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SoPhA - 2012
6ème congrès
Paris, 4, 5, 6 mai 2012
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SoPhA - 2012
Bienvenue
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SoPhA - 2012
Bienvenue au 6ème congrès de la Société de philosophie
analytique à Paris !
La philosophie analytique se porte bien. Dans beaucoup de pays, les méthodes de notre tradition
se sont imposées à l’ensemble de la communauté philosophique, et les critères de sélection des
meilleures revues internationales de philosophie sont celles de la tradition analytique. Ce qui fait
l’unité de cette tradition, ce n’est ni un champ thématique particulier ni une base doctrinale
commune. Faire de la philosophie analytique, c’est considérer que l’argumentation est l’essentiel
de la philosophie. Ce qui importe avant tout, c’est d’être clair et explicite : exposer explicitement
et clairement les prémisses dont on part, la conclusion à laquelle on arrive, et surtout la structure
logique de l’argumentation qui mène des premières à la seconde. Il est souvent - quoique non
nécessairement - utile d’améliorer la clarification de la structure argumentative par des outils
de logique formelle. La philosophie analytique cherche à répondre correctement aux questions et
problèmes philosophiques, et plus généralement à découvrir la vérité. Voilà les convictions que
tous les philosophes analytiques partagent. Lisant ces lignes, le lecteur sera peut-être tenté de
se demander si une conception si large ne transforme pas toute bonne philosophie en philosophie analytique. Et en un sens, il me semble tout à fait légitime de considérer que Descartes
était un philosophe analytique au sens où son travail est conforme aux principes énoncés plus
haut. En revanche, la poursuite de ces objectifs est par exemple incompatible avec la conception
« thérapeutique » de la philosophie selon laquelle il s’agirait de faire disparaître les questions et
les problèmes plutôt que d’y répondre. Par ailleurs, la philosophie analytique, telle qu’elle existe
aujourd’hui et telle qu’elle s’exprime dans des revues comme Dialectica, Dialogue, Mind, Analysis
ou Erkenntnis, est aussi unifiée par une tradition commune qui prend ses origines dans les travaux
de Frege, Russell et le cercle de Vienne. Il n’est pas nécessaire de trancher si la référence à cette
tradition est indispensable.
Ce qui est surprenant, c’est qu’il subsiste, en tout cas en France, deux malentendus. Beaucoup de
philosophes français se font une idée de la philosophie analytique qui est soit trop large soit trop
étroite : pour les premiers, on peut être analytique sans exposer clairement ses prémisses ou sa
conclusion ou surtout la structure logique de son argumentation. Il suffirait de faire partie d’une
tradition qui remonte à Frege, Russell ou le cercle de Vienne. Pour les seconds, la philosophie
analytique est définie par la thèse selon laquelle la seule méthode philosophique est l’analyse du
langage, soit à la manière du cercle de Vienne soit surtout à la manière de l’analyse du langage
ordinaire dans la tradition wittgensteinienne.
Les exposés qui seront présentés lors de ce congrès montrent qu’il s’agit là d’une méprise : toute
argumentation ne passe pas nécessairement par l’analyse du langage, et aucune des présentations
que vous écouterez ne fait de compromis à l’égard de l’exposition claire et explicite de ses prémisses et de la structure logique de son argumentation, ni à l’effort de rechercher la vérité.
Je vous souhaite un excellent congrès.
Max Kistler
Professeur à l’université Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne
Président de la SoPhA
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SoPhA - 2012
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Sommaire
Le mot du président . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sommaire
Revues
The Review of Philosophy
Appel à contribution
Igitur . . . . . . . . . . .
REPHA . . . . . . . . . .
Dialectica . . . . . . . . .
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and Psychology
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Programme - Horaire
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Vendredi 4 mai 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Samedi 5 mai 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Dimanche 6 mai 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Conférences plénières
Anouk Barberousse : Computer simulations and empirical data . . . . . . .
Allan Gibbard : Meaning as a Normative Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Katherine Hawley : Trust and Distrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Christian List : Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise
François Recanati : Communication référentielle et fichiers mentaux . . . .
Galen Strawson : Real naturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Symposia
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Metaphysics and Science
Helen Beebee - Stathis Psillos - Anna-Sofia Maurin - Claudine Tiercelin .
Epistemic Democracy, Self-Interest, and the Common Good
Enrico Biale - Charles Girard - José Luis Marti - Christian Rostbøll . .
Higher-Order Attitudes : Knowledge, Beliefs and Social Interaction
Paul Egré - David Spector - Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic - Olivier Roy .
Symétrie, structure et réalisme
Elena Castellani - Michael Esfeld - Alexandre Guay . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quantum Mechanics Faces the Location Problem
Jean-Pierre Llored - Michel Bitbol - Anna Garrouty-Ciaunica . . . . . .
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SoPhA - 2012
La dimension volontaire des croyances collectives
Olivier Ouzilou - Alban Bouvier - Raphaël Künstler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
L’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées
Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - Andrew Reisner - Krister Bykvist Christine Tappolet - Mauro Rossi - Stéphane Lemaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Résumés
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A - F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
G - N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
O - Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Informations pratiques
HOTELS . . . . . . .
RESTAURANTS . . .
PLANS . . . . . . . .
Numéros utiles . . . .
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Revues
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Editor-in-Chief : Paul Egré
Executive Editors : R. Casati ; C. Heintz ;
D. Taraborelli ; F. de Vignemont
ISSN : 1878-5158 (print version)
ISSN : 1878-5166 (electronic version)
Journal no. 13164
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology is a quarterly journal published by Springer and hosted
by Institut Jean-Nicod. The journal was launched in 2010, with Dario Taraborelli as Editor-inChief, and R. Casati, P. Egré, C. Heintz as executive editors. F. de Vignemont is joining the
board in 2012 !
The journal provides a forum for discussion on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists, and fosters interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences
of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
The Review publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as empirical articles
on issues of philosophical relevance. It also publishes themed issues featuring invited contributions
from leading authors, together with submitted articles.
Regular submissions are encouraged to RPP, as well as thematic proposals by prospective guest
editors. Guidelines for submissions and detailed calls for papers can be found at :
http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/13164
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SoPhA - 2012
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Recent and forthcoming issues include :
RPP 2 :2 : Joint Action : What is Shared, Butterfill, S. & Sebanz, N. (Eds.)
RPP 2 :3 : Social Cognition : Mindreading and Alternatives, Hutto, D., Herschbach, M. & Southgate, V. (Eds.)
RPP 2 :5 : The Body Represented / Embodied Representation, Alsmith, A. & Vignemont, F. (Eds)
Recent and current calls for papers :
Consciousness attributions in Moral Cognition
Guest Editors : Mark Phelan and Adam Waytz (Deadline March 31, 2012)
Distributed cognition and memory research : How do distributed memory systems work ?
Guest editors : Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton (Deadline June 15, 2012)
Distributed cognition and memory research : How do distributed memory systems
work ?
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Guest editors : Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton
Call for Papers
Deadline for submissions : July 15, 2012
According to the extended mind hypothesis in philosophy of cognitive science and the related
distributed cognition hypothesis in cognitive anthropology, remembering does not always occur
entirely inside the brain, but can also be distributed across heterogeneous systems combining
neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. Much of the critical debate on these ideas in
philosophy has so far remained at some distance from relevant empirical studies. But claims about
extended mind and distributed cognition, if they are to deserve wider acceptance, must both make
sense of and, in turn, inform work in the cognitive and social sciences. Is the notion of extended
or distributed remembering consistent with the findings of empirical memory research ? Can such
a view of memory usefully inform empirical work, suggesting further areas of productive enquiry
or helping to make sense of existing findings ?
This special issue will bring together supporters and critics of extended and distributed cognition, to consider memory as a test case for evaluating and further developing these hypotheses.
Submitted papers should thus address both memory and distributed cognition/ extended mind :
ideally, papers should aim simultaneously to make contributions to relevant debates in both philosophy and psychology or other relevant empirical fields. While primarily theoretical papers are
welcome, they should make direct contact with empirical findings. Similarly, while empiricallyoriented papers might draw on evidence from a range of areas, including the cognitive psychology
of transactive memory and collaborative recall, cognitive anthropology and cognitive ethnography,
science studies and the philosophy of science, the history of memory practices, and the cognitive
archaeology of material culture, they should seek to advance the theoretical debate over extended
mind and distributed cognition, rather than simply presenting findings from these fields.
Potential topics include (but are not limited to) :
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SoPhA - 2012
• Relations between biological memory and external memory
How do forms of representation and storage in neural and external memory differ, and why do
such differences matter ? Can theories of distributed cognition deal with the existence of multiple
memory systems ? For example, does the expert deployment of exograms in certain external
symbol systems affect working memory ? How might the development and operation of distributed
memory systems affect neural memory processes ? Is evidence for neuroplasticity relevant for
assessing claims about distributed remembering ? Given plausible links between memory and self,
what might distributed memory systems imply about identity and agency ? What happens when
distributed memory systems fail or break down ?
• How do distributed memory systems work ?
What is socially distributed remembering, and does it offer any support to revived ideas about
group cognition, or to a naturalized understanding of collective memory ? Can theories of extended or distributed cognition encompass socially distributed remembering in addition to artifacts
and other forms of memory scaffolding ? What are the implications of experimental studies of
collaborative recall and transactive memory for theories of distributed cognition ? How do such
theories deal with memory practices and rituals, and with the roles of the non-symbolic material
environment ?
• Distributed memory and embodied cognition
How central in theories of extended or distributed memory should be the study of skill acquisition
and of expertise in the deployment of external resources ? What accounts of embodied skills,
procedural memory, and smooth or absorbed coping are required to support such theories ? How do
distributed memory systems work in specific contexts of embodied interaction, from conversation
to music, dance, performance, and sport ?
Guest authors
The issue will include invited articles authored by :
• Robert Rupert, University of Colorado (Boulder)
• Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis, and Rick Dale, University of California (Merced)
• Mike Wheeler, University of Stirling
Important dates
Submission deadline : July 15, 2012
Target publication date : December 15, 2012
How to submit
Prospective authors should register at : www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and
select Distributed cognition and memory research as an article type. Manuscripts should be
approximately 6,000 words. Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the
journal’s website.
About the journal
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN : 1878-5158 ; eISSN : 1878-5166) is a peerreviewed journal published quarterly by Springer and focusing on philosophical and foundational
issues in cognitive science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics
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Revues
SoPhA - 2012
of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster interdisciplinary research at
the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and
social sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical research as well as
empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited
contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
Contact
For any queries, please email the guest editors : [email protected], [email protected]
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Revues
SoPhA - 2012
Igitur
Igitur
Igitur est une revue philosophique à comité de
lecture, en ligne et d’accès libre. Son objectif est
de promouvoir, dans l’espace francophone, l’argumentation et la discussion dans les grands domaines de la philosophie : métaphysique, philosophie du langage et de la logique, philosophie de la connaissance, philosophie de l’esprit,
philosophie des sciences, philosophie morale et
politique, philosophie du droit, philosophie des
sciences humaines, esthétique, philosophie de la
religion. L’histoire de la philosophie y trouve sa
place, dans la mesure où l’argumentation des auteurs étudiés est prise pour objet.
Les articles soumis sont sélectionnés à l’issue d’une double lecture anonyme sur la base des critères
suivants : argumentation, clarté, précision et originalité de la contribution.
Igitur est éditée par les universités de Nantes (Centre Atlantique de Philosophie - EA2163) et
Rennes I (Philosophie des normes - EA1270).
http://www.igitur.org/
Igitur is a free-access online philosophical journal with a reading committee. Its aim is to promote,
within the French-speaking world, argumentation and discussion in the main fields of philosophy :
metaphysics, philosophy of language and logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of
science, moral and political philosophy, philosophy of law, philosophy of social science, aesthetics,
philosophy of religion. Articles on history of philosophy are also accepted if they focus on the
argumentation of the author(s) studied.
Articles are accepted after a double-blind refereeing based on the following criteria : they should
be well-argumented, clear, precise and original in content.
Igitur is published by the Universities of Nantes (Centre Atlantique de Philosophie - EA2163)
and Rennes I (Philosophie des normes - EA1270).
http://www.igitur.org/
Comité scientifique
Vincent Descombes (EHESS - Paris)
Pascal Engel (Université de Genève)
Paul Gochet (Université de Liège)
Claude Panaccio (UQAM - Montréal)
Philip Pettit (Princeton University)
François Recanati (CNRS - Paris)
Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin)
Comité éditorial
Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim (Université de Rennes I) - Directeur adjoint de la publication
Bruno Gnassounou (Université de Nantes)
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SoPhA - 2012
Pierre Joray (Université de Rennes I)
Stéphane Lemaire (Université de Rennes I)
Pascal Ludwig (Université de Paris-Sorbonne)
Cyrille Michon (Université de Nantes) - Directeur de la publication
Sébastien Motta (Université de Nantes) - Administrateur du site
François Schmitz (Université de Nantes)
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Igitur
Revues
SoPhA - 2012
REPHA
RÉPHA - Revue Étudiante de Philosophie Analytique
RÉPHA (Revue Étudiante de Philosophie Analytique) est une revue semestrielle qui, tout en
respectant les standards académiques (le principe de sélection « double aveugle », des rapporteurs compétents. . .) publie des articles concis
et rigoureux, traitant de problématiques pertinentes dans les débats (analytiques) contemporains.
L’accent est donc mis sur l’aspect argumentatif et clair des articles et sur la pertinence du
sujet dans l’actualité philosophique. Les auteurs
sont principalement des étudiants avancés ou de
jeunes chercheurs à qui RÉPHA offre l’occasion
de publier leurs premiers articles académiques.
L’ambition de la revue est de diffuser la culture
analytique en langue française, en sollicitant les
jeunes chercheurs, tout en promouvant des critères élevés de scientificité.
Chaque numéro contient un article écrit par un philosophe professionnel, ainsi que 2 à 5 articles
originaux écrits par des philosophes ‘juniors’ (mastériens, doctorants, post-doctorants). Depuis
le numéro 4, nous avons décidé d’inclure à la revue deux nouvelles rubriques : une traduction
d’un texte-clé de la philosophie analytique, précédée d’une introduction, ainsi qu’une recension.
Nous souhaitons encourager la recension des livres originaux de langue française, ainsi que des
traductions récentes d’ouvrages de référence.
Nous avons fait le choix d’une revue papier pour son caractère trivialement matériel qui vous
permettra de la placer dans votre bibliothèque entre Ramsey et Russell. Le premier numéro de
RÉPHA est sorti en septembre 2009 et a été lancé avec succès à Genève à l’occasion du congrès
de la SoPhA. A ce jour, 5 numéros ont été édités, à un rythme semestriel.
RÉPHA a pour objectif de favoriser la diffusion de la philosophie analytique francophone en
produisant un espace d’études mêlant des articles écrits par des étudiants et par des professionnels,
destinés aussi bien aux universitaires qu’aux amateurs éclairés.
La revue est aussi un laboratoire d’écriture, qui permet aux étudiants avancés, au seuil de futures
publications professionnelles, de produire leurs premiers articles et d’obtenir une première publication. Les étudiants contributeurs peuvent également parfaire leur pensée personnelle dans un
cadre stimulant.
Afin d’en assurer la rigueur, les articles sont évalués par un comité de lecture compétent. Ils
peuvent traiter des domaines suivants :
• philosophie du langage
• philosophie des sciences et de la connaissance
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Revues
SoPhA - 2012
REPHA
• philosophie de la logique
• philosophie de l’esprit et sciences cognitives
• métaphysique
• esthétique
• philosophie morale
• ou autre dans l’esprit de notre présentation ainsi faite
En outre, ils doivent être introductifs, clairs, concis et pertinents. Nous souhaiterions particulièrement qu’ils traitent de l’actualité relative à chaque domaine. Deux formules sont acceptées pour
les articles originaux :
(i) d’une part, selon le format préférentiel de la revue, des articles ‘courts’, compris entre 10000 et
16000 signes (espaces compris), soit environ 5-7 pages dans une configuration A4 classique (police
12, interligne 1,5) ;
(ii) d’autre part, des articles ‘longs’, compris entre 16000 et 24000 signes. Un ou deux articles
longs pourront être publiés par numéro, selon la qualité des soumissions.
Conformément aux différentes rubriques présentes dans la revue, n’hésitez pas, en plus des articles inédits, à nous envoyer vos recensions (16000 signes) ainsi que vos traductions d’articles
courts.
Nous acceptons les formats suivants : .doc, .rtf, ou .odt. Nous attirons votre attention sur le fait
que les fichiers reçus au format .pdf ne sont pas acceptés. Les articles doivent permettre une
présentation anonyme au comité de lecture.
Contactez-nous pour de plus amples informations : [email protected]
Toutes ces informations peuvent être retrouvées sur le site de la revue : http://www.repha.
fr
Soutiens académiques
Daniel Andler (Université Paris-Sorbonne)
Pascal Engel (Université de Genève)
Jean Gayon (Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne, IHPST)
Max Kistler (Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne)
Pascal Ludwig (Université Paris-Sorbonne)
Mélika Ouelbani (Université Paris-Sorbonne/Tunis)
Bureau de l’association
Marie Robert (Présidente)
Arturs Logins (Vice-Président)
Nicolas Liabeuf (Trésorier)
Emile Thalabard (Secrétaire)
Comité de lecture
Bruno Ambroise, Adrien Barton, Laure Blanc-Benon, Jiri Benovsky, Denis Bonnay, Felipe Carvalho, Christine Clavien, Fabrice Correia, Santiago Echeverri, Luc Faucher, Charles Girard, Jean8
Revues
SoPhA - 2012
REPHA
Baptiste Joinet, Laurence Kaufmann, Xavier Kieft, Stéphane Lemaire, Stéphane Leyens, Flavio
Marelli, Alberto Masala, Anne Meylan, Jean-Maurice Monnoyer, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Ruwen Ogien, Fabrice Pataut, Jérôme Ravat, Sébastien Richard, Xavier Sabatier, Christian Sachse,
Yann Schmitt, Daniela Tagliafico, Fabrice Teroni, Hugo Viciana, et d’autres.
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Revues
SoPhA - 2012
Dialectica
Dialectica
Dialectica publishes first-rate articles and discussion notes predominantly in theoretical and systematic philosophy. It is edited in Switzerland and has a focus on analytical philosophy undertaken
on the continent, being the official organ of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy. This
means that while dialectica publishes articles from all over the world, selected by a rigorous tripleblind refereeing process, it particularly encourages the best analytic philosophers working on the
European Continent to submit their best work.
Dialectica was founded in 1947 by Gaston Bachelard, Paul Bernays and Ferdinand Gonseth as a
journal of philosophy in order to promote dialogue between philosophy and the sciences. Among
the authors publishing in dialectica during its early years were Ayer, Bohr, Carnap, Dieudonné,
Einstein, Gödel, Pauli, Popper, Piaget and Reichenbach. After dialectica had served as the organ of the “Association Gonseth” for several years, Henri Lauener, of the University of Berne,
Switzerland, became its editor in 1977 and remained so until 2001. While dialectica still published articles in epistemology and the philosophy of science, the number of articles dealing with
other branches of analytic philosophy increased. In 1996, dialectica became the official organ of
the European Society of Analytic Philosophy (ESAP). Among the authors who have published
in dialectica since 1977 are Barcan Marcus, Chisholm, Davidson, Føllesdal, Hintikka, McDowell,
Putnam, Quine, Rorty, Searle and Vuillemin.
In 2001, Gianfranco Soldati, of the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, became editor of dialectica. Under Soldati’s editorship, dialectica signed a publishing contract with Blackwell (now
Blackwell-Wiley) and established itself as the leading journal for analytic philosophy on the Continent. In 2005, Pascal Engel, professor of modern and contemporary philosophy at the University
of Geneva, took over. The number of submissions doubled again, now approximating 300 per year,
while we further reduced the acceptance rate to almost 7% and the median turnaround time to
under 2 months. Last year, Pascal Engel stepped down from his position as editor, to be replaced
by Marcel Weber, newly appointed as professor of the philosophy of science at the University of
Geneva.
Dialectica is ranked A on the European Research Index for the Humanities of the European
Science Foundation and is also ranked A in the Australian’s Research Council’s ERA for 2010.
Marc Lange, "A Tale of Two Vectors", dialectica 63 :4, 397-431 has been elected one of the ten
best papers of 2009 according by the Philosophers’ Annual.
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Programme - Horaire
Vendredi 4 mai 2012
Légende
Lieu, Horaire, Discipline
Symposium
Allocution
d’ouverture,
conférence
plénière
Contribution
dividuelle,
événement
inautre
Lieu
Ens, salle Dussane
9h00 - 9h15
Allocutions d’ouverture : P-Y Quiviger, directeur de l’UFR de philosophie, M.
Kistler, président de la SOPHA
9h15 - 10h30
Conférence plénière : Galen Strawson (Reading, invité à l’EHESS) : Real Naturalism, Prés. J.-B. Rauzy
10h30 - 11h00
Pause
11h00 - 12h15
Conférence plénière : François Récanati (CNRS-EHESS-IJN) : Communication
référentielle et fichiers mentaux Prés. J.-B. Rauzy
12h15 - 12h35
Présentation des revues : REPHA, Igitur, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
12h35 - 14h00
Déjeuner
11
Programme
Lieu
SoPhA - 2012
Vendredi 4 mai 2012
Collège de France, amphi Budé
Symposium
Metaphysics
Prés. C. Tiercelin, M. Kistler
and
science,
(Tiercelin,
Kistler)
14h00 - 14h50
Stathis Psillos (Athènes) :Regularities all the way down
14h50 - 15h40
Helen Beebee (Birmingham) :Dispositions as real essences
15h40 - 16h00
Pause
16h00 - 16h50
Anna-Sofia Maurin (Lund) :In Defense of Taxonomic Monism
16h50 - 17h40
Claudine Tiercelin (Collège de France, Paris) :In defense of metaphysical boldness
17h40 - 18h20
18h30 - 19h45
20h00
�
Conférence plénière Christian List (LSE), Panthéon, amphi 2B : « Free will,
determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise », Prés. P. Jacob
Dîner RU Mabillon : 3, rue Mabillon 75006 Paris
12
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Vendredi 4 mai 2012
Séances parallèles
Lieu
ENS, Beckett
ENS, Actes
ENS, Dussane
ENS, Info 1
ENS, Info 2
ENS, Info 5
Intitulé
Président
Philosophie
des sciences,
H. Zwirn
Philosophie
du
langage,
I. Stojanovic
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de
l’action,
M. Panza
Philosophie
politique, philosophie
du
droit, et philosophie sociale,
Ch. Girard
Histoire de la
philosophie
S. Hirèche
Philosophie
morale,
P. Ludwig
14h00-14h30
A. Marcellesi :
Invariance and
Explanatory
Depth
M.
McCullagh : Distributed assertion
Cozic & Bonnay : Consensus and higherorder information
F.-E Rollet :
L’agent et ses
excuses
en
droit pénal
D. Fisette :
Brentano et les
théories néobrentaniennes
de
la
conscience
V.
Aucouturier & B.
Gnassounou :
Les vertus et
les limites de
la doctrine du
double-effet
14h35-15h05
D. Portides :
Idealization
and Scientific
Models
E.
Glick
:
Know-How
and Linguistic
Analysis
P.
Egré
:
Unawareness,
uncertainty
and the knowledge of one’s
ignorance
A. Lever : Discrimination
and
Appearance : What
Does Equality
Require ?
S. Sanhueza :
The
Realist
and the Vulgar
E. Baierlé : Is
Our Phenomenology Libertarian ?
15h05-15h20
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
13
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Vendredi 4 mai 2012
Lieu
ENS, Beckett
ENS, Actes
ENS, Dussane
ENS, Info 1
ENS, Info 2
ENS, Info 5
Intitulé
Président
Philosophie
des sciences,
H. Zwirn
Philosophie
du
langage,
I. Stojanovic
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de
l’action,
M. Panza
Philosophie
du
Ch. Girard
Histoire de la
philosophie
D. Fisette
Philosophie
morale,
P. Ludwig
15h20-15h50
D. Blitman :
La
notion
d’innéité
est-elle scientifiquement
pertinente ?
R. Bluhm :
Linguistic
Corpora
in
Philosophical
Analyses
O. Roy : Normativity in Interaction
N.Tavaglione :
Séquestrer son
patron
A. Mihali :
Toward
a
Cartesian
Epistemic Rule
Consequentialism
A. Billon :
Happiness for
dummies
15h55-16h25
V.
IsraëlJost : Iterative
empiricism
and scientific
observation
D. Belleri &
M. Palmira :
The Accuracy
View of Disagreement
D. Spector :
On the foundation of the
margin for error principle
M. Ostinelli :
Libéralisme
politique
et
républicanisme
classique
sont-ils compatibles ?
M. Hertig :
Self-confidence
and
practical reason in
Aristotle
P. Szalek :
The Minimal
Theory
of
Goodness
16h25-16h40
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
14
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Vendredi 4 mai 2012
Lieu
ENS, Beckett
ENS, Actes
ENS, Dussane
ENS, Info 1
ENS, Info 2
ENS, Info 5
Intitulé
Président
Philosophie
des sciences,
H. Zwirn
Philosophie
du
langage,
I. Stojanovic
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de
l’action,
M. Panza
Philosophie
du
Ch. Girard
Histoire de la
philosophie
D. Fisette
Philosophie
morale,
P. Ludwig
16h40-17h10
Ch.
Malaterre : On
the
distinctness of causal
variables
J. Zakkou : Semantic Relativism for Metaontology
A.
Berninger
:
The
Ontology
of
Emotion and
Perception
B. Cassegrain :
Obligation politique et autorité
B. Goebel :
Was Anselm
really
an
immanent
realist ?
S. Berkovski :
Welfare, subjectivity, and
attitudes
17h15-17h45
J.
Cabaret : Disease
concepts
in
domesticated
animals
E. Clémençon :
La théorie causale
de
la
référence
et
l’épreuve de la
nomenclature
biologique
S.
Wilkinson : Dennett’s Personal/Subpersonal
Distinction in
the Light of
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
S.
Livio
:
Qu’est-ce
que le problème de la
non-identité ?
G. Fréchette :
Dispositional
higher-order
acts. A Brentanian account
�
15
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Samedi 5 mai 2012
Samedi 5 mai 2012
9h15 - 10h30
Conférence plénière (ENS, salle Dussane) Anouk Barberousse (Lille) : « Données empiriques et simulations numériques », Prés. J. Gayon
10h30 - 11h00
Pause
Lieu
ENS, Dussane
Symposium : L’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées (Tappolet, Lemaire), Prés. Ph. Mongin
11h00 - 11h45
J. Deonna (Genève) & F. Teroni (Bern) : From Justified Emotions to Justified
Evaluative Judgements
11h45 - 12h30
A. Reisner (McGill) : Why the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value is Morally
and Metaphysically Implausible
12h30 - 14h00
Déjeuner
14h00 - 14h45
K. Bykvist (Oxford) :’They smiled at the good and frowned at the bad.’
14h45 - 15h30
Ch. Tappolet (Montréal) : Comment ajuster les attitudes et les valeurs
15h30 - 16h00
Pause
16h00 - 16h45
M. Rossi (Montréal) : A fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value
16h45 - 17h 30
S. Lemaire (Rennes) : Pour une approche pratique de l’analyse des valeurs en
termes d’attitudes appropriées
18h00 - 19h15
Conférence plénière : Katherine Hawley (St Andrews), ENS, Dussane. « Trust
and Distrust », Prés. D. Andler
19h30 - 20h00
Assemblée Générale de la SOPHA : ENS, Dussance
16
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Samedi 5 mai 2012
Séances Parallèles
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Intitulé
Président
Be-
ENS,
Théâtre
ENS, Info 1
ENS, Info 2
Info 5
ENS,Rataud
ENS, Résistants
Métaphysique, Philosophie
de l’esprit et
F. Correia
de l’action,
S. Chauvier
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de l’action,
J. Zeimbekis
Philosophie
morale,
C. Michon
Philosophie
de
la
connaissance,
F. Wolff
Philosophie
des sciences,
P. Mongin
Esthétique
et
philosophie
du
langage,
S. Darsel
11h0011h30
S. Richard :
Les
deux
voies
de
l’ontologie
formelle
analytique
A . Ciaunica
:
Supernatural Mind
and Infinite
Decomposability
J.-M. Chevalier : L’unité
du raisonnement !
Y. Eylon :
Blaming
and
Knowing
E. Thomas
Butts : Slim
is In
F. Athané :
Outils
de
philosophie
analytique
pour l’étude
de la circulation
économique
A. Sullivan :
SemanticallyDriven Interpretive
Processes
11h3512h05
A.
Frischhut : The
viciousness
of
McTaggart’s
regress
M. Bitbol :
Consciousness
and
quantum
mechanics
J. Lafraire :
IEM, Nonconceptual
Content and
Semantic
Relativism
M. Spranzi :
Moral
distress,
reasons and
context
Ch.
Pfisterer
:
Predication
in
Perception
C. Imbert :
Collective
science
J. Cook :
Semantic
Deference
and
the
Case
of
Malapropisms
12h1012h40
G. Guigon :
La question
spéciale sur
l’explication
J.-P.
Llored : Relation between
levels of organization
A.-S. Brueggen : The
content
of
imaginings
and
the
"Multiple
Use Thesis"
N. Delon :
The moral
status
of
animals
A. Meylan :
Solving the
problem of
doxastic responsibility
M. Cozic &
B. Hill : Les
théorèmes
de représentation
E. Terrone :
The Fictional World
Viewed
12h4014h00
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
17
Programme
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Intitulé
Président
Be-
SoPhA - 2012
ENS,
Théâtre
Samedi 5 mai 2012
ENS, Info 1
ENS, Info 2
Info 5
ENS,Rataud
ENS, Résistants
de
l’esF. Correia
prit et de
l’action,
J. Dubucs
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de l’action,
J. Zeimbekis
Philosophie
morale,
P. Ludwig
Philosophie
de
la
connaissance,
P. Egré
Philosophie
des
sciences,
M. Cozic
Esthétique
et
philosophie
du langage,
D. Bonnay
14-14h30
D. Costa &
A. Giordani :
Events
as
kind instantiations
M.
Murez : SelfLocation
and Prospective
Control
M.
Arcangeli
:
Imagination
and Memory
D. Cicic :
A
New
Version of
the Manipulation
Argument
for Incompatibilism
J.
Dutant : The
Normative
Sceptical
Paradox
and
its
Practical
Solution
F. Longy :
Why do we
have hybrid
concepts ?
M.
Renauld
:
What
is
makebelieve ?
