ang pag-ibig bilang higit na pagtuklas sa pag

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Volume 3 - March 2013
ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG
HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL SA
KARANASANG MAKA-PILIPINO
FR. MAXELL LOWELL C. ARANILLA, PH.D.
FRIENDSHIP AS PARADIGM OF
ARISTOTELIAN EUDAIMONIA
FR. LORENZ MOISES J. FESTIN, PH.D.
THE POINT: THE SELF THAT
EXPERIENCES GUILT, PRIDE,
AND SELF-CONTENTMENT
CHRIS JULIUS D. CONJURADO
DERRIDEAN CONCEPT
OF FORGIVENESS
JOHN ALFORD L. MOLINA
THE PARADOX OF FAITH
JAY ANTHONIE A. SANICO
EPISTEMIC HUMILITY
KARLO MARKO D. VALLADORES
BOOK REVIEW: MINDFULNESS (2012)
XAVIER PAUL Y. JACOME
STAFF
MARVIN M. CRUZ
Editors
Moderator
Philippine Copyright © 2013 by San Carlos Seminary
ISSN 2094-9448
THEORIA, translated as contemplative activity or study, is what Aristotle
identifies as the highest operation of man’s intellectual faculty that
constitutes the highest form of life. THEORIA is the official journal of the San
Carlos Seminary Philosophy Department which aims to gather articles from
students, graduates and professors.
San Carlos Seminary reserves the rights to all the articles. Mass reproduction
and photocopy is highly discouraged without explicit permission from the
Editor.
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3
ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG
HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA
PAG-IRAL SA KARANASANG
MAKA-PILIPINO
FR. MAXELL LOWELL C. ARANILLA, PH.D.
Sa paghahanap ng Pilipino sa katuturan ng kanyang pag-iral, laging
tumatambad sa kanya ang isang katotohanan: KAMATAYAN, ang
hantungan ng paghahanap ng tao sa kanyang kahulugan. Subalit para
sa Pilipino at sa kultura nito, ang kamatayan ay hindi naman talaga
trahedya. Ito ay hindi lamang hantungan ng buhay ng tao at kasakasama na ito ng tao. Para sa mga Pilipino, mayroong nagbibigkis sa
namatay at namatayan: at iyon ay PAG-IBIG, ang tulay na nagdurugtong
sa kapanganakan at kamatayan ng isang tao.
Malaki nga ang papel na ginagampanan ng pag-ibig sa pag-iral ng
Pilipino. Bawat Pilipino ay may pinag-aalayan ng kanilang mga
pagsisikap at ito ay ang kanilang iniibig o ang obheto ng kanilang
pag-ibig. Para sa mga bayani ng bayan ang pag-ibig sa sariling bayan
ang batayan ng kanilang pag-aalay-buhay na nakabatay naman sa
katotohanang una na tayong inibig at nakatanggap ng pag-ibig sa
ating bayan.
Para sa mga nakararaming Pilipino, sa pag-ibig nagpapatuloy ang ating
mga loob, dumarami ito at nasasalamin pa sa mga pinagkalooban natin
ng kabutihang-loob. Ang pag-ibig ang tulay sa pagitan ng pagsilang at
kamatayan. Ito rin ang tulay na nagdurugtong sa buhay ng mga taong
iniwanan na ng kanilang mga mahal sa buhay at ng mahal sa buhay
na sumakabilang buhay na. Nagiging ganap ang pagkatao ng tao dahil
sa pag-ibig sapagkat ito ang nagpapanatiling buhay sa tao. Hindi
namamatay ang tao kapag siya ay umibig at iniibig. Nagpapatuloy siya sa
mga relasyon o ugnayang iniwan niya. At ang relasyong ito ang higit na
nagpapatirik sa kanyang pag-iral bilang isang tao, bilang isang Pilipino.
March 2013 - Volume 3
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ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL
Tulad ng ibang lahi, ang isang Pilipino ay palagi raw naghahanap ng
kahulugan ng kanyang buhay. Likas na nga sa tao ang hanapin ang
katuturan ng kanyang pag-iral subalit sa paghahanap na ito ng tao, at
partikular na ng mga Pilipino, laging tumatambad sa kanya ang isang
katotohanan: kamatayan.
Kamatayan ang laging hantungan ng paghahanap ng tao sa kanyang
kahulugan. Masasabi ngang para sa mga biktima ng mga sakuna sa
Maynila, sa Rizal, sa Pangasinan, sa Leyte, sa Bicol, sa Ormoc at sa
iba pang mga bahagi ng mundo; para sa biktima ng karahasan sa
Mindanao, sa Kalakhang Maynila, sa Iraq at sa kung saan-saang dako ng
mundo, tila ang kahulugan ng buhay ay kamatayan. Kaya naman para
sa mga dakilang pilosoper ng mga nagdaang panahon, mahiwaga ang
buhay ng tao dahil puno ito ng kabalintunaan, ng di-mawawaang mga
kontradiksyon, at isang kahindik-hindik na trahedya. Kabalintunaan
ang buhay ng tao sapagkat ang tao ay isinisilang nang hindi niya
nalalaman at namamatay nang kadalasan ay labag sa kanyang
kagustuhan. Di-mawawaang kontradiskyon ang buhay ng tao sapagkat
sa sandaling siya ay isinilang, nagsisimula na rin siyang mamatay. At
isang kahindik-hindik na trahedya ang buhay ng tao sapagkat isinilang
ang tao para lamang mamatay (Timbreza 2000:viii-ix). Wika nga ni
Florentino Timbreza, na itinuturing na Ama ng Pilosopiyang Pilipino,:
“Isinilang ang tao upang maghirap at mamatay. Kapag ipinanganak ang
tao, siya’y magsisimula nang maghirap at maghihirap siya hanggang
mamatay” (Timbreza 2000: ix).
Marami ngang kasabihang Pilipino ang magpapatunay sa pagkaabala
ng Pilipino sa kamatayan (Timbreza 2000:236-238). Mga kasabihang
nagpapakita na ang Pilipino ay nagtataka rin kung bakit kailangang
mabuhay ng tao para lamang mamatay. Halimbawa na lamang, para sa
mga Katagalugan,
Anumang isinilang ay mamamatay.
Ayon sa isang kasabihan,
Parang isang bugtong ang buhay
Pagkasabi mo’y wala nang saysay
Parang isang dula kung turingan
Na may simula’t katapusan.
ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL Page
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Para naman sa mga Ilokano,
Awan ti tao nga agbantay ditoy lubong.
Amin a tao agtungpal ken Apo patay.
No umayen ni Apo patay saanka a makagaway.
(Walang taong mananatili para bantayan ang daigdig
sapagkat lahat ay mamamatay. Hindi mo matatakasan ang
kamatayan sa oras na dumating ito.)
Para naman sa mga Waray,
Lakat han panuigon, lakat han kamatayon.
(Sa pagtakbo ng oras, kasunod na ang kamatayan.)
Sa Cebuano naman, sinasabing
Dagan sa kinabuhi gukod sa kamatayan.
(Nabubuhay tayong kasama ang kamatayan.)
Para sa mga Kapampangan:
Ing bie mingari yang bula a gabud na matda.
(Parang bula lamang ang buhay na biglang mawawala.)
Para sa mga Boholano,
Ang camatayon itindog ug ilingcod.
(Dumarating ang kamatayan, nakaupo man o nakatayo
tayo.)
Para naman sa mga Pangalatok:
Say bilay binayes, kasanlilikha naerep.
(Pahiram lamang ang buhay na maaaring kunin anumang
oras.)
Kataka-taka nga na ang tao ay nabubuhay para lamang mamatay. Sa
sandali nga ng kanyang pagsilang, katitigan na niya ang kamatayan
kaya naman maitatanong: Bakit kailangan pang mabuhay ng tao
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kung mamatay rin naman ito? Kaya nga gumugulo sa isip ng tao ang
kamatayan, ayon na rin kay Florentino Timbreza:
Sa karanasang Filipino, ang buhay ay isang malaking
suliranin, isang nakalilitong katanungan na nangangailangan
ng karampatang kasagutan. Bawat isa ay uhaw sa tunay na
kahalagahan ng pagiging tao. Kung kayat bawat indibidwal
ay hindi mapalagay. Mula nang siya’y nagkamalay hanggang
siya’y mamatay, ang tao’y laging naliligalig at nababagabag.
Lagi niyang hinahanap ang kalutasan o solusyon ng kanyang
suliranin, na walang iba kundi ang sarili niya mismo, ang
kanyang pagkatao.
…Bakit kinakailangan pang isilang ang tao kung siya’y
maghihirap at mamamatay rin lamang? Ano nga ba ang
tunay na kabuluhan ng pagkatao? Sino ako? Ano ang tunay
na kaganapan ng aking pagiging tao? Ito ang katanungang
laging bumabagabag sa kaisipan ng bawat indibidwal
(Timbreza 2000: xi).
Saan nga ba nakabatay ang totoong pag-iral ng tao? “Saan nakasalalay
o matutunghayan ang tunay na kaganapan ng buhay-tao? Para sa ilang
mga pilosoper, matatagpuan lamang ang sukdulang kahulugan ng
buhay sa ugnayang tao-Diyos; para naman sa iba, sa isang lipunang
walang mga antas; at para sa iba pa, sa nirvana” (Timbreza 2000:
xiv). May nagsasabi namang ang paghahanap ng kahulugan ay
walang katuturan sapagkat ang buhay ng tao ay wala naman talagang
kahulugan.
Subalit para sa Pilipino at sa kultura nito, ang kamatayan ay hindi
naman talaga trahedya. Datapwat inaamin ng Pilipino na kamatayan
nga ang hantungan ng tao at kasa-kasama na ito ng tao mula pa sa
pagsilang niya, mapapansing may angking positibong pagtingin ang
Pilipino sa kamatayan. Halimbawa na lamang, pansinin natin kung
paano tinitingnan ng Pilipino ang pagkamatay ng isang mahal sa
buhay.
Isang kaibigan ang namatayan ng lola. Nasa SM Megamall siya ng mga
panahong iyon nang matanggap niya ang text message ng kanyang
tatay. Sabi ng mensahe: “Iniwan na tayo ng Nanay.” Ganyan ang tingin
ng Pilipino sa kamatayan. Para sa Pilipino, ang kamatayan ay pag-
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alis lamang. Para sa mga Pilipino, hindi natin sinasabing patay na
siya at iyon na iyon. Sinasabi nating: “Iniwan na tayo,” “Nasa itaas
na siya,” “Sumakabilang buhay na siya,” at kung anu-ano pa. Sa mga
palagay na ito, makikitang para sa mga Pilipino, ang taong namatay ay
sumakabilang buhay lamang. Naririyan pa rin siya. Nakatawid lamang
sya sa kabila. Subalit kahit nasa kabila na siya, mayroong nagbibigkis
sa namatay at namatayan: at iyon ay PAG-IBIG. Kaya naman sa Pilipino,
ang naiwan ay hindi basta asawa lamang o anak lamang o mga
magulang lamang o mga kaibigan lamang. Para sa mga Pilipino, ang
mga naiwan ay mga “mahal sa buhay.” Kaya nga siguro sa mga libing,
pagkatapos ng kaunting iyakan at pagkatapos mailagay sa huling
hantungan, nagbabalik ang sigla ng pamilya at ng mga bisita at muling
nagkakabiruan dahil hindi naman talaga napuputol ng kamatayan ang
mga ugnayan sapagkat naroroon pa rin ang pag-ibig na nagbibigkis sa
namatay at namatayan.
Ngunit, ano nga ba ang koneksyon ng pag-ibig sa kamatayan at sa
kahulugan ng buhay ng tao (at ng Pilipino)?
Siguro, magandang tingnan ang pag-ibig bilang tulay na nagdurugtong
sa kapanganakan at kamatayan ng isang tao. Siguro, may gamit para sa
atin ang kasabihang ito:
Para raw masabing ganap na ang isang tao,
anuman sa mga sumusunod ay dapat niyang gawin –
magtanim ng puno, magsulat ng libro, o maging magulang.
Pansinin na sa lahat ng ito, nakapaloob ang pag-ibig: sa pagtatanim
ng puno, naipapakita mo ang pag-ibig sa darating na salinlahi; sa
pagsusulat ng aklat, ipinakikita ang pag-ibig sa kabataan at sa mga nais
pang matuto; at sa pagiging magulang, ipinakikita ang pag-ibig sa mga
magiging supling. Sa unang bahagi ng paglalahad na ito, sinasabing ang
tao ay umiibig at iniibig. Kaya naman, masasabing nararapat lamang
magtanim ng puno ang isang tao sapagkat nakinabang na siya sa mga
punong itinanim ng mga sinaunang tao; kapag siya’y nagsusulat ng
kanyang mga nalalaman, ito naman ay dahil nakatanggap din siya ng
kaalaman mula sa kanyang mga guro at mga magulang; at siya ay nagaalaga ng kanyang sariling mga anak dahil una na siyang tinangkilik at
inilagaan ng kanyang mga magulang. Kung baga’y ito ang tinatawag na
“pay forward.” Totoo ngang ang tao’y umiibig at iniibig.
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Ang pag-ibig nga ang tulay ng kapanganakan at kamatayan sapagkat ang
panahong ginugol ng isang tao sa pagmamahal ang siyang kahulugan
ng kanyang buhay. Nagkakaroon lamang ng katuturan ang kamatayan
sa pag-ibig sapagkat sa pag-ibig nagpapatuloy ang mga ugnayan. Dahil
sa pag-ibig, ang lahat ng ginagawa natin ay nagkakaroon ng katuturan.
Ang ating iniibig o minamahal ang siyang hantungan at patutunguhan
ng ating pagsisikap at hindi kamatayan.
Malaki nga ang papel na ginagampanan ng pag-ibig sa pag-iral ng
Pilipino. Bawat Pilipino ay may pinag-aalayan ng kanilang mga
pagsisikap at ito ay ang kanilang iniibig o ang obheto ng kanilang
pag-ibig. Maaaring ang kanilang pamilya, ang kanilang mga anak, ang
kanilang mga magulang, ang kanilang mga kababayan, ang kanilang
bansa o ang kanilang lahi.
Pag-ibig at ang mga Bayaning Pilipino
Tulay nga ang pag-ibig sa pagka-Pilipino ng Pilipino at para sa mga
bayani ng bayan ang pag-ibig sa sariling bayan ang batayan ng
kanilang pag-aalay-buhay na nakabatay naman sa katotohanang una
na tayong inibig at nakatanggap ng pag-ibig sa ating bayan. Bilang mga
mamamayang Pilipino, isinasauli lamang natin o sinusuklian lamang
natin ang mga natanggap natin at ibinigay sa atin. Kaya nga madalas
na marinig natin sa mga bayani ng bayan na utang na loob natin sa
ating bayan kung ano at sino tayo ngayon, kaya nararapat lamang na
ibalik sa bayan kung anuman ang mayroon tayo ngayon. Makikita nga
ito sa isinulat ng mga bayaning tulad ni Emilio Jacinto na kung saan
sinasabi niya: “Ang tunay na kabanalan ay ang pagkakawang gawa, ang
pagibig sa kapua, at ang isukat ang bawat kilos, gawa’t pangungusap
sa talagang Katuiran” (Gripaldo 2001:106). Muli sa sulatin ni Jacinto,
ipinaliwanag niya ang kahalagahan ng pag-ibig:
Sa lahat ng damdamin ng puso ng tawo ay wala nga mahal at
dakila na gaya ng pagibig…
…Kung ang pagibig ay wala ang mga Bayan ay dili
magtatagal, at kapagkarakang mapapawi sa balat ng lupa
ang lahat ng pagkakapisan at pagkakaisa at ang kabuhayan
9
ay matutulad sa isang dahon ng kahoy na niluoy ng init at
tinangay ng hanging mabilis…
…Ang pagkaawa sa ating mga kapua na inilugmok ng sawing
kapalaran hangang sa tayo’y mahikayat na sila’y bahaginan
ng ating kamuntik na kaluagan; ang pagtatangkal sa
naaapi hangang sa damayan ng panganib at buhay; ang
pagkakawang-gawa na lahat kung tunay na umusbung sa
puso, alin ang pinagbuhatan kung di ang pagibig?
Ang tunay na pagibig ay walang ibinubunga kung di ang
tunay na ligaya at kaginhawahan. Kailan pa ma’t sapinsapin
ang dagan ng pinapasan ng Bayang lipos ng kadukhaan
at lungkot, ay dahil sa ang tunay na pagibig ay di siyang
naghahari kung di ang taksil na pita sa yama’t bulaang
karangalan…
…Sa pagibig nunukal ang kinakailangang pagdadamayan at
pagkakaisang magbibigay ng di maulatang lakas, maging
sa pagaabuluyan at pagtutulungan ng isa’t isa, maging sa
pagsasanggalang ng mga banal na matuwid ng kalahatan
(Gripaldo 2001: 121-122).
Tulad ni Jacinto, may mga panuntunan din si Andres Bonifacio na
may kinalaman sa pag-ibig. Ito ang kanyang sampung makabayan at
maka-Diyos na panuntunan o ang Dekalogo ni Andres Bonifacio. At
kabilang sa mga panuntunang ito ay ang pag-ibig sa Diyos, pag-ibig sa
bayan at mga kababayan, kabutihan at pagkakawang-gawa sa kapwa,
at kahandaang mamatay para sa bayang minamahal. (Gripaldo 2001:
77).
Tuwiran namang sinabi ni Pangulong Manuel L. Quezon na matatawag
lamang ng isang tao ang kanyang sarili na karapat-dapat na
mamamayan kung matututunan niya muna ang kanyang mga tungkulin
bago niya hingin ang kanyang mga karapatan. Ipinaliwanag pa niya na
madarama lamang ang patriotismong makabayan na nagtataglay ng
debosyon, katapatan, at tapang, at handang mag-alay ng sariling buhay
ng mga taong ang pag-ibig sa bayan ay hindi lamang nakabatay sa likas
na ugnayan ng mamamayan at ng lupang tinubuan kundi nakabatay
sa katotohanang ang bayan nila ang nagkaloob sa kanila ng kalayaan,
katiwasayan, at katiyakang pang-ekonomiya (Gripaldo 2004: 125). At
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10 ANG PAG-IBIG BILANG HIGIT NA PAGTUKLAS SA PAG-IRAL
ayon kay Quezon, kongkretong naipapakita ang pag-ibig na ito sa bayan
sa pagtupad sa mga tungkulin ng isang mamamayan, pagbabayad ng
tamang buwis, at pagpapanatili ng kapayapaan at kaayusan (Gripaldo
2004: 88-89). At dahil ang mga pinuno ang mas maraming nakamit o
natanggap sa bayang tinubuan, sila ang mas maraming dapat isukli.
