveDarlan
meantit,asthewordcamefromtheadmiral'sson,withwhomMurphyhadbeenin
contactforoverayear.MurphysaidhehadraisedwithMastthepossibilityofbringing
DarlaninontheconspiracywithGiraud,Dubreuil,andTheFive,butMastwouldhave
noneofit.HedenouncedDarlanasaskunk,atraitor,anopportunist,andamanwithout
afollowing."TheArmyisloyaltoGeneralGiraud,"Mastdeclared,"anditwillfollow
him,notDarlan.TheNavywillfallinlinewiththeArmy."2
MurphywantedadirectiveonDarlan.SodidEisenhower.WhateverMastsaidofhim,
DarlanwasthemanincommandoftheentireVichymilitaryestablishment,includingthe
NorthAfricanArmyandNavy,whileMastwasaone-stargeneralwhocommanded
nothinghewasonlychiefofstafftoanofficerwhowasnotpartoftheconspiracy.
Moreover,eventheuninformedandnaiveAmericansatGrosvenorSquarehadtowonder
ifFrenchmilitarydisciplinehadsofarcollapsedthatthearmywasreadytoignoreits
establishedhierarchytofollowtheleadofaman,Giraud,whohadnoofficialpositionat
all.ButMastinsistedthatitwasso,andMurphybelievedMast.Still,onecouldnotignore
Darlan.
Page31
EisenhowermusedthatsoonerorlatertheAllieswouldhavetopickbetweenDarlanand
Giraudas"ourchiefcollaborator,"buthehopedthatitwouldbepossibleto"securethe
advantagesaccruingtous"ifbothmenwouldcooperate.Thesewere,however,not
militarymatters,butpoliticalandforeignpolicyproblems.Ikeneededauthoritative
directionfromhisbosses,oneofwhomwasthePrimeMinister.
Itbeingtheweekend,Churchillwasathiscountryhome,Chequers.Clarkgotthroughon
thephonetoChurchill'spersonalchiefofstaff,GeneralSirHastingsIsmay."We'vegota
hotmessagehere,"Clarksaid.
"Howhot?"Ismayasked.
"Well,it'stoohotforthetelephone."
IsmaygavethephonetoChurchill,whogrowled,"Whatdoyouhave?Thisphoneis
secret."
ClarkhandedthephoneovertoIke,whosaidthemessagewastooimportanttotalk
aboutoverthetelephone.Churchillgrowledagainhehatedhavinghisweekend
interrupted.WouldIkecometoChequerstotalkaboutit?Therewasnotenoughtime,
Eisenhowerreplied.
"Damn!"saidChurchill.Then,formally:"Verywell.ShouldIcomebacktoLondon?"
"Yes,sir."
"Allright,I'llmeetyouatNumberTenlatethisafternoon."3
WhenEisenhowerandClarkarrivedatthePrimeMinister'sresidence,Clarkrecorded,
"TherewasaboutasdazzlinganarrayofBritain'sdiplomatic,militaryandnavalbrainsas
Ihadyetseen."ClementAttleewasthere,alongwithLordLouisMountbatten,Admiralof
theFleetSirDudleyPound,FieldMarshalAlanBrooke,andForeignSecretaryAnthony
Eden,plusChurchill.Itwas,inshort,theBritishGovernmentanditstopmilitary
establishment,answeringanimpromptusummonsfromanAmericanlieutenantgeneral
andhistwo-stardeputy.Onemighthavethoughtthatsuchanaugustgroupwouldbrush
asidethedetailsaboutahighlyromanticsecretrendezvouswithobscureFrenchofficers
offtheAfricancoastinordertoconcentrateonthedeadlyserioussubjectofwhetheror
nottodealwithDarlan.Itwasnottobe.
LikeClarkandIke,Churchillwaskeenforhighadventure.ClarksaidtheP.M."wasas
enthusiasticasaboywithanewelectrictrain."Consequently,themeetingconcentrated
ontrivia,
Page32
ChurchilladvisingClarkonwhatclothestowear,howmuchbribemoneytotake,howto
carrythemoney,andsoon.ChurchillgotAdmiralPoundtoagreethattheRoyalNavy
couldhaveasubmarinewaitingthatnightinGibraltarforClark.''Theentireresourcesof
theBritishCommonwealthareatyourdisposal,"hesaidsolemnlytoClark,shaking
handsgravely.4
Therewasonebriefdiscussionaboutcommandproblems.Ikesaidheproposedtohave
ClarktellMastthateventuallymilitarycommandinNorthAfricacouldpasstoaFrench
officer,butthatIkewouldretaintherighttodecidewhentheswitchcouldbemade.To
softentheblowtoGiraud'segoatlosingthetopmilitarycommand,Ikesaidhewould
placeGiraudattheheadofthegovernmentofFrenchNorthAfrica(Eisenhowerdidnot
needtosaythathispowertodosowasbasedsolelyontherightofconquest).Perhaps
DarlanwouldacceptapositioninaGiraudgovernmentascommanderinchiefofthe
NorthAfricanarmedforces.Churchillrathercasuallyagreedtotheseproposals,then
turnedbacktothemoreexcitingsubjectofClark'smission.5Forthefirsttime,butnotthe
last,Eisenhowerlearnedthatwherethedarkartsareconcerned,headsofgovernmentare
sometimesmoreinterestedincloak-and-daggercovertoperationsthaninsophisticated
politicalandmilitaryanalysis.ToechoButcherandClark,secrecybroughtoutthelittle
boyinnearlyallofthem.
Aftersomeweatherdelays,Clarkgotoffat6:30A.M.onOctober19,wearingalieutenant
colonel'sinsignia,flyinginaB-17whosepilot,MajorPaulTibbets,wasgenerally
regardedasthebestflyerintheU.S.ArmyAirForces(TibbetswasIke'spersonalpilot
formuchofthewar;in1945hewasthepilotoftheB-29thatdroppedthefirstatomic
bombonHiroshima).EisenhowerwenttoScotlandtoinspectafieldexercise,which
wouldhelppassthetimeasheworriedaboutClark.
Twodayslater,IkereceivedamessagefromGibraltar.Clark'ssubmarinehadarrivedtoo
latefortherendezvousofOctober20andwouldhavetolayoffshoreallthroughtheday,
submerged,andhopetospotthecorrectsignallightthatnight.ItputIkeina"stateof
jitters."ThinkingaloudinHarryButcher'spresence,hesaidthatifthereweretreachery,
Clarkandhispartymightgoashorenevertoreturn,butiftheconferenceledtoFrench
cooperation,thewholeoperationwasvirtuallyassuredofsuccess.Ifitdidnotwork,Ike
concluded,"wewillhaveonehellofafightonourhands."On
Page33
October22,Butcherrecordedinhisdiary,"IkegreatlyconcernedaboutClark.Afurther
messagefrom'ColonelMcGowan'[Murphy]hadindicatedthemeetingwouldtakeplace
tonight."
ByOctober24therewasstillnowordfromClark.Eisenhowerkepthimselfasbusyashe
could,butitdidlittlegood.FinallyheshutuptheofficeatGrosvenorSquareand
announcedthathewasgoingtodriveouttoTelegraphCottagethatnight.Hewasnotsure
oftheway,hadneverdriveninEnglandbefore,andhadnodriver'slicense,buthestarted
thecarandzoomedoff."Whenlastseen,"Butcherreported,"hewasgoingdownthe
middleoftheroad,veeringalittlebittotherightandabituncertain."6
Atmidnight,thephonerang.OneofEisenhower'saidesreportedthatamessagehad
comeinfromGibraltar,fromGeneralClark.HismeetingwithMasthadbeenbrokenup
byFrenchpolice.ClarkandtheAmericangrouphadbeenforcedtohideinan"empty,
repeatempty,winecellar."Therewasoneothermisadventure.Ingettingintotherubber
boatforhistripbacktothesubmarine,Clarkhadlosthispantsandthegoldcoinshehad
takenwithhim.Hehadtakenoffhispantsandrolledthemup,hopingtokeepthemdry.
ButhewassafeinGibraltarandwouldbeinLondonlaterthatday.Butcher,usingthe
metaphoroncemore,saidIkewas"aspleasedasaboy"andeagertohearallabout
Clark'sadventure.
TomSawyerandHuckFinncouldnothaveenjoyedtellingorlisteningtoatalemorethan
ClarkandIkedidthisone.ClarkdescribedhisflighttoGibraltar,thesubmarinetripto
therendezvouspoint,thelongsubmergedwaitthroughthedayafterhemissedthefirst
appointment,practicedrillsatduskgettingintothecanvasboatsthattookthemtoshore
(theBritishcommandowhoshowedthemhowtodoitfellonhisfanny,toeveryone's
vastamusement),andfinallythecomingoftotaldarkness,theblinkingsignallight,and
thetripashore.
Mastwasthere,alongwithsomeofhisstaffofficers,accompaniedbyMurphy.They
startedtalkingat10P.M.andkeptatitthroughthenight.Shortlyafterdawn,thepolice
arrived-Arabshadreportedfootprintsinthesand.MastandtheotherFrenchofficersfled
throughthewindowsanddisappearedintothebrushalongthebeach.Clarkandthe
Americanshidinthewinecellar.Murphy,hisaide,andtheFrenchmanwhoownedthe
housestayedtomeetthepolice.Theybrokeoutsomebrandy,sangsongs,and
Page34
actedveryjovial,whileMurphyidentifiedhimselfastheAmericanconsulinAlgiersand
hintedthatalittlepartywasgoingon.Thegirlswereupstairs,hesaid,andhehopedthe
Frenchpolicewouldnotembarrasshim.Ikegaveoutoneofhisbigheartylaughswhen
heheardthatone.
Anyway,Clarkwenton,thepolicefinallyleftandtheAmericansdashedpell-melldown
tothebeach,wheretheyhadanawfultimetryingtolaunchtheflimsycanvasboatagainst
aheavysurf.ItwasinthisprocessthatClarklosthispantsandhismoney.Buthemade
it,gotbackonthesubmarine,returnedtoGibraltar,andflewbacktoLondonwithMajor
Tibbetsthatafternoon.Thereweremanyotherdetails-Butcher,whowaspresentwhen
ClarkreportedtoIke,filledeightsingle-spacedtypewrittenpagesinhisdiarywithClark's
escapades-butthefactthatmatteredwasthatClarkhadestablishedsecretcontactwiththe
French.7
Agreatriskhadbeensuccessfullyrun.Clarkwasahero.LikeIke,Churchillhadtohear
thewholestory,minutebyminute.Later,EisenhowertookClarktoBuckinghamPalace
tomeetKingGeorge,whosaidtoClark,"Iknowallaboutyou.You'retheonewhotook
thatfabuloustrip."8
Whatwerethepracticalresults?Inhismemoirs,Eisenhower'spraisewasslightatbest.
"Thisexpeditionwasvaluableingatheringmoredetailsofinformation,"hewrote."These
didnotcompelanymaterialchangeinourplannedoperation."9Infact,nothingnewhad
beenlearned,eitheraboutFrenchmilitarydispositionsorpoliticalpossibilities.Mast's
staffofficersgaveClark'sstaffamassofinformationontheplacementofshorebatteries
aroundAlgiers,trooplocationsandstrength,roads,checkpoints,andsoon.The
informationwasaccurate,butitwasnotnew-ColonelEddy'sOSSagentshadalready
informedIke'sheadquartersonallthesepoints.ThebestthatcouldbesaidaboutClark's
informationwasthatitconfirmedearlierOSSintelligence.
Inotherareas,theMurphy-Mastmeetingwasevenlesshelpful.Mastwantedtoknowthe
dateoftheinvasion,sothathecouldmakethenecessarypreparationstoworktogether
withHenrid'Astiers'youngmenintheChantiersdelaJeunessetotakepossessionofthe
keypointsinAlgiersthenightoftheattack.ButIkehadstrictlyforbiddenClarkto
divulgethedate(whichhadbeensetforNovember8;indeed,ontheverydayofthe
Mast-Clarkconference,GeneralGeorgeS.Patton'scombat-loadedforceshadem
Page35
barkedfromNorfolk,Virginia,targetCasablanca).Clark,therefore,wasvagueabout
datessometimeinFebruary,hehinted,theassaultwouldcome.Hewasspecificaboutthe
overwhelmingforceinvolvedtherewouldbehalfamilliontroops,plustwothousand
planesandabattlefleetfromtheU.S.Navy."Mastwasprettyimpressed,"Clark
recorded,aswellhemighthavebeen.
Thedeceptiondidnotendthere.ClarksaiditwouldbeentirelyanAmericanoperation,
wheninfactmorethanhalfthetotalmilitarystrengthofTORCHwasBritish.(Itwas
assumed,onthebasisofMurphy'sandEddy'sreports,thattheFrenchinNorthAfrica
weresoAnglophobicthattheywouldresistaBritishlandingwhilewelcomingan
Americanforce.)Finally,ClarktriedtoreassureMastaboutthecommandarrangements
bysayingthatatsomepointinthefutureGiraudcouldhavethesupremecommand.
Forhispart,Mastwasnotabovealittledeception.HecontinuedtoinsistthatFrench
officersinAlgeriawouldrallytothenameGiraud,thattheywereseethingwithdesireto
strikeoutagainstthehatedGermansandwouldseizethefirstopportunitytodoso.But
whatwouldhappen,Clarkasked,ifforsomereasonitwasimpossibletogetGiraudout
ofFrance?Mastreplied,"Iwillassumecommand."Itwasapreposterousclaimforaonestarchiefofstafftomake,andClarkaskedtheobviousfollow-upquestion:"Butwillthe
troopsrallytoyou?"Mastinsistedthattheywould.WhataboutGeneralJuin,headofthe
FrenchArmyinNorthAfrica?Mastwasemphaticheandhisfriendswouldtakecareof
Juin.
How?Throughd'Astier'sundergroundarmyofyoungmen.ThisledMasttomakea
requestfortwothousandBrengunsfortheChantiersdelaJeunesse.Clarkmighthave
pickedupthehintherethatMastdidnothavetheforceheclaimedtohave,butinstead
Clarkindulgedinhisownlittledeception,tellingMastthattherewouldbenoproblem
aboutgettingtheBrens.Andsoitwentbluff,subterfuge,anddeceptionwerethe
hallmarksoftheclandestinemeetingbetweenClarkandMast.10
Howcompletelythepotentialcollaboratorsmisunderstoodeachotherwasshown
immediatelyafterward.Murphy'sfirstactwastoprovideDubreuilwithacomplete
briefingonthemeeting.DubreuilthenflewtoFrancetomeetwithGiraud.Hereturnedto
AlgiersthenextdaywithaletterfromGiraud,demandinganagreementinwritingthathe,
Giraud,wouldbeplacedinchargeofthe"InteralliedCommand"forty-eighthoursafter
theattack
Page36
began,plusanassurancethataninvasionofFranceproperwouldbelaunchedshortly
thereafter.11Ikesnortedattheseobviouslyimpossiblerequests.
OnOctober28,MastindicatedtoMurphythatGiraudwouldnotbecomingoutofFrance
foramonthormore.Muchalarmedattheprospectoflosinghischiefactor,Murphy
requestedfromIkepermissiontotellMastthattheattackwasimminent.Eisenhower
reluctantlyagreed.MurphythentoldMastthattheAmericanswouldarrive"earlyin
November."Mast,muchagitated,chargedMurphywithpoliticalblackmail,saiditwas
simplyimpossible,andcomplainedloudlyaboutthelackofconfidence.Buteventuallyhe
gotthewordtoGiraud,whorespondedthathecouldnotpossiblycometoNorthAfrica
beforeNovember20.
Atthis,Murphywentintoapanic.HesentamessagetoRoosevelt,askingthePresidentto
postponetheexpeditionfortwoweeks.Injustification,heconcluded,"Iamconvinced
thattheinvasionofNorthAfricawithoutfavorableFrenchHighCommandwillbea
catastrophe."
So,ontheveryeveoftheinvasion,atthefirstcriticalmomentinhiscareerassupreme
commander,Eisenhowerwasbeingadvisedbyhischiefspytocalloffhisattackand
rescheduleitfortwoweekslater,orelsefacecatastrophe.Ike'sreactionwastolaugh.The
intricatemovementofvastfleets,comingfrombothEnglandandtheUnitedStates,as
Murphyhimselflaterwrote,couldnotbedelayedbyevenonedaywithoutupsetting"the
meticulousplanswhichhadbeenmeshedintoonemasterplanbyhundredsofstaff
officersofallbranchesofthearmedforcesofbothAlliedpowers."12IkewiredMarshall,
"RecentmessagesfromMcGowanindicatethathehasacaseofjitters."Inonemessage,
MurphyhadurgedsimultaneousattacksinNorwayandwesternFrance.Itwasall
ridiculous,butIkewascharitable:''Idon'tmeantosaythatIblameMcGowan,"hetold
Marshall."Hehasamostdelicatepositionandastupendousjobandonethatiswell
calculatedtodevelopabitofhysteriaasthecriticalhourapproaches."13
Bythistime,November7,IkehadtransferredhisheadquarterstoGibraltar.
ArrangementshadfinallybeenmadewithGiraud,whowasspiritedoutofFranceina
submarine,thentransferredtoaflyingboatandtakentoGibraltar,whereonthenightof
theinvasionhemetIke.Giraud'sfirstwordswereademandforcommand
Page37
oftheoperation.HeorderedaplanemadereadytoflyhimtoAlgiers,enumeratedthe
staffpositionshewantedfilled,anddemandedthatcommunicationsfacilitiesbemade
availabletohim.
Ikeignoredthedemands.Whatwewant,hesaid,isforyoutomakeabroadcasttothe
FrenchArmy.GiraudflatlyrefusedhewouldnotparticipateinTORCHexceptassupreme
commander.Ikepromisedhim"thegovernorship,virtuallythekingship,ofNorth
Africa,"withunlimitedfundstobuildanarmyandanairforce,butGiraudkeptsaying
non.Hemusthavethecommand.
Thatispreposterous,Ikeinsisted.Verywell,Giraudresponded,hewouldstandaside,the
FrenchArmywouldfight,andtheAllieswouldnotevengetashore.Withthat,thesevenhourmeetingended.Adisgruntled,exhausted,furiousEisenhowerwentofftotheradio
roomtoseeifhecouldgetanynewsfromtheinvasionforces.14
Whathegotinthewayofnewswasconfused.OnethingstoodouttheGermanshadno
inklingofwhatwashappening.Over150AlliedshipshadpassedthroughtheStraitsof
Gibraltarthatday,afactwellknowntotheGermans,thankstotheirSpanishfriends,but
theGestapoandGermanmilitaryintelligencewereconvincedthattheconvoy's
destinationwasMalta.Thebasisforthatjudgmentwasthenumberofstoriesinthe
Britishpressabout"poor,suffering,braveMalta"andtheneedtoresupplytheisland,
storiesthatwereplantedtoachievethatexacteffect.Hitler'sintelligenceservice,inother
words,wasnogoodtohimatall.While110,000AlliedtroopswentashoreinNorth
Africa,sevensquadronsofSicily-basedLuftwaffefruitlesslycircledtheMediterranean
oppositeCapeBon,waitingtobombthe"Malta-bound"convoy.15
IkeknewthattheGermansweredeceived,thankstoULTRA,whichprovidedproof
throughtheGermans'ownwordsthattheywerefooled.TheradiotrafficbetweenSicily
andItalyshowednoindicationofanyspecialalert,muchlessamovementoftroopsto
Tunisia.Thisnegativeinformationwasheartening.16
AndtheFrench?OnlytheeventitselfcouldtellifMastwouldbeabletobringthearmy
around,evenwithoutGiraud,orifHenrid'Astier'syoungmencouldtakecontrolof
Algiers,evenwithouttheirBrenguns,orifDarlanandJuinwouldcooperate.Theleast
Ikeneededwasto"finddividedcouncilsamongtheFrench,whichshouldpreventthem
offeringreallyeffectiveresistance."17Hewas
Page38
attackinginsufficientforcetoensuresuccess,butanydelayimposedbyFrench
resistancemightprovedisastroustohisrealobjective,whichwastogetcontrolofTunisia
beforetheGermanscouldgettherefromSicily.MuchdependedonhowwellMurphy,
Eddy,andtheOSShaddonetheirjobs;evenmoredepended,accordingtoMurphy'sbest
intelligence,onwhetherornotGiraudwouldcooperate.AndhispartingwordstoIkehad
been,"Giraudwillbeaspectatorinthisaffair."18
Page39
ChapterFour
WhoMurderedtheAdmiral?
NOVEMBER9,1942,thedayafterOperationTORCHstarted.AtiredSupreme
CommanderdictatesalettertoBedellSmith,stillinLondon:"Itisn'tthisoperation
that'swearingmedownit'sthepettyintrigueandthenecessityofdealingwithlittle,
selfish,conceitedwormsthatcallthemselvesmen.AlloftheseFrogshaveasingle
thought'ME.'"1
Laterthatday,fromhisofficedeepinsidetheRockofGibraltar,IkewiresMarshall,"I
findmyselfgettingabsolutelyfuriouswiththesestupidFrogs."2
StrongStatements,especiallycomingfromEisenhower,whooftenexpressedhimselfin
blunttermsinconversationbutusuallywascircumspectinhiscorrespondence.Hehad
reasonforhispassionateoutburst.Whentheinvasionbegan,GiraudandDarlan
continuedtojockeyforpositionandrefusedtocommitthemselvestotheAlliedside,
ColonelEddy'sattemptedcoupatOranfailed,Henrid'Astier'spro-Alliedyoungmenlost
controlofAlgierstotheFrenchArmy,and,worstofall,fightingragedbetween
FrenchmenandAmericansatallthreelandingsites:Algiers,Oran,andCasablanca.
TheGermans,meanwhile,althoughcaughtbysurprise,werereactingwithenergyand
efficiency,whichonlymadeEisenhowermoreenragedattheFrench.ULTRAintercepts
onthenightoftheinvasionhadshownthattheGermansweresleeping,soIkecouldtake
comfortinknowingthatsecurityforTORCHhadbeensuccessful.Butthenextday
ULTRAinterceptstoldIkethatFieldMarshalAlbertKesselring,inItaly,wasrushingmen
andsuppliesinto
Page40
TunisandthatHitlerhadorderedtheoccupationofsouthernFrance.Forty-eighthours
beforethefirstGermanssetfootinTunis,Ikeknewtheywerecoming,inwhatstrength,
andhow,buthecoulddonothingaboutitbecausehistroopsweretieddownfightingthe
French.Hehadlostthestrategicobjectiveofthecampaignbeforethecampaignwaseven
underway,andheknewit.Thushistremendousrage,whichgrewinintensitywitheach
passinghour.HewasangryatDarlan,Juin,andGiraudforputtingtheir"individual
fortunesandopportunities"aheadoftheAlliedcause."Rightthisminute,"hewrote
Smith,"theyshouldallbemakingitimpossibleforAdmiralEstevatopermittheGermans
intoTunisia.Heapparentlyhastheequivalentofthreedivisionsdownthereand,without
theslightesttrouble,couldcutthethroatofeveryGermanandItalianintheareaandget
awaywithit."Heconfessedthat"asituationsuchasthiscreatesinmesomuchfurythatI
sometimeswishIcoulddoalittlethroat-cuttingmyself!"3
Ikemeantitasatinyjoke,butjokeornot,thesubjectofassassinationkeptcomingupin
conversationsbetweentheAlliedleadersonGibraltar.Giraudcontinuedtosaynonto
everyproposalIkemade,andforthefirsttwenty-fourhoursoftheoperationIke
assumedthatGiraudwastheonlymanwhocouldgettheFrenchArmytostopfighting
theAllies.AdmiralAndrewBrownCunningham,Eisenhower'snavalcommander,
suggestedthattheyputGiraudinacellandthenmakeanannouncementinhisname.
Butcherrecordedthat"allfeltsomethinghadtobedone...evenalittleairplane
accident."TheGovernorofGibraltartoldIkethat"hehadagoodbodydisposalsquadif
needed."4
Bythemorningofthesecondday,Giraudbegantosensethehostilityandtorealizethat
Ikewasnevergoingtoturnovercommandtohim.Toeveryone'sdelight,heannounced
thathewasreadytoleadtheFrenchArmyandagreedtoflytoAlgiers.Hedidsoon
November10-andnothinghappened.Noonepaidanyattention.AllofMast'spromisesto
MurphyabouttheeffectofGiraud'sannouncement,andallofMurphy'spromisestoIke,
turnedouttobefalse.NotoneFrenchsoldierralliedbehindGiraud.
InAlgiers,meanwhile,therewasaterriblemess.Onthenightoftheinvasion,Henri
d'Astier'sChantiersdelaJeunessehadtakenJuinandDarlanprisoner,*seizedtheradio
stationandpolice
*TheadmiralwasinAlgiersbecausehissecretservicehadtippedhimoffthattheinvasionwas
imminent.
Page41
headquarters,andgenerallymanagedtogettemporarycontrolofthecity,althoughnotof
thenavalbatteriesortheharbor.Buttheirarmswerewoefullyoutofdatenoneofthe
gunstheOSSandClarkhadpromisedhadbeendeliveredandtheyactedwithoutproper
coordinationorleadership.Worstofall,theystrucktoosoon.ExpectingtheAmericansat
dawn,theyseizedcontrolduringthemiddleofthenight.Theycouldnotholditagainst
theoverwhelmingforceoftheregularFrenchArmyinAlgiers.Bydawn,Juinhad
regainedcontrol.
GeneralMast,meanwhile,wasoutoftouch,ontheoutskirtsofAlgiers,atabeachwhere
heexpectedtheAmericanstoland.Butthelandingsweremilesfromthecityandhours
laterthanMastexpectedthem.Theresultofalltheseerrorswasthat,insteadofthe
AmericanswalkingintoacityalreadycontrolledbyMastandd'Astier'sunderground
army,theymetstiffFrenchresistance.5
InMorocco,too,theattempttoarrangeapeacefulreceptionhadbeenbotchedandthe
Frenchwereresisting.Vichypolicearrestedapro-AlliedFrenchgeneral,andGeneral
AugusteNogues,incommandinCasablanca,orderedall-outresistance.InOran,Eddy's
OSSorganizationhadbeenunabletotakecontrol,buttheAlliesarrivedinsuch
overwhelmingforcethattheyquicklyovercametheFrenchforcesthere.Ikewasnot
especiallyworriedaboutCasablanca,either,becausePattonwasincommandatthatsite
anditwouldnotbelongbeforeheforcedaFrenchsurrender.EveninAlgiers,on
Novemer10,Juinorderedhistroopstoceasefire.Atallthreesites,inshort,Eisenhower's
menhadarrivedinsufficientstrengthtooverwhelmtheFrench.Thetroublewasthatthe
FrenchinTunisiawereallowingtheGermanstocomeintoTunisandnoneoftheFrench
officersinAlgierswouldissueorderstoresist.
WhenamessagecameintoGibraltarfromMurphy,sayingthatDarlanwouldtalkto
Eisenhowerbuttonooneelse,mostespeciallynotGiraud,"Ikespluttered."Butcher
reportedthatheswore,"WhatIneedaroundhereisadamngoodassassin!"6Admiral
Cunninghamlaughed,thenremindedIkethatChurchillhadtoldhim,"KissDarlan'sstern
ifyouhaveto,butgettheFrenchNavy."TheFrenchfleetwastheninToulonanditwas
thoughtthatifDarlanorderedittojointheAllies,thefleetwoulddoso.Ikedecidedto
sendClarktoAlgierstoseewhatcouldbedoneaboutbringingDarlanovertotheAllied
side.
InselectingClark,Eisenhowerwasindulginganoldfriendship,becausecertainlyClark's
firstvisittoAlgeriahadnotbeenofany
Page42
benefittotheAllies.Nevertheless,IkecontinuedtothinkhighlyofClark,andevenfound
causeforpraise.InalettertoMarshallonNovember10,EisenhowersaidthatClark's
secrettrip"hadbeenimmenselyimportanttousinfindingoutexactlywhatwasthe
majoritysentimentinNorthAfricaandinpreparingthewayforeffectiveU.S.-French
collaboration."TheexactoppositewasthetruthClark'svisithadfailedtodiscoverthe
crucialfactthatGiraud'snamewasofnoconsequenceinNorthAfrica,andtherewasno
U.S.-Frenchcollaboration.7StillIkerecommendedClark'spromotiontolieutenant
general.HealsoremainedloyaltoMurphy,despiteMurphy'sembarrassingfailures.
Ike'sinstructionstoClark,whichservedasthebasisforthefamousDarlanDeal,were
straightforwardandentirelyinaccordwiththedirectionsIkehadreceivedfromhis
superiors,ChurchillandRoosevelt.EisenhowersaidthattheAllieshadnotcometoNorth
Africatostirup"thetribes"ortoreplaceanyVichyofficials.Itwouldbebusinessas
usual,andDarlancouldbeincharge,ifonlyhewouldordertheFrenchforcesinTunisia
toresisttheGermanlandingsthere."Idon'tseewhytheseFrenchmen,thatarejockeying
forpersonalpower,donotseethesethingsandmovewithspeed,"IketoldClark.Hehad
becomesocynicalaboutDarlan,Juin,andGiraudthatheadded,"Givethemsomemoney
ifitwillhelp."8
MarkClarkflewtoAlgiers,wherehequicklyconfirmedadealthatMurphyhadalready
madewithDarlan.ItgaveDarlanthetitleofHighCommissionerinFrenchNorthAfrica.
Inreturn,DarlanpromisedtoorderAdmiralEstevainTunistoresist.AtMurphy's
insistence,backedupbyEisenhower,DarlanalsohadtoagreetomakeGiraudthe
commanderinchiefofFrenchforcesinNorthAfrica,whichshowedaratherastonishing
loyaltytoGiraudinviewofhisineffectiveness.OnNovember13,Eisenhowerand
CunninghamflewtoAlgiers,whereIketookpossessionofhisnewheadquarters,inthe
HotelSt.Georges,andsummonedDarlanandGiraudtoameeting,wheretheyexamined
anddiscussedthedetailsofthedeal.
Eisenhowerwasinapositiontosayno,tocallitoff,butheneverconsideredsucha
possibility.Hischiefpoliticaladviserandspy,RobertMurphy,previouslysoforwardand
dogmaticinhisrecommendations,nowthrewuphishandsandsaid,"Thewholematter
hasnowbecomeamilitaryone.Youwillhavetogivethe
Page43
finalanswer."9Ikeneverhesitated.AllMurphy'spreviousreportinghademphasizedthe
importanceofmaintainingorderinAlgeria,andMurphyandClarkhadbothinsistedthat
onlytheestablishedVichyofficialscoulddothat.LikeAmericansouthernpoliticians
dealingwithblacks,theyarguedthatonlyFrenchcolonialofficersknewhowto"handle"
theArabs.IkehimselfhadwarnedClarknottocreateanydissensionamongtheArab
tribes"orencouragethemtobreakawayfromexistingmethodsofcontrol."10
At2P.M.,November13,EisenhowerandDarlansignedtheagreement,whichgave
DarlancivilcontrolofFrenchNorthAfrica.Thus,initsfirstoffensiveofthewar,the
UnitedStatescommitteditselftosupportingandupholdingaNazicollaboratorwhowasa
notoriouslyanti-Semiticfascist.TheUnitedStateshadsentalargemilitaryforcetoNorth
Africa,butfortheJewsandArabsofAlgiers,nothinghadchanged.Theystillcouldnot
attendpublicschools,practiceprofessions,vote,orotherwiseexercisecivilorpolitical
rights.
TherewasanimmediateoutburstofprotestagainsttheDarlanDeal,fromliberalsin
EnglandandAmerica,ledbyEdwardR.Murrow,theCBSradionewsmanbasedin
LondonandoneofthemostrespectedcommentatorsintheUnitedStates.Murrow
demandedtoknowwhatthehellwasgoingon.WerewefightingNazisorsleepingwith
them?Didn'tEisenhowerandhisbossesrealizethatwecouldlosethiswarinwinningit?
WasEisenhowerhimselfafascist?
Muchoftheintensereactionresultedfromnaiveté.AsArthurFunkhaspointedout,
"ManyAmericanswerestill,in1942,wallowingcomfortablyinaWilsoniandelusionthat
warsarefoughttopreservetheworldforthoseonthesideofright."11Anotherfactor
contributingtothestormwasthereactionofChurchillandRoosevelt.Thoseworthies
actedasiftheyhadneverheardthenameDarlanbeforeandwereastonishedthatGeneral
Eisenhowerhadtakensuchlibertiesinpoliticalmatters.Infact,bothhadapprovedthe
DarlanDealweeksearlier,inprincipleifnotspecificdetail,whenDarlanfirstapproached
Murphy.BothheadsofgovernmenthadgivenMurphy,Clark,andEisenhowerfull
authoritytodealwithanyonewhocoulddeliverthegoods,whetheritwasMast,Juin,
Giraud,orDarlan.And.bothChurchillandRoosevelthadinsistedfromthestartthatthe
invadingforceshoulddonoth
Page44
ingtoupsetlocalgovernment.ButneithermanwouldcometoEisenhower'sdefense,
whichencouragedthepressandradiotomountacampaigndemandingthatthedealbe
calledoff.
Eisenhowerbegantorealizehowfarouthehadstuckhisneck.Hehadmadeapolitical
blunderor-morecorrectly-wasbeingmadethevictimofone.Hehadnopowerbaseof
hisown,hewasunknown,hehadwonnogreatvictories,hewasexpendable.Ata
criticalmomentinhiscareer,hisheadwasontheblock.
Ikedefendedhimselfinaseriesofbrilliantlywrittenandarguedmessagestothe
CombinedChiefsofStaff,Roosevelt,andChurchill.(ToChurchill:"Pleasebeassured
thatIhavetoooftenlistenedtoyoursageadvicetobecompletelyhandcuffedand
blindfoldedbyalloftheslickerswithwhichthispartoftheworldissothickly
populated.")12Hisprincipaljustificationwasmilitaryexpendiency;asFunknotes,this
turnedClausewitzonhisheadby"insistingthatmilitaryachievementbesoughtatthe
expenseofdiplomaticdisaster."13AnotherofIke'sjustificationswastoputtheblameon
hisintelligenceservice(althoughheneverblamedMurphy);totheCombinedChiefshe
declared,"Theactualstateofexistingsentimentheredoesnotrepeatnotagreeeven
remotelywithsomeofourpriorcalculations."14
Themilitarycasewasindeedastrongone,butitwouldhavebeenmuchstrongerifIke
hadimmediatelycapturedTunisiaandiftheFrenchfleethadralliedtoDarlan.Because
neitherhappened,itwashardtoseeexactlywhatbenefitstheAllieshadreceivedfrom
dealingwithDarlan.*
Makingmattersworse,oneofthechiefradiostationsbroadcastingfromNorthAfricato
theAlliedworld,RadioMaroc,hadfallenintothehandsofsomeofColonelDonovan's
OSSagents.Theseagents,accordingtoIke'syoungerbrotherMilton,were"idealistic
NewDealers."TheybroadcastcriticalnewsstoriesontheDarlanDeal,storiesthat
emphasizedthepointthatthecomingoftheAllieshadmadenodifferenceinday-to-day
life,asVichyofficialscontinuedtorunafasciststateinNorthAfrica.15
*DarlandidorderAdmiralEstevatousethefleettoresist,buttheFrenchArmyinTunisia,under
GeneralGeorgesBarre,hadwithdrawnintothemountains,refusingeithertofighttheGermansorto
followVichyorderstocollaboratewiththem.TheGermanswerealreadyarriving.Estevadecided
todonothing.ThemainFrenchfleet,meanwhile,atToulon,hadscuttleditselfratherthansailto
jointheAlliesorbetakenoverbytheGermans.
Page45
Atthispoint,RooseveltmusthavebeentemptedtofireEisenhower,repudiatetheDarlan
Deal,putasoldierlikeJuinorGiraudinDarlan'splace,andmakeafreshstartoncreating
anintelligenceestablishmentfortheUnitedStates.Churchillhadfiredastringofgenerals
inEgyptandnowlookedlikeageniusforhavingdoneso,asMontgomeryhadjustwon
theBattleofElAlamein.ButFDRdidhaveasenseoffairplayandheknewperfectly
wellthat,indealingwithDarlan,Ikehadstayedwellwithinhisorders.
Inaddition,threemen,representingthreelevelsoftheAmericanGovernment,cameto
Ike'sdefense.Onewasaseniorofficialandelderstatesman,SecretaryofWarHenryL.
Stimson.AnotherwastheChiefofStaffoftheArmy,GeneralGeorgeC.Marshall.The
thirdwasayoung,up-and-comingbureaucrat,formerlyassistanttoHenryWallaceinthe
DepartmentofAgriculture,currentlyElmerDavis'numbertwomanintheOfficeofWar
Information,MiltonEisenhower.Whatthesethreemen,sofarapartinageand
experience,hadincommonwasthePresident'strust.FDRhadalonganddeep
relationshipwithallthreemenandhebelievedwhattheytoldhim,andinRoosevelt's
administrationasinallotherspersonalrelationshipswereoftencrucial.
SecretaryStimsonbargedintotheWhiteHouseandflatlytoldRooseveltthathe,as
President,absolutelyhadtospeakoutinEisenhower'sdefense.Marshalltooinsistedthat
RoosevelthadtodefendIke.Marshallalsotriedtogetthepresstosoftenitscriticism.At
apressconference,hepointedoutthattheAmericanssuffered1,800killedinactionin
takingNorthAfrica,althoughplanningestimateshadbeenthatthelosseswouldbe
around18,000.MarshallclaimedthatthefiguresshowedtheDarlanDealhadsaved
16,200Americanlives.*MarshalltoldRooseveltthatcriticismofIkeplayedintothe
handsoftheBritish,whowoulddemandIke'sreplacementbyaBritishgeneral,and
AmericanleadershipofanAlliedexpeditionwouldhavesuchablackeyethatthere
wouldbegreatdifficultygettinganAmericanintosuchanexaltedpositionagain.
MarshallthoughtthatEisenhower,ifsuccessful,wouldputtheUnitedStatesintoa
positionofworldprestigebeyondanythingRoosevelthadeverimagined.16
RooseveltwasimpressedbyMarshall'sarguments.Hecalledin
*Puttingittheotherwayaround,Murphy'sandClark'sfailuretocoordinatewiththeFrenchhad
cost1,800Americanlives.
Page46
MiltonandaskedaseriesofquestionsaboutIke'spolitics.ReassuredthatEisenhower
wascomfortablyinthemiddleoftheAmericanroadandcertainlynofascist,FDRthen
askedMiltontodraftapresidentialstatementacceptingtheDarlanDealbutemphasizing
thatitwastemporaryinnatureandundertakenonlyformilitaryexpediency.Miltondidas
directed,broughtbackthedraftforRoosevelt'sapproval,andthenwatched''withsome
painasFDRaddedtheword'temporary'aboutsixmoretimes,whichplusmyfourmade
tentimesthewordwasused."17
ThemostimmediateresultofRoosevelt'sstatementwasanotefromDarlantoClark.The
tinyadmiralwashurt.Musteringwhatdignityhecould,hedeclared,"Informationcoming
fromvariouspartstendstogivecredittotheopinionthatIambutalemonwhichthe
Americanswilldropafteritiscrushed."18Roosevelt,meanwhile,hadsentMilton
EisenhowerovertoNorthAfricatotakecontrolofRadioMaroc(whichhequicklydid)
andtodowhathecouldtobolsterIke'sreputation(whichhetriedbutwithoutmuch
luck).MiltonmetwithDarlan,whousedthesameanalogywithhim,saying,"IknowI
ambutalemonwhichyouintendtouseandthentossaside."19Murphyrecordsthat
Milton,furiousthatsomenewspaperandradiocommentatorswerestillcallinghisbrother
afascist,saidthat"unlessdrasticactionweretakenimmediately,theGeneral'scareer
mightbeirreparablydamaged.'Headsmustroll,Murphy!'heexclaimed.'Headsmust
roll!"20
DespiteMilton'sbestefforts,anddespiteRoosevelt'sandChurchill'sendorsement,the
DarlanDealcontinuedtostink.ProAlliedFrenchofficerswhohadconspiredwith
MurphyandEddywereeitherinhidingorinjail,whiletheVichyofficialswhohad
causedsomuchAmericanbloodshedremainedinpower.Iketriedtoputpressureon
Darlantoliberalizehisadministration,askingthatheatleastgivebacktotheJewsthe
rightsofcitizenship,butDarlanmovedslowly.HetoldIkeprogresswouldbedifficult
"becauseoftheanti-SemitismoftheArabs,"whichmayhavebeenthefirstandonlytime
duringtheFrenchoccupationofAlgeriathattheFrenchtookArabsentimentinto
account.21LikeDieminSaigonintheearlysixties,DarlaninAlgiersinlate1942had
becomeanacuteembarrassmentfortheAmericans.
ForIke,itwasterriblyfrustrating.HewantedtobefightingGermansinTunisia,notupto
hisneckinpoliticsinAlgiers.Nordidheenjoybeingatargetofcriticism."Ihavebeen
calledaFas
Page47
cistandalmostaHitlerite,"hecomplainedtohissonJohn,thenacadetatWestPoint.Ike
toldhissonthatitwasinfacthismostearnestconvictionthat"nootherwarinhistoryhas
sodefinitelylineduptheforcesofarbitraryoppressionanddictatorshipagainstthoseof
humanrightsandindividualliberty."22TohisBritishpoliticaladviser,HaroldMacmillan,
heconfessed,"Ican'tunderstandwhytheselong-haired,starry-eyedguyskeepgunning
forme.I'mnoreactionary.Christonthemountain!I'masidealisticasHell."23
Itwastrue,however,thatonlyAmericanandBritisharmscommandedbyEisenhowerkeptDarlaninpower.Theadmiralhadnopoliticalbase,nosupport.TheGermanshad
occupiedallofFrance,endingwhateverpretensionsVichyhadasanindependent,
legitimategovernment.VichyofficialsinNorthAfrica,ledbyDarlan,stoodrevealedas
opportunistswhowouldcollaboratewithwhateversideseemedtobewinningthewar.It
wasaninherentlyunstable,dangeroussituation.
EspeciallyforDarlan,whohadanimpressivelistofenemies.TheGermanswantedhim
deadbecausehehaddouble-crossedthem.MarshalPétainandhisgangatVichyfeltthe
sameway.DeGaulleandtheFreeFrenchneededtoremoveDarlaninordertomakeway
foranewregimeinAlgiers.TheBritishhadalwayshatedDarlanandnowheldhim
responsibleforthefactthattheFrenchfleetwasatthebottomofToulonHarborinstead
ofsailingbesidetheAlliednavies.TheAmericans,terriblyembarrassedbytheDarlan
Deal,wereanxiouslylookingforawayout.
DubreuilandHenrid'Astier,meanwhile,weredismayedatthewaythingshadturnedout.
TheyhadexpectedMurphyandIketoputGiraudincommand,andtheyhadbeen
confidenttheycouldcontrolthepoliticallyinnocentGiraud.Havinghopedtobecomethe
realauthoritiesinNorthAfrica,Dubreuilfoundhimselfcompletelyexcludedfrom
Darlan'sgovernmentwhiled'AstierwaschiefofpoliceforAlgiersonly.
Insum,potentialassassinswerelininguptogetatDarlan.Algiersmurmuredwith
intrigue.Darlanwasawareoftheactivity;atonepointinmid-DecemberhetoldMurphy,
"Youknow,therearefourplotsinexistencetoassassinateme."24
OneofthoseplotsinvolvedmenwhoweredirectlyorindirectlyassociatedwiththeOSS.
ColonelEdmondTayloroftheOSS,aChicagojournalistbeforethewar,headedasmall
groupofAmericanofficialsattachedtotheAnglo-AmericanPsychologicalWar
Page48
fareBranch(PWB),whichwasintheoryastaffsectionofEisenhower'sheadquarters.But
OSSstationchiefs,liketheirCIAsuccessors,wereinclinedtoindependentactionbased
ontheirownperceptionofthesituation.Ike'spolicywascleartocooperatewith
DarlanbutTaylorandhisPWBofficersrejectedit.ThePWBbecameahavenfor
AmericancriticsoftheDarlanDeal,andTaylorsoughtoutanti-VichyFrenchmento
assurethemthatnotallAmericanshadabandonedthem.PWBofficersalsoactedontheir
owntoarrest,withoutwarrants,inthebest"Chicagogangsterstyle,"fascistpoliticians
andpro-Nazijournalists.TheFrenchauthoritiesprotestedvigorously,andEisenhower
laterremarkedthatthePWBhadgivenhimmoretroublethanalltheGermansinAfrica.
25
PWBbecamearallyingpointforanti-DarlanFrenchmen,whichgaveTayloranexcellent
listeningpostonattemptedcoupsorassassinations.Inmid-December,Taylortold
MurphythathisinformationwasthatHenrid'Astierwasinvolvedinaconspiracyto
replaceDarlanwiththeComtedeParisasheadofanewFrenchprovisionalgovernment,
withDubreuilasfinanceminister.Taylor'sinformantsnotedthattheComtedeParishad
recentlyarrivedinAlgiers,andsaidthatd'Astiermightwelltryanarmedcoupd'etat.
Murphy,accordingtoTaylor,wasunconcerned;infact,Murphyhadplayedarolein
persuadingDarlantoappointd'AstieraschiefofpoliceinAlgiers,whichputd'Astierin
theperfectpositiontoexecuteaplot.26
D'Astier'syoungmenoftheChantiersdelaJeunesseweremeanwhileseekingan
opportunitytostrikeablow.Theyhadbeenhumiliatedonthenightoftheinvasion,when
theregularFrenchArmyhaddisarmedthemasiftheywerechildren.Theyburnedfor
revenge.Theywerepoliticalinnocents,representingeverypointofview,from
CommunistsympathizerstoroyalistssupportingtheComtedeParis,buttheywereunited
intheirferventpatriotismandtheirhatredofDarlan,whohadsulliedthehonorof
France.
ManyoftheseyouthshadjoinedtheCorpsFrancd'Afrique,anewcommandounit
formedunderthedirectionofOSSArabspecialistandHarvardanthropologistMajor
CarletonCoon.OnesuchrecruitwasRogerRosfelder,andheprovidesagoodexample
ofhowd'Astiercouldconfuseandmanipulatehisyoungsters.Animpetuouseighteen
yearsofage,Rosfelderwasreadytoact,notthink.D'Astiertoldhimthat,afterDarlan's
removal,theComtede
Page49
PariswouldbecomeKingofFrance,andthathewouldthencallondeGaulletoforma
government.Rosfelderobjected,saidhewasnoroyalist,butfinallyagreedtohelp
removeDarlan.Hisattitude,helaterdeclared,was:"Firstofall,thereisatraitortobe
executedandthatistheimportantthing.Thepoliticalcalculationsarebeyondme."
InRosfelder'saccount,whichhewrotein1972,hestatedthat"MarioFaivreandI
proposesomeprojectsforDarlan'sexecution.Myplanisfinallyretained....[Itwasto]
formabarragewithtwocars;Darlan'scarisstopped.IapproachandemptymyStenat
him.IabandontheSten(Iamcoveredbyanothergun)andregaintheBoulevardwhere
anothercartakesmetotheSpecialDetachmentoftheCorpsFrancwhereIhaveseveral
witnesseswhowillrecognizethatIhadspentthedaywiththem."
FortunatelyforRosfelder,olderheadsdecidedagainsthisindulginghispassionfora
blazeofmachine-gunfireandvetoedhisplan.TheAbbéCordier,d'Astier'sassociate,
toldRosfelderthatBonnierdelaChapellehadbeenselectedtoexecuteDarlan,directly
andalone,intheSummerPalaceinAlgiers.*OnDecember23,RosfeldertookBonnierto
meetAbbéCordierattheChurchofSt.Augustine.ThepriestheardBonnier'sconfession,
gavehimabsolution,andthenandthere,intheconfessional,turnedoverHenrid'Astier's
twoduelingpistols.
Thefollowingday,ChristmasEve,Rosfelder,Faivre,andHenrid'Astier'ssonJeandrove
BonniertotheSummerPalace.AsBonnierdressedallinblackgotoutofthecar(witha
newpistolbelongingtoFaivre,astheduelingpistolsdidnotwork),hegaveRosfelderhis
identitypapersandaphotoofhimself."Youwillgivethembacktomeafterward,"he
said."Ifnot,youwillburnthem!"Bonnierwasconvinced,Rosfelderrecorded,thatthere
wasnorisk.Bothd'Astier,thechiefofpolice,andAbbéCordier,hispriest,hadtoldhim,
"Don'tworry,everythingisaccountedfor."27Afterall,whenonehasthechiefofpolice's
ownpistols,onehasacertainconfidence.
At2P.M.,ChristmasEve,BonnierstrolledintotheSummer
*AccordingtoMichaelR.D.Foot,SOEinFrance(aBritishofficialhistory,publishedin1966),
"membersofd'Astier'sAlgiersgrouphaddrawnlotsforwhichofthemshouldhavethehonourof
killingtheadmiral,"butFrenchsourcesdonotsupporthisstatement.MarioFaivresupports
Rosfelderinhisownconfession,Nousavonstuel'AdmiralDarlan(Paris,1976).
Page50
Palace.Noonechallengedhim.Theusualguardsseemedtobemissing;itwasquietinthe
palace.Bonnierknewhiswayaroundandplacedhimselfinawaitingroomoutside
Darlan'sstudy.About3P.M.Darlanreturnedfromlunch.Astheadmiralapproachedhis
study,Bonniersteppedforwardandfiredtwoshotsfromhis.25-caliberrevolveratpointblankrange.Darlandiedalmostimmediately.Whenhisaide,CommandantHourcade,
rushedforward,Bonniershothimintheleg,butthenDarlan'schauffeurmanagedto
knockBonnierdownanddisarmhim.Hewashustledofftopoliceheadquarters.28
Astheseeventstranspired,EisenhowerwasnoteveninAlgeria,butatthefrontlinesin
Tunisia.Fortheprecedingtwoweekshehadbeentryingtogetanoffensivestartedfor
Tunis,butheavyrains,coldweather,andpoorroadshadfrustratedhisattempts.Themud
mademovementimpossible,andlocalintelligence-theArabnatives-saidtherainswould
beworseinJanuaryandFebruary.GeneralKennethAnderson,commandingtheBritish
FirstArmy,whichwastoleadthedriveonTunis,startingoffonChristmasEve,toldIke
thattheoffensivecouldnotbeginbeforeMarch.Itwas"abitterdisappointment"to
Eisenhower.
EquallyfrustratingwasthestatusoftheFrenchNorthAfricanArmy.Asaresultofthe
DarlanDeal,GeneralJuinandhisforceshadtakentheirplacebesidetheAlliesonthe
battlefront.TheBritishheldthepositionsinthenorth,facingTunis;theAmericanswere
atthesouthernendoftheline;theFrenchheldthehillyareainthecenter.Theproblem
wasthatJuinrefusedtotakeordersfromAnderson.AndersonwantedIketotalktoJuin,
whichIkeagreedtodo.OnChristmasEvethetwomenmetatafarmhousethatwas
servingasheadquartersfortheBritishVCorps.Theyhadjustsatdownfordinnerwhen
Ikewassummonedtothetelephone.
ClarkwascallingfromAlgiers.HetoldIketherewasbigtroubleandheshouldreturn
immediately.Clark,accordingtoButcher,puthismessage"intermssoguardedthatIke
suspected,butwasn'tsure,thatDarlanhadbeenshot."29Withinthehour,Eisenhower,
Butcher,astaffofficer,andtheirdriverhadpiledintoIke'sarmoredCadillacandwere
off.TheydroveallthroughthenightandmostofChristmasDay,stoppingonlytoget
fuelandforbreakfastatthecommandpostinConstantine,wherethenewsofDarlan's
Page51
assassinationwasconfirmed.Theylunchedfromemergencyrationsalongtheroadand
reachedAlgiersaround6P.M.onChristmasDay."Ike'scommentwhileenroutehome
fromtheeast,"Butcherrecorded,"wasthatDarlan'sdeathendedoneproblem,butno
doubtcreatedmanymore."30
UponarrivalattheHotelSt.Georges,Eisenhower'sfirstactwastowriteasympathynote
toMrs.Darlan.Thenhehadhisstaffbriefhimonevents.Nexthesentwordtothe
"ImperialCouncil"(thetopVichyofficialsinNorthAfrica)thathewantedGiraudelected
toreplaceDarlan,whichwasimmediatelydone.Giraudthenheldadrumheadtrial,found
Bonnierguilty,andmuchtoBonnier'ssurpriseorderedafiringsquadtoshoothim.No
attempthadbeenmadetoforceBonniertorevealwhohisfellowconspiratorswere.
BecauseBonnierhadbeenassuredthatonlyapretensewouldbemadeofexecutinghim,
hedisplayedimpressivecourageandcalmnessinfrontofthefiringsquad.31The
executionwasreal,however;itwascarriedoutduringaGermanairraidonDecember27,
atamomentwhenantiaircraftfiredrownedoutthesoundofthefiringsquad'sguns.32
Thereasonforthelackofaninvestigation,accordingtoRosfelder,wasplain.The
authorities,Rosfeldernoted,"showedanevidentwillingnesstominimizethewhole
affair."Forthisphenomenon,Rosfeldersaid,"thereisonlyoneexplanation:fiveorsix
politicalorpatrioticgroupshadDarlanintheirsightsandeachonebelievedforquite
sometimethatitwas'his'plotthathadsucceeded."Indeed,thepolicesuperintendent
"hadevenpushedhisobligingnesstothepointofburningallourfiles...stillanother
whobelievedinthesuccessof'his'plot!"33
ItwasindeedtruethatfewmeneverhadmoreenemiesthanDarlan,whichopenedthe
waytowildspeculationintheworldpressaboutwhowasbehindBonnier.TheGermans
saidtheBritishSecretServicediditinordertoforestallAmericaninfluenceinNorth
Africa.NaziradiostationsclaimedthatDarlan'slastwordswere,"NowtheBritishhave
succeededinreachingtheirgoal."FromItaly,RadioRomedeclaredthattheconspirators
were"FrenchdeGaullistsinthepayoftheBritishintelligenceservice."34TheSpanish
pressblamedVichy.TheNewYorkTimessaidBonnierwasanItalian.35
ColonelEddy,meanwhile,dispersedtheOSSagentsworkingwithCorpsFrancd'Afrique
forfeartheywouldbeimplicated.
Page52
EddysentMajorCarletonCoon,whowasinchargeoftheunitBonnierbelongedto,off
toTunisiabeforehecouldbeaccusedofcollusioninthemurder.36
Atthesametime,IkewastryingtomanipulatetheFrenchsothatallFrenchmenoutside
ofVichycouldjointogethertofighttheNazis,whichmeantinthefirstinstancea
rapprochementbetweenGiraudanddeGaulle.DeGaullewantedtocometoNorth
Africa,andIketriedtoconvinceGiraudtoallowhimtodoso.ButonDecember27,
GiraudtoldIkethatdeGaulleshouldwaituntilthepoliticalandmilitarysituationin
NorthAfricahadbecomemoresettled.37Eisenhoweragreedtowait,andonDecember28
hewiredChurchill,"IbelievethatGiraudwillserveasthemediumthroughwhichthe
desiredrapprochementcansoonbeeffectedifthematterisnotpressedtoo
precipitately."38
Thenextevening,December29,ahighlyagitatedOSSofficerrushedintoPWB
headquarterstoannouncebreathlessly,"They'vearrestedallourfriends!"39Algierswas
inanuproarassquadsofVichypolicedescendedontheirvictimsattheirhomes,
handcuffedthem,andwhiskedthemoutofthecity.OnerumorhaditthatonlyGaullists
werebeingarrested;anotherheldthatitwasDubreuilandhisgang.Twelvemenwere
arrested;fourwerepoliceofficers,andtwoorthreeweresaidtohavehelpedthe
Americansland.
CharlesCollingwoodofCBSinterviewedGiraud,whotoldhimthattheconspiratorswho
hadmurderedDarlanalsointendedtoassassinateGiraudandMurphy.Giraudsaidthe
arrestedmenwerebeingheldinpreventivearrestandwouldnotbeexecuted."Wehave
arrestedpeoplewhohelpedtheAmericanstolandandthosewhohelpedtheGermans,"
GiraudtoldCollingwood,"aswellasthosepolicewhoknewoftheplotagainstDarlan
butdidnottelltheirsuperiors.IamfollowingtheFrenchthesisthatitisbettertoprevent
thantopunish."
Collingwoodaskedaboutthepolicemenwhohadbeenarrested."TheyknewthatDarlan
wasgoingtobemurderedanddidnotwarntheirsuperiors.Ididnotwanttostartthat
again.IonlycarriedoutthearrestswhenIknewbeyonddoubtthatthereweretobeother
assassinations."40
TheOSShaddifferentexplanationsofwhathappenedandwhy.Oneagentreportedthat
DubreuilandtheCagoulardshadattemptedaroyalistcoupd'etat.41AgentTaylorbelieved
thatallthosearrestedwereGaullistswhohadsupportedtheAmerican
Page53
landings.Heprotestedthrough"everybureaucraticchannel,politicalandmilitary,formal
andinformal,inavainattempttomakeEisenhowerrealizethecatastrophiceffecton
worldopinionifwetoleratedthisvindictiveVichycounteroffensiveagainstthe
undergroundallieswhohadriskedtheirlivesinourcommoncauseafewweeksearlier."
ButIkerefusedtoact.TaylorwenttoMurphy.SurelyMurphywouldnotallowthevery
menhehadconspiredwithinOctobertobearrestedonthepretextthattheyhaddesigns
onhislife?ToTaylor'samazement,MurphygavethesamereplyIkehadused:hecould
notinterfereinaninternalFrenchmatter.Taylor'sbitterconclusionwas,"Darlanhadbeen
ourson-of-a-bitch,andGiraudwasnow,andwhoeverwasagainstanofficiallyapproved
son-of-abitchmustipsofactobeagainstus."
TaylorturnedhisPWBheadquartersattheHoteldeCornouaillesintoasanctuaryfor
FrenchmenbeinghuntedbytheAlgierspolice.Oneoftherefugeeswastheheadofthat
policeforce,butHenrid'Astierhadlearnedthathisownpoliceagentswerelookingfor
him,supposedlywithorderstoshootonsight.Taylorgaved'AstieraPWBjeeptotake
himtothecathedralformass.Twoweekslaterd'Astierwasarrested.42
Giraudhadthrownawidenet,ashehadindicatedtoCollingwood,arrestingmenofall
politicalpersuasionsandbackgrounds.Bysodoing,heimplicatedeverybodyinDarlan's
murder,whichmayverywellhavebeenhisobjective,asitisprobablethathehimselfdid
notknowwhothesuccessfulconspiratorswere,butassumeditcouldhavebeenanyone
ofahalf-dozengroups.43
Withinayear,afterdeGaulleandGiraudhadachievedtheirrapprochement,theyjoined
handstomakeBonnierintoahero.Onthefirstanniversaryofhisexecution,accordingto
theAssociatedPress,"agroupofabout50persons,themajorityofwhomfillofficial
positionsundertheordersofGeneralsGiraudanddeGaulle,celebratedtheanniversary
ofthedeathofFernandEugeneBonnierdelaChapelle,whoassassinatedAdmiral
Darlan,byplacingawreathonhistombandobservingaminuteofsilence."
Thatincrediblescenewasfollowedupaweeklaterbyanincredibleact-theAlgerian
CourtofAppeals,underdeGaulle'scontrol,annulledthesentenceagainstBonnier,citing
asitsreason"documentsfoundwhichshowedconclusivelythatAdmiralDarlanhadbeen
actingagainsttheinterestsofFranceandthatBonnier's
Page54
acthadbeenaccomplishedintheinterestsoftheliberationofFrance."
Bonnier'scrimedisappearedfromtherecord.Asaconsequence,sodidthatofanyofhis
accomplicesandthecasewasclosed.Shortlythereafter,Henrid'Astierandhisassociates
werereleased;thedayhegotoutofjail,d'AstierreceivedtheCroixdeGuerrewithpalms
fromGiraud,andthefollowingdaytheMedaloftheResistancefromdeGaulle.Two
dayslaterdeGaullenamedhimamemberoftheConsultativeAssembly.44
Becauseoftheseactions,andbecausedeGaullebenefitedsoimmediatelyanddecisively
fromDarlan'sremoval,mostcommentatorshavepointedtohimastheultimatesourceof
theconspiracy.ButalthoughbothGiraudanddeGaulleweredelightedtohaveDarlanout
ofthewayandmadenoefforttohidetheirpleasure,theywerenotnecessarilyinonthe
plot,eithertogetherorasindividuals.Rosfelder'sconfession,publishedthirtyyearsafter
theevent,andconfirmedbymuchotherevidencegatheredinthattime,45raisesmany
questionsabouttheultimateconspirators.CertainlyAbbéCordierwasattheheartofit,
andheworkedford'Astier,whoworkedforDubreuil.AndbeyondDubreuil?Another
Frenchman?OrperhapsanAmerican?
TheultimatesourceofauthorityinNorthAfricawasFranklinRoosevelt.Heputitbluntly
whenhecabledChurchillonJanuary2,1943,"Ifeelverystronglythat,inviewofthe
factinNorthAfricawehaveamilitaryoccupation,ourcommandinggeneralhas
completecontrolofallaffairs,bothcivilandmilitary.OurFrenchfriendsmustnotbe
permittedtoforgetthisforamoment.Iftheselocalofficialswillnotcooperate,theywill
havetobereplaced."46
RobertMurphywasthePresident'spersonalrepresentativeinNorthAfrica,aswellas
headofanOSSorganizationthatincludedMajorCoon'sCorpsFranc,ofwhichBonnier
wasamember,andTaylor'sPWB,whichhadclosecontactswithd'Astier.Further,
MurphywasaclosefriendofDubreuilandhadmadeastrongcommitmenttoGiraud,
whilehedetesteddeGaulle(asdidRoosevelt).Thequestionarises,wasMurphyapartof
theconspiracy?WasDarlan'smurderthefirstassassinationfortheAmericansecret
service?WasIkehimselfinontheplot?Doesthatexplaintherathercuriouscircumstance
thatatthemomentthemurderwascommittedthecommandinggeneralofallAllied
operationsin
Page55
NorthAfricawasatacorpsheadquartersonafarmmorethanaday'sdrivefromAlgiers?
Atthetime,in1942,fewAmericanswouldhavebelieveditpossiblefortheirgovernment
tobeinvolvedinsuchdastardlywork;agenerationlater,however,millionsofAmericans
wouldtakeitforgrantedthatiftherewasfoulplayandthepredecessoroftheCIAwasin
thearea,andiftheAmericansbenefitedfromthefoulplay,thentheOSSmusthavebeen
involved.ThesequestionsalsopersistbecauseofMurphy'scontinuedassociationwith
Dubreuil,whosehopestobecomefinanceministerandtherealpowerinaGiraud
government(orprimeministerundertheComtedeParis)disappearedwhenGiraudand
deGaullegottogetherinJanuary1943.DeGaulledespisedDubreuilasacollaborator.
WhendeGaulleemergedinthespringof1943astheheadofgovernmentinAlgiers,
DubreuilfledtoSpain,wherehejoinedanumberofhisoldassociatesfromtheCagoule.
47In1944,followingtheliberationofFrance,Dubreuilslippedacrosstheborder.Hewas
promptlyarrestedbyFrenchpoliceonchargesofhaving"negotiatedwithaforeign
power."48
MurphyusedhispositionasIke'schiefpoliticaladvisertopersuadetheFrenchtodrop
thechargesagainstDubreuilandheldapartyinParisincelebrationofDubreuil's
freedom.49Afterthewar,MurphyrefusedtodiscusshisloyaltytoDubreuilorevents
surroundingthemurderofDarlan,*butinhismemoirshemadetheastonishingstatement
that"themotivefortheassassinationofDarlanstillremainsamystery."50In1947,
Dubreuilwastriedfortreasonbutacquitted;onJuly12,1955,hewasshottodeathby
unknownassailantsforunknownreasonsonthedoorstepofhisCasablancahome.51
Murphy'sloyaltytoDubreuilaside,thefactthattheAmericansbenefitedsodirectlyfrom
Darlan'sdeathmakesthematleastsuspect.Clark,inhismemoirs,publishedin1950,
addedtothesuspicionbecauseheexpressedsuchdelightovertheassassination."Admiral
Darlan'sdeathwas,tome,anactofProvidence.Itistoobadthathewentthatway,but,
strategicallyspeaking,hisremovalfromthescenewaslikethelancingofatroublesome
boil.Hehadserved
*Atleastwiththisauthor,whoaskedonanumberofoccasionsinthe1960s.CarletonCoonalso
refusedthreeseparaterequestsforaninterviewmadein1979.
Page56
hispurpose,andhisdeathsolvedwhatcouldhavebeentheverydifficultproblemof
whattodowithhiminthefuture.Darlanwasapoliticalinvestmentforceduponusby
circumstances,butwemadeasensationalprofitinlivesandtimethroughusinghim.''52
Thatalmostsoundslikeaconfession,butdespiteClark'scarelesslychosenwords,and
despitespeculationlinkingMurphywiththeconspirators,thereisnodirectevidence
connectingEisenhower,hischiefsubordinates,ortheOSSwiththemurderofDarlan.
Eisenhower'sattitudewasbestexpressedbyhisreactiontoRoosevelt'smessagesaying
thatiftheFrenchleaderswouldnotcooperate"theywillhavetobereplaced."Ikewas
terriblyupset,accordingtoButcher.HesaidthatwithoutthegoodwilloftheFrench
Army,theAmericanswouldhavetotakeonthe"manwasting"jobofprovidingcivil
administrationforAlgeriaandguardingthelinesofcommunicationthroughNorthAfrica.
InsteadofactiveassistancefromtheFrench,Ikesaidhefearedtherewouldbe"passive
resistanceàlaGhandi,orpossiblyresumptionofFrenchfightingAmericans'pour
l'honneur.'"
IfFDRinsistedondictatingtotheFrenchtothepointthatitbroughtonFrench
resistance,Butchernoted,"Ikesaidhewouldofcoursecarryouttheorder,butwould
thenasktoberelieved,whichwouldnodoubtmeanreversiontotherankoflieutenant
colonel,andretirement."53IkehadcometoadmireDarlanandappreciatehiscooperative
spirit.Hedidnotputthefingerontheman.
NeitherdidMurphyortheOSS,ifonlybecausetheydidnothavetodoso.Anyone
livinginAlgiersinDecember1942wouldhavehadtohavebeendeafandblindnotto
knowthattherewerenumerousplotstokillthelittleadmiral.Theanalogythatfitsis
Saigonin1963,wheretheCIAdidnothavetoliftahandagainstDiembutsimplystood
asideandlettheSouthVietnamesethemselvesdothekilling.AsRosfeldermakesso
abundantlyclear,inAlgierstherewereplentyofFrenchmenontheprowlforDarlan.And
asdeGaulle'sandGiraud'sactionsaftertheeventindicate,thereweremanyhighlyplaced
Frenchmenwhoweredelightedtohavetheadmiraloutoftheway,somuchsothatthey
madeaherooutofthemurderer.
Page57
ChapterFive
IkeandULTRAinAfrica,Sicily,andItaly
FEBRUARY,1942.Afoxbroughttobaybyapackofhoundsisafearfulsight,
snarling,snapping,turningleft,right,backward,neverresting,alwaysalert.Thefoxis
thedreadedErwinRommelandhisfamousAfrikaKorps;thehoundsare
Montgomery'sEighthArmy,pursuingfromtheeast,theAmericanIICorps(General
LloydFredendall)closinginfromthewest,theFrenchfromthenorthwest,andthe
BritishFirstArmy(GeneralKennethAnderson)coveringthenorthernescaperoute.
RommelhadjustretreatedacrosshalfofNorthAfrica,followinghisdefeatbytheBritish
atElAlameininNovember1942.WhenhereachedtheMarethLine,aprepareddefensive
position,partlyunderground,alongtheTunisianLibyanborder,Rommelturnedonthe
British,whorecoiled,thensettleddowntoawaitreinforcements.ThechaseacrossAfrica
hadbeenexhilarating,buttocloseinonthe"DesertFox"inhisdenwasanothermatter
altogether.MontygaveRommeltimetocatchhisbreathandplanhisnextmove.
TheAmericanIICorpswastoRommel'swestandnorth,stretchedoutalongtheeastern
dorsaloftheAtlasMountains.ThefrontlinewastoolongfortheAmericanstoholdin
strength,butneitherFredendallnorEisenhowerwereoverlyworried.Intelligence
indicatedthatanyGermanattackwouldcomefromnorthoftheIICorpslineatFondouk,
whichwasaBritishandFrenchresponsibility.
AccordingtoIke'sintelligencereports,Rommelwasfullyoc
Page58
cupiedbyMonty,soGeneralJürgenvonArnim,whocommandedtheGermanforcesin
Tunis,wouldleadtheoffensive.Ike'sG-2(intelligence)officeratAlliedForce
Headquarters(AFHQ)wasBritishBrigadierEricE.Mockler-Ferryman.Hereportedthat
allavailableinformationindicatedthatvonArnimwasgoingtodrawonRommel'sAfrica
Korpsforreinforcements,thenattackthroughapassatFondouk,withtheaimof
scatteringtheFrench,thenturningnorth,drivingtothecoast,toisolateAnderson'sFirst
Army.1
EisenhowerdidnotfullyacceptMockler-Ferryman'sjudgment,buthedidnothave
sufficientself-confidencetooverrulehisG-2.Hewasworriedenoughtogotothefront
tooverseepreparationstomeetvonArnim'sattack.OnFebruary13-14hemadean
allnighttourofthefront.Hewasdisturbedbywhathesaw.TheAmericantroopswere
complacent,green,andunblooded.TheyhadnotreceivedintensivetrainingintheUnited
States,astheywerethefirstdivisionstogotoEnglandin1942.InNovembertheyhad
shippedoutforNorthAfrica,whereoperationswerejustactiveenoughtoprevent
trainingbutnotenoughtoproviderealbattlefieldexperience.Officersandmenalike
showedthelackoftraining.2
Ikewasalsoupsetatthedispositionofthe1stArmoredDivision,whichhadbeensplit
intotwoparts,CombatCommandAandCombatCommandB(CCAandCCB),andwas
thereforeincapableofoperatingasaunit.GeneralAndersonhadinsisteduponkeeping
CCBnearFondouktohelptheBritishmeettheexpectedattackfromvonArnim;CCA
wastothesouth,nearFaidPass.
GeneralPaulRobinettcommandedCCB,andonthenightofFebruary13-14he
insistentlytoldIkethathewassureMocklerFerryman'sinformationwaswrong.Robinett
saidhedidnotexpectanattackatFondoukbecausehehadsentpatrolsallthewayacross
theeasterndorsalwithoutencounteringanyenemybuildup.Further,airreconnaissance
hadfailedtorevealanypreparationsforanattack.Robinettsaidhehadreportedthis
intelligencetohissuperiors,GeneralsFredendallandAnderson,buttheydidnotbelieve
him.Ikesaidhedid,andpromisedtochangethedispositionsthenextday.3
AfterhistalkwithRobinett,Ikedrovesouthforacoupleofhours,thenpaidavisitto
CCA.Everythingthereseemedtobeinorder.Justaftermidnighthewentforawalkinto
thedesert.The
Page59
moonshone.Lookingeastward,hecouldjustmakeoutthegapintheblackmountain
massthatwasFaidPass.Nothingmoved.
Shakingoffthemoodofthedesert,EisenhowerreturnedtoCCAheadquartersandthen
drovetowardTebessa,Fredendall'sheadquarters.Hearrivedthreehourslater,around
5:30A.M.TheGermans,helearnedtohisastonishmentfromaradiomessage,had
attackedCCA,comingthroughFaidPassat4:00A.M.Reportsindicated,however,thatit
wasonlyalimitedattack,probablydesignedtodrawoffstrengthfromthenorthernend
oftheline.CCAsaiditcouldholdonwithnodifficulty.ClimbingintohisCadillac,
EisenhowerdroveontowardhisadvancecommandpostatConstantine.Alongtheway
hestoppedtovisitthefamousRomanruinsatTimgadanddidnotreachConstantineuntil
themiddleoftheafternoon,St.Valentine'sDay.4
Thenewshereceivedwhenhegottohisheadquarterswasbad.TheattackoutofFaïd
PasswasmuchbiggerandmoreaggressivethanCCAhadthoughtatfirst.TheGermans
haddestroyedanAmericantankbattalion,overrunabattalionofartillery,isolatedtwo
largesegmentsofAmericantroops,anddrivenCCAoutofitsposition.Nevertheless,
GeneralAndersoncontinuedtoinsistthatMockler-Ferryman'sintelligencewascorrect
andthatthemainattackwouldcomeatFondouk.HerefusedtoreleaseRobinett'sCCBto
joinCCAinthedefense.IketriedtospeedaflowofreinforcementstoCCA,buthismain
strategicreserve,theU.S.9thInfantryDivision,wasunabletomovewithanydispatch
becauseithadnoorganictrucktransportation.Asaresult,outnumberedand
inexperiencedAmericantroopshadtotakeonGermanveteransledbyErwinRommel
himself.TheresultwasoneoftheworstAmericandefeatsofthewar.CCAlostninetyeighttanks,fiftysevenhalf-tracks,andtwenty-nineartillerypieces.Ithadpracticallybeen
destroyed-halfanarmoreddivisiongone!5
FortunatelyforIke,theGermancommandsetupwasalmostasmuddledastheAllied
one.RommelandvonArnimoperatedindependently.VonArnimwantedtoconfine
himselftolimitedattacksagainstFondouk.Rommelwasaftermuchbiggerresultshe
wantedtobreakthroughthemountainsatKasserinePass,capturethegreatAlliedsupply
baseatLeKef,thenpossiblydriveontoAlgiersitself.Hewantedtoturnatactical
advantageintoastrategictriumph,destroyingtheIICorps,isolatingtheFirstArmy,and
thusreversingtheentirepositioninNorthAfrica.Ifallwentwell,
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hecouldaccomplishhisobjectivesbeforeMontywasreadytoattacktheMarethLine.6
VonArnimwasavain,ambitiousmanwhorefusedtocooperateinRommel'sbold(but
wildlyimpractical)plan.Higherheadquarters(Kesselring)hadorderedhimtogivehis
bestpanzerdivision,the10th,toRommelfortheoriginalattack,butvonArnimhad
stalledanditwasnotcommittedonFebruary14.Ironically,thisturnedouttobenefit
Rommel,becausethelocationofthe10thPanzerwas,accordingtoMockler-Ferryman,
thekeypieceofinformation.AslongasthosetankerswerefacingCCBatFondouk,that
waswhereMockler-Ferrymaninsistedthattheattackwouldcome.
OverthenexttwodaysRommelpressedhisinitialadvantage.OnFebruary20the10th
Panzer,finallyreleasedtohiscommand,movedintoKasserinePass.Itwastoolate.
Americanreinforcementshadarrived.TheGermanoffensivestalled.
Thatsameday,February20,IkeaskedtheBritishChiefoftheImperialGeneralStaff,
AlanBrooke,toreplaceMockler-Ferryman"withanofficerwhohasabroaderinsight
intoGermanmentalityandmethod."7Itwastheonlytimeinhisthree-yearcareeras
AlliedCommanderinChiefthatEisenhoweraskedtheBritishtorelieveoneoftheir
officersonhisstaff.InacabletoMarshallthenextday,Ikeexplainedthat"duetofaulty
G-2estimates"Andersonhadnotbecomeconvinced"untiltoolatethattheattackthrough
Faïdwasreallythemaineffort."
Then,inguardedlanguage,headded,"Iamprovokedthattherewassuchrelianceplaced
uponparticulartypesofintelligencethatgeneralinstructionswereconsidered
inapplicable.Inthisconnectionandforyoureyesonly,Ihaveaskedforthereliefofmy
G-2.HeisBritishandtheheadofthatsectionmustbeaBritishofficerbecauseofthe
networkofspecialsignalestablishmentsheoperates,butBrookehasagreedtomake
availableamaninGreatBritainwhoistopsinthisregard."8ThemanwasGeneral
KennethStrong.HestayedwithIkethroughtheremainderofthewarandthetwoofficers
establishedacloseandeffectiverelationship.Mockler-FerrymanreturnedtoLondonto
headtheSpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE),whichcontrolledsabotageand
undergroundeffortsinoccupiedFrance.
Butwhat,meanwhile,wastheoriginofMockler-Ferryman's
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terriblemistakeatKasserinePass?ItwasULTRA.AnentryofFebruary20inButcher's
previouslyunpublisheddiaryprovidessomeofthedetails:"Anexplanationofthedefeat,
asseenbyIke,liesinamisinterpretationofradiomessagesweregularlyinterceptfrom
theenemy.Thissourceisknownas'Ultra.'IthappensthatourG.2BrigadierMocklerFerryman,reliesheavilyuponthissource.Ithasfrequentlydisclosedexcellent
informationastotheintentionsoftheAxis.However,theinterpretationplacedbyG.2on
themessagesdealingwiththeplaceofattackanattackthathasbeenexpectedforseveral
daysledMockler-Ferrymantobelievethatafeintwouldbemadewheretheattackactually
occurred...andthattherealandheavyattackwouldcomeinthenorth."9
WhatButcherdidnotknowwasthatRommel'sinitialattackwasasmuchasurpriseto
vonArnimandhissuperiorsasitwastoMockler-Ferryman.Rommel,notforthefirst
time,haddisobeyedorders.10
OnMarch14,afterRommelhadbeendrivenbackbothatKasserineandthenatthe
MarethLine(andhadconsequentlyleftAfrica),IkewroteBrookeagainaboutMocklerFerryman.HesaidthathisG-2'sperformance,uptoKasserine,hadbeenoutstanding,
pointingoutspecificallythat"hisforecastoftheextentofFrenchoppositionprovedin
theeventtobemoreaccuratethanthatofanyotherauthority."IkewantedMocklerFerryman'srelieftobe"withoutprejudice."Thenheadded,"Inhissuccessor,Inowlook
foralittlemoreinquisitivenessandgreaterattentiontocheckingandcross-checking
reportsfromvarioussources."11
TheBattleofKasserinePasshasoftenbeenpointedtoasthecontestwheretheAmerican
ArmyofWorldWarIIcameofage.Greentroopsbecameveterans;newcommanders
gainedbadlyneededcombatexperience;over-cockyAmericanslearnedwhatatough
opponenttheywereupagainst.Themanwholearnedthemostwasthecommander
himself,DwightEisenhower,andoneofthemostimportantlessonshelearnedwasthat
noonesourceofinformation,nomatterhowsensational,iseverbyitselfsufficient.
Mockler-FerrymanhadbeensoconfidentofULTRA'Sinsightandtrustworthinessthathe
hadneglectedother,moretraditionalsources.AsButchernotedinhisdiary,"Ikeinsists
weneedaG.2whoisneversatisfiedwithhisinformation,whoprocuresitwithspies,
reconnaissance,andanymeansavailable."12
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IntheaftermathofKasserine,IkealsolearnedfrominterrogationofGermanprisoners
thattheenemywas"easilyandconstantly"breakingthelow-levelcodesusedbythe1st
ArmoredDivision.HedecidedthattheGermanswereprobablyasenamoredwiththis
informationasMockler-Ferryman,andthathecouldtakeadvantageofthem.Hetold
Patton,"Weshouldobviouslybutclumsilychangethecodeatfrequentintervals,sothat
theHunwillnotsuspectaplant,butneverenoughsothatitwillbeimpossibleforhimto
breakthemquickly.Aslongasnothingishurttheordersgiveninthiswayshouldbe
faithfullyexecuted(unimportantpatrols,etc.).Butwhenthetimecomesforrealsurprise,
useanerroneousorderinordertosupportyourothermeasuresofdeception.Thiseffort
shouldnotbedifficulttomakeanditmightwork!"13TheinnocentAmericanwas
learningquickly.
DespiteitsrelativefailureatKasserinePass,ULTRAwasIke'ssinglemosteffectivespy
throughoutthewar.Itproveditselfineverycampaignfrom1943onward,beginningwith
OperationHUSKY,theinvasionofSicily,Ike'ssecondamphibiousassault.Wellbefore
HUSKYwaslaunchedinJuly1943,thankstoULTRA,Eisenhowerhadacompletepicture
oftheenemy'sorderofbattleonSicilyandinItaly.Equallyvaluable,ULTRAallowed
himtopenetratetheGermanmindandjudgehowsuccessfulAllieddeceptionmeasures
hadbeen.
ThemajorattemptatdeceptionforHUSKYshowedtheBritishSecretServiceatthetop
ofitsform.Inanimaginativesubterfuge,theBritishmanagedtoconvincetheGermans
thatEisenhower'stroopswouldlandeitheronSardiniaorinGreece,ratherthanSicily.
Thissophisticateddeceptionschemewaspotentiallydecisive,becausetheGermanshad
morethanenoughtroopsscatteredthroughoutItalyandtheMediterraneantoreinforce
SicilysufficientlytoproduceanotherGallipoli.
Thestoryiswellknown-itwassuperblytoldbyEwenMontaguinhis1954book,The
ManWhoNeverWas-andneedsonlyabriefsummaryhere.ABritishSecretServiceteam
searchedtheLondonmorguestofindasuitablebody-theyneededaoncefairlyhealthy,
fairlyyoung,andcompletelyunknownman.Oncefound,theyusedoddsandendsto
givehimanidentity,abiography,ahistory.Hebecame"Captain(actingMajor)William
Martin,09560,
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RoyalMarines."Hispocketsandhisbriefcasewerestuffedwithdocuments,matches,
loosechange,loveletters,abillortwo,abankstatement,aphotoof"mom,"allprepared
withexquisitecaretoprovethatMajorMartinwasauthentic.
MajorMartinwasacourier.Hisbriefcasewasattachedtohiswristbyhandcuffs.Init
werevarioustravelordersandotherdocuments,somelabeled"MostSecret."Theplanted
materialconsistedoftwoprivateletters,onefromthevicechiefofstafftoGeneralHarold
Alexander,theoverallgroundcommanderintheMediterranean,underIke,andtheother
fromLordLouisMountbattentoAdmiralCunningham.Eachletterhintedthatthenext
operationswouldstrikeatSardiniaandGreece.
Atdawn,April30,1943,MajorMartinwasdumpedoverboardfromaBritishsubmarine
offHuelvaontheSpanishcoast.(AtthelastminuteinLondon,therehadbeenananxious
discussionaboutwhatwouldhappenifthetidefailedtosweephimtoshore.Churchill
gavehisverdict:"Youwillhavetogethimbackandgivehimanotherswim.")The
Spanishpickedhimup,openedthebriefcase,gavethedocumentstoaGerman
intelligenceagent(whophotographedthemandsentthefilmontoBerlin),replacedthe
documentsinthebriefcase,thengaveittotheBritishvice-consulinHuelva.MajorMartin
wasinterredandhisdocumentsreturnedtoLondoninthefreshlysealedbriefcase.
HadtheGermanstakenthebait?ULTRAshowedthattheyhad.FromtheWarCabinet
OfficetoChurchill,theninWashington,thesignalflashed,"Martinswallowedrod,line
andsinkerbytherightpeopleandfrombestinformationtheylooklikeactingonit."The
phrase"bestinformation"meantULTRA.14BetweenearlyMayandJuly10,thedateof
theinvasion,ULTRAprovidedmountingevidenceofthesuccessfuldeception,primarily
throughorderofbattleinformation,theareainwhichULTRAwasalwaysatitsstrongest
andmostreliable.ULTRAreportedthattheGermanshadmovedthe1stPanzerDivision
fromFrancetoGreece,thattheyhadmovedunitsfromRussiaintoGreece,that
reinforcementsfromGermanyweresentintoSardinia,andsoon.InMay,theLuftwaffe
hadhad415aircraftinSicilywith125inGreece;byJulytherewere305inGreeceand
only290inSicily.15
ULTRAwaspreciseabouttheoppositionIke'sforceswouldfaceonSicily.FieldMarshal
KesselringgaveBerlinacompleterun
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downonhisdispositions.HehadtheHermannGöringPanzerDivisiononSicily,along
withtheGerman15thPanzerDivisionandsomeItaliantroops(whowerewithout
transportationandbadlyequipped).Partofthe15thPanzerwasinPalermo,onthenorth
coast;theremainder,alongwiththeHermannGöringPanzerDivision,wasinthecenter
oftheisland,readytomoveinanydirection.Thiswaspricelessinformation,aswasIke's
knowledgethatviaULTRAhewouldbeabletolisteninontheGermanreactiontothe
landings.16
Theinitialassaultwentaccordingtoplan.OnthemorningofD-Day,fromhisadvance
headquartersonMalta,EisenhowersentacabletotheCombinedChiefs:"Fragmentary
informationobtainedmostlyfrominterceptofmessagesindicatesthatleadingwavesof
British5th,51standCanadianDivisionsareashoreandadvancing."17ULTRA,inother
words,wasgivinghimnotonlytheGermanreaction-whichwasslowandconfused-but
wasalsohisbestsourceontheimmediatetacticaldispositionsofhisowntroops.The
followingday,July11,wasthecriticaloneinthecampaign,asGermanarmorfromthe
HermannGöringDivisioncounterattackedagainstAmericanforcesatGela.ULTRAhad
providedanalert,andtheAmericanswerereadywithacombinationofsuperbnaval
gunfire,artillery,infantryaction,andtanks.TheGermanswererepulsedwithheavy
loss.18
TheoperationinSicilydidrevealULTRA'Sinescapablelimitations.TheAlliesdarednot
actonULTRAinformationthatstoodalone-i.e.,therehadtobesomeexplanationother
thanacodebreakastohowtheyfoundoutthisorthat,ortheGermanswouldrealize
whathadhappenedandchangetheircode.ChurchillandMenziesinsistedthatthose"in
theknow"hadtopromisenevertouseULTRAinformationuntilitwaspossibletopoint
tosomeothersource.
Forexample,parachutists,underthecommandofGeneralJamesGavin,droppedonto
Sicilyontheeveoftheinvasion,couldnotbetoldthattheHermannGöringDivisionwas
intheirdropzoneforfearofrevealingtheULTRAsecret.Themenwerenottoldthey
wouldencounterGermantanks.Theywerealsonotgivenantitankweapons.Theywere
toldthatthereweresomeGerman"technicians"intheareaand"nothingmore."In1979,
GeneralGavincommented,"FromtheviewpointofprotectingUltra,I
Page65
thinkthatthiswasthepropercourseforthehighcommandtotake,providedthey
equippeduswithadequateantitankweapons."19
Ifthesecurityofultrawasafirstobjective,thequestionarises,howwasULTRA
informationrelayedtothefieldcommanderssafelyandswiftly?TheBritishhadworked
outasystemofSpecialLiaisonUnits(SLUS)tospeedtheinterceptedmessagesfrom
BletchleyPark(BP),wherethedecodingandtranslatingtookplace,toChurchillandthe
generals.In1943theUnitedStatesbegantocreateitsownSLUS.Theresultwasahuge
successandanextraordinaryachievement,showingAmericansattheirbest.
TheArmy'sselectionprocesswassuperb.Itmanagedtolocatepreciselythetwodozenor
soofficerswhowereperfectforthejob.Theyhadtobeyoungandhealthy,becausethe
SLUSworkedlong,taxinghoursonintricateproblemsandbecausetheSLUShadtobe
juniorofficers,usuallycaptainsormajors,sothattheywouldnotattractattentionbytheir
rank.Theyhadtobediplomaticenoughnottooffendtheseniorgeneralstowhomthey
reported,butfirmenoughtomakesurethegeneralsheardwhattheyhadtosay(not
alwaysaseasyasitmightseem,especiallywhenPattonorClarkweretherecipients).
Menwhoareabsolutelytrustworthy,mentallyquick,tireless,andself-effacing(they
knewtherewouldbenobattlefieldpromotionsfortheminthiswar,noranyopportunity
toleadmenintocombat)arefewinnumber-butAmericahadenoughofthem,andthe
Armyfoundthem.Toaman,theydidanoutstandingjobduringthewar;toaman,they
kepttheirtrust,notoneofthemeverrevealingtheULTRAsecretorhispartinthewar.*
ItmaynotbetoomuchofanexaggerationtosaythattheULTRAsystem,fromBPtothe
SLUS,wasatriumphoftheWesterndemocraciesnearlyonaparwiththecreationofthe
atomicbomb.
TelfordTaylorheadedtheAmericanSLUeffort.Hislatercareer,aswastrueofallthe
SLUS,wasmarkedbysuccessaftersuc*Inaninterviewin1979,formerSLUStuyvesantWainwrightIIagreedthatitwasremarkablethat
thesecretwaskeptsolong.Heexplained,"Don'tforgetweallsignedtheBritishSecrecyAct.
Haveyoueverseenone?Itpracticallysaysyourtesticleswillbecutoffandyou'llspendtherestof
yourlifeinthelocalclinkifyouopenyourmouth,thatyouwouldpracticallydisappearina
StalinistcampinNorthernSiberiaifanythingcameoutaboutULTRA....Itneveroccurredtome
todiscussituntilthirtyyearslater.Ineverdiscusseditwithmywife.Shealwayswantedtoknow
whatIhaddoneandInevertoldher."
Page66
cess.TaylorwastheprosecutorattheNurembergWarCrimesTrialsandlatera
distinguishedauthorandprofessoroflawatColumbiaUniversity.Hisyoungmen,
selectedforbrainsandabilityratherthanrankorbackground,includedWilliamBundy,
whobecameAssistantSecretaryofState;AlfredFriendly,whobecamemanagingeditor
oftheWashingtonPost;JohnOakes,whobecameaneditoroftheNewYorkTimes;
LangdonvanNorden,abusinessmanwhobecamechairmanoftheMetropolitanOpera
Association;CurtZimansky,anotedphilologist;YorkeAllen,oftheRockefellerBrothers
Fund;StuyvesantWainwrightII,four-termcongressman;LewisPowell,AssociateJustice
oftheU.S.SupremeCourt;JosiahMacy,vicepresidentofPanAmericanAirways;and
AdolphRosengarten,whowasalittleolderthantheothersbutstillhadasuccessful
postwarcareer,firstasadirectoroftheFidelityPhiladelphiaTrustCompany,then-in
1975,atageseventyearninghisPh.D.inhistoryfromtheUniversityofPennsylvania.
ClearlytheSLUSwereoutstandingjuniorofficers.20
TheSLUSservedinanewArmyorganization,SpecialBranchoftheMilitaryIntelligence
Service.Indefiningtheirresponsibilities,GeneralMarshallinsisted,withoutanyquestion
ofmisinterpretation,thattheseofficerswereinaspecialcategoryandthatthegeneralsin
commandmustallowthem(nomatterhowyoungorunmilitary)thenecessaryscopeand
authority.
MarshallgavehisSLUSmorelatitude,anddemandedofthemagreatdealmore,than
theirBritishcounterparts.IntheBritishsystem,theSLUSwereonlyglorifiedmessengers
whohandedonthecompleteULTRAinterceptstotheirsuperiors.Underthesystemthat
MarshallandTaylorcreated,theAmericanSLUSsynthesized,summarized,and
interpretedtheintercepts.AsMarshallputit,''Theirprimaryresponsibilitywillbeto
evaluateUltraintelligence,presentitinusableformtotheCommandingofficer,assistin
fusingUltrawithintelligencederivedfromothersources,andgiveadviceinconnection
withmakingoperationaluseofUltraintelligenceinsuchfashionthatthesecurityofthe
sourceisnotendangered."21AsLewinnotes,"Thisdirectivewassocomprehensiveand
permissivethatitallowedandindeedencouragedtherepresentativetothinkofhimselfas
akindofprivateintelligencecenter."22AstheSLUSwere,infact,forinthefieldeach
hadhisowntent,van,ortrailerasanoffice-undercontinuousguard-in
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whichhissafecontainedULTRApapersplusagreatdealmoreinformation.
Totrainthesemen,TaylorfirstofallsentthemtoBP,wheretheysaw10,000ofthemost
valuablepeopleintheBritishEmpireatwork.Theyweredeeplyimpressed.Theexposure
oftheSLUStotheinnerworkingsofBPmeantthattheyunderstoodthemagnitudeand
significanceofwhatULTRAofferedinawaythatfewfieldcommanderscould.
Inaddition,TaylorcarefullyindoctrinatedtheSLUSinallaspectsofintelligence
gathering,whichgavethemaperspectivethatwascrucialtotheireffectiveness.The
temptationtorelycompletelyonULTRAwasalwaysthere,butusuallyspurned.In1978,
Rosengartenwrote,"IamboldtosaythatUltrawasprimusinterpares,someofthetime
butnotallofthetime,amongthesourcesofinformationwhichwereavailabletoour
section.Thesewereprincipallyprisoners,civilianswhocrossedtheline,airphotography,
andlowleveldeciphering."23
Rosengarten'spointwasmadeoverandoveragainbytheAmericanSLUS.Afterthewar,
Taylorhadeachofhismenansweralongquestionnaireabouttheirexperiences.Inhis
summaryofthesereports,Taylornotedthat"theneedforcarefulstudyofallsourcesof
intelligencewasstressedbymostoftherepresentatives."Everythingthatthecommanding
general'sG-2sectionknew,theSLUSknew,becausehemadeithisbusinesstoreadall
paperspassingthroughtheG-2situationroom.ThisenabledhimtofuseULTRAwith
otherintelligence.
OneSLUwrote,"ItismosteasyfortheUltrarepresentativetoallowhimselftobecome
isolatedfromthemainstreamoftheintelligencesection,sothathelosesawarenessof
whatothersourcesareproducing.Anotherfacileerror,inducedbyinertia,istopermit
Ultratobecomeasubstituteforanalysisandevaluationofotherintelligence.Thetwo
easyerrors,isolationfromothersourcesandtheconvictionthatUltrawillprovideall
neededintelligence,areindeedtheScyllaandCharybdisoftherepresentative.Ultramust
belookedonasoneofanumberofsources;itmustnotbetakenasaneatlypackaged
replacementfortediousworkwithotherevidence."24
AnotherpointTaylorstressedinhisfinalreportwasthatULTRA'S"normalfunctionwas
toenabletheSLUSandhisrecipients
Page68
toselectthecorrectinformationfromthehugemassofP/W,agent,reconnaissance,and
photographicreports.Ultrawastheguideandthecensortoconclusionsarrivedatby
meansofotherintelligence;atthesametimethelatterwasasecurevehiclebywhichUltra
couldbedisseminatedundercover."25
Aswillbeseen,thesystemTaylorcreatedworkedwell.TimeandagainhisSLUSwere
abletogetcrucialinformationtotheircommandersintimefordecisiveaction.Most
SLUShadadailybriefingforthegeneral;someheldtwobriefings;allhadroundtheclockaccesstothegeneraliftheyhadaninterceptthatcalledforimmediateaction.It
wasAnglo-Americancooperationatitsmosthighlydeveloped-recallthatalldecodingand
translatingwasdonebyBritishatBP-andastheGermanscantestify,itwasremarkably
effective.AsLewinconcludes,"AftertheAmericansfirstbecamefullyinvolvedinUltra
theyenteredintoanenormousinheritancewhichtheydidnotsquander."26
IftheSLUSwerethepickofAmerica'syoungmen,Donovan'sOSSagentswere
supposedtobealmostasgood.ButinSicily,andthenduringtheinvasionofItalyin
September1943,theOSSwasofnohelptoIke,unlessitwastoprovidesomecomic
relief.
ColonelDonovanclaimedthattheOSShadproveditselfinNorthAfricaandthatit
shouldthereforebegivenafreehandinSicilyandItaly.Henearlygotit,althoughIke
wasabletostoponeortwoharebrainedschemesbeforetheygotstarted.InlateJune,for
example,DonovanwantedtosendanOSSteamtoSicilyforsabotageoperations,but
whenEisenhowerlearnedoftheplanhevetoedit,ontheobviousgroundsthatsendingin
agentsatsolateadatewouldalertGermancoastaldefenses.
DonovanranafarmoreseriousriskonD-DayforHUSKYwhenhewentashorewith
Patton'stroopstodirecttheeffortsofhistenmanOSSunitforSicily.Howithappenedis
amystery,exceptthatDonovansomehowmanagedtodoitwithoutIkefindingout.It
wasabitofmadness,obviously,foramanwhoknewallaboutULTRA,theatomic
bomb,theBritishSecretServiceorganizationforFrance,nottomentiontheOSSsecrets,
toputhimselfinapositionwherehemightbecaptured.AnthonyCaveBrown,theBritish
journalist,comments,"ThisrashbehavioronthepartofseniorOSSofficialswasoneof
therootcausesoftheintensesuspicionwith
Page69
whichtheBritishsecretserviceswerenowcomingtoregardtheirAmericancomrades-inarms."27
ItwasprobablyinevitablethattheAmericanGovernment'ssecretagencies,initiallythe
OSSandthentheCIA,wouldfindoccasiontoworkinclosecooperationwithanother
secretorganizationthatalsohadnearlyunlimitedfunds,theMafia.Ithappenedfirstin
1943duringtheSiciliancampaign.AssistantNewYorkDistrictAttorneyMurrayGurfein,
atthattimeattachedtotheOfficeofNavalIntelligence(ONI),lateranOSScolonelin
Europe,andeventuallyafederaljudgeinNewYork,madeadealwithMafiachief
"Lucky"Luciano.Lucianowasinprisonforcrimesconcerningprostitution.Thedealwas
thatiftheMafiainSicilycooperatedwiththeOSStheretoprovideinformation,theONI
wouldgethimoutofprison.Althoughnoconcreteevidencehasbeenproducedto
indicatethattheMafiaturnedoverintelligenceofanyvalue,onthedayWorldWarII
endedinEurope,ONIsentapetitionforexecutiveclemencyforLucianotoGovernor
ThomasE.DeweyofNewYork.ThepetitionsaidLucianohad"cooperatedwithhigh
militaryauthorities"andhadrendered"adefiniteservicetothewareffort."Dewey
approvedtheappealandLucianowasletoutofprisonanddeportedfromtheUnited
States.28
AstheMafiaconnectionindicated,theAmericanshadatremendouspotentialadvantage
incarryingoutspyinginItalymillionsofAmericanswerefromItalyorsecond-generation
immigrantswithclosepersonaltiestotheoldcountry.Speakingthelanguageperfectly,
knowingthecountryanditswaysthoroughly,theItalian-Americanswereidealagents.
