Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual H VAS-E

Transcription

Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
0 To our Foreign
Reader
1 Introduction
2 Safety activities and
requirements common to all materiel
3 Methodology
Weapons and Ammunition
Safety Manual
4 Weapons
5 Ammunition
6 Definitions
7 References
Stock name: H VAS-E
Stock number: M7762-000242
Approved: FMV:Inspectorate
Edition: 2000
Central storage: Armed Forces book and form store
8 Checklists
4
Foreword
This Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual supersedes previous editions of
the Ammunition Safety Manual (FMV Amsäkhandbok 1990).
The Ammunition Safety Manual contained a chapter on ammunition safety
methods. As such methodology is a core feature and shall be applied to all safety
work concerning materiel and systems this chapter has been excluded from the
current manual as it was found to be more appropriate to incorporate a methodology chapter in the Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual (H SystSäkE). Both
manuals are co-ordinated and are designed to be used together. This Weapons
and Ammunition Safety Manual should thus be used as a complement to the
System Safety Manual.
Comments on the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual will be gratefully
received and should be submitted to
FMV: Inspectorate, SE-115 88 Stockholm, Sweden.
5
Content
0 To our Foreign Reader ........................................................................... 15
0.1 Purpose of this chapter ................................................................... 15
0.2 Defence Materiel Systems Procurement ....................................... 15
0.3 About the manual ........................................................................... 15
1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 17
1.1 General ............................................................................................. 17
1.2 Instructions for use ......................................................................... 20
1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety .................................................. 21
1.3.1 General .................................................................................. 21
1.3.2 Concepts ................................................................................ 23
1.4 Objectives for safety activities ....................................................... 25
1.4.1 General .................................................................................. 25
1.4.2 Peacetime and wartime .......................................................... 25
1.4.3 Integration of safety work with other activities ..................... 25
1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV .................... 25
1.6 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting
authorities ........................................................................................ 26
1.7 Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers ... 26
2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel ................. 27
2.1 General ............................................................................................. 27
2.2 Safety activity requirements .......................................................... 28
2.3 Requirements common to all materiel .......................................... 32
2.4 Checklist for safety activities and requirements common to
all materiel ....................................................................................... 34
3 Methodology ............................................................................................. 35
3.1 General ............................................................................................. 35
3.2 Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO ........................ 35
3.2.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 35
3.2.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 36
3.2.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 36
3.2.4 Activity description ............................................................... 36
3.3 Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP) ..... 37
3.3.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 37
3.3.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 37
3.3.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 37
3.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements
Proposed (SRP) ............................................................................... 39
3.4.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 39
3.4.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 39
7
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.4.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 40
3.4.4.1 Manufacturer’s internal safety requirements .......... 40
Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) ........................... 41
3.5.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 41
3.5.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 41
3.5.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 41
Obtaining advice from advisory groups ....................................... 43
3.6.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 43
3.6.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 43
3.6.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 43
3.6.4.1 Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility,
and checklists for reviews ....................................... 44
3.6.4.1.1 Advisory Group for Fuzing systems .... 45
3.6.4.1.2 Advisory Group for Explosives ........... 46
3.6.4.1.3 Advisory Group for Warheads and
Propulsion Devices .............................. 48
Safety testing ................................................................................... 50
3.7.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 50
3.7.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 50
3.7.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 50
Test directives for safety surveillance ........................................... 52
3.8.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 52
3.8.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 52
3.8.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 53
Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations
(PHST) ............................................................................................. 53
3.9.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 53
3.9.2 Responsibility ........................................................................ 54
3.9.3 Time frame ............................................................................ 54
3.9.4.1 Background ............................................................. 54
3.9.4.2 Subdivision of materiel publications ....................... 55
4 Weapons .................................................................................................... 57
4.1 General ............................................................................................. 57
4.1.1 Purpose .................................................................................. 57
4.1.2 Structure of chapter ............................................................... 57
4.1.3 Purpose of the requirements .................................................. 57
8
4.2
4.3
4.1.4 Risks and system safety ......................................................... 58
Common requirements ................................................................... 60
4.2.1 Requirements of International Law ....................................... 60
4.2.2 General requirements ............................................................ 60
4.2.2.1 Danger area ............................................................. 61
4.2.2.2 Safety of friendly forces .......................................... 62
4.2.3 Toxic substances .................................................................... 64
4.2.4 Electrical and magnetic fields ............................................... 66
4.2.5 Water and moisture resistance ............................................... 67
4.2.6 Extreme climatic conditions .................................................. 67
4.2.7 Fire ......................................................................................... 68
4.2.8 Blast pressure ........................................................................ 69
4.2.9 Backblast ............................................................................... 69
4.2.10 Vibration dose ....................................................................... 70
4.2.11 Pressure ................................................................................. 70
4.2.12 Forces .................................................................................... 70
4.2.12.1 General .................................................................... 70
4.2.12.2 Requirements .......................................................... 71
4.2.12.2.1 Springs (gas or mechanical) ................. 71
4.2.12.2.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics .................. 72
4.2.12.2.3 Recoil forces ........................................ 72
4.2.12.2.4 Additional requirements ...................... 73
4.2.13 Lasers ..................................................................................... 74
4.2.14 Stability – mechanical ........................................................... 74
4.2.15 Transport ............................................................................... 75
4.2.15.1 General .................................................................... 75
4.2.15.2 Requirements .......................................................... 76
4.2.15.2.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back ....... 76
4.2.15.2.2 Installation aspects ............................... 76
System requirements ...................................................................... 77
4.3.1 Launchers .............................................................................. 77
4.3.1.1 Weapon installation ................................................ 77
4.3.1.2 Recoil systems ........................................................ 78
4.3.1.2.1 General ................................................. 78
4.3.1.2.2 Breech mechanisms ............................. 79
4.3.1.2.3 Firing mechanisms ............................... 79
4.3.1.2.4 Breech ring ........................................... 81
4.3.1.2.5 Obturation ............................................ 81
4.3.1.2.6 Backflash ............................................. 81
4.3.1.2.7 Barrels and sub-calibre barrels ............ 82
4.3.1.2.8 Fume extractors .................................... 84
4.3.1.2.9 Muzzle brakes, flame guards and
recoil amplifiers ................................... 84
9
4.4
4.3.1.2.10 Muzzle flash ......................................... 85
4.3.1.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre
adapters ................................................ 85
4.3.1.2.12 Ramming .............................................. 86
4.3.1.2.13 Recoil buffers ....................................... 86
4.3.1.3 Recoilless weapon and rocket systems ................... 87
4.3.1.3.1 General ................................................. 87
4.3.1.3.2 Requirements ....................................... 88
4.3.1.4 Composite and compound barrels ........................... 89
4.3.1.5 Other weapon systems ............................................ 90
4.3.1.5.1 Minelayers for landmines ..................... 90
4.3.1.5.2 Minelayers for naval mines and
depth charges ........................................ 91
4.3.1.5.3 Launch tubes for torpedoes .................. 91
4.3.2 Pylons and dispensers ............................................................ 93
4.3.3 Weapon platforms ................................................................. 94
4.3.4 Hatches and doors .................................................................. 95
4.3.5 Sighting and laying systems .................................................. 96
4.3.5.1 General .................................................................... 96
4.3.5.2 Requirements .......................................................... 96
4.3.5.2.1 System accuracy ................................... 96
4.3.5.2.2 Sight tests and adjustments .................. 96
4.3.5.2.3 Firing .................................................... 97
4.3.5.2.4 Aiming and firing limitations ............... 97
4.3.6 Guidance systems .................................................................. 97
4.3.7 Miscellaneous requirements ................................................ 100
4.3.7.1 Pressure vessels ..................................................... 100
4.3.7.2 Lifting devices ....................................................... 100
4.3.7.3 Fire-fighting equipment ........................................ 100
Requirement checklist for weapons ............................................ 102
5 Ammunition ............................................................................................ 113
5.1 Joint ammunition requirements .................................................. 113
5.1.1 General ................................................................................ 113
5.1.2 Requirements of International Law ..................................... 114
5.1.3 Materiel specific requirements ............................................ 114
5.1.4 Checklist for joint ammunition requirements ...................... 116
5.2 Warheads ....................................................................................... 118
5.2.1 General ................................................................................ 118
5.2.1.1 Description ............................................................ 118
5.2.1.2 Materiel environment ............................................ 119
5.2.1.3 Requirements ........................................................ 120
5.2.2 Warheads containing high explosive (HE) .......................... 122
10
5.3
5.4
5.2.2.1 HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition ....... 122
5.2.2.2 HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles ...... 124
5.2.2.3 HE warheads for bombs ........................................ 125
5.2.2.4 HE warheads for landmines .................................. 126
5.2.2.5 HE warheads for large underwater ammunition ... 127
5.2.2.6 HE warheads for other ammunition ...................... 129
5.2.3 Pyrotechnic warheads .......................................................... 130
5.2.3.1 General .................................................................. 130
5.2.3.2 Requirements ........................................................ 132
5.2.3.3 Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched
ammunition ........................................................... 132
5.2.3.4 Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs ....... 134
5.2.3.5 Other pyrotechnic warheads ................................. 134
5.2.4 Other warheads .................................................................... 135
5.2.5 Requirement checklist for warheads ................................... 136
Propulsion systems ........................................................................ 138
5.3.1 General ................................................................................ 138
5.3.1.1 Description of function ......................................... 139
5.3.1.2 Safety aspects ........................................................ 139
5.3.1.4 Joint requirements ................................................. 141
5.3.2 Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition ............... 142
5.3.2.1 General .................................................................. 142
5.3.2.1.1 Safety aspects ..................................... 144
5.3.2.1.2 Requirements ..................................... 145
5.3.3 Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets,
guided missiles, unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs),
torpedoes, etc. ...................................................................... 145
5.3.3.1 General .................................................................. 145
5.3.3.2 Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas
generators .............................................................. 146
5.3.3.3 Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas
generators .............................................................. 149
5.3.3.4 Jet engines ............................................................. 150
5.3.3.4.1 General ............................................... 150
5.3.3.4.2 Requirements ..................................... 151
5.3.3.5 Ram rocket engines ............................................... 152
5.3.3.5.1 General ............................................... 152
5.3.3.6 Propulsion devices for torpedoes .......................... 153
5.3.3.6.1 Requirements ..................................... 154
5.3.4 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices .................... 154
Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges ............... 157
5.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................... 157
11
5.4.2
5.4.3
5.4.4
5.4.5
5.4.6
12
5.4.1.1 General .................................................................. 157
5.4.1.2.1 Mechanical stress ............................... 162
5.4.1.2.2 Physical and chemical stress .............. 163
5.4.1.3 Technical solutions ............................................... 164
5.4.1.3.1 Electrical subsystems ......................... 164
5.4.1.4 Other fuzing systems ............................................. 167
5.4.1.4.1 Fuzing systems for explosives etc. ..... 167
5.4.1.4.2 Demolition devices (such as plastic
explosives, demolition sticks, Bangalore
torpedoes and linear charges) ............. 167
5.4.1.4.3 Signal and spotting agents .................. 167
5.4.1.4.4 Hand-grenades ................................... 168
5.4.1.4.5 Mine counter-blasting charges and
explosive cutters ................................. 168
5.4.1.4.6 Self-destruction .................................. 168
5.4.1.4.7 Submunitions ..................................... 168
5.4.1.4.8 Multi-purpose ammunition ................ 169
5.4.1.4.9 Tandem systems ................................. 169
5.4.1.4.10 Propulsion devices ............................. 169
General requirements ........................................................... 170
5.4.2.1 Common requirements .......................................... 170
5.4.2.2 Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs) ....................... 172
5.4.2.3 The arming process ............................................... 173
5.4.2.4 Arming safety features including semiconductor
switches ................................................................. 174
5.4.2.5 Application specific requirements ........................ 174
5.4.2.6 Testing ................................................................... 176
5.4.2.7 Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and
disposal .................................................................. 177
5.4.2.8 Requirements of International Law ....................... 177
Requirements for systems with interrupters ........................ 178
5.4.3.1 Design requirements ............................................. 178
5.4.3.2 Testing interrupters ............................................... 178
Requirements for systems without interrupters ................... 179
Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming
functions .............................................................................. 180
5.4.5.1 Fuzing systems where unique, application specific,
environmental factors are not available ................ 180
5.4.5.2 Signal and spotting agents ..................................... 180
5.4.5.3 Initiation devices and demolition charges ............. 181
5.4.5.4 Propulsion devices ................................................ 182
Requirement checklist for fuzing systems ........................... 182
5.5
Packaging for ammunition ........................................................... 188
5.5.1 General ................................................................................ 188
5.5.2 Environmental factors ......................................................... 189
5.5.3 Consequences of environmental stress ................................ 189
5.5.3.1 Mechanical environmental stress .......................... 189
5.5.3.2 Electrical environmental stress ............................. 190
5.5.3.3 Chemical environmental stress ............................. 190
5.5.3.4 Climatic environmental stress ............................... 190
5.5.3.5 Other environmental stress ................................... 190
5.5.4 Requirements ....................................................................... 190
5.5.5 Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings ............ 192
6 Definitions ............................................................................................... 193
6.1 Terminology .................................................................................. 193
6.2 Key to abbreviations ..................................................................... 218
7 References ............................................................................................... 223
7.1 Documents governing safety ........................................................ 225
7.2 Standards relating to design and testing .................................... 226
7.3 Design principles and experience ................................................ 230
7.4 Textbooks ....................................................................................... 233
7.5 Documents relating to the environment ..................................... 235
7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of
ammunition ................................................................................... 237
7.6.1 System specific specifications ............................................. 237
7.6.2 Environment specific specifications .................................... 237
7.6.2.1 Mechanical testing ................................................ 237
7.6.2.2 Climatic testing ..................................................... 238
7.6.2.3 Chemical testing .................................................... 238
7.6.2.4 Electrical and electromagnetic testing .................. 238
7.6.2.5 Fire and explosion testing ..................................... 239
7.6.2.6 Combined testing .................................................. 239
7.7 Accident investigations ................................................................. 239
8 Checklists ................................................................................................ 241
8.1 Checklist example 1 ...................................................................... 241
8.2 Checklist example 2 ...................................................................... 242
Index ........................................................................................................ 243
13
To our Foreign Reader 0
0
TO OUR FOREIGN READER 1
0.1
Purpose of this chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to inform our Foreign Reader on some facts about
the role-play in Sweden concerning Weapons and Ammunition procurement.
0.2
Defence Materiel Systems Procurement
The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) is a separate agency for
procurement of materiel for the Armed Forces on assignment from the Head
Quarters (HQ). FMV has no funding of its own, everything is financed through
the assignments.
An assignment is formulated as an agreement between the HQ and FMV in each
case, defining the scope of work and reached after a dialogue regarding technical, financial and time aspects. To define the task, HQ issues a tactical, technical, financial objective (TTFO), which could be compared with a specification
in a business agreement.
The responsibility for the defence procurement extends to the technical processing (e.g. producing technical specifications), negotiating contracts, purchasing,
testing and inspection of equipment. But as a governmental authority, FMV
does neither manufacture nor sell anything, nor has it basically any resources for
design (but quite a lot for testing). FMV contracts the industry, mostly in competition and strictly obeying the public procurement act, based on EU directives.
After contracting a supplier, FMV monitors and controls the safety work performed by the supplier.
0.3
About the manual
During the late sixties and early seventies, a number of ammunition related accidents occurred in Sweden. As a result of the investigation of the accidents, an
Ammunition Safety Manual was issued. The purpose of the manual was to pre-
1. This chapter is added to the English edition only and does not exist in the Swedish
edition.
15
0
0 To our Foreign Reader
scribe a procedure that would ensure an acceptable level of safety throughout
the life of the ammunition and to lay down basic safety requirements for ammunition.
0
The manual was based on a record of experience gained over the years. It contained a list of technical requirements, some mandatory and some desired. Many
of the requirements were of the prohibiting type. The manual has been updated
regularly and also been issued in English versions.
A couple of years ago we had reports on some failing artillery pieces. We also
carried out safety investigations on some older artillery systems. Reflecting the
obvious advantages of the ammunition safety methodology Sweden had until
then, the natural question was ‘Why only ammunition?’. We were also aware of
the growing complexity of modern systems and also the impact from the use of
software. This manual hence includes requirements and experiences from both
ammunition and weapons.
16
Introduction 1
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
General
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual (H VAS-E) is a record of the
experience accumulated over the years relating to weapons and ammunition
safety, particularly during the development stages of projects. This manual complements the Swedish Armed Forces’ System Safety Manual, 1996 English edition (H SystSäkE) M7740-784851. The System Safety Manual shall always be
applied. If the defence materiel system contains weapons and/or ammunition
this manual, H VAS-E, shall also be applied.
As a result of a proposal in the final report dated 1970-09-28 from the Ammunition Safety Working Group (ASWG) with representatives from the Defence
Materiel Administration (FMV), the Defence Research Establishment (FOA)
and the Swedish defence companies concerned, a manual was compiled of
experience accumulated from the ammunition sector. This has now been
extended to include a weapons section. This is a natural progression as the
boundary between weapons and ammunition is becoming increasingly fuzzy. It
can even be difficult to categorize certain types of defence materiel as either
weapons or ammunition. If there is any doubt use both Chapter 4 and 5.
The purpose of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is:
•
to complement the System Safety Manual in respect of weapons and ammunition,
•
to state appropriate activities for providing weapons and ammunition with
the required level of safety throughout their service life,
•
to state basic requirements concerning weapons and ammunition,
•
to constitute a guide and checklist for personnel in the Armed Forces, FMV,
FOA and the defence industry in matters concerning weapons and ammunition safety during development, acquisition, manufacture, use and disposal.
This manual states both the requirements for operations in the form of activities
that are necessary primarily during development/acquisition of weapons and
ammunition, and the materiel specific requirements for weapons and ammunition.
17
1
1 Introduction
Safety requirements in this manual are subdivided into mandatory (SHALL) and
desired (SHOULD) requirements. The requirement specification in the order/
contract shall state which requirements, and the type of requirement (mandatory
or desired), shall apply for specific weapons and/or specific ammunition.
Figure 1.1 illustrates schematically how the Weapons and Ammunition Safety
Manual interrelates with other documents etc. that govern and affect weapons
and ammunition safety activities.
1
The System Safety Manual states how system safety activities can be appropriately conducted and contains certain materiel specific requirements.
The REQDOC Technical Specification Manual (H Kravdok) states how requirements shall be formulated in the work undertaking (VÅ) and technical (materiel
related) requirements in a technical specification (TS).
The Software Safety Manual (H ProgSäk) states directives relating to the programming of safety critical software.
The Vehicle Safety Manual (H FordonSäk) states the design principles for, and
experience accumulated from, the development of vehicles as well as regulations governing road worthiness.
The Submarine Safety Manual (H UbåtSäk) states the design principles for, and
experience accumulated from, the development of submarines.
These manuals are used as a complement to the Weapons and Ammunition
Safety Manual when formulating technical requirements and requirements for
operational undertakings. For example, if a weapon contains safety critical software the Software Safety Manual shall be applied in addition to the Weapons
and Ammunition Safety Manual.
18
Introduction 1
H VAS
Software
Safety
Manual
Requirements
Documentation
Manual
System Safety
Manual
Vehicles
Safety
Manual
1
Submarine
Safety
Manual
Figure 1.1 The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual relative to other documents.
Weapons and ammunition safety activities are governed within FMV by FMV
Service Regulations (TjF-FMV 1997:12, updated via TjF-FMV 1999:46). These
state that the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual shall be applied during
the acquisition of weapons and ammunition.
Safety work in a defence industry is often governed by internal company documents that relate to the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual. These documents often specify the entire materiel development process with safety work as
an integral part. This approach is also supported inter alia in ISO 9000-1:1994
and AQAP 110.
When a defence materiel system is to be acquired the contract stipulates that a
System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) shall be established. The SSPP then governs other safety-related activities. The System Safety Manual and the Weapons
and Ammunition Safety Manual provide support concerning which activities
and overall requirements should/shall apply. Refer also to the System Safety
Manual, Chapters 2 and 3.
19
1 Introduction
1.2
Instructions for use
This manual comprises both descriptive and requirement based chapters as
described below.
Chapter 1, ‘Introduction’ describes the background, preconditions and objective
of the manual.
1
Chapter 2, ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ specifies
weapon and ammunition related safety activities as well as the common materiel
requirements for the project.
Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’ describes how the activities specified in Chapter 2
can be managed.
Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’ specifies materiel specific requirements for weapons of
which the main parts are Common requirements and System requirements.
Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’ specifies materiel specific requirements for ammunition. With regard to ammunition the specific subsystem requirements also apply
that are specified under the respective headings Warheads, Propulsion systems,
Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges and Packaging for ammunition.
Chapter 6, ‘Definitions’ defines certain materiel specific terminology and lists a
key to the abbreviations and acronyms used in the manual.
Chapter 7, ‘References’ lists references to literature relating to defence materiel.
Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’ contains examples of how checklists of requirements
can be formulated for inter alia issuing reports to FMV advisory groups.
In all the chapters where safety requirements are specified (chapters 2, 4 and 5)
checklists are provided that can be used to check that each requirement is
observed. Other chapters (1, 3, 6, 7 and 8) are of a descriptive nature.
For some defence materiel systems it may be difficult to determine the boundary
between weapons and ammunition. In such cases both Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’
and Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’ must be applied.
20
Introduction 1
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual is based on – and is a complement to – the System Safety Manual. It can mainly be read and applied independently but certain sections in the text, however, refer directly to the System
Safety Manual.
1.3
Weapons and ammunition safety
1.3.1
General
1
All activities with technical systems involve risk. Complete freedom from risk is
thus an unattainable ‘ideal condition’ which is why the goal of risk reducing
activities and measures in general can only be to reduce the risks to a so-called
tolerable risk level, which means a real ‘acceptable level of safety’. The purpose
of the weapons and ammunition in the Armed Forces is to inflict the maximum
possible damage on the enemy in wartime. Consequently, weapons and ammunition often constitute a potential major hazard even to the user. The requirements specified for performance and reliability can be mutually exclusive to
requirements stipulated for safety since complex safety devices can entail a
lower level of reliability and operational availability. When designing weapons
and ammunition it shall always be assured that they have a tolerable level of risk
throughout their service life.
The Armed Forces, FMV, and the defence industry are enjoined to conduct
active safety work through legislation such as the Work Environment Act, Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act, and Transport of Dangerous Goods Act.
As accidents with weapons and ammunition often have serious consequences
for personnel, materiel and the environment, the requirements governing safety
shall be stringent. Accidents with weapons and ammunition, moreover, also tend
to erode confidence in military materiel in general. Consequently, the materiel
must be acceptable safe to handle throughout its life, which includes storage,
transport, handling, use, maintenance and disposal. The Armed Forces stipulate
requirements in the TTFO for the achievement of a tolerable level of risk.
The National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI) examines and
approves all explosive goods developed and manufactured by the industry for
military or civil use. In addition, the National Inspectorate of Explosives and
Flammables examines and approves all explosives, determines transport codes,
and establishes storage codes in consultation with FMV.
21
1 Introduction
The following prerequisites are necessary to meet the requirements pertaining to
a tolerable level of risk:
1
•
Relevant materiel specific safety requirements and requirements for safety
activities are formulated by the Armed Forces in the form of Tactical Technical Financial Objectives (TTFO) or equivalent.
•
FMV formulates the requirements of the Armed Forces into technical requirements with the aid of the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual
and other applicable specifications. All the safety requirements are specified
by FMV in the Request for Proposal (RFP).
•
FMV ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirements
specified in the RFP or equivalent as well as those specified in this manual,
and ensures that safety activities stated in the SSPP are performed in a satisfactory manner and that documentation for Armed Forces’ activities are
produced.
•
The supplier ensures that weapons and ammunition meet the safety requirements stated in requirement specifications and that the activities agreed in
the SSPP are properly performed.
•
The Armed Forces ensure that training materiel and training plans, safety
regulations, and restrictions on the use of the materiel are available so that
military units can use the materiel in a safe manner.
•
Military units provide users with sufficient training and ensure that conditions during usage are such that weapons and ammunition do not cause accidents or ill-health.
•
The user complies with the instructions given during training and with safety regulations when handling the weapon and ammunition.
•
The Armed Forces assign to FMV the task of disposal of weapons and ammunition.
It is essential that all parties involved are aware of their responsibility for ensuring that weapons and ammunition are acceptably safe to handle throughout their
service life.
In the weapon and ammunition sectors the system safety activities consist of a
number of risk reducing activities that are to be performed during development,
production, transport, storage, use, maintenance and disposal. These specific
weapon and ammunition activities are described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2,
while the general activities are described in the System Safety Manual.
22
Introduction 1
1.3.2
Concepts
The term ‘accident’ is used in the Work Environment Act. A hazardous event
shall result in someone being injured or something being damaged for it to be
deemed an accident. (Example: If a shell detonates at an undesired point in time
it is a hazardous event, but if no person is injured and no materiel/property or the
environment is damaged by the detonation the event is not designated as an accident but as an incident.)
1
Accident
&
Hazardous
Event
Person injured
or object
damaged
Figure 1.2 The ‘accident’ concept
Weapons and ammunition safety is the property of materiel to be handled under
specified conditions without a hazardous event occurring or parts incorporated
in the materiel being affected in such a way that a hazardous event may occur
during subsequent handling.
Examples of such stated conditions (preconditions) for materiel safety are:
•
that the safety of devices for handling weapons and ammunition are satisfactory,
•
that users have undergone the specified training,
•
that the specified environmental severities are not exceeded,
23
1 Introduction
•
that the materiel is used and operated in the intended manner, i.e. that instructions for use have been complied with,
•
that safety inspections and status checks are performed as required.
Handling refers to handling during all phases throughout the life of the product,
e.g. storage, transport, use, maintenance and disposal.
1
Weapons and ammunition safety is only one of many safety concepts. An explanation of how this safety concept can be related to other safety concepts is given
below.
The concepts below may constitute parts within a major system such as a naval
vessel. In such a case seaworthiness, ammunition safety, and weapons safety are
constituent parts of the wider system safety concept for the vessel. System
safety may also encompass further concepts such as software safety, resistance
to environmental conditions, and activities for the protection of the environment. Equivalent concepts apply to vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, self-propelled
artillery guns and missile launchers for example.
System safety
Ammunition safety
Weapons safety
Seaworthiness
Figure 1.3 System safety exemplified by a naval vessel system
Seaworthiness in this example is directly affected by weapons and ammunition
safety insofar as defects and deficiencies in these could impact on seaworthiness. For example, if it was possible to fire a gun onboard a vessel towards the
deck resulting in holes in the hull, or if ammunition stored in the ammunition
hold was unable to withstand environmental stresses (e.g. vibration) resulting in
hazard detonation.
24
Introduction 1
1.4
Objectives for safety activities
1.4.1
General
Weapons and ammunition safety activities shall be performed to an extent that:
•
applicable legislation and requirements governing the materiel are complied
with and provide adequate safety against ill-health and accidents during
handling and that the materiel is provided with instructions for use, safety
regulations and marking,
•
requirements specified in the Armed Forces’ TTFO are met,
•
system safety will not be degraded by the use of new technology or new system solutions.
1.4.2
Peacetime and wartime
It is of decisive importance for combat morale that the user has full confidence
from the safety aspect in the materiel that is used.
Safety requirements for newly developed weapons and newly developed ammunition should specify that the materiel can be used with the same restrictions in
peacetime and in wartime alike.
1.4.3
Integration of safety work with other activities
Safety cannot be managed independently but only in combination with the other
activities involved during the life of the materiel.
Neither can responsibility for safety be removed from the line organization at
the Armed Forces, FMV or manufacturer level.
1.5
Weapons and ammunition safety activities at FMV
Responsibility for weapons and ammunition safety devolves upon the function
at FMV which is:
•
responsible for acquisition or modification of the weapon or ammunition in
question,
•
responsible for integration of the weapon or ammunition into existing materiel or system.
25
1
1 Introduction
After completion of weapons and ammunition safety work or system safety
work a Safety Statement (SS) shall be issued as specified in the Armed Forces’
Advice concerning weapons and ammunition safety can be obtained from the
Inspectorate advisory groups (and such advice shall be procured in cases where
explosive goods require transport and storage classification). Advice obtained
does not alter the line organization responsibility stipulated above.
1
Regulations governing ammunition safety activities within FMV are disclosed
in TjF-FMV 1997:12, updated 1999-12-27 via TjF-FMV 1996:46.
1.6
Weapons and ammunition safety activities at interacting authorities
This manual does not govern delegations and responsibility for weapon and
ammunition safety activities within the Defence Research Establishment or
other supporting authorities.
1.7
Weapons and ammunition safety activities at manufacturers
The application of this manual by manufacturers shall be governed by the provisions stipulated in the relevant order contract.
26
Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel 2
2
SAFETY ACTIVITIES AND REQUIREMENTS
COMMON TO ALL MATERIEL
2.1
General
This chapter specifies the safety activities and materiel requirements that are
specific to weapons and ammunition. It is necessary to carry out a selection of
these activities in order to achieve the required level of safety. Section 2.2 specifies safety activity requirements and Section 2.3 the requirements common to all
materiel. Requirements and activities are subdivided into three different project
types according to whether they deal with:
•
P1: Development.
•
P2: Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems.
•
P3: Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems.
2
These project types are henceforth referred to as P1, P2 and P3:
•
Project type P1, Development, here refers both to development of new
weapon and ammunition systems and to modification or renovation of existing systems.
•
Project type P2, Acquisition of Off-the-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition
Systems, here refers to purchase of off-the-shelf goods. Within the framework of a large-scale type P2 acquisition the adaptation of subsystems may
be necessary. Such an adaptation is carried out as a P1 project type.
•
Project type P3, Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems,
here refers to an investigation of the status of materiel in existence within
the Armed Forces with the objective of creating the basis for a decision regarding the most appropriate measures to be taken with the system, e.g.
modification, renovation or disposal.
Activities that are specific to weapons and ammunition shall be integrated with
overall materiel system activities. It is appropriate that this integration be carried
out by incorporating the specific activities in the System Safety Program Plan
(SSPP) of the materiel system, see the System Safety Manual. Some of the
weapon and ammunition specific activities form a natural basis for the overall
activities. For example, only weapon and ammunition specific materiel requirements are stated in this manual while the overall requirements are stated in the
27
2 Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel
While drafting this manual consideration was given to the procedures and standards that are in use internationally, and consequently the manual is applicable
in its entirety even for international use.
When a development project is assigned to a foreign manufacturer the safety
activities shall be performed in the same way as they would be during development by a Swedish manufacturer. It may, however, be necessary to take into
consideration procedures in use in the country in which development is taking
place.
2
When purchasing fully developed materiel from abroad it shall always be
ensured that information/documentation is obtained to enable an evaluation of
safety to be performed. In some cases such documentation can be obtained via
the authorities of a country with whom a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) has been established.
Prior to each decision on an acquisition a thorough evaluation of the safety of
the product shall be performed. Pertinent documentation must be available to
form a basis for making a decision on acquisition.
2.2
Safety activity requirements
The principles for weapon and ammunition safety activities are illustrated in
Figure 2.1.
With regard to their nature and purpose, weapons and ammunition often contain
hazards that are essential for their objectives to be achieved. It is for reasons
such as this that it is impossible to create completely safe systems.
However, the risks pertaining to a weapon and ammunition system during its
various phases can partially be eliminated or limited. During design and manufacture most risks are limited by the design measures taken and by good production control.
Certain hazards may remain after manufacture such as blast pressure, thermal
radiation during firing, and fragments from detonation. Such hazards can be
limited through restriction on use, and by providing users with training in the
handling and operation of systems etc.
28
Materiel system
Possible
hazards
Defence industries activities
FMV activities
Armed Force activities
2
Figure 2.1 System safety activities
Figure 2.2 shows the safety activities that can be performed during the various
phases in the life of the system for the various types of project (P1, P2 or P3).
The activities selected and the interflow between them varies depending on the
specific project. This is stipulated in the SSPP for the materiel system. The substance of the activities – often denoted in this manual by abbreviations – are
explained in more detail in the System Safety Manual. Abbreviations are
derived from English language expressions.
The objective of these activities is to obtain an acceptable level of safety for personnel, equipment, property and the surrounding environment.
29
Phase
Studies
Planning and
procurement
Study/
Development
Verification/
Testing
Operation
Disposal
Activity
Manufacture Transport/
Storage
Use/Consumption
Maintenance
Disposal
Supplement to TTFO
Supplement to RFP
Supplement to SRP
Supplement to PHL
Advising Group Check
(Advisory Group)
Safety Testing
Directives for safety inspection
Directives for PHST
2
Figure 2.2 Safety activities during the various phases
Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate the information flow between the Armed
Forces, FMV, and the manufacturer involved in the P1, P2 and P3 programs.
Requirements for the safety activities to be performed in the various programs
(P1, P2 and P3) are incorporated into the overall SSPP or equivalent for the
materiel system.
Each requirement is assigned a unique number to facilitate references. Furthermore, each mandatory (SHALL) requirement is written in bold type on a dark
yellow background and each desired (SHOULD) requirement is written in normal typeface on a light yellow background. Requirements for the safety activities to be performed for the various programs (P1, P2 and P3) are incorporated
into the overall SSPP or equivalent for the materiel system. The words ‘shall’
and ‘should’ are used in the running text as explanations. Cases where the text
does not have a requirement number shall not be interpreted as strict requirements but as a general guideline and explanation.
In the activity flows below the circles with ‘A’ indicate who bears the main
responsibility for performance of the activity, while an empty circle denotes participation in the activity or that a document/activity moves, and the arrows indicate the intended direction of the information flow.
30
Activity
FM
Supplement to TTFO
A
FMV
Industry
A
Supplement to RFP
A
A
Supplement to SRP
Supplement to PHL
(Advisory Group)
A
A
Safety Testing
A
A
Directives for PHST
Figure 2.3 Example of activity flow forP1: Development
Activity
FM
Supplement to TTFO
A
FMV
2
Industry
A
Supplement to RFP
A
Supplement to SRP
(Advisory Group)
A
A
A
Directives for PHST
Figure 2.4 Example of activity flow for P2: Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Materiel
Activity
FM
Supplement to TTFO
A
Supplement to RFP
Supplement to PHL
Safety Testing
FMV
A
A
A
Figure 2.5 Example of activity flow for P3: Review of Existing Materiel
How, when, and by whom the activities stated below shall be performed in each
program (P1, P2 and P3) is described in Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’. Most activities conclude with a clearly identifiable documentation.
1.22001
Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO (Tactical Technical Financial Objectives) shall be performed as specified in
Section 3.2.
1.22002
Supplement to safety requirements in the RFP shall be performed
as specified in Section 3.3.
31
1.22003
Supplement to supplier’s Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP)
performed as specified in Section 3.4.
1.22004
Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) performed as specified in Section 3.5.
1.22005
For explosive goods advice shall be obtained from FMV’s Advisory Group for Explosives. Refer also to Section 3.6.
1.22006
Advice from FMV’s Advisory Groups should be obtained as per
the instructions issued by the chairman of the Advisory Group for
System Safety. Refer also to Section 3.6.
1.22007
Safety testing shall be performed by the manufacturer as part of
safety verification. Refer also to Section 3.7.
1.22008
Test directives for safety inspections (part of the In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition) shall be produced by FMV in conjunction
with ammunition development. Refer also to Section 3.8.
1.22009
Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST)
should be established as specified in Section 3.9.
2.3
Requirements common to all materiel
2
Requirements that apply to all weapons and ammunition have been collated in
this section to avoid the need for repetition in Chapter 4 and 5. Further requirements are stated in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 2, Section 2.3. These
requirements shall be incorporated into requirement specifications together with
other applicable weapon and ammunition requirements.
It is the aim of weapons and ammunition development to create a design that
satisfies safety requirements. During the development phases safety requirements are verified by means of audits, analyses and tests. As the failure probability values to be verified are very low it is not sufficient to use only testing –
instead, several methods of verification must be used in parallel.
1.23001
32
Weapons shall not be designed so that they violate the applicable
Rules of International Law. Thus it is forbidden to design weapons
with non-discriminatory effect that cause unnecessary suffering or
excessive injury.
Comment:
Refer also to requirements in Section 4.2.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and
5.4.2.8.
1.23002
Each project concerning new acquisition or modification of weaponry or conventional weapons mainly for use against personnel
shall be reported to the Delegation for International Supervision
of Weapon Projects.
1.23003
Explosives incorporated in the materiel shall be approved by the
National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI).
Comment:
Approval is based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives and
Flammables statute book (SÄIFS 1986:2). SÄI determines transport
and storage codes in consultation with FMV and establishes UN
codes.
1.23004
Explosives incorporated in the materiel shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214.
Comment:
Appraisals of the scope of qualification are performed by the Advisory Group for Explosives, see Section 3.6.
1.23005
Materials incorporated shall be compatible so that the product remains safe during its lifetime.
Comment:
Incompatible materials are to be avoided even if their reaction products are harmless. Compatibility testing often tests all organic materials with the explosives incorporated and with other safety
critical components. This applies to materials that are in direct contact with each other or that can be affected via an interchange of gasses.
1.23006
The product shall retain its safety properties for at least as long as
its specified service life.
1.23007
Testing of ‘chemical life’ should be performed as specified in FSD
0223.
33
2
2.4
Checklist for safety activities and requirements
common to all materiel
The checklist can be used when monitoring projects and when reporting to advisory groups. Examples of checklists for more specific reports are given in Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’.
Table 2:1 Checklist of requirements for safety activities and requirements
common to all materiel
Reqmt. no. Reqmt. type Content
2
Activities
1.22001
1.22002
1.22003
SHALL
SHALL
a)
Requirements in TTFO
Requirements in RFP
Requirements in SRP
1.22004
a)
PHL
1.22005
SHALL
1.22006
1.22007
1.22008
1.22009
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
SHOULD
Advisory Group for Explosives
Advice
Safety testing
Safety inspections
PHST
Comment
Requirements common to all materiel
1.23001
SHALL
Non-discriminatory effect
1.23002
SHALL
Scrutiny by Delegation for
International Supervision of
Weapon Projects
1.23003
SHALL
Explosives approved by SÄI
1.23004
SHALL
Explosives qualified
1.23005
SHALL
Compatibility
1.23006
SHALL
Service life
1.23007
SHOULD
Chemical life
a) Becomes mandatory (SHALL) requirement if specified in the SSPP.
34
Methodology 3
3
METHODOLOGY
3.1
General
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide for the implementation of the
activities described in Chapter 2.
The activities do not have to be carried out in the manner stated in this chapter,
but if other methods are used they must be described, preferably in the System
Safety Program Plan (SSPP) as specified in the System Safety Manual.
It is appropriate to produce the draft SSPP at the same time as the draft requirement specification.
Each section in this chapter embraces the following areas:
Purpose:
Gives a brief description of what the activity intends
to achieve for each project type: P1, P2 and P3.
Responsibility:
Determines which authority – FMV or the manufacturer – bears prime responsibility for ensuring that the
activity is carried out.
Time frame:
To state in which phase during the life of the system
that the activity shall be started or carried out.
Description of activity:
Describes the way in which the activity can most suitably be carried out.
3.2
Supplement to safety requirements in the TTFO
3.2.1
Purpose
The Armed Forces are responsible for ensuring that all requirements stipulated
for the weapon system are disclosed in the TTFO. FMV participates in a dialogue with the Armed Forces to generate proposals for supplementary requirements concerning system safety aspects for weapons and ammunition for a
specific materiel system. To these are appended selected requirements from the
35
3
3 Methodology
3.2.2
Responsibility
P1: FMV compiles proposals for supplementary requirements to be incorporated in the TTFO.
3.2.3
Time frame
P1: At project start, study phase.
P2: When acquisition is necessary.
3
P3: In conjunction with review of existing materiel.
3.2.4
Activity description
The safety requirements are specified in the DTTFO (Draft version of Tactical,
Technical and Financial Objectives), PTTFO (Preliminary Tactical, Technical
and Financial Objectives), and finally in the TTFO (Tactical, Technical and
Financial Objectives). In the DTTFO and PTTFO the requirements are divided
into mandatory (SHALL) requirements and desired (SHOULD) requirements.
The safety requirements are used by FMV as the basis for the formulation of
requirements in the Request for Proposal (RFP) to the manufacturer.
Changes in the general operative conditions, operative focus, or operative capability and tactical guidelines, etc. may create the need for revisions to established requirements. This leads to a new TTFO process.
Requirements for weapons and ammunition safety may comprise inter alia the
following:
•
Maximum restrictions during use such as the maximum size of the danger
area in peacetime and wartime.
•
Restrictions concerning firing conditions such as rate of fire, permitted
charges for artillery, permitted safety distances when firing.
36
Methodology 3
•
Maximum restrictions concerning storage such as compatibility groups for
ammunition.
•
Insensitive munition (IM) requirements. Regarding policy and testing refer
to FSD 0060.
Safety requirements can be stated qualitatively or quantitatively. They must
comprise all phases of use throughout the life of the system.
More information is available in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3,
Section 3.2.
3.3
Supplement to requirements in Request for Proposal (RFP)
3.3.1
Purpose
To formulate the specific safety requirements that shall apply during the RFP
process on the basis of the weapon and ammunition related requirements in the
TTFO. FMV also formulates the safety requirements necessary for FMV’s own
work such as for review of existing materiel.
3.3.2
Responsibility
P1: FMV.
P2: FMV.
P3: FMV.