Ayon nga kay Jacinto, nakabatay ang kapangyarihang pulitikal ng mga
pinuno sa kanilang pag-ibig at malasakit sa kanilang mga kababayan,
at walang sinuman ang may karapatan dito kung hindi ito gagamitin
sa kabutihan at para sa ikabubuti ng nakararami (Gripaldo. 2004:5455).
Gayundin naman, ang pag-ibig ay tulay din sa pagkakaisa ng mga
Pilipino. Sa Panimula ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas, isa sa batayan
ng isang makatarungan at makataong lipunan ay isang demokrasya
na kung saan ang namamayani ay ang batas, ang katotohanan, ang
katarungan, ang kalayaan, ang PAG-IBIG, ang pagkakapantay-pantay,
at kapayapaan (1987 Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas). Siguro, masasabi ng
mga Pilipino, na ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas ang tanging saligang
batas sa buong mundo na kung saan binabanggit ang pamamayani ng
PAG-IBIG bilang daan sa isang makatarungan at makataong lipunan.
Si Jacinto nga ang nagsabi na ang unang bunga ng pag-ibig ay
pagkakaisa. Ito nga raw ang lakas at buhay ng isang bansa. Kapag
ang mga tao ay nagkakaisa at nagmamahalan, magiging magaan ang
mga pagsubok at ang kakatiting na kasiyahan ay magiging dakilang
pagsasaya. At kapag ang mga tao ay totoong nagmamahalan, wala
nang paniniil at wala ng pang-aapi (Gripaldo 2004: 82-84).
Sinasabing sa Pilipinas, kapag may nangyari sa kapitbahay,
dumaramay ang mga kababayan o kabarangay. Natatangi raw ito sa
Pilipinas na kung saan ang magkakapit-bahay ay may “pakialam” sa
isa’t isa (datapwat kung minsan, natatawag itong tsismis), na kung
saan may malasakit ang isa’t isa. Likas sa Pilipino na kaisang-loob niya
ang kanyang mga kapitbahay. Ngunit kung tatanungin, ano nga ba ang
kongkretong pagpapakita ng pag-ibig ng Pilipino sa kanyang sariling
bayan ayon na rin sa kulturang Pinoy o Pilipino? Bakit nga ba maigting
ang pagdadamayan sa kulturang Pilipino?
11
Pag-ibig at ang Kalooban ng Pilipino
Sa puntong ito, mahusay na balikan ang konseptong Pilipino na “loob.”
Kailangan marahil na balikan ang kalooban ng Pilipino para mas
maunawaan ang pag-ibig bilang tulay sa kaganapan ng isang Pilipino.
Ano ba ang konseptong “loob”?
Sa Pilosopiya ng Tao, isa sa pinakamahalagang konsepto ay ang kalooban.
Kapag loob na ang pinag-uusapan, maaari itong mangahulugang talino,
kagustuhan, mga emosyon o damdamin, at mga bagay na etikal. Para sa mga
Cebuano ang loob ay isinasaling buot samantalang para sa mga Ilokano, ito
ay nakem. Kaya naman, kung titingnan, ipinakikita ng loob na buo ang tingin
ng Pilipino sa kanyang sarili. At kung anuman ang nangyayari sa kalooban
ay may epekto sa buong katawan at kaluluwa (Mercardo 2005: 37).
Totoo ngang mayaman sa kahulugan ang Filipinong salitang loob. Sa
katunayan, mula sa salitang ito ay iba’t ibang salita ang nabuo tulad
ng kalooban, pagloloob, panloloob, pinaglooban, pinakaloob, kalooblooban, kaloob, loobin, pagbabalik-loob, kusang-loob, kapalagayangloob, lamang-loob, kabutihang-loob, kasamaang-loob, utang na loob,
buong-loob, tamang-loob, maling loob, malakas ang loob, mahina ang
loob, maruming loob, malinis na loob, maliit na loob, malaking loob,
sirang-loob, maayos na loob, panloob, at iba pa (Miranda 1988: 1).
Sa pinakadiwa nito, ang loob ay isang “lugar” na hindi nakikita. Masasabi
ring ito ang “panahon” sa pagitan ng simula at ng katapusan. Ngunit
sa simboliko nitong kahulugan, ang loob ay tumutukoy sa interyoridad
ng isang tao (kalooban ng isang tao). Kaya naman sinasabing ang loob
ay ang sentro o pinaka-ubod ng tao (Miranda 1988: 1). At ano naman
ang sentrong ito? May antas ba ang kalooban ng tao tulad ng kalooblooban, pinakaloob, kaibuturan?
Marahil tama si G. Jose de Mesa nang isulat niya na ang Loob ay ang
totoong kaibuturan ng tao sapagkat ito ang pinakarurok at sentro ng
katotohan ng tao. Doon matatagpuan ang pagkanilalang ng tao. Kaya
naman ang loob o kalooban ng sarili, ang ubod ng pagkatao ng isang
tao at doon matatagpuan ang halaga ng tao (De Mesa 1984: 52-60).
Sa katanungang kung may iba’t ibang antas ang loob, may mga
nagsasabing sa Pilipino ang konseptong loob ay walang mga antas na
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tulad ng id, ego at superego. Sa halip, sa Pilipino raw, ang mayroon
ay kamalayan, ulirat, isip, diwa, bait at loob (Miranda 1988: 2). Kaya
naman para sa Pilipino, ang loob nga ay kumakatawan ng kanyang
buong pagkatao at sa kanyang pagbibigay-sarili, kailangan niyang
ipakilala ang kanyang kalooban at upang makilala naman niya ang iba,
kailangan ding magbukas-loob siya upang tanggapin ang kalooban
o loob ng iba. Ito siguro ang tinatawag nilang pakikipagkapwa-loob
o ang pagtatalaban ng “loob” sa “loob.” Ano ba ang ibig sabihin ng
“pakikipagkapwa-loob”?
Ang malaking tukso raw para sa mga namimilosopiya sa konseptong
loob ay ang ihalintulad ang pagkikita at pagtatalaban ng dalawang
magkaibang loob bilang ugnayang “Ako-Ikaw,” o “Ako-Ito.” Subalit
kung lilimiin sa wikang Pilipino, ang pagtatagpo ng “Ako-Ikaw” ay
hindi sinasabing “Ako” at “Ikaw” kundi “Kita,” “Kata,” “Taka.” Dinadala
tayo ng pagsasaling ito sa malalim na kahulugan ng pagtatalaban
ng dalawang loob sa Pilipino. Kung pagbabatayan ang pagsasalin
ng “Ako-Ikaw” sa “Kita,” “Kata,” “Taka” masasabing, sa Pilipino, ang
pagtatalaban ng mga loob ay nangangahulugan ng pagkawala ng iba’t
ibang loob at ang pagkakaisa ng mga loob sa iisang pag-iral. Kaya
naman iba ang ibig sabihin ng “Mahal kita” sa “Ikaw ang mahal ko.”
Kung kay Buber ay nananatili ang pagkakaiba ng “Ako” at ng “Ikaw,” sa
kontekstong Pilipino, nawawala ang pagkakaibang ito at ang “Ako” at
ang “Ikaw,” ay nagiging isa (Mercardo 2005: 59-62).
Subalit paano ba nagaganap ang pagtatalabang loob na ito o ang
pakikipagkapwa-loob? Sa isang bahagi ng sulatin ni Mercado, isinalin
niya ang salitang Ingles na “dialogue” bilang “pakikipagpalagayangloob” (Mercardo 2005: 168). Siguro, magandang makita rin ang
pagkakapwa-loob sa punto de vista ng “pakikipagpalagayang-loob.” Sa
pang-araw-araw na pamumuhay, mapapalagay lamang ang isang tao
sa kanyang kapwa-tao kapag palagay ang loob niya rito. Subalit paano
ba napapalagay ang loob ng tao sa kanyang kapwa tao? Ayon na rin sa
una nating nakita sa itaas ng paglalahad na ito, napapalagay lamang ang
loob ng tao sa kanyang kapwa tao kapag nagkakilala na sila. Pero anong
klaseng pagkilala ba ang nagaganap sa pagitan ng dalawang loob?
Iba-iba ang ginagamit na salita sa Pilipino kung ang pinag-uusapan ay
ang pagkilala. Naririyan ang alam at ang kilala. Ginagamit sa Pilipino
13
ang salitang alam kung tumutukoy ito sa kaalaman at pag-unawa sa
isang bagay. Subalit may pagka-alam nga rito, impersonal naman ang
pamamaraan dito. Kapag ginagamit naman ang salitang alam, mas
para ito sa mga bagay. Kapag alam mo ang isang bagay, may bahid
ito ng tiwala sa sarili at damdamin na angat ka sa bagay na alam mo
(Mercardo 2005: 62-65).
Samantala, ginagamit din ng Pilipino ang salitang kilala—na ang ibig
sabihin ay nakikilala o nakikita ang kaibahan sa iba. Ang salitang kilala
ay ginagamit sa tao at interpersonal ang dating nito (samantalang ang
salitang alam ay mas impersonal at nasa antas lamang ng pagkaalam
o pag-unawa sa mga impormasyon). Kapag ginagamit ang salitang
kilala, para sa Pilipino, ito ay nangangahulugang palagay ang loob niya
sa isang tao. Ito iyong puntong nagkaroon na sila ng panahon para sa
isa’t isa kaya naman sila ay nagkakilala na. Kapag ang ugnayan ay nasa
antas ng kilala na, naroon na ang pagdamay, pagiging malapit sa isa’t
isa, at maging awa o pagmamahal.
Kapag “alam” natin ang isang bagay, naganap ito dahil sa tuwirang
pagdanas dito o intwisyon. Kapag “kilala” mo naman ang isang tao,
base ito sa panahong ginugol mo sa “pagkaalam” sa kung sino siya at
ano siya para sa iyo at para sa iba. Nagaganap ang pagkilala sa isa’t isa
sa isang mababaw na pagtatagpo, na nauwi sa pagkakaibigan, at kung
minsan mas nauuwi pa sa pag-iibigan na minsan ay nagbubunga pa
ng pagiging magkamag-anak. Kapag mas “alam” mo na ang isang tao,
na bunga ng maraming oras na pagtatagpo, mas nakikilala mo na siya
(Mercardo 2005: 65-66).
Subalit masalimuot ang pagkilala sa loob ng ating kapwa. At kung
minsan, mas masalimuot pa ang pagkilala sa ating sariling kalooban
sa pagkat ang loob, datapwat ito’y patuloy na nagpapakilala, ay
hindi naman ganap na nakikilala. Marami itong dimensyon na
kapag natalupan mo na ang unang balat, mayroon pang balat na
mas dapat tuklasin. Kaya nga, kung nais maunawaan at makilala
ang loob ng kapwa at totoong magkaroon ng pakikipagkapwa-loob,
kailangang magkaroon din ng panahon at tiyaga upang totoong
makikilala ito. Kailangang magkaroon ng panahong huminto upang
mabigyan ng pagkakataon ang bawat loob na makapagpakilala. At ang
pagpapakilalang ito ay hindi simple. Wika nga ni Miranda:
Page
Nakikilala lamang ang loob sa pamamagitan ng
pagpapakilala. Ang pagpapakilala ay nagaganap lamang
sa mga sangkap na panlabas. At bagamat ang panlabas ay
maaaring magkubli sa halip na maglinaw, ang panlabas na
rin ang siyang natatanging daan sa pagpapakilala ng loob.
At ano ang mga katangiang panlabas na ito? (Miranda 1988:
58).
Si Miranda na rin ang nagpaliwanag kung anu-ano ito. Ang mga
katangiang panlabas ay kinabibilangan ng pagkakaroon nito ng
katawan; kakayahan nitong magsalita; paggamit nito ng mga bagay;
at paggamit ng mga simbolo (Miranda 1988: 58-63). Nakikilala ng
isa’t isang loob ang bawat isa una sa pagtatagpo ng mga katawan,
pagkasilay sa mukha at sa pamamaraan ng tingin. Sa mga paraang ito,
maaaring makilala ng isang tao ang isa pa sapagkat may kasabihan
ngang “anuman ang loob ay kailangang pangatawanan” (Miranda
1988: 58-60). Pagkatapos, pumapasok na rin ang paggamit ng salita,
ng mga bagay at ng mga simbolo.
Sa mas malalim na pamamaraan, ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng loob at ng
isa pang loob ay ang pagtatalaban ng “malay sa malay” na sinusundan
ng “dama sa dama,” ng “ugali sa ugali,” “isip sa isip,” “bait sa bait,”
“kalooban sa kalooban.”
Una muna, kailangang mamalayan ng isa’t isa ang pag-iral ng bawat
isa. Pagkatapos nito, kailangang madama ng isa’t isa ang damdamin
ng bawat isa. Kailangang maunawaan kung ano ang nasa damdamin
ng bawat isa. Kasabay nito, pumapasok din ang pagkilala sa ugali ng
bawat isa. Dito ay makikita kung ano ang pinahahalagahan ng bawat
kalooban. At kasabay din nito ang pagkilala sa takbo ng isipan ng
kausap sapagkat ang isip at ang puso ang nagdidikta sa ikinikilos ng
isang tao. At ang lahat ng ito ay sinusundan din ng pagpapadama ng
bait at ng kalooban. Ang mga ito ay nangangailangan ng panahon at
atensyon upang maganap (Miranda 1988: 64-68). At ang adhikain ng
pakikipagkapwa-loob ay magkaroon ng liwanag o unawa. Sa madaling
salita, ang magkaroon ng pagkakaunawaan o pagkakaliwanagan. Hindi
ibig sabihin nito na umaayon ang isa sa isa kundi nagkakaliwanagan
lamang ang isa’t isa. Subalit kung magkaka-isang loob sila, iyon na ang
rurok ng pagkikipagkapwa-loob (Miranda 1988: 62).
15
Ang Iba’t Ibang Mukha ng Pakikipagkapwa Loob ng Pilipino
Ang konsepto ng pakikipagkapwa-loob ay makikita sa iba’t ibang uri
ng mga relasyon o ugnayan. Ilan sa mga halimbawa ng mga uring ito
ay ang kapalagayang-loob na nagaganap sa pagitan ng magkapatid;
kahulugang-loob sa pagitan ng magkaibigan; at kahulihang-loob
sa pagitan ng mag-asawa. Sa tatlong ugnayang ito, mapapansin na
nandoroon ang pagbubukas-loob ng isa’t isa, na pinananatili sa
kabuuan ng relasyon. Pareho nilang sinisikap na maunawaan at
matanggap ang isa’t isa. At habang nagtatagal, lalo pang nagbubukasloob ang isa’t isa basta walang dahilan upang ipagkait ang kalooban sa
isa. Kaya naman ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng magkapatid, magkaibigan
at mag-asawa ay hindi istatik; mapapanatili lamang ang mga ugnayang
ito sa patuloy na pagpapakilala at pagbubukas-loob (Miranda 1988:
7-72).
Tulad nga nang nasabi na sa itaas, ang pakikipagkapwa-loob ay
nagbubukas sa iba’t ibang uri ng mga ugnayan. Dito rin nabubuo ang
pakikipagbarkada, pakikisama, bayanihan, pagkakaroon ng suki, at
ang utang na loob. Subalit may puntong sumasablay ang mga ugnayang
ito kung ang pagbabatayan lamang ay ang pagiging magkakilala.
Ang barkada ay maaaring maging isang pangkat ng mga hoodlum o
mga kasanggang handang pumatay para sa kapwa kasangga; ang
pakikisama ay maaaring magbunga ng katiwalian dahil ayaw nang
kumibo ng isang tao para huwag masabihang walang pakisama; ang
bayanihan ay maaaring magbunga ng kawalang-sariling palo dahil
lagi na lamang umaasa sa iba; ang suki ay maaaring laging bigyan
ng negosyo kahit wala nang bidding; at nang dahil sa utang na loob,
pikit matang tatanggapin ang gustong ipagawa ng isang kaibigan kahit
labag ito sa tama at sa kanyang kalooban.
Sumasablay nga rin ang mga ugnayang ito. Subalit maitutuwid lamang
ang mga sablay na ito kung umiiral ang pag-ibig – kung ang pag-ibig
na ito ay ang pagtatalaban ng eros at ng agape. Ito ang pag-ibig na
handang magbigay subalit handa ring tumanggap. Ito ang pag-ibig na
nais maunawaan (Eros) subalit handa ring umunawa (Agape). Ito ang
pag-ibig na hindi na nakikita lamang ang “Ako” at ang “Ikaw,” kundi ang
“Kita.” At dahil “Kita” na ang patutunguhan ng pag-ibig na ito, ito ang
pag-ibig na inaasam ang makabubuti sa lahat at hindi sa iilan lamang.
Page
At dahil ang pag-ibig na ito ay siyang nagdurugtong sa atin sa ibang
kalooban, pumanaw man tayo, hindi pa rin tayo masasabing sawi at
hindi pa rin masasabing kamatayan ang siyang tagumpay. Sa pag-ibig,
nagpapatuloy ang ating mga loob, dumarami ito at nasasalamin pa sa
mga pinagkalooban natin ng kabutihang-loob. Totoo ngang pag-ibig,
ang tulay sa pagitan ng pagsilang at kamatayan; subalit ito rin ang
tulay na nagdurugtong sa buhay ng mga taong iniwanan na ng kanilang
mga mahal sa buhay at ng mahal sa buhay na sumakabilang buhay
na. Nagiging ganap ang pagkatao ng tao dahil sa pag-ibig sapagkat ito
ang nagpapanatiling buhay sa tao. Hindi namamatay ang tao kapag
siya’y umibig at iniibig. Nagpapatuloy siya sa mga relasyon o ugnayang
iniwan niya. At dito nga nagkakatotoo ang sinabi sa pelikula na hango
sa aklat na Tuesdays with Morrie, “Tinatapos ng kamatayan ang buhay
ngunit hindi ang mga relasyon” (Death ends life but not relationships).
