ISI 1 - Lembaga Studi Pertahanan dan Studi Strategis Indonesia

Transcription

ALMANAC INDONESIA 2007
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Editor :
AH
P IJ
AK SIKAP
BI
J
K
A
AR
Beni Sukadis
DCAF
LESPERSSI
Lembaga Studi Pertahanan dan
Studi Strategis Indonesia
The Geneva Centre for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces
Editor :
AH
P IJ
AK SIKAP
BI
J
K
A
AR
Beni Sukadis
DCAF
LESPERSSI
Editor : Beni Sukadis
Assistant Editor : Aditya Batara G
Language Editor : DCAF, Switzerland
First Edition, August 2007
Copyright © Lesperssi and DCAF
ISBN : 978-979-25-2031-6
Warning : The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the official position of LESPERSSI and DCAF (Geneve Center
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), unless its says otherwise.
Almanac Indonesia 2007 Security Sector Reform
CONTENTS
Contents
…..……………………………………………………………..……………...... iii
FOREWORD
Suripto SH, Deputy Chairman of Commision III DPR………………..………. v
Dr. Philipp Fluri, Deputy Director of DCAF …………………………..…… vii
Introduction Chapters
Beni Sukadis………………….. .……………………………………………….. 1
The Departement of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia
Kusnanto Anggoro………………….…………………………………………… 5
The Indonesia Armed Forces (TNI)
Al Araf
…………………………………………………………………………………... 19
The Parliament and Security Sector Reform
Rico Marbun dan Hilman R. Shihab…………………………………………….. 32
The Indonesian National Police
S. Yunanto……………………………………….……………………………..... 42
Mobil Brigade (Brimob POLRI)
Muradi…………………………………………………………………………… 53
Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88)
Eko Maryadi…………………………………………………………………....... 68
State Intelligence Agency (BIN)
Aleksius Jemadu..................................................................................................... 81
Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS)
Rizal Darma putra.................................................................................................. 93
The TNI business
Eric Hendra............................................................................................................ 102
The Territorial Command and Security Sector Reform
Agus Widjojo ......................................................................................................... 120
The Role of CSO in Security Sector Reform
Mufti Makaarim Al Ahlaq...................................................................................... 127
The Media and Security Sector Reform
Ahmad Taufik......................................................................................................... 138
iii
The Relations of DEPHAN and TNI Headquarters in the Reform Era
Rico Marbun.......................................................................................................... 149
Border Management and National Security
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita.................................................................................. 160
Indonesia’s Security Sector Legislation Reform
Bhatara Ibnu Reza................................................................................................. 172
Contributors......................................................................................................... 202
.
ANNEX................................................................................................................. 205
Institution Profile
Iiv
Security Sector Reform in Indonesia
An Effort to Guarantee Citizen’s Security
Suripto, SH
The Vice Chairman of Commission III of
Indonesian Parliament
and
The Founding Chairman of LESPERSSI
Reform movement which ended authoritarian and centralism
governmental system in Soeharto’s regime, in 1998, soon rolled on several
reforms agenda in several sectors, includes security sector by means to
improve the governmental system which transparent, accountable and
democratic
The expected effects of security sector reform are upgrading people’s
welfare and security guarantee for all citizens.
By then, the reform in security sector should covers some stake holders
which not always be directly related to defense-security operational and
responsibility such police and military institution, but also other institution in
executive that planning the policy of utilizing military force and legislative in
means as democratic control.
Besides that, the existence of mass media and NGOs as democratic civil
control also need to be involved, considering both of them play a crucial role in
overseeing so the security reform in line with with human security concept.
Then, each of parties of security sector expected to have a synergy cooperation
dealing with the security sector reform by learning the history of role’s
deviation on security-defense actor’s. The process of security sector reform in
Indonesia takes place for the past eight, but there are remaining problems in
reforming the military, police, as well as intelligence and also the border
management issue.
There are factors on the Indonesian security sector reform that needs
some improvements, one of them are the weakness of legal framework, also
the old paradigm which remain of the mindset of security sector actor, such as
putting the security institution as a political actors. Old paradigm that lingers
become a values that is hard to change. So does with, the vested interest for
business of some actors in security sectors. These problems contribute to
slowing the security sector reform pace and also prevent them from acting
professionally.
This Book titled “Almanac on Indonesian Security Sector Reform 2007”
discussed several issues in security sector reforms which still needs
improvement. Among other, Indonesian Armed Forces reform is not complete
yet, the restructurization of military business is not finished yet, as well as the
Indonesian Army territory command abolishment, which all related to debated
performance of the Armed Forces and its professionalism.
The roles and function of the Indonesian parliament, as peoples’
v
representatives, that formulate legislation and oversight on security
sector was considered in slow pace.
On the other side, Department of Defense which is a civil institution
authorized in formulating policies on state defense did not show its supremacy
over military institution. In Department of Defense issue, relations between
Department of Defense and Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters also
become the integral part which also discussed in this book. The relationship of
the institutions will portray on how far the ideal concept of security sector
reform achievement in Indonesia could be attained.
The state intelligence agency issue and its reformation also become a
sub-theme of the book. Indonesia National Police as the domestic security also
discussed from various of perspective such are Institutional Reform of
Indonesian Police, Mobile Brigade (Brimob) as a paramilitary policing and
Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror (Densus 88).
An emerging security challenges in national border trespass sovereignty
and cross-border crimes, would ultimately pose a threat to security condition.
Therefore, a sound border management with border police may be significantly
importance to deal with the problems. Of course, it is interesting to be brought
up in this book.
Media and NGOs also addressed in this book. Their roles as the fifth pillar
of democracy in the dynamic of security sector reform play a role as “watch
dog” to ensure the succeed of the security sector reform also addressed in this
book.
In general, this book is divided into two parts. The first part discusses
about Indonesian security sector in form of institutional reform, and the second
part discuss a vary issues in Indonesia’s security sector.
In conclusion, Indonesia Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies
(LESPERSSI) would like to acknowledge the Geneva Centre for Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF Swiss) and the Germany Ministry of Foreign
Affairs for its generous support in publishing this book. LESPERSSI also would
like to thank to all contributors in the book on Almanac Indonesia 2007 Security
Sector Reform for sharing constructive thoughts for Indonesia’s security sector
reform. LESPERSSI wish to give a fruitful information and also give a notes to
all people and parties who has interests in security sector reform. The security
sector reform in Indonesia is not ended yet.
Jakarta, Juli 2007
vi
FOREWORD
DCAF Directors
This Almanac offers a survey of the security sector in Indonesia from the
perspective of security sector reform and the democratic oversight of armed
forces. It maps out the various institutional and societal actors of the security
sector and assesses – inter alia – the level of effective democratic
parliamentary and civil society oversight of the security sector and considers
current monitoring and guidance programmes.
This volume seeks to achieve a better understanding of the current state of the
Indonesian security sector, identify security sector reform (SSR) needs in the
short and long term and, ultimately, create the necessary consensus for
reform. It is projected that this Almanac will be updated bi-annually so as to
report on the progress of reforms and the nature of emerging challenges.
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has
already used a similar methodology in Turkey. Since 2005, in partnership with
the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), it has published
an annual survey of the Turkish security sector and has identified existing
oversight mechanisms. Since, the Turkish SSR Almanac has served as a focal
point in the debates in Turkish society and media over the policy and practices
of the security sector, as Turkey continues to move towards greater European
integration.
From 1998 onwards, a lively debate has surfaced in Indonesia over the
difficulties and progress of security sector reform. Research and monitoring of
defence, police and security reform was undertaken by a number of NGOs,
including CSIS, IDSPS, Imparsial, INFID, KontraS, Lehmannas, Lesperssi,
Pacivis, ProPatria as well as the Human Rights Working Group and the Security
Sector Working Group. The presence of many of these organisations as
contributors to this volume is indicative of their professional abilities,
methodical approaches and mutual cooperation. Since early 2007, cooperation
and informed consultation among them – and, most notably, the SESKO
Bandung and the Indonesian Ministry of Defence - have further enriched these
discussions.
Parliamentarians - perhaps the most influential actors in SSR – from
Committees I & III are increasingly debating issues related to the oversight of
the security sector. DCAF’s initial involvement in Indonesia came at the
suggestion of Indonesian parliamentarians who participated in regional
meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU). Parliamentary oversight was
increasingly discussed after the publication of the DCAF-IPU Handbook on
Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. The publication of the DCAFIPU Handbook in Indonesian, translated and published in cooperation with
CSIS, served as another key catalyst for establishing the bases of long-term
vii
cooperation programmes. Parliamentary discussions, informed advice from
long-standing DCAF Advisory Board member Dr. Yusuf Wanandi of CSIS,
establishment of close working relations with Mr. Rizal Darmaputra of
LESPERSSI and Mr. Hans Esderts, former Head of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
office in Indonesia, all contributed to the formulation of a programme of
assistance and cooperation with Indonesian democratic institutions, civil
society and the security sector.
The most important challenges facing the Indonesian security sector are well
known. Since 1998, the activities of the Police, the Indonesian Army and
Intelligence Forces have been increasingly scrutinized and, at the same time,
actors of the Indonesian security sector have received opportunities to learn
about best practices in democratic defence management in institutions such as
King’s College, Cranfield University and USAID. As its economy continues to
grow, Indonesia faces democratic challenges that even established
democracies might find difficult to manage. These challenges increase the
pressures on the security sector to not only guarantee Indonesian sovereignty,
but also the human security of its citizens.
Indonesia, as many other countries, also faces the challenge of transnational
terrorist networks. These networks emerged in the 1960s and their
organisational and operational capacities have often increased in parallel with
political, economic and technological developments. The pressure to improve
redundant capacities due to defence and diplomacy assistance programmes –
not to forget the huge incentives offered by some countries in defence
procurement– are considerable. Indonesia’s parliament and civil society will
play a crucial role in ensuring that appropriate choices are made and that best
practices are implemented in the interests of human security and democratic
governance. Significant resources will be deployed and all Indonesian citizens
have a stake in these decisions.
In the past year, DCAF has been a privileged participant in the ongoing debate
over security sector reform in Indonesia and hopes to facilitate the process of
reform by putting its expertise to use and by sharing international best
practices that have proved effective in various countries, regions and cultures.
In Indonesia, border management reform, democratic policing, national
security policy, parliamentary oversight of the military budget, defence
procurement, and the jurisdiction of military courts have emerged as priority
issues in the reform of the security sector.
In the field of parliamentary capacity building and democratic security
oversight, DCAF will continue to assist parliamentarians and civil society in
legal-political procedures, principally by facilitating the drafting of securityrelated laws in light of international best practices. Parliamentarians can also
debate specific issues with the view to further their understanding of security
viii
sector oversight, relevant legal frameworks as well as transparency and
accountability mechanisms, most notably in issues related to budget oversight.
In the field of democratic institution building, DCAF can provide comparative
data on defence, police and intelligence reform as well as policy and planning
recommendations. DCAF has extensive experience in working with the
different components of the security sector in different cultures and can
facilitate the process of reform. Relevant assistance and policy
recommendations are framed in the wider context of the promotion of human
rights and the protection of civil liberties.
Finally, a strong and independent civil society and media are essential for the
effective democratic oversight of the armed forces. A well-informed civil
society can offer an independent perspective to democratic institutions and the
media on security issues. Similarly, a professional and independent media can
ask insightful questions on security-related policies and practices. Much of
society’s understanding and engagement of security sector governance issues
is informed by the vitality and substance of civil society organizations and the
media.
Ultimately, policy decisions and planning priorities must be implemented by the
Indonesian security forces themselves with the informed input – and support –
of Indonesian society. Well-informed stakeholders across society who have
acquired ownership of security problems at the local, regional and national
levels can decisively affect and contribute to the process of institutional reform.
One of the most recurrent problems in the theory and practice of SSR is that a
country’s problems are said to be unique: the security sector is too vast,
monitoring challenges too complex and the practice of law-making too
complicated for outsiders to understand. These, however, are misperceptions
and usually benefit those who oppose reform of the security sector for private
gain. Just as the principles, practices and challenges of democracy can be
understood and implemented, so can the principles and good practices of the
democratic oversight of armed forces be assimilated by any nation, polity or
community. The most pressing challenge is for the security sector and
democratic institutions to develop the necessary expertise and competence to
implement and sustain democratic reforms. Human security can be guaranteed
in a country only if there is genuine democratic participation. Debate over
security sector reform must move away from a mere protest position: it must
offer sound analysis which can form the basis of constructive, informed and
decisive engagement. This Almanac hopes to facilitate this process.
DCAF seeks to continue its current involvement in Indonesia as it remains one
of its most successful of programmes in Asia. DCAF’s programmes in Indonesia
have been made possible since December 2005 by the generous support of the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. None of the envisaged programmes,
however, can be hoped to be successful unless debated and consolidated with
ix
Indonesian experts from both the governmental and non-governmental fields,
and implemented with their active participation.
Finally, DCAF wishes to acknowledge the vital contribution played by
LESPERSSI and its Director Mr. Rizal Darmaputra as well as Mr. Beni Sukadis,
Staff Coordinator, Mr. Aditya Batara, Analyst and Ms. Rosemerry in
conceptualising, coordinating, and producing this Almanac. Further thanks go
to our friends and colleagues from Indonesian civil society who have done their
utmost to make this first Almanac a success.
Dr. Philipp Fluri, Deputy Director DCAF
Geneva, July 2007.
x
Introduction Chapters
Security Sector Reform in Indonesia 2007
Beni Sukadis1
Introduction
Security Sector Reform (SSR) has been an essential component in political reform
wave in Indonesia since 1998. SSR is a follow-up of university students’ demand
and other civilian groups in the country desiring the security actors such as TNI
(Indonesian Military), POLRI (National Police) and intelligence to be professional
institutions. The essence of SSR is a structural, legislative and cultural, closed and
secretive institution into a transparent and accountable institution.
The security actors, truly, TNI, POLRI or BIN (State Intelligence Agency) are state
institutions providing public service in security sector. They should have
possessed, according to the definition, obligation and responsibilities to protect
and serve the public and expect nothing in return. Regarding to its public service
in providing the security, the SSR in Indonesia is very relevant to be addressed to
transform the institutions into reliable security actors.
A number of prerequisites from political and legal instruments are needed in the
frame of transformation toward accountable and transparent institutions. For the
past 8 years, a number of instruments have supervised the performance of those
security actors. TAP MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly’s regulation) No. VI Of
2000 on the separation of TNI and POLRI’s role are principal instrument to
activate their roles. Although the TAP MPR is imperfect, 2 years later, POLRI Act
and State Defense Act were issued. Both instruments firm that TNI and POLRI
have different authorities and duties.
Transformation
To date, public still ask the internal reforms conducted by each institution either
TNI, POLRI or BIN. The two first mentioned institutions seem to be more
advanced in conducting the internal reform by executing a number of
organization validations and legislation reform. As a concrete illustration, TNI
issued separate acts in 2004, although it is still far from ideal demand hoped by
civilian community. At least, Act No. 34 of 2004 on TNI emphasized the function of
TNI to defend the state from external threat.
The most interesting part of reform process in security sector is those actors
should adapt with national, regional and international situation. At first, the
1
Beni Sukadis, is the Program Coordinator at LESPERSSI (Indonesia Institute for Defense and Strategic
Studies), Jakarta.
1
national situation demand becomes a chief motivation of the internal reform. The
devastating political and economic situation resulting from the downfall of
Soeharto Regime (eds; wellknown as New Order regime)2 turns the institutional
change into “a need” as an impact of national situation with multidimensional
crisis.
Thus the SSR almanac needs to be made in order to know haw far the internal
reform of the security actors (TNI, POLRI, BIN) works out and its relation with the
stakeholder such as
Defense Ministry (government), DPR (House of
Representatives), CSO, mass media, etc. The internal reform will be difficult to be
observed if the actors have not possessed strong commitment to participate in
transparency process, particularly regarding to formulate transparency process,
particularly regarding to formulate the national security document, prepare the
expenditure budget or other different data and document.
The important process in SSR is up to how far the security actors see the threat
either from internal or external forces. The threat perception or assessment on
threat affects the force structure, the competence and budget of each actor.
Assessment on threat will be formulated in a more specific role and job
distribution among the actors. Besides that, a comprehensive assessment on
threat creates a performances-oriented budget preparation and planning. This
process surely must involve the oversight actors, either political authority from
executive, legislative or civilian (CSO).
This oversight task becomes one of indicator that security actors have adapted
into a transparent and accountable institution. One of challenges faced to date is
that legislation not sufficient to support the oversight tasks particularly Freedom
Act to obtain Public Information (ILMIP). As this not legalized yet, constraints and
challenges for oversight actors are how to gain the information/data possessed
by security officials.
It is true that the need of valid and accurate information is a part of oversight
process. It is rather difficult to conduct with accurate information a democratic
oversight on the security actor particularly the intelligence actor (BIN) which to
date has no organizational legal instruments.
The Objectives of SSR Almanac in Indonesia
To make public more conscious, the concept of SSR is stakeholders continuing
efforts in conducting control on part of the security actors to be accountable to
political authority and public. The core of SSR is to alter the closed institution into
transparent one by involving the community in institution transformation
particularly in planning and the decision making process, enabling them to play
role according to constitutional reference.
2
To contrast with the Soekarno's regime (1945-1966), the Soeharto regime (the 2nd President whose power lasted
for 32 years from 1966-1998) claims that his government as the New Order and keep calling that the Soekarno's
as The Old Order. This term was widely used during the New Order regime to distinguish its tenure. Until the
Soeharto falldown, the new regime does not called as itself as Reform regime, but the public called it as the
reform government.
2
This SSR Almanac is intended as well to provide a comprehensive description on
numbers of issues, policies or practices related to the security actors and
stakeholders in Indonesia. Several issues or practice adopted from TNI are TNI’s
business which should have been terminated by 2009 and the territorial
command of TNI - Army which tends to shadow the authority of civilian
government. The issue such from POLRI is institutional reform of POLRI and two
agencies under POLRI named BRIMOB and Detasemen 88 (Detachment 88)
which are in charge of handling the communal conflict and terror cases in the
country. The intelligence issues consist of 2 parts, i.e. BIN organization and the
military intelligence in the context of democratic oversight.
A number of other significant issues addressed in Almanac 2007 are legislative
reform (Act), borders management in Indonesia. Those mentioned have a very
close relation to the division of labors and responsibility among the security
actors in Indonesia. At least, there were two regulations related to the security
officials discussed quite intensively in 2006, namely RUU Kamnas (National
Security Draft law) and RUU Peradilan Militer (Military Court draft law). Meanwhile
the management of borders concerns with the extent of land and sea borders
unmanaged by the security actors, especially the minimum guards in the borders,
makes the critical area from different crimes across states (illegal fishing, illegal
logging, arm trafficking, etc).
Moreover, Almanac of SSR 2007 needs to reveal the role and duties of a number of
governmental stakeholders in which the executive is represented by Ministry of
Defense and legislative body, in this case DPR RI (Indonesia’s parliament). The
Ministry of Defense is the most responsible political authority in preparing the
defense policies (The Defense White Book) and other strategic defense
documents; meanwhile the function of DPR RI is to conduct oversight on security
actors either from its performance or budget. Their roles can be examined by how
far they can manage those constitutional duties.
Then the stakeholders in SSR from civilian namely, NGO’s and mass media are
also discussed. These two civilian institutions seem to be a representation of
public’s voice. Their role is significant as pressure groups in context of SSR. For 8
years of reforms, they constantly follow the development and issue of SSR.
The Almanac 2007 is expected to describe how the relations among the political
authorities (Dephan, DPR) and security operational authority (TNI, POLRI, BIN)
or among the security authorities to manage different security issues. The
relation among the security actors should have been coordinated and co-worked,
enabling the synergy in managing the security issues. Then the relation of those
actors with community –as one of stakeholders – needs to be viewed from a
broader perspective that is an effort in upgrading the transparency of the security
actors.
The issue of Indonesian Almanac 2007 which is more descriptive, analytic and as
objective as possible is expected to give contribution to public such as university
students, businessman or house wives, and others as well as the stakeholders
such as NGO’s, mass media, government officials and DPR RI members. This
almanac is made to provide a description of what had already been done by SSR
3
during 2006, what constraint appears and what/how to solve it. This almanac has
no intention to give all answer to the problems in SSR; however it may oversee
the reform process measurably and continuously.
SSR in Indonesia is a long and winding process and it takes time and patience to
see the desired results. This process needs several important prerequisites, they
are: first, consciousness as well the similar perspective among the stake holders
in viewing the national and national threat perception. Second, there is a change
of mindset or paradigm to see the actors’ role and duties in line with their
mandates. Third, the common consciousness is needed that all parties are
responsible to optimize their own roles. Fourth, the security actors must obey and
be responsible to the elected political authority.
Those four prerequisites are urgent to be kept communicating among the security
actors and stakeholders. Thus, the initial objectives of reform to implement the
most accountable and reliable security actors are not just a dream. Finally, it can
be concluded that the involvement of different community element is one of
obligations to create the inclusion and perception unity in analyzing different SSR
issue in the context of democratic supervision.
4
The Department of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia
Ineffective Civilian Control
Kusnanto Anggoro1
Introduction
For the last eight years, the post of Minister of Defence and Commander of the
Indonesian Armed Forces has been a separate one, held by two different people.
However, this eight year separation has not yet given civilians proper control over
military institutions. The legislation to develop such a system within the
Department of Defence remains a problem, due to a deficient legal system in
general and an incompatibility between the law and the regulations.2 The scope
of the Department of Defence’s functions has grown wider without contributing to
the development of the military’s power – whilst is should have been functioning
as the main agency to implement the National Defence Policy. This first section of
this paper gives a general overview, discussing the organisational structure,
accountability, internal reform challenges and democratic oversight.3 Several
important questions which need to be answered are: the capacity of the
Department of Defence as a responsible institution to formulate defence policies,
the number of challenges that the Department faces and how they have
performed their role in monitoring the military institution. A crucial factor of the
lack of effective civilian control is the gap between the competencies of the
bureaucracy and the lack of specification within the laws and the regulations.
Institutional Background
The Department of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia was established in 1945,
and it has gone through several changes since its foundation. At the end of the
New Order regime, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Indonesian National
Army (Tentara National Indonesia), hereinafter referred as TNI, was held by one
person, until the position was divided into two separate posts in 1999.
Nevertheless, both the Minister of Defence and the Chief of TNI hold key positions
today and are both members of the Cabinet. However, the Chief of TNI has more
legitimate power, in some aspects, due to the fact that his appointment process
1 Kusnanto Anggoro is Senior Researcher at CSIS, Jakarta
2 See Kajian Krisis Perundangan di bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan, Monograph No. 7 (Jakarta: The Propatria
Institute, 12 September 2006), specifically page. 5-17
3 On accountability and democratic monitoring concept, this essay used some of the concepts offered by Bovens,
Lord and Leigh. See Mark Bovens , “New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance”, Comparative
European Politics (2007) 5, 104120; Ian Leigh (et al), The legal norms of the Democratic Control of the Armed
Forces and security sector reform (Geneva: DCAF, 2003); and C. Lord, A Democratic Audit of the European
Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2004).
5
requires approval from the Parliament. Although having a civilian in the highest
position within the Department of Defence is a crucial emblem, it does not
automatically ensure civilian control over the military.
The Department of Defence’s main functions are to draft and to implement state
defence policies.4 In accordance with Article 16, paragraph (3) of Law No. 3,
2002, on State Defence, the Department of Defence is responsible for the
following functions: to assist the President in formulating a national defence
strategy and to establish an implementation policy based on the President’s
guidelines; to formulate the Defence White Paper that determines the guidelines
for bilateral, regional and international cooperation on defence; to formulate a
general policy on the use of TNI forces and other defence components; to adopt
the budget and oversee the issues of procurement, recruitment, national
resources management, technological education and defence industries which
are needed by TNI; to cooperate with other head’s of department and
government institutions to formulate and implement a strategic plan for the good
management of resources, in order to contribute to the defence of the country.5
The formulation of the aforementioned law does not differentiate between the
substance and the instruments required in order to implement the law. The
problem with the substance of the law, is a lack of clear formulation, for instance
stipulations with regard to the management of defence resources, defence
posture, and a strategic draft on the use of military power to prevent, to act
and/or to jointly defend with other national forces, for instance the use of
diplomacy, to achieve national aims. On the other hand, information regarding
the Defence White Paper, international cooperation, technological education and
national industry and collaboration with other heads of Departments – just to
mention a few examples as stipulated in Law No. 3/2002 – should have not been
elaborated in such detail within the context of the Department of Defence or the
Minister of Defence’s functions, but as instruments which support and implement
defence policies.
The Law on State Defence differentiates between “general defence policies”
(President) and the “general implementation of state defence” (the Minister of
Defence). When the President is drafting general policies on state defence, he or
she can receive inputs and considerations from institutions outside of the
Department of Defence, such as the State Defence Committee, the State Defence
Institute, and the National Defence Board. In other words, the Department of
4 Law No. 3/2002 regulates the scope of authority of the Minister of Defense without substantiating the tasks in
detail. If only the Minister is assumed as the highest authority for Department of Defense, the tasks are defined by
the officals in the Department of Defense, thus it can be formulated that the Department of Defense have played
several tasks and functions in the national defense sector.
5 See Articles 16 and 17 Law No.3/2002 regarding National Defense.
6
Defence is not the only institution that plays a role in the policy making.6 The
terminology of “the implementation of national defence” should be understood to
be undertaken by those with the competent authority to manage national defence
resources in the Ministry of Defence, and the terminology of “general policies on
the use of defence power” should be interpreted within the Department of
Defence’s competentence to direct the use of force.
In some European countries, the Departments of Defence are departments which
specifically deal with the management of preparing for military activities, which is
obviously linked to defence resource management in order to deal with the
military threat (armed threats). Such conditions make the military institution the
main instrument responsible for executing the policies of the Department of
Defence. This raises the question as to whether the political decision on the use of
military power is in the hand of the President, the Parliament or the Minister of
Defence? At least, with such an arrangement as above, the Department of
Defence functions as the responsible institution on the policy options for using
military force.
In the Indonesian context, this issue becomes a crucial question due to the fact
that Law No. 3/2002 on State Defence does not specifically build the link between
the function of defence in regard to a military threat, an armed threat, or other
threats that would require a military response. On the contrary, the above
mentioned law allows a wide governing function. In general, for instance Article 1
paragraph (1) Law No. 3/2002 on National Defence, the function covers all efforts
to maintain national sovereignty and unity and the security of the state from
threats, attack and other forms of disturbance towards the national unity.7 Article
6 of the same law stipulates that defence is performed through improvement of
capacities and that both the state and nation should have the power to counter
every single threat.
In an established democracy, such a problem is no longer an issue. It is the same
when the Department if Defence is viewed by other stakeholders as a legitimate
body, responsible for the drafting of national defence policies in general terms, or
at least the leading body responsible for discussing the issues involved in national
defence. However, within the Indonesian context, the absence of such functions
allows for many consequences, especially pertaining to the relationships between
TNI and the Indonesian Police Force (POLRI) and other civilian institutions. On
6
Although the Law on National Defence (article 15 paragraph 2) gives the mandate to establish a National
Defence Committee (Dewan Pertahanan Negara), it has not been realised yet. The problem of accommodating
varies organisational structures (for instance the National Defense Body/ Dewan Ketahanan Nasional), and the
absence of a strategic plan for policy on the democratisation process, is one of important factors. According to the
National Defence Law, the National Defence Committee is part of the Presidential Office. It is still unclear
whether the Committee would function to assist the President in making decisions in an emergency situation or
would become a functional body equipped with technical bureaucracy.
7 See Article 1 paragraph (1) Law No. 3/2002 regarding the National Defence. Please, pay attention to the
elaboration of the last phrase “state and national integrity” is not always an attribution to national safety but
covers two other scopes. “Military” and “armed threat” is not explicitly mentioned, is an important issue.
7
one hand, there is suspicion among some institutions in the Department of
Defence and TNI that some of their previous functions will be revoked. Recent
discussions on military operations other than war, and the role of TNI in dealing
with internal conflict or other forms of trans-national threats reflects such
concern.
Such confusion means that the Department of Defence cannot prioritise and find
the best way to develop an effective national defence for Indonesia. There are
many examples which support this assertion, such as the discussion on nonmilitary defence by the Department of Defence and intervention on issues outside
the national defence sector, for example civic education for citizens, state
intelligence, and state secrecy. The issue of non-military threats are often
discussed within the Department of Defence and the Military Academy, although
it has never been decided whether such an issue should be dealt with by the
military or not. In addition, there has been no consistency in the remit that the
use of diplomacy should be the first option used to deal with non-military threats;
or focusing the scope of Department of Defence on other functions which directly
link to national defence power domain.
As an institution, the Department of Defence is required to deal with many
paradoxes. On one side, the current logic in Indonesia represents the
conservatism of the New Order; that national defence is a comprehensive issue
and as such must consider other forms of threat. While comprehensiveness and
multi-dimensional issues should be placed in a certain context, especially during
the escalation of national security. The desire to protect local and departmental
interests always emerges in political bureaucracy's and this is a problem for
progress and efficiency). This is especially so, when the President does not give
clear directions regarding the definition of “national defence”, “national security”
and “internal security”. Unlike many other countries, Indonesia does not have an
official National Security Strategy document which regulates the general policies
on national defence and/or national security.
One thing worthy of mention, however, is the fact that over the past few years the
Indonesian Department of Defence has always been headed by Ministers with
non-military or civilian backgrounds. These current Minsters is Juwono
Sudarsono (1999-2000; 2004 - …), and he was preceded by Muhammad Mahfud
(2000-2002), and Matori Abdul Djalil (2002-2004) who both belonged to the
same political party, the State Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa).
Juwono Sudarsono, however, comes from the intellectual community, who
receive their legitimacy from the President, but do not have affiliations to any
political parties. Such a condition makes him vulnerable in parliament, but
credible to the TNI.8
8 One of the military's biggest concerns if they were positioned under the Department of Defence is the
possibility of having a Minister of Defence with a political background; since the military has the perception that
they will misuse the position for their own political interest. Although it sounds naive, this perhaps becomes one
of the President's considerations when appointing a Minister of Defence. Such a perception could be interpreted
positively as the President's so-called accommodation policy or TNI's political bargaining power.
8
Functions, Tasks, and the Administration of the Department of Defence
The Indonesian Department of Defence consists of several sub-divisions. The
highest echelon (Echelon 1) consists of 3 categories. The First category is the
division responsible for the comprehensive organization, whose tasks are to
coordinate, to supervise internally and to communicate with the various other
institutions involved. The Secretary General and the Inspector General belong to
this category. The Second is the executor of the main tasks and this division is
headed by a Director General. The Director General has five areas of duty as
follows: responsibility for the strategy, planning of defence systems, defence
potential, defence power, and defence facilities. The Third category is the
technical division that is specifically responsible for the specialised areas of
research and development, education and training, the data and information
centre, the finance centre, the decoding centre, and a rehabilitation centre for
people suffering from different disabilities (handicaps etc).
As the executors of the main duties, the organisations in the first echelon have
different functions, from routine administrative functions to implementation
functions which reflect their field of work. The Directorate of the National Defence
Strategy consists of the Directorate of National Defence Strategy Policy,
International Cooperation, Environmental Strategy Analysis and Defense
Territory. The Directorate General of Defence Potentials includes the Directorate
of Civic Education and State Defence, Human Resources, Natural and renewable
resources and national territory. The Directorate of National Defence Planning
includes technical planning for the development of national defence planning,
programming and budget planning, administration of budgetary expenditure and
programme control.
In a modern bureaucracy, the structure should not only reflect the specific
functions, but also show the chain of command. In accordance with this theory, it
will improve the quality of the bureaucratic work in general. However, on the other
hand, and still within the modern bureaucratic context, differentiating between
the structures and their specialist functions and coordinating and harmonizing
the sub-bureaucracy. In practice, the requirement to coordinate and to
harmonise practices among sub-bureaucrats is difficult to implement for some
bureaucrats, due to military culture and leadership at the departmental
management level. Strong technical, operational capacity plays a key role in this
context. The organisational structure of an institution reflects the scope of work
and at some stages it would be able to functions as an effective and proper policy
executor.
Nevertheless, differentiating between specialized functions makes it crucial not
to forget to implement certain norms, especially the prevention of overlapping
within the structures. It is interesting to pay more attention to the relationship
between the “defense territory” as part of the strategy and “natural and
renewable resources potentials”. Combining both structures into one department
of “defence potential” could be more useful. Other more simple possibilities are
dissaggregation at the directorate general level into task execution divisions,
9
specifically to merely mention examples, strategies, plan, and budget. In most
cases, the less structures within an organisation, the easier it is to coordinate –
another important issue to consider, especially when the Department of Defence
is not equipped with strong leadership.9
Regardless of the abovementioned alternative structures, there are several
interesting trends over the past few years. First, the technical tendency to discuss
closely related issues with system building has frequently been undertaken at the
cost of other urgent. The Directorate of Defense Potential has been preparing
policies, including laws, to regulate the contingency components of national
defence – although, the planning to build the main component (read: military)
still needs to be strengthened with the contingency component. Other
Directorates discuss policies on Civic Education and State Defence, and whilst
these are necessary from a system development point of view, they are certainly
not amongst the top priorities.
Other than these two Directorate Generals, another controversial directorate is
the Directorate General of National Defence Strategy, especially as they are
responsible for preparing policy discussions on “national security“ (or state
security and defence), state intelligence and state secrets. These are of course
crucial agenda issues within the national defence system; however, the issue
becomes highly political when the parameters of the debate becomes wider. The
discussion of other related issues, such as freedom of information, makes the
debate on national security even more complex. A one-sided statement that the
Department of Defence should become the leading actor to prepare the laws and
regulations is convincing enough for other ministries, especially the State Police
Department.
Second, demilitarisation of the bureaucracy within the Department of Defence
has not yet taken place. During the Post-New Order period there have only been a
few civilians who have held the position of General Director. They are Mas
Widjaya, who was the Director General of Planning and Budgets under Megawati’s
administration; and Budi Susilo Supandji (the Director General of Potential
Defence) during Susilo BambangYudhoyono’s term. Another position which is
occupied by a civilian is the Head of Research and Development, which for the
past eight years has been held by Sofyan Tsauri and Lilik Hendrajaya. This
indicates that the domination of military personnel within the civil bureaucracy
still remains.
It has to be admitted that all types of bureaucracy are hierarchical, and that the
division of authority flows down from the top to the lowest level within an
organisation. However, it becomes problematic within the realm of the
Department of Defence since there is equality between the civil and the military
bureaucracy. In many cases, the highest civilian officials working in this domain
are equal in rank to a Major General in the military structure – although in theory
there should be no link between the military hierarchal structures and civil
bureaucracy. For Indonesia, it is relevant to take this particular context into
9
Ron Aminzade, A. Jack Goldstone, dam J. Elizabeth Perry, “Leadership Dynamics and Dynamics of
Contention”; dalam Aminzade et al (ed), Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001): pp. 126-154.
10
account. For instance, the position of Secretary General in the Department of
Defence has always been held by an active military person who holds the rank of
Lieutenant General. Meanwhile, echelon one positions are held by those whose
ranks are equal to a Major General (i.e. two-star general).
Implicitly this shows the tacit control which is effected by the TNI Headquarters in
the name of the Department of Defence. It is important to note, that in
accordance with a stipulation in Article 45, paragraph (5) Law No. 34/2004,
regarding the Indonesian Armed Forces, it gives authority to the Chief of the
Indonesian Armed Forces to provide “education” to officers who work within the
Indonesian Armed Forces domain. Therefore, it is no surprise that when the
Minister of Defence did not function well, that the first echelon officials played the
assumed certain political responsibilities even though they only had technical and
operational authority. When the Department of Defence was lead by Matori Abdul
Djalil, for instance, it was often the Director General of the Defence Strategy, held
by Major General Sudrajat at that time, who acted as if he was a “virtual defence
minister”. During that period the Minister of Defence had to approve an initiative
proposed by the Director General of Potential Defence, regarding local
government contributions of patrol ships/ boats from several provinces. This was
even though such a decision violated the existing rules and regulations, which
stipulated that the procurement of weaponry system (alutsista: alat utama
sistem persenjataan) would be financed by the national government (read:
National Budget/APBN).
Accountability and Democratic Oversight
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, accountability is comprehended as
a virtue, with activities open to the outside world, either government, judiciary or
general public. Various pieces of literature written on accountability differentiate
between the meaning of political accountability, institutional accountability, and
public accountability. The other side of accountability, (read: democratic
oversight), is associated more with the way in which the Department of Defence
relates to other state institutions, including the President, the Parliament, the
State Financial Auditing Body (BPK), the Supreme Court and the Anti-Corruption
Commission (KPK). It is not difficult to understand that accountability within the
three latter institutions is directly linked to financial and judicial spheres. The
Department of Defence direct accountability to the Parliament is rather obscure,
however, the Department of Defence’s accountability to the Parliament can be
more easily analysed through democratic oversight, which covers a wider scope
of policy aspects, budget, and laws.
It is important to mention from the beginning, that it is irrelevant to discuss the
issue of political accountability. This concept only applies to the President and the
Minister of Defence in relation to codes of conduct, in so far as under a
presidential form of government they do have prerogative rights. It becomes a
technical issue as to how the President should demand such political
accountability. There is no specific mechanism, however, it is assumed that the
Minister of Defence, like other members of the Cabinet, can be held accountable
whenever the President asks for political responsibility and policy. On the other
hand, the President does give political support to policies made by the Minister of
Defense.
11
As a department, its existence within certain policy domains and its relation to
public interest, the strongest accountability dimension required are those of
institutional and public accountability. In terms of policy accountability, the
Department of Defence is held liable for criticism which comes from the
Parliament, the National Auditing Body (BPK) and the Supreme Court. The
Parliament (DPR) has a specific commission responsible for foreign affairs and
defence issues (Commission I). Most of the issues involved in discussions
between the Government and Commission I, are specific policies pertaining to
procurement, acquisition and defence planning in general.
It is interesting that the Department of Defence is interested in improving its
public accountability by using information technology. Since 2005, all
departments in the Department of Defence have their own websites. Through the
websites, the public is able to access information about ongoing programmes,
such as their routine activities, the development plan of the current defense
stance and the decisions made by the Department of Defence. The Defence White
Paper (2003) is available on the Department of Defense’s website and can be
accessed by the public.
So far, these indicators imply that the Department of Defence has a sufficient
level of public accountability and that differing levels of openness in each substructure of the organisation can be excused as a result of technical problems. In
the website, the defence strategy section offers basic information such as the
organisational structure, the function and tasks and gives more detailed
information on issues such as personnel policies and the budget. In the website of
the Directorate General of Defence Potential (Dirjen Potensi Pertahanan), there is
information available on the budget, however, the public unfortunately is not able
to access or use this information yet. The same is true for the website of the
Directorate General of Defence Power and Defence Planning (Dirjen Kekuatan
Pertahanan dan Rencana Pertahanan).
However, it is worth mentioning that similar trends take place in other
government institutions. The Department of Defence’s initiative to improve its
public accountability through technology should be appreciated, although the
push factor of such an initiative is not necessarily to increase awareness by
exercising freedom of information, but simply to keep the organisation up to date
with the trend. Using the website to gain public support is still a “far-fetched” idea
for the Department of Defence. The Department of Defence has not developed a
Defence White Paper which is as advanced as that of the Australian Government.
In addition, the Indonesian Department of Defence has not used various media
channels as a means to provide two way communications between the
Government and the public.
It is impressive to note that the Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, is the
only minister in Susilo Bambang Yudoyono’s cabinet who expresses his ideas
through various forms of media, including a “blog”. The virtual space, labeled as
“integrity in the strict sense” has provided for a two way communication between
Juwono Sudarsono and the public. It is interesting to note that the public is fairly
12
enthusiastic to follow the updates written in the blog, as well as the fact that they
make their comments on issues related to national defence, diplomacy and
international politics. It is not impossible that in the long term the national
defence policy will attract a greater audience from outside the defence
community.
There is the question as to whether widening the public space on the issue of
national defence gives a stronger bargaining position to the parliament towards
the government; the result of which is an effective check and balance mechanism
between the Government (read: Department of Defence) and the people’s
representatives. The People’s House of Representative (DPR) is represent those
whose members on the whole do not have sufficient technical expertise of the
“national defence” sector. Their members include the representatives of
Commission I, who function as Government partners on national defence and
foreign affairs As a result, the Indonesian Members of Parliament, and especially
those during the period between1999-2004, spent much of their time
questioning minor issues which had no relevance to national defence issues.10
A more serious problem is that the Parliament did not define their role
(parliamentary oversight) with regard to legislation, monitoring, and budgeting
and have not specifically agree as to whether these functions would be conducted
at the levels of decision making, policy drafting, or policy implementation. The
Parliament does not distinguish its role as a controller of checks and balances,
using budget and legislation as the instrument. One of the serious implications of
this confusion is the lack of clarity regarding the extent to which the Parliament
could question the policies of the Minister of Defence, as well as how to address
the problem.
Thus, it is predictable that debates in the parliament are often counter-productive
and deviate from their original scope and purpose. The parliament discusses the
political dimension of the issue rather than the substance of the issue. On many
occasions, parliament questions technical problems which gives the impression
of civilian overstretch within the Department of Defense and/or TNI. Similar
trends can also be seen in the relationship between the Department of Defence
and/or TNI with other monitoring institutions, especially the National Audit Body
(BPK). This tendency is quite natural and should not be considered as a weakness
of parliament or other monitoring institutions. Reforms in the Department of
Defense and TNI require strong political pressure; in relation to that, substantive
distortion could be an instrument to push the reformation process in the national
defence policy. One of the keys to success in the reform process is continued,
consistent and persistent effort.
10
See Kusnanto Anggoro, Supremasi sipil, Profesionalisme Tentara, dan Kontrol Parlemen atas Anggaran
Militer, Background Paper, presented during the IWGSSR Propatria-DPR Discussion.
Hotel Mulia Senayan, Jakarta, 21 April 2003
13
Internal Reform:
Strengthening
Demilitarisation,
Reorientation
and
Capacity
In the previous pages, several changes in the Department of Defence have been
discussed, especially the issue of accountability and monitoring of key
institutional stakeholders. The basis of the abovementioned elaboration is that
the Department of Defence, as well as other departments, is requested to comply
with the existing rules. This argument has resulted in many significant problems
and within the realm of military institutions democratic monitoring remains
somewhat silent. This is particularly true regarding the issues of financial and
judicial accountability. These two problems forefront the issue of civilian control
over military institution.
Having an opinion that the Department of Defence is civilian’s instrument to
control the military, is about how the department has played its role in military
institutions. As this essay has explained earlier, the Department of Defence plays
a strategic role in several matters, especially in relation to national defence
policies, and as such its control over the military is being exercised through these
policies. There is much evidence to support this argument, for example the
application of humanitarian law (2001), the Ministerial Decree on goods and
services procurement in the Department of Defense and TNI sectors (2005), and
the fact that the Minister of Defense has allowed soldiers who commit criminal
offenses to go through civilian criminal court proceedings (2007).
As of now, those few examples indicate that the Department of Defence is
financially and judicially accountable. Apart from this, it is undeniable that
various policies are instrumental in placing the TNI under civilian political and
authoritative control. However, the question is whether the Department of
Defence could exercise effective control over TNI or would it be merely a symbol
of civil supremacy without any meaningful enforcement. As a government
institution, some problems still remain, however.
The first problem is the unclear relationship between the Minister of Defence and
the Commander of TNI. Under the Law No. 3/2002, it is stated that “in terms of
policy and defence strategy including the administration support, TNI is under the
coordination of the Department of Defence,”11 Unfortunately the law does not
further explain the meaning of “under the coordination of” and the way in which
this coordination should be carried out. Since the Headquarter of TNI is not part of
the Department of Defence as yet and as both the Commander of TNI and the
Minister of Defence are members of the Cabinet, it shows that in practice their
relation is equal, not subordinate. In practice, the position of the Commander of
TNI is under the President,12 and that he can even undermine the role of the
Minister of Defence in order to exercise “use of power” policy as mentioned by the
law UU No. 3/2002. This may create ambiguity in determining who has the full
authority to adopt the national defence policy.
11 Article 4 Paragraph (2), Law No. 34 Year of 2004
12 Article 3, Paragraph (1), Law No. 34 Year of 2004.
14
At a glance, the rules and regulations on the role and function of Minister of
Defence, as stipulated under the Law No. 3/2002, show certain levels of authority
and a hierarchical pattern of relation, in terms of national defence policy making,
as the Minister of Defence is the civil authority holder and the military body as the
executor of the policies. A significant weakness of Law No. 3/2002 is the absence
of any elaboration on the meanings of difficult terminologies, mechanisms and
instruments used in which to articulate the meaning of defence policy and how
certain policies, including the Defence White Paper, the Strategic Defence Review
or as to how plans of changes in military personnel appointments will be
communicated to the parliament. The problem is more than just the issue of the
importance of Department of Defence’s control over military institutions (read:
the Headquarter of TNI), in fact the absence of such mechanism produces other
problems for instance such as the ability to monitor whether the President or the
Minister of Defence have implemented certain rules within the laws.
The second problem is capacity building of the defense department, so that it can
play the role as the authoritative institution responsible for the formulation of a
national defense policy. It has been mentioned before that there is still a much
room for them to improve their capacity. The demilitarisation process (or
civilisation) within the Department of Defence has only taken place at the top
most level (Minister) and in a few positions in echelon one. At the lower level, the
Department of Defence still relies very much on the Headquarters’ of TNI. The
Chief of TNI can use Article 45 paragraph (5) Law No. 34/2004, regarding the
Indonesian Armed Forces , to influence the authority of the Minister of Defence.
For the next period, such possibilities would not give political implications to the
State. However, it is undeniable that in order to accelerate the reform process
within the Department of Defence, there should be clear directions as to how the
Department is formed, its working practices, and how is must function in order to
consistently promote civilian supremacy at the operational level. For example,
there should be regulations enforced regarding certain civilians positions, which
cannot be held by active military personnel. Otherwise, the Department of
Defence will not be able to eliminate the military culture that is maintained
throughout this orthodox institution. Without such regulations, the military
reform process in the Department of Defence, and especially that of defence
reform, will remain stagnant.
15
Conclusion
The current reform process in the Department of Defence plays a dual role. On
the one hand, the reform is a precondition to ensure that national defence
policies are held accountable to the public and as part of a democratic monitoring
process in general. On the other hand, reform is instrumental part in the
promotion of civilian control over the military institution and for the
professionalism of military as a whole. This chapter implicitly conveys that
reform in the Department of Defence has made significant steps, especially in
relation to accountability. However, at the same time, the reform process still has
a grueling journey to undertake in the future – part of this is due to political
fatigue and complex bureaucracy where its cost and benefit analysis hinders the
process most of the time.
For those who are involved in this national defence reform, and especially in the
security sector reform process, they can easily understand that the time of
“golden opportunities“ has passed in comparison to the time five years ago
immediately after the downfall of the New Order. Reforms of legislation have
reached a level of fatigue, partly due to the fact the legislation agenda is
composed within the national legislation programme framework (prolegnas),
composed by the National Development Planning Body (Badan Perencanaan
Pembangunan Nasional), and then discussed by legislative bodies in the
Parliament (DPR). Reformists within the Department of Defence should initiate
internal reforms and focus especially on capacity building of the Department.
Over the last eight years, the depolitisation of the military has been the main
characteristic of defence reform rather than an improved professionalism within
the military. Military reform in particular and national defence reform in general
should be less political in order to help reform important technical - operational
aspects.
16
ANNEX 1. The Department of Defense
17
References
Kajian Kritis Perundangan di bidang Pertahanan dan Keamanan, Monograph No.
7 (Jakarta: The Propatria Institute, 12 September 2006), specifically p. 517
Bovens, Mark. “New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance”, Comparative
European Politics (2007) 5, 104–120;
Leigh, Ian (et al), The legal norms of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of the Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform (Geneva: DCAF,
2003)
Law No. 3/2002 on National Defence/ Pertahanan Negara
Law No. 34/2004 on Indonesian National Army/ Tentara Nasional Indonesia
Aminzade, Ron. A. Jack Goldstone, dam J. Elizabeth Perry, “Leadership Dynamics and
Dynamics of Contention”; in Aminzade et al (ed), Silence and Voice in the Study
of Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001): pp. 126154.
Anggoro, Kusnanto. Supremasi sipil, profesionalisme tentara, dan kontrol parlemen atas
anggaran militer, Background Paper, presented during IWGSSR Propatria-DPR
discussion, Hotel Mulia Senayan, Jakarta, 21 April 2003
18
The TNI Reform
Al Araf1
Introduction
Discussion about and studies of military reforms often emerge in post
authoritarian states. The engagement of the military in the world of politics is one
of the main factors in highlighting the importance of carrying out such reforms
inside the military body, not only in Indonesia, but also in other post authoritarian
states. The ideas for the military to return to fulfilling their real function have been
a significant political theme within almost in every transitional state. Failures and
successes can be found in the the implementation of military reforms in such
countries. Lots of factors support – and block - the implementation of military
reforms, from the issue of lack of political will to the implementation of military
reform agendas.
It must be admitted that the demand to carry out military reforms in several
states are very much influenced by the changes in the dynamics of global politics
and the development of national political dynamics in Indonesia. The ups and
downs of the TNI reform process are very much influenced by the wave of
democratisation which is taking place throughout the third world, the strong
global current of international development on issues of Human Rights
enforcement and the international campaign on the war against terrorism. In the
national context, the disputes between the political powers very much influenced
the dynamics of the implementation of TNI reform. However, the process of
political reform which started in 1998 opened the door for a reorganisation of the
role and function of TNI.
In this paper, the discussion focuses on portraying and studying the political
dynamics of the implementation of TNI Reform and its achievements.
Furthermore, this paper attempts to highlight how the TNI reform agenda fits into
the framework of security sector reform (SSR).
The dynamics of the implementation of TNI reform
TNI reform has been going on for the last nine years. There are, however,
different views regarding the success of the implementation of this reform
process. Some observers think that TNI has minimised its influence on the
political process, has improved its standards of professionalism and awareness of
Human Rights’ value and is truly under civilian control. John Bradford states that
at present TNI with its commitments and decisions has kept it at a distance from
practical politic and it focuses itself more on the capability to handle war,
particularly security (Bradford 2005:19).
However, some think that the reform started in 1998 has only been ceremonial
and ineffective. This can be seen from the separation of TNI from the world of
1
Al Araf is Research Coordinator at IMPARSIAL (Indonesia Human Rights Monitor), Jakarta.
19
politics without any sufficient power for the politicians to dictate the main
interests of TNI. William Liddle comes to a conclusion that no fundamental
changes have taken place since the reform drum was struck in 1998.2
Apart from the existing views, the process of TNI reform has, on one hand,
yielded some positive resolutions, whilst on the other hand, TNI reform still
leaves a variety of different issues which need to be addressed. If we take a look
back, some studies observe that TNI’s commitment to implement reform has
been initiated since Wiranto announced the TNI’s new paradigm, namely first, TNI
/Indonesian Military (it used to be the Indonesian Armed Forces/ABRI) attempts
to alter its position and methods so as not to be always in the front line; second,
TNI has altered the concept of occupying territory and directly influencing events;
third TNI wants to alter the methods of direct influence into an indirect one;
fourthly, TNI is willing to share decision-making on governance and political
issues with other national non-military groups.3 These new four TNI paradigms
are described in the ‘fourteen steps’ of TNI internal reform.
Although those new paradigms were introduced by Wiranto, some think that they
were actually prepared during President Soeharto’s era. Agus Wirahadikusumah4.
states that these examples are not new and that Wiranto’s concept was prepared
during the period in which President Soeharto permitted limited reform of TNI.
Thus, when discussion on the need for reform was again initiated, this old concept
resurfaced.
If we look at them very carefully, the new paradigms do not reflect the aspirations
and intentions of TNI to be completely separate the world of politics.5 They only
alter the TNI political model, in which its political model used to be in the front row
in dominating the Indonesian politics, now it is in the back row, however it still
affects the developing political dynamic.6 Furthermore, Ikrar Nusa Bhakti thinks
that the new TNI paradigms are only cosmetic and have do not contain any real
substance.
2
Marcus Mietzer, The Politics of Military Reform in Post -Suharto Indonesian. Elite Conflict, Nationalismand
Institutional Resistance. The East-West Center Washington, 2006.
3 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Teori dan Praktik Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Indonesia, in the book titled Dinamika RSK,
Imparsial, 2005.
4 Agus WK, is a figure assumed by some as a radical figure and dares to encourage the implementation of TNI
Reform. He once was appointed as Wirabhuana Chief and Pangkostrad. One of Agus' ideas is the abolition of
Territorial Command Structure (see Salim Said, Legitimising military Rule, page 181, Sinar Harapan 2006.
5 The politics of TNI is reflected from the placement of active TNI soldiers in key positions in government
(Ministry, governor, Regent, etc).
6 The politically influenced TNI is seen from the engagement of TNI Commander in a Cabinet Meeting to
formulate the political policy. In a more extreme case, the political influence and politic which urged TNI can be
seen during the downfall of Gus Dur's government, in which the Kostrad Chief mobiliszed some tanks to go to
the presidential palace in a apel siaga in Monas (National Monument) on 22 July 2002. This a symbol of the
military's dislike of Gus Dur. 8 days later, Gus Dur fell down and Vice President MG occupied the President's
seat, see Ingo Wandelt, SSR in Indonesia, Military vs Civil supremacy in democracy in Indonesia. The challenge
of Consolidation edited by Bob S. Hadiwinata and Christoph Schuck, Nomos 2007.
20
In that context, Andres Uhlin may be right in thinking that the Indonesian Military
views its engagement in the political process as permanent.7 Meanwhile, for the
culturalists as stated by Ben Anderson, the source of authoritarianism and the
overflow soldiers’ role to other aspects of life is the role of soldiers cultural image
in Indonesia preserving the tradition of Javanese priyayi with Mataram political
ideas stressing on obedience and harmony8, which, updated, is embedded in the
TNI’s identity.
The qualitative achievements of TNI Reforms are shown in the table below:
Year
Government
Achievements
Note
1999
Gus Dur (GD)
Reorganise Ministry of
Defence and Security
into Defence Ministry
Unfortunately this has not
followed by reform within the
Defence Ministry. Up to date,
the 2nd level in the Defense
Ministry is dominated by active
senior officers. Thus it is
difficult to build a more
independent Defence Ministry,
because those officers are
responsible to the Defence
Ministry and the TNI Chief as
well.
1999
Gus Dur
To make the post of
Defence Minister a
civilian position
The Defence Minister used to
have a “dual role” as he also
held the post of TNI chief
1999
GD
To become politically
neutral and to be
separated from Golkar
TNI used to be and institution
affiliated with Golkar.
2000
GD
The separation of TNIPolri structure
TAP MPR/ MPR Resolution No.
VI/2000.
2000
GD
The separation of TNIPolri role, TNI defends
the state, Polri maintains
public order and security
TAP MPR No VII/2000 This
divorce however, becomes a
problem since as the state’s
defence instrument, TNI
sometimes also has roles to
play in territorial security
2000
GD
The abolition of Dual
function Doctrine (Work
doctrine)
-
2000
GD
The termination of
Bakorstanas
-
2000
GD
The appointment of
Senior Officer of Navy
TNI Admiral Widodo AS
as TNI Chief
For 32 years of Soeharto’s
reign, the TNI chief was always
a Senior Army Officer.
7 Anders Uhlin, Oposisi Berserak, Jakarta, Mizan, 1998.
8 Robertus Robert, Empat Konsep Kritik RSK in the book titled Dinamika RSK, Imparsial, Jakarta, 2005.
21
2002
Megawati
The promulgation of the
State Defence Act
Although it has some
weaknesses, this act has given
a basis for the preparation the
defence sector. It is reflected
from the government’s
necessity to make a general
policy on state defence and to
elect the state defence council.
But in its implementation,
neither have been realised up
to now. Besides, although, this
act was legalised in Mega’s era,
the explanation has been
around since GS’s era.
2004
Megawati
The promulgation of TNI
Act
Although it has some weakness,
this act aims to make TNI more
professional. This can be seen
from the TNI’s improvement in
obeying Human Rights and
democratic values,
restructuring the Territorial
command system, the banning
of politics, business takeovers,
etc., but in its implementation,
they have not been not realised
yet.
2005
SBY
The termination of a
Military Emergency
status in Aceh
-
From the above table,9 we can see the many real and radical achievements of TNI
Reform that have occurred during Abdurahman Wahids’ presidency. Thus, it is
not wrong if both domestic and foreign military personnel as well as political
observers think that Gus Dur is a serious figure who has succeeded in
encouraging the process of TNI Reform. In Greg Barton’s biography, he concludes
that “Gus Dur controlled the military and it was one of his great success” (Greg
Barton, 2002:384)10
However, Gus Dur’s intervention into the soldiers’ autonomy has resulted in
military resistance against him and perhaps this is also one of causes of his
downfall. The appointment of Agus Wirahadikusumah as Pangkostrad
(Comander of the Army’s Strategic Reserve Command), without going through
any of TNI’s internal procedures, is part of manifestations of civil authority’s (GD)
intervention into TNI body. Historically, it is very much like Nasution’s rebellion
during Suharto’s regime which intervened ‘too deeply’ into the military
organisation at that time. This can be closely compared with the military coup
d’état of the Thaksin government, which occurred because of his government’s
intrusion within the Thai Military. Thaksin substituted several top level military
9
This table is modified from Marcus Mietzer's table in the paper of the Politics of Military reforms in PostSoeharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance by the East-West Center,
Washington, 2006.
10 Ibid, page 22
22
leaders in the regional command with his own personnel and thus spoilt the
command line. As a result of this, Thaksin could give commands directly down
the line and instruct the commanders at the regional level without going through
the official and existing chain of command. In that context, the objective control
approach of Military  la Huntington becomes very relevant and significant in the
way that civil authority is asked to respect issues relevant to military authority in
fostering its unique civil-military identity.11
Apart from that issue, Gus Dur’s success in encouraging TNI Reform is much
influenced by his government’s effort to build up legitimacy with the public that
this government was different from the previous government.12 Furthermore, the
movement’s direction and the advancement of TNI Reform is caused by ‘civilizing’
imperatives which force the necessity in the international sphere, also the
pressures of the global economy and the ending of the polarizing East-West
ideology. This last factor is very important to be understand since the historical
interpretation on the ABRI ‘Dual Function’ concept operated inside the context of
Cold war ideology conflict. Thus the military vision and mission are also still
determined by Cold War militarism doctrine.13
In that context, the ups and downs of TNI reform process are influenced by two
political dynamics, namely global politics and national politics. During Megawati’s
government, national authority forced the downfall of Gus Dur in 2001, after
forcing Megawati to compromise with conservatives’ in the TNI, affecting the urge
inside the TNI body regarding TNI reform. It should be noted that Megawati’s
compromise with the military at that time was because of the conspiratorial
cooperation and collusion between the military and political elites (Megawati et
al) in order to force Gus Dur’s downfall. As a result, the conservatives’ aspiration
within TNI was accommodated and this can be seen in the establishment of
Sintuwu Maroso Batallion 714 in Central Sulawesi, the Military Emergency (ME)
status in Aceh and the establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda Aceh, etc. In fact,
the agenda to restructure the territorial command was proposed by Gus Dur14
and has been a part of the reform agenda ever since.