3.3.3
Time frame
P1: During RFP for each phase.
P2: During RFP.
P3: Before review of existing materiel.
37
3
3 Methodology
3.3.4
Safety requirements for the materiel are stated in the requirement specification
to be included in the RFP. The format for the requirement specification is specified in the REQDOC Technical Specification Manual and in the REQDOC
Statement of Work Undertakings Manual.
Safety requirements stated in the TTFO are given a more ‘industry-friendly’
wording, e.g. with reference to the concrete requirements specified in Chapter 2,
‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’, Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’ and Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’. Environmental design and test requirements
for extreme environments shall be formulated as per the applicable military or
other standards.
There must, however, be a balance between live ammunition with catastrophic
consequences in the case of a hazardous event, and less complex training ammunition.
3
The Armed Forces’ safety requirements for a complete system may need to be
broken down to subsystem level, at which the various manufacturers/suppliers
of subsystems must share responsibility for the overall safety requirements.
In addition to the materiel specific safety requirements further safety activities
shall be stipulated, preferably as specified in the System Safety Manual,
Chapter 2 Safety activities and materiel requirements, Section 2.2, and from
other manuals such as the Software Safety Manual and the Vehicle Safety Manual. These shall be stated in the RFP. Proposals from the manufacturer regarding
the activities that should be included in the system safety program shall be
stated in the SSPP for the materiel system, see the System Safety Manual,
Chapters 2 and 3.
Examples of safety requirements:
•
Safety margins for structural strength such as compressive strength for
launchers.
•
Criteria for qualification when insensitive munition is required.
•
Prohibited materials and combinations of materials.
•
Danger areas for ammunition.
•
Approved classes of laser (e.g. laser class as per IEC 60825-1, so-called eyesafe lasers).
38
Methodology 3
Requirement
Specification
SSPP
- Activities
- Performance req
System Safety
Manual
- Activities
- Performance
req
H VAS
- Activities
- Performance
req
Software Safety
Manual
3
Vehicle Safety
Manual
Figure 3.1 Allocation of requirements
3.4
Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety Requirements
Proposed (SRP)
3.4.1
Purpose
To formulate weapon and ammunition safety requirements in a requirement
specification that shall apply to the materiel and whose fulfilment shall be verified. For the purchase of off-the-shelf goods this means the specification
requirements that apply to the purchase of the goods.
3.4.2
Responsibility
P1: The manufacturer.
39
3 Methodology
3.4.3
Time frame
P1: During the tender stage and product definition phase.
P2: During the tender stage.
3.4.4
The supplier shall respond to the requirements in the RFP in a way that enables
FMV to evaluate the planned system safety program and compare the tenders
received from the various suppliers. Refer also to the System Safety Manual,
Chapter 3, Section 3.7 ‘Safety Requirements Proposed (SRP)’.
Each requirement shall be described in such a way that it is possible to follow up
the requirement, and so that it is easy to understand how the requirement is to be
verified. Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.16
‘Safety Verification (SV)’.
3
This activity also includes reformulating environmental design and test prerequisites into specified environmental design and test requirements. The operating
environment is specified in the RFP, and the planned verification is stated in the
verification specification, environmental design and test specification or equivalent.
3.4.4.1
Manufacturer’s internal safety requirements
System requirements for a development project must be allocated to subsystems
and components before the actual design work starts. This is often a process that
is internal to the manufacturer since the manufacturer has overall responsibility
for the safety of the complete system.
The safety requirements in the overall requirement specification shall preferably
be reformulated into more concrete requirements to facilitate the task of the
administrator in incorporating them into subsystem specifications.
This involves two things:
•
40
Allocation of safety requirements stipulated at overall level (complete
weapon systems) to weapon and ammunition safety requirements at subsystem level (barrel, platform, ammunition, fuze, cast charge, artillery primer, etc.).
Methodology 3
•
A re-formulation of an overall requirement to more concrete characteristics
for the subsystems.
Example:
System requirement: copper azide must not be formed. Subsystem requirement for fuze: copper alloy and lead azide igniter must not be used simultaneously.
3.5
Supplement to Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)
3.5.1
Purpose
A Preliminary Hazard List shall be compiled early in the operation (and be continuously updated) to identify hazards and their potential hazardous events.
Refer also to the System Safety Manual, Section 3.8. This section states certain
hazards based on experience that can result in hazardous events.
3.5.2
3
Responsibility
P3: FMV.
3.5.3
Time frame
P1: At Product Definition Phase.
P3: Prior to start of review of existing materiel.
41
3 Methodology
3.5.4
To identify hazards one should analyze equivalent materiel, accident and incident reports, previous experience and the checklist below. This can never be
complete, however, but must be supplemented over time.
Table 3:1
Example of hazards
HAZARD
FAULT MODE
Aiming system
Incorrect direction of fire
High barrel pressure
Firing system
Moving parts
3
Laser transmitter
High explosives in warheads
Chemical substances in
illuminating, smoke and
incendiary ammunition
High explosives in explosive trains
Primary explosives
CONSEQUENCE
Impact or fragments outside
danger area
Barrel rupture or fragmen- Blast injuries
tation
Inadvertent firing
Impact or fragments outside
danger area
Inadvertent movement
Personnel injured by crushing
Crushing
Inadvertent transmission
Eye injuries to personnel
Premature burst: in depot Blast, fragmentation or holstore, during transport, dur- low-charge effect
ing handling or loading, in Open fire
the bore or in trajectory
Premature initiation/effect Blast or fragmentation effect
Open fire
Emission of corrosive agents
or toxic gases
Premature initiation
Initiation of warhead
Blast or fragmentation effect
Open fire
Initiation of warhead
Open fire
Open fire, shatter effect
Propellants (propellant
charges for tube-launched
ammunition, solid or liquid Excessive pressure resultrocket fuel, powder
ing in rupture of combuscharges for actuator cartion chamber
tridges)
Escape of gas rearwards
from gun
Blast and fragmentation effect
when chamber ruptures
Facial injuries to gunner
Excessive forward or rear- Gunner injured
ward recoil in recoilless
weapons
42
Methodology 3
Table 3:1
Example of hazards
HAZARD
FAULT MODE
CONSEQUENCE
Projectiles, rockets or missiles at launch, release or in
flight
High electric voltage
High electric current
Hydraulic pressure
Body ruptures, guidance
failure, or fins etc. detach
in flight
Flash-over
Short-circuit
Leakage
Shatter or fragmentation
effect
Rotating parts
Vibration
Electromagnetic radiation
Parts detach
Inherent resonance
Inadvertent radiation
Electric shock
Fire in cables
Injuries caused by release of
pressure
Impact injuries
Internal injuries to driver
Injuries to internal organs
3.6
Obtaining advice from advisory groups
3.6.1
Purpose
3
To obtain advice from advisory groups with technical expertise and experience
in the weapons and ammunition sectors.
The objective of advisory operations is to provide advice and recommendations
to project managers, line managers and administrators within FMV, based on the
technical expertise and experience of the relevant advisory group.
3.6.2
Responsibility
P1: FMV.
P2: FMV.
3.6.3
Time frame
P1: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with the
SSPP or equivalent.
P2: Advice to be obtained from FMV advisory groups in accordance with the
SSPP or equivalent.
43
3 Methodology
3.6.4
The preliminary number of reviews in which the participation of the manufacturer is required shall be specified in the SSPP and in the contractual undertaking.
The aim is to obtain advice relating to the project from the advisory groups as
early as possible. The Advisory Group for System Safety can state which other
advisory groups ought to review the project.
More reviews than those originally planned may be needed. Separate reviews
may be necessary prior to special tests.
The current advisory groups are listed below:
3
•
Advisory Group for Fuzing systems (Rg T)
•
Advisory Group for Explosives (Rg Expl)
•
Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D)
•
Advisory Group for System Safety (Rg SystSäk)
•
Advisory Group for Environmental Engineering (Rg M).
The advisory groups written in italics are described in the System Safety Manual, Chapter 3, Section 3.6.4.
In practical terms advice is given in the form of responses to concrete questions
submitted in respect of a specific project.
It shall be possible to use the responses as a basis for the project or line organization decisions in the project.
This advice also includes the safety principles (norms for ensuring ammunition
safety) that the project or line organization intends to use as a basis for its work
with concrete objects, plans, regulations, etc.
When requesting advice the checklist issued by the relevant advisory group
shall be adhered to.
3.6.4.1
Advisory group tasks and areas of responsibility, and checklists for reviews
Section 3.6.4.1.1 through 3.6.4.1.3 state the tasks for each advisory group and
the data required for review by each advisory group.
44
Methodology 3
If it is unclear as to which groups should review a project the question can be
submitted to the chairman of the Advisory Group for System Safety.
3.6.4.1.1
Advisory Group for Fuzing systems
3.6.4.1.1.1 Tasks
•
To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of fuzing systems
The advisory group operates in the following areas:
– fuzing systems for warheads,
– fuzing systems for propulsion devices,
– design and production methods for fuzing systems for propulsion devices,
– compatibility.
Advice may inter alia concern:
– action to be taken with existing fuzing systems and fuzing systems undergoing development,
– project specifications and technical documentation.
•
To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for fuzing systems (for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extent
possible, or on assignment, to participate in the above.
•
To monitor developments and to work on the communication of experience
acquired concerning fuzing systems to FMV departments and the authorities
concerned as well as to companies.
3.6.4.1.1.2 Procedure
Section 5.4 in the Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the
basis for advisory group assessments.
Scope of report:
•
Brief general information about the object:
– field of application,
– weapon platform,
– weapon (or equivalent),
– ammunition,
– danger areas.
•
Description of the object or functional description:
– drawings or diagrams,
– wiring diagram / block diagram / printed circuit board assembly layout,
45
3
3 Methodology
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
model or hardware,
safety critical software,
function of fuzing system,
arming conditions,
initiation conditions,
explosive trains or transmitters including characteristics,
safety devices.
•
Statement disclosing materials and components:
– type,
– composition,
– treatment (e.g. surface treatment, heat treatment),
– compatibility.
•
Statement disclosing requirement verification for Section 5.4 performed in
accordance with Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’.
•
Statement disclosing safety verifications performed:
– safety analyses,
– environmental analyses,
– tests (as specified in FSD 0112, 0212, 0213 and 0214).
•
Statement disclosing the quality plan for the object.
•
Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. Copies of the
relevant documentation shall be submitted.
•
Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than three
weeks prior to review of the object.
3
3.6.4.1.2
3.6.4.1.2.1 Tasks
•
46
To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of explosives.
The advisory group operates in the following areas:
– selection of explosive,
– testing of explosive,
– classification of explosive (UN code and Transport and Storage codes),
– production methods for the explosive,
– compatibility.
Advice may inter alia concern:
– action to be taken with existing explosives and explosives undergoing
development,
Methodology 3
•
To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for explosives (for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation, etc.) and, to the extent
possible, or on assignment, to participate in the above.
•
acquired concerning explosives to FMV departments and the authorities
concerned as well as to companies.
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual and FSD 0214 shall constitute
the basis for advisory group assessments.
When presenting a submission to the Advisory Group for Explosives concerning
the recommendation of Transport and Storage codes and UN code the special
aspects that are of importance to transport and storage shall be elucidated.
Scope of report:
•
– weapon (or equivalent),
•
Description of the object concerning:
– design (drawings, diagrams and possible model),
– function,
– data on all explosives, pyrotechnic compositions, and other active substances incorporated in the object. Weights and compositions shall be
disclosed and adequate denominations shall be used, i.e. not so-called
brand names. If new explosives are used they shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214,
– compatibility analyses performed concerning the compatibility of the
various components incorporated with the explosives or pyrotechnic
compositions, as well as the compatibility of the various explosives and
pyrotechnic compositions with each other and with the surrounding
fabrication material,
– fuzing system with safety devices and arming conditions (advice from
submission to the Advisory Group for Fuzes, including an account of
the risk for copper azide formation resulting from the presence of materials with copper content and lead azide),
– anti-humidity protection,
– electrical screening.
3
47
3 Methodology
3
•
Packaging:
– design,
– location of the object in the packaging,
– total quantities of explosives etc.,
– total weight,
– anti-humidity protection.
•
Testing of ammunition:
– mandatory testing must always be performed as specified in FSD 0060
and shall be disclosed, provided no comparison can be made with a
similar object that has undergone such testing,
– all informative testing performed that can provide information concerning the sensitivity of the ammunition shall be disclosed, such as:
fragment impact (FSD 0121),
small arms bullet attack (FSD 0117),
bump (FSD 0113),
shock (FSD 0114),
cook-off (FSD 0166).
3.6.4.1.3
Advisory Group for Warheads and Propulsion Devices
3.6.4.1.3.1 Tasks
•
To provide the advice requested concerning the safety of launchers, propulsion devices and warheads. The advisory group shall be able to operate in
the following areas:
– launchers and propulsion devices,
– structural strength,
– wear in launchers,
– materials,
– design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices,
– compatibility.
•
Advice can inter alia relate to:
– action to be taken concerning existing weapons, launchers and warheads or suchlike that are undergoing development,
•
To propose when necessary the drafting of new safety principles or the production of documentation for launchers, propulsion devices and warheads
(for reviews, analyses, assessments, testing, design, verification, validation,
etc.) and, to the extent possible, or on assignment, to participate in the
above.
48
Methodology 3
•
acquired concerning launchers, propulsion devices and warheads to FMV
departments and the authorities concerned as well as to companies.
Members present in the advisory group may vary according to which of the
group’s sectors of expertise is relevant to the advice sought.
The Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual constitutes the basis for advisory
group assessments.
Scope of report:
•
– weapon (or equivalent).
•
A detailed review of the launchers or propulsion devices and warheads:
– Launchers or propulsion devices,
– structural strength,
– wear in launchers,
– materials,
– design and production methods for warheads and propulsion devices.
– compatibility.
•
Statement disclosing safety analyses performed.
•
Statement disclosing safety testing, design type testing and other safety testing performed (as specified in FSD 0060).
•
Statement disclosing verification of requirements for Section 5.2 and 5.3
performed in accordance with Chapter 8, ‘Checklists’.
•
Review of proposals for technical requirement specifications.
•
Review of the quality plan for the object.
•
Documentation shall be made available to the advisory group. Copies of relevant documentation shall be submitted.
•
Documentation shall be received by the advisory group not less than three
weeks prior to review of the object.
49
3
3 Methodology
3.7
Safety testing
3.7.1
Purpose
In combination with the safety analysis to constitute a verification of the safety
requirements for the product.
3.7.2
Responsibility
P3: FMV.
3.7.3
3
Time frame
P1: During verification.
P3: During review of existing materiel.
3.7.4
Safety testing is a comprehensive and extensive activity, see Figure 3.2.
The purpose of safety testing embraces three areas:
•
It is one of several methods for verifying that safety requirements are met
(analysis, inspection, etc. are others).
Example:
3-metre drop test to demonstrate resistance to an environmental condition.
•
It is a method of generating input data for the safety analyses that are used
to verify other safety requirements.
Example:
Testing to find out what happens with an incorrectly fitted spring in a fuzing
system when that system falls from a truck platform, so-called FMEA testing.
50
Methodology 3
•
It is a method for providing the authorities with decision data for qualification/classification.
Example:
Fuel fire test and 12-metre drop test to provide data for classification of ammunition according to UN and Transport and Storage coding by the Advisory Group for Explosives / SÄI.
Verification
Testing:
• 5 m drop
• arming
distance
FMEA-testing
Testing of
defective
units
Analysis
Inspection
Qualification
Classification:
• 12 m drop
• fuel fire test
FSD 0060
FSD 0213
3
Figure 3.2 Example of scope of safety testing
Safety testing as specified in FSD 0060 shall always be performed. FSD 0060
contains a section that defines extreme environments, how high and low temperature sequences shall be dimensioned, and a section on the testing of insensitive
munitions (IM), as well as testing in accordance with UN regulations for the
classification of explosive goods. If ammunition incorporates a fuzing system,
FSD 0213 shall also be applied. If ammunition incorporates an electric igniter,
FSD 0112 and FSD 0212 shall be applied. Since all ammunition contains explosive in some form, FSD 0214 shall also be applied.
51
3 Methodology
Environmental
resistance
Env Engineering
Manual
Separate testing
-FSD
-FSD
Sequential testing
UNFSD 0060
Abnormal environment classification
IMHot sequential
testing
Cold sequential
FSD 0213
Fuze systems
FSD 0212
EED in systems
3
FSD 0214
FSD 0112
Explosives
EED’s
Figure 3.3 Safety testing for qualification
3.8
Test directives for safety surveillance
3.8.1
Purpose
To produce test directives for safety surveillance. This is the documentation that
enables surveillance of ammunition in depot storage to obtain data to decide
whether the ammunition is still safe to use. Safety surveillance constitutes part
of the overall in-service surveillance of ammunition.
3.8.2
P1: FMV.
P2: FMV.
52
Responsibility
Methodology 3
3.8.3
Time frame
P1: During the development phase.
3.8.4
The basis for test directives should contain the following parts:
•
description of the product,
•
applicable documents (references),
•
product requirements,
•
method of implementation,
•
criteria for assessment of results,
•
formulation of the results in the documentation,
•
allocation of undertakings between FMV and possible suppliers.
3
The method for safety inspection is based on the concept that assessment is a
comparison between the characteristics of ageing ammunition and the equivalent characteristics of newly manufactured, safety approved or newly developed
ammunition.
The need for comparative data for newly developed ammunition thus places an
equivalent requirement on development operations to generate ‘zero values’ by
such means as so-called shelf life testing.
For further information refer to the FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service
Surveillance of Ammunition.
3.9
Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations (PHST)
3.9.1
Purpose
To provide a basis for the handling and storage regulations that contribute to
reducing the remaining risks of the weapon system to a tolerable level.
53
3 Methodology
3.9.2
Responsibility
P1: FMV and the Armed Forces.
P2: FMV and the Armed Forces.
3.9.3
Time frame
P1: During the development phase.
3
3.9.4
3.9.4.1
Background
A basis for handling and storage regulations shall be produced at an early stage
in the materiel development process. An integral part of development – together
with representatives from the Armed Forces – shall be to develop a product that
meets the requirements stipulated by the Armed Forces concerning handling in
peacetime and wartime.
The handling and storage regulations produced by FMV in collaboration with
the Armed Forces during development subsequently constitute the basis for the
item headed ‘Restrictions’ in the FMV Safety Statement (SS).
The restrictions in Section 4 of the Safety Statement are issued by the Armed
Forces and FMV in accordance with the regulations stated in the Manual Governing Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids (H PubL), and is regulated under Chapter 6 ‘Co-ordination with other authorities etc.’.
54
Methodology 3
3.9.4.2
Subdivision of materiel publications
The following table is reproduced from the Manual for Armed Forces Publications and Instructional Aids, 1996, where it is published as Table 6:1. It illustrates the co-ordination between publications from Armed Forces headquarters
and materiel publications from FMV regarding content and denomination.
Table 3:2 Publications overview
Content
Armed Forces
HQ publications
Materiel publications
from FMV
Solely directives = compulsory
- Instructions
Diverse directives, guidelines, etc. =
compulsory or advisory
- Manuals
- Regulations
Solely information / elucidation
- Manuals
- Regulations
- Technical orders
- Materiel instructions
- Technical orders (some)
- Materiel manuals
- Materiel charts
- Technical orders (some)
- Materiel manuals
- Materiel charts
The work of producing and allocating information between the various publications should always be co-ordinated between FMV and the Armed Forces.
55
3
Weapons 4
4
WEAPONS
4.1
General
4.1.1
Purpose
In addition to pure ammunition safety and the safety of weapons and launchers,
safety also encompasses the interaction between weapons and ammunition. If
any of these constituent parts is modified or developed further, or a completely
new weapon system is developed or acquired, the interfaces must be given careful consideration. The purpose of this chapter is to:
•
identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered and verified when developing and acquiring a weapon system,
•
identify the characteristics of weapons that should be considered during development of ammunition,
•
make proposals for the specification of such interfaces between weapons
and ammunition.
4.1.2
Structure of chapter
4
This chapter is subdivided into two main parts. One part deals with common
requirements that apply independent of the type of weapon, and the second part
– called system requirements – also includes a number of other requirements.
The system requirements part is subdivided as follows: launchers, pylons and
dispensers, weapon platforms, hatches and doors, sighting and laying systems,
guidance systems and miscellaneous.
Ammunition specific requirements concerning warheads, propulsion devices,
fuzing systems and packagings are not discussed in this chapter but are dealt
with in Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’.
4.1.3
Purpose of the requirements
Where safety to personnel, property and the environment is concerned, the purpose throughout of the requirements formulated is to ensure:
•
safe handling during transport and deployment,
57
4 Weapons
•
safety inside and around the weapon during loading or taking onboard, unloading of the weapon, while the unit is loaded and during firing or weapon
release,
•
safety outside the specified danger area,
•
safety during training, exercises, repair and maintenance,
•
safety during disposal.
4.1.4
4
Risks and system safety
Besides freedom from malfunction in the weapon and ammunition, safety is
also dependent on the interface between them and the interfaces between the
system and the environment and the application (use) for which it is intended.
For example, a gun may be part of a battery with other guns that have different
fire missions and thus different natures of ammunition that should preferably not
require different safety instructions concerning use. There may also be requirements for several natures of ammunition to be usable in the same launcher without any necessity for changes such as barrel replacement. One type of launcher
and one nature of ammunition can also be intended for different weapon platforms such as vehicles, aircraft and naval vessels. It is therefore crucial that
ammunition is developed with due consideration given to all the applicable
applications, and that the characteristics that are decisive for safety in a specific
application are documented. As more specialized functions are incorporated in
ammunition – such as proximity fuzes, terminal guidance, and the various
advanced guidance systems used in guided weapons – increasingly comprehensive safety programs and documentation will be needed.
58
Fragmentation
Sabots/driving band
function
Base bleed container
Mussle brake
Muzzle flash
Trajectory instability
Fragmentation
Sound pressure
Pressure
Recoil
Max impulse
(gun strength)
Wear
Cook-off
Sub-calibre barrel
Hazardous initiation
Backblast
Dynamic interaction
”Rocket flare”
Mask safety
Safe separation
distance
Fuze setting
Aiming and firing limitation
Mechanical ammunition
handling
Loading
Unloading
Flare-back (propellant
combustion)
Abnormal handling
Examples of
hazards factors
Exempel på
riskfaktorer
Bore and
muzzle safety
Transport and
loading safety
Safety distance(times)
Arming range(delay)
Hazard overview
rain safety
resistance to electromagnetic
bush safety
In-flight safety
Weapons 4
4
Figure 4.1 Overview of weapon phases and risk factors
59
4 Weapons
Figure 4.1 shows which risks may need to be evaluated for various types of
weapons and in which phase damage/injury may arise. The figure does not
claim to be exhaustive for all applications.
4.2
Common requirements
Requirements that are independent of weapon type or are similar for several
types of weapons are discussed below. For information concerning requirements
that are common to all materiel refer to Chapter 2, ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’.
4.2.1
Requirements of International Law
The weapons related requirements specified below are stated for the purpose of
ensuring compliance with the requirements of International Law.
For references refer to Chapter 7, ‘References’.
4
1.42001
Booby traps that look like civilian utility goods, or are marked with
internationally recognized safety emblems, shall not be fabricated.
1.42002
Laser weapons mainly for use against people (anti-personnel laser
weapons) shall not be fabricated.
1.42003
Weapons that have deliberately been made toxic in order to harm
people shall not be fabricated.
1.42004
Incendiary weapons that have a non-discriminatory effect, or are
mainly intended for anti-personnel use, shall not be fabricated.
1.42005
Weapons that are difficult to aim at a specific target shall not be
fabricated.
Comment: This requirement applies mainly to carpet bombs.
1.42006
Weapons that may cause extensive, long-term, severe damage to
the natural environment shall not be fabricated.
4.2.2
General requirements
The handling of an uncocked weapon unit shall be tolerably safe both when the
unit is separated from, and is mounted on, the weapon platform. This condition
shall also apply during transport in all operational environments.
60
Weapons 4
During an exercise a loaded weapon shall be safe for the personnel operating it
and for its surroundings. It shall not be possible for the weapon to be inadvertently fired during a simulated attack and thereby cause damage to the weapon
platform or its surroundings including simulated targets (which may be living or
artificial targets).
During combat the weapon shall be tolerably safe for personnel operating it.
Arming of the ammunition should occur at a safe distance from the weapon
platform, but also sufficiently early to enable effect in target at short ranges. In
certain cases the shell (missile) shall self-destruct.
4.2.2.1
Danger area
When firing or testing involves explosive materiel the danger area must be calculated and closed off to prevent damage to property and injury to personnel.
Consideration must be given to the type of trials to be performed. Firing with
sub-calibre anti-armour projectiles may result in a projectile flying several kilometres. Guided ammunition, if a malfunction occurs, may deviate considerably
from its intended flight path, etc. Even damage/injury caused by fragmentation,
toxic gases, backblast and blast pressure must be taken into consideration. The
danger area near the weapon, arising from movement of the weapon for example, must also be considered.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of the danger areas around a weapon and in the firing zone. The size of danger areas is affected inter alia by the characteristics of
the ammunition.
61
4
4 Weapons
Danger area
boundary
Firing zone
4
Figure 4.2 Example of danger areas
1.42007
On the basis of analysis and testing an assessment of the danger
area for all current combinations of weapons, ammunition, and firing procedures shall be performed.
Comment:
Refer also to the relevant hazard factor, e.g. blast pressure, fragmentation, toxic substances.
4.2.2.2
Safety of friendly forces
Before a Safety Release is issued the weapon system must be evaluated to
ensure that it can be operated without risk of injury to personnel or damage to
materiel, and without risk to the general public as a result of inadequate safety
instructions concerning malfunctions when firing. The proficiency required to
operate the weapon, and the methods for stowage of ammunition and other
62
Weapons 4
equipment, constitute a vital part of the requirements. In general terms, the risk
of a major failure or accident owing to human error can be minimized by good
ergonomic design and appropriate training.
For safety in extreme climates refer to Section 4.2.6 ‘Extreme climatic conditions’.
1.42008
There shall be an emergency stop for laying and firing when the ordinary stop function is not sufficient to prevent injury or damage to
property.
Comment:
Cf. standard SS-EN 418 also.
1.42009
The emergency stop for laying and firing should operate in such a
way that the energy source is disconnected.
1.42010
The emergency stop for laying and firing should be located as close
to the energy source as possible.
Comment:
When testing the weapon it should be possible for an observer to operate the emergency stop manually.
1.42011
It shall be possible to unload a propelling charge that has not functioned.
1.42012
It shall be possible to remove empty cartridge cases, missile
launch tubes, etc.
1.42013
It should be possible to manually override automatic functions.
1.42014
It shall be possible to mount and remove equipment at the incline
angles specified for the weapon platform.
1.42015
It shall be possible for a member of the crew to wear specified
equipment while at his operator station.
Comment:
Such equipment may comprise personal protective clothing such as
gloves, helmet, eye protectors (e.g. protective mask, anti-laser goggles) and NBC protective clothing.
1.42016
Monitors/VDUs shall be adapted to enable them to be read with existing illumination, even outdoors in direct sunlight or in darkness,
if the application so demands.
1.42017
Symbols/texts on switches and other controls shall be legible and
unambiguous in accordance with applicable standards.
1.42018
In weapon systems where several operators can fire the weapon it
shall be possible for each operator to disarm the weapon independently.
63
4
4 Weapons
1.42019
Where necessary footholds shall be fitted with appropriate anti-slip
surfaces.
1.42020
Locking devices shall be incorporated to secure heavy hatches and
doors in open position (see also requirements under the heading
‘Weapon platforms’).
1.42021
A ventilation, heating and air conditioning system should be incorporated if applicable.
1.42022
The safe separation distance shall be determined for all relevant
ammunition in the most unfavourable firing conditions. Any protective features on the weapon shall be taken into consideration, cf. requirement 1.51024.
Comment:
Refer also to other hazard factors and hazards such as blast pressure,
fragmentation and toxic substances.
4.2.3
Toxic substances
Substances produced by propelling charges during firing are classified as toxic
when their concentration in the air exceeds certain levels. These toxic substances include inter alia metals, ammonia, carbon monoxide and oxides of
nitrogen. Propelling charge cases may emit toxic substances even after firing.
4
Carbon monoxide (CO) commonly occurs and is dangerous since it is odourless
and colourless, and can cause death. Typical symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning are headache, nausea, blurred vision, giddiness, extreme lethargy and
unconsciousness. Normally, oxygen from the lungs is transported through the
body by the haemoglobin in the blood. Carbon monoxide binds with the haemoglobin and thereby reduces the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood. The
bonding capability of carbon monoxide to the blood can be 300 times greater
than that of oxygen. Carbon monoxide is removed solely through the lungs. The
rate at which carbon monoxide is eliminated from the blood declines exponentially and relatively slowly. The half-life time of carbon monoxide in the blood
can be as high as 4 hours for a healthy person in an environment free from contaminants.
Ammonia (NH3) is generated by the combustion of ammunition propellants.
Exposure to ammonia primarily affects the respiratory tract and the eyes. At
concentrations of 50–100 ppm most people experience a moderate degree of
eye, nose and throat irritation.
64
Weapons 4
Nitrogen oxides are also generated during firing. The predominant components
are nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). Nitric oxide has been
reported to cause unconsciousness in laboratory animals exposed to concentrations greater than 2 500 ppm. Nitric oxide itself has no irritant properties but is
frequently oxidised in air to form nitrogen dioxide. At concentrations below 50
ppm the conversion of nitrogen oxide to nitrogen dioxide is slow.
Nitrogen dioxide is more dangerous than nitrogen oxide, and causes irritation of
the eyes, skin and respiratory tract. Short exposures to 5 ppm may cause coughing and shortness of breath. Exposure to concentrations of 50–100 ppm may
cause death or chronic respiratory problems.
Lead (Pb) can be absorbed into the body from inhaling finely divided particles.
Propelling charges and small calibre ammunition contain certain quantities of
lead. The lead is vaporised as the charge burns. Combustion gases containing
lead either escape via the barrel or enter the crew compartment, and also occur
when small calibre ammunition hits the target. The permissible exposure limit to
lead has been set at 0.05 mg per cubic metre of air as a mean average over an 8hour exposure.
Despite ventilation systems, toxic gases and particles can be a major threat to
personnel working in the enclosed confines of a combat vehicle for example.
Neither shall toxic gases be ignored in the case of towed or other materiel. Toxic
substances, even in small concentrations, can affect or degenerate personnel
capability. A number of factors affect the level of concentration of toxic substances at the crew stations, such as:
•
the rate of fire,
•
the chemical composition of the propellant,
•
the efficiency of the fume extractor if fitted,
•
the internal ballistics, nature and weight of the propelling charge. (The fume
extractor, if fitted, is usually less efficient with low charges),
•
materials used in the ammunition (e.g. beryllium alloys),
•
the efficiency of the ventilation system such as the NBC ventilation system,
•
leakage in the breech mechanism,
•
the volume of the cartridge case,
•
wind velocity and direction,
•
whether firing takes place with hatches open or closed,
•
which of the weapons is fired,
•
overpressure in the crew compartment.
65
4
4 Weapons
Comment: Limit values are specified in AFS 1996:2, ‘Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupational Safety and Health’.
Ozone depleting substances as specified in the Montreal protocol must not be
used. The parties to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer shall be mindful of their obligation under that convention to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the environment against activities
that may affect the ozone layer.
4
1.42023
The concentration of toxic substances shall be less than the permissible values stated in AFS 1996:2.
1.42024
Requirement 1.42023 shall be verified in the most unfavourable firing conditions and in field conditions.
4.2.4
Electrical and magnetic fields
An electrical firing circuit may be subjected to radiated or conducted electrical
interference generated by the weapon system in which it is incorporated, and to
radiated interference generated by external sources, especially radio and radar
transmitters. Firing and fuzing systems containing electric igniters may be particularly susceptible to such interference. Communication with the ammunition
is also a sensitive function. Angle sensors, conditions for arming, and control of
status are other functions that can be affected and lead to a hazardous event. If
the interference level exceeds the specified test level, inadvertent firing may
occur. Fuzing systems employing percussion caps and a striker actuated by a
heavy-duty solenoid are less likely to be adversely affected, and probably do not
need to be tested in this respect. However, if the solenoid is controlled by any
form of electronics or sensitive relays, such a concept may be just as susceptible
as an electrical firing circuit and consequently needs to be analysed and tested.
Electrical switching operations may cause transient interference in the weapon
system. Onboard radio transmitters and other electrical equipment may constitute an internal source of interference, particularly if electromagnetic screening
is inadequate. External interference may emanate from airborne or groundbased radar and radio transmitters operating in the vicinity.
Special measures may need to be taken to protect the weapon system against
electrostatic discharge (ESD), high-power microwave radiation (HPM), and
against the electromagnetic pulse that arises in conjunction with lightning
(LEMP) or when a nuclear charge detonates (NEMP).
66
Weapons 4
1.42025
The susceptibility of electrical circuits to interference shall be
analysed with regard to safety.
1.42026
The susceptibility of safety critical electrical circuits to electrical
interference shall be determined.
1.42027
The levels of electrical and magnetic fields to which the crew and
equipment are subjected shall be determined.
Refer also to Section 4.3.1.2.3 ‘Firing mechanisms’.
4.2.5
Water and moisture resistance
Water and moisture affect mechanical, optical and electrical functions. Drainage
of electrical and optical boxes, for example, is often necessary. Changes in temperature during storage can cause condensation on surfaces with a subsequent
risk of moisture damage and corrosion, for example.
1.42028
The weapon system should not incorporate undrainable channels.
1.42029
The weapon system should be tested while subjected to water
spraying and during fording through water.
4.2.6
Extreme climatic conditions
The safety of the overall system with all its functions shall be verified at the
extremes of temperature stated in the specification for the system. It is also necessary to verify that the crew can operate the weapon system at these temperatures.
It is not sufficient solely to test the system at extreme temperatures. Tests must
be conducted in the field where extreme temperatures combined with the terrain
provide adverse conditions including combinations of sand, dust, mud, snow,
rain, humidity and ice.
To ensure that the crew can fulfil their duties in extreme high and low temperatures in field conditions, the following requirements shall be met:
1.42030
The weapon should be designed so that personal protective clothing and other equipment worn by operators does not affect their
operation of the weapon.
1.42031
The system should be equipped with facilities that provide a good
work environment even in extreme temperature conditions.
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4
4 Weapons
4.2.7
Fire
All constituent parts of a weapon system and natures of ammunition may be
subjected to fire owing to accidents or combat action. For this reason it is essential that the materiel is resistant to fire to a certain degree. Because of the various
types of materiel, range of applications, and variations in other circumstances at
the time of fire, it is difficult to standardize a comprehensive fire test.
Any fire of major scale generates temperatures in excess of 800ºC. Fire-resistant
materiel must thus resist such a temperature for a certain prescribed time without inadvertent initiation of propelling charges or warheads, and in some cases
the materiel shall still be usable after the specified fire exposure time. Even with
fires at lower temperatures, large quantities of toxic gases can be formed.
Fire tests can be subdivided and defined as follows:
•
The purpose of material tests is to determine the properties of materials
when exposed to fire.
•
System tests often consist of operational tests in which the weapon system
or ammunition are subjected to a fire scenario determined by the authorities.
•
The purpose of safety tests is to determine the characteristics of the weapon
and ammunition when exposed to fire or an explosive atmosphere from the
point of view of the crew and materiel safety. The following characteristics
are pertinent:
– resistance to fire with retained function,
– the risk for explosion or ignition during fire,
– the occurrence of toxic or corrosive gases during fire,
– hazards in an explosive atmosphere.
4
For information concerning fire-fighting refer to Section 4.3.7.3 ‘Fire-fighting
equipment’.
Additional requirements concerning the resistance of ammunition to fire are
stated in Chapter 5, ‘Ammunition’.
The requirements shall ensure the safety of the crew during fire in the weapon or
ammunition, and during fire in the crew compartments and ammunition stowage
compartment. Testing can be performed as specified in FSD 0165.
1.42032
68
In the event of fire in a weapon platform or in materiel (ammunition
or other materiel) stowed in a confined space the crew should be
protected by specific material design measures and/or escape
routes.
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4.2.8
Blast pressure
The impact pressure of the air set in motion by an explosion – called blast pressure – that arises when a gun is fired can impair hearing and also injure other
organs in the body. Very high pressure, such as close to the muzzle of a highenergy weapon, can be immediately fatal. The blast pressure pattern inside and
outside the troop transport compartment can be complex and necessitates trials
under field conditions. Blast pressure levels should also be measured around the
vehicle/materiel to enable an assessment of the hazard to troops operating in the
immediate vicinity of the materiel.
1.42033
The blast pressure level shall be determined for the personnel concerned. The wearing of prescribed personal protective equipment
may be assumed. Bow-wave pressure along the projectile trajectory
and detonation in the target zone shall also be taken into account.
Comment:
Recoilless systems shall be designed so that there is no harmful interference between the blast pressure in the muzzle and venturi. The
effect of the terrain (the surroundings) shall also be taken into account.
1.42034
When verifying blast pressure characteristics, the test methods and
criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 should be used.
1.42035
The number of impulse blasts (rounds fired) to which the crew
may be exposed during a given period of time shall be determined
and stated in the Safety Restrictions for the system. The wearing of
prescribed personal protective equipment may be assumed. Bowwave pressure along the projectile trajectory and detonation in the
target zone shall also be taken into account.
1.42036
Any protective devices and the location of the crew relative to the
launcher shall be stated in the Safety Restrictions.
4.2.9
Backblast
The backblast is a rearwards directed jet of (hot) propellant gas that exits a
recoil weapon via the muzzle brake and from a recoilless weapon via the rear
opening during firing. Backblast can contain fragments and particles from the
ground.
1.43037
The backblast (propellant gases) from the muzzle brake or equivalent shall not have such high particle and energy content that it can
cause injury to personnel or damage to materiel outside the specified danger area.
1.43038
Requirement 1.43037 shall be verified by calculation and testing.
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4.2.10
Vibration dose
During firing each individual crew member is subjected to a dose of vibration.
By establishing a vibration dose value (VDV) a limit can be set for each individual crew member.
VDV is a measurement of the total vibration to which a crew member may be
exposed during a specific period of time. The value gives a general indication of
the associated discomfort and risk of injury. VDV is calculated from data
obtained from trials. From these results the number of rounds that may be fired
before the VDV level is reached is calculated for various angles of elevation and
traverse.
4
1.42039
Crew members shall not be exposed to a harmful vibration dose.
Comment:
A common requirement for exposure to body vibration is stated in
ISO 2631, ISO 5349 and SEN 580110.
4.2.11
Pressure
When projectiles are fired the launcher and projectile are subjected to an internal ballistic gas pressure. If this pressure in any section of the barrel exceeds the
structural strength of the structure, there is a risk that the barrel may rupture and
cause serious injury. During the design phase it must also be ensured that other
components than the barrel that are subjected to pressure, such as the breech
block and mechanism, can also withstand the loads involved. If the internal ballistic gas pressure exceeds the structural strength of the projectile there is a risk
of barrel rupture, which is why the projectile must also withstand the internal
ballistic pressure.
1.42040
When determining dimensions and design of the barrel, breech
mechanism and other parts exposed to pressure, the pressure definitions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 or equivalent standard shall be applied.
4.2.12
Forces
4.2.12.1
General
This section contains general guidelines for ‘forces’ in the form of springs,
hydraulic pressure or similar that in the event of a failure/malfunction can be
released and cause injury (e.g. from impact and/or crushing by moving parts).
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Weapons 4
In many cases it is impossible to determine whether a spring, hydraulic system,
etc. contains stored energy. This should be taken into account during service,
maintenance and disposal.
4.2.12.2
Requirements
4.2.12.2.1 Springs (gas or mechanical)
Many constructions contain spring forces such as:
•
drive springs in loading trays,
•
drive springs in ammunition magazines,
•
brake parts (like parking brakes, etc.),
•
balance springs,
•
operating springs in breech mechanisms.
During recoil in a recoil system, drive springs for the ramming motion of the
loading tray, for example, can be cocked. The energy stored constitutes a hazard
which, when inadvertently released, can result in death or serious injury.
When personnel must be present inside a danger area, for unloading or cocking
the breech block before the first round for example, the personnel entering the
danger area shall ensure that the designated safety devices are engaged.
It is important that the analysis gives special consideration to the status of
springs incorporated with regard to stored energy in the event that firing is interrupted.
Springs in a breech mechanism shall be given particular consideration during
the safety analysis, since failure modes in these design elements can have critical consequences.
When the attachment elements of a spring may constitute a more frequent hazard than the spring itself, such attachment elements shall be integrated into the
safety analysis.
1.42041
Spring forces that alone, or in combination with other hazards, can
result in an accident shall be analysed.
1.42042
Spring forces that can cause an accident shall either be provided
with double locking devices or anti-handling devices that prevent
inadvertent release of the spring forces.
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1.42043
Any spring that constitutes a component in a locking device which,
in the event of malfunction, can cause injury shall be analysed with
regard to failure modes and shall be characterized.
1.42044
Fastening elements shall be analysed with regard to failure modes
and shall be characterised together with the spring.
1.42045
The characteristics as specified in requirements 1.42043 and
1.42044 shall not be modified between inspection intervals for preventive maintenance such that safety is degraded.
1.42046
Springs and their attachment elements that can affect safety shall be
located in a protected position in such a way that inadvertent contact by personnel or the environment around the system does not degrade their safety.