17
Sanggunian
CBCP. 2000. Katesismo para sa mga Pilipinong Katoliko. Manila: Word & Life
Publications.
__________. 2001. Lagom ng Katesimo para sa mga Pilipinong Katoliko. Manila:
Word & Life Publications.
__________. 2004. Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Manila:
Word & Life Publications.
De Saint-Exupery, Antoine, 1991. Ang Munting Prinsipe. Isinalin ni Desiderio
Ching at ng isang Munting Kapatid ni Jesus. Quezon City: Claretian
Publications.
Dy, Jr., Manuel, B. 2001: Philosophy of Man (Selected Readings). Makati City:
Goodwill Bookstore.
Gripaldo, Rolando, M. 2001. Liberty and Love: The Political and Ethical
Philosophy of Emilio Jacinto. Manila: De La Salle University Press.
__________. 2004. Filipino Philosophy: Traditional Approach. [Part I, Section 2].
Foreword by George F. McLean. Manila: De La Salle University Press.
Mercado, Leonardo, SVD. 2005 Essays on Filipino Philosophy. Manila: Logos
Publications.
Miranda, Dionisio, M., SVD. 1988. Loob: The Filipino Within. Manila: Logos
Publications, Inc.
Timbreza, Florentino. 2000. Quest for Meaning (Philosophy Made Easy for
Filipinos). Quezon City: New Day Publishers.
Page
18
Friendship as Paradigm of
Aristotelian Eudaimonia
There is perhaps no other theme in Aristotle’s ethics as important and
central as eudaimonia or happiness. As the ultimate goal of human
existence, happiness is seen as defining the significance of all other
human activities. Since happiness is what every human being in the
end pursues, any action has worth and value only insofar as it has a
bearing on this ultimate good. And as long as what one does promotes
or instantiates happiness, one can be said to be doing what is morally
good.
Of course, interpreting how morally good actions bear on happiness
has been a tricky issue. There are those who would like us to think that
good deeds are mere means to attaining contemplation insofar as they
consider this to be what constitutes happiness. Here, a clear distinction
is made between the means and the end, so that the exercise of moral
virtues is viewed as a way of getting into the ultimate goal.
On the other hand, there are also those who underline the idea
that happiness is essentially an actualization [energeia], whereby a
potentiality comes to be realized. Such a process of actualization is
then viewed not simply as a means to an end but as instantiating the
end itself. In this regard, the exercise of moral virtue may be viewed as
forming part of what could be considered happiness. Consequently, a
neat differentiation can hardly be made between what constitutes the
means and what pertains to the end.
Taking into account the place of friendship in happiness, one may be
led towards favoring the second interpretation. As one of the moral
Friendship as Paradigm of Aristotelian Eudaimonia Page
19
virtues included by Aristotle in his list, friendship appears to be an
essential element of a happy life. According to the Stagirite, friendship
is “most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one
would choose to live, though he had all other goods.” [Nicomachean
Ethics, 1155a5-6]
How essential then is friendship in happiness? What role does it play
in the experience and realization of human ultimate good? And in
what way can friendship help us understand and spell out the nature
of happiness?
These are some of the questions that I would like to address in this
paper. In view of this, I have divided my paper in three parts. In the
first, I argue why it is essential to view eudaimonia as actualization.
In the second, I take into account the nature of friendship, pointing
out the evident parallelism between happiness and friendship. And in
the third part, I explain how friendship, insofar as it is paradigmatic of
eudaimonia, can clarify the Aristotelian notion of happiness.
Eudaimonia as Actualization
That Aristotelian ethics is teleological can readily be explained in
terms of the decisive function it assigns to human being’s ultimate
goal in the assessment of an act’s moral worth. But to regard it as no
different from other teleological ethical theories may not do justice to
how Aristotle’s understands such an ultimate goal.
There’s no doubt that both the Hedonist and the Utilitarian approaches
to ethics are likewise teleological in their perspectives. Both schools of
thought relate the act’s morality with the telos [goal] it pursues. There
is thus a tendency in both to look at the action simply as a means to an
end, and to understand the end as defining the moral value or disvalue
of an action.
Of course, the same can be observed about Aristotle’s view of the
relationship between one’s deed and one’s pursuit of happiness. The
former is done in view of the latter. But Aristotle’s insistence that the
human ultimate end is an actualization or activity [energeia] makes
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20 Friendship as Paradigm of Aristotelian Eudaimonia
happiness more complex than a Utilitarian or a Hedonist would have
us think. Happiness cannot simplistically be understood as a product
generated and brought about by a set of actions. It certainly is the end,
and even the ultimate end for that matter, but it need not be achievable
only at the end – when everything has already been done or when one
arrives at the conclusion of one’s life. No, happiness for Aristotle is an
actualization; as such, it consists in the very acts one does. Accordingly
there need not be a neat distinction between the means and the end.
For what might initially constitute the means could ultimately form
part of the end.
Viewing eudaimonia as an actualization makes us avoid the usual
difficulty encountered in the interpretation of what constitutes it.
More specifically, it helps resolve the problem in regard to the place
of moral virtues and the acts pertinent thereto in the account of
happiness. Because human being’s ultimate end is the actualization
of his ergon or characteristic task, which Aristotle associates with
rationality, the constitution and instantiation of happiness need not
be limited to contemplative activity. That is because even in carrying
out morally virtuous acts, one actualizes one’s rationality.
Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia can be summed up in his succinct
description of it. He defines it as an activity of the soul that has a
rational principle in accordance with excellence [NE 1098a7-18].
Since there are many ways in which one can exercise and instantiate
human rationality, the activity constituting happiness can likewise
take many forms. And if it is possible to actualize the human being’s
rational ergon in different activities, so there must likewise be a variety
of excellences or virtues that can be said of human being as human
being, i.e. insofar as he carries out his characteristically human task.
Already here we can see the close connection between happiness
and human virtues, in that the latter are descriptive of happiness as
an activity. The virtues, both moral and intellectual, characterize the
activity or activities constituting happiness. It is in accordance to them
that the various acts characteristic of human being as human being are
carried out. Hence, it is not only when one engages in a contemplative
activity in accordance with some intellectual excellence that one can
be said to attain eudaimonia. Even in exercising moral virtues, one
21
can also be said to achieve happiness. For one also actualizes one’s
rationality in doing a morally virtuous act [NE 1114b26-30].
So, for example, when a person of temperance does temperate things,
avoiding the excessive desire for pleasure, he not only concretizes such
a virtue into action, he also brings to bear his being rational, in that he
thinks and judges rightly what he must do in a given situation and acts
on it. Thus, although what he does is a practical act, his decision to so
act stems from an excellent or virtuous employment of his rational
faculty. In such a case, he did not only act excellently or do his action
well, he has likewise pondered well on what to do, employing his
reason reasonably well.
Aristotle identifies a good number of moral virtues in his list of
excellent states of character. The exercise of each of these virtuous
states may be considered concrete occurrences of happiness insofar
as these can occasion the excellent actualization of the human
characteristic task of rationality. And one of these excellent states is
the moral virtue of friendship, which I believe is quite instructive of
the nature of eudaimonia.
Friendship and Happiness: Parallelism and Correlation
As a moral virtue, friendship is to be understood as a good and
agreeable state of character which disposes one towards engaging in
friendly activities. It is similar to a talent or capacity which is actualized
whenever activities pertinent thereto are done.
But unlike the other moral virtues, friendship cannot be instantiated
without the involvement of another person. Indeed, one can exercise
virtues such as courage and temperance when the need for them
arises. But it’s pretty obvious that friendship and the activities thereof
imply an interpersonal rapport between at least two people.
Friendship is thus descriptive of the disposition not only of one of
the parties involved in a friendly relationship but of both parties.
And we can even say that friendship refers not only to the state of
character of both parties but also to the state or status – to use a more
Page
contemporary expression – of their relationship. And this virtuous
state of character and status of relationship come to be activated when
the parties involved in this friendly rapport are given opportunity to
meet and engage in friendly activities, perhaps celebrating the sheer
fact of their being friends.
Aristotle points out, however, that there is a variety of types when it
comes to friendship, and this is on account not only of the similarity
or dissimilarity of the parties involved but also of the basis of their
friendship. Surely, the friendly rapport between lovers differs from the
loving relationship existing between husband and wife, or between
parents and children. But friendship also varies on the basis of the
parties’ decision to enter into a friendly bond. And Aristotle identifies
three main possible motives: pleasure, utility and virtue [NE 1155b1719]. Some people are friends on account of the pleasure they are able
to draw from each other. There are also others who enter into friendly
rapport for its usefulness. And there are those who become friends
because of their shared trait, in that they are equally morally virtuous.
Of course, Aristotle is quite explicit in his preference for the friendship
on account of virtue. In a way, this evidences his difference and
disagreement with the hedonist and utilitarian stances. He argues
that the true sort of friendship is one that is founded on the virtuous
disposition of the parties. Friendships on the basis of pleasure or
utility are called such only on account of their resemblance with the
true type of friendship. They last as long as their relationship serves
their motivation. But as soon as the friendship ceases to give them
pleasure or be useful to the parties, the breakup eventually ensues.
Friendship among virtuous people is quite different. What occasions
it is not so much the end result desired by the parties as their
predisposition to associate with people in whom they can see
themselves. In other words, by their virtuous disposition they are
naturally inclined to flock together and give actuality to who they are
as people of excellence, such that their being with one another in a way
constitutes a flourishing as well as a celebration of their friendship.
Thus we see a parallel structure between eudaimonia and friendship
or, for that matter, moral virtues in general. Just as moral virtues are
23
states of character concretized in the activities pertinent to them, so is
eudaimonia essentially the human characteristic function instantiated
in the activities which give actuality to such a task. In both eudaimonia
and moral virtues, there is a process of actualization that takes place,
in that a function or a disposition comes to be exercised. In the end,
as we saw earlier, eudaimonia and the moral virtues coincide because
human happiness consists in the activity of the soul in accordance
with excellence. And it is precisely in performing virtuous acts that
one achieves such an activity. That is why, as pointed out earlier,
the constitution of eudaimonia need not be reduced to purely
contemplative activity or the strictly intellectual activation of human
rational function. For even in morally virtuous acts, one is effectively
giving realization to such a characteristically human task.
Friendship: Archetype of Aristotelian Happiness
Among the various moral virtues, however, there is none more
illustrative of eudaimonia than friendship. For aside from the parallel
structure moral virtues possess in relation to eudaimonia, friendship
as a virtue and the exercise thereof involves a further element of
contemplation inextricably connected with the pleasure which
accompanies the activities pertaining to friendly relationship.
Indeed, as Aristotle asserts, moral virtues are closely tied up with
practical wisdom [NE 1114b26-30]. In fact, it is exactly on account of
this intellectual virtue that one is able to act on moral virtues. Practical
wisdom consists in the right employment of rationality. And it affords
one to determine the action that would lead to moral virtues and lend
them some concreteness and actuality. Practical wisdom thus entails
some form of activity comparable to purely contemplative activity,
except that its object would be the right thing one ought to do. Such
intellectual activity consists in deliberation which leads to a decision
to act in a certain manner.
But a further element of contemplation is implied in the exercise of
friendship which makes it all the more aligned with eudaimonia. For
the friendship of the virtuous gives the parties the opportunity not only
to take a look at their excellent state but also to take delight therein
Page
[NE 1169b30-1170a4]. That is why, among the virtuous, friends are
considered another self [NE 1170b5-7]. Being with them allows one
to see oneself because a friend is a mirror to oneself. What one sees
in the other reflects who one is, so that, while this sort of friendship is
not founded on the pursuit of pleasure, it nevertheless affords one the
pleasure of taking delight in the virtues which one possesses oneself
and which one is able to exercise with one’s friend.
Aristotle’s notion of friendship undoubtedly differs significantly from
the hedonist conception thereof. While hedonism might view pleasure
as an end result of a deed, Aristotle thinks that pleasure is simply a
possible accompaniment of an act [NE 1175a29-b1]. Pleasure cannot
exist on its own. It can only supervene on the activity one is engaged
in. And that’s likewise how we must see eudaimonia. Since it is
essentially an activity, happiness cannot and should not be identified
with pleasure itself. Rather, it involves pleasure, in that a person who
achieves happiness is able to take delight in the very activity which
constitutes happiness.
This is where the uniqueness of the virtue of friendship, as a
constituent element of a happy life, is most evident. Friends who
mutually take pleasure in each other’s presence attain eudaimonia
not only because they lend actuality to the friendly state they are in
but also because they are able to contemplate the virtues they each
possess. Accordingly, friendship is able to instantiate eudaimonia
on two counts. Firstly, the exercise of friendship as a moral virtue
represents one concrete activity that makes up eudaimonia. And
secondly, one activity comprising the exercise of friendship is the
contemplative-like activity of beholding the virtues possessed equally
by friends, by which they take delight in the fact that they are living
a good life. Here, friendship helps one to experience more deeply the
pleasure that eudaimonia as an activity brings about.
Friends are thus essential to a fulfilling and happy life. Their company
makes it a lot easier for one to contemplate what matters most in
one’s existence, prompting Aristotle to remark, “If, then, existence is
in itself desirable for the blessed man … and that of his friend is very
much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable.”
[NE 1170b14-17]
25
Friendship itself can give us a clear picture of what happiness concretely
entails. People celebrate their friendship by doing the very acts that
brought them to such a state in their rapport. Of course, friendship
takes time to develop. Initially, friends were just acquaintances. But
on account of the repeated friendly activities they engage in, such
as conversation and shared meals, they eventually reach a stage
whereby a friendly disposition is acquired by both parties. This then
makes them more inclined to socialize with each other, reinforcing
their friendship each time they engage in the activities which equally
interest both of them.
Friendly activities are thus not just a means to achieving the virtue of
friendship. They can just as well be a manifestation and instantiation of
such a virtuous state itself. For instance, sharing a meal with someone
might be a means towards that someone becoming a friend of one.
But it does not mean that, when they become friends, they no longer
dine together. They can – and in fact they ought to – still share a meal,
except that this time around such an activity no longer represents a
means toward them becoming friends, for they already are friends.
Instead, it becomes a celebration and actualization of the friendly
disposition they have toward each other.
The same can be said of eudaimonia. In fact, its nature might even
be further clarified with the employment of the analogy of sharing a
meal with a friend. For once eudaimonia is achieved, the activities that
brought it about become constituent elements thereof, so that it is no
longer possible to distinguish between the end and means, or more
specifically, between eudaimonia and the activities that form part of
it. Thus, while the activities pertinent to moral virtues are essentially
practical acts, this does not necessarily exclude them from forming part
of what constitutes eudaimonia. Surely, eudaimonia is the actualization
of human being’s rational function. But this need not be reduced to
the purely and strictly intellectual activity of contemplation. For, as we
have seen, even morally virtuous activities do entail the activation of
the human characteristic task.
And this is where the analogy of sharing a meal with a friend can be
used for clarification. As pointed out, at first dining together is a way
for two people to develop their friendship. But once they become
Page
friends, what they do together – like chatting, sharing a meal, or just
hanging together – is no longer just a means toward some end. Rather,
these activities become manifestation and actualization of their
friendly rapport.
Morally virtuous activities are comparable to the activity of sharing
a meal with a friend. Initially they might be viewed as means toward
attaining eudaimonia. But when one has achieved the virtuous state,
these activities become instantiations of eudaimonia. They are no
longer mere aids toward getting into eudaimonia. They themselves
become an expression and demonstration of the state in which a
person finds himself in. And this, as pointed out earlier, is most
manifest among friends who are virtuous.
Page
27
THE POINT: THE SELF THAT
EXPERIENCES GUILT, PRIDE,
AND SELF-CONTENTMENT
CHRIS JULIUS D. CONJURADO
“There are moments in our lives when we had been points. These are the
moments when we experience pride, guilt, or self-contentment.”
The Point: Abyss of No Dimensions
Before everything else, I would like to say that this is not a mathematical
exposition, and I am not a mathematician. I chose to start with this
introduction because I want to clarify certain things about the main
topic of this philosophical reflection. I resolved that it is necessary so
that the reader can have a proper background about what I am going
to state.
Almost all of us are familiar with the notion about dimensions. We
have tackled it in elementary algebra and other higher forms of
mathematics. This word is frequently used to depict the measurement
or size of something, like when one measures the dimensions of a
building to be constructed. Some people say that there are eleven
of these dimensions. For some, there are seven. Concerning our
experience, at least in my opinion, we can only be aware of five
dimensions, namely: length, width, height, time, and mind. As we all
know, we move freely in a three dimensional space (length, width,
height). Still, we are inevitably dragged by the fourth dimension of
time. We cannot resist it nor go ahead of it. We can only go with its
flow. Lastly, there is the dimension of the mind, which transcends every
other dimension, i.e. we can think about the past or the future and
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28 THE POINT
other places. These things would certainly cause headache to those
who are not interested. Fortunately, I would not go deeper into that
topic; rather, I would stick upon discussing the first three dimensions.
Let us deal first with solids. Solids are known to exist in the first three
dimensions. They are three-dimensional objects and occupy space,
as we know it. These solids are made up of planes. Planes are twodimensional objects that often appear as shapes. They are composed
of lines which are one-dimensional, that is why planes look like lines
when viewed from the side (try placing a coin on top of a table and
look at it from the edge of a table. The coin would appear to be a
straight line). Lines, on the other hand, are composed of points. This
can be demonstrated by claiming that the intersection of two lines is a
point. Since a line already has one dimension, then what composes it
must be of a lower dimension. Lower than one dimension is zero, that
is, nothing. If this is so, how can it be that a line of one dimension be
made out of points with zero dimensions? It might also seem absurd
to think that a being – the point – exists in the realm of nothingness.
This question would be answered towards the end of our inquiry. We
would first probe the reality of the central theme for this paper, that is,
the point: the abyss of no dimensions.