Furthermore, military emergency policy in Aceh is somewhat contradictory of
Megawati’s commitment, as stated during her early leadership, that not a drop of
blood would be spilt in Aceh. Even worse than this, was the human rights violation
case which occurred on 27 July 2006, in which it was actually Megawati herself
who became the victim in which the judicial process has not resolved yet. During
this period, the TNI reform process did not run smoothly and started to decrease.
However, at the end of her reign, Megawati’s government passed the TNI Law No.
34/2004. Apart from the normative achievements of TNI Reform in the TNI ACT,
the legalisation TNI Act cannot be separated from TNI politics and the Megawati
11 Samuel P Huntington, Prajurit dan Negara; teori dan politik hubungan militer-sipil, Grasindo, 2003
12 See Rocky Gerung, Tentara, Politik dan Perubahan in the book titled Indonesia di Tengah Transisi, Propatria,
2000.
13 Ibid, page 140
14 The most important indication carried out by Gus Dur in TNI reform is when he supported the debate on the
territorial Command System in the future. This system with its capacity and the opportunity to perform
political intervention, is the core of TNI's interest. Ibid.
23
government’s accommodation. This is because at that time only a fraction of TNI
could get involved with the formulation of the TNI Act and to maintain its
objectives.15 Thus in the short term, not less that fifteen days, discussion in DPR,
TNI Act could be legalized.16
In the context of global politics, the campaign of the war against terrorism has
also influenced the TNI Reform process in both Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s
current government and the previous one. Under the current government, the
TNI reform process is not yet showing any significant progress. Dark signs of a
lack of TNI reform were predicted by some from the beginning. Lots of TNI reform
issues should already have been resolved but they are not yet settled, for
example, the inability to restructure the territorial command system as
emphasised in TNI Law Article 11, the incomplete TNI business takeover, the
unsettled cases of Human Rights violations, the issue of military jurisdiction
reform etc. In other words, in the context of TNI reform at present, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono does not only apply a policy of “hesitation” but a policy of
“discouragement” as well.
The war against terrorism has given new justification for coercive institutions17
(including TNI) to fight the current reform process and this is clearly shown in the
desire to maintain the Territorial command structure in the name of the war
against terrorism. Because of the needs and objectives of the war against
terrorism, the US government has finally abolished the arms embargo which has
been applied since the Human Rights violation case in East Timor. In the security
sector, a positive note for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono -JK’s government is
reflected in the policy to abolish the Military Emergency status in Aceh and the
Peace Settlement in Aceh which ended up with Helsinki Treaty.18
The Dynamics of TNI Reform
The arguments regarding the achievements of TNI Reform during the last nine
years have been over three basic issues: Firstly, military-political business;
secondly, the organizational structure and thirdly, issues on Human Rights
violations.19 The ongoing TNI Reform has not yet fully touched on efforts to
reform defence management and a defence strategy, so in other words, it has not
yet touched on the issue of how to build a modern defence force. Although there
are some observers addressing this issue, it has not been a central theme in
motivating military reform nor has it been part of the main political agenda.
15 Pasca pemilu 2004, Fraksi TNI sudah tidak ada lagi di DPR.
16 For more information on the problem of legitimising TNI Act, see Rusdi (“Menuju TNI Profesional (Dinamika
Advokasi UU TNI) Imparsial, Jakarta, 2005.)
17
In the name of the War Against Terrorism, BIN (State's Intelligence Agency) also asked for more authority
from the DPR to capture the terror suspect. This is clearly contradictory to the real function of intelligence and
spoils and violates the mechanism of the criminal justice system.
18 However, the treaty can not be apart from the Tsunami disaster in Aceh which gives consequences to
International forces urging the SBY-JK government to settle Aceh through negotiation and peace line.
19 The three issues become a trend in other transition states, such as in Latin America (For more information see
Alfred Stephan, Militer dan Demokratisasi, Grafiti, 1996).
24
Issues and Agenda to be addressed
To evaluate whether the TNI Reform process is adequate or not and to analyse the
remaining agenda items still left to be considered, needs some sort of benchmark
in order to assess the success of the reform process. The benchmarks should
cover the following seven main issues:20
1. The reordering of the judiciary system based on the rule of law.
2. The establishment of capabilities in order to develop the policy and doctrine
required for defense planning.
3. The implementation of policy and a judiciary system.
4. Professionalisation of personnel.
5. Transparent and effective oversight.
6. Proportional and logical budget management.
7. The resolution of cases of Human Rights Violation.
1. In the context of the order of the judicial system
Indonesia still leaves different issues in reordering the judiciary system in the
security defence sector. Nevertheless, Indonesia still leaves 15 drafts regarding
the security defense sector and other political regulations which must be revised.
One of the most crucial and urgent drafts to be discussed is the draft on Act
amendment on Military Court No. 31/1997. The principles that are needed to be
highlighted in the military court amendment are emphasis on the fact that on the
obedience of military personnel in the jurisdiction of the civilian judiciary when
carrying out a crime. Up until now, military personnel committing civil criminal
offences are still judged in a military court.
Furthermore, in order to synchronise several Acts which are relevant to the
security defense sector and to rearrange the management of national security, an
Act on national security is needed.
2. In the context of the capabilities of policy development to prepare the defence
planning
To date, Indonesia has no general policy on the functions of the state defence as a
basis for and guidance in managing state defence. In fact, in accordance with
Defence Act Article 13 line 2, the President has an obligation to make the general
policy on state defence and the Defense Minister is obliged to make the state
defence policy. The Presidency has changed twice recently, and no president has
as yet issued a general policy on state defense. The lack of such a policy presents
a problem for Indonesia in her preparation of an integral defence sector.
20 Ibid
25
Furthermore, as a preliminary stage in the framework of building a well planned
and effective state defence force, the government must review the existing
defence system. It will therefore be of benefit to measure and assess whether the
existing strategy and defence system is sufficient to face the complex and
developing threat dynamic and to analyse whether or not the current strategy
and defensive power built up meet the reality of Indonesia’s geographical
condition.
Although the government undertook a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 2004, it
did not address the issues of evaluating the defence strategy nor take it forward in
a more modern direction as even the existing SDR fights against developing
current TNI reform. This is reflected in the setting up of land based operations as
the major part of Indonesia’s defense strategy and orientation, which is in fact
contradictory to Indonesia’s geographical condition as a maritime state as well as
being unharmonious with the current doctrine and the development of a modern
defence strategy. In addition, and perhaps one of the worst things, is the fact that
the current SDR has maintained the territorial structure as part of the defence
structure.21
3. In the context of setting up a judiciary system and policy implementation
The implementation of a security and defence judiciary system and the
implementation of policy in Indonesia remains a complex problem. The problems
of implementation are as follows:
a. The settlement of the TNI business takeover, as mandated in TNI Act Article
76 is not yet completed,
b. The agenda of for the Territorial Command restructuring, as mandated in
TNI Act
Article 11 is not yet completed,
c. The Amendment of Military Court Act, as mandated in TAP MPR No VII/2002
and TNI Act Article 65, is not yet completed,
d. The General Policy on State defence as mandated in Defence Act Article 13,
Line
2 is not yet established , etc.
4. In the context of Professionalism of the security service actors
The professionalism of security sector personnel is a principal factor within SSR.
Although it takes time to achieve, security sector personnel must receive
specialist, professional training throughout their service.
In practice, many personnel still show their un-professionalism. For instance, in
the context of TNI, the TNI soldiers who essentially carry out the defence function
actively participate in political activities and are even elected during Regional
Elections even though, in legal terms, in accordance with TNI Act Article 39, TNI
soldiers are prohibited from being involved in political practices.22
21 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, 2004, page 14
22 Even so, the TNI Chief Air Force General Djoko Suyanto ban
on active soldiers from being elected in the
Regional elections at the end of 2006 is progress, since the decree had corrected the previous one.
26
In the context of the intelligence sector, particularly TNI intelligence (Bais/
Strategic intelligence Agency), they still think that the expression of political
freedom is recognised by the constitution as a threat, and this is reflected in Bais’s
attitude which states that Imparsial, Kontras and ELSHAM as threats to the
existence of Pancasila, the State philosophy.
5. In the context of oversight.
Oversight of the institution in charge of the implementation of security in
Indonesia is still weak. The role of parliament as a control institution does not
work well. For instance, there has been no oversight or evaluation conducted by
the parliament on the military operation which took place in Aceh (particularly in
the ME era). To date, the DPR has never asked the government about the
operation itself and the budget spent during this operation.
6. In the context of proportional and logical budget management
The budget management within the defence sector is still disorganized and
confused. It does not correspond with the desire to build up security and a strong
defence force. This is because Indonesia has no general policy on state security
and defence in order to guide the defence management process. As a result, the
budget management is ineffective and inefficient.
7. In the context of the settlement of Human Rights Violations
To date, many cases of Human Rights violation remain unsettled, such as Trisakti,
Semanggi, Aceh, Talang Sari cases and others. Although there is a Human Rights
Court, as seen in the East Timor case, the court itself then becomes an instrument
for impunity as until now there are no TNI officers being punished for their alleged
responsibility.
The Obstacles
In brief, there are several issues which are obstacles in the TNI reform process, as
follows:
- The government’s weak political will to complete SSR (military reforms)
- There are still lots of vested interest by the security sector actors, such as TNI
and Polri, who then block the reform process such as stalling the revision of
Law on Military Courts for example.
- Less public pressure on agenda of TNI reform completion and this condition is
far from the early reform of 1982-2000.
- The weak HRD capacity both in the parliament and government in
understanding the developing issues and problem.
- There are no future plans for encouraging the TNI reform process.
Military reforms as an important agenda of SSR
Military reform is one of the major agenda items within SSR. In broad terms
the security sector comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and
communities within it, and the civilian structures responsible for their
oversight and control.
27
From the above definition, there are several institutions categorised as security
sector institutions:23
1. Military forces who come under the Defence Minister’s responsibility
2. Intelligence agencies
3. Police and customs
4. Law and judiciary system
5. An accountable civil structure to manage and oversee the above
institutions,
SSR as a significant concept was highlighted by the development community
which also has been crystallized a debate among the government and NGOs.24
Professor Robin Luckham has described SSR as a government’s discussion as to
how to re-allocate resources or to allow an uncontrolled security sector a negative
influence upon government.25
Essentially, the main objective of SSR is to create good governance in the security
sector and a safe and sound environment in order to support the state’s
objectives for the publics’ welfare and prosperity. Ann M. Fitzgerald thinks that
SSR is the practice of operational and institutional change programme covering
the national security sector (supported by regional effort) to prepare an
environment to make its citizens feel safe and sound.26
In the context of objectives, Nicola Ball explains that SSR has two main
objectives: to create good governance in the security sector, to strengthen the
state’s capabilities to develop the economic system and political governance
benefiting the community as a whole and to create a safe and sound environment
at international, regional, national and local levels.27
In the framework of SSR, the efforts to manifest TNI reform must be put in a new
wider and more comprehensive perspective. The TNI reform so far has only been
partially carried out. At this stage, this reform surely requires a good design in
order to implement its objectives; that is also what should be done in motivating
the TNI reform. Not only that, TNI Reform in an SSR framework needs a depth
consideration and to be reflected in choosing and determining which priority scale
must comes first in encouraging the reform process. In this context, the building
23 Rifki Muna (Military Reforms in Indonesia, How Far and How Real (Papers) Yogyakarta, 2002).
24 Dr. Ann M Fitz-Gerald, Security Sector-Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to
the Wider
Security Needs, Journal of Security Sector Management, published by Global facilitation Network for SSR,
University of Cranfield, Shrivenham, UK, volume 1, 2003.
25 Ibid, page 4.
26 The lecture material of security sector governance, Ann M. Fitz-Gerald in Magistrate Program of Security and
Defence management, Bandung Institute of Technology, Bandung, 2007.
27 Rizal Sukma, Sektor Keamanan Indonesia. Pengertian Tujuan dan Agenda in the book titled Dinamika RSK,
Imparsial, page 19, 2005.
28
of a national security framework is the main stage which must be established by
the Indonesian government, thus ensuring that the TNI reform process will be
more measured and directed.28
SSR framework, new paradigm in motivating TNI reform includes:
First, TNI reforms must be viewed as part of the agenda to change and complete
the SSR agenda. Therefore, multi-dimensional, inter-disciplinary and interrelated approaches are require to succeed in the military reform agenda. Here we
require a national security framework in order to succeed with the required TNI
reform agenda.
Second, TNI reform must correspond with the political reform process. Then the
consequence is TNI reform must set the democratic political life as it base. There,
democratic values (transparency, accountability) and human rights must be part
of the values involved in the reform process to change and rearrange the TNI
institution.
Third, TNI reform is the responsibility of all national actors as a public goods,
therefore the reform process must be place all its citizens and nation element as
political subject having roles to succeed it. In that context, the exclusivity in
encouraging TNI reform must be avoided and critics and auto-critics against TNI
cannot be assumed as threat but as a form of active participation of citizens in
achieving the professional TNI.
Fourth, therefore, the deadlock on the TNI reform process cannot be blamed fully
on the TNI. As a state applying a democratic system, the responsibility should be
rendered to the chosen legitimate, political authority.
Fifth, TNI reform must be able to confirm that TNI is no longer an instrument of
the political authority, which occurred in the New Order Regime, but that it is the
state’s defense instrument subject to legitimate political authority and the
existing rule of law. Therefore TNI deserves not to carry out the activities which
can block the reform process and is subject to the TNI reform agenda and rules
planned and created by political authority.
Sixth, TNI reform is no longer only viewed as a way to ban the TNI from becoming
involved in politics and business (it does not mean to forget and negate this
problem), but it is more than that and TNI reform must be viewed as an effort to
implement the building of a strong integrated defence force and to manifest
professionalism within TNI.
Conclusion
The reform process has been on going for almost nine years, yields several
positive rules. However, the reform process remains reactive, partial and there
are still many unresolved issues and items on the agenda.
The dynamic of TNI reform have been fairly influenced by the existing condition of
global and national politic. At this point, changes in political dynamics heavily
influence the TNI reform process.
28 To date, the Indonesian government has no National Security Framework (NSF).
29
In reality, we must admit that there was a sharp increase in the achievement of
TNI reform during the Gus Dur era, however, after that, the TNI reform process
has had a significant decline. The arguments regarding the achievements of TNI
Reform during the last nine years have been over 3 basic issues: Firstly, militarypolitical business; secondly, the organizational structure and thirdly, issues on
Human Rights violations. The ongoing TNI Reform has not yet fully touched on
efforts to reform defence management and a defence strategy, so in other words,
it has not yet touched on the issue of how to build a modern defence force.
As part of an SSR agenda, the completion of TNI reform agenda must be carried
out comprehensively and in an orderly fashion. In that context, the government
has an obligation to create a grand design on SSR in which it explains the military
reform’s direction in the future. Without it, the military reforms process will run
partially, reactive and only patch up. In that context, Indonesia requires a
national security framework as a basis on which to encourage military reforms.
References
Alfred Stephan, Militer dan Demokratisasi, Grafiti, Jakarta, 1996.
Andres Uhlin, Oposisi Berserak, Jakarta, Mizan, 1998.
Andi Widjayanto, et.al, Dinamika Reformasi Sektor Keamanan, Imparsial, Jakarta, 2005.
Ann M Fitz-Gerald, Security Sector-Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to
the Wider Security Needs, Journal of Security Sector Management, published by Global
Facilitation Network for SSR, University of Cranfield, Shrivenham, UK, Volume 1 2003.
Ann M Fitz-Geralds dan W.D MacNamara “A National Security Framework for Canada”,
2002. (paper)
Arif Yulianto, Hubungan Sipil Militer di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru, Rajawali Press,
Jakarta, 2002.
Barry Buzan, Ole Waefer, Jaap de Wilde, Security (A New Framework For Analysis), Lynne
Rieener, USA, 1998.
Bob S Hadiwinata and Christoph Schuck, Democracy in Indonesia, The Challenge of
Consolidation, Nomos, 2007.
Defence Ministry, Strategic Defence Review, 2004.
Marcus Mietzer, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesian. Elite Conflict,
Nationalism and Institutional Resistance. The East-West Center Washington, 2006.
Rifki Maulana, Military reforms in Indonesia. How Far and How Real (Papers) Yogyakarta,
2002.
Rusdi Marpaung et.al, “Menuju TNI Profesional (Dinamika Advokasi UU TNI) Imparsial,
Jakarta, 2005.
Salim Said, Legitimizing Military Rule, page 181, Sinar Harapan, 2006.
Samuel P. Huntington, Prajurit dan Negara: Teori dan Politik Hubungan Militer-Sipil,
Grasindo, 2003.
Tim Propatria, Indonesia di Tengah Transisi, Propatria, Jakarta, 2000.
Defense Act No 3 of 203.
Indonesian Military (TNI) Act No.34 of 2004
30
ORGANIZATION OF TNI
31
THE PARLIAMENT AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Rico Marbun and Hilman R. Shihab
Introduction
The reform era, marked by the fall of general soeharto from the presidency, had
changed the parliament variable and national political dynamic. We had
witnessed the parliament was full of members, whose so-called ideology was
merely sitting - listening – money, during the new order. For years, the parliament
had been manipulated into a ”machine” for legalizing laws and regulations
produced by authoritarian regime. After that, the reform era was a turning point
of a significant change.
The Parliament is now very dynamic and even more active to critisize any
legislations initiated by the executive. The parliament is now able to represent
balancing power and the ”check and balances” motivator in national politics.
The seriousness of the parliament to play its legislative role is fundamental to the
succes of reform, including the reform in security sector, which becomes one of
favorite democracy transition agenda in Indonesia. Democracy principle requires
security is public good. This means, citizens are the main consumers, and in order
to ahieve consumer satisfaction, there are some security sector standard and
principles which have to be fulfilled. The parliament is one of those institutions
which adopts legislations to ensure security institutions in Indonesia meet the
consumer satisfaction. Furthermore, the Parliament responsibility is more than
drafting and adopting laws. The Constitution of 1945 addresses three main
responsibiities of Parliament: Oversight, Budgeting and drafting legislation.
This section will not describe principles that security institution should meet.
Instead, this part will elaborate in detail the contribution of the Parliament of
Republic of Indonesia in security sector reform.
The present chapter will answer a fundamental question. As to what extent the
Parliament contribution in security sector reform is effective? In order to answer
such question, the present paper will be delivered in three sections. First,
explanation on specific department is responsible for security sector within the
Parliament which Second, the elaboration on the role of parliament in
reorganizing three main actors in Indonesia Security sector (military or the
National Indonesian Military or TNI, the Police Department or POLRI and the
intelligence body) post 1998. Third, there will be analysis and conclusion.
Rico Marbun is a Researcher at LESPERSSI and Hilman R. Shihab is member of Commission I of DPR RI.
See UUD 45 and its ammendment article 20-A paragraph (1)
32
The Parliament Instrument and Security Sectior
The Indonesian Parliament is divided into several commissions for specific sectors
to be effective. There are two comissions in the parliament which directly related
to security sectors, they are Commission I and Commission III. The Commission I
mainly responsible for Defense, Foreign Affairs, Indonesian National Army,
National Defense Board (Dewan Ketahanan Nasional), State Intelligence Body
(Badan Intelijen Negara), State Institute (Lembaga Sandi Negara), National
Information Institute (Lembaga Informasi Nasional), and National Resilience
Institute (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional). Meanwhile Commission III is dealing
with the State Police Department as one of their specific responsibilities.
The Role of Parliament in Reorganizing the Security Reform
Commission I and II of the Parliament had been actively did some breakthroughs.
The Parliament has been showing explicit effort to reorganize these three security
sector institutions (the Military, The Police and the national Intelligence Body).
I. The Role of parliament in Military Reform
Military institution, in this matter is the Indonesian National Army is the main
focus security sector reform. For tenths of years the military institution had
enjoyed various privileges and it has become one of the most powerful and
influential institution in the Indonesian history. Such a vast and almost
uncontrollable power had made the Military Institution tended to abuse of power.
During the New Order, in de facto term, the military has strong political influence,
they are allowed to do business, and almost above the law. This became the main
concern of the reformist.
The parliament in Post-New Order realized the urgency of military reform to be
executed. After the reform, the parliament has exercised several steps to reform
the military body gradually.
1. Drafting the State Defense Law and Indonesia’s Armed Forces Act
Indonesian Defense White Paper mentioned that the military reform had started
since the issuance of People Consultative Assembly (hereinafter referred as MPR)
Decree No. IV regarding the separation of the Military and the Police, and MPR’s
Decree No. VII Year of 2000 regarding the Role of Military and the Police. Based on
the abovementioned Decrees, the Parliament drafted two bills, the National
Defense Bill and the Indonesian Armed Forces (hereinafter referred as TNI) Bill.
The National Defense Bill was adopted in 2002, meanwhilw the Indonesian
National Army Bill was adopted in 2004.
Those abovementioned laws, among others, stipulate regulations on the
seperation of the Military and the Police, gives the legal foundation for imposing
the management of national defense, determining the values, goals and the
principles of national defense, emphasizing the responsibility and the role of
Indonesian National Army as a security instrument in the national
33
Security system, determining the security development principles, regulating the
scope of authorities and relationships among state institutions and natioanl
security implementing agencies and regulating the tasks of TNI.
2. The Parliament Advocacy for Military Court Reform
Impunity is one of the main issues in military reform. Persons in military abused
of power tend to escape from legal sanctions. This could happen due to the
existing Law No. 31 Year of 1997 regarding Military Court. The law mentioned that
military member who committed a crime cannot be brought to district court but to
the military court. The Professor from Faculty of Political Science (FISIP) –
University of Indonesia, Prof Dr Astrid Susanto, stated that there are many
human rights violation cases involving some military persons remained unsolved
without transparency. This is possible since the military law functions differently
compare to the civil criminal law. The use of military law to solve human rights
problem does not sulfill the sense of justice. Hendardi, a prominent human rights
defenders of PBHI, stated that the judicially, the Law No 31 Year of 1997 has the
tendency to protect the persons in military involved in human rights violation.
This is the root of the problem. Di sinilah letak akar permasalahan. The military
court is often deemed unable to give justice to the military persons involved in
crime.
The latest Military Court Law was adopted on the 15 of October 1997 (the Law No.
31 Year of 1997 on Military Court) clearly stated that when a military personnel
committed a crime then the Military Court that has the competency to try the
case.
The Parliament took the initiative to reform such system. On 24 May 2004, the
Parliament held a general assembly meeting which include an agenda to reform
the military court system. The meeting was resulted in a unonymous decision to
use the parliament initiative right to revise the Law No. 31 Year of 1997 on Military
Court. The meeting was led by the Deputy of the People’s Consultative Assembly
Leader Mr. Soetardjo Soerjoguritno. The meeting were aspired by reformist
movement, the representative from the Reformist Fraction, Rajda Roesli, stated
that the current Military Court Law was not compatible with the new political
condition. The Spoke Person from Nation Awakening Fraction stated that the
revision of the military court law would put everyone on equal befre the law. The
statement from the Moon Star Party Fraction that the Law should be revised in
order to make the military court more transparent and open.
The Parliament was active to press the Government to deliver the draft of Military
Court Law revision. This stage shown that the government was still a bit
resistence and ambiguity. There were about 78 articles out of 335 articles
proposed for revision. One of the main issues pressed by the Parliament was the
possibility of military member to be brought to civil court when one commits a
See Rizal Sukma, Supremasi Sipil: Sampai di mana mau kemana?, media indonesia 5 October 2005
See “Menanti Retasnya sebuah impunity”, Kompas Cyber Media, 3 February 2000
See Darwan Prinst, SH, Peradilan Militer, page 4-6
Kompas 24 May 2004
Kompas, 25 May 2004, DPR benahi peadilan militer
34
criminal offence. The consequences is the military person liable to the crime can
be arrested, investigated by the police, and brought to the civil court.
Responding to the Parliament initiative right, then President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono assigned the Minister of State Secretary Yusril Ihza Mahendra to draft
a revision of Military Court Law. Unfortunately, the discussion of the Parliament
initiative did not go smoothly. The dispute started from the Parliament initiative
was the jurisdiction of the Military Court. Member of the special committee,
Nursyahbani Katjasungkana from the State Awakening Fraction (FKB) said that
they already reached a deadlock after only two meetings between the
Government and the parliament. The Government favored the status quo, that
military personnel who commited crimes goes to the military court. Therefore,
the government favored adhoc civil-military court of justice (pengadilan
koneksitas). Meanwhile the fractions within the parliament had an opinion that a
military personnel who committed a crime would be brought to the civil court,
thus a mixed court is unnecessary. Nursyahbani added that the article was antireform and contradicted to the spirit of civil supremacy.
The nuance of rejection towards the Parliament’s initiave was increased and it
become a public debate. So far, there are several reasons for rejections:
First, the Department of Defense refused the application of civil laws for
convicted soldiers on the basis of soldiers training of character building.
Furthermore, the Department of Defense explained that if a soldier had to go to
civil court, then the the decision would be executed in the civil correctional
institution, while the purpose of the legal sanctions for military personnel in the
military correctional institute is for education by giving tactical and technical
training combined with physical and mental hardening.
Second, the police institutin was considered unprepared to deal with accused
military personnel. One of the implications is the police who will do the
investigation when a soldier violates the law. This is where the doubts emerged.
The commander of Military Police of the Army (Komandan Pusat Polisi Militer TNI
AD), Major General Ruchjan thought that psychologically, the law enforcers,
especially the police officers were not ready yet to handle criminal crimes
committed by Indonesian Military Personnel. Major Genderal Ruchjan was not
alone, the Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono was even more against the
proposal. The Minister opiniated that the unreadyness of the law enforcers due to
the absence of legal foundation which regulate the possibilities of public attorney
sue an active military personnel in court and the low effectiveness of police work
due to low budget. Of course the proposal was totally rejected by the Police and
members of Parliament.
Responding to such objection, the parliament, through the special committee
opiniated that the Department of Defense was not serious and kept on delaying
Kompas Cyber Media, Pemerintah Konsultasikan Draf RUU Peradilan Militer, 11 November 2004
Kompas, Pembahasan RUU peradilan Militer mentok, 16 March 2006
ibid
ibid.
See Kompas Cyber Media, Polisi belum siap tangani kejahatan oleh prajurit TNI, 29 March 2006
See Kompas Cyber Media, RUU Peradilan Militer sulit diwujudkan, 23 June 2006
See Kompas Cyber mEdia, Pemerintah bergeming soal prajurit pelanggar pidana, 1 April 2006
35
the revision of Military Court Law. On that reason, the Special Committee asked
for clarification to the President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
The pressure from the Parliament was finally fruitful. Although, there was no
official response from the Government, however after awhile, the stance of the
Minister of Defense was a bit flexible after consultation with the president. Based
on the agreement, the Minister of Defense agreed that accused soldiers could go
to civil court.. the latest progress is that the Department of Defense and the
Special Committee have agreed to bring the Military Court Bill to the higher stage,
the Working Committee. While the efficacy of the law would go through a 2 or 3year transistion period as a compromise.
3. The Parliament Pressure to Eliminate Military owned Business
Military owned business is one of the main characteristics of military
unprofessionalism, such practices has existed since the beginning of the republic
was born. The basic foundation to reform the military is to eliminate military
business which hamper the military professionalism, is stipulated in the Law of
TNI No. 34 Year of 2004. Ada beberapa pasal penting dalam UU TNI:
a. Article 2 (d) that professional military do not do budinesses.
b. Article 39, military personnel is prohibited to invlove in any form of
businesses.
c. Article 7b paragraph (1), in five years after the adoption of the law, the
government shall take over all business activity owned and managed by
military directly or indirectly.
These articles explicitly show the significant role of the Parliament in order to
eliminate Military incomes outside the official State Budget. Initially, the
Indonesian National Army Bill drafted by the Department of Defense did not touch
upon the elimination and hand over of military business. This particular issues
was being addressed by the Parliament when the Commission I issued a List of
Problems (Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah/DIM) of the TNI Bill on 21 August 2004,
the National Awakening Party emphasized the importance of handing over
military business to the government.
The implication of the new Law on TNI is that by 2009 all of Military Business
aquicition should be done. However, the aquisition of military business process
was not running well over the period of 2004 to 2007. Nontheless, the
Government had a target to finalize the transfer of military owned business to
government by December 2008. For such purposes, the Government had laready
formed a National Military owned Business Transformation Team. Unfortunately,
as of the present paper is written, the President has not issued any decree for
guiding the military own business hand over yet. For that reason, the Parliament
See Kompas Cyber Media. DPR nilai Pemerintah Tak serius. 22 September 2006
Kompas Cyber Media, Pemerintah 'Mengalah'. Prajurit bias diadili di peradilan umum. 29 November 2006
Kompas Cyber Media, Dephan dan PAnsus Sepakat, 24 January 2007
Kompas Cyber Media, Militer akan diadili di peradilan Uumu, ada masa transisi 2-3 tahun, 9 February 2007.
Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, Bisnis Serdadu : Ekonomi Bayangan, hal viii, The Indonesian Institute.
Ibid page i
36
has already sent warning letters to give pressure to the government to take this
Military owned business aquisition seriously. Several recommendations from the
parliament – Commission I, as follows:
a. On 8 December 2004, Parliament – Commission I asked the Minister of
Defense to regulate several military owned businesses in order to
implement the newly adopted law No. 34 year of 2004.
b. In a Commission I meeting, the Chief of ARMY had been asked to prepare ones
institution to actively involved in implementing the TNI Law especially on the
hand over of military owned business.
c. The Parliament - Commission I – urged the Minister of Defense, Minister of
Finance, and Minister for State owned Enterprises and the Chief of TNI to
accelerate the rules and regulations as to how the handover of military
business and its follow-ups so that the Presidential Decree on the Military
Business handover can be adopted immediately.
d. The Parliament - Commission I – urged the government to prohibit partial or
full hand over of TNI’s asset to other parties.
e. The parliament reminded the Department of Defense to reorganize its internal
structures to comply with the ongoing military business transfers.
f. The Parliament specifically reminded the Chief of TNI to terminate TNI’s (the
Marines) business contracts (cooperation) with PT Rajawali Nusantara
Indonesia and PT KGA in the Combat training Area (Pusat Latihan Tempur) in
Pasuruan.
The abovementioned steps were taken by the The Parliament - Commission I to
give pressure to the Government to ensure the implementation of TNI Law
regarding TNI business handover. Unfortunately, the Government has not
adopted the implementing regulations or the presidential decree to realize the
process.
Advocacy of Important Issues
After the New Order, the Parliament took advocacy and intensive monitor
and accompaniment on significant issue relate to the Security Sector Reform. The
most recent case was the farmer shooting in Alas Tlogo case which killed four
civilians and intensive accompaniment to monitor the procurement of armored
vehicle VAB from France to save State’s budget. From the two abovementioned
cases, the Parliament has performed better compare to the parliament during the
New Order. On the Alal Tlogo Shooting Case, the Parliament was immediately
responded the incident by forming and sending an investigation team to the crime
scene, sending a summon letter to the Chief of Marine and Chief of TNI. Then the
Parliament released several decisions openly. In the draft report of the duty trip to
pasuruan on 31 May 2007, the team made several decisions.
First, the investigation of the parliament condemned the act of Marines
which killed four civilians in the incidence.
Second, The team urged for an open trial system to process the case.
laporan singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR dengan Menhan on 8 December 2004
laporan singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR dengan KSAD, 22 March 2005
lapoan singkat Rapat kerja Komisi I DPR dengan Panglima TNI, 8 September 2005
laporan singkat Rapat Kerja Komisi I DPR dengan Menteri Pertahanan, 28 September 2005
laporan singkat Rapat Kerja KOmisi I DPR dengan Menteri Pertahanan, tanggal 28 May 2007
laporan singkat Rapat Kerja komisi I DPR RI dengan Panglima TNI, 13 June 2007
37
Third, the team urged the Chief of TNI to review its previous statement that
the victims died due to bounced bullets which accidently hit them.
Moreover, the Parliament’s pressure to monitor the procurement of armored
vehicle VAB from France to equip the peace keeping troops deployment to
Lebanon resulted into the increased of State Budget efficiency. As public may
have known that the procurement of armored vehicle VAB process had skipped
the bidding/ tender process, but a direct appointment from Government to
Government (G to G). After the team was formed, the Secretary General of
Department of Defense Sjafrie Samsudiin unilaterally announced a plan to
procure 32 armored vehicles that costs 700,000 euro each. Members of
Parliament rejected this procurement plan for two reasons, first, the process
should be done through a tender mechanism. Second, based on the Parliament’s
investigation, the price allocated by the Secretary General of Department of
Defense was too expensive. After several working meetings and summoning the
TNI, both parties reach an agreement to procure the armored vehicle without
tender, but they should reduce the price up to 450,000 euro for each armored
vehicle.
II. The Role of Parliament in the Indonesia’s National Police reform
During the New Order period, the National Police is the fourth branch of the
Armed Forces after the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. In practice, the
National Police is under the Chief of TNI’s control and part of the military
command. However, the People’s Consultative Assembly Decree (TAP MPR) No.
VI year of 2000 decided that the National Police should be independent from the
military institution (TNI). During the New Order, the National Police performed in
a militaristic manner and it functioned as the regime’s tool to maintain its power.
Such position gave the National Police a bad image.
1. The Parliament drafted the national Police Bill
Security sector reform in Indonesia required a reposition and wholistic reform of
National Police Body. The National Police (hereinafter referred as POLRI) reform is
necessary not only to fix its bad image due to its militaristic approach that they
had for many years. But also the national police structures should be reorganize
to maintain the distance between the police and the former authoritarian regime
and position themselves as part of the civilians. Furthermore, the national police
should be designed as civilian in uniform and to act as the strong hand of society
as well as the soft hand of society.
In order to achieve such objective, the parliament took the first step to draft the
new National Police Bill. After series of long meetings, the National Police Bill was
adopted in 2002 with the Law No. 2 Year of 2002. The new legislation clarifies that
the national police is responsible for internal security, while the external security
is the responsibility of the TNI. The present law confirmed the structural
separation between TNI – POLRI. This strengthened the POLRI’s identity as
civilian police force and a direct sub-ordinate of the President
2. The Parliament’s sustainable control and monitor over various issues
around the National Police.
No matter how qualified the law is the most important part is the enforcement of
the law. Therefore, the Parliament – Commission II conducts regular monitoring
meeting on the work of the National Police. One of the most significant issues was
the high rate of violence committed by police officers on duty. In the year of 2002
alone, Independence Journalist Alliance (Aliansi Jurnalis Independence) recorded
that Police Officers was at the first rank of violence offenders against journalists.
After the handover of internal security affairs to the National Police, showed that
its Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB) were not capable enough to control the situation well
in the field. This is indicated by the high rate of violence to undertake Aceh
instability preceding the signing of MOU. One of violent cases which triggered
strong reaction from the members of Parliament was the violent attack to
protesting students at the Indonesia Moslem University Campus, Makassar in
2004. The incidence of police attack to the university complex had caused 65
students injured and two people were shot. The incident had made one of
parliament Member, Ibrahim Ambong, warned the police to cut the national police
budget during a working meeting.
III. The Role of Parliament in Intelligence Reform
Until now, Indonesia does not have single laws to regulate the intelligence
institution and community. Although the monitoring and controlling meeting
between the State Intelligence Body and the parliament are frequently
conducted, however, there has been no significant breakthrough ever taken
place. The only issue that was exposed publicly is the rejection of Parliament
towards the draft of Intelligence bill proposed by the former head of State
Intelligence Body (hereinafter referred as BIN) A.M Hendropriyono in 2002. In
parallel with that proposal, the issue of terrorism is heated the social political
context in Indonesia at that time. Series of terrorism acts such as bombs were
exploded in several locations in Indonesia became a conducive momentum for
the intelligence community to demand bigger authorities to counter terrorism
legally.
However, there were several articles within the draft which threatened the
implementation of human rights principles and vulnerable to abuse of power.
Among others, the articles are follows:
1. Article 21 mentioned: ‘in order to do investigation, …., the state intelligence
are allowed to arrest, to detent, to verify and to search everyone who are
being accused for directly involved in actions which threatens national
security.
2. Article 26 mentioned that such arrest stipulated under article 21 point (a) is
conducted maximum 7 times 24 hours
S Yunanto, Evaluasi Kolektif, page 52
Kompas Cyber Media, Polisi tempati urutan teratas pelaku kekerasan terhadap jurnalis, 30 December 2002.
Pikiran Rakyat, Polri Menuai Kecaman, 4 May 2004
State Intelligence draft Bill, dated 25 January 2002
ibid
39
3. Article 27 paragraph (1) mentioned that intelligence verification/
investigation stipulated under article 21 point (a) is valid for maximum 90
days
4. Article 27 paragraph (2) added that the period of investigation can be
extended to three times 90 days when it is necessary.
5. Article 27 paragraph (3), mentioned that the detention place is determined by
the Head of State Intelligence Body.
6. Article 28 mentioned that the accused has no right of defence counsel
accompaniment, right to silent, right to postponement of detention, right to
communicate with external parties during the intelligence verification period.
In relation to special exceptional authorities of intelligence officer to arrest is a
breach to the existing legal norms which allows police officers only to arrest the
accused. In addition, the extended length of detention by the intelligence without
sufficient proofs violated the sense of justice. Meanwhile the basic civil political
right of the accused is being ignored such as the right to legal counsel
accompaniment. Typical New Order oppressive practices which tend to abuse of
power were mentioned in the Intelligence Bill. Therefore, the parliament had
objected the Bill and asked for revision on the basis of democratic norms were
being threaten.
The Role of Parliament in Reformation Era: It gets better but not enough
From the abovementioned elaboration, that compare to the previous (new order)
parliament, the post new order parliament has made significant effort to improve
its role to monitor the security sector reform process. They were even quite
effective in some of the cases. There are several conclusions that we can make.
First, the parliament has been successful in laying the basic foundation to
regulate the military institutions and the police. The adoption of the Law No. 3
Year of 2002 on National Defense, Law No. 2 Year of 2002 on Indonesia National
Police, and the Law No. 34 Year of 2004 on the Indonesian National Army are the
proofs. Those laws gave the Parliament the legal ground to monitor the work of
security institutions in a sustainable manner.
Second, the manoeuvre taken by the Parliament tended to strengthen the
perception that security sector reform is about military reform. This can be
perceived from the series of parliament works. Military reform issues which were
being addressed such as Military Court Bill, the hand over of Military owned
Business, human rights violation cases perpetrated by the military personnel are
seriously targeted by the members of parliament. Nevertheless, since the scope
of security sector reform includes the national police and intelligence institutions,
the contribution of the Parliament to enhance security sector reform is still
ibid
ibid
ibid
ibid
40
minimum. Regardless the Parliament rejection towards the Intelligence Bill which
has the potential for abuse of power and their success of adopting a new Law on
National Police, there are a lot of tasks still have to be done. For instance, the
cases of violence within the national police body indicated that the organizational
culture in the national police institution remained the same. Although, to make
organizational culture change in the national police body requires more than just
providing recommendations and pressures in working meetings. In intelligence
sector, the follow up of parliaments’ rejection on the Intelligence Bill is unclear.
Third, the breakthroughs done by Parliament, at the same time, they
received a lot of resistance as well. The rejection of revision military court law
and the proposal of intelligence bill which tends to violate basic human rights,
illustrate the level of rejections towards security sector reform agenda is high.
Therefore, the Parliament and other civil forces should consolidate to keep
pressing the reform agenda on the table.
Fourth, the past 10 year of reform era, the number of legislations which
regulate security sector reform was insufficient. There are 11 drafts legislation
related to security sector reform which remained in acted. Among others are the
National Security Bill, State Intelligence Bill, State Secrecy Bill, Military Court Bill,
the Military Penal Code Bill, Reserver component draft bill and Suporting
component draft bill, Mobilization and Demobilisation Bill, Military Training
Requirement Bill, State Defense Bill, Defense Territory Bill (UU Tata Ruang
Wilayah Pertahanan), draft of Martial Law, and the Provision of Assistance Bill (UU
Tugas Perbantuan).
The lack of legislations produced by the Parliament had caused the security sector
reform has not completely finished. At some stages, the vague of rules and
regulations would create problems at the implementation level. For instance the
post of TNI -POLRI separation in 2001 until now, there has been around 21
clashes between the police officers and the military personnel in the field which
causes tenths casualties from both sides (military and police) and civilians.
To conclude, there is a need for the parliament to enhance its performance to
reorganize the security institutions in Indonesia. Security Sector Reform will only
succeed when the Parliament is capable of providing qualified bills, sustainable
and open monitoring process. Without such efforts, it is afraid that the Indonesian
reform process would not achieve its goal.
41
The Indonesia National Police (INP)
S. Yunanto1
Introduction
Indonesian National Police Reform, hereinafter called Indonesian Police is one of
the most important components in Security Sector reform, because this reform
gives a guarantee to the enforcement of law and security and order in the society,
an inherent function of Indonesian Police. In the law enforcement, Indonesian
Police becomes a focal point law enforcer along with other judicial institution such
as attorney general, public court, other civil servant investigators (PPNS), and
extra-departmental institutions such as KPK. In its function creating the security
and order in the society the police becomes the key component, even though
receiving help from the society, other police apparatus such as Civil Service Police
Unit, Forest Police and Indonesian National Army (TNI).
Therefore, it is not exaggerating if we conclude that one of the parameter of
successful reform is the Police institutional reform. One of the most important
components in the security sector reform is the police reform, because the
reformation in this sector has interdependence with other security sectors.
The History of Indonesian Police
Indonesian Police bureaucracy has already existed since the Dutch
colonialization. At that time, the police was made to serve the Dutch colonizer, in
order to protect for human, possessions and other properties from stealing,
plundering of parties that would harm the Dutch. During the Dutch
colonialization, the police orientation was to defend the ruler’s and native elite’s
interests. The police function and position in Japanese Colonialization was nearly
the same, even though largely the police members came from the original
inhabitants. The difference was in using weapon. In the Dutch colonialization,
only the Dutch police was allowed to use gun,2 whereas the native police was not.
During the Japanese era, native police was allowed to officially use gun. It might
be because the Japanese government policy was in line with the political situation
at that time where the Japanese was trying to win the people’s heart, so that they
were willing to take side of the Japanese in facing allied soldiers who become their
enemy in World War II. The local police was least educated and trained in police
theory, by purpose.
After the independence the Indonesian Independence Preparation Committee
(PPKI) integrated the police bureaucracy into the Ministry of Home Affairs. As the
political situation at that time, the police was still being pressured as experienced
by many of Indonesian people. In the end of Old Order, when Law No. 13 of 1961
was issued, precisely, and continued by Presidential decree (keppres) No.
1 S. Yunanto is the founder of IDSPS who is currently taking PhD in the U.S.
2 Muhammad Nasir, Konflik Presiden dan Polri dalam Masa Transisi Demokrasi, Madani Institut, 2004. pp. 28-
30 (this book is adapted from master degree thesis in political science of National University, 2004)
42
290/1964, November 12, 1964, Indonesian Police was integrated into Indonesian
Armed Forces (ABRI, now TNI). Indonesian police became the focal point of
political stability guardian. This integration had caused the Police function and
duty not optimized. A various cases related to socio-political problems are mostly
handled by army (ABRI) as the main actor. The role and duty of Indonesian Police
and the army became ambiguous. For example, the military policy – in post
upheaval in 1965 - is to enforce the law, a duty for which originally was the police
domain. Indonesian Police integration into ABRI has caused a militaristic type of
educational and managerial systems within its institution; centralistic organizing
and policing community were closer to the military than the police.3
In the New Order, Indonesian Police was in a weak position, because the Police
organization was still under ABRI. Since its budget system was under ABRI, the
weapons procurement was often underbudgeted by ABRI. The vague Police’s
position in ABRI also compromised its professionalism. The Police behaviour and
performance during the New Order was more like “military” and far from police
behaviour as the protector of social and public order (kamtibmas). All armed
forces stipulations were also applied for the police, such as education, budgeting
and financial system as well as other needs.4
The fall of the New Order and the commencement of reform era had significant
influenced on the police reform. TAP MPR No VI and VII of 2000 on separation the
Police from TNI and placing the Police function separated from TNI. This law has
put the Police position directly under the president. About the Police function, TAP
MPR No VI and VII of 2000 Chapter 2 article 6 explains:
1. National Police is a State instrument with the role of maintaining public
security and order, enforcing the law, guarding and give protection to the
society.
2. In performing its role, the Indonesian Police is required to have a
professional skill and competence.5
The police position which directly under the president, in the past 8 years,
become a controversy. From the Police perspective, the removal of the
Indonesian Police from TNI structure has encouraged the Police independence
and autonomy, which guarantees its professionalism. While various CSOs, some
politicians and of course the military view that the current police structure has
crossed the line and not properly placed in democratic system. Because in a
democratic country, the Police position is placed under a department (e.g. the
Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Justice). The Indonesian Police position
directly under the President – in past cases – has proven to be influenced and
seemed juxtaposed at the president politization.
3 Bambang W Umar, Penafsiran Kembali Simbol-Simbol Polisi, Jurnal Polisi Indonesia, 4/2002 pp. 19-20
4 Salim Said, Polisi Republik Indonesia Dalam Pusaran Arus Politik, 54th Dies Natalis Script, PTIK, Jakarta, June
17, 2000.
5 See People's Consultative Assembly Decree No. VII of 2000, on TNI and Indonesian Police roles
43
Indonesian Police Organization Structure and Promotion
Now, the Indonesian Police has around 250.000 personnel. If we see it from the
its ratio to the population, the police number has not reached the ideal number,
because the ideal ratio according to the U.N. is 1:500.6 In 2005 the ratio of
Indonesian Police personnel to the population is targeted for 1:675. If the
personnel recruitment plan in 2009 is accomplished, then the police ratio to the
population will become 1:537, this ratio has approached the U.N. prescription
1:500. The Indonesian police leaders still consider the under ratio number of the
police personnel as one of the causes of its underperformance. Yet, the
assumption needs to be tested whether it is actual, or because of other factors
such as the professionalism, leadership and the lack of motivation.
After the Indonesian Police separated from TNI organization, within the
government and constitution the Indonesian Police becomes a non-department
government institution directly under the President. With the separation, the
police is expected to be completely autonomous, independent, without
intervention from other institution, especially from political parties. The
composition of Indonesian Police organization must be based on the task
importance, public demand and taking into account the local characteristics and
well-adjusted to any situation, yet still referring to Indonesia’s archipelago
concept, unity and integrity. The personnel assignment is differentiated between
the overpopulated area and the under-populated area, characteristics disparity,
geography and customs such communication, mobilization tools, technology,
verification, etc. Other than that, the composition of organization position is not
heavily on top brass, instead it is oriented at Resort (Polres) and Sector Polices
(Polsek) levels as the operational front line.7 This policy should be followed by
recruitment policy in local area emphasizing on the local resources (local boy for
local job).
With an intergrated system, the national police work pattern is implemented
bottom up with broader authority and responsibility delegation to regions
especially resort police as the Basic Operational Unity (KOD). The Police
organization structure is supposedly adjusted to local government structure and
criminal judicial system. The Police organization is composed without long
bureaucracy to be able to guarantee a faster and more precise decision making,
so that the public assured of the police services.8
In line with the spirit of becoming Civil Police after the separation of the Police
organization from TNI, so that the Police ranks has been changed. The previous
police rank and file the same as the military organization, now it has the Police
specific rank, as follows:
6
7
8
the standard of UN ratio is 1 police for every 500 people.
Bibit R Rianto, “Reformasi Polri, Pemikiran Kearah Kemandirian Polri”, Jakarta, pp. 40-41
Indonesian Police Chief Policy, July 1, 1999, General Polisi Roesmanhadi, Jakarta. pp. 20-21
44
Previous Police Rank
Officer
Senior Officer
Police General
Police Lieutenant General
Police Major General
Police Brigadier General
Middle rank Officer
Present Police Rank
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonel
Major
First Officer
Grand Commissioner
Police Assistant Grand Commissioner
Police Commissioner
Captain
First Lieutenant
Second Lieutenant
Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
Police Assistant Commissioner
Police First Inspector
Police Second Inspector
Assistant First Lieutenant
Police First Assistant Inspector
Police Second Assistant Inspector
Police
Police
Police
Police
General
Commissioner General
Inspector General
Brigadier General
Non-Commissioned Officer
Sergeant Major
Master Sergeant
First Sergeant
Second Sergeant
Corporal
Police
Police
Police
Police
Chief Brigadier
Brigadier
First Brigadier
Second Brigadier
Master Corporal
First Corporal
Second Corporal
Master Private
Police Assitant Brigadier
Police First Assistant Brigadier
Police Second Assitant Brigadier
Master Policeman
Second Private
Second Policeman
First Private
First Policeman
From the ranks, it is evident that Indonesian Police wanted to get out of the
military culture. But, if the abovementioned rank is further observed, it is
apparently only happens to middle officers to lower ranks. Whereas, the senior
officer ranks, the higher officials still have a strong will to use military rank, for
example the use of General rank.
Educational System
When the Indonesian Police was part of ABRI (now TNI), the Education material in
the Police consists of 40 % on military component and 60 % on police
professionalism. As the consequences, the adhering military culture to its daily
45
attitude, who works based on superior’s command or/and the order and many
others military jargon still persists. Meanwhile, the police must be subjected to
existing criminal codes (KUHAP).9
After the Police separated from TNI, the main problem of education is how to
formulate the education curriculum which can alter the military culture. The effort
to personify the Police employees who are professional and civilized as well as
Able to counterbalance the society’s educational level, the Police educational
system is established in accordance to the national educational system, by
developing the Police science which is held by the police science consortium under
the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the Ministry of National
Education/DEPDIKNAS). Various Indonesian Police trainings including
curriculums in every type of education are oriented with various materials closely
related to police profession, among others are the mastery of Human Rights
issues, democratization, environment and interactive dialogue skills or even local
culture content. Before being assigned to be the police employees, the applicants
are given a probationary period first as the effort to select a good personality of
candidate for the Police employees. For those who qualified will be inducted to be
the Police employees marked by taking oath and statement of accepting
Indonesian Police code of ethics.
To become the police employee, now it is selected through various educational
institution. The first education (Diktama) consists of a School for lower rank noncommissioned officers (Sekolah Tamtama/Seta), a School for non-commissioned
officers (Sekolah
Bintara/Seba), a School for Cadets (Sekolah Calon
Perwira/Secapa), Graduated Source Officers Education (Pendidikan Perwira
Sumber Sarjana/PPSS) and Police Academy (Akpol). Advance education stage in
Indonesian Police is called Formation Education (Diktuk) which consists of a
School for Regular Non-commissioned officers (Seba Reg), a School for Cadets/a
School of Officers (Secapa/Setukpa). The next education stage is Development
Education which consists of an Advance School for Officers (Selapa), Police
Science College (PTIK), a School for Leaders (Sespim) and a School for Senior
Officers (Sespati). Beside those educations, the Indonesian Police also has
Science, technology and spesialized education such as Traffic, Detective,
Intelligence, Policemen Unit, Mobile Brigade and Administration Education
Centers.
The Various Police education are created to get skill abilities/qualifications
through graduate, post-graduate, and doctorate program education systems as
well as educational cooperation either inside - or outside the country. The skill
qualification through one year diploma program education system for police
worker, three years diploma program for first line supervisor, and through
vocational shcools. The managerial qualification through middle and upper level
managerial education systems. Police academy and Police Science College are
service colleges because the educational system are directed to fill the service
needs in Indonesian Police area. SELAPA, SESPIM and SESPATI are Education
institutions above High School which has the identity of services, but they are not
colleges. These institutions are non-title education institutions, or based on laws
9
See PTIK research on Indonesian independence post-independet, PPTIK, 1999.
46
are called profession education institutions. College or university is an academic
education institution. Specifically related to AKPOL which is closely related to
PTIK, the Ministry of National Education (DEPDIKNAS) establishes Diponegoro
University as the academic educator of AKPOL. To enter into PTIK, students
graduated from AKPOL must perform apprenticeship for several years before
taking up PTIK entry test. For educations after PTIK, Indonesian Police also
cooperates with the University of Indonesia holding a master degree (S2)
program under the name of Police Science Study (KIK).
All of those kinds of education are expected to be able to give the necessary skill in
operationalizing Indonesian Police organization. First, the police professional
technical ability. Second, the police managerial ability at basic, intermediate and
advance levels. Third, the skill ability.
Indonesian Police Budget and Business
In the New Order, Indonesian Police budget was hard to detect, because it was
integrated in ABRI budget. In the reform era, the police budget is experiencing an
increment from year to year ranging from 4 to 10%. Below is table of the Police
budget in the last four years.
Table of Indonesian Police National Budget 2004-2007
In billion ( 000,000,000)
NO.
1
2
3
YEAR
2004
2005
2006
AMOUNT
Rp. 10, 645 T
Rp. 11, 165 T
Rp. 16, 778 T
INCREMENT
4, 89%
10, 23%
Other than National Budget source, to finance the operational needs the local
Police also receives contribution from the Local Budget (APBD) and Non-Tax
Government Revenue (PNBP) from Driving License, Motor Vehicle Lisence and
Ownership Certificate of Motor Vehicles and revenues from outside the
government which is usualy called Public Participation (abbrv; Parmas), Friends
Participation (Parman) and revenues from legally doubted sources, often called
Participation from Criminal Sector (Partisipasi Sektor Kriminal/Parmin).
Revenues other than National Budget are not in pursuant to Government
Financial Act and caused an accountability and transparancy problems and
vulnerable to corruption practices. According to Society Economic Development
Institute (LPEM) of the University of Indonesia, even though experiencing an
increment from year to year, the Police budget is still left many problems. First,
the organization vision and mission are not reflected in the plan and budget.
Second, limited fund with sub-optimum allocation. Third, false accountability
practices in finance. Another problem, the implementation of Indonesian Police
budget does not have a clear constitution of legal base either, it is different from
the defense budget. In the Act No. 2 of 2002 on Indonesian Police, there isn’t any
article explaining where the police budget source comes from. This problem gives
an opportunity for illegal fee collecting practices inwhich unaccountable and
nontransparant. Whereas, in fact the Police is one of the important law
enforcement agencies. The source of the Police’s budget is supposed to be
included clearly in the Police Act 2002.
47
Hereinafter, The Police Headquarters has been determined to change Indonesian
Police budgetary system from program-oriented budgetary system (top down) in
which the amount of budget is determined by the government, to become
budget-oriented (bottom up) or the Police budget based on performance needs.
By the changing of the Police status as the civil institution, now in its planning and
budgeting process referring to the Act No. 17 of 2003 on Government Finance and
The Act No. 1 of 2004 on Government Treasury, as well as the Act No. 15 of 2004
on the Cross-Examination of Government Financial Management and
Responsibility.
The Autorization system transformation of The Police budget is considered as a
sign of progress in supporting its performance. Yet, in the reality there are still
weaknesses, especially in the formulation of working unit budget. This worisome
that fund acceptance by Working Unit Chief (especially at Big Cities Area Police,
Regional Police and Resort Police Unit) was not distributed optimally to the lowest
police units. As the consequences, the welfare rate of lower rank Police members
who are responsible every day for police operation gets less attention. This
condition in turn gives an advantage for the leader who has control over the
budget.
Indonesian Police Business
There are three Types of Police Business, they are cooperative system, foundation
and personal business owned by former police and usually has a connection to
police institution. That business has been going on since the New Order, when the
Indonesian Police was integrated with ABRI. In the Police institution, there are
such businesses which in line with the related authority, such as business in the
provision of Driving License, Motor Vehicle License, Ownership Certificate of
Motor Vehicles (SSB), motor vehicle license plat administration facility, and traffic
accident insurance.
Businesses related to the provision of Driving License, Motor Vehicle License,
Ownership Certificate of Motor Vehicle, Motor Vehicle License Plate
administration and Traffic Accident Insurance has been done through out
Indonesia through traffic unit in District Polices, Regional Polices and Resort
Polices without any competitor. Since such business has been adhered to
Indonesian Police organization, other business are not the main objective.
Businesses in the Police are significantly infuential to the police independence in
performing its duties, because Indonesian Police business opens the possibility of
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism among policemen who have the law
enforcement authority and legal practices especially related to the “haves” who
has a law cases. For those who are having a law case the practices of Corruption,
Collusion and Nepotism open the opportunity to abdicate themselves from
judicial process. In such situation, the Police business may encourage policemen
to become criminal instrument. Businesses in the Police may also influence
police’s behavior who is supposed to be in “prestige orientation” (reputation) in
performing its duties changed into “material orientation” (money), in which the
police personal interest will be more prominent and very likely defeating the
institutional mission.
48
The handling of Indonesian Police business is different from the military business.
Now issues connected to the military business was get attention from the CSO’s
and has a valid law references, although the implementation is still doubted.
There has been so many studies and researches on the military business. In
contrast, the study on the Indonesian Police businesses is very few. The law has
not been clear. The Law on the Indonesian Police does not mention a clear
direction about this the Police business. The Indonesian Police involvement in
business will affect the professionalism, independence and justice principle in
giving services. Besides, the Police business handling has not existed yet also had
caused jealousy from the Military whose involvement in business was discussed
over several studies and even Law.
The Oversight and National Police Commission (Kompolnas)
One of the most urgent issues to be discussed is the supervision function. This
function becomes so important because Indonesian Police institution holds two
primary functions, they are: discretion function and secrecy function. Discretion
function simply is interpreted as an authority in interpreting a rule norms as the
base of taking action in performing duties. While the secrecy function is the Police
authority in keeping secrets. Both functions are like a knife with two blades. In the
hand of a member who has a high morality, both functions can become the action
basis giving benefits to the society. In the hand of a member who has a low
morality, both functions can become an opportunity justifying all kinds of
violation. Especially the police has a monopoly in law enforcement.
In order for these functions to be able to be used according to the Police primary
duty, it needs to be accompanied by a supervision system. Internally, the Police
organization implementation is supervised by an Inspectorate called Irwasum.