14h3515h05
M.
Campdelacreu
:
Do we need
two notions
of constitution ?
M. Haemmerli : The
Case
for
Perspectival
Representations of
Space
Ph.
Meadows
:
Holey Naive
Realism,
Batman !
Look At The
Air ! !
A. Vereker :
Universal
Reasons,
Universal
Constraints
Benoît
Gaultier :
La valeur de
la connaissance et la
nature de la
croyance
M. Egg :
The
Role
of Common
Sense in the
Debate on
Scientific
Realism
S. Darsel :
Le paradoxe
de
l’art
conceptuel
15h0515h20
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
18
Programme
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Intitulé
Président
Be-
SoPhA - 2012
ENS,
Théâtre
Samedi 5 mai 2012
ENS, Info 1
ENS, Info 2
Info 5
ENS,Rataud
ENS, Résistants
de
l’esF. Correia
prit et de
l’action,
J. Dubucs
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de l’action,
J. Zeimbekis
Philosophie
morale,
R. Ogien
Philosophie
de
la
connaissance,
P. Egré
Philosophie
des
sciences,
F. Longy
Esthétique
et
philosophie
du langage,
D. Bonnay
15h2015h50
J.-D.
Lafrance : The
Bundle
of
Universals
Theory
of
Material
Objects
M. Serban :
On
functions
and
mechanisms
in the investigation
of cognitive
capacities
M. Gallotti :
Internalism
and the Mystery of the
We-Mode
A.
Martin : Some
Thoughts
On Vulnerability in
Health Care
A. Logins :
Phenomenal
Conception
of
Evidence and
Pragmatic
Factors
S. De Toffoli & V.
Giardino :
Visualization
in
topology :
illustrations
vs diagrams
P. Snider :
A Role That
Functional
Beauty
Does
Not
Occupy
in
our
Aesthetic
Experience
15h5516h25
F.
Drapeau Vieira
Contim
:
Le
monisme de la
constitution
matérielle et
l’objection
de l’indiscernabilité
J. Mégier :
Conscience,
circularité,
régression
infinie, et
conscience
de soi
C. McHugh :
Control
of
Belief
and
Intention
I. Fouche :
Le dilemme
d’Euthyphron
et
la critique
du modèle
légal
en
métaéthique
N. C. Salvatore
:
Wittgensteinian
epistemology
and
cartesian
skepticism
E. Casetta :
Arguing for
a Pluralistic
Species
Concept
in the Assessment of
Biodiversity
�
16h2516h40
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
16h4017h10
N.
Liabeuf : Métamétaphysique
expérimentale (MME)
et "défi de
l’intégration"
F. Pataut :
Anti-realism
and the selfascription of
attitudes
F. Müller :
Phenomenology
of
Minimal
Actions
�
19
�
M. Vorms :
La notion
de modèle
chez
Ernest Nagel
(1961)
Pause
�
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Dimanche 6 mai 2012
Dimanche 6 mai 2012
9h15 - 10h30
Conférence plénière
Prés. J. Proust
10h30 - 11h00
Pause
Lieu
ENS, Dussane
:
Allan
Gibbard
(Michigan),
ENS,
Dussane,
Symposium « Symétrie et structure en philosophie de la physique » (Esfeld,
Guay), Prés. F. Nef
14h00 - 15h00
Elena Castellani (Florence) :Symétrie et réalisme structurel
15h10 - 16h10
Michael Esfeld (Lausanne) :Réalisme structurel et ontologie de la physique quantique
16h10 - 16h30
Pause
16h30 - 17h30
Alexandre Guay (Dijon) : Symétries parfaites et structures
17h30 - 18h10
Pause
18h15 - 18h45
P. Soom : Réductionnisme et élimination
17h40 - 18h10
�
20
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Dimanche 6 mai 2012
Séances Parallèles
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Be-
ENS,
Actes
ENS,
sane
Dus-
Info 1
Intitulé
Président
Philosophie
de
l’esprit
et
de l’action,
F.Récanati
Philosophie Philosophie
Métaphysique Philosophie
de l’esprit sociale
du langage
A.Guay
et
de
B.Cassegrain
Y.Ghodbane
l’action,
J.Dokic
Philosophie
Philosophie Philosophie
de
la du
lan- politique,
connaissance
gage
S.Lemaire
S.Leuenberger F.Schang
11h0011h30
G. Peebles :
Deflationism about
Temporal
Perception
Ph. Lusson : Joint
actions
O. Ouzilou :
Croyances
collectives,
acceptantes
collectives et
intelligibilité
des comportements de
groupe
Ch.
Steiner : The
Problem of
a Definition
of Life
P. Engisch :
Singular
Thought
and the Acquaintance
Principle
J. Langkau :
Reflective
Equilibrium
and Counterexamples
L.
F.
Moreno :
Kripke
on Mill’s
Theory
of Natural Kind
Terms
E. DiazLeon
:
Social
Kinds and
Conceptual Analysis
11h3512h05
F.
Hofmann : The
Generality
Constraint
vertical,
not
horizontal
M.
Guillot :
Understanding the
Concept
"I"
as
a
Phenomenal
Concept
A. Bouvier :
Croyances,
acceptions,
coengagements
et
argumentation
en contexte
judiciaire
et politicoreligieux
M. De :
Two ways of
meeting the
Humphrey
objection
on
the
objector’s
turf
A. Basak :
L’empirisme logique
comme une
perspective
politique sur
le langage
L. Saller :
The Case for
a
Stimulus
Account
of
the Senses
D.
Zeman
:
Temporal
Binding
in
the
Event
Analysis
I. Toader :
Phenomenological
Intuitions
and Intuitionistic
Grounds
12h1012h40
D.
Tagliafico
:
Episodic
Memory,
Imagination
and
the
Notion of a
Memory
Trace
D.
Liggins
:
Unpropositional
attitudes
R. Künstler :
Accepter une
théorie que
l’on
croit
fausse
N. Deng :
An
Interpretation
and Defense
of
Fine’s
’Argument
From Passage’
C. Verheggen : In
Defence
of
Austere
NonReductionism
C. Proietti &
F. Zenker :
Pluralistic
Ignorance
and
Informational
Cascades
J.
YliVakkuri :
Why the
Semantic
Argument
for
Relativism
Fails
Ch. Béal :
Le
positivisme
juridique
inclusif
12h4014h00
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
Déjeuner
21
Info 2
Info 5
ENS, Cavaillès
ENS, Celan
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Be-
ENS, Actes
Info 1
Initulé
Président
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de l’action
C. McHugh
Philosophie
morale,
M. Guillot
14h0014h30
R.
Locatelli
:
Disjunctivism
and
the puzzle of
phenomenal
characters
14h3515h05
15h0515h10
Info 2
Dimanche 6 mai 2012
Info 5
ENS,
vaillès
des sciences,
G. Guigon
D. Blitman
Philosophie
de
la
connaissance
et
du langage
B. Gaultier
Philosophie
du langage
A. Arapinis
Logique,
philosophie
de la logique
et des mathématiques
F. Pataut
Ch. Girard :
The Common Good
as
Equal
Promotion
of all Individual
Interests
G.
Torrengo : Metaphysical
Explanations
Th. Boyer :
L’unité d’un
domaine de
recherche
scientifique,
d’un point
de
vue
pratique
J.-B.
Guillon
:
Held Hostage,
the
Epistemological
Objection to
Libertarianism
F. Schang :
Quelle logique pour
les
itératifs ?
R. Ciuni &
C. Proietti :
Supervaluations,
Subvaluations
and
indeterminism
M. JorbaGrau : Do
We Think
Outside The
Stream Of
Consciousness ?
E. Biale :
Democratic
Bargaining
B. Le Bihan : Why
a
Gunk
World
is
Compatible
with
Nihilism about
Objects
S. Tossut : A
CooperationBased
Account
of
Social
Scientific
Knowledge
P. Marton :
Calling the
Skeptic’s
Bluff
C. Filotico :
Relativism
and
the
Norms
of
Assertion
J.
VidalRosset
:
How
and
why intuitionistic
logic defuses
Diodorus’
master
argument
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
22
Ca-
ENS, Celan
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Dimanche 6 mai 2012
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Be-
ENS, Actes
Info 1
Info 2
Info 5
ENS,
vaillès
Initulé
Président
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de l’action
F. Hofmann
Philosophie
morale,
M. Guillot
Métaphysique
Leuenberger
Philosophie
des sciences,
D. Blitman
Philosophie
de
la
connaissance
et
du langage
B. Gaultier
Philosophie
du langage
A. Arapinis
Logique,
philosophie
de la logique
F. Pataut
15h1015h40
S. Miguel :
Consciousness
and
Theory
of
Mind
J. L. Marti :
Who (and
how) knows
what’s
the
right
thing to do
politically
S. Leuenberger : Relations
intrinsèques
V.
Ardourel
:
La
sousdétermination
des
théories
physiques chez
NewtonSmith
M.
Grajner : A
Two-Factor
Theory
of
Epistemic
Justification
V. Richard :
The internal
nature
of
meaning
F.
Franchette
:
Hypercomputation
and Verification
15h4516h15
A.
Raftopoulos
:
Late vision :
perceptual
or thoughlike ?
Ch.
Rostbøll :
Against Incorporating
Self-Interest
in the Deliberative
Ideal
Ph. Keller :
Representation
—
relational, but
intrinsic
C.
Amoretti & N.
Vassallo
:
Women and
medicine
F.
Lihoreau : Are
Normative
Reasons
Evidence
for Obligations ?
D. Kirkby :
Frege’s
Context
Principle
and Proper
Names
P. Quinon :
The Number
Concept
16h1516h30
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
& Keller
23
Ca-
ENS, Celan
Programme
SoPhA - 2012
Lieu
ENS,
ckett
Be-
ENS, Actes
Info 1
Initulé
Président
Philosophie
de l’esprit et
de l’action
F. Hofman
Philosophie
morale,
S. Lemaire
16h3017h00
Ch. Sachse :
Is there metaphysical
free will ?
17h0517h35
Info 2
Dimanche 6 mai 2012
Info 5
ENS,
vaillès
Leuenberger des sciences,
I. Drouet
& Keller
Philosophie
de
la
connaissance
et
du langage
B. Gaultier
Philosophie
du langage
A. Arapinis
Logique,
philosophie
de la logique
F. Pataut
M.
Gibert : Voir
son
steak
comme
un animal
mort
S. Aimar :
Aristotelian
dispositions
M. Darrason : Esquisse d’une
théorie
génétique
mécaniste
de la maladie
M.
Sollberger
:
Introspecting Other
Minds
S. Hirèche :
For a Weaker
Form
of Compositionality
in Natural
Languages
M. Fischer
& J. Stern :
Paradoxes
of interacting modal
predicates
F.
Kammerer : Le
problème
de la disponibilité du
contenu
R. Myers :
Smith’s
Practicality
Requirement
J.
Rabachou : Les
implications
métaphysiques d’une
acceptation
de la relativité
de
l’identité
M. Pégny :
Calculer
avec
des
algorithmes,
calculer
avec
des
machines
A. Bandini :
La dérive de
la croyance
E.
Paganini : A
defence of
common
currency
names
D. Rizza :
Applied Mathematical
Concepts
17h3517h40
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
Pause
17h4018h10
J.
Smortchkova
:
Arguments
for the rich
content view
of perceptual
content
F. Orsi :
Moral obligations and
rational
desires
F.
Lauria : On
Direction of
Fit
M. Drechsler : Three
Types
of
Uncertainty
J. Zanic :
Externalism
and
the Transcendental
Situation of
Semantics
A. Nasta :
Logical or
Alogical
Words ?
G. Tarziu :
Mathematics and the
World
18h1518h45
L. Jaeger :
Un miracle
viole-t-il les
lois de la
nature ?
F. Cova :
"I couldn’t
have done
otherwise"
�
D. Chiffi et
S. Gaio :
The
Knowability
Paradox in
the
Light
of Logic for
Pragmatics
�
�
24
�
Ca-
ENS, Celan
Anouk Barberousse
Université de Lille 1
Computer simulations and empirical data
Whereas computer simulations are often used as substitutes of field or lab experiments, their
outputs are usually considered as having a less epistemological value than data that are obtained
through the use of detecting or measuring instruments. In this talk, I will discuss the reasons that
have been proposed for this appraisal. I shall focus on the question whether computer simulations
are able to yield new information about physical systems.
Computer simulations are usually supposed to be incapable of producing any new data for two
reasons : (i) their main components, the program and the input data, are built up from already
available information, (ii) the computer program only processes this information, without introducting anything new. As a result, their outputs can hardly come as a surprise to the scientists.
By contrast, the outputs of experiments are sometimes unexpected. I shall distinguish between
different meanings of epistemological novelty and argue that the outputs of computer simulations
can sometimes be said genuinely new and unexpected.
§§§
25
SoPhA - 2012
Allan Gibbard
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor
Meaning as a Normative Concept
It has been claimed that the concept of meaning is a normative concept, and likewise with the
concept of mental content, of what a person is thinking. The talk sketches a project of interpreting
these claims and understanding the concept of meaning as normative, for my forthcoming book
Meaning and Normativity. My analysis of normative terms is expressivistic : to say what one ought
to believe is to say what to believe. This form of expressivism thus applies to itself : claims of
meaning are explained as ought claims, and the meaning of ’ought’ is explained expressivistically.
I experiment with sketching such an account, and ask what the upshot would be. One question
will be whether the account is really distinct from non-naturalism as a theory of normative
concepts.
§§§
Katherine Hawley
St Andrews
Trust and Distrust
Our attitudes of trust and distrust have consequences for other people, whether they are the
targets of our (dis)trust, or otherwise dependent upon us to trust wisely. Distrust can damage its
target, but unwanted trust can also be a burden. I begin by exploring the middle ground between
these : what do we want when we want neither trust nor distrust ? I argue that the notion of
commitment can help us understand this point.
I then discuss our obligations to others in (dis)trusting. Miranda Fricker has argued that we
can damage other people as knowers when we allow our prejudices about their social status
(for example their race or gender) to undermine their credibility in testifying. Can these ideas
encompass trust and distrust more generally, trust in others to meet their practical commitments,
as well as trust in what they say ?
26
SoPhA - 2012
Finally, I explore an apparently more benign form of partiality in trusting and distrusting. We
tend to trust our friends, but does friendship permit or even require us to trust in ways which go
beyond the evidence of our friends’ trustworthiness ?
§§§
Christian List
London School of Economics
Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise
I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require
the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of
doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future
sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined
state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence,
and thus different actions can be "agentially possible". The agential perspective is supported by
our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to
what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher-level one on a par with other higher-level phenomena such as agency and
intentionality.
§§§
François Recanati
Institut Jean-Nicod
Communication référentielle et fichiers mentaux
Dans le cadre de la théorie des fichiers mentaux, je présenterai une analyse de l’emploi référentiel des descriptions définies mettant l’accent sur l’analogie entre descriptions référentielles et
indexicaux, et je comparerai cette analyse, d’inspiration millienne, avec une analyse d’inspiration
kaplanienne qui met également l’accent sur l’analogie avec les indexicaux.
§§§
27
SoPhA - 2012
Galen Strawson
University of Reading
Real naturalism
[1] Many current formulations of naturalism are profoundly anti-naturalistic. The bedrock of
real naturalism, i.e. realistic naturalism, is realism about experience (i.e. conscious experience),
because the existence of experience is a certainly known natural fact (it is the most certainly known
general natural fact). [2] By ’realism about experience’ I mean real realism about experience. What
is real realism about experience ? Real realists about experience take experience to be what they
took it to be before they did any philosophy, e.g. when they were 6 years old. [3] Physicalism
is the view that concrete reality is entirely physical in nature. I take physicalism to be part
of naturalism, so I take it that experience is entirely physical. Obviously physicalist naturalism
rules out anything incompatible with the truths of physics. There is, however, a respect in which
physics only gives structural information about the nature of concrete reality, and has nothing
to say about the intrinsic nature of the concrete reality in so far as its intrinsic nature is more
than its structure. It follows that physicalist naturalism can’t rule out mentalism or panpsychism,
the view that there is no non-structural non-experiential being. Considerations of simplicity and
parsimony support the view that there is no non-structural non-experiential being.
§§§
28
Symposia
Helen Beebee - Stathis Psillos - Anna-Sofia Maurin - Claudine
Tiercelin
According to an important approach in contemporary metaphysics, science should, if not dictate,
at least guide us in our description and explanation of the fundamental nature of reality and of its
properties. However, metaphysicians who accept such a strategy disagree widely on several crucial
issues. Here are some of the debates that will be pursued in this workshop. Does making sense
of scientific theories require the postulate of laws of nature in a sense distinct from regularities,
or do mere regularities suffice ? Does metaphysics imply some commitment to scientific realism ?
Or are there other options ? Does the analysis of contemporary science justify the idea that
nature is structured according to a unique taxonomy, or is taxonomic pluralism the adequate
doctrine ? More generally, should our best method in metaphysical inquiry involve the analysis of
the ontological commitments of our best scientific theories ? Can the analysis of scientific theories
really justify metaphysical theses on the existence of such things as laws, dispositions and powers,
and natural kinds ? To what extent must metaphysicians remain "humble" ? In what ways are
they possibly justified in being "bold" ? And in case they are justified in being so, what kind of
genuine metaphysical "knowledge" can they provide ?
§§§
Helen Beebee
Dispositions as real essences
It has been claimed (by e.g. Alexander Bird and Brian Ellis) that fundamental dispositions have
’real essences’, akin to natural kind essences, which deliver law-like truths about dispositions that
are metaphysically but not conceptually necessary. This paper will argue that this position lacks
the required Kripkean motivation. The claim that dispositions have ’real essences’ gets no support
from Twin Earth-style thought experiments ; moreover, it is implausible to suppose that there is
the epistemic ’gap’ between nominal and real essence that is required to get the Kripkean view
off the ground, as it applies to dispositions. The dispositionalists’ claim that the laws of nature
are metaphysically necessary thus turns out to be a piece of metaphysical dogma that we should
reject.
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Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
§§§
Stathis Psillos
Regularities all the way down
The neo-Humean approach to laws advocates a sparse metaphysical view of the world, according
to which there are irreducible regularities in nature (there are regularities all the way down, so to
speak) which involve patterns of dependence among members of natural classes (natural properties) and which underpin the causal and generally modal relations there are between them. Hence,
there is no need for an additional law-making property of a distinct metaphysical type‚Äîa regularity enforcer. In this talk, I defend the regularity view of laws (RVL) against some objections
(regarding mostly the robustness of laws) and develop the sparse metaphysics of RVL by articulating the view that regularities are mereological sums of their instances (parts), characterised by
the unity of a (natural) pattern.
§§§
Anna-Sofia Maurin
Lund University
In Defense of Taxonomic Monism : On What What There Is Does
Scientific Realism is the view that our (best) scientific theories are true ( or approximately true )
and that what they describe is the ontological structure of mind-independent reality. Taxonomic
Monism is the view that this mind-independent reality is uniquely structured. Scientific Realism
combined with Taxonomic Monism yields a view according to which our (best) scientific theories describe the unique structure of mind-independent reality ; that they "carve reality at its
joints". However, this marriage between Scientific Realism and Taxonomic Monism is arguably
an unhappy one. For, different classificatory practices in the modern sciences furnish us with
equally informative yet mutually incoherent taxonomic schemes. In a number of recent publications, Anjan Chakravartty has argued that a reasonable Scientific Realism should therefore
divorce Taxonomic Monism (and marry its distant cousin Taxonomic Pluralism instead). I will
argue to the contrary that the marriage between Scientific Realism and Taxonomic Monism is
happier than it may at first appear. The key to marital success, I will argue, lies in rethinking
what sort of information about mind-independent reality can be gleaned from our best sciences.
More precisely, I will argue, our best sciences can teach us, not what kinds of things there are,
but rather, what what there is does.
§§§
Claudine Tiercelin
In defense of metaphysical boldness
Against various forms of Kantian, Human and Lewisian humility which, despite their respective
differences, have all in common to take for granted that our metaphysical knowledge is "elusive"
(either because we cannot know how things are in themselves and are doomed to phenomena
30
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
and regularities, or because our cognitive faculties are limited), I shall present some logical,
scientific and metaphysical arguments in favor of a realism of dispositions based both on a causal
and dispositionalist account of properties, and on a conditional dispositionalist viewof laws. In
defending such a scholastic categorical realism which neither excludes to retort to some kind of
"aliquidditism" nor to some teleological aspects of causation, nor to the necessity of some laws, I
shall argue that such a strategy in-between humility and temerity is the only way 1) to avoid the
troubles met both by armchair and naturalized metaphysics alike, 2) to improve on the merits
of various ontic and causal structuralisms, and, most importantly, 3) to give some flesh to the
concept of metaphysical knowledge, and, in so doing, to provide some tentative answer to the
"Integration Challenge"of metaphysics and epistemology which any serious metaphysician has to
face.
§§§
31
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
Epistemic Democracy, . . .
Epistemic Democracy, Self-Interest, and the Common Good
Enrico Biale - Charles Girard - José Luis Marti - Christian
Rostbøll
According to epistemic conceptions, democratic authority rests on the assumption that democratic decision-making tend to produce right outcomes (Estlund, 2007). But what criteria of rightness
should we use to evaluate political decisions ? Deliberative democrats argue that democratic procedures should try to identify and promote the common good and that, as a consequence, public
deliberation foster democracy’s epistemic quality. Not only does it treat citizens respectfully by
giving each one a "fair say", but it is assumed to be, by contrast with bargaining, random selection
or mere voting, the best way to identify the common good (Elster 1986, Cohen 1989, Fishkin and
Ackerman, 2002). This influent view has faced, however, serious challenges. On the one hand, the
appeal to a common good is suspected of dissimulating a systematic bias in favor of particular selfinterests (Young, 2002). On the other hand, if the common good is not necessarily non-existent
or unknown but rather undesired, deliberation’s epistemic promises are founded on a naïve moral psychology (Elster, 2004). These criticisms have led to recent reformulations, suggesting that
self-interest should sometimes also be promoted by democratic deliberation (Mansbridge and al.,
2010). On such an account, while the concept of deliberation was originally defined in opposition
with negotiation aimed at the satisfaction of self-interests, it should now be extended so as to
include specific forms of "deliberative negotiation". To put this conceptual reconfiguration to the
test, this symposium will reexamine the relationship between the common good and self-interests
in an epistemic deliberative context.
§§§
Enrico Biale
Università del Piemonte Orientale (Italy)
Democratic Bargaining : Dealing with Self-Interest or Promoting the Common Good ?
A just society has to identify and promote the common good. One of the most powerful justifications of democracy that has been provided in the recent decades claims that democracy is
legitimate and fair because it is more likely than other institutional systems to pursue the common
good. According to this epistemic justification of democracy, however, to achieve this aim citizens
do not have to aggregate their preferences by voting or negotiate over their interested proposals, but they have to deliberate. In this paper I challenge the traditional contraposition between
common good and self-interest and I argue that within the public policy debate people cannot
identify the common good if they do not take into account their self-interest and demand that the
whole polity acknowledges the legitimacy of their interested proposals. To pursue the common
good, a democracy has to legitimize some forms of negotiation ("democratic bargaining") that
could deal with interested claims without undermining fairness. Since an account of democratic
bargaining will more likely identify and promote the common good than the traditional account
of deliberative democracy, I will conclude that it is not only a legitimate and fair alternative to
deliberation but, at least from an epistemic point of view, a better democratic procedure.
32
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
§§§
Charles Girard
Université Paris Sorbonne
The Common Good as Equal Promotion of all Individual Interests
An epistemic conception of deliberative democracy needs to respond to two challenges. According
to the false common good criticism, the goal public deliberation pursues does not exist : there
are only divergent self-interests that cannot be reconciled. According to the moral conversion
criticism, while something like the common good might exist, it cannot be reached, because
individuals are primarily motivated by their self-interest. I argue that i) the common good is best
understood as the equal promotion of all individual self-interests ; and that ii) given this definition,
both criticisms should be rejected. To do so, I elaborate a conceptual distinction between one’s
individual self-interest and one’s specific interests, drawing on Barry’s analysis. I criticize Barry’s
(and Pettit’s) definition of the common good as the set of interests that are shared by all citizens
qua citizens, as it implies excluding particular interests which are ordinarily deemed legitimate.
However, they can be included in the perimeter of the common good if it is defined as the equal
promotion of all individual (but not specific) interests. This helps to take up both challenges,
since i) the common good does not refer to a (potentially non-existent) set of fixed overlapping
preferences ; and ii) its pursuit does not require a ‚Äòmoral conversion’ as much as an epistemic
effort.
§§§
José Luis Marti
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain)
Who (and how) knows what’s the right thing to do politically : on the epistemic
dimension of deliberative democratic decision-making
It is common to justify democracy as the system of government more respectful with certain
substantive values, such as human dignity, political equality and political autonomy. Any other
system seems necessarily disrespectful of them. But this is not all what we value in government
decision making. We want our collective decisions to be democratic ‚Äìin a procedural sense-,
but we also want them to be correct. Deliberative democracy comes to bridge these two central
concerns. This paper examines the roots for the epistemic value of deliberative democracy : what it
is to be known to make correct political decisions ; who is the appropriate knower ; how this knower
may come to know what is to be known. The paper intends to show why deliberative democracy
may reasonably satisfy our demand for correction in democratic decisions, while resisting the
elitist trend. And it clarifies one crucial point that has generated some misguided criticism in the
most recent literature : the ideal nature of the epistemic deliberative democracy and its relation
with more real and practical approximations to it. It ends by stressing that, even if a self-interested
and strategic behavior by the participants in public deliberation is not conceptually inconsistent
with the idea of deliberation, it is inimical of its epistemic value.
§§§
Christian Rostbøll
33
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
University of Copenhagen (Denmark)
Against Incorporating Self-Interest in the Deliberative Ideal
In the development and refinement of the theory of deliberative democracy over the last two
decades, it has become evident that self-interests cannot and should not be excluded from the political process. It is an important aspect of the political process that citizens have the opportunity
to clarify and express their interests in order that political decisions do not favor the interests
of some groups over the interest of other groups. But does this mean that self-interest should be
included in the deliberative ideal ? In order to answer this question we need to understand that
deliberative democracy is a complex theory of democracy that involves both instrumental and
intrinsic dimensions. This paper argues against the suggestion of Jane Mansbridge et al. that we
should award self-interest intrinsic value and make it part of the regulative ideal of deliberative
democracy. What we need is not integration of self-interest and deliberative democracy into one
unified ideal. Rather, we should maintain an ideal of deliberative democracy that stands apart
from the politics of self-interest.
§§§
34
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
Higher-Order Attitudes : . . .
Higher-Order Attitudes : Knowledge, Beliefs and Social Interaction
Paul Egré - David Spector - Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic Olivier Roy
Higher-order attitudes occupy an increasingly important place in many areas of contemporary
analytic philosophy. Higher-order attitudes are attitudes, cognitive or conatives, about attitudes.
In epistemology, introspection principles have been the object of heated debates for many decades
now. Does one always have, or should have, (correct) beliefs about one’s beliefs ? knowledge
of one’s ignorance ? In recent years, questions of higher-order attitudes have proven to be of
importance not only for these two classical pillars of epistemology, knowledge and beliefs, but also
for notions such as awareness and higher-order vagueness. To take another example, disagreement
is arguably one of the most discussed notions in contemporary social epistemology. Here higherorder attitudes turn out to be crucial as well, but this time in the form of attitudes about
the attitudes of others. Has information about others’ information any epistemic significance ?
Should one always take others’ beliefs into account while forming one’s own beliefs ? Finally,
higher-order attitudes have also occupy an important place in meta-ethics, be it in the discussion
of the importance of higher-order desires in views about personal identity, or about the source of
reasons and normativity.
The aim of this workshop is to present, compare and relate a number of debates and questions
involving higher-order attitudes. The workshop will consist of four talks, each of which is representative of a particularly active area of contemporary analytic philosophy. The first two talks
will address questions raised in the modern debates about introspection in the epistemology of
individual knowledge. The first talk will compare two forms of ignorance and two related forms of
negative introspection, respectively involving knowledge and awareness, combining insights from
cognitive sciences, epistemology and logic. The second talk will turn to positive introspection, but
this time in relation with Williamson’s margin for error principle for knowledge. The third and
fourth talk will explore the social importance of higher-order attitudes, related to questions of
disagreement and normativity, respectively. The third talk will explore the relation, both at the
formal and at the philosophical level, between two well-known mathematical models of consensus
formation. The fourth talk will turn to the notions of reasons and rationality in social interaction and will investigate, from a game-theoretical perspective, their dependence on higher-order
attitudes. All in all, these four talks will provide a snapshot of contemporary areas of analytic
philosophy where higher-order attitude play a key role and will, we hope, lay the ground for a
fruitful interaction between these.
§§§
Paul Egré
(IJN)
Unawareness, uncertainty and the knowledge of one’s ignorance
The distinction between uncertainty and unawareness has been at the center of much formal
work in epistemic logic recently. The perspective of this talk will be to discuss the metacognitive
implications of the distinction in the light of work done on the psychology of known unknowns. In
a classic study, Glucksberg and McCloskey (1982) have proposed a two-stage model of decisions
35
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
about ignorance. On their view, subjects can issue a don’t know verdict when faced with a question
on two grounds : one concerns cases in which subjects find no potentially relevant evidence in their
memory. For such cases, subjects are expected to give fast verdicts of ignorance. A second category
of don’t know answers corresponds to cases in which subjects do find some relevant evidence in
memory, but find no conclusive evidence so as to satisfactorily answer the question. For such cases,
Glucksberg and McCloskey results indicate that verdicts of ignorance take longer, consistently
with the hypothesis of a heavier processing load (see also Hampton et al. 2011). A related aspect
we shall focus on concerns the reliability of decisions about one’s ignorance. Cases in which we
find relevant information in our memory but remain uncertain should be cases for which we find
harder to give a reliable estimate of the degree of our uncertainty, and more generally for which
we could easily overestimate or underestimate our ignorance. By contrast, cases in which we find
no relevant information in our memory, such as cases grounded in antecedent unawareness, should
be cases for which we issue more reliable decisions about the true state of our ignorance.
§§§
David Spector
(PSE)
On the foundation of the margin for error principle
According to Timothy Williamson’s (1994) theory of inexact knowledge, perceptual knowledge
satisfies a margin for error principle resulting from the limited accuracy of individual perceptions.