1.42047
Springs and their attachment elements that can cause a serious injury in the event of a malfunction should have a duplicate (redundancy) function or have a fail-safe function.
4.2.12.2.2 Hydraulics and pneumatics
Hydraulic pressure (and even pneumatic pressure) during operation, or accumulated hydraulic pressure after operation, can result in hazardous events. Hydraulic pressure can also constitute a hazard via its consumers (hydraulic cylinders,
motors, hoses, etc.).
4
1.42048
Accumulated pressure shall be monitored and equipped with a device for pressure equalization if inadvertent actuation of any consumer in the system can lead to injury during operation, unloading
and/or maintenance.
1.42049
Monitoring as specified in requirement 1.42048 should be duplicated (instrument and control lamp) or have a fail-safe function.
1.42050
Hydraulic hoses and hydraulic components should be located
outside crew compartments in confined spaces.
1.42051
Hydraulic fluid should be prevented from penetrating into crew
compartments.
4.2.12.2.3 Recoil forces
Recoil forces exist both in recoilless and recoil systems.
The term ‘recoilless system’ is a qualified truth – there is no absolutely recoilless system. Instead, the recoil is generally so small that it does not entail any
potential risk for accidents.
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Weapons 4
Recoilless systems exist inter alia as manportable anti-armour weapons (such as
the Carl-Gustaf system) or as anti-armour guns of various types. In recoilless
systems the recoil is neutralised by the gas flow through the open rear end of the
barrel which is equipped with a nozzle/venturi. The recoil forces can be influenced by variations in the geometry of the nozzle/venturi.
In manportable recoilless systems the recoil could result in excessive recoil
forces on the gunner’s shoulder and/or cause the sight to hit his eye. In cases
where a recoilless system is fired from the shoulder, the recoil can be experienced differently by different gunners even though the recoil is of equal magnitude (i.e. the same energy).
1.42052
The danger area around the recoil system shall be determined and
stated in the Safety Restrictions.
Comment:
The actions of the gun crew in all situations (emergency firing, unloading, etc.) shall be taken into account.
1.42053
If it is conceivable that overpressure can arise in the recoil buffer
and recuperator and constitute a hazard, they shall be equipped
with a device for relieving the pressure before disassembly.
1.42054
The recoil forces in a recoilless system shall be established by calculation and testing.
4.2.12.2.4 Additional requirements
4
Some examples of parts in a weapon system that can cause serious injuries are:
•
loading trays during ramming,
•
empty cartridge cases that are ejected,
•
axles/shafts and other rotating parts.
1.42055
Rotating and other moving parts shall be located so as to minimise
the risk of injury.
Comment:
This requirement can be satisfied by the provision of guards or by
preventing the presence of personnel inside the danger area.
1.42056
It shall not be possible for loading devices to be controlled by anyone other than the person performing the loading.
1.42057
Personnel shall be protected against the ejection of empty cartridge cases.
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4 Weapons
4.2.13
Lasers
Laser beams can cause burns and total or partial blindness. A laser beam
directed at the skin can cause burns and is also considered to be able to cause
small blood clots. Lasers can even cause injuries at long distances from the laser
source depending on the type of laser, power density and the frequency of repetition. It is particularly dangerous if binoculars or optical sighting devices etc.
are being used.
Occupational activities involving the use of a laser are subject to employer liability in accordance with current legislation and regulations. The overall publication applying to the use of lasers is the Industrial Safety Ordinance and
Regulations of the Board for Occupational Safety and Health (AFS).
Lasers are subdivided into a number of classes according to type and output
power. Regulations governing classification are stated in IEC 60825-1.
4
1.42058
It should not be possible to activate lasers of range-finder type in an
arbitrary direction.
Comment:
This requirement can be satisfied by linking the laser to the barrel
or equivalent.
1.42059
Lasers should be equipped with safety circuits for use in training
mode.
1.42060
Lasers should be equipped with safety covers and locking devices.
1.42061
It should not be possible to look into the laser outlet optic when
used in the normal way.
1.42062
Lasers shall be equipped with warning signs.
1.42063
Sights, prism windows etc. should either have built-in laser protection filters or be designed in a way that allows the operator to
wear anti-laser goggles.
4.2.14
Stability – mechanical
The stability of a weapon system during firing is affected by the following main
factors:
•
trunnion forces and height above the trunnion,
•
the angle of elevation,
•
the weight and the location of the centre of mass of the weapon system,
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Weapons 4
•
the longitudinal axis of the weapon system relative to the direction of fire,
•
the incline and type of surface that the system stands on,
•
the effectiveness of brakes and suspension,
•
whether or not spades are fitted to restrain motion during firing.
Stability during firing shall be verified. The safety of the crew shall also be analysed.
1.42064
Motion of the chassis, platform, controls, eye-piece or launcher
shall be so minimal that no danger to personnel nor damage to ammunition or materiel occurs.
1.42065
Open (or closed) doors or hatches shall remain secured.
1.42066
The weapon or weapon platform shall retain ammunition and
stowed materiel in their designated places during operational use.
4.2.15
Transport
4.2.15.1
General
Despite comprehensive testing in simulated environments it has long been recognized that it is necessary to transport ammunition stowed in combat vehicles
and self-propelled guns for long distances in a manner specified by regulations,
and then subsequently to test fire the ammunition to verify its function.
Although simulation methods have been improved the need for practical trials
remains. In the case of a combat vehicle that uses separated ammunition that is
rammed into the barrel, vehicle motion may cause a projectile to fall back
against the propelling charge. If this should happen, damage may be caused to
the barrel when the gun is fired. The risk of projectile fall-back should be evaluated through transport resistance testing.
In addition, transport resistance testing should be performed whenever:
•
new ammunition is introduced into an existing weapon system,
•
ammunition stowage arrangements are altered,
•
the vehicle is equipped with newly modified tyres, tracks or suspension system,
•
the vehicle is used in a new environment involving more severe environmental stresses for the ammunition.
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4 Weapons
4.2.15.2
Requirements
4.2.15.2.1 Requirements to prevent fall-back
If the weapon is designed to fire separated ammunition (separate propelling
charges) and is required to be kept loaded during transport mode, requirements
to ensure that the projectile does not fall back from rammed position shall be
stated.
1.42067
During driving in terrain in accordance with specified conditions
the ammunition should not fall back from the rammed position.
Comment:
This requirement should be verified by testing with a barrel that has
50% or less of its service life remaining in respect of wear.
1.42068
The system should withstand rounds being fired with ammunition
that is not rammed in a correct manner (i.e. in fall-back position).
Comment:
Gas leakage around the ammunition can damage both the ammunition and the barrel.
4.2.15.2.2 Installation aspects
1.42069
4
76
The method for stowing ammunition in racks and bins in various
stowage locations shall be dimensioned so that the ammunition after
transport and redeployment does not constitute a hazard to the crew.
Weapons 4
4.3
System requirements
4.3.1
Launchers
4
Figure 4.3 Examples of launchers
4.3.1.1
Weapon installation
During development it is necessary to verify the structural strength and integrity
of the weapon installation.
Verification can be by means of calculation and/or testing. In the case of testing
an initial functional inspection shall be performed without firing. Next, strain
gauges are fitted at critical locations to measure the stresses and inner ballistic
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4 Weapons
pressures during firing. A number of rounds are then fired to produce the
stresses and internal ballistic pressures. Finally, the fatigue limits for the installation are estimated through calculations and firings or laboratory trials.
Preparation systems and guidance systems must not render the weapon dangerous in the event of any malfunction. Incorrect firing data must not occur during
temporary malfunctions in the weapon system computers, electrical or hydraulic
systems, or guidance systems, that could enable a hazard firing.
1.43001
Launchers controlled by electronics shall have such an interface
with safety functions that malfunctions, or bugs in software for example, do not affect safety in any crucial way.
Comment:
By differentiating in the design between electronics designed to
control safety functions and electronics designed for other functions, a better interface is obtained.
1.43002
Clearance between the elevating mass and other parts at maximum
recoil within the entire laying range in traverse and elevation shall
be sufficient to prevent damage to the system.
1.43003
Safety devices should be fitted to prevent crew members from inserting limbs into spaces containing moving system parts (range of
movement of the recoil system, etc.).
Comment:
The minimum requirement is that the ‘danger’ zone must be marked
out.
4.3.1.2
Recoil systems
4.3.1.2.1
General
4
Besides the movement of recoil, recoil systems are characterised inter alia by
high internal ballistic gas pressures and high combustion temperatures. The
often high rate of fire rapidly results in a high temperature on the inside of the
barrel.
Automatic handling of ammunition and automatic ramming are common. Often
several natures of ammunition shall be fired in one and the same gun system.
Most modern weapons of large calibre have hydro-pneumatic or hydro-mechanical mechanisms to assimilate recoil forces and to return the system to initial
position. Rifled guns also generate a torque acting on the gun when spin is
imparted to the projectile. Many weapon systems have a muzzle brake fitted to
the barrel to reduce the force of recoil. For any given design of weapon and type
of ammunition, the forces acting on the elevating mass vary according to angle
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Weapons 4
of elevation, the temperature of the propellant, and the temperature of the recoil
system. Consequently, during trials the recoil system shall be fired at the
extremes of temperature and pressure that are expected in the field and at maximum laying angles.
Large calibre weapons that have semi-automatic breech mechanisms can utilize
the recoil energy to open the breech on run-out. Under certain conditions the
recoil energy becomes so reduced that it is insufficient to open the breech. The
worst situation with the recoil system often occurs when firing the lowest propelling charge (or when firing the ammunition that produces the lowest trunnion
force) at the lowest firing temperature. Semi-automatic systems must be tested
by firing under various combinations of these conditions.
4.3.1.2.2
Breech mechanisms
There are several types of breech mechanism such as screw type with sectored
threads, a wedge-shaped transverse block or back-piece.
1.43004
It shall be possible to operate the breech mechanism from outside
the zone of motion of the recoil system to prevent injury to crew
members by crushing.
1.43005
When the breech mechanism is fully closed it shall be locked in the
closed position.
1.43006
The breech mechanism shall not open as a result of vibration
caused by firing or motion/transport.
1.43007
It should not be possible to assemble any component of the breech
assembly in an incorrect manner that could cause injury/damage.
1.43008
When the breech mechanism is operated automatically the firing
mechanism shall automatically become inactive before the breech
mechanism is released from its locked position.
1.43009
It shall be possible to indicate or observe the status of the breech
mechanism.
1.43010
It shall not be possible to fire the weapon if the breech mechanism
is not fully closed.
4.3.1.2.3
Firing mechanisms
4
The firing mechanism initiates the propelling charge via a cannon primer or cartridge. This is either an integral part of the cartridge case or a separate cartridge.
The firing mechanism is also the means by which the firing of the weapon is
controlled, and is therefore of crucial importance for the interface between the
crew and the weapon. There are several types of firing mechanism:
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4 Weapons
4
•
Percussion. In this type a metal firing pin strikes the primer of the cannon
primer or cartridge causing it to produce a flash which ignites the propelling
charge. The firing pin is actuated by the release of a spring mechanism, either manually or by a mechanical or electrical device.
•
Electric. In this type the primer is located in the artillery primer. The electroexplosive device (EED) in the artillery primer contains a priming composition.
•
Laser. This type uses a laser whose output power is dimensioned to initiate
the propelling charge.
1.43011
It shall be possible to safe the firing mechanism from outside the
zone of motion of the recoil system.
1.43012
The weapon shall be fired by an active operation from outside the
zone of motion of the recoil system
1.43013
If an electromechanical device is used it shall be protected from
the effects of radiated or conducted interference that could cause
inadvertent initiation.
1.43014
If a firing button, pedal, lever or similar is employed it shall be provided with protection against inadvertent operation such as by a
trigger guard.
1.43015
If a firing mechanism is employed to release a firing pin it shall be
designed to withstand vibration and shocks.
1.43016
The firing mechanism shall be resistant to shock from other weapons mounted in the vicinity.
1.43017
Electrical firing systems shall be resistant to radiated or conducted interference generated by other electrical installations on the
weapon, or from moderate external sources of interference (radio,
radar, etc.) without resulting in hazard initiation.
1.43018
The electrical connector of the firing mechanism should not come
into contact with the base connector of the artillery primer until the
breech block/screw is closed and locked.
1.43019
There should be at least two mechanical safety devices (which do
not constitute any part of the firing linkage) that directly actuate the
striker or the capability of the striker to fire.
1.43020
There shall be a separate manually operated safety interrupter
that can break the electrical firing circuit.
1.43021
The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1.43020 shall be
located outside the zone of operation of the recoil system.
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Weapons 4
1.43022
The safety interrupter specified in requirement 1.43020 shall be
marked with actual position/mode such as S for unarmed, O for
armed, and A for automatic fire.
4.3.1.2.4
Breech ring
The breech ring is one of the parts in a firing system that is subjected to very
high stresses. In the same way as the barrel etc. the breech ring can become
fatigued. The safety analysis of the breech ring shall be based on calculation and
testing.
1.43023
For a given load profile the life of the breech ring shall be established by calculation and material testing.
4.3.1.2.5
Obturation
The breech mechanism shall prevent leakage of propellant gases. The choice of
obturation system is dependent on design requirements such as rate of fire and
the size of ammunition. From the safety aspect the obturation system must function with all types of relevant charges over the entire temperature range. Leakage of hot propellant gases could severely burn members of the crew. A minor
leakage could cause a rise in the concentration of toxic fumes, especially in confined spaces. It should be noted that initiation systems employing an igniter also
necessitate a gas-tight solution. The same requirement should apply to any
future initiation system such as laser ignition or an equivalent system.
1.43024
Obturation shall be designed to ensure that the crew is not exposed
to either hot gases or harmful concentrations of toxic fumes.
4.3.1.2.6
Backflash
Backflash sometimes occurs in recoil systems when the breech is opened after
firing. It occurs when combustion has not been completed when the breech is
opened, or when combustible propellant gases are released and ignited by the
supply of oxygen. The resultant flash can cause burns to crew members and constitutes a hazard for propellant charges and equipment inside the turret of a combat vehicle, for example. Backflash may occur when the breech block/screw is
opened during run-out. Firing into a head wind also tends to exacerbate backflash. The efficiency of the fume extractor, if fitted, can be another contributing
factor. Backflash is not always detected during development trials of the propelling charge since the breech is not always opened immediately after firing in
such trials. Special trials should be performed to determine whether backflash
might be a problem. If the problem is serious, Safety Restrictions may have to
be placed on the use of certain charges or the fume extractor may need to be
modified.
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4 Weapons
1.43025
Backflash that can cause injury shall not occur during automatic
fire into a maximum head wind.
4.3.1.2.7
Barrels and sub-calibre barrels
4.3.1.2.7.1 Barrel wear
Barrel wear is primarily caused by hot propellant gases eroding the inside of the
barrel. Normally barrel wear is defined as the increase in bore diameter at a specific point in the barrel (usually at the commencement of rifling). Wear reduces
the efficiency of obturation since it allows hot gases to pass the projectile. This
leakage of hot gases can accelerate barrel wear. As wear increases the hot gases
may begin to erode material from the driving band of the projectile. Eventually a
level of wear is reached that results in insufficient spin being imparted to the
projectile. The resultant instability of the projectile then constitutes a hazard,
both in the bore and in trajectory.
In a worn barrel the projectile may accelerate ‘unguided’ until it engages with
the rifling. The resultant load may then cause the driving band to be damaged
while in the barrel.
1.43026
The barrel shall not constitute any enhanced hazard (such as by imparting extra stress on ammunition or incorrect trajectory) when the
ammunition in question is fired in either a new or worn barrel.
Comment: A worn barrel can normally be defined as a barrel that
has less than 25% of its total wear life remaining.
1.43027
Requirement 1.43026 shall be verified by testing.
4
4.3.1.2.7.2 Fatigue
In most modern weapon systems the use of surface coated barrels, wear reducing material (such as titanium dioxide), and non-metallic obturating material has
decreased the rate of barrel wear and has thus extended barrel life considerably.
Consequently, metal fatigue rather than wear can be the determining factor
when calculating the service life of a barrel as fatigue failure may occur before
wear life has expired. To establish the fatigue life it is necessary to perform theoretical calculations. On the basis of this data the safe limit for fatigue failure
can subsequently be established.
1.43028
Fatigue, and the inherent risk of barrel rupture, shall not occur
during firing within the established barrel life.
1.43029
Requirement 1.43028 shall be verified; theoretical calculations
may be employed.
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Weapons 4
4.3.1.2.7.3 Fragmentation
Under extreme conditions, for example when there is soil, sand, a forgotten barrel telescope, or snow in the barrel, the barrel may rupture. Ammunition driving
bands, sabots, obturators, jackets, etc. can also cause fragmentation during firing. To ensure the safety of the crew the requirements below shall be satisfied.
1.43030
Attachment of external parts on the outside of the barrel or subcalibre barrel shall be in a way that precludes detachment during firing.
1.43031
The muzzle brake should prevent rearward ricochets of driving
bands, sabots, obturators, etc.
1.43032
During modification in the design or new development of ammunition or weapons relating to driving bands, sabots, obturators,
jackets etc., or in the event of a new commencement of rifling in the
barrel or a new muzzle brake, testing shall be performed to determine the occurrence of fragmentation.
1.43033
The barrel shall not rupture when firing the highest charge with a
specified amount of snow, sand or gravel in the barrel.
1.43034
Practical trials to simulate barrel rupture as per requirement
1.43033 shall be performed.
Comment:
Testing may be performed by filling the barrel with various quantities of sand and gravel to determine the ruggedness of the weapon.
4.3.1.2.7.4 Cook-off
Where barrel cooling systems are not employed, a sustained high rate of fire will
make the barrel extremely hot. Spontaneous initiation of ammunition (cook-off)
can occur in a hot barrel when, for example, firing is interrupted while a round is
rammed. Usually it is the propelling charge that is initiated, but initiation of the
warhead can also occur. It is also conceivable that a projectile detaches from the
cartridge case during ramming thus enabling propellant to come into direct contact with the hot surface of the barrel and result in ignition. When a warhead
heated in this way is ‘fired’, melted explosive may be subject to hazard initiation
caused by the acceleration stresses generated during firing.
Testing and calculations are necessary to establish at which temperature cookoff occurs, as well as how many rounds and which rate of fire are necessary to
attain this temperature.
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4 Weapons
1.43035
Cook-off shall not occur during the maximum specified fire engagement in combination with interrupted fire with rammed ammunition.
Comment:
Refer also to requirements 1.52011 and 1.53019.
1.43036
To determine the risk of cook-off the temperature and heat flux
etc. for a hot barrel shall be established.
Comment:
The Safety Restrictions shall state the permitted rate of fire, the permitted number of rounds per salvo, and/or the permitted duration for
fire.
4.3.1.2.8
Fume extractors
A fume extractor is a cylinder attached around the mid-section of the barrel. It is
pressure fed by the propellant gases produced during firing and vents them forwards in the barrel, thereby extracting residual gases out through the muzzle.
The fume extractor also helps to prevent the occurrence of backflash. The fume
extractor is subjected to a certain load during firing, and must be dimensioned to
withstand such stresses.
4
Figure 4.4 Example of a fume extractor
1.43037
The fume extractor shall be fitted to the barrel in a way that prevents detachment during firing.
1.43038
The fume extractor shall be so dimensioned that it is not subjected
to fatigue and inherent risk of rupture during firing.
4.3.1.2.9
Muzzle brakes, flame guards and recoil amplifiers
Weapon systems are provided with muzzle brakes to reduce recoil forces. The
muzzle brake is subjected to powerful forces by the high gas velocity, high
velocity particles and high pressure.
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Weapons 4
In some cases it may, however, be necessary to increase recoil forces because of
functional requirements. This can be achieved by mounting an expansion nozzle
(venturi) on the muzzle. A flame guard is employed to reduce the signature from
the weapon when firing.
Figure 4.5 Example of a muzzle brake
1.43039
It shall not be possible for any muzzle brake, flame guard or recoil
amplifier fitted to detach during firing.
1.43040
Any muzzle brake, flame guard or recoil amplifier shall be dimensioned so that it does not rupture during firing.
1.43041
Requirements 1.43039 and 1.43040 shall be verified by firing tests
using the highest charge.
4.3.1.2.10 Muzzle flash
Muzzle flash can occur when the projectile passes the muzzle and unburnt propellant gases are combusted. Muzzle flash can also occur when the driving band
or sabot does not obturate properly against the internal surface of the barrel.
Besides danger to the crew, muzzle flash may also damage sight equipment (e.g.
image amplifier).
1.43042
When fitting external equipment onto the weapon or weapon platform consideration shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle
flash.
1.43043
Crew stations shall be located such that the crew are not subjected
to muzzle flash.
4.3.1.2.11 Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters
A sub-calibre barrel/adapter is often used in large calibre barrels to enable lowcost ammunition to be used, primarily for exercise purposes. By using a sub-calibre barrel the weapon system can largely be used in the same way as with a
standard barrel and effective training is thus achieved.
1.43044
Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.7 above shall
apply.
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4 Weapons
1.43045
It shall not be possible for a correctly fitted sub-calibre barrel or
sub-calibre adapter to detach during firing.
1.43046
It shall be possible to inspect a sub-calibre barrel/adapter for cracks
and other defects.
1.43047
A sub-calibre barrel/adapter shall not produce higher stresses on the
ammunition than a standard barrel.
Comment:
If, for example, a sub-calibre barrel is longer than a standard barrel, other acceleration and spin stresses may arise. It must be determined whether the ammunition is dimensioned for such stresses.
1.43048
Requirements 1.43045 and 1.43047 shall be verified by test firing
using the actual propelling charges and natures of ammunition.
1.43049
A system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently
fitted in an exercise weapon or in a special exercise cartridge that is
loaded like normal ammunition.
4.3.1.2.12 Ramming
4
Ammunition can be rammed in the barrel in a number of different ways. When a
high ramming velocity is used, such as with a high rate of fire, the high explosive or fuzing system in the projectile may be damaged. Ammunition containing
submunitions, electronics, or rocket motors may be particularly vulnerable in
this respect.
1.43050
The rammer shall be provided with safety devices that prevent
physical contact by the crew during the ramming operation.
1.43051
The physical ramming environment for the weapon in question
shall be verified by testing, which shall be performed at the extreme
temperatures specified.
4.3.1.2.13 Recoil buffers
Recoil buffers are employed to create forces to enable the cyclical function of
the recoil system. Recoil forces are usually accumulated in a pressure chamber
for gas/fluid or by springs. The system contains substantial forces which is why
care must be taken during maintenance and repair.
Before and after firing the following requirements shall be satisfied:
1.43052
The system shall be designed so that the static pressure of the recoil buffer is retained.
1.43053
Leakage of recoil buffer fluid and gas should be minimized.
1.43054
Maximum recoil stresses shall be verified.
86
Weapons 4
1.43055
Forced recoil equipment shall withstand recoil forces with a safety
margin.
4.3.1.3
Recoilless weapon and rocket systems
4.3.1.3.1
General
Minimal recoil systems and rocket systems are characterised by relatively little
recoil and gas flow rearwards, among other things.
Ammunition handling is often performed manually. Different types of ammunition can be used in the same weapon system.
Recoilless weapons and rocket systems employ various solutions for ammunition handling:
•
weapons for repeated use,
•
weapons for limited repeated use,
•
disposable weapons (for firing once only),
•
fixed launch and aiming unit with replaceable, disposable barrel or launch
tube.
Such systems usually have muzzle velocities below sonic speed and relatively
short ranges. These systems often have large danger areas rearwards compared
with recoil weapons. Some systems, such as missiles, can be guided while in
flight and this affects the danger area.
In recoilless systems the recoil is neutralised by the escape of gas through the
open rear end of the launch tube which has a nozzle or recoil rocket. The force
of recoil can be influenced by the geometry of the nozzle and the design of the
recoil rocket.
The mass of gas escaping to the rear can be replaced by solid or liquid substances, known as countermass, which results in a lower blast pressure around
the weapon.
In rocket systems the projectile is equipped with a rocket motor in which propellant combustion takes place. The pressure in the launch tube is determined by
the static pressure of the escaping gases, which is usually much lower than in
recoil systems.
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4 Weapons
There are variations to both these systems. For recoilless systems there is the
rocket-assisted projectile (RAP) which maintains or increases velocity in flight
by means of a rocket motor, and for rocket systems a gas generator located in
the launch tube provides the initial acceleration for the rocket in the launcher.
During loading there is a risk of inadvertent firing, and during firing muzzle
flash and backblast present hazards.
4.3.1.3.2
Requirements
4.3.1.3.2.1 Firing mechanism
1.43056
Applicable requirements stated in Section 4.3.1.2.3 above shall apply.
1.43057
The firing mechanism shall have a transport safety device.
1.43058
The firing system shall have a safety device for the operating and
system ready-to-fire phases.
1.43059
It shall be possible to deactivate the system to prevent hazard initiation during loading/unloading and during transport of the system.
4.3.1.3.2.2 Recoil
4
1.43060
The direction of recoil for recoilless launch tubes and rocket systems should be to the rear in the event of any resultant recoil.
1.43061
Recoil forces shall be established by testing.
4.3.1.3.2.3 Hazards around the weapon
1.43062
The necessity for using a specific firing stance when firing a weapon shall be documented in the Safety Restrictions.
Comment:
For example, fin-stabilized rounds with wide-span fins cannot be
fired from the prone position. Safety Restrictions governing operation must be formulated on the basis of the documentation specified
above.
4.3.1.3.2.4 Backblast
1.43063
Outside the danger area for materiel and friendly forces the backblast shall not have a high enough energy content to cause injury.
Comment: Energy and particle content shall be determined.
1.43064
Requirement 1.43063 shall be verified by testing.
4.3.1.3.2.5 Muzzle flash
1.43065
88
When fitting external equipment onto the weapon consideration
shall be given to the effect of possible muzzle flash.
Weapons 4
1.43066
Muzzle flash shall be limited so that personnel are not subjected to
higher levels of thermal radiation than the prescribed personal protective equipment can withstand.
1.43067
The weapon should not produce such a muzzle flash that personal
protective equipment is required by personnel.
4.3.1.3.2.6 Pressure
1.43068
There shall be a safety margin for structural strength and fatigue.
The risk for barrel rupture shall be established for the specified operational profile.
1.43069
Requirement 1.43068 shall be verified by theoretical calculations
and testing.
Comment:
For requirements concerning pressure refer to STANAG 4110 or
equivalent.
4.3.1.3.2.7 Sub-calibre barrel
1.43070
A recoilless system with a sub-calibre barrel should have this permanently fitted in an exercise weapon, or in a special exercise cartridge that is loaded like normal ammunition.
4.3.1.4
Composite and compound barrels
Materials in the form of non-metallic composites, plastics, compounds (mixtures of metal and composite), etc. are used to an increasing extent in weapon
applications. These materials have different properties compared with metallic
materials. Elongation and expansion in barrels and rocket/missile launch tubes
can be significant factors. Such properties shall be taken into account in the
design and calculations for weapon systems.
1.43071
In the design of non-metallic and compound barrels, consideration
shall be given to dimensioning with regard to expected material
properties when these change over time.
1.43072
In the design and fastening of external parts onto non-metallic barrels, consideration should be given to the influence of fixtures that
are permanently attached by winding for example, so that elongation properties are not negatively affected.
89
4
4 Weapons
4.3.1.5
Other weapon systems
4.3.1.5.1
Minelayers for landmines
In some cases landmines can be laid mechanically, which means that hundreds
of mines can be laid every hour by each minelayer. Usually the mines are fed
into the minelayer from the towing truck so that only a small number of mines
are in the minelayer at any one time. A plough-like device, for example,
designed for the type of ground in question prepares space beneath the surface
in which the mines are laid.
Refer also to the requirements stated in Section 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges’.
4
Figure 4.6 Example of a minelayer
1.43073
If the minelayer arms the mine via a mechanical device it shall be
equipped with an automatic monitoring system.
1.43074
A monitoring system as specified in requirement 1.43073 shall
emit both a light and sound signal when a mine becomes jammed in
the minelayer. The alarm shall be reset manually.
1.43075
A minelayer that mechanically arms the mine shall enable access
to a mine that becomes jammed without the necessity for the use of
any tools.
1.43076
It shall be possible to decouple a minelayer that mechanically arms
the mine from the towing vehicle to enable personnel and the towing vehicle to be moved outside the danger area of the mine within
the duration of the safety delay including a safety margin.
Comment:
If the above safety delay is 5+1 minutes it should be possible to de-
90
Weapons 4
couple the minelayer from the towing vehicle and to move the personnel (with vehicle) outside the mine’s danger area within 2
minutes.
1.43077
The minelayer should be designed so as to minimise the risk of a
mine becoming jammed during laying.
Comment:
The configuration of the mine should also be taken into account.
4.3.1.5.2
Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges
Naval mines are normally laid from a vessel under way (within a certain speed
range). The mines can either be launched by rails over the side of the vessel
from where they fall freely into the water, or by a minelaying device specially
designed for one or more types of mine.
Naval mines are often heavy (several hundred kilograms) and thus require special lifting devices during handling.
The fuzing system is generally separate from the mine and is installed before
laying.
Depth charges can be dropped from a launcher (from a vessel or helicopter) to
form a ‘carpet’, i.e. with a certain distance between each depth charge to cover a
specific area.
1.43078
The minelayer shall not arm the mine before the mine leaves the
minelaying device.
1.43079
The minelayer shall be designed so that the mine cannot become
jammed during launch.
Comment:
The configuration of the mine shall also be taken into account.
4.3.1.5.3
Launch tubes for torpedoes
Torpedoes are used as armament (weapon system) on submarines, surface vessels and helicopters.
In a submarine, combat-ready torpedoes are stowed in the launch tubes and/or in
stowage (standby mode) close to the launch tubes.
Onboard surface vessels the torpedoes are normally stowed only in the launch
tubes. Torpedoes are loaded into the launch tubes at the naval base.
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4
4 Weapons
In peacetime torpedoes are used as exercise torpedoes with the warhead
replaced by a special exercise head. After a practice run the torpedo is recovered
and reused for other practice runs. It can also be reused as a combat torpedo
after being refitted with a warhead. There are two types of energy platforms for
propulsion of torpedoes:
•
Thermal system for generating propulsion gas for a thermal motor. Currently Swedish torpedoes use high-test peroxide as oxidation agent and alcohol
or paraffin is used as fuel.
•
Electric energy stored in rechargeable or thermal batteries and an electric
motor for propulsion.
Torpedoes are heavy (250 - 1 800 kg) and require lifting tackle to facilitate handling.
The safety, arming and ignition unit (SAI) is normally stored separate from the
torpedo, and the SAI is also provided with a transport safety device. The SAI is
installed in the torpedo when the latter is loaded into the launch tube.
Two types of system are currently used to launch torpedoes from a submarine:
4
•
Compressed air that actuates a piston located aft of the torpedo that forces
both the torpedo and the water out of the launch tube (push-out).
•
Start of the torpedo motor in a water-filled launch tube whereby the torpedo
‘swims’ out of the launch tube under its own power (swim-out).
Torpedo launch from a surface vessel is performed by an overpressure in the
launch tube aft of the torpedo. This overpressure is generated either by combustion of a propelling charge or by compressed air.
The warhead is armed when the barrier lock in the SAI is cancelled.
1.43080
Launch tubes shall be equipped with sensors that indicate that the
torpedo has left the tube.
1.43081
Launch tubes shall be so designed that the torpedo cannot become
jammed on its way out of the tube or in the forepeak of submarines.
Comment:
The configuration of the torpedo shall also be taken into account.
1.430821
1) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.
92
Weapons 4
1.43083
It shall not be possible for the testing of a launcher to cause hazard
initiation.
Comment:
The test system shall normally be separate from the launch system.
1.43084
For torpedoes incorporating hydrogen peroxide the launch tubes
when in standby mode shall be equipped with a draining system
connected to the hydrogen peroxide system of the torpedo.
4.3.2
Pylons and dispensers
Pylons and dispensers are attachment elements for weapon systems such as
bombs, bomblets (multiple weapons), rockets, missiles and torpedoes. The functions that are built into the pylon or ammunition vary according to the application. A specific function requirement in the following requirements does not
mean that the function must be built into the weapon itself.
4
Figure 4.7 Example of a weapon launcher
1.43085
A pylon/dispenser shall enable a transport safety device in the
form of an indicator or equivalent to be clearly visible while the
ammunition is in transport safety mode.
1.43086
A pylon/dispenser as specified in requirement 1.43085 should enable the transport safety device to be carried adjacent to the ammunition.
Comment:
This enables deactivation if the aircraft lands at a different site from
the ammunition preparation site.
93
4 Weapons
1.43087
Pylons/dispensers shall enable separation of the weapon system or
ammunition in such a way that there is no collision with weapon
platforms.
Comment:
This includes incorrect manoeuvring of the ammunition.
4.3.3
Weapon platforms
This section will be transferred when separate manuals for different platforms
have been compiled.
There are numerous types of platform (aircraft, naval vessels, vehicles, etc.) for
a weapon system, which means that requirements vary according to the type of
platform in question.
Generally, each type of platform shall comply with applicable legislation and
regulations, although in some cases supplementary requirements may be necessary.
For instance, a vehicle that is mainly designed for civil use (such as a construction vehicle), when used in a military application may need additional requirements to be stipulated depending on the particular military application.
4
An articulated truck, for example, usually has only a driver (in some cases also a
‘passenger’) in the cab. When such a vehicle is modified for military use four to
five persons may be transported in the cab. This means that several persons may
be entering the cab (from different directions) while the driver is seated at his
station, which could lead to an (inadvertent) movement of the steering wheel
resulting in injuries from crushing. Furthermore, several persons are often in the
vicinity of the platform while the driver is still at his station, which could entail
a risk of injury by crushing around the platform (in the vicinity of the wheels, in
front of or behind the platform, or at the articulation pivot point).
94
Weapons 4
4
Figure 4.8 Examples of weapon platforms
1.43088
The weapon platform for the system shall satisfy applicable traffic
regulations for civil and military use.
Comment:
Dispensation may be given.
1.43089
Blast pressure during firing shall be acceptable for crew mounted
in the platform.
Comment:
When verifying blast pressure characteristics the test methods and
criteria stated in the American MIL-STD-1474 can be used.
4.3.4
Hatches and doors
Hatches and doors shall meet certain specific requirements. They shall be sufficiently stable to withstand shockwaves close to a detonation and subsequently
be openable. Specific safety requirements concerning manoeuvrability, locking,
opening, etc. must be met.
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4 Weapons
1.43090
The locking mechanism shall be dimensioned to withstand the
stresses arising during operational use.
1.43091
The locking mechanism should be accessible and manoeuvrable
from both inside and outside.
1.43092
Locks on hatches and doors should be manoeuvrable by crew
wearing regulation personal protective equipment at all extreme
temperatures.
Comment:
This is not a general requirement. It does not apply, for example, to
turret guns.
4.3.5
Sighting and laying systems
4.3.5.1
General
It is obvious that a serious accident may occur if the weapon is fired in the
wrong direction. Such an event can be caused by a fault in the sighting system,
or a fault in the laying and firing function caused by human error, or a combination of these.
4
The possibility of user error makes it essential to stipulate requirements to
ensure that the system is designed according to sound ergonomic principles and
that it is easy to operate. Scales and displays must be unambiguous and legible
in all conceivable situations. Controls must be conveniently located for the crew
and facilitate the performance of their tasks. Generally it can be stated that serious accidents can be minimized by good ergonomic design combined with carefully prepared appropriate training.
4.3.5.2
Requirements
4.3.5.2.1
System accuracy
1.43093
The relationship between the axis of bore, and the optical axis in
the sight and the values presented on displays/instruments shall coincide, both when the system stands on a level surface and when it
is on a maximum incline during operation.
1.43094
A stabilised weapon shall retain the direction laid until a new direction is specified/commanded.
4.3.5.2.2
Sight tests and adjustments
1.43095
The setting of the sight should not change owing to transport etc.
96
Weapons 4
4.3.5.2.3
Firing
To ensure that the sighting and laying system can withstand the stresses that
occur during firing, the following requirement shall be met:
1.43096
When firing with natures of ammunition and charges designed for
the weapon the sighting and laying systems shall retain specified
settings and attain specified performance.
4.3.5.2.4
Aiming and firing limitations
1.43097
There shall be devices to prevent the armament being aimed or fired
in prohibited zones.
Comment:
In maintenance mode aiming in a prohibited zone is permitted.
4.3.6
Guidance systems
For a guided weapon/ammunition the flight path is determined after separation
from the weapon platform by the following criteria: the condition of the weapon
platform at separation, the characteristics of the propelling charge/motor, the
pre-determined firing data, and the design and characteristics of the guidance
system. The level of complexity of a guidance system can vary. It generally
incorporates guidance controls, servomotors, and some type of processor to generate guidance signals which can emanate from the weapon platform as well as
from the missile itself. Signals from the weapon platform can be transmitted via
a link such as electromagnetic waves of suitable frequency such as radar, thermal or light, or electrically/optically by wire during part or all of the flight path.
Guided weapons/ammunition often employ search and fire control devices that
register target data via active sensors based on active target acquisition (e.g.
radar, laser) with potentially harmful effects. Furthermore, there is often a turntable or mobile platform and, for example, even a ground installation that also
involve hazards. Search and fire control devices are dealt with in Section 4.2.4,
4.2.13 and 4.3.5 of this manual.
Guidance systems contain sensors, guidance electronics/software, guidance
controls, and possibly additional functions such as communication links, guidance beams or indication equipment (e.g. radar beacon or tracer). All this equipment requires power – electric, pneumatic, hydraulic, for example – in addition
to the power normally required for an unguided system.
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4 Weapons
Self-destruction and control of the warhead function may be incorporated. Elementary examples of this are arming when there is a specific remaining flight
time to target, or proximity fuze delay, based on approach velocity.
Subsystems in weapons/ammunition affect guidance in one way or another. For
example, if the propulsion motor stops/expires the guidance performance is
changed dramatically, and the same applies to the energy supply. A true guidance system incorporates an automatic guidance function with associated rudder
system, sensor unit and target seeker. These units, together with computers and
geometry, form a closed guidance system that must be precisely dimensioned
for optimal functioning and performance.
An attack can be subdivided into several stages depending on the general design
and functional method of the weapon. Search often precedes an attack. Thereafter comes the approach flight (or equivalent) – possibly involving variations in
altitude and/or changes of course. Target search and the locking of the target
seeker onto the target may occur fairly early in an attack or rather late (terminal
guidance) in the case of certain weapons. A successful result in the latter case is
entirely dependent on the preceding guidance to the target zone.
4
Prior to launch and separation of the weapon from the weapon platform, all subsystems are prepared with initial values while essential functional checks are
performed simultaneously so that the separation conditions are satisfied. The
separation sequence may involve constraints on guidance signals and rudder
deflection to prevent any risk of the projectile colliding with the weapon platform, or any risk of the projectile acquiring excessive angular acceleration with
regard to the equipment and subsystems incorporated. Different guidance methods can be applied during the various stages of the flight path such as control of
attitude, proportional navigation with lead bias, inertial navigation and SemiActive Command by Line Of Sight (SACLOS), depending on the design and
performance requirements for the weapon.
The purpose of the requirements is to ensure:
•
safe handling during transport and deployment,
•
safety in and around the fire unit during loading, unloading, loaded fire unit
and launch,
•
safety outside the designated danger areas,
•
safety during training, loading exercises, and operation of the fire unit.
1.43098
98
Sources of radiation (e.g. laser) directed at the fire unit from the
guided weapon/ammunition should be so designed that they do not
require any danger zones at the fire unit.
Weapons 4
1.43099
Sources of radiation for guidance that can have a dangerous effect
shall be indicated to the operator when radiation transmission is in
progress.
1.43100
During exercises the indication specified in requirement 1.43099
should also be visible to anyone anywhere in the vicinity.
1.43101
It shall not be possible for guidance signals to the weapon/ammunition to initiate motor or warhead igniters.
1.43102
The guided weapon/ammunition should incorporate a function
which, in the event of a target miss or if a malfunction is detected,
definitively precludes effect in the target by disarming the weapon.
This can be achieved, for example, by self-neutralisation, self-destruction or disarming.
1.43103
There should be a system for function monitoring and failure detection for the guidance system. This may result in self-neutralisation or disarming of the weapon, etc.
1.43104
The guidance system shall be designed and documented in a way
that enables a safety analysis to be performed.
1.43105
The safety analysis shall be performed or audited by an instance
that is independent of the designer.
Comment:
Another department or special safety function within the same department may be considered as an independent party.
1.43106
All materials incorporated shall be selected and combined in such
a way that effects detrimental to safety do not arise during the life
of the guidance system, for example as a result of corrosion, ageing,
chemical change or short-circuiting.
1.43107
Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and
after launch, should conform to standardized communication protocols.
1.43108
Data transfer between the weapon and fire control, both before and
after launch, shall be subject to function monitoring.
Comment:
Function monitoring can, for example, be by means of parity checking or a ‘watch-dog’ function.
99
4
4 Weapons
4.3.7
Miscellaneous requirements
4.3.7.1
Pressure vessels
There are a number of types of pressure vessel for numerous applications. Structural strength calculations and hydrostatic testing shall always be carried out to
provide the basis for type approval.
1.43109
Pressure vessels shall be type approved in accordance with the
National Board of Occupational Safety and Health directives.