Characteristics of a point. A point, as I mentioned above, exists in the
zero dimensions. It has neither length, nor width, nor height. Being
dimensionless, it cannot be measured. However, it does not follow that
it cannot be seen. It is like a blackhole. It is known to be there yet it
cannot be measured accurately. In order to be measured, one must be
composed of parts. Since a point has no parts, it cannot be measured.
A point, being dimensionless, exists on its own. In its world, it is the
only being because it itself is its own world. Unlike lines, planes, or
solids that can be further divided into line segments, smaller planes,
and fragmented solids, points can never be further separated. In
Pointland: the point is the world, the point is the king, and the point
is the citizen.
Let me further elaborate this by narrating a story from a book entitled
The Story of Flatland: An Adventure in Many Dimensions. In this book,
the main character is a hexadecagon (a sixteen-sided polygon) who
THE POINT Page
29
lives in Flatland, that is, the world of two-dimensional beings. In the
story, she (it is a female) encounters a sphere, which the Flatlanders
thought can never exist because it is from a higher dimension. This
event opened her eyes to the possibilities of transcending her own
world. She also had the chance to encounter the king of the onedimensional Lineland. She tried to convince him that there is a world
of two dimensions but despite her proofs, he cannot believe in two
dimensions because he can only see his left, right, and nothing else.
Later on, the sphere led the hexadecagon to meet the Point: the king
(because the voice is masculine) of Pointland. She heard the point
bragging about how happy he (I would substitute ‘it’ with ‘he’) is, how
perfect is his world, and the like. She tried to talk to the point and tell
him about the higher dimensions that exist out there. However, unlike
the king of Lineland, the point did not hear her. He is the only being in
his world and, therefore, can only think of himself, hear himself, and
talk to himself. The sense of others is not in his vocabulary.
This illustration is undeniably pitiful. No matter what she says, the
point cannot hear her. He himself is his one and all.1 He is happy with
himself, his world. He has no need for others because he would be a
point even without the help of other points.
Even if it is attempted that he be forced out of his dimension, the effort
would be futile because his dimension is himself. He is nothingness.
He is indeed in a hopeless and helpless situation. He cannot be joined
together with another point to form something else. Dedekind and
Cantor2 tried to create a continuum, and thus, a line, out of indivisible
points. Their theory ended up being rejected because of two reasons.
First, if the points were in contact in order to create a line, the
argument would be absurd because no matter how it is viewed upon,
0 + 0 cannot be equal to 1. Two zero-dimensional points can never add
up to a one-dimensional line. Second, if the points are not in contact,
there would be no continuum at all. There would only be spaces in
between. A point will always remain alone all by himself. Still, as it was
in the story, the point is not lonely; rather, he is happy with himself,
and this is not necessarily a good sign.
Although it is sad to think about it, many persons are like points in
the society today. Even in ourselves, we can realize that there are
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30 THE POINT
moments in our lives when we had been or are continuously mere
points. These are the moments when we experience the human reality
of pride, guilt, and self-contentment.
Pride: Self-absorbed Reality
Best-world Ever (mine). The point, having nothing else to do, is
happily contemplating himself. Since he is all alone, he is the king of
his own world – himself – even though he has nobody else to rule. He
can only think of himself, thus, do it to the fullest. In other words, he
is proud of himself.
It is not that it is wrong to stand up and accept who we are, rather, it
is about being too preoccupied with the ‘self’ that the voices of others
cannot be heard anymore. Thinking highly of oneself, one fails to
acknowledge others.
Just like the point, the proud person believes that his world is the
best world because he is in it. He can never imagine a different world
without him. The only world in his mind is the one in which he exists.
He and his world are one and cannot be separated. That is why by
being preoccupied by himself, he is prevented from seeing other
worlds.
Blackhole to Nothingness. The point is like a blackhole. If another
point is added upon it, that other point would just be absorbed into
the first point. When points are added together, they would just be
absorbed by each other. Even if he is not aware of others outside
himself, he is unconsciously absorbing those who get in contact with
him. He absorbs them into his world, that is, himself. His world is
the realm of zero-dimensions, which is why those who get in contact
with him are reduced to nothing. Nobody, then, wants to go near him
(obviously for the reason that they do not want to disappear from
reality) just as nobody wants to approach a blackhole.
The proud ‘self’ is like a point by being a blackhole to nothingness.
He himself is his one and all, thus, he regards others as nothing. He
has no care about anyone outside himself. He thinks highly of himself
THE POINT Page
31
so those who are near him appear to be nothing. They are either
friends who try to help him but are overwhelmed by his boastfulness,
or other proud persons who just absorbs each other into their own
nothingness.
Pride makes the ‘self’ consider that the reason why the ‘self’ can only
think of himself is that he is too high above others and he cannot see
those who are too far below. What he hadn’t realized is that it is he
himself who is sinking into the depths of his own ego and it prevents
him from seeing others. He had become enclosed in his own world; he
cannot see other beings around him.
Experiencing pride, the point becomes a blackhole to those who
are around him. He is empty even though he feels to be so full that
he is brimming over, covering others with his own greatness. This
emptiness leads him to reduce others to nothing by dragging them
with him, and his own self is secluded from the rest of reality as if he
were the only being on the world. He puts the fence around himself –
his own world – therefore, detaching from the rest of reality.
Guilt: From Points to Point
Detachment from the Line. The proud ‘self’ detaches itself from the
community by thinking greatly about itself. The situation is the same
with the guilty person, though the reason is different.
Guilt makes the point detach from the line (here, let us assume first
that the line is indeed made up of points). From the realm of onedimensionality, the point is reduced to nothingness. From being with
others, the point encloses itself in its own dimension. Nobody from
outside can convince it to come out. Detaching from the line would
incur a great loss not on the part of the line, because a line would
still be a line even without a single point, but on the part of the point,
because it would be reduced to nothingness.
The experience of guilt makes the ‘self’ realize the wrongness of its
past acts and makes it want to atone for them. Guilt helps and teaches
the ‘self’ in examining itself and in learning to choose better next time.
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32 THE POINT
However, it is a bad sign if the ‘self’ cannot get out of its own dimension
because of guilt. Truly, guilt is one of the boundary-situations, “the
final and inexorable limits of our being”3, but it must not bind us into
immobility. It is indeed “like a great wall which we cannot climb and
through which we can never pass”4 but it must not restrict us from
moving and from trying harder.
The situation of the enclosed self – the point in its own dimension –
is like that of eternal isolation after death. It is said that the state of
being after death is eternal solitude – nothing to see, no one to talk to,
etc. The same can be said of the point in pointland, who can only see,
hear, talk to, and think of itself.
Only the Self to Blame. Guilt can sometimes be mistaken as the fear
of punishment. When a person commits a wrong deed, he is afraid
of being punished. Often times, guilt is accompanied with fear of
punishment. However, fear and guilt are two different concepts. Let
us take the example of a student who is caught cheating at school for
which he sets a failing mark.5 Before he comes home, he already fears
the punishment he might get from his father. This is the time when fear
and guilt intertwine. Once he gives the report card, his father will ask
what is meant by an F in his character evaluation. By now he would be
trembling with fear, awaiting the punishment he deserves. Fortunately
(or perhaps unfortunately), his father would not do anything to him and
would never talk about the topic. His father would just remain quiet
and would not give him any penalty. He is now left by himself reflecting
on what happened. He may now be free from fear of punishment but
he is still suffering from the burden of guilt. He believes he deserves
to be punished but, he was spared. Does he deserve to be spared from
punishment? According to Merold Westphal, “in fear I am concerned
about my happiness, while in guilt I am concerned about my worthiness
to be happy”6. Fear is directed towards an object outside the self (the
punishment) while guilt is concentrated upon the subject itself (his
worthiness). Guilt, then, is an attitude towards the self.
The ‘self’, which feels guilt, focuses upon itself. “The bearer of guilt is
visited by the shudder identity with himself.”7 He encloses himself in
his own world so that he can meet only his ‘self’. This way, he throws
away contact with others outside his own world. He is aware of others’
THE POINT Page
33
views about him and he approves of them. “In guilt, I approve of
other’s disapproval of me.”8 However, even if he acknowledges other’s
opinion, it is still too painful for him, so he chooses to detach himself
from the community. This way the ‘self’ becomes a point, sealed off in
his own dimension. He only has himself to blame.
“Everyday common sense initially takes ‘being guilty’ in the sense of
owing something’, ‘having something on account’.”9 This makes the ‘self’
indebted to someone. But guilt still has a further significance. It is not
just the accountability over something; rather, it is the responsibility of
the ‘self’ over that which he owes. This responsibility makes the feeling
of guilt subjective. But a question arises, “To whom is the ‘self’ indebted
to?” The ‘self’ is indebted to itself. This can be proven through the notion
of responsibility. As I mentioned earlier, guilt’s further significance
is responsibility. This responsibility entails that it is one’s duty to do
whatever it is that one ought to do. In Kantian language, duty is a selfimposed obligation, through the use of one’s own reason. Therefore, if
one fails in one’s responsibility, one fails in one’s duty towards oneself.
One, therefore, owes the fulfilment of one’s duty to oneself. This is also
why there is an introspective question of worthiness. A guilty ‘self’
blames itself for not being able to fulfil its duty. No other selves can relieve
the guilt of that ‘self’ because it itself is the one that owes something to
itself. Just like an isolated point, a guilty self is unapproachable from the
outside because it is a world on its own, and it is happy about it.
The matter can also be understood from a different perspective. The
‘self’, enclosing itself from the world, cannot find anybody else to
blame. It cannot even think of any other person who is as unworthy
as itself, because, primarily, it can only think of itself. This is really
dangerous because there is a tendency for the self to be locked forever
in its own world. Nobody else can help the ‘self’ except itself. It is just
like a nightmare. You cannot be awakened by anybody else unless you
seek for help (at least in forms of struggle).
Self-contentment: Locked Away in Ignorance
Self-contentment is a dangerous disposition. The ‘self’ has a tendency
to be locked forever in ignorance due to self-satisfaction. One might
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34 THE POINT
take this statement as a criticism against the Christian ideal of
contentment. However, I would like to make clear that this is not so.
The Christian notion of contentment is not an idle satisfaction with
what one has. It is, rather, accepting what one is capable of obtaining
for oneself. Still, one must strive and exert one’s effort. “Ask, and it shall
be given you: seek, and you shall find: knock and it shall be opened to
you.”10 Those who ask would be given what they ask for but they must,
first, ask for it. It is not just a matter of accepting who one is, but of
trying to be better than who one is in the past.
Contentment is not bad as long as it involves appreciating the good
that one has. However, if contentment prevents one from struggling,
this becomes a hindrance to the development of the ‘self’. “Being
contented (with one’s life) is neither necessary nor sufficient for being
a happy person.”11 One cannot be happy just by being contented. Selffulfilment cannot be achieved by being contented with what the ‘self’
is. “Being contented with something only requires the absence of
dissatisfaction.”12
Contented in his world, the self-enclosed point will not exert effort
to look for another world. It is satisfied with its current situation. It
will not try to go out of its world because it is not dissatisfied with
itself. Consequently, the point would be locked away from the rest
of reality. With perfect self-contentment, it becomes ignorant about
other possible worlds.
Perfect Self-contentment. “To aspire is better than to be blindly
and impotently happy.”13 Contented in its own world, the point stops
aspiring for better things. It is afraid to go beyond what is known to it.
It is indeed risky to explore the realm of the unknown. It would be a
leap of faith to struggle to be better because there might be dangerous
consequences resulting from trying. One may be satisfied with one’s
current situation but one could be blind about the truth. The selfcentered point is engulfed in fear. It doesn’t want to take dangerous
risks even if it is for the sake of truth because its fear already makes
it blind.
Fear is a very powerful force. It can paralyze anyone who entertains
it. The ‘self’ who doesn’t want to strive harder is “fearful of truth”
THE POINT Page
35
and “intimidated into conformity”14 with what is already known. One
doesn’t want to get out of one’s comfort zone, in the same way that a
self-enclosed point cannot get out of its world. Fear traps it inside.
It is convinced that it is better to stay in the darkness than find out
what is out there in the light. Undeniably, there might be dangerous
things that lie out there in the bright side. However, as long as the
‘self’ would not go out of its cave, it could only perceive darkness. For
it, this darkness means peace. And it is satisfied with living in this sort
of “peace”.
Ignorance of the Point. The ‘self’, which is satisfied with this “peace”,
can be considered ignorant for “ignorance is a quality of people who
do not try to find out the answers to the great mysteries.”15 It stops
excelling for fear of truth. Fear disables it to be better than before.
Not wanting to take the risks, the enclosed self also throws away the
chance for self-fulfilment. It only awaits its own corruption in the
corner of its cave of ‘peace’.
It is said that ignorance is bliss. However, I think that it is more of
a curse. Ignorance is just an escape from reality. It is a failure to
know what one ought to know. It is a failure of one’s responsibility,
therefore, a source of guilt. It is different from innocence. The ‘self’
uses ignorance as an excuse for not knowing the truth. Still, it is the
duty of human persons to know the truth. It is laziness and fear that
hold back the ‘self’ from endeavouring.
“Happiness requires something more than the mere absence of
dissatisfaction.”16 It is not enough to be contented to fulfil oneself. One
needs to struggle with oneself for one to be a better person.
The point, not wanting to take the risk of going out of its own dimension
doesn’t know anything outside its own world. This is the reason why
it knows only itself – the only being in its world. It is contented with
itself – the only thing it can think of – because it is not dissatisfied
with itself. It would do no harm for one to be introspective, but one
also needs to look outside the ‘self’. Unless the point realizes its pitiful
situation, there is the dangerous chance for it to be locked forever
in ignorance about others outside itself. It would be contented with
being guilty and proud of itself.
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36 THE POINT
Transcendence
If the point ever knew the higher dimensions, it would have strived
more to be better. However, this is impossible as long as it is
preoccupied with itself. It cannot be forced by those who are outside
to move out of its own dimension. Touching the point would be like
touching nothingness. One cannot just pull it out of his own dimension
because its dimension is itself. The change must originate from the
point himself. Unless this is done, it would be a point forever.
Breaking the Law of Nature. If the point would be to transcend
itself, then it would be breaking the law of nature. From a point, it can
become a line through excellence. A point could be a line in three ways.
First, the objection against Dedekind and Cantor could be false. A line
may indeed be composed of points. However, this would not just be
a number of points but an infinity of points. Having infinity of points
could create an infinitely long line. The sum of a number of zeroes will
always be equal to zero, but the sum of infinity of zeroes would not
necessarily be equal to zero.17 To talk about infinity is a different thing
from talking about finite things. The point can be a line if it is united
with the infinite number of selves out there. The ‘self’ that is detached
from the line can always go back.
Second, the line is also a distance between two points. Even if two
points do not meet, it is the space between them that makes a line. It
is their relationship with one another that breaks the law of nature.
If one point relates with another (of course, this would require that
the point would try to surpass itself and go beyond its own realm),
they could no longer be considered a mere nothingness but a line that
contributes a whole.
Thirdly, the line is also a stretched point. The explanation is similar to
the first one. A point that has no dimensions can be a line if it expands
itself to one-dimensionality (against the law of nature). However, this
requires that the point transcend itself. It must extend its capabilities
to the best it can (or even better than its best) so that it can transcend
itself.
An Act of Creation. A point’s transcendence is an act of creation.
From the realm of nothingness, the point emerges into dimensionality.
THE POINT Page
37
It can be a creator and not just a creation. It can be the creator of itself
and what it would become.
Once the point acknowledges other dimensions outside its own, the
proud ‘self’ would cease to be. It would recognize other points outside
itself, which also have the capacity to transcend themselves. Guilt, even
though inescapable, is still amendable. One cannot escape from being
guilty of one’s responsibility, but one can avoid detaching from the
line through self-forgiveness. Only the ‘self’ can forgive guilt because it
is owed to oneself. Self-contentment must be avoided because it is not
sufficient for man’s pursuit of happiness. The ‘self’ must have the “will
to power” in order to transcend itself. “Until the Creative Will says
to it: But I willed it thus! Thus shall I will it,”18 one cannot transcend
oneself. Without this, it would be locked forever in ignorance.
Going back to the infinity of lines, the point loses its individuality.
The same would happen to the self by going back to the community.
As a point, that is, preoccupied with itself, one might seem to be
insignificant. A point will not be a great loss to infinity of points.
However, once one goes out of one’s own box, one could contribute
for the greater good of all. A line would still be a line in the absence of
a point but a triangle cannot be a triangle with one line missing. To be
a line is always better than to be a point – the abyss of no dimensions.
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38 THE POINT
Endnotes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Suzanne Fox Buchele, The Story of Flatland: An adventure in Many
Dimensions (2006), 96. Retrieved from http://www.southwestern.edu/
academics/bwp/pdf/2006bwp-buchele.pdf (accessed 19 February
2013).
Rev. Fr. Lorenz Moises Festin, “Course Notes in Cosmology,” Unpublished
Lecture Notes in Cosmology, (Makati: San Carlos Seminary, n.d.), 20.
John Wild, Existence and the World of Freedom (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), 27.
Ibid., 26.
Merold Westphal, God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of
Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 74.
Ibid., 76.
Ibid., 75.
Ibid., 78.
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Stanbough (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996), 260.
10 Matthew 7:7.
11 Thomas L. Carson, “Happiness, Contentment, and the Good Life,” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981): 378-392. Retrieved from http://
orion.it.luc.edu/~tcarson/Happiness-Contentment-GL.pdf (accessed 21
February 2013), 378.
12 Ibid.
13 Buchele, 96.
14 Ibid., 125.
15 Ibid., 114.
16 Carson, 380.
17 C.K. Raju, Time: Towards a Consistent Theory (Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publichers, 1994), 12.
18 Friedrich Nietszche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale
(London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), 163.
THE POINT Page
39
Bibliography
Abbott, Edwin. Flatland: A Romance of Many Dimensions. UK: Seely & Co.,
1884. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/97/pg97.
html (accessed 19 February 2013).
Buchele, Suzanne Fox. The Story of Flatland: An Adventure in Many Dimensions.
2006. Retrieved from http://www.southwestern.edu/academics/bwp/
pdf/2006bwp-buchele.pdf (accessed 19 February 2013).