Donovanhadgonedeepintothemilitarytofindvolunteers;theleaderofhisSicilyunit
wasMaxCorvo,aU.S.ArmyprivateofSiciliandescent.Corvointurnrecruitedtwelve
Sicilian-Americansandtwoyounglawyerstobecomerecruitersandorganizers.OneOSS
manwhohelpedtrainthelargergrouprememberedthemas"toughlittleboysfromNew
YorkandChicago,withafewlivehoodsmixedin....Theironedesirewastogetover
totheoldcountryandstartthrowingknives."Oneortwohadbeenrecruiteddirectly
fromtheranksofMurder,Inc.,andthePhiladelphia"PurpleGang."29Theydidnot,
unfortunately,meetexpectations.AlthoughCorvo'sgroupdidrecruitonSicily,theywere
unabletofindasufficientnumberofSicilianswho,inthewordsofoneOSSwit,were
willing"totakeashotattheirrelatives."30
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OSShadalltheproblemsofaneworganization,compoundedbythefactthatithadmore
agentsandmoremoneytospendthanitcoulduseeffectively.Theresultwasitsown
privatewar,ofteneitheratoddswiththeaimsoftherealwaroraduplicationofeffort.
DuringtheinvasionofItaly,OSSagentsdashedoffonmissionswithouttheknowledge
orapprovalofEisenhower'sheadquarters.ItwastheonlytimeinthewarthatIkeallowed
thistohappenduringtheNormandylandingsninemonthslaternothingwentonthathe
hadnotpersonallyapproved-anditappearstohavebeenaresultofDonovan's
enthusiasmplusFDR'sstrongbackingofDonovan.
TheabsenceofcommunicationbetweenOSSandtheregularforceswasthecauseofan
absurdmix-uponD-DayatSalerno.A"MacGregorunit"(OSScodenameforasabotage
team),consistingofPeterTompkins,JohnShahhen,andMarcelloGirosi,commandeered
ahigh-speedBritishmotorboat.TheyhadawildplottoreachtheItalianNaval
Command,theretoforcetheItalianadmiralstoturntheirfleetovertotheAllies.What
theydidnotknowwasthatthesecretsurrendernegotiationswiththeItalians,whichhad
beengoingonforsomeweeks,hadalreadymadearrangementsforturningoverthefleet,
whichwasindeedsailingatthatmomenttosurrendertotheBritishatMalta.
Elsewheretheninety-manOSSdetachmentforItaly,commandedbyColonelDonald
Downes,didsomegoodservice.WadingashoreonD-Day,theagentsmanagedtoexploit
theearlyconfusioninordertoinfiltratethroughenemylines,makecontactwith
resistancegroups,andrecruitspies.Anoccasionalpieceofhelpfulinformationcameout
ofthiseffort.31
Beforemuchcouldbeaccomplished,however,Donovancameontothesceneto
reorganizetheunit.HehadDownesjoinhimonatypicalDonovanexpedition-ajauntto
theIsleofCapri,justacrossthebayfromNaples,whichwasstillheldbytheGermans.
Onthewayover,DonovantoldDownesthatColonelEddyhadtakenillandwouldbe
replacedinAlgiersbyaWestPointcolonel.Anothercolonel,ElleryHuntington,Jr.,a
WallStreetlawyerandformerYalequarterback,wouldtakeDownes'placeasheadofthe
OSSdetachmentinItaly.Downeswouldstayinthecountry,butonlyaschiefof
counterintelligence.Finally,DonovansaidthatinthefuturetheOSSwouldhaveto
followthePresident'spoliticalline,whichinItalymeantthattheOSScouldworkonly
withorre
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cruitItalianswhopledgedtheirloyaltytotheKing,VictorEmmanuel.
AllthiswasrathertoomuchfortheidealisticDownes,whotoldDonovanpoint-blank
thathewouldnotserveunderHuntington,"agood-naturedincompetent"whohadbeena
keyfundraiserforDonovanin1932whenDonovanranforgovernorofNewYork.As
tothepoliticaldirective,heaskedDonovan,"HowcouldwebetrayalltheItalian
democrats,almosttoamanrabidlyantiHouseofSavoy,byinsistingthattheyswear
allegiancetotheridiculouslittlekingwhohadsaddledthemwithfascismandthumped
forMussoliniuntilmilitarydefeatwasinevitable?"
TheyarrivedatCapri,whereaMacGregorteamwasplottinganewdaredeviloperationto
rescueanItalianscientistfromGerman-occupiedItaly.Capriwaspeaceful."Elegant
ladiesinsunsuitsandbighatsstrolledaboutfollowedbytheirlittledogsandgigolos.
Thesmarthotelswereopenandatcafetablestheindolentconversationoftheidlerich
wastobeheard."ToDownes'amazement,Donovanannouncedthathisfirstobjective
wastovisitthevillaofMonaWilliams,wifeofaprominentNewYorkutilitiesmagnate
whohadmadethesecondlargestcontributiontoDonovan's1932campaign.Donovan
explainedthathehadpromisedtoprotecthermagnificentresorthomefrombeing"ruined
byalotofBritishenlistedpersonnel."HetoldDownestogetonit.Downesrepliedcurtly,
"Idon'twanttofightawarprotectingMrs.Williams'pleasuredome."Thatnight,
DonovanorderedDownestogetoutofItalyandstayout.32
ThecontrastbetweenTaylor'sSLUSandDonovan'sOSScouldscarcelyhavebeen
greater.Theonewasprofessional,serious,efficient,dedicated,andself-effacing,while
theotherwasamateur,comic,unproductive,andself-serving.
TheItaliancampaignwas,fortheAllies,themostfrustratingofthewar.Hopeswerehigh
andexpendituresofmenandequipmentwereheavy,butresultswereslim.InAugust,
threeweeksbeforetheinvasion,ULTRArevealedthatHitlerhaddecidedtopulloutof
southernandcentralItaly.HewantedKesselringtobringhisdivisionsnorthandputthem
underRommel,whohadtakenovercommandinnorthernItaly.Asthisplanseemedto
makegoodstrategicsense,andbecausetheItalianswerenegotiatingsecretlywithIke's
chiefofstaff,BedellSmith,andhisG-2,Ken
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Strong,topulladouble-crossontheGermans,Eisenhowerexpectedarelatively
unopposedlandingatSalerno.Whathegotwassomeofthetoughestfightingofthewar,
andanotherlessonintheperilsofunduerelianceonULTRA.
ItiswidelybelievedthatHitlerkeptatightcontrolonthevariousWehrmachtbattlefields,
retainingforhimselftherighttomakenotonlystrategicbutalsotacticaldecisions.That
mayhavebeengenerallytrueontheRussianfront,butelsewheretheGermangenerals
seemtohavebeenabletousetheirownjudgmentandevenflauntHitler'sdirectorders.If
itworked,theygotawaywithit.ForKesselring,inItaly,itworked.
KesselringdidnotlikeRommelandlikedevenlesstheprospectofturninghistroops
overtoRommel'scommand.Further,KesselringbelievedthatRomecouldbe
successfullydefended.Hethereforedelayedandobstructedthemovementofhistroops
northward,sothatwhentheattackcameonSeptember9hestillhadthebulkofhis
forcessouthofRome.AgainstHitler'sbetterjudgmentandcontrarytohisorders,
Kesselringdecidedtolaunchanall-outcounterattackagainsttheAlliedbeachheadat
Salerno.ULTRArevealedonlyalittleofKesselring'smovements,mainlybecausethe
GermanshadrelativelysecuretelephonelinesinItalyandthusdidnotneedtousethe
radio.33
ULTRAcouldprovideonlyaninsightintotheenemy'splans,intentions,andcapabilities.
Itcouldnotprovidefightingmen,tanks,planes,ships,oraggressivegenerals.AtSalerno,
MarkClarkhadexpectedacakewalk.Instead,histroopswereunderterrificpressure
fromtheGermansinwhatwasoneofthemostdangerousmomentsoftheentirewarfor
theAlliedarmiesinEurope.Anarmyoftwocorps,withfourdivisions,wasontheverge
ofannihilation.IkereceivedamessagefromClarkthatindicatedthatClarkwasaboutto
puthisheadquartersonboardship.ItmadeIkealmostfrantic.HetoldButcherthatthe
headquartersshouldleavelast,thatClarkoughttoshowthespiritofanavalcaptainand
ifnecessarygodownwithhisship.LiketheRussiansatStalingrad,heshouldstandand
fight.
Fortunately,Clarkstayed,rescuedbytheAlliednavalandairforces.Eisenhowerput
everybomberintheMediterraneantoworkpoundingtheGermanforcesatSalerno,and
broughtintheBritishNavytobombardtheGermanpositionswiththeirbignavalguns.34
Meanwhile,Monty'sEighthArmywascomingupfromthetoeof
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ItalyafteranunopposedcrossingfromSicilytoItalyovertheStraitsofMessina,a
crossingsupportedbyanall-outartillerybarragethatwascomic-operastuff.Theonly
casualtywasanescapedlionfromtheReggiozoo.35Kesselringreluctantlydecidedthat
hisattempttothrowtheAlliesbackintotheseahadfailed,andhesignaledHitlerULTRA
pickeditupthathewaswithdrawingtoalinejustnorthofNaples.Hitlerapprovedhewas
muchimpressedbyKesselring'sresistancetodateandEisenhowerbreathedasighof
relief.
InthecampaigninItalythatfollowed,ULTRAcontinuedtoprovidetheAllied
commanderswithhigh-gradeinformation.Why,then,didthecampaigngosobadly?The
majorreasonwastheGermansthemselves,whofoughtskillfullyandfanaticallyin
mountainousterrainideallysuitedtotheirdefensivegenius.Anotherfactorof
considerableimportancewasthattheAllieddivisionswerebeingsteadilywithdrawn
fromtheMediterraneantogotoEnglandtoprepareforthe1944invasionofFrance.A
thirdfactorwasincompetentAllied,especiallyAmerican,generalship.
NowheredidthisincompetenceshowmoreclearlythanintheAnziolandingsofJanuary
1944.Briefly,theideawastogetanAmericancorpsbehindKesselring'slinesinorderto
cuthiscommunicationswithRomeandthusforcehimtoretreattonorthernItaly.
Churchillsaidhewantedtohurlawildcatashore;whathegotinstead,helater
complained,wasastrandedwhale.TheAmericanssatatAnziowhiletheGermans
poundedthemdayafterday,weekafterweek.Intheend,farfromforcingKesselringto
pullback,thetroopsatAnziohadtoberescuedbyAlliedforcescomingupfromthe
south.
Whowastoblame?MarkClarkpointedtoULTRA.Hesaidthathisforceswouldhave
movedinlandonthefirstday,thuseffectivelycuttingKesselring'ssupplyline,but
ULTRAinformationindicatedthattheGermansweremovingmajorunitsintotheregion
andthatthereforehismenhadtodigintoawaittheassault.Thisclaimhasmadevarious
Britishwritersfurious,andrightlyso.LewinshowsconclusivelythattheULTRA
informationwasabsolutelysound,thatitdidindicateaGermanbuildupagainstthe
beachhead,butthatitalsoshowedthatitwouldtaketwoorthreedaysfortheGermansto
gettothescene.Meanwhile,Clark'smensatandthecampaignwaslostbeforeitgot
started.36
Bythen,IkehadlefttheMediterranean.Roosevelthadselected
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himtobetheSupremeCommander,AlliedExpeditionaryForcesoneofthemostcoveted
commandsinthehistoryofwarfare.InEngland,hewouldhaveavailabletohimforthe
cross-Channelattacktheresourcesofthetwogreatdemocracies,includingthousandsof
warplanesandshipsandmillionsoffightingmen.
Bynomeanstheleastoftheresourcesunderhiscommandwerethesecretones,which
hadbeenbuiltwithsuchskillandpatiencebytheBritish(andlatertheAmericans)forthe
momentwhenthedemocracieswouldhurltheirarmedmightacrosstheChannel.These
secretresourcesincludedguerrillaforcesinFrance,sabotageunits,BritishandAmerican
spies,turnedGermanspiesinBritain,ULTRA,andcountlessdeceptiondevices.Success
inOVERLORDwoulddependnotonlyonhowwellIkeusedhisships,planes,and
fightingmen,butalsoonhowwellhemanagedhissecretforces.
Page75
ChapterSix
TheSecretSideofOVERLORD
JANUARY15,1944.Eisenhower'staskisstaggering.Forcesunderhiscommandhave
totransport176,000fightingmen,coveredbythousandsofairplanes,carriedin
thousandsofships,acrosstheEnglishChannelontothecoastofFranceinoneday,
withoutlettingtheGermansknowinadvancewhereorwhenthismightyhostwill
makeitsassault.Becauseofanotherrequirement,thatofmakingtheGermansbelieve
thattheattackwillcomeatsomepointotherthantheactualsite,thealreadydifficult
assignmentisnearlyimpossible.
ItputstoograndafaceonittosaythatthefutureofWesterncivilizationwasatstake,but
thatisnotfarwrong.OVERLORDwasatremendousgamble.BritainandAmericawere
puttingeverythingtheycouldintoitinadisplayofunityofpurposenotseenbeforeor
sinceineithercountry.Thebetwasthatthewholeofthiseffortcouldbeconcentratedon
oneoperation,andthattheoperationwouldbedecisive.FailureinOVERLORDwould
meanthelossofthebet,andthesizeofthebetwasstupendous,afortuneinmenand
matérielcarefullybuiltupbytheBritishandAmericansoverthepasttwoyears.
EisenhowerandHitlerbothknewwhatwasatstake.Inoneofhisfirstmessagestothe
CombinedChiefsinhiscapacityasSupremeCommander,AlliedExpeditionaryForce,
Eisenhowerdeclared,"ThisoperationmarksthecrisisoftheEuropeanwar.Every
obstaclemustbeovercome,everyinconveniencesuffered
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andeveryriskruntoensurethatourblowisdecisive.Wecannotaffordtofail.''1
Ataboutthesametime,Hitlerwassaying,"Thedestructionoftheenemy'slanding
attemptmeansmorethanapurelylocaldecisionontheWesternFront.Itisthesole
decisivefactorinthewholeconductofthewar."2
Everycommanderhopestosurprisehisenemy,butinIke'scasesurprisewascrucial,
becausehewasontheoffensivewithforcesthatwerenumericallywoefullyinferior.Ike's
onegreatmaterialadvantagewasAlliedairsuperiority.Ontheground,theGermanshad
fifty-ninedivisionsinFrance,whiletheinitialAlliedassaultwouldbeonlyseven
divisionsstrong.BynomeanswerethoseGermandivisionscontemptiblegarrison
troopstheywerearmedwiththelatestweapons,includingtanks,andtheirmoralewas
high.ManywereveteransoftheEasternfront.TheAlliesthereforeneededtodobetter
thansimplysurprisetheenemytheyhadtoinduceHitlertomovethebestofhisunits,
especiallythepanzerdivisions,awayfromtheinvasionsite,andkeepthemaway.
Toaccomplishthisseeminglyimpossibleobjective,Ikewasfortunatetohaveworkingfor
himthebestspiesintheworld,themenandwomenoftheBritishSecretService.While
theAmericanfactoriesproducedlandingcrafttocarrythetroopsacrosstheChannel,the
BritishintelligentsiacompletelyfooledtheGermansastowherethoselandingcraftwould
comeashore.BritishbrainsandAmericanbrawnmadeOVERLORDasmashingsuccess.
Howitwasdonemakesaremarkablestory.
Itbegan,forIke,withhisarrivalinLondonlateonJanuary15,1944,toassume
commandoftheSupremeHeadquarters,AlliedExpeditionaryForce(SHAEF).On
Marshall'sorders,hehadlefttheMediterraneantwoweeksearlierandtakenashort
vacationwithhiswife,Mamie,atWhiteSulphurSprings,WestVirginia.Hismovements
hadbeenkeptsecretfromthepressandpublic,andaheavysecurityblankethadbeen
laidonforhisarrivalinLondon.Whenhegotthere,fortunately,aLondonpea-souper
tookcareofsecurity.TwomenhadtoleadthewayforIke'scarandtheygotlostinthe
distancebetweencurb,car,andthefrontdoorof20GrosvenorSquare.3
Eisenhowerhadreturnedtohisoldheadquartersofthesummer
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of1942.OnlythemostseniorgovernmentandmilitaryofficialsinBritainknewthathe
wasthere,anditwasnearlyaweekbeforeapublicannouncementwasmade.Butalmost
assoonashearrived,aGermanspy,codenameTate,managedtosendaradioreportto
hiscontrollerinHamburgthatthenewsupremecommanderhadtakenuphisdutiesin
London.Itwasanintelligencecoupofthefirstmagnitude.4
TatereceivedhisinformationfromGeneralStewartMenzies,headoftheBritishSecret
Service.AfewdayslaterMenziesexplainedtoEisenhowerwhyitwasthattheAbwehr,
theintelligencearmoftheGermanGeneralStaff,wastoldofhisarrivalandnew
commandwhentheinformationwaskeptsecretfromtheBritishandAmericanpeople.
Ikelistened,incredulous,asMenziesoutlinedforhimtheactivitiesoftheLondon
ControllingSectionandtheworkingsoftheDouble-CrossSystem.
SectionBI-A,thecounterespionagearmofMI-5,theBritishinternalsecurityagency,had
locatedeveryGermanspyintheBritishIsles.EachhadbeenevaluatedbySirJohn
Masterman,formeruniversitydonandavidcricketer,whoservedduringthewarashead
ofBI-A.IfMastermanthoughtthemanunsuitableforanyreason,hewaseitherexecuted
orimprisoned.Therestwere"turned,"thatis,madeintodouble-agents.Theycontinued
toreportbyradiototheAbwehr,butonlyunderthedirectsupervisionoftheir
controllers,whowereBI-Aagents.ThequeriesthespiesreceivedfromBerlin,alongwith
ULTRAintercepts,providedaconstantfeedbackandcheckonhowwelltheDoubleCrossSystemwasfunctioning.AsMastermanlaterclaimed,correctly,"Forthegreater
partofthewarwedidmuchmorethanpractisealarge-scaledeceptionthroughdouble
agents:bymeansofthedouble-agentsystemweactivelyranandcontrolledtheGerman
espionagesysteminthiscountry."5
Tatewasonlyoneofmorethanadozendouble-agentsunderMasterman'scontrol,buthe
wastypicalenough.HehadlandedbyparachuteinSeptember1940,beenpickedup
almostimmediately,brokedownunderinterrogation,andagreedtoworkfortheBritish
(hisalternativewasafiringsquad).Hetransmittedandreceivedmessagestoandfrom
HamburgfromOctober1940untilthedaytheAlliesoverranHamburginMay1945.The
Abwehrsenthimlargesumsofmoney(hekeptdemandingmore)andawardedhimthe
IronCross,FirstandSecondClass.Meanwhilehemergedwith
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theBritishpublic,workingasanewspaperphotographer,andevenmanagedtoget
himselfonthevotingrolls,whichin1945gavehimanopportunityofvotingforor
againstMr.Churchill.Regrettably,Mastermanwouldnotallowhimtoexercisethat
privilege.
MenziestoldIkethatfromthemomenttheDouble-CrossSystemcameintobeing,the
BritishhaddecidedtoaimitexclusivelytowardthatmomentwhentheAlliesreturnedto
France.Inthedarkdaysof1940,controlofGermanspiesandULTRAwerethetwomost
preciouspossessionstheBritishheld,andtheydidnotintendtosquanderthemforshorttermgains.Displayingimpressivepatience,theBritishhadnotusedthespiesfor
purposesofdeceivingtheGermans,onlycontrollingwhatinformationtheygot.Even
moreimpressive,theBI-AriskedprovidingtheAbwehrwithauthenticinformationvia
thespies,informationthatwouldnototherwisehavebeenavailabletotheenemy.The
LondonControllingSection(LCS),abranchoftheJointPlanningStaff(oftheBritish
ChiefsofStaff),wasresponsibleforthedevisingandcoordinatingstrategiccoverand
deceptionsschemes.ItmadethedecisionastowhatinformationtogivetotheGermans.
Itwasacomplexgame.WhattheBritishtoldtheGermansthroughtheturnedagentshad
tobeauthentic,new,andinteresting,buteitherrelativelyunimportantorsomethingthat
theGermanswereboundtodiscoverinanycase.Theideawastomaketheagent
trustworthyandvaluableintheeyesoftheGermans,sothatwhenthesuprememoment
came,onD-Day,theagentscouldbeusedtodeceivetheenemyintothinkingtheattack
wascomingsomeplaceotherthantheactualsite.AsMastermanwrotein1972,inhis
bookTheDouble-CrossSystem,"Wealwaysexpectedthatatsomeonemomentallthe
agentswouldberecklesslyandgladlyblownskyhighincarryingoutthegrand
deception,andthatthisonegreatcoupwouldbothrepayusmanytimesoverforallthe
effortsofthepreviousyearsandbringourworktoanend."6
Double-agents,eventriple-agents,areasoldaswaritself,butneverbeforehadallthe
spiesinonecountrybeenturned.IkegrinnedasMenziessketchedouttohimsomeofthe
possibilitiesfordeception,andnoddedhisunderstandingasMenziesexplainedthatthe
supersecuritysurroundingIke'smovementsthepastcoupleofweeks,andTate'smessage
tohiscontrollerinHamburgonIke'sappointmenttothesupremecommandandhis
arrivalinLondon,wereanintegral,althoughsmall,partofthescheme.Masterman
Page79
wantedBerlintothinkthatTatehadhigh-levelcontactsinsideSHAEFitself,andgiving
HamburgascooponEisenhower'sappearanceinLondonwasexactlythekindof
informationtheBritishlikedtogivetheGermans.Itwasexcitingnews,itmadeTate(and
hiscontroller)lookgood,itgavetheGermanssomethingtogossipabout,butitwas,in
theend,ofnorealmilitaryvalue.
So,whenEisenhowertookuphispost,hegotnotonlytheBritishArmy,Navy,andAir
Forcetohelphimaccomplishhisobjective,buttheuseofeveryGermanspyinBritain.
Thequestionwas,howtousethisinvaluableassettodeceivetheGermans.Beforethis
querycouldbeanswered,theAllieshadfirstofalltodecidewhereandwhenandinwhat
strengththeyweregoingtoland,whatothermeansofdeceptionwereavailabletothem,
andhowthesemeanscouldbeused.
Thewholeplanhadtobeinternallyconsistent,aunifiedandbelievableoperation.The
AlliescouldhardlyhopetomaketheGermansbelievethattheassaultwasnotcomingin
1944-alltheworldknewthatitwas-orthatitwouldcomeashorefarfromtheactualsite,
becauseitwasarelativelysimplematterforGermanintelligencetofigureoutthe
maximumdistanceatwhichfighterairplanecovercouldbesupplied,andthusdefinethe
limitsofpossibleinvasionsites.Further,theGermanshadgoodmilitarysenseand,fora
varietyoffairlyobviousreasons,theyknewthattheattackwouldcomesomewhere
betweentheCotentinPeninsulaandDunkirk.
IkehadlongagoselectedNormandyasthesite.Backin1942,beforethedecisionto
invadeNorthAfricahadbeenmade,Eisenhowerhadbeenplanningacross-Channel
attackfor1943.AtthattimehechoseNormandyasthetargetfornumerousreasons-the
proximityoftheportofCherbourgforunloadingpurposes,thenarrownessofthe
CotentinPeninsula,thenatureoftheterrain,andtheaccesstothemajorroadnetworkat
Caen-butthemajorfactorhadbeensurprise.ForallNormandy'sadvantages,thePasde
Calaishadevenmore.Itseemedtheobvioustarget-itwasclosetoAntwerp,Europe'sbest
port,andclosertoGermanyandtotheBritishhomebase,andinlandtheterrainwas
good-butpreciselybecauseitwassoobvious,theGermanshadtheirstrongestdefenses
there.ThateliminatedthePasdeCalaisasatarget,asfarasIkewasconcerned,adecision
thatremainedinforce
Page80
whenhetookcommandofthecross-ChanneloperationagaininJanuary1944.
TheaimofOVERLORDwastogetashoreandstay.Onceasolidbeachheadwas
established,thewarwasasgoodaswonbecauseAmericanproductivitywould
overwhelmtheGermans.Butlandingcraft,alwaysshortbecausetheyweresobadly
neededinthePacificaswellasintheAtlanticTheater,weresufficienttoliftonlyfive
divisionstoFranceonD-Day.Thefollow-upcapacitywasalsolimited,painfullyso.
Togetashore,IkeabsolutelyhadtofooltheGermansintobelievingthathewaslanding
somewhereotherthanNormandy;tostayashore,heneededtofoolthemintobelieving
thatOVERLORDwasafeint.Otherwise,theGermanswoulddrawontheirnearlyten-toonemanpowerandarmoredsuperiorityinFrancetomountacounterattackofsuch
proportionsassurelytodrivetheAlliesbackintotheseawhencetheycame.Theair
forcescouldhelpkeeptheGermansawayfromNormandybyblowingupbridgesand
railroadfacilities,butbythemselvestheAlliedplanescouldnotkeeppanzerdivisions
immobilized.Onlyasuccessfuldeceptioncoulddothat.
FoolingtheGermanswouldnotbeeasy-theGermansthemselveswereexpertsat
deception.Atthebeginningof1942theyhadmountedoneofthemoreelaborateand
successfuloperationsofWorldWarII,OperationKreml.Itsobjectivewastomakethe
RussiansthinkthatthemainGermanoffensivefor1942wouldtakeplaceontheMoscow
front,notatStalingrad.AsEarlZiemkewrites,Kreml"wasapaperoperation,anout-andoutdeception,butithadthesubstancetomakeitamasterpieceofthathighlyspeculative
formofmilitaryart."Tomakeitappearreal,theGermanHighCommanddidnotinform
divisioncommandersandtheirstaffsthatitwasaphony,dependingontheskillofSoviet
intelligenceofficerstopickuphintsandfindthepiecestofittogetherintoapicture.They
usedfalseradiotraffictomanufacturedummyarmiesthatsupposedlythreatened
Moscow.
TheGermansweresuccessful,probablyevenmoresuccessfulthantheythemselves
realized,inanoperationthatinmostofitsessentialswassimilartoFORTITUDE(code
namefortheOVERLORDdeceptionplan).Infact,KremlwasexactlylikeFORTITUDE
inoneespeciallycrucialaspect-bothaimedtomaketheenemybelievetheattackwould
comeatthemostlogicalspot.Thatis,inthe
Page81
springof1942,MoscowwasamoresensibletargetthanStalingrad,justasin1944thePas
deCalaiswasamoresensibletargetthanNormandy.7
ThePasdeCalaiswastheobviouschoiceforthefalsetargetforNormandybecausethe
Germanswerealreadyinclinedtobelievethatitwouldbethelandingsite.Thetaskwas
toreinforcethatbelief,strengthenit,hardenituntilitbecameadogmawithbothHitler
andtheGermanGeneralStaff.GeographyreinforcedIke'schoiceofNormandy,withthe
PasdeCalaisasthefeint,becauseHitlerwouldnotkeeptroopsinNormandyfollowing
majorlandingsatthePasdeCalaisforfearoftheirbeingcutofffromGermany.Buthe
mightbepersuadedtokeeptroopsinthePasdeCalaisafteralandinginNormandy,for
theywouldstillbebetweentheAlliedforcesandGermany.
TheexecutionofFORTITUDEinvolvedthousandsofmenandwomenindozensof
distincttasksandroles.FORTITUDEincludeddummyarmies,fakeradiotraffic,false
spyreports,andelaboratesecurityprecautions.Itwasajointventure,withBritishand
Americanofficersworkingtogetherincompleteharmony.Intermsofthetime,resources,
andenergydevotedtoit,FORTITUDEwasuniqueinthehistoryofwarfareneverbefore
hadanycommandergonetosuchlengthsorexpensetodeceivehisenemy.
TheBritishandAmericangovernmentshadgivenIketremendousresourcestodraw
upon.Thisvastforceneededasingleguidinghead.Someonehadtogiveitdirection;
someonehadtotakealltheinformationgathered,makesenseofit,andimposeorderon
it;someonehadtomaintainagriponallthevariousactsofsubterfugegoingonatonce;
someonehadtodecide;someonehadtotaketheresponsibility.
ItallcamedowntoEisenhower.Thisputenormouspressureonhim,pressurethat
increasedgeometricallywitheachpassingday."Ikelookswornandtired,"Butchernoted
onMay12."Thestrainistellingonhim.HelooksoldernowthanatanytimesinceIhave
beenwithhim."8
Undertheweightofhisresponsibilities,thenumberofcigaretteshesmokedwentup,to
anaverageofeightyCamelsdailywhilehishoursofsleepwentdown,toanaverageof
notmuchmorethanfourhourspernight.ButIkecouldtakeit.
HeenjoyedattackingtheproblemsposedbyFORTITUDE."Ilikeallthis,"hescribbled
alongthemarginofonesetofproposalsfor
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deception.9Obviouslyhedidnothimselfinitiatethespecificprograms,buthehadto
approvethemall,makesuretheywerecoordinated,andorderthetimeofexecution.
GeneralHaroldR.Bull,headoftheOperationsDivision(G-3)atSHAEF,exerciseddayto-daycontrolofthedeceptionplan.HeworkedcloselywiththeLCSanditsAmerican
counterpart,theJointSecurityControl(JSC).LCSandJSCweretheorganizations
responsibletoIke'sbosses,theCombinedChiefs,fordevisingandcoordinatingstrategic
coveranddeceptionschemes.TheonetheycameupwithforOVERLORDwascomplex,
wide-ranging,anddangerouslyambitious.
OperationFORTITUDE,asIkeapprovedit,wasdesignedtomaketheGermansthinkthat
theinvasionwouldbeginwithanattackonsouthernNorway,launchedfromScottish
portsinmidJuly,withthemainassaultcominglateragainstthePasdeCalais.Theattack
onNorwaywouldbetheresponsibilityofanonexistentBritish"FourthArmy,"whilethe
whollyimaginaryFirstUnitedStatesArmyGroup(FUSAG)wouldmakethelandingsat
thePasdeCalais.TherewereotherelementstoFORTITUDE,designedtoposethreatsto
theBiscaycoastandtheMarseillesregion,tokeepHitlerworriedaboutpossiblelandings
intheBalkans,andingeneraltodistractGermanattentionawayfromNormandy,but
NorwayandthePasdeCalaiswerethebigoperations.
FORTITUDEbuiltonGermanpreconceptions.FieldMarshalGerdvonRundstedt,
commandingGermanforcesintheWest,agreedwithHitlerthattheinvasionwouldcome
"acrossthenarrowerpartoftheChannel,"forsuchobviousreasonsasshorterdistance,
whichwouldreduceships'andplanes'transittime,closenesstotheRuhrandtheRhine,
theheartoftheGermanindustrialsystem,andbecausetheV-1missile-launchingsites
werelocatednearthePasdeCalais.RundstedtfeltthattheAlliesmightmake
diversionarylandingselsewhere,butthePasdeCalaiswasthecertainsiteofthemain
attack.10
TogettheGermanstolooknorth,towardNorway,insteadofsouth,towardNormandy,
forthediversionaryattack,theAllieshadfirstofalltoconvincetheirenemiesthatthey
hadsufficientstrengthtocarryoutsuchadiversion.Thetaskwasdoublydifficult
becauseofIke'sacuteshortageoflandingcraft-itwastouchandgoastowhetherthere
wouldbeenoughliftcapacitytocarryfivedivisionsashoreatNormandyalone.Ikehad
beenforcedtoputthe
Page83
targetdateforOVERLORDbackfromearlyMaytoearlyJune,inordertohaveanother
month'sproductionoflandingcraftonhandfortheassault,andtheCombinedChiefs
hadbeenforcedtocancelasimultaneouslandingintheSouthofFrancebecausethere
werenolandingcraftavailable.Ike,inshort,hadneitherthemennorthelandingcraftto
makeadiversion.
TomaketheGermansbelievetheopposite,theAllieshadtocreatefictitiousdivisions,on
agrandscale.Thiswasdonechieflybyradiosignals.Thereisadeliciousironyhere.The
GermansthoughtthatwithEnigmatheyhadthebestencodingmachineforradiosignals
intheworld.Theyalsobelievedthattheywerethebestininterceptinganddecodingthe
enemies'signals.Theywererightaboutbothconceits,butdrewthewrongconclusions.
Asmuchasanyotherfactor,thesetwobeliefscausedtheGermandefeat.
TheBritishFourthArmy,scheduledtoinvadeNorwayinmid-July,existedonlyonthe
airwaves,butthatdidnotmeanthatitscreationwasasimplematterofsendingoutafew
randommessages.TheAllieshadtofilltheairwithanexactduplicateoftherealwireless
trafficthataccompaniedtheassemblyofanarmy,someofitincipher,someintheclear.
ColonelR.M.MacLeodwasincommandoftheoperation.Hewastoldinhisbriefing,
"TheGermansaredamngoodatinterceptionandradio-location.They'llhaveyour
headquarterspinpointedwithamaximumerroroffivemiles.Anditwon'ttakethem
morethanafewhourstodoso.Whatismorethey'llbeabletoidentifythegradeofthe
headquarterswhetherarmy,divisions,corps,orwhatnotfromthenatureofthetrafficand
thesetsbeingused."11
TwentyoverageofficerswereinvolvedatarmyheadquartersinEdinburghCastle;fake
corpsanddivisionheadquarterswerescatteredacrossScotland.Throughthespringof
1944,theyexchangedmessages:"80Div.requests1800pairsofcrampons,1800pairsof
skibindings...""2CorpsCarCompanyrequireshandbooksonenginefunctioningin
lowtemperaturesandhighaltitudes.""7Corpsrequeststhepromiseddemonstratorsin
theBilgerimethodofclimbingrockfaces..."12
OtherelementsinthedeceptioninvolvedplantingstoriesinScottishnewspapers,suchas
reportson"4thArmyfootballmatches,"orBBCprogramslike"adaywiththe7thCorps
inthefield."GermanspiesinScotland,operatingundertheclosesupervi
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sionoftheirBritishcontrollers,sentmessagestoHamburgandBerlinabouttheheavy
traintraffic,newdivisionpatchesseenonthestreets,andrumorsamongthetroopsabout
goingtoNorway.Woodentwin-engined"bombers"appearedonScottishairfields.British
commandosmadeaseriesofraidsonthecoastofNorway,designedtolooklike
preinvasiontactics.13
ULTRAprovidedfeedback,lettingtheAlliesknowwhattheGermansswallowedand
whattheyrejected.ItshowedthatHitlerhadtakenthebait.Henotonlykepthisgarrison
troopsinNorway,hereinforcedthem.Bylatespring,hehadthirteenarmydivisions
stationedthere,alongwith90,000navaland60,000airpersonnel,includingonepanzer
division.14ThiswasmorethandoubletheforceGermanyneededinNorwayfor
occupationduties.ItwasamajortriumphfortheAlliesamaximumreturnonaminuscule
investment.
TheothermainpartofFORTITUDE,creatingFUSAGtothreatenthePasdeCalais,was
evenmoreelaborate.Itincludedradiotrafficforanarmygroup,dummylandingcraft
inadequatelycamouflaged,fieldspackedwithpapier-machétanks(jeepsdraggingchains
drovearoundtocreatedustandtracks),andthefulluseoftheDouble-CrossSystem.The
spiesreportedintenseactivity-construction,troopmovements,anincreaseinthevolume
oftraintrafficacrosstheMidlands,andthelike-alltheactivitiesthatwouldhavetaken
placeinfactifthePasdeCalaiswerethetarget.Everythingthespiessaidhadtomatch
whattheradiosignalswererevealingtotheGermans,withtheemphasisonhardfact.As
Mastermanwrote,"Speculations,guesses,orleakages,wouldhavelittleornoeffecton
theGermanmilitarymind,fortheGermanstaffofficerwouldmakehisown
appreciationsandhisownguessesfromthefactsputbeforehim.Whathewouldrequire
wouldbethelocationandidentificationofformations,units,headquarters,assembly
areasandthelike."15
AtDover,acrossfromthePasdeCalais,theBritishbuiltaphonyoildock.Theyused
filmandtheaterstagehands.TheKinginspectedit.Eisenhowergaveaspeechtothe
"construction"workersatadinnerpartyheldattheWhiteCliffsHotelinDover.The
mayormadesatisfiedremarksaboutthe"openingofanewinstallation"intown.The
RAFmaintainedconstantfighterpatrols;Germanreconnaissanceaircraftwerepermitted
toflyoverhead,butonlyaftertheyhadbeenforcedto33,000feet,wheretheircameras
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wouldnotbeabletopickoutanydefectsinthedock.Doverresembledanenormousfilm
lot.
ThecapstonetoFORTITUDEwasIke'sselectionofGeneralGeorgeS.Pattonto
commandFUSAG.TheGermansthoughtPattonthebestcommandertheAllieshad
(Pattonagreed)andexpectedhimtoleadtheassault.EisenhowerthoughtPattonan
excellentcommanderforcertainspecificsituations,mostofallinthepursuitofa
retreatingenemy,butnotthemanforOVERLORD,whichrequiredabreadthofvision
andanabilitytogetalongwiththeBritish(especiallyMontgomery)thatPattondidnot
possess.Ike'splanwastousePattonaftertheAlliesbrokeoutoftheNormandy
beachhead.AtthattimePattonwouldtakecommandoftheU.S.ThirdArmyforthe
drivethroughFrance.*
Untilthen,EisenhowerusedPatton'sreputationandvisibilitytostrengthenFORTITUDE.
Onceagain,theGermansknewofPatton'sarrivalinEnglandbeforeapublic
announcementwasmade,thankstoagentsTateandGarbo.Later,Pattonattendedaplay
inLondon,wenttoafewbars,attendedapartyattheSavoyHotel,andinotherwaysgot
hisnameinthepaper.FUSAGradiosignalsalsotoldtheGermansofhiscomingsand
goings,meanwhileshowingthathehadtakenafirmgriponhisnewcommand.
Thesefictitiousarmiesmixedrealandnotionaldivisions,corpsandarmies.TheFUSAG
orderofbattleincludedtheU.S.ThirdArmy,whichwasrealbutstillintheUnited
States,theBritishFourthArmy,whichwasnotional,andtheCanadianFirstArmy,which
wasrealandscheduledtogoashoreinNormandyonD-Day.Therewere,inaddition,
fiftyfollow-updivisions(organizedastheU.S.FourteenthArmy,whichwasnotional)in
theUnited
*Ike'sanalysisofPatton,asexpressedtoMarshall,isworthquotingatlength:"Manygenerals
constantlythinkofbattleintermsoffirst,concentration,supply,maintenance,replacement,and
second,afteralltheaboveisarranged,aconservativeadvance.Thistypeofpersonisnecessary
becausehepreventsonefromcourtingdisaster.Butoccasionsarisewhenonehastorememberthat
underparticularconditions,boldnessistentimesasimportantasnumbers.Patton'sstrengthisthat
hethinksonlyintermsofattackaslongasthereisasinglebattalionthatcankeepadvancing.
Moreover,themanhasanativeshrewdnessthatoperatesinsuchawaythathistroopsalwaysseem
tohaveammunitionandsufficientfoodnomatterwheretheyare.Personally,IdoubtthatIwould
everconsiderPattonforanarmygroupcommanderorforanyhigherposition,butasanarmy
commanderunderamanwhoissoundandsolid,andwhohassenseenoughtousePatton'sgood
qualitieswithoutbecomingblindedbyhisloveofshowmanshipandhistrionics,heshoulddoas
fineajobashedidinSicily."16
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StatesawaitingshipmenttothePasdeCalaisafterFUSAGestablisheditsbeachhead.
ManyofthedivisionsintheFourteenthArmywererealandwereassignedtoBradley'sU.
S.FirstArmy.ThustheactualorderofbattlehadthemainweightofAlliedforcesinthe
west,southwest,andMidlandsofBritain,whilethenotionaloneshowedthemainweight
inScotland,theeast,andthesoutheast.17
RelationswiththepresswereanimportantpartofkeepingOVERLORDsecret.Ayear
earlier,whenpreparationsfortheinvasionofSicilywereunderway,Ikehadworriedthat
newspaperspeculationaboutthenextAlliedoffensivemighttipofftheGermans.Hehit
uponauniquemethodtopreventsuchspeculation.Callingtogetherallthe
correspondentsaccreditedtohisheadquarters,hetoldthemhethoughtofthemasquasimembersofhisstaff,explainedthathedidnotwantthemdoingspeculativestoriesonthe
nexttarget,andconcludedwithanannouncementthatSicilywouldbeit.Heaskedthem
noteventodiscussitamongthemselvesandaddedthatmanyseniorofficersinhisown
headquartersdidnotknowwhattheydid.OnereportertoldButcher,''MyGod,I'mafraid
totakeadrink."Noonetalked.18
EisenhowerdidnotgosofarastotellcorrespondentstheFORTITUDE-OVERLORD
secret,buthedidtellthemthathethoughtofthemasquasi-staffofficersandinstructed
hisunitcommanderstocooperatewiththepressineverywaypossible.Inageneral
order,hesaidthatwarcorrespondents"shouldbeallowedtotalkfreelywithofficersand
enlistedpersonnelandtoseethemachineryofwarinoperationinordertovisualizeand
transmittothepublictheconditionsunderwhichthemenfromtheircountriesarewaging
waragainsttheenemy."19Butanymentionofpossibleoperations,ormovementofunits,
ortheirlocation,wasstrictlycensored.FORTITUDEwastooprecious,toocomplex,to
allowmentionofadivisionorcorpsbyanunsuspectingreportertoruinit.
TheGermanpresswasmuchmoretightlycensoredbyHerrGoebbels'Propaganda
Ministry,sotheAlliescouldnotgetmuchinformationfromFrenchorGerman
newspapers.ButwithULTRA,theyhadanevenbetterinsightintoGermandispositions.
ULTRAfeedbackwassupplementedbyairreconnaissance,spiesreportingfromFrance,
POWinterrogation(muchwaslearnedabouttheGermanArmybybuggingtheprison
cellsofGermangeneralscapturedinTunis,Sicily,andItaly),andothertraditional
methodsofcollectingrawinformation.GeneralKennethStrong,Eisenhower's
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G-2,hadastaffofwelloverathousandworkingforhim,sifting,analyzing,crosschecking,andcollatingtheinformationreceivedandreducingittomanageable
proportions.TogivesomeideaofthescopeoftheintelligencenetworkStronghadunder
hiscommand,herecordedthatingenerala"take"oftwohundredreports"wouldgive
meonesentenceformyreporttoGeneralEisenhower."20
Strongwasanaffable,heartysortoffellow,usuallysmiling,alwaysoptimistic,plainspoken-amanmuchlikeIke-andthetwogeneralsgotonfamously.Stronggivesagood
pictureofEisenhower'smethodsindealingwithintelligence:"Idiscoveredthatthebest
waytodealwithhimwastobecompletelyfrank,nomatterwhatnationalconsiderations
orothercontroversialfactorswereinvolvedinanyissue....IlearnedthatEisenhower
hadanimmensetalentforlisteningtooralexplanationsanddistillingtheiressence....
Onlyonafewoccasions,whenitwasessentialthatsomethingshouldappearonthe
record,didIproduceawrittenIntelligenceappreciationforEisenhower.Hemuch
preferredoralreporting,asthisgavehimanopportunitytoquestionuncertaintiesandto
probebelowthesurfaceoftheapparentpointsatissue.Ifoundthatavisittohimwas
worthapileofmemoranda,especiallyashewassooftenlookingfaraheadofcurrent
events.HeneverinsistedonseeingtherawIntelligenceonwhichjudgmentswerebased,
asIamtoldthatChurchillalwaysdid."21
Throughthespringof1944,Strong'sreportsweredecidedlyencouraging.FromULTRA
andothersourcesitwasclearthattheGermanshadoverestimatedAlliedgroundstrength
byafactoroftwo,andthattheybelievedIkehadfourtimesmorelandingcraftthanwas
actuallythecase.Atoneparticularlymemorablesession,StrongshowedIkeaGerman
mapoftheBritishorderofbattle,capturedinItaly,whichshowedhowcompletelythe
enemywasswallowingFORTITUDEandthenotionalFourthArmy.Arecognition
booklet,distributedtoGermanfieldofficers,pickedupbyanagentinFrance,included
full-colordrawingsoftheimaginarydivisionalshoulderpatches.22ByJune1,German
intelligencecountedatotalofnearlyeighty-nineAllieddivisionsinGreatBritain,whenin
facttherewereforty-seven.23
VonRundtstedtandhisprincipalsubordinate,Rommel,werebadlymistakenaboutthe
Alliedorderofbattle.Eisenhower,thankstoULTRAandothersources,knewtheGerman
orderofbat
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tlealmostaswellasRundstedtandRommeldid.AndULTRAnotonlytoldEisenhower
wheretheGermanswere,andinwhatstrength,butitalsoallowedhimtoeavesdropon
thedebatebetweenRommelandRundstedtoverhowtomeettheattack.Tooversimplify,
Rundstedtwantedtokeephisbestpanzerunitswellbackfromthecoast,makesurethe
invasionwastherealthingandnotafeint,andthen,andonlythen,counterattackingreat
strength.Rommelthoughtdifferently.AsStrongputitinhisestimateofMay5,"Rommel
hasnowlearntthatoncealodgementareahasbeenfirmlyestablishedAlliedsuperiority
inaircraft,tanksandartillerymakestheeliminationofsuchanareaimpossible.Hewill
thereforestrikehardandimmediatelyattheforcesfacinghim."Todoso,Rommel
wantedallhisfightingunitswellforward,rightonthebeaches.24
Fortunately,ULTRAshowedthatRommelandRundstedtwereinagreementoverthe
mostlikelyinvasionsite-thePasdeCalais.RommelhadtwoarmiesinhisArmyGroupB,
theSeventhandtheFifteenth.Thebest-equippedandmostmobileunitswerethe
eighteendivisionsintheFifteenthArmy,whichincludedthecrack116thPanzerDivision
andotherarmoredformations.RommelhadconcentratedtheFifteenthArmyinand
aroundthePasdeCalais,whiletheSeventhArmycoveredtheFrenchcoastfromthe
mouthoftheSeineRivertoBrest,whichofcourseincludedNormandy.
ULTRAalsorevealedthattheGermansestimatedthatEisenhowerhadsufficientlanding
crafttobringtwentydivisionsashoreinthefirstwave.Partlybecausetheycreditedhim
withsomuchstrength,partlybecauseitseemedtomakesuchgoodmilitarysense,the
Germansalsobelievedthattherealinvasionwouldbeproceededbydiversionaryattacks.
Strong'sstaffhadworkedupprecisetablesontheabilityoftheGermanstomove
reinforcementsintoNormandy.TheconclusionwasthatiftheGermanscorrectlygauged
OVERLORDasthemainassault,theycouldconcentrate-byD-Dayplustwenty-five-some
thirty-onedivisionsintheNormandyarea,includingninepanzerdivisions.Ifthat
happened,theAllieswouldbeoverwhelmed.Ikecouldnotmatchthatrateofbuildup;if
hecould,hewouldnotbeabletosupplythemenwithenoughammunition,gasoline,and
foodtofightwith,becauseofinsufficientunloadingcapacityattheartificialports.In
short,ifFORTITUDEdidnotwork,iftheGermanspulledtheirFifteenth
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ArmyawayfromthePasdeCalaisandhurleditagainstNormandy,OVERLORDwould
fail.25
InMay,theJointIntelligenceCommitteeoftheBritishWarCabinetbeganputtingtogether
weeklysummariesof"GermanAppreciationofAlliedIntentionsintheWest,"aone-or
two-pageoverviewofwhere,when,andinwhatstrengththeGermansexpectedthe
attack.Thesedocumentswerestamped"TopSecret"andwerecirculatedonaverylimited
basisonlyfiftycopiesweremade.In1979,theNationalArchivesoftheUnitedStates
madethesesummariesavailabletoscholarsforthefirsttime.Readingthemtoday,ina
dustycubbyholeintheArchivesBuildingonConstitutionAvenueinWashington,oneis
struckbythehighdramaandtremendousstakesinvolved,butevenmorebytwofacts:
howcompletelytheGermanswerefooled,andhowthoroughlytheAlliesknewnotonly
theGermanorderofbattle,butalsoGermanplansandintentions.
ThesummariescameinweekafterweekwithexactlythereportEisenhowerwantedto
read.FORTITUDEwasanedificebuiltsodelicately,precisely,andintricatelythatthe
removalofjustonesupportingcolumnwouldbringthewholethingcrashingdown.On
May29,withD-Daylessthanaweekaway,theappreciationincludedachillingsentence:
"TherecenttrendofmovementofGermanlandforcestowardstheCherbourgareatends
tosupporttheviewthattheLeHavre-Cherbourgareaisregardedasalikely,andperhaps
eventhemain,pointofassault."26
Hadtherebeenaslipsomewhere?HadtheGermanssomehowpenetratedFORTITUDE?
Therewasnowaytoknow,unlesstherewasaluckyULTRAintercept,butmeanwhile
Ike'schiefairofficerwantedtocalloffthescheduledparatrooperandgliderlandingson
thegroundsthattheGermanshadsomehowlearnedthesecretandwouldbewaitingto
slaughtertheyoungmendroppingintoNormandyfromtheskies.ThisrequestcausedIke
hismostanxiousmomentsintheentirewar.TheAlliesweretakingatremendousriskand
securityforOVERLORDwasabsolutelycrucial.
Infact,Eisenhowerhadspentmoreofhisownpreinvasiontimeandenergyonsecurity
thanhedidondeception.ItwasmoreimportantfortheGermansnottoknowthat
NormandywasthesitethanitwasforthemtothinkthatthePasdeCalaiswasit.Ike's
Page90
singlegreatestadvantageoverRommelandvonRundstedtwasthatheknewwhereand
whenthebattlewouldbefought,whilehisopponentshadtoguess.Tokeepthem
guessing,EisenhowerwouldanddidgotoanylengthtokeepthesecretofOVERLORD
secure.
"Thesuccessorfailureofcomingoperationsdependsuponwhethertheenemycan
obtainadvanceinformationofanaccuratenature,"Eisenhowerdeclaredina
memorandumhesentaroundtoallhiscommanders.27Tokeepthatadvanceinformation
fromtheGermans,EisenhowerhadtomakesomehardrequestsoftheBritish
Government.ThetremendousactivitygoingonintheBritishIsles,theheavy
concentrationoftroops,theconstantcomingandgoingofaircraft-allwerepotential
sourcesofsecurityleaks.Thiswasespeciallytrueonthecoastalareas,wherethetraining
exercisescouldprovidemuchinformationtoanenemyobserver.
EisenhoweraskedChurchilltomoveallciviliansoutofthecoastalareasforfearthere
mightbeanundiscoveredspyamongthem.Churchillsaidno-hecouldnotgosofarin
upsettingpeople'slives.BritishGeneralFrederickMorganofIke'sstaffsaiditwasall
politics,andgrowled,"Ifwefail,therewon'tbeanymorepolitics."
Stillthegovernmentwouldnotact.Then,inlateMarch,Montgomerysaidhewantedthe
civilianskickedoutofhistrainingareas,andIkesentaneloquentpleatotheWar
Cabinet.Hewarnedthatit"wouldgohardwithourconsciencesifweweretofeel,in
lateryears,thatbyneglectinganysecurityprecautionwehadcompromisedthesuccessof
thesevitaloperationsorneedlesslysquanderedmen'slives."Churchillgavein.The
civilianswereputoutandkeptoutuntilmonthsafterD-Day.28
InApril,EisenhoweragainforcedtheWarCabinettotakeanunwelcomestep.He
proposednothingshortofafullstoppageofprivilegeddiplomaticcommunicationsfrom
theUnitedKingdom.Churchillwasreluctanttoapplysodrasticameasure,but
Eisenhowerwasinsistent."IfeelboundtosayfranklythatIregardthissourceofleakage
asthegravestrisktothesecurityofouroperationsandtothelivesofoursailors,soldiers
andairmen."Hesaidheknewadiplomaticbanwouldmakegreatdifficultiesforthe
BritishGovernment,andhealsorealizedthattheWarCabinetwouldhavetotakeallthe
blameattachedtotheaction.Still,hesaid,"Icannotconcealmyopinionthatthese
difficultiesarefaroutweighedbythegreaterissueswhichareatstake."
Page91
OnApril17theWarCabinetruledthatforeigndiplomaticrepresentativeswouldnotbe
permittedtosendorreceiveuncensoredmessages,andcouriersofsuchstaffswouldnot
beallowedtoleavetheUnitedKingdom.Theserestrictionsdidnotapplytothe
AmericansortheRussians.AlltheAlliedgovernmentsandtheirrepresentativesinthe
UnitedKingdomprotested,anddeGaullebrokeoffnegotiationswithSHAEFoverthe
commandandemploymentoftheFrenchunderground.*
Churchillwasunderstandablyagitated,therefore,whenEisenhowertoldhimthathe
wantedtocontinuethebanafterD-Day.IkefearedthatifitwereliftedtheGermans
wouldrealizethatOVERLORDwastherealthingandFORTITUDEwouldbe
compromised.AnthonyEden,ForeignSecretaryintheWarCabinet,spokeforChurchill
whenheexpressedshockattherequest.HesaidthatalltheAlliedgovernmentsexpected
thebantobeliftedassoonastheinvasionwasannounced,andthatifitwerenot,their
angerattheBritishforimposingitwouldbeallthegreater.HeaskedIketoagreeto
liftingthebanonD-Dayplusoneortwo.
Eisenhowersaidthatwouldnotdo.IfthebanwereliftedHitlerwould"deducethefact
thatfromthatmomentheissafeinconcentratinghisforcestorepeltheassaultwehave
made."Churchillrespondedbysayinghecouldnotagreetoanindefinitediplomaticban
becauseofthegreatinconveniencesandfrictionswhichitcaused.Heproposedthatitbe
continueduntilD-Dayplusseven.Ikesaidthatwasstillnotgoodenough,andintheend
hehadhisway.ThebancontinueduntilD-Dayplusthirteen.29
WiththeBritishGovernmentcooperatingsoadmirably,Eisenhowercouldnotdoless.His
ordersonsecuritytohiscommandersandtheirunitswereclear,direct,andstern.Hetold
allunitstomaintainthehigheststandardofindividualsecurityandtometeoutthe
severestpossibledisciplinaryactionincasesofviolations.Hewasasgoodashisword.
InApril,GeneralHenryMiller,chiefsupplyofficeroftheNinthAirForceandaWest
PointclassmateofIke's,wenttoacocktailpartyatClaridge'sHotel.Hebegantalking
freely,complainingabouthisdifficultiesingettingsuppliesbutaddingthathisproblems
wouldendafterD-Day,whichhedeclaredwouldbegin
*ImposingthebangaveHitlerausefulclueastothetimingofOVERLORD.Heremarkedinlate
Aprilthat"theEnglishhavetakenmeasuresthattheycansustainforonlysixtoeightweeks."
Page92
beforeJune15.Whenchallengedonthedate,heofferedtotakebets.Ikelearnedofthe
indiscretionthenextmorningandactedimmediately.HeorderedMillerreducedtohis
permanentrankofcolonelandsenthimbacktotheStates-theultimatedisgracefora
careersoldier.Millerprotestedhisinnocence.Ikewroteback,"DearHenry,Iknowof
nothingthatcausesmemorerealdistressthantobefacedwiththenecessityofsittingasa
judgeincasesinvolvingmilitaryoffensesbyofficersofcharacterandofgoodrecord,
particularlywhentheyareoldandwarmfriends."Buthisdecisionstood.30
TherewasanotherflapinMaywhenIkelearnedthataU.S.Navyofficergotdrunkata
partyandrevealeddetailsofimpendingoperations,includingareas,lift,strength,and
dates.IkeconfessedtoMarshall,"Igetsoangryattheoccurrenceofsuchneedlessand
additionalhazardsthatIcouldcheerfullyshoottheoffendermyself.Thisfollowingso
closelyupontheMillercaseisalmostenoughtogiveonetheshakes."Theofficerwas
sentbacktotheStates.31
Despiteallprecautions,thereweremorethan2.5millionmenunderIke'scommand,and
thus,inevitably,therewerescares.OnecameinlateMarchwhendocumentsrelatingto
OVERLORD,includinginformationonstrength,places,equipment,andthetentative
targetdate,werediscoveredlooselywrappedintheChicagopostoffice.Adozenpostmen
hadseensomeorallofthedocuments.ThepackagewasintendedfortheWar
DepartmentinWashingtonbuthadbeenaddressedtoagirlinChicago.Whatmadeit
especiallyfrighteningwasthefactthatthesergeantwhohadputthewrongaddressonthe
package,RichardE.Tymm,wasofGermanextraction.Heunderwentathoroughgrilling;
itturnedoutthathewasnotaspy,justcareless.Hehadbeendaydreamingabouthome
whenheaddressedthepackageandwrotehissister'saddressonit.NowonderIkewas
gettingtheshakesandtalkingaboutcheerfullycuttingafewthroatshimself.32
SecurityforOVERLORDincludedkeepingtheGermansfromdiscoveringthevarious
newdevicesonwhichtheAllieswerecountingforsuccess,suchasartificialharborsand
swimmingtanks.IftheGermanslearnedaboutMulberry(codenameforconcrete
platformstobefloatedacrosstoNormandy,thensunktocreateanartificialport),they
wouldknowthattheAllieswerecomingacrossanopenbeach,notdirectlyataportcity.
ULTRAandthe
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Double-CrossSystemcombinedtotellEisenhowerthattheGermanswereunsuspecting;
therewasnothingabouttheartificialportsonGermanradio,andthespymastersinBerlin
werenotaskingtheirspiesinEnglandforanyinformationaboutMulberry.33
Thesedeviceswerebutsmallaspectsofthelargerscene.WorldWarII,asthephrasehas
it,wasfoughtinlargepartonthedrawingboards.Allthenationsinvolvedwerestriving
franticallytomaketechnologicalbreakthroughs.Byfarthemostimportantofthesewas
thedevelopmentoftheatomicbomb.IntheUnitedStatestheManhattanProject,under
GeneralLeslieGroves,wasmakingrapidprogresstowarditsobjective,butGrovesand
severaloftheleadingscientistsontheprojectwereworriedaboutthepossibilityofthe
GermansusingradioactivepoisonsagainsttheOVERLORDforces.GrovestoldMarshall
therewasaremotechanceofithappening,andMarshallsentArthurPetersonofthe
ManhattanProjecttoLondontoseeIkeandexplainthedangertohim.Peterson
emphasizedtheneedforsecrecysostrongly,however,therewaslittleIkecoulddoto
meetthepossiblethreat.Hedidnotbriefhisseniorcommanders,buthedidhavethe
medicalchannelsinformedaboutsymptoms.34
Inmid-May,Eisenhowerorderedtheconcentrationoftheassaultforceneartheinvasion
portsinsouthernEngland.Theenormousheapsofsuppliesthathadbeengatheredand
storedthroughouttheUnitedKingdomthenbeganthefinalmove,carriedbyunending
convoystothesouth,fillingallavailablewarehouses,overflowingintocamouflaged
fields.Hundredsofthousandsofmenmeanwhiletraveledtotentedareasinthesouthern
counties.Theywerecompletelysealedofffromtherestoftheworld,withbarbedwire
fencesstretchingaroundtheircamps,keepingallthetroopsinandallciviliansout.Some
twothousandCounterIntelligenceCorpsmenguardedthearea.Camouflagewas
everywhere,forthiswasthemosttemptingandprofitablemilitarytargetinEurope,and
theGermanswereknowntobeonthevergeofmakingtheirVweaponsoperational.
Withintheencampment,themenreceivedtheirfinalbriefings.Forthefirsttimethey
learnedtheyweregoingtoNormandy.Theyporedoverfoam-rubbermodelsofthe
beaches,examinedphotographs,weremadefamiliarwithlandmarks,wereassuredof
overwhelmingnavalandairsupport,andfinallygiventheoverallpic
Page94
ture,thebroadoutlineofOVERLORD.Ike'smenweresettogo."Themightyhost,"he
laterwrote,"wastenseasacoiledspring,readyforthemomentwhenitsenergyshould
bereleasedanditwouldvaulttheEnglishChannel."35
Everythinghadbeendonethatcouldbedone.WouldtheGermansbesurprised?The
questioncouldnotbeanswered.Thelast-minutesignscouldnothavebeenworse.Atthe
endofMaythemightyPanzerLehrArmoredDivisionshowedupinNormandy,along
withthe21stPanzerDivision,whichmovedfromBrittanytoCaen,exactlytothesite
wheretheBritishSecondArmywouldbelanding.Evenmorealarming,ULTRArevealed
thattheGerman91stDivision,specialistsinfightingparatroopers,andtheGerman6th
ParachuteRegimenthadmovedonMay29intoexactlytheareaswheretheAmerican82d
and101stAirborneDivisionsweretolandthenightbeforeD-Day.Finally,theGerman
352dDivision,veteransoftheRussianfront,hadmovedforwardfromSt.Lô,atthebase
oftheneckoftheCotentinPeninsula,tothecoast,takingupapositionoverlooking
OmahaBeach,wheretheU.S.FirstArmywasgoingtoland.36
Thesemovementsgaveeveryonethejitters.TheycausedIke'saircommander,LeighMallory,tourgeEisenhowertocalloffthelandingsofthe82dand101stforfearthey
wouldbedestroyed.AsIkelaterwrote,"Itwouldbedifficulttoconceiveofamoresoulrackingproblem."37
Hequicklygotone.SHAEFhadpreparedforeverything,excepttheweather.OnJune4,a
stormroaredinfromthenorthwest.Wavesandwindweremuchtoohightoattempta
landing.Suddenly,theSHAEFweathermanbecamethemostimportantintelligence
officerofall.
Page95
ChapterSeven
D-DayandtheFrenchResistance
JUNE4,1944.GroupCaptainJ.M.StaggoftheRAFmustprovideIkewiththefinal
pieceofinformationheneedstolaunchOVERLORD-onethatnoonecouldcontrolor
keepsecret.WhatwilltheweatherbelikeonD-Day?
Tohelphimanswerthatcrucialquestion,Stagghadsixdifferentweatherservices
(AmericanandBritishland,sea,andair)feedinghiminformation.Onthemorningof
June4,tohisdismay,hehadsixdistinctweatherpredictionstopickfrom.
TheGermans,too,hadtheirproblemsinpredictingtheweather.Staggexplainedtheir
predicamentinhisbookForecastforOverlord:"Deprivedofweatherreportsfromthe
BritishIslesandtheoceanareastothewestandnorth,Germanforecasterscouldbekept
inignoranceofthedevelopmentandmovementofweathersystemsoveranareawhichis
alwaysimportantforforecastingthroughoutnorth-westernandcentralEurope-in
ignorance,exceptinsofarastheGermansorganizedtheirownreportsfromtheirown
reconnaissanceaircraftorsubmarines,andtheywereknowntogotogreatlengthstodo
this."1
StaggwasthebeneficiaryoftheGermaneffort,becauseULTRApickeduptheweather
reportsfromGermansubmarinesandhelpedhimfillinhischarts.Hemadeuphisown
prediction,onethatdrewuponalltheothersbutwasuniquelyhis.Despitetheintense
stormonJune4,StaggpredictedabreakintheweatherforJune6.Iketrustedhissource.
Hedecidedtotaketheriskandgo.
Page96
Theinvasionwasunderway.at1A.M.onJune6,1944,GermanagentGarbosenttothe
Abwehrthemostsought-aftersecretofthewar-whereandwhentheinvasionwas
coming.GarboreportedthatOVERLORDwasontheway,namedsomeofthedivisions
involved,indicatedwhentheyhadleftPortsmouth,andpredictedthattheywouldcome
ashoreinNormandyatdawn.
Thereporthadtobedeciphered,read,evaluated,reenciphered,andtransmittedtoBerlin.
Thereitwasdeciphered,typedup,andsenttoarmyheadquarters,thenontoHitler.The
wholeprocesswasreversedtogetordersouttotheGermanforcesontheFrenchcoast.
Theworddidnotarriveintimetodoanygood.BythetimetheGermansgotit,they
couldsee6,000planesoverhead,5,000shipsoffthecoast,thefirstwaveoftroops
comingashore.
ButitsurelyraisedtheiropinionofGarbo.2
Atdawn,June6,Eisenhower'smightyhostcrossedtheChannelsuccessfully,hurleditself
againsttheNormandybeaches,andestablishedabeachhead.Paratrooperlosses,although
heavy,didnotapproachthe70percentmarkthatLeigh-Malloryhadpredicted.There
weremanyanxiousmomentsalongOmahaBeach,wheretheU.S.1stDivisionfacedthe
German352dDivision,butbynightfallofJune6,theAmericansweretheretostay.The
BritishandCanadianforcesalsogenerallyachievedtheirD-Dayobjectives.
ThefoulweatherhadbeenapositivehelptotheAlliesbecausetheGermansbelievedthe
weatherwassobadthatnoinvasioncouldbelaunched.Infact,duetotheweatherthey
canceledthecustomaryairandseareconnaissancemissionsthatwouldhavewarnedthem
oftheapproachingfleet.AwargameatRennes,attendedbyanumberofarmyand
divisionalcommandersfromtheNormandyarea,wentoffonschedule.AndRommel,
afterstudyingtheweatherreports,hadgoneonleave!
Notonesubmarine,notonesmallboat,notoneairplane,notoneradarset,notone
German,anywhere,detectedthelaunchingofthelargestforceofwarshipsinhistory,or
thepassageofthatfleet-coveredbythelargestforceofairplaneseverassembledacross
theChannel.AsGeneralWalterWarlimont,deputychiefofoperationsatGerman
SupremeHeadquarters,recorded,ontheeveofOVERLORDtheleadersofthe
Wehrmacht''hadnottheslightestideathatthedecisiveeventofthewarwasuponthem."3
Page97
OneaspectofEisenhower'sdecisiontogoonJune6thatisseldommentionedwashis
fearthatifhepostponedOVERLORDuntilthenextsuitabledate(June16),FORTITUDE
mightwellbecompromised.TensofthousandsofAlliedsoldiershadbeentoldthat
Normandywasthesite;tokeepthemsealedofffromtheoutsideworldfortwoweeks
seemedimpossible.Further,Germanairreconnaissancewassuretodiscovertheimmense
buildupofforcesaroundPortsmouthandsouthernEngland.AlreadyRommelseemedto
bereinforcingNormandyandtheCotentinPeninsula.OVERLORDalmosthadtogoon
June6,ifitweretogoatall.
BydawnofJune7,OVERLORDhadachieveditsfirstcrucialgoal,togetashore.Now
beganthesecondtest:HadFORTITUDEconvincedtheGermansthatNormandywasa
feint?RommelandRundstedtgreatlyoutnumberedIkeontheContinent.Iftheyoperated
atfulltilt,rushingreinforcementsintoNormandywithmaximumspeed,theystillhad
plentyoftimeandopportunitytodrivetheAlliesintothesea.BecausetheGermanscould
movebytruck,tank,orrailroad,whiletheAlliedforceshadtojourneytothebattlefield
viashipandlandingcraft,theadvantagewaswiththeGermans.Ikehadthreeweaponsto
keeptheenemyawayfromthebattlefieldwhilehesteadilybroughtinmoreunitsfrom
Britain.
Onewasairsuperiority.Fromdawntodusk,Alliedairmenbombedandshotupevery
enemycolumn,whetherontheroadsorontherails,thatwasspottedtryingtomoveinto
Normandy.Eisenhower'ssecondweaponwastheFrenchunderground,workinginclose
coordinationwithSHAEF,againsttargetsdesignatedbyIke,toharasstheGerman
columns,blowbridges,createroadblocks,andincountlessotherwaysslowtherateof
Germanmovement.
Ike'sthirdweaponinthebattleofthebuildupwasthecheapest,intermsofmenand
matériel,andthemostsuccessfulintermsofkeepingGermantroopsawayfromthebattle
area.ItwasacontinuationofFORTITUDE,thistimewithoneofthemostbrazen
operationsofthewar.
OnD-Dayplusthree,June9,Garbosentamessagetohisspymasterwitharequestthatit
besubmittedurgentlytotheGermanHighCommand."Thepresentoperation,thougha
large-scaleassault,isdiversionaryincharacter,"Garbostatedflatly."Itsobjectisto
establishastrongbridgeheadinordertodrawthemaximum
Page98
ofourreservesintotheareaoftheassaultandtoretainthemtheresoastoleaveanother
areaexposedwheretheenemycouldthenattackwithsomeprospectofsuccess."
CitingtheAlliedorderofbattle,GarbosaidthatEisenhowerhadcommittedonlyasmall
portionofhisseventy-fivedivisions(Ike'sactualtotalwasfifty).Hepointedoutthatno
FUSAGunithadtakenpartintheNormandyattack,norwasPattonthere.Further,"The
constantaerialbombardmentwhichthesectorofthePasdeCalaishasbeenundergoing
andthedispositionoftheenemyforceswouldindicatetheimminenceoftheassaultin
thisregionwhichofferstheshortestroutetothefinalobjectiveoftheAnglo-American
illusions:Berlin."4
Withinhalfaday,Garbo'smessagewasinHitler'shands.Onthebasisofit,theFührer
madeamomentousdecision.Rundstedthadwantedtocommithisbestdivision,the1st
SSPanzerDivision,togetherwiththe116thPanzerDivision,tothebattleinNormandy,
whereRommeldesperatelyneededreinforcements.TheyhadstartedforCaen,butnow
HitlerorderedthearmoredunitsbacktothePasdeCalaistohelptheFifteenthArmy
defendagainstthemaininvasion.HealsoawardedanIronCross,SecondClass,to
Garbo.5
TheDouble-CrossSystemorchestrawasnowplayingatfullvolume,withevery
instrumentinvolved.TheGermanshadgreatconfidencenotonlyinGarbobutinalltheir
spies.WhenevertroopsofrealformationsreachedFrance,theywerealwaystroopswho
hadbeenidentifiedandreportedonbytheagents.Asaconsequenceoffindingthe
reportstobeaccurate,theGermansnaturallybelievedthereportswhichconcernedthe
imaginarytroopssupposedlystillstationedinEngland,poisedtohitthePasdeCalais.It
wasrelativelyeasytoconvincetheGermansthattherealdivisionsthatwerecominginto
NormandyhadbeenshiftedfromFUSAGtoNormandybecauseoftheAllies'unexpected
difficultiesinbreakingoutofthebeachhead.
Thedeceptionwenton.OnJune13,anagentwarnedthatanotherattackwouldtakeplace
intwoorthreedaysaroundDieppeorAbbeville,nearthePasdeCalais.Anotheragent
reportedthatairbornedivisions(whollyfictitious)woulddroparoundAmiens,halfway
betweenParisandthePasdeCalais.
InlateJune,agentTatereported.MastermanhadconvincedtheGermansthathewasa
manwithageniusformakingfriendsin
Page99
highplaceshewasthespywhoreportedEisenhower'sarrivalinLondoninJanuarysothe
AbwehrwasnotsurprisedwhenTateclaimedtohaveobtainedtherailwayschedulefor
movingtheFUSAGforcesfromtheirconcentrationareastotheembarkationports,thus
reinforcingfromanewangletheimminenceofthethreattothePasdeCalais.Tate's
reportwasconsideredsoimportantbyoneAbwehrofficerthathegaveitashisopinion
thatitcould"evendecidetheoutcomeofthewar."Hewasnotfarwrong.
FORTITUDEhadremarkabledurability.AsMastermannotes,"InGermaneyes,thethreat
tothePasdeCalaiswasasgreatanddangerousinJulyasithadbeeninMay.Infact,and
beyondthewildesthopesofthoseresponsible,thethreathelduntiltheautumn."6
OneofIke'sgreatestpleasuresduringthefirsttwomonthsofthecampaignwastoread
theweeklyintelligencesummaries(or,moreoften,hearStrong'soralreport)on"German
appreciationofAlliedintentionsintheWest,"theprinciplesourcebeingULTRA.Each
summarywasbriefandtothepoint.
ThesummaryofJune19read,"TheGermansstillbelievetheAlliescapableoflaunching
anotheramphibiousoperation.ThePasdeCalaisremainsanexpectedareaforattack.
FearsoflandingsinNorwayhavebeenmaintained.Enemynavalandgroundforceshave
remainedunalteredsinceD-Day."
OnJuly10:"Sofartheenemy'sfearoflargescalelandingsbetweentheSeineandthePas
deCalaishasnotdiminished.ThesecondhalfofJulyisgivenastheprobabletimefor
thisoperation."Notsogoodwasthereportthat"GermanfearsofalandinginSouthern
Norwaycontinuetodiminish."
ByJuly24,IkehadalmostthirtydivisionsinNormandyandhadbythenwonthebattle
ofthebuildup.Onthatdate,thesummarywasagainwelcomereading:"TheGermans
haveidentifiedinNormandysomeunitsthattheybelievetohavebeenpartofthearmy
heldinreadinessforasecondmajorlandingbetweentheSeineandtheFranco-Belgian
frontier.ButtherehasbeennoconsiderabletransferofGermanforcesfromthePasde
Calais,whichremainsstronglygarrisoned."Thesummarydidnotethatonedivisionwas
movingoutofthePasdeCalais,andanotherfromBelgium,bothpresumablyheadedfor
thebattleareainNormandy.
Thenextsummary,onJuly31,notedthatthetwodivisionshadshownupinNormandy
"andthelastremainingarmoureddivision
Page100
NorthoftheSeinehasnowarrivedinthebattlearea.Itislikelythatthesemovements
havebeenforcedontheenemybytheincreasingurgencyofbattlerequirementsdespite
hisfearsofanAlliedlandingnorthoftheSeine.Thoughtheenemynowregardssucha
landingasratherlessimminent,thesefearsstillremain."7
ByAugust3,whenPattoncameontotheContinentwithhisU.S.ThirdArmy,most
GermanofficersrealizedthatNormandywastherealthing.Bythen,ofcourse,itwastoo
late.TheGermanshadkepthundredsoftheirbesttanksandthousandsoftheirfinest
fightingmen(atotaloffifteendivisions)outofthiscrucialbattleofthewarinorderto
meetathreatthatwasalwaysimaginary.Equallyremarkable,asMastermannoted,was
"thatnosinglecasewascompromisedbythegranddeceptionforOVERLORD,butthat,
onthecontrary,thoseagentswhotookaleadingpartinitweremorehighlyregardedby
theGermansafteritthanbefore."8
OnOctober25,1944,ColonelJohnBevan,theControllingOfficerofDeceptionand
Masterman'sboss,wrotehisimmediatesuperior,"Whenthehistoryofthiswariswritten,
IbelieveitwillbefoundthattheGermanHighCommandwas,largelythroughthe
mediumofBI-Achannels,inducedtomakefaultydispositions,inparticularduringthe
vitalpost-OVERLORDD-Dayperiod."9ItwasBritishunderstatementonagrandscale.
ToparaphraseChurchill,neverhadsomanybeenimmobilizedbysofew.
FORTITUDEandtheDouble-CrossSystemheldtheFifteenthArmyinplaceatthePasde
Calais,buttheGermanshadotherformationsinFrancetodrawuponinthebattleofthe
buildup.Again,theroleoftheairforcesinimmobilizingthesetroopscannotbe
overemphasized,butthatstoryisnotpartofthesecretsideofOVERLORD.Anequally
importantrolewasplayedbytheFrenchunderground,andthatstoryisapartofany
accountofEisenhowerandtheintelligencecommunity,foritwasinthisareathatthe
OSSmadeitscontributiontoasuccessfulOVERLORD.
"Ah,thosefirstOSSarrivalsinLondon!HowwellIrememberthem,"wrotetheBritish
humoristMalcolmMuggeridge,"arrivinglikejeunefillesenfleurstraightfromafinishing
school,allfreshandinnocent,tostartworkinourfrowstyoldintelligencebrothel.All
toosoontheywereravishedandcorrupted,becomingindistinguishablefromseasoned
proswhohadbeeninthegameforaquartercenturyormore."10
Page101
DonovaninsistedthattheOSShadtohaveamajorroleinOVERLORD,oneatleast
equaltothatofitsBritishcounterpart,SpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE),whichhad
beencontrollingallAlliedrelationswiththeFrenchResistancesince1941.InDonovan's
view,SOEdidnotthinkoractonabigenoughscale.Itsoperationsweregearedtoaspy
here,aclandestineradiooperatorthere,orsporadiccontactwithundergroundcells,all
reflectingthetimewhentheBritishwerefightingthewaralone,onashoestring.Butby
1944,thingsweredifferent-theAlliescoulddrawontheseeminglyunlimitedproduction
oftheUnitedStates.Donovanwantedtodomuchmore,beginningwithaprogramof
supplyingarmsonalargescaletotheMaquis.
TheBritishdisagreed.TheywantedtolimittheamountofsuppliessenttoFrancebecause
oftheirbeliefthatrivalresistancegroupswouldusetheweaponstofighteachother
insteadoftheGermans,andthatafterliberationtheCommunistswouldusethearmsto
takepoliticalpower.Donovanignoredthethreat.HehadCommunistsintheOSSand
wassureheknewhowtocontrolthembesides,theywerefightingGermans,werethey
not?Inplaceofsmall,secret,self-containedcellsdirectedfromLondonbyradio,
DonovanwantednothinglessthanaFrenchArmy,albeitonparamilitarylines,withthe
FrenchsharingleadershipequallywithAmericansandEnglishmenonthespot.Tohell
withthepoliticalconsequenceshewantedasmanywell-armedFrenchmenaspossible
takingpartinthenationaluprisingagainsttheNazis.11
So,inthespringof1944,Donovanadvocatedasubstantialincreaseinthequantityof
arms,ammunition,andothersuppliessenttoFranceinordertoincreaseparticipationin
theMaquisandtoassuremaximummilitaryeffectivenessoftheResistanceonD-Day.
AgaintheBritish,moreaccustomedtofightingtheGermanswithbrainsthanwithbrawn,
werehesitant.Compoundingthatproblem,theBritishhadamonopolyonrelationswith
theMaquisthroughSOE,andthosefewsuppliesthatwereair-droppedtotheFrench
camefromtheBritish.IketriedtoexplaintoFrenchmenwhocomplainedabout
AmericanstinginessthatthesuppliestheBritishweredroppinghadcomefromAmerica
inthefirstplace,butitmadelittleimpression.
AfterD-Day,whentheMaquisbegantoproveitsworth,EisenhoweractingatDonovan's
requestgreatlyincreasedtherateofsupply,usingasmanyasthreehundredbomberson
oneop
Page102
erationtoparachutesuppliestotheFrench.DonovangleefullyreportedtoMarshall,"Itis
nowpossibletopublicizeouraidtotheFrenchResistanceandthustocultivateforthe
U.S.thegoodwilloftheFrenchpeople."12
Asthesupplycontroversyindicates,therewasprofoundmistrustbetweentheAllies.
SomeAnglophobicFrenchmen,includingdeGaulle,suspectedthattheBritishwere
tryingtoreestablishtheoldEnglishkingdomofAquitaineinFrance.Otherschargedthat
theBritishwerewillingto"fighttothelastFrenchman."
TheBritish,fortheirpart,continuedtofearthatcommunismwouldtakeoverwhenthe
GermansleftFranceandtheywereirritatedatDonovan'sbull-in-the-china-shopmethods
andhislackofpoliticalsophistication.TheAmericansjustwantedtokillGermans,as
quicklyandefficientlyaspossible.Underthecircumstances,theBritishwouldnottrust
theFrench;theOSSwouldnottrusttheBritish;theFrenchwouldnottrustanyone.
HowthentousethepotentialoftheMaquis?Theanswerwasabrilliantcompromise,a
remarkableinternationalsecretserviceplancode-namedJEDBURGH(thenamecame
fromthetrainingquartersatJedburghontheJedRiverinScotland).TheJEDteams,as
theywerecalled,werethree-mangroups-oneFrenchman,oneEnglishman,one
American.StartingonD-Day,theJEDSweretoparachuteinuniformtoareasknownto
haveheavyconcentrationsofMaquis,wheretheywouldactasliaisonwiththe
underground,armandtraintheguerrillaforces,andcoordinateactivitywithSHAEF.
Altogether,betweenD-DayandtheliberationofFrance,91JEDteamswereparachuted
intoFrance.13
Initially,controloftheJEDSwassupposedtoremainwiththetwosecretservices,SOE
andOSS.ButIkewashardlythemantoallowanactivitysocloselyconnectedto
OVERLORDtogoonundersomeoneelse'scommand.OnMarch23,1944,heassumed
controlofallsecretserviceactivityconnectedwithOVERLORD.Thejointspecial
operationsunitformedbyOSSandSOEwasdivorcedentirelyfromitsparent
organizationsandrenamedSpecialForceHeadquarters,reportingdirectlytoSHAEF.14
ThisnaturallydispleaseddeGaulle(whohadsetuphisowngovernment,theFrench
CommitteeofNationalLiberation,inAlgiers)becausetheMaquiswas,hefelt,hisarmybuthecouldnotsupplyit,didnotcommandit,andcouldonlybarelycommunicatewith
itastheradiocontactswerecontrolledbySHAEF.
Page103
IkehadnotlivedthroughthenightofNovember8-9,1942,arguingwithGiraudfor
nothing.HewaskeenlysensitivetodeGaulle'scomplaintand,aswillbeseen,hewas
muchmorewillingtomeetdeGaulle'sdemandsandthusgetdeGaulle'scooperationthan
anyotherhighlyplacedAnglo-Americanleader.Hewenttogreatlengthstokeepde
Gaulle'speopleinAlgiersinformed,toasktheiropinion,tocoordinateactivitywiththem.
Suchcoordinationbecameimpossible,however,aftertheimposingofthediplomaticban,
becausedeGaullesaidhewouldbedamnedifhewouldusetheBritishcipherto
communicatewithhismilitaryleadersinLondon.IftheFrenchcouldnotusetheirown
cipher,theywouldnottalktoIkeoranyoneelse.
AnadditionalproblemwasthatbothChurchillandFDRmistrustedtheFrenchso
completelythattheyinsistedEisenhowernottellanyFrenchmanthedateorplaceofthe
attack.Thecomplexstoryofhowtheseproblemswereworkedouttakesavolumein
itselftodescribefully;sufficeittosayherethatIkespentmuchofhispreinvasiontime
onrelationswiththeFrenchwithouteverachievingasatisfactoryresolution.15Hismain
accomplishmentwastoconvincedeGaullethathewashonest,intelligent,andasincere
friendofFrance.
Throughthespringof1944theJEDSwentthroughtheirtraining,underSHAEF
supervision,whilethestaffatSpecialForceHeadquartersporedovercharts,maps,
railroadschedules,andtimetablestoselecttargetsinFrancefortheMaquistohitonDDayandinthefollow-upperiod.
TheBritishofficialhistoryofSOEoutlinestheroleSHAEFassignedtotheMaquis:"A
preliminaryincreaseinthetempoofsabotage,withparticularattentiontofighteraircraft
andenemymorale;attacksonlocalhq,simpleroadandtelephonewrecking,removalof
Germanexplosivefromminedbridgeslikelytobeusefultotheallies,andmoreandmore
sabotageastheairbattlereacheditsclimax;andthen,simultaneouslywiththeseaborne
assault,anall-outattackonroads,railwaysandtelephones,andtheharassingof
occupationtroopswherevertheycouldbefoundbyanyavailablemeans."Allthishadto
becoordinatedwithFORTITUDEi.e.,thesabotageactivitieshadtobespreadoutevenly
overallpossiblelandingsites,withtheemphasisonthePasdeCalais.16
TheJEDShadsomeingenioustechniquestoworkwith.JulianHuxley,thezoologist,
developedacycloniteplasticexplosivethat
Page104
couldbemanufacturedbythethousandsandthatlookedtobecattledroppings.They
werepowerfulenoughtoburstarubbertire.TheideawasfortheMaquistospreadthem
inthepathofpanzercolumnstryingtomaketheirwaytoNormandy.TheJEDSlearned
howtodisruptGermancommunicationssystemsinsuchawaythattheGermanscould
notfindthebreaksonesuchtechniquewastodriveathumbtackintoasignalscable.All
acrossFrance,inthedaysfollowingJune6,signpostswereturnedtopointinthewrong
direction,causingterribleconfusionamongtheWehrmacht.Acubeortwoofsugarinthe
gastankcouldimmobilizeaTigerRoyaltank.
JEDagentsinthenorthofFrancemanagedtosabotagemorethanahundredfactories
producingwarmaterialsfortheGermans.Thefavoritetechniquewassimplicityitself:A
JED,ormorelikelyaFrenchmanoftheMaquisspeakingforhim,wouldapproachthe
managerofafactoryrequestingthatheallowthesabotageofcertainmachines,and
threateningAlliedbombingoftheplantifhedidnotagree.Mostagreed,ifonlyto
preventthedestructionoftheentireplant.Thosewhodidnotwereamazedathow
quicklyandaccuratelytheJEDScouldcallinairstrikesontheirfactories.17
Thevastmajorityofregulararmyofficersaredisdainfulofirregularforces,forintheir
viewtheguerrillawarriorsarewithoutorder,control,discipline,orclearlydefined
purpose.ButIkewasnotanordinaryprofessionalsoldier,andfromthemomenthetook
upthereinsofcommandforOVERLORDhecountedontheMaquisforasignificant
contributiontovictory,mostofallintheareasofinterruptingcommunicationsand
slowingtheflowofGermanreinforcementstoNormandy.Inshort,theMaquiswouldbe
oneofhischiefweaponsinthebattleofthebuildup,nearlyasimportantasFORTITUDE.
InlateApril,EisenhowermadeoneofhismostbasicdecisionsontheMaquisand
OVERLORD.SpecialForcesHeadquartershadplannedtokeeptheResistanceinthe
SouthofFranceoutofactiononD-Day.TheideawastoturntheMaquislooseonlyafter
theAlliedlandingsatMarseilles(codenameANVIL),whichwasscheduledformidAugust.HeadquartersfearedthatiftheyroseupinJune,theGermanswouldidentify
themandprobablyeliminatemostofthembeforeANVIL.Inthatcase,theFrench
Resistance
Page105
wouldnotbeabletodoforANVILwhatitwascountedontodoforOVERLORD.
OnApril18,however,EisenhowerdecidedtooverruleSpecialForces.Hesentacableto
theSupremeCommander,Mediterranean,GeneralHenryWilson,sayingthatbecause
OVERLORDhadthetoppriority,andbecause"itisunlikelythatResistanceforcesin
southFrancecouldberestrainedfromrisingwhenOVERLORDislaunched,"hehad
decidedtohaveSHAEFtakeoperationalcontroloftheResistanceintheSouthofFrance
andmakeitanintegralpartofthewholeJEDsetup.Theobjective,IkeorderedonMay
21,wouldbeto"delaythemovementofenemyforcestothelodgementarea,"andto
"harasssuchenemylinesofcommunicationsaspassthroughtheSouthofFrance."
SpecialForcesthenworkeduplong,detailed,extensivechartsonexactlywhatbridges,
railroadcrossings,andotherkeypointsthesupremecommanderwanteddestroyed.18
Theresults,allacrossFrance,weretremendousandspectacular.TheBBCbroadcastthe
famous"personalmessages"thatsetofftheMaquisandstartedavastarmyinmotion.On
thenightofJune5-6alone,theMaquissuccessfullyattacked950ofthe1,050railroad
targetsithadbeengiven.19
Sensationalasthatachievementwas,therewasevenbettertofollow.AllacrossFrance
thatnight,JEDteamslandedfromtheair,madecontactwiththelocalMaquisleaders,and
wentintoaction.OnD-Dayplusone,aGermanSSarmoreddivisionequippedwiththe
latestandbestGermantanksstartedoutfromToulousetowardNormandy.Itsprogress
wasexcruciatingly,infuriatinglyslow.AllthebridgesovertheLoireRiverweredown,
somedestroyedbyair,somebytheMaquis.
The2dSSPanzerDivisionhaditsownbridgingtrain,andmuchexperiencewiththe
broadRussianriversinhowtouseit,sothedownedbridgeshelditupforonlyafew
hours.Whatreallysloweditdownwastheincessantguerrillaactivity.Thedivision's
gasolinedumpswereblownbeforeitevengotstarted.Therewasonlyasingleopen
railwaylinerunningnorth,ofalmostnohelptothetankersbecauseonestickofdynamite
couldderailthewholetrain.Sotheymarched,andateveryappropriatespotalongthe
way,theMaquissprayedthecolumnwithmachine-gunandmortarfire.Thataction
causedthepanzerstohaltintheirtracks.Thenthe
Page106
JEDteamscouldputinacalltotheAlliedairforces,andIke'spilotswouldgivethe
Germansagoodpounding.TheBritishofficialhistoryrecordsthattheMaquis''leftthe
Germanssothoroughlymauledthatwhentheydideventuallycrawlintotheirlagersclose
tothefightingline,heavingasighofreliefthatatlasttheywouldhaverealsoldiersto
dealwithandnotthesedamnedterrorists,theirfightingqualitywasmuchbelowwhatit
hadbeenwhentheystarted."20
WhenRommelpersuadedHitlertosendthe2dSSPanzerDivisiontoNormandy,he
expectedittoarriveonD-Dayplusthree.Itactuallyarrived,afterpassingthroughits
ordealoffire,onD-Dayplusseventeen.OnemorepanzerdivisionatOmahaBeachon
June9or10mightwellhavemadethedifference,soitmaybesaidwithtruththatinthis
operationalonetheMaquismadeaninvaluablecontributiontotheAlliedvictory.Of
course,notallGermancolumnsmovingtowardNormandyweresobadlyhit,butSHAEF
estimatedthattheoverallactionoftheResistanceresultedinanaveragedelayoftwodays
onallGermanunitsattemptingtomovetothebattle.21
TheFrenchpaidheavilyfortheirownliberation.Ifregularsoldiersdonotlikefighting
withguerrillas,theylikeevenlesshavingtofightagainstthem.TheGermans,inany
event,hadfallenintothehabitofbehavinglikeabsolutebeastsinFrance.Consequently,
therevengetheyreapedforMaquisactionswasterrible.Theworstandmostfamouscase
wasOradour-sur-Glane,whereinretaliationforsniperfirethathadkilledapopular
companycommander,theGermansroundeduptheentirepopulationinthevillage
square.Thewomenandchildrenweresentintothechurch;themenwereshotdown
wheretheystood;theGermansthensetfiretothechurch.ArmedSSguardsstoodaround
ittomakecertainnobodygotoutalive.Aboutsevenhundredwerekilled.22
TheMaquisnotonlyharassedtheGermancolumnsheadedtowardNormandy;theFrench
alsoprovidedtheSHAEFforceswithpricelessinformationonGermantroopmovements
ingeneral,onthestrengthofvariousunits,theirequipment,theirleaders,their
weaknesses.When,inAugust,theGermansbegantheirretreatfromNormandy,the
Maquisambushedtheretreatingcolumns,attackedisolatedgroups,andprotectedbridges
fromdestruction.
TheOSSofficialhistorydeclared,"Themostsignificantdiscoverywastheenormous
importanceofFrenchresistanceasasource
Page107
ofaccuratetacticalintelligence.TheMaquisroleinthisrespecthadoriginallybeen
contemplatedasincidental,butitprovedtobeamajorcontribution.Justbeforethe
break-throughatSt.Lô,forexample,theMaquisgavetheAmericansexcellentcoverage
ofGermanartilleryplacements,tankunits,troopsdispositionsandtheconditionof
strategicbridges."23
WastheMaquisworthfivedivisionstoIke?Ten?Twenty?Itwasandisimpossibleto
makeanexactestimate.Ikeusedtheword"invaluable"onnumerousoccasionsinhis
postwarpraiseoftheResistanceforces.Healsofrequentlypointedtothemostintangible
butperhapsmostvaluablecontributionofthoseforces:"Notleastinimportance,"
Eisenhowerdeclaredinhisofficialreport,"theyhad,bytheirceaselessharassing
activities,surroundedtheGermanswithaterribleatmosphereofdangerandhatredwhich
ateintotheconfidenceoftheleadersandthecourageofthesoldiers."24
NordidEisenhowerwaituntilafterthewartoshowhisappreciation.OnJune15,when
thecampaignwaslessthantendaysold,hegreatlyincreasedtherateofsupplydropsto
theMaquisthroughoutFrance."Theseextrasortiesarebeinggiven,"heexplained,"in
ordertofurtherassisttheresistancemovementwhichatthemomentisgivingunexpected
results."AnespeciallybigdropcameonJune25,when180bombersoftheU.S.Eighth
AirForcedeliveredthreehundredtonsofsuppliestoguerrillasinfourseparateareasin
southernFrance.AResistanceleadersignaledLondon,"TheMaquis'thankstotheU.S.
AirForceforadamnedgoodshow!Whenisthenext?"ThenextcameonBastilleDay
andwasalsoagreatsuccess.25
UntilJune17,theResistancereceiveditsmissions(andthusinpracticeitsorders)from
SpecialForces,apartofSHAEF.DeGaullefoundthisfactdistressing.Heinsistedthat
FrenchtroopshadtobecommandedbyFrenchgenerals,andhehadalreadydeclaredthat
allthosewhotookpartinthenationaluprisingagainsttheenemywouldbeconsidered
partoftheFrenchArmyandentitledtoalltherightsandprivilegesofregularsoldiers.
Ike,anxioustopleasedeGaulleasanecessarypartofmaintainingcoordinationwiththe
Resistance,hadseenthepointlongbeforetheinvasion,butChurchillandRoosevelt
wouldnotgivehimpermissiontoputtheResistanceunderaFrenchgeneral.
Bymid-June,however,theyhadcometoseethattheirmistrust
Page108
ofdeGaullewasmisplaced,andtheyallowedIketoappointGeneralPierreJoseph
KoenigtheheadoftheFrenchForcesoftheInterior,astheMaquiswasnowcalled
officially.Aweeklater,IkeannouncedthatKoenighadthesamestatusofanyAllied
commanderservingunderSHAEF.26Thehumiliationandshameoftheoccupation,
1940-44,wasfinallyover.TheFrenchhadonceagaintakentheirplacealongsidetheir
BritishandAmericanfriendstodrivetheBochefromtheirsoil.
WhenSpecialForceHeadquartersdisbandedin1945,Eisenhowerwroteapersonalletter
ofappreciation.HesaidnofinalassessmentoftheoperationalvalueoftheResistancehad
yetbeenmade,but"Iconsiderthatthedisruptionofenemyrailcommunications,the
harassingofGermanroadmovesandthecontinualandincreasingstrainplacedonthe
GermanwareconomyandinternalsecurityservicesthroughoutoccupiedEuropebythe
organizedforcesofresistance,playedaveryconsiderablepartinourcompleteandfinal
victory."
Ikeaddedhisown"greatadmirationforthebraveandoftenspectacularexploits"ofthe
ResistanceandtheJEDteams.Finally,heputtheeffortintoperspective:"Innoprevious
war,andinnoothertheaterduringthiswar,haveresistanceforcesbeensoclosely
harnessedtothemainmilitaryeffort."27
TheAmericanswerealsogettingbetterinthespygame.TwoyoungSLUS,Stuyvesant
WainwrightIIandJohnOakes,capturedthefirstGermanstay-behindagent,aFrenchman
whosecodenamewasFrutos.TheyknewFrutoswasinCherbourgbecausetheyhad
moniteredhistrial-runmessagesbacktoGermany,sentbeforeAmericantroopsoverran
theportcity.Frutos'assignmentwastosendtheGermansinformationontroopunits
comingintoFrance,shipsinport,andsoon.Fromoneofthepracticemessages,
WainwrightandOakesknewFrutoshadagirlfriend.AssoonastheAmericansentered
Cherbourg,theyfoundher.Shetalked.TheypickedupFrutos,turnedhimintoadoubleagent,andusedhimexactlyastheBritishusedtheiragentsintheDoubleCrossSystem.
Thatis,FrutoswasallowedtosendonaccurateinformationaboutmatterstheGermans
alreadyknew,whilefeedingthemfalseinformationonkeypoints,designedtosupport
FORTITUDE.28
Frutoswasonlythefirstofmanystay-behindspickedupby
Page109
boththeBritishandtheAmericans.MostwerefoundthankstoULTRA.Totheend,the
Germansneversuspectedathing.
TheAmericanSLUSfoundthemselvesgainingprestigeintheeyesoftheircommanders
duringthebattleofthebuildup.Earlier,beforeD-Day,WainwrightsaidthatGeneral
Bradleyandhisstaff"werevery,veryskeptical"oftheULTRAinformation.Theyjust
couldnotbelieveanyintelligenceofficercouldbethatgood.Butoncethebattlewas
joined,"SLUbreaksweresuchthatyoucouldfindoutpracticallywheresmallunitswere
moving,and,Christ,youjusthadtobelieve.BecausegoingthroughNormandy...you'd
getamessagethat110thheadquarterswasatacertainplace,andbyGoditwasthere.This
youhadtobelieve."
