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REVISTA DE LA
ACADEMIA
PUERTORRIQUEÑA
DE JURISPRUDENCIA
Y LEGISLACIÓN
SAN JUAN, 1990
VOLUMEN II
ACADEMIA PUERTORRIQUEÑA DE
JURISPRUDENCIA Y LEGISLACIÓN
Correspondiente de la
Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación
Fundada el 9 de diciembre de 1985
Académicos de número
Dr. José Trías Monge, Presidente
Lcdo. Fernando E. Agrait, Vice Presidente
Lcdo. Antonio R. García Padilla, Secretario General
Hon. Lady Alfonso de Cumpiano, Tesorera
Hon. Miguel Hernández Agosto
Hon. Juan R. Torruella
Dr. Efraín González Tejera
Dr. Carmelo Delgado Cintrón
Lcdo. Antonio Escudero Viera
Lcdo. Marcos A. Ramírez Irizarry
Lcdo. Lino J. Saldaña
Lcdo. Salvador E. Casellas Moreno
Lcdo. Wallace González Oliver
Lcdo. Demetrio Fernández Quiñones
“La Academia Puertorriqueña de Jurisprudencia y Legislación,
correspondiente de la Real Academia de Jurisprudencia de España, tiene
como fines promover la investigación y la práctica del Derecho y de sus
ciencias auxiliares, así como contribuir a las reformas y progreso de la
legislación puertorriqueña”. Artículo 1, Título primero de los Estatutos.
Revista
de la
ACADEMIA PUERTORRIQUEÑA DE JURISPRUDENCIA Y
LEGISLACIÓN
Comisión de la Revista
Carmelo Delgado Cintrón
Director
Antonio García Padilla
Secretario General
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REVISTA
de la
ACADEMIA PUERTORRIQUEÑA DE JURISPRUDENCIA Y LEGISLACIÓN
VOL. II
1990
ÍNDICE
DISCURSOS DE RECEPCION
Págs.
Las acciones contra familiares: análisis de un problema claro y una
jurisprudencia confundida
Demetrio Fernández Quiñones .................................................................................. 1
Contestación al discurso del doctor Fernández
Fernando Agrait........................................................................................................ 19
ARTÍCULOS
Federalism and the Scab of Colonialism
Carmen Consuelo Cerezo ......................................................................................... 25
A Legal Opinion on International Law, Language and the Future of
French Speaking Canada
Ramsey Clark ............................................................................................................ 67
La hipoteca mobiliaria en la “era de la computadora”
Eduardo Vázquez Bote .............................................................................................. 83
La responsabilidad del fabricante: ¿responsabilidad absoluta,
Negligencia o seguro “no culposo” (Informe puertorriqueño)
Luis Muñiz Argüelles ................................................................................................ 93
Matrimonial Regimes: Options for the Twenty First Century
Efraín González Tejera ........................................................................................... 111
La prueba de referencia (“hearsay”) en el derecho español —
Acercamiento comparativo—
Ramón Antonio Guzmán ......................................................................................... 129
TRABAJOS DE LA ACADEMIA
Problems in the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by a
Civil Law Jurisdiction: the Louisiana case
Georgina Prieto ............................................................................................145
LAS ACCIONES CONTRA
FAMILIARES: ANÁLISIS DE
UN PROBLEMA CLARO Y UNA
JURISPRUDENCIA CONFUNDIDA
Demetrio Fernández Quiñones
I. Introducción
Han transcurrido ya cuarenta años desde que el Tribunal Supremo de
Puerto Rico, en el caso de Guerra c. Ortiz,1 se planteó por primera vez el
tópico, en el ámbito de la responsabilidad civil extracontractual, de la
litigación entre parientes. Desde entonces, la norma inicial ha variado
considerablemente o, por lo menos, la actitud del Tribunal ha sido un
tanto zigzagueante. Ello acarrea, desde luego, una gran incertidumbre; no
sólo para quienes viven de la prestación de sus servicios profesionales en
el campo del derecho, sino para cada uno de los miembros de nuestra
comunidad político-social, quienes, a fin de cuentas, para conocer sus
derechos, tienen que pagar la factura que reciben de sus abogados. Me
propongo, a continuación, examinar el desarrollo jurisprudencial del
tema y hacer ciertas reflexiones que, a mi juicio, pueden ayudar a
comprenderlo con mayor exactitud, aunque, como veremos, los
pronunciamientos jurisprudenciales prácticamente prohíben la exactitud
y la predicción, por el jurista, de los fallos futuros.
II. La Factura Judicial de Nuestro Derecho de Daños
Comparto el criterio de que la sentencia más sabia del Juez Presidente
Hughes fue, quizás, aquella en que afirmó: "Vivimos bajo una
Constitución; más la Constitución es lo que lo jueces dicen que es."2 Es
71 D. P. R. 613 (1950).
Charles Evan Hughes. La Suprema Corte de los Estados
Unidos (trad. cast. de Roberto Molina Pesque' y Vicente
1
2
1
2
Rev. Acad. Puert. De Jur. y Leg.
2 1, 1990
así no sólo en la hermenéutica constitucional; esa es una realidad que
caracteriza a cada una de las normas jurídicas del ordenamiento. Si
alguna disposición es buena para ejemplificar lo dicho, esa es,
precisamente, el Artículo 1802 de nuestro Código Civil.3 La aquilatación
del daño, el contenido del concepto "culpa o negligencia", la apreciación
de la existencia de causa eficiente o legal, es decir, el significado del
Articulo 1802, depende continuamente del acto volitivo, más o menos
acertado, constituido por el pronunciamiento judicial.
Queda así planteado, en primer término, la categoría del
pronunciamiento judicial y, por supuesto, la interrogante de si son
adecuadas o no las herramientas que los jueces utilizan para construir sus
pronunciamientos. Rubio Llorente, aunque refiriéndose exclusivamente a
la norma constitucional, pero con palabras que constituyen también como las del Juez Presidente Hughes- afirmaciones extrapolables a
cualquier norma jurídica, lo plantea así:
[L]a incorporación al texto constitucional de preceptos sustantivos (incorporación inexcusable en nuestro tiempo) ha de ser compatible con el pluralismo político, pues el legislador no es un ejecutor de la Constitución, sino un poder que actúa libremente en el
marco de ésta y está libre actuación requiere en muchos casos
(aunque no, claro, en todos) que el enunciado de esos preceptos constitucionales permita un ancho haz de interpretaciones
diversas. No de interpretaciones 'jurídicas', sino de
interpretaciones políticas, es decir, de diversas maneras de
entender el texto constitucional cuyos enunciados han de
construirse, por tanto, con conceptos de valor de un alto grado de
abstracción. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, la sujeción del
legislador a la Constitución y la judicialización de tal sujeción
tienen como consecuencia, de una parte, que esa libertad, por
amplia que se la quiera, haya de tener límites y, de la otra, que
esos límites no sean otros que los establecidos por el juez a partir
de la interpretación 'jurídica' de los preceptos constitucionales.
Todo conflicto constitucional es pura y simplemente el
enfrentamiento de dos interpretaciones, la del legislador y la del
juez. Aquélla tiene la inmensa autoridad de la representación
popular; ésta no puede recabar para sí otra que la que procede del
Herrero). 2da. ed., México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1971,
pág. 7.
3 31 LPRA § 5141.
3
Derecho, es decir, y esto es lo decisivo, de un determinado método
de interpretar los preceptos jurídicos, especialmente los preceptos
constitucionales, cuya estructura necesaria, sin embargo, se presta
mal a la interpretación con las herramientas habituales del jurista.4
Lo importante del planteamiento del Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de España es, justamente, el reconocimiento de la insuficiencia formal y material- de la ciencia jurídica para dar respuestas a todas las
preguntas que las realidades fácticas pueden formularle al texto, más o
menos preciso, de la ley.
En el asunto específico que ahora estudiamos, el derecho es, per
se, insuficiente. Se requiere, en consecuencia, que los operadores jurídicos, y especialmente la jurisdicción - recuérdese que el término jurisdicción significa, etimológicamente, "decir o declarar el derecho"- tengan en
cuenta no solo el resultado abstracto que las herramientas puramente
jurídicas pueden construir, sino que deben ingredir las nociones o realidades sociológicas -siempre que se trate de la familia hay necesariamente
que acudir a la sociología- que deben penetrar y condicionar la exégesis
de la norma jurídica.
Pisamos, por consiguiente, un terreno muy propicio para apreciar las
vías que conectan el derecho con la sociología. Tan íntima es la relación
entre ambas disciplinas que nuestro Eugenio María de Hostos -cuyo
sesquicentenario hemos celebrado durante el año pasado- confundió sus
particularidades y percibió al primero como una de las ramas de la
segunda, en cuanto el derecho "corresponde -afirma el ilustre
mayagüezano- directamente a aquel orden de conocimientos que tiene
por objeto a la sociedad, y que, con el nombre de Ciencia social o
Sociología, constituye una ciencia abstracta."5
Es preciso indicar que, ni la relación entre el uno y la otra puede llegar
al extremo de confundir ambas disciplinas, ni la sociología es, en modo
Francisco Rubio Llorente. "Prólogo". En: Enrique Alonso
García. La interpretación de la Constitución. Madrid, Centro de
Estudios Constitucionales, 1984. págs. XXI. XXII. (escolios
omitidos)
5 Eugenio María de Hostos. Obras completas. 2da. ed., Rio
Piedras, Puerto Rico, Caqui, 1989, T. XV, pág. 10. (énfasis en el
original). Para una iniciación en el pensamiento jurídico
hostosiana, véase: Ramón Antonio Guzmán. "Los orígenes
doctrinales de la obra jurídica de Hostos". 58 Rev. Jur. UPR
423 (1988).
4
4
2 1, 1990
alguno, una ciencia abstracta. Pero hay también que hacer justicia a
Hostos y reconocerle que pudo detectar que no es posible ser abogado o
jurista sin contar con las herramientas necesarias para efectuar las
consideraciones sociológicas pertinentes.6
Elías Díaz, con una percepción más adecuada, nos alecciona, con
mayor acierto, sobre la relación entre derecho y sociología y, más
concretamente, nos indica la importancia de la sociología jurídica. Nos
dice, el catedrático de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, lo siguiente:
Define en esta perspectiva Adam Podgorecki a la Sociología jurídica 'como la ciencia que descubre, formula y verifica las relaciones de interdependencia entre el derecho y los demás factores
de la vida social y, más precisamente, como la ciencia que explica
el modo en que los factores demográficos, religiosos, económicos
y políticos influyen sobre los cambios del Derecho y, viceversa, el
modo en que el Derecho influye sobre el cambio de esos factores'.
La Sociología jurídica es, en efecto, estudio de la interrelación
entre Derecho y Sociedad, analizando las recíprocas y mutuas
influencias entre ambos. […]
Se trata, pues, de investigar sobre los factores sociales que dan
cuenta de la génesis y transformación del Derecho (señalando, entre ellos, el factor o los factores predominantes de esa influencia)
y, a su vez, de poner de manifiesto el tipo de sociedad que de hecho se va configurando desde una determinada legalidad, lo cual
implica la consideración del Derecho como factor de cambio
social.7
El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto no ha cerrado la puerta a esta
tendencia doctrinal Precisamente en Molina c. Dávila,8 uno de los casos
que más adelante examinaremos con cierta amplitud, expresó lo
siguiente:
Sobre el particular, véase: Eugenio María de Hostos. "Reforma del Plan de Estudios en la Facultad de Leyes". En: Obras
completas, citada, T. XII, págs. 171 y es.
7 Elías Díaz. Sociología y filosofal del derecho. 4ta. reimpresión de la 2da. edición, Madrid, Taurue, 1986, pág. 177. (escolios omitidos).
8 88 JTS 84
6
5
Algunas reglas jurisprudenciales son creadas por consideraciones de política pública. Pero si las circunstancias que produjeron
su adopción varían, los tribunales deben formular las nuevas reglas
que sean necesarias para que el derecho adelante al mismo ritmo
que el cambio que experimenta la comunidad. Es decir, que las
condiciones cambiantes de nuestra época, que es caracterizada por
su gran dinamismo, requieren la actitud alerta de los tribunales
para mantener el mismo paso con el resto de los organismos
y funcionarios gubernamentales y los sectores activos de la sociedad.9
Es necesario, por tanto, examinar la realidad sociológica de la familia
puertorriqueña, para poder examinar posteriormente los elementos que
ha considerado y que deberá considerar el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto
cuando tenga que dirimir controversias que estén directa o indirectamente relacionadas con la litigación, por daños y perjuicios causados en
una relación extracontractual, entre familiares.
II. La Familia Puertorriqueña: Acercamiento Sociológico
La sociología es todavía una ciencia nueva. El término que la significa
se utilizó por primera en el año 1839, en el Tratado de filosofía positiva
del francés Augusto Comte. No es hasta iniciado el presente siglo que se
publica, en suelo americano, precisamente por Eugenio María de Hostos,
el primer tratado sobre la materia.
Desde sus inicios, la sociología de la familia consideró que esta
institución tenía tres funciones básicas: (i) la biológica o reproductiva;
(ii) la económica, en cuanto la familia era un centro de producción para
satisfacer las necesidades de cada uno de sus miembros; y (iii) la
sociológica, puesto que en ese núcleo se verificaba casi totalmente el
proceso de socialización, mediante el cual los miembros de cada familia
iban introyectando y haciendo suyos los patrones de comportamiento
exigidos por la sociedad en general.
Según fueron apareciendo y desarrollándose otras instituciones sociales, aquellas funciones fueron perdiendo importancia dentro del seno
familiar. Las nuevas concepciones de la sexualidad dejaron a un lado la
percepción del matrimonio, núcleo de la familia, como un "remedio de la
concupiscencia", para utilizar la expresión del antiguo Código de Dere-
9
88 JTS 84, pág. 5871.
6
2 1, 1990
cho Canónico.10 La economía extra doméstica desplazó a la familia
como un centro de producción y la ha convertido, indiscutiblemente,
en una institución de consumo. Así mismo, el proceso de socialización se
da mayormente, y quizás con mayor eficacia, en la escuela, en la Iglesia
y en los grupos secundarios, aunque es innegable que una parte importantísima del proceso de socialización debe completarse en el hogar.
Ello no implica que la familia sea una institución que esté presta a desaparecer. En la actualidad, y en el futuro, la familia seguirá existiendo,
puesto que desempeña y desempeñará siempre una función insustituible.
Me refiero a la función psicológica. Es decir, la familia satisface la necesidad que tienen los individuos de pertenecer a un grupo primario al que
puedan describir con el adjetivo "mi"; de instalarse en una sede en la cual
se refugie del anonimato de la calle y de su taller de trabajo; de tener
cerca a otros individuos que conozcan sus defectos y sus virtudes y
donde pueda desarrollar su capacidad para dar y recibir afecto.
Esa función psicológica de la familia no admite que el intercambio que
en ella se verifica esté gobernado, en todos sus extremos, por las mismas
pautas y los mismos criterios que rigen la relación entre extraños. Así,
parecería sensato concluir, preliminarmente, que a la legalidad que configura el ordenamiento le está vedado propiciar o consentir todo tipo de
litigación entre familiares.
Sin embargo, la importancia suma de la función psicológica que
desempeña la familia como institución social no puede llegar al extremo
de ignorar la realidad amarga de ciertas familias nuestras.
No es necesario que les aburra con estadísticas para que ustedes acepten que la dinámica entre los miembros de muchas de nuestras familias
alcanza, tristemente, el estadio de lo patológico.
El maltrato de menores es uno de nuestros graves problemas. Las
agencias gubernamentales encargadas de conjurar el fenómeno han tenido que lanzarse a una campaña abierta y, muy probablemente, con pocas esperanzas. El maltrato tiene dos vertientes, la afectación de la integridad física y la insanidad mental. Ello obedece, por supuesto, a que
muchas de las personas que optan por la paternidad no están preparadas
ni psicológicas ni intelectualmente para educar a sus hijos. No tienen el
alma templada para comprender las necesidades psicomotoras y de alimentación vigilada y puntual que tienen sus criaturas. La incomprensión concluye en la golpiza incontrolada, en el aislamiento atiborrado
Código de Derecho Canónico de 1917, Articulo 1030. El
equivalente de éste en el nuevo Código de Derecho Canónico es
el Canon 1055, del cual ha desaparecido la expresión citada.
10
7
de peligros, en la humillación pública, en un desafecto cuyas consecuencias, aunque se desconocen con exactitud, si sabemos que no pueden ser
muy halagüeñas.
Los continuos rompimientos del vínculo matrimonial, en edades en
que los niños no han configurado todavía su personalidad esencial, les
conduce abruptamente a la convivencia en un nuevo grupo familiar
donde habrá una persona, o más de una, que para ellos son, simplemente,
extraños. Su desarrollo no se da, pues, en el ámbito de intimidad que es
preciso.
El rompimiento del núcleo familiar, se convierte, en muchos casos, en
una litigación pública interminable. Nuestras salas de relaciones de familia están afrontando, diariamente, la irresponsabilidad paterna que, por
diversas razones, niega el alimento a sus hijos. No es muy sana una
sociedad en la que los padres, para cumplir sus obligaciones alimentarias,
tienen que ser encarcelados. El recurso del embargo de salario, aunque es
una salida menos onerosa, no es tampoco un índice de sanidad ni de
integridad personal.
Las relaciones incestuosas constituyen otro de nuestros graves males
sociales. Evidencia este fenómeno que el grupo familiar está presidido,
en un número alarmante de casos, por individuos en los que ha fracasado
el control social y, en consecuencia, la desviación individual causa daños
verdaderamente irreparables.
La comodidad que algunos padres egoístas reclaman produce despreocupación y desentendimiento de las decisiones de sus hijos adolescentes.
Así no sólo se explica, aunque no sea la causa única, entre otros males, el
abuso en el uso de las drogas, sino el fenómeno de la sexualidad muy
temprana, cuyo único fin es la sexualidad misma, que es un síntoma
innegable del hedonismo de nuestro tiempo. Esta inclinación individualista por la gratificación inmediata es, por supuesto, una manifestación
del egocentrismo, que implica, necesariamente, el debilitamiento de los
intereses sociales y de la deformación de la conciencia colectiva.
Debe consignarse, además, que si bien es cierto que la vida moderna
aumenta, en proporción al progreso sin fin, tanto la probabilidad como la
dimensión del daño, la indemnización de éste es sólo un aspecto de la
litigación entre parientes. Entre éstos se da también, como he dicho, la
litigación por el pan, por el vestido, por los cuidados médicos y las
oportunidades educativas. Entre parientes es, la mayoría de las veces, la
litigación que surge de la inconformidad por la partición extrajudicial de
un determinado caudal hereditario. Tampoco es totalmente inexistente la
litigación, entre parientes, por el incumplimiento de las obligaciones
contractuales.
No hay que decir más para que todos tengamos que reconocer que el
derecho de daños que, por razón de su hechura judicial, es probable-
8
2 1, 1990
mente la más modernista de las áreas del derecho, no puede cegarse ante
nuestra realidad social.
Veamos, pues, cómo la jurisprudencia de nuestro Tribunal Supremo ha
ido, aunque sin un norte claro, abriendo o cerrando los ojos a dicha
realidad.
IV. La Jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico
Guerra c. Ortiz es, en nuestra jurisdicción, el primer caso en que el
Tribunal Supremo se ve obligado a contestar si está legitimado un hijo
menor no emancipado para incoar una acción contra su padre, por razón
de los daños que éste le causó al incurrir en conducta negligente. Para
resolver la controversia el Tribunal examina la doctrina jurisprudencial
española y de varias jurisdicciones de la "Common Law" y, en ambas
tradiciones jurídicas, encuentra fundamentos análogos para pautar que,
en el caso ante su consideración, el demandante carece de legitimación
para litigar.11
El Tribunal expresa así el más importante fundamento de la decisión
en el caso de Guerra:
Reconocer la existencia de una causa de acción en estos casos
sería abrir una brecha peligrosa en la unidad de la familia,
[constituida] bajo el régimen de la patria potestad […12] no sólo
para beneficio de los hijos sino también, como comenta Manresa,
para beneficio del estado, ya que interesa ‘…sumamente al buen
orden y a la prosperidad social, que esté fuertemente [constituida]
la autoridad paterna para que reine en la familia una firme y
Es pertinente destacar que el Tribunal, aunque no esté
consciente de ello, puesto que no lo señala, al examinar las disposiciones pertinentes del Código Civil de Puerto Rico llega,
como debe ser en una jurisdicción civilista, a una conclusión
desde la perspectiva del derecho substantivo. Sin embargo, en
los precedentes que cita de la "Common Law", lo que se plantea
es si existe una acción que dé cauce a la reclamación del demandante.
12 Se omite la referencia que hace el Tribunal al Artículo 152
del Código Civil, 31. L.P.R.A. g 591, puesto que éste varió substancialmente a partir de la enmienda que sufrió en 1976, al
aprobarse la Ley Núm. 99, de 2 de junio.
11
9
constante disciplina, de la que salgan después ciudadanos
educados en el respeto de las leyes y a los magistrados de su
país.'13
Otro factor, más rebuscado y, por consiguiente, menos fuerte y convincente, es el que arranca del contenido del Artículo 155 del Código
Civil,14 que haría surgir, según el Tribunal, una "situación anormal -por
no conceptuarla de inmoral- de que el padre vendría a ser el administrador y usufructuario de lo que, por actuación puramente negligente, obtuviera el hijo."15
Más recientemente, en Rodríguez Mejías c. ELA.,16 nuestro Tribunal
Supremo resolvió que en la locución "título lucrativo" del Articulo 155
no están incluidas las sumas recibidas por los menores como resarcimiento de los daños físicos o morales que hayan sufrido y, en consecuencia, que los padres no pueden usufructuar el producto de tales sumas. Es decir desapareció el peligro que percibió entonces.
En Guerra c. Ortiz se llega al mismo resultado de la decisión en
Hewlett v. George,17 que es el primer caso en torno a la materia resuelto
en los Estados Unidos. Nuestro Tribunal Supremo no quiso ser atrevido
en la primera oportunidad y calcó el razonamiento y la fundamentación
de los tribunales norteamericanos.18 La postura corresponde a la visión
sociológica que percibe a la familia como entidad de unidad perfecta y
71 DPR 613, 619 (1950).
31 LPRA § 612.
15 71 DPR 619, 619 (1950). El Artículo 155 del Código Civil
reza así:
"Los bienes que el hijo no emancipado haya adquirido o
adquiera con su trabajo o industria, o por cualquier título
lucrativo, pertenecen al hijo en propiedad, y en usufructo a los
padres que le tengan en su potestad y compañía; pero si el hijo,
con consentimiento de sus padre, viviere independientemente
de éstos, se le reputará para todos los efectos relativos a dichos
bienes, como emancipado, y tendrá en ellos el dominio, el
usufructo y la administración."
16 88 JTS 146.
17 68 Mies. 703 (1891)
18 En torno a la génesis y desarrollo inicial de la materia en
los Estados Unidos, véase: William E. McCurdy. "Torts
between Persons in Domestic Relation". 43 Harvard Law
Review 1030 y se. (1929 - 1930).
13
14
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2 1, 1990
que ésta no debe, en momento alguno, sufrir las fisuras que pudiera
causar la litigación entre sus miembros.
Cinco años después, en Fournier c. Fournier, ya el Tribunal comienza
a transformar su percepción inicial y afirma:
[…] Al darle [en el caso de Guerra] acogida a esa doctrina, lo
hicimos acertadamente, porque habiendo unidad familiar que
proteger y relaciones paterno-filiales que conservar, permitir que
la acción tuviera éxito, hubiera sido contrario a y en detrimento y
menoscabo de la política pública [que favorece la unidad de la
familia y la tranquilidad y disciplina en el hogar]. No [fue]
ciertamente nuestra intención enunciarla como norma absoluta,
para concederle inmunidad a los padres contra acciones de los
hijos basadas en culpa o negligencia, por la sola circunstancia del
nexo natural que les une, sin estar justificada la inmunidad por
consideraciones de orden público. El principio que [prohíbe] tales
acciones no es, se ha dicho, 'producto de la inhabilidad inherente
del hijo para demandar al padre, estando más bien basada en el
interés que tiene la sociedad en preservar la armonía de las
relaciones domésticas'.19
En Fournier la hija demandante reclamó indemnización por los
daños sufridos por la muerte, causada por el padre demandado, de su
señora madre. Al ocurrir la muerte, los padres de la demandante estaban
divorciados y ésta vivía bajo el cuidado y la custodia de la madre. De ahí
que el Tribunal concluyera que en este caso no "había algo efectivo que
conservar, mediante la aplicación de la doctrina [pautada en el caso de
Guerra, algo cuya destrucción debía evitarse, no solamente en bien del
hijo, sí en provecho del orden social."20
Debe resaltarse el modo en que el Tribunal expresa su nueva postura:
Estamos plenamente convencidos de que incurriríamos en
grave error si [aplicáramos la doctrina sentada en Guerra] al
caso de autos. Entre el problema resuelto [allí] y el que se nos
llama a decidir en el presente litigio, existe honda diferencia, que
es perfectamente obvia. No tiene aquí justificación alguna la
contención de que al reconocerle a la hija el derecho a recobrar
indemnización de su padre, que le privó de la compañía, ayuda y
19
20
78 DPR 430, 432 (1955).
78 DPR 430, 433 (1955).
11
cuidados de la madre, sería contrario a la política pública, puesto
que la unidad de la familia, y las relaciones paterno-filiales han
desaparecido, y como cuestión de realidad, no existían desde
mucho antes de morir la madre, que estaba divorciada del padre,
estando limitadas las relaciones de éste con la hija, que vivía con
aquélla, bajo su custodia y potestad, a pasarle una pensión
alimenticia para el logro de la cual, entre paréntesis, [fue]
necesaria la intervención judicial.21
Posiblemente el hecho de la muerte de la madre de la hija demandante
haya estremecido a los miembros del Tribunal. Pero sus pronunciamientos son claros y hay que analizarlos detenidamente.
En primer lugar el "conyugicidio" puede darse lo mismo entre parejas
matrimoniadas que divorciadas.22 Ese hecho particular del caso de
Fournier, que pudiera repetirse en otros casos, no puede, por consiguiente, ser definitivo para medir la unidad familiar y la relación más o
menos estrecha de los padres con sus hijos.
Hay que reconocer, en segundo lugar, que en nuestra sociedad actual
hay muchas más personas divorciadas que las que había en 1955. Este
hecho ha implicado unos ajustes en la relación de los ex-cónyuges y
los hijos que éstos procrearon durante su matrimonio; circunstancia
fuertemente matizada por los pronunciamientos jurisprudenciales que
han proporcionado al derecho de los padres a visitar a sus hijos una
amplitud entonces insospechada.
En consecuencia con el rompimiento del vínculo matrimonial ya
no termina, como se concebía antiguamente, la relación paterna filial.
De ahí que se necesiten nuevos criterios para medir la nueva relación que
se da entre los padres y los hijos que no conviven bajo un mismo techo.
Es posible, incluso, que aquellos padres que han tenido que ser llevados
ante la jurisdicción para que cumplan con su obligación de alimentar a
sus hijos, que es uno de los criterios utilizados en el caso de Fournier,
mantengan una relación afectiva adecuada e intensa.23
Ídem
Permítanme la expresión "conyugicidio" en un sentido amplio y simplificador, pues debo aceptar que en su sentido estricto ese fenómeno sólo puede darse entre parejas matrimoniado.
23 Adviértase que la litigación por razón del incumplimiento
de la obligación alimenticia se verifica más bien entre los excónyuges o entre personas que, sin haberse casado, han pro21
22
12
2 1, 1990
A contrario sensu, el cumplimiento puntual de la obligación de
alimentar no es, por sí sola, un indicador de una relación paterno-filial
estrecha en cuanto al afecto y en cuanto a lo que puede implicar, en la
crianza, la presencia del padre que esté privado de la custodia de su hijo.
En una palabra: el precedente establecido en Fournier muy poco
puede ayudarnos en la comprensión adecuada del fenómeno que pretende
gobernar. El juzgador, hoy día, tiene que analizar, con certeza suma y
ponderación cuidadosa, cada uno de los aspectos del caso ante su
consideración.
La postura del Tribunal, en Drahus c. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co.,24 permite inferir, sin equivocación posible, que la única preocupación de ese cuerpo judicial, en cuanto al tema que nos ocupa, es el efecto
patrimonial de la sentencia. Es decir, según nuestro Tribunal Supremo,
la "unidad familiar" sólo está en peligro cuando se produce una
redistribución del patrimonio familiar Por eso cuando es una aseguradora
quien, en una acción directa, se ve obligada a pagar la sentencia, esa
"unidad familiar" se mantiene incólume, sin defecto:
Cuando los daños están cubiertos -apunta el Tribunal contractualmente por un asegurador que a todas luces no está comprendido en el ámbito afectivo de la familia, la acción no genera la
animosidad ni las relaciones tirantes entre padre e hijo que
caracterizan la confrontación adversativa, ni se empobrecerá el
capital de la familia. De hecho se fortalecerán la unidad y el bienestar familiar porque se logra la reparación económica del infortunio que a todos aflige. El viejo fantasma del desquiciamiento de
la armonía doméstica cede el sitio a la relativa satisfacción que
fluye del resarcimiento pecuniario.25
En consecuencia, cuando hay un asegurador que pague, en el término
"confrontación adversativa" no está incluida, según el Tribunal, la
participación del hijo en los demás aspectos del proceso judicial; es
decir, nada importa la declaración del hijo contra su padre ni la del padre
contra su hijo; no es significativo que padre e hijo se sienten en
banquillos distintos y representados por distintos abogados; no cuenta
que, en el descubrimiento y la presentación de la prueba, se ventilen
creado uno o varios hijos, y no entre éstos y el padre demandado.
24 104 DPR 60 (1975).
25 104 DPR 60, 63-64 (1975).
13
detalles íntimos de la vida familiar. Lo único que interesa es que del
bolsillo del padre no salga un solo "peso". Así sólo quedará restringido el
uso -puesto que estarán bajo la custodia y administración del secretario
del Tribunal- de los "pesos" de las compañías de seguros.
El criterio monetario de la decisión en Drahus se confirma, quizás
inadvertidamente, en Ramos c. Caparra Dairy.26 En la primera ocasión
en que el Tribunal Supremo adjudica una de las controversias de este
pleito,27 se determina la comisión de negligencia en unos hechos que
"solo Dios", según lo expresa el mismo Tribunal,28sabe cómo ocurrieron.
Pero esta no es la única anomalía que aparece en la configuración sustantiva y procesal del pleito. En su segunda parte, en su "secuela", para
utilizar el mismo léxico del Tribunal, se permite la adjudicación de un
pleito de nivelación que nunca fue incoado o, si se quiere, la consideración de una reconvención que nunca se presentó. Veámoslo.
El Tribunal determinó que la muerte de un menor se debió a la
negligencia combinada de la demandada, en un 70%, y de la- madre del
niño, quien era también parte codemandante, en un 30%. Los daños
estimados por el Tribunal fueron los siguientes:
la madre del menor:
$75,000.00
el padre del menor:
$50,000.00
el hermano del menor: $10,000.00
la hermana del menor: $ 5,000.00
La Caparra Dairy pagó íntegramente la parte de la sentencia que correspondía a los demás codemandante y procedió a descontar, de la cantidad
de $75,000.00 que debía pagar a la madre, la suma que correspondía pagar a aquélla, es decir, el 30% de lo pagado por la Caparra Dairy. El Tribunal legitima este procedimiento a base de la aplicación de la figura de
la "compensación" en su modalidad judicial. Sin embargo, la sanción
positiva de este procedimiento implica el reconocimiento indirecto o
colateral de la litigación entre familiares. Pero ello no importa, porque a
fin de cuentas, la madre codemandante no tuvo que desembolsar nada; al
contrario, experimentó -utilizo nuevamente una expresión del Tribunal"la relativa satisfacción que fluye [de un] resarcimiento pecuniario" ascendente a $34,171.04. Los demás codemandante quedaron obviamente
"fortalecidos" -parafraseo al Tribunal- en su "unidad y [en] el bienestar
116 DPR 60 (1985).
Ramos Acosta c. Caparra Dairy Inc., 113 DPR 357 (1982)
28 113 DPR 357, 366 (1982)
26
27
14
2 1, 1990
familiar porque se [logró] la reparación económica [ascendente a
$90,000.00] del infortunio que a todos [afligía]".
Molina c. Dávila,29 es una opinión que no resiste análisis.30 Lo único
que más o menos podemos inferir de la parte final de la opinión
concurrente y disidente del Juez Rebollo López es que se trata de una
reafirmación de la norma pautada en Ramos Acosta c. Caparra Dairy.31
Parecería que ni dicho magistrado, ni el Juez Negrón García, autor de la
opinión en la segunda parte del caso de Ramos Acosta y quien concurre
ahora con el Juez Rebollo López, ya no están de acuerdo con su postura
original:
Si se resuelve -apunta el Juez Rebollo- que la joven Molina
Caro incurrió en un 50% de negligencia comparada tendríamos —
bajo la posición asumida por la Mayoría— que la menor tendría
derecho, en primera instancia, a recibir la mitad de los $40,000.00,
esto es, la cantidad de $20,000.00 y la madre la suma integra de
$10,000.00. Hay que recordar, sin embargo, que la parte
demandada tiene el 'derecho de nivelación'. Ramos Acosta c.
Caparra Dairy.32 Ello significa que dicha parte tendría el derecho
a recobrar de la menor el 50% de lo pagado a la madre, por lo que
la menor recibiría la suma neta de $15,000.00.
Ello de momento, repetimos, parece bien. Pero, ¿y [qué] si se
determinara que la menor fue responsable en un 90%?
El resultado, al amparo de la decisión de la Mayoría, sería un
absurdo. Si aplicamos la norma de Torres Pérez [... ] a esta
situación la menor tendría derecho a recibir, de primera instancia,
la suma de $4,000.00 (el 10% de $40,000.00); la madre
continuaría recibiendo sus $10,000.00. Pero al 'nivelar', la parte
demandada tendría derecho a recobrar de la menor el 90% de los
$10,000 pagados a [la madre de ésta], esto es, la suma de
$9,000.00. El resultado final sería que la menor -perjudicada
88 JTS 64, resuelto el 17 de mayo de 1988.
Es en realidad inexplicable la discusión que plantean los
litigantes y que lleva a cabo el Tribunal. ¿Por qué la discusión
en torno a la negligencia imputada cuando el demandado pudo
llegar a un resultado parecido si hubiera hecho el pago de la
sentencia de conformidad con lo decidido en Ramos Acosta c.
Caparra?
31 supra, escolio 26.
32 Ídem.
29
30
15
directa- quedaría debiéndole a la parte demandada la suma
de $5,000.00. No creemos que esa situación ni sea la más
correcta ni la más justa.33
Esta conclusión es correcta, según mi criterio. El único defecto que presenta es que parte de una premisa mayor falsa. La posible responsabilidad de la menor frente a su señora madre, en cuanto puede resultar deudora de ésta, no dependerá, a fin de cuentas, de la determinación de que
la negligencia sea imputable, sino del derecho a nivelación que se reconoce en Ramos Acosta c. Caparra.
Lo único que se me ocurre pensar es que tanto el Juez Rebollo como el
Juez Negrón García piensan que el ámbito de aplicabilidad del caso de
Ramos Acosta es aquel en que el cocausante del daño tiene que desembolsar una suma suficiente como para pagar íntegramente, por razón de
la solidaridad, la suma correspondiente a los codemandante que no son
cocausantes y, además, que sobre alguna cantidad razonable para indemnizar al codemandante y cocausante que padeció directamente la acción
negligente o culposa del demandado. Ello no quiere decir que el pleno
del Tribunal tenga una postura distinta; ocurre, simplemente, que los
jueces disidentes no pudieron convencer a los jueces que componen la
mayoría de que Molina c. Dávila presentaba los hechos necesarios para
un nuevo pronunciamiento jurisprudencial.
La contradicción -tanto la del Tribunal como la de los jueces disidentes- es sólo aparente. Su percepción, especialmente la de quienes presentan el disenso, es que la aplicación automática de la decisión en
Ramos Acosta puede producir resultados descabellados. Tal percepción
es, en mi criterio, correcta y juiciosa. No es racional que cuando una persona se une a otra en una acción para demandar conjuntamente a un tercero que causó daño a uno de los codemandante, luego resulte deudora
de aquél que se unió a ella para reclamar la indemnización por el tercero.
Es decir, es impensable, -utilizo la configuración fáctica del caso de
Molina c. Dávila- que el resultado de una acción en la que une madre se
una a su hija para demandar a un tercero que atropelló a ésta resulte en la
declaración judicial de que la hija es deudora de su madre o, lo que es
peor, del demandado que pague totalmente la sentencia en virtud del
carácter solidario de la sentencia.
Muchas serán la justificaciones y muchas de ellas, por supuesto, constituirán silogismos falsos, si el legislador no auxilia al Tribunal. Es preciso, por tanto, que se revise la redacción del Artículo 1802 de nuestro
33
88 JTS 64, en la pág. 6890 (énfasis en el original).
16
2 1, 1990
Código Civil para que en los casos en que opere la figura de la negligencia comparada, el demandado sólo se vea precisado a indemnizar, a todos
los codemandante entre quienes exista algún tipo de relación afectiva o
consanguínea, en la porción correspondiente a su grado de negligencia.
Así se eliminaría, en estos casos, la figura de la llamada "compensación
judicial" adoptada en el caso de Ramos Acosta.
No hay duda de que a los jueces les repugnan los resultados injustos.