Carson, Thomas L. “Happiness, Contentment, and the Good Life.” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981): 378-392. Retrieved from http://
orion.it.luc.edu/~tcarson/Happiness-Contentment-GL.pdf (accessed 21
February 2013).
Festin, Lorenz Moises. “Course Notes in Cosmology.” Unpublished Lecture
Notes in Cosmology. Makati: San Carlos Seminary.
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Stanbough. Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1996.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale.
1961. Reprint, London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1969.
Raju, C.K. Time: Towards a Consistent Theory. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publichers, 1994.
Westphal, Merold. God, Guilt, and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of
Religion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
Wild, John. Existence and the World of Freedom. Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1963.
Page
40
DERRIDEAN CONCEPT
OF FORGIVENESS
JOHN ALFORD L. MOLINA
Introduction
Charles Griswold says it is surprising that “philosophy has hitherto
played a relatively minor (albeit ongoing and increasingly vocal) part
in the debates about the meaning of this cluster of concepts.”1
Berel Lang in his article in the American Philosophical Quarterly entitled
“Forgiveness” goes further than what Griswold said in his book. Lang
writes at the very beginning of his article, “Moral philosophers have
largely ignored the concept of forgiveness; certainly in comparison to
the attention they give the related concept of punishment…”2
It is therefore the desire of the researcher to be one with the
philosophical world in broadening its horizon in regard to this concept
of forgiveness, in a world where it is badly needed. A deepening
knowledge and reflection on forgiveness should, the researcher
believes, be given more emphasis than its opposite backward concept
of punishment. There is a need to reinforce the voice of philosophy
in adding to the development of humanity’s understanding of
forgiveness, if there is such a thing, in a world where it is increasingly
“demanded, granted or withheld.”3
Now the most common understanding of forgiveness can simply be
explained in this manner: X hurts/offends Y, X realizes4 that he has
committed a mistake, X then asks pardon or says sorry to Y, Y either
grants or withholds pardon to X. Now if X grants pardon to Y then
forgiveness occurs. We can see here that there needs to be an offender,
Derridean Concept of Forgiveness Page
41
an offended and an offense in order for forgiveness to come about. If
we scrap any of the three from this most common understanding of
forgiveness, then the existence thereof would not be possible. Now
this most common understanding of forgiveness is what Griswold
would call the model case5 of forgiveness, although he himself admits
that there are certain controversies or reservations that would arise
with such a terminology.
One can immediately see that in Griswold’s model case, there are
conditions to be fulfilled in order for forgiveness to exist. So it is
not at all surprising that the most common questions that arise
when we talk about forgiveness all lead to a very complicated and
conditional concept thereof. A concept of forgiveness that has too
many requirements or asks too many things, something which makes
this concept of forgiveness impure, at least for Jacques Derrida.
This then would be the focus or main topic that this paper would
tackle: Jacques Derrida’s concept of forgiveness. Derrida considers
forgiveness as one of the aporias6 together with gift, hospitality and
mourning.
Jacques Derrida says that true forgiveness is unconditional forgiveness.
Though he furthers his argument when he says that true forgiveness
only comes about when it is in the face of those things that are
impossible to forgive. For Derrida, the possibility of forgiveness only
comes about in cases when it is impossible to forgive. Alternatively, to
state it in a much simpler manner, forgiveness only becomes possible
in the face of its impossibility. Also, forgiveness, for him, should not
demand anything. Here I think it would be worth mentioning that
connected to Derrida’s understanding of the concept of forgiveness is
his concept of gift.
Forgiveness for him is a gift. A gift is something that is given freely by
someone. It is not supposed to be demanded or asked for, otherwise, it
would not anymore be a gift. If it is something that is given because one
asked for it, then the term gift, at least with its ideal meaning, should
not be used to call it anymore. Rather, the researcher is thinking here
of other terms such as bribe, enticement, or perhaps, even reward.
But the gift should be something pure and unconditionally given, i.e.
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42 Derridean Concept of Forgiveness
it must not be the outcome of our own efforts or capabilities. Come to
think of it, if something is really a gift, then it can never be the result
of our own doing.
Benedict XVI in turn also has a similar understanding of the concept of
gift. He says in his encyclical letter entitled Spe Salvi “heaven is always
more than we could merit, just as being loved is never something
‘merited’, but always a gift.(italic is mine).”7 Here we can see that
Benedict XVI tries to apply the concept of the gift to the concepts of
heaven and love.
Jacques Derrida’s Concept of Forgiveness
In this section, the researcher will focus on exploring Jacques Derrida’s
concept of forgiveness as laid down to us in his two books entitled On
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness and Questioning God.
When we talk about the possibility of the impossibility, the first thing
that readily enters the mind is the question: what does Derrida mean
by the possibility of the impossibility? Is he not committing a logical
contradiction by using possibility and impossibility at the same
time? The researcher would therefore like to propose in this section
two possible understandings or interpretations of this phrase – the
possibility of the impossibility.
In the first three parts of this section, the thoughts of Vladimir
Jankélévitch and the particular case of the Shoah would be used for us
to better grasp Derrida’s understanding of the same. The other parts
would discuss other aspects of Derrida’s concept of forgiveness.
Forgiveness: Meta-Temporal
Vladimir Jankélévitch says that one cannot, one must not forgive
the crimes of the Nazis or the crimes of the Shoah because they are
imprescriptible. Farlex defines imprescriptible as “1.) The state of
being incapable of prescription, 2.) A property which is held in trust
is imprescriptible; that is, the trustee cannot acquire a title to it by
43
prescription; nor can the borrower of a thing get a right to it by any
lapse of time, unless he claims an adverse right to it during the time
required by law.”8 If we try to examine the two possible meanings that
Farlex gives to the word imprescriptible, we will be able to get two
important points that we can use to further Derrida’s response to
Jankélévitch’s understanding of imprescriptibility.
The two points are time and prescription. Jankélévitch said in “Should
We Pardon Them” that one reason why he refuses to forgive the Nazis
is because time does not heal the pain that their crimes caused. Their
crimes, as it were, are meta-temporal, beyond time, beyond its domain
and its dictates. Jankélévitch states:
The time that dulls all things, the time that uses up sorrow
as it erodes mountains, the time that favors pardon and
forgetfulness, the time that consoles settling and healing
time, does not diminish in the least the colossal slaughter;
on the contrary, it never ceases to revive its horrors.9
We will see in this long quotation that Jankélévitch is at least trying to
imply that the usual phase of healing cannot be applied to the particular
case of the Shoah because it is a crime of “colossal slaughter.” Time,
which usually heals the wounds of hurts will not work, cannot work
and be applied to this case. It is as if Jankélévitch is saying that it is not
for time to decide whether the moment of resentment, of punishment,
and of raving and ranting is finally over. It is not a thing of time.
Derrida sees forgiveness as something out of the ordinary course of
history too. It is extraordinary. It is also something which is metatemporal in the sense that it should not be entangled with the rules,
the laws of temporality; otherwise it would become a muddled form
of forgiveness. Because the more forgiveness becomes entangled
with the domain of rules and norms, the more it becomes impure.
Derrida states “Forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative,
normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the
face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the ordinary course of
historical temporality.”10
If Derrida is correct in what he is saying about forgiveness, then the
reason that the crimes of the Nazis were meta-temporal is not enough
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to withhold forgiveness because forgiveness too is meta-temporal. It
is also something which shakes the ordinary flow and course of time.
It is also something which is not time bound. So forgiveness, in the
Derridean understanding could easily dampen, if not remove, the
animosity that is caused by the Shoah.
The second important point that we need to consider in this section is
the word prescription. Usually, it is the law that gives prescriptions. The
law prescribes things that need to be done and also, those things which
need to be avoided. In the case of imprescriptible crimes, prescription, i.e
“all juridical criteria regarding statutory limitations usually applicable
to common law crimes are in this case beside the point”11 at least in
Jankélévitch’s understanding. And this is precisely the main point of
imprescriptibility; that it is really about statutory limitations laid down
by the law as punishments to disobediences thereto.
Jankélévitch seems to be arguing that since the Nazi crimes were
imprescriptible, it follows that they are unforgivable. But there is a big
difference between the words unforgivable and imprescriptible. The
difference is that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. Derrida
writes the “imprescriptible – namely, what is beyond ‘statutory
limitations’ – is not the un-forgivable.”12 So when Jankélévitch tried to
equate the term imprescriptible to the term unforgivable, he was, for
Derrida, committing a very grave mistake. For one, because they are
not synonyms. Another, because imprescriptibility is a concept of the
law, something which, according to Derrida, the concept of forgiveness
must not be confused with, lest it become a pseudo-forgiveness like
reconciliation, political pardon etc.
Imprescriptibility is, according to Derrida, primarily a juridical notion.
He goes on to further say that not only is imprescriptibility insufficient
to justify non-forgiveness, but that it (the concept of imprescriptibility
that is) does not even “belong to the order of forgiveness.”13 It is a
concept which is totally detached, if not, totally different from the
concept of forgiveness.
It seems evident then, that what Jankélévitch tried to envisage through
the concept of imprescriptibility fails to meet his purpose of justifying
the non-forgiveness of the Nazis, at least in Derrida’s view of the matter.
45
Expiation and Inexpiability
Jankélévitch argued, again, for the impossibility of forgiving Nazi
crimes because what they did, according to him, were inexpiable; they
were beyond any remuneration and expiation. What they did were, in
a sense, beyond repair. Their crimes are irreparable.
Irreparability is a concept that is quite connected to the concept of
inexpiability. Expiation is necessary because someone has been
wronged. A certain order or relationship has been destroyed or
disrupted. The purpose of expiation then is the bringing back of the
broken relationship and/or the ordering of whatever was disrupted.
Now it follows that if the crime, the offense that was done is beyond
expiation, as in the case of the Shoah (at least in Jankélévitch’s view)
then what was destroyed could not be brought back anymore, and
what was disrupted could not be ordered once more. It is, in the
strictest meaning of the term, not just inexpiable, but also, irreparable.
Now Derrida does not directly answer Jankélévitch’s claim on
inexpiability, well, except by pointing out or asking whether expiation
was really necessary for forgiveness to come about and by answering
that it is not. Derrida says that expiation is not necessary for
forgiveness to exist since this would immediately lead the concept of
forgiveness to fall into the sphere of that which is “normal, normative,
normalizing.”14 It is surprising, however, that Derrida treats expiation
very minimally in his writings, though giving more importance and
treatment to its other “related notion”15 irreparability.
When there is a need for expiation and reparation in the process of
forgiving, then, according to Derrida we establish a “correlation…
of punishing and forgiving.”16 Derrida says that when Jankélévitch
declared “that forgiveness no longer has a sense where the crime
has become, as has the Shoah ‘inexpiable,’ disproportionate, out of
proportion with any human measure”17 he tacitly lowered the status
of forgiveness to that of an economic exchange, and equaled it to its
negative opposite concept of punishment.
In “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible” Derrida
quotes Jankélévitch thus:
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Properly speaking, the grandiose massacre [the Shoah, the
“final solution”] is not a crime on a human scale any more
than are astronomical magnitudes and light years. Also the
reactions that it inspires are above all despair and a feeling
of powerlessness before the irreparable.18
Derrida italicized the word irreparable in this quotation, he (Derrida)
says, for three reasons. His first reason is a very short one, and
something which the researcher thinks is not very necessary to our
discussion. Derrida says that his first reason for italicizing the word
irreparable is this: “‘Irreparable’ will be Chirac’s word to describe…
the crimes against the Jews under Vichy.”19 The French statement
goes thus “La France, ce jour-là accomplisait l’irréparable” which
when translated to English means “France, that day, accomplished the
irreparable.”20
The second reason that Derrida gives us for underlining the word
irreparable is, the researcher believes, the most important among the
three. Derrida states:
We will have to ask ourselves if the irreparable means the
unforgivable; I think “No,” no more than the “imprescriptible,”
a juridical notion, belongs to the order of forgiveness and
means the un-forgivable.21
Derrida believes that both inexpiability and irreparability do not mean
the unforgivable and, like the concept of imprescriptibility, they are also
juridical concepts. Derrida asks, what do we expiate for? What is it that we
need to repair? What do we need to do remuneration for? Certainly not just
our actions or any other actions. What we expiate for are wrongs, misdeeds.
He likewise asks the same question in regard to forgiveness. Derrida asks,
what do we forgive? Certainly not just any action or deeds, but, as in the
case of expiation and reparation, wrongs and misdeeds. He states:
For there to be a scene of forgiveness, such a fact or deed
(fait), such an event as done, must not be only an event,
something that happens, a neuter/neutral and impersonal
fact, this fact will have had to have been a misdeed or
wrongdoing [méfait] and a wrong done [méfait fait] by
someone to someone, a harm, a fault, implicating an author
who is responsible and a victim.22
47
Both expiation-reparation and forgiveness pertain to wrongdoings; to
a harm done, a fault and a misdeed. While the former does so in view
of justice, the latter does so because it does so. Take note that Derrida
does not give any reason for forgiving because if he does give a reason
for such an act then he would end up, like Vladimir Jankélévitch,
contradicting his own statements on forgiveness. There is no reason
why we should forgive; there is just the object of forgiveness – a wrong,
a fault or a misdeed. And even this is quite problematic for Derrida;
his constant question, one that we will never be able to escape from
according to him, is the question of who and what. Or applying it to
the situation at hand, what is the object of forgiveness i.e. the who or
the what? Derrida says that while the question is inescapable, it is also
unanswerable. So let us leave it at that and return to the issue at hand.
Now if expiation-reparation is under the umbrella of justice, then
Derrida would be justified in saying that they are juridical concepts.
And true enough, most of the expiations and reparations done to
ameliorate or remunerate what was damaged due to misdeeds are
penalties of the law. They are prescriptions of the law, punishments
as it were to crimes done, punishments for defiance of the law. But
this would just prove Derrida’s claim that the inexpiable and the
irreparable are not the un-forgivable. Because the “only inscription of
forgiveness in the law, in juridical legislation, is no doubt the right to
grant clemency.”23
The granting of clemency by the sovereign fulfills what Derrida says
of forgiveness. For Derrida, forgiveness is always heterogenous but
always indissociable to conditions.24 Meaning, forgiveness, since it is
something so pure (at least for Derrida) is always outside the realm of
conditions. But due to its aporetic structure, it cannot but exist with/
in the same sphere of conditions.
Derrida says of the king’s right to grant clemency: “this all-powerful
sovereignty (most often of divine right) that places the right to forgive
above the law, is no doubt the most political or juridical feature of the
right to forgive as the right to punish.”25 The sovereign has the right to
forgive offenses, misdeeds and instances of defiance to the law. This
is the only instant when the king acts above the law, outside the law,
as it were. It is a power inscribed by the law to the sovereign which
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places the same above the law. The granting of clemency disturbs, as it
were, the natural flow and process of the law. If forgiveness interrupts
the flow of historical temporality, the granting of clemency, in turn,
“interrupts…the order of the juridical-political.”26 Nonetheless the
sovereign must be very cautious in this function of his, for it opens
him up to the possibility of acting unjustly.
Derrida states “nothing can be more unjust than clemency”27 because
clemency can be used for personal gains or interest. So the sovereign,
according to Derrida, “should not under any circumstance, have the
right to grant clemency for a crime committed where he is not the one
intended”28 so as to avoid further injustice such as impunity for one.
The king must never grant clemency from a third-party29 point of view
because “forgiveness in general should only be permitted on the part
of the victim.”30
The point is, clemency is the closest thing in the juridical-political that
can get close to the concept of forgiveness. Expiation and reparation
are both from the juridical-political realm, yes, but they do not pertain
to issues relating to forgiveness. They pertain, as mentioned above,
to punishments, to things and acts that could repair the wrong done.
They are concepts of justice. But justice is quite a different thing
from forgiveness. They are not opposing concepts, nor heterogenous
concepts for that matter. For one can unceasingly call for justice to be
done yet at the same time forgive. Derrida states “we can imagine that
someone, a victim of the worst, himself, a member of his family, in his
generation or the preceding, demands that justice be done, that the
criminals appear before a court, be judged and condemned by a court
– and yet in his heart forgives.”31
The problem with Jankélévitch’s usage and understanding of
expiation is that he equates it to the concept of forgiveness. Thus when
something is inexpiable or irreparable, that something is already
unforgivable. But it is not. They are two different animals as it were.
Derrida states “from the inexpiable or the irreparable, Jankélévitch
concludes the unforgivable. And one does not forgive, according to him,
the unforgivable.”32 This connection, this analogy that Jankélévitch
establishes is, for Derrida, misconstrued. He continues to argue that
the inexpiable or the irreparable is different, and does not, in any way
49
pertain to the unforgivable not just because it is against his concept
of pure and unconditional forgiveness, in contradistinction with an
economic forgiveness, but also because, as stated above, expiation and
reparation do not belong to the sphere of forgiveness. They belong to
the domain of justice.
Derrida states “I will not cease to repeat, it is only against the
unforgivable, and thus on the scale without scale of a certain
inhumanity of the inexpiable, against the monstrosity of radical
evil that forgiveness, if there is such a thing, measure itself.”33
Jankélévitch writes in “Should We Pardon Them?” that the crimes
of the Nazis or that particular crime of the Shoah is a crime
against humanity and a crime beyond the borders of human
measurement. So he concludes that they are inexpiable. They are
beyond expiation so they are unforgivable. Derrida then asks: Is
not the unforgivable the only possible correlate of forgiveness?
Could it be possible that the unforgivable is the only thing that
can free forgiveness from being reduced to amnesty, amnesia,
acquittal, and to “some political therapy of reconciliation, in short
to some historical ecology?”34
If we will adopt the position of Derrida that forgiveness should be
extraordinary, that it should interrupt the very course of historical
temporality, then surely the forgiveness of something venial would not
suffice. Derrida would say that only a mortal sin (to use the language
of the Church) would be the possible correlate of forgiveness. Imagine
forgiving say the man who stepped on your toe for example, would
this interrupt historical temporality?