The General Supervision Inspectorate (Irwasum) has the duty to perform the
functions of: development, supervision and general inspection for the entire
Indonesian Police line, holding general supervision routines and programmed or
non-programmed inspection to the managerial aspect of all Indonesian Police
organization units and composing reports on inspection result including the duty
implementation deviation.10
The external supervision at the policy and political level is done by the President
as the direct superior and Commission III of Indonesian Parliamentary marginally
having the supervision function especially in law enforcement. The effectivity of
internal supervision system conducted by Irwasum is doubted. It is nearly
difficult to imagine that Irwasum members who are also the Police members will
take action to their own friends, who are also from the police. The evidence of this
ineffectivity is that in the reform era the Indonesian Police reputation viewed very
poor by the society. The Police was still considered as a corrupted institution,
breaking the Human Rights, and showing the military characteristics. While the
supervision from the president certainly is limited to the extent of macro policy.
The President does not have a special staff having the duty to supervise the
Police. While Commission III of Indonesian parliament limited to the political
supervision. This external supervision mechanism from Indonesian Parliament is
not routine, for example it is only done in the hearing.
10
See Indonesian Police Chief Decree : No. Kep/53/X/2002, dated on Oktober 17, 2002
49
In many countries, the supervising function other than performed by internal
functions and political supervision, is also performed by a police commission. This
commission has an authority in making investigations and inquiries. Even in some
countries like the Phillippines and Sri Lanka, this commission also has an
authority in making arrest to policemen who breaches the law. In Indonesia, the
Act No 2 of 2002 on Indonesian Police Article 37 and 38 also mandate the
formation of National Police Institution called the National Police Commission
(KOMPOLNAS). But different from the Police Commission in other Countries
which have the supervising function, Kompolnas has a very limited duty and does
not have the supervision task. This commission has only the duty to help the
President in determining the Police policy direction and give considerations to the
President in the appointment and termination of Indonesian Police Chief. In
performing its duties, Kompolnas also has a very limited authority, which is to
collect and analyze data as considerations for the President in developing the
Police institution, give suggestion in creating a professional and independent
Indonesian Police. In its relation to the society, Kompolnas receives suggestions
and complains regarding the police performance.
So with the prevailing Act and legislations, Kompolnas indeed is not designed to
be a supervision institution (watchdog), rather than just as a consultative and
Think Tank institution. By seeing the wide range of Indonesian Police duties and
authority and a given supervision structure, it is difficult to imagine that there are
checks and balances principles in Indonesian Police performance assuring the
transparency and accountability. It might happen because it is the factor that
Indonesian police performance up to now has received many criticisms, whereas
now the police has broader authority, more autonomous and independent. In
addition, the police budget has the tendency to increase from year to year.
Blue print of Police Reform
As for TNI has its own internal reform. The Indonesian Police also formulates a
reformation concept called “Indonesian Police New Paradigm”. This paradigm is
conceptualized in three changes (tranformation): the structural aspect, the
instrumental aspect and the cultural aspect. The structural and instrumental
aspects changes are the means and pre-condition toward the Cultural change.
The structural aspect change includes the police institutional aspect change in the
related to the governance, organization, composition and position. The essence
of the structural change post-separation of Indonesian Police organization from
TNI is the implementation of an integrated concept as the national police with
“bottom up” approach and authority delegation to Basic operational Units (KOD)
so that the decision making mechanism goes faster. The organization structure is
made in the form of networks rather than pyramides which emphasizes on the
cooperation. The Police organization is expected to have a structure effective
principle but abundance in functions. The purpose is to accelerate services to the
society. In this spirit Indonesian Police has made partnership efforts with the
society throu8gh Community Police Program (COP), which now has been
improved to Community Policing Program (Polmas). Through the NonGovernmental Organization assistances, national or international, this program
has been conducted in many regions in Indonesia.
50
The instrumental aspect change includes the philosophy which consists of vision,
mission and objective, doctrine, authority, competence, function ability and
science and technology. Indonesian police doctrine, constituting opinion which is
believed to be true and influencing organization personnel or group’s behavior in
carrying out the mission to achieve the organization’s obejctive. The cultural
aspect change is the objective or result of the structural and instrumental aspects
changes. Marginally, the cultural change is the Indonesian Police cultural change
which consists of point of view, mainstream, behavior and attitude reflecting the
identity as a civil police. Conceptually the Civil Police is the police that respects
civil rights and has the civilized or polite characteristic such as courteous, friendly,
doesn’t show an unflexible characteristic, defend the people’s interest rather than
the ruler’s interest, subject to democracy principles and good governance like
accountability, transparancy, checks and ballances. Diametrically the cultural
change vision is different from the police old characteristics reflecting the military
characteristics, having the face of violance, defending the ruler’s interest, like a
secret police, not transparant, not accountable and corrupt. The impact of the
unsuccessful cultural change is that the Police still has a bad image in the eye of
the society, because the Police is not trusted by the society.
While the structural and instrumental changes are considered as placing the
Indonesian Police position on a firm basis in the Indonesian government system
and giving more priority to the civil police paradigm. The cultural aspect change is
bruitted about as still in the process among others in the ordering of education
curriculum, the socialization of Tri Brata, Catur Prasetya Values and Profession
Code of Ethics to personify Indonesian police identity as the protector, guardian
and servant of the society. The Indonesian Police leaders still admit that
Indonesian police behavior is still seen as arogant, using violance, discriminative,
less responsive and not professional. The Public has also not completely trust the
Indonesian Police, because the Police institution is considered as still
discriminative, not professional, less responsive and less polite in giving services.
One of Indonesian parliamentary members from Commission III shows one of the
evidence on the society’s low trust is the emergence of various adhoc team whose
duty may be said the same as the police duty such as: Timtastipikor, Tim Fact
Finding Team. Those teams show that Indonesian Police duty in investigation
hasn’t been able to solve cases which receive public’s attention.
Conclusion
The Reform has encouraged changes in Indonesian Police especially in symbolic
and on surface matters, but hasn’t touched the substansial aspects, that is, the
cultural change which consists of behavior and attitude. In short, Indonesian
Police reformation only gives promises not yet proven. Using Indonesian Police
mainstream, the structural and instrumental changes including the budget
increment from year to year will result in a cultural change. In the long-term we
need to carefully examine whether this change stagnation problem substantively
is caused by more macro problems like at legislation level in regard to crusial
aspects such as organization structure, budget transparancy, supervision
framework. If it is the cause, a more radical reformation in the Police does need to
be done involving strategic aspects like the amendment of Indonesian Police Act
which changes the problems of organization structure, supervision framework,
51
financing source, including Indonesian police jurisdiction review which is now
considered too broad, but with a weak supervision. But this effort politically is
tiresome, because there hasn’t any vision similarity from the decision makers in
the police. Short-term pratical steps are to use the available legislation
framework, to encourage the Police performance with various reinforcements,
consultations and, certainly, supervision programs so that the Indonesian Police
can improve its functions in giving protection, guardianship and services to the
society. That incremental effort may be done as soon as possible, in the
dissatisfying law framework. In the short-term, political institutions such as, the
President, Indonesian parliament and the Society should improve the supervision
on Indonesian Police performance. The rest, the society may cooperate with
Indonesian police in making preventions, investigations and inquiries to criminal
act.
52
Mobile Brigade (Brimob POLRI)
Muradi1
Introduction
An essential issue in the transformation process of POLRI, a police system with
military characteristics, into a civilian institution, is the existence of Brimob
(Mobile Brigade) within POLRI. Brimob is accused of blocking the reform process
of POLRI due to its extremely militaristic vision and method of functioning. Even
the public believe that the Brimob unit poses a major obstacle to the
transformation process within POLRI and should therefore be abolished.
After having been separated from the Indonesian Military (TNI) as the ‘Principal
Organisation’ for almost eight years, POLRI has still not been able to establish an
independent institutional arrangement and organisational culture. Even though
Brimob has adjusted to POLRI at the institutional level, it perceives the process to
be too slow and therefore refuses the implementation of further changes. This
key problem is why Brimob still poses an obstacle to the reform process of POLRI.
The process of change, or in other words Brimob’s adjustment to the POLRI
agenda, increases the psychological burden inside Brimob as it has been focused
on law enforcement tasks related to high level security disturbances since its
establishment. Usually, such tasks cannot be executed by regular police units. As
Brimob, during its formal integration process into POLRI, was forced to give up its
different military attributes, the level of rejection grew stronger as it affected an
‘esprit de corps’.
Born from a Militaristic Tradition
Brimob was founded on 14 November 1946, as a response by POLRI to maintain
independence from the Dutch and preventing their allies from reoccupying
Indonesia. Brimob executed this function together with a TNI unit and the
Indonesian people. POLRI supported all the existing government policies and
protected the state against internal and external threats such as a potential
political party’s agitation and the attempt of a rebellion to alter national ideology.
For example, the PKI rebellion in Madiun in 1948 was destroyed by the Siliwangi
Division of the TNI, POLRI and the Indonesian people.
After the country’s independence, Brimob has continued to dedicate itself to the
state. Different rebellions and separatist movements have threatened the
domestic security (Kamdagri) and the existence of this Republic. Brimob’s task,
as the front unit of POLRI and with the help of the TNI, has been to put down the
different rebellions and separatist movements. According to the old state order,
1
Muradi, is Program Director of RiDEP Institute, Jakarta and He is lecturer at University of Padjadjaran.
53
the role and function of the police were not limited to proactive and repressive
actions but also included operations to destroy rebellion movements such as the
ones initiated by Andi Azis, PRRI/Permesta, APRA, DI/TII and others.
In its initial formation, Brimob was a metamorphosis of paramilitary police
established by the Dutch and Japanese during their occupation. During the Dutch
colonial occupation in 1912, the armed police unit was named ‘Gewapende Politie’
and shortly after substituted by another unit named ‘Veld Politie’. Its tasks were,
among others, to act as a rapid response team, to maintain public security and
order, to preserve the civilian law and to avoid situations that would require the
help of the military.2
The Gewapende Politie and later Veld Politie were parts of an effective unit
designed to destroy potential rebellions before the military was forced to
interfere. Both units represented a ‘softer’ form of armed troops that were
independent of the military.
The Japanese, during their occupation of Indonesia, established paramilitary
troops in April of 1944, named Tokubetsu Keisatsu Tai (TKT), which consisted of
junior police personnel that were trained by the Japanese. Later, the TKT received
more enhanced training from special police units during the Dutch occupation.
The Japanese special police units ran special military exercises and provided
education. The TKT was then assigned duties and responsibilities in the field of
national security and order, as well as on the battlefield.3
The TKT was spread all over the country and every TKT unit was ruled by a
residential police chief. Each area, depending on the regional situation and
condition, was assigned between 60 and 200 personnel. The commander of the
TKT was Itto Keibu (First Lieutenant/First Inspector). One of the TKT
Commanders was Inspector M. Jasin who became the founding father of Brimob
POLRI by declaring the establishment of a special police unit. It was Soemarto,
the first Commissioner and Deputy of the National Police Chief, who changed the
name of the special police into Mobile Brigade (Mobrig).
The change of name was in line with the step to emphasise the existence of a
special police within the standard police structure. The issuance of a Letter of
Order of the Police Junior Chief No. Pol 12/78/1991 ordered Inspector M. Jasin to
prepare all kinds of changes to the Mobile Brigade (Mobrig). It was then
succeeded by the Residential Mobile Brigade (MBK) with one company and a
structure that was adopted from the TKT.
Under the Old Order, Mobrig became a special unit owned by POLRI which
specialised in high level order and security disturbances, such as conflict and
separatist movements. In addition, the unit’s internal organisation was
enhanced. Although the changes were on a temporary basis, the MBK in the
2 As Illustration read Wenas, S.Y. 2006. Korps Brimob POLRI dalam Aktualisasi. PTIK Press. Page 3.
3 TKT formally deployed in different battles when Indonesia was recently independent, and events
such as
the notorious battle on 10th November 1945. Today Brimob has a similar job and responsibility by being
deployed in the battle field such as involvement in previously fighting separatist movements in Aceh and
Papua.
54
residential area was changed to ‘Rayon Mobrig’, and the MBB in the provincial
area received the name of ‘Reserved Company’. At the central level, the
coordinator and inspector of the Mobile Brigade were formed. Their responsibility
was to manage the Mobrig troops stationed in Purwokerto and to assist the chief
of national police regarding matters of Mobrig. The coordinator and inspector of
the Mobile Brigade, which were appointed at the provincial level, had the
obligation to manage the Mobrig troops that were positioned in the province. As a
result, Mobrig units were established in every region.
Based on the Decree, No. Pol 13/MB/1959, dated 25 April 1959, of the Ministry of
National Police, the status of Mobrig was increased from company to battalion
level. The regional coordinator was replaced with a regional commander and the
Mobile Brigade coordinator was made commander of the central mobile brigade.
Before the Mobrig’s 16th anniversary, the Chief of the National Police issued the
letter of Order No. Y. M. No. POl 23/1961, dated 16 August 1961, which indicated
the renaming of Mobrig into Brigade mobile or Brimob. With Brimob’s integration
into POLRI the emphasis on its name lost some importance. Brimob’s military
characteristics were indeed contradictory to POLRI, as an organisation with a
civilian management structure.
What actually makes this factor interesting, however, is that a number of different
legal changes which took place with the issue of Police Act No 13/1961,
emphasised that POLRI was considered as one element of the armed forces. The
change supported the militaristic value of the organisational structure of POLRI.
Since the Keppres (Presidential Decree) No.155/1965, dated 6 July 1965,
concerning a fair and balanced academic education between ABRIMOB and
POLRI, each group was trained in their own academies. This started to change the
face of POLRI. POLRI then had to adapt its image to that of a service with an
operational and civilian basis.
Since its beginning, Brimob has been a truly paramilitary unit of POLRI. Once
POLRI merged with TNI in the name of ABRIMOB (Indonesian Armed Forces), the
paramilitary characteristics were no longer limited to Brimob but also became
part of the internal culture of POLRI. This strengthened the militaristic culture of
the Brimob units even more. The change also very much affected the
performance of POLRI and Brimob in carrying out their role and function as
national security tools. The supportive efforts to create the democratic process,
as part of POLRI’s commitment in maintaining the conducive domestic security
(Kamdagri), almost did not occur.
The emphasis that Brimob’s duties were to keep national order and security
(Kamtibnas) during high level disturbances and at the frontline in battle was
corrected by the issuance of Indonesian Police Chief (Kapolri) No.
Pol:SK/05/III/1972 dated 2 March 1972, on the Re-functioning and
Reorganization of Brimob, which reduced its military and frontline battle role. The
decree placed Brimob’s direction back to the essence of its early establishment,
which was under direct command of the regional police chief (Kapolda).
55
According to the decree, Brimob’s tasks and roles were no longer exclusively
militarily oriented, but also included tactical police operations to fight against
high level criminality. Thus the organisational structure no longer took the form of
a vertical hierarchy, and instead was limited to a unit of battalion strength, with
single companies (BS) which were under the command of POLRI (POLDA).
The change of the organisational structure lasted for only 11 years, as on 14
November 1983 Brimob’s structure was again reorganised with the liquidation of
the BS battalion and company. From its initial establishment, the presence of the
battalion and company have caused a restriction to the POLRI’s decree No. Pol:
SKep/522/XI/1983, which then was replaced with the establishment of the
Brimob Unit, that took the lead on the Non BS companies.
Between 1972 and 1983 Brimob was directly subordinated to POLRI and
ABRIMOB. Brimob’s personnel suffered from this type of subordination and felt
inferior to the ABRIMOB personnel. Brimob was considered neither a police nor a
military unit. Therefore, the public were never able to come up with a clear
perspective of Brimob’s true status. Brimob, however, was well known for its
militaristic practices as part of its routine activities. During that time, the
militaristic practices were part of Brimob POLRI’s routine activities. The activities
were considered legitimate as they received the support of the prevalent regime.
Interestingly enough however, in 1996, Brimob received the status of a Central
Executive Agency. As a consequence, its top ranking officer was given the title of a
one star General (Brigadier General), and this position was held for the first time
by Brigadier General Pol. Drs. Sutiyono. This promotion in status also affected
Brimob-POLRI’s primary function of fostering competence among the population.
Brimob’s strength of maintaining public security and order with the help of other
law enforcement services, particularly in dealing with mass riots, explosives and
organised crime, has enabled the expansion of the level of security in all
jurisdictions of the Republic of Indonesia.4
Brimob’s change in status was considered a historical benchmark, as from then
on it was recognised as an essential part of POLRI. For approximately 30 years
after its change of status, Brimob was more of an authoritative than a state
instrument. In its function it was responsible for preserving and maintaining the
new order. Brimob’s motto was the following: ‘once you are a step ahead, never
retreat’ or ‘once you perform an operation, it must be successful’. Those harsh
mottos led to the unfortunate fact that operations were occasionally performed
with an unnecessary level of violence and cruelty. Therefore, Brimob was still
perceived as a unit following a militaristic slogan and principles and thus was
4 Wenas.
56
Op cit. hal 13.
considered as a military culture within the police. The attitude of the Brimob
members depicted clearly the unit’s difference from other units within POLRI.5
Before the fall of the new order, Brimob was also the target of community critics
because of their violent practices. Attempts to shift their values towards a more
civilian perspective were then included into their curriculum and at the
operational level. The attempts did not prove to be very successful, however, and
since the downfall of Soeharto, Brimob has maintained its militaristic concept
within POLRI.
Brimob and Democratic Policing
The significant changes regarding POLRI’s role and position were made in line
with the reform era, which were characterised by a political decree separating
POLRI from the TNI institution and command line on 1 April 1999. Due to broad
public support, the new status of POLRI and TNI was legalised in TAP
MPR/VI/2000 on ABRI separation (TNI and POLRI) and TAP MPR/VII/2000. TNI
was placed under direct control of the Ministry of Defence, whereas POLRI was
placed under direct presidential control. As a follow up to the first legal regulation,
the UU No. 2 of the year 2002 on the Indonesian Police and UU No. 3 of 2002 on
State Defence were issued. Those regulations again related directly to the role
and position of TNI and POLRI.6
From a more general perspective, the Police still maintains certain military
concepts. It continues to carry the image of ‘having force and power’. Thus, to
operate as a civilian police force, its units have to increase their sense of
community understanding and must distance themselves from ‘power based
force’.
Some parameters of a civilian police include the following: professional and
proportional, democratic, ensuring the application of human rights, transparent,
accountable, lawful and heroic. Therefore, the structural changes must be
followed by instrumental cultural changes.7
POLRI’s position and role as an institution which is focused on domestic security is
emphasised in UU No. 2 of 2002, article 2, 4 and 5. Article 2 explains the functions
of the police as one of the state government’s tools in maintaining public security
and order by means of law enforcement, protection and service to the
community. Article 4 consists of POLRI’s objectives to implement domestic
security by covering the stability of public security and order, law enforcement,
protection and service to the community and human rights enforcement. Article 5
5
Brimob POLRI acts in a different manner, and has always been different from other units because of its
contrasting behaviour and actions, which I still evident today. Thus the reality is that the public do not see
Brimob's as a part of the civil police.
6 Since the Act No 3 of 2002 was not sufficient enough, dids not give enough space to move and tended to be too
general, Act No 34 of 2004 was issued in 2004.
7 The above mentioned indicator of democratic policing emphasises that POLRI, whether it likes or not, must be
able to implement those indicators as the essence of being civil police means that POLRI obeys civil authority
and is under the control of society.
57
re-emphasises public security and order, law enforcement and the protection and
service to the community by stabilising domestic security in the civilian police
culture.
Brimob’s analysis of its primary tasks and functions are as follows:
‘The primary task of Brimob POLRI is to tackle high level public security and
order disturbances – particularly mass riots, organised crime concerning
weapons, explosives, radio-active, biological and chemical substances – along
with the police operational executives, as well as to maintain law enforcement
and public security in all National Jurisdictions of the Republic of Indonesia’.
‘Brimob POLRI’s function, as a special police unit with specific competences, is
to tackle high level national security (Kamdagri) and public safety with the help
of trained personnel, solid leadership and modern technology’.
‘The role of Brimob POLRI is to carry out manoeuvres, either individually or in
groups, with the power to move, capture or if necessary shoot criminals. It also
provides witness protection’.
The main competencies of Brimob POLRI’s personnel are:
Ÿ
Brimob Competence Stratum: Basic police competences such as PPH,
Resmob, Jibom, Wanteror and SAR.
Ÿ
Pioneer Competence Stratum: Basic Brimob competence plus the
competence to counter guerrilla fighters and insurgents.
Ÿ
Bomb Disposal Competence Stratum: Pioneer competence plus Jibom
operator and knowledge of chemistry, biology and radioactive substances.
Ÿ
Instructor Competence Stratum: Knowledge on explosive ordnance
disposal, teaching experience and practical competences.
Brimob POLRI’s institutional competencies are :
Basic Police Competence
Mass Riot Control (PPH)
Mobile Investigation (Resmob)
Bomb Disposal Squad/ Jibom
Terror Combat (Wanteror)
Search and Rescue (SAR)
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Brimob POLRI emphasises that it identifies itself as an integral part of POLRI,
which supports the establishment of good governance. Therefore, the concept of
promotion based on good police performance must be sustainable and applied
equally to all police personnel. The National Police Chief (Kapolri), as the senior
officer of POLRI, has experienced a breakthrough in providing answers to the
demand for reform, particularly by the implementation of the civilian police
culture in the decree No. Pol: SKep/1320/VIII/1998 dated 31 August 1998, in the
Field Instruction Book on the Promotion Service of POLRI. Brimob POLRI
responded to it by issuing a manual for the operational implementation and
fostering of Brimob POLRI as a follow up to build and develop one organisational
culture in line with other units in the POLRI environment.
58
Aspects relating directly to Brimob, are written in the Kapolri’s Decree No. POL:
Kep 53/X/2002 dated 17 October 2002 on the organisation and procedure of
Brimob. That resulted in a change to Brimob’s organisation structure, in which
Brimob’s corps commander and Inspector General Drs. Yusuf Mangga Barani was
appointed as Kakor Brimob (two star general). As a consequence, there was a
change in the Brimob organisation structure in the region by erasing the position
of Kasi Intel (Intelligence Dept Chief) and creating the post of Subden Gegana
(Bomb Disposal Squad). This change also related to the Kapolri’s decree No Pol:
Kep/54/X/2002 on the Organisation of the Regional Police Unit (POLDA). This
change implied that Brimob’s administration should be better integrated into
POLRI. The Kapolri’s Decree No. Pol: SKep/27/IX/2002 was issued even before
the Kapolri decree No. 54. It contains the following aspects:
Structural Aspects
The power of Brimob POLRI is not centralised but left more to the regional levels
(decentralisation at the POLDA level). The organisational structure shall not be
the same as the structure of a military organisation.
Instrumental Aspects
The improvement of the software used by Brimob POLRI is referred to as a new
paradigm of POLRI.
Brimob-POLRI works on systems and methods to best educate its members as
public servants, guardians and professional law enforcement officers.
Cultural Aspects
There is a significant challenge to change the militaristic attitude of Brimob POLRI
members into civilian members of Brimob POLRI, to eliminate the arrogant and
exaggerated pride of corps among Brimob POLRI members during their time at
work and in daily life, and to implement the use of a comprehensive and accurate
programmes to nurture the loyalty of each Brimob POLRI member regarding the
mission of the organisation.
In reality, however, the civilian police culture has not changed much since the
POLRI reform. Even within the Brimob unit, changes have not been clearly visible.
Brimob still places emphasis on its military ideology than other units. Therefore, a
solution had to be found on how to enhance society’s trust in the role and function
of Brimob as a civilian police unit. The three aspects emphasised in the Kapolri’s
Decree have not been fully and effectively implemented. Even in different
processes during 1998 and 2005, Brimob POLRI’s attempts to reform its units in
areas of conflict, such as Aceh, Poso, Ambon and Papua, have not been free of
negative critics from the population.
59
In Aceh, between 1998-2005, Brimob personnel were accused of bribery, shady
economic activities, smuggling and the use of violence.8
A more interesting case includes Brimob POLRI’s deviation from its normal tasks
in Poso. In a paper titled ‘Police Involvement in maintaining the insecurity in
Central Sulawesi’ by G.J. Aditjondro, 12 incidents involving POLRI and Brimob
personnel in illegal activities in greater Poso are mentioned: (a) acceptance of
bribes by uniformed personnel (b) organising and profiting from prostitution (c)
organising and profiting from cock-fighting (d) organising financial activities via
their security unit (e) hunting and smuggling endangered flora and fauna (f)
trading in forest-products (such as logging) (g) transporting goods and
passengers in official vehicles (h) running private security guard businesses (i)
bribery at check points (j) protection of properties belonging to specific or ex-top
officials (k) protection of big firms operations and (l) illegal weapon and
ammunition trading.
Brimob POLRI’s members conducted systematic crimes on the population of Poso.
Even during initial research carried out in 2005, the public’s loathing of Brimob
POLRI’s personnel became more and more explicit. This tendency was proven
when several Brimob POLRI company members clashed when attempting to
capture the terrorists in early 2007.9
Brimob POLRI’s reform process has not yet been fully implemented. This
tendency is reflected in its military reform level and the reason might be that
Brimob is reluctant to eliminate its old military attributes and culture. However,
there have been continuous attempts to replace Brimob’s militaristic motto with a
more human philosophy that is more civilised in its application.
The concept of a civilian and human police system portrays an important factor in
the evaluation of Indonesia’s security sector reform process. In this case, POLRI’s
reform process, the crucial point between a militaristic and civilian police system,
needs to be accelerated. The progress achieved in this reform process will also be
reflected in the establishment of a national security (Kamdagri) concept. The
Kapolri’s decree No. Pol: Kep/20/IX/2005, dated 7 September 2005, on the
Strategic Plan for a National Police 2005-2009, emphasises the importance of
POLRI’s attempts to improve and reposition Brimob as a specific, professional
police unit that has clearly lost its militaristic ideology. It is necessary to neutralise
Brimob’s threat of violence against the community, to stabilise Brimob’s function
in fighting insurgency (separatists), by co-working with TNI and to apply a tighter
recruitment and selection process for Brimob. Recruits should obtain mandatory
civilian oriented training. 910
8 See Abdul Rojak Tanjung, “Kuasa dan Niaga Brimob di Masa Darurat: Sebuah Refleksi Keterlibatan Brimob
di NAD pada Masa darurat Militer, Darurat Sipil dan Pasca Bencana” FISIP, USU, Research Note.
Unpublished.
9 See Yayasan Tanah Merdeka Palu (2006), Poso; Aparat Keamanan dan Rasa Aman yang Hilang, Seputar
Rakyat No. 01 Tahun 2006.
10 Wenas,
60
op. cit pag 22 -23
There exist seven crucial points regarding the evaluation of Brimob’s position in
the POLRI reform process:
Firstly, although Brimob-POLRI’s power concept is not centralised, it needs to be
under direct command of the police headquarters. This command structure
proves difficult when it comes to field activities, as the general command
structure tends to be less sensitive to the problem in place than the chain of
command within each Brimob Unit of the Regional Police. For example, the Resort
Police Chief (Kapolres) of Poso struggles to mobilise the regional Brimob
personnel as he has no direct command over those units. His action first needs to
be authorised by the Chief of the Basic Operational Unit (KOD) or even some
superior officer of the general police department.
Secondly, although Brimob has, for the past eight years of POLRI reform,
attempted to eliminate its military culture and organisational structure, results
have only been partially visible. One of the results was its name change. However,
its old militaristic regime and chain of command are still used. Its continuous use
of violence as part of its field activities is only one sign of the still prevalent
military regime.
Thirdly, the efforts made to integrate Brimob in the reform agenda of POLRI
Headquarters have been numerous, but its positive effects limited. The issue of
the Kakor Brimob POLRI’s decree No. Pol: SKep/94/X/2005 was one of those
efforts.
Fourthly, the structural improvement has still not reached the desired level. The
issue of the Kakor Brimob POLRI’s decree No. Pol.: SKep/115/XI/2006 has not yet
been operationalised.
Fifthly, Brimob POLRI still sees itself confronted with an internal confusion about
whether to accept and implement the necessary changes as part of the reform
process, or whether to maintain its traditional values that came into existence
more than 60 years ago.
Sixthly, the Brimob members’ field behaviour has not been in accordance with the
rules and principles of a civilian police force. The militaristic character is still
shown in the process of carrying out its functions. Unfortunately, Brimob still
makes use of violence in its attempt to solve problems such as mass riots and
engagements in conflict areas.
Seventhly, there has been an exclusion of Brimob personnel for certain POLRI
operations because of previously indicated problems.
Eighthly, efforts to develop the skills and expertise of Brimob personnel have not
yet reached a level of professional expertise. Unfortunately, this type of expertise
does not enhance the level of interpersonal skills which is a clear prerequisite for
civilian and democratic police tasks. Even though some of those skills are taught
during basic police academy training, they tend to diminish within Brimob as its
ideology focuses on preventive and repressive ideas.
61
Ninthly, the recruitment of Brimob POLRI personnel still relies on old regimes and
most officers are drafted from the Police Academy (Akpol). Meanwhile amongst
the non-commissioned officers, recruitment is limited by available selection. The
effect of this policy can be measured in the maintenance of the paramilitary spirit
of the unit.
From the nine problems mentioned above, steps and efforts to emphasise the
reform process of Brimob becomes clearer. There are seven key points on
Brimob’s agenda to be completed regarding its internal reform process to become
a professional civilian police unit:
Firstly, choose an appropriate recruitment and selection procedure for potential
Brimob staff members. There are two selection models that have to be rigorously
applied. One concerns the selection through the Police Academy (Akpol). The
second concerns the selection for the Bintara (non-commissioned officer) and
Tantama (commissioned officer). Those selected through Akpol will, after having
graduated and received the title of first officer, be assigned to the Regional Police
(polda). It would, however, be better if the selection was based on the level of
basic competence, the result of psychological analysis, personal interest and
talent. Regarding the personnel from Bintara and Tantama, even though they are
already on track, efforts should be made to mix them with other POLRI personnel
candidates.
Secondly, the improvement of Brimob’s organisational structure must rely on
professionalism and unique characteristics. The organisational improvement
must always be oriented towards the highest standards of democratic policing.
Thirdly, Brimob’s training procedures should include the concepts of the following
domains: civilian police, public relations, negotiation techniques, social
communication as well as social psychology.
Fourthly, either an Act or Decree (SK) must be used to create the momentum for
transformation among Brimob personnel. This is actually the most feasible step
given the limits on POLRI budgets.
Fifthly, establish a civilian police culture. The cultural development can be
enhanced through interactions within the POLRI environment. Information
Technology (IT) is also expected to melt the deadlock of communication among
the Brimob personnel and other units.
Sixthly, to internalise the values of democratic policing within Brimob’s activities.
The procedure should touch on issues such as democratic values, human rights
and the enforcement of laws.
Seventhly, to develop both a preventive and repressive law enforcement
approach. In many cases Brimob benefits from preventive and rehabilitative
concepts.
62
Conclusion
Based on the previous analysis, Brimob POLRI is still not able to fully support
POLRI, as during its reform process the internalisation of values relating to
civilian and democratic policing have not yet been reached. Brimob POLRI’s
ongoing reform process is related to deeply rooted paramilitary objectives that
date back to the Japanese and Dutch era. Sooner or later, Brimob will have to be
able to develop a paradigm of its field operations that reflect the character of a
civilian and democratic police. A democratic system will enable Brimob to actively
control society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Gunawan, Budi. 2006. Membangun Kompetensi POLRI, Jakarta. YPKIK.
Korps Brimob. 1992. Pembinaan Korps Brimob, Jakarta: Brimob POLRI.
---, 2003. Pendayagunaan Satuan Brimob POLRI dalam Rangka Operasi Kepolisisan
Khususnya di Daerah Rawan GPK. Jutlak/OIR/III/2003.
---, 2005. Upaya Peningkatan Pelayanan Publik sesuai dengan Standar Pelayanan Korps
Brimob POLRI.
Meliala, Adrianus. 2002. Problema Reformasi POLRI. Jakarta: Trio Repro Mabes POLRI.
Pendayaguanaan Brimob. Pertunjuk Pelaksana Kapolri No. Juklak/08/U/1994.
---, Himpunan Petunjuk Lapangan POLRI bagi Satuan Brimob Mabes POLRI. 1983.
Keputusan Kapolri No. Pol. Keo/552/XI/1983. Tentang Likuidasi Satuan Brimob dan
Redislokasi Kompi Kompi BS Brimob.
Miswan. 1998. Pasukan Khusus dan Perang Gerilya. Pusdik Brimob Watukosek.
Mabes POLRI. 2002.
Suparno, Atim. 1998. Pelopor. Pusdik Brimob Watukosek.
63
ORGANIZATION OF KORPS BRIMOB POLRI
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ORGANIZATION OF BRIMOB POLDA TYPE “A”
65
ORGANIZATION OF BRIMOB POLDA TYPE “B”
66
ORGANIZATION OF BRIMOB POLDA TYPE “C”
67
National Police’s Special Detachment 88
Eko Maryadi1
Introduction
The name of Special Detachment (Densus) 88 Anti Terrorism (AT) comes to
surface as 2 members of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI means Islamic Community,
reknown as notorious terrorist group) Zarkasih and Abu Dujana were captured in
Yogyakarta in June 2007. It is the third successful story of Densus 88 after the
massive capture of the terrorist member in East Java and Poso on March 2007 and
the hunt for Doctor Azahari causing the death of Malaysian terrorist leader on
November 2005. Although Densus 88 has marked significant achievement so far,
it has never been at rest from critics and slander, it has been envied by other units
and demanded to be terminated.
The National Police Chief General Sutanto can relax for a while. The lawsuit by Tim
Pembela Muslim (Muslim Advocation Team) on Densus 88 was overruled by
Judiciary of South Jakarta High Court. The resolution states that the capture
action of Densus 88 members on Abu Dujana early June 2007 was declared legal
before the law. TPM sues the Densus 88 members committed violence, abuse and
Human Rights violation by shooting Abu Dujana’s leg during the capture.
The judiciary’s statement is more or less the same as the police’s defense. That is
the action to shoot/paralyze the legs had to be taken since the suspect fought
back and was potential to endanger the officials’ safety. As being admitted by
himself ABUD is the smart and dangerous JI military leader such as the late
Doctor Azahari or Noordin M Top the fugitive.
Before submitting his lawsuit to the court, Abu Dujana’s wife reported National
Police Head Quarter to House of Representative (DPR), National Committee on
Human Rights and National Committee on Human Rights for Children as the
shooting of ABUD by Densus 88 took place before his children’s eye. Finally the
public sympathy has poured into ABUD and it has made him as a ‘hero’.
Besides being bombarded by
the lawsuit, Densus 88 is often criticized,
slandered, even disliked transparently. For instance, Abu Dujana always calls the
police as thogut or great Satan than must be fought. Some Muslim activists
accuse Densus 88 as anti terror unit establish by The US and western countries.
This group demands the Densus 88 to be terminated since it is assumed to be
irritating and discriminative. They accuse Densus 88 was controlled by nonMuslim police officers, thus the law of the enforcement operation tends to be anti
Islam. Even some of them accuse Densus 88 looks like PKI (Indonesian
Communist Party) as it likes to kidnap people diam2. This case occurred in Solo
1
Eko Maryadi, is freelance journalist for International Media based in Jakarta and He is member of AJI
(Independent Journalist Association).
68
when Islamic mass were against Densus 88 ending up with demonstrators
captured by Surakarta Territorial Police with the accusation of insulting the police
institution.
Besides the lawsuit and slander, Densus 88 AT of Polri Headquarters was often
envied by other security unit. It can be understood that Indonesia has different
anti terror unit with qualification of command and was trained in terror action
handling. For instance, Detachment of Terror Handling/GULTOR; Indonesian
Army of Special Troops Corps which used to be named Group 5 Anti terror or Den
81 (Detachment 81), Jala Mangkara Detachment (Indonesian Navy), Bravo Air
Force Unique Force (Paskhas) Detachment and Detachment C Regiment IV Bomb
Disposal Squad (National Police-Mobile Brigade). The use of “anti terror” after the
name of Densus 88 has been also questioned because the legal anti terror
institution so far has been BIN (State Intelligence Agency), Intelligence Unit in
each force, including Polri’s Intelligence Agency.
The History of Densus 88-Polri’s Establishment
Although it is camouflaged in pro-contra discourse, Densus 88 AT Polri is real and
has been established. In national level, anti terror unit is a package of
establishment of Coordination Desk of Terrorism Combat, in line with Security,
politic and Legal Affair Minister’s decree No. Kep-26/Menko/Polkam/II/2002. The
decree was signed by SBY as the Minister in charge as an answer to the instruction
of President RoI Megawati on Terrorism crime or Presidential Instruction No 4 of
2002. This package national policy was summarized in Act Regulation No 1 and 2
of 2002 which later on was legalized into Act No 15 of 2003 on Terrorism Crime
Combat.
In line with the development in national level, changes occurred inside the
National Police. A depth research on the exact day and how the atmosphere of the
establishment of Densus 88-AT. However, the embryo of Densus has emerged
since the Bali Bomb I (2002), Marriot Bomb (2003) and the Australian Embassy
Bomb (2004). Not long after the Task Force of Indonesian Police bomb was
merged the Polri’s internal needs to conduct reorganization of Directorate VI AT
which is less effective. In June 2002, The National Police Chief issued the decree
which regulates the name change of Directorate VII into Densus 88 Detachment
of Anti Terror-Polri.
The Secret of Densus 88 and Denials
Likewise other establishment of special forces in different level, secrecy is a
characteristic of Densus 88. It is about the operation channel, operation
instrument, recruitment, education curriculum, assignment, the amount of the
personnel’s to the operating financing are hard to be known by public. Press, can
be said as the first party that expose the existence of this elite unit of Polri’s anti
terror, such as being informed in FEER magazine, edition of 13 November 2003,
quoted by other national press.
FEER reported that the National Police (Polri) established the special force named
Detachment 88 or Delta 88 with the US Government assistance. This force
69
recruited 400 personnel trained by CIA, FBI and secret service, as anti terror unit
with capabilities to overcome terrorism interference, bombs threat, and hostage
as well. The US Government’s support is rewarded to Polri as it hard work to
reveal The Bali and Marriot Bomb case, comprise of the training, support,
instrument supply and operational financing. The establishment of the Anti Terror
Detachment spent about Rp. 150 billion, including the arms supply, surveillance
instrument and means of transport for the force.
The National Police Chief Da’i Bachtiar at that time denied the FEER report on
Polri’s special force. General Bachtiar only admitted that Indonesia and the US
governments has had cooperation in education and training for Polri member, one
of them is by assigning the Polri officer to the US every year to join the police
training. Head of General Information Department, PR Division, Comssr. Zainuri
Lubis also denied the FEER article. According to him, Polri worked with the
capability and resources it possesses in handling the terrorism cases.
As time goes by, what denied by the Polri Chief proved to be untrue. Densus 88
does not only exist and has ever been established but it also is able to promote the
Polri’s image positively, particularly in combating terrorism. However, regarding
the complexity of the problems and political reality at that time, the Chief’s denial
regarding the establishment of Densus 88 AT Polri can be understood.
For instance, the sentiment of Anti US on the policy of arms embargo for
Indonesian Military and accusation of human rights violation by TNI during the
New Order government. How comes Polri as TNI’s sibling receive US’s aid,
meanwhile the powerful state transparently ‘lessen TNI’s power by military
embargo. Perhaps, the Polri chief at that time also considered the public’s
resistance on sorts of things with ‘special forces’. Not mention the issue of rivalry
between TNI and Polri about who is the most authorized in managing the
domestic security colors the existing sociopolitical situation.
Legal Basis for Establishing Densus 88
Densus 88 started to be proposed in 2002, in a confusing political and legal
situation. It is said confusing situation as the separation of task and role between
TNI and Polri in the early 2000 created a non-simple sociopolitical impact. It gives
implication on the domestic security sector control, which now is fully on Polri’s
hand and state security integral which becomes TNI and Defense Ministry’s
portion.
In the Polri’s headquarter, Densus 88 AT was established by Indonesia National
Police Chief’s – at the time General Pol. Da’i Bachtiar - decree No 30/VI/2003
dated 30 June 2003.
The main reason to establish the Densus 88 AT is to overcome the escalation of
terrorism crime in Indonesia, particularly those terror attack with bomb
explosion.
Before this, the explosive crime handling such as bomb, is only charged by
Emergency Act No. 12 of 1951 on arms and explosive material. Now this kind of
70
crime can be charged by Act No. 15 of 2003 on Terrorism, the substitution of
subversion Act PNPS No. 1 of 1963 which had already been abolished.
Therefore it can be said that Densus AT is the police’s actor dealing with domestic
terror as stipulated in Anti Terrorism Act.
Meanwhile, the establishment of Densus 88 AT in Regional Police (Polda) level was
declared for the first time by Letter of Order of Metro Jaya Polda’s Chief, Police
Insp. Gen. Firman Gani, No 883/VIII/2004 dated 24 August 2004. Densus 88 of
Metro Jaya Polda in the beginning has 74 members comprising of officers and
non-decommissioned officers, and it was headed by Commsr. Tito Karnavian who
has undergone some trainings in different countries.
The Lucky Number 88
Since it early establishment, the number 88 has always been questioned. Those
cynical said that number 88 is an initiation of Delta 88 or the name of special
forces of the US Police.
In fact, the number 88 on this Special Detachment is a symbol of a pair of
handcuffs, the instrument identical to the police institution. The number 88 is also
a representation of the killed victims in Bali Bomb 2002, which were Australians.
Meanwhile according to the belief among the society, it is believed to bring a
double luck. This number has a meaning of something is uninterrupted or it keeps
on and on. It means the task of Densus 88 AT is a continued and unstoppable
task.
Financing and Training
The Densus 88 AT force is initiated and funded by the US Government through the
US Diplomatic Security Service of State Department and directly trained by
instructors from CIA, FBI and Secret Service. Most of instructors from SS are
former US special force members. The exact training fund, arms supply,
instrument facility, operational and logistics is only known by Polri chief and of
course the President.
But it has been a public secret that Densus 88 works with nearly unlimited source
of fund, instrument and logistic support. The US, UK and Australia are the States
often mentioned to tie a technical cooperation and ready to render the
operational aid no matter how it cost. Of course there is no free lunch; all the
cooperation and security aid carry certain interest on Indonesia. At least, all
cooperation is summarized in the great plan titled “War Against Global Terrorism”
led by the US.
School of Anti Terror and Recruitment
The personnel of Densus 88 generally are trained in Education Center (Pusdik)
Polri’s Intelligence in Megamendung area, Puncak, West Java, and in The National
Anti Terror Education Center (Platina), in Police Academy Complex, Semarang,
Central Java. In these places, every Densus 88 personnel gains anti terror
71
education with modern police education curriculum, full facility, domestic and
foreign instructor. All sciences related to the terrorism crime are studied here
including their practices and simulations.
The recruitment of Densus 88 personnel are conducted closely, as the operational
needed and only the Densus chief knows it. However, the reality shows that in the
beginning the Densus 88 members are from Gegana Brimob (Bomb Disposal
Squad-Mobile Brigade) and the outstanding officer from Detective Intelligence
Unit. In general, Densus 88 members can be from Police Academic, School of
Policewomen, PTIK (Police Science University) graduates or even civilian with
specialties such as Informatics Technology and ready to be trained under anti
terror Polri’s Curriculum. As an anti terror elite unit, Densus 88 will not train a
huge number of personnel, however it will shape the adequate skills and
capabilities of each Polri member in order to work in small units trained and
experienced to handle the terror case.
Arms and Instruments
Densus 88 AT is equipped with different modern instrument support and arms,
such as attack arms type Colt M4 5,56 mm made in the US, newer than Steyr
–AUG, sniper arms Armalite AR-10 and shotgun Remington 870 which light and
reliable model. Rumors spread that Densus 88 AT is going to have Hercules C-130
series to upgrade its mobility. All arms, instrument material and training and
operational supporting facilities are believed to be like those owned by the US
SWAT.
Besides the arms, each Densus 88 AT members is equipped with personal or team
instruments. These instruments are needed when they are at work doing
investigation of terrorism crime, for instance, personal communication gadget,
GPS, night surveillance camera, tapping, and micro recorder, interceptor plane,
signal distracting machine and many more. Mabes polri (National Police’s
headquarter) works together with all cellular phone operators and internet
providers to have access in watching and capturing the cellular number and
internet address used by terrorist. For the bomb disposal squad, they are
equipped with bomb and metal detector, special hand gloves and mask, vest and
anti land mine shoes and also tactful vehicles to stop the bomb.
How the Densus 88 Personnel Works
Those who know the way Densus 88 personnel works are the Densus leaders and
personnel themselves. Principally, the National Police special unit is trained to
handle all kinds of terror threat, including bomb terror, kidnap and hostage. In
conducting its job, Densus 88 is authorized to perform the surveillance, capture,
paralyzing to investigate the terrorist suspect. This special unit with 400
personnel comprises of investigation experts, intelligence experts, bomb disposal
squad, strike forces, and snipers. Several Densus 88 AT members are from
Gegana Brimob (Brimob Bomb Disposal Squad) with qualification of Polri Special
Forces.
72
Unlike the working procedure of Polri members managing the general crime,
working method of Densus 88 is more closed and secretive. Tempo magazine
edition of 40/XXXIV/28 November-4 December 2005 reviewed the working
procedure of Densus 88 in its special report. The writer quoted this reports in
detail in order not to reduce the meaning and essence of the article.
Special Report of Tempo Magazine
‘Bagus tapi dengan Kritik (Good but with critics)
Gorries Mere’s face looks happy in The Main Meeting Room, in Mabes Polri,
Jakarta on Wednesday. Two weeks ago. Well, he’d just added one star on his
shoulder. Now he is an Inspector General. The rank promotion ceremony is led
directly by the National Police Chief, General Sutanto.
Along with Gorries, Surya Dharma Salim Nasution gets promoted too. The first
Director of State Security and Transnational crime Investigation unit and criminal
of Mabes Polri (Bareskrim) is promoted to be brigadier general from
commissionaire.
Actually, Gorries deserves to be promoted if it is seen from the post he occupied.
The position of Bareskrim deputy he held since the last step is post for 2 starred
general. However, due to the promotion was a week after the success of Densus
88 in revealing the undercover of Dr. Azahari in Batu, East Java, and people then
connect these 2 things. Do not forget, Gorries and Surya Dharma are the wellknown detachment members.
How can it be so well-known? Azahari with Noordin M Top are number one
fugitives in this country. Both of them are famous as slippery as eels. And Densus
88 succeeds in nailing one of them. The public seems to be curious to know how
the Detachment operates.
A source of Tempo in Mabes Polri whispers that essentially, the detachment
operation has no difference with the standard procedure existing in police:
gathering information, surveillance, and the ambush. The difference, he said, is
Densus is backed up by reliable Intelligence and they own sophisticated tapping
cellular. And- the most important – they are always full of secret.
There was an interesting story on this secrecy around the Densus environment.
For instance, when the surveillance of Azahari’s house, Surya Dharma called his
men up in Surabaya for a back up. When his partner asked his position was, Surya
Dharma told him that he was at the border of Central Java and East Java. He was
already in Batu at that time, ha…ha…ha” A source of Tempo in Detachment 888
environment said.
Who often becomes the “victim“ of secret code implementation is the local
Densus 88. Team of East Java Regional Police had been through with it. For
instance, they were in charge of sterilizing the location when attacking Azahari.
However, even when the round-up took place, some members did not know that
the person was Azahari, said a source of Tempo. But, everybody understands that
the secrecy made the important operation run well and so far the result has been
satisfying.
73
However, some have not been satisfied. The thumbs up is still accompanied by
some critics. The former State Intelligence Agency Chief, Hendropriyono is one of
those criticized. Particularly it is due to incapability to capture Azahari alive in
Batu.
What he meant by ‘professionals’ is Detachment 81 from TNI. This team have
special training ambush. They, for instance are able to shoot the bull’s eye in DC-9
plane blind-folded. “Infiltrating to the attic of a house without being known by the
owner is not impossible to do” he said.
No wonder why Hendro proposes that something related to ‘hit” is not done by
Densus alone. “The intelligence’s brain is still the police. But, let the soldiers
capture the suspect terrorist”, he said.
Organizational Structure of Densus 88
The Central Densus 88 AT structurally is under Bareskrim Mabes Polri chaired by
Detachment Commander titled Brigadier General and assisted by Deputy
Detachment, while in Regional Police level, Densus 88 is under Ditserse
(Directorate of Investigation) led by Commander titled by Junior Officer. In its
development, Densusu 88 Mabes Polri has had 2 Commanders in charge, namely
Brigadier General Bekti Suprapto (Police) and now Brigadier General (Police)
General Surya Dharma Salim Nasution.
In implementing its operation, Commander of Densus 88 has 4 supporting pillars
equivalents to sub detachment (sub den) level. There are Intelligence, Legal
Proceedings (Penindakan), Investigation and Assistance sub detachments. The
Sub-Dens comprise of supporting units and personnel with Anti Terror Assistance
(ATA) education and they work in their working unit with specific expertise.
For instance, intelligence sub den consist of Detection unit, Analysis unit and
contra intelligence unit. Legal Proceedings sub den comprises of Negotiation unit,
Pioneer unit and Bombs Disposal Squad unit, investigation sub den leads the
crime scene unit, investigation unit and technical assistance unit. Meanwhile the
assistance sub-den of operational assistance unit and administration assistance.
In general, Densus 88 AT members are police members working under Act No. 2
of 2002 on National Police. Article 13 of Police Act states there are 3 main tasks of
police: maintain the public order and security; reinforce law, protect and serve
the public. Under the terrorism threat, the police have great job to establish the
police members enabling to implement their basic task fair and equal to public.
Terrorism Issue and the Role of Media
Fact says that it is not easy to work alone in terrorism issue. Terrorism issue can
be a political commodity and it sometimes triggers the sentiment of SARA
(ethnicity, religion and race) which can explode into sociopolitical tension, for
instance, the tensed relation between Densus 88 with Muslims from Wahabi faith
regarding the extreme law action of the police to the JI group. Referring to the fact
needing confirmation, along 1999-2006, the police officers had arrested
74
hundreds of terrorist suspect who happened to be the Wahabi devout. Maybe
they shot death the terrorist members from different communities and religion.
This kind of tense may happen and it is hard to be avoided as most Indonesian
People are Muslim. What must be remembered is most of Indonesian Muslims are
moderate cultural Muslim, not the hard liners such as Wahabi Groups. Thus,
Densus 88 AT does not have any hesitation to reinforce the law based on the
existing regulation.
So far, Densus 88 has proved itself that they are capable to manage the terrorism
issue proportionally. Nevertheless, this special unit often utilizes the media as
partner, at least in announcing the success of terrorism operation in Indonesia.
The big name Densus 88 cannot be apart from the role of media and it can
promote the belief in Polri officers in handling the terrorism crime. The uncovering
of bomb cases, capturing operation, and legal procedure for the arrested terrorist
can be achieved easily unless by hard work and sacrifice. Therefore, the
cooperation with media must be maintained.
On the other hand, the mass media also strengthen the existence of terrorist
group, extend the public fear by informing the terror actions and crimes they
creates. Mass media less publicizes the activities of different moderate groups or
the majority of those reject the terrorism and crime. Up to now, Polri has DPO’ list
(the Wanted List) in which some of DPO have been arrested or in prison. However,
some are free and possible to perpetrate a new terror. Therefore, the prevention
and action against terrorism must be improved according to the valid legal
regulation.
Working in a Legal Corridor
Regarding the strengthen the rule of law, on March 2006, the government and
DPR ratified 2 international convention namely International Convention for
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and International Convention
for Suppression Terrorism Bombing (1997). With this ratification, Indonesia is
expected to promote the International cooperation in preventing the terrorism
financing and bombing. As organizations, especially, the intelligence and
investigation subdetachemnt perhaps in these issue can play active roles in order
to detect the threat potentials as early as possible.
If all procedures are conducted well, the result of Police’s Densus 88’s work surely
will contribute significant pressure to terrorism crime itself. However, as the DPRRI spokesman, Agung Laksono in Paripurna Meeting, May 2006, “the fish is
caught but the water is not turbid” to remind the operation against terrorism by
police’s anti terror unit will not create any mess, nor hurt the people’s feeling.
As social theory, terrorism can be fought with several steps, started from the
preparation, prevention, action, punishment and education. The portion of
Police’s Densus 88 AT is more to the 2nd and 3rd function, there are prevention and
action. Meanwhile the role of punishment does not belong to Police’s authority,
however in the hand of the Courts personnel and Judge. Meanwhile the
preparation and education are in public’s hand and educational institution.
75
The Mobile Brigade Bomb Disposal Squad (Gegana Brimob) and Police’s
Bomb Task Force at a Glance
One of Police’s Detachments with qualification of anti terror, SAR Operation and
Bomb disposal is Gegana Squad under the Brimob. Gegana Brimob has ever been
familiar when the terror case and bomb threat emerged in the country. This squad
comes and checks whenever a report regarding explosive material and bomb
terror in a place. This Brimob force is often deployed to assist the organic security
officers to different ‘hot territory’ such as Ambon, Aceh and Poso to resolve the
riot and security disturbances. We can say that the capabilities of Police’s Brimob
in general are equivalent to the TNI’s fighting unit.
The problem is, the task and role of Polri’s Gegana Brimob is still focused in
repressive efforts and have not developed the preventive ones. Thus, Gegana is
considered not to meet the criteria as anti terror force since it only function as
striking force. Since then, discourse to establish a real Police’s Densus 88 with
qualification of anti terror handling keeps stronger.
Before establishing Densus 88 AT, police has had Anti Bomb Task Force. This force
operates under the National Police’s Chief days and nights to reveal the Bali and
Marriot Bomb cases with assistance of personnel, fund and police instruments
from the US and Australia. However, like its name, this Bomb force is ad hoc or
temporary. Thus, when the Bali and Marriot Bomb are revealed, this force was
terminated. And Gegana, is still in Brimob command headquarter, its principals
and ready to be deployed at anytime.
Densus 88 has been a brand new star of Police’s special force of anti terror. This is
caused by the wide authority of Densus 88 particularly in handling the terrorism
crime. The authority comprises surveillance operation (intelligence),
investigation, legal proceedings to law enforcement. As time goes by, other anti
terror security forces have lost their roles, moreover in democratic climate, in
which the role of military and intelligencer is limited, the presence of Densus 88
AT is more welcomed by the public. The success of the hunt for Dr. Azahari and the
last one, Abu Dujana’s capture has made Densus 88 AT become a Prima Donna.
Public is still looking forward to other great achievement such as arrest the key
terrorist Nordin M Top and to reveal the terrorist network operating in Indonesia.
The Transparency of Budget and Oversight
If there is something vague from all description on Police’s Densus 88 AT, perhaps
it is about the use of budget and its oversight mechanism. So far there has no
valid data to have a clear reference on how much the project of establishing and
operating Densus 88 AT cost for the last 4 years and how its oversight is. How
much does the operating of hunting Azahari or Abu Dujana cost? How much does
the capture of DPO to Poso cost? How much does the operation of terrorist
suspect Wonosobo, Yogyakarta, or other terrorist cost? It does not include the
cost of the instrument used by Densus 88, the logistic cost, accommodation and
other operational cost.
76
As far as we know, in 2005 the budget spent by Densus 88 AT was Rp 16 billion.
Meanwhile, the previous budget (2004) cost Rp. 1.5 billion. How comes there is a
large amount (10 times) in 2 budget years which should be accountable in front of
public and state. Another important thing is the explanation of the use of aid fund
from different countries such as the US, Australia regarding the war against
terrorism. There is no exact number on fund for Densus 88, however, it must
reach up to hundred million dollars.
The transparency of budget is a crucial issue which needs to be honest and true
exposed. The case of possible bribery and corruption involving some police Senior
officers shows that the transparency and weakness of oversight can be the source
of troubles in organization of Densus 88’s career specifically and Polri’s image in
general. With honesty and transparency, the big name of Densus 88 AT will be
maintained.
Recommendation on Densus 88 Polri
As a man-made institution, Densus 88 AT surely has weakness and perhaps
mistakes. There are structural weaknesses, technical weakness such as the
problems of coordination or the essential weakness of Human Resources.
Structurally, the presence of Densus 88 seems to be influenced by approach
method of state security not human security. It explains the occurrence of bloody
Poso incident on 22 January 2007, when the Densus 88 members helped by
Central Sulawesi Police took action on DPO resulting in the death of 14 civilians (in
which three dead civilian has nothing to do with the Jihadi’s group) and a Polri
member, and more than 20 persons captured.2 Those terrorist suspects captured
and dead civilian could be in the wanted list. However, the death of the civilian
including a Polri member is not a law enforcement effort which deserved to be
proud of. It indicates the less optimum of the capability of negotiation unit and the
weak detection unit of Densus 88 AT when conducting the operation.
The coordination weakness seems implied from the confusing information about
the capture of military wing chief of JI Abu Dujana and Zarkasih by Densus 88, in
early June 2007. At that time, the information about the capture of Abu Dujana
was released by Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer and was
confirmed by BIN (State Intelligence Agency), but it was denied by Polri
spokesman. If the case is part of Police Head Quarter’s strategy to blur the
information and to trap other terrorist member to come out, perhaps it is
reasonable. However, if it is purely the communication problem and lack of
coordination among the security agency, it should be a great pity.
Meanwhile the weakness of Human Resources is more caused by the basic
attitude of Densus 88 members in carrying out its duties. As an elite force, Densus
88 members must be different from the old Model of “Malay Intel” behaving
egotistical such a cowboy, look for everything is free, and shows off that he is a
member of intelligent or abusing their title for personal interest. The Densus 88
member must prioritize the sound attitude and working ethic, law order and
professionalism.
2
Page 1, ICG Asia Report No.127 “Jihadism in Indonesia, Poso on the Edge”, 27 January 2007.
77
The chronology on Police’s Special Detachment 88-Anti Terror (Densus 88)
2001
11 September : WTC Twin Towers in New York were hit by suicide bomb aero plane. Approximately
3000 people were dead in the biggest non-military attack post WW II to the heart of USA Commerce.
2002
12 October: 2 bombs exploded in Tourism Resort of Kuta, Bali, demolished Sari’s Club and Paddy’s
Club and tens other buildings in greater Kuta-Legian. The Mobile High Explosive Bomb killed 202
people; most of them were foreign tourists, including 88 Australians and tens of Indonesians. 3
people committed the bomb finally were captured and sentenced death by court.
18 October : Indonesian government put the agenda of combating terrorism into political and
national security by issuing the Regulation No 1 of 2002, No 2 of 2002 and President’s Instruction
4/2002 on Terrorism Crime, followed by the Letter of Decision, of Coordinating Minister of Political,
Legal and Security Affairs No. Kep 26/Menko/Polkam/II/2002 on Establishment of Coordination
Desk of Combating Terrorism. This AT Desk works at a national level as task implementer unit under
the President.
5 August: JW Marriot Hotel, an American-chained hotel in Mega Kuningan Jakarta was exploded by
car bomb. 13 people killed in the site and tens were injured, the front of the hotel was demolished.
This bombing altered the security map of foreign hotels and corporate became more alert.