Pero saben, al mismo tiempo, que sus decisiones deben tener, por lo
menos, una apariencia de racionalidad. Por eso históricamente se
produjeron doctrinas —la de la "última oportunidad expedita", por
ejemplo— que proporcionaron un resultado más justo que el propuesto
por la antigua norma de la negligencia contribuyente. Pero la necesidad
de razonamientos poco convincentes y casi interminables desapareció
cuando el legislador adoptó la norma, justa y sabia, de la negligencia
comparada. Estoy convencido de que nuestro Tribunal Supremo espera
que el legislador le libere, nuevamente, de una encrucijada tan fatigosa.
V. Conclusión
En conclusión, el Tribunal vive y padece, en el tema que nos ocupa, un
dilema que le agobia demasiado. Sabe que es necesario abandonar tanto
su doctrina primitiva como la más reciente; pero sólo está dispuesto a
reconocer su nueva postura a través del artificio y no de un
reconocimiento realista.
El jurista tiene que estar confundido. Muy poco es lo que puede
analizar cuando las actuaciones del Tribunal están más dirigidas a
resolver casos que a orientar la profesión y a pautar e] derecho en un
modo inteligible y con las justificaciones exigidas por la altura de
nuestro tiempo. El factor económico no puede ser determinante. En los
casos en que ambas partes del litigio están unidas por un nexo
consanguíneo, y esto va más allá de la mera responsabilidad civil
extracontractual, son muchos los elementos que el Tribunal debe
considerar para, al mismo tiempo que resuelve el caso particular, sentar
doctrina cuya racionalidad la haga comprensible y aceptable. Ya me he
referido a algunos de ellos, pero ciertamente no a todos. Esta alocución
mía es sólo el planteamiento del tema. Queda mucho por desarrollar.
Desde luego, la doctrina del Tribunal no depende exclusivamente de
los recursos humanos que lo integran. Los abogados postulantes tienen
también mucho que decir, si es que han cumplido su deber de haber leído
y pensado; si sus convencimientos responden al estudio bien realizado y
no al intento de justificar lo injustificable, los miembros del foro son el
auxilio más rico con que pueda contar el Tribunal. Ello requiere, por su
parte, abandonar la actitud recalcitrante de pensar que el abogado tiene
17
todas las respuestas. Hay que buscar en el psicólogo la orientación
psicológica; hay que acudir al sociólogo cuando quieran encontrarse los
fundamentos sociológicos de una perspectiva; en una sola frase: hay que
salir del derecho para retornar a él con un contenido más rico y más
realista.
Los tribunales también esperan mucho de las facultades de derecho.
Estas deben proporcionarle la información más completa y la crítica
mejor pensada. Muchos de nuestros jueces deciden incorrectamente no
porque les agrade el equívoco sino porque no han encontrado, en muchas
ocasiones, una fuente generosa.
Los tribunales necesitan, además, todo cuanto esta Academia
Puertorriqueña de Jurisprudencia y Legislación pueda aportar en la
depuración de las imprecisiones y el soslayamiento de las posturas
atécnicas mediante propuestas de legislación que redunden en actos
legislativos que merezcan el aplauso de todos.
En una palabra: los tribunales necesitan la aportación de cada uno de
los integrantes de nuestra comunidad jurídica. En el desempeño de esa
responsabilidad estamos obligados a obrar como familia en la que no hay
lugar para el litigio.
CONTESTACIÓN AL DISCURSO
DEL DOCTOR FERNÁNDEZ
Fernando Agrait
Debo comenzar con una aclaración importante. En la relación maestroestudiante hay básicamente dos modelos. El primero es aquel donde el
maestro deslumbra al estudiante y el estudiante admira al maestro más,
en la etapa en donde el estudiante conoce menos de la materia objeto de
estudio. El segundo modelo es aquel en donde el estudiante crece en su
respeto y admiración al maestro mientras más conoce y penetra en la
materia objeto de estudio. Mi profesor de Daños y Perjuicios fue
Demetrio Fernández, llevo enseñando esta materia 19 años y mi relación
con el profesor Fernández es del segundo modelo.
La ponencia del doctor Fernández, nos dice con relación a las
acciones de Daños y Perjuicios intra-familiares en Puerto Rico, un
poco lo que nos dice Camilo José Cela en su novela Cristo vs. Arizona:
"[...] el tiempo no estaba confundido pero si revuelto y esto
hace que la gente ande por la vida tropezando".
Usando como punto de apoyo las acciones infra-familiares el ponente
nos llama la atención a un problema central de nuestros tribunales. Me
refiero a la ausencia de una visión o marco conceptual amplio dentro del
cual se pueda ubicar decisiones individuales y encontrar, por tanto,
relaciones, consistencias, continuidad y explicación para diferencias.
Me temo que en este sentido el señalamiento aplica no sólo a
tribunales sino a toda la estructura pública en nuestro país.
Después de todo —esta idea también está presente en el discurso del
profesor Fernández— el afán de nuestro Tribunal de más alta jerarquía
por muchos años de resolver caso a caso, haciendo "justicia"
individualmente, puede generar, como de hecho genera la gran
"injusticia" colectiva de falta de estabilidad, falta de predicibilidad, falta
19
20
2 19, 1990
de certeza en el esquema jurídico y un peligroso depender caso a caso del
juicio individual del juez de turno —por bueno que sea ese juicio.
Otro elemento importante —también apuntado por el nuevo
académico— es que nuestros Tribunales no han logrado armonizar sus
posiciones en los distintos casos. Me refiero a que aún se mantienen
dicotomías como procesal-sustantivo cuando en realidad dicha dicotomía
carece de validez. Tanto lo llamado procesal como lo Ramada sustantivo
lo que hace —o no hace— es proteger, promover e incentivar valores e
intereses que la sociedad, conscientemente o no, ha identificado como
digno de protección.
El análisis de las demandas de daños intra-familiares no puede hacerse
aislado de la solidaridad de cocausantes, ni del derecho de nivelación, no
de la demanda contra tercero en la acepción de la Regla 12.1 (2). Esto
último es particularmente importante pues contrario a la jurisdicción
norteamericana en donde la demanda contra tercero es una invitación que
el demandado hace al demandante para que enmiende su demanda e
incluya al tercero1 en el caso de Dumont c. Inmobiliaria Estado Inc.,2 el
Tribunal Supremo, sin discutirlo específicamente, da por sentado que
esta clase de demanda contra tercero automáticamente pone al tercero
demandado en controversia directa con el demandante original.
La decisión que el Tribunal Supremo tome sobre las demandas intrafamiliares, visto desde la perspectiva del ponente sobre el caso Ramos c.
Caparra Dairy Inc.3 dependerá en última instancia de cuánta vigencia le
va a reconocer al derecho del perjudicado para reclamarle daños a quien
no es parte de la familia. Es así, pues no cabe duda que ese extraño que
causa parte del daño vaya a buscar nivelar contra el miembro de la
familia cocausante. Por tanto, permitir o no esta acción del extraño
contra el familiar, no es sino el viejo juicio en todo caso de daño, esto es,
quién va a cargar finalmente con el costo resultante. No debemos perder
de vista que todo el andamiaje de Daños y Perjuicios no es sino un
sistema de distribución de riesgos y costos.
1
Regla 14(a) - Reglas Federales de Procedimiento Civil para las
Cortes de Distrito- véase en particular los comentarios del Comité
Asesor.
2
113 DPR 406 (1982)
3
116 DPR 60 (1985)
Fernando Agrait
21
El ponente plantea correctamente que el Tribunal hace énfasis
desmedido en el elemento económico como factor decisivo para permitir
o no la demanda intra-familiar.4 Las complicaciones de litigación intrafamiliar trascienden lo económico como muy bien señala el doctor
Fernández. Ahora, no debemos olvidar que los problemas no económicos
que surgen en esa litigación intrafamiliar están presentes constantemente.
Están presentes en todo pleito contra los padres por responsabilidad bajo
el Artículo 1803,5 así como un pleito contra la sociedad legal por daños
causados por uno de los cónyuges y aún en pleitos privativos por el daño
causado por un cónyuge. Esto no ha impedido que se tolere este tipo de
caso sin limitación alguna.
En la parte inicial de la ponencia, el doctor Fernández hace
importantes señalamientos sobre lo que podemos llamar sociología del
derecho de familia, en particular sobre los desarrollos más recientes en la
dinámica familiar en nuestro país. Comparto los planteamientos y creo
que el Tribunal no incorpora a su análisis este elemento que podemos
llamar como el ponente "sociológico". El Tribunal debe enmarcar
cualquier desarrollo sobre pleitos intra-familiares en la realidad
cambiante, rápida, que se da en nuestra sociedad con relación a la familia
y el reconocimiento que tanto de jure —según las enmiendas al Código
Civil en 1976, entre otras— como de facto, se ha dado una liberación
económico-social procesal de la mujer dentro del matrimonio, y el efecto
de ello en las relaciones jurídicas internas. Si esos cambios al Código se
hicieron —independiente de los méritos sustantivos— con el debido
cuidado conceptual al carácter unitario del Código es tema para otro día.
En su correcta perspectiva el tema seleccionado por el ponente es sólo
la punta del témpano de un tema mucho más escabroso. Me refiero a
cuánto podamos permitir y cuán efectivo es el sistema de tribunales para
intervenir en relaciones intra-familiares, que no sean fácilmente
convertibles a relaciones económicas socializables por vía de seguros.
Permítanme traer en este momento dos ideas que me parecen centrales
al tema a la luz de este último señalamiento. Primero, MacLean y Mills
4
Drahus v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 104 DPR 80 (1975); Ramos v.
Caparra Dairy Inc., supra.
5
31 LPRA § 5142.
22
2 19, 1990
en un reciente artículo titulado "Amor y Justicia”6 señalan que en el
ámbito familiar prevalece el valor amor y fuera de la familia se prioritiza
el valor justicia. Sealant:
"What we care about most, our ultimate values, have to do with
family, friends, religion, and the like. But because of our historical
circumstances, the pursuit of any of these values can and has led to
tyranny, intolerance, and exploitation, and so our interactions,
even in the domestic sphere, ought at least to conform to the
demand of justice and respect, even if we may wish that they not
be motivated by these concerns. She seeks love when we marry
and found families, not increasingly complex ways in which we
can learn to treat each other justly. We want justice to be the
foundation, not the focus, of family like.
But in loving relationships people not only find intimacy, they also
discover new ways to step on each other's toes, violate each other's
dignity, and show a lack of respect. Not only love and justice, but
people too are often blind. They are, for a variety of reasons, blind
to the hurts they cause. When our partners show us how we hurt
them or acted selfishly, they are calling for justice as well as love.
If justice is not the focus of loving relationships, it must still be a
continuing concern: like freedom, it requires eternal vigilance."
Segundo, a manera de mera mención, no debe excluirse la posibilidad
de que la litigación intra-familiar sea un mecanismo legítimo, para que
un miembro de la familia que se siente que participa en una relación no
equitativa —por que ha sufrido daño no compensado— lo utilice de
forma que logre generar una relación más balanceada, de mayor equidad
conforme al Equity-Theory que se ha desarrollado en el campo de la
sicología. Con todos sus costos, esa litigación puede ser más eficiente al
generar un nivel de equidad superior, en vez de retener al perjudicado en
una relación no equitativa que produce ansiedad —tanto en el
perjudicado, manifestada como coraje, como en el causante del daño
manifestada como sentido de culpa.
Comparto con el doctor Fernández su preocupación y el deseo porque
se genere un diálogo fructífero en nuestro ámbito con relación a los
problemas jurídicos del país. Sueño con que podamos juntos hacer una
6
Love and Justice, Report from the Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy, Vol. 9, No. 4 (19139)
Fernando Agrait
23
aportación a la calidad del diálogo y discurso público en nuestro país.
Vamos a ocupar un espacio de altura y calidad que permita que el
espacio de debate público no esté ocupado totalmente como ahora lo
está, con un discurso político superficial, repetitivo, gastado, antiguo,
improductivo.
Muchas gracias.
FEDERALISM AND THE SCAB
OF COLONIALISM
Carmen Consuelo Cerezo
For Rosanna Teresa and Francisco Javier
Introduction
It has been said that men need history, that it helps them have an idea
of who they are. And, I would add of who they are not. Thus, it is to
history that I must first turn in narrating the reality, which nurtures this
article. It does not pretend to be a scholarly work for it is too bound to
life to boast of intellectual sophistication. It is bound to a life of solitude
and a grief wrought by apathy and incomprehension. A source of much
of this emptiness is, strangely enough, found in the books of law under
the rubric of federalism. What does one's solitude and grief or the apathy
of others have to do with it? Where lays the enigma? They lie in the fact
that in the name of misunderstood or misapplied versions of federalism
this Island has become a breeding ground for strife, confusion and
conflict. That translated into human terms, means solitude and frustration
for many.
Federalism is a historical fact, a fundamental constitutional arrangement, a bright star in American constitutional law. To this island community, however, it is an alien concept. Neither the old nor the new versions of American federalism apply to Puerto Rico for all of them assume, as in federal systems everywhere, the existence of diverse political
units which, enjoying the guarantees of representation and participation
in the larger, more complex political processes, unite to form one political entity where the ultimate source of authority lies. The social, political
and economic conditions of Puerto Rico since its first encounters with
the United States in 1898 clearly show that Puerto Rico has never been a
participant of American federalism
The underlying message of this article has been sent out by others before me: a better account has to be taken of the facts surrounding the

U. S. District Judge for the District of Puerto Rico.
25
26
2 25, 1990
Puerto Rican reality. The misconceived notion of a sovereignty-oriented
federalism, which is advocated and manipulated by some, lends itself to
the perpetuation of the unequal treatment accorded to the island. Puerto
Rico is neither sovereign nor federalist. Some act and speak as if it were.
That does not change its reality. We cannot hide any longer behind the
grandiose phrases which are used to describe Puerto Rico— federal relations such as "unparalleled relationship, unique, sui generis, a new dimension in American federalism"—for every time that we pass on to a
new generation the unresolved burdens inherent in our present relationship with the United States the possibility of making the social, political
and moral decisions that have to be made becomes more and more remote.
In the first part of this article we shall trace the history of federal-State
relations to follow the growth of the changing concept of American federalism from colonial times to the recent version of a process-oriented
federalism. The second part will deal with some of the problems of a
people whose county is still an unincorporated Territory of the United
States and who should by now be tired of the rhetoric of sovereignty and
the imagery of federalism.
I
A. American Federalism: The Birth of a Nation
There are many theories and different versions of federalism. The
American conception of federalism is no exception. It has been characterized in different ways by different people during the various stages of
its growth. American legal decisions and scholars have talked, for example, about dual federalism,1 "Our Federalism,"2 a state sovereignty
That is, concept of federalism that holds that there are two
sovereign, independent and antagonistic, and that government
flourishes by their competition with each other as equal partners.
2 Justice Black in Younger v. Harris, 401 V. S. 37, 44 (1971),
referred to the “ideals and dreams of „Our Federalism,‟ "stating that
"[t]he concept does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any
more than it means centralization of control over every important
issue in our National Government and its courts," but rather
represents "a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the
National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that
1
Carmen Consuelo Cerezo
27
approach to federalism,3 cooperative federalism,4 horizontal federalism,5
interstitial federalism,6 a process-oriented federalism;7 “separate spheres”
federalism,8 an interactive federalism,9 and a new federalism.10
No one could reasonably argue that American federalism in 1988 is
the same as it was in 1787. As each generation of Americans has faced
new problems, changing views of federalism necessarily arose; accommodations and adaptations had to be made. These various characterizawill not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States."
Professor Redish has raid that "in Younger the Court attempted to
elaborate on the theoretical bases for the bread deference given to the
states under the newly-coined title of 'Our Federalism;' a task which
previous Courts had declined to undertake," and that "[w]hat Justice
Black did not fully explain, however, is exactly which state interest or
institutions were intended to be served by the extreme judicial
deference dictated by 'Our Federalism.'" M. Redish, Federal
Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power (The Michie
Company 1980) at pp. 297-98.
3 This conception of federalism reflects the notion that the dates ere
separate, inviolable spheres whose domains must be free from federal
interference.
4 Cooperative federalism views the various states as cooperating
with the federal government and supplementing each other.
5 See Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Ground as a Means
of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63
Texas L. Rev. 978, 992 (1985) ("a federalism in which dates look to
each other for guidance" resulting from state court departure from
federal court decisions).
6 The belief that federal law is interstitial in nature and builds
upon legal relationship that the states have established.
7 The view that the fundamental limitation on the enroll of
congressional power over the states is one of process and that any
restraint must and ice justification in the procedural nature of that
limitation.
8 A construct of federalism based on the functioning of the dates
within the federal scheme, which proposes that the states build for
themselves separate spheres that federal court will respect.
9 A theory of federalism that rejects the dual model and relies
instead on the interactions of the state and federal systems.
10 An expansion of the state-sovereignty theme, which urges state,
courts to look to their own constitutions as a source of individual
rights. See, S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 38
Southwestern L.J. 951 (1982).
28
2 25, 1990
tions, however, simply reflect different visions of the same political and
social reality, for American federalism, like every other concept of federalism, relies on certain fundamental principles that are determinative of
the federalist manifestation. One of the central strands is the idea that
power is shared, that federalism is a means of sharing and a means of
organizing power. Some federal states may be stronger than others but
the sharing may and the division of power, though the degree to which
power is shared may differ, is the common thread that runs through the
fabric of all societies organized under federalist principles. Professor
William Anderson has said: "If I were asked to point out the common
features that characterize federal systems, I would mention the constitutional division of the powers and functions of government between two
autonomous and constitutionally recognized levels of government, the
central and the regional."11 This, to borrow a phrase from Professor
Livingston,12 is what essentially lends societies their "federal quality."
Among the salient attributes or elements of federalism, in addition to
the division and the diffusion of power among the national and local
units, is the representation of the governed in the general government.
Through the selection of representatives and the subsequent representation of their interests in the national government, the constituent polities
participate in the composition and in the functioning of the larger polity.
Federal systems must guarantee the representation of the constituent polities, in this case States, in the national legislature. In stating the purpose
of the Senate, Madison said:
In order to judge the form to be given to this institution, it will be
proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were
first to protect the people against their rules: secondly to protect
(the people) against the transient impressions into which they
themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate
moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on
the plan of govt. most likely to secure their happiness, would first
be aware, that those charged with the public happiness, might
betray their trust. An obvious precaution against. This danger wd.
be to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might
watch and check each other. In this they wd. be governed by the
Anderson, William, Intergovernmental Relations in Review
(University of Minnesota Press, 1960), p. 5.
12 Livingston, William S., Federalism and Constitutional Chants
(Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 2 (arguing that federalism le a
function not of constitutions but of societies).
11
29
same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate
departments of govt. where all business liable to abuses is made to
pass thro' separate hands, the one being a check on the other.13
On the subject of representation, Governor Huntingdon, addressing the
Convention of the State of Connecticut, stated:
The state governments, I think, will not be endangered by the powers vested by this Constitution in the general government. While I
have attended in Congress, I have observed that the members were
quite as strenuous advocates for the rights of their respective
states, as for those of the Union.14
Hamilton reasoned that the balance between the national and state
governments formed a double security15 for the people. During the 1788
debates in the Convention of the State of New York, he made the
following argument:
After all, sir, we must submit to this idea, that the true principle of
a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to
govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the
current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free
Max Ferrand (ed.), The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, (New Haven), Yale University Press, Vol. I, p. 421.
14 The Debates in the Several! State Constitutions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution, Vol. II, p. 199 (J. Elliot, ed. 1937).
15 Referring to the double source of protection afforded by the
federal system, Justice Brennan has denounced the Supreme Court's
restriction on the federal judiciary. See, Brennan, J., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 489, 502-503 (1977) ("Under the banner of the vague, undefined
notions of equity, comity and federalism the Court has condoned both
isolated and systematic violation of civil liberties. Such decisions
hardly bespeak a true concern for equity. Nor do they properly
understand the nature of our federalism. Adopting the premise that
state courts can be trusted to safeguard individual rights, the
Supreme Court has gone on to limit the protective role of the federal
judiciary. But in so doing it has forgotten that one of the strengths of
our federal system is that it provides a double source of protection for
the rights of our citizens. Federalism la not served when the federal
half of that protection is crippled.")
13
30
2 25, 1990
government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the
most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this principle is adhered
to; where, in the organization of the government, the legislative,
executive and judicial branches are rendered distinct; where,
again, the legislature is divided into separate houses and the
operations of each are controlled by various checks and balances,
and, above, all, by the vigilante and weight of the state
governments,—to talk of tyranny, and the subversion of our
liberties, is to speak the language of enthusiasm. This balance
between the national and state governments ought to be dwelt on
with peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms a
double security. If one encroaches on their rights, they will find a
powerful protection in the other.16
Professor Wechsler points out in his article on the political safeguards
of federalism, a precursor to the Court's theory of federalism in García v.
San Antonio Transit Authority:17
The continuous existence of the states as governmental entities
and their strategic role in the selection of the Congress and the
President are so immutable a feature of the system that their
importance tends to be ignored. Of the Framers' mechanisms,
however, they have had and have today the larger influence upon
the working balance of our federalism. The actual extent of central
intervention in the governance of our affairs is determined far less
by the formal power distribution than by the sheer existence of the
states and their political power to influence the action of the
national authority.18
Closely tied to the element of representation is that of the involvement
of the citizens and the communication, which is, or ought to be,
maintained between the national government and the people. MacMahon
Supra, note 14, at 257.
469 U.S. 628 (1985).
18 Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). It is Professor Wechsler's thesis
"that the existence of the states as governmental entities and as the
sunrise of the standing law in itself the prime determinant of our
working federalism, coloring the nature and the scope of our national
legislative) process from their inception." Id. , at 648.
16
17
31
points out that the "essential ingredient in federations (as distinguished
from looser forms of union) is that their central organs are to some extent
directly in contact with individuals, both to draw authority from them
through elections and also for the purpose of exacting taxes and
compliance with regulations.”19 This contact with the citizenry also gives
the people a degree of control in the national governmental system. The
people know themselves to be the source of the government's legitimacy.
The force of the people of each constituent polity is added and is bound
to that of the people of every other constituent polity in fulfilling the
desire to unite independent, diverse communities into one single polity.
The element of the "equality of the constituent states, absolute, as to
legal status"20 is also basic to federalism. Finally, we must mention
another essential of federalism, which is significant in the discussion of
our subject matter: permanence. The relationship between the component
and the larger complex is necessarily predicated on permanence. It is
neither a transient relation nor a relation that can easily be extinguished
by internal forces. Chief Justice Chase stated it well when he referred to
"an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States."21
All of these features are an integral part of the many facets of federalism advocated in the United States22, which range from the "original
constitutional conception of federalism"23 addressed by Professor
Kurland to such atomized versions as "Justice Rehnquist's federalism." 24
Arthur W. MacMahon, Federalism: Mature and Emergent
(Doubleday Co., Inc., New York, 1965) p. 4.
20 Id. At 5.
21 Texas v. White, 7 Wallace (United States Supreme Court Reports)
p. 700 (1869). Professor Anderson in his book the Nation and the
States, Rivals or Partners? (Minnesota Press, 1955), observed that
this statement "set forth succinctly the basic fact about national state
relations under the Constitution of the United States—the important
and permanence of both the national and the state governments."
22 Edward S. Corwin considers that the federal system has "shifted
base in the direction of a consolidated national power in response to
war, economic crisis and an altered outlook upon the duty of government, yet affirms that "the structural features of our Federal System
still remain what they have always been." See, E. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1950).
23 See, P. Kurland, Federalism and the Federal Courts, Benchmark,
Vol. II, No. 1, January-February 1986.
24 See, J. Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and
Federalism, 91 Yale L. J. 1317, 1343 (1982) ("Justice Rehnquist's role
19
32
2 25, 1990
The characteristics I have mentioned are generally not discussed at any
length in scholarly works on federalism because they are simply the
given premises of their inquiry. It is, of course, taken for granted that
sharing of power, division and diffusion of power, representation, equality, citizen participation in the national political processes, and permanence are part of the federalist formula, more specifically, of the American brand of federalism.25 It would seem naive to even question this. The
in the evolution of the Younger principle of "Our Federalism" and in
the revived of the Eleventh Amendment has been central both to the
Court's decisions and to his own development of the meaning of
federalism as a constitutional first principle. Younger, according to
the interpretation Rehnquist gave it in Rizzo and McNary, is an exact
parallel to Usury. Just as the state sovereignty invoked in Usery bars
federal legislative interference with state legislative decisions, so
Younger, Rizzo, and McNary bar federal judicial interference with
state judicial or executive process. Similarly, Edelman v. Jordan
prohibits the federal courts from vindicating federal statutory rights
by making demands on the state exchequer except pursuant to
congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Token to
their logical extremes, these doctrines would create an almost
impenetrable sphere of state autonomy, upon to federal interference
at only two points. One is the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state court decisions involving federal questions. The other is
Congress' enforcement power under the Civil War Amendments.")
Professor Powell's position is that Justice Rehnquist‟s theory of
federalism, which relies on the idea of sovereignty, fails in its
connection to history, arguing that "The evidence is strong that the
Framers intended to establish a vigorous national government for the
purpose of securing the liberties of the sovereign people." Id. , at
1369.
25 See, Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of
America, Analysis and Interpretation, Introduction to the 1952
Edition, Wash., D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office (1964), p. 4
("Federalism in the United States embraces the following elements:
(1) as in all federations, the union of several) autonomous political
entities, or 'States' for common purposes; (2) the division of legislative
powers between a 'National Government,' on the one hand, and
constituent 'States' on the other, which division le governed by the
rule that the former is a 'government of enumerated powers' while
the latter are governments of 'residual powers; (3) the direct
operation for the most part, of each of these centers of government,
within its assigned sphere, upon persona and property within its
33
need, or better stated, our need for stacking the building blocks of the
pyramid will become obvious in our later discussion. Now, however, it is
important to consider, if briefly, the struggle for the meaning of
American federalism, which for the most part has turned on the
preference of, state over national rights, or vice versa, until the most
recent formulation which ties American federalism to the nation's
political processes. We propose that this development will support the
position taken in this article that American federalism, in its historical
dimension and in its present manifestation, is not only irrelevant to the
Puerto Rican society but also alien to it.
B. Visions of Federalism
As stated earlier, federalism in the American experience has been
characterized in different ways,26 depending on the advocate's personal
preferences in tilting the balance in favor of the states or of the nation. In
this struggle between the votaries of states' rights, on one hand, and the
proponents of a vigorous national government, on the other, lies also
the struggle for the meaning of federalism. Holmes said that it was
enough for the Founders "to realize or to hope that they had created an
organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat
and blood to prove that they created a nation."27 The sweat and blood that
went into building that nation is sometimes ignored by those who embark
territorial limits; (4) the provision of each center with the complete
apparatus of law enforcement, both executive and judicial; (5) the
supremacy of the 'National Government' within its assigned sphere
over any conflicting assertion of 'State' power; (8) dual citizenship.").
26See generally, for different views of judicial federalism: P.
Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 24 F.R.D. 481;
O'Connor, J., Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case Western Reserve L.
Rev. 1 (1984-85): Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43
Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1930); H. Hart, Jr., The Relations between State
and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1954); P. Bator, The State
Court and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
805 (1981); D. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
543 (1985); Wagner, Restriction of Access to Federal Courts: The
Growing Role of Equity, Comity and Federalism, 50 Temple L.Q. 320
(1977); Soifer and Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing
Reconstruction, 55 Texas L. Rev. 1141 (1977).
27 Justice Holmes as quoted in L. Lusky, By What Right? (The
Michie Co. 1975), p. 82
34
2 25, 1990
upon hair-splitting theories and sub-theories of federalism essentially
based on the idea of state sovereignty.28 The struggle, as Professor Field
acknowledges, is in some ways a political one.29 It has been a tortuous
road, the one leading from a sovereignty-controlled view of federalism to
the functional vision of federalism, which was adopted by the Court in
García v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 V.S. 528
(1985). We shall look at several of the many costumes that federalism
has worn and cast aside. The scenario for the display of the costumes has
largely been, of course, the judicial arena, if only because of the preeminence of the American judiciary as expositors of the concept.30
The two most prominent theories of federalism have been dual
federalism and cooperative federalism. Although the Supreme Court for
many years relied on the theory of dual federalism in adjudicating issues
of state/federal relations, it slowly moved away from that conception,
passing through several stages. Before National League of Cities v.
Usery,31 the modern Court interfered little with national political power
thus leaving national political authority largely unrestrained. In this 1976
opinion, however, it revived the idea of placing restraints on the exercise
of national power on the states only to abandon it nine years later, in
García v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth.,32 for deference to the
national political processes as protectors of the states' interests.
Under the theory of dual federalism, the states were regarded as
"integral units, equal with and antagonistic to the federal government,
Professor La Pierre has said that "[A]lthough lates' rights is no
longer primarily a refuge for scoundrels, it is often difficult to discern
whether states' rights proponents are motivated by some principle of
federalism or whether they use states' rights as a convenient legal
mantle for objections to substantive national policies." See, La Pierre,
The Political Safeguards of Federal Redux: Intergovernmental
Immunity and the State as Agent of the Nation, 60 Wash. L.Q. 779,
782-83 (1982).
29 Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The
Demise of e Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 117 (1985).
30 See, Tolman, Leland G., Colum. L. Rev., April 1954, pp. 650.657,
quoted in W. Brooke Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations
(1964) (stating that "the very essence of federalism, the arcs where
Federal and State law touch and overlap, is made integral in the
national judicial structure to a degree greater than in any other
federated government.").
31 426 U. S. 833 (1976).
32 469 U. S. 528 (1985).
28
35
while also retaining their own impregnable spheres of authority."33 This
image of two antagonistic and inherently equal sovereigns diminished
with the passage of time and due to the aggrandizement and
consolidation of national power, and the states came to be regarded
instead as semi-sovereign bodies in contrast to the larger political
community—or nation—which came to be viewed as the sovereign. But
the idea, derived from debates during the ratifying conventions, that
the state and the national governments were distinct and separate,
that each was instituted with different powers and for different purposes,
placated those who feared that the autonomy, even the life, of the states
was placed in jeopardy by the birth of the new national government. So,
even the Federalists, who favored a strong and powerful national
government, engaged at times in the sovereignty rhetoric to allay the fear
of their opponents, or perhaps also, to sink their roots in patriotic turf.
Corwin laments the demise of dual federalism in his famous article
"The Passing of Dual Federalism" where he refers to the shift in the
federal system towards consolidation of national power. There he traces
the development of American federalism stating that its "first
achievement was to enable the American people to secure the benefits of
national union without imperiling republican institutions" while, in
contrast, "…by the constitutional revolution which went by the name of
the 'New Deal'," federalism was overwhelmed in the objectives of
economic reality and peace, thus making it uncertain whether the states
could "be saved for any useful purpose, and thereby saved as the vital
cells that they have been heretofore of democratic sentiment, impulse
and action."34 According to Corwin, certain state powers are an
independent limitation on national power and the police power of the
states has come to embrace the idea that "certain subject-matters were
also segregated to the States and hence could not be reached by any valid
exercise of national power."35
The competitive theory of federalism, where the two sovereigns are
rivals watching over the other as potential transgressors, became
"moribund in consequence of the emergence of the cooperative
conception."36 The cooperative theory, in contrast to the dual concept,
relies on the idea of collaboration between the national government and
Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal"
Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 Ga. L. Rev. 861, 874
(1985).
34 E. Corwin, supra, at 22-23.
35 Id. at 16.
36 Id. at 19.
33
36
2 25, 1990
the states. Morton Grodzins, a theorist of the cooperative model of
federalism, states in his book The American System:
In the modern period the competition between theories of dual and
cooperative federalism is no longer the issue. A cooperative
pattern began to emerge before the Constitution itself, grew during
the Federalist era, and continued side by side with the dual pattern
in the long period between 1800 and 1913. After 1913, and
especially after 1935, it became supreme. The cooperative idea
cultivated new programs and added new dimensions.
In Grodzins' view, the cooperative idea of federalism represents a system
of sharing; "a governmental system of shared responsibilities" which will
inevitably create tensions and trigger public debate, something which he
considers are "the system's energy reflecting lifeblood."37 He understands
that state and national governmental functions are "not neatly parceled
out among the many governments," but sharted functions, the most
obvious of these being the federal grant programs, which he describes as
"an admirable device to utilize the best resources of the national and state
governments."38 Underlying the idea of the blending of governments
espoused by Grodzins, best described by him as the idea of the marble
cake of government, is the belief that the sharing of functions serves to
diffuse and disperse power. Cooperative federalism is thus a means for
dividing the functions and powers of government. Referring to Grodzins'
idea of mingling of functions and blending of powers, Professor Leach
wrote that “[I]n this view, the Constitution visualized a single
mechanism of government in the United States, with many centers of
power, which among them were to perform all the functions required of
government by the American people" and that "[s]hared functions,
without regard to neat allocations of responsibility, is thus the core of
American governmental operation and of the theory of federalism as
well."39
Judge Wisdom calls cooperative federalism "the polite term for that
expansion of national authority when there was an overlapping of
national and state authority, some increase in state authority, and
considerable bypassing of state legislatures and centralized state
authorities in program rendering federal aid to cities and local
Id. at 386.
Id. at 382.
39 See, Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (1975), at 15.
37
38
37
governments."40 Professor Redish, for his part, refers to "the euphemistic
nature of the 'cooperative' label," arguing that its proponents disregard
"the significant conflict and tensions that have arisen over the years
between state and federal systems."41 Redish also rejects the dual
federalism theory as no longer representing "a valid analysis of American
federalism, if indeed it ever did."42 Redish, instead, places the
"interactive" label to his choice of federalism theory to contrast it to the
dual model. He claims it is "[t]he true alternative to the rigid, parallel
function theory of dual federalism... more neutral than cooperative"
because it "recognizes the inevitable intertwining of the state and federal
systems as they both go about the business of governing."43 He views the
interaction of the respective sovereigns to be combative at times yet at
other times their actions will be supplementary to one another.
Translating this to the area of judicial federalism, he submits that in the
judicial context the combative and cooperative elements of interactive
federalism are clearly evident for sometimes "the interaction of state
court with federal law will undermine an overriding federal legislative
scheme, while in others cooperative interaction will be required to
facilitate attainment of federal policies."44 The message of his article is
that recognition of the same principles of interaction that underlie his
model or perception of American federalism as a political theory should
dictate that the Supreme Court exercise a more expansive role in
reviewing state court decisions than even the practice adopted in
Michigan v. Long,45 that is, by reviewing state decisions grounded
exclusively on state law if the state decision substantially relies on
federal law or incorporates federal law by reference.
There are many more perceptions of federalism, also geared to the notion of sovereignty that are advocated by leading commentators. Raoul
Berger, for example, writes that the anti-Federalist attachment to State
sovereignty "was deeply rooted in human nature and the colonial
experience, and had a rational basis."46 He speaks of the "inviolable"
spheres of state governments which coexist beside a limited federal
See, Wisdom, Foreword: The Ever-Whirling Wheels of American
Federalism, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1063, 1088-69 (1984).
41 Redish, supra, note 25, at 880.
42 Id. at 864.
43 Id. at 880.
44 Id. at 896-97.
45 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
46 R. Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design, University of
Oklahoma Press (1987), at 65.
40
38
2 25, 1990
sphere and says that it was the Founders' design that "[w]ithin each
sphere…the respective governments were to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction."47 A dual or two-sovereignty federalism requires, in his view, careful tracing to draw the boundaries between the two spheres, arguing that
"[w]e may not wash our hands of the task of tracing the boundary if only
because Madison assured the Ratifiers that the federal jurisdiction extends to certain objects only, and leaves to the States a residuary and
inviolable sovereignty over all other subjects."48 He makes repeated
reference to the Framers' utterances on devotion to self- government and
their solicitude for local, internal affairs of the states in performing his
task of boundary tracing: functions undoubtedly local as distinguished
from transactions that cross state lines.49
Id. at 59.
Id. at 63.
49 A rejection of this state enclave approach is found in Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth at Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 693, 701-702 (1974) ("The
Constitution is of course a sort of checklist, enumerating in a general
way those things the central government may do and by implication
denying it power to d anything alee. For a time, however, the Court
operated as though there were in addition a second line of
constitutional defense against federal overreaching, a sort of enclave
of local affaire committed exclusively to state regulation and,
therefore, whatever the checklist might imply, beyond the reach of
the central government:
Thus the act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the
Constitution. It not only transcends the authority delegated to
Congress over commerce but also exerts a power as to a purely
local matter (manufacture) to which the federal authority does
not extend.
The problem with this approach is not so much that it is impossible to
give meaning to the notion of a fenced-off domain of exclusively local
affaire; there is no a priori reason to suppose that over time this
concept should not be fleshed out as intelligibly as any other. The real
and dispositive problem is that the enlace theory does not accurately
reflect the Constitution‟s plan for allocating power between the
federal and state governments. The Constitution in no way defines
the content of any enclave of exclusive state authority—except, of
course, by a process of inference from what is not on the checklist of
federal powers. And the tenth amendment, sometimes, incredibly,
cited in support of the state enclave approach, in fact flatly rejects it.