4.3.7.2
Lifting devices
Lifting devices are used to lift parts of, or complete, systems during production
or in the field. An assurance of compliance with the regulations governing lifting
devices shall be submitted in writing by the manufacturer. This means that
applicable standards have been adhered to, structural strength calculations have
been performed, hazard analyses have been performed, an instruction book has
been compiled, test certificates have been issued, material certificates are available, and that the lifting device has been CE marked.
1.43110
Lifting devices shall be CE marked.
1.43111
The danger area for a lifting device shall be established and taken
into consideration when formulating Safety Restrictions.
Comment:
The danger area is greater than the area immediately beneath a
hanging load, for example.
4.3.7.3
Fire-fighting equipment
4
Fire, especially in ammunition stowed in confined spaces, can become catastrophic in a very short time. Even fire in other materiel can quickly lead to
major health hazards to the crew, especially in a combat vehicle. It is therefore
vital that a fire can be extinguished as quickly as possible before the crew is
injured by the fire itself, or by toxic substances released during certain types of
fire.
Fire-fighting equipment comes in the form of fixed equipment and hand-carried
extinguishers.
Fixed fire-fighting equipment can usually be activated automatically as well as
manually.
100
Weapons 4
Fixed sensors that react to smoke and/or temperature, for example, are in general use.
The primary purpose of the requirements is to ensure the safety of the crew, and
secondarily to preserve weaponry.
1.43112
Fire-fighting systems in crew compartments shall not contain halon.
1.43113
Fire-fighting systems for engine, crew, and ammunition compartments shall be automatically activated, but also be possible to activate manually.
1.43114
Confined spaces that have automatic fire-fighting systems shall be
equipped with an evacuation fan to enable rapid ventilation after a
fire is extinguished.
1.43115
In addition to automatic fire-fighting systems, manual fire extinguishers shall be within the reach of the armament crew. This also
applies onboard combat vehicles where all compartments shall
have a fire extinguisher.
1.43116
The equipment shall have sufficient capacity for the most severe
fire possible in a defined application.
1.43117
Confined spaces that are not crew compartments should have automatic fire alarm systems.
1.43118
A single failure in fixed fire-fighting equipment should not result
in non-function.
1.43119
Fixed fire-fighting equipment shall have duplicate containers containing fire-fighting materials.
1.43120
If a rubber hose or equivalent is employed in fixed fire-fighting
equipment, its function shall not be exposed to any hazard before or
during the actual fire-fighting.
1.43121
If the actuating device in fixed fire-fighting equipment comprises
any form of accumulated pressure there should be duplicate pressure vessels.
1.43122
The type of fire extinguisher (powder, water, foam, etc.) should be
selected so as to preclude any other danger arising during the firefighting.
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4 Weapons
4.4
Requirement checklist for weapons
Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons
1.42001
SHALL
Booby traps
1.42002
SHALL
Laser weapons
1.42003
SHALL
Toxic weapons
1.42004
SHALL
Incendiary weapons
1.42005
SHALL
Weapons difficult to aim
1.42006
SHALL
Severe damage to environment
1.42007
SHALL
1.42008
SHOULD
1.42009
SHOULD
4
1.42010
SHALL
1.42011
1.42012
SHALL
SHALL
1.42013
SHOULD
1.42014
1.42015
1.42016
1.42017
1.42018
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
1.42019
SHALL
1.42020
SHALL
102
Danger area
Emergency stop
Energy stop & energy
source disconnection
Emergency stop close to
energy source
Unload propelling charge
Empty cartridge cases &
expended launch tubes
Manual override of automatic functions
Mount & remove equipment
Specified equipment
Monitors/VDUs
Symbols/texts
Disarm the weapon independently
Footholds & anti-slip surfaces
Locking devices on hatches
& doors
Comment
Weapons 4
Table 4:1 Checklist of requirements for weapons, continued
1.42021
SHOULD
1.42022
SHALL
Toxic substances
1.42023
SHALL
1.42024
SHALL
Comment
Ventilation, heating & air
conditioning system
Safe separation distance
Concentration of toxic substances
Verification of requirement
1.42023
Electrical and magnetic fields
1.42025
SHALL
Susceptibility of electrical
circuits
1.42026
SHALL
Safety critical electrical circuits
1.42027
SHALL
Electrical & magnetic fields
Water and moisture resistance
1.42028
SHOULD
Drainability
1.42029
SHOULD
Water spraying & fording
Extreme climatic conditions
1.42030
SHOULD
Protective clothing & equipment
1.42031
SHOULD
Good work environment
Fire
1.42032
SHOULD
Blast pressure
1.42033
SHALL
1.42034
SHOULD
1.42035
1.42036
SHALL
SHALL
Backblast
1.42037
SHALL
1.42038
SHALL
Vibration dose
1.42039
SHALL
4
Crew protection
Blast pressure level
1.42033
Number of rounds fired
Protection & location of
crew
Backblast
1.42037
Vibration dose
103
4 Weapons
4
Pressure
1.42040
SHALL
Determining dimensions relative to pressure
Forces
1.42041
1.42042
SHALL
SHALL
1.42043
1.42044
1.42045
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
1.42046
SHALL
1.42047
1.42048
1.42049
1.42050
1.42051
1.42052
1.42053
SHOULD
SHALL
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
1.42054
1.42055
1.42056
1.42057
SHALL
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
Spring forces & hazards
Spring forces & double
locking devices
Springs & analysis
Fastening elements
Fastening elements, characteristics
Springs to be located in a
protected position
Springs duplicated
Accumulated pressure
Monitoring duplicated
Location of hydraulic hoses
Hydraulic fluid
Danger area
Recoil buffer, recuperator,
overpressure
Recoil forces
Rotating & moving parts
Loading devices
Cartridge case ejection
Lasers
1.42058
1.42059
1.42060
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
1.42061
1.42062
1.42063
SHOULD
SHALL
SHOULD
1.42058
1.42059
1.42060
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
104
Activation of lasers
Safety circuits
Safety covers & locking
devices
Laser outlet optic
Warning signs
Laser protection filters &
goggles
Activation of lasers
Safety circuits
Safety covers & locking
devices
Comment
Weapons 4
1.42061
1.42062
1.42063
SHOULD
SHALL
SHOULD
Stability – mechanical
1.42064
SHALL
1.42065
SHALL
1.42066
SHALL
Transport
1.42067
SHOULD
1.42068
SHOULD
1.42069
SHALL
Comment
Laser outlet optic
Warning signs
Laser protection filters &
goggles
Chassis or platform motion
Open (or closed) doors or
hatches
Retention of ammunition
etc.
Fall-back
Firing in fall-back position
Method for stowage
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
Launchers
Weapon installation
1.43001
SHALL
Interface with safety functions
1.43002
SHALL
Clearance
1.43003
SHOULD
Safety devices for moving
system parts
Recoil systems
Breech mechanisms
1.43004
SHALL
1.43005
1.43006
SHALL
SHALL
1.43007
1.43008
1.43009
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
1.43010
SHALL
4
Operation of breech mechanism
Locking
Breech mechanism: vibration resistance
Incorrect assembly
Firing mechanism inactive
Indication of breech mechanism status
Firing with breech mechanism not fully closed
105
4 Weapons
Firing mechanisms
1.43011
SHALL
1.43012
SHALL
1.43013
SHALL
4
1.43014
1.43015
SHALL
SHALL
1.43016
SHALL
1.43017
SHALL
1.43018
1.43019
1.43020
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHALL
1.43021
SHALL
1.43022
SHALL
Firing mechanism, safing
Firing by active operation
Protection for electromechanical device
Firing button guard etc.
Firing mechanism to withstand vibration & shocks
Firing mechanism, shock
resistant
Radiated or conducted interference
Electrical connector, safing
Mechanical safety devices
Manually operated safety
interrupter
Location of safety interrupter
Safety interrupter marking
Breech ring
1.43023
SHALL
Breech ring life
Obturation
1.43024
SHALL
Obturation
Backflash
1.43025
SHALL
Automatic fire into
maximum head wind
Barrels and sub-calibre barrels
1.43026
SHALL
Firing with new or worn barrel
1.43027
SHALL
1.43026
1.43028
SHALL
Fatigue & barrel rupture
1.43029
SHALL
Verification & calculation of
requirement 1.43028
1.43030
SHALL
Attachment of external parts
1.43031
SHOULD
Driving bands, sabots, obturators
1.43032
SHALL
Testing for fragmentation
106
Comment
Weapons 4
1.43033
SHALL
1.43034
1.43035
SHALL
SHALL
1.43036
SHALL
Fume extractors
1.43037
SHALL
1.43038
SHALL
Comment
Snow, sand or gravel in barrel
Barrel rupture trials
Cook-off at maximum fire
engagement
Determination of temperature & heat flux
Attachment of fume extractor
Dimensioning of fume
extractor
Muzzle brakes, flame guards and recoil amplifiers
1.43039
SHALL
Attachment of muzzle brake
etc.
1.43040
SHALL
Dimensioning of muzzle
brake etc.
1.43041
SHALL
Verification of requirements
1.43039 & 1.43040
Muzzle flash
1.43042
SHALL
1.43043
SHALL
4
External equipment & effect
of muzzle flash
Crew stations – muzzle flash
Sub-calibre barrels and sub-calibre adapters
1.43044
SHALL
Applicable requirements as
stated in Section 4.3.1.2.7
1.43045
SHALL
Fitting of sub-calibre barrel
etc.
1.43046
SHALL
Inspection of sub-calibre
barrel etc.
1.43047
SHALL
Stresses on ammunition
1.43048
SHALL
1.43045 & 1.43047
1.43049
SHOULD
Permanently fitted sub-calibre barrel
Ramming
1.43050
SHALL
1.43051
SHALL
Rammer
Ramming environment
107
4 Weapons
Recoil buffers
1.43052
SHALL
4
1.43053
SHOULD
1.43054
1.43055
SHALL
SHALL
Static pressure of recoil
buffer
Leakage of recoil buffer
fluid & gas
Maximum recoil stresses
Forced recoil equipment
Recoilless weapon and rocket systems
1.43056
SHALL
Applicable requirements
stated in Section 4.3.1.2.3
1.43057
SHALL
Firing mechanism, transport
safety
1.43058
SHALL
Firing system, safety device
1.43059
SHALL
Deactivation, loading/
unloading
1.43060
SHALL
Direction of recoil
1.43061
SHALL
Recoil forces, testing
1.43062
SHALL
Firing stance
1.43063
SHALL
Backblast, energy content
1.43064
SHALL
1.43067
1.43065
SHALL
External equipment & effect
of muzzle flash
1.43066
SHALL
Limitation of muzzle flash
1.43067
SHOULD
Personal protective equipment
1.43068
SHALL
Structural strength for pressure
1.43069
SHALL
1.43068
1.43070
SHOULD
Permanently fitted sub-calibre barrel
1.43071
SHALL
Material properties
1.43072
SHOULD
Fixtures permanently
attached by winding
108
Comment
Weapons 4
Comment
Other weapon systems
Minelayers for landmines
1.43073
SHALL
Arming the mine
1.43074
SHALL
Monitoring system
1.43075
SHALL
Mechanical arming
1.43076
SHALL
Decoupling minelayer
1.43077
SHOULD
Risk of mine becoming
jammed
Minelayers for naval mines and depth charges
1.43078
SHALL
Arming
1.43079
SHALL
Mine cannot become
jammed
Launch tubes for torpedoes
1.43080
SHALL
Sensors
1.43081
SHALL
Torpedo cannot become
jammed
a)
1.43082
1.43083
1.43084
SHALL
SHALL
Pylons and dispensers
1.43085
SHALL
1.43086
SHOULD
1.43087
SHALL
Weapon platforms
1.43088
SHALL
1.43089
SHALL
Hatches and doors
1.43090
SHALL
1.43091
SHOULD
1.43092
SHOULD
Testing
Draining system
4
Transport safety device indicator
Transport safety device to be
carried
No collision of ammunition
with weapon platform
Weapon platform
Blast pressure
Locking mechanism
Locking mechanism accessibility
Manoeuvrable when wearing personal protective
equipment
109
4 Weapons
Sighting and laying systems
1.43093
SHALL
Axis of bore & optical axis
1.43094
SHALL
Direction laid
1.43095
SHOULD
No change of setting during
transport
1.43096
SHALL
Firing & retention of settings etc.
1.43097
SHALL
Firing in prohibited zones
Guidance systems
1.43098
SHOULD
4
1.43099
SHALL
1.43100
1.43101
SHOULD
SHALL
1.43102
1.43103
1.43104
1.43105
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
1.43106
1.43107
1.43108
SHALL
SHOULD
SHALL
Sources of radiation &
danger zones
Sources of radiation &
indication
Indication during exercises
Guidance signals to warhead
system
Design of self-destruction
Function monitoring
Safety analysis
Auditing by independent
instance
Materials incorporated
Data transfer
Function monitoring of data
transfer
Miscellaneous requirements
Pressure vessels
1.43109
SHALL
Pressure vessels, type
approval
Lifting devices
1.43110
SHALL
1.43111
SHALL
CE marking of lifting
devices
Danger area for lifting
devices
Fire-fighting equipment
1.43112
SHALL
Halon systems
1.43113
SHALL
Automatic activation
1.43114
SHALL
Evacuation fan
110
Comment
Weapons 4
1.43115
1.43116
1.43117
1.43118
1.43119
1.43120
1.43121
1.43122
SHALL
SHALL
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
SHOULD
Comment
Manual fire extinguishers
Capacity of equipment
Confined spaces
Single failures
Duplicate containers
Rubber hoses
Actuating device
Type of fire extinguisher
a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank.
4
111
Ammunition 5
5
AMMUNITION
The term ammunition denotes materiel that is designed to achieve damage in the
widest sense (often through explosion), produce smoke, illuminate the battlefield, or achieve electromagnetic jamming. Ammunition also comprises practice
materiel for the above purposes. Packagings can also be included in the ammunition concept as they have a unique marking to denote the characteristic of the
ammunition therein.
This chapter specifies the requirements that are unique for ammunition and its
constituent parts: warheads, propulsion units, fuzing systems and packagings.
Where a weapon part such as a barrel, dispenser, pylon, etc. is a constituent part
of the materiel system, Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’ also applies.
Certain materiel specific requirements that are not naturally related to any of the
other sections in this chapter are thus stated in this section.
With regard to guidance systems for ammunition that affect the ammunition
after it has left the launcher, refer to Chapter 4 ‘Weapons’, Section 4.3.
For all ammunition the activity and materiel related requirements stated in
Chapter 2, ‘Safety activities and requirements common to all materiel’ shall
always be taken into consideration. Thereafter the requirements specified in
Section 5.1 shall apply, after which the materiel specific requirements for the
various parts of the ammunition shall apply as stated in the respective subsystem
section: 5.2 ‘Warheads’, 5.3 ‘Propulsion systems’, 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling charges’, and 5.5 ‘Packaging for ammunition’.
5
5.1
Joint ammunition requirements
5.1.1
General
This section specifies the requirements that are applicable for complete ammunition. These requirements together with the other applicable weapon and
ammunition safety requirements shall be incorporated in the requirement specifications.
113
5 Ammunition
5.1.2
These requirements, originating from international agreements, must always
be met and can thus never be disregarded through any other agreement.
1.51001
High explosive shells designed primarily for anti-personnel purposes shall have a minimum weight of 400 grams.
1.51002
Mines shall not be designed to be of similar appearance to civil utility goods, neither may they be marked with internationally recognised safety emblems.
1.51003
Bullets shall not be easily expanded or flattened in the human
body.
1.51004
Bullets shall be fully jacketed and shall not incorporate any notches
(cf. dumdum bullets).
5.1.3
Materiel specific requirements
When developing ammunition it is necessary, amongst other needs, to achieve a
design that satisfies the safety requirements in the requirement specifications.
During the development phases the safety requirements are verified through
audits, analyses and testing. The requirements stated herein are largely based on
experience accumulated over the years.
1.51005
Analysis and testing shall be performed to provide data for assessment of the danger area for all combinations of launchers and ammunition.
Comment:
Danger areas for lasers, fragmentation, thermal radiation, blast pressure, etc.
1.51006
The projectile and propelling charge should be designed so that the
projectile remains in rammed position with the gun at maximum
elevation without any special devices for this being needed on the
gun. This is particularly important when the projectile and propelling charge are separate and an interspace can arise with certain
charges.
Comment:
The above applies for ammunition where ramming is desirable. Refer also to Section 4.2.15.2.1.
1.51007
The function stated in requirement 1.51006 shall be tested using a
worn barrel.
Comment:
Refer to the definition of a worn barrel.
5
114
Ammunition 5
1.51008
Ammunition should be designed so that unloading can be performed in a safe manner by the weapon crew.
Comment:
This also applies to unloading after an ammunition misfire.
1.51009
Verification of requirement 1.51008 shall include testing to determine the forces that can be permitted for the unloading tool in question.
Comment:
Testing also includes the force required to achieve unloading.
1.51010
Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading as a reverse
process of loading.
1.51011
Ammunition should be designed to enable unloading to be performed with the aid of tools if the ammunition becomes jammed either during ramming or in the barrel.
1.51012
To establish the risk of cook-off for the ammunition, the temperature/heat flux etc. for a barrel at its maximum operating temperature
and for the shell shall be determined.
1.51013
Driving bands/sabots/obturators/casings etc. should be dimensioned and designed so that no fragments are formed that can impact with the muzzle brake (if such is fitted) and ricochet rearwards.
1.51014
When modifying or newly developing ammunition, driving bands/
sabots/obturators/casings etc. shall be tested regarding the occurrence of fragments.
1.51015
Driving bands, casings or equivalent shall be designed so that they
do not inadvertently disintegrate outside the barrel when firing
with the maximum stress level.
1.51016
Sabots shall be designed to ensure safe separation.
Comment:
Consideration shall be given to the hazards of sabot fragments and
to any change in projectile trajectory.
1.51017
The projectile shall be designed to achieve external ballistic stability in all permitted types of firing provided that the barrel has not
reached its maximum permitted wear so that the specified danger
area is still valid.
Comment:
Worn barrels, driving bands, fins, tail units, etc. can affect external
ballistics.
115
5
5 Ammunition
1.51018
Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualified by the
National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables (SÄI).
Comment:
Approval shall be based on the National Inspectorate of Explosives
and Flammables Code of Statutes, edition 1986:2 (SÄIFS 1986:2).
1.51019
Explosives incorporated in the ammunition shall be qualified in accordance with FSD 0214.
Comment:
Assessments concerning the scope of qualification shall be made by
the advisory group for explosives, see Chapter 3, ‘Methodology’,
Section 3.6 and 3.8.
1.51020
The ammunition should be resistant to extreme environments such
as accidents or the effect of enemy weapons so that the ammunition
does not increase the vulnerability of the system to which it is integral.
Comment:
The above shall be based on the resistance of the ammunition and
the protection level of the materiel system. Cf. FSD 0060.
1.51021
Mines shall be designed so that they do not become jammed in
minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement 1.43079.
1.51022
Torpedoes shall be designed so that they do not become jammed
in launch tubes. Cf. requirement 1.43081.
1.51023
Underwater mines/depth charges shall be designed so that they do
not become jammed in minelaying equipment. Cf. requirement
1.43079.
1.51024
The safe separation distance/time shall be determined for the severest case of operational use. Refer also to requirements 1.42022,
1.52022, 1.53007 and 1.54013.
1.51025
The design and the materials used in the ammunition shall be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, including
pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable deformation.
Comment: When dimensioning and designing ammunition the pressure definitions and procedures specified in STANAG 4110 shall be
applied.
5.1.4
Checklist for joint ammunition requirements
5
116
Ammunition 5
Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements
Comment
1.51001
SHALL
Minimum weight of HE
shells
1.51002
SHALL
Mines shall not be similar to
utility goods
1.51003
SHALL
Bullets shall not be easily
expanded
1.51004
SHALL
Bullets shall be fully jacketed
Materiel specific requirements
1.51005
SHALL
Analysis and testing for danger area
1.51006
SHOULD
Projectile in rammed position
1.51007
SHALL
Testing for requirement
1.51006 in worn barrel
1.51008
SHOULD
Unloading safely
1.51009
SHALL
1.510010
SHOULD
Verification of unloading
tool forces
Unloading via loading route
1.51011
SHOULD
Unloading using tools
1.51012
SHALL
1.51013
SHOULD
1.51014
SHALL
1.51015
SHALL
1.51016
SHALL
Exposure to high temperature
Fragments from driving
bands, sabots, casings, etc.
Testing newly developed
driving bands, etc.
Driving bands etc. shall
withstand maximum stress
Safe separation of sabot
1.51017
SHALL
External ballistic stability
1.51018
SHALL
Explosives approved by SÄI
1.51019
SHALL
Qualification of explosives
1.51020
SHOULD
1.51021
SHALL
Resistance to extreme environments
Mines not become jammed
5
117
5 Ammunition
Table 5:1 Checklist of joint ammunition requirements, continued
1.51022
SHALL
1.51023
SHALL
1.51024
SHALL
1.51025
SHALL
Comment
Torpedoes not become
jammed
Underwater mines not
become jammed
Casing to withstand all
stresses
5.2
Warheads
5.2.1
General
This section is a summary of the joint requirements for warheads. For each type
of warhead there are additional object specific requirements that apply which
are stated in the relevant subsections of this chapter.
5.2.1.1
5
Description
The term warhead refers to that component of the ammunition which, at a predetermined time or place (e.g. impact in target, actuation in immediate proximity of target, etc.) is intended to provide effect by, for example, pressure, fragmentation, or incendiary, or any combination of these, or any other effect of
tactical importance to the user. In certain circumstances effect is achieved after
entry or penetration of armour or other protection element, for example. A warhead that is not loaded with explosive is exemplified by an anti-armour projectile which penetrates armour by means of high kinetic energy. Furthermore,
there are pyrotechnic warheads (illuminating, incendiary, smoke). Most combat
warheads have practice counterparts which – on impact – provide some kind of
visual signal, such as a flash or smoke, to indicate point of impact and which
have a lower explosive effect. There is also practice ammunition whose warheads contain little or no explosive (such as inert ammunition that has no explosive content at all).
Several countries are developing more insensitive ammunition designated IM
(Insensitive Munition). Technically, the lower sensitivity is achieved by using
plastic as a binding agent and nitramine-based products for the energy producing substance (PBX = plastic bonded high explosive).
118
Ammunition 5
For multiple warheads, each submunition is treated as an individual warhead. In
the case of guided and trajectory correctable warheads the warheads are dealt
with as described in this chapter, while the guidance and trajectory correction
motors are dealt with in Section 5.3 with consideration given to the actual
launch environment. When initiating such motors, the same requirements are
specified as for fuzing systems for propulsion devices, see Section 5.4, if it is
not proven that hazard initiation does not incur injury to personnel nor damage
to property or the environment.
5.2.1.2
Materiel environment
Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the mechanical effects
of the environment:
•
leakage can occur in joints,
•
cracks can occur in warhead casings,
•
explosive dust or similar can be created and be moved to a more shock sensitive position, e.g. threaded joints and gaps where there may be a risk of initiation due to vibration or shock (e.g. during firing).
Examples of the consequences to materiel resulting from the physical and
chemical effects of the environment:
•
high explosives can be heated to a temperature at which they become plastically deformed or melt. This can lead to cavities, or the high explosive migrating into threaded joints, between separating surfaces, or into cracks
where it can be compressed and thus involve a risk of initiation,
•
air may be pumped in and out through leaks in the warhead casing which
can lead to accumulations of water. The high explosive or equivalent may
be affected and gaseous products may form, for example in the case of high
explosives with an aluminium content,
•
brittle fractures can occur in the casing, especially at extremely low temperatures,
•
a significant difference between the coefficients of expansion of the charge
and the casing can occur which may result in the formation of cracks or cavities at low temperature, or high internal overpressure can result at high temperature,
•
reactions between incompatible materials can change the properties of explosives.
119
5
5 Ammunition
5.2.1.3
Requirements
1.52001
NBC warheads (nuclear charges, biological weapons, chemical
weapons) shall not be fabricated.
1.52002
FAE (Fuel-Air Explosives) warheads, in which a fuel is sprayed
into the air and detonates owing to the oxygen in the air and where
the main purpose is anti-personnel, shall not be fabricated.
1.52003
Warhead casings whose main effect is fragmentation shall be fabricated from material that can be easily detected by X-ray.
1.52004
Multiple weapons and guided weapons shall be treated as having
several warheads and propulsion devices. Separation charges and
guidance or trajectory correction motors shall be treated as propulsion devices.
1.52005
The design and the materials used in the body of the warhead shall
be chosen to enable the casing to withstand all stresses arising, including pressure in the barrel, without exceeding acceptable deformation.
Comment:
Examples of detailed requirements that can be stipulated: safety
margin for deformation, freedom from cracks, overlaps, pores or incorrect heat treatment that can lead to hazardous events. Concerning
pressure in the barrel, refer to Chapter 4, ‘Weapons’.
1.52006
When tempered steel is used in the casing the material and heat
treatment chosen shall be such that hydrogen embrittlement or other dangerous corrosion does not occur.
1.52007
The internal surface of the casing shall be smooth and clean.
Comment:
The warhead shall be protected against moisture until filled with explosive.
1.52008
The design and composition of the HE charge and the pyrotechnic
charge shall be such that they can withstand all stresses arising without any risk of a hazardous event occurring.
Comment:
Testing shall be performed in accordance with FSD 0060.
1.52009
The warhead shall be designed to preclude the presence of high explosive or pyrotechnic composition in threads and joints in such a
quantity as to create a risk of hazard initiation when screwing components on or off or during launch or release.
1.52010
Requirements 1.52008 and 1.52009 shall be verified by testing.
Comment:
The parts in the warhead can be examined prior to testing by using
X-ray, radiography, ultrasonic testing or other methods.
5
120
Ammunition 5
1.52011
The warhead shall not be susceptible to cook-off in the event of a
misfire or interruption in firing when the barrel is at its maximum
operating temperature for the operational profile in question.
Comment:
Refer also to requirements 1.43035 and 1.53019.
1.52012
The melting point of the high explosive should be higher than the
temperature reached by the ammunition in a barrel heated to its
maximum operating temperature for the operational profile in question.
1.52013
The warhead in its application should not detonate in the event of
fire.
Comment:
This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060.
1.52014
Requirement 1.52013 should be verified by testing.
1.52015
The warhead in its application should not detonate from bullet attack from small arms ammunition.
Comment:
This requirement is part of the IM requirement stated in FSD 0060.
1.52016
Requirement 1.52015 should be verified by testing.
1.52017
The design of the warhead should facilitate upgrading, in-service
surveillance and disposal.
1.52018
The possible destruction of any duds (unexploded ammunition)
should be taken into account during the design of the warhead.
1.52019
Toxicity arising from manufacture, use, clearance of duds, recovery
of target materiel, and disposal should be taken into account.
1.52020
The blast pressure from a detonating warhead should be determined.
Comment:
The danger areas for blast pressure and fragmentation shall be determined.
1.52021
The environmental aspects of manufacture, use, clearance of duds,
recovery of target materiel, and disposal should be taken into account.
1.52022
The safe separation distance shall be determined for all warheads.
Refer also to requirement 1.51024.
121
5
5 Ammunition
5.2.2
Warheads containing high explosive (HE)
5.2.2.1
HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition
This section contains object specific instructions for warheads for tube-launched
ammunition. In addition, common instructions as stated in Chapter 2, ‘Safety
activities and requirements common to all materiel’ shall apply.
HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition for cannons, howitzers, mortars,
and recoilless launch tube weapons are dealt with herein.
HE shells primarily consist of a shell body filled with high explosive which may
be compressed or cast. The design is dimensioned to withstand high pressure
and high acceleration and, where relevant, spin.
Practice shells with a reduced charge are similar to HE shells but have a greatly
reduced charge or spotting charge. On burst the spotting charge produces a flash
and smoke to facilitate observation of the impact point. The quantity of high
explosive is reduced to such an extent that no injury to the gun crew nor damage
to the gun shall occur in the event of premature detonation in the barrel. If this
condition cannot be met in the design, the practice shells shall be treated in the
same way as HE shells from the safety aspect.
Fuze
5
Booster
Auxiliary booster
Auxiliary booster
casing
Auxiliary booster
charge
HE Shell
Auxiliary booster
Main charge
Shell body
Driving band
Pipe disc
Figure 5.1 Example of an HE shell containing a booster and fuze
122
Ammunition 5
A characteristic of tube-launched ammunition is that the projectile is subjected
to high pressure, high temperature and acceleration, and often spin in the barrel,
as well as aerodynamic heating while in flight. This means that the safety of the
design must be examined carefully with regard to material load etc.
Material defects can have a critical effect if leakage occurs allowing hot propellant gases to enter and ignite the HE charge. Shell bodies may exhibit leaks in
the base (so-called pipes), which is why the base is usually fitted with a metal
base plate or other sealing device. A coarse inner surface in the shell body may
increase the risk of a hazardous event owing to increased friction.
The sensitivity of the warhead in question is significantly dependent on the quality of the high explosive, its freedom from foreign particles and its application.
Pipes, cavities, and cracks (especially close to the base) may cause settling of
the high explosive during firing, which in turn can lead to premature ignition by
adiabatic compression (detonation in the barrel).
If firing is interrupted, an HE charge in a shell may be initiated if it remains in
the rammed position in a hot barrel (so-called cook-off).
In the case of rocket assisted projectiles it is important to consider the effects of
thermal conductivity and erosion on the wall separating the rocket engine from
the high explosive charge.
The driving band – usually made of copper, a copper alloy, plastic or sintered
iron – can be a safety critical item. Defects in the material or in the manufacture
of the driving band may lead to disintegration in the barrel, which in turn may
cause a hazardous event.
1.52023
If it is conceivable that the material from which the shell body is
fabricated may contain pipes a base plate or equivalent shall be employed and shall be attached in a satisfactory manner.
1.52024
When filling a shell body with high explosive it shall be ensured
that unacceptable pipes, cavities or cracks do not occur and that the
required adhesion is achieved.
1.52025
Requirement 1.52024 shall be verified by X-ray inspection, sawing
in half the shell bodies, or by the use of bisectable shell bodies.
1.52026
Pressed shell bodies shall be free from explosive composition dust.
1.52027
Pressed shell bodies shall meet stipulated requirements concerning
freedom from cracks and other defects.
1.52028
Any separations in the shell body shall be satisfactorily sealed to
prevent the ingress of high explosive into joints.
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1.52029
When installing an auxiliary booster it shall be ensured that no cavity occurs that could cause hazard initiation.
1.52030
In shells equipped with an end screw or base fuze, the HE charge
in the shell shall be well filled against the base of the shell.
1.52031
It shall be ensured that any uncontrolled base bleed combustion
cannot lead to deflagration/detonation of the warhead via gas flow
or gas erosion when firing base bleed ammunition.
5.2.2.2
HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles
This section covers HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles. Such warheads consist mainly of a casing (sleeve, nose cone) and an HE charge. Designs
differ to achieve optimum effect in the intended target. The casing is also dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. The HE charge may be cast
or compressed.
Most rockets and guided missiles have practice warheads for training purposes.
They have a reduced HE charge, combined with a spotting agent that produces
smoke and/or a flash when they burst. There are also practice warheads that produce smoke on impact without employing any high explosive (or fuze), (e.g. an
ampoule of titanium tetrachloride which is crushed on impact).
Figure 5.2 Rocket with warhead
5
A characteristic feature of rocket and missile warheads is that they are usually
located adjacent to a rocket engine. Consequently, the safety review must take
into account inter alia the likelihood of initiation of the explosive by heat from
the burning propellant or by the direct ingress of propellant gases owing to their
erosive effect, or because of material defects. Some projectiles, such as those
employing impulse rocket engines, are subjected to high acceleration when all
the propellant has burnt out in the launch tube. In this type of ammunition the
requirements concerning absence of pipes etc. in the HE charge and warhead
casing are the same as for tube-launched ammunition as specified in
Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’, to avoid any possibility of settling of the high explosive that could cause premature initiation.
Most rocket and missile warheads, however, are not subjected to such an accel-
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Ammunition 5
eration, which is why the same stringent safety requirements do not need to be
applied in respect of the casing, surface texture, and the freedom from pipes and
cracks of the HE charge.
Airborne ammunition can be subjected to aerodynamic heating of the warhead
during normal flight or during the approach phase.
It is important that the quantity of high explosive in practice warheads is
reduced to a small enough quantity to ensure that hazard initiation does not
entail a risk of injury. If this is not feasible, the practice warhead in question
shall be considered to be an HE warhead from the safety aspect.
1.52032
The warhead casing should not consist of separate parts within the
zone adjacent to the rocket engine in order to avoid gas leakage.
1.52033
The HE charge in the warhead should be protected from heat-generating components.
5.2.2.3
HE warheads for bombs
This section addresses HE warheads for bombs which herein refer mainly to
those that are equipped with fins or equivalent, and are dropped from aircraft to
subsequently follow a ballistic trajectory. For bombs that contain devices to
guide the bomb to the target or to correct the final phase of the trajectory, the
applicable parts of Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ and 5.2.2.2 ‘HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles’ apply.
Bomb warheads mainly consist of a casing and an HE charge. The casing is
sometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The casing is also
dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use.
The bomb casing is equipped with a suspension device and fins, and is usually
completely filled with high explosive. This may be cast or compressed, or consist of liquid high explosive. The casing may also contain the bomb fuzing system. For this item the requirements specified in Section 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for
warheads and propelling charges’ apply.
A feature of warheads in HE bombs is that they usually contain large quantities
of high explosive which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage.
In the case of practice bombs containing explosive spotting charges it is vital
that the quantity of explosive contained is small enough so that any hazard initiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage.
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Bombs are usually not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why less
stringent safety requirements can be stipulated regarding the structural strength,
homogeneity, etc. of the explosive charge.
Environmental stress factors such as vibration and aerodynamic heating occur in
high speed flight.
1.52034
If the casing consists of separate parts, there shall be sufficient
sealing to ensure that ingress of moisture or leakage of explosive
does not occur.
1.52035
Where separate charges are used the intervening space shall be
filled with an appropriate filler material.
5.2.2.4
HE warheads for landmines
This section contains materiel specific requirements for landmine warheads.
The joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tubelaunched ammunition’ also apply.
The text below addresses HE warheads for landmines, which herein mainly
denotes those that are laid manually and those laid by a mechanical minelayer.
For warheads that are ejected or transported to the target zone by some kind of
carrier, the relevant parts of previous sections of this chapter apply.
5
In the case of landmines designed for possible deployment in peacetime, the
design shall take into account the possible risk of hazard initiation – caused by
the weather, radio/light signals, minor earth tremors or equivalent, road works –
even after a long period of deployment.
Landmine warheads mainly consist of a casing and HE charge. The casing is
sometimes dimensioned to provide fragmentation effect. The casing also has to
be dimensioned to withstand calculated stresses during use. In some cases the
warhead has no casing, but the HE charge is then reinforced with fiberglass,
either homogeneous or surface-reinforced.
The casing is usually completely filled by the HE charge, which may be cast or
compressed. The casing may also contain the mine fuzing system, for which the
requirements stated in Section 5.4 ‘Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling
charges’ apply.
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Ammunition 5
Figure 5.3 Example of a landmine warhead
In terms of safety, warheads for HE landmines are usually characterised by containing relatively large quantities of high explosive, which means that an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury and damage.
Landmines are normally not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is
why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated concerning their structural strength, homogeneity, etc.
It is vital that practice landmines containing an explosive spotting charge contain a quantity of explosive that is small enough so that any hazard initiation
does not entail a risk of injury during normal use.
1.52036
If the casing consists of separate parts there shall be sealing to prevent the ingress of moisture.
1.52037
The metal casing shall be protected against corrosion.
5.2.2.5
HE warheads for large underwater ammunition
This section contains object specific requirements for warheads used in underwater mines, depth charges and torpedoes. For small underwater weapons, such
as anti-submarine shells, refer to Section 5.2.2.6 ‘HE warheads for other ammunition’. In addition, the joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’ also apply.
The text below addresses HE warheads for underwater use in such weapons as
underwater mines, depth charges and torpedoes.
Underwater mines that are intended for deployment in peacetime should be
designed to take into account the possible risk for hazard initiation – owing to
gas formation in the warhead or collision with a vessel or submarine – even after
a long period of deployment.
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5 Ammunition
Warheads for underwater mines, depth charges, and torpedoes are designed to
provide overpressure effect and consist mainly of an explosive charge, the casing and a location for the fuzing system. The casing is dimensioned for the calculated stresses during handling and the actual launch stresses, but great
importance must also be attached to corrosion resistance and being proof
against the ingress of water/moisture, both in salt water and in a salt water atmosphere.
Figure 5.4 Example of an underwater mine
Figure 5.5 Example of a torpedo
5
A characteristic feature of HE warheads for underwater mines, depth charges,
and torpedoes is that they usually contain extremely large quantities of high
explosive which is why an inadvertent detonation can cause extensive injury or
damage. The high explosive may contain aluminium powder and ammonium
perchlorate to increase the pressure effect. This generally means that stringent
requirements must be stipulated concerning water-tightness since ingress of
moisture may cause gas to form. In certain cases ventilation must be enabled.
These warheads are subjected to lower rates of acceleration than tube-launched
ammunition which is why less stringent safety requirements can be stipulated
concerning the structural strength of the high explosive, its adhesion, and its
freedom from cavities and cracks. However, there is enhanced risk when there
are through-cracks in large charges contained in elastic casings or in casings
with low structural strength.
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Ammunition 5
High explosive should be avoided in practice warheads. If the pedagogical
nature of the training does not enable total exclusion of high explosive, it is vital
that the quantity of any explosive used shall be small enough so that a hazard
initiation does not entail a risk of injury or damage to materiel. Instead, other
types of indication should be employed such as buoys or pyrotechnic spotting
charges for smoke or light signals.
1.52038
If there is a risk of overpressure in the warhead it shall be possible
to remove plugs or other seals without risk of injury to personnel,
such as during in-service surveillance of ammunition.
1.52039
Fuzes shall form a seal with the casing or have a sealed seat/location.
1.52040
Metal casings shall be protected against corrosion internally and
externally.
1.52041
Where separate charges are used, any intervening space shall be
filled with an appropriate filler material.
5.2.2.6
HE warheads for other ammunition
This section states materiel specific requirements for natures of ammunition
containing HE charges other than those dealt with elsewhere in this chapter. In
addition, the joint specifications stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for
tube-launched ammunition’ also apply.
This section addresses HE ammunition that is not readily categorised as having
HE warheads designed for tube-launched ammunition, bombs, rockets, guided
missiles, landmines, underwater mines or torpedoes.
Ammunition denoted by the title to this section is normally used statically with
the exception of hand-grenades and rocket-projected line charges, for example,
the former being thrown by hand and the latter being deployed by means of a
rocket. Initiation is either delayed (e.g. safety fuze with detonator or delay detonator) or remotely controlled (e.g. pull-string with percussion cap, rapid or
PETN fuze, or electrically).
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Examples of such ammunition are hand grenades,
mine clearing ammunition, PETN fuzes, cylindrical or
prismatic hollow-charges, and demolition charges in
the form of Bangalore torpedoes and linear/hose
charges.
A characteristic feature of such HE ammunition is
that it often incorporates high explosive in containers
of elementary design or without a casing, and that if a
hazardous event occurs can deflagrate or detonate to
cause incendiary, fragmentation and pressure effects.
Safety during use is mainly based on directives, regulations, and instructions for use.
Figure 5.6 Example of a hand-grenade
1.52042
Ammunition and packaging should be such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and joint loading in accordance with the ‘UN
Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods’ can be permitted.
5.2.3
Pyrotechnic warheads
The section headed ‘General’ is a compilation of general requirements. In addition, the general requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tubelaunched ammunition’ also apply. Moreover, each type of warhead also has
object specific requirements that are disclosed in other sections of this chapter.
5
5.2.3.1
General
This section addresses warheads whose main effect derives from pyrotechnic
charges. Other warheads incorporating pyrotechnics (e.g. as tracers or as components in priming devices) are addressed in the relevant subsection. The same
applies to warheads with comparable effect achieved by agents other than pyrotechnic (e.g. instantaneous smoke by ejection of substances that are themselves
not explosives). Incendiary warheads containing a charge of high explosive
incendiary composition shall be considered as HE warheads from the safety
aspect.
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Ammunition 5
Pyrotechnic charges contain pyrotechnic compositions that can be in powder
form, granulated to a particular shape, or compressed (with or without a binding
agent) to form pellets. They are usually encased in moisture-proof containers.
Where appropriate, the warhead casing is resistant and sealed, e.g. warheads for
tube-launched ammunition, rockets and bombs.
Pyrotechnic warheads can be incorporated in:
•
illuminating ammunition used for illuminating the battlefield,
•
smoke ammunition for degrading enemy visibility,
•
incendiary ammunition,
•
signal ammunition, utilising light and/or smoke,
•
spotting agents and practice ammunition simulating real weapon effect.
A characteristic feature of most types of pyrotechnic ammunition is that it often
contains flammable pyrotechnic composition which, when ignited, emits hot
combustion products that can cause fire. Depending on the confinement, such
pressure may arise that rapid deflagration, or even detonation, occurs in which
case the casing can burst with subsequent fragmentation effect. Pyrotechnic
compositions can be sensitive to shock, especially if composition dust is present
or can occur. There is a risk of friction ignition if such composition dust
migrates to, or during manufacture becomes present in, threads or joint surfaces
where it may initiate when the fuze is screwed on or off or when subjected to
equivalent stress such as bump, shock or vibration. It is vital that pyrotechnic
charges are adequately confined to prevent risks of this type. Even cracks in
compressed pellets can entail a risk of friction initiation or violent burning
sequence if subjected to environmental stress.