18 December: The first Indonesian AT Forces (Polices’ Densus 88) was established and trained in
Mega Mendung area, Puncak, West Java. The US Government poured about US$ 24 billion to
establish and train this police’s elite force.
2004
9 September: A high explosive mobile bomb exploded in the Australian Embassy yard on Jl. Rasuna
Said, Jakarta. At the same time, National Police Chief General Dai Bachtiar was giving a formal
explanation on domestic security situation in DPR-RI (House of Representative). This bomb
demolished the glass of the building nearby, killed 10 people, including the security guard and
passerby. A month later, Bomb Anti Terror Force of Mabes Polri together with Australian Federal
Police (AFP) discovered the bombing case, captured the actor and sentenced them not more than
10 years in prison.
2005
1 October: The bomb explosion shocked Bali. 23 were killed and 102 were injured in Raja’s Bar and
Restaurant, Kuta Square, Kuta and in Nyoman Café and Menega Café in Jimbaran area. The socalled Bali Bomb II has made the tourism industry in Bali worse and it took long time to recover.
9 November: Densus 88 attacked the Dr. Azahari’s house in Batu, Malang, east Java and made the
fugitive in Indonesia and Malaysia. This case has made Densus 88 as the well-known Anti Terror
Force in Asia.
31 December: Bomb exploded in a market in Paku, Central Sulawesi, 8 people were killed and 45
other were injured. The bombing suspect was one of the civilian group quarrelling in Poso.
2006
29 April: The key terrorist Noordin M Top escaped from the capture of Densus 88 AT officers. In the
round-up operation of the suspect’s rented house in Binangun Village-Wonosobo, Central Java, the
Densus 88 officer arrested 2 people and shot 2 other terror suspect to dead.
78
2007
27 March: Densus 88 rounded-up the terrorist group of Central Java and uncovered the storage of
huge amount of explosive material in Sleman, DIY. Densus 88 captured 7 suspects of illegal
possesion, storing and assembling the bomb and killed 2 terrorist suspect. According to Polri
spokesman, the bomb was more in quantity than Bali Bomb and other bombs. About 20 packages of
huge bomb, tens of detonators, bomb kit, ammunition (bullets), chemical substance to make bomb
and 2 MI6 weapons, and 3 riffles were seized from the suspects.
9 June, after the capture of Central Java Group, Densus 88 capture ABUD alias Ainul Bahri, military
wing chief of JI and Zarkasih. These 2 people are big catch after the hunt for Azahari, however the
fugitive Noordin M Top is still on the loose.
References
1. Researcher of Mass Media covering :Detikcom, Okezone, Antara,
Kompas Cyber, Media, Tempo, Media Indonesia, Republika, Antara,
Suara Pembaruan.
2. Wikipedia Indonesia:,www.wikipedia.co.id
3. ICG Asia Report No.27, date 27 January 2007.
79
80
State Intelligence Agency
Aleksius Jemadu1
Introduction
Some publications that have already portrayed similar topic about the latest
development on intelligence reform, especially which related to the role of State
Intelligence Agency (BIN), will be described ahead of presenting this paper.
Although, there are many efforts to analyse the development of Indonesia
intelligence reform, mainly conducted by non-government organization and
academic communities, however, publication that discuss comprehensively on
this topic is still too little. There are some publications that can be used as
references to find out how far Indonesia intelligence has been playing its roles,
yet each of the publication has its essential Achilles' heel. A book, titled Intel:
Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service written by Ken Conboy, later translated
into Indonesian, depicts the development of Indonesia intelligence since the
independence until the period of post Soeharto fall.2 The advantage of the book
lays on its precision in pointing up the trail of Indonesia intelligence realm history
and its role in every administration periods. Besides, interviews with Indonesia
intelligence practitioners that carried out by the author, an extensive data on
various cases based on “internal source” is an allure of the book. Regrettably, as
of theoretical perspective the book does not give a lucid direction. For instance,
there are many appreciations of the existence of state intelligence agency (BIN)
post Soeharto fall but it is not prescriptively explained how the intelligence should
run its role in a democratic country.
Another book, written by A.C Manullang who knows inside out of Indonesia
intelligence, is Menguak Tabu Intelijen: Teror, Motif dan Rezim. The leads of the
book are the background of its author, who was one of the directors of Badan
Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (BAKIN) and how ample is the span of concepts and
theories exercised in Indonesia intelligence cases. Besides that, the book is also
informed on global politics perspective in analyzing the role of Indonesia
intelligence, particularly in post New Order period. Intelligence understanding
which only associated to technical skills and performance effectiveness is the
weak spot of this book. In a special chapter that described about professional
intelligence, there is no explanation on important aspect of intelligence in
democratic society, which is its control, either, formally by executive bodies or
informally by public at large.3
1
Aleksius Jemadu, is Head of International Relations Department of Parahyangan Catholic University,
Bandung.
2 See Ken Conboy. 2007. Intel: Menguak Tabir Dunia Intelijen Indonesia. Jakarta: Pustaka Primatama.
3 See A.C. Manullang. 2001. Menguak Tabu Intelijen: Teror, Motif dan Rezim. Jakarta: Panta Rei.
81
There are some books, written by human rights non-government organization
and academics that provide readers to know the development of intelligence
reform in Indonesia. A pocket book published by Imparsial titled Evaluasi Kinerja
BIN di Masa Transisi endows with typical non-government organization analysis
and human rights activists, which is critical and even cynical toward Indonesia
government’s performance in managing national security in the last few years.4
However, the book’s coverage is too narrow to assess intelligence reform
progress in Indonesia. An initiative to analyze the latest development on
intelligence reform has been carried out by intelligence reform in Indonesia
working group coordinated by Pacivis of University of Indonesia. Besides
producing draft of State Intelligence Bill as an input from civil society for
government and parliament, Pacivis has also produced some publications that
can be used as references on intelligence reform in Indonesia. One of the books
published is Reformasi Intelijen Negara written by academics of various
universities in Indonesia. The book depicts many important aspects of
intelligence reform in context of democratic consolidation in Indonesia and due to
it has more theoretical-prescriptive nuance than description of empirical cases
that becomes intelligence factual defy in Indonesia.5
As a part of government functions, it is compulsory that accountability principle to
the public, as the proprietor of sovereignty, attached in the intelligence.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that about nine years since the fall of
authoritative regime of Soeharto in May 1998, the reform in intelligence sector
still has been considered not as the main priority agenda for neither executive nor
legislative. Whereas at the same time national security has been shaking by
boom blasts conducted by terrorist group since 2000. Moreover, the spreading
out of conflicts in many places since the fall of Suharto indicates Indonesia
intelligence is too frail in anticipating those ranges of events. There even an
allegation that security and intelligence apparatus involved in some provocations
with the purpose of dwindling the reform movement towards consolidated
democracy. The purpose of this paper is to provide an illustration on intelligence
historical background in Indonesia, particularly during New Order era and some
of its legacy problems that still subsist hitherto.
After the fall of Suharto, the intelligence agency reorganized and becomes State
Intelligence Agency (BIN) that according to many assessments it incapable to
prevent conflict escalation in various regions since B.J Habibie administration and
failed to prevent a series of bomb blasts performed by terrorist group. The failure
of the intelligence reflects the tremulous government of post Suharto era in
developing security and law enforcement architecture in Indonesia. This paper
also explains the latest development on intelligence reform in Indonesia, both,
from government and civil society group perspectives as well as the structural
obstacles, which are hampering the process.
4
5
See Imparsial. 2005. Evaluasi Kinerja BIN di Masa Transisi. Jakarta: Imparsial.
See Andi Widjajanto (ed.). 2005. Reformasi Intelijen Negara. Jakarta.
82
Organizing Intelligence during New Order
For writing almanac about intelligence development in Indonesia, new order era
is used as starting point because Indonesia intelligence’s image at present time is
pretty much influenced by the employ of intelligence, which against to democracy
and human rights principles during the era under the leadership of President
Suharto. Besides, there are many institutional and working culture legacies in the
period that passed in the post Suharto period whereas, formally, Indonesia
institutions have come into democracy era. Organizing intelligence during new
order era could not be separated from the regime characteristics, which are
authoritarian and militaristic. As a consequence of that, the intelligence was
identified with military organization, which has main function to secured
President Suharto’s power and military domination from central to district levels.
Thus, it is not surprising if the three decade of Suharto administration period was
full of black intelligence practices such as assassination or detention of political
counterpart and against one’s own free will disappearances for those who in
opposition to the regime. Although Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (BAKIN)
was, the focal intelligence agency in 1970s but President Suharto held a tendency
to create a matching part body with the purpose of strengthening his position
whilst throwing competition among his subordinates, which finally they will seek
out shield or favour (blessing) from Suharto himself. As an illustration, there were
three intelligence bodies that worked overlapping and under three different
institutions. The three bodies were Intel Assistant under Minister of Defence and
Security who were also Commander in Chief of ABRI, Intel Chief of Kopkamtib,
and State Intelligence Coordination Body (BAKIN). The interesting point out of it
is that L.B Moerdani who was one of Suharto right hands had position in the three
bodies, which the key rationale was to preserve Suharto’s power. Besides that,
Moerdani was also given a trust to lead Central of Strategic Intelligence under the
Department of Defence and Security. Through this position, he held an
exceptionally broad authority in emergency situation to employ special force of
Army (Kopassandha was at the time) and carried out special tasks from
President, among others, to plan and perform invasion to East Timor, buy
modified jet fighters from Israel and rescue mission of a Garuda airplane hijacked
in Thailand. 6
Well thought-out as happened as expected in accomplish intelligence tasks,
Moerdani was appointed Commander in Chief of ABRI in early 1980s. When he
was a Commander in Chief, Moerdani started to develop Strategic Intelligence
Body (BAIS), which has international network by planting defence attaches in
some countries. BAIS has progressively developed until early 1990s when
Suharto started to dispose of Moerdani and his close men. By means of support of
great amount of budget and domestic as well as overseas network, BAIS became
an intelligence body that was superior to other intelligence bodies.7 BAIS that
invented to handle strategic issues mainly exercised to finger domestic security
6
See David Jenkins. 1984. Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975 1983. Monograph
Series. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. Southeast Asia Program. Cornell University, Ithaca New York. p.
26 28.
7 See Haryadi Wirawan. 2005. “Evolusi Intelijen Indonesia” dalam Andi Widjajanto (ed.). op.cit. p. 41.
83
threats instead and even possessed hands at district level through territorial
command structure.8 Suharto’s enslavement on intelligence was dreadfully
immense until the end of 1980s. However, in early 1990s, along with his parted
relation with Moerdani, Suharto changed the strategy to secure his power by
embracing forces outside ABRI, especially with conservative Islamic group
through its main instrument, Indonesia Moslem Scholars Association (ICMI). The
confiscation of Moerdani and his close men from Suharto’s circle of power marked
a new era of Suharto’s power consolidation that became more thin-skinned
toward the growth of democracy movement in Indonesia. Since early 1990s, the
main challenge for Suharto had been civil society groups, which began
questioning his authoritative and repressive power. Under new Commander in
Chief, General Faisal Tanjung, BAIS was discharged and replaced by a new body
called ABRI Intelligence Body (BIA) with recruits who deliberately chosen to
remove Moerdani’ sway in Indonesia intelligence realm. Suharto intentionally
appointed Lieutenant General Moetojib, a general who had not too many
influences and considered would not disobey him, to lead BAKIN. According to
Indonesia intelligence observers, this also had influence on its performance.9 At
the same time, Indonesia intelligence began to monitor activities of prodemocracy groups and political activists from civil society who in opposition to
Suharto’s government. New order’s ruler wittingly used religious issues to break
up civil society in order to weaken them so they would be powerless to challenge
his power. Thus, it is not surprising if ever since the early 1990s conflicts with
religious, racial, ethnic, and intergroup (SARA) issues have been spreading in
many regions in Indonesia that the government could not cope with it. After the
fall of Suharto, conflicts with religious nuance happened in series in West
Kalimantan, Moluccas, and Poso (Central Sulawesi). Indonesia intelligence,
which accustomed to be so aware with such conflicts, all the sudden became
powerless or perhaps even was not fretful to anticipate these communal conflicts
that eating up the country from inside. Although empirically is rather difficult to
prove that there is a deduction that the new order force, either from military or
civilian circle, has played its hands in provoking these various groups to
recuperate weight, both in politics and economy.
A Pathway towards Intelligence that Consonant with Democracy
For the period of President B.J Habibie administration, there was no significant
change in Indonesia intelligence realm and its reputation as an extension
instrument of repressive regime still attached on the institution. Intelligence that
inured to serve up the needs of government revealed to be futile in anticipating
many political unrests and conflict escalation in many regions. While other
institutions have been starting to do the reform, intelligence institution appears
invincible from public demand that call for government accountability. BAKIN,
under President Habibie, was led by Lieutenant General Z.A. Maulani who has
background as a military intellectual. Indeed, there are some important notes in
relation to political changes conducted by President Habibie. For instance, he
annulled Subversion Law (Law No.11/1963) that used to be exercised, by new
order regime, to snatch and detain its political rivals. Besides that, Habibie
8
9
See Andi Widjajanto. 2006. (ed.) Menguak Tabir Intelijen “Hitam” Indonesia. Jakarta. Pacivis & FES. p. 76.
Ken Conboy. op.cit. p. 215.
84
administration also succeeded to reveal mystery behind the disappearance and
abduction of democracy activists, in the last years of Suharto administration,
which involving some Kopassus officers who have been proven to be the
performers and obtained prison term. Despite the important political changes,
people are still not satisfied with the sturdy impunity customs and also for the
reason that there is no exertion taken to reform intelligence institution. Agenda to
reform state intelligence body is still not considered as a priority weigh against to
the other security policies such as reform within TNI and resolving conflict in
some districts.
As a president with community organizational background, Abdurrahman Wahid
(known also as Gus Dur) acquired a strong determination to reform security
sector in Indonesia although at the same time he had to face challenges and even
pressure from TNI leaders whom tried to impede political reform he had fought
for. In substituting Z.A. Maulani, Gus Dur favoured Lieutenant General Arie
Kumaat to lead BAKIN. In reality, the competence of Gus Dur to execute his will to
make a fundamental change within TNI organization had to face a strong
resistance and even resulted to his fall by cooperation between nationalist group
in the parliament and TNI who detested with his intervention. At the same time,
Gus Dur had to deal with conflict escalation in Aceh, Moluccas and Poso, where
Indonesia security and intelligence have shown their feeble in anticipating and
handling the communal conflicts, which are believed to involve TNI and police
forces.
BAKIN has been changed to State Intelligence Body (BIN), during the
administration of President Megawati Sukarnoputri and led by Lieutenant General
A.M Hendropriyono who has military intelligence background. Soon after
Megawati succeeded Gus Dur, the major national security challenge was the issue
of global terrorism network in Indonesia. Moreover, there have many bombing
actions conducted by terrorism network since 2000. Owing to that, a professional
intelligence is required to face the increasing threats on national security and
simultaneously, it must take people aspiration, which demands for Indonesia
intelligence not to reiterate similar blunders made in the past, into its account.
However, response given by President Megawati has not met the actual people
desire. The government seemed reluctant to perform a comprehensive reform to
intelligence institution due to political risks that she could deal with. Megawati
administration supported by conservative military leaders whom did not want to
make any fundamental change to security institutions that still dominated by
military circle. Besides, the government also considered intelligence reform as
not a policy priority that can exceed other national agenda, which are more
necessary such as economic recovery and conflict determination in many areas.
As previous director of BIN, A.M Hendropriyono admits how intelligence
personnel in the field need comprehensible legal mandate from people
representatives in order to give them a lucid guide in performing their tasks.
Nevertheless, A.M Hendropriyono clarified his arguments by stating, “But most of
all, I wanted an intelligence law in order to enable BIN to detain suspects for
limited periods. Such detention would not be for judicial reasons – the police
already have that authority – but rather for operational reasons”. 10
10
A. M. Hendropriyono, “Indonesia badly needs to enact intelligence law”, The Jakarta Post, October 5, 2005.
85
With a frame of thought as mentioned above, Megawati administration has
performed a minimum policy in reforming Indonesia intelligence. This can be
seen in the legal basis used as a ground for the existence of BIN in replacing
BAKIN. The first legal product was President Decree no.103/2001 on Amendment
of government’s institution of non-department’s position, task, authority,
organizational, and performance. The article 34 of President Decree no.103/2001
stated that BIN should perform government tasks in intelligence in accordance
with existing regulations. With the intention of strengthening the coordination
among existing elements within government’s intelligence community, the
government passed President Instruction No.5/2002 in which BIN is given tasks
to establish integrity, plan, and functioning of intelligence tasks in order to
accomplish the aim of national security. Civil society community was questioning
the effectiveness of intelligence coordination carried out by BIN based on high
occurrence of boom explosions, conflict escalation and violence in regional level
11
during Megawati administration. Lack of legal umbrella, as a base for
intelligence tasks to be performed, opens wide a chance of the violation of human
rights and civil freedom. Post September 11th, 2001 tragedy, the challenge on
national security is multifaceted in nature, therefore a comprehensive legislation
is necessary to regulate it. Besides a clear legal mandate for intelligence
personnel, a set of regulations, on the accountability to the people as sovereignty
proprietor, is also necessary. What has been using in Indonesia up to now is not
rule of law but rule of bureaucratic law where executive domination is its main
characteristic in handling national security issues in Indonesia and at the same
time political parties and members of parliament have insufficient knowledge
about intelligence functions in a democratic country. It seems there is a rather
extensive gap of knowledge between non-governmental organization, in one
hand, that actively struggle for democracy and human rights and members of
parliament who have inadequate understanding on intelligence. All these times,
initiatives to endorse the intelligence reform are always from the civil society
community, while the government and people representatives merely perform
reactively and tend to behave conservatively by preferring on the use of state
power, coercively, in coping with the national security threats.
Due to the nonexistence of particular laws on intelligence, in Indonesia, hence in
the midst of the increasing of violence actions in form of boom blasts the
government has been using ad hoc and partial ways to cope with national security
threats. When terrorism acts have been increased in many places in Indonesia,
the government reacted by re-activating Regional Intelligence Community
(Kominda) through President Instruction no.5/ 2002 as its legal basis. The
purpose of Kominda is to provide regional governments to conduct coordination
in intelligence aspect in order to take necessary actions to restore security. This
policy harvested severe demonstrations from non-governmental organizations
and human rights activists since the government endowed with no pledge that
Kominda would not be exploited for the interest of the ruler. Besides that, the
tasks of Kominda, which are not formulated, clearly would open an opportunity to
11
86
See Imparsial. op.cit. p. 9.
human rights and civilian citizen freedom violation in the regional.12 In 2006,
Home Affairs Department issued Minister of Home Affairs Regulation no. 11/2006
on Regional Intelligence Community establishment and Minister of Home Affairs
Regulation no.12/2006 on People Early Warning in Regional level. Those two
ministry level regulations identified the nervous of Indonesia government in
governing domestic intelligence that ought to be along the lines of certain
principles in order to steer clear of making own citizens adversary.13 Although the
government has a good intention with all of these measures, however every ad
hoc regulation in intelligence field will rather just create even bigger problem for
citizens than protect them. Moreover, the informal control by non-governmental
organizations toward security apparatus in regional level is weaker and less
influence than the ones in the central level.
Act in responding to the growing demand in calling for the government to endow
with a draft of state intelligence bill that can accommodate both intelligence
th
interests and democracy, at March 10 2006 such draft offered to the public then
pro and contra reactions of many parties emerged. Should be recognized that
prior to the government proffer, a working group of State Intelligence Reform in
Indonesia coordinated by Pacivis of University of Indonesia has been prepared a
civil society version draft of state intelligence bill. The draft appeared to be hard to
accept by the government (especially BIN) as it considered to have more weight
on citizens’ interest and to draw close space limitation for state apparatus in
dealing with such convolution of national security threats in 21th century.
Nevertheless, until now this paper is made, People Representative Council (DPR)
has not discussed about the government’s draft. As a new democratic country, it
is difficult for Indonesia to assess how far a State Intelligence bill has met
standard that commonly apply in many other countries. For that reason, the only
way to make an assessment is to make use of other countries’ experiences in the
course of publications that have been publicly published. The coverage span of
the bill is somewhat comprehensive seeing that it contains many significant
issues concerning balance between the need for professional intelligence and
democracy and human rights protection. Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) has published an occasional paper titled
Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight – A Practitioner’s View, which the
contents, among others, explain some challenges faced by a new democratic
country in performing its intelligence institution reform. Besides that, DCAF also
provides a practical guidance for every new democratic country what criteria
should be fulfilled to carry out a comprehensively intelligence reform without
sacrificing the effectiveness of national security policy.14
Some important issues on State Intelligence Bill recommended by Indonesia
government will be remarked, based on the thoughts decanted in the DCAF
12
Ibid. p. 28 30.
13
See Telik Sandi, fourthnightly bulletin published by Simpul Aliansi Nasional untuk Demokratisasi Intelijen
(SANDI) p. 2.
14
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), July 2003, “Intelligence Practice and
Democratic Oversight A Practitioner's View”, Geneva, p. 59.
87
publication. Position and authority given to BIN are major in draft of State
Intelligence Bill proposed by government. This can be understood for the reason
that historically there have always been the struggles among intelligence
institutions for influence and control over resources. The role of BIN, described in
chapter 2 of the bill, is bigger than other intelligence community members.15
Moreover, in article 15 stated that “state bodies, government organizations,
private organizations, mass organizations, and every citizens compel to provide
information required by BIN so as to perform intelligence activities”. This
extensive authority of BIN will possess a potency to cause problem or to provide
an opportunity for intelligence misuse by ruler unless there is an effective control
mechanism, both by government formal institution and by public.
In article 12 stated that BIN shall possess a special authority to apprehend a
person and it can keep the person in custody for as long as 7 x 24 hours for the
interrogation purpose. This proviso generates anxiety among civilian’s groups
and human rights activists. Hitherto, in every draft has been proposed by
government (BIN), this clause is constantly included. This spawns a question on
why government dreadfully persistence to put the clause in? Generally, it can be
said that its reason is associated to fact that in any governments, they will
unquestionably put liability toward national security as main concern. However,
other more specific reasons are also can be added to it. First, up till now
government, especially intelligence institute always becomes a target for public
critics due to its incapability to avert terrorism acts, which had been happening
from 2000 to 2005. A shortcut is made-up, as it does not want to be blame
anymore, by creating a lawful rationalization to allow intelligence personnel to
make apprehend or detain. Perhaps the actual issue is the intelligence
incapability to map existing threat potency or a weak coordination among
security apparatus. The suspicion of civilian groups is level-headed because
having such authority to detain or apprehend people does not automatically
lessen threat potency toward national security. Moreover if there is no
improvement in professionalism and coordination among government apparatus.
Secondly, Indonesia government, especially intelligence body is virtually
influenced by general tendency exists in other countries, not only in Southeast
Asia but also in developed democratic countries in where they enfold such
stipulation in their laws on intelligence and national security with the intention to
tackle global terrorism threats. It seems that overlapping between intelligence
function and law enforcement becomes a tendency, which threatens law
supremacy principles of democratic country. By political setting such this, it is
predicted that government will keep “press” on its desire so the intelligence
personnel could be given an authority to detain and interrogate people. The
question is what strategy possessed by civilian groups in dealing with this
militaristic intelligence course? It is not enough to question only article 12 of the
bill without proposing optional bylaw in order to secure democracy and human
rights. There is a suggestion, based on minus malum and maximum bonum
principles (seeking the least negative or the most positive effect formulation),
that intelligence personnel in performing they tasks along with other law
15
88
Intelligence community, in government version Bill of State Intelligence article 7 (1), consists of BIN, Badan
Intelijen Strategis TNI and other intelligence bodies exist within TNI milieu, Indonesia Police Intelligence,
Presecutor Office Intelligence, and other departments or instances' intelligence elements
enforcement apparatus (such as Police and Attorney Offices) shall form a task
force that deliberately established in addressing a certain tasks. In the task force,
people arresting and detaining should be carried out by police and not by
intelligence and based on firm preliminary evidence. If there is misprocedure,
those who deem to be treated unfairly have possibility to presecute police who
arrested or detained them. Thus, the mechanism of democratic country is
maintained without reducing the effort to prevent actions that endanger national
security.
The flaws of State Intelligence Bill that need to be exposed, in relation with its
article 12, is there is no clear distinction between positive and aggressive
intelligence and what the procedure is and when it can be executed. Mixing the
two different working methods may endanger civil freedom and blur intelligence
accountability to the public. Positive intelligence encompasses collecting,
managing and analysing, and making information that can be used to strengthen
early warning system and analysis system of strategic information as anticipation
to deal with national security threats. Whilst, aggressive intelligence is addressed
to cope with foreign elements, which threatening national security by using
contra-intelligence operation and or contra-espionage methods to disclose alike
activities performing by foreign parties or foes. If this method is used to own
citizens, then there must be crucial requirements to be fulfilled. First, there is firm
evidence that there are citizens who work for foreign or enemy intelligence’s
interests. Second, there is activity that leads to adverse toward the whole
structure of constitution and state, which reflected through violence actions.
Third, there is agitation or intimidation efforts to compel or provoke a primordial
violence occur. Fourth, there is evidence that violence acts are taken to urge on
social change for the sake of individual or group’s interests. Therefore, aggressive
intelligence should not perform randomly or in a slapdash fashion by intelligence
apparatus. It is necessary to clarify that the use of aggressive intelligence
working method should not violate what is known as non-derogable rights, which
encompasses rights to live, rights to be free from torment, rights to be free from
inhuman deeds and sentences, rights to be free from slavery, rights to get equal
recognition as individual before laws, rights posses freedom of thinking, heart
consciousness and religion.
In new emerging democratic countries, such as Indonesia, control towards
political institute and government performances is a very crucial because having
modern political institution is not guarantee that democracy is applied. A critical
study identified that articles in the bill, which associated with controlling are so
little, it’s only about 4 percents of the total. For instatnce, article 43, on
establishing DPR sub-commission that in charge to prevent the execution of
special authority by intelligence apparatus. Controlling, certainly, can be
conducted through intelligence budget that is obtained only from APBN
allocation. The inclusion of this article can be considered as a progressive step,
however considering how flimsy is the intelligence institute towards civil rights
violation then it is not wrong to adopt multi layered controlling system, that
introduced by developed countries, for its intelligence agency. Thus, State
Intelligence Bill needs to provide more articles to assure that there will be more
comprehensive supervision. Regardless the inclusion that budget allocation is
only sourced from APBN in the bill, civil society groups yearn for the intelligence to
89
make description of used budget report in more transparent way, however it is
also realized that to make BIN budget report too detail is also lessen the
effectiveness of the institution’s performance. The apprehension of civil society is
reasonable because in the last few years, BIN budget allocation from APBN can be
measured as insufficient for dealing with the increasingly complex national
security threats.16 This condition of budget deficiency will generate opportunity
for BIN to seek out other financial sources that off APBN and potentially can
infringe the laws.
It can be learned to use general practices carry out in countries, where democracy
has been established, in developing an effective control mechanism on Indonesia
intelligence. In countries such as UK, USA and Australia, intelligence is strictly
scrutinized by parliament as well as civil society, especially NGOs that active in
human rights field and mass media, which always ready to expose abuses in
intelligence’s authority. Indonesia which has developed its democratic
institutions such as political parties, parliament, independent mass media and
civil society, that no longer hurdle by government, should be capable of
developing a similar control mechanism. Indonesia should also be able to adopt
what in countries, where democracy has been established, known as oversight
multilayered principle. The principle expresses that intelligence function
performance could be closely watched by four intertwined supervision layers and
the external control layer includes the internal control layer First, every
intelligence bodies has internal control mechanism conducting by the heads
toward they subordinates just the same as a common bureaucratic practise. In
this layer heads should have guarantee that intelligence personnel have carried
out they tasks entirely in accordance with procedures laid by unit and
organisation leaders. Besides that, subordinates should report regularly to their
heads so the heads will be able to monitor and evaluate the tasks that have been
being carried out. In the next layer control is performed by executive power in
which, for instance, President receives repor from the director in charge for the
intelligence body or if the intelligence body is under a department then the related
minister should perform the monitoring towards intelligence body that under his
authority. Control by executives is exceptionally significant to guarantee that the
intelligence body conducts the priority of government policy that has been passed
in accordance with actual national ecurity threats. In turn, as common practices
in democratic countries, executive’s power will be secrutinized by parliament or
DPR where People Representative Council could ask for guarantee from
intelligence body and head of executive that intelligence function performance is
consistent with the existing laws. DPR is also able to carry out monitoring towards
intelligence bodies regarding to the execution of particular authority possessed
by intelligence so they are not violate the existing laws and not in disagreement
with citizen’s human rights. In this case, DPR could form a commission with
special task to scrutinize intelligence performance and to handle cases of laws
violation made by intelligence and then, upon its recommendation, the cases are
brought to the court. Finally, at the most external layer, independent bodies that
receiving grievance or complain from citizents which usually are facilitated by civil
16
90
For instance, for 2006 budget, APBN allocation for BIN is only Rp 959.037.500.000, - (approximately
98.795.330 USD and in APBN 2007 is Rp. 1.072.616.049.000, -. Source ; Bahan Rapat Dengar Pendapat
Komisi I DPR RI dengan Kepala BIN (12 Maret 2007).
society groups such as NGO and mass media, can perform the monitoring. The
rights of civil society groups in revealing abuse of authority by intelligence body
should protected by laws, accordingly government could not act arbitrarily and
violating civil rights in the name of national security. This becomes more
important for the reason that Indonesia has ratified Human Rights Conventions
on civil rights and politics of citizens.
Summary
It is fact that today Indonesia is looking for a suitable form of institution to
accommodate governmental function in intelligence field. Previous experiences
has shown how important is the intelligence reform for the purpose of securing
national security and also at the same time to protect democracy and civil
freedom from anti-democracy parties. Historically, Indonesia has no precedence
in organizing intelligence, which give in before the law supremacy. Intelligence
has been a mean for ruler to oppress its oppositions and consequently intelligence
has always become a bone of contention among various groups or individuals who
want to seize power by means of ill-mannered. One of flaws in a new democratic
country like Indonesia is lack of public and people representatives understanding
on intelligence realm. However, this cannot be used to justify the government
(BIN) monopoly in developing concept on intelligence reform. Thus both
government and civil society groups, due to the lack of public’s knowledge, need
to endow with enlightenment in order to avoid citizens as objects of power
manipulated by an authoritarian ruler. Briefly, intelligence reform in Indonesia is
far too significant to be fingered only by BIN. People should be involved in all the
way through whole process of intelligence reform, including in implementing
intelligence legislation in the future. National security and democracy are two
common objectives, which should not be set against.
Bibliography:
Conboy, Ken. 2007. Intel: Menguak Tabir Dunia Intelijen Indonesia. Jakarta:
Pustaka Primatama.
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). 2003.
“Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight – A Practitioner’s View”, Geneva,
July 2003
David Jenkins, David. 1984. Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military
Politics 1975 – 1983. Monograph Series. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.
Southeast Asia Program. Cornell University, Ithaca New York.
Hendropriyono, A. M. 2005. “Indonesia badly needs to enact intelligence law”,
The Jakarta Post, October 5, 2005.
Imparsial. 2005. Evaluasi Kinerja BIN di Masa Transisi. Jakarta: Imparsial.
Manullang. A. C. 2001. Menguak Tabu Intelijen: Teror, Motif dan Rezim. Jakarta:
Panta Rei.
Widjajanto, Andi. (ed.). 2005. Reformasi Intelijen Negara. Jakarta. Pacivis dan
FES
______________ (ed.). 2006. Menguak Tabir Intelijen “Hitam” Indonesia.
Jakarta, Pacivis dan FES
91
92
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (BAIS)
Rizal Darma Putra1
Background
The State Intelligence Agency (BIN) is Indonesia’s main intelligence service.
Their duties cover a variety of aspects across a number of different sectors in
society, and they are directly responsible to the President. Until now the existence
of BIN has not been based on the law, but on the Indonesian Presidential Decree
Number 30 of 2003, and on the Presidential Decree Amendment Number 103 of
2001 (on the Position, Duty, Function, Authority, Organisational Structure and
Administration of Non-Departmental Government Institutions). This has been
amended several times by the Presidential Decree No.46 of 2002, in which the
State Intelligence Coordination Agency was changed into the State Intelligence
Agency (BIN). BIN’s main duty and function are to perform national intelligence
duties and to play a role in organizing community intelligence.2 Thus, BIN’s
relationship with other intelligence institutions are inter-service relations within
the realms of community intelligence. This means that there is no command
hierarchy between BIN and non-BIN intelligence services.
In addition to BIN, there are other state institutions which also perform
intelligence duties, such as the intelligence unit of the Attorney General,
Immigration, the Customs Office and the Security Intelligence Agency of the
Indonesian Police.
There is also the military intelligence service of the
Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia/TNI), which became
prominent during President Soeharto’s time, and which is known as the Strategic
Intelligence Agency (BAIS).
It can be argued that of all the intelligence institutions mentioned above, only
BIN is directly responsible to the president. Both the military intelligence service,
such as BAIS and the police intelligence – Baintelkam, are directly responsible to
the Commanders of their respective institutions, i.e. the TNI Commander and the
Chief of the Indonesian Police (Kapolri). BAIS is commanded by a Major General
and Baintelkam is chaired by a Police Inspector General, which is equivalent to a
Major General in the military. The leaders of both these institutions (the TNI
Commander and the Chief of the Indonesian Police) provide intelligence reports
from their institutions to the President respectively.
Although BIN is the intelligence service which is directly responsible to the
President, BIN does not, however, have operational authority over the military
intelligence service or of the police, who have their own structural resources and
support at the lowest level in rural areas. In fact, BAIS also has a broad range of
resources available, and they can also obtain information through the Defense
Attaches and their staff at the Indonesian Embassies throughout the world.
1 Rizal Darma Putra, is the Executive Director of LESPERSSI, Jakarta.
2 Y Wahyu Saronto, Intelijen Teori, Aplikasi, dan Modernisasi, PT Ekalaya
Saputra, Jakarta 2004, pp.21-22.
93
Therefore, it can be said that BAIS is a military intelligence organisation, whose
operational range is very broad (especially in the domestic sphere) and this fact
has been endorsed by the lack of reform within the intelligence services until now.
Threat Issue and Perception
The Intelligence service’s ”assessment” of the national threat (threat
assessment) should be based on a consensus or by agreement in the Parliament,
(this may be made through the intelligence commission), who will make a policy
concerning the ’’national threat perception’’. The intelligence service explains to
the parliament a number of issues categorized by their importance as a national
threat, so the parliament can agree upon it as a common perception on national
threat. Then the intelligence service formulates a technical note from an
operational perspective and recommends what actions can be taken. Thereby,
the policy in intelligence sector more or less will gain a legal basis and political
basis because the intelligence service in starting the intelligence cycle, which
normally starts from planning or briefing, has de facto obtained its legitimation
from the parliament. Thus, it is expected that when ”the threat perception” has
been agreed upon by the parliament, the intelligence service does its activity
without digressing from the policy line that has been agreed upon collectively.
Therefore, this is expected to be able to minimise the abuse of power by using the
intelligence service for the political interests of the ruling regime, or a certain
interest group, or even exploited by state interest or foreign intelligence services.
The figure below is known as the intelligence cycle, and is a mechanism which
prevails throughout the intelligence services. In order to minimise the abuse of
power within the intelligence services, a national threat perception is established
based on a consensus or by agreement in the parliament, which starts from the
”planning or briefing circle” as shown in the intelligence cycle below.
Intelligence Cycle
94
As long as there is no national threat policy provided by the parliament and the
political authorities, the intelligence service will tend to make its own
interpretation on the criteria of a national threat as they perceive it.
As interpreted by the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), which is also a
military intelligence agency, interpretations are made of internal (domestic)
threat factors among others by observing critical groups in the society, and
differentiating them, for example, as the ‘radical left or right groups, or similar.
This kind of threat interpretation reminds us of the stigma of the intelligence
apparatus during the Soeharto regime, in muzzling free speech and using various
pretexts to ”take action against” critical groups expressing dissent against the
government. Below is a quotation from the Head of the Strategic Intelligence
Agency (Ka Bais), Major General TNI Syafnil Armen, from a seminar held at the
Department of Defence on 26 August 2006, concerning the critical groups :
The understanding and full comprehension of parts of the society of the
ideology of Pancasila nowadays, has started to experience a degradation
because of the existence of certain groups’ efforts who wish to force an
ideology other than Pancasila. This can be seen from the growing number
of radical groups activities as well as with the passing of the reformation
era:
-
The Radical Left, Today the radical left (Raki) is divided into two
politically-oriented groups, that is, the social democratic group (socialist)
and the communists/marxists. The activities they undertake, amongst
others, are the gathering of facts about communism in Indonesia,
organizational coordination, opinion making in the form of books and other
publications, film making and theatre, as well as the infiltration of cadres,
sympathisers or supporters into the legislative. These activities strengthen
the movement of the radical left group. One of their group’s main purposes
is the abrogation of AP XXV/MPRS/1966, as the preliminary condition to
change the state ideology, Pancasila, and to resurrect communism in
Indonesia.
-
The Radical Right (eds : Islamic Militant). The radical right is active in
infiltrating various political organisations in its effort to apply Islamic law,
by performing dakwah (religious proselytizing) and jihad (holy war). They
also conduct demonstrations to gain muslims’ sympathy/support. The
organisation has used and linked up with the Jemaah Islamiyah (Islam
Community) and the Sovereign Islam Country (Negara Islam
Berdaulat/NIB) organisation. The appointment of its main figures in
various positions in the executive, legislative and judicial branch, become
its strategy to influence and put pressure on any future government
policies.
-
Other radical groups. These consist of NGOs and various elements who
are disappointed with the government, such as Imparsial, Kontras, and
Elsham. They receive aid from foreign parties and are active in giving
political and financial support as well as advocating for the separatist
95
Movement in the country. In addition, they attack every Government policy in
a disproportionate way, by bringing up global issues.3
The explanation above conveyed by the head of BAIS is an example of how the
national threat interpretation comes from the domestic environment, by defining
some members of society who are critical of the government as a national threat,
so they can be categorised as radical groups considered to be jeopardizing the
state ideology, Pancasila.
In his statement, the Head of BAIS also indicates the existence of a number of
members of the legislature, executive, and judiciary who can be categorised as a
radical group responsible for ”attacking” the government. That threat perception
is a form of threat interpretation usually practiced by authoritarian regimes, as it
views parties who are outside the government as a potential threat and who may
disrupt the government’s viability. So, a critical attitude toward the government is
sometimes interpreted as anything that may disrupt administration of the
government which considers them to be equivalent to a threat to national
security.
This kind of thing still happens because the political authorities, who should be
responsible for representing the people, are not involved in the establishment of
the ”threat assessment”, and also because the operational pattern and scope of
the intelligence service, which should be focused more on military intelligence
aspects, have not been changed. Apparently military intelligence was used in
Indonesia for domestic, political operational needs, especially during the
Soeharto regime, and they still perform intelligence activities today which
monitor domestic political dynamics, and interpret some non-combatant groups
in society as a threat. This happens because the scope of duty and the
organisational structure have barely change since this institution was formed.
Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS)
Although BAIS is not the only intelligence organisation within TNI, it is the most
reliable TNI intelligence organisation, and as such is given the main responsibility
by TNI HEADQUARTER to perform intelligence functions. This does not only
include military intelligence activities, as BAIS is also responsible for carrying out
intelligence activities with regard to non-military domestic problems.
The Evolution of BAIS
BAIS derives from the Army Psychology Centre (abbreviated to Psi AD), which
belongs to the Army Headquarters (MBAD). Its aim was to balance the
Intelligence Central Bureau (BPI), which was under Subandrio’s lead and during
that time was responsible for the arrest of many Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) members.
3 The
Head of TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency Mayjen TNI Syafnil Armen, Persepsi Ancaman Internal dan
Transnasional in Seminar at the Department of Defense RI, August 26, 2006, pp.14-15.
96
At the beginning of the New Order, the Department of Defence and Security
(Dephankam) built a Centre of Strategic Intelligence (abbreviated to
Pusintelstrat) and Psi AD members were mainly incorporated into it. Pusintelstrat
was led by the Head of G-I Security Defence, Brigadier General L.B. Moerdani,
who remained in this post until he became the Commander of the Indonesian
Armed Forces. During this time, military intelligence had an operational
intelligence agency called the Command for the Restoration of Security and Public
Order (Kopkamtib) Intelligence Task Force. It was this agency which in the era of
Kopkamtib, played a lead role as the Operational Intelligence Force.
In 1980, Pusintelstrat and the Kopkamtib Intelligence Task Force was merged into
the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) Intelligence Agency (abbreviated into BIA).
The position of the Head of BIA was held by the Commander of ABRI, while BIA’s
operational activities were led by the Deputy Chief.
In 1986, and in response to the challenging cirumstances, BIA was changed into
BAIS. This change had an impact on the organisational restructuring, and their
tasks were now to include the analysis of all National Security Defence and
Development Strategic aspects.
Even before the organisation was restructured, another change took place in
which BAIS was changed back to BIA, and as such was only responsible for
military intelligence operations. The position of the Head of BIA was therefore no
longer held by the Commander of ABRI. Then in 1999, BIA became BAIS TNI once
again4 and has kept that title ever since.
In its organisational structure, BAIS is headed by an officer with the rank of Major
General and has a Chief Deputy of Brigadier General rank. In addition, there are
supervising Directors which lead the following seven directorates within the
military intelligence structure;
- Directorate A : dealing with domestic problems
- Directorate B : dealing with foreign problems
- Directorate C : dealing with the defence sector
- Directorate D : dealing with security issues
- Directorate E : dealing with or conducting psychological operations
- Directorate F : doing administrative and financial duties
- Directorate G: managing and providing intelligence products to BAIS and
the TNI Commander.5
Performing Duties in the Field
In gathering information as well as doing various intelligence activities it can be
said that BAIS is operationally effective because of broad support both inside and
outside the country, for example, obtaining information from abroad, usually the
information channelled through defense or military attaches, for which their
assignments are based instructions from BAIS. While for the supply of domestic
information, information gathering is other than through territorial Command
4 http://www.wikipediaIndonesia..Bais
5Angel Rabasa John Haseman, The Military
and Democracy in Indonesia Challenges, Politics, and
Power, RAND, Santa Monica, 2002, p.32.
97
structure line from various Regional Military Commands (Kodam). BAIS also has
an intelligence unit ’satintel” (Intel Unit) which works regularly in various areas
categorised as ”conflict vulnerable” areas. This unit comes under the direct
command of BAIS. While as the operational implementers especially when
executing intelligence operation ”special” tasks, besides using by BAIS apparatus
assigned by BAIS Intelligence Force HEADQUARTER, field duty is normally also
done by Special Force Command (Kopassus) personnel, who come from
Detachment 81 Anti Terror (Gultor).
Between 1995-2001, Detachment 81 was expanded into Group 5 Anti-Terrorism.
Then in 2001, this unit experienced a reorganisation and became Unit-81 Anti
Terror (Sat-81 Gultor). Sat-81 consists of two battalions: the first battalion is
known as the Special Act Battalion (Batalion Aksi Khusus/Yon Aksus) 811 and the
second is called the Assistence Battalion (Batalion Bantuan/Ban) 812. Each
battalion consists of two detachments.
As part of their assignment, Sat-81 works in small units or ”sections” of 10
personnel or in units of 4 to 5 persons. It is estimated that Sat-81 now has a
compliment of around 800 personnel.6 These small units, comprised of 10
personnel, are usually assigned by BAIS to carry out routine intelligence tasks in
areas categorised as ”conflict vulnerable,” such as in Papua, New Guinea.
BAIS and Military Intelligence Supporting Elements
Military intelligence is also carried out through the territorial command structure,
and in each Regional Military Command (Kodam) there is an Intelligence
Detachment (Detasemen Intel/Den-Intel) performing basic intelligence duties
(investigation, pacification and counter-intelligence) in each area which becomes
the responsibility of that Kodam.
Nevertheless, the intelligence apparatus assigned by BAIS in the Sat-Intel in an
area of Regional Military Command (Kodam), may also access and cooperate with
Kodam’s intelligence element attached in the Intelligence Detachment. Where in
this case Den-Intel is a permanent intelligence unit in the Territorial Command
structure gives an intelligence duty planning or briefing, as well as gets the
feedback through the intelligence section officer either in the Resort Military
Command (Korem) and Koter structures whose hierarchy is under Korem, being
the District Military Command (Kodim). Afterwards, Den-intel receiving the
intelligence information from that section officer, passes it on or reports it to the
Assistant Intelligence in the Kodam.
6 Angkasa
98
Edisi Koleksi, Indonesia Special Forces, Jakarta, 2003, pp. 15-16.
The Intelligence Mechanism Structure of the Territorial Command
KODAM
Commander
Assistant
Intelligence
KOREM
Commander
Intelligence
Section
Officer
KODIM
Commander
Intelligence
Section
Officer
Intelligence
Detachment
Commander
Source: An Interview with a midrank TNI Officer
The Responsibility for intelligence activities in each Kodam lies with the Regional
Military Commander (Pangdam). The Territorial/regional Military Commanders
(Pangdam) are responsible for supplying the intelligence information to TNI
Headquarters, through the Asistant Intelligence for the Chief of TNI General Staff
(Asisten Intelijen Kepala Staf Umum TNI/Asintel Kasum), who then presents this
information to the TNI Commander.
So, even though the ”network” of military intelligence channels are the same, in
that they ultimately flow to the TNI Commander, and that organisationally there is
a line of co-operation between the intelligence officer element in BAIS and the
intelligence personnel from Kodam within intelligence operations in the field, TNI
Headquarters manages two different activity streams within the hierarchy of
military intelligence activity, that is, BAIS with its own intelligence structure and
on the other hand the intelligence structure organized by Asintel Kasum TNI
through the Territorial Command structure. Via such a mechanism intelligence
information may complete and verify each other before the final information
presentation at TNI HEADQUARTER area to TNI Commander.
With such operational structure and pattern from BAIS, it can be said that the
focus is more on domestic intelligence activities, because besides mobilizing its
intelligence unit to various areas categorized as ”conflict vulnerable,” it can also
use the territorial intelligence support apparatus, whose structure is made up
from the provincial to the rural level through the Villages’ Non-Commissioned
Officers (Babinsa).
99
It does not mean that this operational structure and pattern is not good, however
the most important issue is how BAIS places the national threat paradigm in
making operations planning and its intelligence apparatus mobilization which in
this case is the military unit. Certainly, as long as the domestic threat is
combatant, then the existence of BAIS either in intelligence activities in domestic
areas or overseas still can be considered relevant.
Indonesian Intelligence Community Structure
President
TNI Commander
TNI HEADQUARTER
BIN
BAIS
Territorial Command
Structure
Source: Angel Rabasa – Johan Haseman, The Military and Democracy In
Indonesia – Chalenges, Politics, and Power, RAND, Santa Monica, 2002, p.
33
Conclusion
The existence of and the activities undertaken by the military intelligence service
in Indonesia, is a part of the Indonesian Armed Forces organisational structure,
scope of work and activities. This means that military intelligence is expected to
be able to support the performance of the Indonesian Armed Forces. However,
not only does the TNI organisation ”activate” the Strategic Intelligence Agency
(BAIS), as the single military intelligence organisation within the TNI body to
perform intelligence work, but there is also another intelligence mechanism at
work, which relies on the territorial command structure. In addition, even the
special force unit such as Kopassus, also has a unit which has a combat
intelligence capability specification, that often helps BAIS with its intelligence
duties. This means that there are a number of intelligence ”apparatus” within the
TNI organisation generally operating within the domestic scope. But what is
known commonly is the network of a number of intelligence structures, either the
one which operates through BAIS, Koter structure, or Kopassus personnel from
Sandi Yudha Group or Detachment 81 Gultor, that is TNI Commander as the top
”user” in TNI.
100
In order to supervise the military intelligence’s accountability, and especially in
order to avoid the abuse of authority, it is necessary to have the protection of
legislation in the form of intelligence oversight legislation, which amongst other
things also explains; the activity and scope of military intelligence, internal
cooperation procedures between the intelligence ”apparatus” in TNI, or with nonTNI intelligence instances such as BIN, as well as foreign intelligence services.
Also by defining the objectives of intelligence operations, which need to be
outlined clearly, because we cannot let the military intelligence ”go” too far in
determining the object/target of military intelligence to a number of non-military
or non-combat issues or parties. This is necessary so that military intelligence no
longer interprets an alternative view or critical attitude from civilians as
automatically being a national threat that must be responded to by the military
intelligence service along with the military assets and capacities. It means that
there should be a clear mechanism as well as the power gained through proper
legislation. This will ensure that BAIS can performing its military intelligence
function in a legitimate manner, either in its duty scope or in the mobilization and
use of military personnel, either those who join in BAIS or those who come from
other military units.
Given the aforementioned legal basis and clear rules for oversight mechanisms, it
is expected to be able to minimise abuses of authority. Thus, democratic control
over the intelligence services, both from the legislative and the executive as the
”user” can hopefully be effective when there is explicit legislation covering the
scope of and relations between intelligence services. Moreover, if BIN is once
again made the main coordinator of all the intelligence services, including BAIS,
hopefully it may relatively make parliament supervision toward various
intelligence services easier. The existence of an intelligence coordinator who is
the main responsibility for the entire network of national intelligence activities
would also facilitate this process.
101
THE BUSINESS OF INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES
ERIC HENDRA1
‘The role of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) is different from other militaries as there is no army of a
developed country/nation that could serve as a comparison. We must develop a doctrine, strategy, tactic and
technique that are based on our personal experience and needs’2
The History and Evolution of the Indonesian Armed Forces Business
The Indonesian military has always maintained the practice of self-budgeting
which is related partially to its historical formation. The Indonesian national army
is the result of a combination of modern military units that were formed and
trained by the Dutch (KNIL) and Japanese (PETA) before its independence, and
the guerrilla army at local levels. As a direct consequence of its history, the
establishment and formation of the Indonesian military is based on local units
which are self responsible for their finances and logistics.3
Therefore, it is no longer a secret that the Indonesian military has been in charge
of its own financial and economic activities since its independence. In 1957,
however, this function became institutionalised as the martial law took control of
the normal administration of justice. The anti-Dutch demonstrations at that time
were led by the nationalists as part of the West Papua status conflict. This
demonstration opened the way for the Indonesian military to take over the
situation, meaning to take over control of all Dutch companies.
The Indonesian military did not only take control of the Dutch companies, but
extended its influence to the rural areas where it took power over the rice mills.
This allowed the military to influence directly the price of rice.4 The same year,
Pertamina, a government owned Oil Company, was built. The company was also
supported by the military and experienced a rapid expansion. However, under the
Dutch occupation, the company served more as a tool for the Dutch’s selfenrichment.5 The management of Pertamina was, for the first time, taken over be
the Indonesian military in the 1960’s. KASAD General A. H. Nasution ordered
Deputy II Colonel Ibnu Sutowo to take over abandoned oil fields in northern
Sumatra. The oil fields were then managed with capital from Japanese business
groups. This era was characterised with the Indonesian military controlling nearly
all important sectors of the Indonesian economy.
1
Eric Hendra, is a Senior Researcher at Indonesia Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies
(LESPERSSI).
2
Bradford, John, "The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for
Reform,"IDSS Working Paper, no. 73, January, 2005. (Statement by the former President Suharto in 1995).
http://www.ntu.edu.sg/idss/publications/Working_papers.html
3 Ishak, Otto Syamsuddin, in Moch. Nurhasim, ed, Practices of Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia,
Burma, Philippines and South Korea, 2005, pp. 91-93.
4
See Palmier, Leslie, The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia, 1985, pp. 201-202
5 McCulloch, Lesley in Brommelhorster, Jorn, The Military as an Economic Actor, 2003, p. 101
102
In the early 1960’s, the Indonesian economy experienced what we know as the
economic rationalisation period. Almost all government sectors experienced
pressure due to a strict fiscal policy. A soldier’s standard salary was insufficient to
cover its basic expenses. The monthly salary would only cover a family’s one
week expenses.6 Even the military infrastructure and equipment were
insufficient. Based on those conditions, many troop commanders took the
initiative to personally bridge the budget shortage with the actual needs of their
soldiers.
The military improved the situation of its expansion by putting Lieutenant General
Ahmad Tirtosudiro in charge of the National Logistic Agency (Bulog). The
operational tasks were supported by the credit fund of the Bank of Indonesia.
Even though General Tirtosudiro failed in managing Bulog, TNI continued to
expand by announcing PT Berdikari and Suhardiman as the President-Director.
Bulog then acquired two additional companies called PT Karkam and Aslam.
Through the acquisition of those new corporations Suhardiman was able gain
access to the Bank Dharma Ekonomi in a number of provinces. He was able to
establish a cooperation contract with the foreign bank in order to obtain a soft
loan for the expansion of the company's own capital. Shortly after, the bank went
bankrupt as it was too euphoric in its business expansion.
In 1964, many British, and a year later, many American companies were taken
under national control. Once more, the Indonesian military was given the order to
control those companies. As a result, the Indonesian military’s economic role
gained more and more strength.
The military leaders in charge of the ‘take over’ aimed at improving their budget
situation by accessing the financial resources of the newly acquired companies.
This was done at two levels: Firstly, they focused on any military officers that
serve in one of the newly ‘nationalised’ companies, also known as state owned
corporations (Badan Usaha Milik Negara/BUMN). The officers were given the
order to withdraw directly funds for military needs/purposes, instead of using the
funds for as normal government revenue.
The issue culminated in 1969, when the Ground Force Headquarters turned the
corporations it managed into private corporations under the command of PT. Tri
Usaha Bhakti. The private corporations included the following business fields: car
assembly, battery plant, shoes and cloths plant, rice mill, Bank Gepabrik, Zamrud
Airlines and a number or projects that were managed collectively with foreign
companies. In some areas, the Regional Military Command (Kodam) was allowed
to build additional companies such as Propelat in Bandung (1970). The business
sector served Pertamina as a key contractor.
The second focus was placed at the local level, where military units started to
raise funds for the purpose of welfare and operational costs. General Rudini,
6 Ibid
6 Rabasa, Angel, et.al, The Military And Democracy In Indonesia, 2002, p. 71
103
Minister of Internal Affairs during the Soeharto era, was also involved in informal
business activities with military facilities. He used military vehicles to transport
commercial goods, established chicken breeding farms and appropriate storage
facilities with the idea of selling eggs and other commodities at a cheap price
(below a fair market value).8
Other illegal activities include the collection of unofficial tax money and the
engagement in other informal commercial activities. Between 1957 and 1959,
Soeharto, as the territorial military commander with the rank of a colonel, built
quite a large and diverse network of companies. The funding of all those
companies was based on money he received from different charity organisations.
He made the public believe that the money was spent on local economic
development and in support of different pension plans. Unfortunately, the
business practices initiated by Soeharto turned into a culture of corruption that
proved difficult to be removed. Soeharto later was transferred to the Staff and
Command College of the Army (Sesko AD) because his previous job seemed to
exceed his level of competences.
In the 1960’s, General A. H. Nasution, Minister of Defence and Security, tried to
take steps to stop the corruption practices in the military. He established a new
governmental institution called Paran with the duty to investigate cases of
corruption in the military sector. However, General Nasution’s effort was stopped
in 1964 by President Soekarno who at this time was trying to balance the
country’s political situation among military, Islamist and communist influences.
As a compromise, General Nasution proposed the concept of a military-political
role, which was known as the ‘middle course’. This concept provided the military
to enter the civil political realm. In return, the military agreed to no longer
dominate the economic and political developments. The entering of military
representatives at the governmental and legislative level provided the military
with a new role. This role was later to become the basis for the ‘dual function’
concept which was applied during Soeharto’s new order era by means of TAP MPR
No. XXIV/MPRS/1966. Unfortunately, the ‘middle course (jalan tengah)’ concept
which was the basis for the Indonesian’s military socio-political role was
implemented incorrectly during the Soeharto regime.
The military business in Indonesia gained its place and developed rapidly in the
New Order regime, be managing natural resources, finances, as well as housing
and construction concepts.
The Military Business Perspective in the New Order
In the 1970’s, the global oil price reached an extreme high. During the time,
Pertamina, an Indonesian state oil company, made enormous profits. Most of its
money was diverted into governmental financial expenditures. Ibnu Soetowo,
Director of Pertamina, also built his personal business network with the
company’s money. Once the oil price started to drop, Pertamina experienced a
8
Samego, Indria, et.al, Bila ABRI Berbisnis, Mizan, 1998, p. 52
104
drop into large short-term foreign debts. The organisational structure also
experienced severe forms of corruption.
Pertamina was only one of many state-owned corporations with a military
management which was affected by the previously described problems. Another
example is the Logistic Affairs Agency (Badan Urusan Logistik/BULOG), headed
by Ahmad Tirtosudiro. Eventually, the government under Soeharto issued the
regulation No.6/1974 which prohibits any military engagement in the world of
business. After this, the military business activities have received a new basis and
format.
While previously the military money making machine was focused on foreign
companies, which were then turned into state-owned corporations, the initiation
of PP No. 6/1974 transferred the Indonesian military business format into the
form of foundations and cooperative systems. This form includes a varied and
wide business network. Although the creation/inauguration of PP no.6/1974
prohibited TNI institutions engagement in business activities, Soeharto managed
to loosen the regulation to the point where 25 percent of the profit could be
diverted into the TNI treasury.
In the future, the military business assets were transferred into foundation
assets. This change was revealed in the Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation (YKEP)
report. In 1973, all assets of P.T TRUBA (Tri Usaha Bhakti) were transferred
entirely into YKEP assets.9
While all military business units were turned into a cooperative system, the
Indonesian military decided to build a general Headquarters (HEADQUARTER)
called Home Cooperative System (Inkop), which was then implemented at all
levels. At the regional or KODAM level, the Central Cooperative System (Puskop)
was built. At the local or KOREM level the Primary Cooperative System (Primkop)
was established. Similar to the old military foundations, the cooperative systems
also had significantly varied and wide business units.10
It can be concluded that the military business in Indonesia during the New Order
has used TNI’s influence to apply its territorial command network structure from a
central level to remote areas as it served its socio-political interests.
The fact of the military business growth during the New Order Regime as outlined
briefly above may be explained on the basis of the relationship between Soeharto
and the military. Soeharto managed to build a ‘personal relation’ with the military
leaders. The military leaders were, however, always considered as subordinates.
As a consequence, the hierarchical structure of the state institutions was no
longer existent, which negatively affected the professionalism and independence
of the institutions concerned. Therefore, the military business practices were
9 Yayasan
10
Kartika Eka Paksi Report in 2002 on the Restructurization of YKEP and its business units, p. 3
Widoyoko, Danang in Moch. Nurhasim, ed, Practices of Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia,
Burma, Philippines and South Korea, 2005, p. 118
105
tolerated as long as they remained ‘subordinate’ and loyal to their ‘superior’. This
relationship pattern is a reflection of the Javanese power model during the
imperial era. The same model also gives colour to the model of democracy in the
Soeharto governmental era, which is also called the ‘patrimonial democracy’.