Of course the world will not stop; else, time would not stop even if
a person shouts to the top of his voice that he forgives the person
who stepped on his foot. Because they are not extraordinary
instances of forgiveness. They are meager compared to the
atrocious crimes of this century like the Shoah, the lagers and
the gulags, the apartheid etc. With the points that Derrida gave
concerning the inexpiable or the irreparable, it is quite evident
that not just because something is inexpiable it follows that it is
the unforgivable.
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Has Anyone Asked For “Their” Forgiveness?
The researcher modified the title that Jankélévitch gave to the third
section of his essay “Should We Pardon Them?” which he entitled
“Has Anyone Asked For Our Forgiveness?” The researcher did this
modification to show the difference in Jankélévitch’s and Derrida’s
understanding of forgiveness especially in this particular aspect
therein.
Jankélévitch was waiting for the Germans to ask for forgiveness; for
the Germans to show remorse for what happened, for what they did
in the Shoah. It is as if, Derrida says, “he (Jankélévitch) was waiting,
as were others, to be asked for forgiveness, implying thereby that
forgiveness must be asked for, that it asks to be asked for.”35
Derrida answers this problem by giving one solution. He says:
What is essential is not that the word be said but that it
be signified, that a pardon-beseeched be signified, such as
a plea for mercy [grace demandée], a plea for “thank you”
[“merci” demandé], and with this pardon-beseeched, before
it, expiation, remorse, regret, confession, a way of accusing
oneself, of pointing an accusatory and self-referential, autodeictic finger at oneself, something that, as one says, rather
quickly the animal would be incapable of, the mea culpa
of the one who can beat his breast and, by recognizing his
crime, dissociate himself from the guilty subject, from the
subject having been guilty.36
In the long quotation above, Derrida is saying that it is not important
to utter the word sorry or to say the words I ask for your forgiveness.
Rather, what is important is for pardon-beseeched, i.e. pardon asked,
to be signified. Is it important, asks Derrida for the word sorry to be
said or for the request for forgiveness to be uttered? He says that it is
not. It is more important for it to be signified.
Because one can easily say sorry. It is very easy to verbalize a request
for pardon, but to signify it is not. Even Derrida did not state very
clearly how we can signify pardon-beseeched. But to be sure, a pardonbeseeched that is signified is a sort of two-edged sword; for it does not
only signify to the offended that forgiveness is being requested, it is
51
also, at the same time and to use Derrida’s own words, “pointing an
accusatory and self-referential, auto-deictic finger at oneself.”37 It is
an implicit and tacit way of admitting that one has wronged another
without voicing the sentiment.
Now, Jankélévitch was in fact waiting for a word of remorse, and let us
for the sake of this study say that he was waiting even just for a sign of
repentance, from the Germans. But none came, so he says at the time
he wrote “Should We Pardon Them?” However, a correspondence did
indeed exist, and an exchange of letters between Jankélévitch and a
certain young German named Wiard Raveling took place in 1980 and
1981. Raveling writes thus to Jankélévitch:
I myself have not killed any Jews. Having been born German
is not my fault, or my doing. No one asked my permission
[thus is posed from the outset the immense question, which
will remain with us, the question of guilt or forgiveness
according to the legacy, the genealogy the collectivity of a
we and of which we (this is a comment by Derrida inserted
in the letter)]. I am completely innocent of Nazi crimes; but
this does not console me at all. My conscience is not clear,
and I feel a mixture of shame, pity, resignation, sadness,
incredulity, revolt. I do not always sleep well. I often remain
awake at night, and I think, and I imagine. I have nightmares
that I cannot get rid of. I think of Anne Frank, and of
Auschwitz and of Todesfuge and of Nuit et Brouillard: “Der
Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland.”38
So a letter asking or signifying pardon-beseeched did indeed come.
Someone answered Jankélévitch’s question in “Should We Pardon
Them?” Someone has asked for his (this according to Derrida is the
“injustice or ignorance of Vladimir Jankélévitch: as if a letter addressed
to him personally were the only reparation possible”39) forgiveness.
The question now is, is he (Jankélévitch) going to grant forgiveness?
The answer is no.
Jankélévitch answered the letter of Wiard Raveling. Here is an excerpt
of that response:
Dear Sir, I am moved by your letter. I have waited for this
letter for thirty-five years. I mean a letter in which the
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abomination is fully assumed and by someone who has
had no part in it…. You alone, you the first and no doubt the
last, have found the necessary words outside the political
commonplaces and the pious clichés….Thank you. No, I will
not come to see you in Germany. I will not go that far. I am
too old to inaugurate this new era….But you are young, you
do not have reasons as I. You do not have this uncrossable
barrier to cross. It is my turn to say to you: When you come
to Paris, do as everyone does, knock on my door….We will sit
down at the piano40
In the letter quoted above, Jankélévitch, yes appreciates Raveling’s
initiative of writing but states that he cannot say yes to the request of
the same that he go and visit him in Germany. The researcher would
want here to focus in one particular aspect of Jankélévitch’s response.
Jankélévitch says that there is an “uncrossable barrier” that exists
between him and Germany. This is the reason why he cannot go and
visit Raveling. What does he mean?
When we look for another term to replace uncrossable barrier, we will
see that the word impossible would be able to fit. A barrier which is
impossible to cross. Derrida says that what Jankélévitch is pertaining
to here is not merely a geographical barrier but a conceptual one.
Jankélévitch says that he cannot anymore forgive since he is already
too old to inaugurate this new era.41 Old age therefore, coupled with
the uncrossable barrier that Jankélévitch is pertaining to renders, as
it were, the possibility of the impossibility.42 Just when forgiveness
seems so near, we will realize that there is still a chasm that separates
us from it.
But to be sure Jankélévitch still gives chance to the prospect of
forgiveness’ existence. For he does not say that with his death also
comes the death of forgiveness rather when he said to Raveling that
“you are young” and that he does not have “the same reasons as”
Jankélévitch, what he was really trying to imply is that even without
him the history of forgiveness would go on. The history of forgiveness
would not die but continue.
So after all the things and concepts that Jankélévitch tried to grapple
with in “Should We Pardon Them?” Derrida states “history continues
53
on the background of an interruption of history, in the abyss, rather, of
an infinite wound, which, in its very scarring, will have to remain an
open and unsuturable wound.”43 Just when the history of forgiveness
seemed to be halted with what happened in the Shoah and everytime
monstrous and unforgivable crimes occur, it nevertheless continues.
Certain Aspects of Derrida’s Notion of Forgiveness
The researcher will explain very briefly five important aspects of
Jacques Derrida’s concept of forgiveness.
1. Pure Forgiveness. Perhaps we already have a sufficient discussion
of Derrida’s concept of Pure Forgiveness. But one more point. When
we say that forgiveness is pure we just mean that it has not been
entangled with all the other pseudo-forms of forgiveness or other
sibling concepts of forgiveness. It is a concept of forgiveness free of
conditions. It is forgiveness viewed as a gift.
Now Derrida says that the gift and forgiveness cannot be separated
from each other; for even in the etymological root of the French word
forgive the term gift is still present. Forgiveness in French is Le Pardon
while gift is Le Don. If we try to examine the term pardon we will be
able to divide it into two: par/don. Even John Caputo in his book
entitled The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without
Religion would say that the concept of the gift cannot be dissociated
from the concept of forgiveness.44 And this is, the researcher supposes,
the very thing that makes forgiveness a pure concept, that which
makes forgiveness pure – it being a gift.
2. The Possibility of Impossibility. In the section “Has Anyone
asked for ‘Their’ Forgiveness?” the researcher already gave the first
meaning that we can give to the possibility of the impossibility. Now
he will proceed to the second interpretation we can give thereto.
The usage of two seemingly contradictory words here does not entail
a logical contradiction on the part of Derrida. Derrida uses the words
possibility of impossibility because it is (the thing that it is impossible
to forgive that is) the only thing that can give rise to the possibility of
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forgiveness. John Caputo states “The unforgivable is the only possible
correlate of forgiveness and the only way for forgiveness to be a gift,
which means to be itself. Forgiveness begins by the im-possible,
where this ‘im-’ is not a simple negation but an intensification, driving
forgiveness to the most extreme possibility, impelling forgiveness to
the possibility of the impossible.”45
3. Forgiveness as Aporia. Derrida, towards the end of his days, has
become more and more preoccupied with aporias. Aporia is a Greek
term which originally means puzzle; though it has come to mean more
like an impasse or a paradox.
When Derrida talks about aporias, he does not only pertain to
forgiveness. There are four aporias that Derrida is concerned with, to
be precise. But this study is concerned only with the third aporia, i.e
forgiveness.
When we talk of forgiveness as aporia we only mean that the condition
of its possibility is at the same time, the condition of its impossibility.
For Derrida, the concept of forgiveness is so pure and unconditional,
but the concept of forgiveness being such does not exempt itself
from the pole of the conditional. Derrida states “[t]hat is, if we want
to embody an unconditional forgiveness in history and society, we
have to go through conditions. We have to negotiate between the
unconditional and the conditional.”46
The two are heterogenous yet always indissociable because the
unconditional must always lend itself to the conditional, since it is in
the sphere of the conditional wherein the unconditional must breed
itself.
4. Forgiveness: A Madness, An Unintelligibility. One might say
however that a concept of forgiveness so pure would seemingly be
impossible in our world. There is the tendency to acquire the disposition
or belief that forgiveness would really just be good in theory but not
in practice, at least in the Derridean concept of forgiveness. Or that a
concept of forgiveness so pure and unconditional would, in a sense,
be madness to the view of some. And the researcher would argue that
Derrida would agree with them.
55
Forgiveness, in fact, for Derrida is not just something which disturbs
the flow of historical temporality. It is also, for him, madness; it is an
unintelligibility, if you may. For Derrida, the radical purity that his
concept of forgiveness entails, though excessive to others, is quite
necessary. He states “even if this radical purity can seem excessive,
hyperbolic, mad? Because if I say, as I think, that forgiveness is mad,
and that it must remain a madness of the impossible, this is certainly
not to exclude or disqualify it.”47 Forgiveness for Derrida is a madness
of the impossible. And even if the playing of the words possible and
impossible seem barmy to the eyes of others Derrida would not yield
because “[w]hat I (Derrida that is) dream of , what I think as the
‘purity’ of a forgiveness worthy of its name, would be a forgiveness
without power: unconditional but without sovereignty. The most
difficult task at once necessary and apparently impossible, would
be to dissociate unconditionality and sovereignty.”48 This is Derrida’s
dream. A forgiveness not polluted by any kind of power. A forgiveness
that does not have any other thing as its sovereign. Though he himself
admits that this task is difficult and apparently impossible, he hopes
that one day a forgiveness such as this will be found. As he says “[w]
ill that be one day? It is not around the corner as is said. But since
the hypothesis of this unpresentable task announces itself, be it as a
dream for thought, this madness is perhaps not so mad…”49
5. Forgiveness: If There Is Such A Thing. Derrida, in his talks and
writings, usually couples the term forgiveness with the phrase if
there is such a thing. This does not mean that Derrida mistrusts the
possibility of the existence of forgiveness. Neither does this mean that
forgiveness does not exist, had not yet existed and is not yet existing.
This is rather a Derrida being cautious; lest he contradict himself
by giving others the impression that he can say definitively what
forgiveness is. No, he does not go to that extent.
What Derrida means by s’il y en a (the French for if there is such a
thing) is that “if forgiveness happens, then this experience should not
become the object of a sentence of the kind ‘S is p,’ ‘this is, this presents
itself as forgiveness,’ because forgiveness should not present itself.”50
Derrida claims that the more we say that we have forgiven someone,
the more that we recognize that we have consciously forgiven, then
the more we will be brought back to an economy of exchange. Because
Page
in this case, the one forgiven must also recognize that he was, indeed,
forgiven his offense. The presence of exchange must be done away
with in this context, at least for Derrida.
If one says that he knows what forgiveness is, that he knows how
to forgive, then he will have to say, in one way or another “I forgive
you.” This statement which is in the present tense implies that the
“I” has the capacity, nay, the power to forgive. And with this power to
forgive comes the power to manipulate the purity of the concept of
forgiveness. But for Derrida, this consciousness of the being present of
forgiveness and, at the same time, the I’s consciousness of his power
to forgive is simultaneously the destruction thereof. Derrida says “if
I say lightly, ‘I forgive you,’ this sentence in the present, with a verb in
the present tense, is absolutely the destruction of forgiveness.”51
Forgiveness must not be; it must never be a present for us. It must
always exceed the “very category of presence and…of objectivity”52 if
we want it to be true forgiveness. Derrida even goes to the extent of
saying that if forgiveness happens; if we want to have forgiveness, if
there is such a thing, then it must “happen in the night.”53 Because “[t]
he night is its element.”54
57
Endnotes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
When Griswold says “cluster of concepts” he pertains to forgiveness
together with the concepts mentioned above that are relative to it.
Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), xiv.
Berel Lang, “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994):
105.
As stated by Simon Critchley and Richard Kearney in Jacques Derrida, On
Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, trans. M. Dooley and M. Hughes (New
York: Routledge, 2001), x.
We are not yet stating here if X realizes that he has done something
wrong on his own or through another person’s intervention.
Griswold, xvi.
The Greek aporia has the original meaning of puzzle. However, it has
come to mean more of an impasse or a contradiction.
Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), 53.
Taken from The Free Dictionary by Farlex.
Vladimir Jankélévitch, “Should We Pardon Them,” trans. Ann Hobart,
Critical Inquiry 22, 3 (Spring 1996): 556.
10 Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 32.
11 Ibid., 554.
12 Derrida, “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” in
Questioning God, ed. John Caputo, Mark Dooley, & Michael J. Scanlon
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2001), 25.
13 Ibid., 31.
15 Cf. Derrida, “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” 31.
16 Ibid., 30.
17 Ibid., 31.
18 Jankélévitch, “Should We Pardon Them,” 558.
Page
19 Derrida, “To Forgive: The Unforgivable and the Imprescriptible,” 31.
20 Chirac as cited in Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 32.
23 Ibid.
24 Griswold writes in his book, “Derrida argues that the ‘absolutely
heterogenous’ elements of the unconditional and the conditional are
‘irreducible to one another’ (even though also ‘indissociable’), else we
are lead to confusions such as the reduction of forgiveness to amnesty,
amnesia, acquittal, and to ‘some political therapy of reconciliation, in
short to some historical ecology.’” Griswold, 63.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Derrida is consistent in arguing, as Jankélévitch in Le Pardon, that
forgiveness should only exist between two individuals, between two
singularities as it were. Because once a third party intervenes forgiveness
would once again end up to be amnesty, amnesia or other conditional
forms of forgiveness.
30 Ibid., 34.
32 Ibid., 36.
34 Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, 44-45.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Wiard Raveling’s letter addressed to Vladimir Jankélévitch as cited in
Ibid., 39.
59
39 Ibid., 40.
40 Jankélévitch’s response to Wiard Raveling’s letter as cited in Ibid.
41 Perhaps this refers to “the era of forgiveness.”
42 The researcher proposes this as the first meaning of what Derrida means
by the possibility of the impossibility.
43 Ibid., 42.
44 Cf. John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion
without Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1997), 160-222.
45 John Caputo, Mark Dooley and Michael J. Scanlon, “Introduction: God
Forgive,” in Questioning God, 5.
46 Derrida as cited in “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with
Jacques Derrida,” 58.
48 Ibid., 59.
49 Ibid., 59-60.
50 Derrida as cited in “On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with
Jacques Derrida,” 52.
51 Ibid., 53.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
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60
THE PARADOX
OF FAITH
JAY ANTHONIE A. SANICO
“For he who strove with the world,
became great with the world,
and he who strove with himself
became great by conquering himself;
but he who strove with God
became greater than all.”
- Johannes de Silentio
Man is contingent. Yet in his temporal existence, he cannot but discover
a certain necessary force that encompasses his being – the Absolute.
Indeed, man stands in relation to the Absolute. In Christianity, this
Absolute is God and his relation to God expresses his faith. But what is
faith? Can one contain it in a definition? Can one in any way possible
make it intelligible? Or is one an individual who, at the end of the day,
realizes that one’s faith is a paradox?
Faith is one of the existential themes pondered by Søren Aabye
Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Under the pseudonym “Johannes de
Silentio”, he wrote Fear and Trembling (1843) where he reflects on the
figure of Abraham who undertook the trial of God, succeeded therein
and became the father of faith.
“Philosophy cannot give us an account of faith,”1 Johannes writes.
Thence, the author of this paper makes a preliminary confession:
he may fall short in rendering a fully philosophical treatment of
the problem of faith. The primary thrust of this work however is to
acknowledge faith as a paradox. It involves a contradiction because
THE PARADOX OF FAITH Page
61
in believing in the “strength of the absurd”2 man regains what he has
given up. Faith cannot be simply explained. It has to be experienced
by the individual himself – he has to enter into a personal relationship
with God.
Does man stand as an individual? Or is he a mere part of a collectivity
as the Hegelian system proposes? How does he situate his faith in his
context? The author seeks to answer these questions as he expounds
on the three problemata Johannes addresses in his work. In his
conclusion, the author shares his personal reflection on the paradox
of faith. He agrees with Johannes that faith is experienced; it is lived.
Situating the Act of Faith
One of the prominent thinkers in the West in the 18th century is Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In his opus, Phenomenologie des Geistes, he
presents a system which centers on the Geist (German term for spirit)
as the Absolute. The Geist encompasses and includes everything.
Frederick C. Beiser writes, “it is necessary to conceive of the absolute
as the whole of substance and its modes as the unity of finite and the
infinite”3. From this unity, the Geist is manifested in and by the world.
Hegel envisages man in constant relation to the world and to totality.
The world is not simply an object of consciousness; rather it is a
being in which he man imbedded and from which he finds fulfilment.
Thus, man is reduced into a mere part of a collectivity. He finds
himself immersed in an ineluctable infinite totality. As a collection of
individuals, the society is a manifestation of this totality. As part of this
community, man’s moral criteria must mirror the established social
norms. Alasdair MacIntyre writes,
Where do I find criteria? In the established social practice
of a well-ordered community… Their authority is derived
not from my choice but from the way in which in such a
community they cannot fail to be regarded as normative.