Wainwright'sbiggestproblemwasprovidingacoverstoryforhissource.Mostofthe
intelligenceofficershedealtwithdidnotknowaboutULTRA;theywerenaturallycurious
astowhereWainwrightwasgettingallhisfabulousinformation."Nineoutoftentimes
wemadeitupoutofwholecloth.Thecoverstorywaspickedoutoftheair."For
example,whenaskedhowheknewthatthe106thPanzerDivisionwouldbemovinginto
thelinethatnight,Wainwrightrepliedthathewasrunningaspywhooverhearda
conversationatalocalbarbetweentwoGermanofficers.
Thatspywasfictitious,butthestoryrangtruebecauseinfacttheSLUShad"ahelluvalot
ofconfidentialfunds....Theycouldrunagentsontheirown.Hireagents.Ididthat.My
bosswasverykeenonthat.Heusedtocalltheseagentsmidgets.He'dsay,'Wainwright,
howmanymidgetsareyourunning?'"29
ByJuly1944theAllieshadwonthebattleofthebuildup.AhandfulofmenintheBritish
SecretService,spearheadedbyMasterman,alongwiththousandsofFrenchmenand
Frenchwomenofallages,aidedinnosmallmeasurebytheSLUSandULTRA,had
imposedjustenoughdelayontheGermanstomakethevictorybytheBritishand
Americantroopspossible.Itwasadamnclose-runthing,asWellingtonisreportedto
havesaidaboutWaterloo,butifthemarginwasslim,itwassufficient.
Page110
ChapterEight
TheBattleofMortainULTRA'SGreatestTriumph
MID-JULY1944.Cherbourghasbeencaptured,thedamagetotheportrepaired.On
July19thefirstsupplyshipsstartunloading.TheAmericanshavelandedatotalof
770,000troopsinNormandy.Theyhavesuffered73,000casualties,whicharemore
thancompensatedforbyreservedivisionsinEngland(includingthe82dand101st
Airborne,whichhavebeenwithdrawnfromtheContinentforrefitting)waitingtheir
chancetocrossoverandjointhebattle.
TheBritishandCanadianshavelanded591,000troops,suffered49,000casualties,and
alsohavereserveforceswaitingtocross.TheGermans,meanwhile,continuetohold
theFifteenthArmyatthePasdeCalais,despitetheoverwhelmingAlliedcommitment
toNormandy,becausetheystilloverestimateIke'stotalforce.TheWehrmachthas
taken116,863casualties.InNormandy,theGermanshavetwenty-sixdivisions,many
ofthemunderstrength,facingthirty-fourAllieddivisions.1
AllGermanAttemptstodrivetheAlliesofftheContinenthadfailedmiserably,partly
becauseofpoorgeneralshiptheycommittedtheirreservespiecemeal,feedingtheminto
thebattleassoonastheyarrivedatthefrontandpartlybecauseofULTRA.Wheneverthe
Germansdidtrytoassembleforcesforamajorcounterattack,ULTRApassedthewordto
Alliedartillery,airmen,andnavalforces,whotogetherunleashedahorrendous
bombardmentontheassemblycenter.
Still,theWehrmachtonthedefensiveremainedaformidable
Page111
foe.WinterbothamwenttoNormandytoseeBradleyandcheckontheoperationofthe
SLUsystem.BradleythankedhimandallthoseinvolvedinULTRA'Sperformance:
"NeverdidIexpecttogetsuchconciseinformationaboutmyopponents,"hesaid,then
added,"Theonlytroubleisthatthereseemstobetoomanyofthem."2
So,althoughhewasincontrolofmostofNormandyandwasthewinnerinthebattleof
thebuildup,asJulydrewtoacloseIkewasclosetodespair.Flyingbombswerefalling
onLondon.Monty'sattemptstotakeCaenhadfailed,despitethemassiveapplicationof
airpower.Bradley'sprogressinthehedgerowcountrywasagonizinglyslow.Afterseven
weeksoffighting,thedeepestAlliedpenetrationsweresomethirtymilesinland,ona
frontofonlyeightymiles.Therewashardlyenoughroomtomaneuverortobringinthe
reserveswaitinginEngland.TheGermanswerefightingsavagely,takingadvantageof
everypieceofcoverandlayingmineswithextraordinaryskill.
TheWehrmachtwas,however,stretchedthin,toothintokeepupthefightmuchlonger.
ULTRArevealedthatHitlerwasorderinghisgeneralstostayput,whichindicatedthat
theywereaskinghimforpermissiontoretreat.3FortunatelyfortheAllies,Hitlerdecided
thatRundstedtwasadefeatistandreplacedhimwithGeneralGuenthervonKluge.
Evenbetter,RommelwaswoundedonJuly17whenanAlliedfighterstrafedthestaffcar
inwhichhewasriding.HewasthenimplicatedintheJuly20plotagainstHitlerand
eventuallycommittedsuicidetoavoidtheshameofatrial.VonKlugeassumedRommel's
dutiesinadditiontohisotherresponsibilities,butHitlerdidnottrustKlugeeitherand
thereforeinsistedonmaintainingatightpersonalcontroloverhisbattleplansandactions.
ThatsituationforcedtheGermanstousetheradioextensively,whichwasidealfor
ULTRA.
Nevertheless,theGermans,intheirfixedpositions,withtheirpanzersdugin,utilizing
everyfoldofground,mostespeciallythefamoushedgerowsofNormandy,couldnotbe
dislodged.IftheAlliescouldeverbreakthrough,theycouldusetheirairandtransport
superioritytolaunchawarofmaneuverthatwouldcrushtheGermansinFrance.The
trickwastobreakthrough.Inasensethesituationof1940hadbeenreversed,withthe
GermansintheroleoftheimmobileFrenchattheMaginotLineandtheAlliesreadyto
beginablitzkriegoftheirown,ifonlytheycouldcracktheshell.
Page112
Bradleyhadaplantoforceabreakout.Itcalledforthemassiveuseofairpowerina
mannerthatresembleda1916-typeoffensive,withthebomberssubstitutingforartillery
toblastaholethroughtheGermanline.ThebigdifferencebetweenBradley'splan,code
nameCOBRA,andaWorldWarIoffensivewastherelativethinnessoftheGermanline
in1944,coupledwiththepresenceofAmericantankstoexploittheholeblastedinthe
line.
COBRAbeganonJuly25.ThetremendousbombardmentlefttheGermansinadazed
condition.AtthesametimetheCanadians,ontheleft,beganadrivetowardFalaise,
whichgainedlittlegroundbutdidpindownthepanzersfacingMontgomery.Meanwhile,
General"LightningJoe"Collins,aveteranofGuadalcanal,ledhisU.S.VIICorpstoSt.
Lô,throughtheGermanlines,andbrokeoutintotheopencountrysideofFrance.
TheGermans,finally,abandonedtheiridéefixethatthemainlandingswouldcomeatthe
PasdeCalais.KlugeobtainedHitler'spermissiontotransfertwodivisionsfromthe
FifteenthArmytoNormandy.HitlertoldKlugeto"keephiseyesrivetedtothefrontand
ontheenemywithouteverlookingbackward."4ULTRApickedupthatsignal,toIke's
greatdelight,becauseittoldhimtheGermansweredoingexactlywhathehopedthey
woulddo-standinNormandyandtakeabeatingthere.WhatEisenhowermostfearedwas
thattheGermanswouldretiretothelineoftheSeineRiver,orperhapsallthewayback
totheFranco-Germanborder,theretotakeupprepareddefensivepositions.
ButwithHitlerincharge,therewasnodangerofaGermanretreat.Ikecountedonwhat
hecalledHitler's"conqueror'smentality."HebelievedthatHitler,likemostaggressive
leaders,couldnotbringhimselftogiveuplandhehadconquered.Throughoutthewar,
Eisenhowertookitforgrantedthathisenemieswouldstandandfight,nomatterhow
precarioustheirsituationorhowbadtheirposition,ratherthanretreattoshorter,more
easilydefendedlines.Itwasaleapintothemindofthemandirectingthebattlefromthe
othersideofthehill,thekindofintelligencethatcomesfromstudyandobservationover
aperiodoftime,aswellasfromastudyofhistory,ratherthanastheresultofan
interceptedradiomessageoraspy'sreport.5
Collins'breakthroughopenedthewayforaflowofreinforcementsfromEnglandto
FranceledbyPatton.Thesituationwastheculminationofasoldier'sdreams.Eisenhower
hadar
Page113
moredunitslooseintheenemyrearandtheycouldgoinanydirectionhewantedthemto
go.Pattonmightbesenteast,towardParis,ornortheast,towardtheGermanrearatCaen,
orsouthintocentralFrance,orwestintoBrittany.
AsIketoldMarshallonAugust2,henowhadagoldenopportunitynotonlytodefeatthe
GermanArmybuttodestroyit.PattonsentonecorpsintoBrittanytogetpossessionof
theportsthere;theotherthreecorpsofhisThirdArmyspedsouthwardfromAvranches,
withtheultimateintentionofswingingaroundtheexposedGermanleftflankand
encirclingKluge'sSeventhArmy.TheThirdArmy'sfood,fuel,ammunitionandother
supplieshadtocomethroughthenarrowbottleneckatAvranches.
Atthismoment,Hitlerdecidedtocounterattack.Heorderedanoffensivealongthe
Mortain-Avranchesaxisonthroughtothecoast.Itwasabrilliantstrategicmovethat
promised,ifsuccessful,toisolatePattonandpossiblyevendrivetheAlliesbackintothe
sea.
Itwasagamble,andHitlersignaledtoKluge,"ThedecisionintheBattleofFrance
dependsonthesuccessoftheAvranchesattack.Youhaveauniqueopportunity,which
willneverreturn,todriveintoanextremelyexposedenemyareaandtherebytochange
thesituationcompletely."6
Tosucceed,HitlerneededtoconvinceKlugethattheplanwouldwork.Inthishefailed.
Hitlerwantedtodelaythecounterattackuntilanimposingforceofpanzershadbeen
gatheredoppositeMortain,sothattheblow,whenitcame,wouldbeastrategicandnot
justatacticalone.ButKlugeattackedfivedaysaheadofschedule,preciselybecausehe
thoughtthebestthatcouldbeattainedwouldbeminorchangesinthefrontline,nota
strategicturnaround.Furthermore,Klugecouldnotaffordtopullmoreofhistanksoff
Monty'sfront;hehadalreadybroughtdowntoNormandymostofthearmorinthe
FifteenthArmy,andinanycasethecombinationofAlliedairforcesguidedbyULTRA
andtheFrenchResistancemademovementofunitsintoNormandytoocostlyandtimeconsumingtobeworththeeffort.
TheotherelementHitlercountedonforsuccesswassurprise.Herehewasonmuch
betterground,becausetheAllieswerepredisposedtobelievethattheGermanswere
fightingwiththeirbackstothewall,thinkingonlyaboutanorderlyretreattotheFrancoGermanborder,incapableofevencontemplating,much
Page114
lesslaunching,amajorcounterattack.Hisplanwassobold,Hitlerbelieved,thattheAllies
wouldneversuspectituntiltoolate.ButthankstoULTRA,EisenhowerandBradleywere
abletofightaclassicdefensivebattle,atextbookexampleofhowtomeetandthrowback
anarmoredattack.
ThestorybeganonAugust3,whenULTRApickedupaHitlerto-Klugesignalthatread,
"Thearmoureddivisionswhichhaveuptonowbeenemployedonthatfrontmustbe
releasedandmovedcompletetotheleftwing.Theenemy'sarmouredforces[Patton's
ThirdArmy]whichhavepressedforwardtotheeast,south-eastandsouthwillbe
annihilatedbyanattackwhichthesearmouredformationsnumberingatleastfourwill
make,andcontactwillberestoredwiththewestcoastoftheContentinatAvranchesor
northofthatwithoutregardtotheenemypenetrationsinBrittany."7
Everyoneinvolvedintheprocessofdecoding,translating,interpreting,anddisseminating
ULTRAmaterialrealizedimmediatelytheimportofthismessage.TheSLUSgotitto
EisenhowerandSHAEFwithinthehour,whileWinterbothampersonallyrangup
Churchillwiththeintercept.
Ike'sdeputy,AirChiefMarshalSirArthurTedder,asWinterbothamrelates,"tookthe
ratherunprecedentedstepofringingmeupand,asheputit,'inviewoftheextreme
importanceofHitler'ssignal,'askingifIwouldbequitecertainthatitwasnotabluff.
AgainhesaidthatthesubstancewasofsuchimportancethatEisenhowerdidn'twantto
takeanychances.IphonedHut3[inBletchleyPark]tomakequitesurethattheoriginal
GermanversionwasinHitler'sowndistinctivestyleandlanguage.Theytoldmewehad
noreasontodoubtitonanyscore,andthesignalhadwithoutdoubtcomefromFuehrer
headquarters.Tedderwassatisfied."8
SowereEisenhowerandBradley.TheyagreedatoncetokeepPattondrivingforward,
evensendingmoreunitsthroughthenarrowopeningbetweenMortainandthecoast
whileholdingatMortainwithonlyoneinfantrydivision,the30th,andtwoothersin
reserve.
ThethreeAmericanshadallbeenoutstandingathletes(Bradleyinbaseball,Pattonin
polo,Ikeinfootball);allwereWestPointers;theyhadbeenfriendsfornearlythirtyyears.
Pattonwastheoldest,Bradleytheyoungest.BradleyhadservedunderPat
Page115
ton'scommandinSicily;nowPattonwasunderBradley;itwasameasureoftheir
closenessthatIkeneverheardawordofcomplaintfromeithermanaboutthe
relationship.
PattonandBradleyseemedtobeexactopposites.Pattonwasagreatactor,deliberately
portrayingtheroleoftheruthlesssoldier,swashbuckling,profane,insensitive.Hisfrown
wasenoughtoscareamanhalftodeath,hisshoutswerelegendary.Bradleywasquiet,
self-effacing,neverraisedhisvoice,wasconsiderateofhismen,andshunnedanyhintof
role-playing.WherePattonloveduniforms,withpearl-handledpistolsstickingoutonhis
hips,BradleyworeasimpleEisenhowerjacketandplainpants.
Butbothmenhadmuchincommontoo,beginningwithabeliefinIkeandawillingness
totrusthim,nomatterwhat.Inaddition,eachmanhaddark,deep-set,penetratingeyes
thatmissednothing;agrim,determined,squarechin;abroad,hard-setmouth;andaface
thatdisplayedsinglenessofpurpose.TheUnitedStatescouldwellbeproudofthistrioof
generals.
EisenhowerwaswithBradleyathisheadquarterswhenBradleymadethedecisiontohold
atMortain.Ikeapprovedhisplan,Tedderrecalled,"thereandthen.HetoldBradleythatif
theGermansshouldtemporarilybreakthroughfromMortaintoAvranchesandthuscut
offPatton'sthrust,wecouldgivetheadvanceforcestwothousandtonsofsupplyperday
byair."9
HowcouldtheAmericanleaderstakesucharisk,knowingthatHitlerintendedtoattack
withfourarmoreddivisionsintheinitialassault?Partlybecauseairpowercouldsupply
Pattonandprotecthisflanks,morebecauseofULTRA.Theywereconfidentthatthe
oracleofBletchleyParkwouldgivesufficientadvancewarningofwhere,when,andin
whatstrengththeattackwouldcomeforthemtoprepareforit.Whattheywerereally
dependingonwasthatHitlerwouldtrytocontrolthebattleandthusfilltheairwithradio
signals.
ByAugust6,Klugehadthreearmoreddivisionsreadyattheirjump-offpoints.Although
well-camouflaged,forreasonsthatwereinexplicabletotheGermans,theyweretakinga
terrificairandnavalgunbombardment.Incontrasttotheusualdailypersonnellossesof
about3percentforunitsincombat,thecasualtyreportsforAugust6inthedivisions
scheduledfortheattackreachedheightsof40percent.10
TheGermanshadtoattackorfallback.Rightaftermidnight,
Page116
theenginesoftwohundredassaulttanksroaredintolifeandtheBattleofMortainwas
on.Bydaylight,the2dSSPanzerDivisionhadoverunMortain.Therewasnosignificant
Americanopposition.TheGermansassumedtheyhadachievedcompletesurpriseand
gleefullybegantodrivebeyondMortaintowardAvranches.
Astheydidso,andasthelightstrengthened,Americanartilleryshellsbegantodropall
aroundthem,settingvehiclesafire,kickingupdust,raisinghellgenerally,forcingthe
panzerstoseekcover,throwupcamouflage,anddigin.Ontheflanks,the1stSSPanzer
Divisionandthe2dPanzerDivisionweregoingthroughsimilarexperiences.Theattack
hadcometoahaltalmostbeforeitgotstarted.
WhathadhappenedwasthatelementsoftheU.S.30thDivisionhadstayedonHill317,
immediatelyeastofMortain,whileotherelementshadthrownuproadblocksthat
funneledtheGermantanksinpredeterminedandselecteddirections.Bradleyhadalsoset
upartillerybatteriesoneachflank.Withdaylight,themenonHill317,enjoying
unexcelledobservation,calledtheartilleryfirerightdownontheGermans'heads.''11
Simultaneously,Britishrocket-firingHurricaneandTyphoonfighterairplanesswooped
downontheenemy,firingrocketafterrocketintothemassedtanks.Theyweresoon
joinedbyAmericanLightnings,Thunderbolts,andMustangsfromGeneralPete
Quesada's9thTacticalAirCommand.Thirtyyearslater,Quesadastillrecalledthat
triumphantattack.HetoldLewin,"Youknow,BradandIneverusedtotalktogether
aboutourULTRAsignals.Wejusttookitforgrantedthateachofusknewwhatwasin
them.ButIcanstillseethatmomentwhenwestoodwiththosesignalsinourhands,and
grinned,andsaid,'We'vegotthem.'"12
HitlerpromisedKlugeextensiveaircover.HesaidthateveryLuftwaffeplaneinFrance
wouldbethrownintothebattle.Butnotone-notone-appearedintheskyoverMortain
thatAugust7.Wherewerethey?Mostlyshotup.ThankstoULTRA,theAllieswereable
toengagethemthemomenttheygotoffthegroundfromtheirairfieldsaroundParis.
Onlyafewgotoutofsightoftheirairfields;nonereachedMortain.13
OntheafternoonofAugust7,KlugesentagloomyreporttoHitler'sheadquarters.Hehad
lostfullyhalfhistanks,hesaid,andwasstilllosingthem.Theattackhadbeenbroughtto
astandstill.
Page117
HewantedtodisengagewhatwasleftofhisthreepanzerdivisionsatMortainanduse
themtoblunttheCanadiandriveatFalaise.14
Hitlerwasfurious.HethoughtthatKlugehadlaunchedtheattackprematurely,hastily,
andcarelessly.InHitler'sview,heshouldhavewaitedforthearrivalofthreemore
armoreddivisions,ontheirwaytoMortain,andthenmadeatrulymassiveeffort.From
Hitler'spointofviewinEastPrussia,thatmadesense;fromKluge'spointofviewin
Normandy,towaitmeantthattheunitsalreadyassembledwouldbedestroyedinplaceby
Alliedartillery,air,andnavalfire.
ButHitlerwasincharge,notKluge,andHitlergavetheorders(theywerereadbyIke
withinanhourofKluge'sreadingthem)."Icommandtheattackbeprosecuteddaringly
andrecklesslytothesea,"Hitlerbegan."Regardlessofrisk,"hewantedthreepanzer
divisionswithdrawnfromtheFifthArmyfacingtheCanadiansandcommittedinthe
Avranchessector"tobringaboutthecollapseoftheNormandyfrontbyathrustintothe
deepflankandrearoftheenemyfacingSeventhArmy."Toconsummatewhattohimhad
becomethemasterstrokeoftheWesterncampaign,Hitlerconcluded,"Greatestdaring,
determination,imaginationmustgivewingstoallechelonsofcommand.Eachandevery
manmustbelieveinvictory."15
Kluge,despondent,toldoneofhissubordinates,"Iforeseethatthefailureofthis
continuedattackcanleadtocollapseoftheentireNormandyfront,buttheorderisso
unequivocalthatitmustbeobeyed."16
TheU.S.30thDivisioncouldnotbyitselfwithstandanassaultfromsixGermanarmored
divisions.*BradleysentintheU.S.2dand3dArmoredDivisionstomeettheGerman
spearheads,alongwithtwoinfantrydivisionstostrengthentheflanksandprovide
additionalartilleryfire.Meanwhileotherunitscontinuedtomovethroughthegap
betweenAvranchesandthesea,thendrivenorthtowardtheGermanrearoreasttoward
Paris.
BynightfallofAugust7,thebattlethathadbegunatmidnightwasessentiallyover,
despiteHitler'spreemptoryorderstoKluge.
*The30thcontinuedtofightmagnificently,eventhoughsurrounded,inanactionthatrankswiththat
ofthe101stAirborneatBastogneinDecember;unfortunatelythe30thDivisionhasneverreceived
thecredititshouldhaveforthisheroicstand.
Page118
Americanartillerybatteriessetnewrecordsforshellsfired;theyoperatedonthepremise
thatitwasbettertowasteshellsthanmissapossibletarget.Theairforceshadflown
hundredsofsorties.Asaresult,ofthetwohundredorsoGermantanksinvolvedinthe
initialassault,onlytwenty-fivewereleftthenextmorning.17
AlthoughHitlercontinuedtowallowinhisfantasiesandorderattackafterattack,the
BattleofMortainwasover.Littlerememberedtoday,itwasneverthelessagreatAllied
victory.TheelementsthatmadeitpossibleincludedAmericanmass-production
techniques,whichprovidedthefightingmenwithwell-nighunlimitedartillery
ammunitionandvirtuallycompleteaircover,excellenttacticaldispositions,thecourage
andskillofindividualAmericansoldiers(especiallythoseinthe30thDivision),and
calm,cool,firmleadershipatthetop.But,clearly,themostimportantelementinthe
victorywasULTRA.
Ironically,August7wasthelastdayofthewarthatULTRAwouldbedecisive.Themain
reasonforthisdevelopmentwasthatasEisenhowerwentovertoanall-outoffensive,the
Germanshadtoreacttohismoves,ratherthantheotherwayaround,ashadbeenthe
caseduringthebattleofthebuildupandatMortain.AnotherreasonwasMonty'srather
strangedisregardofULTRAinformation.Winterbothamcomplainsthroughouthisbook,
TheUltraSecret,aboutMontgomeryneveracknowledgingULTRA,muchlessthanking
allthoseinvolvedingettingULTRA'Spricelessinformationtohim.ThatMontyhatedto
sharethecreditforavictoryisclearenough,butwhyhefrequentlyignoredULTRA
information(orotherformsofintelligence,forthatmatter)remainsmysterious.Thebest
exampleofthisphenomenonisMortain.
BythemorningofAugust8,theAlliedHighCommandknewthatHitlerhadordered
mostofthearmorintheFifthArmytoleavetheCanadianfrontnearFalaiseandproceed
toMortain,theretoparticipateintheattack.Althoughitwastruethatifthismightyforce
hadmanagedtobreakthroughtotheseabeyondAvranchesitwouldhavecreatedserious
problemsfortheAllies,especiallyPatton'sThirdArmy,itwasalsotruethatBradleyhad
bythengatheredtogethertwoarmoredandfiveinfantrydivisionstogreettheGerman
tanks.Therewas,infact,almostnochanceatallofaGermanbreakthrough,asKluge
himselfknewfullwell.Underthesecircumstances,Monty'smostlogicalmovewould
havebeentoholdbacktheCanadiansuntilthepanzershaddepartedfrom
Page119
theirfront,waitforKlugetocommithistanksatMortain,andthenunleashtheCanadians
foradrivetoandthroughFalaise,whichwouldcompletelyseverthesupplyand
communicationslinesoftwoentireGermanarmies.
ButMontyhadbeenunderextremepressurefromIkeforweekstogetgoing.Heknew
thatIke'simpatiencewithhisperformancewassharedbyallthestaffatSHAEF,British
andAmericanalike,andthatevenChurchillwasbeginningtogrowl.Afterall,Montyhad
promisedtotakeCaenonD-Day,buthehadnotgottenituntilnearlytheendofJuly,and
sincethenhadhardlyadvancedbeyondCaen.TedderhadurgedEisenhowertodemand
ofChurchillthatMontyberelievedofhiscommand.Hewouldnotgothatfar,butas
Butcherrecorded,"IkekeepscontinuallyafterMontgomerytodestroytheenemynow."
18
SoMontgomery,thegeneralwhousuallywaiteduntilthelastbuttononthelastprivate
wasinplacebeforeattacking,attackedtoosoon.OnthemorningofAugust8hesentthe
Canadiansforwardagain,towardFalaise.Theattackcamejustafterthe10thSSPanzer
DivisionhadstarteditsmovetoMortain,andjustasthe9thand12thSSPanzerDivisions
werestartingtofollowalongthesameroute.TheCanadianattackgaveKlugetheexcuse
heneededtocancelthewholemovement;hekeptthetanksinplacetofightthe
Canadians.IfMontyhadonlywaitedtwenty-fourhours,hecouldhavehadFalaisethe
nextday.Asitwas,theCanadiansranintothemassedfireoftwoGermanarmored
divisionsandmadelittleheadway.19
EisenhowerandBradley,meanwhile,werelookingforwardtotheprospectofdevouring
twoentireGermanarmieswhole.Afterhearingthelatestintelligencereportsonthe
morningofAugust8,andafterstudyingthemap,EisenhowerdecidedthatPattonought
toturnnorthinordertolinkupwiththeCanadiansbehindtheGermanlines,thus
encirclingtheenemy'sSeventhArmyandFifthArmy.HewenttoBradleywiththeidea,
onlytofindthat"Bradhadalreadyactedonit,"atypicalexampleofthesimilarityof
strategicthoughtbetweenthetwogenerals.
BradleytoldPattontodriveontoArgentan,concentratehisforcesthere,andwaitforthe
CanadianstocometohimthroughFalaise.EisenhowerdrovetoMonty'sheadquarters"to
makecertainthatMontywouldcontinuetopressontheBritish-Canadianfront."20
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Kluge,meanwhile,inaccordancewithhisorders,continuedtoattackontheMortain
front.Themenofthe30thDivisionwhowereencircledonHill317continuedtocallin
devastatingartilleryfirefromthemassedbatteriesofthedivision'sartillery.Byday'send
therewereonehundredwreckedtanksaroundthehill.TheGermanshadattackedagain
andagaininanefforttotakethehighground,andalthoughtheykilledorwoundedmore
thanhalfthesevenhundredmenonHill317,therestheldout.The30thDivisionasa
wholelostalmosttwothousandmenduringthebattle.Germanlossesweremuchgreater.
Asthecloseststudentofthebattle,MartinBlumenson,observes,"WhattheMortain
counterattackmighthaveaccomplishedseemedinretrospecttohavebeenitsonlymerit."
21
Bycontinuingtoattack,KlugewasdoingexactlywhatEisenhowerandBradleyhoped
thathewoulddo-stickinghisheadfartherintoanoosethatwouldbedrawntightwhen
theCanadiansandtheU.S.ThirdArmylinkedupatArgentan.Pattonwasmaking
spectacularprogresstowardthatlink-up;theCanadianoffensive,however,wasgoing
slowly.ByAugust10,Klugerealizedthathisonlyhopeforescapelayinanimmediate
withdrawalbehindtheSeine,butHitlerinsistedthathecontinuetheoffensiveatMortain.
Finally,afteranexchangeofmessagesandatelephoneconversation,Hitlerconsentedto
allowKlugetosuspendthewestwardattack,shortenhislines,andthenstrikePatton's
leadingcorpsinordertokeepthesupplylinesopen.Itseemedalreadytobetoolate.The
GermanSeventhArmyhadlostitsrearinstallationsandwasdependingontheFifth
Armyforsupplies.TheGermanswereonthevergeofanincredibledebacle.
OnAugust12,Patton'sThirdArmyspearhead,theXVCorps,reachedArgentan.The
Canadianswerestilleighteenmilestothenorthandmakingonlyslightprogress.Patton,
impatient,wantedtocrosstheboundarylineBradleyhadestablishedinordertoclosethe
gap.HepleadedwithBradleyonthetelephone,"LetmegoontoFalaiseandwe'lldrive
theBritishbackintotheseaforanotherDunkirk."
Bradleyrefusedtochangetheboundary,andIkebackedhimup.NotuntilAugust19did
thelink-upoccur,toolatetodomuchgood,accordingtoPatton,whoblamedMonty,and
beyondhimIke.AttimesPattoncouldbealmostidolatrousofEisenhower;atothertimes
hecouldbeheardtocomplain,"Ike'sthebestdamn
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generaltheBritishhavegot,"meaningthatEisenhowerwastoomuchunderMonty'sand
Churchill'sinfluence.
Twenty-threeyearslater,in1967,whenhewasreviewingasummaryofthecriticismsof
hisgeneralshipatFalaise,preparedaspartoftheannotationforhisofficialpapers,Ike
wrotebyhand,"Someofthesewritersforgetthatgrandtacticsandstrategymustbe
decideduponbypeoplewhoareinpossessionoftheoverallsituationinsuchmattersas
relativestrength,mobilityandlogisticpossibilities.Pattonwasanoperationalofficernot
anoverallcommander."22
WhatEisenhowermeantwasthatPattonseemedtothinkthatallhehadtodowassend
theXVCorpsforwarduntilitlinkedupwiththeCanadians,atwhichpointthe
encirclementwouldbecompleteandtheGermanswouldsurrender.ButasEisenhower
andBradleyknew,fromalltheirintelligencesources,cappedbyULTRA,thereweretwo
completeGermanarmiesinsidethetrap.Althoughtheywereshortonsupplies,theystill
couldmaintainatremendousrateoffire,fromheavyartillerythroughtanktosmallarms.
Toencircleisnottodestroy.AlreadyULTRAindicatedthattheGermanswouldbe
fightingtheirwayout.HitlerhadrelievedKluge,butgavehissuccessor,GeneralModel,a
freehand.Modelstartedafull-scaleretreat.
BeyondULTRArevelations,Eisenhowerwasrelyingonintelligenceestimatesofthe
enemy'sintentionsthatwere,basically,hisown.Atitshighestlevel,intelligenceismorea
hunchthanascientificmatter.Ithastobefeltratherthanstudied,sensedratherthan
calculated.Atthislevel,intelligenceisanartform,apredictionaboutwhattheenemywill
dobeforetheenemyknowshimself.Eisenhowerwasamasterofit.Oneofhismost
notabletraitsasahumanbeingwashissensitivity,hiskeenawarenessoftheotherman's
pointofview.ThosewhoworkedwithIkehavetoldofhisconcernforthewell-beingof
hissubordinates,ofactsofkindnessorawareness.Oneofthesecretsofhissuccesswas
hishardworkingstaff;hisstaffslavedforhimpreciselybecausehewasconcernedabout
them,aspeople.Thistremendousconcerngavehimunmatchedinsightsintoother
people'sminds,andthuspaidoffwiththemostimportantkindofintelligence.From
Hitlerin1945toKhrushchevin1959,Ikeseldommisjudgedhisopponents.
AsatFalaise,wherePatton,andmanyothers,assumedthattheGermansintheWesthad
hadit,thattheirdefeatwasasobviousto
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themastotheAllies,andthatsurrenderwasimminent.Eisenhowerheldapress
conferenceonAugust15andthereporterskeptaskinghimhowmanyweeksitwould
taketoendthewar.Furious,"Ikevehementlycastigatedthosewhothinktheycan
measuretheendofthewar'inamatterofweeks.'Hewentontosaythat'suchpeopleare
crazy."'HeremindedthepressthatHitlercouldcontinuethewareffortthroughthe
GestapoandpointedoutthattheGermanleaderknewhewouldhangwhenthewar
endedsohehadnothingtoloseincontinuingit.IkesaidthatheexpectedHitlerwould
enduphanginghimself,butbeforehedidhewould"fighttothebitterend"andmostof
histroopswouldfightwithhim.23
Hewasalmostexactlyright.AllhemissedwasthemethodHitlerwouldusetokill
himself.
Eisenhowerwasrightintheshortrun,too,atFalaise.TheGermansrejectedtheeasyway
out,surrender,andfoughttoholdopenthejawsofthetrapthatwereslowlyclosingon
them.They,notPatton,madeitaDunkirkinreverse.DespiteEisenhower'splea,inan
orderoftheday,foreverymaninhiscommand"tomakeithisdirectresponsibilitythat
theenemyisblastedunceasinglybydayandbynight,andisdeniedsafetyeitherinfight
orflight,"itwastheGermans,nottheAllies,whomadethesupremeeffortatFalaise.24
LewinputsthelastphaseofthebattlethatbeganatMortainintoitsproperperspective.
Noone,hewrites,"whohasnotfacedaGermanpanzerarmyfightingforitslifehasthe
righttocriticizethosewhohavedonesoandapparentlyfailed."TheGermanswere
"strugglingforsurvival."ThefailureatFalaise,ifitcanbecalledafailure,"wasdueto..
.asimpleinability,ontheAllies'part,todestroytheGermanwilltosurvive."25
ThetruthisthatMortain/Falaisewasagreatvictory,thanksinlargestparttothesuperb
defenseatMortain,whichwasitselfbasedinequalmeasuresonthecourageandfighting
abilityofthemenofthe30thDivisionandonULTRA.TogetherwiththeAlliedairforces
andtheCanadians,theygavetheGermansahellofalicking.Some50,000German
troopswerecaptured,another10,000killed,whileabout40,000gotaway.
Thosewhoescapedlefttheirequipmentbehind.Anofficerwhohadobservedthe
destructionoftheWorldWarIbattlefieldsfoundthat"noneofthesecomparedinthe
effectupontheimaginationwithwhatIsawnearFalaise.Asfarasmyeyecouldreachon
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everylineofsight,therewerevehicles,wagons,tanks,guns,primemovers,sedans,
rollingkitchens,etc.,invariousstagesofdestruction.Isteppedoverhundredsofriflesin
themudandsawhundredsmorestackedalongsheds.Isawprobablythreehundredfield
piecesandtanks,mountinglarge-caliberguns,thatwereapparentlyundamaged."26
ThefullextentofthedestructionisbestmeasuredintheAugust28strengthreportofthe
FifthArmy.Ithadonly1,300men,twenty-fourtanks,andsixtypiecesofartillery.27The
fullmagnitudeofthevictoryisbestseenintheeventsthatfollowed,asdescribedby
AdolphRosengarten,theSLUwiththeU.S.FirstArmy:"ManyGermanSeventhArmy
formationsescapedfromthepocketandfled,althoughnotingoodorder,totheGerman
frontier.Asitwasthreehundredoddmilesaway,followingthemwasfun.Wedrove
throughthelovelyFrenchcountrysideintheAugustsunandpitchedourtentsforstands
oftwoorthreenightsinthekitchengardensofsomebeautifulchateaux."28
InthatdashthroughFrance,ULTRAplayedlittlerole,mainlybecausetheGermanswere
sodisorganizeditwasalmostacaseofeverymanforhimself,whichinturnmeantthere
waslittleinthewayofdirectionorcontrolbeingexercisedbyradio.WhentheGermans
didnotusetheradio,ULTRAwasuseless.TheFrenchpeople,however,providedan
alternativesourceofinformationthatwasasaccurateandtrustworthyasULTRA.In
everyvillagebetweentheSeineandtheGermanborder,GIsandTommiescouldcounton
thelocalinhabitantstellingthemexactlywhenthelastGermanformationwentthrough
thevillagesquare,inwhatdirection,withwhatequipment,andinwhatnumbers.This
pricelessinformationmadethepursuiteffectiveandcontinuous.TheGermansnevergot
achancetocatchtheirbreath.
UntiltheyreachedtheGermanborder.SuddenlytheAllies,whohadseenallandknown
all,wereblind.Localinhabitantsweresullenandnoncommunicativeinsteadoffriendly
andinformative.Insidetheirowncountry,theGermanshadsecuretelephonelines,and
ULTRAcouldconsequentlyhearnothing.Eisenhower,whountilnowhadbeenwell
informedabouthisenemies'strengthsanddispositions,wassuddenlyshutofffromsuch
informationascompletelyashewouldhavebeenhadasteelwalldescendedbetweenthe
contendingsides.Heneededtoprovehimselfasacommander
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whodidnotneedvirtuallyacompletesetoftheenemybattleplansinordertowin.Butif
hewasnowintheinferiorpositionwithregardtointelligence,hecommandedthe
superiorforce,notonlyinairpower,butintanks,men,artillery,andfightingformations.
Hisbiggestproblemwasoverconfidence.AfterthedashthroughFrance,hisofficersand
menfeltthattheGermansintheWestwerefinished,done,kaput.Allthatwasleftwasthe
formalityofoccupyingBerlin.TheheadysuccessoftheliberationofFrancehaditseffect
everywhere,eveninthemindofthesupremecommander.Hewasquiteconfidenthe
couldwrapthewholethingupbyChristmas.HeevenmadeabetwithMontyaboutit.
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ChapterNine
Ike,Strong,Monty,andtheBridgeTooFar
SEPTEMBER15,1944.The9thand10thPanzerDivisionsaremissingfromthe
SHAEForderofbattlefortheWehrmacht.ItisKenStrong'sjobtofindthem.
Ike'schiefspyinWorldWarII,andoneofthebesteverintheartofgathering
intelligence,MajorGeneralSirKennethStrongwasablunt,hardyScotwhogoton
famouslywithEisenhower,Bradley,andPatton,notsowellwithMonty.Stronghadan
explosivelaugh,anappreciationofthewisecrack,andaneasyacceptanceoftheWest
Pointers'roughlanguageandcasualmannerrareinBritishofficers.Inhismemoirs,he
endearedhimselftoallthosefromtheNewWorldsideoftheAtlanticOceanwhohad
beenputoffbyBritishstuffinessandsnobberywhenheremarked,"Thebesttimeina
man'slifeiswhenhegetstolikeAmericans."1
StronghadbeenEisenhower'sintelligenceofficerinNorthAfrica.WhenEisenhower
movedtoSHAEFinJanuaryof1944,andaskedAlanBrooke,ChiefoftheImperial
GeneralStaff,totransferStrongtoLondonsothathecouldbeG-2atSHAEF,Brooke
refused.HechargedthatEisenhowerandhischiefofstaff,Bedell"Beetle"Smith,had
alreadyrobbedAlliedheadquartersinAlgiersofitsbestofficersandheinsistedthat
StronghadtostaytheretohelpfightthewarinItaly.
Smith,whohadcomepersonallytomaketherequestforStrong,lethisalwayshot
tempergetawayfromhim.HeshoutedatBrooke,demandingtoknowhowinhell
OVERLORDcouldbeasuccessiftheBritishrefusedtogiveIketheirbesttalent.Brooke,
hisvoiceicycold,saidtheanswerwasstillno.Smithstartedforthe
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door,grumblingthatBrookewas''notbeinghelpful."Brookecalledhimbackand"abit
offranktalk"ensued.Thatevening,EisenhowerapologizedtoBrookeforSmithand
explainedthatSmith"fightsforwhathewants"butmeantnodisrespect.2
WhateverBrooke'sfeelings,EisenhowerstillwantedStrong.Hekeptrepeatingthe
request,onlytomeetmorerebuffs.Finally,inanunusualmovethatinitselfwasan
indicationofIke'sestimateofStrong'sabilities,thesupremecommanderwentoverthe
headoftheChiefoftheImperialGeneralStafftoappealdirectlytothePrimeMinister.
Churchill,whowasanxioustogiveEisenhowerallthehelphecouldforOVERLORD,
gotorderssenttoAlgiersdirectingStrongtocometoLondontotakeuphisdutiesas
SHAEFG-2.3
AsIke'schiefintelligenceofficer,Strongwasthemanwhobriefedthesupreme
commanderontheenemyorderofbattle,capability,andintentions.Hissourceswere
wideandvaried.Theinformationflowedbackwardfromcompanytobattalionto
divisiontocorpstoarmytoarmygroupand,finally,toStrong'sstaffatSHAEF.Strong
integratedit,digestedit,summarizedit,andthenpresentedittoEisenhoweratadaily
briefing.
Inhismemoirs,Strongdescribedhismethodsandthenatureofhisrelationshipwithhis
boss.Thememoirsareanexcellentsourcenotonlyfortheirmaintheme,Intelligenceat
theTop,butalsoasaninsightintoEisenhower'sleadershiptechniques.
Stronglearned,firstofall,thatIkedidnotwanthimtothinkofhimselfaschairmanofa
committee,whichwastheBritishpractice,butrathertoregardhimselfasthe
commandingofficerattheheadofthestaffsectiondealingwithintelligence.His
judgmentsshouldobviouslybebasedoninformationsuppliedtohimbyhis
subordinates,buttheyshouldbehisjudgments,nottheconsensusviewsofacommittee.
Strongrecords,"IrememberononeoccasionsuggestingtoBedellSmiththatIwouldlike
toobtainthecommittee'sviewonacertainproblem.Hisreplywaspromptandtothe
point:'We'vehiredyouforyourknowledgeandadvice.Ifyouarewrongtoooftenwe'll
fireyouandhiresomeoneelseinyourplace.'"4
Eisenhowerhadunshakableviewsonthesubjectofstaff.HehadwrittentoMarshall,in
Februaryof1943,"Iamconstantlyonmyguardtopreventanyimportantmilitaryventure
dependingforitscontrolanddirectionuponthe'committee'systemofcommand....I
amsuremystaffthinksIamgettingtougherand
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morearbitrarydaybydaybut,althoughIadmittheimpossibilityofworkingwithout
adequatestaffs,theydoseemtodevelopdiseasesthatincludeobesityandelephantiasis.
Apparentlyonlyasharpknife,freelywielded,providesanycure."Hewasalsoadamant
onthesubjectofdecision-making,whichheinsistedbelongedsolelytothecommander.
Hefrequentlytoldthiswriterthatinallhiscareerheneveraskedforastafftovoteona
decision(heinsistedjustasstronglythathealwayswantedeverystaffmember'sviews,
honestlyexpressed)andsaidthatanyleaderwholefthisdecisionsuptoastaffvotewas
notworthyofhisjob.5
AnotherdifferencebetweentheAmericanandBritishstaffsystemwasinaccesstothe
commandingofficer.Montywassomethingofanextremeexample,buthishabitsmadea
dramaticillustrationofthepoint.Montylivedinsplendidisolation.Herarelymetwith
aides,leavingsuchmundanematterstohischiefofstaff,FreddiedeGuingand,who
wouldreporttohimtheresultsofsubordinates'labors.Montywouldthenstudythe
reportsalone,makehisdecision,andhanddowntheresult.Heconsideredhimself
superiortoalmosteveryone,andleteveryoneknowit;hiscurtmanner,hispinchedfacial
features,trimmustache,andever-presentberetalltendedtoputpeopleoff.WhereIke
waswarmandoutgoing,Montywascoldandintroverted.
Ikewasinconstantcontactwiththeheadsofhisstaffsections,meetingwiththem
formallyandinformally,chatting,discussing,mullingover,consideringthisorthatitem.
AlthoughStrongwasalreadyageneralofficerandoneofthetop-rankingonesinthe
BritishArmyatthat,hewassurprisedtodiscoverthat"Ihadtherightofdirectaccessto
EisenhowerandhisChiefofStaff,andIcouldapproachthemwheneverIwished."He
wasevenmoresurprisedandpleasedtolearnthat"aboveall,undertheAmericansystemI
wasamemberofthe'innercircle,'wherepolicywasdecidedandplanningandother
decisionstaken.Allmyexperiencesuggeststhatthisstatusisvitaltotheefficient
functioningofanIntelligencemachine."6
AnotherdifferencebetweenIkeandMontywasthatIkewasagreatbelieverin"the
team."BackatWestPoint,beforeWorldWarI,EisenhowerhadbeenapotentialAllAmericanhalfback,butakneeinjuryhadcuthiscareershort.Inhisfirstdecadeinthe
Army,however,hefrequentlycoachedthefootballteamonthepost.Partlyasa
consequenceoftheseexperiences,hewasaself
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described"fanatic"ontheimportanceofteamwork.Assupremecommander,hewould
notallowanyofhisAmericanofficers,notevenBradleyorPatton,togetawaywithantiBritishcracks.AtSHAEFheinsistedthathisstaffbenotonlya"team,"butalsoa
"family."
Hisprincipalmethodforweldingthestafftogether,Strongwrote,wastointermingle
BritishandAmericanofficersatalllevels.IftheheadofasectionwasBritish,hisdeputy
wasalwaysAmerican,andviceversadowntheline.Furthermore,Ikemadethemeat
togetherandsharelivingquarters.Asaresult,hehoped,nationalprejudicesand
approachestoproblemswoulddisappear,tobereplacedbyAlliedattitudes.7Infact,for
themostpart,itdidworkoutthatway.Forexample,itwasusuallytheBritishofficersat
SHAEF,ledbytheDeputySupremeCommanderhimself,AirMarshalArthurTedder,
whourgedIketosackMonty.
AnotherfeatureofEisenhower'sleadershiptechniquewastogiveauthoritytothemanhe
wasmakingresponsible.InStrong'scase,Iketoldhimthatifanyoneontheintelligence
staffwasnotmakingthegradeorwascreatingdifficulties,Strongwas"fullyempowered
tosackhimonthespotwhateverhisnationality.'Hireandfire'wastheslogan."This
standsinsharpcontrastwithMonty,whokeptallthepowerinhisownhands.Anotherof
Ike'stechniqueswasfrequentvisitstofront-lineunits."ThefirsttimeIsawEisenhower,"
Strongrecalled,"hetoldmethatitwasmydutytogetoutofmyofficeasmuchas
possibleinordertomakecontactwiththecommandersandtheirstaffsinthefieldand
gaintheirconfidence."8
Aseveryoneknows,EisenhowercouldstanduptotheBritishwhenhethoughttheywere
wrong.Throughoutthewarhehadsomerealset-toswithAlanBrookeandChurchill.
WithregardtooneofChurchill'sproposals,Ikerecalledafterthewarthat"Isaid'no'to
himinonehundreddifferentwaysintendifferentlanguages"9withoutchanging
Churchill'smind,itshouldbeaddedandsomeofthemostfamouscontroversiesofthe
warpittedEisenhoweragainstChurchill,Brooke,andMonty.
ButEisenhowerwasbynomeanstooproudtolearnfromtheBritish.Ikefrequently
complainedtoStrongaboutthepoorqualityofAmericanintelligenceofficers.He
explainedthatfewofficershadreceivedanytraininginintelligence,thatintelligencehad
rankedjustaboutatthebottomofallmilitaryspecialtiesinthe
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prestigerankingoftheU.S.Army,andthatconsequentlynoofficerofabilityhadgone
intointelligencework.Theresultwasthat"theUnitedStatesIntelligencemachinein
Washingtonandinthefieldwasineffective."Toremedythisshortcoming,Eisenhower
hadStrongcreateatrainingschoolforintelligenceofficers.
IntheschoolStrongtriedtogettheAmericanstodismissfromtheirmindstheromantic,
Hollywoodapproachtointelligence.Histhemewas,"Intelligenceisnowascientific
matterrevolvingaroundsuchthingsasairphotography,interrogation,examinationof
documentsandradiolistening.Wenolongerdependonagentsandsuchcloak-anddaggersourcesforourinformation.Thesemodernmethodshavecompletelytransformed
Intelligence."10
Eisenhowerdemandedmuchofhisstaffofficers;hegavemuchinreturn.Hewasan
absolutemasteratthehandlingofmen,keenlysensitivetotheirneedsandwants.Having
beenastaffofficerforalmostallthetwenty-oneyearsbetweenthewars,Eisenhowerhad
beentherehimselfandknewhowitfelt.Forexample,whenarumorsweptSHAEFthat
Tedderwasgoingtobereplacedasdeputy,thestaffassumedthatthenewdeputywould
insistonanewstaffsetup,bothinpersonnelandorganization.Thesespeculations
reachedEisenhower.HetoldStrongandtheotherheadsofstaffsections"thatifTedder
werereplaceditwouldmakenodifferencetotheirpositions."Heassuredthemthatthey
hadhisconfidence"andthatitwouldbehiswishforustocarryonashitherto."
ToStrongpersonally,Eisenhowersaid"thatIshouldremaininchargeofAllied
IntelligenceatSupremeHeadquarters,nomatterwhatotherchangesmightbemade."11
Tohavesuchcompletebackingfromthebossdoeswondersforaman'smoraleand,as
Eisenhowerknew,makesamanworktwiceashardasbefore.
Strong'sinsistenceonascientific,objectivebasisforintelligencewasobviouslywise,and
obviouslyimpossible.Nomatterhowmuchdataiscollected,intheendintelligence
requiresapenetrationoftheenemy'smindandspirit.Inthefallof1944thatmeant
judgingcorrectlythestateofGermandefenses,notjustintermsofnumbersoftanks,
artillery,aircraft,etc.,butalsoindeed,moreimportantjudgingtheGermanwilltoresist.
Onthisleveleveryoneinvolved,fromthesupremecommanderthrough
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hischiefintelligenceofficerdowntothelowestsecondlieutenantservingonadivisional
G-2staffinthefield,waswrong.
Theywerewrongbecausetheyweretoococky,toooverconfident,toolikelytocommit
theoldestmilitarysin-underestimatingtheenemy.TheJapaneseandGermanshaddoneit
atvarioustimesinthe1940-42period.IthadhitMontgomeryhard,causinghimto
believethathecouldbreakrightthroughtheGermandefensesandmarchonintoBerlin
inasingle,narrowthrustacrossthenorthGermanplain.SHAEFplanners,and
Eisenhower,sufferedtoo,althoughtheirhallucinationwasdifferent-theythoughtthatthe
Alliedarmiescouldadvanceabreastrightuptoandbeyondtheprepareddefensive
positionsintheWestWall.
ItwasinevitablethatIkeandhiscommandersshouldfeeloptimistic.Thethreeweeks
fromAugust15toSeptember5wereamongthemostdramaticofthewar,withgreat
successesfollowingoneanotherinrapidsuccession,beginningwiththedestructionof
theGermanarmiesinFranceandtheliberationofthatcountry.Rumaniasurrendered
unconditionallytotheSoviets,thendeclaredwaronGermany.Finlandsignedatruce
withtheRussians.Bulgariatriedtosurrender.TheGermanspulledoutofGreece.The
AllieslandedintheSouthofFranceanddrovetoLyonsandbeyond,while
simultaneouslyattackinginItaly.TheRussianoffensivecarriedtheRedArmyto
Yugoslavia,destroyingtwelveGermandivisions,inflicting700,000casualties.Bothinthe
EastandtheWesttheGermansseemedtohavecrumbled.Nowonderthenthatmemories
ofNovember1918crowdedinoneveryone'smind.
ItwasinthesecircumstancesthatMontyofferedaboldplantoendthewar.Codename
MARKET-GARDEN,itinvolvedthreeparatrooperdivisions,theU.S.82dand101stand
theBritish1st,alongwiththeBritishSecondArmy.ItwasdesignedtoleaptheRhine
RiverbeforetheGermanscouldorganizetheirdefenses.Theparatrooperswoulddropin
acarpetoutaheadoftheSecondArmy,seizeandholdbridges,andwaitfortheground
troopstocomeuptothem.TheBritish1stAirbornewouldbefarthestaway,atArnhem.
Theplaninvolvedahighdegreeofriskandonlycommanderswhowereconvincedthat
theenemywasroutedcouldhaveagreedtoit."HadthepiousteetotalingMontgomery
wobbledintoSHAEFwithahangover,"Bradleyrecalledafterthewar,"Icouldnothave
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beenmoreastonishedthanIwasbythedaringadventureheproposed.Forincontrastto
theconservativetacticsMontgomeryoriginallychose,theArnhemattackwastobemade
overa60-milecarpetofairbornetroops.Monty'splanforArnhemwasoneofthemost
imaginativeofthewar."12
Atthismoment,Eisenhowerwasbedridden,theresultoftwistinghiskneeduringan
emergencylandinginasmallplaneonthebeachafterareconnaissancemission.Hewas
inGranville,wherehissecond-storybedroomwindowheldamagnificentviewofMont
St.Michel.There,lookingoutatthesupremeaccomplishmentofmedievalarchitecture,
Ike,Bradley,Smith,andStrongdiscussedMonty'sproposal.
Bradleywasopposed,inpartbecauseMARKET-GARDENwouldcosthimhisFirstArmy
(lenttoMontytoprotecttheSecondArmy'srightflank),andpartlybecauseitwouldtake
suppliesfromPatton,whoseThirdArmywasjuststartingacrosstheMoselleRiver.But
SmithsaidSHAEFcoulddeliverathousandadditionaltonsofsupplyperdayto
MARKET-GARDEN,andStrongaddedthathebelievedtheGermanshadnotyet
recoveredfromtheirroutinFrance,soherewasachancetogetacrosstheRhineata
relativelysmallcost.EisenhowerdecidedtoapproveMonty'splan.
Yearslater,in1966,GeneralEisenhowerreadsomeannotationonMARKET-GARDENin
hisofficialpapers,thenbeingpreparedforpublication.Inahandwrittennote,he
commented,"InotonlyapprovedMARKET-GARDEN,Iinsisteduponit.Whatwe
neededwasabridgeheadovertheRhine.IfthatcouldbeaccomplishedIwasquite
willingtowaitonallotheroperations.Whatthisactionprovedwasthattheideaof'one
full-bloodedthrust'toBerlinwassilly."13
WhatEisenhower,Bradley,Smith,Strong,andMontydidnotrealizewasthatField
MarshalWalterModel,Rommel'sandKluge'ssuccessorattheheadofArmyGroupBand
probablythebestgeneralintheWehrmachtatthistime,hadestablishedhisheadquarters
intheArnhemarea.Hehadwithhimthe2dSSPanzerCorps,containingthe9thand10th
SSPanzerDivisions,veteransofboththeEasternandWesternfronts.Theyhadcometo
HollandfromFrancetorefitandregroup,notbecausetheyexpectedanattackthere.
Purelybychance,then,Monty'sleadingunit,theBritish1stAirborneDivision,wouldbe
droppinginthe
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midstoftwoofthebestdivisionsintheGermanarmy,commandedbyatough,
experienced,anddeterminedgeneral.
Theoperationthatensued,afterIkeinsistedonMARKET-GARDEN,showedSHAEF
intelligenceoperatingefficiently,butitalsoshowedthedistinctlimitationsoftheimpact
oftheintelligencecommunityondecision-making.Lewin'sscathingjudgmentisthat
MARKET-GARDENwas"afailureofintelligence,whoserootsaretobefoundinthe
prevailingattitudeofcomplacency.Nobodywantedtoknow."14Butthatisfarfromthe
wholetruth.Someintelligenceofficers,includingStrong,didrealizethattherewasa
panzercorpsintheArnhemareaandtriedtowarnthegenerals,buttheirwarningswere
ignored.
MARKET-GARDENindicatedthattheAllieshadcometorelytooheavilyonULTRA,
eventhoughbySeptemberof1944ULTRAwasproducinglittleforthelandforces.The
oneusefulmessageULTRApickedupshowedthatModel'sArmyGroupBheadquarters
wasfourkilometerswestofArnhem,butwhenthisinformationwassentoutfrom
BletchleyParkonthefifteenth,twodaysbeforetheattackbegan,itwasgivenalow
priorityrating,fortheobviousreasonthatnooneatBPrealizedamajoroperationwas
scheduledfortheArnhemarea.Theworddidnotarriveathigherheadquartersuntiltoo
late.15
ButifStrong'ssourcesatBPwerelettinghimdown,hehadothersinthefieldwhowere
not.TheDutchResistancewasnotasnumerous,well-armed,oractiveastheFrench
Resistance,butitcouldneverthelessprovidevaluableinformation.OnSeptember11
elementsoftheDutchResistancegotwordtotheintelligenceofficeratBritishSecond
Armyheadquartersabout"batteredpanzerdivisionsbelievedtobeinHollandtorefit."
Thiswasanitemtoovaguetobeofanyimmediateorpracticaluse.Strongdidnot
includeitinhisdailybriefingofIke,nordidheputitintotheweeklyintelligence
summary.Buthedidfileitinthebackofhismind.16
Theinformationwasalsopasseddowntheline,exactlyastheSHAEFG-2organization
wassupposedtooperate,anditcametothedeskofMajorBrianUrquhart,theintelligence
officerat1stAirborneCorps(whichconsistedoftheU.S.82dand101stAirborneand
theBritish1stAirborne).Urquhartwastheofficermostimmediatelyconcerned,forhis
jobwastotellhissuperiorswhattheycouldexpecttofindinandaroundArhem.
Althoughthere
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portedGermandivisionswereunidentified,theirstrengthunknown,andalthoughthey
mightwellbemerelypassingthroughHolland,thespotonearththatUrquhartwasmost
concernedwithmightwellhavetwoenemyarmoreddivisionsonit.Urquhart,ashelater
recalled,"wasreallyveryshookup."17
Thus,unlikeStrong(whohadmanymoreresponsibilitiesthanjustMARKET-GARDEN),
Urquhartdidnotfilethereportinhismindbutratherfolloweditup.FirstAirborne
CorpsheadquarterswasinEngland,andUrquhartknewthattherewasaSpitfirefighter
squadronequippedwithspecialcamerasforreconnaissancestationednearby,in
Oxfordshire.OntheafternoonofSeptember12,herequestedasweepoftheArnhem
area.Theresultingphotographsindicatedthepresenceoftanks,althoughinwhat
numbers(mostwerewellcamouflaged),andwhetherserviceableornot,couldnotbe
told.18
ThisinformationcametoStrong,alongwithpersistentreportsfromtheDutchResistance.
AtSHAEFG-2,officershadbeenworkingforsometimepastinanattempttolocatethe
9thand10thSSPanzerDivisions.SHAEFG-2kepttrackofallGermanunits,andthese
particulardivisionshadbeen"lost"sincethebeginningofSeptember.Puttingallhis
informationtogether,StrongcametotherightconclusiontherewasGermanarmorinthe
MARKETGARDENarea.StrongtookhisconclusiontoSmith,sayingthathedidnot
knowthefightingcapabilityofeitherunit,butthathedidnotdoubtthelocationofthe
9thand10thSSPanzerDivisions.HeguessedthattheywereinArnhem"toberefitted
withtanks."
WhathappenednextwastoldbySmithtotheAmericanmilitaryhistorianS.L.A.
Marshallimmediatelyafterthewar,wholaterretoldittoCorneliusRyanforuseinhis
best-sellingbook,ABridgeTooFar.Strongalsotoldthestoryinhismemoirs.
Smithwasdeeplyconcerned,indeed"alarmedoverthepossibilityoffailure,"inhisown
words.HetookStrongwithhimtoIke'sbedroom,wherehetoldIkethattheBritish1st
AirborneCorps"couldnotholdoutagainsttwoarmoreddivisions."SmithtoldS.L.A.
Marshallthat"myfeelingwasthatifwecouldnotdroptheequivalentofanotherdivision
inthearea,thenweshouldshiftoneoftheAmericanairbornedivisions,whichwereto
formthe'carpet'furthernorth,toreinforcetheBritish."19
Thesuggestion,threedaysbeforetheassaultwasscheduledtobegin,seemedodd,
especiallycomingfromthemanEisenhower
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oncedescribedas"theperfectstaffofficer."20Itwouldhavebeenwell-nighimpossible
forthestaffat1stAirborneCorpstodoallthenecessaryworkintime,nottomentionthe
problemsofcoordinatingthenewactionwiththeSecondArmy.ThatSmithnevertheless
recommendedittoEisenhowerindicatedhowseriouslyhetookStrong'sinformation.
ButIkecouldhardlytellMontyhowtousehisdivisions.Americanarmypracticewasto
givesubordinatesinthefieldafreehand.MontywasclosertothebattlethanIke;Second
Armycommanderand1stAirborneCorpscommanderwerecloserthanMonty;
presumablytheycouldbestjudgehowtousetheirstrength.AsatOVERLORD,
Eisenhowercouldhavecanceledtheoperation,butthereweretwogoodreasonsnottodo
so.First,theGermanshadnotbeenabletostandandfightsincetheFalaisebattlea
monthearlier.Therewasnooverwhelmingreasontobelievethattheycoulddosonow,
andtheAlliedtroopsandtheircommanderswereallanxioustogo.
Second,itwouldhaveexacerbatedthebadfeelingsbetweenSHAEF,Bradley,andPatton
ontheonehand,andMontyontheother.Tensionwasdangerouslyhighalready."I
cannottellMontyhowtodisposeofhistroops,"IketoldSmith,norcouldhe"calloffthe
operation,sinceIhavealreadygivenMontythegreenlight."Buthedidwanttomake
sureMontyhadthebenefitofStrong'sinformationandSmith'srecommendations.Hetold
thetwogeneralsto"flyto21stArmyGroupheadquartersandargueitoutwith
Montgomery."21
StrongandSmithflewtoBrussels,wheretheymetwithMonty.Smithrecommendedthat
becauseoftheunexpectedpresenceofthe2dSSPanzerCorpsinArnhem,thelanding
zoneofoneoftheAmericanairbornedivisionsbeswitchedthere.
Montgomery,SmithlatertoldS.L.A.Marshall,"ridiculedtheidea.Montyfeltthegreatest
oppositionwouldcomemorefromterraindifficultiesthanfromtheGermans.Allwould
gowell,hekeptrepeating,ifweatSHAEFwouldhelphimsurmounthislogistical
difficulties.HewasnotworriedabouttheGermanarmor.HethoughtMARKETGARDENwouldgoallrightasset."Smithadded,"AtleastItriedtostophim,butIgot
nowhere.Montgomerysimplywavedmyobjectionsairilyaside."22
Theattackwentasscheduled.Italmostworked,butataterribleprice.FieldMarshal
Modelandhispanzersliveduptotheir
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reputation,counterattackingfiercelyandskillfully,imposingontheBritish1stAirborne
DivisiontheworstlossessufferedbyanyAllieddivisioninthewar.Ofthe10,005men
whodroppedintoArnhem,casualtiestotaled7,578.Thedivisionceasedtoexist.23
Overall,theAlliestookheaviercasualtiesinMARKET-GARDENthantheydidonD-Day.
TheirattempttoleaptheRhinehadbeenthrownback.Therewouldbenovictorybefore
Christmas.Along,toughwintercampaignloomedahead.Muchhadbeenlost,nothing
gainedbyMARKET-GARDEN.
AsStrongsummeditupin1979,"Ourinformationwassufficientformetouttera
warningIntelligencecanseldomdomuchmorethanthatofpotentialdangerfrom
armouredtroops.Afterthatitisuptothedecisionmakersandthereisnoguaranteethat
theywillheedtheIntelligencepeople."24
Itiseasy,today,tocriticizeMontyandhisboss,Eisenhowerfornotheedingtheir
intelligencepeople,buteveryattackcarrieswithittheriskofheavycasualtiesandfailure.
Potentiallossesmustbebalancedagainstpotentialgains.AsStronghimselfputitinhis
memoirs,"Theastonishingthingwasthatthegreatgallantryofthosetakingpartbrought
theArnhemoperationsoneartosuccess.Ifithadnotbeenforthequickandincisive
reactionsoftheGermans,triggeredoffbythechancepresenceonthespotofthatmost
energeticGermancommander,Field-MarshalModel,allourobjectivesmighthavebeen
captured,inspiteofthearmoureddivisionslurkinginthebackground."25
Or,toputitintoacliché,withalittlebitofluckitwouldhaveworked.
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ChapterTen
Ike'sIntelligenceFailureattheBulge
MIDNIGHT,DECEMBER15-16,1944,intheEifel,theroughmountainouscountryin
westernGermany,atthespotwhereBelgium,Luxembourg,andGermanymeet,
directlyoppositetheruggedforestareaoftheArdennes.AllthroughtheEifelthereis
feverishactivity.Squadleaderswaketheirmeninchurches,townhalls,cellars,and
attics.Theyhustlethesleepy-eyedsoldiersofftotheirassemblypoints.Enginesroar,
andoutofhaystackscometanks,gigantictankswithlongmuzzlessniffingtheair,
lookinginthemistlikeprehistoricmonsters,tomeetwithothermonstersemerging
frombarns,fromundertrees,orcamouflagenetting.Elsewheresoldiersthrowback
thetarpsthatcovertheircannon,orremovethebrushtheyhadpiledupagainstthebig
guns,andmakereadyforaction.
Forthefirsttimesincethespringof1943,atKurskinfarawayRussia,theGerman
Army,themightyWehrmacht,isabouttotaketheoffensive.
AslongagoasthemiddleofSeptember1944,ontheeveoftheArhembattle,Hitlerhad
startedplanninghiscounterattackagainstEisenhower'sarmies.Hehadselectedthe
Ardennesforthis,hismasterstroke,foranumberofgoodreasons.Eisenhowerwas
unlikelytostationstrongforcesthere,partlybecausetheroadnetwasinadequateto
supplymanytroops,morebecauseofthenatureoftheterrainintheEifel.Thenatural
defensivestrengthofthemountaincountrymeantthatIke'sarmieswouldhavetoflowto
thenorthandsouthofthearea.Further,theAllieswouldnever
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expectanattackthroughtheArdennes,eventhoughthatwaswheretheGermantanks
brokethroughtheFrenchlinesin1940,becausetheAlliesdidnotbelieveHitlercould
collectsufficientfueltosustainanattackthroughtheArdennesintotheopencountry
beyondtheMeuseRiver.
Hitler'splanofattackwasboldanddaring,designedtowinnotjustalocaltacticalvictory
butratherastrategicsuccessthatwouldreversethefortunesofthewar.Thebasicidea
wasfortwopanzerarmiestobreakthroughthethinlyheldlineoftheU.S.FirstArmyin
theArdennes,withtwoadditionalGermanarmiesprovidingflankprotectionand
reinforcements.Thepanzers,onceintotheclear,wouldcrosstheMeuseRiver,thenturn
northwest,towardAntwerp,thelargestportinEuropeandEisenhower'slifeline.The
attackwouldsplittheBritishandAmericanforcesinEuropewhilecuttingtheirsupply
lines.IfHitler'swildestfantasythencametrue,theWesternAllieswouldsueforpeace,
leavingGermanyfreetoturnallofherforcesagainsttheRedArmy,thenpressingagainst
Germany'seasternborder.Tosucceed,HitlerneededtogatherenoughstrengthintheEifel
tostrikewithoverwhelmingforceatthepointofattack;heneededsurprise;andhe
neededenoughgasolinereservestocarryhistankstoAntwerp.
Securitywasasinequanon,andsecuritymeantfirstofallkeepingtoanabsolute
minimumthenumberofthosewhoknewoftheoffensive,those''intheknow."This
suitedHitler'sinclinationanyway,becauseaftertheJuly20attemptonhislife,Hitler
trustedalmostnoneofhisgeneralswithgoodreason.
OnethathedidtrustwasRundstedt,whomhecalledoutofretirementtoserveas
commanderoftheattack.Infact,however,Rundstedt'sroleintheArdennesbattlewas
similartoPatton'sintheNormandybattlehewasadecoy.Hitlerpersonallytookchargeof
thetacticaldetails;Rundstedt'spresencewasdesignedtomaketheAlliesthinkthatifa
counterattackdidcome,itwouldbenorthoftheArdennes,becauseRundstedtwastoo
muchtheprofessionalsoldiertotryanythingsocrazyasatankattackthroughthe
Ardenneswithoutsufficientgasoline.
Hitleroversaweverything,missingnodetail.Itwasanimpressiveperformance.
GatheringtwopanzerarmiesintheEifelwasagiganticlogisticaltask.Men,tanks,cannon
werebroughtinfromalloverEurope,fromNorwaytoAustria.Otherunitswerepulled
awayfromthefightinginHolland,conveyedbackovertheRhine,
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refittedandreinforced,andsentbackagainovertheRhinetotheEifel.Enormous
quantitiesoffuel,ammunition,food,bridgingequipment,camouflagenetting,andother
materialsweremovedintotheassemblyarea,andallmovementhadtotakeplaceby
night.Comedawn,everythingwashiddenfromtheAlliedairforces.
TheGermanstookspecialprecautionstopreventdesertersfromcrossingthelinewith
newsoftheactivityintheEifel.InthefirsttwoweeksofDecember,therewereonlyfive
desertersonthewholeWesternfront;usuallythereweretenormoreperday.German
officerswithknowledgeoftheplanwerenotallowedtoflywestoftheRhineforfearof
captureintheeventofanaccident.Hitlercountedon,andgot,Europe'straditionallybad
late-fallweather,whichhinderedAlliedairreconnaissance.
Securitycoveredeverything.AlongtheEifelfrontline,onlyunitsthathadbeenin
positionforsomeweekswereallowedtofire,andeventheyatareducedrate,togivethe
ideathattheywerelowonammunition.Radiocommunicationwaskeptupatexactlythe
samerate,dayafterdayforamonthandmore.Patrollingwaskeptdowntoaminimum.
Altogether,withouttheAllieseversuspectingathing,Hitlergatheredanimpressiveforce
intheEifel,notsogreatashehadhoped,butmuchlargerthanhisskepticalgeneralshad
thoughtpossiblewhenhefirstannouncedhisplan.Thetotalwasnearlytwohundred
thousandcombattroopswithaboutfivehundredtanksandnearlytwothousandguns,
organizedintotwopanzerarmiesoftwenty-fourdivisions.
LikeEisenhower,Hitlerknewthattoachievesurpriseitisnecessarynotonlytomake
suretheenemydoesnotknowwhereyouareattackingbuttogethimtolookforan
attackinanotherplace.AlltheshiftingofGermantroops,themovementofunitsacross
Europe,couldnotbetotallyhiddenfromAlliedintelligence.Divisionsdonotdisappear.
ItmightbepossibletomakeStrongandhissubordinatesthinkthattwoorthree,oreven
fiveorsix,divisionshadbeencannibalized-brokenupandplacedasreinforcementsbut
nottenormore.Therehadtobesomebelievableexplanationaboutwhatwashappening
tothedivisionswithdrawnfromthefrontlines.Norcouldthemovementofallthose
guns,tanks,andtrucksbekeptacompletesecret.
HitlerthereforetriedtodivertAlliedattentiontothenorth,in
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theRoerRiverarea,whereSHAEFG-2alreadyexpectedacounterattack.TheGermans
didwhattheycouldtoencouragethatidea.Troops'movementstowardtheRoerwerenot
carefullyconcealed.AstheAlliesdidinFORTITUDE,theGermanscreatedaghostarmy,
theTwenty-fifth,withradiotraffic,movementorders,andalltheotheractivityassociated
withtheorganizationofanewarmy.TheexistenceoftheTwenty-fifthhelpedin
accountingfordivisionsactuallyattachedtoSixthSSPanzerArmy.Civilianswereopenly
evacuatedfromtheRoerarea,andartilleryfirewasgreatlyincreased.
FromwhattheGermanscouldtell,thedeceptionschemehadworked.TheAmericansin
theArdennes,onlythreedivisionsstrong(VIIICorps,GeneralTroyMiddleton
commanding),werecockyafterthelongstringofsuccessestheyhadwon-overconfident
andsecurity-lax.VIIICorpsradiochitter-chatterhadtoldtheGermansthatnothingwas
suspectedandthatnoreinforcementswereontheway.
OnDecember15,Hitlergotapredictionofbadweatherforthenextweek,andgavethe
ordertogo.Thefinalbriefingscameasasurprisetomanyoftheofficersandmen,but
theirsurprisesoongavewaytoelation.TheWehrmachtwasonthemoveagain!Itwould
bejustlikethespringof1940.1
Midnight,December15-16,1944,atSHAEFheadquarters,TrianonPalaceHotel,
Versailles,outsideParis.GeneralEisenhowertookonelastsipofchampagne,wavedone
lastgood-bye.Hewasinafinemood.Ithadbeenawonderfulparty,heldatWAC
quarters,tocelebrateamarriageearlierthatdaybetweentwoenlistedpersonnelofthe
innerSHAEFstaff.
Ikehadsomethingelsetocelebratetoo-thatdayhelearnedthathisnominationasGeneral
oftheArmy,withitsfivestars,hadbeensentbyFDRtotheSenate.In1940Ikehadtold
hissonJohnthatheexpectedtoretirewithinayearorsoattherankoflieutenantcolonel,
afterhavingbeenamajorforsixteenyears.Sincethewarbegan,hehadrisenfromlight
coloneltofive-stargeneral-sixpromotionsinalittleoverthreeyears.2
Christmas,promotions,weddings,parties-themoodwasagayonethroughouttheAllied
ExpeditionaryForce.MontyhadwrittenIkeonDecember15toaskpermissionto"hop
overtoEngland"tospendtheChristmasholidayswithhisson.Ikesaidhewas
Page140
delightedMontyhadthechanceandaddedaheartfelt,"Ienvyyou."3Inmid-November
theU.S.FirstArmyhadmoveditsheadquarterstoSpa,justnorthofMalmedyonthe
edgeoftheArdennes.AnintelligenceofficerwiththeFirstArmylaterwrote,"Untilthen,
wehadbeeninthefieldintents.Imentionthisbecausethereisnodoubtthatoncewe
movedintobuildingswebegantofeelmorecivilized,andonthewholeIdon'tthinkthe
headquarterswasonitstoesaswellasithadbeenwhenthemenwereoutintheswamps
orfields.Spa,analmostuntouchedcity,isoneofthegreatEuropeanresorts,andthe
buildingsintowhichwemovedofferedmanyluxuries."4
Buoyant,breezy,sureofitself,theAEFwaitedonlyforabreakintheweathertofinish
thejobagainsttheWehrmacht.WhentheFirstArmygatheredintoitsPowcagesthe
250,000thGermanprisoner,astaffofficersuggestedthattheyholdaformalceremonyat
whichtheluckyGermanwouldbegivenaWarBond.5In1979,GeneralStrongrecalled
"thegeneraleuphoriathatexistedamongthetopcommanders.TheGermanwasalready
beatenandthatwasthat!"6
Itwasdifficulttothinkotherwise.OnDecember3,Eisenhowerhadwrittentothe
CombinedChiefs,"GeneralStrongreportstomeinhislatestG-2reportthattheattacks
thatbeganinNovemberhaveeliminatedatleast128,000Germans.Iknowthattherehave
beencountedthroughthecagesoftheFirst,NinthandThirdArmies,morethan40,000
prisoners.Ourlosseshavebeennothinglikethefiguresgivenabove."7
Twodayslater,inapersonallettertoMarshall,Ikesaid,"Atpresentwehavenewly
formedDivisionsarrivingonourfront,andhaveattractedseveralDivisionsdirectlyfrom
HungaryandEastPrussia.Inspiteofallthis,theenemyisbadlystretchedonthisfront
andisconstantlyshiftingunitsupanddownthelinetoreinforcehismostthreatened
points."
ThatwasexactlywhatHitlerwantedIketobelieve.Indeed,ifHitlercouldhaveseen
Eisenhower'slettertoMarshall,hewouldhavebeendelighted.FromHitler'spointof
view,therewasevenbettertocome.EisenhowerdeclaredthatG-2studies"showthatthe
Germanismorefrightenedofouroperations"intheRoerandSaarthatis,northandsouth
oftheEifel"thananywhereelse,"andthusmorelikelytocounterattackthere.8
TheSHAEFintelligenceteam,alongwithitssubordinateunits
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attachedtothearmies,corps,anddivisionsinthefield,likedtothinkofitselfasthebest
intheworld.AsEisenhower'sreporttoMarshallindicated,G-2recognizedthatnew
divisionswerecomingintotheline,thattheGermanshadbeenattemptingtogather
togetheranarmoredreserve,andthatacounterattackwasadistinctpossibility.Indeed,
FirstArmy'sG-2EstimateNo.37ofDecember10,1944,declaredthatsecondamongfour
possibleGermanactionswas"aconcentratedcounterattackwithair,armor,infantryand
secretweaponsataselectedfocalpointatatimeofhisownchoosing."9
StrongtoldSmith,earlyinDecember,thattheGermanreservemightbetransferredtothe
Easternfront,orthatitmightstrikeintheArdennesoreastoftheVosges,wheneverthe
Germanshadapredictionofsixdaysofbadweather.SmithaskedhisG-2headtogoto
Bradleytowarnhimofthesepossibilities.Strongdidso,andBradleysaid,"Letthem
come."
Bradley'sG-2atTwelfthArmyGroupconcludedthattheenemywasusingtheEifelasa
trainingground,puttingreplacementsintothelinethereinordertogivethemexperience.
FirstArmyG-2reportedinearlyDecember,"Duringthepastmonththerehasbeena
definitepatternfortheseasoningofnewly-formeddivisionsinthecomparativelyquiet
sectoroppositeVIIICorpspriortotheirdispatchtomoreactivefronts."AndVIIICorps'
G-2reportedonDecember9,"Theenemy'spresentpracticeofbringingnewdivisionsto
thissectortoreceivefrontlineexperienceandthenrelievingthemoutforcommitment
elsewhereindicateshisdesiretohavethissectorofthefrontremainquietandinactive."10
Insum,atmidnightonDecember15-16,1944,theAllieswereasignorantofGerman
intentionsandcapabilitiesastheGermanshadbeenofAlliedplansatmidnightonJune56,1944.When,atdawnonDecember16,theGermanartillerybarragebeganandthe
tanksstartedtogrindtheirwaywestwardthroughthemistandfog,theattackcameasa
completesurprise.
Theworld'sgreatestintelligenceestablishmenthadbeenbadlyfooled.Attackingwhere
theywerenotexpectedhelpedtheGermansbutitwasthesize,fury,andsustainedpower
oftheattackthatcameasthegreatestsurprisetoSHAEF.
ForrestPogue,SHAEF'Sofficialhistorian(andlaterGeneralMarshall'sbiographer),has
writtenacomprehensiveanalysisof
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theintelligencefailure.Hisconclusionisthattherewerefourmajorreasonsforit.First,
althoughIkeandBradleyrealizedtheGermanswerecapableofsomeoffensiveaction
somewhere,theywerereluctanttomovetheirtroopsfrompointtopointtomeetevery
possiblethreat,notonlybecauseitwasimpracticalbutalsobecauseitwoulddisrupttheir
ownoffensiveplans.ThesecondreasonwasSHAEF'Semphasisonanoffensivestrategy.
ThethirdwastheerroneousbeliefthatRundstedt,thecautiousandtraditionalsoldier,
wascontrollingstrategyandwouldnotputhistroopsintotheopenwheretheAlliedair
forcecoulddestroythem.ThefourthwasthebeliefthattheGermanfuelshortagewould
precludeanymajorcounterattack.11
Asnotedearlier,ULTRAwasoflittlehelponcetheGermansstabilizedthelineandcould
usethetelephone.WhatlittleULTRAdidrevealwas,forpurposesofpredictingthe
Ardennesattack,misleading.MostULTRAmaterialcamefromtheLuftwaffe,andmost
Luftwaffetrafficconsistedofcomplaintsaboutthefuelsituation.ThevariousAlliedG-2s
hadcometorelyexcessivelyonULTRA,ratherlikeMockler-Ferrymaninthedesertat
KasserinePass.BecauseULTRAdidnotrevealanypreparationsforanattack,whileitdid
indicateaseverefuelshortage,theG-2sconcludedthattherewasnothingtoworryabout.
AdolphRosengarten,SLUwiththeU.S.FirstArmy,ina1978articleintheprofessional
journalMilitaryAffairsonhisexperienceswithULTRA,recalledoneinterceptthatmight
havebeendecisive."Dissectedduringapost-mortemoftheBulgewithareaderfrom
anotherheadquarters,onesignalinearlyDecemberIrememberfromaLuftwaffeLiaison
officertohiscommandhadreportedthathehadreachedhisdestination(ifmemorynow
serves,theheadquartersofanamedPanzercorps),wheretheywerepreparingforthe
forthcomingoperations.Homerwrotethataftertheeventeventhefooliswise,andtoday
onecaninferfromthatsignalthatsomethingonalargescalewasplanned.But,Isubmit,
theAmericanintelligenceofficer,whoinearlyDecember1944usedthatisolatedintercept
topredictanoffensiveledbytwoPanzerarmieswithadequateflanksupport,wouldhave
beensenthome."12
Therewasanotherhintthat,properlyinterpreted,wouldhavepreparedtheAlliesforthe
assault.OperationalIntelligenceCentreattheBritishAdmiraltydetected,accordingto
PatrickBeesly,"averyconsiderablesouthwardmovementoftroopsfromNorway.
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OnOctober30itreported,'thegrosstonnageofshippingwhichhasmadethepassage
fromOslofjordtoDenmarkfromthemiddleofOctoberamountsto95,000GRT.Itis
estimatedthatthisissufficienttohaveliftedatleastonedivisionfromNorway.Elements
ofthe269thDivisionpreviouslystationedintheBergenareahavebeenidentifiedonthe
WesternFrontduringthelastfewdays.'ThemovementscontinuedthroughoutNovember
andthefirsthalfofDecember."Beeslyaddsflatly,"Eisenhower'sintelligencestaffcannot
havedrawntherightconclusionsfromthesereports."13
Overconfidencewasonereason,lookingintheoppositedirectionanother.Ikewas
emphasizingtheoffensive.TheAlliedbomberswereblastingGermanproduction
facilities.TheRedArmywaspressinghardontheEasternfront.Rundstedt'sonlyhope
forholdingthelineoncespringcamewastohusbandhisforces.Tousethemupina
Germanoffensivethatcouldachievenothingmorethanaslighttacticalsuccessmadeno
sense.WhatSHAEF,thearmygroups,andthearmieswereconcernedwithwasnotwhat
theGermansmightdotothembutratherwhattheywoulddototheGermans.14
OnlyintheEifel,inGermanterritory,couldtheWehrmachtassemblesuchamightyforce
withoutSHAEFdiscoveringitspresence.HadtheGermanstriedtodoitanywherein
France,Holland,orBelgium,localresistancegroupswouldhavegottenthewordto
SHAEFimmediately.Indeed,thesurprisetheGermansachievedattheBulgeisoneofthe
mosttellingcommentsonthevalueoftheundergroundforcestoIkeandhisarmies
duringthecampaignsinFrance.
SpiesinsideGermanymighthavehelpedpredicttheattack,butbothSOEandOSShad
concentratedoncooperatingwiththeFrench,andneitherhadanextensivespynetwork
setupinenemyterritory.OSShadonlyfourmeninsideGermanyandtheyhadno
communicationswithLondonandwereproducingnointelligence.15
Eisenhowerpersonallyinsistedonacceptingtheblameforthesurprise,andhewasright
todoso,forhisfailureswerethecrucialones.Hehadfailedtoreadcorrectlythemindof
theenemycommander;hehadfailedtorecognizethatHitler,notRundstedt,wasdirecting
thestrategy;hehadfailedtoseethatHitlerwouldtryanything.Hewastheman
responsiblefortheweaknessoftheline
Page144
intheArdennes,theonewhohadinsistedoncontinuingtheoffensivesnorthandsouth
ofthatarea.AsaresultofhispoliciestherewasnogeneralSHAEFreserveavailable.
Butdespitehismistakes,IkewasthefirstAlliedgeneraltograspthefullimportofthe
attack,thefirsttobeabletoreadjusthisthinking,thefirsttorealizethatalthoughthe
surpriseGermanoffensiveandtheinitialAlliedlosseswerepainful,inrealityHitlerhad
givenAEFamagnificentopportunity.OnDecember16,atVersailles,Bradleywas
inclinedtothink,onthebasisofscatteredreports,thattheattackwasalocalonethat
couldbestoppedwithoutdifficulty.Ikeinsistedthathesendarmoreddivisionsfromthe
northandsouthtowardtheflanksoftheattack.ThenextdayIkereportedtoWashington
thattheenemyhad"launchedaratherambitiouscounterattackeastoftheLuxembourg
areawherewehavebeenholdingverythinly."Hesaidhewasbringingsomearmorinto
hittheGermanflanksandconcluded,"Ifthingsgowellweshouldnotonlystopthe
thrustbutshouldbeabletoprofitfromit."16
ByDecember19theGermanswerealreadydangerouslybehindschedule.Althoughthey
hadcrushedmostofMiddleton'sVIIICorps,smallunitsorgroupsofAmericans
continuedtofightandholduptheadvance.Asexpected,thepoorroadsystemwas
hurtingtheGermans,too,especiallybecauseIkehadrushedthe101stAirborneintothe
keyroadjunctionatBastogne.
ButintheAlliedworld,therewassomethingclosetopanic.InParistheFrenchflagsthat
inAugusthadwavedsoproudlyfromnearlyeverywindowwerenowdiscreetlyputback
intostorage.InBelgiumpeoplebracedthemselvesforanotherGermanoccupation
nightmare.Jewswhohadsurvivedthefirstoccupationwentbackintohiding.
AspecialGermandetachmentofEnglish-speakingsoldiers,dressedinAmerican
uniformsandinfiltratedbehindthelines,addedtothepanic.SomeputonU.S.Military
Policearmbandsandmisdirectedtraffic,whileotherswentonkidnapingand
assassinationmissions,withIkehimselfastheultimatetarget.Asoneresult,Harry
Butcherrecorded,"Ikeisaprisonerofoursecuritypoliceandisthoroughlybut
helplesslyirritatedbytherestrictionsonhismoves.Thereareallsortsofguards,some
withmachineguns,aroundhim,andhehastotraveltoandfromtheofficeledand
followedbyanarmedguardinajeep."17
Page145
Inspiteofthedisastrousbeginning,itwasattheBulgethatEisenhowercameintohis
ownasamilitarycommander.AsGeneralStronghaswritten,"TheArdennesshows
Eisenhowerathisverybestdecisive,determinedandinfullcontrolofthesituation."18
OnDecember19,whenthethreatappearedmostalarming,hecalledawarcouncilat
Verdun,wheretheAlliedHighCommandmetinacold,dampsquadroominaFrench
armybarracks,withonlyalonepotbelliedstovetoeasethechill.Everyonelookedglum
andserious.
Ikeopenedthemeetingbydeclaring,"Thepresentsituationistoberegardedasoneof
opportunityforusandnotofdisaster.Therewillbeonlycheerfulfacesatthisconference
table."
Pattonpickedupthetheme."Hell,let'shavethegutstoletthe___________goallthe
waytoParis,"hesaid,grinning."Thenwe'llreallycut'emoffandchew'emup."19
EisenhowernexttoldhiscommanderswhathehadalreadysaidtoButcher:"Itiseasier
andlesscostlytoustokillGermanswhentheyareattackingthanwhentheyareholedup
inconcretefortificationsintheSiegfriedLine,andthemorewecankillintheirpresent
offensive,thefewerwewillhavetodigoutpillboxbypillbox."20
AnothermarkofEisenhower'sself-confidenceduringthiscrisiswasaconversationhe
hadwithBradley,withonlyGeneralStrongpresenttooverhearit.Becausetheearly
Germansuccesshaddisruptedcommunicationslines,Eisenhowerhadgivencommandof
theU.S.FirstArmytoMonty,onatemporarybasisonly.Bradleywasfurious.Hedidnot
likeMontytobeginwith,anditwasgallingtohavetheFirstArmytakenfromhimatthe
heightofthebattle.
"IcannotberesponsibletotheAmericanpeopleifyoudothis,"BradleytoldIkeoneof
hisoldestandbestfriendsandaddedforgoodmeasurethathewishedtoresignatonce.
Ikewasshocked,accordingtoStrong,butrecoveredquicklyanddeclaredflatly,"Brad,I,
notyou,amresponsibletotheAmericanpeople.Yourresignationthereforemeans
absolutelynothing."Bradleyhesitatedamoment,thenacceptedthesituation.21
Thebattlethatfollowed,theBattleoftheBulge,isthemostwritten-aboutbattleofWorld
WarII,anditneednotbediscussedanyfurtherhere,excepttopointoutthatoncethe
attack
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began,theGermansleftbehindthemtheirtelephoneandteleprinterlinks,sotheywere
forcedtousetheradioagain.ThatbroughtULTRAbackintoplay.TheSLUScould
reporttotheircommandsthelocationofGermanunits,thereliefandreplacementoftop
officers,thechainofcommand,divisionboundaries,thelocationofheadquarters,and
themovementoflargerformations.
Hitler'sboldbidfailed,asRundstedtknewitwould.TheAllieswonasmashingvictoryin
theArdennes,andthechiefresultofthebattlewasthat,whengoodweathercameinthe
springof1945,RundstedthadinsufficientforceslefttodefendGermany.TheAlliesby
thenhadsuchoverwhelmingstrengththattheynolongerrequiredexact,precise
informationabouttheenemy.TheycouldsimplyoverwhelmtheWehrmacht.22
Strong'scommentontheintelligencefailureattheBulgewasthat"theconsequenceswere
ofcourseserious,butperhapstoomuchattentionhasbeenpaidtothisspecificquestion."
AmajorfactorhelpingtheGermanstoachievesurprisewasStrong'sownestimateof
Germancapabilities,notonlyinarmoredunitsbutalsointhefuelandthesupply
situationgenerally.Strong'sinformationwassuchthathebelievedRundstedtwas
incapableofsustainingamajoroffensive.
Strongwasabsolutelycorrectinthisconclusion.Ashewrites,"Itshouldnotbeforgotten
thatourestimateofGermancapabilitiesatthisstageofthewarwasbasicallysounder
thantheestimateofthosewholaunchedtheArdennesoffensivetheGermans
themselves."23
Attheendofthewar,ColonelTelfordTaylor,themanincommandoftheSLUSandthe
distributionofULTRAmaterial,askedallhisSLUStosubmitafullwrittenreportontheir
experiences.Forathirdofacenturythesereportswerekeptunderlockandkeyatthe
NationalArchives,finallybeingdeclassifiedinOctoberof1978.Theyprovideamajor
sourceforthehistoryofULTRA,itsuses,andeffectiveness.
LieutenantColonelAdolphRosengartenwrotethelongestreport,andthemostselfcritical.Hestatedbluntly"thattheArdennesOffensive,whichwasverycostly,couldhave
beenforeseen."Hegavefourbasicreasons.First,"theenemywasdefendingonan
artificiallinewithamajorobstacle,theRhine,astridehissupplylines."Second,basic
Germanarmydoctrinewasanactive
Page147
defense.Third,''theGermansituation,inthebigpicture,wassodesperatethathecould
affordtotakethelongestchances."Fourth,"theeffectofouroverwhelmingair
superioritywasminimizedbychoosingatimewhendaylightwasshortest,andthe
weathermostlikelytobebad."Rosengartenadmittedthatsomecluescameinfromother
sources,butwereignoredbecausenonecamefromULTRA.
OncetheAlliesrealizedthattheyfacedanall-outoffensivewithAntwerpasthestrategic
objective,Rosengartenwrote,"Thetideswungprecipitouslyfromgeneraloptimism
basedonthelongtermhopelessnessofGermany'sstrategicpositiontocalamityandwoe,
involvingtheimminentarrivalofdivisionsbelievedtobeintheEast(aswellasinvented
ones),andnewsecretweapons.Theproblemwastokeeptherecordaccurateand
straight."24
ThattheSLUS,andtheG-2sandtheircommanders,tookmorecareaftertheBulgewas
clearonJanuary1,1945,whentheGermanslaunchedanother,secondaryoffensive.
MajorDonaldBussey,SLUtotheU.S.SeventhArmy,statedinhispostwarreportthat
shortlyaftertheArdennesoffensivebegan,ULTRAstartedpickingupGAF
reconnaissanceorderstocovertheSaar-Palatinatearea.Itwasclearthatanattackwasin
theoffing,andthatitsobjectivewastodrawoffAlliedstrengthfromtheBulge.But
wherewoulditcome?
Busseyfoundthatbyputtingtogetherenemyorder-of-battleinformation,alongwiththe
boundarylinesbetweenGermanunits(informationprovidedbyULTRA),hecould"state
withrelativecertaintythatthemaineffortintheattackwouldbemadewestoftheHardt
Mountains,withasecondaryattackbetweenthemountainsandtheRhine."Bussey
commented,"Iftherewaseveranessentialelementofinformationthiswasit,forthe
passesthroughtheVosgesMountainswereaseriousobstacletotherapidmovementof
SeventhArmyreserves."UsingtheinformationBusseyhadpickedupfromtheGAF
intercepts,Eisenhowerreinforcedthethreatenedsectorwiththe2dFrenchArmored
DivisionandtheU.S.36thInfantryDivision(aveteranoutfitandoneofthebest);these
movementswerenotpickedupbyGermanintelligence.
Busseydescribedtheresult:"Whentheattackwaslaunchedon1January,theGerman
maineffortcollapsedcompletely.Theironlysuccesswasinthesectorofthesecondary
effort,inandeastof
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theHardtMountains.ThisGermanoffensivewasproperlyappreciatedandpreparations
madetosuccessfullymeetthethreat.LackingULTRAitseemsverydoubtfulwhetherthe
attackwouldhavebeenrepulsed,orwhetherothersourcesofinformationwouldhave
givenadvancewarning.Opensourcesprovidedonlythemostmeagerevidenceofan
attack,andtherewasmuchopposingevidencesuggestingpreciselytheopposite-a
thinningoutinthesectorandmovementofunitsawayfromtheSaar-Palatinateto
reinforcetheNorth."25
WhileIke'sarmiesmetandrepulsedtheselast-gaspGermanattacks,hisairforceswere
busypoundingGermanytobits.Intheairwar,ULTRAcontinuedtobeofgreathelp
becausetheLuftwaffeusedtheradioconstantlyandcarelessly.Therewassomuch
ULTRAmaterialthattheTacticalAirForceshadnotonlyaSLUattachedtoheadquarters,
butinadditionaSpecialAdviseronULTRA.MajorLuciusBuckexplainedthat"the
necessityfortheSpecialAdvisergrewoutofthefailure...torecognizethecapabilities
androleoftacticalairpower,coupledwiththeunworkableandfallacioustheorythatit
wasthefunctionofArmiesandArmyGroupstodotargetplanningfortheTacticalAir
ForcesandtheirTacticalAirCommands;anda'BattleofBritain'emphasisonULTRAat
AirMinistryandWarStation,thatis,astressingofOrderofBattleaspectsandalarge
discountofthetargetvalue.ThiswasinconsistentwithAmericanconceptsofoffensive
airpower."26
OtherAmericansechoedBuck'scomplaintthattheBritishconcentratedtoomuchonwhat
theGermansmightdotothem,notenoughonwhatairpowermightdototheGermans.
LieutenantColonelLeslieRood,SLUattheFirstTacticalAirForce,wroteinhisreportto
Taylor,"IfIhaveanycriticismtomakeofBletchleyPark'samazingcontributiontothe
WaritisthatitfailedtorecognizeafterD-DaythattargetshadreplacedtheGermanAir
Forceasthemaininterestofairintelligence.AtBPIgainedtheimpressionthattheGAF
wasahotsubjectbutatthecommandstheoperationspeoplewerecompletely
uninterestedinitsgrandioseplansandineffectiveoperations.TheAlliedairsuperiority
wastoooverwhelmingtobeaffectedbyanythingtheGAFmightdo."
Nevertheless,Roodwenton,"GAFnewscontinuedtocomeoverthelinkinitscarefully
processedformwhilethetargetinfor
Page149
mationarrivedwithoutthebenefitofBP'susualdependablethought."
Inhisanalysisofthesituation,Roodpointedoutthat"targetintelligenceisnaturallymore
controversialthanorderofbattlebecauseinitintelligencebecomesoperational.PerhapsI
wasseekingorderwheretherecouldbenoorder.YetIfeelthathadBPexercisedthe
samecarefulandubiquitousguidanceinthisfieldasitdidinorderofbattle,someofthe
wastefultargetargumentsmighthavebeeneliminatedandthebombersusedmore
intelligently."27
InsofarastherewasaGAFleftafterD-Day,ULTRAprovidedthecluesthatrenderedit
inoperative.LieutenantColonelJamesFellers,SLUtotheIXTacticalAirCommand,
notedthatinattackingGAFfacilities,"itwasofkeyimportancetoproducebombcraters.
Repairwasnolongerasimpleprocessofbulldozerandroller.Intheexistingweather,the
cratersfilledwithwater,drainagewaspoor,andconsiderabledelayinrestoring
serviceabilitywasaffected.ULTRArevealedthattherealwaytorendertheGAF
nonoperationalwasnotinshootingupindividualaircraftbystrafing,butratherby
destroyingfuelstocksandsupplies,renderingairfieldsunserviceableanddelaying
repairs.ThesignificanceofULTRAinaffectingsuchchangesinAlliedtacticsis
noteworthy."28
TherewasgeneralagreementamongtheU.S.ArmyAirForceofficerswhoservedas
SLUSthatULTRAwasthebestguidetotargetpriorities.Withinhoursofaraid,BPwould
pickuptheGermans'owndamagereportandassessment,thustellingtheAllieswhether
theyneededtohitthatparticulartargetagain.And,asMajorAnselTalbert,SLUatU.S.
EighthAirForce,pointedout,ULTRAwas"theagentwhichchangeddifferentviewpoints
intoacommonpolicy."Throughoutthewar,boththeBritishandAmericanairforces
complainedthattheyhadtoomanymasterstoserveSHAEF,21stArmyGroup,12thArmy
Group,thevariousarmies,andevencorpsheadquarters.Eachmasterhadhisownideaas
totheproperuseofAlliedairpower.