The military business reality in the New Order may also be explained on the basis
of a structural perspective. The military can be considered a separate social class
within the Indonesian societal structure during the time of post-colonialisation11.
The Dutch, as the colonial ruler in Indonesia, changed the class order of the
imperial society at that time. The ‘bourgeoisie’ started to disappear. After
Indonesia became an independent country, the military tried to claim control over
the different societal structures.
The military indirectly tried to identify its existence as the new ‘bourgeois’ class
and developed accordingly its business activities. The military further tried to
implement its ideological perspective on the business activities. During the New
Order Regime, the military enhanced its political support. This tendency was
known as part of bureaucratic political practices, in which the military leaders led
and took advantage of the political activities of that time. Usually, such conditions
become visible in countries with an authoritative military power model, as applied
in Soeharto’s governmental era and his New Order.
Defence Budget Problems
The military budget has, since its very beginning, consisted of 25-30 percent
state funds and a 70-75 foreign fund which was deficient. This budgetary
discrepancy has asked the military to engage in business activities that were
often quite far from its normal military tasks. As a result, the new business
function has always been directly affiliated with the existence of an army in a
democratic society.
As of 2002, by Act No. 3 on State Defence, the defence budget has to originate
uniquely from the government’s revenue and expenditure budget. All attempts to
improve the national defence capacity are taken at governmental level through
the department of defence.
The dilemma is given by the centralised management principles of the state
defence system and the democratic control principles that are applied by
forbidding the existence of foreign budget sources. Therefore, the overall defence
budget is limited to the existing state funds. This may, in the extreme case,
threaten the state defence’s ability to fulfil all the defence needs. Different levels
of authorisation between the Department of Defence and TNI Headquarters may
lead to problems during the implementation budget mechanism programme.
11
For further explanation can be seen in Robinson, Richard, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, 1986
106
Fig.1 Defence Budget in 2006-2007. Source: DEPHAN
The 2006 defence budget was with more than Rp 28.2 trillion the second largest
behind the educational sector. According to the current Minister of Defence,
Juwono Sudarsono, the Department of Defence proposed for an annual budget of
Rp 45 trillion. The previously approved budget reached only 4 percent of the APBN
and not even 1 percent of the Indonesian Gross National Product (GNP).
Indonesia has, compared to some of its neighbouring countries, a relatively small
defence budget. For example, Malaysia has a defence budget of USD 3.5 Billion
with a GNP of USD 180 Billion. Malaysia budgets nearly 2 percent of its GNP for
defence matters. This, even though, Malaysia only has a total of 25 million
citizens and a land mass less than a quarter of Indonesia’s national territory.
Singapore, with roughly 600 square kilometres of land and a total of 4.2 million
citizens, budgets USD 4.4 billion for the defence sector. Therefore, Singapore’s
budget allocation is 1.5 times bigger than the one of Indonesia. During SBY’s
governmental period, the defence budget improved quantitatively in comparison
to previous years. While in 2006 the budget amounted to Rp 28.2 trillion, it
increased in 2007 to Rp 32.6 trillion which can be seen in figure 1. Percentage
wise, the defence budget allocation drastically decreased compared to the GNP.
As in 1970 the difference between the defence budget and the GNP was 27
percent, in 2000 it was 1 percent. According to figure 2, the percentage of the
defence budget was only 1 percent below the GNP one. The recovery process of
the Indonesian economic condition since the 1990’s is one of the reasons for the
percentage decline. Of course, other socio-political conditions and situations
played a role as well.
107
Fig.2 The Percentage of Defence Budget to GDP in 1970-2006. Source: SIPRI and
DEPHAN12
Fig.3. The Percentage of Defence Budget to APBN in 2000-2006. Source: DEPHAN
As shown in figure 4, the 2007 defence budget provided for TNI soldiers welfare
system, which includes salaries and allowances, housing facilities and
dormitories, maintenance and construction, the construction of health facilities,
as well as the procurement of health supplies and tools in the amount Rp 14.6
trillion. Commodity expenses amounted to Rp 8 trillion, capital expenses to Rp
9.9 trillion, and the export credit to Rp 4.2 trillion.
12
For data of 1970, 2000 and 2001 budgets are calculated from Widjajanto, Andi, in Moch. Nurhasim, ed,
Practices of Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia, Burma, Philippines and South Korea, 2005, p.
143. While 1988-89 as well as the 1990s are based on SIPRI and 2007 budget is based on DEPHAN.
http://www.dmcindonesia.web.id/berita.php?id=136
108
Fig. 4 The Defence Budget Expenditure Allocation in 2007. Source: DEPHAN
The 2007 defence implementation policy included the establishment of a state
defence system software which comprised of a defence strategy, doctrine and
posture. It further included the 2006 S and Defense White Book.
The problems related to Indonesia’s defence budget allocations are not simply
identified. Besides the economic factors there are also non-economic issues that
are usually of greater importance. However, the formulation and effective
realisation of a proper budget policy remain the biggest problem.
If the development of a reliable defence system is considered, which is capable of
responding to potential challenges and threats, then the Indonesian defence
budget allocation procedure has clearly failed to accomplish this purpose. The
current Indonesian routine budget expenditure, which has mainly fulfilled the
soldier’s welfare requirements, has not yet made possible the creation of a
professional army.
As is explained in figure 5, until the year 2000, the routine budget made up the
highest percentage of the overall defence budget. The maintenance and
development budget still made up a small portion. In 2004, however, an
improvement of the development budget could be observed. Reason for this
could have been the economic growth and decline in inflation.
If the military business transfer is considered the only alternative to cover the
state’s incapability to fulfil the country’s defence budget needs, this approach has
to be regarded too na
ve because the military business contribution accounts
only for about 1 percent of the budget that is included in the APBN. Act No.
34/2004, specifying on the military business state mandate, does not consider
the business mandate as an alternative source to the Indonesian defence budget,
but intends more to have the military return to its main militaristic role as well as
to avoid its impact on the economic, political climate.
109
Fig. 5 The Defence Budget Allocation in 1995-2004. Source: SIPRI and DEPHAN
The military business transfer itself is not a simple problem. To stop the military
business, the state needs to find another financial source to compensate for what
used to be covered by the military transfer. To build a professional Indonesian
military, a great deal of financial support is needed.
As the Indonesian economic market has not yet recovered from the previous
crisis, the process of attaining this purpose is still far from reality. Instead of
cutting the Indonesian defence budget, a strategy needs to be found to make
more savings and tighten the budget allocation. Additionally, if the democratic
control principle is applied then the budget problem cannot be used as a
justification for the Indonesian military to be involved in business activities.
Brief Typology of TNI Business
There has been a long debate about the definition and potential prohibitions of
the TNI business transfer mandate of Act No. 34/2004. Section three of article 39
of Act No. 34/2004 states that: ‘TNI soldiers are prohibited to become a member
of a political party, to get engaged in practical political tasks, to do business
activities, and to be elected as a legislative member or to obtain some other
political position’. The same Act provides for an explanation of the term
professional army: ‘train, educated, well equipped,
without any political
affiliation, no business activities, guaranteed welfare, following the state’s
political policy, democratic principles, civil supremacy, human rights, the
stipulation of national and ratification of international laws.
The words ‘not doing business’ as cited in article 2 (d) and the words ‘in business
activities’ in article 39 may cause an interpretation ambiguity. On the one hand, it
may either be interpreted as an activity (the business process) or an ownership
(investment or financial involvement as part of the total percentage). On the
other hand, the words may also be interpreted as a partial involvement in the
activity process. Thus, the prohibition may only concern an actual involvement in
the business process but not a financial investment in the business sector.13
13 Tuhuleley, E.H, in Beni Sukadis & Eric Hendra, eds, Toward Professional TNI: TNI Business Restructuring, 2005,
pp. 134-135
110
Further, it is necessary to consider TNI’s institutional asset the state’s asset.
Therefore, military business capital must always be viewed as state asset.
Without government regulation there is a risk for parties concerned to decide
arbitrarily on which private businesses to be taken over by the state.
Given the level or amount of financial revenue source for Indonesian military, we
actually can classify what may be termed as military business. Based on Angel
Rabasa’s pyramid illustration, we can conclude that the biggest finance sources
for the Indonesian military are found in foundations and corporate systems. The
APBN budget percentage is always found as the smallest portion.14
BN
APBN
BUMN
Bisnis Yayasan dan Koperasi
Sumber-sumber lainnya
The Scheme of Financial/Fund Source for Indonesian Military
post-PP no.6/1974
Sumber-sumber lai
Placing the current financial or fund sources scheme of the Indonesian military in
comparison with the time prior to the implementation of PP No. 6/1974, the
biggest contribution resulted in the older system came from BUMN. The smaller
portion resulted from APBN or the budget allocated by the central government.
APBN
Sumber-sumber lainnya
AP
BUMN (Pertamina, Bulog, dll)
The Scheme of Financial/Fund for Indonesian Military prior to PP
no.6/1974
14 Rabasa, Angel, Ibid, pp. 72-73. In the lowest layer of military economic supporting structure which is the biggest funding
for Indonesian military includes the service and contribution business activity for local industrialists. This type of
business activity is generally not known in detail by the military senior commander
111
Apart from the definitions on military businesses as stated in Act No. 34/2004 on
TNI, military businesses can simply be divided into institutional and noninstitutional groups. Some may want to add a third group, the so called illegal
business group. This group, however, may also be categorised as a noninstitutional group.
1. The Institutional Business
TNI’s classified information includes the names of foundations that are part of
every TNI’s dimension along with companies that are grouped in a holding
company or related project outside the holding company. Based on TNI’s
structural and coordinating institutions, the company may be devided into two
categories.15 Therefore, we can conclude that the TNI institutional business
may be understood as business units that are either considered as coordinative
or structural institutions.16
15 I Gde Artjana in Beni Sukadis, Eric Hendra, eds, Menuju TNI yang Profesional: Restrukturisasi Bisnis TNI,
2005, p. 29
16
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Ÿ
Summarized from various sources. (The following outline is only a description of how wide the business
network that Indonesian military has. *There has been many changes for recent condition).
A. Foundations
i. Ground Force
 Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation (YKEP) has a holding company, that is, PT. Tri Usaha Bhakti. Of so
many business units, some of them are as follows, having a land in Jakarta of 44 hectare in an area
known as the “gold triangle” region, Bank Artha Graha, Cigna Indonesia Assurance, Danayasa
Artatama (Hotel Borobudur), housing, golf course, carpentry as well as manufacture. In general, this
foundation is made as a main source for the soldiers' welfare, especially the provision of housing. But
this foundation also supports Ahmad Yani University in Bandung despite others.
ii. Navy
 Bhumiyamca Foundation (Yashbum) has quite variety companies. In sailing, resorts, oil mill, property
rental, import-export, choco plantation, electronic and maritime telecommunication, taxi company,
and diving service. In social and education, this foundation also overshadows two orphanages, Hang
Tuah School, etc. Marine formally under the Navy also has its own business in housing and a joint
venture on Cilandak Plaza.
iii. Air Force
 Adi Upaya Foundation (YAU) has Bank Angkasa together with PLN Retirement Fund Company and
other private investors. It has a golf course, transportation service company, hotel, carpentery, aviation
and air photography company. In social and education, this faoundation gives scholarships and health
insurance for Air Force soldiers as well as building houses in the Air Force bases.
Iv. The Department of Defense

Panglima Sudirman Foundation moves in education. As for the institution under the protection of
the foundation is Pembangunan Nasional University, “Veteran” in three cities in Java, that is,
Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. Besides those, there is also a Public Senior High School in
Central Java.

Satya Bhakti Pertiwi Foundation moves more in business units as a financial source for the soldiers'
welfare. As for the business units, they are quite diverse.
PT. Yamatran in transportation
PT. Mina Jaya in advertising
PT. Undagi Wana Lestari in forestry
PT. Yayasan Maju Kerja in forestry, etc.
V. TNI Headquarters
112
2. The Non-Institutional Business
Although, as of 1974, active military is prohibited to engage in business
activities, PP No. 6/1974 authorises them to engage in non-institutional
business activities. Business in the non-institutional category is usually run by
active or retired TNI officers or some of their family members. Their business
activity usually is outside the military institutional business. The coverage of
the business area may be in the formal or informal business sector. Because
involvement is at the individual level, hence this business shape is determined
as non-institutional because it does not involve the institutional level.
The business in the informal sector in its practice includes taking commission
on goods and services done by associate entrepreneurs, including but also
beyond the Chinese community. Other business includes the renting of
military transportation vehicles such as trucks, as well as air and sea


Manunggal ABRI Foundation
KOSTRAD
Darma Putra Kostrad Foundation through its holding company, PT. Darma Kencana Sakti, has an airline
business, Mandala airlines; chemistry restore company in cooperation with Mitsubishi, plastic bag
manufacture supplied to Pertamina, furniture company, luxurious car importer as well as house contractor
company.
Vii KOPASSUS
Korps Baret Merah (Kobame) Foundation in cooperation with private entrepreneurs built a consortium
under the protection of PT. Kobame Propertindo which built Graha Cijantung on a land belongs to Kodam
Jaya. Actually, there are still many businesses owned by this foundation, but when the economic crisis
happened to Indonesia many of these businesses went bankrupt or suffered losses.
B. Cooperative System
In general the cooperative system is supported by financial aid from many foundations; for very diverse
business units, from the ownership of gas stations to land rental for business. And like foundation,
cooperative system also has an investment invested or joint venture, or even its own company which has a
very wide business area (at the central cooperative system level and home cooperative system level).
Ground Force Navy Air ForceLevel

Army HOME COOPERATIVE SYSTEM

Army CENTRAL COOPERATIVE SYSTEM

Army PRIMARY COOPERATIVE SYSTEM

NAVY HOME COOPERATIVE SYSTEM

NAVY CENTRAL COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
Ÿ
NAVY PRIMARY COOPERATIVE SYSTEM AIR FORCE HOME COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
Ÿ
AIR FORCE CENTRAL COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
Ÿ
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE PRIMARY COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
Ÿ
KODAM
Ÿ
BATTALION/ KODIM/KOREM (Besides that, the flying squash units also have business under the
cooperative system format)
Vi.
Ÿ
Ÿ
113
transportation. Business practices also include security services and
sometimes activities that are prohibited by law.17
Military Business in the Act No. 34/2004 on TNI
The Indonesian public’s demand for the military to return to its main function
after the fall of the new order regime is a phenomenon that can be explained on
the basis of many perspectives. One analysis can be made from a sociological
point of view. The functional relations paradigm of a society, in which every part of
society – the military included as well – is considered to have its own specific
function, intends to accomplish the society’s goal and purpose by increasing the
fluency within the system.
If one specific part of society starts to deviate from its normal function then
pressure will emerge on the related parts to help reintegrate the deviating part.
This process is crucial for the stability within society. The stability itself has to be
based either on a functional obligation or on a consensus of values, ideally a
democratic value system. It may be concluded that the values held collectively by
a majority of the society are the key reference for an empirical analysis of a social
system.8
Therefore, based on the Parsonsian qualification paradigm above, the military’s
business activities, which make up one part of society, are considered a functional
deviation and activity against the public and the democratic value system being
built in Indonesia. After having experienced various constraints and undergone
several revisions, the plenary session of the Indonesian Legislative Assembly
(DPR), on 30 September 2004, legalised the Bill on the TNI to be an official Act
(UU).
The preliminary TNI Bill consisted of 9 chapters and 67 articles. Once the Bill will
be completed, it will count 11 chapters and 77 articles. During the approval
process, the TNI Bill is often critisised by society for being too conservative.
Issues may concern TNI’s territorial development and its possibility to engage in
institutional and non-institutional activites. Society has also maintained certain
doubts about the duration of TNI’s reform plans of five years (2004-2009).
17 It is no longer a secret that Indonesian military (non-institutional) also gives a security service to individual or company.
For example, P.T Freeport case in its report to the exchange securities commission in U.S. in 2002, the company has
offered funds to TNI in the amount of more or less 50 billion rupiah for their security service expend, similar to other
foreign companies, such as the Exxon Mobile Oil. Please access www.jatam.org for further information about it. There
are still many and various cases on illegal business or businesses classified in the category of crime act done by active
military individuals, from the involvement in illegal logging to a murder case of ASABA director involving the Army
flying squash member as well as frog troop unit member from the Navy Marine Corps. In the case of the human rights
violation may be seen at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/hrw-idn-21jun.pdf. Recent case which is the
public shooting case in Pasuruan, East Java, by Marine appratus serve as a security for a private company was also a
breach of the security function which has no longer been TNI function, but Indonesian Police function and TNI may be
involved on assistance request from Indonesian Police. Apart from that, in a disputed land which supposed to serve as a
place for fighting exercise for the Marine, but by th emergence of this case, it is found out that the land was rented for a
cana field to a private entrepreneur.
18
Parsons, T, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, 1969, p. 6
114
There exist three articles in the Act No. 34/2004 on TNI oversight and business
activities. The first article identifies TNI’s obligation as a professional army and
prohibits TNI’s soldiers engagement in business activities. The third article
obliges the government to take over all existing TNI businesses.
As stated in clause 1, ‘in the first 5 years after the enactment, the government
must take over, directly or indirectly, all business activities that are managed or
owned by TNI. As for clause 2, ‘further procedures concerning the
implementation of clause (1) are included in the President’s decree’.
In other words, the take over process needs to be in accordance with the
President’s regulation (peraturan presiden/perpres). The President’s regulation
further needs to outline the rules or compensation for the TNI soldiers. An
adequate increase of the Government Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN)
needs to be considered to assure consistent soldier payments. Those basic
regulations are needed in order to avoid contraproductive circumnstances for the
TNI.
TNI’s Business Restructurization and President Regulation
Initially, various discourses have been held about what will be taken over from the
military business in Indonesia. The Minster of Defence cooperated with three
other Ministers on the formulation of the military business take over procedure.
The three departments concerned are the Department of Finance, the State
Ministry of BUMN, and the Department of Justice and Human Rights. The actual
take over will be based on the assessment of five aspects: type of business,
assets owned, business classification, business interest and accountability.
Act No. 34 2004 on TNI, especially article 76, regarding the TNI business,
indicates that the government side has formed an inter-department team that
includes also TNI members. The team is called the Supervision and TNI Business
Transformation Team (Tim Supervisi dan Transformasi Bisnis/TSTB), which was
established collectively by the Ministry of BUMN and the Department of Defence.
TSTB is headed by Said Didu, Secretary General of the Ministry of BUMN, and his
Deputy, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin.
Based on the decision taken by four Ministers, Dana Reksa and Bahana will serve
as independent auditors for the business units in the TNI field. The verification
and analysis process will be coordinated by the State Minister of BUMN and the
legally authorised party. The government’s intention is to find out which TNI
business units make use of the state facilities and which not. Eventually, it will be
decided that only business units with a minimum asset between Rp 15-20 billion
will be taken over. Based on the results obtained, the business unit will be
considered a Limited Company (PT), General Company (Perum) or a Holding
Company.
The preliminary government deadline was set for 27 September 2005. The
process included an inventory of the Indonesian National Army’s military
business in the TNI headquarters, force dimensions and existing units. The
results of the inventory process will then be reported to President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono.
115
Since the approval of TNI’s Act in 2004, it takes more than two years to only go
through a business inventory process in the military and have the results verified.
Thus, many societal circles consider the government’s procedure as very slow.
The number of businesses taken over created also some problems. The number
increased from 219 units to 900, 1000 and finally 1’520 units.19 The government
should also provide for a regulation to to put into effect an official status on TNI
business units. This will ensure that none of the inventoried and verified business
units are sold to private parties. As the Presidential regulation has not yet been
issued, the Department of Defence is only limited to verifying data from the TNI
headquarters.
TSTB TNI has verified all TNI business activities and recommended that all TNI
business be handled by a TNI Business Management Agency. This type handling
will legalise business activities and clarify the process. The establishment of this
Management Agency has fulfilled Act No. 34 of 2004.
According to the President’s regulation, the Minister of Defence, Juwono
Sudarsono, argued that it would be established around the October 2005. It then
changed to April 2006, as the Minister of Defence wanted to wait for the results of
the supervision of the State Minister of BUMN. After the end of this period, without
having given an official explanation to the public, he explained that the
President’s regulation would be announced together with the President’s annual
speech on 16 August 2006. Finally, the Department of Defence postponed the
President’ announcement to March 2007. In fact, the Presidential regulation has
still not been inaugurated.
The continual delay of the President’s regulation has become the source of an
unclear process and many different interpretations about the type and number of
businesses that need to be kept at military level. Additionally, this also led the
public to question the government’s seriousness in settling the problem of the
military business take over. The Presidential regulation, in fact, is supposed to be
the technical implementation and directive of Act No. 34/2004, stating that TNI
has not right to engage in business activities. Article 76 of the TNI Act indicates
clearly, that TNI no longer has permission to do business within the foundation
and in the cooperative business.
So, the reason and conclusion issued by TNI stating that TNI business taking over
process lasted in 2009 is not true; that now it is still allowed because legally the
legislation content becomes bound since it has been established or legalized and
in article 39 concerning the obligation and prohibition which one of them stating
the prohibition for TNI soldiers to engage in business activities. As for article 76
mandating TNI business taking over, it must be seen as a time limit (5 years) to
taking over the existing business. Therefore, a given TNI business, since the
establishment of the Act, must be cleaned up and dissolved or at least must be in
status quo and under the government supervision that finally is taken over by the
government.
19 Republika, "Bisnis TNI Yang Diverifikasi Sudah 1.520 Unit", March 14, 2006
116
On the other hand, TNI and the government, in this case is the Department of
Defense, stating that the cooperative system in TNI is not taken over or will be let
go on with a reason that the cooperative system in TNI does not use the state
asset and the capital is the soldiers’ capital which also must be made clear that if
the manager is an active military, it means that it still breaks the Act No. 34/2004
on the prohibition for the military to do business while if the reason is because the
government has not been able to fulfill the soldiers’ welfare, then it actually has
also break the Act no.34/2004 stating that the soldiers’ welfare is borne by the
state.
If indeed the government has not been able to fulfill its responsibility, it is not
necessarily mean that the government must ignore and let the military keep
doing his business in making them selves prosperous, but the government is also
supposed to take over at least control as has been proposed by the formation of
an Agency managing TNI business. The purpose of this Agency formation actually
is to comply with article 76, the Act no.34 on TNI that TNI business is taken over
by the government.
This agency is limited only to govern the policy. Since the problem faced in dealing
with TNI business now, not necessarily used for the business activity, is the state
asset. That asset used may be assets belong to the foundation or cooperative
system. But since it has been prohibited by the Act no.34/2004 on TNI, thus we
need a breakthrough step to accelerate the implementation.
By controling and keeping TNI’s cooperative systems in order under the
government supervision and following the cooperative system implementation
rules according to the cooperative system legislations, then the government has
filled the obligation in its effort to fulfill the soldiers’ welfare, besides not breaking
TNI Act which requires the state to bear TNI soldiers’ welfare. As for the
management of those cooperative systems, it is very likely to be managed by TNI
retired officers or other civilians rather than active military like now. Similar to the
foundations in the area of TNI.
The government eventually said that it would form TNI’s Business Transfer
National Team (TNPB TNI) immediately following the establishment of the
president regulation which was said to be issued this year (2007). The National
Team is divided into three sub-sections, the Driving Team consisted of the
Minister of Defense, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Justice and Human
Rights, the Minister of BUMN, and the Commander of TNI; and the Supervising
Team consisted of TNI Business Transformation Supervision Team (TSTB) led by
Sesmeneg BUMN and the Secretary General of the Department of Defense plus
Kasum TNI, and the Directorate General of National Wealth. And the third is the
Executing Team that will execute businesses in the area of TNI, to be sorted out
which one that will be returned to TNI and which one that will be taken over by the
government or BUMN. The Executing Team is planned to be led by the Deputy of
the Relations of Communication, Indormation and Stakeholder BRR Aceh,
Sudriman Said and will have four professional and independent members. The
time limit to take over TNI business is targeted for two years.20
20 Http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=7387
117
The National Team of TNI Business Transformation will start working when the
President Regulation is signed at the cost of APBN. But it is explained that now the
National Team preparation remains to be done as the approval from the Driving
Team. This National Team then will perform its duties to examine TNI business
and report it to the Driving Team with the time limit to December 2008.
Meanwhile, the Supervising Committee that is an internal institution of the
Department of Defense and TNI was also formed and it was also a transition
Committee between TSTB TNI and the National Team of TNI Business
Transformation.21
Whatever it is, eventually these kinds of thing will be able to be understood by law
assurance which is supposed to be issued in the president regulation. Therefore,
to immediately issue the president regulation becomes significant, and hopefully
the president regulation that has been delayed for so long, is really issued
immediately in this 2007 before the public concern shifts again to the preparation
of democratic election party in 2009 and makes this issue on TNI business as a
political commodity. Above all, the technical content of the president regulation
that will issued, will also be considered as the manifestation of government
seriousness nowadays in implementing the mandate of the Act No.34 of 2004.
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119
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND THE TERRITORIAL COMMAND
Agus Widjojo1
Brief History
The history of the defense system known as Koter, or territorial command, dates
back to 1948 and the second Indonesian war of independence. In 1947, Dutch
colonial forces, claiming violations of a previous agreement, launched “police
action” in Indonesia and drove republican forces out of the islands of Sumatra and
East and West Java, confining them to the Yogyatra region of Central Java.
Colonial advances ultimately led to Ratification of the Renville Agreement,
temporarily recognizing Dutch control of newly seized regions but providing for a
referendum on the future political status of these occupied areas. In that period,
the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) was forced to leave much of the
territory they controlled. These new circumstances caused the Indonesian Armed
Forces to change its military tactics in dealing with the Dutch, switching from a
linear defense strategy to guerrilla tactics. In summary, the new tactical aims
were to (1) abandon linear defense strategies (2) establish guerrilla bases,
especially in mountainous areas (3) establish a new combat principle based on
guerrilla warfare, taking into account, on the one hand, the aggressive nature of
the enemy, and, on the other, the potential for the guerrilla movement to
establish the military, civil, social and economic bases of an independent
Indonesian republic.2 To use the words of General Nasution, during the war of
independence, “a military government was needed by society. Army officials
must hold positions of power in the military government; the civil government will
later be incorporated into it. This way, Indonesia’s de facto power will remain in
society”.3
The primary mission of the community-based intelligence system, the military's
territorial command or Koter, is national defense. National defence is broadly
defined and does not specify particular responsibilities. The Koter system was the
initial foundation of the Indonesian army during the second war of independence,
as outlined above. In the early days of the young republic, military units were
primarily organised in regional battalions and officers were identified by territorial
origin. It is in that context that the military government developed the notion of a
“Territorial Army” and later on named Regional Military Command units (Kodam).
The “Territorial Army” concept stems from the national liberation struggle of the
1940s and was developed in the 1950s. At first, the guerrilla movement had a
dual duty: to engage in military operations and perform the daily governmental
functions in a specified territory. In that period, governmental functions were
essentially tied to natural resources extraction in order to finance military
1 Agus Widjojo, is Lieutenant General TNI (Retired), is a Senior Fellow at CSIS, and member of Indonesian
Truth and Friendship Commission Timor Leste (KKP).
2
3
Jenderal AH Nasution, TNI, Seruling Masa, Jakarta, 1968, page 187.
Ibid, page 202
120
activities. It is only at a later stage that the military government took on
additional administrative duties. Territorial administration is not, however, part of
the constitutional mandate of the TNI. Therefore, in peacetime, these functions
should be administered by civilian governments.
In peacetime, the function of the TNI is to prepare available combat units to fight
for the defence of the country in the advent of war. One needs to distinguish
between these two functions in order to understand the difference between
“territorial responsibilities” and “territorial command”. Territorial responsibilities
refer to governmental tasks performed by the military in situations of crises and
states of emergency. Conversely, territorial command is a constitutional
obligation of the TNI: ensuring a structured military command and deploying
available forces for the defence of the country. The mission of Koter is thus
geographically limited: training soldiers and implementing defence systems in
specific areas. The Koter system does not have the authority to manage national
resources, mobilise civilians, organise mass political parties, handle public
security, or to perform intelligence gathering.
To understand the significance of the Koter system, one must see it as an integral
part of TNI defence structures. National defence is essentially the ability to
safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country against foreign
threats. To face these threats, a country needs to have the military capacity,
military hardware, personnel and proper training to be able to defeat all potential
enemies. To do so, one must first assess the most likely risks to the security of
Indonesia. Then, defence capabilities must be geographically deployed according
to these threats assessments and. The Koter system is an integral part of these
efforts.
The Koter system is part of the geographical subdivision of national defence. In
accordance with the 2004 Act No. 34 of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI),
article 11 clause 2,“the implementation of TNI forces management and
organisation must be implemented in a way to avoid the influence for public
political interest and its implementation must not necessarily follow
administrative boundaries.” In other words, the deployment of armed forces
must remain unaffected from the demands of local populations and must not
necessarily follow civilian administrative boundaries.
Legal Aspects
Because the Koter system is an integral part of the TNI, its legal status is closely
related to the latter. Although the current legal and constitutional status of the
armed forces is not perfect and needs improvement, it has so far sufficed to give a
clear picture of its role, authority and duties.
The role of the TNI is enunciated in Chapter 4, article 5 of the 2004 Act No. 34 of
the Indonesian Armed Forces. The TNI is an “instrument of the government
whose responsibilities are limited to the decisions and policies of the executive”.
In other words, the TNI cannot dictate its own policies. The obligations of the TNI
obligations are: “to uphold state sovereignty and to maintain the territorial
integrity of the Republic based on the five philosophical principles of the Republic
of Indonesia (Pancasila) and the 1945 Constitution. The duty of the armed forces
is to protect the Indonesian nation from any acts or disturbances that might
constitute a threat to national or territorial integrity.”
121
From the above, we can infer that:
1.
The Constitution confers the responsibility to defend the nation to the armed
forces. Consequently, the obligations of the Koter system must be limited to
national defence. The term “national defence”, however, is an ambiguous
one. It can mean security from foreign threats but also security from
domestic disturbances. In that latter case, the ability of the government to
deploy TNI units to neutralize domestic disturbances is constitutionally
limited. The TNI might, for instance, assume administrative powers during a
state of emergency or martial law, in accordance with Indonesian Act
No.23/Prp/1959 on states of emergency. During a state of emergency, Koter
can fulfill governmental duties, for instance duties related to the
management and efficient use of available resources in order to finance
defence operations. As noted above, this responsibility of the Koter system
dates back to the second Indonesian war of Independence and the initial
guerrilla-like organisation of the Indonesian army.
2.
The safeguard of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of
Indonesia is essentially linked to the ability to counter foreign military
threats. To face these threats, military capabilities must match or surpass
the capabilities of potential aggressors. Today, the TNI, as a military
institution, is prepared for any eventuality. The situation is quite different,
however, when dealing with domestic “threats”. These “threats” are in fact
violations of the law and must be dealt with by law enforcement agencies. As
previously stated, the function of the TNI encompasses defense from
external threats and assistance to domestic law enforcement agencies in
specific, limited circumstances; enforcement per se is not a responsibility of
the TNI. This provision is in place to ensure that the authority of the Koter
system is not used beyond its constitutional jurisdiction.
The central issue, therefore, is not whether the Koter system should be
maintained or not, but which role it should play in a more democratic system. The
current legal framework limits the role of Koter to national defence and territorial
administration only during a declared state of emergency or martial law. In other
words, the fundamental role of Koter is to prepare soldiers for defence operations
in a given geographical area; its jurisdiction does not extend to civilian matters.
To be clear, the existence of regional command institutions is not peculiar to
Indonesia. The United States, for instance, also has different regional commands
such as the Pacific Command, Central Command and European Command. The
same is true for Australia and many other countries.
Recent Developments
The democratic oversight of the Koter system cannot be divorced from
discussions about the democratisation process in Indonesia. The current
transitional period is at the time when past habits must be abandoned and new
customs implemented. The need to reform the current Koter system is in fact one
of the most central elements of security sector reform in Indonesia. The “dual-
122
mission” of the TNI is intimately related to practices of the past and must be
reformed to adapt to new realities. The TNI must not expand its current defence
activities to intelligence gathering, “guidance to society” or coordination of the
armed forces politico-economic activities, all of which fall outside its
constitutional mandate.
The “dual function” doctrine of TNI of the past, assigned a twofold security
and socio-political role to the armed forces. The socio-political role of the TNI
gave it the authority to engage in domestic political issues, as it was assumed
that the most pressing threats facing Indonesia were not foreign but domestic
in nature. The “dual function” role of the military has made it more involved in
civilian matters and is today one of the most important obstacles in the
democratisation process of the country.
The current situation reinforces the position of groups opposed to reform. These
groups argue that the current Koter system is an indivisible feature of the TNI and
must remain unchanged because it is a historical and permanent feature of the
Indonesian Army. Transferring the existing duties of Koter to local governments
undisputedly needs time and gradual adjustments, as most local governments
have no prior experience in handling these issues.
Indisputably, there are currently many civil officials who oppose the idea of
reform. First, there are those who long for the political stability of the past and
oppose reform. Second, a number of public officials simply do not understand the
complexity of the issue to support it. Finally, a number of elements of the ruling
elite are closely linked to the TNI and also oppose reform.
Reform of the “territorial responsibility” and “territorial command” duties of the
TNI must be viewed in the wider context of security sector reform. If the central
government has delegated many duties to local governments, national defence
has been one notable exception. Following the separation of the Police (Polri)
from the TNI, some police duties have nevertheless been administered by the
Ministry of Defense. Theses duties should be managed by a central authority and
cannot be delegated to regional governments. Otherwise, national security is in
effect handled by local authorities.
There have been calls to establish a Department of Regional Defence (Kanwil
Dephan).This is an inadequate option, because the very meaning of national
defence refers to the safeguard of state - not regional - sovereignty. The
administration of natural resources must remain a responsibility of local
governments. In fact, establishing a Department of Regional Defense would only
transfer current duties from a military Koter system to a civilian one; it would not
address any of the central issues of reform.
Reforming the “territorial responsibility” and “territorial command” duties of the
TNI requires strong political commitment. Reform is highly unlikely if political
authorities remain unaware of the importance of restructuring the Koter system
for enhancing the accountability and transparency of the security sector.
123
Democratic Oversight
The principles of democratic control of the armed forces do not a priori question
the existence of the Koter system, but relate rather to the parliamentary
oversight of these structures by the Indonesian Legislative Assembly. The
national assembly’s oversight function is the ability of the legislative to influence
defence-related policies, allocation of defence budgets and deployment of troops.
These functions are described in further detail in the Defence White Book, which
serves to enhance the accountability of the armed forces as an institution and
acts as a confidence building measure for foreign countries.
For a defence-related policy to be implemented, it must first obtain approval from
the Indonesian Legislative Assembly and be consistent with the state defense
budget. If the policy is changed after it has been first adopted, it must obtain the
approval of parliament and, more importantly, changes must conform to the
Defence White Book.
To respond to calls for further democratisation of the armed forces, the TNI has
formulated a proposal for reform that would 1) abolish its socio-political role in
society 2) shift its focus to national defence and 3) position itself as part of the
national democratic governmental apparatus, which in practice means no longer
fulfilling the functions of a law enforcement agency, a responsibility of the
Indonesian Police (POLRI). These institutional prerogatives would in essence
confirm the traditional role of the TNI, as spelled out in the 1945 Constitution. In
sum, reform of the Koter system implies a gradual reduction of the current
responsibilities of the Koter system to national defence. With regards to the
expansion of Regional Military Commands (Kodam), several questions arise.
First, what are the underlying reasons that warrant the expansion of the Koder
system? What roles should be assigned to these structures, given the current
constitutional framework?
Korem is the lowest subdivision of the Koter structure entrusted with the
authority to plan and execute military operations and train personnel. Kodim and structures below it - do not have the authority to execute military operations.
There are a series of question surrounding the role of Kodim-level units, and
concerns that they in essence duplicate the role of the civilian authorities. Can
Kodim units perform civilian duties? Has the Koter apparatus, as some
commentators have argued, become an intelligence gathering structure to spy on
political activism in society? Is the Koter system used to perform intelligence
gathering on suspected domestic elements, on communist sympathisers for
instance? If these allegations are true, then it seems that the authority of Koter
system overlaps with those of civilian governments. If not, the existence of Kodim
(and units below it) is redundant in peacetime and a waste of money. Could the
money allocated to these units not be used more efficiently for improving, for
instance, the welfare of soldiers?
124
There are fundamental differences of opinion in our country as to the current
transitional period. On the one hand, there are those who advocate governance
based on democratic principles and the separation of powers. Others argue that
the arrangements of the past have proven effective for providing security and
stability to the country. From this point of view, current changes will negatively
affect national development. Our response should be that Indonesia has already
taken a long-term – and irreversible - decision to move towards a more
democratic system.
It is sometimes hard to conceive of a government that is run entirely on
democratic principles. To move forward, we, Indonesians, must stop blaming
each other and see our history in context. In the past, if the President officially
had all powers, the political culture was one without effective control and was
characterised by gross violations of human rights. We cannot go back to the past
but must, instead, look to the future. The current situation in Indonesia is
certainly not ideal, but we need a clear vision of the society we want in order to
direct our efforts. The transitional period is, by definition, temporary and one
which we must try to overcome. There are positive developments in this regard.
The TNI has recently formulated a programme to transfer the Koter system to
local governments within a period of 15 years. It is no longer admissible to defer
the transition by simply invoking the “unpreparedness” of alternate institutions or
the uniqueness of the army in fulfilling certain roles.
In determining the appropriate duty of the Koter system and the territorial
function of the TNI, we need to follow the 1945 Constitution and the guiding
principles of the democratic control of armed forces. The reduction of koter is a
problem of substituting other TNI structures such as a Division, because between
koter and Division there is a difference of authority.4 Koter’s authority to handle
civil resources that were transferred to civil administration, cannot be substituted
by the Division structure. Therefore, it is irrelevant to associate the existence of
koter at the divisional level outside the context of its defensive function. This
adjustment between koter and territorial function eventually is meant to protect
TNI soldiers, in that in any duty TNI soldiers perform, they will be guaranteed by
the authority given by the Constitution. These adjustments do not constitute a
radical change per se, as they are consistent with the 1945 Constitution. They are
in fact a readjustment of the duties of the TNI in accordance to its original
constitutional mandate. Readjusting the role of the Koter system enhances the
defence mechanisms of Indonesia.
Summary
The present discussion of the Koter system and the need for reform can be
summarised in ten points.
1. The current role and function of the TNI territorial command dates back to the
guerrilla structures of the Indonesian army during the second war of
independence.
2. During the war of independence, the TNI performed a development mission
aimed at extracting natural resources to support the war effort.
4 Agus Widjojo,
Media Indonesia, March 31, 2005
125
3.
Natural resource extraction is usually carried out by civilian governments.
This duty should not be attributed to the TNI in peace time.
4.
The Koter system has the responsibility for territorial administration only
during a state of emergency or after the imposition of martial law.
5. Calls for reform of the Koter system do not question the existence of the
system per se, but rather the role and authority that the Koter system should
play in a democratic society.
6. Territorial command is a legitimate goal when its responsibilities are limited
to national defence and are in accordance to the constitutionally defined
mandate.
7. The fundamental aim of reform of the Koter system is to place it under
democratic civilian control and limit its functions to those enunciated in the
1945 Constitution.
8. If the role of Koter remains unchanged, then there is in practice a duplication
of jurisdiction in peace time: natural resources development responsibilities
are performed both by Koter and local governments.
9. The mandated authority for the development of natural resources in the
regions is the district head. Therefore, there is no need to establish a
Regional office for the Department of Defence.
10. Defence is one of the only governmental functions that the central
government does not share with local governments. The central government
is responsible for the defence of the territory from foreign threats. In
peacetime, natural resource extraction is the responsibility of regional
governments.
Regional Military Command in Indonesia
Names Kodam
Kodam Iskandar Muda
Kodam I/ Bukit Barisan
Kodam II/ Sriwijaya
Kodam
Kodam
Kodam
Kodam
Kodam
Jaya
III/ Siliwangi
IV/ Diponegoro
V/ Brawijaya
VI/ Tanjungpura
Kodam VII/ Wirabuana
Kodam IX/ Udayana
Kodam XVI/ Pattimura
Kodam XVII/ Trikora
126
Overseeing (provinces)
Daerah Istimewa Aceh
Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, Riau
Kepulauan Riau
Sumatera Selatan, Jambi, Bengkulu,
Lampung, Bangka Belitung
DKI Jakarta
Jawa Barat, Banten
Jawa Tengah, Jogjakarta
Jawa Timur
Kalimantan Timur, Kalimantan Selatan,
Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Barat
Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Barat, Sulawesi
Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sulawesi Utara
Bali, NTB, NTT
Maluku, Maluku Utara
Papua, Papua Barat
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION
IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Mufti Makarim Al Ahlaq1
Introduction
The reform movement had three main objectives between 1997 and 1998: to
impeach Soeharto, to abolish the dual-function of the Indonesian Armed Forces
(ABRI) and to eradicate collusion, corruption and nepotism (KKN). Those three
fundamental objectives provided the basis for additional and more specific
objectives for change. The demand to abolish the dual functioning of ABRI has
implied the eradication of all forms of political and economic roles of the following
actors: Indonesian Military (TNI), National Police (POLRI) and State Intelligence
Agency (BIN). The government of the ‘New Order’ has intended to educate and
develop professional security actors that are subject to civilian political authority.
All security sector actors are held accountable for the potential use of violence,
human rights violations and other violations of democratic principles.
This article will briefly analyse the general dynamics of the civil society
organisations (CSO) in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) Agenda in 2006. The
analysis will also compare the reform agenda of 1998 and previous years. The
portrait of activities presented in this article does not intend to judge past CSO
activities, but merely tries to illustrate what has happened during the past eight
years since 1998. Another issue to be discussed in this paper, are the numerous
government policies introduced in the last year, and in particular those relating to
the judiciary, law enforcement and other security actors, POLRI counterterrorism activities, military acquisitions, the review on territorial command,
national security draft, intelligence act and evaluation of the increase in police
brutality during the past years.
This paper will reveal the background history of SSR advocacy mandated by civil
society organisations, and the development and dynamics of advocacy activities,
problems dealt with and also the effectiveness and outcomes of advocacy
activities.
The Background SSR Advocacy: 1998-2006
In Indonesia, the idea of SSR did not suddenly emerge in 1998, however, with the
downfall of Soeharto that year it caused the public to release their accumulated
frustration in the form of criticism towards the security sector actors’ poor
performance. In the post-1965 movement,2 security sector personnel were
1 Mufti Makarim Al Ahlaq, is Executive Director of IDSPS, Jakarta
2 1965, was mark as the bloodiest era in Indonesia history inwhich after the failed PKI coup in 1 October 1965
that eventually led to the transfer of power from Sukarno to Suharto in 1967.
127
afforded a great deal of power as they served the state as a militaristic instrument
to maintain the political and economic stability of the country. As the state policy
makers, security personnel applied policies to intimidate, reduce people’s
freedom of speech and performed excessive oversight of their citizens’ private
lives.
The significant public discussion during this period was about the dual function of
ABRI, the defence system, civil military relations, the security actor’s role as
mediator in agrarian, labour and political conflicts. The repressive and violent
concept of the new order regime was followed by different violent escalations and
by civil rights movements in the 1990’s. Although the state tried to hide its illegal
and often violent activities, some cases were still revealed to the public. The cases
are as follows: Tanjung Priok, Talang Sari, the murder of the Udin journalist,
Marsinah and Kedung Ombo. Other serious cases involved massacres and brutal
arrests of members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and ‘separatist
groups’ in East Timor, Aceh and Papua.
These harsh government actions caused the ever more diverse sections of the
public to protest against and criticise the government, as well as expressing their
increased level of fear and frustration. Critics have also arisen from members of
the academic world such as Mochtar Mas’oed, Yahya Muhaimin, George
Aditjondro, Arief Budiman, Onghokham, Vedi R. Hafidz, Adnan Buyung Nasution
and YB. Even Ali Sadikin and A. Hasnan Habib, who are retired military personnel,
have uttered their concerns about those terrible incidents. During these years,
the university student’s movement, which was the basis for mass movements in
1997 and 1998, had already mushroomed. The underground movement went
hand in hand with a number of activities, which was spread throughout several
provinces and organised by academics and activists from institutions such as
Legal Aid Assistance (LBH). The activities critically addressed the dictatorial
behaviour of the security actors.3
The reform efforts, including SSR, were stronger in 1997 and 1998 as the Regime
failed to maintain its power due to an economic crisis and international pressure.
The international pressure was the result of the regime’s international economic
interests in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and foreign
investors’ concerns/worries about their financial investments in a country that
was characterised by a devastating political condition and human rights
violations. The New Order Regime did not only face external pressure from the
international environment, but also from its internal economic crisis, human
rights violations and the ever increasing public anger towards the states’
dictatorial security instruments.
In response to the extensive public demand, a number of polices and legislations
were issued during the following five years. Those included the new TNI paradigm
which was issued by the TNI Headquarter (Mabes TNI) on 5 October 1998; the
TAP MPR RI (MPR RI’s Regulation) No VI/MPR/2000 on the separation of TNI and
POLRI; the TAP MPR RI No VII/MPR/2000 on the role of TNI and POLRI, issued by
3
The following are young activists of LBH (Legal Aid Institute) involved in the People's fight to confront the
state authority and security's repression: Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara, Todung Mulya Lubis, Nursyahbani
Katjasungkana, Hendardi, Mulyana W Kusuma, Bambang Widjayanto and Munir.
128
the national assembly; Act No 2 of 2002 on State Defence; Act No 34 of 2004 on
TNI, issued by the House of Representatives, and the Defence White Paper, issued
by the defence ministry (DEPHAN) in 2003. Those new policies and legislations,
however, have not ensured the growth of the SSR concept and its practical
application. Additionally, a number of other legislations and policies, concerning
the intelligence sector and the amendment of government regulations and the
presidential decree, have not been realised.
The New Order control and its militaristic security actors caused the CSOs to
prioritise their activities and criticism of the military aspect of security. If the New
Order control had chosen a less militaristic approach and placed greater focus on
its contribution of more technocratic solutions, such as changes in the strategies
relating to the defence system or making the TNI, POLRI, and BNI more
professional. Unfortunately, the New Order control did not learn a lesson from the
‘traumatic’ events of the past, which caused many CSOs to avoid the path of
cooperation with state institutions.4
Post 1999, three types of CSO SSR advocates have emerged. These include think
tanks, motivators and pressure groups. The choices of these advocacy groups has
been strongly influenced by the background knowledge of their personnel with
regard to the security sector. Another favourable factor included the contact
model chosen by their constituents and organisations.
The ‘Think Tank’ group consists of academics, policy makers and retired military
personnel, who all engage in activities that are related to the formulation of
legislation and policies, such as writing analytical academic papers, holding
hearings, drafting and lobbying for legal acts. Meanwhile, the motivator groups
are mostly academics and campus activists pushing for the continuity of SSR
discourse, although SSR legislation and policies are not influenced per se.
The groups being exposed to governmental pressure consist of different
community groups such as labourers, farmers, fishermen, urban marginalised
groups, victims of violence from security actors and organisations working in the
Legal Aid Assistance (LBH) and they push for accountability and justice for the
crimes and human rights violations by security actors as well as monitoring the
limitations of the state’s progress in pushing forward SSR programmes.5
4
Kusnanto Anggoro, Introduction in “Rekam Jejak Proses 'SSR' Indonesia 2000-2005” (Jakarta: Propatria
Institute, October 2006), page xvii.
5 The division of 3 categories is not an extreme separation, as at certain levels actors from CSO have a meeting in
order to share ideas and prepare strategies. For example, in response to the Anti-Terrorism Act, all CSOs
conducting SSR advocacy tended to have similar criticisms and objections although the advocacy methods and
approaches were different
129
Table: Types of SSR Advocacy by CSOs
1
Beni Sukadis adalah Koordinator Program Lesperssi (Lembaga Studi Pertahanan dan Studi Strategis)
,Indonesia Jakarta
130
Between 2000 and 2005, CSOs issued many strategic recommendations in
opposition to draft legislation, policy formulation and the abolition of policies and
legislation created by the government that was contradictory to democratic
values, human rights and principles of good governance. CSO actors therefore
had a gradual impact on a more constructive SSR. In line with the emergence of
state transparency and the public’s aspirations, the basis for an enhanced SSR
concept with freedom of expression was given. For example, by proposing Draft
Acts/Legislations, carrying out hearings with the DPR (House of
Representatives), DEPHAN, Mabes, TNI and POLRI, through judicial reviews of
security sector policies that were assumed to threaten human security and by
organising an open public debate on CSO concepts and perceptions.
BOX 1
In 2000, for the first time, a number of crucial recommendations for a civilian leadership were
presented by a consolidation of CSOs during a forum on democratic reform. The forum
consisted of academics, NGO’s, civil bureaucrats and diverse international experts. The forum’s
main aspects were: (1) the abolishment of the TAP MPR No VII/MPR/2000 and to keep in
existence the TNI-POLRI fraction in MPR until 2009; (2) the need to abolish the Act No 80 of
1958 on the National Development Agency – which provides the military with a significant role
regarding policy decisions – and Act No 20 of 1982 – which appoints the military as an equal of
other social powers that operate towards national success in building, establishing and
promoting a secure environment for the public; (3) the need to abolish the quota of a military
chair in the DPR and regional DPRM; (4) to guarantee that every citizen has a right to vote; (5)
to strengthen DPR’s expertise in mastering the defence and military issues by playing a better
role as the government’s legislator and oversight mechanism; (6) to ensure the formulation of
TNI doctrine and practice are subject to civilian oversight and oversee TNI’s defence activities
against external threats; (7) to abolish Act 28 (1) of chapter X of the second amendment of the
1945 constitution, which bans charges; (8) the need for military personnel to be tried at a
civilian court for any civil legal violations; (9) to reinforce DEPHAN’s expertise in military
issues; (10) to ban military officials on active duty to hold civilian positions within the
government; (11) to set clear legal limits for all intelligence bodies and hand over their jobs to
the police as long as approved officially; (12) to ensure that the appointment of high ranking
officials is carried out by the government executive branch through its consultation with the
national parliament, (13) that the police is placed under the authority of the Ministry of Home
Affairs as it is turned into a civilian organisation; (14) that the civilian structure which is
accountable to the government shall take over all the legal business management of the armed
forces and ensure that the profit gained still belongs to TNI and (15) to reduce the military
territorial command, which must be given the opportunity to participate in international forums
to nurture the troops professional norms and to raise their salaries.6
Dynamics of the 2006 SSR Advocacy: Accommodation, Compromise and
State Resistance
SSR projects conducted by CSOs in 2006 can be considered from different
perspectives and significant examples and other relevant information are
described below:
6
Forum untuk Reformasi Demokratis, “Penilaian Demokratisasi di Indonesia“ (Jakarta-Stockholm :
International IDEA, 2000), page 81-101
131
1. National Security Draft
The discussion on the NSD in DEPHAN (Defence Ministry) has created a polemical
situation between DEPHAN and POLRI. In fact, for a long time, many CSOs have
argued for a national security concept with a civilian political leadership over all
other security actors. It was NGO Pro Patria who was mainly in favour of this
concept, as the dynamics and complexity of security problems were overlapping
among the legislation, policies and role distributions of the security actors in the
field. Pro Patria’s proposal helped by bridging the different views on national
security policy. Pro Patria’s approach, in combination with the concept of human
security developed by the UN, helped to reduce the public’s suspicion of national
security, which was often affiliated with past traumatic incidents. The problem
seems not on the concept and draft proposed by CSOs, however it is likely more
due to politics that a draft prepared by DEPHAN “threatens” POLRI’s privilege.7
2. Intelligence Draft
Based on the little attention on the intelligence reform and the tendency to
‘reactivate’ the extraordinary and extrajudicial role of the State Intelligence
Agency especially in relation to the terrorism issue. Therefore, PACIVIS UI
initiated the state intelligence reform in early 2005. They had reviewed on
proposal of the intelligence draft law and also state secrecy draft. This group socalled Intelligence Working Group consists of academics from the university,
think tanks, LIPI and NGO’s. Their version of the state intelligence draft tends to
be much more democratic and in line with human rights. Furthermore, it places
BIN in proportion with its functions and duties as a state intelligence service. The
draft, which was prepared by the working group, served as the basis for the
intelligence reform which was also supported by one national coalition named
Simpul Aliansi National untuk Demokratisasi Inteligen (SANDI), which consists of
several CSOs such as Elsam, Human Rights Working Group (HRWG), Imparsial,
ICW, ISAI, Kontras, Pacivis, Propatria, RIDEP and YLBHI. Unfortunately, ‘the
government’s positive responses’ towards this draft have not been accompanied
by a serious effort to include them in the national legislation programme
(PROLEGNAS) until the end of this year.
3. Military Trials Draft
The process of the revision of the military trials act has been activated. CSOs have
protested severely about issues resulting from the counter-productive attitude of
DEPHAN, which protects their military interests instead of supporting the ongoing
revision. The Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, has made his conservative
attitude clear. He is in favour of excluding the military from being treated equally
by the law. He constantly argued that a civilian law officer is not qualified to
7
See articles on “Supaya TNI and POLRI Lebih Serasi”, Koran Tempo, 2 November 2006, “RUU Keamanan
Nasional Terkendala Posisi POLRI”, Republika 20 November 2006.
132
properly judge military personnel.8 YLBHI and ELSAM state strictly that the KUHP
(Criminal Code) and KUHAP (Criminal Administration Code) are competent to
judge all TNI members accused of general law violations. The Supreme Court
(MA) even states that available civil courts should be prepared to judge TNI
members.9
4. Role of the Defence Ministry
The strategic role of DEPHAN as the institution in charge of establishing state
defence policies, in which TNI is its chief component, assumes that TNI maintains
an effective capacity of control.10 But, the TNI still effectively controls policy and is
more dominant in influencing the DEPHAN policies to be applied for TNI,
especially in terms of threat assessment, defense posture development, force
structure, instruments and budgets. The CSOs criticisms of DEPHAN, include its
weak attitude towards TNI’s involvement in human rights violations, corruption
and criminal business practices that may even pose a threat to the state system.
TNI’s unlawful activities are mainly related to DEPHAN’s weak civilian political
image and its lack of proper control of the administration. In the case of logistic
and weapon procurements, and operational expenditure for instance, the
condition seems clearer. Instead of blaming TNI for its mistakes, DEPHAN tries to
save TNI by taking the responsibility for its negative actions.11
5. Military Business Reconstruction
CSOs’ advocacy on the issue of the sell off of military-owned businesses
highlights the slow and time-wasting governmental effort to remove the last
assets of the TNI’s businesses. The process of proposing the Presidential decree
of appointing the National Team for TNI Business, a working group, official
correspondence from the Defense Minister to the TNI Chief and Chief of Staff, to
verification of the programme has taken two years since the relevant TNI acts
were passed in 2004. According to info, initially there are 219 units, after that
8 As a representation of the Political authority, Minister of Defence should have understood that the discussion of
Military Court Draft, emphasising the jurisdiction of criminal and disciplinary violations by TNI soldiers, is
the continuation of TAP MPR No VII of 2000 on TNI and POLRI's Role and Act No 34 of 2004 on TNI. Read
“Penyidik TNI Diminta Tetap Polisi Militer”, Republika 8 December 2006, “Peradilan Sipil diminta tak
Tinggalkan Ciri Militer”, Koran Tempo 8 December 2006, “RUU Peradilan Militer yang Terkatung-katung
Menunggu Political Will Pemerintah”, Indopost 14 November 2006, “Juwono Reject Civilian Trials”, The
Jakarta Post 30 November 2006.
9 “KUHP and KUHAP Dinilai Kompatibel”, Kompas 1 December 2006, “Pengadilan Militer Siap Adili
Anggota TNI” 2 December 2006.
10 Article 16 , Act No. 3 of 2003 on State Defence mentions the Defence Minister's role , namely to: 1) assist the
president in formulating the general policy of state defence 2) set the policy on state defence implementation
based on the general policy set by the President 3) Prepare the Defence White Paper and set the bilateral,
regional, and international cooperation policy in its field 4) formulate the general policy on the use of TNI
force and other security component 5) set the policy on budgeting, procurement, recruitment, national
resource management and defence technology and industry development needed by TNI force and other
security component, and 6) co-work with department and government institution leaders and prepare and
implement the strategic planning of national resource management for security purpose.
11
Kontras-INFID-Imparsial, “Catatan Monitoring Reformasi TNI I Tahun Paska Penghapusan Embargo
Militer Amerika Serikat”, October 2006, page 19.
133
900-1000 business units, or even possibly 1520 units. Moreover, the Presidential
decree on issue has still not been realised.12 CSOs also criticize the lack of serious
action against “grey” businesses and even the illegal/criminal ones, such as
security service being paid by a US mining company based in New Orleans,
Freeport McMoran Copper and Gold Inc. to Kodam XVII Trikora; also involvement
in illegal logging by a high ranking TNI official, government officials and law
enforcement in Papua in 2002-2004; and also the case of 185 weapons of
different types found at Deputy Assistant of Logistic of KSAD, the late Brigadier
General Koesmayadi.13
6. Human Rights Violations by TNI and POLRI
In the view of CSOs, the security actors, and in particular TNI, have continued to
use their influence in every legal process concerning their officers. As a result,
none of the cases involving TNI members have been investigated carefully. Some
of the important cases include: East Timor, Tanjung Priok, Abepura and the
murder of Munir. CSO critics also address the many legal and human rights
violations that are not processed in accordance with civil law. TNI has preserved
the practice of impunity towards its officers who have violated civilian or human
rights law. TNI even tries to protect its officers by trying their cases in military
courts to avoid severe penalties on the basis of the national legal system,
including the human rights court.14 The TNI has not yet adapted its legal
understanding to the point where military and civilian personnel are treated
equally by the law.15
7. Abolition of the US Military Embargo
The ratification of the HR 3067 Appropriation Act by the President of the United
States, George W. Bush, on 14 November 2005, initiated the abolition of the US
military embargo on Indonesia. This event was the beginning of a better military
12
See,“ 900 Unit Bisnis TNI Terpetakan” Republika 25 February 2006, “Pemerintah Bentuk Pengelola Bisnis
TNI” Koran Tempo 3 March 2006, “Bisnis TNI Dijadikan 7 Perusahaan” Republika 8 Maret 2006, “Bisnis TNI
yang Diverifikasi Sudah 1.520 Unit” Republika 14 March 2006
13 See, “NGOs accuse TNI officials in biggest timber heist ever” The Jakarta Post 18 February 2005, “Security
payment by Freeport triggers U.S government inquiry” The Jakarta Post 19 January 2006. Koesmayadi Case
was analysed comprehensively in 2 editions of Majalah Tempo consecutively, edition “Warisan Maut Jenderal
Koes”, Tempo Edition of 3-9 July 2006, and “Jenderal di Luar Jalur”, Tempo Edition of 10-16 July 2006. issue
on fee for protection and security service of PT. Freeport can be read in Global Witness Report, “Paying for
Protection”, The Freeport mine and the Indonesian Security Forces” July 2005. Meanwhile for the illegal
logging case involving TNI officers, read Environmental Investigation Agency/Telapak Report, “The Last
Frontier; Illegal Logging in Papua and China's massive timber theft”, London/Jakarta, February 2005.