Thus Hegel’s final standpoint is that the moral life can only
be led within a certain type of community, and that in such a
community certain values will prove indispensable.4
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62 THE PARADOX OF FAITH
Hegel identifies the Absolute Geist with the God of the Judeo-Christian
tradition. The Absolute Geist is immanent in the world which is
manifested in mankind and in nature and on which everything
depends. The Geist is independent of anything and is self-sufficient.
Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy is basically a reaction to the Hegelian
collectivism. Man according to Kierkegaard is not a mere part of a
totality; he is a free and unique individual. “If the emphasis in Hegel’s
philosophy is the entirety or the totality of the whole system and
the interconnectedness of its components, Kierkegaard stresses the
irreducibility and the irresolubility of the individual to the totality of
the system”5. Hence, it is not the society that would determine his acts;
it is his choice which defines him. His existence is comprised of many
alternatives from which he can freely choose. He is thus a unique
individual. Robert C. Roberts affirms the uniqueness of the individual:
“To be an individual is to be so constituted as to be able to act with a
high degree of social independency”6.
Kierkegaard names three levels of existence in which man may choose to
live. The aesthetic existence is characterized by an appeal to the senses.
In this level, one is driven by pleasure and is directed towards satisfying
one’s sensual desires. The ethical existence is governed by reason. It is
where one’s action is motivated by the sense of duty and is satisfied on
the fulfilment of one’s moral obligations. The religious existence is lived
out in one’s faith in God. Here, one encounters God in one’s individuality.
Kierkegaard emphasizes that man is confronted with many
possibilities and he has to choose from them. Thus, each of his
acts is his responsibility. This radical freedom to choose between
alternatives engenders anxiety7. Under the pseudonym Vigilius
Haufniensis, Kierkegaard defines anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety as
“the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to
posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility,
laying hold of finiteness to support itself”8. Man stands before a gaping
abyss of possibilities; he experiences anxiety upon recognizing that he
himself defines life with the actions he makes.
Does anxiety imply a pessimistic tendency in man’s existence? And
what is its significance to the act of faith? Anxiety does not lead man
63
to hopelessness; it compels him instead to further search for the
truth. Moreover, it leads him to accept his temporal existence and
the contingencies of the finite things around him. It can be a source
for spiritual education. It teaches man to be ready to renounce finite
things even those he holds most dear when God asks him to. Anxiety
stills in him a clearer perspective of finite things of his world.
Thus the act of faith is always situated: it is an act of a free and unique
individual who experiences anxiety upon choosing among the many
possibilities before him; an individual who chooses to let go of what
finite things he may have and who still believes that he will grasp it
once more. His individuality affirms that faith is personal act, that is,
an act he has freely chosen.
Taking the Leap of Faith
Upon recognizing that faith is an individual act, one ought to
understand how Kierkegaard provides a concrete example thereof.
Johannes de Silentio presents the story of Abraham whom God tested
by asking him to sacrifice his only son, Isaac:
Some time after these events, God put Abraham to the test.
He called, “Abraham!” “Ready!” he replied. Then God said:
“Take your son, Isaac, your only son, whom you love, and
go to the land of Moriah. There you shall offer him up as a
holocaust on a height that I will point out to you.9
To this test, Abraham responded. The Book of Genesis continues,
Early in the next morning Abraham saddled his donkey,
took with him his son, Isaac, and the two of his servants as
well, and with the wood he had cut for the holocaust, set out
for the place of which God has pointed him.10
The Scriptures narrated how Abraham and Isaac reached Moriah. As
they journeyed, Isaac asked where the victim was. Abraham replied
that God would provide the lamb. After setting the altar, he tied
Isaac and set him atop the altar. As he was about to offer his son, the
messenger of God forbade him and told him that he had proven to God
Page
his faith. Abraham spotted a ram, offered it to God, and went home
with Isaac.
Abraham’s action demands explanation. Ethically, what he attempted
to do was murder. Johannes thus draws four situations in which
Abraham’s behavior could be understood. In the first situation,
Abraham does not conceal from Isaac what he is about to do; he
even takes the risk of Isaac hating him lest his son lose faith in God.
In the second situation, Abraham doubts his act and sacrifices the
ram instead; Isaac eventually grows but Abraham has lost the will to
live. In the third situation, Abraham questions his act and asks God
to forgive his sin for willing to sacrifice his son and for neglecting his
duty to him as a father. In the fourth situation, Abraham prepares
everything as planned but Isaac sees him drawing the knife in despair;
consequently, Isaac’s faith is lost forever.
These scenarios are relevant to the pervading theme of Fear
and Trembling: the distinction between the ethical ideal and the
religious ideal. The ethical centers on man’s fulfilment of his duty
and obligations. It deals with the individual’s place in the society
and his relation thereto. Thus, the ethical man’s actions can easily be
understood in terms of social norms. The religious, on the other hand,
concerns man’s relationship with God. It transcends the ethical. Thus
the religious man’s actions cannot be simply justified or explained
since his acts lie in his exclusive relationship with God.
The four situations present possible alternatives in which Abraham’s
act can be explained in the ethical sphere. However, none of them could
provide a rational explanation for Abraham’s act. At the first glance,
his act can be seen as an attempt at human sacrifice which violates the
ethical ideal. In regard to the command of God, MacIntyre writes,
This command is contrary, not merely to inclination but
also to duty. What God commands is, from the standpoint
of the ethical, simple murder. There is thus a break between
the highest merely human consciousness and the divine
inclusion of the apparently absurd.11
Abraham knew the consequences of what God was demanding of him.
He was also aware that he was free to comply with it or not. He knew
65
that God’s demand goes against his ethical duties as a father. Here,
one can imagine Abraham at the brink of anxiety of having to make a
choice and take responsibility for it. There can be no intelligible way
of understanding and obeying God’s command. What sort of father
would be willing to sacrifice his own son? It is simply absurd. Yet,
Abraham believed in the strength of that absurdity. He gave up Isaac
yet he believed that he would still have Isaac: Johannes writes:
All along he had faith, he believed that God would not
demand Isaac of him, while still he was willing to offer him
if that was indeed what was demanded. He believed in the
strength of the absurd … He climbed the mountain, even in
that moment when the knife gleamed he believed – that God
would not demand Isaac. Certainly he was surprised by the
outcome, but by means of a double movement he had come
back to the original position and therefore received Isaac
more joyfully than the first time.12
What is that “double-movement” which Johannes refers to? It is
the double-movement of faith which involves two acts: the infinite
resignation and the leap of faith. The first movement is accomplished
by renouncing the desires of man’s heart. With this is the pain of letting
go of something dear to oneself and embracing the bereavement
it entails. Thus one is reconciled with the pain and finds peace and
contentment. But here comes the second type of a higher movement,
which is, taking the leap of faith. Upon renouncing, one recognizes the
impossibility of having it back. Yet, one holds on to the possibility of
re-acquiring it. That is absurd, but one believes in the strength of the
absurd. Johannes adds, “All that could save him is the absurd and this
he grasps by faith. Accordingly, he admits the impossibility and at the
same time believes the absurd. This he has done, through faith.”13
With this, Johannes draws the image of the knight of faith. He claims
that this knight is not distinguished by his physical appearance.
He looks like an ordinary man who lives ordinarily. He exists as an
individual who enjoys the world and the temporary things it has to
offer. Yet, he is someone who performs the double-movement of faith.
Johannes differentiates the knight of infinite resignation from the
knight of faith. The former renounces the finite and the temporal,
Page
experiences the pain of doing so and gets reconciled with the pain.
He thus deepens his knowledge about himself, and this Johannes
calls the eternal consciousness. This is the image of the ethical
and the Hegelian system; the knight of infinite resignation makes
himself understandable by his acts and he gives up his own desire
for the universal. The knight of faith likewise makes the movement
of resignation. But he takes a step further: he takes the leap of faith,
confident that he will regain through God’s goodness what he has.
He believes that nothing is impossible with God. He exemplifies the
religious; thus he is beyond understanding. Eventually he experiences
repetition: regaining what he has given up and appreciating it more
fully and completely.
From these ideas, one explores the psychology of faith which Johannes
articulates in his work. This psychology centers on the doublemovement of faith: the infinite resignation and the leap of faith. What
does this tell about the man of faith? He is aware of the finiteness of all
things in the world and the possibility that God may take them from
him any time. He, however, sees these temporal things as gifts from
God and finds delight in them as such. This attitude affirms his deep
personal relationship with God.
Illuminating the Paradox of Faith
At this point, it is important to consider how Johannes expounds more
concretely the paradox of faith. This he accomplished by examining
and answering three problemata which he himself posted. Each
problema begins by accepting as true the Hegelian definition of the
ethical as the universal; this is followed by presenting how this may
involve a paradox, particularly in view of Abraham’s behaviour.
The first problema is this: “Is there an ethical suspension of the ethical?”
Telos is the Greek term for end or goal. The Hegelian collectivism can
be considered as teleological since for this system, the end of every
human being is to be united with the absolute. Man thus abandons
his individuality to become one with the universal. Now the question
whether there can be a teleological suspension of the ethical entails
another question: can there be a higher end to pursue which can
67
cancel out my ethical obligations? Hegel denies this possibility since
the ethical is the universal which is every man’s ultimate telos. Thus,
Abraham for him is a murderer since he (Abraham) tried to go against
the ethical which is also the universal; Abraham had sinned before
God.
Johannes claims that Abraham’s act indeed contains the suspension
of the teleological. Ethically, what he has done is a murder attempt.
Paradoxically, he as a single individual becomes higher than the
universal (that is, the ethical). He does this by believing on the strength
of the absurd. SparkNotes editors write, “Abraham suspended his
ethical obligation to Isaac on behalf of some higher telos, the telos
of faith”14. He committed that act both for God’s sake – because He
demanded this proof of his faith – and for his own sake to prove his
faith15. He encountered a temptation in the ethical itself (his ethical
obligation to Isaac). This leads to another paradox: for by suspending
the ethical teleologically, Abraham stands thus as an individual in an
absolute relation to the absolute. He is a particular before the universal.
With this, did he sin? Johannes is firm in saying that Abraham acted on
God’s order and he had done so with faith.
The second problema asks the question: “Is there an absolute duty to
God?” The Hegelian system proposes that all moral laws are universal
which allow no exceptions. Thus the ethical is the universal. Every
duty as an ethical duty is a duty to the universal, and thus to God.
Hence, they must be observed for they hold as necessarily binding
regardless of the circumstances. Johannes, however, argues that there
is an absolute duty to God; that one, at times, would have to oppose
the ethical when God demands it. He writes, “The absolute duty can
then lead to what ethics would forbid, but it can by no means make the
knight of faith have done with loving”16.
On acting out on account of the ethical duty, one abandons his
individuality to be in the universal. The Hegelian system favors the
exteriority than the interiority. It is because the former determines
the latter; it is the one publicly expressed, and hence is universal.
Johannes writes that in faith, the interiority is higher than and is
incommensurable with the exteriority. It is where the individual
relates personally and directly to God; the exteriority provides one
Page
only an indirect relation to God. Johannes continues, “The paradox can
also be put by saying that there is an absolute duty to God; for in this
lie the obligation the individual relates himself absolutely as the single
individual”17.
Looking at Abraham at the ethical level, his act is an obvious violation
of his duty to Isaac as a father. Yet, Abraham acted out on God’s
order and he did so with faith. Such a contradiction renders him
incomprehensible. Yet, it is in this religious level that Johannes claims
that the knight of faith is in a private relation to God. Abraham might
have recognized his ethical duty and responsibility and the joy to live
in harmony with these social conventions; but he was as well aware
of his absolute duty to God, that by believing on the strength of the
absurd, he had to move infinitely as when God commanded it. Such
a command cannot be simply justified in the universal (that is, the
ethical). Though others might rebuke or condemn him for his act, he
knew in himself that what he had done is for God and in a way, for
himself.
The third problema inquires: “Was it ethically defensible of Abraham
to conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar and from Isaac?” The
Hegelian system claims that man as a private individual is concealed.
Thus, his ethical task is to unwrap himself from this concealment and
become disclosed in the universal18. To make oneself understandable
in the society, one opens oneself to others. This reality is expressed in
the conventional use of language. One relates and discloses oneself by
sharing one’s feelings, ideas and stories to another.
Johannes claims that the aesthetic hero, when tempted, would be
silent, since he wants to protect those he loves. That goes against what
the ethical hero would do in such a situation; he would be totally open
to everything in his life. The former hero is free to speak himself up
but he chooses not to; if he decides to explain himself, he would be
intelligible. The knight of faith however has to stay silent; he has to
remain concealed. He cannot speak because he cannot be understood.
Abraham thus is justified for concealing his true intention. Otherwise
he would have only made himself incomprehensible. There was no
rational explanation for what God had demanded of him. He is higher
69
than the aesthetic hero and ethical heroes by his necessary silence. In
the story, Isaac asked him where the sacrificial lamb was. He just told
him that God would provide19. This comprises a paradox: Abraham
was able to speak without speaking anything. Had he spoken to Isaac
that he would be the sacrifice, all was lost (which may closely resemble
the first situation mentioned). His answer to his son was not a lie; it is
in that reply that his faith shines all the more: that by the strength of
the absurd, while being willing to sacrifice Isaac, he believed that God
would indeed provide a lamb in place of Isaac.
The three problemata probe into the paradox which the act of faith
involves entails in its relation with the ethical ideal. The religious
level can actually oppose the ethical level. This also puts a great
emphasis on the individual’s radical freedom to choose: by believing
on the strength of the absurd, one chooses to pursue the higher end
of faith; one chooses to comply with one’s absolute duty to God; and
one chooses to conceal oneself for He indeed cannot be spoken. By
freely deciding to give up the finite one cherishes and by believing on
the strength of the absurd, one acquires it once more. With that, one
becomes an individual higher than the universal; one’s relationship is
unintelligible to others but it is a personal relationship between one
and God.
Faith may summon an individual to abandon what his own judgement
deems right and it may command him to carry what God asks him
to do with unquestioning obedience. His existence is marked with
temptations and tests; thus he acts with fear and trembling20 since his
chosen act may indeed violate the ethical which is definitive. Yet he
finds the strength to do so through his faith in God.
Reflecting on the Paradox of Faith
The moment the first rays of light streak, the dawn heralds the
beginning of another day for man’s search for meaning. In his pursuit
of explanations, he cannot but confront the contradictions of his
existence. Twilight descends and the long day is over, the struggle
stops for a moment and he finally retreats and rests in the arms of
God.
Page
But what greater trial can there be than one given by God? There
he inevitably faces an absurdity: it is his God who requires him to
make a sacrifice of what he loves the most. It is in dealing with these
contradictions that man makes use of his unique capacity: his free will.
Man is free and his acts would define who he is. Before him lie a
thousand of possible courses of actions. What makes it unbearable is
the fact that in every decision he makes, he has to abandon the others.
With that he has to embrace whatever consequences it may entail.
He shudders with anxiety; yet the man of faith knows that it is God
who is testing him and that trial is a matter between the two of them
alone. He chooses to accept the test: while giving up what he must, he
believes that God in His infinite goodness would not demand it.
Thus in him there is no question of God’s goodness for such is a basic
tenet of his faith. He firmly believes and trusts all the more even when
faith becomes paradoxical. It is from this that he can choose to pursue
the higher end of faith, to follow his duty to God, and to be silent
whenever necessary even at the risk of becoming misunderstood by
his community.
The act of faith is personal but it is not isolated. Indeed, it is a matter
of relationship between the individual and God but it is lived in the
context of living together. It does not deny the existence of the society
or the benefits of a community. A man of faith lives and respects the
conventions and norms of his community. His faith even helps him to
build, and be a part of, a community of believers.
The test of faith is part and parcel of everyday living. It need not to be
grand. It can be as simple as waiting for the rain to pass or answering
an examination. Everyday everyone is tested in different ways and in
various situations but what is common to these trials is the invitation
to trust God.
Finally, the paradox of faith through the double-movement is an
affirmation of love between man and God. Man affirms his love to
God through his unwavering faith: it is through this love that he can
stand the test, appreciate his world and radiate this love to others.
God affirms His love to man through His unswerving providence: it is
through this love that He draws man incessantly to Himself, embraces
71
him despite his sins and even makes the ultimate sacrifice of His only
begotten Son to save him. Man has faith in God in His infinite goodness.
In his abiding love, God has faith in man.
There is this story of a young man who at a young age experienced the
tests of faith. Born to an ordinary family, his parents had to work hard
to make both ends meet. Despite their plight, his mother inculcated in
him the Christian values particularly belief in God. Thus the boy first
believed that someday God would give them a better life.
At the age of ten, his parents parted ways. His father ran off with
another woman while his mother was left to raise the family singlehandedly. Life became a tougher battle and the boy himself had to find
means to help augment their meager income. With his mother and
two older siblings, he believed that God would provide them what they
lack. A little more than a year, the boy experienced a great trial in his
life: the untimely death of his mother. Consequently, his siblings and
he had to live separately among their relatives. The boy had to accept
the ordeal and he still believed that they would still be reunited.
Can anyone really understand the boy? Who could explain the anxiety
surging within him? At a young age, the tests of God were more than
enough to shatter his soul and weaken his faith. Yet, the fact that he
was able to write this paper proves that he has accepted the test, taken
the leap of faith, and appreciated life as it is. He has learned one thing:
to stand the storms, one must build his house on a firm rock, not on the
shifting sands.
Taking the leap of faith is adhering to God. It is trusting Him
unreservedly. Thus faith involves a paradox because it transcends
any conceptualization. Reason may fall short in providing a full,
intelligible account thereof. Nevertheless, there is a truth about man’s
existence that always remains valid: Faith is a relationship between
the individual man and God. It is experienced rather than theorized; it
is lived rather than rationalized.
Page
Endnotes
1
Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Alastair Hannay (London:
Penguin Books, 1985), 35.
3
Frederick C. Beiser, The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 7.
5
Lorenz Moises J. Festin, Course Notes in Philosophical Anthropology,
(Unpublished), 54.
2
Ibid., 38.
4
Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967), 201.
6
Robert C. Roberts, “Existence, emotion and virtue: Classical themes
in Kierkegaard,” in Alastair C. Hannay and Gordon Marino, eds., The
Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 178-179.