This principle in turn gives rise to the epistemic sorites paradox, which Williamson solves by
rejecting the view that knowledge satisfies positive introspection. Several authors (Mott, 1998 ;
Dutant, 2007 ; Dokic and Egré, 2009) have criticized Williamson’s reasoning by resorting to an
explicit modeling of perceptions. They showed that even if perceptions are imprecise, individuals
can make inferences based on their perceptions and on their knowledge of their perceptual limitations, resulting in knowledge that may violate the margin for error principle. Williamson (2000)
retorts that this argument is invalid because it assumes individuals to have perfect rather than
inexact knowledge of their perceptual limitations. We assess the merits of the two sides of this
debate by explicitly modeling perceptual limitations at various orders. We show that, for a certain
class of signal structures, the margin for error principle for perceptual knowledge holds only to
the extent that it holds at all higher orders. However, in order to avoid an infinite regress, one
must assume that there exists some primitive knowledge not resulting from perceptions. A full
modeling of perceptions at all orders thus casts doubt on Williamson’s claim that the margin for
error principle can be justified by considerations on perceptual limitations. Furthermore, we find
that such a modeling may warrant the rejection of the margin for error principle for perceptual
knowledge.
§§§
Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic
(Paris X, Paris XII, IHPST)
Consensus and higher-order information
How should an agent take into account the probabilistic opinion of other agents in a group ? The
traditional Bayesian answer would be to use Bayes rule and higher-order probabilities. In the
36
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
80’s, Lehrer and Wagner proposed a different and much simpler model based on the attribution
of epistemic weights, which were meant to express degrees of trust. The interest of the model
is to allow for a detailed study of the conditions under which agents may reach consensus (by
repeated updating on each other’s beliefs). However, the absence of a principled justification for
their update mechanisms casted on some doubts on the significance of the results. In this talk,
we will discuss whether such a justification can be given and prove a representation theorem for
Lehrer and Wagner’s updates with respect to Bayesian updates.
§§§
Olivier Roy
(Munich)
Normativity in Interaction : the Case of Higher-Order Attitudes
In many social situations, in seems that we are under normative pressure to take into account facts
about what others believe about, or expect of us. We can be rationally criticized for overlooking
or ignoring such facts. Take for instance the famous scene of Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove,
when the latter tells the Russian ambassador "The whole point of the Doom’s Day Machine is
lost... if you keep it a secret ; why didn’t you tell the world, he ? ! ? !". Strangelove is pointing
out that building the machine in question makes little sense without making sure that everyone
knows about its existence or, even, without it being common knowledge. This talk will be about
such situations, where we raise normative claims about what should be mutually or commonly
known, believed or expected, and about how these should bear on actions. Our starting point will
be contemporary epistemic game theory (Brandenburger, 2007) and dynamic-epistemic logic (van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007). After explaining how to see "choice rules" (e.g. dominance, maximization
of expected utility, admissibility, maximin) as potential sources of normative statements, we will
survey known results concerning the sensitivity of these choice rules to perturbations in higherorder attitudes (e.g. Rubinstein 1989, Apt, 2007, Trost, Manuscript), and explain the significance
of theses results from the perspective of a general, normative theory of rational decision making
in social interaction.
§§§
37
Symposia
SoPhA - 2012
Elena Castellani - Michael Esfeld - Alexandre Guay
Deux concepts ont particulièrement soulevé l’intérêt des philosophes de la physique au cours des
vingt dernières années : le concept de symétrie et celui de structure. Pour les physiciens, ces deux
concepts sont essentiellement liés à travers leur usage dans les applications à la physique de la
théorie des groupes. Les philosophes, quant à eux, ont abordé ces deux concepts séparément et,
généralement, en poursuivant des visées philosophiques différentes dans chaque cas. En simplifiant
un peu la situation, on constate qu’aujourd’hui, nous faisons face à deux traditions de recherche
qui se recoupent peu. La première porte sur l’usage des symétries en physique et consiste principalement en travaux indépendants de la question du réalisme. L’autre tradition a pour objet
la défense, l’attaque et le développement du réalisme structurel. L’objectif principal du présent
symposium est de réunir ces deux domaines de questionnement philosophique et d’entamer une
réflexion qui visera à obtenir une unification des perspectives qu’ils soulèvent.
§§§Elena Castellani
Symétrie et réalisme structurel
Les symétries (au sens d’une invariance par rapport à un groupe de transformations) et les structures sont deux notions intimement liées. D’un côté, les relations qui constituent la structure
d’un ensemble d’éléments sont souvent identifiées sur la base du groupe de transformations qui
les laisse invariantes (c’est-à-dire, le groupe de symétrie). De l’autre, les symétries sont parfois
définies comme les transformations qui préservent une structure donnée. Elles sont ainsi classées
sur la base du type de structure qu’elles préservent. Voir, par exemple, (Ismael & van Fraassen
2003, 378). Il est donc naturel que les symétries, si liées aux structures, aient une importance
considérable dans l’approche structurelle des théories physiques. Dans le cas des théories physiques ’fondamentales’ (par exemple le Modèle Standard en théorie quantique de champ), le rôle
primordial des symétries est d’autant plus marqué. Par exemple, dans le développement de la
version ’ontologique’ du réalisme structurel, par French et Ladyman, la possibilité de caractériser les particules élémentaires sur la base des représentations irréductibles du groupe de symétrie
fondamental a joué un rôle central. Voir sur le même sujet, l’article pionnier de Wigner (1939). De
manière plus générale, certains ont soutenu précédemment une approche fondée sur les groupes
de la question des objets physiques, par exemple (Cassirer 1944 et 1945 [1979]) et (Born 1998).
Pour une discussion générale, voir la section " Objects and Invariance " dans (Castellani 1998).
Dans cet exposé, nous examinerons de plus près la relation entre symétrie et structure du point de
vue d’une approche structurelle des théories physiques. Nous examinerons tout spécialement dans
quelle mesure le rôle des symétries physiques est nécessaire pour cette approche, en particulier
en ce qui a trait à la version ontologique du réalisme structurel.
§§§
Michael Esfeld
Réalisme structurel et ontologie de la physique quantique
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Cette communication cherche à établir un lien entre le réalisme structurel ontologique et les
interprétations majeures de la physique quantique discutées dans la littérature contemporaine, à
savoir celles d’Everett, de Ghirardi, Rimini et Weber et de Bohm. J’argumenterai que le réalisme
structurel ontologique constitue une sorte de cadre général et informatif pour l’interprétation de la
physique quantique dans lequel entrent ces trois interprétations et ce, en dépit de leur différences
ontologiques considérables. Afin d’être en mesure de fonctionner comme un tel cadre général,
le réalisme structurel doit se baser sur les symétries qu’implémente la mécanique quantique.
Finalement, je montrerai comment on peut procéder à une évaluation argumentative de chacune
de ces interprétations sur cette base.
§§§
Alexandre Guay
Symétries parfaites et structures
Plusieurs philosophes ont soutenu que l’on pouvait utiliser les symétries pour identifier les surplus descriptifs dans les théories physiques (par exemple Nozick 1998). Les symétries pourraient
ainsi nous permettre de cerner la part " objective " du discours physique. Récemment, Richard
Healey (2009) a proposé le concept de symétrie parfaite, soit une symétrie empirique qui relie
des situations qui partagent toutes leurs propriétés intrinsèques. On peut montrer qu’une symétrie empirique est parfaite si elle peut être expliquée, par un certain argument, à partir d’une
symétrie théorique, soit une symétrie qui relie les modèles de la théorie. La proposition de Healey
est intéressante en particulier du fait qu’elle propose une méthode systématique pour clarifier
l’ontologie du discours physique. Dans cet exposé, nous discuterons des deux points suivants :
1. Nous montrerons comment les symétries parfaites ne distinguent pas entre symétries internes
et externes qui, elles, ont des interprétations ontologiques différentes (Redhead 1988) et, qu’en
conséquence, elles affaiblissent la distinction entre propriété intrinsèque et extrinsèque. 2. Nous
discuterons de l’impact de cet affaiblissement sur le structuralisme en physique et en particulier
sur le réalisme structurel.
§§§
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Quantum Mechanics . . .
Quantum Mechanics Faces the Location Problem
Jean-Pierre Llored - Michel Bitbol - Anna Garrouty-Ciaunica
We provide a reformulation of the view according to which consciousness derives from a material
fundamental basis by exploring recent quantum mechanics developments. The overall challenge
is to assess the classical location problem (Jackson 1998) on radically different grounds : instead
of eliminating or reducing or identifying contents of experience or phenomenological reports to
the structural network of objective science, we will strive towards embedding phenomenological
reports in a broader relational network, of which the law-like structure of the objective domain is
only a fraction. (Bitbol 2008) In line with Varela (1998) and Van Fraasen (2002), we will rather
advocate a radical change of stance regarding the consciousness-matter link.
§§§
Jean-Pierre Llored
CREA/Ecole Polytechnique, ULB
Relation between levels of organization : an examination from quantum chemistry
This survey is about possible connections between the concept of emergence and quantum chemistry. I first come back to laboratories of research in order to scrutinize how quantum chemists and
biochemists work and contrive their scientific tools for studying molecular transformation. I then
carefully analyze how they tailor languages, iconographic models and mereologies to articulate
the different patterns of organization they currently use. The minimization of molecular energy is
a crucial step which intertwines a molecule whole, its parts -whatever their nature should be-and
the surrounding context at the same time. No ontological priority is put forward between levels
but only relations and entanglements between them. In this respect, modes of access (instrumental or cognitive) are of paramount importance to highlight the codependence of such levels. To
conclude, I will explain how and why this framework may provide philosophers with interesting
arguments to face some problems such as emergence, supervenience and the connection of mind
and matter.
§§§
Michel Bitbol
CREA
Consciousness and quantum mechanics : a deflationary examination
There are two versions of the putative connection between consciousness and the measurement
problem of quantum mechanics : consciousness as the cause of state vector reduction (Wigner,
Von Neumann etc.), and state vector reduction as the physical basis of consciousness (Penrose,
Stapp etc.). In this symposium, these controversial ideas will neither be accepted uncritically,
nor rejected from the outset in the name of some prejudice about objective knowledge. Instead,
their theoretical and philosophical credentials will be examined carefully, and their origin will be
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Quantum Mechanics . . .
sought in our most cherished (but disputable) beliefs about the place of mind and consciousness
in the world. Might these common beliefs about mind and consciousness arise from reification
of situated first-person experience ? And might the very project of studying the connection of
mind and matter by way of physics be a spurious effect of the ontological projection of both the
first-person and the third-person standpoints ? These hypotheses will be submitted to scrutiny
along several philosophical lines of investigation.
§§§
Anna Garrouty-Ciaunica
Supernatural Mind and Infinite Decomposability
If the physical is uncontroversial natural, and if the mental is (at least tacitly) accepted as
non- supernatural, why do we find ourselves with the ontological problem of mentality and its
subjective qualitative compound “qualia” on our hands ? What is so special about the subjective
mind that poses a problem in a naturalist view of the world ? Furthermore, if quantum mechanics
approaches (QM) turn out to be one of the most well-confirmed physical theories ever developed
by humans, why then do philosophers develop theories of the mind- brain link as if QM did not
exist ? (Q. Smith 2003)
In this paper, I propose to examine one construal of the location problem, i.e. the idea of determining the nature of the deepest level of reality with respect to the mental and the physical. One
important metaphysical issue is to determine whether everything is ultimately mental, physical
or both. But what if there is no such thing as the deepest level because the universe is infinite ?
I will argue here against ontological foundationalism and in favour of infinite decomposability
thesis. (Schaffer 2003, Montero 2006, Nagasawa 2012 forthcoming)
§§§
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La dimension volontaire . . .
La dimension volontaire des croyances collectives
Olivier Ouzilou - Alban Bouvier - Raphaël Künstler
La distinction entre deux types d’états mentaux doxastiques, belief et acceptance, est désormais
usuelle. Le contenu de cette distinction varie cependant fort sensiblement (Cohen, Bratman, Van
Fraassen, etc.). Cohen oppose ainsi croyance et acceptation (ou " assentiment ") comme un état
passif (au sens où tout élément de volonté fait défaut : la croyance est foncièrement subie) à un état
actif (au sens où un élément de volonté est présent dans l’assentiment). Cohen distingue, en outre,
deux types d’acceptations : l’acceptation pragmatique (ou prudentielle), à laquelle la discussion
des analyses de Cohen s’est souvent cantonnée - et l’acceptation évidentielle (ou épistémique). Cohen s’est cependant limité lui-même au seul champ des croyances individuelles. Margaret Gilbert,
au contraire, a soutenu une conception des croyances collectives qui est également une conception
volontariste, fondée sur l’idée de contrat réciproque tacite (joint commitment). Mais Gilbert a
dénié à peu près toute pertinence aux distinctions de Cohen en ce contexte, suscitant une vive
controverse (Meijers, Wray, etc.), d’autant que les analyses de Philip Pettit sur les groupes à objectif pourraient être elles-mêmes, semble-t-il, développées à l’aune de ces distinctions. Ces débats
seront examinés sur des exemples pris dans les domaines judiciaire, religieux et scientifique
§§§
Olivier OUZILOU
Croyances collectives, acceptantes collectives et intelligibilité des comportements de
groupe
L’originalité de Gilbert (1987) réside, en partie, en sa tentative d’introduire en philosophie sociale
une compréhension des notions intentionnelles collectives qui se distingue de ce qu’elle nomme leur
acception "sommative". Ainsi, une compréhension sommative du concept de "croyance collective"
échouerait à rendre compte de la dimension intrinsèquement collective de cette notion en réduisant
les croyances collectives à de simples croyances partagées au sein d’un groupe social donné. Face
à une telle approche, Gilbert propose de distinguer les croyances collectives par le type spécifique
de normativité qu’elles font émerger. Toutefois, la notion de "croyance collective" telle que l’a
thématisée Gilbert a été soumise à certaines critiques. L’une des objections centrales à sa position
consiste à dire, comme le fait Wray (2001), que les états mentionnés dans son analyse ne sont
pas des croyances mais des " acceptances " et que cette redéfinition permet de saisir le type
spécifique de rationalité qui caractérise le comportement " doxastique " des sujets pluriels. En
concentrant mon propos sur les "groupes à objectif" (Pettit, 2003), j’aimerais montrer comment
ces sujets pluriels peuvent être en réalité simultanément sensibles à des normes pragmatiques et
épistémiques.
§§§
Alban Bouvier
IJN & Aix-Marseille U.
Croyances, acceptions, co-engagements et argumentation en contexte judiciaire et
politico-religieux
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La dimension volontaire . . .
Cette contribution se concentre tout d’abord sur l’evidential acceptance en cherchant à montrer sa pertinence empirique (phénoménologique) sur l’analyse de cas de " croyances judiciaires
" idéal-typiques, que Cohen considère longuement, puis de cas de "croyances religieuses ", que
Cohen considère rapidement. Je conclue ici que si la belief n’est pas accessible à l’argumentation,
l’acceptance, pragmatique comme évidentielle, l’est. La complexité des croyances religieuses, auxquelles je m’arrête ensuite, révèle très vite que même les distinctions de Cohen sont insuffisantes
pour rendre compte de la spécificité des croyances collectives (Tuomela, Wray, Meijers). A cette
fin, Margaret Gilbert a introduit le concept de co-engagement (joint commitment), proche du
concept de foi conçue comme fides (fidélité). Si les croyances collectives comme agrégation de
beliefs individuelles ne sont pas accessibles comme telles à l’argumentation, ni les idées ou représentations qui reposent sur la foi, la " foi " elle-même (religieuse ou politique) comme fides
est paradoxalement accessible à l’argumentation au sens particulier où il est parfois possible de
montrer que le co-engagement qui la constitue a été brisé par l’un des " co-engagés". L’islam est
pris comme exemple.
§§§
Raphaël Künstler
Accepter une théorie que l’on croit fausse
Cohen soutient que l’activité scientifique exige des chercheurs qu’ils s’entraînent à renoncer à toute
croyance théorique, et à se contenter d’une simple acceptation des lois physiques. Il s’agit d’éviter que le chercheur ne s’obstine dans une position théorique incompatible avec les découvertes
empiriques ou théoriques récentes, et ainsi de préserver la soumission de la pensée du chercheur
à une norme de rationalité entendue comme la capacité d’un sujet à réviser ses opinions lorsque
ses interactions avec les phénomènes ou autrui lui fournissent des informations nouvelles. Si cette
prescription de Cohen était valable, le chercheur devrait être prêt à accepter des théories qu’il
croirait pourtant fausses. J’aimerais d’abord montrer que cette formule étonnante ne décrit pas
une situation impossible en exposant la manière dont Poisson a été conduit à accepter la théorie de Fresnel. En même temps, ce cas met en évidence l’insuffisance de la caractérisation de
l’activité scientifique sur laquelle Cohen s’appuie : il méconnaît aussi bien la recherche que Kuhn
nomme " ordinaire " que les " contextes de poursuite " dont s’est préoccupé Laudan. Cette lacune
me conduira à me demander comment autoriser l’intervention des croyances dans les conduites
scientifiques sans pour autant renoncer au rationalisme.
§§§
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L’analyse des valeurs . . .
L’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées
Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - Andrew Reisner - Krister
Bykvist - Christine Tappolet - Mauro Rossi - Stéphane Lemaire
Julien A. Deonna et Fabrice Teroni
Université de Genève
From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements
We often pass evaluative judgements as a result of undergoing emotions. John judges that the
joke is funny because he is amused by it, Mary judges the remark to be offensive because she
is angry at its author. It is thus natural to think that emotions often explain, at least in part,
our evaluative judgements. This phenomenon we take for granted. Our focus will be on the
epistemological role emotions may play in connection with evaluative judgements and in particular
on whether justified emotions are apt to justify the judgements they often explain. This problem
requires that we answer the following two questions. First, under which conditions are emotions
justified ? Second, which epistemological role(s) can justified emotions play in connection with
evaluative judgements ? Our starting point consists in motivating the need for an account of
justified emotions by considering central disanalogies in the respective epistemological roles of
emotions and perceptions vis-à-vis the judgements they explain. Next, we reject an epistemological
picture – the idea that emotions are preceded by axiological judgements or value intuitions – that
these disanalogies may foster but that we perceive as unconvincing. We then put forwards the
claim that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute
an instance of the evaluative property that features in the correctness conditions of this emotion.
Finally, we argue that justified emotions are sufficient for the justification of evaluative judgements
and that emotions are not epistemologically superfluous.
§§§
AndrewReisner
McGill University
Why the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value is Morally and Metaphysically Implausible
Since T.M. Scanlon’s book, What We Owe to Each Other, has revived interest fitting-attitude
analyses of final value (including the buck-passing analysis), much of the attention of the topic has
focused on finding analysis that are resistant to counterexamples. In this paper, it is observed that
the narrow focus on finding a version of the fitting-attitude of buck-passing analysis that avoid
counterexamples has led us not to ask deeper questions about the desirability of such analyses on
other grounds. I shall argue that for both metaphysical and moral reasons, we should be sceptical
about these agent-centric analyses. Many moral views, and much that is plausible to say about
morality, tells against thinking that we should fundamentally understand evaluative concepts in
terms of normative (or quasi-normative) claims about agents’ attitudes or actions. This moral
concern closely tracks related metaphysical worries about the reduction of value concepts or
properties to deontic concepts or proprerties.
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§§§
Krister Bykvist
Oxford University
’They smiled at the good and frowned at the bad.’ A reexamination of the fitting
attitude analysis of goodness
We all agree that it seems fitting to favour the good and disfavour the bad. This intuition, almost
feels like a truism. Indeed, it has become increasingly popular to turn this intuition into an explicit
definition, according to which the good is defined as what it is fitting to favour, and the bad as
what it is fitting to disfavour. Furthermore, it is often assumed that to say that an attitude is
fitting is say something deontic or normative rather than something evaluative. My aim in this
paper is not to add some new objections to the fitting attitude analysis of value (the FA-analysis).
I think it is time to take a step back and reconsider the reasons that led people to accept the
account in the first place. I shall argue that the most important considerations that led people
to adopt the FA-analysis can in fact be taken into account by value primitivists as well. If this
is correct, then, in light of all the objections to the FA-analysis, one should seriously ask oneself
whether the FA-analysis is worth the price.
§§§
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Comment ajuster les attitudes et les valeurs
Les analyses des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées affirment que les concepts de valeurs
peuvent être analysés ou élucidés à l’aide du concept d’attitude appropriée. Ces analyses ont
récemment fait l’objet d’un grand nombre de critiques. Une des questions difficiles est celle de
savoir quel type de réaction devrait figurer dans l’analysans. Selon Krister Bykvist (2009), il
paraît loin d’être possible de spécifier de manière non circulaire le type de réaction en question.
Je soutiendrai que le problème majeur de l’argument de Bykvist est qu’il ne considère pas un type
central de concept évaluatif. Il s’agit des concepts affectifs, comme amusant, dégoutant, admirable.
Comme je le montrerai, les analyses en termes d’attitudes appropriées de ces concepts ne sont
pas menacées par les objections de Bykvist. De plus, comme l’argument de Bykvist se focalise sur
les concepts évaluatifs les plus généraux, il omet de tenir compte des analogies importantes entre
bon et coloré. Pourtant ces analogies permettent de voir comment il faudrait traiter les concepts
évaluatifs généraux.
§§§
Mauro Rossi
UQAM
A fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value
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This paper explores the issue of how a fitting attitude analysis of value can be extended in order
to account for the comparative dimensions of value, i.e. the fact that value comes in degrees,
that some things are better than others and that some things are incomparable to each other
in terms of value. More specifically, I focus on two recent accounts (Gert 2005 ; Rabinowicz
2008), according to which making a judgment of comparative value is equivalent to making a
normative assessment of preference. The central feature of these accounts is the idea that there
are two levels of normativity that are relevant for assessing preferences : rational requirement and
rational permissibility. After reconstructing the motivations for introducing this distinction, I
argue against this way of analysing comparative value and propose an alternative account.
§§§
Stéphane Lemaire
Université de Rennes 1
Pour une approche pratique de l’analyse des valeurs en termes d’attitudes appropriées
The fitting attitude analyses (FAA) of values, and especially of emotional values (admirable,
shameful, disgusting, etc.) may be presented as proposing in outline the following analysis : O
is admirable if there is a reason to admire O. Unfortunately, the FAA of values faces the wrong
kind of reasons problem. Although there is a reason to admire the demon because he threatens
to inflict severe pain on you if you do not admire him, it seems that the existence of such reasons
is irrelevant to the question of whether the demon is admirable. This and similar examples have
led most defenders of the FAA to adopt various epistemic approaches, whose common ground is
precisely to deny systematically that practical reasons are relevant. In this presentation, I argue
that this is the wrong way to go. First, I suggest that in order to determine when an emotion is
appropriate, it is necessary to rely on practical reasons. However, for such a practical approach to
work, I need to offer a criterion that is able to distinguish among practical reasons, those which
are relevant in the FAA of values. In the second part of the presentation, I therefore propose such
a criterion and defend it against various objections.
§§§
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Simona Aimar
Oxford University
Aristotelian dispositions
The simplest and most popular analysis of potentialities says : something has a potentiality toΦ
just in case if a stimulus s were to occur, then it would Φ. Here "s" and "Φ" each refer to a
specific type of event. But this view does not allow for potentialities that have no stimuli. Moreover, even for potentialities that have stimuli, it faces counterexamples : when the stimulus of
a particular potentiality occurs, something may still prevent the occurrence of the manifestation
associated with that potentiality Φ-ing. In Metaphysics Theta 5, Aristotle offers a more sophisticated analysis of potentialities. It says that something has a potentiality to Φ just in case, if a set
of conditions C were to hold, then x would Φ. Here "C" refers to conditions that are incompatible
with the obtaining of preventing conditions, i.e. conditions that rule out the manifestation of the
potentiality. I evaluate this account, suggesting that it provides a viable and attractive alternative
to the more popular analysis.
§§§
Cristina Amoretti 1* & Nicla Vassallo 2*
1* 2*University of Genoa, Italy
Women and medicine : Some epistemological notes on gender-specific medicine
This paper aims to provide analysis of a quite recently developed branch of medicine, that is
gender-specific medicine, in order to assess whether it may be well grounded from an epistemological point of view. Even if gender-specific medicine has some important merits that cannot be
disregarded, we also think that it still needs to be analyzed in deeper details, examining the role
of women as subjects of knowledge and as objects of knowledge in medicine. In both cases, we
would like to prove not only that the two notions of sex and gender cannot be detached from
other notions, such as race, ethnos, social class, age, religion, etc., but also that further empirical
research is necessary in order to evaluate both women’s role in medicine and the real effectiveness
of gender-specific medicine. As a conclusion, we wish to point out that gender-specific medicine
may be weakened by two crucial flaws. First, we believe that it embraces, explicitly or not, the
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stereotypical dichotomy between male and female, man and woman ; second, it may support the
idea of an intrinsic dichotomy between male/female, man/woman, and eventually strengthen old
and unjustified sex and/or gender based stereotypes and prejudices.
§§§
Basak Aray
Philosophies contemporaines (PHICO) Université Paris I
L’empirisme logique comme une perspective politique sur le langage : la pédagogie
d’Otto Neurath
Cette intervention a pour objet la contribution d’Otto Neurath à la philosophie analytique du
Cercle de Vienne. Son activité dans le Musée de la Société et de l’Economie de Vienne et dans
l’institut ISOTYPE (International System of Typographic Picture Education) sera présentée
dans le cadre de la perspective collective du Cercle sur la dimension politique de la conception
scientifique du monde. Celle-ci développe une philosophie du langage optimisée pour la pédagogie
et adaptée à la popularisation, tout en s’opposant au renfermement idéologique, disciplinaire ou
académique. Le langage visuel ISOTYPE, développé par l’équipe de Neurath pour la visualisation
des données statistiques pour le grand public, sera présenté comme un exemple pratique de la
philosophie politique du langage pratiquée par le Cercle de Vienne. Nous soutenons que les valeurs
épistémologiques comme l’intersubjectivité, la clarté et le réductionnisme empirique indiquent un
désir de renouvellement du langage philosophique dans la direction d’une popularisation de la
pensée critique.
§§§
Margherita Arcangeli
Imagination and Memory : a New Content Account
The sensory-like experiences we undergo through imagination and memory are very similar, insofar as they are faded and lack the feeling of presence involved in genuine perceptual experiences.
Still in most cases we can say whether we are imagining or remembering. What are the markers
of sensory imagination and episodic memory ? In the current literature three accounts of the markers of imagination and memory have been put forward : the mental image account, the content
account, and the epistemological account. Firstly, I shall review the three approaches. Following
Byrne, the upshot will be that neither the mental image nor the content accounts are useful in
order to distinguish imagination and memory. However, according to Byrne the epistemological
account is appealing. Against Byrne, I argue that there is more to the content account. Secondly,
following some insights from situation theory and in particular its interpretation by Recanati,
I shall argue that if one takes into account a broad notion of content, the content account is
still a valuable alternative. Moreover, I shall try to show that once we have acknowledged the
complexity of the relevant notion of content, the epistemological account can be seen as a natural
development of the content account.
§§§
Vicent Ardourel
IHPST
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La sous-détermination des théories physiques chez Newton-Smith
La thèse de la sous-détermination des théories par les données empiriques occupe une place
prépondérante au sein des débats sur le réalisme scientifique. Selon une version forte de cette
thèse, il est à jamais impossible de trancher entre plusieurs théories rivales sur la base des données
empiriques. Malgré le peu de crédit que l’on peut accorder à cette thèse énoncée de manière
générale, Newton-Smith soutient l’existence d’une sous-détermination forte entre deux théories
physiques sous certaines conditions particulières : lorsque les deux théories reposent, l’une sur
l’hypothèse d’un temps continu et l’autre sur celle d’un temps simplement dense.
Dans cette présentation, je commencerai par présenter la stratégie adoptée par Newton-Smith
pour défendre sa thèse. Il s’appuie notamment sur l’exemple d’une théorie fictive, ‘la théorie de
Notwen’ dont il cherche à montrer qu’elle ne peut être empiriquement discriminée de la mécanique
de Newton. Le propos de Newton-Smith est cependant insuffisamment convaincant, notamment
parce qu’il est illustré par une théorie seulement fictive. Je propose ici une nouvelle stratégie
pour défendre la thèse de Newton-Smith. Celle-ci s’appuie cette fois non plus sur une théorie
fictive mais sur une reformulation récente de la mécanique classique représentant le temps de
manière discrète et qui par conséquent permet d’illustrer de manière plus détaillée la possibilité
d’une sous-détermination forte entre deux théories physiques, l’une représentant le temps comme
continu et l’autre le représentant comme simplement dense.
§§§
François Athané
IUFM Paris
Outils de philosophie analytique pour l’étude de la circulation économique
Le mot "échange" a des usages très variés : on parle d’échanges de gaz, d’échanges de regards,
d’échanges de services, d’échanges d’un bien contre de l’argent. Seules ces deux dernières expressions dotent le mot " échange " d’un sens proprement économique, car seules elles impliquent
une structure déontique : c’est-à-dire des droits sur des biens, et des devoirs, par exemple de
verser la contrepartie. L’échange de biens implique en outre, par nécessité logico-conceptuelle,
l’existence de droits de propriété, sous une forme ou une autre, sur ces biens. Il s’avère donc que
ce sont les implications déontiques d’un terme qui lui donnent son sens proprement économique.
Il découle de là deux perspectives de recherche. Premièrement, l’échange est-il la seule façon de
transférer la propriété ? Nous montrerons que non, et que l’analyse conceptuelle des termes du
langage courant permet d’identifier et de définir les quatre principales manières de transférer un
bien, ou un droit sur un bien, à autrui. Cette typologie se trouvant confirmée par les données
fournies par l’ethnologie, l’histoire et les sciences économiques. Deuxièmement, qu’en est-il de la
propriété, nécessaire pour qu’il y ait échange au sens économique de ce terme ? Nous montrerons
en quel sens la propriété est également une structure déontique. Mais celle-ci est toujours relative
à une communauté que le chercheur se donne comme communauté de référence, ce qui doit être
compris et explicité afin de ne pas confondre un phénomène déontique et institutionnel avec un
phénomène naturel.