Some parts of inadequately mixed compositions may be more sensitive to percussion than normal.
Pyrotechnic compositions that are hygroscopic may change their properties as a
result of moisture ingress. Gas may form and create such an increase in pressure
that the casing can burst. Escaping gas (such as hydrogen) can form an explosive mixture with air.
Ingress of moisture can also entail a risk of spontaneous combustion (e.g. for
smoke compositions containing zinc).
Generally, smoke compositions contain inert zinc which shall not involve a risk
of spontaneous combustion. Smoke ammunition is TS classified with a ‘3’ as the
second digit, i.e. there is no risk of inadvertent ignition.
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Pyrotechnic compositions or their combustion products can be toxic, especially
smoke compositions. Care must also be taken to ensure compatibility between
the various compositions and the other components in a pyrotechnic warhead.
The stability of the compositions used when subjected to various environmental
conditions shall also be assured.
5
5.2.3.2
Requirements
1.52043
Pyrotechnic ammunition should be designed and the compositions
selected such that co-storage in accordance with IFTEX and the
‘UN Recommendations on Transport of Dangerous Goods’ can be
permitted.
1.52044
The charge shall meet the prescribed moisture content.
1.52045
The charge shall meet the prescribed purity from foreign particles.
1.52046
The pyrotechnic composition used should have good storage stability.
1.52047
Compressed pellets shall meet the prescribed structural strength.
1.52048
Insulation adhesion shall meet the prescribed value.
1.52049
Requirement 1.52048 shall be verified by testing, and if necessary
by destructive testing.
1.52050
Insulation shall be free from cracks and cavities.
1.52051
The charge casing shall be sealed.
5.2.3.3
Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition
This section contains object specific requirements for pyrotechnic warheads for
tube-launched ammunition. In addition, the applicable parts of the joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition’
also apply.
This section addresses pyrotechnic warheads for illuminating, smoke or incendiary effect (or a combination thereof) used in guns (including signal pistols).
Such warheads mainly consist of a shell body (cargo shell) which is dimensioned to withstand the high pressure and subsequent high acceleration and,
where appropriate, spin and spin acceleration for the weapon specified, together
with a pyrotechnic charge (or charges). Additionally, in most cases there are one
or more parachutes, spin brakes and support segments. Effect is achieved in the
form of illumination, smoke screen, setting the target on fire, or by signal effect.
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Ammunition 5
Smoke shell
Illuminating shell
Fuze with igniting
device
Separation charge
in bag or cartridge
Smoke charges with
igniting charge
Illuminating charge
with igniting charge
Spin brake
Spin brake
Shell body
Driving band
Support sleeve
Parachute with central
and shroud lines
Base plate
Figure 5.7 Example of a shell for smoke and illuminating effect
A characteristic feature of pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition
is that the propelling charge subjects them to high pressure and high temperature
during the bore phase. In most cases the shell body is provided with an expellable base, which is expelled together with the pyrotechnic charge at a pre-determined point in the trajectory. Unsatisfactory sealing of the base or material
defects that may allow the ingress of hot propellant gas can cause a hazardous
event if the charge is ignited in the barrel.
Furthermore, the structural strength of the charge and the charge casing is vital
from the safety aspect, because if the charge disintegrates during acceleration,
or if there is loose composition dust present, friction initiation and an uncontrollable burning sequence may occur.
1.52052
The base of the shell shall be completely sealed against hot propellant gases, moisture etc. and against composition dust.
1.52053
At final assembly the charge shall have the correct moisture content.
Comment:
If necessary the charge may need to be dried before final assembly.
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5.2.3.4
Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs
This section contains object specific requirements for pyrotechnic warheads for
rockets and bombs. In addition, applicable sections of the joint requirements
stated in other sections pertaining to warheads for rockets and bombs also apply.
This section addresses pyrotechnic warheads for illuminating, smoke or incendiary effect, or combinations of these, for rockets and bombs. The warheads
mainly consist of a casing and a charge (or charges) containing pyrotechnic
composition, and a parachute or equivalent. In rockets the warhead is integrated
with the rocket engine (or engines) while bombs are generally ballistic units that
are dropped onto the target from aircraft.
A characteristic feature of pyrotechnic warheads for rockets is that they are usually located adjacent to a heat-generating rocket engine. The safety review must
therefore take into account the risk for ignition of the pyrotechnic composition
by the ingress of hot propellant gas or by heating through the dividing wall.
Such ingress of propellant gas can occur through defective sealing, material
defects or erosion.
Most warheads for rockets and bombs are not subjected to high rates of acceleration which is why stringent requirements do not need to be stipulated for the
structural strength of the charge. However, loose composition dust in threads or
joint surfaces may ignite by friction when the fuze is inserted or removed or
equivalent, or if there is shock stress. Aerodynamic heating of the warhead can
occur in airborne ammunition during high-speed flight.
1.52056
The dividing wall (partition) between the warhead and rocket engine shall be sealed and insulated so that ignition of the composition
does not occur through the ingress of propellant gas or by heat transmission.
1.52057
At final assembly the charge shall have the correct moisture content.
Comment:
If necessary the charge may need to be dried before final assembly.
5.2.3.5
Other pyrotechnic warheads
5
This section contains object specific requirements for other pyrotechnic materiel
than warheads in tube-launched, rocket or bomb ammunition. In addition, the
joint requirements stated in Section 5.2.2.1 ‘HE warheads for tube-launched
ammunition’ apply.
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Ammunition 5
This section addresses pyrotechnic materiel
with illuminating, infrared (IR), smoke,
incendiary or acoustic effects, or combinations thereof. Such materiel is usually used
statically with the exception of smoke handgrenades and tracers, for example, and is
ignited either with a delay (e.g. a fuze) or
from a distance (pull-string, trip-wire or by
electric triggering).
The following are examples of such pyrotechnic materiel: alarm mines, smoke hand-grenades, smoke candles, electron incendiary
bombs, spotting rounds, thunder flashes and
burst simulators.
Figure 5.8 Example of an alarm mine
A characteristic feature of the pyrotechnic materiel listed above is that it contains a pyrotechnic composition inside a container of elementary design (waxed
paper, plastic or sheet-metal containers), and that it constitutes a fire hazard and
can provide pressure and/or fragmentation effect. Safety is based mainly on
safety regulations and regulations for use.
There are no specific requirements except for the joint requirements stated in
Section 5.2.3.2 ‘Requirements’.
5.2.4
Other warheads
5
This section contains object specific requirements for other warheads than those
containing high explosives and pyrotechnic compositions. In addition, applicable parts of Section 5.2.1 ‘General’,5.2.2 ‘Warheads containing high explosive
(HE)’ and 5.2.3 ‘Pyrotechnic warheads’ also apply.
This section addresses warheads with payloads consisting mainly of non-explosives.
Such warheads may, however, contain explosives for ejecting or propelling out
such items as instantaneous smoke, radar-reflecting chaff, radio jamming
devices, meteorological sonds, etc. Such warheads can also contain other substances that are toxic, corrosive or inflammable, possibly with the capacity for
spontaneous ignition on contact with air or water (moisture) such as titanium
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5 Ammunition
tetrachloride, chlorosulfonic azide (a smoke-producing agent) or phosphorus.
These substances must be confined in such a way that their harmful effects are
prevented. The ammunition addressed in this section need not contain any
explosive (such as napalm and gas for training purposes).
1.52058
Applicable parts of the requirements specified for pyrotechnic
charges in Section 5.2.3 ‘Pyrotechnic warheads’ shall apply.
5.2.5
Requirement checklist for warheads
Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads
Warheads, general
1.52001
SHALL
1.52002
SHALL
1.52003
SHALL
1.52004
SHALL
5
1.52005
1.52006
1.52007
1.52008
1.52009
1.52010
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
1.52011
1.52012
1.52013
1.52014
1.52015
1.52016
SHALL
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
1.52017
1.52018
1.52019
1.52020
1.52021
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
136
NBC warheads
FAE warheads
Fragment detection
Multiple weapons, separation charges
Deformation of casing
Heat treatment of casing
Internal surface of casing
Composition of charge
High explosive in threads
1.52009 and 1.52009
Cook-off
Melting temperature
Resistance to fire
Resistance to fire, testing
Resistance to bullet attack
Resistance to bullet attack,
testing
Facilitate upgrading
Destruction of duds
Toxicity
Blast pressure
Environmental aspects
Comment
Ammunition 5
Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads, continued
1.52022
SHALL
Comment
HE warheads for tube-launched ammunition
1.52023
SHALL
Base plate against pipes
1.52024
SHALL
Unacceptable pipes
1.52025
SHALL
X-ray inspection
1.52026
SHALL
Explosive composition dust
1.52027
SHALL
Freedom from cracks
1.52028
SHALL
Separations sealed
1.52029
SHALL
Auxiliary booster, no cavity
1.52030
SHALL
HE charge well filled
1.52031
SHALL
Uncontrolled base bleed
combustion
HE warheads for rockets and guided missiles
1.52032
SHOULD
Mono-casing
1.52033
SHOULD
HE charge protected
HE warheads for bombs
1.52034
SHALL
Casing in separate parts
1.52035
SHALL
Separate charges, filler
material
HE warheads for landmines
1.52036
SHALL
Casing in separate parts
1.52037
SHALL
Corrosion protection for casing
5
HE warheads for large underwater ammunition
1.52038
SHALL
Plugs for overpressure
1.52039
SHALL
Fuzes sealed
1.52040
SHALL
Corrosion protection for casing
1.52041
SHALL
Separate charges, filler
material
HE warheads for other ammunition
1.52042
SHOULD
Co-storage
Pyrotechnic warheads
1.52043
SHOULD
1.52044
SHALL
1.52045
SHALL
Co-storage
Moisture content of charge
Purity of charge
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5 Ammunition
Table 5:2 Checklist of requirements for warheads, continued
1.52046
SHOULD
1.52047
SHALL
1.52048
1.52049
SHALL
SHALL
1.52050
1.52051
SHALL
SHALL
Comment
Storage stability of pyrotechnic composition
Structural strength of compressed pellets
Insulation adhesion
1.52048
Insulation free from cracks
Charge casing sealed
Pyrotechnic warheads for tube-launched ammunition
1.52052
SHALL
Base of shell sealed
1.52053
SHALL
a)
1.52054
1.52055
a)
Pyrotechnic warheads for rockets and bombs
1.52056
SHALL
Dividing wall sealed
1.52057
SHALL
Other pyrotechnic warheads
The applicable parts of the requirements specified for pyrotechnic warheads apply to
other pyrotechnic warheads
Other warheads
1.52058
SHALL
5
Requirements as per Section 5.2.3
a) This requirement number is not used and is intentionally left blank
5.3
Propulsion systems
5.3.1
General
This section specifies the joint requirements for propulsion devices. In addition,
the materiel specific requirements stated in the relevant subsection for the various types of propulsion system also apply.
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Ammunition 5
5.3.1.1
Description of function
The purpose of propulsion devices in ammunition is to impart sufficient impulse
to the warhead to transport the ammunition to the target. The term propulsion
devices herein denotes charges in gun systems that impart the correct muzzle
velocity to projectiles, and includes reaction motors of various types that provide propulsion in the launch or trajectory phase – such as in a rocket assisted
projectile – or in both phases.
Gas generators are designed to produce gas flow under pressure and are used for
various purposes in ammunition, such as to pressurise fuel and oxidiser tanks in
liquid fuel rocket engines etc., as power sources for subsystems in guided missiles and torpedoes, or as devices in projectiles for reducing air resistance – socalled base-bleed units.
Propulsion agents are used in propulsion devices and gas generators, but can
also be taken from the medium through which the projectile travels, i.e. air or
water (torpedo propulsion). Gun systems use propellants only, though in the
future this may possibly be combined with electricity. Rocket engines use propellant as well as single, double or triple base liquid propulsion agents. Airbreathing engines use low-oxidiser propellants (in ram rocket engines and
turbo-rocket engines), solid fuels without oxidizer (ramjets, SFRJ – Solid Fuel
RamJet), and liquid fuels (ordinary ramjet and turbojet engines). Gas generators
use propellants or liquid propulsion agents.
Propellants, like other types of explosives, are characterised by a very rapid generation of energy irrespective of their surroundings. On the other hand, heat generation per unit weight is low, for example only about 10% of the heat generated
by burning the corresponding quantity of petrol (gasoline) in air.
Ignition of propulsion agents is achieved by using various types of priming
devices containing an initiator that is initiated mechanically or electrically, or by
some other type of energy supply. The priming device usually contains a pyrotechnic booster charge adjacent to the initiator (e.g. percussion cap, electric
primer) to ensure rapid, reproducible ignition of the propulsion agent. Artillery
primers, base-bleed initiators, and rocket engine initiators are examples of such
priming devices.
5.3.1.2
Safety aspects
From a safety point of view it should be noted that propulsion agents can be
inflammable, highly reactive, toxic and explosive. The rate of combustion usually increases with pressure, i.e. confinement ratio. If the rise in pressure is
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5 Ammunition
uncontrolled there is a risk of a hazardous event. Inadvertent initiation can occur
through friction, discharge of static electricity, heating to ignition temperature,
or by inadvertent actuation of the priming device (by impact, shock, heat or
electric fields). Additionally, propulsion agents can be susceptible to deterioration through ageing so that the ignition temperature becomes lower or the agent
becomes unstable, for example.
Several countries are developing ammunition that is less sensitive to fire and
bullet attack. This ammunition is known as IM (insensitive munition). The designation LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition) is also used. Technically, the
propulsion agent is made less sensitive by the use of plastic as a binding agent
while the energy-producing agent is a nitramine, and/or by confining the propulsion agent in such a way that sensitivity is reduced.
5.3.1.3
The following are examples of the consequences of mechanical stress from the
environment:
•
Cracks, debonding, formation of propellant dust, damage to propellant insulation or other defects that considerably increase the burning surface, may
occur in propelling charges causing the pressure during combustion to be
higher than that for which the ammunition casing is designed.
The following are examples of the consequences of physical and chemical stress
from the environment:
•
If stored at high temperature and/or in high humidity there is a risk that the
rate of burn of the propelling charge may be affected so that an excessive
pressure arises. This applies particularly to unbonded charges and can, in
unfavourable cases for example, result in blockage of the exhaust nozzle in
rocket engines or base bleed units by charge particles that have debonded.
•
When using a case bonded charge a permanent deformation may be induced
because of differences in the coefficients of expansion between the casing
and the charge. This can – in some cases after a long duration – result in
cracks in the charge (relaxation until fracture) or cause debonding between
the charge and its insulation. The risks are enhanced when the casing is subjected to pressure at ignition. Risks can also arise owing to variations in temperature (temperature cycles).
•
Reactions in the propulsion agent, or between the agent and other materials,
can change the properties of the agent itself (i.e. ageing). An example of this
is a decay in the rheological properties which can lead to the formation of
cracks in the propulsion agent when used at low temperature. Another example is degraded stability which, in severe cases, can lead to self-ignition
of the propulsion agent. A further example involves changes in internal bal-
5
140
Ammunition 5
listic properties, which can cause the combustion process to differ from
what is intended, particularly at high or low temperatures. Furthermore, the
propulsion agent can affect other materials, such as the igniter cup, causing
the material to embrittle and rupture.
•
Liquid fuel propulsion agents with a higher thermal cubic expansion rate
than the surrounding fuel tank casing can, when overheated, rupture the casing or the integral bursting discs, whereby the propulsion agent can be expelled into the reaction chamber and/or the surroundings.
•
Propellant motors with non-electrically conducting casings, and propellants
containing metallic powders such as aluminium, can be subject to hazard
initiation caused by electrostatic discharge. Electrical charging of the motor
casing can occur during use. This applies particularly in a dry, cold atmosphere. The electric field from the charge can be intensified in the propellant
and create a flash-over between the metallic grains thus causing hazard initiation. A number of accidents caused by ESD (electrostatic discharge) have
occurred in the USA. All have occurred in systems containing large charges
(Pershing, Peacekeeper).
5.3.1.4
Joint requirements
1.53001
The design of, and materials in, a propelling charge casing shall be
selected so as to ensure that the casing resists all specified loads
without exceeding the permissible deformation or stress.
1.53002
Adjacent materials, and materials in the propelling charge, shall be
compatible. These materials may comprise internal protective
paint, sealing agents, insulation materials, combustion catalysts,
wear protectants, etc. Refer also to requirements 1.23005, 1.23006
and 1.23007.
1.53003
When using hardened steel the material and heat treatment chosen shall be such that no hydrogen brittleness nor detrimental corrosion occurs.
1.53004
The propelling charge shall be of a type, quality, and size to ensure
that the required safety margin for permissible maximum pressure
in all specified environments is not exceeded.
1.53005
The propulsion force process and pressure–time curves shall be reproducible within the stated requirement specification.
1.53006
The propelling charge should be designed to minimise fragments
propelled rearwards from the base plate or nozzle plug, for example.
1.53007
The safe separation distance/time shall be established for all propulsion systems during the most unfavourable operating conditions.
Refer also to requirement 1.51024.
141
5
5 Ammunition
5
1.53008
Metal additives, if any, shall not be able to block the exhaust nozzle.
1.53009
The propulsion agent casing shall be sealed as required.
1.53010
The propulsion agent casing shall withstand handling throughout
its service life.
1.53011
The composition of the propulsion agent should be such that the
agent, its components and its combustion products are of minimal
toxicity and have as little environmental impact as possible. This
applies to manufacture, use, clearance of duds and disposal.
1.53012
The design should facilitate disassembly (e.g. for upgrading, inservice surveillance and disposal).
1.53013
The propulsion device in its tactical application should not detonate when subjected to the specified bullet attack.
Comment:
This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD
0060.
1.53014
Bullet attack testing of the propulsion device as specified in requirement 1.53013 should be performed.
1.53015
The propulsion device in its tactical application should not detonate if subjected to fire.
Comment:
This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified in FSD
0060.
1.53016
A fuel fire test should be performed as specified in requirement
1.53015.
5.3.2
Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition
5.3.2.1
General
This section contains materiel specific requirements for propulsion agents in the
form of solid propellant for tube-launched ammunition. In addition, the joint
requirements specified in Section 5.1 also apply.
Nitrocellulose-based propellants are normally used as propulsion agents in tubelaunched ammunition. The following factors must be taken into account when
dimensioning a propelling charge: the size of the combustion chamber, length of
the barrel, dynamic strength of the barrel (elasticity), mass of the projectile,
driving band force, method of ignition, and the temperature. The pressure process is dependent on these factors as well as on the type of propellant and the
142
Ammunition 5
size and shape of the burn surface. Propellant dimensions are usually such that
the propellant has burnt out before the projectile travels through the muzzle of
the barrel, since the aim is to achieve low dispersion of velocity and to minimise
the flame.
Propellant is normally encased either in fabric (i.e. bag charge), or in a cartridge
case or separate case to form a propelling charge of designated type and dimensions.
Bag charges are used where an incremental/modular charge system is required,
such as for howitzers and mortars. Bag charges can then be used in combination
with separate charge cases, made of metal or plastic, to facilitate simultaneous
loading of the shell and propelling charge. Small arms and automatic weapons,
for example, use unitary ammunition with a single propelling charge in a metal
cartridge case. Combustible cartridge cases are also available, consisting mainly
of nitro-cellulose. The combustible case burns together with the propellant, and
is integral to the propelling charge to a greater or lesser extent. Propellants in
liquid fuel propellant ammunition employ other suitable mixtures of explosives
rather than nitro-cellulose and nitro-glycerine, to enable a lower sensitivity
resulting from a higher ignition temperature for the composition.
Priming devices normally consist of an artillery primer (electrically or mechanically actuated), and usually screwed into the base of the cartridge case. The
artillery primer can be short or can extend through a large section of the loading
chamber. Bag charges (modular charges) often have a booster charge of black
powder or finely granulated porous propellant attached. This enables simultaneous initiation of the entire propelling charge.
Cannon primers are used as priming devices in howitzers and other gun systems
that use bag charges. The cannon primer is inserted into the breech mechanism
of the weapon.
The propulsion agent for small arms ammunition is ignited by a percussion cap
or equivalent.
Liquid fuel propellant may be introduced into future weapon systems. The high
pressure in the ejection mechanism requires steel with very good mechanical
and chemical properties. Oscillations during combustion can affect the electronics in the ammunition, for example.
ETC (electro-thermal-chemical launching) is being studied and developed for
possible introduction into future weapon systems. This technology provides the
prerequisites for increased range and higher reproducibility in the weapon.
143
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5 Ammunition
More stringent requirements will thereby be prescribed for heat resistance and
structural strength in the combustion chamber and barrel. Considerably higher
combustion temperatures and pressures will be achieved. The rapid discharge of
large quantities of stored energy in the capacitor bank of the weapon increases
risks in the form of high electric and magnetic fields and currents.
Figure 5.9 Examples of propelling charges
5
5.3.2.1.1
Safety aspects
A characteristic feature of propelling charges is that they combust without any
supply of air, and that their rate of combustion depends inter alia upon the pressure, which in turn is dependent on the confinement conditions of the propellant.
Some propellants, under certain circumstances, can be made to detonate. Factors that tend to increase their proneness to detonation are severe confinement,
small particle size, high porosity, high nitro-glycerine content and large charge
quantities.
In addition to the hazard initiation stated in Section 5.3.1.2, accidents can occur
if the incorrect charge (incorrect type of propellant, incorrect dimension or
quantity) is used, or if an incorrect or defective projectile is used.
144
Ammunition 5
5.3.2.1.2
Requirements
1.53017
Within the permitted temperature range the propelling charge shall
produce a pressure (MOP) that is lower than the permitted maximum value for the barrel and shell.
Comment:
In the dimensioning and design of the ammunition the pressure definitions and procedures stated in STANAG 4110 shall be applied.
1.53018
For recoil barrels the combustion of the propelling charge should be
designed not to cause backflash.
1.53019
The propelling charge shall be resistant to cook-off in the event of
a misfire or an interruption in firing when the barrel is at maximum
temperature for the operational profile in question. Refer also to requirement 1.43035.
1.53020
The cartridge case shall seal against the chamber seat so that there
is no gas leakage.
1.53021
When using percussion caps in artillery primers etc., the impact
surface shall be countersunk so that the risk for inadvertent initiation during use is minimal.
1.53022
The propelling charge should be designed such that the propellant
is burnt out before the projectile exits the muzzle.
5.3.3
Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets, guided missiles, unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs),
torpedoes, etc.
5.3.3.1
General
5
This section contains materiel specific requirements for propulsion devices and
gas generators used in rockets, guided missiles, UAVs, torpedoes, etc. A common factor of these devices is that they all contain propulsion agents that constitute hazard factors (fire, explosion or toxic hazards). These devices are
incorporated in various types of propulsion systems, and can be subdivided into
the following three groups:
•
reaction engines (see Figure 5.10),
•
gas generators,
•
propulsion devices for torpedoes.
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5 Ammunition
Reaction engines
Rocket engines
Jet rocket engines
Jet engines
Contain oxidants and fuel
Contain a gas generator
that generates gaseous fuel
that is combusted by air
taken in form the atmosphere
Use fuel (solid or liquid) that
is combusted by air taken in
form the atmosphere
Propellant
rocket engines
Contain solid
propellant
Hybrid rocket
engines
Liquid fuel
rocket engines
Contain a solid and
a liquid propulsion
agent
Contain liquid
oxidant and liquid
fuel. In certain
cases, a singel
component
propulsion agent
Ram rocket
engines
Turbojet
engines
Ram rocket
engines
Air taken in from
the atmosphere is
compressed by a
turbine driven
compressor
Air inducated from
the atmosphere is
compressed by the
ram effect
Figure 5.10 Subdivision of reaction engines
5.3.3.2
Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators
Propellant rocket engines and propellant gas generators use propellant confined
in a casing (sleeve) incorporating one or more jets (nozzles) and the necessary
priming devices.
As the propellant burns, hot gases are formed that vent out through the exhaust
nozzle(s).
5
Because the rate of combustion is dependent on the temperature of the propellant, the pressure is usually higher in a hot engine than in a cold one.
In a propellant gas generator the pressure is regulated by releasing the gas flow
that is not consumed for the designed purpose through one or more valves.
146
Ammunition 5
Exhaust jets
Filter
Insulation
Casing
Booster charges
Main charge
Electric priming device
Figure 5.11 Example of a propellant gas generator
The charge(s) in a propellant rocket engine is/are usually designed according to
one of two main principles:
•
unbonded in the engine casing in the form of tubes or rods, for example, see
Figure 5.12,
•
case bonded by casting propellant directly into the engine casing which is
provided with an internal layer of cementing and insulating material, see
Figure 5.13.
Sections of the inner walls of the engine casing that are subjected to hot combustion gases during combustion are usually protected by insulation.
Figure 5.12 Unbonded tubular propellant. All-round combustion
147
5
5 Ammunition
Propellant charge
Liner
Insulation
Figure 5.13 Case bonded charge. Combustion in the propellant channel
The malfunction of a propellant rocket engine or propellant gas generator as a
result of enlargement of the surface, such as by cracks in the propelling
charge(s) and/or debonding between the charge and its insulation, may create
such high pressure levels that the casing ruptures.
High pressure can also result from the unstable combustion of propellant owing
to high frequency pressure oscillations in the engine.
Rupture or leakage at normal operating pressure can also occur owing to degradation in the strength of the casing material, or because of corrosion or defects
in the internal heat insulation.
5
Usually the propellant is extinguished if the casing ruptures, but it can be reignited if it comes into contact with hot surfaces.
1.53023
Propulsion devices should be designed such that the pressure vessel does not burst or detonate as a result of the impact of shrapnel
from fragment-forming ammunition (or equivalent).
Comment: This requirement is part of the IM requirement specified
in FSD 0060.
1.53024
Propulsion devices should be designed such that if the pressure
vessel bursts a minimum number of dangerous fragments are
formed.
1.53025
Propulsion devices should be designed such that fuel fire does not
cause uncontrolled flight.
1.53026
Propulsion devices containing propellant with metallic powder
shall be analysed with regard to risks in the event of electrostatic
charging.
148
Ammunition 5
5.3.3.3
Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators
Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators are based on propulsion
agents usually in hermetically sealed containers (tanks). Propulsion agents can
be of mono- or multi-component type where each component is stored in a separate tank. The main parts of the system are:
•
tank system,
•
feed system,
•
reaction chamber (combustion usually occurs spontaneously),
•
exhaust nozzle.
1
2
1. Fuel pipe
2. Fuel tank
3. Oxidant tank
3
45
4. Piston
5. Gas generator
6. Priming agent
6 7
8
9
7. Over-pressure valve
8. Combustion chamber
9. Exhaust nozzle
Figure 5.14 Example of a liquid fuel rocket engine of off-the-shelf, factory-sealed
type with double base propulsion agent (spontaneously reacting fuel and oxidiser) including propellant gas generator
Propulsion agents are often highly reactive and toxic. Liquid fuel rocket engines
usually contain propellant gas generators with relevant priming devices. The following hazardous events can occur:
•
poisoning or injury to skin upon contact with propulsion agent that has
leaked out during the liquid or gaseous phase,
•
fire in the event of contact between propulsion agent that has leaked out and
combustible or catalytic substances,
•
spontaneous or delayed reaction in the event of contact between propulsion
agents.
1.53027
Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024 and
1.53025 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as
specified in previous subsections.
1.53028
The tank system shall be designed such that direct contact between
propulsion agents cannot occur inadvertently.
1.53029
Tanks for propulsion agents shall have adequate space for the expansion of the liquids.
149
5
5 Ammunition
1.53030
Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the engine to start.
1.53031
Leakage of propulsion agents shall not cause the pressure vessel
to burst.
5.3.3.4
Jet engines
5.3.3.4.1
General
Turbojet and ramjet engines usually use liquid fuel, but ramjet engines can also
use a solid fuel charge located in the combustion chamber of the engine. Missiles that have liquid fuel engines are usually kept in storage with their fuel
tanks full.
5.3.3.4.1.1 Turbojet engines
Vehicles powered by turbojet engines can be air or ground launched (or
launched from ships). In the latter case one or more booster rocket engines are
used that are discarded after burnout. Turbojet engines are normally started after
the weapon is released or launched.
5.3.3.4.1.2 Ramjet engines
5
Vehicles powered by ramjet engines are normally accelerated to approximately
twice the speed of sound to achieve satisfactory ramjet engine function. This is
generally achieved by using a propelling charge in the combustion chamber of
the ramjet engine (i.e. an integrated booster). The rocket engine nozzle located
in the ramjet engine exhaust nozzle is discarded after burnout, and either the
front end of the combustion chamber is opened or special sealing elements are
ejected to enable air to enter for the ramjet engine to start. The rocket engine
exhaust nozzle can be eliminated in certain cases by designing the propelling
charge in a specific way (a so-called nozzleless booster).
Liquid fuel
Figure 5.15 Example of a turbojet engine
150
Priming agent
Ammunition 5
Air intake with
centre cone
Diffuser
Combustion
chamber
Propellant
charge
Afterburner
chamber
Exhaust
nozzle
Figure 5.16 SFRJ – Solid Fuel RamJet engine
A special safety aspect concerning turbojet engines is that the liquid propulsion
agent can cause fuel fire through leakage or inadvertent fuel feed. From the
safety aspect an integrated ramjet engine is characterised – apart from the risk of
fuel fire – by the same hazards as those inherent in propellant rocket engines
owing to the propelling charge located in the combustion chamber. Other hazards that must also be taken into account with both types of engine are those that
arise when engine parts such as intake and exhaust covers, rocket engine
exhaust nozzles, and separate burnt-out booster rocket engines are discarded
after launch.
For an SFRJ to function it is necessary for it to reach a high velocity. This velocity can be achieved with the aid of a booster rocket or by firing from a gun. The
fuel for the ramjet phase is a solid fuel propellant, generally with no or very low
oxidiser content. The safety requirements are therefore less stringent than
requirements stated for booster rockets and propulsion devices in gun barrels.
5
5.3.3.4.2
Requirements
1.53032
Requirements 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023 and 1.53025
shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified
in previous subsections for integrated boosters.
1.53033
The quantity and size of discarded parts (debris) at the start of ramjet function should be minimised.
1.53034
The number of components containing pyrotechnic or explosive
compositions should be minimised.
151
5 Ammunition
5.3.3.5
Ram rocket engines
5.3.3.5.1
General
A ram rocket engine consists of a gas generator in which a gaseous fuel is generated, and an afterburner chamber where the fuel is burnt after mixing with air
from the atmosphere.
The gaseous fuel is generated through combustion or pyrolysis of a solid propulsion agent.
A ram rocket engine usually has a propellant rocket charge located in the afterburner to achieve the required flight velocity in the same way as an integrated
ramjet engine. It has a similar system of sealing elements in the front end near
the air intake, and a propellant rocket nozzle aft that is discarded when the propellant has burnt out. The solid fuel (i.e. propellant with a large excess of fuel)
in the gas generator can be ignited and be already burning during the rocket
engine phase, thus contributing in a minor way to the mass flow and thereby to
the thrust. However, it is more usual to have the airway between the gas generator and afterburner chamber closed during this phase. At transition (i.e. end of
propellant phase) the airway is opened while simultaneously the seal closing the
air intake is also opened. The gas generator is started by its own igniter and
begins to produce gas in the afterburner chamber where it mixes with incoming
air to be subsequently ignited by the afterburner igniter.
5
152
Ammunition 5
Booster phase Solid fuel
Transition phase
Ram rocket phase
Propellant
Propellant igniter
Priming agent
Priming agent
Figure 5.17 Ram rocket engine phases
From the safety aspect, ram rocket engines are equivalent to propellant rocket
engines and propellant gas generators, as well as ramjet engines (see relevant
subsections).
1.53035
5.3.3.6
Requirements 1.53005, 1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023,
1.53025, 1.53033 and 1.53034 shall be applied as SHOULD or
SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections.
5
Propulsion devices for torpedoes
Propulsion devices for torpedoes are based on piston engines that are driven by
high-pressure steam from a steam generator. A propellant gas generator can be
used to start the engine. Battery-driven electric motors are also used.
The steam generator is in principle a combustion chamber in which fuel and an
oxidiser react while heat is generated. At the same time an appropriate quantity
of water is injected so that the propellant gas for the engine consists of dry highpressure steam mixed with combustion products, usually carbon dioxide, as well
as nitrogen in the case of air propulsion.
153
5 Ammunition
The following combinations of fuel and oxidiser are used: ethyl alcohol and air,
paraffin (kerosene) and air, ethyl alcohol and hydrogen peroxide (HP), and paraffin (kerosene) and high test peroxide (HTP).
Propulsion agents are stored in separate tanks. Compressed air is used as an oxidiser as well as for pressurising the other propulsion agent tanks.
The hazard factors that apply to propulsion devices with the propulsion agent
combinations of ethyl alcohol/air and paraffin (kerosene)/air are the same as
those that apply to liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators (see
above in this section). The instability and powerful oxidising effect of hydrogen
peroxide constitutes the most significant hazard factor in systems where HP is
used as propulsion agent.
HP that accidentally leaks out and comes into contact with combustible or catalysing substances can cause spontaneous combustion.
5
5.3.3.6.1
Requirements
1.53036
Requirements 1.53005, 1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023, 1.53024,
1.53028 and 1.53029 shall be applied as SHOULD or SHALL requirements as specified in previous subsections.
1.53037
HP shall be provided with a stabilizer.
1.53038
HP tanks shall be provided with adequate load relieving and draining devices.
5.3.4
Requirement checklist for propulsion devices
154
Ammunition 5
Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices
Comment
Propulsion devices and gas generators in ammunition
1.53001
SHALL
Deformation of casing
1.53002
SHALL
Compatibility
1.53003
SHALL
Heat treatment
1.53004
SHALL
Permissible maximum pressure of propelling charge
1.53005
SHALL
Reproducibility of propulsion force process
1.53006
SHOULD
Fragments propelled rearwards
1.53007
SHALL
1.53008
SHALL
Locking of exhaust nozzle
1.53009
SHALL
Propulsion agent casing
sealed
1.53010
SHALL
Propulsion agent casing,
handling throughout service
life
1.53011
SHOULD
Toxicity of propulsion agent
1.53012
SHOULD
Disassembly
1.53013
SHOULD
Bullet attack of propulsion
device
1.53014
SHOULD
Bullet attack test
1.53015
SHOULD
Propulsion device resistant
to fire
1.53016
SHOULD
Fuel fire test for propulsion
devices
5
Propulsion devices in tube-launched ammunition
1.53017
SHALL
MOP of propelling charge
1.53018
SHOULD
Backflash
1.53019
SHALL
Cook-off
1.53020
SHALL
Cartridge case sealed
1.53021
SHALL
Percussion caps countersunk
1.53022
SHOULD
Propelling charge burnt out
Propulsion devices and gas generators in rockets etc.
1.53023
SHOULD
Pressure vessel burst caused
by shrapnel
1.53024
SHOULD
Fragments from pressure
vessel burst
155
5 Ammunition
Table 5:3 Requirement checklist for propulsion devices, continued
1.53025
1.53026
SHALL
SHALL
Uncontrolled flight
Electrostatic charging
Liquid fuel rocket engines and liquid gas generators
1.53027
SHALL
Requirements 1.53005,
1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023,
1.53024 and 1.53025 apply
1.53028
SHALL
Direct contact between propulsion agents
1.53029
SHALL
Propulsion agent tanks,
space for expansion
1.53030
SHALL
Motor not started by leakage
of propulsion agents
1.53031
SHALL
Pressure vessel not to burst
by leakage of propulsion
agents
Jet engines
1.53032
SHALL
5
1.53033
SHOULD
1.53034
SHOULD
Ram rocket engines
1.53035
SHALL
1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023
and 1.53025 apply
Discarded parts to be minimised
Explosive compositions to
be minimised
1.53013, 1.53015, 1.53016,
1.53023, 1.53025, 1.53033
and 1.53034 apply
Propulsion devices for torpedoes
1.53036
SHALL
1.53015, 1.53016, 1.53023,
1.53024, 1.53028 and
1.53029 apply
1.53037
SHALL
Stabiliser for HP
1.53038
SHALL
Draining devices for HP
tanks
156
Comment
Ammunition 5
5.4
Fuzing systems for warheads and propelling
charges
5.4.1
Introduction
5.4.1.1
General
The following sections apply to all fuzing systems that are designed to initiate
warheads or propelling charges.
The requirements specified in Section 5.4.2 through 5.4.5 shall as far as possible
be met, even by fuzing systems with non-conforming functions (e.g. fuzing systems that do not use environmental forces for arming) in Section 5.4.6.
Warheads and propulsion devices must be initiated by a fuzing system if they
are to function as intended. It thus follows that the safety of the fuzing system is
a decisive factor in the safety of the entire weapon system. The fuzing system
therefore has its own safety system whose task is to prevent hazard initiation
throughout all phases in the life of the ammunition with the necessary degree of
safety.
The integral safety system of a fuze may contain one or more mutually independent safety devices. Each safety device is subject to one or more arming conditions, each of which must be satisfied for the safety device to arm.
It is necessary for all the safety devices to be armed to enable the warhead to be
initiated.
The more safety devices that prevent initiation or transmission in an explosive
train at any given stage, the greater is the degree of safety against hazard initiation at that stage.
On the other hand, a large number of safety devices can degrade the reliability
of the fuzing system with regard to its intended function.
The principal element of a fuzing system consists of one or more transmission
safety devices, the design and location of which are dependent on the method of
initiation.
157
5
5 Ammunition
There are two groups of transmission safety devices (see Figure 5.18 and 5.19):
1. Transmission safety devices for systems with an out-of-line explosive train
(safety device). The explosive components in the explosive train are separated by a mechanical interrupter.
2.
Transmission safety devices for systems with an in-line explosive train.
There is no mechanical interrupter between the explosive components of
the explosive train.
The transmission safety device can be electrical (circuit breaker) or optical, for
example.
The explosive train is initiated by an initiator when the initiator receives the signal to initiate.
Sensor(-s)
Initiator
Transmission
safety device
Interrupter
Safety
features
5
Explosive train
Signal processor
Initiator
Interrupter
Booster
Booster
Warhead charge
Figure 5.18 A fuzing system with out-of-line explosive train
158
Arming
conditions
Ammunition 5
Sensor(-s)
Explosive train
Transmission Circuit breaker
safety device
Safety
features
Signal processor
Initiator
Booster
Circuit breaker
Arming
conditions
Initiator
Booster
Warhead charge
Figure 5.19 A fuzing system with in-line explosive train
When all requirements for the arming process cannot be met, such as when
environmental conditions dependent on use are lacking, the safety level can be
accepted in certain cases by enabling the fuzing system – or an essential part
thereof – to be assembled/installed immediately before use.
The most sensitive part of the initiator can be a primary explosive, an explosive
or a priming composition. Of these the primary explosive is most easily initiated, and therefore demands the most stringent requirements for the safety system.
The use of electric SAI units has become increasingly common in pace with the
use of electronics for sensors and signal processing. These initiators are generally more sensitive to initiation (by radiated interference, for example, that can
cause hazard initiation) than mechanical initiators. However, there are exceptions such as EFI systems. Moreover, it is often difficult to predict the presence
and extent of electric energy.
159
5
5 Ammunition
Total safety when using a fuzing system is based on two factors – firstly, very
carefully considered technical solutions and, secondly, instructions on how to
use the system. Together these two factors shall enable a tolerable safety level.
As many as possible of the safety features shall be designed into the technical
solution, and shall rely on operating instructions no more than is necessary.
Requirements governing the need for safety devices in a fuzing system must, to
a large extent, be related to the consequences of a hazardous event. A thorough
consideration of this interrelationship is vital to system safety.
5
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Exempel på
riskfaktorer
Bore and
muzzle safety
Transport and
loading safety
Mask safety
Safe separation
distance
Safety distance(times)
Arming range(delay)
Hazard overview
rain safety
resistance to electromagnetic
bush safety
In-flight safety
Ammunition 5
5
Figure 5.20 Safety concepts
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5 Ammunition
5.4.1.2
Certain typical defects can be detected by subjecting the fuzing system to special testing during development. Such testing shall simulate the predicted environment to which the fuze will be exposed during its life. Defects discovered at
this stage can often be remedied by relatively elementary actions.
Examples of defects and events that can result from environmental stress and
that can adversely affect safety are listed in the subsections below. The list
should not be considered as comprehensive.
New designs and materials may entail new hazard factors.
Additional information may lead to the discovery of further hazard factors.
5.4.1.2.1
Mechanical stress
Examples of the effects of mechanical stress:
5
•
Leakage.
•
Cracks in materials
•
Pulverization of explosives that can subsequently migrate to a position
where initiation can occur through shock or vibration.
•
Localized heating caused by friction between moving parts.
•
Mechanical parts of fuzing systems can be damaged or broken so that initiation occurs during transportation, or prematurely during loading or firing.
•
Electric power cuts or short-circuits can occur through damage to leads or
connections. Extraneous circuits can also be created by the ingress of foreign bodies. The risk of complex short-circuits on printed circuit boards and
in connectors, for example, should be particularly considered.
•
Cracks in micro-electronic circuits can result in failure effects that are difficult to evaluate.