7
Angster is the German term for anxiety. Other cognates of this word are angst
or anguish.
9
Genesis 22:1-2. All biblical quotations are taken from the New American
Bible Version.
8
Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 61.
10 Genesis 22:3.
11 MacIntyre, 210.
12 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 34.
13 Ibid., 38.
14 SparkNotes. “Fear and Trembling.” Retrieved from http://www.
sparknotes.com/philosophy/feartrembling (accessed 13 February
2013).
15 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 69.
16 Ibid., 87.
17 Ibid., 82.
18 Ibid., 98.
73
19 Read Gen. 22: 8.
20 SparkNotes editors comment that Johannes might have taken the words from
the Scriptural text Philippians 2: 12-13. St. Paul in this epistle says, “[You
must] continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is
God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose”. In
fact, this phrase which bears the title of book appears only on the discussion
of the second problema. The knight of faith, in facing God’s trials, may be
in fear and trembling since his act is definitive, and might oppose the social
norms. Yet, he trusts that it is God who test him, and with that he cannot
question or doubt.
Bibliography
Beiser, Frederick C., ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. New York.
Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Festin, Lorenz Moises J. Course Notes in Philosophical Anthropology.
Unpublished.
Hannay, Alastair and Gordon Marino. trans. and eds. The Cambridge
Companion to Kierkegaard. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Kierkegaard, Søren. Fear and Trembling. Translated by Alastair Hannay. New
York: Penguin Books, 1985.
____________. The Concept of Anxiety. Translated and edited by Reidar Thomte.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics. London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul Ltd., 1967.
SparkNotes. “Fear and Trembling.” Retrieved from http://www.sparknotes.
com/philosophy/feartrembling (accessed 13 February 2013).
Page
74
EPISTEMIC
HUMILITY
KARLO MARKO D. VALLADORES
Introduction
There’s always a problem in every period or epoch that philosophy
would try to answer. At this point, the 17th Century comes to mind. With
all the breathtaking, mind-blowing, and ground-breaking scientific
discoveries of the time, Scholasticism simply could not keep up. What
further advanced its decline was the dogmatism it had imposed – an
air that had left so bad an impression to modern man that the trend
of time had been to rid oneself of any contact or connection from
medieval philosophy.
Consequently, philosophies began to emerge hoping to propose a
solution to the disturbing questions of the time. Although there has
been a debate among scholars regarding what was the main issue of
modern philosophy, we shall confine ourselves to Copleston’s standing
that modern philosophy was caused by the reawakening of scepticism.
In order, however, to appreciate the significance of Descartes’
quest for certainty and of his looking to mathematics as a
model for reasoning, it is desirable to bear in mind the revival
of scepticism which was one of the aspects of Renaissance
thought. When one thinks of French scepticism in the last
part of the sixteenth century the name which comes first
to mind is that of Montaigne (1533-92) … Montaigne
revived the ancient arguments in favour of scepticism; the
relativity and unreliable character of sense-experience, the
mind’s dependence on sense experience and its consequent
incapacity for attaining absolute truth, and our inability to
epistemic humility Page
75
solve the problems which arise out of the conflicting claims
of the senses and the reason.2
One could therefore say that modern philosophy was a period
“obsessed”3 with truth and certainty4. It is precisely in this light that
Immanuel Kant’s contribution is given high regard – for its attempt to
reconcile empiricism and rationalism.
This paper shall be thus divided into three parts: an exposition of
Kant’s views, a presentation of a criticism thereof and a response
thereto.
Transcendental Idealism
Kant explains his epistemological approach as thus:
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all
appearances the doctrine that they are all together to
be regarded as mere representations and not things in
themselves, and accordingly that time and space are only
sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations
given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in
themselves.5
Simply put, Kant argues that man’s knowledge is limited to a world
of appearances –a joint product of the manner in which the mind
functions and the world outside the mind. This thus entails that we
make the world of experiences.
Transcendental Idealism is also what Kant personally considers as a
philosophical Copernican Revolution since it changes the attention
from the medieval concept of truth as the conformity of the mind with
the thing to the idea that truth is the conformity of the thing with the
mind. He writes:
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must
conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something
about them a priori through concepts that would extend our
cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing.
Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with
Page
76 epistemic humility
the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects
must conform to our cognition, which would agree better
with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of
them, which is to establish something about objects before
they are given to us.6
Phenomena and Noumena
Whenever Kant would discuss his epistemology, two words
continue to appear, phenomenon sometimes called as appearance or
representation and noumenon or that which is sometimes called the
transcendental object. What does Kant mean by the two?
When Kant speaks of phenomena, it simply means things-asthey appear-to-us. This, however, can be quite misleading for the
term appearance may imply that Kant wishes to propose a sense
of subjectivism or perspectivism but it is quite the opposite, he is
concerned with truth. Dicker thus explains:
This will not mean that the knower creates or even alters
things as they are in themselves. Nor will it mean that
knowers need be aware of the fact that they are contributing
to the content of knowledge. But it will mean that in
knowing, humans unconsciously and inevitably, because of
their own, built-in nature, impose on the object as known
certain of its basic structural features.7
Simply said, phenomena are realities clothed in the vests that
the mind inevitably makes for them. Being thus a product of the
“transmutation” of reality and mind, phenomena “are the very
data of experience, the material which reason makes use of and
make representations of, and it is through these appearances
that knowledge of objects is possible”8
With regard to the noumena, Kant refers to them as the transcendental
object or as the things-in-themselves. One must bear in mind that
Kant uses the term transcendental to refer to things that are beyond
the human mind; unlike scholastics who made use of the term to
77
refer to universality. The noumena is simply the bowl which holds
the ingredients for the creation of phenomena. Kant writes:
We have said above that appearances themselves are
nothing but sensible representations, which must not be
regarded in themselves, in the same way, as objects (outside
the power of representation). What does one mean, then if
one, speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also
distinct from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object
must be thought only as something in general = X, since
outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set
over against this cognition as corresponding to it.9
By limiting himself to phenomena, Kant believes that he will be
able to free himself from the quagmire which both rationalists
and empiricists find themselves in.
Some Preliminary Notes
Before proceeding further, it seems best to give a few remarks that
would help us avoid confusion. First, Kant uses reason in two senses:
at times he refers to the whole of cognitive function such as in the title
of his first critique and secondly, reason refers to that propensity to
inquire about the three transcendental ideas. We may refer to this as
reason in the strictest sense. Metaphysics is also used in two different
ways. The metaphysics which Kant remarks as the old matron in his
first Preface is scholasticism, but in latter parts of the text it must be
understood as the science of the three transcendental ideas. Lastly,
one must also take note that the medieval concept of an analytical
judgment is different from that of modern philosophy.
The Critique of Pure Reason
Having clarified possible and foreseeable ambiguities, we can
freely proceed to discuss Kant’s approach to the epistemological
Page
problems of his time. He begins his “architectonic” project by
first agreeing with empiricists that knowledge does indeed
begin with the senses but argues that the mind, as previously
said, takes part in creating experiences.
The Critique of Pure Reason has two parts10. The first of this contains
the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements which is divided into
the Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic. The section on Aesthetics
treats the mind’s capacity of sensibility while Logic treats our
understanding11. The transcendental Logic has two divisions, the
Transcendental Analytic which discusses what Kant calls as the twelve
categories; it discusses how the mind makes use of these concepts, and
the Transcendental Dialectic which talks about the three antinomies,
these are areas where, according to Kant, reason’s powers fail. The
last part of the Critique is the Doctrine of Method. Here Kant lays down
his arguments in comparing mathematical and logical proofs and the
distinction between practical and theoretical reason.
Although Kant sets the Critique as a manner of clarifying the stretches
of the capacity of human reason, another purpose of the text, as
previously stated, is “whether metaphysics [is] capable of extending
our knowledge of reality”12 and more specifically whether man has
the capacity to know things about God, human freedom and the
immortality of the soul. Yet this does not mean that what Kant intends
to know is whether metaphysics13 is possible but how one could go
about it.
Now what does Kant mean by transcendental aesthetics? These refer
to the manner through which man sees reality i.e. through space and
time. To Kant, space and time are neither substances nor accidents but
subjective conditions. This has two implications: first, that they are a
priori; second, being intuitions, they represent only one thing.
This is followed by the Transcendental Analytic through which Kant
presents the wiring of the human mind and the impositions it makes
on reality. The twelve categories which the section discusses are based
on the twelve forms of judgments of logic. The subsections 24-26 of
the Critique seek to argue how the twelve categories are applied to the
senses in general. The influence of the categories is found in that the
79
mind has the tendency to anticipate things. “The ability to anticipate
what is given to us in sensible intuition, to require a certain formal
consistency in space and over time, depends on a connection between
the productive imagination and space-and-time consciousness.”14 How
is this possible? Note that intuitions are the object of the categories.
Since space and time are intuitions, they are subject to the power of
these categories. But all representations are clothed in space and time
once the mind receives them. Hence, the categories exercise their
powers on human experience.
The last parts of the critique seek to present the antinomies – the
quagmire in which we fall whenever we inquire into unreachable
realities and the explanation of this propensity. Although, this may be
of interest to others, we shall confine ourselves to these sections as
these have been the most heavily criticized by Kantian scholars such
as Guyer.
Criticism
Although we could enumerate a number of criticisms, we shall
confine ourselves to one which is of particular interest – Gaven Kerr’s
accusation against Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. In his article
“Transcendental Idealism: A Hypothesis?”15 published in June 2011
by the International Philosophical Quarterly, Kerr argues that Kant’s
epistemology is as more illusory than real since the Kantian theory of
knowledge was not able to bridge the gap between the things outside
and the mind. According to Valdez16, Kerr viewed the Kantian theory
through an Aristotelian perspective. He argues that “Kant’s system
gives too much emphasis on epistemic efficient causality (EEC), in
which the mind creates the form of the object intuited, and utterly
rejects epistemic formal causality (EFC), in which objects act on the
mind formally to produce a likeness of their form in the mind”17 and
that his strict representationalism is no different from Descartes
pineal gland – a petty attempt to bridge the gap that he had made.
Kerr attacks Kant in two ways, first by arguing that if the only things
permissible are things that are representational, how is it that there
are a priori concepts that need not be represented? Furthermore, Kerr
Page
also says that Kant seems to assume that the mind simply thinks in
such a manner rather than defending it.
Response
One has to admit that Kant does seem to forget the need for a
metaphysical basis for the existence of the objects that the mind hopes
to grasp, at least partially in Kantian language. Yet, as Valdez would
argue, such a criticism is based on a faulty assumption as well.
Kant clearly states that what he is attempting is an examination of
reason in its purest form, and hence an actual world with existing
objects is assumed as a given. In addition, the concern here is the mind
and how it operates; any contact with external reality must therefore
not be considered. In fact, he makes use of the term Copernican
revolution, precisely to make us focus our attention on the knower
and the knower alone. Kant also argues that this may be the only way
so as not to stop at a dead end (please refer to footnote 6).
Kerr fails to see that Kant’s Copernican turn does not presume any form of
“correspondence of reason to reality,” and that Kant showed that he need
not do so in the first place. Kant’s investigation of reason has shown that
knowledge of objects depend on the faculties and the activity of reason,
and one cannot assume any form of fundamental truth that goes outside
reason’s boundaries. If Kant sought to prove his theory of knowledge
based on an unfounded assumption about objects, then reason “gets into
trouble” and falls into the same error that transcendent metaphysics (and
its accompanying theories of knowledge) has committed.18
In the end, one could say that the Critique was Kant’s way of separating
from the fondling arms of any ontology that assumed knowledge of
the thing-in-itself.
Conclusion
Having looked at these facts, we are therefore ready to draw a
conclusion. It is now clear to us that it never entered Kant’s mind to pave
81
the way for subjectivism and perspectivism; rather Kant’s admittance
of reason’s incapacity is a form of “epistemic humility”. Furthermore,
although the mind may only function in a phenomenological world,
what matters is that we can still get through the end of the day, assured
that there is still a thing as certitude.
Endnotes
1
This is how Langton had called Kant’s epistemological approach.
3
One only need to turn to Descartes’ Meditations on the First Philosophy
to get a full grasp of this obsession.
2
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Vol. IV: Modern
Philosophy From Descartes to Leibniz (New York: Doubleday, 1994).
4
The issue is not exactly if truth or certainty were possible. That is
considered a given. More than anything else, the issue of concern is
how one arrived at the truth. The concern is the methodology towards
the truth.
5
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 369. Henceforth, CPR. I
shall refer to the edition (A or B) and the page number.
7
Geroge Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 32.
9
CPR, A 104.
6
CPR, B xvi.
8
Earl Allyson Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status Of Kant’s Transcendental
Idealism: A Response To Gaven Kerr” (2012), 12.
10 The whole discussion is based on Altman’s and Copleston’s explanation
of the divisions of the Critique.
11 “The science of all principles of sensibility a priori, I call Transcendental
Aesthetic.” CPR, B 22. “A science of this kind, which should determine
the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions
must be called Transcendental Logic.” CPR, B 48.
Page
82
12 Copleston, History of Philosophy, Vol. VI, 211.
13 Here, one must take note that Kant uses the term metaphysics in two
different ways. He sometimes refers to metaphysics as a science and
this he later on concludes is impossible. He does, on the other hand,
consider a metaphysics, which simply refers to the attitude of the
human mind.
14 Matthew Altman, A Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
(Washington: Westview Press, 2008), 140.
15 It is, however unfortunate that the article is unavailable to us and that
we have in this case to rely on a response to the Kerr’s “accusations”.
Due to this, we shall limit ourselves to one criticism.
16 Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism.”
17 Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,”
2.
18 Valdez, “The Hypothetical Status of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,”
8.
BOOK REVIEW
Page
83
Raymun J. Festin, SVD
MINDFULNESS
Manila: Logos Publications, Inc., 2012.
437 pp. ISBN 978-971-510-249-0
An inspiring way to look at philosophy is couched by this book entitled,
Mindfulness. Fr. Raymun Festin intended the book to be written in a
way that will inspire philosophy students and the reading public to
appreciate the art of philosophizing. Like any other art, philosophy is
a gift that can be acquired, and this is what this book intends to show.
This book is about being mindful. It seeks to explain what it means. It
describes its basic features exemplified in the different ways in which
past thinkers tackled philosophical puzzles and problems
This book argues that philosophy is a self-reflective activity involving
serious study and soul searching. It affirms that the search for
understanding makes sense only when it improves one’s mode of
thinking and reforms one’s manner of living.
The main theme unfolds in five chapters. Chapter one discusses
the early Greek thinkers—also known as the Presocratics—and the
specific concerns that engaged their minds. In particular, Chapter
one focuses on the thoughtful ways in which they conceived their
insights, while grappling with the questions that agitated the Greek
polymorphic mind.
Chapter two picks up the thread of the discussions in the first chapter.
The term Being, the key concept in Philosophy, is formally introduced
to the general discourse. Plato and Aristotle are forthwith presented as
two most important thinkers who followed the lead of the Presocratics.
The question about Being is not mere intellectual curiosity for Plato
Page
84 BOOK REVIEW: MINDFULNESS (2012)
and Aristotle. It wields an ethical bearing on their thoughts. It also
influenced, to a great extent, the succeeding generation of thinkers.
Chapter three examines language as a philosophical theme. The
discussion is set against the backdrop of one of the most significant
shifts that occurred in the history of philosophy—a turning point that
began with Rene Descartes. This phase is characterized by a change of
focus in philosophical reflection. While the Presocratics contemplated
the external world of nature, Descartes and the modern philosophers
mulled over the self as a thinking subject and made it the starting
point of their research and investigation. It spawned new challenges
for philosophy, the most significant of which is the confrontation
between faith and reason.
Chapter four deals with the notion of presupposition and its
importance in philosophical reflection. Under normal conditions,
we are unaware of the assumptions that underpin our thinking
and acting. Unquestioned suppositions are of special interest for
philosophers. Lastly, Chapter five tackles one of the most absorbing
issues in contemporary philosophy: the theme of otherness.
The concluding part of the book ties up the discussions of the
chapters and gives a brief summary of the key insights propounded.
What does mindful philosophizing consists in? it is the experience
of philosophizing that makes the difference. One would discover as
one goes through the pages of the book to learn to appreciate and
to relish the beauty of philosophy. If there is one thing which sums
up the book’s insights, it is the idea that philosophic mindfulness is
basically an attitude of the mind. It is a peculiar outlook that seeks
to understand things by looking at them from another perspective.
The early philosophers were possessed of this kind of disposition by
viewing the world of nature from a different angle, they were able
to come to grips with the basic character of reality. So does our so
called quest for being philosophically mindful starts when one allows
oneself to persevere in the search for truth and wisdom, even though
the journey never ends.
Page
85
Contributors
Fr. Maxell Lowell C. Aranilla, Ph.D. is professor at the Philosophy
Department of San Carlos Seminary where he teaches Metaphysics,
Epistemology, Philosophy of God and Philosophy of Education. He also
teaches at De La Salle University in Manila.
Fr. Lorenz Moises J. Festin, Ph.D. is the dean of the Philosophy
Department of San Carlos Seminary where he currently teaches Cosmology,
Anthropology, Thesis Writing and Philosophical Synthesis. He also teaches
at De La Salle University in Manila and San Carlos Graduate School of
Theology.
Chris Julius D. Conjurado is a third year student of Philosophy at San
Carlos Seminary. He comes from the Our Lady of the Pillar Seminary in
the Diocese of Imus.
John Alford L. Molina earned his degree in Philosophy at San Carlos
Seminary in 2013. His article in this journal is a summary of his thesis for
which he received the Zwaenepoel Award for Best Thesis in 2013.
Jay Anthonie A. Sanico is a third year student of Philosophy at San Carlos
Seminary. He comes from the Our Lady of the Pillar Seminary in the
Diocese of Imus.
Karlo Marko D. Valladores earned his degree in Philosophy at San Carlos
Seminary in 2013. His articles appear in the SCS Information, the official
newsletter of San Carlos Seminary.
Xavier Paul Y. Jacome is a third year student of Philosophy at San Carlos
Seminary. He served as Chairman of the Intellectual Formation Committee
in 2012 and is currently co-editor of Theoria.

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