14
Many problematic General promoted such as Major General Sriyanto Muntrasan as Kodam III/Siliwangi
Commander (in Tanjung Priok case, 1984). Colonel Chairawan as Korem 011 Lilawangsa, Aceh Commander
(political abduction), Mayor General Endang Suwarya as Deputy of Army Chief of Staff (Aceh Military
Emergency Commander). See, “Rights group wary of TNI reshuffle” The Jakarta Post 5 Februari 2005,
“Promosikan Sriyanto dan Chairawan, TNI Diprotes” Indopost 5 Februari 2005, “TNI Dinilai Belum Hormati
Penegakan HAM” Suara Pembaruan 5 Februari 2005, “LSM Nilai TNI Tak Peka Soal Endang Suwarya” Koran
Tempo 2 April 2005, “Activist criticize latest TNI moves” The Jakarta Post 2 April 2005.
15 Mufti Makaarim A, “Potret Reformasi TNI 2006”, www. Prakarsa-rakyat.org
134
relationship between the US and Indonesia. CSOs view regarding the new
situation was divided into two parts: the CSOs with a human rights approach,
mainly objected to the new situation, whereas the SSR think tanks seemed to be
in favour of the ratification process. However, the collective attitude of both sides
stressed the importance of reform regarding human rights issues and asked the
US Government, on the basis of its cooperation, to develop an annual evaluation
parameter.16 One year later, Indonesian CSOs kept asking the US government
and other members of the international community to devote serious attention to
the enforcement of the Indonesian democratic process. Unfortunately, Indonesia
had not been provided with appropriate help in its reform process for the past
eight years. Therefore, it is even more crucial now, that the international
environment takes its responsibility in guiding Indonesia through its transition
era into a solid form of democracy. A number of issues appeared to be deliberated
by the US government, as Congress and Senate reviewed the military
cooperation between US and Indonesia and did not wish to be tied to purely
military cooperation with Indonesia. The US government, including the Congress
and Senate, does not automatically accept lobbying by the Indonesian
Government, the Indonesian military or CSOs who desire a more normal military
relationship between the US and Indonesia in order to effect the SSR process, TNI
reform and the modernisation of military weapons, without monitoring the
democracy transition process in Indonesia.17
8. Arms Procurement
In the view of the CSOs, the procurement of military instruments tends to be
inconsistent with defence developments. As a result of the US embargo, the
Indonesian Government purchased its arms from European countries, even
though the weapons were too expensive and of insufficient quality due to fact that
they were second hand products. The problem is that almost all procurements are
based on the export credit facility which is allocated to DEPHAN and POLRI at an
annual level.18 The National Development Planning Board (Bappenas) allocates
500 million USD each year for military procurement. The financing schemes do
not allow for any bilateral or multilateral donors. Besides the special APBN (State
Revenue Budget) defence budget, the military acquires additional financial
sources which definitely augment the state’s loan burden.19
9. Counter-terrorism
The critical view of CSOs on counter-terrorism operations is closely related to a
minimal protection of human rights and the safety of civil society. The state’s war
policy on terrorism lowers the degree of private rights and freedom and, at the
same time, provides security sector actors – BIN and the POLRI’s detachment 88
– with the power to act repressively. CSOs observed severe cases of brutal
16
See INFID, Propatria, Kontras, Imparsial HRWG, The Ridep Institute and LBH Reports, Jakarta, October
2005
17 Kontras-INFID-Imparsial report, ibid, page 25.
18 For further study , see Andi Widjajanto and Makmur Keliat, “Laporan Penelitian Reformasi Ekonomi
Pertahanan di Indonesia” (Jakarta:INFID dan PACIVIS, 2006)
19 Kredit Ekspor TNI dan Polri Dievaluasi “Suara Pembaruan, 28 February 2006
135
arrests, unlawful detention, torture and the application of the death sentence for
criminal activities. Incidents occurred in Central Sulawesi, Central Java, DI
Yogyakarta and East Java.
Combating terrorism may also include procedures that undercut citizens’ rights,
“legalise” torture, brutal arrests and arbitrary detention. Another issue to be
highlighted is the President’s wish to include TNI in the war against terror. 20
10. Brutality of POLRI
The phenomenon of police brutality is often associated with an incomprehensive
reform of state institutions.21 The police, as a part of TNI, have inherited a new
dominant role in the application of violence. Unfortunately, a large number of
police officers are known to be involved in illegal business activities and other
unlawful conduct. CSOs believe police brutality to be influenced by a lack of clarity
of their role and function and lack of oversight by a civil political authority. At the
same time, there is no legal instrument to guarantee police accountability by the
House of Representatives, and the Commission for National Police meant to
oversee police activities has only a ‘weak’ mandate in Act No 2 of 2002 on National
Police.
The Future of CSOs Advocacy in SSR: Dynamics and Challenges to
motivate Democratic Oversight and Control
The dynamic of SSR consists of other specific issues and involves diverse actors
and approaches. Some of the important factors are listed as follows:
1) There are compromises and accommodation politics operating among the
elites of the new order retaining influence on judicial, legislative and executive
responses on the public’s urgent demands as outlined above
2) The emergence of civilian politicians from old and new political perspectives
willing to make accommodations on a number of democracy transition agenda
3) The public’s open access to the concept of SSR. This includes SSR design,
process and policy making in the parliament and government with the help of
academics, CSO, NGO and other organisations.
4) Support from the international community on matters of SSR.
20 The statement invites a harsh reaction from different levels. The former President Abdurrachman Wahid states
that enacting the KOTER (Territorial Command) role is the wrong remedy for our sickness and has the
potential to trigger the militants and drive towards an authoritative government. While the MPR spokesman
Hidayat Nurwahid affirms that the military can only play a role of assistance to the National Police (POLRI)
and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), not to take over their role. See “Politicians slam plan for TNI”, The
Jakarta Post, 7 October 2005.
21
As an illustration, see “Anggota Polisi Tembak Warga Sipil”, Kompas 29 August 2006, “Polisi Pukul
Terdakwa”, Media Indonesia 29 August 2006, “Polisi Tembak Istri yang TNI”, Indopost 30 August 2006,
“Pelecehan Seksual, Langgar Kode Etik Brigjen Edhi Bisa Dipecat”, Media Indonesia 30 August 2006,
“Illegal Logging, Wakapolres Tabalong Dipecat”, “Oknum TNI, Polisi dan Penjahat Bersekongkol”, 12
November 2006.
136
Unfortunately, the SSR dynamics of the post Soeharto reign have not yet shown
major changes. The measures of change are mainly symbolic instead of
substantive reform. The problem is reflected in the emergence of SSR policies
with a poor level of practical implementation and, overall, oversight remains at a
very weak level.22 Some of the problems were also closely related to the complex
relations between the most elite security sector actors.
CSOs role under the last two governments (Megawati Soekarnoputri and Susilo
Bambang Y’s government) has developed without a clear consensus and role
distribution in guarding the SSR agenda. This dynamic is clearly different from its
role under the two previous governmental periods (BJ Habibie and Abdurrahman
Wahid). This condition is closely related to macro-political dynamics as well as
the elite’s tendencies and interests. This condition shows that Indonesian
democracy is still in a process of transformation towards finding a collective
meaning among the different interests that currently exist. The issue depends
very much on the flow of dominant political interest instead of answering the
principal and substantial issues, its bottom line is to make changes consistently
and effectively in the body of state specifically, POLRI and TNI reform motivated
by the government, for instance, has touched mainly on the legal aspect of non
law enforcement and the structural aspects rather than posture oriented and
defence strategy policy.
The BIN reform is still less advanced, as none of the new legal regulations have
been validated. BIN’s draft regulations are supposed to provide a legal
framework for this institution, however its authority has not been regulated and it
has banned the state’s oversight mechanism (executive and legislative) on the
tasks of its intelligence agency.
Therefore, CSOs SSR advocacy does not only face the resistance of the security
actors, but also clashes with the ambiguity of the state’s political behaviour and
receives poor support from the political elite. To inspire and motivate the
tendency towards substantive SSR advocacy among CSO, prioritizing more
realistic strategies and agenda choices, in line with the capacity and interest
direction of each organizations, on key policy and monitoring issues, is crucial to
change attitudes and affect significant change.
22
Reformasi TNI Masih Parsial and Internal”, 14 November 2006
137
Mass Media and Security Sector Reform
Ahmad Taufik1
Introduction
Since the Indonesia's independence in 1945, the press in Indonesia has
experience ups and downs. Only after the reform era, the press has more
freedom to expose news. During the New Order, the press played as the
government's 'spoke person' role to disseminate and they were being uncritical
towards government's policy.
The government controlled the press by imposing a license to publish printed
media (SIUPP). There was only one journalist organization namely Indonesian
Journalist Association (PWI) who acted as if they are the government's mouth
piece. SIUPP was subject to be annulled by the government without notification.
Controversial cases of annulment of press license were the cases of Tempo, Detik,
and Editor Tabloid in 1994. Although, young journalists were strongly protested
such decision, it did not change the Soeharto's government stance. Only after the
students' toppled down Soeharto in 1998, Tempo magazine can be published.
After the falldown of the New Order regime in 1998, the press had the opportunity
to develop and to become more critical in delivering news and facts to public. This
progress can be seen throughout the democratization process, for instance the
exposure of security institution reform in order to improve the security
institution's task in conflict areas in Indonesia. Indonesian press plays a big role in
exposing news on the dynamics of TNI and Polri reform.
The most significant institutional change in the security sector actors is the
separation of Polri from TNI in 1999. In parallel with the separation process, there
were several clashes between TNI and Polri in some areas, especially in conflict
areas such as Mollucas, Papua, and Aceh. These clashes became part of the
publication by media. It is important to view the coverage and publication of role
and dynamic of security actors by media as public social control. Since the media
functions as public information provider, thus the contributions of mass media
become crucial.
Media coverage on the dynamics of security actors should be considered as part of
oversight on the security sector reform. In results, professional and impartial
mass media is a pre-condition to convey messages to public in a transparent
manner. It means, the freedom of press in media coverage should be consistently
promoted to uphold pillars of democracy.
1
Ahmad Taufik, is a Senior Journalist from Tempo Magazine, and member of AJI, Jakarta
138
Mass Media and the Dynamics of Security Actors
It is important to understand as to what the function of mass media in the society
and in security sector in particular. According to Harold Laswell that in general,
the function of mass media can be classified into the followings:
1. Social surveillance
2. Social correlation
3. Socialization 2
Social surveillance function of media is the dissemination of information for social
control. For instance, the news coverage on human rights violations cases
perpetrated by the apparatus is part of social control conducted by the media.
Then, social correlation function of media is connecting one party or its opinion to
others. The last, socialization function is disseminating ideas and virtues from
one generation to another. For examples as to how the values of honesty, mutual
cooperation, social justice and unity or nationalism in the society kept on exposed
by the media.
Following the reformation process in all sectors, the quantity of mass media in
Indonesia is significantly increased. As illustration, there were 695 printed Media,
for electronic Media; there were 1.100 radios, 10 national TV Stations and one
State Owned TV Station (TVRI). More electronic media which grows rapidly is
online media through internet such as detik.com, Kompas online and
tempointeraktif, etc. Although, the quality of media coverage is still debatable
whether it is getting better or it is still in the assessment process in order to
identify the right format.
Media can be classified into two clusters as follows, printed mass media includes
newspaper, tabloid, and magazine, and electronic media covers radio, television,
and online media such as internet. Mass media competition among printed
media, electronic and online media is inevitable. Although, the ownership of mass
media dominated by a few people who own capital and more experiences. Some
media groups are Kompas-Gramedia group, Jawa Pos group, Media Indonesia
group, Tempo group, and there are other smaller media groups such as Republika
and Pikiran Rakyat.3
From the 2004 data, printed media was mostly dominated by giant
conglomerates from the following groups, Kompas, Jawa Pos and Media
Indonesia. The Kompas group has 14 daily papers and 32 weekly papers,
whereas Jawa Pos Group has 81 daily newspapers and 23 weekly papers, while
Media Indonesia group has 4 daily news papers and 1 TV Station. This group of
media is categorized as mainstream media, in spite of alternative media which
covers news from different perspectives and aim elimination of violence.
From the abovementioned media, which one that consistently has serious policy
to make coverage on actors and the dynamics of security sector reform. The
present essay was mainly based on printed national media since this media is
2
3
Page. 14, Kompetensi Wartawan, Penerbit Dewan Pers, 2005.
Page. 52, Media Sadar Publik, LSPP, Jakarta, 2005
139
considered well-read by consumers across Indonesia, reached the most remote
areas, and competent to disseminate information and to influence its readers
massively. Nonetheless, this does not meant to deny the local mass media role or
cheap modern media such as internet.
From the news content analysis, there are several issues that receive attention
from the printed media, such as the right to vote of the Indonesian National
ARMY/ Police Force of Republic of Indonesia, human rights violation, military
business, Weapon procurement, military court and anti-terrorism bill, and
corruption within the apparatus body. The following is several printed media
coverage on security sector reform during 2006-2007 periods:
1. A big controversy shocked public trust in mid of 2006 is the discovery of
hundreds of guns and thousands ammunition at Deputy Assistant of Logistics
of Indonesian Army Headquarter (Waaslog KSAD) the late Brigadir General
Koesmayadi’s residence, in the North of Jakarta. Unfortunately, this finding
could only reached by public after the Chief of ARMY made a press conference
at the TNI AD Head Quarter. Afterwards, media were competing to make
media coverage of the incident. In the beginning there was domination by big
media such as Kompas, Koran Tempo, Media Indonesia and Tempo magazine
that intensively made the media coverage. However, the status of the case is
currently unclear, despite of the accused civilian and military has been
disclosed. Hence, it is still a mystery as to how the late Brigjen. Koesmayadi
could posses those arms. Most importantly the usage of those arms is still
unclear. Printed media coverage put more weight on incident-base coverage
instead of investigation-based coverage to disclose the process.
2. The Department of Defense procurement on the VAB Armored Vehicle before
the deployment of Indonesian Peace Keeping troops to Lebanon, beginning
of October 2006, had became printed-media’s polemic for more than a
month. The controversy began when the Government directly appointed the
VAB armored vehicle, reconditioned in the year of 2000, from France without
bidding/ tender process. Whereas the meeting between government
(cHeadquarter. The department of defense) with the parliament (Commission
I) has refused such direct appointment.4 As the result of the parliament
pressured the government to re-negotiate with the armored vehicle
company, they could finally reduce the price from US$ 700.000 to around US$
549 for a standard armored vehicle APC. The government had earmarked
US$ 287 million for such procurement. Although the price of the armored
vehicle had gone down and the total cost of the armored vehicle was only US$
205 million, the Government still spent US$ 287 million on the argument to
use the remaining fund for repairing the old armored vehicles that we already
have since 1997. The mainstream printed Media have not investigated as to
whether the remaining fund was used to repair the old armored vehicles.
There was only one online media who critically quoted the statement by a
member of Commission I from FPG Yuddi Chrisnandi regarding the use of the
remaining fund. 5
4
5
Kompas, 10 September 2006, Indonesia bought armored vehicle worth Rp 259,2 billion
Media Indonesia online, 11 Oktober 2006, Dephan dinilai Manipulasi Pembelian panser VAB.
140
3. On 30 May 2007, in Alas Tlogo Village, Lekok Sub-Districts, Pasuruan District
East Java, there were four civilians killed and eight were injured. They were
attacked by the Indonesian Marine Troops. This farmers shooting case in Alas
Tlogo really shocked the public due to the fact that social political condition
had changed. Post New-Order era, the military institution has repeatedly
convince the public that they have transformed from a repressive institution
becomes a modern institution in terms or organization culture and
institutional character. The presence of military apparatus in the plantation
field acted as if they were the „body guards“of the business executive. This is
similar with the New order period. Many people were pessimistic about the
settlement of this farmer shooting case. One of Judicial Commission Heads,
Busro Muqoddas, in one of the media stated that the people shooting in
Pasuruan East Java should go through a legal process in civil court. Because of
the esprit de corps heavily dominates the military court, this could influence
the impartiality of the judicial process of the case and untransparentnot
transparent. Almost all mainstream media made coverage on this shooting,
at least 11 days afterwards; there were still many printed national media who
publicized the follow-ups of the case, even though they were not headlines
anymore.6 It is worth mentioning that online media did the news coverage on
the case rapidly from variety of angles (in a form of public comments or facts).
4. The candidacy of Governor of Jakarta, Fauzi Bowo, who appoint an active
military personnel Major General TNI Prijanto to become his candidate for
Deputy Governor for the Jakarta Governatorial Election (pilkada) August
2007. Prijanto was the Chief of Commando Resor Militer-051/Wijayakarta
Jakarta Raya Military Territory in 1999 – 2000. He was the Territorial Assistant
of the Chief of Army (Asisten Teritorial Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat) since May
2006 before running for deputy-governor seat with Fauzi Bowo. Such
appointment has disappointed many retired military personnel who are
already involved in politics for sometime and ruined the TNI reform which to
ensure political practice free from TNI. This affair was exposed by mass media
in Indonesia, as to how Major General Prijanto becomes a candidate governor
election as Fauzi Bowo’s Deputy while he is still active military personnel who
hold Territorial Assistant. The public has questioned Prijanto’s status in
military body in many media. Although Prijanto has responded people’s
accusation by claiming that he already retired from military when he was
appointed to run as deputy governor, however, this claim did not convince the
public easily. It was hard for the people to understand the fact that such
resignation from government official of military bodies could be done in a
couple of days. It means there was a distrustful fact, but up to now there has
been no mainstream media who conduct a journalistic investigation on the
status of Prijanto.
5. Military business. Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono, in a discussion,
mentioned that TNI was involved in business since 1952, when the
government did a rationalization on military institution.7 According to
6
7
See news on this case on page, Media Indonesia Daily, 9 June 2007
Kompas , 12 June 2007.
141
Juwono, the Government could not afford the military. Thus, the institution
was authorized to manage the assets resulted from nationalization of
colonials’ assets. Despite of its history, such bias argumentation is no longer
valid. Since the adoption of TNI Law five years ago, all military business
should be handed over to the government. This is in compliance to the article
76 Law No. 34 Year of 2004 regarding TNI. Therefore, early 2006 a
Supervision Team for Military Business Transformation were formed. The
team was consist of members from different departments, collected all data
and information on all Military Business assets. So far, the public do not know
the amount of assets of Military’s foundations and cooperatives yet, since all
the data is in the hand of the team. The issue of military business hand-over
was closely related with the use of narrow military business definition which
caused a public debate. In accordance to the Department of Defense, military
business is those companies whose assets worth US$ 50.000 minimum.
Based on Juwono’s opinion, there were only six or seven companies who did
not meet these criteria. This implicates foundations and cooperatives who
have businesses could no be handed over and remained belong to the military
institution. Kompas, Republika and Jakarta Post doubted the government’s
will to take over military business in their coverage on military business.
Some fundamental public questions on military business such as whether the
military owned companies have gone through audited process? If they had,
who were the independent public auditors? Were the auditors assigned by the
government/ from the government? Mainstream Media have not publicized it
yet.
6. National Security Bill; the publication on National Security Bill, which drafts
are being drafted and discussed by the Department of Defense, the Minister
of Defense stated explicitly Tempo Interaktif that the separation of TNI-Polri
has exceeded the limits of TNI reform 1998-1999. This is like turning the TNI
reform upside-down, which already divide the authority of security matters to
the police while the defense matters to the military. There were many
mainstream media coverage focusing on the controversy of bill which puts the
police department under a department (political authority). Whereas the
more substantial issues is the role of TNI in a state of emergency especially
endanger situation for the national security. Issue regarding who has the
capacity to interpret the role of TNI to assist in dealing with emergency
situation due to social outbreak which could threat the national security. In
conclusion, there should be a clear regulation to define the TNI’s assistance
task. TNI assistance task to civil administration or the police is a mandated
duty besides their main duties.
7. The role of parliament, according to Kusnanto Anggoro quoted in a media,
should have played an important role in the TNI reform process. He said, “In
theory, civilian control over military could be done in several mechanisms.” He
mentioned several procedures; among others are public hearing and or
budgetary control. For instance, the People’s Representative Council (DPR)
could approve the amount of security budget and determine the level of
military “power”. Department of Defense formulates The Defense White
Paper and Strategic Defense Review to guide military in developing its
operational forces. The DPR could question on President’s policy on security
142
and defense, to Minister of Defense or the Chief of Indonesia National Police.
“However, such Civilian control instinct over military is not strongly
embedded in democratic institutions yet,” Anggoro said.
Such media
coverage marked the typical style of mainstream media in publicizing TNI
reform. This means, the values of the news comes from experts opinions
which in the end invites polemic in media.
8. Clash between TNI and Polri. News on the clashed between these two security
apparatus institutions becomes the hottest sources of news in varies national
media, either printed, electronic, or online media. At least there were six
clashes in 2006, and the clash that received the biggest media attention is the
one n Atambua, East Nusa Tenggara at the end of 2006.8 there was one
member of TNI ARMY from Yon 744 – who secures RI-Timor Leste border –
killed and another one injured. The media tend to expose the incidents from
the victim perspective and the damage it has caused, instead of exploring and
covering the root of the problems.
TNI Reform in Mainstream Media
In the beginning people thought that TNI reform in political sphere was a success
by making the parliament and civilian government free from military. Even a
researcher from LIPI Jaleswari Pramodhawardani was deceived when he/she
made a conclusion during a book discussion in Jakarta, "since 1998, the tension
between the civilian and the military is related to two issues, one as to how to
exclude TNI from politics and business. The first issue is relatively easier to be
done compare to the second issue, “Jaleswari said.
The fact that Prijanto, active military personnel in civilian politics position as the
candidate of deputy governor, has proven that Jaleswari thesis was invalid. CSIS
political observer, J. Kristiadi thinks that the candidacy of military member in the
Governor Election could hamper military reform process. „Constitutionally, TNI
member could only vote. Even if they want to be elected, they should retire first,’
he said.
Therefore, if TNI is serious in reforming its institution to be come professional,
they should do their main duty which is to maintain the national sovereignty and
unity, they do not have to participate in the local governor election.
It is interesting to note as to how the press often conduct polling to understand
the people’s perception on the work of security apparatus. One of the examples is
KOMPAS Daily did a polling on the work of TNI during the 61st anniversary of TNI.
The result of the KOMPAS Daily research and development division,9 concluded
that it seems the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) is at a cross road. They are at
the cross-road of continuing the reformation agenda by improving its
professionalism and refraining themselves from politics or leaving the barracks
by opening small political freedom in the security-defense institution?
KOMPAS found something in common in their research, that public has double
8
9
Panglima TNI: bentrok TNI-Polri, Masalah Serius, Tempointeraktif, 11 December 2006.
Kompas , 4 October 2006.
143
feelings in looking at the current TNI’s role in the post new-order political process,
either supporting or worrying the use of TNI’s political rights.
Indeed, the image of TNI is considerably improved since 1998. in accordance to
polling in 2006, not less than 60, 6 percent think that TNI has good image. On the
contrary, those who gave low „grades“on TNI’s image has the tendency to
increase. In 2005, there was 22, 2 percent of respondents gave low grades to
TNI’s image increased to 35, 5 percent in 2006. the decreased of TNI’s good
image indicates the incidents which surrounded this 62-year old institution.
This becomes a polemic which causes a suspicious uncontrollable movement
within the TNI body. More than half (47,3 percent) of respondents mentioned that
the TNI has lost its trust since the case of arm finding (Koesmayadi’s case), other
groups of respondents (65,2 percent) are pessimistic that the Koesmayadi’s case
will be brought to justice in a free and fair legal procedure. Regardless the case,
reform and control over arm business in the military body have not improved yet.
It perhaps even gets worse. Recently, there was a disclosure of a retired TNI
member who is involved in an illicit arm trafficking in the United States of
America.
Nevertheless, such controversial within the military body did not eliminate the
positive image that TNI has been built since the beginning of reform era. Public
memory on the role of TNI in various disaster areas, the responsive action by TNI
on location such as Merapi Mountain, Yogyakarta eartHeadquarteruake, tsunami
in Pangandaran to the Sidoarjo hot mud have ignited positive appreciation by
public. The TNI’s social role in helping society in many disasters has invited many
compliments from the people; three out of four respondents (75 percent) are
satisfied with TNI’s work to help casualties in disaster locations.
Unfortunately, although the social role of TNI has received positive
appreciation from public, the demand to be more professional has not been
fulfilled yet. In restoring conflict areas, only 46, 3 percent of respondents are
satisfied with the work of TNI, where as the other half of respondent (50, 7
percent) are not satisfied yet. The scoring for TNI’s other work such as
maintaining the state sovereignty is not enthusiastically responded by the
respondents.
Those who were positive about the work of TNI are comparable to those who were
negative about the work of TNI. In general, the polling shows that the majority
(56, 7 percent) were satisfied with the work of TNI. However, 39, 6 percent felt
unsatisfied about the work of TNI.
Among these compliments and criticism from public, TNI is in the middle of
debates on its political roles. After putting the issues under the rug for quite a
while since the fall of Soeharto, now the political rights of Tin’s members are being
questioned again. The initiative to restore political rights of TNI members was
started in the parliament, an institution which supposes to represent political
parties. It seems that political role of TNI in the eye of public has created
confusion, either to let the TNI have their political rights but being nervous about
it.
The growing discourse in public is restoring the TNI’s right to vote in general
election means bringing back the military into political practice directly or
indirectly. Although, they would probably have done it in a completely different
144
manners in the past. On the other hand, the President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono himself has asked the military at least three times in official forums for
TNI to be free from politics.
Public has mixed feelings about the implementation of TNI’s political
rights. Half (49,2 percent) of the polling results did not mind TNI use their right to
vote just like in the General Election 1955, while the other half (48,8 percent) had
refused such idea. On the other hand, public’s concern was all of the sudden
emerged. It is afraid that TNI could not maintain its neutrality if they could use
their right to vote. Not less than 62, 1 percent of respondents stated such
concern. Furthermore, 65, 5 percent of respondents think that all this time, the
TNI always took the side of business executives over the people.
The statement of President Yudhoyono that TNI should not be in politics
has strong argumentation. At least the majority of the respondent (67, 9 percent)
thinks that TNI has strong influence in domestic political affairs. Nonetheless, the
public still cannot indecisive whether TNI political involvement is necessary or
not.
The public still favors civilian figures, instead of military figures in political
practice for instance in governor elections. More than 61, 7 percent firmly
disagree if there were members of TNI participate in local general election
(pilkada). It seems that mostly the public still does not want to return to the past
where governors were dominated by military personnel.
If the public still shows ambiguity in regards to TNI’s political role, but the
public has clear stance to reject TNI’s involvement in business. Although more
than half of the respondents (66,2 percent) think that the welfare of the TNI’s
members is apprehensive, the majority (86,2 percent) strongly against the idea
of TNI doing business and it is the State who is accountable for the welfare of the
soldiers.
The results of the polling indicate that the profile of TNI in the country has been
analyzed from many different angles. In some angles, TNI’s existence is not
expected, but in other perspectives its existence as well-trained troops to
maintain the national security and unity is favorable, interesting and sometimes
making the people proud. 63, 6 percent of respondents stated that their proud if
there were members of their families or relative who joined the military, shows
quite a high level of appreciation to their social class.
Mass Media’s Attitude in News Coverage
The case of VAB armored vehicle, Koesmayadi, Alas Tlogo, Military business and
candidate Deputy Governor of Jakarta Prijanto illustrate the failure of TNI reform
(in particular the ARMY/ TNI AD) in civil supremacy over TNI context. Later on,
this will be closely related with the State’s orientation in drafting bills, especially
in drafting the National Security, Intelligence, State Secrecy, and Contingency
Components Bills. One of the reformation keys is the availability of legal
foundation which clearly defines the division of labor of security apparatus.
Thus, it is inevitable for mass media to closely monitor the work and behavior of
TNI. KOMPAS Daily has written many articles that TNI is not fully prepared to
reform its own institution. Although, KOMPAS is often not directed its constructive
criticism to the right target. The abstruse argument from KOMPAS is difficult to
145
understand by the average public. Critical opinions regarding the military mostly
came from opinion writers who are KOMPAS’ internal staff.
TEMPO magazine is more critical and directly targeted the actor. For instance, the
finding of 103 arms, 42 pistols, 6 grenades, and almost 30.000 ammunitions in
the late Brigadier General Koesmayadi's House. For TEMPO, this is serious
„business“.
According to TEMPO, various armed conflicts in Aceh and Molluccas and the ongoing conflicts in Poso and Papua leave unanswered questions: where did these
military standard arms and weapons come from? This includes the incident when
the police have arrested an automatic arm dealer, Uzi, in North Jakarta. The police
also had seized similar weapon from Jamaah Islamiyah groups. The finding at
Brigjen Koesmayadi’s House should become an entry point to disclose the
mystery of arm trafficking which probably had contributed to the violence in this
republic.
Kompas is quite intensive observing formal procedures such as the proposal of
bills which related to TNI’s matters. While Tempo Interaktif pays more attention
to statements by experts and events which has news values.
Republika Daily seems not very interested in military reforms issues. They are
only enthusiastic in covering events or incidents which are related to the
Moslems, for instance the arrest of terrorist in Tanah Runtuh (Central Sulawesi)
by Detachment 88 of Indonesia’s National Police. The proportion of such news
coverage is confirming its claim as the Moslem’s media representative. Republika
Daily has the tendency to exaggerate news coverage on human rights violation
cases perpetrated by the police in the arrest.10 In 2006, Republika did write a long
review on military reform during the anniversary of TNI.
The Jakarta Post, perhaps due to its English language newpapers, has more guts
to criticize the TNI. The Jakarta Post often featured critical review on TNI matters
such as military business, National Security Bill, Territorial Command (KOTER),
civil – military relationship, and others.
10
Republika, 23 January 2007.
146
Conclusion
The reform process required checks and balance mechanism. However, reform
also requires trust and equal opportunities. Reform process requires time and
conducive situation.
In accordance to a military expert Salim Said, one of the security sector reform
challenges is to pull and to place the military into the “new religion“called the
religion of democracy. This includes preventing the militarization of police forces
and other intelligence bodies dominated by military leaders and discourse.
Without the willingness of military to enter the new era, it is difficult to realize a
holistic human oriented security concept. Salim views two main obstacles. First,
the reluctance of military to trust the civilians and to uphold civil supremacy.
Second, are the readiness and the courage of civilians themselves. The most
recent example is the candidacy of Governor and deputy governor Jakarta Fauzi
Bowo/Prijanto.
Yet, in accordance to Salim Said, Alfred Stephan was only giving new outfit to the
reality in the third world. This is deigned by the US Government to justify the
involvement of military in politics, especially during the Latin America regime that
the US government had supported. Stephan’s opinion is still dominant in the
Indonesian military communities.
Kusnanto has an opinion that mass media as one of the Democracy pillar, has a
problem of its own. The problem is similar, most journalists are more interested in
covering the “politics of Generals” rather than exposing the substantial security
matters. These weaknesses are worth analyzed further as to what are the cultural
and structural impacts of such journalism.
It can be excused if it is a cultural problem since such cultural changes take time.
However, if it is caused by structural problem, it will worsen the press critical
thinking in dealing with social political matters, especially which are related to
security sector reform matters.
Mass media coverage on security sector reform is still conducted a reactive
manner.11 Media coverage has not publicized the news comprehensively by
exploring the root of the problem. This means media should use holistic approach
in covering news especially the cause – effect process. Media should be able to
explore the problems and consistently follow the incidents until it is solved.
However, the interest of the owners is prioritized over public interest. Therefore,
the journalist, the frontline of press, should cooperate with civil society to push
security actors’ improvement.
The alliance/coalition of civil society is not solid yet to bring military into
democratic order, thus it could not consistently maintain the sustainability of
security sector reform. Even if there were changes, it had happened due to
willingness of the military to change. Circumstances like this, there is always a
11
See several examples of media coverage on eight cases/ issues mentioned in the beginning of the essay.
147
chance for exploitation of political structure by certain political forces including
the military. Now, the civilians should dare to take decision in division of labor
especially in strengthening its role. Especially the media should be more vocal
and honest. Primarily, to optimize the mass media’s function in order to control
the security actors.
References
Report of Kontras (draft), 6 June 2007
Tempo Interaktif, 31 May 2007
Media Indonesia Online, 31 May 2007
Kompas, 12 June 2007
Kompas, Wednesday, 04 October 2006
KOMPAS, Monday, 12-12-2005
Tempo Interaktif, 15/2/2005.
TEMPO Edisi 10 October 2004
Antara, 14 April 2005
Tempo Interaktif 7 June 2007
Tempo Interaktif, 18 June 2007
Republika, 6 October 2006
Jakarta Post, 10 July 2007
Kompetensi Wartawan, Dewan Pers, 2005
148
The Ministry of Defence and Indonesian National Armed Forces
Headquarters in the Reformation Era
Rico Marbun1
Introduction
There have been three major developments in the reform of the
Indonesian military sector in the post-Suharto era. First, the Police of the Republic
of Indonesia was detached from the TNI based on the decision of the People’s
Consultative Council IV of 2000. Second, the Ministry of Defence and Security
(Dephankam) was renamed Ministry of Defence. The exclusion of the word
“security” is more than a question of syntax, it reflects the desire to amend the
mission of the Ministry to its constitutional duty: national defence. According to
the Decision of the People’s Consultative Council (TAP MPR) no. VII of 2000, the
Police is the institution responsible for maintaining domestic security and public
order. Third, the posts of Minister of Defence and Commander of the Indonesian
Army have been separated. Fourth, and for the first time in four decades of the
Indonesian New Order (Orde Baru), President Abdurrahman Wahid – nicknamed
Gus Dur – has appointed a civilian figure as the Minister of Defence. These steps
have been intended to strengthen the civilian democratic oversight of the TNI and
its subordination to governmental control.
The reform of the Ministry of Defence is an important aspect in the reform of the
security sector, because the Ministry of Defence is a privileged actor in the
democratic oversight of the military sector. For Indonesia, and all other postauthoritarian countries, the restructuring of the organisation and working habits
of the Ministry of Defence is of crucial importance in the process of
democratisation.
This chapter assesses the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the
TNI Central Command in the transitional period and seeks to answer two
fundamental questions. First, what changes are likely to occur in the relationship
and respective missions of the Ministry of Defence and TNI Central Command?
Second, have changes in this relationship in the transitional period led to
establish the basis for democratic civilian control of the armed forces?
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the working
relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the TNI Central Command since
1998. The second analyses this relationship in contrast to existing legislation and
questions the causes of inconsistencies and the final section offers policy
recommendations to reform the current system.
1
Rico Marbun, is researcher at LESPERSSI and he get His master degree from strategic studies from IDSS,
Nanyang University, Singapore.
149
The New Order of the Ministry of Defence and TNI Headquarters in the
reformation era
During the Reformation era (1998 to present) that followed the demise of
Suharto’s “New Order” (Orde Baru), two acts regulating the civilian control of
armed forces were enforced: the 2002 Act no.3 on National Defence and the 2004
Act no.34 on the Indonesian National Army (TNI). These two pieces of legislation
define the respective mission and organisational structure of the Ministry of
Defence and the TNI Headquarters (TNI HEADQUARTER) and their legal
framework for interaction.
A. The Authority of the Ministry of Defence.
Article 16 of the 2002 Act no.3, states that the Ministry of Defence is responsible
for assisting the President in formulating a national defence strategy and
elaborating implementation policies. The Ministry of Defence is in charge of
maintaining an appropriate number of combat units and formulating a general
policy on the use of available combat units. The 2002 Act also states that the
Minister of Defence must cooperate with other governmental agencies to
formulate and implement a strategic plan for the good management of the
resources, in order to contribute to the defence of the country.
In sum, the duties of the Minister of Defence (Menhan) are:
1. To assist the President in formulating a national defence strategy.
2. To establish an implementation policy based on the guidelines enunciated
by the President.
3. To publish a Defence white book that determines the guidelines for bilateral,
regional and international cooperation in military affairs.
4. To formulate a general policy on the use of TNI forces
B. Organizational Arrangements and Patterns of the Relationship between the
Ministry of Defence and TNI Headquarters
The State Defence Act and the TNI Act have grounded the legal bases for the
relationship between the Ministry of Defence and TNI HEADQUARTER. In
particular, Article 17, clause 1 of the TNI Act stipulates that the supreme
commander of the TNI is the President. The TNI Commander, in turn, is in charge
of the every-day running of combat forces and is ultimately responsible to the
President.
The TNI is subordinated and under the authority of the Ministry of Defence, as
outlined in the national defence strategy. The TNI act specifies that all matters
related to strategic planning, such as budgetary planning, recruitment, natural
resources management, general management issues, and armament
procurement is the responsibility of Ministry of Defence. In turn, the development
of combat forces, issues related to the personnel education and training,
preparation of available combat units and the development of a military doctrine
is the responsibility of the Commander of the TNI, who is to be assisted by the
150
Head of Staff. The TNI central command is composed of the TNI Commander and
representatives from the Headquarters of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.
C. The Plan of State Defence Implementation Policy
President
assisted by
Council on National Defence
National Defence
Strategy
Indonesian
Parliament
(DPR)
Ministry of Defence
Implementation
Policy
TNI
Commander
General Policy on the
Use of TNI forces
(Menhan)
Military Strategic
Planning
Fig. 12
2 Andi Widjajanto,
Reformasi Sektor Keamanan Indonesia, (Jakarta: Pro Patria), p. 56
151
The above table indicates that plan of state defence policy rather than the
operational command of the armed forces. The military process is detailed in the
State Defence Act. The implementation of a defence-related policy proceeds as
follow: first, in its preliminary stages, the executive branch formulates general
guidelines on a defence-related policy. The general defence policy is then
“operationalised” by the Minister of Defence, who elaborates a national
implementation plan and procedures for the use of TNI forces.
Article 16 of the Act 3/2002 states that the Ministry of Defence has an obligation
to assist the President in the formulation of a national defence strategy and plan
its implementation. In the implementation process, the Minister of Defence is
responsible for developing the capacity of TNI forces and establishing procedures
for the use of combat units. In other words, the TNI Commander is guided by the
policies of the Ministry of Defence in issues of military strategy. More generally,
the formulation and implementation of defence policies are overseen by the
Indonesian Legislative Assembly.
D. Budget Coordination
One of the fundamental aspects of democratic control of armed forces is civilian
control of the military budget. In accordance with the State Defence Act, the
defence budget is elaborated by the Ministry of Defence and financed from the
government’s budget (APBN). The TNI Commander can make recommendations
but it is the Minister of Defence who has the final word.
The TNI Budget procedures are as follow:
1. The HEADQUARTERs of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force prepare a
comprehensive annual review to identify the needs of their respective units.
2. The reviews are handed to the Minister of Defence to assist him in formulating a
national defence strategy.
3. The national defence policy paper details a development plan based on which
the Ministry of Defence determines appropriate budgetary allocations. The
budget is according allocated from the government’s annual budget (APBN)
4. The allocation of the defence budget is set out by the Ministry of Defence and
approved by the Indonesian Legislative Assembly (DPR)
The State Defence Act and the TNI act mark substantial progress and
demonstrate an attempt to achieve greater civilian control of the armed forces.
These legal documents have set out a legal framework for regulating the relations
between the Ministry of Defence and the TNI HEADQUARTER. The Ministry of
Defence is now recognised as an extension of the civilian government in military
affairs. The State Defence Act has also given the Ministry of Defence a greater
role in the formulation of a national defence strategy and in decisions regarding
the deployment of forces. It must be emphasised that it is the Ministry of Defence
that has the authority to establish the defence budget.
152
The Unsteady Control of the Ministry of Defence
In sum, the working relationship between the Ministry of Defence and TNI
HEADQUARTER has improved over the last few years but many challenges remain
unanswered.
First, despite legislation that stipulates that the TNI HEADQUARTER is
subordinate and “under the direct control” of the Ministry of Defence, the
relationship between the two entities has remained ambiguous. This situation is
complicated by the fact that in practice, the TNI HEADQUARTER is rarely under
”the direct control” of the Ministry of Defence since the Commander of the TNI
HEADQUARTER is equal in rank to the Minister of Defence as both are members of
Cabinet. In practice, it means that the TNI is responsible to the President rather
than the Minister of Defence.
This situation has led to a Janus-faced authority in the conduct of national
defence. A hierarchical relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the TNI
has not materialised because the TNI Act is remarkably unclear about the
relationship between the two entities. According to the Act No. 34/2004 article 4,
clause 2 states that “in the formulation of defence policy and administrative
tasks, the TNI is subordinate to and under the direct control of the Ministry of
Defence”. However, the meaning of “under the direct control” is left undefined and
there are no conditions as to how that control is to take place in practice,
particularly in view of the equality of status of the Minister of Defence and the TNI
Commander.
This ambiguity manifested itself in the reform of a military command unit in Aceh
(Komando Daerah militer di Aceh/KODAM) as a result of pressures from the TNI
HEADQUARTER. As it is widely known, Kodam in Aceh had been left unchanged
during the Habibie regime. During Megawati’s tenure, the TNI HEADQUARTER
openly announced its intention to reform the Kodam system in Aceh considering
the low levels of activity of the separatist Independent Aceh Movement.
Notwithstanding discussions about its effectiveness, this public announcement in
principle violated the provisions of the State Defence Act. Kodam is in essence a
force deployment, a prerogative of the state, and the authority to make changes
to the Kodam structure is in the hands of the civilian government. This policy,
therefore, should have been announced by the Minister of Defence, not the TNI
Commander. This incident can also be interpreted as a sign of the willingness of
the TNI HEADQUARTER to demonstrate that it can change the Kodam system in
Aceh without having to through the Ministry of Defence.
Secondly, even if in theory the national defence strategy, defence budget and
armament policy are part of the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, there are
many cases where this has not always the case in practice. On more than one
occasion the Ministry of Defence was left uninformed of major arms purchases.
For instance, on 23 April 2003, Indonesia concluded an agreement to buy military
planes from Russia: two Sukhoi SU 27SK, two SU 30 MK respectively and two Mi35P helicopters. The purchase, however, violated the procurement rules spelled
out in the State Defence Act. The contract was not signed by authorised party –
the Ministry of Defence - but by the TNI Commander of the time, General
153
Endriartono Sutarto, and the Chief of Bulog3 Widjanarko. In fact, the deal was
completed without the knowledge of the Minister of Defence, who later admitted
that he had no idea of plans to purchase the Sukhoi planes. This purchase was in
clear violation of Article 16, clause 6 of Act. No.3/2002.
Similarly, when the Riau Local Government decided to acquire KAL-35 ships, it
contacted the Indonesian Western Fleet. Shortly after, a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between Admiral Muslimin Santoso, Commander of
the Western Fleet, and Saleh Djasit, Governor of Riau. The deal clearly violated
Article 25, clause 1 of the State Defence Act that stipulates that national defence
must be financed by the Government Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBN).
In this case, the sale of weaponry should have been passed through the Ministry
of Defence before it was distributed.
These are many other examples of similar breaches. They suggest that the
civilian control of military affairs is far from ideal and attest to the ambiguity of the
legal framework governing the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and
the TNI HEADQUARTER. This ambiguity ultimately leads to a disordered
relationship between the two entities. Because the TNI HEADQUARTER is not
subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, it can in practice act independently and
by-pass its decisions. The current legal framework paves the way for further
violations and the continuing ascendancy of the military in defence matters.
The explanatory note of TNI Act (Article 3, clause 2) states that for the effective
and efficient management of national defence, the TNI must in the future be
subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. In other words, the TNI HEADQUARTER
must be under the effective control of the Ministry of Defence and the TNI
Commander should no longer have the same rank as the Minister of Defence.
These objectives are difficult to realise for three main reasons. Firstly, the TNI act
elaborates on relations as they should be “in the future”. The ambiguity of the
phrase “in the future” – not setting any time limit - has delayed the integration of
the structures of the TNI into the Ministry of Defence. Secondly, the government
itself has not issued a timetable for the subordination of the TNI. Thirdly, and
most importantly perhaps, the TNI Commander and other high-ranking military
officials have repeatedly expressed their refusal to be incorporated into the
structures of the Ministry of Defence.
Juwono Sudarsono, the current Minister of Defence, has on many occasions
stated his desire to see the TNI HEADQUARTER incorporated into the structures of
the Ministry of Defence, judging that the integration process and transitional
period would take approximately three years. The demands of the Ministry of
Defence, however, are met with equally strong pressures from the TNI
Commander not to be incorporated into these structures. The main reason,
according to the TNI Commander, is the unpreparedness of the civilian sector. The
TNI Commander has raised concerns that if the position of Minister of Defence is
filled by certain figures, the TNI will likely be used to benefit particular political
3 BULOG is Logistic Affairs Agency, an institution responsible for the distribution and stabilisation of nine staple
supplies such as hulled rice, kerosene, etc., BULOG institution is not related to defence
154
interests. In short, the TNI is still very doubtful about the preparedness of the
Ministry of Defence to refrain from political considerations should the TNI be
incorporated into its structures.
Looking into the Roots of Refusal
One question follows: why does the TNI refuse to integrate within the structures
of the Ministry of Defence?
The continuous refusal of the TNI Commander to submit to the authority of the
Ministry of Defence must be understood from a historical perspective. Many highlevel military officials assume that if the TNI is subordinated to the structures of
the Ministry of Defence, the TNI will invariably become “politicised”. These
trepidations can be traced back to the events in the era of “Parliamentary
Democracy”.
On 14 November 1945, Indonesia adopted a new constitution that introduced a
parliamentary system, replacing the previous presidential system. The first
government of the new era was formed by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir, head of
the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) who named Amir Sjarifuddin
as Minister of Defence. Sjahrir was a socialist and a staunch anti-fascist who
believed that the army should be placed under the authority of a civilian
government. He effectively refused the army’s proposal to place Sri Sultan
Hamengkubuwono as the Minister of Defence, and instead named Amir
Sjarifuddin, a colleague and member of the Indonesian Socialist Party.
Soon after, Amir Sjarifudidin took steps to not only place the armed forces under
civilian control, but under the control of the Socialist party and the influence of
socialist ideology. On one occasion, Sjarifudidin gave a speech to the army where
he expressed his desire to ideologically indoctrinate the army. He followed on with
his promise and established a Military Political Educational programme called
Pepolit (Army Political Education). Sjarifudidin appointed his civilian colleagues to
prominent positions in the Pepolit structure and some of them, such as Soekarno
Djojopratiknyo, were given the military rank of Lieutenant General. Others were
given the rank of Major General, a position equal to the rank of an Army Division
Commander. Soedirman, Commander of the TNI, was at the time vehemently
opposed to the Pepolit programme, which he saw as nothing more than an
attempt to distil communist ideology in the army.
The tactics employed by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir were indubitably an attempt
to politicise the army. These policies caused the TNI HEADQUARTER, based in
Yogyakarta, to openly oppose the directives of the Amir Syarifuddin who was
based in Jakarta. The Minister of Defence interpreted this as a case of clear-cut
disobedience and decided to form a new army named the “Fighting Bureau”,
separate from existing institutions. He recruited an impressive number of soldiers
into the newly created army, given that Indonesia had only recently declared
independence. Initially, the Fighting Bureau was presented to be a non-partisan
entity, but because the Ministry of Defence was soon dominated by the
Indonesian Socialist Party, it was never truly neutral. The Socialist Party was
155
quick to fill the ranks of the “Fighting Bureau” with soldiers from PESINDO and
other socialist groups and eventually reassigned these newly recruited soldiers
into the People’s Indonesian National Army (TNI Masyarakat) in an attempt to
compete with the TNI.
However, to lay blame only on the Ministry of Defence for the mistakes of the
parliamentary era would be misplaced. The animosity and hatred that the military
felt was not only a result of the mistakes of the civilian government but also stems
from the military’s belief in its superiority and preparedness to guarantee the
security of the country. The divergences between the civilian government and the
military culminated in 1948 during the second Indonesian war of independence.
President Soekarno and other civilian leaders did not keep their promise to fight a
guerrilla war alongside the army against Dutch colonial forces. Also, Sudirman,
the TNI Commander, was extremely displeased with civil leaders as they did
nothing to prevent his capture. These attitudes of hostility have been passed
through generations and are embodied in one of the common sayings of the TNI:
“We are the true guard of the Republic”.
Secondly, and since its inception, the Ministry of Defence has always been
disadvantaged in two fundamental ways. The Ministry of Defence has never been
able to effectively control the TNI Headquarter, or has been in effect directly
dominated by the military. More importantly perhaps, the Ministry of Defence has
gradually been filled with military staff.
The first attempt to create a powerful and effective Ministry of Defence was
undertaken by General Nasution in the 1960s. His goodwill, however, proved
insufficient in countering the opposition of the civilian government of the time. In
1961, on a visit to Moscow to buy military equipment, Nasution searched for ways
to reorganise the Indonesian military around a binding principle. Nasution got the
idea to integrate existing military structures and strengthen the authority of the
Ministry of Defence and its relation with the TNI Headquarter, suggesting a
pattern similar to the one of the Red Army in the Soviet Union. Nasution famously
stated: “I want to have a structure where the Head of the Army also serves in the
Ministry of Defence. The four Headquarter of the TNI will be merged into the
Ministry of Defence and will be governed by one common staff”. Although
Nasution was a military figure himself, his proposal would have in fact enhanced
civilian control over the armed forces, placing the Army, Navy and Air Force under
the control of the civilian government. Furthermore, Soekarno, Indonesia’s
founding president had another vision and the idea was never implemented.
Soekarno quickly got rid of Nasution and was successful in influencing the Army,
Navy, Air Force and Police not to accept the proposed structure. To the contrary,
all the heads of the Army were given the rights and responsibilities of a Minister, a
move widely seen as an effort from Soekarno to prevent the Army from becoming
more independent.
The continued dominance of the TNI Headquarter in relation to the Ministry of
Defence, which has manifested itself to the “Reformation era”, did not happen
overnight. It is an institutional reality that dates back to the early days of the
Republic. Additionally, much of the Ministry of Defence is in turn fully dominated
by military personnel, even since democratic changes swept the country.
156
Period
1945-1966
Institutional links
between the Ministry
of Defence
Institution and the
TNI
The Ministry of Defence
is formed but quickly
changes its name to
“Ministry of Communal
Security” and later to
“Ministry of Defence
and Security”.
1966-1983
The post of Minister of
Defence and Security is
combined with the
duties of the TNI
Commander.
1983-1988
combined with post of
TNI Commander
4
Institution
Leader
Institution
Function
In that period,
National Defence.
several civilian
figures are given
the position of
Minister of
Defence.
Until 1973,
President
Soeharto4 was
also Minister of
Defence and
Security and
Commander of
Indonesian
Republic Army
(ABRI). From
1973 onwards,
the ABRI
Commander also
held the position
of the Minister of
Defence and
Security
The Minister of
Defence and
Security always
had a military
background but
his position was
distinct from the
ABRI
Commander.
Although the posts
of Minister of
Defence and TNI
Commander were
combined, and
given operational
command in the
capacity as a
commander,
military
operational
remained under
TNI Headquarters’
control
The Ministry of
Defence provided
administrative and
logistical
assistance but the
TNI Commander
retained
operational
command.
General Soeharto is the second Indonesian Republic President who was in power for 32 years
157
1998-1999
separated from the post
of TNI Commander
The ABRI
Commander
automatically
was also
automatically
appointed to
head the
Ministry of
Defence and
Security. The
Ministry is still
dominated by
military staff.
The Ministry of
Defence and
Security retained
logistical and
administrative
function. The TNI
HEADQUARTER
was the dominant
player in defence
matters.
1999-present
The Ministry of Defence
and Security is
renamed Ministry of
Defence
For the first time
in 32 years, the
Ministry of
Defence is
headed by a
civilian with no
military
background. The
TNI is led by TNI
Commander.
The legal
framework
regulating the
relationship
between the
Ministry of Defence
and the-TNI are
enunciated down
in the State
Defence Act and
TNI Act.
Table 15
The above table indicates that the Ministry of Defence has been continuously
dominated by military personnel since the rise of President Soeharto in 1968.
From 1968 to 1983, the Commander of the TNI has also held the post of Minister
of Defence and Security. It was Benny Moerdani, appointed Commander of the
Armed Forces in 1983, that reinstated the position of Minister of Defence, which
was to be held by an official other than the Commander of the Armed Forces.
However, the Minister of Defence continued to play a minor role, as the work of
the Ministry of Defence was limited to administrative and logistical tasks in
support of the TNI. In 1988, however, Soeharto re-merged the two positions: the
Commander of the ABRI was also given the title of Minister of Defence. This
situation persisted until the overthrow of Soeharto in 1998. Since then, the
Ministry of Defence is a civilian political institution separated from the TNI
Headquarter, which in theory, must carry out the decisions of the civilian
government. But as the present discussion suggests, the desire of the Ministry of
Defence to direct the TNI is hampered by a long history of domination of the
military over the civilian government.
5 It is summarised from various sources, primarily the Ministry of Defence's official website
6
ABRI Indonesian Republic Army is Indonesian military name before finally changed into TNI (Tentara
Nasional Indonesia/Indonesian National Army)
158
Designing Improvement
This chapter suggests that the Ministry of Defence has reformed and moved
towards a more democratic system, one with greater civilian sector oversight of
the security sector. The legal framework regulating the relationship between the
Ministry of Defence and the TNI Headquarter has expanded the powers and
authority of the former. During Suharto’s New Order, the Ministry of Defence was
assigned only administrative and logistical duties but has since acquired more
important powers. The Ministry of Defence, under the instructions of the
President has the responsibility to, inter alia, formulate a national defence
strategy and determines the budget allocated to the armed forces. The TNI
Headquarter must implement these instructions.
However, progress has only been partial. The TNI Headquarter has on some
occasions bypassed, even contradicted, the authority of the Ministry of Defence
and the Minister of Defence is often powerless since the TNI Commander is also a
Cabinet Minister and enjoys, in practice, similar authority.
In the foreseeable future, it is likely that the TNI Headquarter will continue to
oppose civilian control of the armed forces and that its bargaining power will
remain relatively strong vis--vis the Ministry of Defence. This, however, is not a
convincing argument to be content with the status quo. Reform of civil-military
relations is of the utmost urgency.
How should we proceed then? First, the TNI must be immediately placed under
the effective authority of the Ministry of Defence and this requires political will
[Although the intention to place TNI under the Ministry of Defence as mentioned
in TNI Act does not explicitly explain the time, yet this idea must immediately be
encouraged and ripened] The recent recommendations of the Ministry of Defence
in that regard must be followed up.
Second, the State Defence Act, the TNI Act and the TAP MPR VI & VII must be
amended. Legislation must be changed to incorporate a clause that explicitly
states that the TNI is subordinate and under the authority of the Ministry of
Defence and that the TNI Commander is no longer directly responsible to the
President.
Third, the civilian sector must acquire greater expertise in defence matters.
There is a dearth of civilian expertise in these issues, an area normally the
privilege of the military. The development of an experienced civilian staff in
defence issues is a matter of urgency if the Ministry of Defence truly aspires to
raise its bargaining power vis--vis the military establishment. Another issue is
the “maturation” of political parties. This point is certainly not trivial: a noncohesive political elite will hamper the need and coherence of security sector
reform.
159
National Security and Border Management
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita1
“The bad condition of the borderland area cannot attract the government to
focus its attention on the people living in this area. The government tends to
limit border area issues to the outer islands, although the land borders need
attention too.” 2
Introduction
The statement above explicitly highlights the complex problems of Indonesia’s
border territory.3 The poor management of the border territory, worsening
economic development and social conditions of the local communities and poor
territorial security make the state border issue one of the most significant issues
for Indonesia today. This internal problem, and the possible claims by
neighbouring states on Indonesian territory, makes this issue the Indonesian
government’s main priority, in order to maintain the territorial integrity and
sovereignty of Indonesia as a nation-state in the era of globalisation.
The Defence White Papers of RI 2003, for example, clearly state that the Republic
of Indonesia still has a number of border territory issues with its 10 neighbouring
states. There are a number of different border territory issues, which have not yet
been resolved well with the following countries, namely Singapore, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, India, Thailand, Timor Leste
and Republic of Palau.4 These problems could have adverse consequences on
various aspects of our national security (public order), including military security,
political, economic, and social and environment dimensions.5
Therefore how should we observe and position the state border as pivotal part in
national security and what systematic effort must take place in order to promote
Indonesian border management? How is border security management reviewed
1 Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, PhD. is Vice Rector of Parahyangan Catholic University, in Bandung. He is also
a member of SSR Working group in Jakarta.
The statement of National Mandate Party Chairman, Soetrisno Bachir, as quoted from KOMPAS, “Isu
Perbatasan bukan Hanya Pulau Terluar”, 13 February 2006.
3 In conceptual vocabulary, this term sometimes has the same meaning as Frontier and boundary. According to
Duska Knecevic Hocevar, the meaning of Frontier, boundary and border is a line of inter-state territory border
based on international law. These 3 words have different meanings covering the geographical space, symbolic,
ethnicity and politic. See Duska Knecevic Hocevar (2000) studying international borders in Geography and
anthropology: Paradigmatic and Conceptual Relations. In Georafski Zbornik. Vol, page 83-92.
4 See the Defence White Paper, Ministry of Defence (2003). Defending The Country Entering the 21st Century.
Jakarta: Ministry of Defence, page 24-25.
5 For more discussion on the 5 security dimensions, see Barry Buzan (1998). Security: A New Framework for
Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
2
160
from a SSR framework? This paper will focus academic discussion on the state
border and its relationship to national security and the SSR process as well. The
discussion will be initiated by observing the relationship between globalisation
and individual states, wherein border management is an index of effective state
capacities. It will be followed by an analysis of how the state border issue should
be one of the fundamental topics of national security and Indonesian foreign
policy. The last part of this paper will highlight the importance of developing our
defence forces, policy coordination and state institutions in order to manage the
Indonesian border as part of the SSR process.