§§§
Valérie Aucouturier 2, * , Bruno Gnassounou 1, *
2 : Centre Leo Apostel (V.U.B., Bruxelles) Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - Flandres
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1 : Centre Atlantique de Philosophie, Université de Nantes
Les vertus et les limites de la doctrine du double-effet
La doctrine du double-effet s’appuie sur une distinction entre ce qu’un agent a l’intention de faire
et les effets collatéraux de son action, qu’il prévoit mais n’a pas l’intention de réaliser : si un acte
a deux effets, l’un bon, l’autre mauvais, il est permis de l’accomplir si (1) l’effet mauvais n’est pas
visé intentionnellement, (2) le bon effet n’est pas produit par le truchement du mauvais et (3) le
bon effet " surpasse " le mauvais effet. Nous voudrions évaluer deux aspects de cette doctrine :
1) Quand, dans un acte d’auto-défense, je tue quelqu’un, en quoi est-il légitime de dire que j’ai
voulu me défendre et que la conséquence, non voulue, en était la mort de la personne, plutôt que
de dire que j’ai voulu le tuer comme moyen de sauver mon existence ? Cette distinction entre
responsabilité et culpabilité semble aussi essentielle qu’artificielle. 2) Y-a-t-il un sens à dire que
parmi les effets possibles d’une action, nous " choisissons ", en " dirigeant notre intention " sur les
premiers et non sur les derniers, ceux qui entreront dans l’action intentionnelle à titre de moyen
et de fin, et ceux qui seront de simples effets collatéraux ?
§§§
Emmanuel Baierlé
Département de Philosophie, Université de Fribourg
Is Our Phenomenology Libertarian ?
It is pretty common in the free will literature to declare that before doing philosophy one normally starts as a libertarian. In recent years, there have been some attacks against this claim.
On the one hand, experimental philosophers have tried to show that the lay person has compatibilist intuitions and on the other hand Horgan et al. have tried to show that it is a mistake
to think that our phenomenology has libertarian veridicality conditions. I will try to show that
our phenomenology is indeed libertarian, i.e. we experience ourselves as free and undetermined.
I argue that to experience oneself as undetermined means having an experience the content of
which is incompatible with being determined. I propose an analysis of the content of a paradigmatic case of free decision and try to establish its incompatibility with the agent’s decision being
determined.
§§§
Aude Bandini
Groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité (GRIN)
La dérive de la croyance
Avec la notion de " dérive cognitive ", l’anthropologue T. Luhrmann, dans Persuasion of the
Witch’s Craft (1989) entend rendre compte de la manière dont des individus rationnels peuvent
en venir à entretenir des croyances irrationnelles, en l’occurrence en la sorcellerie. Au travers du
cas d’acrasie épistémique qu’elle décrit, on montrera que le fait que des facteurs non-épistémiques
puissent intervenir dans le processus de formation et de fixation de la croyance n’implique pas
que l’on doive renoncer au principe déontologiste selon lequel " on ne doit croire que p, que si et
seulement si p est vrai ". En établissant que le concept de croyance peut être pris dans un sens
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descriptif et/ou évaluatif, on s’efforcera de défendre l’idée que les croyances sont des attitudes
gouvernées par des normes proprement épistémiques, mais auxquelles nous pouvons nous plier
ou non, volontairement. Rendre compte du phénomène de la dérive de la croyance permettra
d’asseoir la thèse selon laquelle nous avons des devoirs épistémiques, parce que les croyances sont
bien, quoi qu’en un sens qu’il faudra spécifier et qui ne s’applique pas aux actions, des attitudes
volontaires.
§§§
Christophe Béal
Enseignant dans la secondaire. Doctorat soutenu à Paris 1, Nosophi
Le positivisme juridique inclusif
Les commentaires suscités par la théorie du droit de H.L.Hart ont profondément renouvelé la
réflexion sur le positivisme juridique. On a ainsi vu apparaître l’hypothèse d’un positivisme juridique inclusif qui, tout en maintenant la thèse de la séparation entre le droit et la morale,
reconnaît la possibilité d’introduire des critères moraux dans les règles de reconnaissance qui permettent d’identifier le contenu du droit et qui fixent les conditions de validité des règles juridiques.
Notre contribution vise à présenter cette version du positivisme juridique et à faire le point sur
les diverses critiques dont elle a fait l’objet. Deux questions majeures se posent. Le positivisme
juridique inclusif est-il encore positiviste et peut-il être vraiment distingué de certaines versions
du droit naturel ou de théories qui remettent en cause les principes du positivisme ? Doit-on
admettre, à la suite de Joseph Raz, qu’une théorie positiviste conséquente ne peut-être qu’exclusive ? Le problème qui est ainsi soulevé est de savoir comment une règle secondaire peut inclure
une norme morale sans pour autant que l’ordre juridique soit subordonné à des normes morales
extra-juridiques.
§§§
Delia Belleri 1, & Michele Palmira 2
1 : University of Bologna
2 : University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
The Accuracy View of Disagreement
The recent debate on Truth Relativism has shed light on a variety of disagreements. But what
has Relativism done for the notion of disagreement tout court ? Not much ‚Äì one would be
tempted to answer. Until now, the acknowledgment of several kinds of disagreements by Relativists
has been mostly a strategic move purported at a defence of Relativism itself. The variety of
disagreements that has emerged so far has not yet been addressed as interesting in its own right.
In this paper, we wish to focus on disagreement as a category in its own right. The question
to be faced is whether there is something like disagreement tout court, over and beyond the
many disagreements on which Relativists have attracted our attention. We shall argue that some
notions that have been introduced by Relativists can be fruitfully employed to this end. Our
purpose is that of taking advantage of some notions typically introduced by Relativists, such as
the notion of "accuracy", strip them off of their Relativistic presuppositions and use them in order
to address the independent question of whether there is an overarching and interesting notion of
disagreement.
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§§§
Sandy Berkovski
Bilkent University
Welfare, subjectivity, and attitudes ; On approval
Many theorists taking part in the debate over personal welfare engage with the idea that the
welfare of an individual must, in a certain way to be specified, be subjective : it must reflect the
approving or disapproving ‘attitudes’ of that individual. Some theorists are attracted by this idea.
Others, while eventually coming to reject it, accept it as a legitimate and coherent alternative.
The purpose of this talk is to question the coherence of subjectivism. I ask whether there is
a concept of approval suitable for the subjectivist’s purposes. I argue that the only concept of
approval employable by a theory of welfare is one which fits hedonism. However, hedonism should
not be counted among subjectivist theories.
§§§
Anja Berninger
University of Tübingen
The Ontology of Emotion and Perception
The so-called perceptual theories of emotions have become increasingly popular in recent years.
One of the central claims these theories make is that there is a close structural similarity between
emotions and perceptions. In my talk I explore this claim from an ontological perspective. The
question I ask is whether emotions and perceptions belong to the same ontological category.
Following Helen Steward I distinguish three categories : states, events and processes. I then
explore the descriptions of emotions offered in perceptual theories of emotions. When theorists
say that emotions are similar to perception they usually mean ‘perception’ in the sense of ‘pattern
recognition’. I show that within these theories emotions and this form of perception are usually
seen as either states or events. I then go on to show that the way that emotions unfold through time
makes it much more plausible to see them as processes. I conclude that emotions and perceptions
should be placed in different ontological categories and that this poses a serious problem for
perceptual theories of emotions.
§§§
Alexandre Billon
STL - Université Lille 3
Happiness for dummies
There is a long tradition, in philosophy, of blaming passions for our unhappiness. If only we
were more rational, it is claimed, we would lead happier lives. I argue that such an optimism
is misguided and that paradoxically, people with desires, like us, cannot both be happy and
rational.
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§§§
Delphine Blitman
Institut Jean Nicod
La notion d’innéité est-elle scientifiquement pertinente ?
La notion d’innéité est très critiquée dans la philosophie des sciences contemporaine. Aux yeux de
nombreux chercheurs, c’est une notion préscientifique, qui doit être éliminée. L’objet de cet article
est de défendre la pertinence scientifique de la notion d’innéité tout en prenant acte des critiques
justifiées qui lui sont faites. En premier lieu, je reviens sur les critiques de la notion d’innéité. Le
débat contemporain est en partie confus, mêlant des arguments différents. L’analyse de celui-ci
permet de regrouper les arguments avancés sous trois grands problèmes distincts : au niveau
de la génétique, le problème de l’interactionnisme ; au niveau du cerveau, celui de la plasticité
cérébrale ; enfin, au niveau du comportement, celui du développementalisme. Pour chacun de
ces problèmes, je montre dans quelle mesure la critique de la notion d’innéité est justifiée. En
second lieu, j’argumente cependant pour soutenir que ces critiques n’ôtent pas tout sens au débat
inné/acquis. Je propose d’abord que la notion d’innéité doit être définie, de manière relative et
particulière, à chacun de ces niveaux, et j’explique ensuite pourquoi une interprétation causale
des liens entre ces différents niveaux me semble à même de sauvegarder la cohérence de la notion
d’innéité.
§§§
Roland Bluhm
TU Dortmund
Linguistic Corpora in Philosophical Analyses
Ordinary Language Philosophy has largely fallen out of favour and with it the belief in the
primary importance of analyses of ordinary language for philosophical purposes. Still, in their
various endeavours philosophers not only from analytic but also from other backgrounds make
reference to the use and/or meaning of terms of interest in ordinary parlance. In doing so, they
most commonly appeal to their own linguistic intuitions (in the sense of their active knowledge
of the object language). Not uncommonly, the appeal to individual intuitions is supplemented
by reference to dictionaries. In recent times, internet search engine queries on expressions of
interest have become quite popular. Apparently, the attempt is to surpass the limits of one’s own
linguistic intuitions by appeal to experts or to factual uses of language. I will argue that this
attempt is recommendable but that its execution is wanting. Instead of appealing to dictionaries
and/or internet queries, philosophers should employ computer-based linguistic corpora in order
to confirm or falsify hypotheses about the factual use of language. This also has some advantages
over methods employed by experimental philosophy. If the importance of ordinary language is
stressed, the use of linguistic corpora is hardly avoidable.
§§§
Thomas Boyer
MSH de Lorraine (USR 3261 CNRS / Université de Lorraine), Archives Henri Poincaré (UMR
7117 CNRS / Université de Lorraine)
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L’unité d’un domaine de recherche scientifique, d’un point de vue pratique : une
proposition
Je m’intéresse ici à l’unité de la science au sein d’un domaine de recherche, et non pas entre des
domaines de recherche différents. Par exemple, il s’agit de caractériser en quoi la mécanique des
fluides, ou la mécanique quantique, constituent chacun des champs de recherche unis. Cette unité
n’est pas étudiée de façon théorique (auquel cas il s’agirait de montrer si les différents modèles
utilisés, ou les différentes hypothèses théoriques employées, peuvent former un tout cohérent)
mais en prenant en compte la pratique scientifique : on s’intéresse par exemple au langage employé, aux questions considérées comme significatives, aux méthodes expérimentales adoptées,
etc. L’objectif de cette présentation est de caractériser de façon générale les conditions sous lesquelles on considère qu’un domaine de recherche est uni d’un point de vue pratique. Pour cela, je
considère tout d’abord un concept d’unité proposé par Kitcher (1993), qui repose sur l’existence
d’une pratique scientifique consensuelle dans le domaine de recherche. J’étudie ensuite les limites
auxquelles cette analyse fait face. Je propose enfin un nouveau concept d’unité, qui repose sur la
possibilité de réutiliser des travaux scientifiques en dépit d’une diversité des pratiques scientifiques
adoptées.
§§§
Anne-Sophie Brueggen
Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum
The content of imaginings and the "Multiple Use Thesis"
Many authors endorse (implicitly or explicitly) the so-called Multiple Use Thesis of imagination.
This thesis claims that the same mental image can serve different imaginative projects. So e.g.
imagining a suitcase and imagining a suitcase totally obscuring a cat behind it involve the same
mental image. But the Multiple Use Thesis raised several questions, among others the following : If
the same mental image can be used in different imaginative projects, what is the intrinsic content
of the "neutral" mental image ? Based on this criticism I will reconsider MULT in this paper
and offer an alternative account to construe imaginative content. I will argue that an actively
produced visual imagining intrinsically settles all imaginative content. So there are no "neutral"
mental images, which can be used for different purposes. Additionally I will suggest that MULT
is based on a misguided analogy to perception.
§§§
Evan Thomas Butts
Slim is In : A Narrow Account of Abilities in Epistemology
Ability is a key notion in much contemporary, externalist epistemology. Various authors have
argued that there is (at least) an ability condition on knowledge (Sosa 2007 ; Greco 1999, 2007.
2009 ; Millar 2010 ; Pritchard 2010, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). Moreover, epistemic justification is also argued to be tied to ability (at least by Greco 2007). Yet, there is not total agreement
amongst the interested parties about the conditions under which subjects possess abilities, nor
the conditions under which a subject who possesses an ability exercises or manifests it. I will
argue in favor of what Millar (2010) dubs the "narrow" account of abilities, and against the
"broad" account. My argument proceeds by identifying basic constraints on accounts of ability,
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and then arguing that the broad account of abilities (advocated by Millar [2010] and Greco [2009])
runs afoul of these constraints. The narrow account (advocated by Sosa and Kallestrup & Pritchard) will be seen not to have this problem. A possible out for Greco will be considered, before
concluding in favor of the narrow account.
§§§
Jacques Cabaret
INRA and Tours University
Disease concepts in domesticated animals : the role of deduction, induction and
abduction
Disease concept in humans is threefold : what you feel (sick : personal concept), what your doctor
diagnosed (disease : biomedical concept), what society reckon about your disease (ill : sociological
concept).These concepts fit also to animal diseases but they will be mediated through the owner,
the vet and the health insurance company. The owner will base its sick category on the fact that
the animal behave differently (it does not eat, is rejected by the others etc.) ; after these alerting
signs, the owner may well have deepen his analysis : does the animal present fever, anaemia etc..
Induction and possibly abduction will be the major reasoning tools. The vet will be indicated
which animal is behaving differently and will try to construct a diagnostic, alone or with the
aid of the laboratory, and then will propose control of the disease either in a sole animal or in
a group : the deduction will be the major tools.. The insurance expert, based on vet or other
health experts, will then decide to reimburse the cost of treatments or not. The ill concept will be
constructed from deduction (the vet/laboratory diagnosis), induction (farmers/owner view) and
particularly abduction.
§§§
Marta Campdelacreu
University of Barcelona
Do we need two notions of constitution ?
In this paper I present and analyse Robert Wilson’s arguments against the following traditionally
held position. The relation between objects like a statue, a dollar bill or a person and the object(s)
from which they are made like a piece of marble, a piece of paper or an organism, is a relation
not of identity but of constitution. Moreover, there is just one relation of constitution. Wilson
argues against this last point and defends that there are two different relations of constitution.
In this paper I argue that Wilson’s arguments for the existence of two notions of constitution are
incorrect. In my argumentation I crucially use the existence of principles of existence‚ persistence,
which constitutionalists, Wilson among them, usually accept. I also use a slightly modified version
of Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of constitution.
§§§
Elena Casetta
Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST)
LabOnt (Torino)
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Arguing for a Pluralistic Species Concept in the Assessment of Biodiversity
It seems fairly obvious to tie in some way biodiversity to species. But, because of the so-called
species problem, and in particular the persistent disagreement on species counting, several alternative proposals have been advanced to assess biodiversity without resorting to the species
concept, such as measuring higher taxa, phylogenetic diversity, or genetic diversity. In this talk
I will argue that although species are not the (only) units of biodiversity, a pluralistic species
concept is nonetheless a useful tool to assess biodiversity. After having enlighten the difference
between units of biodiversity and indicators of biodiversity, I take as a case study the shift from
a non phylogenetic species concept to a phylogenetic one and I argue that disagreement about
species counts is not a practically insurmountable obstacle ; rather, it could provide conservation
plans with useful criteria for making better choices. Hence — as far as an indicator of biodiversity is concerned — pluralistic species concept can do the job. Finally I give three more reasons
speaking in favor of species (and against the majority of alternative proposals), in spite of the
difficulties.
§§§
Bertrand Cassegrain
Université de Genève, Département de science politique et relations internationales
Obligation politique et autorité : une critique de la théorie des principes multiples
de George Klosko
Il existe aujourd’hui une vaste littérature sur l’obligation politique, c’est-à-dire sur l’obligation
d’obéir à l’Etat qui nous gouverne. En revanche, plus rares sont les discussions à propos de
l’autorité, qui est pourtant considérée comme étant l’autre face de la même pièce. Or, l’étude de
l’autorité peut apporter des éléments nouveaux au débat concernant l’obligation politique. Dans
un premier temps, je proposerai une description particulière de l’autorité, qui fera appel à la
théorie Hohfeldienne des droits ainsi qu’à certains éléments de la philosophie du langage. Dans
un deuxième temps, je montrerai en quoi une telle description peut nous être utile pour réfléchir
à la justification ou à la légitimation de l’autorité et, in fine, à la justification de l’obligation
politique. Je le ferai en examinant la théorie des principes multiples de Georges Klosko et je
tenterai de montrer que, si nous avons peut-être de bonnes raisons d’obéir à l’Etat, ces raisons ne
légitiment pas pour autant son autorité. J’espère ainsi permettre une meilleure compréhension des
conditions de justification et de légitimation de l’autorité ainsi que de l’obligation politique.
§§§
Jean-Marie Chevalier
Chaire de métaphysique et de philosophie de la connaissance Collège de France
L’unité du raisonnement !
Dans The unity of reasoning ? (2009), John Broome propose une conception cognitiviste du raisonnement pratique, selon laquelle ce que l’analyse du raisonnement théorique dit des croyances
peut être dit des intentions dans le cadre de l’analyse du raisonnement pratique. Cela lui permet
de défendre la thèse supposée non intuitive de l’unité du raisonnement, c’est-à-dire de l’homogénéité des raisonnements pratique et théorique. Une partie de l’article consiste à répondre à
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l’objection du "just too cognitive" (Bratman 2009) : bien que peu plausible, cette proximité des
formes de raisonnement n’est pas un argument contre la théorie. J’examine l’objection inverse, du
"not entangled enough". En effet, rien ne semble justifier que les raisonnements pratique et théorique soient hétérogènes, sinon une tradition philosophique qui d’Aristote à Anscombe a souhaité
développer l’autonomie du domaine pratique. L’intuition du sens commun serait bien plutôt que,
dans le cas des intentions et des croyances, nous mettons en jeu des processus similaires. Soucieux
de ne pas passer pour un cognitiviste extrême en défendant sa conception "épistémique" du raisonnement pratique, Broome a omis de considérer certaines corrélations profondes entre les deux
types de raisonnement.
§§§
Daniele Chiffi & Silvia Gaio
The Knowability Paradox in the Light of Logic for Pragmatics
Fitch’s Knowability Paradox shows that from the reasonable assumptions that all truths are
knowable in principle and that there is at least an unknown truth (i.e., we are non-omniscient)
follows the undesirable conclusion that all truths are in fact known. Several diagnoses of the
paradox have been proposed. We focus, in particular, on the Intuitionistic revision, which aims
at avoiding the paradoxical conclusion. However, Percival argues that the Intuitionistic revision
incurs a further paradox, the so-called Undecidedness Paradox of Knowability, which states that
there are no undecided statements. Our proposal is to provide a Pragmatic revision of the Undecidedness Paradox, that is a revision based on the Logic for Pragmatics. Unlike the treatment
of the Undecidedness Paradox of Knowability in Intuitionistic Logic, our argument avoids any
contradiction and paradox as it merely shows that there are undecidable sentences. Since in different fragments of the Logic for Pragmatics classical and intuitionistic arguments are valid, our
approach sheds new light on the Paradox of Knowability, preserving its gains but avoiding some
of its paradoxical consequences.
§§§
Eric Clémençon
La théorie causale de la référence à l’épreuve de la nomenclature biologique
Les exemples de termes de sortes pris par Kripke et Putnam sont majoritairement pris dans
le vocabulaire des langues naturelles. Du fait des conséquences épistémologiques tirées par ces
auteurs et leurs épigones, il est légitime de se demander si la TCR s’applique aux lexiques scientifiques. Nous confrontons cette théorie sémantique aux Codes Internationaux de Nomenclature
biologiques qui régulent la construction et la validité des noms des taxons. Cette confrontation
se fait à deux niveaux : 1) Nous comparons les hypothèses sociolinguistiques du "baptême" et de
"la division sociale du travail linguistique" à la méthodologie effective des naturalistes de terrain
et des taxinomistes. 2) Nous présentons les Codes de Nomenclature du point de vue de la fixation
de la référence des termes systématiques, et les rapportons à la thèse de la TCR selon laquelle
un terme peut être "introduit soit par ostension, soit par une description". Nous dégageons le
principe sémantique des Codes et analysons particulièrement leur outil méthodologique central,
"le type porte-nom". Celui-ci est obligatoirement constitué par 1) la présence matérielle d’un spécimen du taxon, 2) le nom scientifique donné par le découvreur de l’espèce, et 3) une description
du taxon, la "diagnose". Sur la base de ces deux ensembles, nous évaluons la pertinence de la
TRC dans le contexte de la nomenclature scientifique.
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§§§
Damir Cicic
Central European University
A New Version of the Manipulation Argument for Incompatibilism
The Manipulation Argument is one of the most influential arguments for the incompatibility of
moral responsibility and causal determinism. It is an argument to the effect that if causal determinism is true we cannot be morally responsible for our actions because there is no relevant
difference between causal determinism and responsibility-undermining manipulation. In my presentation I will try to answer two questions concerning this argument. The first is whether it is
possible to manipulate someone in a way that the person is not responsible, without depriving
her of the abilities or characteristics that one could have regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism. In other words, I will inquire whether it could turn out that everyone is the victim of
responsibility-undermining manipulation. The second question I will examine is whether the mere
fact of being manipulated by another person could account for the lack of one’s responsibility. I
will present my own manipulation examples developed on the basis of Derk Pereboom’s examples,
which, in my view, strongly suggest the affirmative answer to the first question and the negative
answer to the second question. Thus, I will argue that there are good reasons to believe that
causal determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible.
§§§
Roberto Ciuni & Carlo Proietti
Supervaluations, Subvaluations and indeterminism
Supervaluationism holds that the future is undetermined, and as a consequence of this, statements
about the future may be neither true nor false. Here we explore the novel and quite different view
that the future is abundant : statements about the future do not lack truth-value, but may
instead be glutty, that is both true and false. We will show that (1) the logic resulting from this
“abundance of the future” is a non-adjunctive paraconsistent formalism based on subvaluations,
which has the virtue that all classical laws are valid in it, while no formula like "A and notA" is satisfiable (though both "A" and "not-A" may be true in a model) ; (2) The peculiar
behaviour of abundant logical consequence has a meaningful interesting parallel in probability
logic ; (3) abundance preserves some important features of classical logic (that supervaluationism
does not preserve) when it comes to express those important retrogradations of truth which are
presupposed by the argument de praesenti ad praeteritum.
§§§
Nicola Claudio Salvatore
University of Edinburgh
Wittgensteinian epistemology and cartesian skepticism
In this paper, I present and discuss a number of current anti-skeptical strategies directly influenced
by Wittgenstein’s remarks on hinge propositions. I aim to show how these proposals, both as
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viable interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and especially as anti-skeptical strategies, are
ultimately unconvincing. Furthermore, I compare and contrast these approaches with another
Wittgenstein-inspired position, according to which we should consider "hinge propositions" as
"rules of grammar". I argue that this account represents a more viable solution (or, perhaps
better, dissolution) of Cartesian-style skepticism.
§§§
John Cook
St. Francis Xavier University
Semantic Deference and the Case of Malapropisms
Donald Davidson (1986) has argued that the ubiquity of malapropisms, and the ease with which
we are able to interpret those who utter them, shows that speaking as others do, and meaning
the same thing by our words as others in our linguistic community, are not essential features of
successful linguistic exchanges.
This argument has been challenged in many ways, but most recently by appealing to the phenomenon of linguistic deference.
Reimer (2004), for instance, argues that it is a necessary condition that a speaker is deferential
to the linguistic conventions prevailing in the community, otherwise, her words lack semantic
content. Predelli (2010), on the other hand, argues we are able to preserve our widely-shared assumptions about communication because the appeal to what he calls “syntactic deference” means
that speakers who utter malapropisms do not “employ expressions” that violate the conventions
of the linguistic community.
In this paper we argue that these appeals to deference do not in fact avoid the problem posed by
Davidson. Although it is certainly true that many speakers acknowledge these deferential intentions in speaking, the appeal to linguistic deference is no help in explaining how we understand
speakers who are non-deferential.
§§§
Damiano Costa 1* & Alessandro Giordani 2*
1 : University of Geneva
2 : Catholic University of Milan
Events as kind instantiations
The present paper aims at assessing two of the problems characterizing contemporary metaphysics, i.e. (i) the problem of the individuation of events ; (ii) the problem of the persistence of
objects and events, i.e. whether they perdure or endure. We put forward a theory of kinds that
offers an elegant solution to both problems and highlights the connection between the identity
criteria of events and their way of persistence.
Ad (i), every criterion of identity for events proposed so far turned out to be problematic. It has
been argued that an effective criterion should position itself at a level of intermediate granularity
between that of Kim and that of Quine. In this contribution we shall show how a theory of kinds
of events allows formulating a criterion that positions itself at the requested intermediate level.
Ad (ii), we shall show how kinds of objects and events have structurally different characteristics,
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and how these differences allow deducing that events perdure and objects endure. Besides that,
these considerations are interesting for a twofold reason : (a) they link together the topics of
persistence and identity ; (b) they allow to approach the endurance/perdurance debate at a level
logically deeper than the one of temporal parts.
§§§
Florian Cova
Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences
"I couldn’t have done otherwise"
Les commentaires suscités par la théorie du droit de H.L.Hart ont profondément renouvelé la
réflexion sur le positivisme juridique. On a ainsi vu apparaître l’hypothèse d’un positivisme juridique inclusif qui, tout en maintenant la thèse de la séparation entre le droit et la morale,
reconnaît la possibilité d’introduire des critères moraux dans les règles de reconnaissance qui permettent d’identifier le contenu du droit et qui fixent les conditions de validité des règles juridiques.
Notre contribution vise à présenter cette version du positivisme juridique et à faire le point sur
les diverses critiques dont elle a fait l’objet. Deux questions majeures se posent. Le positivisme
juridique inclusif est-il encore positiviste et peut-il être vraiment distingué de certaines versions
du droit naturel ou de théories qui remettent en cause les principes du positivisme ? Doit-on
admettre, à la suite de Joseph Raz, qu’une théorie positiviste conséquente ne peut-être qu’exclusive ? Le problème qui est ainsi soulevé est de savoir comment une règle secondaire peut inclure
une norme morale sans pour autant que l’ordre juridique soit subordonné à des normes morales
extra-juridiques.
§§§
Mikaël Cozic 1* & Brian Hill 2*
1 : Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques CNRS
2 : GREGHEC
Les théorèmes de représentation
L’une des caractéristiques saillantes de la théorie de la décision, telle qu’on la pratique depuis la
seconde guerre mondiale, est le style axiomatique dans lequel elle se développe. Le travail axiomatique culmine dans des résultats qu’on appelle des théorèmes de représentations. Von Neumann
et Morgenstern, dans la Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944/1947) et Savage dans
les Foundations of Statistics (1954/1972), ont montré la voie en proposant deux théorèmes de
représentation pour le critère d’espérance d’utilité. Soixante après ces travaux pionniers, une part
considérable de la recherche théorique en sciences de la décision est toujours structurée par l’élaboration de tels théorèmes de représentation. Pour certains, c’est parce qu’ils fournissent des «
fondements » aux concepts des modèles de décision concernés (par exemple, ceux d’utilité ou de
probabilité subjective pour le modèle d’espérance subjective d’utilité). Notre communication se
propose de discuter et d’évaluer cette idée, en la confrontant aux conceptions contemporaines
de la signification des termes théoriques et en particulier à celles que l’on rattache à Carnap et
à Lewis. Nous montrerons que l’indispensabilité des théorèmes de représentation est difficile à
justifier de ce point de vue.
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§§§
Marie Darrason
Esquisse d’une théorie génétique mécaniste de la maladie
Le concept de maladie génétique s’est considérablement élargi au point qu’on a pu affirmer dans
la littérature biomédicale contemporaine que toute maladie pouvait être considérée comme génétique . Cette affirmation a généralement été interprétée comme une tentative de gène centrisme,
qui consacrerait la prédominance du rôle des gènes dans l’explication causale de la maladie au
détriment des facteurs non génétiques. Comme il a été démontré que le gène centrisme est à la fois
scientifiquement injustifié et éthiquement discutable, cette affirmation devrait être rejetée. Il nous
semble pourtant qu’à condition de bien vouloir cesser de mesurer l’influence causale des gènes et
de l’environnement dans l’explication des maladies, c’est à dire à condition de sortir du problème
de la sélection causale, il est possible de donner une interprétation pertinente de cette affirmation.
Nous proposons en particulier de nous appuyer sur la théorie génétique des maladies infectieuses
qui prétend unifier les maladies infectieuses en mettant au jour des mécanismes génétiques communs à cette classe de maladies. A partir de cet exemple d’une théorie génétique mécaniste d’une
classe de maladie, nous chercherons à esquisser les fondements d’une théorie génétique mécaniste
de la maladie en général.
§§§
Sandrine Darsel
Archives Poincaré, UMR 7117, CNRS
UNIVERSITE DE NANCY 2
Le paradoxe de l’art conceptuel
On attend de l’art conceptuel qu’il possède une valeur cognitive élevée. Cela tiendrait à sa spécificité : l’œuvre d’art comme résultat est mise entre parenthèse au profit de l’action artistique
entendu comme processus intellectuel. Toutefois, on peut douter du rôle cognitif qui est attribué à
l’art conceptuel ou à tout le moins, reconsidérer sa teneur épistémique. En ce sens, je souhaiterais
développer l’argumentation suivante. La faiblesse cognitive de l’art conceptuel ne tient pas à un
manque de contenu propositionnel mais à ses conditions logiques de réception : l’art conceptuel
n’appelle pas à une expérience sensible d’un quelque chose ayant des propriétés esthétiques. Or,
la valeur cognitive essentielle et spécifique de l’art repose sur la performance réussie du spectateur
attentif à l’œuvre (laquelle mobilise perception aspectuelle fine, effort de l’imagination, émotions
ajustées et aventure conceptuelle). Ainsi, quelque soit son contenu propositionnel, le rôle cognitif
de l’art conceptuel n’est ni intrinsèque ni spécifique. A l’inverse, l’art « traditionnel » sous ses
diverses formes peut posséder une telle valeur cognitive.