That amendment certainly proves what would have been obvious
anyway, that the framers felt there were some powers that the
47
48
39
This theme of jurisdictional line drawing was further developed, from
a wholly different perspective, by Professor Althouse in an article in
which she urges that the "[s]tates are not inviolable spheres of sovereignty,"50 that judicial doctrines of federal jurisdiction will operate "to
adjust—to redraw—the boundary that circumscribes the states' independent functioning."51 The states' boundaries are mutable, though separate, and the state must find the ways to form its own sphere. She adopts
Justice Powell's doctrine in Pennhurst,52 which "awards separateness
only to the state that earns it."53 Althouse's proposal is a vision of federalism based on a separate spheres theory, which holds that the national
interests are best served when the states function effectively. However, the states have to win or earn their separate spheres by, for example, offering genuine alternatives to the enforcement of federal law. It is
a functional approach to federalism derived from Justice Black's formulation in Younger that there is a federal interest in effectively functioning
states. The author, like Justice Black in Younger, disclaims any belief in
blind deference to States' Rights, noting that "federalism is not, fundamentally, about displays of respect" and that “[a]n unbroken flow of
politesse would reflect the states' rights belief disavowed in
Younger."54 Thus, there is a need to promote an independent functioning
in the states which, in turn, will warrant deference to them but "[i]t is not
that the states deserve autonomy simply because they are states, but rather that it is appropriate to leave the states alone, to accord them a `separate sphere' because the `National Government will fare best' that way."55
The states must build for themselves their separate spheres and "the state
that fails to function effectively should suffer federal interference."56
This functional analysis of federalism contemplates federal interference
central government was to be denied. But it could hardly be clearer
that the question of what matters are to be left exclusively to the
states is to be answered not by reference to some enclave construction
but rather by looking to see what is not in the federal checklist.")
(Quoting Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918)).
50 Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere-Federal Courts and
State Power, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1485 (1987).
51 Id. at 1486.
52 Penhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 V. S. 89
(1984).
53 Id. at 1526.
54 Id. at 1509.
55 Id. at 1488.
56 Id. at 1489.
40
2 25, 1990
when the state falls behind and fails to apply or misapplies federal law
yet it advocates restraint when the state is trying to find in its own law
alternative solutions to the problems addressed by federal law.
The year 1976 was a good one for the advocates of state sovereignty in
the struggle over federal-state relations. That was the year in which the
Court decided National League of Cities Usery,57 overruling Maryland
v. Wirtz,58 which had upheld the constitutionality of the amendments to
the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that extended minimum wage
and maximum hour regulation to a group of public employees. National
League of Cities held that Congress may not exercise its power to regulate commerce "so as to force directly upon the states its choices as to
how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental
functions are to be made."59 The Court went on to state that "such assertions of power, if unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in Wirtz, allow 'the National Government [to] devour
the essentials of state sovereignty,' and would therefore transgress the
bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause."60
Since 1937 and before the National League of Cities decision in 1976,
there had been "no judicially enforceable limits on congressional power
which derived from considerations of federalism," and "[t]he role protections for the states were political."61 National League of Cities , however, "reintroduced state sovereignty as a functioning legal limitation on
the federal legislative power."62 The situation in National League of
Cities had to do with the 1974 amendments to the FLSA which extended
the act's minimum and maximum hour provisions to almost all State and
municipal employees. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice
Rehnquist wrote:
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws
regulating individual business necessarily subject to the dual
sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in
which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise
of congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to
the States as States. We have repeatedly recognized that there are
attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
426 U. S. 833 (1976).
392 U. S. 183 (1968).
59 426 U. S. at 855.
60 Id. at 855, citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 205.
61 Powell, supra note 24, at 1322.
62 Id. at 1322.
57
58
41
which may not be impaired by Congress not because Congress
may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising
the authority in that manner.63
He then went on to state that the question to be resolved was whether the
state determinations involved, in that case the determination by the state
of the wages which would be paid to its public employees, are "functions
essential to separate and independent existence."64
Justice Brennan wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion in National
League of Cities which referred to the majority opinion as "today's mischievous decision" and warned that his brethren did not successfully
obscure the "patent usurpation of the role reserved for the political process by their purported discovery in the Constitution of a restraint derived from sovereignty of the States on Congress' exercise of the commerce power" and further arguing that "there is no restraint based on
state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial enforcement anywhere
expressed in the Constitution."65 He referred to the "longstanding
constitutional jurisprudence" rejected in National League of Cities
which relied on "the heretofore unchallenged principle that Congress‟
can, if it chooses, entirely displace the States to the full extent of the farreaching Commerce Clause'”66 and that said principle "sometimes invalidates state laws regulating subject matter of national importance."67 "In
either case", he urged, "the ouster of state laws obviously curtails or prohibits the State? prerogatives to make policy choices respecting subjects
clearly of greater significance to the 'State qua State' than the minimum
wage paid to state employees,"68 a result dictated by the Supremacy
Clause under "the federal system of government embodied in the Constitution."69 He denounced as alarming "the startling restructuring of our
federal system"70 by the majority. He attacked the Court's notion of state
426 U. S. at 845.
Id. at 845 (quoting from Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76
(1868).
65 Id. at 858.
66 Id. at 875, quoting from Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State
Board, 330 U.S. 767, 780 (1947) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
67 Id. at 875.
68 Id. at 875.
69 Id. at 875.
70 Id. at 875.
63
64
42
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sovereignty as "an abstraction without substance"71 and challenged as
clearly misplaced their reliance on Chief Justice Stone's concurring
opinion in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (1946), in support of the doctrine of state sovereignty in National League of Cities ,
noting that the Chief Justice did not address the question of a state-sovereignty restraint upon the exercise by Congress of the commerce power,
"but rather the principle of implied immunity of the States and Federal
Government from taxation by each other.”72 He characterized the use of
the doctrine of state immunity from federal taxation as an awkward extension of that doctrine which was "conclusively distinguished by Mr.
Justice Stone in California, as an immunity that is 'narrowly limited' because the 'people of all the states have created the national government
and are represented in Congress.'"73 Justice Brennan's dissent was
grounded on the idea that the States' influence in the national political
process is the safeguard to their sovereignty, a reality which was discarded by the Court although it "frequently remand[s] powerless individuals to the political process."'74
Expanding on Justice Brennan's charge that the Court's state sovereignty doctrine in National League of Cities is an "abstraction without substance," Professor Michelman reasons that "a state's sovereignty,
as conceived in National League of Cities, can consist neither in a notion
of the state as the object of political loyalty and legitimate arbiter, nor in
a notion of the state as the embodiment of political choice about the basic
`structuring' of roles and functions in civil society."75 This, he believes, is
confirmed by the fact that National League of Cities entitles municipalities to the protective mantle of state sovereignty,76 although municipaliId. at 860.
Id. at 864,869.
73 Id. at 833, referring to United States v. California, 297 U.S. at
183-185, and quoting from Halvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 416
(1938) (Stone, C.J.).
74 Id. at 878.
75 Michelman, States‟ Rights and States‟ Roles: Permutations of
“Sovereignty” in National Language of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L. J.
1165, 1169 (1977).
76 The appellants‟ claim in National League of Cities
was that
“…when Congress sought to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions virtually across the board to employees of the state and
municipal governments it “infringed a constitutional prohibition‟
running in favor of the Sates as States.” See National League of Cities
at pp. 836-837. Among the appellants in National League of Cities
71
72
43
ties had been denied immunity from suit in federal court77 and no reason
is given for protecting them also from the exercise of congressional
commerce power. For Michelman, what is sovereign about municipalities is not their legislative position or significance, but the „states‟ customary reliance on them to provide for the interest of citizens in receiving certain important social services.78 Thus he concludes that the Court's
notion of sovereignty in National League of Cities is a functional one
which regards "the state's service role as crucial to its constitutional
place”79 and that the Court in National League of Cities was using sovereignty "to stand for nothing more nor less than the state's role of providing for the interests of its citizens in receiving important social services.80
This notion of sovereignty reflects a specialized meaning of the concept
as opposed to the common meaning of states' rights. It has no political
content and expresses no greater deference to the state governmental
activity of a political nature than to private activity unless it falls into the
various categories of functions labeled by the Court in National League
of Cities as integral, typical, traditional, or essential.
Whatever the meaning ascribed by scholars to the doctrine of state
sovereignty in National League of Cities81 and whether or not that notion
of sovereignty was an abstraction without substance, as charged by
were the cities of Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompoc, Cal. and Salt Lake
City, Utah.
77 Mt. Healthy City School Din. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, at 280.
78 Michelman, supra, note 72, at 1171.
79 Id. at 1173.
80 Id. at 1172.
81 Both Tribe and Michelman reach the conclusion that, despite the
rhetoric of sovereignty in the National League of Cities
opinion,
what the Court is really referring is to the roles and duties of the
states in providing basic social services to their citizens. In this
specialized meaning of sovereignty the social service role is treated as
a part of the legal conception of what it mean to be a state.
Michelman argues that "the state sovereignty invoked and canonized
in the National League of Cities" obscures and twists the social justice
considerations underlying he opinion. Tribe argues that the National
League of Cities opinion supported individual rights claims and that
"[t]he language of National League of Cities is indeed quite consistent
with a protected state role premised on individual rights." See, Tribe,
Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
1065, 1075 (1977).
44
2 25, 1990
Justice Brennan in his dissent, these are concerns of the past for the
sovereignty approach to federalism was abandoned for a process-oriented
federalism invoked nine years later in García. The judicial function
envisaged in National League of Cities, which contemplated enforcing
restraints upon Congress' power to control the states' relationship to the
nation, was instead substituted in García for a subordinate, more passive
role, which recognizes that the protection of the states against
congressional overreaching is essentially found in the national political
process. Respect for the outcome of the national political processes
requires that there be future judicial intervention in federalism-related
disputes only when there are defects or failures in the political process at
a national level, which endanger the interests of the states. A process
failure is thus required for the courts to intervene. Wechsler advocated
this passive role of the judiciary as far back as 1954 when he said that it
is Congress and not the Supreme Court "that on the whole is vested with
the ultimate authority of managing our federalism."82 Both Professor
Wechsler and Dean Choper were precursors of the idea adopted in
García that state-federal tensions be resolved politically, without judicial
intervention. In his article on political safeguards, Wechsler had argued
thirty years before García that the Court should focus its function of
review to the areas of protection of the rights of individuals against the
government for here "the political processes cannot be relied upon to
introduce their own correctives."83 Dean Choper, while recognizing that
the Court "has generally left decisions on federalism to the national
political branches," referred to "the turnabout… accomplished in the
Usery decision" decided the year before and warned that "[f]or the Court
to continue to review such federalism cases…would sap the Court's
strength to act on behalf of individual rights."84
This view that the Court's legitimate judicial role in federalism-related
disputes must be a limited one is consonant with Wechsler's own concept
of a working federalism where the states are instrumental in the selection
Wechsler, supra, at note 17, p. 560. But see, J.R. Schmidhauser,
The Supreme Court as Final Arbiter in Federal-State Relations (Univ.
of N. Carolina Press 1958) (advocating that it was the Framer's
intention that the Supreme Court be the final arbiter).
83 Id., at 560.
84 J. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis á Vis the States: The
Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale L. J. 1552, 1621 (1977);
Judicial Review and the National Political Process: a Functional
Reconsideration o/ the Role of the Supreme Court (Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1980.
82
45
and the composition of the national government.85 He refers to the states
as the prime determinants of federalism and as "the strategic yardsticks
for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of
political activity, the separate geographical determinants of national as
well as local politics." And it is these prime units' fundamental role in the
selection and composition of the national government that guards against
encroachment by the center and contains its authority. The political
safeguards upon which Wechsler essentially relies on to strike the
balance needed in federal-state relations are the composition of Congress
and the nominating process of the President, Choper also views the
Congress and the President as especially sensitive to state concerns and
vigilant over the impact of federal actions on their interests due to the
substantial influence exercised by states and state leaders. His Federalism
Proposal advocates that the federal judiciary should not intervene in
disputes of federalism concerning the allocation of power of the national
government vis-a-vis the states, for whether federal actions violate states'
rights is an issue best left to the political branches for resolution.
Referring to Wechsler's statement in the sense that the national authority
is not inherently expansionist but must rally wide state support before
significantly intrusive measures will be adopted, he observed the
following:
This conclusion and its underlying rationale have singular
pertinence to the view, contained in the Federalism Proposal, that
the Supreme Court should not adjudicate constitutional questions
of national power versus states' rights. Cases that allege an
excessive act by the central government are presented to the Court
only after the act has attained the broad consensus that is required
to overcome the inertia and the various negative features of our
national lawmaking process. Legislation affecting states' rights
must also clear the imposing hurdle of active congressional
concern for state sovereignty, a solicitude…that cannot be
attributed to the threat of judicial invalidation. For, except in a few
notable instances, the Court's definitions of national powers have
afforded the political branches exceedingly broad discretion in this
area. In contrast to the undemocratic aspect of malapportionment,
which permits minorities to impose laws on the majority, national
See, Wechsler, supra at 546. (“And with the President, as with
Congress, the crucial instrument of the selection-whether through
electors or, in the event of failure of majority, by the House voting as
state units-is again the states.”)
85
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legislation affecting states' rights must have the widespread
support of those affected. Under these conditions, the need for
judicial review is at its lowest ebb.86
This was the proposal to which García responded in 1985. And so "the
ever whirling wheels of American federalism," to use Judge Wisdom's
vivid phrase,87 turned back to the old reliance on the political processes
to protect the states against intrusion by the central organs. In doing so,
the Court accepted the more passive role which Choper88 and Wechsler
suggested, bowing to the Congress as the chief umpire in the questions of
state-national relations, at least as far as the exercise of power under the
Commerce Clause was concerned That acceptance can only be described
as enthusiastic given the Court's complaint that the self-imposed task
which originated in National League of Cities of distinguishing between
traditional versus non-traditional governmental functions for purposes of
determining state immunity from federal regulation had become
impossible to perform.
García has been described by Field as "shorthand for deference to
political processes of decision-making."89To the disappointment of those
who, like Kaden, had hailed "the renewed interest in protecting the states'
independent status"90 shown in National League of Cities, the Court went
back to its old habit of rejecting "challenges to the exercise of federal
legislative power under the spending, commerce and war clauses of the
Constitution when those challenges were based upon an asserted interest
J. Choper, supra note 76, at 1570.
Wisdom, supra note 38, at 1063.
88 Referring to the Court's role of judicial review, Dean Choper also
wrote "that when the Supreme Court, naïf without conventional
political responsibility, says 'thou shall not' to acts of Congress, it
usually cuts sharply against the grain of majority rule. The relatively
few laws that finally overcome the congressional obstacle course
generally illustrate the national political branches operating at their
majoritarian best while the process of judicial review depicts that
element of the Court's work and that exertion of federal authority
with the most brittle democratic roots." Choper, The Supreme Court
and the Political Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice, 122 U.
Pa. L. Re. 810, 831 (1974).
89 Field, supra note 27, at 114.
90 Kaden, Politics, Money and States Sovereignty: The Judicial
Role, 79 Col. L. Rev. 847, 849 (1979).
86
87
47
in state autonomy."91 García was a move away from the sovereignty
based jurisprudence of federalism.92 Stating that "[d]ue respect for the
reach of congressional power within the federal system mandates that we
do so,"93 it overruled National League of Cities and held that the
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Federal Labor
Standard Act applied to employees of a public mass transit authority.
Adhering to the views of Choper and Wechsler, the Court concluded that
a priori definitions and conceptions of state sovereignty offered no
guidance when measuring congressional power under the Commerce
Clause and relied, instead on "the built-in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal governmental action."94
Revisiting the colonial scenario and drawing upon the words of Madison,
the Court made a point of referring to the curtailment of state
sovereignty, stating that the States retain their measure of sovereign
authority "only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them
of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal
Government." Specifically citing Choper and Wechsler in support of the
recurring theme that the national political process is capable of
safeguarding the interests of the states and should be deferred to, it said:
Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the
delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, the principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself. It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the
Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the
States a role in the selection both of the Executive and the
Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The States were
vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives
Id. at 848.
Professor Rapaczynski has said that the sovereignty approach t
federalism was responsible for the poor intellectual quality of the discussion of that subject and that the main thrust of the Courts decision was "to reject the usefulness of the sovereignty based analysis
and to replace it with a focus on the nature of the political process
responsible for making the federalism-related decisions." A.
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 Supreme Court Review 341, 360.
93 469 U. S. at 557.
94 Id. at 556.
91
92
48
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and the Presidency by their control of electoral qualifications
and their role in presidential elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, Section
2, and Article II, Section 1. They were given more direct influence
in the Senate, where each State received equal representation and
each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his State. Art.
I, Section 3. The significance attached to the States equal
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of
any constitutional amendment divesting a State of equal
representation without the State's consent. Art. V.
Although the majority recognizes that changes have occurred in the
structure of the federal government since 1789, including the substitution
of popular election of Senators by the adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment, nonetheless, it reiterated its conviction that "the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the
Commerce Clause to protect the `States as States' is one of process
rather than one of result" and that "[a]ny substantive restraint on the
exercise of the Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the
procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than
to dictate a sacred province of state autonomy.'"95
La Pierre, another source of authority invoked in García, had also
taken up the matter of the effectiveness of the political safeguards of
federalism in a 1982 article previously cited where he refers to the
political accountability of Congress. Quoting Pennock,96 he defines
political accountability as the "answerability" of representatives to the
represented. He identifies the political checks on congressional power
and probes how they create political accountability and protect the
interests of the states as political communicities. There is, for example, a
political check in the requirement to provide financial resources to
enforce national policies since the burden, which is placed upon the
voters who must provide these financial resources, makes Congress
answerable to them. Another political check on Congress, according to
La Pierre, is the application of national policies to private activities.
Referring specifically to the application of the Federal Labor Standards
Act to public employers and denouncing the Court's intervention in
Id. at 1019-20.
La Pierre, supra note 28, at 984 (quoting Pennock, Responsiveness, Responsibility and Majority Rule, 56 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 797
(1968).
95
96
49
National League of Cities, he illustrated the effectiveness of this
particular type of political check:
If the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA are applied to state
and local governments in their capacities as employers, there is an
additional effect on the states: the costs of providing public goods
and services are increased. Nonetheless, the same political checks
operate and Congress is politically accountable because the
regulations also apply to private employers, and state interests are
vicariously protected by the impact of the FLSA on private
employers. Since national intrusion on the states is limited by the
application of the FLSA standards to both private and public
employers, judicial protection for the States in NLC was not
warranted.97
And, in further elaborating his theory of political accountability as a
means of preserving states' interests, he strikes the same chord as the
García decision that judicial interference will require a failure of the
political process at the national level.
Thus, political checks and political accountability, and not
simply the representation of state interests in Congress by representatives elected from the states, are the political safeguards of
federalism; they justify deference to the national political process
and protect the states' role as political communities in the federal
system. When political checks make Congress politically accountable, intrusion on the independence of state political decisionmaking is permissible; that is, the political safeguards are sufficient. Conversely, when Congress is not politically accountable,
courts should protect state interests in political decision-making.98
The critics of García have attacked the adequacy of the modern
political process in the nation asserting that in the real world these are
insufficient.99 Others have denounced García as allowing and
97Id.
at 991.
Id. at 787.
99 See generally, for criticism of Garcia: Van Alstyne, Comments,
The Second Death of Federalism, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985);
Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrent to Fundamental Principles, 19 Ga. L Rev. 789 (1985); Saur,
Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and
98
50
2 25, 1990
encouraging the imperialistic expansionism of the Federal Government
over the States. In a way, it is ironic to end our discussion of American
federalism on this note. For if there is such a fear, despite the existence
of the States as diverse political communities which are an integral and
respected part of the second larger political community —the nation—
and despite their full participation in the selection and composition of the
federal government, what can be expected of those who have stood by
the wayside for almost a century?
II
Puerto Rico: The Colonial Malaise
Who-what, then, is Puerto Rico? Has it ever been a part of the balance
in intergovernmental relations that Hamilton spoke about? Does it play
any role in the national political process to which the García Court deferred the protection of the states against congressional encroachment?
Where does it fit in the political structure of an American federalism? I
could give the "yes/no" answers that usually sprout in any inquiry of
Puerto Rican-federal affairs. The answers are "mixed," they say, or, "they
depend on the circumstances." Yet, when we trace the basic ideas underpinning the growth, the process, the constitutional scheme, the political
arrangement, if you will, known as federalism, an honest mind can only
conclude that federalism is a myth in Puerto Rico. It is not honest to
speak of modern Puerto Rico as a new dimension in federalism while at
the same time the very existence of that new reality has to be conditioned
to obtaining such essentials of a federalist society as the participation in
the process of federal legislation. You can go through reams of papers on
scholarly constitutional analysis of Puerto Rican-federal relations and all
will leave you with the bitter taste of its anomalous situation, called by
some its "unique" situation.
Federal-state relations have generated in the United States a jurisprudence of federalism. Puerto Rican-federal relations have, in turn, created
a jurisprudence of colonialism, with all the mixed signals, the evasiveness, the blooming rhetoric and "the juggling of words"100 that must be
put in when in the dawn of a new century you still have judges dealing
the Manifest Destiny of Congressional Power, 8 Harv. J. L. Pub. Policy
745 (1985).
100 Justice Harlan, referring to the contradictions in the Court‟s
treatment of Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory in Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 V. S. 245, 386.
51
with the problems of a colony while at the same time making believe
they are not. It is pitiful. And, it is painful.
The jurisprudence of the Insular Cases101 "blessed the colonial
experiment"102 in Puerto Rico by adopting the doctrine of territorial
incorporation which held that the territories acquired by the United States
as a result of the Spanish American War of 1898 could belong to the
United States without being a part of the United States and that,
therefore, "the Island of Puerto Rico is a territory appurtenant and
belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within
the revenue clauses of the Constitution."103 Justice White expanded on
this convenient piece of nonsense and ambivalence which called for
different treatment of the inhabitants of the territories which had been
annexed on the ground that they were foreign "to our habits, traditions
and modes of life," possessions104 made up of "alien races, differing from
us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and mode of
thoughts."105 In his concurrence in Downes, he observed that:
The result of what has been said is that whilst in an international
sense Puerto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was subject
to the sovereignty of and was owned by the United States, it was
foreign to the United States in a domestic sense because the island
had not been incorporated into the United States but was merely
appurtenant thereto as a possession…106
And so, the fancy of an intellectual, Professor Abbott L. Lowell of
Harvard University, who had advocated that very same theory in a law
A group of cases decided by the Supreme Court in 1901 that deal
with the status of Puerto Rico. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Goetz v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States,
182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901);
and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 245 (1901). For an excellent
analysis of the Insular Cases, see Torruella, The Supreme Court and
Puerto Rico: The Doctrine al Separate and Unequal (1985).
102 J. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine
(Book Review) 100 Harv. L. Rev. 450 (1986).
103 See Downes, 182 V. S. at 286
104Id. at 280.
105 Id. at 286.
106 Id. at 341.
101
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review article107 two years before the Insular Cases were decided,
became the nightmare and the stigma of an entire population. The
double standards were born right there: "belongs, but not a part, foreign
and yet domestic, American, yet alien." The effect of these ambiguities is
clearly depicted in Raymond Carr's book on Puerto Rico and its troubled
relationship, past and present, with the United States. Quoting from a
1901 article of a local newspaper, he writes:
The economic advantage of permanent union with the United
States made tolerable a political settlement that left the Puerto
Rican, „Mr. Nobody from Nowhere,‟ imprisoned in a constitutional limbo as an unincorporated territory. `We are and we are not
an integral part of the United States. We are and we are not a foreign country. We are and we are not citizens of the United
States…The Constitution covers us and does not cover us… it applies to us and does not apply to us.‟ These ambiguities were to
haunt Puerto Rico's relationship with its new master; they are still
unresolved.108
These ambiguities have dislocated and torn our society, have menaced
the core of its identity and the free and full expression of its individuals.
Eighty-four years after the Insular Cases, Dean Helfeld, a distinguished
scholar who is well versed in the history of the Puerto Rican-United
States relationship, returned to the recurring theme of the ambiguities:
Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions-A Third View, 13
Harv. L. Rev. 153, 176 (1899). ("The theory, therefore, which beet
interprets the Constitution in the light of history, and which accords
most completely with the authorities, would seem to be that territory
may be so annexed as to make it a part of the United States, and that
if so all the general restrictions in the Constitution apply to it, says
those on the organization of the judiciary; but that possessions may
also be so acquired as not to form part of the United States, and in
that case constitutional limitations, such as those requiring uniformity of taxation and trial by jury, do not apply. It may well be that
some provisions have a universal bearing because they are in form
restrictions upon the power of Congress rather than reservations of
rights.").
108 R. Carr, Puerto Rico: A Colonial Experiment (New York
University Press, 1984), at 98.
107
53
Constitutional relations between Puerto Rico and the United States
are not based on a system of logically consistent principles.
Purposes Puerto Rico is treated as if it were a state of the Union,
for others as an unincorporated territory and for still others as a
jurisdiction uniformly incorporated into the network of national
legislation.109
The doctrine of territorial incorporation espoused by Lowell and
adopted in the Insular Cases provided "a constitutional basis for governing these colonies for an indefinite period— without the impediment of
constitutional limitations that were deemed not “fundamental.”110 Thus,
the Constitution would apply only as to “fundamental rights."111 The
granting of citizenship in 1917, contrary to the expectations of many,
neither conveyed full application of the Constitution to Puerto Rico nor
endowed Puerto Ricans with the same political rights enjoyed by American citizens in the mainland. To this day, only the core of the Constitution applies to Puerto Rico. What lies within the core and which are or
are not fundamental rights are constant markers in litigation? In People v.
Balzac, decided five years after the granting of citizenship to Puerto
Ricans, the Court, alter first cautioning against lightly inferring "an intention to incorporate in the Union these distant ocean communities of a
different origin and language from those of our continental people,112
said:
Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and
Statutes are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Paper
prepared for the 1985 First Circuit Judicial Conference (Nov. 4,
1985).
110 J. Cabranes, supra, note 102, at 458.
111 Justice Harlan said in his dissent in Downes:
... The idea that this country may acquire territories anywhere
upon the earth, by conquest or treaty, and hold them as mere
colonies or provinces the people inhabiting them to enjoy only such
rights as Congress chooses to accord to them is wholly
inconsistent with the spirit and genius as well as with the
words of the Constitution.
112 People v. Bates, 258 U.S. 298, 909 (1922). The Court went on to
exalt the case of Alaska, which in his view was a good case for incorporation in the Union because its "enormous territory" offered opportunity for settlement by American citizens. Without such enormity of
space or opportunity for settlement, the small ocean community of
Puerto Rico was thought to be a very different case from that of
109
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2 25, 1990
The guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights declared in
the Constitution, as for instance that no person could be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, had from
the beginning full application in the Philippines and Porto Rico,
and, as this guaranty is one of the most fruitful in causing
litigation in our own country, provision was naturally made for
similar controversy in Porto Rico…113
The Court found, however, no place among the fundamental rights for
the right of a criminal defendant in Puerto Rico to a trial by jury, as
established by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, and thus in
1922 it denied that right to Jesús M. Balzac, an American citizen living
in an "ocean community of a different origin and language." Arguing that
"[i]t is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution
in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the people
who live in it,114 the Puerto Rican just turned American citizen soon
found out how superficial a meaning could be attached to those
impressive words: "fundamental rights."
In 1922, the court noted in Balzac that the granting of United States
citizenship to Puerto Ricans "enabled them to move into the continental
United States and becoming residents of any State thereto enjoy every
right of any other citizen of the United States, civil, social and political."115 The clear underlying message was that Puerto Ricans would have
"to move into the United States proper" to enjoy all political and other
rights. In other words, we were free to step inside; outside the United
States proper rights just dwindled. And thus it came to pass that in 1977,
more than fifty years after Balzac and more than two decades after the
creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, citizens Torres, Colón
and Vega who had stepped inside the United States proper lost the Social
Security Income (SSI) benefits they had been receiving as residents of
Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Jersey the moment that they moved
back to Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico has been excluded from the SSI program for the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1382, provided that
no individual was eligible for benefits during any months in which
Alaska. Thus, the older inferiority of the non-incorporated territory
continued despite the trappings of the American citizenship bestowed
five years earlier.
113 Id. at 312-13.
114 Id. at 308.
115 Id. at 308.
55
she/he is outside the United States and the statute defined "the United
States" as "the 50 States and the District of Columbia." In footnote 4 of
the opinion, the Court relying on the Insular Cases of 1901 and referring
to its oft-quoted statement that Puerto Rico has a relationship to the
United States "that has no parallel in our history," 116 reminded us
once again "that Congress has the power to treat Puerto Rico differently,
and that every federal program does not have to be extended to it.”117
Thus, even though Puerto Ricans pay full Social Security taxes just as
any other recipient, benefits to the aged, the blind and the disabled under
the SSI program are withheld from them and from any citizen who
moves to Puerto Rico even though she/he otherwise qualifies. The reasons for their exclusion from the program were brought up again in
Harris v. Rosario:118 "Puerto Rican residents do not contribute to the
federal treasury, the cost of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican
economy." These three factors had been stated before in Califano in a
footnote, which cited as single authority a 1976 Report of the Undersecretary's Advisory Group on Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands,
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. In Harris v. Rosario, the
program involved was The Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 49
Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 601, et seq. which provides
federal financial assistance to States and Territories to aid families with
needy dependent children. Puerto Rico received leas assistance than the
States. A class action was filed claiming that the lower level of reimbursement provided to Puerto Rico violated the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection clause. It took the Court one paragraph to dispose of the claim
and to reverse the favorable judgment obtained. Invoking the Territorial
Clause of the Constitution, it reasoned that Congress could treat the territory of Puerto Rico differently from the States:119
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 596 (1976).
Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 3 (1977).
118 446 U.S. 651, 652 (1979)
119 See, Fisher, The Supreme Court Says "No" to Equal Treatment of
Puerto Rico: A Comment on Harris v. Rosario, 6 N.C. J. Ind. L. 127,
138. (Denouncing the Court's reliance on the old doctrine of non-incorporation.) ("As the debate over Puerto Rico's future shows, the real
significance of the Rosario holding lies in its political consequences.
The territories of the United States are remnants of the American
Empire built at the turn of the century. The decision in Harris v.
Rosario rests implicitly upon the outmoded concept of unincorporated
territories, a convenient paradigm utilized by the Court during past
116
117
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Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the
Constitution, U.S. Const., Art. IV, Section 3, cl. 2, to `make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory…
belonging to the United States' may treat Puerto Rico differently
from the States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions.120
The rationality of the congressional action was grounded on the three
factors listed before, without further inquiry or explanation.121
Justice Marshall dissented while Justices Brennan and Blackmun,
unpersuaded that the summary disposition in Califano controlled this
case, would have noted probable jurisdiction and set the case for
argument."122 Marshall denounced, in Harris, the haste in resolving
"important legal issues without full briefing or oral argument.'" 123
Strange, that he felt the need to remind his Brethren that "Puerto Ricans
are United States citizens."124 He wrote:
…the Court suggests today, without benefit of briefing or
argument, that Congress needs only a rational basis to support less
beneficial treatment for Puerto Rico, and the citizens residing
periods of United States expansionism. The precedential value of this
idea, which originated in the Insular Cases, is highly questionable.
The Court itself gradually extended the benefits of the Bill of Rights
to the territories and devitalized the paradigm. Nevertheless, in
Rosario, the Court has taken a step backward. It has ruled, in a
summary judgment, that the Constitution gives Congress a blank
check in dealing with the territories so long as congressional actions
have some discernible rational basis.")
120 Id. at 651, 652.
121 Justice Marshall addressed these factors in the dissenting
opinion. Referring specifically to the economic concerns he argued
that the Court‟s reliance on the disruptive effect that greater benefits
would have on the Puerto Rican economy suggested "that programs
designed to help the poor should be less fully applied in those areas
where the need may be the greatest" and that such reliance impulse
"that Congress intended to preserve or even strengthen the
comparative economic position of the States vis-a- vis Puerto Rico."
Rosario at 655-56.
122 Justice Brennan had voted to affirm in Califano while Justice
Marshall noted probable jurisdiction and would have set the Califano
case for oral argument.
123 Id. at 652.
124 Id. at 653.
57
there, than is provided to the States and citizens residing in the
States. Heightened scrutiny under the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment, the Court concludes, is simply
unavailable to protect Puerto Rico or the citizens who reside there
from discriminatory legislation, as long as Congress acts pursuant
to the Territory Clause. Such a proposition surely warrants the full
attention of this Court before it is made part of our constitutional
jurisprudence.125
In his article on federal financing in Puerto Rico, Professor Richard B.
Cappalli, commented that "[t]he price paid for not being a federated State
is that Congress can and does discriminate against Puerto Rico in federal
grant programs."126 He compared ceilings imposed in 1950 and in 1967
in federal welfare payments to Puerto Rico. Referring to the 1950
ceiling, he observed that "[a]n absolute limit of 4,250,000 in federal
payments to Puerto Rico under all the welfare categories was inserted; in
addition, the federal share of the welfare program in Puerto Rico could
not exceed 50%, whereas in the States it could reach as high as 75%.” 127
According to statistics used by Cappalli, in 1967 the ceiling still existed,
although it had been raised to $9.8 million and the Puerto Rico's
allotment amounted to 0.3% of the total amount of federal assistance
payments throughout the United States, lower than the allotment in 1950,
which represented 0.4% of the total. The author suggested that [t]he
specter in Puerto Rico of monstrously long welfare rolls sponsored by
the federal treasury"128 was one of the reasons for the severe limitations
on federal welfare assistance to Puerto Rico.
As recent as March 1988, the matter of limitations on the amount of
funds; that Puerto Rico receives under federal assistance programs was
addressed by the White House Task Force on Puerto Rico in response to
questions posed by the Subcommittee on Insular and International
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.129
The Task Force gave three reasons for the restrictions imposed:
Id. at 654.
R. Cappalli, Federal Financing in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, 39 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 7, 103 (1970).
127 Id. at 66.
128 Id. at 67.
129 Responses of the White House Task Force on Puerto Rico to the
Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs, March 14, 1988,
p. 4.
125
126
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First, there was concern that, given disparities in prevailing wages
between the U.S. and Puerto Rico, full extension of the programs
could interfere with work incentives and operation of an effective
labor market. Second, family structure, social institutions and
governmental programs vary from those on the mainland and
programs designed for the fifty states may have negative
consequences when applied to Puerto Rico. In addition, there was
concern with the cost of extension of these programs to Puerto
Rico—in all likelihood about $1 billion a year.
The discriminatory treatment accorded Puerto Rico has resulted not
only in its exclusion from the federally funded Supplemental Security
Income program (SSI) but also in the loss of approximately $78 million
due to the funding ceiling of $72 million placed on the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children program and a loss of approximately $325 due
to the $74.4 million limitation on the Medicaid assistance to the needy in
Puerto Rico.
I submit that the unequal treatment of Puerto Ricans has been in the
books of American constitutional law since 1901 and up to this date. In
1952, many thought that would all end with the advent of the
Commonwealth. A 1981 First Circuit case categorically refers to the end
of Puerto Rico's territorial status in these plain words:
Puerto Rico's territorial status ended, of course, in 1952.
Thereafter it has been a Commonwealth with a particular status as
framed in the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act. Act of July 3,
1950, Pub. L. 600, § .4, 64 Stat. 319…130
However, (there is always a "however" when courts speak of Puerto
Rico's status and this particular case was no exception) the Court, subtly
refused to let the territorial scheme go entirely, saying "the new status
rendered the words 'dependency or insular possession' somewhat
obsolete as to it…"131 Others, less polite perhaps but more realistic in
their perception of Puerto Rico's present status, have simply referred to it
as a colony. José A. Cabranes132 in his remarks before the First Circuit's
Judicial Conference of 1985 said:
See, First Fed. S. & L., etc. v. Ruiz de Jesús, 644 F.2d 910 (1991),
at 911.
131 Id. at 911 (Emphasis supplied.)
132 Judge, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; former General Counsel, Yale University and former
130
59
The key point about Puerto Rico's place in the American
constitutional system is that no word other than 'colonialism'
adequately describes the relationship between a powerful
metropolitan state and an impoverished overseas dependency
disenfranchised from the formal lawmaking processes that shape
its people's daily lives. We do well to speak plainly and accurately
-and without embarrassment- about the facts as they are.133
Dean Helfeld, in remarks made before that same judicial conference,
observed that "[f]rom the perspective of democratic theory, the principal
defect in the constitutional relations between Puerto Rico and the United
States can be traced to Section 9 which authorizes Congress to legislate
unilaterally for Puerto Rico."134
The former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, José Trías-Monge has described Puerto Rico as one of
the countries with the longest colonial history in the world. Specifically
referring to the year 1963, more than a decade after the creation of the
Commonwealth, he denounced the stubbornness of Congress in failing to
recognize the principle of free determination, arguing that Congress was
"morally obliged to put an end to the still clearly colonial situation of
Puerto Rico."135 Further expanding on the matter of free determination,
he wrote:
The truth is that in spite of the many expressions by the United
States in favor of free determination, that right has never been recognized to Puerto Rico beyond the realm of rhetoric. We have
seen that during different stages of the recent constitutional history
of this country each of the three status formulas has for some time
dominated public opinion. The people of Puerto Rico, consequently, requested at different times during this century admission
in the Union as a federal state or at least as an incorporated territory. It was not pleased. It requested independence. No bona fide
offer was made either. It sought full autonomy. It was consistently
denied, although from time to time some reforms were effectuated,
Administrator to the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and
Special Counsel to Governor Rafael Hernández-Colón (19731975).
133 J. Cabranes, supra note 102, at 480.
134 See Helfeld; supra note 109, at 22-23.
135 4 J. Trías-Monge, "Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico" at
217 (1983).