•
Batteries and electrolytic capacitors can be damaged causing leakage of
electrolyte that may cause spontaneous ignition of explosives or make them
more sensitive.
•
During transportation, loading and firing, warheads are subjected to acceleration levels that can disable safety features temporarily or permanently.
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5.4.1.2.2
Physical and chemical stress
Examples of the effects of physical and chemical stress:
•
Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they melt or flow
plastically. This can result in explosives fastening in screw threads or cavities where they may later be actuated leading to hazard initiation.
•
Explosives can be heated to such a high temperature that they are initiated
(cook-off).
•
Air can be pumped in and out through leaks whereby water vapour enters
the fuzing system. Most explosives are adversely affected by water and become either more sensitive or more inert. Gaseous products can be formed
from the reaction that can cause damage to constituent parts, and sometimes
may also react with them to form more sensitive compounds (such as copper
azide).
•
The structural strength, elasticity, and dimensions of the materials from
which the fuze is fabricated are affected by temperature so that damage from
shocks and vibrations at low temperature, for example, is more likely to occur.
•
Extreme variations in pressure can occur that can damage confined parts and
thereby affect their function.
•
Where there are great differences between the coefficients of linear expansion of explosives and their encasing material, leaks and ruptures can be
caused in the casing or cracks may be formed in the explosive. Materials
containing moisture may swell or shrink when the moisture content changes.
•
Gases or fluids (desirable or undesirable) in the construction can cause corrosion or other physical changes to constituent materials in the fuzing system.
•
Reactions between incompatible materials.
•
Condensation and coating on electrical components and leads can result in
extraneous lead-over current and changed electrical characteristics. Corrosion can occur where there is galvanic contact between different metals.
•
An inadvertent flow of energy to electric or laser initiators, possibly caused
by some environmental factor, can cause initiation.
•
An inadvertent supply of electric energy, such as discharge of static electricity, can result in electronic components being damaged in such a way that
safety is affected.
•
Electrostatic discharge can, in unfavourable cases (in inappropriate designs), directly or indirectly initiate the initiator in the fuzing system.
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•
An electric potential difference can occur between the ammunition and
nearby objects or earth/ground. The risks are greatest when the potential difference is equalized in conjunction with a connection – mechanical or electrical – to the weapon platform or test equipment.
•
When connecting and disconnecting electrical equipment, high transient
currents can occur inadvertently such as when disconnecting the power
source after testing.
5.4.1.3
Technical solutions
5.4.1.3.1
Electrical subsystems
5.4.1.3.1.1 General
Consideration shall be given to the following factors inter alia when designing
fuzing systems to achieve protection against inadvertent function:
•
Selection of components:
The relay for the armed and unarmed modes shall be selected such that an
electric current maintains the relay in armed mode, and any break in voltage
results in the relay returning to unarmed mode. Mechanical initiators for
thermal batteries shall be selected such that they do not activate the batteries
in the event of a defect. When selecting components all the environmental
factors to which the system can be subjected shall be taken into account.
•
Static electricity:
Any uncontrolled discharge of static electricity can cause hazard initiation
of the fuzing system. The design shall ensure that the electrostatic discharge
can occur via a resistor or in some other way.
•
Electromagnetic energy:
The design must provide the best possible protection from electromagnetic
influences including lightning, EMP (electromagnetic pulse) and HPM
(high power microwaves). Protection can be achieved in the following
ways:
– Metallic shielding of sensitive components. Storage containers can
give considerable protection against electromagnetic energy.
– HF shielding of openings where there are controls and connectors.
– ‘Filtration’.
– Circuit insulating relays and connectors that are insensitive to HF energy shall be located as close as possible to protected elements to preclude use of long cables that assimilate energy.
– Shield connections shall be of low resistance and shall be fully
sheathed at all connection points.
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•
Earth/ground currents:
The design shall not incorporate earth/ground loops. Each design shall ensure that earth/ground currents are restricted to a safe level during operation,
loading and testing.
•
Connectors and cables:
Connectors and cables shall be designed and located to achieve maximum
protection against short-circuiting resulting from ingress of moisture and
foreign matter, e.g. lead connections can have insulating combs between
connection points. Connectors shall be designed such that they cannot be assembled incorrectly nor be incorrectly identified.
5.4.1.3.1.2 Electronics
Experience has shown that our present fuzing systems are very safe. When
developing new products the aim must be to maintain, or even improve, on this
standard of safety.
Current developments involve the replacement of mechanical and electromagnetic designs with electronic circuits. This trend is driven by the major advantages afforded by electronics such as high performance, low weight, great
flexibility and low price.
The application of electronics in fuzing systems is, however, far from self-evident. Often any defect in the electronics will affect not only function but also
safety. Consequently, there are excellent reasons for exercising great caution.
In fuzing systems with an out-of-line explosive train transmission in the explosive train is certainly prevented, but if the interrupting function as such is controlled by electronics the system should be considered as an electronic fuzing
system from the safety aspect.
5.4.1.3.1.3 Subsystems with wave-borne signals
If an arming system uses a signal transmitted via a carrier wave the system will
be open to all signals – intentional and inadvertent – that reach its input port. It
must thus be ensured that only the correct signal can result in arming, and that
the probability of an unauthorized signal reaching the arming object is made
sufficiently low.
This can be achieved, for example, by:
•
Using a sufficient number of combinations and a sufficiently narrow bandwidth.
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•
Limiting the strength of the signal in range and dispersion to that which is
necessary for the specific application.
•
Selecting codes so that only a limited number of objects can be armed by the
same code.
•
Changing the signal before the next operating occasion.
•
Varying the signal when repeating commands to the same object.
•
Being able to vary codes or data for signal configuration when deploying the
object.
•
Ensuring the code cannot be deciphered despite wide knowledge of the safety system.
•
Incorporating a time-dependent parameter in the signal in cases where arming will take place at a later occasion after deployment.
5.4.1.3.1.4 Programmable subsystems
5
The increasing use of software in safety critical applications creates a need for
rules and guidelines concerning the development of such systems. Those used
for the design of electronics are not directly applicable. Conventional safety
analysis studies the consequences when various components malfunction or are
missing. The behavior of the system in various failure modes can be predicted.
Component defects do not usually occur in software after the system has been
developed. Instead, the risk is that the system does not behave as intended in all
respects. Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove subsequently that an existing
software program is free from bugs in all respects. ‘Manufacturing defects’ can
also arise during coding, for example. Instead, safety must be designed into the
application. This is achieved by systematic procedure throughout design, development, testing, configuration management and documentation. Software can
be a good aid for enhancing test efficiency but should be avoided as a circuit
safety feature in fuzing systems.
5.4.1.3.1.5 Laser fuzing systems
A laser fuzing system in its most elementary form consists of a laser, optical
fibre, and a detonator (primer). It is also possible to transmit laser energy
directly to the detonator without any optical fibre.
For a system without an interrupter in the explosive train, the laser must be prevented from releasing initiation energy to the detonator before the safe separation distance has been reached.
This can be prevented by:
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Ammunition 5
•
Separating the laser from the detonator by a barrier introduced into the part
of the beam, or by blocking the laser cavity. The requirements for the barrier/blocking then become the same as for an interrupter.
•
Safety features to prevent the electronics from activating the laser.
For laser systems with an interrupter in the explosive train, the standard requirements for an interrupter apply.
5.4.1.4
Other fuzing systems
5.4.1.4.1
Fuzing systems for explosives etc.
Fuzing systems with an in-line explosive train have been traditionally accepted
for use in demolition devices, signal and spotting agents, hand-grenades, and
minesweeping ammunition such as mine counter-blasting charges, explosive
cutters and acoustic explosive sweeps, even though sensitivity requirements are
not met for such fuzing systems. The initiator usually consists of a primer or
detonator that is initiated by electrical or mechanical energy. Safety is mainly
based on the observance of regulations governing use. For newly developed
ammunition, however, the requirements in this section should also be applied.
5.4.1.4.2
Demolition devices (such as plastic explosives, demolition
sticks, Bangalore torpedoes and linear charges)
Demolition devices are initiated by fuzing systems consisting of, for example, a
safety fuze, PETN fuze, non-electric fuze, or solely a detonator with electrical
or mechanical initiation. It is vital that fault-free materiel and only the prescribed initiation device are used to prevent hazard initiation.
5.4.1.4.3
5
Signal and spotting agents
Signal and spotting agents are ignited by igniting devices such as a primer in
combination with a safety fuze, or percussion primer with wire actuation.
Signal rounds for underwater use can have explosives which, in the event of
hazard initiation in air, can cause great damage. For this reason they should have
a safety system to which the requirements in this section are applied to the
greatest possible extent.
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5.4.1.4.4
Hand-grenades
There are different kinds of hand-grenades such as smoke or HE grenades of
which the latter are the most dangerous, having on many occasions caused
injury during practice throwing.
The most common type of hand-grenade has a fuzing system containing a priming device (i.e. hand-grenade fuze). The fuzing system is armed by the release of
a lever on throwing. The hand-grenade fuze is stored separately and is installed
only when the grenade is to be used.
For newly developed hand-grenades, however, the requirements in this section
should be applied to the greatest possible extent.
5.4.1.4.5
Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters
Mine counter-blasting charges and explosive cutters are initiated by a fuzing
system consisting of a mechanically initiated detonator. In addition to a transport safety device they incorporate a safety device that requires them to be submerged in water (water pressure).
An acoustic explosive sweep consists of detonator clusters and TNT bodies that
are initiated by electric detonators. The detonators are fired by an electric initiation device with the charges located in special launch tubes.
5.4.1.4.6
5
Self-destruction
If the fuzing system contains an integrated self-destruction or anti-handling
device etc., this function shall have the same degree of safety against hazard initiation as the remainder of the system.
5.4.1.4.7
Submunitions
Fuzing systems in submunitions are subject to the same basic requirements as
other fuzing systems. Submunitions can have special functions and characteristics for which it is important to observe the following:
•
That the safety features are disabled in the proper sequence. This can be crucial, for example, for a submunition in an artillery shell in which the first
safety feature is disabled when the shell is fired, the second safety feature is
disabled when the submunition is ejected.
•
That the safety features are disabled as late as possible with regard to available environmental requirements. For an airborne pod system it could, for
example, be inappropriate to disable the first safety feature when the pod is
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released from the aircraft since the aircraft is often close to the pod for a long
time after separation. Instead, the separation of submunitions from the pod
and the drag force from the parachute etc. should be used as conditions for
disabling. Separation from the aircraft may, however, be used as an ‘extra’
safety condition and as a prerequisite for disabling the other safety features.
•
For submunitions containing high explosive it is often important to incorporate a self-destruction facility owing to the risk of difficulty in detecting unexploded ammunition.
5.4.1.4.8
Multi-purpose ammunition
Multi-purpose ammunition is a special type of tube-launched ammunition that
exists mainly in the 12.7 - 40 mm calibre range. A characteristic feature of this
type of ammunition is that it lacks a conventional fuzing system, and that the
explosive reaction consists rather of deflagration instead of detonation. The
explosive in the warhead is initiated solely by the transfer of energy that occurs
when the shell hits the target.
Safety against inadvertent initiation can thus only be regulated to a certain
extent by applicable requirements in this section. Instead, safety must be verified by testing dedicated to the operational environment of the object.
A safety margin can be achieved by increasing the level of severity during testing contra the operational environment. In addition, FMEA testing should be
performed with regard to the conceivable malfunctions that can cause safety
hazards.
5.4.1.4.9
Tandem systems
The requirements stated in this section shall apply to the initiation of each warhead in systems containing several warheads (i.e. tandem systems).
The warheads can have separate or common fuzing systems.
5.4.1.4.10 Propulsion devices
Existing fuzing systems for propulsion devices often lack a transmission safety
device despite the fact that the fuzing system contains explosives that are not
approved for use after interrupters, and that the propulsion device itself in the
event of a hazard initiation can cause great damage, and even in some cases can
activate the fuzing system for the warhead.
For newly designed fuzing systems for propulsion devices, however, it is desirable that the requirements stated in this section be applied.
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5.4.2
5.4.2.1
Common requirements
1.54001
Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable safety analysis to be
performed.
1.54002
The safety analysis shall be performed by at least one independent
party.
Comment:
In some cases the special system safety function in the same company that designed the system can be considered to be an independent party.
1.54003
The safety level of the fuzing system should be specified numerically as a probability and should be verified by analysis.
1.54004
Single failures that can lead to inadvertent arming or initiation of
explosives after the interrupter or circuit safety device within the
safe separation distance/time shall not occur.
Consequences to the system of single failures shall be verified by
theoretical analysis and/or FMEA testing throughout the environmental/applicational range.
Comment:
This requirement does not apply to the failure mode ‘self-initiation
of explosive’.
For some applications the requirement for redundancy to prevent inadvertent arming can be resolved by, for example, a fail-safe function or by an interrupter between the energy source and the initiator
so that activation of the sensor does not lead to initiation.
1.54005
Explosive trains containing sensitive explosives (not approved for
use after an interrupter as specified in FSD 0214) shall have at least
one mechanical interrupter. No sensitive explosive is permitted
after that interrupter.
Comment:
Refer also to requirements1.54113, 1.54114 and 1.54115.
1.54006
The interrupter in an explosive train should, before arming, segregate the sensitive explosive (out-of-line) from the explosive train.
1.54007
Explosives approved for use after the interrupter or for use in systems without an interrupter shall be qualified for such use as specified in FSD 0214.
1.54008
The probability of inadvertent initiation of an explosive after the
interrupter or circuit safety device shall not be higher than the probability against inadvertent arming.
5
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Ammunition 5
Comment:
A failure must thus not lead to initiation unless all the steps normally required for arming have been completed.
1.54009
Fuzing systems shall be designed and documented in such a manner as to facilitate an effective production control and quality inspection.
1.54010
All constituent materials shall be selected and combined such that
no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life of the fuzing
system, e.g. as a result of corrosion, mechanical fatigue, mutual interference, or insufficient chemical stability resulting in the formation of copper azide for example.
1.54011
All explosives shall be confined and/or be fixed so that they remain
intact when subjected to specified environmental severities.
1.54012
It shall not be possible for external environmental stress – such as
electromagnetic, electrostatic or laser – to be able to inadvertently
initiate the initiator in a fuzing system.
1.54013
The safe separation distance/time shall always be established with
regard to warhead effect and intended tactical use. Refer also to requirements 1.42022 and 1.51024.
Comment:
Three different cases can be distinguished:
1. The safe separation distance is so great that there is no risk to
friendly forces in the event of a burst when that distance has been
reached. No evasive action is assumed.
2. The safe separation distance is shorter than in item 1 above owing to tactical reasons. Evasive action or taking cover is assumed.
3. The safe separation time enables friendly forces to exit the danger area.
1.54014
Fuzing systems should be designed so that a failure in the system
results in a fail-safe state.
Comment:
This requirement can lead to a degradation of any deactivation or
self-destruction function.
1.54015
Fuzing systems should not be capable of accumulating sufficient
energy to initiate the warhead within the safe separation distance/
time.
1.54016
Fuzing systems should be designed such that incorrect assembly
of safety critical parts is not possible.
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5
1.54017
It shall not be possible to install an armed SAI/SAU in the ammunition if signals to the target sensor can be expected to occur during
transport and storage, or during firing before the safe separation distance has been reached.
Comment:
Arming may have occurred without being detected as a result of incorrect assembly during manufacture or maintenance, or because
the SAI/SAU was not deactivated after final testing.
1.54018
Fuzing systems should be equipped with indication for vital safety
devices/functions such as arming.
Comment:
This requirement applies to all phases including manufacture.
1.54019
If there is a requirement for system testing after manufacture (AUR
testing), functions for a reliable test shall be built into the fuzing
system from the beginning.
1.54020
Fuzing systems should be designed to enable maintenance, upgrading, in-service surveillance, disposal, destruction and destruction of
duds, to be carried out safely.
1.54021
The composition and integration of the booster should be such that
it does not detonate or deflagrate before the main charge is subjected to heating (e.g. by fire).
1.54022
Integrated circuits should be avoided in safety critical applications.
1.54023
Well proven components should be used.
5.4.2.2
Electro Explosive Devices (EEDs)
1.54024
Connector pins in external connectors connected by an EED
should be semi-enclosed.
1.54025
The sleeve of an external connector should make contact and provide electromagnetic shielding before the pins engage.
1.54026
The shielding of ignition cables should be connected to the casing
of the connector around the complete circumference of the cable.
Comment:
This is particularly important with the casing of an EED to obtain
good high frequency protection. The connection pins in a connector
should not be used to connect shields.
1.54027
The switch that finally connects an EED to the electric supply
should be located as close to the initiator as possible.
1.54028
The lead/leads between the switch and the EED shall be shielded
from external electromagnetic fields and be protected against static
electricity.
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Ammunition 5
1.54029
The capacitance across the switch should be kept sufficiently low
to prevent initiation by electrostatic discharge.
1.54030
Twin conductors should be twined.
1.54031
If one pole is earthed/grounded to an EED the earthing/grounding
should take the shortest route to a shield surrounding the igniter.
1.54032
Ignition cables shall not be located in the same shield as other conductors.
1.54033
An EED shall have documented electrical characteristics as specified in FSD 0112 or equivalent.
1.54034
Fuzing systems containing EEDs shall be system tested in accordance with FSD 0212 or equivalent.
5.4.2.3
The arming process
1.54035
The arming process should be as elementary as possible.
1.54036
The arming process should be functionally and physically separated from other processes in the system.
1.54037
If a fuzing system requires human intervention to start the arming
process, there shall be a device that provides unambiguous indication of whether the system is unarmed.
1.54038
Arming shall not occur until the safe separation distance/time has
been reached at the earliest.
1.54039
When two electric signals are used for arming at least one of them
shall be dependent on a continuous current supply.
1.54040
If the current supply ceases before arming is completed the fuzing
system shall be neutralized or deactivated.
1.54041
In a system where the arming process is controlled by electrical
safety features, at least two of them shall be in the form of an interrupter from the current supply.
1.54042
Fuzing systems in which arming is performed by connecting the
circuit to earth/ground (single conductor system) should be avoided.
1.54043
Arming shall not be enabled as a result of plausible short-circuits
such as short-circuits between adjacent leads in harnesses, in connectors, on PC assemblies and in integrated circuits.
1.54044
Arming shall not be enabled as a result of a plausible power cut
caused by, for example, soldering defects, oxidised connector surfaces, or cracks in PCBs or substrates.
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1.54045
In systems with wave-borne signals the probability of unauthorized arming/actuation shall be sufficiently low with regard to the
field of application.
1.54046
If a signal outside the ammunition is used for arming, the fuzing
system shall verify the signal before arming takes place.
5.4.2.4
Arming safety features including semiconductor switches
1.54047
Hazard arming shall be prevented by at least two mutually independent safety features.
Comment:
The safety features can be:
– mechanical safety features in an interrupter,
– mechanically operated electric switches,
– relays,
– semiconductor switches.
1.54048
If a system with only two safety features is used, both shall be mechanical.
1.54049
There shall be at least one mechanical safety feature before the
point of launch/deployment.
1.54050
For systems with only semiconductors as safety features, at least
three independent ‘closings’ shall be required at system blocking
level for arming.
Comment:
The closings are best actuated by different signal levels.
1.54051
A system containing only semiconductors shall not be able to arm
as a result of static failures in the safety features (failure mode either
closed or open), which can mean that at least one of the safety features requires a dynamic signal.
Comment:
The dynamic signal must be of such a nature that it cannot reasonably occur inadvertently.
1.54052
The safety analysis of system solutions containing only semiconductors as safety features should be performed by at least two independent parties.
5.4.2.5
Application specific requirements
1.54053
Fuzing systems should be designed so that safety is not dependent
upon operating procedures.
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Ammunition 5
1.54054
Arming shall only be enabled during use.
Comment:
The lower limit for arming shall exceed by a good margin the maximum stress level experienced during operation, transport and other
relevant environmental conditions.
1.54055
Arming shall only be enabled if two mutually independent, application specific, environmental conditions are satisfied, provided
that reasonable such conditions are available.
Comment:
Examples are stated below of environmental factors that can be
used to activate arming and/or as sources for arming energy. All of
them shall be considered before the most suitable is selected:
– acceleration,
– angular acceleration,
– spin,
– launch/deployment device. Sensing of these devices (such as a
barrel) is not considered to be a particularly good method but can
be accepted,
– dynamic pressure,
– drag (via a turbine or parachute for example),
– hydrodynamic and hydrostatic pressure,
– arming wires,
– back pressure.
1.54056
If only one realistic environmental condition is available, or two dependent conditions, there shall be at least one manual operation
(such as removal of a safety pin) required for arming prior to loading/deployment.
Comment:
When safety relies entirely on one environmental condition after the
manual operation has been performed, a major effort must be made
to verify practically and theoretically that this condition cannot occur inadvertently after the manual operation, such as if a shell is
dropped during loading.
1.54057
A manual operation or safety pin shall also block the function produced by the only available environmental condition
1.54058
During mechanical deployment of ammunition (such as when laying mines with a minelayer) the arming shall take place at the earliest when the mine leaves the laying device.
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5.4.2.6
Testing
1.54059
Constituent components and subsystems that are vital to the safety
of the fuzing system shall undergo separate safety qualification
(type testing).
1.54060
Fuzing systems shall undergo complete safety qualification as
specified in FSD 0213 or equivalent. Safety critical functions
should be monitored during testing and be inspected after testing.
1.54061
Testing shall be performed at a safety limit at which arming is not
permitted.
Comment:
Safety limit in this case denotes the stress level which exceeds by an
acceptable margin the most severe level reached during transport,
operation, ramming or the firing/launch process. Testing is designed to verify requirement 1.54054. Refer also to the comment after requirement 1.54056.
1.54062
The choice of materials in a fuzing system shall – if it is considered
necessary – be verified by testing that demonstrates with acceptable
probability that no effects detrimental to safety occur during the life
of the fuzing system. Refer also to requirements 1.23005, 1.23006
and 1.23007.
1.54063
Testing shall be performed to demonstrate whether the design used
for confinement of the explosives meets the stipulated requirements.
Comment:
For this testing, dimensions, compacting pressure and other properties shall be selected within their respective tolerance range such
that the probability for failures is considered to be greatest. Testing
shall be performed in the environment (within the operating range
of the fuzing system) that is considered to be the most unfavourable
from the safety aspect.
1.54064
Testing shall be performed to establish the distance or time from
launch or equivalent at which the transmission safety device arms.
If there are other safety devices in the explosive train, they shall be
neutralised prior to testing.
1.54065
Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not
initiate within the safe separation distance/time owing to passage
through mask, impact with the ground, contact with the seabed,
somersault, or collision with obstacles.
Comment:
The concept of ‘inherent safety’ is used for torpedoes.
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Ammunition 5
1.54066
Testing shall be performed to verify that the fuzing system does not
initiate in flight or after deployment after the arming process is completed as a result of the environmental stress stipulated in the requirement specification for the object.
Comment:
This requirement applies in the first instance to ammunition for
which there is a continuous (undivided) danger area.
1.54067
Fuzing systems shall be designed to enable the required functional
testing to be performed safely.
5.4.2.7
Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal
1.54068
Ignition capacitors shall be equipped with duplicate discharge
circuits. At least one of these circuits shall be physically located as
close to the capacitor as possible.
1.54069
The leakage resistance of ignition capacitors, or for earthing/
grounding in twin conductor systems, shall have as low earth/
ground resistance as the system permits.
1.54070
If the fuzing system contains an integrated anti-handling or anticlearance device or a booby trap charge, the same safety requirements shall apply as for a normal fuzing system.
1.54071
Fuzing systems incorporating a deactivating function shall contain
a device that indicates in an unambiguous way whether the system
is deactivated.
1.54072
Deactivation shall provide at least the same level of safety as when
the system was initially in unarmed mode.
1.54073
Deactivation should not require special tools.
1.54074
Deactivation should remove all initiation energy.
1.54075
The fuzing system should be designed such that deactivation/neutralisation is not prevented by a malfunction in any part of the fuzing
system that is not used for deactivation/neutralisation.
1.54076
If it is intended to enable clearance or disposal or recycling the fuzing system shall be designed for subsequent safe handling.
5.4.2.8
1.54077
Landmines shall have a self-destruction, neutralisation or deactivation facility that renders the mine harmless after a certain time.
This facility can be automatically or remotely controlled.
1.54078
Drift mines shall have a fuzing system that ensures that the mine
is harmless one hour after deployment at the latest.
5
177
5 Ammunition
5
1.54079
Anchored mines shall be neutralised as soon as the mine has
slipped its mooring.
1.54080
Torpedoes shall be neutralised if they do not hit the target.
5.4.3
Requirements for systems with interrupters
5.4.3.1
Design requirements
1.54081
The interrupter shall prevent the booster charge in the fuzing system from initiating in the event of a hazard initiation in the explosive train before the interrupter.
1.54082
Each of the safety features shall individually retain the interrupter
in unarmed mode.
1.54083
Safety features in an interrupter should lock directly into the interrupter, not via any linkage or similar device.
1.54084
In systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are available, at least one of the safety features shall lock the
interrupter during the arming phase until the ammunition has left
the launcher/release device.
1.54085
Fuzing systems should not contain stored energy – such as mechanical, pyrotechnical or electrical – for removing the interrupter
in an explosive train.
Comment:
Energy for removing an interrupter can best be provided by some
unique environmental factor after launch/release.
1.54086
Stored energy shall not be used for both disabling safety features
and removing interrupters.
1.54087
Confinement of the explosive train shall be designed such that hazard initiation of the explosive train before the interrupter while the
interrupter is in unarmed mode does not provide ejection of fragments that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment.
5.4.3.2
Testing interrupters
1.54088
Testing shall be performed to establish that an interrupter remains
locked in unarmed mode with sufficient margin when subjected to
the most severe load (cf. the environmental specification) when
only one safety feature is installed. The function of each safety feature shall be tested individually.
178
Ammunition 5
1.54089
Testing shall be performed to establish that explosives located after
the interrupter are not initiated by the detonator while the safety device is in unarmed mode.
Comment:
The following shall be taken into consideration:
– the critical thickness of a mechanical barrier,
– the critical charge quantity and compacting pressure of a detonator located before the interrupter,
– the critical play and dimensions etc. of gas passages through or
around the interrupter. The term ‘critical’ denotes the value
when transmission in some form takes place. Testing can be supplemented by calculations.
1.54090
Testing shall be performed to determine at which point transmission
is achieved when the interrupter is gradually moved from unarmed
to armed position. Dimensions shall be chosen within each tolerance range so as to facilitate transmission. Between unarmed position and the boundary limit for transmission, any ejection of
fragments, deformation or fragmentation shall not entail a risk of injury.
Comment:
For interrupters with an instantaneous arming motion, testing can be
performed in fewer positions (at least one) between unarmed and
armed position.
5.4.4
Requirements for systems without interrupters
1.54091
A fuzing system with an in-line explosive train shall be initiated
only by a signal that is unique and which cannot be emulated by any
undesired internal or external signal.
Comment:
Usually only high power systems (such as EFI) are used in systems
containing only circuit fuzes.
1.54092
Charging of an ignition capacitor or equivalent should only be
started after the safe separation distance/time has been reached.
1.54093
The voltage in an ignition capacitor or equivalent shall be below the
lower ignition voltage (maximum-no-fire) until the safe separation
distance/time is reached.
Comment:
This is analogous to the conventional case with one interrupter that
moves slowly and enables transmission in the explosive train at
179
5
5 Ammunition
some point before final position. Full arming is achieved when the
voltage of the ignition capacitor reaches the minimum-all-fire level
of the electric igniter.
1.54094
In systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are available, at least one of the safety features shall be disabled
by an environmental factor after the ammunition has left the
launcher.
5.4.5
Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming
functions
5.4.5.1
Fuzing systems where unique, application specific, environmental factors are not available
1.54095
Fuzing systems shall be designed such that the packaged ammunition and fuzing systems remain safe during storage, transport, handling and use. This applies until the point in time when the
ammunition is issued, or when the fuzing system or initiator is installed and arming or priming is performed in accordance with the
specified operating instructions.
1.54096
Fuzing systems should be set/installed as late as is permissible by
the requirements of the tactical application.
1.54097
Incorrect installation of a fuzing system should not be possible.
1.54098
At least two different and almost simultaneous manual operations
shall be required for arming to take place.
Comment:
These manual operations should be sequential, i.e. a specific sequence is required.
1.54099
Electric ignition energy shall not be enabled in the firing circuit until after the specified arming delay or safe separation time has
elapsed.
1.54100
Fuzing systems shall be equipped with a device which – after arming – provides sufficient safety time for the operator to leave the
danger zone.
5.4.5.2
1.54101
The risk of incorrect connection of fuzing systems to explosives,
signal and spotting agents owing to a mistake, clumsiness or carelessness shall be taken into account.
1.54102
In cases where safety is based on operation, operating instructions
shall accompany the packaging or the ammunition.
5
180
Ammunition 5
1.54103
The fuzing system and components for the fuzing system shall be
designed such that assembly of the priming device can be performed as the final operation in the readiness procedure.
1.54104
An intentional manual operation, such as removing a safety pin,
shall be necessary before initiation of the warhead can take place.
Comment: The safety pin shall be designed so that it is not inadvertently removed during normal handling of the ammunition.
5.4.5.3
Initiation devices and demolition charges
1.54105
Fuzing systems for demolition charges shall be designed to enable
them to be disassembled safely after connection so that they can be
re-used if so stipulated.
1.54106
When the application permits, fuzing systems for demolition charges should incorporate an interrupter that is remotely controlled
from the initiation device.
1.54107
Time fuzes should incorporate an interrupter that arms after the
fuze is set and after personnel have taken cover. The initiation device is armed when the interrupter is removed from the explosive
train.
Comment:
Where application specific environmental factors are available
(such as hydrostatic pressure for underwater time fuzes) they shall
be used. For other time fuzes manual time-delayed arming, for example, can be used.
1.54108
Ignition leads shall be long enough to enable connection of the initiation device without it being necessary for personnel to be inside
the danger area of the warhead.
1.54109
If requirement 1.54108 cannot be met, the initiation device shall incorporate a time function that provides a delay in arming of sufficient duration to enable the operator to leave the danger area or take
cover.
1.54110
Initiation devices should be designed so that the risk of ignition
failure is minimised.
Comment:
Consequently, it should be equipped with a conductor tester and an
indicator to show that it can deliver sufficient ignition energy.
1.54111
To minimise the risk of inadvertent initiation, initiation devices
shall be designed so that at least two manual operations are required to enable firing.
181
5
5 Ammunition
5
1.54112
There shall be at least one mechanical/galvanic interrupter in the
firing circuits of initiation devices.
Comment:
The output on the initiation device can also be short-circuited up to
the moment of firing (e.g. by one or more electromechanical interrupters).
5.4.5.4
Propulsion devices
1.54113
There shall be a transmission safety device in the explosive train
of propulsion devices if hazard initiation of the propelling charge
leads to activation of the fuzing system in the warhead.
Comment:
This requirement also applies if the propelling charge itself can
cause major damage.
1.54114
Electric igniters in propulsion devices that do not contain a transmission safety device shall be as insensitive as possible.
Comment: The aim shall be that an electric igniter can be subjected
to a current intensity of 1 A and an output of 1 W for a minimum
duration of 5 minutes.
1.54115
The explosive in an igniter composition after an interrupter, or in an
igniter in a system without an interrupter, should not be more sensitive than the explosive in the propelling charge.
1.54116
It should be possible to install the fuzing system into a propulsion
device as late as possible before operation.
1.54117
It should be possible to check easily whether the fuzing system is
installed in a propulsion device.
1.54118
The fuzing system should be easily accessible for replacement.
1.54119
The fuzing system shall be designed so that normal firing takes
place within the specified timeframe (i.e. abnormal delay, socalled hangfire, is prevented).
5.4.6
Requirement checklist for fuzing systems
182
Ammunition 5
Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems
1.54001
SHALL
1.54002
SHALL
1.54003
SHOULD
1.54004
SHALL
1.54005
SHALL
1.54006
SHOULD
1.54007
1.54008
SHALL
SHALL
1.54009
SHALL
1.54010
SHALL
1.54011
1.54012
SHALL
SHALL
1.54013
1.54014
1.54015
SHALL
SHOULD
SHOULD
1.54016
SHOULD
1.54017
1.54018
1.54019
SHALL
SHOULD
SHALL
1.54020
1.54021
1.54022
1.54023
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
Comment
Fuzing system design
Safety analysis
Specification of safety level
Single failures, safety analysis
Mechanical interrupter in
explosive trains
Interrupter in an explosive
train
Qualification of explosives
Probability of inadvertent
initiation
Quality inspection of fuzing
systems
Selection of constituent
materials
Confinement and/or fixing
No initiation by environmental stress
Accumulated energy in fuzing systems
Incorrect assembly of fuzing
systems
Assembly of SAI/SAU
Indication in fuzing systems
Integral test in fuzing systems
Upgrading
Booster design
Integrated circuits
Proven components
5
183
5 Ammunition
Table 5:4 Checklist of requirements for fuzing systems, continued
EEDs
1.54024
SHOULD
1.54025
SHOULD
1.54026
1.54027
1.54028
1.54029
1.54030
1.54031
1.54032
1.54033
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHALL
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHOULD
SHALL
SHALL
1.54034
SHALL
Arming process
1.54035
SHOULD
1.54036
SHOULD
1.54037
SHALL
1.54038
SHALL
1.54039
SHALL
1.54040
SHALL
1.54041
SHALL
5
1.54042
SHOULD
1.54043
1.54044
1.54045
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
1.54046
SHALL
Comment
Connector pins semienclosed
Shielding of connector
sleeve
Shielding of ignition cables
Location of switch
Shielding of leads
Capacitance across switch
Twin conductors twined
Earthing/grounding
Location of ignition cables
Documented characteristics
of EEDs
System testing
Elementary arming process
Separated arming process
Unarmed indication
Point in time for arming
Electric signals for arming
Neutralisation/deactivation
Interrupter for current supply
Arming by earthing/grounding
Arming by short-circuiting
Arming by power cut
Probability of unauthorized
arming
Verification of arming signal
Arming safety features including semi-conductor switches
1.54047
SHALL
Hazard arming
1.54048
SHALL
Mechanical safety features
1.54049
SHALL
Mechanical safety feature
1.54050
SHALL
Independent ‘closings’
184
Ammunition 5
1.54051
SHALL
1.54052
SHOULD
Comment
Arming by semiconductors
only
Safety analysis
Application specific requirements
1.54053
SHOULD
Safety
1.54054
SHALL
Arming
1.54055
SHALL
Arming, environmental conditions
1.54056
SHALL
Manual operation
1.54057
SHALL
Manual operation, block
1.54058
SHALL
Point in time for arming
Testing
1.54059
1.54060
SHALL
SHALL
1.54061
1.54062
SHALL
SHALL
1.54063
1.54064
1.54065
SHALL
SHALL
SHALL
1.54066
SHALL
1.54067
SHALL
Type testing of components
Complete safety qualification
Testing at safety limit
Verification of choice of
materials
Testing for confinement
Testing for distance/time
Testing for safe separation
distance/time
Testing for environmental
stress
Design to enable functional
testing
5
Neutralisation, deactivation, recovery and disposal
1.54068
SHALL
Discharge of ignition capacitors
1.54069
SHALL
Low leakage resistance of
capacitors
1.54070
SHALL
Anti-handling or anti-clearance device
1.54071
SHALL
Indication of deactivation
1.54072
SHALL
Safety level of deactivation
1.54073
SHOULD
No special tools for deactivation
185
5 Ammunition
1.54074
SHOULD
1.54075
1.54076
SHOULD
SHALL
Deactivation to remove initiation energy
Design and deactivation
Clearance or disposal, etc.
1.54077
SHALL
Self-destruction/neutralisation of landmines
1.54078
SHALL
Fuzing system for drift
mines
1.54079
SHALL
Neutralisation of anchored
mines
1.54080
SHALL
Neutralisation of torpedoes
Requirements for systems with interrupters
Design requirements
1.54081
SHALL
Interrupters, basic requirement
1.54082
SHALL
Individual safety features
1.54083
SHOULD
No linkage in safety features
1.54084
SHALL
Safety feature before separation
1.54085
SHOULD
Stored energy for interrupter
1.54086
SHALL
Stored energy for interrupter
or safety feature
1.54087
SHALL
Ejection of fragments
5
Testing interrupters
1.54088
SHALL
1.54089
SHALL
1.54090
SHALL
Test of locking
Initiation in unarmed mode
Interrupter transmission status
Requirements for systems without interrupters
1.54091
SHALL
Initiation
1.54092
SHOULD
Charging and ignition
capacitor
1.54093
SHALL
Maximum-no-fire
1.54094
SHALL
Safety feature disabled by
environmental factor after
launch
186
Comment
Ammunition 5
Comment
Requirements for fuzing systems with non-conforming functions
Fuzing systems where unique, application specific, environmental
factors are not available
1.54095
SHALL
1.54096
SHOULD
Setting/installing fuzing system
1.54097
SHOULD
Incorrect installation
1.54098
SHALL
Manual operations
1.54099
SHALL
Ignition energy
1.54100
SHALL
Safety time
1.54101
SHALL
Incorrect connection
1.54102
SHALL
Operating instructions
1.54103
SHALL
Assembly of priming device
1.54104
SHALL
Intentional manual operation
Initiation devices and demolition charges
1.54105
SHALL
1.54106
SHOULD
Remotely controlled interrupter
1.54107
SHOULD
Interrupter in time fuzes
1.54108
SHALL
Length of ignition leads
1.54109
SHALL
Time function
1.54110
SHOULD
Initiation device design
1.54111
SHALL
Manual operations for initiation devices
1.54112
SHALL
Mechanical interrupter
Propulsion devices
1.54113
SHALL
1.54114
SHOULD
1.54115
SHOULD
1.54116
SHOULD
1.54117
1.54118
SHOULD
SHOULD
1.54119
SHALL
5
Transmission safety device
Electric igniters to be
insensitive
Sensitivity of explosive in
igniter composition
Point in time for installation
of fuzing system
Check of installation
Fuzing system accessible for
replacement
Abnormal delay
187
5 Ammunition
5.5
Packaging for ammunition
5.5.1
General
To ensure that the safety characteristics of ammunition are maintained during
handling and storage it is essential that ammunition be protected by appropriately designed packaging whose task is:
•
to protect its contents against the adverse effects of the relevant environmental factors,
•
to protect the surrounding environment.
There are two distinct environmental concepts for packaged goods: the external
environment where environmental factors affect the goods from the outside, and
the internal environment (sometimes called the micro-environment) which
denotes the environmental factors present inside the packaging.
It is essential that packages be clearly marked to enable rapid and safe identification (even under stressful conditions) to prevent dangerous mix-ups during
handling.
5
It is important to consider the question of packaging at the earliest possible
stage during development of ammunition to enable the specified safety level to
be achieved in the most appropriate way. Comprehensive data must be prepared
for the study of environmental factors, properties of materials, and resistance to
various environments etc. The required safety level can be achieved by choosing
the packaging design and materials to enable the critical environmental factors
in the internal environment to be constrained to a low level of severity.
Packagings consist of a collective part that surrounds one or more units as protection against prevalent environmental stresses. Components like shock absorbers, barriers (against humidity, gases, etc.), and protection against electrical
interference etc. are included herein.
There are various types of packaging for once-only (i.e. disposable) or repeated
use. In some cases the packaging is designed to have a secondary function such
as a launcher or other type of launch device.
In the case of IM and LSM the packaging can contribute to reducing the sensitivity of the packaged ammunition.
188
Ammunition 5
5.5.2
Environmental factors
The risks of damage to packaged ammunition are determined by mechanical,
electrical, chemical, climatic and biological environmental factors. The risks
may exist during all phases of the life of the ammunition. If the packaging is
damaged it may result in unpredictable impact on the environment.
Mechanical environmental factors comprise, for example, dynamic stresses
from shock or vibration, or stresses caused by static load (such as when stacking).
Electrical environmental factors comprise, for example, electromagnetic radiation (e.g. from radio or radar transmitters), static electricity (e.g. thunderstorms
or hovering helicopters), or electromagnetic pulse in conjunction with a nuclear
weapon engagement, and high power pulsed microwave radiation.
Chemical environmental factors such as the effect of gases, vapours, fluids or
particles in the external or internal environment can cause damage or hazardous
events.
Climatic environmental factors such as extreme high or low temperatures,
changes in barometric pressure, thermal shock, relative humidity, rain, hail, etc.
can cause damage or hazardous events.
Biological environmental factors such as other life forms (such as rodents,
insects, fungi and bacteria) can cause damage or hazardous events.
5.5.3
Consequences of environmental stress
5.5.3.1
Mechanical environmental stress
5
Examples of the consequences of mechanical stress:
•
Leaks in joints can occur through fatigue, shock or other mechanical stress.
•
Cracks, debonding, explosive dust, damage to surface treatment, indications
of ruptures or other degradation of material strength can occur as a result of
mechanical stress or fatigue.
•
Initiation of initiators containing impact-sensitive pyrotechnic compositions
can occur through inadvertent impacts.
189
5 Ammunition
5.5.3.2
Electrical environmental stress
Examples of the consequences of electrical environmental stress:
•
Electric igniters can be initiated inadvertently if the electrical and electromagnetic environment is more severe than the test level. This also applies in
the case of electrostatic discharge.
5.5.3.3
Chemical environmental stress
Examples of the consequences of chemical environmental stress:
•
Corrosion can occur through the effect of incompatible substances in combination with moisture, either by direct contact or through any gases or fluids generated.