§§§
Michael De
Utrecht University
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Two ways of meeting the Humphrey objection on the objector’s turf
One serious objection to Lewisian modal realism, in particular counterpart theory without overlap,
is that it violates important adequacy conditions on an analysis of modality. One such constraint,
call it Aboutness, is that de re possibilities for an individual s be genuinely about s. What the
“genuinely” qualification is intended to rule out are analyses according to which de re possibilities
for s may be given without attributing (in the analysans) a property intrinsic to s herself. Kripke’s well-known “Humphrey objection” is precisely the objection that Lewis’ counterpart theory
violates Aboutness. Lewis responds by claiming that what is important in an analysis of de re
possibilities concerning an individual such as Humphrey need not be genuinely about Humphrey
as long as the analysis involves an individual that suitably represents Humphrey.
Lewis’s response is clearly not going to convince anyone wedded to Aboutness. I argue, however,
that there are two responses faithful to counterpart theory that embrace Aboutness. One of them
undermines an assumption Lewis holds concerning the temporal structure of possible worlds,
while the other concerns the nature of ordinary and transworld individuals.
§§§
Nicolas Delon
The moral status of animals
I defend a contextual approach in animal ethics. A common core assumption of the main theories
(utilitarianism, deontology, rights, contractualism, capabilities) is that the implications of moral
status of an entity are exclusively determined by its intrinsic properties (esp. capacities). I consider, and rebut, several attempts to correlate status with intrinsic properties (moral individualism,
degree-theories), and I put forth a theory that avoids such oppositions as speciesism/impartialism,
particularism/universalization. It rests on (i) a species norm account that does not lead to crude
speciesism and allows relevantly to adapt an animal’s status to its nature ; (ii) a contextual
aspect which refines corresponding obligations as a function of salient parameters. Moral individualism and degree-theories lead to both epistemic and practical dead-ends, and the cost of
their counterintuitive implications outweigh their benefits. But even more moderate approaches
such as Nussbaum’s can only evade the objections at the cost of revising the aforementioned
core assumption. I address the objections from the appeal to commonsense intuitions and from
partiality, and show that my approach is actually robust and compatible with a certain form of
impartialism.
§§§
Natalja Deng
An Interpretation and Defense of Fine’s ’Argument From Passage’
I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine’s "Argument from Passage", which is
situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart’s paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic
approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory.
I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines
us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the
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picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed facts
not being "oriented towards" one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others who
advance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart’s paradox to indicate neither the need for
a more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is not
to be had : Fine’s "non-standard realism" amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. But
instead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannot
deliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B-theoretic account of passage
that simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender.
§§§
Esa Diaz-Leon
University of Manitoba
Social Kinds and Conceptual Analysis : Defending the Semantic Strategy
My main question in this paper concerns the methodology of the study of social kinds. In particular, I want to focus on the role of two possible kinds of considerations in order to assess accounts
of race and gender : conceptual analysis, on the one hand, and normative considerations, on
the other. Some philosophers have recently argued that conceptual analysis is irrelevant, or at
least seriously limited, when it comes to answering the main philosophical questions about the
nature of gender and race. For instance, Sally Haslanger has argued that the main question in
this debate is not what our ordinary concept is, but rather what our ordinary concept should be,
and furthermore, that even when we are concerned with our ordinary concept, this is not really
constrained by ordinary speakers’ intuitions. Similarly, Ron Mallon has argued that the most
significant question in the race debate is the question of whether we should keep or eliminate
racial terms (and this is independent of what our ordinary concept of race is, or what it actually
refers to). In response, I will argue that conceptual analysis has a significant role to play in the
context of philosophical debates about race and gender.
§§§
Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim
Université Rennes 1
Le monisme de la constitution matérielle et l’objection de l’indiscernabilité
Le monisme à l’égard de la constitution matérielle soutient que la coïncidence permanente (CP)
entre un objet et le morceau de matière qui le constitue entraîne leur identité. Son défi est
d’expliquer comment il peut y avoir identité dans les cas de CP en dépit de propriétés modales
différentes. À cette fin, les monistes adoptent une stratégie dite « abélardienne » d’après laquelle
la différence de prédication modale ne reflète pas une différence quant aux propriétés modales,
articulées en termes de relations de contrepartie. Mon intervention discute une objection récente
que Jim Stone adresse à l’encontre du monisme : si celui-ci défend qu’il y a indiscernabilité
modale dans les cas de CP, alors il doit aussi le faire dans les cas de coïncidence temporaire
(CT), s’empêchant ainsi d’expliquer la divergence des carrières temporelles. Je montrerai que,
pace Stone, la théorie des contreparties a suffisamment de ressources pour rendre compte du fait
qu’il y a bien une différence modale dans les cas de CT sans différence modale dans les cas de
CP. Je soutiendrai que ceci ne sauve cependant pas le monisme de l’objection dans la mesure où
il est incapable d’expliquer la différence de propriétés sortales dans les cas de CT.
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§§§
Mareile Drechsler
London School of Economics (LSE)
Three Types of Uncertainty
Using Savage’s framework, this paper proposes a distinction between three types of uncertainty :
ambiguity, option uncertainty and state space uncertainty. Under ambiguity the agent cannot assign a unique subjective probability to each state. The results of Ellsberg’s (1961) experiment tend
to be explained by ambiguity aversion. Option uncertainty refers to the case where the state space
is insufficiently fine-grained. Then consequences of acts at particular states are not unique ; the
agent can envisage several possible consequences at every state. This paper argues that this type
of uncertainty is separate from, and cannot be reduced to, ambiguity. The empirical phenomenon
of status quo bias (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991) is predicted by option uncertainty aversion. State space uncertainty is the most severe case of uncertainty, where the agent does not have
access to an exhaustive state space and unforeseen contingencies can occur. Subjective expected
utility maximisation is no longer feasible. The paper analyses the characteristics of these types of
uncertainty and argues that they are normatively and descriptively distinct.
§§§
Julien Dutant
The Normative Sceptical Paradox and its Practical Solution
In a nutshell, the normative sceptical paradox is this. If you know what you had for lunch, you
could bet your mother’s life on it. But you could not bet your mother’s life on it. So you do not
know what you had for lunch. But that is crazy, you do know it. The paradox is at the heart of
the recent "pragmatic encroachment" literature. Main existing diagnoses lay the blame on some
assumption about knowledge : that we have it, that it is not sensitive to stakes, or that it warrants
action. We defend a diagnosis that lays the blame on some assumption about normative reasons.
p is not a sufficient reason to bet your life on p for a small gain. Hence knowing p does not
make it rational for you to bet your life on p for a small gain. The diagnosis requires some rule
utilitarist-like reconsideration of the way in which decision problems are commonly framed.
§§§
Matthias Egg
Université de Lausanne
The Role of Common Sense in the Debate on Scientific Realism
In the debate on scientific realism, realists and antirealists often seem to share a certain realism
about the objects of common sense, disagreeing only about the status of scientific entities. However, this paper analyzes an argument (by Stathis Psillos) in favour of scientific realism, which
seems to contradict common sense realism. I will show that there is a tension between Psillos’s
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criticism of common sense and his factualist (as opposed to fundamentalist) conception of scientific realism. The paper concludes with a proposal on how to reconcile these two conflicting aspects
of Psillos’s philosophy.
§§§
Patrik Engisch
University of Fribourg
Singular Thought and the Acquaintance Principle
What I will call the Standard Account of singular thought can be summarized with the help of
the following three theses :
(i) One can think about a particular either via a description or directly.
(ii) The correct explanation of that fact is that descriptive thoughts have general propositions as
content while non-descriptive thoughts have singular propositions as content.
(iii) In order to hold a singular thought, i.e. a thought that has a singular proposition as content,
one must be acquainted with its constituents.
As it is well-known, Russell defended a very strong version of (iii), restricting heavily the class
of singular thoughts. But his notion of acquaintance has since been supplanted by more or less
strong versions of it, both in the neo-Russsellian and in the neo-Fregean camp. Recently, however,
some authors have proposed a very different way to account for the phenomenon of the singularity
of thought. In my talk, I intend to examine critically a position advocated by Robin Jeshion in
a recent series of papers in which she casts doubt on both (ii) and (iii) while trying to argue
independently for (i).
§§§
Yuval Eylon
The Open University of Israel
Blaming and Knowing
What is the rule governing the speech-act of blaming ? One necessary condtion is knowledge, or at
least justified belief : blame S fo A iff you know S acted wrongly without a valid excuse. But this is
not sufficient : when the blamer himself is guilty of committing the same wrong, the speech0act is
infelicitous. I will argue that we should look for further conditions to the knowledge-ruke. Insraed,
we should understand knowledge as entailing motivation (internalism), and view understanding
of others as involving identification (and reject theory-theory views).
§§§
Carlo Filotico
Université de Parme, Département de Langue et Littérature Italiennes
Relativism and the Norms of Assertion
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§§§
According to many contemporary versions of relativism, at least some propositions are such
that we can assign to them a truth value only relatively to a further parameter, which may
represent the standards of evaluation of the person involved in the truth-judgement. Some
contemporary relativist philosophers hold also that accounts of truth as a relative notion are
reliable because they are strong enough to justify the thesis that belief and assertion are
governed by norms in which the concept of truth is supposed to play a role : namely, the norms
that we aim to make true assertions and that we should believe a proposition only when that
proposition is true. In my work I will focus mainly on John MacFarlane’s account of norms for
assertion (MACFARLANE (2005) and I will try to show that MacFarlane’s notion of relative
truth, as it stands, cannot play a genuine normative role because it requires some further
theoretical clarifications, still to be provided by relativist philosophers.
Martin Fischer 1* & Johannes Stern 1*, 2*
1 : MCMP, LMU Munich
2 : Université de Genève
Paradoxes of interacting modal predicates
Conceiving of modal notions as predicates has been around since the very beginning of formal
philosophizing. For almost as long we know that the constitutive modal ptinciples lead to inconsistency, if modalities are treated as predicates. This suggest that our basic linguistic and
philosophical intuitions with respect to these notions have to be reconsidered. Before doing so it
seems helpful to be aware of the different options available and thus to analyze and systematize
the modal principles with respect to their joint consistency and inconsistency. Where this has
been done to a certain extent with respect to modal principles of single modal notions nothing
of the like has been done for the setting of multiple modalities where several modal predicates
are allowed to interact. This is even more pressing as further, unexpected paradoxes might arise
in this setting. In our presentation we shall make some first steps towards a systematization of
the paradoxes arising from the interaction of modal predicates and, more specifically, propose to
distinguish between paradoxes which in a certain sense are reducible to the paradoxes of single
modal predicates and those that are genuine, crucially depending on the interaction of the modal
predicates.
§§§
Denis Fisette
Université du Québec à Montréal
Brentano et les théories néo-brentaniennes de la conscience
Je m’intéresse aux discussions récentes autour de Brentano et de ce qu’il est maintenant convenu
d’appeler les théories néo-brentaniennes de la conscience. La théorie de la conscience élaborée par
Franz Brentano dans sa Psychologie d’un point de vue empirique suscite actuellement beaucoup
d’intérêt dans la philosophie de l’esprit et dans les sciences cognitives. Certains ont souligné le
caractère novateur de sa conception de la conscience tandis que d’autres, tels les défenseurs d’une
théorie auto-representationelle de la conscience, se réclament explicitement de Brentano dans lequel ils voient un précurseur de leur propre théorie. Ce retour est-il pertinent à la lumière des
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débats actuels sur la conscience, et plus précisément sur ce qu’on appelle la conscience phénoménale ? Plusieurs adversaires de Brentano estiment que sa conception de la conscience et de l’esprit
s’apparente à ce qu’on appelle depuis G. Ryle le théâtre cartésien (i.e. à un ensemble de propriétés
attribuées à la res cogitans de Descartes) et qu’elle n’est donc d’aucune utilité pour résoudre le
problème "difficile" de la conscience. Je voudrais montrer que le programme de Brentano peut
répondre à la plupart de ces objections et que, moyennant quelques modifications, il conserve
toute sa pertinence dans le contexte actuel des débats sur la conscience.
§§§
Ide Fouche
Laboratoire d’études sur les monothéismes
Le dilemme d’Euthyphron et la critique du modèle légal en métaéthique
Un des arguments avancés en philosophie de la religion par les tenants de la réponse volontariste
au " dilemme d’Euthyphron " (les objets possèdent-ils leurs propriétés morales indépendamment
de toute pro/con-attitude des agents, et de Dieu lui-même, ou en raison d’un décret libre de
Dieu ?) tire de la thèse de la souveraineté divine l’impossibilité de considérer Dieu comme obéissant à des lois, fût-ce à des lois de la raison pratique, et la nécessité de faire de lui la source de
toute moralité et des obligations morales auxquelles il n’est pas lui-même soumis. Un problème
posé par cet argument est qu’il repose sur une conception " légale " de l’éthique partagée par
ces volontaristes et par un certain nombre de leurs adversaires objectivistes ou réalistes. Une critique de cette conception métaéthique ( par l’argument de l’inconsistance et de l’insatisfaisabilité
des commandements portant sur les fins bonnes ) permet de tenter une solution du dilemme,
fondée sur une théorie alternative, internaliste, et définissant la bonté comme une propriété extrinsèque possédée par les objets en relation avec les agents et leurs attitudes subjectives ou leurs
dispositions.
§§§
Florent Franchette
Hypercomputation and Verification
Alan Turing has devised the Turing machine, which is in logic the formalization of the notion of
a computable function. Nevertheless, Turing showed it was possible to devise an another model
named "O-machine", which is able to compute more functions than the Turing machine. The possibility of computing more functions than the Turing machine is today called "hypercomputation".
Although many hypercomputation models have been devised, the notion of hypercomputation is
not fully accepted by scientists and philosophers. More precisely, the debate concerns the following
claim that I will call "hypercomputation thesis" : it is possible to physically build a hypercomputation model. In this presentation, I will explain one problem raised against the hypercomputation
thesis, namely the "verification problem" : if we assume that we have a hypercomputation model
physically built, it would be impossible to verify that this model is able to compute a function
which is not computable by a Turing machine. I will propose an analysis of this problem in order
to show that it does not explicitly dispute the hypercomputation thesis.
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Guillaume Fréchette
Université du Québec à Montréal
Dispositional higher-order acts. A Brentanian account
What makes my seeing of a red patch a conscious act ? Is it a second-order act or is it a build-in feature of all mental acts ? Regarding the first question, we might ask further : is the second-order
act itself conscious ? Or are these acts unconscious acts ? Higher-Order-Theories of perception
and thought (HOT-theories) usually answer the first question affirmatively. In order to avoid the
infinite regress of second-, third-, etc. order of conscious-making acts, they usually argue that
second-order acts are not conscious. Franz Brentano’s theory is generally seen as an interesting
alternative to HOT-theories with (unconscious) higher-order acts, since it gives an account of
inner consciousness in terms of conscious-making acts without acknowledging the existence of
unconscious acts. But does he really succeed in avoiding the infinite regress ? In the following
paper, I express some doubts about his success. In order to make sense of his theory, I argue
that we have to choose between one of the two alternatives : either by allowing for some form of
unconscious consciousness or by showing that his theory is really an identity theory of consciousness and mental acts despite some of the HOT features it has. My choice will go for the first
alternative, but following a dispositional understanding of the adjective ‘unconscious’.This understanding of dispositions and its adaptation in the framework of Brentano’s theory of inner
consciousness would lead to a higher-order theory where for an intentional act A to be conscious
it is necessary for A (among other things) to be triggered by a disposition to A. I will propose
some support for this kind of theory.
§§§
Akiko Frischhut
The viciousness of McTaggart’s regress
McTaggart (1927) thought that temporal passage is incoherent because it leads into an infinite
vicious regress. I shall present a limited defence of McTaggart, arguing that his notion of passage
does indeed lead into a regress. I shall also argue however that the regress is not vicious in the
sense McTaggart thought it was.
My argument is based on the following three premises :
(1) If we follow McTaggart in regarding tenses as properties, then A-properties must be relational
properties and change in terms of them must be merely relational change.
(2) Relational changes necessarily depend on non-relational changes to bring them about.
(3) There is no non-relational change that can bring about the changes that constitute McTaggart’s temporal passage.
After arguing for each of the premises, I conclude that temporal passage, as McTaggart conceives
of it, is impossible.
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Mattia Gallotti
Jean Nicod Institute - Centre d’Epistémologie et d’Ergologie Comparatives
Internalism and the Mystery of the We-Mode
The theory of collective intentionality is an invaluable tool for exploring a wide range of issues
in social ontology and cognition. One classic argument proposed by John Searle holds that the
mark of collective intentionality lies in the representational mode in which collective mental
states are held in the head of individuals. So, for a state to be shared people need to access the
relevant mental content in the same "we-mode.’ Despite its commonsensical appeal, Searle’s view
has often been discarded as somewhat mysterious. According to relational theories of collective
intentionality, granted that a state is social insofar as it is represented as such, it is unclear how
sociality can be construed as an intrinsic property of individual brains. It follows that collective
intentionality excludes internalism. In this paper I shall question the clarity and significance of
the relational view, by proposing a newer interpretation of internalist collective intentionality
that builds upon, while trying to settle some of the controversies about, Searle’s theory of social
ontology.
§§§
Benoit Gaultier
Collège de France, chaire de Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance
La valeur de la connaissance et la nature de la croyance
Nous estimons intuitivement qu’il est préférable de savoir que p plutôt que simplement croire
véridiquement que p. Comment rendre compte de cette intuition ?
Je voudrais montrer qu’on ne peut espérer rendre compte de la supériorité épistémique de la
connaissance sur la simple croyance vraie en se demandant en quoi peut bien consister, et de
quelle propriété peut bien provenir, cette valeur qui, s’ajoutant à celle de sa vérité, fait qu’une
connaissance est supérieure à une simple croyance vraie. Il faut au contraire partir de la valeur
indivisible de la connaissance, c’est-à-dire (minimalement) du fait d’atteindre le vrai de façon
non chanceuse, et juger du succès de nos croyances en fonction du degré auquel il se trouve ainsi
atteint.
Je voudrais montrer ensuite que savoir que p n’est pas valorisé parce que le fait d’être dans cet état
épistémique satisferait une aspiration quelconque que nous aurions en formant nos croyances. La
supériorité de la connaissance découle constitutivement de la nature de la croyance, de sorte qu’il
est inconcevable d’imaginer des êtres dotés de croyances qui n’attribueraient pas de supériorité
épistémique à la connaissance.
Je voudrais montrer enfin qu’il ne s’ensuit cependant pas que lorsque je forme la croyance que p,
le fait de savoir que p est ce qui m’importe et doit m’importer. La connaissance n’est ni le but,
ni la norme de la croyance.
§§§
Martin Gibert
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Neurophilosophie, Université McGill
Voir son steak comme un animal mort (et l’imagination comme une vertu épistémique)
Imaginer un animal mort lorsque je vois un steak dans mon assiette peut-il constituer un gain épistémique ? Selon une certaine tradition rationaliste, l’imagination est une faculté dont on devrait
se méfier lorsqu’il s’agit de connaître la réalité. Cependant, plusieurs auteurs ont cherché à identifier une " imagination morale " et à valoriser son rôle en éthique. Dans ce papier en psychologie
morale, je me démarque moi aussi de la tradition rationaliste. Je considère plus particulièrement
le rôle de l’imagination dans notre perception morale, c’est-à-dire dans l’étape de prise de connaissance d’une situation, préalable nécessaire à la formation de tout jugement moral. Je soutiens que
l’imagination peut enrichir notre perception morale et que nous avons par conséquent des raisons
de la voir comme une vertu épistémique. J’établis ce point en mobilisant les notions de pertinence
morale et de saillance perceptive. Et je crois que mon explication est consistante avec ce que la
philosophie de la psychologie nous a récemment appris de l’imagination.
§§§
Ephraim Glick
University of St Andrews
Know-How and Linguistic Analysis
One welcome consequence of recent interest in know-how has been the recognition of the literature
as providing an excellent case study in how considerations about language might yield insight
on philosophical issues elsewhere. Appealing to linguistic theories of questions and knowledge-wh
constructions, D.G. Brown provided an early defence of the view that know-how is a kind of
knowledge-that. After Brown’s strategy was adopted and updated with contemporary syntax and
semantics by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, a number of critics expressed reservations
about the methodology. How could linguistics possibly establish substantive conclusions about
the relationship between two sorts of mental states ? In the present paper I (i) reconstruct the
central argument of Brown / Stanley and Williamson, (ii) review extant criticisms of the linguistic
strategy and argue that they fail to refute the central argument, and (iii) compare the debate
over know-how with several other issues to draw a general methodological moral : there is no
in-principle problem with using linguistics to identify type/sub-type relationships among nonlinguistic phenomena, provided those phenomena can be characterised in a certain way.
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Bernd Goebel
Theologische Fakultät Fulda
Was Anselm really an immanent realist ?
There still is much disagreement as to the nature of Anselm of Canterbury’s solution to the
ontological problem of universals. Anselm has recently been taken to be saying that a universalis
strictly immanent to its corresponding particulars. The chief evidence cited for Anselm’s all eged
immanent realism is his theory of original sin. The main part of my paper will be devoted to
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demonstrate that Anselm’s theory of original sin does not support any interpretation of this
kind. The immanentist reading draws upon by his remark that "the whole human nature" (tota
humana natura) was in Adam and "nothing of it" (nihil de illa) outside of him. Despite Anselm’s
use of the mereological preposition de, this has been taken to mean that Adam’s sin affected other
persons through their human nature, because human nature in its entirety was in Adam. That
is, not only was the reno part of human nature outside of Adam, but also did human nature not
exist anywhere else. Yet all it really means is that the substantial universal "human nature’ was
wholly, rather than partially instantiated in him. From these and other considerations, it turns
out that Anselm was no immanent realist.
§§§
Martin Grajner
TU Dresden
A Two-Factor Theory of Epistemic Justification
In this talk I outline and defend a theory of immediate or foundational justification that I call
"phenomenal reliabilism". This theory incorporates elements from Huemer’s theory of phenomenal
conservatism and Comesaña’s indexical reliabilism. The basic idea of the theory I propose is that
certain mental states contribute in a twofold way to the epistemic justification of beliefs, namely
due to the way they determine how things seem to a subject and due to the fact that they are
actually reliable indicators of the truth of their contents. The first component allows this theory
to accommodate internalist intuitions. The second component allows it to foster the connection
between justification and truth without being subject to the counterexamples that plague simple
or unqualified reliabilist theories. I also try to show that this theory is superior to rival theories
that have been proposed in the literature, like Huemer’s theory itself (2001) or a process-reliabilist
treatment of foundational justification as in Goldman (2008a).
§§§
Marie Guillot
Institut Jean Nicod
Understanding the Concept "I" as a Phenomenal Concept
I defend the view that the concept "I" functions as a phenomenal concept. (By the concept
"I" I mean here the ordinary, non-theoretical individual notion that each subject uses to store
information specifically about themselves.) What is special about phenomenal concepts is that
they cannot be acquired before one has some phenomenal experience (e.g. as of a certain shade
of red, or a certain ache). The felt quality of that experience is used as a label to be put on
further encounters with experiences of the same kind. I propose that, in the case of the I-concept,
the felt quality used as a "label" for all that falls under the concept is what some have called
"mineness" or "me-ishness" : that quality of all of my experiences that identifies them as mine. I
show how this hypothesis can ground a model of the concept "I" that sheds light on some aspects
of the epistemology of first-personal thoughts, including the form of authoritativeness attached
to first-personal reports of such thoughts, and immunity to error through misidentification. This
model may also help solve some issues related to personal identity, like the "Why it matters"
problem.
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Ghislain Guigon
Département de Philosophie, Université de Genève
La question spéciale sur l’explication
Let the Special Explanation Question be the following : (SEQ) when is it true that ‚àÉx such that
x explains why p is the case ? The traditional answer to SEQ is the rationalist one : it is impossible
to give conditions under which there is a truth that explains p, because, necessarily, for all p, some
truth explains why p is true. The rationalist answer to SEQ is based on the Principle of Sufficient
Reason according to which, necessarily, for all p, there is something that explains why p is true.
This principle has long been regarded as a basic philosophical principle ; and so AR has long
been regarded as an undisputable answer to SEQ. The most recent and most important challenge
to the rationalist answer to SEQ is the Bennett-van Inwagen argument according to which the
PSR should be rejected because it yields an incredible claim, namely that necessitarianism is
true. In my talk I shall first explain why the premises of the Bennett-van Inwagen argument yield
a genuine rationalist paradox. Then, after having dismissed proposed replies to the rationalist
paradox, I shall offer an original defence of the rationalist answer to SEQ.
§§§
Jean-Baptiste Guillon
Centre Atlantique de Philosophie, Université de Nantes
Held Hostage, the Epistemological Objection to Libertarianism
In this presentation, I want to consider an objection against Libertarianism, understood as the
conjunction of an incompatibilist conception of freedom and the claim that we actually have
such a freedom. In a nutshell, the objection goes as follows : if free will requires well-located
indeterminism, then we cannot presently claim to know that we are free, for we cannot presently
claim to know that there is well-located indeterminism. Therefore, the libertarian stance cannot
be warranted. Fischer (1999) dramatized this situation saying that, if incompatibilism were true,
then our view of ourselves would be "held hostage to an esoteric scientific discovery". This kind
of reasoning is quite rarely worked out or even spelled out, though it is, I believe, an important
motivating element in many an anti-libertarian doctrine. In this presentation, I try to give an
explicit version of this objection, emphasizing its fundamentally epistemological nature. Then I
argue that the objection can be successfully rebutted. My conclusion is that an incompatibilist
free will, if it is conceivable, is also knowable, and therefore, the libertarian can be warranted in
his claim that we have (incompatibilist) free will.
§§§
Marion Haemmerli
The Case for Perspectival Representations of Space
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In both the philosophical and the psychological literature there is a consensus as to the existence
of two different types of representations of space within the human brain. Human beings represent
space both egocentrically and absolutely. Egocentric representations present space from the particular view point of the observer ; absolute representations comprise both map-like representations
involving no particular view point and intrinsic representations (also called object-centred representations) involving the view point of an object different from the observer. I present a case for
a new type of dichotomy, different from the distinction between egocentric and absolute representations, distinguishing between perspectival and detached representations of space. Under the
reading I propose, perspectival representations of space comprise intrinsic and egocentric representations, whereas detached representations comprise solely map-like representations of space.
My argument will run in two steps. I will first show that the current distinction between egocentric and absolute representations yields an incomplete account of intrinsic representations of
space ; I will then show that the dichotomy between egocentric and absolute representations gives
rise to a slightly mistaken philosophical interpretation of what is involved in the different types
of spatial representation.
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Michael Hertig
University of Lausanne
Self-confidence and practical reason in Aristotle
In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle enquires the moral character of akrasia (incontinence) and associates it with a defect in the agent’s knowledge of what is best to do (1147a10-18).
In a recent article, David Charles associates rightly this epistemic defect with lack of confidence
(pistis). In this talk, I first argue that lack of confidence concerns not only akrasia, but enkrateia (continence) and phronêsis (practical wisdom) as well. Phronêsis, akrasia and enkrateia are
distinguished by a proper degree of confidence, which makes of confidence an essential feature
of practical thinking. I then show that the strength or weakness of confidence depends on the
amount and appropriateness of reasons to act the agent considers when he is inferring a practical
conclusion. According to my reading of Aristotle, reasons to act can be either the practical end(s)
the agent is seeking to realize, or the particular circumstances of the action as perceived by the
agent.
§§§
Salim Hirèche
For a Weaker Form of Compositionality in Natural Languages
While most people agree that natural languages are compositional, they often disagree on the particular form of compositionality that these languages exhibit. The aim of this paper is precisely to
address that issue. First, I argue that a plausible version of compositionality should be consistent
with how complex expressions are actually formed and interpreted — that it should, in particular,
meet the following two criteria : (i) consistence with the flexibility of natural languages and (ii)
consistence with their systematicity and productivity. The idea is that compositionality should
be both weak enough to meet (i) and strong enough to meet (ii). Then, I sketch four versions
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of compositionality, ranging from the strongest to the weakest : total compositionality ; strong
compositionality, which corresponds to the "standard" version of compositionality (roughly : the
meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning of its constituents and by its
syntactic structure) ; weak compositionality ; and zero compositionality. After briefly considering
the two extremes, total compositionality and zero compositionality, I conclude that the former
clearly fails to meet (i), while the latter clearly fails to meet (ii). Finally, I argue that strong
compositionality does not meet (i), whereas weak compositionality meets both criteria.
§§§
Frank Hofmann
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
The Generality Constraint - vertical, not horizontal
The Generality Constraint (Evans) has been proposed as a demarcation criterion for conceptual
content, and there has been extensive debate about whether perceptual representation satisfies
it or not. The debate is ill-advised, since it rests on taking the Generality Constraint in a horizontal way. That is, according to this horizontal reading, the Generality Constraint requires that
a subject can re-combine subject concepts and predicate concepts more or less freely. Taken in
this way, it becomes impossible to make progress on the issue of whether perceptual representation is non-conceptual, since all depends on whether one accepts that perceptual representation
allows for object representation (singular representation). In contrast, I propose to interpret the
Generality Constraint in a vertical way. Concepts allow for the generation of representations of
the same thing (redness, happiness etc.) with varying semantic roles (such as subject role and
predicative/attributive role). Arguably, perceptual representation is restricted to the predicative/attributive role and, thus, is non-conceptual.
§§§
Cyrille Imbert
Archives Poincaré
Collective science : How to describe, measure and study collective understanding ?
This talk is devoted to trying to clarify under which conditions a scientific group can be said to
have scientific understanding of an item of knowledge. In the first part of the talk, I argue that
the possession of scientific understanding is a specific problem for collaborative science, even if
it has so far been largely ignored by philosophers of science and social epistemologists. In the
second part, I argue that the understanding possessed by groups can be studied by focusing upon
which sets of understanding-denoting questions they can answer and I show that this instrumental
approach is compatible with most approaches about understanding. In the final part of the talk, I
highlight typical situations of distribution of scientific knowledge and abilities within groups and
analyze which set of understanding-denoting questions the corresponding groups can answer in
each case.
§§§
Vincent Israel-Jost
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Iterative empiricism and scientific observation
In this paper, I develop an account of observation that respects the empiricist demand that
observation sentences have a particularly high epistemic authority, while acknowledging that their
formulation relies on previously held beliefs (or more generally a ’view’ : beliefs, concepts, theories,
etc.) This dependence does not permit to see the epistemic authority of observation sentences as
arising from their epistemic autonomy, as has been traditionally done in empiricism. My defense
then, is based on a full recognition of the interdependence between observation sentences and a
view. This in turn leads to an evolutive model of empirical enquiry, in which the subject’s view
is under constant change while experiential judgments can vary depending on the views held by
different subjects or by the same subject at two different times. Despite this apparently shaky
epistemic situation, I show that investigators have the means to stabilize their material, conceptual
and doxastic frameworks as they undertake various experiments. I provide several arguments
in favor of the possibility to stabilize an investigation inspired by works in history of science,
philosophy of experiment and epistemology. I also link observation to stabilization and I show
that stabilization is enough to defend the epistemic authority of observation sentences.