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mostly modest ones, to the regimen. These habits of a drifting imperialism, which on so many occasions have tainted the relations
between the United States and Puerto Rico, have made the solution of the status problem unnecessarily difficult.136
The thorough analysis made by Raymond Carr is relevant in any
discussion on Puerto Rican-United States relations. The Twentieth
Century Fund, a research foundation founded in 1919, decided to request
the study from an English scholar for it was its belief that Puerto Rican
and American scholars had already made up their minds about what the
relationship ought to be. His basic explanation of the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico follows:
It resembles a state in that, while its elected representatives have a
measure of control over its domestic concerns, many important
issues are settled by federal laws; it differs from a state in that it
has no representative in the body—the United States Congress—
that makes those laws. The relationship between Puerto Rico and
the United States has never become, as Henry Stimson once argued it should, "analogous to the present relation of England to her
overseas self-governing territories;" the British Commonwealth is
a loose association of sovereign states—thus, for example, the
Irish Republic, then a member of the Commonwealth, did not declare war in 1939. This option would not have been open to the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Unlike citizens of the self-governing dominions, but like the British citizens of the colonies who
were involved in a war declared by a Parliament in which they
were not represented, the American citizens of Puerto Rico have
been automatically involved in wars declared by president and
Congresses in whose election they played no part. If the term
Commonwealth is meant to imply any resemblance to a member
state of the Commonwealth, it is delusory, hiding a colonial
relationship in which the metropolitan power legislates for the
colony and controls its defense and foreign policies.137
Juan R. Torruella, a judge of our Circuit whose clear and courageous
writings have done much to disentangle the web of the Puerto RicanUnited States relationship, concluded in his book that "constitutionally
speaking, Puerto Rico remains an unincorporated territory of the United
136
137
Id. at 250.
Carr, supra note 108, at 9-10.
61
States even if de facto it has been allowed by Congress to exercise
internal autonomy similar to that which the States are entitled."138
Torruella‟s book was reviewed by Judge Cabranes in 1986. In that
review, he made a forceful statement of present-day Puerto Rico:
Puerto Rico is still not a part of the 'United States' for all
constitutional purposes; the island and its people are still subject to
the laws and regulations adopted by the political branches of the
national government before which they appear only as supplicants;
and that national government retains virtually unlimited discretion
to determine whether or how the island will fit into national
policy. It is thus true, as Torruella argues that the island's basic
political status has not changed since the turn of the century and
the development of the doctrine of territorial incorporation.139
Most of the authors quoted above could rightfully be called the critics
of Commonwealth status. The fact remains, however, that the advocates
of that political status also concede the basic shortcomings of that
formula, to wit, the lack of representation in the national political
processes which directly affect all Puerto Ricans, the partial application
of the United States Constitution resulting from the distinction between
fundamental/nonfundamental rights, the unequal treatment suffered time
and again which is patent in cases such as Torres and Rosario, the very
weakness of a political creature that must abide and abide without ever
casting a vote to make those by whom it abides more sensitive to its
needs and interest. Its defenders have downplayed these realities, calling
it a new dimension of federalism. This is what Carl Friedrich, for
example, called it, stating that it "conceivably provides a striking model
for future developments in the sphere of the liberation of colonial
peoples who do not wish or may not be able to organize themselves as
independent political communities."140 I venture to say that only a people
with a colonial history as long as ours can perceive the trickery enclosed
in those words.
It is more of the word spinning that we are accustomed to.
Torruella, supra note 101, at 159.
J. Cabranes, supra note 102, at 481.462.
140 Bowie and Friedrich, Studies in Federalism (1954) at 715,
quoting Friedrich, "The World Significant of the New Constitution," in Puerto Rico: A study in Democratic Development, The Annals,
January 1963. (Emphasis supplied.)
138
139
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A scant five years later, Friedrich, in a lecture delivered at the University of Puerto Rico in January 1958 and, despite his belief that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico "is in fine with the basic philosophy of
American constitutionalism and federalism,"141 recognized the shortcomings of the Puerto Rican participation in the process of federal legislation
(including constitutional amendments) and "the failure to provide for a
participation in the shaping of foreign and defense policies.”142 Pointing
to the magnitude of federal activities in Puerto Rico, he observed:
The fact that all these activities are carried forward by officials
appointed without the consent of Puerto Rico indicates the severe
limits within which autonomy is at present defined. They suggest
the importance of radical alterations in the federal relations we
believe to be necessary before Puerto Rico can be considered truly
self-governing.143
Finally, despite the touting of federalism in Puerto Rico one cannot
help but notice the touch of irony contained in Friedrich's dedication of
those lectures to his "son Otto, because of his abiding sympathy for all
the underprivileged of the world."144 I have never heard anyone refer to
people living in federal systems in this manner. You may hear about the
poor in Germany, Switzerland, or the United States but certainly, no one
refers to them in collective terms as "the underprivileged of the world."
Another advocate of Commonwealth status, Pedro Ortiz-Alvarez, a
distinguished lawyer and a Commonwealth official at present, promotes
in a law review article a new compact of association between the United
States and Puerto Rico, saying:
The new compact will be the basic document in the United StatesPuerto Rico relationship. With its acceptance by Congress and by
the people of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act
and all its ambiguities will disappear. Among them, the elimination of the expression `belonging to the United States' contained in
said act is indispensable because its colonial touch is evident. 145
C. Friedrich, Puerto Rico: Middle Road to Freedom, (1969) at 77.
Id. at 64.
143 Id. at 36-37.
144 Id. Preface (Emphasis supplied.)
145 P. Ortiz-Alvarez, the Compact between Puerto Rico and the
United States: Its Nature and Effects, 91-92 Revista de Derecho
Puertorriqueño 185, 282-283 (1984). 148. Id. at 287.
141
142
63
And, making his own list of shortcomings in the present relationship,
which serve at the same time to support his claims of culmination of the
Commonwealth status, he said.
In the future compact the model of the states should no longer
govern. The States are members of the Union, their citizen‟s vote
for the President and have full congressional representation.
Puerto Rico is not a member of the Union; its citizens do not vote
for the President and are represented in Congress only by a
Resident Commissioner with the right to speak but not to vote.
Indeed, Puerto Ricans hope that Congress will understand our
claims… And, of course, the culmination of the Commonwealth
status is politically indispensable. The continuation of the status
quo will be harmful for the dignity of Puerto Rico and for the
international reputation of the United States. More important, the
Congress cannot ignore the demands of a community, which has
shown absolute loyalty to the American citizenship, to the
democratic institutions contained in the Constitution of the
United States, and to the principles of liberty, which make great
this country.146
The efforts at improving, at strengthening the Commonwealth have
been many. As of today, we remain as, Judge Cabranes said,
"supplicants" at the doors of the political branches of the national
government. Despite this, there are those who would still call Puerto
Rico a "sovereign." Although recognizing that "the legal relationship
between Puerto Rico and the United States is far from clear and fraught
with controversy,"147 the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit went on to hold that "Puerto Rico is a sovereign separate from the
United States for purposes of double jeopardy."148 Judge Torruella
concurred in the result but not the reasoning of the Court on the
sovereignty issue. Arguing that there has been no change since 1950 in
Puerto Rico's territorial status or in Congress' plenary power over it
pursuant to the Territorial Clause of the Constitution, he concluded that
Puerto Rico and the United States are not dual sovereigns for double
jeopardy purposes. The distinction between sovereignty and autonomy,
often forgotten, was made. That Puerto Rico has achieved a measure of
Id. at 287
U. S. v. López Andino, 831 F. 2d. 1164, 1168 (1987).
148 Id. at 1172.
146
147
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control over its local or internal affairs after Commonwealth is not
disputed. However, self-government or autonomy is not sovereignty. It is
artificial to refer to Puerto Rico as a sovereign state standing before the
other sovereign—the United States. The concept of sovereignty
throughout history has always entailed the idea, or the reality, of the
sovereign being the ultimate source of power. The sovereign can enact
laws for its subjects and change them at will for the ultimate authority
lies there. Such is not the case of Puerto Rico whose life is governed to a
great extent by federal legislation enacted by organs of power who have
the last word. In our situation, the last word of the sovereign becomes
law without any real intervention by the governed in the enactment of
decrees. Aside from the lack of authority of our people and the unilateral
control by Congress, Torruella indirectly addresses the lack of
permanence of the relationship that binds the United States and Puerto
Rico. On this matter, Dean Helfeld, cited in the opinion, flatly stated:
Though the formal title has been changed, in constitutional theory
Puerto Rico remains a territory. This means that Congress continues to possess plenary but unexercised authority over Puerto Rico.
Constitutionally, Congress may repeal Public Law 600, annul the
Constitution of Puerto Rico and veto any insular legislation, which
it deems improper. From the perspective of Constitutional law, the
compact between Puerto Rico and Congress may be unilaterally
altered by the Congress.149
Helfeld concludes that the legislative history of Public Law 600 and the
Constitution of Puerto Rico is barren of any evidence that Congress
intended to abrogate or to delegate its power and authority over Puerto
Rico. In 1952, he hoped for greater Congressional awareness of the
Puerto Rican reality, saying:
The existing federal-insular relationship has within it the seeds of
two tensions; one is symbolic, while the second involves
government without representation. With time the tension between
political reality and Constitutional, theory, between the possession
of home rule and the status of a territory, may grow to
unmanageable proportions. Pan of the reality of freedom is feeling
free. Indeed, man's history chronicles innumerable occasions when
Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude toward Public Law
600 and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, XXI
Rev. Jur. De la Universidad de Puerto Rico 255, 307 (1952).
149
65
the symbol of freedom outweighed all political considerations.
Since men live by and for symbols, a substantial degree of selfdetermination may not compensate for a badge of an inferior
status. Nor is the badge merely symbolic, since Puerto Rico is
permitted no politically effective role in the making of national
policy—even with respect to federal policy, which affects the
island deeply and directly. A people with democratic convictions
can hardly countenance government without representation at the
national level as a permanent political condition. It is to be hoped
that Congress will not be slow in recognizing Puerto Rico's
symbolic as well as its practical and democratic need for effective
participation at the national center of power.150
More than three decades have passed and nothing has changed. The
symbols are still there; the inequities still roam. The United States
Supreme Court continues evading with its approach that it makes little
difference whether Puerto Rico is a State or Territory for a way out is
always found. It will continue to quote Magruder who made one of the
many "is/is not" statements:
Puerto Rico has thus not become a State in the Federal Union like
the 48 States, but it would seem to have become a State within a
common and accepted meaning of the word.151
In these circumstances, it has no meaning to refer to Puerto Rico as a
sovereign, unless you do so as a token gesture to ease tensions or to
soothe hurt egos. Nor does it make any sense to talk in a loose manner
about the development of federalism in Puerto Rico or the new role of
Puerto Rico in federalism. There is none. As Wechsler correctly
observed, it is the continuous existence of the states as governmental
entities and their influence on the selection of the Congress and the
President, which are the determinant factors of a working federalism in
the United States. Friedrich, for example, believed that "federalism
should not be considered as a static pattern." However, despite all the
inventiveness, he too had to borrow from the essential attributes of the
classic pattern to try to rescue the supposed dynamic dimension of
federalism he saw in Puerto Rico from an artificial and an unviable form
of federalism. The problem is that he borrowed those attributes to square
Id. at 315.
Mora v. Mejia'', 208 F.2d 377 (CA 1 1963) cited in Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 94 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (1974).
150
151
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away his theory. Thirty years after he dictated his lectures, the people of
Puerto Rico have never experienced the "freedom with justice"152
that he anticipated under this new dimension of federalism. All of the
"shortcomings" pointed out by him still exist; none of the solutions
proposed by him were adopted. Perhaps because, as Professor Lewis
said, "the argument, albeit attractive, is predicated upon grounds that
remain, so far, pretty fragile."153
Instead of participation in the federal legislative process, we have a
Resident Commissioner without vote in Congress, lobbying efforts, and
the memoranda of law firms. Instead of Congressional concern and
awareness originating from the accountability of Congress to the States
and their constituencies, we have the ebb and flow of whatever power
and favor can be obtained from contacts and friends in Washington.
How does this fit into the framework of built-in guarantees of the
federal system, which led the Court in García to step aside unless there
was a failing in the political process at the national level? The obvious
answer is that it does not. The basic tools are missing. Puerto Rico does
not have a place in the spheres that the García Court found capable of
self-protection.
Conclusion
A body politic, which has no participation in the composition and
selection of the national government, whose citizens have virtually no
political participation in the national processes, and where, consequently,
there is no accountability to it, can be called many things, except a part
of a federalist plan. The organization and political configuration of
Puerto Rico simply lack the structural elements of the American
federalism. Wasn't it after all the desire for political participation and for
freedom of choice, which joined the hands of those who wrote the
Charter? Whatever the imagery or the legalesse, Puerto Rico is not a part
of American federalism, be it crippled or blooming.
Let there be no doubt. No one who has lived in this Island long enough
to know it can ignore its painful reality. Some accept it out of inertia,
others because of sheer exhaustion, still others because of cowardliness
or personal gratification while the Lowells of our time thrive on the
endless bickering that saps our energy and ruins our peace.
Freidrich, supra note 141.
Lewis, Puerto Rico: Freedom and Power in the Caribbean (1963)
at 362.
152
153
A LEGAL OPINION ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW,
LANGUAGE AND THE FUTURE
OF FRENCH SPEAKING
CANADA
Ramsey Clark
This memorandum will address two questions:
1.
Whether Chapter VII, Section 58 of the Quebec Charter of the
French Language which generally requires public signs and posters and
commercial advertising which are out of doors or intended to be seen by
persons who are out of doors and under certain circumstances when
located inside business establishments be only in French violates
international law, or infringes on fundamental human rights;
2. Whether Chapter VIII, Sections 72-86, of the Quebec Charter of
the French Language requiring that instruction in kindergarten and
elementary and secondary school classes be in French, but excepting on
request a child whose mother or father was instructed primarily in
English in Quebec, or in English elsewhere and was domiciled in Quebec
on 26 August 1977, violates International law, or infringes on
fundamental human rights.
On casual consideration, the questions might seem to address arbitrary,
narrow and peculiar restrictions on the use of languages. In fact, they
deal with fundamental elements of culture and values having a powerful
influence on the nature and character of a society. For they are concerned
with the language of learning and its culture and the role of foreign
language and economic power in the domestic lives of a people.

Legal opinion requested by the Mouvement Québec Français (MQF)
Former Attorney General of the United States.

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Language as the most pervasive and comprehensive carrier of culture is a
key determinant in the individual's understanding of self, the world and
human values. Though inadequately articulated in the international
corpus juris it is among the most fundamental of all human rights.
1. The Nature and Role of Language in Culture and Human Life
In the book of Genesis, we read that the whole earth was of one
language until the tower of Babel was destroyed when that one language
confounded and the people then unable to understand one another's
speech were scattered abroad upon the face of all the earth. Over the
millennia thousands of languages, many with multiple dialects emerged,
evolved, fragmented, died, merged and expanded. Within each language,
aspects of events experienced by its speakers and the more common
aspirations, dominant character and group values adhered in words and
phrases of special meaning and were transmitted in an expanding culture
reflecting a shared and changing experience of thousands and millions of
individuals over generations and centuries.
At the beginning of the first century A.D., Christian gospel gave one
answer to the longing of many through all the ages for a single language
of perfect communication. As the Disciples of Christ prepared to journey
throughout the world to carry their message, the Book of Acts reports
there was a sound from heaven of a mighty rushing wind and the
disciples began to speak with other tongues.The multitudes were
confounded because everyone heard the message in his own language.
To speak the language of others is the opposite of the historic practices
of military conquest, colonial dominion, economic intervention and
exploitation, not to mention tourism of Americans and others, which
have imposed their language where they could and used their own where
they could not.
At mid-twentieth century, Toynbee found evidence of 26 civilizations
of which 16 were dead; two were in their last agonies and seven under
threat of annihilation or assimilation. Within those civilizations and the
surviving dominant civilization were thousands of silenced languages,
which reflect more comprehensively the nature, and values of all the
people who spoke them than all other remnants of their existence. Those
languages as the principal component and fabric of the culture they
expressed are the clearest key to the quality of their lives. Toynbee
observed, “…language which wins…over its rivals usually owes its
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success to the social advantage of having served …as a tool of some
community that has been potent either in war or in commerce.”
At the end of the twentieth century, scholars estimate that there are
between 2500 and 4000 languages excluding dialects in current use on
the earth. From this, particularly in light of expanding electronic communication, the ease and speed of travel and global interdependence, one
might assume the vast majority are soon to be extinct despite widespread
efforts to save them, including the development of written forms for
many languages that have none, using phonetic transcriptions into the
alphabets and symbols of existing written languages. It is not sentimental
to observe the unique and precious quality of those languages and remember that they reflect the cumulative human experience of many individual lives. Consider only Haitian Creole, generally considered a separate language now. Does it not contain much of an incredible human
experience of a beautiful people: kidnapping, crossing an unknown sea in
chains, contact with a dying Indian population, slavery, rebellion,
Toussaint L'Overture, violence, corruption, the spoilage of a paradise,
racial mixture, French language transformation, sadness, poverty, hunger, flight, music, art, marines, education, Duvalier, Catholicism, animism, voodoo, environmental degradation, human dignity, Aristide, an
indomitable spirit? Should that language be sacrificed to agribusiness,
tourism, or cultural intervention of an incomparably more powerful police, or economy? With the thrill of deciphering a Rosetta Stone, or
breaking the Maya code we also enrich our lives. But how much more
we would know about the post, life and ourselves if those languages,
their knowledge, wisdom and values had survived.
Andre Malraux in The Voices of Silence wrote “Every culture aspires
to perpetuate, enrich and transform ... [its] ideal concept of man…”
Taken together these cultures are “the heritage of the quality of the
world.” On the decline and fall of cultures Malraux observed “When we
survey the charnel-house of dead values, we realize that values live and
die in conjunction with the vissitudes of man…our culture is not built up
of earlier cultures reconciled with each other, but of irreconcilable
fragments of the past… Each hero, saint or sage stands for a victory over
the human situation. All the same the Buddhist saints could no more resemble St. Peter and St. Augustine than Socrates resembled Gandhi…
When we welcome amongst us all these antagonistic elements, is it not
obvious that our eclecticism, defying history, merges them in a past
whose conception is other than the real past, and acts as a defense of our
own culture?” Thus, the distinct values of the demised culture are largely
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lost and only aspects of it are transformed to reinforce a surviving culture
and its values.
The struggle for the preservation of a culture and language is for the
survival in human consciousness and life of the contributions of all those
who lived within the culture and used its language.
Tyranny over language is essential to control and dominate a conquered people with a different tongue. It is the essential element in culturcide. Culturcide is the only means of completely dominating another
people. Empires spread their language as a weapon of domination. The
struggle to control language is found throughout the history of war, conquest, intervention and economic exploitation. The different means of
suppressing another language can be seen in every epoch. To speak or
write a forbidden language has often been punishable by law. As random
examples, Turkey has prohibited the use of the ancient Kurdish language
to try to dominate and assimilate a minority of 14 million people. Japan
compelled the use of its language in occupied Korea and Taiwan in the
decades before the end of World War II. The Filibusterer William
Walker proclaiming himself President of Nicaragua in the mid1850s
made English the official language though few could speak it.
Colonial powers, ancient and modern, have compelled their colonies to
use their languages in public affairs, courts, schools and commerce.
Major commercial sea faring peoples, Phoenicians, Malaysians and many
others, spread their languages by their economic power. It is their power,
not their presence that extends their language. Economic refugees cannot
persuade others to use their language. They seek to assimilate.
Multinational corporations spread the language of their ownership and
management around the world. The terror experienced by millions of
refugees, exiles, immigrants, prisoners of war, linguistic minorities and
others caught in a foreign language and culture, disadvantaged and unable to communicate or fend for themselves is among the greatest
violations of human rights.
Wrestling to identify the essence of freedom and human dignity,
George Orwell writing his classic 1984, found tyranny ultimately
depended not only on prohibiting all foreign languages, but also on
creating its own language. Newspeak was made to replace Oldspeak, or
Standard English.
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“The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of
expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees
but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that
when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all any diverging from
[its] principles should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is
dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact
and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member
could property wish to express, while excluding all other meanings …He
has described the power language has to control thought.
Language is uniquely a human characteristic and seemingly both the
most important for individual self-realization and accomplishment and
the most intimate and personal for individual thought, development and
understanding. Aristotle noted that man is the only animal “endowed
with the gift of speech.” Darwin observed, “Lower animals differ from
man solely in his almost infinitely larger power of associating together
the most diversified sounds and ideas.” Descartes found language, together with thought, “Je pense donc je suis,” to be one of two differences
“that exists between man and brutes.” As a singular and essential
attribute of human dignity, language is basic among fundamental human
rights.
Lavoisier thought, “the art of reasoning is nothing more than a
language well arranged.” While Plato believed “thought is the unuttered
conversation of the soul with itself,” he could not deny that even that
conversation was inextricably intertwined with language. Thus, language
is an essential element of thought, privacy, opinion, self-knowledge,
understanding, fulfillment, even conscience. It is among the most
elusive, valuable and fundamental of all rights.
II. The Evolution of Language as a Human Right
Realization of the importance of language as a human right has
dawned slowly. We are still told, “Whether linguistic rights merit
protection in the context of international human rights law is a matter of
much debate.” The Protection of Language Rights in International
Human Rights Law, Virginia Journal of International Law (Vol. 32: 515,
1992) at p. 517. But language rights have been recognized in
international law and treaties for generations.
Following World War I, Central, and East European nations were
required by treaty to both protect and promote the linguistic rights of
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minorities. The Permanent Court of International Justice was given
jurisdiction to enforce the treaty provisions and in cases such as the
Minority Schools in Albania decided in 1935 endeavored to do so.
Minority Schools in Albania (Advisory Opinion) 1935 PCLJ (Ser AB)
No. 64.
These treaties which sought to preserve languages and cultures rose
from the idealism following World War I, which produced Woodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points and the League of Nations. They suffered from
a lack of practical judgment. Deferential to power they provided no
language rights in government matters while imposing impossibly
burdensome requirements for schooling of minorities in their many
languages that divided ethnic, national and linguistic groups. They went
far beyond anything the allied powers dreamed of according minorities in
their own midst. While the treaties were largely unenforced and their
purpose a failure, it ought to be asked what role the effort to so coerce
others, as is seen in the Treaty with Serb-Croat- Slovene State of
September 10, 1919, might play in the present tragedy in former
Yugoslavia.
The United Nations Charter, incorporating a proposal by France made
at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, made language with race, sex and
religion as one of four areas to be protected from discrimination in
Article 1(3). The U.N. Charter refers to the protection against
discrimination on the basis of for language in articles 13(6), 55(c) and
76(c).
Since this important advance, language has been recognized regularly
in international human rights documents. In 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in Article 2 guaranteed the right to
freedom from discrimination on the basis of language. Article 2(2) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966
prohibits discrimination based on language.
Among all the international human rights treaties, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights deals most comprehensively with
linguistic rights. In Art. 2(1) it requires State Parties to respect and insure
non-discrimination on account of language. In succeeding subsections, it
requires Parties to take measures to give effect to all the rights provided
and remedies for their violation. Art. 14 importantly guarantees a person
charged with crime the right to be informed of the charges in a language
he understands and to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he
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cannot understand or speak the language used in court. It is pitiful to
watch bewildered Blacks before South African Pass Courts without
meaningful translations, or counsel who speaks their tongue, sentenced
to separation from their families without any ability to understand what
is happening, where they are to be sent, or the length or conditions of
their sentence. The scene has been repeated in many other nations among
other races and in many languages.
Language rights are repeatedly addressed in the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Art. 19, while not mentioning linguistic rights deals with
the intimately related rights to hold opinions and freedom of expression.
Art. 24(1) concerns discrimination against children including their
language rights. Article 26 addresses equality and includes language
rights.
While nearly all international law references to language have dealt
with negative — thou shall not — injunctions protecting individuals, Art.
27 importantly, and virtually for the first time in explicit positive
command in an international agreement, protects the rights of linguistic
minorities to “in community with other members of their group… enjoy
their own culture… to use their own language.” As with all generalities,
and especially so with new concepts lacking the gloss of history, the
inherent uncertainties of application of such language require a long
process of interpretation.
That process, more so than with most international law which
excepting commercial interests remains vague in its applications and
spotty in its enforcement, is in an early stage of development. Looking
around the world today one sees an almost endless variety of language
predicaments needing address if invaluable, irreplaceable human
experience and value systems are to be preserved for the benefit of all.
After the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
failed to address rights of linguistic groups, because of their obscurity,
absence from historic dialogue and central relationship to power, the
General Assembly requested the Sub commission on the Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on
Human Rights to make a thorough study of rights required to protect
linguistic minorities. The study was intended to assist the United Nations
in considering the need for specific protection. From its earliest
considerations, linguistic rights of the group, not individual rights were
addressed. Individual rights to expression were already extensively
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treated and the United Nations was concerned with the survival of
languages and cultures and conflict arising in those struggles. It was
importantly recognized that protection of such rights was dependent on
the desire of the group to exercise its linguistic rights. Without such a
desire, the protection would be as meaningful as the right to study
ancient Greek and Latin in a modern business school.
Because of their complexity, obscurity and the resistance to minority
rights, the efforts to define minorities and define the protections law
should offer were abandoned at the Fourth Session of the Commission on
Human Rights.
After promulgation of the Covenants on Civil and Political and
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966, the sub Commission
again took up the task of studying protections for linguistic minorities in
1967. This lead to a report in 1979, which remains the most thorough
analysis available on international rights to language. Francesca
Capotorti, The Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub 2/348/Rev 1
(1979). Among its more obvious conclusions was that survival of
cultural and linguistic minorities is dependent on use of its language in
education. It noted most countries do not provide education in minority
languages assuming cost and fragmentation of the education system as
reasons, but largely ignoring political and economic power as the
decisive factors. The study doubted that judicial power could be properly
exercised to protect linguistic rights because of the absence of their clear
and detailed definition in positive international law.
The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Art. 10 of its
Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have sought to
protect the “right of children to have access to education in their own
language... and control their own educational systems…” Draft
Declaration of Indigenous Rights, August 1988, E/Cn. 4/Sub. 2/1988/25.
This reveals the growing recognition of the obvious. The rights have
been specifically implemented in the James Bay and Northern Quebec
Agreement, which makes Cree and Inuit the teaching languages in
schools there.
Of even greater significance, the Draft recognizes that mere tolerance
of cultural and linguistic rights of indigenous peoples is not sufficient to
protect them from the onslaught of the political, economic and
technological power of dominant societies. The Draft would create
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positive rights and affirmative action for language to assure the survival
of the indigenous peoples.
The protection of cultural rights, which is a major commitment of
international law, includes necessarily the protection of linguistic rights.
Activities over recent decades by UNESCO and the ILO, the 1960
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, the declarations of International
Cultural Cooperation (1966), The Guiding Principles on the Use of
Satellite Broadcasting (1972) and Race and Racial Prejudice (1978) all
reflect expanding awareness of the essential role of language in human
rights. Nongovernmental efforts have significantly extended both
understanding and commitment to action on linguistic rights. The
Association for the Development of Cross Cultural Communication in
1987 issued a “Cali for a Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights.”' It
drafted a document, The Declaration of Recife, where the conference,
which produced it, was held at the law school of the University of
Pernambuco, urging the United Nations to adopt and implement a new
reformulated declaration of language rights to eliminate linguistic
prejudice, discrimination, domination, injustice and oppression, among
its ambitious goals.
Regional Human Rights Conventions have recognized at least negative
linguistic rights, including the American Convention on Human Rights.
The European Convention is the most advanced both in terms of the legal
rights created and their enforcement in the European Court. In 1968 in
the Belgian Linguistic Case, the Court unanimously denied claims of
Francophone groups living in predominantly Flemish areas complaining
their children were offered only Dutch language education at their local
schools, but by a vote 8 to 7 found a discriminatory denial of access to
existing French language schools in one of the six questions presented
the Court. European Court of Human Rights, Sec. A, Vol. 6, Case
Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in
Education in Belgium. (Judgment of 23 July 1968).
In 1989 the European Court held that a requirement that a foreign
lecturer of painting at the College of Marketing and Design in Dublin
where instruction was in English and only a minor fraction of the
population was fluent in Irish could be required to pass a 'special
examination in the Irish language as a qualification to teach. The Court
noted the interest of successive Irish governments in promoting the use
of Irish to express national identity and culture, the provision in the Irish
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Constitution making Irish the first official language with English the
second official language and the special role lecturers perform in
education and culture. Common Market Law Review 27:129-139 (1990)
Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister of Education and the City of Dublin
Vocational Education Committee, Judgment of 28 November 1989). The
emphasis the Court placed on the Constitutional designation of an
official language is deference to State power concerning languages.
Approximately a third of all national constitutions provide some
recognition of the rights of linguistic minorities. Many have
comprehensive laws dealing with teaching languages as education and
other concerns of such minorities. These provisions reveal the
recognition at the national level of the need to respect and address this
important human concern.
As tensions regarding minority rights grew worldwide, the U.N. Sub
commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities by its Resolution 36 of 1988 authorized preparation of a
working paper on ways and means to facilitate the peaceful and
constructive resolution of problems of racial, national, religious and
linguistic minorities. The following year the Commission on Human
Rights by its resolution 61 established a continuing Working Group to
draft a declaration of rights of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities. The Working Group adopted a Draft Declaration in 1990 and
the Commission requested the Secretary-General to invite comments on
the proposed text. Many critical comments were received and considered
throughout 1991 including the absence of a definition of minority, failure
to adequately delineate specific rights including use of the mother tongue
freely in public and private, and failure to provide affirmative support for
instruction in the native language. The United States argued that the right
to use a historical language was too broadly defined particularly for
countries with numerous linguistic minorities. The concern for the
tension between individual rights to free speech and group rights to
cultural and linguistic preservation remained largely unaddressed
reflecting the special interests of participants and the general absence of
historic international experience in resolving the tension between rights
to speech and rights to language, as when an individual desires to speak
English and the community wants to preserve French.
Free speech has a long legacy of inspired advocacy. Milton and
Voltaire proclaimed its central role in individual freedom and the life of
the mind. In the great volumes of classic free speech literature in the
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United States, Meiklejohn, Chafee, Emerson, homage is paid on every
page to the heroes of uninhibited expression while language cannot be
found in their indexes. Thousands of cases in courts define the meaning
of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibiting the
abridgement of freedom of speech or of the press. Dialogue on linguistics
rights is hard to find.
While the work of the U.N. proceeds, international law has yet to
address in a comprehensive and coherent way the fundamental human
rights in language. The core concern of the quest for international
protection of linguistic rights is the felt need to preserve and cherish
endangered cultures and the recognition of the conflicts that arise from
the power struggles that threaten them.
Urgency of the need for solutions to worldwide problems of language
rights has never been greater and still the principles of law addressing the
issues are rudimentary. Concepts of autonomy, sovereignty and selfdetermination arise largely from cultural and language identities.
Militarism, separatism and domination are ever present as a means of
assaulting and protecting culture and language. Politics, law and human
rights must offer a better solution. Consider Tanzania, probably the least
homogenous nation ethnically in the world with over 130 groups, each
with distinct physical, social, cultural and linguistic characteristics and
more than 100 spoken African languages with Swahili the lingua franca.
What is to become of its people if means for living together with respect
for diversity and equality in cultural and linguistic rights cannot be
developed? Look at the fragmentation of the USSR, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Cambodia where French was the sole language of
teaching and administration until 1975 and other former nations. How
can peace, economic development, or human dignity prevail without
respect and urgent action to protect the rights of diversity?
Remember Puerto Rico, which, though dominated by the United States
for nearly a century, saturated with its culture and products, taught in its
English language schools for generations, has defied foreign political,
economic and cultural intervention and revived its cultural heritage, its
Spanish language and its own rich literature, art and music. Among the
reasons for this success must be the vitality of its people, its remote
island location, its affirmative legislation to protect the Spanish language
and its intense psychological commitment shared throughout Latin
America to its own identity in the shadow of its giant northern neighbor.
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Consider little Estonia with its rich cultural language and high level of
development confronting a 40% Russian speaking population within its
borders and bordering Russia herself which has dominated the whole
society for the past nearly half century. Most people cannot abandon
their language, because they lack the capacity to change. But what
worthy people capable of choice will abandon their heritage, their
history, their language and their culture?
The emotion stimulated by cultural and linguistic conflict must not
obscure the obvious and essential need in our time for every people and
most individuals to develop and maintain the capacity for sophisticated
communication with neighbors and the world community. The divisions,
which the natural centrifugal force pulling at languages over time and
distance create, must be bridged by full meaningful communication
without deterring language rights. Peace and economic cooperation are
not possible without clear communication. Enrichment by the experience
of other cultures is limited without common language skills. While
individual character will be stronger and life richer from a healthy native
culture, fuller understanding and the hope to live lovingly together will
depend on reasoning together with all. An adequate common language in
addition to sophisticated native language is essential for that purpose.
The need is for tolerant, compassionate commitment to resolve
differences, to preserve and enrich cultural heritages, to respect the rights
of others, to communicate sensitively with all languages, cultures, races
and creeds and to devise structures for political and economic
community that assure peace, social justice and human rights.
III. Conclusion
It follows from this discussion that the Quebec Charter of the French
language is an effort by government to protect and revitalize the French
language and culture in Quebec and by the example of Quebec
throughout Canada from the erosion of its long history as part of an
overwhelmingly English-speaking region from colonial times to its
present estate. As a part of Canada, it has experienced direct English
government influence over its culture and language in myriad ways for
many generations and the presence in Quebec of an often-privileged
English-speaking minority with its substantial commercial, business, and
educational social and religious institutions. As a neighbor of the United
States, it has long experienced the overwhelmingly powerful forces of
the U.S. economy, its corporate and business presence, its investments
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and tourists, its books, magazines, movies and music, and its radio and
T.V. directly transmitted into Quebec. This is an experience shared with
all Canadians, but compounded for French speaking Canada. Those in
Canada who speak French perceive with substantial objective evidentiary
support the waning and dilution of their culture, language and
values which they wish to preserve.
IV. Article 58 of the Charter of the French Language is
protected by International Law as Supportive of
Fundamental Human Rights
Economic intervention as history shows is deadlier to a domestic
culture and language than foreign military or local police state
suppression of language rights. Direct oppression creates resistance. It is
difficult to police whispers and impossible so far to control thoughts. A
people are driven, however miserable the experience, to their own
resources, their culture, their language, and unity in the face of force.
Economic intervention can buy out a culture. Profits will attract even the
patriot. Young people will flock to a materialistic opportunity glorified
on television. Aesthetics aside, and the sensitivity of the people who live
there, foreign language advertising can help drive a domestic language
and its culture off the streets and out of favor and has done so in areas
around the world. It can change the outer appearance of a society to that
of a foreign commercial strip. Cultural and linguistic integrity involve
authenticity in appearance as well as fact. To equate the right to advertise
with the right to preserve a culture is to equate money with character. It
is comparable to permitting unlimited political campaign contributions in
the name of free speech, which values money over democracy. It is a
mistake the law must not make.
To the extent that outdoor advertising is speech, it is little more than a
symbol or identification in attractive design and setting. A trademark
carries the message for a well-known brand. The intent is rarely more
than to identify a product, remind a consumer, suggest quality or
newness. Language is an insignificant part of the content and it usually
can be as readily expressed in any language.
The Charter accepts messages of a religious, political, ideological, or
humanitarian nature when not for profit. It does not affect oral
communication in any language. It does not affect advertising in news
media that publish in a language other than French. It permits business
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firms with fewer than fifty employees that do not share a name with
other businesses to use signs, posters and commercial advertising in
foreign languages inside their establishments. To provide for unforeseen
burdens, the government is authorized to permit public signs, posters and
commercial advertising to be in both French and another language or
solely in another language by regulation. The burden of the law on nonFrench speaking businesses and the non-French speaking public is
minimal.
The threat to the French language in Canada is omnipresent and a
whole culture is at risk. Under any circumstances, an advertiser can
communicate its product equally with all others in French. The state has
and ought to have the power under international law to compel this
restriction on outdoor and commercial advertising under regulation
not broader than is reasonably necessary to protect a threatened
language and culture. Suggestion that the purpose of preservation can be
accomplished by permitting foreign language advertising if French as
well is predominantly used evades the real issue and absurdly expands
outdoor advertising messages by doubling the words on a sign.
Psychologically it may be a sharper reminder to those who speak an
embattled language that foreign economic intervention threatens its
future where two languages are used. Certainly, it does not provide a
vista that is resonant with a dominant culture.
V. Chapter VIII of the Charter of the French Language is
protected by International Law, as
Supportive of Fundamental Human Rights
More than even the language at home, the language in which children
are taught in school will determine the language they use in their adult
life. The former may be used in later years when visiting parents, but the
latter will probably be used in adult family, social and economic life. The
teaching language is the strongest single preservative and promoter of a
language and its culture because it is the language in which the child is
prepared to emerge into full adult participation in the larger society.
Throughout history, cultures have sought to educate their children in
their own language, and often at great sacrifice. As an affirmative effort
to preserve and invigorate an embattled language, the language of
teaching is the single most important tool.
Hugo Grotius in his early major work The Law of War and Peace
wrote it is “this care to preserve society that is the source of all law.”
Ramsey Clark
81
Central to the preservation of society is the protection of the culture on
which it is based. This care to preserve the French speaking society in
Canada is the source of the Charter of the French language.
As it ought to be, the law on the language of instruction is respectful of
English and other languages. For English it provides for the continuation
of English language teaching in public schools for the children of parents
who request it if one of them received the major part of his or her
elementary instruction in English in Quebec. The provision is extended
to parents resident in Quebec before 20 August 1977 who received such
English instruction outside Quebec, so that only English language
immigrants after 1977 are not provided English language instruction for
their children. The law provides an exception for children with serious
learning disabilities empowers the Minister of Education to exempt
children or person temporarily in Quebec and contemplates flexible
regulations to meet unforeseen needs.