Globalisation, the State Border and National Security
“Borders are like agents of national security and sovereignty and a physical
record of a state’s past and present relation with its neighbours”.6
The above statement strongly implies that the state border plays a significant role
in determining the national security and sovereignty of a state. Moreover, borders
are an important tool in the foreign policy of any country and, when properly
managed, are essential components of a constructive engagement with
neighbouring states. The contemporary international relations and foreign policy
agenda will still be dominated by state border traditional issues. These surely are
related to national security, territorial sovereignty and the effectiveness of
foreign policy and the diplomacy role played by a state.
On the other hand, the globalisation phenomenon, with all its aspects, seems to
neglect the traditional boundaries of inter-state relations and the physical
distance between nation-states vanishes. The rapid development of information
technology, communications and weapons has also shown how state border lines
have become increasingly less relevant in international relations in this era of
globalisation. Globalisation, according to Anthony Mc Grew, has not only made
the issue of territory in many states become increasingly less relevant, but also
questions the sovereignty existence of the territory of nation-states.7 Ironically,
the progress occurring in most developing countries in this era of globalization
shows a very different condition.
Identity and Weak/Failed States
In most cases in many developing countries, the lack of ability to manage the
state boundary effectively often becomes one of indicators that the state has
turned into a weak or even a failed state.8 This, for example, is marked by the
inability of the state to manage its territorial boundaries. Furthermore, the lack of
effective administration in managing national borders has also become a
separate problem adding to the already complicated problem of traditional state
boundaries.
6
See Kari Laitinen (2004). Reflecting the Security Border in the Post-Cold War Context, in
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol6_2/laitinen.htm, accessed 25 January 2006.
7 See, Anthony McGrew (2000). Force Shift: From National Government to Global Governance, in David held
ed. A Globalising World?: Culture, Economics and Politics. London: Routledge, page 127-168.
8 See Stewart Patrick (2006). Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction. In The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
29, No. 2, page 27-53.
161
In the context of Indonesia, the phenomenon for establishing new regencies and
provinces can also be seen as the emergence of locality sentiment based on
traditional borders/boundaries. As a result, several regency administration and or
new province nowadays try to reaffirm its own territorial border. One illustration
of this type of case is the request of DPRD (Regional House of Representative) and
Banten Provincial Administration to DPRD and DKI Provincial Administration to
reaffirm the territorial border of the Thousand Islands (Kepulauan Seribu).9 If the
said problem cannot be settled comprehensively, a negative impact on the
national integrity of Indonesia will appear. The negative consequences of the
failure of the state to comprehensively manage its national territorial integrity will
produce social, economic and political tensions among sub-nationals and even
create (violent) conflicts which in turn will create fragmentation and national
disintegration.10
The limited and low capacity of the state capability to manage and watch all
borders and territories, either in the air, at sea and on land will have a real impact,
both internally and externally. The complexity of border territory issues will not
only push intrastate conflict/war but could also trigger of inter-state conflict and
war. This is due mainly to the fact that border issues are closely related to the
principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Traditionally, every nation-state
is ready to do anything, including going to war, in order to maintain its
sovereignty.11
Furthermore, as Kari Laitinen argued, border issues do not only include the issue
of physical territory, but they also covers various aspects such as (natural)
resources and the issue of identity, which in certain contexts become an
important factor regarding national and local pride in its foreign policy.12 At this
point, border issues are a significant part of the national security agenda. Hence,
the management system of our national borders will play a crucial role in the
development of a national security agenda.
Meanwhile, in the context of international relations, there are many cases that
can be mentioned to illustrate inter-state conflicts in which border issues were a
triggering factor. In other words, various developments in contemporary
international relations have brought contradictions between the relations among
the various actors (both state and non state). On one hand, border issues have
strengthened the sentiment of (ethno) nationalism and various other forms of
identity (national and local), including the desire to maintain (natural) resources.
The case of Ambalat between Indonesia and Malaysia is one of the cases which
can be used to explain the significance of border problems among nation-states.
9 See “Banten Minta Batas Kepulauan Seribu”, KOMPAS, 28 March 2006
10 See Julian Saurin (1995) The End of International Relations? The State and International Theory In The Age
of Globalization. In John Mac Millan, Andrew Linklater. Boundaries in Question: New Direction in
International Relation. London: Pinter Publishers, page 244-261.
11 The dynamics of sovereignty concept, see Daniel Philpott (2001). Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas
Shaped Modern International Relations. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, page 5-10.
12 See Kari Laitinen (2004).ibid
162
Traditionally, international relations studies concentrate on the issue of patterns
of relations among nation states. The territorial aspects of the nation state will, in
the end, determine their sovereignty, power and even their security.13 Therefore,
national boundaries will play a very significant role in determining the existence
of a nation state. The main idea of a determined territorial border is to physically
differentiate between states. In addition, the state border becomes an
instrument to control the flow of goods, ideas and even ideologies.
In order to effectively protect and control its territory from any possibility of
external military threats, all nation-states will need an appropriate military
strength. The idea of protecting the security and safety of its national territory is
based on classical realism which emphasizes the self-help system. In other
words, the concept of security of the border will have consequences on the ability
of a deterrent, the need to have military forces and the security dilemma and
interaction with other state actors.
Even for the classical realist such as Hans J. Morgenthau, the most important
national security interest is to “protect [its] physical, political and cultural identity
against encroachments by other nations”.14 Furthermore, every nation state
must achieve its national interests ‘defined in terms of force’ to protect the
security of its territory and its survival.
According to the realist school of international relations, the international system
is fundamentally anarchic and the global distribution of power limits the range of
possible foreign policy options for any given state. In that logic, the national
interest is expressed in terms of security and military capabilities, primarily in the
capacity to safeguard state sovereignty.
However, the problem of national state boundaries and security has shown
different faces in most developing states. One Study, conducted by Robert I
Rotberg, has explicitly indicated that one of the important characteristics of failed
states is the inability to manage the state boundary, which has subsequently
resulted in intra and interstate war.15 The effective management of state
boundaries, therefore, becomes the main prerequisite for creating a strong
state.16
On the other hand, as George Sorensen noted, the biggest problem to create a
national security and a strong state lies with the limited capacity of the state. This
13
See for instance, Mike Bowker, Robin Brown (1993). From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and world
Politics in The 1980s. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, page 2
14
Quoted from Jutta Welds (1996). Constructing National Interest. In European Journal of
International Relation. Vol. 2. No. 3, page 275-318.
15
Robert I. Rotberg (2004). The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair.
Robert I. Rotberg ed. “When States Fail: Causes and Consequences”. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, page 1-50.
16 Referring to Sorenson's explanation, a strong state is indicated by a matured political mechanism and
institution, sound economic performance, sound territorial management, good governance and strong national
identity. See, George Sorenson (1996) Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the
Principal Problem. In Journal Security Dialogue. Vol. 27 No.4, page 375-390
163
is mainly because the state agenda is occupied with various domestic problems,
such as maintaining the regime, and thus has a limited capacity to manage issues
such as economics, cultural, social and political aspects and defence (including
the guarding of the state border and its territory).17 Thus it is no surprise if we
learn that the cases of smuggling and theft of our national resources are so high,
due to weak oversight of our sea and land border territories.
Military and Non Military Security in Border Issue
For many developing countries, such as Indonesia, the national border issues
frequently produce a dilemma. Defence aspects, which refer to the ability to
overcome various military threats coming from external environments, are
consequently related to the non military threats. Unlike other developed nationstates, developing states must also face various problems in their economic,
cultural, social and political development which are so complicated and tightly
related with internal stability and the ability of the defence forces to protect the
state from any military threat from their external environment. In may cases in
developing countries, different issues – as mentioned above- finally become an
integral part of the state’s security and defence issues. Even, the issue of border
territory development as a domestic vulnerability, often dominates the agenda of
national security development, and thus becomes a main objective of the defence
of a state.
Viewed through the exploration of academic literature, the various related
problems, as mentioned above, have shown the significance of non military
issues and capacity to protect national security.18 A state that fails to protect its
national border will therefore face various security problems from non state
actors, such as trans-national organized criminals and terrorist groups which
frequently exploit territorial boundaries to plan, prepare and conduct their
terrorist activities.19
One case that could clearly explain how trans-national criminal organisations and
terrorist groups have conducted their activities is through the use of the border
regions between Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore by terrorist groups in
designing, planning and executing terrorist activities in Indonesia two years
ago.20 The border of southern Thailand, from the province of Satun to Sumatra
17 Ibid
18 See Richard Ullman (1983). Redefining Security. In International Security. Vol. 8 No. 1, Ole Waever (1989).
European Security-Problems of Research of Non-Military Aspects. Copenhagen Papers No. 1. Copenhagen:
University of Copenhagen, Barry Buzan (1991). People, states and Fear: An Agenda for International Security
Studies in the Post Cold War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Helga Haftendorn (1991). The Security Puzzle:
Theory Building and Disciplines in International Security. In International Studies Quarterly. Vol.35 No.1,
Muthiah Alagappa (1998). Asian Security Practice” Material and Ideational Practices. California: Stanford
University Press, Benjamin Miller (2001). The Concept of Security: Should it be redefined. In The Journal of
Strategic Studies. Vol. 24. No.2, Sean Kay (2004), Globalization, Force and Security. In Security Dialogue.
Vol.35 No.1.
19 See Elke Krahmann (2005). From State to Non-State Actors: The Emergence of Security Governance in Elke
Krahmann. New Threats and New Actors in International Security. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, page 3-20.
20 “Terorisme: Segitiga Maut Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand”, KOMPAS, 1 April 2006
164
(Islets of Riau), through the territorial water of Malaysia around LangkawiPenang, is a land route and a favourite sea route used to move the flow of
weapons and explosives of the terrorism perpetrators for their terrorist activities.
In addition, the border region of the South Philippines from Zamboanga and
Davao (Mindanao), towards the islands of Sulu to Sarawak and Nunukan in
Kalimantan, and the islands of Sangihe Talaud in North Sulawesi to Maluku and
central Sulawesi, are alleged to become one of the routes for weapons used to
conduct terrorist activities in the eastern part of Indonesia.21 From the above
examples, it is no exaggeration when the New York Times expressed that,
“Failed states that cannot provide jobs or food for their people, that have
lost chunks of territory to warlords, and that can no longer track or
control their borders, send an invitation to terrorists”.22 In this context, the
weak control to border territory will be a disturbing factor for border diplomacy,
which Indonesia must employ with her neighbouring states. In other words, this
will be a weak point in formulating and implementing the foreign policies of
Indonesia.
As experienced by many developing countries, the complexities of actors, the
military and non military issues, such as unequal and uneven development in the
border regions, overpopulation, trans-national crime, degradation of the
environment, and social and culture problems are the root causes of national
insecurity and creates problems for foreign policy making. As Caroline Thomas
says, ‘(national) security in the context of the third worlds does not simply refer
to the military dimension, as it is often assumed in the western discussion of the
concept, but to the whole range of dimensions of a state’s existence which have
been taken care of in the more developed states, especially those in the west”.23
The simple cases concerning the above statement, for example, can be illustrated
by two different reports made by KOMPAS daily (10 March 2006). It was reported
in one article entitled “Keamanan RI Jadi Isu Utama [Indonesia’s Security Is the
Main Issue]”. This article wrote about the disinclination of Japanese investors to
invest their capital, due to the low level of security and social instability in
Indonesia. While in other news, written in the same daily newspaper, on the same
date, there was an article entitled “Pos TNI in Pulau Terluar Papua [TNI Post in the
outmost islands of Papua}" which reported the efforts of Kodam Trikora to build a
military post to protect the outer most islands from the possibility of claims from
external party (states). In addition, it was also suspected that this border region
has become one of the main sea lines for smuggling, illegal logging and illegal
fishing.24
The term ‘security’ as implied in the two articles indeed carries two different
meanings. The first news article aimed to show the real condition of non military
21 ibid.
22
As written in New York Times, July 2005. Quoted from Stewart Patrick (2006) page
34. The bold typed words are for the sake of this paper by the writer
23 Quoted from Caroline Thomas (1991). New Directions in Thinking about Security in the Third World. In Ken
Booth ed. New Thinking about Strategy and International Security. London: Harper Collins Academic. Page
269.
24 See KOMPAS, 10 March 2006, page 21 and 25.
165
security issues at the domestic level which substantially influence foreign
investors. In order to invite foreign investments, the government needs to have a
more comprehensive policy in the area of non military issues such as economics,
law and social culture. Meanwhile, the second news article obviously refers to the
aspect of defending the border land from any possible external military threats.
However we should acknowledge that a military response is not an adequate
response, and. other responses such as economic, legal, socio-cultural aspects
and diplomacy are needed to support the effort to protect our territorial
sovereignty.
The level of vulnerability in many developing countries becomes increasingly
higher when the various problems, as mentioned above, are mixed with other
problems such as limited financial resources, human resources and institutional
incapacity (including the strength of the military forces). For this reason, national
border issues and national security is inseparable from both military and non
military threats. As a result, the management of the national territorial border will
include various dimensions including military, economic, social-cultural,
environmental and political aspects.
The Development of the Defence Force (Indonesia Navy) and National
Coordination of Border Security as part of the SSR Agenda.
In its efforts to guard its national border (maritime), Indonesia needs to have
effective and sophisticated maritime defence facilities.
As Naval Chief (KSAL) Admiral Bernard K. Sondakh, at that time said, Indonesia’s
existence as a maritime state can only be maintained if Indonesia has an efficient
and strong Naval Fleet to patrol and secure its maritime territory.25 As stated in
the Indonesian Navy’s doctrine ‘Eka Sasana Jaya’ which stresses that a great
nation or maritime state is determined by its maritime force, in the form of
commercial shipping assets as well as the Navy itself.26
Thus, the presence of the Navy, to provide safety and assurance at sea, has been
a condition ‘sine qua non’.27 In other words, the backbone of our national defence
is no longer focused on a continental land oriented force, but should be focused on
a marine-oriented and air force. We can say that the chief orientation of our
national defence must be given to maritime and air forces.
As a comparison, the table below presents the maritime defence forces of
Indonesia and other states in Asia-Pacific Region.
25 Interview KOMPAS with Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Bernanrd K. Sondakh, KOMPAS, 27 June 2004.
26 See www.tnial.mil.id/doktrin.php, accessed 25 June 2004.
27 Ibid
166
Table of Navy Forces of the States in Asia Pacific
States
Australia
India
Indonesia
Japan
North Korea
South Korea
Malaysia
The Philippines
Singapore
People’s Republic of China
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam
The US (Pacific)
Russia (Pacific)
Personnel
14.200
53.000
45.000
43.800
46.000
60.000
12.500
20.500
9.500
23.000
68.000
73.000
42.000
132.300
31.000
Submarine
s
4
16
2
16
26
19
3
71
4
2
38
17
Mains
Fleet
11
26
17
55
3
39
4
1
53
37
15
6
58
10
Coast
Guard
16
40
58
3
309
84
41
67
24
676
104
88
40
41
Source: taken from the Military Balance 2003-2004 London :Oxford UP, 2004.
The table above indicates that the maritime forces of Indonesia are smaller than
those of Thailand, even though Indonesia’s maritime territory which must be
guarded is larger. Indonesia’s forces are also smaller than those of South Korea,
North Korea, and Taiwan. Indonesia’s maritime territory is the biggest in the Asia
Pacific Region, however, the naval forces in the region are dominated by the US
and the People’s Republic of China. Today, these 2 states determine the pattern of
regional interaction.
Regarding the condition of the Maritime Fleet, the majority of the ships were built
in the late 1960s and refitted in the 1980s. Most of the armament systems are
completely out of date and as such incapable of providing comprehensive
maritime defence. In total, the Indonesian Navy has 113 ships28 which were built
between 1967 and 1990, and the Fleet built in 1967 was refitted between 1986
and 1990. To protect national maritime security effectively, however, Indonesia
ideally requires 380 warships.29 In addition, in the area of the Malacca Straits, the
Indonesian Navy requires at least 38 patrol ships to protect the security, over the
28
The types of ship owned by TNI AL areas follows: submarine (2), Frigate (6), Patrol Frigate (6), Exercise
Frigate (1), Light Frigate (3), Missile Ship (4), Patrol Corvette (16), Mine sweeper (9), Patrol Boat (19), ASW
Patrol Boat (4), Tug boat (22), Coastal Mine sweeper (2), Command Ship (1), Tanker (2), Tug Boat (2), Survey
Ship (2), Research Ship (6), Ferry (3). Source: Toppan, Andrew, World Navies Today: Indonesia, http://www.
Hazegray.org. accessed on 14 April 2004.
2929 Interview KOMPAS with Indonesian Navy Chief Admiral Bernanrd K. Sondakh, KOMPAS, 27 June 2004.
167
613 miles of the straits.30 From the Fleet owned by the Indonesian Navy, 39 ships
are more than 30 year old, 42 ships are aged between 21-30 years, 24 ships are
11-20 years old and only 8 ships were built within the last 10 years.31 Within the
next 5 years, the Indonesian Navy plans to further equip its Naval Fleet by
purchasing 2-3 new submarines.32
Therefore, the development and enhancement of the Navy defence force,
including the modernisation of the armament systems and the development of a
new maritime doctrine, of Indonesian Navy, can be categorised as “a minimum
defence requirement”.33 This must be performed by TNI AL in order to protect
national security by ensuring an effective maritime defence of Indonesia.
The force and condition of Indonesian Navy ships are as follows:
No
1
Class
Submarine (2
units)
Type
U-209 (Made in German,
1981)
2
Frigate (6 Units)
Van Speijk (Made in the
Netherlands)
3
Corvette (4 Units)
Made in the Netherlands and
Yugoslavia, 1980
4
Parchim Ship (16
Units)
Made in East Germany in 80’s
Note
70% operational,
no maintenance
or refit
undertaken over
the last 20 years.
In bad condition,
16 knot speed,
gas-consuming,
harpoon missile
weapon (2 units
expired, 4 units
expired in 2004).
The most modern
ship owned by
the US, 26
expired Exocet
missiles MM-38.
The propeller
system is unable
to operate in a
tropical climate,
and it is not
possible to get
any spare parts
as the factory in
Rostock has been
shut down.
30 As spoken by Western Territorial Fleet Chief, Admiral Jr. Y. Didik Heu Purnomo in the interview with weekly
magazine, TEMPO, edition 28 June-4 July 2004.
31 Written answer from KSAL on a question from Members of Commission I, DPR RI, 2002.
32 TEMPO Magazine, 5 February 2006.
33 In strategic studies, this concept refers to two principal roles, namely defence planning and defence
management. See for instance, Gompert, David C. liker, Olga, Timilsina, Anga (2004), Clean, Lean, and Able: A
Strategy for Defence Development. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, page. 5.
168
5
High Speed Missile Made in Korea, 1979
Boat (4 Units)
6
High Speed Boat
With Torpedo (2
Units)
Made in PT. PAL, Indonesia
Expired Exocet
Missile MM-38, 1
unit in a bad
condition, and 3
units undergoing
maintenance.
In good condition
and ready for
operations.
Source: KSAL Speech in front of Commission I, DPR RI, 2002.
The table above indicates the national priorities for developing national maritime
defence. The above table indicates that the source country of materials also has
clear implications long-term force development. As we already know, there are
significant changes in the political, economic and defence sectors. The dynamics
occurring in the Asia Pacific Region will heavily influence future Republic of
Indonesia’s foreign and defence policy.
Concerning different positive developments in the framework of regional
maritime cooperation, there are a number of national policies that must be
considered. First, to establish the credible maritime defence and to create
maritime security for all states in the region.
The development of a strong and reliable Indonesian maritime force is also
needed to anticipate the different military and other threats occurring in
Indonesian waters, such as illegal fishing in national maritime territory, the
practice of smuggling of both goods and people and the possibly of a military
disturbance from several hotspots in the South China Sea. In other words, the
enhancement of TNI AL is more for defence and security of the national waters
than as an aggressive force.
The significant advancement of the Indonesia Navy would change Indonesia’s
strategic position within the region and thus Indonesia would play a greater part
in determining the patterns of interstate relation in the Indian Ocean and
particularly in the Pacific Ocean. Although the Defence Ministry has allocated an
export credit of US$ 1.97 billion for the TNI AL over the next five years, this sum of
money is not adequate to equip the defence system of TNI AL to effectively
safeguard our national maritime security.34
Secondly, the problems of lack of coordination amongst the various institutions
involved in the management of the border should receive much more attention.
To date, there is the impression that the activities of the Indonesian Navy, the Air
Force, the National Police and relevant department (Fishery and Maritime Affairs
Ministry), DEPLU (Foreign Affairs Ministry), Custom and Immigration and Courts,
who are all involved in protecting the territorial maritime waters and maritime
border territory, still overlap and are incomprehensive.
34 TEMPO Magazine, 5 February 2006
169
Therefore, the different institutions, as mentioned above, need to settle their
problems regularly and in a coordinated manner. The problem of coordination
becomes even more complicated when several provinces such as Papua, Riau,
Bangka Belitung, in the spirit of regional autonomy, plan to purchase patrol boats
to safeguard their maritime waters from illegal fishing. The issue of purchasing
the fast patrol boats causes controversy among several different domestic
institutions such as provincial administration, the Home Affairs Ministry, the
Defence Ministry and TNI AL. This is due to the misinterpretation of Act No.
3/2002 on State Defence and Act No. 22/1999 on Regional Administration.35
Sound coordination and harmonisation between the different national institutions
(Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defence Ministry, TNI Head Quarters and other
government institutions) would undoubtedly lead to a higher capability of
oversight over the security of both regional and national maritime traffic, and as
such make Indonesia a great state within the region. However, this would require
a large amount of funds to be allocated as well as strong coordination between the
various institutions involved, and thus it will take some time and much effort
before Indonesia can become a ‘master’ of national maritime security. As KSAL RI
Admiral TNI Slamet Subiyanto said, “the efforts to manage Indonesia’s maritime
security integrally needs a defensive strategy which is suitable for all of
Indonesia’s geographical conditions, synergy of all state security components
and oversight of the different security sector actors, whether military or civilian.36
The political will of the DPR members, who are strongly representative within civil
society, will influence the need for a sound security level in our border territory,
and DPR can also play an oversight role which is one of principal prerequisites in
SSR implementation.
Conclusion
From the above analysis, it can be understood that the problem of maritime
security management is multidimensional in nature. Furthermore, the source of
maritime threats faced by Indonesia and other littoral states, include both a
military and non-military dimension as well as those arising from within the
internal and external environment. The range of potential military threats to
Indonesia is considerable, but the capabilities of the Indonesian Navy are limited.
In other words, there is today a significant inadequacy between the needs of
Indonesia in terms of maritime security and the capacities of the Indonesian
Navy.37
Therefore, Indonesia cannot rely solely on its Navy to guarantee the security of its
maritime borders; it needs to collaborate more closely with neighbouring states.
35 “Kontroversi Pembelian Kapal Patroli oleh PEMDA: Saat Otonomi Menyentuh Keamanan Laut.” KOMPAS,
24 July 2004
36 See Adm. Slamet Subianto (2005). Gagasan Tentang Strategi Pertahanan Maritim Indonesia (SPMI) Sebagai
Strategi Pertahanan Negara Kepulauan. Dalam Jurnal Satria: Studi Pertahanan, Vol. 1 No. 2 page 10-17
37 This concept refers to a condition in which threats are more and diverse than the capability to overcome those
threats.
170
In other words, Indonesia needs to participate more actively in bilateral,
multilateral and trans-national cooperation forums to better monitor its maritime
borders. In addition, there needs to be an effective oversight mechanism and an
improved data collection mechanism as an integral part of the reform of the
security sector.38
The complicated state border problems that we possess nowadays are marked by
different aspects such as the type and nature of the threat, the vast problem of
our national security, limited resources, various perceptions of threat, and the
approach and policy instruments currently in place, which emphasise the
necessity to continuously discuss these issues in a more transparent and
accountable manner. We must reform the current system and establish new
instruments and policies (for example by creating, a new political unit in charge of
maritime security under the direct responsibility of the President) which will more
appropriately address the currents needs and challenges of border, and more
generally national security, in Indonesia.
Internally, the management and oversight of all the border territory will not only
strengthen the nation-state building but also motivate the emergence of regional
security building. For instance, this can be carried out by enhancing cross-border
cooperation with all our neighbouring states. However, before this can be
reached, once again, we must be able to involve the different dimensions such as
economy, social, law and diplomacy in managing our border territory.
As Rizal Sukma says, the comprehensive management of the state border
territory and the national security of Indonesia must involve four components
integrated in a policy framework, namely: Development, Democracy, Diplomacy
and Defence.39 There are those who still advocate fragmented approaches to
border security and national defence in Indonesia. These proposals will only make
Indonesia weaker and unable to respond to changes at the local, national and
international levels.
38
See about this in Otwin Marenin (2006). Democratic Oversight and Border Management: Principles,
complexity and Agency Interest. In Marina Caparini, Otwinm Marenin eds Borders and Security Governance:
Managing Borders in a Globalized World. Zurich: LIT Verlag. Page 27-28.
39 Rizal Sukma (2005) “War will Never Solve our Problem” in The Jakarta Post, 21 March 2005
171
Indonesia’s Security Sector Legislation Reform
Bhatara Ibnu Reza1
Introduction
The aspiration of reform in post-Suharto era is to establish good governance in all
sectors, including security sector reform. Security sector reform has a broad and
complex scope that requires restructuring of the function, structure, culture, and
responsible institution of security, which is in line with value system of democracy
and human rights.
During year 1988-2004, the government was led by four President (includes
Susilo Bambang Y), but none of them really commit to solve the main problem in
order to pass over the transition period. The situation is worsening when the
political elites in the Parliament use the transitional issues for momentary political
interest and as a bargaining means with the government. Whereas, security
reformation requires a democratic environment and also respect to human rights.
It is caused by strong military domination in the past so that the issues have
become the subject that is easily being manipulated. The main agenda of security
reform that has been executed for the first time is a separation of Indonesian
Military (TNI) with Indonesian Police (Polri) which has joined the Indonesian
Armed Forces (ABRI) for a long time.2 It is an important issue considering that the
failure will cause the risk of repetition over similar human rights violations that
have occurred in the past.
Indonesia, which is still in the transition period, is continuously shadowed by
possibilities that big role possessed by military will return into national politics
through a better and legal method. However, political reform requires military
position in civil supremacy and reinstates it as defense and professional
institution. Not only military, but also police institution, intelligence institution,
and other institutions are experiencing sustainable reformation until present
time, which places the functions as security actor at home and also as the actor
that highly respects human rights.
1 Bhatara Ibnu Reza is Research Coordinator of Human Rights at IMPARSIAL, Jakarta.
2 The terms Indonesian National Army (TNI) is used for the first time on 3 June 1947. On 21 June 1962, the terms
changed to Indonesian Armed Forces since Indonesian Police is included by MPRS Decree No. II/MPRS/1960
jis Act. No.13 Year 1961 on Indonesian Police which emphasized by Presedential Decree No. 290 Year 1964. On
1969, Presidential Decree 52 Year 1969 which stated that Indonesian Police is under the Department of Defense
and Security was stipulated. TNI Commander, Jenderal Wiranto, re-employ TNI terms. See Kompas, “Pangab
Usulkan ABRI diubah menjadi TNI”, 3 April 1999. Meanwhile Indonesian Police since 1 April 1999, Indonesian
Police operational management was bestowed from Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarter to Department of
Defense and Security, as Peoples' Representative Decree No. VII/MPR/2000 on TNI dan Indonesian Police
Roles is stipulated. See Kompas, “Polisi Resmi Pisah dari ABRI: Stop Gaya Militer”, 3 April 1999. TNI and
Indoensian Police division was initiated by stipulation of Presidential Instruction No. 2 Year 1999 on Policies
Phases on separation of Indonesian Police from Indonesian Armed Forces. Complete description see
Muhammad Fajrul Falaakh, et al, Implikasi Reposisi TNI-Polri di Bidang Hukum, (Yogyakarta: Fakultas
Hukum Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2001).
172
In order to increase the civilian authority, it is required two approaches: first,
military should not involve in the political arena; second, civilian authority should
involve in military issues in line with its function in national security under
supervision and control of civilian.3 The civilian involvement in this issue not only
represented by political elites but also by citizen elements, such as civil society
group that concerns with a change in security sector reform that is performed
through its involvement in restructuring defense and security sector through
political regulation or legislative reform. By implementing a change to the political
regulation, it is expected that there is a change to security actor to be more
professional under civilian control.
It is possible due to political change post-Suharto era that has a share in changing
political configuration to be more democratic that opens an opportunity for full
people participation to actively determine general policy so that it produces a
legal product that has characteristic that reflects justice and meets people
expectation.4
The measuring rod in looking at the success of security sector reform is
determined by seven components as follows:5
The stipulation of laws, which is based on the rule of law, has been put into
order.
The ability to develop policy, prepare defense and security planning has
been developed.
The implementation of policy has been completed.
Professionalism of implementer actor has been realized.
The capability and effectiveness of supervision.
Logic and proportional budget management.
The settlement of human rights violation cases has been completed.
Based on the above components, the focus of legislative reform can not be freed
from effectiveness, legal basis, and accountability so that the resulted regulation
can work as it is supposed to. In order to realize this matter, it should be closely
connected with legal politic development that relates to legal material
development in Indonesia, which is being put, at present time, in National
Legislation Program (Prolegnas).6 Prolegnas is a map or picture of the plan
concerning the laws to be made in certain period.7 Prolegnas is prepared by House
of People’s Representative (DPR) and Government, and in its preparation is
coordinated by DPR, which represents a logic consequence of first amendment of
Constitution 1945 that shifts the weight of law establishment from the
Government to DPR.8
3 See Terence Lee, “The Nature and Future of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia”, Asian Survey at 703-704,
Vol. 40, No. 4 (Jul.-Aug., 2000).
4 Moh. Mahfud M.D., Politik Hukum di Indonesia, (Jakarta: LP3ES, Cet.2, 2001), page 24-25.
5 See Nicolle Ball, Tsjeard Bouta dan Luc van de Goor, Enhancing Democratic Governance
of the Security
Sector, An Institutional Assessment Framework, (Clingendael: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs/TheNetherlands Institute of International Relations, 2003)
6 See Moh. Mahfud M.D., Membangun Politik Hukum, Menegakan Konstitusi, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2006). page 33.
7 Ibid. page 33.
8 Ibid. page 33.
173
The position of Prolegnas is determined in Law No. 10 Year 2004 concerning the
Procedure of Laws Establishment, which not only related to material or plan of
laws establishment, but it also represents an instrument that includes the legal
planning mechanism so that it is always consistent with the objective, guideline,
and legal idea that become its basis.9
The security sector reform has been conducted since year 2000 through
legislative reform with the use of political stipulations by People’s Consultative
Assembly (MPR), change through the Constitution 1945, and the laws, as follows:
1. Amendment to the Constitution 1945.
2. TAP MPR No. VI/MPR/2000 on Separation of Indonesian Army (TNI) and
Indonesian Police (Polri).
3. TAP MPR No. VII/2000 on Separation of Indonesian Army (TNI) and
Indonesian Police (Polri) Roles.
4. The Law No. 3 Year 2002 on the State Defense.
5. The Law No. 2 on the Indonesian Police (Polri)
6. The Law No. 15 on Establishment of Regulation for Substitute Law No.
Year 2002 on Eradication of Terrorism Criminal Act to be the Law.
7. The Law No. 34 on the Indonesian Army (TNI).
The above six regulations not only represent the pillar of change for the security
sector, but also change the constitutional structure in Indonesia. The
constitutional change is shown by the interaction between institutions in the
executive power area, such as President, Defense Minister, TNI Commander, and
Indonesian Police Chief, and interaction between executive and legislative as law
makers, as described above. The other important issue is that regulation reform
of security sector that stated in Prolegnas must also parallel with the security
sector requirement plan that has been compiled in the grand design of security
sector.
In the period of 2004-2009, legislative reform in security sector still leave behind
a number of laws that need to be discussed by the Government and DPR, such as
national security, assistance duty, drafted military, military operation other than
war, state intelligence, mobilization and demobilization, reserve component of
state defense, defense the state, and determination of emergency situation.
Based on those issues, there is a question whether the security sector regulation
reform that has and is taking place between years 2000-2007 has fulfilled the
expectation and worked well in line with Prolegnas, and complied with grand
design of security sector.
9
Ibid. page 33.
174
The Reform of Security Sector Legislation
Amendment to Constitution 1945
During Suharto era, the opportunity to make a change to the Constitution 1945
was not closed at all. It was a consequence of Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959
by President Soekarno who reenacted the Constitution 1945, which provided the
portion to the armed forces to be the main actor in Indonesia national politic
through the parliament.10
However, as explained previously that during post-Suharto era, one of the main
agenda of political reform is amendment to the Constitution 1945, which mutatis
mutandis will change the laws under it. It is caused by the position of the
Constitution 1945 as the highest legal basis in Indonesia laws. The MPR has made
an amendment as many as four times during year 1999-2002.
The focus of Amendment to the Constitution 1945 in security sector includes
amendments to the President’s position and authority as Head of State and
Parliament, in this case is DPR. The President’s position as Head of State in
relation to the armed forces is affirmed in Article 10 of constitution 1945 that
states, “President holds highest power over the Ground Force, Navy, and Air
Force. The President’s position is the Supreme Commander in the armed forces,
and with his position, president has full authority to the military.11 However, in
daily operational, the three forces are led by TNI Commander.12
President also has the authority to declare a war as affirmation of Article 11 (1) of
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 1945, “President, with the approval of
DPR, declares a war, makes a peace and agreement with another country.”
President also has the authority to declare that the nation is in an emergency
situation as regulated in Article 12 of the Constitution 1945,”President declares
an emergency situation. The requirements and consequences of emergency
situation are determined by law.”
A significant change has been made in Chapter XII of the Second Amendment of
the Constitution 1945 on State Defense and Security that stated in Article 30:13
10
Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, (Oxford University Press,
1982), page 138.
11 There was discussion between the observers about President position as army supreme commander. On their
view, President as the Commander in Chief. But in Indonesian, there are amry commander whose position is less
than the president. Terms of Supreme Commander firstly occupied in Act No. 23 Year 1959 on State of
Emergency, see Prof. Mr. Herman Sihombing, Hukum Tata Negara Darurat di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Djambatan,
1996). In writer's view TNI commander position as commander in chief should ber re-observed, in other word
should be effectively be given to President as the highest authority in Armed Forces.
12
Relations between President and TNI Commander will be elaborated in the sub-chapter of Act No. 3 Year
2002 on State Defense and Act No. 34 Year 2004 on Indonesian National Army (TNI).
13 Compare to Chapter XII on State Defense in Article 30, 1945 Constitution: “(1) Every citizen has the right
and obligation to participate state defense efforts; (2) Conditions on state defense are arranged in the Act.” In
Indonesian there are difference between terms of “pembelaan (protection)” (Article 30 1945 Constitution)
and “pembelaan (defense)” (Article 30 Second Amandement of 1945 Constitution). The first term has the
175
1. Each and every citizen has a right and is obliged to participate in the state
defense and security.
2. The effort of state defense and security is performed through the whole
people defense and security system by TNI and Polri as the main power,
and people as supporting power.
3. The TNI consists of Ground Force, Navy, and Air Force as government
apparatus with the duty to defend, protect, and maintain country’s unity
and sovereignty.
4. The Polri as government apparatus that maintain society security and
order with the duty to protect, comfort, and serve the society, and enforce
the law.
5. The Law regulates structure and position of TNI, Polri, authority relation
between TNI and Polri in performing their duties, and requirement of
citizen participation in the defense and security efforts that regulated by
the law.
The important issue of this article is the legalization of the whole people defense
and security system concept, which had never been regulated in the constitution.
The most important issue in the constitution amendment in Indonesia is the
acknowledgement to human rights, which has not been regulated in the
constitution previously.14 Several important issues that regulated in the
International Bill of Human Rights, in this case, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have been adopted in the Second Amendment of
the Constitution 1945, long time before Indonesia conducted ratification to those
two instruments.15 The most important issue is the nation’s guarantee for the
right that includes in non-derogable category or the right that may not be
deducted in any condition.16
With the inclusion of human rights in the constitution, it means that those rights
have been acknowledged as constitutional right of citizen that must be highly
respected by the government including the security actors.17
active-aggressive meaning than the second word. But in English, both terms has the same meaning as “defense”.
See Bhatara Ibnu Reza, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare: Problems in Civil-Military Relations
and Their Implications for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Thesis for Master of Laws in International
Human Rights Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, 2006, Page. 39-40.
14 Human Rights especially arranged in Chapter XA starts from Article 28A to 28J the Second Amandement of
1945 Constitution.
15 Indonesia ratificated ICESCR by publishing Act No. 11 Year 2005 on International Covenant Ratification on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and ICCPR by Act No. 12 Year 2005 tentang Pengesahan International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
16 Admission of non-derogable rights in constitution is added in Article 28I (1) Second Amendment of 1945
Constitution. Article 28I(1): Rights to live, Rights not to be tortured, Rights freedom of thinking and inner
feelings, rights to believe, rights not to be slaved, rights in law and rights not to be prosecuted on subsided law.
These are human rights which are non degorable in any circumstances
17 Compression discussion on Human Rightson security actors can be seen in Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human
Rights Law on Armed Forces, (United Kingdom: Cambrigde University Press, 2006).
176
MPR Decree Year 2000
Parallel with the constitution amendment, MPR also decided two important issues
concerning the security sector reform. In line with chronological order of laws in
Indonesia, the position of MPR determination (TAP) is placed under the
constitution.18 The two MPR TAPs that were ratified in year 2000 is the basis of
MPR legislative reform and also as the legal basis of law under it, such as Law No.
2 Year 2002 on the Indonesia Police, Law No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense, and
Law No. 34 Year 2004 on the Indonesian Armed Forces.
The core of the two MPR TAPs in year 2000 was the separation of institution, role,
and legal jurisdiction between TNI and Polri. And it also includes the prohibition of
TNI and Polri involvement in political practice and dual positions. Besides that, the
most important issue of the two MPR TAPs was the involvement of parliament, in
this case, DPR in the process of selection, appointment, and dismissal of TNI
Commander and Indonesian Police Chief in the framework of the Constitution
1945.19
The concerned MPR TAPs are: First, MPR TAP No. VI/MPR/2000 on the Separation
of TNI and Polri. This determination contains the affirmation about separation of
those two institutions. Article 2 of MPR TAP No. VI/MPR/2000 affirms:
The Indonesian Armed Forces is the government apparatus that plays a role in
state defense.
1. The Indonesian Police (Polri) is the government apparatus that
plays a role in maintaining state security.
2. In case if there is a relationship between defense activity and
security activity, TNI and Polri should work cooperatively and assist
each other.
18 Based on People' Consultative Decision No. III/MPR/2000 on law source and order of legislation regulation.
But since People' Consultative Decision No. I/MPR/2003 on Observation Materials and the status of Temporary
Peoples' Consultative Decision and Decree 1960-2002 has been stipulated, not all People' Consultative Decision
can be Indonesian law. But some permanent People' Consultative Decision are the source of law, so all
regulations on which they are based can be stipulated as legislation should refer to the People' Consultative
Decision tersebut such People' Consultative Decision No. VI/MPR/2000 on division of Indonesian National
Army and Indonesian Police also People' Consultative Decision No.VII/MPR/2000 on Indonesia National
Army and Indonesian Police Roles. The new source of laws and order of legislation regulation are arranged in
Act No. 10 Year 2004 Article 7(1) on The Arrangements of Legislation Regulation:
a.
1945 Constitution
b. Act/Governmental Regulation as Substitution of Act
c. Governmental Regulation.
d. Presidential Regulation.
e. Local Regulation
19
See Ulf Sundhaussen, Politik Militer Indonesia 1945 -1967: Menuju Dwi Fungsi ABRI,
(LP3ES: Jakarta, 1986), Page. 123-128.
177
Second, MPR TAP No. VI/MPR/2000 on the TNI’ Role and Polri’s Role. There are
several important articles concerning TNI. First, Structure and Position of TNI as
stated in Article 3 MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000:
1. The Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) consists of Ground Force, Navy,
and Air Force and their organizations are structured based on the
requirement and regulated by the Law.
2. The Indonesian Armed Forces is under the President.
3. The Indonesian Armed Forces is led by a Commander who is
appointed and dismissed by the President wit the approval of DPR.
4. A. The Indonesian Armed Forces soldiers must obey to the military
court power in case of military laws violation and must obey the civil
court in case of civil code violation.
b. If the civil court power as meant in this paragraph does not
function, then the soldier must obey the court power that regulated
by the law.
This article shows to us about how the position of the TNI Commander is placed
under the Presidential authority, and there is DPR’s involvement in deciding to
appoint and dismiss the TNI Commander. It is the first time MPR decides the
position of TNI Commander in MPR TAP that regulated in the law previously.20
Second, the TNI’s assistance to Polri is stated in Article 4 (2), “Indonesian Army
(TNI) provides assistance to Indonesian Police (Polri) in the security duty based
on the request that regulated in the law.” This article existed based on the
experience when Polri was a part of the armed forces. During that time, the issue
to keep law and order including security was also the military duty.
Article 5 of MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000 regulates the TNI participation in state
implementation, as follows:
1. State political policy is the basis of policy and duty
implementation of the TNI.
2. The TNI has a neutral attitude in political life and not get involve in
political practice activities.
3. The TNI supports the upholding of democracy, and highly respects
the law and human rights.
5. Member of TNI does not use the right to elect and to be elected. The
TNI participation in determining the direction of national policy is
channeled through the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) at the
latest until year 2009.21
20
Formerly, TNI commander position has never been arranged in Peoples Consultative Decision nor
Constitution.
21
During 19992004, TNI-Police Faction is still a part of People's Consultative and Legislative. As in Article
5(4) People' Consultative Decision No.VII/MPR/2000 on TNI and Police roles, TNI employed their rights to
determine the national policy preferences in Parliament up to 2009. After the fourth amendment of 1945
Constitution on 2002 which arranged People's Consultative and Legislative membership, TNI and Police
178
5. Member of TNI can only hold a civilian position after resigning or
being retired from the military service.
This article ends the era of armed forces dual functions, and also ends the military
involvement on Indonesia political life and the work practice that often been
conducted where an active military officer can hold a civilian position in dual
manner.22 The other important is a change in cabinet that requires the TNI
Commander does not hold position as Defense Minister at the same time.23
The Polri’s role is regulated in Article 6 of MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000, as follows:
1. The Indonesian Police (Polri) is the government apparatus that
plays the role in maintaining the society security and order,
enforcing the law, providing society comfort and services.
2. In playing its role, Polri is required to have the expertise and skills
professionally.
Whereas, the Structure and Position of Polri is also clearly regulated in Article 7 of
MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000:
1. The Indonesian Police (Polri) is the National Police, the organization
of which is structured hierarchically from central level to regional
level.
2. The Indonesian Police (Polri) is under the President.
3. The Polri is led by Indonesian Police Chief who is appointed and
dismissed by the President with the approval of DPR.
4. Member of Polri must obey the power of civil court.
Since the police institution is under the President, then it is necessary for MPR to
add an institution to assist the President in determining the direction of Polri
policy. It is regulated in Article 8 of MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000 concerning the
National Police Institution. Not only that, this institution also functions to provide
where their membership in the parliament are based on the appointment of TNI commander and The Police Chief
not as the result from general election to choose legislative members.
22 Terms “an active military personnel” should be meant as a person who still act as military personnel. But TNI
says a non-active military personel means that a personnel who has no port folio. It shows that military member
still allowed civil position by temporary non-activated. This kind of thing still happens in the head of district
election where active military personnel are nominated in local politic area. See Aris Santoso, “Pilkada Ujian
lapangan Bagi TNI”, Republika, 6 May 2005. The implementation of Indonesian Armed Forces double functions
firstly stated in People's Consultative Decision No. X/MPR/1998, see Muhammad Fajrul Falaakh, et al, Op.Cit.
Page. 41.
23 It used to be common for TNI Commander to have taken as a Minister of Defense. This indicated that military
police was independent and beyond civil control. The last double position was hold by General Wiranto who was
promoted by Soeharto as Commander in Chief of Armed Forces on 16 February 1998 and a moment later as
Minister of Defense. After Soehato fell, Habibie appointed him to stay in his previous post on 22 May 1998. Up to
4 November 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid appointed him as Minister of Politic, Social and Security
Coordinator and gives the TNI Commander position to Admiral Widodo A.S. and Minister of Defense to Prof.
Juwono Sudarsono. See Bhatara Ibnu Reza, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare: Problems in CivilMilitary Relations and Their Implications for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Thesis for Master of Laws
in International Human Rights Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, 2006, Page. 44.
179
consideration to the President in appointing and dismissing Indonesian Police
Chief. This institution is established by the President based on the law.
Polri also has an assistance duty as applied to the Indonesian Army (TNI), but
there are some special characteristics of the police that are not possessed by the
military. This is stated in Article 9 of MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000, as follows:
1.
2.
3.
In case of emergency, Polri provides assistance to TNI as regulated in
the law.
Polri actively participates in the duties as a member of International
Criminal Police (Interpol) to overcome the international crimes.
Polri actively assist the duty of world peace keeping operation under
the United Nation’s flag.
The Article 10 of MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000 as it is applied to TNI
concerning its participation in the state implementation, the member of Polri
must be neutral and does not participate on political practices. In addition to that,
member of Polri does not have right to be able to elect and to be elected, but their
participation in determining the direction of national policy is channeled through
MPR until 2009. The other stipulation is the requirement to resign or retired for
the member of Polri if he/she wants to hold a position outside of the police.
The Law No. 2 Year 2002 on the Indonesian Police
The birth of Law No. 2 Year 2002 on the State Police is an implementation of the
MPR TAP mandate No. VI/MPR/2000 on the Separation between TNI and Polri,
and MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/200 on the TNI’s and Polri’s Role. This Law, at the same
time, replaces the Law No. 28 Year 1997 on the Polri that was effective for a period
of 5 years after being regulated as long as 35 years in Law No. 13 Year 1961 on the
Indonesian Police.
The issuance of the Law gives an expectation of cultural change for Polri, which
previously very militaristics, to be a civil police institution as it is known in
democratic countries. The police institution is also expected to be professional
and modern, particularly in its function as law enforcer by highly respecting
democracy and human rights.
The Law No. 2 Year 2002 on the Indonesian Police, which substantially places the
police institution as a strong institution that can be seen from its function and
position in the government. It is affirmed in Article 2 of Law No. 2 Year 2002, “The
police’s function is one of state government functions in the sector of society
security and order keeping, law enforcement, and society protection, comfort and
service.” Meanwhile, the position of Polri is under the President as stated in Article
8 of Law No. 2 Year 2002.
If studied further, there are three important issues in the Indonesian Police (Polri)
position: first, the government function, second, law enforcement function, third,
the society security and order function. From the government point of view, it can
180
be seen from Polri’s authority to make common police regulation in the effort of
security and order recovery in line with the laws.
This stipulation is improper if a police regulation has a common binding
characteristic where it can be found in the laws. Although the police regulation is
issued based on the existing laws, there is a chance for human rights deviation or
violation considering it is aimed in framework of security and order recovery.24
The function of police in the framework of Criminal Court System (integrated
justice system) that regulated in Article 16 of Law No. 2 Year 2002. Specifically,
the police function as law enforcer is regulated in the Criminal Code (KUHP).
The police function and authority in society security and order sector is
specifically regulated in Article 14 and 15 of Law No. 2 Year 2002. In these two
articles, there is an overlapping between the police function and authority
in order to enforce the law with the authority as a builder of society security and
order. For example, the Article 15 (1)(f) where the police apparatus may conduct
a special investigation in the prevention act effort.25 In the description of Law No.
2 Year 2002, this act is not explained, and therefore, it will cause a violation of
habeas corpus right, and there is a chance for torturing practice to the suspect.26
In other words, it is very difficult to distinguish between the police apparatus uses
the law and they enforce law.
The most important issue in this Law is the affirmation concerning the National
Police Institution that regulated in Chapter VI, Article 38-40 of Law No. 2 year
2002. this institution, as affirmed in article 38 (1), is called the National Police
Commission. However, it is different with the mandate in MPR TAP No.
VII/MPR/2000 concerning the TNI’s Role and Polri’s Role, where this institution is
expected to be a supervising institution of the police institution, but it is only an
advisory institution of the President.27
The last issue that regulated in Law No. 2 Year 2002 is Article 41 and 42
concerning the Assistance, Relation, and Cooperation, which is actually an
affirmation to request of assistance from Polri by TNI in implementing the security
duty, Polri assistance to TNI in a military emergency situation, and participation in
peace keeping under the United Nation flag, all of which regulated in Article 9 of
MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000. Whereas, cooperation in general is described in
terms of cooperative development between Polri and local institutions as well as
foreign institutions.
24
See Republika Online,” Maklumat Tembak Ditempat berlebihan”, 18 January 2007,
http://www.republika.co.id/koran_detail.asp?id=279333&kat_id=59, accessed on 24 April 2007.
25 Article 15(1)(f) Act No. 2 Year 2002 on Indonesian Police: Enduring the special investigation as a part of police
prevention.
26 Indonesian has ratificated Convention Against Torture and other Cruel by legalization of Act No. 5 Year 1998
on Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
27 See Media Indonesia Online,”Mabes Polri Terima Daftar Nama Anggota Kompolnas”, 20 Mei 2006,
http://www.media-indonesia.com/berita.asp?id=201314, diakses 24 April 2007.
181
d. The Law No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense
The Law No. 3 year 2002 on State Sefense fundamentally changes the national
defense system, and civil-military relation, although it is still limited. This Law
replaces the Law No. 20 Year 1982 on the Principle Stipulations of State Security
Defense.28 The issuance of Law No. 3 year 2002 has directly reduced the political
role of military where in this legislative reform, it adopts the democratic values,
human rights, general welfare, environment, national legal stipulation,
international law, international custom, and adjoining life peacefully.29
In this Law No. 3 Year 2002, there are two important issues that must be
considered. Firstly, concerning the change in the national defense system, and
secondly, relation and role of the President, Defense Minister, and TNI
Commander, in the state defense.
As described above, the position of whole people defense system has been stated
in the constitution. However, the Law No. 3 Year 2002 has different interpretation,
particularly concerning the involvement of society or people, which is not
considered anymore as basic component in facing the military threat. The Article
7(2) of Law No. 3 year 2002 affirms that, ”State Defense System in facing the
military threat places TNI Army as the main component with the support of
reserve component and supporting component.”30 The TNI‘s role is also limited if
the state is facing non-military threat by bringing forward other government
institutions.31
The reserve component consists of citizen, natural resources, man-made
resources, and national facilities and infrastructure that ready to be mobilized in
order to enlarge and strengthen the main component.32 Whereas, the supporting
component consists of citizen, natural resources, man-made resources, and
national facilities and infrastructure that directly or indirectly can increase the
power and capability of the main and reserve components.33
28 Act
No 20 Year 1982 as the form of confirming the The Indonesian Armed Forces dwi-function practices
which previously confirmed by People's Consultative Decision No.XXIV/MPRS/1966 on new Defense and
Security policies. Though, to protect Indonesian Armed Forces roles in defense and social-politics, Soeharto
regime needed to enforcing its position Article 26 Act No. 20 Year 1982 which is: Armed Forces has the function
as the state defense and protection forces and also as the social forces. In Article 28 (1) Act No. 20 Year 1982:
Armed forces as the social power who act as the mover and stabilizer, along with other social forces carry
responsibility to reassure and to succeed the fight in fill the independence and to increase people welfare.
29 See Article 3(1) Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense
30
Compare to Article 1(5) Act No. 20 Year 1982: Defense System and Universal Security is
organized of the entire state security and defense components which consists of basic
component of Trained People, main component of Indonesian Armed Forces also backup
components of Indonesian Army, and special components on People Protections and support
components which are national resources, artificial resources and national infrastructure as a
whole, solid and directed.
31 See Article 7(3) Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense. See Article 8(1) Act No. 3 Year 2002
on State Defense
33
See Article 8(2) Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense
182
Based on the above arrangement, TNI must become a professional military
institution since they only focus themselves on state defense. It is the
government duty to establish the laws that regulates people involvement in the
defense so that there will be no direct involvement of TNI in using people in the
state defense.34 Based on description of the Law No. 3 2002 stipulate TNI as the
main component and the people as reserve component, so that the
implementation of state defense is in line with international laws, particularly in
differential principle of combatant and non-combatant.35
The Law No. 3 Year 2002 has placed the President as the highest power holder of
TNI, which has the authority and is responsible for power mobilization of the TNI36
as regulated in the Constitution 1945. Nevertheless, the President may not
directly use the authority without a prior approval from DPR,37 except in an
emergency situation.38 If it happens, the President, within 2x24 hours, must ask
for an approval from DPR39, and if not being approved, the President must stop
the mobilization of military operation.40
Whereas, the position of Minister of Defense in Law No. 3 Year 2002 is to lead the
Department of Defense41 and assist the President in formulating the general
policy of state defense.42 Minister of Defense also determines a policy concerning
the implementation of state defense based on general policy that established by
the President.43 Defense Minister formulates the general policy for the use of TNI
and other defense components.44
Minister of Defense also has the duty to determine the policy for budgeting,
procurement, recruitment, national resources management, and development of
defense technology and industry that required by TNI and other defense
components.45 In the framework international relations, Minister of Defense
prepares a Defense White Book and determines the policy for bilateral and
regional cooperation, and work in its sector. 46
34 There were several regulations on mobilization and demobilization of trained people and Indonesian Armed
Forces troops. But the regulation is no longer valid since 1945 Constitution are in amendment and Act No. 20
Year 1982 has been replaced by Act No. 3 Year 2002
35 See General Explanation of Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense. Related to the implementation of law,
human right and humanities law related to the stipulation of Act No. 3 Year 2002, Minister of Defense stipulated
the Ministerial Decree No. Kep/02/M/II/2002 on Application of human right and humanities law in the
implementation of State Defense.
36 See Article 14(1) Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense.
41 See Article 16(1) Act No. 3Year 2002 on State Defense.
46 See Article 15(3) Act No. 3Year 2002 on State Defense. On 31 March 2003, Department od Defense has
published the Indonesian Defense White Book. See Department of Defense, Mempertahankan Tanah Air
Memasuki Abad 21, (Jakarta: Departmen Pertahanan, 2003).
183
The Law No. 3 Year 2002 states that a Commander as the TNI leader47 and being
responsible to the President in using state defense component, and working
cooperatively with Defense minister in fulfilling the TNI requirement.48 The TNI
Commander also implements the military strategic and operational planning,
development of military profession and power, and maintenance of operational
readiness.49 Finally, the TNI Commander has the authority to use all state defense
components in the military operational implementation based on the law.50
Therefore, it can be said that the position of President and Defense Minister in this
Law reflects the civil-military relation by placing the civilian supremacy over the
military, which not known previously in the Indonesia governmental system.
However, this Law not really practice a full civil-military relation considering that
the TNI position is not under control of Defense Department. In their positions,
the two institutions, Defense Department and TNI Commander, are on the same
level that formally under control of the President. The President’s position has a
command central authority in its relation to mobilization and use of TNI power.
e. The Law No. 15 Year 2003 on Countering the Terrorism Criminal Act
The Law No. 15 Year 2003 concerning on the Regulation for Replacement of Law
No. 1 Year 2002 on the countering the Terrorism Criminal Act to be declared as the
Law. The Law Substituting Regulation (Perpu) No. 1 Year 2002 is considered as a
response to the bombing incident in Bali on October 12, 2002.
Initially, the law was not established by itself, but it is accompanied by Perpu No. 2
year 2002 on the Eradication of Terrorism Criminal Act on the bombing incident in
Bali on October 12, 2002, which then ratified to be the Law No. 16 Year 2003.51
Since its initial issuance, the factions in DPR have different attitudes, although
some of them agreed that the presence of the two Perpu is a consequence of
international political influence, some of them were worried, and majority of them
requested the existence of alternative draft.
No
Meeting
date
Faction
name
Name of
faction
member
47 See Article 18(1) Act No. 3Year 2002 on State Defense
51 Act No. 16 Year 2003 on Fighting against Terorrist
Faction
attitude
toward Antiterrorism’s
Perpu and Bill
Other description
Act on Bali Bombing, 12 october 2002, later be ca
cancelled by Constitutional Court since it was against the Article 28(i) 1945 Constitution especially on nonretroactive matter. See Constitutional Court Decree 013/PAct-I/2003 on Maskur or Abdul Kadir, convicted in the
bombing on Denpasar Public Court. See also Media Indonesia, “Yusril: Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi hanya
untuk Bom Bali”, 25 July 2004. See deeper studies on Constitutional Court in Petra Stockmann, The New
Indonesian Constitutional Court: A Study into Its Beginnings and First Years of Work, (Jakarta: Hans Seidel
Foundation, 2007).
184
1.
15
January
2003
Reformation
Faction
Patrialis
Perpu is very
Akbar and
dangerous for
Luthfi Ahmad the people
Worry if the Bill
cannot be enacted
as Law, then must
accept the Perpu
2.
16
January
2003
F-KKI
Sutradara
Ginting and
Kapad
Perpu in the
form of
reactive postBali and Antiterrorism Bill
are certain to
be accepted
Acceptance of Antiterrorism Bill with
the reason of
international
political
consideration at
present time
3.
16
January
2003
F-Golkar
Marzuki
Achmad,
Datuk
Labuan, and
Daryatmo
Mardiyanto
Perpu is
automatically
not valid if the
Bill is ratified
to be the Law
Expect the
existence of a full
form of alternative
Bill and request
DIM
4.
20
January
2003
F-PDU
K.H. Ahmad
Satari,
Mudahan
Hazdie, and
Amarudin
Djajasubinta
Refuse Perpu
and refuse the
BIN expansion
to province
and region
Request the
alternative form of
Bill
5.
21
January
2003
F-PBB
Ahmad
Sumargo,
M.S. Kaban,
etc.
Request the
alternative form of
Bill
6.
22
January
2003
F-KB
Chotibul
Umam,
Manase
Mallo,
Muhaimin
M.T, Ida
Fauziah, and
Susono Yusuf
Worry that
Perpu will be
crossed and
refuse the BIN
expansion
Worry that
Perpu will be
crossed and
refuse the BIN
expansion
7.
23
January
2003
F-PDI-P
Nyoman
Gunawan,
V.B. Da
Costa, and
Dwi Ria
Latifa
Not having a
clear attitude
and all depend
on the
instruction of
F-PDI-P
Request the
alternative draft,
but not certain it
will be discussed
8.
-
F-PPP
-
-
-
Request the
alternative form of
Bill
Table 1. The Attitude of DPR Factions Toward Perpu and Bill of Eradication of
Terrorism criminal Act (Source: Anti-terrorism Law: between People Freedom
and Security, Imparsial, 2003)
Since its issuance in the form of Perpu until it becomes a law, substantially this
Law has received many critics, mainly concerning threat to democracy and
185
human rights.52 First, it also changes the appearance of law enforcement with the
presence of non-judicial intelligence in the Integrated Criminal Justice System.