§§§
Lydia Jaeger
Institut Biblique de Nogent
Un miracle viole-t-il les lois de la nature ?
Hume définit un miracle comme une violation des lois de la nature. Mais il existe des auteurs
(C.S. Lewis par exemple) qui refusent cette définition. L’exposé explore des conceptions rivales de
la définition humienne du miracle : Dans quelle mesure la force des arguments avancés dépendelle de la conception de loi favorisée ? Des présupposés métaphysiques sont-ils impliqués dans le
débat ? Dans le cas de lois probabilistes et de lois ceteris paribus, rien ne semble pouvoir compter
comme une violation de ces lois. Cela implique-t-il qu’aucun miracle n’est alors possible ?
L’exposé mettra aussi en parallèle le rapport entre miracles et lois d’un côté, et celui entre esprit
et corps de l’autre. Le physicalisme non réductionniste est parallèle à une conception du miracle
sans violation des lois. Je montrerai que le physicalisme non réductionniste est incohérent. Seul
l’abandon du physicalisme permet de maintenir une conception satisfaisante de l’esprit. De même,
quand on considère qu’un miracle ne peut se constater que quand les lois de la nature ont été
violées, on utilise une conception réductionniste de l’action intentionnelle : celle-ci relèverait de
tout ce qui est contraire aux lois.
§§§
Marta Jorba-Grau
Logos‚ University of Barcelona
Do We Think Outside The Stream Of Consciousness ?
According to some authors, the ’cognitive phenomenology thesis’ is the idea that there is a
specific cognitive phenomenology for conscious thought, different from sensory and emotional
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phenomenology. Recently, there has been a line of resistance against cognitive phenomenology
based on the idea that mental states of thought are not the kind of things suited for having
phenomenal character. Soteriou (2007) and Tye & Wright (2011), relying on some observations
of Geach (1969), argue for the conclusion that the mental states of conscious thought do not
and cannot enter into the stream of consciousness, except insofar as they are clothed sensorily or
emotionally. And thus there cannot be such thing as cognitive phenomenology. This conclusion
relies on these two premises : (i) anything that figures in the stream of consciousness must unfold
over time and (ii) thoughts are states, and as such, they do not unfold over time. I first argue
that this specific requirement is not warranted and, second, that even if we accept this condition,
conscious thought can satisfy it.
§§§
François Kammerer
Rationalités Contemporaines Université Paris-Sorbonne - Paris IV
Le problème de la disponibilité du contenu : une critique des théories représentationnalistes de la conscience phénoménale
Les théories représentationnalistes fortes et réductives de la conscience phénoménale (Dretske,
1995 ; Tye, 1995, 2000) prétendent identifier les états mentaux phénoménaux à des états représentationnels, et le contenu phénoménal de ces états à une forme de contenu représentationnel.
Une objection importante a pu être soulevée contre ce type de théories : l’objection de la démarcation (Kriegel, 2002 ; Seager, 2003 ; Stoljar, 2007). Celle-ci consiste à remarquer que, pour pouvoir
réduire la conscience phénoménale à une activité de représentation, le représentationnaliste doit
être en mesure de rendre raison de la démarcation entre les états représentationnels phénoménaux
et non-phénoménaux ; or, il n’est pas sûr que les théories représentationnalistes soient en mesure
d’opérer une telle démarcation. Une réponse notable à cette objection consiste à affirmer que c’est
la disponibilité, pour le système cognitif central, du contenu de certains états représentationnels,
qui rend ceux-ci phénoménalement conscients (Tye, 2003). Dans cette présentation, nous désirons
produire une analyse la notion de " disponibilité " afin de montrer que celle-ci n’est pas en mesure
de remplir le rôle que les représentationnalistes voudraient lui voir jouer, et ne constitue donc pas
un critère de démarcation pertinent pour séparer les états représentationnels phénoménaux des
états représentationnels non-phénoménaux.
§§§
Philipp Keller
University of Geneva
Representation - relational, but intrinsic
How is it that some items of the world say, mean or represent others ? What grounds this prima
facie very surprising property to stand (in) for something else ? In my talk, I argue that some
help may come from perhaps an unexpected corner : seeing why, and how, the intrinsic/extrinsic
and the relational/non-relational distinctions in the metaphysics of properties crosscut, may help
us understand representational properties as an intrinsic, but relational, while intentionality is
extrinsic, but non-relational.
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David Kirkby
Durham University
Frege’s Context Principle and Proper Names
Applying Frege’s Context principle to proper names, as he himself thought it should be, defuses
the debate about their semantics. I advance this claim with particular reference to the recent
revival of predicative accounts of proper names, arguing that this revival is not motivated.
§§§
Jérémie Lafraire
IEM, Nonconceptual Content and Semantic Relativism
Nonconceptual mental contents have sometimes been defined as contents that do not exhibit
subject-predicate structure. It has been argued that it follows that such contents cannot be immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person (IEM). In this paper, I claim
the opposite. I argue for an account of certain nonconceptual contents inspired by Recanati’s
(2007) Strong Moderate Relativism. This relativist account explains how such contents can be
immune. But any relativist theory of mental contents faces a difficulty raised by what cognitive scientists have described as "shared representations" based on "mirror mechanisms". Such
representations seem to violate an essential requirement on the applicability of the relativist framework : the invariance condition. My main point in this paper is that this objection is based on
a confusion between two distinct invariance conditions, a strong and a weak one, that a relativist
may appeal to when considering whether a certain mental content is relative. I show that the
variability shared representations display is perfectly consistent with the satisfaction of the weak
invariance condition. I then sketch what a detailed relativist account of immune nonconceptual
states based on this idea should look like.
§§§
Jean-David Lafrance
FQRSC Postdoctoral Fellow, Corpus Christi College, University of Oxford
The Bundle of Universals Theory of Material Objects
The bundle of universals theory of material objects claims that objects are identical to fusions of
universals (of the ones, as we would ordinarily say, that they instantiate). It says, moreover, that
an object instantiates a universal P just in case P is a part of the fusion of universals to which
the object is identical. The transitivity of the part-whole relation poses a problem for the bundle
theory. It follows from the latter that any universal instantiated by an object’s spatiotemporal
part is also a part of the fusion of the object’s universals. And that is clearly wrong ; the properties
of an object’s parts may be different from the object’s properties. I argue that a simple solution
to this problem takes a ternary part-whole relation as a mereological primitive, and modifies the
bundle theory so that it claims that objects are fusions of universals at some region or other.
Furthermore, I argue that the resulting bundle theory is not committed to a controversial version
of Leibniz’s Indiscernability of Identicals, unlike the typical bundle theory.
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§§§
Julia Langkau
Reflective Equilibrium and Counterexamples
At first glance, reflective equilibrium seems to reduce to a trivial and uncontroversial claim about
philosophical methodology : we aim to take into account all information available to build a coherent theory. I argue that reflective equilibrium entails two substantive methodological claims.
First, we ought to assign equal initial plausibility to intuitions and theories. Second, in the case of
a conflict between an intuition and an accepted theory, we have two options to regain coherence :
we either drop our intuition or adjust our theory. I show that the first claim is substantive at
least on the view originally defended by John Rawls. In order to show that the second claim is
substantive, I discuss how the method applies to our current practice of debating thought experiments as counterexamples to philosophical theories. I conclude that reflective equilibrium does
not correspond with our current practice, especially as carried out by experimental philosophers.
Whereas reflective equilibrium has been discussed mainly in normative ethics and political philosophy, my focus lies on thought experiments in areas such as epistemology, metaphysics, or
philosophy of language, where the subject matter under investigation does not consist of moral
or similar norms.
§§§
Federico Lauria
Fit, Fit, Fit, and Fit. On Direction of Fit
As a matter of fact, some things fit each other, while others don’t. For instance, Cinderella’s
foot fits her shoe, while Mary’s foot doesn’t. Moreover, some things fit each other in a distinct
way than others do. For instance, beliefs are supposed to fit the world, while the world itself
is supposed to fit our desires. But what does that mean ? In this talk, it is defended that fit
is the function of satisfaction, i.e. a kind of correspondence which consists in the obtaining of
content. Its relata are facts and bearers of content. Directions of fit of conative and cognitive
representations then are distinguished by a formal difference in the norm for satisfaction. Whereas
cognitive representations are the subject of the norm for satisfaction, the world itself is under a
requirement for satisfaction of conations to occur. It is finally claimed that this contrast is better
understood by paying attention to the respective modes under which content is represented. In
the case of desire, content is represented as what ought to/should obtain, while in the case of
beliefs content is represented as being the case. The direction of fit then relies on the presence or
absence of the deontic operator.
§§§
Baptiste Le Bihan
Philosophie des Normes, Université de Rennes I
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Why a Gunk World is Compatible with Nihilism about Objects
Ted Sider (1993) argues that nihilism about objects is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk and takes this point to show that nihilism is flawed. I shall describe one kind of
nihilism able to answer this objection. I believe that most of the things we usually encounter do
not exist. That is, I take talk of macroscopic objects and macroscopic properties to refer only to
sets of fundamental properties, which are invoked as a matter of linguistic convention. This view
is a kind of nihilism : it rules out the existence of objects ; that is, from an ontological point of
view, there are no objects. But unlike the moderate nihilism of Mark Heller (1990), Peter van
Inwagen (1990) and Trenton Merricks (2002) that claims that most objects do not exist, I endorse
a radical nihilism (following Mark Heller (2008)) according to which there are no objects in the
world, but only properties instantiated in space-time. As I will show, radical nihilism is perfectly
compatible with the metaphysical possibility of gunk. It is also compatible with the epistemic
possibility that we actually live in a gunk world. The objection raised by Ted Sider applies only
to moderate nihilism that admits some objects in its ontology.
§§§
Stephan Leuenberger
University of Glasgow
Relations intrinsèques
Caracterisées de manière informelle, les propriétés intrinsèques sont celles dont l’exemplification
par un individu dépend uniquement de la manière d’être de cet individu, et non pas de ce qui
se passe en "dehors’ de lui. De façon analogue, les relations intrinsèques sont celles dont l’exemplification par des relata dépend uniquement de la manière d’être de ces relata. Tandis que les
propriétés intrinsèques font le sujet d’un vif débat, les relations intrinsèques - à distinguer des
relations internes ‚Äì ainsi que la portée métaphysique de la distinction même entre intrinsèque et
extrinsèque dans ce contexte ont été négligées. Je ne connais qu’une seule analyse proposée, celle
de David Lewis. J’affirme qu’elle échoue, cependant, et que son défaut est irréparable. Malgré tout,
la notion de relation intrinsèque est suffisamment claire pour illuminer plusieurs débats portant
sur les propriétés intrinsèques. J’en donne deux exemples : le débat sur les analyses combinatoires
des propriétés intrinsèques, et celui sur l’impossibilité prétendue de leur connaissance.
§§§
Annabelle Lever
Discrimination and Appearance : What Does Equality Require ?
Is it wrong to discriminate against people based on their physique, dress and grooming and, if it
is wrong, should the law seek to prevent it ? On the one hand, appearance discrimination seems
to be one of the ways in which other forms of discrimination operate. So, when we discriminate
against people because of their race, religion, class or sex we often do so via a hostile or disparaging response to their physique, dress, grooming and demeanour. On the other hand, there does
seem to be something troubling about the idea that employers should have to treat employees
equally, regardless of their clothing, hairstyles and general appearance. So, on the face of it, there
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seems to be a normatively important difference between laws prohibiting discrimination based on
characteristics such as race or sex over which we have little, if any, control, and discrimination
based on our clothes, grooming and general appearance, where we have more scope for choice.
However, equality can require us to protect people’s choices and to ignore their unchosen circumstances, as opponents of luck-egalitarianism have noted. But if that’s the case what, if anything,
is wrong with appearance discrimination ?
§§§
Nicolas Liabeuf
Méta-métaphysique expérimentale (MME) et "défi de l’intégration" : Que font réellement les métaphysiciens ?
Selon le « défi de l’intégration » (Peacocke, 1999), « nous devons réconcilier une explication plausible de ce qui est impliqué dans la vérité des énoncés d’un genre donné avec une explication
crédible de la manière dont nous pouvons connaître ces énoncés, quand nous les connaissons »
[nous soulignons]. Une telle réconciliation de la métaphysique et de son épistémologie est envisageable en adoptant une stratégie « expérimentale méta-métaphysique » (MME) qui étudierait
l’intuition métaphysique, indépendamment des résultats avancés par des métaphysiques qui se
proclament descriptives ou normatives. Nous allons voir dans notre exposé que la prémisse d’une
telle étude revient à supposer que l’intuition métaphysique est « la chose du monde la mieux
partagée ».
§§§
David Liggins
University of Manchester, UK
Unpropositional attitudes
The most familiar arguments for the existence of propositions rest on the well-known relational
analysis of attitude ascriptions. Tobias Rosefeldt (2008) has argued against the relational analysis
by showing that we should not regard "that’-clauses appearing in attitude ascriptions as singular
terms. Rosefeldt is not concerned with ontology and is happy to presuppose that propositions
exist. I claim that Rosefeldt’s work can be used to undermine standard arguments for the existence
of propositions. In this paper I show how.
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Franck Lihoreau
Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem, Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Are Normative Reasons Evidence for Obligations ?
In a series of recent papers Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star argue that normative reasons to do
an act simply are evidence that one ought to do this act, and suggest that "evidence" in this
context is best understood in standard Bayesian terms. I contest this suggestion.
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§§§
Roberta Locatelli
Philosophies contemporaines (PHICO) Paris I
Disjunctivism and the puzzle of phenomenal characters
In the present talk I try to elucidate what phenomenal disjunctivism (typically propounded by
Mike Martin) is committed to. I point out a tension or even a contradiction between its use of the
notion of phenomenal character (which, I will argue, seems to make a proper sense only within
an internalist framework) and the externalist aim professed by disjunctivists. Then, I attempt to
spell out the reasons for this tension and show how phenomenal disjunctivism is committed to an
untenable view, which inscribes the ontological commitment to the mind-independent world in
the phenomenal character through a question-begging argument. I will then diagnose the motives
why a disjunctivist may be willing to embrace such a view : such motives are connected with the
attempt to dispel the skeptical threat. I will then exploit these results to show that an account of
hallucinations consistent with naïve realism does not require phenomenal disjunctivism, provided
one properly understands naïve realism and dismisses the skeptical threat.
§§§
Arturs Logins
Phenomenal Conception of Evidence and Pragmatic Factors
Evidentialism, a popular theory about epistemic justification, states that what justifies our beliefs
(and other doxastic attitudes) is the set of our (total) evidence. According to one Evidentialist
variety, namely the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence (PCE) Evidentialism, evidence itself is
fixed by our non-factive mental states, i.e. mental states that do not entail truth of their content.
Traditionally, Evidentialism has adopted an Intellectualist view about epistemic justification, according to which only truth-connected (or theoretical) elements can justify a belief. Recently, it
has been forcefully argued that also factors of pragmatic nature play a role in epistemic justification of a belief (Practicalism). I argue, first, that Evidentialists who adopt PCE are committed
to abandon Intelectualism. And, second, that a conjunction of Practicalism, PCE Evidentialism
and a plausible principle about the constraints on the normativity of action leads to absurd
consequences."
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Françoise Longy
Why do we have hybrid concepts ?
Paul Bloom argues in "Water as an artefact kind" (2007) that there is one sense of "water" that
does correspond to H2O" and another one that corresponds to an artefact kind. That shows,
according to him, that the concept of water is hybrid and that "we naturally think about many
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categories, including water, as both natural kinds and artefact kinds". And he claims that the
existence of such hybrid concepts is "a natural solution to a difficult learning problem". I argue
that Bloom is right about the existence of hybrid concepts which refer at least to two different
kinds, one of which is a natural/real kind, but I claim that (a) the analysis he proposes is
unsatisfactory as a general account of hybrid concepts (in particular, since it suggests that only
one reference can be a natural/real kind) ; and (b) our possession of such hybrid concepts is not
simply the consequence of having to cope with a difficult learning problem, but is epistemologically
justified as a means for enhancing our knowledge of the world. I will defend these claims using
the concept of biological species as a case study.
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Philippe Lusson
New York University, Philosophy department
Joint actions
Philosophers who examine collective actions have for the most part concentrated their efforts
on related concepts, such as shared intentions, participatory intentions or team reasoning. It is
not always clear how their arguments shed light on collective actions. I will argue that a fruitful
view should not be constructed out of related concepts, but from the ground up. The concept of
collective action has a role to play in some explanations of coordinated behavior, when multiple
agents achieve more with coordinated actions than they would have on their own. Coordinated
behavior sometimes is an achievement of the participating agents. When some or all of them can
get some or all of the others to act in specific (relevant) ways, their group displays some form of
integrated planning towards a goal. It is a distinctive kind of explanation for their coordinated
behavior, which delineates an interesting concept of collective action. I argue that it makes for a
more convincing picture than concepts derived from shared intentions, participatory intentions or
team reasoning. In particular, it connects paradigmatic philosophical examples, like painting the
house together, with other examples, like the actions of hierarchies or the group hunts of some
populations of chimpanzees.
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Christophe Malaterre
IHPST
On the distinctness of causal variables
Distinctness of causal relata plays a crucial role in causation, either when construed as a consequence of causation (when it is claimed that distinct causal relata bestow different causal powers
- e.g. Achinstein 1974, Amrstrong 1978, Shoemaker 1984), or when defined as a foundational
assumption for causation (e.g. Hausman 1998). The aim of this contribution is to make sense
of "distinctness" within Woodward’s manipulationist account of causation (2003) : in this account, distinctness appears in the definiens of causal clauses, yet is nowhere explicitly defined.
I explore two approaches : first, a reductive approach with a view to explicating "distinctness"
with concepts that are not causal ; and second, a non-reductive approach with the objective of
construing distinctness with the help of manipulationist causal concepts (yet avoiding bootstrapping concerns). I show that both approaches lead to sufficient conditions for distinctness.
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Yet identifying necessary conditions proves more difficult and points to the need to underpin
manipulationism with stronger foundational clauses than current.
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Alexandre Marcellesi
Invariance and Explanatory Depth
According to the account of causal explanation developed by James Woodward and Christ Hitchcock, a generalization Y = f(X) contributes to causally explaining an event y = f(x) if and only
if it is invariant under at least one conceptually possible testing intervention. Together with this
account comes an account of explanatory depth, i.e. an account of the criteria we rely on when
making comparisons of explanatory quality between generalizations describing causal relations.
According to this account, a generalization permits deeper causal explanations the "greater" the
range of interventions it is invariant under. There are several ways to understand the "greater"
in this account. I present three interpretations, a purely quantitative one, a purely qualitative
one, and one according to which it is the variety of interventions a generalization is invariant
under that is crucial. I argue that Woodward and Hitchcock’s account of explanatory depth is
inadequate under all three interpretations. I argue, in particular, that it conflicts with the idea
that good causal explanations should cite causes which are proportional to their effects, an idea
defended by many authors, including Woodward himself. I conclude by examining three possible
objections to the argument I develop.
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Angela Martin
Institut d’éthique biomédicale, Université de Genève
Some Thoughts On Vulnerability in Health Care
I argue that a common distinction concerning the scope of the concept "vulnerability" in contemporary bioethics does not pose a real problem but rather a pseudo-problem which appeared due
to a lack of thorough conceptual analysis. Firstly, I formally analyze the concept "vulnerability"
and its rules of application, thereby distinguishing i) the reasons why a being can be ascribed
vulnerability ; ii) the circumstances of manifestation of vulnerability ; and iii) the manifestations
of vulnerability. Secondly, I define those as vulnerable who have interests i) which concern their
welfare ; or ii) which are of moral relevancy ; and iii) which potentially can be ignored, frustrated
or wronged by the individuals themselves, the circumstances or other living beings. Finally, I
show that not all manifestations of "vulnerability" can or should be prevented in applied areas
such as health care : only those manifestations of "vulnerability" are morally condemnable for
which a moral agent is directly or indirectly responsible insofar as he did not take the claims
of those concerned into just consideration. In order to clarify this, I outline the differences and
overlaps between harm and wrong, and delineate the kind of claims one has towards the health
care system.
§§§
Peter Marton
Clark University, Worcester, MA, US
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Calling the Skeptic’s Bluff : Brains, Vats, and Irrelevance
Arguably, the argument based on the brains-in-a-vat (BIV), or similar scenarios, is less part of
the skeptical tradition than of the dogmatist practice. The argument is a test case or challenge for
dogmatists to show the strength of their theories of knowledge. The central claim of the present
essay is that this "argument" does not deserve our attention. The essay will first offer a formal
argument (the Inconsistency Thesis) to show that the possibilities of empirical knowledge and
scenarios, like the BIV, are inconsistent. If so, the BIV-skeptic (or the dogmatist, using it) must
make the case why to prefer the BIV-scenario over the possibility of empirical knowledge. I will
argue that the BIV-skeptic cannot rely on any selection principle (as e.g. conceivability) to select
her scenarios over the possibility of empirical knowledge ; neither can she successfully make the
claim that such principle is unnecessary for her project. We will also consider whether or not the
skeptic can succeed with challenging the Inconceivability Thesis, arguing that even if the skeptic
acknowledges the possibility of empirical knowledge, her scenario cannot be salvaged. The essay
will conclude with considering the morals of the above argument for the dogmatist (or simply,
epistemological) endeavor.
§§§
Claudio Mazzola
University of Sydney
Symmetry, Foresight, and Understanding
The problem of determining the logic of scientific explanation is central in contemporary philosophy of science. Stephen Toulmin’s contribution to this topic is included, to a large extent, in
his 1961 book Foresight and Understanding : according to his model, scientific theories are inspired by "ideals of natural order", i.e. paradigmatic patterns of behavior, which are regarded as
both natural and perfectly intelligible ; scientific explanations accordingly consist in showing how
natural phenomena could deviate from those paradigms. The notion of ideals of natural order,
however, has been fiercely criticized, either for being tacitly committed with a Aristotelian view of
natural phenomena, or because of its historical variability. I outline a revised version of Toulmin’s
model, which abandons the notion of ideals of natural order in favor of the more widely accepted and less troublesome notion of symmetry. The resulting account is shown to overcome the
major difficulties of Toulmin’s proposal, though preserving all of its virtues. In addition to this,
the model so obtained discloses the possibility of unifying the fundamental intuitions underlying
the principal competing models, including the deductive-nomological, the unificationist, and the
causal-mechanical ones.
§§§
Mark McCullagh
University of Guelph
Distributed assertion
Sometimes in making an assertion, one has reason to flag some words for interpretation as if
uttered by another. It is an error to try to pigeonhole this either as *using* the flagged words or
as *quoting* them. In this talk I consider this phenomenon, which I call "distributed assertion".
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A speaker makes a distributed assertion when she indicates (often using quotation marks) that
some of her words are to be interpreted as if produced by another speaker. Standard Kaplanian
semantics, surprisingly, is able to handle this sort of thing rather smoothly, as long as each of the
separately-performed parts is evaluatable semantically in such a way that the resulting semantic
values admit of combination. In such cases, interpretation involves intra-sentential shift both in
the context of utterance *and* in the semantic theory being used. I compare this approach to
such cases to the approaches proposed by François Recanati, Robert Brandom, Yitzhak Benbaji,
and (most recently) Daniel Gutzmann and Eric Stei. I then consider what reasons one might have
to make a distributed assertion. I distinguish between a need for semantic deferral and a need for
justificatory deferral. And in closing I consider what implications there are for our conception of
assertion.
§§§
Conor McHugh
Philosophy, University of Southampton
Control of Belief and Intention
The "symmetry view’ about belief and intention says that belief has an essential connection to
truth, and intention has a corresponding essential connection to "to-be-doneness’, and that this
explains certain parallels between our control of belief and intention respectively. In particular,
it explains why we cannot form a belief or intention merely because it would be desirable to
have that belief or intention. I distinguish three versions of the symmetry view : a metaphysical
version, a normative version and a teleological version. I argue that we should prefer a (modified)
teleological version. One can form a particular intention in order to make up one’s mind, even
when one’s reasons favour only weakly, or not at all, the action thereby chosen. By contrast, one
cannot form a particular belief in order to make up one’s mind, when one’s evidence favours only
weakly, or not at all, the proposition thereby believed. This prima facie problem for the symmetry
view can and should be dealt with, I suggest, by holding that belief’s essential connection is to
knowledge rather than truth. This move is easily accommodated by the teleological version of the
symmetry view, but causes trouble for the normative and metaphysical versions.
§§§
Phillip Meadows
University of Manchester
Holey Naive Realism, Batman ! Look At The Air ! !
Naive Realism holds that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences is constituted by
the mind-independent world and the properties they possess. I will argue that it is possible to
have two perceptual experiences, (i) an experience of a landscape from a particular point of view
through a glazed window and (ii) an experience of the same landscape from the same point of view
through an unglazed window, such that the phenomenal character of each experience is identical.
By appealing to this possibility, together with the fact that constitution is a one-one relation,
I will present an argument against Naive Realism that has the advantage over the argument
from illusion that it precludes the currently popular disjunctivist claim that in the case of each
experience there is no common kind. This is because neither case can plausibly be construed as
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a case of illusion. The strongest response available to this form of argument will be to deny that
we see the glass in the glazed window case or the air in the unglazed window case : consequently,
I provide an argument that we do see the glass and the air in each of these cases !
§§§
Jacques Mégier
Institut Jean Nicod , Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)
Conscience, circularité, régression infinie, et conscience de soi
Qu’est-ce qui rend conscient un état mental ? Un état mental est conscient si ... nous en sommes
conscients, dit D. Rosenthal, qui convient qu’il existe un fort sens intuitif de l’auto-référence de la
conscience, mais il le requalifie en faveur d’une théorie méta-représentationnelle selon laquelle une
représentation mentale devient consciente si elle est l’objet de l’ intentionnalité inconsciente d’un
autre état mental, dans certaines circonstances appropriées. Les théories méta-représentationnelles
proposent une explication réductive de l’état de conscience par la " rencontre " intentionnelle
d’états inconscients, mais soulèvent d’importantes difficultés, d’ordre intuitif, logique, ou épistémique. Si l’on prend au sérieux l’intuition d’auto-référence de la conscience, un schéma remplaçant
la méta-représentation par l’auto-représentation devient plausible. La conscience n’est plus une
propriété extrinsèque, dérivant de certaines relations de représentation, mais intrinsèque, due
à la structure d’auto-représentation de certains états mentaux. Il faut montrer que ce schéma
est intelligible, que le risque de régression à l’infini dans les capacités représentationnelles de la
conscience n’existe pas, et que de robustes intuitions sont ainsi éclairées, comme la structuration
de la conscience entre premier plan et arrière plan, et le lien entre arrière plan et conscience de
soi.
§§§
Anne Meylan
Solving the problem of doxastic responsibility. Why non-volitionalism does not help
The problem of doxastic responsibility concerns the question of whether we can be responsible
for our beliefs, despite the fact that we cannot control them in the way that we can control our
bodily movements. According to the non-volitionalist solution, which is a popular solution to
this problem, we can be responsible for our beliefs because our beliefs are attitudes for which we
can appropriately be asked our reasons for having them. This article’s goal is to cast doubt on
this solution. This objection proceeds in two steps. First, I explain why our reasons for believing
things, i.e. our epistemic reasons, has to be identified to motivating reasons in order for the nonvolitionalist solution to work. The volitionalist solution cannot explain why the fact that I can
be asked my epistemic reasons for believing something is sufficient to make me responsible for
this belief if our epistemic reasons cannot be identified to motivating reasons. Second, I try to
show that two conceivable ways of defending the claim that our epistemic reasons are motivating
reasons both fail.
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Sebastian Miguel
Logos, University of Barcelona ; NYU
Consciousness and Theory of Mind : a Common Theory ?
According to Higher-Order theories, phenomenally conscious states are those that are the objects
of some kind of higher-order process or representation. There is something higher-order, a metastate, in the case of phenomenal conscious mental states, which is lacking in the case of other
kind of states. According to these theories, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind.
A Theory of Mind, is the ability of humans to identify their own mental states and attribute
mental states different from their owns to others. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be
decomposed into another two : mindreading and metacognition.
In this paper I ague that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for our mindreading
ability. This observation jeopardizes theories that maintain that phenomenal consciousness is a
by-product of our mindreading ability.
My objection might be extended to other HOR theories on the reasonable assumption that metacognition depends on mindreading. To press on other HOR theories, I argue that HOR theories
cannot endorse the view that metacognition and mindreading are independent cognitive mechanisms. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the plausibility of a functional
explanation of the evolution of metacognition. I offer some reasons to doubt that such an explanation will be provided.
§§§
Andreea Mihali
Wilfrid Laurier University
Toward a Cartesian Epistemic Rule Consequentialism
This paper proposes a reading of the Meditations as the tortuous trajectory toward a rule consequentialist epistemology ; the Meditations tell the story of the meditator’s passage from an unreflective to a reflective stance which contains three levels : rule-extraction , rule-adoption, 2nd
nature rule-compliance. Noa Naaman-Zauderer’s deontological reading of Descartes maintains
that the C&D rule is binding because it is experienced as stemming solely from us, not because
of the value of a further goal. Contra Naaman-Zauderer, I show that for Descartes at least part of
the bindingness of the rule stems from the value of the goal (i.e. truth) ; blame is about improperly
arrived at results. This alternative account of the C&D rule brings to light Descartes’ reliance and
emphasis on results. Having both a methodological and an adaptive feedback function, results are
needed for the discovery of the C&D rule ; once this rule is in place, results serve to buttress the
rule’s bindingness and to confirm compliance with it. Only after having become versed in applying
the C&D rule can the meditator dispense with the double-checking of the outcomes of his acts of
assent and move into something resembling Naaman-Zauderer’s "deontological" phase.
§§§
Luis Fernandez Moreno
Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of Madrid
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Kripke on Mill’s Theory of Natural Kind Terms
In a famous passage of the third lecture of Naming and Necessity Kripke summarizes the core of
his criticism to the description theory of natural kind terms, taking into account the theory of
general terms proposed by Mill, insofar as it is applied to natural kind terms, as a paradigmatic
version of that sort of theory. The aim of this paper is to argue that Mill’s generic theory on
general terms does not coincide with his theory concerning the type of general terms that natural
kind terms are and that the main thesis of the latter is not subject to Kripke’s objections put
forward in the aforementioned passage.