ULTRAservedastheultimateguide,rejectingthisorthatpettheoryonthebasisofthe
Germanreactionwhileembracingothers.AsTalbertnoted,"Theoiloffensivewasnot
undertakenuntilafewweeksbeforetheinvasionandtherewasconsiderableskepticism
inmanyairforcequarterswhetheritwouldpayoffintimetoaffectGermanairand
groundoperations.ByFall1944,ULTRAbegantorevealshortagesoffuelwhichgrewin
proportionsrapidly
Page150
andsoonclearlywererevealedbyULTRAasbeinggeneral,NOTlocal.Thisconvinced
allconcernedthattheairoffensivehaduncoveredaweakspotintheGermaneconomy
andledtoexploitationofthisweaknesstothefullestextent."29
Bythespringof1945,Germanywasfinished.Ike'sairforcesdominatedthesky
overhead,histroopscouldgoalmostanywhereatwill,theRussianswereclosinginon
Berlin,andhisneedforinformationabouttheenemy'splans,intentions,andcapabilities
hadallbutdisappeared.Therewas,however,tobeonemoreminorflapoverintelligence.
AllenDulles,headoftheOSSoperationinSwitzerland,andhisagentsbecameconvinced
thattheGermanswerebuildinganAlpineredoubt,orfortress,intheBavarianAlps,
whereHitlerintendedtomakealast-ditch,Wagnerianstand,atrueGötterdämmerung.As
earlyasSeptember1944,OSSreportshadwarnedofthepossibilitythatasthewarneared
itsendtheNaziswouldprobablyevacuatekeygovernmentdepartmentstoBavaria.30
ThenonFebruary16,1945,Dulles'officesenttoOSSheadquartersinWashingtona
bizarrereportobtainedfromagentsinBerlin:"TheNazisareundoubtedlypreparingfora
bitterfightfromthemountainredoubt....Strongpointsareconnectedbyunderground
railroads...severalmonths'outputofthebestmunitionshavebeenreservedandalmost
allofGermany'spoisongassupplies.Everybodywhoparticipatedintheconstructionof
thesecretinstallationswillbekilledoff-includingthecivilianswhohappentoremain
behindwhentherealfightingstarts."31
ThevariousG-2sembellishedonthesupposedthreat,possiblybecausetheyhadlittleelse
todobythisstageofthewar.SeventhArmyG-2,forexample,suspectedthecreationin
theredoubtof"aneliteforce,predominatelySSandmountaintroops,ofbetween200,000
and300,000men."Alreadysupplieswerearrivingintheareaattherateof"threetofive
verylongtrainseachweek....Anewtypeofgunhasbeenreportedobservedonmany
ofthesetrains...."Therewerehintsofanundergroundaircraftfactory"capableof
producingMesserschmitts."32
Itallseemedtomakesense,ifonlybecausetheBavarianAlpswerethebestnatural
defensiveareatheGermanscouldfind,andtheretheycouldcombinethefightingforces
fromGermanyandItaly,perhapsevendrawinsomefromtheEasternfront.General
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StrongorderedreconnaissancemissionsflownovertheAlps,buttheresultswere
confusing.TheGermansseemedtobeinstallingextensivebunkers,andtherewasa
definiteincreaseinantiaircraftprotection.ItdidseemlikelythatthefanaticalNaziswould
makealast-ditchstandsomewhere,andtherewasnobetterplacetomakeit.
AsGeneralStrongcommentedtoBedellSmith,"Theredoubtmaynotbethere,butwe
havetotakestepstopreventitbeingthere."Smithagreed.Hesaidinhisopinionthere
was"everyreasontobelievethattheNazisintendtomaketheirlaststandamongthe
crags."33
Alltherumors,thefragmentsofrealevidence,andthegenuinefearsamongtheAllies
thattheywouldhavetokilleverylastNazibeforethewarwouldbeoverfedtheMarch
11SHAEFintelligenceanalysis:"Theoreticallywithinthisfortress,defendedbothby
natureandthemostefficientsecretweaponsyetinvented,thepowersthathavehitherto
guidedGermanywillsurvivetoorganizeherresurrection.Theareais,bytheverynature
oftheterrain,practicallyimpenetrable.Theevidenceindicatesthatconsiderablenumbers
ofSSandspeciallychosenunitsarebeingsystematicallywithdrawntoAustria...and
thatsomeofthemostimportantministriesandpersonalitiesoftheNaziregimeare
alreadyestablishedintheRedoubtarea."
Atthispoint,Strongseemstohavebeencarriedawaywithhisownverbiage."Here
armamentswillbemanufacturedinbombprooffactories,foodandequipmentwillbe
storedinvastundergroundcavernsandaspeciallyselectedcorpsofyoungmenwillbe
trainedinguerrillawarfare,sothatawholeundergroundarmycanbefittedanddirected
toliberateGermanyfromtheoccupyingforces."34
Insofarasthereneverwasaredoubt(althoughSHAEFG-2didhaveamappinpointing
Germandefensivepositionsinthearea,asreportedbyOSS),neveranyGermanplanto
movetroopsintotheregion(althoughbecauseofthepressurefromtheirenemiesthey
didtendtodriftinthatdirection),Strong'sreportofMarch11mustrankasoneofthe
worstintelligencesummariesofthewar.HehimselfblamedAllenDulles.Inhismemoirs,
Strongwrote,"TherewasaperiodwhenAllenDulleswasresponsibleforpassingagood
dealofinformationdirectlytotheAmericansunderEisenhowerespeciallyinformation
concernedwiththeso-called'Na
Page152
tionalRedoubt'inGermany;ifIhadnottakenstepstocountersomeofthelessreliable
informationaboutthis'Redoubt'itcouldhavehadaconsiderableeffectonEisenhower's
strategy."35
Ithas,however,oftenbeenchargedthatDulles'flightoffancyabouttheredoubtdid
actuallyinduceEisenhowertochangehisstrategy,specificallytoleaveBerlintothe
RussianswhilehemovedPatton'sandBradley'stroopssouthtowardtheredoubtinthe
lastweeksofthewar.Thischargeimmediatelygetstiedupinthebroaderissuesof
whethertheAlliesshouldhaveandcouldhavetakenBerlinbeforetheRussiansgotthere,
controversiesthatwillgoonaslongaspeopleareinterestedinWorldWarII.Sufficeitto
sayherethatwhetherIkewasrightorwrong,hisreasonsforavoidingBerlinhadlittleto
dowithimaginativeintelligencerumors;hestayedawayfromthecapitalforwhatseemed
tohimandtothiswritertohavebeensolidmilitary,diplomatic,andpoliticalreasons.
OnMay8,1945,Germanysurrenderedunconditionally.Thefinalintelligencereportof
thewar,issuedthatday,read,"Forthefirsttimeinelevenmonthsthereisnocontactwith
theenemy.ThevictorywhichwaswononOmahaandUtahBeachesreacheditsclimax.
TodaybelongstothemenofthisArmywhofoughtandconqueredtheenemyfrom
NormandytotheElbe.Thereisnoenemysituationtoreportforthereisnolongeran
enemytodefeat."36
Page153
INTERLUDE1945-53
Page155
ChapterEleven
EisenhowerBetweenSHAEFandthePresidency
EARLYSPRING,1952.Ikehastodecidewhetherornottorunforthepresidency.He
believesitisimproperforasoldiertoenterpolitics,buthedoesnotwanttoshirkhis
duty,andhedoesbelievehiscountryfacesgravethreats.
FromJanuaryof1942UntilMayof1945,DwightEisenhowerwasoneofthedozenorso
mostpowerfulmenintheworld.FromJanuaryof1953untilJanuaryof1961,hewasthe
mostpowerfulmanintheworld.Intheinterlude,from1945to1953,Ikewasnota
decision-makernorinapositiontocreatepolicy.Hewas,however,nearthecenterof
power,firstasArmyChiefofStaff(November'45toFebruary'48),thenasPresidentof
ColumbiaUniversity('48to'51),whereheaddedtheNewYorkfinancialandindustrial
elitetohislistoffriends,alistthatalreadyincludedmanyofthetopgovernmentand
militaryofficialsaroundtheworld,andfinallyasthefirstsupremecommanderofthe
NATOforces('51to'52).Inretrospect,althoughnotplannedthatway,theinterludewasa
perfectpreparationforthepresidency,asortoffinishingschoolatthehighestlevel.
Althoughhefrequentlyexpressedaheartfeltdesireforaquietretirement,thetruthwas
thatIkewasmuchtoovibrant,toopassionate,tooconcernedtosimplyretire,evenwhen
in1950hereachedsixtyyearsofage.
Heworkedabrutalschedule.AsChiefofStaff,hewasconstantlytestifyingbefore
congressionalcommittees,attendingceremonialfunctions,meetingwiththeJointChiefs,
goingoninspectiontours,puttinginlongdaysinhisofficeandputtingoff
Page156
politicianswhowantedhimtorunforthepresidency.AtColumbia,wherehehadhoped
togetsomerestinthesupposedlycalmatmosphereofivy-coveredwalls,hefoundhe
wasworkingalmostashardashehadin1944.
Mentally,hewasreachingtowardapeak.Hehadabreadthofexperience,withhis
knowledgeofforeignleadersmatchedinAmericaonlybyGeorgeC.Marshall,andinthe
worldonlybyChurchill,deGaulle,andStalin.HehadbeentotheKremlinafterthewar,
wherehemetwithStalinandallthetopRussians.Hehadanintimateassociationwith
Churchill(whowasvotedoutofpowerin1945,butwentbacktoNumber10Downing
Streetin1951).HehaddeGaulle'srespect,admiration,andbestofallfriendship.Heknew
themapofWesternEuropeaswellasthatofcentralKansas;hehadlivedinthe
Philippinesforfouryearsbeforethewar;hehadjourneyedthroughmuchofAsia.He
wasfamiliarwithCentralAmerica,too,havingservedinPanamaforthreeyearsinthe
1920s.
HeknewtheUnitedStatesGovernment,perhapsaswellasanymanliving.Firstofall,he
knewtheWhiteHouseanditsoperatingprocedures.NeverpersonallyclosetoeitherFDR
orHarryTruman,IkeneverthelessspentmorethanenoughtimewitheachPresidentto
haveagenuineinsider'sperspectiveandunderstandingofhowthepresidencyworked.
Second,heknewthearmedforcesandtheirwaysofdoingthings,theircapabilitiesand
limitations,theirpersonnel,theirprejudices,andtheirtraditions.
HealsoknewCongressanditspeculiarwaysofoperating,sofrustratingtooutsiders.Ike
knewaboutCongressasaresultofhavingservedMacArthur,inthethirties,asthe
Army'schiefliaisonofficerwithCongress.Further,hisbrotherMiltonwasthenumber
twomanintheDepartmentofAgricultureduringtheNewDeal,andhesharedhis
experienceswithIkefourorfivenightsaweek.BeingatthecenterofoneoftheNew
Deal'smostactiveagencies,andbeingasharpobserverofthecongressionalscene,Milton
wasabletogivehisbrotherapricelesseducationmerelybyrecountinghisday.Finally,as
ArmyChiefofStaffafterthewar,Ikehadhisownexperienceswiththeinnerworkings
ofCongress.Forallthesereasonshealsoknewthefederalbureaucracyanditsstandard
operatingprocedures.
Anotherassetwashisfirsthandknowledgeofclandestineoperations,ofwhattheycould
andcouldnotaccomplish,howtoset
Page157
themup,howtocontrolthem,howtodirectthesecovertactionssothattheyreinforced
policy,howtotiethemintoabroaderprogramofnationalaction.Hewasuptodate,too,
onthestateoftheartinelectronicintelligencegathering,airreconnaissance,cameras,and
otherdevicesusedinscientificspying.HeknewtheBritishSecretService'soperation
almostaswellasChurchillorMenzies.Heknewtherightquestionstoaskofthespies,
andhowtoaskthem.
AfurthersourceofEisenhower'sstrengthwashistremendouspopularitywiththe
Americanpeople.Hisbiggrin,hisopenmannerwithreporters,hisobvioussincerity,his
speakingability(hewasabighitwithsmallgroupsofinfluentialmen,aswellaswith
largeaudiences;manyBritishers,includingChurchill,ratedIke's1945Guildhallspeechas
oneofthebesttheyhadeverheard),andhisimageastheleaderofthecrusadeagainst
Hitlerallcombinedtomakehimtrustworthy.Montgomeryputitbest:Ike,Montysaid,
"hasbuttosmileatyou,andyoutrusthimatonce."1Eventhosewhonevermetorsaw
themanfeltthatway,believedthattheycouldtrustIke.
CrusadeinEurope,hiswarmemoirpublishedin1948,addedtohisstature,prestige,and
popularity.Oftendescribedasthesecond-bestsetofmemoirsfromanAmerican
professionalsoldierprideofplacegoestoUlyssesGrantIke'sbookwasanimmediatebest
seller.ItwasIkeathisbesthiscommonsense,hisabilitytocommunicatewithdifferent
typesatdifferentlevels,hisdecisiveness,hisleadershipcapability,hisoutstanding
generalship,hisopennesstonewideas,newtechniques,newmethods,allcamethrough
innearlyeverychapter.
Smallwonder,then,thatboththeDemocratsandtheRepublicanswereanxiousto
nominatehimforthepresidencyin1948.Heturnedthembothdown,partlybecausehe
thoughthehaddoneenoughforhiscountry,mainlybecauseofPershing'sexampleafter
WorldWarI.PershingwasoneofIke'sfewheroes,andheagreedwithPershingthat
soldiersoughtnotinvolvethemselvesinpolitics.
But,likemostmen,Ikewassusceptibletoflattery.Republicansbegantotellhimthatifhe
didnotrunin1952,asaRepublican,itwouldbetheendofthetwo-partysystemin
America.Itwas,theysaid,hisdutytohiscountrytorun.
Thekeywordwas"duty."TheRepublicansrecognized,earlyon,thatIke,likeGeorge
Marshall,couldnotresistthatword(TrumanhadtwicepersuadedMarshalltogiveuphis
retirement
Page158
bycitinghis''duty").OneoftheRepublicanstoapproachEisenhowerwasthedefeated
1948candidate,ThomasDewey.OnJuly7,1949,Ikerecordedinhisdiary,"Gov.Dewey
visitedmeyesterday.Hestayedatmyhousefor2hours.Hesayshe'sworriedaboutthe
country'sfuture-andthatIamtheonlyonewhocandoanythingaboutit.
"TheGov.saysthatIamapublicpossession-thatsuchstandingasIhaveintheaffection
orrespectofourcitizenryislikewisepublicproperty.Allofthis,therefore,mustbe
carefullyguardedtouseintheserviceofallthepeople.
"(AlthoughI'mmerelyrepeatingsomeoneelse'sexposition,themerewritingofsuch
thingsalmostmakesmediveunderthetable.)"2
OnNovember3,1949,Ikeagainturnedtohisdiary:"Amessagesentmebyaverystrong
manufacturingassociation(nottheN.A.M.)wastotheeffectthatIhadsoontoletthem
knowthat,intheeventofnomination,I'dbe'willing.'Theargumentwasthatthisgang
wasreadytospendfivemilliondollars-andtheyweren'tgoingtodothatiftherewasany
laterchanceofmydeclining.SoItoldthemantosay'Nuts.'Infactthethingsmacksof
thesameineptitudethathascharacterizedalotofAmericanbusinessleadershipoverthe
past40years.
"Iamnot,noworinthefuture,goingwillinglyintopolitics.IfeverIdosoitwillbeas
theresultofaseriesofcircumstancesthatcrushallmyarguments-thatthereappearsto
metobesuchcompellingreasonstoenterthepoliticalfieldthatrefusaltodosowould
alwaysthereaftermeantomethatI'dfailedtodomyduty."3
Likemostgreatmen,Ikewasbothself-assuredanddynamic.Hehadnodoubtsofhis
abilitytodothejobandinfacttodoitbetterthananyonehecouldthinkofasan
alternative.Hisgreatenergyrequiredanoutlet.Alreadyaworldfigure,thetruthwas,
whateverhisprotests,heneededaworldstagetofullyexpresshimself,toexercisehis
abilities,tosatisfyhisintenseandnever-endingcuriosity.Heneededtoleadhisnation
throughperiloustimes.In1952,heagreedtoserve.
Thatthetimeswereperilous,thattheydemandedthebestthenationcouldoffer,hehad
nodoubt.ThemenaceofStalinandtheCommunistswasasgravetoIkeasthatofHitler
adecadeearlier.Insomewaysitwasgreater.TheNazishadalimitedideo
Page159
logicalappealoutsideGermany,whiletheCommunistscouldanddidappealtoentire
classesofpeopleinFrance,Italy,Germany,andthroughouttheworld.TheNazishad
beenforcedtobuytheirspies,andeventhencouldnottrustthem,whiletheCommunists
couldanddidreceiveinvaluableinformationthebestbeinghowtosetoffanatomic
bombfromoutoftheblue,agiftfromtruebelieverswhomanagedtoconvince
themselvesthatgivingStalinmilitarysecretswouldspeedthecomingoftheinevitable
socialistutopia.
Inpost-VietnamAmericaitbecamefashionableonsomecollegecampusestosneeratIke
andhiscontemporariesfortheirseeminglyexcessivefearofStalinandobsessiveanticommunism.ThatgenerationofAmericanleaders,however,feltlikeChurchillinthe
thirtiesthattheywerewarningagainstdangersthatwereterriblycleartothembutwhich
theircountrymenseemeddeterminedtoignore.TheevidencethatStalindidposeathreat
toalltheworld,includingtheUnitedStates,seemedtothemtobebeyonddispute.
ThefactsspokeforthemselvesPoland,EastGermany,Rumania,Bulgaria,Estonia,Latvia,
Albania,Yugoslavia,Czechoslovakia,NorthKorea,andChina,alltakenoverbythe
CommunistsinthefirsthalfdecadefollowingHitler'sdeath.IneveryinstanceCommunist
dictatorshipssuppressedpreciselythosefreedomsIkeandhiscomradesinarmshad
foughttodefendfreedomofspeech,ofthepress,ofreligion,ofeconomicenterprise,and
ofpersonalmovement.Intheprocess,Stalinbroughtallthesecountries(exceptfor
China,Albania,andYugoslavia)underhisdirectcontrol,therebyaddingenormouslyto
themilitarypotentialoftheSovietUnion.Thusbytheearlyfifties,asEisenhowerandhis
friendssawit,Stalinhadclearlydemonstratedthathehadthewilltoconquer,the
ideologywithwhichtodoso,andthemilitarystrengthtomakeworldconquest
conceivable.
WiththesingleexceptionofWorldWarII,theUnitedStates,afterherwars,hasindulged
insplendidisolationism.Theimmediatepostwargenerationin1784,in1816,in1900,and
in1920hasturnedawayfromactiveinvolvementintheworld,relyingontheoceansfor
thenation'sdefense.ThatdidnothappenaftertheSecondWorldWar.Theisolationists
werestillthere,tobesure,ledbySenatorRobertTaft.Ike'sfearthatTaftwouldbethe
Republicannomineeifhehimselfdidnotrunwasthemajorfactor
Page160
inconvincinghimthathisdutyrequiredhimtoenterpolitics.FortheAmericansto
withdrawfromEuropeandAsiawouldhavebeentoabandonthoseancientcivilizations
tocommunism;Ikefelthehadtodowhathecouldtopreventsuchacatastrophe.
NewweaponrymagnifiedtheCommunistthreat.WorldWarIIhadbroughtgreatleaps
forwardinthearsenalofdestructionandmadeAmerica,forthefirsttime,vulnerableto
anattacklaunchedfromEurope.Mostterrifyingofall,ofcourse,wastheatomicbomb,
whichtheRussiansacquiredin1949.Fromthatmomenton,theColdWarwasfought
undertheshadowofthemushroom-shapedcloud.
Ifthebombhighlightedthethreat,sodidthemethodbywhichtheSovietsacquiredit.
TheUnitedStatesandGreatBritainhadmadeastupendousefforttobuildthefirstatomic
weapons,aneffortthatinvolvedbillionsofdollars,hundredsofthousandsofman-hours
oftheirbestscientists,andahugeindustrialcommitment.TheRussians,thankstotheir
spies,whowereforthemostpartmotivatedbyideology,wereabletoavoidmuchofthat
effort.IftheRussianscouldsoeasilypenetratethetop-secretManhattanProject,it
appearedthatnoscientificbreakthroughwouldbesafeforlong.*TheRussianshada
worldwidenetworkofspies,muchthelargestinhistory.
ThereweremanyobviousreasonstofeartheRussians,nottheleastofwhichwasthe
RedArmyinEasternEurope.CapableofmobilizinghundredsofdivisionsalongtheElbe
River,thedividinglineinGermanybetweenEastandWest,theRedArmycouldaccordingtoestimatesbytheU.S.ArmyG-2overrunallofWesternEuropeintwoweeks.
Thatwasanexaggeration,Ikethoughthewroteonthemarginofthis1948estimate,"I
don'tbelieveit.MyGod,weneededtwomonthsjusttooverrunSicily"5butthegeneral
pointwascertainlyvalid.
Mostfrighteningwaswhatseemedmostlikely,asurpriseattack.PearlHarborhadburned
itselfintothemindsofeveryAmericanleaderoftheday.Toamantheyweredetermined
thatitwouldneverhappenagain.ARussian-launched"PearlHarbor"wouldinvolvea
groundoffensivebytheRedArmyinEurope
*U.S.scientistshadestimatedthatitwouldtaketheRussiansaboutfouryearstodevelopthebomb.
Thus,asfarasthescientistswereconcerned,espionageplayedasmallrole.Tothepoliticians,
however,thespies'roleseemedcrucial.4
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and/oranatomicassaultontheUnitedStates,andunliketheoriginalPearlHarbor,it
wouldalmostsurelybedecisive,atleastinEurope.TheRedArmy,onceentrenchedin
France,wouldbealmostimpossibletodislodge.
Ike'sperceptionofthesethreatswaskeenerthanthatofmostleaders,partlybecauseit
washisbusiness,mainlybecauseheknewbetterthananyoneelsehowcloseWorldWar
IIhadbeen.
ThedangersAmericafacedintheColdWarwereevengreaterbecauseStalinandthe
RussianswerebetterthanHitlerandtheGermans,betterinthesensethattheyhadmore
spies,moretroops,andasimilarlackofscruples.Inshort,asIkesawit,thelifeand
deathstrugglethatbeganwithHitler'sinvasionofPolandin1939didnotcometoanend
in1945withHitler'sdeath.Farfromitthestrugglewasnowevenmoreintense.
Eisenhowerexpressedhisprivatethoughtsonthesubjectfromtimetotimeinhisdiary.
OnJanuary27,1949,herecorded,"Jim.F.[JamesForrestal,SecretaryofDefense]andI
haveagreedtotrytokeepthemindsofallcenteredonthemainfactsofourpresent
existence.
(a)ThefreeworldisunderthreatbythemonolithicmassofCommunisticImperialism.
(b)TheU.S.mustwakeuptoprepareapositionofstrengthfromwhichitcanspeak
serenelyandconfidently."6
AndonJune11,1949,shortlyafterForrestal'stragicdeath,hewrote,"Thereisnouse
tryingtodecideexactlywhatIthoughtofJimForrestal.ButonethingIshallalways
remember.Hewastheonemanwho,intheverymidstofthewar,alwayscounselled
cautionandalertnessindealingwithSoviets.Hevisitedmein'44andin'45andIlistened
carefullytohisthesisIneverhadcausetodoubttheaccuracyofhisjudgmentsonthis
point.Hesaid'Becourteousandfriendlyintheefforttodevelopasatisfactorymodus
vivendibutneverbelievewehavechangedtheirbasicpurpose,whichistodestroy
representativegovernment.'"7
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ChapterTwelve
TheBirthandEarlyYearsoftheCIA,1945-53
FALL,1944.PresidentFranklinRooseveltasksGeneralDonovanoftheOSStosend
himasecretmemorandumonthesubjectofapostwarintelligenceservice."Whenour
enemiesaredefeated,"Donovanwritesinresponse,"thedemandwillbeequally
pressingforinformationthatwillaidusinsolvingtheproblemsofpeace."
Accordingly,heproposesthatFDRtakeimmediateactiontotransformtheOSSintoa
"centralintelligenceservice"thatwillreportdirectlytothePresident.TheOSS,
Donovandeclares,has''thetrainedandspecializedpersonnelneededforthetask.This
talentshouldnotbedispersed."1
Donovan'sproposalwassimple,straightforward,logical.Hehopeditwouldbe
implementeddirectlyuponthedefeatoftheNazis,withDonovanincommand.Butthe
gestationperiodwasyears,notmonths,andbythetimetheCIAemerged,Donovanwas
longsincegone.
HehadbeendoneinbyAmerica'smostimposingbureaucrat,possiblythemostfeared
maninWashington,theDirectoroftheFederalBureauofInvestigation,J.EdgarHoover.
Hoover,ponderous,single-minded,andpugnacious,wasabuilderofempires.Hewanted
theFBItobethemostpowerfulagencyinWashington,andheknewthatthekeyto
achievinghisgoalwasbymonopolizingintelligence.Hewhohadtheinsideinformation
hadeverything.Atthebeginningofthewar,HooverhadtriedtoobtainfortheFBIthe
exclusiverighttocollectandanalyzeintelligenceonaworldwidebasis.Donovan
protestedthatdomesticandforeignclandestineac
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tivitieshadtobehandledbyseparateagencies.Roosevelt,inhisusualfashion,decidedto
splitthedifference;hegaveDonovanEuropeandAsiawhilereservingSouthAmericafor
theFBI.
Donovan'spartialvictorystrengthenedHoover'sdistrustoftheOSS.Representativesof
theBritishSecretServiceinWashingtonwereamazedtofindthat"Hooverkeenly
resentedDonovan'sorganizationfromthemomentitwasestablished."Thefeud
continued.RichardHarrisSmith,authorofanexcellenthistoryoftheOSS,recordsthat
in1942Donovan'sagentssecretlybrokeintotheSpanishEmbassyinWashingtonand
beganphotographingthecodebooks.Hoover,furiousatthisinvasionofhisoperational
territory,waiteduntilDonovan'smenmadeanothernocturnalentryintotheembassy.
Whiletheyweretakingphotographs,twoFBIsquadcarspulledupoutsidetheembassy
andturnedontheirsirens.Donovan'sagentsfled.DonovanprotestedtoFDR,butrather
thanreprimandHooverforhisaction,Rooseveltorderedtheembassyinfiltrationproject
turnedovertotheFBI.2
JabbingandsparringbetweentheOSSandtheFBIcontinuedthroughthewar.Latein
1944,HooversawachancetoridhimselfoftheOSSandDonovanforgood.Heseized
theopportunity.HesomehowacquiredacopyofDonovan'srecommendationsfora
postwarintelligenceserviceand,inaflagrantbreachofsecurity,leakedthetop-secret
documenttothebitterlyanti-RooseveltChicagoTribune.TheTribune'sWalterTrohan
thenwroteaseriesofsensationalarticles,underevenmoresensationalheadlines,about
Donovan'splansfora"super-spysystem"inthe"postwarNewDeal."Trohancharged
thatDonovanwantedtocreatean"all-powerfulintelligenceservicetospyonthepostwar
worldandtopryintothelivesofcitizensathome....Theunitwouldoperateunderan
independentbudgetandpresumablyhavesecretfundsforspywork."3
Apredictablecongressionaluproarresulted.Oneconservativecongressmandeclared,
"ThisisanotherindicationthattheNewDealwillnothaltinitsquestforpower.Like
SimonLegreeitwantstoownusbodyandsoul."Rooseveltdecideditwouldbe
expedienttobackoff;theWhiteHousehadDonovan'sproposalputonthetable.InApril
1945,FDRdecidedtoreviveit,butaweeklaterhewasdead.
Roosevelt'ssuccessor,HarryTruman,was,unlikeRoosevelt,nofriendofDonovan's,and
atthebeginningofhisadministration
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TrumanwashardlystrongenoughtotakeontheredoubtableHoover.Inaddition,
Trumanwasdeterminedtoreducethefederalbudget,whichmeanteliminatingwartime
agencies.WhenhisvenerableandconservativeDirectoroftheBudget,HaroldSmith,
indicatedthatagreatdealofmoneycouldbesavedbyabolishingtheOSSandputtingits
agentsandactivitiesintothehandsoftheolder,establisheddepartmentsoftheNavy,War,
andState,Trumanacted.BoldlydeclaringthatAmericahadnoneedforapeacetime
"Gestapo,"onSeptember20,1945,Trumanissuedanexecutiveorderdisbandingthe
OfficeofStrategicServices.4
TheolderdepartmentswerealldelightedtohavetheOSSfunctionsassignedtothem,
naturallyenough,althoughtheywereresentfulofthefreewheelingDonovanagentswho
camealongwiththeassignment.ThecovertandespionagesideofOSSwenttotheWar
Departmentasaso-calledStrategicServicesUnit,butthiswasnothingmorethana
caretakerbodytopresideovertheliquidationoftheOSSespionagenet.TheResearch
andAnalysisBranchofOSSwenttoState,whereitwasquicklydecimatedby
congressionalandpresidentialbudgetcutting,coupledwiththehostilityofolderState
Departmenthands.AssistantSecretaryofStateSpruilleBradentoldacongressional
committee,"Weresistedthisinvasionofalltheseswarmsofpeople...mostly
collectivistsand'do-gooders'andwhat-nots."5
TheconservativereactionthatdominatesWashingtonafterallofAmerica'swars(best
summedupbyWarrenHarding'sclassiccallfora"returntonormalcy")representeda
hopefor,ratherthanarealisticappreciationof,thefuture.Truman,likemillionsofhis
fellowcitizens,yearnedfor"normalcy,"whichmeantareturntoisolationism.An
isolationistAmericawouldnotneedhugemilitarybudgetsorsecretspyagencies.
Almostimmediately,however,Trumanrealizedthathewaswrong.Americacouldnot
escapetheworld,andtobeeffectiveindealingwithothercountries,theUnitedStateshad
tohaveacentralizedintelligenceservice,justasithadtohaveamorecentralizedmilitary
establishment,theTrumanDoctrine,andtheMarshallPlan.TheattackatPearlHarbor
wasasurprisebecausetheArmyandNavyfrequentlyactedasiftheywereatwarwith
eachother,andbecauseafragmentedintelligenceapparatus,dominatedbythemilitary,
hadbeenunabletodistinguish"signals"from
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"noise,"letalonemakeitsassessmentsavailabletoseniorofficersintimeforthemtoact.
InJanuary1946,therefore,TrumanissuedapresidentialdirectiveestablishingtheCentral
IntelligenceGroup.TheCIGhadadirectorofCentralIntelligence,selectedbythe
President,andwasresponsibleforcoordination,planning,evaluation,anddissemination
ofintelligence.Itsoundedimpressive,butinfacttheCIG'sbudgetandpersonnelwere
drawnfromWar,Navy,andState,whichmeantthattheolddepartmentsretainedtheir
autonomyovertheirownintelligenceoperationsandthushadcontrolovertheCIG.6
Thiswasanobviouslyunsatisfactorysituation.Themilitaryintelligenceservicesjealously
guardedtheirsourceswhilecontinuingtoinsistontheirrighttoprovidepolicyguidance
tothePresident.InthewordsofalaterSenatecommittee,themilitarytherebymadethe
"CIG'Sprimarymissionanexerciseinfutility."7Notonlywouldthearmedservicesnot
provideinformationonoverseasevents,theywouldnoteventelltheCIGwhatAmerican
capabilitiesandintentionswere.TheStateDepartmentwasequallyunwillingtocooperate
withtheCIG.FromtheWhiteHousepointofview,by1947America'sintelligence
organizationswerenobettercoordinated,normoreprofessional,thantheyhadbeenin
1941.ItwasasiftherewerenolessonstobelearnedfromPearlHarbor.
Changewasclearlyneeded.ItcameinJuly1947withthepassageoftheNationalSecurity
Act,abroadlybasedpieceoflegislationthatestablishedthebasicdefenseorganizationfor
theUnitedStatesfortheColdWar.TheactseparatedtheAirForcefromtheArmy,gave
theJointChiefsofStaffastatutorybasis,madeanattempttointegratetheservicesby
creatingtheofficeofSecretaryofDefense,andprovidedthePresidentwithacommittee
responsibledirectlytohim,theNationalSecurityCouncil(NSC).
OnepartoftheactchangedthenameofCIGtoCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)and,
moreimportant,madeitanindependentdepartment,responsibletotheNSC(andthus
directlytothePresident),nottotheSecretaryofDefense.Theactassignedfivegeneral
taskstotheCIA:(1)toadvisetheNSConmattersrelatedtonationalsecurity;(2)tomake
recommendationstotheNSCregardingthecoordinationofintelligenceactivitiesofthe
departments;(3)tocorrelateandevaluateintelligenceandprovideforitsap
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propriatedissemination;(4)tocarryout"serviceofcommonconcern,"and(5)"to
performsuchotherfunctionsanddutiesrelatedtointelligenceaffectingthenational
securityastheNSCwillfromtimetotimedirect."8
ThelastfunctionwasdecisiveingivingtheCIAamajorandcontroversialroleinthe
ColdWar.Ithadbeenhotlydebatedandwasdeliberatelywordedvaguelybecauseneither
theExecutivenortheLegislativebranchofgovernmentcouldbringthemselvesto
forthrightlyadvocateorauthorizecovertactionsbytheCIA.AsGeorgeKennanofthe
StateDepartmentlaterrecalled,"WewerealarmedattheinroadsoftheRussianinfluence
inWesternEuropebeyondthepointwheretheRussiantroopshadreached.Andwewere
alarmedparticularlyoverthesituationinFranceandItaly.WefeltthattheCommunists
wereusingtheveryextensivefundsthattheythenhadinhandtogaincontrolofkey
elementsoflifeinFranceandItaly,particularlythepublishingcompanies,thepress,the
laborunions,studentorganizations,women'sorganizations,andallsortoforganizations
ofthatsort,togaincontrolofthemandusethemasfrontorganizations....
"ThatwasjustoneexamplethatIrecallofwhywethoughtthatweoughttohavesome
facilityforcovertoperations."9
Combiningintelligencegatheringandcovertactionsinoneagencyrepresentedavictory
fortheDonovanheritage,asEdmondTaylor,anOSSveteran,pointedoutin1969.The
OSS,Taylorwrote,established"aprecedent,orapattern,forUnitedStatesinterventionin
therevolutionarystrugglesofthepostwarage.TheDonovaninfluenceonU.S.foreign
andmilitarypolicyhascontinuedtobefelteversincehisdeath;forgoodorillhelefta
lastingmarkonthenation'spowerelite.Howeverindirectly,manyofourlatter-dayCold
Warsuccesses,disasters,andentrapmentscanultimatelybetracedbacktohim."10
AnotherOSSveteran,FrancisMiller,agreed."TheCIA,"hewrotein1971,"inherited
fromDonovanhislopsidedandmischievouspreoccupationwithactionandtheBayof
Pigswasoneoftheresultsofthatlegacy."11
Accordingtocritics,assigningtheCIAacovertactionresponsibilitywasatwofold
mistake.First,itgavelicensetoanagencyoftheU.S.Governmenttocarryout
operationsthatwereclearlyillegaland,moreoftenthannot,counterproductive.Sabotage
andsubversionwereonethinginwartime,anotheraltogetherduringaperiodofgeneral
peace.
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Trumanhimselfspoketothispointin1963,whenhedeclaredinasyndicatednewspaper
interview,"ForsometimeIhavebeendisturbedbythewayCIAhasbeendivertedfrom
itsoriginalassignment.Ithasbecomeanoperationalandattimesapolicy-makingarmof
thegovernment....
"IneverhadanythoughtthatwhenIsetuptheCIAthatitwouldbeinjectedinto
peacetimecloak-and-daggeroperations.Someofthecomplicationsandembarrassment
thatIthinkwehaveexperiencedareinpartattributabletothefactthatthisquiet
intelligencearmofthePresidenthasbeenremovedfromitsintendedrolethatitisbeing
interpretedasasymbolofsinisterandmysteriousforeignintrigue-andasubjectforcold
warenemypropaganda."12
KennanechoedTruman'scomplaint."ItendedupwiththeestablishmentwithinCIAofa
branch,anofficeforactivitiesofthisnature,andonewhichemployedagreatmany
people,"hedeclaredin1975."ItdidnotworkoutatallthewayIhadconceivedit...."
Kennansaidhehadthought"thatthiswouldbeafacilitywhichcouldbeusedwhenand
ifanoccasionarosewhenitmightbeneeded.Theremightbeyearswhenwewouldn't
havetodoanythinglikethis.Butiftheoccasionarosewewantedsomebodyinthe
Governmentwhowouldhavethefunds,theexperience,theexpertisetodothesethings
andtodotheminaproperway."13
Theseconderrorincombiningintelligencegatheringandcovertoperationswasthat,
inevitably,covertops(astheycametobeknown)tookprecedenceoverintelligence
collection,especiallyinthemindofthedirectoroftheCIA.Theonewasdull,scholarly,
painstakingwork;theotherwasexcitinganddramatic,providingimmediateandtangible
benefitsandgivingitspractitionersprestigeandglamour.Thus,criticscharge,the
irresistibletendencyintheCIAhasbeentoconcentrateonthesensationalcovertaction
ratherthanthepractical,butfarmoreimportant,taskofcollectingandanalyzing
information.
Initsfirstthreeyears,underAdmiralRoscoeHillenkoetterasDirectorofCentral
Intelligence(DCI),theCIAengagedinafewselectedcovertactivities.Thefirstwasan
interventionintotheItalianelectionsofApril1948.TherewasagreatfearinWashington
thatItalywasonthevergeofgoingCommunist,bypopularvote,whichwouldhavebeen
anabsolutedisasterforAmericanforeignpolicy,apolicybasedonTruman'scontainment
doctrine(an
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nouncedin1947)andtheMarshallPlanforEuropeanrecovery.Dominoeswerenotyet
beingusedasananalogy,butAssistantSecretaryofStateDeanAchesondidspeakabout
rottenapplesinfectingthewholebarrel.IfItalywentCommunist,Achesonargued,then
Francewouldgo,andthenWestGermany,andthentheLowCountries,andthenBritain.
Americawouldstandalone,anislandinaCommunistworld.
TheCommunistcoupinCzechoslovakiainFebruary1948wastheeventthatshockedthe
freeworldintoaction.NearlyeveryonerememberedHitlerandMunichtenyearsearlier,
andfearedthattheRedArmywasabouttomarchacrossEurope,astheWehrmachthad
done.
Withthestakessohigh,nowondertheTrumanadministrationdecidedtoact,especially
sincethisfirstactionwasbenign("benign"inthesensethatitwasdonenottooverthrow
anexistinggovernmentbuttosupportit).TheRussianswereknowntobepouring
moneyintothetreasuryoftheItalianCommunistParty;whatcouldbemorenaturalthan
anefforttocounterthatprogram?TheNSCrecommendedtoTrumanthattheUnited
Statesprovidecampaignfundsforthepro-WesternChristianDemocraticParty.Truman
acceptedtherecommendationandauthorizedtheCIAtocontributeaboutonemillion
dollarstotheChristianDemocrats.Whentheywontheelection,theCIAnaturallytook
creditforthevictory.14
Whatabargain!Forapaltrymilliondollars,ItalyandWesternEuropeweresaved.Orso
atleasttheCIAcouldanddidargue.Itwasacautious,conservativeventureintocovert
ops,butitwasastart.
Thenextyear,1949,CongresspassedtheCentralIntelligenceAgencyAct,which
exemptedtheCIAfromallfederallawsrequiringthedisclosureorthe"functions,names,
officialtitles,salaries,ornumbersofpersonnelemployedbytheAgency,"andgavethe
DCIpowertospendmoney"withoutregardtotheprovisionsoflawandregulations
relatingtotheexpenditureofgovernmentfunds...suchexpenditurestobeaccounted
forsolelyonthecertificateofthedirector."15
Withunlimitedfundsavailable,andnoaccountingrequired,theCIAbegansecretlyto
subsidizedemocraticorganizationsthroughoutWesternEuropelaborunions,political
parties,magazines,newspapers,professionalassociations,andsoforth.Overall,
Page169
theassistanceprogramwasagreatsuccess,enthusiasticallysupportedbythosefew
congressmenwhoknewaboutitandbyeveryPresidentfromTrumantoNixon.
ButtheCIA'smainreasonforexistencewasnottoprovideafunnelforpouringmoney
intothehandsofAmerica'sEuropeanallies-itwas,rather,toprovideearlywarningofa
Sovietattack.WhatcametoseemabsurdtolatergenerationsthattheRedArmywould
oneday,withoutwarningorprovocation,crosstheElbeRiverandmarchintoWestern
Europeseemedin1948tobenotonlypossiblebutevenprobable.Thatfatefulyearof
1948,theyearoftheCzechcoupandtheItalianelectionsandtheMarshallPlan,alsosaw
Stalin'sattempttodrivetheWestoutofBerlinbyimposingablockadeontheGerman
capital.Inanowfamoustelegram,GeneralLuciusClay,Ike'ssuccessorascommanderof
AmericanforcesinGermany,declared,"Withinthelastfewweeks,Ihavefeltasubtle
changeinSovietattitudewhichIcannotdefinebutwhichnowgivesmeafeelingthatit
[war]maycomewithdramaticsuddenness."16
The1948warscareenhancedtheCIA'sgrowingreputation.U.S.Armyintelligenceflatly
predictedanimminentSovietinvasion,"imminent"meaningwithinamatterofweeks,if
notdays.TheCIAdissented.Intheagency'sview,basedonitsinformation,drawn
mainlyfromagentsbehindtheIronCurtain,theRedArmywasnotreadytomarch.There
wasnoneedtopanic.TimeprovedtheCIAanalysiscorrect.
TogetadvanceinformationonSovietintentions,theCIAbeganaprogramofoverflights
ofEasternEuropeandtheSovietUnion.Big,lumberingC-47swouldparachuteagents
behindtheenemylines.TheagentswerepoliticalrefugeesfromHungary,
Czechoslovakia,Poland,andelsewhere,menwillingtorisktheirlivestofight
communism.TheirmainfunctionwastoprovideinformationonSoviettroop
movements,mobilizationactivities,andothermilitaryintelligence.Thisprogram,
accordingtotheagentincharge,"wasneverclearedwiththeDepartmentofState,though
presumablyitwaswiththePresident,andonlyintheearlyfiftieswastheSecretaryof
Stateinformed."17Ofcourse,theRussiansknewabouttheillegaloverflights,whichwere
moniteredbySovietgroundcrews.Occasionallytheyshotatsome,buttheC-47s
survivedeveryflight.
Toalmosteveryone'ssurprise,theCommunistoffensive,when
Page170
itcameinJune1950,wasnotincentralEuropebutinAsia,andwasnotmountedbythe
RussiansbutbytheNorthKoreans.TheCIAfailedtopredicttheattack,butitsexcuse
wasunassailableGeneralDouglasMacArthur,commandingAmericanforcesintheFar
East,refusedtoallowtheCIAtooperateinhistheater,justashehadshutouttheOSS
duringWorldWarII.Whenthewarstarted,MacArthurreluctantlygavetheCIA
permissiontooperateinKorea,andagentswereair-droppedbehindenemylines,mainly
KoreansbutincludingsomeAmericans.Onesuchagentwasaformerhigh-ranking
ChineseNationalistofficerwhoparachutedontothemainlandinthelatesummerof1950.
HisdetailedreportsonthenumberanddistributionofChineseCommunisttroopsalong
theManchurian-NorthKoreanbordergaveafairwarningoftheimminentCommunist
crossingoftheYaluRiverinNovember1950.
Nevertheless,MacArthurwascaughtbysurpriseagain.Hisownoverconfidencewasthe
majorreason,buthelaterdeniedhavingseenanyCIAreportsofaChinesebuildupalong
theYalu.Trumancontradictedthegeneral.Hestatedpubliclythathehadseenandread
CIAreportsonChinesetroopconcentrationsalongtheYalu.18
MacArthurwasbynomeanstheCIA'sonlyfoewithintheAmericanpowerstructure.J.
EdgarHooverwaspredictablyunhappywiththenewlycreatedagency.WhentheCIA
exerciseditsrightsandreplacedtheFBInetworkinLatinAmerica,Hoovertoldhismen
theretodestroytheirintelligencefilesratherthanbequeaththemtotheCIA.Itwasareal
"scorchedearth"policy,accordingtoHowardHunt,whohadtopickupthepiecesin
MexicoCity.19HooveralsopromotedchargesthattheCommunistshadpenetratedthe
CIA,witholddo-goodersandone-worldersfromtheOSSleadingtheway.
Partlytocountersuchcharges,in1950TrumanappointedWalterBedellSmith,Ike's
wartimechiefofstaff,asDCI.Smithwasaboutasright-wingasaprofessionalarmy
officerwaseverlikelytoget."Iknowyouwon'tbelievethis,"anex-CIAagentlater
declared,"butSmithoncewarnedEisenhowerthat[Nelson]Rockefellerwasa
Communist."20
PreciselybecausehewassoextremeontheCommunistissue,Smithwasabrilliant
choiceasDCI.SenatorJosephR.McCarthyhadlaunchedhisanti-Communistcrusade
earlierin1950,andhad
Page171
indicatedinanumberofwaysthatwhenhehadfinishedwiththeStateDepartmenthe
intendedtoturnhisattentiontotheCIA.Smith'sappointmenthelpedpacifyMcCarthy,as
didtheappointmentofotherright-wingers,suchasCharlesBlack,husbandofformer
childmoviestarShirleyTemple,andJamesBurnham,lateraneditoronWilliam
Buckley'sNationalReview.BuckleyhimselfwasMcCarthy'schiefintellectualdefender,
co-authorofMcCarthyandHisEnemies.21
SmithbroughtmoretothejobthananabilitytoappeaseMcCarthy.Blunt,curt,
outspoken,astrongandheavyuserofcursewords,Smithwasabureaucrat'sbureaucrat.
Heknewpreciselywhentomakeadecision,whentosayno,whentosaymaybe,whento
buckthedecisiononuptohisboss.Althoughhewasalmostunknownoutsidethetop
militaryandgovernmentalcircles,whereitcountedhisreputationwasalmostashighas
thatofEisenhowerhimself.
Smithdidnotsufferfoolsgladly,nordelays,norexcuses,norshoddyperformance.He
didsufferfromulcersthatproducedalmostcontinuousandnearlyunbearablepain,
whichhelpedexplainwhyhisfaceseemedalwaystobepinchedtogetherinacrabby
grimace.Physicallysmallandtoothin,heneverthelessterrifiedhissubordinatesand
associates.Theoverallimpressionwasofaverysour,veryaggressive,veryselfconfident,veryintelligentman.SummingupSmith'spersonality,Ikeoncetoldthiswriter,
referringtoSmith'sethnicstock,"YouhavetoalwayskeepinmindthatBeetleisa
Prussian."22AsPresident,IketookgreatdelightinseeingBeetlegotoMoscowasthe
Americanambassador."Itservedthosebastardsright,"Ikecommented,ashegrinnedat
theideaoftheKremlinhavingtoputupwithSmith.23
TheCIA,underSmith,becamemoreaggressiveincollectinginformation,inpressingits
viewsonthePresident,andinconceivingandconductingcovertoperations.Itwasnot,
however,givenovercompletelytotheright-wing,orotherwisesurrenderedtoMcCarthy
andhisfriends.ThiswasprimarilybecauseofAllenDulles,whoSmithselectedin1951
ashisdeputydirector.
LikeSmith,DulleshademergedfromWorldWarIIwithareputation,amonginsiders,as
oneofthebestmenAmericaproducedinthestruggleagainsttheNazis.Fifty-eightyears
oldatthetimeofhisselection,Dulles'backgroundwaswell-nighperfectforhisnewjob.
ThesonofaPresbyterianminister,hehadstudiedatAuburn,
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NewYork,Paris,andPrinceton,wherehegraduatedin1914.Aftershortstintsteachingat
missionaryschoolsinIndia,China,andJapan,hejoinedthediplomaticservicein1916,
servinginViennaandBerneasanintelligenceofficer.Hemoveduprapidly,asdidhis
olderbrotherJohnFosterDulles,inpartnodoubtbecausetheirgrandfatherhadbeen
BenjaminHarrison'sSecretaryofState,whileanunclehadheldthesamepostunder
WoodrowWilson.TheDullesbrothersweretogetherinParisin1919asmembersofthe
AmericandelegationtotheVersaillesPeaceConference.
In1920,AllenDullesmarriedCloverTodd,thedaughterofaColumbiaUniversity
professor.Theyhadoneson,whowaswoundedandpermanentlydisabledintheKorean
War.In1926,afterserviceinBerlin,Constantinople,andWashington,Dullesleftthe
diplomaticservicetojoinhisbrotherinthefamousWallStreetfirmofSullivanand
Cromwell,specialistsininternationallawcorporatepractice.WithSullivanand
Cromwell,Dullesworkedonadaily,intimatebasiswiththepoliticalandindustrialelite
ofEuropeandtheUnitedStates.
IntheirworkatSullivanandCromwell,theDullesbrotherscametoknowtheworldand
itscommerceaswellasanymenliving.Althoughtheysharedacommonworkload,they
werenotmuchalike.WilliamMacomber,whoworkedforboth,saidthat''Allenfromthe
beginningwaslessintellectualandmoreoutgoing.Hehadamoredevelopedpersonality,
awarmpersonality."JohnFosterDulleswasmoreold-fashioned,agentlemanoftheold
school."Healwaysmeasuredwithahandkerchiefonaglobe,that'showhemeasuredthe
distance.Healwayssharpenedhisownpencils.Incredible.Healwaysfinishedthejob
withapocketknife.Whenhewasalittleboyhisfatherorhisgrandfatherwouldaskifhe
werecarryinghisknife;andifhewascarryingithegotapenny,ifheweren'tcarryingit
heowedapenny.Hewasbroughtuptothinkitimportantforamantocarryapocket
knife."
BoththeDullesbrothershadgout,"terriblegout,"butJohnFosterneverfailedtotakehis
pillsonschedule,whileAllen"wasalwayshavingtrouble,becausehewouldforgetto
takehispills....AllenDullesdidn'thavethebrillianceofeitherhissisterorhisbrother,
buthehadaperfectlygoodsetofbrains."
Bothmenwerealittlesoft,dumpy,nonathletic.Huge,perfectlyroundeyeglassesgave
themanowlishappearance.Allenhadthinninghair,alargeforehead,blackbushy
eyebrows,aprominent
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nose,andastrong,juttingchin.Allen'spipe,whichhewasconstantlylighting,peering
over,orwavingaroundtomakeapoint,gavehimtheappearanceofaPrinceton
professor,perhapsofhistoryorpoliticalscience.Hehadagraymustache,twinklinggray
eyes,aboominglaugh,andanadvancedsenseofironythataddedtotheimpressionofa
detachedintellectual.JohnFosterhadmoreofagigglethanalaugh.WhereAllentended
towardtweedy,IvyLeagueclothes,JohnFosterfavoredsevere,double-breasted,
conservativesuits,givingtheappearanceofasuccessfulbanker.
HowardHuntrememberedAllenDullesas"amanwhowasphysicallyimposing.Hehad
averylargehead,almostwhitehair,asortofaTeddyRooseveltmustache."Dulles
inspiredgreatloyaltyandaffectionamongallthosewhoworkedforhim.Toaman,they
praisedhimalmosttoexcess,eventwentyyearsafterhelefttheCIA.Huntsaid,"Hewas
oneofthemostthoughtful,kindlymenthatIhaveeverknown.Infact,Ican'tthink,with
theexceptionofmyownfatherIcan'tthinkofanybodymoredeservingofsucha
description."RichardBissell,whowasintheCIAforovertwodecades,said,"Ican't
thinkofanybodyintheagencywhodidn'tlikeAllen.Everyonebothlikedandadmired
him.Whichisquiteatributeoveraperiodofyears."
MacomberrecalledthatAllenwasmuchmoreinformalthanJohnFoster.In1951hewent
toseeAlleninhisCIAoffice."AllenDullesinthosedayswasnumbertwo,BeetleSmith
wasone,andAllenwasdeputydirector.Buthewaseminentenoughforme.Iremember
goinginthere,andmybosssatdown,andthefirstthingIknewheputhisfeetupon
AllenDulles'desk.Theonlypersonwhoseemedtonoticeitwasme."24
Becauseofhisvastexperienceandinnumerablecontacts,AllenDulleswasanatural
choiceforthejobassignedtohimbyDonovanwhenWorldWarIIbegan,chiefofthe
OSSmissioninSwitzerland.Hisdiplomaticcoverwasasanassistanttotheministerin
theAmericanLegation,butinfactheoperatedhisintelligencegroupfromafifteenthcenturyhouseinBerneoverlookingtheAarRiver.
Asamasterspy,Dullesgotmorecreditthanhedeserved.Hewaspraisedfortwo
outstandingaccomplishmentsthepenetrationoftheAbwehr,Hitler'sintelligenceservice,
andasthemanresponsibleforthesurrenderofGermantroopsinItaly.Infact,inboth
cases,Dulleswasmerelyconvenient.TheAbwehrhardlyneeded
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penetrating,asitshead,thebumblingAdmiralCanaris,allbutshovedtop-secretmaterial
intoDulles'hands,andFieldMarshalKesselringturnedtoDullestoarrangethesurrender
ofhisforces,notbecauseDulleswasbrilliant,butbecausehewasthere.
Everyoneknewhewasthere,accordingtoKennethStrong,whichwouldnormallybe
regardedasadisastertoaspy,butwhichinDulles'casewasaboon.Thepublicityhe
receivedhelpedhimaccomplishhistaskbecause,Strongpointsout,"oftenthedifficulty
withinformantsisthattheyhavenoideawheretotaketheirinformation.What
SwitzerlandneededduringWorldWarIIwasawell-knownmarketforintelligence,and
thisiswhatDullesprovided."Indeed,hewas"beseigedbyamultitudeofinformants,"
whichhelpedhimaddtohiswidenetworkofcontactsandspiesthroughoutEurope.
UnlikeSmith,Dulleswassoft-spoken,polite,easygoing.Hehad,Strongrecalled,"an
infectious,gustylaugh,whichalwaysseemedtoenteraroomwithhim."WhereSmith
wasbluntanddirect,Dullesseemedalmostscatterbrained."EvenwhenIcametoknow
himbetterinlateryears,"Strongwrote,"Iwasseldomabletopenetratebeyondhislaugh,
ortoconductanyseriousprofessionalconversationwithhimformorethanafew
sentences."25
Buttherewas,Strongalsonoted,"acertainhardnessinhischaracter."Hewasagreat
believerinthepossibilitiesofcovertoperations.RobertAnderson,Eisenhower's
SecretaryoftheNavy,regardedhimas"oneofthegreatintelligencefiguresinthe
century.AndIthinklargelybecauseheloveditso."26Strongsaidhewas"thelastofthe
greatIntelligenceofficerswhosestock-in-tradeconsistedofsecretsandmysteries.He
mightwithoutdisrespectbedescribedasthelastgreatRomanticofIntelligence."27
DulleswasSmith'soppositeinmanyways,includingpolitics.Itusuallycomesasa
surprisetoAmericanstolearnthattheirmostfamousDirectorofCentralIntelligencewas
aliberalbuthewas.WhileSmithwasbringingMcCarthy'sfriendsintotheCIA,Dulles
wasjustasbusybringingliberalsonboard.OneCIAnewcomerrecruitedbyDulleswas
WilliamSloaneCoffin,laterchaplainofYaleUniversityandaleadingdoveduringthe
VietnamWar.AnotherliberalwasaDartmouthCollegeprofessorofEnglish,artmuseum
director,andOSSveteran,ThomasBraden.LymanKirkpatrickwasathird.Tracey
BarnesandRichardBissellwereothers.
UndertheinfluenceofDullesandhisrecruits,theCIAextended
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itsfinancialsupportofforeignorganizationstothenon-Communistpoliticalleft.Braden
laterrecalled,"Intheearly1950s,whentheColdWarwasreallyhot,theideathat
CongresswouldhaveapprovedmanyofourprojectswasaboutaslikelyastheJohn
BirchSociety'sapprovingMedicare.Iremember,forexample,thetimeItriedtobringmy
oldfriendPaulHenri-SpaakofBelgiumtotheU.S.tohelpoutinoneoftheCIA
operations."AllenDullesmentionedSpaak'sproposedjourneytotheSenateMajority
Leader,WilliamF.KnowlandofCalifornia,oneofMcCarthy'schiefsupporters.
"Why,"thesenatorsaid,"theman'sasocialist."
"Yes,"Dullesreplied,"andtheheadofhisparty.Butyoudon'tknowEuropethewayI
do,Bill.InmanyEuropeancountries,asocialistisroughlyequivalenttoaRepublican."
"Idon'tcare,"Knowlandgrowled."Wearen'tgoingtobringanysocialistsoverhere."28
RichardBissell,aFordFoundationofficialwhojoinedtheCIA,wherehehada
spectacularcareer,andwhocharacterizedhimselfasaneasternliberal,laterremembered
theagencyintheearlyfiftiesas"aplacewheretherewasstillintellectualfermentand
challengeandthingsgoingon."Itwastheonegovernmentalagencythatwasnotrunning
scaredfromMcCarthy,andassuchitattractedsomeofAmerica'sbestandbrightest
youngmen.29TheCIAwasthegoodwaytofightcommunism.McCarthyismwasthebad
way.
Smith,thehard-boiledmilitaryman,wassomethingofaMcCarthyite,lookingfor
Communistsunderhisbedatnight.Attheheightofthe1952presidentialelection
campaign,hetoldacongressionalcommittee,"IbelievethereareCommunistsinmyown
organization.IdoeverythingIcantodetectthem,butIammorallycertain,sinceyouare
askingthequestion,thatthereare."30
AllenDullesrefusedtojoinawitchhunt.JohnFosterDulleswasagreatdisappointment
tomanycareerForeignServiceofficersbecausehefailedtoprotecttheStateDepartment
fromMcCarthy.AllenwasaherotoCIAagentspreciselybecausehedidstandupto
McCarthy.AfterIkemadehimtheDCI,Allenwarnedhisemployeesthathewouldfire
anyonewhowenttoMcCarthywithleaksoraccusationsagainstagencyemployees.He
alsopersuadedEisenhowertohaveVicePresidentRichardNixongotoMcCarthyto
pressurethesenatortodrophisplanforapublicinvestigationof
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CommunistinfiltrationintotheCIA.*Asoneresult,throughoutIke'sterminoffice
moraleintheCIAwasexcellent,insharpcontrasttotheStateDepartment.Therelaxed,
freethinkingatmosphereDullescreatedwasdeeplyappreciated.31
InsumminguphisimpressionsoftheDullesbrothers,Bissellsaid,"Theywerequite
differenttemperamentally....Allenwasamoreopenperson....Hewasawarmer,more
outgoingindividual,andIthinkheinspiredmuchmoreloyalty.Iadmiredcertainaspects
ofFosterDullesverymuch.Hewasatoughman,onoccasionaverycourageousperson.
Hedidn'tchoosetodeployhiscouragemuchagainstMcCarthy,andIneverlikedthat
aspect."32
WithAllenDullesinplaceintheCIA,youngidealistsjoinedthe"Company,"underwent
theirtraining,andthensalliedforthtosavetheworld.Itwasallsupersecret,
superexciting,supernecessary.ProfessorsatYale,Harvard,andotherprestigious
institutionsrecommendedtheirbeststudentstotheCIA,andtheagencykeptexpanding.
UndertheSmith-Dullesteam,theCIAcovertactioncapabilityskyrocketed.TheOfficeof
PolicyCoordination(OPC),thebranchoftheAgencyinchargeofsuchactivities,leaped
fromatotalpersonnelstrengthof302in1949to2,812in1952,withanadditional3,142
overseascontractpersonnel.In1949,OPC'sbudgetwas$4.7million;by1952itwas$82
million,anearlytwentyfoldincrease.In1949,OPChadsevenforeignstations;by1952it
hadforty-sevensuchstations.33
Thatwasalotofpeopleturnedloosewithanawfullotofmoney.Andtheattitudein
OPCwasanearlyversionoftheinfamous"bodycount"inVietnamagentswerejudged
bythenumberofprojectstheyinitiatedandmanaged.Therewasviciousinternal
competitionbetweenagentsoverwhocouldstartthemostprojects.By1952therewere
fortydifferentcovert-actionprojectsunderwayinonecentralEuropeancountryalone.34
FormeragentVictorMarchettipointsoutthat"onereason,perhapsthemostimportant,
thattheagencytendedtoconcentratelargelyoncovert-actionoperationswasthefactthat
intheareaoftraditionalespionage(thecollectionofintelligencethroughspies)
*McCarthywasafterWilliamBundy,amemberoftheCIA'sBoardofNationalEstimatesandDean
Acheson'sson-in-law.Bundy,itseemed,hadcontributed$400totheAlgerHissDefenseFund.
Page177
theCIAwasabletoaccomplishlittleagainsttheprincipalenemy,theSovietUnion.With
itsclosedsociety,theU.S.S.R.provedvirtuallyimpenetrable."35
TheEastEuropeansatellitesweresomewhateasiertopenetrate,orsoatleastOPCliked
tothink.IntheearlySmith-Dullesyears,theCIAsetupavastundergroundapparatusin
Poland.Millionsofdollarsingoldwereshippedthereininstallments.Agentsinside
Polandusedradio,invisibleink,andotherclassicspymethodstogetreportsbacktotheir
controllersinWestBerlin.ThesePolishoperativescontinuallyaskedforadditionalagents
andmoregold;onoccasionanagentwouldslipouttomakeadirectreportonprogress,
andaskforevenmoreagentsandmoney.
Itwasagreatachievement,orsotheCIAthought,untillatein1952whentoitschagrin
theagencydiscoveredthatitwasallahoax.ThePolishsecretservicehadalmostfromthe
beginningcooptedtheentirenetwork.TherewasnorealCIAundergroundinPoland.
ThePoleskepttheoperationgoinginordertolureantiCommunistPolishexilesbackinto
theirhomeland,wheretheywerepromptlythrownintoprisonorelserunbycontrollers,
justastheBritishhadrunGermanspiesintheDouble-CrossSystem.Intheprocess,
Marchettiwrites,"thePoleswereabletobilktheCIAofmillionsofdollarsingold."36
Suchacontretempswouldhavebeenamajorembarrassment,atbest,foranyother
governmentagency,buttheCIAcouldshrugitoffbecause,intruth,almostnoonein
authoritywantedtoknowthedetailsofwhattheCIAwasdoing.Onthisoccasion,Dulles
calledintheagentsresponsible,askedsomesomberquestions,gottheshockinganswers,
puffedonhispipe,andfinallyrosefromhischairtogofaceanexecutivesessionof
SenatorRichardRussell'sArmedServicesCommittee.
"Well"Dullesshrugged"IguessI'llhavetofudgethetruthalittle."Hiseyestwinkledatthe
word"fudge,"accordingtoTomBraden,whowasthere.Thenheturnedseriousashe
pulledhisoldtweedtopcoatoverhisroundedshoulders."I'lltellthetruthtoDick
[Russell].Ialwaysdo.''Thenthetwinklereturned,andheadded,withachuckle,"Thatis,
ifDickwantstoknow."ButDickdidnotwanttoknow,eitherthenorlater,ashepublicly
statedonanumberofoccasions.37
ItmaybethatTruman,too,didnotwanttoknow.Thatcouldbetheexplanationforhis
statement,"Ineverhadanythought
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whenIsetupCIAthatitwouldbeinjectedintopeacetimecloakanddaggeroperations."
InApril1964,AllenDulleschallengedtheformerPresidentonthatremark,reminding
TrumanofvariouscovertoperationsthattheCIAcarriedoutduringhisterm.Another
explanationisthatTrumanwasmisquoted,andathirdhasitthathewasinhiseightiesby
thattimeandmaynothavebeenresponsibleforwhathewassaying.Inanyevent,much
ashemayhavedislikeddirtytricksand"Gestapo"tactics,itisabundantlyclearthatthe
CIAwasfullyinvolvedinsuchactivitiesduringhispresidency.38
Kennan,too,mayhavehopedthattheCIAwouldmerelybeafundingagencyfor
friendlyoverseasorganizations,buteventuallyhealmostcertainlyhadtoknowbetter.
Thatis,ifhewantedtoknow.
Thepointis,asnotedbytheChurchCommittee,that"by1953theagencyhadachieved
thebasicstructureandscaleitretainedforthenexttwentyyears."39CreatedbyTruman,
shapedbySmithandDulles,itwasoneofEisenhower'schiefassetswhenhebecame
President"theStateDepartmentforunfriendlycountries,"asAllenDullesoncedescribed
it.LikeULTRAortheDouble-CrossSystemortheFrenchResistance,itwasaweapon
availabletotheCommanderinChiefforthelifeordeathstruggleforfreedomand
democracyaroundtheworld.40
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PARTTWO
THEPRESIDENCY
Page181
ChapterThirteen
PresidentEisenhowerandtheCommunistMenace
JUNE19,1953.DemonstratorsmarchupanddowninfrontoftheWhiteHouse,their
signspleadingwiththePresidenttograntexecutiveclemencytoJuliusandEthel
Rosenberg,whohavebeensentencedtodeathforgivingatomicsecretstothe
Russians.
December2,1953.SecretaryofDefenseCharlesWilsoncallsthePresidentonthe
telephonetoinformhimthatJ.EdgarHooverhasjustsenthimchargesthatitis"more
likelythannotthatJ.RobertOppenheimerisaCommunistspy."
January15,1954.SenatorMikeMansfieldintroducesaresolutiontocreatea"Joint
CongressionalOversightCommitteefortheAmericanClandestineService."
ThemannerinwhichIkedealtwiththesethreeincidentsisthemeasureofhowgravely
heregardedtheCommunistthreattotheUnitedStates,andoftheimportanceheattached
toespionageandcounterespionageactivities.Allinvolvedharddecisionsthathadtobe
madeonthebasisofwhatthePresidentthoughtwasbestforthecountry.
TheRosenbergcasewasonEisenhower'sdeskwhenhetookoffice.1JuliusandEthel
RosenbergweremembersoftheCommunistParty,U.S.A.,andallegedlyatthecenterofa
Sovietspyring.DavidGreenglass,Ethel'sbrother,hadworkedasamachinistonthe
ManhattanProject,andinJanuary1945hesupposedlygavetheRosenbergsrough
drawingsofthedetonatingdevicefortheatomicbomb(howtosetoffanatomicbomb
hadbeenoneofthe
Page182
mostvexingproblemsoftheManhattanProject).Laterin1945,viaacouriernamedHarry
Gold,GreenglassgavetheRosenbergsdrawingsofthebombitself,alongwith
explanatorynotes.
Fouryearslater,theRussiansexplodedtheirfirstatomicdevice.Shortlythereafter,in
England,KlausFuchsconfessedtoespionagefortheSovietUnion.Heputthefingeron
Gold,whointurnnamedGreenglass.InJune1950,Greenglassconfessed.Henamedthe
Rosenbergs.Greenglassgotafifteen-yearsentence,Goldgotthirtyyears,whilein
England,Fuchswassentencedtofourteenyears.
ButtheRosenbergspleadednotguilty.Theyweretried,foundguilty,andsentencedto
deathonthechargeofespionage.*Theyappealed,unsuccessfully,totheSupremeCourt.
ByJanuaryof1953,whenIketookoffice,theRosenbergs'onlyhopewasexecutive
clemency.
Communistsandtheirfellowtravelers,joinedbyinnumerableliberalsandsuch
luminariesasMartinBuber,PopePiusXII,AlbertEinstein,andBertrandRussell,
launchedacampaigntoconvinceIketostaytheexecution.Theychargedthatthe
Rosenbergshadbeenframed,thattheirdeathsentencewastheresultofanti-Semitism
andrunawayMcCarthyism.TheystageddemonstrationsinAmericaandaroundthe
world.Humanitarians,meanwhile,objectedtotheseverityofthesentence.Greenglass,
Gold,andFuchshadgottenoffwiththeirlives,andevenwithoutlifeimprisonment.In
addition,theRosenbergshadtwosmallboys.SomeofIke'smosttrustedadviserstold
himhewouldhavetograntastayofexecutionbecausethenationsimplycouldnotputto
deaththemotherofsmallchildren.ManyintheCabinetrecommendedclemency.2
Ikeneverthelessdecidedtoallowtheexecutionstobecarriedout.Heexpressedhis
reasonsinprivateletterstohissonJohnandtoaColumbiaUniversityfriend,Clyde
Miller.ToJohnhewrote,"Imustsaythatitgoesagainstthegraintoavoidinterferingin
thecasewhereawomanistoreceivecapitalpunishment.Overagainst
*TheRosenbergcaseisalmosttheAmericanDreyfusaffair.Ithasexcitedmorecontroversythan
theHisscase,andcontinuestodoso.In1979TheNewRepublic(June23)publishedanarticlethat
contendedthatJuliuswasinvolvedinaCommunistespionagering,whileEthelalthoughcertainlyan
activeCommunistwasinnocentofanyspying.Thearticlebroughtforthavirtualavalancheofangry
lettersfrombothsides(seetheAugust4,1979,issueofTheNewRepublic).Thereisaveryactive
NationalCommitteetoReopentheRosenbergCase.
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this,however,mustbeplacedoneortwofactsthathavegreatsignificance.Thefirstof
theseisthatinthisinstanceitisthewomanwhoisthestrongandrecalcitrantcharacter,
themanistheweakone.Shehasobviouslybeentheleaderineverythingtheydidinthe
spyring.Thesecondthingisthatiftherewouldbeanycommutingofthewoman's
sentencewithouttheman'sthenfromhereontheSovietswouldsimplyrecruittheirspies
fromamongwomen."
ToMiller:"AstoanyinterventionbasedonconsiderationofAmerica'sreputationor
standingintheworld,youhavegiventhecaseforoneside.Whatyoudidnotsuggest
wastheneedforconsideringthiskindofargumentoverandagainsttheknown
convictionsofCommunistleadersthatfreegovernmentsandespeciallytheAmerican
governmentarenotoriouslyweakandfearfulandthatconsequentlysubversiveandother
kindsofactivitycanbeconductedagainstthemwithnorealfearofdirepunishmenton
thepartoftheperpetrator.Itis,ofcourse,importanttotheCommuniststohavethis
contentionsustainedandjustified.Inthepresentcasetheyhaveevenstoopedtodragging
inyoungandinnocentchildreninordertoservetheirownpurpose.
"Theactionofthesepeoplehasexposedtogreaterdangerofdeathliterallymillionsof
ourcitizens....Thattheircrimeisaveryrealoneandthatitspotentialresultsareas
definiteasIhavejuststated,arefactsthatseemtometobeabovecontention."3
ThecaseofJ.RobertOppenheimerwasnearlyasdifficultastheRosenbergaffair.
Oppenheimer,thebrilliantscientistwhohadbeenacentralfigureintheManhattan
Project,waschairmanoftheGeneralAdvisoryCommitteeoftheAtomicEnergy
Commission.In1949hehadopposedthedevelopmentofthehydrogenbombonwhat
wereessentiallypoliticalgroundshethoughtitmuchtoodangerousandagreatmistaketo
createsuchaweaponbuthadbeenoverruledbyPresidentTruman.In1953,Ikeputhim
attheheadofanadvisorygrouptoreporttothePresidentonwhatcouldbedoneabout
thearmsrace.Oppenheimer'sattitudewasthatitwouldbemadnesstocontinue
developingever-biggerbombsandnucleararsenals.Inamemorablephrase,hecompared
theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionto"twoscorpionsinabottle,eachcapableof
killingtheother,butonlyattheriskofhisownlife."4
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Oppenheimerwastremendouslypopularwithscientistsandyoungintellectualsgenerally.
Oncollegecampusesallacrossthecountry,studentsespeciallythosemajoringinphysics,
inthoseyearsthehotsubjectcouldbeseenwearingtheporkpiehatshefavored,smoking
pipesashedid.Hisstanceonthehydrogenbombelicitedastronglypro-Oppenheimer
response.
OppenheimeradvisedIkethathisfirststepinbringingthearmsraceundersomekindof
controlshouldbecandoraboutthehorrorsofnuclearwar,startingwithareportonthe
sizeoftheAmericannucleararsenalandadescriptionoftheamountofdevastationit
couldcause.TherecommendationsetoffanintensedebateinEisenhower's
administration.Oppenheimer'sleadingopponentwasAdmiralLewisStrauss,aWall
StreetinvestmentbankerwithclosetiestotheRepublicanrightwing,andalsothe
chairmanoftheAtomicEnergyCommission.Despitetheirpoliticaldifferences,Strauss
andOppenheimerwereoldfriends,frequentlystayingineachother'shomesas
houseguests.In1946itwasStrausswhogotOppenheimerthepostofDirectorofthe
InstituteforAdvancedStudiesatPrinceton.
ButontheissueofOperationCandor,asitcametobecalled,Strausswasfiercely
opposedtoOppenheimer.Strausstooktheviewthatsuchcandor"wouldnothave
advantagedtheAmericanpublicbutcertainlywouldhaverelievedtheSovietsoftrouble
intheirespionageactivities."5
IkewasbetweenOppenheimerandStraussinhisthinking,"encouragingbothwithout
offendingeither."Heviewedtheso-called"Bang!Bang!papers,"withtheirdescriptions
ofatomichorrorsleaving''everybodydeadonbothsides,withnohopeanywhere,"astoo
frighteningtoserveanyusefulpurpose."Wedon'twanttoscarethecountrytodeath,"he
said,fearingitwouldsetoffacongressionaldemandforoutlandishandlargely
ineffectivedefensespending.Eventually,hetriedunsuccessfullytofindawayoutofthe
armsracewithhisfamousAtomsforPeaceproposaltotheUN.6
ItwasnotOperationCandorthatgotOppenheimerintotrouble,however,althoughlater
itwaschargedthatOppenheimer'sfightwithStrauss,plusthegeneralatmosphereof
McCarthyism,wasresponsibleforwhathappened.
TheincidentbeganonDecember3,1954,whenIkeheldameetingintheOvalOffice,
withStrauss,theAttorneyGeneral,theSecretaryofDefense,andafewotherhighrankingofficialsinat
Page185
tendance.AllegationshadbeenmadeagainstOppenheimer'sloyalty.
J.EdgarHooverhadaletterfromtheformerdirectoroftheJointCommitteeonAtomic
Energy,WilliamBorden,chargingthatitwas"morelikelythannotthatJ.Robert
OppenheimerisaCommunistspy."SenatorMcCarthyhadbecomeawareofthecharges.
Itwasthuspotentiallybothahotpoliticalissueandadangeroussecuritychallenge,as
Oppenheimerknewasmuchaboutatomicweaponsasanymanliving,andMcCarthywas
lockedinastrugglewiththeAdministration(theArmy-McCarthyHearingswerethen
goingon).
Ikewasfurious.HefirstofallwantedtoknowhowonearthStrausscouldhavecleared
OppenheimerfortheAECbackin1947,andwhythemanhadbeenclearedforworkon
theManhattanProjectduringthewar,andwhytherehadbeennoinvestigationofhim
sincetheRepublicanstookoffice.Straussmutteredsomereplies,themainpointbeing
thattheycouldnothavebuiltthebombwithoutOppenheimer.Ikethensaidthatwhilehe
"wishedtomakeitplainthathewasnotinanywayprejudgingthematter,"hewanteda
"blankwall"placedbetweenOppenheimerandanyfurtheraccesstotop-secret
informationuntilsuchtimeasahearinghadbeencompleted.7
Thenextmorning,Ikewroteinhisdiary,"IdirectedamemorandumtotheAttorney
GeneralinstructinghimtoprocurefromtheDirectoroftheFBIanentirefileinthecase
ofDr.Oppenheimerandtomakeofitathoroughstudy....Itisreportedtomethatthis
sameinformation[thechargesagainstOppenheimer],oratleastthevastbulkofit,has
beenconstantlyreviewedandre-examinedoveranumberofyears,andthattheoverall
conclusionhasalwaysbeenthatthereisnoevidencethatimpliesdisloyaltyonthepartof
Dr.Oppenheimer.However,thisdoesnotmeanthathemightnotbeasecurityrisk."8
Eisenhowersetupathree-mancommitteetoconductthehearing.Thecommittee
discoveredthatOppenheimerhadacontinuingfriendshipwithaformerFrenchprofessor
andCommunistintellectual,HaakonChevalier.Inthe1930sOppenheimerhadbeena
frequentcontributortoWestCoastleftistorganizations.Headmittedthathehadbeena
"fellowtraveler"from1937to1942.Hisfiancée,Dr.JeanTatlock,wasamemberofthe
CommunistPartyinSanFrancisco.HisformerwifehadbeenmarriedtoaCommu
Page186
nistwhowaskilledin1937fightingintheSpanishCivilWar.Hisbrotherandsister-inlawhadbeenCommunists.Perhapsworstofall,Oppenheimeradmittedthathehadlied,
underoath,abouttheseassociations.9
Byavoteoftwotoone,thecommitteeheldthatOppenheimer,whilenotdisloyal,had
"fundamentaldefectsofcharacter"andthereforerecommendedthathissecurityclearance
betakenaway.Byavoteoffivetoone,withStraussleadingtheway,theAECthen
upheldthatdecision.Ikeinturnconcurredintherecommendationandrefusedto
reinstateOppenheimer'sclearance.
ThedecisionsplittheAmericanscientificcommunityintotwobitterfactions.Critics
chargedthatrefusingOppenheimeraccesstotop-secretmaterialwasliketellinghimhe
wasnotallowedtothink.Theuglychargeofanti-Semitismwashurledabout.Manyof
Oppenheimer'ssupporterssaidIkehaddoneitonlytoappeaseMcCarthy.Strausscamein
forsomeparticularlyhostileremarks.Thebitternesswassuchthatsometimelaterthe
SenaterefusedtoconfirmStrauss'nominationasSecretaryofCommerce.
Ike'sattitude,asalways,wastotrytofindsomecompromise,somecommongroundon
whichallthecontestantscouldstand,somewayofleavingeveryonehappyandnoone
angry.Attheheightofthecontroversy,hesentanotetoStrausssaying,"Whydowenot
getDr.Oppenheimerinterestedindesaltingseawater?Icanthinkofnoscientificsuccess
ofalltimethatwouldequalthisinitsboontomankindprovidedthesolutioncoulddothe
jobonamassivescaleandcheaply."10
Oppenheimer,whohadbeenpubliclyhumiliated,neverworkedforthegovernment
again.
Whetherornotaterriblemistakehadbeenmadeandaninjusticedonecannotbesettled
here.In1963,LBJawardedOppenheimertheAEC'Shighesthonor,theFermiAwardthis
actwasgenerallytakentobeavindication.ItshouldbenotedthatOppenheimerwasnot
"punished"inanydirectway,merelydeniedtheopportunitytocontinueworkingforthe
governmentonatomicmattersonthegroundsthatsuchemploymentwasnot"clearly
consistentwiththeinterestsofthenationalsecurity."Strausspersonallycontinuedto
supportOppenheimer;asamemberoftheboardofdirectors,Straussofferedthemotion
toreelectOppenheimerasDirectoroftheInstituteforAdvancedStudies.Andinhis
memoirsIkeinsistedthattheMcCarthyaspectofthecasehadnobearingon
Page187
hisdecision.Itjustseemedtohimthatamanwhohadsuchlongandcloseassociation
withCommunists,andwhohadliedaboutitforyears,hadtobeconsideredasecurity
risk.AsheputitinhisfirstStateoftheUnionaddress,"Onlyacombinationofboth
loyaltyandreliabilitypromisesgenuinesecurity."11
IfIke'sdecisionIntheRosenbergandOppenheimercasesdemonstratedhowseriouslyhe
regardedthethreattotheUnitedStatesposedbytheSovietespionagenetwork,his
acceptanceoftheDoolittleReportshowedhowfarhewaswillingtogotocounterthat
threat.
EarlyinEisenhower'spresidency,SenatorMikeMansfieldintroducedaresolutionfora
"JointCongressionalOversightCommitteefortheAmericanClandestineService."
EisenhowerstronglyopposedanysuchinterferencewithexecutivecontroloftheCIA.
StuyvesantWainwrightII,afreshmancongressmanfromLongIsland,andPeter
Frelinghuysen,anotherRepublican(fromNewJersey),supportedMansfieldintheHouse.
Ikeexploded.Wainwrightlaterrecalledthat"hetoldbothPeterandmethatthiskindofa
billwouldbepassedoverhisdeadbody."Onereasonwas"hefeltthatanyCongressional
CommitteewouldendupbeingdominatedbySenatorMcCarthy...andhewasdamned
ifhewasgoingtoletMcCarthyhaveanyotherareawhereinhemightgetafoothold."
Ikewasalsoupset,Wainwrightrelated,becausehefeltthatWainwright,asaformerSLU
andmemberoftheSHAEFstaff,shouldhaveknownbetter."Iaskedhimoneday,"
Wainwrightrecalled,"whythehelldoyoucallmeWainwrightandPeter,Peter?Hesaid,
'Well,becauseyouwereonmystaffandworkedforme.'*Consequentlyhewasreally
shockedandhorrifiedthatIwouldhavechosen,inhisview,toattacktheintelligence
serviceswiththisbill,orattacktheCIAwithabillrequiringacertainamountof
disclosuretoaselectcommittee."12
EisenhowertriedtoheadofftheMansfieldbillbyappointingacommitteetoinvestigate
theCIAandreporttohimpersonally.The
*Wainwright,inhisearlytwentiesduringthewar,wasaveryjuniormemberofIke'sstaff.He
couldrecallseeingEisenhoweronlyfourorfivetimesin1944and1945,andwasmuchimpressed
thatIkerememberedhisnameeightyearslater."Hehadapolitician'skindofmemory,"Wainwright
said.
Page188
committeewasheadedbythefamousWorldWarIIaviatorGeneralJamesDoolittle.
TheproseoftheDoolittleReport'sconclusionwaschilling:"Itisnowclearthatweare
facinganimplacableenemywhoseavowedobjectiveisworlddominationbywhatever
meansandatwhatevercost.Therearenorulesinsuchagame.Hithertoacceptablenorms
ofhumanconductdonotapply.IftheUnitedStatesistosurvive,long-standingAmerican
conceptsof'fairplay'mustbereconsidered.Wemustdevelopeffectiveespionageand
counterespionageservicesandmustlearntosubvert,sabotage,anddestroyourenemies
bymoreclever,moresophisticated,andmoreeffectivemethodsthanthoseusedagainst
us.ItmaybecomenecessarythattheAmericanpeoplebemadeacquaintedwith,
understand,andsupportthisfundamentallyrepugnantphilosophy."13
TheDoolittleReportwasaconcisesummaryofIke'sownviews.AsPresident,he
intendedtofighttheCommunistsjustashehadfoughttheNazis,oneverybattlefront,
witheveryavailableweapon.Hisarsenalwasamightyone,cappedbytheatomicbomb.
Oneimportantelementinit,theonetheDoolittleReporthadbeendesignedtoprotect,
wasthenewlybornbutrapidlygrowingCentralIntelligenceAgency.
Page189
ChapterFourteen
Iran:ThePreparation
MIDNIGHT,AUGUST1-2,1953.Alarge,ornategardeninTeheran,Iran.Amediumsized,medium-height,rathernondescriptAmerican,wearingadarkturtleneckshirt,
Oxford-grayslacks,andPersiansandals,opensthegatetothegarden,slipsout,
glancesupanddownthestreet,andsilentlyclimbsintothebackseatofanordinarylookingblacksedan.Withoutabackwardglance,thedriverpullsawayslowly,
smoothly,andheadstowardtheroyalpalace.Inthebackseat,theAmericanhuddles
downonthefloorandpullsablanketoverhim.
Atthepalacegate,thesentryflashesalightinthedriver'sface,grunts,andwavesthe
carthrough.Halfwaybetweenthegateandthepalacesteps,thedriverparks,getsout,
andwalksaway.Aslim,nervousmanwalksdownthedrive,glancingleftandrightas
heapproaches.TheAmericanpullstheblanketoutofthewayandsitsupastheman
entersthecarandclosesthedoor.
Theylookateachother.ThenHisImperialMajesty,MohammedRezaShahPahlavi,
ShahanshahofIran,LightoftheAryans,allowshimselftorelax,andevensmile.
"Goodevening,Mr.Roosevelt,"hesays."IcannotsaythatIexpectedtoseeyou,but
thisisapleasure."
"Goodevening,YourMajesty.Itisalongtimesincewemeteachother,andIamglad
yourecognizeme.Itmaymakeestablishingmycredentialsabiteasier."
HisImperialMajestylaughs."Thatwillhardlybenecessary.Yournameandpresenceis
alltheguaranteeIneed."
Page190
RooseveltKermit("Kim")Roosevelt,TeddyRoosevelt'sgrandsonandFDR's
cousinquicklyexplainsthathehasenteredIranillegally,thathiscovernameisJames
Lochridge,andthatheisthereasapersonalrepresentativeofPresidentDwight
EisenhowerandPrimeMinisterWinstonChurchill."PresidentEisenhowerwillconfirm
thishimself,"Rooseveltstates,"byaphraseinaspeechheisabouttodeliverinSan
Franciscoactuallywithinthenexttwenty-fourhours.PrimeMinisterChurchillhas
arrangedtohaveaspecificchangemadeinthetimeannouncementoftheBBC
broadcasttomorrownight.Insteadofsaying,'Itisnowmidnight,'theannouncerwill
say,'Itisnow'pause--'exactlymidnight.'"
Havingestablishedhisbonafides,Rooseveltexplainsthathispurposeincomingisto
assuretheShahthathehasthefullbackingoftheAmericanandBritishgovernments,
thatWashingtonandLondonareanxioustohelphimoverthrowhisprimeministerand
ensurethatH.I.M.retainshisthrone.
Thethirty-four-year-oldEmperorsmiles,aswellhemight.Tohavethecomplete,
unquestioningsupportofaRoosevelt,Eisenhower,andChurchillis,afterall,a
reassuringfeeling,especiallytoashakymonarchsurroundedbyrumorsofcoups,
countercoups,plots,andrevolutions,withtheadditionalproblemofsharingalong,
virtuallyundefendedborderwiththeSovietUnion.Evenbetterthanthegeneral
promiseofsupportfromEisenhowerandChurchillisRoosevelt'spledgethathewould
personallysetinmotionaseriesofeventsthatwouldridtheShahofhisIranian
enemies.
AftergivingH.I.M.abriefoutlineofhisproposedcountercoup,Rooseveltindicates
thattheyhadbestpartbeforetheirmeetingisdiscovered.Theyagreetomeetagainthe
followingmidnightunderidenticalcircumstances.
"GoodnightorshouldIsaygoodmorning?Mr.Roosevelt.Iamgladtowelcomeyou
onceagaintomycountry."
"AndIamverygladtobehere,YourMajesty.Iamfullofconfidencethatour
undertakingwillsucceed."TheShahleavesthecar,thedriverreturns,Rooseveltpulls
theblanketoverhisheadagain,andisreturnedtohisgarden.TheCIA's
Page191
firstmajorcovertactionunderEisenhower'sordersislaunched.1
HowhadthingscometosuchapassthataRooseveltwassneakingaroundatmidnight,
hidingunderblankets,whileEisenhoweralteredaspeechandChurchillusedtheBBCfor
personalmessages,allinsupportofapotentialdictatorwhosesolepoliticalobjectivewas
tooverthrowahighlypopularprimeministerinfavorofapro-Nazigeneral?Abrief
answeristhatoilandcommunismmakeavolatilemixture.Afullerresponsetakesinto
accountthecomplexitiesofpostwarinternationalrelationsandtherecenthistoryofIran.
ThereareonlytwofactsaboutmodernPersiaIranthattrulymattertotherestoftheworld.
Ithasoil,anditisRussia'ssouthernneighbor.Becauseoftheoil,theBritishhadmoved
inonIranin1909,whentheAnglo-PersianOilCompany(inwhichtheBritish
Governmentcontrolled52percentofthestock)obtainedasixty-yearconcessionwhich
gaveitexclusiverightstoexploreandexploittheoilofIran.Becauseoftheborder,
BritainandRussia(withAmericansupport)hadinvadedIranin1941,whereinamatter
ofhourstheydestroyedtheImperialIranianArmedForces.Thiswasasmuchanactof
greatpowerhighhandednessandbrutalityasHitler'sinvasionofDenmark,althoughin
thiscasethevoicesofoutragedprotestwereexclusivelyIranian.Thepurposeofthe
invasionwastoprovideacorridorfortheshipmentofAmericanlend-leasegoodsinto
Russia.
TherulerofIranin1941wasRezaKhan,anilliterateofficerinthePersianCossack
BrigadewhohadledacoupagainsttheQajarregimeinthe1920sandestablishedhimself
asRezaShah,founderofthePahlavidynasty.Iranwasaconstitutionalmonarchywitha
two-houseParliament.2TheBritishandRussiansbelievedthatRezaKhanwaspotentially
pro-Nazi,sotheyforcedhisabdication,senthimintoexile,andputhistwenty-three-yearoldsononthethrone.AtthesametimetheBritishalsokidnapedGeneralFazollah
Zahedi,adashing,handsome,six-foot-twoladies'manwithatasteforsilkunderwear,
expensiveprostitutes,andopium.AccordingtotheBritish,Zahediwasalsopro-Nazi,and
theykepthiminjailinPalestinefortheduration.
Thenew,youngShahlookedthepartofamonarch.Hecarriedhimselfstifflyandwas
strikinglyhandsome,despiteorperhaps
Page192
becauseofahighlyprominentnose.Butdespitetheimpressionofstrengthhegave,he
hadbeenasicklyboy,dominatedbyhissternandcruelfather,andwasfilledwithselfdoubtandfearsofhisownweakness.3Hewaseasilymanipulatedbytheoccupying
powers(whichafter1942includedtheAmericans).
TheAlliesgavetheShahasenseofimportance.Churchillacceptedaninvitationtolunch
atthepalace,andtheBigThreeheldoneoftheirfamousconferencesinTeheran,where
theyoungShahmet,briefly,bothStalinandRoosevelt.Stalinofferedhimarms(with
Sovietadviserstogowiththem);Churchillpretendedtodiscussseriouslymilitary
strategy;FDRdisplayedgreatinterestinareforestationprogramandofferedtoreturnto
IranafterthewartoadvisetheShahonthesubject.4
AttheTeheranConference,theoccupyingpowerspledgedthemselvestowithdrawtheir
troopsfromIranwithinsixmonthsoftheendofhostilities.Inlate1945,Britainand
Americakepttheirword,buttheRussiansstayedoninthenorthernIranianprovinceof
Azerbaijan,wheretheyattemptedtoinspirearevoltthatwouldleadtoasecessionofthe
provinceanditsincorporationasa"republic"intotheSovietUnion.Thiswasthefirst
realcrisisoftheColdWar.PresidentTrumansentAmerica'snewestaircraftcarrier,the
FranklinD.Roosevelt,totheeasternMediterraneanasashowofforcetobackhis
demandthattheRussiansgetoutofIran.AfternegotiatingadealthatgavetheRussians
accesstoIranianoil,Stalindidpullhistroopsout.TheIranianParliamentthenrefusedto
ratifythedeal,andRussiasufferedamajordiplomaticsetback.5
TheAmericanattitudetowardIranintheimmediatepostwaryearswassetbySecretaryof
StateDeanAcheson,whobelievedtheUnitedStatesshouldplayasupportingrolein
Iran'sresistancetotheSovietpressure.Asaresult,relationsbetweenAmericaandIran
wereexcellent.TheShahvisitedtheUnitedStates,wherehehadasuccessfulaudience
withTrumanandmetEisenhower,thenpresidentofColumbiaUniversity(Ikerecorded
inhismemoirs,"AtthattimeIdevelopedonshortacquaintancesomeconfidencethathe
wouldproveaneffectiveleaderofhispeople").6
In1947,KimRoosevelt,Harvardgraduate,historian,OSSMideasternexpertduringthe
war,waswritingabookcalledArabs,OilandHistory,andhehadalonginterviewwith
theShahinhispalace.Rooseveltwasthenthirty-one,theShahtwenty-eight.
Page193
Theyimpressedeachotherfavorably,orsoRooseveltlaterclaimed.TheShah,hewrote,
was"anintenseyoungman,withawirybodyandawiryspiritalsodark,slim,withadeep
storeofbarelyhiddenenergy."Rooseveltdidadmitthat"his[theShah's]personalitywas
subduedatthattime."7
ThemostimportantAmericanintheShah'slifeinthemid1940swasnotTruman,nor
Acheson,norKimRoosevelt,butratherafabulouscharacternamedSchwarzkopf.
ColonelH.NormanSchwarzkopfoftheU.S.ArmyhadbeenthechiefoftheNewJersey
StatePoliceandwasinternationallyknownforhissuccessinhandlingtheLindbergh
kidnapingcase.
HewasoneofthefirstofthoseexpertssentbytheUnitedStatestounderdeveloped
countriestoteachtheirgovernmentshowtomaintainlawandorderandpreserve
themselvesinpower.TheIranianshadaskedforhishelpinreorganizingtheirpolice
force.From1942to1948hecommandedtheImperialIranianGendarmeriewithfirmness
anddetermination,turningitintoamodern,efficientforcethatwasloyaltotheShahand
extremelyhostiletotheTudeh(Communist)Party.Schwarzkopfalsohelpedorganizethe
secret,orsecurity,branchofthepolice,thenotoriousSAVAK.Duringthecrisisin
AzerbaijantheGendarmeriehelpedensurefirmgovernmentcontrolbyarrestingsome
threehundredTudehPartyleaders.Schwarzkopfpersonallyshowedupwherevertrouble
wasbrewingandwasthussingledoutasatargetforspecialattacksfromtheSovietpress,
whichaccusedhimofbeingthefrontmanforAmericanimperialism.8In1948,
SchwarzkopfwaspromotedtobrigadiergeneralandleftIranforanewpostinWest
Germany.
TheUnitedStates,delightedatIran'ssuccessfulresistancetoSovietencroachment,
rewardedtheShah'sgovernmentwithnewprogramsoftechnicalandfinancialaid,
includingamilitarymissionofsomeeighteenofficerswhooversawthedistributionof
weaponsfromAmericanwarsurplusstocksworthsome$60million.9Thebadlyburned
Soviets,meanwhile,fearfulofanincreasedAmericanpresenceontheirsouthernborder
(atthistimetheUnitedStateswasreplacingBritainasthechiefsupporteroftheGreek
monarchy,inaccordancewiththerecentlyannouncedTrumanDoctrine),adopteda
cautiousandratherconservativeattitudetowardIran.TheRussianspreferredaweaker
BritishpresenceinIrantoanaggressiveAmericanintrusion,buttherewaslittlethey
coulddotostoptheincomingYanks.10
Page194
WiththeRussianscheckedandtheAmericansprovidingsupport,theIranianswereina
positiontoturnontheirrealenemies,thehatedBritish.Theyhadmuchtocomplain
about.TheAngloPersianOilCompanypaidmoreintaxestotheBritishGovernmentthan
itdidinroyaltiestoIran.Equallygalling,thecompanyusedthehugeprofitsitearnedin
Irantoexpanditsoiloutputinotherpartsoftheworld.Further,totheBritishtheIranians
werejustanothersetof''wogs,"tobetreatedwithcontemptandexcludedfromanybut
themostmenialpostsintheoperationoftheAbadanrefinery.
Thesituationwasintolerable.ItpresentedamarvelousopportunitytoanyIranian
politicianwhohadthecouragetolead.Theonewhoseizedthechancewasaremarkable
oldman,Dr.MohammadMossadegh,leaderoftheNationalFront.Seventyyearsoldin
1951,hewasarichlandowner,educatedinFranceandSwitzerland,worldlywise,a
successfulspellbinderofaspeakerwhohadbeenelectedtotheMajlis(thesecondhouse
oftheParliament)in1915,andwhowasgenerallyregardedbythoseWesternerswho
dealtwithhimasacompletelyunreasonable,demagogic,andxenophobicman.
Tall,thin,bent,asemi-invalidwhooftenappearedinpubliccladonlyinpajamas,he
wouldburstintotearsatthemostinappropriatemoment,orfaintdeadaway.Hehada
hugenosethatwasalwaysdripping.(OneStateDepartmentofficialsaid,"Mossadeghhas
anosethatmakesJimmyDurantelooklikeanamputee!")11Hisfavoriteplacefordoing
businesswashisbedroom,wherehewouldrecline,proppedupbypillows,and
alternativelycackleandcry.
DeanAchesondepictedMossadeghas"smallandfrail,withnotashredofhaironhis
billiard-ballhead;athinfaceprotrudingintoalongbeakofanoseflankedbytwobright
shoe-buttoneyes.Hiswholemannerandappearancewasbirdlikeandhemovedquickly
andnervouslyasifhewerehoppingaboutonaperch.Hispixiequalityshowedin
instantaneoustransformations."12
MossadeghwasthefirstMiddleEasternpoliticiantodemandthecompletenationalization
ofhiscountry'soilfields.TheShah'sPrimeMinister,GeneralRazmara,opposedsuch
drasticaction.OnMarch7,1951,amemberoftheCrusadersofIslam,oneofthegroups
inMossadegh'sNationalFront,assassinatedRazmarawhilehewasattendingaceremony
inamosque.Mossadeghwasthe
Page195
overwhelmingpopularchoicetosucceedRazmara.AstheShahlaterwrote,"Howcould
anyonebeagainstMossadegh?Hewouldenricheverybody,hewouldfighttheforeigner,
hewouldsecureourrights.Nowonderstudents,intellectuals,peoplefromallwalksof
life,flockedtohisbanner."13Reluctantly,theShahappointedhimPrimeMinister.The
sameday,May2,1951,theParliamentpassedabillnationalizingtheoilindustry.Aweek
latertheMajlisgaveMossadegh'sgovernmentavoteofconfidencebyamajorityof
ninety-ninetothree.