5.5.3.4
Climatic environmental stress
Examples of the consequences of climatic environmental stress:
•
Variations in temperature during storage can cause condensation on the surfaces of materials with high thermal capacity incurring a risk of moisture
damage and corrosion, for example.
•
Variations in temperature of high amplitude can cause such high stresses in
materials or joints that ruptures occur.
•
Air can be pumped in or out through leaks in packaging enabling moisture
to be transported into the internal environment where it causes damage to
the ammunition such as corrosion.
5.5.3.5
5
Other environmental stress
Example of the consequences of other environmental stress:
•
Explosives can be initiated by inadvertent heating (e.g. in the event of a
fire).
5.5.4
Requirements
1.55001
Provided no special reason for non-compliance exists, the packaging shall withstand the testing specified in the UN recommendations for the explosive goods in question.
1.55002
The packaging shall protect the ammunition against the environments to which it is predicted that the system will be subjected
throughout its life. These environments are stated in the environmental specification.
190
Ammunition 5
Comment: Requirements governing the protective properties of the
packaging can be related to the inherent resistance of the ammunition. Furthermore, the packaging must not create an environment
that the ammunition cannot withstand.
1.55003
Constituent materials in the packaging shall be selected and combined so that effects detrimental to safety do not occur.
Comment:
Such effects can, for example, be caused by corrosion, incompatibility or instability. Further, there are certain constraints regarding
materials in international regulations (e.g. ADR, RID, IMDG code
and the UN Recommendation for the Packaging of Dangerous
Goods).
1.55004
Packagings should be designed to prevent mass detonation.
Comment:
This requirement can be achieved by adequate separation between
the units.
1.55005
Packagings should be designed such that the consequences of a hazard initiation of the constituent explosive is limited.
Comment:
In the event of a fire a propulsion device, for example, can give a
‘gun effect’ if the packaging is in the form of a metallic tube.
1.55006
The design of, and materials for, packagings shall be selected to prevent detrimental effects from handling and storage environments.
1.55007
Packagings and their contents shall be TS classified in accordance
with IFTEX.
1.55008
Packagings and their contents shall be classified in accordance with
UN coding.
1.55009
Packagings and their ammunition shall be provided with distinct
and durable marking in accordance with applicable regulations
governing transport and storage to enable rapid and safe identification of the contents.
1.55010
Re-usable packagings shall be checked to ensure that they are
equivalent to new ones from the safety aspect.
1.55011
When selecting materials for packagings, consideration shall be
given to the applicable regulations for recycling.
1.55012
The prescribed material recycling symbols shall be marked on
constituent components.
191
5
5 Ammunition
5.5.5
Requirement checklist for ammunition packagings
Table 5:5 Checklist of requirements for ammunition packagings
1.55001
SHALL
1.55002
SHALL
1.55003
SHALL
1.55004
SHOULD
1.55005
SHOULD
1.55006
SHALL
1.55007
SHALL
1.55008
SHALL
1.55009
SHALL
1.55010
SHALL
1.55011
SHALL
1.55012
5
192
SHALL
UN recommendations
Protection of ammunition
Constituent materials
Mass detonation
Hazard initiation
Storage environment
TS coding
UN coding
Marking
Re-usable
Selection of materials for
recycling
Material recycling symbols
Comment
Definitions 6
6
DEFINITIONS
This section lists the nomenclature and abbreviations used in this manual.
6.1
Terminology
Ablation
Evaporation of surface material by the action of (hot) gases (flowing over it).
Comment: Ablation is a method for protecting objects against aerodynamic
heating (e.g. space vehicles on re-entry into the atmosphere).
Accident
An undesired event, or series of events, that causes unacceptable injury or damage to property or the environment.
Acquisition program for off-the-shelf (OTS) materiel
This program relating to system safety shall be applied when acquiring OTS
materiel systems.
Ageing
The ageing of materials involves a continuous change through time of properties
(chemical and physical such as sensitivity, rate of combustion and mechanical
strength).
Aiming and firing limitation
Aiming and firing limitation is a system integrated into the weapon to prevent
aiming in certain sectors (so as not to collide with nearby obstacles for example), and to prevent firing in other specific sectors (to prevent hitting weapon
platforms or friendly forces for example).
Ammunition
Materiel designed for inflicting damage, producing smoke or illumination, blasting, mining, mine clearance, and certain types of signalling, as well as exercise
materiel used to replace the above during training. The materiel may contain
explosives or other chemicals.
The term also comprises packaging for ammunition and manufactured parts for
ammunition.
193
6
6 Definitions
Ammunition safety
Ammunition safety is the property of ammunition that enables the ammunition
– under specified conditions – to be transported, kept in depot storage, used, and
disposed of without a hazardous event taking place, and without constituent
parts in the ammunition being affected in such a way that a hazardous event
occurs.
Arm
To remove safety constraints in safety device(s) to enable initiation to take
place.
Comment: In a system with an out-of-line explosive train arming occurs when
the interrupter has been removed and an initiation can result in fuzing system function. In an in-line system arming occurs when the
minimum level for ignition energy has been reached and only the
initiation signal remains for initiation to take place.
Arming device
Refer also to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.
Arming range/distance/time
The range (distance/time) from the launcher (or release device) until the point
(in time) where/when the fuzing system is armed.
Artillery primer
An igniting device of the same design and function as a cannon primer. An artillery primer is usually threaded and is used to ignite a propulsion agent confined
in a cartridge case or separate case, in the rear plane of which there is a seat for
the artillery primer.
Comment: In cases where the priming device is fixed by means of compressing it is often incorrectly referred to as a cannon primer.
6
Assemble, install (a fuze)
To assemble/install individually manufactured ammunition components containing explosive, including assembly/installation of fuzes in ammunition.
AUR (All Up Round) testing
Testing of a complete weapon or ammunition while in storage.
Auxiliary booster
A booster affixed to a main charge (e.g. by cementing, casting or screw attachment). The auxiliary booster consists of compressed high explosive designed to
ensure initiation of the main charge.
194
Definitions 6
Backblast
The rearward blast of (hot) propulsion gases which, when a weapon is fired,
escape from the muzzle brake of recoil weapons and from the aft opening (venturi) of recoilless weapons. The blast may contain fragments and particles swept
up from the ground.
Barrel fatigue life
This is the number of rounds a barrel can be fired with an acceptable risk of
fatigue rupture. The barrel fatigue life is calculated using mechanical rupture
methods based on crack propagation data for the material of the barrel. The calculation shall be made for a pressure level corresponding to an upper operational temperature for the ammunition, and an established safety factor for
barrel life shall be applied.
Base bleed
An auxiliary device in a shell consisting of propellant in a combustion chamber.
The propellant gases flow out into the wake behind the shell, enhancing the
pressure and thereby reducing drag.
Black powder
Refer to the entry for ‘Propellant’.
Blast pressure
Air shock waves created around the weapon as a result of firing. The shock
waves normally emanate from the muzzle in recoil systems, and in recoilless
systems from the aft end of the launcher as well as the muzzle.
Comment: Severe blast pressure may cause impairment of hearing. High levels may cause injury to the larynx. Extreme levels may even cause
fatal injury (collapse of the lungs, etc.).
Booster (1)
A launch rocket engine. Refer also to the entries for ‘Booster (2)’ and ‘Booster
charge or booster’.
Booster (2)
1. An amplifying charge in a fuze usually comprised of compressed explosive.
2.
A charge, usually comprised of compressed explosive, in an explosive train
for amplifying the effect of the HE charge.
Comment: The booster is normally also used as a connector device for combinations of certain fuzes and shells.
195
6
6 Definitions
Booster charge or booster
A link in an explosive train for amplifying the effect of the priming device. The
booster charge may also be referred to in various contexts as booster, auxiliary
booster or auxiliary charge.
Booster motor or booster
A motor that accelerates a vehicle in the launch phase.
Bore safety
The property that enables ammunition and its constituent parts to withstand the
environment during the bore phase of firing with the required level of safety.
Bridge primer, bridge wire igniter
An electric initiator in which the initiation current passes through a wire or thin
layer of metal that becomes heated, thereby initiating a priming composition or
primary explosive.
Bullet attack safety
The capability of the ammunition to withstand bullet attack without initiating/
igniting.
Burst
The explosion phenomenon of a detonating warhead and its corresponding practice ammunition.
Cannon primer
An igniting device in the form of a cartridge containing an initiator such as a
percussion primer and booster charge. A cannon primer is mainly used in guns
where the propulsion agent is not confined in a cartridge case, such as in certain
howitzers. A cannon primer is inserted (fed into) the breech mechanism.
6
Cartridge case
A case, usually made of metal or plastic, incorporating an igniting device and
containing propellant.
Comment: Cartridge cases are used in:
– fixed rounds (permanently attached to the projectile)
– semi-fixed rounds (attached to the projectile, such as by a bayonet coupling, so as to be separable)
– separated rounds (separated from the projectile but united before
loading).
Cf. the entry for ‘Separate case’.
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Definitions 6
Case bonded charge
Refer to the entry for ‘Rocket propellant charge’.
Circuit interrupter
Refer to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.
Combustion catalyst
An additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to increase the
rate of combustion.
Combustion chamber
The space in which propulsion agents burn, in some cases after mixing.
Composite propellant
Refer to the entry for ‘Propellant’.
Compatibility
A property of materials used in a product which means that they do not affect
one another chemically when subjected to the specified environmental conditions.
Comment: TNT, for example, is affected by polyamides but not by olefin plastics.
Polycarbonate resin is embrittled by double-base propellant.
Lead azide forms highly sensitive copper azide on contact with
copper.
Certain combinations of metals may cause galvanic corrosion that
may involve a safety hazard.
Control system, guidance system
Functions and related subsystems that can change the path of a guided missile,
torpedo or other guided ammunition.
6
Cook-off
Inadvertent initiation of an explosive as a result of abnormal heating.
Comment: Cook-off can occur, for example, after a misfire in a hot barrel.
Danger area
The area around a proving/firing site inside which there is a risk of injury.
Deactivate
To return an armed fuzing system to unarmed mode. No special action is normally required before the fuzing system can be used again.
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6 Definitions
Deactivation of ammunition, demilitarization
Disassembly of ammunition for an in-service surveillance inspection, for example, or to render harmless components of ammunition that can/will no longer be
used (e.g. defective, exceeded the established service life, etc.).
Delay
A device that provides the desired delay in a fuzing system. The delay may be
achieved pyrotechnically, electrically, mechanically or chemically.
Deflagration
Deflagration is characterised by a combustion wave, sustained by the generation
of heat in the decomposition zone, that spreads through the explosive or explosive mixture at subsonic velocity.
Comment: During normal use of propellants in rockets, barrels, gas generators, etc., the combustion rate (deflagration rate) – which is dependent on the pressure – is much lower than sonic velocity (in the
magnitude of cm/s at l0 MPa). In the event of incorrect operation or
malfunctions of various types, such as a blockage in the exhaust
nozzle of a rocket engine or excessive charge density in guns, the
combustion rate may increase uncontrollably so that the combustion chamber ruptures. This may even progress to detonation.
Design criteria and test plan
The part of an item specification that contains requirements specifying resistance to environmental conditions and the environmental factor list for testing.
Desired (SHOULD) requirements
Refer to the entry for ‘Requirements’.
Destruction
Refer to entry for ‘Deactivation of ammunition, demilitarization’.
6
Detonation
Detonation is characterised by a shock wave, sustained by a chemical reaction in
the shock wave zone, that propagates at supersonic velocity.
Comment: Detonation gives maximum blast effect in explosives, and is normally started by a primary explosive which, even in small quantities, can transmit a sufficiently powerful shock wave impulse to
initiate a detonation process.
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Definitions 6
Detonator
An initiator that is initiated by a stab, percussion, friction, flame or break sensitive primary explosive designed to initiate the detonation in an explosive.
Dud
High explosive ammunition that has not burst despite expected function.
Dynamic analysis
Verification of test of the flow in a computer program to discover how the program behaves in different situations. The following items inter alia are of particular interest:
•
determination of which segments of the program are executed most frequently,
•
time studies for certain operations,
•
tracing of variable values,
•
inspection of invariant conditions,
•
code that is not executed,
•
inspection to verify that the test comprises all elements of the program.
Dynamic interaction
The interaction between projectile and barrel during the launch process.
Comment: Incorrect interaction can cause damage to the bore and/or greater
dispersion and/or ammunition malfunction (e.g. failure to initiate).
EBW (exploding bridge wire) igniter
An electric initiator without priming composition or primary explosive. Initiation is achieved by an exploding wire in contact with a low-density explosive,
usually PETN.
Comment: The wire is made to ‘explode’ by a very high power input (MW).
EED (electro-explosive device)
A priming device that is initiated electrically. Electric igniters, electric primers,
electric artillery primers, electric detonators, electric blasting caps and electric
priming detonators are examples of EEDs.
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6 Definitions
EFI (exploding foil initiator) igniter
An electric initiator without a priming composition or primary explosive. Initiation is achieved by an exploding metal foil accelerating a plastic disc against the
high density explosive.
Comment: The metal foil is made to ‘explode’ by very high power input
(MW). The term ‘Slapper’ is also used for EFIs.
Electric primer
An electrically initiated igniting device containing an initiator and booster, all
confined in a casing.
Electric detonator
An initiator that is electrically initiated and which contains primary explosive
for a detonating explosive train.
Electro-explosive cartridge
Refer to the entry for ‘Electric detonator’.
Electric gap detonator
An electric initiator that is very fast and easily initiated.
There are three main types of gap detonator:
•
Electrically conducting composition, consisting of primary explosive and
graphite or metallic powder.
•
Graphite bridge, in contact with primary explosive.
•
Spark gap, adjacent to primary explosive.
Thus there is no hot wire, and the initiating function in all three types is based
on energy concentration in hot spots.
6
Electric igniter, EED
An initiator that is initiated electrically.
Electric primer
An initiator that is initiated electrically and which contains priming composition
for a deflagrating explosive train.
Electric primer-detonator
An electric initiator used for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes and
explosive cutters. Cf. the entry for ‘Electric detonator’.
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Definitions 6
EMP (electromagnetic pulse)
An electromagnetic pulse that can arise, for example, when a nuclear charge
detonates.
Environment
The cumulative effect of all the natural and induced environmental factors to
which an item is subjected at a specific moment.
Environmental factor
A factor or group of factors that alone affects certain failure mechanisms and
can thus usually be isolated when testing.
Environmental severity
The value of the physical and chemical magnitudes that is characterised by the
environment or an environmental factor.
Erosion
The removal of material from a surface by the action of another medium flowing
over the surface.
Exhaust nozzle
That part of a reaction engine through which the combustion gases of the propulsion agent escape at high velocity. An exhaust nozzle consists of an inlet, a
constricting section, and in most cases an expansion section. The thermal energy
released is converted into kinetic energy in the exhaust nozzle.
Explosive
Explosives are defined in the Law Governing Inflammable and Explosive Goods
as solid or liquid substances or mixtures thereof that can undergo a rapid chemical reaction whereby energy is released in the form of pressure-volume work or
heat.
Explosive plunger
An explosive charge used in explosive cutters.
6
Explosive train
A combination of various elements (explosives, channels, etc.) designed to initiate a charge. The explosive train may contain conditional interrupters or barrier
locks (safety devices).
Extreme environment
Environmental factors of such a severity that arise in conjunction with accidents
or enemy attack (e.g. fire, bullet attack).
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6 Definitions
FAE (fuel air explosives)
A warhead based on fuel that is dispersed in the air in an appropriate ratio prior
to initiation.
Flame safety device
An interrupter in an explosive train that prevents the transmission of ignition to
a deflagrating main charge. Cf. the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.
Fuel
The propulsion agent that is combusted (oxidated) to generate energy.
Full form gauging
An inspection method for the loadability of ammunition.
Fuze
A fuze is a type of initiation system in which the sensors, safety system, initiator
and booster are integrated into the same assembly unit – generally for artillery
ammunition.
Comment: Fuzes are classified according to:
– mode of initiation, e.g. impact, time or proximity,
– location, e.g. in nose, mid-section or base,
– sensitivity, e.g. sensitive or supersensitive,
– time of action, e.g. instantaneous or delay,
– safety devices in fuze categories,
– connection dimensions in fuzing systems.
Fuzing system
A generic term for a device designed to initiate charges in ammunition at a specific time or location.
6
Comment: A fuzing system also contains a safety system that shall prevent
inadvertent initiation that can cause injury or damage to equipment
or serious malfunctions. A fuzing system consists of (a) sensor(s),
a safety system (often referred to as an SAD/SAU) and a priming
device.
The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks controlled
by arming conditions.
There are two different principles for the design of a fuzing system:
– an out-of-line explosive train in which the SAD/SAU contains a
mechanical interrupter which, in unarmed mode, prevents transmission in the explosive train,
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Definitions 6
– an in-line explosive train containing no interrupter. In this case
the safety and arming functions are allocated to the electric circuits preceding the explosive train. The explosive train contains
no primary explosive.
In out-of-line systems the interrupter often incorporates a detonator
or primer which, when in unarmed mode, is geometrically located
in such a way that its detonation or deflagration cannot be transmitted to subsequent charges. This arrangement is the reason for the
term ‘out-of-line’.
The interrupter may consist of a rotor, slide or equivalent.
Fuzing systems are often named according to the method of functioning of their sensor(s), such as impact or proximity sensing, or
delay systems.
Gas generator
A device for producing a gas flow under pressure by combustion of a propulsion
agent.
Comment: There are two types of gas generator: propellant and liquid gas.
Guided missile
An unmanned object that is launched, projected or dropped/released, and which
is designed to move in a flight path totally or partially above the surface of the
earth guided by external signals or by integrated devices.
Gun PMP (permissible individual maximum pressure)
The pressure which, for reasons of safety, must not be exceeded at any point in
the weapon by more than 13 rounds in every 10,000 statistically.
Handling
In the Law Governing Inflammable and Explosive Goods handling denotes all
handling from manufacture to final use and destruction. This comprises inter
alia storage, transport, handling, use and disposal/demilitarization.
Hazard
Something that can cause injury or damage to property or the environment.
Hazardous event
An event that occurs by accident, i.e. unintentionally, and which may result in
an accident/mishap or damage/injury.
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6 Definitions
Hazard initiation
Inadvertent initiation of a propelling charge or warhead.
High explosive (HE)
An explosive whose decomposition normally occurs through detonation.
Comment: To start a detonation in a high explosive usually requires initiation
with high energy and shock wave effect provided by, for example, a
primary explosive.
HPM (high power microwaves)
High-energy pulsed microwave radiation.
Hybrid rocket engine
Refer to the entry for ‘Rocket engine’.
Hypergolic propulsion agent combination
A combination of propulsion agents (fuel–oxidizer) that react spontaneously
with one another.
Igniferous burst
The explosion phenomenon of a deflagrating warhead. Cf. the entry for ‘Burst’.
Ignite
To make an explosive deflagrate.
Igniting device
A device whose purpose is to ignite deflagrating explosive charges. It consists of
an initiator and a booster charge.
Comment: An igniting device in its most elementary form may consist of only
the initiator (e.g. a primer in small arms ammunition).
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IM (insensitive munition)
Ammunition with a lower sensitivity than current ‘normal’ ammunition. This is
achieved by using a lower sensitivity propellant and explosive, or by enclosing
the propulsion agent in such a way that its sensitivity is reduced.
Impulse (rocket) motor
A motor of very short burning duration used to provide guidance impulses etc.
Independent safety device
A safety device is independent if its status is not affected by the status of any
other safety device in the system.
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Definitions 6
In-flight safety
The property of ammunition and parts thereof not to detonate or burst in flight
from the point at which the fuzing system is armed until the point at which it is
designated to function.
Inherent safety
The safety property of a torpedo and its constituent parts that enables it to make
contact with the seabed, or to somersault, or collide with objects in the water,
without detonation of the main charge within the safe separation distance.
Initiate
To ignite or initiate an explosive.
Initiate
To cause an explosive to detonate.
Initiating device
A device designed to initiate detonating explosive charges. It comprises an initiator (mechanical or electric) and a booster.
Initiator
A device, such as a primer or detonator, that receives initiation signal(s) and
subsequently initiates an explosive train
In-line explosive train
An explosive train whitout interrupter, i.e. if one element in the explosive train
is initiated then the booster in the fuzing system will also be initiated.
In-service surveillance inspection
An activity designed to establish whether the status of ammunition has changed
so as to jeopardise safety during storage, transport, operation or other handling.
Integrated fuzing system (or initiator)
A fuzing system that is built into the ammunition in such a way that it is not possible to remove it completely or partially.
Intelligent ammunition
Ammunition with built-in logics, target seeker, target sensor or equivalent to
enhance hit probability.
Interrupter
A mechanical component that effects a designated interruption in an explosive
train. It may consist of a rotor, slide or similar device.
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6 Definitions
Item or specimen
Any piece of defence materiel or software being dealt with at a specific moment.
An item may, for example, be a complete guided missile, an electronic component or a computer program. Cf. the entry for ‘Test item or test specimen’.
Launch phase
The period from when the ammunition has irrevocably started to move in the
launcher until it has left the launcher.LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition)
Propellant with low sensitivity properties.
Liner
A binding layer between the propelling charge and the cartridge case, usually
consisting of the same material as the fuel polymer in the propellant.
Loading safety
The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables the ammunition to be loaded into a weapon with the required level of safety.
LSM (less sensitive munition)
Ammunition for which action has been taken to reduce sensitivity to extreme
environments such as fire.
Main charge
The largest charge in a high explosive warhead or propulsion device.
Mask safety
The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enable firing through
vegetation (mask) close to the weapon without a burst or igniferous burst resulting.
6
Mission profile
A part of the operational profile that defines conditions to which an item can be
subjected when used in a specific way, such as an airborne missile suspended
from an aircraft and carried on a mission, which in turn is defined in the form of
flight velocities, altitudes and durations. Cf. the entry for ‘Operational profile’.
Monopropellant
A propulsion agent that decomposes in a reaction chamber to form propellant
gas. Decomposition can be by catalysis or be started by the application of heat.
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Definitions 6
MOP (maximum operating pressure)
The pressure that a specific charge provides under the most extreme conditions,
such as in terms of propellant temperature, and which purely statistically must
not be exceeded by more than 13 cases out of 10,000.
Multiple warhead
A warhead which in turn consists of several warheads.
Muzzle safety
The property of the ammunition and its constituent parts that enables it to pass
through a fixed obstacle close to the muzzle of the weapon with the required
level of safety.
Neutralization
Prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated, for example by discharging ignition capacitors or by interrupters returning to unarmed state.
Obturator
A sealing element attached to the projectile used to achieve a satisfactory seal
during the launch phase.
Out-of-line (interrupted) explosive train
The explosive train that contains an interrupter that in unarmed position prevents transmission in the explosive train.
Operational profile
The part of the life cycle comprising use of the product. The operational profile
is defined in terms of various methods of application and their respective durations.
Oxidizer
A propulsion agent that oxidizes fuel while generating energy.
6
PBX (plastic-bonded explosive)
Plastic-bonded explosive.
Pendulum pressure
Pressure perturbation in barrels and rocket engines.
Barrels
Pressure oscillations that can occur in long chambers not
completely filled by the propelling charge. Pressure in the
chamber may thus increase locally to such an extent that deformation occurs.
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6 Definitions
Rocket engines
Pressure oscillations that can occur in propellant-driven as
well as liquid fuel rocket engines as a result of resonance between acoustic perturbation and pressure-dependent combustion. The geometry of the engine and the charge, together
with other factors, contribute to this. The pressure oscillations may be of such an amplitude that the engine ruptures.
Polymer
A chemical compound formed by the interlinking of small units to large molecules. Polymers can be subdivided into plastics (such as polyethylene, PVC and
phenolic plastics) and elastomers or rubber materials (such as natural rubber,
polybutadiene rubber and styrene-butadiene rubber).
Premature burst
A burst that occurs inadvertently in the trajectory before the designated point or
time.
Primary explosive
An explosive that decomposes through detonation and which requires little initiation energy, for example in the form of heat (friction, percussion, flame or hot
wire), and is used to initiate detonation in high explosives (such as TNT). A primary explosive detonates even in very small quantities when there is little or no
confinement.
Primer
An initiator consisting of a case (capsule) containing a stab, percussion, flame or
other heat sensitive priming composition designed to initiate deflagration in an
explosive train.
Priming composition
A pyrotechnic composition that is initiated by heat (friction, percussion, flame,
spark, hot wire).
6
Priming detonator
An initiator for depth charges, underwater mines, torpedoes and explosive cutters. Cf. the entry for ‘Detonator’.
Priming device
A device containing an initiator (mechanical or electrical) and a booster whose
purpose is to initiate or ignite an explosive charge. In its most elementary form a
priming device may comprise only an initiator (such as a primer as an igniting
device in small arms ammunition).
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Definitions 6
Projectile
General
A body projected (launched) by an external force and
which subsequently continues in motion under its own
inertia.
Applied to ammunition A warhead without an integral propelling force, and
which does not contain explosive with the exception of
illuminating compositions in tracers and incendiary
substances in small incendiary compositions (spotting
charges), fired from tube-launched weapons.
Comment: The term projectile is also used as a generic name for all types of
warheads in tube-launched ammunition.
Propellant
An explosive in solid form that normally decomposes by deflagration.
The most common types of propellant are:
•
Nitro-cellulose based propellant such as single-base propellant, the main
constituent of which is nitro-cellulose, double-base propellant containing
nitro-cellulose gelatinized with nitro-glycerine, triple-base propellant containing nitro-cellulose, nitro-glycerine and a nitro compound such as nitroguanadine, and nitramine propellant with a binding agent of plastic.
•
Mechanically mixed propellants in which the various components in finegrained powder form are granulated or compressed to the desired shape and
size. An example of such a propellant is black powder which, however, can
also be denoted as a pyrotechnic composition.
•
Composite propellant consisting of a finely distributed oxidiser, usually ammonium perchlorate dispersed in a fuel binding agent – usually a polymer
such as polybutadiene. Energy enhancing additives, such as metallic powder, are sometimes used. The mixture can be cast into the desired shape.
Composite propellant usually contains softeners and combustion catalysts.
•
Anew type of propellant known as LOVA (low vulnerability ammunition)
where reduced sensitivity is achieved by using a binding agent consisting of
a polymer and where the energizer is a nitramine (such as RDX or HNX).
Propulsion device
The part of the ammunition that provides the necessary impulse to transport the
warhead from its launcher to the target.
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6 Definitions
Propulsion agent
A substance that functions as a fuel or oxidiser or both, and which contains the
energy necessary for propulsion. Propulsion agents can be in solid, liquid or gas
form. They can be mixed with each other like propellants, or be separated as in
liquid-fuel rocket engines and air-breathing engines.
Propulsion cartridge
A cartridge containing a propelling charge and igniting device, used in mortar
ammunition and rifle grenades for example.
Pyrolysis
The decomposition of solid or liquid substances caused by the effect of heat into
smaller, usually gaseous, molecules.
Pyrotechnic composition
An explosive that consists of a mixture of fuel and oxidiser, usually in solid
form, which normally are not themselves explosives.
The components can react with each other in the form of deflagration involving
heat generation.
Pyrotechnic compositions are usually used for:
•
functions in explosive trains in the form of ignition, delay, initiation
•
effect in warheads in the form of light, fire, smoke, noise.
RAP (rocket assisted projectile)
A shell with a (propellant) rocket engine that provides thrust in flight, thereby
increasing range.
6
Reaction chamber
A chamber into which propulsion agents are injected and made to react in order
to generate propelling gas.
Reaction motor or jet engine
A motor in which the thrust is generated by the momentum of an escaping
working medium (combustion gases, reaction products, air, etc.).
Recoil
Recoil is the phenomenon that occurs when a weapon reacts to the effect of the
propellant gases and acceleration of the projectile. There are different ways of
measuring recoil such as impulse, force and energy.
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Definitions 6
Relaxation to rupture
The delayed forming of cracks in a deformed material.
Requirements
Mandatory requirements (often expressed by SHALL in tables) are requirements that are of decisive significance to the achievement of the necessary
safety level in a system.
Desired requirements (often expressed by SHOULD in tables) are requirements
that are important to system safety and shall thus be satisfied whenever possible.
Requirement specification
A specification issued by the purchaser to provide a basis for tendering prior to a
procurement, or issued as a requirement document when placing an order.
Resistance to environmental conditions
The capability of an item to withstand a specific severity for a specific duration.
Rheological properties
The deformation properties of a material subjected to external forces. In viscoelastic materials the properties are time-dependent.
Risk
A combination of frequency or probability and the consequence of a specified
hazardous event or accident.
Rocket
An unmanned, unguided self-propelled object incorporating a warhead and
rocket engine(s).
Rocket engine
A type of reaction engine that carries its own fuel and oxidiser, and is thus independent of the surrounding atmosphere for combustion.
There are three types of rocket engines:
•
Propellant rocket engines. The propulsion agent is a solid propellant.
•
Liquid fuel rocket engines. The propulsion agents are liquid – mono-propellant or bi-propellant – in the latter case an oxidiser and fuel. Tri-propellant
may also be used.
•
Hybrid rocket engines. The propulsion agents consist of a solid and a liquid
propulsion agent.
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6 Definitions
Rocket engine igniter
The igniting device for a rocket engine.
Rocket propellant charge
A solid propulsion agent charge for propellant rocket engines. The propellant
charge is determined inter alia by the type of propellant, charge geometry, and
the method of fixing it inside the rocket casing. An unbonded charge is free from
the rocket casing but is supported against it or against special support. A case
bonded charge is wholly or partially bonded to the rocket casing by means of an
intermediate layer (liner). The charge may also be bonded to an internal support
tube.
SAD (safety and arming device), SAU (safety and arming unit)
A device that arms a fuzing system at the correct time, and which also prevents
inadvertent initiation of the explosive train.
The minimum distance between the launcher (or drop/release device) and the
ammunition beyond which a burst is judged to give an acceptable level of safety
for personnel and equipment located at the launcher or drop/release device. Reasonable evasive action by the weapon platform is assumed.
Safety assessment of existing materiel
A system safety program that shall be applied during overhaul of existing
defence materiel systems in storage that have not been examined previously
with regard to modern system safety requirements.
Safety device
Refer to the entry for ‘Transmission safety device’.
6
Safety analysis
A generic term describing the parts of the safety program that involve a systematic analysis of hazardous events and their causes, as well as the qualitative or
quantitative evaluation of the safety level achieved.
Safety device
A part or combination of parts designed to prevent inadvertent initiation of the
main charge in ammunition.
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Definitions 6
Safety distance
The distance from the launcher (drop/release device) to the point in the trajectory or flight path at which a safety device is cancelled.
Comment: Each individual safety device has its safety distance.
Safety system
The generic term used to denote the combination of all the safety devices in a
fuzing system. The safety system contains interrupters and barrier locks that are
controlled by arming conditions.
Sealing ring
Refer to the entry for ‘Obturator’.
Service life
The period during which the ammunition can be transported and stored in the
prescribed packaging under the stipulated storage conditions (temperature and
relative humidity) without changes occurring that can result in hazardous events
or an unacceptable degradation of performance.
Safety feature
A device that locks a transmission safety device. A mechanical component that
locks the interrupter in unarmed or armed mode or a component/function that
breaks an electric circuit.
SAI (safety, arming and ignition) unit
An SAD/SAU with ignition function.
Secondary armament
This term refers to additional weaponry that can be mounted on a combat vehicle to provide secondary or supporting functions. The following types of
weapon are considered to belong to this category:
•
machine gun or cannon for covering fire,
•
parallel machine gun for use together with the main armament,
•
mortars,
•
flare launchers.
6
Secondary charge
Refer to the entry for ‘Booster charge or booster’.
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6 Definitions
Self-destruction
Automatic initiation of an HE charge in ammunition that has missed the target,
for example, or was not initiated within the designated time after arming.
Sensor
The part of a fuzing system that senses the target and emits initiation signal(s) to
the initiator when function is expected.
Separate case
A case, normally made of metal (e.g. brass) with an igniting device and containing a propelling charge. It is kept separate from the projectile during transport
and loading.
Comment: A separate case requires two operations when loading the weapon.
Cf. the entry for ‘Cartridge case’.
Set a fuze
The act of setting the fuze to the desired initiation mode (e.g. impact or proximity mode) or time.
SHALL requirement
Refer to entry for ‘Requirements’.
Shelf life testing
Testing to verify the performance, reliability, and safety of a product after simulated depot storage.
Shell
A projectile with a cavity filled with explosive, smoke or illuminating composition, submunitions or equivalent.
6
Similar to operational conditions
The realization of hardware, software (in co-ordinating functional parts outside
the tested software) or environment in the system, being as close to the final
design or system environment as possible with regard to function and behavior.
Example: If the requirement is that the software shall be verified using an electricity supply similar to that used in operational conditions, the power unit of the
series design shall be used.
Squib
An initiator that is initiated electrically and which comprises electricity supply
leads with a heating hot wire between them surrounded by priming composition.
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Definitions 6
ST fuze
A shock-tube fuze consists of a plastic tube coated on the inside with a thin
layer of high explosive or filled with a combustible gas mixture.
The initiation impulse is transmitted through the tube as a shock wave.
Stabilizer
An additive in propellant and other propulsion agents designed to keep decomposition at a low level and thereby safeguard storage capability.
Stability
The property that enables a material not to change in the environment in which
it exists.
Sterilization
The prevention of an armed fuzing system from being initiated by permanently
damaging some part of the safety system (Cf. the entries for ‘Neutralisation’ and
‘Deactivate’.)
Storage, logistical
The long-term storage of items in depots, usually under controlled relative
humidity conditions.
Storage, tactical
The storage of an item for a limited period of time under field conditions. It
denotes storage in ammunition depots or at readying sites located adjacent to
bases, naval vessels, or deployment areas, usually without any kind of controlled environment.
Sub-calibre barrel
A small calibre barrel inserted inside the standard barrel, and used either for
aligning the standard barrel or for practice firing. Also known as sub-calibre
adapter.
Sustainer, sustainer motor
A motor designed to provide thrust in flight.
Terminally corrected projectile
A shell that is corrected in the final path of its trajectory by intermittent lateral
forces triggered by guidance signals.
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Terminally guided projectile
A shell that is guided in the final part of its trajectory by continuous lateral
forces controlled by guidance signals.
Terminal guidance device
A device that by its influence makes a projectile, for example, fly in a specific
direction.
Test
An investigation to determine one or more properties of an item/specimen.
Test item or test specimen
An object, such as a component or subsystem, that is to be tested.
•
This denotes an interrupter in an explosive train including associate safety
components. The synonyms for this concept are detonator safety device,
arming device, and flame safety device (out-of-line explosive train).
•
A switch in the electric circuit(s) of a fuzing system including associate
safety components. Also known as a circuit breaker (in-line explosive train).
Transport, logistical
Transport of items to and between storage depots, and from storage depots to
and from maintenance workshops.
Transport, tactical
Transport of items in field conditions from depot storage to bases, naval vessels,
deployment areas, etc. The concept includes short transport of items within and
between these sites.
6
Transport safety
The property of ammunition and its constituent parts that enables transport,
operation and storage with the required level of safety.
Unbonded charge
Refer to the entry for ‘Rocket propellant charge’.
Unguided weapon
A weapon whose flight path is determined at launch.
216
Definitions 6
Validation
This is a method of verifying that requirements are correct, i.e. that the product
functions as intended in its operational environment.
Wad
A flat or cupped unit, often made of cardboard, that is inserted into the cartridge
case to secure the propelling charge in position and to reduce the risk of cookoff.
Wake
The area immediately behind a projectile in motion. Cf. the entry for ‘Base
bleed’.
Warhead
The part of ammunition which at a predetermined time or place provides the
intended effect by means of pressure, fragmentation, or incendiary effect, or any
combination of these effects; other forms may be smoke or illuminating effects
or sensor jamming.
Weapon
A device for firing, launching, dropping or deploying ammunition.
Weapon safety
Weapon safety is the property of the weapon that enables the weapon under
specified conditions to be transported, kept in depot storage, used, maintained
and demilitarized without any hazardous event occurring, or any constituent
parts of the weapon being affected in such a way that a hazardous event could
occur.
Wear (in barrel)
The mechanical, thermal, and chemical influences on the internal surface of the
barrel. There are two wear effects: barrel wear through the mechanical effect of
the round, and erosion of the barrel caused by the mechanical and chemical
influences of hot, fast flowing propellant gases. As a rule, the commencement of
rifling is most exposed to wear.
Worn barrel
A worn barrel has less than 25% of its total barrel life left. The wear life is usually established with reference to decreased muzzle velocity, dispersion, and
wear at commencement of the rifling.
Comment: A worn barrel is a prerequisite for some compatibility tests.
217
6
6 Definitions
6
6.2
Key to abbreviations
AFS
Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations of the Swedish Board
for Occupational Safety and Health
ASWG
Ammunition Safety Working Group
BVKF
Swedish Armed Forces’ joint regulations for the prevention of fire
and explosion hazards, water contamination, chemical health hazards from flammable goods etc.
Cf.
Compare
CE
EC mark of conformity
DTTFO
Draft version of TTFO
EED
Electro-Explosive Device
EFI
Exploding Foil Initiator
EMP
ElectroMagnetic Pulse
ESD
ElectroStatic Discharge
FAE
Fuel-Air Explosives
FM
Swedish Armed Forces
FMEA
Fault Modes and Effects Analysis
FMV
Swedish Defence Materiel Administration
FOA
Swedish Defence Research Establishment
FSD
Swedish Defence Standard
HF
High frequency
HQ
Headquarters
HP
Hydrogen peroxide
218
Definitions 6
HPM
High power microwaves
HTP
High test peroxide
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
IFTEX
Instruction governing storage and transport of Swedish Armed
Forces’ explosive goods
IM
Insensitive Munition
IR
Infrared
LEMP
Lightning ElectroMagnetic Pulse
LSM
Less Sensitive Munition
MIL-STD
Military Standard (USA)
MOP
Maximum Operating Pressure
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MPa
MegaPascal
NA
Not applicable
NBC
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NEMP
Nuclear ElectroMagnetic Pulse
P1
Development
P2
Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon and Ammunition Systems
P3
Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems
PBX
Plastic-bonded Explosives
PCB
Printed circuit board
PETN
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate
219
6
6 Definitions
6
PHA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PHL
Preliminary Hazard List
PHST
Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport Regulations
PMP
Permissible Individual Maximum Pressure
ppm
Parts per million
PTTFO
Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives
RFP
Request for Proposal
Rg
Advisory Group (at FMV)
RSV
Hollow charge
SAI
Safety, Arming and Ignition unit
SACLOS
Semi-Active Command by Line-Of-Sight
SFS
Swedish Code of Statutes
SFRJ
Solid Fuel Ram Jet
SRP
Safety Requirement Proposed
SSPP
System Safety Program Plan
SV
Safety Verification
SÄI
Swedish National Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables
SäkI
Safety Instructions for the Swedish Armed Forces
TS
Transport and storage
TTFO
Tactical Technical Financial Objectives
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN
United Nations
220
Definitions 6
PTTFO
Preliminary Tactical Technical Financial Objectives
VDU
Video Display Unit
VDV
Vibration Dose Value
6
221
References 7
7
REFERENCES
Owing to constraints on the space available in this manual it has been necessary
to severely restrict the number of references.
To find complete information in MIL-STD and STANAG documents, for example, the reader is referred to the special search systems that are available on the
market.
At FMV there is a subscription system so that MIL-STD is available on CDROM.
The documents referenced are grouped as follows:
7.1
Documents governing safety
7.2
Standards relating to design and testing (e.g. MIL-STD, STANAG)
7.3
Design principles and experience
(e.g. manuals, magazine articles, studies)
7.4
Textbooks
7.5
Documents relating to the environment
(fundamental studies, measurement methods, etc.)
7.6
Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition
7.7
Accident investigations.
The following acronyms and abbreviations have been used for the standards referenced herein:
AOC Proc.
Australian Ordnance Council, Proceeding, AUS
AOP
Allied Ordnance Publication, NATO
7
DEF (AUST) Australian Defence Standard, AUS
DEF STAN
Defence Standard, UK
DOE
Department of Explosives, USA
223
7 References
DOD-STD
Department of Defense Standard, USA
FSD
Swedish Defence Standard
GAM
Delegation General Pour l´Armement, FR
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
ITOP
International Test Operation Procedure, USA, BRD
MIL-HDBK Military Handbook, USA
MIL-STD
Military Standard, USA
NAVORD
US Naval Ordnance Laboratory, USA
OB Proc.