§§§
Franziska Müller
Université de Fribourg
Phenomenology of Minimal Actions
According to a standard theory, an action consists of two parts : a mental part (an intention)
that causes a bodily movement. Following this, Wegner and other authors claimed that our
sense of agency is derived from an experienced correspondence of the two elements. Against
this view, several authors raised the argument from minimal action (Pacherie, Bayne, Proust).
This phenomenological argument is based on the claim that in most of our everyday activities,
we do not experience any intention that accompanies or proceeds the action even though we
do experience these activities as ours. The standard reply to this argument is to say that we
need a more sophisticated account of intentions. This stance claims that those minimal actions
lack any higher order intention proceeding the action, but they do contain a lower-level intention,
something like Searle’s intention-in-action. In the development of these accounts, authors typically
rely on empirical findings about the mechanisms that underly action generation. I argue that if
we understand the sense of agency as a representational state and start from the underlying
mechanism to understand what the phenomenology of agency is like, we will not arrive at a
convincing solution to the initial problem of minimal action.
§§§
Michael Murez
Institut Jean Nicod
Self-Location and Prospective Control
The conjunction of the simple view of belief (as a relation between a subject and a proposition)
and the simple view of propositions (as individuated by their truth-conditions) is traditionally
thought to face the problem of self-locating belief, i.e. that it fails to explain famous cases in
which subjects believe and desire the same propositions but are not disposed to act similarly.
Popular responses reject the simple view of belief by introducing a new term into the belief relation, or the simple view of propositions by adopting finer grained contents. I propose a novel
approach, which requires neither. What is needed is only an independently motivated extension
of the list of attitudes contributing to action. Self-locating "belief", I argue, is actually a psychologically more complicated phenomenon than has been supposed, combining belief and what
I call prospective control‚ roughly, the attitude we have towards what feels within our power to
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bring about. Introducing this notion allows for a solution to the problem of self-location, which
interestingly connects our capacity to self-locate with a distinctive feature of our experience as
agents, the systematic link between where we locate ourselves and which possibilities feel directly
within practical reach.
§§§
Robert Myers
York University ; Toronto
Smith’s Practicality Requirement : A Friendly Amendment, Then a Problem
According to Michael Smith’s practicality requirement, if an agent judges that there is reason
for her to Φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to Φ in C or she is practically
irrational. As a number of critics have noted, however, it is far from clear that this is correct,
for if an agent’s normative judgements have often proven unreliable before, or seem otherwise
suspect now, it is not always clear what practical rationality demands of her. I therefore begin
by proposing a friendly amendment to Smith’s requirement, one that makes it much easier to
defend. I then go on to argue that this requirement is actually much harder to satisfy than Smith
thinks it is, and in fact that there is good reason to doubt that it could be satisfied if desires
were nothing more than the purely functional states that Smith claims they are. I finish by briefly
sketching a different account of what desires are and briefly explaining why I think it puts us in
a better position to satisfy the practicality requirement.
§§§
Andrei Nasta
Logical or Alogical Words ?
§§§
Drawing on some important linguistic results of the last few decades, I start, mainly for expository purposes, by emphasizing the differences between the semantics of logical terms as they
appear in natural language and their first order logic counterparts. The logical terms treated here
are the quantifiers and some connectives, with focus on negation. I show that we have to accept,
crudely put, several levels of meaning (for the natural language logical terms) and that first order
logic cannot adequately represent them. Then I present the broad outlines of a proper semantics/pragmatics for logical terms which is flexible enough to unify these diverse levels of meaning.
I end by making salient what I take to be the "economical" feature of the semantic/pragmatic
processes described.
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Francesco Orsi
Tartu University
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Moral obligations and rational desires
In a recent article Michael Smith argues that his dispositional theory of value and reasons has
a rather definite normative upshot. From the mere concept of a fully rational agent we can
derive two agent-relative moral obligations : an obligation not to interfere with people’s exercise
of rational capacities, and an obligation to do what we can to make sure that people possess
rational capacities. In my paper I explain Smith’s reasoning, and raise three objections to it.
First, Smith can plausibly account for obligations to do things we cannot desire to do only at
the price of positing a mismatch between our motivational abilities and those of our rational
counterparts, something that Smith’s "advice’ model would not welcome. Second, it is far from
clear that the obligations thus derived must be agent-relative rather than agent-neutral. Third,
since the other-regarding desires of our rational counterpart are simply required by consistency,
it is not clear how they can generate genuine moral reasons for us.
§§§
Marcello Ostinelli
Scuola Universitaria Professionale della Svizzera Italiana
Libéralisme politique et républicanisme classique sont-ils compatibles ? Une comparaison de deux modèles de l’éducation à la citoyenneté
Récemment le rapport entre libéralisme et républicanisme a fait l’objet d’un débat philosophique
très animé. Dans Political Liberalism Rawls déclare que libéralisme politique et républicanisme
classique ne sont pas des positions politiques incompatibles puisqu’il n’y a pas entre eux une "
opposition fondamentale " (Rawls, 2005). Pour mettre au point leur compatibilité je choisis un
point de vue insolite pour un philosophe politique en confrontant les modèles de l’éducation à la
citoyenneté qui peuvent être extraits de la théorie de Rawls et de la tradition du républicanisme
classique. Mon exposé vise à discuter en premier lieu la question posée par Rawls de la compatibilité entre libéralisme politique et républicanisme classique. En même temps mon analyse
procède par une comparaison des modèles de l’éducation à la citoyenneté pour aborder la question de l’extension légitime de l’éducation politique des citoyennes et des citoyens. Mon exposé se
termine avec la réfutation de la thèse de Viroli selon laquelle le libéralisme est un républicanisme
appauvri, ou incohérent.
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Elisa Paganini
Dipartimento di Filosofia, Università degli Studi di Milano
A defence of common currency names
Hawthorne and Lepore (forthcoming) defend a sceptical attitude towards what Kaplan (1990)
called common currency names (from now on, cc-names). If they are correct, the belief that
there are such entities is ungrounded. I argue instead that they provide no reason to contend the
existence of cc-names. Hawthorne and Lepore’s argument may be summed up as follows. They
assume the following conditional : (A) If a cc-name exists, then its possible occurrences have
something in common in order to belong to the same cc-name. They argue that there are reasons
to believe that : (B) name occurrences do not have something in common in order to belong to
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the same cc-name. They conclude that it is reasonable to suppose (applying modus tollens to (A)
and (B)) that (C) cc-names do not exist. I will argue that, contrary to what they claim, there is
at least one good reason to assume that (B) is false and, as a consequence, it is not reasonable
to suppose that cc-names do not exist (i.e. it is not reasonable to suppose (C)).
§§§
Fabrice Pataut
Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST) Paris 1
Anti-realism and the self-ascription of attitudes
In a nutshell, semantic antirealism is the doctrine that if a statement is true, then it must be
possible, at least in principle, to determine that it is true. Consider the particular case of selfascriptions of attitudes such as beliefs and desires, i.e. statements of the form "I Φ [that] p",
where Φ ranges over propositional attitude verbs and p provides the content of whatever is Φd
by the self-ascriber. Should we be semantic antirealists about these when the putative bearer of
the attitude is the only individual who may retrieve a warrant in favour of his Φing that p ? We
can’t have a good grasp of the question unless we’re clear about (i) whether or not the "at least in
principle" clause is too weak, and (ii) what kind of role, if any, should the referents of that-clauses
play in the delivering of warrants in favour of such self-ascriptions by way of introspection. Thus
two issues : strict finitism on the one hand and intentionality on the other. I shall argue that
recent views defended by Peacocke and Pryor are found wanting with respect to both.
§§§
Graham Peebles
Université de Fribourg
Deflationism about Temporal Perception
Using simple resources, representationalism about perception and a conceptual claim about what
our notion of change is, I argue for a deflationary account of the experience of temporal change.
Instead of requiring a standard memory theory or a retentional or extensional specious present
theory, I argue that a paradigm case of experience of temporal change, namely motion, can be
accounted for in terms of subsequent perceptions with linked representational contents.
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Maël Pégny
Philosophies Contemporaines Paris-1
Calculer avec des algorithmes, calculer avec des machines : un problème philosophique
La thèse de Church stipule que toute fonction calculable est calculable par une machine de
Turing. En distinguant, à la suite de nombreux auteurs, une forme algorithmique de la thèse
de Church, portant sur les fonctions calculables par un algorithme, d’une forme empirique de
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cette même thèse, portant sur les fonctions calculables par une machine, il devient possible de
poser une nouvelle question : les limites empiriques du calcul sont-elles identiques aux limites
des algorithmes ? Ou existe-t-il un moyen empirique d’effectuer un calcul qu’aucun algorithme
ne permet d’effectuer ? Je tâcherai de montrer la pertinence philosophique de cette question,
notamment pour l’étude du statut épistémologique du calcul. S’il existait une fonction calculable
par une machine sans être calculable par un algorithme, il existerait un problème calculatoire qui
serait soluble par un dispositif empirique, sans être soluble par aucune méthode mathématique a
priori. En ce sens, la coïncidence de la calculabilité par des machines avec la calculabilité par des
algorithmes fonde ainsi le caractère a priori de la connaissance obtenue par le calcul.
§§§
Christoph C. Pfisterer
University of Zurich
Predication in Perception
In Origins of Objectivity Tyler Burge develops a theory of perception advocating the philosophical
benefits of perceptual psychology. The central task of his monograph is to investigate the constitutive conditions for objective representation. He diagnoses the syndrome of "over-intellectualizing"
perception. The core assumption of the syndrome is the requirement that for an individual to
represent the world as it is, it has to represent the conditions for representation, too. Burge
argues that objective empirical representation can stand on its own and does not require beliefs,
concepts, or language. Central to Burge’s argument is the notion of "perceptual attribution’ ; i.e. a
kind of predication that occurs in perceptual reference, without making perception propositional.
In my presentation I shall give a critical examination of this notion. In contrast to Burge’s antiintellectualism I am prepared to argue that perception requires propositional capacities.
§§§
Demetris Portides
University of Cyprus
Idealization and Scientific Models : Reducing the Information Content
In this paper I focus on the character of idealization, particularly regarding its use in scientific
models. More specifically, I try to analyze the ways idealization enters in scientific modeling
from the perspective of the reasoning process involved. I argue that the core feature of the
reasoning process behind scientific modelling is the systematic omission of information, which
leads to reduction of information content in models. By relying on an analysis of the reasoning
process as omission of information regarding the characteristics of target systems, three general
ways by which information content is reduced are distinguished : idealization by undelimitation,
idealization by isolation and idealization by decomposition. These three kinds of idealizations are
explained and an attempt is made to demonstrate their usefulness in making sense of a variety
of characteristics exhibited by models.
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Carlo Proietti & Frank Zenker
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Lund University
Pluralistic Ignorance and Informational Cascades : an approach in Dynamic Doxastic
Logic
A group is in a state of pluralistic ignorance (PI) if, roughly speaking, every member of the
group thinks that his or her belief or desire is different from the beliefs or desires of the other
members of the group. PI has been invoked to explain many otherwise puzzling phenomena in
social psychology, such as the familiar situation where every student in a class refrains from asking
for clarification, wrongly assuming that all the others have understood the lecture ; or to explain
why bystanders refrain from acting on behalf of victim of an emergence. Our main purpose is to
shed light on the nature of PI states - their structure, internal consistency and opacity - using the
formal apparatus of Dynamic Doxastic Logic, and also to study the sense in which such states
are "fragile”, i.e. to identify plausible conditions under which a PI state dissolves into a state of
shared belief as the result of a public announcement. Our plan is to (1) define pluralistic
ignorance in a DDL formalism and show its (model-theoretical) consistency. We shall then
(2) call attention to the close connection between PI and Moore’s paradox which reveals the
precise sense in which PI states are epistemically opaque to the group members themselves. We
will further show that (3) a singular public announcement by some agent does not have the
characteristic cascading effect that dissolves PI but that this effect can be obtained by a series of
announcements triggered by perceived collective belief (to be distinguished from the notion
of shared belief defined above).
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Paula Quinon
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
The Number Concept : Human Cognition and Philosophy of Mathematics
In this paper is proposed a conceptual analysis of natural numbers. This analysis results in a
plausible picture of number concept formation, proposing an explanation of the relationship between numbers as understood by cognitive scientists studying number concept in little children
and natural numbers used by mathematicians in model-theoretical framework. A designed picture is three-folded. Firstly, research of cognitive scientists is reminded, and concepts of core
knowledge and innate cognitive numerical systems are discussed. Secondly, still with respect to
cognitive scientists research, the necessity of ability to language use in order to apprehend number
concept. Claims that "number words" and "counting routine" is necessary in order to "saturated"
number concept to arise, are explored and an interpretation in mathematical language proposed.
Finally, descriptive methods used by mathematicians to define concept of number and concept of
computability are explored.
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Julien Rabachou
Caphi (Centre atlantique de philosophie)
Les implications métaphysiques d’une acceptation de la relativité de l’identité
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Le but de cette contribution est de défendre la thèse de la relativité de l’identité, dans la version
assumée par Peter Geach, et surtout de tirer les conséquences métaphysiques et ontologiques de
son acceptation. La stratégie la plus intuitive de réfutation de la thèse, adoptée par exemple par
Wiggins, consiste à soutenir que la relativité de l’identité est vraie mais triviale lorsqu’il s’agit de
l’identité sous un prédicat quelconque, et qu’elle s’avère fausse dans le cas où il s’agit d’identité
sous un prédicat sortal. Nous soutiendrons par conséquent que l’acceptation de la relativité de
l’identité implique a contrario, pour répondre à cette stratégie " essentialiste " de réfutation,
le rejet de la distinction entre prédicats sortaux et prédicats ordinaires. Puis nous montrerons
que ce rejet de l’essence ne fait difficulté que si l’on présuppose que la relation d’identité est un
principe réel d’unité des individus. Nous considérerons au contraire que l’identité est une relation
seulement logique et que l’individualité des êtres existe concrètement et antérieurement à toutes
nos procédures d’identification. La conséquence est dès lors que la distinction entre prédicats
essentiels et accidentels ne s’impose plus, et que la thèse de la relativité de l’identité n’apparaît
plus problématique.
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Athanasios Raftopoulos
University of Cyprus
Late vision : perceptual or though-like ?
In earlier work, I analyzed early vision, which I claimed is a pre-attentional visual stage unaffected
by top-down conceptual modulation. I have related the content of the states of early vision with
the nonconceptual content of perception. I also underlined the distinction between early and
late vision. The latter is cognitively penetrated and involves the modulation of processing by
attention. In this paper, I examine the processes that occur in late vision and discuss whether
late vision should be construed as a perceptual stage or as a thought-like discursive stage. I
argue that late vision, its (partly) conceptual nature notwithstanding, does not consist in pure
thoughts, that is, propositional structures that are formed in the cognitive areas of the brain and
participate in discursive reasoning and inferences. Using Jackendoff’s (1989) distinction between
visual awareness, which characterizes perception, and visual understanding, which characterizes
pure thought, I claim that the contents of late vision belong to visual awareness and not to visual
understanding. Although late vision implicates beliefs, either implicit or explicit, these beliefs
are hybrid visual/conceptual constructs and not pure thoughts. Distinguishing between these
hybrid representations and pure thoughts lays the ground for examining the conceptualization of
perceptual content and the way concepts modulate it affecting either its representational or its
phenomenal character.
§§§
Marion Renauld
Archives Poincaré
What is make-believe ? A critical path through theories of fiction
The concept of "make-believe" turned out to be central to any definition of fictionality, notably
those of G.Currie, P. Lamarque or K. Walton, to the extent that it provides a good explanation
of the nature and functioning of works of fiction, when in large part characterized out of semantic
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notions like truth or reference. Generally, it is said that the content of a fictive story is to be
make-believed by the audience, who participates in such a game of pretended actions or "made
up" worlds. Regardless to the peculiarities of each theory, this propositional attitude is regarded
to be the kind of appropriate response to the fictionality of novels, fairy tales, films, not to say
sculptures or paintings as well. It is also used to give a more precise account of the activity of
imagining, a well-designed object for cognitive sciences or anthropology to look at. But how are
we supposed to get what it really means ? How does it help us to understand what is at stake
with "fictional" narratives or representations ? And, finally, is it a specific feature, strong enough
to distinguish between fiction and non-fiction in an absolute way ?
§§§
Sébastien Richard
Centre de recherche en philosophie (PHI)
Les deux voies de l’ontologie formelle analytique
Dans cette conférence, nous distinguons d’un point de vue critique deux projets d’ontologie formelle au sein de la métaphysique analytique. Le premier, que nous qualifions de naïf, a été
principalement défendu par Nino Cocchiarella et consiste à résoudre les problèmes ontologiques
traditionnels au moyen des outils de la logique formelle contemporaine. Nous opposons à ce premier projet relativement traditionnel dans la métaphysique occidentale une deuxième conception
plus substantielle de l’ontologie formelle. Celle-ci consiste à affirmer l’existence de relations et
propriétés ontologico-formelles qui ne se réduisent pas à celles de la logique. Dans la version qu’en
a proposée Barry Smith, une telle ontologie formelle devrait être formulée dans un langage directement dépictif utilisant des diagrammes représentant uniquement la complexité ontologique,
afin d’éviter toute immixtion de la logique. Néanmoins, ce projet nous semble souffrir de plusieurs
défauts, dont les moindres ne sont pas la projection de structures spatiales dans une théorie qui ne
devrait concerner que les structures ontologiques valant pour tout objet en général et un préjugé
en faveur de l’effectivité contraire à la neutralité ontologique, dont devrait jouir toute ontologie
formelle.
§§§
Vincent Richard
Université Paris 1, Equipe Philosophies contemporaines
The internal nature of meaning
In this talk I will argue for an internalist account of meaning and propositions. Language is
not a meaningless bearer of meaning. Syntax itself contributes to the determination of meaning.
Especially, I’ll argue that the notion of proposition does not concern content but structure. I will
first investigate the ways syntax constrains interpretation. I will show that syntactic structures
have semantic effects, and so that the interpretation must follow this syntactic paths. In other
words, there is a structural part of meaning that is irreducibly syntactic and internal. I will
then argue that the internal part is responsible for most of our semantic notions, such as the
one of proposition. It is not because we have the semantic intuition that syntax should conform
to a definite kind of structure ; on the contrary, it is because syntax generates a definite kind
of structure that we have some definite intuitions, apparently semantic, but actually syntactic
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in nature, on the completeness of utterances. A propositional structure is a structure that is
syntactically complete.
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Davide Rizza
University of East Anglia
Applied Mathematical Concepts
Philosophers of science have standardly understood the application as the bridging of an empirical
structure and a mathematical structure by means of mappings. The mathematical structure is
the model of the empirical structure and the inferences that rely upon its properties can be used
in order to gain information about the empirical structure. In this paper I claim that this picture
does not provide a general account of applications : in some important cases the application of
mathematics can be entirely resolved into the introduction of concepts and arguments that act
directly on the elements of the empirical problem at hand. No resort to mappings is required or
pertinent. The representational approach does therefore illustrate only one possible way in which
mathematics is applied. I illustrate this conclusion by examining several related results in social
choice theory.
§§§
Fanny-Elisabeth Rollet
Nosophi, de PhiCo Philosophies Contemporaines, Paris 1
L’agent et ses excuses en droit pénal : De l’intention criminelle aux dispositions
coupables
Notre projet est d’examiner les standards de la responsabilité et de l’irresponsabilité criminelle
du point de vue de l’agentivité, à la lumière de concepts tirés de la philosophie de l’action (D.
Davidson) et de théories de l’excuse formulées par des philosophes du droit anglo-saxons contemporains (H. L. A. Hart, G. Yaffe et R. Duff). On s’intéressera ici au problème de la caractérisation
criminelle (i.e. au fait de savoir ce qui doit compter comme crime) sous l’angle du rapport qu’entretient cette qualification pénale avec les catégories de l’action imparfaite ou incomplète, et plus
précisément avec la reconnaissance d’excuses dans le langage juridique. On commencera par s’interroger sur la nature de l’excuse juridique au regard de la norme d’agentivité qu’elle sous-tend,
pour se demander ensuite comment l’excuse juridique, dans ses mutations contemporaines, tend à
être comprise en termes dispositionnels, alors même que certaines dispositions de l’agent revêtent
une valeur juridique équivoque (aggravante et non atténuante de responsabilité).
Le problème de la nature de l’excuse et des limites de la criminalisation de l’intention peut
ainsi conduire à une réflexion plus large propre à réinscrire l’ontologie pénale dans un cadre de
philosophie politique : l’incrimination par des catégories pénales telles que celle de dangerosité
(des dispositions ne valant plus que comme circonstances aggravantes) met en exergue la relation
avec le modèle social et politique que cette ontologie est susceptible de promouvoir.
§§§
Christian Sachse
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Is there metaphysical free will ?
Probably not. There is a strong argument that we are token-identical with something physical and
it seems that the "space" in our physical world does not suit sufficiently our intuitions about free
will since we face the following dilemma : in a deterministic world, we are not the ultimate origin
of our acts and therefore hardly free ; this is the consequence argument against compatibilist positions. On the other hand, it seems problematic to base our free will on indeterministic processes
since it then could not be distinguished from chance ; this is the matter of chance argument.
Still, this paper spells out a possible solution to the matter of chance argument : 1) I discuss the
notion of autonomy of special science’s properties within a conservative reductionist framework
and thereby some kind of independency and robustness of psychological properties. Against this
background, 2), it is possible to focus in more detail on the possible adaptive functions of noise /
indeterministic brain processes if combined with particular constraints and/or feedback mechanisms in the brain. The upshot of this consideration is a possible distinction between free will and
chance within indeterminism but without contradicting neither ontological nor epistemological
reductionism.
§§§
Laura Saller
The Case for a Stimulus Account of the Senses
In this presentation I shall give a reason for taking seriously a certain position regarding the
question how to distinguish our senses. This position, called stimulus account, claims that the
senses are distinguished by the physical stimuli that are responsible for the relevant perceptions
and by the sense-organs that are involved in the production of these perceptions. In order to
vindicate this position, I will take a close look on the cases that are used as arguments in the
debate regarding the question how to distinguish the senses. These cases, i.e. human echolocation
and an instrument called TSSV, are commonly held to speak for one of the two standard positions
in the philosophy of perception. These positions are the position that senses are distinguished
by the properties that we perceive by them and the position that the senses are distinguished
by the qualia of the perceptions. I am going to show that these examples, in contrast to what is
commonly thought, are best explained by the not very popular stimulus account of the senses. I
will then take a look at this account, indicate the difficulties for such a position and show how
we could try to avoid them.
§§§
Sebastian Sanhueza
University College London
The Realist and the Vulgar : Hume on the Objects of Perception
By the vulgar opinion, David Hume means one form the belief in the continuous and distinct existence of bodies takes in the human mind. The vulgar opinion is often taken to capture something
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close to what we would nowadays call a direct realist account of perception and its objects : in
broad lines, a view according to which there is a mind-independent external world, the objects of
which are directly or immediately perceived by subjects of perceptual experiences. In this piece,
however, I make a small case against this wide-spread assumption : specifically, I suggest that
the core-content of the vulgar opinion might be closer to Berkeleyan Idealism ‚Äì that is, a view
on which the objects of the external world have the same or a similar kind of existence as those
objects perceived by the human mind. The motivation for pursuing this very specific goal is that
Hume’s views on the topic of skepticism regarding the senses is apparently shaped by his rejection
of the vulgar and the philosophical opinion ; thus, one way of understanding Hume’s enigmatic
stance about this brand of skepticism (I take it) consists in clarifying what view he was rejecting,
and what such a rejection amounted to.
§§§
Maria Serban
On functions and mechanisms in the investigation of cognitive capacities
One influential tradition in philosophy of psychology holds that explanations of cognitive systems such as working memory and stereopsis proceed by showing that these complex capacities
are made up of simpler sub-capacities organized together so that they exhibit the explanandum
phenomenon. This sort of explanation is usually referred to as functional analysis. In contrast,
contemporary views about the nature of neuroscientific explanation maintain that good neuroscientific explanations describe mechanisms which reveal the causal structure of the world. In the
present paper I defend the hypothesis that functional analysis is a form of mechanistic explanation.
More precisely, I take it that functional analysis is a mechanism sketch which omits various details
about the mechanisms under study, but which turns into a complete mechanistic explanation once
these details are appropriately filled in. I argue against the received view about the relationship
between psychological and neuroscientific explanations by showing that neither the distinctness,
nor the autonomy thesis can face the challenges raised against them. I conclude that while both
functional analyses and neuroscientific mechanisms are explanatory relevant, the former are best
understood as elliptical mechanistic explanations. The proposed solution suggests a framework
for integrating psychological and neuroscientific accounts of cognitive capacities.
§§§
Fabien Schang
Laboratoire d’Histoire des Sciences et de Philosophie - Archives Henri Poincaré (LHSP)
Université Nancy II
Quelle logique pour les itératifs ?
L’exposé qui suit propose une réflexion en philosophie du langage à propos des verbes itératifs :
quelles sont leurs règles de signification, et quelle logique moderne serait susceptible d’en établir
les règles ? La réflexion s’articulera en trois étapes. (1) Une étude empirique des itératifs dans
la langue française Une interprétation logique de ces constructions naturelles consiste à faire du
verbe itératif une fonction appliquée sur un argument propositionnel ; ce schéma fonctionnel se
retrouve dans la famille des logiques modales telles que la logique épistémique. (2) Nous examinerons dans un second temps de l’exposé la question suivante : à quelle(s) condition(s) une
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itération fait-elle sens ? Nous porterons l’attention sur un cas particulier d’itératif : douter. Notre
conclusion aboutira à un rapprochement entre itération et auto-référence. (3) Pour conclure cet
exposé, nous insisterons sur le caractère performatif des itératifs et privilégierons ainsi une analyse logique illocutoire de ces verbes. Le cas singulier du doute itératif met en évidence une classe
spéciale de verbes au sein de la théorie des actes de discours : les anti-performatifs, dont l’effet
sur l’interlocuteur est contraire à celui énoncé par le locuteur.
§§§
Livio Simeone
Laboratoire Théories du Politique Université Paris VIII ; Université Catholique de Louvain
Qu’est-ce que le problème de la non-identité ?
Certaines actions et certains choix nous semblent moralement condamnables à l’égard de personnes qui existeront dans le futur car ils sont la cause de dommages à ces derniers. C’est le
cas par exemple des parents qui décident volontairement d’avoir un enfant handicapé sans avoir
suivi le traitement prescrit. Pourtant, une objection simple nous dit que ces intuitions devraient
être rejetées. En effet, l’existence d’une personne dépend de la rencontre particulière entre un
spermatozoïde et un ovule et peut être altérée entre autres par le moment exact de la conception. En l’absence de l’acte incriminé, la prétendue victime n’existerait donc pas du fait que
les parents auraient procédé à la conception plus tard en raison du traitement. Le concept de
dommage n’est donc pas applicable à la condition de la victime, car tenter de prévenir le mal a
fatalement pour conséquence de prévenir l’existence de cette dernière. Le problème dit de la nonidentité (PNI), formulé initialement par Derek Parfit dans Reasons and Persons (1984) consiste
en l’inacceptabilité de cette objection pour nos jugements moraux. Cette présentation se donne
pour but d’expliquer ce problème et de préciser ses conséquences pour la philosophie morale et
politique.
§§§
Joulia Smortchkova
Institut Jean Nicod
Arguments for the rich content view of perceptual content
What kinds of properties enter into the experiential contents of perception ? Do only low-level
properties (such as being blue, square, etc.) enter into perceptual experiences (poor content view)
or do high level properties (such as being an agent, a banana, being sad, etc.) enter into experiential content as well (rich content view) ? I focus on the arguments for the rich content view. I
first critically examine the division between low-level properties and high-level properties which
they presuppose. I then underline the limitations of a method recently proposed to argue for the
rich content view : the phenomenology first method. I suggest one way to improve the method
is by checking its predictions against the experimental data provided by psychological research
on visual agnosia and perceptual adaptation. My aim in so doing is not simply to imply that the
methods used by psychology are the right ones : taken on their own they do not cut finely enough
between competing possible interpretations of certain data. Instead, I outline how a combination
of approaches might positively impact future research on such issues.
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§§§
Pietro Snider
A Role That Functional Beauty Does Not Occupy in our Aesthetic Experience
G. Parsons and A. Carlson recently put forward the notion of Functional Beauty as a sort of
aesthetic appreciation that accords a "central role to [the knowledge of] function" (Functional
Beauty, OUP 2008, p.228. my emphasis). I question their claim that the knowledge of function
occupies a "central and primary place" in our aesthetic experiences (p.234) by evaluating whether it is true that Functional Beauty is always the most important component in our aesthetic
appreciation of an object. By means of a few examples, I show that this is not the case, i.e. that
there are at least a number of cases in which the overall aesthetic character of an object is not
influenced more by our appreciation of its fitness for function than by its "immediate" sensory
properties. I conclude that Parsons & Carlson are wrong in suggesting that Functional Beauty
occupies a central and primary place (the most important one) in all of our aesthetic experiences.
I claim that the role that Functional Beauty plays in aesthetic appreciation, although possibly
significant, is not always more important than the role of the immediate sensory beauty of an
object.
§§§
Michael Sollberger
Introspecting Other Minds
The main issue that I shall discuss in this paper is whether it is possible to introspect someone
else’s mind as the mind of someone else. This question lies at the heart of the epistemological
problem of other minds : how do I know that others have mental lives that are very much like
my own ? If I can inspect my own mental states but never those of others, what justifies my
belief in the mental states of others ? Contrary to received philosophical wisdom, I shall argue
that it is, indeed, theoretically possible to have introspective access to another’s mental state
as her mental state. To support this, admittedly controversial, claim, I shall dwell on cases of
inserted thoughts in schizophrenia and stress the key distinction between the owner and author
of a thought. I shall apply this distinction to the epistemological problem of other minds and
highlight that under certain theoretical conditions, one can be said to truly introspect another’s
mentality as the mentality of another. The result will be that there is no a priori bar to our having
introspective knowledge of the inner lives of other human beings.