The Charter contains these affirmative action programs to resist
commercial and linguistic intrusion destructive of French Canadian
culture and language. They are not inherently nationalistic or separatist.
They are intended to protect the fundamental human right to culture and
language. Sensitively administered, they will enrich the rights of all by
enabling every language and culture to communicate with and share in
their rich heritage.
LA HIPOTECA MOBILIARIA
EN LA "ERA DE LA
COMPUTADORA"
Eduardo Vázquez Bote
Gracias al generoso gesto del Decano de la Facultad de Derecho de la
Universidad de Ottawa, señor Raymond Landry, puedo atender a la
gentil invitación cursada para asistir a las presentes Jornadas, sin incidir
exageradamente en esa característica que nos ha hecho famosos a los
españoles: hablar sobre lo que nada sabemos (y más hablar cuanta mayor
es nuestra ignorancia). El Decano Landry me envió el texto del Proyecto
de Código de Quebec, base de los temas que aquí se tratan. A él, mi
profundo agradecimiento, que extiendo, asimismo, a los patrocinadores
de este encuentro. Sin embargo, y a pesar de lo dicho, mucho me temo
que en las presentes páginas seguiré demostrando que soy español:
desconozco el Derecho de Quebec; soy un franco ignorante del Derecho
norteamericano. Con tanta ignorancia por delante, espero de su
amabilidad, que sepan disculpar lo que pueda decir, tomándolo siempre
"a beneficio de inventario".
La computadora es un instrumento técnico, que ha dado lugar a la
ciencia de la informática. El Registro de bienes es, igualmente, un
instrumento técnico, que ha generado esa rama del Derecho que
denominamos "registral". Son sin embargo, instrumentos técnicos
que han generado unas técnicas casi, casi, antagónicas.
La computadora -los sistemas informáticos sería mejor decir- ofrecen
como característica que les define la velocidad de transmisión de datos,
la multiplicación de operaciones, millones de ellas, en lapsos temporales
de segundos.
El Registro de bienes, y en general, los sistemas de toma de razón
registral, se organizan para lograr seguridad y certeza en las
transacciones que tienen por objeto a los bienes que se registran. E
implican un sistema que atiende a la lentitud más que a la rapidez.
Serían, por ello, los norteamericanos anglosajones quienes asumieron
la labor de desarrollar los sistemas informáticos, pues en los Estados
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Unidos la rapidez es un valor ("el tiempo es dinero"), lo que implica su
posición avanzada en este tema. Como se explica, que su sistema de
registración sea el más anacrónico y deficiente de todos los existentes, ya
que la seguridad ofrecida por un registro la logran ellos -a un costo
altísimo, ciertamente- mediante el contrato de seguro.
Cabe, pues, preguntar: ¿Son compatibles ambas técnicas, tomando en
consideración los fines, tan distintos, que persiguen?
Personalmente, creo que la respuesta afirmativa se impone. Si
observamos el "manejo informático" y la llevanza de un registro,
podemos deducir, que ambos instrumentos técnicos no sólo son
perfectamente compatibles entre sí, sino que coadyuvan en su uso al
mismo fin.
La informática permite disponer de un enorme potencial de
almacenamiento de datos, resultando su eficacia en proporción directa al
volumen de almacenamiento. El Registro es, igualmente, un sistema de
almacenamiento de datos; si bien su eficacia deriva de la selección de
dichos datos: mejor informa cuantos menos datos contiene; de ahí, la
conveniente selección que debe realizar el encargado del registro,
dirigida a permitir solamente el acceso de aquellas circunstancias
jurídicas de transcendencia para terceros. Sin embargo, la velocidad
informática, debidamente programada, permite proporcionar al registro
una mayor capacidad de almacenamiento y, sobre todo, una mayor
velocidad de información. Baste un ejemplo:
Para otorgarse los documentos públicos correspondientes a un contrato
de compraventa, regularmente es menester: a) conseguir la información
registral acerca del inmueble; b) redactar la propia escritura notarial; c)
llevarla al registro. En este proceso, si es rápido, pueden transcurrir diez
o doce días: dos, para certificarse el contenido registral relativo al
inmueble; tres o cuatro, para formalizarse el contrato; uno o dos días
adicionales, para llevar el documento a su inscripción o transcripción
registral; y varios días adicionales, para extender la inscripción en el
correspondiente libro. Imaginemos, ahora un sistema informático
conectado por terminales: el Notario recibe, prácticamente en un
instante, la información del inmueble que contiene el registro
computarizado; en un tráfico seriado como es el actual, la escritura de
venta, prácticamente, supone llenar unos espacios en blanco, añadiendo,
en su caso, las particularidades del caso en concreto, labor que puede
hacerse en escasas horas; un fax puede remitir el documento,
instantáneamente, al registro (sin perjuicio del envío del documento
original por correo o personalmente, que puede hacerse en el mismo día);
la misma computadora, debidamente programada, puede "calificar" el
documento y determinar su inscripción o su rechazo. Todo ello,
ahorrando bastantes días y, con ello, esfuerzos económicos y tiempo.
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Una segunda ventaja de la informática es su velocidad de trabajo, ya
que procesa los datos en tiempo real: provee la información en segundos,
para en pocos segundos más, tomarse la de- cisión (que, con frecuencia,
puede venir determinada por otro medio computadorizado) Consiguientemente, se explica esa capacidad de certificación que tienen los registros
de inmuebles cuales el de Buenos Aires (Capital federal) o de México
(Distrito Federal), de expedir hasta sesenta mil certificaciones por día.
Con una ventaja jurídica adicional: ordena la prioridad o preferencia a
un ritmo mareante y totalmente riguroso (prior tempore potior iure).
Un tercer factor —de enorme importancia en los sistemas registrales—
es, que la exactitud y fiabilidad de los datos y operaciones es plena. Los
riesgos de error humano prácticamente que- dan reducidos a cero. Con lo
que la seguridad jurídica se ve enormemente reforzada.
Un cuarto factor relevante es el de la adaptabilidad de los sistemas:
pueden diseñarse sistemas para todo y para cada caso concreto a un costo
francamente irrisorio, dados los beneficios de resultados.
Naturalmente, las grandes ventajas del sistema informático no
excluyen la presencia de sus grandes inconvenientes, entre los cuales
merecen ser resaltados algunos.
El primero destaca claramente: el llamado envejecimiento prematuro.
Los avances y desarrollos de las ciencias informáticas llevan implícitos
la esencia del sistema, su velocidad. Y lo que hoy es última moda
deviene en anacrónico en un lapso de escasos cinco años. Se ha dicho,
con motivo de la "guerra del Golfo", que los sistemas informáticos de la
Defensa norteamericana emplean aparatos que dejan muy atrás a los
últimos modelos del mercado civil. Consiguientemente, la renovación y
puesta al día de un registro informatizado, ¿es rentable a largo plazo?
¿Justifica la renovación periódica el empleo de fondos públicos para
satisfacción, al fin y al cabo, de intereses privados? El tema deja de ser
técnico jurídico para convertirse, quizá, en político.
Uno de los grandes inconvenientes de la informática, terminar con la
"vida íntima" de las personas no es, sin embargo, destacado cuando de un
registro se trata. Porque aquí interesa, precisamente, la publicidad. Pero,
no es menos cierto, que publicar datos patrimoniales significa hacer
públicos datos económicos; y con éstos, podemos entrar de lleno en la
vida íntima de las personas. Lo saben muy bien las entidades de crédito,
que disponen de suficiente información como para, cruzándola con las
otras fuentes, tener un perfecto perfil de cada individuo. Leía hace unos
meses cómo los grandes supermercados, sus proveedores, y en general,
las grandes tiendas, consiguen, mediante el sistema de "barras
electrónicas", llegar hasta averiguar los gustos del cliente, tiempo que
tarda en decidirse por un producto u otro, etc. Quienes deseen defender la
vida íntima han de tener, frente a la informática, un serio enemigo.
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Más importante en tema de registros es la enorme vulnerabilidad del
sistema informatizado, que no obstante, todas las medidas de seguridad,
es constante objeto de "asaltos". La posibilidad de fraude en los "input" y
"out put" es enormemente facilitada, según los expertos, no obstante las
contramedidas de seguridad que existen. Que un joven haya podido,
desde Alemania, entrar en los sistemas de la Defensa norteamericana -si
es cierto el hecho que leí hace un par de años en la prensa-, es algo que
da qué pensar.
Y se podría concluir ahora, que la combinación informática-registro
debe alentarse.
Queda, no obstante, otro aspecto por dilucidar cuando se habla de las
relaciones y sistema informatizado. Porque, entre juristas, cuando nos
referimos a un registro, pensamos siempre en un registro jurídico, y en
las sociedades no sólo hay registros jurídicos; los hay, por ejemplo,
administrativos, meramente fácticos, etc.
Y, es claro, la aplicación informática será diversa y producirá
consecuencias muy diferentes según el tipo de registro de que se trate.
Por ejemplo, introducir datos falsos en un registro administrativo, nos
llevará, forzosamente, a conclusiones erróneas si usamos de dichos datos.
Pero un dato falso en un registro jurídico nos ha de conducir, junto a la
errónea conclusión, a la adjudicación de efectos no queridos, con todas
sus consecuencias.
Naturalmente -y ahora comienzo a expresarme como español: sin
saber de qué estoy hablando- aplicar la informática a los archivos
inmobiliarios norteamericanos, por ejemplo, será siempre saludable
jurídicamente. Y por una sola causa: el sistema jurídico norteamericano
pasa siempre por el juez -con los altísimos costos que ello significa-, que
puede actuar como filtro jurídico de los errores fácticos proporcionados
por la informática manipulada.
Ahora bien, los países en que el registro no es un simple archivo, sino
un instrumento técnico jurídico, lo que se pretende es evitar pasar por el
juez ("a registro abierto, juzgado cerrado"). De modo tal, que el filtro
jurídico puede desaparecer, produciendo el error o el fraude todas sus
consecuencias en el plano del Derecho. Porque la certeza que se persigue
con un registro jurídico es precisamente, que el único efecto que se
produzca en Derecho sea el que surge del propio registro, nada más.
Y este es un tema que debe ser profundamente pensado.
Ciertamente, el proyecto de Código Civil de Quebec no toca este
aspecto —no es la norma adecuada para ello—, pues se limita a
instrumentar jurídicamente la hipoteca mobiliaria, suponiendo una
remisión a ordenanzas de otro orden una posible instrumentación de
apoyo informático. Que es otro de los puntos de fricción entre
informática y Derecho. Aquélla, vive de realidades que generan nuevas
87
realidades, matemáticamente; éste, ofrece probabilidades cuya realidad
depende de múltiples factores. Combinar ambos aspectos, creo, no es
labor sencilla. Pero es fundamental en aquellas naciones que buscan, con
los instrumentos técnicos, ahorrar esfuerzo. Y, no se olvide, el modelo
económico norteamericano lo que reclama es consumir un brutal
excedente. (1/2 del PN).
Pongamos un ejemplo que aclare a qué me refiero.
Por tradición histórica, los países influidos por el Derecho romano
Justiniano (beneficiados de la "recepción" producida en los Siglos XII y
XIII), escinden sus relaciones jurídicas en dos grandes categorías
(división que no es agotadora de otras relaciones), las relaciones jurídicas
de obligación y las relaciones jurídicas de derecho real. Regularmente, al
Registro solamente acceden éstas, por la sencilla razón que son las que
pueden oponerse a un tercero. El Derecho norteamericano —que, a
diferencia del Derecho inglés no ha sido reformado por legislación,
sustenta solamente una clase de relaciones, las de obligación. No conoce
el concepto de derecho real. Sus archivos inmobiliarios admiten, por
incorporación plena del documento, todo lo relativo al inmueble
(hasta "la factura de un restaurante", ha escrito, jocosamente, PAYNE).
Se ahorran, así, la "calificación" o discernimiento entre una y otra clase
relaciones, para apreciar si una concreta es o no susceptible de
inscripción o transcripción registral. Y logra un efecto jurídico último
ocasionalmente más enérgico que el inherente al derecho real, derivado
de la fuerza que los Tribunales dan al hecho de la publicidad del archivo,
mediante reglas de inversión en la carga de la prueba ("caveat emptor",
etc.). Pero siendo un sistema de transmisión causal, los defectos de una
original transmisión se mantienen siempre. Resultando en un sistema que
induce al pleito —gestos de tiempo y recursos económicos—, que
fomenta el pleito y que vive del pleito. Esto es, consume recursos. Por
ello, en el Derecho norteamericano el archivo de inmuebles
jurídicamente sólo sirve para justificación de las compañías de seguros
de títulos: aseguran las resultas de la investigación registral, no los
contenidos del propio registro; logrando con ello un excelente negocio,
pero sin proporcionar seguridad jurídica. Esto es, habrá que recurrir
siempre al juez en último extremo.
Desconozco si la economía de Quebec tiene un problema de consumo
de excedentes como lo tiene la norteamericana; pero me temo que, al
menos desde el plano de la idiosincrasia de sus gentes, responde al
criterio de ahorro de esfuerzos.
Y, si esto es así, me cuesta comprender cómo se ha tomado como
ejemplo o modelo al Código Uniforme de Comercio de los Estados
Unidos. El Decano Landry escribe, que:
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"Salvando ciertas reservas de forma y de fondo, nosotros
aplaudimos el actual intento de armonizar el Derecho quebecois
con el de las jurisdicciones del common law; la eficiencia y la
certidumbre jurídica necesarias para el favorecimiento del
desarrollo económico, requieren esta tendencia hacia la
uniformidad, la que deberá adaptarse a las características
peculiares de la codificación" (Las Garantías: La hipoteca
mobiliaria en la era de la informática, Comunicación, pág. 2).
Quizá sea una exigencia del desarrollo económico, no lo pongo en
duda. Pero si puedo dudar, si de instituciones jurídicas se trata, que su
calidad jurídica se determine por criterios de desarrollo económico.
Porque si hay algo que el Derecho norteamericano no ofrece es
precisamente, seguridad (no me refiero al "Statutes Law), sino constante
incertidumbre: la que deriva de todos los imponderables que rodean el
pleito (por eso el álea es una constante en las transacciones inmobiliarias,
objeto de archivo o registro). Y debe recordarse el dicho popular: más
vale un mal arreglo que un buen pleito", o aquél otro: "pleitos tengas y
los ganes", como expresión de "maldición". Al igual que el buen médico
debe evitar la cirugía, el buen jurista debe evitar los tribunales. El
Derecho de Quebec, de factura francesa, es un Derecho preventivo. El
Derecho norteamericano, de factura romana pre-justiniana, es un
Derecho del juicio, sólo deducible de la sentencia y con la sentencia.
Y si los registros buscan y persiguen seguridad, ¿hasta qué punto ha de
lograrse si el modelo de Derecho es uno que vive de la inseguridad?
En otras palabras, la instrumentación de la hipoteca inmobiliaria
¿busca "ahorrar" o "consumir", en términos sociales? ¿A qué responde la
hipoteca mobiliaria? Realmente a una distinción histórica de los bienes,
de raíces medievales: la relevancia del suelo como base de riqueza, que
llevó al desprecio relativo de los bienes muebles (“res mobiles, res
viles") y que centró en los inmuebles la importancia de su función
garantizadora. El pignus romano se aplicaba, indistintamente, a todo
tipo de bienes (entre otras causas, porque la condición de mueble o
inmueble era, en Roma, irrelevante; lo que importaba de las cosas es si
eran mancipi o nec mancipi). Los siglos XVIII y XIX limitarán la
hipoteca a los inmuebles por la sola circunstancia de su más fácil
identificación (dificultada en los muebles). Por consiguiente, cuando
en este siglo los bienes muebles adquieren enorme relieve e importancia
económica- social, se explica, que la hipoteca se extienda a ellos.
Pero lo que importa destacar -desde aquel plano de la seguridad que
busca todo acreedor hipotecario- es, que si el bien no puede
individualizarse, de poco sirve la garantía. Por ello, los ordenamientos
jurídicos modernos, cuales el italiano, el alemán, el francés, e incluso el
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español desde 1956, cuando regulan la hipoteca mobiliaria la someten a
un principio fundamental, el de especialidad. Es decir, que el bien objeto
de hipoteca debe ser uno distinguible de otros de su género; porque si no
la función de garantía que con la hipoteca se persigue se disuelve en la
inherente a las cosas genéricas (genus nunquam perit) o en la garantía
patrimonial universal, convirtiéndose el derecho real en un simple
crédito preferente.
Y es, si lo he entendido bien, lo que se hace de menos en el Artículo
2.651 del Proyecto, que admite cualquier objeto como hipotecable, de
modo tal, que parece más bien pensado para los pignus tabernae (prenda
de empresa) que para una garantía derivada de la mera y simple relación
intersubjetiva (lo que explicaría las palabras del decano Landry).
Y, naturalmente, el Artículo 2.963 se ve obligado a eludir el sistema de
folio real, manteniendo un registro simplemente subjetivo. Bueno, la
experiencia del Derecho francés demostró que tal sistema es muy poco
eficaz, hasta el punto, que las reformas de la década de los cincuenta
obligaron a la llevanza del folio real aunque no tenga consecuencias
jurídicas.
Este inconveniente, así como la permisibilidad de los pactos comisorios -prohibidos desde la época de Justiniano, por alentar al acreedor a
dificultar el cumplimiento al deudor: puede ser mucho más lucrativo-,
que parecen recoger los Artículos 2.748 y 2.761 y siguientes, así como la
variante del Articulo 2.767, resultan, desde mi punto de vista, gratuitas
concesiones al acreedor - casi siempre, el denominado peyorativamente
"acreedor institucional"-, esto es a los grupos económicamente poderosos, de los que puede derivar un grave peligro para los deudores. Al menos, dos mil años de experiencia claman por una solución distinta.
Supongo, que es aquella ausencia de individualización del bien, la que
explica la preferencia a favor del Estado por impuestos debidos (sin más
especificación), por lo que, consiguientemente, deduzco, que cualquier
débito fiscal adquiere la preferencia otorgada. Cuando de inmuebles se
trata, dicha preferencia va referida exclusivamente a la contribución
territorial (rústica o urbana), de conformidad con el axioma de la
especialidad. Y, en principio, no hay razón alguna para no sujetar los
bienes muebles a ese mismo axioma. Tiene sentido, que un aeroplano, un
barco, soporten las cargas fiscales que sobre ellos recaen; pero no lo
tiene, que ofrezcan una preferencia fiscal por razones, por ejemplo, del
impuesto sobre ingresos ("income tax”) pues ninguna relación especial
guarda el tributo con el bien. Y, por el contrario, frente al acreedor por
hipoteca mobiliaria, dicho bien desmerece al posponerse este crédito.
Con lo cual, me parece apreciar en mi ignorancia, se juega un poco
con los intereses; se pospone, pienso que indebidamente, la preferencia al
acreedor hipotecario; de otro lado, se admiten los efectos de lex
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commisoria. Y si mi apreciación es cierta, se agrava sensiblemente la
posición del deudor (el acreedor impele a una ampliación de las
garantías, ante el temor del privilegio fiscal, al tiempo que puede preferir
-dado que la garantía será siempre de mayor valor que la deuda- el
incumplimiento por parte del deudor: es más lucrativo. Porque no debe
olvidarse la realidad subyacente de las ventas en ejecución, que provocan
un sensible desmerecimiento del bien en garantía y la presencia de
testaferros que sirvan al interés último del acreedor).
Por el contrario, creo excelente la sujeción de la constitución de la
hipoteca al principio de publicidad constitutiva (hecha excepción de los
débitos fiscales y demás preferencias), única forma de poder quedar un
tercero informado de la función garantizadora del bien y el alcance de su
"pasivo" por garantía. Publicidad que determina el correspondiente
rango.
Y me asaltan dudas ante el radical Artículo 2.656, sobre extensión
objetiva. Y la duda deriva por mi ignorancia de vuestro Derecho: ¿opera
la extensión objetiva si el bien hipotecado deviene en accesorio de otro
principal? Porque el precepto alude a la simple "unión" de bienes, sin
más matices. Por poner un ejemplo: hipotecado un objeto artístico de
valor cien, al que, por accidente se une con mezcla inseparable una
cantidad de oro líquido de valor seiscientos, ¿éste bien, que es principal,
será accesorio a efectos de la garantía? El ejemplo puede ser absurdo,
pero no faltan miles de otros verdaderos.
Y, honestamente, me resulta difícil comprender una hipoteca sobre un
bien futuro. No es que el Derecho no permita concebir como existente lo
que está por surgir (base fundamental del crédito en una economía
industrial), sino porque es otra negación del principio de especialidad,
con todas sus consecuencias. Ciertamente, atenuadas éstas al constituirse
un registro de folio personal y no de folio real.
Naturalmente, buena parte de mis dudas y acondicionamientos
derivan, es claro, de desconocer los detalles de la economía de Quebec,
su tráfico de bienes, los giros normales del comercio, etc. Porque, de otro
lado, y salvo aquellos matices que acabo de indicar, aprecio en el
proyecto de Código la recepción de casi todos los "principios" que
consagran un buen sistema registral, proclamados ya, respecto de
inmuebles, en los I, II y III Congresos Internacionales de Derecho
Registral (celebrados en Buenos Aires, Madrid y Puerto Rico,
respectivamente), en los que recuerdo la presencia de la delegación
canadiense (sentada en alguno de ellos frente a mi).
Y, en fin, comparto el criterio del Decano Landry acerca de la
preferencia atribuida al Estado mediante hipoteca legal tácita.
Precisamente cuando las técnicas de computación, el sistema informático
(del que el Estado es un principalísimo consumidor), pueden hacer
91
expreso dicho gravamen, mantener tal preferencia puede significar
permitirle una lentitud que no va con los tiempos. Sin duda, se encuentra
aquí una noción del interés público digna de encomio; pero la técnica
moderna permite la protección de ese interés rápidamente, y sobre todo,
con publicidad. Recuérdese, que la razón de ser de los registros es
anunciar; y toda garantía tácita no anunciada, atenta contra esa finalidad.
Con lo expuesto, creo que se consume el tiempo otorgado a cada
participante para realizar su exposición. Sólo me resta, pues, aparte de
solicitar sus disculpas por mi osadía en enjuiciar lo que desconozco,
expresarles mí más profundo agradecimiento por su paciencia y atención.
A la Comisión organizadora, nuevamente, muchas gracias por haberme
permitido el honor de estar entre ustedes.
LA RESPONSABILIDAD DEL
FABRICANTE:
¿RESPONSABILIDAD
ABSOLUTA, NEGLIGENCIA O
SEGURO "NO-CULPOSO"?
(INFORME PUERTORRIQUEÑO)
Luis Muñiz Argüelles
Las leyes y reglamentos puertorriqueños que tratan el tema de la
responsabilidad del fabricante son escasas. Nuestras normas jurídicas a
menudo emanan de decisiones del Tribunal Supremo que, sobre todo en
las últimas dos décadas, han adoptado doctrinas similares a aquellas
vigentes en Quebec, Luisiana, la Comunidad Económica Europea u otros
de los más modernos países occidentales. Estas normas de origen

Este artículo fue preparado para el Taller VII del "Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies Conference on Codification in North
America on the Eve of the 21st Century". Su alcance está limitado a
las doctrinas de Puerto Rico. El autor agradece al Instituto de Estudios Judiciales de la Administración de los Tribunales y en particular
al Lic. Rafael J. Torres Torres y a la Lic. Ivette M. Rosselló González
la traducción y la corrección del texto original, que se presentó en
inglés. Limitaciones de espacio impiden ahondar en un análisis comparado, aunque a veces hacemos mención de estatutos de otras jurisdicciones. Para comentarios adicionales sobre las normas de la responsabilidad del fabricante en Puerto Rico recomendamos la lectura
del Capítulo 18 de Brau del Toro, ii„ Daños y Perjuicios extracontractuales en Puerto Rico, Publicaciones J.T.S., San Juan, 1980 (suplemento de hojas sueltas), y Arroyo-Dávila, M., Developments in the
Law of Product Liability in Puerto Rico, 18 Rev. Jur. U.I.A. 1 (1983) y
los casos y estatutos allí citados.

Catedrático asociado de la Escuela de Derecho de la Universidad
de Puerto Rico; Juez del Tribunal Superior; Doctorat de l'Université
de droit, d'économie et de sciences sociales de Paris (Paris 11);
Profesor Visitante, Harvard University; 3.11, Universidad de Puerto
Rico; M.S., Columbia University; B.A., Cornell University.
93
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2 93, 1990
jurisprudencial, sin embargo, tienen sus fallas, son a veces incoherentes y
contienen lagunas. Por otro lado, en términos generales, la jurisprudencia
ha sido lenta en su adopción de normas modernas sobre la materia.
Casi todos los casos de Puerto Rico relativos a la responsabilidad del
fabricante invocan e interpretan artículos del Código Civil español de
1889 sobre la compraventa o la responsabilidad extracontractual. Estos
se hicieron aplicables a Puerto Rico en el 1890. El Código ha
experimentado algunas revisiones, pero los artículos sobre la
compraventa y la responsabilidad extracontractual no han sufrido
cambios significativos.1 Pese a que se interpretan artículos españoles,
la casuística del Tribunal Supremo ha recurrido constantemente a la
jurisprudencia norteamericana al resolver que las doctrinas sobre
responsabilidad extracontractual aplican a las reclamaciones para
recobrar daños personales (físicos y morales), independientemente de los
vínculos contractuales entre las partes, al adoptar reglas de
responsabilidad absoluta limitada y al rechazar doctrinas tales como la
del requisito de vínculo contractual ("privity of contract”).2
El artículo 1802 el artículo sobre responsabilidad extracontractual, fue enmendado en 1956 para adoptar doctrinas de
negligencia comparada y descartar la defensa de negligencia contribuyente que el Tribunal Supremo había permitido por algunos
años. Aunque no hay duda de la importancia del cambio, hay consenso en que la doctrina sobre negligencia contribuyente fue creada
por los tribunales; que la doctrina española, usada para interpretar
los artículos del Código Civil Español equivalentes a aquellos en vigor
en Puerto Rico, habla rechazado la defensa de negligencia contribuyente y que el Tribunal pudo haber adoptado normas de negligencia
comparada aun cuando la Legislatura no hubiese enmendado el artículo 1802. Otros artículos del Código Civil sobre la responsabilidad
del fabricante no han sufrido cambios en los últimos 102 años.
2 Este recurrir a la jurisprudencia norteamericana es comprensible
si se toman en consideración dos factores. El primero es que durante
la primera mitad del siglo XX se hizo un esfuerzo consciente e
importante de americanizar la ley y la sociedad puertorriqueña.
Véase, por ejemplo, Trías Monge, J., La crisis del derecho en Puerto
Rico, 49 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 1 (1980) y Delgado Cintrón, C., Derecho y
Colonialismo, Ed. Edil, Rio Piedras, 1988, que explican algunos de los
principales esfuerzos de americanización en lo referente al sistema
jurídico. El segundo factor es que la ley española entonces disponible
reflejaba el subdesarrollo industrial y el aislamiento político de
España de inicios de siglo. La entrada de España al Mercado Común
Europeo (C.E.E.) que ha adoptado la directriz número 85.374 de 25 de
1
Luis Muñiz Argüelles
95
La adopción de las normas norteamericanas, sin embargo, ha sido
lenta y, en general, el derecho puertorriqueño todavía requiere que se
pruebe negligencia si es que el demandante ha de recobrar la totalidad de
los daños alegadamente sufridos. Obviamente, este requisito le añade un
alto grado de incertidumbre al proceso judicial. (¿Está la prueba
disponible? ¿Es ésta creíble? ¿Resulta costoso obtenerla? ¿Conlleva ello
largas tardanzas?).
Las excepciones principales a la obligación de establecer negligencia
surgen cuando el demandante alega que sus daños fueron ocasionados
por bienes destinados al consumo humano (los casos resueltos envuelven
daños provocados por comestibles y han aplicado normas de garantía
implícita, normas que pueden ser renunciadas, sobre todo si el fabricante
expresamente limita su garantía)3 y cuando se invocan las normas de
vicios ocultos en los bienes vendidos.4 En los casos de vicios ocultos, el
cobro generalmente se limita a un reembolso parcial o total del valor de
los bienes, dependiendo de la gravedad del defecto. Si el demandante
julio de 1985 sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante y su acelerado
desarrollo industrial de las últimas décadas han provocado cambios
importantes en el derecho español. Predecimos que estos cambios,
fácilmente disponibles a los juristas puertorriqueños, comenzarán a
desempeñar un papel más importante en la solución de controversias
sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante de lo que ha sido el caso
durante buena parte de este siglo. Véase Valle v. American
International Insurance Co., 108 DPR 692 (1979).
3 Hay límites al grado en que un fabricante o vendedor puede
limitar las garantías implícitas. El contrato de compraventa no
puede, por ejemplo, ser leonino; pero lo que es leonino es un asunto
que sólo un juez puede decidir. Quizás el límite más importante al
que se enfrenta el demandado surge de la tendencia a resolver todas
las acciones por daños personales como acciones de responsabilidad
extracontractual. La lógica nos dicta que si la responsabilidad es
extracontractual, las cláusulas limitativas de la responsabilidad
contractual son inoperantes. Bajo este análisis, las doctrinas de
garantía implícita no pueden ser renunciadas por la vía contractual.
Sin embargo, no hay casos que expresamente decidan esto de una
forma u otra.
4 La lógica dicta que se debe reconocer une causa de acción cuando
la parte perjudicada ha alquilado o arrendado un producto defectuoso,
siempre que el arrendador demandado no sea lo que conocemos
como un "financial lessor", que bajo la jurisprudencia de Puerto
Rico está exento de las obligaciones del vendedor. Meyers Brothers v.
Gelco, 114 DPR 118 (1983).
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2 93, 1990
puede establecer que el vendedor tenía o debió tener conocimiento de los
vicios ocultos, puede entonces reclamar por todo tipo de daño sufrido.
Para establecer esa culpa o dolo el demandante podrá hacer uso de las
presunciones, sean éstas de las Reglas de evidencia o, específicamente,
de la doctrina de "res ipsa loquitur".
Las defensas del requisito de vínculo contractual no aplican,
independientemente de si el demandante reclama bajo responsabilidad
extracontractual o bajo contrato de compraventa. El Tribunal Supremo ha
resuelto que todos los que intervienen en la cadena de distribución
(fabricante, subcontratistas, importadores, mayoristas y detallistas) le son
responsables solidariamente al demandante. Los codemandados pueden
entonces presentar demanda contra coparte para recobrar de aquellos
contra los que puedan establecer responsabilidad por los daños sufridos.
Si aquellos en la cadena de distribución no son unidos al pleito por el
demandante, el demandado puede traerlos incoando una demanda contra
tercero, que bajo la Regla 12.1 de Procedimiento Civil los hace
responsables directamente al demandante.
Aquellos potencialmente responsables no están obligados a tener
seguro, aunque muchos de los más solventes si lo tienen. En ocasiones,
cuando los aseguradores son incluidos como demandados, o en casos en
que las partes responsables invocan la obligación del asegurador de
proveer asistencia legal, la interrogante de si la responsabilidad es
contractual o extracontractual surge nuevamente, pues el asegurador
muchas veces no ha acordado pagar u ofrecer asistencia legal si se trata
de responsabilidad contractual. La defensa no procede si los artículos de
responsabilidad extracontractual aplican. Si la responsabilidad cubierta
es "civil" o de "torts" del "common law", la aseguradora debe responder.
Lo mismo ocurre si se concluye que la intención fue de responder por
todo reclamo por daños ocasionados por el bien.
Cuando consideramos normas de responsabilidad del fabricante,
debemos tomar en cuenta también las reglas de Derecho internacional
privado, pues muchas veces los fabricantes no están domiciliados en la
jurisdicción del tribunal. Las normas de Puerto Rico son pocas y
generales. El poder extraterritorial de la Regla 4 de Procedimiento Civil
permite que el tribunal adquiera jurisdicción sobre muchos de los
demandados que forman parte de la "cadena de distribución". La Regla
4.7 permite a los demandantes presentar acciones en los tribunales de
Puerto Rico si la causa de acción, sea contractual o extracontractual, se
originó en Puerto Rico; y el artículo 10 del Código Civil establece que la
97
ley de Puerto Rico aplica a las acciones incoadas bajo los artículos de
daños y perjuicios o de compraventa.5
En los siguientes párrafos, analizaremos en más detalle las normas más
importantes del Derecho puertorriqueño relativo a la responsabilidad
del fabricante. Examinaremos (I) las fuentes estatutarias, incluyendo
una breve referencia a los principales estatutos de los Estados Unidos y a
los tratados internacionales, y señalaremos el tipo de bien que está sujeto
a la aplicación de estas normas; (II) el papel que desempeña la
negligencia en casos de responsabilidad extracontractual y de vicios
ocultos en contratos de compraventa, la prueba necesaria para probar
dicha negligencia dado el deber de cuidado que puede establecerse
estatutariamente, la extensión de los daños recobrables dadas las
diferencias sobre la necesidad de establecer negligencia y los diversos
plazos de prescripción, dependiendo de si aplican los artículos de
responsabilidad extracontractual o de compraventa o de si el
demandando tenía conocimiento previo de los vicios ocultos que
causaron los daños probados; (III) quién puede reclamar y contra quién
pueden reclamarse y, de haber más de una parte responsable, si estas son
solidariamente responsables; (IV) las principales defensas disponibles a
los demandados y, específicamente, la llamada defensa de estado de
conocimiento sobre la materia ("state of the art"); y (V) la aplicabilidad
de las reglas de Derecho Internacional Privado. (VI) Cerraremos con
algunas observaciones personales.
Las normas de Derecho Internacional Privado están ahora bajo la
revisión de un grupo privado. Si algunas de las propuestas ventiladas
son eventualmente aprobadas, ciertas normas aplicables sobre el
grado de cuidado exigible a las partes y sobre la distribución de los
daños entre éstas podrían cambiar. Una propuesta, por ejemplo,
sugiere que si se permiten daños punitivos en el lugar donde el
fabricante tiene su domicilio, éstos deberían también permitirse en
Puerto Rico, no obstante el hecho de que un Derecho Puertorriqueño
normalmente no se permite, excepto por el mandato de leyes
especiales que proveen para doble o triple compensación o a través de
la imposición de honorarios de abogados en contra de una parte
temeraria bajo la Regla 44 de Procedimiento Civil.
5
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2 93, 1990
I. Fuentes de Ley
A. El Código Civil
Según mencionamos anteriormente, los casos de daños personales son
analizados bajo el artículo 1802 del Código Civil sobre responsabilidad
extracontractual en general. El Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico ha sido
consistente en su aplicación de este artículo cuando se han sufrido daños
físicos y morales, independientemente de si el demandante y el
demandado han contratado la adquisición de derechos sobre bienes o la
prestación de ciertos servicios que ocasionan los alegados daños objeto
del reclamo.6
Los artículos 1350, 1363 y 1373 a 1379 establecen que el
vendedor de un bien es responsable si se prueba que éste adolece de
vicios ocultos y fijan el límite exigible y el plazo en el que dicha
responsabilidad puede ser invocada. Los artículos no hacen distinción
entre los tipos de bienes y son aplicables a muebles e inmuebles7 aunque,
como ya señalamos, al referirnos a las normas de responsabilidad del
fabricante hablamos sólo de las que son de aplicación en casos de bienes
muebles.
La interrogante es a cuáles muebles en particular les son de aplicación.
Un caso reciente, al discutir la defensa del estado de conocimiento sobre
la materia, clarifica el punto.8 El demandante había reclamado daños
personales resultantes de haber ingerido un pescado envenenado en un
Las demandas por impericia médica, por ejemplo, se ventilan
siempre bajo este artículo, no obstante el reconocimiento en el Código
y en la jurisprudencia de que los pacientes normalmente contratan
los servicios médicos, Rosado v. E. L. A., 108 DPR 789 (1979) y Matos
v. Mt. Sem. Médicos, 118 DPR 667 (1987), entre muchos otros. En
Rojas v. Maldonado, 68 DPR 818 (1948) el Tribunal decidió que existe
una causa de acción cuando un paciente no he prestado su consentimiento al tratamiento, Visto que el consentimiento implica un contrato, hay ahí un reconocimiento implícito de que la relación entre las
partes es contractual, pero el Tribunal decidió el caso aplicando el
artículo 1802, de responsabilidad extracontractual
7 Los inmuebles no están sujetos a las normas de responsabilidad
del fabricante. Los fabricantes de éstos, contratistas y arquitectos,
están sujetos a la responsabilidad decenal o bienal bajo el artículo
1483 del Código Civil o los reglamentos del Departamento de Asuntos
del Consumidor.
8 Méndez Carrada v. Ladi's Place, 90 JTS 125
6
99
restaurante. Al aplicar la defensa, el Tribunal efectivamente extiende las
normas sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante a todos los bienes que
hayan sido alterados por cualquier forma de actividad humana. (El caso
fue decidido por el Tribunal mediante sentencia, que según la
jurisprudencia de Puerto Rico no establece precedente. Sólo uno de los
jueces emitió una opinión firmada. Es en ella que se discute la defensa
del estado de conocimiento sobre la materia.)
Por otro lado, los artículos 1380 a 1388 del Código Civil establecen
normas especiales para los casos en que compradores reclaman por daños
causados por la venta de animales enfermos un tema que obviamente no
cae dentro del ámbito de la responsabilidad del fabricante. Para
propósitos de este trabajo, sólo discutiremos dos casos, el primero a
continuación, que interpretan estas disposiciones, y ello porque discuten
normas que aplican la responsabilidad del fabricante en general.