Second, a change in criminal law, and third, the retroactive application of
terrorism crime.
Parallel with the issuance of Perpu at that time, President Megawati issued two
Presidential Instructions. First, the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 4 Year
2002 where the Coordinator Minister for Politics and Security, has an authority to
formulate the terrorism policy.53 Second, the Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.
5 Year 2002 where it stated that State Intelligence Agency (BIN) as the
coordinator of all intelligence activities (BAIS, Polri, Attorney General, Judge,
Immigration, Customs, etc.).54
The Law No. 15 Year 2003 in the sector of civilian rights protection that threaten
the press freedom and freedom to propound the opinion.55 Article 20 of Law No.
15 Year 2002 states that “… the ‘intimidation’ act to the investigator…,” without a
limitation of what it means with “intimidation,” the formula of this article can be
used as reason to limit the mass media or those people who give comment on the
legal process over the terrorism criminal act.56
The Law No. 15 Year 2003 also threaten individual rights through telephone
tapping act, bank account supervision, and so on, which solely based on the
intelligence report.57 It is a new issue in the criminal law where the intelligence
report as one of evidences as regulated in Law No. 6 ear 1981 on the Criminal
Code (KUHAP).58
Apply the retroactive terrorism criminal stipulation that is contradictory to civil
rights. Therefore, this law considers all non-retroactive principles that represents
the cardinal principle of criminal law.59 In its practice, each constitution in various
52 As the summon to the regulations some non-political organization and Human Rights activist agree to form
Coalition for Civil Liberties as follow up of the meetion on 7 and 12 November 2002. By the time, coalition
appointed IMPARSIAL The Indonesian Human Rights Monitor as the coordinator. See Imparsial dan Koalisi
Kebebasan Masyarakat Sipil, Act Anti Terorisme: Antara Kebebasan dan Keamanan Rakyat, (Jakarta,
Imparsial, 2003). This book gives a complete description of entire regulations on combationg terrorism includes
some communiqué from the coalition.
53Ibid. page 9
54 Ibid. page 9
55 See, “Terorisme dalam Pergulatan Politik Hukum”, in Rusdi Marpaung and Al Araf, Ed., Terorisme: Definisi,
Aksi dan Regulasi, (Jakarta, Imparsial, 2003). Page. 52.
56 Ibid. page. 52. Article 20 Act No. 15 Year 2003: Anyone who use the force or threats to intimidate the
investigators, researcher, general prosecutors, lawyer and/or judges who is handling the terrorism act in
consequence of disturbing the trial process, will be liable to the minimum of 3 years (three) and the maximum 15
year (fifteen) of detainion.
57 Ibid.Page 52, Article 26(1) Act No. 15 Year 2003: to get preliminary evidence, investigator can use every
intelligence report. See Article 30 Act No. 15 Year 2003.
58 See Article 184(1) Act No. 6 Year 1981 on Criminal Code (KUHAP): the official evidence are:
a. Witness testimony;
b. Profesional terstimony;
c. Papers;
d. Clues;
e. Accused explanation
59 See Constitutional Court Decree 013/PAct-I/2003.
186
democratic countries refuses to open a court based on past cases (ex-post
factor).
As stated earlier, Law No. 15 Year 2002 threaten the independency of judicial
system with the involvement of non-judicial intelligence apparatus, such as State
Intelligence Bureau (BIN) and TNI.60 It surely can paralyze the public supervision
toward legal institution with the involvement on non-judicial intelligence in legal
process.61
The Law No. 15 Year 2003 also adopts the pre-trial mechanism that comes from
Anglo-Saxon system, but it does not adopt its courting system, but it can
eliminate the rights to submit an objection (habeas corpus).62 Moreover, this
mechanism closes the possibility that the individual right uses the court
procedure as regulated in the KUHAP as the only habeas corpus mechanism as a
control facility.63 The establishment of pre-trial mechanism in the admissibility
process where a judge decides on initial evidence, arrest order, and confiscation,
is a framework to develop law immunity and intelligence immunity as described in
Article 26 (2).64
Instead of limiting and preventing the abuse of state power, the Law No. 15 Year
2003 gives a chance to abuse the state power, particularly the provision of big
chance to the intelligence, intelligence from BIN or TNI, for other objectives that
is meant to prevent or collect the information related to terrorism.65 In addition to
that, the Law No. 15 Year 2003 protects the actor of power abuse that performed
by bank or financial institution, in the form of bank secret divulgence,
embezzlement, corruption, etc. as solely an administrative mistake.66
In its development later, the government realizes that many critics to the Law No.
15 Year 2003, and therefore, a revised design is prepared. However, the spirit and
intention to do an amendment only occur if there is a bombing incident in
Indonesia. It is clearly seen in the preparation of amendment of design document
of confinement to base the results dated on August 20-28, 2003, which
60 Rusdi Marpaung dan Al Araf, Op.Cit. page 52
61 Ibid. page 52
62 Ibid. page 52. See Article 26(2) See Article 26(2) Act No. 15 Year 2003: stipulation to begin the investigation
process by the Chief or the vice of the court as sufficient initial evidence as stated in verse (1) are gathered.
Pre-trial is arranged in Act No. 8 Year 1981 on Criminal Code (KUHAP) in chapter X The Court Authorty to
Bring to Justice First Part
63 Pre-trial is arranged in Act No. 8 Year 1981 on Criminal Code (KUHAP) in chapter X The Court Authorty to
Bring to Justice First Part.
64 Rusdi Marpaung dan Al Araf, Op.Cit. page 52.
65 Ibid. page 53.
66 Ibid. page 53 See Article 29(2) Act No. 15 Year 2003: Inverstigator order, general prosecutor, or gudge as what
is meant by verse (1) should be stated in written by mention clearly about:
a. Name and prosecutor or judge position.
b. Identity of every person who has been repoted by the bank or financial service agency to the
inverstigator, suspects or offender
c. Blocade reason
d. Suspicion or indictment
e. Property existence
187
represented a response to the bombing of JW Marriot Hotel on August 5, 2003.
While other design amendments occurred on September 2004 as a response the
Kuningan Bombing on September 8, 2004.67 The spirit used is still the same,
which is the reinforcement to the country, and not guarantee and respect to
human rights and democracy.
In the first design amendment, the government accommodated the claim of nonjudicial institutions, such as TNI and BIN to participate in law enforcement
process.68 The desire of Justice Department and Human Rights69 seems reactive
and based on short-term interest, and neglects the fundamental aspect in the
form of TNI and BIN placement in the framework of democratic country.70
Whereas, the second design amendment of Law No. 15 Year 2003 that proposed
by the government through Justice Department and Human Rights post-bombing
of Kuningan, the government did not provide a clear limit who is meant by the
terrorism actor.71 In Article 13B concerning the terrorism organization, the
government classify that people who wear the clothes and attributes of terrorism
organization in the public place, and use the money from terrorism organization,
are considered as part of the people who are appropriate to be imposed a legal
sanction for a period of around 3-5 years imprisonment.72
f. The Law No. 34 Year 2004 on the Indonesian Army (TNI)
The issuance of Law No. 34 Year 2004 on the TNI is considered as further effort in
conducting the security sector reform as the mandate of MPR TAP No.
VI/MPR/2000 and MPR TAP No. VII/MPR/2000. In its journey, when this Law was
still in the form of Bill, there was an effort performed by TNI in its endeavor to
make it as an independent institution that is freed from civilian control. In the TNI
Bill Year 2003,73 TNI succeeded in putting a controversial article, especially the
use of power. In Article 19 of the TNI Bill 2003, it is affirmed the following:
1.
2.
In case of emergency where the country sovereignty, regional unity,
and safety of all people, are in danger, the Commander can use the
TNI Power as an initial step to prevent a bigger country loss.
The mobilization of TNI power as stated in paragraph (1) must be
reported to the President at the latest in 1x24 hours.
Then this article is notorious as “Coup Article” that according to the TNI is
necessary in case of emergency.74 This article then becomes the target of critic by
67 See Tim Imparsial, Catatan HAM 2004: Keamaman Mengalahkan Kebebasan, (Jakarta, Imparsial, 2006),
Page 48
68 Ibid. Page. 48
69 The department changed to Departement of Law and Human Rights
70Ibid, page. 48
71 Ibid, page 48
72 Ibid, page 48
73 TNI Bill as the result of Departement of Defense Meetion on 3 February 2003
74 See Tim Imparsial Team, Menuju TNI Profesional: Tidak Berbisnis dan Tidak Berpolitik, (Jakarta:
Imparsial, 2005), Page. 115. This book gives overall informations about the discussion process on Indonesian
188
Political figures, Human Rights defenders, and politicians in DP who involved in
the preparation of TNI Bill. Basically, the article does not give a clear criteria about
what is meant by “urgent condition” that threatens the country sovereignty and
regional unity, and does not identify the actor that has right to assess the
criteria.75
The former TNI Commander, Jenderal Endriartono Sutarto explained that he
agreed if the mobilization of power must be decided by the President with an
approval from DPR.76 However, according to him, in the practice, TNI needs a
legal framework to avoid an enemy attack as soon as possible when in case of
emergency. In responding to it, the authority to use and mobilize power as stated
in article 19 of TNI Bill is significantly regulated in a standard operating
procedure.77 In other words, the TNI Commander does not have an automatic
authority, but there should be a political minded.78 Due to big refusal from various
society elements, this article has been eliminated and never occurred in the next
TNI Bill.
In June 30, 2004, amidst the Presidential Election 2004, President Megawati
Soekarnoputri proposed the TNI Bill to DPR. The time allocation needed by DPR to
discuss the Bill was 45 days before the last session of DPR, which is too short for
the law making in Indonesia.79 For the TNI, the TNI Bill discussion is the last effort
for those who involved in determining the direction of national policy through
legislative process before they leaved the DPR.
There are four important issues in the discussion of TNI Bill at this time: first,
territorial development as the main task of TNI; second, the position of TNI
Headquarter is under the Department of Defense; third, the work issue in
bureaucracy where a member of TNI can also be a military and bureaucracy
officer at the same time I the civilian circle; fourth, is the military business.
No
Political Elite
Attitude
Source
1
Megawati Soekarnoputri Support he TNI Bill by proposing Kompas, August
it to DPR on June 30, 2004
16, 2004
(RI President)
2
Amris Fuad Hasan (Vice Support the discussion of TNI
Chairman of
Bill with the reason to give the
last chance to TNI-Polri Faction
Commission I DPR)
Media Indonesia
Online, August 3,
2004
3
Marshal Pieter L.D.
Wattimena (Directorate
General of Defense
Department Kuathan)
Tempo Interactive
Online, July 19,
2004
Request that the TNI Bill to be
discussed by DPR in this period
because it is a constitutional
mandate. He considered that a
pending discussion until
establishment of DPR for period
of 2004-2009 is not
appropriate.
National Army at the Legislative, includes the analysis and campaign to refuse Indonesian National Army Bill
75 Ibid. Page 116.
76 See General Endriartono Sutarto, “Soal Pasal Kudeta”, Kompas, 7 April 2003.
77 Tim Imparsial, Op.Cit. page 123.
78 Ibid.page 123.
79
Imparsial Policy Analysis,“Gambaran Reformasi TNI dalam Pengesahan Act TNI”, (Jakarta: Imparsial,
December 2004), Page. 1.
79 Ibid. Page. 4.
189
Table 2. Initial Attitude of Political Elite toward the TNI Bill (Source: Imparsial
Analysis, 2004).
In this opportunity, TNI once again put an article concerning the territorial
development as one of TNI duties. In the Article 8(2), the TNI Bill states that the
main duties of TNI are as follows:
(2). In performing the main duty as stated in paragraph (1), TNI executes:
a. military operation for a war;
b. military operation for other than war;
c. territorial development in line with TNI’s role and authority:
1.
assist the government in conducting development of
defense potential in the effort to improve the capability of
state defense;
2.
assist the government to conduct a military service and
basic military training for the citizen;
3.
realize the total integration with people;
4.
other duties based on the laws.
This article makes the territorial development as the TNI main duty, which
indirectly makes the TNI territorial structure is permanent because during this
time, the territorial development is one of the duties that binding to territorial
command.80 The territorial command during this time is considered as the
backbone of TNI-Ground Force in implementing the Regional War Doctrine and
not as a part of defense system that involves all measures.81
The TNI Commander, General Endriartono Sutarto, interprets the importance of
territorial development as a tool to realize the people standing to the TNI, and as a
long arm of the TNI to get the information.82 The interpretation of TNI
Commander has proven the TNI desire to be a political entity that is freed from
civilian control.
Faction
PDI-P
Golkar Party
PPP
PKB
Function of
TNI
Territorial
Refused
Has not been
decided
Refused
Refused
TNI under
Defense Minister
Work in Bureaucracy
Agreed
Agreed
Must resign
Must resign
Agreed
Agreed
Must resign
Must resign
80 Ibid. Page 4.
81 See Bhatara Ibnu Reza, The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare: Problems in Civil-Military Relations
and Their Implications for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Thesis for Master of Laws in International
Human Rights Law, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, 2006.
82 See Kompas, “RUU TNI Belum Tentu Bisa Diselesaikan DPR, 29 Juli 2004. See also Bhatara Ibnu Reza,
“Mempertimbangkan RUU TNI”, Suara Pembaruan, 5 Agustus 2004.
190
Reformation
TNI/Polri
Has not been
decided
Agreed
Agreed
Refused
Refused
Agreed
Table 3. he Attitude of DPR Factions toward TNI Bill on August 23, 2004 (Source:
Impartial Analysis, 2004)83
On September 30, 2004, the TNI Bill was ratified to be the Law without putting the
territorial development in it. The Law No. 34 Year 2004 on TNI in parallel has
strengthen several issues that have been regulated in the Law No. 3 Year 2002 on
State Defense like TNI mobilization by the President with an approval from DPR,84
President’s authority in case of emergency,85 the role of TNI Commander under
the President in using the forces.86 And the position of TNI Commander in using
the forces.87 However, this Law fails to place the TNI under the Department of
Defense as a reflection of civilian supremacy to the military.
The issuance of Law No. 34 Year 2004 also eliminates the Law No. 2 Year 1988 on
the Indonesia Armed Forces Soldier. It is caused that the Law No. 34 Year 2004
also regulates the TNI soldiers.
Several Legislation Draft of Security Sector
Meanwhile, there are several legislation drafts that still being debated in DPR. The
discussion process of several legislative drafts is influenced by political struggle in
DPR so that their discussion required a long time until years. The legislation draft
being discussed at present is the Bill on the Nation’s Secret, the Bill on Freedom to
Access for Public Information,88 the Bill on the Change of Law No. 31 Year 1997 on
Military Court. The two Bills that come up and attract the public attention,
although have not been discussed by DPR, are the Bill on State Intelligence and
the Bill on National Defense.
Specifically concerning the discussion of the Bill on Nation’s Secret, Bill on KMIP,
and the Bill on State Intelligence, which are not free from political situation in
Indonesia related to anti-terrorism policy post-bombing in Bali on October 12,
2002. Since then, there are some government efforts, particularly BIN, to request
the DPR, during its discussion of Terrorism Criminal Act, to balance their inner
83 Fraksi Kesatuan Kebangsaan, Fraksi Daulatul Ummah dan Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang are not recorded
84 See article 17(1) dan (2) UU No.34 Tahun 2004 on TNI. See also article 14(1) dan (2) UU No. 3 Tahun 2002 on
National Defense
85 See Article 18 (1),(2) and (3) Act No.34 Year 2004 on Indonesian National Army (TNI). Also see Article
14(3),(4) and (5) Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense.
86 See Article 19(1) Act No.34 Year 2004 on Indonesian National Army (TNI)
87 See Article 19(2) Act No. 34 Year 2004 on Indonesian National Army
(TNI). In the explanation, TNI
Commander Responsibility to President is a military operation act. Also see Article 18(3) dan (4) Act No. 3 Year
2002 on State Defense.
88 The latest up-date KMIP Bill Special Committee changed the name of the bill ini to Public Information
Transparacy Bill (KIP). See Kompas, “KMIP Bill changed to KIP: terms 'freedom' cannot be found”, 28 May
2007
191
situation in preparing the Bill of KMIP, the Bill on State Intelligence, and the Bill on
Nation’s Secret. 89
A. The Legislation Draft that being Addressed by DPR and Government
a. The Bill on State’s Secret
The Bill on Nation’s Secret is one of Prolegnas priorities based on DPR RI
Decision No. 01/DPR-RI/III/2004-2005 that will be ratified in 2007 as the Law. At
present time, the Bill of Nation’s Secret is considered as a design that is proposed
by Department of defense, the design of which is prepared by State Code
Institution.90 The discussion of Nation’s Secret Bill is not freed from the presence
of KMIP Bill.91 The DPR’s decision to prioritize the Nation’s Secret Bill over the
KMIP Bill in the Prolegnas is considered as an improper decision from the
legislative making considering that the KMIP Bill has been discussed earlier.92
Since the first time of the spirit carried by the Bill is the limited access maximum
exemption, which means that every information that comes from the state is
confidential.93 Its consequence in the future will produce the state police as
practiced by the Communist Regime of East Germany.94 This Bill is supposed to
accommodate the maximum disclosure and limited exemption principle as one of
main signs to limit the nation’s secret. 95
The Bill also refers to Article 28J(2) of 1945 Constitution whose the bottom line is
to limit the freedom and right of every people in the scope of respecting the
human rights in getting the information.96 The Bill hasn’t accommodate Article
28J (2) of 1945 Constitution which can protect the bill from The Principal of
989 See Imparsial Lobby Document, “Act Anti Teroris: Kembalinya Otoritarianisme”, in Imparsial and Koalisi
untuk Kebebasan Masyarakat Sipil, Act Anti Terorisme: Antara Kebebasan dan Keamanan Rakyat, (Jakarta,
Imparsial, 2003), Page. 13
90 See Team Imparsial, RUU State Secret: Ancaman Bagi Demokrasi, (Jakarta, Imparsial, 2006), page. 3. This
book gives a review and a deep analysis on the existence of State Secret Bill. This book is focusing the critics on
the draft of State Secret Bill on January, 2006. There was also a draft of State Secret Bill from State Secret Bill
harmonization meeting in Department of Law and Human Rights, May 4, 2005.
91 Since December 1998, several NGOs form a Coalition for Freedom seeks for the information and arranged
coalition version of KMIP Bill which was proposed to The Legislative. Look Masyarakat Transparansi
Indonesia,”Trilogi Kebebasan Memperoleh Informasi: RUU Kebebasan Memperoleh Infomasi, RUU
Kerahasiaan Negara dan RUU State Intellegence”, www.tranparansi.or.id published on March, 2006. Page. 1.
Accessed on 10 May 2007. KMIP Bill will be discussed in the future.
92 In February 19, 2003, State Secret draft Bill has just been proposed by 20 members of The Legislative Agency
(Baleg) where at the same time KMIP Bill Special Committee was completing the KMIP Bill draft. See Paulus
Widiyanto, “Mewaspadai Legislasi RUU Kerahasian Negara: Catatan Singkat Paulus Widiyanto,“ (no year)
page 3
93 See Article 2(1) State Secret Bill, draft January 2006: every person obligates to protect State Secret. The
explanation of Article 2(1): The obligation is valid for Indonesian Citizen and Foreign Citizen who lives inside
or outside the territory.
94 East-Germany Police or what was known as Stasi (Staatssicherheit) was under the Minister of State Security
(Ministerium für Staatssicherheit). Stasi is the leading actor in watching the East-Germany people by spreading
the terror and intimidation. Even every citizen was made to spy on others where the information will be filed.
The files can still be seen in Stasi Headquarter in Licthenberg which now has become a museum. See James A
McAdams, Judging The Past in Unified Germany, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
95 Tim Imparsial, RUU Rahasia..Op.Cit. page 16.
96 Team Imparsial, RUU Rahasia…Op.Cit. Page 16.
192
Balance which allows people to access the information and also to limit the bill its
own.97 This is seen in how state secret types are arranged by the bill into
information, thing and/or activities.98
Then, the bill divides the state secret by the state of policies and actions into:99
a. State defense and security
b. International Affair
c. Law Enforcement Process
d. National Economic Endurance
e. State Coding System
f. State Intelligence System
g. State Vital Asset.
Especially in security and defense, there were mentioned few things which in
classified classifications, which are: weapons, logistics, combat equipments and
research and development.100 On the other side, there are international
regulations on weapon transfer that have been stipulated by multilateral
institution such Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and DualUse Goods and Technologies document which published by Wassenar
Arrangement where as UN members has agreed on the “Guidelines for
International Transfer” that stipulated by Disarmament Commission on May 3,
1996.101
UN guidelines set up the basic agreement on weapon transfer whose the main
objectives are; (1) cooperation in preventing the transfer (2) Published the
verification on the last equipped and the end user; (3) custom and intelligence
cooperation to detecting the trade of smuggled weapon; (4) Cooperation in law to
expand the basic procedure in export and import weapon; (5) the arrangement of
weapon supplier broker agents; (6) the obedience in sanction and weapon
embargo that has been stipulated by UN Council; and (7) reports on weapon
transfer transaction.102
Reporting on a weapon is based on UN Register of Conventional Arm and UN
standardized System of Reporting on Military Expenditure where both are
arrange the transparency on state defense relates to the conventional data on
weapon transfer that cover:103
97 Ibid, page 8. Article 28J(2) Second Amendment of 1945 Constitution: In using the rights and freedom, every
person has to obey the limitation as stated in the act, by mean to guarantee the avowal and respect to other
people's right and freedom to get a fair trial based on moral, religious values and public order considerations of a
democratic people. This article is often used in retentions where it can limit the right of living which has been
known as the non degradable rights as what is arranged in Article 28I (1) Second Amendment of 1945
Constitution. Article 28I(1): Rights to live, Rights not to be tortured, Rights freedom of thinking and inner
feelings, rights to believe, rights not to be slaved, rights in law and rights not to be prosecuted on subsided law.
These are human rights which are non degradable in any circumstances.
98Ibid. page. 8. Article 28F 1945 Constitution: Every person has the right to communicate and to gain
information to develop his/her personal and social domain, has the right to search, to gain, to own, to keep,
to develop and to deliver the information by any manners
99 Article 4 of State secret bill.
100 Article 5 of State Secret Bill.
101 Elaboration of article 5 (a) on the State Secret bill
102 Tim Imparsial, RUU Rahasia…Op.Cit. page 46
103 Ibid. page 46.
193
Ÿ The defense policies in the exporting state that transferred the weapon
Ÿ Weaponry system Distribution Companies
Ÿ National Weapon Production
While in investigation and research process of certain cases which is conducted by
the police officers or Civil Investigator, there are possibilities of violation to the
rights of suspect104 which is guaranteed in law procedure in Criminal Code. Other
important thing is to the cases which take a great public attention such corruption
and heavy violation on human rights.
Moreover, when the police, district attorney and/or judge need to present items
that considered as state secret in a trial, such undefined “trial matters” also can
violate the right of the suspect, the person who is sentenced and/or the criminal,
especially in the cross examination process of a trial. In additional when the
criminal act involving the agency functionaries who carry out the investigation
and research or related to human rights and corruption cases which strictly need
the physical evidence.105 It is clear that the bill will impede the law enforcement
process. The investigation in human rights and corruption cases will be stopped if
one important document is stated as a state secret and cannot reveal how a
criminal act is conducted; even there is possibility that the subject still as the chief
of the agency. 106
b. Bill on the Freedom to Access Public Information
As discussed before, KMIP Bill is the focus of the legislative that will be stipulated
as an Act on 2007 by The Republic of Indonesia Legislative Decree No. 01/DPRRI/III/2004-2005. The background of the bill is Article 28F second amendment of
1945 Constitution as what also has arranged in Article 19 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that has been ratified by Indonesia and
enacted by Act No. 11 Year 2005 on the validation of an Act based on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 107
In other words, the access to get information not only has become a part of
human rights which assured internationally through ICCPR but also become a
part of Indonesian citizen’s constitutional rights.108 The spirit of maximum access
limited exemption which carried by KMIP Bill accommodating citizen’s rights in
accessing the information which/and parallel with the good governance practices
in the matter of public information services.
104 Ibid. page 47.
105 Explanations of Article 5(c) State Secret Bill.
106 Article 27(1) State Secret Bill
107 Tim Imparsial, RUU Rahasia…Op.Cit. Page 42.
108 Also see Article 14 Act No. 39 Year 1999 on Human Rights:
a)
Every person has the right to communicate and to gain information to develop his/her personal and
social domain.
b) has the right to search, to gain, to own, to keep, to develop and to deliver the information by any
manners
Long before, in the era of Soeharto there are also regulations that guarantee the citizen's right to gain the
information as stated in Act No 24 Year 1992 on Landscaping, Act No. 23 Year 1997 on Organizing the Living
Space and Act No. 36 Year 1999 on Telecommunication.
194
The amendment is the repetition and development of the preceding Article 14 of
Act No.39 Year 1999. The main objectives of the stipulation which strictly arrange
the freedom in accessing the information:109
Ÿ Urging democracy to ensure the public access to information and data record.
Ÿ Improving the public access to data and information
Ÿ Ensuring the agency to obey the expired date
Ÿ Maximizing the use of agencies’ data and information
In 2007, KMIP Bill goes in its 7th year of discussion in The Legislative since
periods 1999-2004 and continued to 2004-2009 periods. The long discussion
caused by the encounter process between The Parliament and Government on
substantial matters and synchronization of KMIP Bill to State Secret Bill. In the
discussion, Government is represented by the Department of Communication
and Information (Dekominfo) who made the government’s version bill named
Public Information Bill (IP Bill).110
Some problems arise in this long discussion, which are:
a. The absent of laws on the matter that cannot be accessed by public and
matters than cannot be exposed for some conditions.
b. Terms that still need some further explanations. KMIP Bill only arranges
the public rights n information but not the obligations of governmental
agencies to expose information to public.
c. KMIP Bill doesn’t give sanctions.
d. KMIP Bill doesn’t mentioned the accusation procedure and condemn
mechanism when the functionary won’t allowed the access to the
information.
One of the important matters in the KMIP Bill is the exceptional information.
Article 15 of KMIP Bill stated clearly that public agencies in some exceptional
cases can neglect their obligation in giving the access to the information, unless it
can cause some of the consequences bellow:
1. Impeding the law enforcement process.
2. Disturbing the protection and the importance of intellectual rights and
protection from unfair business competition.
3. Creating loss in defense strategy and national security.
4. Violating personal privacy.
Especially on the information that harm the national defense and security
defense. The details mentioned in Article 15(c) are:
a. Intelligence information, tactics, defense and security strategy in the
matter of domestic and internationally threat.
b. Document on implementation of combating strategy.
c. Data on estimation of foreign military forces.
109
The equivalent of Act on freedom to get information from many countries see Toby Mendel, Kebebasan
Memperoleh Informasi: Sebuah Survei Perbandingan Hukum, [Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal
Survey] Translated by Kawantama Team, (Jakarta: UNESCO, 2004).
110 Masyarakat Transparansi Indonesia, “Trilogi RUU…” Op.Cit. page 2.
195
d. Number and composition of battling unit and its development plan and/or;
e. Military base situation.
We have known that data on estimation of foreign military forces and number and
number of combat forces can be accessed as public information. For examples,
data on the estimation of military forces of other countries can be accessed
through White Paper (Buku Putih) that frequently published by department of
defense of each countries to inform, especially for the neighboring countries that
their defense posture development will not harm the other. So that, there won’t
be any security dilemma in which causes competition on military forces
enforcement because feeling threatened by the other.
Other important thing that have been mentioned before is the weapon
transparency which has been part of international regulation on weapon transfer
such Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies document which published by Wassenar Arrangement where as
UN members has agreed on the “Guidelines for International Transfer” that
stipulated by Disarmament Commission on May 3, 1996.111
We can conclude that KMIP Bill and State Secret Bill acknowledge the limitations
of citizen’s freedom on getting the public information. Though, it should be
highlighted that the arrangement of state secrets as in State Secret Bill should
refers to KMIP Bill so there won’t be overlapping regulations and different law
interpretations of both bills.
c.The Amendment of Act No. 31 Year 1997 on Military Judicature112
Discussion on alteration bill of Act No.32 Year 1997 on Military Judicature is one of
the legislation drafts which have been discussed for more than a year by
Parliament Special Committee (Pansus DPR) period 2004-2009 since October,
2005. Priory, the Legislative for period 1999-2004 has demand for an act which
arrange military member who violate the civil law to sit in public trial.113 The
substantial change in the alteration draft is the abolition of connection. There is
no other substantial change from the bill to Act No. 31 Year 1977. There are only
minor and pertaining to editing changes, such ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) to
TNI (Indonesian National Armed Forces) and terms “law advisor” to “lawyer”.114
By the end of its service time, The Indonesian Parliament for period 1999-2004
hasn’t discussed the amendment of bill on Act No.31 Year 1997 on Military
Judicature. One and a half year later, the next period of legislative (2004-2009)
propose this bill by putting it in the priority list of Prolegnas based on Indonesian
111 Tim Imparsial, RUU Rahasia…Op.Cit. Page 46.
112 The writer searched it from Imparsial research draft
on Military Judicature Reformation which will be
published on June, 2007.
113
114
Kompas, ”Segera Revisi UU Peradilan Militer”, Monday 13 March 2000, page 6.
See Act No. 18 Year 2003 on Lawyer.
196
Legislative Decree No. 01/DPR-RI/III/2004-2005. Their discussion partners are
Department of Defense and Department of Law and Human Rights.
In early May 2005, in the Parliament Plenary Meeting, all political parties agree to
use their initiative rights to revise Act No. 31 Year on Military Judicature which has
been proposed by The Parliament Legislation Body (Baleg).115 The consideration
is that Act No. 31 Year 1997 on military Judicature no longer appropriate to
reformation on security sector which demands military compliance to law
supremacy and civil authority elected in a democratic election.
There are two crucial things that caused long duration of discussion on this bill.
First, jurisdiction matters in which the bill states that the military troop who
conducts military crime will be judged by Military Court as the mandate of
People’s Consultative Council Decision No.VII/MPR/2000 on Indonesian and
Indonesian Police Roles and the Act No. 34 on Indonesian Armed Forces. Second,
Government’s indictment in which The Legislative should prioritize the
legislations revisions which regulate the material laws such Military Criminal Code
than The Military court which is under the authority of The Supreme Court.116
A long discussion between The parliament and the government, especially with
the Department of Defense is hardly to reach an agreement up to the next
Legislative meeting on August 2006. As anticipation of a deadlock, at the end of
the last meeting, they agreed to form a lobbying forum between Special
Committee (Pansus) and the government.117
The matters developed to and arised two main refusal reasons on the alteration
bill. The first is psychological matter, which will be a serious problem to bring an
Indonesian National Troops to a trial. The condition gets worst as there is no civil
law institution such the police, attorney and judge which prepared to handle the
criminal cases that involve the Indonesian National Troops.118 The second reason,
the government believes that it is impossible to put a military member in a civil
court if the Military Criminal Code, as the basic of material law, has not been
changed. The alteration on the basic of material law should be done before
revising the Act of Military Judicature.
115 Kompas, “RUU Peradilan Militer Jadi Usul Inisitif DPR”, Wednesday, June 22, 2005, page. 6.
116
See Article 24(2), third amendment of 1945 Constitution: The jurisdiction authority is conducted by the
Supreme Court and agencies bellow in general judicature, religious judicature, military judicature, the
judicature in governmental area, and by a Constitutional Court. So that, on September 1, 2004 Indonesian
National Troops Commander officially transferred the authorities of the court system based on mandate of Act
No. 4 Year 2004 on authorities of Judicial Affairs and Presidential Decree No. 56 Year 2004.“Mabes TNI Resmi
Alihkan Peradilan Militer ke MA” at http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2004/09/01/brk,2004090152.id.html
117
The parliament Lobbying Team formed by 10 people who are 4 chiefs of Special committee and
representatives of factions which haven't included as the chief. The lobbying process is done after the legislative
entered the meeting session on May 2006
118 Kompas, ”RUU Peradilan Militer; Pertarungan Merebut 'Pedang Keadilan'”,Thursday, 28 December 2006.
197
By the end of November 2006, when he was in Japan, President Bambang Susilo
Yudhoyono stated through The Minister of State Secretary, Yuzril Izra Mahendra
and The Minister of Law and Human Rights, Hamid Awaludin that the government
agree that TNI member who committed a criminal act will be put on a public
court. By the statement, The Parliament and Government had found a way out
and an agreement to the problem and agreed to have further discussion. By the
early 2007, The Parliament and Government started to find a point of
understanding in the problem of discussion on Military Judicature Bill. Both
parties have the same intention to continue the process of discussion on draft of
the bill to the level of working committee. Smoothened attitude of both parties
are seen when The Parliament Special Committee for Military Judicature fulfill the
invitation of Coordination Meeting by the Department of Defense.119
The Parliament Special Committee for Military Judicature–Department of
Defense meeting creates several agreements. First, Department of Defense
accepted the Article 9 alteration bill on Act No. 31 Year 1997 on Military
Judicature. Second, both parties agreed to have two to three years of transition
time to socialize the act to Indonesian Armed Forces, also some other adjustment
in several act which related to Criminal Code (KUHP, KUHAP) and Military
Criminal Code before the Military Judicature is revised.
B. Bills that draw Public Attention but hasn’t been discussed by The
Parliament
a. Bill on State Intelligence
State Intelligence Bill - January, 2002 draft version - drew public attention when
IMPARSIAL opened it in public through parliament Special Committee for
Terrorism in the matter of potentially to harm human rights.120 It means this bill
has been prepared long before the Bali Bombing in October 25, 2002. The bill has
confidential status since State Intelligence Agency (BIN) purposedly it will not
made for public. 121
One of the State Intelligence Agency’s authorities in the bill is known as
“Kidnapping Article” 122in which to detain the criminals for 90 days without being
119 See Kompas, ”Dephan dan Pansus Sepakat; RUU Peradilan Militer ke Panja”, Wednesday 24 January
2007. Also see Media Indonesia,”Pembahasan RUU Peradilan Militer Dilanjutkan; Pansus dan Menhan
Berdamai”, 24 January 2007, page. 6, and Detikcom,”DPR-Dephan Sepakat Peradilan Umum untuk Prajurit
TNI”, 23 Januari 2007.
120 Imparsial dan Coalition for Civil Freedom, Op.Cit. Page. 13. By the time, IMPARSIAL Executive Director
Munir for the first time revealed State Intelligence Bill in front of The Legislative Special Committee and
immediately got negative response from the parliament and from the people.
121 Draft of Bill on State Intelligence version 25 January 2002 stamped the “confidential” in every page.
122 Article 27(1) RUU on State Intellegence (25 January 2002 draft): Detainion for intelligence investigation as
what is meant in Article 21 point a last for the longest 90 days. See www.korantempo.com,“ BIN Akui 'Article
Penculikan' ”, http://www.korantempo.com/news/2003/3/7/headline/2.html (accessed 18 May 2005). The
violation of rights of the suspects see Article 28 State Intelligence Bill: In the intelligence investigation as what
is meant violation rights of the suspect in Article 21 points are:
Inquisitor system is valid;
a. Has no right to get a lawyer;
b. Has no right to silent or not to answer the investigators' question;
c. Has no right to get deferment of detainion by any bail.
198
Given any rights as stated in the criminal code. The Draft of January, 2002 also
gives the right for the intelligence chief to supply and to control the arms for the
intelligence.123 While structurally, State Intelligence Agency is under and directly
responsible to The President as what is arranged in Article 5 (2) draft on bill on
State Intelligence.
After draw a public contoversy, The State Intelligence agency then preparing a
legislation draft called Intelligence Principals Bill on September 5, 2003. The bill is
also confidential and some matters such as “Kidnapping Article” was not included
anymore,124 although State Intelligence has the authority to detain until 30 day
without any explanations on the rights of the suspect.125 Arms supply also given
in this version but with the absence of authorities to control as what is stated in
the previous draft.126 Article 6 (2) in this version of Intelligence Principal Bill
stated the State Intelligence is placed under the President and directly
responsible to the President.
In the progress, The Government has drafted State Intelligence Bill March 2006
version which also trigger critics and still flawed. First, there is intelligence’s
arrangement which contradict with democratic principals and second, the
democratic intelligence principal was not included in the articles of the bill.127 It is
shown by intelligence’s authority as law enforcement agencies’, such right to
detain.128
If we look further, almost all bills on intelligence tends to violate human rights and
law. As we known, intelligence officers are not law enforcement officers so giving
the same authorities can overlap with the criminal justice system. Furthermore,
a. Has no right to get home detainion or city-detainion.
b. Has no right to make any contact to other, includes to the family.
123 Article 25 State Intelligence Bill (draft 25 January 2002): The State Intelligence Chief has the authority
to:
a. Directly to procure arms supply either through the domestic or foreign agent
b. Regulating the arms license for the intelligence.
124 Stamped as “confidential” on draft of Bill on State Intelligence Principals, 5 September 2003 version.
125 Article 21 RUU on State Intellegence Principals (draft 5 September 2003):
1. Detainion as what is meant in Article 20 will last for 30 days (thirty days)
2. If the result of the investigation as what is meant in Article 20 verse (1) shows there is no strong
evidence on threats to national importance, the subject will be transferred to The Republic of Indonesia
Police to be processed in the valid law.
3. If the result of the investigation as what is meant in Article 20 verse (1) shows there is no possibility of
threats, the subject should be released.
126 Article
23 Intelligence Principal Bill:
1. The Chief of State Intelligence Agency has the authority in supplying the arms for the Agency, directly
to the producer or through the domestic or foreign agent
2. Utilizing of the rifles as what is meant in verse (1) of this article is arranged by The Chief Intelligence
Decree.
127 Andi Widjajanto, Ed., Panduan Perencangan Undang-Undang Intelijen Negara, (Jakarta: Pacivis,
August 2006). The book gives detail picture and critiques on State Intelligence Bill of March 2006 version.
128 Article 12 State Intelligence Bill (draft March 2006):
1. Intelligence National Agency (BIN) has a special authority to arrest someone in the matter of
interrogating, tapping, account examination and opening letters of every person who considered as a
harm for citizen.;
2. The longest interrogation is 7 x 24 Jam;
3. If fulfilled the requirements as preliminary evidence, the subject will be transferred to the authorized
199
There is no law on claiming the intelligence if there are any officer’s misconduct as
what is stipulated in the Criminal Code through pre-trial court.
b.National Security Bill
National Security Bill is a draft of bill which attracted many public attentions on
early 2007. Besides it materialized in a sudden, this bill was not the priority to be
addresssed in 2007 as what had been arranged by Prolegnas. Discussion in public
has become polemics before draft of bill on National Security, January 18, 2007
version of Department of Defense was made public. It seemed concealed from
public and other security institution such as The Indonesian Police.129 A discussion
drew the Police’s suspicion and resistance especially related to its future position
that is under the Department of Internal Affair.130
After the draft of National Security Bill version January 18, 2007 is published,
several problems in which related to the spirit in developing security reformation
arise again. This is seen in how the bill refers to Act No. 23/Prp/Year 1959 to
define the state of emergency which substantially won’t match to today’s
context.131
Other problem in this version is the Indonesian Armed Forces oblige in assisting
the governmental duties of Local Government as what is stated in Article 61 (1).
In details, what is meant by governmental duties in Article 61 (1), are:
1. Assisting in the impact of national strike action.
2. Assisting in natural disaster or non-natural disaster.
3. Assisting in communal conflict and its impacts.
4. Assisting people problems in isolated areas.
While in Article 62 (1)-(3) is stated that Indonesian Armed Forces participation in
assisting the local governmental duties is based on the request from the head of
the local government by using the pattern of military operation other that war
which the request is arranged by governmental regulations. This stipulation
opens the possibility for Indonesian Armed Forces to get the regional budget
(APBD) which violating Article 25 (1) Act No. 3 Year 2002 on State Defense where
strictly stated that state defense expenses is part of national budget (APBN)132.
Consequently, security reformation in which civil controls military budget will be
reversed to the starting point.
Furthermore, the implementation of local autonomy nowadays is very loose and
seems without any framework to regulate local government authority. The central
129 Kompas, “Legislasi: Dephan Perlu Buka Draf RUU Keamanan Nasional “, (13 January 2007).
130 Kompas, “RUU Kamnas Tidak Akan Dibahas Tahun Ini, Kusnanto Anggoro: Wajar Polri
Dibawah
Depdagri”, (4 January 2007).
131 Article 9(4) National Security Bill (18 January 2007 draft): Determination of national security condition from
the state of civil order, state of civil emergency order, state of military emergency order or state of war is based on
the legislation regulation on state of emergency. Explanation of Article 9(4) National Security Bill (18 January
2007 draft): What is meant by the legislation regulations is Act No. 23/Prp/1959 on State of Emergency.
132 Team Imparsial, Pembiayaan Pertahanan Melalui APBD, (Jakarta: Imparsial, 2007).
200
government seems lack of supervision, although the Ministry of domestic affair
and Local Government Association agreed to 10 principals of Good Governance
(Participation, Transparency, Accountability, Capacity, Equality, Law
Enforcement, Controls, Future Conception, Professionalism, Efficiency and
Effectiveness). In the stage of autonomy implementation, there is no sufficient
supervision from the central government. It gives the authority for local
government to interpret problems which should be included in the sphere of
authority in national level.133
It will be necessary for DPR, as the creator of the Act, to reconsidering the draft of
bill on National Security since there are some complex problems will arise if it is
enacted as legislation. If it’s necessary, The parliament will take over the
discussion on the bill by using its legislative right in making its own draft.
Interpretation and the spirit of the draft on National Security Bill is away from the
constitution spirit that stated that the state protecting the whole nation and
country, creating public welfare, educating the nation and participating in world
piece.
Conclusion
Based on the explanations of all legislations and all legislation drafts which
regulate security sector during 2000-2007, we can conclude that; First, security
sector still have some problems considering some of its substances in
contradiction to the main objectives of the reform in creating the good
governance in security sector and creating the peace and order so that support
the state’s goal to create a welfare and prosperous people.
Second, the legislation reform in security sector hasn’t parallel with the
protection and guarantee to human rights that has been included in the second
Amendment of 1945 Constitution. Also in democratic values, considering there
are some things that can harm human rights, human security and also in running
democratic governance.
Third, the security sector reform was not in orderly manner and well-planned. In
other words, it’s under-developed in ability of creating the policy, arranging the
defense and security planning which is stated in grand design of security sector. It
caused the reform of security legislation become blurred and dissimilar with the
Prolegnas (National Legislation Program). There are draft of bills which are not
discussed or become the focus of the parliament becomes an evidence that the
security sector development through legislation is partial.
133 Team
Imparsial, Pembiayaan Pertahanan…, Op.Cit, page. 20.
201
Contributors
Anak Agung Banyu Perwita PhD, Vice Rector of Relations and Cooperation at
Parahyangan University, Bandung and senior lecturer at Department of
International Relations of FISIP UNPAR. Previously, he was Dean of Social and
Political Science Faculty at UNPAR. He took graduate degree in Britain and
PostGraduate degree in Australia. He wrote many article on international
relations and SSR in national papers and journals as well as international
journals. He was the editor of a book “Mencari Format Komprehensif Sistem
Pertahanan dan Keamanan Negara”, published by Propatria Institute.
Agus Widjojo, is retired Lieutenant General TNI, a former TNI Territorial Head of
Staff, a former Deputy Chairman of People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR RI),
now he is active as a Senior Fellow in CSIS, a member of Indonesian Truth and
Friendship Commission – Timor Leste (KKP), and also become a member of
Lemhanas Steering Boards and also the Deputy I of UKP3R. In the early of reform
era, He was one of the reform minded military officers that push for TNI’s internal
reform. After retirement, He still become a speaker in many forum and wrote
articles on TNI reform.
Ahmad Taufik, he studied at UNISBA, Bandung. He worked as Tempo journalist
for Bandung bureau before moving to Jakarta. Now, He is Senior Reporter of
Tempo weekly magazine. He also founder and member of Independent Journalist
Association (AJI).
Al Araf, Research Coordinator of Imparsial, Jakarta. He obtained his
undergraduate (S1) in Faculty of Law, University of Brawijaya Malang and
currently taking a Magistrate Study at Security and Defense Management in
Bandung Institute of Technology. He writes some books, namely 1) Perebutan
Kuasa Tanah, published by Lappera Yogyakarta, 2002, 2)With Poengky Indarti
and Ali Syafaat, Perlindungan terhadap Pembela HAM, Imparsial 2005, 3) With
Rusdi Marpaung, Gufron Mabruri and Ahmad Junaidi, Menuju TNI Profesional
(Tidak Berbisnis dan Tidak Berpolitik), Imparsial, 2005, 4) Dinamika RSK,
Imparsial, 2005 as one of writers and editor. He also writes article in Mass Media,
inter alia Kompas, the Jakarta Post, Jawa Post, etc.
Aleksius Jemadu, Ph.D, born in October 12, 1961, in Ruteng, Manggarai, NTT.
He hold a number of positions such as Head of International Relations
Department at Parahyangan Catholic University (UNPAR), Bandung and also
Head of Program for Social Science Graduate school at the same university. He
earned his undergraduate International Relations at FISIPOL UGM, Jogjakarta.
He earned his master degree at University of Indonesia (UI) and post-graduate
(PhD) at KUL, Leuven, Belgia. He writes many articles and essays in national and
international journals and book. He is member of working Group on intelligence
facilitated by Pacivis UI.
Bhatara Ibnu Reza, is a Researcher at IMPARSIAL the Indonesian Human
Rights Monitor, Jakarta, since November 2002. In 2007, he became a Human
Rights Research Coordinator in the same institution. He is also a visiting lecturer
202
at the Department of International Relations, University of Al Azhar Indonesia,
Jakarta and the Department of International Relations, University of Pelita
Harapan, Tangerang. In 2005, Bhatara Ibnu Reza is granted a Fulbright
Scholarship for Master of Law (LL.M) degree program at Northwestern University
School of Law, Chicago, US, with concentration in International Human Rights
Law. He graduated with Honors in 2006. In 2002, He received his Master degree
in International Relations from FISIP, at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta. His
interests, among other, is Human Rights, Public International Law, International
Criminal Law, International Relations and SSR.
Beni Sukadis, the Program Coordinator at LESPERSSI (Institute of Defense and
Strategic Studies), Jakarta. He has participated in training course on civil military
relations in The Clingendael Institute, The Hague (Netherlands) and also in short
training course on Defense Resource Management in Jakarta held by Naval Post
Graduate School (USA). He co-edited two previous books on TNI bussines and on
borders management.
Eric Hendra, a Senior Researcher at Indonesia Institute for Defense and
Strategic Studies (LESPERSSI). He received his Bachelor of Political Science
degree at Parahyangan University. In 1996 he received a Master's degree (MA) in
International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.
He involved in some of UN projects in Indonesia, such as with UNOCHA in “Timor
Crisis Project”, EU-UNDP “Electoral and Parliamentary Support Projects besides
many projects with international organizations such as with The British Council
Indonesia as a manager for Conflict and Peace Project. His research interests
include institutional politics, security sector reform, international security,
democracy, and civil-military relations. He is also a lecturer at Universitas
Pembangunan Nasional “Veteran”, Pusbabimkar, Jakarta.
Eko Maryadi (Item), Born in Ajibarang march 8, 1968. He studied in Literature
Faculty at Universitas Padjadjaran (UNPAD), Bandung. He work as a freelance
journalist for international mass media. He used to work for The Washington Post
(USA) and ABC Television (Australia). Eko is member of Independent Journalist
Association (AJI). He is the Advocacy Coordinator in AJI.
Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro, Senior Researcher at Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), lecturer at Graduate Program of International
Relations, FISIP, University of Indonesia. He is frequently invited as guest
speaker at various military school and college such as SESKO-TNI (Bandung),
SESKOAU (Lembang), and SESKOAL (Jakarta). Dr. Kusnanto active as
sourceperson/speaker in various seminars and also give input for Indonesian
Department of Defense and the Indonesian parliament on defense and security,
he is also a member of Working Group on TNI bill (2002), TNI bill (2003), dan
Indonesia’s Defense White Book (2003). Kusnanto completed his doctorate (S3)
in Kremlinologi dan Russian politics at Institute of Russian and East European
Studies, University of Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom. His main interest are
security studies, strategic studies, and defense reform.
Muradi, Researcher and Program Director for the RIDEP Institute, Jakarta,
Lecturer of Civil Administration Department, FISIP UNPAD and International
203
Relation Department, FISIP Pasundan University (UNPAS) of Bandung. He is a
lecturer at International Relation Department of Paramadina University and
International Relation Department FISIP Al Azhar Indonesia University (UAI) of
Jakarta. He obtained undergraduate degree from History Science Dept, UNPAD in
2000 and master degree of Politics Science of University of Indonesia in 2003. He
has an interest in military and police studies, his book related to security sector
reform published by UNPAD Press (2005), “Berpijak di Atas Bara:Kegamangan
Politik TNI pada Masa Transisi”, and paper on “Pemerintah Daerah, Bisnis Militer
dan Profesionalisme TNI” dalam Jaleswari Pramodhawardani dan Andi Widjajanto
(ed) Bisnis Serdadu: Ekonomi Bayangan (TII, 2007). He actively writes on police
and military issues in various journals, magazines and newspapers in Indonesia.
Mufti Makarim A, Born in Pasuruan in October 4, 1976. Now, He is the Executive
Director of IDSPS, Jakarta. His undergraduate degree on Islamic law. Since 2000
has become staff an NGO’s called Commission of the Missing Person and Victim of
Violences (Kontras). He involved in various research on SSR and Human rights,
among others, Book on Military Business (2004), Analisis of Implementation Anti
Terorism Act (2005), and The TNI’s Reform Post US embargo (2006).
S. Yunanto, currently enrolled as PhD student at Department of Political Science,
Western Michigan University, USA. M.Si holder from Graduate School of Political
Science, University of Indonesia. He has been participated in International
Training on preventing Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. such as In the Eastern
Mennonite University USA (2001), Khon Kaen University Thailand (2001), Upsalla
University, Sweden (2005). He used to be the Executive Director of Institute for
Defense, Security and Peace Studies (IDSPS) and also Lecturer at Department of
Political Science University of Indonesia. Before, he served as Executive Director
of The RIDEP.
Rizal Darma Putra, the Executive Director of LESPERSSI, Jakarta. He graduated
for master degree in International Relations at the University of Indonesia. He has
contributed as speakers in various seminars and discussions on SSR. He also
contribute a paper for upcoming UNDP book on the state of emergency.
Rico Marbun, a Researcher at LESPERSSI. He obtained his master degree in
strategic studies from IDSS, Nanyang University, Singapore. He now also a
lecturer in PTIK, Jakarta. He used to be student leader when he was studying at
the University of Indonesia. He has conducted various research on security and
police reform.
Hilman Rosyad Shihab, a member of Commission I of DPR-RI from PKS Faction.
204
ANNEX :
Abbreviations used in Indonesian Security Sector
ABRI = Indonesian Armed Forces
ALKI = Indonesian Sea Lines of Communication
AD = Army
AL = Navy
AU = Air Force
AMN = National Military Academy
Akabri = Indonesian Armed Forces Academy
AAU = Air Force Academy
AAL = Naval Academy
AKPOL = Police Academy
Alutsista = Armament/Weaponry system
Asops = Assistant Operation
Asintel = Assistant Intelligence
Asrena = Assistant Planning
Aster = Assistent Territorial
Aslog = Assistent Logistic
Aspers = Assistent Personnel
Armabar = West Region Fleet
Armatim = East Region Fleet
Armed = Field Artillery
AT = Anti-Terror
Art = Artilerry
BIN = State Intelligence Agency
BIA = ABRI Intelligence Agency
BAIS = Strategic Intelligence Agency
Babinsa = Non-Commissioned village army
Bareskrim = Detective and Criminal Board
Brimob = Mobile Brigade
Balahanpus = Central Defense Troops
Balahanwil = Regional Defense Troops
Bin = Development
BS = Self-supporting (a term for a separated military unit)
Datin = Data and infromation
Dephan = the Ministry of Defense
DPR RI = Indonesian Legislative Assembly
Dan = Commander
Danrem = Resort Military Command Commander
Dandim = District Military Command Commander
Danramil = Ward level Military Command Commander
Darmil = Military Emergency
Dirops = Operational Director
Dirbin= Development Director
Densus = Special Detachment 88 (Indonesian Police)
Denma = Headquarters Detachment
Den 81 = Detachment 81 Anti-Terror (Army)
Denjaka = Detachment Jalamangkara (Navy)
205
Denbravo = Detachment Bravo (Air Force)
Dirjen = Directorate General
Gultor = Anti Terror
GARSTAP = Permanent Garrison
Han = Defense
Hanneg = State Defense
INF = Infantry
TNI = Indonesian National Army
Jakum = General Policy
JCLEC = Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation
KSAD = Army Chief of Staff
KSAL = Navy Chief of Staff
KSAU = Air Force Chief of Staff
Kastaf = Chief of Staff
Kasum = General Chief of Staff
Kapolsek = Sector Police Chief
Kopassus = Special Forces Command
Kostrad = Strategic Reserve Command (Army)
Kopaskhas = Special Troops Command (Air Force)
Kopaska = Frog Troops Command (Navy)
Kodam = Regional Military Command
Korem = Resort Military Command
Kodim = District Military Command
Koramil = Ward level Military Command
Koter = territorial command
Kohanudnas = National Air Defense Command
Kormar = Marine Corps
Pangti = Highest Commander
Pangdam = Regional Military Command Commander
Kapolri = Indonesian Police Chief
Koops = Operation Command
Jianstra = strategic studies
Mabes TNI = Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters
Mabes Polri = Indonesian Police Headquarters
Kuathan = Defense Force
Kamnas = National Security
KMIP = Freedom to Obtain Public Information
Kotama = Key Command
Komcad = reserve component
Kamdagri = domestic security
Kamtibmas = public security and order
Kominda = regional intelligence community
Kowil = Sub-regional Command
Kodahan = defense area command
Kowilhan = defense subregional command
Kum = Laws
Kasubdit = sub-directorate chief
Komlek = communication and electronic
KRI = Indonesian Boat
Kal = Supplies
206
Kes = health
Lanud = Air Base
Lanal = Naval Base
Lemdik = Education Institution
Polda = Regional Police
Polwil = Sub-regional Police
Polres = Resort Police
Polresta = City Resort Police
Polsek = police precinct
Pospol = Police Post
Pothan = Defense Potential
Polkam = Security Politic
Propam = profession and security
PTIK = Police Science College
Platina = National Anti-terror Training
Pusdik = Education Center
Pers = personnel
PM = Military Police
Strahan = Defense Strategy
Ranahan = Defense Facility
Renhan = Defense Planning
Renstra = Strategic Planning
RSK = Security Sectorn Reformation
Sekjen = Secretary General
NKRI = Unitary State of Indonesia
NCB Interpol = National Country Bureau International Police
RUU = Bill
UU = Act
RN = Government Secret
RI = Republic of Indonesia
Otda = Regional Autonomy
OMS = civil society organization
Otmil = Military Prosecuting Attorney
Opslihkam = security recovery operation
LSM = non-governmental organization
SDR = Strategic Defense Review
Linmas = Society protection
Lemhannas = National Resilience Institute
HAM = Human Rights
Bekang = supplies and transportation
Ops = Operation
Rengar = Planning and Budgeting
Log = logistic
Kaur = affairs chief
Kadis = service chief
Renstra = Strategic Planning
Polri = Indonesian Police
Polmas = community policing
Puspen = Information center
Permil = Military Court
207
Pussenif = Infantry Armament Center
SOPS = Operation Staff
Sintel = Intelligence Staff
Spers = Personnel staff
Setum = General Secretariat
SESKO TNI = Indonesian National Army Staff and Command School
SESKO AD = Ground Force Staff and Command School
SESKO AL = Air Force Staff and Command School
SESKO AU = Air Force Staff and Command School
Sespim Polri = Indonesian Police Staff and Leader School
Sespati = Upper Level Administration Staff and Leader School (Indonesian Police)
SPN = State Police School
Secapa = School for cadets
Secaba = School for non-commissioned officer
Satker = Working Unit
Sus = Special
Tontaipur = Combat Spy Platoon
Vet = veteran
Wanjakti = Senior Position and Ranking Board
YONIF = Infantry Battalion
YONKAV = Cavalry Battalion
208
AH
AK SIKAP
PIJ
BI
J
A
K
AR
Institution Profile
LESPERSSI
Indonesia Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies (LESPERSSI) was
established in 1996 as a discussion forum that analyze several issues at that time, such as,
horizontal and vertical conflict, democratization, civil-military relations, and other strategic issues
on regional or international level.
For years, LESPERSSI has positioned as a non-governmental organization (NGO) in
Indonesia that focused on activities regarding the defense, security, and other strategic issues.
There are a few activities that conducted by LESPERSSI such as research, training, conference,
workshop and also producing publications to support and to enhance public accountability, good
governance, democratic oversight, and democracy.
LESPERSSI
Jl. Petogogan I, No.30, Blok A, Gandaria Utara
South Jakarta 12140
Indonesia
Tel
: +62-21 7252725
Fax
: +62-21 7262305
E mail
: [email protected]
Web site : www.lesperssi.or.id
Institution Profile
DCAF
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) was
established by the Swiss government in October 2000. The Centre's mission is to
promote good governance and reform of the security sector in accordance with
democratic standards.
The Centre conducts research on good practices, encourages the development of
appropriate norms at the national and international levels, makes policy
recommendations and provides in-country advice and assistance programmes. DCAF's
partners include governments, parliaments, civil society, international organisations and
the range of security sector actors such as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border
security services and the military. The Centre works with governments and civil society to
foster and strengthen the democratic and civilian control of security sector organisations.
DCAF is an international foundation with 48 Member States (including the canton
of Geneva). Their representatives compose the Foundation Council. The Centre's primary
consultative body, the International Advisory Board, is composed of experts from the
various fields in which the Centre is active. The staff numbers over 70 employees from
more than 30 countries. DCAF's main divisions are Research and Operations which work
together to develop and implement DCAF's programmes as follows:


By conducting research to identify the central challenges in democratic
governance of the security sector, and to collect those practices best suited to
meet these challenges
By providing support through advisory programmes and practical work assistance
to all interested parties, most commonly to governments, parliaments, military
authorities, and international organisations
The Centre is directed by Ambassador Dr. Theodor H. Winkler. DCAF's head office is
located in Geneva, Switzerland and the Centre also has a subsidiary office in Brussels.
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
Rue de Chantepoulet 11, P.O.Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva I, Switzerland.
Tel
: +41 (22) 741 77 00
Fax
: +41 (22) 741 77 05
E mail
: [email protected]
Web site : www.dcaf.ch

ISI 1 - Lembaga Studi Pertahanan dan Studi Strategis Indonesia

Transcription

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