FortheBritish,thewogswereontherampage.FortheIranians,awarofliberationhad
begunagainstthecolonialists.14FortheAmericans,herewasanopportunitytogeta
footholdintherichIranianoilfields,andawindowtoRussia.TheBritishrefusedto
acceptthecompensationpaymentforthecompanyofferedbyMossadegh,shutdown
Abadancold,refusedtobuyoilfromIran,andputvariouslegalobstaclesinthewayof
anycountrythatwaswillingtopurchaseIranianoil,arguingthatsuchoilwasinfact
stolengoodsandthreateningtotakeanypurchasertocourt.
TrumanandAchesontriedtoserveashonestbrokers,offeringtomediatetobringabout
acompromise.MossadeghcametoWashingtonandwasputupattheBlairHouse.
MeetingwithTruman,Mossadegh,lookingoldandpathetic,saidintremblingtones,"I
amspeakingforaverypoorcountryacountryalldesertjustsand,afewcamels,afew
sheep..."Acheson,grinning,interruptedtosaythatwithallitssandandoil,Iran
remindedhimofTexas.Mossadeghlaugheddelightedly.Theytalkedofoilprices,with
MossadeghcomplainingaboutthevastgapbetweenwhattheBritishpaidIranperbarrel
andwhattheychargedfortheproductontheworldmarket.Acheson"explainedoil
economicstohimintermsofthewidespreadbetweenthepricewegotforbeefcattleon
thehoofonourfarmsandthepricewepaidforaprimeroastofbeefinthebutcher's
shop."Mossadeghrespondedthat"peasantswerealwaysexploited."
Later,AchesonwrotethattheUnitedStateswasslowtorealizethatMossadeghwas
"essentiallyarich,reactionary,feudal-mindedPersianinspiredbyafanaticalhatredofthe
Britishandadesiretoexpelthemandalltheirworksfromthecountryregardlessofcost.
"15
TheshutdownatAbadan,meanwhile,forcedacrisisinIran.Withnomoneyscomingin
fromoilroyalties,thegovernmentwas
Page196
rapidlygoingbankrupt.InJuly1952,Mossadeghdemandedauthoritytogovernforsix
monthswithoutrecoursetoParliament,andthathebegiventheadditionalpostof
MinisterofWar.TheShahrefusedandinsteaddemanded(andgot)Mossadegh's
resignation.ImmediatelytheNationalFront,supportedbytheTudehParty,launchedriots
anddemonstrations.Mossadegh'sreplacementinflamedthesituationbyindicatingthathe
wasgoingtogiveintotheBritishonthequestionofoilnationalization.Theriotsgrew
worse.Unabletocontrolthem,thenewPrimeMinisterresigned.FivedaysaftertheShah
hadfiredMossadegh,hehadtoreappointhim.16
InOctober1952,MossadeghbrokeoffdiplomaticrelationswithBritain.Meanwhile,
WinstonChurchillonceagainbecamePrimeMinisterofGreatBritain,and,inNovember
1952,EisenhowerwaselectedPresidentoftheUnitedStates.Thetwocomradesinarms
fromWorldWarIInowhadtheiropportunitytosolvetheIranian"problem."
InJanuary1953,MossadeghsentPresident-electEisenhowerathree-pagecableinwhich
hecongratulatedIkeonhiselectionvictory,thenplungedintoanextendeddiscussionof
Iranianaffairs.Thethemewassummedupinonesentence:"Foralmosttwoyears,"
Mossadeghwrote,"theIranianpeoplehavesufferedacutedistressandmuchmisery
merelybecauseacompanyinspiredbycovetousnessandadesireforprofitsupportedby
theBritishgovernmenthasbeenendeavoringtopreventthemfromobtainingtheirnatural
andelementaryrights."Inahand-draftedreply,Ikesaidhisownpositionwasimpartial,
thathehadnoprejudicesinthecase,andthathehopedfuturerelationswouldbegood.17
Infact,however,everythingthePresident-electwashearingwasanti-Mossadegh.
ChurchillandtheBritishseizedontheTudeh'ssupportofthePrimeMinistertomakethe
pointthattheoldmanwaseitheraCommunistoravictimofCommunistintrigue.The
AmericanambassadortoIran,LoyHenderson,acareerForeignServiceofficerwhohad
servedinMoscowbeforethewar,wasbitterlyanti-Communist.Whenaskedtoassessthe
extentofMossadegh'ssupport,HendersontoldtheincomingEisenhoweradministration
that"oldMossy"reliedon"thestreetrabble,theextremeleft...extremeIranian
nationalists,some,butnotall,ofthemorefanaticalreligiousleaders,intellectualleftists,
including
Page197
manywhohadbeeneducatedabroadandwhodidnotrealizethatIranwasnotreadyfor
democracy."
HendersonalsotookadimviewofMossadegh'sactiononthepointatissue,the
nationalizationofthecompany."Wedidnotbelieve,"hedeclaredlaterinaninterview,
"thatsuchanexpropriationwasinthebasicinterestofIran,GreatBritain,ortheU.S.Acts
ofthiskindtendedtounderminethemutualtrustthatwasnecessaryifinternationaltrade
wastoflourish."18
TheBritish,meanwhile,hadapproachedKimRoosevelt,wellknowntothemfromOSS
daysandcurrentlyoneofthetopCIAagents.SirJohnCochran,actingasspokesmanfor
theChurchillgovernment,proposedthattheBritishSecretServiceandtheCIAjoin
forcestooverthrowMossadegh."AsItoldmyBritishcolleagues,"Rooseveltlaterwrote,
"wehad,Ifeltsure,nochancetowinapprovalfromtheoutgoingadministrationof
TrumanandAcheson.ThenewRepublicans,however,mightbequitedifferent."19
RooseveltexpectedadifferentapproachbecauseofthenatureofRepublicanattackson
theTruman-Achesonforeignpolicy.IkecriticizedtheDemocratsforspreadingAmerican
resourcestoothin,acceptingthestatusquotoowillingly,andconcentratingtooheavily
onWesternEurope.EisenhowercontendedthattheUnitedStatesmustwresttheinitiative
fromtheSovietUnion,andifpossible"liberate"areasfromCommunistcontrol.
EisenhowerseemedsomuchtougherthanTrumanthattheNewYorkTimeswrote,"The
dayofsleep-walkingisover.ItpassedwiththeexodusofTrumanandAchesonism,and
thepolicyofvigilancereplacingPollyannadiplomacyisevident."20Rooseveltalsofelt,
basedonhiswartimeexperiences,thatEisenhowerwouldbemuchmorelikelytousehis
covert-actioncapabilitiesthanTrumanhadbeen.
TheessenceoftheplantheBritishpresentedtoRooseveltwastokeeptheShahwhile
dumpinghisPrimeMinister.SomehowMossadeghlearnedoftheplot.Hethen
denouncedtheShahforhisintrigueswithforeigninterestsandbegantoagitateforthe
Shah'sabdication.
AtthispointtheShahlosthisnerve.OnFebruary28,1953,heannouncedthathewould
leavethecountry,alongwithhisqueenandentourage.Theannouncementbroughton
riotsinthestreetsofTeheran.TheTudehParty,alongwiththeUnitedFront,marchedin
supportofthePrimeMinister;attheotherendof
Page198
town,asH.I.M.recordedinhismemoirs,"themassdemonstrationsofloyaltytotheShah
weresoconvincingandaffectingthatIdecidedtoremainforthetimebeing."He
canceledhisagreementtoabdicate.21
TheactivesupportoftheTudehforMossadeghfedtheimpressionthatthePrime
MinisterhadgoneovertotheCommunists,andfortheirownreasonstheBritishwhohad
sincethewarlostcoloniesallaroundtheworld,asituationthenewChurchillgovernment
wasdeterminedtoreverseclamoredaboutthedangersofaCommunisttakeoverinIran.
Strangelyenough,nooneseemedtonoticethatthroughoutthiscrisis,inwhichthestakes
werenothinglessthanoneoftheworld'sgreatestoilpools,theRussianswerecontentto
standaside.NordidanyoneintheWesteverpointoutthatMossadeghhadnotappealed
tohisnorthernneighborforhelp.
TheideathatthisreactionaryfeudallandlordwasaCommunistwas,infact,quite
ridiculous.Theoldmanhashisownexplanationofwhatwasgoingon.WhenHenderson
complainedtohimaboutCommunistmobsdemonstratingagainsttheWestinthestreets
ofTeheran,Mossadeghreplied,"ThesearenotrealCommunists,theyarepeoplepaidby
theBritishtopretendtheyareCommunistsinordertofrightentheUnitedStatesinto
believingthatundermyPremiershipthecountryisgoingCommunist."Thatmaywell
havebeentrue,buttoHendersonitappearedthatMossadegh"hadbecomeaparanoiacso
farastheBritishwereconcerned.HeheldthemresponsibleforallofIran'sillsandgave
themcreditforalmostsuperhumanmachinations."22
Mossadegh'spolicywastoattempttosplittheUnitedStatesandBritain.Tothatend,in
May1953,heonceagainappealedtoIke.Inalongpersonalmessagehebeggedthe
PresidenttohelpremovetheobstaclestheBritishhadplacedonthesaleofIranianoiland
toprovideIranwithsubstantiallyincreasedAmericaneconomicassistance."Irefused,"
Ikerecordedbluntly,"topourmoreAmericanmoneyintoacountryinturmoilinorderto
bailMossadeghoutoftroublesrootedinhisrefusaltoworkoutanagreementwiththe
British."
ToMossadegh,Ikewrotedirectly."IfullyunderstandthatthegovernmentofIranmust
determineforitselfwhichforeignanddomesticpoliciesarelikelytobemost
advantageoustoIran....IamnottryingtoadvisetheIraniangovernmentonitsbest
interests.
Page199
Iammerelytryingtoexplainwhy,inthecircumstances,thegovernmentoftheUnited
StatesisnotpresentlyinapositiontoextendmoreaidtoIranortopurchaseIranianoil."
23(Itshouldbepointedoutherethatinthosehappydays,theUnitedStateswasitselfan
exporterofoil,andintheworldasawholefarmoreoilwasbeingpumpedoutofthe
groundthanwasbeingconsumed.Mossadegh'sproblemwasthattheworldoftheearly
1950scouldgetalongquitewellwithoutIranianoil.
Iranwasbynowontheedgeoffinancialandeconomicruin.TheTrumanadministration
hadincreasedAmericanaidfrom$1.6millionbeforeMossadeghcametopowerto$23.4
millionforthefiscalyear1953,butthatwasnotevenclosetoenoughmoneytomakeup
forthelostoilrevenue.WhenIketurneddownhisplea,Mossadeghwasforcedtodraw
moneyfromthepensionfundsandthenationalinsurancecompany.24
ModeratesinIranbegantoturnagainstthePrimeMinister.Inresponse,hesuspended
electionsfortheNationalAssemblyandheldareferendumtodecideifthecurrent
NationalAssemblyshouldbedissolved.Hearrangedtheelectionsothatthoseinfavorof
dissolutionandthoseagainstitvotedinseparate,plainlymarkedbooths,whichwere,of
course,closelywatchedbyhissupporters.Underthosecircumstances,itwasnosurprise
thatMossadeghwonthereferendumby99percentto1percent.
ToIke,theriggedelectionlookedforsurelikeCommunisttactics.Heconcludedthatif
oldMossywasnotaCommunisthimself,thenhewaseitherafoolorastoogeforthe
Communists.25Hisambassador(hehadkeptHendersononthejob)toldhimthatif
MossadeghgotridoftheShah,"chaoswoulddevelopinIran,achaosthatwouldbe
overcomeonlybyabloodydictatorshipworkingunderordersfromMoscow."26This
impressionwasverymuchstrengthenedwhenMossadegh,havingbeenspurnedby
Eisenhower,turnedtotheSovietsforhelp.OnAugust8theRussiansannouncedthat
theyhadinitiatednegotiationswithIranforfinancialaidandtradetalks.
Mossadegh,Ikewroteinhismemoirs,"believedthathecouldformanalliancewiththe
TudehPartyandthenoutwitit."TothePresident,thiswasimprobableatbest.Hefeared
that"MossadeghwouldbecometoIranwhattheill-fatedDr.Beneshadbeenin
CzechoslovakiaaleaderwhomtheCommunists,havinggainedpower,wouldeventually
destroy."27Inadditiontohisdetermi
Page200
nationtostopCommunistexpansion,theRepublicanshadjustwonanelection,inpart,
bydemandingtoknow"WhoLostChina?"Theywerenotgoingtoexposethemselvesto
thequestion"WhoLostIran?"
Ikedecideditwastimetoact.HeorderedtheCIAtogoaheadwithaplanthathadbeen
initiatedbytheBritishSecretService,pickedupbyKimRoosevelt,andapprovedfive
weeksearlierbyhisStateDepartmentinahigh-levelmeetingintheSecretaryofState's
office.
ThatmeetinginauguratedtheCIA'scovert-actionprogram,goingbeyondsimplefinancial
supportforAmerica'soverseasfriends,toactiveinterventionintheaffairsofaforeign
nation,tothepointofoverthrowingagovernment.
ThemeetingbeganwhenKimRooseveltlaidbeforeSecretaryofStateJohnFosterDulles
athickpaperoutliningaplanofclandestineaction,codenameAJAX.Pickingitup,the
Secretaryglancedaroundtheroom,smiled,andsaid,"Sothisishowwegetridofthat
madmanMossadegh!"Noonelaughed;indeed,someofthosearoundthetableflinched.
28
AmongthosepresentwereBedellSmith,whoIkehadmovedfromtheCIAtotheState
Department,wherehewasnowtheUnderSecretaryofState.Bedellwasaneighborand
oldfriendofRoosevelt's.HealreadyknewofandhadapprovedAJAX.Smith's
replacementasdirectoroftheCIA,AllenDulles,wasalsothere.He,too,knewand
approvedofAJAX.AthirdinsiderwasLoyHenderson,"agentlemanhimself,"Roosevelt
recorded,"whopreferreddealingwithhisforeigncolleaguesinagentlemanlyfashion.
ButHendersonwasoneofasmallbandofdistinguishedforeign-serviceofficersofthat
erawhounderstoodtherealitiesoflifeinthisworldwelivein."Inotherwords,
HendersontoosupportedAJAX.29
TherewereanumberofStateDepartmentofficialspresentwhowerenotinontheplot,
includingRobertMurphy,whohadbeenIke'sfirstspybackinNorthAfricaelevenyears
earlier.ThenewSecretaryofDefense,CharlesWilson("EngineCharlie,"formerheadof
GeneralMotors)wasthere,ruddy-faced,white-haired,gruff,blunttothepointof
embarrassment.Wilsonhadahabitofsittingthroughmeetingswithacigaretteinhis
mouth,lettingitsmolderrightdownuntilitstartedtoburnhislips.Hewouldtossitinto
theashtrayandlightanotherandletitburndown.Hehada
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wayofgettingtotheheartofthematter.AtoneearlyEisenhowercabinetmeeting,there
wasalongdiscussionofAmerica'smilitaryposturevis-à-visCommunistChina.Finally
Wilsonstubbedoutacigarettebutt,turnedtoIke,andsaid,"Mr.President,Iunderstand
fromwhat'sbeensaidthatwecouldlickChina.WhatIdon'tunderstandiswhatwe
woulddowithChinaafterwegotthemlicked."30
Agroupofhardheadedrealists,inshort,menofvastexperience,able,cynical,
accustomedtoassessingevidenceandmakingtoughdecisions,unafraidtotakerisks.
MenIketrustedtogivehimsound,practicaladvice.IfRooseveltcouldconvincethem
thatAJAXcouldwork,theywouldconvinceIke.
Rooseveltbeganbysayingthat,onAllenDulles'instructions,hehadmadetwotripsto
Iransincetheelectioninordertomakeajudgmentontwopoints.First,that"theSoviet
threatisindeedgenuine,dangerous,andimminent,"andsecond,thatinashowdown"the
IranianarmyandtheIranianpeoplewillbacktheShah."Rooseveltsaidhewassatisfied
onbothpoints.HereportedfurtherthattheBritishhadapprovedAJAXandagreedto
providewhateversupporttheycould,butgivenanti-BritishsentimentinIranwouldstay
asfarinthebackgroundaspossible.
TheobjectiveofAJAXwastoremoveMossadeghfromoffice.TheShahhadindicated
thathewantedtoreplaceMossadeghwithGeneralZahedi.Thatwasabitmuchforthe
Britishtoswallow,astheyhadkeptZahediinprisonthroughoutWorldWarIIandhewas
almostasanti-BritishasMossadegh.ButChurchillandhisForeignSecretary,Anthony
Eden,realizedthattheirchoiceswerelimited,andbetweenMossadeghandZahedithey
preferredZahedi.
Thefirsttask,Rooseveltcontinued,wastoorganizemilitarysupportfortheShah.The
chiefofstaff,GeneralRiahi,wasasupporterofMossadegh.Hewouldhavetobe
removedorcircumvented.ThekeytoAJAXwastobepreparedtogivetheShahprompt
support,bothmilitaryandpublic,whenheannouncedthedismissalofMossadeghand
theappointmentofZahedi.
"Wearequitesatisfied,sir,"Rooseveltconcluded,turningtoSecretaryDulles,"thatthis
canbedonesuccessfully.Allwewaituponisyourdecision."
AllenDullesspokefirst."Kim,youhadbettercovertwomorepointsbeforetheSecretary
comments:first,ontheestimatedcost,
Page202
andsecondly,Ithinkyoushouldgiveyourideaofthe'flappotential'whatcouldhappenif
thingsgowrong."
Rooseveltrespondedthatthecostwouldbeminimal,oneortwohundredthousand
dollarsatthemost.Onthesecondpoint,hesaidagainthathesawnodangeroffailure,
butifhehadtotallymisjudgedthesituationandthingsdidgowrong,theconsequences
"wouldbeverybadperhapsterrifyinglyso.IranwouldfalltotheRussians,andtheeffect
ontherestoftheMiddleEastcouldbedisastrous.ButImustaddthis:Thesearethesame
consequenceswefaceifwedonothing."
FosterDullesaskedaboutGeneralGuilanshah,thecommanderoftheIranianAirForce.
RooseveltsaidthatalthoughhewasloyaltotheShah,hewouldnotbeapartoftheplot
becausetherewasnorolefortheAirForceinAJAXandtheconspiratorswantedtokeep
thenumberofthoseintheknowatthesmallestpossiblefigure.
TheSecretaryofStatethenpolledthemenaroundthetable.Mostsignifiedconsentwith
theleastpossiblecommitment.RoosevelthadnodoubtsaboutBedellSmithsixmonths
earlier,whenSmithwasstillDCI,hehadcalledRooseveltintohisofficetodemand,
"WhenarethoseblankingBritishcomingtotalktous?Andwhenisourgoddam
operationgoingtogetunderway?Pullupyoursocksandgetgoing,youngman."31Now,
whenaskedbyFosterDulleswhethertogoornot,Smith,surlyasalways,snarledthatof
coursetheyshouldproceed.
RobertMurphy,theonlymanpresentwithsomeexperienceinoverthrowing
governments,noddedhisassent.CharlesWilsonwasenthusiastic.LoyHendersonspoke
gravely:"Mr.Secretary,Idon'tlikethiskindofbusinessatall.Youknowthat.Butweare
confrontedbyadesperate,adangeroussituationandamadmanwhowouldallyhimself
withtheRussians.Wehavenochoicebuttoproceedwiththisundertaking.MayGod
grantussuccess."
"That'sthat,then,"theSecretaryofStatedeclared."Let'sgetgoing!"
Later,Rooseveltrecordedhisconvictionthat"Iwasmorallycertainthatalmosthalfof
thosepresent,iftheyhadfeltfreeorhadthecouragetospeak,wouldhaveopposedthe
undertaking."32
Thenextstepwastogettheapprovaloftheheadsofgovernment.Asnoted,Ikegavehis
orderstogoaheadafterMossadeghopenednegotiationswiththeSoviets.OntheBritish
side,therewas
Page203
noproblemChurchillandEdenhadbeeninonAJAXfromthestart;theyhadbeenthe
menwhohadinitiatedtheoperation.
HavingconvincedhissuperiorsthatAJAXcouldwork,andhavingobtainedthe
President'sgo-ahead,KimRoosevelt'snexttaskwastopersuadetheShahtoact.This
provedtobemoredifficultthanconvincingtheDullesbrothersandEisenhower.The
ShahsensedthatintryingtoridhimselfofMossadegh,hecouldloseeverything.Ina
showdown,thearmyandthepeoplemightverywellsupportthePrimeMinisterrather
thanH.I.M.
WhenRooseveltenteredIraninmid-July1953heknewthathehadfudgedabitbefore
theDullesbrothersinoutliningAJAXwhenheguaranteedthattheShahwaspreparedfor
decisiveaction.Infact,theShahwashesitant,confused,fearful.TwoIraniansecret
agents,whohadonceworkedfortheBritish,thenjoinedwithRoosevelt,hadexplained
thisquitecarefullytohimduringoneofhisearliervisits.
H.I.M.,theagentstoldRoosevelt,"isconcernedovertheapparentfactthathehasno
foreignsupport.ObviouslytheRussians...arehisenemies.Heknowstheysupport
Mossadegh.WhatabouttheWest?Asyouknow,asweknow,theyarewithhim.Buthow
canhetell?LookattheterrificreceptionMossadeghwasgiveninWashington[bythe
Trumanadministration].HowcantheShahbesure,afterthat,thattheU.S.willgivehim
theirbacking?AndtheBritish,whoarewhatevertheymaythinkjustabouttobethrown
outofIran,whyshouldhebelievethattheywillcometohisassistance?Wehopeyoucan
findsomewayofconvincinghim,preferablynotjustofU.S.supportbutofBritishas
well.Wedon'tknowjusthowwearegoingtoarrangeallthis,butwetellyou:Itmustbe
done!"33
AmbassadorHenderson,atRoosevelt'surging,hadtriedtoreassuretheShahofWestern
support."IdidhavemanyfrankprivatetalkswiththeShahduringwhichItriedto
encouragehim,"Hendersonlaterrecalled."Icanremember,forinstance,thatatonetime,
almostdespairingatthepositioninwhichMossadeghhadpushedhim,theShahhad
decidedtogoabroad.Ipledwithhimnottodoso,pointingoutthathisdeparturemight
wellleadtothelossofIran'sindependence.Iwasgreatlyrelievedwhenhedecidedthatit
washisdutytoremaininthecountryregardlessofthehumiliationsthatMossadeghwas
heapingonhim."34
Page204
Thesimplest,mostdirectwaytobuckupthewaveringShahwouldhavebeenfor
Roosevelthimselftogodirectlytothepalace,buttheDullesbrothersweredeterminedto
keepAJAXaclandestineoperation.WhentheyagreedtoallowRoosevelttoserveasthe
agentinchargeofAJAX,itwaswiththeexplicitunderstandingthathewouldremain
completelyoutofsight.''Hehasaveryprominentfamilyname,"FosterDulleshad
declared,chuckling."Hewillhavetokeepawayfromanyonewhomightknowhim."The
SecretarydidnotwanttheAmericanrolerevealed,underanycircumstances.35
Roosevelthadthereforesetuphiscommandpostinthebasementofa"safehouse"in
Teheran,buttherecouldbenocoupiftheShahwasafraidtoact,andinearlyAugustthe
Shahwaswaveringmorethanever.Atthisjuncture,GeneralSchwarzkopfappearedin
Iran,"armedwithadiplomaticpassportandacoupleoflargebags"containing"millions
ofdollars."*
SchwarzkopfrequestedandwasgrantedanaudiencewiththeShah.ButH.I.M.,fearing
spiesinhisownpalace,wascautious,andSchwarzkopfsreassurancesofWesternsupport
werenotconvincing.MeanwhiletheTudehPartynewspapershadlearnedof
Schwarzkopf'spresence.Inspecialeditions,theyloudlydenouncedH.I.M.forhis
contactswith"brainlessagentsofinternationalreaction."Mossadeghwasfurious.He
threatenedtoholdanotherreferendum,thistimetodeposetheShah.Thecrisiswasat
hand.
ObviouslySchwarzkopfhadtogetoutofthecountry,fast.Beforeleaving,hemetwith
Roosevelt."Kim,"hesaid,"yousimplyarenotgoingtobeabletodealwiththe
Shahanshahthroughanyintermediary.I'mconvincedthatyouwillhavetomeetwith
H.I.M.personally."Nothingshortofadirectmeetingbetweenthetwomenwould
convincetheShahtoact.37
Rooseveltagreedemphatically.UsingacommunicationsnetworksetupbytheBritishon
Cyprus,hegotIketoaddaphrasetoaspeechhewasmakinginSanFrancisco,and
Churchilltoalter
*KimRooseveltdeniesthefigure;heclaimstherewasonly$1millionandonly$100,000actually
spent.Afterhisretirementin1962,onaCBStelevisionshow,AllenDulleswasaskedwhetherit
wastruethat"theCIApeoplespentliterallymillionsofdollarshiringpeopletoriotinthestreets
anddootherthings,togetridofMossadegh.Isthereanythingyoucansayaboutthat?""Well,"
Dullesreplied,"Icansaythatthestatementthatwespentmanydollarsdoingthatisutterlyfalse."36
Page205
theBBCtimeannouncement.Thatnighthemadethefirstinhisseriesofclandestine
visitstothepalace,wherehemanagedtoconvincetheShahthatwithEisenhower,
Churchill,andaRooseveltstandingbehindhim,H.I.M.couldaffordtoact.
Page206
ChapterFifteen
Iran:TheAct
AUGUST10,1953.PrimeMinisterMossadeghpostponesprohibitionforoneyear.
KennettLoveoftheNewYorkTimesreportsthat"winejugsalloverthislandofOmar
Khayyam[are]tiltedtodayincelebration."ProhibitionwasvotedinbytheMajlis,
undertheleadershipofSpeakerAyatollahKashani,afewmonthsearlier,*but
MossadeghhassincethendissolvedtheMajlisandnow,inabidforpopularsupport,
Mossadeghhimselfateetotaleroverridesthelaw.ReporterLoveguessesthathismotive
istoappeasetheRussians,whoarecontinuingfinancialnegotiationswithIran,amajor
exportmarketforRussianvodka.
Obviouslydelightedhimself,LoveinformsTimesreadersthat"vodkaisextremely
importantinTeheranlife,beingservediniceddecanterswithbowlsofcaviarbeside
splashingfountainsunderweepingwillowtreesinwalledgardencafes.Asthedeadline
forprohibitionapproached,thirstypatronsofIraniantavernsaskedwiththeancient
tentmakerpoet,'Iwonderoftenwhatthevintnersbuyone-halfsopreciousasthestuff
theysell.'"1
ForKimRoosevelt,hidinginhissafehouse,thebignewswasnotthedelayof
prohibition,butratherthedistressingwordthattheShahhadfledhiscapital.After
agreeingtosignaroyaldecreedismissingMossadeghandreplacinghimwithGeneral
Zahedi,H.I.M.hadlosthisnerve.Togetherwithhisqueen,hehad
*Becausethefinancialsituationhasbeensobad,andbecauseliquortaxesproducedessential
revenue,theimplementationofprohibitionhadbeensetsixmonthsinthefuture.
Page207
flownofftohissummerpalaceontheCaspianSeawithoutsigningthedecree.
Roosevelt,double-crossedandfurious,consultedwithhistwoIranianagents.Hesent
themtoColonelNematollahNassiry;theybulliedNassiryintoflyingtotheCaspianwith
theroyaldecreesandinstructionstomakesuretheShahsignedthem.Nassirygotthere
safelyandmanagedtoconvincetheShahtosign,butthentheweatherclosedinandhe
wasunabletoflybacktoTeheran.
SoRooseveltfumed."Wesat,"helaterwrote,"inthedaytimearoundthepool,afterdark
inthelivingroom,smoking,drinkingmildvodkaswithlimejuice,playinghearts...or
backgammon,andcursingheartfeltobscenitiesatunpredictableintervals."2
Healsosent,viatheBritish-controlledcommunicationsnetworkonCyprus,regular
reportsbacktoWashington.Ikerecalledinhismemoirs,"Iconferreddailywithofficials
oftheStateandDefensedepartmentsandtheCentralIntelligenceAgency,andsaw
reportsfromourrepresentativesonthespotwhowereworkingactivelywiththeShah's
supporters."Thesereports,headded,"oftensoundedmorelikeadimenovelthan
historicalfacts."3
Atmidnight,August12,ColonelNassiryreturnedwiththesigneddocuments.Butto
Roosevelt'sdismay,theycouldnotbedeliveredfortwodaysbecausetheIranian
weekendhadbegun.Thushesatbythepool,smokingcigarettes,drinkingvodka-limes,
andplayingasongfromthecurrenthitBroadwaymusicalGuysandDolls"LuckBea
LadyTonight."4
Mossadegh,meanwhile,hadlearnedofthedecreesdismissinghimfromoffice.So,when
ColonelNassiryappearedinthemiddleofthenightofAugust14-15beforethePrime
Minister'shomeonTakht-i-Jamshid,afewblockswestoftheAmericanEmbassy,he
founditsurroundedbyAmerican-madetanks,guardedbytroopswhowereobeying
ordersfromGeneralTazhiRiahi,theIranianchiefofstaffandaMossadeghloyalist.The
troopshadbeeninstructedtokeepNassiryaway,buthestrodeforwardboldly,infull
uniform,andannouncedthathehadaroyaldecreetodeliver.AstheShahlaterwrote,
"TheColonelhadjudgedcorrectlythatthetankcrewsandothertroopsknewhimsowell,
andweresoaccustomedtorespectinghisauthority,thattheycouldnotbringthemselves
toshoothimdown."5
NassirydemandedaccesstoMossadegh.Thiswasrefused.Hethendemandedareceipt
forthedeliveryoftheroyaldecree.This
Page208
wasrefused.Nassirywouldnotleavewithoutareceipt.Finally,afteranhourandahalf
wait,hegotareceiptsignedbyaservant.Thedelay,however,wasfatalbeforeNassiry
couldwithdraw,GeneralRiahihadhimarrestedandbroughttohisoffice.Riahistripped
Nassiryofhisuniformandputhimbehindbars.
Thenextmorningat7A.M.Mossadeghmadearadiobroadcast.Heannouncedthatthe
Shah,encouragedby"foreignelements,"hadattemptedacoupd'etat,andthat
heMossadeghwasthereforecompelledtotakeallpoweruntohimself.Hesentoutorders
toarresteveryknownsupporteroftheShahinTeheran.GeneralRiahi'stroopsstarted
turningthecityupsidedownlookingforGeneralZahedi,whomMossadeghdenounced
asatraitor.
TheycouldnotfindZahedibecauseKimRoosevelthadtakenhimtoasafehousenear
theAmericanEmbassy,aplacewithabigbasementandsurroundedbyahighwall.From
thatspot,Zahedibeganmakinghisownradiobroadcasts,claimingthathewasthe
rightfulPrimeMinister,bydecreeoftheShah,andthatMossadeghwastherealtraitor.6
Atthisjuncture,theShahfledIran,withQueenSoraya,oneaide,andthepilotofhis
Beechcraft.Theyhadnoluggageandnopassports.TheyflewtoBaghdad,wherethe
IraqiGovernmentagreedtoallowthemtostayforaday.
InTeheran,meanwhile,theTudehhitthestreets.Mobsswelled,chanted"Downwiththe
Shah,""DeathtotheAmericans,""Yankees,gohome!"Theysurgedupanddownthe
streets,smashedstatuesoftheShahandhisfather,andjoyfullylootedeverythingthey
couldgrab.
"Frankly,"KimRooseveltconfessed,"itscaredthehelloutofme."7
Theriotswentonfortwodays.TheShahflewtoRome.AllenDulleshoppedaplaneto
Rometoconferwithhim.FosterDulles,afterconsultingwithIke,toldLoyHenderson
(whohadbeenon"vacation"asapartoftheAJAXcoverplan)toreturntoTeheranto
seewhathecoulddothere.
Henderson'sreturnprovedtobethedecisivestroke.HearrivedonAugust18.Kim
Roosevelt,againhuddledonabackseatunderablanket,madehiswaybycartothe
embassytoconsult."We'verunintosomesmallcomplications,"Rooseveltruefully
confessed.HesuggestedthatHendersonseeMossadegh,complainabout
Page209
harassmenttoAmericans,andthreatentopullallAmericancitizensoutofthecountryifit
didnotstop.8
HendersondemandedandgotanimmediateaudiencewithMossadegh.ThePrime
MinisterlaunchedintoacondemnationoftheU.S.Government.HesaidthatCIAagents
hadpersuadedtheShahtoissuetheroyaldecrees,whichheshoutedwereillegal,asonly
Parliamentcouldremovehimfromoffice.
Henderson,brushingallthecomplaintsaside,saidhehadcometotalkaboutthepresence
ofAmericancitizensinTeheran.TheTudehmobswereathreattotheirlivesandsafety.
Inaninterviewyearslater,Hendersonrecalled,"ItoldthePrimeMinisterthatunlessthe
IranianpolicewerepreparedtostopCommunistpillagingandattacks,itwouldbemy
dutytoorderallAmericanstoleavethecountryatonce."
NowitwasoldMossy'sturntolosehisnerve.HebeggedHendersonnottodoit.An
Americanevacuationwouldlookjustterrible,makeitappearthathisgovernmentwasnot
abletogovern.Heassertedthathewasperfectlycapableofmaintaininglawandorder.
HendersonchargedthathedidnotbelieveMossadeghrealizedtheextenttowhichthe
Tudehhadbeengivenafreehandtoransackthecity.
MossadeghcalledinanaideandaskedifitweretruethattheTudehpeoplewereroaming
thestreetsingangs,pillaging,destroying,andattackingforeigners.Whentheaidesaidit
certainlywastrue,Hendersonsaid,"InmypresenceMossadeghpickedupthetelephone,
calledtheChiefofPolice,andgaveordersthatthepolicebeinstructedimmediatelyto
restoreordertothestreets,tobreakuptherovinggangswhowereengagingin
violence."9
Itwastheoldman'sfatalmistake.TheSchwarzkopf-trainedpolice,previouslyunder
ordersnottotakestepsthatmightoffendtheTudeh,weredelightedtobeturnedloose.
KennettLovereportedtotheNewYorkTimes,"Policemenandsoldiersswungintoaction
tonightagainstriotingTudehpartisansandNationalistextremists.Thetroopsappearedto
beinafrenzyastheysmashedintotherioterswithclubbedriflesandnightsticks,and
hurledteargasbombs."10
Thefollowingmorning,August19,KimRooseveltsprangintoaction.TheproMossadeghforceswereoffthestreets,thedaywasalreadyhot,theatmosphere
oppressive.RooseveltgavehisIranian
Page210
agentstheordertostrike.HehadearlierdescribedtheseagentstotheShah:"Theyare
extremelycompetent,professional'organizers'whohavealreadydemonstratedtheir
competence.Theyhaveastrongteamunderthem,theycandistributepamphlets,organize
mobs,keeptrackoftheoppositionyounameit,they'lldoit."Rooseveltalsotoldthe
Shah,"Wehaveagiganticsafenexttomyprincipalassistant'soffice.Itisinabigcloset
andoccupiesthewholespace.Thissafeisjam-packedwithrialnotes....Wehavethe
equivalentofaboutonemilliondollarsinthatsafe."11
ThatwasthemoneySchwarzkopfhadbroughtinfromtheCIA.Roosevelt'sIranian
agentsnowbegantobuythemselvesamob.
TheystartedwiththeZirkanehgiants,weightlifterswhodevelopedtheirphysiques
throughanancientIraniansetofexerciseswhichincludedliftingprogressivelyheavier
weights.TheZirkanehshadbuiltuptremendousshouldersandhugebiceps.Shuffling
downthestreettogether,theywereafrighteningspectacle.Twohundredorsoofthese
weightliftersbeganthedaybymarchingthroughthebazaar,shouting"LongLivethe
Shah!"anddancingandtwirlinglikedervishes.Alongtheedgesofthecrowd,menwere
passingoutten-rialnotes,adornedwithahandsomeportraitofH.I.M.Themobswelled;
thechant"LongLivetheShah!"wasdeafening.AsthethrongpassedtheofficesofaproMossadeghnewspaper,mensmashedthewindowsandsackedtheplace.12
"DoyouthinkthetimehascometoturnGeneralZahediloosetoleadthecrowd?"oneof
Roosevelt'sassistantsaskedhim.
Notyet,hereplied."Thereisnothingtobegainedbyrushing.Let'swaittillthecrowd
getstoMossadegh'shouse.Thatshouldbeagoodmomentforourherotomakehis
appearance."13
Roosevelt'sradiooperatorappeared,tearsstreamingdownhisface.Hehadamessage
fromBedellSmith,amessageSmithhadsenttwenty-fourhoursearlier,butwhichthe
BritishonCyprushadheldupforaday.Themessagesaid,ineffect,"Giveupandget
out."
Withaheartylaughandabroadgrin,Rooseveltjotteddownareplyfortheradiooperator
tosendbacktoCyprus:"Yoursof18Augustreceived.HappytoreportZahedisafely
installedandShahwillbereturningtoTeheranintriumphshortly.Loveandkissesfrom
alltheteam."14
Withthat,Rooseveltlefthisbasementhideoutandwentoutintothestreets.Hewasonhis
waytopickupZahedi.HeranintoGen
Page211
eralGuilanshah,chiefoftheAirForce,infulluniform.GuilanshahrecognizedRoosevelt
andeagerlyofferedtohelp.Roosevelttoldhimtopickupatank.Guilanshahasked
whereZahediwas,andRooseveltgavehimtheaddress.
ArrivingatZahedi'shidingplace,RooseveltfoundthePrimeMinister-designateinthe
cellar,wearingonlyhiswinterunderwear.InbrokenGerman,Roosevelttoldhimtoget
dressed.Thegeneralputonhisfull-dressuniform.Ashebuttonedhistunic,Guilanshah
burstintotheroom.Hehadatankwaitingoutside.15
Intellingthestoryyearslater,CIAagentsembellishedituntilamythdevelopedthatKim
Roosevelt,inthegrandtraditionofhisRoughRidergrandfather,hadmountedthelead
tankandledthewaytoMossadegh'shome.Infact,hestayedoutofsight.Zahediledthe
mob,supportedbytanksroundedupbyColonelNassiryandGeneralGuilanshah.
AccordingtotheShah(whoofcoursewasnotthere),anamazingcrosssectionofthe
peopleofIranledtheassaultonMossadegh'sforces"students,artisans,manuallabourers,
professionalmen,policemen,membersofthegendarmerie,andsoldiers."16Accordingto
TimesreporterLove(whowasthere),thetwo-hourbattlethatragedoutsideMossadegh's
homewasfoughtbetweenthosesoldiersloyaltoMossadegh,andactingunderGeneral
Riahi'sorders,andtroopsfollowingZahedi.Onehundredwerekilled,threehundred
injured.Zahedi'sforcesprevailed,asRiahi'smenranoutofammunition.17
Atdusk,Royalisttroopsoverwhelmedtheremaininghouseholdguardandentered
Mossadegh'shome.Theoldmanwasgonehehadslippedoutthebackway.
Zahediwenttotheofficers'club,whichwasjam-packedandriotous,tocelebrate.Kim
RooseveltwentfirsttotheAmericanEmbassy,whereheandLoyHendersonopened
champagnetotoast"theShah,Zahedi,DwightEisenhower,WinstonChurchill,andone
another."ThenRooseveltproceededtotheofficers'club,where"everyone,totalstrangers
aswellasgoodfriends,embracedme,kissedmeonbothcheeks."18
TheShahreceivedthenewsthenextdaywhilehewaslunchingathishotelinRome.The
Timesreportedthat"hewentpaleandhishandsshooksoviolentlythathehardlywas
abletoreadwhennewspapermenshowedhimthefirstreports.'Canitbetrue?'heasked.
TheQueenwasfarmorecalm.'Howexciting,'sheexclaimed,placingherhandonthe
Shah'sarmtosteadyhim."
Page212
Alittlelater,inapressinterview,theShahdeclared,"Itshowshowthepeoplestand.
Ninety-ninepercentofthepopulationisforme.Iknewitallthetime."19
Thatsameday,August20,Mossadegh,tearsstreamingdownhisface,hisnosedripping,
leaningheavilyonhiscane,anddressedonlyinhispinkpajamas,acceptedhisfateand
surrenderedtoZahedi.20
Withthat,ZahedisentatelegramtotheShah."TheIranianpeople,andyourdevoted
Army,areawaitingyourreturnwiththegreatestimpatienceandarecountingtheminutes.
Ibegyoutohastenyourjourneybackinorderthatyourpeoplemayshowyoutheir
sentimentsastheysoardentlywishtodo."21
H.I.M.decidedtoreturn.Aftersuchatouchingdisplayofaffectionandloyaltyfromhis
subjects,howcouldhedootherwise?OnSaturday,August22,HisImperialMajesty,the
Shahanshah,MohammedRezaShahPahlavi,LightoftheAryans,returnedintriumphto
hiscapital.PrimeMinisterZahedi,allmembersofthenewCabinet,theentirediplomatic
corps,"andmobsofdeliriouslyhappycitizensfromallranksoflife"(atleastaccordingto
KimRoosevelt)wereattheairporttogreethim.
Midnight,August23,1953.KimRooseveltdrove,onelasttime,tothepalace.Thistime
hesatup.HisvehiclewasplainlymarkedasbelongingtotheAmericanEmbassy.There
wasnoblanket.Guardssalutedwithaflourishasheentered.Insteadofsneakingintothe
car,theShahreceivedtheAmericanagentinhisoffice.Afrock-coatedattendant
appearedwithvodkaandcaviarcanapés.TheShahgraciouslymotionedforRooseveltto
beseated.
Hisfirstwordswere,"IowemythronetoGod,mypeople,myarmyandtoyou!"He
raisedhisglassinatoast.22
OnhiswayhometotheStates,RooseveltstoppedinLondontobriefChurchill.At
Number10DowningStreet,hefoundthePrimeMinisterproppedupinbedtheseventynineyear-oldChurchillhadsufferedastroke.Rooseveltsatbesidethebed.
"WemetatyourcousinFranklin's,didwenot?"Churchillasked.Rooseveltnodded."I
thoughtso.Well,youhaveanexcitingstorytotell.I'manxioustohearit."
WhenRooseveltfinishedhistale,Churchillsmiled."Young
Page213
man,"hesaid,"ifIhadbeenbutafewyearsyounger,Iwouldhavelovednothingbetter
thantohaveservedunderyourcommandinthisgreatventure."
Afewdayslater,RooseveltreportedinWashingtontotheDullesbrothers,Secretaryof
DefenseWilson,AdmiralArthurRadford,andGeneralAndrewGoodpaster.Inthebest
CIAfashion,hehadaneasel,maps,achart,theworks.Hewentintogreatdetail.His
audience,helaterwrote,"seemedalmostalarminglyenthusiastic.JohnFosterDulleswas
leaningbackinhischair....Hiseyesweregleaming;heseemedtobepurringlikea
giantcat."23
Then,andlater,EisenhowerandhisassociateswereextremelycoyaboutRoosevelt'srole
inthecoup.Ikedidadmitinhismemoirs:"ThroughoutthiscrisistheUnitedStates
governmenthaddoneeverythingitpossiblycouldtobackuptheShah."Eisenhowerwas
onvacationinColoradowhenKimRooseveltreturned.Hewascarefulnottomeetwith
RooseveltorhaveanydirectconnectionwithAJAX.InhismemoirsIkedidquotea
portionofRoosevelt'sreport,butonlythatpartthatdealtwiththeaftermath("TheShahis
anewman.Forthefirsttime,hebelievesinhimself.."etc.),andhestatedflatlythatthe
reportwaspreparedby"anAmericaninIran,unidentifiedtome."24
Inaprivateinterviewtwodecadeslater,whenLoyHendersonwasaskedifhecould
identifythis"unknown"American,hereplied,"Yes,IthinkIknow,butI'mnotatliberty
totellyou."25Overthefollowingdecadesrumorsflew,mythsgrew,untilin1979Kim
Rooseveltdecidedtosettherecordstraightandwrotehisownaccountofthecoup.*
ThereckoninginIranwentasfollows:Mossadeghwastried,foundguiltyoftreason,and
sentencedtothreeyearssolitaryconfinement.ColonelNassirybecameBrigadierGeneral
Nassiry.PrimeMinisterZahedireestablisheddiplomaticrelationswiththeBritish.An
internationalconsortiumofWesternoilcompaniessignedatwenty-five-yearpactwith
Iranforitsoil.TheoldAngloPersianOilCompanygot40percent,RoyalDutchShellgot
14percent,theCompagnieFrançaisedesPetrolesgot6percent,andtheAmericans(Gulf,
StandardofNewJersey,Texaco,andSocony-Mobil)got40percent.Underaspecial
rulingbytheDepart*SeeNote1,p.334.
Page214
mentofJustice,theAmericanoilcompaniesparticipatedintheconsortiumwithoutfear
ofprosecutionundertheantitrustlaws.
SotheBritishhadfailedtostoptheinevitabletheylosttheirmonopolywhilethe
Americanshadmanagedtopreventtheimprobable,aCommunisttakeoverinIran.
InSeptember1953,PresidentEisenhowerannouncedanimmediateallocationof$45
millioninemergencyeconomicaidtoIran,withanother$40milliontofollow.On
October8,Ikewroteinhisdiary,''NowiftheBritishwillbeconciliatory...iftheShah
andhisnewpremier,GeneralZahedi,willbeonlyalittlebitflexible,andtheUnited
Stateswillstandbytohelpbothfinanciallyandwithwisecounsel,wemayreallygivea
seriousdefeattoRussianintentionsandplansinthatarea.
"Ofcourse,itwillnotbesoeasyfortheIranianeconomytoberestored,evenifher
refineriesagainbegintooperate.Thisisduetothefactthatduringthelongperiodof
shutdownofheroilfields,worldbuyershavegonetoothersourcesofsupply....Iran
reallyhasnoreadymarketforhervastoilproduction.However,thisisaproblemthatwe
shouldbeabletohelpsolve."26
Sixyearsafterthecoup,PresidentEisenhowervisitedIran.AnAmericanobserversaid
thatthedrivefromtheairporttotheShah'spalacewasatremendoustriumphthestreets
werepackedwithcheeringthrongs(thepeoplewerepaidten-rialnotestobethere,orso
theobserverwasgiventounderstand).Theentiredistance,fiveorsixmiles,wascovered
withPersianrugsoverwhichthelimousinedrove.TensofthousandsofPersianrugs.
WhateverelsemightbesaidoftheShah,hewasnocheapskatewhenitcametoshowing
hisgratitude.27
Page215
ChapterSixteen
Guatemala
Abright,sunnydayinearlyMay,1954.AttheEastGermanportofStettin,
longshoremengruntastheyworkalongthedocks,movingheavycrateswith
CzechoslovakianmarkingsontoaSwedishmerchantvessel,theAlfhem.Seagullsswirl
overhead,theirraucouscriesblendinginwiththeshoutsofthelongshoremen.Froma
nearby,unuseddock,abirdwatcherstudiesthegulls,scanningthescenewithhis
binoculars,hopingtospotanexoticspecies.
Thebirdwatcherblinks,lowershisglasses,rubshiseyes,raisesandrefocusesthe
binoculars.Thereisnomistake.Theworkersareusingcranestoliftsmallartillery
piecesintotheholdoftheAlfhem.Thebirdermakessomenotesonhisspecieslist,
thenslowlysauntersoffintheotherdirection,continuingtoscantheskyforraregulls.
Returningtohisapartment,thebirdwatcherwhowasinrealityaCIAagentwrotea
seeminglyinnocuouslettertoaFrenchautomobilepartsconcerninParis.Toithe
attachedasmallmicrofilmdot.TheagentinParistranslatedthemicrofilmmessageinto
codethemessagestartedwiththetwenty-secondprayerofDavidintheBookofPsalms,
whichbegins,"MyGod,myGod,whyhasThouforsakenme?"Hesentitviaradioto
Washington.ThateveninginWashingtonanotheragentdecodedthemessage,then
reportedtoAllenDulles.AshipmentofCommunist-blockarmswasonitswayto
Guatemala.
DullesinstructedstillanotheragenttocheckoutthereportastheAlfhempassedthrough
theKielCanal.Hediscoveredthatal
Page216
thoughtheAlfhem'smanifestlistedhercargoasopticalglassandlaboratorysupplies,and
herdestinationasDakar,Africa,infactthefreighterwascarryingtwothousandtonsof
smallarms,ammunition,andlightartillerypiecesfromthefamousSkodaarmsfactoryin
Czechoslovakia.HerrealdestinationwasPuertoBarrios,Guatemala.1
OnMay15,1954,theAlfhem,afterchangingcourseseveraltimesinanefforttoconfuse
theCIA,tiedupatPuertoBarrios.Twodayslater,asshewasbeingunloaded,Secretary
ofStateJohnFosterDullescalledapressconference,whereheannouncedthata
shipmentofarmsfrombehindtheIronCurtainhadarrivedinthewesternhemisphere,in
defianceoftheMonroeDoctrine.Immediately,Washingtonwasinanuproar.Senator
AlexanderWileyoftheForeignRelationsCommitteecalledtheshipment"partofthe
masterplanofworldcommunism,"andPresidentEisenhowerassertedthatthis"quantity
ofarmsfarexceededanylegitimate,normalrequirementsfortheGuatemalanarmed
forces."2
Ikewasright,butthearmswerenotintendedforthearmedforces.Instead,thePresident
ofGuatemala,JacoboArbenzGuzmán,intendedtodistributethemtohissupportersin
ordertocreateapeople'smilitia,freeofanycontrolbytheregulararmyofficercorps.
ArbenznolongertrustedtheAmerican-equippedand-trainedGuatemalanarmedforces.3
TheAmericanpublicresponsewasswift.TheEisenhoweradministrationannouncedthat
itwasairliftingfiftytonsofrifles,pistols,machineguns,andammunition("hardly
enoughtocreateapprehension"inGuatemala,Ikelaterwrote)toGuatemala'sneighbors,
NicaraguaandHonduras.Inaddition,EisenhowerdeclaredablockadeofGuatemala,and
calledforameetingoftheOrganizationofAmericanStatestoconsiderfurthersteps.4
Thoseactswerebackedupbyafarmoreimportantdecision,madeatasecret,emergency
sessionoftheNationalSecurityCouncil,presidedoverbythePresidenthimself.Allen
DullespresentedtheCIA'Sassessmentofthesituation.Itwas,essentially,thatthe
CommunistsweretryingtoestablishafootholdinCentralAmericaasabasefor
operationsthroughouttheNewWorld,inblatantdisregardoftheMonroeDoctrine.He
indicatedthattheCIAhadnotbeencaughtunawares,thatitwasreadytomove.
Eisenhower
Page217
approvedtheprogramDullesoutlined.TheCIA-sponsoredinvasionofGuatemalawas
on.
LikevirtuallyeveryadministrationsinceTeddyRoosevelt's,Eisenhower'shadcomeinto
powerpromisinganewpolicytowardLatinAmerica.Nomoregunboatdiplomacy,no
morebig-bullytactics,nomoreMarineslandingthemomentagovernmenttothesouth
displeasedWashington.Inaddition,Eisenhower'schiefadviseronLatinAmericawashis
youngerbrotherMilton,oneofAmerica'sforemostexpertsonthearea,ahighly
intelligent,keenlysensitivemanwhowaswellawareofLatinresentmentofany
Americaninterventionforanyreasonintotheirinternalaffairs.Howthencoulditbethat
Ikewouldapproveandenthusiasticallyatthataclandestineoperationdesignedto
overthrowademocraticallyelectedgovernmentinfavorofamilitaryregime?
Tofriendlyobservers,theanswerwasclearandstraightforward.Thethreatof
internationalcommunismoverrodeallotherconsiderations.Ikewassimplynotgoingto
allowtheCommuniststoestablishabaseinCentralAmerica,abasefromwhichthey
couldsubvertthegovernmentsoftheirneighbors.
TocriticsoftheEisenhoweradministration,theanswerwasalsoclearand
straightforward.TheArbenzregimerepresentedathreattothefinancialinterestsofthe
UnitedFruitCompany;theUnitedFruitCompanyhadpowerfulfriendsinhighplaces
(includingtheSecretaryofStateandthedirectoroftheCIA);Eisenhowerthereforeacted
toprotectUnitedFruit.
ThefirstviewwasstatedinofficialforminOctober1954bytheAmericanambassadorto
Guatemala,JohnE.Peurifoy,intestimonybeforetheSubcommitteeonLatinAmericaof
theHouseSelectCommitteeonCommunistAggression:"TheArbenzgovernment,
beyondanyquestion,wascontrolledanddominatedbyCommunists.ThoseCommunists
weredirectedfromMoscow.TheGuatemalangovernmentandtheCommunistleadersof
thatcountrydidcontinuouslyandactivelyinterveneintheinternalaffairsofneighboring
countriesinanefforttocreatedisorderandoverthrowestablishedgovernments.Andthe
CommunistconspiracyinGuatemaladidrepresentaveryrealandveryseriousmenaceto
thesecurityoftheUnitedStates."5
ThesecondviewwasexpressedinaninterviewinDecember
Page218
1977bytheCIA'SpoliticaldirectoroftheoperationdesignedtooverthrowArbenz,E.
HowardHunt.Huntdeclared,"I'veoftensaidofthatproject[Guatemala]thatwedidthe
rightthingforthewrongreason.AndIalwaysfeltasenseofdistasteoverthat.Iwasn'ta
mercenaryworkerforUnitedFruit.Ifwehadaforeignpolicyobjectivewhichwasto
assuretheobservanceoftheMonroeDoctrineinthehemispherethenfine,thatisone
thing;butbecauseUnitedFruitorsomeotherAmericanenterprisehaditsinterests
confiscatedorthreatened,thatistomenoreasonatall."6
UnitedFruit'sinvolvementinGuatemalabeganshortlyaftertheturnofthecenturywhen,
becausethefertilecountryoffered"anidealinvestmentclimate,"itbecamethesiteofthe
company'slargestdevelopmentactivity.Thequaintlittlebananarepublic,inwhichallbut
thefewenjoyedwhatMexicansusedtocalllapazdelatumba(thepeaceofthetomb),
wassafeforforeigncompanies,foreignmerchants,wanderingforeignstudents,scholars
ofMayanantiquities,andmissionaries.Thecompanywasthedominanteconomic
institutioninGuatemalanlife.7
In1931,astheDepressionhitGuatemala,anewcaudillo(dictator),JorgeUbico,took
power.FouryearslaterthelawfirmthatrepresentedUnitedFruit,Sullivanand
Cromwell,negotiatedaninety-nine-yearcontractwithUbicothatimprovedthecompany's
alreadyfavorableposition.First,UnitedFruitgotmoreland,bringingitstotalpossession
tomorethanthecombinedholdingsofhalfofGuatemala'slandowningpopulation,
includingtheCatholicChurch.Second,thecontractexemptedUnitedFruitfromvirtually
alltaxesandduties;eventheexporttaxonitsmajorcommodity,bananas,was
insignificant.Additionalconcessionsincludedunlimitedprofitremittancesanda
monopolyofthecommunicationandtransportationnetworks.
TheSullivanandCromwelllawyerwhonegotiatedthedealforUnitedFruitwasJohn
FosterDulles.8
In1944amilitaryjuntaoverthrewtheUbicodictatorship.InOctoberofthatyear,in
Guatemala'sfirstfreeelection,JuanJoséArévalowaselectedPresident.Arévalowasan
educatorandanintellectualwithleftisttendencies;hecalledhisprogram"spiritual
socialism,"aconceptwhichcausedmuchderision.UnitedFruitagentsmadeit
synonymouswithfuzzypoliticalthinkingandsoftnesstowardcommunism.Hisnickname
was"Sandia,"orthe
Page219
watermelon,whicheveryoneknowsisgreenontheoutsideandredinside.9
Arévalointroducedreformsthatweremodeled,inpart,ontheNewDeal,includinghealth
care,worker'scompensationbills,andasocialsecuritysystem.Hegavewomentheright
tovote.HestartedamassiveIndianliteracycampaign.Heallowedacompletelyfreepress
andtoleratedallpoliticalactivity.TheCatholicChurchtookadvantageofthisfreedomto
agitateagainsthim,sendinginanti-CommunistpriestsfromotherCentralAmerican
countrieswhoadoptedabitterlyanti-governmentline.Communistsalsoflockedtothe
country,bothpreviouslyexiledGuatemalansandforeign-born.TheCommunistshada
flourishingnewspaper,becameincreasinglyactiveinthegovernment,andbegan
organizinglaborunions.10
In1947theArévalogovernmentenactedanewLaborCode.Thecodecalledfor
compulsorylabor-managementcontracts;itrequiredcollectivebargainingingoodfaith;it
expresslyacknowledgedtherightofworkerstoorganize;itestablishedtheprincipleof
minimumsalaries.AtthattimetheFBIwasstillresponsibleforespionageinLatin
America,andJ.EdgarHoover'smenbegancompilingdossiersonArévaloandother
leadingfiguresinthegovernment.Thesedocuments,whichhaverecentlybeen
declassifiedundertheFreedomofInformationAct,revealthatmostoftheFBI's
informantswereformerUbicosupporterswhonaturallyenoughstressedtheCommunist
influenceinthenewgovernment.Themain"proof"wasArévalo'sencouragementof
laborunions.11
MuchoftheFBI'sevidenceofGuatemala'spenetrationbyinternationalcommunismwas
equallysilly.Forexample,in1950,TapleyBennett,theStateDepartment'sofficerin
chargeofCentralAmericanAffairs,chargedthatGuatemala'sfailuretosignthe1947Rio
deJaneiroTreatyofReciprocalAssistance(whichcalledforAmericannationstocometo
eachother'saidintheeventofanarmedattack)was"apertinentexampleoftheinfluence
onGovernmentthinking[inGuatemala]byCommunist-mindedindividuals."12Infact,
Guatemala'soppositionstemmedfromitshistoriccontroversywithHondurasoverBelize.
EventhemilitarygovernmentthattheUnitedStatessetupinGuatemalain1954,whenit
signedtheRioTreaty,addedthereservation,"ThepresentTreatyconstitutesno
impedimentpreventingGuatemala
Page220
fromassertingitsrightwithrespecttotheGuatemalanterritoryofBelizebyanymeansby
whichitmaydeemmostadvisable."13
Therewas,however,somerealevidenceofCommunistinfiltration.Intheregularly
scheduledelectionsof1950,thecampaignmanagerofwinningcandidateJacoboArbenz
GuzmánwasJoséManuelFortuny,founderoftheGuatemalanCommunistPartyand
editorofitsnewspaper.(ButArbenzvehementlydeniedthathehimselfwasa
Communist,andFortunylosthisownbidforaseatintheNationalAssembly.)Arbenz
wasinauguratedonMarch19,1951;twoweekslaterFortunysigned,forthefirsttime,a
publicmanifestoastheSecretary-GeneraloftheCommunistPartyofGuatemala.In
OctobertheConfederationGeneraldeTrabajadoresdeGuatemalabecamethesingle
nationallaborfederation,withaself-proclaimedCommunistasSecretary-General.Two
monthslater,theCGTGaffiliatedwiththeWorldFederationofTradeUnions,the
Communistinternationallaborfront.14
OnemanwhoneverquestionedtheCommunistinfluenceonArbenzwastheCIA'sagent
inMexicoCity,E.HowardHunt.Ofmediumheight,Huntwasbroad-shouldered,
powerful,sureofhimself.Casualofmanner,softofvoice,hewasneverthelessdeliberate
inhismovements,straightforwardinhisactions.Articulateandintelligent,hehadaflair
fordescriptiveandimaginativewritingandapenchantforaction.Hewasquicktoform
judgmentsandbrutalinexpressingthem.
Intheearlyfifties,HuntwassendinginreportsfromMexicostressingthedangersin
Guatemala.MostofhisinformationcamefromMexicanstudentswhohadconfereesin
Guatemala.Huntwas,inhisownwords,"subsidizinganddirectingaverypowerfulantiCommuniststudentorganizationinMexico,andtheseyoungpeople,andit'snotproperto
callthemagentsbecausetheydidn'tknowwhowasbehindthem,werereportingstudent
activitiesinGuatemala,andthiswasveryalarming."
WhenaskedaboutArbenzhimself,Huntreplied,"WellFortunywastheprincipal
Communist.HeandArbenz'wife,whocamefromaverygoodSalvadoreanfamily(in
facttheybecameneighborsofoursyearslaterinMontevideo).Arbenzwasaveryweak
individual.Histwodaughterswerebeautifulandnubile....She[thewife]wasreallythe
agitator,andhewassortofoneofthosefacelesspersons....Sheontheotherhand
representedthemightoftheCommunistworld.HewasIwouldsay
Page221
theirpuppet.*OfcourseIhadampleopportunityinlateryearstoobservethemin
Montevideo.Weevenbelongedtothesamecountryclub.Helikedtolivewell."15
WhetherornotArbenzwastheweaklingHuntthoughthewashisportraitshowsaman
strikinglyhandsome,inaSpanishDonsortofway,withahighforeheadandlong,
aristocraticnose,wholookedlikehemighthavebeenabullfighterifhehadnotbecome
apoliticiantheGuatemalanPresidentdidhaveenoughcouragetopushthroughthe
AgrarianReformLawof1952.InthewordsofonecarefulhistorianoftheGuatemalan
revolution,"ThelawitselfiswidelyacceptedbycriticswritinginbothSpanishand
EnglishasjustifiedunderGuatemalanconditionsandasbasicallyaimedatidleland."16
ThebillredistributedallestatestakenbythegovernmentfromGermanownersduring
WorldWarII.Moreimportant,itexpropriatedsome240,000acresofUnitedFruit's
Pacificcoastholdings,allofitidleland,and(ayearlater)another173,000idleacreson
theAtlanticcoast.Thisleftthecompanywith162,000acres,ofwhichonly50,000were
undercultivation.Arbenzofferedtopay$600,000fortheland,butinlong-termnonnegotiableagrarianbonds.17Eisenhower,whileadmittingthat"expropriationinitself
doesnot,ofcourse,proveCommunism,"neverthelesschargedthatthecompensation
offeredwas"woefullyinadequate"for"thisdiscriminatoryandunfairseizure."18The
figure$600,000,however,wasnotpulledoutofthinairitwasUnitedFruit'sowndeclared
valuationfortaxpurposes.
Thecompany,furious,struckbackwithallitsconsiderableresources.Althoughitwas
notabletoforcetheTrumanadministrationtosendintheMarinesorotherwiseactively
intervene,itdiduseitscontactsandinfluencetopictureArbenzasaCommunisttobe
feared.TheseUnitedFruitcontactsincludedSpruilleBraden,AssistantSecretaryofState
forLatinAmericanAffairs,laterpublicrelationsdirectorforthecompany,andEdward
Miller,Jr.,anotherassistantsecretarywhohadbeenamemberofSullivanandCromwell.
TheyhelpedpaintthepictureofArbenzthatUnitedFruitwantedtheAmericanpeopleto
see.Thecompanylaunchedasizablepublicitycampaignandsponsoredjunketsto
Guatemala.
*LaterinthesameinterviewHuntcharacterizedArbenzas"notanervyguy,aweakling...[who
dranktoomuch]totallydominatedbyhisactuallyverycompetentwife...."
Page222
Truman'sGuatemalanambassador,RichardPatterson,Jr.,saidthathecouldtella
Communistbyapplyingthe"ducktest."Heexplained,"Manytimesitisimpossibleto
provelegallythatacertainindividualisaCommunist;butforcasesofthissortI
recommendapracticalmethodofdetectionthe'ducktest.'...Supposeyouseeabird
walkingaroundinafarmyard.Thisbirdwearsnolabelthatsays'duck.'Butthebird
certainlylookslikeaduck.Also,hegoestothepondandyounoticethatheswimslikea
duck.Thenheopenshisbeakandquackslikeaduck.Well,bythistimeyouhave
probablyreachedtheconclusionthatthebirdisaduck,whetherhe'swearingalabelor
not."19
Patterson'ssuccessor,appointedbyIke,wasJohnPeurifoy.AccordingtoHowardHunt,
Peurifoygotthejobforthreereasons.First,theRepublicanswerestuckwithhim."You
knowPeurifoystartedoutasanelevatoroperator,"Huntexplained,"andwiththe
oncomingEisenhoweradministrationhewouldhavebeencastout,buttheDemocratsdid
whattheyaresoskillfulatdoing,theyencapsulatedtheirpeople,givingthemcivilservice
protection....Therewasahellofastinkatthetime.Inanyevent,Peurifoywasan
unwantedmanattheambassadoriallevel."Second,hehadbeenambassadortoGreecein
thelateforties,atthetimeoftheTrumanDoctrine,sohehadexperiencefighting
Communists.Third,"hewasexpendable.NobodyintheEisenhoweradministrationowed
himadamnthing...andtheyneededaguywhocouldtaketheheatincasethingswent
wrong."20
PeurifoyappliedPatterson'sducktesttoArbenzanditcameoutpositive."Ispentsix
hourswithhimoneevening,"Peurifoyexplained,"andhetalkedlikeaCommunist,he
thoughtlikeaCommunist,andheactedlikeaCommunist,andifheisnotone,hewilldo
untilonecomesalong."21
OfficialWashington,inshort,wasconvincedthatwithArbenztheCommunistshad
succeededinestablishingtheirfirstregimeintheNewWorld.Givenwhathadrecently
transpiredinChina,Czechoslovakia,EastEurope,andinVietnam(theGeneva
ConferenceonVietnamwasjustthengettingunderway);givenIke'sownviewson
Communistaggression,aswellastheDullesbrothers'andthatofnearlyeverysenator
andrepresentativeinWashington;giventheCIA'srecentsuccessinIran;giventhatthe
CIAhadalreadysetupanoperation,codenamePBSUCCESS,to
Page223
overthrowArbenz,itwasprobablyinevitablethattheUnitedStateswouldintervenein
Guatemala,UnitedFruitornoUnitedFruit.
JohnFosterDulleshimselfstatedexplicitlyatthepressconferencecalledtoannouncethe
shipmentofarmsontheAlfhem:"IftheUnitedFruitmatterweresettled,iftheygavea
goldpieceforeverybanana,theproblemwouldremainjustasitistodayasfarasthe
presenceofCommunistinfiltrationinGuatemalaisconcerned.Thatistheproblem,not
UnitedFruit."22
RichardBissell,Jr.,whowasintimatelyinvolvedinPBSUCCESS,saidinaninterviewin
November1977,"IhaveastrongconvictionthatUnitedFruit'sinterestswouldnothave
beenparticularlypersuasiveonAllenDulles.Ithinkbythistimeinhiscareermyguessis
thatFosterDulleswasinfinitelylessinterestedintheUnitedFruitCompanythanhewas
withcommunism....AsforMr.EisenhowerandBedellSmith,twomilitarymen,I
wouldbetveryheavilythattheissuewasnotUnitedFruit,butcommunism."23
Allofwhichmayverywellbetrue,butwhatisalsoabsolutelytrueisthatUnitedFruit
hadsomepowerfulsupportersintheEisenhoweradministration.AsidefromtheDulles
brothers,andtheirconnectionwithSullivanandCromwell,therewasJohnMoorsCabot,
theAssistantSecretaryofStateforInter-AmericanAffairs.Hewasamajorstockholderin
UnitedFruit.Hisbrother,ThomasDudleyCabot,theStateDepartment'sDirectorof
SecurityAffairs,hadpreviouslybeenadirectorofUnitedFruitandpresidentoftheFirst
NationalBankofBoston,theregistrarbankforUnitedFruit.Eisenhower'sSecretaryof
Commerce,SinclairWeeks,hadbeenanotherdirectoroftheFirstNationalBank.Robert
Cutler,SpecialAssistanttothePresidentforNationalSecurityAffairs,hadbeenboard
chairmanoftheOldColonyTrustCompany,UnitedFruit'stransferagent.Othersinthe
EisenhoweradministrationhaddirectfinancialinterestsinGuatemala,includingRobert
Hill,ambassadortoCostaRica,andHenryCabotLodge,Jr.,U.S.Representativetothe
UnitedNations.HilllaterbecameadirectorofUnitedFruit.SodidBedellSmithafterhe
leftthegovernment.24
Ifoneweretoapplytheducktesttothislistofworthies,onemightbeforgivenfor
concludingthatdespiteDulles'disclaimers,despiteBissell'svehementdenials,theUnited
FruitCompanydid
Page224
playasignificantroleinconvincingIkethat,whateverhisscruplesaboutnotintervening
intheinternalaffairsofasisterrepublic,theArbenzregimehadtobetoppled.
ButEisenhowerhimselftoldoneofhisoldestfriends,GeneralAlfredGruenther,that
policieswhichdefendedindividualcompanieswithoutconsideringtheadverseeffects
suchpolicieshadonnationalistmovementswereshortsightedand''Victorian."He
believedthattheWesternpowersshouldmakegradualconcessionstosatisfythespiritof
nationalismindevelopingcountries,therebyassuringtheircontinuedsupport.Ashe
wrotehisfriendBillRobinsonoftheNewYorkHeraldTribune,iftheUnitedStates
followedpoliciesinimicaltotheeconomiesofthedevelopingnations,"wewillmost
certainlyarousemoreantagonism."Thenthepossibilityofthesecountries"turning
Communistwouldmountrapidly."Butitwasentirelyanothermatteronceacountryhad
alreadyturnedCommunist,asIkethoughthadhappenedinGuatemala.25
EisenhowermadehisdecisionandorderedtheCIAtogoaheadwithPBSUCCESS.The
CIA,flushedwithitstriumphinIran,wasabouttooverthrowanothergovernment.
PBSUCCESSAlmostgotstartedintheTrumanadministration.In1952,Anastasio
Somoza,theNicaraguandictator,approachedBedellSmith,thendirectoroftheCIA,with
aproposal.IftheCIAwouldsendhimsufficientarms,hewouldtakecareoftheArbenz
problem.Smithapprovedandgottheshipmentready,buttheStateDepartmentlearnedof
thedealandvetoedit.
Ayearlater,inAugustof1953,ThomasCorcoran,formeraidetoFDRandthena
lobbyistforUnitedFruit,approachedtheby-thenUnderSecretaryofStateSmith."The
interventionofTommytheCorkwithBedellSmithwasdecisive,"HowardHuntsaid,
"thatisaccordingtoeverythingI'veheardandI'veneverheardanythingincontrast."26
CorcorantoldSmiththatbothNicaraguaandHonduraswerepreparedtoactagainst
Arbenz,providedtheywereassuredofAmericanhelp.HealsosaidthatColonelCarlos
CastilloArmasandMiguelYdigorasFuentes(Arbenz'smajoropponentinthe1950
election)hadmetinTegucigalpa,Honduras,tosigna"gentleman'spact"promisingto
cooperatetooverthrowArbenz.CastilloArmastoldYdigorasFuentesthattheycould
countonAmerican
Page225
support.InSeptember,CastilloArmaswroteSomozasaying,"Ihavebeeninformedby
ourfriendsherethatthegovernmentoftheNorth,recognizingtheimpossibilityof
findinganothersolutiontothegraveproblemofmycountry,hastakenthedecisionto
permitustodevelopourplans."27
AllenDulleswasthedrivingforcebehindPBSUCCESSintheUnitedStates.Richard
BissellstatedinaninterviewthatDulles"wasclosertotheGuatemalaoperationthanhe
wastotheBayofPigs....TheGuatemalanoperationwasauthorizedatahigherlevelat
theverybeginning,liketheBayofPigsoperation,andwasregardedasaverymajor
operation,withpotentiallypoliticalovertonesandtherest."28
WhenIkeapprovedPBSUCCESSinitsoriginalform,hedidsostrictlyonthebasisof
makingaplanandcreatingaforcetocarryitout,whichheregardedasanassetthat
mightormightnotbeused,dependingoncircumstances.Hewasaccustomedto
operatinginthatmannerhisparatroopers,forexample,hadmadeliterallydozensofplans
inFranceandGermanyin1944-45,andmorethanhalfadozentimeshadgottentothe
pointofactuallyloadingup,butonlyoneoperation,MARKET-GARDEN,hadgone
forwardtobecomereality.Ikevehementlyandfrequentlyinsistedtohisclosestassociates
thatapprovalofplansdidnotmeanapprovalofactualoperations."Hewasvery,very
preciseaboutthat,"GeneralAndrewGoodpaster,Eisenhower'sliaisonofficerbetweenthe
CIAandtheWhiteHouse,statedina1979interview.29Ikegavetheordertogoonlyafter
thearrivaloftheAlfheminGuatemala.
TheCIAhadsetupitsheadquartersforPBSUCCESSatOpaLocka,Florida,outside
Miami.Therewereaboutonehundredagentsinvolved.Thefirstheadoftheprojectwas
J.C.King,anFBIholdover,who,accordingtoBissell,"epitomizedtheoldFBIapproach,
andthatwasanapproachthatconcentratedalmostexclusivelyonespionage."SoKing
wasreplacedbyAlHaney,whowasnot,accordingtoHunt,anyimprovement."'Zaney'
Haney..wasarealnut.HisSpanishwasexecrable,butthatwastheleastofhis
deficiencies...."30
AtthispointDullessentinfourofhisbestmen.TraceyBarnes,whohadworkedwith
DullesinSwitzerlandduringthewar,becameheadoftheoperation,underthe
supervisionofFrankWisner,DeputyDirectorofPlansfortheCIA,andRichardBissell.
Page226
AndHowardHuntbecameChiefofPoliticalActionforPBSUCCESS.*
Hunt'sfirstandmostimportanttaskwastoselectArbenz'replacement.Therewasnot
muchchoice."It'sliketalkingaboutanoppositionintheSovietUniontoday,"Hunt
explained."Youcan'treallypickyourpeoplefromtheinside,wheretheyareunder
harassmentorpossiblyinprison.Youhadtodealwiththosewhohadmanagedto
escape."
YdigorasFuentes,whohadrunagainstArbenzin1950,andwhowasinHonduras,was
theobviouschoice,but"thepeopleinStatesaidhewastooreactionary.Anybodywho
doesn'tlikecommunismbecomesanultra-rightestintheirvocabulary."ButHunthimself
recognizedthatYdígorasFuenteswouldnotdo,because"helookedlikeaSpanishnoble.
Andthesewerethelittlethingswehadtotakeintoconsideration.Youdon'trallya
countrymadeupofmestizoswithaSpanishDon."32
ColonelCastilloArmas,bywayofcontrast,"hadthatgoodIndianlookabouthim.He
lookedlikeanIndian,whichwasgreatforthepeople."Further,hehadmachismo.A
professionalsoldier(andagraduateoftheU.S.Army'sCommandandGeneralStaff
CollegeatFortLeavenworth,Kansas),CastilloArmaswassomethingofafolkhero.
Woundedinanabortive1950uprisingagainsttheArévalogovernment,CastilloArmas
wasbelieveddeadandwastakenofftobeburied.Onlyafortuitousmoanchangedhis
destinationtoahospital.Afterhisreleasehewassentencedtoprison,fromwhichon
June11,1951,hedramaticallyescapedbyhand-diggingalongtunnel.Subsequentlyhe
traveledthroughoutCentralAmericacontactingothercounterrevolutionaries,including
YdigorasFuentes.Hismilitarybackground,honestreputation,heroicimage,andMayan
appearancemadehimagoodchoicetoleadtheinvasion.33
TheCIAcreatedabaseforCastilloArmasinHonduras.ViaOpa-Locka,hereceived
moneyandan"army,"mercenariesrecruitedthroughoutCentralAmerica.Atthetraining
camp,anAmericanreportersawsoldiers"receivingwadsofdollarbillspassedoutby
menwhowereunmistakablyAmerican."Therewas
*Theprogramwasseparatelyadministeredi.e.,theregularCIAstationchiefswerenotinvolved.
PBSUCCESShaditsownbudgetandchainofcommand.AccordingtoHuntandBissell,theproject
costbetween$5and$7million.31
Page227
another"rebel"centerinNicaragua,locatedonapersonalestateofSomoza.Americans
cameinfromOpa-Lockaviaanold-abandonedFrenchairstripinthePanamaCanal
Zone,thenontoNicaragua.
InMay1954theUnitedStatessignedmilitaryagreementswithNicaraguaandHonduras,
andtheNewYorkTimescouldreport,"MilitarilytheUnitedStatesisdoingitsutmostto
drawacirclearoundthisspotofCommunistinfection....Thecharteraircraftbusinessat
Toncontin[Honduras]boomedsothatitwasvirtuallyimpossibletohireaprivateplane."
34
DiplomaticsupportforPBSUCCESSwasdeepandfar-reaching.BedellSmithkepta
closewatchontheoperation.BissellsaidSmith"wastheStateDepartmentofficialwith
whomwedealtalmosthourbyhour....OneoftheoccasionsthatIrememberwasa
meetinginSmith'soffice,andseveralofuswerethere.Weweretryingtogetpermission
tosendfourmoreofthoselittleobsolescentaircraft,andHenryHolland,theAssistant
Secretaryresponsible,wasopposingandBedellSmithoverruledhim."35
SmithhadateamofdiplomatsinCentralAmericaunderhisdirectorders.Therewas
Peurifoy,ofcourse,servingas"teamleader"fromhispostasAmbassadortoGuatemala.
HecommunicatedwiththeCIAviatheagency'sstationtheretoOpa-Locka.Other
membersoftheteamincludedWhitingWillauer,theAmbassadortoHonduras,whohad
beenClaireChennault'sdeputyintheChineseFlyingTigers(theoutfitthathadfoughtso
longagainsttheChineseCommunists),alongwithRobertHill,AmbassadortoCosta
Rica,andThomasWhelan,AmbassadortoNicaragua.
TheUnitedStatesInformationAgency(USIA)mobilizedallitsresourcestosupport
PBSUCCESS.ItsmaingoalwastoconvincetheOrganizationofAmericanStatesthat
therewasagenuineCommunistthreatinGuatemala,adifficulttasksince,astheUSIA
noted,mostLatins"eitherregardedtheArbenzregimeasa'homegrown'revolutionary
movementdedicatedtoimprovingthelotoftheexploitedGuatemalans,orpreferredto
dwellontheUnitedFruitissueandspeculateastoUnitedStatesmotivesofeconomic
imperialism."TheUSIAfloodedCentralAmericawithpamphlets,taperecordings,
plantedstoriesinnewspapersandonradioprograms,alldesignedtoestablishthepoint
thatArbenzwasindeedaCommunist.36
TheSecretaryofStatehimselftooktheleadinprovidinglegal
Page228
justificationforaction.InMarch1954heflewtoCaracas,Venezuela,toattendtheTenth
Inter-AmericanConference.Inhisopeningremarks,Dullesdealtatlengthwiththethreat
ofcommunismandSovietaggressionintheAmericas.Thenheintroducedadraft
proposal,"DeclarationofSolidarityforthePreservationofthePoliticalIntegrityofthe
AmericanStatesAgainstCommunistIntervention,"laterknownastheDeclarationof
Caracas.Denouncingcommunismas"alienintrigueandtreachery,"thedeclaration
concludedbyproposingthatCommunistdominationorcontrolofanycountrywould
justify"appropriateaction."
Thatphrase,"appropriateaction,"arousedtraditionalLatinfearsofYankeeintervention,
andvariousamendmentswereadded.DuringthedebatetheGuatemalanForeignMinister
denouncedtheresolutionas"merelyapretextforAmericaforinterveninginourinternal
affairs,"andheaccusedtheUnitedStatesofreturningtoTeddyRooseveltdiplomacy,
internationalizingMcCarthyism,andseekingtousethefalseissueofcommunismto
suppressLatinAmericandesiresforeconomicindependence.Nevertheless,the
declarationpassedbyanoverwhelmingmajority,althoughUruguay'schiefdelegate
seemedtospeakformanywhenhetoldTimemagazine,"Wevotedfortheresolutionbut
withoutenthusiasm,withoutoptimism,withoutjoy,andwithoutthefeelingthatweare
contributingtotheadoptionofaconstructivemeasure."37
Withthedeclarationsafelyadopted,DullesflewofftoGenevafortheconferenceon
Indochina,wherehecontinuedtofightthenever-endingbattleagainstcommunism.
Smithwentwithhim.Arbenz,facedwithinvasion,rebuffedtimeaftertimeinhisattempt
tobuyarmsfromtheUnitedStates,mistrustfulofhisownmilitary,nowturnedtothe
SovietUnionforhelp.Heintendedtoarmthepeasants.TheRussians,delightedatan
opportunitytoextendtheirinfluencetoCentralAmerica,arrangedfortheshipmentof
armsfromtheSkodafactorytoPuertoBarrios.
WhenAllenDullesreportedtheshipmentofarmstoIke,thePresidentorderedtheCIAto
putPBSUCCESSintofulloperation.
Themilitarypreparationsfortheshowdown,onbothsides,werelittlemorethanashow.
TheCzechoslovakianarmswereeitherwornoutorineffectiveforjunglewarfareand
completelyinappropriatebecausetheyweretoocomplexortoocum
Page229
bersomeforamilitiaforce.Mostofthearmswereneverusedbutstoredinanarsenal,
wheretheywereeventuallyblownup.
OntheAmericanside,too,theCastilloArmas"army"wasridiculous,nothingmorethan
a"rag-taggle"(Bissell'sdescription),neverintendedforseriousfighting.Insteadthe
emphasisofPBSUCCESSwaspsychologicalwarfare.Thekeyprojectwastobroadcast
anti-Arbenz,pro-ArmasradiopronouncementsintoGuatemalafromthesurrounding
countries.ItgotstartedonMay1,1954;theLaborDayholidayensuredawideaudience.
CallingitselftheVoiceofLiberation,thestationadoptedtheslogan"Trabajo,Pany
Patria"Work,BreadandCountry.
ThebroadcastersclaimedthattheywereoperatingfromwithinGuatemalaitself,even
thoughtheyneversetfootonitssoil.Theywouldsimulatea"raid"bygovernment
officials,onlytobroadcastagainthenextday,allegedlyfromanewlocation,thus
providing"proof"ofArbenz'ineptness.TheVoiceofLiberationsoundedsoauthenticthat
soonforeigncorrespondents,includingthosefromtheNewYorkTimesandLife
magazine,accepteditasthesourceofinformation.
TheCIAarrangedforpropagandaleaflets,criticizingtheArbenzgovernmentforselling
thecountryouttotheCommunists,tobedroppedonGuatemala.Theagencyalso
arrangedforCardinalSpellmanofNewYorktohavehisassociatesholdclandestine
meetingswithGuatemalanpriests,whichledtoamassivevolumeofanti-Arbenzpastoral
messageseachSunday.GuatemalanArmyofficerswhocouldnotbeconvincedthat
ArbenzwasaCommunistwereboughtoffbydirectbribery.38
Asthepressuremounted,ArbenzturnedtotheSovietswithapleaformoremilitaryaid.
TheyrespondedbyarrangingtoshipsixtonsofantiaircraftshellstoPuertoBarrios.But
IkehadalreadydeclaredablockadeofGuatemala,andonJune14theUnitedStates
announcedthatGermanportpolicemeninHamburg,actingunderthedirectionofU.S.
Armyoccupationofficers,hadpreventedtheloadingoftheshellsaboardtheHamburgAmericanLinefreighterCoburg.Thisactioncausedatremendousuproar.TheU.S.
Armyofficeronthesceneadmittedthatthedocumentsaccompanyingtheshipmentwere
inperfectorderandthatthecargowaslegitimateexport;hesaidthereforethattheCoburg
hadbeen"detainedbutnotconfiscated."39
TheBritishweregreatlyalarmed.Theyrejectedoutofhand
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JohnFosterDulles'proposalthatshipsboundforGuatemalavoluntarilysubmittoa
searchbyU.S.Navyvessels."Thereisnogeneralpowerofsearchonthehighseasin
peacetime,"AnthonyEdendeclared.DrewMiddletonreportedfromLondonthatthe
BritishwishedtobepolitetoMr.Dulles,butdidwanthimtounderstandthatthey"cannot
alloweithertheAtlanticortheCaribbeantobecomehisprivatepreserve."40
AtthisjunctureRobertMurphy,DeputyUnderSecretaryofState(whohadbeenkept
ignorantofPBSUCCESS),upbraidedDullesforhis"bankrupt"policyofblockade.
"InsteadofpoliticalactioninsideGuatemalaweareobligedtoresorttoheavy-handed
militaryactionontheperipheryofthecauseoftrouble,"Murphycomplained."WhileIdo
notquestiontheusefulnessofadisplayofnavalforceintheCentralAmericanareaunder
presentcircumstances,forcibledetentionofforeignflagshippingonthehighseasis
anothermatter....Inourpastweassertedourrighttodeliverarmstobelligerents."
MurphysaidthattheAmericandisregardforthehighprincipleoffreedomoftheseas
wasabadmistake,broughtonby"inadequatestaffactionintheDepartment."41Henry
Holland,AssistantSecretaryofStateforInter-AmericanAffairs,wasalsocriticalofthe
decisiontoimposeablockade.
AllofwhichmadeIkefurious.HelatertoldGoodpasterthat"heandtheNational
SecurityCouncilhadgonequitedeeplyintotheGuatemalansituation"andthedecisionto
acthadbeenmade.Atthis"crucialperiod,"GoodpasterrecalledIkesaying,"someof
those,ofhisprincipalassociates...begantogetnervousaboutit,afterwehad
committedourselves.Andhisanswertothem,whichstayedveryclearinhismind,was
thatthetimetohavethosethoughtswasbeforewestarteddownthiscourse,thatifyouat
anytimetaketherouteofviolenceorsupportofviolence...thenyoucommityourself
tocarryitthrough,andit'stoolatetohavesecondthoughts,nothavingfaceduptothe
possibleconsequences,whenyou'remidwayinanoperation."42
IketoldDullestopushon.Thefollowingday,June19,theNewYorkTimes'headline
proclaimed,"REVOLTLAUNCHEDINGUATEMALA:LAND-AIR-SEAINVASION
REPORTED:RISINGSUNDERWAYINKEYCITIES."
Thatwasputtingitrathergrandiloquently.Infact,CastilloArmas'"army"of150menhad
crossedtheHonduranborder,ad
Page231
vancedsixmilesintoGuatemala,settleddownintheChurchoftheBlackChristand
waitedfortheArbenzregimetocollapse.
TheCIAbaseditsstrategyonfear.AgentstrainedinOpa-LockajammedGuatemalan
radiocommunicationssothattheinhabitantsofGuatemalaCityhadlittleornoideaasto
whatwashappeningatthe"front."Wildrumorscirculated,reportingmajordefeatsof
governmentforcesandtheimminentarrivalofwell-equippeddivisionsofrebeltroops.
Infact,theGuatemalanArmyremainedsafelyinbarracksthroughouttherebellion.
Arbenzaggravatedthesituationwhen,inanefforttosilencetheVoiceofLiberation,he
orderedatotalblackoutofthecapitalandotherlargecities.Thisonlyincreasedthe
tension,makingthethreatseemmorereal.Theincessantsoundofpolicesirensand
curfewbellsfrayedthepeople'snervestothebreakingpoint.Thescenewasoneofmass
confusion.
InthissituationCastilloArmas'"airforce,"withpilotshiredbytheCIA,becamethe
crucialfactor.ItconsistedofafewsmallCessnasalongwithsomeP-47Thunderbolts.
TheseplanesbuzzedGuatemalaCity,occasionallydroppingasmallbombortwo,or
blocksofdynamiteattachedtohandgrenades.Theywerecalledsufatos,theGuatemalan
wordforlaxatives,duetothepsychologicaleffecttheyhadonArbenzandtheresidents
ofthecity.OneluckyhitonthecitadelwheretheAlfhem'scargoofmunitionswasstored
madeanimpressiveexplosion.
TheCIAusedblackpropagandaeffectivelytogroundArbenz'airforce,whichwasweak
andunreliabletobeginwith.TheVoiceofLiberationbroadcastaccountsofSoviet
aviatorswhohaddefectedtotheWestwiththeirplanes.WhenaGuatemalanpilotdidthe
same,CIAagentstriedtopersuadehimtoappealpubliclytoothersintheairforceto
followhisexample.Herefused,buttheagentsgothimdrunk,thenpersuadedhimto
makean"imaginary"appeal.Thiswassecretlyrecorded,cutandspliced,andthen
broadcasttriumphantlybytheVoiceofLiberation.Fromthatmoment,Arbenzgrounded
theremainderofhisairforce,fearfulthatotherpilotswoulddefectwiththeirplanes.43
Nevertheless,Arbenz'antiaircraftgunnerswereabletoputupsomeresistance,and,on
June22,AllenDullesreportedtoIkethatCastilloArmashadlosttwoofthethreeold
bomberswithwhichhewaslaunchingthe"invasion."TheTimes,meanwhile,after
Page232
keepingtheGuatemalanrevoltintheheadlinesforaweek,wasrapidlylosinginterest.No
GuatemalanpeasantswererallyingtoCastilloArmas'cause,theGuatemalanArmy
continuedtositinitsbarracks,therebel"army"tositinitschurch.Withoutsomeboost,
therebellionmightsoondieofboredom.
LateontheafternoonofJune22,IkeheldameetingintheOvalOfficeoftheWhite
House.FosterDulleswasthere,andAllen,alongwithHenryHolland.AllenDullessaid
thatSomozaofNicaraguahadofferedtosupplyCastilloArmaswithtwoP-51fighterbombersiftheUnitedStateswouldagreetoreplacethem.Holland,perfectlyinnocentof
anyknowledgeofPBSUCCESS,insistedthattheUnitedStatesshouldkeephandsoff
becausetheLatinAmericanrepublicswould,"ifouractionbecameknown,interpretour
shipmentofplanesasinterventioninGuatemala'sinternalaffairs."TheDullesbrothers
arguedthatreplacingthebombers"wastheonlyhopeforCastilloArmas,whowas
obviouslytheonlyhopeofrestoringfreedomtoGuatemala."
IketurnedtoAllenDulles."WhatdoyouthinkCastillo'schanceswouldbewithoutthe
aircraft?"
"Aboutzero."
"Supposewesupplytheaircraft.Whatwouldthechancesbethen?"
Dullesdidnothesitate."Abouttwentypercent."
Recallingtheeventyearslater,Ikesaidhethoughtofthe"letterandspiritoftheCaracas
resolution."Hisdutywasclear.HeinstructedDullestosendtheplanes.
AsDullesbegantowalkoutoftheOvalOffice,Ikewenttothedoorwithhim.Smilingto
breakthetension,thePresidentsaid,"Allen,thatfigureoftwentypercentwaspersuasive.
Itshowedmethatyouhadthoughtthismatterthroughrealistically.Ifyouhadtoldme
thatthechanceswouldbeninetypercent,Iwouldhavehadamuchmoredifficult
decision."
"Mr.President,"Dullesrepliedwithagrinofhisown,"whenIsawHenrywalkinginto
yourofficewiththreelargelawbooksunderhisarm,Iknewhehadlosthiscasealready."
44
Theplanesweredelivered,therebelsresumedtheirbombing,andfivedayslaterArbenz
resigned.HewasreplacedbyashortlivedmilitaryjuntathatgavewaytoCastilloArmasa
weeklater.
OnJune30,FosterDulleswentonnationwidetelevisionandradiotoreporttothe
Americanpeople.Inhisconclusionhede-
Page233
dared,"NowthefutureofGuatemalaliesatthedisposaloftheGuatemalanpeople
themselves."45
ToIke'scriticsthiswasasordidevent,nothingmorenorlessthantheoverthrowofa
democraticallyelected,populargovernmentwhoseonlyinterestwasinimprovingthe
wretchedlivesoftheGuatemalanpeople.ToIke'sdefendersthiswasaheroicevent,
nothingmorenorlessthanthepreventionoftheriseofanearlyCastroinCentral
America.ToUnitedFruititwasagodsend.Thecompanygotitslandback,thelabor
reformlawswererepealed,wagescut.ToCastilloArmasitwasonlyatemporaryvictory.
Hewasassassinatedthreeyearslater,tobereplacedbyYdigorasFuentes,whose
cooperationwiththeCIAinpermittingtheagencytouseGuatemalaasastagingground
fortheBayofPigscausedsuchwidespreadcriticismthathewascompelledtodeclare
martiallaw.
ForPeurifoytheresultmaywellhavebeenCastilloArmas'fate.Peurifoywentto
Thailandasambassador;ayearlaterhediedinanautomobileaccident.Huntsaidthat"a
lotofpeoplethinkthathewaskilledinSoutheastAsia"becauseofhisinvolvementin
PBSUCCESS."Ihavemanyfriendswhostillthinkthat."46ForHuntandBissell,the
resultwasgreatlyenhancedreputationsandabigstepforwardintheirCIAcareers.For
theCIA,theresultwasahugesuccess.Atthecostofafewdozenlivesandafewmillion
dollars,ithadoverthrownanothergovernment.
In1977,thinkingovertheevent,HowardHuntmused,"OfcourseI'veoftenwonderedin
retrospectifweshouldn'thavelettheGuatemalans[i.e.,CastilloArmas'Guatemalans]
shootthatgroupwehadoutattheairportthere,includingCheGuevara.I'mgladthey
didn'thavetoshootArbenzthough,Ithinkthatwouldhavebeenbad.Whathappened
wasthattherewasanagentthereandhesaid,'Don'tdoit,wedon'twantabloodbath.'47
Asasociallyconscious,rebelliousmedicalstudentinhisearlytwenties,Guevarahad
enteredGuatemalainFebruary1954.Hewasmoreaconcernedobserverthanadedicated
revolutionary,atleastatfirst,butthenhebecameasupporterofArbenz.WhenArbenz
fled,Chewentwithhim,seekingasyluminMexico.TherehemetRaúlCastro,wholater
introducedhimtohisbrotherFidel.
ThelessonChelearnedinGuatemalawasthatnoLatinAmericanreform,nomatterhow
justified,wouldbeacceptedbythe
Page234
UnitedStates,notifitimpingedonAmericaneconomicinterests.Hewasalsoconvinced
thatArbenz'failuretoarmthepeasantshadcausedhisdownfall.Inhisfirstpolitical
article,''ISawtheFallofJacoboArbenz,"Guevaraoutlinedhistacticsforrevolutionary
organization.Latinrevolutionaries,heargued,mustbuildanarmywhoseloyaltyistothe
government,notindependentofit,andtheymustspurnmoderation,becausemoderation
inthefaceofAmericanhostilityisfutile.
"Thestrugglebeginsnow,"Chewroteinhisconcludingsentence.When,sevenyears
later,theCIAwenttoCubatodotoCastrowhatithaddonetoArbenz,Guevaraandthe
Castrobrotherswouldbeready.48
Page235
ChapterSeventeen
Hungary,Vietnam,andIndonesia
NOVEMBER1,1956."Help!Help!Help!SOS!SOS!SOS!"theradiofromBudapest
repeatsoverandover."Anynewsabouthelp?Quickly,quickly,quickly!"Explosions
andgunshotscanbeheardinthebackground."SOS!Theyjustbroughtusarumorthat
theAmericantroopswillbeherewithinoneortwohours.''Anotherhandmade
Molotovcocktailgoesoffwitharoar."Wearewellandfighting.sos!Wherearethe
Americantroops?"1
ThereneverwouldbeanyAmericantroops.TheHungarianFreedomFightersof1956
wouldhavetofightitoutontheirown,withMolotovcocktailsagainsttanks,slingshots
andstonesagainstmachinegunsandbullets.AmericanpromisestohelpliberateHungary
werehollow,meaningless,emptyverbiage.
Inaterribleblunder,theCIAhadpromisedwhatitcouldnotdeliver,raisedhopesthat
couldnotberealized,helpedstartarebellionthatcouldonlybecrushed.Butitwasbyno
meanstheexclusivefaultoftheCIA,whichwasmerelyrepeatingwhattheSecretaryof
StatewassayingandwhatthePresidenthadapproved.
RepublicanpromisestohelpfreetheRussiansatellitesinducedthousandsofAmericans
ofEastEuropeanparentagetovoteforEisenhowerin1952.Thepromisesalsoraised
unrealistichopesamongthepeoplesofHungary,Poland,EastGermanyandelsewhere.
ThesehopesweresustainedandstrengthenedbybroadcastsfromRadioFreeEurope,a
CIA-controlledradiostationinMunichthatbroadcasttoalltheEastEuropeancountries.