En un caso en que la compraventa fraudulenta de animales enfermos fue probada, el Tribunal Supremo aseveró que los compradores
de bienes defectuosos podían reclamar daños bajo cualquiera de los artículos que hemos citado o bajo aquellos que proveen para la responsabilidad contractual o para la resolución de los contratos.9 Recurrir a estos
otros es, no obstante, excepcional. Los remedios que ofrecen están muchas veces comprendidos en los artículos que proveen remedios en los
casos de compraventas o son de poco interés para muchos demandantes
que invocan las normas de responsabilidad del fabricante.
El artículo 1054, por ejemplo, permite reclamar daños en todos los casos de negligencia contractual, pero limita la compensación a los daños
previsibles, que para todos los efectos prácticos son aquellos enumerados
en el artículo 1375 del Código Civil, el artículo que limita el monto de
daños exigible por vicios en las compraventas. Si hubiere intención, dolo
culpa lata, los artículos 1055 o 1060 imponen responsabilidad al demandado por todos los daños, independientemente de su previsibilidad. La
recuperación total si se prueba una intención fraudulenta, sin embargo,
también se contempla en los artículos 1365 y 1374 sobre compraventas.
El artículo 1077, que recoge la doctrina de "exceptio non adimpleti
contractus", permite la resolución y daños en todos los incumplimientos
sustanciales de contratos bilaterales. En la mayoría de los casos sobre
responsabilidad del fabricante, sin embargo, no hay contratos bilaterales
que permitan invocar la doctrina. Cuando los hay, los artículos de la
compraventa también proveen para resolución y daños.
9
Márquez v. Torres Campo, 111 DPR 854 (1982)
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2 93, 1990
Los artículos 1217 a 1222, por último, también permiten la rescisión
cuando el consentimiento se prestó por fraude, violencia o intimidación
del demandado o cuando hubiese un error sustancial por parte de
cualquiera de las partes contratantes. Los artículos sobre la compraventa,
sin embargo, también permiten la rescisión en los casos de defectos
sustanciales. Estos defectos, que también deben ser probados si se invoca
un error sustancial para resolver la obligación, son más fáciles de probar
que el estado mental de las partes, que es siempre un factor esencial
cuando los artículos sobre los vicios del consentimiento son invocados.
En resumen, salvo en casos sumamente excepcionales, los remedios
adicionales reconocidos por el Tribunal Supremo son de poco interés
práctico para la mayoría de los demandantes.
B. Los Procedimientos Especiales
Hay, no obstante, dos mecanismos procesales de interés disponibles
para los demandantes que sólo reclaman cantidades pequeñas. El primero
es el que provee la ley habilitadora del Departamento de Asuntos del
Consumidor.10 El Departamento, que tiene poderes cuasi judiciales,
provee un procedimiento sencillo para la resolución de querellas de
consumidores. Sin embargo, limitaciones presupuestarias y un cúmulo
excesivo de casos han sobrecargado de trabajo al Departamento y llevado
a la Legislatura a aprobar una ley en 1985 que provee el remedio de
mandamus para las partes cuando el Departamento no emite su decisión
en 120 días laborables desde la presentación de la demanda.11
El segundo mecanismo procesal es el que aparece en la Ley sobre
estados provisionales de derecho.12 Esta ley permite a los consumidores
solicitar un remedio interdictal en casos de alega- das violaciones de
garantías expresas menores de $3,000. Los procedimientos son sencillos
y las partes no tienen que comparecer asistidos de abogados. Los
Tribunales Municipales o de Distrito pueden citar a las partes de
inmediato y decidir luego de escuchar sus argumentos. Las órdenes del
Tribunal pueden ser revisadas en un juicio "de novo", pero hasta tanto se
revoque la orden inicial, quienes incumplan con éstas están sujetas a ser
condenadas por desacato.
3 LPRA §§ 341 et. seq.
3 LPRA §§ 341i.1 y 3 LPRA § 341i-2.
12 32 LPRA §§ 2871 et. seq.
10
11
101
C. La Reglamentación del D.A.C.O.
El Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor, aunque autorizado para
aprobarlos, no tiene reglamentos sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante.
El principal reglamento de protección al consumidor (el Reglamento
sobre Prácticas Comerciales Fraudulentas), sólo cubre ofertas, aceptaciones y prácticas de anuncios engañosos y no asuntos relativos a los vicios
en los bienes.
D. La Legislación Sobre Rotulación
Hay tres leyes especiales que ofrecen protección contra prácticas
deficientes de rotulación. Estas requieren que una rotulación especial se
fije en los venenos comerciales,13 en comestibles, drogas y cosméticos14
y, en general, en todas las sustancias que el Secretario de Salud
identifique como peligrosas.15 La más reciente de estas leyes describe las
sustancias peligrosas en términos muy generales (tóxicos, corrosivos,
irritantes, inflamables y explosivos, así como cualquier juguete que por
reglamento se considere peligroso).16 Aunque estas leyes son invocadas
en raras ocasiones, es interesante señalar que uno de los principales casos
sobre responsabilidad del fabricante fue decidido al amparo de una de
ellas.17
E. La Legislación Federal
Las leyes federales sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante son
aplicables en Puerto Rico. Estas tratan, mayormente, con normas de
seguridad, anuncios, rotulación (siendo el Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act18 la más conocida) y con la obligación de someter datos
a ciertas agencias federales. Entre las leyes más importantes están el
Consumer Product Safety Act,19 el Magnuson-Moss Warranty -Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act,20 el Food, Drug and Cosmetic
5 LPRA §§ 1001 a seq.
24 LPRA §§ 711 et. seq.
15 24 LPRA §§ 2701 et. seq.
16 24 LPRA §§ 2702 et. seq.
17 Castro v. Payco, 75 DPR 63 (1953).
18 15 USC §§ 1331 et. seq.
19 15 USC §§ 2051 et. seq.
20 15 USC §§ 2301 et. seq.
13
14
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Act,21 el Hazardous Substances Act,22 el National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard Act,23 el Poison Prevention Packaging Act of
197024 y el Toxic Substance Control Act.25
A pesar de múltiples esfuerzos, el gobierno federal no ha adoptado una
ley uniforme aplicable a toda la nación y el texto de proyectos recientes
sugiere que tal ley no será adoptada en un futuro cercano.26
F. Las Normas Internacionales
En lo que respecta a tratados internacionales, el más pertinente es la
Convención de las Naciones Unidas para la Venta Internacional de
Mercaderías,27 que no es objeto de análisis en este artículo. Haremos, sin
embargo, una breve mención de dos artículos de esta convención en la
Parte IV.
II. El Papel de la Negligencia
A. La Prueba de Negligencia en Casos de Responsabilidad
Extracontractual
El artículo 1802 del Código Civil requiere prueba de negligencia,
relación causal y daños. Aunque no discutiremos las doctrinas sobre
relación causal y daños, los casos sobre responsabilidad del fabricante
tienen ciertas peculiaridades sobre la prueba de negligencia que ameritan
comentario.
La primera es que el testimonio pericial costoso es muchas veces
indispensable en el juicio. En el segundo caso en que se solicitó la
resolución de una compraventa de animales enfermos, el tribunal
21 USC §§ 301 et. seq.
15 USC §§ 1261 et. seq.
23 15 USC §§ 1391 et. seq.
24 15 USC §§ 1471 et. seq.
25 15 USC §§ 1601 et. seq.
26 Debido a limitaciones de espacio, no discutiremos estos esfuerzos
legislativos. Para un análisis general véase: Travers, T., ed., American Law of Produce Liability 3d, Lawyer's Cooperative and BancroftWhitney, Rochester y San Francisco, Cap. 2, 1987 (suplemento de
hojas sueltas).
27 Estados Unidos es parte de la convención, que entró en vigor el
11 de diciembre de 1986. Como Puerto Rico está bajo la jurisdicción
de los Estados Unidos, la convención es aplicable a la isla.
21
22
103
desestimó la demanda y específicamente señaló que no se había ofrecido
testimonio pericia1.28
Como mencionamos anteriormente, algunas leyes federales y de
Puerto Rico requieren que el fabricante, importador, distribuidor o
detallista cumplan con ciertas normas (instalación de bolsas de aire,
rotulación de precauciones necesarias en el uso, etc.). Aunque el mero
incumplimiento no es suficiente para establecer negligencia, en términos
prácticos el demandante que convenza a un juez de que el
incumplimiento estaba directamente relacionado a los daños sufridos no
tiene que preocuparse por establecer otro tipo de negligencia.
Cuando tal prueba no esté disponible, el demandante que reclame bajo
el artículo torticero debe recurrir a otra, pues el artículo requiere
establecer negligencia. Para poder prevalecer, puede invocar las
presunciones que se encuentran en las Reglas de Evidencia, copia virtual
de las reglas federales. Cuatro de éstas, las reglas 10(G), 16(5), 16(6) y
69(A) (la regla de la mejor evidencia), son en realidad reglas punitivas,
pues castigan a la parte que suprime evidencia en las fases del
descubrimiento o del juicio.
Una norma desarrollada por el Tribunal dispone que se presume
que los fabricantes conozcan los defectos de los bienes que son
vendidos por ellos, pues debieron tomar las precauciones reconocidas por
la industria para detectar dichos defectos.29 Debe señalarse, sin embargo,
que esta regla no significa que todos los vendedores profesionales se
presumen negligentes cuando se ofrece prueba de vicios ocultos, como es
el caso en el Derecho francés, por ejemplo. El demandado puede
presentar prueba de que, no empece la debida diligencia, desconocía del
defecto. Puede además invocar el artículo 1373 del Código Civil, que
dispone que si un comprador es un perito que "por razón de su oficio o
profesión, debía fácilmente conocer [los defectos]", el vendedor está
exento de responsabilidad. El conocimiento pericial, pues, puede
beneficiar los intereses del vendedor y no del comprador.
Sin duda alguna, la presunción más útil para el demandante es la que
surge de la doctrina jurisprudencial extracontractual de "res ipsa
loquitur". Desafortunadamente para esta parte, su aplicación depende de
la discreción judicial. El Tribunal Supremo la ha usado para encontrar a
demandados responsables por daños causados por comestibles insalubres
y por un fuego que se inició en el panel de instrumentos de un automóvil
28
29
Vaquería Garrochales, Inc. v. A.P.P.R., Inc., 106 DPR 799 (1978)
Castro v. Payco, 75 DPR 63, (1953)
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2 93, 1990
y que destruyó el vehículo.30 El Tribunal nunca lo reconoció
expresamente, pero estamos convencidos de que el riesgo de serios daños
físicos o de costosos daños materiales tuvieron que ver con el resultado
final. Después de todo, mientras mayor sea el riesgo potencial, mayor es
la diligencia que se debe esperar de un deudor.
B. La Prueba de Negligencia en los Casos de Compraventa
Cuando se resuelve que son de aplicación los artículos sobre vicios
ocultos, el demandante no tiene que probar negligencia para recobrar. El
artículo 1373 del Código Civil dispone que todo cuanto tiene que probar
es que los defectos ocultos que tuviere la cosa vendida la hacen
"impropia para el uso al que se le destina o, si disminuyen de tal modo
este uso, que de haberlos conocido el comprador, no la habría adquirido
o habría dado menos precio por ella".31 El artículo 1375 le da entonces la
opción entre desistir del contrato o una rebaja en el precio. La resolución
requiere la devolución de las cosas vendidas y por lo tanto no está
disponible cuando se ha consumido el bien, como obviamente es el caso
de los comestibles.32 La devolución de cosas que han depreciado no
significa que el vendedor pueda retener parte del precio pagado y la
Castro v. Payco, 75 DPR 63, (1953); Mendoza v. Cervecería Corona, 97 DPR 499 (1969); National Car Rental v. Caribe Motora
Corp., 104 DPR 74 (1975); pero véase, Ortiz v. Fleming Motora, Inc.,
99 DPR 668 (1971).
31 Esta regla fue reafirmada en el primer caso sobre responsabilidad del fabricante en Puerto Rico: Marrero v. Garaje Mayagüez, 31
DPR 908 (1923). Para un caso más reciente, véase García Viera v.
Ciudad Chevrolet, 110 DPR 168 (1980). Exactamente qué lo que es
necesario para que exista la causa de acción puede estar en controversia. En Fuentes v. Hui Dobbs, 88 DPR 562 (1963) el Tribunal Supremo, sorprendentemente, resolvió que unos neumáticos defectuosos
hacían a un vehículo impropio para el fin para el cual fue adquirido.
La decisión fue más tarde revocada en García Viera v, Ciudad Chevrolet, 110 DPR 158 (1980). Para otros casos en que el Tribunal decidió que había una causa de acción válida, véase Millón v. Caribe Motora, 83 DPR 494 (1961), problemas de recalentamiento constantes y
serios; Barrios v. Courtesy Motora, 91 DPR 441 (1964), problemas
serios de la transmisión; y D.A.C.O. v. Marcelino Mercury, Inc., 105
DPR 80 (1976), defectos que causaban daños recurrentes a los neumáticos.
32 Castro v. Payco, 75 DPR 63 (1953)
30
105
inflación no significa que deba devolver el valor actual del dinero
ofrecido.33 De cierta forma, el estar obligados a recibir bienes y dinero
depreciados es el precio que cada parte debe asumir por haber vendido
bienes defectuosos y por haberlos usado por un tiempo.
Las normas anteriores no significan que el demandante, en una acción
en que se invoque la responsabilidad del fabricante, está impedido de
probar un fraude del demandado. El segundo párrafo del artículo 1375
dispone: "Si el vendedor conocía los vicios o defectos ocultos de la cosa
vendida y no los manifestó al comprador, tendrá éste la misma opción y
además se le indemnizará de los daños y perjuicios, si optare por la
rescisión."34
C. La Negligencia y la Prescripción
Los casos considerados bajo el artículo de responsabilidad
extracontractual, que requiere prueba de negligencia, prescriben pasado
un año al momento en que el demandante pudo reclamar daños de las
partes responsables, conforme a los artículos 1868 y 1869 del Código
Civil. En la práctica esto significa que si los daños o las partes
responsables son desconocidos, el término prescriptivo no comienza a
correr. En los casos de responsabilidad del fabricante, los mecanismos de
descubrimiento de prueba permiten que se solucione fácilmente cualquier
problema de identidad de los demandados. El problema principal es
establecer cuándo fue que el demandante tuvo conocimiento efectivo de
los daños reclamados.
Se interrumpe el término prescriptivo cuando el demandante presenta
una demanda o notifica al demandado que debe compensarla por los
daños sufridos, o cada vez que el demandado reconozca la causa de
acción del demandante, aun cuando el término prescriptivo haya
expirado, según el artículo 1873.
Cuando se invocan los artículos sobre compraventa, el término
prescriptivo es de seis meses desde la fecha de entrega, según el artículo
1379. Este período de tiempo puede ser interrumpido todas y cada una de
las veces que las partes intenten corregir los vicios ocultos que dan lugar
Nadal v. Hull Dobbs, 102 DPR 653 (1974)
Márquez v. Torres Campo, 111 DPR 854 (1982). La lógica nos
dice que si hay prueba de que cualquiera en la cadena de distribución
que no fuere el vendedor tuviera conocimiento efectivo de los vicios
ocultos, él también seria solidariamente responsable por la totalidad
de los daños sufridos.
33
34
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2 93, 1990
a la causa de acción.35 Si se establece el fraude, sin embargo, el
demandado pierde el beneficio del término corto del artículo 1379 y está
sujeto a daños bajo la responsabilidad contractual ordinaria de los
artículos 1054 y 1060 del Código Civil, que permiten que el
demandante presente demanda en cualquier momento en un período de
15 años, conforme al artículo 1864.36 El fraude también impide que el
demandado invoque cláusulas contractuales que límiten el tiempo en que
una demanda puede ser presentada, según el artículo 1055.
La Regla 6.3 de Procedimiento Civil dispone que el demandado
renuncie a la defensa de prescripción si no la alega oportunamente. En la
práctica, los demandados casi siempre alegan la defensa en su
contestación a la demanda, aunque no aplique.
La ley de Puerto Rico no tiene una norma comparable a la que se encuentra en el artículo 11 de la directriz número 85-374 de la Comunidad
Económica Europea (mercado común) sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante. Este artículo provee protección al fabricante si los daños ocurrieron pasados los 10 años luego de que los bienes fueron puestos en el
mercado.37
Ferrer Delgado v. General Motors, 100 DPR 246 (1971).
Aunque los legisladores españoles del Siglo XIX que aprobaron el
Código Civil opinaban que los plazos de prescripción extracontractual
de 30 años franceses e italianos eran excesivos, lo que les llevó a
reducir el mismo a un año, éstos no establecieron plazo alguno para
reclamar daños contractuales. Como resultado, el artículo general de
prescripción de 15 años aplica a las acciones de cumplimiento
específico o de daños contractuales. Diez Picazo, L., La prescripción en
el Código Civil, Ed. Bosch, Barcelona, 1964, p. 238 et. seq.; Castán
Tobeñas, J., Derecho civil español, común y foral, Ed. Reus, Madrid,
To. I, Vol. II, 14a ed., 1984, p. 975 et. seg.; Lange o. Honoré, 47 DPR
218 (1934); Segarra v. Vivaldi, 55 DPR 160 (1939).
37 El plazo de diez años aplica en los contratos de construcción, conforme al artículo 1483 del Código Civil, Aunque no hay casos que así
lo resuelvan, podría argumentarse que, por analogía este plazo debe
ser de aplicación en casos de responsabilidad del fabricante. Es improbable que el legislador español de 1889, que favorecía un término
de prescripción de un ello para casos de responsabilidad extracontractual y un término de seis meses en casos de vicios ocultos, tuviera la
intención de establecer una responsabilidad indefinida para los demandados en casos contra fabricantes resueltos bajo el artículo 1902
del Código Civil español, sobre la responsabilidad extracontractual
(equivalente al 1802 de Puerto Rico). Es incluso difícil imaginarse que
35
36
107
D. Daños Punitivos
Bajo la ley de Puerto Rico, los daños punitivos no proceden, excepto si
han sido expresamente autorizados por una ley especial.38 La negligencia
o el fraude, sin embargo, desempeñan un papel en la determinación de la
cantidad de daños que se conceden.
El artículo 1056 del Código Civil permite al Tribunal tomar en
consideración el grado de negligencia al reducir la compensación en
casos de responsabilidad contractual. Pero más importante aún que esta
discreción son las normas expuestas en los artículos 1060 y 1802. El
primero permite a los demandantes en acciones contractuales en que se
establezca fraude o dolo recobrar todos los daños sufridos, sean o no
previsibles al momento en que se acordó el contrato.
El segundo, el artículo principal de responsabilidad extracontractual,
también permite recobrar la totalidad de los daños, lo que implica que
procede una valoración por el Tribunal de los daños físicos y morales.
Ya que es legítimo decir que si se establece que el demandado obró con
culpa lata o que conscientemente trató de engañar al demandante la
humillación de este último aumenta, los tribunales podrían conceder
compensaciones mayores por daños cuando el fraude esté presente o
cuando el grado de negligencia sea mayor. Las compensaciones por
daños, sin embargo, nunca están en la vecindad de los más
espectaculares casos norteamericanos en que se han impuesto daños
punitivos.
La Regla 44.1 de Procedimiento Civil también permite a los tribunales
conceder a la parte victoriosa una suma por honorarios de abogados
cuando la parte perdidosa haya procedido con temeridad o haya forzado
a la otra a presentar demanda para reclamar lo que obviamente
procedía. La suma concedida por temeridad depende de la discreción del
Tribunal. Si no se establece la temeridad, conforme a lo que se conoce
como la norma estadounidense de litigación, cada parte deberá pagar sus
honorarios de abogados, excepto por gastos especiales (gastos de
presentación, emplazamiento, deposiciones y peritaje, en general)
que en principio se le conceden a la parte victoriosa.
dicho legislador decimonónico se imaginase que tomarla cerca de 10
años antes de que un bien mueble defectuoso causase daños.
38 Carrasquillo v. Lippitt & Simonpietri, Inc., 98 DPR 659 (1970).
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2 93, 1990
III. Partes en las Demandas y Normas Sobre Solidaridad
Las normas puertorriqueñas sobre solidaridad y partes demandadas son sencillas. El Tribunal Supremo consecuentemente ha decidido
que todos aquellos que tomen parte en la fabricación, importación, distribución y venta (la cadena de distribución) de los productos defectuosos
le son solidariamente responsables al demandante.39
El hecho de que el Tribunal Supremo ha descartado la defensa sobre el
requisito de vínculo contractual40 también significa que cualquiera que
reclame daños puede demandar a cualquiera en la cadena de distribución.
El artículo 1098 permite que los demandados que pagaron en exceso del
porcentaje de responsabilidad que el tribunal les adjudicó presenten demandas contra co-parte o demandas contra terceros para recobrar aquello
que, en la relación interna entre deudores, les corresponda pagar a éstos.41
IV. Defensas
Las partes demandadas tienen a su disposición todas las defensas
disponibles a cualquier parte en una acción ordinaria de daños,
incluyendo falta de causalidad, ausencia de daños, la no mitigación de
daños, causas interventoras y negligencia comparada. Por ser defensas
generales, éstas no serán discutidas en este escrito. Sin embargo, una
defensa, la de estado del conocimiento sobre la materia, amerita algunos
comentarios.
Un caso reciente mencionado antes,42 ha resuelto que el fabricante es
responsable solamente si no logró demostrar la diligencia que el estado
Esta norma aplica a las acciones de compraventa y a las acciones
de responsabilidad extracontractual, no obstante el artículo1090 del
Código Civil, que dispone que en acciones contractuales los deudores
son solidariamente responsables solamente cuando han consentido
renunciar e la mancomunidad. En el plano extracontractual, sin embargo, la solidaridad ha sido la norma desde que el Código Civil entró
en vigor. Véase, García v. Gobierno de la Capital, 72 DPR 138 (1951).
40 Ferrer Delgado v. General Motors Corp., 100 DPR 246 (1971);
Nadal v. Hull Dobbs, 102 DPR 653 (1974); National Car Rental v.
Caribe Motors Corp., 104 DPR 74 (1975); Ford Motor Co. v. Benet, 106
DPR 232 (1977); Montero Saldaña v. American Motora Corp., 107
DPR 452 (1978)
41 Nadal v. Hull Dobbs, 102 DPR 653 (1974)
42 Méndez Corrada v. Ladi’s Place, 90 JTS 125.
39
109
del conocimiento sobre la materia le permita alcanzar al momento de la
fabricación. En el caso, un dueño de un restaurante convenció al tribunal
de que la demanda debía desestimarse porque los desarrollos científicos
no permitían el descubrimiento de una enfermedad (ciguatera) del
pescado que ordeno el demandante. Aunque los argumentos están
esbozados en una opinión concurrente que no sienta precedente, el caso
es interesante porque aplica la doctrina de la responsabilidad del
fabricante a un comestible que, de no haberse sometido a una
preparación previa, posiblemente no estaría sujeto a estas normas.
No hay casos que hayan determinado que existe responsabilidad por
no haber retirado del mercado o advertido a los usuarios de que un bien
particular ha sido juzgado potencialmente peligroso en una fecha
posterior a la de haberse mercadeado. Hay suficiente jurisprudencia de
otras jurisdicciones, sin embargo, para que podamos aseverar, sin temor
a equivocarnos, que en el caso apropiado se determinaría responsabilidad
por no hacer estas advertencias o por insistir en la venta de lo que ya se
sabe puede ser dañino.
V. Derecho Internacional Privado
Las principales normas puertorriqueñas sobre Derecho Internacional
Privado se encuentran en el artículo 10 del Código Civil y en la Regla
4.7 de Procedimiento Civil. El artículo 10 dispone que los "bienes
muebles están sujetos a la ley de la nación del propietario". Ya que se ha
resuelto que las acciones de daños son propiedad mueble,43 si el
demandante es puertorriqueño y el demandado no, éstas estaría sujetas a
la ley de Puerto Rico. La Regla 4.7 (1) y (2) de Procedimiento Civil
dispone que si los daños ocurren en Puerto Rico o si el demandado
estaba haciendo negocios en la isla, sea directamente o a través de
un representante, los tribunales puertorriqueños tienen jurisdicción sobre
el demandado.
La Convención de las Naciones Unidas para la Venta Internacional de
Bienes tiene dos artículos de interés en el estudio de las normas sobre la
responsabilidad del fabricante. Estos son los artículos 2(a) y 5, que
específicamente excluyen de su aplicación contratos consumeriles y
normas de responsabilidad del vendedor por la muerte o por los daños
personales causados por los bienes objeto de una compraventa. Como
resultado, el Derecho Internacional Privado de Puerto Rico aplica en
casos de daños personales, de muerte y de consumidores, que son el
43
Gearhart v. Haskell, 87 DPR 57 (1963).
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2 93, 1990
grueso de los litigios en los que se invocan normas sobre la
responsabilidad del fabricante.
VI. Comentarios Finales
No obstante el hecho de que en Puerto Rico hay pocos estatutos y
reglamentos especiales sobre la responsabilidad del fabricante y que
muchos de los casos decididos fueron resueltos bajo un Código Civil del
siglo diecinueve, las decisiones emitidas durante los últimos 20 años han
creado un estado de derecho similar al que está en vigor en la mayoría de
las jurisdicciones occidentales modernas. Es innegable que hay lagunas e
inconsistencias, en y fuera de las fronteras del ámbito de la
responsabilidad del fabricante.44 Las diferencias sobre la prescripción son
difíciles de explicar; la prueba de negligencia es difícil de obtener, lo que
a menudo implica que las partes perjudicadas queden sin compensación;
con respecto a los vendedores profesionales no siempre se presume que
conocen los vicios ocultos pero si en cuanto a los compradores
profesionales; no hay límite de tiempo a la responsabilidad del fabricante
luego de que éste introduce sus bienes en el mercado y hay pocos límites
a su responsabilidad monetaria si los casos se deciden conforme a las
normas de responsabilidad extracontractual.
No hay duda de que sería conveniente que muchos de estos
cabos sueltos fuesen debidamente atados. Personalmente, favoreceríamos
un estatuto que codificara muchas de las normas que están ahora en
vigor; que fijara un límite al tiempo en que un fabricante es
potencialmente responsable; que proveyera para responsabilidad sin
culpa con compensaciones de daños monetarios limitados, si no hay
prueba de fraude o dolo; que permitiera daños ilimitados si éstos fueran
establecidos; y que fijara límites prescriptivos uniformes al ejercicio de
causas de acción no sólo en casos de responsabilidad del fabricante, sino
en la mayoría o en casi todas las demandas por causas de acciones
personales.
Es difícil entender, por ejemplo, por qué el Tribunal Supremo ha
resuelto que el cobro de una deuda es una actividad inherentemente
peligrosa que impone responsabilidad a un banco demandado por los
daños atribuibles a los actos negligentes de un contratista independiente, un cobrador, Monines v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 DPR
515 (1979}, pero no ha desarrollado unas normas de responsabilidad
absoluta para la fabricación y compraventa de automóviles, que cada
año causan más muertes que los conflictos bélicos o las guerras del
narcotráfico.
44
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES:
OPTIONS FOR THE TWENTY
FIRST CENTURY
Efrain González Tejera
I. Introduction
I have been asked to speak about marriage covenants or equal
partnership protection. In the time allotted, I will try to convey my
thoughts about an adequate economic regime for the marriage institution
in our countries, which are on the threshold of the twenty first century.
At the outset, we must bear in mind that in western culture marriage
has traditionally been viewed, not as an economic partnership but rather
as a lifetime commitment of a woman to a man, of a female homemaker
to a male provider, a master of the financial aspects of the union.
Marriage, as a bond of man and wife, having equal rights under the law,
is only a social aspiration of rather recent origin.
The premise that marriage is much more than a lifelong personal
commitment, a partnership among coequals, is slowly taking hold in
important sectors of society.1 Because 'til death do us part' no longer
applies, the economic aspects are more important than ever today.2
However, in our opinion, the financial side of the institution should not
be overemphasized, for husband and wife do not join their lives for the
primary purpose of accumulating wealth. There are other more
appropriate social institutions serving that purpose
This modern view of marriage as a joint venture among co-equals is
not yet a complete legal reality in many of our countries. There are
strong pockets of resistance, because ours are inherently unequal and
1 L. Diez Picazo. Picazo. "Del régimen económico patrimonial",
Published in: Comentarios a Las Reformas del Derecho de Familia,
Vol. II, Tecnos, Madrid, 1984, p. 1498.
2 In Puerto Rico, as in most Western countries, the divorce rate is
quite high. Although it increased fivefold from 1953 to 1973, from
2,307 to 12,248; it increased to 15,773 in 1981 and leveled off to
15,125 in 1989. Sea: Annual Report, Statistical Divorce Office of
Courts Administration, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 10, 1991.
111
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2 111, 1990
discriminating societies. Control over wealth has traditionally been the
domain of men. Property has for millennia been owned, controlled, and
disposed of by men. Women have been perceived, even among
themselves, as dependent and in need of protection, incapable of
deciding patrimonial matters. As has been stated in a recent publication,
women generally have a collective social history of disempowerment and
subordination, which explains to a great extent the prevailing state of
inequality they are subjected to in our jurisdictions.3
Current constitutional mandates in our countries requiring equality
among the sexes must be turned into an operational reality. It has been
stated that equality, to be effective, must operate in a threefold sphere.
In the personal sphere, equality implies perceiving a fully equal person
in your partner. The old notion that it is the husband's primary obligation
to protect his wife, and her duty to obey him, must somehow yield to a
relationship of coequals bent on the common task of raising a family.
Protection and obedience must yield to mutual respect and
collaboration.4 In the economic area, equality implies that your spouse is
an equal partner both in profits and in risks, that enjoyment of family
wealth is shared not only at the end of the marriage but on a daily basis.
It is in this area where, in our view, legal action can achieve some
success. You cannot legislate love, not even a smile. But you can
legislate equality as concerns the enjoyment and distribution of
accumulated family wealth.
However, equality among spouses, to be fully effective, must also
affect the other members of the family unit. This means that both spouses
are expected to protect the best interests of members of this unit,
particularly minors and incompetent children.
Fortunately, we can perceive that the desire for equality is
increasing in all sectors, especially among women. This includes
expectations not only for equal participation in the distribution of the
accumulated wealth, but equal rights in the administration and
disposition of that wealth. That is to say, equality now and not only at the
culmination of the marriage. Equality means mutual respect and fidelity,
each one intimating equal duties toward the family it also means that the
selection of the family home is decided by mutual consent.
Those sectors disillusioned with current shortcomings in the legal
system should, however, be advised that legal norms are seldom effective
Catherine McKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100
Yale L. 1281, 1285 (1991).
4 See: De los Mozos, La Reforma del Derecho de Familia en España,
Hoy, Vol. I, Univ. de Valladolid, 1981, p. 97.
3
Efraín González Tejera
113
to insure marriage cohesion. In a harmonious union, the decision-making
process is usually beyond the mandate of the laws. As a matter of fact,
laws are highly ineffective in strengthening married life and at times,
they may even be an obstacle.5 Thus, it appears that the solutions too
much of our marriage problems, must be found outside the law.
Strengthening the basic social institutions such as family, school, and
church appears to be the only viable alternative to future family crisis.
Experience indicates that the weakening of the family is a lengthy
process. It is that weakening which lies at the base of many current social
problems besetting our countries, including drugs, crime, teenage
pregnancy, abortion, school dropout, and a high suicide rate.6
One way family unity may be strengthened is through a just economic
matrimonial regime. Since divorce and death are two of the main events
to transfer wealth in society, and since we all aspire to a more rational
and equitable distribution of accumulated wealth, it should be a
legislative priority to provide our jurisdictions with an adequate family
economic regime. We are not intent on developing a new one. There are
various alternatives available whose effectiveness has been proven for
generations.
II. Choosing a Regime
Choosing a matrimonial regime depends on the particular circumstances of each society, its social and economic conditions, the existing
level of equality among the sexes and its particular view of marriage and
the family.7
It should be a regime that would not impede, but rather facilitate
dealing with the economic and personal hardships found in the everincreasing instances of family crisis within our societies. It must
address the special needs of the weaker members of the family unit, as
well as the so-called residual family.
The chosen regime, as will be explained, must provide for change,
thus facilitating much needed adjustments when a marriage crisis affects
the family unit. The immutable approach prevailing in jurisdictions like
Puerto Rico constitutes a rigid constraint too many married couples.
See: Diez Picazo, Luis, Familia y Derecho, Civitas, Madrid, 1984,
p. 139.
6 See: The New York Times, May 1, 1991, p. A-12.
7 See: Angel L. Reboleda Varela, Separación de Bienes en el
Matrimonio, Ed. Montecorbo, Madrid, 1983, p. 349.
5
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2 111, 1990
A suppletory legal regime must suit the majority.8 Although unpolled,
it appears that in most of the civil law jurisdictions the community
property system seems to be favored. That is the particular case in Puerto
Rico, where there is no evident tradition of entering into marriage
covenants, which generally serve to further the interests of blood
relatives rather than those of the spouses. Covenants are usually designed
to perpetuate differences and similarities, which according to their
proponents are important to the economic or personal well-being of one
or the other.9 Actually, young, poor, and first marriage couples do not
have much need for marriage covenants.
Various options should be available to couples. Plurality of
matrimonial regimes is a desirable approach in dealing with our complex
societies. We no longer have the uniformity of personal behavior and of
family models that characterized the era of codification. Freedom to
select a patrimonial regime, although with certain restrictions, is more in
tune with current Western social pluralism.10
Nevertheless, an adequate regime should not only encompass the socalled "normal" marriage, but also a marriage in crisis. It should provide
temporary solutions for that critical stage many couples reach which is
between judicial intervention in the crisis, and the final dissolution of the
marriage bond. It should provide a set of rules that can bridge those two
points in time. This does not suggests that a society be expected to
legislate on small, fleeting marriage problems, which no marriage
survives without. We refer to crises, that is to say, marriage pathology.
For them the regime should contain pendente lite measures intended to
protect the family members. Rules are required that will lead to an
economical and rapid resolution of the crisis, which might be the result
of a crisis of confidence among the spouses.
III. Economic Regimes: Options
A general examination of the prevailing matrimonial regimes in
Western societies would indicate that they run the gamut between two
extremes: at one end, the universal community and at the other end,
separate property.
See: Report of the Matrimonial Regimes Committee, Civil Code
Reform Commission, Montreal, 1988, p. 4.
9 See: O’Donnell, Williams J. and Jones, David A., The Law of
Marriage and Marital Alternatives, Lexington Books, Toronto, 1982,
pp. 181-182.
10 Supra, note 1 pp. 1492; 1495.
8
115
A. Universal Community
Under the universal community model, all property owned by each
spouse, no matter when, or by whatever title acquired, is transferred to a
common fund, and upon divorce or death, it is equally divided among
them or their children. In countries like Puerto Rico and Spain, where
community property constitutes the subsidiary legal regime, universal
community is the real regime for most spouses because the average
couple marries with no financial resources. However, in cases where at
least one individual has accumulated some wealth, we may reasonably
expect resistance to universal community, particularly if one considers
the alarming rate of divorce that prevails in our countries. If marriage
were to conform to the social aspiration of a lifetime union, we suppose
there would be less resistance to universal community, considering its
affinity with the marriage institution. It has been repeatedly said that it is
both proper and convenient to the spiritual unity of spouses to
correspond to patrimonial unity.
In countries where the "legítima" is a serious impediment to mortis
causa disposition, universal community is becoming an adequate
testamentary alternative. Universal community is a worthwhile
alternative for couples who survive the difficult initial years or those who
marry later in life, whose separate property regime had to be modified, as
well as for those whose main worry is the well-being of their marriage
partners after their own deaths.11
B. Community Property
In our opinion, the community property regime, or "sociedad legal de
gananciales", is the system best suited to the marriage relationship; it is
conceived as a joint undertaking of personal and economic relations, and
of risks and economic benefits. Community property is the most
common patrimonial marriage regime in the world today.12 It affords the
utmost protection to women, especially to those who chose marriage as a
career -to the homemaker, the mother, the child-rearer and custodian
When it originated one of the main deficiencies of the community
property regime was that it discriminated against married women,
See: Glendon, Mary A., The New Family and the New Property,
Butterworths, Toronto, 1981, pág. 23.
12 Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 Williametts L. Res.
413, 416 (1976).
11
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2 111, 1990
because the administration and disposition of the common mass, and
even the wealth of the wife, was entrusted to the husband. Coadministration of common property is a rather recent development in
some of our countries. In Puerto Rico, it became a legal reality in 1976.13
In Spain, it was achieved in 1981,14 in Germany in 1957,15 and in France
in 1965.16
Another advantage of the community property regime lies in the fact
that it encourages cooperation of both spouses in the production of
wealth. However, the traditional view has been that only contributions in
material wealth are relevant. Recent developments, fortunately, are
accepting the wife's homemaker services as no less important. It can
persuasively be argued that the services of the homemaker make possible
the financial contributions of the other spouse.17
Contrary to other regimes, under community property, the eventual
participation of each spouse is attributed in kind and not in value, thus
insuring something more than equitability, full equality. We are aware,
however, that in some cases distribution in-kind may not be convenient,
such as the case when the controversy involves the distribution of
agricultural, industrial or commercial operations. Breakdown of assets in
those cases has its economic and social costs. Some adjustments are in
order for cases of that type.
Notwithstanding the foregoing advantages, we must address some of
the shortcomings. First, we must be aware that in establishing the
private-community property dichotomy in our Civil Codes, nineteenth
century ideas on the relevant forms of wealth still prevail. They are
replete with references to real estate, livestock, and to a lesser extent, to
movables. The latter were not as incredibly diverse as in modem times.