Ordnance Board Proceeding, UK
SFS
Swedish Code of Statutes
SS
Swedish Standard
SSI FS
National Swedish Institute of Radiation Protection Code of Statutes
STANAG
Standardization Agreement, NATO
SÄI FS
National Swedish Inspectorate of Explosives and Flammables
Code of Statutes
TDv
Technische Dienstvorschrift, BRD
TECOM
Test and Evaluation Command, USA
TOP
Test Operation Procedure, USA
7
224
References 7
7.1
Documents governing safety
Table 7:1 Documents governing safety
Designation
Title
AFS 1996:2
Industrial Safety Ordinance and Regulations for
Hygienic Limit Values issued by the Board for Occupational Safety and Health
Lasers
Guidance for the Assessment of the Safety and Suitability for Service of Munitions for NATO Armed Forces
Ordnance Board Safety Guidelines for Weapons and
Munitions
Guide pour la construction de la securité
System Safety Manual
AFS 1994:8
AOP-15
DEF STAN 13-131
DGA/AQ 4112
H SystSäk
M7740-784851
IEC 60825-1
MIL-STD 882
TjF-FMV 97:12
SFS 1977:1160–1171
SFS 1982:821
SFS 1988:220
SFS 1988:868
SFS 1988:1145
SFS 1994:536
SSI FS 1980:2
SSI FS 1993:1
SÄIFS 1986:2
SÄIFS 1999:2
Laser Classification and Safety
System Safety Program, Requirements
Regulations governing weapon and ammunition safety
activities within FMV
Work Environment Act (AML) and directives
Transport of Dangerous Goods Act
Radiation Protection Act
Explosive and Flammable Goods Act
Directive on Explosive and Flammable Goods
Directive on International Supervision of Weapon
Projects
Classification of lasers
Directives on lasers
General advisory statements concerning SÄI directives
on sensitivity testing of explosives
Directive on the handling of hydrogen peroxide
7
225
7 References
7.2
Standards relating to design and testing
Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing
Designation
ADA-086259 Vol. 4
7
Title
Joint Services Safety and Performance Manual for
Qualification of Explosives for Military Use
AOC 218.93
The Qualification of Explosives for Service Use
AOC 223.93
Assessment of Munition Related Safety Critical Computing Systems
AOC 236.94
Guidelines for the Preclusion of Electro-Explosive Hazards in the Electromagnetic Environment
AOP-22
Design Criteria for and Test Methods for Inductive Setting of Electromagnetic fuzes
DEF (AUST) 5168
The Climatic Environmental Conditions Affecting the
Design of Military Materiel
DEF (AUST) 5247
Environmental Testing of Service Materiel
DEF STAN 00 35
Environmental Handbook for Defence Material
DEF STAN 00 36
Test Methods (draft)
DEF STAN 00 55
Requirements for the Procurement of Safety Critical
Software in Defence Equipment
DEF STAN 00 56
Requirements for the Analysis of Safety Critical Hazards
DEF STAN 59-41/1
Electromagnetic Compatibility
DEF STAN 59-41/2
Electromagnetic Compatibility Management and Planning Procedures
DEF STAN 59-41/3
Electromagnetic Compatibility Technical Requirements
Test Methods and Limits
DOD-STD-2168
Software Quality Evaluation
DOE/EV/06194-3- REV2 DF DOE Explosives Safety Manual
86 OV1154
GAM-EG-13
Essais Generaux en Environment des Materiels
ITOP 3-2-829
Cannon Safety Test
ITOP 4-2-504/1
Safety Testing of Field Artillery Ammunition
ITOP 4-2-504/2
Safety Testing of Tank Ammunition
ITOP 5-2-619
Safety Testing of Missile and Rocket Systems Employing Manual Launch Stations
IFTEX
Instruction governing the storage and transport of
Part 1 M7762-000082
Armed Forces’ explosive goods
IFTEX
Part 2 M7762-000220
226
References 7
Table 7:2 Standards relating to design and testing, continued
Designation
Title
M7762-000220
FMV Manual of Regulations for In-Service Surveillance of Ammunition
Climatic Information to Determine Design and Test
Requirements for Military Systems and Equipment
Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment
Explosive Components, Electrically Initiated, Basic
Qualification Tests for
Fuze and Fuze Components, Environmental and Performance Tests for
Electronic Reliability Design Handbook
Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Requirements for Equipment
Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics, Measurement of
Software Development and Documentation
Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines
Fuze Design, Safety Criteria for
Preclusion of Ordnance Hazards in Electromagnetic
Fields, General Requirements for
Dispenser and Sub-munition, Air Delivered, Safety
Design and Safety Qualification, Criteria for
Safety Criteria and Qualification Requirements for
Pyrotechnic Initiated Explosive (PIE) ammunition
Human Engineering Design Criteria for Military Systems Equipment and Facilities
Noise Limits for Army Materiel
Electroexplosive Subsystems, Electrically Initiated,
Design Requirements and Test Methods
Technical Reviews and Audits for Systems, Equipments
and Computer Software
Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analyses
Environmental Criteria and Guidelines for Air-launched
Weapons
Munition Rocket and Missile Motor Ignition System
Design, Safety Criteria for
Hand-Emplaced Ordnance Design, Safety Criteria For
MIL-STD-210
MIL-HDBK-217
MIL-STD-322
MIL-STD-331
MIL-HDBK-338-1
MIL-STD-461
MIL-STD-462
MIL-STD-498
MIL-STD-810
MIL-STD-1316
MIL-STD-1385
MIL-STD-1455
MIL-STD-1466
MIL-STD-1472
MIL-STD-1474
MIL-STD-1512
MIL-STD-1521
MIL-STD-1629
MIL-STD-1670
MIL-STD 1901
MIL-STD 1911
227
7
7 References
Designation
Title
MIL-STD-2105
Hazard Assessment Tests for Navy Non-Nuclear Munition
Climatic Environmental Conditions
Safety of Fuzing Systems
Safety of Fuzing Systems, Mines
Environmental Testing of Armament Stores
Assessment of Gun Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and
Above
Principles of Design and Use for Electrical Circuits
Incorporating Explosive Components
Solid Propellants for Rocket Motors
Life Assessment of Munitions
Assessment of Ammunition of 40 mm Calibre and
Above
Assessment of Land Service Weapons Installations
excluding Rocket Systems and GW, Pillar Proceeding
Electric detonators, general requirements and testing
Machine safety – emergency stopping, functional
aspects – design principles
Design of Aircraft Stores for Fixed Wing Aircraft and
Helicopters
Design Safety Principles and General Design Criteria
for Weapon Fuzing and Safety and Arming Systems
Definition of pressure terms and their interrelationship
for use in the design and proof of cannons and ammunition
Development Safety Test Methods and Procedures for
Fuzes for Unguided Tube-launched Projectiles
Principles and Methodology for the Qualification of
Explosive Materials for Military Use
Fuzing Systems – Safety Design Requirement
Safety and Suitability Testing of Artillery and Naval
Gun Ammunition 76 mm and Greater
Safety Evaluation of Mortar Bombs
Assessment of Safety and Suitability for Services of
Underwater Naval Mines
Safety Testing of Airborne Dispenser Weapons
Gun Munition of Caliber 20 to 40 mm, Safety Evaluation
OB Proc 41 849
OB Proc 42 202
OB Proc 42 240
OB Proc 42 242
OB Proc 42 351
OB Proc 42 413
OB Proc 42 491
OB Proc 42 496
OB Proc 42 610
OB Proc P114(1)
SS 49 90 701
SS-EN 418
STANAG 3441
STANAG 3525
STANAG 4110
STANAG 4157
STANAG 4170
STANAG 4187
STANAG 4224
7
STANAG 4225
STANAG 4226
STANAG 4227
STANAG 4228
228
References 7
Designation
Title
STANAG 4234
Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) 200kHz
to 40 GHz Environment - Affecting the Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces
Electrostatic Environment Conditions Affecting the
Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces
Lightning Environmental Conditions Affecting the
Design of Material for Use by NATO Forces
Design Principles for Safety Circuits Containing EED
Electrostatic Discharge Test Procedure to Determine
the Safety and Suitability for Service of EEDs and
Associated Electronic Systems Munitions and Weapon
Systems
Liquid Fuel Fire Test for Munition
Bullet Attack Test for Munition
Implementing Document for AOP-15
Electromagnetic Radiation (radio Frequency) Test
Information to Determine the Safety and Suitability for
Service of Electro-Explosive Devices and Associated
Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems
Air-launched Munitions, Safety Evaluation
Implementing STANAG for AOP-8
Lightning Test Procedure to Determine the Safety and
Suitability for Service of EEDs and Associated Electronic Systems in Munitions and Weapon Systems
Surface Launched Munition, Safety Evaluation
Underwater-Launched Munition, Safety Evaluation
Environmental Test Planning for NATO Material
Safety Design Requirements and Guidelines for Munition-Related Safety Critical Computing Systems
Aircraft Guns & Ammunition, Safety Evaluation
Safety Assessment of Munition-Related Computing
Systems
Index of Test Operations Procedures and International
Test Operations Procedures
Bewerten von Waffenrohren kal 5,6 mm bis 20,3 cm
Toxic Hazard Tests for Vehicles and Other Equipment
Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods, Model Regulations
STANAG 4235
STANAG 4236
STANAG 4238
STANAG 4239
STANAG 4240
STANAG 4241
STANAG 4297
STANAG 4324
STANAG 4325
STANAG 4326
STANAG 4327
STANAG 4337
STANAG 4338
STANAG 4370
STANAG 4404
STANAG 4423
STANAG 4452
TECOM Pam 310-4
AD No A204333
TDv 018
TOP 2-2-614
UN ST/SG/AC.10/1/Rev.11
229
7
7 References
Designation
Title
UN ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev.2
Recommendation on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods, Manual of Test and Criteria
7.3
Design principles and experience
Table 7:3 Design principles and experience
7
Designation
Title
R N Gottron
National Defence
May/June l975,
464-466
Kurt Nygaard AB
Bofors FKP-2 l978
Reynolds Industries Inc,
San Ramon, Ca
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-l29
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet No 706-114,
115, 116, 117, 118, 119
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-177,
1971
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-l79
January l974
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-2l0
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-235
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-l86
The Army and Fluidics
230
Characterizing of Electric Ignitors
Electronic Firing Systems
Engineering Design Handbook, Electromagnetic Compatibility
Engineering Design Handbook, Environmental Series
Engineering Design Handbook, Explosive Series –
Properties of Explosives of Military Interest
Engineering Design Handbook,
Explosive Trains
Engineering Design Handbook,
Fuzes
Engineering Design Handbook, Hardening Weapon
Systems against RF Energy
Engineering Design Handbook, Military Pyrotechnics,
Part Two, Safety Procedures and Glossary
References 7
Table 7:3 Design principles and experience, continued
Designation
Title
US Army Material
Command
Pamphlet 706-l80,
April 1972
US Army Material
Command
EMA-89-RR-22
Engineering Design Handbook, Principles of Explosive
Behavior
San Ramon, Ca
San Ramon, Ca
SÄIFS 1989:15
K O Brauer
Chemical Publishing Co Inc,
New York l974
NAVWEPS OP 3199
Vol 1 0609 319 9100,
l965
Ove Bring
UD 1989:5
W C Schumb,
C N Satterfield,
R L Wentworth
Reinhold Publishing
Corporation, New York,
N Y, 1955
FFV FT 102-04:79
M Gunnerhed
FOA 3 C 30420-E
M A Barron
National Defence
September/October l974,
l46-l48
G Hall, S Jahnberg,
M Ohlin, B Spiridon
FOA C 20649-2.7
FMV-Vapen A
761:62/85
Engineering Design Handbook, Part Four, Design of
Ammunition for Pyrotechnic Effects
ESD. Solid Full Propellant Hazards with Special Application to Manufacture and Handling Operation in Sweden
Exploding Bridgewire Ordnance
Exploding Foil Initiator Ordnance
List of directives and general advisory statements
within SÄI’s field of operations
Handbook of Pyrotechnics
The Handling and Storage of Liquid Propellants
Humanitarian rights and weapons control
Hydrogen Peroxide
Long-term storage ZP81
Microelectronics in safety critical applications
Multi-Option Fuzing
7
Software in safety critical applications
Risks involved in the use of glass fibre reinforced plastic as reinforcement material for explosives
231
7 References
Table 7:3 Design principles and experience, continued
Designation
Title
M E Anderson
Ordnance,
July/August l972, 59-62
NAVWEPS OP 2943
(First Revision) l965
Report FFV MT 225/72 l972
Safety/Arming Devices
Olof Nordzell
FMV-A:VAB2
Order no. 28-3600-0l
FMV, Stockholm l97l
Radio Technical
Commission for
Aeronautics
RTCA/DO-178
FMV-A:A A761:
3/82 1982
H Almström
FOA Report
Franklin Institute, l969
S Lamnevik
FOA C 20302-D1
FMV-Vapen A761:
342 83/86
TRC 829/l03
TRC 829/072
7
Ola Listh
FOA report
C 20457-Dl(D4)
Part l:
Ola Listh
FOA report
C 20228-D1 (D4)
March 1978
232
Safety Precautions for Prepackaged Liquid Propellants
Safety inspection of 105 mm light HE shell m/34
60 units, 105 mm HE shell m/60Z 120 units, 105 mm
HE shell m/61A 25 units
Safety field trials with ammunition l960–l965
Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certification
Final report of cavity group
Study of risks associated with cavities in high explosive
shells
Summary of Test Data for 75 Hot-Wire Bridge or EBW
Initiators Tested at the FIRL
Explosive trains for detonation transmission
UK Qualification Programme for Introduction of PBX
into Service
Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the
smallest detectable cavity using gamma metric analysis
Investigation of 105 mm HE shell to determine the
smallest detectable cavity using gamma radiography
with Co60
Investigation of electric igniters for ammunition.
Data for igniters in Swedish ammunition and knowledge status concerning testing
Instantaneous point detonation supersensitive m/484D
– investigation of certain risks for inadvertent arming
and initiation of composition dust
References 7
7.4
Textbooks
Table 7:4 Textbooks
Designation
Title
Roy L Grant
Bureau of Mines, Dept of the
Interior, Washington D.C.,
l967
FMV-A M77:21/79
AB Bofors
Wezäta, Göteborg, l960
W Ficket & W C Davis
Univ California Press
Berkeley, l979
Johansson C H and
Persson P A
Academic Press, London
(l970)
B T Fedoroff m fl
Picatinny Arsenal, Dover
New Jersey, USA
S Lamnevik
l983
A Combination Statistical Design for Sensitivity Testing IC-8324
Rudolf Meyer
Verlag Chemie, GmbH
D-6940 Weinheim, l993
ISBN 3-527-28506-7
G Blomqvist
FOA report A l577-Dl
l973
S Lamnevik m fl
l983
Ingvar Seilitz
Nobelkoncernservice
A A Shidlovsky
Report FTD II-63-758
(trans DDC AD 602 687) Air
Force Systems Command
Wright-Patterson AFB, l964
Ammunition doctrine for the Army
Analytical Methods for Powders and Explosives
Detonation
Detonics of High Explosives
Encyclopedia of Explosives and Related Items
Explosive processes – Fundamentals for consequence
and risk analysis.
Compendium FOA Inst 24
Explosives
Explosives and their sensitivity properties.
Fundamentals for future sensitivity research
Chemistry of explosives.
Revised extract from MHS compendium in chemistry
l972-ll-06
Knowledge of explosives
Foundations of Pyrotechnics (translation from the Russian original Osnovy Pirotekhniki)
233
7
7 References
Table 7:4 Textbooks, continued
Designation
Title
D W Culbertson,
V F De Vost
U S Navy
Instrumentation Techniques and the Application of
Spectral Analysis and Laboratory Simulation to Gun
Shock Problems, The Shock and Vibration Bulletin, Jan
l972, Bulletin 42
Joint Services Evaluation Plan for Preferred and Alternative Explosive Fills for Principal Munitions Vol IV
NAVORD OD448ll
Naval Weapons Center,
China Lake Ca (l97l)
Military Office of the Swedish
Ministry of Defence
ISBN 91-38-31004-X
(M 7740-804001)
B M Dobratz
Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory
report UCRL-52997, l98l
NASA-AP-8076
NASA-SP-8039
7
C L Mader
Univ of California Press
Berkeley, l979
J M Mc Lain
The Franklin Institute Press
Philadelphia, l980
RARDE, Fort Halstead,
Kent, GB (l988)
E Lidén, L Holmberg
I Mellgard, L Westerling
FOA-R-94-00035-2.3-SE
October 1994
ISSN 1104-9154
P F Mohrbach, R F Wood
Franklin Institute
Monograph APL-69-l, 1968
M7742-108001
US Navy
NAVORD OD 44 492
234
International rules of warfare, conventions of international law applicable during wartime, neutrality and
occupation
LLNL Explosives Handbook Properties of Chemical
Explosives and Explosives and Explosive Simulants
NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Propulsion): Solid Propellant Grain Design and Internal
Ballistics. March l972
NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical Propulsion): Solid Rocket Motor Performance Analysis
and Prediction. May l97l
Numerical Modeling of Detonations
Pyrotechnics
Sensitiveness Collaboration Committee, Manual of
Tests
Warheads, interaction protection
Systems and Techniques Employed by the Franklin
Institute Research Laboratories to Determine the
Responses of Electro-explosive Devices to Radio Frequency Energy
Weapons doctrine for the Army
Weapon System Safety Guidelines Handbook
References 7
7.5
Documents relating to the environment
Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment
Designation
Title
Saab-Scania AB
TCP-37-7.76:R2,
June 1979
SAAB
SAAB TCP-0-72.33:Rl
René Renström
FOA report C 2525-D3,1972
ITT Research Institute
(For Defense Nuclear
Agency, Washington)
Teleplan
E3-MPA-0236, Dec l978
ITT Research Institute
(For Naval Surface
Weapon Center USA)
Report NSWC/WOL/TR
75-l93
FOA 2
Reg. no. 2l330-Xl6
August l977
S Almroth
FOA C 23204-41 1969
S Lamnevik
FOA 1 report
A146l143 (40, 4l)
January l969
Bofors KL-R6775
Anders Schwartz
FOA report A 200l5-Dl
March l976
Anders Schwartz
FOA report A 2003l-Dl
February l979
S Lamnevik
FOA A-1510-41(40) 1970
Küller, N-E
FMV A:A m/4/l4:85/75
30 mm automatic cannon m/75
Fuze accelerations with forced driving band
Acceleration measurement in fuze.
Analysis of measuring methodology
Acceleration stresses in projectile-borne rocket propellant
DNA EMP Awareness Course Notes, August l973
Electric interference
EMP Design Guidelines for Naval Ship Systems, l975
Fourier analysis of water shock waves from underwater
charges
Casting properties and sensitivity for octol
Copper acid corrosion
Sensitivity of octol NSV10 and octonal NSB 9030
Methods for testing rocket propellant.
I Double-base propellant
Methods for testing rocket propellant.
II Composite propellant
7
HMX. Basic data for technical specifications
Plan for analysis of ammunition environment
235
7 References
Table 7:5 Documents relating to the environment, continued
7
Designation
Title
A Magnusson
FOA 2 report A 2l48-242
October l96l
AB Bofors
KL-R-5696, Dec l976
Institute for water & air purification research
IVL no. 02:0464, June l977
H J Pasman
DREV Report 707/75
DREV Québec, Canada,
1975
J Hansson, G Åqvist
FOA report A 20027-Dl
May l978
A D Randolph and K O Simpsson, Univ. Arizona, Tucson,
Arizona 1974
AB Bofors
KL-R 7742, Nov l982
US Army
TECOM Pamphlet No 3l0-4
AB Bofors
KL-R-5776, Dec l976
S Lamnevik
FOA report C 20l68-Dl
(D4) April l977
FOA 2
Reg. no. 2l840-Xl6
October l976
FOA 2
Reg. no. 2278-Xl5
Anders Schwartz
FOA report A 200l6-Dl
(D3) 1976
T Liljegren
FOA 2 report A 2234-242
October l963
Rheological properties of viscoelastic materials
236
Risk for self-initiation of round rammed in a hot barrel
Collocation of the presence, content levels, and properties of gaseous air pollutants
Shell Prematures by Compression Ignition and their
Laboratory Simulation
Study of organic substances present in ammunition surroundings that have a harmful effect on ammunition
and packaging
Study of Accidental Ignition of Encased High Explosive Charges by Gas Compression Mechanisms
Safety testing of ammunition with regard to resistance
to cook-off
Test Operations Procedures
Pressure and temperature in the air cushion in front of a
projectile in a barrel
Investigations concerning composition dust in fuzes
Investigation concerning water shock wave severity at
various distances from a detonating underwater mine
Some shock wave parameters for warheads detonating
above ground
The influence of age on the adhesion of insulation on
gas generator charges
Ageing testing of rocket propellant
References 7
7.6
Description of methods for environmental testing of
ammunition
7.6.1
System specific specifications
Table 7:6 System specific specifications
Designation
Title
FSD 0060
FSD 0112
Safety testing of ammunition
Testing of electric igniters with regard to electrical
properties
Environment types
Testing of systems containing electric igniters
Testing of fuze systems
Qualification of explosives for military use
Shelf-life engineering
FSD 0168
FSD 0212
FSD 0213
FSD 0214
FSD 0223
7.6.2
Environment specific specifications
7.6.2.1
Mechanical testing
Table 7:7 Mechanical testing
Designation
Title
FSD 0098
FSD 0099
FSD 0102
FSD 0103
FSD 0104
FSD 0105
FSD 0107
FSD 0113
FSD 0114
FSD 0115
FSD 0116
FSD 0117
FSD 0118
FSD 0120
FSD 0121
FSD 0122
Constant acceleration
Shock firing
Sinusoidal vibration
Jumbling
Broadband random vibration
Free-fall drop from maximum 12 m
Free-fall drop from high altitude or equivalent
Bump
Shock
Shock with high peak value and short duration
High-frequency transient vibration
Small arms bullet attack
Loose cargo
Static load
Fragment attack
Shock waves in water
7
237
7 References
Table 7:7 Mechanical testing, continued
Designation
Title
FSD 0123
FSD 0234
Acoustic noise
Sand and dust
FSD 0124
Recommended severity of mechanical testing
7.6.2.2
Climatic testing
Table 7:8 Climatic testing
Designation
Title
FSD 0044
Low barometric pressure and during change of air pressure
Humidity, methods A and B
Thermal shock and temperature change
Low temperature, methods A, B and C
High temperature, methods A, B and C
Salt mist
Water spraying
Simulated solar radiation
High water pressure
Recommended severity of climatic testing
FSD 0045
FSD 0059
FSD 0072
FSD 0073
FSD 0125
FSD 0126
FSD 0127
FSD 0128
FSD 0129
7.6.2.3
Chemical testing
Table 7:9 Chemical testing
Designation
Title
FSD 0130
FSD 0224
Gaseous air pollutants and ozone
Testing with contaminants
7.6.2.4
Electrical and electromagnetic testing
Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing
7
Designation
Title
FSD 0046
FSD 0047
FSD 0058
FSD 0100
Lightning
Static electricity, methods A and B
Transient over voltages when current is interrupted
Electromagnetic fields relevant to radar and radio radiation
Inductive interference of wiring
FSD 0101
238
References 7
Table 7:10 Electrical and electromagnetic testing, continued
Designation
Title
FSD 0106
FSD 0112
Electromagnetic pulse, EMP
Electric igniter tests: electrical properties (excluding
EBW and EFI)
Testing of semiconductor components with regard to
ionizing radiation
High Power Microwaves
Recommended severity of electrical and electromagnetic testing
FSD 0225
FSD 0235
FSD 0119
7.6.2.5
Fire and explosion testing
Table 7:11 Fire and explosion testing
Designation
Title
FSD 0159
FSD 0165
FSD 0166
FSD 0167
Gas pressure shock (explosive atmosphere)
Fire
Cook-off
Recommended severity of fire and explosion testing
7.6.2.6
Combined testing
Table 7:12 Combined testing
Designation
Title
FSD 0160
FSD 0161
FSD 0162
FSD 0163
FSD 0164
High temperature – vibration
Low temperature – vibration
High temperature – low barometric pressure
Low temperature – low barometric pressure
Recommended severity of combined testing
7.7
Accident investigations
Table 7:13 Accident investigations
Designation
Title
A:VA 036577:9l/70
FOA-report A l520-40,
l970
A:VA A684/24/7l
l97l-l0-ll
Expert group for Ravlunda accident 1969. Final report
Analysis of m/5l fuze clockwork as a result of the firing
accident at Ravlunda
Expert group for the Grytan accident l969
239
7
7 References
Table 7:13 Accident investigations, continued
Designation
Title
A:V A684:75/74
l974-l0–02
A:VA A684:80/73
l973-l0–09
A:A M4808/4:6/78
Expert group for the Väddö accident l970
Expert group for the Kungsängen accident l97l
Final report regarding accident when firing with 84 mm
Carl Gustaf at InfSS in January l978
The committee (KN 1981:02) Firing accident at Stockholm coastal artillery defence
for investigation of serious
force on 17 May 1984
accidents.
Investigation report no. 2:1985
Initiation of Explosive in Shell Threads
S D Stein, S J Lowell
Picatinny Arsenal
l957, PB l28 979
Ordnance Corps (USA)
Report on Investigation of Premature Occurrence with
Report No. DPS-220
Cavitated Composition B Shell, HE, l20-MM, Tl5 E3
R L Huddleston
Diagnostic Significance of Macro- and Microscopic
Aberdeen Proving Ground
Features of Catastrophic Gun-tube Failures
ADA 026 046
7
240
Checklists 8
8
CHECKLISTS
This chapter provides some examples of how checklists can be designed. To
provide a clear overview of the requirements that apply to a weapon and/or
ammunition system some form of checklist is advisable. Chapter 2, 4 and 5,
which define requirements, contain basic checklists of all requirements. These
lists provide a good overview but have limited use for monitoring purposes in
the various advisory groups, for example. More detailed information is often
required for the advisory groups and when monitoring projects which is why
more specific checklists are necessary. A number of examples of specific checklists have been compiled in this chapter.
Some advisory groups require specific checklists to be submitted. Refer also to
Chapter 3, Section 3.6.
8.1
Checklist example 1
CHECKLIST FOR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SAFETY MANUAL
Compiled by:
N.N.
Date
2000-02-07
Page 2 (30)
Item:
Flame thrower
Project phase:
Product definition phase
Requirement no.:
1.22003
Content:
Supplement to supplier’s SRP in accordance with Section 3.4
Requirement met:
Comment:
Requirement type: Desired (SHOULD)
Yes
No
Not applicable
A technical requirement specification was established (Ref. No.
08 222 221) in which all requirements from the RFP have been
formulated with regard to the concept in question. In addition, the
requirements from the RFP have been broken down into the relevant subsystems.
8
241
8 Checklists
8.2
Checklist example 2
Comment
Yes
Activities
1.22001
SHALL
×
Supplement to safety
requirements in TTFO
(Tactical Technical Financial
Objectives) shall be
performed as per Section 3.2
a) NA = Not applicable
8
242
No
NA a) Description/ repor
A list of weapon
related safety
requirements are
stated in report
FMV:Armament
Directorate: 123/00
Index
INDEX
A
Abnormal delay 182
Accident 23
Accumulated pressure 72
Advisory Group 43–44
Advisory Group for Environmental
Engineering 44
(Rg Expl) 32, 44, 46
Advisory Group for explosives
(Rg Expl) 116
Advisory Group for Fuzing systems
(Rg T) 44–45
Advisory Group for System Safety 44
Advisory Group for Warheads and
Propulsion Devices (Rg V & D) 44, 48
Ageing 140
Aiming and firing limitations 97
Air conditioning system 64
Air-breathing engines 139
Alcohol 92, 154
Ammonia 64
Ammunition 113
Anti-laser goggles 74
Anti-slip surfaces 64
Arming
carrier wave 165
conditions 157
delay 180
enabled 175
failure 171
full 180
hazard 174
inadvertent 170
indication 172
mechanical deployment 175
phase 178
power cut 173
process 159, 173, 177
safe separation 173
safety features 174
safety limit 176
short-circuits 173
signal outside 174
single conductor 173
time-dependent 166
unauthorized 174
Artillery primers 139, 145
Axis of bore 96
B
Backblast 69, 88
Backflash 81–82, 145
Bag charge 143
Bangalore torpedoes 130, 167
Barrel 82
rupture 82, 89
Barrier 188
Base of the shell 124, 133
Base plate 123, 141
Base-bleed 139
initiator 139
Blast pressure 62, 69, 121
Body vibration 70
Bomb 93
Bomblets 93
Booby traps 60
Booster 158–159
charge 143
Breech mechanism 79
Breech ring 81
Bullet attack 121, 142
Bullet attack test 142
Bump 131
Burst simulators 135
Bursting discs 141
C
Cannon primers 143
Carbon monoxide 64
Carrier wave 165
Cartridge case 143, 145
Casing 115, 120, 125
Casting propellant directly 147
Cavity 124
CE marking 100
Changes in barometric pressure 189
Charge casing 132
Chassis 75
Checklist for safety activities and
requirements 34
Circuit breaker 158–159
Classification 51
243
Index
Clearance 78
Clearly marked 188
Climatic conditions 67
Combustible cartridge case 143
Combustion catalysts 141
Commencement of rifling 82
Compatibility 33
Composite barrels 89
Compound barrels 89
Compressed pellets 132
Conducted interference 80
Confined spaces 101
Consequence 42
Constituent materials 191
Contact with the seabed 176
Cook-off 83, 121, 145, 163
Copper azide 41, 163, 171
Copper content 47
Corrosion 67, 99, 127, 129, 141, 148,
163, 171, 190–191
resistance 128
Co-storage 130, 132
Countersunk 145
Cracks 123, 162
D
Danger
area 61–62, 73
zones 98
Data transfer 99
Deactivation 93, 171, 177
Debris 151
Deflagration 124, 172
Deformation 120, 141
Delegation for International Supervision
of Weapon Project 33
Demolition charge 130
Description of function 139
Desired requirement 18
Destruction 121
Detonation 124
Direction of recoil 88
Disassembly 142
Dispensers 93
Dividing wall (partition) 134
Doors 64, 95
Draining
devices 154
244
system 93
Driving bands 83, 115
Drop test 50
DTTFO 36
E
EED 172
EFI systems 159
Ejection of empty cartridge cases 73
Electric primer 139
Electrical
fields 66
subsystems 164
Electromagnetic
pulse 189
radiation 189
Electromechanical device 80
Electron incendiary bomb 135
Electronics 165
Electrostatic charging 148
Emergency stop 63
EMP 164
Empty cartridge cases 63
Environment
extreme 116
severe damage 60
Environmental
aspects 121
factors 178, 189
ESD 66
Ethyl alcohol 154
Evacuation fan 101
Explosive 33, 46
composition dust 123
cutters 167–168
train 170
External ballistic stability 115
External environment 188
Extraneous circuits 162
F
FAE 120
Fall-back 76
Fastening element 72
Fatigue 82, 89
Fault mode 42
Filler material 126, 129
Fire 68
Index
Fire extinguisher 101
Fire-fighting
equipment 100
systems 101
Firing 97
button 80
circuit 182
mechanism 79, 88
stance 88
Flame guard 84
Flammable and Dangerous Goods Act 21
FMEA testing 170
FMV Manual of Regulations for InService Surveillance of Ammunition 53
Footholds 64
Forced recoil 87
Forces 70
Fording 67
Fragmentation 62, 83
Fragments 115
Friction initiation 131
FSD
0060 37, 48–49, 51, 116, 120–121,
142, 148
0112 46, 51, 173
0113 48
0114 48
0117 48
0121 48
0165 68
0166 48
0212 46, 51, 173
0213 46, 51, 176
0214 46–47, 51, 116, 170
FSD 0214 47, 170
Fume extractor 84
Fuzing system 45, 113, 119, 125–126,
128, 157–160, 162–174, 176–182
Fuzing systems for warheads and
propelling charges 157
G
Gas pressure 70
Guidance signals 99
Guidance systems 97
Guided weapons 120
H
Hail 189
Hand-grenades 168
Hatches 64, 95
Hazard firing 78
Hazard initiation 93, 119–120, 124–
127, 129, 141, 144, 157, 159, 163–
164, 167–169, 178, 182, 191
Hazardous event 23
Hazards 28
HE charge 120
Heat
flux 84, 115
treatment 141
Heating 64
High test peroxide 154
Hollow-charges 130
Hose charges 130
HPM 66, 164
Hydraulic
systems 71, 78
Hydraulics 72
Hydrogen peroxide 93, 154
I
IEC 60825-1 74
IFTEX 130, 132, 191
Igniter cup 141
Ignition
cables 172–173
capacitor 177, 179
composition 134
energy 180
friction 131
inadvertent 131
leads 181
of propulsion agents 139
premature 123
pyrotechnic composition 134
self 140
spontaneous 162
spontaneous contact 135
temperature 140
voltage 179
Illuminating ammunition 131
IM 118
Impact
of shrapnel 148
245
Index
with the ground 176
Impulse 139
blasts 69
Inadvertent initiation 140, 170
Incendiary
ammunition 131
weapon 60
Incorrect assembly 171
Inherent safety 176
Initiate 157
Initiation
designed 181
devices 181
Initiator 158–159
In-line explosive train 158, 179
Insensitive munition 37
Inspection
X-ray 123
Installation 76
Insulation
adhesion 132
material 141
Internal protective paint 141
Interrupted fire 84
Interrupter 158, 178–179, 181
ISO
2631 70
5349 70
J
Jackets 83
Jet engines 150
Joint surface 131
L
Laser 74
fuzing systems 166
protection filters 74
weapons 60
Launch tubes 92
torpedoes 91
Launchers 77
Laying systems 96
Lead 65
azide 41, 47
Leakage 162
of propulsion agents 150
LEMP 66
246
Lifting devices 100
Linear charges 130, 167
Liquid
fuel rocket engines 149
gas generators 149
Loading devices 73
Locking
devices 64, 74
mechanism 96
LOVA 140
M
Magnetic fields 66
Mandatory requirements 18
Marking 191
Mass detonation 191
Material
recycling symbols 191
Materiel
environment 119, 140, 162
publications 55
Mechanical
barrier 179
interrupter 182
Melting point 121
Memorandum of Understanding 28
Micro-electronic circuits 162
Micro-environment 188
MIL-STD-1474 69, 95
Mine counter-blasting charge 168
Minelayers
depth charges 91
landmines 90
naval mines 91
Mines 116
Missile launch tubes 63
Missiles 93
Moisture
content 132–134
resistance 67
Monitor 63
Monitoring system 90
Montreal protocol 66
MOU 28
Moving
parts 73
system parts 78
Multiple weapons 120
Index
Multi-purpose ammunition 169
Muzzle
brake 84
flash 85, 88
N
National Inspectorate of Explosives and
Flammables (SÄI) 21
NBC 120
NEMP 66
Neutralized 173
Nitric oxide 65
Nitrogen
dioxide 65
oxide 65
Non-discriminatory effect 32
Nozzle plug 141
O
Obturation 81
Obturators 83, 115
Optical axis 96
Out-of-line explosive train 158
Overpressure 73
P
P1 Development 27
P2 Acquisition of Off-The-Shelf Weapon
and Ammunition Systems 27
P3 Review of Existing Weapon and Ammunition Systems 27
Packaging 113, 188
Paraffin
kerosene 92, 154
PBX 118
Peacetime 25
Percussion caps 129, 139, 143, 145
Peroxide 92
PHL 41
PHST 53
Pipe 123
Plugs 129
Pneumatics 72
Potential difference 164
Preliminary Hazard List 32, 41
Pressure 70, 89
MOP 145
time curves 141
vessels 100
Pressure vessels 100
Production control 171
Programmable subsystems 166
Propellant
gas generators 146, 153
rocket engines 146
Propelling
charge 141
charge casing 141
Proposed Handling, Storage and Transport
Regulations (PHST) 32, 53
Propulsion
agents 149
device 139, 169
devices for torpedoes 153
force process 141
systems 138
unit 113
Protective clothing 63, 67
PTTFO 36
Publications from Armed Forces headquarters 55
Pulverization 162
Purity 132
Push-out 92
Pylon 93
Pyrotechnic warheads 130
Q
Quality inspection 171
R
Radiated interference 80
Radiography 120
Rain 189
Ram rocket engines 139, 152
Ramjet engines 150
Rammer 86
Ramming 86
Reading instructions 2
Recoil 88
amplifiers 84
buffer 73, 86
forces 73, 88
systems 78
Recoilless weapon systems 87
Recuperator 73
Recycling 191
247
Index
REQDOC Technical Specification Manual 38
Request for Proposal 37
Requirements of International Law 60,
114
RFP 31, 37
Rocket
assisted projectile 139
engine initiators 139
systems 87
Rotating parts 73
Rupture 83
S
Sabots 83, 115
SACLOS 98
Safe
separation distance 64, 121, 171
separation time 171
Safety
circuits 74
covers 74
devices 78, 158
interrupter 80–81
surveillance 52
system 157
testing 50
Safety Requirements Proposed 39
SAI units 159
Sealed 123
Sealing 126
agents 141
Self-destruction 99, 168, 177
Semiconductor switches 174
SEN 580110 70
Separate
case 143
charges 126, 129
Separating surface 119
Separation 98, 115, 123
Service life 33
Shock 131
absorbers 188
Sighting systems 96
Signal
agents 167, 180
ammunition 131
Single conductor system 173
248
Single failure 101, 170
Smoke
ammunition 131
candles 135
hand-grenades 135
Smoke ammunition 131
Soldering defects 173
Solid Fuel RamJet engine (SFRJ) 151
Somersault 176
Sources of radiation 98–99
Spotting
agents 131, 167, 180
rounds 135
Spring 71–72
forces 71
SRP 39
Stability 74
Stabilizer 154
STANAG 4110 70, 89, 116, 145
Static
electricity 189
load 189
Steam generator 153
Storage stability 132
Stowage 76
Stress
chemical 163
chemical environmental 190
climatic environmental 190
dynamic 189
electrical environmental 190
mechanical 162
mechanical environmental 189
physical 163
Structural strength 89, 100, 132
Sub-calibre
adapters 85
barrel 85–86, 89
Sub-calibre barrel 86
Submunitions 168
Supplier’s Safety Requirements
Proposed 32
Swim-out 92
Symbols 63
System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) 19,
22, 27
Index
T
Tactical Technical Financial
Objectives 22, 31
Tandem systems 169
Temperature cycles 140
Terminal guidance 98
Thermal shock 189
Threads 120, 131, 134
Thunder flashes 135
Time fuzes 181
Tolerable level of safety 21
Tolerance range 179
Torpedo propulsion 139
Torpedoes 116, 178
Toxic
substances 62
toxicity 121
weapons 60
Transient currents 164
electrical 158
optical 158
Transport 75
safety device 88, 93
Transport and storage classification 26
Transport of Dangerous Goods Act 21
TS classified 191
TTFO 21, 31, 35–36
Tube-launched ammunition 142
Turbojet engines 150
Turbo-rocket engines 139
Type testing 176
VDU 63
VDV 70
Ventilation 64, 101
Verification 40, 50
Verify other safety requirements 50
Vibration 131, 189
Vibration dose 70
W
Warheads 113, 118
Warning signs 74
Wartime 25
Water
resistance 67
spraying 67
Weapon platforms 94
Weapons difficult to aim 60
Wear protectants 141
Work environment 67
Work Environment Act 21
X
X-ray 120, 123
U
UAV 145
Ultrasonic testing 120
UN
coding 191
recommendations 190
Uncontrolled base bleed combustion 124
Underwater
ammunition 127
mines 116, 128
Unloading 115
Unloading tool 115
V
Variations in temperature 140
249
Notes
9
NOTES
Notes
Abbreviated list of contents
0 To our Foreign Reader .............................. 15
0.1 Purpose of this chapter ..................... 15
0.2 Defence Materiel Systems
Procurement ..................................... 15
0.3 About the manual ............................. 15
4 Weapons .....................................................57
4.1 General .............................................57
4.2 Common requirements .....................60
4.3 System requirements ........................77
4.4 Requirement checklist for weapons 102
1 Introduction ................................................ 17
1.1 General ............................................. 17
1.2 Instructions for use .......................... 20
1.3 Weapons and ammunition safety ..... 21
1.4 Objectives for safety activities ......... 25
1.5 Weapons and ammunition safety
activities at FMV ............................. 25
activities at interacting authorities ... 26
activities at manufacturers ............... 26
5 Ammunition ..............................................113
5.1 Joint ammunition requirements ......113
5.2 Warheads ........................................118
5.3 Propulsion systems .........................138
5.4 Fuzing systems for warheads and
propelling charges ..........................157
5.5 Packaging for ammunition .............188
2 Safety activities and requirements common
to all materiel ............................................. 27
2.1 General ............................................. 27
2.2 Safety activity requirements ............ 28
2.3 Requirements common to
all materiel ....................................... 32
2.4 Checklist for safety activities and
requirements common to
all materiel ....................................... 34
3 Methodology .............................................. 35
3.1 General ............................................. 35
3.2 Supplement to safety requirements
in the TTFO .................................... 35
3.3 Supplement to requirements in
Request for Proposal (RFP) ............. 37
3.4 Supplement to manufacturer’s Safety
Requirements Proposed (SRP) ........ 39
3.5 Supplement to Preliminary
Hazard List (PHL) ........................... 41
3.6 Obtaining advice from advisory
groups .............................................. 43
3.7 Safety testing ................................... 50
3.8 Test directives for safety
surveillance ...................................... 52
3.9 Proposed Handling, Storage and
Transport Regulations (PHST) ........ 53
6 Definitions ................................................193
6.1 Terminology ...................................193
6.2 Key to abbreviations .......................218
7 References ................................................223
7.1 Documents governing safety ..........225
7.2 Standards relating to design and
testing .............................................226
7.3 Design principles and experience ...230
7.4 Textbooks .......................................233
7.5 Documents relating to the
environment ....................................235
7.6 Description of methods for environmental testing of ammunition .........237
7.7 Accident investigations ..................239
8 Checklists ..................................................241
8.1 Checklist example 1 .......................241
8.2 Checklist example 2 .......................242
Index .........................................................243

Weapons and Ammunition Safety Manual H VAS-E

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