RFEencouragementtothecaptivepeopleswasbackedupbytheEisenhower
Page236
WhiteHouse,whichsentoutastreamofcaptive-nationsresolutions.EachChristmasthe
WhiteHouseradioedaChristmasgreetingtotheEastEuropeansto"recognizethetrials
underwhichyouaresufferingandtoshareyourfaiththatrightintheendwillbringyou
againamongthefreenationsoftheworld."2
Suchstatementsmadegoodcampaignmaterial,butunfortunatelysomeofthecaptive
peopledidnotknowhowtodistinguishbetweenAmericancampaignbombastandactual
policy.Thetruthwasthatliberationtalkwasintendedforthedomesticpoliticalsituation,
notfortheEastEuropeansthemselves.TherewaspreciouslittlethoughtgiventotheRFE
broadcastsortheWhiteHousepronouncements.TheideathattheEastEuropeanscould
setthemselvesfreebycopyingtheexampleoftheFrenchResistancewasabsurd.The
FrenchResistancehadbeensuccessfulbecause,first,theSHAEFarmiestiedupnearlyall
Germanresourcesand,second,nearlyeveryFrenchmanand-womansupportedthe
Resistance,andthird,theFrenchundergroundhadacloselyknitorganization.Noneof
theseconditionswere,orcouldbe,presentinEastEuropein1956.Underthe
circumstances,itwashighlyirresponsiblefortheRepublicanstotalkofliberation,but
theycouldnotresistthetemptation.
TheironywasthatthisawfulfailureinHungarywasadirectresultofoneoftheCIA'S
greatintelligencecoups,theacquisitionin1956ofPremierNikitaKhrushchev'sfamous
secretspeechattheTwentiethPartyCongressdenouncingStalinforhiscriminalcruelty
andmisgovernment.ThatspeechdovetailedperfectlywiththeRepublicanPartyplatform
pledgesinthe1952campaignto"liberate"theCommunistsatellitesinEastEurope.Inone
well-publicizedincidentduringthatcampaign,JohnFosterDulleshadsaidtheUnited
Stateswould"useeverymeans"toachieveliberation.Ikehadcalledhimonthephone
thateveningandtoldhimtobesuretoinserttheword"peaceful''between"every"and
"means"fromthenon,butneverthelesstheemphasisremainedonliberation.3
AccordingtoRayCline(Harvardgraduate,OSSofficer,authoroftheCIA'SNational
IntelligenceEstimates,eventuallyDeputyDirectoroftheCIA),AllenDullesmanagedto
getacopyofKhrushchev'ssecretspeechbyputtingoutthewordthattheCIAwantedit
badlyandthatpricewasnoobject.Itwasfinallyacquired"ataveryhandsomeprice,"
accordingtooneex-CIA
Page237
agent.ButJamesAngleton,Jr.,theformerChiefofCounterIntelligence,declaredin1976
that"therewasnopayment."AngletonsaidthespeechwasacquiredfromanEast
EuropeanCommunistwhosemotivewasideological.Athirdsource,HowardHunt,said
thatthespeechwasgiventotheCIAbyIsraeliintelligence.4
Howeveracquired,theCIAhadacopyofthespeech.InitKhrushchevhadbeenbrutalin
hisdenunciationsofStalinandseemedtopromisethatthefuturewouldbedifferent,that
arelaxationofCommunistPartycontrolsinsideRussiawouldbematchedbya
moderationofpolicytowardthesatellites.Itevenhintedthattheremightbeamodicum
oftrueindependenceforthesatellitesinthenearfuture.Itwas,inshort,anexplosive
document,andtheSovietshadkeptitacloselyguardedsecret.Onlythosewhohadheard
KhrushchevdeliverthespeechattheTwentiethPartyCongressknewofitsexistence.
ThefirstquestionfortheCIAwas,isourcopyauthentic?RayCline,representingthe
intelligence-gatheringandanalysissideoftheCIA,wasabletoprovideFrankWisner,
RichardHelms,andAngleton,allfromtheoperationsside,with"convincingandmost
welcomeinternalevidencethatthetextwehadwasauthentic..Thismadeeveryone
happy."5
Thenextquestionwas,whattodowithit?Clinewantedtoreleaseitatonce,onthe
groundsthat"itwasarareopportunitytohaveallthecriticalthingswehadsaidforyears
abouttheSovietdictatorshipconfirmedbytheprincipalleaderoftheSovietPolitburo.
Theworldwouldbetreatedtothespectacleofatotalitariannationindictedbyitsown
leadership."
ToCline'samazement,WisnerandAngletondemurred.Theywereinchargeofan
operation,codenameREDSOX/REDCAP,whichinvolvedtrainingrefugeesfrom
Hungary,Poland,Rumania,andCzechoslovakiaforcovertandparamilitaryoperations
insidetheirhomelands.AngletonandWisnerwantedtoholdthesecretspeechuntilthe
REDSOX/REDCAPforceswere"uptosnuff,"thenreleaseittopromotenational
uprisings.6ButtheycouldnotconvinceCline,andhecouldnotconvincethem.
Shortlythereafter,onaSaturday,June2,1956,ClinewasalonewithAllenDulles,
workingonaspeech.Suddenly,Dullesswunghischairaround,peeredatCline,andsaid,
"WisnersaysyouthinkweoughttoreleasethesecretKhrushchevspeech."
Clinesaidthathedidandgavehisreasons.AsClinelater
Page238
recalledthescene,"Theoldman,withatwinkleinhiseye,said,'Bygolly,Iamgoingto
makeapolicydecision!'HebuzzedWisnerontheintercom,toldhimhehadgivenalotof
thoughttothematter,andwantedtogetthespeechprinted."7
DullesthenphonedhisbrotherattheStateDepartment.FosterDullesconcurred.
Together,theDullesbrotherswenttotheOvalOffice.Ikewasenthusiasticandorderedit
done.StatesentacopyofthespeechtotheNewYorkTimes,whichprintediton
Monday,June4,initsentirety.8
PublicationofthespeechcausedtremendousexcitementthroughoutEastEurope.Riotsin
PolandledtothedisbandingoftheoldStalinistPolitburoinWarsaw.Wladyslaw
Gomulka,anindependentCommunist,tookpower.PolandremainedCommunistanda
memberoftheWarsawPact,butitwonsubstantialindependenceandsetanexamplefor
theothersatellites.
TheexcitementspreadtoHungary.OnOctober23,1956,Hungarianstudentstooktothe
streetstodemandthattheStalinistrulersbereplacedwithImreNagy,aHungarian
nationalist.TheCIAsentREDSOX/REDCAPgroupsinBudapestintoactiontojointhe
FreedomFightersandtohelporganizethem.
HungarianworkersjoinedwithstudentstodemonstrateagainsttheRussianoccupation
forces.KhrushchevagreedtogivepowertoNagy,butthatwasnolongerenoughto
satisfytheHungarians,whonowdemandedtheremovaloftheRussiansandanendto
communism.RadioFreeEurope,andtheREDSOX/REDCAPgroups,encouragedthe
rebels.SodidJohnFosterDulles,whopromisedeconomicassistancetothosecountries
thatbrokewiththeKremlin.
OnOctober31,NagyannouncedthatHungarywaswithdrawingfromtheWarsawPact.
Khrushchev,furious,decidedtoinvade.Hesent200,000troopswith2,500tanksand
armoredcarstocrushtherevolt.BitterstreetfightinginBudapestleft7,000Russiansand
30,000Hungariansdead.9
ThoseradiopleasforhelpfromBudapestmadethetragedyevenmorepainful,butIke
didnotevenconsidergivingovertmilitarysupporttotheHungarians.WhenMiltonasked
himaboutit,Ikemerelypointedtoamapandsaid,"Lookforyourself.Hungaryis
landlocked.Wecan'tpossiblyfightthere."10
Liberationwasasham.Ithadalwaysbeenasham.AllHungarydidwastoexposeitto
theworld,andtotheCIA,whichwas
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furiousatIkeforbackingoff.WilliamColby,atthetimeajuniorCIAofficer,later
remarkedthat"therecanbenodoubtthatWisnerandothertopofficialsofhisDirectorate
ofPlans,especiallythoseonthecovert-actionside,werefullypreparedwitharms,
communicationsstocksandairresupply,tocometotheaidofthefreedomfighters.This
wasexactlytheendforwhichtheAgency'sparamilitarycapabilitywasdesigned."
ButIkesaidno."WhateverdoubtsmayhaveexistedintheAgencyaboutWashington's
policyinmatterslikethisvanished,"Colbywrote."Itwasestablished,onceandforall,
thattheU.S.,whilefirmlycommittedtothecontainmentoftheSoviets...wasnotgoing
toattempttoliberateanyoftheareaswithintheirsphere."11
HoweverdeepIke'shatredofcommunism,hisfearofWorldWarIIIwasdeeper.Even
hadthisnotbeenso,thearmedforcesoftheUnitedStateswerenotcapableofdriving
200,000RedArmycombatsoldiersoutofHungary,exceptthroughanuclearoffensive
thatwouldhaveleftmostofHungaryandEuropedevastated.InthefaceofRussian
tanks,theREDSOX/REDCAPgroupswerepitifullyinadequate.TheHungarians,andthe
otherEastEuropeanpeoples,learnedthattherewouldbenoliberation,thattheywould
havetomakethebestdealtheycouldwiththeRussians.TheSovietcaptureand
executionofNagymadethepointbrutallyclear.
Manyex-agentstodaybelievethatFrankWisner'stragicmentalbreakdownand
subsequentsuicidedatefromthefailureoftheREDSOX/REDCAPprogram.12
Aftertheevent,PresidentEisenhowerandGeneralLucianTruscottconductedathorough
reviewoftheentireliberationpolicy.TruscottquestionedtheCIA'SREDSOX/REDCAP
operatorstofindoutwhattheyhadtoldthefreedomfightersaboutAmericanintentions
andpromisesofsupport.InTruscott'sviewtheresultsofhisinvestigationshowedabasic
failureonthepartoftheCIAtodistinguishbetweeninsurrectionalviolence,mass
uprisings,revolutionaryaction,andtrueguerrillawarfareinthetwentiethcentury.Tohis
horror,hediscoveredthattheCIAwasstillpushingREDSOX/REDCAP.Theagency
wantedtotryagain,inCzechoslovakia.ButasaresultofhisreporttothePresident,Ike
orderedREDSOX/REDCAPterminated.13
Eisenhowerhimself,however,wasthemanmostresponsibleforthedebacle.Notonly
hadhegivenhisapprovaltoREDSOX/RED
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CAP,itwashisAdministration,actingunderhisorders,thathadmadeliberation"amajor
goalofAmericanforeignpolicy."Liberationwasgoodfordomesticpolitics,buta
disasterfortheHungarians.Theyendedupwith30,000oftheirbestandmostcourageous
youngpeopledead,andatighterSovietcontrolthaneverbefore.
SimultaneouslywiththeHungarianuprisingcametheSuezcrisis.BritainandFrance,
actinginconjunctionwithIsrael,invadedEgyptinanattempttorecovercontrolofthe
SuezCanalfromColonelGamelAbdelNasser.IkewasangryattheBritishandFrench
foractingwithoutconsultinghim,andfuriousatAllenDullesforhavingfailedtowarn
himinadvance.HeeventuallyforcedtheBritishandFrenchtogivetheCanalbackto
Egypt.
Still,IkewasnofriendofNasser's.AtoneOvalOfficeconference,helistenedtovarious
suggestionsonwaystheCIAmight"toppleNasser."Finally,accordingtotheminutesof
themeeting,"ThePresidentsaidthatanactionofthiskindcouldnotbetakenwhenthere
isasmuchactivehostilityasatpresent.Forathinglikethistobedonewithoutinflaming
theArabworld,atimefreefromheatedstressholdingtheworld'sattentionasatpresent
wouldhavetobechosen."14
Inthatinstance,thePresidenthimselfsaidnototheCIA.Inothercases,itwasthe5412
Committee,chairedbyGordonGray.GrayhadbeenTruman'sSecretaryoftheArmyand
thenEisenhower'sDirectoroftheOfficeofDefenseMobilization.In1955hebecame
Ike'sSpecialAssistantforNationalSecurityAffairs.HewastheliaisonbetweentheWhite
HouseandtheStateandDefenseDepartments,aswellasChairmanofthe5412
Committee.
Thatcommittee(oftenreferredtoasthe"SpecialGroup")consistedofGray,the
SecretariesofDefenseandofState,andtheDirectorofCentralIntelligence.Createdin
Marchof1955bytheNationalSecurityCouncil,inPapernumber5412/1,itwasthemost
secretcommitteeoftheU.S.Government.Nocovertactioncouldbeundertakenwithout
thepriorapprovalofthecommittee.15
Themajorfunctionofthespecialgroup,accordingtoGray,was"toprotectthe
President."ItwouldscrutinizeproposedCIAactions,policies,andprogramstomake
certaintheydidnotgetthePresidentorthecountryintotrouble.Thecommitteedealtwith
issuestoosensitivetobediscussedbeforethewholeNationalSecu
Page241
rityCouncil,alargegroupthatdebatedissuesbutneversetpolicy.16
RichardBissellexplainedhowthecommitteeworked."Whenanoperationwasaboutto
beundertaken,itwouldbewrittenupwithintheclandestineservice,andapprovedupthe
line,uptoandincludingAllen,andthenAllenhimselfalmostalwaysattendedthe5412
andthenhewouldpresentit."AtthatpointtheStateDepartment,usuallyrepresentedby
RobertMurphy,FosterDulles'deputy,wouldgiveitsapproval.WhenBissellwasaskedif
anoperation,onceapprovedby5412,wouldgobeforetheNationalSecurityCouncil,he
replied,"No.Theseweremuchtoosensitive.RememberthatunderEisenhowertheNSC
wasawholebigroomfulofpeople."
GordonGraywouldbringthe5412decisionprivatelyandinformallytothePresident.
Then,adayortwolater,GraywouldgetbacktoAllenDullesandsay,"Look,myboss
hasthisorthatreactiontothisoperation."OnlythenwouldtheCIAspringintoaction.17
Duringtheearlyyearsof5412,theCIAhadtremendousconfidenceinitself,andIkehad
tremendousconfidenceinit.Itseemedthattheagencycouldmanipulateeventsanywhere
intheworldtosuittheUnitedStates.IranandGuatemalaweretheproof.
ButIranandGuatemala,ifrealisticallyassessed,wouldhaveindicatedtheunwelcome
truththattherewerelimitsonwhattheUnitedStatesandtheCIAcouldaccomplish.
Instead,asRayClinenoted,"romanticgossipaboutthecoupinIranspreadaround
Washingtonlikewildfire.AllenDullesbaskedinthegloryoftheexploitwtihoutever
confirmingordenyingtheextravagantimpressionofCIA'Spowerthatitcreated."
Thetroublewas,asKimRooseveltwasthefirsttoadmit,"theCIAdidnothavetodo
verymuchtotoppleMossadegh,whowasaneccentricandweakpoliticalfigure."Iran
didnotprovethattheCIAcouldoverthrowgovernmentswhenandwhereitwished;
rather"itwasauniquecaseofsupplyingjusttherightbitofmarginalassistanceinthe
rightwayattherighttime."18
InGuatemala"thelegendofCIA'Sinvincibilitywasconfirmedinthemindsofmanybya
covertactionprojectthatinchedonestepfurthertowardparamilitaryintervention."
Again,however,asClineinsists,Guatemalawasauniquesituation.Itrequiredlittleuse
ofactualforceandsucceededmainlybecauseofashrewdex
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ploitationoffavorablelocalpoliticalcircumstances.Nevertheless,the"mystiqueofCIA's
secretpowerwaswellestablishedbythetalesfromTeheranandGuatemalaCity,"not
leastinthemindofAllenDulleshimself.19
ThemajorresultwasthattheCIAbecameevenmoreofanaction-orientedagency,which
wascertainlyinaccordwiththeDonovan-OSSlegacybutwhichwas,accordingtosuch
well-informedcriticsasClineandMortonHalperin,detrimentaltotheconductof
Americanforeignpolicy.20Detrimentalbecausethecovertoperationsbackfired,asin
Hungaryin1956andlaterinIndonesiaandCuba,andbecausetheemphasisonaction
meantthattheCIA,underDulles,failedtoprovidethePresidentwiththeinformationhe
needed,whenheneededit,asintheSuezcrisisof1956orinCubain1959.
Ikewaspainfullyawareoftheseshortcomings.HewantedDullestoservehimasGeneral
Stronghadservedhimduringthewar,tobeinfactaswellasinnamehischief
intelligenceofficer,themanwhowouldgivehimanoverview,tobesurethePresident
gottheinformationheneededtoact,whilescreeninghimfrompettydetail.Hedidnot
wantDulleswastinghistimeonminorclandestineoperations.IkehadGordonGraytalk
toDullesaboutthesepoints,butitdidlittlegood.21
Dullescontinuedtospendmostofhistimeoncovertoperationsandremainedhesitantto
makeintelligencesummariesorjudgments.Ratherthancomedownononesideorthe
otheronwhethertheFrenchcouldholdoutinVietnam,forexample,orwhetherFidel
CastrowasaCommunist,Dullespreferredtopresentvastamountsofrawintelligence
materialtothePresidentandlethimdecide,whilehedirectedhisagentsintheir
paramilitaryactivities.Thetroublewastwofold:therawintelligencewasusually
contradictory,andalwaysterriblybulky.ThePresidentsimplydidnothavethetimeto
readitandevaluateit.
InJanuary1956,IkecreatedthePresident'sBoardofConsultantsonForeignIntelligence
Activities(PBCFIA),composedofretiredseniorgovernmentofficials,toprovidethe
Presidentwithadviceonintelligencemattersingeneral,andtorecommendappropriate
changesintheCIA.OmarBradley,GeneralDoolittle,andDavidBrucewereamongthe
members.ThePBCFIArecommendedthatDullesseparatehimselffromtheCIA
altogetherandserveasthePresident'sintelligenceadviserbycoordinatingintelli
Page243
gencegatheredfromallsources,includingtheFBI,themilitary,andtheStateDepartment.
Inbrief,DulleswouldbetoPresidentEisenhowerwhatStronghadbeentoGeneral
Eisenhower.
ButDulleswouldnotchange.DespitethePBCFIA,anddespiteIke'sownpressure(the
ChurchCommitteefoundthat"PresidentEisenhowerhimselfrepeatedlypressedDullesto
exertmoreinitiative"inintelligencegatheringandsummary),Dullesheldtohisown
conceptsandmethods.HecouldnotorwouldnotshaketheDonovanlegacy.22
Ayearlater,inJanuaryof1957,IkeheldareviewconferencewiththeNSC.Always
seekingnewwaystobalancethebudget,hecomplainedthatintelligencewasbecominga
$1billion-a-yearoperation.Theminutesnotedthat"indiscussionthePresidentrecalled
thatbecauseofourhavingbeencaughtbysurpriseinWorldWarII,weareperhaps
tendingtogooverboardinintelligenceeffort."AdmiralArthurRadford,Chairmanofthe
JointChiefs,saidthatthevariousintelligence-gatheringagencies,includingtheCIA,"are
doingquitewellinbringinginthematerial."But,headded,"wecandobetterasregards
screeningandpullingittogether."
Ikesaidheagreedwiththeimportanceofscreeningmaterial,buthedidnotwanttogo
toofarinthatdirectioneither.TheDCIshouldnotholdbackimportantitems,he
declared,citingtheexampleofPearlHarbor,wheretheseniorofficersonthespotwere
notgiveninformationavailableinWashington.
ThenotesthenrecordthatDullesgavehissemiannualreportoncovertoperations.Asthe
meetingended,theDCItoldthePresidenthewantedtogetGeneralLucianTruscottto
jointheCIA"andtakeoverthecoordinationduty."Ikerepliedthathewantedittheother
wayaround"thatMr.Dullesmustperformthecoordination,andthatheshouldgetaman
whocouldmanagetheoperationsoftheCIA."23
ButwhenTruscottcametotheCIA,hedidsoasDeputyDirectorforCommunityAffairs,
withresponsibilityforcoordinatingintelligencegatheredbytheCIA,themilitaryservices,
andtheStateDepartment.Thisdidnotworkout,for,astheChurchCommitteenoted,
"theseparateelementsoftheintelligencecommunitycontinuedtofunctionunderthe
impetusoftheirowninternaldrivesandmissiondefinitions."24AsPresident,Ikenever
foundthereplacementforGeneralStrongthathewaslookingfor.
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Allofwhichraisestheperplexingquestion,whydidn'thefireDulles?Themanhad
violatedhisdirectorders,inbothletterandspirit,intheTruscottaffair.Partoftheanswer
isthenatureofthebeast.PresidentEisenhowercouldnotimposehiswillonthefederal
bureaucracytoanythingliketheextentthatGeneralEisenhowerimposedhiswillon
SHAEF.Anotherpartoftheanswerliesinpersonalityandinfluence.Ike'sveryhigh
regardforJohnFosterDullesundoubtedlyplayedamajorroleinhisretentionofAllen
Dulles.
Ikegavehisownanswerinthisstatement,quotedbytheChurchCommittee:"I'mnot
goingtobeabletochangeAllen.Ihavetwoalternatives,eithertogetridofhimand
appointsomeonewhowillassertmoreauthorityorkeephim[Allen]withhislimitations.
I'dratherhaveAllenasmychiefintelligenceofficerwithhislimitationsthananyoneelse
Iknow."25
SoDullesstayedon,asIke'schiefspy,fortheentireeightyearsoftheEisenhower
administration.Hisreputationwasconsistentlyhigh.HewasonthefrontlinesintheCold
War,themanwhocouldoverturngovernmentswithasnapofhisfingers,foiltheKGB
withthebackofhishand,uncoversecretsnomatterwhereorhowdeeplyhidden.By
pretendingtoavoidpublicity,heattractedit.Hewascertainlythebest-knownspyinthe
world,thesubjectoffeaturearticlesintheSaturdayEveningPostandU.S.News&
WorldReport,26aswellasafavoriteguestoftelevisioninterviewers.Andthroughouthis
tenureasDCI,hekepttheemphasisoftheCIAoncovertoperations.
AsinVietnam.BythetimeIkemovedintotheWhiteHouse,inJanuary1953,theUnited
StateswasalreadyinvolvedinVietnamtotheextentthatitwaspayingforaconsiderable
portionoftheFrenchwareffort.Oneofthefirstforeign-policydecisionsofthe
Eisenhoweradministrationwastostepupthatsupporttoincludeequipmentaswellas
money.
InApril1953,Ikeapproved"theimmediateloanofuptosix'FlyingBoxcars'(C-119s)to
theFrenchforuseinIndochinatobeflownbycivilianpilots."ThePresidentwantedthe
loankeptsecret,sohehadAllenDullesandtheCIAhandlethearrangements.InMay,Ike
hadBedellSmitharrangetosendamilitarymissiontoVietnam"toexplorewaysand
meansthroughwhichAmericanas
Page245
sistancecanbestbefittedintoworkableplansforaggressivepursuitofhostilities."27
Theescalationwasunderway.ByJanuary1954theUnitedStateshadsentinfiftyheavy
bombers(B-26s)tosupporttheFrenchatDienBienPhu.Atameetingofthe"President's
SpecialCommitteeonIndochina."AllenDulles"wonderedifourpreoccupationwith
helpingtowinthebattleatDienBienPhuwassogreatthatwewerenotgoingtobargain
withtheFrenchaswesuppliedtheirmosturgentneeds."28
HewasexpressingawidespreadconcerninWashingtonthatifwearegoingtosupplythe
equipmentandpaythecost,wemustcontrolthestrategy.Ikewasimpatientwiththe
French,whosestrategywasalmostasbadlyexecutedasitwasconceived.Heoncesaid,
"Whocouldbesodumbastoputagarrisondowninavalleyandthenchallengethe
otherguy,whohasartilleryonthesurroundinghills,tocomeoutandfight?"29
ToexertmoreAmericaninfluence,thePentagonhadconvincedtheFrenchcommander,
GeneralNavarre,toacceptagroupofliaisonofficers.Thiswasobviouslyadelicate
mattertheFrenchfiercelyresentedanyhintthattheyneededmilitaryadvicefromthe
Americans,buttheyneededtheAmericanequipmentsobadlytheycouldnotsayno.
UnknowntotheFrench,Dulleshadbiggerplans.Thecommitteenotesstate,"Mr.Allen
Dullesinquiredifanunconventionalwarfareofficer,specificallyColonelLansdale,could
notbeaddedtothegroupoffiveliaisonofficers....AdmiralRadfordthoughtthismight
bedone."30
ThusdidtheredoubtableColonelEdwardLansdalemakehisentryintoVietnam,where
hemadeamarkthatwaslaterenshrinedintwosemifictionalworks,TheUglyAmerican
andTheQuietAmerican.LansdalewasaformerSanFranciscoadvertisingmanwho
believedin"selling"theAmericanwayoflifewhenandwherehecould,andincovert
actionswhentheywerenecessary.Hewasaveteranofguerrillaactionagainstthe
CommunistHukbalahapsinthePhilippines.
Dulles'instructionstoLansdalewereto"enterintoVietnamquietlyandassistthe
Vietnamese,ratherthantheFrench,inunconventionalwarfare."Hewasnottoirritatethe
French,ifpossible,buthewastokeepthematarm'slength.InVietnam,Lansdale
Page246
wastosetuptheSaigonMilitaryMission(SMM)''toundertakeparamilitaryoperations
againsttheenemyandtowagepoliticalpsychologicalwarfare."31
LansdaleenteredSaigononJune1,1954.Hehadasmallboxoffiles,adufflebagof
clothes,andaborrowedtypewriter.Theprospectscouldnothavebeengloomier.Dien
BienPhuhadjustfallentotheVietminh.AttheGenevaConference,thenorthernhalfof
VietnamhadbeengivenovertoHoChiMinhandtheCommunists.Speakingforthe
UnitedStates,UnderSecretaryofStateBedellSmithpromisedthatalthoughhis
governmenthadnotsignedtheGenevaAccords,itwouldnotuseforcetoupsetthem.
ThatputsomelimitsonhowmuchaidtheEisenhoweradministrationcouldopenlygive
totheSouthVietnameseleader,NgoDinhDiem.
OnLansdale'sfirstnightinSaigon,Vietminhsaboteursblewuplargeammunitiondumps
attheairport,rockingSaigonthroughoutthenight.Lansdalehadnodeskspace,no
office,novehicle,nosafeforhisfiles.HedidhavetheuseoftheregularSaigonCIA
stationchief'scommunicationssystem,buthehadnoassistants,noteam.TheSMM
consistedofLansdalealone.
Buthemaderapidprogress.HisreputationfromthePhilippineshadprecededhim,and
high-rankingSouthVietnameseofficersmadecontact.LansdaleorganizedtheVietnamese
ArmedPsywarCompany.Thiswasinaccordwithhisinstructions"todevelop
homogeneousindigenousunitswithanativeofficercorps,"forwhichpurposehehad
$124milliontospend.32
LansdaletrainedhisPsywarCompany,thensentthesoldiers,dressedincivilianclothes,
toHanoi.ThecitywasinastateofnearchaosastheFrenchpulledoutandtheVietminh
tookover.ThePsywarCompany'smissionwastospreadthestoryofaChinese
CommunistregimentinTonkinactinginabeastlyfashion,emphasizingthesupposed
massrapesofVietnamesegirlsbyChinesetroops.SinceChineseNationalisttroopshad
behavedinjustsuchafashionin1945,andsincetheVietnamesehadhatedandfearedthe
Chineseforcenturies,Lansdalewasconfidentthattheplantedstorywouldconfirm
VietnamesefearsofChineseCommunistoccupationunderVietminhrule.
Alas,nomemberofLansdale'sPsywarCompanyeverreturnedfromthemission.Toa
man,theydesertedtotheVietminh.33
Lansdale,meanwhile,hadjumpedintothemiddleofthecon
Page247
fused,nearlychaoticpoliticalsituationinSaigon.Inmid-1954,theFrenchturnedcontrol
ofthegovernmentovertoEmperorBaoDai.HisPrimeMinisterwasNgoDinhDiem,a
pudgyfive-footfive-incharistocrat,fifty-threeyearsold,withafierceambition.The
ArmyChiefofStaffwasGeneralHinh,animpatient,disingenuousofficerwhowanted
totalcontrolforhimself.ThestruggleforpowerwasbetweenDiemandHinh,asBaoDai
wasenjoyinghimselfinParisandalongtheFrenchRiviera.
LansdalebecameinvolvedbecausehewasclosetobothDiemandHinh.Hehadmetthem
inthePhilippinesearlier,likedthemboth,andgotonfamouslywiththeirwives.Hewas
alsoafriendofHinh'smistress,whowasapupilinasmallEnglish-languageclass
conductedbytheCIAmissionforthemistressesofvariousVIPSinSaigon.
Becauseofhisconnections,LansdalelearnedofaplotbyHinhandotherhigh-ranking
officerstooverthrowDiem.HeinformedAmbassadorDonaldHeath,whoaskedhimto
seewhathecoulddotopreventanarmedattackonthePresidentialPalace,whereDiem
hadhisoffice.LansdalewenttoHinhandbluntlytoldhimthatUnitedStatessupportfor
SouthVietnamwouldendiftheattacktookplace.ThenhewenttothePalacetogivethe
presidentialguardstacticaladviceonhowtostopatankattack.TheSMMofficialhistory
records,"Theadvice,ontanktrapsanddestructionwithimprovisedweapons,musthave
soundedgrim.Thefollowingmorning,whentheattackwastotakeplace,wevisitedthe
Palace:notaguardwasleftonthegrounds;Diemwasaloneupstairs,calmlygettinghis
workdone."34
TheSMM,bymid-August1954,hadtenagents.Eighthadbeenrushedinatthelast
minute,justbeforethecease-firewentintoeffect.Thenewcomers,roundedupinKorea,
Japan,andOkinawa,wereoldOSShands,withsomeexperienceinparamilitary
operationsbutnoneatallinpsywar.Theirzealmadeupfortheirinexperience.They
formedclandestineunitsofanti-CommunistVietnamese,thenwentnorthtodisruptthe
CommunisttakeoverinHanoi.Oneteamtriedtodestroythelargestprintingplantthere,
butVietminhguardsfrustratedtheattempt.Theythentriedaso-calledblackpsywar
strike,printingleaflets,attributedtotheVietminh,thatinstructedresidentsonhowto
behavefortheimmediatefuture.Theyproclaimedathree-dayholiday,outlinedaphony
monetaryreform,andsoon.Vietminhcurrencythenext
Page248
dayfell50percentinvalue,andmostofHanoiwasonthestreetscelebratingthe
"holiday."35
AnotherteamspentthenightbeforetheVietminhtakeoveratthecitybusdepot
contaminatingtheoilsupplysothatthebusengineswouldgraduallybewrecked.The
teamhadtoworkquicklyinanenclosedstorageroom.Fumesfromthecontaminant
cameclosetoknockingthemout."Dizzyandweak-kneed,"theSMMhistoryrecords,
"theymaskedtheirfaceswithhandkerchiefsandcompletedthejob."36
BackinSaigon,Lansdale'seffortsweresomewhatmorepositive.Heservedasanadviser
toDiem,supportingthePrimeMinisterinhisdecisiontocrushtheBinhZuyen,aquasicriminalsectwhichcontrolledgambling,theopiumtrade,andprostitutioninSaigon.
LansdalealsopersuadedDiemtoholdareferendumdesignedtogivehisregimea
popularlegitimacy.TheballotallowedtheSouthVietnamesetochoosebetweenDiem
andEmperorBaoDai,whohadthoroughlydiscreditedhimselfasaplayboytoolofthe
French.Diemgot98percentofthevoteonOctober23,1955,andbecamePresidentof
SouthVietnam,whichbecamearepublic.37
Lansdalehadambitiousplansforthenewrepublic.HeproposedtoAllenDullesthatthe
CIAprovidethemoneytosupportaprogramhecalled"MilitantLiberty."Hedescribedit
asaconcepthehadusedsuccessfullyinthePhilippines.AsLansdaleexplaineditto
Dulles,itsoundedlikeahighschoolcivicsexercise:"Theheartofanyplantoimplement
'MilitantLiberty'istheprogressivetrainingofgroupsofindigenouspersonnelinan
understandingofthemeaningofafreesocietytotheindividualandtheindividual's
responsibilitiesincreatingandmaintainingsuchasociety."Hewantedtoconcentratethe
programintheSouthVietnameseArmybecause"theinduction-training-dischargecycle
providesreadyaccesstoindigenouspersonnelwhocanplayanimportantroleina
revitalizationofVietnambothduringtheirperiodofmilitaryserviceandsubsequently
aftertheyhavereturnedtocivilianlife."38
Throughthesecondhalfofthefifties,Lansdalecontinuedtoinvolvehimselfinthe
ByzantinepoliticsofSaigon,acityfullofplots,filledwithintrigue,andjammedwith
spies.AllhisactivitycouldnothidethefactthattheUnitedStateshadbeenunableto
preventtheCommunisttakeoverinNorthVietnamandthattheCIAwasincapableof
topplingHoChiMinh'sgovernmentin
Page249
Hanoi.IntheFarEastthereweretobenocheapvictories,astherehadbeeninIranand
Guatemala.
TheCIA'sfailureinVietnamdidnotdetertheagencyfromtryingagaintotopplean
Asiangovernment,thistimein1958inIndonesia.PresidentSukarno,afifty-six-year-old
ladies'manwhohadhadfourwivesandwhowaslinkedbygossiptosuchmoviestarsas
GinaLollobrigidaandJoanCrawford,wassomewhatlikeMossadegh,aspellbinderofa
speakerbuterraticandmercurialasaleader.LikemanyThirdWorldpresidents,Sukarno
haddriftedtowardtheleft.HehadexpropriatedmostoftheprivateholdingsoftheDutch
(whohadheldIndonesiaasacolonyfor350years),hehadturnedtotheRussiansfor
helpinobtainingweaponsforhisarmedforces,andhehadbroughttheCommunistParty
ofIndonesiaintohiscoalitiongovernment.
Sincewinningitsindependencein1949,Indonesiahadbeenaparliamentarydemocracy.
ButinFebruary1957,followingatourofRussiaanditssatellites,Sukarnodeclaredthat
democracydidnotsuithisdiversenation.Indonesiawasindeeddiverseitsnearly100
millionpeoplelivedon3,000islands.SukarnodissolvedParliamentandtook
semidictatorialpowersforhimselfundertheeuphemism"GuidedDemocracy."Hischief
supportcamefromtheone-million-memberCommunistPartyandtheIndonesianArmy.
ModeratesinIndonesia,headedbypoliticalleadersoutsideofJava,wantedtooverthrow
Sukarno.TheCIAencouragedthemtoact.OnFebruary15,1958,theRevolutionary
CouncilinSumatraproclaimedanewgovernmentwithamultiparty,coalitioncabinet.
Therebelshadhopedthearmedforceswouldjointhem,butinsteadtheheadofthearmy,
GeneralAbdulHarisNasution,dishonorablydischargedsixgeneralswhohadsidedwith
themwhiletheairforcebombed,strafed,anddestroyedtworadiostationsthathadjoined
therebels.
Civilwarbegan.TheUnitedStatestookthehighroad."WearepursuingwhatItrustisa
correctcoursefromthepointofinternationallaw,"JohnFosterDullestoldCongressin
earlyMarch."Wearenotinterveningintheinternalaffairsofthiscountry."39
ThenextweektherebelsaskedtheUnitedStatesforarms,andappealedtotheSoutheast
AsiaTreatyOrganizationforrecognition.Again,DullesdeclaredAmericanneutrality:
"TheU.S.views
Page250
thistroubleinSumatraasaninternalmatter.Wetrytobeabsolutelycorrectinour
internationalproceedingsandattitudetowardit."
Therebels'bestweaponwastheirairforce,whichcarriedoutaseriesofraidsagainstthe
government.OnApril30,SukarnoaccusedtheUnitedStatesofsupplyingthebombers
andthepilots.HewarnedWashington"nottoplaywithfireinIndonesia....Letnota
lackofunderstandingbyAmericaleadtoathirdwar."
"Wecouldeasilyhaveaskedforvolunteersfromoutside,"Sukarnocontinued."Wecould
winkandtheywouldcome.Wecouldhavethousandsofvolunteers,butwewillmeetthe
rebelswithourownstrength."40
Thatsameday,Ikeheldapressconference.HewasaskedaboutSukarno'scharges."Our
policy,"thePresidentreplied,"isoneofcarefulneutralityandproperdeportmentallthe
waythroughsoasnottobetakingsideswhereitisnoneofourbusiness.
"Nowontheotherhand,"Ikecontinued,"everyrebellionthatIhaveeverheardofhasits
soldiersoffortune.YoucanstartevenbacktoreadingyourRichardHardingDavis.
Peopleweregoingoutlookingforagoodfightandgettingintoit,sometimesinthehope
ofpay,andsometimesjustfortheheckofthething.Thatisprobablygoingtohappen
everytimeyouhavearebellion."
Boyswillbeboys,inshort,andnoonecouldexpectthePresidenttochangehuman
nature.ThetroublewithIke'soffhandedexplanationwasthatitwasalie.TheAmericans
flyingbombingmissionsfortherebelswerenotsoldiersoffortuneactingontheirown,
butCIAagentsactingatthedirectionoftheEisenhoweradministration.41
WhenSukarnomadehisdealwiththeIndonesianCommunistPartyandbeganreceiving
armsfromtheSovietUnion,theCIAdecidedtodotohimwhatithaddonetoMossadegh
andArbenz.Ikecheckedovertheplan,whichwasalmostidenticalwithPBSUCCESS,
andapprovedtheoperation.
ThepilotsandplanescamefromtheCivilAirTransport(CAT),originallyformedin
ChinabytheCIAtosupportChiangKai-shek,laterusedbyLansdaleinthePhilippines
andIndochina.MostoftheCATequipmentandmanpowercameoutofClaire
Chennault'sFlyingTigers.LansdaledescribedCATinatop-secretmemorandumon
"unconventional-warfareresourcesinSoutheastAsia,"whichhegavetoGeneralMaxwell
Taylorin1961(and
Page251
whichwaslaterpublishedinthePentagonPapers):"CAT,aCIAproprietary,providesair
logisticalsupportundercommercialcovertomostCIAandotherU.S.Government
agencies'requirements....CAThasdemonstrateditscapabilitiesonnumerousoccasions
tomeetalltypesofcontingencyorlong-termcovertairrequirements....Duringthepast
tenyears,ithashadsomenotableachievements,includingsupportoftheChinese
Nationalistwithdrawalfromthemainland,airdropsupportfortheIndonesianoperation,
airliftsofrefugeesfromNorthVietnam,morethan200overflightsofMainlandChina
andTibet,andextensiveairsupportinLaosduringthecurrentcrisis."42
CATsuppliedtheIndonesianrebelswithahalfdozenorsoB-26two-enginebombers.
TheyflewharassingraidsintendedtofrightenSukarno'smilitarysupportersinto
desertinghim.AllwasgoingwelluntilMay18,1958,whenapilotnamedAllenLawrence
PopewasshotdownduringabombingandstrafingrunontheAmbonIslandairstripin
theMoluccas.TheAmericanambassadortoIndonesia,HowardP.Jones,followedIke's
leadanddismissedPopeas"aprivateAmericancitizeninvolvedasapaidsoldierof
fortune,"butthatfictioncouldnotsurvivelong.AllenDulleslosthisenthusiasmforthe
venture;Ikenolongerwantedanypartofit.TheCIAwithdrewCATandtheIndonesian
rebellioncollapsed.
Itwasanignominiousfailure.AsRayClinehasnoted,itmadeSukarnoincreasingly
dictatorialandledtomuchmiseryforIndonesia.Sukarno'satrociouspoliticaland
economicmismanagementledtoacrisisinthemid-1960sthatsawtheCommunists
murdermanyofthepoliticallyconservativeleadersinanattempttoseizetotalcontrol.
ThatattemptresultedinthewidespreadmassacreofthousandsofCommunists
themselves.TheUniversityofIndonesia,afteraninvestigation,placedthenumberkilled
at800,000,makingthisoneoftheworstbloodbathsofalltime.43
ClinehasanexcellentsummaryofthedebacleinIndonesia:"Theweakpointincovert
paramilitaryactionisthatasinglemisfortunethatrevealsCIA'Sconnectionmakesit
necessaryfortheUnitedStateseithertoabandonthecausecompletelyorconverttoa
policyofovertmilitaryintervention.Becausesuchparamilitaryoperationsaregenerally
keptsecretforpoliticalreasons,whenCIA'ScoverisblowntheusualU.S.responseisto
withdraw,leavingbehindthefriendlyelementswhohadentrustedtheirlivestotheU.S.
enterprise."44
Page252
ChapterEighteen
TheNationalIntelligenceEstimates
ThemostimportantworktheCIAdoestakesplaceintheWashingtonofficeofthe
DeputyDirectorforIntelligence(DDI).TheretheCIAcarriesontheoldresearchand
analysisfunctionsoftheOSS,tappingAmerica'sprestigiousuniversitiesforspecialized
personnelwithintimateacquaintancewiththelanguages,history,economics,and
socialconditionsofforeigncountries.R&AhasnoneoftheglamourofanOperation
PBSUCCESS,noneoftheexcitementofanOperationREDSOX/REDCAP,noneof
therewardsofanOperationAJAX,butitistheheartofthematter,whattheCIAisall
about.ForitistheDDIwhoprovidestheinformationthatthePresidentreliesupon
whenhemakesapolicyjudgment.
AllenDulles,asnoted,wasrelativelyuninterestedinacquiringandanalyzing
intelligence-heleftituptotheDDI.
OneofthebestmenevertoworkontheintelligencesideoftheCIAwasRayS.Cline,
anOSSveteranoftheR&AbranchandultimatelytheDeputyDirectoroftheCIA.
Clineisascholar'sscholar.AfterthewarhewroteWashingtonCommandPost:The
OperationsDivision,oneofthemostwidelypraisedvolumesinthehighlyregarded
seriesTheU.S.ArmyinWorldWarII,andafterhisretirementhewroteSecrets,Spies
andScholars:BlueprintoftheEssentialCIA,whichwaspraisedintheprofessional
journalsasthebestbookyetontheCIA.
Inthe1950s,ClineworkeddeepinthelabyrinthoftheCIA'Sintelligencebranch.
Therehehadthegreatest,and
Page253
rarest,satisfactionthatcancometoabureaucrathisworkactuallyhadanimpacton
policy.ItdidsobecauseCline'sultimateboss,PresidentEisenhower,wasabletoforce
thebureaucracytoservehimashewanteditto,ratherthanasitwantedtodo.
InanNSCmeetingearlyin1954,Ikecomplainedthatthereweretwothingswrong
withtheintelligencehewasgetting.First,itfailedtomakeacleardistinctionbetween
Russiancapabilityandactualintentions.Thisisaclassicproblembecausethe
professionalmilitary,whoarechargedwiththedefenseofthenation,always
exaggeratetheextentofthethreatthenationfaces.Themilitarycitestheenemy's
capabilitieswhattheRussiansmightdoinarmsproductionwhileignoringtheenemy's
intentionswhattheRussiansareinfactdoing.
ThesecondcomplaintIkehadwasthatnotenoughwasbeingdonetoputtheRussian
threatintoaproperperspective.HewasbombardedwithnewsthattheRussianswere
buildinguphere,there,everywhere,withoutweighingtheRussiancapabilitiesand
intentionsagainstanestimateofAmerica'scapabilities.Anoverallviewwasabsent
becausetheCIAwasresponsibleforgaugingtheRussianthreat,whiletheJointChiefs
ofStaff(JCS)wereresponsibleforestimatesoftheAmericanabilitytorespond.The
twohadtobebroughttogether.
WhatIkewantedwasa"net"evaluation,orwhatthemilitarycalleda"commander's
estimate,"thekindofeffortGeneralKennethStrongproducedthroughoutWorldWar
II.In1954thePresidentaskedAllenDullesandAdmiralArthurRadford,Chairmanof
theJCS,topreparesuchacommander'sestimateontheprobableoutcomeofawar
betweentheU.S.S.R.andtheUnitedStates.1
DullesdelegatedClinetodotheCIAsideofthestudy,whileRadfordchoseRear
AdmiralThomasRobbins,whomClinecharacterizedas"abrilliantbutsomewhat
lackadaisical"officer.Robbins,inthebestmilitarytradition,delegatedtwostaff
assistantstorepresenthim.Theseyoungofficers,Clinewrote,"hadnotaclueasto
whatweweresupposedtodo,"soClinetookover.
Heimmediatelydiscoveredthetremendouspowerofthe
Page254
militaryintheWashingtonbureaucracy.ClinecouldinvokeAdmiralRadford'sname
"andhavethingshappeninstantaneously."Therewasavastvacuum-tubefirstgenerationcomputerfillingthebasementofthePentagon.Healsolearnedthattheonly
experiencedwar-gamingstafftheserviceshadwasoutsideWashington.Cline
mentionedthistoRadfordonFriday;onMonday,hehadfull-timeuseofthecomputer,
andthewar-gamingstaffwasonstationinthePentagon.Clinethenpreparedtoplaya
computerizedwargameand,forthefirsttime,makeitpartofanetestimate.2
InthatsecondyearoftheEisenhoweradministration,attheheightoftheColdWar,the
Pentagonwasfulloftensionandfear.Itwascommonlysaidthatcommunismwasbent
on"worlddomination"andthatthe"timeofgreatestdanger"ofattackwastwoyears
hence.TheRussianswouldmarchacrosstheElbeRiverintoWestGermanyandonto
France,whiletheChinesewouldmarchacrosstheYaluRiverintoKoreaandlaunchan
amphibiousassaultagainstFormosa.Theunexaminedassumptionwasthatthe
Communistshadboththecapabilityandintentionofcarryingoutsuchambitious
offensives.
ButwhenClineplayedhiswargamesonthatgiantcomputer,hemadesome
fascinatingdiscoveries,thechiefbeingthat"itwasaprettydesperatemoveforthe
U.S.S.R.toattackuswiththeirsubstantiallyinferiorlong-rangeairforce."U.S.radar
tacticalwarningsystemsinEuropeandAsiaweregoodenoughtoprecludethe
possibilityoftheCommunistsachievingsurprise.Anincidentaldiscoverywasthatthe
characteristicsofdefenseradarmadeitmoreprofitabletoattackatlowlevels,where
"groundclutter"confusedtheradar,thanatthehighaltitudesforwhichAmerican
bombersweredesigned.ThisdiscoveryledtoarevisionofU.S.AirForcebombing
tactics,afortuitousrevisionasthedevelopmentoverthenextfewyearsofSoviet
ground-to-airmissilesmadeitimperativefortheUnitedStatestogotolow-level
attack.3
Withtheresultsofthewargamebeforehim,Clinethenwrotethecommander's
estimatefor1954.Hepreparedabriefingonthesubject,completewiththeusualvisual
aids
Page255
andcharts.ThemilitaryinsistedonprideofplaceandAdmiralRobbins,notCline,
madetheoralpresentationattheWhiteHouse.Ikeinsistedthatallthetopofficialsin
theDefenseDepartmentattendthisspecialbriefing.
"Theencomiumsweregreat,"Clinewrotewithjustifiablepride.WhatIkehad
suspectedallalongwasconfirmedusingsuchtermsasthe"ultimate"intentionof
"worlddomination"wasapoorindicatorofspecificnear-termmilitaryaction.*The
Communistswereneitherreadynorabletoresorttodirectmilitaryaction.Thefigure
ofspeechthat"thetimeofgreatestdangerofattackistwoyearshence''disappeared
fromJCSpapers.Militaryintelligenceofficersandciviliananalystsbecamemore
sophisticated,theirlanguagemoremoderate,theirdescriptionsoftheCommunistthreat
moreaccurateandlessscary.
Thecommander'sestimate,Clinesummarized,alongwithothersinthefollowingyears,
"succeededinreducingtheSovietmilitarythreattotheUnitedStatestoreasonable
proportionsinthemindsofwar-planningstaffs."ThisinturnallowedIketohold
steadytohis"NewLook"indefensepolicy,atanimmensefinancialsavingstothe
nationwhilesimultaneouslyreducingfearsandslowingthearmsrace.TheCIA,Cline
boasts,"probablyneveraccomplishedmoreofvaluetothenationthanthisquiet,littleremarkedanalyticalfeat."4
Cline'saccomplishmentwasavictoryforanalysis.ItwasmatchedbytheCIA'S
greatesttriumphofintelligencegathering,theU-2program,discussedinthefollowing
chapter.AthirdfunctionoftheDDI'SsideoftheCIAwasprediction,toanticipate
eventsaroundtheworldandreportthemtothePresidentbeforetheyhappened.Even
whenthePresidentcouldnotdoanythingonewayoranotherabouttheevent,which
wasusuallythecase,healwayswantedtoknowinadvance.AmericanPresidentshate
tobecaughtby
*Eisenhower'sdefensepolicy,whichhecalledthe"NewLook,"cutbackdrasticallyonTruman's
expendituresfordefense,primarilybecauseIkerefusedtobebamboozledintoseeingtheRussians
assomesortofsupermen.Ikethoughtthegreatestthreatwasanuncontrolledarmsracethatwould
leadtouncontrollableinflationandultimatebankruptcy.
Page256
surprise.ItistheCIA'SjobtotellthePresidentwhatisgoingtohappen,anditisan
almostimpossibleassignment.
In1956,ontheeveoftheEisenhowervs.Stevensonpresidentialelection,Franceand
BritainjoinedwithIsraeltoattackEgypt.WhiteHousePressSecretaryJamesHagertytold
reportersthatthePresidentgothisfirstinformationontheinvasion"throughpress
reports."Theattack"cameasacompletesurprisetous."Simultaneously,theRussians
senttheirtanksintothestreetsofBudapest;Administrationspokesmentoldthepressthat
theRussianattackonHungarywasalsoacompletesurprise.
SuchreportsmadeAllenDullesfurious.Amonthlaterheleakedstoriestothe
WashingtonpresscorpsthattheCIAhadpredictedHungaryindetail.Healsocomplained
toreporterAndrewTully,"MybrothersaidtheStateDepartmentwastakenbysurprise.
Thatwasonlytechnicallycorrect.WhathemeantwasthattheBritish,FrenchandIsraeli
governmentshadnotinformedourambassadors.ButwehadtheSuezoperationperfectly
taped.Wereportedthattherewouldbeathree-nationattackonSuez.Andontheday
beforetheinvasionCIAreporteditwasimminent."5
Dulles'leaksmadeIke,inhisturn,furious.ThePresidenthadalegendarytemper,which
hestruggledusuallysuccessfullyallhislifetocontrol.Whenangry,hecouldnotkeepthe
brightredcoloroutofhisface,andthebackofhisneckwouldbecomeredasabeet,but
hedidmanagetositperfectlystill.Underhisdesk,however,hewouldtearhis
handkerchiefintotinybits,downtotheindividualstrandsofcotton.Whenhefinished,
therewouldbealooseballofcottonstrandsathisfeet,andnohandkerchief.
WhatupsetIkewas,first,thefactoftheleakitselfallPresidentsdislikeleaks.Second,
Dulles'claimstohavepredictedSuezandHungarysimplywerenottrue.Buttheultimate
insulttoIkewasDulles'hintthatthePresidentwastoolazytodohishomework.
Throughouthispresidency,Ikesmartedunderthecriticismthathetooktoomany
vacations,thathedidnotworkhardenough,thatheneglectedhisdutiesforagolfgame
orafishingexpedition,andmostofallthatherefusedtoreadanyreportthatwasmore
thanonepagelong.
InanApril1958articleonHungary,Harper'sMagazinerepeatedDulles'chargesthatIke
wouldhaveknownwhatwas
Page257
goingtohappenifhehadonlyreadtheCIAreports.Eisenhower,accordingtoHarper's,
"showedgreatannoyanceatthis,announcingthatthereportsweretooponderoustoread
andaskingthathenceforththeCIAappendmaps,withredarrowspointingtostrategic
points,andheadlinesummariestoitsdailyintelligencedigest."6
Nightclubcomedians,late-nightTVcomics,andtheDemocraticPartyallhadgreatfun
withIke'sredarrowsandheadlinesummaries.Thetruthwas,however,thattheCIA
reportsweretooponderousforanyonetoread.ItcanbearguedthatthePresidentisthe
busiestmanintheworld,operatingonthetightestschedule,carryingthemost
responsibilities,andhavingtheleastamountoftimeforseriousreading,orindeed
readingofanykind.Hewantshisintelligencesummariestobebrief,straightforward,
accurate.
ButtheworldismuchtoocomplexandtheCIA'staskmuchtoodifficulttomeetthose
requirements.Thehonestintelligenceofficerknowsthathecanneverbecompletelysure.
Heistryingtopredicttheactionsofmenandorganizationsthatareresourceful,have
everyreasontohidetheirintentions,andhavevastexperienceindoingso.And,
obviously,manyoftheworld'sgreateventsareunpredictable,takingeveryoneby
surprise.Inevitably,theCIAwantstocoveritself,toqualifyitspredictions,tointroduce
nuancesintoitsreports,tosaythat"suchandsomighthappenifthistakesplace,butthen
ontheotherhand..."etc.
Along,ponderousreport,filledwithqualifications,isanhonestreport.Itisalsooflittle
usetothePresident.InpredictingCommunistreactionstopossibleAmericaninitiatives,
however,theCIAwasoftenquiteexact,andmosthelpful,especiallyingivingIkea
reasonnottodosomethinghedidnotwanttodoanyway.
Vietnammakesagoodcasestudyofthisdevelopment.From1953to1961theCIAfiled
voluminousreportsontheprospectsinVietnam.Called"NationalIntelligenceEstimates,"
theywereissuedatregularintervals.TheestimatesweresubmittedtothePresidentand
theNSCbyAllenDulles,whowascarefultonoteonthecoverpagethat"thefollowing
intelligenceorganizationsparticipatedinthepreparationofthisestimate:TheCIAandthe
intelligenceorganizationsoftheDepartmentsofState,theArmy,theNavy,theAirForce,
andtheJointStaff."Someoftheestimateswereoverthirtypageslong,nonelessthan
ten.
ThefirstestimateIkesawonVietnamwaspublishedonJune4,
Page258
1953.Itwasinterestingbut,forthePresident,oflittleuse.Thereportsaidthatthemilitary
situationmightormightnotgetbetter.WhocouldtellifnewFrenchgeneralswouldhelp
ornot?TheChinesemightormightnotinvade.Therewasonegood,solid,
straightforwardprediction:"IfpresenttrendsintheIndochinesesituationcontinue
throughmid-1954,theFrenchpoliticalandmilitarypositionmaysubsequentlydeteriorate
veryrapidly."7Butthen,thatwashardlyasecret.
OnJune15,1954,theagencydealtwithoneofthemostexplosiveproblemstheNSC
everhandedittoestimateCommunistreactionstotheuseofnuclearweaponsbythe
UnitedStatesinVietnam.Therequestcameaboutbecausevariousmembersofthe
Eisenhoweradministration,ledbyChiefofStaffoftheAirForceGeneralNathan
Twining,andincludingalltheJCS(exceptforArmyChiefofStaffMatthewRidgway),as
wellastheSecretaryofDefense,andtheVicePresident,hadurgedthePresidenttouse
atomicbombs.Twiningsaidthattheuseoftwoorthree"nukes"ontheVietminharound
DienBienPhuwould"cleanthoseCommiesoutofthereandthebandcouldplaythe
MarseillaiseandtheFrenchwouldcomemarchingoutinfineshape."8
Ikesaidthathewouldnotuseatomicweaponsforthesecondtimeinlessthanadecade
againstAsians,partlybecauseitwouldputtheUnitedStatesintheworstpossiblelightin
AsiaandthroughouttheThirdWorld,mainlybecausehehatedwhathecalled"those
terriblethings."9
NothingcouldhavebudgedIkefromthatposition,buthewasthankfulforCIAsupport.
TheCIAwarnedflatlythat"theChinesewouldtakewhatevermilitaryactiontheythought
requiredtopreventdestructionoftheVietMinh,includingwhenandifnecessaryopen
useofChineseCommunistforcesinIndochina."Theagencypointedoutthat"U.S.useof
nuclearweaponsinIndochinawouldhastentheultimateChinesedecisionwhetherornot
tointervene."10
DienBienPhufelltotheVietminh.InGeneva,inJulyof1954,France,HoChiMinh,and
thegreatpowers(exceptfortheUnitedStates)signedtheGenevaAccords.Theparties
agreedtoatruceandtoatemporarypartitionofVietnamatthe17thparallel.Neitherthe
Frenchinthesouth(whosoonhandedoverthegovernmenttoDiem)norHoChiMinh's
Communistsinthenorthcouldjoinamilitaryallianceorallowforeignmilitaryforcesor
Page259
equipmentontotheirterritory.Therewouldbeelectionswithintwoyearstounifythe
country.
TheUnitedStatesdidnotsigntheaccords,nordidanyrepresentativeofaSouth
Vietnamesegovernment.BedellSmithwasinGenevaasanobserver,notaparticipantin
theconference.Heissuedaletterstatingthathisgovernment"tooknoteof"theaccords
andpromisingthattheUnitedStateswouldsupportfreeelectionsandwouldnotuse
forcetoupsettheagreements.
ThiswasamajorembarrassmenttotheRepublicans,whohadcometopowerpledgedto
apolicyof"liberation,"andwhonowhadtowatchasyetanotherAsiancountry,North
Vietnam,felltotheCommunists.Desperatetosavesomethingfromthedebacle,inlate
July,GeneralTwining,AdmiralRadford,SecretaryDulles,andothersworkedoutan
invasionschemethatwouldhavelandedAmericantroopsatHaiphong,followedbya
marchtoHanoi.
AgainGeneralRidgwayopposed.OnthebasisofArmyintelligenceestimates,heargued
thattheadventurewouldrequireatleastsixdivisions,eveniftheChinesedidnot
intervene.Eisenhower'sdefensepolicywastoreducetheArmy,notexpandit.The
Presidentrefusedtoact.11
SecretaryDullesthenmovedonthediplomaticfront.Ikewasagreatbelieverinalliances,
andinSeptemberof1954heencouragedDullestosignupalliesinAsia.Dulles
persuadedBritain,Australia,NewZealand,France,Thailand,Pakistan,andthe
PhilippinestojointheSoutheastAsiaTreatyOrganization(SEATO).Itwasadefensive
allianceinwhichthepartiesagreedtoacttogethertomeetanaggressor.Protectionfor
Cambodia,Laos,andSouthVietnam,theindependentnationsthathadcomeintobeing
whentheFrenchwithdrewfromIndochina,wascoveredinaseparateprotocol.
BringingSouthVietnamintoSEATOwasadefactoviolationoftheGenevaAccords.The
UnitedStateshadalreadydecided,inanyevent,thatthoseaccordswouldhavetobe
ignored,especiallythesectionthatcalledforfreenationwideelections.TheCIAhad
reportedinAugustthat"iftheschedulednationalelectionsareheldinJuly,1956,andif
theVietMinhdoesnotprejudiceitspoliticalprospects,theVietMinhwillalmostcertainly
win."12
Ikewasmorepreciseinhismemoirs.Hestated,"Ihavenevertalkedorcorresponded
withapersonknowledgeableinIndochineseaffairswhodidnotagreethathadelections
beenheld
Page260
...possibly80percentofthepopulationwouldhavevotedfortheCommunistHoChi
MinhastheirleaderratherthanChiefofStateBaoDai."13
Ike'sstatement,sofrequentlyquotedbydovesinthesecondhalfofthe1960s,hada
majorqualifiertoit.BaoDaiwasthenlivinginFrance.Hehadnointerestinhisnative
land,andalltheCIAreportsindicatedthathispopularitywasnonexistentamonghis
subjects.Inaddition,Ikeoftenpointedout,whenconfrontedwiththisstatement,that
NorthVietnamhadnearlytwicethepopulationofSouthVietnam,andheassumedthat
HoChiMinhwouldget100percentofthevoteinhishalfofthecountry.14
Nevertheless,thestarkfactremainedthatHoChiMinhhadmorepopularitythanany
non-Communistleader.Underthecircumstances,nooneintheU.S.Governmentcould
havebeenexpectedtosupportfreeelections.Sothedecisionwasmadetofindan
alternativetoHo,meanwhileavoidingelections.NgoDinhDiembecamethefavored
alternative,andwiththehelpofColonelLansdaleandtheCIA,hemanagedtowinthe
powerstruggle,eliminatinghisopponentsintheVietnamesemilitaryandBaoDai.
TheCIA,onSeptember15,1954,judgedDiemagoodprospectforAmericansupport,
indeed"theonlyfigureonthepoliticalscenebehindwhomgenuinenationalistsupport
canbemobilized."Althoughhewas"confrontedwiththeusualproblemsofinefficiency,
disunity,andcorruptioninVietnamesepolitics,"hewashonestandenergetic.Diem,the
CIAfelt,had"considerableunorganizedpopularsupport,particularlyamongCatholic
elementsofSouthVietnam."Itpredictedhewouldsurvivethepresentcrisisbutsaidthat
hisabilitytocreateagovernmentthatcouldlastdependedon''earlyandconvincing"
outsidesupport.15
EisenhowerthenmadehisdecisiontobackDiem.OnOctober1,1954,hewrotealetter
ofsupporttohim,aletteroftencitedlaterbyPresidentsKennedy,Johnson,andNixonas
proofthatitwasIkewhogotusintoVietnam.
"Wehavebeenexploringwaysandmeans...tomakeagreatercontributiontothe
welfareandstabilityoftheGovernmentofViet-Nam,"Ikebegan.Hewastherefore
instructingtheAmericanambassadorinSaigontoconferwithDiemtosee"howan
intelligentprogramofAmericanaidgivendirectlytoyourGovernmentcanservetoassist
Viet-Naminitspresenthouroftrial,providedthatyourGovernmentispreparedtogive
assurancesasto
Page261
thestandardsofperformanceitwouldbeabletomaintainintheeventsuchaidwere
supplied."
Thepurposeoftheoffer,thePresidentsaid,wastoassistDiem"indevelopingand
maintainingastrong,viablestate,capableofresistingattemptedsubversionoraggression
throughmilitarymeans."Therewasaconditiontotheaid."TheGovernmentofthe
UnitedStatesexpectsthatthisaidwillbemetbyperformanceonthepartofthe
GovernmentofViet-Naminundertakingneededreforms."Suchagovernmentwouldbe,
thePresidenthoped,"soresponsivetothenationalistaspirationsofitspeople,so
enlightenedinpurposeandeffectiveinperformance,thatitwillberespectedbothat
homeandabroadanddiscourageanywhomightwishtoimposeaforeignideologyon
yourfreepeople."16
Thereformsnevertookplace.TheCIAreportedthatDiem'sregimewasincreasingly
repressive.AmericanaidneverthelesscontinuedtosupportDiem'sgovernment.Oneof
thereasonswasthelackofanalternative;anotherwastheoptimisticpicturetheCIA
paintedofSouthVietnam.InSaigon,therewasahighstandardofliving,political
stability,economicprogressaccordingtotheCIA.
InMay1957,DiemcametotheUnitedStatesforatriumphantwelcome.Hespentthree
daysinWashington,whereheconferredwithIke,Dulles,andotherhighofficials.He
addressedajointsessionofCongressandmetwithsuchsupportersasCardinalSpellman,
SenatorJohnKennedy,JusticeWilliamO.Douglas,andMayorRobertWagnerofNew
York.WagnerhailedDiemasaman"towhomfreedomistheverybreathoflifeitself."
IkeloanedDiemhispersonalplanetoflytotheWestCoast.Inthepress,ontelevision,at
banquets,everywhereDiemwashailedasthemiracleworkerwhoprovidedlivingproof
ofwhatcouldbeaccomplishedintheThirdWorldwithoutCommunistregimentation.17
CIAreportscontinuedtoechothatview.Inits1959NationalIntelligenceEstimate,the
agencycontrastedthetwoVietnams.Thenorthwas"organizedalongstrictCommunist
lines.Thestandardoflivingislow;lifeisgrimandregimented;andthenationaleffortis
concentratedonbuildingforthefuture."Inthesouth,meanwhile,"thestandardofliving
ismuchhigherandthereisfarmorefreedomandgaiety."Securityinthesouthwasmuch
improved;thenumberofCommunistguerrillaswasdownfrom
Page262
10,000to2,000,"scatteredalongtheCambodianborderandintheremoteplateauregion
ofthenorth."
Theagencydidadmitthattherewereproblems,althoughonehadtogotothefineprint
ofthebulkydocumenttofindthem.OnewasthatDiemconcentratedonbuildinghis
armedforces,notlongtermeconomicdevelopment.Consequently,Americanaiddollars
wereusedtobuyconsumergoodsfromJapanortheUnitedStates,whichinhibitedthe
developmentoflocalindustry.
Anotherproblemwasthat"afaçadeofrepresentativegovernmentismaintained,butthe
governmentisinfactessentiallyauthoritarian....Noorganizedopposition,loyalor
otherwise,istolerated,andcriticsoftheregimeareoftenrepressed."Thestrongly
centralizedone-manruleprovidedstabilityattheexpenseofalienatingthenation's
educatedeliteandinhibitingthegrowthofpoliticalinstitutionsthathadpopularsupport.
Overall,however,theCIA'sconclusionwasthat"DiemwillalmostcertainlybePresident
formanyyears,"andthatwithDiemtherewouldbestabilityandcontinuedprosperityin
SouthVietnam.18
InbriefingPresident-electKennedyonJanuary19,1961,onSoutheastAsia,Ikedidnot
evenmentionVietnam.Itwasnota"problemarea."
Nearlytwodecadeslater,bywhichtimetheUnitedStateshadsent4.25millionofher
youngmentoVietnam,andthenbroughtthemhome,andlostthewar,General
GoodpasterplacedpartoftheblameforIke'sshortsightednessonVietnamatthefeetof
theintelligenceagencies.GoodpastercharacterizedourinformationonVietnamas
"inadequate,poor,terrible."19
ThatjudgmentseemsunfairifitisdirectedsolelytowardtheCIA.America'spolicy
towardVietnamwasmadeintheWhiteHouseandtheStateDepartment,notinCIA
headquarters.ThechieffeatureoftheCIAreportingwasthatitcouldusuallyberead
eitherway.IkecouldhavesupportedDiemonthebasisoftheintelligencehereceived,or
hecouldhaveadoptedananti-Diempolicyonthebasisofthosesamereports.Thechoice
washis.AlltheCIAdidwastosupplyhimwithinformation.Thatwasallitwas
supposedtodo.
Onthequestion,whogotusintoVietnam?theEisenhowerscouldbeasquicktopoint
thefingerofblameasIke'ssuccessors.Inaninterviewin1979,MiltonEisenhowersaid,
"Oneofthe
Page263
hardestthingsIhadtodowithLyndonJohnsonwasthathekeptsaying,asthecriticism
oftheVietnamwarmounted,'I'monlycarryingoutthepolicyofTruman,Eisenhower
andKennedy.'
"AndononeoccasionIsaid,'PresidentJohnson,you'remakingaterriblemistake.
PresidentEisenhowerwasbitterlyopposedtoanyparticipationintheVietnamwar.He
wasimportunedbytheAirForceandeverybodyelse,andhedeclinedtimeandagain.'
"AndJohnsonlookedatme,andtookmebysurprise.Hesaid,'Well,thenwhyisitthat
nowthatwe'reintherehe'sneverspokenawordofopposition?'
"Isaid,'Well,therearetwothingstobesaidaboutthat.Beforewegetintoafightit'squite
adifferentmatter.Andfurthermore,nowthatwe'reinitandyouaremakingallthe
statementsthatyouare,ifPresidentEisenhowerdifferedwithyou,itwouldbethe
greatestcomforttotheenemythatyoucanimagine,anditwouldprolongthewar.'
"Hesaid,'MyGod,Ineverthoughtofsuchathing.I'llneversaythatagain.'
"Isaid,'YoujustrememberthatTrumangavemonetaryhelp,Eisenhowerputinafew
menasadvisers,butKennedyputthefirstmenintostartshooting,andyou'retheone
thatexpandedthewar.Sodon'tblameitonanybodyelse.'Hetookitlikeaman."20
Ike,too,couldbecriticalofhissuccessors,althoughasMiltonpointedouthenever
utteredawordagainstthePresidentinpubliconthesubjectofthewar.Butin1968,
immediatelyafterLBJmadehisstartlingannouncementthathewasnotgoingtorunfor
reelectionandsimultaneouslyannouncedthathewasstoppingthebombingnorthofthe
DMZ,Ikewroteintheprivacyofhisdiary:
"April1,1968.LasteveningPresidentJohnsonwentonthetelevisiononanational
hookup.Hetalkedagreatdealaboutthewarandmadethesepoints:1.Hedefended
earnestlythereasonsforAmericabeinginthewar.2.HesaidAmericawouldpersevere
untilthelimitedobjectivesheoutlinedshouldberealizedandthatthoseobjectivesdidnot
includeconqueringNorthVietNam,usingsuchmethodsthatwouldconvinceHanoithat
wewouldnotbedefeatedandthereforetoinducethem,soonerorlater,tocometothe
bargainingtable.HereiteratedtheAdministration'sdeterminationtoachievetheselimited
objectivesandthereaftertoassistthatcornerofAsia.
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"NexthesaidthathehadorderedacessationofbombingofNorthVietNaminthehope
thatthiswouldleadtosatisfactorypeace.Thisabruptchangeinpolicy,withoutanyquid
proquofromHanoi,will,ofcourse,furtherbewildertheUnitedStates.Itappearstobe
notonlycontrarytothePresident'sannounceddeterminationinthematter,butapartial
capitulation,atleast,tothe'peaceatanyprice'peopleinourowncountry.
"Thefinalandmostpuzzlingfeatureofhistalkwashisdeclarationthathewouldnotseek
andwouldnotacceptthenominationofhisPartyforthePresidencyoftheUnitedStates.
Theinclusionofthisstatementseemstobealmostacontradictiontohispleaforamore
unifiedAmericainattainingourlimitedobjectivesinVietNam.Hisspeechisvirtuallyan
efforttosurrendertoanotherthePresidentialresponsibilitiesintheconflict.The
conclusionseemsinescapablethatthoughheisconvincedoftheworthinessofour
purposesinSoutheastAsia,he,himself,isunwillingtoremain,personally,inthefight.
"TomeitseemsobviousthatthePresidentisatwarwithhimselfandwhiletrying
vigorouslytodefendtheactionsanddecisionshehasmadeinthepast,andurgingthe
nationtopursuethesepurposesregardlessofcost,hewantstobeexcusedfromthe
burdenoftheofficetowhichhewaselected."21
Page265
ChapterNineteen
TheU-2andIke'sDefensePolicy
Nearlymidnight,abalmyJuneevening,Washington,1956.Analmostfullmoonshines
ontheLincolnMemorialanddownthelengthofthereflectingpool.Atall,stoopshouldered,long-faced,long-leggedman,verydeliberateinhismovements,strides
alongtheshadowsbesidethepool.Hehasanairofself-confidencethatshowsinevery
step.HestopswhenhereachesBuildingK,oneofthosedismal,uglyWorldWarII
"temporary"buildings.BuildingsJ,K,andLstretchtheentirelengthofthereflecting
pool,fromSeventeenthtoTwenty-thirdstreets.Theyserveastheheadquartersforthe
DeputyDirectorofPlansoftheCIAandhisstaff.
Theman,RichardBissell,drawshimselfuptohisfullsix-feet-four-inchheight,
glancesupanddownthepool,thenhurriedlymovesinsideK.Hewalksquicklydown
thecorridortohisoffice.Sixhoursearlierhehadapprovedmissionplansforaspy
flightovertheSovietUnion.Nowhehasreturnedforthe"go-no-go"briefing.
Inhisoffice,Bissell'sprojectteamhasbeenwaitingforhim.Hesitsbehindhisdesk,
picksupapaperclip,andleansbackinhischair,swinginghislonglegsandbigfeet
upontohisdesk.Asishishabit,hetwiddlesthepaperclip,bendingitintofantastic
shapes.Tossingitaside,hefidgetswithapencil,polisheshisglasses,looksupatthe
ceiling,allthewhilelisteningtoreports,occasionallyinterjectingan"O.K."ora"Right,
right!"andlessfrequentlyshakinghisheadandmumbling"No,no."
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He'slikeanatomicbomb,atremendousbundleofenergyboundupinonesmall
space,alwaysonthevergeofbursting.
HisweathermanreportsthatconditionsoverRussiahavenotchangedsincethe
previousbriefingtheweatherremainsfavorable.Thatisthekey.ThePresident
authorizedtheflightfourdaysearlier,foraten-dayperiod.IfBissellcannotgetitoff
thegroundinthosetendays,hewillhavetoscrubthemissionandreturntotheWhite
Housetostartalloveragain.Hehasalreadypostponedtheflightthreetimesbecauseof
cloudcoveroverRussia.
TheliaisonmanwiththeairbaseinWiesbaden,WestGermany,reportsthattheplane
andpilotareready.Thetechnicalmansaysthatthecameraandfilmareproperlysetup
fortheoperation.Otherexpertsconfirmthattheyarereadytobringthefilmfrom
GermanytothelabsinWashingtonforimmediateprocessing.
Noddingvigorously,Bissellletsalittleofhistremendousenergyburstforth."All
right,"heannounces."Let'sgo."
Andwiththatthemostelaborate,technologicallyadvanced,andspectacularlysuccessful
spymissioninthehistoryofespionagetothatdatewaslaunched.Thewordwasflashed
toWiesbaden,andwithinminutesthefirstU-2wasairborneonitsinitialflightover
Sovietterritory.1
Bissellwasaccustomedtohigh-risksituations.Hehadbeeninthemiddleofthe
PBSUCCESSoperationinGuatemalaandinvolvedinotherCIAactivities.Hewenthome
aftermakinghisdecisionandenjoyedagoodnight'ssleep.Thefollowingmorning,ata
quartertonine,hewalkedintoAllenDulles'office.
DulleseagerlyaskedifBissellhadgottentheU-2missionofftheground.
"Yes,"Bissellreplied."It'sintheairnow."
"Whereisitgoing?"Dullesasked.
"GoingfirstoverMoscow,"Bissellreplied,"andthenoverLeningrad."
"MyGod!"Dullesexclaimed."Doyouthinkthatwaswise,forthefirsttime?"
"It'llbeeasierthefirsttimethananylatertime,"Bissellassuredhisboss.
Page267
Theremainderofthemorning,Bissellandhisprojectpeoplesataround,ratherlike
WalterCronkiteandthemenatMissionControlinHoustonduringarocketlaunching,
waitingforareport.Towardnoon,acablefromWiesbadencamein.TheU-2wasback.
Theweatherhadbeenperfect,thepilothadusedallhisfilm,thefilmwasonitswayto
Washington.Acheerwentup.Bissell,allsmiles,hurrieddownthehalltotellDulles.
ThedirectoroftheCIAwenttotheWhiteHouse,wherehehadthegreatpleasureof
reportingthesuccessfulflighttothePresidentandseeingoneofIke'sfamousgrins
spreadacrosshisface.
TheU-2programwastheCIA'sgreatestcoup.ItgotitsstartbecauseIkeinsistedthatthe
U.S.Governmentkeepitselfatthecuttingedgeoftechnologyandsawtoitthathis
nation'sbestscientistswereworkingforthegovernmentonmattersofnationalsecurity.
OnthebasisofhisownWorldWarIIexperience,Eisenhowerhadgreatfaithinaerial
reconnaissance,andhadbeendeeplyimpressedbythemiraclesthatcouldbeperformed
byphotographicinterpretation.AsPresident,oneofhisgreatfearswasthattheUnited
Statesmightagainbecaughtbyanothersurpriseattack,asatPearlHarbor,butthistime
onthemainlandandfarmoredevastating,asitwouldbecarriedoutwithnuclearbombs.
Inearly1954,aboutayearafterhetookoffice,IkeappointedaSurpriseAttackPanel,
underthechairmanshipofJamesR.Killian,presidentofMITfrom1948to1959and
Eisenhower'sSpecialAssistantforScienceandTechnologyfrom1957to1959.The
SurpriseAttackPanelhadthreesubcommittees,oneofwhichwasconcernedwith
intelligence.ItsleadingmemberswereEdwinH.LandandEdwardPurcell.
LandwastheinventorofthePolaroidcamera,andpresident,chairmanoftheboard,and
directorofresearchforthePolaroidCorporation.DuringWorldWarIIhehadworked
fortheNavyonplasticlenses.PurcellwasaHarvardprofessorofphysics,winnerofthe
NobelPrize(1952),andanexpertinsuchareasasmicrowavephenomena,nuclear
magnetism,andradio-frequencyspectroscopy.
Thesubcommitteemetregularly.ItwasgreatlyimpressedbytheworkofArthurLundahl,
aPI(photointerpreter)ofWorldWarIIwhohadjoinedtheCIAandranthesmallphoto
interpretationofficeoftheDDI.Lundahlwasafarsightedvisionary
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whoconstantlytoutedthepotentialofthepicturethattoldmorethan10,000words,or
than1,000spies.RayClinecalledLundahl"thesupersalesmanofphotointerpretation."
Atthestart,hehadonlytwentymenunderhim;bytheendofthe1950s,therewere1,200
PISintheCIA.2
LundahlshowedKillian,Land,andPurcellsomeastonishingdevelopmentsin
photography.Landwasmuchimpressedbythenewcameras,lenses,andspecialfilms
thatmadehigh-levelphotographypractical.SeeingwhatLundahlcouldaccomplish,the
subcommitteeoftheSurpriseAttackPanelbegancastingaboutforawaytoflyover
Russiatotakepictures.
LandlearnedthatsixmonthsearlierClarence"Kelly"Johnson,adesigneratLockheed,
hadproposedtotheAirForceahigh-altitudesingle-enginereconnaissanceaircraft.
Johnsonhadevensubmittedadesignconceptandafewdrawings.TheAirForce,
unimpressed,contractedinsteadforanewversionoftheCandarabomber,withnew
wingsandredesignedforweightreduction.FouroftheselightweightCandaraswerebuilt
andflown,buttheyprovedtobeunsatisfactory.
Discouraged,theAirForcehadturnedtoaballoonproject.Unmannedballoons,
equippedwiththelatestcameras,weretofloatacrosstheU.S.S.R.,toberecoveredinthe
Pacific.Twoorthreeballoonswereactuallybuilt,andtheattemptwasmade,butthose
flights,liketheCandaras,wereunsuccessful.
Land,meanwhile,haddecidedthattheAirForcemadeamistakewhenitturneddown
KellyJohnsonandLockheed.HeandPurcellwenttoAllenDullesforaprivatemeeting.
TheyconvincedDulles.ThedaybeforeThanksgiving,1954,Land,Purcell,Dulles,and
KillianwenttotheOvalOfficetomeetwiththePresident.Theytooknopaperswith
them,andnominuteswerekept.
Ikelistened,considered,andapprovedimmediately.Thiswasunusualforhim,ashe
ordinarilylikedtosleeponadecision.HetoldAllenDullestogetonit.Dullescalled
RichardBissellonthephoneandtoldhimtogetovertotheWhiteHouse.
Bissellwasthereinhalfanhour."Becauseallthediscussionhadbeenconductedatsuch
ahighlevelintheexecutivebranch,"helaterexplained,"nobodyhadreallyworkedout
howanythingwastobedone.Nobodyknewwherethemoneywascomingfrom.
Nobodyknewhowmuchitwouldcost.Nobodyknewwhowouldprocuretheaircraft.
Nobodyhadevengivenanythoughttowhere
Page269
itcoulddevelop,whereflighttestingcouldbedone,wherepeoplecouldbetrainedorby
whom,whowouldflyitoranything."
Washingtonhasareputationasatowninwhichitisdifficulttogetanythingdone,and
nothinggetsdonequickly,butwithapresidentialmandatetoact,thepiecestendtofall
intoplace.Thatafternoon-stillthedaybeforeThanksgiving,1954-Bissellwenttothe
PentagontomeetwiththeAirForcepeoplewhohadbeenworkingontheCandara,
balloon,andotherhigh-altitudeprojects.AsBissellsuccinctlyputitinaninterviewin
1979,"theprogramwaskickedoffthenandthere."TrevorGardineroftheAirForce
calledKellyJohnsonlong-distanceandgaveLockheedthegoaheadtobuildaU-2.
Immediatelythequestionoffundingarose.BissellsaidhewouldrecommendtoDulles
thattheCIAfundtheprocurementoftheairplaneoutoftheReserveFund,whichmoney
couldbereleasedonpresidentialauthorityorbytheDirectoroftheBudget.Hewentback
toseeDulles.Dullesapproved.ThenovertotheDirectoroftheBudget,andhealso
approved.Sothemoneywasfoundtomakecovertprocurementpossible.
Bissellhadageniusforadministration.Hesetuphisprojectofficeinadowntown
Washingtonofficebuilding.Hestartedoffwithfourmenafinanceofficer,acontracting
officer,anoperationsofficer,andanadministrativeofficer.Twoorthreeotherswerelater
added,buttheprojectofficestaffneverwentaboveeightmen.
LockheedcalledtheplanetheU-2.ItwasbuiltinaseparatelittlehangarinCalifornia
calledthe"skunkworks,"becausenoonenotworkingonthecraftwasallowednearthe
hangar.Pratt-Whitneybuilttheengine,amodifiedJ-57,andHyconbuiltthecameras.3
Thespeedwithwhichtheplaneandcamerasweremadereadyforoperationswassimply
incredible.Byearly1955,onlyafewmonthsafterIkesaidtobuildit,thefirstU-2was
ready-andBissellhadbroughtitinatacost$3millionbelowtheoriginalcostestimate.4
Theplaneitself,asRayClinedescribedit,"lookedmorelikeakitebuiltaroundacamera
thananairplane;itwasnearlyallwinganditssinglejetenginemadeitshootintotheair
likeanarrowandsoarhigherthananyotheraircraftofitsday."Toholddowntheweight,
itlandedononesetoftandemwheelsratherthanthenor
Page270
malpair.Asaresult,whenforwardmomentumwaslostonlanding,theU-2simplyfell
overononeofitslongwingtips.Takingoff,thewingshadtobeheldupbylittlepogo
sticksonwheelsthatdroppedoffwhentheplanewasairborne.5
Theplanecouldflymileshighinthesky,attainingaltitudesofbetterthan70,000feetfor
cruising.Fromthatimmensedistance,thecamerasweresogoodtheycouldtakeapicture
ofaparkinglotandthePIcouldactuallycountthelinesforthestallsorthenumberof
carsparkedinthelot.
BissellwenttotheWhiteHouse,alongwithDullesandtwoAirForcegenerals,toreport
thattheU-2wasreadyfortestflights.HeaskedIketoextendtheboundariesofan
atomic-energytestsiteinthesouthwesternUnitedStates,whichthePresidentimmediately
did.ThenBissellhadasmallairbasebuiltontheedgeofasalt-lakebed,andhewas
readytostarttestflights.
Atthispointaninevitablejurisdictionaldisputebegan.TheAirForce,bynowwellaware
ofIke'swholeheartedsupportfortheproject,triedtotakeitover.GeneralCurtisLeMay
oftheStrategicAirCommandarguedthatSACoughttotakechargeoftheoperational
phaseoftheproject.DullesandBissellrefusedandIkebackedthemup.Themostthe
PresidentwouldgiveSACwasadeputy'spostunderBissell.
ThePresidentalsoinsistedthatalthoughthepilotswouldberecruitedfromSAC,they
wouldhavetoacquirecivilianstatusandflyundercontractwiththeCIA.Ikewantedthe
entireprojectconductedasacivilianintelligence-collectingoperationratherthanasa
militaryoperation.
Eisenhower,meanwhile,usedhisforeknowledgeoftheU-2tomaketheboldestproposal
forpeaceinthehistoryoftheColdWar.AttheGenevaSummitConferenceinJuly1955,
aweekorsoafterthefirstU-2testflight,IkedescribedthenewprogramtoBritishPrime
MinisterAnthonyEden,''whowasmostenthusiastic."Thenextday,July21,1955,
Eisenhowerspoketothefullconference.Hemadeanoffer,whichcametobecalled
"OpenSkies,"thatwasanextraordinary,farsightedproposal.HadtheRussiansbeen
equallyfarsighted,OpenSkiesmightwellhaveputalidonthearmsrace.Itcertainly
wouldhaveloweredtension.
Iketoldtheconference,totheastonishmentofeveryonepresentexceptforEdenanda
half-dozentopadvisers,thattheUnitedStateswaspreparedtoexchangemilitary
blueprintsandcharts
Page271
withtheSoviets.Hewasmakingtheoffer,hesaid,toshowAmericansincerityin
approachingtheproblemofdisarmament.Theworld'sgreatfearwasasurprisenuclear
attack.Anexchangeofallmilitaryinformationwouldeasethatfear.
ThePresidentsaidhewaswillingtogofurther.HeinvitedtheRussianstobuildairfields
intheStates,fromwhichtheirpeoplecouldfreelyflyoverAmericanmilitaryinstallations
toreassurethemselvesthatnosurprisefirststrikeswereintheoffing.Eachplanewould
carryanAmericanrepresentativealongonthereconnaissanceflights.TheUnitedStates
wouldwantthesameprivilegesinRussia.
Ofcourse,assoonastheU-2wasoperational,theUnitedStateswouldbeabletospy
unilaterallyovertheU.S.S.R.Ike'sofferofareciprocalagreementwasquiteremarkable,
theclearestproofofwhatchancesandriskshewaswillingtotakeforpeace.
Theimmediatereceptionwasremarkable,too.AsIkerecordedinhismemoirs,"AsI
finished,amostextraordinarynaturalphenomenontookplace.Withoutwarning,and
simultaneouswithmyclosingwords,theloudestclapofthunderIhaveeverheardroared
intotheroom,andtheconferencewasplungedintoStygiandarkness....Foramoment
therewasstunnedsilence.ThenIremarkedthatIhadnotdreamedIwassoeloquentas
toputthelightsout."
Despitethethunder,PremierNikitaKhrushchevturnedhimdown.Hesaidtheideaof
OpenSkieswasnothingmorethanabaldespionageplotagainstMotherRussia.Ike
argued,tonoavail.6
TheU-2tests,meanwhile,wentwell,withaminimumofhitches.Byearly1956Bissell
wassatisfied.Heorderedtwenty-twoU-2sfromLockheed.Thepilotswereready,too,
havingflownmissionswhichBisselldirectedfromWashingtonthatsimulatedoverseas
conditions.AstheChurchCommitteenoted,quitecorrectly,gettingtheplane,thepilots,
thecameras,andthefilmpreparedforactualmissionssoquickly"wasatechnical
achievementnothingshortofspectacular."7
BissellflewtoLondon,whereheconferredwithEden,whoagreedtoallowtheCIAto
flyU-2missionsfromtheSACbaseatLakenhurstintheUnitedKingdom.Bissellsent
overafewU-2s,whichflewsomepracticemissionsoverEastEurope,butthenthe
Britishgrewskittish.
Page272
AnincidentinPortsmouthHarborinvolvedaRussiancruiserthatwaspayingacourtesy
call.TheBritishSecretServicesentafrogmanundertheshiptogetalookatitssignaling
gearandunderwaterapparatus.Hisbodywasfound,threedayslater,floatinginthe
harbor.WhethertheRussianskilledhimornotnooneknew.Inanyevent,Eden
indicatedtoIkethathedidnotwantLakenhurst-basedU-2sflyingoverRussia.
SoEisenhowersentBisselltoWestGermany,wherehemetwithKonradAdenauer.The
GermanChancellorgavehimpermissiontobasetheU-2inWiesbaden.Laterthebase
movedtoasmallWorldWarIILuftwaffeairfieldthathadbeendeactivated,closetothe
EastGermanborderbutfarfromanycityortown.
InearlyJune1956,BissellandtheDullesbrotherswenttotheOvalOfficetorequest
permissiontooverflytheSovietUnionitself.Ikelistened,askedsomequestions,andsaid
hewouldgiveBissellhisdecision.Adaylater,GeneralGoodpastercalledBissellonthe
phoneandsaidthatthePresidenthadauthorizedtheflightforaperiodoftendays.Bissell
saidheassumedthatmeanttendaysofgoodweather,notjusttencalendardays.
Goodpastersaid,"No,youhavejusttencalendardaysandyouwillhavetotakeyour
chanceswiththeweather."Theflightwent,successfully,fivedayslater.
Inthenextfivedays,Bissellransixadditionalmissions.Thencameagreatshockthe
Russianssentinaprivatebutfirmdiplomaticprotest.MuchtotheCIA'sdisappointment,
itturnedoutthatRussianradarwastrackingtheU-2flights.Theagencyhadassumedthe
spyplanesflewtoohightobespottedAmericanradarcouldnotfollowthem,butthe
Russians,theCIAdiscovered,hadbetterradarthantheUnitedStates.IketoldBissellto
slowdown,"anditwasquiteafewmonthsbeforehewasreadytoauthorizeanother
flight."Fromthenon,thePresidentauthorizedflightsonebyone.
AsBissellexplainedin1979,theentireprogram"wascontrolledverytightlybythe
Presidentpersonally."Beforeeachflight,Bissellwoulddrawuponamaptheproposed
flightplan.TheywouldspreadthemaponthePresident'sdeskintheOvalOffice.With
JohnEisenhowerstandingbehindoneshoulder,AndyGoodpasterbehindtheother,Ike
wouldstudytheroute.Bissell,theDullesbrothers,SecretaryWilson,andthechairmanof
theJCSwouldallbepresent.
Page273
WhenBissell'spresentationwasover,afterhehadexplainedwhytheCIAwantedpictures
ofspecificspots,"thePresidentwouldaskalotofquestions.Hewouldaskmetocome
aroundandexplainthisorthatfeatureoftheflight,andtherewereoccasions,morethan
once,whenhewouldsay,'Well,youcangothere,butIwantyoutoleaveoutthatlegand
gostraightthatway.IwantyoutogofromBtoDbecauseitlookstomelikeyoumight
begettingalittleexposedoverhere,'orsomethingofthatkind."
"Sowehadvery,verytightgroundrules,"Bissellcontinued,"verytightcontrolbythe
President.Then,oncethemissionwasapproved,itwasmyresponsibilitytowatchthe
weatherforecaststhreetimesaday,andselecttheactualtime,andthennotifyall
concernedthatthemissionwasabouttotakeoff."8
WhenthePresidentfeltitwasnecessary,hewouldinitiatetheflightshimself,ratherthan
waitingforBisselltocometohimwithaproposal.OnNovember6,1956,forexample,at
8:37A.M.,hemetwithAllenDullesandGoodpaster.TheSuezcrisiswasatitsheight.It
wasalsoElectionDay,Eisenhowervs.Stevenson.ThePresidentorderedDullesto
conductU-2flightsoverSyria,Egypt,andIsraeltomakecertainthattheRussianswere
notmovingairplanesintoEgypt.Goodpaster'sminutesrecord,"ThePresidentsaidthatif
reconnaissancedisclosesSovietAirForcesonSyrianbaseshewouldthinkthatthere
wouldbereasonfortheBritishandFrenchtodestroythem.ThePresidentaskedifour
forcesintheMediterraneanareequippedwithatomicanti-submarineweapons."
ToDulles,Ikesaid,"IftheSovietsshouldattackBritainandFrancedirectly,wewouldof
coursebeinamajorwar."9
Withthat,IkeandMamiedroveuptoGettysburgtovote.Atnoontheyreturnedto
Washingtonbyhelicopter.OnthewayintotheWhiteHousefromtheairport,Goodpaster
reportedthattheU-2flightsrevealednoSovietaircraftweremovingintoSyria,orfrom
SyriatoEgypt.WorldWarIIIwasnotabouttobegin.10
Simultaneously,U-2swereflyingoverEastEuropetomonitorRedArmyactivityduring
theHungariancrisis.Khrushchevprotested,privatelybutfirmly.SecretaryofStateDulles
calledthePresidentonthetelephonetosay"weareintroubleabouttheseoverflights."
Ikesaidhewasconsideringa"completestoppageoftheentirebusiness."
Dullessaid,"Ithinkwewillhavetoadmitthiswasdoneandsaywearesorry.Wecannot
denyit.RelationswithRussiaareget
Page274
tingprettytenseatthemoment."Allthiswastakendownverbatimbythetaperecorder
Ikehadinstalledinhisoffice.
Dullessaidhehad"alwaysbeenafraidthatastheir[theRussians']problemsathome
increased,theymightgetrecklessabroad."IkesaidhewouldcallCharlesWilsonand
"havehimstopit"untilthecrisisreceded.11
Bythebeginningof1957,theU-2programwassecurelyinplace,includingflightsover
theSovietUnionwhenthePresidentauthorizedthem.Bissellhadaboutfivehundred
peopleinhisorganization.TherewereonehundredinWashington,anotheronehundred
atthewesterntestingfacilities(Bissellwasalreadylookingaheadtothenextgenerationof
spyintheskyplanes,andtothedevelopmentofevenbettercameras).12Overseas,there
were150meneachatthetwoactiveairbases,whichhadbeenmovedtoTurkeyand
Japan."Wequiteliterallyhadtheabilitytocoveralmostanypartofthesurfaceofthe
earthforphotographreconnaissance,withintwenty-fourhoursofnotice..."Bissell
declared.
FrancisGaryPowerswasinthefirstgrouprecruitedfromSACbyBissell.Powersbegan
flyingregularlyinSeptember1956.Hisinitialassignmentwastoflyoverthe
Mediterranean,wherehewasto"watchforandphotographanyconcentrationoftwoor
moreships."TheshipshewaslookingforwereBritishandFrench;whattheCIA,and
Ike,wantedtoknowwashowquicklyandinwhatstrengthLondonandPariswere
preparingforanattackonEgypt.Powersflewanumberofsuchmissions,takingoff
fromtheU-2baseatAdana,Turkey,flyingoverCyprus,ontoMalta,andbacktobase,or
toCyprus,thenovertoEgypt,acrosstheSinai,thennorthtoIsrael,andbacktoTurkey.
OnaflightonOctober30,1956,Powerssawandphotographedblackpuffsofsmokein
theSinaithefirstshotsintheIsraeliinvasionofEgypt.13
AnotherU-2pilot,makingapassoverEgyptianairfields,sawEgyptianplaneslinedup
wingtiptowingtip.Hemadealooptogetonthecorrectcourseforthenextlegofhis
flightplanandpassedovertheairfieldagain.Thistime-fiveminuteshadelapsedhesaw
theEgyptianAirForceinflames.TheIsraelishadstruckwhilehewasmakinghisturn.14
AllthisinformationgavethePresidentanaccuratepictureofwhatwasgoingonandthus
allowedhimtomakehispolicydecisionsonthebasisoffacts,notguesses.
IkemadeimmediatepracticaluseoftheresultsofotherU-2flights.Asoneexample,in
September1958theChineseweremak
Page275
ingthemostdreadfulthreatsagainstFormosa.Theimmediateissuewasthetinyoffshore
pairofislands,QuemoyandMatsu.ChouEn-laiwarnedthatifChiangKai-shekdidnot
abandonthem,theCommunistswouldinvadeFormosa.Americawouldthenbedrawn
intotheconflict,andWorldWarIIImightbeunderway.TheChinalobbywarnedthat
therehadbetternotbeanyappeasement;theBritishandotherNATOallieswarnedthat
theywerenotreadytogotowartodefendacoupleoftinyNationalistChineseislands.
U-2flightsrevealedthattherewasnoChinesebuildupforaninvasion.Armedwiththat
intelligence,Ikewentonnationaltelevisiontoreport,"Thereisnotgoingtobeany
appeasement,and.thereisnotgoingtobeanywar."The"crisis"disappeared.15
TheU-2spaidoffinthelong-rangestrategicsense,aswellasforshort-termtactical
decisions.Infact,theU-2photographsundoubtedlysavedtheAmericantaxpayermore
moneythananyothergovernmentinitiativeofthe1950s,becausethosephotographsgave
IketheessentialinformationhehadtohavetoholdtohisNewLookindefensepolicy.
AsPresident,Eisenhowerwasresponsiblefirstandforemostforthedefenseofhis
country.Asaprofessionalsoldier,hewaskeenlyawareofthemilitarythreattheSoviets
presented.Asastatesman,however,hehadlongagoconcludedthatthegreatestthreat
wasthattheRussianswouldfrightentheUnitedStatesintoanarmsracethatwouldlead
tounmanageableinflationandultimatebankruptcy.HebelievedthatAmerica'sgreatest
strengthlayinhereconomicproductivity,notinbombsandmissiles.Hebelievedfurther
thatasoundeconomydependedonabalancedfederalbudget,whichhethoughtwasthe
keytostoppinginflation.Tobalancethebudget,hehadtocutbackondefensespending.
Todothat,hecutbackonconventionalarms,reducingtheArmyandtheNavy,while
relyingincreasinglyonnuclearweaponsformassiveretaliation.Asaresult,Ikewasable
toholdDefensespendingtoanannualexpenditureofaround$40billionthroughouthis
eightyearsinoffice.Thisfigurewassome$10billionunderwhatTrumanhadproposed,
andwhattheDemocratswereadvocatingbespent.Byholdingdownthedefensecosts,
Ikewasabletobalancehisbudgetmoreoftenthannot,withoneresultbeinganannual
inflationrateof1.25percent,oratotalof10percentforhiswholeeightyearsinoffice.
Page276
ThisaccomplishmentwasbasedonIke'sunderstandingofhowmassiveretaliation
worked.HearguedthattodetertheRussianswhatonehadtodowasbeinapositionto
droponeortwobombsonMoscow.NoRussiangainanywherewouldbeworththeloss
ofMoscow.TheUnitedStatesdidnotneedthousandsofbombersandmissilestomake
thethreatbelievable.ItwasbynomeansnecessarytobeabletodestroytheSovietUnion
todetertheKremlin.
Ike'sfundamentalinsight,inshort,wasthatinthenuclearage,Clausewitzianstrategy,
withitsemphasisonthedestructionoftheenemy'sfightingforces,nolongerapplied.
TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwereinexactlythepositionOppenheimerhad
saidtheywere,twoscorpionsinabottle.
Underthosecircumstances,theUnitedStatesdidnothavetogointoanall-out,fabulously
expensiveprogramofproducingatomicbombsandICBMStodeliverthem.Indeed,Ike
believedthatthemorethenationspentondefense,atleastafteracertainpoint,theless
securethenationbecame.Thatflewinthefaceofcommonsense,butwasofcourse
exactlytrue,fortheobviousreasonthatthemoretheAmericansbuilt,themorethe
Russianswouldbuild,andtherewasnodefenseagainstICBMStippedwithnuclear
warheads.Noarmsraceevermademuchsense,Ikeoftensaid,butanarmsraceinthe
nuclearagewasabsolutemadness.16
Eisenhower'sDemocraticcritics,ledbythreeSenatehawks,JohnF.Kennedy,LyndonB.
Johnson,andHubertH.Humphrey,assailedhim.Theychargedthathewasallowinghis
Neanderthalfiscalviewstoendangerthenationalsecurity.By1958theywereclaiming
thata"bombergap"existed;in1959itbecamea"missilegap."TheRussianshadgotten
aheadoftheUnitedStatesinstrategicweapons.Americawassuddenlyvulnerabletoa
Sovietfirststrike.
Ikeknewthatthe"gaps"wereallnonsense.HeknewbecauseoftheU-2flights.They
revealed,in1957and1958and1959,thattheRussianshadbynomeansgoneintoacrash
programofbuildingeithermissilesorbombers.TheyprovedthattheUnitedStates,even
withitsmodestbomberfleetandrelativelysmallICBMfleet(aroundtwohundredby
1961),hadaclearleadovertheSoviets,aleadofabouttwotoone.
AsBissellpointedout,theU-2flightsweretheheartofa"veryelaborateprogramof
identifyingRussiannuclearfacilities."Thephotographsshowedwherethesiteswere
located,theirphysical
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sizeandshape,thenumberofmissilelaunchers,andsoon.Oneortwofiringrangesthat
hadnotbeensuspectedwereuncovered;inaddition,theU-2photosrevealedthelocation
ofRussianradarinstallations.Allthiswasbasic,pricelessknowledge.
Inaddition,asAndrewGoodpastersaidina1979interview,theflightsshowedwhatthe
Russianswerenotdoing.IfKhrushchevhadbeenbuildingbombersandrocketsat
maximumcapacity,the"bombergap"andthe"missilegap"mighthavebecomereality.
ButphotographicintelligenceshowedconclusivelythattheSovietswerebuildingatarate
considerablyshortofcapacity,andtherewasnothinginthepipeline,suchasmovement
ofbasicsuppliestoconstructionsites,toindicatethattheyintendedtospeedup.There
wasnoneedtopanic.17
ThePresidentwouldnotbeforcedintospendingmoneyforweaponsthatwerenot
needed.Ofcourse,itwaseasierforEisenhowertosaynoonsuchmattersthanany
PresidentbeforeorsincebecauseasoneSenatehawkputit"HowthehellcanIarguewith
IkeEisenhoweronmilitarymatters?"
TheJCScould,anddid,arguewiththePresident.Theycouldnotwintheargument,and
twoArmychiefsofstaffMatthewRidgwayandMaxwellTaylorresignedinprotestover
Ike'sreductionoftheArmy.Ikehadbeentherehimself,andheknewperfectlywellthat
thePentagonhadtoarguethatnotenoughwasbeingdoneforthenation'sdefenses.In
Augustof1956hewrotehisoldestfriend,SwedeHazlett,anadvocateofmoredefense
spending,"LetusnotforgetthattheArmedServicesaretodefenda'wayoflife,'not
merelyland,propertyorlives."ThePresidentsaidhewantedtomaketheJCSacceptthe
needfora"balancebetweenminimumrequirementsinthecostlyimplementsofwarand
thehealthofoureconomy."18
Or,ashetoldtheAmericanSocietyofNewspaperEditors,"Everygunthatismade,every
warshiplaunched,everyrocketfiredsignifies,inthefinalsense,atheftfromthosewho
hungerandarenotfed,thosewhoarecoldandarenotclothed."19
PersuadingtheJCStoacceptthatpositionwasoneofthemostdifficultandfrustrating
tasksEisenhowerundertookasPresident.InatypicaltelephonecommenttoFoster
Dulles,amonthaftertheHungary/Suezcrisis,Ikesaidthat"hewasgoingtocrackdown
onDefensepeopletomorrow,thatheisgettingdesperatewiththeina
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bilityofthementheretounderstandwhatcanbespentonmilitaryweaponsandwhat
mustbespenttowagethepeace."20
OneremarkableaspectofEisenhower'sinvolvementwiththeU-2wasthathenever
revealedhissources,evenafterPowerswasshotdown,whenitwouldhavebeengreatly
tohispersonaladvantagetodoso.Throughout1960,KennedyandtheDemocratscried
"missilegap"againandagain,untilitbecamealmostthecentralthemeofJFK's
presidentialcampaign.Ikecontentedhimselfwithrespondingthatitsimplywasnottrue,
withoutindicatinghowheknew.
Hewasbadlydisappointed,evenhurt,whentwoofhisownmen,NelsonRockefellerand
RichardNixon,turnedagainsthimonthisissue.Rockefellerissueda"report"that
repeatedmostofthechargestheDemocratshadmadewithregardtoDefensespending.
Nixon,attheheightofthepresidentialcampaignof1960,wenttoNewYork,conferred
withRockefeller,andemergedtotellreportersthathe,too,believednotenoughwas
beingdoneforAmerica'sdefense.Theirjointstatementdeclaredthat"theU.S.canafford
andmustprovidetheincreasedexpenditurestoimplementfullythisnecessaryprogram
forstrengtheningourdefenseposture.TheremustbenopriceceilingonAmerica's
security."
Inhismemoirs,Ikeputitpolitelywhenhecommented,"Thatstatementseemed
somewhatastonishing,comingasitdidfromtwopeoplewhohadlongbeenin
administrationcouncils."21
Duringthecampaign,EisenhowerdidneverthelessspeakforNixon.Hisonemajor
addresstookupthequestionofincreasedDefensespending,andmighthavebeen
pointedatbothcandidates,althoughhereferredonlytotheDemocrats:"Iftheywould
payfortheseprogramsbydeficitspending,raisingthedebtofourchildrenand
grandchildren,andtherebydebaseourcurrency,letthemsoconfess."22
Kennedywontheelection.AsPresident,hebeganacrashprogramtobuildICBMS.
WhenIkeleftoffice,theUnitedStateshadabouttwohundredICBMS.WhenKennedy
wasassassinated,thenumberwasonethousandandgrowingdaily.Fouryearslater
Kennedy'sSecretaryofDefense,RobertS.McNamara,confessedthatthereneverhad
beena"missilegap,"oriftherehad,itwasinAmerica'sfavor.Bythenitwastoolate;the
modernarmsracewasunderway.
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ChapterTwenty
FrancisGaryPowersandtheSummitThatNeverWas
MAY1,1960.AbeautifuldayinRussia.AtAdana,Turkey,FrancisGaryPowers
dressesinhispressurizedflyingsuit,climbsintothecockpitofhisplane,andtakesoff
forBodo,Norway.Midwaythroughanuneventfulflightthereisaflash,followedbya
boomandanexplosion.TheU-2rocks,startstocrash.Powersejects.Hisparachute
opensandhefloatstoearthnearSverdlovsk.Heisimmediatelycapturedandtaken
awayforquestioning.
"TheCIApromisedusthattheRussianswouldnevergetaU-2pilotalive,"John
Eisenhowerdeclared,hiseyesflashing."AndthentheygavetheS.O.B.aparachute!"1
Hisfatherputitlessvehemently,butwasequallyfirm.TheU-2program,Ikedeclaredin
hismemoirs,operatedunder"theassumptionthatintheeventofamishaptheplane
wouldvirtuallydisintegrate.Itwouldbeimpossible,ifthingsshouldgowrong,forthe
Sovietstocomeinpossessionoftheequipmentintact-or,unfortunately,ofalivepilot.
Thiswasacruelassumption,butIwasassuredthattheyoungpilotsundertakingthese
missionsweredoingsowiththeireyeswideopenandmotivatedbyahighdegreeof
patriotism,aswashbucklingbravado,andcertainmaterialinducements."2
RichardBissell,too,thoughtnopilotwouldeveremergealivefromacrash,whether
broughtaboutbyamalfunctionoftheU-2orasaresultofaRussianattack.TheCIAdid
providethepilotswithcyanide,buttoldthemthatwhethertotakeitornotwastheir
decision.Theideawastoboostpilotmoralebylettingthemthink
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theyhadachancetosurvive;thetruthwasthattheCIAdidnotbelievetheyhadone
chanceinamillion.3
So,thecoverstoryintheeventaU-2wentdown,workedoutyearsinadvance,was
basedontheassumptionthatthepilotwouldbedead.''Wewerequitepreparedtosay,if
theRussiansshowedphotographsofit,eitherthatitwasn'ttheU-2orthattheyhadtaken
theplaneandmovedit.Webelievedthatwewouldmakeaprettyplausiblecaseforthe
coverstory.Andwefeltthatitwouldbeverydifficultforthemtodisprovethat,"Bissell
declared."Sothewholepointofthestorywastoexplainwhathadhappenedthatapilot
hadinadvertentlycrossedtheborderandhadbeenshotdownandlandedinside,andthat
theyhadmovedthewreckage."4
ButtheCIAgaveFrancisGaryPowersaparachute,neverexpectingthathewouldbeable
touseit,andasaresulttheParisSummitConferenceofMay1960,whichhadonce
seemedsofullofpromise,waswrecked,andtheUnitedStatessufferedoneofitsmost
embarrassingmomentsintheentirehistoryoftheColdWar.
TheeventmadeIkelookindecisive,foolish,andnotincontrolofhisowngovernment.It
alsoledtothecharge,widelybelieved,thattheCIAhadengagedinaconspiracyto
sabotageIke'ssearchforpeacebyarrangingforPowers'crash.
Inthespringof1960,hopehadbloomedaroundtheworld.ItseemedthattheColdWar
mightbeending,tobereplacedbyaperiodofgrowingcooperationandtrustbetweenthe
SuperPowers.Mr.KhrushchevhadmadeatriptotheUnitedStatesinSeptember1959
thatwasahugesuccess,amediaeventofthefirstmagnitude.Healmostseemedtobean
Americanpoliticianoutforvotes.Ajollyfatman,heroaredwithlaughteratjokesand
wasdulyimpressedbyAmericanproductivity.Tothedelightofphotographers,he
matchedhisgirthagainstthatofaportlyIowafarmer.Hespokeconstantlyoftheneedfor
peace.NearlyasoldasIkeandfullyasbald,KhrushchevagainlikeIkehadagrandfather
image.Heseemed,somehow,comforting.
AtCampDavid,theserenepresidentialretreatintheMarylandmountainsthatIkehad
namedafterhisgrandson,Khrushchevaddedtotheimpressionthathewasareasonable
manwhosesoleinterestwasmovementtowardgenuinepeace.Hehadpreviouslyissued
anultimatumonWestBerlin-iftheUnitedStates,Britain,andFrancedidnotwithdraw
theiroccupationtroopsfromthat
Page281
city,hethreatened,hewouldturnovertheaccessroutestotheEastGermansandthenthe
AllieswouldhavetofighttheirwaythroughtoBerlin.Now,atCampDavid,Khrushchev
saidthathehadnotmeantittobeathreat.Theultimatumwasnotanultimatum.There
couldbenegotiations.
Thetwoleadersthenagreedtomeetinmid-May1960atasummitconferenceinParis,
whereitwashoped"theSpiritofCampDavid"couldengulftheworld.Afterward,Ike
wouldrepayKhrushchev'svisit,takingalonghisfamilyforatouroftheSovietUnion.
SmallwonderhopeswerehighforanendtotheColdWar,forthebeginningofpeace.
Ikedidnotsharethosehopes.Hewasalwayssuspiciousofmediaevents.Hehadtold
Khrushchevthatpoliticalsummitstendedtobelikerealmountainsummitsbarren.5He
hadalwaysexpectedKhrushchevtobackdownonhisBerlinultimatum,aslongasthe
PresidentoftheUnitedStatesstoodfirm,ashehadduringtheCampDavidtalks.Ikewas
unimpressedbyKhrushchev'spubliccallsforpeace.Hewouldbeconvincedthat
KhrushchevwasseriousonlywhenhesawsomerealindicationthattheSovietswere
readyforpeace.ButtheSovietsoperatedaclosedsystemWesternerscouldnotevengeta
roadmapoftheSovietUnion,muchlessanindicationoftheirmilitarydispositionssothe
onlywaytoseewhattheywereuptowastospyonthem.Therefore,asthedateforthe
summitapproached,EisenhowerorderedincreasedU-2reconnaissanceoverRussia.
Hedidsowithsomereluctance.AseriesofrecentNationalIntelligenceEstimatesfrom
theCIAhadindicatedthattheSovietsweredeveloping,orhaddeveloped,surface-to-air
missiles(SAMS)capableofinterceptingtheU-2.TheSAMS,accordingtotheCIA's
information,couldgetupashighastheU-2,althoughtheywereoptimizedforuseagainst
mannedbombersflyingbelow60,000feet.TheSAMSdidnothavemuch
maneuverabilityabove60,000feet,whiletheU-2flewat68,000feetandhigher."There
wasthereforethethought,"Bissellrecalledin1979,"thatifthemissilewerefireditwould
beanear-miss,ratherthanahit."ButGordonGraypersonallytoldIkethatsoonerorlater
''aU-2wouldsurelybeshotdown."6
However,thePresident'sotheradvisers,fromtheCIA,theDepartmentofDefense,and
theStateDepartment,downgradedthe
Page282
danger.FosterDulles,forexample,oncetoldIke,laughing,"IftheSovietsevercapture
oneoftheseplanes,I'msuretheywillneveradmitit.Todosowouldmakeitnecessary
forthemtoadmitalsothatforyearswehadbeencarryingonflightsovertheirterritory
whiletheyhadbeenhelplesstodoanythingaboutthematter."7
Ofallthoseconcerned,Ikelaterwrote,onlyJohnEisenhower,RichardBissell,and
AndrewGoodpasteragreedwithhimthat"ifeveroneoftheplanesfellinSovietterritory
awaveofexcitementmountingalmosttopanicwouldsweeptheworld,inspiredbythe
standardSovietclaimofinjustice,unfairness,aggression,andruthlessness."8
Aftertheevent,inaJuly1960postmortem,Ikesaidthat"allhisadvisers,includingFoster
Dulles,hadmissedbadlyintheirestimateregardingtheU-2....Hedidnotwishtosay'I
toldyouso'butrecalledthathewastheoneandonlyonewhohadputmuchweighton
thisfactor,andthathehadgivenitgreatemphasis.Beingonlyoneperson,hehadnotfelt
hecouldopposethecombinedopinionofallhisassociates.Headdedthattheactionthat
wastakenwasprobablytherightaction,andwhathewouldhavedoneanyhowevenif
hisadvisershadcorrectlyassessedthepotentialreaction."9
Inotherwords,thePresident,likehisadvisers,wasextremelyanxioustomakemore
flights,whatevertherisk.Thepurpose,inthespringof1960,wastoflyoverterritorythat
hadnotbeencoveredpreviously,territorythattheCIAbelievedmightbebeingusedby
theSovietstobuildnewICBMsites.Ikewantedtoknow,beforethesummit,whatthe
factswere.10
TherewasalsoafeelingthattheUnitedStateshadbestflyasmanymissionsasitcould
beforetheSAMSgotanybetter.FrancisGaryPowersthoughtthatwasthemajorreason
forhisMay1,1960,flight.TherehadbeentwoflightsinclosesuccessioninApril,
Powerslaterwrote,and"thepilotsbelievedtheresumptionoftheflightswasdueatleast
inparttotheagency'sfearthatRussiawasnowclosetosolvinghermissile-guidance
problem."11
PowersalsobelievedthattheCIAhadnotinformedIke"ofthemanydangersinvolved,
lestheconsidertheadvisabilityofdiscontinuingtheoverflightprogramentirely."Powers
furtherhadtheimpressionthat"Eisenhowerbelievedthepilotshadbeenorderedtokill
themselvesratherthansubmittocapture."12
Onthislastpoint,Powerswascertainlywrong.Eisenhowerhad
Page283
nosuchimpression.WhathedidbelievewasthatnopilotcouldescapealivefromaSAM
hit.
Mid-April1960,TheWhiteHouse.Intheworld'smostfamousoffice,JohnEisenhower
andAndrewGoodpasterleanedoverthePresident'sshoulders,tracingoutforhimona
hugemapofRussiatheproposedflightpatternforaU-2mission.Ikeaskedafew
questions.Bissell,acrossthePresident'sdesk,explainedwhytheCIAthoughttheremight
benewmissilesitesalongtheroute.Eisenhowergrunted,thenturnedtotheSecretaryof
State,ChristianHerter(Dulleshaddiedofcancerthepreviousyear).
Herterwasworriedaboutthetiming,withtheSummitmeetingonlyamonthaway.Ike's
attitudewasthat"therewouldneverbeagoodtimeforafailure."Still,hetoowas
worried.ThePresidenttoldBissellhehadanauthorizationtoflyforthefollowingtwo
weeks.13
Everydayforthenextfourteendays,Russiawascoveredbyclouds.TheU-2needed
near-perfectweathertofly.Theweatherneverimproved.Bissellappliedforanextension.
IkehadGoodpastercallBissellandtellhimtheflightwasauthorizedforonemoreweek,
thatis,uptoMay2.Ifhecouldnotgetitoffthegroundbythen,itwasscratchedfor
good,becauseitwouldbetooclosetotheParismeetingtoriskit.
"Andthatmeans,"asBissellsummeditupin1979,"thatallofthosestoriesimplyingthat
nobodygaveanythoughttothetimingorthattheWhiteHouseforgotthatthesummit
wasgoingonareabunchofnonsense."14
TheafternoonofMay1,1960,GoodpastercalledEisenhoweronthetelephonetoreport
thataU-2flyingamissionoverRussiawas"overdueandpossiblylost."15Whetherithad
malfunctioned,runoutoffuel,orbeenshotdownwasunknownandunknowable.
Therewasnoreasontopanic.First,everyoneassumedthatPowerswasdead.Second,
theCIAhadassuredthePresident"thatifaplaneweretogodownitwouldbedestroyed
eitherintheairoronimpact,sothatproofofespionagewouldbelacking.Selfdestroyingmechanismswerebuiltin."16Third,Khrushchevwouldprobablysaynothing
aboutitanyway,justashehadnotmentionedthemanypreviousflights,includingthe
twoinApril.
Onthefirstandsecondpoints,theCIAhadgivenIkebadinformation.Powershad
survivedandinanycaseitwouldhavebeen
Page284
impossibletodestroytheconclusiveevidencethathewasengagedinspyingonthe
SovietUnion.Thatevidencewasthefilmitself.AsLymanKirkpatrick,aCIAcareerman
whobecameexecutivedirectoroftheagency,wrotein1968,"Nobodyhaseveryet
devisedamethodforquicklydestroyingatightlyrolledpackageofhundredsoffeetof
film.EvenifFrancisPowershadsucceededinpressingthe'destructionbutton'which
wouldhaveblowntheplaneandthecameraapart,theoddswouldstillhavebeenquite
goodthatcarefulSovietsearchwouldhavefoundtherollsoffilm."17
TheCIAhadfudgedwhenittoldthePresidentthattheplanehada"self-destruct
mechanism."Thedevicehadtobeactivatedbythepilot.Further,itwasonlyatwo-andone-half-poundcharge,hardlysufficientto"destroy"acraftasbigastheU-2.18
Butthebiggestmistakeofallturnedouttobetheassumptionbehindpointthree,that
Khrushchevwouldkeepquiet.Forawhile,hedid.Then,onMay5,fourdaysafterthe
SAMknockedPowersoutofthesky,Khrushchevbrokethenews,andinsuchamanner
astoensurethewreckingoftheParisSummit,therebydestroyingthebrighthopesforan
endtotheColdWar.Whetherthatwashisintentionornot,nooneintheWestknowsor
canknow,butitwastheresult.
SpeakingbeforetheSupremeSoviet,inablisteringspeech,Khrushchevsaidthatthe
RussianshadshotdownanAmericanplanethathadintrudedSovietairspace.Heangrily
denouncedtheUnitedStatesforits"aggressiveprovocation"insendinga"banditflight"
overtheSovietUnion.Inthecourseofalongharangue,KhrushchevsaidtheAmericans
hadpickedMayDay,"themostfestivedayforourpeopleandtheworkersoftheworld,''
hopingtocatchtheSovietswiththeirguarddown,buttonoavail.
Inanalyzingtheevent,Khrushchevsuggestedinterpretationsthatwerelaterpickedupin
theUnitedStatesandremainverymuchaliveinthe1980sasconspiracytheories.The
RussianPremierchargedthatmilitaristsintheUnitedStates,intheCIAandinthe
Pentagon,fearfulofanoutbreakofpeaceatParis,hadsentPowersoverRussiaprecisely
towrecktheconference."AggressiveimperialistforcesintheUnitedStatesinrecent
timeshavebeentakingthemostactivemeasurestounderminethesummitoratleastto
hinderanyagreementthatmightbereached."
ThenKhrushchevofferedanexplanationthatstillfindswidesupportamongAmerican
intellectualsandliberalsthatIkedid
Page285
notknowwhatthemilitaristsweredoingbehindhisback."Wasthisaggressiveactcarried
outbyPentagonmilitarists?"heasked."IfsuchactionsaretakenbyAmericanmilitary
menontheirownaccount,itmustbeofspecialconcerntoworldopinion."19
Ikedidnotdenythechargesorreplytotheinnuendos.Meanwhile,theNational
AeronauticsandSpaceAdministrationwentaheadwiththelong-establishedcoverstory.
ItissuedastatementonMay5thatbegan,"OneofN.A.S.A.'sU-2researchairplanes,in
usesince1956inacontinuingprogramtostudymeteorologicalconditionsfoundathigh
altitude,hasbeenmissingsinceMay1,whenitspilotreportedhewashavingoxygen
difficultiesovertheLakeVan,Turkey,area."Thepilotwasidentifiedasthirty-yearold
FrancisGaryPowers,acivilianflyingundercontracttoLockheedAircraftCorporation.
Presumably,theU-2hadstrayedoffcourse,perhapscrossingtheborderintoRussia.The
unstatedassumptionwasthatPowers'weatherplanewastheonetheRussianshadshot
down.20
Thefollowingday,Khrushchevreleasedaphotographofawreckedairplane,describing
itastheU-2Powershadflown.Itwasnot,however,aU-2,butanotherairplane.The
Premierwassettingatrap.HewantedEisenhowertocontinuetobelievethatPowerswas
dead,theU-2destroyed,sothattheUnitedStateswouldsticktoits"weatherresearch"
story,asitdid.OnMay7,Khrushchevspranghisgreatsurprise.Hejubilantlyreportedto
a"wildlycheering"SupremeSovietthat"wehavepartsoftheplaneandwealsohavethe
pilot,whoisquitealiveandkicking.ThepilotisinMoscowandsoarethepartsofthe
plane."
Khrushchevmadehisaccountastoryofhighdramaandlowskullduggeryinterspersed
withbitinglysarcasticremarksabouttheAmericancoverstory.Criesof"Shame,Shame!"
rosefromthedeputiesasKhrushchevheapedscornontheCIA,mixedwithcriesof
"Bandits,Bandits!"21
Uponreceivingthisnews,whichhefound"unbelievable,"22Eisenhowermadeaserious
mistake.AtSecretaryHerter'surging,heauthorizedtheStateDepartmenttoissuea
statementdenyingthatPowershadanyauthorizationtoflyovertheSovietUnion.
AsJamesRestonreportedintheNewYorkTimes,"TheUnitedStatesadmittedtonight
thatoneofthiscountry'splanesequippedforintelligencepurposeshad'probably'flown
overSovietterritory.
Page286
"Anofficialstatementstressed,however,that'therewasnoauthorizationforanysuch
flight'fromauthoritiesinWashington.
"Astowhomighthaveauthorizedtheflight,officialsrefusedtocomment.Ifthis
particularflightoftheU-2wasnotauthorizedhere,itcouldonlybeassumedthat
someoneinthechainofcommandintheMiddleEastorEuropehadgiventheorder."23
CriticsononesideblamedthePresidentforadmittingthattheUnitedStateshadspy
planes.Criticsontheothersideblastedhimfornotbeingincommandofhisown
military.Whicheverwayoneexaminedit,thePresidentlookedterrible.Thestatement
onlymadeabadsituationworse.
Inhismemoirs,Eisenhowerpassedoverthatpartofthestatementthatdeniedany
authorizationfromWashington.Hesimplydidnotmentionit.Hedidexplainthe
"unprecedented"acknowledgmentofespionageactivitiesbypointingoutthatsincethe
Russianshadtheplaneinhand,hecouldhardlydenyitsexistence.
EisenhoweralsopointedoutthattheSovietswerenotoriousforspyingontheUnited
States,thattheiractivitiesinespionage"dwarfed"thoseoftheAmericans,andthatto
chargethatflyingoveranationinanairplanecarryingonlyacamerawas
"warmongering"was"justplainsilly."24
Nevertheless,asRestonreportedfromWashingtonintheTimesofMay9,"Thiswasasad
andperplexedcapitaltonight,caughtinaswirlofchargesofclumsyadministration,bad
judgmentandbadfaith.
"ItwasdepressedandhumiliatedbytheUnitedStateshavingbeencaughtspyingoverthe
SovietUnionandtryingtocoverupitsactivitiesinaseriesofmisleadingofficial
announcements."25
Overthenextfewdays,humiliationgavewaytofright,astheheadlinesbecamemoreand
morealarmist."KHRUSHCHEVWARNSOFROCKETATTACKONBASESUSEDBY
U.S.SPYINGPLANES,"theTimesannouncedonMay10.Thefollowingmorning,the
headlineread,"U.S.vowsTODEFENDALLIESIFRUSSIANSATTACKBASES."
Ike,meanwhile,indicatedthathewouldnotmakeatriptoRussiaaftertheParisSummit
Conference.Khrushchevrepliedthathewouldnotbewelcomeanyway.Thefateofthe
conferenceitselfwasindoubt.Khrushchevtoldanimpromptunewsconferencein
MoscowthathewasputtingPowersontrialandadded,"Youun
Page287
derstandthatifsuchaggressiveactionscontinuethismightleadtowar."26
Eisenhowerheldhisownnewsconference.Hereadacarefullywordedstatement,saying
thattheSoviet"fetishofsecrecyandconcealmentwasamajorcauseofinternational
tensionanduneasiness."Infirm,measuredtones,withoutahintofregretorapology,Ike
saidKhrushchev'santicsoverthe"flightofanunarmednon-militaryplanecanonly
reflectafetishofsecrecy."ThePresidentthendeclaredthathewasassumingpersonal
responsibilityfortheflights.HesaidtheywerenecessarytoprotecttheUnitedStatesfrom
surpriseattacks.27
AlthoughIkedefendedAmerica'srighttofindoutallthatitcouldaboutRussianmilitary
dispositions,andcitedtheneedfortheU-2program,healsoindicatedthatnomore
flightswouldgoforthintheimmediatefuture.Thereweretwogoodreasonsforthis
suspension.First,theobviousonetheSovietshaddemonstratedacapacitytoshootdown
theaircraft.Second,theUnitedStateswasmakingprogressinphotographyoftheearth
fromsatellites,sotheU-2swerenotascrucialastheyhadbeen.28
ThatfactdeepensthemysteryastowhatKhrushchevwasupto,withhishistrionics,wild
charges,andpretendedoutrage.SovietsatelliteswereflyingoverAmericadailyby1960,
andRussiannewspapershadevenpublishedphotographsoftheUnitedStatestakenby
camerasaboardsuchsatellites.29
RestonguessedintheTimesthatKhrushchevwaspretendingtobeshockedandoutraged
becauseherealizedthatEisenhowerwasnotgoingtopulloutofBerlin,sohewasusing
theU-2"toblametheUnitedStatesforthebreakdownoftheParismeeting."30
CharlesdeGaullelatertoldIkehethoughtthereasonKhrushchevmadesuchafussabout
theU-2wasthathefearedapresidentialvisittoRussia,andusedtheU-2incidentasa
wayofpreventingit.IndeGaulle'sinterpretation,KhrushchevdidnotwanttogiveIke
theopportunityasIkehadgiventoKhrushchevwhenhevisitedtheUnitedStatestospeak
directlytotheRussianpeopleoverSoviettelevision.31
Whateverhismotives,intheweekbeforetheParismeetingKhrushchevkeptsayingthat
hedoubtedthatEisenhowerpersonallyknewabouttheflights.Atonepoint,heevensaid
thattheKGBoftencarriedonactivitiesthathedidnotknowabout.Severalof
Page288
Ike'sassociates,andsomemembersofCongress,urgedhimtotakeadvantageofthis
interpretationbydismissingBisselland/orAllenDulles,withthethoughtthatthiswould
showthatthePresidenthadbeena"victimofoverzealoussubordinates."
Ikerefused,firstbecauseitwasuntrue,secondbecauseitwouldindicatethattheCIAwas
operatingirresponsibly,wasevenoutofcontrol,andthirdbecauseitwouldallow
KhrushchevtosaythatEisenhowercouldnotspeakforhiscountrysincehecouldnot
controlhisowngovernment.Thus,Ikerecorded,"Irejectedthewholenotionoutof
hand."32
OnMay14,1960,IkeflewtoParis.DeGaulle,ashost,hadalreadycheckedwith
KhrushchevtomakecertaintheRussianleaderwantedtogoaheadwiththemeeting.
Khrushchevhadsaidthathewasready.WhenIkecalledondeGaulleonMay15,
however,deGaullereportedthatKhrushchevwasnowmakingtrouble.Hehadbeento
seedeGaulleandindicatedthathewashighlyagitatedabouttheU-2flights.Hecouldnot
understandwhyEisenhowerhadadmittedpubliclythatheknewaboutthemissions.By
Khrushchev'sstandardsthisindicatednotAmericantruthfulness,butrathercontemptfor
theSoviets.DeGaulletoldKhrushchevthathecouldnotseriouslyexpectIketo
apologize.
DeGaullediscussedthesematters,accordingtoIke'sinterpreter,GeneralVernonWalters,
"withasortofOlympiandetachment....Hedidnotthinkthatthepeccadilloesof
intelligenceserviceswereappropriatematterstobediscussedatmeetingsofchiefsof
government."33
Thefollowingmorning,deGaulle,presiding,hadnotevenfinishedcallingtheinitial
meetingtoorderwhenKhrushchevwasonhisfeet,red-faced,loudlydemandingthe
righttospeak.DeGaullenodded,andKhrushchevlaunchedintoatiradeagainstthe
UnitedStates.Soonhewasshouting.
DeGaulleinterrupted,turnedtotheSovietinterpreter,andsaid,"Theacousticsinthis
roomareexcellent.Wecanallhearthechairman.Thereisnoneedforhimtoraisehis
voice."Theinterpreterblanched,turnedtoKhrushchev,andbegantotranslate.DeGaulle
cuthimoffandmotionedtohisowninterpreter,whounfalteringlytranslatedinto
Russian.KhrushchevcastafuriousglanceatdeGaulle,thencontinuedtoreadinalower
voice.
Hesoonlashedhimselfintoanevengreaterfrenzy.Hepointedoverheadandshouted,"I
havebeenoverflown."
Page289
DeGaulleinterruptedagain.Hesaidthathe,too,hadbeenoverflown.
"ByyourAmericanallies?"askedKhrushchev,incredulous.
"No,"repliedGeneraldeGaulle,"byyou.Yesterdaythatsatelliteyoulaunchedjustbefore
youleftMoscowtoimpressusoverflewtheskyofFranceeighteentimeswithoutmy
permission.HowdoIknowyoudonothavecamerasaboardwhicharetakingpicturesof
mycountry?"
Khrushchev'sjawdropped.Thenhesmiled.Heraisedbothhandsabovehisheadand
said,"Godseesme.Myhandsareclean.Youdon'tthinkIwoulddoathinglikethat?"
DeGaullegrunted.
Khrushchevreturnedtoreadinghisspeech.Soonheexclaimed,"Whatdevilmadethe
Americansdothis?"DeGaulleobservedthatthereweredevilsonbothsidesandthatthis
matterwasnotworthyoftheconsiderationofchiefsofgovernmenttowhomtheworld
waslookingforsignsofpeace.
KhrushchevthenannouncedthatunlessEisenhowerwouldapologizehewouldwalkout
oftheconference.Ikerefusedtoapologize.Khrushchevrepeatedhisthreattowalkout.
DeGaullelookedatKhrushchev,accordingtotranslatorWalters,"asonewouldlookata
naughtychild."Headjournedthemeeting.AsEisenhowerstartedtoleavetheroom,de
Gaullecaughthimbytheelbowanddrewhimaside,withWalterstointerpret.Hethen
saidtothePresident,"IdonotknowwhatKhrushchevisgoingtodonorwhatisgoingto
happen,butwhateverhedoes,orwhateverhappens,IwantyoutoknowthatIamwith
youtotheend."34
ThenextdayKhrushchevreturnedtoMoscow.TheParisSummitConferencewasover.
Insumminguptheeventinhismemoirs,Eisenhoweradmittedthat"thebigerrorwe
madewas,ofcourse,intheissuanceofaprematureanderroneouscoverstory.Allowing
myselftobepersuadedonthisscoreismyprincipalpersonalregret."35
TherehavebeenmanyinterpretationsofthePowersincidentandthefailureofthe
summitconference.AprominentoneisthattheCIAdeliberatelysabotagedPowers'plane
inordertopreventanoutbreakofpeace.Thisconspiracytheoryreachedsuch
respectabilitythatinOctober1975theprofessionalquarterlyjournal
Page290
MilitaryAffairspublishedanarticleonthesubjectthatconcluded,"Theanomaliesinthe
PowerscasesuggestthattheU-2'incident'mayhavebeenstaged.Moreover,the
managementofthecrisisgivesfurtherwarranttothehypothesisthattheU-2wasadevice
deliberatelychosentodestroyanemergingdétente."36
PowerswaseventuallyexchangedforColonelRudolfAbel,amasterSovietspycaughtin
Brooklyn.PowersworkedforLockheedasatestpilotforafewyears,thenbecamea
pilotofahelicopterthatwatchedrush-hourtrafficforatelevisionstationinLosAngeles.
InAugust1977hecrashedanddiedinanaccident.Inevitably,itwassuggestedthathis
crashwasnoaccidentthattheCIAhaddonehimin,presumablybecausehewasaboutto
"talk."37
Powersinfacthadalready"talked,"inhismemoirs,entitledOperationOverflight,which
hepublishedin1970.Hehadhisownconspiracythesis.Itwasbasedonthefollowing
facts:In1957theU-2swerebasedinanewlocation,Atsugi,Japan.InSeptember1957a
seventeen-year-oldMarineprivatewasassignedtoaradarunitatAtsugi.Aftertwoyears
ofextensiveradarworkfortheMarines,hewasdischargedfromtheCorps.InOctober
1959hedefectedtotheSovietUnion,wherehepresumablytoldtheSovietseverythinghe
knewaboutAmericanradaroperations,andwhathehadlearned,includingperhapsthe
supposedlycrucialinformationabouttheflyingaltitudeoftheU-2s.
ThenameofthatMarinewasLeeHarveyOswald.38
OneofPowers'"proofs"ofOswald'sinvolvementwasthefactthattheWarren
Commissionhadrefusedtoreleaseatop-secretCIAmemorandumofMay13,1964
(preparedbyRichardHelms)toJ.EdgarHooveronthesubjectof"LeeHarveyOswald's
AccesstoClassifiedInformationAbouttheU-2."Powerscomplainedthatthedocument
wasstillclassifiedandhehadbeenrefusedaccesstoit.
In1979,inresponsetoaFreedomofInformationActrequest,thiswriterobtainedthe
document.ItrecordedthattheU-2stationatAtsugiwasa"closed"base,withrestricted
flightlinesandhangarareas.Oswald"didnothaveaccesstothisarea."Helms's
conclusionwasthat"thereisnoevidenceorindicationthatOswaldhadanyassociation
with,oraccessto,theU-2operationoritsprograminJapan."Hemayhaveseenthe
airplanebutifhedid"itismostunlikelythatOswaldhadthenecessaryprerequisitesto
differen
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tiatebetweentheU-2andotheraircraftengagedinclassifiedmissionswhichwere
similarlyvisibleatAtsugiatthesametime."39
WhenRichardImmermanaskedBissellaboutthepossibleOswaldconnection,Bissell
scoffedatit.TherewasnowaythatOswaldcouldhaveknownthedateoftheflight,
obviously,andSovietradarhadlongsincebeentrackingU-2flights,sotheRussians
alreadyknewhowhightheplaneswereflying.BissellagreedwithGoodpaster,John
Eisenhower,andKellyJohnson(themanwhodesignedtheU-2)thatPowerswasdowned
byanear-missexplosionfromaSAM.40
TheMilitaryAffairsarticlemadethepointthatbecausesatelliteswereinoperationby
May1960furtherU-2flightswereunnecessary.Therefore,Powersmusthavebeensent
outbytheCIAinordertobeshotdown.
Bissell'sresponsetothischargeisthat"thefirstU.S.reconnaissancesatellitedidnotoccur
untillateAugustof1960.Priortothatflighttherehadbeensomethirteenunsuccessful
launchesofthereconnaissancesatellite,nooneofwhichyieldedusablephotography,by
reasoneitherofvehicleorcameramalfunction."
AsecondreasonforusingtheU-2wasthat"anaircraftmissioncanbeprogrammed,asto
choiceoftargetsandtimingovertargets,soamissioncouldbelaidoutandtimedinsuch
awayastoachievecoverageofselectedtargetsatspecifiedtimeswhenitwasexpected
thattheywouldbevisible."Bycontrast,satellitemissions"hadtobeplannedand
prepareddaysinadvancebeforereliableweatherpredictionswereavailable.Theycould
ofcoursebeaborteduptothelastminutebuttheycouldnotbegreatlymodified."
Finally,"theresolutionofU-2photographswasconsiderablyhigherthanthatofsatellite
photography.(Thatsituationhaschangedintheinterveningyears.)Sincethepurposeof
Powers'flightwastoverifyordisprovetheexistenceofanumberofICBMsitesinEast
CentralRussia,andtoobtainhighresolutionphotographyofthemifdiscovered,acase
couldhavebeenmadefortheuseoftheU-2evenifasatellitecapabilityhadbeenin
existence."41
ThechargethatBissell,AllenDulles,andothersintheCIAdeliberatelysabotagedthe
Powersflightinordertowreckthesummitconferenceandthuspreventdétenteis
absurd.Itignores
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theobviousfactthatitwasKhrushchevwhotooktheinitiative.Hewastheonewho
madethePowersincidentpublic,notIkeorDullesorBissell.Hewastheonewhomadea
fuss,nottheAmericans.Hewastheonewhowantedtowreckthesummit,forwhatever
reason,andhesucceeded.
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ChapterTwenty-One
IkeandtheCIA'SAssassinationPlots
AUGUST18,1960,Léopoldville,theCongo.PrimeMinisterPatriceLumumbahasjust
madeadealwithKhrushchevthatwillgivetheCongoforcesSovietmilitaryplanes,
whichLumumbasaysheneedstobringrebelliousKatangaProvincebackunderthe
controlofthecentralgovernment.VictorHedgman,CIAstationchiefinLéopoldville,
sendsatelegramtoAllenDulles:"BELIEVECONGOEXPERIENCINGCOMMUNIST
EFFORTTAKEOVERGOVERNMENT.MANYFORCESATWORKHERE:
SOVIETS,COMMUNISTPARTY,ETC.ALTHOUGHDIFFICULTDETERMINE
MAJORINFLUENCINGFACTORSTOPREDICTOUTCOMESTRUGGLEFOR
POWER,DECISIVEPERIODNOTFAROFF.WHETHERORNOTLUMUMBA
ACTUALLYCOMMIEORJUSTPLAYINGCOMMIEGAMETOASSISTHIS
SOLIDIFYINGPOWER,ANTI-WESTFORCESRAPIDLYINCREASINGPOWER
CONGOANDTHEREMAYBELITTLETIMELEFTINWHICHTAKEACTION."
August26,1960.AllenDullessendsacableoverhisownsignature(ahighlyunusual
action)toHedgmaninLéopoldville:"INHIGHQUARTERSHEREITISTHE
CLEARCUTCONCLUSIONTHATIFLUMUMBACONTINUESTOHOLDHIGH
OFFICE,THEINEVITABLERESULTWILLATBESTBECHAOSANDATWORST
PAVETHEWAYTOCOMMUNISTTAKEOVER....CONSEQUENTLYWE
CONCLUDETHATHISREMOVALMUSTBEANURGENTANDPRIME
OBJECTIVEANDTHATUNDEREXISTINGCONDITIONSTHISSHOULDBEA
HIGHPRIORITYOFOURCOVERTACTION."1
Page294
Lumumbawasnottheonlytarget.OneoftheCIA'SplotswastopoisonFidelCastro's
cigars.Anotherwastodropapoisonpillinhiscoffee.Athirdbrightideawastorigan
exoticseashellwithanexplosivedevicetobeplacedinCastro'sfavoriteskin-divingarea;
afourthwastodusthisdivingsuitwithaskincontaminant.
BissellbroughttheMafiainontheplot.Hethoughtthegangsterswouldbeefficientand
wouldkeeptheirmouthsshut.Itturnedoutthattheyblunderedeveryattempttokill
Castroandthensanglikecanaries,toeveryone'sembarrassment,especiallyafteritwas
saidthatoneoftheMafialeadersandJohnF.Kennedysharedagirlfriend.2
Thereisnodoubt,ineitherofthesecases,thatCIADirectorAllenDullesorderedCastro
andLumumbamurdered.WhetherhedidsowithIke'sknowledge,ornot,ishotly
debated.WhetherhedidsounderIke'sorders,ornot,isevenmorehotlydebated.
Eisenhowerloyalists,andtherearemany,swearthatIkedidnotandcouldnothave
knownabouttheseassassinationplots.Intheiropinion,itisinconceivablethathecould
haveorderedthemurders.Yetthesesameloyalistsinsistjustasfirmly,withregardtothe
U-2andotherCIAprograms,thatIkewasabsolutelyincharge,themanincommand,and
thatAllenDulleswouldneverhavedaredmovewithoutthePresident'sorders.
InNovember1975,theU.S.Senate'sSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmental
OperationsWithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities,popularlyknownastheChurch
Committee,conductedwidelypublicizedandhighlycontroversialhearingsintoCIA
activities,includingtheassassinationplotsagainstforeignleaders.Oneofthecommittee's
conclusionswas,''Thechainofeventsrevealedbythedocumentsandtestimonyisstrong
enoughtopermitareasonableinferencethattheplottoassassinateLumumbawas
authorizedbyPresidentEisenhower."3
Twomonthslater,inJanuary1976,anumberofEisenhoweradministrationinsiders,
includingGordonGray,DouglasDillon,AndrewGoodpaster,andJohnEisenhower,
challengedthisfinding.InastatementtotheSenate,theyrequestedthatthecommittee
"disavow"thefindingthatPresidentEisenhowerhadauthorizedanassassination.Ina
replyofFebruary2,1976,thecommitteechairman,FrankChurch,andthevicechairman,
John
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Tower,responded,"AfterreviewingtheevidenceintheLumumbacaseonceagain,we
remainconvincedthatthelanguageusedintheCommittee'sfindingswaswarranted."4
Thecommitteeitselfhadnotedinitsoriginalreport,however,that"thereisenough
countervailingtestimony...andenoughambiguityandlackofclarityintherecordsof
high-levelpolicymeetingstoprecludetheCommitteefrommakingafindingthatthe
PresidentintendedanassassinationeffortagainstLumumba."Thecommitteedidstate
directlyandclearlythat"AllenDullesauthorizedanassassinationplot."Inexplanation,it
wrote,"StrongexpressionsofhostilitytowardLumumbafromthePresidentandhis
nationalsecurityassistant,followedimmediatelybyCIAstepsinfurtheranceofan
assassinationoperationagainstLumumba,arepartofasequenceofeventsthat,atthe
least,makeitappearthatDullesbelievedassassinationwasapermissiblemeansof
complyingwithpressurefromthePresidenttoremoveLumumbafromthepolitical
scene."5
ThoseclosetoIkedenydirectlyandvehementlythatthePresidenteverauthorizeda
murder.JohnEisenhower,whoattendedNSCmeetingsasAssistantWhiteHouseStaff
Secretary,saidhehadnomemoryofhisfathereverorderinganassassinationatoneof
them,aswasalleged,andpointedoutthat"ifIkehadsomethingasnastyasthistoplot,
hewouldn'tdoitinfrontoftwenty-onepeople,"thenumberpresentatNSCmeetings.
GoodpastertestifiedunequivocallytotheChurchCommittee,"Atnotimeandinnoway
didIeverknowoforhearaboutanyproposal,anymentionofsuchanactivity.Itismy
beliefthathadsuchathingbeenraisedwiththePresidentotherthaninmypresence,I
wouldhaveknownaboutit."6
InaninterviewintheSuperintendent'sofficeatWestPointin1979,Goodpastersaidhe
recalledsomeassistantoncemakingajokingreferencetobumpingoffLumumba.Ike
reddened,thesuresignofangerintheman,andsaidsternly,"Thatisbeyondthepale.We
willnotdiscusssuchthings.Onceyoustartthatkindofbusiness,thereisnotellingwhere
itwillend."7
YetRobertH.Johnson,amemberoftheNSCstafffrom1951to1962,toldtheChurch
Committee,"AtsometimeduringthatdiscussionintheNSC,PresidentEisenhowersaid
somethingIcannolongerrememberhiswordsthatcameacrosstomeasanorderforthe
assassinationofLumumba.Therewasnodiscussion;
Page296
themeetingsimplymovedon.Iremembermysenseofthatmomentquiteclearlybecause
thePresident'sstatementcameasagreatshocktome."8
AtanAugust25,1960,meetingofthe5412Committee,covertoperationsagainst
Lumumbawerediscussed.GordonGray,afterhearingaboutattemptstoarrangeavoteof
noconfidenceagainstLumumbaintheCongoleseSenate,commentedthat"hisassociates
hadexpressedextremelystrongfeelingsonthenecessityforverystraightforwardaction
inthissituation."
Graylateradmittedthathisreferencetohis"associates"wasaeuphemismforIke,
employedtopreserve"plausibledeniability"bythePresident.
DullesrepliedtoGray'scommentbysaying"hehadeveryintentionofproceedingas
vigorouslyasthesituationpermitsorrequiresbutaddedthathemustnecessarilyput
himselfinapositionofinterpretinginstructionsofthiskindwithintheboundsof
necessityandcapability."
Theminutesofthe5412meetingconcluded,"Itwasfinallyagreedthatplanningforthe
Congowouldnotnecessarilyruleout'consideration'ofanyparticularkindofactivity
whichmightcontributetogettingridofLumumba."9
Oneofthemajorfunctionsof5412,GordonGraydeclaredina1979interview,wasto
"protectthePresident."Inonesense,thismeantitstaskwastocarefullyscrutinize
policiesandprogramstomakesuretheydidnotgetthePresidentintotrouble.The5412
Committeealsoprovidedaforumforthediscussionofoperationstoosensitivetobe
discussedbeforethewholeNSC.10Thecommitteealsoprovidedaperfectdevicefor
obscuringtherecord,makingitimpossibleforthehistoriantosaythatthismanordered
thataction,orotherwisefixresponsibility.
TheCIA'srecord,andIke's,withregardtoassassination,isthereforepurposely
ambiguous.ThisistruenotonlywithregardtoLumumbabutalsointhecasesofChou
EnlaiandFidelCastro.Areviewofthewholedelicatesubjectofassassinationsandthe
CIAisthusinorderbeforeanyconclusionscanbeattempted.
HowardhuntisthesourceforthechargethattheCIA,inthemidfifties,hadan
assassinationunit.Huntsaidthattheunit,
Page297
which"wassetuptoarrangefortheassassinationofsuspecteddoubleagentsandsimilar
low-rankingofficials,"wasunderthecommandofColonelBorisT.Pash,aU.S.Army
officerassignedtotheCIA.11Pash'stitlewasChiefofProgramBranch7(PB/7),a
"specialoperations"unitwithintheOfficeofPolicyCoordination(OPC),theoriginal
clandestineservicesorganizationthateventuallybecametheDirectorateofPlans.
FrankWisner,directorofOPCandthussupervisorofProgramBranch7,saidthatPash's
PB/7functionsincludedassassinationsand"kidnappingofpersonagesbehindtheIron
Curtain...iftheywerenotinsympathywiththeregime,andcouldbespiritedoutofthe
countrybyourpeoplefortheirownsafety;orkidnappingofpeoplewhoseinterestswere
inimicaltoours."Thiswas,Wisnerexplainedinamemorandum,"amatterofkeepingup
withtheJoneses.Everyotherpowerpracticedassassinationifneedbe."Thewritten
charteroftheunitread,"PB/7willberesponsibleforassassinations,kidnapping,and
suchotherfunctionsasfromtimetotimemaybegivenitbyhigherauthority."
HunttoldtheChurchCommitteethatatonepointin1953hehadameetingwithPashand
hisdeputytodiscuss"wetaffairs,"i.e.,liquidations,withregardtoadouble-agentwho
hadpenetratedtheCIA'soperationinWestBerlin.HuntsaidthatPash"seemedalittle
startledatthesubject.Heindicatedthatitwassomethingthatwouldhavetobeapproved
byhigherauthorityandIwithdrewandneverapproachedColonelPashagain."12
Oneattemptwasalmostmade,in1955,butPB/7wasnotinvolved,thetargetwasnota
low-rankingdouble-agent,andIkeknewnothingaboutit.AstationchiefinEastAsia
sentacabletoCIAheadquartersoutliningaproposedmediapropagandacampaign.Toit
headdedaplantoassassinateCommunistChina'snumbertwoman,ChouEn-lai.Chou
wasattendingaconferenceofThirdWorldcountriesatBandung.Theplanwastohave
anindigenousagentplaceanundetectablepoisoninChou'sricebowlattheBandung
Conference'sfinalbanquet.Chouwoulddietwodayslater,afterhisreturntoPeking.13
AllenDullesvetoedtheplan.HehadCIAheadquarterssendoutacablethat"strongly
censured"thestationchiefforevensuggestingassassinationandindicating"inthe
strongestpossiblelanguagethisAgencyhasneverandneverwillengageinsuch
activities."
Page298
Thecableaddedordersto"immediatelyproceedtoburnallcopies"ofanydocuments
relatingtotheplan.14
Forthenextfiveyears,theCIAstayedawayfromanydiscussionofpolitical
assassination.Thesubjectcameupagainin1960.PatriceLumumbawasthetarget.A
briefhistoryofdevelopmentsintheCongoduringthefiftiesisnecessarytoan
understandingoftheLumumbaassassinationattempts.
TheBelgianCongo,aEuropeancolonylocatedincentralAfrica,wasgovernedbythe
Belgiansasifitweretheeighteenthcentury.Therewasnolocalgovernmentofanykind;
noteventhe100,000BelgiansemployedintheCongohadanypoliticalrights.Allpower
residedwiththeGovernorGeneral,whowasappointedbytheBelgianGovernmentand
derivedhispowersfromit.TheBelgiansmadenoattempttopreparetheCongofor
independenceuntil1956,whenattheurgingoftheUnitedNationssomelocalelections
wereheldtochooseAfricanadviserstothemunicipalgovernments.Theseelectionsled
totheformationofpoliticalpartiesintheCongo.JosephKasavubu,leaderofthe
BakongotribeinLéopoldville,formedonepartydrawnmostlyfromhistribe.Patrice
Lumumba,apost-officeclerk,foundedanother,which,unlikeKasavubu's,triedtoattract
supportersonanationwidebasis.MoiseTshombeformedathirdpartyinthemineral-rich
provinceofKatanga.
Thecomingofpoliticalpartiesnaturallyincreasedthepressureforindependence,asno
politiciancouldhopetowinvotesunlessheattackedtheBelgiansanddemanded
immediateindependence.Bythebeginningof1960theBelgianshadcometothe
conclusionthattherewasonlyonewaytheycouldkeepthegoodwilloftheCongolese
afterindependence,andthuskeeppossessionofthemines,andthatwastogrant
independenceasearlyaspossibleandtrustthattheCongolesewouldrecognizethattheir
totalinexperiencemadeitnecessaryforthemtorelyonBelgianadvisersandmanagers.
Electionswerequicklyarranged,withindependencepromisedforJune30,1960.The
electionswouldchooseaNationalAssembly,whichwouldthenselectaheadofstateand
aprimeminister.
KasavubuandTshombeurgedtheBelgianstocreateafederalstate,whichwasnaturalas
theyhadmainlylocalsupport.Lumumbademandedthattheexistingunitarystate,witha
strongcen
Page299
tralgovernment,becontinued.Hearguedthatitwastheonlywaytokeepsuchahuge
anddisparatecountrytogether.TheBelgianssupportedLumumba,whosepartywonthe
mostseatsintheNationalAssemblyintheensuingelection,althoughnotenoughto
enablehimtoformagovernment.TheBelgianGovernorGeneralgavebothLumumba
andKasavubuanopportunitytoformagovernment.Whenbothfailed,adealwasmade
wherebyKasavububecamePresident,whileLumumbabecamePrimeMinister.15
InearlyJuly,thearmycalledtheForcePubliquemutiniedagainstitsBelgianofficers.
KasavubuandLumumbaattemptedtoreasonwiththesoldiers,butabandonedtheeffort
whenBelgianparatroopersenteredthecountryforthepurposeofprotectingBelgian
nationals.LumumbachargedthatBelgiumwaspreparingtorestorecolonialrule.OnJuly
11heappealedtotheUnitedNationsforhelp.ThatsamedayTshombe,premierof
KatangaProvince,declaredtheindependenceofthatprovincefromtheCongo,with
himselfasPresident.MeanwhiletheForcePublique,underthenominalcommandofits
sergeants,hadbeenrapidlydisintegrating,committingnumerousatrocitiesagainstboth
blackandwhite.
Katanga,therichestpartoftheCongoandthustheareaofmostconcerntotheBelgians,
settleddownunderTshombe'srule.HewasdiscreetlybackedbytheBelgianmining
companies,whopaidtheirtaxestohimandnottothecentralgovernment.TheUnited
Nations,meanwhile,respondingtoLumumba'spleaforhelp,sentapeace-keepingforce
totheCongo.
InlateJuly,LumumbaflewtotheUnitedStatestoconsultwithUNandStateDepartment
officials.HemadeaverybadimpressiononUnderSecretaryofStateC.DouglasDillon.
"Hewouldneverlookyouintheeye,"Dillonreported."Helookedupatthesky.Anda
tremendousflowofwordscameout.HespokeinFrench,andhespokeitveryfluently.
Andhiswordsdidn'thaveanyrelationtotheparticularthingsthatwewantedtodiscuss.
YouhadafeelingthathewasapersonthatwasgrippedbythisfervorthatIcanonly
characterizeasmessianic....Hewasjustnotarationalbeing."
TheStateDepartmenthadhopedthatitwouldbeabletoworkwithLumumba,butthose
hopesvanishedafterhismeetingwithDillon,whoconcludedthat"thiswasanindividual
whomitwasimpossibletodealwith."16
Rebuffed,LumumbareturnedtotheCongo.Unabletoobtain
Page300
armsandsupportintheUnitedStates,heturnedtotheSovietUnion.Khrushchevhad
alreadybeenshakinghisfistattheWestingeneralandtheBelgiansinparticular,warning
themnottoattempttoreassertcolonialcontrolintheCongo.TheRussianleader
respondedpositivelytoLumumba'srequestformilitaryplanes.
OnAugust18,1960,DillonreportedondevelopmentsintheCongotoameetingofthe
NSC,atwhichIkewaspresent.BothLumumbaandKhrushchevweredemandingthatthe
UNpeacekeepingforcegetoutoftheCongo.Dillon,accordingtotheminutes,saidthat
"theeliminationoftheU.N.wouldbeadisasterwhich...weshoulddoeverythingwe
couldtoprevent."IftheUNwereforcedout,hewarned,theSovietswouldcomein.The
minuteswenton,"SecretaryDillonsaidthatLumumbawasworkingtoservethe
purposesoftheSovietsandMr.DullespointedoutthatLumumbawasinSovietpay."17
Ikethensaiditwas"simplyinconceivable"thattheUnitedStatescouldallowtheUNto
beforcedoutoftheCongo."WeshouldkeeptheU.N.intheCongo,"thePresidentsaid,
"evenifsuchactionwasusedbytheSovietsasthebasisforstartingafight."HenryCabot
Lodge,Jr.,AmbassadortotheUN,saidhedoubtedthattheUNforcecouldstayinthe
CongoifthegovernmentoftheCongowasdeterminedtokickitout.ThePresident
responded,theminutesrecord,bystating"thatMr.Lodgewaswrongtothisextentwe
weretalkingofonemanforcingusoutoftheCongo;ofLumumbasupportedbythe
Soviets.''TheCongolesepeoplewantedtheUNforcethere,Ikedeclared.18
ThefirstdirectreferencetoassassinationasasolutioncamefromHedgman,thestation
chiefinLéopoldvillewhohadsentthealarmisttelegramofAugust18.OnAugust24he
reportedthatanti-LumumbaleadersintheCongohadapproachedKasavubuwithaplan
toassassinateLumumba,butKasavubuhadrefusedtoendorseitbecausehewas
reluctanttoresorttoviolenceandinanycasetherewasnootherleaderofsufficient
staturetoreplaceLumumba.19
Thenextday,August25,the5412CommitteemettodiscussCIAplansforpolitical
actionsagainstLumumba.ItwasatthismeetingthatGordonGray,Ike'spersonal
representativeon5412,reportedthatthePresident"hadexpressedextremelystrongfeel
Page301
ingsonthenecessityforverystraightforwardactioninthissituation,andhewondered
whethertheplansasoutlinedweresufficienttoaccomplishthis."Theminutesstatethat
thecommittee"finallyagreedthatplanningfortheCongowouldnotnecessarilyruleout
'consideration'ofanyparticularkindofactivitywhichmightcontributetogettingridof
Lumumba."20
Thefollowingmorning,AllenDullessenthisowncabletoHedgmaninLéopoldville
tellinghimthatthe"removal"ofLumumbawasan"urgent"objective.
BeforeHedgmancouldact,theswirlingeventsinsidetheCongointervened.On
September5,PresidentKasavubudismissedLumumbafromthegovernment.He
evidentlywasafraidthatLumumbawouldmaketheCongointoaColdWarbattleground.
Lumumba'sdismissalshouldhavesolvedtheproblem,butHedgmanwiredDulles,
"LUMUMBAINOPPOSITIONISALMOSTASDANGEROUSASINOFFICE."
Inresponse,DullestoldHedgmanthattheUnitedStateswasapprehensiveabout
Lumumba'sabilitytoinfluenceeventsintheCongobyvirtueofhispersonality,
irrespectiveofhisofficialposition.Aweeklater,onSeptember14,GeneralJoseph
Mobutuseizedpowerviaamilitarycoup.LumumbathenplacedhimselfinUNcustody.
HedgmanthoughtthatbyturningtotheUNpeace-keepingforceforprotection,Lumumba
hadstrengthenedhisposition(atleasthewastemporarilysafefromHedgmanandthe
CIA).HedgmanwiredDulles,"ONLYSOLUTIONISREMOVEHIM[Lumumba]FROM
SCENESOONEST."21
AtthisstageRichardBissellaskedaCIAscientist,JosephScheider,tomakepreparations
toassassinateorincapacitateanunspecified"Africanleader."BisselltoldScheiderthatthe
assignmenthadthe"highestauthority"behindit.Scheiderprocuredtoxicbiological
materialsandreportedthathewasready.22
OnSeptember19,1960,BissellcabledHedgman,tellinghimtoexpectamessengerfrom
Washingtoninthenearfuture.Twodayslater,atanNSCmeeting,AllenDullesstatedthat
Lumumba"wouldremainagravedangeraslongashewasnotyetdisposedof."On
September26,ScheiderflewtoLéopoldvillewiththelethalsubstances,whichhegaveto
Hedgman.ScheidertoldHedgmanthatPresidentEisenhowerpersonallyhadorderedthe
assassinationofLumumba.23
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Thesubstancewasneverused.LumumbaremainedunderUNprotectionuntilNovember
27,whenhedecidedtogotoStanleyvilletoengageinpoliticalactivity.Hedgmanfound
outaboutLumumba'splansandreportedthemtoMobutu.Inaddition,hecooperated
withMobutuinsettinguproadblockstohelpcaptureLumumba.
Afewdayslater,Lumumbawascaptured.MobutuheldhiminprisonuntilJanuary17,
1961,justthreedaysbeforeIkeleftoffice,whenheputLumumbaaboardanairplanethat
tookhimtoElisabethvilleinKatangaProvince.SomanyofLumumba'sfollowershad
beenbutcheredattheElisabethvilleairportthattheplacewasknownasthe
"slaughterhouse."
Attheslaughterhouse,Lumumbawasmurdered.Eyewitnessestohisappearanceashe
wasdraggedofftheplanetestifiedlaterthathemightwellnothavesurvivedthebeatings
towhichhehadalreadybeensubjectedanyway.24
So,intheend,theCIAwasnotdirectlyinvolvedinLumumba'smurder,althoughithad
beeninonhiscapture.ThatbegsthequestionastowhetherIkeorderedthemankilled,
however,orifAllenDullestookituponhimselftoputoutthecontract.Itissimplyone
man'swordagainstanother's.JohnEisenhowerpointedouttotheChurchCommitteethat
assassinationwascontrarytohisfather'sphilosophythat"nomanisindispensable,"and
asnotedAndrewGoodpasterwasunequivocalindenyingthatIkeevergaveanyorderto
assassinateanyone,andpositiveinhisbeliefthathewouldhaveknownaboutithadsuch
ordersbeengiven.
GordonGray,whowaspresentatallthecrucialmeetings,testifiedthat"Iagreethat
assassinationcouldhavebeenonthemindsofsomepeoplewhentheyusedthesewords
'eliminate'or'getridof.'Iamjusttryingtosayitwasnotseriouslyconsideredasa
programofactionbythePresidentoreventhe5412Committee."Grayalsosaidthat
"theremaywellhavebeenintheCIAplansand/ordiscussionsofassassinations,butat
thelevelof5412orahigherlevelthanthat,theNSC,therewasnoactivediscussionin
anywayplanningassassinations."25
ButtoRichardBissell,whowasafterallthenumbertwomanintheCIA,Dulles'cableto
LéopoldvillewasaclearsignalthatthePresidenthadauthorizedtheCIAtokill
Lumumba.AttheChurchCommittee,thisexchangeoccurred:
Page303
"Q:DidMr.DullestellyouthatPresidentEisenhowerwantedLumumbakilled?
Mr.Bissell:Iamsurehedidn't.
Q:Didheevertellyouevencircumlocutiouslythroughthiskindofcable?
Mr.Bissell:Yes,Ithinkhiscablesaysitineffect."
Bissellwentontosay,"IthinkitisprobablyunlikelythatAllenDulleswouldhavesaid
eitherthePresidentorPresidentEisenhowereventome.Ithinkhewouldhavesaid,this
isauthorizedinthehighestquarters,andIwouldhaveknownwhathemeant."26
FidelCastrowasthenextCIAtargetandtheobjectofnumerousassassinationattempts.
SomeoftheoperationsagainstFidelcrossedtheborderintopurelunacy.Apartofthe
explanationastohowthingsgotsocompletelyoutofhandisthattheCIAwas,bythe
endoftheEisenhoweradministration,atthepeakofitspower,prestige,influence,and
cockiness.AnotherpartisthathavingaCommunistregimesoclosetotheStates,literally
thumbingitsnoseatUncleSam,andthisonanislandthatoweditsindependencetothe
UnitedStatesandthathadalwayshadaspecialrelationshipwithWashington,infuriated
Americanpolicy-makers.Quitesimply,itdrovethemmad.Theresultwaslunaticactions.
Item:TheCIA'sOfficeofMedicalServicestreatedaboxofFidel'sfavoritecigarswitha
botulinustoxinsopotentthatCastrowoulddietheinstantheputoneinhismouth.The
cigarsweregiventoanagentwhoclaimedhecouldgetthemintoCubaandintoFidel's
hands.27
Item:RichardBissellenlistedtheMafiainaplottokillCastro.Bisselllikedtheideaof
bringingtheMafiainonitbecausethegangsterswouldbehighlymotivated,havingbeen
cutoutoftheirverylucrativegamblingoperationinHavana.Thustheyhad"theirown
reasonsforhostility."Further,theMafiaprovided"theultimatecover"because"therewas
verylittlechancethatanythingthesyndicatewouldtrytodowouldbetracedbacktothe
CIA."BissellthoughttheMafiawasextremelyefficientandithadanunquestionedrecord
ofsuccessful"hits.''
ContactsweremadewithJohnnyRosselli,whohadlearnedhistradeunderAlCapone,
andSalvatoreGiancana(alsoknownas"SamGold"),whowasontheFBI'slistoftenmost-wantedcrimi
Page304
nals.TheCIAwanteda"gangland-stylekilling"inwhichCastrowouldbegunneddown.
Giancanaopposedtheideabecauseitwouldbedifficulttorecruitahitmanforsucha
dangerousoperation,andRossellisaidhewantedsomething"niceandclean,without
gettingintoanykindofout-and-outambushing."Giancanasuggestedapoisonthatwould
disappearwithoutatrace.TheCIAthenpreparedabotulinustoxinpillthat"didthejob
expectedofit"whentestedonmonkeys.PillsweregiventoaCubanfordeliverytothe
island.Obviously,nonewereeverdroppedintoFidel'scoffee.28
ThevariousCIAplotstodestroyCastro'spublicimagewereevenmoreridiculous.One
schemewastosprayCastro'sbroadcastingstudiowithachemicalsimilartoLSD,thus
undermininghischarismaticappealbysabotaginghisspeeches.Thatideawasdiscarded
becausethechemicalwasunreliable.NexttheTechnicalServicesDivisionoftheCIA
impregnatedaboxofcigarswithachemicalthatproducedtemporarydisorientation,
hopingtoinduceFideltosmokeoneofthecigarsbeforedeliveringamajorspeech.
AnotherplaninvolvedatripoutofCubathatCastrowasscheduledtotake.The
TechnicalServicesDivisionpreparedsomethalliumsaltsthatcouldbedustedonto
Castro'sshoeswhenheleftthemoutsidehishotelroomtobeshined.Thesaltswerea
strongdepilatantthatwouldcauseFidel'sbeardtofallout,thusdestroyinghismachismo
image.29
HowmuchIkeknewaboutthisnonsenseisunclear.Dulleswascertainlyinformed.In
December1959,J.C.King,theformerFBIagentwhowasheadoftheCIA'sWestern
HemisphereDivision,sentamemorandumtoDullesrecommendingthat"thorough
considerationbegiventotheeliminationofFidelCastro."KingsaidthatneitherRaúl
CastronorCheGuevarahad"thesamemesmericappealtothemasses"andthatFidel's
elimination"wouldgreatlyacceleratethefallofthepresentGovernment."Dullesgavethe
recommendationhisapproval.30
WhetherDullestoldIkeornotisthepointatissue.RichardBisselltestifiedbeforethe
ChurchCommitteethathedidnotinformeitherthe5412CommitteeorPresident
EisenhoweroftheCastroassassinationoperation.Bisselladdedthattohisknowledge,
neitherdidDullestellIke.However,BissellsaidhebelievedthatDulleswouldhave
advisedthePresident(butnotthe5412people
Page305
ortheNSC)ina"circumlocutious"or"oblique"way.Bisselladmittedthathisobservation
was"purepersonalopinion"basedonhisunderstandingofDulles'standardoperation
procedureinsensitivecovertoperations.ButBissellalsosaidthatDullesnevertoldhim
thathehadsoadvisedEisenhower,althoughheordinarilydidletBissellknowwhenhe
hadusedthe''circumlocutious"approachwiththePresident.31
OthertestimonybeforetheChurchCommitteestronglydeniedthatthePresidenthadany
knowledgeofaCIAconnectionwiththeMafiaoranyassassinationplotsagainstCastro.
GordonGraysaidthathehaddirectordersfromthePresidenttotheeffectthat"allcovert
actionsimpingingonthesovereigntyofothercountriesmustbedeliberatedbytheSpecial
Group(the5412Committee)."LikeBissell,Graysaidthatthe5412peoplenever
discussedanyassassinationplansforCastro."Ifinditverydifficulttobelieve,"Gray
testified,"andIdonotbelieve,thatMr.Dulleswouldhavegoneindependentlyto
PresidentEisenhowerwithsuchapropositionwithoutmyknowingaboutitfromMr.
Dulles."32
AstothepossibilitythatIkeandDullesconferredprivatelyabouttheplot,General
GoodpasterwhoordinarilywasthefirstpersontoseethePresidentinthe
morningtestified,"ThatwassimplynotthePresident'swayofdoingbusiness.Hehad
madeitverycleartoushowhewantedtohandlemattersofthiskind,andwehadsetup
procedurestoseethattheywerethenhandledthatway."SOPwastocleareverything
with5412,thengetthePresident'sdirectapproval,asintheU-2program.Bissell's
assumptionofa"circumlocutious"personalconversationbetweenIkeandDulleswasto
Goodpaster"completelyunlikely."33
ThomasParrott,Secretaryforthe5412Committee,said,"Ijustcannotconceivethat
PresidentEisenhowerwouldhavegoneoffandmountedsomekindofcovertoperation
onhisown.ThiscertainlywouldnothavebeenconsistentwithPresidentEisenhower's
staffmethodofdoingbusiness."34
JohnEisenhower,whowasGoodpaster'sassistant,testifiedthathisfatherhadconfided
secretmatterstohim"toaverylargeextent."Asexamples,JohnsaidIkehadtoldhim
abouttheatomicbombamonthbeforeHiroshima.Hethensaidthathisfather"nevertold
himofanyCIAactivityinvolvinganassassinationplanorattemptconcerningCastroand
itwashisopinionthatPresidentEisenhowerwouldhavetoldhimifthePresidenthad
knownabout
Page306
suchactivity."Johnalsosaidthathisfather"didnotdiscussimportantsubjects
circumlocutiously."Headdedthathisfatherbelieved"thatnoleaderwasindispensable,
andthusassassinationwasnotanalternativeintheconductofforeignpolicy.''35
Finally,AdmiralArleighBurke,ChiefofNavalOperations,toldtheChurchCommittee,
"Itismyfirmconviction,basedonfiveyearsofcloseassociationwithPresident
Eisenhower...thathewouldneverhavetoleratedsuchadiscussion,orhavepermitted
anyonetoproposeassassination,norwouldhehaveeverauthorized,condoned,or
permittedanassassinationattempt."36
AllofwhichisstrongtestimonytoIke'sinnocence.Thefactremains,however,that
Dullesdidapproveatleasttwoassassinationplots,andtheCIAdiddoitsbesttocarry
themout.Itishighlyunlikely,almostunbelievable,thatDulleswouldhavedoneso
unlesshewascertainhewasactinginaccordwiththePresident'swishes.Itmaybethat
DulleswastoozealousorliberalinhisinterpretationofwhatthePresidentwanteddone.
WithbothEisenhowerandDullesdead,wewillneverknow.
Page307
ChapterTwenty-Two
IkeandtheBayofPigs
APRIL17,1961.SometwothousandCubanrebelslandattheBayofPigs.Theyarehit
immediatelybyCastro'sarmedforces.Adebacleisinthemaking.Aroundtheworld
peoplewanttoknowwhoisresponsibleforthisterribleplan.
GeneralAndrewGoodpaster,inIke'sopinion,wasnotonlythebestofficerintheU.S.
Army,butalsooneofthetwoorthreesmartestmeninthecountry.1Welloversixfeet
tall,ramrodstraight,impeccableinhisperfectlypresseduniform,withruggedfeatures,
broadshoulders,andapowerfulchest,hewasgracefulinhismovements,politeyet
firminhisattitude.HewassecondintheWestPointclassof1939andearnedaseries
ofcombatmedalsplustwoPurpleHeartsinItalyduringthewar.
Goodpaster'sbearing,manner,shockofhair,andgoodlooksremindedsomeobservers
ofhisnamesake,anothergeneral,AndrewJackson.Whenheemergedfromretirement
in1977totakeupthedutiesofSuperintendentoftheMilitaryAcademy,torestore
WestPointtoitsfullintegrity,heremindedotherobserversofSylvanusThayer,the
legendaryfounderoftheacademy.
Goodpasterwasamanwhospokecarefully,meaningexactlywhathesaid,saying
exactlywhatwasonhismind.Latein1960,intheOvalOffice,Goodpasterexpressed
concernthattheassemblingandtrainingofanorganizationofCubanrefugees,
authorizedbyEisenhowermonthsearlier,mightwellbebuildingupaproblemwith
difficultconsequences.
Page308
Eisenhowerhadgivenauthorityonlytoformandtraintheforce,reservingany
decisionwhetheractuallytouseitand,ifso,how.Inhisview,itwasonlyasmall
trainingbase,reallynotmuchmorethanaplacetokeepaneyeonsomeofthe
hotheadedCubanswhoweresoanxioustoreturntotheirhomelandandoverthrow
Castro.Goodpaster'sfear,however,wasthattheoperationwouldbuildupa
momentumofitsown,whichwouldbehardtostop.2
Ikerefusedtoseeanydanger.Hesaidhewasonlycreatinganasset,notcommittingthe
UnitedStatestoaninvasionofCubaoranythinglikethat.Whetherthisparamilitary
forceofCubanexiles,trainedbytheCIA,wouldbeusedornotwoulddependentirely
oncircumstances,specificallyonpoliticaldevelopments.Inanyevent,thedecision
wouldbemadeintheWhiteHouse,notbytheCIAortheCubansthemselves.
TheCubanTrainingProgramhaditsbeginninginDecember1959atthesametimethat
theCIAbeganitsassassinationplottingagainstFidel.J.C.Kingwroteamemorandumto
AllenDullesobservingthattheCastrodictatorshipinCubawasexpropriatingAmerican
propertyatanalarmingrate,andwarningthatifitwerepermittedtostayinpower,the
CastroregimewouldencouragesimilaractionsagainstotherU.S.holdingsinotherLatin
Americancountries.Herecommendedabroad-basedprogramtoeliminateFidel,
includingassassinationandparamilitaryactivities.3
OnJanuary13,1960,DullestookKing'srecommendationstothe5412Committee.Dulles
toldthecommitteethat"aquickeliminationofCastro"wasnotcontemplatedbytheCIA,
buthealso"notedthatoverthelongruntheU.S.willnotbeabletotoleratetheCastro
regimeinCuba,andsuggestedthatcovertcontingencyplanningtoaccomplishthefallof
theCastrogovernmentmightbeinorder."
TheStateDepartmentrepresentativeon5412commentedthat"timingwasvery
important."TheCIAshouldnotmoveagainstCastrountila"solidlybasedCuban
opposition"waspreparedtotakeover.Dullesthen"emphasizedthatwedonothavein
mindaquickeliminationofCastro,butratheractionsdesignedtoenableresponsible
oppositionleaderstogetafoothold."4
Page309
InFebruary,DullescametotheOvalOfficetodiscusswithIkepossiblemovesagainst
Castro.ThePresidentwassympatheticbuthardlyenthusiastic.Dulleshadbroughtsome
U-2photosofaCubansugarrefinery,alongwithplanstoputitoutofactionbyusing
guerrillasaboteurs.Ikescoffedatthis,pointingoutthatsuchdamagecouldbeeasily
repaired.TheCIAhadtocomeupwithsomethingbetterthanthis.IkesaidthatDulles
shouldgobacktohispeopleandreturnwhentheyhada"program"workedout.5
TheCIAthencreatedataskforce,underthedirectionofRichardBissell,totakecharge
ofCubanoperations.Thatgroupwastemptedtotryforaquickfix-Castro'sassassinationasasolution.J.C.King'sattitude,asrecordedinamemorandumofameetingonMarch9
withthetaskforce,was"thatunlessFidelandRaúlCastroandCheGuevaracouldbe
eliminatedinonepackagewhichishighlyunlikelythisoperationcanbealong,drawnout
affairandthepresentgovernmentwillonlybeoverthrownbytheuseofforce."6
Thefollowingday,March10,1960,theNSCdiscussedAmericanpolicyto"bringanother
governmenttopowerinCuba."Theminutesofthatmeetingrecordthat"thePresident
saidwemighthaveanotherBlackHoleofCalcuttainCuba,andhewonderedwhatwe
coulddoaboutsuchasituation."AdmiralArleighBurke,ChiefofNavalOperations,said
thechiefimmediaterequirementwastofindaCubanleaderaroundwhomanti-Castro
elementscouldrally.DullesreportedthattheCIAwasworkingonaplantoridtheisland
ofFidel.Burkesuggestedthatanyplanforhisremovalshouldbe"apackagedeal,since
manyoftheleadersaroundCastrowereevenworsethanCastro."7
Bissell,meanwhile,haddraftedapolicypaper,"AProgramofCovertActionAgainstthe
CastroRegime,"andonMarch14broughtittothe5412Committee.Itcalledforfour
steps:(1)creationofa"responsibleandunified"Cubangovernmentinexile;(2)"a
powerfulpropagandaoffensive";(3)"acovertintelligenceandactionorganizationin
Cuba"thatwouldbe"responsive''tothegovernmentinexile,and(4)"aparamilitary
forceoutsideofCubaforfutureguerrillaaction."8
The5412peoplewereimpressed.AlthoughBissellwarnedthatitwouldtakesixtoeight
monthstoputhisprogramintoaction,whatheproposedwasmoresolidandhelpfulthan
theearliertalkaboutassassination.Thecommitteedidhave"ageneraldiscussion
Page310
astowhatwouldbetheeffectontheCubansceneifFidelandRaúlCastroandChe
Guevarashoulddisappearsimultaneously."AdmiralBurkeobservedthattheonly
organizedgroupinCubawastheCommunistParty,andthatiftheCastroswere
eliminatedtheCommunistswouldmoveintothevacuum.Dullesthought"thismightnot
bedisadvantageous"becauseitwouldgivetheUnitedStatesandtheOrganizationof
AmericanStatesanopportunitytomoveinonCubainforce.J.C.Kingsuggestedthat
nothingbedonehastily,assofarnoanti-CastroCubanleaderhadappearedwhowas
capableofwinningpopularsupport.9
Threedayslater,onMarch17,IkeapprovedBissell'sfourpointprogram.ThePresident
puthisemphasisonBissell'sfirststep,findingaCubanleaderlivinginexile(probablyin
Miami)whowouldformagovernmentinexilethattheUnitedStatescouldrecognize.10
Throughthespringandsummerof1960,Bissellworkedonseveralfronts.Asnotedin
ChapterTwenty-one,variousattemptstoassassinateCastroweremade,possiblywithout
Ike'sknowledge,certainlywithoutsuccess.Meanwhile,theflowofanti-CastroCuban
refugeesintoMiamiwasbecomingaflood.Manyoftheserefugeeswereeagertoreturn
totheirhomelandand,withAmericanmilitaryhelp,overthrowFidel.Unfortunately,they
bickeredamongthemselves.Somewerepro-Batista,mostwereanti-Batista,allwerehottemperedandhardheaded,fewwerewillingtocooperateortakesecondplaceina
governmentinexile.Nogenuineleaderemerged.
Bissell,meanwhile,begantoputstepfour,thecreationofaparamilitaryforce,into
action.Ifnothingelse,itwasawaytogivethemostactiverefugeesasenseofmovement,
afeelingthatsomethingwasbeingdone.TheoriginaltrainingcampwasoutsideMiami,
butitwastoopublic,soBissellsentthegroupdowntothePanamaCanalZone.
TheretheCIAtrainedaninitialcadreofthirtyCubanleadersforguerrillawarfareinside
Cuba.AsBissellexplainedinaninterview,"Thenotionwasthatwhenalargergroupwas
assembledsubsequentlyfortraining,thatlargergroupwouldbetrainedbyCubans,thus
insulatingtheU.S.fromanydirectinvolvement."11
ByJuly,itwasobviousthattheplanwasnogood.Itwasbasedontheconceptofastrong
guerrillamovementinsideCuba,which"begantoappearlessandlesspossible."One
reasonwasthatthe
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anti-CastroCubansneverdevelopedacommandandcontrolnet,atrueorganized
underground.TherewerevirtuallynocommunicationsbetweenMiamiandCuba.There
wereresistancegroupsontheislandbut,asBissellexplained,"theyweresopoorly
organizedandtheirsecuritypracticesweresopoorthat...theywereroundedup
quickly,"exceptintheEscambreyMountains.
Andinthemountains,Bissellsaid,"whatCastrodidwastoputacordonofmilitiaaround
thewholearea,usingenormousnumbers,andineffecthestarvedthesepeopleout.They
hadtocomeouttoforage,andtheywerepickedupatthattime."
TheCIAdidinfiltrateafewsmallgroupsofguerrillasontothenorthcoastofCuba
duringthesummer,butbecausetherewas"nocommandandcontrolnet,no
underground,noorganization,nowaytheycouldbeshelteredfrominformers,itwas
simplyimpossibletobuildupthebasisofaresistancemovementintheisland."12
Assassinationhadfailed.Infiltrationhadfailed.Somethingbigger,somethingbetter
plannedandexecuted,wasclearlynecessary.OnAugust18,1960,Ikeapprovedan
expandedprogram,witha$13millionbudget.Hewaswillingtotakemoreactivesteps
becausetheCIAhadobtainedphotographsofCzecharmsinCuba.13
Thesameday,IkeapprovedtheuseofDepartmentofDefensepersonnelandequipment
intheCubanoperation,althoughheinsistedthat"noUnitedStatesmilitarypersonnel
weretobeusedinacombatstatus."14
AftergivinghisapprovaltoBissell'sexpandedplans,Ikeaskedagain,"Where'sour
governmentinexile?"BissellandAllenDullesexplainedthatitwasdifficulttogetthe
Cubanstoworktogether.Ike,impatient,replied,"Boys,ifyoudon'tintendtogothrough
withthis,let'sstoptalkingaboutit."Nothingcouldhappen,heinsisted,withouta
popular,genuinegovernmentinexile.15
AsBissell'soperationgrew,ithadtomovetolargerquarters.Nonewereavailableinthe
CanalZone,sohemadecontactwithhisfriendsintheGuatemalanGovernment,whose
President,MiguelYdigorasFuentes,hadhelpedtooverthrowArbenzsevenyearsearlier.
YdigorasagreedtoallowtheCIAtoestablishitstrainingbaseonGuatemala'sCaribbean
coast.ByOctobertheagencyhadfourhundredguerrillas-in-trainingatthebase.
Thewholeconceptoftheoperation,meanwhile,hadundergonearadicaltransformation,
althoughneitherIkenorthe5412people
Page312
wereinformedofthechangeuntilmonthslater.16Theoriginalideahadbeentorely
primarilyontheanti-Castroresistanceforcesalreadyontheisland,butbythefallof
1960,Bissellhadreluctantlyacceptedthefactthatsuchaplanwasimpossible,because
therewasnoresistanceforcethatcouldbecountedon.Bissell'snewplanwastolanda
fairlylarge,well-equipped,heavilyarmedforcethatwouldsecureabeachheadandbe
abletoholditagainstCastro'scounterattack.17
ThenextstagewouldbearepeatoftheCIA'SperformanceinGuatemalain1954.Thatis,
theinvasionforcewouldholditsposition,asCastilloArmas'"army"hadsatinthe
ChurchoftheBlackChrist,whileCIAairplanescarriedoutraidsonHavanaandCIA
radiostationsbombardedCubawithpropagandaandrumors.Then,asinGuatemala,it
washopedtherewouldbedefectionsbyCastro'sarmyandairforce,Castrowouldlose
hisnerveandfleetheisland,andtheCIAwouldhaveanothertriumph.18
Asthetrainingwentforward,BissellbuilthisradiostationonSwanIsland,110milesoff
thecoastofHondurasand400milessouthwestofCuba.SwanIsland,amileandahalf
longandhalfamilewide,withapopulationoftwenty-eighthumansandthousandsof
lizardsandgulls,wasclaimedbybothHondurasandtheUnitedStates.Bissellputupa
fifty-kilowattradiostationwhichwaspowerfulenoughtocoverthewholeCaribbean
areaatnight.ItcouldalsobeheardinMiami.Togivetheappearanceofevenhandedness,
itattackedbothTrujillooftheDominicanRepublicandCastro.19
IntheUnitedStates,meanwhile,theCubanoperationbecameanissueintheKennedyNixonpresidentialcontest.NixonwasurgingIketoact:Hefeltthattheoverthrowof
CastrobeforeElectionDaywouldbe"amajorplus,arealtrumpcard."ButIkewas
unwillingtoorderactionbeforetheCubanshadagreedamongthemselvesastothe
governmentthatwouldreplaceFidel.ThePresidentcontinuedtopressBissellandDulles
aboutthegovernmentinexile;theyassuredhimthatprogresswasbeingmade.Ikewas
skeptical."I'mgoingalongwithyouboys,"hesaid,"butIwanttobesurethedamned
thingworks."20
Bisselllaterconfessedinaninterviewthatnorealprogresshadbeenmade."Wehadto
virtuallyforceakindofallianceamongtheCubans,"hesaid."Theyneverachieved
sufficientunityatthepoliticalleveltomakepossibletheformationofacohesive,
effective
Page313
Cuban-mannedorganization,thatcoulddirectthetraining,muchlessconductit,that
couldplanforoperations,thatcoulddoanyofthelogisticplanningorsupport,orthat
couldbeentrustedwithsensitiveIntelligenceoranythingofthiskind.Sothe
impossibilityofconstructingsuchaCubanorganizationleftnoalternative,ifthe
operationwastobecontinued,buttohaveaU.S.organization[theCIA]thatineffect
madeallthedecisions."21
DemocraticnomineeKennedy,meanwhile,thrustCubatothefrontofthecampaign.On
October20theNewYorkTimesheadlineran,"KENNEDYASKSAIDFORCUBAN
REBELSTODEFEATCASTRO.URGESSUPPORTOFEXILESAND'FIGHTERSFOR
FREEDOM.'"22
Nixonlaterwrotethat,whenhesawtheheadline,"Icouldhardlybelievemyeyes."He
checkedwithDulles,whosaidhehadinformedKennedyaboutthetrainingoperationin
GuatemalaandBissell'splans.Nixon,furious,feltthatKennedyhadjeopardizedthe
operationwhilewinningvotesfromthemillionsofAmericanswhowantedCastro
toppledandwhothoughttheRepublicanstooweaktodoit.Butdespitehisanger,Nixon
believedthat"thecovertoperationhadtobeprotectedatallcosts."Hethereforewentto
theotherextreme,attackingKennedy'sproposal"aswrongandirresponsiblebecauseit
wouldviolateourtreatycommitments."
InhiscampaigndebatewithKennedythefollowingnight,Nixonpredictedthatifthe
UnitedStatessupportedtheCubanexilesinamilitaryadventure,itwouldbe"condemned
intheUnitedNations"whilefailingto"accomplishourobjective."Itwouldbe"anopen
invitationforMr.Khrushchev...tocomeintoLatinAmerica."23Theirony,ofcourse,
wasthatpreciselywhatNixonpredictedwouldhappenalthoughheneverreallybelievedit
himselfdidhappen.TheUnitedStatesdidfail,itwascondemned,andtheBayofPigs
operationwasaninvitationfortheRussianstomovemilitaryforcesintoCuba,an
invitationKhrushchevquicklyaccepted.
Kennedy,meanwhile,wontheclosestelectionindecades.Theweekaftertheelectionwas
atenseoneinCentralAmerica.RiotsinGuatemala,broughtonbythegovernment's
decisiontoallowtheCIAtousethatcountryasabaseofoperations,raisedfearsin
WashingtonthattheCommunistsmighttakeoverthere.Iketold
Page314
SecretaryofStateHerterthat"ifwereceivedarequestfromGuatemalaforassistance,we
wouldmoveinwithoutdelay."24
TheStateDepartment,meanwhile,alwaysmoresensitivetoLatinAmericanfeelingsthan
theCIAortheWhiteHouse,wasurgingthePresidenttoorderthewholeCubanbrigade
outofGuatemala.IkeaskedBissellaboutit."Wethoughtofmovingthembyairliftoutto
oneoftheislandsinthePacific,"Bisselllaterrecalled,"weweresodesperatetofinda
moresecurebaseforthem."OnesolutionwouldhavebeentobringtheCubansbackto
southernFlorida,butasBissellsaid,"Therewasareluctancetomovethembackandto
facethefactthatsincetheU.S.wasdoingthetraining,itmightaswellbedoneinthe
U.S."ItseemedtoBissellthatitwasimportanttomaintainthefictionthattheUnited
Stateswasnotinvolved.HeconvincedIke.ThebrigadestayedinGuatemala.25
ItspresencetherepracticallyinvitedCastrotosendhisownparamilitaryforces,ledby
Che,intoGuatemala.Toguardagainstthatpossibility,IkesentU.S.Navyvesselstothe
CaribbeantopatroltheGuatemalancoast.AnastasioSomozainNicaraguawasalso
worriedaboutCheandotherCubanguerrillasinvadinghiscountry,soIkeextendedthe
patrolstoincludeNicaraguaandaddedaircovertotheseapatrols.TheAmerican
servicemenwereorderedto"refrainfromcombatunlessspecificallyauthorizedorunless
necessarytobaradirectCommunistinvasionattempt."26
InDecember,DullesfinallybriefedIkeonBissell'sevolvingconceptoftheoperation.
Thenewideacalledforlandingarelativelystrong,self-containedforcethatcouldseize
andholdabeachhead.Ikelistened,thenaskedonceagainaboutpoliticalprogress.Did
theCubanshavearecognizedleaderyet?ThePresidentwantedagovernmentinexile
formedthatwouldhaveenoughpopularsupportamongCubanexilestoallowhimto
recognizeitasthenewgovernment.27
Thefollowingday,December8,Dullestoldthe5412Committeeofthenewconcept.By
thenthebrigadewasuptosevenhundredmenandstillgrowing.Thecommittee
"encouraged"Dullestocontinue"development"oftheforce.Someonewarnedthatitwas
becomingcommonknowledgethroughoutLatinAmericathataUnitedStates-backed
forcewasbeingtrainedinGuatemala.28
Itwassuchcommonknowledge,infact,thatonJanuary10,1961,theNewYorkTimes
carriedanarticle,withamap,describ
Page315
ingtheforce,itslocation,anditspurpose.TheEisenhoweradministrationignoredthe
article.29
Ike'sattitudetowardthebrigaderemainedoneofwaitandsee.DouglasDillon,Under
SecretaryofState,whodiscussedthebrigadewiththePresidentonanumberof
occasions,reportedthatEisenhowermaintained"acertainskepticismuntilsuchtimeas
theCubans'trainingwascompleted,andthenawillingnesstolookatit."30Asalways,he
insistedonpoliticalunitybeforeattemptingparamilitaryoperations.Inhismemoirs,Ike
declared,"Becausetheyhadasyetbeenunabletofindtheleadertheywantedanational
leaderknowntobebothanti-Castroandanti-Batistaitwasimpossibletomakespecific
plansforamilitaryinvasion."31
Bisselllaterreportedthat"itwasn'tuntilaboutJanuary1961thattheforceintraining
reachedasmanyaseightorninehundredinstrength,andofcourseatthattimetherehad
beennofirmdecisionthattheywouldbeemployed."32
But,asGoodpasterhadsuggestedtoEisenhower,themomentumwasthereanditwas
unstoppable.AsBissellputit,"It'sonlyfairtosaythattheKennedyadministrationdid
inheritamilitaryorganizationherethatwouldhavebeendifficulttodisposeofand
embarrassingtodisposeofinanywayotherthanbyallowingittogointoaction."33
Inhisretirement,Eisenhowerinsistedthatthedistinctionbetweencreatinganassetand
approvingaplanremainedsharpandclear.Hesaidheneverdiscussedatacticalor
operationalplanwithBissell,Dulles,oranyoneelse,becausetheprogramhadnever
gottenthatfaralong.34AndvariousmembersofIke'sadministrationinsisttothisdaythat
hadEisenhowerbeenintheWhiteHouse,theBayofPigsoperationeitherneverwould
havegoneforwardor,ifitdid,therewouldhavebeenmassiveAmericanmilitarybackup
support.
Perhapsso.Buttherewasthatmomentum,abigpartofwhichwastheCIA'Sintense
desiretohelptherefugeeswhilesimultaneouslypretendingthattheUnitedStateswasnot
involved.Ikewastechnicallycorrectinsayinghehadnotgivenhisapprovaltoany
specificplan,butonlytechnically.Bissell,Dulles,theStateDepartment,andtheincoming
KennedyadministrationallfeltthattheplanhadGeneralEisenhower'sprofessional
backing.
TheKennedypeoplefeltsobecausetheyhaditfromthebest
Page316
possiblesource,Ikehimself.OnJanuary19,thedaybeforeEisenhowerleftoffice,he
hadanall-morningtransitionmeetingintheCabinetRoomoftheWhiteHousewiththe
topechelonoftheincomingadministration.ClarkClifford,HarryTruman'sspecial
counselandlaterLyndonJohnson'sSecretaryofDefense,tooknotes.
AccordingtoClifford'snotes,Eisenhower,withJFKsittingonhisleft,madeitclearthat
theprojectwasgoingverywellandthatitwasKennedy's"responsibility"todo"whatever
isnecessary"tomakeitwork.Cliffordsawno"reluctanceorhesitation"onIke'spart.
Indeed,fivedayslaterCliffordsentamemorandumtoPresidentKennedyremindinghim
thatIkehadsaid"itwasthepolicyofthisgovernment''tohelptheCubans"totheutmost"
andthatthiseffortshouldbe"continuedandaccelerated."35
Theresult,aseveryoneknows,wasthedisasteroftheBayofPigs.ThemomentumIke
hadallowedtheCIAtobuildprovedirresistible.
Page317
ChapterTwenty-Three
IkeandHisSpies
ThelongblacklimousinepullsupoutsidetheCIA'sheadquartersbuilding.Sittingin
thebackseataretheAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStates,RobertF.Kennedy,andthe
DirectorofCentralIntelligence,AllenDulles.Thedooropens.Slowly,painfully,
Dullesgetsout.Thelimousinedrivesoff.
Dulles'shouldersareslumped.Heisverydejected,deeplydepressed.Hehasjust
finishedanotherinaseriesofmorningmeetingswiththecommitteethatis
investigatingtheBayofPigsdisaster.CreatedbyJohnKennedyandchairedby
MaxwellTaylor,thecommittee'srealpurpose,accordingtoHowardHunt,is"simplyto
whitewashtheNewFrontierandtolaytheblameontheCIA."InHunt'sview,Dullesis
"beingharassedbyBobbyKennedy,harassedbythePresident,byDeanRusk,andBob
McNamara."
BackwithhisownpeopleatCIAheadquarters,freefortheremainderofthedayfrom
thehostilityoftheNewFrontiersmen,Dulles'spiritsrevive.Turningawayfrom
Kennedy'sdepartinglimousine,hispacequickens,hisstepbecomesalittlelighter.
Huntrecalled,"Bythetimeheemergedonthethirdfloorfromhisprivateelevatorand
walkedintotheoffice,hewouldhaveacheerygrinonhisface.He'dberubbinghis
arthritichandstogether,andwouldbecheerfulandoutgoing,givingnoneofusany
reasontobelievethathewasunderstrain,thathewasdepressed
Page318
aboutthefatethatawaitedhim,andtheveryharshandunwarrantedcriticismthatthe
agencywasbeingsubjectedto.
"Andhewouldcomeintothemessforlunch(wewouldbealreadyinsideandseated)
andgiveashoulder-poundingtosomebody,andshakehandshereandthere,andtakehis
placeattheheadofthetableandbegincommentingontheWorldSeriesgametheday
before,askfornewsofonethingoranother.Verylittlebusinessmostlyoneventsinthe
outsideworld.Hewasaprettyavidsportsfan,sothatiswhathechattedabout."1
AllenDullesbecamethescapegoatfortheBayofPigs.PresidentKennedyacceptedhis
resignation.Afterthat,hishealthfailedrapidly.Withinafewmonthshehadastroke.
Morebadnewsfollowed.Dulles'sonhadbeenlivingwithhiminWashington.Theboy
hadbeenabrilliantstudentatPrincetonbuthadsufferedagrievouswoundintheKorean
War,whereheservedintheMarineCorps.AChinesebullethadblownawayagood
portionofhishead.Dulles'son'sconditionnaturallypreyedonhismind.Theburden
becameintolerablewhentheboybecameextremelyviolent.Dulleshadtohavehimtaken
offtoasanitariuminSwitzerland.
AsHuntsummedup,"ThelastyearsofAllenDulles'lifewereverysadandunrewarding
ones,althoughheandhiswifemaintainedtheirbeautifulGeorgetownhomeintheir
customarystyle,withgracioushospitality.Buthewasattheend,averytragic,sad,and
unfulfilledfigureofaman."2
HehadbeenIke'schiefspyforeightyears.Morethananyotherindividual,hehad
shapedandmoldedtheCIA.Forbetterorforworse,itwashisagency.Hegaveitasense
ofimportanceandasenseofmission.TheCIAunderAllenDullesfoughtonthefront
linesoftheColdWar,itspurposenothinglessthantosavetheworldfromthe
Communists.Moralewasconsistentlyhighinsidetheagency,aswasitsreputationonthe
outside.