§§§
Patrice Soom
Heinrich-Heine Universität Düsseldorf
Réductionnisme et élimination
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Le débat contemporain relatif à la réductibilité des sciences spéciales s’est recentré autours de
quelques questions parmi lesquelles figure premièrement celle de la réalisation multiple. L’orthodoxie actuelle veut que la réalisabilité multiple des propriétés des sciences spéciales (MRT)
soit garante de leur irréductibilité, mais aussi de leur indispensabilité scientifique. Ceci soulève
deuxièmement la question des implications métaphysiques de la réductibilité ou de l’irréductibilité de ces propriétés. Il est ici communément admis que l’irréductibilité des sciences spéciales
leur confère autonomie méthodologique et épistémique, alors que leur réductibilité entrainerait
inévitablement leur élimination. Nous nous proposons premièrement dans le cadre de cette communication de montrer que l’interprétation anti-réductionniste de MRT conduit à un dilemme
inconfortable, entre éliminativisme et épiphénoménalisme à l’égard des propriétés des sciences
spéciales. Ce dilemme est engendré par l’assomption selon laquelle les prédicats des sciences spéciales sont des désignateurs rigides. Or, pour peu que l’on abandonne cette assomption, il est
possible de construire une position réductionniste compatible avec MRT. Se pose alors la question de savoir si une telle position implique, comme le veut l’orthodoxie standard, l’élimination
des sciences spéciales. Nous montrerons que MRT, une fois reconsidérée, peut être alors conçue
comme garantissant l’indispensabilité scientifique des sciences spéciales, y compris dans un cadre
réductionniste, ce qui nous permettra finalement d’examiner la question des implications normatives de la thèse réductionniste.
§§§
Marta Spranzi
Université de Versailles, CERSES
Moral distress, reasons and context : a plea for moderate moral intuitionism
Intuitionism is a controversial meta-ethical stance today. It is both supported by work in evolutionary and moral psychology, and attacked on factual and normative grounds. In this paper, I
would like to argue in favor of a "moderate intuitionism". By analyzing the example of doctors’
intuitions about end-of-life actions, I will show that genuine moral intuitions exist and that they
are important both for understanding our moral experience and for changing practices. Indeed,
moral, as opposed to psychological, distress signals the violation of a moral principle which underlies genuine moral intuitions. In order to answer important objections to classical approaches,
a "moderate" form of intuitionism provides a role both for reason (to weed out genuine from spurious intuitions and to identify the normative rule underlying genuine intuitions) and for context
(moral intuitions do not hold universally, but have to be consistent across similar contexts).
Thus moral intuitions are only prima-facie justified, whereas genuine moral intuitions need to be
backed-up by reason in order to have normative import.
§§§
Christian Steiner
The Problem of a Definition of Life
The task of defining life poses a serious philosophical problem. For, although it seems to be obvious
what the characteristics of living beings are, they are either not shared by all living beings or
also shared by non-living beings. In this paper, I will ask how we should interpret the lack of an
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analytic definition of life and discuss two possible answers : (a) that the notion of a living being
is a family resemblance concept,and (b) that it is a formal concept. I will argue in favour of (b)
by showing why (a) might be wrong.
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Arthur Sullivan
Memorial University of Newfoundland
Semantically-Driven Interpretive Processes
There is a prevalent notion that there is no tenable middle ground between minimalism and
contextualism (in the sense of these terms in which they designate sorts of positions on the
semantics-pragmatics interface). Minimalists are prone to argue that any attempts to define an
intermediate position will inevitably collapse into contextualism. (Cases in point include Borg,
Stanley, and Cappelen & Lepore.) From the other direction, contextualists are also dubious about
the tenability of attempted intermediate options. (Examples include Carston and Recanati.) The
aim of this paper is to work toward developing a way to rebut this prevalent notion. I will argue
that it rests on a false dilemma, which results from unhelpfully broad senses of, respectively,
"semantics" (within the minimalists’ camp) and "pragmatics’ (on the part of contextualists). To
the contrary, provided that a coherent and significant notion of what I will call "semanticallydriven interpretive processes" can be discerned as distinct from both austere semantic interpretive
processes on the one hand and paradigmatically pragmatic interpretive processes on the other,
then there is a firm and principled resting ground between minimalism and contextualism.
§§§
Piotr Szalek
Catholic University of Lublin, Poland/University of Cambridge, UK
The Minimal Theory of Goodness
The paper aims to propose and examine a modest extension of the minimal theory of the truth
predicate, according to which this minimalist strategy (or tendency) might be applied also to the
predicate “x is good”. Considering the domain of moral language, it seems promising to distinguish
between devices which express approval or rejection of actions performed by (moral) agents. The
predicate “x is good” might be understood as a kind of generalised concept working over actions
when one expands the scope of particular actions to its generalised class.
§§§
Daniela Tagliafico
Università degli studi di Torino
Episodic Memory, Imagination and the Notion of a Memory Trace
In my talk I will criticize the theory of episodic memory that has been proposed by Alex Byrne
(2010). According to Byrne a state of episodic memory does not imply the preservation of the
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knowledge of the once experienced event ; all is required in order to distinguish episodic memory
from imagination is the cognitive contact that the agent had with the event and that allows
her to undergo a recalling process. I will claim that this requirement is not enough because, if
someone is not able to recall any veridical fact or detail about a certain event, then she is only
trying to recall, but she fails. In other words, if she remembers, of that event, that it occurred,
but does not remember one veridical detail about it, then we can attribute to the subject only
a piece of semantic memory, but not a memory of the episodic kind. Moreover, I will show that
the notion of a memory trace that is implicitly presupposed by Byrne can help him to distinguish
memory from imagination only at the price of giving up its essential property (that of preserving
content).
§§§
Gabriel Tarziu
Faculty of Philosophy University of Bucharest
Mathematics and the World : A Solution to the Problem of Applicability
One of the most interesting and puzzling features of mathematics is its utility to science. Recently, this feature came to occupy a central place in the philosophy of mathematics as Platonists
discovered a very ingenious argument in support of their doctrine that starts exactly from the
fact that mathematics is applicable in science. What is the problem of applicability ? The formulation that I have in mind is the one given by the physician Eugene Wigner who, in an article
published in 1960, expresses his surprise about "the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics" and he offers an argument for the idea that
this appropriateness is a miracle starting from the premise that mathematics arises from some
sort of aesthetic impulse in humans. In this paper I will be concerned with providing an answer
to Wigner’s problem. My strategy will be to show that the aesthetic factor doesn’t play the right
kind of role in mathematics for Wigner’s argument to work. I will argue that mathematics is not
essentially developed, as so many tend to think, with aesthetic considerations in mind.
§§§
Nicolas Tavaglione
Dpt de science politique, Université de Genève
Séquestrer son patron : une forme de légitime défense sociale ?
Il s’agira ici de se demander si, dans certaines circonstances, séquestrer son patron en cas de conflit
social peut être justifié par la logique de la légitime défense classique. Cette dernière impose, à
toute action défensive, des conditions strictes : (i) la défense doit être nécessaire ; (ii) elle doit
répondre à une attaque imminente ; (iii) elle doit être proportionnelle à cette dernière ; (iv) elle doit
viser un agresseur injuste. Certaines séquestrations de patron satisfont-elles ces conditions ? Oui.
Et il apparaît donc que, si on accepte la légitime défense classique, on doit admettre que certaines
séquestrations de patron ne méritent pas la désapprobation sans faille que ce type d’acte s’attire
habituellement. Bien entendu, cette conclusion est limitée à certains contextes uniquement : les
Fermetures d’Usine Sauvages. Et elle suppose qu’on abandonne certaines idées répandues, mais
fragiles, sur la liberté absolue des propriétaires de faire ce qu’ils souhaitent de leur propriété.
Heureusement, nous le verrons, il existe de bons arguments philosophiques et juridiques en faveur
d’un tel abandon.
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O-Z
§§§
Enrico Terrone
Università degli studi di Torino (UNITO)
The Fictional World Viewed. The Ontological Foundation of Narrative Cinema
When we see a narrative film, we perceive a series of pictures and sounds that provide us with
information about a fictional world. On one hand, the supporters of the "impersonal imagining
thesis" (Currie 1995, Gaut 2004) argue that the spectator uses sights and sounds as prompts for
the imaginative construction of a fictional world, but this account does not fit well with the real
experience of films. On the other hand, the supporters of the "imagined seeing thesis" (Levinson
1996, Wilson 1997) argue that the film spectator imagines to perceive the fictional events in a
first-personal way, but in order to do this, the spectator must first imagine being in the fictional
world, with some paradoxical consequences. I claim that these opposing theses bear upon the same
ontological fallacy, that of conceiving a fictional world as a possible world, causally disconnected
from the real one. Conversely, I will argue that fictional worlds are artifactual, that is, essentially
created and therefore essentially connected to the real world. I will show that this ontological
account allows us to preserve the benefits of the "imagined seeing thesis" without its paradoxical
consequences.
§§§
Iulian Toader
University of Notre Dame
Phenomenological Intuitions and Intuitionistic Grounds
In the philosophy of mathematics, one has recently contended that it is unjustified to believe,
as for example Hermann Weyl did, that a defeat of intuitionism would entail a rejection of the
phenomenological approach to mathematics. The reason for this contention is that some types
of phenomenological intuition could allegedly ground parts of mathematics which go beyond
intuitionistic mathematics (see Mancosu and Ryckman 2002). In my paper, I shall argue that
this contention is false : if intuitionism is defeated, in the way Weyl thought it was, then one
should also reject a phenomenological approach to mathematics. My argument is based on the
claim, which I defend, that Mancosu and Ryckman have misinterpreted Weyl’s actual reasons for
believing that a defeat of intuitionism would entail a rejection of the phenomenological approach
to mathematics. A thorough analysis of these reasons shows that, according to Weyl, intuitionism
has been defeated, but only if victory is measured with respect to scientific objectivity, rather than
with respect to mathematical belief and understanding, and thus the phenomenological approach
is defeated only as an approach to scientific objectivity, but is in fact indispensable as an approach
to mathematical belief and understanding.
§§§
Silvia De Toffoli 1*, Valeria Giardino 2*
1 : Berlin Mathematical School, Technische Universität 2 : Departamento de Filosofia y Logica y
Filosofia de la Ciencia, Universidad de Sevilla
104
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Visualization in topology : illustrations vs diagrams
In this article, we want to draw attention to the visual material involved in the practice of
mathematics (e.g. figures, illustrations, diagrams, etc.) in order to analyze their ‘forms’ and their
epistemic and cognitive roles. In particular, we will focus on diagrams, one of our aims being
to contend the segregation of diagrammatic reasoning to the domain of pure heuristics. We will
introduce knot theory as a case-study in order to evaluate a specific mathematical practice. Knot
theory is a branch of topology which is a surprisingly rich source of examples and will be an
experimentation ground to develop an analysis of the role of space and action in diagrammatic
reasoning. We will propose a characterization and a classification for the diagrams used in knot
theory based on their dynamic nature. Our hypothesis is that knot diagrams, differently from
illustrations, are not static but convey a set of (more or less explicit) rules that regulate their moves
in the space they live in, thus triggering a form of manipulative imagination which is nurtured
by expertise. In our conclusions, we will hint at possible generalizations of our results.
§§§
Giuliano Torrengo
Logos University of Barcelona
Metaphysical Explanations
Lately, it has been suggested that metaphysics should not be confined to the ontological inquiry
about what exists, but it should aim at telling a story about the fundamental features of reality
and how they relate to each other and to what is derivative. There are of course many differences
between those projects, but roughly the underlying idea is that the philosophical inquiry should
focus on what are the fundamental aspects of reality and how they relate with what is derivative.
Often, this idea is fleshed out in terms of a explanatory link between : the relation of grounding.
However, explanations in metaphysics often take the form of reduction or elimination of the
explanandum. Therefore, a generic notion of metaphysical explanation is not a reliable guide to
characterize grounding relations between fundamental and derivative entities. A somewhat more
modest aim is worth pursuing though : spelling out a generic notion of metaphysical explanation,
which has grounding, reductionist and eliminativist explanations as its species. I will show the
relevance of my approach for the issue of genuine disagreement in metaphysics.
§§§
Silvia Tossut
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele Milano
A Cooperation-Based Account of Social Scientific Knowledge
Scientific research is a group activity, characterized by cooperation between agents which collectively pursue the goal of knowledge production. I summarize the veritistic account of the social
dimension of scientific knowledge proposed by Bird (2010) and present some remarks on the
functionalist approach he endorses. I argue that social relations affecting scientific research, in
particular membership in a research team, have epistemic relevance in virtue of a shared intention
maintained by the individuals involved in cooperative scientific research and common knowledge
of this intention. More precisely, following Bratman’s (1993) analysis, shared intention includes an
105
Résumés
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O-Z
intention toward the efficacy of other agents’ actions, and so cooperation entails a disposition to
help the other members in realizing their intentions. Since the common goal in scientific research
is knowledge production, each agent is committed to tell the truth to facilitate the other members
in their research. Common knowledge of this commitment provides each agent with good reasons
to rely on others’ testimonies, and thus it affects knowledge attributions. The social aspects of
scientific research can be accounted for in a way such that they turn out not to affect the truth
orientation of scientific knowledge.
§§§
Alexandra (Sasha) Vereker
Universal Reasons, Universal Constraints
There are at least two rival conceptions of normative reasons : Humean and anti-Humean. Humeans hold, and their opponents deny, that normative reasons depend on our desires. It may
seem that the Humean thesis poses a problem : if normative reasons depend on our desires, then,
when we argue about normative reasons, we are arguing about reasons-relative-to-my-desires and
reasons-relative-to-your-desires, in which case we cannot disagree. I argue that this is not so : Humeans can allow for disagreement by distinguishing between normative reasons and constraints
on them. They can accept that constraints on normative reasons are not relative to our desires,
and so we can disagree, even if normative reasons themselves are relative to our desires.
§§§
Claudine Verheggen
York University, Department of Philosophy
In Defence of Austere Non-Reductionism
Hannah Ginsborg has recently developed and defended a new account of meaning and rulefollowing which, she maintains, avoids the pitfalls of both dispositionalism and anti-reductionism.
Contra dispositionalism, she tries to accommodate the ineluctably normative aspect of meaning.
But, contra anti-reductionism, she wants to do this by proposing a kind of normativity, which
she calls primitive, which, though it is not to be conceived of in purely naturalistic terms, is
nonetheless to be applied to states or facts that are not fully intentional or contentful in that
they are "below the level" of meaning facts. Ginsborg calls "austere" the kind of non-reductionism
she targets, in contrast to her own partial reductionism. I argue, against Ginsborg, that the real
problem with dispositionalism is that dispositions cannot provide standards of correctness for
the applications of linguistic expressions. Ginsborg’s primitive normativity, because it is quasi
reductive, cannot accomplish that task either. I share, however, Ginsborg’s dissatisfaction with
the austere non-reductionist claim that nothing philosophically illuminating can be said about
how people’s use of expressions may amount to meaning. But I argue that her proposal fails to
shed any light because, again, it is cashed out in quasi reductionist terms.
§§§
Marion Vorms
University College Londres
106
Résumés
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La notion de modèle chez Ernest Nagel (1961) : les théories scientifiques sont toujours
déjà interprétées
Je me propose d’examiner dans le détail la manière dont Ernest Nagel (1961), considéré comme
l’un des derniers représentants de l’empirisme logique, introduit la notion de modèle dans la
reconstruction qu’il propose des théories scientifiques. Je m’efforcerai de montrer que, présentée
comme un infléchissement mineur de la conception " orthodoxe " des théories formulée par Carnap
(1956, 1966), l’introduction de la notion de modèle implique en fait un renoncement au projet
formalisateur de l’empirisme logique. Elle marque en effet la reconnaissance du fait qu’on ne
peut faire abstraction, dans l’étude du contenu des théories, de la compréhension qu’en ont leurs
utilisateurs. J’espère par là contribuer à la fois à éclairer un épisode important de l’histoire de la
philosophie analytique des sciences, et apporter un éclairage utile sur les débats actuels autour
de la notion de modèle et, plus largement, des représentations théoriques. La plupart des sens
de la notion de modèle telle qu’elle est utilisée aujourd’hui, et des problèmes soulevés par cette
polysémie, sont en effet déjà présents dans le texte de Nagel.
§§§
Sam Wilkinson
University of Edinburgh
Dennett’s Personal/Subpersonal Distinction in the Light of Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
I emphasise the importance of Dennett’s personal/subpersonal distinction for the empirical study
of the mind and brain. However, there are two versions of the distinction within Dennett’s work.
The earlier one, which is (unsurprisingly) closer to Ryle’s view, is to be found in Consciousness
and Content (1969). The later version, published in Brainstorms (1978), comes hand-in-hand with
his intentional stance. My aim is to clarify and adjudicate between these two views. Reflection
on recent work in cognitive neuropsychiatry, especially on delusional disorders, suggests that it is
Dennett’s earlier distinction that is more useful.
§§§
Juhani Yli-vakkuri
University of Oxford Faculty of Philosophy
The Semantic Argument (also known as the "Operator Argument") for Relativism derives the
conclusion that propositions vary in truth value along some nonmodal parameter from the claim
that there are sentential operators which "shift" the parameter, together with some further assumptions. I show that, if sound, Semantic Argument applies to variable-binding operators, and
that, so applied, Semantic Argument shows that the truth value of a proposition is relative to a
variable assignment. This leads to an absurdly fine-grained, orthographic conception of propositions, which both Relativists and their opponents presumably reject.
Why the Semantic Argument for Relativism Fails
§§§
Julia Zakkou
107
Résumés
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O-Z
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin
Semantic Relativism for Metaontology
In my paper I revive the nowadays rather unpopular thesis that ontological claims are not absolutely but only relatively true. My line of reasoning to this conclusion runs as follows : In the
first part, I’ll introduce what was taken in the past few years to be the core intuition motivating
so-called “metaontology”, the intuition that ontological disputes don’t have a unique substantive
answer. In the second part, I’ll present one currently discussed way to do justice to this intuition,
so-called “verbalism”. First I’ll outline two ways to explicate this view. Then I’ll show that both
of them are confronted with serious problems. In the third part, I’ll present an alternative way
to accommodate the metaontological intuition. Its core thesis is that ontological claims are only
relatively true. I’ll spell it out in more detail and argue that by avoiding its problems and saving
its merits it can accommodate the intuition far better than verbalism.
§§§
Josko Zanic
Department of Linguistics, University of Zadar, Croatia
Externalism and the Transcendental Situation of Semantics
The paper analyses the conditions of possibility of empirical investigation of meaning as a basis for
a critique of semantic externalism. There are two basic ways of doing semantics : the denotational
and the conceptualist way. Whatever the approach chosen, the sematicist cannot avoid assuming
the omniscient position, seeing our words/concepts and things "from the outside". Externalism
is treated here as a specific, philosophical interpretation of denotational semantics. The basic
externalist thesis is formulated thus : the reference of (some of) our terms is determined by the
environment by way of causal contact between the cognitive system and the environment. The
critique of externalism focuses on three points : the alleged causal links are too many ; or not there
at all ; or not the right ones. It follows that causal links are neither necessary nor sufficient to
fix reference. We can be said to refer successfully, but this cannot be accounted for by the causal
link story. The externalist thinks he can just point to the links that purportedly fix the reference
of (some of) our terms, but he is actually privileging certain links in order to ensure the "fixing
of reference". Externalism is therefore an abuse of the omniscient observer position.
§§§
Dan Zeman
Institut Jean Nicod
Temporal Binding in the Event Analysis
In this paper I investigate one answer to the so-called "argument from binding" for locations
consisting in quantification over events instead of quantification over locations. The particular
view I will focus on is Cappelen and Hawthorne’s "event analysis". After a brief presentation of
the view and of how it answers the argument from binding, I provide some examples of temporal
binding that show the need to modify the account. I then envisage some ways the account could
be modified in order to deal with the examples given, and conclude with a more general discussion
of what kind of views could benefit from the event analysis.
108
HOTELS
5ème arrondissement
• Auberge de jeunesse - BVJ
www.hotelmarignan.com
44 rue des Bernardins 75005 Paris
[email protected]
Tél 01 53 00 90 90
Dortoir de 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 lits, selon disponibilité et ordre d’arrivée, avec petit déjeuner
29 euros/personne en dortoir
Simple (WC et douche sur le pallier) :
50 euros
Simple avec WC : 65 euros
Simple avec WC et douche : 75 euros.
Double (WC et douche sur le pallier) : 35
euros/personne
31 euros/personne en chambre double
Double avec WC : 40 euros/personne
Double avec WC et douche : 45 euros/personne
• Young and Happy Hostel
80 rue Mouffetard, 75005 Paris
3 lits avec douche et WC, avec petit déjeuner : 36,5 euros/personne
Tél : 01 45 35 09 53
4 lits avec WC, avec petit déjeuner : 31
euros/personne
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Dortoir de 4 à 5 lits, avec petit déjeuner :
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28 euros/personne
4 lits avec douche et WC, avec petit déjeuner : 34 euros/personne
• HOTEL DU BRESIL**
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• HOTEL MARIGNAN
Tél : 01 43 54 76 11
13 rue du, Sommerard, 75005 Paris
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Tél : 01 43 54 63 81
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109
SoPhA - 2012
HOTELS
• HÔTEL DES CARMES**
[email protected]
Chambre 1 lit avec salle de bains, WC,
sans petit déjeuner : de 82 à 89 euros
Chambre double avec salle de bains, WC,
sans petit déjeuner : 45 euros/personne
Chambre 3 lits avec salle de bains, WC,
sans petit déjeuner : de 41 à 44 euros/personne
+ 6 euros /personne pour le petit déjeuner
5 rue des carmes, 75005 Paris
Tél : 01 43 29 78 40
Chambre à 2 lits avec douche, WC : de
47,5 à 55 euros/personne
Chambre à 1 lit avec douche, WC : de 85
à 100 euros
+ 6 euros le petit déjeuner
• HÔTEL DES GRANDES ECOLES
• HOTEL DE SENLIS**
***
7-9 rue Malebranche, 75005 Paris
75, rue du Cardinal Lemoine, 75005 Paris
Tél : 01 43 29 93 10
Tél : 01 43 26 79 23
[email protected]
Chambre double avec douche et WC,
sans petit déjeuner : de 44 à 55 euros
Chambre à 1 lit avec douche et WC, sans
petit déjeuner : de 80 à 96 euros
+ 7euros/personne petit déjeuner
[email protected]
grandes-ecoles.fr
www.hotel-
Chambre double salle de bains, WC,
sans petit déjeuner : de 58 à 70 euros/personne
Chambre à 1 lit avec salle de bains, WC,
sans petit déjeuner : 115 euros
• HOTEL DES NATIONS ST GER-
+ petit déjeuner : 8 euros
MAIN **
54 rue Monge, 75005 Paris
Tél : 01 43 26 45 24
[email protected]
• HÔTEL ELYSA ***
6, rue Gai-Lussac, 75005 Paris
Tél : 01 43 25 31 74
Chambre double avec douche, WC et
climatisation, sans petit-déjeuner : 54,5
euros/personne. (Avec petit-déjeuner : 62
euros/personne)
Chambre à 1 lit avec douche, WC et climatisation, sans petit déjeuner : 99 euros.
(Avec petit déjeuner : 113 euros).
110
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Chambre double avec douche, WC, avec
petit déjeuner : 64,5 euros
Chambre à 1 lit avec douche, WC, avec
petit déjeuner : 129 euros
SoPhA - 2012
• BEST WESTERN -PANTHEON
***
71 rue Monge, 75005 Paris
Tél : 01 43 31 25 64
HOTELS
01 43 54 67 30
www.3colleges.fr
Chambre 1 personne avec douche : 85/89
euros
www.my-parishotel.com
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WC, sans petit déjeuner : de 63 à 83 euros/personne
sans petit déjeuner : 148 euros
+ 13 euros le petit déjeuner
Chambre 1 personne avec bain (ou grande
douche) : 109/114 euros
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euros
Chambre double avec bain (ou grande
Chambre twin avec bain (ou grande
• ALBE HOTEL ***
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1, place de la Sorbonne, 75005 Paris
1, rue de la Harpe, 75005 Paris
01 46 34 14 80
01 46 34 09 70
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Chambre double avec salle de bains, WC,
avec petit déjeuner : à partir de 98 euros/
personne
Chambre single : à partir de 102 euros
avec petit déjeuner : à partir de 195 euros
Chambre double avec bain ou douche : à
partir de 132 euros
Chambre twin : à partir de 132 euros
Chambre triple : à partir de 182 euros
Chambre « deluxe » : à partir de 182 euros
• HOTEL DES 3 COLLEGES
Suite Junior : à partir de 242 euros
16, rue Cujas, 75005 Paris
• HOTEL DES CANNETTES **
Chambre triple : autour de 200 euros
17, rue des Cannettes, 75006 Paris
Chambre quadruple : autour de 220 euros
01 46 33 12 67
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• HOTEL PERREYVE **
63 rue Madame
Chambre single : autour de 100 euros
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Paris 75006
Chambre twin : autour de 130 euros
+33 (0) 145 483 501
111
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http
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124, rue de Rennes, 75006 Paris
01 45 48 03 75
www.hotel-aramis.fr
• BEST WESTERN HOTEL ARAMIS SAINT GERMAIN***
112
HOTELS
Chambres à partir de 140 euros
SoPhA - 2012
RESTAURANTS
RESTAURANTS
Voici quelques bonnes adresses pour manger de la bonne cuisine française à des prix assez (et
parfois même très) raisonnables.
• Le Verre à Pied
01 43 29 40 99
118, rue Mouffetard, 75005 Paris
• La Tourelle
01 43 31 15 72
5, rue Hautefeuille 75005 Paris
• Le Café de la Nouvelle Mairie
01 46 33 12 47
19, rue des Fossés-Saint-Jacques, 75005
Paris
01 44 07 04 41
• Le Pré Verre
19, rue Sommerard, 75005 Paris
01 43 54 59 47
• Café Panis
21 Quai Montebello, 75005 Paris
• BistroY. . . Les Papilles
01 43 54 19 71
30, rue Gay Lussac, 75005 Paris
01 43 25 20 79
• L’Écurie
2, rue Laplace, 75005 Paris
• Ribouldingue
01 46 33 68 49
10, rue Saint Julien le Pauvre, 75005 Paris
• Le Café D’Avant
01 46 33 98 80
35, rue Claude Bernard, 75005 Paris
• Louis Vins
01 43 31 30 46
9, rue Montagne Sainte Geneviève, 75005
Paris
• La Fourmi Ailée
8, Rue Fouarre, 75005 Paris
01 43 29 12 12
113
SoPhA - 2012
RESTAURANTS
• Au Pied de Fouet
• Fish La Boissonnerie
3 Rue Saint Benoit, 75006 Paris
69, rue de Seine, 75006 Paris
01 42 96 59 10
01 43 54 34 69
• Le Petit Vatel
• Chez Fernand
5, rue Lobineau, 75006 Paris
127 bvd Montparnasse, 75006 Paris
01 43 54 28 49
01 43 27 47 11
• Bouillon Racine
• Le Caméléon
3, rue Racine, 75006 Paris
6, rue de Chevreuse, 75006 Paris
01 44 32 15 60
01 43 27 43 27
• Le Bistrot d’Henri
• Kitchen Galerie Bis
16, rue Princesse, 75006 Paris
25, rue Grands Augustins, 75006 Paris
01 46 33 51 12
01 46 33 00 85
114
SoPhA - 2012
PLANS
PLANS
Ecole Normale Supérieure, 45, rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris
Pour se rendre à l’ENS :
RER : ligne B, arrêt Luxembourg
Bus : lignes 21 et 27, arrêt Feuillantine ; lignes 84, 89, arrêt Mairie du 5ème – Panthéon ; ligne
38 arrêt Auguste Compte
Métro : ligne 10, arrêt Maubert-Mutualité
115
45 Rue d'Ulm, 75005 Paris à Restaurant Universitaire Mabillon - Google Maps
De la rue d’Ulm à RU
14/02/12 21:45
SoPhA - 2012
PLANS
Itinéraire vers Restaurant Universitaire Mabillon
3 Rue Mabillon, 75006 Paris- 01 43 25 66 23
Mabillon
1,6 km – environ 6 mn
Chargement en cours...
©2012 Google - Données cartographiques ©2012 Google -
Pour se rendre au Restaurant Universitaire Mabillon :
RER : ligne B, arrêt Saint Michel
Métro : ligne 10, arrêt Mabillon ; ligne 4, arrêt Saint Germain des Prés
Bus : ligne 63 et 86, arrêt Saint Germain des Prés ; ligne 70, 87 et 96 arrêt Seine-Buci
http://maps.google.fr/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=ENS,+45+rue…ls&ie=UTF8&t=m&z=15&layer=c&ei=28c6T-HYDpD3jAfw3Km7Cg&pw=2
116
Page 1 sur 2
Informations
SoPhA
- 2012
45 Rue d'Ulm, 75005pratiques
Paris à Place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris - Google
Maps
PLANS
14/02/12 21:44
Itinéraire vers Place du Panthéon, 75005 Paris
– environ 3 mn
De la rue d’Ulm à la Place800
dumPanthéon
Chargement en cours...
©2012 Google - Données cartographiques ©2012 Cybercity, Google -
Pour se rendre à l’Université Sorbonne, Place du Panthéon :
RER : ligne B, arrêt Luxembourg
Bus : lignes 21, 27 et 38 arrêt Luxembourg ; lignes 84, 89, arrêt Mairie du 5ème – Panthéon
Métro : ligne 10, arrêt Odéon ou Maubert-Mutualité
http://maps.google.fr/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=ENS,+45+rue+…a=ls&ie=UTF8&t=m&z=16&layer=c&ei=j8c6T6K_NIyRjwfixIWzCg&pw=2
117
Page 1 sur 2
SoPhA - 2012
Immeuble France, 190 Avenue de France, 75013 Paris
Pour se rendre à l’immeuble France
RER : ligne C, arrêt Bibliothèque François Mitterand
Métro : ligne 14, arrêt Bibliothèque François Mitterand ; ligne 6, arrêt Quai de la gare
BUS : ligne 89, arrêt Bibliothèque François Mitterand - Avenue de France
118
PLANS
SoPhA - 2012
Numéros utiles
Numéros utiles
SAMU
Police-Secours
Pompiers
Général
15
17
18
112
Taxis G7 : 3607 ou 01 47 39 47 39
Taxi Bleus : 3609 ou 0 891 70 10
10
Radio Alpha : 01 45 85 85 85
Taxis parisiens : 06 24 59 64 83
119
SoPhA - 2012
L’équipe d’organisation
Alexandra Arapinis
Samir Blakaj
Isabelle Drouet
Paul Egré
François Kammerer
Max Kistler
Pascal Ludwig
Francesca Merlin
Antonine Nicoglou
Frédéric Pascal
Hélène Richard
Émile Thalabard
Document réalisé par Samir Blakaj sous LATEX

sQI GSRKVsW - SoPhA - Université Paris 1 Panthéon

Transcription

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