Our Codes still reflect the ideas of a rural society in the manner they deal
with the limited forms of wealth of a century ago.
See: Law No. 51, May 21, 1976, 31 LPRA, Sec. 284.
Luis Diez Picazo, supra, note 5, p. 66.
15 See: Diez-Picazo, supra, note 15.
16 See L. No. 65-570 du 13 Juill 1965. The French 1965 statute
amended articles 1400 et seq. of the French Civil Code.
17 Referring to the merits of community property, a Supreme Court
Justice once said: "Much may be said for the community property
theory that the accumulations of property during marriage are as
much the product of the activities of the wife as those of the titular
breadwinner". Justice Douglas, dissenting in Fernández v. Wiener,
326 V.S. 340, 365 (1945).
13
14
117
Within that traditional setting, the rule of equality in the distribution of
the accumulated wealth was conditioned on the refunding to each spouse
all the private property he or she contributed. Reimbursement presents
today, even more so than at the turn of the century, a serious problem. To
begin with, current law does not require an inventory of private property,
much less, of its valuation. This has the inherent difficulty of
determining what exactly it is it that must be reimbursed. In referring to
movables, especially cash, it must be traced along the years of married
life, which is almost impossible. With immovable, the rural farm may
become rural lots, the small restaurant, a fast food chain, etc. But the
decreasing value of property is more complex. Our codes do not provide
for reimbursement of real but of nominal value, regardless of inflation
and the devaluation of cash. Reimbursing nominal value inevitably leads
to unequal treatment in the distribution of marriage wealth.18
But equality is much more threatened by the fact that, consciously or
not, relevant forms of wealth in the family today are excluded from the
traditional definition of community property.19 New forms of wealth,
perhaps the most relevant in explaining current socio-economic
differences, are not included in the Codes. Judges, under the influence of
the old definitions, have mainly kept them out of the reach of the
community, to the detriment of one of the spouses, usually the wife. For
instance, professional licenses and degrees; life insurance proceeds;
pensions, vested or not;20 stock options and profit sharing plans, are
generally excluded; notwithstanding the presumption that property
belongs to the community, if produced by the family while the marriage
nexus is in effect.
But even within the traditional ideas of what marital property is and
what it is not, a new approach, in our view, is needed. In many of our
community property jurisdictions the inception of title theory prevails.
The date a particular item of wealth is acquired is determinant in whether
Aware of this problem, Spanish legislators in 1981 ruled that
reimbursement of value of goods either to one spouse or to the
conjugal partnership was to be made by means of the reintegration of
present value at the time of liquidation. Art. 1358, Spanish Civil
Code.
19 See: McKnight, J., Defining Property Subject to Division at
Divorce, 23 Fam. L. Q. 198, 200 (1989).
20 As recently as 1990, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that
a retirement pension, in which the employee was, not making direct
contributions to the plan, was private property and thus, not subject
to marital distribution at divorce. Benítez v. García, 90 JTS 62.
18
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2 111, 1990
title is vested in one spouse or in the community; depending on whether
the contract toward its acquisition was executed before or after the
marriage ceremony, even though the spouse who acquired it did not pay
full price. Under this type of solution, unjust results are inevitable.
The date when a legal obligation to pay is created should not be
determinant of the rights of the parties. Acquisition by installments is an
on-going process because title is not necessarily acquired on the date a
legal obligation to pay is assumed.21 In this respect, not only the
acquisition of title, but also the source of funds for the acquisition of
property should be determinant, and non-monetary contributions should
also be considered.22 It can be argued persuasively that in those situations
there was a tacit agreement that the property was being acquired by the
community, rather than by one of the spouses, so that the community
obtained an equitable lien or a right to reimbursement.23 This approach in
our view is much more consistent with the nature of marriage as a joint
undertaking in risks, as well as in benefits.
Entrenched ideas about what constitutes private property has led to an
unjust distribution of the increases in value of family wealth, especially
when the increase is attributed to the inherent nature of the property. 24
The traditional solution deprives the homemaker spouse of a fair share in
the increase, since property has traditionally been owned and controlled
by men. From our standpoint, he or she who contributes homemaker
services should have a fair share in the increase in value of their
partner's property, whether it is due to its inherent nature or not. Equal
partnership protection requires no less.
There are, however, elements of wealth that, in our opinion, by their
very nature, must be considered private property, regardless what
patrimonial regime prevails; such as property inherent to the person,
not subject to intervivos or mortis causa transfers, e.g. alimony, life
interests in property, copyright, etc. The same should apply to objects of
See: Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W. 2d 866 (Mo. 1976).
The source of funds theory has been followed by some American
jurisdictions. See: Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A. 2d 70 (Maine 1979);
Vieux v. Vieux, 251 P. 64 (1926).
23 See: Fischer v. Fischer, 383 P. 2d 840 (Idaho (1963); Harper v.
Harper, 448 A. 2d 916 (Md. 1982).
24 See: In Re Marriage of Kommick, 417 N.E. 2d 1305 (III. 1981). In
some separate property jurisdiction, the increase in value of private
property is marital, and as such, subject to equitable distribution.
See: Colo. Rev.Stat. 14-10-113 (4), 1973; 23 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann., Sec.
401 (e) (1) 3.
21
22
119
personal use, from the most basic to the most bizarre,25 which no matter
how, and by whom, they were brought to the marriage, should be
permanently assigned to the person who uses them. Personal clothing,
furniture, and household goods or utensils of the habitual dwelling of the
family, and even the motor vehicle used for family travel, should be
assigned to the surviving spouse or the head of the residual family unit.26
The same holds true for the tools needed to engage in a business or
profession, because although a person may fail as a spouse, they
need not fail in their professional or financial pursuits.
C. Separate the Property Regime
Although available in many of our Civil law communities as a
conventional alternative, it has hardly been used. On the threshold of a
loving relationship, couples are not inclined to negotiate what they
consider to be trivial economic matters, except when blood relatives take
the initiative. In English- speaking countries, on the other hand, separate
property has been the rule. In its most basic form, separate property is
generally detrimental to one of the parties: he or she, who enters the
relationship without initial wealth, or income-producing potential, is at
the end, condemned to poverty.27 For the wealthy or professional woman,
separate property offers the advantages of independence and self-esteem.
She is specifically free from her husband's debts, and in particular, from
any alimentary obligations to her husband's children.28
Separate property may be an adequate alternative for elderly couples,
divorcees, widows and widowers, and for spouses with substantial
wealth, or with children from prior relationships; and above all, for those
rare cases in which one of the partners engages in financially risky
See: Garrido de Palma, Martínez Fernández and Sánchez
González, La Disolución de la Sociedad Conjugal, Reus, Madrid, 1985,
p. 23.
26 See to this effect, Art. 1321, Spanish Civil Code, 1981. See also,
Art. 41.4, Bill 124, Civil Code of Quebec.
27 See: Diez Picazo, supra, note 5, p. 135.
28 Under Art. 1308, Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31 LPRA, sec.
3661(5), the community is liable for the support of the minor children
of each spouse, but under separate property regime each spouse is
solely liable for his or her own children. In 1981, the Spanish Civil
Code was amended to provide that the common mass was liable for
the support of only those children of the other spouse living in the
conyugal residence. See: Art. 1382.
25
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activities. Separate property has the added advantage that there is no
confusion in each spouse's patrimony. This insures certainty in economic
transactions with third parties, for each one is sole owner not only of
what he or she brought to the marriage, but also, of what he or she
acquired by whatever title, during it. In sum, it may be said that if both
spouses are substantially equal financially the separate property regime is
an adequate alternative. We cannot ignore the fact that at least in theory,
it is a regime that conforms to present social goals of liberty and equality
among spouses.
However, for it to operate properly, equal bargaining power is a
prerequisite and unfortunately men and women, as the case of employers
and employees, are rarely equal at the bargaining table.
D. Other Regimes
Many jurisdictions, aware of the criticisms against their traditional
matrimonial regimes: community or separate property, have developed
intermediate alternatives, such as profit sharing, community of acquests,
and community of movables and acquests, under which each spouse is
sole owner and administrator of their own wealth, whether brought into
the marriage or acquired thereafter. It is at the conclusion that each one is
entitled to share in the profits acquired by the other. Through them, you
retain the main advantage of community property, e.g., sharing in wealth
accumulation, and that of the separate property regime, e.g., the right to
administer, disposes of, and enjoys property without interference from
the other. In other words, these supplementary regimes, while in
operation, function as separate property. It is at the conclusion that the
community property principles become operative.
IV. Compulsory Rules
For those who are willing and able to devise a set of rules and
regulations suitable to their own needs, it is the duty of the State to
inform them about what boundaries they should not overstep. Two sets
of norms must be provided in whatever regime is chosen by a given
couple: those that apply generally, and those whose purpose it is to
define the limits of contractual freedom.
With respect to the first type, we believe, the following limitations
should always apply:
121
A. Mutual Information
Spouses must be required to inform each other regularly about to their
patrimonial matters. That is to say, about his or her current financial
condition and management of the family or personal wealth. Many of the
difficulties confronted by courts and litigants in dissolution proceedings
have their roots in the lack of information of one of the parties,
(ordinarily the wife) about the financial condition of the marriage.
B. Family Residence
The home is ordinarily one of the most, if not the most, valuable
component of wealth in many families today. It is the place where the
rights and duties of the marriage relationship are exercised. The most
important functions of human life are carried out in the family residence,
including the socialization and education of its members. Regardless of
traditional ideas of title, the relevant legal nexus in the home in an active
marriage is co-possession. Both spouses should exercise possession for
the benefit of the family unit. This being the case, when crisis develops,
transfer of possession must be governed by concepts of family
protection. The residual family, usually the custodial parent and their
minor or mentally unfit children, must have preference, either on a
permanent or on a temporary basis.
The traditional emphasis in some of our regimes in equal division of
wealth for events such as separation, divorce, nullity or death, ignores the
fact that the basic ideas about justice are not fulfilled because equal
division is not always equitable. What is needed is not quantitative but
qualitative equality. This infers that upon divorce or death the family
residence should be assigned on the basis of family needs. It may be
owned by him or her, or even leased to third parties, but while the
residual family unit needs it, title prerogatives must be suspended.
The right to sell, lien, mortgage or lease, or even destroy it, must be
limited. The written consent of one's spouse is needed for those acts,
even when it was brought to the marriage by only one of them.
Fortunately, in some of our Western jurisdictions there has been
legislation to that effect.29
With reference to this, see Art. 43, Costa Rica Civil Code, where
not even the spouse’s creditors can obtain that asset, except for debts
incurred by both of them or prior to the marriage. See also: Article
1320, Spanish Civil Code, 1981 revision; Article1448, Belgian Civil
29
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There are valid alternatives to insure that divorce or death do not
deprive the surviving head of the family of this most necessity of life.
UMDA-type legislation30 is one of these alternatives. However, the
postponement of wealth distribution after death or divorce may also be
effective. Still another alternative may be a right to preferential
attribution to the widow or widower. A general grant of discretionary
judicial power towards the protection of the surviving or custodial spouse
might also be sufficient.
C. Homemaker Services
In our countries, women who choose marriage as a career and give up
their professional growth are generally not treated fairly in property
distribution and alimony adjudication. This is particularly true in
common, law jurisdictions although our community property regimes
still raise serious policy issues.31 In most U.S. jurisdictions equitable
distribution developed as an instrument for the protection of women
who made possible the material and spiritual development of the
members of the family unit, usually postponing indefinitely their own
economic and personal development.
Although there is no consensus about how to measure the value of
homemaker services, there are those who would apply traditional
economics: either replacement or opportunity cost theory.32 But marriage
involves much more than economic factors.33 The personal aspects of it
cannot be measured. Money cannot be the only relevant component of
value when the task at hand is to distribute wealth accumulated through
that very special partnership. Regardless of marketplace economics, our
Code, Article 832, French Civil Code; Articles 400-404, Quebec
proposed Civil Code.
30 UMDA, Sec. 307 (1970).
31 The prevailing rule In civil law jurisdictions, such as Puerto Rico,
is that before division of wealth, upon divorce or death, each spouse is
given all their contributions, which in many cases mean that there is
little if anything to be divided and the home maker ends up poorer
than at the outset.
32 See: Kilker, Division litigation: Valuing the Spouses Contribution
to the Marriage, Trial, Dec. 1980, p. 48. See also, Baxter, fan F.G.,
Marital property, The Lawyers Coop. Pub. Co., 1990, Supplement, p.
26.
33 Freed and Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 Fem. L. Q. 275
(1973).
123
countries must seek both equality and equitability in property distribution
upon death or divorce.
In community property jurisdictions, homemaker services are
accorded the same value as capital contribution. The trend in common
law jurisdiction during the last decades has been to recognize the
economic value of homemaker's services, partially approaching the civil
law solution. However, full equalization with capital contribution is still
resisted in some quarters, as in the judge to whom a clear one third of
marital property was a liberal allowance to the wife.34
Even though there are some to whom homemaker services command
equal valuation with capital contributions,35 it is fair to assume that both
in civil and in common law jurisdictions women receive less wealth than
their husbands in the event of divorce.36
D. Mutability of the Chosen Regime
The official grounds for the immutability rule were the protection of
creditors, potential heirs, and the State treasury against the possibility of
fraud. But the real reason for the rule is to maintain the power exercised
by blood relatives who are interested in retaining control over the
transfer of wealth through the bloodline.
The mutability rule adopted in Spain, France and other Civil law
countries, should be followed elsewhere.37 It allows much needed
adjustments to new situations, such as de facto separation, and changes
in professional, commercial and empresarial activities of the spouses. It
See: Gauger v. Gauger, 157 Wis. 630, 633; 147 NW 1078 1077
(1914).
As of 1979, with respect to property distribution twenty states
considered the factor of the non-monetary contribution of a spouse as
a homemaker, parent, career of other members, and to the well-being
of the family unity. See Baxter, supra, Nota 2, p. 163.
35 See: Roe v. Roe 556 P. 2d 1246 (Mont. 1976).
36 Weitzman, Lenore, The Economic of Divorce: Social and
Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 V.C.L.A. L. Rev.1181, 1191, note 37 (1981).
37 The trend towards mutability of the chosen regime is growing.
The Quebec Civil Code Revision Commission initially recommended
immutability for the province. See: Report of the Matrimonial
Regimes Committee, I, Montreal, 1986, p. 14. However, in the 1990
Draft, Art. 437 favor mutability.
34
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2 111, 1990
may also be said that mutability can function as an escape valve for
family crisis.
If we are to promote freedom, marriage should not be an obstacle to it.
Married people should be allowed to manage their own persons and their
property with adequate flexibility. The rule against immutability of the
marriage regime is a serious constraint to its application. The danger of
potential fraud against creditors and potential heirs has been exaggerated.
Judges, we hope, have the necessary tools at their disposal to deal with
this.
The rule in Puerto Rico and in Spain until 1981, which forbids
contracts between spouses, has the same foundation as the rule against
mutability. For decades, couples under marriage covenants could validly
contract among themselves. However, the arguments for potential fraud
are equally applicable with or without a covenant. But mutability, in
order to assuage the fears of fraud, should be coupled with some form of
reliable publicity.38
E. Limits to Contractual Theory
As a general rule, clauses binding the spouses in personal, not
patrimonial matters should be declared null and void. For example, the
rather extensive regulation of the law of domestic relations dealing with
custody, maintenance, emancipation, parental authority, guardianship
and the like, should be declared beyond the reach of freedom to contract.
Covenants, as a general rule, should be limited to the patrimonial aspects
of the marriage.
Within that area, spouses should be free to reach agreements between
each other and with third parties, whether the transfers of wealth
involved are gratuitous or onerous.39
Clauses setting limits to the exercise of the right to privacy, and the
respect for the dignity the members of the family unit, should also be
prohibited, as well as those against the constitutional mandate of equality
among the sexes. Those social achievements cannot be subjected to
modification, much less to elimination by private agreement.
See: Art. 440, Quebec proposed Civil Code, 1990 Edition.
In the current Puerto Rican regime, spouses under a marriage
contract can buy and sell goods to each other, but if married under
the community property regime, they cannot. See: Article 1347, Civil
Code, 31 LPRA sec. 3272.
Gifts, on the other hand, are prohibited among spouses, regardless
of the economic regime chosen. Sea: Article 1286, 31 LPRA sec. 3588.
38
39
125
As a general rule, agreements by which one of the spouses has
overtaken the other and gained undue advantage should also be
forbidden.
V. Non-Marital Partners
Since the increase of non-marital partners is a fact of life in our
societies, a patrimonial regime for the family would be incomplete if no
provisions are made for them.40 In addressing this form of family unit,
we must decide on the major policy consideration of whether the full
range of marriage rights and privileges should be extended to them, or
whether some or all should be denied.41
In the Civil Codes with which we are familiar there are no provisions
regulating non-marital unions. The 19th century Spanish legislator
simply decided to ignore them. It was sub silentio left to the courts of
justice the job of designing its legal scheme. Initially, judges, both in
Civil and Common law jurisdictions, held that homemaker and other
socially acceptable services among concubines were gifts of one to the
other, usually of the female to the male.42 Eventually, presumed
donatives intent was replaced by a reasonable expectation of recovery. 43
Notions of fairness, equality and of unjust enrichment led courts to
borrow from the marriage dissolution provisions thus partially
assimilating concubinage to marriage.
In Puerto Rico, 10% of all marital unions are non-ceremonial
marriages. See: Vázquez Calzada and Judith Carnivoli, El Divorcio
en Puerto Rico; su Distribución y Características, San Juan, 1985,
Apéndice, Tabla 3.
41 The debate today is not so much over wealth distribution, but
whether to extend to concubinage all the other legal effects of
marriage, such as the right to inherit; to file joint tax returns; to sue
for wrongful death or for loss of consortium; marital communication
privilege, to visit partner In jails, hospitals or mental institutions, to
receive bereavement leave, guardianship over the incompetent
partner, to be appointed executor of the °state, estate and gift tax
benefits, social security benefits, workmen’s compensation and the
like. See: Tulane Lawyer, spring, 1991, vol. II, no. 1, p. 7.
42 See: Morales v. Cruz Vélez, 34 DPR 834 (1926).
43 See: Torres v, Roldán, 67 DPR 347 (1947); Caraballo v. Acosta,
104 DPR 474 (1975).
40
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2 111, 1990
Most sectors still argue that non-marital unions should not receive all
the blessings the legal systems reserve for ceremonial marriages.44
Where there seems to be, no consensus is as to what specific,
consequences of marriage should be extended to concubinage,45 except
with regard to a fair share of the accumulated wealth. But a more
controversial issue is presented with gay, lesbian and communal unions.
In our view, gay and lesbian couples who, independently of their sexual
behavior, accumulate wealth by joining efforts and cash are entitled to
equitable distribution. However, the regulation does have to be included
in our civil codes.
IV. Closing Statement
Let me conclude my remarks by stating that although we cannot legislate
stability marriage, we certainly can and should legislate participatory
democracy and distributive justice, not only upon dissolution, but also
for an existing union. Of all the patrimonial regimes examined,
community property, with recommended adjustments, will go a long way
to insure that marriage is truly an equal partnership undertaking. It seems
to me that like in no other alternative in community property, spiritual
unity corresponds to economic unity. Let us hope that by strengthening
equality, liberty, and dignity between spouses, we can somehow
moderate the incidence of serious marriage crises in our countries today.
See: Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P. 2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
Those sectors feel that in order to protect the marriage institution,
some legal consequences should be reserved only to traditional
marriages. See: Haten, The Constitutional Status of Marriages,
Rinahip and Sexual Privacy, 81 V. Mich. I, Rev. 463, (1983).
45 In Ortiz de Jesús v. Vázquez Cotto, 119 DPR 521 (1987), the
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that a concubine is not entitled to
alimony. The Court held that a solution of this type would require
legislative action.
44
LA PRUEBA DE REFERENCIA
(“HEARSAY”) EN EL DERECHO
ESPAÑOL-ACERCAMIENTO
COMPARATIVO
Ramón Antonio Guzmán
Introducción
Es indudable, cada día con mayor certeza, la verificación de una
mayor afinidad o un acercamiento más estrecho entre las grandes
tradiciones o familias jurídicas. Uno de los que más ha insistido en esta
idea es John Henry Merryman, quien posiblemente sea, en los Estados
Unidos de América, la figura contemporánea más importante en el
estudio comparado del derecho.1 Muy bien resumida aparece, la misma
postura, en un trabajo reciente del Profesor Echeverría:
“[...] la corriente jurídica llamada „civilista‟, que predomina en el
ambiente europeo y en América Latina, y la corriente jurídica
llamada del Common law que rige en Gran Bretaña, en los Estados
Unidos de Norteamérica y en los antiguos dominios británicos,
tienden en muchos aspectos, desde hace un siglo a converger.»“2
La convergencia no sólo se verifica en el derecho substantivo. Puede
también observarse en el ámbito procesal y, más específicamente, en el
terreno del derecho probatorio. De ahí que Alcalá-Zamora, siguiendo a
Cappelleti, haya dicho que “median analogías evidentes entre el
Véase John Henry Merryman 81 David S. Clark. Western
European and Latin American Legal Systems. Charlottesville,
Virginia, 1978, págs. 51 y ss.; John Henry Merryman. The Civil Law
Tradition. California, Stanford University Press, 1969.
2 José Echeverría. “Notas pare una eventual reforma del Código
Civil de Puerto Rico”. 52 Rev. Jur. UPR 343, 344 (1983).
1
129
130
2 129, 1990
enjuiciamiento romano clásico y el del Common law [...], así como entre
el bizantino y el de equity por otro”.3
Propongo, en este trabajo, un acercamiento a la figura de la prueba de
referencia (“hearsay”) en el derecho español. Adelanto, desde ahora, que
se hallará un ejemplo más de la convergencia apuntada.
A. La Definición de Prueba de Referencia
La regla general de exclusión de prueba de referencia es,
históricamente, un fenómeno de origen inglés que no tiene contraparte en
el derecho continental europeo4 Todavía hoy, muy pocas leyes procesales
en ese derecho hacen alusión a la prueba de referencia.5 Resulta curioso,
sin embargo, el movimiento inverso que se verificó en la historia del
derecho continental frente a la historia del derecho inglés: aunque no fue
hasta fines del siglo XVIII que la regla general de exclusión de prueba de
referencia tuvo gran acogida en el derecho inglés, precisamente en ese
momento fue que los países de la Europa continental dejaron a un lado la
tradición de no admitir testimonios extraños al conocimiento personal.6
Hasta entonces, el continente europeo seguía apegado la tradición forjada
por el derecho canónico.
La Sección 2 del Canon 1791 del Código de Derecho Canónico de
1917 recoge lo que, hasta aquel momento, fue la norma del derecho
probatorio continental en materia de prueba de referencia:
“Existe prueba suficiente cuando dos o tres personas, inmunes
de toda tacha, bajo juramento, firmemente coherentes entre sí,
testifican en juicio por ciencia propia sobre algún hecho; a no ser
que en alguna causa la suma gravedad del asunto o la existencia de
indicios que puedan engendrar alguna duda sobre la verdad de la
Niceto Alcalá-Zamora y Castillo. “Exposición, por un profesor
continental europeo, de un curso angloamericano de 'evidencia' “6
Revista de Derecho Puertorriqueño 243, 246-246 (1966)
4 H.A. Hammelmann. “Hearsay Evidence, a Comparison”. 67 Law
Quaterly Review 67 (1951)
5 Alemania y Suiza son parte de la excepción. También España.
Ésta, como se verá posteriormente, alude a la prueba de referencia en
el Artículo 710 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal de 1881, todavía
vigente.
6 H.A. Hammelmann. Op. cit., pág. 69
3
131
cosa atestiguada persuadan al juez la necesidad de una prueba más
fuerte.”7
El contenido de este canon implica que la prueba de referencia
es dable sólo en el ámbito de la prueba testifical. Así ocurre
también en las leyes procesales españolas. El canon permite
apreciar, además, el valor exiguo conferido a la prueba testifical.
Idem en España.
A pesar de que España es uno de los pocos países cuyo
ordenamiento contiene alusiones directas a la prueba de referencia,
en ninguna de sus leyes aparece definido en qué consiste aquélla.
Ocurre allí lo mismo que ocurrió en Puerto Rico hasta la
aprobación de las Reglas de Evidencia de 1979. De ahí que, para
analizar lo que allí constituye prueba de referencia, arranco de la
definición que aparece en nuestras reglas:
(A) Declaración — es (1) una aseveración oral o escrita; (2)
conducta no-verbalizada de la persona, si su intención es que se
tome como una aseveración.
(B) Declarante — es la persona que hace una declaración.
(C) Prueba de referencia — es una declaración aparte de la que
hace el declarante al testificar en el juicio o vista, que se ofrece en
evidencia para probar la verdad de lo aseverado”.8
De esta definición se infiere, como se verá más adelante, que son
varios los medios probatorios que constituyen prueba de referencia en el
ordenamiento español. Conjuntamente se estudiará el problema de la
admisibilidad de tales mecanismos de prueba.
1. La prueba testifical
En el derecho probatorio español sólo se concibe, como prueba de
referencia, el testimonio de terceros que no son parte en pleito. Será en el
análisis de este tipo de prueba que los tratadistas españoles se plantean el
carácter de referencia de la prueba ofrecida al juzgador. Cito, in extenso,
la siguiente afirmación de Silva Melero:
Aunque el testimonio […] viene a significar etimológicamente
presencia, con lo que implícitamente parecería debían rechazarse
los testigos no presenciales o de referencia, la verdad es que no
7
8
Énfasis añadido.
Regla 80 de Evidencia de 1979 (énfasis añadido)
132
2 129, 1990
todos los ordenamientos jurídicos regulan esta cuestión de un
modo unánime.
Mientras en el derecho francés y en el nuestro este testigo se
admite sin limitación, en el Derecho alemán sólo es admisible si el
testigo de quien procede la información no puede ser localizado,
aunque haya que consignar que en la doctrina alemana hay quien
piensa que no son admisibles y quien sostiene que sólo podrán
serlo con carácter muy excepcional.
El derecho anglo-norteamericano excluye el testimonio de
referencia con alguna excepción, como la de tratarse de un
moribundo víctima de un homicidio, en razón de creer que
el testimonio de un hombre próximo a morir es una garantía de
verdad, así como también en algún otro supuesto de imposibilidad
física, pero siempre a título excepcional”.9
Estas afirmaciones, aunque limitadas en algunos aspectos, son de gran
valor en otros. Primeramente, el autor considera el rechazo del
testimonio de referencia en al apartado de su obra dedicado a la
capacidad de los testigos. En nuestro derecho, aunque continúa
existiendo este requisito de capacidad,10 su importancia no es tan esencial
como el requisito de confrontación.11 El fundamento de mayor peso para
excluir aquí el testimonio de referencia está ubicado, pues, en el terreno
constitucional. Los acusados de haber cometido un delito tienen
reconocido un derecho constitucional a carearse con los testigos.12 Por
Valentín Silva Melero. Op. cit., T. I., pág. 30 (énfasis añadido).
Reglas 36, 37 y 38 de Evidencia de 1979
11 Ernesto L. Chiesa. Práctica procesal puertorriqueña- Evidencia.
San Juan de Puerto Rico, Editorial J.T.S., 1969, pág. 160.
12 Enmienda VI de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos de
América:
“En todas las causas criminales, el acusado gozará del derecho
a un juicio rápido y público, ante un jurado imparcial del estado
y distrito en que el delito haya sido cometido, distrito que será
previamente fijado por ley; a ser informado de la naturaleza y
causa de la acusación; a carearse con los testigos en su contra; a
que se adopten medidas compulsivas para la comparecencia de
los testigos que cite a su favor y a la asistencia de abogado para
su defensa.” 1 LPRA pág. 192 (énfasis añadido)
Primer párrafo de la Sección 11 del Artículo II de la Constitución
del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico:
9
10
133
otro lado, las cláusulas del “debido proceso”, contenidas en las
Constituciones de los Estados Unidos de América13 y del Estado Libre
Asociado14 exigen —en los casos civiles— los requisitos de (i) presencia
física y (ii) derecho a contrainterrogar al testigo contrario.
“En todos los procesos criminales, el acusado disfrutará del derecho a un juicio rápido y público, a ser notificado de la naturaleza y causa de la acusación recibiendo copia de la misma, a carearse con los testigos de cargo, a obtener la comparecencia compulsoria de testigos a su favor, a tener asistencia de abogado, y a
gozar de la presunción de inocencia.” 1 LPRA págs. 307-308 (énfasis añadido)
13 Enmienda V de la Constitución de los Estados Unidos:
“Ninguna persona será obligada a responder por delito capital
o infamante, sino en virtud de denuncia o acusación por un gran
jurado, salvo en los casos que ocurran en las fuerzas de mar y
tierra, o en la milicia, cuando se hallen en servicio activo en
tiempos de guerra o de peligro público; ni podrá nadie ser sometido por el mismo delito dos veces a un juicio que pueda ocasionarle la pérdida de la vida o la integridad corporal; ni será compelido en ningún caso criminal a declarar contra sí mismo, ni
será privado de su vida, de su libertad o de su propiedad, sin el
debido procedimiento de ley; ni se podrá tomar propiedad privada para uso público, sin justa compensación.” 1 LPRA pág. 188
Sección 1 de la Enmienda XIV de la Constitución de los Estados
Unidos:
“Toda persona nacida o naturalizada en los Estados Unidos y
sujeta a su jurisdicción, será ciudadana de los Estados Unidos y
del estado en que resida. Ningún estado aprobará o hará cumplir
ninguna ley que restrinja los privilegios o inmunidades de los
ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos; ni ningún estado privará a
persona alguna de su vida, de su libertad o de su propiedad, sin
el debido procedimiento de ley, ni negará a nadie, dentro de su
jurisdicción, la igual protección de las leyes.” 1 LPRA pág. 196
14 Sección 7 del Artículo II de la Constitución del Estado Libre
Asociado de Puerto Rico:
“Se reconoce como derecho fundamental del ser humano el derecho a la vida, a la libertad y al disfrute de la propiedad. No
existirá la pena de muerte. Ninguna persona será privada de su
libertad o propiedad sin [el] debido proceso de ley, ni se negará a
persona alguna en Puerto Rico la igual protección de las leyes.
No se aprobarán leyes que menoscaben las obligaciones contrac-
134
2 129, 1990
La doctrina jurisprudencial del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico
ha destacado la importancia del segundo requisito frente al primero. El
Tribunal,15 en Pueblo c. Ruiz Lebrón,16 expresó:
“La confrontación que garantizan la Sexta Enmienda y el Art.
II, Sec. 11 de nuestra Constitución se cumple con la oportunidad
de contrainterrogar, sin que sea indispensable la presencia del
acusado. No está irremisiblemente atada al encuentro físico, al
enfrentamiento nariz con nariz entre testigo y acusado, que en
términos de depuración del testimonio no es ni sombra del eficaz
escrutinio, del potencial de descubrimiento de la verdad que es el
objetivo constitucional y esencia del contrainterrogatorio
formulado por el abogado defensor.”17
Cappelleti, con gran acierto, recoge la singular importancia que poseen
ambos requisitos:
“[...] la hearsay rule está sustancialmente dirigida a evitar que
sean admitidas como pruebas las declaraciones de verdad,
prestadas fuera del debate y por consiguiente sin las garantías de la
„viva voce examination in open court‟ ”.18
La afirmación de Silva Melero demuestra, además, la poca
profundidad de su ejercicio comparativo. En el caso específico del
derecho anglo-norteamericano queda muy claro que el autor no repasó,
en detalle, las numerosas excepciones que en aquel derecho existen a la
regla general de exclusión de prueba de referencia. No es incomprensible
que un autor europeo (continental) tenga problemas para acercarse a la
figura de la prueba de referencia en el derecho anglo-norteamericano. He
aquí la confesión de uno de ellos:
tuales. Las leyes determinarán un mínimo de propiedad y pertenencias no sujetas a embargo.” 1 LPRA pág. 275
15 Siempre que me refiera al “Tribunal”, sin más, la referencia será
al Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico.
16 111 DPR 435 (1981)
17 111 DPR 435, 442 (1981) (énfasis añadido)
18 Mauro Cappelleti. La oralidad y las pruebas en el proceso civil
(trad. Cast. Por Santiago Sentís Melendo). Buenos Aires, Ediciones
Jurídicas Europa-América, 1972, pág. 373.
135
“[...] Así igualmente no se admite de ordinario [en los Estados
Unidos] la hearsay evidence, esto es, el testigo puede deponer
solamente en mérito a cuanto ha visto u oído directamente. La
regla sufre, sin embargo, numerosas excepciones. El derecho de
las pruebas constituye, por consiguiente, una de las ramas más
complejas del derecho [norte] americano y un instrumento
indispensable para el trial de las causas.”19
A las complicaciones, relacionadas con el dominio de las excepciones
a la regla general de exclusión de la prueba de referencia, hay que añadir
la racionalidad de la mayoría de sus excepciones. De ahí que Wigmore
afirmó, con toda razón, que la regla de “hearsay” y sus excepciones
constituyen “the pride of the Anglo-American system of evidence”.20
La importancia de las expresiones de Silva Melero reside (i) en la
dación de noticias en torno a la admisión, sin límites, del testimonio de
referencia en el derecho español y (ii) con tales noticias, el juicio de un
catedrático de derecho procesal en las Universidades de Murcia y Sevilla
y de derecho Penal en la Universidad de Oviedo, de un abogado con una
práctica intensa y de un magistrado del Tribunal Supremo de España.21
Ese juicio personal también es importante porque nos permite apreciar
que la concepción que hay en España de la prueba de referencia está
limitada a la prueba testifical, es decir, cuando el declarante carece del
conocimiento personal. Se trata, pues, de una concepción más estrecha
que la existente en Puerto Rico. Dada la definición previamente
presentada, algunos documentos pueden constituir prueba de referencia.
La contradicción de Silva Melero es evidente. ¿Cómo es posible que la
incompetencia del testigo produzca la inadmisibilidad del testimonio de
referencia y, al mismo tiempo, que tal testimonio carezca de límites para
ser admitido en el procedimiento? Aunque el autor no lo explica en ese
apartado, la expresión quedará justificada luego de un repaso del proceso
para la presentación de la prueba en el procedimiento español.
Ocurre, en primer lugar, que la afirmación de Silva Melero está
fundamentada en la definición etimológica de testimonio, pero no en el
derecho positivo español. Él adopta la explicación que Mittermaier preAngelo Piero Sereni. El proceso civil en los Estados Unidos (trad.
cast. por Santiago Sentís Melando). Buenos Aires, Ediciones Jurídicas
Europa-América, 1968, págs. 23-24. (énfasis añadido) (escolios
omitidos)
20 Citado en: H.A. Hammelmann. Op. cit., pág. 67
21 Leonardo Prieto-Castro y Ferrándiz. “Prologo”, en Valentín Silva
Melero, Op. cit., T. I, pág. vii.
19
136
2 129, 1990
senta de la locución “testis”, cuyo origen está en las voces “antesto” y
“antisto”, que designan al individuo que se encuentra directamente a la
vista de un objeto.22 Así, una vez toma en cuenta -entre otros criterios- la
definición etimológica del término “testimonio”, concluye que la capacidad “aparece condicionada a la natural aptitud de percepción,
facultad memorística y posibilidad de exteriorizar lo percibido.”23 No
obstante, hay que tomar en cuenta que el derecho probatorio está gobernado, en España, por dos leyes procesales principales: la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil y la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, ambas de 1881.
El Artículo 649 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil establece:
“Luego que el testigo haya contestado a las preguntas
expresadas en el artículo anterior, [24] será examinado al tenor de
cada una de las contenidas en el interrogatorio y admitidas por el
Juez, o de las acotadas por la parte que lo presente.
Acto continuo lo será igualmente por las preguntas, si se
hubiesen presentado o admitido.
En cada una de las contestaciones expresará el testigo la razón
de ciencia de su dicho.”25
La “razón de ciencia de su dicho”, según nos dice Manuel de la Plaza,
es un requisito relacionado con (i) la indicación de la procedencia de su
conocimiento: de ciencia propia o de referencia y (ii) a los matices
(“demeanor”) de su declaración. Ambos aspectos deben ser conocidos
por el juzgador para que éste pueda determinar el valor probatorio que
concederá al testimonio.26 Vemos, pues, que el carácter extrajudicial de
las declaraciones no implica la exclusión de éstas sino su reducido valor
probatorio.
Silva Melero, Op. cit., T. I, pág. 214.
Silva Melero. Op. cit., T. I., pág. 216 (énfasis añadido) No quiero
parecer quisquilloso, pero es Interesante observar cómo el mismo
Silva Melero se limita a decir que la facultad está “condicionada” y no
utiliza, lo que hubiera expresado mejor el resultado lógico de su razonamiento, le expresión “determinada”.
24 Son las preguntas relativas al nombre, edad, profesión, domicilio,
parentesco, relación de interés, dependencia o amistad con loe litigantes y al interés del testigo en el resultado del pleito.
25énfasis añadido
26 Manuel de la Plaza. Derecho procesal civil español. 3ra. ed.,
Madrid, Revista de Derecho Privado, 1951, Vol. I, pág. 512.
22
23
137
El escaso valor probatorio de la declaración obedece a que “su valor es
de segundo grado, puesto que esta prueba, como todas, exige un supuesto necesario para apreciar su eficacia: el cumplimiento de determinados requisitos (publicidad, citación contraria, presencia del órgano
jurisdiccional), aun en un sistema de libre valoración”.27
Por su parte, el Artículo 710 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal establece que los “testigos expresarán la razón de su dicho y, si fueren de
referencia, precisarán el origen de la noticia, designando con su nombre
y apellido, o con las señas con que fuere conocida, a la persona que se la
hubiera comunicado.”28
Aunque en el ordenamiento español no existe, como se ha dicho, una
definición de “prueba de referencia”, la doctrina lo reduce al testimonio
judicial que carece del conocimiento personal del declarante. La concepción doctrinal está presente, del mismo modo, en el citado Artículo 710.