Twodecadeslater,formeragentslookedbackonthefiftieswithstrongfeelingsof
nostalgia.GonewerethegreatsFrankWisner,RichardBissell,TraceyBarnesandAllen
Dulles.Nearlytoaman,veteransfeltthatneveragaindidtheCIAhavealeadertomatch
Dulles.Hismotiveswerepure,hisloyaltytohissubordi
Page319
natescomplete,hiscauseinspiring,hismethodsbrilliantorsoatleastitseemedtotheexagents,inretrospect.
Totheoutsideworld,heseemedmoredifficulttoassess.Tosomecommentators,he
appearedtobearatherbumblingimitationoftheBritishmasterspy,amanwhousedthe
twistofaknifehere,orawell-stagedriotthere,togainandholdanempire.Asomewhat
contraryviewregardedAllenDullesastheevilgeniuswhowasatthecenterofthe
capitalistconspiracytoruletheworldforthebenefitofAmericancorporations,the
epitomeoftheimmoralimperialist.Otherssawhimasamanwhocouldberelieduponto
protectAmericaninterestsaroundtheworld,bywhatevermeanswerenecessary.
Dulleswasaleaderwhomadesomemistakes,enjoyedmanytriumphs.Nothingsays
moreaboutIke'sviewofDullesthanthefactthatthePresidentkepthimonthejobfor
eightyears,ajobthatwascrucialtothesuccessoftheEisenhoweradministration,anda
jobthatwasclearlythemostsensitiveinthegovernment.Ikedecidedhewouldrather
haveAllenDullesashischiefspy,evenwithhislimitations,thananyoneelseheknew.
Byitself,thatwasapowerfulendorsementandrecommendation.
InterviewingIkeabouthisspiesInhisGettysburgoffice,whenhewasinhismidseventies,itwasobviousthatheenjoyeddwellingonthewaryearsmorethanonthe
yearswiththeCIA.Likemanyoldmen,hecouldremembereventsofthirtyyearspast
morevivdlythanthoseoftenyearspast.Whenthinkingaboutthewar,hewouldgrinand
laughasherecalledhowtheAllieswonavictory,grimaceandreddenasheremembered
somethingthathadgonewrong.
TalkingaboutOperationFORTITUDE,hewouldpointoutwherePattonhadcreateda
dummytankcorps,orhowthestrategicbombingpatternconvincedtheGermansthatthe
AllieswouldlandatthePasdeCalaisratherthanNormandy.Inthemiddleofdiscussing
oneoranotherofthemyriadofelementsthatwentintoFORTITUDE,hewouldlook
skyward,frown,thensmile,turntowardmewiththatwonderfulgrin,slaphishanddown
onhisthigh,andexclaim,"ByGod,wereallyfooledthem,didn'twe!"
AndhewouldlaughthatbiggustyEisenhowerlaugh,andstillgetakickoutof
rememberingit,afterallthoseyearsandallthoserememberings."ByGod,wereally
fooledthem,didn'twe!"You
Page320
wouldhavethoughthewasTomSawyer,pullingoffafastoneonAuntPolly.
AndindeedIke'sspiesdidfooltheGermans,generallythroughoutthewarbutespecially
sointhecrucialOVERLORDbattle.Makenomistakeaboutit.OVERLORDwasnosure
thing.Itwasaboutasevenabattle,takingallthingsintoconsideration,aseverhappens.
Eithersidecouldhavewon,withoutthevictorybeingaflukeortheresultofsomepiece
ofsheerluck.IfintelligenceandsubterfugedidnotwinthewarfortheAllies,asmight
beargued,itisclearthatwithouttheedgeinintelligenceandsubterfugethatthey
achievedandmaintained,theAlliesmightnothavewonthewar.
"Wereallyfooledthem."WithIke,theemphasiswasalwaysonthe"we,"eventhoughhe
ofallmenintheAlliedworldhadtherighttoclaim,"Ireallyfooledthem."Partlythat
"we''wasduetonativemodesty,butmainlyitwasarecognitionoffact.Ikeheadeda
team.Hewasnotaprofessionalintelligenceofficer,neverhadbeen.Butthroughthewar
helearnedhowtocommandanintelligenceeffort,asheprogressedfromRobertMurphy
andMarkClarktoMockler-FerrymanandfinallytoKennethStrong.
Strongandhispeoplelettheirbossdownonlyonce,attheBulge.Otherwise,SHAEFG-2
compiledanenviablerecord.Strongcouldbrag,withjustice,thatheknewtheGerman
orderofbattlebetterthantheGermanHighCommanddidfrommid-Augusttotheendof
thewar(eveninDecember1944),whichwasafeatunmatchedbyanyotherintelligence
operationinthisoranyotherwar.
The"we"whohelpedfoolthemincludedallthosenamelesspeopleassociatedwith
BletchleyParkandULTRA.ChurchillsaidoftheRAFpilotsintheBattleofBritainthat
neverhadsomanyowedsomuchtosofew.Itcouldbesaidwithequalormoretruthof
themenandwomenofBP.Withoutthem,thewarcouldnothavebeenwon,oratleastas
quicklyasitwas.
Anotherpartofthe"we"wastheFrenchResistance,whichIkeguidedandsteered
primarilythroughhisadroithandlingofGeneraldeGaulle,partlythroughhisjudicious
distributionofarmsandsuppliestotheMaquis.TheResistancenotonlyhelpedfoolthe
Germans,italsodelayedbyforceofarmsthepassageofmajor
Page321
GermandivisionstotheNormandybattlefield,whichwasalwaystheaimof
FORTITUDEdelaytheGermanreinforcements.
SuccessinFORTITUDEowedmuchtoGeneralPattonandhisactingabilities.Hemade
thewhollyfictionalFUSAGseemreal.washelpedbystagehandswhocouldcreate,out
ofnothingbutcardboardandplywoodandsomeglueandnails,oildepotsandtank
divisionsandbarracksandwhateverelseonemightwant.Hewasalsoaidedbythose
overageBritishandAmericanofficers,spreadaboutScotlandandtheeastcoast,
constantlysignalingtoeachotherontheradiotohurryupwiththeskibindingsorget
readyforGeneralPatton'sinspectionorsendmoremapsofthePasdeCalaiscoastline.A
boringtask,butoneofthosedulljobsthat,hadtherebeenoneslipupovertheradio,
couldhaveledtodisaster.
TherecouldhavebeennoFORTITUDEwithouttheBritishSecretServiceandthe
Double-CrossSystem.Garbo'smessageofJune5,warninghisGermancontrollerthat
OVERLORDwascoming,andhismessageofJune9,inwhichhearguedthatthereal
invasionwouldcomelateratthePasdeCalais,mayhavebeenthetwomostimportant
messagesofthewar.
Obviously,IkehadnopersonalcontactwithGarboorBrutusoranyoftheotherturned
spies,orwiththeradioofficersinScotland,orwiththepeopleofBP,althoughhe
commendedthemall.
Buthewasgratefultothemall,justashewastothosewhowereintimatelyinvolvedwith
SHAEF,orthosehesawonadailyorweeklybasis-suchmenasBedellSmithand
KennethStrongandOmarBradley,andofcourseMonty.
Ofallthosewhowerepartofthe"we,"WinstonChurchillsurelystoodtall.Hehad
cooperatedhandsomelyontheDiplomaticBan,withsuchdistastefultasksasmoving
Britishcitizensoutoftheirhomes,andincountlessotherways,buthisrealcontribution
wastheunfailingsupporthegavetoBP,totheDouble-CrossSystem,andtoalltheother
ranksintheBattleofWits.
OVERLORDpittedthebestGermanyhadtoofferagainstthebesttheUnitedStatesand
theUnitedKingdomhadtooffer.ItwasChurchillandRooseveltvs.Hitler,Eisenhower
vs.Rundstcdt,Bradleyvs.Rommel,AmericansergeantsandBritishprivatesvs.their
Germancounterparts.Inasense,OVERLORDpittedtheGermaneducationalsystem
againstthedemocraticeducationalsystem.
Page322
TheAllieswon.TheywonmostofallbecauseofthesuccessofFORTITUDEand
OVERLORD,whichinturndependedonaculture,apoliticalsystem,atradition,abelief,
anunderstandingofwhatdemocracyisandwhatitmeans.Thatkindofunderstanding
andcommitmentcomeonlywhenthethreattodemocracyisrealandperceived,butwhen
itdoescome,itisanawesomething.
FORTITUDErequiredtrustamongtheparticipants,upanddowntheline,akindoftrust
thatsimplydidnotexistinNaziGermany.NearlyeverygeneralintheWehrmachtknew
ofthevariousplotstokillHitler,whiledozensofthegeneralswereactivelyinvolved.Not
asingleoneofthemwenttoHitlerwiththeinformation.SuchasituationintheAllied
worldisunimaginable.
Peoplewhodonottrusteachother,orbelieveinthecausetheyarefightingfor,cannot
equaltheeffortmadebythepeopleinBletchleyPark,atStrong'sG-2,amongtheFrench
ResistanceandtheBritishSecretService,andthroughoutIke'scommand.
FORTITUDEandOVERLORDweretriumphsforWesterndemocracy.Ithinkthatis
whatIkehadinhismindwhenhewouldgrinthatwonderfulgrinandslaphisthighand
exclaim,"ByGod,wereallyfooledthem,didn'twe!"
IfsuchatestofWesterndemocracyevercomesagain,itisthatspiritthatwecanandwill
drawupontodefendourselves.
Page323
NOTES
ChapterOne
1.ThewholesecretwarismagnificentlydescribedinR.V.Jones,TheWizardWar.
2.Ibid.,p.215.
3.AnthonyCaveBrown,BodyguardofLies,andRonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar:The
SecretStory,arebasicsourcesonULTRA.
4.Brown,Bodyguard,p.22.
5.Lewin,Ultra,p.248.
6.InterviewwithFilby.
7.Jones,WizardWar,pp.139,204.
8.Lewin,Ultra,p.281.
9.AdolphG.Rosengarten,Jr.,"WithUltrafromOmahaBeachtoWeimar,Germanya
PersonalView,"MilitaryAffairs,vol.XLII(October1978),p.129.
10.PatrickBeesly,VerySpecialIntelligence:TheStoryoftheAdmiralty'sIntelligence
Centre,1939-1945,p.69.
11.F.W.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.135.
12.Lewin,Ultra,p.19.
ChapterTwo
1.AlfredD.Chandler,ed.,ThePapersofDwightD.Eisenhower:TheWarYears,p.545.
HereinaftercitedasEisenhowerPapers.
2.RobertMurphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,pp.102-3;HarryButcher,MyThreeYears
withEisenhower,pp.105-10;StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWar
YearsofDwightD.Eisenhower,pp.98-99;DwightD.Eisenhower,CrusadeinEurope,
pp.86-87;ArthurFunk,ThePoliticsofTorch,pp.106-9.
3.EisenhowerPapers,pp.253-54.
4.AnthonyCaveBrown,ed.,TheSecretWarReportoftheOSS,pp.42-62.
5.Butcher,MyThreeYears,pp.98-99.
6.EisenhowerPapers,p.448.
7.EisenhowerPapers,pp.562-63;Funk,PoliticsofTorch,p.107;Murphy,Diplomat
AmongWarriors,p.106.
Page324
8.EisenhowerPapers,p.699.
9.Butcher,MyThreeYears,p.106.
10.RayCline,Secrets,SpiesandSoldiers,pp.44-45.
11.Funk,PoliticsofTorch,p.18.
12.Brown,SecretWarReportoftheOSS,p.135.
13.Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.117.
14.TheOSSreportsonDubreuilareinaMilitaryAttachéReportofJuly13,1944,from
Madrid,RecordGroupNo.3020,inModernMilitaryRecords,NationalArchives;andin
reportNo.MFT3.3.,June19,1944,RecordGroupNo.3700,inibid.,andinRichard
HarrisSmith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirstCentralIntelligenceAgency,p.
40;seealsoMurphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.116.
15.Funk,PoliticsofTorch,p.89;Smith,OSS,p.51.
16.Smith,OSS,pp.42-43;Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.92.
17.Smith,OSS,pp.43-44.
18.EisenhowerPapers,pp.469-71.
19.Brown,SecretWarReportoftheOSS,p.134.
20.Ibid.,pp.140-42.
21.Smith,OSS,p.57.
22.EisenhowerPapers,p.590.
23.Butcher,MyThreeYears,pp.106-7.
24.Funk,PoliticsofTorch,pp.106-7;Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.104;
Butcher,MyThreeYears,pp.108-9.
25.ThedocumentisinRecordGroupNo.226,OSS,Entry5,cables,ModernMilitary
Records,NationalArchives.
26.WinstonChurchill,TheHingeofFate,p.630.
27.Funk,PoliticsofTorch,p.21.
28.Butcher,MyThreeYears,p.110;Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.105;
Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander,pp.100-1.
29.EisenhowerPapers,p.567.
ChapterThree
1.MarkClark,CalculatedRisk,p.66.
2.ArthurFunk,ThePoliticsofTorch,pp.133-34;RobertMurphy,DiplomatAmong
Warriors,p.118;HarryButcher,MyThreeYearswithEisenhower,pp.144-47;Clark,
CalculatedRisk,p.67;StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYears
ofDwightD.Eisenhower,pp.105-6;Smith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirst
CentralIntelligenceAgency,p.58.
3.InterviewwithEisenhower,October7,1965;Clark,CalculatedRisk,pp.67-68.
4.Clark,CalculatedRisk,pp.71-72.
5.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.106.
6.Butcher,MyThreeYears,pp.147-54.
7.Ibid.,pp.152-57;Clark,CalculatedRisk,pp.73-89.
8.Clark,CalculatedRisk,p.90.
9.DwightD.Eisenhower,CrusadeinEurope,p.88.
10.ThebestdiscussionisinFunk,PoliticsofTorch,pp.149-59.
11.Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.120.
12.Ibid.,pp.120-21.
Page325
13.EisenhowerPapers,p.666.
14.EisenhowerPapers,pp.668-69;Ambrose,SupremeCommander,pp.113-15.
15.Brown,SecretHistoryoftheOSS,pp.143-45.
16.RonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar:TheSecretStory,p.244.
17.EisenhowerPapers,p.606.
18.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.117.
ChapterFour
1.EisenhowerPapers,p.677.
2.EisenhowerPapers,p.680.
3.EisenhowerPapers,p.693.
4.StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYearsofDwightD.
Eisenhower,pp.116-17.
5.DetailsareavailableinasecretOSSReport,M.I.9(R.P.S.),1218,January20,1943,in
ModernMilitaryBranch,NationalArchives.
6.HarryButcher'sdiary,November8,1942,inEisenhowerManuscripts,Abilene,Kansas.
7.EisenhowerPapers,pp.686-88.
8.EisenhowerPapers,p.699.
9.Butcher'sdiary,November13,1942.
10.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.123.
11.ArthurFunk,ThePoliticsofTorch,p.255.
12.EisenhowerPapers,p.711.
13.Funk,PoliticsofTorch,p.252.
14.EisenhowerPapers,p.707.
15.Foratypicaltext,seeRG226,RecordsoftheOSS,#28564,November11,1942,
ModernMilitaryRecords,NationalArchives.
16.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,pp.130-32.
17.InterviewwithMiltonStoverEisenhower.
18.Ibid.
19.Ibid.
20.RobertMurphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,pp.150-51.
21.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.134.
22.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,048.
23.HaroldMacmillan,TheBlastofWar,p.174.
24.Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.143.
25.RichardHarrisSmith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirstCentral
IntelligenceAgency,p.64.
26.Ibid.,pp.62-65.
27.Rosfelder'sremarkablestoryisinanobscurememopublicationcalledTodayin
France(No.99,January1972),thenewsletteroftheSocietyofFrench-AmericanAffairs
inNewYorkCity.IwanttothankDr.ArthurFunkforbringingthisdocumenttomy
attention.
28.NewYorkTimes,December26,27,and28,1942.
29.Butcher'sdiary,December26,1942.
30.Ibid.
31.M.R.D.Foottoauthor,February26,1979;author'spossession.
32.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.148;Newsweek,January4,1943.
33.TodayinFrance,No.99,January-February1972.
Page326
34.Newsweek,January4,1943.
35.NewYorkTimes,December26,1942.
36.Smith,OSS,p.64.
37.EisenhowerPapers,p.869;ArthurFunk,CharlesdeGaulle-TheCrucialYears,pp.
61-62.
38.EisenhowerPapers,p.870.
39.Smith,OSS,p.65.
40.LondonTimes,December30and31,1942,andJanuary1,1943;evidentlytheTimes
didnothaveamaninAlgiers,forittookitsstoriesfromCharlesCollingwood'sradio
broadcasts.
41.SeedocumentXL6203,RecordGroup226,RecordsoftheOSS,ModernMilitary
Branch,NationalArchives.
42.Smith,OSS,pp.65-66.
43.Letter,Collingwoodtoauthor,September13,1978,author'spossession.
44.PeterTompkins,TheMurderofAdmiralDarlan:AStudyinConspiracy,pp.270-71.
45.Ibid.
46.ThefullmessageisinU.S.Dept.ofState,ForeignRelationsoftheU.S.,Diplomatic
Papers,1943,6vols.,Washington,1963-65,vol.II,Europe,pp.23-24.
47.XL923,RecordGroup226,RecordsoftheOSS,June19,1944,inModernMilitary
Branch,NationalArchives.
48.Ibid.
49.Tompkins,MurderofDarlan,pp.270-71.
50.Murphy,DiplomatAmongWarriors,p.143.
51.Tompkins,MurderofDarlan,p.272.
52.Clark,CalculatedRisk,p.130.
53.Butcher'sdiary,January4,1943.
ChapterFive
1.MartinBlumenson,KasserinePass,pp.1-71;StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupreme
Commander:TheWarYearsofDwightD.Eisenhower,pp.167-69.
2.DwightD.Eisenhower,CrusadeinEurope,pp.141-47.
3.Blumenson,Kasserine,pp.94-95;Eisenhower,Crusade,p.142.
4.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.170.
5.Blumenson,Kasserine,p.163.
6.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.171.
7.EisenhowerPapers,p.969.Afterthisbookhadgonetothegalleyproofstage,Michael
Footinformedmethatitwasallacover.Mockler-Ferrymanhadcorrectlypickedupfrom
Ultratheimpendingattack,buttheAmericancorpscommanderwouldnotlisten.Ike
firedtheAmericangeneral.TogivebalanceforthesakeofAnglo-Americanrelations,he
also"fired"theMock,sendingthemessagetoMarshall,quotedaboveinalow-level
cipherinthehopetheGermanswouldpickitup.Accordingtothecoverstory,theMock
returnedtoLondonindisgrace,wherehetookupworkwiththeBoyScouts.Infact,he
becameheadoftheSpecialOperationsExecutive(SOE)thatrantheFrenchResistance.
8.EisenhowerPapers,p.971.
Page327
9.HarryButcher'sdiary,February20,1943;seealsoRonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar:
TheSecretStory,pp.273-74.
10.HaroldDeutsch,"TheInfluenceofUltraonWorldWarII,"inParameters:Journalof
theU.S.ArmyWarCollege,Vol.VIII(December1978),p.6.
11.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,034.
12.Butcher'sdiary,February20,1943.
13.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,014.
14.RonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar,pp.311,370.
15.Ibid.,p.280.
16.F.W.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.158.
17.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,249.
18.EisenhowerPapers,pp.1,253-54.
19.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.281;letter,Gavintoauthor,March26,1979.Gavin
admittedthatonlyBritishsix-pounderswouldhavedonethejob,andtheywerenot
readilyavailable.
20.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,pp.248-49.
21.Marshall'slettertoEisenhowerofMarch15,1944,isinModernMilitaryRecords,
NationalArchives.
22.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.250.
23.AdolphG.Rosengarten,Jr.,"WithUltrafromOmahaBeachtoWeimar,GermanyA
PersonalView,"inMilitaryAffairs,vol.XLII(October1978),p.131.
24."SynthesisofExperiencesintheUseofUltraIntelligencebyU.S.ArmyField
CommandsintheEuropeanTheaterofOperations,"RecordGroup457,ModernMilitary
Records,NationalArchives.
25.Ibid.
26.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.262.
27.AnthonyCaveBrown,ed.,TheSecretWarReportoftheOSS,pp.189-90.
28.Ibid.,pp.190-91;RichardHarrisSmith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirst
CentralIntelligenceAgency,p.86.
29.Smith,OSS,p.105.
30.Ibid.,p.86;Brown,ed.,SecretWarReportofOSS,p.191.
31.Brown,ed.,SecretWarReportofOSS,pp.192-93.
32.Smith,OSS,pp.88-89.
33.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,pp.164-65;Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.281.
34.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,pp.270-71.
35.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.283.
36.Ibid.,pp.285-86;Deutsch,"TheInfluenceofUltra...,"p.9.
ChapterSix
1.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,673.
2.AnthonyCaveBrown,BodyguardofLies,p.426.
3.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,656;DwightD.Eisenhower,AtEase:StoriesITelltoFriends,
p.269.
4.Brown,BodyguardofLies,p.409.
5.J.C.Masterman,TheDouble-CrossSystemintheWarof1939-1945,p.xiv.
Page328
6.Ibid.,p.145.
7.EarlZiemke,"OperationKreml:Deception,Strategy,andtheFortunesofWar,"
Parameters;JournaloftheU.S.ArmyWarCollege,Vol.IX(March1979),pp.72-81.
8.HarryButcher'sdiary,May12,1944;EisenhowertoSwedeHazlett,January23,1956,
DwightD.Eisenhower,PapersasPresident,1953-1961(WhitmanFile),DiarySeries,
"1956,Misc.(2),"EisenhowerLibrary,Abilene,Kansas.(HereaftercitedasDwightD.
EisenhowerLibrary).
9.Brown,BodyguardofLies,p.436.
10.DavidKahn,Hitler'sSpies:GermanMilitaryIntelligenceinWorldWarII,pp.48889.
11.Brown,BodyguardofLies,p.464.
12.Ibid.,p.465.
13.Ibid.,pp.466-67;Masterman,Double-Cross,pp.150-56.
14.Brown,BodyguardofLies,p.472;RonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.333.
15.Masterman,Double-Cross,p.146.
16.EisenhowertoMarshall,September20,1943,EisenhowerPapers,p.1,439.
17.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,840;StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:The
WarYearsofDwightD.Eisenhower,pp.343-45.
18.Butcher'sdiary,June12,1943.
19.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,853;ForrestC.Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,AppendixA,
"SHAEFandthePress."
20.SirKennethStrong,IntelligenceattheTop:TheRecollectionsofanIntelligence
Officer,p.118.
21.Ibid.,p.182.
22.Masterman,Double-Cross,p.156.
23.Kahn,Hitler'sSpies,p.496.
24.G-2EstimateoftheEnemyBuildUpAgainstOVERLORD,May5,1944,SHAEFSGS
350.09/3,RecordGroup331,ModernMilitaryRecords,NationalArchives.
25.Ibid.SeealsoGermanAppreciationofAlliedIntentionsRegardingOVERLORD,May
29,1944,SHAEFSGS350.09/2,RecordGroup331,ModernMilitaryRecords,National
Archives.
26.Ibid.
27.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,746.
28.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,761-62;Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.402.
29.EisenhowerPapers,p.1,814;Ambrose,SupremeCommander,pp.401-2;Kahn,
Hitler'sSpies,p.507.
30.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.403.
31.Ibid.,p.404;Brown,BodyguardofLies,pp.532-33.
32.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.403.
33.Brown,BodyguardofLies,pp.540-41.
34.LeslieGroves,NowItCanBeTold-TheStoryoftheManhattanProject,pp.199-206;
EisenhowerPapers,pp.1,859-60.
35.DwightD.Eisenhower,CrusadeinEurope,p.249.
36.Kahn,Hitler'sSpies,p.615.
37.EisenhowerPapers,pp.1,894-95.
Page329
ChapterSeven
1.J.M.Stagg,ForecastforOverlord,p.67.
2.DavidKahn,Hitler'sSpies:GermanMilitaryIntelligenceinWorldWarII,p.514;J.
C.Masterman,TheDouble-CrossSystemintheWarof1939-1945,pp.156-57.
3.WalterWarlimont,InsideHitler'sHeadquarters,p.422;AnthonyCaveBrown,
BodyguardofLies,p.639.
4.Masterman,Double-Cross,pp.156-57;Kahn,Hitler'sSpies,pp.515-16.
5.RonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.317;Masterman,Double-Cross,p.157;Kahn,
Hitler'sSpies,p.515.
6.Masterman,Double-Cross,pp.160-61.
7.ThesesummariesareallinSHAEFSGS350.09/2,RecordGroup331,ModernMilitary
Records,NationalArchives.
8.Masterman,Double-Cross,pp.158-59.
9.Ibid.,p.163.
10.RichardHarrisSmith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirstCentral
IntelligenceAgency,p.163.
11.AnthonyCaveBrown,ed.,TheSecretWarReportoftheOSS,p.399.
12.EisenhowerPapers,pp.1,927,1,932.
13.Brown,ed.,SecretWarReportofOSS,p.403;Smith,OSS,p.175.
14.Smith,OSS,p.179.
15.EisenhowerPapers,pp.1,771,1,852,1,857.
16.M.R.D.Foot,SOEinFrance:AnAccountoftheWorkoftheBritishSpecial
OperationsinFrance,p.350.
17.Brown,Bodyguard,p.567;Brown,ed.,SecretWarReportofOSS,p.391.
18."AFHQHistoryofSpecialOperations,"MTO1942-45,inModernMilitaryRecords,
NationalArchives.
19.Foot,SOE,p.389.
20.Ibid.,p.398.
21.Brown,ed.,SecretWarReportofOSS,p.459.
22.Foot,SOE,p.399.
23.Brown,ed.,SecretWarReportofOSS,p.453.
24.ReportbytheSupremeCommandertotheCCSonOperationsinEuropeofthe
AlliedExpeditionaryForce(London,1946),pp.52-53.
25.EisenhowerPapers,pp.1,926,1,932.
26.ForrestC.Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,pp.236-37.
27.QuotedinFoot,SOE,pp.441-42.Footadds,"Itisimpossibletooverlookthecontrast
[withMontgomery].Resistanceisbarelymentionedineitherofthevolumesinwhich
Montgomeryrecountsthetriumphsthat,butforresistance,wouldnothavebeensoeasily
won."
28.Wainwrightinterview.
29.Ibid.
ChapterEight
1.StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYearsofDwightD.
Eisenhower,pp.459-60.
2.F.W.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.200.
Page330
3.Ibid.,p.199.
4.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.466.
5.InterviewwithEisenhower.
6.MartinBlumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.460.
7.RonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.337.
8.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.215.
9.ArthurW.Tedder,WithPrejudice:TheWarMemoirsofMarshalloftheAirForce,
LordTedder,p.575;OmarN.Bradley,ASoldier'sStory,pp.369-72;EisenhowerPapers,
pp.2,059-60.
10.Blumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.461.
11.Ibid.,pp.462-63.
12.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.339.
13.Blumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.464.
14.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.220.
15.Blumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.464.
16.Ibid.,p.465.
17.Ibid.,p.474;Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.227,writes,''Ithadbeenanepic
story.TheULTRAsignalsbetweenHitlerandvonKlugewhichleduptotheBattleof
FalaiseandthedestructionofalargepartoftheGermanArmyintheWestwereprobably
ULTRA'Sgreatesttriumph."
18.HarryButcher'sdiary,August5,1944.
19.Winterbotham,TheUltraSecret,p.221;Blumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.481.In
Montgomery'sdefense,itshouldbenotedthataheavyairbombardmentprecededthe
Canadianattackanditwouldhavebeendifficulttorescheduletheparticipationofthe
bombers.Difficult,butnotimpossible.
20.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,pp.473-75.
21.Blumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.491.
22.EisenhowerPapers,p.2,060.
23.Butcher'sdiary,August16,1944;Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.477.
24.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,pp.476-77.
25.Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.345.
26.Blumenson,BreakoutandPursuit,p.558.
27.U.S.MilitaryAcademy,DepartmentofMilitaryArtandEngineering,WestPointAtlas
ofAmericanWars,vol.II,map55.
28.AdolphG.Rosengarten,Jr.,"WithUltrafromOmahaBeachtoWeimar,GermanyA
PersonalView,"inMilitaryAffairs,vol.XLII(October1978),p.129.
ChapterNine
1.SirKennethStrong,IntelligenceattheTop:TheRecollectionsofanIntelligence
Officer,p.112.
2.StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYearsofDwightD.
Eisenhower,p.339.
3.Strong,Intelligence,p.176.
4.Ibid.,p.116.
5.EisenhowerPapers,p.944;interviewwithEisenhower.
6.Strong,Intelligence,p.117.
Page331
7.Strong,Intelligence,p.176.
8.Ibid.,p.114.
9.InterviewwithEisenhower.
10.Strong,Intelligence,p.135.
11.Ibid.,p.230.
12.OmarN.Bradley,ASoldier'sStory,p.416.
13.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.518.
14.RonaldLewin,UltraGoestoWar,p.347.
15.Ibid.,p.348.
16.InterviewwithStrong;CorneliusRyan,ABridgeTooFar,p.104.
17.Ryan,BridgeTooFar,p.105.
18.Ibid.,p.131.
19.Ibid.,p.130;Strong,Intelligence,p.202.
20.InterviewwithEisenhower.
21.Ryan,BridgeTooFar,p.130.
22.Ibid.,pp.130-31.
23.Ibid.,p.517.
24.Strongtoauthor,March19,1979.
25.Strong,Intelligence,p.202.
ChapterTen
1.ThisaccountofGermanpreparationsfortheBulgeisbasedonPeterElstob,Hitler's
LastOffensive,pp.46-50,andJohnS.D.Eisenhower,TheBitterWoods,andRonald
Lewin,UltraGoestoWar,pp.355-57.
2.HarryButcher'sdiary,December16,1944.
3.EisenhowerPapers,p.2,350.
4.AdolphG.Rosengarten,Jr.,"WithUltra...,"MilitaryAffairsvol.XLII(October
1978),p.130.
5.Ibid.,p.129.
6.Strongtoauthor,March19,1979.
7.EisenhowerPapers,p.2,329.
8.EisenhowerPapers,p.2,335.
9.Rosengarten,"WithUltra,"p.132.
10.StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYearsofDwightD.
Eisenhower,p.554;ForrestC.Pogue,TheSupremeCommand,pp.361-65.
11.Pogue,SupremeCommand,pp.361-65.
12.Rosengarten,"WithUltra,"p.130.
13.PatrickBeesly,VerySpecialIntelligence:TheStoryoftheAdmiralty'sIntelligence
Centre,1939-1945,pp.242-43.
14.Rosengarten,"WithUltra,"p.130.
15.RichardHarrisSmith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirstCentral
IntelligenceAgency,p.225.
16.EisenhowerPapers,p.2,117.
17.Butcher'sdiary,December23,1944.
18.Strongtoauthor,March19,1979.
19.Ambrose,SupremeCommander,p.558.
20.Butcher'sdiary,December23,1944.
21.SirKennethStrong,IntelligenceattheTop:TheRecollectionsofanIntelligence
Officer,p.233.
Page332
22.Rosengarten,"WithUltra,"p.131.
23.Strong,Intelligence,p.245.
24.Rosengarten'sreportispartofaseries,"ReportsbyU.S.ArmyULTRA
RepresentativeswithArmyFieldCommandsintheEuropeanTheaterofOperations,"
RecordGroup457,N.S.A.,SHH-023Part1,ModernMilitaryRecords,National
Archives.
25.Ibid.
26.Buck'sreportisinibid.
27.Rood'sreportisinibid.
28.Fellers'reportisinibid.
29.Talbert'sreportisinibid.
30.CorneliusRyan,TheLastBattle,p.210.
31.Ibid.,p.212.
32.Quotedinibid.,p.213.
33.StephenE.Ambrose,EisenhowerandBerlin:TheDecisiontoHaltattheElbe,pp.
75-76.
34.Quotedinibid.,p.75;seealso,RodneyG.Minott,TheFortressThatNeverWas.
35.SirKennethStrong,MenofIntelligence,p.124.
36.QuotedbyRosengarteninhisreporttoTaylor.
ChapterEleven
1.StephenE.Ambrose,TheSupremeCommander:TheWarYearsofDwightD.
Eisenhower,p.325.
2.Eisenhowerdiary,EisenhowerLibrary,Abilene,Kansas.
3.Ibid.
4.HerbertF.York,TheAdvisers:Oppenheimer,Teller,andTheSuperbomb,pp.31-37.
5.PolicyPlanningStaffPaperNo.32,January10,1948,ModernMilitaryRecords,
NationalArchives.
6.Eisenhowerdiary.
7.Ibid.
ChapterTwelve
1.RichardHarrisSmith,OSS:TheSecretHistoryofAmerica'sFirstIntelligenceAgency,
p.363.
2.Ibid.,p.20.
3.Ibid.,p.363.
4.Ibid.,p.364.
5.Ibid.,p.364.
6.FinalReportoftheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmentalOperationsWith
RespecttoIntelligenceActivities,U.S.Senate,bookIV,SenateReportNo.94-755,94th
Congress,2dsession,pp.6-9.HereinaftercitedasChurchCommittee.
7.Ibid.,p.12.
8.Ibid.,p.13.
9.Ibid.,p.31.
10.EdmondTaylor,AwakeningFromHistory,p.350,asquotedinSmith,OSS,p.361.
Page333
11.FrancisP.Miller,MenFromtheValley,asquotedinSmith,OSS,p.362.
12.WashingtonPost,December22,1963;thereisagooddiscussioninDavidWiseand
ThomasRoss,TheInvisibleGovernment,pp.95-98.
13.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.31.
14.HarryRositzke,TheCIA'sSecretOperations:Espionage,Counterespionage,and
CovertAction,pp.186-87.
15.WiseandRoss,InvisibleGovernment,pp.96-97.
16.QuotedinHerbertFeis,FromTrusttoTerror:TheOnsetoftheColdWar,p.296.
17.Rositzke,CIA'sSecretOperations,p.23.
18.Ibid.,p.53.
19.Huntinterview.
20.Smith,OSS,p.367.
21.Ibid.,p.367;WilliamBuckleyandL.BrantBozell,McCarthyandHisEnemies.
22.Eisenhowerinterview.
23.Ibid.
24.Macomberinterview;Huntinterview;Bissellinterview.
25.SirKennethStrong,MenofIntelligence,pp.124-25.
26.Andersoninterview.
27.Strong,MenofIntelligence,p.135.
28.ThomasBraden,"I'mGladtheCIAis'Immoral,'"SaturdayEveningPost,May20,
1967,asquotedinSmith,OSS,pp.368-69.
29.AccordingtotheChurchCommittee,whichinvestigatedtheCIAinthemid-seventies,
"duringtheearly1950'stheCIAattractedsomeofthemostablelawyers,academicians,
andyoung,committedactivistsinthecountry."ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.43.
30.Smith,OSS,p.369.
31.Ibid.,pp.370-71.
32.Bissellinterview.
33.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,pp.31-32.
34.Ibid.,pp.33-36.
35.VictorMarchettiandJohnMarks,TheCIAandtheCultofIntelligence,pp.46-47.
36.Ibid.,p.47.
37.TomBraden,"What'sWrongwiththeCIA?"SaturdayReview,April5,1975,as
quotedinChurchCommittee,bookI,p.547.
38.Rositzke,CIA'sSecretOperations,p.151.
39.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.40.
40.Forabalancedandinsightfulessayontheroleofintelligenceinthemodernworld,
thebestthisauthorhasread,seeM.R.D.Foot,"IntelligenceServices,"TheEconomist
(London),March15,1980.
ChapterThirteen
1.ThissectionisbasedoninterviewswithEisenhowerandonDwightD.Eisenhower,
MandateforChange,pp.223-25.
2.Brownellinterview.
3.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.225,reprintstheseletters;theoriginals,toJohnEisenhower,
June16,1953,andtoMiller,June10,1953,areintheEisenhowerLibraryinAbilene.
Page334
4.QuotedinHerbertParmet,EisenhowerandtheAmericanCrusades,p.386.
5.LewisStrauss,MenandDecisions,p.356.
6.Parmet,Eisenhower,p.387.
7.Strauss,MenandDecisions,p.268;Eisenhower,Mandate,p.311.
8.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.311,reprintsthisdiaryentry.
9.Parmet,Eisenhower,p.344;Strauss,MenandDecisions,pp.281-91.
10.EisenhowertoStrauss,June16,1954,EisenhowerLibrary,Abilene;Eisenhower,
Mandate,p.313.
11.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.312.
12.Wainwrightinterview.
13.QuotedinBookIV,FinalReportoftheSelectCommitteetoStudyGovernmental
OperationswithRespecttoIntelligenceActivities,U.S.Senate,SenateReportNo.94755,94thCongress,2dSession,pages52-53.
ChapterFourteen
1.KermitRoosevelt,Countercoup:TheStrugglefortheControlofIran,pp.155-57.
Shortlyafteritspublication,McGraw-Hillwithdrewfromcirculation,untilalater
unspecifieddate,thismemoiroftheCIA'sprojecttooverthrowMossadegh.Accountsof
thewithdrawalinTheWallStreetJournal(November6,1979)andtheNewYorkTimes
(November10,1979)quoteMcGraw-Hill'spublicitydirector,DonaldRubin,as
explainingthattherecallwasdueto"defectiveproductionanderrata"and"...problems
ofaccuracyatthetimeofshipping."BotharticlesemphasizedthatRoosevelt'svolume
hadclearedthemandatoryCIAreview,and,althoughthereisnodirectevidencethatthe
BritishPetroleumCompanyinfluencedMcGraw-Hill'sdecision,thesenewsreports
assumedthatBPhadobjectedstronglytotheformerCIAoperative'sallegationthatthe
Anglo-IranianOilCompanyBP'spredecessorcompanyhadinitiallyproposedthecoup.
SincethischapterintheCIA'shistorycannotberelatedaccuratelywithoutRoosevelt's
information,hisworkCountercoupisbeingcitedhere.
2.ThemostarticulatecriticofRezaKhan'sdecisiontoassumethethronewas
MohammedMossadegh,thenamemberoftheIranianParliament.MarvinZonis,The
PoliticalEliteofIran,p.19.
3.Seeibid.,p.21,andMohammedRezaShahPahlavi,MissionForMyCountry.pp.49-
65.
4.Pahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,p.80.
5.StephenE.Ambrose,RisetoGlobalism:AmericanForeignPolicySince1938,p.131.
6.DwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange,p.160.
7.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.59.
8.GeorgeLenczowski,RussiaandtheWestinIran,1918-1948,pp.272,313-14.
9.Ibid.,p.312.
10.SharamChubinandSepehrZabih,TheForeignRelationsofIran,p.42.
11.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.87.
12.DeanAcheson,PresentattheCreation,p.503.
Page335
13.Pahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,pp.90-91.
14.LeonardMosley,PowerPlay,p.204,asquotedinRoosevelt,Countercoup,p.87.See
also,RichardCottam,NationalisminIran.
15.Acheson,PresentattheCreation,pp.504,510.
16.Pahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,pp.94-95.
17.Eisenhower,Mandate,pp.160-61.
18.Hendersoninterview.
19.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.107.
20.NewYorkTimes,February25,1953;NashvilleBanner,May21,1954.
21.Pahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,p.97;Eisenhower,Mandate,p.161.
22.Hendersoninterview.
23.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.162.
24.Pahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,p.98;Hendersoninterview.
25.Eisenhowerinterview.
26.Hendersoninterview.
27.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.163.
28.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.8.
29.Ibid.,p.8.
30.RobertAndersoninterview.
31.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.116.
32.Ibid.,pp.11-19.
33.Ibid.,p.94.
34.Hendersoninterview.
35.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.122.
36.EricSevareid,"CBSReports:TheHotandColdWarsofAllenDulles,"CBS-TV,April
26,1962.
37.Roosevelt,Countercoup,pp.148-49.
ChapterFifteen
1.NewYorkTimes,August11,1953.
2.KermitRoosevelt,Countercoup:TheStrugglefortheControlofIran,p.170.
3.DwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange,p.164.
4.Roosevelt,Countercoup,pp.171-72.
5.MohammedRezaShahPahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,p.100.
6.ThisreconstructionisbasedontheNewYorkTimesreportsandPahlavi,MissionFor
MyCountry,p.101,andRoosevelt,Countercoup,pp.175-79.
7.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.179.
8.Ibid.,pp.182-85.
9.Hendersoninterview.
10.NewYorkTimes,August19,1953.
11.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.166.
12.Ibid.,pp.186-87;Hendersoninterview.
13.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.188.
14.Ibid.,pp.190-91.
15.Ibid.,pp.192-93.
16.Pahlavi,MissionForMyCountry,p.103.
17.NewYorkTimes,August20,1953.
18.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.18.
Page336
19.NewYorkTimes,August21,1953.
20.Ibid.
21.Ibid.
22.Roosevelt,Countercoup,p.199.
23.Ibid.,p.209.
24.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.164.
25.Hendersoninterview.
26.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.166.
27.Harwoodinterview.
ChapterSixteen
1.AndrewTully,TheCIA:TheInsideStory,pp.62-64;Huntinterview;JamesHagerty
diary,May20,1954,EisenhowerLibrary,Abilene,Kansas;RichardandGladysHarkness,
"TheMysteriousDoingsoftheCIA,"SaturdayEveningPost,October30,1954.
2.NewYorkTimes,May19,1954;DwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange,p.424.
3.KeithMonroe,"Guatemala,WhattheRedsLeftBehind,"Harper'sMagazine,vol.211
(July1955),pp.60-65.
4.DwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange,p.424.
5.Quotedinibid.,pp.422-23.
6.Huntinterview.
7.WalterPayne,"TheGuatemalanRevolution,1944-1954,"PacificHistorian,vol.17,no.
1(1973),p.3.
8.ThomasP.McCann,AnAmericanCompany:TheTragedyofUnitedFruit,p.45;
ThomasandMarjorieMelville,Guatemala;ThePoliticsofLandOwnership;StacyMay
andG.Plaza,TheUnitedFruitCompanyinLatinAmerica.
9.Payne,"GuatemalanRevolution,"p.11.
10.Ibid.,pp.14-15;LouisMcDermott,"Guatemala,1954:InterventionorAggression?"
RockyMountainSocialScienceJournal,vol.9,no.1(1972),p.79.
11.FBIreportstotheStateDepartmentarequiteextensiveandhadremainedclosedtothe
publicuntilwerequestedtheybedeclassifiedundertheFreedomofInformationAct.The
documentscanbefoundinthecorrespondencebetweenHooverandFrederickB.Lyons
intheNA814.00Bfile.
12.TapleyBennett,StateDepartmentmemorandum,"SomeAspectsofCommunist
PenetrationinGuatemala,"March23,1950,inCarrolltonPress,Inc.,TheDeclassified
DocumentsQuarterly,vol.I,no.3(January1975),p.179B.
13.U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeonForeignAffairs,92dCongress,2d
Session(October10,1972),Inter-AmericanAffairs,p.131.
14.McDermott,"Guatemala,"p.14.
15.Huntinterview.
16.Payne,"GuatemalanRevolution,"p.18.
17.MaxGordon,"HistoryofU.S.Subversion:Guatemala,1954,"ScienceandSociety,
vol.XXXV,no.2(1971),p.142.
Page337
18.Eisenhower,Mandate,p.421.
19.RichardPatterson,draftofspeechtoRotaryClub,March24,1950,PattersonPapers,
boxfive,TrumanLibrary,Independence,Missouri.
20.Huntinterview.
21.U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,SubcommitteeonLatinAmericaoftheSelect
CommitteeonCommunistAggression,NinthInterimReport,CommunistAggressionin
LatinAmerica,p.124.
22.U.S.DepartmentofState,AmericanForeignPolicy,1950-1955,BasicDocuments,
vol.I,p.1,310.
23.Bissellinterview.
24.MuchofthisinformationisfromtheappropriatevolumesofWho'sWhoinAmerica.
Seealso,FrederickJ.Cook,"TheCIA,"TheNation,vol.192(June24,1961),pp.53741.
25.EisenhowertoAlfredGruenther,November30,1954,DwightD.Eisenhower,
"November,1954";EisenhowertoWilliamRobinson,August4,1954,DwightD.
Eisenhower,"August,1954."
26.Bissellinterview;Huntinterview.
27.Huntinterview;SpruilleBradeninterview;MiguelYdigorasFuentes,MyWarWith
Communism,p.50.
28.Bissellinterview.
29.Goodpasterinterview.
30.HuntandBissellinterviews.
31.Huntinterview.
32.Huntinterview.
33.HispanicAmericanReport,vol.VII(July1954),pp.11-12;NewYorkTimes,June16,
1954.
34.NewYorkTimes,May23,June19,1954;Bissellinterview.
35.Bissellinterview.
36.USIA,"ReportonActionsTakenbytheU.S.InformationAgencyintheGuatemalan
Situation,"Secret,August2,1954,NA714.00/8-254.
37.U.S.DepartmentofState,TenthInter-AmericanConference,pp.8-9;"Afterthe
Vote,"Time,vol.68(March29,1954),p.32.
38.DavidA.Phillips,NightWatch:TwentyYearsofPeculiarService,pp.40-46;Hunt
interview.
39.NewYorkTimes,June15,1954.
40.Ibid.,June19,1954.
41.QuotedinStephenSchlesinger,"HowDullesWorkedtheCoupd'Etat,"TheNation,
vol.227,no.14(October28,1978),p.441.
42.Goodpasterinterview.
43.FedroGuillen,Guatemala,PrologoyEpilogodeunaRevolución,pp.62-64;Phillips,
NightWatch,pp.43-44.
44.Eisenhower,Mandate,pp.425-26.
45.Quotedinibid.,p.427.
46.Huntinterview.
47.Huntinterview.
48.JohnGerassi,"Introduction,"Venceremos:TheSpeechesandWritingsofChe
Guevara,pp.45-47.
ChapterSeventeen
1.StephenE.Ambrose,RisetoGlobalism:AmericanForeignPolicySince1938,p.252.
Page338
2.Ibid.,p.253.
3.Ibid.,pp.244-45.
4.RayCline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,pp.162-63;NewYorkTimes,November30,
1976;WilliamCorson,TheArmiesofIgnorance,p.367;Huntinterview.
5.Cline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.163.
6.NewYorkTimes,November30,1976;Corson,ArmiesofIgnorance,pp.367-68.
7.Cline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.164.
8.Corson,ArmiesofIgnorance,p.368;NewYorkTimes,June4,1956.
9.Ibid.,pp.369-70.
10.InterviewwithMiltonEisenhower.
11.WilliamColby,HonorableMen:MyLifeintheCIA,pp.134-35.
12.Huntinterview.
13.Corson,ArmiesofIgnorance,p.371.
14.Memorandumofconference,October6,1956,DwightD.Eisenhower,StaffNotes,
"October,1956."
15.Corson,ArmiesofIgnorance,p.382.
16.Grayinterview.
17.Bissellinterview.
18.Cline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.132.
19.Ibid.,p.133.
20.HalperintoldtheChurchCommittee,"IbelievethattheU.S.shouldnolonger
maintainacareerserviceforthepurposeofconductingcovertoperations."Church
Committee,vol.7,p.58.
21.Grayinterview.
22.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.62.
23.MemorandumofaconferencewiththePresident,January19,1957,DwightD.
EisenhowerNotes,"January,1957."
24.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.63.
25.Ibid.,p.62.
26.WashingtonPostofNovember13,1954,andU.S.NewsofMarch19,1954.
27.PentagonPapers,book9,pp.38-41.
28.Ibid.,p.241.
29.Eisenhowerinterview.
30.PentagonPapers,book9,p.244.
31.PentagonPapers,aspublishedbytheNewYorkTimes,July5,1971.
32.PentagonPapers,book9,pp.334-36.
33.PentagonPapers,NewYorkTimes,July5,1971.
34.Ibid.;PentagonPapers,book10,pp.753-55.
35.PentagonPapers,NewYorkTimes,July5,1971.
36.Ibid.
37.DavidWiseandThomasRoss,InvisibleGovernment,pp.157-58.
38.PentagonPapers,book10,pp.776-79.
39.WiseandRoss,InvisibleGovernment,p.140.
40.Ibid.,p.141.
41.VictorMarchettiandJohnMarks,TheCIAandtheCultofIntelligence,p.128;Wise
andRoss,InvisibleGovernment,p.137.
42.PentagonPapers,NewYorkTimes,July5,1971.
43.WiseandRoss,InvisibleGovernment,p.136.
Page339
44.Cline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.182.
ChapterEighteen
1.RayCline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.141.
2.Ibid.,p.142.
3.Ibid.,pp.142-43.
4.Ibid.
5.AndrewTully,CIA:TheInsideStory,p.110.
6.WarrenUnna,"CIA:WhoWatchestheWatchman?"Harper'sMagazine,April,1958.
7.PentagonPapers,book9,p.47.
8.StephenE.Ambrose,RisetoGlobalism:AmericanForeignPolicySince1938,p.232.
9.InterviewwithEisenhower.
10.PentagonPapers,book9,pp.564-65.
11.InterviewwithMatthewRidgway;Ambrose,RisetoGlobalism,p.233.
12.PentagonPapers,book10,p.692.
13.DwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange,p.372.
14.InterviewwithEisenhower.
15.PentagonPapers,book10,p.752.
16.PublicPapersofthePresidents:DDE,1954(Washington,1960),pp.948-49.
17.MarvinKalbandElieAbel,RootsofInvolvement:TheU.S.inAsia,p.102.
18.PentagonPapers,book10,pp.1,190-98.
19.Goodpasterinterview.
20.InterviewwithMiltonEisenhower,BaltimoreSun,September9,1979.
21.Eisenhowerdiary.
ChapterNineteen
1.ThischapterisheavilybasedontwolonginterviewswithRichardBissell,onebythe
ColumbiaUniversityOralHistoryProject,theotherbyRichardImmerman.Allstatements
offactandquotationsnototherwisefootnotedcomefromoneortheotheroftheBissell
interviews.
2.RayCline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.156.
3.Ibid.,p.157.
4.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.59.
5.Cline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.157.
6.DwightD.Eisenhower,MandateforChange,pp.520-21.
7.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.59.
8.Bissell'stestimonyonthesemattersisfullycorroborated,indetail,inseparate
interviewswithJohnEisenhowerandAndrewGoodpaster.
9.Memoofconference,November6,1956,WhitmanFile,EisenhowerLibrary,Abilene,
Kansas.
10.DwightD.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.91.
11.DwightD.Eisenhower,"Phonecalls,12/56."Ikerecorded,orhadMs.Whitemantake
shorthandnotesof,almostallhisphoneconversations.
12.Cline,Secrets,Spies,andScholars,p.158.
13.FrancisGaryPowers,OperationOverflight,pp.308-9.
14.Bissellinterview.
Page340
15.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.301;Goodpasterinterview.
16.BasedonmanydiscussionswithEisenhowerduringinterviews.
17.Goodpasterinterview.
18.QuotedinStephenE.Ambrose,RisetoGlobalism:AmericanForeignPolicySince
1938,p.223.
19.Ibid.
20.DwightD.Eisenhower,''Phonecalls,12/56."
21.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.595.
22.Ibid.,p.601.
ChapterTwenty
1.InterviewwithJohnEisenhower.
2.DwightD.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.546;italicsmine.
3.Bissellinterview.
4.Ibid.
5.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.446.
6.Bissellinterview;Grayinterview.
7.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.546.
8.Ibid.
9.MemorandumofaconferencewiththePresident,July11,1960,Whitmanfile,
EisenhowerLibrary,Abilene,Kansas.
10.Bissellinterview.
11.FrancisGaryPowers,OperationOverflight,p.229.
12.Ibid.,p.353.
13.Bissellinterview;Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.547.
14.Bissellinterview.
15.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.543.
16.Ibid.,p.547.
17.LymanKirkpatrick,TheRealCIA,p.97.
18.Powers,OperationOverflight,p.353.
19.ThetextofKhrushchev'sspeechisintheNewYorkTimes,May6,1960.
20.Ibid.
21.Ibid.,May8,1960.
22.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.549.
23.NewYorkTimes,May8,1960.
24.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.551.
25.NewYorkTimes,May9,1960.
26.Ibid.,May13,1960.
27.Ibid.,May12,1960.
28.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.552.
29.VernonWalters,SilentMissions,p.342.
30.NewYorkTimes,May8,1960.
31.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,pp.558-59.
32.Ibid.,p.553.
33.Walters,SilentMissions,p.341.
34.Ibid.,pp.344-47.
35.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.558.
Page341
36.JamesA.Nathan,"AFragileDétente:TheU-2IncidentRe-examined,"Military
Affairs,vol.XXXIX(October1975),pp.97-103.
37.LosAngelesTimes,August28,1977.
38.Powers,OperationOverflight,p.357.
39.HelmstoJ.EdgarHoover,May13,1964,WarrenCommissionDocument931,
NationalArchives,Washington.
40.HearingBeforetheCommitteeonArmedServices,onFrancisGaryPowers,U.S.
Senate,87thCongress,2dsession,March6,1962.
41.BisselltoImmerman,October29,1979,Immerman'spossession.
ChapterTwenty-One
1.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"pp.14,15.
2.HarryRositzke,TheCIA'sSecretOperations:Espionage,Counterespionage,and
CovertAction,p.197;ThomasPowers,TheManWhoKepttheSecrets:RichardHelms
andtheCIA,pp.145-49.
3.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.51.
4.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.138.
5.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.52.
6.Ibid.,p.64.
7.Goodpasterinterview.
8.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.55.
9.Ibid.,p.60.
10.Grayinterview.
11.NewYorkTimes,December26,1975.
12.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.131.BothWisnerandHunttestifiedtotheChurch
CommitteethattheyknewofnoassassinationmissionsorplanningbyPB/7,beyondthe
generaldiscussionamongPashandothersintheprocessofestablishingOPC.The
capabilitywasthere,butitwasneverused.Pashtestifiedthat"Iwasneveraskedto
undertakesuchplanning."
13.ChurchCommittee,bookIV,p.133.
14.Ibid.
15.ThisdiscussionreliesheavilyonStewartC.Easton,WorldHistorySince1945,pp.
685-91.
16.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.53.
17.Ibid.,p.58.
18.Ibid.
19.Ibid.,p.15.
20.Ibid.
21.Ibid.,pp.16-17.
22.Ibid.,p.19.
23.Ibid.,p.48.
24.Ibid.,pp.64-65.
25.Ibid.,p.66.
26.Ibid.,p.73.
27.Ibid.,pp.73-81;PeterWyden,BayofPigs:TheUntoldStory,pp.40-43.
28.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.72.
Page342
29.Ibid.,p.92.
30.Ibid.,pp.109-11.
31.Ibid.,p.112.
32.Ibid.,pp.112-13.
33.Ibid.,p.113.
34.Ibid.
35.Ibid.,p.115.
36.Ibid.
ChapterTwenty-Two
1.InterviewwithEisenhower.IkeputGoodpasterinacategorywithRobertAnderson
andhisbrotherMilton.
2.Goodpasterinterview.
3.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.92.
4.Ibid.,p.93.
5.PeterWyden,BayofPigs:TheUntoldStory,p.24.
6.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.93.
7.Ibid.
8.Wyden,BayofPigs,p.25.
9.ChurchCommittee,"AllegedAssassinationPlots,"p.93;Wyden,BayofPigs,p.25.
10.DwightD.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.533.
11.Bissellinterview.
12.Ibid.
13.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.537.
14.TaylorReport.ImmediatelyaftertheBayofPigs,PresidentKennedyhadGeneral
MaxwellTaylormakeafullinvestigationandreporttohim.In1977apartofthisreport,
inanexpurgatedform,wasmadeavailabletoscholarsthroughtheJohnF.Kennedy
Library,Boston,Massachusetts.
15.Wyden,BayofPigs,p.31.
16.Ibid.,p.69.
17.Bissellinterview.
18.Ibid.
19.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.534;Wyden,BayofPigs,pp.22-23.
20.Wyden,BayofPigs,p.68;Grayinterview.
21.Bissellinterview.
22.NewYorkTimes,October20,1960.
23.Wyden,BayofPigs,pp.67-68.
24.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.613.
25.Bissellinterview.
26.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.613.
27.Ibid.,p.614.
28.Wyden,BayofPigs,p.69.
29.NewYorkTimes,January10,1961.
30.Wyden,BayofPigs,p.73.
31.Eisenhower,WagingPeace,p.614.
32.Bissellinterview.Italicsmine.
33.Ibid.
Page343
34.Eisenhowerinterview.SeealsoEarlMazo,"IkeSpeaksOut:BayofPigswasall
JFK's,"Newsday,September10,1965;Grayinterview.
35.Wyden,BayofPigs,p.88.
ChapterTwenty-Three
1.HowardHuntinterview.
2.Ibid.
Page344
GLOSSARY
A
Abwher:ThemilitaryintelligencedivisionoftheGermanGeneralStaff.
AJAX:CodenamefortheCIAcovertoperationtooustIran'sPremierMohammed
MossadeghandreinstatetheShah.
ANVIL:TheAlliedlandingatMarseilles,1944.
B
BI-A:CounterespionagearmofMI-5,responsibleforhandlingdoubleagents.
"Bomb":ThedeviceusedatBPtobreakEnigma'scode.
BP:BletchleyPark.TheBritishestatewhereEnigma'scodewasbrokenanddeciphered.
C
COBRA:U.S.GeneralOmarBradley'splanthatledtothesuccessfulbreakthroughofthe
GermanlinesatSt.LôinlateJuly1944.
ChurchCommittee:HeadedbyFrankChurch,the1975SenateCommitteewhich
investigatedCIAclandestineoperations.
CIA:CentralIntelligenceAgency.ThemodernUnitedStatesintelligenceagency,created
in1947.
CIG:CentralIntelligenceGroup.CreatedbyPresidentTrumanin1946,thelargely
ineffectualprecursortotheCIA.
COI:CoordinatorofInformation.ThefirstUnitedStatesintelligenceagency,established
in1941underWilliamDonovan.
CorpsFrancd'Afrique:AcommandogroupofyoungFrenchpatriotsorganizedinpartby
OSSofficerMajorCarletonCoon.
D
DCI:DirectoroftheCentralIntelligenceAgency.
Double-CrossSystem:TheBI-AoperationofturningcapturedGermanspiesintodoubleagents.
E
Enigma:TheGermanencodingmachine,thoughtbythemtobeundecipherable.
ETO:EuropeanTheaterofOperations.
F
FORTITUDE:CodenameforOVERLORDdeceptionplan.
Page345
FUSAG:TheFirstUnitedStatesArmyGroup.Theimaginaryforcepurportedlypreparing
fortheAlliedinvasionatPasdeCalais.
G
G-2:SHAEFintelligencedivision.
G-3:SHAEFoperationsdivision.
GAF:GermanAirForce,orLuftwaffe.
H
H.I.M.:HisImperialMajesty.CommonreferencefortheShahofIran.
HUSKY:AlliedinvasionofSicily,July1943.
J
JCS:JointChiefsofStaff.CombinedheadsoftheUnitedStatesArmy,Navy,andAir
Force.
JED:ShortforJEDBURGH,thecodenameforthethree-manAlliedteamsthatarmedand
trainedtheFrenchguerrillaundergroundandcoordinatedactivitieswithSHAEF.
JSC:JointSecurityControl.U.S.counterpartofLCS.Responsiblefordevisingand
coordinatingstrategiccoveranddeceptionschemes.
L
LCS:LondonControllingSection.Britishorganizationresponsiblefordevisingand
coordinatingstrategiccoveranddeceptionschemes.
M
MacGregorUnit:OSScodenameforasabotageteam.
Maquis:TheFrenchguerrillaunderground,orResistance.
ManhattanProject:UnitedStatesefforttobuildtheatomicbomb.
MARKET-GARDEN:FieldMarshalBernardLawMontgomery'splantocrosstheRhine,
September1944.
MI-5:BritishSecretServicesectionresponsibleforsecuritywithinGreatBritain.
MI-6:BritishSecretServicesectionresponsibleforsecurityoutsideGreatBritain.
MULBERRY:Codenameforconcreteplatformsthatcreatedanartificialportfor
OVERLORD.
N
NSC:NationalSecurityCouncil.Organizedin1947alongwiththeCIA,theWhiteHouse
agencyintegratingthosedepartmentsresponsibleforadvisingthePresidentonnational
securityaffairs.
O
ONI:OfficeofNavalIntelligence.
OPC:OfficeofPolicyCoordination.ThebranchoftheCIAinitiallyinchargeofcovert
operations.
OSS:OfficeofStrategicServices.ThesuccessortotheCOI,theU.S.intelligenceand
covertactionagencyduringWorldWarII.
OVERLORD:AlliedinvasionofFrance,June1944.
P
PBSUCCESS:CodenameforCIAoperationinGuatemala.
PWB:PsychologicalWarfareBranch,SHAEF.
R
RAF:BritishRoyalAirForce.
S
SAVAK:ThesecuritybranchoftheIranianpoliceforce.
SHAEF:SupremeHeadquarters,AlliedExpeditionaryForce.
SLU:SpecialLiaisonUnit.BritishandU.S.officerschargedwithrelayingandinterpreting
ULTRAinformationtothefieldcommanders.
Page346
SOE:SpecialOperationsExecutive.ThebranchofMI-6responsibleforliaisonwiththe
FrenchundergroundResistance.
T
TORCH:AlliedinvasionofNorthAfrica,November1942.
U
U-2:PlaneusedtooverflytheSovietUnionforintelligencegathering.
ULTRA:BritishcodenameforthesystematicbreakingoftheGermancode.
Page347
ANESSAYONTHESOURCES
byRichardH.Immerman
Thebibliographyliststheworkscitedinthisbook,butastudyofcovertintelligence
operationsisincompletewithoutsomeadditionalexplanationofsourcesused.Thisis
particularlytrueifthebookdealswithDwightD.Eisenhower.Ikewassocircumspect
whenitcametodiscussingorwritingabouthisinvolvementindeceptionandclandestine
activitiesthattheauthormustbebothresearcherandsleuth.Touncoverasecret
operationisonething;torevealIke'sknowledgeandparticipationisanother.
OurinvestigationofIke'sconductasSupremeCommanderduringWorldWarIIwas
mademucheasierbytheexcellentworkofothers,particularlytheBritishhistorians,who
arejustifiablyproudoftheirintelligenceservicesandhavewrittenextensivelyaboutthe
subject.TheBritishGovernmentcommissionedscholarslikeMichaelFoottomakepublic
previouslyunknownbutcriticallyimportantfacetsofthewareffort,andrecentlythefirst
volumeofF.W.Hinsley'sofficialhistoryofBritishintelligenceactivitiesappeared.After
F.W.WinterbothambrokethesilenceaboutULTRAin1974,R.V.JonesandRonald
Lewinbroughttolightasideofthewarmoreintriguingthanthemostexcitingand
imaginativenovel.Thesestudies,alongwiththeothersincludedintheBibliography,
provedinvaluabletoourownwork.
ButlearningoftheUnitedStates'involvement,andespeciallyIke'sstillpresented
problems.ThereisnoAmericanofficialhistory,andalmostallUnitedStatesaccountsof
WorldWarIIintelligenceareconfinedtotheOfficeofStrategicServices.Asexplainedin
ourbook,theOSSwasjustoneofseveralintelligencenetworks.MemoirsbyIke's
subordinates,includinghisG-2,GeneralKennethStrong,filledinmuchofthestory,and
SirKennethkindlyconsentedtoanswerourquestionsbyletter.Wefoundoutaboutthe
roleoftheSLUSthroughtheTelfordTaylorreports,depositedintheModernMilitary
Recordsbranchofthe
Page348
NationalArchives,andhelpfulinterviewswiththeparticipantslistedintheBibliography.
Ike'sroleemerged.ThefinalingredientwastheJohnsHopkinsUniversityeditionof
Eisenhower'spapers,anexhaustivecollectionofIke'spersonalcorrespondenceand
memoranda,withoutwhichourtaskwouldhavebeenvirtuallyimpossible.
Ourtaskbecamemoredifficultwhenwebeganthepresidentialyears.Fortunatelyour
timingwasopportune.AftertheWatergatebreak-inandthedisclosureofCIA"dirty
works,"thereappearedaplethoraofmemoirsandscholarlyinvestigationsdescribing
overtwodecadesofintelligenceoperations.Interviewsaddedtoourknowledge,foran
increasingnumberofformergovernmentofficialswelcomedanopportunitytosetthe
recordstraight.
Iwanttoexpressourthankstoallthosewhodidcooperatesoextensively,especially
RichardM.Bissell,Jr.,HowardHunt,GeneralAndrewGoodpaster,MiltonEisenhower,
JohnEisenhower,andStuyvesantWainwrightIII.Theseareallexceedinglybusymen
whotooktimeouttospendhoursdiscussingamyriadofsubjectsandoftensuggested
additionalavenuesforustopursue.Theircollectivememoriescompriseagreatdealof
ourhistory,fortheybothdescribedandexplainedwhatreallywenton.
WeusedourpersonalinterviewsinconjunctionwiththeColumbiaOralHistory
CollectionandPrinceton'sDullesOralHistoryProject,essentialsourcematerialforany
scholaroftheEisenhowerpresidency.Thepost-Watergateperiodproducedtwoother
essentialsources:thePentagonPapersandthetranscriptoftheChurchCommittee's
studyofgovernmentoperations.Thevalueofthesetwopublicationstothestudentofthe
spiescannotbeoveremphasized.
TheJohnsHopkinscompilationofEisenhower'spapershasnotyetgonebeyondthe
chief-of-staffperiod,andwestillawaitthepublicationoftheForeignRelationsvolumes
forIke'sadministration.Tomakemattersworsefromourstandpoint,manyofthe
documentsrelatingtoCIAactivitieswereeitherneverpublishedor,aswasmore
commonlythecase,remainedsecurity-classified.AgainwewerehelpedbypostWatergate
sentiment.BygoingthroughRecordGroup59oftheNationalArchivesDiplomatic
Branch,wediscoverednumerouspreviouslyunusedmemorandaanddispatchesand
identifiedthosestillnotreleasedtothepublic.Weobtainedhundredsofthesethroughthe
FreedomofInformationAct.
ForIkehimself,however,themainsourcewastheEisenhowerLibraryinAbilene,
Kansas.DirectorJohnWickman,Dr.JamesLyerzapf,andtherestofthelibrarystaffhave
expertlycataloguedthethousandsuponthousandsofpapersresultingfromthe
EisenhowerWhite
Page349
House,andassembleddetailedfindingguidesastotheircontents.Thebulkofthis
collectionknownastheWhitmanFileprovidesinsightsintoIke'sadministrationand
personalityneverbeforethoughtpossible.SpecialmentionshouldbemadeofIke's
personaldiary.Althoughobviouslytoobusytorecordaday-by-dayaccountofhis
activities,Ikekeptthediaryperiodicallyfromthe1930supuntilhisdeath.Perhapsno
otherdocumentrevealswithsuchclaritythemindofthismanwhoforsomanyyears
supervisedourcomplexintelligencecommunity.
Onefinalnoteonthesources.Wehaveattemptedtoobtainasmuchoftheinformationas
possible,butwewillnotpretendthatthestoryiscomplete.ThefilesfromtheWhite
HouseSpecialAssistantforNationalSecurityAffairsandtheNationalSecurityCouncil
seriesarestillprimarilyclosed,asaremanyotherdocumentsintheEisenhowerLibrary's
holdings.Itisunlikely,evenwiththenewlyinstitutedExecutiveOrder12065,thatthese
documentswillbedeclassifiedinthenearfuture.Iketookmanyofhissecretswithhim
tohisgrave.Butheleftenoughforustoknowthathebelievedintheintelligence
community,thatheusedittoitsfullestpotential,andthatitwasneverthesameagain
afterheretired.
Page350
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NationalArchives,DiplomaticBranch,Washington,D.C.
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RichardG.Patterson,Jr.,Papers,HarryS.TrumanLibrary,Independence,Mo.
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Page356
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
SamVaughanofDoubledayhadtheideaforthisbook.Heandhisassistant,BettyHeller,
providedguidance,counsel,sympathy,andunderstandingastheworkproceeded.I
cannotthankthemenough.
ThestaffoftheUniversityofNewOrleanslibraryprovidedmewithexpert,professional
helpateveryturn.IamalsogratefulforassistancefromtheEisenhowerLibraryin
Abilene,Kansas,theNewYorkPublicLibrary,andtheLibraryofCongress.Thestaffat
theModernMilitaryBranchoftheNationalArchivesinWashington,D.C.,wassuperb.
Withouttheaidofthatstaff,theWorldWarIIsectionsofthisbookcouldnothavebeen
written.IamespeciallyinthedebtofMr.JohnTayloroftheArchives.
WhenIwasjustbeginningtowritetheWorldWarIIsection,Ihadthegreatgoodluckto
meetDr.RichardImmermanofPrincetonUniversity.Immermanhadjustfinishedhis
dissertationontheCIAinGuatemalain1954.HewasworkingwithProfessorFred
GreensteinatPrincetononamajorprojecttoreassesstheEisenhowerpresidency.Ona
beautifulFourthofJuly,1979,atPrinceton,Idiscoveredinasix-hournonstop
conversationwithImmermanthatherewasabrilliantyounghistorianwhoknewthe
sourcesfortheEisenhowereraaswellasanyoneinthecountry.
IaskedImmermanifIcouldusehisGuatemalamaterial,especiallytheHowardHunt
interviews.Hereadilyagreed.Afewdayslater,backhomeinNewOrleans,Irealizedthat
IhaddozensofquestionsforImmerman.Ithereforeaskedhimifhewouldcollaborate
withme.Tothegreatbenefitofthebook,heagreed.
Immermanwasthefirstresearchertogothrough,inasystematicandprofessional
manner,therecentlyopenedEisenhowerpapersinAbilene,coveringthepresidentialand
retirementyears.Thefruitsofhishundredsofhoursofresearchinclude,amongother
items(all
Page357
printedhereforthefirsttime),thequotationsfromEisenhower'sprivatediary,thenotes
ofthemeetingsoftheNationalSecurityCouncil,thesummariesoftelephone
conversations,GeneralGoodpaster'snotesonvariousinformalmeetingsintheWhite
House,andIke'sprivatecorrespondencewithhisclosestfriends.
Immermanmadeanequallyvaluableandessentialcontributionthroughhisinterviews.
HehadpreviouslyinterviewedRichardBissellandHowardHuntonGuatemala;he
returned,asmycollaborator,taperecorderinhand.Heinterviewedanumberofothers;as
allthesubjectscantestify,heisanintelligentandprobinginterviewerwhoisadeptat
gettinghissubjectstorelaxandtellthefullstory.
Somemightsaymywritinghabitsareabitextreme.Whenwritingabook,Inormallyget
upat3A.M.andwriteuntil8A.M.Igotobedimmediatelyafterdinner.Suchaschedule
disruptsthehouseholdregime,tosaytheleast,especiallywithfiveteen-agersinthe
houseandawifefinishingherM.A.andbeginningherteachingcareer.
Moiraandthechildrenweremodelsofpatienceandunderstanding.Withouttheir
support,Icouldn'tdothework.Withouttheirlove,itwouldn'tbeworthdoing.
STEPHENE.AMBROSE
NEWORLEANS
DECEMBER19,1979
Page358
STEPHENE.AMBROSEwasborninDecatur,Illinois,in1936.HeearnedaB.S.degree
attheUniversityofWisconsinin1957,anM.A.atL.S.U.in1958,andaPh.D.atthe
UniversityofWisconsinin1963.HehasservedonthehistoryfacultyatL.S.U.,Johns
Hopkins,theNavalWarCollege,wherehewastheKingProfessorofMaritimeHistory,
andatKansasState,wherehewastheEisenhowerProfessorofWarandPeace.Hehas
writtenthirteenbooksonAmericanhistory,rangingfrombiographiesofCrazyHorse,
GeorgeCuster,andDwightEisenhower,toahistoryofWestPointandanotheronthe
ColdWar.AsoneoftheeditorsoftheofficialPapersofDwightDavidEisenhower,he
hadaccesstopreviouslysecretEisenhowerdocuments,aswellastothemanhimself.
Married,thefatheroffivechildren,hishobbiesarecanoeing,camping,gardening,and
running.HeisProfessorofHistoryattheUniversityofNewOrleans.
Page359
INDEX
A
AarRiver,173
Abel,Rudolf,290
Abwehr,77,99,173
Acheson,Dean,168,192-93,194-96
Adana,Turkey,274,279
Adenauer,Konrad,272
AfricaKorps,19,57-60
AJAX,200-11
Alexander,Harold,63
Alfhem,215-16,223,231
Algiers,15,40-56passim
Allen,Yorke,66
AmericanSocietyofNewspaperEditors,277
Anderson,Kenneth,50,57
Anderson,Robert,174
Angleton,James,Jr.,237
Anglo-PersianOilCompany,191-95,213
Antwerp,79,147
Anzio,73
Arbenz,Jacobo,216-33passim
Ardennes,136-46
Arévalo,JuanJosé,218-19
Armas,Castillo,224-34,312
Army-McCarthyHearings,185
Arnhem,Netherlands,130-35
Arnim,Jiirgenvon,56-62
Atlantic,Battleof,12
AtomicEnergyCommission,183-87
Atsugi,Japan,290
Avranches,113-20
Azerbaijan,U.S.S.R.,193
B
Baghdad,208
BaoDai,Emperor,247,248,260
Barnes,Tracey,174,225,318
Barre,Georges,44
Bastogne,Belgium,144
BayofPigs,225,307,317
Beams,Battleof,5-6
Beesly,Patrick,11,142-43
BelgianCongo,298-302
Belize,Honduras,219-20
Bennett,Tapley,219
Bergen,143
Berlin,152,167,177
Berne,173
Bevan,John,100
BinhZuyen,248
Bissell,Richard,173,174-76,223-34,241,294,301;
andBayofPigs,309-16;
andFrancisGaryPowers,279-92;
andplottokillCastro,302-6;
andU-2program,263-78
Black,Charles,171
BlairHouse,195
BletchleyPark(BP),8-9,65-68,114-15,132,148,320,322
Bodo,Norway,279
BonnierdelaChapelle,FernandEugene,49-56
Borden,William,185
Braden,Spruille,164,221
Braden,Thomas,174,177
Bradley,Omar,86,109,111,125,128,130-31,242,321;
andBattleoftheBulge,141-46;
andFalaise
Battle,120-23;
andMortain
Battle,112-20
Britain,Battleof,5,9
BritishBroadcastingCompany,105
BritishEighthArmy,72-74
BritishFirstAirborneDivision,130-35
BritishSecondArmy,94,130,132-35
Page360
BritishSecretService,4,7,62,68,76-79,109,163,197,272;
andIran,200-11
BritishWarCabinet,90-91
Brooke,SirAlan,31,61,125-26,128
Brown,AnthonyCave,68
Bruce,David,242
Brussels,134
Buber,Martin,182
Buck,Lucius,148
BuckinghamPalace,34
Buckley,WilliamF.,171
Budapest,235-39
Bulge,Battleofthe,136-46
Bull,HaroldR.,82
Bundy,William,66
Burke,Arleigh,306,309,310
Bussey,Donald,147-48
Butcher,Harry,17,24,27,30,32,41,50-51,56,61,62,72,81,86,119,144
C
Cabot,JohnMoors,223
Cabot,ThomasDudley,223
Caen,France,111,113,119
Cagoule,20,27,53-56
CampDavid,280-81
CanadianFirstArmy,85,119-23
Canaris,Admiral,174
Capone,Al,303
Capri,Isleof,70-71
Caracas,228
Casablanca,23,41,55
Castro,Fidel,234,294,302-6,308-16
Castro,Raúl,233,304,309
CentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),187-88;
andassassinationplots,294-306;
andBayofPigs,309-16;
andDulles,317-19;
andGuatemala,216-33;
andHungary,235-39;
andIndonesia,249-51;
andNationalIntelligenceEstimates,252-57;
originsandearlyyears,167-78;
andPowersincident,279-91;
andVietnam,257-62
CentralIntelligenceAgencyAct,168
CentralIntelligenceGroup,165
ChantiersdelaJeunesse,26,29,34-35,40,48-49
Chennault,Claire,227,250
Chequers,3-4
Cherbourg,89,110
Cherchel,Algeria,29
Chevalier,Haakon,185
ChiangKai-shek,275
ChicagoTribune,163
ChouEn-lai,275,297
ChristianDemocraticPartyofItaly,168
Church,Frank,294-95
ChurchCommittee,178,243,244,271,294-306passim
Churchill,Winston,15,19,26,34,41-46,63,73,87,103,107,114,119,120-23,126,128,
156,190-91,192,321;
andClark'strip,31-32;
andIran,196-212;
meetswithEisenhower,3-13;
andsecurityforOVERLORD,90-92
CivilAirTransport(CAT),250-51
Claridge'sHotel,91
Clark,MarkWayne,17,41-42,50-56;
andItaliancampaign,72-74;
secrettrip,29-34
Clausewitz,44
Clay,Lucius,169
Clifford,Clark,316
Cline,Ray,19,236-38,241,242,251,252-57,268-69
Coffin,WilliamSloane,174
Colby,William,239
Collingwood,Charles,52
Collins,"LightningJoe,"112
ColumbiaUniversity,66,155-58
CombinedChiefsofStaff,44,64,75,82,83,140
CommunistPartyofGuatemala,220
CommunistPartyofIndonesia,249-51
CommunistPartyoftheSoviet
Page361
Union,TwentiethPartyCongress,236-37
CommunistPartyoftheUnitedStates,181-83,185-87
ComtedeParis,48
ConfederationGeneraldeTrabajadores,220
Constantine,50
Coon,Carleton,48-56passim
CoordinatorofInformation,15
Corcoran,Thomas,224
Cordier,Abbé,49,54
CorpsFrancd'Afrique,48-49,51-56
Corvo,Max,69
Coster,Don,15
Crawford,Joan,249
Crete,9-10
Cunningham,AndrewBrown,40-41,42,63
Cutler,Robert,223
D
Darlan,Alain,25
Darlan,Jean,18,25,26,30-31,37,39-56passim
d'AstierdelaVigerie,Henri,26,29,34,35,40,47,48-56
Davis,Elmer,45
Davis,RichardHarding,250
DeclarationofCaracas,228,232
deGaulle,Charles,18,26,49,52,55,102-3,107,156,287-91,320
Dewey,ThomasE.,69,158
Diem,NgoDinh,46,56,246-48,258-64
DienBienPhu,245,258
Dillon,C.Douglas,299
Donovan,William,15-17,21,23,68-71,101-4,162-64
Doolittle,James,188
Double-CrossSystem,77-79,93,98-99,108,321
Douglas,WilliamO.,261
Dover,84-85
Downes,Donald,70-71
Dubreuil,Lemaigre,20-21,22,25,26,30,35,47-56
Dulles,Allen,150-52,171-78,201-2,273-75,291-92;
andBayofPigs,308-16;
and5412Committee,240-43;
andGuatemala,215-32;
andHungary,236-39;
andLumumba,293-302;
andNationalIntelligenceEstimates,252-57;
inretirement,317-19;
andSuez,256;
andU-2,266-67;
andVietnam,244-49,257-63
Dulles,JohnFoster,172-74,176,200-11
passim,213,238,241,249-51,273-74,277,282;
andGuatemala,216-32passim
E
Eddy,WilliamA.,21-23,35,38-39,46,51-52,70
Eden,Anthony,31,91,201,203,230,270-72
EdinburghCastle,83
Eifel,Germany,136-46
Einstein,Albert,182
Eisenhower,DwightDavid;andAllenDulles,244;
attitudetowardRussianthreat,158-61;
andBattleoftheBulge,136-46;
andBayofPigs,307-16;
andClark'strip,29-34;
andCongressionaloversightcommittee,187-88;
andDarlan,43-48;
andDarlan'sassassination,50-56;
andD-Day,93-96;
decisiontorunforPresidency,155-58;
andDulles,318-19;
andFalaiseBattle,120-23;
andFORTITUDE,82-86;
andFrancisGaryPowers,279-92;
onFrenchhighcommand,39-41;
andFrenchpolitics,35-38;
andGermansinNormandy,87-89;
andGuatemala,216-32;
andHungarianRevolution,235-39;
andIndonesia,249-51;
andinvasionofSicily,62-64;
andIran,196-212;
andItaliancampaign,72-74;
andJohnson,262-63;
andKasserinePass,57-62;
andLumumba,293-302;
onMark
Page362
Clark,41-42;
andMARKET-GARDEN,130-35;
meetswithChurchill,3-13;
meetswithMurphy,14-15,17-27;
andMortainBattle,112-20;
andNationalIntelligenceEstimates,252-57;
andNationalSecurityCouncil,240-43;
andNormandyBattle,96-109;
andOppenheimer,183-87;
andOVERLORD,75-76;
andplanningforOVERLORD,79-82;
andplottokillCastro,303-6;
inretirement,319-22;
andRosenbergcase,181-83;
andsecurityforOVERLORD,89-93;
andStrong,86-87,125-29;
andSuezCrisis,240;
andU-2,263-78;
andVietnam,244-48,257-62
Eisenhower,JohnS.D.,47,139,182,272,279,282-83,291,294-306passim
Eisenhower,MamieDowd,76,273
Eisenhower,MiltonStover,44-46,156,217,262-63
ElAlamein,Battleof,45
Elisabethville,Congo,302
Enigmamachine,7-8
EscambreyMountains,311
Esteva,Admiral,40,42
F
FaidPass,59
Faivre,Mario,49-56
Falaise,Battleof,120-23
FederalBureauofInvestigation,162-63
FermiAward,186
Filby,William,9
Finn,Huck,33
FirstNationalBankofBoston,223
5412Committee,240-41,296-302,305;
andBayofPigs,308-16
Fondouk,57
Foot,MichaelR.D.,49
FordFoundation,175
Forrestal,James,161
FORTITUDE,79-82,89,97,99,104,319-21
Fortuny,JoséManuel,220
Franco,20
Fredendall,Lloyd,57-60
FreedomofInformationAct,290
FreeFrench,20-21,26
Frelinghuysen,Peter,187
FrenchandIndianWar,4
FrenchForcesoftheInterior,108
FrenchResistance(seeMaquis)
Friendly,Alfred,9,66
''Frutos,"108
Fuchs,Klaus,182
Fuentes,MiguelYdigoras,224-34,311
Funk,Arthur,43,44
FUSAG,82-86,98,321
G
"Garbo,"96-98,321
Gardiner,Trevor,269
Gavin,James,64
Gela,Sicily,64
GenevaAccords,246,258
GenevaSummitConference,270
German:
1stPanzerDivision,63
1stSSPanzerDivision,116
2dSSPanzerCorps,131-35
2dSSPanzerDivision,105-6
2dPanzerDivision,116
6thParachuteDivision,94
9thSSPanzerDivision,119,131-35
10thPanzerDivision,60
10thSSPanzerDivision,119,131-35
12thSSPanzerDivision,114
106thPanzerDivision,109
116thPanzerDivision,88,98
269thDivision,143
352dDivision,94,96
FifteenthArmy,100,110,112-23
FifthArmy,117
HermanGoringPanzerDivision,64
PanzerLehrDivision,94
SeventhArmy,112-23
SixthSSPanzerArmy,139
Page363
Gestapo,37,122
Giancana,Salvatore,303
Gibraltar,32,36-38,40
Giraud,Henri,20,26-27,29-31,35-38,39-56
passim,103
Girosi,Marcello,70
Gold,Harry,182
Gomulka,Wladyslaw,238
Goodpaster,AndrewJ.,213,230,262,273-77,282-91
passim,294-302
passim,305;
andBayofPigs,307-8,315-16
Grant,Ulysses,157
Granville,France,131
Gray,Gordon,240-41,242,296-306
Greenglass,David,181-83
GrosvenorSquare,29,33,76
Groves,Leslie,93
Gruenther,Alfred,224
GuatemalaCity,213
Guevara,Che,233-34,304,309
Guilanshah,General,202,211
Guildhall,157
GulfOil,213
Gurfein,Murray,69
GuysandDolls,207
H
Hagerty,James,256
Haiphong,259
Halperin,Morton,242
Haney,Al,225
Hanoi,246-48
HardtMountains,147-48
Harper'sMagazine,257-58
Harriman,W.Averell,24
Hazlett,Swede,277
Heath,Donald,247
Hedgman,Victor,293-96,298-302
Helms,Richard,237,290
Henderson,Loy,196-213passim
Henri-Spaak,Paul,175
Herter,Christian,283,285
Hill,Robert,223,227
Hillenkoetler,Roscoe,167-68
Hill317,116,120
Hinh,General,247
Hitler,Adolf,3,5,18,71,75-76,81,98,106,111,150-52,158-59,321-22;
andBattleoftheBulge,136-46;
andFalaiseBattle,120-23;
andMortainBattle,112-20
HoChiMinh,246-48,258-63
Holland,Henry,227,230,232
Holmes,Julius,15
Hoover,J.Edgar,162-63,170,181,183-87,219,290
HoteldeCornouailles,53
HotelSt.Georges,42,51
Hourcade,Commandant,50
Huelva,Spain,63
Hull,Cordell,15
Humphrey,HubertH.,276
HungarianFreedomFighters,235-39
Hunt,Howard,170,173,218-33
passim,296-97,317-19
Huntington,Ellery,Jr.,70
HUSKY,62-64,68
Huxley,Julian,103
Hycon,269
HydePark,14
I
Immerman,Richard,291
ImperialIranianGendarmerie,193
InstituteforAdvancedStudies,186
Ismay,SirHastings,31
J
Jackson,Andrew,307
Java,249-51
JedTeams,102-4,108
Johnson,Clarence"Kelly",268-69,291
Johnson,LyndonB.,186,263-64,276
Johnson,RobertH.,295-96
JointChiefsofStaff,16,23,155,165,253,258,272,277
JointIntelligenceCommittee,89
Jones,HowardP.,251
Jones,R.V.,6,9
Juin,Alphonse,25,35,37,40-41,43,44,50
Page364
Kasavubu,Joseph,298-302
Kashani,Ayatollah,206
KasserinePass,Battleof,58-62
KatangaProvince,293-302passim
Keen,Harold,8
Kennan,George,166-67,178
Kennedy,JohnF.,261-62,263,276,278,294,312-16
Kennedy,RobertF.,317
Kesselring,Albert,39,60,63-64,71,73,174
Khan,Reza,191
Khrushchev,Nikita,121,236-37,271,273,300,313;
andPowersincident,280-92
KielCanal,215
Killian,JamesR.,267-68
King,J.C.,225,304,308-9
Kirkpatrick,Lyman,174,284
Kluge,Guenthervon,111,131;
andFalaiseBattle,120-23;
andMortainBattle,112-20
Knowland,WilliamF.,175
KoreanWar,170
"Kreml,"80
L
Lakenhurst,271
LakeVan,Turkey,285
Land,EdwinH.,267-68
Lansdale,Edward,245-48
LeHavre,89
Leigh-Mallory,Trafford,94,96
LeKef,Tunisia,59
LeMay,Curtis,270
Lewin,Ronald,10,66,68,116,122,132
LifeMagazine,229
LockheedAircraftCorp.,268-69,285,290
Lodge,HenryCabot,Jr.,300
LoireRiver,105
Lollobrigida,Gina,249
LondonControllingSection(LCS),78
Love,Kennett,206,209,211
Luciano,"Lucky,"69
Luftwaffe,6,37,63,116,148-50
Lumumba,Patrice,293-302
Lundahl,Arthur,267-68
Lyautey,Port,23-24
M
MacArthur,Douglas,3,70,156
McCarthy,JosephR.,170-74,176,185,187
Mack,Hal,24
MacLeod,R.M.,83
Macmillan,Harold,47
McNamara,Robert,278,317
Macomber,William,172-73
Macy,Josiah,66
Mafia,69,303-6
MaginotLine,111
Malmedy,Belgium,140
Malta,37
ManhattanProject,93,160
Mansfield,Mike,181,187-88
Maquis,7,101-8,113,235-39,320
Marchetti,Victor,176
MarethLine,57,60
MARKET-GARDEN,130-35
Maroc,44
Marshall,GeorgeC.,3,4,13,14,16,19,22-23,24,28,36,39,42,45-47,66,76,92,102,
113,133-35,140,156,157-58,164,168
Martin,William("MajorMartin"),62-63
Mast,Charles,21,22,26,27,29,30,32,33-36,41,43-50
Masterman,John,77,84,98,109
Matsu,275
Matthews,Freeman,24
MeuseRiver,137
Menzies,Stewart,7,12,77-78,157
Messina,73
MexicoCity,220
Middleton,Drew,230
Middleton,Troy,139,144
MilitaryAffairs,142,290-91
Miller,Clyde,182-83
Miller,Edward,Jr.,221
Miller,Henry,91-92
Mobutu,Joseph,301-2
Page365
Mockler-Ferryman,Eric,24,58-62,142,320
Model,Walter,121,216
MonroeDoctrine,216
Montagu,Ewen,62-63
Montgomery,BernardLaw,11,45,57,85,111,113,119-23,127-35
passim,139-40,157
Morgan,Frederick,90
Mortain,Battleof,112-20
Moscow,80,171
Mossadegh,Mohammad,194-212,241
Murphy,Robert,29,39-56,200,202,230,241,320;
briefsEisenhower,14-15,17-27;
andClark'strip,30-34;
inNorthAfrica,35-38
Murphy-WeygandAccord,19
Murrow,EdwardR.,43
N
Nagy,Imre,238-39
Nassiry,Nematollah,207-13
Nasution,AbdulHaris,249-51
NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration,285
NationalArchives,89,146
NationalReview,171
NationalSecurityAct,165
NationalSecurityCouncil,165,216,240-44,253
Navarre,General,245
"NewLook,"255,275-78
NewRepublic,182
NewYorkCity,155
NewYorkHeraldTribune,224
NewYorkTimes,51,66,197,206,209,211,227,230-31,285-87,313,314
Nixon,Richard,175,278,312-16
Nogues,Auguste,41
Norden,Langdonvan,66
Normandy,79-95;Battleof,96-100
NorthKorea,170
NurembergWarCrimesTrials,66
O
Oakes,John,66,108
OfficeofPolicyCoordination,176
OfficeofStrategicServices,15-17,21,38,47,51,106-7,143,150-52,162,164,170;
inNormandyBattle,100-8;
inSicilyandItaly,68-71
OfficeofWarInformation,45
OldColonyTrustCo.,223
OmahaBeach,94,96
Opa-Locka,225-34
"OpenSkies,"270-71
OperationCandor,184
Oppenheimer,J.Robert,183-87,276
Oradour-sur-Glane,106
Oran,23,41
OrganizationofAmericanStates,216,310
Oswald,LeeHarvey,290
OVERLORD,75-97,321-22
Oxfordshire,133
P
Pahlavi,MohammedRezaShah(seeShahofIran)
PanamaCanalZone,310
ParisSummitConference,280-92
Parrott,Thomas,305
PasdeCalais,79-82,88,98,99,110,112,321
Pash,BorisT.,297
Patterson,Richard,Jr.,222
Patton,GeorgeS.,Jr.,12-13,21,24,34,41,84-85,98,125,128,131,145,321;
andFalaiseBattle,120-23;
andMortainBattle,112-20
PBSUCCESS,222-32
Pershing,JohnJ.,157
Pétain,Henri,18,25,47
Peterson,Arthur,93
Peurifoy,JohnE.,217-32passim
Pogue,Forrest,141-42
Pope,AllenLawrence,251
PopePiusXII,182
Portsmouth,97,272
Pound,SirDudley,31-32
Page366
Powell,Lewis,66
Powers,FrancisGary,274,279-92
Pratt-Whitney,269
President'sBoardofConsultantsonForeignIntelligence,242
Prestwick,14
PsychologicalWarfareBranch(PWB),47-48,52-53
PuertoBarrios,Guatemala,216,228
Purcell,Edward,267-68
Q
Quemoy,275
Quesada,Pete,116
R
Radford,Arthur,213,243,248,253-54,259
RadioFreeEurope,235-39
Razmara,PrimeMinister,194
REDSOX/REDCAP,237-39
Rennes,France,96
RepublicanParty,157-58
Reston,James,285-87
RhineRiver,130
Riahi,Tazhi,207-12
Ridgway,Matthew,258,277
RiodeJaneiroTreaty,219
Robbins,Thomas,253-55
Robinett,Paul,58-59
Robinson,William,224
Rockefeller,Nelson,170,278
RoerRiver,139
Rommel,Erwin,10-11,12,19,87-88,106,131;
andBattleofKasserinePass,57-62;
andNormandyBattle,97-100
Rood,Leslie,148-49
Roosevelt,FranklinD.,4-6,14-16,19,36,42-46,54,56,70,73,103,107,139,156,16264,192
Roosevelt,Kermit,23,189-213,241
Roosevelt,Theodore,217
Rosenberg,Ethel,181-83
Rosenberg,Julius,181-83
Rosengarten,Adolph,66,67,123,142,146-50
Rosfelder,Roger,48-56
Rosselli,Johnny,303-4
RoyalDutchShell,213
Rundstedt,Gerdvon,82,87-88,97-99,111;
andBattleoftheBulge,137-46
Rusk,Dean,317
Russell,Bertrand,182
Russell,Richard,177
Ryan,Cornelius,133
S
Saar-Palatinate,147
Saigon,246-48
SaigonMilitaryMission,246-48
St.Lô,112
Salerno,70,72
SaturdayEveningPost,244
SavoyHotel,85
Sawyer,Tom,33,321
Scheider,Joseph,301
Schwarzkopf,H.Norman,193,204,209-10
SeineRiver,99-100,123
Shahhen,John,70
ShahofIran,189-213
Sicily,Invasionof,62-64
SiegfriedLine,145
Skoda,216
Smith,Harold,164
Smith,WalterBedell,24,29,39,40,71,151,210,223,227-30,244,259,321;
andBattleoftheBulge,141-46;
andCIA,170-74;
andMARKET-GARDEN,130-35;
andStrong,125-29
Socony-Mobil,213
Somoza,Anastasio,224-32,314
Soraya,Queen,208
SoutheastAsiaTreatyOrganization,249-51,259
SouthVietnam,248
Spa,140
SpecialForceHeadquarters,102-5,107-8
SpecialLiaisonUnits(SLUs),65-68,108-9,114,146-50
SpecialOperationsExecutive,7,23,60,101-4,143
Spellman,Cardinal,229,261
Page367
Stagg,J.M.,95
Stalin,Joseph,5,156,158-61
Stalingrad,80
StandardOilofNewJersey,213
Stettin,215
Stimson,HenryL.,4,45
Strauss,Lewis,184-87
Strong,Kenneth,60,72,86-87,88,151-52,174,243,253,320,321;
andBattleoftheBulge,140-46;
andEisenhower,125-29;
andMARKET-GARDEN,130-35
Sukarno,249-51
SullivanandCromwell,172,218,223
Summersby,Kay,15
SurpriseAttackPanel,267-68
Sverdlovsk,U.S.S.R.,279
SwanIsland,312
T
Taft,RobertA.,159
Talbert,Ansel,149
"Tate,"77,98-99
Tatlock,Jean,185
Taylor,Edmond,47-48,166
Taylor,Maxwell,277,317
Taylor,Telford,53,65-68,146-50
Tebessa,Algeria,59
Tedder,Arthur,114-15,119,128-29
Tegucigalpa,Honduras,224
Teheran,189-213
TeheranConference,192
TelegraphCottage,15,17-18,24,26,33
Temple,Shirley,171
Texaco,213
Tibbets,Paul,32,34
TimeMagazine,228
Timgad,Algeria,59
Todd,Clover,172
Tompkins,Peter,70-71
TORCH,16,24,29,37,39
Toulon,41,47
Toulouse,105
Tower,John,294-95
TrianonPalace,139
Trohan,Walter,163
Truman,HarryS.,156,157,163-68,177-78,183,192,195,263
TrumanDoctrine,164,193,222
Truscott,Lucian,239,243
Tshombe,Moise,298-302
TudehParty,193-212
Tully,Andrew,256
Tunis,40
Twenty-firstArmyGroup,134
Twining,Nathan,258-59
Tymm,RichardE.,92
U
U-2,263-92passim,309
Ubico,Jorge,218
ULTRA,39,61,73,77-78,87,92-93,99,111-23,132,142,146-50,320;
originsandoperation,7-13;
andOVERLORD,95-96;
inSicily,63-64
UnitedFruitCompany,217-32passim
Urquhart,Brian,132-34
U.S.:
1stDivision,96
2dArmoredDivision,117
3dArmoredDivision,117
9thInfantryDivision,59
9thTacticalAirCommand,116
30thDivision,116-17,120,122
36thDivision,147
82dAirborneDivision,94,110,130
101stAirborneDivision,94,110,130
VIIICorps,139
XVCorps,120-22
EighthAirForce,107
FirstArmy,86,123,131,136-46
SeventhArmy,147,150
ThirdArmy,85,100,113-23
U.S.Army,intelligence4
U.S.Army,TankCorps,6
U.S.InformationAgency,227
U.S.MilitaryAcademy,307
U.S.NewsandWorldReport,244