Éste autoriza la admisión sin límites del testimonio de referencia, aunque
limitada por un requisito flaquísimo: designar —con nombre y apellido o
hasta con un simple mote— la persona cuya declaración extrajudicial
está repitiendo o reseñando el testigo. Tal requisito proviene del Artículo
649 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil. Se trata, si utilizamos una
expresión de Francisco Ramos, de la única “razón de ciencia” exigida a
los testigos.29 Las disposiciones del citado Artículo 710 son también
aplicables al sumario, que es el procedimiento para investigar y reunir la
prueba necesaria para la formulación de una acusación forma1.30
De ese modo, el derecho probatorio español establece la norma más liviana para la admisión de prueba de referencia entre los países del continente europeo. En Italia y Francia, por ejemplo, la ley concede al juzgador la facultad para llamar a la persona que es fuente del testimonio de
referencia e interrogarla dentro del procedimiento judicial.31 Ello no
implica, sin embargo, que en tales países exista una concepción distinta
de la española: la existencia de la prueba de referencia, cuya única consecuencia es la ponderación más o menos libre de su valor probatorio, se
verifica exclusivamente en el ámbito de las declaraciones orales. Es decir, no incluye consideración de prueba escrita ni las aseveraciones no
verbales que tienen la intención de aseverar.
Manuel de la Plaza. Op. cit., Vol. I, pág. 511 (énfasis en el
original)
28 (énfasis añadido)
29 Francisco Ramos Méndez, Derecho procesal. Barcelona, Librería
Bosch, 1978, pág. 380.
30 Francisco Ramos, Op. cit., pág. 382.
31 H. A. Hammelmann. Op. cit., pág. 75
27
138
2 129, 1990
Debe consignarse que el Tribunal Constitucional de España está autorizado, por la Constitución de 1978,32 a declarar la inconstitucionalidad
de una ley que no se avenga a dicha Constitución. De ese modo, el
constituyente español buscó aproximarse al esquema constitucional de
los Estados Unidos de América.33 Pienso, empero, que una revisión
judicial del Artículo 710 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal no
necesariamente conducirá a la supresión del testimonio de referencia que
allí se permite. Es así, dado que las cláusulas equivalentes a las del debido proceso de ley en el derecho nuestro, encontradas en los Artículos
17 y 33 de la Constitución española,34 carecen de un alcance tan amplio
como el que existe en las nuestras.
El Artículo 17(1) de la Constitución española establece:
“Toda persona tiene derecho a la libertad y a la seguridad.
Nadie puede ser privado de su libertad, sino con la observancia de
lo establecido en este artículo y en los casos y en la forma
previstos en la ley.”35
Por su parte, el Artículo 33(3) —también de la Constitución
española— pauta:
“Nadie podrá ser privado de sus bienes y derechos, sino por
causa justificada de utilidad pública o interés social, mediante la
correspondiente indemnización y de conformidad con lo dispuesto
por las leyes.”36
32El
Artículo 161(1) (A) de la Constitución española de 1978 dice:
“El Tribunal Constitucional tiene jurisdicción en todo el territorio
español y es competente para conocer: a) Del recurso de inconstitucionalidad de una norma jurídica con rango de ley, interpretada por la
jurisprudencia, afectará a ésta, si bien la sentencia o sentencias recaídas no perderán el valor de cosa juzgada.” Entiéndase, siempre que
me refiera a la Constitución española, que la referencia es a la de
1978.
33 Eduardo García de Enterría. La Constitución como norma y el
Tribunal Constitucional, 2da. ed., Madrid, Civitas, 1982, pág. 61.
34 Oscar Alzaga Villamil. Comentario sistemático a la Constitución
española de 1978. Madrid, Ediciones del Foro, 1978, pág. 288.
35 énfasis añadido
36 énfasis añadido
139
Vistos en conjunto, la letra de ambos pasajes muestra que en ellos
aparecen cláusulas exclusivamente programáticas del “debido proceso de
ley”. Así, al confrontarse los Artículos 710 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal y el 649 de la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil con la Constitución
española, podrá concluirse que ambos integran, precisamente, el
programa establecido por el legislador.
No obstante, el Artículo 10(2) de la Constitución española establece
que “Las normas relativas a los derechos fundamentales y a las libertades
que la Constitución reconoce se interpretarán de conformidad con la
Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos”. Esta afirmación podría
dar pie a una interpretación que requiera mucho más que la letra estricta
de la Constitución española.
Hay que recordar, nuevamente, que en el derecho probatorio español
“rige el principio de libertad, y es al juez a quien incumbe calificar la
pertinencia de los medios probatorios propuestos”.37 Por tanto, siempre el
juez podría considerar la carencia de idoneidad de la prueba testifical
propuesta y excluir así el testimonio de referencia. Incluso cuando la
admitiera, operaria —como ha quedado dicho— el principio de la libre
apreciación de la prueba. Éste permite al juez conceder, libremente, el
valor probatorio a cada medio de prueba presentado. Es decir, el temor
de que el jurado conozca información de poco valor probatorio queda
subsanado, en el ordenamiento español, por la presencia del juez
formado académica y jurídicamente.38
Es imperativo repetir, una vez más, que en España la prueba testifical,
contrario a lo que ocurre en los procedimientos judiciales nuestros, no
goza de la misma aceptación que la prueba documental.39 Indicativo de
esta concepción es el orden en que aparecen enumerados los medios para
la presentación de la prueba en el Artículo 578 de la Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil:
1. la confesión en juicio
2. los documentos públicos y solemnes
3. los documentos privados y correspondencia
Aranzadi. Nuevo diccionario de legislación. Vol. XIX. pág. 1267.
Recuérdese que las reglas de derecho probatorio son “hijas del jurado”. Es decir, fueron creadas para orientar a personas que carecían
de la formación técnica necesaria para saber “separar el grano de la
paja”. En el ordenamiento español no existe la institución del jurado
ni en los casos civiles ni en los criminales.
39 Aquí, en no pocas ocasiones, se utiliza un testigo para presentar
como prueba un documento que habla por sí mismo.
37
38
140
2 129, 1990
4. los libros de los comerciantes
5. el dictamen de peritos
6. el reconocimiento judicial
7. los testigos
A estos medios hay que añadir los que están relacionados con la
prueba de las obligaciones, que aparecen en los Artículos del 1214 al
1252 del Código Civil de España, de los que se derivan los Artículos del
1168 al 1204 del Código Civil de Puerto Rico.40
Veamos esos medios de presentación de la prueba que aquí nos
interesan en el mismo orden que hemos tomado del Artículo 578 de la
Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil.
2. La Confesión Judicial y la Extrajudicial
La confesión que aparece en el número uno del Artículo 578 de la Ley
de Enjuiciamiento Civil es la confesión judicial. Esta, no es simplemente
al testimonio de una de las partes litigantes sino que se refiere al
reconocimiento judicial que hace un litigante de los hechos que le son
perjudiciales.41 El Artículo 1232 del Código Civil español, del que
proviene el 1186 del Código Civil nuestro nos dice que “[l]a confesión
hace prueba contra su autor.”42 El Artículo 1231 del Código Civil
español, antecedente del Artículo 1185 del Código Civil de Puerto
Rico,43 establece que “[l]a confesión puede hacerse judicial o
extrajudicialmente.”44
El fundamento para conceder plenitud probatoria a la confesión, en
cualquiera de sus dos modos posibles, “obedece al criterio de
normalidad, en el sentido de que ninguna persona de buen juicio es capaz
de hacer declaraciones contrarias a su interés si no son conformes a la
verdad.”45 Este es el mismo fundamento que permite, en Puerto Rico, la
admisión de prueba de referencia en el caso de las declaraciones contra
interés.46 Sin embargo, las figuras no son equivalentes, ya que la Regla
64 de Evidencia de Puerto Rico, contrario a lo que ocurre en España,
opera exclusivamente cuando el testigo no está disponible. Además, la
31 LPRA §§ 3261 y ss.
Valentin Silva Melero. Op. cit., pág. 145.
42 31 LPRA § 3292.
43 31 LPRA § 3291.
44 Énfasis añadido.
45 Valentin Silva Melero, Op. cit., pág. 156.
46 Regla 64 de Evidencia de 1979.
40
41
141
“declaración contra interés” de la Regla 64 se refiere a la declaración de
cualquier persona, mientras que la “confesión” española se refiere
exclusivamente a la declaración de un litigante. De ahí, que se asemeje
más a la “admisión” que aparece en la Regla 62 de Evidencia de Puerto
Rico.47 A pesar de las sutilezas que puedan existir o la ausencia de
concordancia perfecta, en ambos ordenamientos se obtiene el mismo
resultado.
Una vez aclarado el significado del término “confesión” en el
ordenamiento español, puede perfectamente comprenderse que la
contradicción existente entre las Reglas de Evidencia de Puerto Rico
relativas a la prueba de referencia y las disposiciones del Código civil
que gobiernan la prueba de las obligaciones constituyen, más bien, una
contradicción aparente.
3. Los Documentos Públicos y Solemnes
La prueba documental, también llamada prueba preconstituida,48 goza
en España de un alto valor probatorio. Es así porque el documento
“perpetúa el pensamiento [...] muestra la verdad en el suceder del tiempo,
protege, conserva [...] realidad psíquica traducida en forma externa, es
demostración de lo que se quiere.”49 Los documentos públicos y
solemnes aparecen enumerados en el Artículo 596 de la Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil:
(A) las escrituras públicas otorgadas con arreglo a derecho
(B) las certificaciones expedidas por los Agentes de Bolsa y
Corredores de Comercio
(C) los documentos expedidos por los funcionarios públicos que estén autorizados para ello
(Ch) los libros de actas, estatutos, ordenanzas, registros, catastros y
demás documentos hallados en los archivos públicos
(D) las ordenanzas, estatutos y reglamentos de sociedades,
comunidades o asociaciones aprobados por Autoridad pública
(E) las partidas o certificaciones de nacimiento, de matrimonio y de
defunción, (i) dadas con arreglo a los libros por los párrocos o (ii)
por los que tengan a su cargo el Registro civil
47Para
la distinción entre “admisión” y “declaración contra interés”,
véase: Ernesto L. Chiesa. Op. cit., págs. 211 - 212.
48La frase “prueba preconstituida”, según informa Silva Melero, fue
acuñada por Bentham. Valentin Silva Melero. Op. cit., pág. 235
49 Valentin Silva Melero. Op. cit., pág. 238
142
2 129, 1990
(F) las ejecutorias y las acciones judiciales de toda especie
Vemos, pues, que el contenido del Artículo 596 de la Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil es equivalente a los incisos H, I, J, K, L, N, O y V
de la Regla 65 de Evidencia de Puerto Rico.50 Aquí, para mantenerse fiel
Regla 85 de Evidencia de 1979: “Es admisible como excepción a la
regla de referencia aunque el declarante esté disponible como testigo:
I…1
(H) Récords e informes oficiales: Evidencia de ausencia en los récords de un negocio del asiento de un alegado acto, condición o evento,
cuando se ofrece para probar la no ocurrencia del acto o evento, o la
inexistencia de la condición, si el curso del negocio era hacer récords
de todos dichos actos, condiciones o eventos, en o cerca del momento
del acto o condición o evento y preservarlos, siempre que las fuentes
de información y el método y momento de preparación de los récords
del negocio fueran tales que la ausencia en el récord es una indicación
confiable de que el acto o evento no ocurrió o de la inexistencia de la
condición.
(I) Récord de estadística vital: Un escrito como récord de un nacimiento, muerte fetal, muerte o matrimonio, si la ley requería al que
no lo hizo presentar un escrito en una oficina pública determinada y
el escrito fue hecho y presentado según requerido por ley.
(J) Ausencia de récord público: Un escrito hecho por el custodio oficial de los récords de una oficina pública, haciendo constar que se ha
buscado diligentemente y no se [ha] hallado un récord determinado,
cuando se ofrece para probar la ausencia de dicho récord en esa oficina.
(K) Récords de organizaciones religiosas: Declaraciones concernientes al nacimiento, matrimonio, divorcio, fallecimiento, filiación, linaje,
raza, parentesco, por consanguinidad o afinidad, u otro hecho similar
del historial personal o familiar de una persona, que esté contenida
en un escrito hecho como un récord, ordinariamente llevado, de una
iglesia u otra organización religiosa.
(L) Certificados de matrimonio, bautismo, y otros similares: Una
declaración referente al nacimiento, matrimonio, fallecimiento, raza,
linaje, parentesco, por consanguinidad o afinidad u otro hecho similar
del historial familiar de una persona, si la declaración estuviere contenida en un certificado de quien ofició la ceremonia correspondiente,
efectuó un matrimonio o administró un sacramento, siempre que
quien la oficiare fuere una persona autorizada por ley o por los reglamentos de una organización religiosa para celebrar los actos informados en el certificado, y éste fuera expedido por quien lo hizo en
50
143
a la definición de prueba de referencia, han de ser admisibles como
excepciones a la regla general de exclusión. En España, al no estar
amarrados por tal definición, son medios ordinarios de prueba. El
fundamento para su admisión es el mismo en ambos ordenamientos:
“[...] la fe documental consiste, evidentemente, en el crédito que
en el tráfico jurídico encuentran los documentos con carácter
general, y muy especialmente los documentos de los funcionarios
públicos en el ejercicio de sus funciones con las solemnidades
legales. De aquí que la protección jurídica especial de este tipo de
documentos se debe, no solamente a que al documento se le
atribuya una particular eficacia, sino a la derivada de la cualidad
el momento y lugar de la ceremonia o sacramento, o dentro de un
tiempo razonable después del mismo.
[…]
(N) Récords oficiales sobre la propiedad: Evidencia presentada del
registro oficial de un documento que afecte un derecho o interés en
propiedad, mueble o inmueble, para demostrar el contenido del documento original y su otorgamiento, inclusive la entrega por cada persona que aparece otorgándolo, siempre que el registro fuera un récord
oficial de una oficina gubernamental y estuviere autorizado por ley el
registro de tal documento en dicha oficina.
(0) Declaraciones en escritos que afectan propiedad: Una declaración contenida en un documento que afecte un derecho o interés en
propiedad, mueble o inmueble, si lo declarado era pertinente al propósito del documento, siempre que las transacciones habidas con la
propiedad desde que se hizo la declaración no hayan sido incompatibles con la veracidad de la declaración.
[…]
(V) Sentencia por convicción previa: Evidencia de una sentencia final, tras un juicio o declaración de culpabilidad, declarando e une
persona culpable de delito grave, ofrecido para probar cualquier hecho
esencial para sostener la sentencia de convicción. La pendencia de
una apelación no afectará la admisibilidad bajo esta regla, aunque
podrá traerse a la consideración del tribunal el hecho de que la sentencia de convicción aún no es firme. Esta regla no permite al Pueblo
en una acción criminal ofrecer en evidencia la sentencia de convicción
de una persona que no sea el acusado, salvo para fines de impugnación de un testigo.”
144
2 129, 1990
de quien interviene, en este caso, precisamente, el funcionario
público aludido.”51
Del mismo modo, poco se lograría con traer al procedimiento judicial
al funcionario encargado de emitir copia de los documentos, puesto que
su participación de ordinario se limita a declarar exclusivamente lo que
está contenido en el documento público. Lo mismo vale para los casos en
que el documento está expedido por un funcionario eclesiástico. Ese tipo
de documento tiene, en España, carácter público.
4. Los Libros de los Comerciantes
Este es el equivalente a nuestra Regla 65(F) de Evidencia de 1979.52
Como se ha señalado, en España constituye un medio ordinario de
prueba, aunque según la definición de nuestra Regla 60 de Evidencia esté
concebida como prueba de referencia. Por eso aquí, para ser lógicos,
había que convertirlos en una excepción a la regla general de exclusión
de la prueba de referencia.
Conclusión
A pesar de las diferencias históricas entre el derecho procesal nuestro
y el derecho procesal español, en ambos se llega a resultados similares
en cuanto a la prueba de referencia se refiere. Este es un indicador más,
como había quedado avisado, de la notable convergencia entre las
grandes familias jurídicas.
Valentin Silva Melero. Op. cit., pág. 239-240. Una justificación
similar aparece en: Ernesto L. Chiesa. Op. cit., pág. 221.
52 Regla 65 (F): “Récords del negocio o actividad: Un escrito hecho
como récord de un acto, condición o evento si el escrito fue hecho durante el curso regular de un negocio, en o próximo al momento del
acto, condición o evento, y el custodio de dicho escrito u otro testigo
declara sobre su identidad y el método de su preparación, siempre que
las fuentes de información, método y momento de su preparación fueran tales que indiquen su confiabilidad. El término „negocio‟ incluye
además de negocio propiamente, una actividad gubernamental, profesión, ocupación, vocación u operación de instituciones, ya sea con o sin
fines pecuniarios.”
51
PROBLEMS IN THE ADOPTION
OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE BY A
CIVIL LAW JURISDICTION:
THE LOUISIANA CASE
Georgina Prieto
Introduction
As of now, the state of Louisiana’s version of the U. C. C. omits
Articles 2 (on Sales), 2a (on Leases), 6 (Bulk on Sales), 9 (on Secured
Transactions in Personal Property), 10 (on Effective Date and Repealer)
and 11 (on Transition Provisions. Articles 7 (on Warehouse Receipts,
Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title) and 8 (on Investment
Securities) were adopted in 1978 but its Article 8’s version follows the
U. C. C. as amended in 1962. The 1977 revision of Article 8 has not been
enacted in Louisiana (see 2(A) ULA, Master Edition).1
Since Louisiana’s version of the U. C. C. omits those articles
enumerated above, it cannot be called a uniform code; moreover, since
its format is not at all in the tradition of a civil law code, it cannot be
called a “code”. Hence, the statute has been designated: “Commercial
Laws” of Louisiana.
It should be noted that, in spite of omissions and changes, the
sequence of sections in Title 10 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes follow
those of the Uniform Commercial Code. Articles of the U. C. C. become
Chapter in Title 10; but part and section numbering remains the same.
Thus, in dealing with out the state lawyers, judges and others, the same
set of numbers can be used. For example, a reference to U. C. C. Section
3-105 is to R. S. 10:3-105; and, the Louisiana adaptation of U. C. C.
Section 1-205 may be cited as R. S. 10: 1-205.
Louisiana adopted the 1972 Revision of Article 9 (on Secured
Transaction) by its enactment of Law 528 in 1988; this Law becomes
effective on January 1, 1990.
1
145
146
2 145, 1990
Throughout the Uniform Commercial Code, a Cooperative
relationship between Code and Non-Code law can be found. The Code
frequently merely restates common-law rules. For examples: under
Article 2 the obligation of the buyer to pay and, of the seller to tender,
remain concurrent conditions, of each other; if either party wishes credit,
he must bargain for it; U. C. C. Sections 2-507 and 2-511.
Similarly, Article 3 retains the common law doctrine that taking a
negotiable instrument either in payment for or to secure an antecedent
obligation constitutes the giving of value; U. C. C. Section 3-303. This
section of the U. C. C. makes clear that in the law of negotiable
instruments value and consideration are not synonymous. The baseline
proposition as stated in Section 3-303(a) is that a holder takes for value
only to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed. This
limitation established by Section 3-303(a) notwithstanding, in Section 3303(b) it is specified that taking an instrument in payment of or as
security for an antecedent debt constitutes the giving of value.
Another occasion where the Code does not require demonstrated
reliance is where the holder gives a negotiable instrument for the
negotiable instrument in question. (See U. C. C. Section 3-303(2)). The
mere possibility that the negotiable instrument given will end up in the
hands of a holder in due course is the justification for saying that value
has been given in such transaction.
The drafters of Louisiana’s commercial statute have made a
considerable effort to eliminate some of the aforementioned common law
terminology from those articles of the U. C. C., which have been
adopted. An example is Section 3-419 of the Louisiana legislation. This
section deals with liabilities and defenses without regard to the common
law concept of conversion referred to in the uniform text of that
provision. An effort has also been made to stop common law and equity
from penetrating the civil law traditions by the process of Code
supplementation.
In the case of Daube v. Bruno,2 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
explained that the Louisiana legislature adopted the substance of the
Uniform Commercial Code’s Section 3-419(1)(c) except for the deletion
of the reference to conversion. In so doing, said the court, the lawmakers
heeded the advice of the scholars who contend that it is unwise to import
conversion theory into Louisiana law because established civil law
actions are more appropriate and, in many respects, superior remedies.
Louisiana’s Supreme Court reasoned that, unlike other articles of the
U. C. C., Article 3 is not a preemptive, systematic and comprehensive
2
493 So. 2d. 606 (La 1986)
Georgina Prieto
147
treatment of its area of coverage. Thus, said the Court, “it cannot be
applied as a closed system from which most commercial paper questions
can be deductively reasoned. Instead, resort must be had to the general
tort law of conversion, and caution must be exercised not to extend
coverage of a particular section of Article 3 beyond its scope…” Daube
v. Bruno.3
These observations made by the Court appear to be a recognition that
Article 3 is still a common law code, notwithstanding the deletion of
some common law terms by the Louisiana legislature when it adopted
parts of the Code. The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded in Daube
that, despite Louisiana’s deletion of the term “conversion” from Section
3-419, the provision must be read as identifying a few patterns of
wrongful or improper conduct in the handling of instruments. The Court
then held that the action by the true owner of the check against the bank
for payment of the instrument in question was not an action of a
negotiable instrument but was a delictual action subject to liberative
prescription of one year.
Despite the Court’s observations made in the Daube case in relation to
Article 3, the Code has been found to control in those parts, which are
adopted in Louisiana as they appear in the U. C. C. In Darby v. Doucet,4
for example, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that Sections 3-415
rather than the Louisiana law of obligations, governs the rights of an
accommodation comaker of a note. The comaker, said the court, is
entitled to an action against the accommodated maker for the sum paid to
the creditor.
Title 10 is designated in Section 1-101 as the “Commercial Laws” of
Louisiana. Title 10 is divided into five Chapters”.
Chapter 1: Genera Provisions
Chapter 3: Commercial Paper
Chapter 4: Banks Deposits and Collections
Chapter 5: Letters of Credit
Former Title 7 on Bill and Notes was repealed: this matter is now
covered in sections of Title 10. The former Uniform Bills of Lading Law
(L. S. A. R. S. 45:901 to 45:955) and the former Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act (R. S. 54:1 to 54:58) are also now part of Title 10.
Besides the laws mentioned above, the subject matter of the former
Uniform Stock Transfer Law (R.S. 12:621 to 12:643) as well as the
matter relating to clearing corporations (R.S. 12:651) have been
3
4
supra, at p. 608.
482 So. 2d. 986 (1986)
148
2 145, 1990
incorporated to the “Commercial Laws” of Louisiana (as the title has
been designated in 10: 1-101).
COMPARISON WITH THE U. C. C.
Chapter 1
10:1-101
As previously explained, Section 1-101 designates Title 10 as
Louisiana’s “Commercial Laws”.
10:1-102
The drafters omitted the word “underlying” in subsection 1 and 2
because it seemed useless; it was considered enough to state the
“purposes and policies” without characterizing them as “underlying”.
Subsection (2)(c) was amended to show that Title 10 merely “promotes”
but cannot accomplish uniformity.
10: 1-103
The original U. C. C. text was rejected. The Louisiana statute makes
clear that the rest of Louisiana law implements the commercial law if a
situation is not covered by the latter.
10: 1-104
This section is similar to its U. C. C. counterpart.
10: 1-105
This section (added in 1974) is similar to U. C. C. Section 1-105 but
the references made in the U. C. C. to Sections 2-402; 6-102(4), 8-106
and 9-103 were deleted. Louisiana has not adopted Articles 6 and 9; its
version of Article 8 dates from 1978.
Subsection 1 states the rights of the parties in a multi-state or foreign
trade transaction to choose their own laws subject to the rules given in
subsection (2). The comment makes clear that especially in Article 9
parties taking a security interest or asked to extend credit which may be
subject to a security interest, these must have sure ways to find out
whether and where to file and where to look for possible existing filings.
Georgina Prieto
149
“Section 9-103”, reads the U. C. C. comment “should be consulted as to
the rules for perfection of security interests and the effects of perfection
and non-perfection.”
10: 1-107
Is similar to U. C. C. Section 1-107.
10: 1-108
Section 1-108 (Severability) of the U. C. C. was deleted entirely. The
Comment notes that there is a severability clause in the enacting statute.
10: 1-109
Was deleted entirely; considered contrary to Louisiana policy.
10: 1-201
This section deals with general definitions. The Comment points out
several differences with the U. C.C.:
(a) “Bill of Lading”: The U. C. C. definition refers to “marine”
or rail transportation”. The Louisiana statute was amended to refer
to “marine or land” transportation so as to include bus or trucks
transportation.
(b) “Conspicuous”: The last sentence was deleted because it
was considered inappropriate in Louisiana.
(c) “Delivery”: The clause “actual or constructive, from one
person to another” was included. It is pointed out in the Comment
that the omission of this clause in the U. C. C. has been the subject
of litigation.
(d) “Notice”: The last two sentences of the official U. C. C. text
were deleted because they were regarded as unnecessary.
(e) “The following definitions found in the U. C. C. were
entirely deleted:
(1) “Action”: regarded as conflicting with La. C. C. P. Arts.
421 and 1031.
(2) “Aggrieved Party”: considered unnecessary.
150
2 145, 1990
(3) “Agreement”: U. C.C.’s definition considered incomplete,
inaccurate and unnecessary.
(4) “Banks”: considered a poor and unnecessary definition.
(5) “Buyer in ordinary course of business”: definition tied to
Article 2 (Sales) of the U. C. C., which has not been adopted in
Louisiana.
(6) “Contract”: U. C. C. definition considered incomplete,
inaccurate and unnecessary.
(7) “Defendant”: considered unnecessary since term is defined
in C. C. P. Art. 1040.
(8) “Fault”: definition considered as incomplete and misleading.
(9) “Genuine”: U. C. C. definition considered too restrictive.
(10) “Security Interest”: Definition tied up to Article 9, which
has not been adopted in Louisiana.
10: 1-201
Is similar to its U. C. C. counterpart.
10: 1-203
10: 1-204
10: 1-205
10: 1-206
U. C. C. Section 1-206 was entirely deleted because Articles 2277,
2278 and 2241 of the La. C. C. cover the area.
Georgina Prieto
151
10: 1-207
Is similar to its U. C. C. Section 1-207.
10: 1-208
Is similar to its U. C. C. Section 1-208.
10: 1-209
This section of the U. C. C. was not adopted. The drafters regarded
this section as an optional one that has not been favorably received
generally.
Chapter 3
This Article represents a complete revision and modernization of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. Is should be noted here that this
Article does not apply in any way to the handling of securities; Article 8
deals with that subject.
Article 3 consists of eight parts.
A. Part 1: Short Title, Form and Interpretation
10: 3-101
Is similar to U. C. C. Section 3-101 in form but reads as follows: “This
Chapter shall be known and may be cited as Commercial LawsCommercial Paper”.
10: 3-102
(On Definitions) Is similar to U. C. C. Section 3-102.
10: 3-103
Is similar to U. C. C. Section 3-103. This section makes clear that
Article 3 is restricted to commercial paper drafts, checks, certificates of
deposit and notes as defined in Section 3-104(2).
Subsection 1 expressly excludes any money (which is negotiable at
common law or under separate statutes). Subsection also excludes
documents of title (like bills of lading or warehouse deposits, which fall
under Article 7) and investment securities, which falls under Article 8.
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2 145, 1990
10: 3-104 to 10: 3-123
Sections 10: 3-104 to 10: 3-123 are all similar to the U. C.C.’s
corresponding sections.
B. Part 2: On Transfer and Negotiation
10: 3-201
The language in subsection (2) was changed to avoid reference to an
Article 9. Security interest. Article 9 has not been adopted in Louisiana.
Otherwise, this section is similar to the U. C. C.
10: 3-202 to 10: 3-208
Sections 3-202 to 3-208 are similar to the U. C. C.
C. Part 3: Rights of Holder
10: 3-301 to 10: 3-307
These sections are similar to their U. C. C. counterparts.
D.Part 4: Liability of Parties
10: 3-401 to 10: 3-419
All of these sections are similar to the corresponding sections of the U.
C. C. in the same way as the U. C. C. Section 3-415 refers to the
Contract of Accommodation Party and Section 3-416 to the Contract of
Guarantor. These sections define and delineate the obligations of the
accommodating party whether he is an accommodation maker, an
acceptor or an accommodation indorser. They also define the obligations
of an indorser who guarantees payment as well as those of the guarantor
who has only given a guaranty of collection.
Georgina Prieto
153
E. Part 5: Presentment, Notice of Dishonor and Protest
10: 3-501 to 10: 3-511
These sections are all similar to the U. C. C.’s corresponding sections.
F. Part 6: Discharge of Parties
10: 3-601 to 10: 3-606
These sections are similar to the U. C.C. counterparts.
G.Part 7: Advice of International Sight Draft
10: 3-701
Consists of only one section, which is similar to its U. C.C.
counterpart.
H. Part 8: Miscellaneous
10: 3-801
Is similar to U. C.C. Section 3-801.
10: 3-802 to 10: 3-804
Were left blank. These sections were deleted because they were
considered unnecessary to the principle of uniformity and because they
tend to conflict with Louisiana law.
10: 3-805
Is similar to U. C. C. Section 3-805. This chapter applies to any
instrument whose terms do not preclude transfer and is otherwise
negotiable but not payable to order or bearer, except that there can be no
holder in due course of such an instrument.
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2 145, 1990
10: 3-806
Former R. S. 7: 251 which was part of the old Negotiable Instruments
Law was retained.
10: 3-807
Former R. S. 7: 252 was also retained; this section refers to figures to
express sum.
CHAPTER 4
On “Banks Deposits and Collections consist of five parts:
Part 1
10: 4-401 to 10:4-109
All of these sections are similar to the U. C. C.’s corresponding
sections except for Section 4-102(2) where the reference to the U. C.C.’s
Article 8 was deleted.
Part 2
10: 4-201 to 10: 4-214
All of the sections in this part dealing with depositary and collecting
banks are similar to their U. C. C. counterparts.
Part 3
10: 4-301 to 10: 4-303
All the three sections of this part dealing with payer banks are similar
to U. C. C. Sections 4-301 to 4-302.
Part 4
10: 4-401 to 10: 4-407
This section which deal with the relationship between payer bank and
its customer are similar to U. C. C. Sections 4-401 to 4-407.
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155
Part 5
10: 4-501 to 10: 4-504
All of these sections dealing with the collection of documentary drafts
are similar to U. C. C. Sections 4-501 to 4-504.
CHAPTER 5
LETTERS OF CREDIT
10: 5-101
This section is similar to U. C. C. Section 5-101.
10: 5-102
10: 5-103
A change was made in subsection (1)(a) which defines Credit or Letter
of Credit to indicate that a credit has to “clearly state whether it is
revocable or irrevocable and, in the absence of such statement, shall be
presumed to be irrevocable”.
The definitions “Contract of Sale” (which refers to U. C.C. Section 2106) and “Security” (referring to U.C.C. Section 8-102) were omitted.
This section was added in 1974 and Louisiana adopted Article 8 in 1978.
Article 2 has never been adopted.
10: 5-104 to 10: 5-106
These sections are similar to their U. C.C. counterparts.
10: 5-107
The additional language was added in subsection (4) to make sure that
this section is read in context with 10: 5-109.
10: 5-108 to 10: 5-110
These sections are similar to their U. C. C. counterparts.
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2 145, 1990
10: 5-111
Parts of Subsections (1) and (2) were deleted in order to avoid all
references made in the U. C. C. to Articles 7 and 8.
10: 5-112 to 10: 5-117
These sections are similar to Sections 5-112 to 5-117 of the U. C. C.
CHAPTER7. WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE (ACTS 1978, NO. 164, SECTION 1 ENACTED
CHAPTER 7)
Part 1
10: 7-101 to 10: 7-105
All are similar to the U. C.C.’s corresponding sections.
Part 2
10: 7-201 to 10: 7-203
Are similar to U. C. C. Sections 7-201 to 7-203.
10: 7-204
Subsections 3 and 4 of its U. C. C. counterpart were deleted. Among
other things, subsection 3 would allow a contractual shortening of
prescription which was found undesirable in Louisiana.
10: 7-205
Is similar to U. C. C. Section 7-205.
10: 7-206
Is also similar to U. C. C. Section 7-206.
10: 7-207
Is similar to Section 7-207 of the U. C. C.
Georgina Prieto
157
10: 7-208
This section is similar to Section 7-208 of the U. C. C.
10: 7-209
This section was entirely re-written for stylistic reasons as wells as to
clarify the rights contained in the U. C. C. text.
10: 7-210
For stylistic reason, the phrase “in the case of a public sale, the time
and place thereof” was added to the U. C. C. text in the second sentence
of Subsection one.
Also, the word “conversion” was deleted in Subsection 9 and replaced
with the word “misappropriation” so as to conform with Louisiana
terminology.
Part 3: Bill of Lading: Special Provisions
10: 7-301 to 10: 7-302
The sections are similar to the U. C. C. Sections 7: 301 and 7: 302.
10: 7-303
The word “depositary” found in Subsection 2 was substituted for the
word “bailee” in order to conform with Louisiana terminology.
10: 7-304
The word “depositary” was in two instances substituted for the word
“bailee” in Subsection 5 for the same reason given above.
10: 7-305
This section is similar to Section 7:305 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
10: 7-306
This section is similar to U. C. C. Section 7:306.
158
2 145, 1990
10: 7-307
Several stylistic changes were made in the U. C. C. text: the
parentheses were removed, a comma was placed after the word
“transportation” and the word “including” was deleted. Likewise,
whenever the word “bailee” appeared, the word “depositary” was
substituted for it.
10: 7-308
The same changes pointed out in 10: 7-210 were made in this section
for the same reason.
10: 7-309
The word “man” (found in Subsection (1) WAS CHANGED TO
“person”, the word “conversion” (found in Subsection 2) was changed to
“misappropriation”.
Subsection 3 was entirely deleted for the same reasons for which 10:
7-204(3) was deleted.
Part 4. (Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading: General Obligations)
10: 7-401
The word “depositary” was substituted for “bailee” in Subparagraph
(c) in order to conform with Louisiana terminology.
10: 7-402
This section is similar to U. C. C. Section 7:402.
10: 7-403
The word “depositary” was used instead of “bailee” in Subsections 1,
2 and 3.
The phrase found in U. C. C. Section 7: 403(1)(b) reading “but the
burden of establishing negligence in such cases is on the person entitled
under the document” was deleted; it was considered unimportant and
many states have disregarded it.
Georgina Prieto
159
The phrase found in Subsection 1(d) reading “pursuant to the
provision of the Article on Sales (Section 2-705)” was deleted because
this section has not been adopted in Louisiana.
10: 7-404
The word “depositary” was used instead of “bailee”.
Part 5 (Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading: Negotiation and
Transfer)
10: 7-501
This sections is similar to Section 7-501 of the U. C. C.
10: 7-502
The words “agency or estoppel” were deleted because it was
considered unnecessary to limit the right involved to those existing under
the law of agency or estoppel.
The word “depositary” was substituted for the word “bailee”; the word
“misappropriation” was substituted for the word “conversion”. The
changes were made to conform with Louisiana terminology.
10:7-503
The phrase “an interest protected by law” was used instead of the
phrase contained in the U. C. C. “a legal interest or a perfect security
interest in them” because the latter deals with concepts found in Article
9, which Louisiana has not adopted.
Also, the last clause of Subsection 7(a) of the U. C. C. which makes
reference to Section 2-403 and Section 9-307 was replaced by the phrase
“under any applicable law”. Sections 2-403 and 9-307 do not exist in
Louisiana; the La. version is intended to cover ownership rights under
Louisiana law as well as under other states’ law.
10: 7-504
Subsections 2, 3 and 4 (U. C. C. Section 7: 504 (2)(3)(4) were deleted
because these U. C. C. subsections are based upon Art. 2 which
Louisiana has not adopted. The area is covered by applicable Louisiana
laws.
160
2 145, 1990
10: 7-505
10: 7-506
10: 7-507
10: 7-508
10: 7-509
The words “contract to sell” were used instead of “contact for sale”.
Part 6 (Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading: Miscellaneous
Provision)
10: 7-601
In Subsection (2) everything found in the U. C. C. after the word
“thereby” was deleted because its source was the common law concept
of “conversion”.
10: 7-602
10: 7-603
The term “interpleader” is used in the U. C. C.; in Louisiana the term
“concursus” in used for the similar Louisiana proceeding. Therefore, the
term “concursus” was substituted for “interpleader”.
Part 7 (Fraud Through the Use of a Document of Title)
Georgina Prieto
161
10: 7-701
There is no counterpart to this section in the Uniform Commercial
Code.
CHAPTER 8. INVESTMENT SECURITIES
Although the title of Article 8 has not been changed, its coverage has
been broadened to include both, securities which are reifed, i.e.,
represented by certificates or other instruments, and those which are not.
The former are defined as “certificated securities” while the latter –which
are now expressly covered by the Uniform Commercial Code –are
designed in revised Article 8 as “uncertificated securities”.
Louisiana has not enacted the 1977 revision of Article 8. Thus its
version of Article 8 deals only with “certificated securities” which
constitutes the entire subject matter of pre-1977 Article 8.

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